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Title: A History of the Coldstream Guards From 1815 to 1895
Author: Ross-of-Bladensburg, C.B.
Language: English
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Transcriber’s Note:
This version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects.
Italics are delimited with the ‘_’ character as _italic_. Superscripted
characters are preceed with ‘^’.
Unusual fractions (usually fractions of a year) are shown as, for
example, ‘2-4/12’.
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printer. This version retains that table, but has made the suggested
corrections.
Minor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected. Please
see the transcriber’s note at the end of this text for details regarding
the handling of any textual issues encountered during its preparation.
A HISTORY
OF THE
COLDSTREAM GUARDS.
[Illustration:
_Field Marshal H.R.H. Adolphus Frederick, Duke of Cambridge K.G.,
G.C.B., G.C.H.,
Colonel Coldstream Guards 1805-1850._
FROM A PRINT IN THE POSSESSION OF THE REGIMENT.
]
[Illustration:
A
HISTORY
OF THE
COLDSTREAM GUARDS,
FROM 1815 TO 1895.
BY
L^T. COL. ROSS-OF-BLADENSBURG, C.B.
LATE
COLDSTREAM GUARDS.
ILLUSTRATED BY
LIEUT. NEVILE R. WILKINSON,
COLDSTREAM GUARDS.
LONDON,
A.D. INNES & C^O.
1896.
]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
THIS HISTORY
OF
HER MAJESTY'S COLDSTREAM REGIMENT OF FOOT GUARDS,
FROM THE YEAR 1815 TO 1885,
IS, BY MOST GRACIOUS PERMISSION,
HUMBLY DEDICATED TO
=HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN-EMPRESS=
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PREFACE.
The following pages are a continuation of Colonel MacKinnon’s _Origin
and Services of the Coldstream Guards_, from the victory of Waterloo
down to the year 1885. They have been compiled with great care and much
labour, and the reader will, I trust, feel justified in adding, with
accuracy and marked ability.
The first few chapters deal with events that took place in France, after
Waterloo, including the military occupation of the North-Eastern
frontier by the Allies, up to the year 1818.
The period onwards to the Crimean War, although containing but few
accounts of interest concerning the career of the Regiment, is valuable
as continuing, to a considerable extent, the history of events in Europe
so far as that is consistent with the subject of the present volume.
There is reference, nevertheless, to the part taken by the Regiment in
the suppression of the Canadian rebellion.
From the date, however, of 1854, the subject assumes a different
character, and is of absorbing interest to every Officer and man
associated with the Coldstream Guards.
The events connected with that campaign have been carefully selected
from thoroughly authentic sources; they are recorded in no spirit of
vainglory or self-sufficiency, but as a true and faithful tale of the
share which the Regiment took in that eventful war,—illustrating, as it
does, acts of gallantry, a noble and uncomplaining endurance of
difficulties and hardships, and a strict performance of duty under very
trying circumstances.
The accuracy of the record of the more recent Egyptian campaigns is of
special value, from the fact of the author of this work having himself
taken an active part in one of them.
The perusal of these records will be accompanied by the conviction which
exists in the minds of all of us, that those who replace their gallant
predecessors will, when their turn comes, deserve equally well of their
country.
FRED^K. STEPHENSON, _General,
Colonel, Coldstream Guards_.
1896.
AUTHOR'S NOTE.
I beg to return sincere thanks to the many members of the Coldstream
Guards, past and present, who have helped me to compile the volume I now
venture to issue to the public; and to assure them that, but for their
assistance, it would have been far less worthy of their acceptance than
even it is at the present time. It is not possible for me, in the short
space at my disposal, to mention all by name to whom I am indebted in
this respect. But I should fail in my duty did I not, at least, express
my gratitude to General Sir Frederick Stephenson, G.C.B., and to General
Hon. Sir Percy Feilding, K.C.B., for the interest they have shown in my
work, and for the trouble they have taken to enable me to carry it out.
Major Vesey Dawson was indefatigable in compiling all that concerns the
Nulli Secundus Club. Captain Shute prepared an Appendix on the
Coldstream Hospital. Mr. Sutton spared no pains in supplying information
which the Regimental Orderly Room affords; and Mr. Studd arranged
materials that required considerable labour. Major Goulburn, Grenadier
Guards, moreover, lent me the interesting Crimean Diary of the late
Colonel Tower; and Colonel Malleson kindly looked through the proofs,
and made many valuable suggestions.
I also offer my acknowledgments to Messrs. Blackwood and Sons, and to
Messrs. Seeley and Co., for their courteous permission to use the maps
in Mr. Kinglake’s _Invasion of the Crimea_ and in Sir E. Hamley’s _War
in the Crimea_ .
Lastly, I must express the pleasure it gives me that my work is
illustrated by so able and accomplished an artist as Mr. Wilkinson.
It only now remains for me to explain that as Colonel MacKinnon’s
_Origin and Services of the Coldstream Guards_ does not contain
illustrations of uniforms worn by the Regiment during the many
generations of its existence, we preferred to give representations, not
of the familiar figures of this century, but of those that are less
known. Thus, though the following pages only describe events from the
year 1815 to 1885, the plates generally refer to a more remote period of
the history of the Regiment.
JOHN ROSS-OF-BLADENSBURG,
_Lt.-Colonel_.
_October, 1896._
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
THE CAPITULATION OF PARIS.
PAGE
Flight of Napoleon from the field of Waterloo—Reaction in
Paris—Napoleon’s abdication—Surrender to Captain
Maitland—Provisional Government set up in France—Advance of the
Allies from Waterloo—Operations of Marshal Grouchy—Allies hope
to cut the enemy off from Paris—Blücher’s energy to secure that
object—Unsuccessful efforts of the Provisional Government to
obtain a suspension of hostilities—The Allies before Paris—The
Prussians move round to the south of the city—Co-operation of
Wellington—Capitulation of the capital, July 3rd—Advance of
Austrians and Russians—“Waterloo men”—The “Wellington
pension”—Rank of Lieutenant granted to Ensigns of the Brigade
of Guards—The soldier’s small account-book introduced into the
British army 1
CHAPTER II.
MILITARY OCCUPATION OF FRANCE.
Termination of the war—Difficulties of the situation—The Allies
occupy Paris—Dissolution of the Provisional Government—Entry of
Louis XVIII. into the capital—New French Government
formed—Blücher and the _Pont de Jena_—Arrival of the Allied
Sovereigns—Reviews in France—Paris in the hands of the
Allies—Treatment of the French by the Prussians; by the
British—The wreck of the French Imperial forces disbanded—Life
in Paris—The Louvre stripped of its treasures of
art—Prosecution of Imperialist leaders—Labedoyère, Ney,
Lavalette—Peace of Paris, November 20th 24
CHAPTER III.
OCCUPATION OF FRENCH FORTRESSES.
Organization of the Allied army of occupation, under the supreme
command of the Duke of Wellington—Return of the remainder to
their respective countries—Instructions of the Allied Courts to
Wellington—Convention relating to the occupation, attached to
the Treaty of Paris—Positions assigned to each contingent on
the north-eastern frontier of France—March from Paris to
Cambrai—Military precautions—Camps of instruction and field
exercises—Reduction of the army of occupation—Difficulties with
the French—Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle—Evacuation of France—The
Guards Brigade leave Cambrai, after nearly three years' stay
there, and embark at Calais—Valedictory Orders—The Coldstream
sent to Chatham—Conclusion of military service in French
territory 48
CHAPTER IV.
FIRST PART OF THE LONG EUROPEAN PEACE.
Distress in England after the war—Reductions in the Army and
Navy—Stations of the Brigade—French Eagles captured, deposited
in the Chapel Royal, Whitehall—Reforms in interior
economy—Death of George III., and Accession of George IV.—Cato
Street Conspiracy—Trial of Queen Caroline—Coronation of George
IV.—Guards in Dublin—Distress in 1826—Death of the Duke of
York—Changes in uniform—Death of George IV.; succeeded by
William IV.—Political agitation at home, revolution abroad; the
Reform Act—Coronation of William IV.—First appearance of
cholera—Death of the King, and Accession of Her Majesty Queen
Victoria—Changes and reforms introduced during the reign of
William IV. 72
CHAPTER V.
SECOND PART OF THE LONG EUROPEAN PEACE.
Beginning of the reign of Queen Victoria—Troops during
Parliamentary elections—Coronation of the Queen—Fire at the
Tower of London, 1841—Rebellion in Canada—Two Guards Battalions
sent there, 1838, of which one the 2nd Battalion Coldstream
Guards—Return home, 1842—Visit of the Russian Tsar Nicholas I.
to England—European revolution—Bi-centenary celebration of the
formation of the Coldstream Guards, 1850—Death of the Colonel
of the Regiment, H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge; succeeded by
General the Earl of Strafford—Exhibition in London—Death of the
Duke of Wellington—Changes and reforms up to 1854—Camp at
Chobham 103
CHAPTER VI.
BEGINNING OF THE WAR IN THE EAST.
Position of Russia in Europe—State of the Continent in
1853—British alliance with France—The Tsar’s quarrel with
Turkey—Commencement of hostilities on the Danube—-The affair of
Sinope—How it drew England and France into the war—Three
Battalions of the Brigade of Guards ordered on foreign
service—Concentration of the Allies in the Mediterranean—Guards
Brigade at Malta—Thence to Scutari—Want of transport—The Allies
moved to Varna—Good feeling between the British and French
troops—Course of the war on the Danube—Siege of
Silistria—Retreat of the Russians into Bessarabia—Intervention
of Austria—The Allies in Bulgaria-Sickness among the
troops—Return to Varna—Preparations for the invasion of the
Crimea—The organization and strength of the Allies 130
CHAPTER VII.
THE INVASION OF THE CRIMEA.
Small results gained by the Allies—Sudden determination to attack
Sevastopol—Russian position in the Trans-Caucasian
provinces—Conditions under which the Crimea was invaded—The
allied Armada sails from Varna to Eupatoria—Landing effected at
“Old Fort”—The move to Sevastopol; the order of march—The enemy
on the Alma river, opposes the advance of the
Allies—Description of the field of battle; strength and
position of the enemy—Commencement of the battle of the
Alma—Advance of the Light and the Second Divisions—Deployment
of the First Division—Advance of the Guards and Highland
Brigades—Defeat of the Russians—No pursuit—Losses—Bravery and
steadiness of the British troops—The Allies lose valuable time
after the battle—Arriving at last before their objective,
Sevastopol, they refuse to attack it—General description of
Sevastopol 156
CHAPTER VIII.
BEFORE SEVASTOPOL.
Predicament in which the Allies found themselves—Flank march
round Sevastopol—Occupation of Balaklava by the British and of
Kamiesh Bay by the French—The Allies refuse to assault
Sevastopol; they prefer to bombard it—Depression of the
Russians, who fear a prompt assault—Description of the defences
round the south side of Sevastopol; successful efforts of the
enemy to strengthen them—Description of the upland of the
Chersonese, occupied by the Allies; their position and
labours—First bombardment and its results—No attack; a regular
siege inevitable—Draft of Officers and men to the Coldstream
arrive in the Crimea—Establishment of the Regiment—Russian
reinforcements begin to arrive—Battle of Balaklava; Cavalry
charges—_Sortie_ of the Russians against the British right
flank; its failure 180
CHAPTER IX.
THE BATTLE OF INKERMAN.
Large Russian reinforcements reach the Crimea—Position and
strength of the enemy; of the Allies—Description of the field
of Inkerman—Commencement of the battle, 5th of November—The
progress of the first part of the fight—The Guards Brigade
advance to the scene of action—The struggle round the Sandbag
battery—Arrival of the Fourth Division under General
Cathcart—The manœuvre of the latter, and its failure—The
arrival of the French—Successes of the British
artillery—Repulse of the Russian attack; the retreat of the
enemy; there is no pursuit—Operations of the garrison of
Sevastopol and of the Russian force in the Tchernaya Valley
during the day—Great losses incurred on both sides—Reaction
among the soldiery after the battle 204
CHAPTER X.
THE WINTER OF 1854-55 IN THE CRIMEA.
Prostration of both sides after the battle of Inkerman—Sevastopol
not to be taken in 1854—Tardy arrangements to enable the army
to remain in the Crimea during the winter—Violent hurricane of
the 14th of November; stores scattered and destroyed—The winter
begins in earnest—How the Government at home attended to the
wants of the army at the seat of war—Absence of a road between
the base at Balaklava and the front—Miserable plight to which
the army was reduced—Indignation in England, and the measures
taken to relieve the troops—Admirable manner in which the
misfortunes were borne by the British soldiers—Operations on
both sides during the winter—The Turks occupy Eupatoria;
successful action fought there—The Guards Brigade sent to
Balaklava 231
CHAPTER XI.
THE FALL OF SEVASTOPOL.
Stay of the Brigade at Balaklava—Improvement in the condition of
the men—Return of the Guards to the front, June 16th—Changed
aspect of affairs before Sevastopol—Review of events during the
time spent at Balaklava—Second bombardment—Interference by
Napoleon III. in the course of the war; operations
paralysed—General Canrobert resigns, and is succeeded by
General Pélissier—Energy displayed by the latter—Third
bombardment—Fourth bombardment; assault of Sevastopol—Its
failure—Death of Lord Raglan; succeeded by General
Simpson—Siege operations continued—Battle of the
Tchernaya—Fifth bombardment—Sixth bombardment; second
assault—The Malakoff is captured—Fall of the south side of
Sevastopol—The Russians evacuate the town, and retreat to the
north side—State in which the Allies found Sevastopol 249
CHAPTER XII.
THE END OF THE RUSSIAN WAR.
Home events during the war—Sympathy of Her Majesty with her
Crimean soldiers—Badges of distinction added to the
Colours—Inactivity of the Allies after the fall of
Sevastopol—Expeditions against the Russian coast—Sir W.
Codrington succeeds Sir J. Simpson as Commander of the
Forces—The winter of 1855-56—Negotiations for a peace, which is
concluded, March 30th—Events after the cessation of
hostilities—A British cemetery in the Crimea—Embarkation and
return home—The Crimean Guards Brigade at Aldershot; visit of
Her Majesty the Queen—Move to London, and cordial reception
there—Distribution of the Victoria Cross—Summary of events
connected with the war—Losses—Appointment of H.R.H. the Duke of
Cambridge as Commander-in-Chief, and of Major-General Lord
Rokeby to command the Brigade of Guards 267
CHAPTER XIII.
A PERIOD OF WAR, 1856-1871.
Reductions after the war—Comparison between the situations in
Europe, in 1815 and in 1856—Fresh troubles and complications
imminent—Many wars and disturbances—Scientific instruction
introduced into the army—Practical training of the troops
carried out—The material comfort of the soldier attended
to—Military activity in England in 1859—The Earl of Strafford
succeeded by General Lord Clyde—Death of H.R.H. the Prince
Consort—Misunderstanding with the United States of
America—Chelsea barracks completed—Marriage of H.R.H. the
Prince of Wales—Death of Lord Clyde; succeeded by General Sir
W. Gomm—The Brigade of Guards Recruit Establishment—Public
duties in London—Fenian troubles in Ireland; the 1st and 2nd
Battalions succeed each other there; the Clerkenwell
outrage—Reforms in the armament of the British infantry 292
CHAPTER XIV.
ARMY REFORM, 1871-85.
Effect produced in England by the military successes of
Prussia—Short service and the reserve system
introduced—Abolition of army purchase—Abolition of the double
rank in the Foot Guards—Substitution of the rank of
Sub-Lieutenant for that of Ensign or Cornet—Manœuvres and
summer drills—Changes in the drill-book—Illness and recovery of
H.R.H. the Prince of Wales—Death of Surgeon-Major Wyatt, and of
Field-Marshal Sir W. Gomm—General Sir W. Codrington appointed
Colonel of the Coldstream Guards—Death of Captains Hon. R.
Campbell and R. Barton—Company training—Pirbright Camp
established—Medical service in the Brigade—Change in the
establishment of the Regiment—Death of Sir W. Codrington, and
appointment of General Sir Thomas Steele as Colonel—Troubles in
Ireland—Alarm in London—The Royal Military Chapel 319
CHAPTER XV.
THE WAR IN EGYPT, 1882.
Origin of the war—Emancipation of Egypt from Turkish rule;
introduction of European control—Deposition of Ismail
Pasha—Tewfik becomes Khedive—Military revolts—Disorganization
of the country—Joint action of the English and French; its
failure—Naval demonstration—Bombardment of the forts of
Alexandria—The French withdraw and leave Great Britain to act
alone—British troops sent to Egypt—The Suez Canal seized—Base
of operations established at Ismailia—Action of Tel
el-Makhuta—Clearing the communications—Actions at Kassassin,
August 28th and September 7th—Character of the Egyptian
army—Night march on Tel el-Kebir—The enemy is overwhelmed,
September 13th—Pursuit; losses—End of the war—Return of the
Coldstream to England 350
CHAPTER XVI.
FIRST PART OF THE WAR IN THE SUDAN, 1884-85—EXPEDITION
UP THE NILE.
General description of the possessions of the Khedive in
1882—Rebellion in the Sudan; rapid rise of the Mahdi—Policy of
the British Government—General Gordon sent to Khartum; he is
cut off and besieged there—General Lord Wolseley goes to
Egypt—Formation of a Camel Corps, of which the Guards compose a
Regiment—Problem how to effect the rescue of Gordon—The Nile
route selected—Advance to Korti—News from General Gordon—Two
columns advance from Korti: one across the Bayuda Desert, the
other up the river—Battles of Abu Klea and Abu Kru—The Nile
reached near Metemmeh—Sir C. Wilson’s effort to proceed to
Khartum—Death of General Gordon—Change of plan entailed by this
event—Battle of Kirbekan—Retrograde movement of both
columns—Troops placed in summer quarters 372
CHAPTER XVII.
SECOND PART OF THE WAR IN THE SUDAN, 1884-85—SUAKIN CAMPAIGN.
Reasons for the expedition to Suakin—Departure of the
Coldstream—Orders to Lieut.-General Sir G. Graham—Position of
the enemy—Advance against Hashin—Engagement at Tofrek—Attack on
a convoy, escorted by the Coldstream and Royal Marines—Advance
to Tamai—Construction of the railway—Attack on T'Hakul—Abrupt
end of the campaign—The Coldstream proceed to Alexandria, and
thence to Cyprus—Evacuation of the Sudan; how the Mahdi took
advantage of it; how the Dongolese were treated—Position taken
up south of Wady Halfa—Defeat of the Arabs at Ginnis—Return of
the Guards Camel regiment—Return of the Coldstream from
Cyprus—Honourable distinctions added to the Colours—Officers of
the Regiment in December, 1885 393
APPENDIX I.
1. DESPATCH OF M.-GEN. SIR JOHN BYNG TO H.R.H. THE DUKE OF
YORK, ON THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO, NIVELLES, JUNE 19, 1815 413
2. GENERAL ORDERS, NIVELLES, JUNE 20, 1815 414
3. PROCLAMATION OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON TO THE FRENCH PEOPLE,
MALPLAQUET, JUNE 22, 1815 415
APPENDIX II.
1. GENERAL ORDER, PARIS, OCTOBER 28, 1815 416
2. ORDERS FOR BILLETING THE BRITISH TROOPS IN FRANCE, OCTOBER
29, 1815 416
3. ALARM POSTS OF BRITISH DIVISIONS IN FRANCE, OCTOBER 30, 1815 418
APPENDIX III.
ORDERS FOR A BRITISH CONTINGENT TO OCCUPY FRENCH FORTRESSES,
NOVEMBER 9, 1815 418
APPENDIX IV.
DISTRIBUTION OF THE BRITISH CONTINGENT IN FRANCE, APRIL 10, 1816 421
APPENDIX V.
SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE BAND OF THE COLDSTREAM GUARDS 424
APPENDIX VI.
1. FAREWELL ORDER TO THE ALLIED ARMY OF OCCUPATION IN FRANCE,
NOVEMBER 10, 1818 426
2. FAREWELL ORDER TO THE BRITISH CONTINGENT, CAMBRAI, NOVEMBER
10, 1818 427
3. GENERAL ORDER, PARIS, DECEMBER 1, 1818 427
APPENDIX VII.
COLDSTREAM GUARDS HOSPITAL 428
APPENDIX VIII.
THE NULLI SECUNDUS CLUB; AND LIST OF MEMBERS FROM ITS FORMATION,
1783, TO 1896 429
APPENDIX IX.
GENERAL ORDER, CONSTANTINOPLE, APRIL 30, 1854 436
APPENDIX X.
DEATH OF FIELD-MARSHAL LORD RAGLAN, G.C.B. 437
APPENDIX XI.
AGES AND PREVIOUS OCCUPATIONS OF THE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS
AND MEN OF THE 1ST BATTALION COLDSTREAM GUARDS, AND DRAFTS
SENT TO THE EAST, ENGAGED IN THE WAR WITH RUSSIA 439
APPENDIX XII.
1. RETURN OF THE NUMBERS KILLED IN THE CRIMEA 440
2. RETURN OF THE NUMBERS WOUNDED IN THE CRIMEA, DEAD,
INVALIDED, ETC. 440
3. DEATHS IN THE 1ST BATTALION COLDSTREAM GUARDS BY MONTHS
DURING THE WAR WITH RUSSIA 441
APPENDIX XIII.
THE VICTORIA CROSS 442
APPENDIX XIV.
1. THE BRITISH FORCES EMPLOYED IN THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN, 1882 444
2. EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL ORDERS ISSUED AFTER THE BATTLE OF TEL
EL-KEBIR 446
3. EXTRACT OF REPORT ON ARMY SIGNALLING IN EGYPT, 1882 447
APPENDIX XV.
STATIONS OCCUPIED BY THE COLDSTREAM GUARDS, 1833-1885[1] 448
APPENDIX XVI.
1. COLDSTREAM ROLL[2] 458
2. COMMANDING OFFICERS OF THE COLDSTREAM GUARDS, FROM 1650 TO
1896 478
3. REGIMENTAL STAFF OFFICERS[2] 482
4. WARRANT OFFICERS 485
-----
Footnote 1:
Continued from Appendix 273 of Mackinnon’s _Origin and Services of the
Coldstream Guards_.
Footnote 2:
Continued from Appendix 285 of Mackinnon’s _Origin, etc._
-----
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
PAGE
FIELD-MARSHAL H.R.H. ADOLPHUS FREDERICK DUKE OF
CAMBRIDGE, K.G. _Frontispiece_
PIKEMAN, 1669; DRUM MAJOR, 1670; GRENADIER COMPANY,
1670 _To face_ 18
SERGEANT, 1658; DRUMMER, 1658 ” 36
MUSQUETEER, 1650 ” 66
MUSKETEER, 1669 ” 86
OFFICER _temp._ JAMES II. ” 102
MUSKETS AND RIFLES FROM 1830 TO 1890 ” 126
PRIVATE, 1742 ” 230
COLOURS, 1669, 1684, 1685 ” 248
COLOURS OF THE COLONEL, LIEUT-COLONEL, AND MAJORS,
1750, AND THE QUEEN’S COLOUR, 1893 ” 266
DRUMMER, 1745 ” 286
SERGEANT, 1775; OFFICER, 1795 ” 300
OFFICER, 1839; OFFICER, 1849 ” 318
OFFICER, 1849; PRIVATE’S UNDRESS CAP, 1850 ” 342
SERGEANT DRUMMER, 1895 ” 392
MAPS.
PAGE
1. SKETCH MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF
FRANCE FROM 1815 TO 1810 _To face_ 54
2. BLACK SEA AND SURROUNDING COUNTRY ” 149
3. COUNTRY BETWEEN EUPATORIA AND SEVASTOPOL ” 165
4. BATTLE OF THE ALMA ” 174
5. SKETCH MAP OF COUNTRY NEAR SEVASTOPOL ” 182
6. SEVASTOPOL ” 194
7. BATTLE OF INKERMAN ” 216
8. THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF TEL EL-KEBIR FROM THE SUEZ
CANAL TO ZAGAZIG AND THE COUNTRY ROUND SUAKIN ” 360
9. SKETCH MAPS TO ILLUSTRATE EGYPTIAN AND SUDAN
EXPEDITIONS, 1882-1885 ” 379
CORRIGENDA.
Page 86, line 31, _for_ “May 25th” _read_ “May 27th.”
” 90, ” 13, _for_ “May 15, 1829” _read_ “May 16, 1829.”
” 118, ” 12, _for_ “November 13th” _read_ “November 9th.”
INTRODUCTION.
The central figure in Europe, during the first fifteen years of this
century, was the Emperor Napoleon, the great military leader, who,
having restored order in France—violently disturbed by the terror,
anarchy, and confusion of the Revolution that broke out in
1789,—succeeded in ruling that country, and in imposing his arbitrary
will upon its people. A master of the science of war, and gifted with
the genius that makes a man supreme in the field of battle, he organized
the military qualities of his subjects, who, under his guidance, invaded
their neighbours, destroyed their institutions, and overran Europe from
one end to the other. One opponent only remained unsubdued, and that was
England; and so strong was her resistance to this modern Attila, that
she succeeded not only in breaking his power, but in adding also to her
own importance and influence in the world.
Napoleon, though a General of the first order,—whose campaigns will
always commend themselves to the student of the art of war,—was less
remarkable for his knowledge of that other science which makes a man a
statesman. He lived by the sword, and he perished by the sword. He
destroyed the prosperity of the people he subdued, but he could not
cement a friendship with them. His object was war and only war, and he
reaped its reward—military fame; but he did not use the absolute power
he wielded, for the advantage of France, nor was he able to establish
his name among the greatest and most enlightened rulers of mankind.
After a period of victory, he exhausted the resources of his country,
and then there was formed against him a coalition of European Princes,
who gradually closed their forces around him with ever tightening grasp,
and pursued him to the heart of his Empire. At last, he was defeated and
undone, and acknowledged his impotence to carry on any longer the mighty
struggle in which he had been engaged (1814). Europe then restored the
Bourbons as Kings of France, and determined that Napoleon should be
expelled therefrom, and interned in the island of Elba,—an Emperor of a
very narrow dominion, and a Monarch only in name. But scarcely had he
been there a year, when he broke loose. Landing in France, he made the
King (Louis XVIII.) fly from Paris; and, amid the acclamations of the
people, he once more re-established himself upon the throne (March,
1815).
The Allied Sovereigns now combined to drive this disturber of the peace
from France, and took immediate steps to invade that country again. In
June, two of the Powers had their forces in Belgium,—the British and
their immediate allies (the Dutch, Hanoverians, etc.), under the Duke of
Wellington; and the Prussians, under Marshal Blücher. The rest were
still east of the Rhine. Perceiving that his antagonists were not yet
able to move forward together against him, the French Emperor resolved
to strike the first blow, by advancing northwards and by attacking
Wellington and Blücher. Accordingly, he left Paris on the 12th of June,
and on the 16th he fought the battles of Ligny, where he defeated the
Prussians and drove them off the field, and of Quatre-Bras, from which
place the British, though they held their ground, eventually fell back
slowly towards Waterloo. Giving orders to Marshal Grouchy, who was
placed at the head of a considerable force, to pursue Blücher, and to
prevent him from forming a junction with Wellington, Napoleon advanced,
and attacked the British at Waterloo (June 18th). Here the most decisive
battle of the present age took place. Stubbornly did the British troops
maintain their position; while Blücher, rallying his forces, and leaving
behind only a small corps to contain Grouchy, marched with the remainder
to the field of Waterloo. The French were now enveloped, and completely
and irretrievably defeated.
There was a Guards Division at the battle of Waterloo, commanded by
Lieutenant-General Sir George Cooke, formed of two Brigades. The 1st
Guards Brigade (Major-General P. Maitland) was composed of the 2nd and
3rd First (now Grenadier) Guards; and the 2nd Guards Brigade
(Major-General Sir John Byng) of the 2nd Coldstream and the 2nd Third
(now Scots) Guards. Sir George Cooke being severely wounded during the
course of the day, the command of the Guards Division devolved upon Sir
John Byng.
THE HISTORY
OF
THE COLDSTREAM GUARDS.
1815-1885.
CHAPTER I.
THE CAPITULATION OF PARIS.
Flight of Napoleon from the field of Waterloo—Reaction in
Paris—Napoleon’s abdication—Surrender to Captain
Maitland—Provisional Government set up in France—Advance of the
Allies from Waterloo—Operations of Marshal Grouchy—Allies hope to
cut the enemy off from Paris—Blücher’s energy to secure that
object—Unsuccessful efforts of the Provisional Government to obtain
a suspension of hostilities—The Allies before Paris—The Prussians
move round to the south of the city—Cooperation of
Wellington—Capitulation of the capital, July 3rd—Advance of
Austrians and Russians—“Waterloo men”—The “Wellington pension”—Rank
of Lieutenant granted to Ensigns of the Brigade of Guards—The
soldier’s small account-book introduced into the British army.
The battle of Waterloo broke the power of Napoleon for ever. So
confident of victory had that great soldier been, that he did not even
make any preparations for retreat, and hence, when he was defeated, a
terrible rout ensued. The wreck of the French army, blocking the only
road which was available, hurried from the scene of disaster in a
confused mass of fugitives. The Prussians, who were comparatively fresh,
took up the pursuit, and relentlessly they pressed it home, driving the
enemy back, increasing his panic, and completing his misfortunes.
Through the whole night of the 18th-19th of June, a fierce and active
pursuit was maintained; while the British troops, exhausted by the
labours and anxieties of the day, bivouacked as they stood, on the
bloody but glorious field of victory.
Napoleon, stupefied by the unexpected result of the battle, forced his
way through the surging mass of his now disorganized troops to
Quatre-Bras, and as he went along, he had ever increasing evidence of
the catastrophe that had overwhelmed him. He sent a message to Grouchy,
announced his defeat, but gave the Marshal no orders. He then rode to
Charleroi, and, almost unattended, pushed on to Philippeville, where he
made his first effort to repair his broken fortunes. He ordered Marshal
Soult to rally the _débris_ of his forces at Laon; he despatched a
letter to General Rapp, who was in command on the German frontier, and
to General Lamarque, engaged in La Vendée, with orders to march to
Paris; and he was sanguine enough to declare that he could reorganize a
sufficient force to cover the capital, and to give time for the
concentration of a much larger army, wherewith to renew the war and to
save France from the invasion that threatened her.[3] But he was far
from being reassured. He could scarcely deny even to himself that the
end of his career had at last come in earnest, and that the stupendous
ascendency which he exercised over his countrymen had disappeared now
and for ever. Once before had he been obliged to acknowledge himself
vanquished, and the glamour of invincibility no longer surrounded his
person. He had engaged in a desperate undertaking. The whole of Europe
was arming against him, and was determined to put him down. His first
bold venture to try and beat the Allies in detail had signally failed.
The armies of Great Britain and of Prussia had hopelessly crushed the
flower of his forces. He had henceforward to reckon with Austria and
Russia, and with a formidable coalition flushed with victory. His
countrymen never forgave a military leader who had suffered a disaster
in the field. He knew that his prestige was weakened, that the influence
which his name inspired was shaken, that his resources were at an end,
and that his enemies were gathering about him from every quarter.
-----
Footnote 3:
George Hooper, _Waterloo: the Downfall of the First Napoleon_ , pp.
239, 263 (London, 1862).
-----
Tormented by these gloomy thoughts, he pursued his journey, and reached
Philippeville; and there he snatched a few hours repose. But the fear of
the Prussians haunted his followers, and he was hurried on, still in a
state of indecision.[4] The momentous question had now to be faced, and
immediately decided. What was Napoleon to do? Should he remain in the
field in command of his troops, rally the shattered remnants of the
grand army, and cover Paris, or should he fly to the capital, assert his
authority there, and trust to the magic of his name to retain his
supremacy over France? His own desire was to stay among his men, and to
abide the result at the head of an army, devoted to his person and to
his interests. Had he done so, his fate would have been less humiliating
than it eventually proved to be. But his failing health, and the shock
he had experienced, paralysed the active energies of the man, and,
dreading a revolution in the seat of government, he agreed, against his
better judgment, to start at once for Paris. He reached his destination
early on the 21st, exhausted and shaken both in body and mind.
-----
Footnote 4:
Alphonse de Lamartine, _The History of the Restoration of the Monarchy
in France_ , ii. 443 (London, 1852).
-----
Paris was struck dumb by this event. On the 18th, the guns of the
Invalides thundered a salute in honour of the battle of Ligny, and on
the two following days the details of the French victory over the
Prussians were published in glowing colours; but towards the evening of
the 20th, the news of trouble began to leak out, and on the morrow the
Emperor arrived at the Elysée palace attended only by a few of his
personal Staff. “Dans le premier moment on refusa à croire; ce fut
ensuite une anxiété cruelle; puis une morne stupeur.”[5] And now at
length the fatal news was fully realized, and spread like wildfire
through the excited people, and all knew for certain that the army of
Napoleon had been annihilated, that his military genius had played him
false, and that the catastrophe was at once complete and irretrievable.
-----
Footnote 5:
Hooper, p. 265.
-----
Then the weakness of the Emperor’s power began to show itself, and the
instability of the foundation upon which he had constructed his Imperial
system became apparent. France, who drained her resources freely to
serve her passion for glory, now spurned the defeated hero who had made
her glorious. His rule, though it pandered to her vanity, did not rest
upon the true affections of the people; and his want of success at the
critical moment was an unpardonable offence, to be atoned only by
abdication. Enemies created everywhere by his arbitrary will, by his
reckless policy, and by the jealousy his brilliant genius inspired, now
saw their opportunity to revenge themselves, and they arose to crush
him. Alone in Paris, without an army, he was almost a prisoner in the
hands of his foes, where he could not hope to recover from the disaster
which had overwhelmed him, or employ his talents for the military
protection of the country. The Chambers took the control of public
affairs; and Napoleon, prostrated by recent events, and unable to
resolve upon any definite course of action, acquiesced sullenly in
allowing the reins of government to be snatched from his hands. He was
forced to await the decision of a special Council of State that was
summoned to settle the future of the Emperor and the policy to be
pursued by the nation. Lafayette, who was named member of the Council,
and was its leading spirit, insisted that the defence of the country
should not be the only question discussed, but that negotiations for the
restoration of peace should be also proceeded with; and he succeeded in
carrying a resolution, to the effect that, as the Allies had signified
their determination not to treat with Napoleon, the two Chambers should
themselves nominate negotiators, who were, under their authority alone,
to come to terms with the conquerors.[6] It was a revolution; and it was
nearly complete on the morning of the 22nd. In the divided councils of
the Emperor, Lafayette gained a great advantage, and giving voice to the
one thought that filled all minds in that moment of anguish, he resolved
that Napoleon’s deposition should forthwith, and at all hazards, be
carried into immediate execution.
-----
Footnote 6:
Hooper, 275; Lamartine, ii. 480.
-----
A struggle—a one-sided struggle—took place between the Emperor and the
Chambers. The former could only rely upon his previous military prestige
and upon the halo of influence that still might be supposed to surround
his name; but he did nothing to rouse himself out of the lethargy that
oppressed his moral faculties. The latter, representing the reactionary
and Republican parties, were tired of Napoleon and of his greatness.
They regarded him as the sole obstacle to peace, and as a fallen leader
who must be swept away in the interests of the country. So fickle were
the French to the man they received as their ruler in defiance of Europe
four months before, and who had been their unquestioned master for
nearly fifteen years, and so intent were they to be rid of him, that
they only granted him—and that with difficulty—but one short hour to
make up his mind to vacate his throne; in default, he was to be
discrowned by force. Napoleon was indignant, but he did not resist. “I
have not returned from Elba,” he said, “to deluge Paris with blood;”[7]
and, fearing to provoke a civil war, he accepted the inevitable, and
abdicated in favour of his son within thirty-six hours of his arrival in
the capital.
-----
Footnote 7:
Lamartine, ii. 478.
-----
And yet his overweening pride was still thirsting for power, and this
act of renunciation was neither tendered nor accepted in good faith.
Napoleon II., as he was called, was a child, and was in Austria, and the
Emperor still clung to the delusive hope that he might be re-installed
in the power he had lost, though he could only wield it in the name of
his son. On the other hand, the Chambers, fearing to drive their
antagonist to extremes, and dreading above all things a revival of his
wonted energy, agreed to an equivocal recognition of Napoleon II. In
this way they also satisfied the cravings of the army for Imperialism;
but the assent was a mere fictitious one, which was intended to have no
meaning and which had no result. The Empire was indeed doomed, its
founder dishonoured, and his dynasty destroyed. It was a wretched end to
a glorious career, not even redeemed by that fortitude and personal
dignity which mark the fall of the truly great. This final downfall is
without parallel in history, and the weakness of human nature and the
vanity of man’s personal ambition stand out prominently, as the main
features of the drama. The last scene was approaching, and may be
described in a few words.
The moment Napoleon abdicated, he ceased to be a factor in the great
events that followed. He was even an obstacle in the way of those who
had usurped his place, and was treated with a contumely he had little
deserved at the hands of flatterers, who, having basked in his smiles,
had now constituted themselves the arbiters of his lot. Driven almost
with indignity to the suburban retreat of La Malmaison, where his
personality could not affect the Parisians, he still dreamt of power,
but did nothing to grasp it. At last he was obliged to fly to the coast
before the Allies, who were approaching the capital. Despairing of
making good his escape, and feeling keenly the humiliation of his
position, should capture await him in the land where for so long he had
been the idol, he yielded himself a prisoner to Captain Maitland, who
commanded H.M.S. _Bellerophon_—stationed near Rochfort to intercept the
Imperial fugitive,—as to the representative of “the most powerful, the
most constant, and the most generous” of his enemies (July 15th). This
is the last of Napoleon, and henceforward he lived and died a captive in
the island of St. Helena, hated by his gaolers, forgotten by his
country, and forsaken by his kindred.
“But where is he, the modern, mightier far,
Who, born no king, made monarchs draw his car;
The new Sesostris, whose unharness’d kings,
Freed from the bit, believe themselves with wings,
And spurn the dust o’er which they crawl’d of late,
Chain’d to the chariot of the chieftain’s state?
Yes! where is he, the champion and the child
Of all that’s great or little, wise or wild?
Whose game was empires, and whose stake was thrones?
Whose table earth—whose dice were human bones?
Behold the grand result in yon lone isle,
And as thy nature urges, weep or smile.”[8]
-----
Footnote 8:
Byron, _Age of Bronze_, iii.
-----
The overthrow of her great military hero brought no satisfaction or
relief to France. She needed a chief to direct, and a policy to shape
her actions; but at the most critical moment, when the Allies were
thundering at her gates, she deliberately deprived herself of the one,
and had not thought of the other. Napoleon was rejected; but who was to
take his place, and who was to safeguard her interests? The noisy
demagogues had effectively stirred up a revolution, and had deposed the
only soldier who could have stood between her and the victorious enemy.
Their momentary success was complete; but they left nothing except chaos
behind them, and their work was folly because it was destructive. It is
true, they did conceive some hope that they could rear up a Republic or
a Constitutional Monarchy upon the ruins of the Imperial system, and
none for a moment believed that the unconditional restoration of the
Royal Family was imminent. The “obstacle to peace” was removed; but the
peace that France desired was denied her, and she was not to be allowed
to have a voice in shaping her own destinies. The Allies were masters of
the situation; and they were as intent upon taking ample securities
against the people who had for so long scourged Europe, as against the
man who had led them on to plunder Christendom. The man was gone, but
the people remained; and in their eagerness to repudiate him, they
forgot that they too had some account to render to the conquerors.[9]
-----
Footnote 9:
Hooper, _Waterloo_ , pp. 280, 285.
-----
A Provisional Government was set up in Paris on the evening of the 22nd
of June, composed of five persons, among whom was Fouché, Duc d'Otranto,
late Minister of Police under Napoleon, and one of his bitterest
enemies. He had the address to be named President, and in the anarchy
produced by the panic which the crisis created, he alone preserved his
faculties unimpaired. Seizing the supreme control of the State during
the moment of interregnum, he became dictator, and the sole and
irresponsible advocate of his country’s cause. A Republican by
conviction, a regicide, and holding to the extravagant tenets which were
enunciated in 1789, he was far more keenly alive to his own immediate
interests than to his avowed principles; and perceiving clearly that his
credit and reward could best be secured by obliging France to
accept—even against her will—a Bourbon _régime_, he devoted his great
talents and his incomparable powers of intrigue to bring about the
unconditional restoration of King Louis. His treachery was deeply
resented by the nation, but what could they do? Napoleon had been
abandoned, and there was no one to replace him,—none to form a patriotic
administration, none to give effect to the national aspirations of the
people, none to cope with the difficulties that had arisen, none to
secure those terms which a proud and vigorous race had a right to
expect, even when overwhelmed by adversity. In the universal prostration
which succeeded the battle of Waterloo, Fouché, “one of the most hateful
among the hateful tribunes of the Terror,”[10] reigned in France, an
autocrat, hated by all, feared by all, and obeyed by all.[11]
-----
Footnote 10:
B: M. Guizot, _History of France, 1789-1848_ , edited by Madame de
Witt, _née_ Guizot, viii. 231 (London, 1881).
Footnote 11:
Hooper, p. 286, etc.
-----
While these events were taking place in Paris, the victorious Allies
were advancing towards that city, there to reap the fruits of their
success, to restore the peace of Europe, and to impose their will upon
the now distracted country that lay at their mercy. After the battle
there was a meeting between the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blücher,
at which operations for the immediate future were decided. The former
engaged to advance the following day, and returned for the night to his
head-quarters at Waterloo; the latter agreed to pursue the enemy without
delay, and to endeavour to cut off Grouchy. He then went to Genappe,
and, on the 20th, his advanced troops were in French territory. Early on
the 19th, the army commanded by Wellington left their bivouacs, the 2nd
Battalion Coldstream Guards starting from the farm of Hougomont, which
they had held—in conjunction with the 2nd Battalion of the Third Guards,
and with the light companies of the First Guards (2nd and 3rd
Battalions)—with such credit to themselves. They reached Nivelles that
evening, where Major-General Sir John Byng wrote his despatch on the
battle, and on the stubborn contest that centred round Hougomont.[12]
-----
Footnote 12:
Appendix No. I. 1.
-----
On the 20th, the Guards Division reached Binche, and on that day the
Duke of Wellington issued a General Order, which not only conveyed his
thanks to the army under his command, for their conduct in the decisive
action on the 18th, but which also warned the troops of the absolute
necessity of treating the inhabitants of France as a friendly
people.[13] This admonition of the rules which prevail in war time among
civilized nations, was not indeed needed by the seasoned troops of
British origin, who had been trained in the humane usages invariably
adopted by England, to respect the liberties and the property of the
people over whose lands war has to be waged. It was rather addressed to
the Anglo-allies (Dutch, Belgians, and Germans), to enforce the maxim
that hostilities are not conducted against the population, and that ill
treatment of peasants only exasperates the enemy, and does nothing to
secure his final subjugation. It is to be remarked that this policy was
not followed by the Prussians, with the result that the latter never
gained the good will of the French, while the British, on the contrary,
were looked upon by that proud and sensitive people with respect, and
almost without distrust.
-----
Footnote 13:
Appendix I. 2.
-----
On the morning of the 22nd of June, Wellington was at Malplaquet, the
scene of one of Marlborough’s greatest triumphs over the same enemy.
Before leaving, he issued a proclamation in French to the people whose
territories were then entered by the
British troops, to the effect that the invaders had come to deliver them
from the iron yoke that oppressed them; and that the population would be
well treated by the army, provided they did not join the cause of the
“Usurper” (Napoleon), who had been “pronounced to be the enemy of the
human race, with whom neither peace nor truce could be made.”[14]
Neither in this effort to conciliate the population did Prince Blücher
follow the example of his colleague; on the contrary he displayed
resentment against the natives of a country whose military genius had,
in the past, humbled in the dust the pride of his own nation. It was
perhaps natural that he should assume this attitude when the provocation
which the Prussians received is taken into account, but it was not
calculated to reassure the French in their despair, nor to reconcile
them to the restoration of the Royal Family.
-----
Footnote 14:
Appendix I. 3.
-----
In order to give a general view of the whole military situation, it will
now be necessary to refer briefly to the incidents of the war that took
place close to Waterloo, on the day of the battle, where Marshal Grouchy
was struggling with Blücher’s rear-guard. On the 18th he was at Wavre,
with 32,000 men, of whom 5000 were cavalry; and there he was held in
check during the whole day by Thieleman’s Prussian Corps, only 15,000
strong. It was not until evening that he turned the right of the
Prussians, when at length he opened a road for his troops, whereon to
advance to the main body of the French army, known to be somewhere near
Waterloo. As it was then too late to continue the action, Grouchy hoped
next day to complete the victory he had achieved, ere he pushed forward
to join his chief. On the morning of the 19th he received no tidings
from the Emperor, and he believed that all was well; but Thieleman,
though he was not informed of the full details of the disaster to which
the French had been subjected, heard that a great battle had been
fought, and that they were defeated; so he, too, determined to attack
Grouchy in the morning. A battle consequently took place on the 19th, in
which the Prussians, though they contested the ground inch by inch, were
forced to fall back towards Louvain by the superiority of the masses
they engaged. At the very moment of victory, Grouchy received the
message which Napoleon had sent him from Quatre-Bras, announcing the
total destruction of the French army, and thus revealing to him the full
extent of the danger in which he was placed. Perceiving at once the
necessity that his corps should be saved from the general wreck, he
determined to retreat through Namur upon Givet, and began to move
without delay. General Pirch I., having been detached from the main
Prussian army on the evening of the 18th to intercept him, joined
Thieleman, who also advanced as soon as he perceived that he was no
longer being pursued by the corps which had defeated him. Both Prussian
Generals endeavoured to arrest the enemy, but they failed to do so; and
Grouchy, who marched with great rapidity and resolution, ably seconded
by the valour of his subordinate Generals, reached Givet on the 21st,
and entered French territory in safety. He was then ordered to join
Marshal Soult, who was attempting to rally the broken fragments of the
main army at Laon. This occurred on the fatal 22nd, the same day that
Napoleon, coerced by the political leaders in Paris, closed his public
career, and signed his abdication of the French throne in favour of his
son.
Grouchy’s corps was the only one that, having taken part in the campaign
in Belgium, remained intact. The main French army had been
panic-stricken at Waterloo, and a large mass of those who survived the
battle fled straight to Paris, or deserted their standards, and were
nowhere to be found; many flung away their arms, and dispersed to their
homes. The disruption of the great army was complete, and the defeat
signal and decided beyond all former precedent. The co-operation of the
greater bulk of Napoleon's forces in subsequent military events was
impossible, and little resistance was to be apprehended from these men.
But there was a remnant of true soldiers still available, who, seeking
their Colours, concentrated some 20,000 strong near Philippeville. On
the 22nd they were at Laon, and about that time the French could dispose
of some 50,000 men for the defence of the northern frontier. The
situation was a desperate one, and would have been fatal even to
Napoleon himself in the full vigour of his military genius; but the
position was all the more impossible, since the Saxons, the Austrians,
and the Russians were by this time upon the eastern frontier of France,
and were ready to advance in a concentrated and concentric march upon
the capital.
On the 22nd of June, Wellington reached Le Cateau Cambresis. He
had three divisions at Bavay, and four echeloned along the road to
Le Cateau—the Guards Division being at Gommignie. Besides this,
other troops were employed against Le Quesnoi and Valenciennes,
which were occupied by men of the Garde Nationale. Blücher was at
Catillon-sur-Sambre with his troops in the vicinity, including
Thieleman, who had returned from the pursuit of Grouchy, but
excluding Pirch I., who was ordered to remain in rear for the
purpose of reducing the fortresses which defended the French
frontier. The Prussians were also at that time blockading
Landrecies and Maubeuge—also garrisoned by local levies, from whom
little resistance was to be expected. The Anglo-Prussian Allies
halted on the 23rd, for the purpose of collecting their
stragglers, and of bringing up ammunition; and thereby a
much-needed rest was afforded to men who, for more than eight
days, had been constantly and actively occupied in the arduous
labours of the war. During the halt the two Generals, Wellington
and Blücher, met to decide how a united advance could best be made
upon Paris. As a result of this conference, it was agreed that the
Allies should not pursue the enemy directly, but, covered by the
Oise, push along the right bank of that river, upon Compiègne and
Creil, so as to turn his left, and if possible, cut him off from
Paris,—the movement to be masked by the Prussian cavalry, whose
presence, it was hoped, would induce the French to retard their
retreat.[15] Wellington, moreover, anxious that the moral effect
of the battle of Waterloo should be fully reaped, and that
Napoleon should have no time to recover from the disaster,
hastened the arrival of King Louis into French territory, offering
to secure Cambrai as his residence until Paris should be captured.
Hearing, also, that that fortress was imperfectly guarded, he sent
Sir Charles Colville forward with a detachment to seize it (June
23rd). The attack was successful, in so far that the town was
taken with little loss; but the citadel held out until the 25th,
when the Governor capitulated to the King. His Majesty by this
time reached the British head-quarters, and he temporarily
established his Court in Cambrai.
-----
Footnote 15:
Capt. Siborne, _History of the War in France and Belgium_ in 1815, ii.
370 (2nd edit., London, 1844). See Map No. 1, p. 54.
-----
On the 24th the combined armies continued their advance. The British
pushed on two brigades towards Cambrai, but otherwise only altered their
position slightly, as they were waiting for their pontoon train. The
Prussians, however, moved forward, taking Guise and St. Ouentin. During
the day, intelligence was received of Napoleon’s abdication, but the
news was at first discredited. Later, it became confirmed; but both
Commanders determined that terms of peace could only be signed at Paris,
and they rejected all overtures made to them by the Provisional
Government to arrest their march upon the capital. On the 25th of June,
the British head-quarters were at Joncourt, the Coldstream Guards being
at Le Cateau.
Blücher, on the other hand, hearing that the French had not been
deceived by the cavalry demonstration made in the direction of Laon, now
came to the conclusion that they were hastening towards Paris; he
therefore determined to secure the passages over the Oise, and he pushed
on to these points with the utmost rapidity. A squadron entered
Compiègne in the evening of the 26th, and early the following day a
Prussian brigade supported it, just in time to prevent this place from
falling into the hands of the enemy; for Grouchy, who had superseded
Soult, ordered D'Erlon to occupy the bridge with the remnants of his
Corps, about 4000 strong. D'Erlon, finding the Prussians in position,
cannonaded it, and very soon afterwards retired, unpursued by the
Prussians, who were too much exhausted to advance; so that it was
mid-day before the advantage gained could be pressed home. These
operations were connected with the movements of other Prussian columns,
one of which also succeeded in capturing the bridge of Creil just before
the French arrived there. Brushing the enemy away, the invaders
continued to march to Senlis, where D'Erlon was met and driven off the
straight line of his retreat. The bridge of St. Maxence was found
partially destroyed, and the river had to be crossed in boats, but that
of Verberie was taken. By the evening of the 27th, Blücher’s advanced
troops were on the left of Grouchy, intercepting the road to Paris, and
with every hope of being able to prevent him from reaching the capital
before the Prussians.[16] At dawn of the 28th, a small force under Pirch
II. came into collision with the enemy near Villers-Cotterets, and,
being greatly outnumbered at that point, they were in some danger of
being overpowered. The French, however, were in no condition to fight;
they had lost heart, and many were deserting their Colours. Being
disorganized by their reverses, and by the fear that Blücher’s energy
inspired, they now allowed Pirch to get away unhurt. The latter had
succeeded by his manœuvre to delay them, so that during the day they
were repeatedly attacked with considerable loss, and most of them were
forced to turn to their left to cross the river Marne, and so reach
Paris by a circuitous route. By the evening of the 28th, the Prussians
had not only captured sixteen guns and four thousand prisoners, forced
the French from their true line of retreat, and increased the terror and
confusion which prevailed among them, but they also succeeded in
following some few detachments of the enemy, who had been enabled to fly
straight to Paris. In this manner their advanced posts were within five
miles of the capital, near Le Bourget and Stains, where they carried
panic and dismay into the heart of the city.[17] Blücher established his
head-quarters at Senlis.
-----
Footnote 16:
Siborne, ii. p. 403.
Footnote 17:
Siborne, ii. 415.
-----
During this vigorous pursuit, the Anglo-allies were also advancing
southwards. On the 26th, Sir John Byng assaulted the fortress of Peronne
with the 1st Guards Brigade, who carried the outworks by storm with
little loss, soon after which the town capitulated. The British
head-quarters were at Vermand and the army in the vicinity, advanced
cavalry patrols having penetrated as far as Roye. The Coldstream Guards
halted at Coulaincourt. Next day the army crossed the river Somme at
Willecourt; the Duke was at Nesle, and Roye was occupied. On the 28th,
the British right was near St. Just, and Montdidier was occupied; the
left was in rear of La Tulle, where the roads meet that run from
Compiègne and Roye; the reserve reached the latter place, and the Guards
Division was at Conchy, where the rest of the First Army-Corps was
posted.
The rapid approach of the invaders upon Paris made it plain to the
Provisional Government that they had no power to arrest the progress of
the Allies for a single moment; and although the north side of the city
was secured by a line of fortified works, sufficiently strong to resist
a _coup de main_, yet the wreck of Napoleon’s army had not reached the
capital, and time was imperatively required to bring them there and to
organize some defence. An armistice was once more sought on the 27th,
and again on the 28th, in the despairing hope that the Government might
be allowed some breathing-time in which to consider their position, and
make some show of resistance, in order to save France the humiliation
which was clearly in store for her. But the allied Commanders were
inexorable, and, refusing all such negotiations, they pursued their
operations with the same activity as in the past. Wellington indeed
frankly told the Commissioners who approached him on behalf of the
Provisional Government, that he—
“must see some steps taken to re-establish a government in France
which should afford the Allies some chance of peace” before he could
sanction a suspension of hostilities; that he personally “conceived
the best security for Europe was the restoration of the King, and that
the establishment of any other government than the King’s in France
must inevitably lead to new and endless wars;” and he concluded by
these words: “That, in my opinion, Europe had no hope of peace if any
person excepting the King were called to the throne of France; that
any person so called must be considered an usurper, whatever his rank
and quality; that he must act as an usurper, and must endeavour to
turn the attention of the country from the defects of his title
towards war and foreign conquests; that the Powers of Europe must, in
such a case, guard themselves against this evil; and that I could only
assure them” (the Commissioners) “that, unless otherwise ordered by my
Government, I would exert any influence I might possess over the
Allied Sovereigns to induce them to insist upon securities for the
preservation of peace, besides the treaty itself, if such an
arrangement as they had stated were adopted”—viz., any arrangement
whereby a prince, other than the King, were called to the throne of
France.[18]
-----
Footnote 18:
Siborne, ii. 427, etc.
-----
On the 29th, Blücher pressed on towards Paris, and reconnoitred the
defences thrown round the northern side of the city. The remnants of the
great army which had been shattered at Waterloo also entered the capital
on that day, and the French mustered some 80,000 to 90,000 men
there—troops from the provincial depôts and from the country having been
called for the defence of the seat of government, and as many discharged
veterans as could be collected having been assembled in a special corps
some 17,000 strong. Besides this, there was plenty of artillery
available, and about 30,000 of the Garde Nationale; but on the latter no
great reliance could be placed. Marshal Davoût, Prince d'Eckmühl, was
appointed Commander-in-chief. The British forces were still in rear, and
occupied positions between Gournay and St. Maxence, the Guards Division
being near St. Martin Longeau. At dawn, on the 30th of June, the
advanced French post at Aubervilliers was attacked by the 4th Prussian
Corps under Bülow, and the enemy was driven back, and pursued as far as
the canal in rear of that village; but it became evident that to
dislodge him from that line, a more serious effort would be necessary.
The Duke of Wellington having proceeded to Blücher’s head-quarters
during the night of the 29th-30th, a conference was held as to the
future operations to be pursued. It was then agreed to move the
Prussians to their right, to take advantage of the capture of the bridge
of St. Germains which had already been effected, and to extend the
investment of the capital round the west and south of the city,
threatening to cut it off from those provinces that furnished it with
supplies. The British army at the same time was to move into the posts
which their allies had taken up north of the city, and to mask the
defences which the enemy had erected there. During the night of the
29th-30th and the following day, these operations were carried out, the
4th Prussian Corps covering the movement until the British arrived. In
the evening, the latter were about Louvres, twelve miles away from
Paris; the Guards Division being at La Chapelle. The two Prussian Corps,
under Thieleman and Ziethen, were close to St. Germain; while two
regiments of Hussars, under Lieut.-Colonel von Sohr, having been thrown
forward, bivouacked at Marley, on the road to Versailles. During the
day, Bülow’s Corps had been engaged, as we have seen. On the 1st of July
he began to move off, and in the afternoon he was relieved by the
advanced British forces, who took his place; the Guards Division were at
Le Bourget and the forest of Bondy, five miles from the capital.
On this day the enemy gained an advantage over the Prussians—the only
one of the campaign, except the delusive victory at Ligny,—for the
cavalry brigade under von Sohr, ordered to reconnoitre round the
southern suburbs, proceeding too far away from its supports, was
attacked, and, though the men defended themselves bravely, they were cut
to pieces. This transient success, however, produced no effect upon the
main result, and was but a passing incident in the drama now soon to
close. Next day, the 2nd, Blücher continued his march round Paris; and
his troops, under Ziethen, came into collision with the enemy near
Sèvres, who was driven back to Issy, and, later in the evening, into the
town. Thieleman pushed forward advanced troops to Chatillon; and the
reserve, under Bülow, was near Versailles. The British remained in the
positions on the north front of the capital, sending detachments across
the Seine, which occupied the villages of Asnières, Courbevoie, and
Suresnes, to keep up communications with the Prussians. On the 3rd,
Vandamme made an attempt to drive Ziethen’s troops out of Issy, and a
battle took place, which, lasting about four hours, ended disastrously
for the French, who were repulsed, and forced to take refuge within the
barriers of the city. This effort was the end of the operations, and no
more fighting took place, for the Provisional Government, holding that
the defence of Paris was not practicable against the victorious Allies,
now agreed to treat for a capitulation.
A great change had by this time come over public feeling in Paris, and
this was mainly the work of Fouché. France, left without a chief in the
moment of her abasement, fell into the hands of Napoleon’s ex-Minister
of Police. Once installed in power, he issued a proclamation to the
people he was deliberately deluding (June 24th). It held out extravagant
hopes that, under his guidance, France would at last be contented with
an honourable peace. It was a dishonest proclamation, for it made
impossible promises; and yet, in the national degradation which marked
the crisis, the people had perforce to obey the man, who, while in
secret correspondence with the Allies for the restoration of the King,
told them—
“After twenty-five years of political tempests, the moment has arrived
when everything wise and sublime that has been conceived respecting
social institutions may be perfected in yours. Let reason and genius
speak, and from whatever side their voices may proceed, they shall be
heard.... Who is the man, that, born on the soil of France, whatever
may be his party or political opinions, will not range himself under
the national standard, to defend the independence of his country!
Armies may be in part destroyed, but the experience of all ages and of
all nations proves that a brave people, combating for justice and
liberty, cannot be vanquished. The Emperor, in abdicating, has offered
himself a sacrifice. The members of the Government devote themselves
to the due execution of the authority with which they have been
invested by your representatives.”[19]
-----
Footnote 19:
Siborne, ii. 378.
-----
Nor was it long before Fouché gained sufficient influence over Davoût to
make it clear to him that the Empire had come to an end, and that the
only solution possible out of the _impasse_ in which France had become
involved, was submission to the will of the conquerors and the
restoration of the Bourbons. Once gained over, the Marshal did not
hesitate to obey, and efforts to ensure the defence of the capital were
undertaken with deliberate half-hearted vigour.[20] The Parisians were
rapidly becoming indifferent to their fate; they cared not who was to
rule them, provided they were allowed to live in peace. The era of glory
had afforded them some satisfaction, but it had its drawbacks, and late
events had brought these to a crisis; therefore they were glad to
welcome the strongest, and to have done with conquests. The Chambers,
also, had exhausted all their energies in destroying the man whose
military genius might have served the country at this terrible juncture.
They succeeded admirably in their design; and now they devoted
themselves to academical studies, and busied themselves in discussing a
new constitution, quite oblivious of the fact that their labours must be
fruitless. All sections of the nation were easily dealt with by Fouché;
and even the army, devoted to their late incomparable leader, soon
submitted to his will.
-----
Footnote 20:
Hooper, _Waterloo_ , p. 286.
-----
Besides the efforts already made to obtain a suspension of hostilities
from the allied Commanders, Marshal Davoût approached them on the 30th
of June, but again unsuccessfully. On the same day, he also joined in a
protest addressed to the Chambers against the return of the Bourbons—a
protest intended, perhaps, rather to satisfy the susceptibilities of the
army than for any other purpose. The Chambers, in their reply, alluded
to their proposed constitution; and stated that, while they were
prepared to accept whatever dynasty the Allies might insist on fixing
upon the throne, they were convinced that the accession of the new
Monarch could only become an accomplished fact, when he had agreed to
the conditions they meant to impose upon his prerogative. They “will
never,” they said, “acknowledge as legitimate Chief of the State him
who, on ascending the throne, shall refuse to acknowledge the rights of
the nation, and to consecrate them by a solemn compact.”[21]
-----
Footnote 21:
Siborne, ii. 450.
-----
But neither the Chambers nor the army were to determine the fate of the
country; for Fouché, alone among Frenchmen, was possessed of power, and
he only had any voice in shaping its policy in this crisis. Wellington,
anxious above all things that Paris should submit without further
bloodshed, consented, on the 2nd of July, to a suspension of
hostilities, on the basis of the evacuation of the capital by the army.
But he was not altogether master of the situation, for Marshal Blücher,
to whom he was so greatly indebted for his victory over the enemy, had
different ideas, and wished to humble the French in a manner that would
have been impolitic as well as hostile to the best interests of a stable
peace. It required, therefore, all the Duke’s tact to make him
understand, that the best way to end the war, was to accept a
capitulation, and to give up all ideas of incurring the responsibility
of taking so large a city as Paris by force of arms. Blücher,
fortunately, had some respect for the good sense of his colleague, and
agreed to these views, and, on the 3rd, he consented to treat. Thereupon
hostilities ceased abruptly, while Vandamme was being driven back, in
the manner that has been already described, near Issy.[22]
-----
Footnote 22:
Hooper, 296.
-----
Commissioners met on the 3rd, at the Palace of Saint-Cloud, and speedily
agreed to a Military Convention, which stipulated the following
conditions:—
(1) The army to evacuate Paris within three days, and to take up a
position in rear of the Loire, the movement to be complete within eight
days; (2) St. Denis, St. Ouen, Clichy, and Neuilly to be given up to the
Allies on the 4th, Montmartre on the 5th, and, on the 6th, all barriers,
giving access into the city, to be placed in the power of the Allies;
(3) Order to be maintained in Paris by the Garde Nationale, and by the
municipal _Gens d’armerie_; (4) The actual authorities to be respected
“so long as they shall exist;” (5) Private and public property, except
that which relates to war, to be respected, and all individuals to enjoy
their rights and liberties, “without being disturbed or called to
account, either as to the situations which they hold, or may have held,
or as to their conduct or political opinions;” (6) The capital to be
furnished with supplies.[23]
-----
Footnote 23:
Siborne, ii. 470, where the text of the Convention is given in full.
-----
These stipulations, ratified by the British and Prussian Commanders,
were carried out by the French with scrupulous fidelity. In spite of the
violence of the troops, whose enthusiasm for the Imperial system had
scarcely abated, the army, 70,000 men and 200 guns, marched towards the
Loire on the 4th, under Marshal Davoût.[24] The Chambers continued their
sittings, still intent upon their proposed constitution. On the 7th, the
Allies determined to enter Paris, heralding the re-instatement of Louis
XVIII., the Bourbon king.
-----
Footnote 24:
Davoût told Marshal Macdonald that the effective of the army going
beyond the Loire amounted to 150,000 men, 30,000 horses, and 750 guns
(_Souvenirs du Maréchal Macdonald_, p. 393).
-----
[Illustration:
GRENADIER COMPANY 1670. DRUM MAJOR 1670. PIKEMAN 1669.
N. R. Wilkinson del. A. D. Innes &C^o London Mintern Bros
Chromo.
]
During this time the Germans, Austrians, and Russians were advancing to
the capital, and, although the war was practically concluded by the
Military Convention just signed, yet it languished for a few months
longer in some of the provinces. The North-German Corps (26,000 men),
formed of contingents brought together by the petty Princes, was
occupied in the beginning of July, in reducing some of the French
fortresses on the north-east frontier. The Austrian army, under Prince
Schwartzenburg, including Saxons and South Germans, and amounting to
more than 250,000 men, had its advanced troops between the Seine and the
Marne, near La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, on the 10th of July. The Russians,
under Marshal Barclay de Tolly (nearly 170,000 men), were at Paris and
in its vicinity by the middle of July. A combined Austro-Sardinian army
(60,000) was in the south-east of France, and completed, during that
month, the subjugation of the districts in that quarter.[25]
-----
Footnote 25:
Siborne, ii. 481, etc.
-----
Besides the various expressions of thanks to the gallant army that
destroyed the power of Napoleon at Waterloo, to which allusion has
already been made, letters were published in General Orders, July 2nd,
from the Commander-in-Chief, H.R.H. the Duke of York, and from the
Secretary of State for the Colonies and for War, Earl Bathurst,
conveying the admiration felt at the conduct of the troops.[26] On the
5th, the resolutions of thanks passed by the House of Lords and by the
House of Commons were published in General Orders;[27] and, on the 17th,
those of the Common Council of the City of London (dated July 7th) were
communicated to the troops in the same manner.
-----
Footnote 26:
_The Despatches of Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington during his
Various Campaigns, etc._ , compiled by Colonel Gurwood, viii. 186
(London, 1847).
Footnote 27:
_Ibid._ , viii. 198.
-----
Towards the end of July it was determined, in recognition of the
“conspicuous valour” displayed by the army “in the late glorious
victory,” to grant: (1) increase to the pensions allowed to Officers for
wounds, according as they might be promoted in the service; (2) to all
Subalterns in the Infantry of the Line and in the Cavalry, and to all
Ensigns of the Guards, at Waterloo, two years' service, so as to qualify
them for extra pay after five, instead of seven, years' service; (3) to
every Non-commissioned officer, private, etc., present at the battle,
the distinction of being called a “Waterloo man,” and to every “Waterloo
man” two years' service in reckoning his service for increase of pay or
for pension, when discharged,—but this indulgence was not otherwise to
affect the conditions of his original enlistment. These arrangements
were notified on the 5th of August.[28]
-----
Footnote 28:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc., of Field-Marshal Arthur Duke of
Wellington_ , compiled by his son, xi. 98 (London, 1864).
-----
The Reverend John Norcross, Framlingham Rectory, Suffolk, having
promised to settle an annuity of ten pounds—to be called the “Wellington
Pension”—upon one of his “brave countrymen who fought in the late
tremendous but glorious conflict,” to be selected by the Duke, the
latter chose Lance-Sergeant Graham, Coldstream Guards, for that honour.
The record shows that Sergeant Graham “assisted Lieut.-Colonel Macdonell
in closing the gate” (at Hougomont) “which had been left open for the
communication, and which the enemy was in the act of forcing; he shot
the leading man. His brother, a corporal in the same company, was lying
wounded in a barn on fire; Sergeant Graham removed him a short distance
secure from the fire, and returned again to his duty. Three years and
two months in the Regiment.” Another man, also recommended to the Duke,
was Private John Lister, Third Guards, whose conduct was noted for
particular bravery during the whole day.[29]
-----
Footnote 29:
_Ibid._ , xi. 35, 121. _Wellington Despatches_ (Gurwood), viii. 249.
-----
On the 29th of July, H.R.H. the Prince Regent granted to all Ensigns of
the three Regiments of Foot Guards then serving, and afterwards to be
appointed, the rank of Lieutenant, as a mark of Royal approbation of the
distinguished gallantry of the Brigade of Guards in the important battle
which had just taken place. Thereby was completed the system of the
“double rank” which had existed in the Household Infantry for many
years. Captains of the First and Coldstream Guards had been given the
rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in 1687, and four years later, in 1691,
Captains of the Scots Guards received the same privilege; while all
Lieutenants of the three Regiments of Foot Guards were upon that
occasion given commissions of Captains in the army.[30]
-----
Footnote 30:
Colonel MacKinnon, _Origin and Services of the Coldstream Guards_ , i.
190, 211, and ii. 368 (London, 1833). The Prince Regent also conferred
upon the First Guards the title of Grenadier Guards, “in commemoration
of their having defeated the Grenadiers of the French Imperial Guard
upon this memorable occasion” (_ibid._, ii. 368).
-----
During the halt which was made at Le Cateau on the 23rd of June, a
return was ordered, giving the number of killed, wounded, and missing,
casualties of the fighting that took place between the 16th and 18th
inclusive.[31]
-----
Footnote 31:
A return, dated Adjutant-General’s Office, April 13, 1816, was
transmitted to the Duke of Wellington from the Horse-Guards on July
16th of that year, showing the number of sergeants, trumpeters,
drummers, farriers, and rank and file of the British army, who were
killed, wounded, or missing in the actions fought in Flanders on the
15th, 16th, and 18th of June, 1815. The following concerns the
Division of Guards:—
┌────────────────────────────┬─────────┬───────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ │ │ Wounded. │
├────────────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────┬───────────┬───────────┬─────────────┤
│ │ │ Died of │ Suffered │ │ Transferred │
│ │ Killed│ Wounds. │Amputation.│Discharged.│ to Vet. or │
│ │ │ │ │ │Garr. Battns.│
│ │ │ │ │ │ │
├────────────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼───────────┼───────────┼─────────────┤
│Grenadier Guards, 2nd Battn.│ 61 │ 29 │ 6 │ 44 │ —— │
│ ” ” 3rd ” │ 71 │ 30 │ 14 │ 48 │ —— │
│Coldstream ” 2nd ” │ 47 │ 26 │ 6 │ — │ —— │
│Third ” ” ” │ 39 │ 47 │ 12 │ 21 │ —— │
├────────────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼───────────┼───────────┼─────────────┤
│Total Guards Division │ 218 │ 132 │ 38 │ 113 │ —— │
├────────────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼───────────┼───────────┼─────────────┤
│Total British Army │ 1715 │ 856 │ 236 │ 506 │ 167 │
├────────────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼───────────┼───────────┼─────────────┤
│ │ │ │ │ │ │
├────────────────────────────┼─────────┴─────────┴───────────┴───────────┴─────────────┤
│ │ Wounded (cont’d). │
├────────────────────────────┼─────────┬─────────┬───────────┬───────────┬─────────────┤
│ │Rejoined │ Remain │ │ Rejoined │ Not since │
│ │Regiment.│ in │ Total. │ Regiment.│ heard of; │
│ │ │Hospital.│ │ │ supposed │
│ │ │ │ │ │ dead. │
├────────────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼───────────┼───────────┼─────────────┤
│Grenadier Guards, 2nd Battn.│ 197 │ 26 │ 302 │ 10 │ 38 │
│ ” ” 3rd ” │ 361 │ 33 │ 486 │ 3 │ 32 │
│Coldstream ” 2nd ” │ 208 │ 1 │ 241 │ 4 │ —— │
│Third ” ” ” │ 96 │ 19 │ 195 │ 17 │ 2 │
├────────────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼───────────┼───────────┼─────────────┤
│Total Guards Division │ 862 │ 79 │ 1224 │ 34 │ 72 │
├────────────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼───────────┼───────────┼─────────────┤
│Total British Army │ 5068 │ 854 │ 7687 │ 482 │ 353 │
└────────────────────────────┴─────────┴─────────┴───────────┴───────────┴─────────────┘
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xiv. 632, 633.
-----
Some changes took place in the army during the six months that followed
the battle of Waterloo.
The Prince of Orange, having to return to Holland, on the 22nd of June,
Major-General Sir John Byng assumed temporarily the command of the First
Army-Corps until the 12th of July, when he reverted to his position of
Commander of the Division of Guards until the 23rd; he was then replaced
by Major-General Sir Kenneth Howard (late Coldstream Guards), and he
re-assumed the command of the 2nd Guards Brigade, the 1st being still
under Major-General Maitland. Owing to the absence of the Prince of
Orange, the command of the First Army-Corps devolved upon Sir Kenneth
Howard on the 22nd of August, when Sir J. Byng again reverted to the
Guards Division, and remained at their head till further orders;
thereupon Colonel Hepburn (Third Guards) became Brigadier of the 2nd
Guards Brigade. On the 2nd of October, Sir J. Byng having obtained leave
of absence to proceed to England, Major-General Maitland took command of
the Division until his return.
On the 20th of June, Captain Walton, Coldstream Guards, was temporarily
appointed Brigade-Major of the 2nd Guards Brigade, vice Stothert, Third
Guards, who was severely wounded, and who subsequently died. On the 6th
of November, Captain Prince was appointed Adjutant of the 2nd Battalion
Coldstream Guards vice Major C. Bentinck, who, upon the death of Captain
Lascelles, was posted to the 1st Battalion as Senior Adjutant.[32]
-----
Footnote 32:
The Junior Adjutant was invariably posted to the 2nd Battalion at that
time, and on becoming Senior Adjutant he was transferred to the 1st
Battalion. This custom prevailed until about 1840. Major C. Bentinck,
while Junior Adjutant, served at the battle of Waterloo as Deputy
Assistant-Adjutant-General, his place in the Battalion having been
taken by Captain Walton.
-----
The following Officers, belonging to the 1st Battalion, were ordered, on
the 22nd of June, to hold themselves in readiness for foreign service,
viz. Colonel Sir. H. Bouverie, Captains Shirley and Girardot, and
Ensigns Clifton and Salwey; next day Captain Sandilands received a
similar order. With the exception of Sir H. Bouverie and Ensign Clifton,
these Officers were posted to the 2nd Battalion on the 27th till further
orders, and at the head of a detachment of two hundred men, they reached
Paris on the 19th of July. Previous to this date, on the 1st, a
redistribution of Subaltern Officers of the Battalion in France had been
made, by which: Captain Anstruther was posted to the Grenadier company,
Captain Sowerby and Ensign Short to the 1st, Ensign Hon. J. Forbes to
the 2nd, Captain Cowell and Ensign Hon. W. Forbes to the 3rd, Ensign
Gordon to the 4th, Ensign Douglas to the 5th, Captain Lord Hotham to the
6th, Ensign Buckley to the 7th, Ensign Hervey to the 8th, Captain Bowles
and Ensigns Gooch and Buller to the Light-infantry companies.
It was about this time that the present soldier’s small account-book was
introduced into the British army. By a letter from Lord Palmerston, the
Secretary-at-War, to the Duke of Wellington, dated War Office, August
31, 1815, “in order to remedy the inconvenience and delay experienced in
the adjustment of the claims of the soldiers,” it was determined that “a
book should be kept by every Non-commissioned officer, trumpeter,
drummer, fifer, and private man of His Majesty’s regular forces,
calculated to show the actual state of his accounts.”[33] This book was
introduced by Horse Guards letter on the 6th of October following, and
regulations were made to ensure that the accounts should be correctly
made up to the 24th of each month, and to oblige the men to keep their
small books in their own possession, and in good order.
-----
Footnote 33:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 151.
-----
The Coldstream Guards contained the following Officers, in November,
1815:—
_Colonel._—Field-Marshal H.R.H. Adolphus, Duke of Cambridge, K.G.
_Lieut.-Colonel._—Colonel Hon. H. Brand, C.B.
_Majors._—_First Major_—Colonel Sir R. D. Jackson, K.C.B.
_Second_ ” —Colonel A. Woodford, C.B.
_Captains._—Colonel Sir H. Bouverie, K.C.B.; Lieut.-Colonels James
Macdonell, C.B.; J. Hamilton; and L. Adams (_Mounted_).
Lieut.-Colonels H. Loftus; W. H. Raikes; F. Sutton; F. Milman; T. Gore; T.
Barrow; D. MacKinnon; Hon. J. Walpole; H. Dawkins; Colonels Hon. A.
Abercromby, C.B.; Sir C. Campbell, K.C.B.; Lieut.-Colonel Hon. E.
Acheson, C.B.; Colonel Sir R. Arbuthnot, K.C.B.; Lieut.-Colonels Sir
W. Gomm, K.C.B.; Hon. H. Pakenham, C.B.; and H. Wyndham.
_Lieutenants._—Lieut.-Colonel T. Steele; Major G. Bowles; Captains T.
Sowerby; P. Sandilands; Lieut.-Colonel J. Fremantle, C.B.; Captains J.
Prince (Adjutant); J. V. Harvey; W. Walton (Brigade-Major in France);
A. Wedderburn; C. White; T. Bligh; C. Shawe; Major C. Bentinck
(Adjutant); Captains J. Talbot; W. Baynes; W. Stothert; J. S. Cowell;
W. Grimstead; Lord Hotham; W. Anstruther; Hon. J. Rous; C. Shirley; J.
Drummond; Hon. R. Moore; C. Girardot; T. Chaplin; E. Clifton; H.
Salwey; G. G. Morgan.
_Ensigns._—Lieutenants T. Duncombe; Hon. J. Forbes; T. Powys; H. Gooch; A.
Cuyler; M. Beaufoy; W. Kortright; H. Armytage; Hon. W. Rous; H.
Bentinck; F. Shawe; H. St. J. Mildmay; F. Buller; H. Griffiths; J.
Buller; J. Montagu; J. Hervey; H. Vane; F. Douglas; R. Bowen; F.
FitzClarence; A. Gordon; Hon. W. Forbes; C. Short; H. Serjeantson; R.
Beamish; Lord Wallscourt; Jasper Hall; J. Jenkinson; W. Cornwall; H.
Murray; and E. Duke.
_Quartermasters._—T. Dwelly; and B. Selway.
_Surgeon-Major._—J. Simpson. _Battalion Surgeons._—J. Rose; and W.
Whymper. _Assistant Surgeons._—T. Maynard; G. Smith; S. Worrell; and
W. Hunter.
_Solicitor._—J. Wilkinson, Esq.
CHAPTER II.
MILITARY OCCUPATION OF FRANCE
Termination of the war—Difficulties of the situation—The Allies occupy
Paris—Dissolution of the Provisional Government—Entry of Louis
XVIII. into the capital—New French Government formed—Blücher and the
_Pont de Jena_—Arrival of the Allied Sovereigns—Reviews in
France—Paris in the hands of the Allies—Treatment of the French by
the Prussians; by the British—The wreck of the French Imperial
forces disbanded—Life in Paris—The Louvre stripped of its treasures
of art—Prosecution of Imperialist leaders—Labedoyère, Ney,
Lavalette—Peace of Paris, November 20th.
The long period of the wars of the French Revolution, which devastated
the continent of Europe for more than twenty years, had now definitely
come to an end, and another era was about to dawn upon the civilized
world. France, who had provoked the struggle and prolonged the strife to
satisfy the craving of a restless ambition, was at last crushed; and the
military chief, whose genius had called into activity the warlike
character of her inhabitants, was captured. The common enemy was no
longer to be feared; but the balance of power in Europe had been rudely
shaken, and new ideas had taken deep root in France into the political
and social life of the people. A government had to be established in
Paris, of a nature calculated to repress disorder, to calm the natural
turbulence of the nation, and to give the Allies pledges for future good
behaviour. In short, the French were to be invited to re-enter into the
European comity of nations, and to conform to the re-settlement which
was rendered necessary after the general disturbance that had taken
place. But, in effecting this, the interests of the enemy could not be
taken into account. Once before, France had been subdued, and, in 1814,
the Allies had expelled Napoleon, and sought to restore a general peace
without unduly oppressing the people who had been the aggressors. The
attempt failed, for the Emperor returned to Paris, and thereby he
re-kindled the torch of war, and revived the baneful policy which
threatened his neighbours with destruction. France had participated in
Napoleon’s act, and had received him once more as her ruler; and, being
defeated, she had little to expect from the forbearance of the victors.
She was thus treated as a conquered country, and was subjected to some
of the indignities which her soldiery had, in their turn, inflicted for
so long a time upon her present masters.
And yet the task of a French reconstruction was by no means an easy one.
The vitality of the nation, homogeneous and patriotic, at once forbade
the Allies from any attempt to dismember it, even if their mutual
jealousies had allowed them to adopt such a proposal. The only feasible
plan was to give the people a ruler who could and would control the
explosive forces which existed among them, and put an end to the dangers
that menaced Europe by reason of the warlike and unscrupulous character
they had displayed in the past. But the Allies, in carrying out this
policy, forgot that it was of the first consequence to the future
wellbeing of the Monarchy, to place Louis in an independent position,
and, instead of restoring him to his kingdom by force of hostile
bayonets only, to attain to the same end, by fostering the movement
towards Royalism, which France began to develop after the battle of
Waterloo. The downfall of Napoleon and the rejection of his dynasty had
left three solutions, and only three, for the future government of the
country. A Republic might have been formed; a popular King might be set
up in the person of an Orleanist prince, who would accept the tricolor
flag; and, lastly, the legitimate rule of Louis could be established.
The first two solutions were contrary to the spirit of the age, they
gave no security for future tranquillity, and the Allies set their faces
firmly against either of them. There remained the third, which was the
avowed object of the conquerors, and it was obvious that it could best
be reached by causing the people to recall their King of their own
accord. This had been the proposition of Marshal Davoût and of others;
and, while their views were possibly more in advance than could have
been agreed to without modification, yet, had the matter been left in
English hands, there is little doubt that the King’s restoration would
have been effected, with the least shock possible to French
susceptibilities, and the new order based on a firmer foundation than
was given to it. But the British Government had others to consult, and
the Allies, smarting under the injuries to which they had been subjected
for more than twenty years, were not inclined to be too conciliatory.
Nor was this the only difficulty; for the French themselves, hopelessly
divided into two hostile camps, were unable to come to any satisfactory
agreement. On the one hand, there were the followers of the King,
reactionary in feeling, who remembered with bitterness the cruelties
they had experienced during revolutionary times, and who, now that they
were supported by victorious armies, demanded the revival pure and
simple of the _ancien régime_. On the other hand, there was Imperial and
Revolutionary France—the nation itself,—who, having irrevocably adopted
new canons of social and political existence, endeavoured to make terms
with the party in power for the protection of the people. There was
little sympathy between the two; but the latter had no leader, and had
placed themselves unreservedly in the unworthy hands of Fouché, who,
having gauged the situation, deserted those he was bound to support, and
sought his own personal aggrandisement by joining the party that
attached itself to the King.
The keen anxiety of Louis XVIII. to save France from the humiliations
that were to be imposed upon her was undoubted; so also was his earnest
desire to reign in accordance with the liberal spirit which the times
required. He hoped to reconcile all sections of the population, and to
prove himself their deliverer, not only from internal disorder, but also
from foreign oppression. But though his good will and generosity were
unquestioned, his prejudices remained, and were not to be eradicated
even by misfortune, and his followers and intimate counsellors were not
endowed with a similar noble spirit of forgetfulness for past
ill-treatment. France, therefore, by the will of the Allies and with the
full consent of the Royalist faction, was again to be unconditionally
placed in the King’s hands, his prerogative was to be unfettered, and
his power was to be absolute. Nor were his first proclamations, issued
to his subjects and dated the 25th and 28th of June, calculated to give
much satisfaction to a people who dreaded his rule. The King’s party, in
short, had not the wisdom to perceive that a stable Restoration must be
accompanied by a complete amnesty in favour of those, at least, who had
no further power to resist—and resistance to the old French Monarchy had
entirely ceased in the country. Hence, although Louis repudiated all
intentions of restoring feudal rights, or of dispossessing those who had
illegally acquired lands during the Revolution, yet he did not hesitate
to threaten with punishment the men by whose assistance he imagined
Napoleon had been able to install himself once again as Emperor.[34]
-----
Footnote 34:
The vengeance against Napoleon’s adherents was thus announced in the
Royal proclamation of the 28th of June, which was countersigned by
Prince Talleyrand, at one time a revolutionist, and afterwards Foreign
Minister of the Emperor: “I wish to exclude from my presence none but
those whose celebrity is a matter of grief to France and of horror to
Europe. In the plot which they hatched, I perceive many of my subjects
misled and some guilty. I promise—I who never promised in vain (all
Europe knows)—to pardon to misled Frenchmen, all that has passed since
the day when I quitted Lille, amidst so many tears, up to the day when
I re-entered Cambrai, amidst so many acclamations. But the blood of my
people has flowed, in consequence of a treason of which the annals of
the world present no example. That treason has summoned foreigners
into the heart of France. Every day reveals to me a fresh disaster. I
owe it then to the dignity of my Crown, to the interest of my people,
to the repose of Europe, to except from pardon the instigators and
authors of this horrible plot. They shall be designated to the
vengeance of the laws by the two Chambers, which I propose forthwith
to assemble” (_Annual Register_ , 1815; _State Papers_ , p. 393).
-----
“Up to the moment of the capitulation of Paris,” says a contemporary
writer, “the Chambers continued their deliberations, and on the day
when the humiliation of the country seemed complete, the national
representatives issued a declaration of the rights of Frenchmen,
resembling in its spirit and in its principal features the Bill of
Rights claimed by the Parliament of England from William III., and it
is surely a tribute of no ordinary value offered to the Constitution
of England, that, at the very time when her army was at the gates of
the French capital, our national institutions were the objects of the
perpetual eulogy, and the subjects of the imitation, of the statesmen
of the hostile nation. The constancy of the Chambers was put to a
severe trial. The King had arrived at Compiègne, and nearly a million
of foreign troops were hastening from every quarter to re-instate him
on the throne, and yet not one member in either House thought proper
to propose his restoration.... The national representatives also
addressed the people with a firmness of tone, and in a spirit of
independence, that will entitle them to the admiration of future
ages:—'A Monarch,' say they, in language similar to that held by the
Convention Parliament of England, 'cannot offer any guarantee, if he
does not swear to observe the Constitution framed by the national
representation, and accepted by the people; it hence follows, that any
government which shall have no other title than the acclamation and
the will of a party, or which shall be imposed by force, and every
government which shall not guarantee the rights and liberties of a
people claiming the privileges of freemen, will have only an ephemeral
existence, and will neither secure the tranquillity of France nor of
Europe.'”[35]
-----
Footnote 35:
Edward Baines, _History of the Wars of the French Revolution, from the
Breaking-out of the War in 1792, to the Restoration of a General Peace
in 1815_ , ii. 488 (London, 1818).
-----
How little the arrangements made in 1815 secured the permanent
tranquillity of France, is shown by the history of that country during
the last eighty years; but to these events it is not our intention to
revert, for our object is only to give as faithful a picture as possible
of what did occur at this crisis, to describe the part which was taken
in these events by the Regiment whose annals we are engaged in
recording, and to explain the condition of affairs which presented
itself to both Officers and men during this moment of victory and of
anxiety.
The barriers of Paris were placed in the hands of the Allies in the
afternoon of the 6th—in accordance with the terms of the Military
Convention—amid persistent cries from the populace of: “No Bourbons!”
“The Representative Government for ever!” intermingled with some in
favour of the fallen Emperor. On the 7th, the Prussians under Blücher
marched into the town in force, and took possession of the Luxembourg
and of other places. The Duke of Wellington, with the tact which
distinguished his conduct during this moment of triumph, contented
himself with taking part in this demonstration by despatching one
brigade only into the city, “with orders to camp in the Champs Elysées,
and near to the Place Louis Quinze, where the Duke of Wellington will
have his head-quarters to-day.”[36] The main body of the British army
were encamped in the Bois de Boulogne, to which place the Guards
Division were also brought, without any display.
-----
Footnote 36:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 2.
-----
As soon as Paris was occupied by foreign troops, the Provisional
Government dissolved itself, on the plea that the country had been
deceived by the conquerors! The message of dissolution communicated to
the Chambers, written by Fouché himself, asserted that up to the 6th it
had been believed that “the Allied Sovereigns were not unanimous upon
the choice of a prince who was to reign in France;” that it was only
then declared that “all the Sovereigns had engaged to place Louis XVIII.
upon the throne.” The message went on to say that, as foreign troops had
just occupied the Tuileries, where the Government was sitting, “we can
only breathe wishes for our country; and, our deliberations being no
longer free, we think it our duty to separate.” Upon receiving this
news, the Chamber of Peers immediately followed the example given, and
also dissolved. The Deputies, however, determined to show a bolder
front; and proclaiming that they were at their posts by the will of the
people, and that bayonets only could disperse them, they continued their
deliberations upon the proposed Constitution, which they determined to
offer to the King for his acceptance, as if there was still a government
in the country, and as if nothing had happened to disturb their
equanimity. But the following day (July 8th), the farce came to an end,
and they were excluded from their place of meeting by the bayonet; the
gates were locked, a body of the Garde Nationale warned them off and
made them retire, and thus they too were obliged to dissolve.[37]
-----
Footnote 37:
Baines, _Wars of the French Revolution_ , ii. 490.
-----
Paris was now ready to receive Louis, and his public entry took place on
the 8th. The tricolor flag was everywhere replaced by the white standard
of the Bourbons, and the people, who had vociferously welcomed Napoleon
on his return from Elba, not four months before, now came in immense
crowds to greet the King, and acclaimed his restoration with
enthusiastic joy. The scene was gay, and the sight that presented itself
to the inhabitants such as they loved to behold; but, beneath the
surface of these outward appearances, the minds of those who had any
power of reflection were filled with depression and sadness. “Even the
Royalists were downcast: their patriotic feelings were deeply wounded by
the defeat of France; they augured ill of the restoration of the King in
the rear of the English bayonets.”[38]
-----
Footnote 38:
Archibald Alison, _History of Europe from the Commencement of the
French Revolution in 1789 to the Restoration of the Bourbons in
1815_ , x. 964 (2nd edit., 1844). “No one who has not witnessed it, or
who has not been convinced of it by the accounts of others, could form
an idea of the rapidity with which the public cry can be changed in
France. At nine in the morning of the day on which the King last
returned to Paris, a man was torn to pieces in the Place Vendôme for
wearing the white cockade; at one, a Marshal of France (Moncey or
Mortier), riding into Paris with the white cockade, was pursued by the
populace, and with difficulty saved himself; and, at three, the King
entered the capital, accompanied by shouts of acclamation far greater
than those which greeted him the year before. All those who in an
adverse sense were clamorous in the morning, had changed or
disappeared” (Mr. Arbuthnot to Lord Liverpool, October 30, 1815:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 220).
-----
Next day, the new Government was formed, and announced to the public, at
the head of which was Prince Talleyrand, who also became Minister for
Foreign Affairs. It included, besides, men belonging to different
parties, for Louis was anxious to get the confidence of all; and lastly,
it contained the name of Fouché, who, having succeeded in shaping the
anarchy, which followed the fatal 18th of June, to the benefit of the
Royal cause, received, much against the King’s inclination, the
portfolio of Minister of Police!
“Louis XVIII. was thus once more seated upon the throne of his
fathers, but he reigned only in the Tuileries. To the foreign troops
by which he was surrounded he was solely indebted for his elevation.
The national will had not been consulted; and the same potent agency
which placed him on the throne could alone maintain him in his present
position. Indebted to the enemies of his country for his elevation,
surrounded by a discordant ministry, compelled to impose heavy burdens
upon his people as the price of his restoration, and forced to
subscribe to conditions humiliating to the glory of France, the
opening of his second reign was inauspicious in the extreme; but it
was not utterly hopeless. Whatever might have been the errors of his
former government, or however unpromising his present circumstances,
he enjoyed personally the respect of the French nation. The people
were wearied with revolutions. Their military passion, which, before
the return of Napoleon, constituted the great danger of the French
Monarchy, was subdued; and the nation wished for peace and a moderate
share of freedom, both of which the King possessed the power and the
inclination to confer.”[39]
-----
Footnote 39:
Baines, _Wars of the French Revolution_ , ii. 491.
-----
The difficulties of the situation were not lightened by the
extraordinary conduct of Marshal Blücher at this juncture. That brave
Commander could never forget the sufferings which the Imperial armies
had caused in Prussia, nor the indignities imposed upon his country by
the intolerance and the arrogance of Napoleon, when at the zenith of his
power, in Berlin. He regarded the French nation as responsible for the
outrages which had been inflicted, and, now that he was able to have his
revenge, he determined to take it. He refused to hold any communications
with the King, or with the new authorities who had been re-introduced
into office by the co-operation of his own Government; and he desired
Baron Müffling, appointed Military Governor of Paris, to levy a
contribution of 100,000,000 francs on the town, as well as clothing
sufficient for 110,000 men.[40] But not content, he went still further,
and insisted that one of the bridges over the Seine, known as the bridge
of Jena, should be destroyed, because it bore the name of the battle
which had been so disastrous to Prussia. Wellington, informed of this
mad project, endeavoured to intervene; but so blinded was his impetuous
and hot-headed colleague, that he declined to listen to any
remonstrance, and began forthwith to undermine the arches. The Duke
thereupon placed a guard of British soldiers on the threatened bridge,
with orders to drive away by force any one who should attempt to damage
it; and he intimated his determination to prevent this senseless
destruction by arms if necessary.[41] Blücher now at last was brought to
reason, and gave way; and thus an act of vandalism was prevented which
was not only a distinct infraction of the Convention of July 3rd,
stipulating that all property was to be respected, but would also have
cast a deep and lasting stain on the honour and good name of the Allies.
-----
Footnote 40:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 3.
Footnote 41:
It appears that a Battalion of the Grenadier Guards were employed upon
this duty (_The Reminiscences and Recollections of Captain Gronow_ ,
i. 129, and ii. 39; London, 1892).
-----
Shortly after this (July 11th), the Emperors of Austria and Russia and
the King of Prussia arrived in Paris, when Guards of Honour were found
by the Brigade of Guards.[42]
-----
Footnote 42:
His Majesty, Alexander I. of Russia, expressly requested that he
should be escorted and guarded by British troops (_Supplementary
Despatches, etc._ , xi. 25).
-----
About the same time, Lord Castlereagh and the other statesmen of the
allied Powers reached the capital, to negotiate the terms of peace to
which France was to be obliged to subscribe. The conclusions agreed to,
and the incidents which took place during the occupation of Paris, will
be noticed presently, but, meanwhile, we must make a short allusion to
certain military displays made by the Allies during this period. On the
24th of July a celebrated review of the Anglo-allied army, which had
just been reinforced by several regiments who had come to France from
America—where peace had been concluded—took place near Paris, before the
Emperor of Russia and the other Allied Sovereigns. There were as many as
60,000 British soldiers present, the whole of the troops being under the
command of the Duke of Wellington.[43] The demonstration was more of a
pageant than anything else, and as correct a representation as possible
was given of the battle of Salamanca. It is perhaps worth remarking
that, in the General Orders issued, dated July 22nd, these words occur,
“The Field Marshal begs that Officers may be dressed uniformly, and, if
possible, according to the King’s orders;”[44] while the following was
also published in Battalion Orders of the 2nd Battalion Coldstream
Guards: “Officers are to appear in plain grey overalls, jackets hooked
and buttoned regimentally, sashes to be tied on the left side.” On the
10th of September, a great review, which seems to have created a
considerable impression at the time, also took place of all the Russian
troops that were in France, near Chalons, where 160,000 men (including
28,000 cavalry) and 540 guns were brought together.[45]
-----
Footnote 43:
So critical was the situation in France considered to be, that the
British Government sent large reinforcements to Wellington during the
summer of 1815, with the intention of making him stronger at Paris
than he had been at Waterloo. After that battle more than 20,000
English troops were sent to the Continent (Lord Liverpool to Lord
Castlereagh, Aug. 11, 1815; see _Correspondence, etc., of Viscount
Castlereagh_ , third series, ii. 477: London, 1853).]
Footnote 44:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._, xi. 51.
Footnote 45:
Alison, _History of Europe, from 1789 to 1815_ , x. 973. Captain
Gronow mentions a curious incident that occurred at one of the reviews
held by the Russian Emperor of his own troops. The British Foot Guards
found a Guard for Alexander I., at which a dinner was provided,
similar to that at St. James’s. On one occasion the Captain of the
Emperor’s Guard was informed that there were four Russian General
Officers in his custody. The latter were asked to dinner, and as their
health was drunk, they were invited to reveal the nature of their
offence, which called for such a punishment to men of their military
rank. In reply, they said that the Emperor had not been satisfied with
the manner in which they had marched past that day; whereupon one of
the British Officers present, filling his glass, drank “Confusion to
all tyrants—Vive Napoleon!” “The poor Russians appeared thunderstruck,
and observed that if they drank the toast proposed, it would cost them
their heads.” It seems, this story came to the ears of Alexander, and
the Duke had to explain it, for he sent for the Officers of the Guard,
and begged them to repress their jokes for the future (Gronow,
_Reminiscences, etc._ , ii. 19).
-----
These displays, having as much for object an easy demonstration to the
inhabitants that they were completely in the power of Europe, as an
exhibition made for the purpose of satisfying the national vanity of the
different armies concerned, were perhaps not necessary to prove to the
French that their new Government rested only upon alien arms for
support. Everywhere, except south of the Loire,—where the last remnants
of Napoleon’s army had collected under Marshal Davoût,—was the country
in the military occupation of foreigners; and in Paris especially, there
were no regular troops to be seen, other than those of Great Britain, of
Prussia, and of their allies. They guarded the King and the Royal
palaces; they stood at the barriers of the town, and they performed all
the military duties of the capital. They were to be seen at all the
public buildings, at the various and numerous hôtels where the Allied
Sovereigns and their Counsellors and principal Officers lodged, and even
at the places of entertainment where the people flocked during the balmy
weather of a French summer. Nor were these duties of a ceremonial
character; for guard-houses were placed in nearly all the principal
thoroughfares, the bridges were held by troops, there were chains of
sentries everywhere, patrols were constantly on the move and on the
alert, and guns were kept loaded and ready for any serious emergency.
Paris was placed under the command of Baron Müffling; his orders, dated
July 23rd, for the preservation of order, were thus conceived:—
“The Garde Nationale will perform police duties, and the garrison,
composed of the Allied troops, occupying the great centres of the
town, will remain in reserve. In case the latter have to act, for the
Garde Nationale may refuse to quell disturbances, guns will be fired,
when the regular forces will assemble at their alarm posts. The
British brigade will form up in the Avenue de Neuilly, one battalion
in Place Beauveau, and another at the junction of the Boulevard de la
Madeleine and Rue St. Honoré. The Austrian brigade will have two
battalions and a battery in Place Vendôme, a battalion guarding the
Emperor, and a fourth battalion in Rue du Montblanc, near the
Boulevards des Capucins and des Italiens; the cavalry to be in the
Boulevard de la Madeleine. The brigade of Prussian Guards will occupy
the Esplanade des Invalides with two battalions; they will have a
third battalion at the Quay d'Orsay, a fourth on the Pont Royal, a
fifth on the Pont Neuf, a sixth in the Luxembourg, and a seventh,
together with the cavalry and the artillery, in the Champs de Mars.
The Prussian Grenadier brigade will occupy the Place de la Bastille,
the Pont du Jardin des Plantes, and the Place du Panthéon, with a
battalion each; and the Quai de la Tournelle and l'Ile du Palais with
two battalions each; the cavalry and artillery to be posted in the
Place Walhubert. Guards in the town and at the barriers to remain at
their posts. The Governor’s head-quarters are in Place Vendôme; the
Commandants of the north and south of the city, in Place Louis XV. and
on Pont Neuf, respectively. Patrols to keep up communication between
the different stations.”[46]
-----
Footnote 46:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 53.]
-----
An English traveller who, having visited France in 1814, returned in
1815, thus describes some of his experiences:—
“The state of things had entirely altered, and plain indications were
given on the road to Paris, and at its entrance, that the visitor in
1815 would find it placed in circumstances very different from those
which it held in the preceding year. The time for the real humiliation
and severe punishment of the nation had now arrived; there was no
longer a disposition to save it from drinking out the bitter contents
of the cup of defeat; in short, Paris, as representing France, was now
in the condition of one that is beaten and bound, previously to being
mulcted in a heavy forfeiture.... I found Paris in a state of very
discomposed feeling and opinion. Every Frenchman seemed acutely alive
to the calamity that had fallen upon France, and all diversities of
political sentiment met in one point of union, namely that of
indignation against those who acted as the conquerors of the country.
A Royalist would say, 'Ah, it is very impolitic in the Allies to think
of taking any territory or money from France, for good Frenchmen,
united under the Bourbons, will become more formidable than the nation
ever was under Bonaparte, and woe to Europe, in the course of a year
or two, for what she now inflicts on us.' A military man would gurgle
a _sacré_ out of his throat, and anticipate the day of revenge, under
some new leader, when France would show that she had not been beaten,
although she had been betrayed.... Going round, late in the evening,
by one of the more unfrequented walks, running through the woods of
Saint-Cloud, I came suddenly upon a strong column of British infantry,
posted in silence and order among the trees, on the hill immediately
above the amusements, that jingled upon the ear from below. The
regiment was in complete order for action, the Officers were all at
their posts; and as I passed them by in the deep shadow, I heard not a
word or even a breath, though I was close to five or six hundred men.
The Allied Sovereigns were seldom seen except at reviews, for they did
not now, as at a former time, go about to public places to scrape
acquaintance with the Parisians and keep them in good spirits. The
aspect of the alliance, as it was now settled on the inhabitants of
Paris, was clouded and severe; and a very considerable degree of
reserve was maintained by the representatives of the various Powers.
Even the Court of the Tuileries was not frequently visited by them;
there were few or no courtly entertainments and ceremonies. However
friendly the Allied Sovereigns might feel towards Louis personally,
their determination to make France know that the consequences of war
are sometimes serious, occasioned a sense of restraint, and an
appearance of coolness, as between them and the Royal Family of the
Bourbons.”[47]
-----
Footnote 47:
John Scott, _Paris revisited in 1815_ , pp. 264, etc. (2nd edit.:
London, 1816).
-----
The military occupation of France, painful as it was to the inordinate
pride of the people—especially after their armies had run riot in every
capital of the Continent,—was rendered still more unbearable by the
excesses which the Prussians indulged in. Following the example set by
their gallant, but irrational, Commander, both Officers and men
exercised their authority in a harsh and often in a brutal manner.
Forgetful of what they owed to Louis XVIII., whose restoration absolved
the French from past offences, and mindful only of the grievous tyranny
which they had experienced, they made the unfortunate inhabitants feel
the full measure of their revenge, by their arrogance and exactions.
“Blücher’s troops were billeted in every house; he obliged the
inhabitants to feed and clothe them; and he issued an order (which I
well recollect seeing), commanding the authorities to supply each
soldier with a bedstead containing a bolster, a woollen mattress, two
new blankets, and a pair of linen sheets. The rations per day, for
each man, were two pounds of butcher’s meat, a bottle of wine, a
quarter of a pound of butter, ditto rice, a glass of brandy, and some
tobacco[48].... Blücher’s Generals occupied all the best hôtels in the
Faubourg St. Germain; General Thieleman that of Marshal Ney, where he
forcibly took possession of the plate, carriages, and horses. Other
Prussian Generals acted in a similar manner. The Russian and Austrian
armies with the two Emperors entered Paris soon after our arrival. The
Emperors imitated Blücher in some respects; they refused to quarter
their soldiers in the large and wholesome barracks which were in
readiness to receive them; they preferred billeting them with the
peaceable merchants and tradespeople, whom they plundered and bullied
in the most outrageous manner.”[49]
-----
Footnote 48:
It is said that the Prussians cost the French not less than three
francs per day for each man (_Paris revisited in 1815_ , p. 361).
Footnote 49:
Gronow, _Reminiscences_ , i. 206.
-----
It is pleasant to record that the Duke of Wellington adopted an entirely
different system in his relations with the inhabitants; everything was
paid for regularly, property was respected, and the people were
unmolested. In short, the British army set an example of humanity,
generosity, and forbearance, which not only did honour to their country
and to their noble profession, but which also (notwithstanding national
antipathies), gained them the respect and almost the affection of the
French themselves.[50]
-----
Footnote 50:
“The Prussians, who were in bivouac near us” (in the Bois de Boulogne,
early in July), “amused themselves by doing as much damage as they
could, without any aim or object; they cut down the finest trees and
set the wood on fire at several points. There were about 3000 of the
Guards there, encamped in the wood, and I should think about 10,000
Prussians. Our camp was not remarkable for its courtesy towards them;
in fact, our intercourse was confined to the most ordinary demands of
duty, as allies, in an enemy’s country” (Gronow, _Reminiscences_ , i.
81).
-----
In this connection, a quaint conversation between the English traveller
(already quoted) and some Highlanders he came across in Peronne, may be
noticed here. The latter, bivouacked, not billeted,—they said they
seldom troubled the inhabitants for billets,—had only one thing to
regret, viz. that they did not get the liberty “that ither sogers
get—the Prussians and them,” for “there’s nae use in our being
mealy-mou’d, if the ithers are to tak' what they like, the d—d Prussians
ken better what they’re about,” and although, “ilka body praises us, but
very few gie us ony thing.” In reply to the question, whether the Duke
of Wellington took severe measures to enforce his principles regarding
the lives and property of the inhabitants at the seat of war, they said:
“Na, sir, no here, for the men ken him gailies now; but in Spain we
aften had ugly jobs. He hung fifteen men in ae day there, after he had
been ordering about it God knows how long. And d—n me if he didna ance
gar the Provost-Marshal flog mare than a dizen of the wimen; for the
wimen thought themselves safe, and so they were war’ than the men. They
got sax and therty lashes a piece on the bare doup, and it was lang
afore it was forgotten on ’em. Ane o’ ’em was Meg Donaldson, the best
woman in our regiment, for whatever she might tak’ she didna keep it a’
to hersel’.”[51]
-----
Footnote 51:
_Paris revisited in 1815_ , p. 253.
-----
The demeanour of the British troops was friendly to the French, and few
brawls took place between them; this contrasted with what occurred to
the Prussians, who had frequent and fierce encounters with the populace.
The English soldiers were usually to be seen on the Boulevard du Temple,
which at that time was an open space (but has since then been built
over), and there they used to amuse themselves by watching jugglers,
mountebanks, rope-dancers and other shows. A certain number of men of
the armies of occupation were admitted free into the theatres; and we
are told that a party of Guardsmen, headed by a sergeant, saw a piece
admirably put on the stage, entitled _Les Anglaises pour rire_, in which
Englishwomen were grotesquely caricatured. Not understanding the
language, nor the acting, and being indignant at the insults they
supposed were levelled against their countrywomen, the honest fellows
stormed the stage, and drove off, not only the actors, but the police
who attempted to arrest them. “It must be remembered that the only
revenge which the Parisians were able to take upon their conquerors, was
to ridicule them; and the English generally took it in good humour, and
laughed at the extravagant drollery of the burlesque.” Notwithstanding
these minor disputes, good feeling existed; and although numerous
Prussians were assassinated in Paris and in the country, there was only
one soldier of British nationality found dead in the streets of the
capital, and, in his case, there were no signs of violence upon him.[52]
-----
Footnote 52:
Gronow, _Reminiscences_ , i. 92.
-----
[Illustration:
SERGEANT. 1658. DRUMMER. 1658.
N.R. Wilkinson del. A.D. Innes & C^o London. Mintern
Bros. lith.
]
That Wellington should be appealed to, to lighten the burden placed on
the miserable people who groaned under the invader’s despotism, is
natural enough; and there are petitions recorded on the part of the
inhabitants of Le Cateau and Roye, asking that British troops might
continue to garrison those towns, so that they might be placed under
their protection.[53] But it was not always that he could do anything
for them. We find, for instance, M. de Breteuil, who, according to
himself, was “one of the most faithful subjects of Louis XVIII.” and who
had “given the King proofs of devotion,” complaining bitterly that not
only was his house and property, situated at three leagues distant from
St. Quentin, pillaged, but that the town itself was mulcted in a sum of
1,200,000 francs, of which he had to pay 20,000 (£800), because he had a
single house there, “which brings in nothing, and is, on the contrary,
full of soldiers.” To this complaint, Wellington could only reply, “I
have no troops in St. Quentin, and never had any in that town. I think
you ought to address yourself to Marshal Prince Blücher.”[54]
-----
Footnote 53:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 85, 101.
Footnote 54:
_Ibid._ , xi. 19.
-----
Nor was the King unmindful of what he owed to the British army for their
discipline; for, having invited the principal Officers to the Tuileries,
and having formed them in a circle about him, he told them, in broken
English, in the presence of the Emperor of Austria, “I congratulate you,
gentlemen, upon the result of your valour and conduct; but I am most
grateful to you for your generosity and humanity towards my poor
misguided people; the father and the family will for ever hold it
remembrance.”[55]
-----
Footnote 55:
Letter of Lieut.-Colonel Sir W. Gomm, who was present upon that
occasion, to his Aunt, July 16, 1815, _Letters and Journals of
Field-Marshal Sir W. Gomm, G.C.B._ , p. 376 (London, 1881). See also
Alison’s _History of Europe_ , 1789-1815, x. 968. The Duc de Richelieu
(Foreign Minister) wrote on this subject to the Duke of Wellington,
January 19, 1816, “Sa Majesté m’a spécialement recommandé de saisir
cette occasion pour faire connaître à Votre Excellence combien elle a
été satisfaite de la conduite des troupes Anglaises dans la capitale,
et du soin qui a été mis par les chefs à alléger les charges
indispensablement attachées à la présence de ces troupes. Sa Majesté
sait à cet égard tout ce qu’elle vous doit, My Lord; et elle a voulu
que je vous donasse de nouveau l’assurance qu’elle ne perdrait jamais
le souvenir des témoignages de déférence et d’affection qu’elle a
reçus de vous” (_Supplementary Despatches, etc._, xi. 282).
-----
In order to give employment to the men under his command, and to help
the French peasants, at a time when labour was very scarce, the Duke of
Wellington allowed British soldiers to reap the harvest. The owners of
the harvest were to make their own bargains with the men direct, but
application for labourers were to be made by the mayors of districts,
and not by private individuals. Commanding Officers also were to know
exactly where each soldier was employed; and the men were to return to
their regiments every night, if possible, or at all events twice a
week.[56]
-----
Footnote 56:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 73.
-----
Towards the end of October, the Division of Guards, hitherto in the Bois
de Boulogne, marched into Paris, and occupied on the 30th, the Casernes
Rue Verte, Montblanc, and Rue Temple, the Palais Louis XV., and the
Abbatoire de Roule. The 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards were thus lodged
in barracks in the capital; and the general alarm post for the Division
was the Palais Louis XV.[57] At the same time, a general change of
quarters took place among the whole of the British troops, and camps
were abandoned for houses. Wellington issued on the 28th of October,
strict orders for the protection of the inhabitants, to apply whenever
men were to be billeted, or when they were marching through the
country.[58]
-----
Footnote 57:
_Orders for the Piquet_ : “In the event of any disturbance in the
neighbourhood, the Piquet will fall in in front of the barrack gate,
and detach a sergeant’s party to the right and left, if necessary, to
observe what is going on. The Lieutenant on this duty will send an
immediate Report to the Officer Commanding the Battalion. The
Lieutenant inspecting the messes, at one o’clock, and the Ensign will
inspect the barrack rooms at half-past twelve, and will take care to
enforce the barrack regulations. The same to be mentioned in the
report of the senior Officer at dismounting. The Battalion will
assemble in the barrack yard, in case of any riots of a serious
nature, and will wait the orders of a Field-Officer, who will cause it
to move to the Place Louis XV., if it appears expedient. Officers on
detached duties will, in case of serious disturbance, likewise move to
the Place Louis XV.” (_Battalion Order_ , Paris, Nov. 3, 1815). The
public duties in Paris, found by the two Guards Brigades and by the
King’s German Legion on the 5th of November, amounted to 1 Captain, 12
Subalterns, 38 sergeants, 55 corporals, 13 drummers, and 587 privates.
Footnote 58:
Appendix No. II.
-----
We left the wreck of Napoleon’s beaten army south of the Loire, where
they were under the command of Marshal Davoût. There was nothing more
for them now to hope, and their Commander soon persuaded them to conform
to the circumstances of the hour, and, throwing aside their Eagles, to
hoist the white flag of the Bourbons, and to adopt the white cockade.
This they did, and shortly after, by Royal decree, dated the 23rd of
July, they were disbanded. At the same time, a new army was forthwith to
be formed, to consist of eighty Legions of infantry (103 officers and
1,687 men each), one to be raised in every Department, and to bear its
name; forty-seven regiments of cavalry, and twelve regiments of
artillery,—or a military force of some 200,000 regular troops. Disbanded
Imperialists were allowed to engage after proper examination.[59] The
command was entrusted to Marshal Macdonald, who had remained firm in his
allegiance to the King, during the whole of the Hundred Days of the
second French Empire; and he replaced Davoût, who resigned.
-----
Footnote 59:
Baines, _Wars of the French Revolution_ , ii. 519.
-----
Immediately hostilities came to an end by the Convention of the 3rd, a
large number of English people went over to Paris, on business or
pleasure, and settled in that gay capital, almost as if it had been
their own. Coaches were soon brought over, and horse-racing introduced,
contrasting very much in the disfavour of the native _sport_, which the
King endeavoured to encourage, but which was then quite in its infancy.
In short, the English made themselves thoroughly at home.
“Going along the _Rue du Faubourg St. Denis_, we saw many of the
British privates sauntering with a lazy air of enjoyment, looking at
the print stalls where they were caricatured, cheapening grapes with
the fruit girls, or treating themselves to a glass of lemonade. Our
Officers, too, swarmed about, mounted—some well, some very badly; for
those who could not procure a decent animal, put up with almost any
creature that had four legs. Contrasting remarkably with the heavy
cabriolets and clumsy dirty coaches—the awkward calèches and grotesque
voitures—English equipages, complete, light, and genteel, glanced
rapidly by, spattering, as foreigners, mortification from their wheels
on the vehicles of the country. To estimate this exhibition properly,
it is necessary to fancy its counterpart displayed by Frenchmen in
London; to imagine a Frenchman of fashion, vested with magnificent
amplitude of box-coat and commanding longitude of whip, spanking his
four blood greys down Bond Street and St. James’s Street, or drawing
up smartly, in a knowing style of driving, to talk over the topics of
the morning with the Officer of the French Guards, on duty at the
Palace of the King of England!”[60]
-----
Footnote 60:
_Paris revisited in 1815_ , p. 265.
-----
All eyes were turned to Paris at that time. Many Sovereigns were living
there—the Monarchs of Austria, Russia, Prussia, Holland, Bavaria,
Wurtemburg, and France, and several independent Princes of Germany. They
were accompanied by some of the most distinguished statesmen and
diplomatists of the age; and military leaders were also present who
enjoyed a European reputation for their achievements in the field.
Events of transcendent importance were taking place in this capital; and
the fate of a great and gallant nation, outlawed for a quarter of a
century, and now reduced to submission, was being decided. Curiosity
urged many to go to France, from all parts of Europe, at this historic
juncture; the pleasures of society moved others, and duty took a still
larger number there. “All the world’s in Paris,”[61] was indeed true,
and crowds flocked to that city; while the discordant elements to be
found there, and the strange medley of Frenchmen, Englishmen, and
foreigners of almost every nationality, brought together and kept
together, at such a time and at such a place, presented at once a scene
that was both unique and remarkable.
-----
Footnote 61:
Popular song of the day.
-----
Paris was gay and dissolute, and the Palais Royal might be called the
centre of dissipation.
“Mingled together, and moving about the area of this oblong square
block of buildings, might be seen, about seven o’clock p.m., a crowd
of English, Russian, Prussian, Austrian, and other Officers of the
Allied armies, together with countless foreigners from all parts of
the world. Here, too, might have been seen the present King of
Prussia” (the late Emperor William I. of Germany), “with his father
and brother, the Dukes of Nassau, Baden, and a host of Continental
Princes, who entered familiarly into the amusements of ordinary
mortals, dining _incog._ at the most renowned restaurants, and
flirting with painted female frailty.”[62]
-----
Footnote 62:
Gronow, _Reminiscences_ , i. 90.
-----
The Palais Royal contained the principal, but by no means the only,
gambling hell in Paris, and these constituted the “very fountains of
immorality.” “There were tables for all classes; the workman might play
with twenty sous, or the gentleman with ten thousand francs. The law did
not prevent any class from indulging in a vice that assisted to fill the
coffers of the municipality of Paris.”[63]
-----
Footnote 63:
_Ibid._ , i. 87.
-----
In such a society it was only natural that constant disputes should
arise between men who gave way to dissipation, and who, full of life and
spirits and of national prejudices, had little to occupy them beyond the
mere routine of military duty. Men’s minds were in a state of
excitement, and all were engaged in defending interests which frequently
conflicted with those of their temporary companions. These disputes
could only be settled at that time by the sword or pistol. Numerous
duels accordingly took place, sometimes between Royalists and
Imperialists, and often between Frenchmen and the representatives of the
invaders. It is stated that in almost every case the aggressors were the
French; and while the English Officers had sometimes to defend
themselves against the insolence of the natives, it appears that the
Prussians, who used to congregate at the Café Foy in the Palais Royal,
were the principal victims of Gallic fury, and were assailed more
pertinaciously than the rest by half-pay French Officers, who went on
purpose to pick quarrels with them.
“Swords were quickly drawn, and frequently the most bloody frays took
place; these originated, not in any personal hatred, but from national
jealousy on the part of the French, who could not bear the sight of
foreign soldiers in the capital.... On one occasion our Guards, who
were on duty at the Palais Royal, were called out to put an end to one
of these encounters, in which fourteen Prussians and ten Frenchmen
were either killed or wounded.”[64]
-----
Footnote 64:
Gronow, _Reminiscences_ , i. 106.
-----
France was the possessor of the most extensive collection of works of
art ever before known; acquired, not by the genius of her people, but by
the grasping policy of her Imperial master. Napoleon, having taken
possession of every large city in continental Europe, during the
plenitude of his power, had systematically seized all that was
remarkable therein, and had transferred his plunder to Paris. The French
were inordinately proud of this vast and unique collection, which served
to flatter their vanity and to form a lasting monument of their
extraordinary military successes. It had been untouched by the Allies in
1814, but in 1815 the disturbers of Europe were to be severely punished,
and the stolen property was to be restored to its former owners.
Attempts having failed to effect a restoration amicably, owing to the
opposition of Talleyrand, forcible possession of the Louvre was taken on
the 23rd of September, by a body of British troops, and with the
assistance of Austrians and Prussians, the splendid galleries of that
palace were stripped of those treasures of art, which belonged
principally to Italy and to the Netherlands. Out of fifteen hundred
celebrated pictures, it is said that only seventy-four were left in
Paris. The restoration of the statuary was not less complete; and the
well-known antique Corinthian bronze horses, taken from Venice, to form,
in the Place Carrousel, the supporters of the great monument,
designed—but not finished—to perpetuate Napoleon’s fame, were taken down
and conveyed back to that city. Nothing affected the Parisians so much
as this act of strict justice; for it showed them their own absolute
weakness and humiliation, and it wounded their pride in the most
sensitive point.[65]
-----
Footnote 65:
_Paris revisited in 1815_ , p. 312, etc.; Alison, _History of Europe,
from 1789-1815_, x. 969.
-----
The policy of revenge and proscription against persons who aided and
abetted Napoleon in the early part of 1815, which had been announced in
the proclamations issued by Louis at Cambrai before he entered Paris
(June 25th and 28th), was not to remain a dead letter; and we have now
to mention some of the saddest incidents which took place at this crisis
in French history, and which were witnessed by the British army. Fouché
had become Minister of Police. He justified his acceptance of that post
by declaring that he wished to save the men who were threatened with
vengeance.[66] Upon him it devolved to carry out this policy, and though
he did so with outward reluctance, and told the King that there had been
no conspiracy to dethrone him in favour of Napoleon—which appears to
have been quite true, for all acted on the wild impulse of the
moment,—yet still he was not ashamed to come forward in the odious light
of an accuser against his former friends. On the 24th of July, two
ordinances, countersigned by himself, were published, by which
thirty-two Peers who had joined Napoleon’s Upper House, established
since the 20th of March, were declared to have forfeited their rights to
the French Peerage; twenty Officers and other Officials were at the same
time ordered to be arrested, and brought to trial before a
court-martial; and thirty-nine more were desired to quit Paris in three
days, to places pointed out by the Minister of Police, and to remain
there under his supervision, until the new Chambers should decide
whether they were to be banished, or delivered over for trial to the
tribunals.[67]
-----
Footnote 66:
Thiers, _Histoire du Consulat et l'Empire_, xx. 516 (Paris, 1862).
Footnote 67:
Baines, _Wars of the French Revolution_ , ii. 517. It appears that
these ordinances did not evoke dissatisfaction from the British
Government, for Lord Liverpool, writing to Mr. Canning on the 4th of
August, says, “One can never feel that the King is secure upon his
throne till he has _dared_ to spill traitor’s blood: it is not that
many examples would be necessary; but the _daring_ to make a few will
alone manifest any strength in the Government” (_Supplementary
Despatches, etc._ , xi. 95). On the other hand, they raised much
indignation on the part of the friends of the incriminated persons,
and several letters were written to the Duke of Wellington, to implore
his powerful intercession in their distress. Apparently he could do
nothing for them, except in the case of General Lobau (_ibid._, xi.
59, 101, 273). Marshal Davoût was not included in the list of
proscribed persons, but he wrote to the War-Minister, Marshal Gouvion
St. Cyr (July 27th), to protest energetically against the injustice,
which he alleged had been done to such men as Gilly, Grouchy, Clausel,
Laborde, and others, whose only fault was that they had carried out
orders, which he had given them as Minister of War. He maintained that
his own name ought to be substituted for theirs, and he drew attention
to the assurances given by the King, that if the army made its simple
and unconditional submission, His Majesty would show clemency and do
more than was desired (_ibid._, xi. 70). Davoût was then near a
somewhat exasperated and only partially converted force of
Imperialists, south of the Loire, and, had his arrest been
contemplated, the attempt to carry it out might have been accompanied
by unpleasant consequences to the ultra-Royalists. Among the
proscribed, there appeared the name of Carnot, colleague of Fouché in
the Provisional Government, and like him a regicide and a man of the
Revolution. Upon what principle Carnot should have been banished, and
Fouché should have been made a Minister under Louis XVIII. is
difficult to determine; but such was the policy of the reactionary
party. Carnot, naturally indignant that he should have been marked out
for vengeance by his colleague, wrote to him, “Où veux tu que je me
retire, traître?” while the latter replied with equal brevity, “Où tu
voudras, imbécile.” Fouché did not long survive the fate of those he
had betrayed; driven from power in September, he was appointed
minister at Dresden, but shortly afterwards he was exiled by a decree
which was fulminated against all who had voted for the death of the
unfortunate Louis XVI., and thus fittingly terminated his career of
intrigue and treachery.
-----
The first victim put upon his trial was General Labedoyère, who
commanded the regiment at Grenoble that deserted its post and joined
Napoleon in his famous march from Cannes to Paris. His defection had
given the first signal to the universal revolt against the King’s
authority that followed, and was one of the causes of the Emperor’s
success; the partisans of the King were therefore more than ordinarily
embittered against him. He admitted the facts of his treachery; he
contented himself by defending his honour by declaring that, though he
might have been misled by illusions, by recollections of his former
master, and by a false idea of honour and of what was due to his
country, he was no traitor or conspirator, and hoped that his death
might atone his error. He was shot on the 19th of August.
Next day Marshal Ney, who had been previously apprehended in the
Department of Lot, was examined at the Conciergerie; but his case was
adjourned till later in the year. Meanwhile the King’s Government was
overthrown, in September, and an ultra-Royalist Ministry established,
with the avowed intention of showing no clemency to the proscribed.
Ney’s trial accordingly took place early in November, and he was at
first arraigned before a court-martial of four Marshals.[68] But the
latter decided that the prisoner, being a Peer, was entitled to be
judged by his peers, and it devolved upon the Upper House to do so. His
guilt was clearly established, and it was rendered all the more heinous
by the protestations of loyalty with which he quitted Louis when he left
Paris to arrest the progress of Napoleon, promising to bring the latter
back in an iron cage. For some days he remained true to his duty, but,
though a brave man, he was singularly impulsive, and was not endowed
with much discretion or judgment. A frenzy of delirium had seized hold
of the Royal troops, who were flocking to Napoleon’s standards, and Ney
began to fear that he had not sufficient force to resist his former
master; his moral courage began to fail. Dreading, above all things, a
civil war, he resolved that no step of his should precipitate such a
calamity; believing that the cause of the Bourbons was irretrievably
lost, and, carried away by the violent excitement of the moment, he
forgot his promises and the trust reposed in him, and wildly threw in
his lot with the Emperor.[69] Thereby he dealt a final blow to the
fortunes of the King. For his defence, it was pleaded that the Military
Convention of the 3rd, had guaranteed that no person in the capital
should be disturbed or called to account, for his conduct or political
opinions; but the Chamber refused to entertain the plea, and he was
condemned to death by one hundred and thirty-nine votes against
seventeen (December 6th). Strenuous efforts were made to obtain the
prisoner’s release on account of the Convention, and applications were
addressed to the Duke of Wellington, Lord Liverpool, and even to the
Prince Regent on the subject. But these high authorities declined to do
anything for him, on the ground that the Convention related only to the
military occupation of Paris, and that, while the article in question
prevented the Allies from adopting measures of severity towards persons
in the capital, yet it did not, and could not, prevent the French
Government from acting in this respect, as they might deem fit.[70]
-----
Footnote 68:
Marshals Jourdain, Massena, Augereau, and Mortier (Baines, _Wars,
etc._ , ii. 525).
Footnote 69:
1815. Henry Houssaye, _La Première Restauration, le Retour de l'Ile
d'Elbe, les Cent Jours_, pp. 301-315 (3me edit.: Paris, 1893).
Footnote 70:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 235.
-----
The execution took place in the gardens of the Luxembourg palace, at
nine o’clock in the morning of December 7th, when Ney met his death with
calmness and courage. It shed a deep gloom over Paris, and did little,
as might have been expected, to serve the King. Had Louis shown clemency
to the man who had deeply wronged him, and whose reputation had thereby
become sullied, instead of proceeding to extremities by violating the
Convention of July 3rd, his credit would have been raised. While the
justice of such action becomes all the more clear, since it was
stipulated that, in the case of difficulties arising, a favourable
interpretation was to be given to the claims of the French army and of
the city of Paris. Further, as foreign armies have no right to punish
the inhabitants of a conquered State for political opinions or conduct,
the Convention either bound Louis, on whose behalf the capital was
taken, or else it had no value whatsoever.[71]
-----
Footnote 71:
Baines, _Wars of the French Revolution_ , ii. 527.
-----
The third and last victim selected for vengeance by the ultra-Royal
party was General Lavalette, a relation by marriage of the Emperor, and
Director of Posts, who was convicted of having misused his power in
favour of Napoleon, when the latter reached Fontainebleau in March.
Having been in civil employ, he was condemned to death by the
guillotine; and the sentence, in spite of appeals to the mercy of the
King, was to be carried out on December 21st. In this case, however, the
Government were baulked of their prey, and the prisoner made good his
escape by the courage and devotion of his wife, with the assistance of
three Englishmen. His wife having exchanged dresses with him, Lavalette
got out of prison; but he remained in hiding in Paris for more than
twelve days, not being able to leave the closely guarded city until the
8th of January; when, by the co-operation of Mr. Bruce, and Captain
Hutchinson, Grenadier Guards (afterwards Earl of Donoughmore), he drove
to Compiègne in an open carriage, disguised as a British Officer, and
accompanied by General Sir Robert Wilson. It was with difficulty that
the latter piloted him out of France, but this was at last managed
successfully. Sir Robert then returned to Paris on the 10th, and the
police, having received information of the facts of the case, he,
Captain Hutchinson, and Mr. Bruce were immediately arrested and
confined, awaiting trial, till the 22nd of April, 1816, when they were
condemned to be imprisoned for three months. That a distinguished
Officer of high rank in the British army, and well known in Europe for
his personal animosity against Napoleon, should have actively interfered
to save the life of one of the latter’s best friends, was a sufficient
reason to put a stop to further acts of the bloodshed, which cast so
unnecessary a shadow over the first months of the restoration of King
Louis.[72]
-----
Footnote 72:
_Ibid._ , ii. 527; Gronow, _Reminiscences_ , i. 100. See also
_Supplementary Despatches_ , _etc._, xi. 275, 279, 333, 341; and
_Annual Register_ , 1816, “Appendix to Chronicle,” p. 329.
-----
The negotiations which had been going on continually between the Allied
Sovereigns and Louis XVIII., ever since they and their counsellors
arrived in Paris, terminated at last by a treaty of peace, dated
November 20th. There were matters of considerable difficulty to be
discussed, before a general agreement could be arrived at between so
many independent nations, whose interests were not all identical. The
situation, moreover, was somewhat complex, and this is shown by Lord
Liverpool who, writing to Mr. Canning, on the 4th of August, says:—
“By demanding considerable sacrifices from France for the security of
Europe, we unavoidably lower the character of the Government, which it
is our wish to uphold; on the other hand, the stability of that
Government, after the Allies shall have evacuated France, is so very
problematical, that we should not do our duty to Europe if we looked
to no other security than that which the legitimate government of the
King of France could in itself hold out to us.”[73]
-----
Footnote 73:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 95.
-----
By the Treaty, the eastern frontier, from the North Sea to the
Mediterranean, was restricted generally, to the line that existed in
1790; and thus the French lost a strip of territory which, in 1814, had
been ceded to them, including the fortresses of Landau, Sarre-Louis,
Philippeville, and Marienburg. France had moreover to pay a war
indemnity of 700,000,000 francs, for the expenses of the war. Further,
an army of not more than 150,000 men, formed of British, Russian,
Austrian, Prussian, and German troops, in about equal proportions, and
under a Commander-in-chief appointed by the Allied Sovereigns, was to
occupy seventeen fortresses along the northern frontier, from Condé,
Valenciennes, Bouchain, and Cambrai, to the _tête de pont_ of Fort Louis
on the Rhine. The occupation was to continue for three years certain,
and might last for another two years. This mixed army was placed under
the supreme command of the Duke of Wellington, and all the expenses
incurred by it were to be defrayed by the French. It was understood that
the primary object of these latter stipulations was to preserve Louis on
the throne, and to give time for the consolidation of his government.
Lastly, a sum of 835,000,000 francs was exacted by way of compensation
to the Powers, for the spoliations and losses which they suffered during
the Revolution, and to indemnify the minor States for their recent
expenses. Thus, the French had to submit to the payment of more than
sixty-one million sterling, as the result of their defeat; and this sum
did not include the vast amounts which were otherwise taken from them,
under the head of contributions for the armies that invaded their
country, or that were to be maintained there, for the purpose of
inducing them to conform to the new order which had just been
established.[74]
-----
Footnote 74:
Baines, _Wars of the French Revolution_ , ii. 529, 530, where the text
of the Treaty is given; Alison, _History of Europe, 1789-1815_ , x.
972.
-----
CHAPTER III.
OCCUPATION OF FRENCH FORTRESSES.
Organization of the Allied army of occupation, under the supreme command
of the Duke of Wellington—Return of the remainder to their
respective countries—Instructions of the Allied Courts to
Wellington—Convention relating to the occupation, attached to the
Treaty of Paris—Positions assigned to each contingent on the
north-eastern frontier of France—March from Paris to
Cambrai—Military precautions—Camps of instruction and field
exercises—Reduction of the army of occupation—Difficulties with the
French—Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle—Evacuation of France—The Guards
Brigade leave Cambrai, after nearly three years' stay there, and
embark at Calais—Valedictory Orders—The Coldstream sent to
Chatham—Conclusion of military service in French territory.
In consequence of the Treaty of Paris, November 20, 1815, the capital
was to be relieved of the unwelcome presence of the invader, and all the
troops not required for the occupation of the north-eastern frontier
were to evacuate France as soon as possible, and to be sent back to
their respective homes. Of the Allied army of occupation, 150,000
strong, Great Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia supplied a
contingent of 30,000 men each; of the remainder 10,000 were Bavarians,
while Denmark, Saxony, Hanover, and Wurtemburg furnished each a force of
5000 men.
By a General Order, dated the 30th of November, the future organization
of the British contingent was notified. It was formed of 3 brigades of
cavalry (3 regiments each), 3 divisions of infantry, and 60 guns; the
cavalry under the command of Lieut.-General Lord Combermere, and the
infantry under Lieut.-General Lord Hill. The First Division
(Lieut.-General Sir L. Cole) was composed of 3 brigades (8 battalions);
the Second Division (Lieut.-General Sir H. Clinton) of 3 brigades (9
battalions); and the Third Division (Lieut.-General Sir C. Colville) of
3 brigades (8 battalions). The 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards, and the
2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards, who were ordered to remain in France,
formed the 1st Brigade of the First Division, under Major-General Sir P.
Maitland.[75] The Duke of Wellington, having in the same General Order
provided for the return home of the rest of the army, took leave of the
gallant troops now about to be dispersed, in these words:—
“Upon breaking up the army which the Field-Marshal has had the honour
of commanding, he begs leave again to return thanks to the General
Officers and the Officers and troops, for their uniform good conduct.
In the short but memorable campaign they have given proofs to the
world that they possess in an eminent degree all the good qualities of
soldiers; and the Field-Marshal is happy to be able to applaud their
regular good conduct in their camps and cantonments, not less than
when engaged with the enemy in the field. Whatever may be the future
destination of those brave troops of which the Field-Marshal now takes
his leave, he trusts that every individual will believe that he will
ever feel the deepest interest in their honour and welfare, and will
always be happy to promote either.”[76]
-----
Footnote 75:
Captain Gunthorpe, Grenadier Guards, Brigade Major of the 1st Guards
Brigade during the campaign, was appointed to the same post in the 1st
Brigade, First Division of the army of occupation (_General Order_,
Dec. 2, 1815).
Footnote 76:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._, xi. 248, etc.
-----
The despatch upon which the above arrangements were made was
communicated to Wellington by H.R.H. the Duke of York by letter, dated
the 9th of November, and is reproduced in an Appendix.[77]
-----
Footnote 77:
See Appendix, No. III. It will be observed therein that the Coldstream
Battalion was to be reinforced by 204 men. On the 13th of November a
detachment of that strength, from the 1st Battalion, marched from
London for this purpose, under Lieut.-Colonel Adams, Captain
Wedderburn, and Lieutenants Powys and Kortright, (the first two were
to return to the 1st Battalion), and arrived in Paris on the 6th of
December. On March 7, 1816, Officers were posted as follows in the 2nd
Battalion:—
Captains. Lieutenants. Ensigns. Staff.
Grenadier Company: Capt. Anstruther. ... Assist.-Surg. Smith.
Lt.-Colonel D. ” Hon. J. Rous.
MacKinnon. ” ” R. Moore.
No. 1 Company: Capt. Sowerby. Lt. Kortright. Adjt. Capt. J.
Lt.-Colonel J. ” Montagu. Prince.
Macdonell, C.B. Quarter-M. Selway.
Surg. W. Whymper.
No. 2 Company: Capt. Sandilands. Lt. Cuyler.
Colonel Hon. A. ” Short.
Abercromby, C.B.
No. 3 Company: Capt. Drummond. Lt. Vane.
Lt.-Colonel Sir W. ” Douglas.
Gomm, K.C.B.
No. 4 Company: Capt. Chaplin. Lt. Gooch.
Lt.-Colonel Hon. ” Gordon.
E. Acheson, C.B.
No. 5 Company: Capt. Walton. Lt. Powys.
Lt.-Colonel Hon. ” Bowen.
H. Pakenham, C.B.
No. 6 Company: Capt. Lord Hotham. Lt. Griffiths.
Lieut.-Colonel H. ” FitzClarence.
Wyndham.
No. 7 Company: Capt. Cowell. Lt. Armytage.
Lt.-Colonel Sir R. ” Hon. W.
Arbuthnot, K.C.B. Forbes.
No. 8 Company: Capt. Girardot. Lt. Beaufoy.
Lt.-Col. H. ” Hervey.
Dawkins.
Light Infantry Major Bowles. ... Asst.-Surg. Hunter.
Company: Capt. Shirley.
Lt.-Colonel ” Harvey.
Hon. J. Walpole.
-----
The Prussian contingent was commanded by Lieut.-General von Ziethen, and
consisted of 10 infantry regiments (thirty battalions), 1 battalion of
Jägers, 9 regiments of cavalry (thirty-six squadrons), and 80 guns,
formed into five brigades of infantry, and three of cavalry.
The Austrian corps, under General Baron von Frimont, contained 22½
battalions, 28½ squadrons, and 96 guns, divided into three divisions of
two brigades each.
The Russians, under Lieut.-General Count Woronzow,—24 battalions, 6
regiments of cavalry (thirty-four squadrons), and 84 guns: two infantry
divisions (of three brigades each), and the cavalry division (also of
three brigades).
Prince Frederick of Hesse commanded the Danish contingent,—5 battalions,
4 squadrons, and 20 guns (two brigades). Major-General Sir J. Lyon
(relieved afterwards by Count Alten), the Hanoverians,—6 battalions, 4
squadrons, and 6 guns (two brigades). Lieut.-General Baron de Wöllwarth
(replaced afterwards by General Count Scheler), the Wurtemburgers,—6
battalions, 4 squadrons, and 6 guns. Major-General von Gablenz, the
Saxons,—5 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 8 guns. And Lieut.-General de la
Motte, the Bavarians,—3 regiments of infantry, and 2 of cavalry.[78]
-----
Footnote 78:
The number of guns is not stated.
-----
It had already been agreed by the four great Powers (Great Britain,
Austria, Russia, and Prussia), on the 22nd of October, that the Allied
armies—other than the corps required for the occupation—should evacuate
French territory as soon as possible, and Wellington was commissioned to
make the necessary arrangements for this purpose. Even before that date,
the Russians, having a long way to march home before the winter set in,
began to move eastwards; and Blücher intimated, as far back as the 8th
of October, that, having been desired to withdraw towards Prussian
territory, he was giving orders for the purpose of carrying out the
intentions of his Government. The evacuation, however, by the British
troops, did not begin till the middle of December, when, marching to
Calais, they were shipped over to England with the least delay possible
under the supervision of Major-General Sir D. Pack; but adverse winds
retarded the operation, and it was only completed on the 4th of
February, 1816.
When the Allied Sovereigns placed the supreme command of the army of
occupation in the hands of Wellington, they gave him instructions to
enable him to carry out the duty with which they entrusted him. On the
20th of November, they dealt with the political situation, by reminding
him that the objects for which their troops were stationed in France
were: (1) to secure the execution of the treaties concluded with that
country, and (2) to protect Europe from French violence, and from
internal revolutionary upheavals which were liable to take place among
the people. They said their hopes of tranquillity were founded upon the
system which they had established in the country, and they attached the
greatest importance to the maintenance of a legitimate Sovereign, in the
person of Louis XVIII. Until such times, therefore, as the forces of the
King were organized, it was to be the duty of the Allied armies, in
concert with the French Government, to protect the capital and the Royal
family from popular effervescence; with this view the Commander-in-chief
was empowered to delay his march from Paris until His Most Christian
Majesty should notify to him that his presence in the capital was no
longer necessary. The Allied Sovereigns, moreover, did not desire their
troops to perform mere police duties, or to interfere in the internal
administration of the country; but this did not exempt them from the
obligation they were under, to maintain Louis on the throne of France,
and “to support him against every revolutionary convulsion which might
tend to upset by force the order just established, and to compromise the
general tranquillity.” They did not disguise from themselves that it
would be a delicate matter to judge when intervention might become
necessary, but they announced their entire confidence in the British
Commander-in-chief, to whose discretion they left the matter, should it
ever arise. In order, however, to enable him to form a correct opinion
upon it, they instructed him to take into consideration the views of the
diplomatic Agents of the Powers residing in Paris. Finally, the latter
were directed to send him, at least once a week, a united and common
report, when he was absent from the capital; and they were also to
transmit, in their corporate capacity, any communication which he might
think it proper to address to the French Government.[79]
-----
Footnote 79:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._, xi. 240.
-----
The military situation had been considered at an earlier date (October
22nd), with the following conclusions: Full authority over the Allied
army was given to the Commander-in-chief, who was enjoined to consult,
as far as he could, the usages which prevailed in each contingent. The
troops of each nationality were to be quartered as much as possible
together, and on the lines of communications leading to their respective
countries; they were to be under the immediate command of their own
Generals, and everything relating to the discipline or to the interior
economy of the various corps was to be dealt with by their own Officers.
General Officers commanding contingents were formally placed under the
supreme command of the Duke of Wellington; they were ordered to send
their reports to him, and to obey him in all the dispositions which he
might deem it his duty to make. Lastly, the French Government were
invited to arrange with him, without delay, all matters affecting the
occupation and the maintenance of the troops, as well as the “execution
of particular conventions to regulate both these objects.”[80]
-----
Footnote 80:
_Ibid._, xi. 208.
-----
Attached to the Treaty of the 20th of November there was a Convention,
which was “as valid as if inserted word for word” in the Treaty, and, by
Article No. 4,—
(1) The Allied troops were to occupy the Departments of Pas de Calais,
Nord, Ardennes, Meuse, Moselle, Lower and Upper Rhine, their line of
demarcation being the frontiers of these Departments respectively.
(2) A neutral zone was established between the above-mentioned strip of
French territory in foreign occupation, and the remainder of the
kingdom, in which neither the French nor the Allies were to maintain any
military force, except for some special reason, and then only by mutual
agreement. This zone was bounded on the south and west, by the river
Somme to Ham, thence in nearly a straight line to Chalons-sur-Marne,
whence it continued to a point between Joinville and Chaumont; from that
place it took an easterly direction to Blamont, and then ran south to
the Swiss frontier near St. Hypolite.
(3) The French were to have power to garrison certain places within the
territory to be occupied by the Allies; but the forces to be quartered
there were not to exceed the number which was laid down, and only such
war _matériel_ and stores as properly belonged to these places were to
be kept there, the remainder to be removed into the kingdom west of the
neutral zone. Altogether 22,000 men were allowed to garrison these
places, the largest number being in the following fortresses, viz.
Calais, where the garrison was not to exceed 1000 men; St. Omer, 1500;
Arras, 1000; Lille, 3000; Dunkerque, 1000; Douai and Fort Scarpe, 1000;
Metz, 3000; Strasburg, 3000; Schelstadt, 1000; Neu Brisach and Fort
Mortier, 1000; and Belfort, 1000 men.[81]
-----
Footnote 81:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._, xi. 192.
-----
The British contingent was ready to move to its allotted stations by the
beginning of the year 1816; but a delay occurred in consequence of the
representations made by the Duc de Richelieu, the French Minister of
Foreign affairs, who believed that it would be dangerous to leave Paris
unguarded until the discussions on the law of Amnesty, which was then
being debated, had terminated.[82] Wellington adds, “From what I have
seen and heard likewise of the King’s Guard, I don’t conceive it is as
yet a body in which much confidence could be placed, in case there
should be any disturbance in this town.”[83]
-----
Footnote 82:
The law of Amnesty, as it was called, raised many fierce animosities.
It received the Royal sanction on January 12th. By this law, the
ordinances against proscribed persons were ratified and extended.
Exiled persons might be deprived of their property; the relations of
Napoleon were excluded for ever from the kingdom, and were declared
incapable of enjoying civil rights or of possessing any property.
“Regicides, who, in contempt of a clemency almost boundless, ...
accepted offices or employment from the Usurper, and who, by so doing,
declared themselves irreconcilable enemies of France and of the lawful
Government, are for ever excluded the realm, and are bound to quit it
in the space of one month, under pain of the punishment enacted by the
33rd Article of the Penal Code; they cannot possess any civil right in
France, nor any property, title, or pension granted to them of favour”
(_Annual Register_ , 1816, “General History,” p. 107). It was in
virtue of this clause, that Fouché was banished by his recent allies.
Footnote 83:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 265.
-----
These difficulties, however, were speedily overcome; and on the 24th of
January, the Commander-in-chief of the army of occupation wrote to the
Ambassador of Great Britain and to the Plenipotentiaries of the other
Allied Powers, saying that he proposed forthwith to evacuate the
capital. These Ministers having agreed, the troops began their march
towards the fortresses on the north-eastern frontier of France, which
they were to occupy, and, before the end of the month, Paris was left to
the King and to the new system that had been established by the Treaty.
No disturbances occurred, and Louis was enabled to maintain his
authority without the intervention of a foreign force; but Wellington
found that it would be expedient to remain a short time longer in the
capital, believing that his presence there was “very useful to the
Government and to the King, in a variety of ways, and gives confidence
to that party which brought back the King.” As he was alone in the
capital, and without British troops, Marshal Oudinot sent a detachment
of French soldiers to mount guard over his quarters.[84]
-----
Footnote 84:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 301, 296.
-----
N^o. 1.
[Illustration:
SKETCH MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE
BRITISH OCCUPATION OF FRANCE
FROM
1815 to 1818
A. D. Innes & C^o. London.
]
The positions occupied by the Allied contingents were as follows: The
British corps had their head-quarters at Cambrai, and were quartered in
the Departments of Pas de Calais and Nord, at Cassel, Hazebrouck,
Lillers, St. Pol, Bapaume, Cambrai, Valenciennes, etc.; near them, in
the Department Nord, the Danes were stationed at Bouchain, the
Hanoverians at Condé, and the Saxons at Le Quesnoi. Occupying the
eastern portion of the latter Department, as well as nearly the whole of
the Ardennes, the Russians placed their head-quarters at Maubeuge, and
were quartered in Landrecies, Avesnes, Charlemont, Givet, Réthel, etc.
The Prussians were in the Departments of Meuse and Moselle, their
head-quarters at Sédan, occupying Mezières, Montmédy, Longwy, Briey,
Thionville, Commercy, Bar-le-Duc. The Baravians were close to them and
to the Palatinate, at St. Avold, Sarreguemines (head-quarters), and
Bische; the Wurtemburgers at Weissemburg and Lauterburg.[85] The
Austrian contingent took possession of the Departments of Upper and
Lower Rhine, head-quarters at Colmar, and the principal garrisons were
at Hagenau, Molsheim, Bischweiler, Mulhausen, and Altkirch.[86]
-----
Footnote 85:
Under Article No. 4 of the Convention of November 20th, Lauterburg and
Weissemburg had been allotted to the French, who were permitted to
place garrisons there of 200 and 150 men respectively. The French
Government, however, consented to give them up to the Allies, in
January, and were allowed to occupy Abbeville instead (_Ibid._ , xi.
292).
Footnote 86:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 355, 410, etc.
-----
The Coldstream Guards were the last troops to leave Paris. On the 26th
of January all the public duties in the capital were found by the
Battalion,[87] and the 4th and 5th companies, under Lieutenant-Colonel
MacKinnon, were ordered to relieve the 23rd Regiment at Montmartre. Next
day, the Guards Brigade with Captain Sinclair’s brigade (field battery)
of Artillery and the Sappers and Miners attached to the First Division,
marched off from the barrière de Villette; the Grenadier Guards and the
Sappers and Miners to Louvres, the Coldstream and the Artillery to
Gonesse. The public duties were collected by Lieut.-Colonel Dawkins at
the barrière des Martyrs, where they were joined by Lieut.-Colonel
MacKinnon’s detachment, and the whole followed to Gonesse after the rest
of the troops had left Paris. The march was continued to Cambrai in
detachments, the Battalion being billeted at each halt in several
villages,[88] and the route taken was by Senlis and Peronne to Cambrai,
which was reached by the head-quarters, together with the Grenadier and
the 1st companies, on the 6th of February.
-----
Footnote 87:
As the termination of the occupation of Paris approached, the public
duties were gradually reduced, and, on the 26th of January, Officers'
guards were found at only six of the barriers of the town.
Footnote 88:
“It is of the utmost importance to the comfort and the discipline of
the soldiers, that the Officers of companies should inspect and visit
the quarters of their men frequently, and the Commanding Officer
trusts that they will see the necessity of extraordinary exertion on
these occasions” (_Battalion Orders_ , Paris, Jan. 26, 1816).
-----
The 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards and the two companies of the
Coldstream just mentioned, formed the garrison of Cambrai, while the
remainder of the latter Battalion occupied the following villages:—2nd
company, Villers Ploich; 3rd and 4th companies, under Lieut.-Colonel
MacKinnon, Marcoing; 5th company, Banteau and Bantouzelle; 6th and 7th
companies, Gouzecourt; 8th and the Light-infantry companies, Villers
Glishain, under Lieut.-Colonel Dawkins, who had orders “to detach an
Officer’s party to Honnecourt, if he deemed it desirable;”
Lieut.-Colonel Macdonell was quartered at Gonnelieu, and took command of
the 2nd, 5th, 6th, and 7th companies.[89]
-----
Footnote 89:
Appendix No. IV. On April 25th, the 2nd and 3rd companies were ordered
to march to Cambrai, being relieved by the 8th and Light-infantry
companies. On May 14th two more companies were brought into the town,
and the remainder rejoined head-quarters on the 3rd and 5th of June,
when the Battalion was complete in Cambrai, six companies being
quartered in the Cavalry barracks, and four in the Citadel.
-----
Though peace had been concluded, the foreign contingents were kept ready
for active service, and the fortresses were held closely guarded, as if
an enemy were in the field. Thus at Cambrai, the gates of the town were
carefully locked under the superintendence of an Officer of the main
guard, and were kept closed from sunset to dawn; no one was allowed to
enter at such times, except under peculiar circumstances, (and then only
when the main guard was turned out). Patrols were sent out constantly at
uncertain hours; Non-commissioned officers and men were not permitted to
leave their quarters after dark, without a pass; sentries were relieved
hourly, both by day and by night; and even the Field-Officer of the day
was not admitted into the Citadel by night, and the Officer of the guard
there had to communicate with him from the ramparts.[90]
-----
Footnote 90:
It was not until April that “soldiers composing the garrison have
permission to pass out of the gates, when properly dressed in
side-arms, to walk within one mile of the fortress, unprovided with
passes” (_Garrison Orders_ , Cambrai, April 29, 1816).
-----
The occupation of French territory lasted three years, until November,
1818, and during the whole of this time, the British troops were kept
actively employed on their military duties. It was a period in which the
efficiency of the army was maintained at a high standard. The Coldstream
were continually exercised in route marching, in drill, in musketry,[91]
and, the Officers and selected Non-commissioned officers and men, in
sword exercise. Every detail of interior economy was carefully attended
to, under the company Officers, who were held responsible to the
Commanding Officer for the arms and accoutrements, for the men’s
regimental necessaries, for the cleanliness and good order of the
barrack rooms, and for the regular closing of the accounts, which at the
time was done on the 24th of each month.[92] In the summer as many of
the troops as could be spared from fortress duty were encamped wherever
open spaces were available, the Guards Brigade upon the glacis of
Cambrai, for the purpose of carrying out the Field exercises then
practised by the army. The Duke of Wellington paid minute attention to
the drill of the contingent, and issued repeated orders on the movements
in which he desired the regiments to perfect themselves.[93]
-----
Footnote 91:
The following are the musketry results of the Battalion in 1816:—
Two rounds were fired at 60, 85, and 90 yards, and four rounds at 100
yards. Total cartridges issued, 9,448; total shots on the target,
3,785. Of these the Grenadier company fired 852 rounds, and put 436
shots on the target. Fourteen battalion prizes were given. The company
Officers offered, in 1817, prizes to their best shots; and the
Commanding Officer gave three prizes to the best battalion shots. The
same was repeated in 1818, the Commanding Officer stipulating that the
prizes were only to be awarded if the men were of good character
(_Battalion Orders_ , Nov. 25, 1816; Aug. 20, 1817; and June 10,
1818).
Footnote 92:
“The following certificate being added to the Monthly Return, the
Commanding Officer requests Officers commanding companies will forward
their reports to him, respecting the settlement of the men’s accounts,
in good time, so as to enable him to sign the Monthly Return on the
morning of the 25th: 'I certify that the company’s accounts have been
settled by the Captain, or the Officer commanding the company, up to
the 24th of ——, and that the balances then due have been regularly
paid to the men in daily proportions, in conformity with the General
Orders of June 3, 1815'” (_Battalion Order_ , April 25, 1818).
Footnote 93:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 426, 501; xii. 31, 538. It may
be interesting to remark that the review of infantry in column, not
contained in “His Majesty’s Regulations” of the day, was ordered and
provided for by the Field-Marshal.
-----
Reviews on a larger scale took place in the autumn of each year, in the
neighbourhood of Denain. In October, 1816, the English, Danish, Saxon,
and Hanoverian contingents were assembled, 36,000 men and 84 guns strong
(of which nearly 26,000 men and 60 guns were furnished by the British
army); a detailed programme of the operations to be performed was
prepared, a feigned enemy was told off, and the whole concluded by a
march past, according to the accustomed forms of the different corps
present.[94]
-----
Footnote 94:
_Ibid._, xi. 522. The following Brigade Order, dated Cambrai, Oct. 23,
1816, concerned these manœuvres: “The light companies of the
Brigade and the three leading companies of the Coldstream marched
yesterday through the village of Denain in a soldierlike and exemplary
manner. The rest of the Brigade did anything but follow their example.
That loose marching, which it fell into, has two effects. The troops
either arrive late at their destination, or they arrive harassed and
unfit for their operations. Either is an evil of the first magnitude.
The principle on which this march originated is pure selfishness. The
individual would save himself a little inconvenience at the expense of
serious evil to no matter how many of his comrades in rear. The
Brigade, with the exception of those companies already mentioned with
approbation, and the leading and rear companies of the Grenadier
Guards, will assemble every morning at the usual place, the Bapaume
gate, at half-past seven o’clock, till they receive an order to the
contrary.” The latter portion of this order was countermanded on the
25th.
-----
Their Royal Highnesses the Duke of Kent and the Duke of Cambridge were
present on this occasion, and were received by Guards of Honour
furnished by the Coldstream Guards. Similar manœuvres took place in
the middle of October next year, near Bouchain, at which the King of
Prussia and the Prince of Orange assisted, and again the same thing was
repeated in September, 1818. Finally, another military display was given
on the 23rd of October, 1818, just before France was evacuated by the
Allies, near Villers-en-Couchies, in the presence of the Emperor of
Russia and of the King of Prussia; 51,000 men and 168 guns were then
brought together, of which 23,000 and 84 guns were Russians, 19,000 and
60 guns British, 3000 and 10 guns Danish, 3000 and 8 guns Saxons, and
3000 and 6 guns Hanoverians.[95] The enemy was represented by a
detachment of Cossacks and of Russian infantry and artillery, and by the
British cavalry, three companies of Sappers and Miners, and three
brigades of artillery; the latter under Lieut.-Colonel Sir G. Scovell,
and the whole under the general direction of Major-General Narishkin.
-----
Footnote 95:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._, xii. 783.
-----
“It is supposed that the enemy is master of Bouchain, Le Quesnoi, and
Valenciennes, and occupies a position behind the Escaillon.... The
object of the army is to reconnoitre Valenciennes from the heights of
Famars, and for this purpose the enemy’s corps is to be forced back
upon the place; having been in the first instance dislodged from his
position on the Escaillon, the direct attack upon the front of which,
is to be facilitated by a movement to turn his left.”
The movements to be executed were all published beforehand, and the
operations ended by a march past.[96]
-----
Footnote 96:
_Ibid._ , xii. 711. The following letter, written by the Duke of
Wellington to General Woronzow, commanding the Russian contingent,
dated Aix-la-Chapelle, Oct. 13, 1818, just before the review at which
the Emperor of Russia was present, is not without interest: “I write
you just one line to tell you that, from what the Emperor has said to
me, I judge that he thinks, from the reports he has heard, that, in
marching in open column your troops do not preserve their distances
regularly. You will, of course, attend to those hints, and make them
preserve their distances from front rank to front rank” (_Ibid._ ,
xii. 765).
-----
Soon after the British contingent reached its quarters in the
Departments of Pas de Calais and Nord, a reduction was effected in its
strength by three regiments of cavalry,[97] by drafts of men entitled to
their discharge or unfit for service, and by 400 men from the Guards
Brigade (200 from each Battalion, so as to bring them to 1000 instead of
1200 men per Battalion). By this means, taking into account some 800
recruits who joined the contingent, the latter amounted to a little more
than 29,000 Officers and men in the beginning of May, 1816.[98]
-----
Footnote 97:
The three cavalry brigades were, however, still maintained in France,
each consisting of two regiments, instead of three.
Footnote 98:
_Ibid._ , xi. 386.
-----
There were found to be some 60 men unfit for service in the 2nd
Coldstream Guards about this time, and the 200 were made up by selecting
15 of the most unserviceable men per company (or 150 from the
Battalion). Captain Shirley, and Lieutenants FitzClarence and Douglas,
proceeded to England in charge of this party (April 23rd), which,
together with that belonging to the 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards, was
placed under the command of Lieut.-Colonel D. MacKinnon, Coldstream
Guards.
In the course of the year, the Duc de Richelieu endeavoured to secure
from the Allies a more solid and more general reduction of the army of
occupation, in order to lessen the financial strain that burdened
France, at a moment when she was oppressed by debt and afflicted by a
bad harvest. He hoped thereby to render the King more popular. But he
experienced considerable reluctance on the part of the British
Government and of Wellington to agree to any such proposition, until the
Chambers had proved by their acts that they were prepared to support the
rule of Louis XVIII., and so “dissipate all reasonable apprehension as
to the fulfilment of the late Treaty.”[99] The Duke, indeed, was at
first much opposed to it, and wrote strongly against it from Cambrai
even as late as December, 1816, being of opinion that any real reduction
of the Allied forces would tend to excite the French malcontents, and do
harm to the Royal cause and to good government, and that “we ought to
reduce only gradually and in proportion to our casualties.”[100] A
little later, however, being in Paris (January 9th), he modified his
opinion on account of the successful negotiation of a French loan in
London, which might “recall to the recollection of public men in France
the obligations they owe to the Allied Sovereigns, and again reconcile
them to measures which France herself, and not foreign Powers, rendered
necessary.”[101] Under these circumstances, he proposed a reduction of
30,000 men (or one-fifth from each contingent), to be made on the 1st of
April, 1817, and to be announced “in the manner most likely to produce a
favourable effect on the public mind,” as soon as the budget passed and
the measures for ensuring the loan were definitely adopted.[102] These
proposals were accepted by the Allies, and were embodied in an official
note, which was presented to the French Government on the 10th of
February, 1817.[103]
-----
Footnote 99:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 485, 506.
Footnote 100:
_Ibid._ , xi. 573.
Footnote 101:
_Ibid._ , xi. 592.
Footnote 102:
_Ibid._ , xi. 589, etc.
Footnote 103:
See _Annual Register_ , 1817, “General History,” p. 103, where the
note is given _in extenso_.
-----
In pursuance of these arrangements, six battalions returned to England,
proceeding there by Calais, to which were added detachments of 200 men
from each of the Guards Battalions, or about 6000 men in all. The
staffs, moreover, of the Third Division (Sir C. Colville) and of two
brigades (Sir R. O'Callaghan and Sir J. Keane) were broken up.[104]
-----
Footnote 104:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 622, 638, 657. The order for
sending home these detachments from the Guards Battalions “originates
in the reduction of the whole establishment of the Guards, and the
consequent necessity of the Battalions in France bearing their
proportion of the non-effectives. H.R.H. desires me to express his
hope that this diminution of 400 Guards may not embarrass you in
regard to the amount of reduction” (Major-General Sir H. Torrens to
Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington: _ibid._, xi. 639). The
detachments marched from Cambrai on March 15, 1817, under the command
of Lieut.-Colonel Hon. J. Walpole, Coldstream Guards. Captain Sowerby
and Lieutenant Hervey were in charge of the Coldstream; and
Assistant-Surgeon Smith, Coldstream Guards, accompanied the troops to
Calais.
-----
In June, 1818, Sir P. Maitland having been sent to Upper Canada as
Lieut.-Governor of that province, Major-General Sir J. Lambert was
appointed to the Guards Brigade at Cambrai; but as he was on leave,
Colonel Woodford, Coldstream Guards, remained in temporary command until
August. In June, also, Major-General Sir R. O'Callaghan replaced Sir J.
Lambert as Brigadier of the 7th Brigade, and Sir C. Colville assumed
command of the Second Division, vice Sir H. Clinton.
The Band of the Grenadier Guards had been sent for a few months to
Paris, during the autumn of 1815, and left London on the 1st of
September, proceeding by Brighton to Dieppe. Next year, the Coldstream
Band went to Cambrai, on the 10th of June, by Dover and Calais, and
remained there till the following October.[105]
-----
Footnote 105:
For a short account of the Band of the Coldstream Guards, see Appendix
No. V.
-----
The health of the troops in France, during the three and a half years
succeeding Waterloo, seems to have been satisfactory. By a return, dated
Paris, July 15, 1816, it appears that the number of sick amounted to
1060 men in the whole British contingent, of which only 43 belonged to
the Coldstream, out of a total strength of 1104 Officers and men
belonging to the Battalion at that time.[106] The principal cause of
illness arose from the prevalence of ophthalmia, which, beginning in
Paris in the winter of 1815, continued to affect the men until they left
the country in 1818. Numerous orders were issued to prevent the spread
of this evil.
-----
Footnote 106:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 439.
-----
Two Officers belonging to the Regiment died in France during this
period, viz. Lieutenant J. Buller, in Paris, in January, 1816, and
Lieutenant A. Gordon, killed in a duel with a French Officer, at
Cambrai, in April, 1818.
There were not many incidents of any great importance to mark the
occupation of French fortresses by European contingents. France,
deprived of her incomparable military Chief, destitute of popular
leaders, and exhausted by the wars that drained her resources during the
past twenty-five years, settled gradually down, and accepted, though
very reluctantly, the government which the Allied Powers had imposed
upon her. The alien force did the work which had been contemplated; for,
keeping the people under control, and repressing all revolutionary
ebullitions, while Louis was consolidating his rule, the occupation did
not come to an end until he had established his power in the country.
Subsequent events have proved that the settlement thus effected by the
will of Europe was not a permanent arrangement; France never consented
to it, and we now know that it was overthrown within the brief space of
fifteen years.[107] But when the Allied forces finally returned to their
homes, and left the conquered people to their own resources, the Bourbon
_régime_ seemed, at all events outwardly, to be restored, and the new
authority to be unquestioned.
-----
Footnote 107:
Wellington perceived clearly the weakness of the new system; but he
blamed the stupidity of the ultra-Royalist party, who, ruling the
King, endeavoured to gain a cheap popularity at the expense of the
Allies, to whom they owed entirely their restoration to power. “The
descendants of Louis XV. will not reign in France; and I must say, and
always will say, that it is the fault of Monsieur” (afterwards Charles
X.) “and his adherents.... I wish Monsieur would read the histories of
our Restoration and subsequent Revolution, or that he would recollect
what passed under his own view, probably at his own instigation, in
the Revolution. The conduct of the Royalists in joining with the
Jacobins against the Moderate party, certainly led to the King’s
death. There are persons now at Paris who recollect the triumph of
these parties when they obtained the vote for excluding from office,
and from the Legislative Assembly, all who had been in the
Constituante Assembly; and yet it is certain that that vote, more than
any other single measure, was the cause of all the subsequent
misfortunes, confiscations, murder of the King, etc.; and they could
not avoid comparing that triumph with the senseless one over the
Government the other day, upon a vital question in the law for
regulating the press” (The Duke of Wellington to the Right Hon. J. C.
Villiers, Jan. 11, 1818: _Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xii. 213).
-----
The British troops conformed in every respect to the laws of the
country, and to the various and frequently vexatious police regulations
that prevailed at the time.[108] They conducted themselves peaceably in
their various cantonments, and contrived to get on well with the
population. So generally quiet was the state of affairs, that a liberal
allowance of leave could be granted to the Officers of the contingent,
soon after their arrival in the north of France.[109] The same relations
existed between the inhabitants and the troops of the other Powers.[110]
But, nevertheless, the occupation raised many controversies,—easily to
be accounted for by the temper which the people were ready to display
towards the invader, after a crushing military defeat. Irregularities
committed by the troops, when they took place, were rectified without
delay, and measures were adopted to prevent their recurrence; in this
respect, at least, the French had nothing to complain of. On the other
hand, there were repeated difficulties with the civil officials of the
country, and with the turbulence that moved many of the inhabitants to
be disorderly. The French Préfets and Maires too often refused to
discharge their functions, the magistrates to convict on the clearest
evidence, and the police to repress riots when the natives were found to
be engaged in disputes with the foreign troops. Wellington continually
protested strongly on this subject to the King’s Government, and assured
the Ministers that, unless the local authorities did their duty, the
troops would be provoked to retaliate and revenge the injuries they had
too often to put up with.[111] The irritation felt by a certain portion
of the population against the foreign contingents, led to constant
brawls, which became a source of danger when they occasioned the people
to assemble tumultuously. The danger of frequent collisions was
increased by the habit, then adopted by the British Officers, of using
their fists for their personal protection, when drawn into scuffles with
the natives in the streets. To stop this, the Duke insisted that all
Officers should wear “their side-arms ... whenever they appeared out of
their quarters or tents, except when hunting or shooting.”[112]
-----
Footnote 108:
One order may be quoted, illustrating the condition of the rural
districts in France at the time: “It having been represented by the
Civil Authority that smoking out of doors of houses, in the villages,
is contrary to the Police Laws, from the danger to which the houses
would be exposed to fire from their being generally low and thatched,
Commanding Officers are requested to take measures to prevent it.
Smoking can only be allowed inside of the houses” (_Divisional
Orders_ , Cambrai, May 2, 1816).
Footnote 109:
Fifteen Subalterns per regiment (nine in the cavalry), half the
Captains, and one-third of the Field-Officers had to be present
(_General Order_ , Paris, Feb. 27, 1816). By another General Order,
dated Cambrai, June 1st, the above rule, relating to Field-Officers,
applied to Regimental Captains of the Brigade of Guards.
Footnote 110:
“Je suis bien heureux de pouvoir faire rapport à Votre Majesté que le
système de l’occupation militaire d’une partie de la France remplit
les attentes de ceux qui l’ont adopté plus que l’on pouvait l’espérer.
Les officiers et les troupes de toutes les nations se comportent
envers les habitants du pays de manière à les concilier; et je suis
bien heureux de pouvoir assurer Votre Majesté que les siennes en
donnent le meilleur exemple” (The Duke of Wellington to the Emperor of
Russia, April 24, 1816: _Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 373).
Footnote 111:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 421, 436, 440, 737; see also
pp. 630, 726.
Footnote 112:
_Ibid._ , xi. 478, 570, 579; and xii. 77. “The measure” (the
occupation) “has succeeded beyond our most sanguine expectations. Not
only are there no complaints, but I really believe that the common
people of the Departments occupied, particularly those occupied by us,
are delighted to have the troops, and the money spent among them. But
not so the gentry, particularly the Royalists; not so those employed
by the Government, and even the Ministers themselves.... All this
would be of little importance in the decision of the question of
reduction, if the King’s Government possessed any real authority and
strength, and if the people of the country were not of a character
easily disturbed and irritated, and led to acts of violence and
outrage whenever they find weakness. I believe that although _we_, the
English, behave better than others, we are on that account the worst
treated. There are constant broils between individuals of the middling
and better classes, and Officers of the army, particularly at
Valenciennes. We can get no justice from the authorities of the
country—indeed, that is a general complaint in each of the
contingents; and in more than one instance it has happened that a mob
has collected with impunity upon the occasion of an assault upon or
broil with an Officer” (The Duke of Wellington to Viscount
Castlereagh, Cambrai, Dec. 11, 1816: _ibid._, xi. 572).
-----
A grave incident occurred at Cambrai, where a riot took place in June,
1816; hearing which, Wellington wrote to Sir. P. Maitland, then in
command of that fortress, as follows:—
“I beg you will tell the Sous-Préfet that I am surprised that after
the many examples he has had of our desire to do justice to those who
have to complain of our people, the police at Cambrai should have
suffered such a riot to take place without noticing it. You have my
orders to turn out the troops and fire whenever the people attempt to
riot again. I repeat them now, and I beg you will tell the Sous-Préfet
that I have reminded you of them; and particularly that the troops are
not to be turned out to quell a riot without firing in earnest. I beg
you will also tell the Sous-Préfet of Cambrai, that I can no longer
allow the Garde Nationale of Cambrai to remain armed. They must be
paraded in an hour after you will make this communication, and must
lodge their arms in the great square, and go to their homes. You will
take possession of their arms, for which you will give a receipt. They
are to be lodged in store. Inform the Sous-Préfet that I consider him
and the Maire responsible to me that no arms are kept by the
individuals of the Garde Nationale. I understand that people from the
gaming-houses have been sent down to all the garrisons; and I beg you
will tell the Sous-Préfet that I will not allow them to remain; and
they had better therefore remove without obliging me to use
force.”[113]
-----
Footnote 113:
“_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 420. General Ziethen had
previously given orders that all these gambling establishments should
be closed in the places where the Prussian contingent were cantoned”
(_ibid._, xi. 409).
-----
The questions that arose out of the peculiar conditions in which the
occupied districts were placed, caused difficulties, which differed in
certain respects from those arising out of other military occupations.
In 1871, for instance, after the peace of Versailles, Germany occupied
some French provinces; and, in this case, the conquering armies had only
to deal with the inhabitants—there were no hostile troops in their
vicinity. But, in 1816, the Allies were placed in another position, and
French soldiers were in their neighbourhood. Europe, moreover, had
caused a revolution in France, and had to support the new government,
until its power was established. The army of occupation, therefore, was
not only exacting redress from the vanquished nation, according to
treaty, but it was also in close alliance with the Government of the
latter. Hence it was not unnatural that some delicate points should be
raised, embarrassing to the French Ministers, who, while they posed as
patriotic Frenchmen, had much to fear from the Imperialists and other
malcontents that roamed over the country. A question arose in the
Prussian districts, regarding the disbanded troops of Napoleon’s armies,
which is perhaps best explained by quoting an extract from a letter
addressed by the Commander-in-chief to General Ziethen, dated February
15, 1816:—
“The soldiers of the Imperialist armies,” says Wellington, “are viewed
with suspicion, not only by the chiefs of the Allied army of
occupation, but also by the King of France and by the French
Government.... Your Excellency is therefore right to watch these
persons, and I am sure that your measures, taken with this object,
have the approval of the King of France. But I beg you to be careful
that you do not trespass upon those powers which belong to the King or
to the legislature. It is true, the King of France has ordered
disbanded soldiers to return to their homes, and they do not obey if,
having their domiciles elsewhere, they persist in congregating in
those Departments, which are occupied by the troops under Your
Excellency’s command. You are therefore right in obliging these
persons to obey their Sovereign’s order, and in sending them out of
the Prussian districts. But to oblige all these soldiers who inhabit
your districts, to be in possession of a card of residence, to be
submitted to your Brigadiers, is a step in advance. This is more than
a police measure, which in my opinion should be limited to putting the
existing law in motion; it is an act of sovereignty, and even of
legislation; because it obliges soldiers who are subjects of the King,
and who are residing in their homes by the King’s command, to furnish
themselves with papers for their personal security, which neither the
King nor the laws of the country require of them. I think, therefore,
that your order ought only to oblige such soldiers who are not
domiciled in your Departments to quit them, and to command your
Officers to carry out your order, if they find these unauthorized
persons. At the same time, in order to clear up the subject, you can
demand from the mayors, the Sous-Préfets, etc., a list of the men who
have a right to live in your Departments, and you can remove all
those, whose names are not to be found on the lists. This you may do,
because you would be only carrying out the decrees of the Sovereign
authority; but I do not think we should be justified in doing more
than this.”[114]
-----
Footnote 114:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 303. Elsewhere, the Duke of
Wellington, writing to the French Government, says: “Je suis très loin
d’approuver les mesures de rigueur que je vois adoptées souvent comme
mesure de police, mais il n’est pas très facile de les empêcher.
L'existence d’une police militaire une fois admise, l’examen par les
commandants militaires des passeports de ceux, qui passent par le pays
occupé, en est une conséquence, qui ne peut pas être évitée. Il
faudrait voir, si en mettant en exécution ces mesures de police, il se
trouve des abus. Pour ce qui regarde la demande au maire de Stenay de
la liste des militaires qui s’y trouvent ou aux environs, V.E. verra
que j’avois suggéré cette mesure dans ma lettre au Général Ziethen.
Elle devient onéreuse à cause du nombre de militaires que se trouvent
dans ces environs; mais aussi il faut observer, que la nécessité de
tenir les militaires en observation, est urgente en proportion de
leurs nombres, et le Général Ziethen m’apprend dans une lettre du 20,
qu’il n’y a pas moins que 20,000, dans les districts occupés par
l’armée Prussienne” (Duke of Wellington to the Duc de Richelieu,
Paris, March 2, 1816: _ibid._, xi. 323).
-----
Owing to the arrangement sanctioned by the Convention of the 20th of
November, 1815, attached to the Treaty of the same date, by which the
French were allowed to maintain garrisons in certain specified places in
the Departments under foreign occupation, further complications arose,
which increased the tension between the King’s Government and the Allied
forces. While manœuvres were going on in the summer of 1816, the
Governor of St. Omer raised a note of alarm, on seeing British troops in
the vicinity of the fortress; and the excitement became such, that
Wellington was obliged to write to the Duc de Feltre (the War Minister),
a letter of strong remonstrance, in which, having first defended himself
against a ridiculous charge that he intended to seize a French fort, he
declared that the occupation was a measure calculated to secure the
peace of Europe and the consolidation of the Royal power, that the
foreign contingents were the allies of the King, and that he would not
suffer his soldiers to be disarmed when they had occasion to march
through a French garrison.[115]
-----
Footnote 115:
“Si on me croit assez fripon pour vouloir m’emparer d’une place
occupée par un garnison du Roi, on devrait au moins me faire la
justice de croire que je ne suis pas assez bête pour le faire....
L'occupation est une mesure de paix; son objet est, en affermissant le
trône du Roi, et en donnant au Roi le temps de s’affermir lui-même
dans son gouvernement, de maintenir la paix parmi les nations, et
d’assurer autant que possible la tranquillité du monde. Les troupes
des Puissances étrangères qui se trouvent en France sont donc les
alliées du Roi; et quel que soit l’opinion à présent sur le bien ou le
mal qu’elles font à S.M., on ne peut pas nier que l’année passée on
croyait que leur présence était absolument nécessaire pour assurer les
objets que tout homme bien pensant avait en vue. Mais quand des
troupes amies ou alliées se trouvent dans un pays, est-ce l’usage que,
... si on veut faire passer un détachment de troupes par une ville
fortifiée (et observez que si on veut marcher en hiver ou en été cette
armée-ci, il faut passer par les places fortes), il faut désarmer les
officiers et les soldats à la porte, placer les armes sur les
chariots, et passer ainsi comme prisonniers! Vraiment je rougis en
écrivant sur cette matière, dont je n’ai appris les détails que
dernièrement; et je m’assure que V.E. verra comme moi la nécessité de
mettre fin à de telles absurdités. Je sais bien qu’elles sont
contraires aux ordres du Roi.... Le principe et les usages militaires
exigent qu’il y ait des précautions en admettant une troupe, même de
la même nation, dans une place forte; mais est-ce nécessaire, est-ce
l’usage de les désarmer? Est-ce possible que je puisse m’y soumettre?
N'y a-t-il pas des précautions d’une autre nature qui seraient
réelles, et qui sont d’usage, et qui pourraient concilier tous les
objets de la sécurité de la ville à passer, avec ce qui est dû au
caractère et au respect dû à l’armée d’une autre nation? Par exemple,
ne pourrait-on pas avertir du passage, et convenir du nombre qui
pourrait passer par la porte au même moment?... Je ne peux pas, ni ne
veux pas, me soumettre au désarmement de mes soldats, en passant par
une ville quelconque” (_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 493).
-----
The passage of troops through fortified places had an unfortunate result
at Cambrai; for, on the 10th of May, 1818, when a French detachment
marched through the town from Paris to Douai, a riot ensued, in which
three or four men of the Coldstream were injured. The British garrison
behaved well in the emergency, and the following order was published by
Colonel Woodford, then in command:—
“Colonel Woodford desires to express his satisfaction at the
temperance and forbearance shown by the Non-commissioned officers and
soldiers of the Brigade, in the affray between them and the French
soldiers and the inhabitants yesterday evening; to this temperate
conduct, so highly creditable to brave troops, and to the activity of
the Officers and Non-commissioned officers who were present, is to be
attributed the early restoration of order and tranquillity throughout
the town.”[116]
-----
Footnote 116:
_Brigade Order_ , Cambrai, May 11, 1818.
-----
[Illustration: N. R. Wilkinson del. MUSQUETEER 1650. Mintern Bros.
Chromo.]
The Allied forces were now soon to quit French territory. It had been
stipulated by treaty that the occupation was to last five years, but it
was also expressly stated that it might terminate in three, and all
parties by this time wished to bring it to a conclusion as soon as
possible. The French naturally pined for emancipation; and the words of
the Duc de Richelieu, delivered in the Chambers, that “every heart
throbbed at the thought of seeing on the soil of the country, no other
banner but that of France,” found a responsive echo throughout the
length and breadth of the land, and awoke a passionate longing for
freedom in the minds of the people, which was very difficult to resist.
Wellington, also, was disposed to assist them. The Government of the
King had been showing increased hostility to the foreign contingents,
who were becoming daily more hateful in the eyes of the French nation.
He expressed himself clearly on this subject to Lord Bathurst, on the
8th of March, 1818:—
“As soon as the occupation becomes odious to the people, and that we
are liable to the attacks which they are daily excited to make upon
us, and that, under these circumstances, we are to begin a new lease,
as it were, of the occupation, we must close up, and take our real
position with our whole force between the Meuse and the Scheldt, and
our occupation must become more burthensome to the country in which we
shall be placed, and in fact, become one of war. Of course that state
of things could not last, and the Powers of Europe must be prepared to
support their troops left in such a situation in this country.”[117]
-----
Footnote 117:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._, xii. 381.
-----
It was apparent to all that this condition of tension must come to an
end; and, though there was no certainty that the King could maintain
himself on the throne without foreign support, yet it was evident that
the cure for the evils to be dreaded, was liable to become a greater
misfortune to Europe, than the apprehension itself. The French,
moreover, had made great efforts to discharge their financial
obligations to the Allies; and in these efforts they were successful,
aided by the Duke of Wellington, who, upon the proposal of the Emperor
of Russia, was appointed president of the diplomatic and finance
committee charged with the regulation of these liabilities.[118] Added
to this, the fortifications of the Netherlands frontier were by this
time nearly completed, and as this was done to form a barrier against
France, the moment had arrived when the country could be delivered from
the burden that oppressed it, as well as from the cause which produced
so much irritation.
-----
Footnote 118:
Sir Archibald Alison, _History of Europe from the Fall of Napoleon in
1815, to the Accession of Louis Napoleon in 1852_ , i. 538 (London,
1852). _Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xii. 119, 156, 193.
-----
In the autumn, therefore, of 1818, a Congress was convened at
Aix-la-Chapelle, for the purpose of determining the question;[119] and
an agreement was made, on the 1st of October, by which the foreign
forces were to leave the soil of France on or before the 30th of
November. To this compact was added an invitation to His Most Christian
Majesty to join the four Great European Powers, and to take part in
their deliberations, present or future, for the maintenance of peace,
and for the mutual guarantee of the rights of nations. The conference,
however, did not end there; for a secret convention was also signed, by
the four Powers only, stipulating that, in case France should resume her
revolutionary ways, and again threaten the tranquillity of the civilized
world, British, Prussian, Austrian, and Russian _corps d’armées_ were to
assemble forthwith at Brussels, Cologne, Stuttgart, and Mainz
respectively, for the suppression of these disorders.[120]
-----
Footnote 119:
M. de Richelieu, present on the part of France, was instructed only to
obtain the emancipation of France. “Make every sacrifice,” said the
King to him at his departure, “to obtain the evacuation of the
territory. It is the first condition of our independence. No flag but
our own should wave in France. Express to my Allies how difficult my
government will be so long as it can be reproached with the calamities
of the country, and the occupation of the territory.... Obtain the
best conditions possible; but at any sacrifice, get quit of the
stranger” (Alison, _History of Europe, 1815-1852_ , i. 566).
Footnote 120:
_Ibid._ , i. 568, etc.
-----
Wellington took early measures to effect the evacuation by the army of
occupation, and hastened the operation with all possible despatch.
General von Frimont reported (October 23rd) that the Austrian contingent
would send the first column across the Rhine on the 1st of November, and
that the whole corps would quit French territory on the 11th. The
Prussians moved off early in the month, and were directed upon Cologne,
Bonn, and Coblentz. The Russians marched in two columns immediately
after the review, which had taken place near Villers-en-Couchies on the
23rd of October, the first through the Netherlands, the other following
the Prussians to the Rhine at Mannheim. After this latter column, came
the Saxons, who left Le Quesnoi on the 7th and 9th, and moved to
Forbach. The Bavarians began to evacuate their cantonments on the 12th;
while the Hanoverians and the Danes marched northwards, through the
Netherlands, the former between the 4th and the 9th, and the latter
between the 12th and the 19th. The British troops, who were placed under
canvas during their march, were sent to Calais immediately after the
review just mentioned, where they were embarked under the orders of
Major-General Sir M. Power. The embarkation began on the 29th of
October. As soon as the fortresses were permanently evacuated by the
Allies, the French, who had been specially authorized to enter the
occupied Departments for the purpose, marched into them without delay,
and, hoisting the white flag, under a Royal salute, once more took
possession of their own territory, amidst the universal enthusiasm and
joy of the military and of the inhabitants. The British stores, which
could not be conveyed to Calais, were shipped at Valenciennes, and were
taken by water to Antwerp; a portion were sold to the King of the
Netherlands.[121]
-----
Footnote 121:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xii. 739-826; Alison, _History of
Europe_ , 1815-1852, i. 574. It appears that the Russians returned to
their native country by sea (C. Joyneville, _Life and Times of
Alexander I._ , iii. 276: London, 1875).
-----
The progress of the evacuation being sufficiently advanced, the
Field-Marshal commanding the Allied forces, issued, on the 10th of
November, a valedictory address, and on the same day similar orders were
communicated to the British army. Later, on the 1st of December, a
letter from H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief was published, conveying to
the British contingent the thanks of the Prince Regent “for the
discipline and good order which have been so successfully maintained, to
the honour of the British arms, during the period it has been stationed
in France.”[122]
-----
Footnote 122:
These three documents are to be found in Appendix VI.
-----
On the 6th of November, a letter was received from the Préfet of the
Department of Nord, recording his gratitude and that of his
subordinates, for the rigid discipline which prevailed in the army of
occupation, “to which has been due the harmony which existed between the
troops and the inhabitants.” He added that he felt a real satisfaction
in testifying to the excellent conduct of the British corps, and to the
zeal with which all the Officers carried out the views of the Duke, to
alleviate as much as possible the burden of the occupation.[123]
-----
Footnote 123:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xii. 784. The Duke’s answer is
given at p. 819, and conveys his acknowledgments to “the first
authority of the Department” for his good opinion.
-----
The Guards Brigade did not leave France with the rest of the British
army, but remained at head-quarters at Cambrai, with the Chief of the
Staff, Lieut.-General Sir G. Murray (the Duke being obliged to return to
Aix-la-Chapelle after the review of the 23rd of October), until the
morning of the 18th of November; when, evacuating the fortress, they
moved, at eleven o’clock, to Cantin. The march of the Coldstream was
made in six columns, four being composed of two companies; and was
continued to Calais, the port of embarkation, avoiding as much as
possible all large towns and centres of French patriotism. Marching by
Lillers, Racquingham, and Louches, the Brigade reached Calais on the
23rd, and immediately embarked for Dover. On this date Sir J. Lambert
published the following order of farewell to the Guards, who had
completed their service in France:—
“_Calais_, November 23, 1818. Major-General Sir J. Lambert cannot
relinquish the command of the Brigade without congratulating the
Officers and soldiers on the termination of a service of four years'
duration, during which they have acquired to themselves on many
occasions the greatest honour and credit. The Major-General requests
that the Officers will be assured that he was perfectly sensible of
the honour conferred upon him on his appointment to the Brigade, and
feels certain, had circumstances permitted that its exertions in the
field might have been more efficiently called for, that he should now
have had the satisfaction of expressing his admiration of that
distinguished conduct which has ever called forth the encomiums of
those who have had the good fortune to be in command.”[124]
-----
Footnote 124:
General Sir F. Hamilton, K.C.B., _History of the Grenadier Guards_,
iii. 74 (London, 1874).
-----
Arrived at Dover, the Coldstream marched to Chatham, where they arrived
on the 28th of November, and remained quartered in that garrison till
further orders.
Thus ended this stirring drama that began in March, 1815, and in which
the Coldstream Guards participated to the fullest extent. During these
eventful years, services were not only rendered to King and country, on
the field of battle, at one of the most momentous crises of modern
history; but duty was also zealously performed, in a less acknowledged
sphere, when a war-like nation was induced, with much difficulty, to
abate her military ardour, to renounce her menacing attitude, and to
resume a pacific policy towards her neighbours. The years spent in
France were useful to the British troops quartered there. It was a time
when they had to be prepared for every emergency, when they had to
cultivate amicable relations with a foreign people who resented deeply
their presence among them, when their demeanour towards the inhabitants
had to be both firm and conciliatory, and when their military efficiency
and discipline could alone enable them to discharge the delicate duties
with which they were entrusted.
This chapter must not conclude without recording that, at the end of the
occupation, the Duke of Wellington was created a Field-Marshal in the
armies of Austria, Russia, and Prussia; and that his services to Europe,
which could not be further rewarded by his own Sovereign, were
acknowledged in simple language, which expressed the difficulties of the
situation, and the Royal approbation at the manner in which they had
been overcome.
“The command of the army,” said Lord Bathurst, “composed of so many
nations, and belonging to Sovereigns eminently distinguished for their
military exploits, not stationed within any of their own dominions,
but in temporary and partial occupation of a given district within the
territories of a martial people, with whom His Majesty had so recently
closed an almost uninterrupted warfare of more than twenty years'
duration, presented difficulties of no ordinary magnitude, which could
only be surmounted by no ordinary measure of judgment and discretion.
In this command your Grace maintained the British army (divided for
the relief of the inhabitants in separate and distant quarters)
unimpaired in their discipline, and even improved in their condition.
You preserved the several contingents composing the Allied army in the
utmost harmony with each other, and in the best understanding with the
authorities of the country which they occupied. You won so much upon
the esteem and confidence of His Majesty’s Allies, that they all
spontaneously applied for your arbitration of their respective claims
upon France; and you impressed that Government with such a sense of
your justice, impartiality, and exertions, that you had the
gratification of receiving assurances from His Most Christian Majesty
that, but for your intervention, that intricate negotiation could not
have been satisfactorily concluded. Amidst, therefore, the signal
achievements which will carry your name and the glory of the British
Empire down to the latest posterity, it will not form the least part
of your Grace’s renown, that you have exercised and concluded a
command, unexampled in its character, with the concurrent voice of
approbation from all whom it could concern.”[125]
-----
Footnote 125:
Earl Bathurst to the Duke of Wellington, Nov. 27, 1818: _Supplementary
Despatches, etc._ , xii. 851.
-----
CHAPTER IV.
FIRST PART OF THE LONG EUROPEAN PEACE.
Distress in England after the war—Reductions in the Army and
Navy—Stations of the Brigade—French Eagles captured, deposited in
the Chapel Royal, Whitehall—Reforms in interior economy—Death of
George III., and Accession of George IV.—Cato Street
Conspiracy—Trial of Queen Caroline—Coronation of George IV.—Guards
in Dublin—Distress in 1826—Death of the Duke of York—Changes in
uniform—Death of George IV.; succeeded by William IV.—Political
agitation at home, revolution abroad; the Reform Act—Coronation of
William IV.—First appearance of cholera—Death of the King, and
Accession of Her Majesty Queen Victoria—Changes and reforms
introduced during the reign of William IV.
The defeat of Napoleon brought about a period of peace in Europe, which,
lasting till 1853, almost entirely undisturbed by the clash of arms, is
chiefly conspicuous in history for the internal changes, and for the
popular and national ideas that were then developed, both in England and
on the Continent. This period, containing necessarily, as far as the
Coldstream is concerned, few of those stirring incidents which invest
the annals of a regiment with public interest, marks the introduction to
our present modern society, and exhibits a rapid growth in the British
Empire, and a great improvement in the material lot of the people. But
it opened inauspiciously, and was at its commencement tinged with gloom.
The principles of the French Revolution, generating dangerous and
violent forces, and threatening Christendom with anarchy and
destruction, were at length laid low, and, to outward appearances at
least, they were finally crushed and eradicated. The victory rested with
England, to whose indomitable energy, national power, and vast financial
resources, the result of the gigantic contest had been due. And as men
who have conquered in a desperate struggle, to rest and refreshment as
the fruit of their labours, so did Great Britain indulge in the
expectation that, the enemy being vanquished, she would at once be
compensated for her innumerable sacrifices by the quiet and unalloyed
enjoyment of the rewards of her valour. Nor was this an extravagant
hope. Even during the war, while the people were oppressed by a crushing
taxation, and when the country was in the very throes of an exhausting
and terrible conflict, England, thanks to her commanding maritime
supremacy, that alone endowed her with extraordinary strength, advanced
steadily in riches and in population.[126] It may, then, be readily
conceived that, if such was the case in the hour of darkness, the nation
had cause to look forward with confidence, to a rapidly accelerating
progress in material prosperity, as soon as the millennium of a general
peace should dawn upon the civilized world. But anticipations are
frequently disappointed, and in this case they were not immediately
realized. The cessation of hostilities, instead of heralding an era of
plenty, was the signal of much misery and distress, which cast a dark
shadow over the last few years of the reign of George III., and
chastened the rejoicings that followed the successful termination of the
greatest war of modern times.
-----
Footnote 126:
The exports, which in 1792 were valued at £27,000,000, amounted to
nearly £58,000,000 in 1815; imports rose from £19,000,000 to
£32,000,000 between those years; the shipping advanced from 1,000,000
to 2,500,000 tons; and the population of the three kingdoms, from
14,000,000 to 18,000,000 souls (Alison, _History of Europe_ ,
1815-1852, i. 79).
-----
Various causes are assigned for this unexpected suffering, into which we
cannot enter. Suffice it to record the fact, and to note, that the
widespread poverty that then prevailed, led to disorder, which, breaking
out in many parts of the country, had to be quelled by the interference
of military force. In London there were also disturbances or threats of
riots, so that, from the end of 1816 until the autumn of 1817—and,
indeed, upon many occasions afterwards—the Guards quartered in the
Metropolis were constantly kept ready for the preservation of the public
peace; the troops were often confined to barracks, the Officers recalled
from leave, the public duties strengthened, and piquets temporarily sent
to protect vulnerable points in the city. The rabble, urged by leaders,
who endeavoured, as usual, to convert the distress to their own
purposes, began to display a rising animosity towards the soldiery;[127]
and schemes were formed for the purpose of burning the barracks in
London, and of attacking the Tower, the Bank, and other places of
importance. No actual outbreak occurred until the 2nd of December, when
a disturbance took place, known as the Spafield riots, in which the mob,
having procured arms, marched into the City and retained possession of
the Minories for some hours. After doing much damage, they were
dislodged by the troops sent to put them down, and the district was
patrolled till order was completely restored.[128]
-----
Footnote 127:
Adverting to the insults to which both Officers and men were exposed
when mounting and dismounting guard, marshal-men and park-keepers were
warned to attend those parades, and to prevent the disorder complained
of, and Officers were ordered to report them, if this duty was not
properly performed (_Brigade Order_ , Oct. 17, 1816).
Footnote 128:
_Annual Register_ , 1816, “Chronicle,” 190; _ibid._, 1817, “General
History,” 7, 12. The following letter from the Adjutant-General of the
Forces to the Field-Officer in Brigade Waiting, dated December 4th,
and published in Brigade Orders of the 6th, refers to this riot: “I
have received the Commander-in-Chief’s commands to desire that you
will convey to the Brigade of Foot Guards, H.R.H.'s entire approbation
during the last two days, of the temper and discipline they have
displayed, while rendering the most effectual aid to the civil
authorities, by which the tranquillity of the metropolis has been
secured.”
-----
The abrupt cessation of hostilities occasioned reductions in the large
naval and military establishments which had to be maintained for the
vigorous prosecution of the war; and the promptitude with which they
were effected, aggravated not a little the general distress that
followed. The Government, defeated in their proposal to continue the
property tax, and having thereupon voluntarily given up the war duty on
malt, found themselves suddenly deprived of £17,000,000 of revenue, and
had no option but to discharge forthwith, and in no sparing manner, a
large portion of the forces of the Crown. Of the 100,000 men required
for the Navy in 1815, only 33,000 were retained in 1816; the military
establishment was also fixed during the Session, at 111,756 men, not
counting the regiments serving in India, paid by the East India Company,
nor the contingent quartered in France and provided for by that nation.
To effect the necessary reductions in the land services, some 50,000 of
the regular Army, the Militia 80,000 strong, and of course the foreign
corps, nearly 21,000 men, were disbanded.[129] Some of these changes did
not take place until 1817, but they affected the Coldstream as early as
the 24th of December, 1815, when the Regiment lost 400 men; on the 24th
of March, 1817, simultaneously with the reduction effected in the army
of occupation in France, another diminution of 200 men was made in the
establishment; again, shortly after the 2nd Battalion returned from
Cambrai (December, 1818), the services of four Lieutenants, sixteen
Ensigns, two Assistant-Surgeons, and 200 men were further dispensed
with; and lastly, on the 25th of August, 1821, four companies were
abolished, twelve Officers were seconded, and 216 Non-commissioned
officers and men were discharged.[130] The sweeping nature of these
reductions, rendered necessary by the termination of the war, is perhaps
best appreciated by comparing the Regimental establishment as it stood
in the spring of 1814, with that which was in force in the autumn of
1821:—
1814. 1821.
22 Companies. 16 Companies.
4 Field-Officers (Colonel, 4 Field-Officers (Colonel,
Lieutenant-Colonel, and 2 Lieutenant-Colonel, and 2
Majors). Majors).
22 Captains. 16 Captains.
46 Lieutenants. 20 Lieutenants.
20 Ensigns. 12 Ensigns.
2 Adjutants. 2 Adjutants.
2 Quartermasters. 2 Quartermasters.
3 Surgeon-Major and Battalion 3 Surgeon-Major and Battalion
Surgeons. Surgeons.
4 Assistant-Surgeons. 2 Assistant-Surgeons.
1 Solicitor. 1 Solicitor.
2 Drum-Majors. 2 Drum-Majors.
1 Deputy Marshal. 1 Deputy Marshal.[131]
2 Sergeants-Major. 2 Sergeants-Major.
2 Quartermaster-Sergeants. 2 Quartermaster-Sergeants.
2 Armourer-Sergeants. 2 Armourer-Sergeants.
2 Schoolmaster-Sergeants. 2 Schoolmaster-Sergeants.
176 Sergeants. 64 Sergeants.
176 Corporals 63 Corporals.
47 Drummers and Fifers. 35 Drummers and Fifers.
2706 Privates. 1344 Privates.
—— ——
3220 Total. 1580 Total.
-----
Footnote 129:
Alison, _History of Europe_ , 1815-1852, i. 108. “We have had one of
the most disagreeable sessions I ever remember; a sour, discontented
temper among our friends, considerable distress throughout the
country, and endless debates upon economy, whilst everything that has
been done by the Prince and his Government, is either forgotten or
thrown into the shade” (Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington,
May 13th, 1816: _Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 401).
Footnote 130:
If Officers, not included in the reduction of 1818, wished to retire
on half-pay, the difference to be paid on an exchange was fixed at
£1000 for a Lieutenant, and at £600 for an Ensign, “to those on the
permanent establishment who may be entitled to such indulgence.” In
the reduction of 1821, the men were allowed to take away their
knapsacks, their regimental clothing of the year, and their great
coats, if they had been two years in wear; the Officers seconded, were
to be re-absorbed into the Regiment, by seniority, as vacancies
occurred. (Lord Palmerston to Field-Marshal H.R.H. the Duke of
Cambridge, Colonel of the Coldstream Guards, War Office, Aug. 16,
1821.)
Footnote 131:
The Deputy Marshal ceased to form part of the Regimental establishment
in December, 1828.
-----
In consequence of these changes, the King’s Guard and the Buckingham
House Guard were reduced to ninety and thirty privates respectively, and
the other public duties were lightened (January 1, 1822); very shortly
afterwards (February 14th), the guards furnished by the Tower Battalion
at the East and West India Docks were also abolished, and the Dock
companies were thereby obliged to provide themselves with adequate
protection.
During the war of 1815, and the subsequent occupation of Paris, there
were only three Battalions of the Brigade in England, and they were all
quartered in the West-end of London. In the winter of 1815-16, after the
conclusion of the peace, two more Battalions returned home, when Windsor
and the Tower were again occupied. On the 20th of August, 1816, a roster
was published for the regular half-yearly change of quarters, viz. from
the Tower, to Windsor, to Lower Westminster, to Portman Street barracks,
to Knightsbridge barracks. This arrangement was slightly altered in
December, 1818, when French territory was evacuated, and Finsbury and
Chatham were added to the list.[132] The quarters at these last two
places were shortly afterwards vacated, or irregularly occupied, and
Holborn and Brighton (or Portsmouth) substituted for them; in the end of
1821, a Battalion of Foot Guards proceeded to Dublin, and six months
later the Brigade was stationed as follows:—Grenadier Guards, 1st
Battalion, Dublin; 2nd Battalion, Tower; 3rd Battalion, Knightsbridge:
Coldstream Guards, 1st Battalion, King’s Mews barracks (now known as St.
George’s barracks); 2nd Battalion, Portman Street: Third Guards, 1st
Battalion, Lower Westminster; 2nd Battalion, Windsor.[133]
-----
Footnote 132:
_Brigade Orders_ , Aug. 20, 1816, and Dec. 9, 1818; the latter of
which contained a provision to enable the Coldstream and the Third
Guards to exchange quarters with a Regiment having two Battalions in
London, in the event of both their Battalions being simultaneously out
of town.
Knightsbridge barracks occupied a site near St. George’s Place, Hyde
Park Corner, at the back of the present Alexandra Hotel; Portman
Street barracks was situated where Granville Place, Portman Square, is
now built.
Footnote 133:
The changes of stations, as far as they affect the Regiment, up to
January, 1833, are given in Appendix No. 273 of MacKinnon’s _Origin
and Services of the Coldstream Guards_ ; after that date, they are to
be found in Appendix No. XV.
-----
As there was not, at this time, sufficient accommodation for a battalion
at any of the London barracks, that portion of the men who could not be
lodged there were billeted in the vicinity. At Windsor, also, the Foot
Guards, though sometimes furnishing detachments at Hungerford, Reading,
Kew, and Sandhurst, had not enough room in the barracks, and a portion
of the men were similarly provided with quarters in the town. The system
of billeting was gradually brought to an end, but it does not seem to
have entirely disappeared, in London at least, until 1837, when barrack
accommodation was provided for the whole Brigade. The discipline of the
men in quarters was specially looked after, each company being told off
into squads under proper superintendence; the men were frequently
visited, and were efficiently controlled, and reports were made of any
complaint either on the part of the soldiers, or on the part of the
landlords.[134] The following appears in the 1st Battalion Orders of the
25th of February, 1820:—
Colonel Woodford feels certain, from the excellent conduct of the
Battalion throughout the past year, that he may look forward with
confidence to a continuance of good order, sobriety, and discipline in
quarters, and although many soldiers will be dispersed in the
public-houses, he trusts that they will never dishonour themselves by
associating with any disaffected or ill-disposed people. The men must
be regular and clean in their quarters, and they may expect to be
visited frequently and at uncertain times and hours, both by day and
in the evening; and any man reported for improper behaviour will be
removed to barracks immediately.
-----
Footnote 134:
See _2nd Battalion Order_, Sept. 11, 1819. It appears that the men of
the Brigade were at one time allowed to earn money as coal porters,
but no record has been found to show when the practice ceased. It is
said that a certain number of men on guard were also allowed to do the
same thing, provided they joined their posts at the evening roll-call,
and that this was the origin of beating the taptoo on the Queen’s
Guard.
-----
From May, 1816, until the summer of 1820, the West-end Battalions
supplied a detachment of some 250 men, at Deptford and Woolwich, to
protect the Government establishments maintained there. The detachment
was relieved every fortnight at first, and afterwards once a month.
Later, the Brigade supplied detachments of variable strength, for the
same purpose, at irregular periods, to both, or to either of, these
places, viz.: April, 1836-April, 1837; June, 1847-November, 1847; July,
1850; March, 1851; October 28, 1853-February 8, 1854.
On the 18th of January, 1816, the Eagles captured at Waterloo, were
deposited with great solemnity in the Chapel Royal, Whitehall. An
escort, consisting of Officers and men of the three Regiments, who had
all been present at the battle (of which the Coldstream furnished 1
sergeant, 1 corporal, and 23 privates), marched past the public duties
and the rest of the Brigade, assembled on the Horse Guards parade,
lowering the Eagles as they approached the King’s Colour, and proceeded
thence to Whitehall, accompanied by the band of the Coldstream. Divine
Service was then read, during which, the trophies were brought in, and
were lodged in the Chapel.
It is perhaps worthy of remark that, as early as 1817, Government
granted to soldiers the privilege of sending their own letters by post,
at the then very cheap rate of one penny.[135]
-----
Footnote 135:
_General Order_ , Jan. 22, 1817.
-----
The supply of Regimental necessaries had hitherto not been
satisfactorily managed. The Commanding Officer accordingly established
stores, from which all the articles required by the men could be
procured, of good quality, at the cheapest rate, and at fixed and known
prices; and he published an order, January 23, 1817, directing that, for
the future, all the men’s necessaries should be got for them there, and
at no other place.[136] This order was enforced in the 2nd Battalion,
then at Cambrai, on the 9th of February.[137]
-----
Footnote 136:
By 1st Battalion Order, October 10, 1819, all articles of necessaries
and clothing were to be marked with the Regimental mark previous to
their delivery to the men.
-----
-----
Footnote 137:
The following Battalion Order was issued on this subject, dated
Cambrai, February 11, 1817: “The monthly inspection of necessaries is
to take place every 24th, if possible. The different articles sealed
and approved by the Commanding Officer are to be the patterns for the
Battalion, and no necessaries are to be considered as Regimental
excepting such as are stamped by the Quartermaster. The
Non-commissioned officers and men are to be completed according to the
list sent to each company. There will be only one delivery of
necessaries in the month from the store-room, as soon after the
inspection as possible. The sealed patterns are to be sent to each
company with the new articles, to enable the men to compare them, and
if they are not equally good, the pay-sergeants are to send them back
immediately to the Quartermaster.”
-----
Increased attention was paid about this time to interior economy, and
former orders on the subject, issued piecemeal, were summarized. The
method of paying the men and of keeping their accounts, established by
the Commanding Officer, was enforced by Regimental Orders of January 19,
1818, and July 28, 1820; the messing was more closely looked after; and
the duties of the company Officers, and of the Officer of the day, were
better defined. By a Regimental Order of June 20, 1822,[138] Officers
commanding companies were directed frequently to visit the barrack
rooms, and to see the messes, also to inspect the men’s necessaries
weekly, instead of monthly as heretofore; marching order parades every
Sunday morning were then instituted for this purpose, and the custom was
not abolished until the year 1843, when Saturday was finally substituted
for Sunday, as the day upon which the inspection was to take place.
-----
Footnote 138:
Repeated and somewhat enlarged by 2nd Battalion Orders of August 2,
1827, and February 25, 1830. By the former, the Officer for the week
was directed to inspect the breakfast messes every morning at eight
a.m.
-----
Colonel Sir Richard Jackson, K.C.B. (First Major of the Regiment),
having left the Coldstream, Colonel Alexander Woodford, C.B., succeeded
him in the command of the 1st Battalion, and Colonel Sir Henry Bouverie,
K.C.B., promoted Second Major, assumed the command of the 2nd Battalion
(January 18, 1820).
George III., after a long and glorious reign of sixty years, died on the
29th of January, 1820, and was succeeded by the Prince of Wales, who,
through the illness of the King, had been Prince Regent, or Monarch in
fact, though not in name, ever since the end of 1810. The ten years
during which George IV. occupied the Throne, did not differ generally
from the five that succeeded Waterloo: they were marked by disturbances
and political commotions, which, lasting until the reign of his
successor, William IV., brought about important and radical changes in
the constitution of the country. During this period, moreover, the power
of steam was brought into practical use, and railways and steam-ships
began to take the place of stage coaches and sailing vessels. England,
in short, was passing through a phase of transition, when a new order
was being established both in the political and social life of the
people.
The first Battalions of the three Regiments of Foot Guards attended
the obsequies of George III., which took place at Windsor, February
16th, and received from General Earl Cathcart, Gold Stick in Waiting,
in chief command of the troops, through Colonel Askew, the
Field-Officer in Brigade Waiting, “the entire approbation of H.R.H.
the Commander-in-Chief of their appearance, attention, and regularity,
on that most melancholy occasion, and his sincere thanks for the
propriety of their conduct in performing the several services assigned
to them.” Next day the 1st Battalion Coldstream proceeded for four
months to Portsmouth, returning to Windsor in June.
The 2nd Battalion meanwhile remained at Portman Street, and rendered
good service on the occasion of the apprehension of the Cato Street
conspirators, on the 23rd of February. It was ascertained that the
latter, not unlike a modern gang of anarchists, were plotting to murder
the King’s ministers, and to overturn every form of government; that
they were well armed, and were lying concealed in a loft over a stable
in Cato Street, the only approach to which was by a ladder and through a
trap-door. Some police, accompanied by a detachment of thirty men of the
2nd Battalion, under Lieutenant F. FitzClarence, stormed the loft,
garrisoned by twenty-five desperate characters, and a fight ensued in
the dark, under circumstances of great confusion. Several conspirators
succeeded in making their escape, but nine were secured, and sufficient
arms and ammunition for one hundred persons were seized; not, however,
before one of the policemen was killed, and a sergeant of the 2nd
Battalion, named Legge, wounded.[139] A Regimental Order, dated February
25th, was issued, referring to this incident:—
The Commanding Officer has great pleasure in expressing his
satisfaction with the piquet of the 2nd Battalion commanded by
Lieutenant FitzClarence, on the night of the 23rd instant. The
gallantry and moderation with which they performed their duty, are in
the highest degree creditable.
-----
Footnote 139:
_Annual Register_ , 1820, “Chronicle,” 51. Alison, _History of
Europe_ , 1815-1852, ii. 424.
-----
The new reign began with an event that stirred the whole nation to the
very depths, and wrought irreparable scandal through every grade of
society—the trial of the unfortunate Caroline, Queen of George IV.
Happily, the episode is now forgotten, and there is no necessity to
revive it. But the trial of a Queen, publicly charged with degrading
personal conduct, is unique in modern history, and it created naturally
an extraordinary excitement among all classes at the time; and, as
feeling upon the subject ran exceedingly high, and a spirit of disorder
and disaffection was widespread, the Brigade had a part to play in it,
which cannot entirely be passed over. The trial itself took the form of
a Bill of Pains and Penalties, read a first time in the House of Lords,
July 5th. On the second reading, evidence was heard, and the
proceedings, beginning on the 17th of August, did not end until the 6th
of November, when there was a majority of twenty-eight in favour of the
measure. At the third reading (November 10th), the majority sank to nine
votes, and thereupon Government abandoned the Bill. The populace had
ever been the partisans of the unhappy Queen, and, when she arrived in
England in June, she met with a reception which could only compare with
that which greeted Charles II. on the restoration of the Monarchy in
1660. So, also, when the withdrawal of the Bill was announced, London
was illuminated on three successive nights, and, the results of the
inquiry being forgotten, a universal joy manifested itself through the
whole country, which almost equalled the unbounded enthusiasm displayed
after the fall of Napoleon.
During this trying time, the Battalions of the Brigade quartered in the
Metropolis formed the main force for the repression of disorder, and
arrangements of the most comprehensive nature were made to prevent an
outbreak that was almost hourly expected. A detachment of 350 rank and
file was furnished daily, from the 17th of August, for the protection of
the House of Lords. For this purpose, 50 men were added to the Tylt, a
guard of 50 men was stationed during the trial, in the Cotton Yard
behind Westminster Palace, the piquet at Carlton Palace was permanently
posted, and a force was held as a reserve in St. James’s Park. The guard
at the British Museum was doubled, the Tower Battalion was prepared to
supply 200 men at any moment, on the requisition of the Lord Mayor,
while a Captain’s piquet of 100 rank and file was kept constantly ready
at each of the three principal West-end barracks—the King’s Mews,
Knightsbridge, and Portman Street. The usual half-yearly change of
quarters took place on the 26th of August, when the 1st Battalion
Coldstream proceeded from Windsor to the Tower, and the 2nd Battalion
from Portman Street to Knightsbridge barracks, and to that part of Upper
Westminster contiguous thereto. The military arrangements made for the
trial were sometimes modified during its procedure, now being reduced
and again increased. During October, a guard was placed in Westminster
Hall, and the Bank piquet remained on duty for twenty-four hours. These
precautions were finally discontinued on the 15th of November, and the
ordinary leave granted to Officers; though we find, on the 28th, riots
were again apprehended, and the 1st Battalion was directed to attend to
the Lord Mayor’s requisition to the extent of 300 men.
The violence of popular excitement soon subsides, and, the inquiry over,
the Queen’s partisans lost interest in her cause. The King, too, became
more popular with the mob, and it was possible to fix a date for his
Coronation. This great event was solemnized upon the 19th of July, 1821,
with all the magnificent pomp and quaint ceremonial of past ages, and is
more than usually interesting in that it was carefully conducted upon
ancient models, and that it is the last pageant of its kind which is
ever likely to be seen in England. The Royal procession, in gorgeous and
mediæval array, moved from Westminster Hall to the Abbey by a covered
platform, 1500 feet long, by 25 broad, fitted with a lower edging three
feet wide on each side, and returned by the same route, after the
religious ceremony was concluded. The whole of the Foot Guards (except
the 1st Battalion Third Guards) were present (the 2nd Battalion
Coldstream having been brought up from Windsor for the purpose), and
were commanded by Colonel Hon. H. Brand, Lieut.-Colonel of the Regiment.
The two Grenadier companies of the Coldstream were stationed in the
Abbey with the State Colours. The platform was lined throughout by 1500
men standing in single file on each side, on the lower portions just
mentioned. They were divided into three divisions, each under a
Field-Officer, with a part of the bands, drums, etc. Forty Officers and
1141 men were employed in furnishing strong piquets, extra guards, and
Guards of Honour, in strengthening the public duties, and in patrolling
the neighbourhood of Westminster. A portion of the streets was also
lined, the Coldstream having its right at the west gate of the Abbey,
and extending towards Westminster Hall. The troops got into position at
one o’clock in the night preceding the ceremony; and a large force of
cavalry, aided by Yeomanry, the Light Horse Volunteers, and the
Honourable Artillery Company, were also present under Major-General Lord
Edward Somerset, and furnished patrols throughout the Metropolis. These
ample precautions were rendered necessary by the apprehension of a riot;
for the Queen, whose application to be crowned had been refused,
expressed a determination, nevertheless, to appear in person, and
serious disturbances were expected to be the result. To such an extent
did the panic spread, that, we are told, places to see the procession,
which had been selling for ten guineas, were to be had, on the morning
of the ceremony, for half a crown.[140]
-----
Footnote 140:
Alison, _History of Europe_ , 1815-1852, ii. 484. For a full account
of the Coronation of King George IV., see _Annual Register_ , 1821,
“Appendix to Chronicle,” p. 324, etc.
-----
The following General Order was published on the day after the
Coronation:—
“The Commander-in-Chief has received the King’s gracious command to
express to the troops employed yesterday in aid of the arrangements
for the Coronation, His Majesty’s thanks for the orderly, soldierlike,
and exemplary conduct which they have evinced upon the occasion. The
Commander-in-Chief has received the King’s further command, through
the Secretary of State, to convey to the Light Horse, His Majesty’s
thanks for their services upon the same occasion, and his full sense
and approbation of the loyalty and zeal which they have manifested in
the offer of them.”
Next day, on the appointment of Colonel Brand, C.B., to the rank of
Major-General, Colonel Woodford, who had commanded the Coldstream
Battalion at Waterloo, became Lieut.-Colonel of the Regiment, and
Colonel Macdonell, C.B., promoted Major, was posted to the command of
the 2nd Battalion.
On the 3rd of September, the sum of £665 was distributed among the
Non-commissioned officers and men of the Brigade who had taken part in
the King’s Coronation, under the name of “Platform money.” The 6
Sergeants-Major received each 14_s._ 1½_d._; 226 Sergeants, 7_s._
1½_d._; 225 Corporals, 4_s._ 8¾_d._; and 3575 Drummers and Privates,
2_s._ 11¼_d._ A little more than £100 was allotted per Battalion, the
Coldstream receiving £212 2_s._ 1½_d._
It seems unnecessary to record the various and numerous reviews that
have at all times taken place; it would be monotonous to do so, and
little interest would thereby be afforded. For the most part, therefore,
they will be omitted. It was usual upon these and other occasions, for
the inspecting Officer to record publicly his opinion of the state of
the troops reviewed; thus very many testimonials exist—speaking of the
efficiency which has ever distinguished the Coldstream, and thanking the
Officers and men for their zeal and exertions—written by order of the
Sovereign, the Commander-in-Chief, the Colonel of the Regiment, the
Lieut.-Colonel, Generals under whom a Battalion happened to be serving,
and also giving messages from foreign Princes. These communications to
the Regiment have also been generally omitted, as their number renders
it difficult to reproduce them, and as their repetition would be
tedious.
It has been already mentioned that a Battalion of the Foot Guards was
sent to Dublin at the end of 1821. The step was rendered advisable by
the increasing trouble which afflicted Ireland, where discontent
prevailed, and where the recent currency laws had reduced the value of
agricultural produce, on which alone the peasants had to depend. Each
Battalion was kept there for a year, the change being made in the
summer. It became the turn of the 1st Battalion Coldstream to proceed to
Dublin in July, 1823, and on the 25th the troops were conveyed in canal
boats from Paddington on the road to Liverpool, whence they were sent to
their destination. The Lieut.-Colonel of the Regiment thus published his
opinion on the manner in which the start was effected from London:—
_Regimental Order, July 25, 1823._ Colonel Woodford desires to
express the satisfaction he felt at witnessing the highly creditable
manner in which the 1st Battalion turned out for the embarkation this
morning; he has particularly to notice the sobriety of the men, and
the activity and propriety with which the Non-commissioned officers
performed their duties, and he has made a favourable report to H.R.H.
the Duke of York on the subject.
During their stay in Ireland, this Battalion gained the unqualified
approbation and praise of the Lieut.-General, the Commander of the
Forces, and of the Major-General commanding the District; and this will
be best shown by giving two orders issued in Dublin. The first appeared
in Regimental Orders of February 19, 1824:
_Garrison Orders, Dublin, January 24, 1824._ Major-General Sir C.
Grant has great pleasure in expressing to the garrison of Dublin, the
satisfaction the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces experienced
yesterday in making the inspection of the Coldstream Guards. The
order, cleanliness, and regularity which were so observable, reflect
much credit on Lieut.-Colonel Milman and the Officers of this
distinguished corps, generally, and the great attention which has been
paid to that essential branch of interior economy. As all Commanding
Officers in Garrison were present at this inspection, they have had an
opportunity of seeing how much can be done, even in very indifferent
barracks, by a little care and attention. The Major-General will
expect to find all the barracks of the Garrison of Dublin in the same
creditable state as those of the Coldstream Guards.
The second was published as follows:—
“_Regimental Order, August 7, 1824._ Colonel Woodford has great
pleasure in communicating to the 2nd Battalion, the General Order
issued in Dublin, so flattering to the Officers, Non-commissioned
officers, and men of the 1st Battalion.”
“_General Order, Adjutant-General’s Office, Dublin, August 2, 1824._
The 1st Battalion of the Coldstream Guards being on the point of
embarkation to return to England, Lieut.-General Lord Combermere feels
he cannot in too strong terms, express his approbation of the good
conduct and discipline of this fine Battalion, during the time it has
been employed in this command. The Lieutenant-General could not but be
highly gratified in his recent inspection of the Battalion, by the
soldierlike appearance, steadiness, and extreme precision with which
the movements were executed. The Battalion has no less claim to merit
for the extreme order and regularity which prevail in the barracks,
affording ample proof of excellent interior arrangement, unremitting
attention on the part of all ranks, and of the zeal and ability with
which the command is conducted. In conveying his best thanks to the
Battalion generally, Lord Combermere feels desirous to express
particularly to Colonel Sir H. Bouverie, the sense he entertains of
his zeal and exertion in the performance of every point of duty, and
especially during the period he had the superintendence and command of
this Garrison.”
The Duke of York recorded his appreciation of the conduct of the
Battalion, by causing a letter, dated August 12th, to be addressed to
Colonel Woodford, which was published in Regimental Orders of the 14th:—
H.R.H. has learnt with great satisfaction from your letter, as well as
from the reports from Ireland, that the conduct of the 1st Battalion
of the Coldstream has received the unqualified approbation of the
Commander of the Forces, which would offer a confirmation, if any had
been necessary, of the favourable opinion he has always entertained of
the discipline, and meritorious discharge of every duty.
Alterations in the Regimental Hospital in Vincent Square, established in
1814, were completed in September, 1823, and the building was
re-occupied on the 9th; quarters were provided therein for a Medical
Officer, under whose care the recruits of the Regiment (then at the
Recruit House in London) were also placed.[141] About the same time,
1824, another Medical Officer took up his residence in barracks, and was
made specially responsible for the men, women, and children of the
Battalion stationed there. After an inspection made by the Duke of
Cambridge, the Colonel of the Regiment, an order was published, dated
August 10, 1825, expressing to Dr. Whymper and the Medical Officers His
Royal Highness' satisfaction and pleasure at the perfect state,
regularity, comfort, and cleanliness of the Regimental Hospital.[142]
-----
Footnote 141:
_Regimental Order, Aug. 16, 1824._
Footnote 142:
See Appendix No. VII.
-----
A boat-race against time was got up in 1824, the conditions being, that
“six Officers of the Guards belonging to aquatic clubs” should row in a
six-oared wherry from Oxford to Westminster Bridge in sixteen
consecutive hours, the crew to choose their own coxwain. The distance is
118 miles; there were no outriggers in those days, and many locks
intervene and obstruct the course to be rowed over, which, however, on
application to the Thames Commissioners, were kept in readiness to let
the boat through without delay. An attempt had previously been made to
perform the same feat in seventeen hours, by Lord Newry (the late Lord
Kilmorey), with a crew selected by himself from among his own people,
but it failed. The present match was looked forward to with considerable
interest, and large sums of money were laid upon the event. Captain
Short (Coldstream Guards) seems to have been captain of the boat, the
other oars being Captains Gordon-Douglas (afterwards Lord Penrhyn), and
H. S. Blane (Grenadier Guards), and Captains G. F. H. Hudson, G. D.
Standen, and Hon. J. C. Westenra (Third Guards). The wherry left Oxford
at 3 a.m. on the 14th of May, and, reaching Bolter’s Lock at 11.30,
Windsor Bridge at 1 p.m., Teddington Lock at 5.30, Putney Bridge at 6,
and Battersea Bridge at 6.30, arrived at Westminster Bridge, at 6.45,
“amidst the acclamations of thousands of spectators,” with just a
quarter of an hour to spare. “They were assisted out of the boat,
carried on shore, and put to bed.” The average rate was about seven and
a half miles an hour, counting stoppages for refreshment and those
occasioned by going through the locks, and the feat was remarkable,
considering the class of boat that existed at that time. We are told,
moreover, that all the crew were in a state of great exhaustion at the
conclusion of the race, and that one or two could not stand without
support.[143]
-----
Footnote 143:
_Annual Register_ , 1824, “Chronicle,” p. 59.
-----
On the 16th of July, 1825, Major-General Woodford, promoted to that rank
on May 27th, retired from the command of the Regiment, and was succeeded
by Colonel Macdonell, Sir H. Bouverie having also been appointed a
General Officer in May. Thereupon Colonel Hamilton became Senior Major
(commanding the 1st Battalion), and Colonel Raikes, Junior Major (2nd
Battalion).[144]
-----
Footnote 144:
The distinction between the First and Second Majors, which existed in
Regiments of Foot Guards, was abolished by authority, dated, September
11, 1821 (MacKinnon, _Origin and Services of the Coldstream Guards_ ,
ii. 503).
-----
[Illustration: N. R. Wilkinson del MUSKETEER 1669. Mintern
Bros. Chromo.]
In July, 1825, the Regiment contained the following Officers:—
_Colonel._—Field-Marshal H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, K.G., G.C.B.,
etc.
_Lieutenant-Colonel._—Colonel J. Macdonell, C.B.
_Majors._—Colonels J. Hamilton; and W. H. Raikes.
_Captains._—Lieut.-Colonels F. Milman; T. Barrow; D. MacKinnon; and H.
Dawkins; (_Mounted_).
Colonel Sir R. Arbuthnot, K.C.B.; Lieut.-Colonel Sir W. Gomm, K.C.B.;
Colonel Waters, C.B.; Lieut.-Colonels T. Steele; J. Fremantle, C.B.;
W. Walton; A. Wedderburn; C. Shawe; G. Bowles; C. Bentinck; G.
FitzClarence; F. Russell.
_Lieutenants._—Major J. S. Cowell; Captains J. Drummond; C. Girardot; T.
Chaplin; H. Salwey; Hon. J. Forbes; A. Cuyler; W. Kortright; H.
Armytage; H. Gooch; T. Powys; H. Bentinck (Adjutant); F. Shawe; F.
Buller; J. Montagu; H. Vane; R. Bowen; C. Short; J. Hall; Hon. H.
Dundas; W. Cornwall; Hon. W. Graves; H. Murray; B. Broadhead.
_Ensigns._—Lieutenants C. Hay; G. Bentinck; W. Northey (Adjutant); J. D.
Rawdon; Hon. T. Ashburnham; Hon. E. Erskine; W. J. Codrington; E. D.
Wigram; St. J. Dent; Hon. H. Fane; Hon. J. Hope; W. Cotton; Hon. A.
Upton; F. Paget; B. Manningham; E. B. Wilbraham; Lord M. W. Graham.
_Quartermasters._—T. Dwelly and B. Selway.
_Surgeon-Major._—J. Simpson. _Battalion Surgeons._—W. Whymper, M.D., and
T. Maynard. _Assistant Surgeons._—G. Smith and F. Gilder.
_Solicitor._—W. G. Carter, Esq.
The year 1826 was one of distress in England, which led to considerable
disorder, especially in the manufacturing parts of Lancashire. The
workmen, believing that the introduction of machinery, then beginning to
be used, was the cause of their sufferings, committed many acts of
outrage, and, during the last week of April, a large amount of property
was destroyed by riotous mobs in that county. In order to strengthen the
military force required to suppress these disturbances, the 2nd
Battalion Coldstream and the 1st Battalion Third Guards proceeded to
Manchester (by canal from Paddington) on the 1st and 2nd of May
respectively. The 2nd Battalion were stationed there until the end of
July, when they were sent to Dublin to relieve the 2nd Battalion
Grenadiers, which, on reaching Liverpool, were ordered to remain in the
Northern District.
On leaving this District, the following letter was addressed by the
Lieut.-General Commanding (Sir J. Byng) to the Commanding Officer, 2nd
Battalion Coldstream, dated July 23rd, and published in Regimental
Orders, August 8th:—
The Battalion of Coldstream Guards under your command, being on the
point of its departure for Ireland, Sir John Byng thinks it but due
to the Officers and men, to notice to them the very creditable
reports which have reached him of the orderly and soldierlike
conduct of the Battalion during the time it has been stationed at
Manchester—testimonials which, joined to what he has observed
himself when on the spot, are the more gratifying to the
Lieutenant-General, because, whilst they afford him an opportunity
of thanking them for their useful services in the District under his
orders, another occasion presents itself of recording his
unqualified approbation of a corps which so highly distinguished
itself under his command at the Battle of Waterloo; and for whose
welfare and high character he must ever feel sincerely interested.
In communicating the above to you, the Lieutenant-General requests
you will be so good to make it known to the Battalion in such manner
as you may judge proper.
Colonel Raikes having retired from the service, June 21, 1826, Colonel
MacKinnon became Junior Major, commanding the 2nd Battalion.
It was not until towards the end of the year that the two Battalions of
Guards quartered in Lancashire were brought back to London, and then a
fresh duty awaited the Brigade. There was trouble between Spain and
Portugal, and the Government determined to support the latter Power. The
resolution to do so, was hastily formed or tardily published, and on the
same day that it was announced in Parliament (December 11th), orders
were issued for six companies of the 1st Grenadiers and of the 2nd
Battalion Third Guards, made up to 84 rank and file each, to be held in
readiness for foreign service; the Brigade so formed, to be commanded by
Major-General Sir H. Bouverie (late of the Coldstream). The expedition,
numbering 5000 men, under Sir H. Clinton, started immediately
afterwards, and, before Christmas, the troops began to land at Lisbon.
As no portion of the Coldstream took part in this service, it is
unnecessary to make any further allusion to it in this volume, except to
note that it lasted more than a year, and that the two Battalions did
not return home until the spring of 1828.
The death of the Duke of York, January 5, 1827, brought to a close the
career of an able military administrator who, for twenty-one years of
his early life (1784-1805), had been Colonel of the Coldstream Guards.
His unremitting devotion to the best interests of the service, during a
period of thirty-two years (broken by a short interval only), in which
he served as Commander-in-Chief (1795-1827), earned for him an enduring
fame in the annals of the country. When he first was entrusted with this
high office, the British army was still afflicted by that inefficiency
which caused disaster in North America, and brought ruin and disgrace
upon our arms; but, at the end of his life, greatly owing to his vigour
and ability, this lamentable state of things was completely changed, and
victory and glory once more shone upon our banners.
“It is not on account of his early services,” wrote Sir Walter Scott,
“that we now venture to bring forward the late Duke of York’s claims
to the perpetual gratitude of his country. It is as the reformer and
regenerator of the British army, which he brought, from a state nearly
allied to general contempt, to such a pitch of excellence, that we
may, without much hesitation, claim for them an equality with, if not
a superiority over, any troops in Europe.”[145]
-----
Footnote 145:
_Annual Register_ , 1827, “History and Biography,” p. 460.
-----
At the funeral, which took place at Windsor, the Brigade was represented
by a force of about 1400 Officers and men, of whom the 1st Battalion
Coldstream furnished 12 Officers and 269 Non-commissioned officers and
men.
In the summer of this year, the 2nd Battalion returned from Ireland, and
was quartered in Portman Street, the 1st Battalion being stationed in
King’s Mews barracks (August 1st).
Next year, the 1st Battalion marched to Manchester (October 1st),[146]
and remained there for ten months, when they were sent to Dublin, by
Liverpool (July, 1829), for a year’s service in Ireland, returning to
London (Portman Street) in August, 1830. During this period, the
Battalion continued to receive the highest commendation for the
excellent discipline and good conduct that prevailed among all ranks,
and the following extract from Major-General Dalbiac’s confidential
report, dated May 6th, and sent by order of the Commander-in-Chief (Lord
Hill) to the Lieut.-Colonel, for the information of the Colonel of the
Regiment, Field-Marshal H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, will be read with
interest:—
“It is impossible to speak in terms too commendable of the good order,
the interior economy, and the general efficiency of the 1st Battalion
Coldstream Guards, which I consider to be a corps of the first value.
The body of men is particularly good; the Battalion thoroughly
instructed in its duties in garrison and in the field; the conduct of
the men very exemplary. The Commanding Officers have severally
afforded me much valuable assistance in upholding the discipline of
the Garrison.”[147]
-----
Footnote 146:
The following Regimental Order was published upon this occasion, dated
20th: “The Commanding Officer of the Regiment cannot withhold his
great satisfaction at the reports made to him of the exemplary conduct
of the 1st Battalion on the march from London to Manchester.”
Footnote 147:
Deputy Adjutant-General, Horse Guards, to Colonel Macdonell, July 5,
1830. It may be stated that the Regimental standard of height for
recruits, was fixed at 5 ft. 9 in. in the autumn of 1828, and was
raised to 5 ft. 10 in. three months later.
-----
In this connection, a Battalion Order of February 11th, published in
Dublin, may also be quoted:—
In consequence of the diminution in the list of defaulters,
Lieut.-Colonel Fremantle requests that Officers will set at liberty
the defaulters in their respective companies.
On May 16, 1829, Colonel Hamilton having retired, Colonel MacKinnon
became Senior Major (1st Battalion), and Colonel Sir W. Gomm was
promoted Junior Major (2nd Battalion).
It should be noted here, that, about this time, a mistake began to creep
in with respect to the title of the Regiment, which, being placed in the
Army List between the First, or Grenadier, and the Third Regiment of
Foot Guards, was occasionally described as the “Second Foot Guards.” In
December, 1829, the Lieut.-Colonel (Colonel Macdonell) protested against
this innovation; and, in reply, Sir H. Hardinge, then Secretary at War,
had it stopped, and regretted that a clerical error should have
accidentally been made.[148]
-----
Footnote 148:
There is evidence to show that when the standing army was in its
infancy, the designation “Second” instead of “Coldstream” Guards was,
upon a few occasions, used in official documents; but this happened
through inadvertence, and the Regiment invariably protested against
this name, basing the objection on the origin of the corps and its
services at the Restoration of King Charles II. The military
authorities acquiesced in this protest, and admitted the validity of
the objection. Hence the motto “Nulli Secundus” was used; and the
motto soon took a wider meaning than is merely expressed by Regimental
succession in the army roll. While on this subject, it will not be
amiss to note that the modern ungrammatical appellation of
“Coldstreams” is incorrect. The Regiment is the “Coldstream,” and the
men are called “Coldstreamers.” Soldiers who handle grenades or fusils
may be known as Grenadiers or Fusiliers; but those who are called
after one town (Coldstream), cannot be designated by the plural of
that town. One or two old documents, dated about 1689, contain the
word “Coldstreams.” The rest are invariably correct; but if language
was, in a very few instances, defective at that period, it might
surely be corrected in the present day.
-----
Some changes had been made in the uniform of the Officers of the Brigade
after 1815, especially in the beginning of the reign of George IV.; but
a more complete and permanent change began to be adopted in the year
1830, and was not finally effected until 1834. It may be sufficient to
state here, that blue trousers with gold lace, those of Oxford grey
mixture with the red stripe (for winter wear), and the present gold and
crimson sashes were then introduced. The gorget, the white pantaloons,
or breeches and stockings (worn in the evening), and the cap-lines and
tassels of Non-commissioned officers were discontinued; and the bearskin
cap became the head-dress of the whole Regiment instead of the Grenadier
company only, as was formerly the case. The Rose—one of the distinctive
badges of the Coldstream, which has now, unfortunately, entirely
disappeared from the uniform of Officers, though still happily to be
seen on that belonging to Non-commissioned officers and men—was then
retained on the epaulettes, and was not removed until a quarter of a
century later. Further, a braided great-coat was allotted to Officers of
the Brigade, of the same pattern for the three Regiments, to distinguish
them from the Line. Lastly, Field-Officers of the Guards were ordered by
the King (_Brigade Order_ , March 2, 1831) to wear the same sword belt,
as that of a General Officer. Uniform, at that time, seems to have been
worn in out-quarters more frequently than is customary at present; and
orders exist, which show that Officers stationed in Dublin, were not
allowed to appear in plain clothes, unless going to some distance in the
country, and remaining absent all night from their quarters. On the
other hand, there was no special mess-dress; but uniform at mess was
nevertheless the rule, and Officers did not dine in barracks in plain
clothes.
The death of George IV. occurred on June 26, 1830, and William IV.
ascended the Throne. The funeral of the late King took place at Windsor,
and was attended by the 2nd Coldstream (the 1st Battalion was in
Dublin). Upon this occasion an order was issued intimating that,
“Colonel Macdonell has been honoured by His Majesty’s commands to
communicate to the 2nd Battalion, in the strongest possible terms, his
approbation of their conduct during the ceremonial of the Funeral of His
late Majesty King George IV.,” adding that “the King has further
directed Colonel Macdonell to say that it affords him the greatest
pleasure thus to express his satisfaction, on the first opportunity he
has had of seeing them since his accession to the Throne.” An order
couched in similar terms was addressed to that part of the Brigade,
employed in the ceremonial just mentioned, viz. 1st Grenadiers,
quartered at Windsor, 100 men each from the 2nd and 3rd Grenadiers, the
2nd Coldstream, and the 1st Battalion Third Guards.
During the early years of his reign, William IV. frequently inspected
the Foot Guards. The 2nd Battalion Coldstream was the first reviewed
(July 19th), and on the same day, the King granted the Regiment the
privilege of receiving His Majesty with the Coldstream March instead of
the National Anthem. This was communicated by the following Regimental
Order:—
“Colonel Macdonell has received His Majesty’s commands to communicate
to the Officers, Non-commissioned officers and men, his entire
satisfaction with their appearance this morning. His Majesty has been
further pleased to command that hereafter, when he is received by
either Battalion of the Regiment, the band is to play the Coldstream
Regimental March instead of 'God save the King.'”[149]
-----
Footnote 149:
The Coldstream March is taken from Mozart’s _Nozze di Figaro_ (“_Non
piu Andrai_”), and it used to be called “The Duke of York’s March.”
About fifty years ago, “The Milanollo” was introduced as a Regimental
Quick March.
A like privilege to play their Regimental Marches instead of the
National Anthem, when receiving His Majesty, was also granted (July
19th) to the other two Regiments of Foot Guards. Two Battalions of the
Grenadiers were inspected by the King on July 22nd, when it was
ordered that the spears of their Colours should be surmounted by a
wreath of oak leaves, and that the whole of the Officers and men of
these Battalions, and of the detachments from the Brigade keeping the
ground, should wear laurel in their caps, in compliment to the Duke of
Wellington, it being the anniversary of the battle of Salamanca.
-----
On the same day, the King commanded that the Field-Officer in Brigade
Waiting, accompanied by the Adjutant in Waiting, and an Orderly Sergeant
from each Regiment of Foot Guards, should attend His Majesty’s carriage
on State occasions. The former practice was that the Field-Officer
attended the Sovereign, and had a place in a Royal carriage assigned to
him.
A few days later the members of the Nulli Secundus Club were honoured by
an invitation to dine with His Majesty (July 31st). Upon this occasion,
the King was pleased to express the attachment which he felt,
especially, for the Coldstream Guards, and the sincere interest he took
in the continued prosperity of the Nulli Secundus Club, and he intimated
it to be his intention to receive the members at dinner every year.[150]
-----
Footnote 150:
See Appendix No. VII.
-----
On the 22nd of July, Colonel Macdonell, having been promoted
Major-General, was succeeded in the command of the Regiment by Colonel
MacKinnon; thereupon Colonel Sir. W. Gomm became Senior Major (1st
Battalion), and Colonel Milman, Junior Major (2nd Battalion).
The period 1829-1832, will ever be memorable in English history as one
of great trouble, anxiety, and difficulty. There was considerable
distress among the working classes, especially in 1829,—due, according
to some writers, to the currency laws which then came into
operation.[151] But besides this, and far more important, a wave of
agitation swept over the face of the country with a terrific force,
unknown since the great Rebellion. Violent riots and great disorder were
of frequent occurrence; and civil war, though happily it never broke
out, was imminent, and was believed by some to be inevitable. During
this period, Catholic Emancipation was carried and Reform was passed;
the landmarks of the then existing British Constitution were
obliterated, and the political principles, which were held by many to be
the basis of national prosperity, were uprooted. The death of George IV.
at this critical juncture, contributed in no small degree to fan the
flames of discontent, and to produce the uncompromising changes in the
government of the country, which were effected in 1832. But events
abroad also served to shape the destinies of England; for, added to the
trouble at home, Europe, too, was convulsed by mighty disturbances,
which shook to their foundations some of the principal Continental
nations, and influenced the course of agitation in this country.
Belgium, at that time subject to the Crown of Holland, rebelled,
declared her independence, and succeeded in establishing herself as a
separate Monarchy under the rule of a Prince of Saxe-Coburg, who assumed
the title of King Leopold I.[152] In France the spirit of revolution,
vainly smothered in 1815, and ignorantly dealt with by the Bourbons,
again reared its head, and Charles X. was hurled from his throne. The
ancient Monarchy of France was finally and for ever extinguished, and a
Citizen-King, surrounded by Republican institutions, was invited to
reign by the favour of the Garde Nationale—the armed representatives of
the populace. The insurrection, that succeeded in vesting Louis-Philippe
with a semblance of Royal power, and that effectually tore to shreds the
constitution fixed by the Allies in 1815, began in Paris on the 26th of
July, 1830, just two days after the dissolution of Parliament in London.
The general election took place about a month later; and in the excited
state of men’s minds, when widespread sympathy was felt and expressed
for the aspirations of the Orleanist faction in France, the result could
not but reflect the movement that was carried on there, and give impetus
to an agitation which had already acquired considerable strength.
-----
Footnote 151:
Alison’s _History of Europe_ , 1815-52, iv. 214, etc.
Footnote 152:
King Leopold I. was a near relation of our Royal Family, being uncle
of Queen Victoria, brother of the Duchess of Kent. His first wife,
moreover, was Charlotte, only child of George IV., by his Queen,
Caroline. Had this Princess lived, she would have become Queen of
England, and her husband, like his nephew subsequently became, would
have been Prince Consort.
-----
Parliament opened on the 26th of October, and three weeks later, on the
fall of the administration of the Duke of Wellington, Lord Grey was
called to office. The winter passed gloomily, and a wild spirit of
revolt was abroad. The southern counties around London were “in a state
of open insurrection;” the agitators, frequently referring to events in
Belgium and France, inflamed the passions of the people; outrages and
excesses were committed, and so great was the consternation created by
the fear of disorder, that the King’s visit to the city (November 9th)
had to be given up. It is unnecessary to describe the various
vicissitudes which attended the great struggle for Reform. Suffice it to
say that the country continued to be the prey to an increasing
agitation, unparalleled in modern British history, and that the Bill was
finally passed into law by a large majority, June 7, 1832, because those
that opposed it were intimidated into silence, believing that further
resistance would end by plunging the nation into the abyss of civil war.
The army, taking no part in the effervescence that seethed around, was
occupied in the uncongenial duty of preserving the public peace,
wherever it was disturbed. In London, a system of Metropolitan Police
had just been organized (1829), to replace the watchmen, who up to that
time were responsible for good order and for the prevention of crime.
The new force had only come into existence, nor was it sufficiently
strong to cope with the serious emergency that had arisen. The Brigade,
therefore, was frequently held in readiness to aid the civil power, and
in November, 1830, all Officers were recalled from leave, while
Non-commissioned officers and men on furlough were ordered to rejoin
their corps without delay. A detachment of two Subalterns and
fifty-seven men were stationed at North Hyde, furnished by each
Battalion in turn, the reliefs being made fortnightly, until March 1,
1831, when it was found by the 1st Battalion Coldstream, who proceeded
to Windsor on that date.[153]
-----
Footnote 153:
On November 10th, an allowance of ninepence daily per man was made for
the purchase of refreshments to the troops assembled on piquet duty,
in and near the metropolis. It was ordered that this money should not
be spent on spirituous liquors. The following 1st Battalion Order,
dated June 7, 1831, was issued: “The Commanding Officer has much
satisfaction in making known to the Battalion a communication he has
received from the Mayor of Windsor, expressive of the obligation the
civil authorities feel themselves under, for the assistance afforded
by several soldiers in securing offenders against the public peace
during the past week, and particularly on Saturday last.”
-----
The Coronation of the King and Queen took place in Westminster Abbey,
September 8, 1831, the day after the Reform Bill had passed the
committee stage in the Commons. The ceremony was sufficiently
magnificent, but was shorn of much of its ancient splendour, and, in
accordance with the economy of the age, His Majesty was prevented from
giving the usual Coronation Banquet in Westminster Hall.[154] The
Brigade lined the streets in the vicinity, the 1st and 2nd Battalions
Grenadiers and the 1st Scots Fusilier Guards[155] occupying the west
side, the 1st and the 2nd Battalions Coldstream—a portion of which had
been brought from Windsor—and the 2nd Scots Fusiliers, the east side,
the left of the Coldstream being posted near the Abbey. Piquets were
also held in readiness in case of disorder, which happily did not occur.
The troops, in review order, wearing white trousers, and Officers in
gold sashes, were in position at 7 a.m. The _largesse_ of “Platform
money” was not distributed upon this occasion, but an allowance of one
shilling, to each Non-commissioned officer and private under arms, was
made for refreshments, half of which was spent, the remainder being
given to the men in the evening.[156]
-----
Footnote 154:
For a full description of this Coronation, see _Annual Register_ ,
1831, “Chronicle,” p. 140, etc.
Footnote 155:
The Third Guards were called by their new title, Scots
Fusilier-Guards, in Orders, dated, June 24, 1831.
Footnote 156:
Present at the Coronation, and drawing the shilling: 1st Battalion
Coldstream—27 sergeants, 19 drummers, and 526 rank and file; 2nd
Battalion Coldstream—14 sergeants, 12 drummers, 266 rank and file.
-----
The pleasures of political agitation were somewhat marred, and the
intensity of the strife was perhaps blunted, by the first appearance in
England of the plague of cholera, which occurred towards the end of
1831. This terrible disease, having broken out in Bengal in 1817, spread
to Persia in 1823, where it remained in a more or less dormant state,
until 1830, when it revived, and extended rapidly through Russia, into
Austria, and North Germany. In spite of severe quarantine regulations,
cases of this fatal illness were reported in Sunderland on October 26,
1831; and before the end of the year many persons were attacked, and
succumbed to its violence, in the north of England and in Scotland.
In February, it appeared in the port of London, and from thence it
spread through every part of the kingdom, and continued its ravages into
Ireland. The panic created by this unknown epidemic was great. Medical
men were naturally at a loss to understand, much more at a loss to treat
effectively, the new disorder; but, though severe, it was everywhere
less fatal than preconceived notions had anticipated, and, when it
gradually disappeared in the autumn, surprise seems to have been general
that so much apprehension had been entertained.[157]
-----
Footnote 157:
_Annual Register_ , 1831, “History of Europe,” p. 298; _ibid._, 1832,
p. 304.
-----
The results of cholera were not, however, unimportant, for the
visitation served to introduce more sanitary and cleanly habits among
the people, and to put an end to the billeting system and to
overcrowding in military barracks. Every precaution was naturally taken
to preserve the health of the troops, and to guard them against
infection. The 2nd Battalion, being at the Tower, in a dangerous
quarter, stringent orders were issued to secure this object. Frequent
medical inspections took place, certain districts were placed out of
bounds, drunken men were isolated until visited by the Surgeon, the
water supply was not neglected, and the men were “earnestly desired to
report themselves directly they felt unwell, as it is found when
remedies are applied in time fatal results seldom ensue.” The order
(dated March 21, 1832) added that—
the Commanding Officer has great pleasure in observing the orderly
behaviour of the men in general during the last week, and he trusts
that by abstaining from absence from barracks, drunkenness, and other
excesses, and a strict compliance with the above regulations, they
will continue to second his efforts as much as possible, to keep the
barracks free from disease.
In February, moreover, Warley was converted into a Depôt for all Brigade
recruits, who were taken from the Recruit House in London; and the Royal
Waggon Train, being removed from Croydon, the barracks there, were
placed at the disposal of the Foot Guards for the occupation of those
convalescents or weakly men, who were unable to perform the usual
military duties in town. During the same month, married soldiers and
others were sent to Croydon, Chatham, and Brighton—at which latter place
there was then accommodation for 336 men. In March, also, certain houses
in Hanley Road, Hornsey, were hired for a year, fit to receive five
Officers and 463 men. New barracks were constructed, or the old ones
improved, and, in November, 1833, the King’s Mews were changed into St.
George’s barracks,[158] and the Recruit House into the present old wing
of Wellington barracks, called at that time, for a few months only,
Westminster barracks. On March 1, 1834, the Brigade occupied the
following quarters: Grenadier Guards—1st Battalion, Tower; 2nd
Battalion, Portman Street; 3rd Battalion, Wellington (Westminster)
barracks: Coldstream Guards—1st Battalion, Windsor; 2nd Battalion,
Knightsbridge, Kensington, and the Magazine barracks: Scots Fusilier
Guards—1st Battalion, St. George’s barracks; 2nd Battalion, Dublin.
-----
Footnote 158:
These barracks are now smaller than they were then, a portion having
been given up to increase the National Gallery.
-----
It may be stated here, that a company was also stationed in Buckingham
House, usually found by the Battalion occupying Knightsbridge, and that
the latter barracks were given up in May, 1836, and St. John’s Wood
substituted for them. The Brigade continued to occupy these West-end
quarters until the Crimean war broke out—that is, Portman Street, St.
George’s, and Wellington barracks accommodated one Battalion each, while
the fourth Battalion was divided into detachments, the head-quarters and
three or four companies being in St. John’s Wood, the remainder in
Kensington, the Magazine, Buckingham Palace, and St. George’s or
Wellington barracks.
In July, 1832, the 2nd Battalion proceeded to Dublin by Bristol,
returning to London in the following summer. Ireland was then passing
through one of the phases of popular discontent and resistance to law so
common in her history, and which have for so long troubled the
government of that island. The anti-tithe agitation was then in full
swing, and was accompanied by incidents very similar to those that
occurred during the recent anti-rent struggle, with which we are
familiar. As a means of pacifying the disturbed districts, troops were
quartered in them, just as was done in 1880. The 2nd Battalion furnished
three companies for this duty during the latter end of October, when it
appears that this force, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Hon. J.
Forbes, was stationed at Leighlin Bridge, in Carlow, and was quartered
there for a fortnight. The Battalion gained the approbation of the
military authorities in Dublin, shown by two orders (dated May 23 and
August 12, 1833), testifying to the high opinion entertained by them of
the “exemplary conduct,” and of the discipline of the corps whilst
serving in Ireland.
The next two years passed without much incident until 1836, when the
Regiment was put into mourning by the unexpected death of the
Lieut.-Colonel (Colonel MacKinnon), who, having served in the Coldstream
throughout the whole of his military career, from the early age of
fourteen to the day of his death, in every rank from Ensign to
Lieut.-Colonel, through the Peninsular war and at Waterloo, where he was
wounded, may be considered as an Officer peculiarly belonging to the
Regiment.[159] In spite of illness, he remained at his post until the
middle of June, when he obtained a year’s leave; but he was unable to
avail himself of it, for a few days later, on the 22nd, he died, only
forty-six years of age, respected alike by the Officers and the men. The
public exercises of the Regiment were immediately suspended till after
the interment of the Commanding Officer, and, on the 8th of July, the
following order was promulgated by Colonel Sir W. Gomm, who succeeded
him, on the occasion of an inspection of the two Battalions by Lord
Hill, the Commander-in-Chief:—
The Lieutenant-Colonel feels much pride in communicating to Colonel
Milman, Colonel Fremantle,[160] and the Officers and men of both
Battalions of the Coldstream, the marked satisfaction expressed by the
General Commanding-in-Chief at the high soldierlike appearance,
steadiness under arms, and precision of movement, which they both
displayed at the inspection—qualities pronounced by Lord Hill to be so
eminently characteristic at all times of the Corps to which they
belong. The Lieutenant-Colonel, while imparting these gratifying
sentiments of Lord Hill to the Regiment, would be greatly wanting in
what he feels to be due to his Lordship and to the Corps at large, to
the memory no less of its late distinguished Commanding Officer, did
he fail to communicate, at the same time, the strong expression of
condolence and regret with which Lord Hill adverted to the loss
freshly sustained by the Regiment, and the Army in general, in the
death of Colonel MacKinnon—a regret which Lord Hill felt assured was
so largely and so duly shared with him by all ranks and orders of the
Regiment.
-----
Footnote 159:
Colonel MacKinnon is the author of the _Origin and Services of the
Coldstream Guards_ , a work remarkable for its research in the early
history of the British army.
Footnote 160:
Upon the death of Colonel MacKinnon, Colonel Milman became Senior
Major (1st Battalion), and Colonel Fremantle was promoted Junior Major
(2nd Battalion).
-----
Sir W. Gomm did not long retain the command of the Regiment; but, as
will be seen, he returned to the Coldstream a quarter of a century after
he had left it, when he was appointed Colonel of the Regiment. Becoming
Major-General, the Lieut.-Colonelcy devolved upon Colonel Milman, and
Colonels Fremantle and Walton succeeded as Senior and Junior Majors
respectively (January 10, 1837).
The Coldstream now stood—
_Colonel._—Field-Marshal H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, K.G., etc.
_Lieut.-Colonel._—Colonel F. Milman.
_Majors._—Colonels J. Fremantle, C.B.; and W. Walton.
_Captains._—Lieut.-Colonels A. Wedderburn; C. Shawe; G. Bowles; and C.
Bentinck; (_Mounted_).
Lieut.-Colonels T. Chaplin; H. Armytage; H. Bentinck; C. Short;
W. Cornwall; B. Broadhead; C. Hay; H. Gooch; J. Rawdon; Hon. T.
Ashburnham; W. Codrington; E. Wigram.
_Lieutenants._—Captains W. Stewart; Hon. J. Hope (Adjutant); G. Knox;
Hon. A. Upton; F. Paget; Hon. E. Wilbraham; Lord M. W. Graham; J.
Pringle; J. Clitherow; Gordon Drummond; Lord F. Paulet; C. Horton
(Adjutant); J. Forbes; R. Vansittart; C. Windham; C. Wilbraham; W.
Tollemache; J. Elrington; H. Daniell; Hon. R. Boyle; F. Halkett; H.
Dent.
_Ensigns._—Lieutenants C. Dundas; R. Hulse; D. Chisholm; S. Conroy; Hon.
F. Villiers; H. Brand; G. Herbert; Viscount Alexander; Hon. R.
Lambart; G. Johnson; W. S. Newton; Hon. C. Grimston; G. Mundy; P.
Bathurst; E. Milman; Hon. L. Hope; Spencer Perceval.
_Quartermasters._—T. Dwelly; and W. Morse.
_Surgeon-Major._—G. Chenevix. _Battalion Surgeon._—W. Hunter, M.D.
_Assistant-Surgeons._—F. Gilder; and J. Wedderburn.
_Solicitor._—W. G. Carter, Esq.
The reign of William IV. was now drawing to a close, and a few months
only elapsed, when, by the death of the Sovereign, June 20, 1837, our
present Gracious Queen, then just eighteen years old, ascended the
Throne. The funeral obsequies took place as usual at Windsor, and were
fixed for the 8th of July. The 1st Grenadiers were stationed there at
the time; and the 1st Coldstream had gone to Dublin in 1836, whence they
did not return until August, 1837. About one hundred men from each of
the other Battalions of the former Regiment, as well as four companies
from each Battalion of the Scots Fusiliers, and the whole of the 2nd
Coldstream Guards proceeded to Windsor to take part in the ceremony.
Before closing this chapter, it may be well briefly to record one or two
points which affected the Regiment during the reign that has just come
to a conclusion. Towards the end of 1829, gratuities, in addition to the
pension, were granted, on discharge, to specially selected
Non-commissioned officers and men, who, by their length of service and
meritorious conduct, were recommended for reward; and on the 30th of
July of the following year, the silver medal for “Long service and good
conduct” was instituted, and presented to them. Later, in 1836, good
conduct badges—or “marks of distinction,” as they were then called—were
introduced, and worn on their uniform, by men whose character deserved
recognition. Each “mark” added a penny a day to the recipient’s pay;
and, if in uninterrupted possession of it for five years immediately
preceding discharge, the same amount was added to the pension.[161]
During this reign, moreover, a Commission inquired into military
discipline, more especially into the system of flogging, then in force
in the army. The final report, dated March 15, 1836, was in favour of
retaining corporal punishment, but recommended that “no pains may be
spared to endeavour to make its infliction less frequent.”[162]
Regimental numbers, identifying soldiers, appear to have been introduced
into the army about this time; they were at first applied only to the
men’s records, but gradually they were more generally adopted
(_Regimental Order_ , January 2, 1836).
-----
Footnote 161:
“November 14, 1829. With a view of rewarding meritorious soldiers when
discharged, and of encouraging good conduct in others whilst serving,
... a gratuity, in addition to the pension, may, in certain cases, be
given to one sergeant or corporal and one private annually in every
regiment of an establishment of 700 rank and file and upwards. The men
to be recommended, must have completed twenty-one years of actual
service in the infantry; they must never have been convicted by
court-martial, and must have borne an irreproachable character, or
have particularly distinguished themselves in the service. The
sergeants must have ten years' service and the corporals seven years'
in their respective ranks as Non-commission officers, and must have
been discharged as such.” The gratuities amounted to: Sergeants, £15;
Corporals, £7; Privates, £5.
“August 18, 1836. Whereas it has been represented that it would
materially tend to the encouragement of good conduct in the army, if a
reward to be attained only by a well-conducted soldier were
substituted for the additional pay, now granted to soldiers who have
completed certain periods of service, all soldiers who shall enlist on
or after September 1, 1836, shall have no claim to additional pay
after any period of service; but a reward of additional pay for good
conduct shall be granted to such soldiers, under the following rules—
“After seven years' service, 1_d._ a day, and to wear a 'ring of lace
round the right arm,' provided the man’s name does not appear in the
Regimental Defaulter book for at least two years immediately preceding
such claim. After fourteen years', an additional 1_d._ and two rings,
if the man has been in the enjoyment of the first 1_d._ for at least
two years immediately preceding such further claim. And similarly, a
third penny and three rings, under the same conditions, after
twenty-one years' service.”
Footnote 162:
_Annual Register_ , 1836, “Public Documents,” p. 315. Flogging was
finally abolished in the army in 1881; but it was done away with, in
1867, when troops were not engaged on active service.
-----
In the summer of 1836 it was ordered that the Battalions of the Foot
Guards, and not the light companies only, should be practised in light
infantry movements in extended order (_Brigade Order_ , July 11, 1836).
We have seen that the Brigade Depôt was transferred from London to
Warley early in 1832. It appears, that the recruits of the Coldstream
and of the Scots Fusiliers were ordered to Croydon in June, 1833, and
the rest followed to the same place next year. A Subaltern Officer was
placed in command of the station; but in January, 1837, a Regimental
Lieutenant (bearing rank of Captain) was ordered to perform this duty,
and he remained there for a fortnight at a time. An Assistant Surgeon,
relieved every two months, was also quartered at the Depôt.
The control exercised by the Lieutenant-Colonel over the two Battalions
of the Regiment was made somewhat more direct by the introduction of
weekly reports, which were furnished to him by Officers commanding
Battalions, and which stated what drills, exercises, etc., were
performed, and whether there had been ball practice or marching
(_Regimental Order_ , April 12, 1833). A scale of punishment was
instituted, to equalize, as far as possible, awards made for minor
offences (_1st Battalion Order_, May 24, 1831). On July 14, 1832, a
Regimental Order was issued, which gives some idea of the system then
pursued in the Regiment, as regards the discipline of the men:—
“Battalions will have evening parades. In London the Battalions will
always parade in Guard Order, when finding the public duties. No leave
is to be given from church parade, inspection of necessaries, or
Surgeon’s inspection, unless absolutely necessary. Men unfit for duty,
or parade, caused by liquor, to be punished as drunk. When a drunkard
appears in a suspicious state at evening parade, and that by leaving
barracks he would probably get intoxicated, he must be kept in, and on
no account be permitted to enter the canteen.... No soldier to have
leave all night, and only six men a company to have leave from parade,
or till twelve o’clock. To receive leave or other indulgence, the
soldier must have been clear of all defaulter’s list at least a month.
To get a pass or furlough, he must have a good general character, and
have been clear of the defaulter’s list two months. Soldiers must have
been two years in the Regiment, before they can apply for a pass.”
Lastly, it may be stated that His Majesty’s Commands for the part to be
taken by the Brigade, at investitures of the Order of the Bath, were
published in 1835 (_Brigade Order_ , August 19th), and were to be
considered as a Standing Order for the future, when the ceremony should
take place in St. George’s Hall, Windsor Castle. The Sergeant-Major and
fifteen Sergeants from the Windsor Battalion, and the Sergeants-Major
and forty-two Sergeants of the West-end Battalions, were stationed in
the Hall; the former at each of the doors right and left of the Throne,
the latter forming a line from the Throne to the entrance; the whole
under the Adjutant of the Windsor Battalion, whose place was near the
King. At the subsequent banquet in the Waterloo Chamber, the Colours of
the Battalion were crossed over the south fireplace, six Sergeants of
the same corps stood at the doors, and the remainder formed a line from
St. George’s to the Banqueting Hall, as the procession passed to and
from the Waterloo Chamber; the Band was placed in the latter room, the
Drums at the top of the grand staircase. Additional sentries were
mounted, eight in the Quadrangle, and one on Queen Elizabeth’s Gate.
[Illustration:
N. R. Wilkinson del OFFICER TEMP. JAMES II. Mintern Bros.
lith.
A. D. Innes & C^o. London
]
CHAPTER V.
SECOND PART OF THE LONG EUROPEAN PEACE.
Beginning of the reign of Queen Victoria—Troops during Parliamentary
elections—Coronation of the Queen—Fire at the Tower of London,
1841—Rebellion in Canada—Two Guards Battalions sent there, 1838, of
which one the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards—Return home,
1842—Visit of the Russian Tsar Nicholas I. to England—European
revolution—Bi-centenary celebration of the formation of the
Coldstream Guards, 1850—Death of the Colonel of the Regiment, H.R.H.
the Duke of Cambridge; succeeded by General the Earl of
Strafford—Exhibition in London—Death of the Duke of
Wellington—Changes and reforms up to 1854—Camp at Chobham.
The young Queen had only reigned a few months, when it became necessary
to send a military expedition to Canada, where for some time trouble had
been brewing, and where reinforcements were required to maintain the
authority of the Crown, and to settle the difficulties that had arisen.
The 2nd Battalion Coldstream formed part of this expedition, and left
London March 28, 1838; but before we refer to the events which occurred
in that colony, we propose to deal shortly with those that took place at
home, until the year 1842, when the Battalion returned to England.
During the General Election that followed immediately after Her
Majesty’s Accession, the troops quartered at Portman Street and in St.
John’s Wood, were ordered to march away from the borough of Marylebone.
The 2nd Coldstream being at the former station, proceeded, in
consequence, to “Hammersmith and adjacents,” July 22nd, until the 28th.
The system of removing soldiers from the place of an election seems
never to have been adopted in Westminster, nor does it appear to have
been a usual practice elsewhere in the Metropolis, except in the City,
where the Bank piquet was often suspended for two or three days; as a
general rule the troops were confined to barracks. On one other
occasion, however (June 28, 1841), the 1st Battalion Coldstream vacated
Portman Street, and marched to Fulham, Parson’s Green, and Walham Green,
while an election was taking place in Marylebone; and from thence, on
the 3rd of July, proceeded to Hounslow and Twickenham during an election
in the county of Middlesex; the Battalion returned to London on the 9th.
Upon the same occasion, the recruits at Croydon were marched to London,
July 5th, to their respective Regiments, until after the termination of
the East Surrey election, July 12th; during the interval, the Assistant
Surgeon, the Hospital establishment, and a corporal and an old soldier
from each Regiment, only remained in barracks.
On the retirement of Colonel Milman to half-pay, August 8, 1837, Colonel
Fremantle succeeded as Lieutenant-Colonel, and Lieut.-Colonel Shawe was
promoted Major. Colonel Walton took command of the 1st Battalion, and
Colonel Shawe of the 2nd.
The expedition to Canada put an end to the Dublin quarter, which was not
again renewed for nearly twenty years; and the 1st Battalion Scots
Fusiliers, who had proceeded there in the summer of 1837, returned to
London in the following March. Moreover, during the absence of two
Battalions of the Brigade in North America, the Tower was not occupied
by Guards in 1838, and duty was done in Windsor, 1839-1842, by a
regiment of the Line.
On May 6, 1838, the Royal Military Chapel in Wellington Barracks was
opened for the first time; and a year later (July, 1839), the three
Regiments took it in turn to send their Bands there to attend Divine
Service.
The Queen’s Coronation, June 28, 1838, was conducted on the abridged
model of that of William IV.; but in some respects it was more
magnificent and stately than the latter, and it included a public
procession to and from Westminster Abbey, which had been absent in
former ceremonies of the kind, since the reign of Charles II. As the
personality of Her Majesty, moreover, roused enthusiasm among all
classes to a far greater degree than had been the case with many of her
predecessors, the people, drawn in dense crowds to the splendour of the
spectacle, were not slow to display the feelings of genuine loyalty and
affection, with which they were filled towards their youthful Sovereign;
and the effect produced on the public mind, was even greater than if,
under ordinary circumstances, the older forms of mediæval pageantry had
been adopted. The streets were lined by troops from Buckingham Palace to
the Abbey, the infantry in single rank on either side of the road; the
Brigade occupied the distance from Westminster to Marlborough House, and
the five Battalions were present. The 1st Coldstream, having been
brought up from Windsor, were in Pall Mall, the Scots Fusiliers thence
to the Horse Guards, and the Grenadiers took up the remaining ground. On
the other side of the Coldstream, in St. James’s Street, Piccadilly, and
Constitution Hill, there were Marines, Rifles, and the 20th Regiment
(then at the Tower). In the Abbey a line was kept by a detachment of the
Queen’s company, Grenadier Guards, the Ensign of which carried the Royal
Standard, and men of the Grenadier companies of the 1st Coldstream and
of the 1st and 2nd Scots Fusiliers, under Subaltern Officers of their
own corps.[163]
-----
Footnote 163:
One interesting feature of the Coronation was the presence at it, as
French Ambassador Extraordinary, of Marshal Soult, the opponent of the
Duke of Wellington, in many fields of battle in the Spanish Peninsula,
and at Waterloo. It need scarcely be said that the reception of this
gallant old soldier, by the English people and by the Duke of
Wellington, was most cordial, and that all were glad to welcome warmly
a former hostile Commander, who had displayed skill and valour when he
fought against us.
-----
Her Majesty held her first review in Hyde Park on the 9th of July
following, at which the Coldstream was not present, being at Windsor,
but a detachment under Lieut.-Colonel Gooch went up to London and found
the public duties upon that occasion. It may be interesting to note that
each man of the force inspected, was supplied “with thirty rounds blank
cartridge, a good flint, and a spare one in his pouch.”
Colonel Fremantle having retired December 31, 1839, Colonel Walton
became Lieutenant-Colonel, and Colonel Bowles was promoted Major (2nd
Battalion), Colonel Shawe assuming command of the 1st Battalion. In the
Regimental Order of farewell, Colonel Fremantle, after referring to his
services of nearly thirty-five years in the Regiment, dwells on “his
proud satisfaction of participating in those fields of honour in which
the Coldstream acquired its noble perfection,” and continues:—
“Since the peace, I have served in it, with the approbation and
protection of our Royal Colonel, and in harmony and good fellowship
with my brother Officers. My earnest desire in thus taking leave, is a
continuation of the same honour and happiness. However much I may
personally regret resigning the command of the Coldstream Guards, I
avail myself of the painful occasion to perform a pleasing duty, to
express my thanks to Sergeant-Major Lundie, the Non-commissioned
officers and soldiers of the Regiment, and to congratulate them upon
that system of discipline which, of late years, has tended so much to
the diminution of crime and consequent punishment. I trust that the
same spirit of loyalty which has rendered the Coldstream Regiment
'Second to None,' will ever continue to be prominent in its duty to
Her Majesty.”
Among the miscellaneous duties performed by the Brigade in London, was
that relating to the extinguishing of metropolitan fires,—one even now
discharged, but which was of more importance in days when the Fire
Brigade was imperfectly organized. In October, 1834, when the Houses of
Parliament were destroyed, the exertions of the troops to arrest the
flames were warmly recognized by the Home Secretary; and again, in
January, 1836, the thanks of Lord Palmerston were published, with the
intimation that, but for the timely assistance of the Brigade, the
Foreign Office would have been burnt down. On the night of October 30,
1841, a conflagration took place in the Tower, which, having spread with
alarming rapidity, completely gutted the Armoury, and destroyed many of
the trophies of former wars which had been deposited there. Owing to the
exertions of the Battalion quartered in the Tower (1st Scots Fusiliers),
and other portions of the Brigade, that hurried to the disaster, the
Regalia was saved, and many interesting parts of that historic fortress
and prison were preserved.[164] On the 5th of November the following
Regimental Order was issued:—
“Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington, Constable of the Tower, having
brought to the notice of the General Commanding-in-Chief the
meritorious conduct of the troops, who assisted in checking the
conflagration which unfortunately took place in that fortress on the
night of Saturday last, the 30th ulto., I have Lord Hill’s command to
desire that you will be pleased to convey, to the portion of the
Brigade of Guards employed upon that occasion, the gratification which
his Lordship feels, at receiving this report of their exertions, and
of the great service which they rendered, not only in stopping the
progress of the flames, but in saving the public property thus
threatened with destruction. Lord Hill anticipates the additional
pleasure, which the Guards cannot but experience, from the
circumstance of this report of their conduct having emanated from the
Duke of Wellington.”
-----
Footnote 164:
See _Annual Register_ , 1841, “Chronicle,” p. 99, for a full
description of this well-remembered calamity.
-----
Officers who have so often seen the piece of plate, representing the
Sphinx, on the table of St. James’s Palace, may be interested in
knowing, that it was received at a general meeting of the Guards Club,
on May 5, 1842. The Duke of Bedford, executor of General Earl of Ludlow,
Scots Fusilier Guards, gave it, in accordance with the latter’s will, by
which he left “the Egyptian vase, presented to him by the Brigade of
Guards in the camp before Alexandria, to the Guards Club, with his
grateful thanks.”
It is now time to revert to the more serious affairs, which engaged the
attention of the 2nd Battalion in North America. Canada at that period
was divided into two distinct colonies—the Lower province, inhabited
almost entirely by old French settlers, and the Upper province, peopled
by immigrants of British nationality. In the former, a simmering of
discontent had prevailed for some years; the colonists resented the
system by which, under a semblance of constitutional government, their
popular representatives were excluded from all control and authority
over their own affairs. In the month of November, 1837, things came to a
head, and a rebellion broke out, led by one Papineau. Encouraged to
violence by this evil example, assisted by free-booters from the United
States, and having some grievances of their own to complain of, another
insurrection occurred almost simultaneously in Upper Canada. In both
cases, the disorder was instantly put down by Sir J. Colborne
(afterwards Lord Seaton), with a military force in Lower Canada, and by
the local militia in the other province. But the news reaching home,
that an actual outbreak had taken place, created the utmost sensation in
England. It was immediately determined to strengthen the troops in the
colony, and to send out Lord Durham as Governor-General and High
Commissioner, with large powers to deal with the difficulty.
On the 23rd of January, the 2nd Grenadiers and the 2nd Coldstream were
ordered to be held in readiness for embarkation for Quebec, each to be
made up to 800 rank and file; and the Brigade, so formed, was placed
under the command of Major-General Sir J. Macdonell, K.C.B. (late of the
Coldstream). Captain Arthur Torrens, Grenadier Guards, was appointed
Major of Brigade; and Captain J. Elrington, Coldstream Guards,
Aide-de-camp to the Major-General. On the 22nd of March this body of men
was inspected by Lord Hill, when a congratulatory order was issued upon
their appearance, expressing the Commander-in-Chief’s conviction that
they “would do honour to the high reputation of the Brigade of Guards,”
and concluding with his “best wishes for their welfare while employed
abroad in the service of the country.” After the Officers had attended a
Levée “to take leave,” and had been entertained at dinner by the
Colonel, the Duke of Cambridge, the 2nd Coldstream left London for
Winchester, in four divisions, on the 28th and 29th.
1st Division, Lieut.-Colonel Hon. T. Ashburnham, Commanding (Nos. 1 and
2 Companies); Captains W. Tollemache, Hon. R. Boyle; Lieutenants
Hon. L. Hope, G. Mundy.
2nd Division, Colonel G. Bowles, Commanding (Nos. 3 and 4 Companies);
Captains R. Vansittart, C. Wilbraham; Lieutenants M. Tierney, Hon.
A. Graves.
3rd Division, Lieut.-Colonel W. Stewart-Balfour, Commanding (Nos. 5 and
6 Companies); Captains C. Windham, R. Hulse; Lieutenants W. Clayton,
Lord Alexander.
4th Division, Lieut.-Colonel E. Wigram, Commanding (Nos. 7 and 8
Companies); Lieutenants S. Perceval, E. Milman, P. Bathurst.
Head-quarters, Colonel C. Shawe, Commanding the Battalion; Lieutenant D.
M. Chisholm, Adjutant; Quartermaster T. Lee; and Surgeon F. Gilder,
and Assistant-Surgeons E. Greatrex and W. Robinson.
The following Officers belonging to the Battalion were allowed to find
their own way out to Canada: Lieut.-Colonels W. Codrington, Hon. J.
Hope, and T. Chaplin; Captains H. Daniell, F. Halkett, and H. Dent.
Lieutenant Hon. F. Villiers was appointed Aide-de-camp to Lord Durham.
The Battalion embarked at Portsmouth on the 17th of April, in H.M.S.
_Edinburgh_ and _Athol_, and landed at Quebec on the 11th of May, a few
days before the arrival of the new Governor-General, who reached the
Colony towards the end of the month, and was received in state by the
newly arrived Guards Brigade.
The situation in Lower Canada was one of outward tranquillity, the
rebellion had been crushed, and order was restored; but serious
complications still remained to be adjusted. Numerous prisoners were in
custody awaiting trial, for their treason; and as it would have been
impossible to obtain a conviction by a local jury, Sir J. Colborne, the
temporary Governor, confined most of them in prison, 161 in number,
until the decision of the High Commissioner could be given. On the 28th
of June, Lord Durham issued an Ordinance, by which he granted a complete
amnesty to all, with the exception of eight of the principal
ringleaders; these men he transported to Bermuda. He also declared that
if these men, or if Papineau and other fifteen chiefs of the
insurrection—who had absconded and had fled for safety into the United
States, directly they were in danger of capture—were again found at
large without permission, they would suffer death as traitors. The
Ordinance, though humane and calculated to bring about peace without
further bloodshed, was adjudged to be illegal or unconstitutional. There
was no power to transport offenders nor to threaten, with the extreme
rigour of the law, those who had not been tried. It would have been
necessary to pass an Act of Parliament to make it valid, and the state
of parties at home rendered any such course impossible. Government was
weak, a strong Opposition was ready to oust the Ministers from office,
and Lord Durham had many personal enemies. Lord Melbourne, the Prime
Minister, disavowed the Ordinance, and threw over the High Commissioner,
and thereupon the latter resigned his post, and left Canada, November
1st.[165] But before quitting North America, he committed an act for
which he has been gravely censured; for, he announced to the rebels
(October 9th), that the general amnesty he granted had been ratified by
Her Majesty’s Proclamation, and that the exceptions to the amnesty had
been disallowed, and he told them that there was no further impediment
to prevent them from returning to the colony.[166] The exiles were not
slow to avail themselves of this welcome intelligence, and in the month
of October they came back, freed from the consequences of their former
guilt, and determined to light afresh the torch of civil war.[167]
-----
Footnote 165:
As upon the arrival of Lord Durham, so at his departure, the Guards
Battalions furnished Guards of Honour of 50 men each, with Regimental
Colour, under a Lieutenant and Captain and two Ensign-Lieutenants. The
streets were lined by the remainder of the Brigade.
Footnote 166:
“The Proclamation contained an entire amnesty, qualified only by the
exceptions specified in the Ordinance. The Ordinance has been
disallowed, and the Proclamation is confirmed. Her Majesty having been
advised to refuse her assent to the exceptions, the amnesty exists
without qualification. No impediment therefore exists to the return of
the persons who have made the most distinct admission of guilt, or who
have been excluded by me from the province, on account of the danger
to which its tranquillity would be exposed by their presence. And none
can now be enacted, without the adoption of measures alike repugnant
to my sense of justice and of policy” (Lord Durham’s Proclamation,
October 9, 1838: _Annual Register_ , 1838, “History,” p. 322; “Public
Documents,” p. 311).
Footnote 167:
Alison, _History of Europe_ , 1815-1852, vi. 328, etc.
-----
During the first six months, the troops had little to do beyond their
ordinary duties,[168] and in the summer leave was freely given to many
of the Officers to see the country, on the understanding, however, that
none were to enter the United States. But, in spite of the appearance of
outward tranquillity, there was a spirit of disaffection abroad, the
authorities were resisted, the jury system had broken down, and the
population of one nationality were bitterly divided from that of
another. The execution of the law was difficult, as a Battalion Order of
the 11th of July may perhaps exemplify—publishing the good conduct of
several privates of the Coldstream for assisting the Superintendent of
Police in the execution of his duty; “but for them, two prisoners would
have escaped, and he would have received a severe beating from the
crowd.”
-----
Footnote 168:
On the day fixed for the Coronation of the Queen, June 28, 1838, the
Coldstream fired a _feu-de-joie_ in the citadel of Quebec, where they
were quartered, at 9.30 in the evening.
-----
Feeling ran high among the loyal inhabitants, at the weakness and
timidity of the Home Government, and at the ungenerous treatment their
Commissioner had received at their hands. Addresses poured in upon him
from all quarters, expressing sorrow at his departure. A farewell dinner
was also given to him by the Officers of the Guards Brigade, at which
Sir J. Macdonell spoke of him and his policy in eulogistic terms—an
incident which raised some comment, as it was supposed by some to be an
interference by a military Officer in a political question; though
undoubtedly it testified to the sentiments that prevailed among the
well-disposed. It was universally felt in the province, that the welfare
of the colony had been sacrificed to the evils of party exigencies.
Already, before the departure of Lord Durham, a rising had been
prepared, under the leadership of the returned exiles, and it broke out
on the 3rd of November, 1838, in the neighbourhood of Beauharnois, a
place on the right bank of the St. Lawrence river, not very far distant
from Montreal.
Troops were at once despatched to quell the disturbance. The Grenadiers
joined the expedition, and did not return to Quebec till the end of
April, 1840; but the Coldstream Battalion being ordered to remain in
that town to secure its tranquillity during the crisis, did not form
part of the column sent forward to disperse the rebels.[169] The
outbreak was sudden, and caused considerable alarm while it lasted; but
the operations were of short duration, nor were they of much importance
from a military point of view. Volunteer forces also lent their aid to
put down the rebellion, and on the 17th of November they were cordially
thanked by the Commander of the Forces (Sir J. Colborne, who, since Lord
Durham’s departure, was also Governor), “for defeating the traitors and
invaders” by “their heroic perseverance and devotion to the service of
their country, which they have displayed from the first moment of this
second revolt.” The disaffected made little or no resistance, and,
unable to maintain themselves in the field, they soon dispersed or
surrendered. The insurrection thus came to an end almost immediately,
and many of the prisoners were taken to Montreal, where a Court-Martial
sat continuously for six months to try them. The Coldstream, still at
Quebec, did not furnish Officers for these trials.
-----
Footnote 169:
On November 6, 1838, the following 2nd Battalion Order was issued:
“The Piquet Officer is to go round the walls of the citadel (at
Quebec) twice at night, and he is not to do so at the same time as the
Officer of the citadel guard. He is always to be properly dressed
during the night, and to be ready to turn out at the shortest notice.
The Captain of the day will go his rounds twice during the night, the
second time just before daybreak.”
-----
After the suppression of the insurrection, there was still cause for the
presence of troops in the colony. First, to protect the loyal portion of
the population from the evil influence of agitators, who continued to
lurk in the country; and secondly, to maintain order, while reforms were
being introduced, calculated to put an end to discontent for the future.
Volunteer corps were raised, and Officers appointed to command and
organize them. Lieut.-Colonel Hon. James Hope (Coldstream Guards) was
placed in command of the “Queen’s Volunteers,” and reported, Dec. 10,
1839, that this corps was then composed of 2 staff-sergeants, 24
sergeants, 6 drummers, and 432 rank and file, of whom 381 were taking
their share of garrison duty.[170] Captain Halkett (Coldstream Guards),
appointed Assistant Military Secretary in Upper Canada, also
superintended the formation of another corps.[171] About the same time,
the Royal Canadian Regiment was raised, and some Non-commissioned
officers and men from the Guards were allowed to volunteer for service
therein. As it appears to have offered special advantages to married
men, the latter readily endeavoured to be allowed to obtain a transfer
to its ranks.
-----
Footnote 170:
_District Order_ , Quebec, April 14, 1840: “The Queen’s Volunteers
having nearly closed the period of their engagement, the Major-General
cannot allow that body to separate without recording his perfect
satisfaction at the efficient manner in which they have performed
their duties. Lieut.-Colonel Hon. J. Hope, in discharge of the
important trust confided to him as Commanding Officer, has fully met
the expectation naturally formed in his ability and judgment. The
Lieut.-Colonel has been ably and zealously seconded by Major Irvine,
and well supported by the Officers in general, to all of whom the
Major-General makes his acknowledgments; and he begs that
Lieut.-Colonel Hope will convey to the Non-commissioned officers and
privates his thanks, and the conviction he entertains, that, should
emergency arise, Her Majesty’s Government may depend on a renewal of
their valuable services.”
Footnote 171:
This Officer died before rejoining the Coldstream. The following order
appeared on the occasion of his death: “Toronto, October 26, 1840. It
is with the most sincere and poignant regret that His Excellency the
Lieut.-Governor and Major-General Commanding has to announce the death
of Captain Halkett, Coldstream Guards, Assistant Military Secretary
and Colonel in the Militia of Upper Canada. The demise of this
lamented and promising Officer took place yesterday. The zeal with
which Captain Halkett devoted himself to the duties of his office, and
the ability with which he discharged them, could not fail to ensure
the high consideration and the most perfect confidence with which he
was regarded by the Lieut.-Governor and Major-General Commanding. His
soldierlike qualifications and most gentlemanlike character were
highly appreciated by his brother Officers, and the kindly spirit with
which he conducted business, often of a perplexing nature, and the
amiable disposition which he displayed in private life, secured for
him the esteem of the community at large.”
-----
Although Lord Durham’s action in Canada was repudiated by the Government
in England, the efforts he made to reconcile the people to British rule
were in the end very successful. Before he left North America, he made a
masterly and comprehensive report upon the position of affairs in the
colony, and he recommended remedies to redress the grievances, which he
perceived kept the people in a state of ferment. “As Mr. Mill has said,
these recommendations laid the foundation of political success and
social prosperity, not only of Canada, but of all the other important
colonies.... In brief, Lord Durham proposed to make the Canadas
self-governing as regards their internal affairs, and the germ of a
federal union.”[172] His report was accepted, and it became the basis of
the policy which Government now adopted. Mr. Paulet Thompson, created
shortly afterwards Lord Sydenham, was sent to North America at the end
of 1839, in the capacity of Governor-General of the two Canadas, to
carry out the recommendations which he proposed. At the same time, Sir
J. Colborne returned to England, being relieved as Commander of the
Forces by Lieut.-General Sir Richard Jackson (late of the Coldstream
Guards). Early in 1841, the legislative union of the two provinces was
carried into execution, and from this act the new system of colonial
life, as now understood in the British Empire, may be said to date.
-----
Footnote 172:
Justin McCarthy, M.P., _A History of our Own Times_ , i. 77; John
MacMullen, _History of Canada_ , p. 426 (London, 1868).
-----
The Coldstream continued all this time to remain at Quebec, nor were
they moved therefrom until they left North America in 1842. During these
years small drafts were annually sent out to keep up the Battalion to
its proper strength, and upon almost every occasion they were inspected
previous to departure by the Colonel of the Regiment, H.R.H. the Duke of
Cambridge. Arrangements for winter clothing were made by the Commanding
Officer, who authorized a coat and cap to be worn by the Officers, in
cold weather, the former to replace the ordinary red coatee, then used
instead of the present tunic. An allowance was made by the Treasury,
calculated at £1 10_s._ for every effective soldier serving in Canada
for the first winter, and at 5_s._ for subsequent winters. This money
formed a fund, from which a supply of winter clothing was provided for
Non-commissioned officers and men. These articles were to be considered
public property, and could, if necessary, be transferred from one man to
another.
In the winter, parties were sent out into the woods when snow lay deep
on the ground, to be practised in “camping, etc.,” or rather, in
constructing log huts. The public duties in Quebec appear to have
averaged two Subalterns (on guard at the Castle and at the citadel), 10
sergeants, 15 corporals, 2 drummers, and from 110 to 180 men,—besides
ten to fourteen men of the Royal Artillery. It may here be mentioned
that the stuffed goose’s head, adorned with a gorget (to be seen in the
Regimental Orderly Room), records an incident which took place at this
time. The goose, having attached itself to the Battalion, became the
constant companion of one of the sentries in the citadel, and a humble,
though faithful friend and follower of the Regiment. While it lived it
wore the gorget that now is to be found round its neck; and a picture,
also in the Orderly Room, testifies to its never varying attendance on
the beat of the sentry it had chosen to follow.
On March 27, 1841, Officers were posted to companies as under:—
Compy. Lieutenant-Colonels. Captains. Lieutenants.
No. 1. Hon. James Hope. J. Forbes. Hon. L. Hope.
Hon. C. Grimston.
No. 2. Hon. T. Ashburnham. J. Elrington. Hon. A. Graves.
No. 3. C. Hay. R. Hulse. M. Tierney.
S. Perceval.
No. 4. H. Bentinck. P. Bathurst. W. Clayton.
No. 5. T. Chaplin. H. Daniell. J. Kirkland.
W. Verner.
No. 6. W. Codrington. R. Vansittart. P. Somerset.
No. 7. W. Stewart-Balfour. Earl of Caledon. G. Whyte-Melville.
No. 8. E. Wigram. C. Windham. T. Wigram.
E. Milman.
Sir James Macdonell left Canada (June, 1842), having been promoted
Lieut.-General some time before; thereupon, Colonel Bowles, commanding
the 2nd Coldstream, assumed the command, as Guards Brigadier, of the two
Battalions, until they left for England. Also on the promotion of
Captain Torrens (September, 1840), Captain Lord Frederick Paulet,
Adjutant of the 2nd Battalion, was appointed to succeed him as Major of
the Brigade in Canada, when Captain Forbes became Acting Adjutant.
The reforms introduced by Lord Sydenham produced a speedy and salutary
effect in Canada, and the recollection of the period of rebellion soon
passed away. Tranquillity, order, and stable government were restored by
the new policy, and the improvement effected, appeared to be of a
permanent character. The Guards might have gone back to England in 1841,
for, as far as affairs in the colony were concerned, their presence was
no longer required. But we had still a question with Washington, and, as
the two Battalions happened to be in North America, it was naturally
deemed advisable to keep them there until this matter should be
adjusted. Previous treaties had not properly defined the north-eastern
frontier of the United States, nor traced a clear line of demarcation
between the State of Maine and the British possessions which lay to the
north of it. Both Governments desired to come to an amicable conclusion
on the subject, and, early in 1842, Lord Ashburton was sent out to
settle it. A Treaty was agreed to and approved at Washington on the 9th
of August. Our American cousins were not displeased with the result, for
it gave them advantages, which perhaps, in strict right, they had little
reason to expect. But in a sense, it was also satisfactory to the
British Government, as at least it put an end to a dispute, or to a
cause of future trouble, of long standing. The arrangement was therefore
ratified without demur, and we were content to abide by it.[173]
-----
Footnote 173:
The text of the Treaty is to be found in the _Annual Register_ , 1842,
“Public Documents,” p. 498.
-----
The Brigade had now been for more than four years in North America, and
the time had been passed pleasantly and profitably by all ranks. Seldom
have the Guards had an opportunity of observing for themselves the life
of a thriving British colony, and the development of our national energy
across the ocean. The experience was a useful and a novel one, and was
very different to that which they are wont to feel, when sent to a
foreign country to maintain the interests of the Empire in times of war,
or of disturbance. In Canada, at least, we were among our own people,
among settlers loyal to the British Crown, who form a part of our own
commonwealth. Difficulties did exist among them, but these were capable
of easy adjustment by the light which the British Constitution will
always afford in such cases; and guided by this light, it was not long
before statesmen found a remedy for the evils that were complained of.
If the troops were necessary to put down the disorder of the few, and to
guard the introduction of reforms from the impatience of popular
agitation, so is it also true, that the intelligence of the whole colony
ranged itself on the side of the authorities and of the soldiers, who
saved the Canadian communities from the tyranny, and the rapacity of
revolutionary leaders.
Thus did a cordial feeling of respect and of mutual good will spring up
between the Guards and the colonists; and the former, adhering closely
to their Regimental traditions, that have formed their character, and
guided them in every position in which they have been placed, maintained
their discipline unimpaired in the midst of surrounding
temptations.[174] Some of our men acquired a taste for colonial life,
and wished to settle in the country. For this purpose, it was necessary
to obtain their discharge in Canada, and an application was accordingly
made to that effect. The order for the return of the Brigade to Europe,
was dated August 18, 1842, and, two days later, Sir H. Hardinge, the
Secretary at War, agreed that a certain number of men might be allowed
to receive their discharge with a modified pension. He specially desired
that it should be known “that this extensive indulgence had been
assented to, in consequence of the very exemplary manner in which the
Guards have conducted themselves, during the time they have performed
Colonial service in North America.”
-----
Footnote 174:
The facility with which British soldiers could desert by crossing the
border to the United States, and the efforts made by many from the
States to induce our men to do so, formed no small a temptation to
many young soldiers. It will be seen presently how few of the
Coldstream were guilty of this serious military crime.
-----
The movement towards home took place in the autumn of 1842, the bulk of
the Grenadier Guards leaving a few days before the Coldstream. Six
companies of the latter, having embarked at Quebec on the 5th of
October, on board H.M.S. _Calcutta_, sailed therefrom on the 6th, and
reached Spithead on October 31st, whence they proceeded by train in two
detachments to Winchester. After an inspection by Major-General Sir H.
Pakenham, on the 1st of November, the Officer Commanding, in
communicating the Major-General’s “high approbation of the steadiness
and appearance” of the men, expressed his own “sense of their
soldier-like conduct during the late voyage and up to the present
moment, which he will take the earliest opportunity of bringing to the
notice of the Officer Commanding the Regiment.” The remaining two
companies followed from Canada, together with two companies of the
Grenadiers, in H.M.S. _Pique_, and left on the 19th of October, arriving
at Spithead on the 12th of November. The Battalion, reunited at
Winchester, remained there until the 22nd of November, when they were
sent to London (St. George’s barracks).[175] On the 30th of November,
the Lieutenant-Colonel issued the following Regimental Order:—
Colonel Walton has much pleasure in congratulating the 2nd Battalion
on their highly soldierlike appearance and steadiness under arms at
the inspection this morning. In welcoming the return of this fine
Battalion to England, the Lieutenant-Colonel takes the opportunity of
expressing to Colonel Bowles and the Officers and Non-commissioned
officers and privates, the feelings of pride and satisfaction he has
experienced, in hearing the good accounts, which have from time to
time been received of the conduct and soldierlike feeling exhibited by
the Battalion, from the commencement of its period of service in
America, so fully borne testimony to by every Officer under whom it
served. It is worthy of remark, that, during a period of nearly five
years, so few cases of desertion have taken place in a Battalion 800
strong; nine only of which have occurred among the duty men, and this
in a country where temptations to the commission of this crime were
particularly strong. The Lieutenant-Colonel feels assured that such
old soldiers who, for the purpose of equalizing the two Battalions,
may shortly be transferred from one to the other, will by their
example, impress upon their younger comrades the necessity of a ready
submission to discipline, and due subordination to those placed over
them, by which the individual comfort of the soldier is so much
advanced, and the credit of his corps firmly established.
-----
Footnote 175:
The 2nd Battalion, returning home from British North America,
contained 41 sergeants, 18 corporals, and 688 men. The Officers who
were present were: Colonel Bowles, Commanding Battalion; Captain Lord
F. Paulet, Adjutant; Quartermaster Lee; Assistant Surgeon Robinson;
Colonel H. Bentinck; Lieut.-Colonels Codrington and Wigram; Captains
Vansittart, Daniell, Hulse, and Earl of Caledon; Lieutenants Kirkland,
Somerset, Whyte-Melville, and Verner (with the six companies); and
Colonel Chaplin, Captain Bathurst, Lieutenant Ellice, and Assistant
Surgeon Munro (with the two companies).
-----
On the return of the Brigade from Canada, Windsor was again occupied by
the Foot Guards, and Winchester remained an out-quarter until June 24,
1847, when Chichester was substituted for it. A Battalion was stationed
at this latter place up to 1854.
Colonel Bowles, who had joined the Regiment in December, 1804, having
retired upon half-pay, after nearly thirty-nine years service, on May
30, 1843, Colonel C. Bentinck was promoted Major, and commanded the 2nd
Battalion.
As far back as January, 1832, a sergeant and corporal from each of the
three Regiments were sent to the Fencing Rooms of Mr. Angelo (at that
time in Old Bond Street), to learn a system of bayonet exercise which he
had invented, and were inspected the following month by Lord Hill. The
latter appears not to have considered the results satisfactory, and
nothing more was done in the matter.[176] But later, in February, 1843,
Mr. Angelo’s services were again requisitioned, and several
Non-commissioned officers were sent to his School of Arms, in St.
James’s Street, to be instructed in the sword exercise, and with a view
to their drilling the men of their Battalions in the use of the bayonet.
Mr. Angelo, moreover, held periodical inspections of the Officers and
men of every Battalion of the Brigade. He commenced this duty in
December, 1843, and continued to perform it until the spring of 1852.
The bayonet exercise thus begun in the Brigade, was not extended
generally to the rest of the army, until after the Crimean war.
-----
Footnote 176:
General Sir J. Hamilton, K.C.B., _History of the Grenadier Guards_ ,
iii. 108.
-----
A review took place at Windsor on June 5, 1844, before the Emperor of
Russia, attended by the 2nd Scots Fusiliers, then stationed there, and
by the 2nd Grenadiers and 2nd Coldstream, who proceeded from London for
the purpose. Lord Saltoun commanded the Brigade; the whole, including
infantry of the Line, cavalry, and artillery, being under Lord
Combermere. It is perhaps of interest to remark that His Majesty the
Tsar, who within ten short years, was engaged in a serious war with this
country, conveyed his approbation and thanks to the troops, and desired
that they should be spoken of as “his comrades in arms.” Three years
later, another review on a large scale, but of infantry only, was held
in Hyde Park, June 17, 1847, before H.I.H. the Grand-Duke Constantine of
Russia, and was attended by the Duke of Wellington. Five Battalions of
the Brigade were present (1st and 2nd Grenadiers, 1st and 2nd
Coldstream, and the 2nd Scots Fusiliers), divided into two brigades—the
Coldstream in one, under Colonel C. Bentinck,—and a brigade of the Line.
The whole under the command of H.R.H. Prince George of Cambridge, who
expressed the pleasure it afforded him to command a body of the Brigade
of Guards for the first time.
On the retirement of Colonel Walton (May 8, 1846), Colonel Shawe became
Lieutenant-Colonel, and Colonel Chaplin was promoted Major (2nd
Battalion). A few months later (November 9th), Colonel Shawe being
appointed Major-General, Colonel C. Bentinck succeeded to the
Lieutenant-Colonelcy of the Regiment, and his brother, Colonel H.
Bentinck, became Junior Major. Thereupon Colonel Chaplin commanded the
1st, and Colonel H. Bentinck the 2nd Battalion. It will be remembered
that Colonel C. Bentinck had served as Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General
at Waterloo; and that Colonel Walton, then Acting Adjutant of the 2nd
Battalion, had been appointed Brigade-Major of the 2nd Guards Brigade,
June 20, 1815, until the corps was dissolved, after the treaty of Paris,
November 20, 1815. Again, in 1848 (April 25), there was another change
in the command of the Regiment, when, on the retirement of Colonel C.
Bentinck, Colonel Chaplin was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel, and Colonel
Hay became Major. According to the rule then prevailing, the latter
commanded the 2nd Battalion, and Colonel H. Bentinck was transferred to
the 1st Battalion.
In May, 1848, the Regiment stood as follows:—
_Colonel._—Field-Marshal H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, K.G., etc.
_Lieutenant-Colonel._—Colonel T. Chaplin.
_Majors._—Colonels H. Bentinck; C. Hay.
_Captains._—Colonels W. Cornwall; W. Codrington: Lieut.-Colonels Hon. A.
Upton; F. Paget; (_Mounted_).
Lieut.-Colonels Hon. G. Upton; J. Clitherow; Gordon Drummond;
Lord F. Paulet; J. Forbes; R. Vansittart; C. Windham; H. Daniell;
Hon. R. Boyle; W. S. Newton; E. Milman; G. A. Vernon.
_Lieutenants._—Captains G. Johnson; Spencer Perceval; M. Tierney; Hon.
V. Dawson; H. Cumming; T. Steele; W. M. Wood; W. Eccles; C. White;
W. Baring; C. Cocks; P. Somerset (Adjutant); J. Cowell; J. Halkett
(Adjutant); Sir J. Harington, Bart.; D. Carleton; Lord A. C.
FitzRoy; C. Burdett; F. Newdigate; L. MacKinnon; Sir G. Walker,
Bart.; G. Warrender; W. Dawkins.
_Ensigns._—Lieutenants H. Jolliffe; Lord Dunkellin; F. Burton; Hon. P.
Feilding; E. Dering; W. Reeve; Hon. G. Eliot; C. Baring; H.
Bouverie; H. Armytage; Hon. H. Byng; C. Morgan; A. Thellusson; T.
Rolt; R. Sulivan; H. Cust; D. Williamson.
_Quartermasters._—W. Morse; T. Lee.
_Surgeon-Major._—E. Greatrex. _Battalion Surgeon._—W. Robinson.
_Assistant-Surgeons._—J. Munro; J. Skelton.
_Solicitor._—W. G. Carter, Esq.
The fever of revolution again attacked the continent of Europe, and the
year 1848 was one of confusion and disturbance. Insurrections of a
violent character were the order of the day, and convulsed every
country. France more especially was affected, where Louis-Philippe, the
Citizen-King, was swept away, and a Republic erected. England alone was
preserved free from rebellion, in spite of the efforts of a body of
malcontents, called Chartists, who sought to involve the country in
serious trouble. For some time this body had been at work to undermine
the British Constitution by every means in their power. They selected
the 10th of April upon which to give a great display of their strength
and numbers, and so to “overawe Government into a concession of their
demands, as the only means of averting a violent revolution.”[177] But
these efforts entirely failed; for the people, firm in their love of
order, had no sympathy with agitators, whose sole desire was to disturb
the public peace. Preparations on an extensive scale, were made by the
Duke of Wellington to resist any unlawful attempts that might be made to
coerce the constituted authorities. But the troops, as far as possible,
were kept out of sight, as a reserve, to come to the aid of the numerous
special constables, who, drawn from every class of society, eagerly
enrolled themselves for the occasion. Early in March, when the trouble
was brewing, the Guards were confined to barracks, and piquets were held
in readiness to assist the civil power; these arrangements continued
intermittently during the month. On the 10th of April, however, more
elaborate precautions were taken: the 1st Coldstream, then at the Tower,
having left detachments in the Mint and Bank, were stationed for the day
in Blackfriars; the 2nd Grenadiers, brought up from Chichester, occupied
Somerset House; the West-end Battalions being placed at Wellington
barracks, at Buckingham Palace, in the Magazine (Hyde Park), in the
Royal Mews (Pimlico), and at St. George’s and Portman Street
barracks.[178] The day passed without riot or disturbance; after which,
the effervescence gradually cooled down, and the normal state of public
tranquillity soon prevailed again.
-----
Footnote 177:
_Annual Register_ , 1848, “History,” p. 124.
Footnote 178:
Hamilton, _History of the Grenadier Guards_ , iii. 146.
-----
The year 1850 was the two hundredth anniversary of the formation of the
Regiment, and it was celebrated, with due solemnity and much enthusiasm,
on the 22nd of May. The 1st Battalion was quartered in Portman Street,
the 2nd in St. George’s barracks. In the forenoon, the Regiment paraded
in Hyde Park, and the men of the two Battalions were formed into one
corps of eight companies, those belonging to a company of one Battalion
being mixed up with those of the corresponding company of the other. In
this order the Regiment, 1400 strong, were marched to Portman Street,
under Colonel H. Bentinck. A substantial dinner was then provided for
Non-commissioned officers and men in the barrack yard, which had been
completely covered with canvas, and suitably decorated with emblems,
flags, and banners; and conspicuous among them were the tattered
Waterloo Colours wreathed in laurel, presented to the Regiment the day
before, by Lieut.-General Sir Alexander Woodford, who had commanded the
2nd Battalion at that battle. Sergeant-Major Hurle presided, and the
Colonel and all the Officers were present, H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge
occupying a seat among the privates. After some time spent together,
during which the warm relations existing between the various ranks of
the Regiment were manifested, the Officers left at four in the
afternoon, and dancing and other amusements terminated the day. In the
evening, the bicentenary festival was also celebrated by a dinner held
in the Banqueting Hall, St. James’s Palace, and attended by all the
Officers past and present, together with a few guests, among whom was
the Duke of Wellington, Colonel of the Grenadier Guards, and then
Commander-in-Chief. Altogether 140 persons sat down to table; Colonel
Chaplin presided. In the course of the entertainment, many toasts were
proposed and honoured, among them “the Marquis of Huntly, the oldest
Coldstreamer present,” who, as Lord Strathavon, had left the Regiment in
1792, and was now nearly ninety years of age. The Duke of Wellington
also made a speech, from which, on account of his great military
position and authority, it may be interesting to give the following
extract:—
I may well be gratified and flattered at the honour you have done me
in inviting me to attend your festival on this occasion. Long before I
had the honour of holding a commission in the corps of Guards, I had
every reason to respect that corps on account of their display of
every military quality as soldiers, in every situation in which they
could be placed. I have had the good fortune to see them in the
presence of the enemy—in situations of difficulty under every possible
circumstance, and on every such occasion they have conducted
themselves with distinction, and have displayed every quality which
could be expected from the best class of soldiers. Among these, the
least distinguished have not been the Coldstream Guards. I see many
around me whose conduct I have had occasion to applaud under every
variety of circumstance—in the field, in cantonments, and in quarters.
Gentlemen, I know also it is impossible to see troops equal to the
efficiency of the Guards.
The recollections of the bicentenary celebration were still vividly in
the minds of the Coldstream, when the Regiment was plunged into mourning
by the death of their veteran Colonel (July 8, 1850), who, appointed in
September, 1805, was the oldest soldier in the corps, and “the Father of
the Coldstreamers,” as he himself delighted to be called. H.R.H. Prince
Adolphus Frederick, Duke of Cambridge, was born in 1774, and was the
seventh and youngest surviving son of George III. He saw active service
in Flanders,—where he was twice wounded—in 1793, under his brother the
Duke of York and Marshal Freytag, and again in the two subsequent years.
Later, he was given appointments in Hanover, and was Governor there
until the death of William IV., when the Duke of Cumberland became
Sovereign of that State, and when the kingdom was finally separated from
the Crown of England.
The funeral took place at Kew on the 16th, and it was attended by both
Battalions, each of which furnished a Guard of Honour, the 2nd Battalion
at Cambridge House, Piccadilly, and the 1st Battalion at Kew. On the
25th the following Regimental Order was issued:—
The Commanding Officer is desired by H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge to
express to the Officers, Non-commissioned officers, and privates, his
thanks, and those of the Duchess of Cambridge and family, for the
feeling manner in which they conducted themselves at Kew, on the
occasion of the funeral of His late Royal Highness.
Shortly afterwards (August 15th), the Colonelcy of the Regiment was
bestowed by Her Majesty upon General the Earl of Strafford, G.C.B. (late
of the Third Guards), and better known in the Coldstream as Sir John
Byng, the gallant commander of the 2nd Guards Brigade during the
campaign of 1815, and (when Sir G. Cooke was wounded) of the Guards
Division at Waterloo.
London, in the summer of 1851, was the scene of the first great
Exhibition of the Industry of all Nations—a scheme to promote the
peaceable development of commerce, which was conceived, initiated, and
organized by the enlightened energy of the late Prince Consort. This
splendid display of the arts and sciences created extraordinary interest
among all classes, both at home and abroad. The Brigade took its part in
this undertaking by guarding the building, and by furnishing a piquet of
one Officer and 50 men in case of emergency. The latter were quartered
in the disused Knightsbridge barracks, and the usual autumn change of
quarters was put off until the end of October.
On the 22nd of August, Colonel H. Bentinck was promoted
Lieutenant-Colonel on the retirement of Colonel Chaplin, when Colonel
Hon. A. Upton became Junior Major (2nd Battalion).
The year 1852 (September 14th) saw the death of the now aged Duke of
Wellington—the great Commander who broke the power of Napoleon, and who,
above all other Generals, raised the military prestige of England to
that high standard of fame and glory, that made the British nation
invincible in the field, and enabled her to stand single-handed against
the conqueror of Europe. It is quite impossible in a work of this kind,
to attempt to recapitulate a tithe even of the services which this great
man rendered to his country. They stand recorded in history, and in the
annals of the Coldstream they are partially described in the events
which occurred up to 1818, when his active military career, as a General
in the field, came to an end. Suffice it here to reproduce the touching
General Order which Her Majesty caused to be published to the Army as
soon as she learnt that her faithful soldier and servant had breathed
his last:—
“The Queen feels assured that the Army will participate in the deep
grief with which Her Majesty has received the intelligence of the
irreparable loss sustained by herself, and by the country, in the
sudden death of Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington. In him Her
Majesty has to deplore a firm supporter of her Throne; a faithful,
wise, and devoted councillor; and a valued and honoured friend. In him
the Army will lament the loss of a Commander-in-Chief unequalled for
the brilliancy, the magnitude, and the success of his military
achievements; but hardly less distinguished for the indefatigable and
earnest zeal with which, in time of peace, he laboured to maintain the
efficiency and promote the interests of that Army, which he had often
led to victory. The discipline which he exacted from others, as the
main foundation of the military character, he sternly imposed upon
himself; and the Queen desires to impress upon the Army, that the
greatest Commander whom England ever saw, has left an example for the
imitation of every soldier, in taking as his guiding principle, in
every relation of life, an energetic and unhesitating obedience to the
call of duty.”[179]
-----
Footnote 179:
_Annual Register_ , 1852, “Chronicle,” p. 144.
-----
The remains of the illustrious dead having been removed from Walmer to
London (November 10th), the lying-in-state lasted some days in Chelsea
Hospital, when Guards of Honour were furnished daily by the Battalion
finding the public duties; and thousands flocked to the scene to pay a
last tribute to the memory of the greatest Englishman of the century.
The funeral was fixed for the 18th, and the ceremony was on as imposing
and magnificent a scale as a grateful country could devise upon so
solemn an occasion of universal mourning and public sorrow. The
procession started from the Horse Guards Parade, under an escort of six
battalions, eight squadrons, and nineteen guns, together with
representatives of every available regiment of the British Army,[180]
the whole under the command of Major-General H.R.H. the Duke of
Cambridge.
-----
Footnote 180:
“The Queen, having been graciously pleased to command that every
regiment in Her Majesty’s Service shall, as far as practicable, be
represented in the funeral procession of Field-Marshal the Duke of
Wellington, by a detachment, consisting of one Field-Officer, Captain,
Subaltern, Sergeant, Corporal, and six privates, the General
Commanding-in-Chief requests you will be pleased to issue the
necessary orders for selecting these detachments from the several
Battalions of the Foot Guards enumerated in the margin, [viz. from
each of the seven Battalions of the Brigade, transmitting the names of
the Officers to this Department for Viscount Hardinge’s information.
In selecting the men for this honourable duty, His Lordship desires a
preference may be given to length of service, when combined with good
conduct and general orderly habits. The Officers and men to be fully
armed and equipped” (_Adjutant-General to the Field-Officer in Brigade
Waiting_ , Nov. 4, 1852).
-----
The infantry consisted of two brigades, one of which, under
Major-General Shawe (late of the Coldstream), was composed of the 1st
Battalions of the Grenadiers, Coldstream, and Scots Fusilier Guards. The
2nd Coldstream, then at the Tower, was posted near St. Paul’s, where the
interment took place, while the flank companies of the 2nd and 3rd
Grenadiers, the late Duke’s Regiment, took up a position within the iron
railings there.[181]
-----
Footnote 181:
A full account of the funeral of the Duke of Wellington is given in
the _Annual Register_ , 1852, “Appendix to Chronicle,” p. 483.
-----
Eighteen months had barely elapsed, after the disappearance of the chief
actor in the glories of the great wars that disturbed the beginning of
the century, when the long European peace came to an end, and again
there was a call to arms, and the nation was involved in the harassing
anxieties of a sanguinary struggle in the East with Russia. The Crimean
war opens up a new era in the military history of the country, and as
the Coldstream participated largely in it, it will be described in the
subsequent chapters. Meanwhile, it may be convenient to mention, as
briefly as possible, some few of the changes and reforms that affected
the army at large, and the Regiment in particular, during the period
(1837-54), with which we are now more immediately concerned.
It may be stated that, during the reign of William IV., there was only a
sergeant’s guard at Buckingham Palace; but in July, 1837, when Her
Majesty took up her residence there, it was increased to one Subaltern
and forty-four Non-commissioned officers and men. Again, before the
Queen’s Accession, guard-mounting, attended by the flank companies of
the Brigade, seems often to have been held more than once during the
year; but since that time, it took place more regularly as a Birthday
ceremonial. Moreover, prior to 1841, the public duties mounted, as a
rule, all the year round from the Horse Guards Parade; from that date,
however, they appear to have paraded there during the summer months only
(May 1st-October 1st), when white trousers were worn by the troops. The
practice of mounting the public duties from the battalion parades during
the whole year, except for about a month, as at present, began about
1849.
As early as 1829, efforts were made to increase the comfort of the men
on guard, by providing them with means to cook, or at least to warm,
their dinners, which, prior to that date, had been served up to them in
a very unsatisfactory manner. Later, other improvements were introduced
into barracks. Suitable washing and cooking arrangements began to be
organized (1838 and 1843), and fuel and light were authorized for a room
to serve as a “library” for the use of men (1839). These changes,
however, were not finally complete until 1849, in which year also, the
new barracks at the Tower (Waterloo barracks) were finished and ready
for occupation. It may be interesting to note that, in 1850, by an order
from the Horse Guards, all bagatelle tables in barracks were forbidden;
and this was interpreted to entail the removal of a billiard table which
had been set up at Chichester, as the Field-Officer in Brigade Waiting
considered it “in the same light as the bagatelle boards which have been
so recently done away with by the Commander-in-Chief” (_Brigade Order_ ,
July 24, 1850).
Regimental Savings Banks were established in the end of 1843, and were
brought into operation in the Coldstream by a Regimental Order, dated
January 22, 1844.
Considerable attention was paid to the well-being of the Recruit Depôt
at Croydon, and it is satisfactory to record a Regimental Order of the
20th of June, 1843, showing that the system then adopted, met the
requirements which it was intended to supply.
The Commanding Officer has not failed to observe the state of
efficiency in which the recruits from Croydon have been sent up to
join their respective Battalions, so highly creditable to Sergeant
Trew and the Non-commissioned officers under his command in the
superintendence of that establishment.
In 1849 new school arrangements were introduced there, and a routine of
duty, both for the winter and summer, was fixed to enable the recruits
to attend the classes regularly.
On the 19th of December, 1845, a medal for “Meritorious Service” was
introduced into the army, to be presented, in addition to an annuity not
exceeding _£_20, to sergeants recommended for distinguished service, and
to be held while doing duty or together with pension. A yearly sum of
_£_2000 was set apart for this purpose.[182]
-----
Footnote 182:
About the same time, the conditions under which the “distinguishing
marks for good conduct” were granted, were made more easy. We have not
attempted in this work, to give all the many changes which have been
made to better the soldier’s lot and to encourage good behaviour in
the ranks, being content to indicate only some of the first steps
taken to secure these results. It should, however, be understood, that
when a reform of this nature was introduced, it very naturally grew to
the advantage of the men, until it expanded into the system now in
force.
-----
It may be remarked that in April, 1850, a modification was made in the
manner of keeping the men’s accounts, and Officers were held
responsible, as heretofore, to inspect and sign the pay and soldiers'
settling books, as well as to see that any balances deposited in the
Savings Bank were duly entered. A certificate to this effect was signed
once a month.
Events contributed to cause the country generally, to bestow some
greater attention on military matters than had been the case for many a
long year. The fear that we might become involved in a serious dispute
with the French, owing to affairs in Syria in 1841; the increasing
hostility displayed by that people; and the revolution that disturbed
Europe in 1848-49, induced us to make some augmentations to the regular
forces, to reform the system of army service, and to reconstitute the
militia.[183] But the value of these changes would not have been
complete unless other means had also been taken to improve the state of
the army. It is known, and recognised with gratitude, that H.R.H. the
Prince Consort devoted his great talents, with the earnestness that
marked his character so strongly, to the well-being of the army, and
laboured indefatigably to secure reforms and to increase
efficiency.[184] Lord Hardinge, the new Commander-in-Chief, successor to
the Duke of Wellington, also took immense interest in the subject, with
the result that the soldier’s firearm was improved, and that some system
of practical training was at last provided for both Officers and men.
-----
Footnote 183:
_The Army Book for the British Empire_ ; Lieut.-General W. H.
Goodenough, C.B., R.A., and Lieut.-Colonel J. C. Dalton (H.P.), R.A.,
aided by various contributors, pp. 27, 42 (London, 1893).
Non-commissioned officers and men of the Coldstream were lent to
militia regiments for the purpose of drilling them. On November 20,
1852, a Regimental Order expresses the gratification felt by the
Lieutenant-Colonel at the reports which he received of their good
conduct, and of the manner in which they conveyed the instruction
required.
Footnote 184:
It must be noted here, that the Prince Consort was an advocate of a
system by which men might be allowed to leave the Colours, on
furlough, before their army service expired, and so form reserve
battalions in case of emergency (Theodore Martin, _Life of H.R.H. the
Prince Consort_ , ii. 436; 4th edit.: London, 1877).
-----
[Illustration: REGULATION MUSKET 1830.]
[Illustration: ENFIELD. 1853-1865.]
[Illustration: SNIDER. 1865-1871.]
[Illustration: MARTINI HENRY. 1871.]
[Illustration: LEE METFORD. 1890.]
[Illustration: N.R. Wilkinson del. A.D. Innes & C^o.
London Mintern Bros. lith.]
The armament of the Brigade underwent a change during the first sixteen
years of Her Majesty’s reign. As far back as 1836, the Quartermasters of
the 1st Coldstream and of the 3rd Grenadiers received “percussion
muskets intended for trial;” but the old flintlock was still retained,
until about the year 1843, when percussion caps were introduced, and the
“pickers and brushes,” worn by the corporals and privates, were
discontinued in the Regiment. The Minié musket-rifle was produced in
1851, and Brigade Orders, dated February 26th, and April 1, 1852,
directed the seven Battalions of the Foot Guards to send two intelligent
Non-commissioned officers to Woolwich, for the purpose of being
instructed in its use. Early the following year, a few of these firearms
were served out, when each Battalion of the Regiment received 200. A
general distribution of the new musket-rifle, however, was not by any
means complete when hostilities broke out in 1854, nor had the
authorities apparently quite made up their minds upon its value; but,
fortunately, sufficient progress had been made in its construction, and
the Guards and the greater portion of the British Army, that took the
field, were all armed with it before they met the Russians. It may
therefore be stated at once, that the weapon which we had in the Crimea,
was much superior to that used by the majority of the enemy’s troops.
Another pattern was adopted in 1853, but it was not issued till later.
Prior to the introduction of the Minié rifle, musketry was imperfectly
and irregularly practised. Battalions in out-quarters (Chichester and
Dublin) contrived to do so, but in London it was not attempted. Officers
took much interest in teaching the men the use of their firelock, and
encouraged them to shoot by offering prizes for which they competed. The
ranges were, of course, short—100 yards,—the results inferior, and only
five or ten rounds per man were fired. The target, some 6 feet by 2 feet
broad, was often embellished with a figure of a French Grenadier, to
give the men zest in their efforts to hit it. In 1853, a range was
procured near Kilburn, and on the 25th of August, the four Battalions in
London were ordered to commence ball practice there as soon as possible.
The year following, it was but natural that “incessant” musketry should
be ordered, and in March a party was sent to the school of Hythe, which
appears to have been opened about that time. In May, a return was called
for on the musketry as practised at Kilburn, and Captain Le Couteur
(Coldstream Guards), “having made himself acquainted with the method of
instruction as carried on at Hythe,” was ordered to superintend all
target practice of the 2nd Battalion which was then at home. It may be
added, that drafts going out to the Crimea, were also ordered to
practise musketry during the voyage out, and ammunition was provided for
that special purpose. The present system of musketry now adopted in the
army, appears to have grown out of these beginnings.
In 1852, several detachments, consisting of one Officer and 20 to 25 men
of the 1st Battalion, were sent to Chatham for the purpose of being
instructed in siege operations, and in the construction of field-works.
The next year was one of considerable military activity, brought about
by the efforts of the Prince Consort, and by the fact that other
nations, more especially Prussia, were devoting much attention to the
training of their troops. A camp of instruction was formed at Chobham,
under the command of Lieut.-General Lord Seaton, which lasted for two
months, commencing from the middle of June. The Foot Guards proceeded
there for their training in two Brigades, each remaining for a
month,—the first consisting of the 1st and 3rd Grenadiers, 1st
Coldstream, and 1st Scots Fusiliers, under Colonel H. Bentinck; the
second, of the 2nd Grenadiers, 2nd Coldstream, and 2nd Scots Fusiliers,
under Colonel Godfrey Thornton (Grenadier Guards). Captain Frederick
Stephenson (Scots Fusilier Guards) was appointed Major of Brigade of
both Brigades.
The instruction was of a practical character, and the troops acquired a
knowledge of their duties in the field, which could in no other way be
imparted to them. Some 16,000 were altogether present. Being the first
peace manœuvres held in England (we should perhaps, in the present
day, call them only summer drills), the camp at Chobham evoked much
interest among all classes; and as the Queen, accompanied by the Prince
Consort, frequently inspected the troops or was present when military
exercises were performed, it became a centre of attraction to thousands
of spectators, who flocked to see those unwonted displays of mimic
warfare.
Thus ended the year 1853, the forerunner of the great war with Russia,
which was so soon to try the value of the British army under the cruel
test of hardships, difficulties, and privations. The army at that time
had passed through a long period of peace; it had little theoretical
knowledge of its profession, and was imperfectly served by those
departments that are indispensable to its efficiency in the field. But
it was a thoroughly disciplined army, one that knew its duty, that
respected and obeyed authority, and that bore unflinchingly and
without murmur, all the sufferings which it was called upon to endure.
This was the army with which England again engaged in a serious
European war. Nor was the country disappointed with the work that was
performed. For, in spite of many shortcomings in administration and
organization, and notwithstanding innumerable trials and difficulties,
the troops maintained unsullied the honour of their Sovereign, by the
conspicuous display of those pre-eminent and fundamental military
virtues,—discipline and fortitude.
CHAPTER VI.
BEGINNING OF THE WAR IN THE EAST.
Position of Russia in Europe—State of the Continent in 1853—British
alliance with France—The Tsar’s quarrel with Turkey—Commencement of
hostilities on the Danube—The affair of Sinope—How it drew England
and France into the war—Three Battalions of the Brigade of Guards
ordered on foreign service—Concentration of the Allies in the
Mediterranean—Guards Brigade at Malta—Thence to Scutari—Want of
transport—The Allies moved to Varna—Good feeling between the British
and French troops—Course of the war on the Danube—Siege of
Silistria—Retreat of the Russians into Bessarabia—Intervention of
Austria—The Allies in Bulgaria—Sickness among the troops—Return to
Varna—Preparations for the invasion of the Crimea—The organization
and strength of the Allies.
The Empire of Russia—except for the great expansion in Central Asia
which has taken place during the last forty years, and which has now
brought its frontiers close to India—was scarcely less vast and
formidable in 1853 than it is at present. Stretching from Germany on the
west, to the Pacific Ocean on the east, bordering the Black Sea, and
pressing on Turkey, Persia, and China, it occupies an immense and
continuous territory, both in Europe and in Asia, and exercises many and
important influences over the civilization of the world. Inhabited
generally, by a docile agricultural population who live in the plains,
and whose liberties and property are at the mercy of a strong executive
power, it is ruled by an Autocrat both in name and in reality, and is
governed by a trained army of ubiquitous administrators and officials,
who enforce his decrees, and coerce the whole people to spend their
existence in the service of the Tsar. The organization of Russia, less
adapted, perhaps, to secure the welfare of her subjects than to
accomplish the will of her rulers, is skilfully constructed; and the
sagacity she displays in the conduct of her affairs, is as conspicuous
in the manner she brings fresh conquests within her grasp, as in that by
which she controls and assimilates the numerous and heterogeneous
nationalities, that are to be found within her borders. But here her
advantages end. Russia has no seaboard, and her foreign commerce,
incommensurate to her size and importance, is not sufficient to enable
her to develop her vast resources, or to consolidate the stupendous
forces with which her disciplined intelligence, large possessions, and
teeming population should endow her. A glance at the map reveals the
disability under which she labours. Fettered in the north by an
ice-bound ocean, she has but two outlets through which to reveal her
strength, and these are blocked by the narrow channels of the Sound and
the Bosphorus.
That Russia is ambitious and greedy of power, few will deny; but her
encroachments are not altogether due to the mere love of extending her
territories. Her existence, as a nation of the first rank, is menaced by
her maritime weakness, and until she frees herself from the shackles
that cripple her commercial activity on the sea, she is the ready and
easy victim of the Power that holds, and has strength to use, the keys
of her house. But, added to this, her statesmen have long perceived
that, as soon as they shall have gained the Bosphorus, they will win a
commanding supremacy over the destinies of the world. While, therefore,
they are impelled to a system of aggrandisement, in order to force their
way to the sea and to preserve the life of their Imperial structure,
they by no means despise the glorious goal of wide dominion, to which
the success of this policy must infallibly conduct them. This, then, is,
and has been for many generations, ever since their genius conceived the
design, the reason which has urged them relentlessly to enlarge their
possessions in Poland, Persia, and in Central Asia, and to exhibit
undying hostility towards the Turkish Empire.
The Western Powers have not failed to recognise the danger to which they
are exposed by this active and aggressive policy, and Great Britain,
having vital interests of her own in the far East, has never been able
to view with unconcern the absorption of Turkey by her Northern rival.
Hence, it has come about that, when the Sultan has been threatened, many
nations of the West have endeavoured to go to his assistance, and to
ward off the disaster that seemed to be imminent. But their efforts have
been badly directed; for, divided among themselves, pursuing divergent
interests, interfering without wisdom, or led away by false conceptions
of the real situation, they too often manacled the defensive power of
Turkey, and gave victory to the Russians, when the latter had not won it
by their own strength. In this way Russia advanced and prospered,—by the
ascendency that organized intelligence will ever command over a policy
of mere sentimental or unreflective expediency,—until 1853, when another
crisis was impending in the East, which produced a great European war,
and terminated the long peace that had existed since 1815.
It is not necessary to dwell upon the origin of the war. It arose from a
trivial incident—the possession of the keys of the Holy Places in
Palestine. The Emperor Nicholas I. reigned at St. Petersburg at that
time, and he claimed these emblems of superiority as head of the Greek
Church; so also did the French, in virtue of an old Treaty made in the
sixteenth century, which, they affirmed, constituted them protectors of
the Latin Church in the East. The Sultan adjusted the petty cause of
dispute, and thereupon the Tsar made fresh demands, which the Porte
resisted. These will be adverted to presently, but a word will be
necessary here to describe briefly the position of affairs, that existed
on the continent of Europe.
France did not long maintain the Republic set up by the Revolution of
1848. Louis Napoleon, nephew and political heir of the first great
Napoleon—in spite of the old decree banishing the family of the late
Emperor,—was elected President for four years by a large majority
(December 20th). Strengthening his position with the army, by appeals to
past glory, and with the people generally, by the maintenance of order
in troublous times, he resolved to revive the Empire, and succeeded in
December, 1851, in constituting himself President for ten years, with
largely increased powers, and with the title of Prince. Twelve months
later (December 2, 1852), he was proclaimed Emperor under the name of
Napoleon III., and was so acknowledged by Europe. The new Sovereign was
not blind to the advantages which a friendship with England would confer
upon him; he was even anxious to conciliate a people he had known and
respected in the days of his exile. The defect in his title, moreover,
was best obliterated by the adoption of a policy of adventure. The
appearance of the Eastern cloud furnished him with an opportunity he was
glad to seize; and, as it became darker, so did he, the more readily,
co-operate with the British Cabinet, in their attempt to disperse it.
When it was determined that peace could no longer be maintained, an
alliance was cemented between the two countries, and England and France,
so often in the past unhappily opposed in war, were at length found side
by side in the strife, combating the same foe and loyally supporting
each other in the field of battle—rivals only in the honour and glory to
be derived therefrom. And yet this union was not without serious
drawbacks. Seldom can a confederacy of independent States be
satisfactory; for each has different interests to serve, and conflicting
opinions too frequently weaken the efforts of those who have banded
themselves together to accomplish an object avowedly dear to all. In
1854 the alliance was definitely established; it became _l’entente
cordiale_, as it was felicitously termed, and, when the war was in
progress, harmony and mutual respect and confidence reigned between the
armies engaged. But, as a price, to please Napoleon, England gave up
some of her most cherished customs of naval warfare—a sacrifice which
the armed forces of Europe had in vain sought to wring from her,—and
hostilities assumed a direction which, as will be seen, did the least
damage to the enemy, and effected injury to the cause which the British
nation had most at heart.
The popular explosion in France in 1848, affected not only that country,
but produced widespread results, and its consequences were felt, like
the Revolution of 1830, all over the continent of Europe. In Austria the
crisis had been peculiarly acute, and the Hungarians and Italians rose
in rebellion against the authority of their Sovereign. The latter was
able to re-assert his power in Lombardy by his own resources; but in
Hungary the resistance was so strong that, when the Tsar offered the
assistance of his troops, the proposal was accepted, and Russian
bayonets reduced the Magyars to obedience, and placed them once more
under the Austrian Emperor (1849). In Prussia and in the petty States of
Germany less difficulties had been experienced; but the temper of the
people had been aroused, and they clamoured for reform and a greater
control over their own affairs. The German Princes were alarmed; they
distrusted their subjects, and relied for counsel and aid upon
Russia—the only Power whose government, like theirs, was despotic, but
who, unlike them, had no fear of a popular ebullition. In truth, the
credit of the Tsar was in the ascendent in Central Europe: he ostensibly
saved Austria from disaster, if not from dissolution; he intervened in
the question of the Danish Duchies,[185] which then agitated the whole
of Germany; and he mediated successfully between Austria and Prussia,
when they became rivals and jealous of each other, on account of the
efforts of the latter to restore in her own favour the Imperial
Constitution of Germany, which had come to an end in 1806. In short, the
Emperor Nicholas controlled the German nations; he arbitrated in their
differences; and could involve them in serious trouble should they see
fit to dispute his pleasure.
-----
Footnote 185:
Schleswig and Holstein, torn from Denmark in 1864.
-----
When Russia, therefore, not content with the settlement effected with
respect to the Holy Places, determined still to provoke a quarrel with
Turkey, the Western Powers were not united upon the problem that invited
their attention. England and France alone resolved to resist her
pretensions, while the others—Austria, Prussia, and the minor States of
Germany—practically ranged themselves on her side. The demands made upon
the Porte are of little importance; any pretext is good, where an object
is to be gained. The Sultan was required to accept the protection of
Russia over his Christian subjects, and he refused to submit (May 23,
1853). In this determination England agreed; indeed, it is clear that it
would have been impossible for him to deliver over a very considerable
section of his people into the hands of his hereditary enemy. Thereupon
a Russian force, under Prince Michael Gortchakoff, crossed the Pruth
(July 2nd), occupied the Principalities (now the kingdom of Roumania),
and established itself upon the Danube. The Turks immediately made great
efforts to meet the emergency, by collecting troops and despatching them
both into Asia Minor, and into Bulgaria. But no declaration of war took
place, for the Western Powers persuaded the aggrieved party to have
patience, while they sent representatives to Vienna to try to avert
hostilities by the arts of diplomacy.
These endeavours failed entirely, not to say ridiculously. An Instrument
was drafted, called the Vienna Note, to which both the Tsar and the
Sultan were to consent, as a basis for a future arrangement. The former
did so readily, but the latter peremptorily refused his adhesion to it.
That he was right, is shown by the fact that the Note was so loosely
drawn, as to be capable of an interpretation, whereby the full demands
of Russia would have been agreed to by Turkey; and in the negotiations
which followed, it became apparent that this was the only interpretation
which the Emperor Nicholas had adopted! So the intervention projected at
this centre of Russian intrigue, came to an end with the full
concurrence of the British and French Governments, who were obliged to
recognize that they had been duped. In October, the Porte formally
called upon General Gortchakoff to evacuate the Danubian Principalities,
and ordered Omar Pasha, the Turkish Commander-in-chief in Bulgaria, “to
commence hostilities if, after fifteen days from the arrival of his
despatch at the Russian head-quarters, an answer in the negative should
be returned.” After the stated interval, towards the end of the month,
the war commenced, not only on the Danube, but also on the Armenian
frontier in Asia.
Interesting as is the campaign that now began, to the student of
military history, it will be impossible to describe it at any length in
these pages. It must suffice to say that, at the end of the year, the
results in Asia were unimportant. There were victories on both sides,
but no great progress was achieved by either of the combatants. It was
different in Europe, for there, thanks to the skill and energy of Omar
Pasha, and to the gallantry of his troops, the Turks gained many and
considerable advantages. Crossing the Danube at Turtukai, they secured a
position on the northern bank of the river at Oltenitza, in the face of
superior forces, and repulsed every attempt to dislodge them. Again,
having established themselves firmly at Kalafat, opposite Widin, they
attacked and dealt a crushing defeat (early in January, 1854) on a
strong corps, which had entrenched itself in their vicinity near Citate.
The Ottoman troops were everywhere victorious in this theatre of
operations; the Russians, on the other hand, were beaten and
disorganized, their _morale_ shaken, and their losses, on their own
admission, amounted to 35,000 men.
While these successes were being won, an incident occurred which caused
the war to spread, and drew England and France into its meshes. A small
Turkish squadron of a few frigates and smaller vessels lay at anchor at
Sinope; whereupon, a far more powerful Russian fleet, consisting of
heavily armed and large ships, approached under cover of a fog,
surprised them, and completely destroyed them (November 30th). The
attack was conducted under circumstances of considerable barbarity; no
quarter was given, the ships were sunk, the wounded and the helpless
were not spared, and 4000 men were slaughtered or drowned. When the news
of this action reached Europe, indignation, already aroused by previous
events, could not be restrained in England, and so strong was the
feeling evoked in the country, that war could no longer be avoided. At
first sight it may appear strange, that the story of useless butchery,
perpetrated in war time, should produce so violent a resentment; but
when events are reviewed, the reasons for it will be perceived. It is
necessary to glance at these events, in order to understand some
features connected with subsequent operations.
The guiding line of thought that influenced the statesmen of the two
Powers, interested in curbing the aggression of St. Petersburg, was the
conviction that Russia was at that time overwhelmingly powerful, and
that the Ottoman Empire was in the last gasp of impotence and
decrepitude. The Emperor Nicholas had for long fostered this idea, and
had carefully instilled it into our Government. With this object, he
made a journey to this country as early as 1844, and he pressed it upon
our Ambassador at his Court, in secret communications held in the spring
of 1853, before the actual crisis had taken place. We were then told
that Turkey was “a sick man—a very sick man” who might at any moment
“die upon our hands,” and that it was therefore advisable to divide his
inheritance; and our cupidity was tempted by the offer of Egypt, and
even of the island of Crete, if we would take these bribes, and give
Russia a free hand. We believed these assertions of omnipotence on the
one hand, and of prostration on the other, though needless to say we had
no desire to share in the spoils. Our minds instantly recurred to the
campaigns of 1828-29, when the Russians crossed the Balkans, and forced
a disastrous treaty upon the Sultan at Adrianople. We dwelt upon these
results, showing only Russian victories and Turkish defeat, and we drew
our conclusions therefrom. But we forgot a few historical facts
connected with that war.
We forgot that the Russians could only undertake a successful invasion
of Turkey, when they had the command of the Black Sea, and that we
ourselves had secured this for them, in 1828, by annihilating the
Turkish fleet the year before (August, 1827), at the unfortunate victory
of Navarino. We forgot, also, that the Balkans do not form the last line
of defence, but that the difficulties of an invader increase materially
as he approaches the Sea of Marmora. In 1829, the Russian army had
achieved a great deal, but it had not attained to victory. It was
exhausted, and unable to maintain itself at the end of a long line of
communications; while Turkey, on the other hand, was gathering her
forces together. We surely, then, failed to recollect, that we seized
the opportunity at that very critical moment to force the Sultan to make
a shameful peace; thereby saving the aggressor from disaster, and
securing to him advantages which otherwise he could never have hoped to
gain.
As a consequence of the exaggerated dread inspired by the great Northern
Power, the Turks were not allowed to act in their own defence in 1853;
they were obstructed by severe diplomatic pressure, and harassed by
vexatious interference. At last, after the _fiasco_ at Vienna, they
could no longer be restrained by their timid friends, and, in spite of
them, they at length declared war, in the autumn of 1853. Now, when the
Emperor Nicholas ordered an advance into the Ottoman Empire (viz. the
Danubian Principalities), in July, and when the Porte, dissuaded from
using force to repel the invasion, was obliged to allow her enemy
quietly to consolidate himself therein, Russia, to appease Europe, made
an announcement that she intended only to seize a material guarantee,
and would engage in no further offensive operations. She would only meet
any assault directed against her. England and France had sent their
ships to a port near the Dardanelles (September 11th), and, as soon as
the Sultan commenced hostilities, they ordered them up to
Constantinople, to protect Turkey from Russian aggression (October
22nd). Conscious of the dangers surrounding the small Turkish squadron
in the Black Sea, very urgent requests were made, that the friendly
fleets should pass through the Bosphorus, to prevent its falling into
the power of the enemy. But these applications were all peremptorily
refused.[186] To make the matter very much worse, and, indeed, to render
the whole course of action unintelligible, _the Turkish fleet itself_,
by the strong representations of the Sultan’s Western advisers, was also
kept back idly in the Bosphorus, and was prevented from sailing to the
support of the exposed squadron![187] Hence the disaster at Sinope
became inevitable. When this state of affairs was realized in
England,—when it was seen that our diplomatic skill was again at fault,
that the assurances of Russia were not to be relied upon, and that our
naval demonstrations were held in contempt,—then the natural
consequences followed, and the British people, their Government
notwithstanding, determined that the disturber of the peace of Europe
should be punished.
-----
Footnote 186:
“Our last information from St. Petersburg, still represents Russia as
desirous to treat, and as determined, above all, to assume the
offensive in no quarter. This confidence explained why our fleets did
not move” (_M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski_, Paris, Dec. 15,
1853).
Footnote 187:
See _Correspondence respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin
and Greek Churches in Turkey_ , part ii., pp. 248-258. Writing from
Therapia, November 5, 1853, to Lord Clarendon, Lord Stratford de
Redcliffe, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, says, “I have
succeeded in dissuading the Porte from sending a detachment of
line-of-battle ships and sailing frigates into the Black Sea at this
moment” (_ibid._, p. 250).
-----
Early in 1854, the English, French, and Turkish fleets entered the Black
Sea; but the Russian flag had everywhere disappeared. The victorious
Admiral at Sinope,—never dreaming that our extreme caution and fear of
giving offence to his Imperial Master would prevent us from taking some
action, or from giving the Sultan leave to pursue and capture him,—had
betaken himself back to Sevastopol with the utmost speed; he only waited
to make the necessary repairs to secure a safe passage, for “the Russian
squadron had suffered considerably.” Nor was the Emperor Nicholas cast
down by recent events, except for the fact that Omar Pasha was steadily
destroying his military prestige on the Danube, and was revealing to the
world the real weakness of his supposed power in the field. He ordered
his Ambassadors in London and Paris to demand their passports, and they
left those capitals on the 6th of February. Meanwhile the tedious and
fruitless negotiations continued at Vienna, and Russia, far from showing
any conciliatory disposition, increased her demands. But these
conferences came to nothing, and on the 13th the British Ambassador was
invited to quit St. Petersburg.[188] An Ultimatum followed, calling upon
the Tsar to evacuate the Principalities, and the formal declaration of
war was issued on the 28th of March.
-----
Footnote 188:
The French Ambassador in Russia thereupon applied for his passports.
-----
Before this date, preparations for the coming strife had already been
made. Treaties of alliance were concluded with France and Turkey, and
the expeditionary force was sent to Malta. On the 10th of February a
Brigade Order was issued, whereby a Brigade of Foot Guards, consisting
of the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers and the 1st Battalions Coldstream and
Scots Fusilier Guards, were to be held in readiness to proceed on
foreign service by the 18th, each Battalion to be completed to 40
sergeants, besides the usual Staff-sergeants, and 850 rank and file. The
1st Coldstream, then quartered at St. George’s barracks, were sent on
the 14th of February to Chichester, where the 2nd Battalion were
stationed,[189] there to be made up to field strength, and to transfer
weakly or unfit men to the latter. This was the first movement of the
troops in London, and the people, eager for war to commence, and ever
ready to welcome their brave defenders, hailed the appearance of the men
with unbounded enthusiasm. A contemporary writer thus describes the
scene:—
“It was just noon when the Battalion left, ... the whole line of
streets, from the barracks, along the Strand, over Waterloo Bridge, to
the terminus of the South Western Railway, was literally blocked by
multitudes, all eager to show some token of sympathy. Many a hand was
stretched out to the brave fellows as they passed, which they had
never clasped before—men of the humblest station grasped hands in
which the best blood of England flowed. 'Fair women and brave men'
waved their parting adieus. The windows and even the housetops were
peopled with spectators, whose cheers, and waving of hats, and
kerchiefs, testified their interest in the scene. Many of the Officers
were young-looking men, and the rank and file seemed to be in the very
bloom of youth and manhood, and to have attained that soldierly
bearing which only a perfect discipline, united to professional pride,
ever thoroughly forms.”[190]
-----
Footnote 189:
The 2nd Battalion proceeded to Windsor, and on the 28th to Wellington
barracks.
Footnote 190:
Nolan, _History of the War against Russia_ , i. 92.
-----
The Battalion, having been inspected at Chichester on the 17th,
proceeded to Southampton, and, amid the hearty cheers of a dense crowd,
embarked on board the steamship _Orinoco_ (22nd) for Malta. Arriving
there after a prosperous voyage, on the 4th of March, they were
stationed at Fort Manoel (4 companies), Fort Tigne (1 company), and in
the Lazarette (3 companies). The strength was 35 Officers, 919 men, and
32 women, the average age and service of the men being twenty-nine and
seven years respectively.[191] The following Officers embarked:—
Colonel C. Hay (_Commanding Battalion_).
Colonels W. Codrington; and G. Drummond (_Mounted_).
Lieut.-Colonels W. S. Newton; Hon. V. Dawson; M. Tierney; T.
Crombie; and H. Cumming.
Captains C. Cocks; J. Cowell; L. D. MacKinnon; W. Dawkins; H. Jolliffe; C.
T. Wilson; Hon. A. Hardinge; Hon. Percy Feilding (Adjutant); Charles
Baring; Hon. G. Eliot; H. Bouverie; H. Cust; H. Armytage; and Hon. H.
Byng.
Lieutenants A. Thellusson; P. Crawley; Sir James Dunlop, Bart.; G.
Goodlake; Lord Bingham; F. Ramsden; H. Tower; Hon. R. Drummond; and P.
Wyndham.
Battalion Surgeon J. Skelton. Assistant Surgeons F. Wildbore; and J.
Wyatt.
Quartermaster A. Falconer.
-----
Footnote 191:
John Wyatt, Battalion-Surgeon, _History of the 1st Battalion
Coldstream Guards during the Eastern Campaign, from February, 1854, to
June, 1856_ , p. 1 (1858).
-----
The three Guards Battalions reached Malta about the same time, and were
commanded by Colonel Bentinck (Coldstream Guards), who was appointed
Brigadier-General, February 21st. There they remained for about seven
weeks, awaiting events; while other troops, all infantry, poured into
the island, without General Officers, Staffs, or Departments, wherewith
to form an army. At first it seemed somewhat doubtful whether they would
go further. Our Government at home still dreamt of peace, and could not
make up their minds that war was upon them; they even seemed to have
thought that, though a naval demonstration had signally failed at
Constantinople, a military display in the Mediterranean might frighten
the Russians! The interval, however, was not misspent; it was utilized
in preparing the men for active service, principally in the exercise of
musketry, which was practised without interruption. With reference to
this important subject, the following, written by a Coldstream Officer
(Colonel Wilson), who was present with the Battalion, will be of
interest:—
“When the Household Brigade was ordered abroad, the military Court of
Chancery had come to no decision relative to the suitableness of the
Minié rifle for the general use of infantry. As yet that amazing tool
was in the possession of only a few _select_ men in every
regiment.[192] Hence, Lord Hardinge, who, it must be confessed, did
much for the improvement of English small arms, judged it expedient
that the Guards should take 'Brown Bess' to Malta; but, at the same
time, he despatched thither cases of Miniés, under the charge of a
competent instructor of musketry, Captain Lane-Fox [now General
Pitt-Rivers, late Grenadier Guards].... Thanks to Captain Fox’s
exertions in favour of modern betterment, and a few experiments, a
right verdict was at length delivered. At Scutari, old Brown Bess was
marched off ignominiously to the Ordnance stores, and the Minié maiden
became the faithful consort of every foot soldier. How completely have
subsequent events substantiated the truth of Fox’s arguments!”[193]
-----
Footnote 192:
The Battalions of the Brigade proceeding on foreign service, started
with 200 stand of Minié rifles and 650 percussion muskets (_Brigade
Order_ , Feb. 21st). Even as late as February, 1854, the respective
merits of these two firearms were so little determined, that we find
parties from each Regiment of the Brigade, ordered to fire 100 rounds
“of the common balls out of the old musket,” and to report upon the
comparative accuracy of the fire (_ibid._, Feb. 8th).
Footnote 193:
“A Regimental Officer” (Colonel C. T. Wilson, late Coldstream Guards),
_Our Veterans of 1854, in Camp and before the Enemy_ , p. 15 (London,
1859). The exchange of these firearms was not effected in the
Battalion till the end of May, 1854.
-----
Towards the end of March our French allies, already formed into fighting
units, began to appear in Malta on their way to Gallipoli, when they
fraternized freely and cordially with their British friends. A few days
later, Lieut.-General Sir George Brown reached the island, and started
for the same destination, where he was joined by five battalions of
infantry. Shortly afterwards, Scutari, opposite Constantinople on the
Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, was occupied by our troops, and the
British forces in the East began to collect there. The Guards Brigade
left Malta on the 21st of April, in three ships, seven companies of the
Coldstream embarking on H.M.S. _Vulcan_, the eighth accompanying the
Grenadier Guards on board the _Golden Fleece_; and, landing at Scutari
on the 29th, they encamped there. Next day a General Order was issued,
which announced to the troops the arrival and appointment of General
Lord Raglan, G.C.B., to the command of the army in Turkey,[194] whose
composition into divisions and brigades, “to replace the provisional
arrangement hitherto made by Lieut.-General Sir G. Brown,” was also
notified. The organization and strength of the Allies will be given
later, when they were more complete, but it may be stated here, that
Captain F. Stephenson (Scots Fusilier Guards) was appointed
Brigade-Major of the Guards Brigade, and that the following Officers
belonging to the Coldstream were placed upon the Staff: Lieut.-Colonel
T. M. Steele, Military Secretary, and Lieut.-Colonel P. Somerset,
Aide-de-camp to Lord Raglan; Captain Hon. A. Hardinge, Deputy Assistant
Adjutant-General, First Division; Captain Hon. H. Byng, Aide-de-camp to
Brigadier-General Bentinck; and Lieutenant Lord Bingham, extra
Aide-de-camp to Major-General Earl of Lucan.[195]
-----
Footnote 194:
See Appendix No. IX.
Footnote 195:
The following also eventually served upon the Staff as Coldstream
Officers: Lieut.-Colonel Lord Burghersh, Aide-de-camp to Lord Raglan;
Lieut.-Colonel J. Airey, A.Q.M.G. Light Division; Captain Hon. H.
Campbell, Aide-de-camp to Major-General Codrington.
-----
“The army, or rather the infantry element of an army,” writes Colonel
Wilson, “accumulated apace. Most mornings saw leviathian steamers
letting go anchor in the Bosphorus; and an evening seldom passed
without a fresh uprising of tents. But cavalry, artillery, military
stores of all sorts, were yet afar off, tossing somewhere in sailing
transports. In too many quarters, indeed, there were indications that
the administration still clung to the fatal hallucination of peace,
when there could be no peace,—still tried to believe that a
demonstration within a mile of Constantinople, must be successful.
'Floriana and its parades failed,' some said, 'because Malta is so
distant from the Pruth; but this concentration of ours at Scutari has
a real business look, which _must_ tell!' Unluckily, the Tsar knew
that the government of England was built up of incoherent materials.
He had faith in his old familiar friend, '_ce cher_ Aberdeen.' His
Greek spies informed him, how on the heights of Chalcedon stood no
army ready to combat, only a stout corps of the unrivalled British
Foot; therefore, he stayed not his hand. Old birds are not to be
caught with chaff.”[196]
-----
Footnote 196:
_Our Veterans, etc._, p. 20.
-----
The six weeks spent at Scutari passed pleasantly enough. The scenes
around them were new to the rank and file, and many, in the Household
Brigade certainly, had never dreamt of the East and its marvels. There
was much to excite the interest of the men, and little to mar their
enjoyment. British sports and pastimes were freely indulged in; the food
was good; stores of groceries and other material comforts were provided;
no hardships were endured; the heat was not too oppressive; the military
authorities even relaxed some of their old-fashioned and most cherished
regulations, and the dog collar, called the stock, which then throttled
our soldiers, was happily discarded. Cavalry and artillery began,
moreover, to arrive in camp, and we seemed at length to be consolidating
into a field army. The troops were turned out on the Queen’s birthday,
and again on the 31st of May, for the inspection of the Sultan; and, as
usual, they presented a splendid appearance, both in physique and
discipline; moreover, they also began to look like an organized force.
Still there was no transport, and the medical service left much to be
desired. With no efficiency in these departments, how was war to be
conducted? And as the deficiency was absolute, did our Government really
mean that we should take the field? At last a makeshift was proposed,
which is best described in Colonel Wilson’s words:—
“The utter insufficiency of means of land-transport greatly perplexed
the authorities, and, judging from the ever-varying complexion of the
memoranda, orders, and notifications on the subject, which issued
continually from the bureaux of Selimnieh, it was unlikely a
satisfactory solution of the problem would be promptly reached. At one
moment, we were assured that the commissariat (hapless institution!
doomed from the very beginning to be the scape-goat of every
administrative failure or shortcoming) would provide for the
conveyance of tents, sick, baggage, and the like; an hour afterwards,
it was noised abroad that that department declined to engage in such
duties, that the poor Treasury camel, starved and cuffed about as it
was, had quite enough to do to provide the troops with daily bread,
without undertaking any fresh burdens. Then did a public-spirited man
in authority, hit upon the policy of making the Captains responsible
for the carriage of the _impedimenta_ of their respective companies;
naturally enough, this scheme was unfavourably received by those so
seriously menaced in that delicate point—the pocket. The intended
victims remonstrated, inquiring whence the purchase-money of so many
horses and mules was to be derived? how losses were to be indemnified?
meekly adding, that the project was unprecedented in military finance.
These objections silenced the prescriber of the nostrum. The alarmed
centurions heard no further about the matter.”[197]
-----
Footnote 197:
_Our Veterans, etc._, p. 23.
-----
After this, orders were issued to all Officers to provide themselves
with bât-horses.[198] Twenty-one were allotted to each battalion, of
which two belonged to every company for the transport of tents (_General
Order_ , June 1, 1854). Baggage parades frequently took place, to
instruct the men how to pack the loads, and to accustom the animals to
carry them.
-----
Footnote 198:
_Battalion Order_, May 25, 1854: “Officers are to provide themselves
with animals for the conveyance of their baggage without delay.”
-----
During the stay at Scutari, the question arose as to what further should
be done, and, to resolve it, the British and French Commanders-in-chief
proceeded to visit Omar Pasha in Bulgaria. The latter naturally desired
to have the Allies at his back, and he urged that they should occupy
Varna. This was agreed to, and the armies of England and France were at
last to be transferred to the seat of war. On the 29th of May, Sir G.
Brown’s division began to move, and a fortnight later (June 13th), the
Guards and Highland Brigades, forming the First Division, steamed up the
Bosphorus for their new destination. The Coldstream were conveyed there
in the steam-transport _Andes_. The men started in light order; a
reduced kit was carried in the knapsacks, the great coats, smock frocks,
and blankets rolled on the top, but the rest of the clothing and
necessaries were packed in the squad bags and left behind.[199]
-----
Footnote 199:
_General Order_, May 25th. “There will be no store of any kind at
Varna. Everything not intended for the field must be left here in
store” (_Battalion Order_, 26th).
-----
It may strike the modern reader as strange, that a proportion of women
were allowed to accompany their husbands belonging to the force destined
for the East. In Scutari they were lodged in huts in the camp, and
though inadequately provided for, badly housed, and subject to
inconveniences which could not be permitted in the present day, their
existence still was tolerable. But seeing how incomplete were the
transport arrangements, our astonishment must be extreme, when we learn
that the British army, about to take the field in a quarter where no
depôt or base of operations existed, was to be accompanied by these
women, whose presence under such circumstances, could not fail to be a
misery to themselves, as well as a serious burden to our defective
military organization. Yet this was done, and we find two tents per
battalion, making a total of ninety-six, allotted for their
accommodation. In the subsequent operations these unfortunate women, as
might have been easily anticipated, suffered considerably. They remained
in camp until the embarkation for the Crimea took place. A few were even
allowed to sail with the army to that coast, and during the passage the
wife of a sergeant of the Coldstream gave birth to a daughter, who was
appropriately christened “Euxina.” Fortunately they did not all
land.[200] They were sent back to Scutari, where the main depôt and
primary base of operations of the army in the East was formed, of which
a Brevet Major of the 30th Regiment was appointed Commandant.[201]
-----
Footnote 200:
At least some of the men’s wives (none belonging to the Brigade, as
far as can be ascertained) accompanied their husbands into the Crimea,
and remained there, during the course of the campaign. When we come to
the winter of 1854-55 (Chapter X.), it will be seen what hardships
they had to suffer. In mid-winter a letter, dated December 31st, was
published in Orders, stating that some women’s clothing had arrived,
and would be issued upon the production of a certificate that the
women applying were fit persons to receive it.
Footnote 201:
_General Order_, June 8, 1854. Subsequently a smaller depôt was also
formed at Varna, under command of a Captain of the 50th Regiment
(_General Order_ , June 30, 1854).
-----
Arriving at Varna (June 14th), the 1st Coldstream landed late in the
evening, and had to pitch their camp in the dark. The site was
unfortunately selected, both for the Brigade and for the rest of the
British army, being situated on a slimy flat, close to a large lake of
stagnant water, three-quarters of a mile from the town. Before a week
elapsed, the intense heat, bad water, indifferent and insufficient food,
and the monotony of inaction began to tell upon the men; they were
afflicted with diarrhœa and other ailments, so that the health of the
troops, hitherto entirely satisfactory, rapidly deteriorated. The
French, on the other hand, had taken greater care of themselves; they
occupied higher ground, and they suffered less. During the stay
there—about a fortnight, for, on the 1st of July, an advance was made to
Aladyn, some ten miles in the interior—the masses of the allied soldiery
met each other for the first time, and the warmest good-fellowship
existed between them. The French Chiefs, Marshal St. Arnaud and General
Canrobert, often rode through our camps, and the men invariably turned
out and cheered them with the utmost heartiness and good will—a welcome
which was always much appreciated. In spite of the sickness that
oppressed our troops, the Officers amused themselves, as they are always
sure to do, in various ways, not least of which was a hunt, extemporized
(but without hounds), after the wild mongrel dogs that were driven out
of the town, and infested the district. In the month of June, the armies
continued their concentration in Bulgaria; and by the 21st the bulk had
arrived there, when, in addition to the detachments of Turkish and
Egyptian troops that were stationed in the neighbourhood, they mustered
some 60,000 men.[202]
-----
Footnote 202:
Nolan, _History of the Russian War_, i. 201.
-----
Meanwhile the forces under Omar Pasha were seriously engaged with the
enemy, and a few words will be necessary to explain briefly the military
events that took place. After the victory at Citate, there was a pause
in the operations till the middle of February, owing to the severity of
the winter and to the temporary illness of the Turkish Commander. The
Russians made strenuous efforts to repair their failures and their
losses sustained in 1853, and they poured large reinforcements into the
Principalities. In March, the Ottoman troops gained several successes.
On the 4th, they crossed to the northern bank of the Danube and made a
raid on Kalarashi; they repulsed an attack at Kalafat on the 11th, and
on the 15th they prevented a passage at Turtukai, while a like attempt
upon Rustchuk was also defeated. But the enemy, under General Luders,
succeeded about the same time in crossing the river lower down, near its
mouth, at Galatz, and invaded the Dobrudsha—an unhealthy district, full
of swamps, and badly suited to military operations. Overjoyed with this
advantage, Gortchakoff now reinforced Luders. After a series of
well-contested engagements, at the price of great losses, the principal
fortresses of the province, as far as Trajan’s wall (which extends from
Rassova to Kustendji, on the Black Sea), were reduced; while Omar left
them to their fate, and took no steps to retrieve the fortunes of the
campaign in this quarter. These reverses, however, were partially
compensated by another victory near Kalafat, and, as the Russians
retired before the Turks in this direction, Krajova was occupied by the
latter. This retreat was in reality a change of plan, for the enemy
moved a portion of his forces to the east, and pressed on the right of
Omar’s line, with the design of establishing himself between Varna and
Silistria.[203] His design was now to lay siege to the latter place,
which interposed, and which he had to take, if he meant to try and
establish a footing in Eastern Bulgaria.
-----
Footnote 203:
Nolan, _History of the Russian War_, i. 127, etc.
-----
The protracted siege of Silistria has become famous in the annals of the
war, indeed in the history of military achievements. Space does not
allow a proper description of the gallant and desperate resistance,
which was then made by the Turks against overwhelming odds; but the
principal points connected therewith may be glanced at in this work, if
only because the British Officer, Major Butler, to whom, with Major
Nasmyth, great glory is due for the defence, was transferred to the
Coldstream Guards, as a reward for his brilliant services, though he
never belonged to the Regiment, for his death occurred before he was
actually gazetted.[204]
-----
Footnote 204:
Captain J. A. Butler, from half-pay, Ceylon Rifles, was gazetted
Lieutenant and Captain Coldstream Guards, July 15, 1854; he was
promoted Brevet-Major; and, on the 28th following, Lieutenant Ramsden
was appointed Lieutenant and Captain, _vice_ Brevet-Major Butler,
“died of his wounds.” His death took place on June 22nd, but his
appointment was never cancelled.
-----
Silistria was attacked on the 14th of April, but it was three weeks
later before a partial investment of the place was effected. The
Russians were determined to take the place at any cost, and they made
desperate efforts to accomplish their object; they brought up all their
available forces, and placed their most renowned and capable Officers in
command. During the siege, the war seemed almost everywhere else to
stand still in Eastern Bulgaria, and all eyes were fixed on the
memorable drama, that was being enacted in this part of the theatre of
operations. The garrison was weak, and the indifferent works were only
hastily repaired and strengthened; but the defenders were well led,
while the matchless bravery and the military virtues of the Turk were
fully displayed. Among the leaders, Mussa Pasha, the Commander, stood
pre-eminent for intrepidity and firmness. He was admirably supported by
the two British Officers, Captain Butler and Lieutenant Nasmyth, whose
scientific knowledge, ardent valour, and cool judgment made their
services of the utmost value, and gained for them undying renown. The
enemy having drawn his lines as close as possible to the fortifications,
resorted to every art to carry them. His principal efforts were directed
towards an open work, called Arab Tabia, whose fall would have
disconcerted the whole defence. Time after time, during the month of
May, the besiegers bombarded the stronghold, sapped up to it, tried to
mine it, and assaulted it both by day and by night. All to no purpose;
every attempt was repulsed with slaughter and disgrace. The Turks held
fast to their entrenchments, repaired them, met the enemy underground by
countermines, and made continual sorties, which they always pressed
home. Nowhere was a lodgment made; the troops of the Tsar gained no
single advantage, but were harassed and beaten. During this time Omar
Pasha was at Shumla, only some fifty miles distant, at the head of a
formidable corps. Contrary to his well-known character and to his
previous conduct in the war, he unaccountably remained inactive, and his
subordinates near him followed his example. But in the beginning of
June, he broke loose from the fetters that seemed to numb his faculties,
and once more began to display something of his wonted energy. He
ordered attacks to be made on various points of the Danube, which were
successful; and he pushed a brigade to Silistria, which entered it and
reinforced it. The Russians were now thoroughly disheartened, and, under
cover of a final assault, they raised the siege on the 23rd of June, and
fled in disorder from the scene of their disaster. In the siege alone
they lost as many as 12,000 men, and all their principal leaders were
severely wounded. Of the Turks, 4000 to 5000 men fell, but among them
were counted the brave Mussa and the heroic Butler, who succumbed to his
wounds on the 22nd, the day before victory crowned his noble deeds.[205]
-----
Footnote 205:
Nolan, _History of the Russian War_, i. 214, etc.; Alexander W.
Kinglake, _The Invasion of the Crimea_, ii. 48, etc.
-----
Nor was this the only success gained by the Ottoman troops. During May,
the Turkish army based on Western Bulgaria, and operating from Kalafat,
was not idle, and defeated the enemy in several engagements, pushing him
back towards the east. By the end of the month, this advance began to
have some effect on the fortunes of the siege, and to be inconvenient to
the communications of the Russians. When, therefore, the latter gave up
all hope of taking Silistria, and left it in despair, they also soon
after evacuated all the strong places they had taken in the Dobrudsha,
and, re-crossing the river, they abandoned that province. This event was
followed by an attack on Giurgevo, opposite Rustchuk, where the Russians
still endeavoured to maintain a position; but the Turks drove them out,
and forced them to fall back towards Bucharest, in the middle of July.
Shortly afterwards, the enemy made a disorderly retreat towards the
Pruth, pursued by the victorious Turks, who entered the Roumanian
capital in triumph on August 8th.
“The retreat of Gortchakoff was neither dignified nor skilful; his
whining appeals to the inhabitants for mercy, and his haste to get his
troops beyond the reach of their enemies, contrasted ludicrously with
the braggart bulletins and proclamations which were so profusely
scattered, when there was no armed foe to dispute the seizure of the
'material guarantee.'”[206]
-----
Footnote 206:
Nolan, i. 236.
-----
N^o. 2.
[Illustration:
BLACK SEA
AND SURROUNDING COUNTRY
A.D. Innes & C^o London.
]
About this time another element was introduced into the tangled web of
Eastern affairs, which had great influence over the course of events,
and over the future conduct of the Anglo-French Allies. Austria now
intervened; and her action at this juncture led to important results.
This action must be taken briefly into consideration before we can
understand the causes that led to the invasion of the Crimea. The
geographical position of this Empire necessarily exercises a deciding
control over the communications of an army entering the Ottoman
territory from the north. Austria, in short, commands the lid of the
Turkish box; she can open it, and she can shut it, and prevent the hand
of Russia from trying to snatch the prize—Constantinople—which lies at
the bottom. In 1853, she held the lid wide open; but in 1854 another
course was adopted, more pleasing to the Allies, though not less
gratifying to the Tsar. It would not have suited the Government of
Vienna to run directly counter to the two maritime Powers of Europe, and
to declare themselves openly on the side of Russia; a diversion in Italy
might have been serious to their prosperity. So the plain policy of
opening the lid could no longer be maintained with safety. They
therefore concentrated a force of observation on the south-eastern
frontier early in spring, and, having prudently made an offensive and
defensive treaty with Prussia, whom they did not trust, they calmly
awaited events; and nothing was done till the summer. Austria then
prepared for future contingencies, by inducing the Porte to sign a
convention (June 14, 1854), by which she undertook to make Russia
evacuate the Principalities, and to occupy them herself while
hostilities lasted. Still she avoided any dispute with the Emperor
Nicholas; she remained inactive, until the fortunes of the war should
decide which of the belligerents was going to win in the field. On the
20th of August, however, when victory had declared itself entirely on
the side of the Ottoman armies, then, and then only, her forces entered
the Principalities, under the agreement that had been already signed,
and thereby she rendered several important services to the Russians. She
protected their retreat, saved them from disaster, and enabled them to
proceed undisturbed into the Crimea, by preventing the Turks from
pressing upon them, during their unfortunate march to the Pruth. She
became a barrier in the way of the Allies should they deem it necessary
to invade Bessarabia, and take a “material guarantee” for the repression
of future encroachments in Turkey. And, lastly, she upheld the false
prestige of the Tsar’s omnipotence, by making it appear that the
Russians had evacuated the Danubian Principalities, not because they
were forced to do so by the unaided valour of the Turks, but because the
strategic position of the Austrian Empire had obliged them to retire.
Meanwhile, little or nothing had been done by the Allies. Their fleets,
indeed, found no enemy to oppose them. Except, therefore, bombarding
Odessa (April 22nd) to avenge an outrage on a flag of truce, and
destroying batteries erected at the mouth of the Danube, there is
nothing of interest to record. It is to be noted that we neither
utilized, nor assisted the Turks to utilize, this great and important
river—over which our naval superiority gave us considerable power—for
the purpose of the war; but if our Ministry had the intention of
remaining inactive in Bulgaria, the want of all enterprise is easily
understood, and was the natural result of the policy pursued in London.
In the military sphere, a few squadrons, under Lord Cardigan, were sent,
in the end of June, when the fighting was all but over, to reconnoitre
towards the Dobrudsha, and returned about the 10th of July. They
acquired no information that could be of service, but, owing to the
heat, exposure, and insufficiency of food, many of the horses perished
or were disabled, and our small body of cavalry was uselessly weakened.
After their return, a large French force was pushed forward from Varna
as far as Kustendji. There was obviously nothing to be done in this
quarter at this period, so no advantage was or could be gained; but
cholera attacked the expedition, causing enormous loss, and they, too,
were needlessly weakened.[207]
-----
Footnote 207:
On August 8th it was computed that 10,000 lay dead or were stricken
down by sickness (Kinglake, _Crimea_, ii. 133).
-----
We left the Guards Brigade at Aladyn, close to Varna, which they reached
on July 1st. Here a halt was called, and the humdrum of camp life was
resumed. In the morning, the men were drilled, they practised musketry,
made fascines and gabions, or threw up earthworks; in the heat of the
day they lay about and slept; in the evening, the more energetic
endeavoured to obtain some addition to the ordinary scanty and insipid
supper. The peasants were conciliated, and a bazaar was established,
under the auspices of Colonel Gordon Drummond of the Coldstream, which
was fairly successful. It may be also noted that, after some discussion,
the old-fashioned regulations were further relaxed at this time, and,
shaving being dispensed with, beards were at length allowed to be worn
in the field.[208]
-----
Footnote 208:
This change had probably a wider bearing, if we may judge by the
following Regimental Order (London, July 25, 1854): “The moustache
will be taken into wear by the Coldstream, commencing to-morrow
morning.”
-----
The Brigade was inspected by Omar Pasha on the 6th of July, and his
presence inspired the men with genuine admiration. Here at last, was a
General who had really seen the Russians, who had fought against them,
and who had beaten them. The sight of such a leader gladdened our
gallant soldiers not a little; for they were sadly disappointed with
their forced inaction in Bulgaria,—so close to scenes of martial glory.
Now at last they buoyed themselves up with hope; they would move to the
front and take the field in earnest against the enemy. But this, alas!
was not yet to be, and before their warlike ardour was to be satisfied,
many trials were still to be endured.
Next day, the Brevet, dated June 20th, arrived in camp, and made
considerable changes in the Coldstream. By this gazette,
Brigadier-General Bentinck and Colonels Hay and Codrington were promoted
Major-Generals. The first of these Officers continued to command the
Guards Brigade in Turkey; the second, appointed to the Mauritius,
returned home; while General Codrington remained at the seat of war, and
shortly afterwards obtained a brigade there;[209] and before the peace,
he became Commander-in-chief of the British army in the Crimea. Owing to
these changes, Colonel Hon. A. Upton became Lieutenant-Colonel of the
Regiment, while Colonel Hon. G. Upton was posted to the command of the
1st Battalion, and Colonel G. Drummond to the 2nd Battalion. The latter
accordingly, as soon as he was relieved, was ordered to proceed to
England, as also were the following Officers, who were transferred on
promotion to the home Battalion: Lieut.-Colonel Newton, Captains
Halkett, Cowell, and Lieutenant Thellusson. By Brigade Order (London,
June 6th) a draft of 150 men for each Battalion in Turkey, was held in
readiness to proceed to the East on the 1st of July. The Coldstream
detachment, under the command of Colonel Hon. G. Upton and nine other
Officers, including a Medical Officer, embarked in H.M.S. _Vulcan_ on
the 27th, and reached Aladyn on the 20th of July. About the same time,
on the promotion of Captain F. Stephenson, Captain Hon. P. Feilding
temporarily took his place as Brigade Major, and Captain Hon. G. Eliot
became Acting Adjutant of the Battalion.[210]
-----
Footnote 209:
Vacant by the appointment of Major-General R. Airey as
Quartermaster-General on Lord Raglan’s Staff, _vice_ Major-General
Lord de Ros, invalided home.
Footnote 210:
The Officers of the Battalion were posted as follows: Commanding
Officer, Colonel Hon. G. Upton; Acting Adjutant, Captain Hon. G.
Eliot; Quartermaster, A. Falconer; Medical Officers—Battalion Surgeon,
J. Skelton; Assistant Surgeons, F. Wildbore, J. Wyatt, J. Trotter.
Company. Lieutenants. Ensigns.
No. 1. ... Capts. H. Jolliffe. Lts. F. Ramsden.
C. Baring.
No. 2. Colonel Lord F. Paulet. L. D. MacKinnon. Hon. R. Drummond.
Hon. W. Wellesley.
No. 3. Lt.-Col. T. Crombie. H. Armytage. H. Tower.
No. 4. Lt.-Col. Hon. R. Boyle. Capts. W. Dawkins. Lts. Sir J. Dunlop, Bart.
Percy Wyndham.
No. 5. Lt.-Col. C. Cocks. H. Bouverie. P. Crawley.
A. J. Fremantle.
No. 6. Lt.-Col. M. Tierney. C. Strong. H. Cust.
E. A. Disbrowe.
No. 7. Colonel W. Trevelyan. Lord Dunkellin. G. Goodlake.
No. 8. Lt.-Col. Hon. V. Dawson. C. T. Wilson.
Hon. G. Eliot.
-----
The camp at Aladyn was placed near the lake of Devna in a singularly
beautiful spot, “the seventh heaven of the artist;” but it was terribly
unhealthy, and entirely unsuited to a military station.[211] Sickness,
in the shape of typhus, dysentery, and ague, was not long in appearing
among the troops. It assumed increasing and alarming proportions, and it
was found very difficult to restore the strength of those who were once
attacked. During July, about a fifth of the Battalion were admitted into
hospital; the men lost their elasticity, and their spirits drooped. On
the 27th of the month, it was determined to move to a higher situation
near Gevreklek, a village about three miles away. It was hoped that the
change would produce an improvement, and everything was done to
endeavour to stay the disorders that had broken out; but without avail,
and cholera appearing, added its ghastly horrors to the general
distress. In spite of the efforts of the military authorities, and the
devotion of the doctors, the medical department was unable to bear the
strain thus suddenly put upon it, and the sick, placed in small bell
tents, and unprotected from the scorching heat, suffered terribly. The
rest, weakened by disease, awed by the plague that burst upon them, and
doomed to passive inactivity, were depressed and nerveless.
-----
Footnote 211:
This remark does not apply only to this camp, but to every camp
occupied by the British army in Bulgaria at this time. The evils that
befell the Brigade of Guards were reproduced with greater or less
intensity, at each of our military stations in this Turkish province.
-----
“A heavy torpor hung about the camp, voices rarely to be heard, except
when the sergeants warned the duties, or summoned a funeral party to
turn out. The poor men lounged about pallid, gloomy, depressed, and,
worst of signs, their appetites were remarkably affected; not half of
their daily portion of pork or beef could they consume; and yet, with
strange perversity, the authorities chose this moment as the apt time
for superadding an extra half pound of meat to the rations—the
original allowance being overmuch for our feeble digestions, we were
to get still more!”[212]
-----
Footnote 212:
_Our Veterans, etc._, 81.
At length the stricken troops were moved out of the pestilential place
in which they were stationed; a new decision was made, and the British
army was to be taken back to Varna. The Brigade left Gevreklek early on
the 16th of August, and such was the condition to which they were
reduced, that three days were required to accomplish a distance of less
than fifteen miles; the health of the men was so entirely broken down,
that they were unable to carry their packs during the short stages of
five miles each.
“Seldom has there been a more dismal march. The men, very ghosts of
the rosy giants who, but six short months before, had stepped so
cheerily across Waterloo Bridge, now plodded along in gloomy silence.
Not the most tremulous version of a song, not the feeblest effort at a
joke proceeded from the haggard ranks; and, worst sign of all, even
tobacco had fallen to a discount; ... and yet 'twas the flesh alone
that ailed, the spirit was willing as ever; ay, that it was!”[213]
-----
Footnote 213:
_Our Veterans, etc._, p. 91
-----
During the period the Battalion was stationed in Bulgaria, 57 men died
in the camp hospital, 28 of them from cholera and 25 from typhus fever.
The chief mortality occurred among the men lately arrived from England,
who appear to have been very young, with an average age and service of
21¾ and less than 2 years respectively. Many Officers were also affected
by the pestilence, and the Regiment had to mourn the loss of two among
them—Colonel Trevelyan, and Lieut.-Colonel Hon. R. Boyle, M.P. Five
others were invalided.[214]
-----
Footnote 214:
Wyatt, p. 15. Lieut.-Colonels Tierney and Crombie, Lieutenants Wyndham
and Fremantle, and Assistant-Surgeon Wildbore. Lieut.-Colonel Cumming
had been invalided from Scutari in May, and Captain Hon. H. Byng,
Aide-de-camp to General Bentinck, was sent home in July, on account of
ill-health.
-----
Arrived at Varna, the sea breezes, the prospects of at last getting a
glimpse of the enemy, and possibly the new site selected for
encampment—away from the influence of the plague-breeding lake, in the
position which Omar Pasha had originally advised before the British army
left Scutari—produced beneficial effects upon the men. Though they were
still sickly and weak, and cholera lurked among them, their health
improved, and their spirits revived.[215] On the 29th of August, the
Brigade embarked for the much talked of invasion of the Crimea, but the
start was not made till some days later. The Coldstream, 26 Officers and
737 men, were divided into two wings; the left wing and head-quarters on
board the _Tonning_, the right in the _Simoon_ with the Grenadier
Guards. From the latter, to prevent overcrowding, two companies, under
Colonel Lord F. Paulet, were subsequently trans-shipped to the
_Vengeance_, and, on the 4th of September, to H.M.S. _Bellerophon_. The
sick of the Battalion, 89 in number, and 30 convalescents, were left
behind in the camp hospital, in charge of Assistant-Surgeon Trotter;
shortly afterwards they were sent to Scutari with the same Medical
Officer, who rejoined the Battalion on the 9th of November. A Brigade
detachment, moreover, consisting of three Officers (under a Captain and
Lieutenant-Colonel), four sergeants, and 100 rank and file, selected
from convalescents and those unfit for active service, were left behind
at Varna; of these the Coldstream furnished a sergeant and 33 rank and
file, under Captain MacKinnon, who rejoined the Battalion in the Crimea,
on the 4th of October.
-----
Footnote 215:
“At last the order to embark for the Crimea arrives. We are wild with
delight at the prospect of being shot at instead of dying of cholera!”
(Colonel Tower, late Coldstream Guards, _Diary_, Aug. 28, 1854).
-----
The fleet weighed anchor on the 7th of September, and, getting into
communication with our French and Turkish allies, the united armada
started on its errand to the Crimea. The events that now took place will
be described in the next and subsequent chapters, but, before concluding
this one, it will be necessary to give some idea of the forces and
organization of the Allied hosts that sailed on this memorable occasion
to invade the Empire of the Tsar of All the Russias.
The British army, under the command of General Lord Raglan, consisted of
five infantry divisions and of one cavalry division, each of two
brigades. The First Division, under Lieut.-General H.R.H. the Duke of
Cambridge, consisted of the Guards (3rd Grenadiers, 1st Coldstream, and
1st Scots Fusilier Guards, Major-General Bentinck), and the Highland
brigades (the 42nd, 79th, and 93rd Regiments, Major-General Sir Colin
Campbell), and of two field batteries of artillery. The Second Division,
under Lieut.-General Sir de Lacy Evans, consisted of Major-General
Pennefather’s (30th, 55th, and 95th Regiments), and Brigadier-General
Adams' brigades (41st, 47th, and 49th), and of two field batteries. The
Third Division, under Lieut.-General Sir R. England, consisted of the
brigades of Brigadier-Generals Sir J. Campbell, Bart. (1st, 38th, and
50th), and Eyre (4th, 28th, and 44th), and of two field batteries. The
Fourth Division, under Lieut.-General Hon. Sir G. Cathcart, was still
incomplete, as two battalions had not yet arrived; the remainder was
formed of the 20th, 21st, 63rd, 68th Regiments and the 1st Battalion
Rifle Brigade, together with one field battery; the brigades being
commanded by Major-Generals Arthur Torrens and Goldie. The Fifth or
Light Division, commanded by Lieut.-General Sir G. Brown, was formed of
the brigades of Major-General Codrington (7th, 23rd, and 33rd), and of
Major-General Buller (19th, 77th, and 88th), also of the 2nd Battalion
Rifle Brigade, and of one troop horse artillery, and one field battery.
The Cavalry Division, under Lieut.-General Earl of Lucan, was formed of
the Light (4th and 13th Light Dragoons, the 8th and 11th Hussars, and
the 17th Lancers, Major-General Earl of Cardigan), and of the Heavy
brigades (4th and 5th Dragoon Guards, and 1st Royal Dragoons, the Scots
Greys, and 6th Inniskilling Dragoons, Major-General Hon. J. Scarlett),
also of one troop of horse artillery. General Scarlett’s brigade left
Varna later than the rest of the army, and reached the Crimea in
October. A siege train had also been provided; but it was temporarily
left behind. Each division was about 5000 men strong, and the English
army numbered altogether some 26,000 infantry, nearly 2000 cavalry, and
60 guns.[216]
-----
Footnote 216:
General Sir Edward Hamley, K.C.B., _The War in the Crimea_ , pp. 31,
112 (London, 1892).
-----
The French, under the command of Marshal St. Arnaud, were formed into
four infantry divisions, each about 7000 strong, commanded by:—Generals
Canrobert 1st Division; Bosquet, 2nd; Prince Napoleon, 3rd; and Forey,
4th Division. At first they brought no cavalry with them to the Crimea,
but they had 68 guns. They were also accompanied by some 7000 Turks,
who, commanded by Suleiman Pasha, were attached to the French Marshal’s
army.
CHAPTER VII.
THE INVASION OF THE CRIMEA.
Small results gained by the Allies—Sudden determination to
attack Sevastopol—Russian position in the Trans-Caucasian
provinces—Conditions under which the Crimea was invaded—The allied
Armada sails from Varna to Eupatoria—Landing effected at “Old
Fort”—The move to Sevastopol; the order of march—The enemy on the
Alma river, opposes the advance of the Allies—Description of the
field of battle; strength and position of the enemy—Commencement of
the battle of the Alma—Advance of the Light and the Second
Divisions—Deployment of the First Division—Advance of the Guards and
Highland Brigades—Defeat of the Russians—No pursuit—Losses—Bravery
and steadiness of the British troops—The Allies lose valuable time
after the battle—Arriving at last before their objective,
Sevastopol, they refuse to attack it—General description of
Sevastopol.
Hitherto the Anglo-French Allies had done nothing in the great struggle,
which had been raging between Russia and Turkey since the autumn of
1853, though they had been officially at war with the former for more
than five months, and were preparing for the strife before hostilities
had been declared. There was much cause for disappointment at this
inglorious result; and it was humiliating to the gallant armies of the
two foremost nations of Europe, to be sent to the East, merely to eat
out their hearts in inactivity, when feats of valour against the enemy
were performed almost within earshot of their camps. Nor was the excuse
put forward for this apathy—the want of transport—of any value; for
every member of the Government knew that transport is indispensable to
an army’s motion, and that without it no campaign is possible. That it
could have been obtained is not to be denied; and the conclusion is
irresistible, that the intention of taking the field in earnest, did not
enter into the calculations of our Cabinet. But now, when the enemy,
driven out of the Principalities, effected his escape under the friendly
cover of an Austrian force, when the Tsar, moreover, in no mood to sue
for peace, still breathed defiance, our Government were placed in a
difficulty. They had undertaken to make Russia submit; but their
diplomacy was unsuccessful, and their demonstrations were disregarded;
added to these failures, valuable time had slipped away, and the season
was wasted. Something, then, had to be done at once to retrieve the
past, for the country was losing its patience, and would brook no
further vacillation. Hence a change in policy became inevitable.
The Government had been cautious, not to say timid; but they now
entirely altered their demeanour. They suddenly became bold to the verge
of rashness, and resolved at any price to take Sevastopol by a _coup de
main_. It is true they were in complete ignorance of the strength,
defences, armament, and capacity of that fortress; they knew little of
its position, and nothing of the peninsula in which it is situated; and,
while the transport of the army was more than defective, the
commissariat and medical services were not in a much better condition.
But these things seem to have pressed them lightly. Their opinion was
strong, that Sevastopol was sure to fall, directly the Allied forces
appeared before its ramparts; and its destruction, they doubted not,
would bring about a peace, and cause the Tsar to relinquish his arrogant
pretensions. As soon, therefore, as the raising of the siege of
Silistria put an end to the war on Ottoman territory, they hastened to
frame a despatch to Lord Raglan, dated June 29th, directing that an
expedition against Sevastopol should be prepared. The despatch was so
worded, that it left the British Commander little option but to comply.
He therefore accepted the arduous undertaking which was pressed upon
him, though he did so very much against his better judgment, and he
announced his intention to the Government in a letter, dated July
19th.[217] It was early in September, as we have seen, before the armada
was ready to sail from Varna.
-----
Footnote 217:
Kinglake, ii. 115, etc. It is not without interest to observe, that
the draft of the despatch of June 29th, was submitted to the Cabinet
the day before, and that it passed without modification or even
comment. Mr. Kinglake tells us that the Ministers, upon whom devolved
the momentous duty of directing the course of military operations at
this critical time, “were overcome with sleep; ... the despatch,
though it bristled with sentences tending to provoke objection,
received from the Cabinet the kind of approval which is often awarded
to an unobjectionable sermon” (_Ibid._, 94).
-----
There can be no doubt, that it was anomalous and very inconvenient to
send out a military expedition to check Russian aggression with no
rational plan of action. In the beginning of the year, the terror which
the supposed omnipotence of the Emperor Nicholas inspired, made us
believe that all our efforts would be required to save Turkey from
certain and swift destruction. We even imagined that Constantinople was
in imminent danger; and the French rushed to Gallipoli, to take up a
flanking position against the hostile columns, which were almost
immediately expected to assault that city. This was our only plan, and
we trusted to events to develop another for us, should it be required.
When, therefore, we found that the result of the war on the Danube had
overturned all our preconceived ideas, we were unprepared for such an
event; and we drifted towards the first plausible scheme put forward,
irrespective of ways and means. Hence, the descent on Sevastopol was in
the nature of an afterthought: a crude design, hastily proposed and
rashly adopted, without reflection or calculation, and concerted without
reference to the Commanders at the seat of war, who, nevertheless, were
forced to accept it, and were held responsible for its execution.
After the collapse of the campaign in the Principalities, the urgent
question naturally arose—where was Russia to be attacked, and how was
she to be coerced by the Western Powers? There were vitally delicate
joints in the armour of that Empire, not inaccessible to our resources,
in Poland and in Finland. But the resuscitation of the oppressed
northern nationalities formed no part of our policy; they were held to
be beyond the scope of our aspirations. So we confined ourselves to a
few inconclusive descents on the coast of the Baltic, and the enemy had
no serious cause of disquietude in this important portion of his
dominions. Our intervention, therefore, in these quarters need not
further be discussed.[218] The army being in the Levant, principal
operations were to be conducted there.[219] The Crimea, no doubt,
occupies an important position in the Black Sea, and its conquest would
necessarily cramp the future plans of Russian aggrandisement. But who
was to hold it, if it were taken? Sevastopol, also, situated in the
peninsula, is a land-locked harbour, and a base of naval operations,
defended from the sea, and, in 1854, it was partially protected, on the
land fronts, by some indifferent works. If there were a good prospect of
rapidly capturing it, the design to do so had much to recommend it. Such
an event would injure the prestige of Russia, on which she greatly
relies for acquiring power; it would temporarily put an end to a secure
harbour suitable to maintain her fleet in the Black Sea, and it would be
one step towards the conquest of the Crimean Peninsula. But was the
chance—the slender chance—of prompt success worth the risk? Why enchain
our whole forces before the walls of a single and isolated fortress, if
the _coup de main_ were to miscarry, and a lengthened siege became
necessary? Was not the Euxine in our sole possession, and, as long as
this remained so, was not Sevastopol outside the sphere of military
operations, and entirely innocuous?
-----
Footnote 218:
The overwhelming catastrophe that overtook Napoleon I. in 1812, when,
in spite of his military genius, he lost his whole army of 500,000 and
his great power in Europe, calmed the impetuosity of those who might
have hoped to invade Russia, as if she were an ordinary European
nation. Yet the object-lesson could have been, and it is feared was,
pushed too far. Napoleon’s disaster was due to his own perversity and
to his military pride; for had he been content to re-organize and
emancipate Poland, and avoid the snow-covered and barren steppes of
the interior, his success, in destroying the sources of the power of
Russia, could not have failed to be complete, and the tide of her
encroachments must have rolled back for generations.
Footnote 219:
See Map No. 2, p. 149.
-----
Austria had been allowed to close the western theatre of operations
against the belligerent Powers. But it never seemed to have occurred to
them to cast a thought on that other theatre of war, which still lay
open to their attack in Asia. During 1854, the Turks were in disorder
there; acrimonious quarrels broke out among the leaders of their forces,
and, though the Russians made no great progress, the fortunes of the war
were deciding against our allies, to the detriment of the cause we had
undertaken to defend. In this quarter, moreover, we had every prospect
of success; we should have exposed ourselves to the least risk, and, if
victory crowned our efforts there, we should have secured the most
brilliant results. This field of operations, not distant from the
Crimea, offered ample scope for our energies, and, as we approached it
in 1855, though we did not avail ourselves of its advantages, a brief
allusion to it must here be made.
The Caspian Sea is connected with the Euxine by a chain of lofty
mountains (the Caucasus), which runs from Baku, on the former, to near
Poti, on the latter, and then, taking a north-westerly direction, skirts
the shore as far as Anapa, close to the straits of Yeni-kale. The
Caucasus forms the natural southern limit of Russia, but, in the course
of years, by the incomparable ability and, perhaps, by the unscrupulous
character of the policy pursued at St. Petersburg, the frontiers of the
Empire have been pushed south of these mountains, pressing upon Persia
on the Araxes, and on the Ottoman Empire in Armenia. Now, communications
with these Trans-Caucasian provinces (Mingrelia, Georgia, etc.) were
insecure in 1854; for, inhabiting the northern slopes of the great range
were vigorous, unsubdued races of hardy mountaineers, called by the
general name Circassians, who for years had preserved their liberties
and independence, in spite of the efforts of the Tsar to enthrall them.
This eastern Switzerland had some claim upon our sympathy, if not
because of the cause of freedom for which the people struggled, at least
on account of the peculiar position they occupied on the Russian line of
communications. Nor should it be forgotten that the subjugation of these
mountaineers affected, in no slight degree, the tranquillity and the
future security of India; for, until they were overcome, the systematic
advance of Russia into Central Asia was not easily accomplished.
Operations to support the Circassians and the kindred tribes in the
Caucasus, had the advantage, then, of directly protecting, in the far
East, those interests, to secure which, we had embarked in the war; and,
if they had been successful, as they could not fail to be successful,
even by the employment of a moderate force, the enemy must have lost
Trans-Caucasia. The Russian Empire, considered to be safe from attack,
was very vulnerable in this quarter, at a time when the mountain region
was still unsubdued; and a blow struck there, making the Allies masters
of the situation, would necessarily have enabled them to settle the
Eastern Question as they thought best for the welfare of Europe. But the
influence which was exercised over the Tsar’s aggressions in Turkey, by
the brave races, who for so long held the passes against tremendous odds
in defence of their homes, was scarcely recognized and hardly noticed in
the West in 1854.[220]
-----
Footnote 220:
Major-General Sir Henry Rawlinson, K.C.B., _England and Russia in the
East_, p. 272 (2nd. edit.; London, 1875). The writer doubts if the
fall of Circassia has ever been properly understood. He alludes to the
great efforts made by Russia immediately after the Crimean war to
subdue these tribes; she practically accomplished this difficult task
in 1859, when Shámil was taken prisoner. A year or two later, the
extinction of the Circassian nationality was achieved. This “was the
turning-point of Russian Empire in the East.” The regular and
successful advance in Central Asia took place after this event,
beginning in 1863. Since then, but only since then, this advance has
been rapid, and has proceeded without a check, until, in spite of
“neutral zones” and “buffers,” the present commanding position has
been gained in Asia, almost within sight of our Indian frontiers.
-----
We have already seen that, owing to the benevolence displayed by Austria
to the Russians, the latter were enabled to retire from the Danube into
Bessarabia unmolested by the pursuing Turks. This act on the part of a
Power regarded as a friend by Great Britain, cost us dear shortly after
this time. Its immediate consequences were, however, not unnoticed, and
it was plain both to the allied Governments and to the Commanders, that
the enemy would push his forces into the Crimea, without delay, if he
got an inkling that an attempt on Sevastopol were imminent.
Unfortunately the enemy got more than a hint as to our intentions. In
order to prepare for the success of a _coup de main_ on a position, it
is evident that one essential condition to be observed is secrecy; nor
is it immaterial to mislead the enemy by false attacks, alarms, and
reports. But exactly the reverse took place. No demonstrations were
made, and we blazoned our design to the whole world; the English press
spoke of it freely and openly, since the end of June; and Marshal St.
Arnaud had the imprudence to issue a vainglorious proclamation to his
army, on the 25th of August, which ended with the following inflated
words: “Bientôt nous saluerons ensemble les trois drapeaux réunis
flottant sur les remparts de Sévastopol de notre cri national, Vive
l'Empereur!”
A plan, previously concerted with the Officers who were to carry it out,
upon so difficult a subject as the operation in hand, could not have
been matured and adopted, unless the means of isolating the Crimea from
the rest of Russia, had also been considered. There are two principal
lines by which the peninsula is fed from the main land. The isthmus of
Perekop and the Sea of Azof. The former, unconnected with the great
river system of the Empire, was of service mainly to bring portions of
the army of Bessarabia to the neighbourhood of Sevastopol. The latter,
however, receiving the waters of the Don, served to take down
reinforcements and supplies from the interior to the new seat of war.
The despatch of the 29th of June already alluded to, contains a passage
on this matter: “As all communications by sea are now in the hands of
the Allied Powers, it becomes of importance to endeavour to cut off all
communication by land, between the Crimea and the other parts of the
Russian dominions.” It would have been fortunate if, in accordance with
these instructions, we could have seized the narrow isthmus of Perekop,
but we did not do so, and it remained open to the enemy. On the other
hand, a small body of troops could have gained a footing near Kertch,
and have maintained itself there; for, the Allied naval resources were
more than ample to support it, to occupy and dominate the Sea of Azof,
and to cut the Crimea off completely from the supplies sent down the
river Don, from the large depôts and magazines established in its
vicinity. Such an expedition, moreover, would have served to blind the
enemy as to the intentions of the invaders with regard to Sevastopol,
and have made him uncertain whether the ultimate aim was not to operate
in the neighbourhood of the Caucasus. Having much to lose in this
quarter, he was all the more sensitive to pressure there, and greater
deception could thus have been practised on his fears.
That these expeditions did not take place at that time, is probably to
be ascribed to the belief of the Commanders that the whole force was
little enough, in order successfully to carry Sevastopol by storm. The
orders they received from home did not contemplate a lengthy operation.
Not for an instant did any one suppose, that it could last through the
winter. It was late in the year; barely six weeks, or at least two
months, of good weather could be expected to continue. It was known that
the winter in the Black Sea region was intensely severe and cold; there
was no provision made for the army against the terrible hardships which
the snow, frost, and hurricanes of the Crimea must entail. The plan
proposed to the allied Commanders was a short operation, and by them it
was so accepted; it was a descent upon a coast, a march, and an assault.
Fixing their eyes intently upon this plan, the importance of attacks on
the enemy’s communications, dwindled in their estimation, and lost much
of its value. Expeditions of this nature, were fitted rather to a
regular siege, which might be expected to last for many months, and were
scarcely essential to carry out the object which was then in hand, viz.
to bring up every available battalion to the point, where a
ready-prepared and decisive victory was to be gained.
These preliminary observations are necessary to a Regimental history, as
an introduction to the events which are now to be recorded. For if they
were not stated, it would be impossible for the reader to understand the
reasons for the hardships, which our troops had soon to suffer, or to
appreciate the glorious part they played in a calamitous war, where
their fortitude and courage not only saved, but enhanced, the military
greatness of Great Britain, and stood out in bright relief to so much
that was unfortunate and damaging to our reputation as a nation of the
first magnitude in Europe. It may in truth be stated, that to the
British soldiers, and to the Officers who led them, the country owes it
that a national catastrophe did not occur. Their discipline and dogged
resolution never wavered for an instant, and they carried England
unscathed through the ordeal. A history dealing with the actions of a
Regiment engaged on that memorable occasion, would be sadly incomplete,
if it failed to show this truth, or to describe the false positions in
which the vital interests of this country became unhappily involved, and
from which it was extricated solely by the manly bearing, and
unflinching self-sacrifice of the army.
The armada, which left the shores of Bulgaria on the 7th of September,
did not immediately sail to its destination; part of the Allied fleet
had started before that date, but the whole met together on the 8th, and
next day the British portion anchored in deep water some miles east of
the Isle of Serpents. Lord Raglan now left to reconnoitre the coast, and
to select a landing-place. His French colleague was ill, and could not
accompany him. Proceeding from Balaklava to Eupatoria, he finally
selected a stretch of sandy beach, covered by lagoons, at a spot marked
on the maps as “Old Fort,” situated some twelve miles south of the
latter town, and about twenty-five from Sevastopol.[221] Meanwhile, the
Allied flotilla again got into communication, the slower sailing ships
coming up to the _rendez-vous_. On the 12th, the magnificent and orderly
array of the united fleets, occupying nearly nine miles of sea room,
approached the Crimea, and converged on Old Fort; and then our men got a
first welcome glimpse of the strange and unknown country they were about
to invade. Next day, Eupatoria was summoned, and surrendered without a
shot being fired; and on the 14th, exactly the forty-second anniversary
of the triumphant entry of Napoleon I. into Moscow, the Allies began to
land, the Turks on the right, then the French, and the British on the
left.
-----
Footnote 221:
See Map No. 3, p. 165.
-----
The sea voyage braced up the health of the men; they were fast losing
the lassitude and despondency that so lately oppressed them, and were
regaining their usual strength, elasticity, and good spirits.
“Notwithstanding there is no casting loose the foul fiend—cholera,” and
many casualties were reported; but the Coldstream seem to have been
spared by the scourge during the passage, though eight sick were unable
to disembark, and were sent to the _Simoon_. A foretaste of cold weather
was also unexpectedly experienced, for on the 12th, there was a
hail-storm “abundantly accompanied by snow.”[222]
-----
Footnote 222:
_Our Veterans, etc._, p. 102.
-----
Before leaving their ships, the troops had the temporary character of
the expedition brought strongly before their imagination. The
bât-horses, collected with difficulty at Scutari, were left behind in
Bulgaria; there was no transport for regimental baggage, except an
animal to carry the medicine-panniers. Officers loaded their haversacks
and their persons with three days' salt pork, biscuit, and such
indispensable articles, that a short campaign required. Dressed in
tight-fitting swallow-tailed coatees, resplendent with gold lace, now
sadly tarnished, their clothing was scarcely adapted to the harsh trials
of actual warfare; added to which, they were weighted and encumbered,
and had the appearance of “animated lumps of undigested packages, all
cloak, bundle, and hairy cap.” Nor did the men fare any better. It
appears that the only heavy part of the knapsack was its wooden frame,
and this had been discarded some weeks before; when this was done, it
served as a light and fairly good valise in which to carry the necessary
kit safely and secure from rain. At the last moment, however, it was
feared that the men were still too weak to carry even their lightened
packs. But, instead of reducing the articles to be taken therein to a
_minimum_, this _minimum_, in the shape of a pair of boots, a pair of
socks, a shirt, and a forage cap, was ordered to be wrapped in the
blanket and great coat; while the knapsack itself, designed to hold
them, was left behind on board ship, together with all other articles of
private property brought from Varna. Thus an unsightly and most
inconvenient bundle was formed, ill-adapted to its purpose, and a
doubtful place for the safe keeping of the few articles that were
considered indispensable to the soldier’s welfare.[223] Three days'
rations, some cooking utensils, wooden water-kegs, and sixty rounds of
ammunition completed the personal equipment brought into the enemy’s
country.
-----
Footnote 223:
It appears that the two companies of the Coldstream which were on
board H.M.S. _Bellerophon_, under the command of Colonel Lord F.
Paulet, retained their lightened knapsacks (Wyatt, p. 19). The reader
will be interested to learn that the men left Varna dressed in white
trousers; the order to take cloth trousers into wear, is dated Sept.
15th.
-----
N^o. 3.
[Illustration:
COUNTRY BETWEEN
EUPATORIA AND SEVASTOPOL
_Compiled from_ Hamley’s Crimea _by kind permission_.
]
From the 14th to the 18th, the disembarkation of the Allies continued,
observed by Cossack horsemen until driven away, and interrupted only by
the rolling waves, which, tumbling on the beach, made it sometimes
unsafe to land the horses and guns. The Light and First Divisions were
on shore on the 14th; the Guards Brigade, remaining in formation till
the afternoon, marched inland for about three miles, after the Light
Division had started, where they bivouacked for the night. The morning
was fine, but the evening turned very cold, the wind rose, and the rain
came down in torrents, drenching all ranks and conditions, from the
Divisional Commander, H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, to the youngest
drummer. It was an inhospitable welcome that awaited our first night on
the Crimean coast, but the men were in good heart, and made light of
their misfortunes. On the 16th, a few tents were landed, but, for want
of transport, they had to be returned on board the following day,—except
one, which was retained for the sick, and was to be carried between the
medicine-panniers on the hospital bât-horse. The story of the halt near
Old Fort, would not have been complete had there been no “scare” to
record. Was it ever wanting among troops, who for the first time await
the approach of an enemy? Here it took place about midnight on the 16th,
when an alarm was raised of the approach of Cossacks, and the troops
turned out hurriedly; nor was it unlikely that the Russians would
endeavour to attack the Allies, before they were ready to advance from
the coast. Upon this occasion, however, a false report only had gained
credence; there was no enemy in the vicinity, and the occurrence, though
startling for the moment, doubtless, eventually served to steady the
nerves of men who had never yet heard a shot fired in anger. In one way,
things went smoothly enough, at all events in the camp of the Brigade,
who, placed near a friendly Tartar village, bought small sheep at two
shillings each, and fowls for fourpence or fivepence; but the dreaded
cholera still hovered about, and one man of the Battalion died, after a
few hours' sickness, on the 17th.
At last, early on the 19th, all arrangements being completed, the
troops, horses, and guns landed, a small number (250) of country carts
collected, and some cattle, sheep, and other supplies procured from the
neighbourhood, the Allies began their march to Sevastopol, supported by
the fleets that steamed slowly along the coast in the same direction.
They numbered rather less than 60,000 men and 128 guns, and as the
French and Turks had no cavalry with them, the united army had only one
brigade (Lord Cardigan) to rely on. Marshal St. Arnaud marched near the
sea; Bosquet’s division was in front, followed by Prince Napoleon on the
left, by Canrobert on the right, and by Forey in rear; and, lastly, the
Turks and the baggage and reserve ammunition, were in the open space
which was surrounded by these four divisions. The British army moved on
the left of the French, and were thus placed on the exposed flank; the
Second and Light Divisions leading, the former nearest our allies,
followed respectively by the Third and First Divisions, the Fourth
marching after the First. The guns were on the right of their divisions,
the infantry in double column of companies from the centre of
battalions, and the cavalry divided, two regiments on the left flank,
two covering the advance, and one in rear. This formation was adopted,
because, the left of the Allies being undefended, it was not improbable
that the enemy might venture to make an onslaught upon that flank from
Simferopol. The weather was sultry, and the advance lay across a vast
rolling plain, destitute of trees and shrubs, and swept bare of
inhabitants and supplies by the Russian cavalry. After two hours, the
heat affected some of the men, and, the ever-recurring plague of cholera
still dogging their footsteps, victims to its ravages began to fall out.
“And now an astounding fact became patent to all—we had no ambulance!
We had invaded an enemy’s country without means of transporting the
sick and wounded, beyond a few stretchers in the hands of bandsmen and
drum-boys! The sick and wounded of 27,000 British soldiers were to be
carried bodily over burning steppes, where water was not, by drummers
and fifers! These lads being physically unequal to the duty expected
of them, we endeavoured to supply their places with files of the
heavy-weighted soldiery: but of course this hard expedient broke down
too; the work could not be done by human muscle, in fact; hence, tall
fellows, not a few, were left behind, to take their chance of being
picked up—God help them!”[224]
-----
Footnote 224:
_Our Veterans, etc._, p. 122. Kinglake tells us that, in the evening,
a force was sent to bring in the stragglers, who were very numerous
during the march (_Invasion of the Crimea_, ii. 209).
-----
But in the afternoon the attention of the troops was diverted from these
scenes of suffering; shots were heard in the front. The enemy was
expected to take up a position near one of the rivers that flow at right
angles across the Eupatoria post-road, on both sides of which the Allies
were advancing; and here, at length, on the Bulganak, the divisions in
rear thought that they were going to try conclusions with the enemy. In
a very short time, however, the firing proved to be but a skirmish; for,
after the expenditure of a few rounds, the Russians—6000 infantry, 2000
cavalry, and two batteries—moved back, before they had made us deploy
much of our force, and left us in possession of the stream without
further resistance. There we bivouacked for the night, in the full
assurance that a great action would be fought on the following day.
According to an estimate of the enemy’s forces in the Crimea, made by
the Foreign Office at home, it was computed that there were some 45,000
men near and in Sevastopol, excluding troops which might be drawn from
the Caucasus and Bessarabia. Of this estimate Lord Raglan had been
informed, but it seems he placed no great reliance upon it. He knew,
however, that the Russians were relatively strong in cavalry, and that
their army was commanded by Prince Menshikoff.
It was between nine and ten before the Allies moved from their bivouacs
on the morning of the 20th, the British army bringing their left
shoulders up, to get into closer communication with the French. On
reaching the top of a grassy ridge which looks over the valley of the
Alma, the position taken up by the enemy on the heights above that
stream, first came into sight, and immediate preparations were made to
dislodge him. The field of battle is a sloping plain from the north to
the river, which is fordable in summer, from whence springs abruptly on
the south bank, to a height of 300 to 400 feet, a commanding range of
hills overlooking the plain, and running from the sea, for a distance of
five miles, to a bluff called Kurgané Hill.[225] The river makes a
trifling bend, forming a slightly re-entering angle towards these
heights, on the western side of the Kurgané; and here the post-road
crosses the stream, close to the village of Burliuk, by a wooden bridge,
which had not been destroyed. This point marked the junction of the
English right and the French left. On the French section of the field,
the heights press close and cliff-like to the river, but they recede and
become more accessible for a mile to the west of the angle mentioned.
Roads available for guns ascend the hills at the mouth of the Alma, at
the village of Almatamak, at a farm a mile further up, and again close
to Burliuk, where, on the Russian side, the ground is more practicable;
this last road leads to a height known as the Telegraph Hill. On the
English section, the heights are further from the river, and the ascent
is everywhere easy for all arms; but on that very account it was the
more difficult to storm, for here the ground could be swept with fire,
and the defenders had every facility for making counter-attacks. The
tops of the hills form a wide plateau, stretching southwards towards the
Katcha river, indented only near the angle, by a depression between the
Kurgané and Telegraph Hills, through which the post-road rises, as it
proceeds to Sevastopol.[226]
-----
Footnote 225:
See Map No. 4, p. 174.
Footnote 226:
Hamley, _War in the Crimea_, p. 47, etc.
-----
The Russian army, numerically weaker than the Allies, being 33,000
infantry, 3400 cavalry, and 120 guns, occupied the plateau. The main
portion, 21,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry, and 84 guns, was placed on
Kurgané and on the post-road, opposite the English section; the
remainder, 12000 infantry, 400 cavalry, and 36 guns, near the post-road
and on Telegraph Hill, were opposed to the French. The cavalry took post
on the enemy’s right and rear, supported by horse artillery; but no
troops were further to the west, where the ground was under fire from
the war-ships. Menshikoff, however, forgot, though he had time at his
disposal, to block the roads which ascend the cliff and the rough
precipitous hillsides opposite the French position. Nor did he construct
fieldworks on his front and right flank, contenting himself with only
two gun-epaulments on Kurgané, one of which, about 300 yards from the
river, was armed with 14 heavy guns of position.
There was a pause when the Allies approached the position they were
about to assail, during which the troops refreshed themselves with cold
pork and biscuits, after their march on a warm and glorious morning. In
the interval, all eyes were turned to the heights that frowned in front,
and saw in the distance the hostile sharpshooters extended along the
river, in the vineyards and gardens, through which the advance was about
to be made. Nor were we unconscious that the whole of our force was
easily to be discerned, and our intentions to be divined by our
antagonist; for we halted boldly on the sloping plain, in full view of
the enemy, who, perched on the higher ground, was enabled to make his
observations and to conceal much of his own order of battle from our
anxious gaze. Meanwhile, the two Commanders-in-chief were concerting
their plans. They had met before, but this was their final consultation.
St. Arnaud had fixed and strong ideas on the situation; he was voluble
in expressing them, and, though zealous and brave, he was somewhat
shallow and self-opinionated. Lord Raglan’s first care was to insure a
good understanding with his impetuous colleague. He was hampered by the
alliance; and there was no supreme Commander to give a decision at this
moment when unity of action was indispensably necessary. The Chiefs
parted, and came to no definite conclusion; unless a hazy understanding
can be called so, that the French were to try and turn the Russian left,
but that the British could not do the same thing on the other flank
“with such a body of cavalry as the enemy had in the plain.”[227]
-----
Footnote 227:
Kinglake, ii. 239, etc., 250.
-----
At one o’clock Bosquet’s division advanced. One brigade with the
artillery, pushed through Almatamak and up the road there; the
remainder, and the Turks, some 10,000 men, crossed the Alma near its
mouth, and, ascending the pathway that leads thence to the cliff, found
themselves far from the battle-field, and never fired a shot during the
action. Canrobert took his division along the road at the farm, and
debouched on the plateau a mile to the west of Telegraph Hill; but his
own artillery followed that of Bosquet, and were with the latter’s left
brigade, a mile still further to the west. Prince Napoleon’s division
was on Canrobert’s left, and made for Telegraph Hill; while Forey was in
second line, in reserve. As the Turks were 7000 strong and the French
28,000, Marshal St. Arnaud had only 25,000 men and 68 guns in action.
The original formation of the British army had not been altered: the
Second Division was on the right, the Light on the left, both in the
first line, followed by the Third and First in the second line, the
Fourth Division in reserve; four regiments of the cavalry covered the
left, one followed in rear. The whole, 23,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry,
and 60 guns—for part of the Fourth Division were still on the road from
Old Fort—covered by the Rifles, now moved forward straight for the
enemy’s strong position on Kurgané, the right being directed upon
Burliuk. The Russian skirmishers retired, setting fire to that village
as the first line approached; while the latter, coming nearly within
range of the hostile artillery, deployed. But too little ground had been
taken up, and, in spite of every effort to rectify the mistake, the
battalions overlapped, and were dangerously crowded. Lord Raglan, in
pursuance of the arrangement already made with St. Arnaud, now delayed
the attack until the French had time to complete the movement they had
begun; but the Marshal was impatient, and before his troops could
produce any impression on the enemy’s left, he urged his colleague to
wait no longer. In response to this strong request, Lord Raglan ordered
his first line to advance.
The Second Division (Sir De L. Evans) was delayed by the conflagration
raging in Burliuk; but the Light Division (Sir G. Brown), breaking
through the vines and fording the river, gained a footing on the south
bank, disordered by the obstacles they met, by the want of space, and by
the hot fire poured upon them. General Codrington, heading his brigade
and two battalions that joined him—one of Buller’s and one of the Second
Division—led them boldly up the slope under the fire of the battery
behind the epaulment; while the rest of Buller’s brigade covered his
left flank from a threatening movement observed in that direction. On
his right were three of Evans’s battalions; the other two, under Adams,
having crossed the Alma, below the burning village, pushed into the
space to the west of the post-road. The Russians, seriously alarmed at
Codrington’s impetuous onslaught, withdrew their heavy guns from the
epaulment, except two, which they could not get away, and which were
captured. Cheered by this retreat, the British gained the breastwork,
and took possession of it; but they now found themselves face to face
with large masses of the enemy’s infantry and cavalry, supported by
field-guns. The gallant rush in the face of a tremendous fire had come
to an end; it was the moment for supports to arrive; but as they were
not close enough to be available at this critical moment, the attacking
brigade was soon afterwards forced back to the foot of the slope.
Meanwhile, the First Division (Duke of Cambridge) deployed and halted
just beyond effective range, watching with enthusiastic animation and
breathless interest, the movements of their comrades in front of them.
There was more room for them, as they were not overcrowded by the Third
Division (Sir R. England), which took up a position somewhat in rear. On
the right stood the Guards Brigade in their usual order—Grenadiers on
the right, Coldstream on the left, and Scots Fusiliers in the centre;
the Highlanders were formed on the left of the division. While they
waited, spent round shot came bounding through the ranks like cricket
balls. The men, longing to take part in the fray, were in exuberant
spirits; the least trifle amused them, and a little Maltese terrier
called “Toby,” belonging to the Coldstream drummers, drew loud laughter
from the light-hearted soldiery as it gave chase to the Russian round
shot which rolled slowly along the smooth ground.
At length Lieut.-Colonel Steele brought the order to advance, and never
was it obeyed with greater alacrity and spirit, the whole division
moving forward with admirable precision. Approaching the vineyards, the
enemy directed his artillery upon our men; but they quickly pushed their
way through the tangled shrubs, and over a low wall obstructing their
path up to the Alma, which they immediately crossed, and here they found
shelter from the fire of the Russians. As it had been impossible to
reconnoitre the ground, each regiment had to take its chance of finding
a favourable spot, or the reverse, for its passage; and it happened that
the Coldstream reached the river, where it makes a large S-shaped bend,
so that the greater part of the Battalion had to go through the water
three times. Owing to the many obstructions in their way, all three
Battalions were in considerable confusion when they arrived at the foot
of the southern bank, and they at once began to reform their ranks.
Colonel Upton, having halted the Coldstream, called out the markers to
the front, quickly assembled the companies upon them, and then wheeled
the Battalion into line, before making any further advance, in a manner
that would have satisfied the most exacting drill-sergeant on parade in
Hyde Park.[228]
-----
Footnote 228:
See _The Crimea in 1854 and 1894_ (by General Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C.,
G.C.B.), p. 55 (London, 1895).
-----
Meanwhile Codrington’s brigade were still in front, clinging to the
epaulment they had captured, and engaged in a very unequal struggle with
the enemy. Their distress was apparent from the river, and General
Bentinck immediately ordered the Scots Fusilier Guards to hurry to their
relief before there had been sufficient time to reform their line, and
while their ranks were still disordered and their companies mixed up. As
they moved forward, they met General Codrington’s Aide-de-camp, who was
sent to beg them to hasten to the front as quickly as possible, and they
eagerly complied. Just at this moment a series of untoward circumstances
occurred. The backward rush of some of the Light Division struck them
with tremendous force; an order intended for the 23rd Fusiliers, “Retire
Fusiliers!” was heard in the field, and was believed by many of the
Fusilier Guards to apply to them; the enemy was close, and in hot
pursuit, and his artillery was firing furiously upon them. It was a
critical moment, and one that would have been fatal to any but the best
troops; but in spite of the gallantry of the Officers, who, running
forward, endeavoured to rally the men, two or three companies were swept
back by the retreating brigade, and were carried away with them towards
the river, while the remainder halted, opened fire, and held their
ground.[229]
-----
Footnote 229:
The following extract of a letter written by General Codrington, on
September 27th, will be read with interest: “We were borne back, and
when I saw we could not long bear up in these groups (from which I
could not get them), I sent young Campbell [now Lt.-Col. Hon. H.
Campbell, late Coldstream Guards] to the rear to the Battalion of
Guards which I saw, to beg them to hurry their advance, otherwise we
must lose all we had gained.... I saw the line of Guards coming up,
though they were further off than I wished, and than they ought to
have been in such a crisis; it was the Fusiliers in my rear to whom I
sent, and I tried hard to keep our position, though in our irregular
order, till they came; but I could not, the fire was heavy, the men
collected in instinctive heaps and were borne back on the advance of
the left wing of the Fusiliers, carrying, in fact, three or four
companies back with them down the slope to the rocky shelter.... When
the two or three companies of the Fusiliers were borne back with us,
the right wing went on gallantly.” The losses of this Battalion were
very heavy, and amounted to 11 Officers and 170 men during the day.
Among the many acts of bravery performed by Officers and men during
the crisis, Lieutenant R. Lindsay (now Lord Wantage) gained the
Victoria Cross for his intrepid conduct.
-----
As this was going on, the other two Guards Battalions, now completely
reformed and in proper order, advanced steadily forward up the hill.
Coming into alignment with the Scots Fusilier Guards, and perceiving the
hot engagement that was still raging, the left company of the Grenadiers
was wheeled back, and fired across the front, while the Coldstream,
without changing position, opened upon the Russians as soon as they got
the opportunity, and the latter retired. Though there was a gap in the
Brigade which could not be immediately closed, the Guards—
“continued to advance in lines absolutely unbroken, except where
struck by the enemy’s shot; such French Officers on the hills on the
right as, in an interval of inaction, were free to observe what our
troops were doing, spoke of this advance of the Guards as something
new to their minds, and very admirable.”[230]
-----
Footnote 230:
Hamley, _War in the Crimea_, p. 59.
-----
Soon they reached the epaulment, firing as they advanced, the enemy
giving way before them, and as they came up to the crest of the hill the
three companies, previously mentioned, rejoined their Battalion, and the
whole Brigade was again complete.[231] To our left, protecting the left
flank of the British army, were the Highlanders in echelon of battalions
from the right; and this magnificent corps, handled with great ability,
fired into the hostile columns that passed them on their way to the
epaulment (round which the fight centred in this quarter of the field),
and contributed in no small degree, to lighten the task of the
Guards.[232]
-----
Footnote 231:
A point connected with this phase of the battle may be noted. The
British soldier had never been trained to advance firing, and at first
there was some difficulty in preventing him from halting to load,
especially as the repeated cheering of the men drowned to a
considerable extent the orders of the Officers. Many of the latter,
however, springing to the front, showed by their example that the
advance was on no account to be checked, and the line thereafter did
not halt. Sir Colin Campbell drilled the Highland Brigade to advance
firing, the morning after landing at Old Fort, and instructed them to
open out, so that they should not crowd upon each other or interfere
with each other’s movements when loading and firing.
Footnote 232:
Of the Coldstream, it is written that the Battalion was “drawn up in
line with beautiful precision; because of the position of the ground
on which it advanced, it had been much less exposed to fire and
mishaps than either of the other Battalions of the Brigade, and it had
not been pressed forward, as each of the other two Battalions had
been, to meet any special emergency occurring on its front. Therefore
it was that it fell to the lot of the Coldstream to become an almost
prim sample of what our Guards can be in the moment which precedes a
close fight. What the best of battalions is, when, in some Royal Park
at home, it manœuvres before a great princess, that the Coldstream
was now on the banks of the Alma, when it came to show its graces to
the enemy. And it was no ignoble pride which caused the Battalion to
maintain all this ceremonious exactness; for though it be true that
the precision of a line in peace time is only a success in mechanics,
the precision of a line on a hill-side with the enemy close in front,
is the result and the proof of warlike composure” (Kinglake, ii. 426).
-----
Nor had the British artillery been inactive; pressing forward, they took
up positions wherever they were to be found, whence they fired either
upon the enemy’s guns or into the solid masses of his infantry. At the
moment when the Duke’s division appeared upon the slope, three of
Evans’s battalions were engaged near the post-road; two more, under
Adams, were further to the right, moving up the hill; England’s Division
was crossing the river, and the Fourth Division (Sir G. Cathcart) was
still in rear, as a reserve. The first onslaught of the Light Division
had shaken the enemy; and now, when opposed to the steady advance of the
Guards and Highlanders, he did not long maintain the contest. The
Russians were unable to fight in line; they remained throughout the
whole day in dense columns.[233] This faulty formation, adopted to suit
the quality of their troops, gave them greater weight had they been able
to come to close quarters with their antagonist, but it prevented them
from using their muskets, and offered a large target to our fire. On the
other hand, the fire of the two British brigades was fully developed.
Moving as if on parade, the Guards in line kept up a continuous and
well-aimed stream of lead, at short ranges, into the masses in front of
them, while the Highlanders in echelon succeeded in striking the right
flank of the enemy.[234] Unable to bear down on the thin lines that
opposed them, the Russians wavered, and, with a ringing cheer, our men
charged home, and drove them from the field. The English army had
cleared the formidable position held by the enemy on Kurgané, as well as
from that hill to the eastern slopes of the Telegraph, where the French
had now arrived. Menshikoff’s troops fled from the field, and their
retreat was so precipitate that it was not even covered by cavalry or
artillery. For a short time our batteries played upon their ranks; but
Lord Raglan’s request that Marshal St. Arnaud might complete the rout by
sending forward his comparatively fresh troops, was met by a frivolous
excuse, and there was no pursuit.
-----
Footnote 233:
“They had a curious formation of close column, with swarms of
skirmishers on each side; they seemed to run out of the ranks to fire,
and then take refuge in their columns again; they would have been much
safer outside altogether” (Tower, _Diary_).
Footnote 234:
“Scarcely a man had seen a shotted musket fired before, except at a
target, and yet they looked as cool and self-possessed as if 'marking
time' in an English barrack square” (_Our Veterans, etc._ , 133). “We
soon drove the enemy before us up the hill and through the epaulment,
but the guns had been taken out [except the two previously captured],
and a regiment was retreating out of the rear of the work in very
tolerably good order, firing at us, and in no confusion or disorderly
haste. We gave them two or three steady volleys before they were out
of shot; our men fired wonderfully steadily all the time. We fired
sixteen rounds going up the hill” (Tower, _Diary_).
-----
The British losses amounted to 106 Officers, 121 sergeants, and 1775
rank and file, total 2002, of whom were killed 25, 19, and 318
respectively. The French, who played a minor part in the action,
exaggerated their casualties, which really numbered only 60 killed
(including three Officers), and 500 wounded. The Russians put their
losses at nearly 6000, but this was probably less than the truth. The
Coldstream and the Highlanders had been protected to a great extent by
the folds of the ground, and they were fortunately not under the direct
fire of the Russian guns, as the other two Battalions of the Division
had been. The casualties of the Scots Fusiliers have been already given;
those of the Grenadier Guards amounted to 4 Officers and 137 men; the
Highland Brigade (three battalions) lost 90 of all ranks. In the
Coldstream there were two Officers and 27 men wounded,—of the former,
Captain Cust, who succeeded Captain Byng as Aide-de-camp to
Major-General Bentinck, died of his wounds immediately after the action;
the other, Captain C. Baring, had his arm amputated.
N^o. 4.
[Illustration:
BATTLE
OF THE
ALMA
A.D. Innes & C^o. London
]
Military critics are disappointed with this battle, and condemn both
sides for displaying little tactical knowledge or talent. Menshikoff
left almost everything undone, to enable him to make a stand on the
ground he had himself selected for barring the march of the Allies. The
influence of St. Arnaud, who at this time was in bad health, seemed to
damp the usual ardour of the French; and on this occasion they hardly
maintained the high standard of their brilliant military reputation. We
have seen that Lord Raglan and the Marshal had formed no definite plan
of action before the fight began. If they intended to turn the enemy’s
left, and drive him off the road to Sevastopol into the interior, the
English attack was too soon delivered; and if they hoped to push him
towards the sea, they took no measures to effect that object. They
pursued neither of these courses, and a mere frontal attack was
undertaken, which resulted in dislodging the Russians, but which, in the
absence of a vigorous pursuit, involved them in no serious disaster.
Lord Raglan, moreover, having ordered the first line to advance, took up
a position well in front of his own army, within the ground occupied at
that time by the enemy; in this exposed place he watched the course of
the battle, but he ceased to be able to control it. Hence the
co-operation between his divisional commanders, necessary to the attack,
was wanting, and we missed the opportunity of inflicting a greater
defeat upon the enemy than we succeeded in doing. Of the bravery of both
the Officers and men, of the steadiness and discipline under fire of the
rank and file, who for the first time were in action, but one opinion
has ever been expressed.
“All, therefore, that we had to be proud of was the dash and valour of
the regiments engaged. These were very conspicuous, and worthy of the
traditions of the Peninsular days. A French Officer, who was viewing
the field, where our men lay, as they had fallen, in ranks, with one
of our naval Captains, observed to him, 'Well, you took the bull by
the horns—our men could not have done it.'”[235]
-----
Footnote 235:
Hamley, _War in the Crimea_, p. 65.
-----
As has been said, there was no pursuit after the battle, and the enemy
was allowed to leave the field unmolested. This was the more
unfortunate, since the retreat of the Russians degenerated into a rout.
But worse followed, for the morning of the 23rd dawned before we stirred
from the scene of our success, and two of the most valuable days of the
campaign were irretrievably lost to the Allies. The fault was St.
Arnaud’s, whom nothing could shake in his determination to remain where
he was. Happily the strain of the alliance touched not the troops of
either nation, and among them existed warm feelings of an honest
_camaraderie_. Just as the First Division was about to fall in, a French
brigade passed by on its southward march, and friendly expressions of
mutual recognition and of good will were heard; from us, by lusty cheers
and waving of bearskins and bonnets, and from them by hearty cries of
“Vivent les Anglais! Vivent les Montagnards!”
Leaving the Alma, the approach to Sevastopol was made by easy stages. On
the 23rd a halt was called at noon on the Katcha, where we had the
mortification of learning that the heavy field-pieces, which had done us
so much damage on the Kurgané heights, had left but four short hours
before our arrival. Next day, we reached the Belbek, thirteen miles from
the late field of battle, and within striking distance of Sevastopol,
the goal of our ambition. And now a strange thing happened. Far from
attacking the very position we had come to assail, we even refused to
make a reconnaissance to ascertain the nature of its defences, and the
force and quality of the enemy holding it.
The expedition, we have seen, was expressly designed to be a speedy
operation, and every step taken with respect to it was governed by that
one idea; otherwise, it would never have been undertaken in the autumn
of 1854. Hence, a coast destitute of secure harbours wherein to form a
base of operations, was not considered unsuitable as a landing-place;
communications between the Crimea and the rest of the Russian Empire
were not intercepted; a line of advance exposed to attack by a relieving
army was not rejected; a late season of the year did not put an end to
the enterprise; and hence, also, there was no provision made for the
winter. These conditions were none of them in accordance with sound
military science or practice; but they were accepted, and they led the
army to the north side of Sevastopol—to the objective which the Allies
designed to reach when they landed at Old Fort. Arriving there, the
Anglo-French armies came face to face with an obstacle, some works
loomed in the haze before them, and they began to deliberate.
Counsellors, not consulted when the expedition was planned, were now
admitted as advisers, and they naturally viewed the problem without
reference to the past. We had lost touch with the defeated Menshikoff,
and it was thought that he probably had his army safe behind the
entrenchments in front; the attack might not succeed, a delay might
occur, and at any rate it was dangerous to wait when we had no secure
base in our rear. In short, the hazardous nature of the expedition which
had been forced upon the allied Commanders from home, suddenly burst
upon them with a vivid light never experienced before, and they had to
recognize, although unfortunately they did not yet acknowledge, that the
surprise had failed, that a lengthened siege was inevitable, and that
the descent on the fortress, as originally conceived, was a snare and a
delusion.
And yet, had the position been reconnoitred, some interesting facts
would have been revealed. We should have found the defences weak,
imperfectly armed, and garrisoned only by 11,000 men, whose weapons for
the most part were antiquated flint-locks, while others were only
provided with pikes or cutlasses.[236] The field-force that fought on
the 20th was not there at all; it had hastily retired to the south side
to re-organize itself after the disaster it had suffered.
-----
Footnote 236:
Kinglake, iii. 43.
-----
The possession of the north side of Sevastopol offered the Allies
considerable advantages.[237] The town, barracks, dockyards, and arsenal
are built on the south side of an extensive creek, deep enough to float
the largest ships of war, which runs from the sea in an easterly
direction four miles inland, 1000 to 1200 yards in breadth. This inlet,
forming the roadstead or harbour of Sevastopol, is defended at its mouth
by several strong forts, some of those on the north side being perched
on cliffs 100 feet high. The northern bank entirely commands the south
side, and rises from the water’s edge more abruptly than the latter.
These things were known to the Allies before they landed in the Crimea.
It is obvious that, if the invaders could have established themselves on
this northern bank, they would have taken the town and some of the forts
in reverse; and that, if they could have brought up sufficient guns of
the requisite calibre, the fortress itself would have been untenable,
and the destruction of the ships in the harbour ensured by the force of
plunging fire directed upon them.
-----
Footnote 237:
See Map No. 5, p. 182.
-----
While we lingered on the Alma, General Menshikoff had not been idle, and
he determined to secure all the advantages which the Russian fleet of
the Black Sea might be able to confer. It was hopeless to suppose that
this fleet could cope with our own magnificent ships which lay outside
the harbour; and indeed, ever since the battle of Sinope, it had been
carefully kept out of harm’s way. The only use to which it could be put,
was to convert it into an addition to the land defences of Sevastopol;
but even then, it would be exposed to danger, for the enemy had a
wholesome dread of what the historic daring of British seamen is capable
of achieving when directed by an enterprising commander. On the night of
the 22nd, therefore, he effectually barred the entrance of the roadstead
by sinking seven vessels, and by constructing a boom across it, and thus
he secured his shipping from any direct attack which our navy might have
contemplated. Hence, the Russian war-ships became stationary floating
batteries, and their function was to play their guns upon the ground
that bordered the roadstead. For this device, also, the Allies must have
been prepared, and might have taken it into consideration before even
they started on the expedition. Now, the plateau on the top of the
heights overlooking the town from the north, was much less (if at all)
exposed to the enemy’s naval artillery than the ground over which the
invaders must advance, if they meant to deliver their attack from the
south; and the fire directed upon this plateau would be uncertain and
inefficient, since considerable portions of it were out of sight of the
ships below.
The British Admiral, Sir Edmond Lyons, at that time second in command,
never lost sight of the original plan of invasion: he advocated strongly
an attack upon the north side, and was prepared to take a prominent part
in the action he expected to follow. If successful, the closing of the
harbour was of trifling moment. This powerful co-operation was
impossible on the south side. Lord Raglan agreed with the Admiral, and
was also in favour of striking a blow from the north, as had always been
intended. But he was in a position of great difficulty. Some of his own
advisers were against the proposal, and the French Marshal, always
unfavourable to activity in this quarter, was sinking under a disease
that carried him off before the end of the month. The question whether
this attack from the Belbek river would have brought about the immediate
fall of Sevastopol, need not be further discussed; no attempt was made
to ascertain whether it was practicable. Suffice it to say that General
Todleben, who defended Sevastopol, afterwards expressed his deliberate
opinion, and elaborately argued it out, that the northern plateau was
untenable by the Russians, and that operations conducted against it
would have led the Allies to a speedy success. Nevertheless, it is
important to notice that the original design of taking Sevastopol by a
_coup de main_ under the effects of a surprise, was given up before even
a reconnaissance was made to ascertain the strength of the objective, to
which the Allies were committed by that very design. We shall now see
that, refusing to pursue their plan, on account of the serious military
errors it disclosed, the Allies were forced to adopt another plan, which
equally, if not in a greater degree, violated the canons of the science
of war.[238]
-----
Footnote 238:
The late Sir E. Hamley holds that General Todleben was wrong, and
writes: “But he [Todleben] says the enemies' [allied] ships,
approaching the shore, could batter the fort almost with impunity,
[_i.e._ the Star-Fort, or the principal work on the north side of
Sevastopol, which the Allies would have had to attack]. The
impossibility of this is best shown by the fact that, in the
subsequent engagement between the fleets and forts, one of the
batteries on the cliffs (100 feet high) of the north side disabled
several of our ships without receiving a shot in return, although they
made it the object of their fire, and that the Star-Fort is distant
inland from this battery 1000 yards. Thus, according to Todleben, the
ships, while themselves under the fire of the coast batteries, which
they could not injure in return, were to bombard a fort 1000 yards
beyond these batteries, and which would be invisible from the sea”
(Hamley, _War in the Crimea_, p. 71).
The bombardment spoken of, in which the English ships were injured,
was only directed against the forts situated at the entrance of the
harbour. From that point, no doubt, the Star-Fort could not be seen;
but still Todleben made no puerile suggestion with respect to the
geography of a place every inch of which he had good reason to know
intimately. The Russian entrenchments on the north plateau could be
reached by the guns of our fleet, from another spot off the coast,
just round the promontory on which the coast batteries were built, and
where our ships would be to a great extent (if not entirely) sheltered
from the fire of the latter.
-----
h2 CHAPTER VIII. | BEFORE SEVASTOPOL.
Predicament in which the Allies found themselves—Flank march round
Sevastopol—Occupation of Balaklava by the British and of Kamiesh Bay
by the French—The Allies refuse to assault Sevastopol; they prefer
to bombard it—Depression of the Russians, who fear a prompt
assault—Description of the defences round the south side of
Sevastopol; successful efforts of the enemy to strengthen
them—Description of the upland of the Chersonese, occupied by the
Allies; their position and labours—First bombardment and its
results—No attack; a regular siege inevitable—Draft of Officers and
men to the Coldstream arrive in the Crimea—Establishment of the
Regiment—Russian reinforcements begin to arrive—Battle of Balaklava;
Cavalry charges—_Sortie_ of the Russians against the British right
flank; its failure.
The Allies, at this juncture, found themselves placed in a strange
predicament. Their plans had hitherto been successful, and nothing
remained to be done except to justify their first resolutions by
standing firm to their original purpose. The critical moment at length
arrived, and then, in the very presence of the enemy, they changed their
minds. They would not operate against the north of Sevastopol; they
would attack it from the south, and form a secure base in the harbours
of Balaklava and Kamiesh, that indent the coast of the upland plain,
called by the ancients the Chersonese. In order to accomplish this new
design, they had to march the united armies from the Belbek to the
south-west corner of the peninsula, quite close to the fortress they
intended to capture. Added to this, the ground over which they had to
pass was unknown; they left behind them the broad, open, and treeless
plains, where they could march in battle array, ready for emergencies;
they now approached a woody, difficult, and intersected country, and had
to adopt long columns of route in moving across it. According to the
information in their possession, moreover, a hostile army was sheltered
somewhere within the lines of Sevastopol; it was believed to be securely
posted behind the entrenchments on the northern plateau. They did not
wish to meet it there, and, to avoid doing so, they were obliged to have
recourse to the only alternative, and to commit a bad military error.
They exposed the right of their long columns and their rear to imminent
danger, and, courting disaster, invited the Russians to fall upon them,
in a position where partial defeat must prove fatal to their existence.
On the 25th the main body, preceded by a regiment of cavalry, a troop of
horse artillery, and a battalion of Rifles, left the Belbek, and the
perilous flank march commenced. It was carried out in a manner which
would have given the fullest advantages to the enemy had he availed
himself of them. The general direction was kept, often by consulting the
compass; but the difficulties of the country, the thick woods, and the
haste which urged us forward, disarranged the order of the troops. At
one moment, indeed, the head-quarters, leading the whole advance, were
followed by a long procession of thirty guns without supports, and
offered a tempting and easy reward to Russian enterprise. But, slow
though we may be to recognize it, a miracle does sometimes take place,
and in this case it showed itself in the fact, that the extraordinary
march proceeded onwards without the slightest mishap. Not only this, but
the British even captured some twenty carts from the enemy, though they
failed to get hold of the horses, which were cut away directly we came
into sight. This meeting came about in a curious way. It happened, as we
have seen, that Prince Menshikoff, far from taking post on the north
plateau, was refitting his defeated army in the town of Sevastopol south
of the roadstead. He came to the conclusion that he ought to preserve
his communications with the interior of the Crimea, and support the
advance of the reinforcements he expected to come from Bessarabia. At
dawn on the 25th, therefore, he, too, emerged from his retreat, crossed
the Tchernaya at Traktir Bridge, and, advancing to Mackenzie Farm,
marched towards Bakshiserai. Thus it came about that the two contending
armies, moving on the same day, and for some time advancing towards one
another by the same road, crossed each other’s path, and that neither
had the least conception of what the other was doing. It was fortunate
that, in this curious game of blind man’s buff, Menshikoff did not
strike our columns of route full in the flank; as it was, we just
happened to drive our ram into the tip of his tail; for, as the
head-quarter Staff, stumbling suddenly on the last portion of the
enemy’s baggage train as it passed unconsciously by, stood wondering at
the sight, a few of our guns hurried up to the rescue, unlimbered, and
secured some of his unhorsed carts. Among the booty was a carriage
belonging to one of the Russian Commanders, in which were stars,
crosses, medals, uniform, French novels, and a portfolio “of coloured
prints, the morality of which will not bear discussion.”
The experiences of the First Division on this march should not be
omitted. After waiting ready equipped for two hours, the men at length
moved off, at 8.30 in the morning, and plunged almost immediately into
the forest.
“Everybody who has seen beaters pushing their way through a thick
cover, may form a faint idea of the difficulties which beset, and the
obstacles which retarded our progress. The heat was overpowering, not
a breath of air percolated the dense vegetation. You scrambled on with
arms uplifted to protect the face against the swinging back-handers
dealt by the boughs; now your shakoe was dashed off, now the briars
laid tenacious hold on your haversack, or on the tails of your coatee.
It was as much as you could do to see the soldiers immediately on your
right and left. For the time, military order was an impossibility,
brigades and regiments got intermixed. Guardsmen, Rifles, and
Highlanders straggled forward blindly, all in a ruck. There was much
suffering, and some stout soldiers dropped involuntarily to the rear,
to be heard of no more.”[239]
-----
Footnote 239:
_Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 163.
-----
N^o. 5.
[Illustration:
SKETCH MAP OF COUNTRY
NEAR
SEVASTOPOL
_Compiled from_ Hamley’s Crimea _by kind permission_.
A.D. Innes & C^o. London.
]
After four hours or more, the troops emerged on a lane blocked by the
cavalry and baggage, and squeezed through. A little later they heard an
explosion, and, pushing forward, they came upon the scene of the
singular meeting that took place between the head-quarter Staff and the
rear of the enemy’s army. Continuing along a tolerably good road, they
approached the valley of the Tchernaya after dark, and, crossing it at
Traktir Bridge, they finally bivouacked near the village of Tchorgun, at
ten o’clock at night, “completely exhausted, parched with thirst, and
their clothes much torn by struggling through the wood.” Indeed, they
were fortunate, for it was one in the morning before the last British
division reached its halting ground. The French, who followed their
English allies, remained for the night midway on the wooded heights near
Mackenzie Farm, where they suffered much from want of water. Next day
the movement continued; and the cholera, that accompanied our troops
without intermission, burst out with renewed malignity, and struck its
victims down on the roadside along our line of march. After three hours,
the division reached Kadikeui, about half a mile from Balaklava; while
our ships, approaching, threw a few shells into an old Genoese fort,
which commanded the harbour, and which was held by a handful of Greek
troops in the Russian service; after a mere show of resistance, they
surrendered without difficulty. The French also moved forward on the
26th, and established themselves on the Fediukhine heights near the
Tchernaya. The Fourth Division, under Sir G. Cathcart, had been left
behind on the Belbek, to embark the sick that remained there; on the
same day (26th) he, too, started from his bivouac on the north of
Sevastopol, and, following the track of the Allied armies, arrived on
the Tchernaya without misadventure.
Thus the flank march was completed, and during the whole of the
difficult and dangerous operation, lasting two days, the Russians stood
by absolutely passive, and the Allies were entirely unmolested. Not a
company was cut off, nor was a gun taken. This was the more remarkable
since, perceiving the movement from a high tower in Sevastopol, they
were accurately informed of our plan at midday of the 25th; General
Menshikoff must also have known it, from the meeting that took place
between the hostile armies near Mackenzie Farm. It was, indeed,
fortunate that we had so forbearing an enemy.
Communications having now been fortunately re-established with the
fleet, the British occupied the Bay of Balaklava, the French that of
Kamiesh, where their respective bases of operations were formed. Thus we
were placed on the right of the new line fronting northwards, and we
were again posted upon the exposed flank. About this time, an event of
importance occurred to the French. Marshal St. Arnaud got so ill, that
he was obliged to give up his command, and to leave the seat of war. He
was to be taken to Scutari, but he died on the passage. General
Canrobert succeeded him—a valiant, honourable, and straightforward
soldier, but one little fitted to take upon himself the onerous
responsibilities of his new position.
The Allies now found themselves occupying a fertile country, almost
entirely denuded of inhabitants, who fled at their approach, covered
with highly cultivated gardens, orchards, and vineyards, which teemed
with vegetables and fruit in great abundance. Never were troops so amply
supplied as during the first few days of their stay in this land of
plenty; but the good things did not last, they were soon exhausted, and
could not be replaced. The men were not easily restrained from enjoying
to the full the luxurious feast which lay before them, after the
fatigues of the forced flank march; though it is to be feared they
suffered from its effects, and from the fact that they were still
without tents. Cholera continued, and diarrhœa (its pilot-fish)
increased considerably.[240]
-----
Footnote 240:
Of 76 cases of sickness that occurred in the Battalion in the month of
September, 30 were fever, 24 diarrhœa, and 7 cholera (Wyatt, p.
24).
-----
The idea seems to have been pretty general among the troops that the
flank march was intended to shift the position of the united armies from
a strong front of Sevastopol to a weaker side, and that the attack was
only delayed until we got close to the southern defences of the town. It
was confidently expected that the assault would be soon delivered, and
the landing of the siege-train did not put an end to that hope. As days
went by, however, it began to be realized that operations of a slower
nature were to be begun, and that a siege, not an assault, was to be
undertaken. This surmise was entirely correct; though the Chiefs of the
armies still held to the belief that, when a bombardment by siege guns
had taken place, the defences would be destroyed, and the town would
then fall before the winter set in. Lord Raglan personally seems to have
been disposed to make an immediate attempt against the enemy’s lines,
without incurring this further delay; and this view was certainly shared
and supported by Sir George Cathcart, and was also advocated by Sir
Edmond Lyons. It was urged that the Russian fortifications were slight
and weak at the end of September, when the Allies got within striking
distance, and, though we should be stronger against them as soon as the
siege batteries were constructed and armed, yet the time required to do
so could be utilized by the defenders in so strengthening their works,
that the advantages of a delay would accrue to them, and to our
detriment. General Canrobert, however, was cautious, and was disinclined
to run any risks just as the supreme command was vested in him by the
French Emperor. Others, among the British advisers at head-quarters,
held the opinion that it was dangerous to deliver an attack unless
prepared by artillery fire; they feared that the attempt might cost us
500 men, which loss they hoped would not occur if a siege were opened in
the regular manner. Lord Raglan was forced to concur.
During this time the Russian commanders, left in Sevastopol after
General Menshikoff’s departure, were in a state of great depression, and
believed that the town could not hold out against a vigorous assault.
The entire garrison amounted to 35,850 men, made up of heterogeneous
elements—one single battalion of regulars (750 men), militia, gunners,
marines, seamen, and workmen. Of the latter, there were 5000—a useful
body to create a fortress, if time were granted, but useless to repel an
immediate attack. Of the sailors set free from the imprisoned fleet,
there were 18,500, of whom a fourth part only were well trained or even
decently armed.[241] The south side, moreover, does not lend itself
easily to a good defence.[242] A creek, hardly half a mile broad, called
the inner harbour, runs inland for nearly two miles from the main
roadstead, terminating in three ravines which ascend the upland of the
Chersonese. This inlet divides the town from a suburb, called the
Karabelnaya, and as both had to be held against the Allies, there was a
formidable obstacle obstructing communications between them. The French,
based on Kamiesh Bay, were opposite the western portion of Sevastopol,
that is the town itself, from the sea to the head of the inner harbour.
The British army on the right, faced Karabelnaya, and were responsible
for the ground from the inner harbour to Careenage Bay,—another inlet,
half a mile long, which also terminates in a ravine indenting the
upland,—where the enemy’s defences ended. The line held by the Russian
garrison was about four miles in length: two miles from the sea to the
head of the inner harbour, and the same distance onwards to Careenage
Bay. On the 25th of September, this long line was imperfectly defended.
On the French section, the gorges of the Quarantine and Artillery Forts
had been closed, and three bastions or redoubts had been constructed
between them and the head of the inner harbour, where the Flagstaff
bastion stood, connected, with but little interruption, by a naked
loopholed wall. On the British section, there were four works, which
were unconnected by wall or entrenchment, known as the Redan, the
Malakoff Tower, the Little Redan, and No. 1 Battery, near Careenage Bay.
Of these the Malakoff was “a mere naked tower, without a glacis, exposed
from head to foot, unsupported by the powerful batteries which were
destined to flank it, and uncovered as yet by the works which afterwards
closed up round its base.” The whole of the south side of Sevastopol,
moreover, was armed with 172 guns, of which by far the greater number
faced the French, and only a few the British position.[243]
-----
Footnote 241:
These numbers are taken from Hamley’s _War in the Crimea_ , p. 86.
Todleben says there were but 16,000 “combatants” (excluding artillery)
available for the defence of the south side (Kinglake, iii. 195).
Footnote 242:
See Map No. 6, p. 194.
Footnote 243:
Kinglake, iii. 123, etc., 194, 347. Sir Edmond Lyons urged the
immediate assault of the Malakoff hill, “then unoccupied, and advised
the immediate construction of a battery there, which would make it
necessary for the fleet to take care of themselves” (_Ibid._, iii.,
Appendix, p. 491). The capture of the Malakoff in September, 1855,
caused the immediate fall of Sevastopol.
-----
The serious and very reasonable apprehension entertained by the Russian
chiefs did not, however, prevent them from taking every measure to
fortify their position, directly they understood that the Allies were
approaching the south side in force. The greatest activity prevailed day
and night in the garrison and among the inhabitants, the women and
children taking their share of the labour, and thus the works designed
by the Russian Engineer Officer, Todleben, were rapidly thrown up. The
Anglo-French Commanders never interrupted these operations, nor did they
make any demonstrations to try the quality of the defences; they
contented themselves with distant reconnaissances, so that in a short
time the entrenchments were greatly strengthened, especially the
Malakoff, and began to look more formidable than had been the case
before; the armament also was being changed, the lighter guns giving
place to heavier ordnance drawn from the ships and arsenal.
The upland of the Chersonese, on which the Allies had established
themselves, is a sloping plain, trending from a line of hills called the
Sapuné Ridge, 500 to 700 feet high, that bounds it on the east, from the
head of the roadstead of Sevastopol to a point on the coast some four
miles west of Balaklava. The upland is scored by numerous ravines,
running from the ridge in a general north-westerly direction to the town
and coast; but on the eastern side of the ridge the ground falls
abruptly and almost in a cliff-like manner into the valley of the
Tchernaya river, which discharges itself into the roadstead. The
distance from Balaklava to Sevastopol is nearly eight miles. Of the two
roads connecting them, one, the Woronzoff road, was metalled, and,
proceeding along the Causeway Heights, formed the main communication
with the south of the Crimean peninsula; the other, a mere cart-track or
pathway, more to the south, ascended the ridge over the “Col de
Balaklava,” three miles from that place, and joined the Woronzoff road
two miles further on, on the upland.
This extended position had to be defended from attacks that were to be
feared from Menshikoff’s army. The latter, having left Sevastopol, was
in easy communication with the town and was securely posted on very
defensible ground, from whence it could advance upon the right of the
Allies or upon our base at Balaklava. Moreover, the Russians would,
before long, be strongly reinforced by troops which, as we have seen,
were hurrying without opposition from Bessarabia into the Crimea; but
when this event would take place was still uncertain. The Allies had
lost all touch with the enemy’s army they had defeated at the Alma, and
their hesitation to assault the weak defences that covered Sevastopol
directly after the flank march, was in a measure due to their ignorance
of what their opponent was doing. In reality he was then many miles
away, and had no intention of resuming hostilities without further
assistance; he was re-organizing his men, and waiting for the fresh
forces he expected from the north.[244] Only for the moment, therefore,
was the right flank of the invaders free from danger, and under no
circumstances could it have been left unguarded.
-----
Footnote 244:
Kinglake, iii. 215.
-----
The French divided their army into two Corps. The 3rd and 4th Divisions,
under General Forey, formed the besieging force, and took post before
Sevastopol, their right on the great ravine which runs into the inner
harbour, their left on Streleska Bay. The 1st and 2nd Divisions,
together with the Turkish contingent, constituted a Corps of
observation, under General Bosquet, and were entrenched on the Sapuné
Ridge, facing the east, between the Woronzoff road and the Col
previously mentioned. The whole of the British army was engaged in the
siege, before the suburb of Karabelnaya, the left on the ravine, in
communication with the French, the right upon ground not far from the
Sapuné heights. The defence of Balaklava was provided by the 93rd
Regiment (withdrawn for the purpose from the Highland Brigade), 1,000
Marines, a battery of Artillery, and a body of Turks (3,500 of whom had
been recently despatched to the Crimea, the remainder, two battalions,
being lent by the French). These troops, which included a provisional
battalion formed of 25 to 30 weakly men drawn from every regiment, were
placed under the command of Sir Colin Campbell, who was detached from
his brigade. In front of them, in the valley, was Lord Lucan’s cavalry
division.
These measures did not, however, secure the right flank of the British
siege-works. At this point, the cliff-like appearance of the heights
overlooking the Tchernaya partially disappears, and the upland falls
towards the roadstead and the river, in numerous spurs, intersected by
ravines. This broken country was known to the Allies by the name of
Inkerman, and along its foot there ran a road from Balaklava, which,
skirting the Tchernaya to the roadstead, proceeded to Sevastopol along
the southern shore of the latter. The river, moreover, was crossed at
its mouth by a bridge and a causeway, over which another road led to
Bakshiserai. This was a vulnerable point in the line adopted by the
Allies, who far from being able to invest the place they intended to
besiege, were too weak even to establish themselves upon the head of the
roadstead, and prevent an irruption from the town, or an attack from the
direction of Bakshiserai upon the right of their position. To guard this
vital point, only a strong piquet was employed, and a battery of two
guns of position, called the “Sandbag battery,” constructed to
strengthen it, had soon to be disarmed, as it was found impracticable to
support the guns by infantry. The flank, in short, was left undefended,
because the whole of the British army was required to undertake the
siege, and because Bosquet’s corps had entrenched themselves on an
inaccessible position on the ridge, where no enemy could attack them,
and where they could neither give efficient support to the defences of
Balaklava, nor be of any immediate use should an onslaught be made on
the unguarded spurs of Inkerman. In other words, we suffered from the
effects of a divided command.[245]
-----
Footnote 245:
Kinglake, iii. 291; Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , 124.
-----
We left the Guards Brigade, on the 26th of September, near Balaklava, at
the end of the flank march. For the first few days there was little
done. “Troops passive and grape-gorging, with the exception of strong
fatigue parties engaged in the slow and laborious office of landing the
siege guns from the transports, which now cram the harbour of
Balaklava.”[246] On the 2nd of October, the First Division marched to
the front, and about this time the British army was thus bivouacked
before Sevastopol. The Second Division on the right, with the First in
support, nearly a mile in rear; next came the Light Division, separated
from them by the Careenage Ravine. These three divisions manned the
British Right Attack. The Fourth and Third Divisions were posted
south-west of Cathcart’s Hill, and continued the line to the west, in
rear of the Left Attack, to the ravine, on the other side of which lay
the French siege corps, near Mount Rodolph. The work of bringing up the
battering train continued without interruption, and some heavy guns from
the ships were drawn to the batteries by sailors, who, forming a brigade
under command of Captains Lushington and Peel, took part in the
operations which were soon to commence.
-----
Footnote 246:
September 29th (_Our Veterans, etc._, p. 177).
-----
It was fortunate that tents were at last issued, on the 5th of October;
for the men, having been constantly bivouacked since the disembarkation
at Old Fort, nearly three weeks before, were again attacked by sickness.
Cholera reappeared on the day after the troops stood on the upland plain
before Sevastopol, and an Officer of the Coldstream, Captain Jolliffe,
died of it on the 4th. It seems that the delay in providing shelter,
even of an indifferent nature, was due to the want of transport, which
still failed us; nothing apparently could induce our Government to give
the army this indispensable requirement. The boon of again having a tent
to cover them in the chilly autumn nights of the Crimea, was keenly
appreciated by Officers and men; but comfort is a relative term, and,
judged from the ordinary standpoint, the slight shelter which was
supplied, was inadequate and insufficient.
On the 4th, Captain MacKinnon and a small detachment of convalescents,
who had been left behind at Varna, reached the Battalion.
The constant labour which the Russians devoted to the improvement of
their fortifications became apparent to regimental Officers, as they
anxiously scanned the enemy’s works during their leisure time.
“Within the last few days,” writes Colonel Wilson, on the 7th, “an
amazing change has taken place in the aspect of the town. The base of
the Great Tower (the Malakoff) is now 'shored up' with earthworks; and
defences of similar construction—some far advanced towards
completion—are being thrown up along the entire line commencing at
Careenage Bay on the east, and terminating near the cemetery on the
west [near the Flagstaff bastion]. Hence, in the course of a week, if
not sooner, Sevastopol will have assumed the likeness of a vast
entrenched camp.”
On the same day, it seemed to leak out, that “the place looked so much
stronger than had been anticipated, that perhaps we might not take it
this winter;” and it was devoutly hoped that precautionary measures
would be taken in time, against “the onslaughts of Generals Rain, Frost,
and Snow, no matter how great soever may be head-quarter confidence in
the overwhelming efficacy of our opening fire.”[247]
-----
Footnote 247:
_Our Veterans, etc._, p. 191, etc.
-----
It was, however, still officially considered that the projected
bombardment would shatter the Russian defences, and that the speedy
capture of Sevastopol would be the result. This opinion was also shared
by many of the Officers of the British army, and every nerve was
strained to make the operation a success. On the 10th we broke ground,
and began the construction of three batteries. Two, known as Chapman’s
and Gordon’s, called after the Engineer Officers in charge, were some
1400 yards from the Redan, and the trench connecting them became
eventually the first parallel. Chapman’s battery, 41 guns, was placed on
Green Hill, between two ravines that descend into the inner harbour,
viz. the valley of the Shadow of Death and the Woronzoff ravine.
Gordon’s battery, 26 guns, stood on Mount Woronzoff (also called
Frenchman’s Hill), between the Woronzoff and the Docks ravines. On the
next hill, between the Docks and the Careenage ravines, the Victoria or
Lancaster battery was built, armed with 6 guns (5 of the Lancaster
pattern), more than 2000 yards from the enemy’s lines. The French began
their siege-works on the 9th, on Mount Rodolph, and placed 53 guns in
battery, 1000 yards from the enemy’s fortifications. Thus the Allies had
126 guns in position, not counting the field artillery. The enemy had
118,—64 facing the French, and 54 the British,—besides 223 of lesser
calibre.
The Battalion, in common with the other troops stationed before
Sevastopol, took their full share in the construction of these
batteries, by supplying working parties and covering guards to resist
sorties. The operation was new to all ranks, who had received little
training in these special duties, the greater part of which had to be
performed at night. But any confusion incidental to the circumstances of
the case speedily passed away, and from start to finish the men stuck to
their work, and did it thoroughly, under a heavy and unreturned fire,
that constantly poured upon them from dawn to dark from the Russian
lines.
“On the 14th October,” Colonel Wilson writes, “the duties grew very
hard. For myself I have been at work four nights out of five, and so
have many others.... But in this respect, of course, the rank and file
are the principal sufferers. To what insignificance do our hardships
sink when compared with theirs! In the case of the private, downright
manual labour—picking, shovelling, dragging, lifting—is superadded to
watching. In his instance, no little dainties ... vary the nauseous
salt junk, and the wish-wash of green coffee. In his instance, the
tatters—which were a uniform once—only cover the wearer’s nakedness
imperfectly: that ragged patchwork has long ceased to combat with the
wind and rain.... Oh! what painful illustrations of the cheap and
nasty principle, are those filthy dangling shreds and bursted seams!
How one’s heart yearns toward the unflinching British 'common soldier'
so sternly superior to privation, so proudly reckless of his life!
Brave heart! unconquerable soul! Crimean hero, whom we cannot glorify
too much!”[248]
-----
Footnote 248:
_Our Veterans, etc._, p. 211.
-----
The excellence of the work performed by the Brigade is thus described in
a recent publication, already alluded to:—
“The spade work of the soldiers varied considerably, but from the
Royal Engineers' journal of work done in Bulgaria, and from what I saw
early in the siege, that of the Guards Brigade was undoubtedly amongst
the best. This may have arisen from the memory of instruction at
Chobham camp in 1853, or from regimental pride, or from both
causes.... By the end of August the infantry had made six thousand
gabions and seven hundred fascines; for every one of these passed as
serviceable, the soldiers received 14_d._ and 7_d._ respectively,
which included the labour of cutting and carrying the brushwood which
was close at hand. In the Guards Brigade each section of three men
produced three gabions daily; in the Line the average did not exceed
one gabion daily per section. Throughout the long ensuing siege, the
working parties in the trenches did well or badly in proportion to the
efficiency of the Officers. When they sat and smoked, paying no
attention to the men, the sergeants followed suit, and but little
progress was made. On the other hand, when the Officers, keen and
sympathetic, knew how to get cheerful work out of their men, the
spirits of the directing Engineer Officer rose considerably.”[249]
-----
Footnote 249:
Wood, _Crimea in 1854 and 1894_, p. 87. As the training at Chobham
camp lasted but a short time, and amounted in reality to very little,
and as the work performed in Bulgaria and before Sevastopol afforded
more practical instruction than could possibly have been given at
Chobham, does it not seem probable that the excellence, attributed to
the Brigade, arose much more from what is called regimental pride,
from the character of their system, and from the efficiency of their
Officers, than from any other cause?
-----
The following extracts from Colonel Tower’s diary, give, moreover, an
idea of the nature of some of the duties discharged by the men, and the
conditions under which they were performed:—
“_Oct. 14th._ Paraded at 3 a.m. for a covering party in rear of
Chapman’s battery. The enemy annoyed us very much all day, throwing
shot and shell, but, by dint of creeping about and keeping well under
the parapet, we all got safe back to camp at 6 a.m., after
twenty-seven hours in the trenches.
”_Oct. 16th._ On covering party in rear of the sailors' battery. There
was a large heap of stones, two to three feet high, behind which we
laid down as flat as we could; about 10 a.m. a red flag was hoisted on
the Redan, and immediately every gun they had mounted commenced
pitching into our battery, ... for about half an hour, evidently to
try their range. Every sort of missile they could cram into their guns
came whistling over us and knocking our heap of stones about. We lay
as still as mice, and the shot rattled about like hail, and went
bounding away over the hill in our rear towards the camp; Goodlake and
self, Francis Baring and Bob Lindsay were our party. In the middle of
the _jeu d’enfer_, old Gordon the Engineer appeared walking over the
open towards the battery, the shot striking the ground all round him;
he never quickened his pace, and seemed perfectly unconscious of his
imminent danger: but fortune favours the brave, and although he ought
to have been struck fifty times, he coolly walked up the hill with the
utmost indifference.”
In preparation for the bombardment, fixed to commence at 6.30 a.m. on
the 17th of October, the troops were held in readiness in their camps
to fall in at a moment’s notice, arrangements were made in case the
army was ordered to move forward to assault the Russian position,
scaling ladders, tools, etc., were collected, and a body of
sharpshooters was specially organized. In the First Division, the
latter were placed under Captain Goodlake of the Coldstream, whose
gallant services soon earned for him the Victoria Cross.[250] But the
first onslaught on Sebastopol failed to produce the results that were
expected from it. The Allies found the enemy placed in far other
circumstances than had been the case when they first presented
themselves before the south side on the 26th of September. At that
date the advantages gained by the battle of the Alma had not been
entirely dissipated: the Crimean field army, under Menshikoff, was
beaten, and was far away from the scene of hostilities, refitting and
awaiting reinforcements; the garrison of Sevastopol—composed of a mere
medley of details, imperfectly armed, and many of whom could scarcely
be called “combatants”—was physically and morally weak; the
entrenchments were slight and incomplete; the guns to oppose an attack
were light. On the 17th of October a great change had been effected.
The forces from Bessarabia were arriving; the Russians had been able
to reconnoitre the valley of the Tchernaya, and to threaten our
exposed right flank and our base of operations; they spared as many as
25,000 of the regular army to strengthen the garrison of the town; the
_morale_ of the latter had been raised; the defences were much
improved—they assumed the appearance of genuine fortifications; the
armament was greatly increased, and had been rendered formidable.
-----
Footnote 250:
By _First Divisional Order_, Oct. 16th, ten men and a Non-commissioned
officer from each battalion, good shots, volunteers preferred, were
selected to act as sharpshooters, under a Captain and a Lieutenant of
the Brigade of Guards, and a Lieutenant of the Highlanders. “The
sharpshooters will have to approach within 400 or 500 yards of the
enemy’s works, there to establish themselves in extended order (by
single men) under cover of anything which may present itself to afford
protection. They will endeavour to improve their cover behind any
obstacle by scraping out a hollow for themselves in the ground, and
they will carry with them provisions so that they will be enabled to
remain, being once under cover, for many hours (even twenty-four)
without relief. Whilst so established, they will endeavour to pick off
the enemy’s artillerymen in the embrasures. The approach of the
sharpshooters to the spot they must occupy, must be rapid, in a
scattered order; each man acting for himself, and exercising his
intelligence to the utmost of his ability. Each man will select the
spot which suits him best, and be guided only in that choice by the
cover he may find and the command it may give him of an effectual fire
into the embrasures.” It is to be noted that the Officers ordered to
perform this important duty were in no way “selected” for it, but were
taken by “roster.” In Crimean days, as well as during the Peninsular
war, it was considered that all Officers were fitted to discharge the
ordinary duties which their profession required of them.
-----
Nevertheless, the operation was an affair of great importance and
magnitude. The Allied fleets took part in it in full force, though it
was not possible for them to produce any real effect; for the land
defences were out of their reach, and the sea forts were extremely
strong. Still all the artillery the invaders could muster, discharged
their thunders upon the fortifications which covered the south side of
the town and the entrance of the roadstead. The French, subjected to a
hotter and closer fire than we, suffered severely, and between ten and
eleven in the morning, two explosions having occurred in their
batteries, their guns were silenced. The British, on the other hand,
were very successful. Directing their fire upon three of the enemy’s
works, they inflicted considerable damage on the Flagstaff battery,
silenced the Malakoff, and almost demolished the Redan, the salient of
which was blown to pieces by the explosion of a powder magazine. The
defences of the Karabelnaya were completely paralysed, an immediate
assault was expected, and the troops to oppose it being demoralized,
fell back in confusion.[251]
-----
Footnote 251:
Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 105.
-----
N^o. 6.
[Illustration:
SEVASTOPOL
_October 17^{th} 1854_
_By kind permission from_ Kinglake’s Crimea.
A.D. Innes & C^o. London
]
But no attack took place. The French were unable to advance against the
lines which had silenced their siege guns. It was too much to ask them
to allow us to go on, under cover of their friendly co-operation and
support. The enemy, in a word, gained by the Anglo-French alliance, and
the common interests were obscured under the pressure of inter-national
courtesy. Thus a severe strain was still to weigh down the resources of
the two Great Powers of Europe; an insignificant fortress was to baffle
their united efforts; their armies were to be destroyed on the upland of
the Chersonese by cold and famine; and, while our British Engineers
alone could survey with complacency the results of their skill,
evidenced by the speedy destruction of the defences around Karabelnaya,
the Allies were not one whit nearer the accomplishment of their object
than they had been before the bombardment began. Still the Chiefs of the
invading forces were sanguine that their fire at last would tell, and
would allow them to storm the place together, at points where each had
breached the defences opposed to them; but in this expectation they
were, as they deserved to be, disappointed. The bombardment was
continued on the 18th, and the British batteries alone took part in
it—for the French were not ready, and were improving their earthworks
after the disaster of the day before,—not, however, against the wreck
which we had created by the evening of the 17th, but on renewed and
freshly armed defences that were repaired in the night by the ceaseless
energy of the garrison, whose labours were undisturbed by any
countermove on our part. Again, on the 19th, the united artillery fired
on the hostile batteries with complete success on our side, but once
more the French guns were silenced. The bootless bombardment continued
till the 25th, ever with the same result: the lines covering the
Karabelnaya were open to attack, but the forts opposite Mount Rodolph
were unsubdued. Thus no advantage was gained, or indeed could be gained,
under the rule which the Allies had imposed upon themselves to the
benefit of the enemy, who, not slow to perceive the situation, took
every advantage therefrom. A great display, therefore, was all that took
place, which cost the Russians nearly 4000 men, while the Allies lost
less than a fourth part of that number.
As the fire proceeded from day to day, the attention of the First and
Second Divisions was directed to their right flank.
“Started an hour before daybreak on outlying piquet on the heights to
our rear, and was kept the whole day in a state of excitement by a
large force of Russians, cavalry and artillery, in the plain below;
some took up a position on the hills in front of Balaklava, and some
remained near where we bivouacked at the Tchernaya bridge, evidently
threatening Balaklava. Some of them advanced towards us, and brought
some artillery and opened fire. Presently a battery of ours unlimbered
in the bushes by my piquet, and got ready for action; the 2^{me}
Zouaves were also sent, and there was a report that the enemy was
advancing up the Inkerman gorges; in short, we thought we were in for
a scrimmage. But after a short time the Zouaves and artillery were
sent back to their quarters, and I was left face to face with the
Ruskis. After dark their fires blazed all over the plain, but nothing
occurred. I was with my sentries all night. They evidently intend
making an attack on Balaklava when we assault the town, which
doubtless must take place soon.”[252]
-----
Footnote 252:
Tower, _Diary_ , Oct. 18th.
-----
The enemy, seen upon this occasion, was again observed by a piquet of
the Coldstream on the 20th, among the Inkerman ruins (beyond the
Tchernaya), mounting guns. Towards evening he opened fire, and directed
his aim upon the camp of the Second Division, until the Sandbag battery,
previously mentioned, was constructed, and armed with two 18-pounders.
The British fire soon drove away the guns from the ruins, but the
18-pounders had to be removed to a less exposed position.
Nine Officers reached the Crimea and joined the Battalion on the 17th,
the first day of the bombardment, viz. Lieut.-Colonels Newton, Cowell,
and Halkett (who had left Bulgaria on promotion in July),
Lieut.-Colonels Mark Wood, Dudley Carleton, and Lord A. Charles FitzRoy,
and Lieutenants Heneage, Hon. W. Amherst, and Greville.
It should be stated here, that, on account of the war, the Regiment
received an augmentation, first on the 13th of February, and again a
little later. The establishments were as follows:—
Feb. 1st, Mar. 1st, Aug. 1st,
1854 ” ”
Colonel. 1 1 1
Lt.-Colonel. 1 1 1
Majors. 2 2 2
Captains. 16 16 20
Lieutenants. 20 20 24
Ensigns. 12 12 16
Adjutants. 2 2 2
Qr.-Masters. 2 2 2
Surgn.-Major. 1 1 1
Surgeon. 1 1 1
Assist.-Surgns. 2 3 4
Solicitor. 1 1 1
Sergeants. 72 88 118
Drummers. 37 37 46
Rank and File. 1280 1600 2200
2 Battns. 2 Battns. 2 Battns.
. 16 Cos. 16 Cos. 20 Cos.
Of the twenty companies, twelve were at home and eight at the seat of
war, but the latter were strong companies on paper, and the former weak;
it was further ordered that the service Battalion was not to bear upon
its strength less Officers than were required for 10 companies, the
Adjutant not included.[253] Hence the two mounted Officers who, before
the receipt of this order, were posted to companies in the field, were
placed upon the 1st Battalion establishment, and nominally belonged to
companies at home.
-----
Footnote 253:
_Brigade Order_ , London, Sept. 5, 1854.
-----
During the first few days of the operations against Sevastopol there
were several casualties among the Officers of the Grenadier Guards. On
the 16th, Captain Rowley was killed, and, two days later, the same fate
overtook Colonel Hood, the gallant Commanding Officer who had greatly
distinguished himself by his coolness and intrepidity at the Alma. The
losses of the Coldstream at this moment were happily less. It was not
till the 20th, that the first man was wounded in the trenches; but next
day, Lord Dunkellin was unfortunately captured. Commanding a working
party without arms—for at that time the men told off to dig were sent to
the front unarmed,—he lost his way in the darkness, and, stumbling upon
a piquet which he thought was English, he went forward by himself to ask
where he was. As it happened, he found himself within the enemy’s lines,
and was taken; his men, however, luckily escaped under cover of the
night.[254]
-----
Footnote 254:
This incident does not appear to have modified the rule by which
working parties were sent to the trenches at night, across an unknown
and intersected country, without arms or an escort, if we may judge
from the following General After Order of the 22nd: “The Commander of
the Forces directs that all parties, whether armed or on fatigue,
which may be ordered to the front, may be accompanied by a Staff
Officer competent to guide them.” On the 11th of November, however, it
was ordered that all working parties were to take their arms with them
(_First Divisional Pass Order_ ).
-----
Prince Menshikoff so far recovered from his defeat on the 20th of
September, that he occupied the hills in the neighbourhood of Mackenzie
Farm, and took possession of the roads leading therefrom into the valley
of the Tchernaya on the 7th of October. He had good reason to be proud
of the achievements of the garrison of Sevastopol, and to rejoice at his
own singular good fortune. The town was fast growing into a powerful
fortress, sufficiently strong to resist any sudden assault, and likely
for months to occupy the energies of a far more numerous force than
stood before it at that time. He himself was placed in an unassailable
position. Secure as regards his communications with the interior of
Russia and with Sevastopol, he not only received without difficulty the
fresh forces that were hurrying to his assistance; but he also hemmed
the invaders into a small corner of an exceedingly inhospitable country,
restricted their enterprise, and threatened them with destruction in
case a reverse were to happen to them. History, indeed, fails to record
any great genius in this Russian General, nor were his troops of that
high order to account for the immense advantages he gained at this
moment. He was simply fortunate in the Governments and in the leaders of
his antagonists, who, unable to combine to carry out any single plan,
continually changed their intentions, until a surprise on the north side
was converted into a lengthy siege (without investment) of the south
side.
The Bessarabian reinforcements began to reach Simferopol early in
October, and on the 15th, General Liprandi arrived there. A few days
later it was determined to make an attack on our base at Balaklava, with
some 25,000 troops (22,000 infantry, 3400 cavalry, and 78 guns)
commanded by that Officer. The attack took place on the 25th, a day
immortalized in our military history by the bravery of the British
cavalry, particularly by the charge of the Light brigade, “one of the
most brilliant ever remembered in the annals of war,” though it resulted
in the destruction of that corps.[255]
-----
Footnote 255:
General G. Klapka, _The War in the East, from the year 1853 till July,
1855_ (translated by Lieut.-Colonel A. Mednyansky), p. 96 (London,
1855).
-----
Balaklava was covered by two defensive lines, the outer and the inner.
The outer line, more than two miles in length, running along the
Causeway Heights and near the Woronzoff road, had the support of a few
small earthworks, “mere scratches with the spade, a donkey might have
been ridden into some of them,” armed with only nine 12-pounder guns in
all, and occupied by about two battalions of Turks. The inner line, near
Kadikeui, was 3000 yards in rear, and was held by the 93rd Regiment, a
few invalids, the Marines, and the rest of the Turks. The Russians,
advancing in force at dawn on the 25th, brought 30 guns (some of them of
heavy calibre) against the earthworks on the Causeway Heights,—which
were isolated, entirely unsupported, and commanded by neighbouring
ground,—and captured two of them on the right of the line, after a
stubborn resistance; a third soon after fell into their hands. They then
pushed forward their cavalry, of which four squadrons reconnoitred
towards Kadikeui; the latter came within range of the 93rd, drawn up in
line, who received them with a volley, and with such determination that
they quickly wheeled about and fled to the rear. The rest, a solid
column, nearly 3000 strong, supported by 32 guns, moving in somewhat the
same direction, came suddenly close to the British Heavy cavalry
brigade, who, without the slightest hesitation, charged, and in a few
moments routed them, and sent them back in confusion, past the front of
the Light brigade. Unfortunately Lord Cardigan did not fall upon the
flying mass and complete their discomfiture; so they got away down the
valley that lay between the Fediukhine and Causeway heights, both of
which were held by the enemy’s infantry and artillery, and took up a
position about a mile and a quarter away, behind some Russian guns. And
now “some one blundered,” and the Light brigade made their famous
charge, over this dangerous ground, flanked on each side by well-posted
artillery, straight into the guns and the cavalry at the end of the
valley. The story of this gallant deed is well known. The Russian
gunners and cavalry were swept away, and forced to retreat before the
impetuous onslaught of our weak squadrons, but the brigade was broken,
and indeed destroyed. It numbered 670 sabres at the commencement of the
action, and at the conclusion its mounted strength was only 195. The
enemy was quite unable to cut off the retreat of the remnants of our
light horse, as they rode back after their desperate expedition, very
few prisoners were taken, and the French, making a spirited and
successful charge upon the Fediukhine Heights, prevented the Russians
from harassing our men from that quarter, as they emerged from the
deadly and unequal conflict.
Heavy firing had been heard in the British camps before Sevastopol at
dawn, and, when the serious nature of the attack was perceived, orders
were sent to the First and Fourth Divisions to march down to meet the
danger. Two of Bosquet’s infantry brigades, as well as the French
cavalry, which had by this time reached the seat of war, were also
brought to the field of battle. When our troops got to the Sapuné Ridge,
and looked on the plain beneath, they saw with breathless interest the
first encounter between the contending horsemen.
“The Heavy cavalry charge,” says Colonel Tower, “was just going on as
we came in sight of the Turkish redoubts; we could indistinctly see
the grey horses and bearskin caps [the Scots Greys] swallowed up in a
dense mass of grey-coated Russians, their sabres flashing in the
sun.”[256]
-----
Footnote 256:
_Diary_ , Oct. 25th. Readers of the late Sir Edward Hamley’s _War in
the Crimea_ , p. 113, will remember the vivid description which he has
given of this brilliant cavalry charge, as it appeared to him and to
the troops (among them the Coldstream) standing on the heights above.
-----
The subsequent charge of the Light brigade was not so apparent to our
infantry:—
“The threatened attack of Balaklava,” continues Colonel Tower, “turned
out to be nothing; and when it appeared to be all over, the Light
cavalry started on their suicidal expedition, we could see them over
the line of hills of the Turkish redoubts, and then they vanished to
be seen no more. When the remnants returned, I got leave to fall out,
and walked up to the Turkish redoubts, and almost the first thing I
saw was poor Nolan’s body, his chest knocked to pieces by a round
shot; the whole plain was dotted about with men and horses, some
struggling on the ground, some loose horses galloping about without
riders; a great many Russian cavalry were lying about where the Heavy
cavalry had driven them back,—our men had used their sabres with good
effect.”
Despite the glorious conduct of our troops upon this occasion, we lost a
good deal and gained very little. The eastern portion of an unsupported
advanced line of redoubts on the Causeway Heights was captured by the
weight of numbers, and the outer defences of Balaklava were occupied by
the enemy; but his further movements towards Kadikeni were crushed by a
handful of our Heavy cavalry, and our Light brigade proved their
superiority over him by a useless feat of daring which is unparalleled
in warfare.
Thus, though Balaklava was still safe, we were deprived of the use of
the Woronzoff road as a means of communication between our base of
operations and the upland, and we had only the unmetalled path which led
over the Col to rely on. We shall see that this result of the battle of
the 25th was a serious one for the British army besieging Sevastopol.
There was, indeed, some idea of turning Liprandi out of the Causeway
Heights; but had it been definitely formed, the infantry would have
descended from the ridge on which they stood by the Woronzoff road,
whence the object would have been more easily accomplished. Instead of
this, however, they were moved onwards to the Col, and remained during
the day covering Balaklava. No forward operation was undertaken, and it
was probably considered that we had not sufficient troops to hold the
outer line efficiently. So the main road was placidly given up to the
enemy, and at nightfall the Guards Brigade and the Fourth Division
returned to camp, while the remaining two Highland regiments were left
at Balaklava to strengthen the garrison at that important place.[257]
-----
Footnote 257:
The battle which deprived us of our principal road, cost the Allies—
English, 40 Officers; 386 sergeants, rank and file; 426 total
French, 2 ” 50 ” ” 52 ”
Turks, 9 ” 250 ” ” 259 ”
———
Total, 737 men,
and 409 horses. The Russians lost some 600 men, of whom the greater
number fell before the British Heavy cavalry. The latter suffered but
little in that superb charge, though they had many casualties when
shielding the recoil of the Light brigade (_Our Veterans, etc._, p.
255).
-----
The vulnerable point on the right flank of the British position has
already been adverted to, also the position taken up by the French Corps
of observation under General Bosquet. We have seen that this force could
not help the Allies to retain possession of the Woronzoff road, nor
could it, as we shall see, secure the right of their siege-works from
serious attack. The first attempt to disturb this flank was made at noon
on the 26th, when a force emerged from Sevastopol, of which 700 men
advanced up the Careenage Ravine, while the remainder, 4300 men and four
guns, crossed that obstacle, and directed themselves upon Shell Hill, in
front of the camp of the Second Division. The former column was met by
the sharpshooters of the Guards, under Captain Goodlake, who, drawing up
his insignificant detachment behind a ditch that ran across the ravine,
held the hostile column in check, and barred its further advance,—even
capturing several prisoners,—until, a little later, some men of the
Rifles appearing upon the scene, the enemy was driven back.[258]
-----
Footnote 258:
This was one of the acts of gallantry performed by Captain Goodlake
during the war, for which he was awarded the Victoria Cross.
-----
The main column, endeavouring to reach Shell Hill, met the outposts of
the Second Division, some 250 strong, who, instead of retiring before so
superior a force, stubbornly resisted it, and held it at bay, until,
outflanked and pressed back by numbers, they retreated slowly and in
good order. But the Russians gained nothing, for the divisional
artillery, reinforced by a battery of the First Division, had time to
come into action, and when the enemy appeared upon the crest of the
hill, he was met by the fire of our guns, which speedily repulsed him,
and made him retire precipitately to the fortress, pursued by the
piquets, and under fire of the Lancaster battery. In this combat, where
the Russians acknowledge the loss of 270 men and 80 prisoners, as
against 12 killed and 77 wounded on our side, Lieutenant Conolly, of the
49th Regiment, greatly distinguished himself. He was promoted Brevet
Major, obtained the Victoria Cross, and a commission in the Coldstream.
The Brigade was not employed in this action; they stood in reserve out
of musketry fire, and watched the fight, ready for emergencies, but
their services were not required.[259]
-----
Footnote 259:
The Russians appear, upon this occasion, to have understated both
their strength and their losses.
-----
This sortie was intended, according to Todleben, to distract our
attention from Balaklava; and it may well be that Liprandi, knowing its
importance, was under grave apprehension lest the Woronzoff road might
be wrested from him. It has also been thought that the Russians were
endeavouring to effect a lodgment on Shell Hill, preparatory to the
attack they meant soon to deliver on our right flank at Inkerman, and
this is very likely. But, if so, they had an inadequate force to
accomplish such a purpose, and by this time they had ample experience of
the fighting qualities of the British troops, who, man for man, were
immensely superior to their own. Indeed we had every need of the
sterling bravery of our gallant soldiers, for a great crisis was at
hand. The strength of our Crimean army was becoming alarmingly weakened,
not only by the wear and tear of active service and losses incurred on
the field, but through the unusual amount of sickness that prevailed,
and the arduous nature of the campaign in which we had become engaged.
In the Coldstream there were 190 more admissions into hospital in
October than there had been in September.[260] On the other hand, the
actions of the 25th and 26th increased the confidence of our men when
opposed to the enemy. They felt themselves more than a match for him if
they could only get leave to be at him; but they little knew how severe
the trial would be that awaited them in a very few days.[261]
-----
Footnote 260:
Wyatt, p. 28.
Footnote 261:
Colonel Wilson, describing the excellent tone that prevailed among our
men at this time, notes the behaviour of the wounded on the 26th, as
they limped or were carried on stretchers past the Brigade. He says it
was “wonderful, the very reverse of what might have been looked for.
Far from drooping in spirits, most of them were in buoyant spirits.
Sometimes a fine youth with a badly fractured arm, hurraed lustily as
he passed; another, whose thigh a round shot had smashed, would—faint
as he was—raise himself up a little on his litter, and brandish his
rifle triumphantly. I observed that nearly every man, whether slightly
or sorely hurt, still clutched his musket.... A bullet through the
heart alone conquers such soldiers” (_Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 266).
-----
On the night of the 28th, many of our camps were alarmed, and believed
they were about to be attacked. The outposts watching the plain of
Balaklava heard cavalry approaching, and a great deal of firing in the
dark took place—the sentries blazing away whenever they saw, or fancied
they saw, the phantom horsemen, “who seemed perpetually galloping, but
never coming any nearer. Staff Officers kept arriving to know what the
commotion was about. Of course I could give them no information.” A
regiment of Zouaves and the guns in a French redoubt poured volleys into
imaginary columns coming to storm our position. “The Russian drums all
along the Fediukhine heights beat to arms; and I sat down quietly on a
stone in advance of my sentries, and could hear nothing more, but made
up my mind Liprandi intended to give us a benefit in the morning.” When
the morning broke the mystery was cleared. It was found that a number of
Russian horses had stampeded from their lines, and that no enemy was
near. A hundred or more were caught, and served to mount a few of our
cavalry, while the remainder scampered back across the plain to their
legitimate owners.[262]
-----
Footnote 262:
Tower, _Diary_ , Oct. 28th.
-----
The weary monotony of the siege continued after the sortie of the 26th,
the troops being largely employed in the trenches, constructing
approaches or batteries, or acting as covering guards, generally under a
heavy fire from the fortress in front of them.
“The enemy is barricading the streets, and we shall have to fight
every inch of ground. I fear we have a great many of our sorrows to
come, more especially wintering here; too horrible to contemplate! An
army of 30,000 men in our rear with a large force of cavalry, and
Sevastopol, which seems to be getting stronger every day, in our
front. Any number of general actions is better than a siege. In the
trenches for twenty-six hours at a time (we used to mount now at 2
a.m., with nothing but biscuit and salt pork to eat), shells
constantly troubling one’s life, and showers of dirt covering you
every time a shot strikes the parapet.”[263]
-----
Footnote 263:
_Ibid._ , Oct. 27th.
-----
The French were sapping up towards the Flagstaff Battery with the
greatest energy. They were becoming strong enough to withstand the guns
of the garrison, and to retrieve their failure of October 17th-25th.
Another bombardment, to be followed by an assault, was contemplated, and
the allied Commanders had full confidence that this time, at least, the
effect would be decisive. They even agreed to meet on the 5th of
November to arrange the details of their projected operation. But
neglected opportunities too often rise in judgment against a General in
the field. The 5th was the day of Inkerman, and all our plans were
completely frustrated.
CHAPTER IX.
THE BATTLE OF INKERMAN.
Large Russian reinforcements reach the Crimea—Position and strength of
the enemy; of the Allies—Description of the field of
Inkerman—Commencement of the battle, 5th of November—The progress of
the first part of the fight—The Guards Brigade advance to the scene
of action—The struggle round the Sandbag battery—Arrival of the
Fourth Division under General Cathcart—The manœuvre of the
latter, and its failure—The arrival of the French—Successes of the
British artillery—Repulse of the Russian attack; the retreat of the
enemy; there is no pursuit—Operations of the garrison of Sevastopol
and of the Russian force in the Tchernaya Valley during the
day—Great losses incurred on both sides—Reaction among the soldiery
after the battle.
The Russian reinforcements which, as we have seen, began to arrive in
the month of October, continued their advance upon the Crimea, so that
early in November the hostile forces at the seat of war amounted, all
told, to more than 120,000 men capable of taking part in the operations
of the campaign.[264] The moment had now come when the enemy determined
to deliver his well-prepared attack upon the invaders, and hoped to rid
the Crimea for ever of their presence. It must be confessed that he had
a good opportunity of accomplishing his object, and that every advantage
was on his side. He could choose his own time and place of attack; his
forces were far more powerful than those of the invaders, both in
numbers and in position; and, by the reconnaissance or sortie of October
26th, he found out (if he did not already know it) that our vulnerable
right flank was unsecured by any fieldworks to make up for our other
deficiencies. The onslaught, then, that was to drive us away from
Sevastopol, and to sweep us into the sea, was to be directed upon this
flank, upon ground which our soldiers called Mount Inkerman, and Sunday,
the 5th of November, was chosen as the day upon which to put the design
into execution.[265]
-----
Footnote 264:
Sir E. Hamley, in his _War in the Crimea_ , p. 129, estimates these
forces at 110,000 to 115,000, including the enemy’s sailors. He has,
however, apparently omitted to include men whom he previously counted
as part of the garrison at the end of September (see _ante_, p. 185).
Footnote 265:
See Map, No. 7, p. 216. Properly speaking, Inkerman was on the other
side of the Tchernaya, called by us Old City Heights.
-----
On the evening of the 4th, Prince Menshikoff established his
head-quarters near the mouth of the Tchernaya, and his troops were
posted as follows: The garrison was not increased beyond the numbers it
contained towards the end of October. General Dannenberg, head-quarters
on the Old City Heights, midway between Mackenzie Farm and the head of
the roadstead, commanded a corps of 50 battalions, 1 squadron, and 134
guns (of which 54 were guns of position). This corps was divided into
two columns, namely, General Soimonoff, 19,000 infantry and 38 guns (22
of position), whose troops were temporarily sheltered in the lines of
the fortress in the Karabelnaya; and General Pavloff, 16,500 infantry
and 96 guns (32 of position), concentrated on the Old City Heights. To
the left of Pavloff, there was another force of 16 battalions, 62
squadrons, and 88 guns (15,000 infantry), composed mostly of Liprandi’s
column, but now under Prince Gortchakoff, whose head-quarters were at
Tchorgun. Lastly, there was a body of 4000 infantry and 36 guns guarding
the road to Bakshiserai, somewhere near Mackenzie Farm. Thus, besides
the garrison which amounted to nearly 60,000 men, placed in what was now
a secure stronghold, amply covered and well armed, there was a force of
54,500 infantry, a powerful body of cavalry, and 258 guns available to
operate against the undefended flank of the Allies.
The latter, on the other hand, had received a few reinforcements, but
not sufficient to compensate for the immense losses to which they had
been subjected. On the evening of the 4th, they numbered but 58,000
infantry,—16,000 British, 31,000 French, and 11,000 Turks; and this
small force was further weakened by the fact that the allied Commanders,
totally unacquainted with the warlike qualities of their Ottoman
auxiliaries, would not allow them to develop their value, and left them
no chance to assist in the approaching battle. So far did Lord Raglan’s
prejudice go, that the 6000 attached to the British army, were not
suffered to take part as combatants, and when Omar Pasha proposed to
send him a further contingent he refused the offer.[266] Hence there
were practically only 47,000 British and French infantry left to meet
the grave crisis which now confronted us. These troops were disposed on
an irregular curve which stretched from Streleska Bay (north of Kamiesh
Bay) along the front of the enemy’s lines of Sevastopol to the heights
of Inkerman, thence southwards on the Sapuné Ridge to the Col, where it
ran more to the east, near Kadikeui, and covered Balaklava. This line
measured twenty miles in length, it was unsupported by any central
reserve, and was everywhere in contact with powerful masses of the
enemy.
-----
Footnote 266:
Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , 128; _Kinglake_ , v. 33, 34 note, 41
note. Sir Evelyn Wood says, in his recent publication, that he has
“never understood why these Moslems, who came out so grandly at
Silistria, were considered unfit to fight alongside the English and
French troops” (Wood, _Crimea in 1854 and 1894_ , p. 199).
-----
Menshikoff’s onslaught was to be delivered as the first gleam of light
appeared at dawn on the 5th, when his forces were to be before our
outposts, ready to press the advance home. The principal attack was
confided to Dannenberg’s corps, whose two columns were to converge upon
the British unguarded position at Inkerman,—that of Soimonoff, issuing
from the Karabelnaya by the road that skirts the south bank of the
roadstead, that of Pavloff marching down to the Tchernaya and crossing
the river by the causeway and bridge near its mouth. Gortchakoff was to
support this operation, and endeavour “to seize one of the ascents to
the Sapuné Ridge;” and the garrison was to “cover by its fire the right
flank of the assaulting columns, and, should there be confusion in the
enemy’s batteries, to storm those batteries.” The Russians were elated
by the bright prospects before them. “Future times, I am confident,”
wrote their Chief, “will preserve the remembrance of the exemplary
chastisement inflicted upon the presumption of the Allies.... Heaven
visibly protects Holy Russia. Have the kindness to bring this to the
knowledge of our august Sovereign for the great satisfaction of his
magnanimous heart.” Two of the Grand-Dukes, sons of the Tsar, arrived in
the Crimea, to encourage the Muscovite troops, and to bear witness to
the “exemplary chastisement” about to be inflicted; but the “magnanimous
heart” was not to be satisfied, for Menshikoff forgot to take into
account, what a handful of British soldiers are capable of doing when
sorely pressed, and when protecting the honour of their Queen and
country, even against overwhelming odds.
A general description of the ground known as Inkerman (or Mount
Inkerman) has already been given. The Lancaster battery, now nearly
dismantled, and holding but one gun, had been planted on the Victoria
Ridge between the Docks and Careenage ravines, and more than a mile in
rear, stood the camp of General Codrington’s brigade of the Light
Division. To the east, another main spur, jutting out from the upland,
fills up the space between Careenage Ravine and the Tchernaya, broken by
water-courses which descend into the ravine, the roadstead, and the
river. Into the ravine, there is one water-course, the Wellway, which
joins it 400 yards in rear of the Lancaster battery; and into the
Tchernaya there is another, the Quarry Ravine, through which a post-road
runs connecting the upland with the head of the roadstead. Between the
Wellway and the Quarry Ravine, the main spur is some 1300 yards broad,
and supports a rise, called Home Ridge, that bends to the north under
the name of Fore Ridge, and thence slopes away towards the Tchernaya, in
two spurs, which overlook the valley, and which are divided by St.
Clement’s Gorge, viz. Inkerman Tusk and the Kitspur. On the Kitspur the
Sandbag battery had been erected on commanding ground: it was a mere
short wall of earth, only eighteen paces in length, too high to shoot
over except where cut by two embrasures; it was unprovided with a
banquette, and at this moment it was vacant and unarmed. Astride the
post-road the Second Division was encamped, immediately behind Home
Ridge, in front of which the main spur is contracted to 250 yards in
breadth. But at a distance of 1400 yards from the ridge, the main spur
again widens out considerably, and here there is another rise, called
Shell Hill, flanked on each side by buttresses, West and East Jut, which
the enemy had vainly tried to capture on October 26th. About a mile in
rear of the Second Division, and always on the same main spur, near a
ruined windmill, stood the camp of the Guards Brigade, the Coldstream
being somewhat in rear, and separated from the rest by a narrow ravine.
Thus, in the first instance, available to resist an attack on Inkerman,
there was one division, viz. the Second, of 3000 men and 12 guns;
supported in rear by the Household Brigade, 1300 men, and 12 guns of the
First Division, and, on the left, though with a great obstacle
intervening—the Careenage Ravine—Codrington’s brigade, 1200 men. To the
rear, some two miles from the Guards, lay the northern portion of
Bosquet’s Corps of observation, which at this time was in closer
communication with the Highlanders and Marines, at Balaklava, than had
been the case before October 25th. To the left, were Buller’s brigade of
the Light, and the Fourth and the Third Divisions, distant respectively
from Home Ridge, 1½, 2½, and 3 miles. These latter troops were covered
by the defences which the trenches and batteries afforded, as was also
Forey’s French siege corps, which, as already mentioned, took up the
line from the British Left Attack to Streleska Bay. But no such
protection was available for the division and the two brigades more
immediately threatened in the vicinity of Inkerman.
Though both Commanders of the Allied armies felt anxiety on account of
this exposed flank, nothing was done to make it secure. General
Canrobert paid us the compliment of placing extraordinary reliance on
our troops,—especially the _bonnets de poil_, as he called the Guards;
on the other hand, Lord Raglan, weak in numbers, thought he could not
spare any of his men from the trenches. Still, the omission to safeguard
this vital position with earthworks has never been explained, for as
Turks could have been obtained for this purpose, and as Engineer
Officers were available, the excuse given, like many others put forward
to cover our deficiencies in this extraordinary war, can hardly be
deemed satisfactory. Of the value of works of defence to be occupied in
case of attack, it is sufficient to point out that, if we were
victorious without them, we should have been far stronger with them, and
the battle (if it had taken place at all under these circumstances)
could not have failed to result in greater disaster to the enemy, and in
much less loss to ourselves.
The Guards furnished piquets to watch the flank and rear of the British
army. On the 1st of November a stronger force was considered necessary
to accomplish this object, and the Brigade supplied eight piquets daily.
Six (numbered 1 to 6) mounted an hour before daybreak for twenty-four
hours, under the Field-Officer of the day while the other two (Nos. 7
and 8) were posted as a reserve from sunset until an hour after sunrise,
the whole during the night being placed under the command of a “full
Colonel of the Brigade.”[267] Besides finding three working parties in
the trenches, each 40 to 50 men strong under an Officer, the Coldstream
furnished, on the 4th, piquets Nos. 5 and 8, and again on the 5th, Nos.
3, 5, and 6. Thus before dawn on the morning of the battle, the
Battalion had two piquets (Nos. 4 and 5 companies) coming off, and three
(Nos. 6 and 7 companies) going on duty; so that four companies were
absorbed, and when the first alarm was given, only half the Battalion
(Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 8 companies) were in camp. The Colonel on duty, during
the night 4th-5th, should have been Lord F. Paulet, but as he was
incapacitated by illness, Colonel Upton took his place; moreover,
Lieut.-Colonel Newton, detailed Field Officer of the day for the 5th,
had left long before daylight began to appear. The next senior Officer
was Lieut.-Colonel Dawson, and, when the first alarm was given, he
quickly formed up what remained of the Battalion, and immediately
marched them to the front where the battle was heard, to the support of
the Second Division, who were then seriously engaged with the enemy.
-----
Footnote 267:
_Brigade Order_ , Nov. 1, 1854.
-----
“MacKinnon, Ramsden, and I,” writes Colonel Tower, “were all three
living in one tent, and were awakened at daybreak, or soon after, by
firing in the direction of Inkerman; we thought little of it, as we
were accustomed to alarms, and the piquets constantly fired; but
presently a big gun or two told us it was more than piquets. The
bugles sounded in the camp, and 'fall in directly' was echoed by the
sergeants along the line of tents. We hurried on our arms, as we
always slept in our clothes, and found the Battalion falling in. Vesey
Dawson was in command, on a chestnut horse; Granville Eliot, Adjutant,
on his old grey arab, Bashi-Bazouk. It rained a great deal during the
night, and that memorable Sunday morning dawned a nasty damp foggy
day; the mist was rising from the ground and the brushwood was quite
wet; we could only see a few yards before us, but we could hear the
pattering of musketry, and the firing had been going on fully half an
hour before we came on the scene of action. We left camp in column of
fours, but before we got to the Second Division tents one or two round
shot came right through our ranks, and we began to have an idea how
close the enemy was, and of the serious nature of the business. We
formed line, and advanced through the Second Division tents, many of
which were knocked down and shot through.... We were the battalion on
the extreme right of the army, and my company (No. 1) was on the
extreme right of the Battalion.”[268]
-----
Footnote 268:
Tower, _Diary_ , Nov. 5th.
-----
Meanwhile, what had happened was this. Although we knew that an attack
was imminent, we were unable to tell the precise day on which it was to
take place. The night 4th-5th passed quietly, there was no firing, no
alarm, no spies came to warn us. The sentries on outpost, and the
piquets, heard a rumbling noise in the valley, but the sounds were
deadened by the heavy rain that fell during the 4th and throughout the
night, and they were not sufficiently distinct to induce us to concert
any definite arrangements to meet the emergency. In so far the enemy
acted with caution and ability; the attack came upon us as a surprise,
even though we expected it. He failed, however, to marshal his immense
masses to the best advantage. The orders given to Dannenberg’s forces
were vague, and there was a confusion as to whether both Soimonoff and
Pavloff were to operate on the eastern side of the Careenage Ravine, or
whether the former was to advance along the Victoria Ridge and the
latter against Inkerman. Obviously, had this plan been adopted,
Codrington’s brigade and Evans' division would both have been in
imminent danger; and had either been driven in, the results must have
been disastrous. Fortunately, the two unwieldy Russian columns jammed
themselves together on the broken ground east of the ravine, and
interfered by their numbers and proximity with each other’s movements.
Soimonoff, arriving on the ground a little before his colleague,
commenced the attack with his powerful column. Advancing cautiously and
silently in three lines covered by skirmishers, he had 6000 men in the
first line, followed by 3300 and his heavy guns, and 9000 with the light
artillery in reserve. The latter was the first hostile body perceived by
the British advanced piquets; who, though they could then see nothing,
heard their approach. On discovering them, they opened fire, and these
volleys were heard by General Codrington, who, according to his usual
practice, was near the Lancaster battery reconnoitring to the front with
his relieved piquets, before the day broke. He at once got his brigade
under arms, moved them to the edge of the ravine near the battery, and
lost no time in conveying the alarm to head-quarters and to the left.
Buller then moved out towards the threatened point, and the Fourth and
Third Divisions were in readiness to march.
The enemy soon pressed back the outposts of the Second Division, and the
camp being aroused, the troops formed on Home Ridge; while the 22 heavy
Russian pieces establishing themselves on Shell Hill, opened on the
ridge and on the ground in rear of it: by this means the Russians hoped
to crush the British supports that were supposed to be in their ordinary
place. But, as a matter of fact, we had none there, a single thin line
held the crest, and the fire beyond it succeeded only in destroying the
camp and the horses left behind. While this was going on, the twelve
field guns of the division were neither silent nor inefficient, and
General Pennefather (in command, Sir De Lacy Evans being at Balaklava,
on the sick list[269]) now pushed forward bodies of 200 to 500 men to
reinforce the piquets, who were slowly retiring before the advance of
the masses opposed to them. One of these detachments, 500 strong, under
General Adams, moved to the right, towards the Sandbag battery; and
another, hurrying to the left, soon came in contact with a huge hostile
column which bore down on them in the mist. The Officer in command had
just time to sing out, “Fire and charge!” and the men obeying with loud
cheers, the enemy was driven back, right through the line of his guns on
Shell Hill, before the impetuous onset could be arrested. The result of
this hand-to-hand encounter between a thin line of red-coats and a
strong column of the Russians, was often repeated during the day. The
battle, in short, resolved itself into a series of personal combats
between small British detachments and dense masses of the enemy; the
former, under the nearest Officers, dashing boldly, without supports,
against the latter wherever opportunity offered or danger pressed. There
was no central control, nor were manœuvres attempted; both were
impossible. But the activity, intelligence, and courage of the few—to be
counted by hundreds against thousands—never flagged for an instant, and
the unwieldy forces opposed to us, though so much more powerful in point
of numbers, were shattered and driven back in confusion.
-----
Footnote 269:
He came up later, but refused to take the command out of Pennefather’s
hands.
-----
“No doubt the mist was favourable to the fewer numbers, hiding from
the Russians the fact that there was nothing behind the English lines,
which came on as boldly as if strong supports were close at hand. It
needs some plausible supposition of this kind to account (however
imperfectly) for the extraordinary combats which ensued, where the
extravagant achievements of the romances of chivalry were almost
outdone by the reality.”[270]
-----
Footnote 270:
Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 141.
-----
Soimonoff, leaving 10,000 men in rear of his guns on Shell Hill, made
his first real assault with 9000 infantry, who, to avoid our artillery
fire, moved along the eastern slope of the Careenage Ravine. Part of
Pavloff’s corps, 6000 men, had by this time arrived on the scene, and
they got into the Quarry Ravine, and, bearing across Inkerman Tusk, made
for the Sandbag battery. Thus the narrow flat of the main spur,
connecting Home Ridge with Shell Hill, was swept with fire from the
enemy’s guns, and on one side of it (our left) were 9000 Russians
advancing, while 6000 more were threatening our right front at the head
of the Quarry Ravine and on the spurs in the vicinity overlooking the
Tchernaya. General Buller reached the field at this juncture, with 600
men and a battery from the Fourth Division. To meet the onslaught of
15,000 men suitably supported by artillery, against both our flanks,
Pennefather, therefore, had just 3600 men and 18 guns. Soimonoff’s
advanced troops on our left met with a transient gleam of success; they
captured three guns, which were hurrying into action, and they managed
to push into the Wellway. Had they been able to emerge on the plateau
near Home Ridge, they would have taken the British position in
reverse.[271] But this column was quickly discomfited by a gallant
charge of a few men of the 77th Regiment, and by a piquet of the
Grenadier Guards under Lieut.-Colonel Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar,
posted close by. Nor did the remainder of Soimonoff’s corps hold their
ground, for they also gave way when met by the steady line of British
infantry, and the whole attack upon our left was soon repulsed; indeed,
one of our groups, having driven in immensely superior forces, pursued
them, and halted not until Shell Hill was reached. The three English
guns taken by the enemy were speedily recaptured, and were found to be
uninjured; the Russian General, Soimonoff, moreover, was killed at this
period. Nor did Pavloff’s 6000 men fare any better, though they were
confronted by only 700 to 800 Englishmen. At the head of the Quarry
Ravine, the leading hostile battalions were charged by 200 men of the
30th Regiment, and were routed; while the rest, attacked by General
Adams and the 41st Regiment near the Sandbag battery, were also driven
back in confusion.
-----
Footnote 271:
Apparently this advanced column was composed of sailors or marines,
not reckoned in Soimonoff’s corps; they were, therefore, additional to
it (Kinglake, v. 117).
-----
It was now nearly 7.30 in the morning, and everywhere the struggle had
resulted in our favour. But the battle was only in its infancy.
Soimonoff’s reserve, 10,000 strong, was intact, and the remainder of
Pauloff’s corps, 10,000 men, had arrived, together with his long train
of artillery, which, placed on commanding ground, prolonged the line of
guns from Shell Hill to the end of East Jut. Dannenberg now assumed
command of these 20,000 infantry, and of the columns whose first attack
had failed. He determined to employ his masses against our right, and so
co-operate more closely with Gortchakoff, who, as we have seen, was
manœuvring in the valley, with orders to seize the Sapuné Ridge. This
latter corps had very early assumed a threatening attitude as far north
as the heights for which the Guards Brigade were responsible, and this
fact somewhat delayed their advance to the front;[272] but it was soon
perceived that the enemy in this quarter was making a mere empty
demonstration, that the real crisis was round Home Ridge, and that the
piquets were sufficient in the present emergency to guard the hills
overlooking the Tchernaya. The Grenadier and Scots Fusilier Guards,
encamped closer to the scene of action, were therefore moved forward to
take their share in it, followed soon after by the Coldstream (four
companies strong, under Lieut.-Colonel Dawson, as we have seen), and the
whole came into action about 7.30, when the introductory phase of the
fight was over, and just as the new attack was developing itself.
Shortly after the departure of the Regiment, the two relieved Coldstream
piquets (Nos. 4 and 5 companies), having been kept out somewhat longer
than usual, on account of Gortchakoff’s movements, came into camp, and,
finding it empty, advanced to the front, as did also Colonel Upton. The
strength of the Brigade was as follows:—
Officers. Sergeants. Drummers. Rank & Total.
File.
Grenadier Guards 22 24 17 438 501
Coldstream (6 companies) 17[273] 34 14 373 438
Scots Fusilier Guards 20 23 17 332 392
Brigade Staff 3 (Major-Gen. Bentinck; Capt. 3
Ellison, Bde. Maj.; & Capt.
Visct. Balgonie, A.D.C.)
Total 62 81 48 1143 1334
-----
Footnote 272:
See Kinglake, v. 70.
Footnote 273:
The names of these Officers are: Colonel Hon. G. Upton, commanding
Battalion; Captain Hon. G. Eliot, Acting Adjutant; Lieut.-Colonels
Hon. V. Dawson (commanding the four companies that first left camp,
viz. Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 8), Lord C. FitzRoy, J. Cowell, and J. Halkett;
Captains L. MacKinnon, C. Strong, C. Wilson, H. Bouverie, P. Crawley,
F. Ramsden, and H. Tower; Lieutenants E. Disbrowe, Hon. W. Amherst,
and C. Greville; lastly, Captain Hon. P. Feilding (Acting D.A.A.G.
First Division) is here reckoned as a Regimental Officer, since early
in the day his horse was shot, and he then joined and fought with the
Battalion.
Belonging to the Regiment, and also actively engaged with the enemy,
were Lieut.-Colonels T. Steele and P. Somerset on the head-quarter
Staff; and Captain Hon. A. Hardinge, D.A.A.G. First Division.
On piquet, and holding the heights over the valley against
Gortchakoff’s demonstrations, were Lieut.-Colonels Newton in command,
Wood, and Carleton; Captains H. Armytage, and Sir J. Dunlop; and
Lieutenant Heneage; with Nos. 6 and 7 companies.
Of the Medical Officers, the Battalion Surgeon, J. Skelton, had been
invalided home, November 1st; Assistant-Surgeon Wyatt was present,
also Quartermaster Falconer.
-----
Dannenberg’s advance was directed against the Sandbag battery, a work,
although quite unfit for defence, and worthless when gained, yet served
as a rallying-point, which the enemy endeavoured to capture, and which
we determined to defend. Round it and near it, therefore, there surged
the bloody and lengthened contest in which the Brigade was about to take
a leading and conspicuous part. The attack was of a far more fierce and
formidable nature than those which preceded it, and which were almost as
child’s play compared with what followed. Instead of yielding to an
impulse to fly when the heads of their columns recoiled before our
impetuous charges, as had invariably been the case in the early morning,
the Russians, still assailed by the same dauntless and romantic British
courage, now fought with greater determination; they worked round our
flanks and rear, and refused to be carried back by the retreating bodies
which our men repulsed. The advance, in short, was better regulated,
better fed, and better covered by artillery.
Adams was still holding the Sandbag battery, and had received
reinforcements after his first success; our troops were also at the head
of the Quarry Ravine, where a short wall of loose stones, called “the
Barrier,” blocked the post-road. Little breathing-time was allowed them
after the repulse they had just inflicted on the enemy, and a desperate
struggle recommenced at these points. The small British detachments,
overpowered by numbers and threatened in flank, were forced back; they
retired fighting, and in good order, losing many men, among them General
Adams. Three guns, under Captain Hamley (the late Sir Edward Hamley,
whose book has been so frequently referred to), effectually checked any
desire the Russians might have indulged in to harass our retreat. At
this juncture the Guards Brigade arrived on Home Ridge; and it will be
useful to take a rapid glance at the position as it was at that moment.
On the left, General Codrington was chained to the slopes near the
Lancaster battery, and could not move therefrom without endangering the
whole line. He received, though unwillingly, slight reinforcements, and
his force then amounted to 1400. Later, additional troops reached him
from the Third Division, and some artillery, but the latter were
overpowered by heavier fire, and the one gun in the Lancaster battery
could not be used till near the conclusion of the battle. During the day
he held the ridge, maintained a heavy fire upon the enemy in Careenage
Ravine, and stood ready to oppose any hostile advance that might have
been contemplated up its course. His casualties amounted to about 180
men. Next, in and near the Wellway and in front of it, were the various
groups who had repulsed Soimonoff’s first attack, including the company
of Grenadier Guards previously mentioned; in all, about 1000 men—that
is, allowing for losses, less than a third of the whole force that held
Inkerman during the preliminary stage of the battle. It was not known
that the enemy meant to concentrate all his efforts on our right, and to
leave the other flank practically unmolested, so these men were also
chained to the places where they stood, expecting fresh adventure, and,
if any of them had to be moved to meet an emergency elsewhere, others
replaced them in the position they held. Of the rest, a proportion were
men exhausted or unrallied after their previous exertions, and it is
calculated that some 1400 men only remained to defend Home Ridge and the
Kitspur, 700 on each. As we have seen, those holding the latter were
slowly retiring. Of reinforcements arriving, the Guards, 1300, had just
reached the ridge, as well as 12 guns of the First and 6 of the Light
Divisions. The Fourth Division, 2000, under Sir G. Cathcart, was
approaching, so that some 4700 men and 36 guns might be reckoned upon
for immediate purposes, while 1600 French and other of Canrobert’s
troops were moving forward. On the other hand, the enemy was still very
strong, though he had lost part of the 15,000 troops that first
attacked, some of whom, indeed, were streaming away from the field
panic-stricken, down the Careenage Ravine into Sevastopol, and over the
Tchernaya bridge. But he had his powerful and numerous artillery
securely posted on West Jut, Shell Hill, and East Jut, and, besides the
greater portion of the 15,000 men, there were 20,000 fresh troops. Of
these latter, 10,000 were in reserve, and the other 10,000 in the Quarry
Ravine, in the neighbouring glens, on the post-road, and in the Sandbag
battery which they had just captured.[274]
-----
Footnote 274:
According to the theory of Mr. Kinglake (whose excellent work on the
Crimean War has been largely drawn upon, in preparing this part of the
present volume), the 15,000 men who attacked in the early morning in
two columns, one 9000 strong on our left and the other 6000 on our
right, were so completely shattered by their first encounter with the
detachments of the Second Division, that they _all_ fled away, and not
a man of them took any further part in the battle. Also that, of the
20,000 infantry remaining to the Russians, practically only 10,000
were engaged, the reserve of 10,000 being most of it kept back. Thus,
while 15,000 were dispersed into space with the utmost ease, in an
hour, by very few opponents, almost as if by magic, the 10,000 made so
good a resistance that they were with difficulty vanquished, in three
hours and a half, by the 4700 Englishmen who were on the scene at this
moment, aided by 1600 French, who appeared soon after, and by the
Algerines, Zouaves, and other troops of the same nation, 4000 strong,
who reached the ground between ten and eleven o’clock. Nor is it
alleged that the early attacks of the enemy were delivered by worse
troops than those who came into action at 7.30 a.m. This theory was
evidently not believed by some who fought at Inkerman, and Colonel
Tower is of opinion that when the Guards first entered into the
struggle, they met the Tarutin and Borodino regiments; that is, the
eight Russian battalions which formed the main portion of the first
attack made by the enemy with 6000 men on the Kitspur, and which, by
Kinglake’s account, were not only repulsed, but clean driven from the
field never to appear there again, by the bold onset of 700 to 800
Englishmen.
The losses during the day of the two Russian columns, that took part
in the first attack, before 7.30, amounted to some 5000 men; and this
fact seems to show conclusively that the 15,000 men continued the
fight, as stated in the text, long after the hour when Mr. Kinglake
says they disappeared from the battle-field. The casualties of the
10,000 men under Pavloff, who came into action at 7.30, were somewhat
greater, proportionately, than those of the first two columns. The
losses of the reserve (10,000 men), which to a great extent was kept
back out of the struggle, were proportionately much less. (P. Alabine,
_Notes of the Expedition in 1853-5_ , published in the Russian
language, at Viatka, 1861, gives the losses by Russian regiments.)
-----
The enemy had secured a footing on the plateau of the Inkerman main
spur, and the Guards Brigade, coming up at that instant, were launched
against him, the Grenadiers in front, then the Scots Fusiliers, the
Coldstream following a short distance in rear. The leading Battalion
charged, and drove the Russians back to the crest; the next formed on
its left, and Dawson prolonged the line to the right.
“Thus the narrow strip of height on the beak of which arose the
two-gun work [the Sandbag battery] was thinly edged by the _Tria
juncta in uno_, ranged two deep: the Duke of Cambridge and General
Bentinck in command.”[275]
-----
Footnote 275:
_Our Veterans, etc._, p. 287.
-----
Many of the rifles at first missed fire, for the incessant rain had
saturated everything; but by snapping off caps to dry the channel and by
other means the arms were got to work.[276] The failure to use their
weapons at this crisis caused great confusion, as may well be imagined,
for there was a dense mass of Muscovite grey coats and flat caps in
front, advancing against the Brigade.
-----
Footnote 276:
Some of the nipples had even to be unscrewed (Tower, _Diary_).
-----
N^o 7.
[Illustration:
INKERMAN
_about 8 A.M._
_This map has been drawn from_ Kinglake’s “Crimea” _by kind
permission_.
_The position of the troops has been slightly altered to suit the
hour._
A.D. Innes & C^o. London.
]
“We were almost among them _at once_, we were certainly not
twenty-five yards from them.... They yielded ground and we advanced a
little, showing a most decided front, but they kept pouring a most
deadly fire into our ranks, which began to tell fearfully. The enemy’s
artillery were posted on Cossack and Shell hills, and they had seventy
or eighty guns at least, but the mist prevented their laying their
guns properly for our lines, and they worked the Second Division
heights whilst we were far in advance of that; the road was also a
point on which they concentrated their fire. Big gaps began to be
visible in our line, our dark great coats and bearskin caps towering
above the bushes made our men conspicuous in the grey mist.... Several
times I saw heads of Russian columns coming swarming through the
bushes, the Officers in front waving their swords and shouting to the
men; but directly they saw us there was a hesitation, a huddling
together, an indecision, and a decided tendency _not_ to come on. They
fired quickly and nervously, and generally over our heads; they were
so close to us before they saw us, and they were on lower ground than
we were; if they had advanced in anything like a decided manner, we
_must_ have been entirely swamped and annihilated. But our fellows
stood their ground manfully, and the more the Ruskis came up, the
quicker our fellows rammed down their cartridges and blazed into
them.... Our men were getting very few and far between; our poor
company, No. 1, suffered terribly, but we yelled and screamed and
fired at the columns we saw in our front; they were immensely superior
to us in numbers, ten to one at least, and seemed now to stand their
ground very well; they pressed us _hard_. But determination and dogged
courage kept them back, and not a yard would we yield. The numbers in
front of us increased every second, and we were really hand to hand
with them; the bushes were full of English and Russians mixed up
together. The groans of the wounded, Officers yelling and screaming at
their men, the soldiers shouting at one another, and (I have no doubt)
using their favourite expressions, and the firing almost deafened one.
“The Brigade was getting very much mixed up now.... Several other
regiments and men of the Second Division piquets furnished us with
stragglers who were of the right sort. Our Brigade line, or remnant of
our line, was the rallying-point of everybody who was animated with a
right spirit. Oh, for breechloaders at this moment, how we could have
swept them off as they came up the hill!... I kept taking ammunition
out of dead men’s pouches to feed the pouches of the living, screaming
if I saw any fanatic Ruski that required shooting.... Some one behind
or in the ranks hallooed out, Charge! Granville Eliot galloped forward
right at the mass in front of him, Cowell, Bob Lindsay (Fusilier),
young Greville, and myself were all close together, and we ran forward
with all the men that were near us. It really was a critical moment in
the battle, at least in our _local_ part of the battle. Eliot fell
from his horse, shot through the head; Cowell staggered and fell by
the same bush; young Greville was shot through the body. The enemy was
frantic at this moment; the few men who charged with us were all shot,
and I found myself entirely surrounded by flat caps.... I could see no
one but Russians anywhere near; one fired at me, the powder almost
singed my cap. I could see some bearskins on my right through the
bushes, and accordingly made for them as hard as I could lay legs to
the ground, and I suppose Bob Lindsay and the men who were with us did
the same.
“There was a small two-gun sandbag battery on the crest of the hill,
into which the remnants of the Brigade were retiring; the Grenadier
Colours were already there: the Russians had been driven out of it
just before.[277] There were perhaps a hundred men of the three
Regiments in the little battery, and crowds of Russians hemmed us
nearly all round; we extended men on the left and rear to prevent
their cutting off our retreat and getting in behind us. Column after
column kept pouring up the hill, and every moment our chances of
retreat looked worse and worse. The parapet in front of us was too
high to fire over, and the enemy kept climbing into the embrasures and
up the exterior slope of the parapet; but one after another they fell,
shot by our men as they showed.... We could see lines of bayonets
outside the parapet, and could hear them howling and cheering one
another on; it was now _fearfully_ exciting.... We kept them at a
respectable distance; our line extended some way in the rear and left:
but they kept getting nearer, and our men fell very thick.... Vesey
Dawson I saw shot by a Russian creeping into the embrasure; Sir R.
Newman of the Grenadiers was also killed, and some other Grenadier
Officer fell wounded. Our ammunition was beginning to fail, some of
the men had not had a round of their own for a long time: the dead
furnished the living; but now even that began to fail, and the men in
their excitement threw stones, lumps of earth, anything they could
see, over the parapet among the Russians, and they came back again
amongst us with interest. One of the most remarkable things about
Russian troops is the noise they make in action, and I think it is
catching, as I never heard our men make such a yelling as they did all
this day; I know I was as bad as the rest, because I could not speak
for hoarseness that evening and the next day. How long the game of
throwing stones lasted I cannot say, but it seemed a long time. There
was a visible diminution of bayonets outside the battery, and we had
really driven the enemy back a great deal on our left; it was more
that they ceased coming on than that we were driving them back. We
were still surrounded by them, and they were firing into us as hard as
they could.
-----
Footnote 277:
For their gallantry upon this occasion, Colonels Lord Henry Percy
and Sir Charles Russell, Grenadier Guards, got the Victoria Cross.
-----
“Of course we could do nothing but retire; this we accordingly did,
the Grenadier Colours being our rallying point: but in our weak state,
with only a handful of men, _very_ few Officers, and very little
ammunition, retiring in the face of a body of the enemy was no easy
matter, although the enemy were not in the same strength they were,
nor did they seem to be animated with the same spirit they had shown
previously. They retired from outside the Sandbag battery certainly;
because I remember going outside the battery with several men and
pursuing, or rather firing into the enemy, as there were large bodies
of them below the battery amongst the bushes; I very nearly got killed
for my pains, as I got too far down the hill, and found the top above
me lined with Ruskis, and had to run the gauntlet through the bushes
along the side of the hill to rejoin the remnants of our Brigade with
the Grenadier Colours.... At this moment the _Indigènes_ [the
Algerines] came into action; they were the first individuals that
appeared on the stage, and well do I remember their black faces and
blue uniform coming tearing through the bushes.... When we got to the
Second Division heights we were given ammunition.... As to what
occurred in the front after this I cannot pretend to say, I only know
firing went on with considerable vigour for some time; but the battle
_had_ turned in our favour.
“The French troops advanced in masses down the road and over the
Second Division heights [Home Ridge], but the _real_ fighting all
along the line was over when we retired and when the _Indigènes_
advanced. Some heavy guns on the Second Division hills had cut up
their artillery on Cossack and Shell hills very much; the distant
rumbling of musketry was going on and some heavy firing still, but it
got further off.... I am _perfectly certain_ the brunt of the battle
was over when we were retiring out of Sandbag battery: the sun then
came out, and it was perfectly clear; our heavy guns began to tell
upon the enemy’s artillery on Cossack Hill. The fog having lifted, I
saw the whole battle for the first time when we retired out of the
Sandbag battery; before then, we had been entirely enveloped in mist
and fog. I put this period at about 8.30 or 9, perhaps a little later,
but no Frenchman appeared on the right of the battle till after this
time, 9.30.... I am perfectly confident the Russians were in retreat
when Bosquet’s _Indigènes_ came into the action.... When the
_Indigènes_ came through the bushes, some of our men joined them to
have a last shot at the Ruski, and they probably formed along the hill
in our old position, and peppered into the retreating columns as they
went down the hill.”[278]
-----
Footnote 278:
Tower, _Diary_ , Nov. 5, 1854.
-----
This account of the fierce struggle between the Brigade and overwhelming
masses of the Russians, written in the private diary of an Officer of
the Regiment, gives a few of the confused events that took place
immediately near him. Colonel Tower belonged to No. 1 company, and as
Colonel Wilson was with No. 8 company, a few words describing what
occurred about him may be also reproduced.
“Amid a dense fog raged wholesale murder; the mortal strife was hand
to hand, foot to foot, muzzle to muzzle, butt-end to butt-end. It must
not be supposed that we always stood rooted on our ground, that we
never budged. No, the fight rested not steadfast for an instant. It
was now backward, now forward, now sideways. Here, a Grenadier party,
after a frantic tussle, would be forced by overwhelming swarms out of
the battery; there, a knot of Coldstreamers would arrest the advance
of an entire Russian battalion; in another place, a cluster of
Fusiliers, rallying after a repulse, would fling themselves upon a
column, and with the sheer might of strong hearts, arms, and steel,
send it slap-dash over the height’s crest. This ceaseless wrestling to
and fro accounts for the Sandbag battery being occupied alternately by
men of the different Guards Regiments (or, more properly speaking, by
mixed parties of the three Regiments larded with brave Liners).
Whenever Pavloff succeeded in ousting one band of defenders from the
work, a comrade batch would rush in, and, by a combination of bullet,
bayonet, and gun-stock, thrust forth the intruders....
“Time marches so marvellously fast in battle, that it is utterly
impossible for men, plunged in the _mêlée_, to form an idea of how
they stand with the clock. I have therefore no notion at what period
reinforcements reached us. All I know is, that towards the end of the
fight I saw many Linesmen fighting intermixed with Guardsmen....
Despite melting ranks, despite fresh regiments which continued to
stream up the hillside, despite the growing scarcity of ammunition,
the English clung to their battery with the grip of despair. If, by
chance, the bull-dog’s hold was for an instant shaken off, the next
moment his teeth closed tighter than ever on the sandbags....
“The Russian Officers behaved like true soldiers. They ever were in
front of their less adventurous rank and file, urging them on with
voice and uplifted sword; nay, they rushed freely on certain death,
with the view of inflaming the sluggish spirit of their followers....
And now half the Brigade—a grandiose title for 1300 men—strewed the
ground; some slain outright, others bleeding to death, others vainly
imploring to be carried off the field. Oh! that I must write 'vainly,'
but in the devilish turmoil not a man whom God had shielded could be
spared to carry away the wounded. The honour of England, nay, the very
safety of the army, demanded that all living should be breast to
breast with the Russians.... Meanwhile the Guards seemed at their last
gasp, every minute found them less able—not a jot less willing—to
repel the enemy. Hardly a man tasted food that morning, hence
individual strength began to flag; where companies contended now only
subdivisions struggled, hence collective power was ebbing fast. Nor
was this all, ammunition had become frightfully scarce; in many cases,
indeed, the soldiers had none left, so they were reduced to rifling
the pouches of their fallen messmates; and when that resource failed,
to pounding away at the ugly Calmuck visages with stocks and
stones.”[279]
-----
Footnote 279:
_Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 290, etc.
-----
It is unnecessary to proceed further with this account, for the writer
now gives his experiences, when his excited men, having forced a
superior number of Russians into hurried flight down the hillside into
the valley, rushed after them in pursuit, in spite of their Officer’s
efforts to call them back. It is sufficient to say that any description
of the struggle between the Guards and the masses which Dannenberg
brought against them is impossible. The combatants were in close
proximity, the contest was fought out in a thick fog, and on broken
ground covered with tough hornbeam bushes and oak scrub, so that our men
were speedily dispersed into groups, and few could really say what their
neighbours were doing.[280]
-----
Footnote 280:
The following extract, from an account furnished by a Coldstreamer
present at the battle, will be read with interest: _Sergeant W.
Wilden, No. 1 Company_ , writes:—“Suddenly the alarm came, 'fall in,'
every man rushed for his rifle and ammunition; the order was so sudden
many had not turned out, and several took their places in the ranks
only partly dressed; poor Captain Ramsden was killed in his brown
shooting-suit.... During the early part of the day, I should think
about 8 or 8.30, the atmosphere became so thick with fog, rain, or
mist, and the smoke from firing on both sides, I was not able to see
more than eight or ten of my comrades, and scarcely able to
distinguish the enemy, although within a few yards of him. At this
juncture an alarm ran through our shattered ranks that the enemy was
surrounding us. This turned out to be true, for he was working round
our right flank to obtain possession of the small Sandbag battery....
A terrible struggle took place for possession of this battery; the
enemy pushed his columns to the front in great numbers, and at the
same time his left flank was gradually working round and attacking our
right. At this time I should think about two companies of our
Battalion held the battery. Here our losses were very heavy. We held
it apparently for some time, and kept the Russian massive columns in
check, until an unfortunate crisis happened; our ammunition was
exhausted, and, as our ranks were so terribly shattered, we were
compelled by superior numbers to retire from the battery, or, in other
words, we were driven out, and left it in the hands of the enemy; but
only for a short time, for we rallied and charged the enemy at the
point of the bayonet and recaptured the battery. Here a dreadful
struggle ensued, a hand-to-hand fight took place, in which bayonets
were freely used on both sides, and at one period stones were resorted
to to beat the enemy back from the north-western embrasure....
Although several bayonet charges were made upon the enemy, we were
unable any longer to hold our ground against overwhelming numbers, and
greatly exhausted, we were compelled gradually to retire, at the same
time disputing every inch of ground. Here the enemy gradually
advanced, and many of our wounded comrades were bayoneted or killed by
the enemy. At this moment, the welcome sound of the bugles of the
gallant Bosquet’s division of Zouaves reached our ears; their numbers
enabled them to force the enemy back and regain the position we were
gradually losing. We then retired.... Two long 18-pounder guns were
about this time drawn by hand to replace those dismantled, and were
used until the close of the battle.”
-----
But the main features of the contest are fairly clear. The Russians,
securely posted in the Quarry Ravine, St. Clement’s Gorge, and on the
eastern slopes of the Kitspur, made their main attack against the
latter, and as their assaulting columns were driven from the crest, they
rallied again in the hollows beneath, and kept surging upwards, and
renewing the strife. For some time the Brigade drove back the successive
waves of the advancing enemy unassisted, except by the broken fragments
of Adams' men; but a little later, when Cathcart’s division approached,
some 500 of his troops were pushed forward, and joined in the fray,
while another portion moved to the head of the Quarry Ravine, and
regained the Barrier. The latter, reinforced from time to time, remained
there during the rest of the battle, and though the enemy passed them
by, now as he advanced and again as he retired, it seems he never closed
in on their rear or reconquered the post. Colonel Upton, reaching the
ground some time about 8 a.m., with No. 5 company and a company of the
Scots Fusilier Guards, also coming off piquet,[281] endeavoured to close
an undefended gap which existed between the Sandbag battery and the
Barrier, and he prevented the enemy from seizing its advantages at that
moment. But his force was insufficient to hold it for more than a brief
space, and his men were most of them drawn into the vortex of the
principal fight. Hence, it was not difficult for the Russians, pressing
through the gap, to work round the left flank of the Brigade, and to
penetrate to their rear. Most of the Fourth Division, having been split
up into fractions, were sent wherever the pressure of the battle
required their presence; but a residue of 400 men under General Torrens
remained, and with this force Cathcart hoped to relieve the Brigade in
their arduous struggle, and assail the enemy in flank by descending the
slopes on our right. The attempt, though successful at first, was not
fortunate, and it failed to accomplish the results that were expected
from it. The men soon dispersed in groups, were almost surrounded, and
had to fight their way upwards with the Russians above them. It was
here, moreover, that the valuable life of Cathcart was lost, and that
Torrens (some time in the Grenadier Guards) was severely wounded.
-----
Footnote 281:
It appears that No. 4 company moved forward separately, and joined the
main body of the Battalion.
-----
This manœuvre appears to have changed the principle on which the
Brigade had been resisting the hostile columns, and many who hitherto
never pursued the beaten bodies of the enemy beyond the crest, now
rushed after them down the slopes into the hollows beneath. In this way
the group near Captain Wilson got out of hand, and pursued far down into
the valley of the Tchernaya, where they were met by shots from
Gortchakoff’s riflemen, “who sprang up among the bushes, and blazed full
in our faces.” Meeting some stray groups of Cathcart’s submerged
detachment, the whole party reascended the heights, and lost heavily as
they climbed up. Here they found themselves between two fires, and
ascertained that the enemy was really above them, for at first they
thought they were mistaken for Russians, and were being shot at by
English soldiers. Avoiding this danger, by taking an upwards direction
to the left, they stumbled upon a dead ammunition mule, and eagerly
replenished their pouches, as for some time they had not had a round
among them. Having at last reached the top, they found that the fog had
lifted, that the Brigade was not where they had left it, and that
Zouaves and Algerines (the _Indigènes_) were approaching the ground, and
were driving the enemy back, as Colonel Tower has already told us.
Wilson and the last of his men joined this attack, and many fell; he
finally attached himself to the French 50th of the Line as they
advanced, and then finding he could do nothing more, he sought the
Coldstream, eventually falling in with them near Home Ridge, which he
reached before the shattered remains of the Battalion got there.
From the moment our men began to descend the slopes their means of
maintaining their post on the Kitspur seemed to diminish. Under any
circumstances, the struggle of the few against the many was gradually
exhausting the power of the former, and reinforcements were urgently
required. It was fortunate, therefore, that our allies now appeared upon
the scene. Bosquet, who for some time in the early morning had been
observing Gortchakoff, came speedily to the conclusion that that General
meant to remain quiescent; he therefore sent forward some of his troops
without delay, to Home Ridge, where the danger was most pressing. Two
Battalions, 1600 strong, arrived first; and one, the French 6th of the
Line, pushing towards the Kitspur, struck in flank the Russians, who,
advancing through the gap, which was ever getting wider, were
endeavouring to operate against our rear. This French battalion,
however, soon got into difficulties, and the other, the 7me Léger, was
sent to its support. But before this was effected another crisis
occurred; for, the enemy, urging forward his numerous forces up the
ravines which he occupied, brushed past the Anglo-French then on the
Kitspur, and made a very determined onslaught on Home Ridge itself. This
serious manœuvre was repulsed by the gallantry of a few British
detachments present on the spot, and of the 7me Léger; the defeated
column was driven back, so that the two French battalions were brought
together. It was now 10 a.m., and another French force, a brigade with
some artillery, led by Bosquet in person, reached the battle in two
columns: in the first, some rifles, a battalion of Algerines, and one of
Zouaves (1900); in the other, more Zouaves, and the French 50th of the
Line (2200). There was still a good deal of difficulty in forcing the
enemy to recede; for as the first column pursued him, they advanced too
far, and fresh hostile forces were able to move up the ravines leading
to the main spur, thereby threatening our allies in rear. But on the
arrival of the second column, the Russians, now thoroughly broken by
their losses and by the stubborn resistance which held them in check,
gave up the contest. They were finally driven off the Kitspur and out of
the ravines which had been so useful to them during the struggle, by
enabling them to re-organize after so many repulses inflicted by our
slender forces. Kinglake thus speaks of a band of the Coldstream during
this phase of the fight:—
“The Zouave battalion was advancing ... when the bearskin all at once
reappeared. It was from the wooded steeps of the hillsides that the
spectre uprose. Since the time when last we observed it, the small
band of Coldstream men collected by Wilson had remained in the
brushwood below, watching always for some such occasion as the one
that now offered. Amid a roar of joy and welcome—for the Zouaves and
the Guards were close friends—these Coldstream men joined the advance,
aligning on the right of the French.... What followed was
slaughter.”[282]
-----
Footnote 282:
Kinglake, v. 402.
-----
Meanwhile we had already gained an immense superiority over the enemy’s
artillery. As early as about 9.30, two 18-pounder guns of position had
been brought on Home Ridge, and after a short space of time the power of
the hostile batteries began to wane. The French guns, coming up, posted
themselves on our right, and the bombardment continued with increasing
advantage on our side, though the number of our pieces was not half that
of our opponents. Some of our men on the left and centre of our line
also advanced, and added to the misfortune of the gunners on Shell Hill.
The battle was really decided at eleven, though the artillery continued
to fire till much later. As soon as the bulk of the Household Brigade
returned to Home Ridge, and after ammunition had been served out, the
men were reformed, and were moved up to protect the guns against any
sudden assault. This duty was “worse than fighting the infantry, for we
got no revenge for the men we lost,” and we incurred casualties not a
few.[283]
-----
Footnote 283:
Letter of Mr. Taylor, late Quartermaster Somersetshire Militia, then
in the Coldstream; one shell killed and wounded eight men. Colonel
Upton was wounded at this period. See, also, _Our Veterans, etc._ , p.
299.
The action of the Guards at Inkerman seems to be imperfectly described
in Kinglake. According to that writer, the bulk of the Brigade came
out of action at 8.30; though he notes that the force under Wilson
joined the last attack undertaken by the French about 11 o’clock, and
allows that the companies which followed Upton were in the field as
late as 10. Giving Bosquet’s impressions of the scene presented to his
observation at that hour, he says, “High above on the right, where
there sauntered a red-coated Officer with the _bonnet de poil_ and a
singularly unconcerned air (Colonel Upton), some men of the Guards
could be seen lying down among the brushwood” (Kinglake, v. 382). Yet
Tower and Wilden, whose accounts have been given, state that they were
relieved on the Kitspur by the Algerines and Zouaves—that is, after 10
o’clock; and Wilson who, according to Mr. Kinglake, was on that
portion of the battle-field later than any other Guardsman, tells us
himself that he got back to Home Ridge _before_ the bulk of the
Brigade reached it. Some isolated groups, separated during the fierce
struggle in the fog and brushwood from the main body, possibly found
themselves on Home Ridge before; Taylor says he helped to pull up the
two 18-pounders, which, as we know, took place about 9.30.
-----
The retreat of the Russians commenced about one o’clock, and was covered
by a column of their reserve; which, attempting to advance, was quickly
dispersed by a few rounds of the 18-pounders. There was no pursuit. The
enemy slipped away, and “seemed to melt from the lost field; the English
were too few and too exhausted, and the French too little confident in
the advantage gained, to convert the repulse into a rout.” Our allies,
deducting losses, numbered at the end of the engagement some 7000
infantry, for, besides the troops already mentioned, three battalions
(2400) arrived on the ground at eleven; they also had 700 cavalry and 24
guns present. Lord Raglan was anxious to complete the victory by falling
on the rear of the flying Russians, but his cautious colleague would not
consent; for he still feared an attack from Gortchakoff’s untouched
forces, and was unwilling to expose his men to the fire of the ships
that were moored in the roadstead.[284]
-----
Footnote 284:
Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 157.
-----
While the battle was going on, the garrison of Sevastopol kept up so
poor a demonstration, that we were able to denude our camps of men, and
push them to Inkerman. Besides the men on duty in the trenches, the
greater part of the Third Division watched the fortress, and they were
subjected to no further inconvenience than that which the fire from the
place, intensified on this day, entailed. About 9.30, however, the enemy
made a sortie against Forey’s siege corps, under General Timofeyeff,
with 5000 men and 12 guns. The blow, though it met with some success at
first, failed, and the Russians were pursued by our gallant allies back
under the shelter of the fortress. Thus little was done by the garrison
to assist Dannenberg, and that little was of trifling value.
Gortchakoff’s operations during the day were still less effective. He
made a few feints, fired upon the Sapuné Ridge, and, it is said, did
lose 15 men. He thereby gave the companies on piquet (among them, Nos. 6
and 7 companies of the Coldstream) the opportunity of engaging him with
distant volleys, without apparently causing much, if any, loss to our
side. In short, he did nothing, when by attacking Bosquet, he would have
prevented that General from advancing to our assistance at Inkerman. His
orders were “to support the general attack, to draw the Allied forces
upon himself, and to try and seize one of the ascents to the Sapuné
Ridge.” Mr. Kinglake, however, tells us that these written orders were
explained away by “oral communications” into something different,[285]
and makes us believe that there is a mystery which has never been
explained, hanging over the operations of this Russian Commander, who
held so much power in his hands on that day. What we do know is that
Dannenberg, in spite of his overwhelming numbers, was unable to secure a
footing on the Kitspur, that this was due to the manner in which it was
defended by our scanty forces, and that in this defence the Household
Brigade played a glorious part, and suffered much in consequence.
-----
Footnote 285:
Kinglake, v. 59 (note), 69.
-----
The losses were very great on both sides: those of the enemy, who moved
in heavy columns, being more than those of the Allies, though
relatively, in proportion to numbers at the seat of war, he suffered
less than we did. The Russians had 10,729 killed, wounded, and
prisoners, including 256 Officers. The English 2357 of all ranks, of
whom 130 were Officers (or 39 Officers, and 558 men killed, and 91
Officers and 1669 men wounded). The French 929, among them 49 Officers
(or 13 Officers and 130 men killed, and 36 Officers and 750 men
wounded).[286] The Brigade lost nearly half its effective strength,
viz., out of a total of 1334:—
Killed 12 Officers, 9 Sergts., 1 Drumrs., 177 Rank & file, Total 199
Wounded 20[287] ” 20 ” 4 ” 357 ” ” 401
Missing — ” — ” — ” 4 ” ” 4
Total 32 ” 29 ” 5 ” 538 ” ” 604
-----
Footnote 286:
The above were the losses on the field of Inkerman. The total
casualties on the 5th of November amounted to: Russians, 11,959;
English, 2573; and French 1800 of all ranks (Kinglake, v. 443, 457).
Footnote 287:
Counting Major-General Bentinck, who was severely wounded. Of the
Coldstream Officers serving on the Staff on that day, none were
wounded; Colonel Somerset, however, had a horse shot under him.
-----
The Coldstream suffered in like proportion, but the casualties among the
Officers far exceeded those that occurred in the other Regiments. In
fact, almost all the Officers were swept away. Out of seventeen present,
four only escaped uninjured, viz. Captains Strong, Wilson, Crawley, and
Tower. Of the rest, eight were killed or died soon after of their
wounds, viz. Lieut.-Colonels Dawson, and Cowell, Captains MacKinnon,
Bouverie, Eliot, and Ramsden, and Lieutenants Greville, and Disbrowe.
The remainder were wounded; viz. Colonel Upton (slightly),
Lieut.-Colonels Halkett, and Lord C. FitzRoy, Captain P. Feilding, and
Lieutenant Amherst (all severely). The losses of the Battalion amounted
to—
Killed 8 Officers, 3 Sergeants, 73 Rank & Total 84
File,
Wounded 5 ” 11 ” 107 ” ” 123
Total 13 ” 14 ” 180 ” ” 207
The principal casualties were in the flank companies. No. 1 entered the
action with 50 to 60 men, and No. 8 was slightly stronger. The former
lost one sergeant and 43 rank and file, and the latter two sergeants and
41 men. No. 2 came next, losing 37 men. Where a Battalion has so freely
shed its life-blood in the stubborn defence of the position assigned to
it, it may seem strange that no official notice should be taken of the
death of the Officer who led it into action, and who directed its
movements until he fell, and more especially when in the Brigade to
which the Battalion belonged, no other Commanding Officer lost his life.
Yet this is what occurred with respect to the memory of the gallant
Colonel Dawson, and the feelings of his brothers in arms were not
inadequately expressed in the following lines, written by Colonel
Wilson:—
“The despatch which informed England of this dearly bought victory,
commended the services of many of the living and blazoned the merits
of many of the dead; but from that encomiastic scroll there was at
least one remarkable omission. To the memory of Colonel Vesey Dawson,
shot through the heart while in command of the Coldstream Guards, was
conceded not a passing word of eulogy or of regret. It is melancholy
to reflect that on this humble page should stand the only record of
how as brave a soldier as ever drew a sword, as noble a gentleman as
ever earned the respect of his fellow-men, fought and died.”[288]
-----
Footnote 288:
_Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 306.
-----
We are told that this great victory caused no outward elation among our
troops. A reaction succeeded the excitement of the struggle; the danger
now past began to be realized for the first time; and the men, though
hardened to the miserable scenes which war creates, were almost awed by
the terrible carnage and devastation that met their eyes on the
hard-fought field. The Second Division camp was laid flat, the tents
uprooted and scattered, canvas saturated with blood carpeted the ground.
Our own camp swarmed with the wounded and the dying, and the sight sent
a chill of depression through the few survivors as they returned to
their bivouacs. Everywhere on the narrow space of the battleground the
victims lay thick, some killed, others groaning in agony, and nowhere
thicker than in and around the Sandbag battery, where the contest raged
the fiercest. Here the dead were literally piled up on one another as
they fell.
“The whole battle-field, which could all be seen at a glance, except
where concealed by brushwood, looked perfectly _covered_ with bodies;
between the Second Division hills and the crest of the Inkerman hill
is a very short distance, and the entire action having been fought on
that limited space, there was an awful scene of carnage upon it....
Before evening we got all our wounded off the field; the dead, of
course, remained there, and the poor wounded Ruskis who were a great
deal too numerous to take off.... From the heights I could see the
Russian army winding up the road; the whole country was covered with
troops straggling over the causeway over the Tchernaya marsh; they
were a long time crossing. Arabas full of wounded, guns, etc.,
lumbering up the way, but they had quite enough of it.... Our hospital
was a most piteous sight.... Our poor fellows were all dying or
dead.... The camp was miserable, and I could only thank God I was not
lying in the hospital tent with half my limbs smashed to pieces, or
lying on a stretcher ready to be buried.”[289]
-----
Footnote 289:
Tower, _Diary_ .
-----
Saddest of all, was the cruel thought surging in every mind that many of
our brave wounded had been basely bayoneted as they lay helpless on the
ground, by an uncivilized enemy, who, unable to drive off the few that
held the plateau against him, wreaked his vengeance on the defenceless,
as soon as they fell into his hands. We had ample evidence of this
savagery—established, moreover, by a special inquiry—that cast so black
a stain on the Russian army, for, when our men hurled the foe from a
corner from which he had driven us, we found our wounded stabbed to
death.
Thus was the battle of Inkerman fought and won by small bodies of the
British and French armies, over an overpowering hostile force of more
than 35,000 infantry, amply supported by artillery; who, having stolen
in during the night up to our outposts, endeavoured to break through the
Allied line round Sevastopol, at a point where we were weakest, and
where we had absolutely no defences.[290] The result proved the immense
superiority of our arms over those of Russia; so also does it give us
some indication of what would have happened if we had boldly attacked
Sevastopol at the end of September, before, or immediately after, the
flank march, or even during the bombardment in October. The British
fought with a valour and constancy that surpassed even the glorious
traditions of the past. Led by Officers who hurled themselves like the
old Knight Errants into the thick of every danger, they nobly followed
on with that unflinching steadiness produced by constitutional bravery,
by devotion to their leaders, and by the splendid discipline that was
the predominant characteristic of our Crimean troops. Their bold
extension and their courage in maintaining it, even without supports and
when opposed to heavy columns, made the Russians think that the line of
red-coats was but a fringe of our strength, and they hesitated when they
ought to have acted boldly. We were, moreover, provided with a superior
rifle, and so when the enemy, emerging from the ravines, found himself
met by a heavy and shattering fire, his columns were brought to a
standstill, and he lost the advantage which his solid formation might
have given him. He was far from being imbued with the spirit that
animated our men, and he lacked the determination to close with them.
-----
Footnote 290:
It cannot be insisted too often that the Sandbag battery was a battery
only in name; and that its importance consisted in the fact that it
served as a rallying-point, on account of its being a conspicuous
object, round which the main struggle on the Kitspur raged. Russian
exaggerations have given it a wholly fictitious value; even Todleben,
describing the fight a little after eight o’clock, says that the
Okhotsk regiment (3000 strong) attacked the Sandbag battery held by
their “worthy rivals—the intrepid Coldstream,” that they expelled the
latter, and that nine guns were the reward of this brilliant feat of
arms! (see Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 160).
-----
“Had he, at the commencement of the battle, pushed these columns
resolutely forward, it follows nearly as a matter of course that, by
sheer momentum of his heavy masses, the British lines would have been
broken through and trampled down utterly. It would have been a
question of weight alone. As it was, no devotion, no exertions on the
part of the Russian Officers, could at the outset spur their
battalions to one grand combined rush. Time was frittered away in a
series of persevering but desultory attacks, which were invariably
repulsed, thanks to English valour and English firearms.”[291]
-----
Footnote 291:
_Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 309. It is proper to add that the Russian
Rifle corps, 1800 strong, were armed with as good a weapon as our
Minié, also that some of the British battalions (the 20th Regiment,
for instance, who distinguished themselves greatly in the battle)
carried the old smooth-bore musket, known as “Brown Bess” (see
Kinglake, v. 475).
-----
[Illustration: N.R. Wilkinson del. PRIVATE 1742. Mintern Bros.
Chromo.]
CHAPTER X.
THE WINTER OF 1854-55 IN THE CRIMEA.
Prostration of both sides after the battle of Inkerman—Sevastopol not to
be taken in 1854—Tardy arrangements to enable the army to remain in
the Crimea during the winter—Violent hurricane of the 14th of
November; stores scattered and destroyed—The winter begins in
earnest—How the Government at home attended to the wants of army at
the seat of war—Absence of a road between the base at Balaklava and
the front—Miserable plight to which the army was reduced—Indignation
in England, and the measures taken to relieve the troops—Admirable
manner in which the misfortunes were borne by the British
soldiers—Operations on both sides during the winter—The Turks occupy
Eupatoria; successful action fought there—The Guards Brigade sent to
Balaklava.
The battle of Inkerman exhausted the energies of the combatants, and for
a few days they recoiled from each other, stunned by its effects. The
Allies had gained a Pyrrhic victory; another such victory, and their
forces must be annihilated. The enemy also had received a crushing
defeat, which shattered his military prestige and ruined the _morale_ of
his army. Neither side was in a condition to operate against the other,
and each faced his opponent listlessly, almost helplessly. But
Menshikoff, though disgraced in the field, deserved the gratitude of his
Imperial Master, and had every reason to be content with what he had
achieved; for, he had gained an advantage of supreme importance. He had
put it out of the power of the Anglo-French invaders to finish the war
during the year 1854, and thus, while chaining them fast to the bleak
and narrow upland of the Chersonese, he had the satisfaction of knowing
that they would be exposed to the rigours of the approaching winter.
This result was all the more disastrous to us, since, not having
foreseen it, we were in no position to meet it, and were unprovided with
the means of maintaining our troops in the inhospitable region to which
we had become committed. In short, the Allies were about to be handed
over to foes far more destructive and terrible than those they had
hitherto met. Instead of contending against Russian weapons, they were
now also to struggle with the forces of nature and the fury of the
elements. On the 6th of November it was finally determined to put off
the bombardment, and to winter in the Crimea. The Commissariat
Department, informed of this decision, was then, and then only, ordered
to make such preparations as would enable the army to remain on the
upland. But the tardy order came too late, for in less than ten days the
winter began in earnest, and nothing could then be got ready to save the
troops from the cruel trials that awaited them.
On the day after the battle, the Allies were engaged in burying the
dead, in removing the Russian wounded who still lay on the ground, and
in clearing the field of the traces of the struggle. An invitation
addressed to General Menshikoff to agree to a truce, and to send out his
men to bury their own dead, was refused, for that prudent commander was
naturally disinclined to give his troops so sombre and depressing an
object-lesson of their utter inefficiency in the field. His army,
however, met this invitation in another fashion, and, whether in error
or by design, they answered it by firing upon our burying parties. As
another attack was feared, the front was cleared of incumbrances as soon
as possible, and the wounded were promptly taken to Balaklava. Their
sufferings were considerable; there was a scarcity of hospital comforts
and appliances at the seat of war, and the ambulances in use were
unfitted for the purpose of conveying injured men.
Much affected by the heavy losses sustained by his “First Brigade,” the
Duke of Cambridge came early into the Guards camp, where the few men
present turned out to cheer him.
“Accompanied by his Aide-de-camp, the brave and popular Macdonald, the
Royal General was assiduous in his attentions to the wounded
Guardsmen, sympathizing in cheering tones with the livid wretches that
still breathed, and shedding tears of manly sorrow upon the mangled
clay of those who had completed their last tour of earthly duty.”[292]
-----
Footnote 292:
_Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 314.
-----
The funeral of the numerous Coldstream Officers formed a most sad
procession. Seven—Dawson, Cowell, MacKinnon, Eliot, Ramsden, Disbrowe,
and Greville—were laid to rest in one grave, in a small rocky ravine
near the Windmill. Bouverie’s body was only recovered late on the 6th,
and he was buried by the side of Lieut.-Colonel Hunter-Blair of the
Scots Fusilier Guards, who survived the action twenty-four hours.
“It was really enough to unman anybody; poor fellows! far away from
all their friends and relations; poor Greville, whose death killed his
mother, everybody loved him; we laid them side by side, and I remember
the earth pattering on their poor bodies with dull hollow sound.”[293]
-----
Footnote 293:
Tower, _Diary_ . All the Guards Officers were buried in this spot.
During the winter of 1855, more than a year later, their bodies were
exhumed, and were properly interred on Cathcart’s Hill, where they now
lie.
Colonel Upton, though badly hurt, was able to remain at his post till
the middle of November, and he assumed the command of the Brigade,
_vice_ General Bentinck, wounded, and of the First Division from the
7th, when the Duke of Cambridge was sent to Balaklava, on the sick list.
The command of the Battalion thus devolved upon Colonel Lord F. Paulet.
The Coldstream was, in truth, a mere skeleton of the fine body which
embarked at Portsmouth in the spring of 1854. It only mustered now 11
Officers and 307 men, while no draft,—except a small one of 58 men,
which, having left London on the 26th of October, reached the Crimea on
the 22nd of November,—was on the road to compensate for this serious
deficiency of strength in the field. When news of the battle arrived in
England, strenuous efforts were made to fill up the attenuated ranks of
the army, by sending out fresh battalions and reinforcements to those
already at the seat of hostilities. But the campaign, ever since July,
when we were first encamped near the pestilential lake of Devna, had
sadly drained our resources—far more rapidly, indeed, than the home
authorities had anticipated,—and though recruiting had been actively
going on, the large demands which this war created could not be
satisfied. In this way, the next draft sent to the Coldstream only
amounted to 153 men, and could do little to restore our depleted ranks
to an efficient state. This draft started on the 24th of November, and
arrived in the Crimea on the 18th of December.[294] In France, however,
there was not such a dearth of fighting men as seems to have been the
case in England, and considerable reinforcements were despatched to the
east, so that somewhat later (in February) our allies were able to
extend the siege-works that surrounded the south side of Sevastopol.
-----
Footnote 294:
The average age of the small draft of 58 men reaching the seat of war
in November, was twenty-one, and their service nearly two years. The
averages of the next draft arriving in December, were twenty-one and a
half years and eight months, respectively. Lieutenants Whitshed and
Julian Hall accompanied the first; and Lieut.-Colonel C. Burdett,
Captains F. Burton and J. Le Couteur, and Lieutenants G. Wigram, A.
Lambton, G. Rose, and G. Ives the second. Assistant-Surgeon C. V. Cay
reached the Crimea on November 28th.
-----
We have seen that the omission to strengthen the unguarded flank at
Inkerman by earthworks had led to serious consequences. The critical
nature of the battle made this so clear, that, when the fight was over,
though we had fewer men to spare than were available before, this vital
position was at once placed in a state of defence. English, French, and
even Turks—held hitherto to be an incumbrance—were set to perform this
duty, and Fore Ridge and Shell Hill were soon crowned with works,
commanding the approaches to the scene of the recent struggle, and
securing it at last, as far as possible, from further molestation.[295]
-----
Footnote 295:
Recent events having opened the eyes of authority, the shoulder was
put vigorously to the wheel. Hence the fortification of an
all-important point which, previous to the battle, had either been
considered unnecessary, or had been pronounced impossible of
achievement with the means at disposal, was actually executed with
sorely straitened means after the battle. In a word, few hands
contrived to do what comparatively many hands had been judged
incapable of doing. “Where there’s a will there’s a way” (_Our
Veterans, etc._ , p. 325).
-----
The ordinary routine of siege life had hardly recommenced after the rude
shock which interrupted it on the 5th, when the winter burst upon the
Crimean peninsula with a suddenness and violence that marked a distinct
feature in the story of the war, and brought innumerable troubles upon
the Allies engaged in it. The weather lately had been cold and stormy,
varied upon occasions by short gleams of sunshine and partial warmth. At
daybreak on the 14th, however, a violent hurricane, accompanied by a
deluge of rain, unexpectedly arose, and swept with terrific force over
the country, and not only blew away every tent standing on the upland,
scattered the stores upon which the army depended, and stopped all
communications, but also dashed to pieces or disabled much of the
shipping laden with supplies that were then very urgently needed.[296]
The ground was speedily converted into a deep and impassable sea of
sticky mud, which flew about in large quantities; the temperature fell,
and snow came down. The men of the various regiments huddled together
like sheep, behind bushes or rocks, or wherever they could find some
protection against the violence of the elements. The condition of the
houseless troops was miserable in the extreme, both during the day and
long afterwards, for they had nothing wherewith to repair their losses;
but it was worse with the sick and wounded, who were exposed to the full
force of the cyclone, and to the cold and the rain. A considerable
amount of shipping had been left outside the harbour of Balaklava,
instead of being safely berthed inside the landlocked bay. Of the
vessels anchored in this dangerous position, many went to pieces on the
rocks forming the iron-bound coast; altogether twenty-one were sunk, and
their valuable cargoes were all lost. H.M.S. _Retribution_, with the
Duke of Cambridge on board, narrowly escaped destruction. On that fatal
first day of a severe Crimean winter, the troops were deprived of vast
quantities of ammunition, food, clothing, and forage, and there was no
reserve at hand from whence they could be replaced.
-----
Footnote 296:
It is said that only three tents remained upright in the English camps
(Nolan, i., p. 650). But a fourth, belonging to Lieut.-Colonel
Carleton, also survived, and it was the only one that did so in the
Guards camp. The Turkish tents, placed in a sheltered position, made a
better resistance than ours, and comparatively few were swept away.
-----
The difficulties and sufferings that now overwhelmed the army began with
this storm, but they are clearly to be traced to the aimless manner in
which the campaign had been conducted. The original intention had been
to surprise Sevastopol, but it soon disappeared out of sight, and no
step was taken to capture the town in accordance with the conditions
under which the expedition landed on Russian soil. On the contrary, a
regular siege was gradually commenced, and a completely new plan was
thereby adopted. But the change was never recognized, its bearing upon
the fortunes of the war was not appreciated, and no stores were
accumulated at the base of operations to meet the requirements of the
lengthy proceedings into which the invaders had drifted. This was the
more unfortunate, since, when the allied Commanders undertook the flank
march, and shifted their ground from the north to the south side of
Sevastopol, they found themselves obliged to operate upon a barren
upland which afforded no supplies, and very soon they even lost the
advantage of drawing forage from the valley of the Tchernaya. Thus,
after the 25th of October, if not before, nothing whatsoever was to be
obtained from the land in which the army was established, and every
single article had to be transported by sea from a distance. The battle
of Inkerman at last revealed the true position in which we stood; but it
was then too late, and when the storm destroyed the vessels lying
outside the harbour, which contained considerable addition to our scanty
stores, it must be acknowledged that this position was indeed
deplorable.
Nor should it be forgotten that requisitions put forward were
imperfectly attended to by the authorities in England, and that there
was often confusion at the base (Scutari and Balaklava), which appears
to have been incompletely organized. Owing to these circumstances, many
misfortunes overtook the British army, some of which may be cited.
Though a request was made early in September for 2000 tons of hay, only
228 tons were received in the Crimea by the 1st of February, 1855.[297]
In November an application was forwarded for 3000 tents, and for a steam
mill and bakery, but more than six months elapsed before they arrived at
the seat of war.[298] Again, we have seen that a substantial portion of
the kits were left behind in the squad bags, at Scutari, at the end of
May; also that, on landing at Old Fort, the packs were taken away from
the men. The former seem to have been allowed to remain where they were
stored. But an effort was made in the middle of October, just a month
after they had been left on board ship, to recover the knapsacks, though
apparently with very indifferent success; and the troops remained,
exposed to the severe inclemency of the weather, without any change of
clothing, in the worn-out and tattered garments that had uninterruptedly
done duty day and night from the beginning of June, when they landed at
Varna. Lastly, biscuit and salt pork formed the usual, indeed the
never-varying ration served out to the British soldier. This diet was
his only food, and it produced scurvy, as was only to be expected. To
counteract this plague, limejuice and vegetables were thus urgently
required, but neither was available. It is true that small quantities of
vegetables were sometimes to be had, but then they were sold to the
starving men at famine prices.[299] A tardy requisition was made in
October for limejuice, and half the quantity demanded (20,000 lbs.)
reached Balaklava on the 19th of December; but there it remained almost
unnoticed, and this antidote against the scourge of scurvy was only
unearthed on the 29th of January following; nor was it apparently
ordered to be issued to the troops as a ration, until the middle of
February.[300]
-----
Footnote 297:
Kinglake, vi. 128, note.
Footnote 298:
_Ibid._ , pp. 98, 138.
Footnote 299:
_General Order, Memo._ , Nov. 1st: “Commanders of divisions will send
to-morrow at 9 a.m. to the Quartermaster-General’s office, on the
wharf at Balaklava, for potatoes.... They must be paid for at the spot
at the price of £1 1_s._ per cwt.” _Ibid._ , Nov. 6th: “Those corps or
divisions which desire potatoes should send to Balaklava for them; the
price is £1 1_s._ per cwt.... The money required to pay for them must
be sent at the same time.” It appears that later, after December 10th,
whenever vegetables were available they were supplied to the men
gratis; but as they had to fetch them from Balaklava under
circumstances of extreme difficulty (as will presently appear), it is
scarcely to be wondered that the wearied troops did not always avail
themselves of the boon (see Kinglake, vi. 138, note). It should
further be stated here, that Lord Raglan, “in consideration of the
length of the siege operations, the constant labour the men have been
called upon to perform, the inclemency of the weather, and the
cheerfulness and good will they have manifested in discharge of their
duty,” granted the unusual issue of working pay to the troops employed
in digging, etc., in the trenches, at the rate of, for
Non-commissioned officers as overseers, one for every twenty men,
1_s._ by day, 1_s._ by night; for rank and file, 8_d._ by day, 10_d._
by night (_General Order_ , Nov. 14, 1854).
Footnote 300:
Wyatt, pp. 41, 55. Limejuice, after February 16th, was issued three
times during the month.
-----
Arising directly out of the incomprehensible manner in which this
extraordinary war was conceived and carried on, another circumstance,
more powerful for evil than the apathy with which the necessities of the
army were regarded by the Government, caused famine and distress to
oppress our troops. We had no road between Balaklava and the front; and
hence, when supplies reached the former place, we were without means of
conveying them to the spot where they were to be consumed. And yet the
distance to be traversed was under eight miles. It has been shown that,
of the two roads connecting the English before Sevastopol and the base,
one, the Woronzoff road, was metalled; the other, over the Col, was but
a mere pathway or cart-track: also that on the 25th of October, we lost
the use of the former, and were restricted to the latter. During the
autumn this pathway was serviceable; indeed, so firm and open was the
country, that waggons and guns could easily move across it anywhere. But
when the torrents of rain flooded the ground on the 14th of November,
the whole aspect of the upland became altered, and the track as well as
the plain were converted into a deep morass, over which communications
were rendered almost impossible. The French, with proper forethought,
constructed a good road between Kamiesh Bay and their camps, directly
they occupied the Chersonese; but as all the British troops were
required to push forward vigorously the siege-works, and as we indulged
in the misplaced confidence that Sevastopol would fall immediately after
the bombardment of the 17th of October, we never even thought of
securing our communications, until after the 5th of November, when it
was decided to winter in the Crimea. The rejected Turks, offered by Omar
Pasha, might certainly have performed this important service while the
weather was clear and dry, but the prejudice against them has already
been mentioned, and their assistance was refused. After the battle of
Inkerman we took measures to construct the road, and we acted as we did
with respect to the defences near Home Ridge; tools were hastily
procured from Constantinople, and Turks were at last employed. But it
was then too late. The unfortunate men were unprovided with food and
shelter, and the weather was severe; they died so rapidly that the
living were all required to bury the dead, and in a short time this
ill-fated contingent disappeared altogether.
The scarcity of forage and the want of a road acted and reacted on each
other, and formed the principal causes of the winter troubles. The
horses and mules died of starvation, and it was useless to replace them,
as there was not wherewithal to feed them. The transport, miserably
insufficient as it always had been, dwindled into nothing, and all but
disappeared; troop horses of the cavalry were impressed into this
service, but they too perished. Carriage traffic soon ceased, and an
attempt was then made to convey supplies on the backs of the wretched
beasts that survived. This expedient also failed; the quagmire of
tenacious clay intervening between the port and the front, the famine,
and the exposure to cold and wet, all operated together, and the animals
could work no more. Thenceforward there was nothing for it but to make
the men themselves wade through the deep mud, and fetch up such things
from the base as they required, to keep body and soul together. The duty
was no inconsiderable addition to their ordinary toil, for while they
were decreasing fast in numbers, the labour in the trenches did not
abate. The journey also sometimes took twelve hours to accomplish, and
during the time it lasted they were without food, shelter, or rest.[301]
This miserable makeshift was, of course, entirely inadequate to supply
the troops, and the more bulky or heavy articles, however necessary to
the well-being of the army, could not be brought to camp at all. The
serious error by which magazines had not been established in time at the
seat of war, was repaired quickly by the great energy displayed at
head-quarters, and in December considerable quantities of every kind of
stores were available at Balaklava, but there most of them remained
unused, because, as Government would not supply forage (and it seems it
was not easily procured out of England), there was no transport, and as
there was no road to span the morass, means did not exist of crossing it
and of reaching the front.
-----
Footnote 301:
Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 170.
-----
The winter all through Europe was a peculiarly severe one, and there was
no exception to its inclemency in the Crimea, where the season was
specially cold. All the combatants suffered from its effects; even the
Russians felt it acutely, though housed and provided with a tolerably
fair transport service from their well-stored magazines on the Sea of
Azof. Our French allies also underwent many privations, due to the
general difficulties that affected the invaders established on the
barren upland and exposed to the wind, the snow, and the rain; but more
especially on account of the small _tente d’abri_ which sheltered them
at night, and which was not so useful as our bell tent. But the British
army suffered most. Like the French, our men were sent to trenches
filled with water, where they remained wet to their knees for many hours
during the day and night; but, unlike them, these hardships were of
constant recurrence. Reinforcements were rapidly sent to General
Canrobert, and his force was strong enough to enable him to give his
soldiers rest when their tour of service in the siege-works was
finished. But the British had no such exemption; their numbers were
insufficient for the purposes of the campaign; and they practically were
always at work. Lord Raglan computed that they were “on duty five nights
out of six, a large proportion of them constantly under fire.”[302] If
we add, that they were seldom dry; that they had little or no fuel
except brushwood and roots; that they could not cook their food; that
the coffee served out was in the form of the green unroasted berry;[303]
that the ration of rice failed from the 15th of November to the end of
December; that the boots were defective and bad; and that there was no
warm clothing available until the beginning of the latter month;—it will
be readily seen that the hardships undergone were of no trivial
character.[304]
-----
Footnote 302:
Letter to the Duke of Newcastle, Dec. 26th.
Footnote 303:
Many of the men now existed almost entirely upon the biscuit and
ration of spirit; the camp was often strewed with portions of uncooked
salt meat, and partially roasted or green coffee (Wyatt, p. 40). The
green coffee ceased on February 22nd, and compressed vegetables were
supplied for the first time on the 26th (_ibid._, p. 56).
Footnote 304:
In the Coldstream some warm clothing and blankets were issued to the
men early in December, more were obtained later, and in January a
further supply was procured. Lord Raglan directed (January 6th) that
each soldier should receive a pair of boots gratuitously (_General
Order_ ). The following is the clothing served out to the Battalion
(including the Regimental hospital) between the 6th of December and
the 28th of February: Great coats, 392; trousers, 100 pairs; sheepskin
coats, 459; tweed coats, 29; fur caps, 503; flannel shirts, 147;
jersey frocks, 861; pairs of socks, 1527; flannel drawers, 994; mitts,
993; boots, long and short, 532; comforters, 446; gregos, 55 (Wyatt,
pp. 41, 45, 57). The long boots appear to have given little
satisfaction. On account of the cold—the thermometer sometimes ranging
from eleven to fifteen degrees Fahrenheit,—it was not easy to make the
men take off their boots at night; their wet feet often being swollen,
were pressed by the leather, and thus frost-bite was induced (_ibid._,
p. 42).
-----
Nor did the men’s sufferings end here, for when exhausted by toil and
privations there was no alleviation to those whose health and strength
had given way. So badly organized were the hospital arrangements, that
we are told the climax of misery was only reached in the places set
apart for the sick. Circumstances necessarily made the field-hospitals
in the front rude habitations for numerous patients seized and tormented
by painful complaints.[305] The transport of invalids to Balaklava was,
moreover, a difficult proceeding and an agonizing ordeal; but arrived at
the port, their troubles should surely have come to an end. It was not
so, however, for such was the confusion prevalent at the time, so great
the number of the sick, that they were subjected, if possible, to worse
treatment during the voyage across the Black Sea and in the great
hospital established at Scutari. In short, this hospital was a loathsome
lazarette, “crammed with misery, overflowing with despair,” until Miss
Nightingale and a number of Nuns and Sisters, having arrived on the
scene early in November, acquired such influence and acted with such
admirable prudence and energy, that gradually—the evil was too great to
be arrested at once—order was restored, sanitary conditions were
introduced, and the sick were well tended and cared for by the gentle
and able nursing of kindly ladies.[306]
-----
Footnote 305:
The indefatigable Surgeon of the Coldstream in the Crimea, Dr. Wyatt,
tells us that a marquee was applied for (November 17th) to replace the
ill-ventilated bell tents used as a Regimental hospital. It arrived
next day, but without ropes, and these, though repeatedly demanded,
were only obtained a fortnight later, through Colonel Steele, Lord
Raglan’s Military Secretary, who at last procured them from a
man-of-war. On the 18th of December another marquee was required (the
sick were becoming very numerous), and it arrived on the 29th, also
without ropes and deficient of five pieces of canvas; in this case the
error was only rectified on the 30th of January.
Footnote 306:
Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 172, 179, etc. After the battle of
Inkerman, the depôt which had been established at Scutari early in
June, was re-organized and placed under the able command of Colonel
Lord William Paulet (November 23rd), through whose energy many
improvements in the hospitals were effected (see Kinglake, vi. 437).
An acting Sergeant-Major (Sergeant White of the Coldstream) was
appointed there (November 19th).
-----
The British forces before Sevastopol were rapidly melting away in
consequence of the combination of misfortunes that overwhelmed them.
Diseases of a violent type broke out, and cholera, typhus, diarrhœa,
dysentery, scurvy swept away the ranks; frost-bites were common, and
even men reported fit for duty, were so weakened as to be scarcely able
to continue their labours under the hard circumstances that surrounded
them. The drain was excessive upon our strength in the field, and the
small army was in truth threatened with extinction. Between the 1st of
November and the 28th of February we lost as many as 22,506 men, not
including the killed in action; of whom 8898 had died in hospital, while
the remainder, 13,608, were lying there sick on the latter date. In
spite of fresh regiments and drafts which reached the Crimea after
Inkerman, the total effectives all told at the seat of war, reckoning
the troops at Balaklava, amounted then to only 17,311 men. In January
there would have been about 3000 to 4000 men of the infantry available
to repel another attack of the enemy, had he attempted to repeat the
operation of the 5th of November.[307] The British would have had a
smaller force at the end of February.
-----
Footnote 307:
Kinglake, vi. 202, etc.
-----
The Coldstream shared to the full the calamity which has just been so
imperfectly described. Taking part in the constant duty which exhausted
the army, exposed to the cruel suffering that the winter brought about,
and conspicuously displaying the virtues of strict discipline and of
uncomplaining fortitude which enabled our men to preserve a bold and
defiant front against the Russians, the lot of the Battalion can
scarcely be separated from that which afflicted and honoured its
brethren in arms standing before Sevastopol. Its fate was the same as
theirs, its sorrows were equally acute, its bearing likewise was proud
and dauntless, its glory bright and lasting. But its losses were heavy,
as the following table will show:—
┌────────────────┬────────────────────┬─────────────┬────────────────────────┐
│ │Regimental Hospital.│ Sick │ Remarks. │
│ ├───────────┬────────┤ Transferred │ │
│ │Admissions.│ Deaths.│ to Scutari. │ │
├────────────────┼───────────┼────────┼─────────────┼────────────────────────┤
│Nov. (including │ 277 │ 22 │ 153 │ Eight died of cholera │
│ at Inkerman) │ │ │ │ and eleven of wounds. │
│December │ 221 │ 17 │ 99 │ —— │
│January │ 186 │ 37 │ 91 │The average daily │
│ │ │ │ │ sick was more than │
│ │ │ │ │ sixty-three per cent. │
│ │ │ │ │ of strength present. │
└────────────────┴───────────┴────────┴─────────────┴────────────────────────┘
On the 1st of November the effective strength of all ranks in the field
was 600 Officers and men; 1st of December, 451; 1st of January, 353; 1st
of February, 173; and at the end of February there were fewer than
100.[308]
-----
Footnote 308:
Wyatt, p. 58. It should not be forgotten that the two drafts which
reached the Battalion on November 22nd and December 18th, numbered
together 211 men. It appears that there was considerable sickness and
mortality among the young and unseasoned soldiers who composed the
drafts. Of the Officers invalided during the winter (November to
February), were Captain Wilson (November 22nd) and Captain Strong
(January 1st); Captain Hardinge, moreover, had to leave the Crimea on
account of his health (December 24th), and returned the following May.
-----
But there was an end at last to these mournful circumstances that
oppressed our forces fighting in the Crimea; and with the first peep of
spring a new era of hope dawned upon the army. The news of the winter
troubles roused a strong feeling in England, and the nation was stirred
to its depths with sympathy for its brave and suffering soldiers, of
whom no country had more reason to be proud, and with resentment against
the supposed delinquents who were accused of bringing about the
disaster. Greater activity and energy were displayed at home, and a
railway was begun to connect Balaklava with the front, so that by the
end of March it reached the Col on the edge of the upland, at a time
when the road, constructed by ourselves and the French, was made to the
same place. A Land transport service was also at length organized.
Subscriptions were collected, and clothing, food, stores, and even
luxuries poured into the Crimea, and into the hospitals established at
and near Scutari. The Government was overturned, and a Commission of
inquiry was instituted, both in England and at the seat of hostilities,
to report upon every circumstance connected with the war. The result of
these investigations, as well as the conclusions arrived at by another
that sat later (in 1856), need not be alluded to in this volume. But one
point cannot be omitted which deals with the conduct of the troops, who,
in the dark hour of trial, did honour to their Queen, to their country,
and to their noble profession.
“Great Britain,” says the report of the Commissioners sent to the
Crimea, “has often had reasons to be proud of her army, but it is
doubtful whether, the whole range of military history furnishes an
example of an army exhibiting, throughout a long campaign, qualities
as high as have distinguished the forces under Lord Raglan’s command.
The strength of the men gave way under excessive labour, watching,
exposure, and privation; but they never murmured, their spirit never
failed, and the enemy, though far outnumbering them, never detected in
those whom he encountered any signs of weakness. Their numbers were
reduced by disease and by casualties to a handful of men, compared
with the great extent of the lines which they constructed and
defended, yet the army never abated its confidence in itself, and
never descended from its acknowledged military pre-eminence. Both men
and Officers, when so reduced that they were hardly fit for the
lighter duties of the camp, scorned to be excused the severe and
perilous work of the trenches, lest they should throw an undue amount
of duty upon their comrades; yet they maintained every foot of ground
against all the efforts of the enemy, and with numbers so small that,
perhaps, no other troops would even have made the attempt. Suffering
and privation have frequently led to crime in armies as in other
communities, but offences of a serious character have been unknown in
the British army in the Crimea ... intemperance has been rare. Every
one who knows anything of the constitution of an army must feel that,
when troops so conduct themselves throughout a long campaign, the
Officers must have done their duty and set the example.”[309]
-----
Footnote 309:
First Report, 1855, pp. 2 and 3.
-----
The Russians, on the other hand, except for the great labour and care
expended on the fortress, remained almost quiescent during the winter
months. Restricting their energies to the defences of Sevastopol and to
the annoyance of the besiegers, they made the fortress exceedingly
strong, and pushed advanced works in front of the line they had already
occupied. The greater portion of their field army was brought into the
town to reinforce the garrison, the remainder being quartered in the
neighbouring villages, or in the Tchernaya Valley. But no offensive
operations were undertaken, notwithstanding their immensely superior
numbers; and this was the more fortunate, since in the midwinter our
forces were so weakened that the English trenches were guarded by only
350 men. This extraordinary inactivity on the part of the enemy has
excited astonishment, and it may well be asked—
“how it was that an enemy who possessed such enormously superior
forces in men and material, and who could, at any time during a period
of months, have directed on some selected point of the siege-works
thousands of troops that would have found only hundreds to meet them,
did not muster the courage for such an enterprise, when it promised
deliverance to the fortress and ruin to their foes.”[310]
-----
Footnote 310:
Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 194. Whether the Russians were
destitute of the necessary courage to take advantage of the obviously
favourable chances that the winter offered them of sweeping away the
feeble residue of frozen and plague-stricken Englishmen that still
survived before Sevastopol, or whether their conduct was the result of
a deliberate design, may perhaps be revealed at some future time, when
eventual consequences of the Crimean war have been fully developed. It
may easily be imagined that the Government of St. Petersburg shrank
from converting the existing war of cabinets, hitherto purely local,
into a general struggle of nations and principles (Klapka, _War in the
East_ , p. 101). For had Great Britain been driven from the Crimea,
she would surely have taken her revenge, and have removed the contest
from a barren and useless fortress, where unhappily she became
involved, to a vital point in the armour of her foe. If there were to
be a war at all, it is obvious that the struggle for Sevastopol was
the least expensive and the most advantageous form of hostilities that
the Tsar could engage in; he lost comparatively little if the contest
should prove adverse to his arms, more especially if he could prolong
his resistance against the united efforts of the two great Powers of
Europe. The more he succeeded in doing this, the more he gained a
fictitious prestige, the more he exhausted our resources, by the
dissolving process which the winter must surely effect, and the more
he made the Western nations beware for the future how they again
attempt to thwart his plans.
-----
On the part of the Allies, the approaches to the fortress were pushed
forward with considerable activity, both by ourselves and by the French,
but there was little actual fighting except what was brought about by
the siege operations. In the beginning of February, the French, who,
thanks to the liberal supply of men sent to the seat of war, were
growing in numbers, undertook to extend the siege-works on our
right;[311] thus continuing the line of trenches towards the roadstead
of Sevastopol. Bosquet’s Corps was employed for this purpose. Another
element of strength was brought into the field during the winter, to
which brief allusion must be made. It was at last determined that Omar
Pasha’s army should be removed to the Crimea from Bulgaria, where it was
unable to influence the course of hostilities; the concentration was
effected at Eupatoria, and, on the 17th of February, before the movement
was complete, the Turkish force there amounted to 23,000 men. The
Russians, having reinforced the troops they had in this part of the
peninsula to 20,000 men, attacked the place on that date, and were
repulsed with a loss of some 800 men. This success seems to have been
decisive, in so far that the Allies now held firmly a point within
striking distance of the enemy’s communications through the isthmus of
Perekop; but its value was considerably lessened by the following fact.
In the autumn of 1854, General Menshikoff was dependent upon this line
to draw reinforcements from Bessarabia, and, as he found it open, he
advanced freely along it, and reached Sevastopol before the 5th of
November, as has been already related. This advantage gained, the road
through Perekop became of comparatively minor importance, and the enemy
thenceforward relied upon the line from the Sea of Azof. His
communications in this quarter could, of course, only be threatened by a
force based somewhere in the neighbourhood of Kertch; but that place was
avoided, and Eupatoria was selected. Hence the achievement of the 17th
of February, while it might have been followed by satisfactory results
had it taken place early in October, was, to a certain extent, a barren
victory, and served only to show that our Turkish auxiliaries were
capable of performing some service in the war.[312]
-----
Footnote 311:
Our allies had 56,000 men in the Crimea in November, 65,000 in
December, and 78,000 in January (Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p.
176).
Footnote 312:
Colonel (now Field-Marshal Sir Lintorn) Simmons was present with Omar
Pasha as British Commissioner with the Turkish army. He served in that
capacity from the summer of 1853, until the end of the war.
-----
The Guards Brigade, having suffered so severely at Inkerman, and being
the only infantry force in the front composing the First Division (the
Highlanders occupied Balaklava since the 25th of October), it was
necessary to reinforce that division by adding thereto the 97th Regiment
(November 23rd). This regiment was armed with the old smooth-bore
musket, but as sickness diminished the ranks, the Minié rifles of
non-effective Guardsmen were handed over to the survivors of the 97th
and of other corps similarly situated. On the 22nd of November the
position of the camps of the Grenadiers and Scots Fusiliers were moved
to the spot where the Coldstream was established. Two days later, a new
disposition of the piquets was ordered; of the eight furnished by the
division, six were found by the Brigade and two by the 97th. The
strength of these piquets, 50 men each, allowed a double sentry every
fifty paces of the entire front; three piquets were placed in reserve,
and all were “to be encouraged in making fires, as it is desirable that
our full strength should be estimated.”[313] On the 25th of December the
piquets were reduced to 30 rank and file each.
-----
Footnote 313:
_Divisional Memo._ , Nov. 24, 1854.
-----
During Colonel Upton’s absence at Balaklava on sick-leave, Colonel
Lockyer commanded the Division until the 15th of January, when the
former returned to the front; the senior Guards Officer present
commanded the Brigade during this interval. Colonel Lord Frederick
Paulet was also away on the sick-list until the 16th of January, and the
Battalion during this time was under Lieut.-Colonel Newton; Captain
Armytage was appointed acting Adjutant, vacant by the death of Captain
Eliot. On the 17th of January the Brigade lost the services of their
Paymaster, Captain South (late 20th Regiment), who, having been present
with them ever since they left England, was obliged to leave the Crimea
through ill-health. His duties were undertaken by a committee, composed
of Colonel Hamilton (Grenadiers), president, and Lieut.-Colonel
Stephenson (Scots Fusilier Guards), and Captain Sir J. Dunlop
(Coldstream), members.
On the 26th of November the Household Brigade furnished a detachment of
200 men, under a Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel, to the neighbourhood of
the monastery of St. George, on the coast west of Balaklava, for the
purpose of making gabions, which were required for the siege-works. Of
these, the Coldstream provided 70 men with Officers, and
Non-commissioned officers in proportion. The detachment was relieved by
a similar party on the 21st of December, and again on the 20th of
January by 150 men, each Battalion finding a Subaltern Officer and 50
men, with the usual number of Non-commissioned officers.
Major-General Lord Rokeby arrived in the Crimea on the 2nd of February,
and assumed the command of the First Division and of the Brigade, when
Colonel Upton reverted to the Battalion. But not for long, for, owing to
the promotion of the Lieut.-Colonel of the Regiment (Colonel Hon. A.
Upton), he was gazetted to that command (February 20th), and left soon
after to take up his duties in London.[314] By this change Lord
Frederick Paulet
-----
became Major of the 2nd Battalion, and Colonel Gordon Drummond obtained
the command of the 1st; at the same time Lieut.-Colonels Daniell and
Perceval were posted to the latter, and Newton to the former (Acting
Majors, mounted).[315]
-----
Footnote 314:
In parting from the Battalion when it was still before the enemy, and
after having held the command during a very eventful period, Colonel
Upton issued an order of which the following is an extract: “He has
known their gallantry and firmness before the enemy, their endurance,
and their discipline under every trial and pressure.... To the young
soldiers one word at parting: let them ever hold in view the conduct
and bearing which have characterized their older comrades, that they
in their turn may pass them on to others, and so uphold and carry
forward the name of the distinguished Regiment of which they now form
a part.”
Footnote 315:
Lieut.-Colonel Stepney, Captains Markham, Blackett, and Caulfeild, and
Lieutenant Lane-Fox, joined the Battalion in January, February, and
March.
-----
When the sick of the Battalion left the front for Scutari, no
information regarding them was obtained by the Regimental authorities,
and to correct this serious inconvenience, a Captain and
Lieutenant-Colonel from each Battalion of the Brigade was sent to
inspect the hospitals where Guardsmen were treated, and to arrange a
more proper system for future adoption (February 16th). Lieut.-Colonel
Dudley Carleton, who represented the Coldstream, reported that the
admission of men into hospital, as well as the patients' death or
discharge, were imperfectly registered:
“their kits were either stored or condemned without regular authority,
or were left in the hold of transports, carried up and down during
many voyages, and not unfrequently plundered. When a man died, no
regular record was kept or transmitted to his regiment, although
professedly done. No returns whatever had been sent to the Battalion
of men dead, invalided home, or otherwise employed.”[316]
-----
Footnote 316:
Wyatt, 53. The three Officers were, Lieut.-Colonels Hon. C. Lindsay,
D. Carleton (now Lord Dorchester), and Hon. S. Jocelyn (now Earl of
Roden).
-----
Colonel Carleton remained absent six weeks, and during this time he
established a system of fortnightly returns, which thenceforward were
regularly despatched to the Crimea, and he placed a sergeant of the
Coldstream on the staff of the hospital at Scutari to carry it out.
It has already been mentioned that the winter troubles added to the
losses incurred at Inkerman, and, in the absence of sufficient
reinforcements from home, had destroyed the efficiency of the Brigade at
the seat of war. At the end of January the three Battalions could hardly
muster a tenth of their proper strength, and numbered only some 312 men
able to do duty.[317] Lord Rokeby seems to have been so struck with
their exhausted appearance, that he endeavoured to obtain for them an
exemption from trench duty for a time; but as the Order book shows them
to be still continually at work, it is evident that it was not possible
to comply with the proposal. Towards the end of February, however, it
was found absolutely necessary to make a complete change, and to move
them to Balaklava, there to rest and to recruit their strength after the
very arduous labours in which for so long they had been engaged.
Accordingly, on the 22nd, the Grenadiers marched there, followed by the
Coldstream on the 24th, and by the Scotch Fusilier Guards about the same
time. In the Regiment there were less than 100 men of all ranks on
parade. For some time previously it had become manifest that, if the men
continued to live under existing conditions, it was but a question of
time how long the Battalion could survive except on paper. Of the sick
left behind, 41 followed on the 27th, and 75 were conveyed next day by
French mule transport (the usual conveyance lent us by our allies, and
indeed the only transport procurable, since our own arrangements had
broken down), but the last detachment was not removed to Balaklava until
the 28th of March.[318] The Guards remained at the base till June, 1855,
and though absent more than three months from the front, they missed
little chance of performing any useful military service.
-----
Footnote 317:
Kinglake, vi. 204, quoting from the _Report of the Sevastopol
Commission_ .
Footnote 318:
Wyatt, pp. 54, 65.
-----
[Illustration:
REGIMENTAL
1669
COLONEL LIEUT: COLONEL MAJOR N^o. IV COMP^S.
1684
COLONEL LIEUT: COLONEL N^o. VI COMPANY
1685
N.R. Wilkinson del. A.D. Innes & C^o. London. Mintern Bros.
Chromo.
]
CHAPTER XI.
THE FALL OF SEVASTOPOL.
Stay of the Brigade at Balaklava—Improvement in the condition of the
men—Return of the Guards to the front, June 16th—Changed aspect of
affairs before Sevastopol—Review of events during the time spent at
Balaklava—Second bombardment—Interference by Napoleon III. in the
course of the war; operations paralysed—General Canrobert resigns,
and is succeeded by General Pélissier—Energy displayed by the
latter—Third bombardment—Fourth bombardment; assault on
Sevastopol—Its failure—Death of Lord Raglan; succeeded by General
Simpson—Siege operations continued—Battle of the Tchernaya—Fifth
bombardment—Sixth bombardment; second assault—The Malakoff is
captured—Fall of the south side of Sevastopol—The Russians evacuate
the town, and retreat to the north side—State in which the Allies
found Sevastopol.
There are few incidents of Regimental interest to record during the stay
at Balaklava. The men were lodged in huts, but as these were situated
near a burial ground and close to the stables of the Land Transport
Corps, the advantages gained by a change from the fatigues and hardships
of the siege to the base of operations were sadly diminished, and
several cases of maculated fever for the first time appeared. In March,
another site having been selected on the west side of the harbour, in a
more favourable and sanitary position, and huts having been constructed,
the Battalion moved there towards the end of the month. The better food,
the shelter, the increased comfort, and the rest now enjoyed by the men,
produced a satisfactory effect upon their health, to which the
improvement in the weather also contributed; for, the short, though
terribly severe winter had passed away, and with the spring the
temperature became warm and pleasant. During March, 101 men were
admitted into hospital, of whom 24 were suffering from typhus, and the
mortality amounted to 10; while next month, 53 men only were admitted,
and but 5 deaths occurred.[319]
-----
Footnote 319:
Wyatt, p. 65.
-----
The Battalion were employed principally in the ordinary duties performed
at the base of operations, guarding the stores and buildings or other
places set apart for the use of the army, and unloading the ships that
arrived in Balaklava. Drills were carried out, and the troops practised,
in occupying the trenches at night, to meet any sudden attack which the
enemy might contemplate. The danger of such an attack was lessened by
the fact that the enemy had relaxed his hold, as far back as the end of
December, upon the heights on the left bank of the Tchernaya, captured
by him on the 25th of October, though he continued to occupy the line of
the river. It was still necessary to restrain his activity in this
quarter, and several reconnaissances took place to prevent his advance.
As was only natural, the Officers at Balaklava, when off duty, rode
frequently to points where operations of interest were being undertaken,
but the Brigade itself was not engaged at this period.
The gabion-making detachment was continued near Balaklava, to supply the
siege-works before Sevastopol.
Early in March, convalescents from Scutari, wounded at the Alma and at
the Inkerman, returned to the Battalion, but the next draft did not
arrive until the 1st of May, when 7 Officers and 307 men, whose average
age and service were 22-1/12 years and 7 months respectively, landed in
the Crimea.[320] Owing to the Regimental promotion which had taken
place, Colonels Lord F. Paulet (commanding the 2nd Battalion) and
Newton, and Lieut.-Colonel Wood were now ordered home to the 2nd
Battalion; while Colonel Gordon Drummond assumed the command of the 1st
Battalion, Colonels Daniell and Perceval being Acting Majors (mounted),
as has already been stated. About this time, also,[321] Officers were
posted to companies as follows:—
No. 1 Company: Captains F. Burton, H. Tower, and C. Blackett.
(Subsequently Lieut.-Colonel Lord C. FitzRoy.)
No. 2 Company: Lieut.-Colonel C. Burdett; Captain M. Heneage; Lieutenant
St. V. Whitshed.
No. 3 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Herbert Stepney; Captain Le Couteur;
Lieutenant Rose.
No. 4 Company: Lieut.-Colonel W. Dawkins; Captain Hon. R. Drummond;
Lieutenant H. Lane.
No. 5 Company: Major P. Crawley; Lieutenants A. Lambton, Lane-Fox.
No. 6 Company: Captain Sir J. Dunlop; Lieutenant A. Adair. (Subsequently
Major C. Baring.)
No. 7 Company: Lieut.-Colonel C. Cocks; Captain J. Caulfeild; Lieutenant
G. Ives.
No. 8 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Dudley Carleton; Captains A. Thellusson,
Gerald Goodlake; Lieutenant Godfrey Wigram.
-----
Footnote 320:
The Officers were: Colonels Gordon Drummond, Daniell, and Perceval;
Lieut.-Colonel Cocks; Captain Thellusson; and Lieutenants Adair, and
Lane. Shortly afterwards Lieut.-Colonel Lord C. FitzRoy (wounded at
Inkerman) and Major C. Baring (wounded at the Alma) reached the seat
of war; Assist.-Surgeon T. Rogers arrived on June 15th.
Footnote 321:
_Battalion Order_ , May 4, 1855.
-----
As the summer approached, the weather became extremely hot, and towards
the middle of May, 90 degrees were registered in the shade. Cholera
again broke out among the troops, but, warned by the visitation of this
plague in the previous year, every precaution then known to medical
science was taken to avert it. The number of sick increased during May
and June, the admissions into hospital being in the first month 134, and
the deaths 5, and in the second month 267 and 36 respectively; of the
latter, 24 men died of cholera.
On the 16th of June, the Brigade returned to the front to join in the
operations which were intended to be undertaken by the Allies on the
18th, the anniversary of the battle of Waterloo.[322] The Battalion was
488 strong (excluding Officers). Three Officers and 61 men were left
behind sick, as well as 15 convalescents; altogether 111 men were
abstracted from the effective strength. On reaching the upland the old
positions were scarcely to be recognised by the rank and file who had
remained more than three months at Balaklava. The French having already
extended the British Right Attack, occupied the ground in front of the
Karabelnaya from the Dockyard Ravine, past the Careenage Ravine, and
along Mount Inkerman to the heights overlooking the roadstead.
Innumerable siege-works cut up the plateau, the lines were pushed
further forward, a large force was concentrated on the spot, and the
face of the country—so bleak and barren in February—was now covered with
the green carpet of a luxuriant vegetation.
-----
Footnote 322:
The Highland Brigade marched up with the Guards, and thus the First
Division, under Lieut.-General Sir Colin Campbell, was once more
complete before Sevastopol. Shortly afterwards the following changes
were made in the British army. The Highlanders were separated from the
Guards, and having several battalions added to them, formed the
“Highland Division,” commanded by Sir Colin Campbell. Lord Rokeby,
promoted locally Lieut.-General, commanded the First Division, formed
of the Guards Brigade, under Brigadier-General Craufurd; and of the
2nd Brigade, viz. a battalion of the 9th, 13th, 31st Regiments, and of
the Rifle Brigade, under Colonel Ridley. About the same time, the
Second, Third, Fourth, and Light Divisions were commanded by
Major-Generals Markham, Eyre, H. Bentinck, and Lieut.-General Sir W.
Codrington respectively. The Cavalry, under Lieut.-General Sir J.
Scarlett, was divided into three brigades: the Heavy, Light, and
Hussar brigades.
-----
We must now take a hasty glance at the state of affairs prevailing
before Sevastopol and elsewhere, which controlled the war, while the
Guards were at Balaklava. In spite of the united efforts of the British
and French occupying the ground before the Malakoff, the enemy succeeded
in extending his works to his front, and in materially strengthening the
lines that covered the Karabelnaya. The fact was becoming more apparent
that General Canrobert, gallant soldier though he was, was not disposed
to risk the chances of making a bold move against the Russians; and that
the latter, under the distinguished leadership of Colonel Todleben, were
enabled thereby to prolong the struggle.
But Canrobert was not entirely his own master in this matter, for
towards the beginning of the year 1855 the Emperor Napoleon interfered
with the conduct of the operations in the Crimea, in a manner to impede
seriously the progress of hostilities. Declaring himself to be
dissatisfied with the course pursued, the Emperor conceived the idea of
delaying the siege until he could isolate Sevastopol from the rest of
the peninsula; and he even proposed to go himself to the Crimea to carry
out his design. He was happily dissuaded from undertaking this latter
part of the project—dangerous both on account of his inexperience in
war, and because of the instability of his authority in Paris,—and it
was finally abandoned, after he had been received as a guest at Windsor
(April 25th); but he still adhered to his determination to enforce some
hazy plan which his vanity had formed, and thereby he increased
considerably the difficulties of the Allies.
Added to this, there was a renewal of negotiations at Vienna. The Tsar
Nicholas died early in March, and though his successor Alexander II. was
clearly in the hands of the war faction, some feeble attempt was made to
patch up a peace. The negotiations failed; but the events alluded to
could not but exercise some influence over the fortunes of the war, by
fettering the action of the French army engaged in it.
This appears to be shown by the results that followed the second
bombardment of Sevastopol, which commenced on the 8th of April. Immense
preparations had been made to ensure its success, and it was confidently
expected by the Allied hosts that this bombardment would at last lead to
an immediate and triumphal assault of the fortress.
“Ten days did the terrific storm of iron hail endure; ten days did the
Russian reliefs, holding themselves ready to repel attack, meet wounds
and death with a constancy which was of necessity altogether passive.
On the 19th they saw the fire of the Allies decline, and settle into
its more ordinary rate; they saw too, that the sappers were again at
work with their approaches, and reading in this the signs of a
resumption of the siege, and the abandonment of the policy of assault,
they once more withdrew their sorely harassed infantry to places of
shelter and repose. Then they began to reckon their losses, which
amounted for the ten days, in killed and wounded, to more than 6,000
men. The French lost in killed and disabled, 1,585 men; the English,
265.”[323]
-----
Footnote 323:
Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 212.
-----
All this expenditure of lives and of war _matériel_ effected just
nothing, nor was anything even attempted against the enemy; for the
French, though having an opportunity to assault, not possessed at that
time by their British allies, were “kept waiting for Louis Napoleon, and
were restrained from engaging in any determined attack.”[324]
-----
Footnote 324:
Kinglake, vii. 195; compare Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 225.
-----
In order to accomplish the views of the Emperor Napoleon, a French army
of reserve was being collected near Constantinople, and as it was
expected soon to reach the Crimea—to undertake the plans which had been
sketched out in Paris,—two important operations against the enemy were
delayed. First, a further bombardment, arranged to take place at the end
of April, and to be followed by an assault, was put off; and secondly,
an expedition, at last agreed to, against the Russian communications in
the Sea of Azof, and which had actually started to Kertch (May 3rd), was
recalled.[325] Both these events caused much embarrassment to Lord
Raglan, who, understanding imperfectly even then the Emperor’s
proposals, found his own plans thwarted by the supine and unintelligible
conduct of his colleague. The confidence reposed in the latter was
naturally shaken; and when, a few days later, Napoleon’s scheme was
fully revealed to the allied Commanders, was discussed, and was found to
be impossible of execution, General Canrobert felt his position to be
intolerable, and he resigned the chief command of the French army. It is
right to add that, though Canrobert’s character unfitted him to direct
the difficult operations which lay before him, he was well suited to
assume the lower functions of a commander of a division or army-corps.
Being of a loyal and soldierlike disposition, and unwilling to leave the
seat of war, he begged that he might revert to the position he
originally occupied in the French army when the war broke out, and
recommended that General Pélissier (who had reached the Crimea in
January) should be appointed the new Commander-in-chief. These proposals
were sanctioned in Paris by telegram, and were immediately carried into
execution (May 19th).
-----
Footnote 325:
“I merely record that both armies were certainly, if not discontented,
amazed, when an expedition which started on the 3rd of May to Kertch,
to destroy Russian magazines and stores, was recalled three days
later, on the receipt of a telegram from Paris” (Wood, _Crimea in 1854
and 1894_ , p. 264).
-----
The change in the French command completely altered the state of affairs
in the Crimea. The vacillating weakness of Canrobert and his
subserviency to the foibles of his Imperial Master, were at last
replaced by the hardy daring of Pélissier and by his manly disregard of
an ill-timed interference in the conduct of the war, which could only
end in disaster. The forces fighting against Russia, moreover, were
increasing; while the strength of that Empire was ebbing fast. In April
nearly half of Omar Pasha’s Turks, about 45,000 strong, were taken from
Eupatoria to the Chersonese, and next month a compact division of 15,000
Sardinians—who had joined the confederacy against Russia—landed in the
Crimea, under the command of General La Marmora. The enemy about this
time, by reason of his immense losses, had little more than 100,000 men
in the peninsula; the Allies were more numerous, and could dispose of
about 180,000 men.[326] Thus, it was becoming apparent, that by
vigorously pushing on the siege, Sevastopol must fall, and that the
resources of Russia—so fatally allowed to accumulate in the early stages
of the war—were beginning to fail.
-----
Footnote 326:
English, 28,000; French, 100,000; Turks, 45,000; Sardinians, 15,000
(Kinglake, viii. 7).
-----
Immediate arrangements were made to storm the advanced works which
Todleben had constructed, to occupy the Tchernaya and the plain of
Baidar that lay beyond it, and to attack Kertch and the Russian base of
supplies formed on the coast of the Sea of Azof. On the 23rd of May,
after severe fighting, the French gained an important advantage over the
enemy near Quarantine Bay; and, two days later, he was also attacked on
the Tchernaya and driven out of Tchorgun. About the same time, the
expedition to Kertch, composed of 15,000 English, French, and Turks,
started for its destination. Operations in this quarter were entirely
successful, and by the middle of June the Allies, having struck deep
into the resources of the Russians, cut their chief line of supply, and
in no small degree carried out practically the policy of investment
which the Emperor professed to desire.[327]
-----
Footnote 327:
Hamley, _Crimea_ , p. 242. Established now at last on the shores of
the Sea of Azof, the Allies might even at this late period have
inflicted a crushing blow on the enemy in the direction of Circassia,
and so have brought about the end of the war, and a severe check to
Russia’s advance through Central Asia and towards India—the objects
that Great Britain had in view when she undertook to curb the Tsar’s
pretensions in the East. It appears that the attention of the Foreign
Secretary (Lord Clarendon) was directed at that time to this most
important point; but there was a difficulty with the French, who,
conceiving that they would be giving assistance to a purely English
policy, would not concur in any such scheme (see Rawlinson, _England
and Russia in the East_ , 272 note). It must not be forgotten that
Louis Napoleon disapproved of the expedition to Kertch—the one
operation in the war which was crowned with complete and immediate
success, and which cost the Allies nothing,—and that he peremptorily
ordered Pélissier to take no part in the attack on Anapa on the
Circassian coast (Kinglake, viii. 79).
-----
The allied Commanders now directed their efforts to the Russian advanced
works covering the Karabelnaya, and, determining to attack them, they
prepared for the assault by a fierce cannonade (the third bombardment),
which opened on the 6th of June with tremendous violence and effect, and
lasted until the 10th. On the evening of the 7th, the French advanced
against the White works (situated on Mount Inkerman, to the east of
Careenage Ravine), and the Kamskatka Lunette (on the Mamelon, covering
the Malakoff and some 500 yards in front of it); and the English moved
against the Quarries (covering the Redan and about 400 yards from it).
These attacks were successful, and the enemy, driven from all these
outworks, was restricted to his main line of defence. The captured
positions were occupied and held by the Allies. Between the 6th and the
10th the Russians lost altogether, in killed, wounded, and prisoners,
8500 men and 73 guns; the Allies nearly 7000 men.
These advantages were now to be pressed home, and a great effort made to
assault the main line round the Karabelnaya; the Malakoff and the Redan
were to be attacked, and the fortress so long besieged was at last to
fall. The final act of the long drama was fixed for the 18th of June,
when the Anglo-French allies, having shared so many dangers and
hardships in common, might reap the reward of their arduous labours, and
obliterate the memories of the day of Waterloo.
The fourth bombardment opened on the 17th, and the fleets once more
joined their fire to the numerous great siege guns planted before
Sevastopol. The devastating force of the artillery soon obtained a
mastery over that of the fortress, and the usual results followed: the
enemy’s works were knocked to pieces, his defences ruined, and he lost
4000 men. Now, therefore, was the time for the assault to take place,
and, as we have seen, the Guards Brigade were brought up to the front
from Balaklava to participate in the operations about to ensue. But the
ardent expectations of the besiegers were not yet to be realized, and
the attack ended unfortunately. Neither in the Malakoff nor in the
Redan, were the French or ourselves able to effect a lodgment; the only
consolation was the capture of a position in front of our Left Attack.
Among the blunders that occurred to account for the failure, perhaps the
most unfortunate was that of Pélissier himself. It had been settled that
the bombardment was to continue for two hours after dawn on the 18th, so
as to shatter the repairs which the Russians invariably made to their
works during the night, and that then the assault was to commence at
about 5.30 in the morning. But this plan was altered at the last moment,
by Pélissier, who wished the advance to begin at dawn, without any
previous preparation by artillery fire. Lord Raglan was not consulted,
and, when he heard of it, he submitted to the change most reluctantly.
The enemy, therefore, was ready, behind parapets hastily renewed and
armed with field guns during the night, and thereby he was enabled to
repel the attack. That this was probably the main cause of the failure,
may perhaps be inferred from the fact that when, after the assault, the
bombardment recommenced, the soldierlike spirit of the Russians gave
way, and many of them, unable to stand against the terrific fire poured
upon them, fled to the harbour, and endeavoured to escape to the north
side of Sevastopol.[328] The Guards Brigade were not engaged upon this
occasion; they remained in reserve, and were not brought forward. In
fact, the attack had failed, and further expenditure of lives had to be
avoided. The losses were great on that fatal day; that of the English
amounted to 1500, of the French to 3500, and of the enemy only to 1500.
-----
Footnote 328:
Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 261.
-----
Two Officers occupying very conspicuous positions in their respective
armies disappeared from the scene of their labours about this time.
General Todleben was slightly wounded on the 18th, and more gravely hurt
a few days later, so that he had to leave Sevastopol, and the Russians
lost the services of that master mind to whose conspicuous ability,
energy, and courage the prolonged and successful defence of the fortress
was primarily due. The Allied armies also were plunged into mourning by
the unexpected death of Lord Raglan, who never recovered from the grief
and disappointment which oppressed his mind after the events of the
18th. This reverse, added to the labours and anxieties of the previous
fifteen months, during which time he discharged his high but onerous
duties without intermission, undermined his constitution, and he died on
the 28th, surrounded by his personal friends and his military staff. He
was succeeded by General Simpson.[329] His body was removed to England,
and was taken to the Bay of Kazatch with full military honours, on the
3rd of July; and, in accordance with General Orders, the troops not
engaged in the funeral or on duty in the field, remained in their tents
during the afternoon. While the ceremony lasted, the Allied forces
before Sevastopol were passive in the trenches, and, whether owing to
chance or to a graceful act of courtesy on the part of the Russian
Commander, the guns of the garrison also kept silence.[330]
-----
Footnote 329:
See Appendix No. X., containing General Orders on Lord Raglan’s death.
Footnote 330:
Kinglake, viii. 299.
-----
The siege was pushed forward with great activity after the 18th, and in
this portion of the weary operations the Guards Brigade took their full
share. Seeing the mistake committed by advancing over open ground for a
distance of 400 to 500 yards, against the _enceinte_ covering the
Karabelnaya, General Pélissier now proposed to sap up close to the
fortress. The soil near his own siege-works favoured such an
undertaking; but not so, that which lay in front of our positions, where
a thin layer of earth only covered the solid rock. Thus, while the
French were able to get close to the ramparts of the Malakoff, the
British were prevented from pushing through the ground much beyond the
Quarries, or from lessening to any considerable extent the distance that
separated them from their objective—the Redan.
These siege operations lasted without intermission until early in
September. On the night of June 18th, the Brigade found 30 Officers and
1000 men for the trenches, of which the Coldstream, furnished 8 Officers
and 263 men; and so on, from day to day, in varying numbers, according
to the requirements of the moment. It was ordered on the 21st, that “in
future the proportion of Officers and men in the trenches will be one
Captain and one Subaltern to every 100 men;” and also “should any part
of the guard of the trenches be called upon to work, they are positively
forbidden to take off their accoutrements or to go far from their
arms.”[331] Commencing July 10th, the duties were found by divisions—the
First, Second, and Light in the Right, the Third and the Fourth in the
Left Attack,—and during that night the Battalion furnished 7 Officers
and 312 men, also 21 men more as a special working party.[332]
-----
Footnote 331:
_First Divisional Morning Order_ , June 21st.
Footnote 332:
Special and other working parties and shot-loading fatigues in the
trenches were frequently ordered at this time. The following, relating
to the duties in the trenches, may be of interest:—
_Head-quarter Memo._ , July 10th: “General Officers of divisions will
be so good as to detail not less than a Brigadier-General, three Field
Officers, and two Adjutants for duty in the trenches on the days that
their divisions furnish the guard, Right Attack.”
_Divisional Order_ , July 12th: “The troops will be told off to their
places in the trenches before they leave their camp, and they will
move off from the parade in front of the camp, after being so told
off, at 6.15, so that they may all be in their places in the trenches
and the relief completed by 8 o’clock, according to the General Order
on the subject.”
_Head-quarter Memo._ , July 24th: “Until further orders the guard in
the trenches by night, will be 2400 men, under a General of the day
with three Field Officers; of this number 600 men will work if
required by the Royal Engineers, from 4 to 8 a.m., and return to their
camp at 8 a.m. if it should seem prudent to the senior Officer in the
trenches to dispense with them.... The remainder of the guard will
furnish working parties as usual during the day, when required by the
Royal Engineers.... There will be a special working party, consisting
of 400 men under a Field Officer, independent of the guard of the
trenches, except in case of an attack, when they will be available to
be called upon by the Officer commanding in the trenches.... General
Officers of divisions furnishing the guards in the trenches are to
consider the remainder of their division as a support ready to
reinforce the guard, with which they will proceed in case of alarm,
and resume the command of the whole force in the trenches.”
Later, in the middle of August, a reserve of 600 men was ordered “to
remain in the trenches the twenty-four hours, and will be planted
during the day in such spots in the 1st parallel or other places of
security as may be pointed out by the Generals of the Attacks. Troops
not on duty are to remain in camp till further orders” (_Head-quarter
Memo._ , Aug. 16th).
_Head-quarter Memo._ , Aug. 17th: “A steady fire of musketry, by
riflemen and good shots, must be kept up during the night, from the
advanced trenches of both Attacks on the Redan and works in rear and
flank. The object being to prevent the enemy from repairing the damage
done to their works. The artillery should assist this as much as
possible by throwing light balls.”
Colonel Tower says that, on August 21st, he was in the 5th parallel,
and that he was ordered to keep up a heavy fire all night on the
embrasures. 75,000 rounds were fired from the trench in which he was
stationed. He also says that the custom in the middle of August, was
to withdraw the guards of the trenches to a position in rear, and to
leave an Officer and small party in the advanced line to watch the
enemy’s works, and to fire at the embrasures when any one showed
himself (Tower, _Diary_ ).
Towards the end of August, and during the beginning of September, more
men were employed. There was a party for the trenches 2800 strong, the
guard as before 2400, and the special working party, 400 men. During
this period, more than one division furnished the necessary daily
number required.
-----
It should be noticed here, that the Guards Brigade, on August 31st,
exchanged the whole of their arms and ammunition for the new Enfield
rifle then introduced, and that, at this time, there were two patterns
in use by the troops of the British army standing before
Sevastopol.[333]
-----
Footnote 333:
“After 5 p.m. on the 28th inst. the small-arm ammunition magazine on
the right of the eight-gun battery in the Right Attack will contain
only Enfield rifle ammunition, pattern 1853, bore ·577; the three
other magazines will still be supplied with Minié rifle ammunition,
pattern 1851, bore ·᛫702.”
-----
Notwithstanding the interest which the operations undertaken between
June and September excited, and the high hopes generally entertained
that the fortress would soon fall, the little-varying duty in the
trenches became monotonous in the extreme, and all wished earnestly that
this phase of the war might quickly pass away. Some cricket matches
served to while away a few of the weary hours; but the weather was
extremely hot and oppressive, and the season was sickly. There was, of
course, much to distract the minds of men who, for the first time, found
themselves in the presence of an enemy; but it was different for those
who had been almost constantly at work for many months on the same spot
and at the same object, and thus even these distractions lost much of
their novelty and interest.
“The siege was really getting too fearfully tedious now,” writes
Colonel Tower, about August 28th. “The weather was hot and sultry; our
camp was a long way from the works. We used to parade about 5 p.m.,
having crammed in all the victuals we could get. We toiled down three
miles in the sun, carrying great coat, haversack, revolver, and
defiled into the zigzags before sundown; all night (if in the advance)
we were straining our eyes over the parapet, momentarily expecting a
sortie, being graped and shelled the whole time, and losing a good
many of our party. The sun got up very early, and often a breeze with
it, and from sunrise to sunset we had to sit in a dusty ditch, being
shelled, our food—salt pork and biscuit—covered with dust and sand.
The men could not show their noses over the parapet.... The deep blue
sea stretching away, dotted with ships coming in and going out, looked
so cool and nice in the distance, I used to think of home far away,
and long for the siege to be over. It really seemed now as if it were
drawing to a close. The bridge across the harbour had been constructed
some time, and could be for no other purpose than as a means for the
enemy to retire. The French pressed the enemy at the bastion Du Mât
[the Flagstaff Battery] and the Malakoff; I used to spend a good deal
of time in the French trenches, and knew the whole position as well as
any one in the army.”
The casualties in the Battalion were not very severe during these three
months, and amounted to 47 wounded, of whom 6 died of their injuries.
Besides this number, an Officer of the Regiment, Captain Hon. R.
Drummond, was wounded, on August 25th, in the trenches, having been shot
through the chest; he left the Crimea on September 6th, but died before
he reached England, unfortunately, indeed, just before the steamer
anchored at Spithead. The general health of the Battalion may be seen
from the following table:—
+————-+——————————————-+————————+ | |Admissions into Hospital from|
Deaths from | | |———————+———————+————————+ | | Disease. | Wounds.
|Disease.|Wounds.| +————-+———————+———————+————+———-+ |July | 138 | 20 |
8 | 1 | |August | 132 | 15 | 5 | 3 | |September| 65 | 12 | 2 | 2 |
+————-+———————+———————+————+———-+
Between June 20th and September 21st, 78 men returned to duty from the
hospital at Balaklava; but, _per contra_, 95 men were sent down from the
front for treatment during the same period.[334]
-----
Footnote 334:
Wyatt, p. 86.
-----
The Russians could do little to resist the formidable preparations made
by the Allies to bring about the capture of Sevastopol. They lost
heavily every day, even under the ordinary fire which the besiegers
poured upon them, and, perceiving that the end of the long struggle was
imminent, they resolved to make one final effort to free themselves from
the forces that were closing nearer and nearer to their defences. After
much consideration, General Michael Gortchakoff[335] determined to bring
down the field army, which was established on the Mackenzie heights and
on the Belbek, into the valley of the Tchernaya, and to attack the
French, Sardinians, and Turks holding that portion of the field. On
August 15th, accordingly, a general action took place in that quarter,
known as the battle of the Tchernaya, between a Russian army of 48,000
infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 272 guns, and a somewhat smaller force of
the Allies, who, though they massed as many as 60,000 men, did not
deploy their whole strength upon that occasion. The enemy displayed much
bravery, but showed little skill; he was routed, and fell back slowly
towards Mackenzie Farm, losing 69 Officers and 2300 men killed, 160
Officers and 4000 men wounded, and 31 Officers and 1700 men
missing—total 8260. The French had 1500 killed and wounded, and the
Sardinians 200.[336] The besieging armies expected that this battle
would be accompanied by a general sortie from Sevastopol; but it did not
take place, for, the Russians were getting exhausted, and their
resources were almost entirely at an end. In order to prevent any such
attempt, and also to enable the French to sap up quite close to the
defences of the Karabelnaya opposite to them, the Allies opened another,
though only a partial, bombardment (the fifth) on August 16th, and
continued their fire for some days with great violence; but no assault
followed, for they were not yet ready to enact the final scene that was
soon to begin.
-----
Footnote 335:
General Menshikoff had been replaced in his command in the Crimea by
General Gortchakoff in the spring of 1855; the same who fought on the
Danube, and whose curious movements, on the day of Inkerman, have
already been adverted to.
Footnote 336:
Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 271.
-----
General Gortchakoff might now have yielded the fortress which had been
held so tenaciously and gloriously by the armies of the Tsar; but, after
a full inspection of the town, of its ruins, and of the miseries and
horrors it contained, he came to the resolution that it was to be held
to the last extremity, and that the honour of his Sovereign prevented
him from either evacuating it or capitulating. He determined, therefore,
to bring into Sevastopol all he could spare of his field army, and to
resist to the end. Hopeless as the outlook was at this moment, he still
professed to believe that he could hold out for another month.
The last and sixth bombardment commenced on September 5th, and
continued, if possible, with even greater fierceness and intensity than
before, till the 8th, the day set apart for the grand assault. Pélissier
guarded himself this time against advancing at dawn; and, having
observed that at noon the Malakoff was usually more weakly occupied than
at any other hour of the day or night, he resolved to take advantage of
this circumstance, and to deliver the attack then. At noon therefore,
the French, under Bosquet, were to storm the Malakoff, the Curtain near,
and the little Redan; while the English, under General Codrington, were
to attack the Redan. The town defences, moreover, were to be assailed by
the French opposite to them, aided by a Sardinian brigade under General
Cialdini; but this movement was subject to further orders.
A very fierce fight took place at all these places, of which one alone
was successful; for the French, having entered the Malakoff, secured a
firm footing there, and gained that important position in the enemy’s
main line. Their losses were immense, not less than 3087 in killed and
wounded out of 7446 men engaged in this portion of the battle-field.
Everywhere else the assaults were beaten back, and the Allies could only
believe at first that they had but gained an indecisive victory.
The attack on the Redan was made, as has been seen, under very
difficult—almost impossible—circumstances; but, if it was only
undertaken to relieve the pressure which the enemy brought to bear upon
our allies near the Malakoff, our purpose was fulfilled. It is, however,
difficult to believe that a diversion was all we intended to effect,
since this assault was to be the final act of the great military drama
which had been going on for a whole year in the Crimea, and which
riveted the eyes of Europe upon Sevastopol. The troops engaged comprised
the Second and Light Divisions, 6200 strong—1700 in the first line, 1500
in support, and 3000 in reserve in the 3rd parallel; the Third and
Fourth Divisions formed a main reserve; but neither the Highland nor the
First Division, to which the Guards Brigade belonged, was called up to
share in the action. The Brigade was posted in rear, about half a mile
from the Malakoff, where a splendid view of the fighting was obtained.
There was much regret among all ranks composing it that they were not
allowed to advance and take part in the attack; more especially since,
when the French (according to Colonel Tower) asked General Simpson to
send some of his troops to help them to hold the Malakoff, the request
was refused, and the First Division, or, at least, the Guards, who were
close by, were not told off to perform this duty. If this is more than
camp gossip, it is, indeed, to be regretted that no British troops were
enabled to participate in the glory of inflicting a final reverse upon
the enemy’s position in the Karabelnaya.
General Simpson explains that he determined to give the honour of
leading the assault to the Second and Light Divisions, because they had
defended the trenches and approaches to the Redan for many months, and
because of the intimate knowledge they possessed of the ground. Military
critics believe that this was a “cruel kindness to the army.” The two
divisions were exhausted by the siege, and the knowledge of the ground
is considered upon this occasion to have been a positive disadvantage,
“for, in acquiring it, the troops generally lost the dash which is
essential to success.” Moreover, these divisions were now filled with
young and only partially trained soldiers, “who paid no attention to the
orders that were given;” “the companies lost all formation and cohesion
from the irregular manner in which they ran forward, and they stood in
confused groups behind the parapets;” “the battalions got mixed up;” in
fact, “the young, raw recruits failed to follow their leaders in the way
in which the soldiers had done at the Alma and Inkerman.”[337] On the
other hand, there were fresh troops available; the Guards had only
shortly before come up to the front from Balaklava, where they passed
three and a half months, and the Highlanders had been there between
October and June. Neither, as we know, were employed in the assault,
much to their disappointment and chagrin.
-----
Footnote 337:
Wood, _Crimea in 1854 and 1894_ , pp. 370-378.
But all this is only one side of the story. The task before the British
was, under any circumstances, most difficult to fulfil. They had to
advance over the open for a considerable distance, against a strong
work, covered in front by obstacles, whose rear was unenclosed, and
whose fire was unsubdued. It had been impossible to construct _places
d’armes_ in our trenches, owing to the rocky nature of the soil, and
hence the reserves could not be concentrated in suitable positions
whence to push forward at the proper moment and feed the attack.
Nevertheless, the leading British troops advanced with the utmost
gallantry and spirit, notwithstanding the furious fire to which they
were exposed; they penetrated into the Redan, and clung to the position
they had gained. But they could not maintain themselves there; for, the
Russians, hurrying up in immense numbers, forced them to retire before
the reserves—hampered in the narrow trenches—were able to advance to
their support. The French, moreover, having spiked the guns they found
in the Malakoff, had none to turn
-----
upon the enemy as he entered the Redan in force to drive out our
storming parties. After this failure, the attack was put off to the
following day; our losses amounted to 2271 Officers and men, those of
the French to 7567, and of the Russians to 12,913.[338]
-----
Footnote 338:
Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , pp. 278-285. The 23rd Royal Welsh
Fusiliers, in support, lost, in killed and wounded, 15 Officers out of
18, and 197 men out of five companies (Wood, _Crimea_ , loc. cit.).
-----
But there was no necessity to renew the combat; for the enemy, aware of
the strength of the Malakoff position, which commanded the whole of the
defences of Sevastopol, evacuated the south side during the night of the
8th-9th, and withdrew to the northern bank of the roadstead, blowing up
their magazines, and firing the town in several places. The Allies had
thus early intimation of the impending fall of the fortress which for so
long had withstood their valour; but the full extent of the victory was
scarcely appreciated before the morning of the 9th, when the enemy’s
retreat became known to the armies engaged. The evacuation of the Redan
was first ascertained by some Highlanders in the trenches in the night,
who, stalking up to the ditch and abatis that was near it, found the
work tenanted only by spiked guns and by dead men.
“N——, who knew my wandering tendencies, came to me in the middle of
the night before daybreak, and told me to get up at once, that some
one had come out of the trenches, and that the Redan was evacuated. I
got on Bono Johnnie and galloped off about daylight. I arrived at our
trenches, which I found occupied by the Highland Division; they were
fast putting out a line of sentries to prevent any one going over to
the Russian works.... I went across the hill towards the Malakoff, the
ground literally paved with iron; the great high parapet was already
broken down, and in the afternoon the ditch was filled in with gabions
and a regular road made into the work. Dead and dying inside the work;
such a scene of devastation and confusion impossible to conceive: guns
broken and upset; powder in the embrasures, two or three inches deep,
all loose on the ground; wounded men, French and Russians, still
crawling about, and the trenches full of Russians who had crept in....
From the top of the parapet our trenches were spread out like a map. I
was wild with delight at thinking the siege was over, and all the
country opened to us. I posted off to the White barracks, and
ransacked the whole place, coming back through the Redan.”[339]
-----
Footnote 339:
Tower, _Diary_ , Sept. 9, 1855.
-----
The Allies did not enter the town on the 9th, for Sevastopol was a
blazing mass of ruins, and the frequent explosions showed the place to
be undermined: the garrison having escaped under cover of the night,
when we were unaware of their intention, could not be further pressed at
that moment, so there was no object to serve by sending the troops into
a fire-trap. A terrible conflagration raged, and to this was added the
burning and the final destruction of the Russian Black Sea fleet. The
minds of our men could be well filled with awe and joy at the wonderful
sights that met their gaze—awe at the fiery furnace the enemy kindled to
mark his departure from the stronghold he had held so audaciously and
bravely, and joy that the protracted siege was at last concluded.[340]
Early on the 10th, the fires had ceased, and the conquerors, advancing
to secure their prize, found one great building intact. Having
penetrated into it, they were amazed to discover that it was a hospital
containing no less than 2000 dead and dying men, who had been left to
their fate without food or treatment for two days and nights, in the
midst of the dire confusion and chaos that prevailed in the town; among
them were three English Officers.[341] At midday on the 13th, a fatigue
party of 500 men of the First Division, under Major Ponsonby, Grenadier
Guards, were ordered into the town to help to cleanse it, and to bury
the numerous dead. The duty was a disagreeable one, as may well be
imagined; it was well performed, as can be seen from the following
Divisional Memorandum, dated September 15th:—
The General Commanding the Forces expresses, through Lieut.-General
Lord Rokeby, his regret at being obliged to employ the Brigade on the
disagreeable fatigue duty of Thursday last, but which, for the health
of the army, was absolutely necessary; and he was fully satisfied with
the manner in which that duty was performed.
-----
Footnote 340:
The Battalion Order dated the 9th, “The Battalion will parade for
inspection of necessaries at 9 a.m. to-morrow, Officers in blue coats,
etc.,” shows that the ordinary routine of military duty was never
relaxed.
Footnote 341:
Hamley, _Crimea_ , p. 286; Nolan, ii. 473.
-----
The French now occupied Sevastopol, and the English the Karabelnaya,
where regular guards were established. The British troops (500 each day
from the Brigade) were employed, with a working pay of 1_s._ 6_d._ a
day, in making a main road from Balaklava to the front, and others in
the neighbourhood, under the superintendence of Lieut.-Colonel Hon. A.
Hardinge, Coldstream Guards.
It should be stated here, that, on the 27th of August, Lord Stratford de
Redcliffe, Ambassador at Constantinople, reached the Crimea for the
purpose of investing several Officers with the Order of the Bath. The
ceremony took place at the British head-quarters, in the presence of
General Pélissier and his Staff. The Guards Brigade furnished a Guard of
Honour; the Coldstream, the Queen’s Colour, the Ensign and Lieutenant
(Lieutenant Whitshed), and 50 men; and the Scots Fusilier Guards, the
Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel, the Lieutenant and Captain, and 50 men.
Among those on whom the honour was conferred, connected with the
Regiment or to be connected with it, were Lieut.-Generals Sir Colin
Campbell, Sir H. Bentinck, and Sir W. Codrington.
The Brigade paraded in review order on the 20th of September, for the
purpose of receiving medals and clasps, which were distributed to the
Officers, Non-commissioned officers, and men who had landed in the
Crimea before the 1st of October, 1854.
Early in October, 1855, new reinforcements reached the Battalion. On the
2nd, 24 convalescents arrived for duty from Balaklava, as against 7
invalids sent to England next day. On the 4th, the fifth draft landed
from home, consisting of 8 Officers and 207 men, whose average age was
24 years, and service 15 months. “They were principally volunteers from
the Militia, and a remarkably fine body of men, not so tall as the
original Guardsmen, but in every way better adapted for the exigencies
of active service.”[342] Officers were posted to companies as follows,
October 7th:—
No. 1 Company: Major C. Baring, Captain H. Tower, Lieutenant Rose.
No. 2 Company: Lieut.-Colonel C. Burdett, Major Lord Bingham, Lieutenant
Julian Hall.
No. 3 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Herbert-Stepney, Captain C. Blackett,
Lieutenant Adair.
No. 4 Company: Captain Le Couteur, Captain Lord E. Cecil, Lieutenant
Whitshed.
No. 5 Company: Captain Sir J. Dunlop, Lieutenant A. Lambton.
No. 6 Company: Lieut.-Colonel F. Newdigate, Captain W. Reeve, Lieutenant
H. Lane.
No. 7 Company: Major H. Armytage, Captain Hon. W. Feilding, Lieutenant
Godfrey Wigram.
No. 8 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Lord Dunkellin, Captain Heneage,
Lieutenant Hon. W. Edwardes.[343]
-----
Footnote 342:
Wyatt, 86.
Footnote 343:
A few days later, Majors Baring and Armytage were invalided to
England, and Captains Hon. H. Byng and Jervoise joined the
Battalion—the former from home, the latter by transfer from the 42nd
Highlanders.
-----
[Illustration:
COLONEL
1750
LIEUT. COLONEL MAJOR
QUEENS COLOUR 1^{ST}. BATT^L. 1893.
N.R. Wilkinson del. A.D. Innes & C^o. London. Mintern Bros.
Chromo.
]
CHAPTER XII.
THE END OF THE RUSSIAN WAR.
Home events during the war—Sympathy of Her Majesty with her Crimean
soldiers—Badges of distinction added to the Colours—Inactivity of
the Allies after the fall of Sevastopol—Expeditions against the
Russian coast—Sir W. Codrington succeeds Sir J. Simpson as Commander
of the Forces—The winter 1855-56—Negotiations for a peace, which is
concluded, March 30th—Events after the cessation of hostilities—A
British cemetery in the Crimea—Embarkation and return home—The
Crimean Guards Brigade at Aldershot; visit of Her Majesty the
Queen—Move to London, and cordial reception there—Distribution of
the Victoria Cross—Summary of events connected with the
war—Losses—Appointment of H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge as
Commander-in-Chief, and of Major-General Lord Rokeby to command the
Brigade of Guards.
The details of the great struggle in the Crimea have necessarily
occupied so much of the space of the last few chapters, that there has
been little opportunity to allude to the occurrences connected with the
Regiment which took place at home during this eventful period. It will
therefore be well to pause in the narrative of the war, and to devote a
few lines to that subject.
As soon as the Guards Brigade started for Malta in February, 1854, the
public duties in London were reduced; and later in the year, when the
requirements of active service necessitated a still further reduction,
they were fixed at 1 Captain, 4 Subalterns, 9 sergeants, 10 corporals, 6
drummers, and 144 men, to furnish the Queen’s Guard, Buckingham Palace,
the Tylt, the British Museum, and the Magazine Guards; and at 1
Subaltern, 2 sergeants, 2 corporals, and 20 men, to furnish the Bank
piquet.[344]
-----
Footnote 344:
_Brigade Order_ , Nov. 23, 1854.
-----
The principal duty of the home Battalion was naturally at this moment to
train and supply men to the 1st Battalion in the Crimea, and we have
already seen something of the quality of the drafts that were sent out
to the East.[345] But as the ordinary recruiting was not sufficient to
maintain the forces at the seat of war in a proper state of efficiency,
the militia—the true reserve of the British army at that time—was called
upon to perform its functions in the emergency. Not only was a portion
of the militia embodied and employed as garrisons in those places where
regular troops were not available, but volunteers were obtained from its
ranks to fill up the gaps which the war created in the active army
fighting before Sevastopol. In this manner men of good physique and
trained to military service were obtained, and were drafted into the
regular army. In April, 1854, the Non-commissioned officers and men of
the Brigade told off to assist in training militia regiments, were
ordered to use their best exertions to induce men to volunteer for their
Regiments.[346] In December, 1854, Officers of the Brigade were employed
to superintend recruiting from the militia. Men were also obtained from
the Irish Constabulary, and it was settled, December 18, 1855, that
volunteers to the Guards from that corps might reckon their previous
police service as military service.
-----
Footnote 345:
See Appendix, No. XI.
Footnote 346:
_Brigade Order_ , April 1, 1854.
-----
It appears that there was an intention to form a Brigade depôt at Malta,
in March, 1855, the companies to form which, were to be borne on the
strength of the Battalions in the East, from the date of embarkation.
But this plan was not carried out, and the home Battalions remained all
through the war with twelve companies, as against eight companies
belonging to the service Battalions; the drafts to the latter were
always furnished direct from London.
As soon as the three Guards Battalions had left England, the other four
were stationed in the West-end (St. George’s, Portman Street, and
Wellington barracks), and there they remained (subject to the ordinary
half-yearly change of quarters) until January, 1855, when the Tower was
again garrisoned by the Brigade. In May, room had to be found for 500
men of the Line passing through London, and a portion of the 2nd
Battalion Grenadier Guards then in Wellington barracks, were put into
billets in Westminster, for four days. This probably is the last time
that any men of the Brigade have been billeted in London. On the 13th of
June, the 2nd Battalions of the Coldstream and Scots Fusilier Guards
proceeded to Aldershot Camp, then newly established, until the 27th of
August, when they were relieved by the two Grenadier Battalions, left in
England.[347] The latter remained there until the middle of December,
when Windsor was again occupied by a Battalion of Guards, and there were
then less than three Battalions of the Brigade stationed in the
West-end, the head-quarters of one being in the Tower, with a detachment
only, in Portman Street.[348] During the absence of a portion of the
Brigade in Aldershot, the Depôt of the 66th Regiment furnished a part of
the public duties in London; but at the end of August, most of these men
having been moved out of town, temporary reductions in the duties were
made (September 16th, and October 9th) until the return of the
Grenadiers.
-----
Footnote 347:
The following order was published upon this occasion, Aug. 27th: “The
Major-General Commanding, [at Aldershot] desires to express to the
Commanding Officer his sense of the general good conduct of the
Battalion and the attention they have paid to their drill during the
time they have been under his command, and to request them to accept
his thanks accordingly.”
Footnote 348:
For stations occupied by the Coldstream, see Appendix No. XV.
-----
It has been already stated that the Emperor Napoleon visited England in
April, 1855, where a cordial welcome awaited him and the Empress, who
accompanied him. A detachment of a Subaltern and 25 men from each
Battalion, under a Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel of the 2nd Grenadier
Guards (with the Queen’s Colour belonging to that Battalion), proceeded
to Windsor on the 14th, and were stationed there until the 19th, during
the period of the French Sovereign’s visit to the Queen. Numerous Guards
of Honour attended upon His Majesty, two of which were found by the 2nd
Battalion, both at Bricklayers' Arms Station, on the 16th and 21st, on
the arrival at, and departure from London, of the Imperial guest. On the
19th, the Emperor went to Guildhall, and the streets were lined by the
two Grenadier Battalions as he went to the City and returned back to the
West-end. Another Royal visit of one of Her Majesty’s Allies took place
on the 1st of December, when the King of Sardinia, Victor Emanuel,
arrived in London, and went to Windsor. Of the Guards of Honour
furnished upon that occasion, the Coldstream found four—two on the
arrival of the King at Bricklayers' Arms Station and at Paddington
Station on the 1st, one at Lord Palmerston’s house in Piccadilly on the
4th, and one at Bricklayers' Arms Station on the 6th, in the early
morning.
The dress of the Brigade occupied the attention of the military
authorities at this time. The white summer trousers were exchanged for
another pattern made of a light grey stuff; the coatee was done away
with, and the tunic was introduced (April, 1855). Epaulettes ceased to
be worn, and thereby the badge of the Rose, still worn by the men,
disappeared from the uniform of the Officers of the Coldstream. The
tunic at first was a double-breasted garment, but a year later (March,
1856), when Officers required new red coats, they were ordered to supply
themselves with single-breasted tunics, such as are still worn in the
Brigade. The bearskin caps had been cut down early in 1854, to nine
inches in height, and the plume was not to exceed six inches. Also, by
an order dated October 7, 1854, peaks to caps were to be discontinued by
sergeants, and were only to be worn by the Sergeant-Major, the
Quartermaster-Sergeant, the Armourer Sergeant, the Regimental Clerk, the
Drill Sergeants, and the Drum Major—a custom which still prevails in the
Brigade.
A curious means taken to test beer may be gathered from the following
Brigade Order, dated April 18, 1854, and shows the practical, though
perhaps unscientific, manner in which our predecessors went to work when
they wished to ascertain a matter of sanitary importance to the men:—
Each Battalion will send to Wellington barracks on Thursday morning,
to receive from the Quartermaster of the Scots Fusilier Guards some
beer, which is to be delivered to six sergeants, who must undertake
not to taste any other malt liquor during the time (10 days) they will
be supplied with it, the object being to test its wholesome qualities.
The Field Officer requests to be furnished with a report from each
Battalion at the expiration of the period specified above.
We find that a few days previous to this order (April 13th), a committee
of Officers was appointed to consider the question of the general
introduction of gas into barracks.
Later (July 17, 1855), a Field Officer of the Brigade (Lieut.-Colonel
Wood, Grenadier Guards) was sent to the “end of Commercial Road,
Pimlico, near to the projected Chelsea Bridge, there to view, in
conjunction with a Medical Officer, a site for a barrack.” It will be
seen that this was the first step taken to construct Chelsea barracks,
which, when completed, removed the Foot Guards from the cramped quarters
in Portman Street and St. George’s barracks, which they occupied at this
time.
The Enfield rifle (pattern 1853), issued, as we have seen, to the
Brigade in the Crimea at the end of August, 1855, was served out to the
Guards Battalions on home service on the 26th of October of the same
year. Nine hundred and one stand constituted the armament of the 2nd
Battalion, and “on their receipt the smooth bore now in possession,
including the sergeants' fusils, are to be returned into the Ordnance
stores.”
It is well known to all her subjects that Her Majesty the Queen followed
the varying fortunes of the Russian war with the utmost attention,
interest, and concern; and that to none was her warm sympathy more
heartily and graciously expressed than to her gallant army, who, amid
unparalleled privations and difficulties, maintained intact the glory of
the British Crown and of the country. Frequently did Her Majesty,
surrounded by the Royal Family at Buckingham Palace, personally see such
of her wounded soldiers as were able to be brought into the presence of
their Sovereign, and there praise them for their merit, and condole with
them on their sufferings. This honour was freely bestowed on the men of
the Brigade, and on many occasions the Commanding Officers of Regiments
were ordered to furnish lists of Guardsmen who were well enough to
participate in it. In 1855, the Queen’s birthday was celebrated on the
18th of May, and on the Horse Guards parade, Her Majesty presented
medals for service in the Crimea to all Officers and to three
Non-commissioned officers and twenty privates per Regiment of the
Brigade, entitled to receive them. Next day the following Order was
published:—
“The Field Officer in Brigade Waiting is commanded to express to the
Officers and soldiers of the Brigade of Guards who were present
yesterday at the ceremony of the presentation of medals, Her Majesty’s
solicitude as to whether they have suffered from the effort which
evidently many of them made, at the cost of much suffering and
inconvenience, and requests that Officers Commanding Battalions will
make the necessary inquiries, and forward the result of them to him
with as little delay as possible.”
When the fall of Sevastopol was known in England, there was much
rejoicing that the Allied arms had captured the enemy’s stronghold and
great naval arsenal in the Black Sea. But hostilities were not at an
end, nor was an immediate peace in prospect. Nevertheless, certain
distinct stages in the war were concluded, and victory had more than
once smiled upon our standards. A General Order, therefore, was issued
on the 16th of October, 1855, giving authority to inscribe the words
“Alma,” “Inkerman,” “Balaklava,” and “Sevastopol” upon the Colours of
the regiments taking part in these actions and in the siege. On the
following December 28th the three badges of distinction, “Alma,”
“Inkerman,” and “Sevastopol,” were inscribed upon the Colours of the
Regiments of Foot Guards.
The Allied armies, having captured the fortress that so long resisted
their skill and courage, found themselves placed in considerable
embarrassment. The question naturally arose as to what should now be
done. But that question was not readily answered, because no steps had
been taken beforehand to decide it. The northern side was still held by
the Russians, and their forces there were closely united to their field
army, which occupied defensive positions on the Mackenzie heights. The
undertaking to clear the two banks of the Sevastopol roadstead of the
enemy, and to drive him out of the peninsula had the outward appearance
of a difficult operation, and no measures had been concerted to proceed
with it.[349] The Anglo-French armies made no attempt to follow up the
victory of the 8th of September, but hung listlessly on the ground they
had won, deliberating as to their future movements, and doing nothing to
secure success. In short, though the capture effected brought prestige
to the besiegers, and placed in their power the fleet, the docks, and
most of the forts at Sevastopol, no further advantage seemed likely to
accrue, and we found ourselves almost as far as ever from exercising a
coercive control over the councils of the Tsar.
-----
Footnote 349:
It will be remembered that the north side of Sevastopol commands the
south side. The capture of the former would have jeopardized the
latter; but the fall of the south side left the other intact.
-----
As a matter of fact, General Gortchakoff was by no means as strong as he
was supposed to be, and could scarcely have maintained himself in the
Crimea had he been vigorously attacked by the brave forces that had
invariably beaten his troops whenever they met them in the field. His
position, indeed, was very precarious—so precarious was it, in the
opinion of his own Government, that he had the fullest liberty given him
to evacuate the peninsula if he found it necessary to do so. But he was
not obliged to resort to this painful and humiliating measure; for the
Allies never pressed him. Far from making any effort to dislodge him, or
from even manœuvring against him to ascertain how he was
circumstanced, they kept almost entirely aloof, and they left him alone
in peace.
The British Government, sincerely desirous to achieve a more important
success than had been gained, urged that the war should be vigorously
prosecuted. They poured troops into the Crimea, so that our army there
in November numbered as much as 51,000 men, of whom 4000 were cavalry,
and 96 guns, besides a Turkish legion, raised by England, of 20,000, and
a German legion of 10,000. The transport was now completely
re-organized, and the medical service in good working order; and, added
to this, the fleet, always overwhelmingly strong, was more powerful than
it had been before.[350] A campaign was now at last possible against an
enfeebled enemy under far better conditions than had been the case in
the same season of the previous year, when we invaded Russia, whose
resources then were practically unimpaired. The English people, also,
were at one with their Government, and were anxious for a vigorous
prosecution of hostilities, if the enemy could not be otherwise
subjugated. But they and their rulers could effect nothing, for our
allies would not move, and above all things was it necessary that the
alliance should be cordially maintained. Hence, our political relations
with the French interfered with our national interests, and controlled
our military operations against the enemy: and, as has happened in the
past, and will again happen, in wars conducted by several nations, the
common foe reaped no inconsiderable benefit by having a confederation of
Powers ranged against him.
-----
Footnote 350:
Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 296. These forces continued to
increase, and by Christmas, 1855, the British army in the Crimea was
still more numerous than is stated in the text, and there were 120
guns; besides, a reserve force was collected at Aldershot, and
amounted to over 18,000 men in April, 1856; at which time it appears
we had in the East about 60,000 men (excluding transport, etc.).
-----
In short, the fall of Sevastopol practically brought the drama to a
close. The efforts of the besiegers to take the town, after they had
allowed it to grow into military importance, seemed to exhaust the
further zeal and ardour of the Emperor Napoleon: it was impossible for
us to re-kindle them into activity. Nor could Marshal Pélissier be
roused to action; his enthusiasm for the success of the struggle had now
grown cold, and his former energy had evaporated. His troops had taken
the Malakoff, the key of the fortress, and, proud of their victory over
the enemy, the French were content with the glory their army had
achieved. So, also, had the Emperor gained all he wanted to secure; and,
the war having established him firmly on the throne, he was anxious for
peace with Russia, and for some new and more profitable adventure.
And yet something had to be done to preserve the semblance of war. The
Turks, already at Eupatoria, were therefore reinforced, and some
successful reconnaissances were effected in that important quarter:
operations were, moreover, continued on the shores of the Sea of Azof,
with advantage to the Allies; and lastly, after threatening Odessa, a
descent was made upon Kinburn and its neighbourhood. These desultory
expeditions served to keep up the illusion that the fight was still
earnestly maintained. But they led to no permanent results, and they
need not be further described; because, under the circumstances and
conditions in which they were undertaken, they only exercised, and could
only exercise, a very minor influence on the war. Omar Pasha had at last
(end of September) been allowed to take a portion of his hitherto
inactive army—chained for no useful purpose in the Crimea—to attempt the
relief of Kars, a Turkish stronghold in Armenia, then besieged by the
Russians. He was only barely supported by the Allies, if indeed he was
not hampered by them, and he failed to accomplish his object. Kars fell
on the 28th of November, and the victory gained there by the enemy
compensated him not a little for the reverse he sustained at Sevastopol.
The French might view the incident with unconcern; but to England,
having vital interests in Asia, the loss of this place was of far
greater moment.[351]
-----
Footnote 351:
While this important event was taking place, the bulk of the British
army was engaged in improving the communications of the Chersonese—a
work which cost us much labour and was of little use to us, though
shortly afterwards, when the peace was signed, it was of great value
to the Russians.
-----
Officers of the 1st Battalion were posted to companies as follows on
December 17, 1855:—
No. 1 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Hon. P. Feilding; Captain H. Jervoise;
Lieutenant G. Rose.
No. 2 Company: Lieut.-Colonel C. Burdett; Captain Whitshed; Lieutenant
Hall.
No. 3 Company: Major Thellusson; Captain Blackett; Lieutenant Adair.
No. 4 Company: Captain Reeve; Captain Heneage.
No. 5 Company: Captain Hon. H. Byng; Lieutenant A. Lambton.
No. 6 Company: Lieut.-Colonel F. Newdigate; Captain Lord E. Cecil;
Lieutenant Lane.
No. 7 Company: Major Le Couteur; Lieutenant Hon. W. Edwardes.
No. 8 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Lord Dunkellin; Captain Hon. W. Feilding;
Lieutenant Wigram.
Colonel Gordon Drummond still commanded the Battalion, while Major Lord
Bingham was appointed Adjutant about that time (21st December).
The Brigade remained on the upland of the Chersonese, with the bulk of
the British army, guarding the Karabelnaya, constructing roads,
drilling, practising musketry, and performing the ordinary duties of
camp life.[352] A tent had been converted into a Crimean Guards Club,
“where we used all to meet, read the newspapers, talk, and smoke,” and
there the first anniversary of the battle of the Alma was duly
celebrated by a dinner. There were races at Kamara on the 17th of
October, shooting expeditions, and other expedients to pass away the
time. Occasionally an interchange of shots took place across the
roadstead that divided the hostile armies; but they were rather signals
to show that the war had not yet officially come to an end than anything
else, and they never produced any important results.
-----
Footnote 352:
The duties in the Karabelnaya district were composed of seven guards,
amounting all told to 2 Captains, 4 Subalterns, 12 sergeants, 2
drummers, 12 corporals, and 249 privates.
At first the Brigade supplied 500 men daily for road-making; but later
in the year these parties were frequently double that strength. It
also furnished large fatigue-parties of several hundred men to bring
up huts from Balaklava, wherein to lodge the troops.
Musketry was carried out with considerable energy during the winter
months, and special orders on the subject were issued by the Commander
of the Forces.
-----
The monotony of these proceedings during an inactive campaign, and in
the presence of an unsubdued enemy, was one day electrified into new
life by a terrible explosion that occurred in the lines of our allies.
On the 15th of November, 100,000 lbs. of powder blew up in the French
artillery park, and kindled a fire that placed one of the principal
English magazines in imminent danger. Looking from the British camp, a
huge column of smoke was seen to ascend high in the air; it then spread
out like a tree,[353] broke, and sent down a shower of iron, stones,
rubbish, broken side arms, guns, gun carriages, and every conceivable
appurtenance of war; shells burst in all directions, and other
combustibles added their flames to the conflagration. Happily the fire
was got under without further mishap, but many Officers and men, mostly
French, were killed and wounded.[354]
-----
Footnote 353:
Pliny describes the great eruption of Vesuvius which overwhelmed
Pompeii, as having at first the appearance of a gigantic pine tree
emerging from the volcano.
Footnote 354:
Nolan, ii. 638. Assistant-Surgeons Wyatt and Trotter of the Coldstream
gained the special thanks of the French authorities for the assistance
they afforded to the wounded upon that occasion.
It appears that our troops had cause to be somewhat accustomed to this
class of misadventure. Under date Nov. 14th, Colonel Tower writes, “On
guard in the Redan; as I was walking about inside the works, I met two
of my men who were off duty, with pipes in their mouths, wandering
about. I cautioned them, and told them there had been many accidents.
A short time afterwards my sergeant came rushing up to me with all his
eyebrows singed off, to tell me Goodram and Bates (the two men) were
buried alive in a Russian magazine. I got Engineers, and we dug for a
long time in smoking ruins; at last we came upon them, burnt to
cinders, and hardly a bone in either of their bodies that was not
broken.... They died soon after we got them out. Goodram was a most
gallant fellow, and would have got the V.C. for going into the Redan
with the assaulting party on the 8th of September. They had trodden on
a fougasse left, probably on purpose, by the enemy when he evacuated.”
Private Goodram, it appears, slipped out of camp at night, September
7th-8th, crept close to the Redan in the dark, and joined the leading
files of the storming party. He greatly distinguished himself during
the assault, and is said to have been the first man to reach the
parapet of the work.
-----
On the 11th of November, a few days before the accident just mentioned,
General Sir James Simpson having resigned, Lieut.-General Sir William
Codrington was appointed by Her Majesty the Queen to the chief command
of the British army in the Crimea. This Officer, a Coldstreamer, served
in the Regiment from 1823 until July, 1854, when, as junior Acting-Major
of the 1st Battalion, and present with it in Bulgaria, he was promoted
Major-General. Remaining at the seat of war, he very soon obtained the
command of a brigade in the Light Division, as has been previously
recorded. At the head of this gallant brigade he greatly distinguished
himself at the battle of the Alma by his cool and intrepid bearing; the
part he played at Inkerman has already been mentioned. He was with the
army from start to finish of the war against Russia, being present on
the upland before Sevastopol throughout the whole of the first severe
winter (except once for the space of a very few days, when on the sick
list), and engaged in all the fights (usually in executive command) that
took place round and in the Redan. Few Officers in the British army were
more exposed to the dangers and the privations of this war than Sir W.
Codrington, and he survived both without a scratch and without even a
temporary illness of a serious nature.
The second winter was now approaching, and hostilities, while they
showed no sign of coming to an end, still languished. But it was passed
under very different conditions to those which prevailed during the
terrible season that overtook us in 1854-55. The autumn was fine and
enjoyable, and the real cold weather was not felt until the end of
November. We were then quite prepared for it, so that the army did not
suffer. The health of the troops was excellent, and for some time prior
to the end of 1855 there was such an abundance of every kind of supply,
that scarcely any requirement remained for the Medical Officer in charge
to suggest.
“During the six months which ensued from the commencement of January,
1856, until the period of embarkation from the Crimea to England, the
condition of the men, in every respect, both as regards amount of
sickness and duties performed, was so much allied to a similar period
passed in any garrison, that a detailed notice would be useless,
except so far as it would display an almost unprecedented amount of
good health, compared with a period passed at any of the out-quarters
at which the Guards are stationed in England, and far better than
obtains in the close and confined barracks of the Metropolis.”[355]
-----
Footnote 355:
Wyatt, 91. Written in 1858, before the small barracks in Portman
Street and St. George’s ceased each to contain the head-quarters and
the main portion of a Guards Battalion.
-----
Both in respect to the comfort and the good administration which our men
now enjoyed, we contrasted very favourably with the French, who, though
they were better off than we had been in the winter 1854-55, did not
improve their services as we had done; they consequently fared worse
than the British army in the cold season of 1855-56, and suffered
considerably in the spring of 1856.
When Sevastopol was in the power of the Allies, they destroyed its
value, as much as they could, as a naval arsenal, and thus the docks,
all the forts in their possession, the barracks, and the aqueducts that
led into the town were demolished. These tasks were accomplished in the
mid-winter.
On the 1st of March the sixth and last draft reached the 1st Battalion,
consisting of 8 Officers and 263 men, whose average age and service
amounted to 23½ years and 18 months respectively. The men were stout and
robust, and, like the preceding draft, well adapted for all the possible
requirements of active service.[356]
-----
Footnote 356:
_Ibid._ , p. 91.
Next day Officers were posted to companies as follows:—
No. 1 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Hon. P. Feilding; Captains Tower;
Jervoise; Lieutenant Rose.
No. 2 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Burdett; Major Crawley; Captain Hall.
No. 3 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Newdigate; Captain Hon. H. Byng;
Lieutenant A. Adair.
No. 4 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Reeve; Captain Lord E. Cecil; Lieutenant
Sir W. Forbes, Bart.
No. 5 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Dawkins; Captain G. FitzRoy; Lieutenant S.
Mainwaring.
No. 6 Company: Captain J. Caulfeild; Lieutenants W. Seymour; Hon. E.
Legge.
No. 7 Company: Majors Armytage; Thellusson; Lieutenant Hon. W. Edwardes.
No. 8 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Lord Dunkelin; Captain Hon. W. Feilding;
Lieutenant Lane.
Ever since the capture of Sevastopol, the work of diplomacy had again
been active at Vienna; and with some additional advantage this time to
the Russians, for it succeeded in partially alienating the Emperor
Napoleon from the alliance. In form that Sovereign remained true to
Great Britain; but it was clear that, as far as he was concerned, the
war was at an end, and that the Tsar had no more to fear from his
animosity. This facilitated the action of Austria, and under her
mediation a project of peace was accepted by the Russians on the 16th of
January, 1856. A month later a Conference sat in Paris to settle an
immediate armistice and to conclude a general peace. The Treaty of Paris
was accordingly signed on the 30th of March, and it put an end finally
to the war that had lasted two years. By the terms of this agreement,
which yielded back to their original Sovereigns all territories in
possession of either of the combatants, an important article was
included, viz. the Black Sea was neutralized, its waters and ports were
“formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the flag of war,” naval
arsenals on its shores were not to be maintained, and ships of war were
forbidden to enter or pass through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. It
is of interest to record the fact that this article, to gain which
England had expended so much blood and treasure, was infringed by Russia
in 1859, who, with no one to interfere in the neutralized sea, blockaded
the Circassian coast, and at last overcame the stubborn resistance of
the liberty-loving tribes of the Caucasus that for so long checked her
progress in Central Asia. Having accomplished this work, she then boldly
repudiated the article, with scarcely a protest on our part, in the
beginning of 1871, when we were at peace with her, just fifteen years
after the conclusion of the Crimean war; and again she prepared her
forces to effect another development of the Eastern Question.
On the 2nd of April official tidings of peace were communicated to the
several armies engaged in the struggle, by a salute fired upon the
upland. Thenceforward the contending forces, drawn together by that
mutual respect and esteem with which brave men regard one another,
looked upon each other as friends, and all traces of hostility vanished
as if by magic. British and Russian soldiers were to be seen in scores
on their respective sides of the Tchernaya, conversing as best as they
could, and exchanging presents. The thoughts of our men, however, were
now naturally turned towards home; but two months were still to elapse
before the Coldstream quitted the soil on which they had for so long
lived and suffered, and where their military virtues had been so
conspicuously displayed.
About this time the French appointed a special mission to inquire into
the relative sanitary conditions of the English and French field
hospitals in the East, and Assistant-Surgeon Wyatt was sent to aid in
the investigation made.
“The whole of the Field hospitals,” says Dr. Wyatt, “were inspected,
and the most satisfactory conclusions drawn by the Inspector in favour
of the detached system of Regimental hospitals in the English army,
compared with the congregated ambulance arrangements of the French; he
was very favourably impressed with the Field hospitals of the Guards,
which he examined most minutely in all their details.”
Added to this, British Sanitary Commissioners made an inspection of the
hospitals in the Crimea, and it is with satisfaction that portions of
two paragraphs of the report are recorded here.
“The best example of a marquee hospital was that belonging to the
Guards, after they went to the front in June 1855.... Among the best
examples of a winter camp which came under the notice of the
Commission during the winter of 1855, was that of the Brigade of
Guards on the plateau, in laying out of which great care and
intelligence had evidently been bestowed. There was plenty of space
for allowing the air to circulate; the arrangement of the huts was
good, the ground was well trenched and drained, and many of the huts
were raised on stone foundations.”[357]
-----
Footnote 357:
Wyatt, 92, 93.
-----
Shortly before the conclusion of the peace an event of great interest to
our allies took place (March 16, 1856)—the birth of a son to the French
Emperor, an heir destined, it was confidently hoped, to preserve the
Napoleonic dynasty, and to hand down to posterity the glory of the great
founder of the Imperial House. Rejoicings were unstinted in Paris and in
London; and in the former place, where the peace Conference was sitting,
the representatives of all the Powers, not excluding Russia, added their
congratulations to the happy Emperor. Nor was the auspicious occasion
forgotten in the Crimea, where it was celebrated by a ball on the 1st of
April.[358] And yet how fickle is Fortune, and how she decided against
this unfortunate prince! He did not ascend the French throne, and was
but fourteen years of age when he was condemned to fly from his native
land, never to return to it. Napoleon III., overwhelmed by the united
might of Germany, was driven from his capital in 1870, and a few years
later he ended his days an exile in England. Living in our midst, his
son, the Prince Imperial, served in the British army, and lost his life,
when only twenty-three years of age, in a small skirmish in South
Africa; and thus he died before any new phase among his unstable
countrymen could recall him in the character of a pretender to the
French Imperial crown. _Sic transit gloria mundi._
-----
Footnote 358:
“A ball will be given to-morrow, in honour of the birth of the
Imperial Prince, by the Officers of the 1st Division of the Corps of
Reserve French army, in their camp on the Woronzoff road, near the
Sardinian army, to which all the English ladies and the Officers of
the English army are invited. Officers attending the ball will appear
in full dress uniform, but without swords and spurs” (_Head-Quarter
Memo._ , March 31, 1856).
-----
The interval between the conclusion of hostilities and the departure
from the Crimea was eagerly seized by many to visit their late enemy and
the places of interest to be found in the peninsula. A few extracts from
the diary of Colonel Tower will perhaps give a fair example of these
experiences.
“_April 8th._—Rode to Mackenzie Farm to visit the Russian camp; the
Russian Officers were extremely civil, and showed us all round their
camp. The men lived in excavations in the ground, like cellars, two or
three steps down, with a roof of branches or anything to make it
waterproof; fusty little holes, and the usual Russian soldier’s smell.
This is very peculiar, the tan of the leather is the chief ingredient,
and the sour smell of the black bread is another powerful ingredient.
They are decidedly unclean in their persons, and never appear without
their long brown coats and high boots.... They seem to be always
fetching water in their tins. The Officers seemed as pleased as we
were that the war was over, and regaled us with whatever liquor they
had, generally champagne.
”_April 13th._—We all went in a body to the Mackenzie heights [_i.e._
with Sir W. Codrington and his Staff], and were received by Luders
[the Russian General then in command] and his Staff. A capital
luncheon with every sort of delicacy was prepared for us, Pélissier
and his Staff also being there. About 10,000 Ruskis passed us in
review, as they were being sent away northwards. It was very
interesting, as we saw specimens of almost every branch of the Russian
service.... A great many Officers of the Guards who had volunteered
for service in the Crimea, marched past with the regiments to which
they were attached; also cavalry Officers with their sabres and spurs
in the infantry. They point their toes as they march past, like the
Prussians.
“_April 17th._—Luders returned Codrington’s and Pélissier’s visit, and
came down to have an exhibition of the English and French armies. We
were in line of contiguous columns, nearly 30,000 strong and 86 guns
(no cavalry), all in the most perfect order; I never saw anything so
well as our troops looked. The men had their best clothing on;
regiments all made up to their full strength; artillery with new
harness, horses in first-rate condition. I saw one of the Russian
Generals separate himself from the Staff, and ride down between the
Grenadiers and our Battalion, to see the size of the men and depth of
the column; he kept muttering exclamations of surprise and admiration,
and well he might. I think 30,000 puts it under the mark. The French
were in line with big intervals between their regiments, which made a
line extending almost to Kamiesh, and it must have been very tiring
riding all along such a line, but I suppose they thought it would make
them appear stronger. It would have looked much better if they had
also been in contiguous columns.
”_April 25th._—Rode with General Craufurd [Commanding Guards Brigade]
and Percy Feilding to the Alma; we got there easily in the mid-day,
and spent all the afternoon stepping the distance from the river to
the epaulment, clambering up where the French ascended the steep bank,
looking for Horace Cust’s grave. We found the field of battle exactly
as we left it, not a spade was put into the ground in the valley, not
a vine cultivated or a house rebuilt. It had quite the appearance of a
‘Field of blood.’
“Next day, off at daybreak to Bakshiserai—a good big town, full of
soldiers and Officers who were quartered there. We went by appointment
to our friend Trubetskoi, who had a very good house and put us up
famously; he introduced us to a set of Ruski Officers, who were the
most rollicking and debauched set I ever came across. They had a
tremendous orgie in our honour, drinking, singing, etc.; they mix
every liquor they can get together.... Percy and I rode back to our
camp that evening (the 27th), after taking leave of Trubetskoi, who
really did all he could to make our expedition pleasant.”
So the days passed on, varied, besides duty, by _fêtes_ of pleasure,
excursions, cricket matches, and races, until the embarkation took
place, and the Battalion returned to England. But, prior to this event,
a solemn duty was performed, and a resting-place for the dead was
prepared, where the remains of those who had fallen in the war might be
laid. A site selected on Cathcart’s Hill was enclosed, and a portion of
it was devoted as a burial place for the Brigade. A number of masons
from the Guards were employed, early in April, to build a suitable wall,
and fatigue parties were furnished to finish the work. The bodies of
most of the Officers and others, killed at Inkerman and elsewhere in the
vicinity, were exhumed, and reverently interred in the new cemetery. The
masses of the dead, however, could not then be removed there, so,
instead, the places where they lay were carefully fenced in. But this
arrangement did not last, because the enclosures became dilapidated
through time, and the graves were liable to be desecrated. A few years
ago this was remedied, and the bones of the departed, together with the
monuments erected by the care of their comrades, were taken to
Cathcart’s Hill, and are there preserved in perpetuity within the
cemetery which had been first laid out in the spring of 1856.
The welcome news that the Battalion was to be sent back home, published
on the 3rd of June, was preceded by a Divisional Order of Lieut.-General
Lord Rokeby, commanding the First Division, dated the 2nd:—
“As the embarkation of the various regiments will shortly cause the
dissolution of the First Division, Lieut.-General Lord Rokeby wishes
to permit himself the pleasure of expressing the grateful thanks he
entertains of the support he has received from all ranks during the
period he has had the honour of being in command. Every one has at all
times endeavoured to meet his wishes, and the Lieut.-General
confidently believes that the record of the army will afford proof of
the good results which have emanated from the cheerful spirit of
obedience which has characterized the conduct of the noble regiments
and corps of which it was formed. The state of the hospitals and the
general health of the regiments, under God’s blessing, speaks for and
forms the best reward of the Divisional and Regimental Medical Staff,
and the Lieut.-General requests Dr. Williams, and all junior to him in
that Department, to accept their full share of the thanks he presumes
to offer to all ranks, and the wishes he forms for their prosperity
and happiness.”
On the 4th of June, the Battalion embarked at Kamiesh Bay, and sailed
from the Crimea in H.M.S. _Agamemnon_, arriving at Spithead on the 28th,
whence they were sent by train to Aldershot camp. They had been absent
on foreign service for 2 years and 126 days (856 days), which time was
passed in the following places: Malta, 48 days; Scutari, 45 days;
Bulgaria, 75 days; Crimea, 627 days; and at sea 61 days.
The strength on embarkation from England (February, 1854) had been 35
Officers and 919 Non-commissioned officers and men, and during the
period of duty in the East, reinforcements amounting to 1141 men were
sent out in six drafts, making a total of 2060 men who served in the
war. The number of primary admissions from all causes into the
Regimental and general hospitals was 3101, of which 2785 were from
disease, 243 from wounds, and 73 from accidental injuries. Death reduced
the Battalion by 699 men, of whom 81 were killed in action, 54 died from
wounds, and 564 from disease: 65 men were invalided home by wounds, and
187 by disease; and 111 men were finally discharged the army on account
of disabilities contracted during active service—59 from the effects of
wounds, and 52 from those of disease.[359] Total loss of
Non-commissioned officers and men, 810. Ninety-one Coldstream Officers
were employed in the Russian war.[360] Of these, nine were killed in
action, viz. Lieut.-Colonels Hon. T. Vesey Dawson and J. C. Cowell,
Captains L. D. Mac-Kinnon, H. M. Bouverie, Hon. G. Eliot, Horace Cust,
and F. Ramsden, and Lieutenants E. A. Disbrowe and C. H. Greville; one
died of wounds, viz. Captain Hon. R. Drummond; three died of disease,
viz. Lieut.-Colonel Hon. R. Boyle, Colonel Trevelyan, and Captain Hylton
Jolliffe: total loss of Officers, thirteen. Seven were wounded, viz.
Major-General Sir H. Bentinck, Colonel Hon. G. Upton, Lieut.-Colonels J.
Halkett, Lord C. FitzRoy, Hon. P. Feilding, and C. Baring, and Captain
Hon. W. Amherst. Seventeen were invalided on account of illness, of whom
seven were unable to return to the Crimea. Several were obliged to leave
the seat of war on promotion, and altogether twenty-two seem to have
done duty at least twice before Sevastopol.
-----
Footnote 359:
Wyatt, 97; see Appendix No. XII. 3.
Footnote 360:
Five more were transferred to the Regiment (during the war); after
they had left the Crimea, viz. Majors Hon. W. Boyle, Conolly, V.C.,
and Maxse (the two last wounded), Captain Hedworth Jolliffe, and
Lieutenant W. Stirling. The latter fought against the Russians in the
Navy, as did also Lieutenant W. F. Seymour (who, however, joined the
Coldstream in the Crimea). Naval-Cadet J. B. Sterling, moreover,
served in the war, but he was not gazetted to the Regiment till 1861.
-----
The Crimean Guards Brigade, concentrated at Aldershot, remained there a
few days, and during that time the Battalion was inspected by the
Colonel of the Regiment, Field-Marshal Earl of Strafford, whose
presence, as a Coldstream Officer, formed a connecting link between the
glories of Waterloo and those achieved in the Russian war.
On the 8th July, Her Majesty the Queen appeared at the camp, and was
received by the troops quartered there who had lately come back from the
East. After the march past, a representative body of Officers and men,
who had been under fire, from each regiment, was formed up in a hollow
square round Her Majesty’s carriage, to listen to the gracious address
of welcome pronounced by the Queen herself to her brave men just
returned from an arduous and protracted war. The address was thus
published in Orders:—
Officers, Non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, I wish personally
to convey through you, to the regiments assembled here this day, my
hearty welcome on their return to England in health and full
efficiency. Say to them, that I have watched anxiously over the
difficulties and hardships which they have so nobly borne, that I have
mourned with deep sorrow for the brave men who have fallen for their
country, and that I have felt proud of that valour which with their
gallant allies they have displayed on every field. I thank God that
your dangers are over, whilst the glory of your deeds remains. But I
know that, should your services be again required, you will be
animated by the same devotion which in the Crimea has rendered you
invincible.
Colonel Tower, who was present upon this interesting occasion, throws
light upon it by recording in his diary that Her Majesty “made us a
capital speech, full of gratitude and good feeling, and got quite
eloquent; at last she quite broke down, and burst into tears when she
talked of the poor fellows that were not there to receive her thanks.”
He adds, “If she had seen us in the trenches in July, 1855, or in
Bulgaria in July, 1854, she would not have recognized her Brigade; we
were now [July, 1856] all so nice and smart.”
Next day the Crimean Battalions of the Brigade, 3200 strong, left
Aldershot to make their public entry into London. Parading at 5.30 in
the morning, they were conveyed to Nine Elms Station by train, where the
three bands met them. The day was observed as a general holiday; the
route taken was densely thronged by an enthusiastic crowd; the houses
were decorated with flags; and the church bells rang out a joyous peal
of welcome. On passing the Horse Guards, H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge
met the column, and as soon as the men perceived their former Commander,
who had been with them at the hard-fought battle of Inkerman, “their
stern gravity gave way, and they honoured him with the heartiest
cheers.” As they defiled through Buckingham Palace, the Queen,
accompanied by the Royal children, by her mother the Duchess of Kent,
her uncle the King of the Belgians, and by other illustrious persons,
came to the balcony to greet her gallant troops with her gracious
presence. Arrived in Hyde Park, they found the other four Guards
Battalions, with the Colonels at the head of their respective Regiments,
formed up in a line of quarter columns, facing Park Lane, with
sufficient interval between them to receive the Crimean Battalions in
their proper places on parade; and while the latter marched into their
positions under the orders of Generals Lord Rokeby and Craufurd, their
comrades presented arms. The three Regiments, now complete, were then
handed over to their respective Colonels, to H.R.H. the Prince Consort,
Field-Marshal Earl of Strafford (seated in a carriage, because he was
too infirm to head his Regiment on horseback), and H.R.H. the Duke of
Cambridge. The Prince Consort having proceeded to join Her Majesty, the
Duke of Cambridge assumed command of the whole. On the arrival of the
Queen the bands played the national anthem, and the seven Battalions
marched past Her Majesty, to the air, “See, the Conquering Hero comes.”
The Brigade then advanced in Review order to the flagstaff; another
Royal salute was given; and the pageant came to an end.
On the same day the following Brigade Order was issued:—
“H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge has received Her Majesty’s Command,
through the Adjutant-General, to express to the Brigade of Guards Her
Majesty’s entire satisfaction and approval of the appearance of the
Brigade this day in the Park, which he requests the Commanding
Officers of Regiments to make known to the several Battalions under
their command.”
After the review, a complete change of quarters took place in the
Brigade: The 1st Grenadiers proceeded to Aldershot, 2nd Grenadiers to
Dublin (which was again occupied by the Household troops), 3rd
Grenadiers to Wellington barracks, Buckingham Palace, the Magazine, and
Kensington; 1st Coldstream to the Tower and St. John’s Wood, 2nd
Coldstream to Windsor; 1st Scots Fusilier Guards to Portman Street and
St. George’s barracks, 2nd Scots Fusilier Guards to Aldershot. A few
days later the Battalions of the Regiment were equalized, in that each
was formed of ten companies, instead of twelve and eight, as had been
the case during the war; two companies belonging to the 2nd Battalion
were therefore transferred to the 1st, and the Officers were posted as
follows:—
_Colonel._—Field-Marshal the Earl of Strafford, G.C.B., G.C.H.
_Lieut.-Colonel._—Colonel Hon. G. Upton, C.B.
1st Battalion. 2nd Battalion.
_Majors._—Colonel Gordon Drummond. Colonel Lord F. Paulet.
_Captains._—Colonels W. S. Newton; Colonels S. Perceval; W. Mark Wood
T. M. Steele, C.B. (_Mounted_). (_Mounted_).
Lieut.-Colonels C. L. Cocks; Lieut.-Colonels J. Halkett; C.
D. Carleton; A. St. G. W. Strong; Lord Burghersh, C.B.;
Herbert-Stepney, C.B.; J. Airey, Hon. A. Hardinge; Hon. P.
C.B.; C. S. Burdett; F. W. Feilding; W. Reeve; C. Baring;
Newdigate; Lord Dunkellin; W. G. Hon. H. Byng.
Dawkins.
_Lieutenants._—Majors J. H. Le Captains A. Fremantle (Adjutant); J.
Couteur; H. Armytage; A. Caulfeild; Majors Hon. W. Boyle;
Thellusson; P. S. Crawley; Sir J. J. Conolly; H. Maxse; Captains
Dunlop; G. L. Goodlake; Lord Hon. W. Amherst; C. Greenhill; H.
Bingham; Captains H. Tower; Hon. C. Jervoise; St. V. Whitshed; Hon.
W. Wellesley; Hon. W. Feilding; H. Campbell; Julian Hall; G.
Major M. Heneage; Captains Lord E. Wigram; A. Lambton; G. Rose.
Cecil; C. Blackett; G. FitzRoy;
Hon. R. Monck (Adjt.).
_Ensigns._—Lieutenants Sir W. Lieutenants E. S. Burnell; W.
Forbes, Bart.; Hon. W. Edwardes; Stirling; F. Seymour; R. Thursby;
H. J. Lane; A. Adair; W. F. N. Burnand; F. Buller; W. Wynne;
Seymour; S. T. Mainwaring; Hon. E. Reeve; H. Bonham-Carter; H.
E. Legge; Hon. W. Ogilvy; G. Fortescue.
Cameron.
_Quartermaster._—A. Falconer. A. Hurle.
_Surgeon-Major._—J. Munro, M.D.
_Battalion-Surgeon._—J. Skelton,
M.D.
_Assistant-Surgeons._—J. Wyatt; T. C. V. Cay; J. W. Trotter.
Rogers; F. Bowen, M.D.
_Solicitor._—W. G. Carter, Esq.[361]
-----
Footnote 361:
The difference made in the Regiment by the war will be seen by
comparing the above with the following, giving the list in February,
1854:—
_Lieut.-Colonel._—Colonel H. Bentinck.
_Majors._—Colonels C. Hay; Hon. A. Upton.
_Captains._—Colonels W. Codrington; Hon. G. Upton; J. Clitherow; G.
Drummond; (_Mounted_). Lieut.-Colonels Lord F. Paulet; H. Daniell;
Hon. R. Boyle; W. Newton: Colonel W. Trevelyan: Lieut.-Colonels S.
Perceval; M. Tierney; T. Crombie; Hon. T. V. Dawson; T. Steele; H.
Cumming; W. M. Wood.
_Lieutenants._—Captains C. Cocks; P. Somerset; J. C. Cowell; J. Halkett;
D. Carleton; Lord A. C. FitzRoy; C. Burdett; F. Newdigate
(Adjutant); L. MacKinnon; Sir G. Walker, Bart.; W. Dawkins; H.
Jolliffe; C. Strong; Lord Dunkellin; C. Wilson; Hon. A. Hardinge; F.
Burton; Hon. P. Feilding (Adjutant); W. Reeve; Hon. G. Eliot; C.
Baring; J. H. Le Couteur; H. Bouverie; H. Armytage.
_Ensigns._—Lieutenants Hon. H. Byng; A. Thellusson; H. Cust; P. Crawley;
Sir J. Dunlop, Bart.; G. Goodlake; F. Ramsden; Lord Bingham; H.
Tower; Hon. W. Wellesley; Hon. R. Drummond; P. Wyndham; E. Disbrowe;
A. Fremantle; C. Greville; M. Heneage.
_Quartermasters._—A. Hurle; A. Falconer.
_Surgeon-Major._—J. Munro, M.D. _Battalion Surgeon._—J. Skelton, M.D.
_Assistant-Surgeons._—F. Wildbore; J. Wyatt.
-----
[Illustration:
DRUMMER 1745.
N.R. Wilkinson del. A.D. Innes & C^o London Mintern Bros.
lith.
]
Where four allies were conducting a war in common, it was only natural
that there should be an interchange of medals and of decorations, and
this was done with no ungenerous hand. A new medal, more coveted than
any other by soldiers and sailors, was established early in 1856, both
for Officers and men in the Naval and Military services, who had
distinguished themselves before the enemy “for valour.” The distribution
of the Victoria Cross did not, however, take place until the 26th of
June, 1857, when all the claims for that most conspicuous honour had
been fully investigated. The day appointed for the ceremony was observed
as a general holiday, and a review was held in Hyde Park before Her
Majesty the Queen, who affixed to the breast of each man entitled to it,
the bronze cross he had won in the field by his personal bravery. In the
Coldstream the recipients of this proud distinction were Majors Goodlake
and Conolly, and Privates Strong and Stanlock.[362] This event, though
it took place more than a year after the conclusion of peace, is
connected with the Crimean struggle, and may be said to terminate the
history of the protracted hostilities that troubled our relations with
Russia. Thenceforward the war became a thing of the past, and its
memories were merged into or overshadowed by other events which occurred
elsewhere.
-----
Footnote 362:
See Appendix, No. XIII.
-----
We have seen how the struggle shaped itself; how disastrously it was
directed; and how devotedly our army maintained it, under very adverse
and wholly exceptional circumstances. We allied ourselves to a Potentate
whose tenure of power was precarious, whose interests were not our
interests, and who only wished to adopt a foreign policy of adventure to
reconcile his new subjects to his rule. His armies loyally supported
ours in the field, and there we happily formed a sincere respect for the
brave French troops who fought by our side. But the Government of
Paris,—objecting always to transfer the theatre of war to Asia, where
the enemy was really vulnerable,—restricted our field of operations to
Europe; and as Austria protected the Russians on the Bessarabian
frontier, we were forced at a late period of the year to make a descent
upon the Crimea. Unhappily we had made no preparations for such an
expedition, and had formed no plan for carrying it out; in fact, such an
invasion had not seriously entered into our calculations when we
declared war against the Tsar.
Thus, we landed fortuitously at a point where the road led to the north
side of Sevastopol, but where no harbours near that town, were at hand
to form a base of operations. Hence, without a base, we advanced to our
objective, and, in due course, and after a successful battle, we arrived
before it. But, on reaching this point, the Commander of our allies was
indisposed to carry out the plan to which we had committed ourselves. We
therefore shifted our forces by a strange flank march to the south side,
in the hope that we might there at least be enabled to bring the
campaign to a speedy conclusion. Sevastopol was at that time guarded by
a small garrison, composed of a medley of indifferent and badly armed
troops; it was imperfectly defended towards the land, and in this
direction it was an insignificant stronghold. Still, as long as it
remained in that state, we hesitated to make any or even the least move
against it; we preferred to wait to bring up our siege-train, and to
open regular approaches, with the expectation that the town would fall
before the cold weather should set in, and put an end to all field
operations.
But we had miscalculated. We did not take into account what a patriotic
and energetic garrison might achieve during the unexpected respite
granted them, nor did we perceive that we were altering, just as winter
was approaching, the whole plan of invasion from an expedition of
surprise to the more lengthened process of a regular siege. Thus, under
the direction of an Engineer Officer of genius, did Sevastopol assume
the proportions of a fortress, while the English and the French were
looking idly on; and before they could batter down simultaneously the
new works in front of each—which they allowed the enemy to
construct,—the Russian forces, drawn from the Danubian Principalities,
were hurried by forced marches into the Crimea, to the support of the
scanty troops that were then to be found there. The very moment we had
meant to deliver our final blow, the enemy’s arrangements were complete,
and we had to fight the unequal battle of Inkerman. Although we were
victorious there against tremendous odds, the result obliged us to spend
the winter on the barren and snow-swept plain of the Chersonese.
For this emergency we were entirely unprepared, and an intensely cold
season having begun early, our troops, as we have seen, suffered in
consequence. We then hung on to our positions before Sevastopol with
strong tenacity of purpose, and with a resolution which is above all
praise. But we could not resume the siege till the spring of 1855, and
it was early in September before the south side fell. Taught by
disaster, we then made every arrangement to continue the struggle with
the best prospects of success; but the French, having gained the objects
they had in view, became inactive; they clamoured for a cessation of
hostilities; and thus, to preserve an alliance into which we had
permitted ourselves to be drawn, we signed a peace of little value, and
so put an end to the war.
The successes gained were not due to the skill of the Government that
directed the struggle; they were solely due to that indomitable bravery,
discipline, and power of endurance which have ever characterized our
soldiers, as well as to the admirable system which made the British
regimental Officers and men second to none that existed at that time in
the other European armies.
The results of the war were dearly purchased. According to a return
presented to Parliament, 390 Officers and 20,425 Noncommissioned
officers and men were killed or died of wounds or of disease in the
Crimea, and 14,718 men were invalided at the conclusion of the war,
bringing the total casualties up to 35,533 of all ranks. But this return
omits to include casualties in the Naval brigade and in the Marines
(doing duty on land), and in the Commissariat, Transport, and Hospital
departments; nor does it seem to give our losses incurred during the
disastrous stay in Bulgaria, etc.: so that the figures do not represent
the entire losses to which even our Land forces were subjected.[363] On
the other hand, it was computed that the Russians lost as many as half a
million men. But this is a surmise, and the facts have never been known.
The estimate is probably exaggerated, though it is certain that the
enemy’s casualties were exceedingly great; but loss of men is not the
greatest calamity that could befall an Empire like Russia.
-----
Footnote 363:
Appendix XII. It will be observed that the losses mentioned in the
text do not take into account those of the Navy incurred on board
ship. On the 8th of May, 1856, Lord Panmure made a statement in the
House of Lords, to the effect that from the 19th of September, 1854
(that is, the day before the battle of the Alma), 270 Officers and
19,314 men were killed, or died of wounds or of disease, and that 2873
men were discharged the service as incapacitated for further service
by war; total, 22,457 casualties,—excluding, apparently, soldiers who
died on board ship, sailors and marines serving on shore, and
departmental troops. It seems strange that this imperfect statement
should be sometimes quoted, instead of the return above mentioned,
even though the latter is far from being satisfactory, and does not
complete the tale of the losses to the Naval and Military Forces of
the Crown during the war with Russia.
-----
Two events must be noted here which took place about this time, one of
which affected the whole army, and the other the Brigade only. On the
death of Lord Hardinge, who had succeeded the Duke of Wellington as
Commander-in-Chief in 1852, H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge was appointed
to that high office, and assumed his new functions July 15, 1856—an
office which he held without interruption until the 31st of October,
1895, for a space of nearly forty years.
The day before, the following Brigade Order appeared:—
July 14, 1856. Her Majesty has been pleased to appoint Major-General
Lord Rokeby, K.C.B., to serve on the Staff of the army, with a view to
his exercising a general supervision over the Battalions [of Guards]
in England, including those at Aldershot; all communications having
reference to the Brigade of Guards will be addressed to him in future,
instead of the Field-Officer in Brigade Waiting as heretofore.
It may be well to explain that, previous to this appointment, orders to
the Brigade had been issued by the Field-Officer in Brigade Waiting—a
Commanding Officer of a Guards Regiment or Battalion, taken by
roster—who is always an Officer of the Sovereign’s Household. The effect
of the order just quoted, was to place a General Officer in actual
command of the Brigade, while the Field Officer in Brigade Waiting was
still retained to fulfil the Court duties, he being, as formerly, the
direct medium of communication between the Court and the Household
Infantry.[364]
-----
Footnote 364:
For some years, after 1856, it appears that the Field-Officer in
Brigade Waiting continued to exercise considerable control over the
military affairs of the Guards. The Major-General Commanding issued
general orders, the details of which were carried out by the
Field-Officer. Between 1856 and 1868 the Foot Guards were called a
Division; but April 27th of the latter year, the old term Brigade was
again restored, and it was directed that the General’s orders should
be called “Brigade Orders,” while those emanating from the
Field-Officer should be termed “Sub-brigade Orders.” The “Sub-brigade
Office” was abolished February 28, 1873. The Home District, created in
1870, was placed under the command of the Major-General Commanding the
Brigade of Guards, and this arrangement still prevails.
-----
CHAPTER XIII.
A PERIOD OF WAR, 1856-1871.
Reductions after the war—Comparison between the situations in Europe, in
1815 and in 1856—Fresh troubles and complications imminent—Many wars
and disturbances—Scientific instruction introduced into the
army—Practical training of the troops carried out—The material
comfort of the soldier attended to—Military activity in England in
1859—The Earl of Strafford succeeded by General Lord Clyde—Death of
H.R.H. the Prince Consort—Misunderstanding with the United States of
America—Chelsea barracks completed—Marriage of H.R.H. the Prince of
Wales—Death of Lord Clyde; succeeded by General Sir W. Gomm—The
Brigade of Guards Recruit Establishment—Public duties in
London—Fenian troubles in Ireland; the 1st and 2nd Battalions
succeed each other there; the Clerkenwell outrage—Reforms in the
armament of the British infantry.
The termination of the Crimean war, though it entailed considerable
reductions in the army, was not accompanied by the acute distress that
marked the close of the great struggle with France in 1815. In the
latter case, the country had been seriously engaged with a formidable
enemy for twenty years, and was constrained to devote all its resources
to crush him. For nearly a generation, Great Britain had been a nation
standing in arms, and thriving, so to speak, upon the success of her
operations by sea and by land. The sudden cessation of hostilities, and
the no less abrupt and violent change from a strong war footing to a
small peace establishment, caused a temporary dislocation in trade, and
this contributed in no small degree to create an unfortunate effect upon
the economic conditions under which the people were then living.
Whereas, in the more recent case, we were engaged for a relatively short
space of time, and were not involved in efforts which could bear
comparison with those we had been obliged to make earlier in the
century. Hence we were able to diminish our armaments without incurring
the same difficulties that had previously oppressed the industry of the
country; and arrangements could be safely made to reduce the regular
army by 50,000 men, and to disband all those other forces that were
brought together for the purposes of the Russian war. On the 1st of
November, 1856, the establishment of the Regiment was diminished by some
600 men, and was fixed on the following scale:—
Colonel. 1
Lt.-Colonel. 1
Majors. 2
Captains. 20
Lieutenants. 24
Ensigns. 16
Adjutants. 2
Qr.-Masters. 2
Surgn.-Major. 1
Surgeon. 1
Assist.-Surgns. 5
Solicitor. 1
Sergeants. 92
Drummers. 34
Rank and File. 1600
2 Battalions, 10 Cos. each.
Another difference between the peace of 1815 and that of 1856 is also of
sufficient importance to require a notice. The final defeat of Napoleon
at Waterloo found Europe exhausted by the long wars of the French
Revolution; and the Congress of Vienna effected such a settlement among
the civilized nations, of apparently so stable a character, that all
Governments believed in the certainty of a protracted period of
international tranquillity. Nor was this expectation disappointed, and
for forty years there were no complications to disturb the political
order that had then been established. But the assurance of peace led
many to suppose that the era of war had come to an end, and we in this
country were inclined to adopt that view—to such an extent, at least,
that we deprived the army of some of the departments which are necessary
to its existence in the field. So to say, we hid the remnant of the
standing army away from the sight of the nation, as an institution
almost out of harmony with the spirit of the age, and as an instrument
of offence which would scarcely be again required for practical use. The
warlike traditions of the past, however, remained in full vigour among
the British troops, between 1815 and 1854; nor was there any relaxation
of the strict principles of soldierlike bearing and conduct which had
been inaugurated and enforced by the Duke of York and by the Duke of
Wellington. No troops were more highly disciplined than those that
belonged to the British army; among none had the military spirit and
tone been so carefully fostered and so fully developed: and it was due
to the splendid qualities which had been instilled into them, that the
achievements of our men in the Crimea commanded the respect and the
admiration of the world. But the knowledge of even elementary military
sciences failed us; no instruction beyond drill was given; we had little
organization, no warlike grouping or cohesion of units, no transport, no
real power to take the field or to utilize there the magnificent troops
which their Officers had formed. The struggle with Russia had revealed
these defects; and, taught in the bitter school of adversity, we were
naturally slow, when the peace was signed, to destroy entirely those
auxiliary services which had been so painfully created in the midst of
war.
Now, the year 1856 was not like its predecessor, the end of a disturbed
period; it marked the very commencement of a new era of European
complications. The statesmen of the day were filled with no illusions,
and were well aware of the unsettled state of affairs which the peace of
1856 had inaugurated. The Italian question was directly raised; Austria
lost credit by her weak and vacillating action, and had become despised
and isolated; steps to secure the aggrandisement of Prussia were already
prepared; the policy of Napoleon III. was obscure and uncertain. Changes
in the old landmarks of the Continent and serious trouble loomed in the
near future. The threatening aspect of the coming storm, in short, was
easy to be discerned: it was only too manifest that England might have
to defend her rights, and could not afford, at such a moment, to neglect
the affairs of her army and navy.
As events turned out, the war-cloud hovered over the whole world, and
oppressed humanity with more or less intensity until 1871. Great Britain
had to contend against many difficulties; but they were not of serious
importance, except the Indian Mutiny,—which, breaking out unexpectedly
in 1857, was not crushed finally until 1859,—and except the rapid
advance of Russia across the barren steppes of Central Asia towards the
frontiers of our Empire of India. Of our minor troubles, we may note:
the Persian war, in 1856-57; the expedition to China, in 1857-61; the
subjugation of the Maori natives in New Zealand, 1864; the invasion of
Abyssinia, 1867-68; and the threatened dispute with the United States,
1861. In none of these, except the last, was the Brigade of Guards
concerned. On the borders of Europe, the Caucasian Switzerland of
Circassia was finally overpowered and assimilated with Russia, and the
one barrier to her progress in the East was at last swept away, 1859.
Nor was America free from disturbance. The United States, torn by
dissensions, fought a fratricidal war of secession, 1861-64, that ended
in re-establishing the authority of the Northern States over the
revolted South; while that political stormy petrel, Napoleon III., took
part in a policy of adventure, by attempting, though unsuccessfully, to
establish French influence, under cover of an Austrian prince, in
Mexico. But in Europe itself the trouble was greater: France and
Sardinia attacked Austria in Lombardy in 1859, and forced her to
relinquish her possession of that province; Italy also rose in rebellion
against the Princes that then ruled her States, and was consolidated
into one kingdom under Victor Emanuel, our late ally in the Crimea. In
1859, also, Napoleon III. showed considerable animosity against England,
and it was thought by many that there would be war with France. In 1864,
Austria and Prussia joined to wrest the Duchies of Schleswig Holstein
from Denmark: and two years later, having quarrelled over the booty,
they came to blows, when Prussia defeated her rival hopelessly in the
short and sharp campaign of a few weeks' duration in Bohemia, and
acquired a complete ascendency over Germany. Italy, at the same time
also, was enabled by foreign aid, to compel Austria to surrender her
hold on Venetia. Then came the great war of 1870-71, when France and
Prussia, regarding each with mutual jealousy and international hatred,
engaged in deathly strife, that resulted in the fall of Napoleon, in the
signal defeat of France, and in the refounding of the German Empire
under the autocracy of Prussia.
The results of these constant contests upon our own army were not, of
course, immediately apparent, nor could they produce a decided effect
all at once upon the course of our military administration. But
sufficient has been said to show that there were obvious reasons why the
lethargy which affected the vital concerns of the forces of the Crown in
1815, was not reproduced in 1856, and how it came about that the nation
began to take an increased interest in these most important affairs.
The Officers of the British army formed at that time a competent body.
Taken from a class where the best leaders of men might be expected to be
found, trained in the manly school of field sports and of outdoor
exercises, brought up to early habits of obedience and of discipline,
and endowed with the faculty of commanding the respect and the
confidence of their subordinates, they were as well qualified to manage
the rank and file placed under them in peace time, as they were
conspicuous for their bravery and for the good example they set when
danger pressed, or when difficulties were to be overcome in war time.
One thing only did they lack—they had little scientific knowledge of
their profession. To remedy this grave deficiency, a Council of Military
Education was appointed in May, 1857, to superintend the system of
education introduced among the Officers, and the examinations of
candidates for admission to the service. It cannot be stated that this
subject had been entirely ignored in the past, but it had been little
regarded. After 1857, however, considerable attention was given to it,
and the new system eventually expanded to its present dimensions—adding,
in fact, to the army, as part of itself, a military University, where
degrees are bestowed upon graduates, in their various ranks, who pass
its examinations. These degrees attesting the scientific and theoretical
proficiency of the candidates then became a necessary qualification for
promotion in the service, at first to the rank of Captain only, but
subsequently to a higher grade. In this respect, the policy has rather
been to form an examining Board, for the purpose of testing the
acquirements of Officers, than to institute something more akin to a
teaching University, with the result that what is called “cramming” (or
hasty learning of special subjects) has been largely increased, to the
detriment perhaps of a more solid system of instruction. At any rate,
whilst the old leaven of manhood and of common sense which has ever
characterized the body of British Officers has not been weakened, a form
of education calculated to teach technical and scientific duties in the
field has been accepted with gratitude and satisfaction.
This important reform was supplemented by H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge,
the new Commander-in-Chief, who carried on the work, initiated by his
predecessor, Lord Hardinge, which had been strongly urged by H.R.H. the
Prince Consort. The camp of instruction established at Chobham in 1853
was moved to Aldershot, in the midst of a wide extent of heather
country; the Crimean huts were erected there, and the head-quarters of a
new military district were formed, where manœuvres could be
undertaken by large bodies of troops, and where the men could be taught
practically their numerous duties in the field. As will be seen, Guards
Battalions were often sent there for this purpose. Nor was musketry
neglected. Officers were told off as instructors in the art of correct
shooting with the rifle that had been introduced into the service; every
soldier was trained individually in its use, in a systematic way and in
accordance with the regulations laid down at the School of Instruction
established at Hythe; parties, moreover, of Officers, Non-commissioned
officers, and men were constantly sent there to undergo a course of
musketry, and receive a certificate of efficiency in that very necessary
branch of their military training.[365]
-----
Footnote 365:
_Brigade Order_ , August 20, 1856: “H.R.H. the General
Commanding-in-Chief appoints Captain Instructors of Musketry,
Brevet-Major Thesiger, 3rd Grenadier Guards; Major Le Couteur, 1st
Coldstream; and Capt. Hon. R. Mostyn, 2nd Scots Fusilier Guards.” But
it was not until the 30th of April, 1857, that regular Instructors of
Musketry appeared in the Army-list in the Coldstream, when Captain
Blackett and Major Conolly, V.C., were appointed in that capacity, in
the 1st and 2nd Battalions respectively.
February 7, 1857. “The Major-General has much pleasure in promulgating
the following, received from the Adjutant-General, dated Horse Guards,
February 4, 1857: 'The General Commanding-in-Chief, having received a
most satisfactory report of the result of the various practices in
shooting and judging distances by the parties lately attached to the
school of musketry, by which it appears that they have, in the
aggregate, attained a higher figure (38·98) than any batch of parties
hitherto under instruction at Hythe, I have it in command to request
your Lordship will make known to the Division of Foot Guards the
satisfaction with which the said report has been received by His Royal
Highness.'”
-----
It has been noted that General Sir W. Codrington utilized the time when
warlike operations practically ceased in the Crimea, by directing that
all British soldiers should be put through an efficient course of
musketry. After the war, the Guards continued to shoot on the range at
Kilburn, but in 1859 a camp was formed for them at Ash, where rifle
practice was carried out by companies, sent there in succession from the
Battalions in England during the spring and summer months. Next year a
Mounted Officer with a regular staff took command of the camp. Though
Ash and Aldershot were the usual places selected for the Guards'
musketry, companies were also sometimes sent to Eastbourne and to
Gravesend for this purpose.
In the winter months marching was practised, and great gun drill was
taught.[366] In 1861, gymnastic training was introduced, and in
September of that year, sergeants from the Brigade were sent through a
course, so as to qualify as instructors. A gymnasium was about this time
first constructed at St. John’s Wood barracks, and companies were
required to go there for a few weeks at a time. The gymnasium at Chelsea
barracks was ready in 1865, and another at Windsor in 1870. The physical
development of their men had before this been a special interest to the
Officers of the Brigade, who endeavoured to introduce a system of
outdoor gymnastics in the Guards, as far back as 1843. The practice,
however, on being objected to by the Duke of Wellington, was given
up.[367]
-----
Footnote 366:
The reader may perhaps be interested in knowing that one of the first
orders given by the Duke of Cambridge on succeeding to the supreme
command of the army related to marches. _Brigade Order_ , November 17,
1856: “In compliance with instructions received from His Royal
Highness, Commanding Officers will march out their Battalions at least
once a week, in complete marching order, not less than eight to ten
miles; the system prescribed in General Craufurd’s regulations for
conducting a march to be adhered to.” His Royal Highness had at
Scutari, in 1854, when in command of the First Division, drawn the
attention of the latter to these regulations. It must not, however, be
supposed that marching in peace time was unknown before 1856. For
instance, by Regimental Order, dated September 12, 1838, it was laid
down, “Whenever weather permits, the Battalion” (_i.e._ the 1st
Battalion; the 2nd was then in Canada) “is to be marched once in four
days.”
Footnote 367:
See Hamilton, _History of the Grenadier Guards_, iii. 145.
-----
It should be mentioned here that signalling courses were not introduced
into the army until 1869. Much attention was then immediately given to
this subject in the Brigade, and the Battalions of Foot Guards were
frequently complimented upon the efficiency they displayed as
signallers.
While military training in many of its various important aspects was
eagerly attended to, and was put upon a basis from which it could
receive its proper development, the material comforts and welfare of the
men were not neglected.[368] The cooking arrangements of the men in the
Crimea had been signally defective, as much on account of the conditions
under which they were placed, as by reason of the very little knowledge
which they had of the subject. This, no doubt, was a serious want, and
it militated against the health of the soldier. A school of cookery was
established at Aldershot in 1862, and Non-commissioned officers were
sent there to be trained in the new system then adopted. Considerable
interest was taken in this matter in the Brigade, reports were
frequently called for, and experimental stoves set up to secure the best
results combined with economy. Sergeant Cooks were appointed in the
Coldstream—in the 1st Battalion, December, 1863, and in the 2nd
Battalion, in the following March; but it was not until May, 1868, that
the establishment of the Regiment was increased by two sergeants for
this purpose, nor was it until May of the year before, that the
assistant cooks were struck off other duties. As part of the same
subject, it may be noted that the Commissariat Store at Chelsea barracks
for the bread and meat to be issued to the troops in London, was
established December 1, 1865, and an inspecting board of three Officers
met daily to examine and to report upon the supplies furnished by the
contractors.
-----
Footnote 368:
It may be of interest to observe here that a Committee of Officers
(nearly all belonging to the Brigade), under the presidency of Colonel
Ridley, Scots Fusilier Guards, assembled in London early in 1862 to
consider the question of the employment of men in trades.
-----
Reforms in the canteen system were introduced shortly after the
Crimean war. In conformity with instructions contained in the
Quartermaster-General’s letter of the 30th of November, 1857, boards
of Regimental Field-Officers were assembled quarterly to revise the
prices of articles sold, and to report upon the canteens inspected by
them. The accounts were examined more frequently, and suggestions were
invited as to the management of these institutions. In 1864, groceries
began to be supplied to the messes, so that the men might only pay
wholesale instead of retail prices, and married soldiers were
encouraged to take advantage of the low cost of articles sold there.
As the management became more efficient, the profits rose, and with
this fund at the disposal of Commanding Officers, a great deal was
done for the benefit of the men,—books and newspapers supplied at the
various metropolitan Guards, extra food provided on long field days,
being some of the items of expenditure that first appear to have
received the sanction of the authorities.
Nor should we omit to draw attention to the encouragement given to
outdoor games and amusements. Officers have always been inclined,
naturally, to introduce among their men the healthy exercises which they
themselves were taught at school, and which they continued to indulge in
after joining the service. Thus cricket was well known, and we have seen
that during the Russian war it was not neglected. Football, however, was
not as common then as it is now, nor had some other forms of athletic
sports taken a firm root in the public schools forty years ago. But as
they became better known there, so did they grow in popularity among the
troops—as also did boating at Windsor,—until at last they have become
well recognized institutions, to the great benefit of the men, and to
the immense advantage of the army. Hunting has always been a favourite
pastime among Officers, and where it is not sufficiently available they
often establish a drag hunt of their own. This was done at Windsor, in
the winter of 1856-57, mainly by the Coldstream, whose 2nd Battalion was
then quartered there. This institution flourishes to the present day.
When the Brigade had the out-quarter at Shorncliffe, as will be seen
further on, another drag hunt was also established there, but on leaving
that station it had to come to an end.
On the 17th of July, 1856, at the suggestion of the Major-General
Commanding the Brigade of Guards (Lord Rokeby), the Battalions who had
just returned from the Crimea applied for new Colours, and, on the 27th
of February following, the old Colours which had seen service in Russia
were deposited, escorted by Guards of Honour of the usual strength, in
the Royal Military Chapel at Wellington barracks.
Owing to the death of Colonel Gordon Drummond, Colonel Newton was
promoted Major, and took command of the 2nd Battalion, November 18,
1856.
On the 3rd of March, 1857, the 1st Coldstream relieved the 2nd Scots
Fusilier Guards at Aldershot (the 1st Grenadiers having been removed to
Town from that camp in December), and returned to London at the autumn
change of quarters (September 1st), when the 2nd Coldstream proceeded to
Dublin, and the 1st Scots Fusilier Guards to Portsmouth. On the return
of the latter (November 20th) the Brigade was again quartered in their
usual stations, viz. four Battalions in the West-end and the other three
in the Tower, Windsor, and the out-quarter (Dublin).[369] After this
time, Battalions were frequently sent to Aldershot for the purpose of
receiving practical instruction, but not to be stationed there for
merely general duty.[370] About this time also—that is, between the 1st
of September and the 7th of December, 1857—the Brigade furnished a
detachment of about 200 Officers and men at Deptford, where occasional
duty had been done by it, as we have seen, between 1815 and 1854.
-----
Footnote 369:
The new wing of Wellington barracks was ready for occupation about
this time; and it appears the present Kensington barracks replaced the
old buildings there, April, 1858.
Footnote 370:
The periods when the Coldstream were stationed in Aldershot are to be
seen in Appendix No. XV. “In compliance with the directions of H.R.H.
the Senior Colonel of the Brigade, the roster for casual home service,
and for the regular training of Battalions at Aldershot in the summer,
will in future be kept separately. The Major-General accordingly
desires that the three Lieutenant-Colonels will be so good as to
confer together with a view to preparing another roster as soon as
they are agreed upon the subject; their proposals will be forwarded to
this Office for approval” (_Brigade Order_ , Feb. 24, 1866).
-----
[Illustration:
SERGEANT 1775.
]
[Illustration:
OFFICER 1795.
]
N.R. Wilkinson del. Mintern Bros. Chromo.
While the Indian Mutiny obliged Government to strengthen the army in
India, drafts were collected at Colchester and Canterbury to be sent out
to the East as they were required. In April, 1858, fourteen Ensigns of
the Brigade (three from the 1st Coldstream) were sent to these places to
look after the men that were assembled there. The following letter,
dated July 3rd, from the Adjutant-General to Lord Rokeby, was published
and ordered by the latter to be entered in the Regimental records:—
The Inspector-General of Infantry having reported to His Royal
Highness, that, in consequence of the embarkation of numerous drafts
for India, there is no necessity for retaining the services of the
Officers of the Guards at Colchester and Canterbury, orders will
consequently be sent to those stations directing the Officers of the
Guards to return to their respective Battalions. In communicating this
decision to your Lordship, I am commanded to acquaint you that His
Royal Highness has much gratification in stating that he has received
from all quarters assurances of the excellent manner in which these
Officers have conducted the duties assigned to them, reflecting as it
does great credit on themselves and on the Regiments in which they
have been instructed.
The 2nd Coldstream, returning from Dublin to London, September 1, 1858,
brought a record of services performed in Ireland which was embodied in
a Garrison Order, dated Dublin, August 30, 1858:—
The Major-General Commanding the District, in directing the departure
of the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards, is unwilling to allow them to
pass from his command without acknowledging his unqualified
approbation of their conduct during the twelve months of their being
in Dublin, and his sincere regret at losing them. Possessed of all the
attributes which constitute excellence in a regiment, whether as
regards the zealous and strict attention to their duty on the part of
the Officers, the activity, intelligence, and trustworthiness of the
Non-commissioned officers, the obedient conduct, soldier-like
appearance, and respectful demeanour of the men, or the order and
regularity of the parade, the general cleanliness of the barracks, the
comfort of the hospital, the large attendance of the adults at school,
the comparative absence of crime, and the pervading system of the
corps, the Battalion has stood forth in the garrison as a model of
regimental discipline, to excite the emulation and stimulate a
generous rivalry. The Major-General, therefore, begs to offer his
thanks to Colonel Newton and his Officers for the support they have at
all times afforded, and to assure the Battalion that he will always
retain a lively recollection of the satisfaction he derived in having
it as a part of his garrison.
Colonel Hon. G. Upton, C.B., appointed Major-General, October 26, 1858,
was succeeded by Colonel Lord Frederick Paulet, C.B., as
Lieutenant-Colonel of the Regiment; thereupon Colonel Newton assumed the
command of the 1st Battalion, and Colonel Spencer Perceval, promoted to
the rank of Major, was posted to command the 2nd Battalion.
As previously mentioned, events in the year 1859 produced the impression
that Napoleon III. was about to declare war against us, and visions of
invasion began to haunt us. Considerable military activity was displayed
at this time. Second battalions to twenty-five regiments of the Line,
and third and fourth battalions to the two Rifle regiments, the 60th and
Rifle Brigade, were raised and incorporated into the army: we find also
that, early in the year, the Brigade was called upon to furnish
Non-commissioned officers that could be spared, as drill instructors to
train the men of some of these new corps. Of these, the Coldstream
supplied four to the 2nd Battalion, 21st Regiment, at Newport, February,
1859. Nor was the condition of the Militia neglected, and Field-Officers
of the Guards, who had been sent to inspect the regiments when embodied,
were more frequently employed on this duty about this time. Now, in
1803, when Napoleon I. threatened to make a descent upon our coasts from
his great camp at Boulogne, bodies of Volunteers were raised to watch
our shores. The same thing happened in 1859, and, although our danger
was scarcely real, yet so strongly impressed were the people with the
facilities of transit across the narrow channel, which steam would give
an invader, and so convinced were they of the power and of the evil
designs of the French Emperor, that they began spontaneously to form
rifle corps for the defence of the country. This was the commencement of
the Volunteer movement which has now developed into an important
auxiliary branch of the forces of the Crown intended for service at
home. Its usefulness in the field has not yet been practically tested,
and we may well pray that the day when it must meet an enemy on our own
soil, may never come. But the influence it commands, by strengthening
the ties that bind the military and the civil elements, by rendering the
regular army popular, and by therefore facilitating the recruitment of a
good class of man, is well known; while the self-sacrifice of many who
devote their leisure to martial exercises, without prospect of reward,
is creditable to the British character, and tends to spread a wider
interest in military affairs than was formerly the case.
In the summer of 1859, many of the Officers of the Brigade were employed
in reporting upon the numerous ranges which had been proposed as
suitable sites for rifle practice. This duty did not cease until the
beginning of 1862, when facilities for musketry existed in almost every
district, and when the exercise became a popular pastime throughout the
country. A National Rifle Association was formed, and a Volunteer camp
established at Wimbledon (1860), where shooting competitions took place.
The meetings continued year after year with ever-growing popularity, and
detachments of Guardsmen were sent from London to perform the military
duties in camp and on the ranges. Colonel Tower (Coldstream Guards) was
the first Field-Officer selected to command these detachments, in 1865,
and since then the Brigade has regularly furnished an Officer of that
rank for this purpose, to attend the Rifle meetings, and, later (from
1874), to command the camp.
As far back as 1860, the drill of Officers of the Militia and Volunteers
was often superintended by Officers of the Brigade of Guards. In
October, 1870, moreover, schools of instruction were established at the
Tower and at Wellington barracks, which were eventually consolidated
into one, where Officers of the auxiliary forces, having passed a
practical course in drill, can obtain a certificate to that effect.
Colonel Hon. R. Monck (Coldstream Guards) was the first Commandant of
the school at Wellington barracks.[371]
-----
Footnote 371:
The following order appeared, dated December 13, 1870, when the
Schools of Instruction in London closed for the first time, for the
Christmas holidays: “The Secretary of State has recorded his sense of
the zeal and discretion which the Officers and Non-commissioned
officers attached to and in charge of these schools have exhibited,
which is proved by the success which has attended their duties, and
the results that have been directly and indirectly obtained, and which
reflect great credit upon the Commandants. H.R.H. the Field Marshal
Commanding-in-Chief is much pleased at receiving so satisfactory a
recognition of their services.”
-----
The Coldstream, having lost their Colonel by the death of Field Marshal
Earl of Strafford, the chief command of the Regiment was bestowed upon
General Lord Clyde, G.C.B., June 22, 1860, better known by the men in
the Crimea, as Sir Colin Campbell. After the war with Russia, this very
distinguished Officer was employed in India, where, appointed
Commander-in-chief, he took a conspicuous part in the suppression of the
Mutiny. Several other changes occurred in the Regiment about this time.
On the promotion of Colonel Lord F. Paulet, C.B., to the rank of
Major-General, Colonel Newton became Lieutenant-Colonel, whereupon
Colonel S. Perceval assumed the command of the 1st Battalion, and
Colonel Steele, C.B., appointed Major, of the 2nd (December 13, 1860).
In a few months, however, there was another change; Colonel Perceval was
promoted Lieutenant-Colonel, when Colonel Steele was posted to the 1st
Battalion, and was succeeded by Colonel Wood in the 2nd (July 2, 1861).
On the 1st of April, 1861, Major-General Lord Rokeby retired, and the
command of the Brigade devolved upon Major-General Craufurd. Shortly
afterwards (June 27th) a Major of Brigade was appointed in the Foot
Guards, and the new post was given to the senior Adjutant, Captain and
Adjutant Gordon, Scots Fusilier Guards.
In December, 1861, the whole country was plunged into deep mourning by
the premature death of the Prince Consort. It is less than the truth to
say that all hearts were moved with profound grief for the Queen in
this, the greatest of domestic afflictions; and at the decease of a
patriot Prince, whose sage counsels had so often ably directed Her
Majesty in many important matters, and who had done so much for the
intellectual elevation and the material advancement of her people. The
sorrow of the nation was felt nowhere more strongly than among the
Guards, who thereby lost their Senior Colonel, and whose inalienable
privilege it is to share, as part of the Sovereign’s Household, the
trials as well as the joys that visit the Royal Family.
This most sad misfortune happened at a moment of a misunderstanding with
the United States of America, when it was apprehended that war might
break out between the two countries, and when an expedition was being
fitted out to defend Canada should the crisis assume an acute stage. It
is scarcely necessary to go into the details of the dispute, well known
as the “Trent affair,” for the Coldstream took no part in the operations
which followed. Suffice it to say that two Battalions of the Brigade
(1st Grenadiers and 2nd Scots Fusilier Guards, under Major-General Lord
F. Paulet) were shipped to British North America, December 19th, and
remained there until the autumn of 1864. Fortunately peace was
preserved, and the expedition, while watching proceedings during the
civil war that was then raging in the States, assumed the character of a
movement of troops from one part of the British Empire to another, for
ordinary purposes.[372]
-----
Footnote 372:
In order to drill and organize Canadian Militia regiments, five
corporals of the Guards Battalions not sent to Canada, were selected
to proceed with the expedition, and the following terms were offered
to them: (1) to have the rank and pay of the next grade above that
they then held, from the date of landing; (2) to be supernumerary on
the strength of their Regiments, and to rejoin them on their return;
and (3) an allowance to be given to their wives during their absence
from home, or until the latter rejoin their husbands (_Brigade
Orders_ , Dec. 6 and 14, 1861).
-----
The 1st Battalion Coldstream, having gone to Dublin in October, 1861,
did not return to London until the next change of quarters in April
following, and so, for the first few months of 1862, there were but
three Battalions in the West-end, while the Tower was occupied by a Line
Regiment (the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Buffs). To lighten the duties,
the latter furnished a detachment at Wellington barracks, which
occasionally supplied the guards at Kensington Palace, the Magazine, and
at the British Museum. In April, 1862, the full complement of four
Battalions did duty in the West-end, and Dublin was given up as a Guards
station. On the return of the Canadian expedition the Tower was again
occupied by Guards, and the out-quarter was transferred to Shorncliffe.
Chelsea barracks, designed as we have seen in 1855, were ready for
occupation in the autumn of 1863, and an entire Battalion and a few
companies of another were stationed there. Subsequently, the
head-quarters of the latter, transferred from St. George’s, were also
placed in these barracks; while Portman Street had been given up in
September, 1863. The new wing of Wellington barracks had been occupied
prior to this date, and was opened shortly after the Crimean war, as we
have seen.[373] Thus considerably more space was obtained for the
Brigade in London, which was distributed almost as is the case in the
present day.[374] It is only necessary to add that the small barracks at
the Magazine were vacated, and handed over to the police authorities on
the 21st of December, 1866; that those at St. John’s Wood ceased to be
occupied by the Foot Guards about the year 1876; and that Windsor
barracks, which was a crowded and unsuitable building for a whole
Battalion, were greatly improved and enlarged, and were ready for
occupation in 1868.
-----
Footnote 373:
See footnote 376, p. 300, _ante_.
Footnote 374:
_Wellington barracks_, one entire Battalion, and another having
detachments at Kensington and Buckingham Palace barracks; _Chelsea
barracks_, one entire Battalion, and another with a detachment at St.
George’s barracks; Tower, one Battalion; _Windsor_, one Battalion; an
Out-quarter, one Battalion.
-----
On the 9th of November, 1862, Colonel Steele, was promoted
Lieutenant-Colonel of the Regiment, _vice_ Colonel S. Perceval,
appointed Major-General; the command of the 1st Battalion then devolved
upon Colonel Mark Wood, and that of the 2nd Battalion upon Colonel
Dudley Carleton.
Many remember the marriage of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales to the Princess
Alexandra of Denmark, March 10, 1863, and the enthusiasm and joy evoked
throughout the length and breadth of the land at the auspicious and
popular event. Her Royal Highness arrived in London on the 7th, and
proceeded to Windsor, where the ceremony was performed, and the
following military arrangements were made for her reception in the
Metropolis. The 3rd Grenadiers furnished a Guard of Honour at
Bricklayers Arms Railway Station, the remainder of the Battalion being
in column of wings in front of St. James’s Palace; the 1st Battalion
60th Rifles, then at the Tower, were formed outside the station; the 2nd
Coldstream Guards in Waterloo Place lining the streets, with a Guard of
Honour (the Queen’s Guard strengthened to the usual complement) near the
Palace, and at right angles to the Grenadiers. The 1st Scots Fusilier
Guards were in line near Hyde Park Corner; the Park was occupied by some
17,000 Volunteers; and the 2nd Grenadiers were stationed at the Marble
Arch, and had a Guard of Honour at Paddington Station. The 1st
Coldstream, then quartered at Windsor, sent a Guard of Honour to Slough.
At the Royal wedding on the 10th, the Brigade was fully represented; the
2nd Grenadier Guards (in which Regiment His Royal Highness had served)
found a Guard of Honour at St. George’s Chapel; the 1st Scots Fusilier
Guards furnished another at the railway station on departure; and the
1st Coldstream, besides providing two Guards of Honour, one at the State
Entrance of the Castle, and the other at the Chapel, were also present.
The Berkshire Volunteers, moreover, had a Guard of Honour outside the
gates of the Castle. The Guards Battalions quartered in London
celebrated the occasion by parading in Hyde Park, where the 2nd and 3rd
Grenadiers and the 2nd Coldstream fired a _feu de joie_, while the 1st
Scots Fusilier Guards kept the ground. The day was observed as a general
holiday throughout the country, and all classes joined to express their
heart-felt congratulations on the happy alliance which had been made by
the Heir Apparent of the Throne.[375]
-----
Footnote 375:
For an account of the Royal wedding, see _Annual Register_ , 1863,
“Chronicle,” p. 36, etc.
-----
Nor ought we to forget to mention that a ball was given by the Brigade
in the Exhibition buildings, June 26th,[376] to the Prince and Princess
of Wales, in honour of the Royal marriage that had just taken place; the
Guard of Honour to receive Their Royal Highnesses was furnished by the
1st Scots Fusilier Guards.
-----
Footnote 376:
Interested in the success of the first great International Exhibition
of Arts and Sciences in 1851, one of the last works of the lamented
Prince Consort was to promote a second Exhibition of the same kind in
London; but he did not, unfortunately, live to see its completion. It
was opened on May 1, 1862, when the ceremony was attended by a
deputation from each of the Guards Regiments, who formed part of the
opening procession. The buildings were not removed in 1863, and were
utilized, as above stated, on the occasion of the Brigade ball. The
Albert Hall has now been erected upon this site.
-----
Several changes occurred in the command of the Brigade and Regiment
during this same year (1863). On the 25th of June, Lord F. Paulet,
having returned from Canada, was appointed Major-General of the Brigade
of Guards _vice_ Lieut.-General Craufurd.
At the death of General Lord Clyde, General Sir William Gomm, G.C.B.,
succeeded him as Colonel (August 15, 1863), and was thus again posted to
the Coldstream Guards, which he had joined as a Captain and
Lieutenant-Colonel just before the battle of Waterloo, and with which he
had served up to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel of the Regiment, until
January, 1837, when he was promoted Major-General. Colonel Steele,
moreover, relinquishing the command of the Coldstream (November 24th),
the Lieutenant-Colonelcy devolved upon Colonel Wood, when Colonel
Carleton was posted to the command of the 1st Battalion, and Colonel
Stepney, C.B., to that of the 2nd Battalion.
Just at this moment, also, the Regiment lost their Bandmaster. Mr.
Charles Godfrey, who died much regretted in December, having joined the
Coldstream fifty years before (in 1813). This excellent musician had
efficiently conducted the Band ever since 1825.[377]
-----
Footnote 377:
See Appendix, No. V.
-----
We have seen that hitherto, when promotion took place, and when
the Senior Major either left the Regiment or was appointed
Lieutenant-Colonel, the Junior Major was invariably transferred to
command the 1st Battalion, and the Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel,
promoted Major to fill up the vacancy created, was posted to that
of the 2nd Battalion. The same rule prevailed as regards the
Acting-Majors (Mounted Officers), so that the senior and the third
senior always belonged to the 1st Battalion, and the second and
fourth seniors to the 2nd. It had also prevailed among the
Adjutants up to the first Canadian expedition in 1838, but then it
seemed to lapse as far as they were concerned, in the Coldstream
at least. This custom was abolished on the 19th of January, 1864,
when the following Order was issued:—
In compliance with instructions from H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, no
alteration in future is to be made in the posting of Majors Commanding
Battalions; these Officers are to remain in the Battalions in which
they were originally promoted, the Senior Major to receive the
difference in allowance which may be attached to the command of the
1st Battalion. By the same rule, Acting Majors will not change
Battalion except for promotion or on appointment to be Senior Acting
Major.
The following list shows the Officers belonging to the Regiment in
January, 1865:—
_Colonel._—General Sir William Gomm, G.C.B.
_Lieut.-Colonel._—Colonel Mark Wood.
_Majors._—Colonel Dudley Carleton; Colonel A. Herbert-Stepney, C.B.
_Captains._—Colonels J. Airey, C.B.; W. G. Dawkins; C. W. Strong; Hon.
H. Hardinge, C.B. (_Mounted_).
Lieut.-Colonels Hon. P. Feilding; W. Reeve; C. Baring; J. H. Le Couteur;
H. Armytage; G. Goodlake, V.C.; H. Tower; A. Fremantle; Colonel Hon.
W. Feilding; P. Crawley; M. Heneage; C. Blackett; G. FitzRoy; J.
Conolly, V.C.; Hon. R. Monck; Hon. W. Boyle.
_Lieutenants._—Captains C. Greenhill; H. C. Jervoise; Hon. H. Campbell;
Julian Hall; G. Wigram; A. Lambton; Hon. W. Edwardes; H. Lane; W. F.
Seymour; Hon. E. Legge (Adjutant); E. S. Burnell; Hon. G.
Windsor-Clive; R. Thursby; N. Burnand; FitzRoy Fremantle; F. Buller;
E. Reeve; H. Bonham-Carter; Hugh Fortescue (Adjutant); J. F. Hathorn
(I. of M.); H. Herbert (I. of M.); H. Brand; Denzil Baring; Hon. F.
Howard; R. Cathcart; C. Lee-Mainwaring.
_Ensigns._—Lieutenants Hon. V. Dawson; E. Chaplin; Sir E. Hamilton,
Bart.; G. FitzRoy Smyth; Lord Wallscourt; H. R. Eyre; J. B.
Sterling; G. G. Macpherson; C. Thomas; Hon. J. Vesey; Hon. F.
Wellesley; Hon. H. Legge; R. Hall; A. Farquhar; C. Alexander; W.
Ramsden.
_Quartermasters._—A. Hurle; and A. Falconer.
_Surgeon-Major._—J. Wyatt. _Battalion Surgeon._—C. V. Cay.
_Assistant-Surgeons._—J. W. Trotter; R. Farquharson; A. B. R. Myers.
_Solicitor._—R. Broughton, Esq.
To persons living in the present day it may perhaps seem strange to hear
of the rigid social laws which were current in our fathers' time against
smoking. This indulgence was regarded, only a few decades ago, as a more
or less uncivilized habit, which might be enjoyed on occasions in the
privacy of a man’s own apartments or in some far-away room of a country
house, out of sight of all general society, but never to be countenanced
in public. Hence, Officers on any sort of duty were not allowed the use
of tobacco even during hours of relaxation, and there were stringent
rules against the practice on the Queen’s Guard. In 1838, for instance,
attention is drawn to orders on that subject there, and again in 1844:—
“The Lieutenant-Colonels of the three Regiments of Guards have
observed with great regret that the regulations for the Guard table at
St. James’s Palace are not attended to, particularly as to smoking....
The Captain of the Guard in St. James’s Palace will have the goodness
to add to his report that there has been no smoking in the Officers'
apartments in St. James’s Palace, during the twenty-four hours he has
been on Guard.”[378]
-----
Footnote 378:
_Brigade Order_ , March 6, 1844.
-----
Nearly six years later the rule was modified, in that the prohibition
only applied to the mess room in the Palace, and the Captain’s
certificate was altered accordingly.[379] The Crimean War, no doubt, did
a great deal to destroy the old prejudice which existed on the subject;
for British Officers learnt the advantages of the weed in the trenches,
and were in close quarters with habitual smokers, the Turks and the
French. Still tobacco was not permitted in the barrack rooms, and, early
in 1859, the Medical Officers were seriously called upon to report
whether smoking there would be likely to prove deleterious to the health
of the men. It was not until October 28, 1864, that leave was given to
soldiers to smoke in the barrack rooms from the dinner hour to tattoo.
-----
Footnote 379:
_Ibid._ , Nov. 26, 1849.
-----
It has already been mentioned that the recruit establishment of the
Brigade had been transferred to Croydon in 1833, and there it remained
for thirty years, except only that the Grenadier section was moved to
St. John’s Wood barracks during the war with Russia, from March, 1854,
to the 18th of June, 1856. On the 1st of April, 1863, the recruits of
the three Regiments were taken to St. John’s Wood, for the purpose of
receiving gymnastic training, until the 2nd of August, 1865, when they
proceeded to Warley.[380] During all this time the establishment was
under the command of a resident Officer (Lieutenant and Captain), who
took the duty there for a fortnight (at St. John’s Wood for a week).
Considerable responsibility rested upon the Regimental Drill-Sergeant
for the training of the men, and several orders attest the fact that
these Non-commissioned officers did their work faithfully and
efficiently. In 1870, a permanent Commandant was appointed, when
Lieut.-Colonel Moncrieff, Scots Fusilier Guards, assumed the new post
(November 28th), and, soon after, another Officer was told off to
perform the duties of Adjutant, the resident Subaltern still remaining
for a fortnight as Piquet Officer. Besides the Medical Officer, and a
Quartermaster who was added later (in 1885), this staff of Officers was
all that looked after the Depôt until 1893, when it was again enlarged.
On the 12th of April, 1875, a board was assembled at Caterham to view
and report upon a site for the Guards Depôt, and this new quarter was
occupied on the 23rd of October, 1877. The Senior Drill-Sergeant,[381]
appointed Acting Sergeant-Major, May 5, 1881, was promoted
Sergeant-Major on July 1st following. The Depôt then contained a
Sergeant-Major, a Quartermaster-Sergeant, an Orderly Room Clerk, four
Colour-Sergeants, four Sergeants, twelve Corporals, and two Drummers;
and these men remained “on the rolls of their respective Battalions for
promotion and married leave.”
-----
Footnote 380:
The Grenadier section occupied Kensington barracks from the autumn of
1864 until the following March, when they went to Warley.
Footnote 381:
Drill-Sergeant Barrell, Coldstream Guards.
-----
In 1866 the public duties in London were reduced, and in July they stood
as follows:—
Capts. Subaltns. Sergts. Corpls. Drums. Prvts.
Queen’s Guard 1 2 2 2 3 36
Buckingham Palace Guard 0 1 2 2 1 27
Tylt Guard 0 1 2 2 1 18
Kensington Guard 0 0 1 1 0 15
Magazine Guard 0 0 1 1 0 9
—— —— —— —— —— ———
Total 1 4 8 8 5 105[382]
-----
Footnote 382:
There was, in addition, a small guard at Southwark military prison, at
St. John’s Wood barracks, when unoccupied by Battalions, and at the
Royal Academy, when open. The British Museum guard seems to have been
done away with about 1864. The Bank piquet remained as before. The
strength of the public duties during the Crimean war has been given in
the last chapter (p. 267); in March, 1835, it appears to have amounted
to, excluding the Bank piquet,—1 Captain, 4 Subalterns, 14 sergeants,
18 corporals, 5 drummers, and 302 privates.
-----
The years 1866 and 1867 are chiefly marked in the domestic history of
the country by the troubles in Ireland, and by the efforts of a secret
society, called the Fenians, to stir up rebellion and serious
disturbances, not only in that island but in England also. The Fenian
body, born and nurtured in the United States, had for some years been
endeavouring to infect the mass of Irishmen distributed throughout the
whole of the United Kingdom with their pernicious doctrines; and in a
sense they accomplished their object by intensifying a feeling that had
existed for many a generation between the Celtic and Saxon populations,
into one of extreme bitterness and animosity. Beyond this, however, they
achieved no immediate success; the illegal and violent measures they
advocated, while they caused a momentary panic among the peaceably
disposed, soon recoiled upon those who perpetrated them. Hence, the
movement speedily dwindled into insignificance, though it left behind a
residue of secret organization, which at no distant date was to support
another agitation, that again was destined to disturb the country.
In the beginning of 1866, the usual spring change of quarters in the
Brigade had been ordered to take place on the 1st of March; the 1st
Coldstream was to move from Chelsea to another station in the West-end,
and the 2nd Battalion from the Tower to Shorncliffe. But the troubles in
Ireland were then giving cause for much anxiety, and the order was not
executed. It was known that some few men belonging to Line Regiments had
secretly joined the Fenians; it was feared that an armed rising might
take place; an attempt to seize Chester Castle had just been frustrated
(February 13th), and a Battalion of the Scots Fusilier Guards had been
hurriedly despatched there to protect the place. A Guards Battalion was
thus urgently required in Dublin, and on the 20th of February the 1st
Coldstream were sent there at twenty-four hours' notice, “the sick,
boys, and men unfit for active service” being attached to the 2nd
Battalion. Shorncliffe was therefore given up as the Guards'
out-quarter.
The stay of the 1st Battalion in Ireland during the year, cannot be
termed a pleasant one. Preserving the public peace against the
machinations of a secret band of conspirators who succeeded temporarily
in deluding a portion of the people, and in partially alienating them
from their legitimate rulers, is a duty too nearly allied to the police
service to be a favourite one with soldiers. The work, however, was well
performed by the Battalion, and this is attested by the following order,
which was issued by the Major-General Commanding the Brigade, on the 6th
of March, 1867, when their tour of duty was completed in Dublin, and
when they returned to London:—
“The Major-General has much pleasure in publishing a Memorandum issued
by General Lord Strathnairn upon the 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards
leaving Dublin. It reflects the utmost credit on all ranks for having
earned so distinguished a compliment. The Major-General notices the
favourable mention of Captain Hon. E. Legge, his close attention to
his duty as Adjutant proves his zeal in the interest of his Battalion.
The Major-General directs that Lord Strathnairn’s Memorandum with this
Order be read to each Battalion of the Brigade. In a corps constituted
as the Brigade of Guards the character of any one Battalion reflects
upon the whole.”
Lord Strathnairn’s Memorandum ran thus:[383]—
“_Memo._ —The Commander of the Forces has every reason to be pleased
with the excellent discipline of the 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards
during the twelve months they have been under his Lordship’s command.
The requisitions of the Government have often during this time
necessitated extra duties for the preservation of the public peace,
all of which the Coldstream Guards have performed with strictness and
cheerfulness. The promptitude with which Lieut.-Colonel Le Couteur,
the Officers, the Non-commissioned officers and men of the Battalion
gave effect to the wishes of Lord Strathnairn for a thorough
organization of the Reading, Recreation, and Refreshment rooms which
tend so much to promote discipline, was very creditable to them. Lord
Strathnairn cannot record this favourable opinion of the 1st Battalion
Coldstream Guards without mentioning his high sense of the unvarying
zeal and ability displayed by the Adjutant, Captain Hon. E. Legge, who
during the twelve months has never been absent from his post.”
-----
Footnote 383:
Lord Strathnairn, as Colonel Rose, had been British Commissioner with
the French army during the Crimean War.
-----
The 2nd Coldstream relieved the 1st Battalion early in 1867, and also
remained in Ireland for twelve months under conditions nearly similar to
those that existed in 1866. At the end of this period, the
Lieutenant-Colonel was able to express to the Regiment the high opinion
entertained by the General Commanding the Forces of the 2nd Battalion,
and his own gratification at this good opinion “during trying times, and
when the men were exposed to mischievous temptations.”[384]
-----
Footnote 384:
_Regimental Order_ , Jan. 21, 1868. On the return of the 2nd
Coldstream, the following order, relating to duty in Ireland, was
published, March 19, 1868: “H.R.H. the Senior Colonel of the Brigade
of Guards has approved of changes in the roster for change of quarters
and casual services, by which Dublin remains in a special Irish
roster.”
-----
Nor had the Battalions of the Brigade stationed in London an easy time
during these two years (1866-1867), for they too were harassed by
popular effervescence. A reform bill was before the country, and many
demagogues, attended by their followers, found it easy to disturb the
public peace. Towards the end of July, 1866, the troops were confined to
their quarters; a wing of the 2nd Coldstream occupied Knightsbridge
barracks during the day; the Major-General took post at the Magazine, to
receive reports should anything extraordinary happen; the piquets were
increased; a magistrate was placed in every London barrack, and for a
few days all Officers on leave were recalled. Next year, the fear of
riots still haunted the authorities, and on several occasions the public
duties were doubled. But this was little when compared with the
excitement produced by the explosion at the Clerkenwell House of
Detention on the 13th of December—an outrage of a vile type, perpetrated
by the Fenians for the purpose of terrorizing the Government. Immediate
steps were taken to defend the Metropolis from a repetition of another
such dastardly attempt upon the lives of innocent persons, and for
nearly a month the troops were busily engaged, while the ordinary
military exercises, marches, gun drill, and gymnastic courses were
suspended. A guard was immediately sent to Clerkenwell, of 100 rank and
file, under three Officers; sentries carried their rifles loaded; strong
piquets, of 100 men under a Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel, were mounted
daily in the principal barracks; half the Officers doing duty were held
available for any sudden emergency, from five in the afternoon till
eleven o’clock at night; the Captain of the Queen’s Guard was made
responsible for calling upon the nearest piquet to turn out in case of
disturbance; a guard was furnished at Millbank prison, and over the
small-arm factories in London; signal communication by rockets was
established between the barracks and where an attack might be expected;
a party of the 2nd Scots Fusilier Guards was despatched to Cowes and to
Osborne; the Bank piquet remained on duty for twenty-four hours on
Sundays and on Christmas day, and all leave and furloughs were
suspended. At the Tower, moreover, where the 1st Coldstream were
quartered, the Officer of the main guard patrolled round the ditches and
wharves during the night. These arrangements were not relaxed till the
11th of January, 1868, and things did not resume their normal course
until somewhat later. But as a net result of the Clerkenwell outrage, it
may be mentioned that the metropolitan barracks were put in telegraphic
communication with the Horse Guards, and the work was completed in
March, 1868. By an order of the 31st of December, 1867, also, two
Non-commissioned officers per Battalion were told off to be instructed
in the duties of telegraphist.
In 1867, the Sultan of Turkey came to England, and in 1869 his nominal
vassal, the Khedive (the Viceroy of Egypt), did the same thing. There
were reviews upon these occasions in their honour, and other martial
displays; but these visits, though of political importance, need not
further be alluded to here, since, in a military sense, they entailed
only the ordinary duties performed by the Brigade when a foreign
Sovereign is received in State by Her Majesty the Queen.
Between 1866 and 1871 the following changes took place in the command of
the Regiment. In May, 1866, Colonel Wood having retired, Colonel Dudley
Carleton became Lieutenant-Colonel, and thereupon Colonel Airey,
promoted Major, assumed the command of the 1st Battalion, under the rule
of the 19th of January, 1864, already quoted; while Colonel Stepney
remained with the 2nd Battalion, until the 14th of August, when,
retiring on half-pay, he was succeeded by Colonel Strong. The latter
also shortly afterwards (March 15, 1867) went on half-pay, and the
command of this Battalion devolved upon Colonel Hon. A. Hardinge; on the
23rd of October following, Colonel Hon. Percy Feilding was promoted
Major, commanding the 1st Battalion, Colonel Airey having left the
Regiment. Colonel Hardinge succeeded Colonel Carleton as
Lieutenant-Colonel, September 2, 1868, when Colonel C. Baring was posted
to the command of the 2nd Battalion. Shortly afterwards the
establishment of the Regiment was reduced by one Major, and the
following Brigade Order was issued on the 29th of May, 1869, to direct
how this reduction should be brought about—
In conformity with a letter from the Military Secretary under date,
May 28, 1869, the Major-General notifies to the Brigade that Her
Majesty has been pleased to approve of the proposal of the Secretary
of State for War, that one Major in each Regiment of the Brigade of
Guards be gradually reduced, retaining the Lieutenant-Colonel, who
will take command of a Battalion in addition to that of the Regiment.
In accordance with the above arrangement, the vacancy in the Grenadier
Guards, caused by the promotion of H.S.H. Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar
to be Major-General, on the 23rd of February last, will not be filled
up; and the command of the 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards, vacated by
such promotion, will devolve upon the Lieutenant-Colonel of the
Regiment, Colonel Bruce, from the above date.
The opportunity to give effect to this order did not come in the
Coldstream until January 4, 1871, when, on the retirement of
Colonel Hardinge, Colonel Hon. P. Feilding, C.B., was promoted
Lieutenant-Colonel, and still retained the command of the 1st
Battalion. Colonel C. Baring remained in command of the 2nd
Battalion until the 13th of August, 1872, when, retiring on
half-pay, he was succeeded by Colonel Goodlake, V.C.
In the Brigade, Lord Frederick Paulet, C.B., was succeeded by
Major-General Hon. J. Lindsay (January 29, 1867), and during the period
of his command the Guards Institute, near Vauxhall Bridge Road, was
opened by H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, July 11, 1867, as “a convenient
place of refreshment, resort, amusement, and occupation for
Non-commissioned officers and men stationed in London.” This club only
flourished a few years, and was closed in 1872, when the building was
bought by Cardinal Manning, and was converted by him into the present
residence of the Archbishop of Westminster. General Lindsay also
promoted a military industrial exhibition, which took place in Chelsea
barracks on the 9th of July, 1868; but on that date Major-General
Hamilton, C.B., had already succeeded him in the command of the Brigade,
having assumed it on the 1st of April. The latter, promoted
Lieutenant-General, left, April 1, 1870, and Major-General, H.S.H.
Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar, C.B., was then appointed in his place.
Of changes in the uniform of the Regiment, the following may be noted:
On the 6th of December, 1859, it was ordered that the chin-straps of the
bearskins were to be worn under and not on the chin; but this method,
apparently, was not long maintained in force. A mess dress was
authorized for the Officers of the Brigade, January 30, 1864. Silver
stars on the forage cap, and sling belts were to be worn by the
Sergeant-Major, Quartermaster-Sergeant, Bandmaster, Sergeant-Instructor
of Musketry, Drum-Major, Band-Sergeant, Drill Sergeants, Regimental
Orderly Room Clerk, Assistant Regimental Clerk, Battalion Orderly Room
Clerk, Hospital-Sergeant, Armourer-Sergeant, Master-Tailor, and the
Sergeant of Cooks, April 25, 1870. Lastly, on the 28th of June, 1872,
gold cords on the shoulders of the Officers' tunics were substituted for
the red silk cord which was worn on one side to secure the sash.
A Regimental Order, dated April 18, 1871, possesses an interest to the
Coldstream, which requires a place in this account of their services:—
“A communication having been received by Field-Marshal Sir William
Gomm, G.C.B., from the Secretary of the Royal Cambridge Asylum for
Soldiers' Widows, to the effect that, at a meeting of the General
Committee held March 9, 1871, a resolution was agreed to, according a
presentation in perpetuity to the above asylum to the Colonel of the
Coldstream Guards, the Regiment of H.R.H. the late Duke of Cambridge,
the fact is here noted as a Regimental record.”
In October, 1871, the names of the Officers posted to the two Battalions
were:—
_Colonel._—Field-Marshal Sir William Gomm, G.C.B.
_Lieut.-Colonel._—Colonel Hon. Percy Feilding, C.B.
1st Battalion.
_Majors._—Vacant.[385]
_Captains._—Colonels G. Goodlake, V.C.; Hon. W. Feilding (_Mounted_).
Lieut.-Colonels G. FitzRoy; G. Wigram; Lord William Seymour; Hon.
E. Legge; E. Burnell; N. Burnand; F. C. Manningham-Buller; J.
Hathorn.
2nd Battalion.
Colonel C. Baring.
Lieut.-Colonels A. Fremantle C. Blackett (_Mounted_).
Colonel Hon. R. Monck; Lieut.-Cols. H. Jervoise; Julian Hall; A.
Lambton; FitzRoy Fremantle; Lord Cremorne; E. Chaplin; G. FitzRoy
Smyth.
-----
Footnote 385:
Colonel P. Feilding commanded the 1st Battalion as well as the
Regiment. Instead of 16 Ensigns, there were 13,—7 in the 1st
Battalion and 6 in the 2nd Battalion. Vacancies were not filled up,
owing to the changes that were about to be introduced into the
Brigade of Foot Guards.
-----
1st Battalion.
_Lieutenants._—Captains H. Bonham-Carter; H. R. Eyre (I. of M.); Hon. F.
Wellesley; Hon. Heneage Legge; H. Aldenburg-Bentinck; Hon. H. Corry;
Hon. E. Boscawen; R. Goff; Waller Hughes; H. Bruce; E. Boyle; Hon.
Ronald Campbell (Adjutant).
_Ensigns._—Lieutenants F. Graves-Sawle; Hon. M. Stapleton; R.
Pole-Carew; Cyril Fortescue; Hon. C. Cavendish; A. Clark-Kennedy; F.
Arkwright.
_Quartermasters._—A. Falconer.
_Surgeon-Major._—J. Wyatt.
_Battalion Surgeon._—
_Assistant-Surgeons._—A. Myers; Whipple, M.D.
2nd Battalion.
Captains J. B. Sterling; C. D. Thomas; Hon. J. Vesey (Adjutant); R. S.
Hall; C. Alexander; W. Ramsden; Hon. E. Acheson; Hon. L. Dawnay; Hon.
E. Digby (I. of M.); W. Turquand; R. Follett; Amelius Wood; Hon. R.
Greville-Nugent; Hon. G. Bertie.
Lieutenants A. Moreton; J. G. Montgomery; F. Manley; Hon. Alfred
Charteris; Lord Ossulston; L. MacKinnon.
J. Birch.
Surgeon-Major C. V. Cay.
J. Trotter
This chapter should not conclude without making some mention of the new
armament introduced into the British infantry during the period under
review. The Danish war, 1864, and more especially the Austro-Prussian
struggle of 1866, revealed the immense superiority possessed by troops
in the field who were supplied with the breech-loading rifle, over those
that still retained the muzzle-loader. In the campaigns which have taken
place between the two Germanic Powers, it has been remarked that Prussia
has more than once been provided with better war _matériel_ than her
antagonist. In the Seven Years' War, Frederick the Great had an iron
ramrod, the Austrians a wooden one, and the advantages he gained thereby
were not inconsiderable. So in the Bohemian campaign of 1866, the
Prussians were armed with a breech-loader, and the mass of fire they
were able to develop on the battle-field was much greater and far more
effective than their enemy could return against them. The great
importance of this military question had not been neglected in England,
and the object-lesson caused by the struggle in Central Europe
stimulated the authorities to greater exertions. While, therefore, we
were considering what pattern of breech-loading rifle we should finally
adopt, immediate steps were taken to hurry on the conversion of the
Enfield into the Snider breech-loader, so that by the end of 1866
Commanding Officers of Guards Regiments were directed to send in
requisitions for the new converted weapon (December 19th). The rifle
eventually adopted was the Henry-Martini, which was served out to the
Coldstream in October, 1874. In time, the latter was discarded for the
small-bore magazine breech-loader (the Lee-Metford .303 Rifle), and this
was issued to the Regiment early in 1890. Immediately afterwards, the
ordinary black powder, which had been in use for many centuries, was
replaced by the present cordite, a smokeless nitro-explosive.
[Illustration: OFFICER 1839.]
[Illustration: OFFICER 1849.]
N. R. Wilkinson del. A.D. Innes & C^o. London. Mintern Bros.
Chromo.
CHAPTER XIV.
ARMY REFORM, 1871-1885.
Effect produced in England by the military successes of Prussia—Short
service and the reserve system introduced—Abolition of
army purchase—Abolition of the double rank in the Foot
Guards—Substitution of the rank of Sub-Lieutenant for that of Ensign
or Cornet—Manœuvres and summer drills—Changes in the
drill-book—Illness and recovery of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales—Death
of Surgeon-Major Wyatt, and of Field-Marshal Sir W. Gomm—General Sir
W. Codrington appointed Colonel of the Coldstream Guards—Death of
Captains Hon. R. Campbell and R. Barton—Company training—Pirbright
Camp established—Medical service in the Brigade—Change in the
establishment of the Regiment—Death of Sir W. Codrington, and
appointment of General Sir Thomas Steele as Colonel—Troubles in
Ireland—Alarm in London—The Royal Military Chapel.
The wars that disturbed the Continent could not fail to rouse the
serious attention of every thinking man in this country, and to make all
look closely into the causes which had brought about very unexpected
results. Englishmen were not surprised at the ease with which the great
Germanic Powers overcame the resistance of Denmark, in 1864: nor yet,
indeed, to see Austria driven from Lombardy when Napoleon III. set
himself to the task, in 1859; because the alliance which we had
contracted with the French in 1854, taught us to respect their army, and
to believe they possessed a system and organization which placed them at
the head of the military nations of Europe. But the struggles of 1866
and 1870-71 were of a very different nature. In the first case, we saw
Prussia suddenly emerge from a small peace to a strong war
establishment, strike swiftly and surely the minor States of Germany,
and swoop down on Bohemia, where, meeting an enemy apparently worthy of
her steel, and of about equal numerical strength to herself, she
annihilated his forces in a few weeks, and obliged him to conclude a
peace almost before he knew that fighting had commenced. In the second
case, we again saw Prussia, in union this time with the smaller Germanic
States, arm herself with even greater rapidity than before, concentrate
her large armies on the frontier of France, invade the territories of
her formidable rival, and lock up the bulk of the hostile forces in the
fortress of Metz, while she captured the remainder at Sedan. These
astounding successes occurred when scarcely two months had elapsed after
the declaration of the war, and the course of hostilities was so
favourable to the invader that, in less than seven months, France lay
prostrate at the feet of Prussia, and was obliged to sue for terms of
peace, humiliating to her national pride and derogatory to her great
position in Europe.
No statesman could neglect to examine the causes of these stupendous
events, and the institutions which had rendered them capable of
realization: no soldier could abstain from studying the new conditions
under which hostilities in the future must be conducted, and the
numerous questions of warlike interest which modern science had
introduced. It is not surprising that the Prussian system should
speedily have become our model in the affairs relating to the army, and
that the British nation should determine to make a searching inquiry
into its military concerns.
It is not necessary to attempt to give a description of all the matters
that claimed the earnest attention of the country at that time. Some of
them did not affect the Coldstream, or did so only in a slight manner,
and their discussion in this work may be omitted, or need receive but a
passing notice. Among them, however, the two following should be
mentioned: (1) the more efficient training of both Officers and men in
their duties, and in the new system of tactics which had to be adopted
in the field in consequence of the increased power of artillery, and of
the great development of the fire of the breech-loader; and (2) the
recruitment of the men, and the term of service during which they should
remain with their corps.
We have seen that, as early as 1856, considerable interest had been
taken in the first of these points, though it is also true that the
reforms introduced were merely in their infancy, and had not by any
means gone far enough. This was a natural result, because to effect a
change of a salutary character, the expenditure of money is necessary,
and public opinion must be moved before it can be obtained. The
successes of Prussia had not then thrown light upon the requirements
which a state of war in the present day exacts; and it was after these
victories had been achieved, and not before, that the country acquired
the faculty of realizing the advantages to be gained if all ranks are
efficiently taught the details of the military profession.[386] Later in
this chapter, an occasion will present itself to refer to some of the
methods undertaken to accomplish this object, and we now pass to the
second point, which, having a peculiar interest of its own, exercises a
special influence on the fortunes of every regiment that forms part of
the army.
-----
Footnote 386:
The army authorities have ever been alive to the necessity of
professional instruction. Examples are to be found in the handbooks
issued by Lieut.-General Lord Frederick FitzClarence (late Coldstream
Guards, who helped to arrest the Cato Street conspirators in 1820) and
by “A Field Officer” (Colonel Torrens, afterwards Major-General Sir
Arthur Torrens, late Grenadier Guards), issued in 1850 and 1851, and
if the reader can procure these publications, he will perceive they
are as up to date, of their time, as our best text-books of the
present day. It is a mistake to accuse the military authorities of
slackness, in respect to the training of soldiers. The blame rests on
the country which alone could supply funds, and which took no interest
in these affairs. During the continuance of the present phase in the
world’s history, when every Continental nation is armed to the teeth,
it is not likely that Parliament will withdraw its annual expenditure
upon the army any more than on the navy. But it is right to add that,
while the country can provide the money, public opinion will of itself
never be able to foster military efficiency, nor instil into the army
those qualities which make a man a soldier.
-----
Up to 1847 military service had been unlimited, and men who enlisted
might be held to remain with the Colours for life.[387] The system was
not satisfactory, and a change was then made by which men contracted to
serve for ten years only, with the power of remaining on eleven more,
should they be permitted to do so, and, at the end of that period, to
receive a pension. In 1867, the first term of service was raised from
ten to twelve years, and soldiers were encouraged to continue their
service for twenty-one years for pension.[388] The advantage of having a
reserve to fill up the ranks of the army in war time had, for some
years, occupied the attention of the authorities, and, before 1867, two
small attempts had been made to secure this object; but, though the
principle was admitted, very little was done in this direction. The war
of 1866, however, made the country realize the importance of a rapid
mobilization; and the Prussians, having practically shown how, with a
reserve at hand, they could, in a short space of time, convert a small
peace establishment into a fully equipped army ready to take the field,
we also desired to follow their example. In 1867, therefore, we
strengthened the reserve; but, as a matter of fact, we still merely
nibbled at the question, until 1870, when it at last received a more
thorough consideration. In that year the Enlistment Act was passed,
introducing “short service” and a more efficient reserve into the army.
-----
Footnote 387:
During an emergency, men had been allowed to enlist for limited
periods of service, varying from two to seven years (in the infantry),
or while hostilities lasted. This was notably the case in the reign of
Queen Anne, in 1745, 1759, 1775, and 1806-1829; but unlimited service
for life also ran concurrently in the army at the same time (_The Army
Book for the British Empire_ , pp. 17, 22, etc.).
Footnote 388:
_The Army Book for the British Empire_ , p. 54. See also pp. 49-67.
-----
By the new system, recruits enlist for twelve years, and engage to serve
the whole time with the Colours, or part of the time with the Colours
and the rest in the reserve, according to the conditions laid down by
the Secretary of State. At first, it was proposed that the two periods
should be equal; but this was soon modified to seven years in the ranks
and five in the reserve, and in the Guards (since 1883) to three and
nine, for such recruits who might prefer those terms. Hence, in the
Brigade, men may now enlist for three or seven years with the Colours,
and spend nine or five in the reserve; three-years men may, with the
consent of their Commanding Officers, extend their service in the ranks
to seven years, and from seven to twelve years, after which, still under
the same conditions, they are able to re-engage for some years more up
to twenty-one, with a view to obtain a pension.
Thus the present system is elastic, and has the merit of training a
larger proportion of the population to the use of arms than was formerly
the case; of enabling the nation to maintain a relatively small force in
peace time, which can be rapidly expanded into an army when hostilities
break out; and of reducing the pension list. It also increases the
domestic comfort of the men, for it definitely disposes of the question
of marriage of the rank and file, which, with long service, was
difficult, indeed impossible, to solve. The practical utility of the
plan has not yet been tested under the strain of war, and, until it has
been so tried, it is manifestly premature to unduly praise it; nor are
we yet in a position to judge whether the fighting material we now
possess, is as well endowed with the fortitude, virtue, and cohesive
force, which discipline bestows, as was the case in so eminent a degree
in the past. We can point to this, however, that Continental nations who
have tried their reserves in the field consider them to be fully equal
to any other troops they have in their ranks; and we, too, have had
experience of the noble qualities of comparatively untrained men in some
very critical situations and emergencies. But, of one thing, at least,
we may be sure: the reserve men will loyally come up when their presence
is required. Englishmen have never failed to respond to the call of
duty, and it is notorious, when even a fear arises that British
interests may be attacked, how quickly the manhood of the country rises
to the occasion, and offers to come forward to defend them. It cannot be
forgotten that, in 1878, when the then existing reserve was called out,
13,684 men, out of a possible of 14,154, reported themselves; and, in
1882, when 11,642 reserve men were summoned, 11,032 appeared.[389]
-----
Footnote 389:
_The Army Book, etc._ , p. 119. We have not paused to inquire how the
new system is suitable or the reverse to the requirements of small
wars, in which Great Britain is so constantly engaged, because this
question depends rather upon the manner in which the home battalion of
a regiment serves as a depôt to its colleague abroad; and as this
portion of the present army system does not affect the Guards, it is
obvious that its consideration is not necessary in this volume.
-----
The Prussian model, upon which we based our army reform, was departed
from in two important particulars. In one, the departure was fully
acknowledged and thoroughly explained in public; but not so the other.
In the first, we repudiated the idea of inflicting the evils and the
tyranny of universal service upon the country, and deliberately declined
to make the people liable to a blood tax, that wastes their wealth and
attacks their liberty and independence. Our military forces, hence, are
smaller than they would otherwise have been, and our means of
mobilization less rapid than those which exist on the Continent, because
our reserve men, living where and as they like, are not localized and
controlled in the manner which obtains among the Powers of Europe.
Nevertheless, we willingly gave up these advantages for the sake of
preserving our freedom, so dear to the mind of every Englishman, and the
foundation of our national prosperity. As we inhabit an island, and hold
the command of the sea by an overwhelmingly powerful navy, there was no
valid reason to press for any alteration in our time-honoured custom of
recruiting the army by voluntary enlistment.
The second departure from the Prussian organization seems to have been
as carefully hidden from the public gaze as the other was ventilated and
discussed. The system we chose to copy approached our own, in that the
Sovereign was the direct and immediate Chief of the army, and from a
purely military standpoint it is easy to perceive that such an
arrangement—adopted moreover, by every great Power that has a Sovereign,
and that aims at real military strength—is the best adapted to produce
the most efficient results. Our reformers, however, completely ignored
in this respect the model they announced they would follow, and as
Englishmen have never been a military race properly so called, they
scarcely saw or appreciated the change that was brought about, when the
Supreme Command, still vested in the Crown, was exercised through the
political channel of the Secretary of State (1870). The historian is
bound to record this vitally important alteration in the constitution of
the army—a change rendered desirable, perhaps, for reasons that are
outside the scope of this work,—for, it affects and must affect the life
of every regiment that composes it, and subjects many of the details of
purely military interest and of the military profession, to the
fluctuations and necessities of party strife.
Nor was it long before the army was made the victim of a political
dispute. The war of 1870-71 had roused the people to fever heat, and
army reform became the universal cry. Politicians, not gifted with
military instincts or knowledge, soon led their followers into those
points of the subject that best suited the interests of their party; and
as the “abolition of purchase” offered just such an advantage in the
parliamentary struggle then going on, it was eagerly seized upon as the
most urgent question of the hour. It cannot be said that army reform was
impossible without abolishing purchase, for every improvement introduced
could have been as easily effected, whether purchase had been retained
or not. But it is also true that the practice of buying and selling a
commission was an anomaly quite indefensible in itself, which deserved
to come to an end, and which was scarcely likely to survive for long. If
so, its abolition, safeguarding the interests of all concerned by it,
would have benefited the army more than can be said was the case, when
it was achieved in 1871, and thereby increased the influence of the
political party that carried it.
The purchase system had the disadvantage of checking the rise in their
profession of men of very moderate fortune, who entered the infantry or
cavalry;[390] and this without doubt was an evil which required
reformation, for it excluded from these branches of the army some whose
service there might have been of value to the country. On the other
hand, this defect was more theoretical than practical; and the system
had the advantage of keeping up a flow of promotion, and of keeping down
the pension list. It was not an arrangement by which any purchaser could
buy his steps; to be allowed to spend money for this purpose was a
privilege to which any conditions could be attached. So was it also a
cheap means of keeping up the supply of Officers, for the sale of a
commission was the only pecuniary reward that was expected, and
Parliament was not asked to spend money to provide gratuities, retired
pay, pensions, and the like, that now have to be given. Officers, in
short, tendered security for their good behaviour, and proved their
devotion to their profession by offering their service for a smaller
return in the shape of pay than they now receive.
-----
Footnote 390:
Purchase only existed in the infantry and cavalry, and not in the
artillery and Royal Engineers.
-----
The Bill to do away with this system passed the House of Commons, and
went in due course up the Lords, where it was read the first time. On
the second reading, a demand was made for further information on the
proposals that were then contemplated, and a resolution to that effect
was carried. Thereupon a Royal Warrant, July 20, 1871, was immediately
issued, which abolished purchase without the aid of Parliament, from the
following 1st of November.
On October 31, 1871, another Royal Warrant was published, which
contained two points that affected the Brigade: (1) it abolished what
has been called the “double rank,” and (2) it substituted the new rank
of Sub-Lieutenant for that of Ensign in the infantry, and of Cornet in
the cavalry, both of which had existed ever since the formation of the
standing army.
The abolition of the “double rank” is of too recent a date, and concerns
the Officers of the Brigade too intimately and personally, to be able
easily to discuss it at the present moment. It will be time enough to do
so at some future date, when war on a large scale has tested the quality
of the modern army, when it has been practically shown where the
military virtues are most plentifully to be found in it, and when we
shall have emerged definitely from the transition state in which the
reforms of 1871 has placed us. Guardsmen do recognise, and have for a
long time recognised, that the advantage which the double rank conferred
upon them was an anomaly which deserved to be swept away, for they have
ever been anxious to possess no purely military privilege which the rest
of their comrades did not enjoy, and have been eager to see removed
anything that might savour of favouritism, or give cause for jealousy.
Nevertheless, it is well to remember that the double rank was an
institution which had obtained the sanction of two centuries, and that
it was the survival of an ancient system which possessed some merit. In
the infancy of the British army, shortly after the Restoration of King
Charles II., brought about by General Monck and his Coldstreamers, there
was much debate over the vexed question of “precedence of command.” This
precedence, in some regiments, not all of them Guards regiments, was
fixed, not by seniority of commission, but by seniority of corps, and
this arrangement appears to have developed into the institution of the
double rank for the Foot Guards, and of Brevet rank for all.[391]
-----
Footnote 391:
Colonel Clifford Walton, C.B., _History of the British Standing
Army_ , A.D. 1660-1700, pp. 441, etc. (London, 1894). The reader
should remember that a form of the double rank still exists in every
regiment of the service; the Colonel of each being either a General
Officer or a Field-Marshal. Further on in this chapter it will be
seen, moreover, that the double rank was practically revived in the
infantry in 1881, when it suited Government to do so to serve their
own purposes.
-----
Now, it seems evident that the object in view, when these things were
arranged, was to maintain efficiency in the army; to keep up a flow of
promotion; and to prevent Officers from ranking low down in the army
list, when, by length of service or for other reasons, it was desirable
that they should rise with others in their profession. The regimental
system, being the basis of military advancement, then, as it is now, it
is obvious that unless some such means were adopted to accelerate the
promotion of an Officer, who belonged to a corps where men were
unwilling to leave the service, no efforts on his part could secure his
rise. Nor can it be forgotten that promotion stagnates in proportion as
Officers generally are attached to their profession and to their
corps,—that is, in not the least distinguished regiments of the army;
and if the regimental system have any value (and that it has a value is
evident, while the promoters of army reform showed their opinion of it
by retaining it), it becomes clear that relief is most required in those
regiments where duty is well performed, and where a high standard of
military efficiency is maintained. The principle laid down was neither
unwise nor unfair; and if in the case of the Foot Guards it was applied
with too generous a hand, it must still be remembered that this was
done, not less on account of their services in the field, than by reason
of the position they occupied in the army.
The sudden abolition of the double rank in 1871, put the Foot Guards in
a worse position than if it had never existed; but they still have the
honour of occupying a unique position in the army, for, while before
1871 they held the first place, after that date they sank immediately
down to the lowest place in their profession. The following table will
illustrate this fact:—
PROMOTION TO THE RANK OF CAPTAIN;[392] AVERAGE NUMBER OF YEARS' SERVICE.
┌──────────────────┬────────────────────────────────────┬──────────┬─────────┐
│ │ BRIGADE OF GUARDS. │ CAVALRY. │INFANTRY │
│ │ │ │ OF THE │
│ │ │ │ LINE. │
│ ├────────────────┬───────────────────┼──────────┴─────────┤
│ │ To Regimental │ To Regimental │ To │
│ │ Lieutenant, │ Captain, bearing │ Regimental Captain │
│ │ bearing Army │ Army Rank of │ bearing no │
│ │ Rank of Capt. │ Lt.-Colonel. │ extra Army rank. │
├──────────────────┼────────────────┼───────────────────┼──────────┬─────────┤
│Between 1838 │ Years. │ Years. │ Years. │ Years. │
│ and 1871[393] │ 4-5/12 │ 14-8/12 │ 7-5/12 │ 9-11/12 │
│ ├────────────────┴───────────────────┤ │ │
│ │ To Regimental Captain, bearing │ │ │
│ │ no extra Army Rank. │ │ │
│ ├────────────────────────────────────┤ │ │
│ │ Years. │ │ │
│In 1884[394] │ 12 │ 7-1/12 │ 8-4/12 │
│In 1894[394] │ 12-3/12 │ 7 │ 8-5/12 │
└──────────────────┴────────────────────────────────────┴──────────┴─────────┘
-----
Footnote 392:
The rank of Captain has been principally insisted upon, as it is the
decisive step in an Officer’s career. Once a Captain, an Officer who
distinguishes himself can obtain Brevet rank. As a Lieutenant, he is
unable to advance in his profession, except by regimental promotion.
Footnote 393:
In calculating the figures of this part of the Table, the promotions
have been taken which actually occurred in the years 1838, 1841, 1846,
1851, 1855, 1865, and 1870, in the whole of the Brigade of Guards, and
of the Cavalry, and in every fifth Regiment (5th, 10th, 15th, 20th,
etc.) of the Infantry of the Line.
The period 4-5/12 years, in the Table for the Brigade of Guards, would
have been 5-4/12 years, had the average length of service required to
promote an Officer of the Coldstream to Regimental Lieutenant, between
1838 and 1871, been given.
Footnote 394:
These figures have been taken in the same way as under Note 400, but
for the years 1884 and 1894.
The year 1884 has been selected because promotion of Officers of the
Brigade of Guards, who do _not_ enjoy the double rank, began then
generally to take effect. The first Coldstream Officer (without double
rank) took 13 years to become Regimental Captain; the second, 13-3/12
years.
It may be stated, that, in 1896, the senior Second-Lieutenants in the
Coldstream have all but six years' service—that is, nearly as much
service as it takes the average Cavalry Officer to attain to the rank
of Captain.
-----
The substitution of the rank of Sub-Lieutenant for that of Ensign led to
some curious results. By the rules established in October, 1871, a
Commission as a Sub-Lieutenant might be given to a successful candidate
who had passed certain examinations; and in order to qualify for the
rank of Lieutenant, a Sub-Lieutenant was required to serve
satisfactorily for twelve months in a regiment, and after such service
to go through a course of study, and to pass a professional examination,
fixed from time to time by the Secretary of State.
The position of the new Officer was unprecedented, and no one at first
knew exactly what he was. Accordingly, on March 5, 1872, we find that he
was forbidden to present himself before his Sovereign, because he was
“not positively confirmed as a Commissioned Officer;” but then, on the
21st of May following, he was stated to be a “regularly Commissioned
Officer, and, when qualified by a knowledge of his work, he was eligible
for Courts-Martial and all other military duties performed by Subaltern
Officers;” and at last, February 24, 1873, it was announced that he
would be received at Court. The trials of the aspirant to serve in Her
Majesty’s army did not end here. The new civilian chief who assumed the
direction of every military detail, determined that the stage of
initiation into the most glorious profession the world has produced
should be thorny, painful, and difficult. The Sub-Lieutenant, just as he
emerged from school and opened the first and brightest page of a happy
youth, was allowed to spend a year full of liberty among his new
companions in arms, and to enjoy to the uttermost the sweets of life as
they unfolded themselves before his vivid imagination. But the bright
holiday was brief, and when it ended, the hapless lad was to experience
a very different treatment. The year of enjoyment was over, and, giving
up his freedom, he was sent back to the rigid discipline of school, (in
this case even more severe than that to which he had been accustomed in
his boyhood). Here he was tutored, controlled, corrected, and crammed.
The power of a Secretary of State is great; but, just as he cannot make
water run uphill, so can he not alter the ardent character of a young
English gentleman, and the latter, we regret to say, rebelled at the
indignities heaped upon him! Solemn indeed were the warnings which his
sympathetic military superiors gave him. But they did more than this,
for they persuaded the political chief to avoid running counter to human
nature, and the rule was changed, and a more rational one substituted
for it. The Sub-Lieutenant went first to school, and then he joined his
Regiment.
It is pleasant now to leave these matters, and to turn once more to the
solid and effective improvements that were introduced about this time.
In 1871, manœuvres on an extended scale were, for the first time,
held in England, when a successful endeavour was made to conduct
operations which should, as far as possible, imitate those that have to
be undertaken in war time. Aldershot and its neighbourhood was selected
for these exercises, and they lasted for about seven weeks, commencing
early in August until the end of September. The Guards Brigade present,
was formed of the 1st Grenadiers, 2nd Coldstream, and 2nd Scots Fusilier
Guards. Next year similar manœuvres took place in Salisbury Plain,
which were even more successful than those of the year before. They
lasted about a month, beginning in the middle of August, and were
attended by the 3rd Grenadiers, 1st Coldstream, and 1st Scots Fusilier
Guards. In this year, also, Regimental transport was introduced, and, in
June, one Non-commissioned officer and twenty men of the battalions just
mentioned were sent to Woolwich to be trained as drivers. In 1873,
parties of the same strength, from the 2nd Grenadiers and 2nd
Coldstream, again proceeded to Woolwich for a similar course, this time
under the command of a Subaltern Officer from each Regiment, and
manœuvres, lasting a month, took place at Cannock Chase, in
Staffordshire. The two Battalions, above mentioned, formed the Guards
Brigade upon that occasion, each made up into eight companies (25
Officers, 641 Non-commissioned officers and men, exclusive of the
Regimental transport detachment). With this year the mimic war
undertaken to exercise every part of the army, the fighting units as
well as the transport, commissariat, medical services, etc., came to an
end: manœuvres cost money, and the recollection of the great struggle
between France and Germany was beginning to fade from the memory of
those whose privilege it is to pay taxes and return members of
Parliament. Henceforward summer drills were substituted for the larger
and more instructive operations.
Concurrently with these reforms, and, indeed, during a longer period
than is above indicated, the drill-book was often revised, and a system
of tactics introduced, calculated to satisfy the conditions under which
troops have to move when opposed to modern arms of precision. The space
allowed to each man in the ranks has been increased, the rigid structure
of the British line has given way to a looser formation, and, greater
independence of individual action being deemed desirable, the
intelligence of the private soldier has been raised and cultivated. The
principles of the science of tactics remain constant, but the system
adopted necessarily varies as new weapons are invented; the problem
before us, therefore, was how to apply the principles to modern
conditions. Our forefathers resolved the question satisfactorily, as far
as their generation was concerned. They inculcated a stiff and rigid
discipline into the British army, and they endowed the rank and file
with a moral stamina sufficient to enable them to maintain themselves on
the field of battle in line, and thus develop to the fullest extent the
fire of their muskets. Our enemies, not so highly trained, could only
fight in column; and, hence, in no small degree, our victories and their
defeats. That the closest attention has been unremittingly given to this
great problem, all know already; but, as we have not yet had the
experience of a great war under new conditions, the results of our
labours are not yet practically tested.
It will be remembered that the Prince of Wales fell grievously ill in
the end of 1870, and that, hoping against hope, it appeared only too
likely that the august patient could not recover. The whole of the
English people, at home and abroad, were deeply agitated with anxiety
for the life of His Royal Highness, and great was the joy, sincerely
felt and universally expressed, when it pleased Providence to spare him
to the country, and to raise him up again in vigour and in health and
strength. Full of gratitude for this signal favour, the Queen commanded
a thanksgiving service to be held in St. Paul’s Cathedral, and proceeded
there, accompanied by His Royal Highness and the Royal Family (February
27, 1871). It need scarcely be said that all classes of Her Majesty’s
loyal subjects eagerly seized this opportunity of joining their prayers
to those of their Sovereign and of the Princess of Wales, and, as the
Royal procession moved to the Cathedral, the people made a demonstration
of sympathy, which showed how acutely they had felt the danger as long
as it existed, and how great was their happiness now that it was past.
The army was fully represented at this ceremony; small deputations from
every regiment in the British Isles had assigned to them a place in St.
Paul’s. The Brigade lined the streets; the 1st Coldstream, occupying a
portion of Oxford Street, near the Marble Arch, represented the
Regiment, as the 2nd Battalion was then at Windsor.
In the summer of 1873, the Shah of Persia visited England (June 18th)
and remained for a few days. It was the first time that the Monarch of
this distant Asiatic kingdom had ever come to Europe, and his reception
in this country was conducted on a scale of much magnificence. There
were, as usual, numerous Guards of Honour, the streets were lined by the
Brigade when he entered the Metropolis, and a review was held at Windsor
on the 24th, at which the whole of the London Battalions were present,
the public duties being found by the 2nd Battalion, 4th Regiment. The
Shah was also taken to the Tower on the 25th, when the 2nd Coldstream,
being quartered there, received him with two Guards of Honour.
The marriage of H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh to a Princess of Russia,
the only daughter of the Tsar Alexander II., and grand-daughter of our
late antagonist, Nicholas I., took place at St. Petersburg early in
1874, and was an event of some importance and novelty; for never before
had the reigning Houses of England and Russia been directly united by
the close ties of a family alliance. The marriage was looked upon as a
happy augury for the future, and strong expectations were entertained
that any past estrangement between the two countries might henceforth
cease, to the benefit, it was hoped, of both. On the occasion of the
public entry of Their Royal Highnesses, March 12th, a warm welcome
awaited them on the part of the people; the streets were lined by the
Brigade, both Battalions of the Regiment being present. In the following
May, the Tsar came to England, and proceeded first to Windsor (13th) for
two days, and was received by the 1st Coldstream, who were stationed
there. When His Majesty went to Guildhall, on the 18th, the streets were
again lined by the Brigade, and next day a review in his honour was held
at Aldershot, attended by the four West-End Battalions.
It may be interesting to note that the power, then vested in the Colonel
of the Regiment, to reduce a Non-commissioned officer summarily to the
ranks was exercised, in 1874, for the last time:—
_Regimental Order_ , 11th May. Sergeant Moss is reduced to Private by
order of Field-Marshal Sir William Gomm, G.C.B., for misconduct whilst
attached to the Lincoln Militia.
In the same year, the Coldstream lost a distinguished Officer,
Surgeon-Major Wyatt, whose report, on many important Regimental details
connected with the struggle in the Crimea, has been frequently consulted
in the preparation of the account given of the war in this work. The
event stands thus recorded in Regimental Orders, and requires no further
comment on our part:—
April 4th. _Death of Surgeon-Major Wyatt, C.B._ In announcing to the
Regiment the sad news of the death of Surgeon-Major Wyatt, C.B., the
Commanding Officer feels sure he will express the feelings of every
member of the Coldstream Guards when he says that a severer loss could
hardly have befallen the Regiment; nor can he record so melancholy an
event without bearing some tribute to the untiring zeal and brilliant
talents of an Officer who, during a service of nearly twenty-three
years, has won for himself a reputation almost as widespread in France
as in his own country. Few men stood higher in the profession to which
Surgeon-Major Wyatt belonged, and it is unquestionable that the energy
which he displayed during the siege of Paris, and the great
professional skill which he then had an opportunity of showing,
reflected no small credit on the corps of which he was such an
ornament. Considering the impaired state of his constitution he would
undoubtedly have been justified in declining to undertake the arduous
duties at the siege for which he was specially selected by the
Secretary of State for War, and it is certain his death was hastened
by the hardships and privations which, in his unflinching zeal, he so
voluntarily and nobly underwent.
The two Battalions were both represented at the funeral, the 1st finding
the firing party, and the 2nd the escort.
But this was not the only loss that the Regiment had to experience about
this time, for a greater cause for mourning was in store for them, when
their veteran Colonel, Sir William Gomm, died, March 15, 1875, in full
vigour of an unimpaired intellect, though more than ninety years of age.
Having entered the army as Ensign, in the year 1794, at an early age,
this distinguished Officer had served his Sovereign for more than eighty
years, and thus the last link which connected us with the past glories
of the great wars of the French Revolution was severed. The
Lieutenant-Colonel only expressed the universal feeling of sorrow that
prevailed in the Coldstream, when he issued the following short
sympathetic order upon this melancholy event:—
March 15, 1875. _Death of Sir William Gomm._ The Commanding Officer
has the painful duty to perform of announcing to the Regiment the sad
news of the death of their gallant and distinguished Colonel,
Field-Marshal Sir William Gomm, G.C.B., which took place this morning.
A notice of his distinguished services, which included more than one
battle during the last century, can hardly be recorded within the
limits of a Regimental Order, but the present occasion cannot be
allowed to pass without expressing the respect entertained by all
ranks for the example set to us by one of the most honourable careers
ever passed in the British army. The lively interest evinced by our
late Colonel in the welfare of the Regiment has been unceasing ever
since his first connection with it, and in him the Coldstream Guards
lose as kind and generous a friend as has ever been entrusted with its
interests. The Band and drums will cease to play in or out of barracks
until after the funeral; a band of crape will be worn by the Officers
on the left arm until after the appointment of a new Colonel shall
have been gazetted. A rosette of crape will be attached to the Colours
until after the funeral.
The Bands and drums of the Brigade ceased to play while the Coldstream
was in mourning, until after the funeral, which took place at
Rotherhithe, and was not accompanied by any military display; but all
available Officers of the Regiment were, of course, present upon so sad
an occasion.
General Sir William Codrington, G.C.B., the late Commander of the Forces
in the Crimea, now succeeded as Colonel of the Coldstream, and issued an
address to the Regiment:—
“_Regimental Order_ , April 5, 1875. The Commanding Officer has much
pleasure in promulgating the following notification received by him
from General Sir W. Codrington, G.C.B., and feels sure that the
Regiment will be gratified to learn that a renewal of that
distinguished Officer’s connection with the Coldstream Guards is as
keenly appreciated by himself as it is by all ranks of the Regiment.
“Her Majesty has been pleased to confer upon me the Colonelcy of the
Coldstream Guards, in succession to the late Field-Marshal Sir W.
Gomm, whose distinguished services were appreciated by the army and by
the Regiment in which he served so long and so well. The position in
which I am now placed by Her Majesty’s favour renews my former
services of thirty years in the Regiment, and although separated from
it in 1854, yet service in the field with another portion of the army
did not separate me so far from the Coldstream Guards as to prevent my
seeing and valuing, on many difficult occasions of war service, the
action of the Brigade of Guards of which the Coldstream formed part.
Twenty years have passed since these occurrences, but the recollection
of them has not passed away, nor the interest diminished in the
well-being of the Regiment with which Her Majesty has again connected
me by a duty which it will be a pleasure and an honour to carry out.”
From 1871, as we have seen, there had been but one Lieutenant-Colonel
and one Major in the Coldstream, the former being in command of the
Regiment and of one Battalion, the latter having the command of the
other Battalion. In 1875, however, the original establishment of one
Lieutenant-Colonel and two Majors was restored, and Colonel A. Lyon
Fremantle (son of a former well-known and distinguished Coldstream
Officer), being promoted Major to fill up the vacancy, was posted to the
command of the 1st Battalion (April 28th). The reason for this change
was that the Lieutenant-Colonels of Guards Regiments were to be
employed, in addition to the command of their own Regiments, in the
capacity of Brigadiers of the metropolitan Volunteer Corps, which were
then incorporated into three separate brigades. In order to discharge
these duties, Regimental Adjutants were shortly afterwards (1881) also
appointed, and these Officers, besides performing the ordinary work
attached to that position (carried out up to this date by a Battalion
Adjutant), acted as Brigade-Majors of the Volunteer brigades so created.
Captain and Lieut.-Colonel Hon. E. Digby was the first Regimental
Adjutant of the Coldstream.
Just before Colonel Goodlake, V.C., left the service (August 7, 1875),
Colonel Fremantle was transferred to the command of the 2nd Battalion,
and Colonel Hon. William Feilding succeeded the former Officer as Major
Commanding the 1st Battalion. On September 5, 1877, Colonel Hon. Percy
Feilding, C.B. retired upon half-pay, and the Lieutenant-Colonelcy
devolved upon Colonel Fremantle, who was replaced in the command of the
2nd Battalion by Colonel FitzRoy. Only a few days later, Colonel William
Feilding also went on half-pay (September 29th), and Colonel Julian
Hall, promoted Major, was posted to the command of the 1st Battalion.
The Regiment then stood thus (December, 1877):—
_Colonel._—General Sir William Codrington, G.C.B.
_Lieut.-Colonel._—Colonel A. Lyon Fremantle.
_Majors._—Colonels G. FitzRoy; Julian Hall.
_Captains._—Lieut.-Colonels G. Wigram; A. Lambton; Lord W. Seymour
(Staff); E. Burnell; FitzRoy Fremantle; (_Mounted_).
F. Manningham-Buller; G. FitzRoy Smyth; H. R. Eyre; J. B.
Sterling; C. D. Thomas; Viscount de Vesci; Hon. F. Wellesley; R. S.
Hall; W. Ramsden; Hon. E. Acheson; H. Aldenburg-Bentinck; Hon. L.
Dawnay; Hon. E. Digby; Hon. H. Corry; R. Follett.
_Lieutenants._—Captain Hon. E. Boscawen (Adjutant); Major R. Goff;
Captains Waller Otway; H. Bruce; Amelius Lockwood; Hon. R. Campbell
(Adjutant); Hon. G. Bertie; F. Graves-Sawle; A. Moreton; Hon. M.
Stapleton; R. Pole-Carew; J. G. Montgomery; Cyril Fortescue; F.
Manley; R. Barton; F. Arkwright; L. MacKinnon (I. of M.);
Lieutenants V. Dawson (I. of M.); Hon. E. Dawnay; Hon. H. Monck;
Lord D. Gordon; A. FitzRoy; J. Ross-of-Bladensburg; A. Codrington;
Hon. H. Legge; J. Gladstone; D. Dawson; C. Brand; Hon. F. Lambton;
Hon. G. Gore; H. Stopford; Hon. H. Gough; Hon. A. Henniker-Major;
Lord Sandhurst; A. Clarke-Jervoise; G. V. Boyle; Viscount Lambton;
Hon. A. Dawson; Hon. H. Amherst.
_Sub-Lieutenant._—H. Surtees.
_2nd Lieutenants._—Edgar Vincent; W. Corbet.
_Quartermasters._—J. Birch; W. Reynolds.
_Surgeon-Major._—C. V. Cay, M.D. _Battalion-Surgeon._—Surgeon-Major C.
Read.
_Surgeons._—A. Myers; J. Whipple, M.D.; J. Magill, M.D.
_Solicitor._—R. Broughton, Esq.
As the aspect of affairs in Ireland had improved, and as the
disturbances that distracted the people had entirely ceased, it was
found unnecessary to continue to keep a Guards Battalion any longer in
Dublin. At the spring change of quarters of the year 1876, therefore,
the Battalion there was not replaced, and the occupation of Shorncliffe
camp was again resumed as the out-quarter of the Brigade. The 1st
Coldstream accordingly went there at that time, and lost then, with
sincere regret, an Officer of much merit in Quartermaster Falconer, who,
having been in that position ever since 1853, left the Regiment in 1876.
This excellent Officer was born in the town of Coldstream; he had been
present with the Battalion during the whole of the war with Russia, and
had gained for himself, during his long period of service in the
Regiment, the sincere respect and the hearty good will of all ranks.
Major-General Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar retired from the command of
the Brigade of Guards, and was succeeded by Major-General F. Stephenson,
C.B., August 1, 1876, who retained that appointment until July 31, 1879,
when Major-General G. Higginson C.B., replaced him.
A second change was made in the course of this century in the title of
the Scots Fusilier Guards, and on April 4, 1877, it was promulgated for
general information that this Regiment would in future be designated by
the name of Scots Guards.
During the period under review, from 1871-1885, the country was engaged
in some minor wars. An expedition to Ashanti took place 1873-1874;
hostilities were undertaken on the North-West frontiers of India,
notably in Afghanistan, to keep out the influence of Russia, which we
feared, and to counteract the rapid advance of her forces towards our
borders; and operations were conducted against various native tribes in
South Africa, principally against the Zulus, and against the Transvaal
Republic in the same quarter of the world. In none of these were the
Coldstream employed;[395] but some of the Officers of the Regiment were
engaged in them in different capacities, and of them three lost their
lives. Lieutenant Hon. Alfred Charteris, Aide-de-camp to the General
Commanding the Ashanti expedition (Sir Garnet Wolseley), was attacked by
fever, contracted in that unhealthy climate, and died, deeply regretted,
on board ship when on his way home. The other two, Captains Hon. Ronald
Campbell and Robert Barton, fell the same day in South Africa, on March
28, 1879. The high estimation in which these two brave Officers were
held by their brothers in the Regiment, and the promise they gave of
future distinction, have never been forgotten by their companions; their
loss is still mourned, and their memory is preserved and cherished, for
they recall to the mind of those who knew them the type and embodiment
of the Coldstream Officer. Of the details of their services it is not
necessary to say more than this, that Captain Campbell, Chief Staff
Officer to Colonel Wood, V.C., C.B., (now General Sir Evelyn Wood), lost
his life while performing an act of daring gallantry, for which, had he
lived, he would have received the Victoria Cross; an Officer and a
soldier who followed him (Lieutenant Lysons and Private Fowler, 90th
Regiment), and who fortunately escaped unhurt, were both awarded that
high order of military merit. Captain Barton, in command of the Frontier
Light Horse, was also killed in the same neighbourhood. In Colonel
Wood’s despatch, the following sentences are worthy of record in these
pages.
“Camp, Kambula, Zululand, March 30, 1879.
“I directed Colonel Weatherley to dislodge one or two Zulus who were
causing us most of the loss” [the enemy being concealed behind rocks
or in caves], “but as his men did not advance rapidly, Captain
Campbell and Lieutenant Lysons and three men of the 90th, jumping over
a low wall, ran forward and charged into a cave, where Captain
Campbell, leading in the most determined and gallant manner, was shot
dead.... His Excellency” [Lieut.-General Lord Chelmsford, Commanding]
“knew Captain Hon. R. Campbell: he was an excellent Staff Officer,
both in the field and as regards office work, and, having shown the
most brilliant courage, lost his life in performing a gallant feat;
and though he fell, success was gained by the courageous conduct of
Lieutenant Lysons and Private Fowler, 90th Light Infantry. Captain
Barton, commanding the Frontier Horse, was always most forward in
every fight, and was as humane as he was brave. On the 20th January,
one of Umsabe’s men, whom Captain Barton wished to take prisoner
instead of killing him, fired at Captain Barton within two yards, the
powder marking his face. When last seen on the 28th, he was carrying
on his horse a wounded man.” Lieut.-Colonel Buller (now General Sir
Redvers Buller, V.C.), commanding the mounted troops of Colonel Wood’s
column, and who himself gained his Victoria Cross on that day for his
own gallantry, writes as follows:—“Captain Barton is also a great
loss; active, energetic, and intrepid, he was an excellent Officer,
and devoted to his profession.”[396]
-----
-----
Footnote 395:
After the battle of Isandlwhana, January 22, 1879, in which the Zulus
succeeded in overwhelming several companies of the 24th Regiment, some
Officers and Non-commissioned officers of the Brigade of Guards, under
Colonel Davies, Grenadier Guards, were sent to take charge of drafts
proceeding to South Africa to join that Regiment. The Coldstream
furnished one Officer (Captain Hon. G. Bertie) and two sergeants (one
of them, the present Superintending Clerk, Sergeant-Major W. Johnson).
The drafts were wrecked on their way out, but fortunately no loss of
life occurred. Arrived at the seat of hostilities, the Guardsmen did
duty with the 24th Regiment until the end of the war. The following
Brigade Order appeared in London, October 3rd:—
“In congratulating the detachment of Officers and Non-commissioned
officers sent to the Cape under the command of Colonel Davies,
Grenadier Guards, the Major-General has much pleasure in publishing,
for the information of the Brigade, the following order, issued by
Colonel Glyn, C.B., commanding 1st Battalion, 24th Regiment, dated
s.s. _Egypt_, October 1, 1879: 'The Officer Commanding cannot allow
the Officers of the Brigade of Guards and Militia who have been
attached to the 1st Battalion, 24th Regiment, during the late campaign
in South Africa, to leave the Battalion without recording his
appreciation of their services, and thanking them most sincerely for
the willing and energetic manner in which they have performed their
duties. Colonel Glyn assures them that they will always be held in
kindly remembrance both by himself and his Officers. To the
Non-commissioned officers of the Brigade of Guards, the Commanding
Officer also tenders his best thanks for the assistance they have
rendered when serving with the drafts and, subsequently, with the
Battalion in the field.”
Footnote 396:
_Supplement, London Gazette_, May 7, 1879. See Appendix XIII. Sir E.
Wood has written an account of Captain Campbell’s heroism in
_Pearson’s Magazine_ (Feb., 1896), “One of the Bravest Deeds I ever
saw.” See _Brigade of Guards Magazine_ , ix. 164.
-----
The grave outlook of foreign affairs in the spring of 1878, when Russia,
after a successful war with Turkey, forced a disastrous treaty upon the
Sultan (treaty of San Stefano), led many to think that England would
again become involved in further hostilities in the East, and for a time
there was serious anxiety on the subject. But, warned by the Crimea, we
were hardly inclined to embark in another quarrel with the Tsar. A
European Congress then assembled in Berlin to modify the Treaty of San
Stefano, and to conclude a new international agreement, known as the
Treaty of Berlin (July 13, 1878). As a demonstration, and indeed also to
take advantage of the opportunity to test the system introduced into the
army by short service, the reserves were called up in April, and, as we
have already seen, the summons to attend was well responded to by the
men. The Coldstream reserves were posted to the 2nd Battalion. The three
Guards Battalions first on the roster for active service (viz. the 2nd
Grenadiers, 2nd Coldstream, and 1st Scots Guards), each selected
thirty-two men to go to Aldershot to be trained as stretcher-bearers.
The Regimental transport was re-organized, and proceeded later to
Aldershot with the Battalions above-mentioned, to take part in the
summer drills; shortly after which (September 11th) its establishment
was fixed at one Officer, one sergeant, six drivers, three waggons, and
one small-arm ammunition cart. Later (January 25, 1879), this transport
was kept together as one corps, and the three Officers took it in turn,
for four months at a time, to have it in charge.
The efforts to extend and improve the training of Officers and men,
which have been already alluded to, were still continued, and in 1883,
it was ordered that Company Commanders should give personal attention to
the subject, and be responsible for the efficiency of the men placed
under their immediate command. Before this date, however, the Brigade
had already availed themselves of the advantages which Pirbright offered
for some of these purposes. A Guards camp having been opened for
musketry in 1881, it was soon utilized as a place where practical
instruction in military exercises (other than ordinary drill), could be
given by the Company Officers. In April, 1882, Commanding Officers were
enjoined to carry out a series of minor tactical operations in
conjunction with the course of musketry practice, and to examine their
Battalions by companies, and by double companies, in outpost duty,
attack formation, shelter-trench exercise, etc. The Battalions were also
to stay at Pirbright for fourteen days, five to be devoted to minor
tactics, four to preliminary drill, and five to musketry. Afterwards,
they remained a longer time in camp, and were thus enabled to all their
company training there, besides their musketry.[397]
-----
Footnote 397:
Guards being stationed in London, have no ground near their barracks
suitable for many of their military exercises.
-----
Following the example set us by Continental armies, we added sectional
and field firing to the course of target practice which was annually
carried out, and increased the number of rounds to be expended by the
trained soldier from 100 to 150 (1882). Musketry had received
considerable attention from the authorities, and it was held imperative
that the men should not only be able individually to shoot with
accuracy, but that they should also be trained to fire together, under
conditions that prevail in the field, and against objects similar to
those which present themselves to the aim of troops in war time. A Siege
Operations Committee having been appointed to conduct experiments at
Dungeness early in 1880, a detachment of the 1st Coldstream, then at
Shorncliffe, was told off to assist them in their labours. The following
Brigade Order (March 11, 1880) relates to this service:—
The Major-General has great pleasure in noticing the highly favourable
report of the conduct of a detachment of the 1st Coldstream Guards
under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Otway, employed under the Siege
Operations Committee at Dungeness. The President of the Committee
remarks upon the cheerful endurance and steady discipline of the men,
as well as the watchfulness and judgment of the Officers, and the
ability and energy with which Captain Fortescue carried out the daily
arrangements.
We have already had occasion to remark that, on the introduction of
signalling, great interest was taken in the subject in the Brigade, and
frequent allusions were made to the efficiency of the Guards in this
respect. An extract of an order, dated March 11, 1884, may be quoted:—
“His Royal Highness’s attention has been drawn to the energetic action
of Lieut.-Colonel Bonham, which is deserving of praise, as also to the
attention paid by the other Officers specially named, viz. Lieutenant
Lloyd, 1st Grenadiers, and Lieutenant Lovell, 2nd Coldstream. Will you
please convey an expression of His Royal Highness’s satisfaction to
the 1st and 2nd Coldstream Guards, the Royal Horse Guards, and the 3rd
Grenadier Guards, who have taken such good positions in the list of
relative efficiency.”
In the last chapter some notes were given upon the improvements which
were made in the canteen system after the Crimean war. In 1879, the
“coffee bar” was separated from the canteen proper, and thus two shops
were established in barracks for the soldiers' use, in one of which no
alcoholic liquor could be bought; this change was completed in London in
1880 and 1881. We may also state here that, through the instrumentality
of Officers of the Brigade, early in the latter year, a coffee tavern
was set up outside barracks in Buckingham Palace Road, for the use of
the Non-commissioned officers and men of the Guards; the arrangement
that was then made did not, however, continue for any great length of
time, and though the tavern still exists, its connection with the
Brigade is now severed.
A few changes in uniform since 1872 deserve a passing mention. Shoulder
straps were added to the Officers' tunics and blue coats (end of 1880),
and the gold cords on the former garments were then abolished. New
badges were put on these straps to show the military rank of the wearer.
Previous to this, although the rank of an Officer was indicated on the
collar of the tunic, no such distinction was to be seen on the blue
coat. In the following March, the dark grey cloth, adopted for the
trousers of Officers in the Brigade in 1830, gave place to a blue tweed.
Up to 1874 Non-commissioned officers and men wore buttons on the skirts
of the tunic, but they were then removed on account of the new valise
equipment which was introduced at that time, instead of the old
knapsack. Since that date the valise has been always carried by the
soldier, though the pattern has more than once been changed.
Some alterations were effected in the medical service of the Brigade. Up
to the year 1865, the Surgeons belonged exclusively to their respective
Regiments as much as any other Officer of the Guards, and their
promotion took place therein when vacancies occurred in their own corps
only. Forming a small body in each, it is evident that their advancement
was always uncertain, and too frequently was it exceedingly slow. To
relieve this stagnation, the Medical Officers of the Brigade, though
still belonging to and wearing the uniform of their respective
Regiments, are now placed upon one list according to seniority, and are
promoted in their turn into whatever corps the vacancy occurs. A better
flow of promotion is thus obtained, though the Medical Officers are
subject to the inconvenience of being sometimes obliged to change their
Regiments when they gain a step. Another change, made in April 2, 1881,
was the appointment of a Brigade Surgeon in the Guards to act as
Principal Medical Officer. This system replaced the old arrangement by
which the three Regimental Surgeons-Major took it in turn to do duty in
Brigade Waiting, and to act as the medical adviser to the Major-General.
Lastly, in 1881, the three Regimental hospitals were converted into
station hospitals, for the general use of all troops quartered in the
London garrison.
The grade, created to supplant the old military title of Ensign, met
with some vicissitudes. Sub-Lieutenants ceased to be so called in 1877,
and the name Second-Lieutenant was then substituted for it. In 1881,
however, the rank was altogether abolished, and Second-Lieutenants were
promoted Lieutenant, while young Officers joining the army were gazetted
Lieutenants. But this arrangement did not last long, and again there was
another change, for in 1887 Second-Lieutenants were re-introduced into
the army; but there appears to be no tendency to restore the old
traditional rank of Ensign.
One of the consequences of the abolition of purchase, clearly foreseen
by the authors of army reform, was to produce a state of complete
stagnation in promotion. To relieve this evil, a device was resorted to,
whereby Officers, their qualifications or inclinations notwithstanding,
were not allowed to remain in certain positions in their regiments for
more than a definite period or after attaining a specified age. For
instance, Commanding Officers of regiments and battalions were limited
to five years command (reduced to four in the case of the latter, 1881),
and all Captains were forced to retire from the service if not promoted
to Major before the age of forty. The relief thus afforded was not of
great advantage to the bulk of the juniors, and it constituted a
well-founded grievance to many who, while able and willing to serve were
thrown out of their profession through no fault of their own.[398] Now,
in 1881, a large number of Captains were doomed to be ejected, whereat
it appears the Secretary of State got seriously alarmed. Nor is it
surprising that he should fear the prospect of having between 3000 to
4500 vigorous and educated men going “up and down the country,” and
pointing out in every constituency the grievances to which they were
subjected by the hasty introduction of political army reforms that his
own party had effected in 1871.[399] He was constrained to save these
men, and the only way to do this was to promote them _en masse_ to the
rank of Major. Hence all Majors in the infantry below a Mounted Officer,
(since 1893, below the Second in command), are “Captains and Majors,”
fulfilling the duties of the former, and dignified with the rank of the
latter. They therefore enjoy the “double rank,” which was held to be so
objectionable, in 1871, when it prevailed in the Foot Guards. The
advantage, however, does not go on, for on becoming “Second in command,”
an Officer performs the duty of Major, but has no extra rank given to
him.
-----
Footnote 398:
The automatic system of facilitating a flow of promotion at no cost to
the State, which purchase produced, may perhaps be illustrated by the
fact that, from 1814 to 1871, or during fifty-seven years, the
Coldstream had twenty-one Lieutenant-Colonels; or each, on an average,
served in that capacity for a period of about two years and nine
months. Whereas, between 1871 and 1895, there have been five
Lieutenant-Colonels, whose average period of command has nearly
reached the full five years allowed by the new regulations.
Footnote 399:
See _The Army Book for the British Empire_ , p. 57.
-----
The introduction of Warrant-officers into the army was brought about at
this time also; and the Sergeant-Major and Bandmaster (and later the
Regimental Clerk) were so promoted.
These things were effected in July, 1881; and then the following changes
were made in the establishment of the Coldstream: The companies were
reduced from 20 to 16 (8 per Battalion, instead of 10, as had been
provided during the Crimean war). The Lieutenant-Colonel remained in
command of the Regiment, but instead of two Majors Commanding
Battalions, the designation of these Officers was altered, and they were
called Lieutenant-Colonels Commanding Battalions. Of the Captains there
had been twenty, or one to each Company, and the four seniors used to be
called Acting-Majors, or Mounted Officers; instead, there were now eight
Majors in the Regiment (the four seniors being mounted,[400] and the
four juniors unmounted), and nine Captains. Lastly, the rank of
Second-Lieutenant was abolished, and instead of 20 Lieutenants and 20
Second-Lieutenants, there were 36 Lieutenants. The differences in the
two establishments are to be seen in the following table:—
May, 1881. July, 1881.
20 Companies. 16 Companies.
1 Colonel. } 1 Colonel. }
1 Lieut.-Colonel } Field-Officers. 1 Lt.-Col. Com. } Field-Officers.
Regt.
2 Majors. } 2 Lt.-Cols. Com. }
Batns.
20 Captains. 8 Majors. }
20 Lieutenants. 9 Captains.
20 Second-Lieutenants. 36 Lieutenants.
2 Adjutants. 3 Adjutants.
(1 per Battn. and 1 Regtal).
2 Quartermasters. 2 Quartermasters.
2 Surgeons-Major. 2 Surgeons-Major.
3 Surgeons. 3 Surgeons.
1 Solicitor. _Total Officers_ 1 Solicitor. _Total Officers_
74. 68.
2 Serjeants-Major. 2 Sergts.-Major.
(Warrant-officers).
1 Staff Clerk.
2 Quartermaster-Sergeants. 2 Quartermaster-Sergeants.
1 Bandmaster. 1 Bandmaster. (Warrant-officer).
2 Sergt.-Instructors of Musketry. 2 Sergt.-Instructors of Musketry.
2 Drum-Majors. 2 Sergeant-Drummers.
2 Armourer-Sergeants. 2 Armourer-Sergeants.
2 Orderly Room Sergeants. 6 Orderly Room Sergeants.
2 Pioneer Sergeants. 2 Pioneer Sergeants.
20 Colour-Sergeants. 16 Colour-Sergeants.
2 Sergeant Cooks. 2 Sergeant Cooks.
60 Sergeants. 48 Sergeants.
_Total Sergeants, etc._, 97. _Total Warrant-officers, Sergts.
etc._, 86.
32 Drummers and Fifers. 32 Drummers and Fifers.
_Total_ 32. _Total_ 32.
80 Corporals. 80 Corporals.
1420 Privates. 1420 Privates.
_Total Rank and File_, 1500. _Total Rank and File_, 1500
—— ——
1703 _Total._ 1686 _Total._
-----
Footnote 400:
The dismounting of two “mounted” Majors took place in 1893; and now
there are in the Regiment two “mounted” (or a “Second in command” per
Battalion) and six “unmounted” Majors.
-----
[Illustration:
UNDRESS CAP PRIVATES
ABOUT 1850.
]
[Illustration: OFFICER 1849]
N. R. Wilkinson del. A.D. Innes & C^o. London. Mintern Bros.
lith.
On the 10th of November, 1880, Colonel Fremantle having left the
Regiment, Colonel FitzRoy was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel, when Colonel
Wigram, promoted Major, assumed the command of the 2nd Battalion. On the
completion of five years period of command, Colonel Julian Hall retired
on half-pay, September 29, 1882, and was succeeded in the command of the
1st Battalion by Colonel Arthur Lambton, who thus became
Lieutenant-Colonel of a Battalion in the Coldstream, and who was
appointed to serve for four years in that capacity. Colonels FitzRoy and
Wigram, C.B., finished their periods of five years simultaneously,
November 10, 1885. The latter, placed on half-pay for a few weeks, was
brought back as Lieutenant-Colonel of the Regiment (December 16th), and
the command of the 2nd Battalion devolved upon Colonel Sterling
(November 10th).
By the death of General Sir William Codrington, G.C.B., on the 6th of
August, 1884, the Coldstream lost their Colonel, who had served as such
for more than nine years. The following Regimental Order was published:—
_August 7, 1884._ The Commanding Officer has the painful duty to
perform of announcing to the Regiment the sad news of the death of
their gallant and distinguished Colonel, General Sir William
Codrington, G.C.B., which took place yesterday afternoon, 6th inst. A
band of crape will be worn by the Officers for a month; the Band and
the drums and fifes will not play until after the funeral.
The funeral was accompanied with military honours, and took place at
Woking Cemetery on the 9th. All Officers attending it were dressed as
for Guard, and, including the firing party of 50 men, there was a
detachment present of the 1st Battalion, consisting of 100
Non-commissioned officers and men under three Officers.
Sir W. Codrington was succeeded by General Right Honourable Sir Thomas
Steele, K.C.B., at that time Commander of the Forces in Ireland, whom
Her Majesty appointed the new Colonel of the Regiment.
In the same year, Lieut.-General Higginson, C.B., vacated the command of
the Brigade of Guards, and was replaced by Major-General R. Gipps, C.B.,
April 1, 1884.
The 1st Coldstream was first on the roster for duty in Ireland, and at
the end of 1880 was quartered in Chelsea and St. George’s Barracks.
Serious troubles once more affected that country, and Government was
sorely perplexed how to deal with them. The presence of the Guards was
again required, and the Battalion was despatched there at a few days'
notice, by two special trains from Victoria Station, _viâ_ Holyhead
(December 6th). Upon this, the 2nd Grenadiers, then at Shorncliffe, were
brought to town, and that out-quarter was given up. On the 15th of
December, a detachment of 100 men from the 2nd Battalion joined the 1st
in Dublin, and five days later the 1st Scots Guards left London for the
same destination. The Coldstream were quartered in Richmond Barracks,
but the Scots Guards were scattered through the town, their
head-quarters in Ship Street, with detachments in Richmond, and in Linen
Hall barracks.
A novel procedure was now adopted with respect to the command of these
two Battalions, which shows how critical the authorities conceived the
situation to be. Shortly after their arrival in Dublin, the
Major-General Commanding the Brigade and the Home District proceeded
there accompanied by his Brigade Staff, and left Colonel Gipps, Scots
Guards (the senior Officer) with the District Staff to command the Home
District; but the arrangement did not last long, and the latter,
temporarily promoted Brigadier General, took General Higginson’s place
in Ireland, who thereupon returned to London, February 15, 1881.[401]
-----
Footnote 401:
On the 7th of December, 1881, Colonel FitzRoy, Coldstream Guards,
temporarily promoted Brigadier-General, proceeded to Dublin to relieve
Colonel Gipps, appointed Major-General.
-----
The stay of the Battalion in Dublin, lasting until March, 1882, was not
more pleasant then than it had been during the Fenian troubles of 1866;
but the duties assigned to the troops were everywhere cheerfully
undertaken and zealously discharged. Among these duties two may be
specially mentioned. In the first place, such was the violence of the
mobs that collected to interfere with the due administration of the law,
that a collision was apprehended every time a writ was served, a seizure
made in a farm, an eviction put into execution, or any other legal
process carried out. To avoid the danger, the Irish authorities
established the rule that the force protecting the sheriff or other
officer employed, should be so overwhelmingly strong, as to put an end
to all thoughts of resistance, on the part of those who assembled to
frustrate the course of justice. The Royal Irish Constabulary were, of
course, always employed on these occasions, but it was also believed
that the presence of red-coats would have a greater effect with the
excited populace, and for this purpose numerous military posts covered
the disturbed districts; but the Guards in Dublin, occupying a central
position there, were not obliged to furnish any of these detachments.
Soldiers, therefore, were often requisitioned to escort the civil
authorities, and the two Guards Battalions (as well as those that
succeeded them in Dublin during the troubles), were often employed in
this manner—generally by despatching small parties of some fifty men
under an Officer. On one occasion, however, the 1st Coldstream had to do
more than this. There was a series of evictions near New Pallas, in the
county of Limerick, and the whole Battalion, together with a portion of
Scots Guards, were sent there for two days to guard the sheriff, who had
to execute the judgment of the Court. It was, at least, an uncommon
service for so large a force to perform; and the Battalion was in all
conscience powerful enough to prevent any breach of the peace!
The other duty to which allusion has been made, refers to what was
called “personal protection.” Many landlords, and indeed others, were in
danger of their lives from the outrage-mongers that infested the land.
In order to afford adequate protection to these persons, soldiers were
told off to reside in their houses, to accompany them in all their
movements, and to be responsible for their safety. The Coldstream and
Scots Guards furnished a number of men to perform this duty, and an
Officer from each Regiment was appointed to inspect them frequently, and
to satisfy himself that this novel service was efficiently discharged.
That this was the case may be gathered from the following order, issued
in London, dated March 17, 1882:—
“By desire of the Field-Marshal the Commander-in-Chief, I have the
honour to transmit to you the enclosed report on the conduct of the
Coldstream and Scots Guards, while employed on protection duty in
Limerick and Clare under the order of Clifford Lloyd, Esq., Resident
Magistrate at Tulla, and to request that you will be so good as to
express to all concerned, His Royal Highness’s approbation of their
conduct in the performance of the duties they have been called upon to
undertake, and which are quite unusual with soldiers. His Royal
Highness has much pleasure in recognising the valuable services
rendered by Captain Fortescue, Coldstream Guards, and by Lieutenant
Romilly, Scots Guards, which have been brought to the notice of His
Excellency the Lord-Lieutenant.”
But the Coldstream had some further experiences. It will be remembered
that Mr. Parnell, the leader of the Irish agitation, was arrested as a
suspect, October 13, 1881, under an Act of Parliament which had been
passed in the spring of that year. The authorities, expecting some
resistance, made every military preparation in Dublin to prevent a riot;
and their precautions being sufficient, and their resources ample, the
capture was very easily accomplished without mishap. Still, the
quick-witted Irish very soon realized that the Government in London were
afraid of them. They had early perceived that the Cabinet, instead of
facing the difficulty boldly, dallied with it, and failed to support the
Chief Secretary, Mr. Forster, in his strenuous efforts to cope with it.
Hence, seeing no strength in the authority that should have protected
them, the people were constrained to obey those who did wield power in
the country, by setting its laws at defiance and by oppressing it
without mercy. The winter, 1881-82, was disturbed and troubled. The
No-rent conspiracy was in full swing; murder clubs, under the name of
Moonlighters, kept the land in terror; juries were intimidated, and
refused to discharge their functions; and the executive was all but
paralysed. It was, moreover, known that a gang of assassins, called “the
Invincibles,” had bound themselves together to murder Mr. Forster, and
it was afterwards ascertained that they had made numerous desperate
attempts upon his life, all of which were happily unsuccessful.
Meanwhile, in January, 1882, the 2nd Grenadiers were sent to Cork, and
for two months there was the unprecedented number of three Guards
Battalions in Ireland, until March, when the 2nd Coldstream relieved the
1st Battalion, who returned to England, and were soon after followed by
the 1st Scots Guards. So the gloomy spring passed, when a new
complication arose. Mr. Forster had remained at his post with steadfast
courage, and scorned the imminent personal danger that surrounded him,
with which he knew he was threatened. But he was unable to stand by a
leader of whose policy he disapproved, or to follow him in the tortuous
intrigue, which became known in history as the “Kilmainham treaty.” He
resigned, and the then Lord-Lieutenant (Lord Cowper), having also
withdrawn from office, Lord Spencer was appointed in his place, and
arrived in Dublin, May 6, 1882, accompanied by his new Chief Secretary,
Lord Frederick Cavendish.
On that very afternoon, in broad daylight, while walking through the
Phœnix Park, which was then full of people, Lord F. Cavendish and Mr.
Burke, the Under-Secretary, were murdered by the Invincibles, who had
for so long unsuccessfully lain in wait to assassinate Mr. Forster. The
event sent a thrill of horror through the United Kingdom, and
effectively and at last forced the Government to open their eyes to the
true nature of the conspiracy with which they had to deal. The
miscreants got away, and for a time there was little information to be
obtained as to the perpetrators of this foul deed, and twelve months had
to elapse before the conspirators were convicted and punished. The 2nd
Coldstream, quartered in Dublin when this tragedy took place, were not
called upon to act in the emergency. There was nothing, indeed, for
soldiers to do at the crisis, except to redouble their vigilance; for it
soon became clear that the Irish were as much the victims of the
agitators and outrage-mongers who had mastered them, as were the
officials who suffered by their violence.
In less than three months both the Guards Battalions, quartered in
Dublin and in Cork, were required to proceed on active service to Egypt,
and left the scenes of internal discord and disorder to meet the open
foes of their country. The 3rd Grenadiers replaced them in Dublin
(August 8th), and since that time there has been only one Battalion in
Ireland. The Coldstream did not return there till the autumn of 1887,
when the agitation had assumed a new phase, although the crisis had by
no means passed away, nor the difficulties come to an end. Thanks,
however, to the vigour of Government, to the remedial measures
introduced, to the disappearance of Parnell, to the absence of another
leader of character, and to the quarrels that have split up the
Nationalist party into hostile fragments, the people are now steadily
quieting down; and, eschewing agitation, they are improving their
material prosperity under the new laws which have been enacted for their
benefit.
In February, 1881, that is, shortly after the two Battalions went in
haste to Ireland at the end of the previous year, the Tower was vacated
by the Foot Guards, and was occupied by a Line regiment until November,
1882. There were then four Battalions in the West End, and this
continued to be the force maintained there—excepting for the two months,
January 25th-March 22nd, 1882, when, as we have seen, three Battalions
were stationed in Ireland—until the departure of a Guards Brigade of
three Battalions for Egypt. During this war, Dublin was still occupied
by a Battalion, but Windsor was vacated, and, until the return of the
Brigade from active service in November, the 2nd King’s Royal Rifle
Corps furnished the Kensington Palace and the Magazine guards. In the
following year, 1883, London was the scene of dynamite outrages,
perpetrated by the agents of the same secret societies, of American
origin, which financed and supported the agitation in Ireland. “For a
time the air was dense with rumours of plots and explosives,” and all
minds were filled with vague alarms. A measure to punish dynamiters was
passed in haste through all its stages in both Houses of Parliament, in
one day (April 9th), and received the Royal assent next day at
noon.[402] The garrison of the Metropolis also required strengthening,
and a Line regiment being brought to the Tower, there were then five
Guards Battalions in the West End. Extra guards were mounted on Somerset
House, the Royal Courts of Justice, and Millbank prison, the London
duties were increased, the public offices protected, and other
precautions taken. The panic was considerable while it lasted, but it
passed away in about six months, and in the summer the garrison of
London assumed its normal strength and condition.
-----
Footnote 402:
_Ann. Reg._ , 1883, part i., p. 84.
-----
This ends the history of the Coldstream up to 1885, as far as affairs in
the United Kingdom are concerned; and we now turn to events that
occurred in Egypt and in the Sudan, 1882-1885. Before doing this,
however, we may briefly allude to a subject which possesses much
interest to all Guardsmen. Some members of the Coldstream may perhaps be
unaware that the exquisite decorations that adorn the interior of the
Royal Military Chapel in Wellington barracks have been scarcely twenty
years in existence. Before that time the walls were cold and bare, and
the building contained little to show how zealously the Brigade guard
the great traditions of the past,—traditions which they have
inherited,—and how warmly they cherish the memory of the Officers,
Non-commissioned officers, and men who, ever since the formation of the
standing army, have faithfully and bravely performed their duty to the
Sovereign of this realm. Numerous are the monuments placed in the Chapel
to record the military virtues of departed Guardsmen of every rank, and
their deeds on many a hard-fought field of strife; while these memorials
furnish a proof of the solid union which knits the three Regiments of
the Household Infantry together, in love for their profession and in
devotion to their Queen and country.
CHAPTER XV.
THE WAR IN EGYPT, 1882.
Origin of the war—Emancipation of Egypt from Turkish rule;
introduction of European control—Deposition of Ismail
Pasha—Tewfik becomes Khedive—Military revolts—Disorganization
of the country—Joint action of the English and French; its
failure—Naval demonstration—Bombardment of the forts of
Alexandria—The French withdraw and leave Great Britain to act
alone—British troops sent to Egypt—The Suez Canal seized—Base
of operations established at Ismailia—Action of Tel
el-Makhuta—Clearing the communications—Actions at Kassassin,
August 28th and September 7th—Character of the Egyptian
army—Night march on Tel el-Kebir—The enemy is overwhelmed,
September 13th—Pursuit; losses—End of the war—Return of the
Coldstream to England.
The hostilities conducted by England in Egypt in 1882 have been
described as a mere bondholders' war. This, in a sense, is true, for our
intimate relations with that country, which eventually led to military
operations, were ostensibly due to our desire to protect the financial
interests of those who had lent money to its ruler. But this is far from
being the whole truth, because other and higher motives induced Great
Britain to intervene in the internal affairs of the native government.
Facing alike the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and containing within
its limits the isthmus of Suez, Egypt, besides being the key of the
valley of the Nile, commands the most convenient water communications to
India, to the further East, and to Australia. Having interests of a
vital nature to defend in this far-distant quarter of the globe, it is
evident we could never remain unconcerned if anarchy were to prevail in
a region through which the main lines pass that connect together
portions of the British Empire. Nor was the problem a new one. At the
close of the last and at the commencement of the present century,
England was struggling with the French for supremacy in India, and at
that time Napoleon—then in the beginning of his great career—made a
descent upon Egypt to secure a road to that Empire for his own nation.
We were then obliged to drive his soldiers out, and, having succeeded in
doing this, we prevented the French from forming an Asiatic dominion.
Still the trouble continued, in a minor degree, until 1809, when we took
the island of Mauritius from them, on which they depended, to base their
operations against our possessions. From this date their power in the
East declined; and England, relieved from rivalry, has thenceforward
been able to exercise an undivided influence in India. If in the
beginning of this century it was necessary to prevent France from
interfering with our national expansion; so was it also the more
necessary to restrain the Egyptians from obstructing (as we apprehended)
our communications in 1882,—when the Suez canal having been opened
(1869), nearly all our Eastern commerce was squeezed through that narrow
passage, and when the importance of African exploration was adding
greater value to the valley of the Nile.
Egypt has passed through some vicissitudes during the last sixty years.
Still considered in theory to be a portion of the Turkish Empire, it was
formerly ruled directly by the Porte, until Muhammad Ali, the
Governor-General, or Vali, rebelled, and wrested concessions from the
Sultan. In 1841, the Governorship was vested in him and in his heirs,
and subsequent Firmans having been granted in his favour, Egypt became
practically an independent principality. The last privilege accorded to
his successors was the right to contract foreign loans without the
previous consent of the Porte, and this right to run into debt was
freely indulged in by Muhammad Ali’s grandson, Ismail Pasha. The latter,
after becoming Viceroy—or Khedive, as the title is called—embarked in
wild speculations, and indulged in unbounded extravagance. Desiring,
like his grandfather, to erect an independent state by the adoption of
European civilization, he failed to understand how this civilization was
to be brought about. He hastened to produce its effects by an immense
expenditure of money, but he omitted to establish an efficacious
administration to curb peculation, or to introduce order into his
affairs. Numerous speculators of every nationality rushed forward to
help him to dissipate his fortune, and it was not long before he
involved the people in financial ruin. As the import of alcohol corrupts
a barbarous tribe, so did the influx of foreign gold demoralize this
Muslim government.
Now, even if England had been prepared to let the bondholders shift for
themselves in this crisis, so were not the other European nations; and
to prevent so important a country from falling into the hands of any one
of them, all agreed to intervene and regulate the evil that had been
brought about. Thus Ismail, emancipated from the rule of Turkey, fell
under the domination of European control. It is scarcely necessary to
describe the various steps taken to secure reform in the financial
concerns of Egypt. England and France were more interested in the matter
than any other of the Powers. They acted harmoniously together, assumed
a joint direction over the affairs of the country, and gradually
tightened their hold upon the government. Thereupon the Khedive became
restive, and as he would not fall in with the new order established to
correct his maladministration, he was removed from Cairo. The authority
of the Sultan, as Suzerain, was now requisitioned by Europe: Ismail was
deposed, and his son, Tewfik Pasha, reigned in his stead, by favour of
the Western Powers (June 26, 1879).
It was easy to see that such an undefined condition of things was not
likely to last long. However beneficial to the people an honest
administration might be, the interference of foreign officials in the
internal affairs of another state, to whose ruler they owed no
allegiance, could not but produce friction, and lead to trouble. It is
true, Tewfik was pliant, and submitted without difficulty to the
unprecedented constitution that was forced upon him; also, that there
was little or no public opinion in the country, and apparently no centre
of resistance to thwart the action of England and France. Nevertheless,
the new Khedive soon lost his authority over his subjects, and
resistance did arise, sooner than might have been expected. It
originated where it ought least to have been found—in the army, where
insubordination showed itself as soon as the native government was
weakened and became contemptible in the eyes of the people, and when
economy was introduced into the war department. Early in 1881, a
military rising was threatened, and with difficulty was it appeased;
but, later, a more serious event occurred (September 9th), when the
Colonel of one of the native regiments, named Arabi Bey, took the lead,
and, surrounding the Khedive’s palace with 4000 men, demanded, with arms
in his hands, the redress of grievances from his Prince. Destitute of
all real power, Tewfik was unable to crush this revolt; he met the
mutineers, tried to conciliate them, and gave in to their demands. A
change of government took place, and the Chamber of Notables was
convened. From that moment Arabi’s influence grew stronger, the army
became devoted to him, and around him rallied all groups of the people
who were dissatisfied with foreign interference. “Egypt for the
Egyptians” was now the cry, and the newly appointed Chamber, far from
allaying the trouble, added fuel to the flames of discontent that were
already kindled. It was evident the crisis could not be much longer
deferred.
The French urged the British Government to take active measures to
support the Joint Control which then existed in Egypt, and the latter
were quite willing to carry out this advice. On the 6th of January,
1882, an Identical or Dual Note was presented to the Khedive, expressing
the determination of the two nations “to ward off by their united
efforts all cause of external or internal complications which might
menace the _régime_ established in Egypt.” The Notables answered this
challenge by claiming the right of regulating the national budget, and
Tewfik’s action became somewhat uncertain. It could not be accurately
ascertained whether he meant to stand by his European allies who had
placed him upon the throne, or whether he was about to throw in his lot
with the national party. At any rate, Arabi, advanced to the dignity of
Pasha, became still more powerful, and was appointed Minister for War.
Now, in England, there was a certain feeling in favour of the Egyptians,
and this might be expected to find expression among the supporters of
the Liberal party then in power, who claim, perhaps with greater
emphasis than others, to respect the liberties of mankind, and to listen
to the grievances of all who complain. It is against our custom to
stifle the voice of an assembly, however feebly it may be supposed to
represent the wishes of a people, and in this crisis there were not
wanting some who hesitated to sanction the use of coercive measures. Nor
was there a total absence of a _primâ facie_ cause of discontent; for
the European officials of every nationality had multiplied in Egypt, and
in 1882 there were as many as 1324, receiving salaries from the taxes
that amounted to a considerable proportion of the revenue,—to £373,704
per annum.[403] It is possible that if we had not deferred to the French
at this juncture, we might have put an end to the commotion without
resorting to war, and that, had we been the sole trustee for European
interests, we might have found some satisfactory solution to the
difficulty. But, as had happened before, we were fettered by our
alliance with the French, which was not defined, and in order to
maintain our relations with them, we followed their lead.
-----
Footnote 403:
_Annual Register_, 1882, pt. i. 361 (note). See, also, D. Mackenzie
Wallace, _Egypt and the Egyptian Question_, p. 135 (London, 1883).
-----
The Dual Note having only intensified the trouble, our Government
despaired of maintaining order unless some vigorous action were taken to
disperse it. They believed that the best course under the circumstances
was to resort to the only legal means which then existed: viz. to
revive, in some shape, the dormant rights of suzerainty which the Sultan
claimed, which in theory had never been abrogated, and which had been
made use of, as we have seen, less than three years before, with the
consent of all the European Powers. It was therefore contemplated to
utilize the Turks, under certain conditions and restrictions, to put an
end to the deadlock, and to prevent Egypt from becoming the prey to the
anarchy that appeared to be imminent. Whether the remedy would have
proved efficacious and satisfactory need not now be discussed; for the
French objected to any such arrangement, and, to please them, we
acquiesced in the objection. Then they proposed that the Anglo-French
fleets should make a demonstration before Alexandria, and in this we
readily concurred without any agreement as to subsequent action. The
plan was therefore put into execution (May 20th). But far from appeasing
the tumult, this step only aggravated it. The authority of the Khedive
was now completely effaced, and Arabi became dictator. The excitement of
the people increased, a serious riot occurred in Alexandria (June 11th),
and earthworks for the defence of the town began to be thrown up. It was
not easy to recede before this defiance. The British Admiral demanded
that the construction of fortifications should be stopped, and, later,
that they should be surrendered to him. The demand was resisted. It was
then deemed necessary to take them at any risk, and to destroy by force
the power of Arabi, who was proclaimed a rebel against his Prince.[404]
And now a strange event occurred. The French, though they succeeded in
inducing our Government to defer to their wishes, were not bound to us
in any way. Having gone just far enough to ensure an armed intervention,
they refused to take their share in it, and, when hostilities were
imminent, their fleet sailed away from the scene where they must
commence.
-----
Footnote 404:
The precise date, says a writer of the day, on which the Khedive’s
troops became rebels could be no more accurately ascertained than that
of the discovery that the “military tyranny” imposed by Arabi,
received the cordial sympathy and support of nearly every class
throughout Egypt (_Annual Register_, 1882, i. 369). It was not until
the 16th of July, after the war began, that the Khedive issued an
order dismissing Arabi from his post as Minister of War (_Military
History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt_, p. 16; prepared in the
Intelligence Branch of the War Office, by Colonel J. F. Maurice, Royal
Artillery). As we have frequently drawn from this work, in future it
will be referred to as “Maurice, _Official Account_.”
-----
The bombardment of the earthworks followed on the 11th of July, and it
is needless to say that our navy soon reduced the enemy’s guns to
silence, and drove him out of Alexandria. Arabi’s troops having retired,
blue-jackets and marines were landed to restore order in the town.
Meanwhile a force, drawn from Malta and Gibraltar, had been concentrated
at Cyprus, and was commanded by Major-General Sir Archibald Alison,
Bart., K.C.B., who arrived in the island, July 14th. These troops were
speedily moved therefrom, and, reaching Alexandria on the 17th, they
took up a line fronting the Egyptian army at Kafr-ed-Dauer, that lay a
few miles south of the coast covering the road to Cairo.[405]
-----
Footnote 405:
See Maps No. 9, p. 379, and No. 8, p. 360. Some future historian may
perhaps consider what the result would have been if the fleet had been
provided with a land force when the war was begun by the bombardment
of the 11th, and whether the revolt against foreign interference could
have been strangled in Alexandria, before it grew and required a
regular invasion to suppress it. Into these matters we do not propose
to enter; it is sufficient to say that no means were prepared to take
military advantage of the peculiar nature of the communications which
join Alexandria with the rest of the country, and that Arabi’s troops
got away unhurt.
-----
Preparations were now actively pushed forward to follow up the first
blow struck by the British fleet for the purpose of restoring the
authority of the Khedive. A vote of credit was agreed to in Parliament,
troops were ordered to be got ready to proceed to the seat of war, and a
portion of the reserves were called up to serve during the emergency
(July 25th). The French also at last plainly expressed their intentions,
by declining definitely to take part in the expedition which had now to
be undertaken. The decision was made on the 29th of July in their
Chambers, by a majority of 416 against 75 votes. Thus Great Britain was
obliged to act alone, and if this was the result, it may seem to be a
pity that she had not been allowed to have a free hand from the
beginning. Be this as it may, she gained the advantage of being at least
unfettered in the military operations that followed, and hence the
dangers and inconvenience of a joint occupation were happily avoided.
As early as the 3rd of July, General Sir Garnet Wolseley, G.C.B.,
appointed to take command of the expedition in case hostilities were
undertaken, confidentially traced the plan of operations to be pursued.
Soon the field army was organized, among which a Guards Brigade was
included; and on the 30th of July, the first troops, the 1st Scots
Guards (Colonel Knox), left England on board the _Orient_.[406] The
other two Battalions of this Brigade, the 2nd Grenadiers (Colonel P.
Smith), and the 2nd Coldstream (Colonel G. Wigram), being at Cork and
Dublin respectively, left these stations for the seat of war as soon as
they received drafts from London to fit them to take the field. For this
purpose, the 2nd Battalion obtained from the 1st Coldstream, one
Colour-sergeant, 9 sergeants, and 204 rank and file (28th); and on the
1st of August, having proceeded to Kingstown from Richmond Barracks,
Dublin, they embarked, about 750 strong, on board the _Iberia_, and
started for Alexandria. They reached their destination on the 13th, and
moved immediately to Ramleh, where the Brigade was collecting under the
orders of Major-General H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, K.G.[407]
The following Officers formed part of the Battalion:—
_Commanding the 2nd Battalion._—Colonel G. Wigram.
_Mounted Majors._—Colonels A. Lambton; F. C. Manningham-Buller.
_Dismounted Majors and Captains._—Lieut.-Colonels J. B. Sterling;
Viscount de Vesci; R. S. Hall; W. F. Ramsden; Hon. E. Acheson; R. W.
Follett; Hon. E. Boscawen.
_Lieutenants._—Captains R. Pole-Carew; J. G. Montgomery; F. C. Manley;
L. D. Mackinnon: Lieutenants Hon. E. Dawney; Hon. H. Monck; J. R.
Gladstone; D. F. R. Dawson; G. V. Boyle; W. O. Corbet (in command of
Regimental transport); G. P. Bouverie; Hon. A. Fortescue; P. A.
Lovell (Signalling Officer); D. J. Hamilton; Hon. Alan Charteris;
and H. G. Shute; also H. Somers-Cocks (who left Portsmouth for
Egypt, August 16).
_Adjutant._—Lieutenant Hon. A. Henniker-Major.
_Quartermaster._—W. Webster.
_Medical Officers._—Surgeon-Major G. Perry; Surgeon J. Whipple, M.D.
-----
Footnote 406:
Lieut.-General Willis and Major-General H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught,
with their Staffs, were on board the _Orient_.
Footnote 407:
Captain Ivor Herbert, Grenadier Guards, was appointed Brigade Major;
Major R. Lane, Rifle Brigade, Aide-de-camp to His Royal Highness.
-----
The following Officers, also belonging to the Regiment, served upon the
Staff:—
Lieut.-Colonel Lord William Seymour, attached to the British Admiral.
Captain Pole-Carew, Orderly Officer to H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught.
Lieutenant A. Codrington, Aide-de-camp to Lieut.-General Willis,
commanding the First Division.
Before this date, Sir A. Alison had been covering the concentration of
the army at Alexandria, and, by means of strong reconnaissances, he
endeavoured to make the enemy believe that the invaders meant to attack
him from the north. But this was not the intention of Sir G. Wolseley,
whose object was to seize the Maritime Canal, and, basing himself upon
Ismailia, to advance thence to the capital of Egypt. In this manner, the
main water-way between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea would be
secured from any attempt which Arabi might make upon it, and the
invading army would obtain the best route into the interior. The route,
it is true, was far from being a good one, for it lay in a desert of
deep sand; but none of the communications of the country, other than by
rail or canal, are good, and, in fact, roads, as we understand them, may
be said to have no existence. The one selected, however, besides the
strategical advantage it offered, of enabling an army to turn the Delta,
and to proceed by the shortest way to Cairo, had along its course a
fresh-water canal, where drinking water was to be obtained, and a
railway; and both of these served as easy lines of supply. Arabi,
indeed, had done his best to render these communications useless, but he
could only obstruct them temporarily; and, though he thereby impeded our
advance, he was not able to arrest it.
The British Commander had from the beginning believed that the enemy
would make a stand at Tel el-Kebir, some thirty miles from Ismailia, on
the road to Cairo; and if this were to prove to be correct, he
determined to deliver a crushing and effective blow there, and so bring
the campaign to a speedy and prompt conclusion. We shall see that he was
entirely right in the opinion he had formed, and successful in carrying
out his plan. To ensure this success, it was necessary to push advanced
troops, of sufficient strength, from Ismailia to a point within striking
distance of Arabi’s position, behind which the water and rail
communications could be restored, and where the main army could be
concentrated for the final battle.
The forces massing at Alexandria from the middle of July came, as we
know, from the Mediterranean stations, and from the United Kingdom; but
troops, native and British, also were despatched to the seat of war from
India; and these, beginning to arrive on the 20th of August, landed at
Suez, and, later, at Ismailia. The whole formed an Army-Corps, under the
command of General Sir G. Wolseley (who landed in Egypt on August 15th),
and was made up of a cavalry division, two infantry divisions, corps
troops, and an Indian contingent. Each division was formed of two
brigades and divisional troops.
The Cavalry Division, 23 squadrons, mounted infantry, and 6 guns, under
Major-General Drury-Low: the 1st Brigade (Brigadier-General Sir Baker
Russell) contained, among others, three squadrons of Household cavalry,
under Colonel Ewart, 2nd Life Guards;[408] the 2nd Brigade
(Brigadier-General Wilkinson), Indian cavalry. The First Division, 8
battalions, 2 squadrons, and 12 guns, under Lieut.-General Willis: 1st
Brigade (three Guards Battalions), Major-General H.R.H. the Duke of
Connaught; 2nd Brigade (4 Battalions), Major-General Graham, V.C. The
Second Division, 9 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 12 guns, under
Lieut.-General Sir E. Hamley: 1st Brigade (4 battalions), Major-General
Sir A. Alison; 2nd Brigade (4 battalions), Major-General Sir E. Wood,
V.C. The Corps troops contained one battery of Royal Horse Artillery,
and three batteries of Field Artillery, 24 guns. The Indian contingent,
under Major-General Sir H. Macpherson, V.C., 4 battalions (of which 2
were native), 1 company Beluchis, 6 guns (mountain battery). Total
force, including a reserve at Aden of 2 native battalions, not brought
into the field, amounted to 23 battalions, 27 squadrons, and 60 guns,
besides Engineers, Marines, Marine Artillery, siege trains, etc.; or to
1180 Officers, and 28,300 men.[409]
-----
Footnote 408:
One squadron from each Regiment of Household Cavalry.
Footnote 409:
Appendix No. XIV. contains the order of battle.
-----
Although all this army had not landed, yet a sufficient force had been
collected to seize the Suez Canal, and to begin the real business of the
campaign. Ample preparations had already been made by the Navy for this
operation. The final details having been settled, a simultaneous landing
was effected by blue-jackets and marines at all the important places
from Port Said to Suez; and the water-way was cleared from end to end by
4 a.m. on the morning of the 20th of August.[410] Meanwhile, those
portions of the Cavalry and First Divisions that were at Alexandria were
embarked on board ship, while those of the Second Division were left
behind to protect the town, and to keep up the delusion that Egypt was
to be invaded from the north. In order to give the greater currency to
this idea, it was further given out that the troops on board ship were
destined to make an attack on Abukir. The 2nd Coldstream, which since
their arrival at Ramleh had been facing south towards Kafr-ed-Dauer,
re-embarked on the _Iberia_ on the 18th of August, and the whole fleet,
consisting of 8 ironclads and 17 transports, left in the direction of
Abukir at noon on the 19th, and approached Port Said next day, in the
early morning. As soon as possible the ships entered the canal, and,
piloted by Officers of the Royal Navy, were concentrated at Ismailia.
They grounded occasionally as they steamed through the difficult
passage, and delayed the procession; but these accidents did not
materially check the movement, which was not confined merely to the
fleet that sailed from Alexandria, but included also transports,
conveying troops direct to the seat of war, from England by Port Said,
and from India by Suez. General Graham, having landed with a small force
of infantry on the evening of the 20th, pushed forward to Nefisha early
next day; and the Guards Brigade, arriving at their destination late on
the 21st, disembarked on the 22nd. For two days they were busily engaged
in fatigue duties at Ismailia, during which time the concentration of
troops continued with unabated energy, so that on the evening of the
23rd about 9000 men were on shore.[411]
-----
Footnote 410:
Three ships, one French and two English, delayed the operation for a
few hours.
Footnote 411:
Maurice, _Official Account_ , p. 36. See Map No. 8, p. 360.
-----
The invaders were dependent for drinking water upon the fresh-water
canal previously mentioned, that runs from the Nile near Cairo to
Ismailia; and now a fear seized the military authorities that Arabi
might be able to destroy its banks, and stop the greater portion of our
supply, not only at Nefisha and Ismailia, but also as far as Suez. It
was therefore determined to send forward a small force on the 24th,
under General Graham, to occupy El-Magfar, where the danger was most to
be apprehended, and to prevent the occurrence of any such calamity. The
force (1 battalion, 3 squadrons, and 2 guns) was not a large one; but it
met with no resistance, and soon accomplished its object, not, however,
without causing the enemy to show that he was concentrating a formidable
body of men in a position further up the canal, at Tel el-Makhuta. It
was evident that the British advanced detachment, if attacked with
energy, might be unable to hold its own, and be obliged to fall back;
but it was also clear that an initial advantage could be gained if we
could bring up a sufficient force to cause the Egyptians to evacuate the
ground they were engaged in taking up. Accordingly Sir G. Wolseley, who
was present, sent back immediately to direct that the Guards Brigade at
Ismailia and a battalion of infantry at Nefisha should move to the front
without delay.
Meanwhile, the advanced troops became engaged, and a very unequal fight,
as far as the numbers of the combatants were concerned, took place under
the orders of General Willis. But the large Egyptian forces showed no
disposition to close with the small body opposed to them, and the latter
maintained their position until reinforcements, consisting of all the
three arms, arrived to their support. Just before sundown the Guards
Brigade appeared on the scene, the Coldstream leading; the Battalion
then coming into the advanced line, under shell fire which happily was
not effective, occupied an extended line of outposts during the night.
The day had been exceedingly hot and oppressive, and the operations as
well as the want of water had greatly exhausted the men, both those who
fought and those who marched to their support under a scorching sun and
through the burning sand.
“A scarcely less trying task had fallen to the lot of the Brigade of
Guards. A march over the two miles of heavy road between Ismailia and
Nefisha, difficult at any time, was, during the burning hours of the
midday sun of an exceptionally hot day, a very serious task indeed.
Throughout all the rest of the campaign, both before and after this,
troops were ordered to march in the cool hours of the early morning,
or of the late afternoon and evening. The sudden necessity for taking
advantage of the enemy’s stand at Tel el-Makhuta alone made this
severe task imperative. Even for troops in presence of the Egyptians,
the direst enemies all that day were the sun and the parching glare of
the desert sand. But at least they had the excitement of actual
fighting, and were able at all times to take advantage of any shade
that waggons and hillocks afforded, and they had not during those
hours of fierce heat the additional labour of plodding over sand,
burning to the feet and ankle deep. Man after man during the march was
knocked down by the severity of the strain, and by stroke of the sun.
All who were physically able pushed on with honest pride and steady
discipline, but it was not until 6.20 p.m. that the march was over,
and that H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught was able to bring up his Brigade
to the support of the troops engaged.”[412]
-----
Footnote 412:
Maurice, _Official Account_ , p. 49. One man of the Coldstream, struck
down by sun apoplexy, died at Nefisha next day (25th).
-----
N^o. 8.
[Illustration:
THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF
TEL EL-KEBIR
FROM THE
SUEZ CANAL TO ZAGAZIG
AND THE COUNTRY ROUND
SUAKIN
]
Mintern Bros. Photo lith. A.D. Innes & C^o. London.
At daybreak (25th), an advance was made by the First Division, General
Graham in front, followed by the Guards Brigade in support, and,
protecting the right flank, the King’s Royal Rifles and Marine Light
Infantry, who had just come up, in second line; the Cavalry, under
General Drury Low, on the extreme right front. Tel el-Makhuta was found
to be abandoned by the enemy; but the Cavalry, still pushing on, found
him at Mahsama, where, after a short struggle, they not only dislodged
him but captured his camp, seven Krupp guns, and a large quantity of
ammunition, stores, and provisions. Next day we took possession of
Kassassin, and it was occupied by General Graham, the Guards being left
at Tel el-Makhuta.
Meanwhile the disembarkation of men, horses, guns, and stores of all
sorts still continued at Ismailia. As the English advanced troops had
reached Kassassin,—within striking distance of Tel el-Kebir, where Arabi
was known to be entrenching, with the object of making a definite stand
against us,—it was now necessary to bring up all available forces for
the assault of his lines. General Sir E. Hamley was therefore ordered
round to Ismailia from Alexandria with the Second Division (except Sir
E. Wood’s brigade, which was directed to remain there for the defence of
the town and neighbourhood); so also was the Indian contingent moved up
from Suez. While the concentration was in progress, communications were
restored as rapidly as possible between the base and Kassassin. The line
of railway was repaired where it was torn up, and where embankments of
earth had been found to block it; and rolling stock brought out from
England was landed and placed upon it. The fresh-water canal also was
cleared by removing the dams, which had been constructed across it at
Makhuta and Magfar. The Guards Brigade remained at Makhuta until the 9th
of September, busily engaged in digging away the obstructions that
impeded the traffic on the railway and on the canal at these two points,
and partly in throwing up redoubts to strengthen the lines of
communications. It was a laborious work;—
“for the skilful dam-makers ... had so wattled in reeds, telegraph
wires, and other binding materials into the mass of the earthworks,
that our men, standing in the muddy canal without any convenient
foothold, had the greatest difficulty in removing the obstacles.”[413]
-----
Footnote 413:
Maurice, _Official Account_ , p. 55.
-----
Supplies also ran short, on account of the impossibility of conveying
them across the deep sand, through which lay the only road to the front,
until the railway or canal could be used.
“But the most trying circumstance which the rapid movement had
entailed was the absence of tents and camp equipage. These were pushed
on by rail and canal as rapidly as the condition of both permitted,
but for some days the necessity of depending for chance shade upon the
shelter of the trees and villages under that glaring sun called for
much endurance on the part of the troops so employed. It was the price
paid for the rapid successes of the 24th and 25th. The tents reached
the troops at Tel el-Makhuta on the 28th. The valises of the men
reached them on the following day.”[414]
-----
Footnote 414:
_Ibid._ , p. 57.
-----
Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties to be overcome, the scorching
heat, and the shadeless glare, the work was well and expeditiously
performed. The following communication from Colonel Drake, Commanding
Royal Engineer of the First Division, refers to what the Brigade did at
this period of the campaign:—[415]
_Tel el-Makhuta_, August 30, 1882. I wish to bring to the notice of
the Lieutenant-General Commanding, the excellent work which has been
done by the Brigade of Guards on the important work, of opening the
communications on the railway and canal. Engineering work, always
fatiguing to troops fully employed on military duties, has been
especially harassing in this climate; but in consequence of the great
interest shown in the work by the Guards Officers in charge of
parties, it has been executed by the men cheerfully and well, and it
is my opinion, that had this spirit not been shown by Officers and
men, the progress of the army must have been for several days delayed.
-----
Footnote 415:
An extract of a report upon the signalling performed in Egypt by the
Coldstream is reproduced in Appendix No. XIV.
-----
Once, on the 28th of August, this labour was interrupted for a brief
space. On that day the enemy attempted to make an attack on Kassassin,
which, owing to the fact that it was commanded by hills in his
possession, was not a strong military position. Having made a
demonstration in the morning, which resulted only in a distant artillery
fire of little value, Arabi ordered a more vigorous attack upon General
Graham in the afternoon, and this produced some fighting, and a charge
conducted in moonlight by the three squadrons of the Household Cavalry.
The Egyptians then retired, and the action came to an end; but as soon
as it was perceived that the enemy was endeavouring to recapture
Kassassin, the Guards Brigade were hurried forward from Makhuta to the
threatened point, and were placed in reserve. The three Battalions did
not return to their quarters until midnight.
On the 7th of September, communications were cleared, a railway service
was established, the main bulk of the supplies and stores—of which large
quantities had already been despatched to the front—were ready to be
sent forward, and the remaining troops, hitherto kept back at Ismailia,
were awaiting to be moved to Kassassin. Orders to concentrate the army
there were given, when Arabi made one more attempt to defeat the
advanced troops opposed to him at that place, before the rest came into
position (September 9th). His previous efforts had failed; and it was
scarcely likely that, having effected so little before—although in
contact with a small portion of the British forces only—he would now be
able to achieve a success at this late stage of the war. The attack was
nevertheless a formidable one in point of numbers, and almost the whole
of the hostile forces, supported by a powerful artillery, were employed
in it. But it was easily repulsed, and the enemy was pursued towards Tel
el-Kebir, where he ran for shelter.[416] During the action, the Guards
Brigade were once more moved forward from Makhuta to remain in reserve
should their services be required; but they were not brought into
action. It seems probable that, had the advance of the First and Cavalry
Divisions, who were then present, been continued, Arabi would then and
there have been driven out of his entrenched position. The pursuit,
however, was not pressed home. Instead of returning to their former
camp, the Guards remained for the next few days on the ground they
occupied on the evening of the 9th.
-----
Footnote 416:
Our losses amounted to 3 killed and 77 wounded.
-----
The Egyptian army could scarcely be considered a very formidable foe.
The Generals had shown little military capacity, the native Officers no
enterprise or power of leadership, and the men in consequence had
displayed but a small amount of valour. Drawn principally from the
fellaheen, or the peasantry of the country, the ranks of the forces
opposed to us were filled with men who had no desire to excel in the
profession of arms; and during the first combats of the campaign we
gained ample proof of their inefficiency in the field.[417] As regards
their numbers, we are informed that at the date of the bombardment (July
11th), the Egyptian army consisted in all of about 9000 men, 288 field
guns, and only 750 horses. Of these, 5000 were in Alexandria, the rest
being dispersed over the country. The reserves were called in
afterwards, and the 9000 expanded to 60,000, by the 20th of August; when
15,000 were before Alexandria, 12,000 at Tel el-Kebir, 11,000 at Cairo,
and 22,000 were distributed in remote garrisons unmolested by the
invaders; besides this, there were 6000 Beduin Arabs, half at Tel
el-Kebir and the remainder before Alexandria. Again, later, 40,000 raw
recruits without training were enlisted, and the total of the army
reached the high figure of 100,000 men, not counting the Beduins. For
all these men, it appears, arms were available, and 11,000 untrained
draft horses were procured.[418] These vast numbers of undisciplined and
unorganized men could do little to serve Arabi’s cause, and they seem to
have been rather a source of weakness to him. Unable to fight, they were
liable to panic, and their presence was more calculated to unsteady the
few soldiers who alone possessed some knowledge of their duties than to
augment the strength of the army.
-----
Footnote 417:
Arabi’s force contained a few battalions of Sudanese, or black troops;
the latter were his best soldiers, and fought well.
Footnote 418:
Maurice, _Official Account_ , p. 40, etc.
-----
By the evening of the 12th of September, the whole available British
forces were at Kassassin, some eight miles from Tel el-Kebir, and
numbered 634 Officers, and 16,767 Non-commissioned officers and men, 61
guns, and 6 gatlings. Previous to this date, several reconnaissances had
been undertaken towards the enemy’s entrenched position to examine his
works, and to observe his strength, disposition, and habits. The
knowledge so gained could only confirm the poor opinion in which the
enemy deserved to be held. His lines were continuous, stretching from
the canal for a distance of some 6000 yards; but they were not
apparently protected by any advanced works, nor provided with efficient
inner entrenchments. They seemed to present little difficulty to
storming parties, nor were any formidable obstacles visible.[419] The
left (north) flank, moreover, was entirely open and unguarded; and,
lastly, no outposts secured the front during the night. Thus feebly did
Arabi venture to oppose the army of one of the great Powers of Europe;
and if he was unable to bring civilized science to his aid, so also were
his troops incapable of displaying the wild heroism that belongs to the
barbarian. In short, he invited a night attack either on his left flank
or in front; with the certainty that, if the invaders could reach unseen
the position he endeavoured to fortify, they could turn it or penetrate
it, before he was ready to meet them; and the whole of his defences
would be rendered useless. This would bring about his complete defeat,
and the dispersal of his raw levies, who eagerly watched for an early
opportunity to desert and fly to their homes.
-----
Footnote 419:
The lines were afterwards found to consist of a parapet from 3 to 5½
feet high, with a ditch in front, about 4 feet deep; they were
stronger in the south, near the canal, than on the north, where, in
fact, they died away, as it were, into nothing in the desert.
-----
It is, however, one thing to perceive after the event, what ought to be
done, but quite another thing to determine beforehand, the best line of
action, and to ensure a result as successful and decisive as the assault
on Tel el-Kebir proved to be. The night march across the desert was by
no means an easy operation. It entailed the bringing up the whole army
in battle array, through the dark, close to a given position at a given
time. Careful arrangements to prevent confusion had to be therefore made
on the part of the leaders, from the Commander-in-chief downwards; and
attention and rigid discipline were more than ever required on the part
of the men who were thus led to the assault. It is needless to say that
all ranks vied with one another in discharging correctly the important
functions that every man had to perform during that night; and in this
manner was the difficult operation carried through without hitch, and
even without temporary delay. It should be added here, that fortune also
favoured us in no small degree. Arabi had, in fact, constructed one, and
only one, advanced work in front of his lines of defence; but it had not
been discovered during our reconnaissances, and we were ignorant of its
existence. By good luck that work was avoided by our columns, as they
went forward in the dark to the attack. Thus we managed to cross the
desert unperceived by so dangerous a tell-tale of our movement, and
arrived at dawn before the hostile lines, close enough to storm them
before the Egyptians even knew that we were in their vicinity.
A conspicuous point in the lines had been selected upon which to direct
the march of the Second (Hamley’s) Division; Sir A. Alison’s Highlanders
in front, followed by a brigade formed of the two Divisional battalions
of the infantry divisions, under Lieut.-Colonel Ashburnham, C.B., King’s
Royal Rifle Corps. The First Division was on Sir E. Hamley’s right, with
an interval of 1200 yards; General Graham’s brigade in front, supported
by the Guards 1000 yards in rear. Forty-two guns were placed between the
two divisions, in line with the Guards Brigade. The Cavalry Division
with 12 guns Royal Horse Artillery were on the extreme right. The Indian
contingent and the Mountain battery, on the south of the canal, with
orders to move off an hour after the rest of the army.
The troops began to strike their tents when dusk set in, and marched to
their various rendezvous not without difficulty. It was, of course,
imperative that every corps should reach its starting-point in proper
order, and there was naturally some moving backwards and forwards in the
dark before the masses were correctly formed and aligned. The Brigade
took post in their usual formation, the Coldstream on the left, and each
Battalion was in columns of half battalions. Everything was ready at 11
p.m.; the men then lay down till 1.30 a.m. of the 13th of September,
when they arose in silence, and commenced the advance. We had the
advantage of meeting no obstacles in the way; the trackless gravelly
soil everywhere afforded an easy passage, and, guided by the stars
alone, the army maintained the direction of their march.
At night, however, men are always somewhat under the influence of a
vague and undefined feeling. The absence of sound, the inability to see
for more than a few feet, the sense of isolation which every group
experiences, the strange surroundings, the uncertainty of the future,
the idea that some untoward event may happen,—all contribute to produce
a suppressed excitement almost akin to nervousness.[420] The principal
danger lay in the fact that should the centre halt, the wings would
continue to move, and so wheel inwards, until one flank faced the other.
This actually occurred in the Highland Brigade; but the mishap went no
further, and was very speedily rectified by the vigilance, discipline,
and intelligence of all ranks. The First Division moved more slowly than
the Second, and its leading brigade appears to have executed some
changes of formation during the night; the Guards, following in support,
made no change in this respect, but marched in the order in which they
had originally started. Just before reaching the enemy’s position, the
British army was in an irregular _echelon_; the left was forward and
nearest to the enemy, and the right was about 800 yards back.
-----
Footnote 420:
“It is impossible adequately to convey an impression of the absolute
silence which prevailed, and of the entire absence of any indication
of the existence of a moving army at only a few yards from each of the
columns” (Maurice, _Official Account_ , p. 82).
-----
The Egyptians say their forces at Tel el-Kebir amounted to 20,000 men
and 75 guns; but there seems reason to believe that they have
under-estimated their numerical strength, and that they had from 25,000
to 30,000 men present.[421]
-----
Footnote 421:
Maurice, _Official Account_ , p. 92. If there is no exaggeration in
the total numbers which, we are told, the rebel government collected
after the bombardment of the 11th of July, and in the number of guns
which were at their disposal at that date, it would appear likely that
at least 30,000 men instead of 20,000 men must have been present at
Tel el-Kebir; and it is somewhat a surprise to find that Arabi had
only so small a force of artillery defending his lines, as 75 guns,
when as many as 288 were apparently available at his orders.
-----
As the enemy had no outposts to cover his front; and as we had been
fortunate enough to pass by the only advanced work he had constructed,
without coming in contact with it,—though our left was at one time
unpleasantly close to it,—he had no sort of warning that our whole army
was approaching his defensive position, and would assault it at
daybreak. He was completely surprised. At 5 a.m., when the first gleam
of light was beginning to appear, the Highlanders were close to Tel
el-Kebir, and, dashing forward, they carried, after a brief but sharp
struggle, the defensive lines in which Arabi apparently had placed so
much confidence. While this fight was proceeding, General Graham’s
brigade hurried up, and penetrated the Egyptian lines, where they
presented a smaller obstacle than did those which faced the Second
Division. The battle lasted scarcely half an hour. By the end of that
time, the enemy was entirely overpowered, and his forces were
annihilated and completely dispersed. The Guards followed, and got into
the works as soon as possible, but the short action was then practically
at an end.
“The first of the enemy’s shells landed in the middle of some
vedettes, about eighty yards to our left front; nearly all the rest
fell about one hundred yards in rear of us. As we advanced the
Egyptians did not seem to alter their elevation. The bullets were
falling all around us; but firing ceased at about 6 a.m., except our
guns blazing at the flying Arabs.”[422]
-----
Footnote 422:
Captain Shute (Coldstream Guards), _Diary_ .
-----
The cavalry was ordered immediately to pursue the enemy to Cairo, the
infantry advancing into and occupying the Egyptian camp and the bridge
at Tel el-Kebir. The former pushed boldly on to a suburb of the capital,
whence Lieut.-Colonel Herbert Stewart went forward with a small force of
fifty men, and secured the capitulation of the town and the surrender of
Arabi (September 14th). Egypt now lay at the mercy of the British
army.[423]
-----
Footnote 423:
See Appendix No. XIV., giving Her Majesty’s message to the British
army, and Sir G. Wolseley’s General Orders, issued after the battle of
Tel el-Kebir.
-----
The losses of Arabi’s forces at the battle of the 13th of September can
scarcely be reckoned by the killed and wounded; for such was the extent
of the disaster he experienced, that he had no further troops at the end
of the action. Many fled to their homes, many rushed wildly onwards
panic-stricken; all idea of further resistance had come to an end; every
man only thought how he could best make his submission, and welcome the
conquerors with demonstrations of joy. The Egyptian casualties are
reckoned at 2500, and 58 of their guns were captured. The British lost 9
Officers and 48 men killed, 27 Officers and 355 men wounded, and 30
missing, total 469. Of these the Highlanders lost 45 killed, 180
wounded, and 6 missing; General Graham’s brigade 9 killed, 119 wounded,
and 24 missing; the Guards Brigade 1 man killed, and 2 Officers and 20
men wounded; in the Coldstream, 1 Officer (Lieut.-Colonel J. B.
Sterling), and 7 men were wounded,—of the latter, one man subsequently
died of his wounds.[424]
-----
Footnote 424:
Lieut.-Colonel Balfour, Grenadier Guards, reckoned among the wounded,
died of his wounds; as did also two Officers of the Highland Brigade.
-----
The victorious forces pushed on towards Cairo after the battle, and
secured all the railway centres which communicated with the Egyptian
garrisons, still held by the enemy. There was little trouble in causing
these garrisons to submit, and by the 24th the whole country was
pacified and disarmed. General Willis, with his 2nd Brigade and
Divisional infantry, remained at Tel el-Kebir for a short time longer,
while Sir G. Wolseley, with the Duke of Connaught, and a company of the
Scots Guards as escort, went by train, on the afternoon of the 14th, to
the capital, followed by the rest of the Scots Guards, by the
Coldstream, and by the Grenadier Guards. Owing to obstructions on the
line, the Commander-in-chief did not reach his destination until the
morning of the 15th; and the Coldstream, starting the same day, reached
Cairo that afternoon. The Battalion were then quartered in the Abdin
barracks.
The rebellion had now been crushed, and the Khedive’s authority having
been completely restored, Tewfik entered his capital in state on the
25th, and resumed his place in the government of the country. British
troops, and among them the Guards, lined the streets, which were gaily
decked with triumphal arches and inscriptions of welcome. If it is
allowable to compare a small event with a great one, the scene was in a
very minor degree (in principle, at least), not wholly unlike that which
attended the return of the Bourbons to Paris in 1815. The “Usurper” in
this case was not redoubtable, nor had he scourged Europe as had his
proto-type; but he had interfered with the legal gains of European
bondholders, and withstood the wishes and designs of the Western
nations. The people, also, in the two cases, not having much will of
their own, like many others in a similar position, were influenced by
one very simple and burning desire—to give their hearty applause to the
strongest party.
A draft from England left for the Battalion, under Lieut.-Colonel F.
Graves-Sawle and Lieutenant E. Wigram, September 11th; but they were too
late to take part in any of the hostilities that marked the campaign,
and they went no further than Malta.
There is little more to record. The six weeks spent in Cairo passed
agreeably enough, and many eagerly availed themselves of the opportunity
to see the sights and the remains of an ancient civilization that makes
Egypt one of the most interesting countries in the world. Nor was a
race-meeting forgotten, held on the 28th of September, even though other
national sports and pastimes had to be discarded on account of the heat.
A serious accident, that occurred the same day at the railway-station of
Cairo, may also be mentioned. An accidental explosion took place in a
waggon laden with ammunition, near the platform, and, as the flames
could not be got under, the station buildings were soon destroyed, and
much rolling stock and a considerable amount of stores were burnt.
Troops were at once sent to the spot, and amongst them the 2nd
Coldstream assisted to clear away the _débris_, and guard the place;
several smaller explosions continued even during the night.
On the 30th of September a review was held before the Khedive, and the
spectacle was made as imposing as possible to impress the natives, not
only by the appearance of English troops, but also by the presence of
the Indian contingent—Mussulmans like themselves—in the service of Her
Majesty. Two days later, the Khedive gave a garden party at the Gezireh
palace, to which all Officers were invited in “full dress,” the latter
being defined for the occasion, “red serges, swords, and forage caps.”
Lastly, there was the famous procession of the “Sacred Carpet,” carried
through Cairo on its way to Mecca, and escorted by British troops—an
incident which gave rise to some comment in England.
“I had a good deal of difficulty,” writes Captain Shute in his diary,
“to find the camel with the carpet, as it had gone another way to the
station so as to avoid the British escort. Tremendous procession of
Arabs with banners; behind the camel with the carpet came several more
camels bearing pilgrims to Mecca, and their baggage.”
The health of the troops gave some cause for anxiety on account of fever
and other illnesses, which broke out among them; and, in consequence,
several Officers and men of the Battalion had to be sent home invalided.
But the sickness was not abnormally great, considering the fatigues and
the privations to which the men were subjected during the campaign; the
losses of the Battalion in this respect amounted to eighteen men, of
whom twelve died of fever.
Soon after the Carpet incident the war organization of the invading army
was broken up, and Sir A. Alison, being left in Cairo with a British
force, while the re-settlement of Egypt was being accomplished,
arrangements were made to send the remainder home to England, and the
Indian contingent to India. The Coldstream, leaving their quarters in
Cairo on the 31st of October by train for Alexandria, embarked there,
the next day, on board the _Batavia_, and, reaching Portsmouth on the
16th, proceeded thence to Chelsea barracks.
It only remains to record that, in recognition of the services of the
army in Egypt in 1882, Her Majesty was graciously pleased to augment the
honourable distinctions upon the Colours of the regiments engaged in the
campaign by the words “Egypt, 1882,” and “Tel el-Kebir.”
Thus was the war in Egypt conducted, and thus did the British army
conquer Arabi Pasha, and subject the country once more to the rule of
Tewfik. A new period now commenced, when Egypt was placed under the
protection of England—a temporary protection only, as the Foreign
Secretary of the day eagerly announced,—who assumed the responsibility
of forming a pure administration out of discordant elements, and of
educating the people to respect the system which was introduced for
their benefit. The success that has attended our efforts, under
difficult circumstances, is an interesting subject; so also is the
resentment which the French pretend to feel—because we are obliged to
stay in a land we conquered and saved from what might have been anarchy,
when they would not move themselves to put an end to the trouble. But
the consideration of these matters does not enter into the scope of this
volume, as the Coldstream was not employed in the work of Egyptian
reconstruction. A question, closely connected with our intervention,
did, however, still remain to be settled, and it very speedily involved
us in further military operations, in which the Regiment took its share.
We must therefore devote the next two chapters to the causes and conduct
of this war.
CHAPTER XVI.
FIRST PART OF THE WAR IN THE SUDAN, 1884-85—EXPEDITION
UP THE NILE.
General description of the possessions of the Khedive in 1882—Rebellion
in the Sudan; rapid rise of the Mahdi—Policy of the British
Government—General Gordon sent to Khartum; he is cut off and
besieged there—General Lord Wolseley goes to Egypt—Formation of a
Camel Corps, of which the Guards compose a Regiment—Problem how to
effect the rescue of Gordon—The Nile route selected—Advance to
Korti—News from General Gordon—Two columns advance from Korti: one
across the Bayuda Desert, the other up the river—Battles of Abu Klea
and Abu Kru—The Nile reached near Metemmeh—Sir C. Wilson’s effort to
proceed to Khartum—Death of General Gordon—Change of plan entailed
by this event—Battle of Kirbekan—Retrograde movement of both
columns—Troops placed in summer quarters.
Egypt proper is generally a long and narrow strip of land formed by the
valley of the Nile.[425] Outside the influence of that river, there is
nothing but desert, and it is due to the fact that the stream branches
out into a Delta at Cairo, that there is any breadth at all in the
country. This great water artery receives no affluents for more than
1500 miles from its mouth—the Atbara River, meeting it above Berber,
being the last tributary that joins it,—and throughout a considerable
portion of its lower course, reckoned from the Nubian Desert northwards,
the people can only live by congregating close to its banks. A great
part of the soil, in fact, which is situated a few miles from the Nile
or from the canals that are fed by it, constructed for purposes of
irrigation, is a mere barren waste, covered by sand, and unfit for
habitation. To the south of the Nubian Desert there is the fertile
province of Dongola, and, separated from it by another desert, a rich
country, which, owning Khartum as its chief town, is watered by the
tributaries of the great river that flow down from the Abyssinian
mountains. This large region, usually called the Sudan,—which includes
the seaboard from Suakin to Massowa, and extends to about the line of
latitude eleven degrees north,—was for many a century overrun by wild
tribes of nomad Arabs, until 1820, when the Egyptians, having begun then
to invade it, gradually brought it under their rule. Later, the
territories lying still further to the south, were opened up to the
energy of the Khedives; and at the time of the war in 1882, Tewfik’s
sway, outside Egypt proper, stretched to the great water reservoirs in
the heart of the African continent close to the equator, where the Nile
takes its rise. In the government of these enormous dominions the
Khedives had been assisted by more than one Englishman, who succeeded in
partially checking the evils of the slave-trade that prevailed among the
natives, and in introducing some form of civilization in their midst. By
far the most celebrated of these administrators was Colonel, afterwards
Major-General, C. Gordon, C.B., whose illustrious name is now a
household word in England.
-----
Footnote 425:
Map No. 9, p. 379.
-----
In 1881, a rebellion broke out in the Sudan, and this calamity was
mainly brought about by two causes. In the first place, the Egyptians
misgoverned the country, and had been obliged to relax their hold upon
it, on account of the troubles that eventually involved them in war with
England. Their administration, always corrupt, became weak, and as a
matter of course the Arabs grew discontented with it. But, in the next
place, the people were deeply stirred by a tradition that fixed this
time—the completion of twelve centuries from the Hegira, November 12,
1882—as the moment when a great chief was to arise, to regenerate Islam,
and to restore the Mussulman world to its former power, glory, and
magnificence. Nor had the Sudanese to wait for the exact date fixed in
the prophecy; for a native of Dongola, named Muhammad Ahmad, proclaiming
himself to be the long-expected Mahdi, enrolled his followers, whom we
call Dervishes, headed a serious revolt, and preached a “Jehad,” or a
“Holy War,” against the authority of the Khedive. By October, 1882, when
the British were in possession of Egypt, the struggle had begun in
earnest, and the rebels had obtained some important advantages. To meet
the danger, 10,000 men of Arabi’s late army were despatched during the
winter to the south; and in March, 1883, General Hicks Pasha, a retired
British Officer who had served in India, reached Khartum to direct
military operations against the enemy. It is sad to relate that he was
poorly supported at Cairo; that, in endeavouring to drive the Mahdi from
his head-quarters at El-Obeid, he cut himself off from his
communications; and that his whole force was surrounded and entirely
destroyed. General Hicks and his Staff died with arms in their hands on
the field of battle, and none survived to tell the tale of their
misfortunes (October 7, 1883).[426] With this disaster, the bulk of the
Egyptian forces were annihilated; the dervishes acquired an immense
addition to their former strength, both material and moral: Khartum was
in danger, and there were only some 2000 men left to defend it.[427]
-----
Footnote 426:
Colonel Arthur Farquhar (late Coldstream Guards) accompanied this
ill-fated expedition, and perished in it. Some account of the good
services rendered by this Officer is given in Slatin Pasha’s recent
publication (_Fire and Sword in the Sudan, 1879-95_ , by Rudolf C.
Slatin Pasha, C.B.; translated by Major F. R. Wingate, C.B., D.S.O.,
R.A.; London, 1896; chap. viii.).
Footnote 427:
_History of the Sudan Campaign_ (compiled at the Intelligence
Department of the War Office, by Colonel Colvile, C.B., Grenadier
Guards), part i. p. 16 (London, 1889).
-----
Nor was this the only trouble, for the dervishes of the Eastern Sudan,
led by one Osman Digna, also raised the standard of revolt, and gained
several successes over the Egyptians in the autumn of 1883. In order to
save so important a port as Suakin from the ruin that seemed imminent, a
force of nearly 4000 men was despatched to oppose the rebels, under a
former British Officer, General Baker Pasha, who had rendered
distinguished service in the Turkish army during the war with Russia in
1877. But all his efforts were of no avail, for his troops also were
overwhelmed and destroyed, February 4, 1884.
These events showed how impossible it was for the Khedive to cope
single-handed with the Mahdi; so also did they put the British
Government in no small difficulty. Our intervention in Egypt had
weakened the military resources of the country, and had imposed
responsibilities upon us which had not been foreseen when we began
hostilities by the bombardment of the forts of Alexandria. We little
imagined then, that we should not only have to guard the frontiers from
the irruption of savage hordes of Arabs, but also be obliged to try to
save the Egyptian garrisons in the Sudan from the perils that menaced
them, and to prevent that slave-dealing region from relapsing into the
darkness and barbarism that oppressed it in the past. And yet little was
done. The revolt was not met at once, and it had time to grow into
formidable proportions. The power of the Mahdi increased with great
rapidity; the native tribes were unsupported, and had to submit to the
terror he inspired. It was then too late to act, unless we were prepared
to re-conquer the huge provinces which had already been devastated. It
is indeed a calamity that the first-fruits of the regeneration we
determined to effect in Egypt, should thus have been unfortunately
coupled with the abandonment of many of the Khedive’s troops to a
merciless foe, and with the obliteration of the work of civilization in
an immense tract of country, by the most cruel form of a hateful
tyranny.
It was determined to evacuate the Sudan; and General Gordon was
requested by the British Government to accomplish this difficult and
perilous mission. Accompanied by Lieut.-Colonel Donald Stewart, 11th
Hussars, he cheerfully accepted it, and reached Khartum unattended by
any force, February 18, 1884. He immediately placed the town in a state
of defence, infused new life and hopes into the panic-stricken garrison
and inhabitants, and took early measures to carry out his instructions.
But it was not long before he perceived the impossible nature of the
task that had been allotted to him. He had no soldiers available to
secure the withdrawal of the many for whose safety he was responsible,
and soon the Mahdi surrounded him, intercepted his supplies, and cut off
his communications with Egypt. In March, the enemy threatened Shendi.
The month following, he established himself in the vicinity of that
place. And towards the end of May, Berber fell. Gordon was thus shut out
from the rest of the world, and he was little more than a prisoner in
Khartum—besieged there, and fighting for his life and for those
entrusted to his charge. Retreat was impossible, and the end must
infallibly come, as soon as his powers of resistance were exhausted,
unless an expedition were sent to his relief.
Meanwhile Major-General Sir G. Graham and a British field force of some
5000 men had been landed in the neighbourhood of Suakin, to defend that
seaport and coast from the inroads of Osman Digna (February 28, 1884).
In less than a month, he had inflicted severe losses upon the followers
of that chieftain, and had pacified the district. But this was all; and
these successes bore no fruit. Graham was not ordered to advance in
force upon Berber to guard that important town and the communications
thereto with the Red Sea.[428] Instead of this, he was withdrawn from
Suakin on the 3rd of April, leaving only a small garrison behind him.
Hence, just at this critical moment, when it was obvious that the
nearest and the ordinary road to Khartum should have been secured and
made easily accessible by a light railway, the opportunity of
approaching General Gordon was neglected, and the means of enabling him
to accomplish his mission were denied him.[429] On General Graham’s
departure there was a pause for several months, during which no further
operations took place as far as we were concerned,[430] though the Arabs
continued to advance northwards; and, unopposed, they re-occupied their
former positions in the Eastern Sudan from which they had just been
expelled.
-----
Footnote 428:
A proposition had been made at this time to send 200 or 300 cavalry to
Berber, which probably they could have reached. But the General
Commanding in Egypt (Lieut.-General Sir F. Stephenson, K.C.B.) opposed
it, on the grounds that it was undesirable to fritter away our troops
in small detachments, that so weak a force in the Mahdi’s country and
unsupported there, could achieve no success, and must only add to the
numbers who had to be rescued from the Sudan.
Footnote 429:
The reader will presently see that a strong force was landed at Suakin
in the spring of 1885, to construct a railway to Berber, _when it was
too late_.
Footnote 430:
Except some battalions pushed to the frontier of Egypt to guard it
against invasion, that appeared to be threatening; also the first
preparations for laying a line of railway from Suakin to Berber, but
which was stopped at the end of August. Major-General A. Lyon
Fremantle (late Coldstream Guards) assumed command at Suakin at the
end of July.
-----
During this interval of inaction in the field, the British Cabinet
deliberated on the situation, and, having asked for advice, considered
the merits of the various schemes relating to the invasion of the Sudan
that were placed before them by the military authorities at home and on
the spot. As a result, they at length announced their determination in a
despatch, dated August 8th, when Khartum had been already beleaguered
and hidden from their view for many months. In this paper[431] they
expressed their opinion that “General Gordon, acting on his
instructions,” might still “secure the withdrawal from Khartum, either
by the employment of force or of pacific means, of the Egyptian
garrisons and of such of the inhabitants as may desire to leave;” they
announced their intention “to undertake operations for the relief of
General Gordon, should they become necessary, and to make certain
preparations in respect thereof;” and they further indicated their
resolution that the expedition—“whose general scope” was to enable
Government “to give directions at a very short notice for the despatch
of a brigade of troops of all arms to proceed to Dongola,”—was to
advance, “should the necessity arise,” along the valley of the Nile.
-----
Footnote 431:
Given in full in Colvile’s _History of the Sudan Campaign_ , part i.
p. 45. Hereafter referred to as “Colvile, _Official Account_ .”
-----
In order to produce an early moral effect upon the enemy, and to
facilitate a prompt advance into the Sudan, which every one knew was
imperative if Gordon was to be saved, Sir F. Stephenson, on the receipt
of this despatch, was anxious to send up troops without delay to
Dongola. But such a proceeding did not at once commend itself to
Government, and they still hesitated before venturing so far, even
though the movement could have been made with perfect safety. At the
same time, 400 boats, each suitable for the conveyance of 12 men and 100
rations per man up the Nile, were ordered in England on the 12th of
August, and a further number of 400 were also put in hand on the 22nd.
But it was not till a month later (September 20th) that the first
British battalion entered Dongola, and it was also only then decided (on
the 21st) that, “if necessary,” the expedition might proceed beyond that
place.[432]
-----
Footnote 432:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , part i. p. 53.
-----
Meantime, General Lord Wolseley, having been sent to Egypt to take
command, reached Cairo on the 9th of September, and two days later he
wrote home to request that a special Camel Corps might be immediately
placed at his disposal, in addition to the troops whom he proposed
should take part in the campaign. The new corps, 1200 strong, was
composed of detachments of 40 men, with one or two Officers, taken from
every Battalion of the Foot Guards (280 men), from the 16 Regiments of
Cavalry at home (640 men), and from two Battalions of the Rifle Brigade
(80 men); also 100 men from the three Regiments of Household Cavalry,
and a similar number from the Royal Marines. The corps was divided into
three sections, viz. the Guards (to which the Marines were eventually
attached), the Heavy, and the Light Camel regiments. The detachments
were quickly got together; they left England on the 26th of September,
and landed at Alexandria on the 7th of October.
The command of the Guards Camel regiment was assigned to Lieut.-Colonel
Hon. E. Boscawen, Coldstream Guards; the Adjutant being Lieutenant C.
Crutchley, Scots Guards; the Signalling Officer, Lieut.-Colonel Bonham,
Grenadier Guards; and the Medical Officer, Surgeon J. Magill, Coldstream
Guards. The following Officers, two from each Battalion, also formed
part of the corps:[433]—
Lieut.-Colonels C. Rowley and I. Herbert; Captain E. Crabbe; Lieutenants
Count Gleichen, D'Aguilar, and R. Wolridge-Gordon: Grenadier Guards.
Lieut.-Colonel F. A. Graves-Sawle; Captain Vesey Dawson; Lieutenants
Douglas Dawson, and Hon. H. Amherst: Coldstream Guards.
Lieut.-Colonels M. Willson, and Sir W. Gordon-Cumming, Bart.;
Lieutenants A. Drummond, and B. Baden-Powell: Scots Guards.
-----
Footnote 433:
The detachments furnished by the Coldstream amounted to: from the 1st
Battalion, three sergeants, two corporals, one drummer, and 38
privates; from the 2nd Battalion, two sergeants, three corporals, one
drummer, and 38 privates. Total, 92 of all ranks.
-----
The rest of the British troops required for field operations were drawn
from our force already in occupation of Egypt.[434] Of these, 3½
battalions of infantry, and one of Marines, one squadron, most of the
artillery, and a portion of the Royal Engineers were left in garrison at
Alexandria, Cairo, and Suakin. The remainder, 9 battalions, 3 squadrons
(of the 19th Hussars), the Mounted infantry, a Camel battery, and Royal
Engineers took part in the expedition, and were disposed along the Nile
to guard the communications, and to form the fighting force.[435] In
addition, the Egyptian army was also utilized, but all, except a Camel
battery which was pushed to the front later on, were left upon the lines
of communication, not further south than Hannek.
-----
Footnote 434:
Except one Battalion, which came from India, and some 390 Canadians
(called “Voyageurs”), under Lieut.-Colonel Denison, brought to Egypt
to help our men to pilot the boats up the Nile.
Footnote 435:
The numerical strength, together with the Camel corps, appears to have
been about 10,000 men and 6 guns, and eventually 6 additional guns,
belonging to the Egyptian army. Subsequently Dongolese troops fought
with us against the enemy.
-----
N^o. 9.
[Illustration:
SKETCH MAPS TO ILLUSTRATE
EGYPTIAN _and_ SUDAN
EXPEDITIONS
Mintern Bros. Photo-lith. A.D. Innes & C^o. London.
]
Khartum, inaccessible from the south, is cut off from all ordinary
communications with the north by large tracts of almost waterless
desert, that lie between the town and Egypt and the Red Sea. The
determination, therefore, to relieve Gordon entailed a military problem
of considerable difficulty, relating to the manner in which he should be
reached in time, by a sufficient number of troops and quantities of food
supplies, and thus be enabled to retreat from the Sudan together with
those he was pledged to save. This problem has been enunciated as
follows: How to “place a force of about 5000 fighting men at or near
Shendi, at the latest by the end of the year, and to carry with them,
not only supplies for themselves, but also for the inhabitants and
garrison of Khartum.”[436] Two proposals had been made to solve it:—
1. By taking the Nile route, and advancing to the neighbourhood of
Dongola, to continue either along the river by Abu Hamed, or else to
strike across the Bayuda Desert to Metemmeh, situated on the Nile
opposite Shendi. There were many difficulties attending this proposal.
The distance from Cairo to Shendi, or Metemmeh, is as much as 1527
miles, and the navigation of the river is greatly obstructed by
cataracts, so that frequent disembarkations of men and stores would be
necessary to surmount these obstacles. Hence much time, which was an
essential element in the problem, would be consumed. Between Cairo and
Dongola (1033 miles), and indeed for quite 100 miles further on, no
enemy was to be expected; but beyond this point it was uncertain where
he might be met. The desert road from Korti, some 100 miles above
Dongola, to Metemmeh, had the advantage of avoiding the loop of the Nile
that passes round Abu Hamed, and of thus saving a distance of more than
200 miles. But it was likely to be occupied by the enemy; a distance of
24 miles, in the face of the dervishes, would have to be traversed
without water from station to station; and even if the route were opened
up, it did not offer facilities for the transport of stores, which was a
far more serious difficulty to be overcome than the mere conveyance of
the troops. The desert, in short, was only suited to enable the British
Commander to take a short cut towards Khartum, and to make a dash
forward to Gordon’s relief, should his position become critical; and it
was in view of this consideration that he requested (September 9th) to
have a Camel corps allotted to him, as we have just seen. But under any
circumstances the expedition would have to proceed forward across many
obstacles, for more than 1100 miles from Cairo, before he could avail
himself of the services of that corps.
-----
Footnote 436:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , part i. p. 58. Shendi is about one
hundred miles north of Khartum.
-----
2. The other plan was to base the army of relief at Suakin, and to push
therefrom to Berber, a comparatively short distance of 245 miles. But
this project, though it contained several important advantages, also
presented no small difficulties. Instead of having to form a fighting
base at so very remote and inaccessible a place as Dongola, or Korti, it
would have been established at Suakin, in easy and direct communication
with the centre of our national resources, and where men, and stores of
even the heaviest description, could be readily accumulated as they were
required. Owing to the fact that Osman Digna had been unmolested since
the spring of the year, he had again taken up an offensive attitude in
the Eastern Sudan; Berber also was occupied by the enemy, and hence it
was hopeless to suppose that there would be any less fighting upon this
route than there would be on the other. This, however, taken by itself
was not of great moment. But another circumstance of the utmost
importance has to be mentioned. There appears to be a more serious
dearth of water in one section of the desert, between the Red Sea and
the Nile, than in the worst place on the road from Korti to Metemmeh;
and a greater distance to be traversed from well to well in the former
(58 miles) than in the latter (24 miles). Herein lay the main difficulty
of the Suakin-Berber route. To overcome it, a light railway was
necessary to span the whole distance; and it had been calculated that it
would have taken three months to achieve such an undertaking. If
successful, the advance from Berber to Shendi (95 miles) would have been
easily accomplished.
It is not our intention to compare these two methods of solving the
problem that had to be faced—rendered exceedingly difficult, and perhaps
not in any manner to be solved, within the short space of time allotted,
by the unfortunate way in which the Mahdi had been allowed to
consolidate his power, and to become a formidable foe. An effort has
rather been made to give, as clearly as it is possible in a few words, a
short account of the obstacles which beset both these routes, of the
conditions which surrounded the two proposals, and to explain some of
the considerations that had to be weighed when the Nile route was
adopted.
The first stage of the campaign is the history of the advance over more
than a thousand miles to Dongola, and across the many obstacles, formed
by rapids and cataracts, that interfere with the navigation of the
river. The most troublesome obstructions blocking the passage did not
begin till Gemai was reached, just above Wady Haifa, and about 780 miles
from Cairo. Up to this place, progress was made by rail and by river
steamers; though even in this section, the journey entailed five
disembarkations. Here the boat service began, and the first serious
difficulty had soon to be met; afterwards many others had to be
surmounted, always at the expense of much labour and of valuable time.
“To write a detailed account,” says Sir H. Colvile, “of the prolonged
struggle between man and nature which the ascent of these cataracts by
six hundred English boats involved,—how company after company, and
battalion after battalion, unloaded and loaded, rowed and tracked, day
by day, and hour by hour, under a blazing sun, against that
ever-rushing, ever-changing torrent, between unchanging walls of
burning basalt,—to tell all this in detail would be to tell an
unequalled tale of pluck, determination, and endurance, but one which
would be of little practical use in a military history.”[437]
-----
Footnote 437:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , part i. p. 117.
-----
The boats ordered in England had been despatched to Egypt with the
utmost promptitude, and such was the energy displayed that the first
troops embarked in them at Gemai on the 1st of November.[438] Assisted
by the Canadian “Voyageurs,” nearly three-fourths of the fighting force
were past that station on the 18th, struggling forward; though only some
1300 men were as far as Dongola. The Guards Camel regiment marched from
Assuan (547 miles from Cairo), and on this date were south of Dal. Korti
having been selected as the point of concentration instead of Dongola,
it was now calculated that the first infantry battalion should arrive
there by the middle of December, and the last on January 22, 1885.
-----
Footnote 438:
The last left Gemai on December 19th.
-----
The Mounted infantry, provided with camels, had throughout the advance
been near the head of the column, and early in December were as far
forward as Shabatut (some 40 miles above Dongola). The Guards Camel
regiment reaching that place on the 4th, was brigaded with them under
the orders of Brigadier-General Sir Herbert Stewart, and until the 10th,
the force was practised in their new formations and drill.[439] On the
11th, the whole advanced to Korti, and arrived on the 15th; the Marines
detachment joined the Guards here. Shortly afterwards a portion of the
Heavy Camel regiment marched into that camp, and two battalions and a
squadron of the 19th Hussars also reached it.
-----
Footnote 439:
Article in the _Nineteenth Century_ , Nov., 1885, by Lieutenant
Douglas Dawson, Coldstream Guards.
-----
While these operations were in progress, some news had been received
from General Gordon. On the 17th of November a letter, dated the 4th,
announced that he could “hold out forty days with ease,” but “after that
it will be difficult;” also that there were at Metemmeh five of his
steamers with nine guns, awaiting orders.[440] Again, on the 31st of
December, a diminutive piece of paper had reached Lord Wolseley at
Korti, bearing the words, “Khartum all right, 14/12/84.—C. G. GORDON,”
but supplemented by a verbal message to the effect that the garrison
were in great straits, that provisions were running low, and would
therefore be exhausted before long.[441]
-----
Footnote 440:
The letter is given in Colvile’s _Official Account_ , part i. p. 121.
Footnote 441:
_Ibid._ , i. 138.
-----
Before the arrival of this last communication, however, arrangements had
already been made to advance in two directions from Korti: one column,
called the River column, under Major-General Earle, was to push along
the Nile through Abu Hamed towards Berber, while the other, under
Brigadier-General Sir H. Stewart, was to march across the desert and
seize Metemmeh.
Now, it was known that there were no supplies to be obtained at the
latter place; and as a sufficient number of camels do not seem to have
been procurable, it was found impossible to convey the Desert column,
with the whole of its stores, to its destination in one journey. The
distance to be traversed (176 miles) is, moreover, so great, that it was
imperative to establish one or two posts on the route. The principal
station was fixed at Jakdul wells, where water was plentiful, 98 miles
from Korti. Owing, however, to the scarcity of camels, it was necessary,
before the final advance could be made, to occupy that place and to make
several journeys to it, in order to victual it and organize it as a
depôt for future requirements. This preliminary operation took some days
to accomplish, and was not completed until the 14th of January, upon
which date Sir H. Stewart was enabled to start for Metemmeh.
The orders he received were to attack and occupy that town, to leave
there a portion of his force, and to return with the remainder to
Jakdul. Colonel Sir C. Wilson, R.E. (the Chief of the Intelligence
Department), and Captain Lord C. Beresford, R.N., with a small party of
seamen, accompanied the column, and both had special instructions given
to them. The latter was to take over one or two of the steamers which
were known to be at Metemmeh, and, when he had reported them to be
ready, the former was to proceed in them to Khartum, and to deliver a
letter to General Gordon. Sir C. Wilson was to be accompanied by a small
detachment of infantry; he might march the men through the city, and
show them to the garrison; but they were not to sleep there; and they
were to return with him to Metemmeh. Further, he was only to stay long
enough to confer fully with General Gordon, and, having done so, he was
to get back to Korti with all convenient despatch.[442] Lastly, he was
supplied with an estimate showing the approximate dates upon which the
troops were calculated to arrive at the different stations along the
route to Khartum. According to this estimate, General Earle was to reach
Abu Hamed about the 10th of February, Berber the 22nd, and Shendi the
5th of March; while the remainder “will commence to reach Metemmeh the
16th of January, and should be concentrated there with sixty days'
supplies by the 2nd of March,” adding, “If we hire many camels this date
may be anticipated.”[443]
-----
Footnote 442:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , part ii. p. 6, etc., where the full text
of all these orders are given.
Footnote 443:
Colonel Sir Charles Wilson, K.C.B., R.E., _From Korti to Khartum_ , p.
3, where this paper is given in full. (London, 1885.)
-----
Sir H. Stewart started from Korti on the 30th of December, with 78
Officers, 1029 men, 221 natives, 2206 camels, and 45 horses, among them
the Guards Camel regiment. Marching in the afternoons and at night, he
reached Jakdul, without opposition, early on the 2nd of January, and the
same day returned, leaving the Guards and Royal Engineers behind, under
Lieut.-Colonel Boscawen. He was again in Jakdul on the 12th. During the
interval, the water arrangements were improved, and the post
strengthened. In respect to this duty, Sir H. Stewart reports as follows
on the 14th January:—
The post at Jakdul has been vastly improved by Lieut.-Colonel Hon. E.
Boscawen and the Guards Camel regiment, during the eight days they
have been quartered there.... I think it right to state that nothing
but extreme hard work on the part of Officers and men could have
effected so complete a metamorphosis in this post, and I venture to
submit that it reflects the highest credit on the Guards Camel
regiment.
Leaving a garrison behind of 150 men of the Royal Sussex Regiment, the
force started from Jakdul at 2 p.m. on the 14th, consisting of two
squadrons of the 19th Hussars, the Naval division, half a Camel battery,
Royal Engineers, Guards, Heavy, and Mounted infantry Camel regiments, a
wing Royal Sussex (on camels), Medical and Transport details;
approximately, 115 Officers, 1687 men, 351 natives, 153 horses, 2888 (of
whom 860 transport) camels, 3 guns, and one Gardner. Next day, evidence
of the enemy’s proximity became apparent, and on the 16th the cavalry,
which had been pushed well to the front, reported that he had taken up a
position to bar our access to the Abu Klea wells. The advance was
continued, and in the afternoon, when it was too late to attack, we got
into close touch with him. A zeriba was then constructed, strengthened
by a hastily made wall and by mimosa thorn; and during the night the
Arabs fired into it, but without doing much mischief. Early on the 17th,
a small garrison was placed there, and the remainder emerged in square,
with skirmishers in front and on the flanks. The formation was as
follows:—Front face, Coldstream on the right, Royal Artillery in the
centre, Mounted infantry on the left; Right face, Scots Guards on the
left, then Grenadier Guards, Marines, Sussex Regiment; Left face,
Mounted infantry on the right, then Heavy Camel regiment; Rear face,
Heavies on the right, then Naval division, with the Gardner gun, and
Sussex; the 19th Hussars were outside on the left. We soon became
engaged, and several casualties occurred, the dervishes firing, and
apparently being driven back behind the folds of the ground. Our
progress was slow, for the cumbrous square formation had to be
maintained, and the camels, carrying the wounded, to be prevented from
straying outside.[444] We were making for a line of flags that was to be
seen in front of us, and many now believed that the enemy was in full
retreat.
-----
Footnote 444:
Nevertheless, some did lag behind, and would have been cut off, but
for the courage of Lieut.-Colonel Rowley, Grenadier Guards, who drove
them into the square, just as the Arabs began the attack which is
about to be described.
-----
“Just at this moment, when about 450 yards from the flags, as if they
had risen from the earth, up rose a line of spearmen all across the
wady, [gully], and at the same moment the whole wady behind appeared
black with them.”[445]
“The skirmishers at once retired, but as they did so directly in the
line of advance of the enemy, they screened him from the fire of the
square during the first stage of his charge, and it was not until the
spearmen were within 200 yards of the square that the fire could be
developed.”[446]
-----
Footnote 445:
_Nineteenth Century_ , loc. cit.
Footnote 446:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , part ii. p. 18.
-----
The sudden and fierce onslaught of some 5000 fanatics, who
held death in contempt, was eventually directed against the left rear
corner; and such was the impetus of the rush, that the Heavies were
pressed back by sheer weight of numbers into the centre of the square,
where the camels were, and almost as far as the front and right faces.
The square was practically broken, and a desperate hand-to-hand fight
followed, but it happily was only of brief duration. The Guards and
Marines had been unmoved by the shock; and keeping up a steady fire with
the front rank upon the masses of the Arabs, who were hovering near to
complete the victory should the rush be successful, they turned about
the rear rank to assist in the struggle that was going on behind
them.[447] In a few minutes the violence of the dervishes had expended
itself, and they fell back, slowly and sullenly, until we got our guns
to play upon them, and they left us in possession of the ground. The
cavalry then pushed forward to the wells, and, when the square was
reformed, it followed slowly on, the men elated by success, but
suffering agonies from thirst. At 5 p.m. the water was reached, but it
was not until early on the 18th that the zeriba was transferred to Abu
Klea, and the post there was then established and strengthened.
-----
Footnote 447:
“I was much struck by the demeanour of the Guards Officers. There was
no noise or fuss; all the orders were given as if on parade, and they
spoke to their men as if nothing unusual was going on” (_From Korti to
Khartum_ , p. 36).
-----
Our losses, which fell principally on the Heavies and the Naval
division, were very great, and amounted to 9 Officers and 65 men killed,
and 9 Officers[448] and 85 men wounded; total 168 of all ranks. Of the
former, Colonel Fred Burnaby (Royal Horse Guards) fell, well known for
his travels and for his adventurous character. Of the Coldstream
detachment 2 men (one a sergeant) were killed; Surgeon James Magill and
10 were wounded, of whom one died of his wounds. The strength of the
enemy is not accurately known; it is supposed to have been from 9000 to
11,000: his losses were considerable, and 800 lay dead in the open
ground close to the square.
-----
Footnote 448:
Two subsequently died of their wounds.
-----
In the afternoon of the 18th, the column started for the Nile, and
continued to move throughout the night. The troops, the native drivers,
and the animals were becoming exhausted by the toil they had undergone;
the men found it difficult to keep awake; the camels, insufficiently
fed, and at work incessantly for nearly three weeks, lagged behind, or
got off the track. The line of advance led through a thick mimosa scrub;
there was no moon, and, on account of the enemy’s proximity, bugles
could not be sounded to keep the column together. During the darkness,
therefore, there was much confusion, and it was not until dawn that
order could be restored. In a short time the river came into sight, some
four miles away. To the left front appeared a large and well-built town,
now recognized to be Metemmeh, and looking far more important and strong
than was represented on our maps or indicated in our reports. As the
British column, from its position near Abu Kru, gazed on the fertile
valley beneath, they perceived large crowds of armed men issuing from
the walls of Metemmeh, and it soon became clear that no water was to be
obtained without a fight.
A zeriba was at once formed, wherein to guard the stores and baggage,
before a force could advance to cut its way through the enemy. But as
this was being accomplished, the latter, creeping up through the long
grass and scrub, opened fire from concealed positions, and several
casualties occurred. Sir H. Stewart at this moment was severely wounded,
and the command devolved upon Sir C. Wilson.
At 2.30 the zeriba was ready, and garrisoned by half the Heavies, the
Cavalry, Artillery, and Naval division, while the remainder, under Sir
C. Wilson, emerged therefrom in square, the executive command of which
was entrusted to Lieut.-Colonel Boscawen. An important duty now devolved
upon this Officer, viz. to lead the square past the enemy in the bush to
the river, and to keep it as much as possible on the open ground. That
the losses at this particular period of the day were comparatively few,
may be ascribed to the manner in which the column was directed and
manœuvred at this time. Warned by the tactics of the dervishes at Abu
Klea, no skirmishers were extended; but as long as the enemy kept up his
fire from the scrub, our men, unable to reply with effect, were at a
disadvantage. Fortunately this did not last long; for the Arabs, unable
to restrain their fiery ardour, charged the square with fury, and were
met by the steady and withering fire of our soldiers. In less than five
minutes the fight was over.
“The seething mass of fanatics who had headed the charge were now a
heap of lifeless bodies, their comrades in rear had melted away into
the distance, and the British troops (sadly reduced in numbers since
their first fight at Abu Klea) made the echoes ring with a loud
cheer.”[449]
-----
Footnote 449:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , ii. 27.
-----
There was no more resistance that day, and Sir C. Wilson, having gone
forward to select a bivouac, the column was halted on the river as dusk
began to fall.
The joy of being once more near a plentiful supply of water, and the
sense of relief that the march across the desert had been at last
successfully accomplished, now filled the minds of our men, and atoned
in some degree for the hardships and privations they had just undergone;
but rest was also required, for not only the labours, but the excitement
and the dangers of the last few days had told severely upon them, and a
much-needed sleep was only partially obtained during the night of
January 19th-20th. Next day the bivouac was shifted to the village of
Gubat, which was placed in a state of defence; and the zeriba, formed
the day before, having been evacuated, the wounded and stores were
brought there.[450] The enemy was hovering near, but made no attempt to
interfere with our operations. In view of the orders given to the
Commander of the Desert column, and to secure our position at Gubat from
attacks which could be easily organized against us in Metemmeh, Sir C.
Wilson determined to capture that place, if this could be accomplished
without serious risk. On the 21st, therefore, he advanced against it
with the greater part of his force, but found it stronger than he
anticipated. During the day, Gordon’s steamers appeared on the scene,
and assisted in the attack; but they also brought news that another
horde of Arabs might be soon expected from the direction of Khartum, and
orders were therefore given to fall back upon Gubat.
-----
Footnote 450:
The horses had all been fifty-eight hours, and some even as many as
seventy-five hours, without water (_Nineteenth Century_ , loc. cit.).
The camels had not received anything to drink for six or seven days,
having been previously accustomed to be watered every second or third
day (_From Korti to Khartum_ , p. 95).
-----
The casualties during the 19th, 20th, and 21st, amounted to one Officer
and 22 men killed, and 9 Officers and 93 men wounded; total, 125: added
to this, two war correspondents to London newspapers (the _Morning
Post_ and _Standard_ ) also lost their lives. Among the severely
wounded, belonging to the Guards Camel regiment, were Lieutenant
Crutchley, Scots Guards, and Major H. Poë, Royal Marines; in the
Coldstream detachment two men were wounded. It is extremely sad to have
to relate that the brilliant Commander of the column, Sir H. Stewart,
never recovered from his wound, and died on the 17th of February, before
he could be taken even as far as Korti, deeply regretted by all who
served under his command, as well as by every one who knew his kindly,
generous, and manly character.
Directly the Queen learnt that the column had reached the Nile, and
heard of the pluck and endurance exhibited by her soldiers, Her Majesty
caused the Secretary of State to signify by telegram “her satisfaction
and warm thanks to her brave troops, and her deep concern for their
losses and sufferings, but especially for General Stewart’s severe
wound;” and in consideration of that Officer’s gallant service, Her
Majesty was also pleased to promote him to the rank of Major-General.
The Khedive, moreover, telegraphed his congratulations and thanks to the
men for the success they had achieved.
Sir C. Wilson had now a double function to discharge. His original
mission was to communicate a letter to General Gordon, and to give him
that moral support which the appearance of a few red-coats for a day or
two in Khartum might confer upon him.[451] But a new duty also obliged
him to provide for the safety of the small and sadly diminished force
which had just been unexpectedly placed under his command. To this most
important task he therefore applied himself. It was reported that
enemies were closing about him from Berber and from the south; Metemmeh
also was too strong to be taken by a _coup de main_. Thus it was
essential that he should see for himself the extent of the Arab
resources which might be brought to bear upon Gubat; and while he sent
the cavalry up the river, early on the 22nd, he embarked in a steamer,
and made his way down the stream. The results of these reconnaissances
were satisfactory, and he returned convinced that the dervishes were not
in such numbers as he had been led to believe. Meanwhile, the position
we occupied was strengthened, and communications with the Nile were
secured; Gubat, situated on a height about half a mile from the water,
could not be evacuated, and it was garrisoned by the Guards; and another
fort, connected with an island by a _tête de pont_, was constructed near
the river.
-----
Footnote 451:
Three British Officers were, moreover, to accompany Wilson to Khartum,
and to be left there with Gordon.
-----
Then a vexatious delay occurred. The steamers required repair, and it
was not until the afternoon of the 23rd, when too late to start on that
day, that they were reported fit to move. Accompanied by 20 men of the
Royal Sussex and 240 black troops, Sir C. Wilson left for Khartum on the
morning of the 24th. The passage up the river was rapidly made, in a
falling Nile, and on the 28th the beleaguered city was approached. It
would be outside the scope of this volume to give any account of the
numerous thrilling adventures and hairbreadth escapes that marked this
perilous journey. It is sufficient to say that Khartum had fallen on the
26th, and Gordon was killed. The whole place was in the hands of the
Mahdi, and the little band of Englishmen ran the gauntlet past the enemy
right up to Khartum, and under its guns, until they made sure that the
end had indeed come, and that there was no further use in remaining
where they were.[452] We now know that Gordon had been starved out, and
that his food ran short on the 3rd or 4th of January, when the last
issue of rations took place; that Omdurman, having fallen soon
afterwards (January 15th), the dervishes drew closer round Khartum; that
they could have entered it any day they chose, as the falling Nile laid
bare the weak points of the defences of the city; that at dawn on the
26th this helpless quarter was stormed; and that the place fell after a
few minutes' fighting. The expedition had been sent a month too late,
and the “game was played out before the British troops reached Gubat; at
that period nothing could save Khartum.”[453]
-----
Footnote 452:
An account of this journey is to be found in Colvile’s _Official
Account_ , part ii. p. 33, etc.—how the steamers ascended the river
with difficulty and advanced to Khartum in the teeth of hostile
batteries and under fire from the city; how the fall of the place
became undoubted; how the native crews of the steamers showed signs of
disaffection; how both steamers were wrecked on the return journey,
and how the small British party were exposed to imminent danger; how
Lieutenant Stuart-Wortley was sent down the river in an open row-boat,
and succeeded in reaching Gubat; and how a rescue party was
immediately organized under Lord Charles Beresford, who went to the
relief of Sir Charles Wilson, and those with him, in another steamer,
amid many difficulties, and in spite of the opposition of the
dervishes.
Footnote 453:
Major C. M. Watson, C.M.G., R.E., _Royal Engineers' Journal_, June 1,
1892. See _Fire and Sword in the Sudan_ , p. 342.
-----
Little occurred to the small British force near Metemmeh during this
interval. Convoys, under Lieut.-Colonel Hon. R. Talbot (1st Life
Guards), of about a thousand camels and 300 to 400 men, started for
Jakdul, to bring up supplies to the Nile, on January 23rd and on
February 2nd. Sir C. Wilson, also, after his gallant effort to reach
Khartum, left Gubat on the 6th, with an escort of twelve men of the
Coldstream, under Captain V. Dawson, and reached Korti on the 9th. These
and other movements took place without opposition on the part of the
enemy, and thus it appeared that the desert had been effectively swept
of Arabs; but they were still to be feared, and rumours were not wanting
to the effect that they were concentrating and were converging upon our
advanced position on the river. When Lord Wolseley heard of Sir H.
Stewart’s wound, he decided to send his Chief of the Staff,
Major-General Sir Redvers Buller, to replace him, and to despatch some
infantry to reinforce the Desert column. Accompanied by six companies of
the Royal Irish Regiment, who marched on their feet the whole way from
Korti, the new General reached Gubat on the 11th, and assumed command
there.
The fall of Khartum, reported at head-quarters on the 4th of February,
made a change in the conduct of the war, and the object of his mission
being no longer possible, the British Commander was left without
instructions as to his future proceedings.[454] He was thus unable to
send any precise orders to Sir R. Buller, who had already left Korti
before the death of General Gordon was known there, until he had
ascertained the views of Government upon the new situation that had
arisen. But these views were not at once forthcoming; for, the first
telegram, dated London, February 6th, gave no indication of the policy
to be pursued in the Sudan, and it was only after a more explicit
statement had been requested, that he was informed that “the power of
the Mahdi at Khartum must be overthrown.” Orders were then despatched to
the Desert column to hold on to the Nile, and, when Metemmeh was taken,
to combine with General Earle in an attack upon Berber. But before this
message was received, arrangements had been already taken for the
evacuation of Gubat. This determination had been rendered necessary
because the camels were insufficient in number, and were too much
reduced by hard work, to perform the transport service across the
desert; supplies were liable to run short; and a hostile force was
reported to be marching from Khartum.
-----
Footnote 454:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , part ii. p. 57.
-----
Accordingly, the last of the wounded left the Nile on the 13th under
escort, commanded by Colonel Talbot, consisting of portions of the
Guards, Heavy, and Mounted infantry Camel regiments. Early next day the
enemy showed signs of renewed activity, by attacking the convoy, which,
encumbered by wounded, many of whom were carried on stretchers, and by
Egyptian soldiers and camp followers who had come from Khartum in the
steamers, was not advantageously circumstanced to ward off a serious
attack. After keeping the enemy at bay by some sharp fighting, the Light
Camel regiment, which was luckily in the vicinity, came up to the
support of the convoy, and with their assistance the Arabs were soon
driven away. Our losses were two killed and six wounded, of whom one
belonged to the Coldstream.[455] On the same day, the 14th, Gubat was
finally evacuated by our troops. Abu Klea was reached on the 15th, and,
in order to reduce the consumption of water, for the wells were only
capable of supplying a moderate force, the Hussars, Guards, Heavies, and
the Sudanese who manned the steamers, were sent to Jakdul on the
16th.[456]
-----
Footnote 455:
This man, Lance-Sergeant Leaning, who died of his wounds, was noted
for his gallantry upon this occasion.
Footnote 456:
Owing to the amount of hard work done, the Guards were now without
boots; and this seems to have been the reason why they were selected
to go back.
-----
The River column, under Major-General Earle, had meanwhile started on
its way to Berber by Abu Hamed (January 24th), and found the ascent of
the Nile, through a hostile and practically unexplored country, by no
means an easy operation. The physical difficulties of the route seemed
to increase day by day, but by dint of hard work and perseverance the
troops continued to push on slowly. On the 10th of February, meeting the
enemy at Kirbekan, where he attempted to make a stand, they attacked and
defeated him; but the victory was unfortunately accompanied by the death
of the General—killed by a bullet fired from a stone hut, in which some
Arabs had taken refuge. The advance was immediately resumed, and was
continued until the 24th, when a point, 26 miles from Abu Hamed, was
reached. Here the troops were stopped by a message, dated head-quarters
20th, which ordered the column to return. A retrograde movement was
therefore at once commenced. The cause of this fresh order has now to be
briefly explained.
On receiving instructions directing the overthrow of the Mahdi’s power
at Khartum, Lord Wolseley decided that the first step was to reduce
Berber, and he therefore wished, as we have seen, to combine both the
River and Desert columns to secure that object. But insuperable
difficulties presented themselves to the execution of that design. In
the first place, the absence of all means of rapid communication between
Korti and the two columns was a serious obstacle to any form of combined
operations. Supplies for immediate and future use had, moreover, to be
carried along with the troops, over the formidable obstructions which
everywhere opposed our progress. The camels of the Desert column had
completely broken down, and there was no transport available; the men’s
boots were also worn out, and their marching powers were in consequence
diminishing day by day. The River column, moreover, though able to move
forward,—but only slowly, on account of the physical difficulties in the
way and the low condition of the Nile,—had not sufficient carrying power
to store Berber with the supplies which it would have been necessary to
place there.[457]
-----
Footnote 457:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , part ii. p. 72.
-----
These difficulties entailed a change of plan, and both columns were
therefore ordered to return. Sir R. Buller had been annoyed by hostile
demonstrations against him near Abu Klea since the 16th, and on that day
and on the next he lost three men killed, and 4 Officers, and 23
wounded. As soon as this advanced position had no longer to be held, he
evacuated it on the 23rd and 24th, in the face of a large number of
Arabs, estimated at not less than 8000 men, with such skill and judgment
that, having deceived them, they made no effort to interfere with his
movements. The retirement was everywhere continued, the Guards reaching
Korti on the 9th of March, and the last troops leaving the desert on the
16th. From Korti, the Guards went to Dongola on the 16th, and remained
there for some months; while the rest of the army also took up summer
quarters on the Nile, not further forward than Merowi,—to await the
coming of the autumn, when a fresh advance was to be made to free
Khartum from the despotism of the Mahdi.
[Illustration:
SERGEANT-DRUMMER 1895.
N.R.Wilkinson del. A.D.Innes & C^o. London. Mintern Bros.
lith.
]
CHAPTER XVII.
SECOND PART OF THE WAR IN THE SUDAN, 1884-1885—SUAKIN
CAMPAIGN.
Reasons for the expedition to Suakin—Departure of the Coldstream—Orders
to Lieut.-General Sir G. Graham—Position of the enemy—Advance
against Hashin—Engagement at Tofrek—Attack on a convoy, escorted by
the Coldstream and Royal Marines—Advance to Tamai—Construction of
the railway—Attack on T'Hakul—Abrupt end of the campaign—The
Coldstream proceed to Alexandria, and thence to Cyprus—Evacuation of
the Sudan; how the Mahdi took advantage of it; how the Dongolese
were treated—Position taken up south of Wady Halfa—Defeat of the
Arabs at Ginnis—Return of the Guards Camel regiment—Return of the
Coldstream from Cyprus—Honourable distinctions added to the
Colours—Officers of the Regiment in December, 1885.
When the British Government made up their mind, early in February, 1885,
to put an end to the devastating tyranny of the dervishes, at all events
in Khartum, and sent instructions to the British Commander to that
effect, they also consulted him as to whether a strong expedition should
be despatched forthwith to Suakin. Under the impression that his
instructions to overthrow the power of the Mahdi at Khartum were
intended really to produce that result, Lord Wolseley gladly accepted
the offer that Osman Digna might be dealt with, without further delay.
We must refer the reader to the current history of the day to seek the
causes of the awakened energy which roused the Government to action at
this moment. Very few years have elapsed since 1885, and the events
which then took place can scarcely be forgotten. Suffice it to say that
the country, justly proud of General Gordon, was roused to indignation
when it was realized that, in spite of warnings from the military
authorities, the Government had delayed to take proper measures to
rescue him and those for whom he was responsible, until the season was
too far advanced, and until rescue was impossible. So also, the large
and unstinted sums of money, freely lavished upon the tardy expedition
that was at last despatched up the Nile, had failed to accomplish the
object which the nation had so much at heart. Under all these
circumstances, it was clearly judicious to propitiate the popular wrath
that began to manifest itself; and how could this be more efficaciously
done than by the public announcement that summary punishment was about
to be inflicted upon the murderers of the British hero, whose death was
so universally deplored? Hence it came about that a railway to Berber
was immediately to be commenced; that another expedition to protect it
was to be sent to Suakin; and that a still more extravagant expenditure
of treasure was to be wasted, now when it was too late, and when the
necessary outlay had been curtailed up to the summer of 1884,—that is,
as long as there was time to save the garrison of Khartum.
In January and February, 1885, Major-General Lyon Fremantle, in command,
as we have seen, at Suakin, since July, 1884, had been reinforced by a
squadron of cavalry, two battalions of infantry, and a battery of Royal
Horse Artillery, brought from Lower Egypt, and amounting to some 2500
men. With these he engaged in defensive operations against Osman Digna,
who had again begun to give trouble in the district. Prompt measures
were now taken to make them capable of assuming the offensive by raising
them to a total of about 13,000 men. The field force, so augmented, was
commanded by Lieut.-General Sir G. Graham, V.C., K.C.B., under the
general orders of Lord Wolseley, who was responsible for all operations
against the enemy; and composing it, there was a Guards Brigade, troops
of the Line, an Indian contingent, and, lastly, an Australian battalion
and battery furnished by the Government of New South Wales. This
Colonial corps of fighting men, and that provided by the Dominion of
Canada for the service of the boats on the Nile, form a new feature in
our military history, which we should be sorry to pass over in silence;
for they show the patriotic feelings which urge our brethren over the
sea, gallantly to take their share in any struggle in which the
interests of our Queen and Empire may be involved.
The following organization was adopted at Suakin: A Cavalry Brigade
(Colonel H. P. Ewart, C.B.), two squadrons of the 5th Lancers, and two
of the 20th Hussars, and a battalion Mounted infantry (4 companies).
Three batteries of artillery (one Royal Horse Artillery), and eventually
one battery New South Wales. The 1st or Guards Brigade[458]
(Major-General A. J. Lyon Fremantle), 3rd Grenadiers (Colonel Hon. W.
Home), 1st Coldstream (Colonel A. Lambton), and 2nd Scots Guards
(Colonel Hon. W. Trefusis). Subsequently, when they arrived, the New
South Wales Battalion, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Richardson,
were attached to this Brigade. The 2nd Brigade (Major-General Sir J. C.
McNeill, V.C., K.C.B.), three battalions of infantry (of the East
Surrey, Shropshire, and Berkshire Regiments), and one of Royal Marines.
The Indian Brigade (Brigadier-General J. Hudson, C.B.), one regiment of
cavalry (9th Bengal), three battalions infantry (15th Sikhs, 17th
Bengal, and 28th Bombay), and one company Madras Sappers. Royal
Engineers (one Railway and two Field companies, two Telegraph sections,
and one Balloon detachment). And four, eventually five, companies of the
Commissariat and Transport Corps.
-----
Footnote 458:
Captains Hon. N. Dalrymple, Scots Guards, and the Hon. F. Stopford,
Grenadier Guards, were respectively Brigade-Major of the Guards
Brigade, and Aide-de-camp to Major-General Fremantle.
-----
The 1st Coldstream were made up by a draft from the 2nd Battalion to 1
Warrant-officer, 80 Non-commissioned officers, 16 drummers, and 710
privates, out of which a detachment of 50 men was told off to form a
Mounted infantry company. Officers were posted as follows:—
_Commanding Officer._—Colonel A. Lambton.
_Mounted Majors._—Lieut.-Cols. J. B. Sterling; and R. S. Hall.
_Adjutant._—Lieutenant Hon. H. Legge.
_Quartermaster._—H. Folson.
_Medical Officer._—Surgeon A. Alexander.
Compy. Lieutenants.
No. 1. Lt.-Col. C. Fortescue. C. Frederick; and F. Maude.
No. 2. ” F. Manley. G. Sebright; and C. Holland.
No. 3. ” R. Follett. Earl of Wiltshire; and G. Milligan.
No. 4. ” L. D. MacKinnon. H. Shute.
No. 5. Capt. Hon. H. Monck. R. Winn (subsequently in command of
Regl. Transport).
No. 6. Lt.-Col. Hon. E. Digby. G. Wyndham; and J. Drummond-Hay.
No. 7. Lieut. J. Gladstone. D. J. Hamilton.
No. 8. Lt.-Col. Hon. H. Corry. Hon. Alan Charteris; and R. Grenfell.
The following Officers served on the Staff: Lieutenants Earl of
Wiltshire, and Hon. Alan Charteris, Aides-de-camp to Major-General Sir
J. McNeill; and Lieutenant Gladstone, Orderly Officer to Major-General
Fremantle. The detachment of mounted men was placed under the command of
Captain Ross-of-Bladensburg and Lieutenant G. Sutton, but until the
ponies were obtained, which did not take place before the 5th of April,
these Officers did duty with the Battalion, the former commanding No. 7
Company. It should also be stated that the Brigade furnished upon this
occasion a company of Army Signallers, under command of Lieutenant F.
Lloyd, Grenadier Guards, composed of 12 men from the 3rd Grenadiers, 12
from the 1st Coldstream, and 6 from the 2nd Scots Guards; the corps was
attached to the 3rd Grenadier Guards. Further, a Field Hospital was also
formed, of which Surgeons-Major C. Read (Coldstream), Lawrence
(Grenadiers), and A. Myers (Scots Guards), and Surgeon G. Robinson
(Scots Guards) were the Medical Officers.
The 1st Coldstream left Wellington Barracks shortly after 7 a.m. on the
19th of February, accompanied by a dense and enthusiastic crowd, and,
marching to Westminster Stairs, proceeded in two river steamers to
Gravesend, where they embarked on board the _Manorah_. Remaining a few
hours at Malta, they were detained a day at Suez, and reached Suakin on
the 8th of March. The Battalion then landed without delay, marched about
two miles, and encamped in an advanced position to cover the assembly of
the troops; they were joined by the 2nd Scots and 3rd Grenadier Guards,
who arrived respectively the 9th and 10th. There had been some alarms of
a disquieting nature when we reached the seat of war. The Arabs
frequently sent forward a few armed men at a time, who, crawling at
night past the outposts into the centre of the camp, attacked and
stabbed our soldiers and horses in the dark, even in the head-quarter
camp or to the rear of it, where at least every one had a right to
believe himself to be in safety, and guarded against depredations of the
sort. This disagreeable method of warfare was not easy to suppress, and
when the enemy was successful in his raid, it produced a “scare,” which
was calculated to disturb the equanimity of the troops. The dervishes,
in short, were hovering very near us at night, firing into us from the
bush (fortunately without much effect), though they seldom made any
demonstrations in the daylight. Detachments were sent out as soon as it
was dark, to watch all approaches leading to Suakin; but the nuisance
only came to an end, when we moved out to attack the enemy, and drove
him back from our neighbourhood. Meanwhile the Brigade camp, though it
had never been disturbed, was withdrawn somewhat closer to the town on
the 16th.
The orders which Sir G. Graham received were dated the 20th of February;
and they directed him, in the first place, to destroy the power of Osman
Digna, and, secondly, to give assistance and protection to the
construction of the railway. The military occupation of the Hadendowa
country, lying near the Suakin-Berber route, was to be accomplished; and
it was indicated that this would be best done by the Indian troops,
while the British portion of the army were to be placed in the hilly
region, which is to be found a little beyond Tambuk wells (25 miles from
Suakin), to a distance of 60 or 70 miles further on towards Berber. It
was also intimated that possibly Berber might not be attacked before the
autumn,[459] and, if so,—
“the railway cannot be pushed much beyond Ariab; and there, all the
railway plant and material necessary for the 100 miles between it
and Berber should be collected as soon as possible, so that the
advance, when the cool weather begins, and Berber is taken, may be
made at once.”[460]
-----
Footnote 459:
The date upon which Lord Wolseley ordered the River column to retire,
was the 20th of February. See _ante_, chap. xvi., p. 391.
Footnote 460:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , part ii. p. 181. The full text of this
despatch from the Secretary of State to Sir G. Graham is given in that
work.
-----
These instructions clearly show the intention of the British Government
at this critical moment in their fortunes, when public indignation was
rising against them; viz. to overthrow the power of the Mahdi at Khartum
in the autumn of 1885, now that it was not found possible to achieve
that object in the spring of the same year. This was to be effected by
the co-operation of two expeditions, under the supreme command of Lord
Wolseley,—one under his immediate leadership, concentrating in the
province of Dongola, to pass the summer there, and to emerge therefrom
when the suitable season came round for field operations; the other,
under Sir G. Graham, with the objects (1) to crush Osman Digna, and to
clear the country of the enemy, in order that the railway might be made,
and (2) to construct that railway at least as far as Ariab (some 145
miles from Suakin), and to place troops for its protection “where the
summer heats could be best endured.”[461]
-----
Footnote 461:
_Ibid._ , ii. 195.
-----
Sir G. Graham reached Suakin March 12th, and next day the railway was
begun.[462] A few days had to be spent in completing the assembly of the
force, and in perfecting the arrangements necessary for their supply.
The wells in the neighbourhood were sufficient to provide the camels and
horses with water, but as its quality and quantity could not be depended
upon for the troops of the expedition, ships fitted with condensing
boilers were brought to Suakin, and condensed sea-water was issued in
tins for their use, and was transported to the various camps by camels
or by railway.
-----
Footnote 462:
It is worthy of remark that this was _not_ a light railway, as had
been originally proposed; but a line of the ordinary gauge, such as is
constructed in England, for general traffic. See Map No. 8, p. 360.
-----
The country near Suakin is a flat sandy plain, intersected by khors, or
water courses (quite dry at this season of the year), which, extending
westward some ten or twelve miles, is terminated by a line of hills
running almost parallel to the sea coast. Near the town, the plain is
fairly open for about two or three miles, but afterwards, and especially
in the khors and at the foot of the hills, it is covered by thick masses
of mimosa thorny scrub, many of which look somewhat like large
gooseberry bushes six to eight feet high, and wide in proportion; in
many places they are tangled by the prickly pear, and by rank grass and
other undergrowth. The enemy was reported to have concentrated his main
force of some 7000 men at Tamai, a village about 16 miles away in a
south-westerly direction from Suakin. Another thousand or more were at
Hashin, eight miles due east of the town, where a valley penetrates into
the hills. It was here that the Arabs were supposed to live who troubled
our nights. To the north-west is the village of Handub, eleven miles
off, also occupied by dervishes; and to this place the railway to Berber
would have to run.
It was evidently desirable that our first movement should be directed
against Hashin. On the 19th of March, a reconnaissance was undertaken
against it, and next day an attack upon the position was made in force;
the 2nd Brigade in front, supported on the flanks by the Guards and
Indian troops, covered by the cavalry; the horse artillery and a Gardner
battery (4 guns) being in rear: altogether a little more than 8000 men.
Arrived at a detached group of hills about a mile and a half from
Hashin, redoubts were constructed there by the East Surrey Regiment,
while the remainder continued to push forward, until the entrance of the
valley, previously mentioned, was reached. The 2nd Brigade, supported by
the Indian battalions, ascended the southern heights above this valley,
and soon drove the enemy therefrom. The Arabs, estimated at 3000 strong,
however, were favoured by the dense bush; they seemed to swarm through
it, and, hovering round, they dashed into our men with the greatest
bravery, whenever an opportunity presented itself. In this way, two
squadrons of Indian horse were somewhat severely handled by an almost
invisible foe. Meanwhile the Guards were in reserve, formed in square,
just under the heights which Sir J. McNeill had taken on our left front,
and close to a small rise in the ground on our right front, which we
called Bee-hive Hill. The redoubts in rear being complete soon after
midday, and garrisoned by the East Surrey, the 2nd and Indian Brigades
were ordered to retire, the Guards to cover the movement. The Arabs,
owing to the thick cover that concealed them, remained closer to our
position than they could otherwise have done, and perceiving our return
towards our camp, they opened a hot fire from the bush upon us,
principally from Bee-hive Hill, which was returned with steady volleys.
This proceeding soon silenced them, though the Brigade lost some men
during this short period of the day—1 Officer, Captain Dalison (Scots
Guards), and 2 men being killed, and 16 wounded. Our total casualties
amounted to 48 Officers and men killed and wounded, and of these the
Coldstream numbered 1 man died of wounds, and 8 wounded. The result of
the action was that we had no further trouble as far as Hashin was
concerned, and thenceforward the enemy’s night raids on our camp ceased.
An advance was now made towards Tamai, the centre of Osman Digna’s
resistance, and, on the 22nd of March, Sir J. McNeill was sent forward
to establish a post on the road to that place, eight miles off, with one
squadron of the 5th Lancers, the Berkshire Regiment, the Marines, a
detachment of the Naval brigade (with 4 Gardner guns), three Indian
battalions, and the Madras Sappers. On the same day, the Coldstream
proceeded towards Hashin, to convoy supplies to the East Surrey
Regiment, who were still in the redoubts constructed on the 20th, and
met with no misfortune, except that several of our men were struck down
by sun apoplexy. On returning home in the afternoon, we saw clouds of
dust rising out of the bush in the place where we conceived Sir J.
McNeill’s column to be, and wondered whether something unusual had
happened there. On returning to camp we heard, at first, exaggerated
accounts of what occurred, but it was not long before the real truth was
known. The column, finding the bush exceedingly thick and no natural
clearings in it, could only advance slowly, and halted some six miles
from Suakin. The men then began to construct a zeriba; and, while so
employed, they were necessarily scattered, some were unarmed, and a
large number of camels blocked the ground. The enemy, lurking unseen in
the scrub close by, crept up, and suddenly made a fierce onslaught on
the force. Unfortunately, one of the Indian battalions was somewhat
unsteady, and, though the Officers worked hard to rally the men, they
were rushed, and carried away to the rear. Then followed a battle of
short duration which is not easy to describe. The Berkshire—who gained
the title of “Royal” for their day’s work—stood manfully up to the
Arabs, though half the battalion were collecting brushwood and the other
half were at their dinners, and, together with the Marines, the Sikhs,
and the remaining Indian battalion, they maintained a hard fight for the
space of twenty minutes. They soon, however, gained the mastery, and
drove the enemy back with great slaughter. Isolated combats took place
at some distance from the zeriba on the road to Suakin, entailing
considerable loss, and towards evening the telegraph wire was cut. But
news had, before this, been received at head-quarters, to assure Sir G.
Graham that the danger was over, and that the attack had entirely
failed. The Arabs were computed at 5000 strong, and their losses at 1500
men. Our own casualties were severe; and amounted to 10 Officers and 131
men killed and missing, and to 5 Officers and 150 men wounded: total
296. Added to this, there were 157 native camel drivers killed and
missing, and 19 wounded. Total _personnel_ lost, 472 men; besides 501
camels. Among the wounded was Lieutenant Charteris, Coldstream Guards.
This action, known as the battle of Tofrek, occasioned more losses on
one day than in any other engagement during the whole war in the Sudan.
The Guards Brigade were sent early the following morning to reinforce
the zeriba and to bring up supplies and water. Forming a square, and
guarding 1200 camels, the march was slow, and took nearly six hours to
accomplish. Many of the loads were indifferently packed, and repeatedly
fell off; the drivers seemed to have little control over the animals,
which were bad movers and difficult to guide. The weather, also, was
oppressively hot, and the men suffered a good deal from thirst. Arriving
shortly before noon, the force halted for some hours; the Grenadier
Guards and the Indian Brigade then returned to Suakin with the wounded
and empty camels, leaving the Coldstream and Scots Guards and the rest
of the troops behind. The immediate neighbourhood of Tofrek was still
covered with hundreds of dead and numerous camels, many of which were
hamstrung, and had to be shot. Burial parties were actively at work, but
it was not easy to dispose quickly of the mass of dead bodies, both of
men and animals, that lay about in large numbers; added to which there
was little shade to be had from the broiling sun, and the water ration
for every purpose had to be reduced to a minimum. For the next few days,
the position in the zeriba was therefore anything but a pleasant one, as
may be readily imagined.
On the 24th, the Coldstream and the Marines began cutting a path one
hundred paces broad towards Suakin. After some hours' work, they
marched, under Colonel Lambton, about halfway to the town, to escort a
convoy to Tofrek, consisting of 425 camels and 818 carts, with 8000
gallons of water, which was brought up to that point by Indian troops.
The Arabs were still hovering near, and they fired upon the two
battalions as they proceeded on their journey, but without inflicting
much loss. On their return, however, the fire became somewhat hotter,
and was delivered at closer ranges than before, so that Colonel Lambton
was obliged to halt several times to return it, and to allow the wounded
to be attended to. The square, crowded with carts and camels that would
not keep a straight course, offered an excellent mark to the
sharpshooters concealed in the bush; but we were able to check this
attack by small volleys fired by marksmen at the spots where we saw the
enemy’s puffs of smoke appear. This lasted for an hour or more, when at
last, to our great satisfaction, some of the most daring of the
dervishes made an attempt to charge. They came on in line, guided by
flags at each flank, in the most gallant manner, and directed their
attack mainly against the left face of the square. But, unable to stand
our fire, they were very soon defeated, and most of them were killed,
though one or two did actually succeed in getting as far as our bayonets
before they fell. After this event they left us alone, and we got back
to the zeriba without further trouble. The casualties of the day
amounted to 24, of which the Coldstream lost 2 men killed or died of
wounds, and 8 wounded; three Officers were wounded, two belonging to the
Royal Marines, and Captain Hon. N. Dalrymple, Brigade Major of the
Guards Brigade; in addition, 5 native camel-drivers were killed.[463]
Some of the camels lagged behind, their drivers having abandoned them
while the fight was going on; others were squeezed out of the square,
which was from the beginning too full to hold them, and thus more than a
hundred were cut off by the enemy.
-----
Footnote 463:
Captain Dalrymple was succeeded as Brigade-Major by Captain Stopford.
-----
Next day, another convoy was taken from Suakin to the zeriba in the same
manner, the escorts meeting each other halfway between the two places.
This time it was not molested, but the occasion deserves mention, since
a captive balloon was then first employed; the latter, attached by a
rope to a waggon that moved in the square, enabled a proper look-out to
be kept upon the enemy in the bush. On the 26th, however, there was
another skirmish, but it was easily repelled with very little loss; and
on this day, the Grenadier Guards relieved the Scots Guards at Tofrek,
while the Coldstream remained there till the 28th, when they also
returned to head-quarters. After the 26th no further difficulty was
experienced with the Arabs; they were apparently disheartened, and had
retreated from the neighbourhood. A move, therefore, was made to Tamai.
Early on the morning of April 2nd, a force of 8000 men marched through
Tofrek to Tesela Hill, near Tamai, where a halt was made for the
night.[464] Next day, the advance was continued, and Osman Digna’s
head-quarters were occupied after a very slight resistance. Tamai, like
other villages in the country, is a mere collection of straw huts, and
it was speedily fired and destroyed, while the enemy made off into the
hilly region that lies to the south, where it would have been difficult,
and indeed unnecessary, to pursue him. The column therefore returned to
Suakin, and the attention of the troops was now directed more
particularly to the protection of the railway, which meantime had been
progressing. The Battalion lost only two men wounded, on the 3rd of
April.
-----
Footnote 464:
The New South Wales Battalion formed part of this force, having
reached Suakin on March 29th.
-----
At this time, also, ponies having arrived, the Guards Mounted infantry
detachments were formed into two companies (April 5th): the Grenadier
and Scots Guards company, under Captain St. John Mildmay, Grenadier
Guards; and the Coldstream company, under Captain Ross-of-Bladensburg,
to which was attached a half-company, furnished by the Royal Engineers,
under Lieutenant Sandbach, R.E. Ten days later, a Camel corps was formed
under the command of Major James, Scots Greys, consisting of 400 British
and 100 native soldiers, divided into five companies, of which one was
composed of Guardsmen (31 men taken from each of the three Battalions),
under Lieutenants Neil Menzies, Scots Guards, and G. Wyndham, Coldstream
Guards.
The railway, leaving Suakin in a north-westerly direction as far as
Handub (11 miles distant), bore round towards the west at this point,
and, passing through Otao (20 miles from Suakin) and Tambuk (25 miles),
was to continue across the hilly country to Ariab; from thence it was to
run to Berber, over a stretch of 100 miles of desert country, which is
watered only by the wells of O-Bak, lying nearly halfway between these
two places. To cover the construction of the line, a zeriba was made
(April 6th) by the Coldstream, the New South Wales Battalion, artillery,
etc., between Suakin and Handub, called No. 1 Station. On the 8th,
Handub was occupied, the Scots Guards being at No. 1 Station. On the
16th, the latter pushed on to Otao without meeting with any resistance;
and when the Coldstream followed on the 18th, the Scots moved to Tambuk,
finding no enemy there. On the 24th, a reconnaissance by a portion of
the Camel corps was made towards Es-Sibil; and by the 30th the railway
was completed as far as Otao. During this time the men were constantly
employed in clearing broad roads through the bush; in digging
watering-places, which had to be deepened daily as the supply became
exhausted; and in protecting the scattered parties of navvies at work on
the line. There were not many Arabs about, though few nights passed
without some shots being fired into the camp.
About the same period, also, reconnaissances were pushed in various
directions to prevent any advance from Tamai, and to clear the
neighbouring valleys of the enemy. The most important was one undertaken
in the early morning of the 7th of May, against a chief who had
collected a force at a place called T'Hakul, lying nearly 20 miles west
of Suakin and 10 south of Otao. The Brigade took no part in this
operation; but the company belonging to the Camel corps and the two
companies of Guards Mounted infantry were present, and forming part of
the force at Suakin, they paraded there a little before midnight on the
6th. A small column co-operated from Otao, and in the morning both
appeared before the camp of the Arabs and surprised it; the enemy fled
at our approach, leaving behind 1100 sheep, goats, and some camels. The
columns then returned to Otao and Suakin respectively; the latter,
however, on their way home, met parties of the enemy occupying heights
within range of which they had to pass; after a few volleys he quickly
disappeared. One Officer (of the Camel corps) and two men were wounded,
of whom one (a sergeant) belonged to the Coldstream (Mounted infantry).
This was the last operation conducted by Sir G. Graham’s force in the
neighbourhood of Suakin. The district had just been pacified and
relieved of the presence of the enemy: at this very moment, orders came
to evacuate it, and to withdraw the troops therefrom, except a small
garrison, which was to be left behind to guard the town.[465] We must
briefly explain how this came about.
The British Government never had much sympathy with the policy of
opposing the Mahdi, whose usurpation of power, founded upon rapine,
massacre, and slavery, had been dignified into the movement of a people
struggling for freedom! This strange opinion upon the upheaval that
swamped every vestige of civilization in the Sudan, was doubtless one
reason, but perhaps not the only reason, for the vacillating proceedings
pursued there, and for the consequent inability to effect, even at great
expense, any useful object. Unwilling to face with a firm resolution the
questions that required solution in that region, and prevented by public
opinion from adopting a policy of non-intervention, the Government did
nothing till popular clamour forced them to some action, and then the
steps they took, costing many lives and much treasure, could produce no
beneficial results. Thus, as we have seen, was the brave intention of
taking Khartum, and of restoring order there, published in February; and
so also, as soon as possible and upon the very first pretext, was that
intention abandoned. An opportunity very soon arose to facilitate this
procedure.
-----
Footnote 465:
With the dispersal of the force collected at T'Hakul, the political
question of the Eastern Sudan may be said to have been solved for the
time being; large numbers of the natives placed themselves
unconditionally at the disposal of Sir G. Graham, and a decided
movement was set on foot against Osman Digna, even among those who
were considered to be his closest adherents. It may be remarked that,
though Osman Digna appears as our principal opponent, he was not a
military leader likely to give much trouble once his followers had
been defeated; the fact being, that he himself never appeared on or
near the scene of conflict, but was content to urge on his men from
some safe position or inaccessible fastness. (Colvile, Official
Account, part ii., pp. 217, 323.)
There was a dispute in Asia over the frontier between the Russians and
Afghans, and, on the 30th of March, news reached London that the former,
having agreed to make no forward movement until pending questions had
been discussed, advanced and took possession of Panjdeh by force of
arms—a place held to be a portion of the territories of the Amir of
Afghanistan. For reasons connected with the safety of India, we had
espoused the cause of that Prince, and were bound to see that his
legitimate claims received proper consideration. It is unnecessary to
describe either the Panjdeh incident, or those that led up to this act
of aggression. It is sufficient to say that they created much excitement
in England, and soon drew public attention from the Sudan. The crisis
did not last long, and the dispute was soon settled, but it enabled
Government to wash their hands of the whole of the troublesome business
connected with Khartum.
“The first step taken towards opening the country for the railway [in
the neighbourhood of Suakin], was an attempt to form an alliance with
the neutral tribes dwelling on or near the Berber road; but it was
soon discovered that any such alliance must be dependent on a fixed
policy on the part of Her Majesty’s Government. The tribes appeared to
be anxious to come in, and to be thoroughly tired of the terrorism
established by Osman Digna, but they one and all said they could not
join us unless they were assured of our future protection against
Osman Digna, and unless we undertook that we would not go away, as we
had done in the previous year. In a telegram to the Secretary of State
for War, dated April 12, 1885, Sir G. Graham asked whether he might
give this assurance. In reply, the following telegram was sent to Lord
Wolseley, on the 15th of April, by the Secretary of State for War:
'Construction of railway for any considerable distance to be suspended
pending further consideration. Suakin to be held for the present, and
any position in neighbourhood necessary for protection from constant
attack, as last year. You should report on point to which railway
should now proceed, and instruct Graham, with reference to his message
of the 12th, not to enter into engagements with tribes inconsistent
with this policy.'”[466]
-----
Footnote 466:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , part ii. p. 212.
-----
This was, therefore, the end of the expedition to the Eastern Sudan,
and, as a matter of fact, orders soon arrived to break up the forces
assembled there. The Guards Brigade and the New South Wales contingent
were the first troops to take their departure. The Coldstream, having
marched from the front on the 14th of May, embarked on the 16th in the
_Deccan_, and started next day for Alexandria, where they arrived on the
23rd. The Battalion remained in the harbour, on board ship, until the
9th of June, when they marched to Ramleh, and camped on the beach. They
stayed there until the 1st of July, and, together with the Grenadiers,
embarked on H.M.S. _Orontes_, and proceeded on the 2nd to Cyprus.
Landing at Limasol on the 5th, they marched to Mount Troödos, and
reached that place on the 9th; the Scots Guards followed a few days
later, and the whole Brigade remained at Troödos till after the middle
of August. Major-General Fremantle stayed behind in Egypt, and Colonel
Lambton, being the senior Officer, assumed the command of the Brigade,
while that of the Battalion devolved upon Colonel Sterling, until the
27th, when Colonel Clive, Grenadier Guards, arrived from England as
Brigadier-General.
We left the Nile force getting into summer quarters in the province of
Dongola, in the spring of the year, and confidently expecting to resume
the offensive against Khartum as soon as the great heat should pass
away. But on the 13th of April a telegram reached Lord Wolseley,
informing him that, in the then condition of Imperial affairs, it was
probable the forward movement might have to be abandoned. The
announcement that this decision had been taken was made known in England
on the 21st, though on the 11th of May the troops were ordered to retire
northwards, and to evacuate the Sudan.
“As it was certain that anarchy would immediately follow our
withdrawal, and probable that a retreat on our part would allow the
dormant hostility of the natives to find vent, it was necessary that
the retreat, especially of the advanced portion of the force, should
be conducted as rapidly and unexpectedly as possible. Jaudet Effendi
[the then Governor of Dongola], was at once informed of the intended
retreat. He begged for fifteen days' start, before our policy was made
generally known, in order that he might take what steps he could, to
mitigate the murder and rapine for which he believed our retirement
would be the signal. This was granted him, and he at once started up
the river, and the movement was arranged to commence on the 21st of
May.”[467]
-----
Footnote 467:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , ii. 167.
-----
Once begun, the evacuation did not take long to accomplish; the enemy
offered no opposition, nor did he try to press our retreat. He was wise
enough to follow at a respectful distance, occupying the country as we
abandoned it. Indeed, ever since the return of the Desert and River
columns we experienced no further trouble with the Mahdi, who, relieved
of the danger with which he was threatened by the British advance,
turned his attention to other matters. He sent a considerable force to
the south of Khartum, to put down a rising which began to imperil his
authority in Kordofan, and, as soon as he became aware that we were
definitely about to withdraw from the province of Dongola and from the
vicinity of Suakin, he despatched more of his men to hasten the
reduction of Sennar and Kassala, both of which were besieged at that
moment. These two places fell in the middle of August.
The operation of withdrawing from the Sudan was extremely distasteful to
British Officers. The inhabitants of Dongola had trusted us, and had
served us; we had necessarily interfered with their government,
disturbed the means at their disposal for taking care of themselves, and
prevented them from making terms with the enemy. They had been induced
by us to resist the Arabs, to incur their vengeance, and to rely for
protection upon the power of England,—a nation who never deserted a
friend or turned away from a foe. We were pledged to defend this
unfortunate people, or to make some reasonable provision for their
future safety, but, in the face of the peremptory orders received from
home, any such arrangement was entirely out of the question. Hence it
was more than distressing to be forced to abandon these natives to the
slavery that was in store for them; and we cannot be astonished that
they reproached us bitterly for deserting them in this helpless
condition, and for leaving them to the cruel tyranny of the Mahdi. Many
appeared anxious to fly from their homes, but they were restrained by
the knowledge that, in that case, they must forfeit the whole of their
property; while others were unable to procure sufficient transport for
their families and effects.[468]
-----
Footnote 468:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , ii. 169.
-----
Nearly 13,000 natives accompanied the retreat, and by the end of June
these refugees, the supplies, and most of the troops were north of
Dongola. At this moment the Government of Mr. Gladstone came to an end,
and Lord Wolseley, who had from the first protested against the
precipitate withdrawal of the expedition, was empowered by the new
Cabinet to arrest the movement temporarily, until the situation had been
considered. It is sad to relate, that the evacuation had been too well
executed, and that it was then too late to return or repair the evil
that had already been done. By the 21st of July, that portion of the
British army destined to remain as a frontier force, for the protection
of Egypt, had taken up a position some ninety miles south of Wady Halfa,
and there they covered the construction of the Sudan railway, which was
completed to Akasheh on the 7th of August. Meanwhile the dervishes did
not invade the northern part of Dongola at once, for the Mahdi fell a
victim to his own debauchery, and, dying on the 22nd of June, left
affairs in the Sudan in an unsettled state.[470] Until, therefore, his
successor, the Khalifa Abdulla, had consolidated his position, no
further conquests were possible, and the province was only seized by him
in the middle of August. After this, the enemy advanced northwards with
the intention of invading Egypt, and he even ventured to lay siege to a
British fort on the frontier, in the month of November. In December,
however, he was attacked, and forced to retire, by Lieut.-General Sir F.
Stephenson, who defeated him at Ginnis on the 30th.
-----
Footnote 470:
See Major Wingate, R.A., _Ten Years' Captivity in the Madhi’s Camp_,
1882-92, (from original manuscripts of Father J. Ohrwalder, late
Priest of the Austrian Mission at Delen, in Kordofan), p. 160.
(London, 1892.)
-----
This event ends the war in the Sudan. Long before it took place the
Guards Camel regiment had been sent home. Starting from Dongola, where
they remained for nearly three months, they marched thence on the 1st of
June, and, proceeding mostly by river, they reached Alexandria on the
1st of July, having halted for two hours at Cairo, where they were
received by Lord Wolseley and Sir F. Stephenson. At Alexandria, they had
the good fortune to meet the Guards Brigade, then on their way to
Cyprus. They left Egypt on the 4th, and arrived in London on the 15th.
After an inspection by H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, the various
detachments composing the Camel corps returned to their respective
Regiments. The following Brigade Order appeared in London on the 21st:—
“Lieut.-Colonel Hon. E. Boscawen, Coldstream Guards, recently in
command of the Guards Camel regiment in the Sudan, having addressed to
the Major-General Commanding the Brigade of Guards his complete
satisfaction with the conduct and soldierlike qualities displayed by
all ranks under his command in the late Nile expedition, the
Major-General wishes to place on record his great pleasure at
receiving such a report, and his high appreciation of the manner in
which the several detachments composing the Guards Camel regiment have
so completely maintained the reputation of the Brigade. This order to
be read at the head of each Battalion at the first full parade.”[469]
-----
Footnote 469:
Colonel Boscawen’s report to the Officers Commanding 1st and 2nd
Coldstream Guards, contained the following: “As the various
detachments forming the Guards Camel regiment are shortly to return to
their several Battalions, I have the honour to report on the general
conduct of the Non-commissioned officers and men of the 1st and 2nd
Battalions Coldstream Guards, during the period of service on the Nile
expedition. The peculiar work which all ranks have been called upon to
perform has been trying and arduous, and for the most part quite novel
to the men. Nevertheless, it gives me the greatest satisfaction to
testify to the cheerful and zealous manner with which these
exceptional duties have been throughout accomplished. The behaviour of
the men in the field needs no comment from me. The period of inaction,
subsequent to the campaign, has been perhaps not the least tedious to
soldiers, who lately had seen a good deal of hard work and excitement,
but their behaviour has been uniformly unexceptionable.”
-----
The casualties of the Coldstream inflicted by the enemy in the field
have already been noted in their proper place; but no mention has been
made of those who died of disease during the two expeditions. It appears
that sickness was less common in the interior than was the case among
the troops stationed on the coast of the Red Sea; and six men only of
the Coldstream died of illness during the many months they were employed
on the Nile. The Regiment, however, had to deplore the death of
Lieutenant G. Sutton and of 13 men of the 1st Battalion who succumbed to
the climate of Suakin; while several Officers and 110 men had to be sent
to England invalided. Lieutenant Sutton, a young Officer of great merit
and of much promise, fell ill a short time before the end of the
expedition, and was sent for a short cruise, in the hope that his health
might be thereby re-established. He returned, as he thought, better, and
resumed duty; but a very few days later he was again obliged to be
placed upon the sick-list, and, becoming rapidly worse, he died at sea,
May 18th, on his way home, before the steamer reached Suez, to the great
sorrow of his brother Officers.
The Guards camp at Mount Troödos was broken up, and the 1st Coldstream
marched from that place on the 24th of August, down to Limasol, where
they embarked on board the _Orontes_ (26th) in company with the
Grenadiers, the Scots Guards being on the _Poonah_. The Battalion
reached Spithead early on the 10th of September, and proceeded next day
to London, where they received a hearty welcome from their friends and
the public at large.
The following extract of a letter, written by Colonel Lambton soon after
his return from the Sudan, to the Officer Commanding the 2nd Battalion,
refers to the men belonging to the latter, and temporarily posted to the
service Battalion for duty during the war:—
Now that the men belonging to the 2nd Battalion have left us, I should
like to express to you how satisfied I have been with their conduct
during the late campaign. I am glad to see there has been no
distinction between the two Battalions; all have done their best to
keep up the credit and reputation of the Regiment.
Medals for the Sudan campaign were issued to Officers, Non-commissioned
officers, and men on the 7th of November; and by General Order, January
10, 1886, it was intimated that Her Majesty the Queen had been
graciously pleased to approve of the three Regiments of Foot Guards
being permitted to bear the words “Suakin, 1885” upon their Colours.
Early in 1883, the record of Marlborough’s battles, which had been
somewhat strangely passed over in the past, were also added to the
Colours, and the Coldstream then showed the following honourable
distinctions, viz. “The Sphinx, superscribed 'Egypt.' Oudenarde.
Malplaquet. Dettingen. Lincelles. Talavera. Barrosa. Peninsula.
Waterloo. Alma. Inkerman. Sevastopol. Egypt, 1882. Tel el-Kebir. Suakin,
1885.”
In December, 1885, the Regiment stood as follows:—
_Colonel._—General Right Hon. Sir Thomas Steele, K.C.B.
_Lieut.-Colonels._—Commanding Regiment.—Col. G. Wigram, C.B.
” Battalions.—Colonels A. Lambton, C.B.;
and J. B. Sterling.
_Majors—Mounted._—Lieut.-Colonels R. S. Hall; Hon. E. Acheson; Hon. E.
Digby; and Hon. H. Corry.
_Dismounted._—Lieut.-Colonels R. Follett; Hon. E. Boscawen, C.B.
(Regimental Adjutant); F. Graves-Sawle; A. Moreton; and R.
Pole-Carew (Military Secretary to the Commander-in-chief in
India).
_Captains._—Lieut.-Colonels J. G. Montgomery; F. Manley; and L. D.
MacKinnon; Captains H. Wetherall; V. Dawson; J. Ross-of-Bladensburg
(A.D.C. to Lord Lieutenant, Ireland); and A. Codrington (Adjutant);
Major Hon. H. Legge; Captains J. Gladstone; D. Dawson (A.D.C. to the
Commander of the Forces, Ireland, H.S.H. Prince Edward of
Saxe-Weimer); and H. Stopford (lately A.D.C. to the Commander of
Forces, Ireland, Sir T. Steele).
_Lieutenants._—Hon. A. Henniker-Major (Adjutant); G. V. Boyle; Hon. H.
Amherst; H. Surtees (employed with Egyptian Army); W. Corbet (A.D.C.
to Major-General Hon. R. Monck); G. P. Bouverie (lately returned
from Special Service in Bechuanaland, South Africa); Hon. A.
Fortescue (lately returned from Special Service in Bechuanaland,
South Africa); B. Gosselin-Lefebre; Hon. R. Winn; P. Lovell; Earl of
Wiltshire; Sir C. Miller, Bart.; C. Kindersley; D. Hamilton; Hon.
Alan Charteris; H. Shute; E. Wigram; Granville Smith; C. Frederick;
G. Wyndham; G. Milligan; C. Holland; Hon. W. Lambton; J.
Drummond-Hay; F. Maude; R. Grenfell; F. Ramsden; C. Monck; Hon. V.
Spencer; J. Hall; J. Sterling; H. Hawkes; Hon. E. Charteris; G.
Taylor; S. Earle; J. Wingfield; Hon. E. Pakenham; Hon. H.
Baillie-Hamilton; J. McNeile; R. Skeffington Smyth.
_Quartermasters._—W. Webster; and H. Folson.
_Medical Officers._—Surgeons-Major C. Read; G. Perry; and J. Magill,
M.D.
” Surgeons A. Alexander; and W. Carte, M.B.
_Solicitor._—R. Broughton, Esq.
The 1st Battalion were on this date quartered at Chelsea barracks
(head-quarters and 5 companies), and at St. George’s (3 companies); the
2nd Battalion at the Tower. The writer of this portion of the History of
the Coldstream Guards here takes leave of them, and wishing them many a
glorious addition to their illustrious records, now bids them, with much
regret, farewell.
APPENDIX I.
1.
_Major-General Sir John Byng to the Duke of York._
“Nivelles, June 19, 1815.
”SIR,
“Your Royal Highness, I am sure, will wish to be informed of the
Conduct of the Brigade of Guards, and, unfortunately, that duty has
devolved upon me from my respected friend, General Cooke, being severely
wounded, having lost His Left Arm. In the brilliant affair of yesterday,
both Brigades have suffered severely, but I have the Authority of the
Duke of Wellington to say, they highly distinguished themselves, that
from the commencement to the end of the Action their conduct was most
excellent. It happened that Both had important duties to perform, which
they gallantly executed. At the commencement of the Action my Brigade,
which was on the extreme Right, had to occupy a House and Wood which it
was of the utmost consequence we should keep. Lieut.-Colonel Macdonell,
of the Coldstream, with two Light Companies, occupied the House, and the
Wood by the Light Companies of the 1st Brigade and some Battalion
Companies of the Battalion of the Coldstream, the whole under
Lieut.-Colonel Lord Saltoun’s Command. Against this post the first
Attack of the Enemy was made, and was successfully resisted, as were the
numerous efforts made to the close of the Day by the Enemy to get
possession. The Duke of Wellington Himself in the early part of the day
gave his particular attention to that point, and, when called to the
Left by a serious Attack on that point, He confided it to my care, with
directions to keep the House to the last moment, relieving the Troops as
they required it,—and the whole of the Brigade, except two Companies,
were required before the Action ceased; Colonels Hepburn and Woodford,
affording me every assistance, and giving a fine example to their
Battalions.
“The conduct of Lieut.-Colonel Macdonell in defending the House, even
when it was on fire, and maintaining it, as ordered, has, I have no
doubt, been particularly noticed to you by The Commander of the Forces.
It was admirable, as was that of Lieut.-Colonel Lord Saltoun. About four
o’clock, the command of the Division devolved upon me, and, having rode
over to see the 1st Brigade just at the time the attack was made by the
Enemy’s Cavalry, I had an opportunity of witnessing the steady manner in
which they received the several charges made to their front. I had also
to witness the gallantry with which they met the last Attack made by the
Grenadiers of the Imperial Guard ordered on by Bonaparte himself, the
destructive fire they poured in, and the subsequent Charge which
together completely routed the Enemy; a second attempt met with a
similar reception, and the loss they caused to the French, of the finest
Troops I ever saw, was immense. I beg you, Sir, to understand that my
presence or advice to General Maitland never was required, I merely
staid with Him as an humble Individual, when the assistance of every one
was required. His own judgment and gallantry directed everything that
was necessary. I cannot say too much in His praise, or in that of the
several Commanders his Battalions had. The conduct, Sir, of every
Officer and Man of both Brigades was everything I could wish; the
Officers on every occasion being conspicuous for their Gallantry.
Sincerely do I regret the loss of so many valuable Officers, such
excellent Men. I hope I have not trespassed too far on Your Royal
Highness in my wish to do justice to my gallant Friends and Soldiers. I
believe every one who witnessed their Conduct will confirm my statement.
The Staff of the Division afforded me every assistance; Lieut.-Colonel
Sir Henry Bradford, Assistant Quartermaster-General, was wounded. My
Brigade Major, Captain Stothert, has lost an Arm, and my Aide-de-camp,
Captain Dumaresq, was shot through the Body.
“I propose recommending to the Duke of Wellington, Lieut.-Colonel
Stanhope, of the First Guards, to do duty for Sir H. Bradford, and
Captain Walton, Adjutant of the Coldstream, to succeed Captain Stothert
as Brigade Major. Should I obtain His Grace’s assent, I hope the
Appointments will meet with your approval.
“I have, etc.
“(Signed) JOHN BYNG,
“Major-General.”
2.
GENERAL ORDERS, NIVELLES, JUNE 20, 1815.
“The Field Marshal takes this opportunity of returning to the army his
thanks for their conduct in the glorious action fought on the 18th
inst., and he will not fail to report his sense of their conduct in the
terms which it deserves to their several Sovereigns....
“As the army is about to enter the French territory, the Field Marshal
desires it may be understood by the troops of the several nations
composing the army which he has the honor to command, that their
Sovereigns are in alliance with the King of France, and that France
therefore must be considered as a friendly country. No article is to be
taken from any individual by any officer or soldier, without payment for
the same. The Commissaries of the army will supply the troops with all
that they require in the usual manner, and no requisition is to be made
direct on the country or its magistrates, by any officer or soldier. The
Commissaries will receive directions, either from the Field Marshal or
from the Generals commanding the troops of the several nations (if these
troops should not be supplied with provisions by the British
Commissariat) to make requisitions as may be necessary for the supply of
the troops, for which they will give the usual voucher and receipt; and
they will understand that they will be responsible to issue and account
for what they will thus receive from the country in France, in the same
manner as they would if they purchased supplies for the troops in their
own country respectively....”[471]
-----
Footnote 471:
_The Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, during his
Various Campaigns, etc._ , (compiled by Colonel Garwood), viii. 156.
(London, 1847.)
-----
3.
PROCLAMATION OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON TO THE FRENCH PEOPLE, JUNE 22,
1815.
“Je fais savoir aux Français que j’entre dans leur pays à la tête d’une
armée déjà victorieuse, non en ennemi (excepté de l’usurpateur, prononcé
l’ennemi du genre humain, avec lequel on ne peut avoir ni paix ni
trève), mais pour les aider à secouer le joug de fer sous lequel ils
sont opprimés. En conséquence, j’ai donné les ordres ci-joints à mon
armée, et je demande qu’on me fasse connaître tout infracteur. Les
Français savent cependant que j’ai le droit d’exiger qu’ils se
conduisent de manière que je puisse les protéger contre ceux qui
voudraient leur faire du mal. Il faut donc qu’ils fournissent aux
réquisitions qui leur seront faites de la part des personnes autorisées
à les faire, en échange des reçus en forme et ordre; et qu’ils se
tiennent chez eux paisiblement, et qu’ils n’aient aucune correspondance
ou communication avec l’usurpateur ennemi, ni avec ses adhérents. Tous
ceux qui s’absenteront de leur domicile après l’entrée en France, et
tous ceux qui se trouveront absens au service de l’usurpateur, seront
considérés comme ses adhérents et comme ennemis; et leurs propriétés
seront affectées à la subsistance de l’armée.
“Donné au Quartier-Général, à Malplaquet, ce 22 Juin, 1815.”[472]
-----
Footnote 472:
_Ibid._ , viii.
-----
APPENDIX II.
1.
GENERAL ORDER, PARIS, OCTOBER 28, 1815.
“Before the troops go into barracks or cantonments, an officer of each
troop or company is to visit the barracks or cantonments which the
soldiers are to occupy, and to ascertain the state in which they are.
The name of the owner of the house in which the troops will be cantoned,
and the names of the soldiers cantoned in the house, must be kept. On
marching days, the barracks and cantonments of each company are to be
visited by an officer, once if possible after the troops will have
arrived, and once before they will march; and upon halting days the
barracks and cantonments of the soldiers must be visited twice every day
by the officer of the company or troop to which they belong; these
visiting officers will observe whether any article has been taken away,
if the troops are in cantonments, and will inquire whether the owner of
the house has any complaint to make of the men. Non-commissioned
officers must be cantoned with the squads to which they belong, and the
officers as near as possible to their companies; the Field-officers with
their regiments; the Generals and Staff as near as possible to their
brigades and divisions.
”WELLINGTON.”[473]
-----
Footnote 473:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 215.
-----
2.
_Lieut.-Colonel Sir C. Broke to Lieut.-General Lord Hill._
“Paris, October 29, 1815.
““MY LORD,
“I am desired by His Grace the Duke of Wellington to inform you
that the circumstances attending the present situation of the army
render it expedient that His Grace should request you will call the
attention of the officers under your command to the necessity of the
strictest discipline and most exact regularity of the troops in the
cantonments which they are about to occupy; and in order to ensure the
uniform conduct of the service, His Grace desires that the following
points may be attended to:—
“Billets are to be made by the mayors, or persons acting for them. They
are to be applied for by officers of the Quartermaster-General’s
Department of Divisions; or if there are no officers of the
Quartermaster-General’s Department, by Staff officers of divisions or
brigades; or if there are no Staff officers, by Quartermasters. Where
there are no mayors or persons having authority to issue billets, the
billets are to be arranged and portioned by the officers of the
Quartermaster-General’s Department of the Divisions; or if there are no
officers of the Quartermaster General’s Department, by Staff officers of
divisions or brigades; or if there are no Staff officers, by
Quartermasters. All billets when granted are to be made use of. If the
owner of a house refuse a billet, it is to be made good, if necessary by
force; but this measure must be sanctioned by the officers of the
Quartermaster-General’s Department’s of Division; or if there are no
officers of the Quartermaster-General’s Department, by the Staff
officers of divisions or brigades; or if there is no Staff officer, by
the Quartermaster authorised to arrange the billets. If the owner of a
house takes away his furniture, or by other means endeavours to deter
officers from entering the billet, the Commanding officer is to place
soldiers in the house. No inhabitant is to be required to accommodate
persons that are not entitled to billets; and it is particularly desired
that officers will not give grounds for complaint by taking their wives
or families into billets without having the consent of the owner of the
house to do so.
“Officers are to be warned against shooting over the country without
having permission of the proprietors. The General Orders of the army
have already given sufficient caution upon this subject.
“The situation of the troops will require that military precautions
should be attended to. Alarm posts are to be established, guards and
pickets are to be posted, and sufficient measures taken for the security
of the communications and for the safety and tranquillity of the
cantonments. The most efficient steps are to be taken for the prompt and
certain circulation of orders, so that the whole or any part of the
troops may be collected at the shortest notice.
“Attention must be paid in the billets of soldiers to the ammunition,
and to its security against accident or robbery; for this the frequent
company inspection will be a precaution.
“The parks of artillery are to be formed where they can be protected;
they are never to be without guards, and troops should be sufficiently
near to afford them support.
“If an attroupement or riotous assembly of the inhabitants against the
military takes place, the troops are to be under arms, and the
attroupement is to be fired upon. Any act of violence against the
soldiery is to be immediately noticed, and the offenders are to be
secured. The service must be respected. The General Officers are to take
care that the discipline and good conduct of the troops merit the
respect demanded. The mayors are to be informed of the measures that
will be taken, and are to be desired to warn the inhabitants against
taking part in the disturbances that may subject them to military
punishment.”
3.
_The Same to the Same._
“Paris, October 30, 1815.
“MY LORD,
“It is the Duke of Wellington’s desire that a place of rendezvous
should be fixed upon for each division of the army. The routes by which
the troops may best move to the place of rendezvous should be
reconnoitred, and such instructions given as may render the assembly
easy and expeditious. The places of rendezvous or general alarm posts of
the troops under your Lordship’s command should be:—
“For the 2nd Division—Versailles, or about the cantonments of the
division that are nearest to Paris.
“For the 4th Division—Longjumeau, or about the cantonments of the
division that are nearest to Paris.
“Baron Estorff’s Cavalry—Bièsvres, or about the cantonments of the
brigade nearest to Paris.
“The Nassau troops—Ecouen or Pierrefitte, or about the cantonments of
the troops nearest to Paris.
“The ground fixed upon should be clear of the towns or villages, and
towards Paris. The troops when assembled are to be in marching order,
with their baggage. If any other point of assembly is desired, the
instructions that may be given will express it. The brigades and
battalions of the divisions are, however, at the same time, to have
their alarm posts.”[474]
-----
Footnote 474:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 218, 219.
-----
APPENDIX III.
_From the Duke of York to the Duke of Wellington._
“Horse Guards, November 9, 1815.
“MY LORD DUKE,
“Having received an intimation from His Majesty’s Government
that a contingent British force, consisting of 30,000 troops, shall be
maintained in France for a certain period after the definitive treaty
of peace, and the period having now arrived for carrying into effect
the organization of this force, and for removing the remainder of the
British army to this country, I have the Prince Regent’s commands to
acquaint your Grace that the following are the corps selected to
remain in France, according to this arrangement, under the command of
your Grace, viz.:—
CAVALRY.
Present Recruits Total.
strength. from
England.
1st Dragoon Guards 392 58 450
2nd ” ” 418 32 450
3rd Dragoons 365 40 405
7th Hussars 357 93 450
11th Light Dragoons 387 63 450
12th ” ” 341 109 450
13th ” ” 343 70 413
15th Hussars 347 103 450
18th ” 386 64 450
Waggon Train Troops 600 .. 600
INFANTRY.
First Foot Guards, 3rd Battalion .. .. 1200
Coldstream Guards, 2nd Battalion 996 204 1200
1st Foot, 3rd Battalion .. .. 1000
3rd Foot, 1st ” 827 173 1000
4th ” ” ” 662 150 712
5th ” ” ” 1116 .. 1000
6th ” ” ” 781 69 850
7th ” ” ” 868 132 1000
9th ” ” ” 1051 .. 1000
21st ” ” ” 804 196 1000
23rd ” 671 29 700
27th ” ” ” .. .. 1000
29th ” 808 22 830
39th ” ” ” 842 108 950
40th ” ” ” 694 106 800
43rd ” ” ” 1044 .. 1000
52nd ” ” ” 987 13 1000
57th ” ” ” 601 149 750
71st ” ” ” 803 130 933
79th ” ” ” 692 80 772
81st ” ” ” .. .. 1000
88th ” ” ” 1130 .. 1000
91st ” ” ” 848 100 948
95th ” 1st ” (six companies) 577 .. 600
” ” 2nd ” ” ” 534 .. 600
Staff Corps 302 .. 200
———
Cavalry and Infantry .. .. 27,613
Artillery .. .. 2000
Officers and Non-commissioned officers .. .. 3300
———
Total 32,913
———
“With regard to the cavalry, the detachments of men from the depôts in
this country will be forwarded without delay; and your Grace will be
pleased to order a transfer of horses from the corps that are to
return to England to complete the regiments remaining in France to 420
horses each, leaving five dismounted men in each troop.
“Your Grace will order the 3rd Battalion of the First Guards to be
completed to 1,200 from the 2nd Battalion. The 2nd Battalion of the
Coldstream will be completed from the 1st Battalion in this country to
the same number.
“Your Grace will also be pleased to order the transfer of such
effectives as may be required from the 4th Battalion of the Royals,
3rd Battalion of the 27th, and 2nd Battalion of the 81st, to complete
the 3rd Battalion of the former and the 1st Battalions of the two
latter corps to 1,000 rank and file. The remaining transfers from the
2nd Battalions and depôts necessary to complete the corps in the
manner specified in the foregoing list will be forwarded from this
country without delay, and will probably reach their destination
before the final departure of the troops returning home; but until
their arrival, your Grace will keep such corps from among those
destined for England as may be necessary to keep the contingent
complete in the first instance.
“Having made this selection of the corps to remain in France as the
British contingent under your command, it remains for me to convey to
your Grace, the Prince Regent’s command that the following corps shall
be marched for embarkation to ,[475] under the charge of the Staff
that is not destined to remain in France, as soon as your Grace shall
have completed your arrangements.
-----
Footnote 475:
Blank in manuscript.
-----
R. and F.
1st Life Guards 233
2nd ” ” 191
Royal Horse Guards 302
3rd Dragoon Guards 310
1st Dragoons 293
2nd ” 298
6th ” 309
10th Hussars 448
16th Light Dragoons 390
23rd ” ” 384
Waggon Train 800
First Foot Guards, 2nd Battalion 720
Third ” ” ” ” 1139
1st Foot, 4th Battalion 500
12th ” 2nd ” 610
14th ” 3rd ” 593
16th ” 617
25th ” 2nd Battalion 426
27th ” 3rd ” 585
28th ” 497
30th ” 2nd Battalion 575
32nd ” 555
33rd ” 470
35th ” 2nd Battalion 575
36th Foot 416
37th ” 2nd Battalion 542
38th ” 654
41st ” 860
42nd ” 472
44th ” 2nd Battalion 737
51st ” 558
54th ” 547
58th ” 1st Battalion 630
59th ” 2nd ” 458
62nd ” ” ” 538
64th ” 508
69th ” 2nd Battalion 454
73rd ” ” ” 490
78th ” ” ” 327
81st ” ” ” 390
82nd ” 1st ” 825
90th ” 1st ” 820
92nd ” 526
95th ” 3rd Battalion 480
2nd Garrison Battalion 992
7th Veteran ” 670
———
Total 24,714
———
“I am further to acquaint your Grace that the Prince Regent has been
pleased to approve of Lieut.-General Lord Combermere to command the
cavalry and Lieut.-General Lord Hill the corps of infantry, under your
command; and upon the calculation that the corps of cavalry will
consist of three brigades, and that your Grace will find it expedient
to form the infantry, exclusive of the Guards, into three divisions
and eight brigades, the following are the Officers who it is proposed
to attach to these respective corps:—
Lieut.-General Sir Lowry Cole, G.C.B.
” ” Sir Henry Clinton, G.C.B.
” ” Sir Charles Colville, G.C.B.
Major-General Sir James Kempt, G.C.B.
” ” Sir Thomas Brisbane, K.C.B.
” ” Lord Edward Somerset, K.C.B.
(Cavalry).
” ” Sir Thomas Bradford, K.C.B.
” ” Sir John Lambert, K.C.B.
” ” Sir Manley Power, K.C.B.
” ” Sir C. Grant, K.C.B. (Cavalry).
” ” Sir P. Maitland (Guards).
” ” Sir John Keane, K.C.B.
” ” Sir Frederick Adam, K.C.B.
” ” Sir H. Vivian, K.C.B. (Cavalry).
Adjutant-General, Major-General Sir E. Barnes, K.C.B.
Quartermaster-General, Lieut.-General Sir George Murray, G.C.B.
“Your Grace will be pleased to make a selection of the Staff for the
Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General’s Departments, as well as
the Medical, Commissariat, and Pay Departments, which you think
adequate to the service; and when your Grace shall have made your
selection of the members and the individuals, I request you will send
a list for the Prince Regent’s final approval.
“I am, my Lord Duke,
“Yours sincerely,
“FREDERICK.”[476]
-----
Footnote 476:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc., of the Duke of Wellington_ , xi. 228.
-----
APPENDIX IV.
DISTRIBUTION OF THE BRITISH CONTINGENT IN
FRANCE, APRIL 10, 1816.
CAVALRY.
Head-quarters. Stations. No. of No. of No. of
Officers. Men. Horses.
1st Brigade Cassel 1st Dragoon Frevent and
Gds. adjacents 30 458 438
2nd ” ” Avesnes and
adjacents 22 437 420
2nd Dragoons Bailleul 26 431 579
2nd Brigade Samer 7th Hussars Etaples and 14
detachments 25 459 430
12th Lt. Fruges and 9
Dragoons detachments 30 499 433
18th Hussars Deserves and 9
detachments 24 468 426
R. H. Samer and 4
Artillery detachments 4 170 189
3rd ” Cassel 11th Lt. Wormhout and 4
Dragoons detachments 28 462 405
15th Hussars Bourbourg and
vicinity 24 496 437
13th Lt. Hazebrouck and
Dragoons 7
detachments 27 394 398
R. H. Samer
Artillery 4 164 171
INFANTRY.
FIRST DIVISION (Head-quarters, Cambrai):—
1st Brigade Cambrai Grenadier Gds. Cambrai 27 1259 75
Coldstream Gds. Cambrai 11 257 29
Marcoing 5 231 9
Gouzeacourt 4 226 9
Gonnelieu 1 3 3
Villers Glishain 3 116 5
Honnecourt 2 117 5
Villers Ploich and Beaugaart 3 116 10
Banteau and Bantouzelle 2 113 3
— —— —
Total Coldstream Guards 31 1179 73
7th ” St. Leger 43rd Regiment Bapaume and 10
detachments 43 1079 69
7th ” Amblainsville
and 13
detachments 37 933 54
23rd ” Hamelincourt
and 13
detachments 39 722 52
Commissariat Sapignies,
Farreuil,
Bapaume 3 90 126
8th ” Beaumez 27th Regiment Bugny and 14
detachments 44 988 67
40th ” Havincourt and
8
detachments 26 653 48
1st Battalion Bourlon and 5
Rifle Brigade detachments 30 503 57
Commissariat Bugny 1 30 46
Divisional R. Artillery Bapaume 8 216 90
” Commissariat ” 1 10 17
SECOND DIVISION (Head-quarters, St. Pol):—
3rd Brigade St. Pol 3rd Regiment Croix and 15
detachments 35 1013 50
39th ” Bethincourt
and 18
detachments 43 968 62
91st ” St. Pol and 18
detachments 43 992 61
Commissariat Vallum,
Bailleul,
Maisnil 2 90 140
4th ” ” 4th Regiment Fauquembourg
and 15
detachments 29 814 52
52nd ” Upen de Aval
and 24
detachments 39 1003 70
79th ” Wizernes and
16
detachments 37 671 42
Commissariat Clety, Dohen 2 52 80
6th ” Lillers 6th Regiment Lillers and 6
detachments 35 843 38
29th ” Chocques and 5
detachments 31 861 59
71st ” Norrein Fonte
and 18
detachments 35 864 62
Commissariat Bourcq, St.
Hilaire 1 40 74
Royal Sappers Well, Pernes,
and Miners Floringham 8 101 63
Divisional R. Artillery Lillers, St.
Pol, Lillers
Barbent 15 258 285
” Commissariat Le Parcq 2 34 49
” R. Waggon Train Aubigny and 1
detachment 4 76 104
THIRD DIVISION (Head-quarters, Valenciennes):—
2nd Brigade Valenciennes 3rd Battn. Valenciennes
Royals 36 1132 49
57th Regiment ” 43 705 30
2nd Battalion Les Celles and
Rifle Brigade 2
detachments 29 553 40
5th ” ” 5th Regiment Valenciennes 37 1152 49
9th ” St. Amand 40 1032 36
21st ” Valenciennes 42 1004 43
9th ” ” 81st ” ” 37 1076 40
88th ” ” 34 1113 56
Royal Artillery ” and St. Amand 13 376 304
” Waggon Train Raillencourt and 3
detachments 15 166 255
” Staff Corps Proville and 1 detachment 11 168 ..
Commissariat Waggon St. Pol, Valenciennes,
Train Sancourt, Oissy, and 10
detachments 48 1343 1810
_Note._—Several of the detachments were commanded by Non-commissioned
officers only.[477]
-----
Footnote 477:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 355.
-----
APPENDIX V.
SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE BAND OF THE COLDSTREAM
GUARDS.
The Band of the Coldstream Guards dates from the 16th of May, 1785, when
twelve German musicians were enlisted by the Duke of York, Colonel of
the Regiment, and were sent to England to replace the eight civilian
performers who were hired by the month, for the purpose only of playing
the King’s Guard to the Palace and back. They were brought over by Mr.
Eley, who was appointed “Music Major.” Mr. Eley was succeeded by Messrs.
Weyrauch, Denman, and Willman. In 1825, Mr. Charles Godfrey—who, having
joined the 1st Royal Surrey Militia as drummer at an early age, entered
the Coldstream in 1813—was appointed Bandmaster in 1825, by the Colonel,
the Duke of Cambridge; and he remained in that position until his death
in 1863, though his military service ended in 1834. The following
Regimental Order was issued on the 18th of December, 1863:—“The
Commanding Officer is desired by General Sir William Gomm to express his
sense of the loss the Regiment has experienced in the decease of Mr.
Godfrey; the acknowledged efficiency of the band is in itself a proof of
his talents as bandmaster, whilst the esteem and respect which he has
earned from all ranks, during a period of upwards of fifty years’
service, sufficiently attest his worth as a man and a soldier.” He was
succeeded by his son, Mr. F. Godfrey, who retained the bandmastership
until 1880, when Mr. Thomas was appointed; the latter was replaced by
Mr. Rogan in 1896. The band consisted, in 1888, of a Bandmaster, two
Sergeants, two Corporals, and forty Musicians.
Three negroes were added; they carried two tambourines and a set of
Turkish bells, and they continued part of the band until 1837, when they
were abolished.[478]
-----
Footnote 478:
Taken from _Music for the People_ , by Robert A. Marr.
-----
The Drums date from 1650, when the Regiment contained one Drum-Major and
twenty Drummers; the former was reduced in 1657, and replaced in 1670,
and a second Drum-Major was appointed in 1810. In 1758, four fifers were
added to the two Grenadier Companies, two to each. On the 6th of
November, 1815, “it being desirable that the several duties of the drum
and fife should be performed in the same manner throughout the service,
and it being essential that one general principle or system of
instruction should be laid down for the guidance of Regiments,” three
books, viz. _A Treatise on Music for the Study of Boys in Her Majesty’s
Service; Instructions for the Fife_; and _Instructions for Beating the
Drum by Note_ , which had been prepared by Drum-Major Potter of the
Coldstream Guards, were sent by the Adjutant-General to the Officer
Commanding the Regiment, for the use of the Coldstream. “It is His Royal
Highness’s command that, after a reasonable period, you will be pleased
to forward a report of the progress of the drummers and fifers, of a
nature calculated to enable the Commander-in-Chief to determine as to
the expediency of the mode of instruction, therein prescribed, being
generally adopted in the service. The treatise which has been prepared
for boys intended to be trained as drummers and fifers, it is
recommended to use in the Regimental School, in order that as soon as
the boys are able to read and write they may be required to copy parts
thereof on their slates, and which may also from time to time be
explained to them by the Drum and Fife-Majors.”
In reply, the Commanding Officer stated, on the 6th of January, 1816,
that, having inspected the boys, they appeared completely acquainted
with the duties of the drum and fife, in the course of one month’s
teaching according to the system proposed in the books above-mentioned;
also that the boys belonging to the Regimental school of the Regiment,
were prepared, without difficulty, in the mode proposed for the further
instruction from “the Drum and Fife-Majors.”
Subsequently, the following General Order was issued by H.R.H. the
Commander-in-Chief, dated December 28, 1816: “The mode of instruction
for drum and fife, practised in the Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards,
having been referred to several Regiments in order to ascertain whether
its adoption would be attended with advantage, and the reports which
have been received appearing satisfactory, the Commander-in-Chief, with
a view of assimilating the respective ‘Calls and Beats‘ throughout the
several Regiments of Infantry, is pleased to command that the system of
instruction for the drum and fife, introduced by Drum-Major Potter, of
the Coldstream Guards, shall be considered as the established system,
and be adopted accordingly.”
APPENDIX VI.
1.
GENERAL ORDER TO THE ALLIED ARMY OF OCCUPATION,
NOVEMBER 10, 1818.
“ORDRE DU JOUR.
“Il est impossible au Feld Maréchal Duc de Wellington de prendre congé
des troupes qu’il a eu l’honneur d’avoir sous ses ordres, sans leur
offrir ses remercîmens pour la bonne conduite, par laquelle elles se
sont distinguées pendant tout le temps de son Commandement. Trois ans se
sont presque écoulés depuis que les Souverains Alliés ont bien voulu
confier au Feld Maréchal le Commandement de cette partie de leurs forces
militaires que les circonstances du moment leur avaient rendu nécessaire
de continuer en France. Si cette mesure adoptée par Leurs Majestés s’est
effectuée d’une manière qui leur a paru satisfaisante, ce succès ne doit
être attribué qu‘à la conduite conciliante observée en toute occasion
par leurs Excellences les Généraux Commandans en Chef; au bon exemple
qui a été donné par elles à leur subordonnés, les Généraux et autres
Officiers de l‘Armée, et à l’assistance que ceux-ci leur ont rendue;
comme aussi à l’exacte discipline qui a toujours regnée dans tous les
Contingents. Ce ne peut être qu’avec des sentimens de regret que le Feld
Maréchal voit le moment arrivé où la séparation de l‘Armée doit terminer
les relations de service, et les liaisons, qu’il a eues avec Leurs
Excellences les Généraux Commandans, et avec les autres Officiers de
leurs Corps. Le Feld Maréchal ne peut se dissimuler combien ces
relations ont été avantageuses pour lui; et il prie les Généraux
Commandans en Chef des différens Contingents, de vouloir bien agréer
eux-mêmes, et communiquer aussi à ceux qui sont sous leurs ordres, les
assurances du vif intérêt qu’il ne cessera de prendre à tout ce qui les
regarde, et combien lui seront chers les souvenirs des trois années
pendant lesquelles il a eu l’honneur d‘être placé à leur tête.
“LE LIEUTENANT-GÉNÉRAL,
“Chef de l‘Etat Major Général de l‘Armée Alliée.”[479]
-----
Footnote 479:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xii. 795.
-----
2.
GENERAL ORDER, CAMBRAI, NOVEMBER 10, 1818.
“Upon the return to England of the troops which have so long served
under the command of the Field Marshal, he again returns them his thanks
for their uniform good conduct during the period in which they have
formed part of the Army of Occupation. The Field Marshal has, in another
Order, addressed to the Army of Occupation at large, expressed his
sentiments regarding the conduct of, and his obligations to, the General
Officers and Officers of the Army. These are especially due to the
General Officers and Officers of the British Contingent; and he begs
them to accept his best acknowledgments for the example they have given
to others by their own good conduct, and for the support and assistance
they have invariably afforded him to maintain the discipline of the
Army. After a service of ten years‘ duration, almost without
interruption, with the same Officers and troops, the Field Marshal
separates from them with regret; but he trusts that they will believe
that he will never cease to feel a concern for their honour and
interest.
“WELLINGTON.”[480]
-----
Footnote 480:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xii. 826.
-----
3.
GENERAL ORDER, PARIS, DECEMBER 1, 1818.
“The Field Marshal has great satisfaction in publishing to the troops
which have lately served under his command the following letter from
H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief, conveying the Prince Regent’s gracious
approbation of their conduct while serving in France.
“‘Horse Guards, November 27, 1818.
“‘MY LORD DUKE,
“‘The Army of Occupation having now finally returned from
France, I have the Prince Regent’s commands to convey to your Grace
the thanks of His Royal Highness for the discipline and good order
which has been so successfully maintained, to the honour of the
British arms, during the period it has been stationed in that
country. I have frequently had occasion to address your Grace, by
command of the Sovereign, in the language of just commendation of
the brilliant victories achieved under the guidance of your genius;
but although the events of peace do not furnish the grounds for
conveying the warmth of expression which a sense of the
distinguished actions of warfare so strongly called forth, yet the
conduct of the army, while stationed in the country of their former
enemy, where the discipline and good order established by your Grace
were calculated to conciliate the inhabitants, and to uphold the
character of the British arms in the view of surrounding nations,
cannot fail to draw forth the Prince Regent’s cordial approbation
and thanks, as well as the gratitude of the country to your Grace
and to them. I am commanded to request that your Grace will be
pleased to make these sentiments known to the General and other
Officers who have been under your command, in any manner you may
think proper.
“‘FREDERICK,
“‘Commander-in-Chief.’”[481]
-----
Footnote 481:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xii. 856.
-----
APPENDIX VII.
COLDSTREAM GUARDS HOSPITAL.
A Hospital for the Regiment was first established in 1814, previous
to which date the sick were attended in their own quarters. Premises
were secured in Rochester Row, and a lease of seven years obtained,
Dec. 25, 1814, at a rental of £90 per annum, by Colonel Hon. Henry
Brand, at that time the Lieut.-Colonel of the Regiment. In June,
1823, the lease was renewed for twenty-one years, at £145 a year, to
Colonels Woodford, Sir Henry Bouverie, and Macdonell. The lease was
then again renewed, June, 1844, for fourteen years, at the same
rent, and on payment of a fine of £200. In 1855 an addition was made
to the premises on the south side, and a lease for this addition was
granted to Colonels Hon. G. Upton and Lord Frederick Paulet, for
3-1/4 years, at a yearly rent of £113 10_s_. The lease of the whole
premises was further renewed in 1858, for a term of forty years, to
Colonels Hon. George Upton, Lord Frederick Paulet, and W. Newton, on
payment of a fine of £315, and at a yearly rent of £185. The sum of
£3850 was then spent on rebuilding the greater part of the Hospital.
Before this lease expired, Government took over the Hospital, and
this transaction, begun in 1881, was finally completed in 1889.
APPENDIX VIII.
THE NULLI SECUNDUS CLUB.
Appendix No. 256 of Colonel MacKinnon’s _Origin and Services of the
Coldstream Guards_ (ii. 373) contains an account of the formation
and history of the Nulli Secundus Club up to the year 1832. Since
then, the rules were altered (1869) so as to render Officers
eligible for ballot who leave the Regiment after having served
therein for three years, (reduced to two years in 1896). On account
of the new arrangements introduced into the Medical Service of the
Brigade (see _ante_, p. 340), Medical Officers transferred to the
Coldstream from another regiment of the Brigade, are eligible for
election, provided they are members of the First or Third Guards
Clubs. And lastly, the service of Medical Officers when attached to
the Regiment, counts towards election to the Nulli Secundus Club;
but they are not eligible for election until permanently appointed
to the Regiment.
The signal honour graciously conferred upon the members of the Nulli
Secundus Club by His Majesty William IV., of receiving them annually
at dinner, has already been adverted to in the text (see _ante_, p.
92).
In the year 1883, the club held its centenary celebration, when all
Officers belonging to the Coldstream, who were not members at the
time, were invited to dinner. Colonel G. R. FitzRoy, Lieut.-Colonel
of the Regiment, presided. The meeting took place at the Albion
Tavern, Aldersgate Street, on May the 30th.
The following is the roll of members of the Nulli Secundus Club.
ORIGINAL MEMBERS.
Fremantle, J. E.
Bosville, Thomas B.
Webb, Nathaniel.
Knight, Francis.
Calvert, George.
Gascoyne, Isaac.
1783.
Gould, Charles.
Vachell, Richard.
Bridgeman, John.
Hewgill, Edwin.
Fraser, John Henry.
Calcraft, John.
Boscawen, Nicholas.
1784.
Fane, Hon. Thomas.
Sutton, John.
Wyndham, Hon. William,
Cavan, Earl of.
1785.
Thoroton, Thomas.
Finch, Hon. Edward.
Morshead, William.
Stopford, Viscount (afterwards Earl of Courtown).
Boscawen, William A. S.
Morgan, Charles (afterwards Sir Charles, Bart.).
1786.
Madocks, Joseph.
Parker, Hon. Thomas.
1788.
Morrison, Edward.
York, H.R.H. Duke of.
1789.
Spencer, John.
1790.
Saye and Sele, Lord.
Gregory, Richard.
Hotham, Charles (afterwards Sir Charles, Bart.).
1791.
Strathavon, Lord (afterwards Marquis of Huntly).
De Visme, William.
Eld, George.
Wynyard, William.
Calvert, Harry (afterwards Sir Harry, Bart.).
Windsor, Hon. Henry (afterwards Earl of Plymouth).
Nugent, George (afterwards Sir George, Bart.).
1794.
FitzRoy, Hon. George (afterwards Lord Southampton).
Hulse, Richard.
FitzRoy, Hon. W.
Buller, William.
Morris, Roger.
Howard, Kenneth A. (afterwards Earl of Effingham).
Dyke, George Hart.
Pomeroy, Hon. G.
1795.
Forbes, Hon. James (afterwards Lord Forbes).
Fuller, Joseph (afterwards Sir J.).
Brand, Hon. Henry (afterwards Lord Dacre).
1796.
Stanwix, Thomas S.
Brownrigg, Robert.
1797.
Vane, William Walter.
Dungarven, Lord (afterwards Earl of Cork).
Brice, Arthur.
Hotham, B
Chester, Harry.
1798.
Wingfield, Hon. John (afterwards Hon. J. Wingfield-Stratford).
Armstrong, Thomas.
1799.
Upton, Hon. Arthur Percy.
1800.
Peacocke, W. M. (afterwards Sir W.).
Boulton, Richard.
Stirling, Gilbert (afterwards Sir Gilbert, Bart.).
Wynyard, Montague.
Lloyd, John A.
1801.
MacKinnon, Henry.
Sheridan, William (afterwards Sir William, Bart.).
Plunkett, Hon. Edward (afterwards Lord Dunsany).
Smith, George.
Phillips, James.
Jackson, Richard D. (afterwards Sir Richard).
Onslow, Mathew.
Cadogan, Hon. Henry.
1802.
Ross, John.
Acland, William P. (afterwards Sir W.).
1805.
Conyers, H. J.
Braddyll, Thomas.
Adams, Lucius F.
1806.
Cambridge, H.R.H. Duke of.
Woodford, Alexander G. (afterwards Sir Alexander).
1807.
Pringle, William Henry (afterwards Sir William).
Dalling, Edward.
1808.
Hamilton, William.
Bouverie, Henry Frederick (afterwards Sir Henry).
1809.
Sutton, Francis Manners.
1810.
Collier, George.
Barrow, Thomas.
Buller.[482]
Aylmer, Lord.
Vachell, H. V.
1812.
Simpson, John (Surgeon-Major).
Sullivan, Sir Henry, Bart.
Taylor, Herbert (afterwards Sir Herbert).
Lascelles, Edward.
1813.
MacKinnon, Daniel.
Wynyard, W. C.
1814.
Milman, Francis M.
Raikes, William Henry.
Sandilands, P.
Bowles, George (afterwards Sir George).
Bayly, Henry.
1815.
Gore, Thomas.
Steele, Thomas.
Walpole, Hon. John.
Walton, William L.
Harvey, J. V.
Prince, John.
Dawkins, Henry.
Buller.[483]
Talbot, John.
Percival, G. H.
-----
Footnote 482:
Either William Buller (1794) re-elected, or Frederick William
Buller elected.
-----
1818.
Fremantle, John.
Hotham, Lord.
Morgan, G.
Rose, Thomas (Surgeon).
Bligh, Thomas.
1819.
Clifton, Edward.
Wedderburn, Alexander.
Chaplin, Thomas.
Armytage, Henry.
Maynard, Thomas (Surgeon).
1820.
Kortwright, William.
Campbell, Sir Colin.
Loftus, Henry.
Cuyler, Augustus.
1821.
Rous, Hon. W.
Whymper, William (Surgeon).
1822.
Buller, Frederick Thomas.
Drummond, John.
St. John Mildmay, Humphrey.
Gooch, Henry.
1823.
Shawe, C.
Salwey, Henry.
Girardot, Chas. A.
1825.
Bentinck, C.
Powys, Thomas.
Bentinck, H. (afterwards Sir Henry).
Montagu, Hon. John.
Bowen, Robert.
Forbes, Hon. James.
Forbes, Hon. W. (afterwards Lord Forbes).
Macdonell, James (afterwards Sir James).
Arbuthnot, Sir R.
Gomm, Sir William.
O’Neill, Hon. J. (afterwards Viscount O’Neill).
Waters, John.
1828.
FitzClarence, George (afterwards Earl of Munster).
Cornwall, William Henry.
Graves, Hon. W. (afterwards Lord Graves).
Short, Charles.
Cowell, J. S. (afterwards Sir J. Stepney Cowell-Stepney, Bart.).
Hall, Jasper T.
1828.
Dundas, Hon. H. (afterwards Viscount Melville).
Murray, Henry.
1829.
Russell, F.
Broadhead, B.
Bentinck, George.
Northey, W. B.
Rawdon, John Dawson.
1830.
Howden, Lord (formerly John F. Cradock).
1831.
Ashburnham, Hon. J.
Codrington, W. (afterwards Sir William).
Wigram, Ely D.
Hope, Hon. J.
FitzClarence, Lord Frederick.
1832.
Hobhouse, Edward T.
Shelley, Sir John, Bart.
1833.
Paulet, Lord Frederick.
Hunter, William (Surgeon).
Hay, Charles M.
1835.
Pringle, J. H.
1836.Vach
Horton, Wilmot.
Drummond, Gordon.
Daniell, H.
1837.
Upton, Hon. Arthur.
1839.
Paget, Frederick.
Wilbraham, Hon. E. Bootle.
1841.
Villiers, Hon. F.
Knox, George.
Brand, Hon. H. (afterwards Speaker, and Viscount Hampden).
1841.
Forbes, John.
Clitherow, John C.
Windham, Charles G.
1843.
Elrington, J. L.
Vansittart, Robert.
1843 to 1863.[483]
Strafford, Earl of.
Stewart-Balfour, W.
Hulse, R. S.
Alexander, Viscount (afterwards Earl of Caledon).
Johnson, George J.
Newton, W. S.
Bathurst, P.
Milman, Egerton.
Boyle, Hon. R.
Perceval, Spencer.
Tierney, M. E.
Dawson, Hon. T. Vesey.
Steele, T. M.
Wigram, James R.
White, C. H.
Cocks, C. L.
Somerset, Poulett.
Whyte-Melville, G. J.
Cowell, J. C. M.
Robinson, W. F. C. (Surgeon).
Halkett, James.
Harington, Sir J., Bart.
Carleton, Dudley (afterwards Lord Dorchester).
Vernon, G. A.
FitzRoy, Lord Charles (afterwards Duke of Grafton).
Upton, Hon. G. (afterwards Viscount Templetown).
Burdett, C.
Newdigate, F. W.
MacKinnon, Lionel D.
Cumming, H. W.
Walker, Sir G., Bart.
Dawkins, W. G. (withdrew July 24, 1873).
Wood, W. Mark.
Jolliffe, Hylton.
Dunkellin, Lord.
Burton, F. A. P.
Baring, William.
Feilding, Hon. P. (afterwards Sir Percy).
Dering, E. H.
Reeve, W. R.
Eliot, Hon. G.C.C.
Baring, Charles.
Bouverie, H.M.
Armytage, H.
Byng, Hon. H.
Thellusson, A.G.B.
Trevelyan, Walter.
Crawley, P.
Strong, C.W.
Dunlop, Sir James, Bart.
Hardinge, Hon. A. (afterwards Sir Arthur).
Goodlake, G.
Bingham, Lord (afterwards Earl of Lucan).
Tower, Harvey.
Wyatt, John (Surgeon).
Dangan, Viscount (formerly Hon. W. H. Wellesley; afterwards Earl
Cowley).
Lyon Fremantle, A.J. (afterwards Sir A.).
Le Conteur, J.H.
Heneage, M.W.
Holmesdale, Viscount (formerly Hon. W. Amherst; afterwards Earl
Amherst).
Herbert Stepney, A. St. G.
Airey, J. T. (afterwards Sir James).
Hall, Julian.
Wigram, G. J.
Lambton, Arthur.
Edwardes, Hon. W. (afterwards Lord Kensington).
Cecil, Lord Eustace.
Feilding, Hon. William.
Blackett, C. E.
FitzRoy, G. R.
Boyle, Hon. W.
Conolly, J. A.
Lane, H. J. Bagot.
Seymour, W. F. (afterwards Lord William).
Burghersh, Lord (afterwards Earl of Westmoreland).
Legge, Hon. E. H.
Burnell, E. S. P.
Monck, Hon. Richard.
Thursby, R. H.
Greenhill-Gardyne, Charles.
Clarke-Jervoise, H.
Burnand, Norman.
Campbell, Hon. H. W.
Wynne, William.
Clyde, Lord.
-----
Footnote 483:
There is no record of the dates of the election of members between
the years 1843 and 1863.
-----
1864.
Reeve, Ellis.
Manningham-Buller, Frederick.
Bonham-Carter, H.
Fortescue, H. G.
Hathorn, J. F.
1865.
Trotter, J. W. (Surgeon).
Herbert, H. A.
Baring, Hon. Denzil.
Howard, Hon. F. C.
Brand, H. R. (afterwards Viscount Hampden).
Cathcart, R. A. E. (afterwards Sir Reginald, Bart.).
Lee Mainwaring, C. W.
1866.
Dawson, Hon. V. (afterwards Lord Cremorne).
Chaplin, E.
Windsor-Clive, Hon. G.
Hamilton, Sir E., Bart.
Smyth, G. F.
Fremantle, FitzRoy.
1866.
Farquharson, R. (Surgeon).
Wallscourt, Lord.
1867.
Eyre, H. R.
Sterling, J. B.
1868.
Macpherson, G. G.
Myers, Arthur (Surgeon).
Thomas, C. D.
1869.
Vesey, Hon. J. (afterwards Viscount de Vesci).
Wellesley, Hon. Frederick.
Legge, Hon. Heneage.
Wilbraham, Rev. Charles P.
Kirkland, Vesey.
Ellice, Charles (afterwards Sir Charles).
Verner, William (afterwards Sir W., Bart.).
Williamson, David (of Lawes).
Crombie, Thomas.
Chichester, Hon. A. C.
Caulfeild, J. A. (afterwards Viscount Charlemont).
Maxse, H. FitzHardinge (afterwards Sir H.).
Adair, A. W.
Seymour, J. H.
Forbes, Sir William, Bart., of Craigievar (afterwards Lord
Sempill).
Grey-Egerton, P. Le B. (afterwards Sir Philip, Bart.).
Warrender, Sir George, Bart.
1870.
Hall, R. S.
1871.
Alexander, C. J.
Ramsden, W. J. F.
1871.
Farquhar, Arthur.
Acheson, Hon. E. A. B.
1872.
Aldenburg-Bentinck, H. C.
1873.
Dawnay, Hon. L. P.
Digby, Hon. Edward (afterwards Lord Digby).
Turquand, William, M. G.
Lowry-Corry, Hon. Henry.
Follett, Robert W.
Boscawen, Hon. E. (afterwards Viscount Falmouth).
1874.
Otway, W. P.
Bruce, Hervey J. L.
Wood, A. R. M. (afterwards Lockwood).
Campbell, Hon. Ronald G. E.
Bertie, Hon. George A. V.
Ailsa, Marquis of.
Boyle, Edmond.
Greville-Nugent, Hon. R.
1875.
Whipple, John (Surgeon).
Graves-Sawle, Francis A.
1876.
Stapleton, Hon. M. (afterwards Lord Beaumont).
Pole-Carew, Reginald.
Moreton, Augustus.
1877.
Montgomery, James G. H.
Fortescue, Cyril D.
Manley, F. C.
Goff, R. C.
Arkwright, F. W.
Cavendish, Hon. C. (afterwards Lord Chesham).
Clark-Kennedy, Alexander.
1878.
MacKinnon, L. D.
Gordon, Lord Douglas.
Dawson, Vesey, J.
Ossulston, Lord.
Stradbroke, Earl of (formerly Hon. J. Rous), [present at the
meeting].
1879.
Dawnay, Hon. Eustace.
Legge, Hon. Henry.
Codrington, Alfred.
Monck, Hon. H. (afterwards Viscount Monck).
FitzRoy, Alfred (afterwards Lord Alfred).
Montrose, Duke of.
1880.
Gladstone, J. R. (afterwards Sir John, Bart.).
Dawson, Douglas F. R.
Boyle, George.
Ross-of-Bladensburg, John.
Brand, Hon. Charles.
Sandhurst, Lord.
Durham, Earl of.
Lambton, Hon. F. W.
Read, C. C. (Surgeon).
1881.
Ormsby-Gore, Hon. George.
1882.
Stopford, Horace.
Henniker-Major, Hon. Arthur.
Magill, James (Surgeon).
Clarke-Jervoise, A. (afterwards Sir Arthur, Bart.).
Dawson, Hon. Anthony.
1883.
Amherst, Hon. Hugh.
Perry, George (Surgeon).
1884.
Surtees, H. C.
Corbet, W. O. (afterwards Sir Walter, Bart.).
Vincent, Edgar (afterwards Sir E.).
Levett, Theophilus.
1885.
Pleydell-Bouverie, George.
Fortescue, Hon. Arthur.
Gosselin-Lefebre, Bertram M. O.
Winn, Hon. Rowland (afterwards Lord St. Oswald).
Sebright, Guy.
1886.
Lovell, Peter Audley.
Wetherall, H. A. (withdrew 1895).
Wiltshire, Earl of (afterwards Marquis of Winchester).
1887.
Miller, Sir C. Hubert, Bart.
Kindersley, Charles P.
Charteris, Hon. Alan.
Shute, Henry D.
Frederick, Charles A.
Hamilton, Douglas J.
Somers-Cocks, Herbert.
Wigram, Eustace.
Smith, Granville.
1889.
Alexander, A. C. (Surgeon-Major).
Fenn, E. H. (Surgeon-Major).
Wyndham, George.
1890.
Milligan, G. D.
Holland, Hon. C. T.
Lambton, Hon. William.
Drummond-Hay, James A.
Maude, Frederick S.
Grenfell, Riversdale F.
Ramsden, Frederick W.
1891.
Monck, Cecil S. O.
Hall, John H.
Sterling, John T.
Hawkes, Henry B.
Earle, Sydney.
Churchill, Lord.
Taylor, George W.
1892.
Wingfield, John M.
Pakenham, Hon. Edward M.
Baillie-Hamilton, Hon. Henry R.
Carte, W. A. (Surgeon).
McNeile, John.
Smyth, R. Skeffington.
Cox, R. H. (Surgeon).
Stephenson, Sir Frederick.
1893.
Athlumney, Lord.
Drumlanrig, Viscount.
Sutton, Hugh C.
1894.
Campbell, Hon. John B.
1895.
Marker, Raymond J.
Feilding, Geoffrey P. F.
1896.
Lambton, William H.
Romilly, Lord.
Ponsonby, John.
Newtown-Butler, Lord.
Portland, Duke of.
Charteris, Hon. Evan.
Newdigate, Francis A.
APPENDIX IX.
GENERAL ORDER, No. 1, CONSTANTINOPLE, APRIL 30, 1854.
“The Queen having been graciously pleased to appoint General Lord
Raglan, G.C.B., to be Commander of the Forces to be employed in
Turkey in support of Her Ally, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, and
His Lordship having arrived, all reports, etc., are to be made to
him through the channels prescribed by Her Majesty’s Regulations.
“The Commander of the Forces avails himself of the earliest
opportunity to impress upon the Army the necessity of maintaining
the strictest discipline, of respecting persons and property and the
laws and usages of the country they have been sent to aid and
defend, and particularly of avoiding to enter Mosques, Churches, and
private dwellings of a people whose habits are peculiar and unlike
those of the other nations of Europe.
“Lord Raglan fully relies upon the General and other Officers of the
Army to afford him their support in the repression of disorder, and
he confidently hopes that the troops themselves, anxious to maintain
the character they have acquired elsewhere, will endeavour to become
the example of obedience to orders and of attention to discipline,
without which success is impossible, and their presence would be an
evil instead of an advantage to those whose cause their Sovereign
has deemed it proper to espouse.
“The Army will for the first time be associated with an Ally to whom
it has been the lot of the British nation to be opposed in the field
for many centuries.
“The gallantry and high military qualities of the French Army are
matters of history, and the alliance which has now been formed,
will, the Commander of the Forces trusts, be of long duration, as
well as productive of the most important and the happiest
consequences.
“Lord Raglan is aware, from personal communication with the
distinguished Officer who is appointed to command the French Army,
Marshal St. Arnaud, and many of the Superior Officers, that every
disposition exists throughout their ranks to cultivate the best
understanding with the British Army, and to co-operate most warmly
with it, and he entertains no doubt that Her Majesty’s troops are
animated by the same spirit, and that the first ambition of each
Army will be, to acquire the confidence and good opinion of the
other.
“By Command,
“(Signed) J. BUCKNALL B. ESTCOURT,
“Brigadier-General and D. A. General.”
APPENDIX X.
DEATH OF FIELD-MARSHAL LORD RAGLAN, G.C.B.
1.
GENERAL ORDER, HORSE GUARDS, JULY 4, 1855.[484]
“The General Commanding-in-Chief has received Her Majesty’s most
gracious Commands to express to the Army the deep regret with which
Her Majesty has to deplore the loss of a most devoted and able
Officer by the death of Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, the Commander of
the Forces in the Crimea.
“Her Majesty has been pleased to command that her sentiments shall
be communicated to the Army, in order that the military career of so
illustrious an Officer shall be recorded, not only as an honourable
testimony of Her Majesty’s sense of his eminent services, and the
respect due to his memory, but as an example worthy of imitation by
all ranks of her Army.
“Selected by the Duke of Wellington to be his Military Secretary and
Aide-de-camp, he took part, nearly fifty years ago, in all the
military achievements of our greatest Commander. From him Lord
Raglan adopted, as the guiding principle of his life, a constant,
undeviating obedience to the call of duty.
“During a long peace, his life was most usefully employed in those
unwearied attentions to the interests and welfare of the Army, shown
by the kindness, the impartiality, and justice, with which he
transacted all his duties.
“When war broke out last year, he was selected by his Sovereign to
take command of the Army proceeding to the East; he never
hesitated—he obeyed the summons, although he had reached an age when
an Officer may be disposed to retire from active duties in the
field.
“At the head of the troops during the arduous operations of the
campaign, he resumed the early habits of his life; by his calmness
in the hottest moments of the battle, and by his quick perception in
taking advantage of the ground, or the movements of the enemy, he
won the confidence of his Army and performed great and brilliant
services.
“In the midst of a winter’s campaign, in a severe climate, and
surrounded by difficulties, he never despaired.
-----
Footnote 484:
Kinglake, _Invasion of the Crimea_, viii. 283.
-----
“The heroic Army, whose fortitude amidst the severest privations is
recognised by Her Majesty as beyond all praise, have shown their
attachment to their Commander by the deep regrets with which they
now mourn his loss.
“Her Majesty is confident that the talents and virtues which
distinguished Lord Raglan throughout the whole of his valuable life,
will for ever endear his memory to the British Army.
“By Command of General the Right Hon. Viscount Hardinge,
“Commanding-in-Chief.
“(Signed) G. A. WETHERALL,
“Adjutant-General.”
2.
FRENCH ARMY OF THE EAST, NO. 15 GENERAL ORDER.[485]
“Death has suddenly taken away, while in full exercise of his
command, the Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, and has plunged the British
in mourning.
“We all share the sorrow of our brave Allies. Those who knew Lord
Raglan, who knew the history of his life—so noble, so pure, so
replete with service rendered to his country—those who witnessed his
fearless demeanour at Alma and Inkerman, who recall the calm and
stoic greatness of his character throughout this rude and memorable
campaign, every generous heart indeed, will deplore the loss of such
a man. The sentiments here expressed by the General-in-chief, are
those of the whole Army. He has himself been cruelly struck by this
unlooked-for blow.
“The public grief only increases his sorrow at being for ever
separated from a companion-in-arms, whose genial spirit he loved,
whose virtues he admired, and from whom he has always received the
most loyal and hearty co-operation.
“(Signed) A. PÉLISSIER,
“Commander-in-chief.”
“Head-Quarters before Sevastopol; June 29, 1855.”
-----
Footnote 485:
Kinglake, _Invasion of the Crimea_ , viii. 291.
-----
APPENDIX XI.
1.
RETURN SHOWING THE AGES OF THE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN
COMPOSING THE 1st BATTALION COLDSTREAM GUARDS WHICH PROCEEDED TO
THE EAST IN FEBRUARY, 1854, AND OF THE DRAFTS SENT OUT DURING THE
WAR WITH RUSSIA.
┌───────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┬─────┐
│ Battalion and│ 1st 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th │Total│
│ Drafts.│Battalion Draft Draft Draft Draft Draft Draft │ │
├───────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼─────┤
│Strength. │ 919 153 58 153 307 207 263│ 2060│
│ │ │ │
│Date of │ 23-2-54 28-6-54 27-10-54 25-11-54 13-4-55 16-9-55 14-2-56│ │
│ Departure │ │ │
│ from England.│ │ │
│ │ │ │
│Under 20 years │ 42 48 26 45 54 4 13│ 232│
│ of age. │ │ │
│20 and under │ 300 86 26 93 198 108 182│ 993│
│ 25. │ │ │
│25 and under │ 286 10 2 14 50 76 51│ 489│
│ 30. │ │ │
│30 and under │ 165 6 3 — 3 16 16│ 209│
│ 35. │ │ │
│35 and under │ 110 1 1 1 2 2 1│ 118│
│ 40. │ │ │
│Over 40 years │ 16 2 — — — 1 —│ 19│
│ of age. │ │ │
│Age of the │ 43 yrs. 40 yrs. 36 yrs. 35 yrs. 36 yrs. 44 yrs. 35 yrs.│ │
│ oldest │ │ │
│ soldier. │ │ │
└───────────────┴───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┴─────┘
2.
RETURN SHOWING THE PREVIOUS OCCUPATIONS OF THE NON-COMMISSIONED
OFFICERS AND MEN COMPOSING THE 1st BATTALION, AND THE DRAFTS THAT
WERE ENGAGED IN THE WAR WITH RUSSIA.
┌──────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────────────────┬──────┐
│ Battalion and│ 1st 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th │ Total│
│ Drafts.│Battalion Draft Draft Draft Draft Draft Draft │ │
├──────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────┼──────┤
│Agricultural │ 694 128 44 121 240 122 174│ 1523│
│ Labourers. │ │ │
│Manufacturing │ 103 10 2 14 23 40 46│ 238│
│ Mechanics, Cloth│ │ │
│ Weavers, etc. │ │ │
│Mechanics in │ 83 14 4 15 43 42 39│ 240│
│ occupations │ │ │
│ favourable to │ │ │
│ physical │ │ │
│ development, as │ │ │
│ Masons, etc. │ │ │
│Shopmen and │ 13 — 1 1 1 3 1│ 20│
│ Clerks. │ │ │
│Professional │ 1 — 1 1 — — —│ 3│
│ occupations. │ │ │
│No previous │ 25 1 6 1 — — 3│ 36│
│ occupation, as │ │ │
│ boys, etc. │ │ │
├──────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────┼──────┤
│ Total.│ 919 153 58 153 307 207 263│ 2060│
└──────────────────┴───────────────────────────────────────────────────┴──────┘
APPENDIX XII.
1.
RETURN OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFICERS AND MEN IN | TH RMY WHO HAVE
BEEN KILLED IN THE CRIMEA, UP |TO UNE 1, 1856.[486]
┌──────────────────┬──────────┬──────────┬──────────┬──────────┐
│ │ Officers.│ Non-Com.│ Men.│ Total.│
│ │ │ Officers.│ │ │
├──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┤
│Cavalry │ 8│ 10│ 104│ 122│
│Artillery │ 10│ 10│ 111│ 131│
│Sappers and Miners│ 9│ 1│ 31│ 41│
│Infantry │ 119│ 140│ 2191│ 2450│
│Staff │ 11│ —│ —│ 11│
├──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┤
│Total │ 157│ 161│ 2437│ 2755│
└──────────────────┴──────────┴──────────┴──────────┴──────────┘
2.
RETURN OF TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFICERS AND MEN IN THE ARMY WHO HAVE BEEN
WOUNDED IN THE CRIMEA; OF THE WOUNDED WHO HAVE SINCE DIED; OF
THOSE WHO HAVE RECOVERED AND HAVE RETURNED TO THEIR DUTY; OF THOSE
WHO HAVE DIED OF SICKNESS; AND OF THOSE INVALIDED, UP TO JUNE 1,
1856.[486]
┌──────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────┐
│ │ NUMBER WOUNDED. │
│ │ │
├──────────────────┼─────────┬─────────┬─────────┬─────────┤
│ │Officers.│ Non-Com.│ Men.│ Total.│
│ │ │Officers.│ │ │
├──────────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┤
│Cavalry │ 22 │ 21 │ 216 │ 259 │
│Artillery │ 30 │ 37 │ 595 │ 662 │
│Sappers and Miners│ 12 │ 7 │ 79 │ 98 │
│Infantry │ 422 │ 514 │ 9892 │ 10828 │
│Staff │ 29 │ —- │ │ 29 │
├──────────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┤
│Total. │ 515 │ 579 │ 10782 │ 11876 │
└──────────────────┴─────────┴─────────┴─────────┴─────────┘
┌──────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────┐
│ │ NUMBER WOUNDED SINCE DIED. │
├──────────────────┼─────────┬─────────┬─────────┬─────────┤
│ │Officers.│ Non-Com.│ Men.│ Total.│
│ │ │Officers.│ │ │
├──────────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┤
│Cavalry │ 4 │ 1 │ 25 │ 30 │
│Artillery │ 1 │ 4 │ 48 │ 53 │
│Sappers and Miners│ 6 │ 1 │ 22 │ 29 │
│Infantry │ 73 │ 79 │ 1753 │ 1905 │
│Staff │ 2 │ — │ — │ 2 │
├──────────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┤
│Total. │ 86 │ 85 │ 1848 │ 2019 │
└──────────────────┴─────────┴─────────┴─────────┴─────────┘
┌──────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────┐
│ │NUMBER RECOVERED AND RETURNED TO DUTY. │
├──────────────────┼─────────┬─────────┬─────────┬─────────┤
│ │ │ Non-Com.│ Men.│ Total.│
│ │ │Officers.│ │ │
├──────────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┤
│Cavalry │ │ 38 │ 585 │ 623 │
│Artillery │ │ 98 │ 1171 │ 1269 │
│Sappers and Miners│ │ 18 │ 154 │ 172 │
│Infantry │ │ 528 │ 8920 │ 9448 │
│Staff │ │ — │ —│ —│
├──────────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┤
│Total. │ │ 682 │ 10830 │ 11512 │
└──────────────────┴─────────┴─────────┴─────────┴─────────┘
┌──────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────┐
│ │ NUMBER DIED FROM SICKNESS.[487] │
├──────────────────┼─────────┬─────────┬─────────┬─────────┤
│ │Officers.│ Non-Com.│ Men.│ Total.│
│ │ │Officers.│ │ │
├──────────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┤
│Cavalry │ 23 │ 53 │ 954 │ 1030 │
│Artillery │ 10 │ 35 │ 1263 │ 1308 │
│Sappers and Miners│ 5 │ 7 │ 168 │ 180 │
│Infantry │ 104 │ 479 │ 12935 │ 13518 │
│Staff │ 5 │ — │ — │ 5 │
├──────────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┤
│Total. │ │ 1137 │ 13581 │ 14718 │
└──────────────────┴─────────┴─────────┴─────────┴─────────┘
┌──────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────┐
│ │ NUMBER INVALIDED END OF WAR.[487] │
├──────────────────┼─────────┬─────────┬─────────┬─────────┤
│ │ │ Non-Com.│ Men.│ Total.│
│ │ │Officers.│ │ │
├──────────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┤
│Cavalry │ │ 70│ 850 │ 920 │
│Artillery │ │ 164│ 1953 │ 2117 │
│Sappers and Miners│ │ 41│ 176 │ 217 │
│Infantry │ │ 862│ 10602 │ 11464 │
│Staff │ │ — │ — │ — │
├──────────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┤
│Total. │ │ 1137 │ 13581 │ 14718 │
└──────────────────┴─────────┴─────────┴─────────┴─────────┘
-----
Footnote 486:
_Annual Register_, 1856, “Public Documents,” p. 347.
Footnote 487:
The columns marked with [487] are published with the following
remark: “There are no documents in the Adjutant-General’s Office
which will afford the information specified in the above columns,
and the same can only be obtained (and probably then only
imperfectly) from the Officers Commanding in the Crimea.”
-----
3.
RETURN SHOWING BY MONTHS THE NUMBER OF NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND
MEN OF THE 1ST BATTALION COLDSTREAM GUARDS WHO LOST THEIR LIVES
DURING THE WAR WITH RUSSIA, BETWEEN FEBRUARY 23, 1854, AND JUNE 30,
1856, AND THE CAUSE OF DEATH.[488]
┌─────────┬─────────┬────────┬────────┐
│ │Killed in│ │ Total │
│ │Action or│Died of │ Deaths │
│ │ in the │Wounds. │ by the │
│ │Trenches.│ │ Enemy. │
├─────────┼─────────┼────────┼────────┤
│ 1854. │ │ │ │
│March │ —│ —│ —│
│April │ —│ —│ —│
│July │ —│ —│ —│
│August │ —│ —│ —│
│September│ —│ 2│ 2│
│October │ 1│ 2│ 3│
│November │ 67│ 22│ 89│
│December │ —│ 6│ 6│
│ │ │ │ │
│ 1855. │ │ │ │
│January │ 2│ 3│ 5│
│February │ —│ 4│ 4│
│March │ —│ 2│ 2│
│April │ —│ —│ —│
│May │ —│ —│ —│
│June │ —│ —│ —│
│July │ —│ 1│ 1│
│August │ 4│ 5│ 9│
│September│ —│ —│ —│
│October │ —│ 2│ 2│
│November │ —│ 2│ 2│
│December │ —│ —│ —│
│ │ │ │ │
│ 1856. │ │ │ │
│January │ —│ —│ —│
│March │ —│ —│ —│
├─────────┼─────────┼────────┼────────┤
│Total │ 74│ 51│ 125│
└─────────┴─────────┴────────┴────────┘
┌─────────┬─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┬────────┐
│ │ DIED OF DISEASE. │ │
├─────────┼────────┬──────────┬────────┬──────────┬────────┬────────┼────────┤
│ │Cholera │Dysentery │Fevers. │Diarrhœa. │Miscel- │ Total. │ Grand │
│ │ │ │ │ │laneous.│ │ Total. │
├─────────┼────────┼──────────┼────────┼──────────┼────────┼────────┼────────┤
│ 1854. │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
│March │ —│ —│ —│ —│ 1│ -│ 1│
│April │ —│ —│ —│ —│ 1│ -│ 1│
│July │ 2│ —│ 6│ —│ 1│ 9│ 9│
│August │ 28│ —│ 22│ 2│ 1│ 53│ 53│
│September│ 5│ —│ 12│ 2│ —│ 19│ 21│
│October │ 14│ —│ 10│ 11│ 1│ 36│ 39│
│November │ 9│ 4│ 4│ 13│ 2│ 32│ 121│
│December │ 7│ 11│ 9│ 45│ 6│ 78│ 84│
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ 1855. │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
│January │ 2│ 12│ 14│ 61│ 13│ 102│ 107│
│February │ —│ 11│ 16│ 42│ 14│ 83│ 87│
│March │ —│ 4│ 8│ 15│ 2│ 29│ 31│
│April │ —│ 3│ 8│ 6│ 1│ 18│ 18│
│May │ 3│ 2│ 5│ 2│ 1│ 13│ 13│
│June │ 25│ —│ 10│ 4│ 2│ 41│ 41│
│July │ —│ —│ 9│ 1│ 1│ 11│ 12│
│August │ 2│ —│ 6│ 1│ —│ 9│ 18│
│September│ 1│ —│ 2│ 1│ —│ 4│ 4│
│October │ 1│ —│ 4│ 1│ 1│ 7│ 9│
│November │ 1│ —│ 5│ 5│ 2│ 10│ 12│
│December │ —│ —│ 1│ —│ 2│ 3│ 3│
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ 1856. │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
│January │ —│ 2│ 4│ —│ —│ 6│ 6│
│March │ —│ —│ —│ 1│ —│ 1│ 1│
├─────────┼────────┼──────────┼────────┼──────────┼────────┼────────┼────────┤
│Total │ 100│ 49│ 155│ 210│ 52│ 566│ 691│
└─────────┴────────┴──────────┴────────┴──────────┴────────┴────────┴────────┘
-----
Footnote 488:
This table is not absolutely correct, as it accounts only for 691
instead of 699 Non-commissioned officers and men, who fell in the
war, either killed, or wounded, or by disease. According to Dr.
Wyatt, who does not classify the casualties by months, the total
losses were 81 killed in action, 54 died of wounds, and 564 died
by disease, or 699 men. But the above return has been given, as it
indicates sufficiently the months during which the bulk of the men
lost their lives.
-----
APPENDIX XIII.
THE VICTORIA CROSS.
This, the most honourable and coveted Order that can distinguish a
British soldier, was instituted by Her Majesty the Queen by Royal
Warrant, dated January 29, 1856, for the purpose of rewarding
Officers and men of the naval and military services, who, while
serving their Sovereign in the presence of the enemy, perform “some
signal act of valour or devotion to their country.” The decoration,
conferred upon those whose deeds of bravery, during naval operations
or on the field, entitle them to belong to this highly prized Order,
is called the Victoria Cross, and consists of a Maltese Cross of
bronze, bearing the motto “For Valour,” which is suspended—on the
wearer’s breast to the right of every other medal,—by a blue riband
in the Navy, and by a red riband in the Army. The Order is open to
every soldier and sailor, entirely irrespective of rank, of long
service, or of wounds received in battle; it is bestowed only where
“the merit of conspicuous bravery shall be held to establish a
sufficient claim to the honour.” Should a man obtain the Victoria
Cross, and again be adjudged worthy of the same distinction, a bar
is added (like a clasp) to the riband, and so on for every other act
of bravery. Warrant and Petty officers and seamen of the Navy, and
Non-commissioned officers and men of the Army receive an annuity of
£10 for the Victoria Cross, and £5 additional a year for every bar
they may obtain.[489]
-----
Footnote 489:
_Annual Register_ , 1856, “Public Documents,” p. 344, where the
whole Royal Warrant is published.
-----
ROLL OF THE VICTORIA CROSS IN THE COLDSTREAM GUARDS.
NO. 1. BREVET-MAJOR GERALD LITTLEHALES GOODLAKE.
For distinguished gallantry whilst in command of the sharpshooters
furnished by the Coldstream Guards on October 26, 1854, on the
occasion of the “powerful _sortie_ on the Second Division,” when he
held the Windmill [Careenage] Ravine below the Piquet-house, against
a much larger force of the enemy. The party of sharpshooters then
under his command killed thirty-eight (one an Officer), and took
three prisoners of the enemy (of the latter, one an Officer), Major
Goodlake being the sole Officer in command. Also for distinguished
gallantry on the occasion of the surprise of a piquet of the enemy,
in November, 1854, at the bottom of the Windmill Ravine, by the
sharpshooters, under his sole leading and command, when the
knapsacks and rifles of the enemy’s party fell into his hands.
NO. 2. NO. 3968 PRIVATE WILLIAM STANLOCK.
For having volunteered, when employed as one of the sharpshooters in
October, 1854, for reconnoitering purposes, to crawl up within six
yards of a Russian sentry, and so enabled the Officer in command to
effect a surprise; Private Stanlock having been warned beforehand of
the imminent risk which he would run in the adventure.
NO. 3. NO. 4787 PRIVATE GEORGE STRONG.
For having, when on duty in the trenches, in the month of September,
1855, removed a live shell from the place where it had fallen.
NO. 4. BREVET-MAJOR JOHN AUGUSTUS CONOLLY.
In the attack by the Russians against the position held by the
Second Division, October 26, 1854, Major Conolly, then a Lieutenant
in the 49th Regiment, while in command of a company of that
regiment, on outlying piquet, made himself conspicuous by the
gallantry of his behaviour. He came particularly under the
observation of the late Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, while in personal
encounter with several Russians, in defence of his post. He
ultimately fell, dangerously wounded. Lieutenant Conolly was highly
praised in General Orders, and promoted into the Coldstream Guards
as a reward for his exemplary behaviour on this occasion.
NOTE.—Captain Hon. R. Campbell would have been fifth on this list,
had he survived his act of bravery. The following gives the
circumstances under which Lieut. Lysons and Private Fowler (90th
Regiment), who gallantly followed Captain Campbell, obtained the
Victoria Cross: “On the 28th March, 1879, during the assault of the
Inhlobane Mountain, Sir Evelyn Wood ordered the dislodgement of
certain Zulus (who were causing the troops much loss) from strong
natural caves commanding the position in which some of the wounded
were lying. Some delay occurring in the execution of the orders
issued, Captain Hon. Ronald Campbell, Coldstream Guards, followed by
Lieut. Lysons, A.D.C., and Private Fowler, ran forward in the most
determined manner, and advanced over a mass of fallen boulders, and
between walls of rock, which led to a cave in which the enemy lay
hidden. It being impossible for two men to walk abreast, the
assailants were consequently obliged to keep in single file, and, as
Captain Campbell was leading, he arrived first at the mouth of the
cave, from which the Zulus were firing, and there met his death.
Lieut. Lysons and Private Fowler, who were following close behind
him, immediately dashed at the cave, from which led several
subterranean passages, and firing into the chasm below, succeeded in
forcing the occupants to forsake their stronghold. Lieut. Lysons
remained at the cave’s mouth for some minutes after the attack,
during which time Captain Campbell’s body was carried down the
slopes.”[490]
-----
Footnote 490:
_Hart’s Army List_, 1896, p. 270 (_a_). Sir E. Wood states in the
account, “One of the Bravest Deeds I ever saw” (_Pearson’s
Magazine_, February, 1896), already alluded to (_ante_, p. 337),
that Captain Campbell fully recognised the risk to the leading man
who should try to enter the Zulu stronghold, and when there was a
delay in the execution of the order, he called out, “Then I will
do it myself,” and, jumping over a low wall, ran forward in the
manner mentioned above.
-----
APPENDIX XIV.
1.
BRITISH FORCES EMPLOYED IN THE EGYPTIAN
CAMPAIGN, 1882.[491]
General Sir Garnet Wolseley, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., Commander-in-chief.
General Sir John Adye, K.C.B., Chief of the Staff and Second in
Command.
CAVALRY DIVISION. Major-General D. C. Drury Lowe, C.B.
_1st Brigade._ Brigadier-General Sir Baker Russell, K.C.M.G.,
C.B.
Three Squadrons of Household Cavalry (Lieut.-Colonel Ewart),
one each from 1st and 2nd Life Guards, and from Royal Horse
Guards; 4th Dragoon Guards; and 7th Dragoon Guards.
_2nd Brigade._ Brigadier-General H. C. Wilkinson.
13th Bengal Lancers; 2nd and 6th Bengal Cavalry.
_Divisional Troops._ One Battery Royal Horse Artillery; Royal
Engineers; Mounted Infantry; Commissariat and Transport; Medical
Department.
FIRST DIVISION. Lieut.-General G. H. Willis, C.B.
_1st. Brigade._ Major-General H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, K.G.
Brigade-Major, Captain Ivor Herbert, Grenadier Guards.
2nd Grenadier Guards (Colonel P. Smith); 2nd Coldstream Guards
(Colonel Wigram); 1st Scots Guards (Colonel Knox).
_2nd Brigade._ Major-General G. Graham, V.C., C.B.
2nd Royal Irish (18th); 1st West Kent (50th); 2nd York and
Lancaster (84th); 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers (87th).
_Divisional Troops._ Two Squadrons 19th Hussars; 2nd Duke of
Cornwall Light Infantry (46th); two Batteries Royal Artillery;
one Company Royal Engineers; Commissariat and Transport;
Medical Department.
SECOND DIVISION. Lieut.-General Sir Edward Hamley, K.C.M.G., C.B.
_1st Brigade._ Major-General Sir Archibald Alison, Bart., K.C.B.
1st Royal Highlanders (42nd); 2nd Highland Light Infantry
(74th); 1st Gordon Highlanders (75th); 1st Cameron
Highlanders (79th).
_2nd Brigade._ Major-General Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C., G.C.M.G.,
K.C.B.
1st Sussex Regiment (35th); 1st Berkshire Regiment (49th); 1st
Staffordshire Regiment (38th); 1st Shropshire Light Infantry
(53rd).
_Divisional Troops._ Two Squadrons 19th Hussars; 3rd Kings Royal
Rifle Corps (60th); two Batteries Royal Artillery; one Company
Royal Engineers; Commissariat and Transport; Medical
Department.
CORPS TROOPS. One Battery Royal Horse Artillery; three Batteries
Royal Artillery; Siege Train; Pontoon and Telegraph Troop; Field
Park; three Companies Royal Engineers; Railway Section; two
Companies Madras Sappers and Miners; Commissariat and Transport;
Medical Department.
INDIAN CONTINGENT. Major-General Sir H. T. Macpherson, V.C., K.C.B.
_Infantry Brigade._ Brigadier-General O. V. Tanner, C.B.
1st Seaforth Highlanders; 7th and 20th Bengal Native Infantry;
29th Company Beluchi Native Infantry; one Mountain Battery.
_Additional Troops._ 1st Manchester Regiment.
_Reserve at Aden._ Two Native Regiments Infantry.
-----
Footnote 491:
Maurice, _Official Account_ , pp. 112, 121. This force amounted to
1,180 Officers, and 28,300 men. Reinforcements, 280 Officers and
10,800 men, were also held in readiness to proceed to Egypt. Total
40,560 of all ranks. (_Annual Register_ , 1882, pt. i., 370.)
-----
2.
EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL ORDERS ISSUED AFTER THE
BATTLE OF TEL EL-KEBIR.
HEAD-QUARTERS, TEL EL-KEBIR, SEPTEMBER 14, 1882.
“The following telegram has been received from Her Majesty by the
General Officer the Commander-in-chief:—
“‘The Queen sends Her warmest congratulations, and thanks God for
victory. Express to all my admiration, and sympathy and sorrow for
heavy loss.’”
HEAD-QUARTERS, CAIRO, SEPTEMBER 16, 1882.
“1. Her Majesty desires to convey to Her Army hearty congratulations
on the bloodless occupation of Cairo, on the capture of Arabi, and
other rebels against the authority of the Khedive, and on the
termination of a campaign in which Her brave troops have so greatly
distinguished themselves.
“2. The General Commander-in-chief directs the following orders be
read and explained to the men at three consecutive parades:—
“The Army-Corps in Egypt will shortly be assembled in Cairo. Its
discipline will now be subjected to a scrutiny the more searching
because fatigue and privation nobly borne and victory brilliantly
achieved will naturally direct upon it the attention of the
civilized world.
“The General Commander-in-chief therefore appeals to all ranks to
show, by a strict attention to duty and discipline, that it is not
only in the field that the British Army is distinguished.
“It must be remembered that the Army is here in Cairo as the friend
of the people of Cairo, whom it has relieved from the despotism of
rebellion.
“3. The police and gendarmerie are not to be disarmed, but, on the
contrary, are in every way to be assisted and supported in their
authority.
“The soldiery has already been disarmed so far as is considered
necessary.
“4. No soldier will be allowed to leave barracks, except on duty,
until 4 p.m. Sergeants must be posted at the gates to see that no
one goes out improperly dressed. Belts must be pipeclayed. Tattoo
will be sounded at 8 p.m., and patrols sent out until all men are
brought to barracks. Passes are not to be given for any hour later
than 10 p.m., and very sparingly. In the event of any drunkenness or
outrage or breaking into houses being reported, the regiment
complained of will be immediately marched two miles outside the town
to Abrasia, and there quartered as long as the Army is at Cairo.”
HEAD-QUARTERS, CAIRO, SEPTEMBER 17, 1882.
“The General Commanding-in-chief congratulates the Army serving in
Egypt upon the brilliant success which has crowned its efforts in
the campaign terminated on the 14th inst., by the surrender of the
citadel of Cairo and of Arabi Pasha, the chief rebel in arms against
the authority of His Highness the Khedive. In the space of
twenty-five days the Army has effected its disembarkation at
Ismailia, has traversed the desert to Zagazig, and has occupied the
capital of Egypt. It has fought and defeated the enemy five times:
on the 24th of August, at El-Magfar; on the 25th of August, at Tel
el-Makhuta and at Mahsama; on the 28th of August and on the 9th of
September, at Kassassin; and, finally, on the 13th of September, at
Tel el-Kebir, where, after an arduous night march, it inflicted upon
him an overwhelming defeat, storming his strongly entrenched
position at the point of the bayonet, and capturing all his guns,
about 60 in number. In recapitulating the events which have marked
this short and decisive campaign, the General Commanding-in-chief
feels proud to place upon record the fact that these brilliant
achievements are to be ascribed to the high military courage and
noble devotion to duty which have animated all ranks under his
command. Called upon to show discipline under exceptional
privations, to give proof of fortitude in extreme toil, and to show
contempt of danger in battle, the General Officers, Officers,
Non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the Army have responded
with zealous alacrity, adding another chapter to the long roll of
British victories.”[492]
-----
Footnote 492:
It is stated in the _Official Account_ , p. 106, that, “on the 4th
of October, the General had issued a congratulatory order,
complimenting the troops alike upon their conduct in the campaign
and upon their behaviour as conquerors in Cairo.” This order is
not given in the above work; and as it is not to be found in the
Battalion Order-book, it has not been possible to reproduce it in
this volume.
-----
3.
EXTRACT OF REPORT ON ARMY SIGNALLING IN EGYPT.
“To Lieutenant Lovell, Coldstream Guards, and Sergeant Dunster and
men, my thanks are due for their willing and most efficient help
rendered on more than one occasion. With the assistance of
Lieutenant Lovell and a party of signallers, Coldstream Guards, to
whom I am much indebted for most efficient help, communication was
opened from Kassassin Lock to Ismailia. Sergeant Dunster, in charge
of this party, rendered very good service, both on this station and
later at Cairo.”
APPENDIX XV.[493]
-----
Footnote 493:
Continued from Appendix 273 of MacKinnon’s _Origin and Services of
the Coldstream Guards_ (ii. 450).
-----
STATIONS.
Date. No. of Stations.
Cos.
March 1, 1833 8 1st Battalion from Knightsbridge Barracks to
King’s Mews Barracks.
Aug. 19, ” 8 2nd Battalion from Dublin _viâ_ Bristol to the
Mews Barracks, in two wings—left wing on the
19th, and the right wing on the 22nd.
Aug. 30, ” 8 1st Battalion from the Mews to Portman Street
Barracks.
Feb. 28, 1834 8 1st Battalion from Portman Street to Windsor.
March 1, ” 8 2nd Battalion from St. George’s Barracks[494]
to Knightsbridge, Kensington, and Magazine
Barracks.
April 30, ” 1 Of the 2nd Battalion from the Magazine
Barracks to Chelsea, returning to the
Magazine the next day.
” ” 1 Of the 1st Battalion from Windsor to London,
returning next day.
May 16, ” 4 Of the 1st Battalion from Windsor to Bagshot;
this detachment was back in Windsor on the
21st.
Sept. 3, ” 8 1st Battalion from Windsor to the Tower, on
the 3rd and 4th.
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from Knightsbridge, Kensington,
and Magazine Barracks to Wellington
Barracks.[494]
March 3, 1835 8 1st Battalion from the Tower to St. George’s
Barracks.
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from Wellington Barracks to
Portman Street Barracks.
Aug. 31, ” 8 2nd Battalion from Portman Street to Windsor,
_viâ_ Hounslow.
Sept. 2, ” 8 1st Battalion from St. George’s to Wellington
Barracks.
Oct. 26, ” 4 Of the 2nd Battalion from Windsor to Brighton.
Feb. 29, 1836 4 Of the 2nd Battalion from Brighton to the
Tower.
March 2, ” 4 Of the 2nd Battalion from Windsor to the
Tower.
March 3, ” 8 1st Battalion from Wellington Barracks to
Knightsbridge, Buckingham Palace,
Kensington, and Magazine Barracks.
May 31, ” 4 Of the 1st Battalion from Knightsbridge
Barracks to St. John’s Wood Barracks.
July 28, ” 8 1st Battalion from London to Dublin, _viâ_
Bristol, by two wings, on the 28th and 29th.
Aug. 30, ” 8 2nd Battalion from the Tower to St. George’s
Barracks.
March 3, 1837 8 2nd Battalion from St. George’s to Portman
Street Barracks.
July 7, ” 8 2nd Battalion to Windsor, to take part in the
funeral of King William IV.; the Battalion
returned to Portman Street about the 9th.
July 22, 1837 8 2nd Battalion from Portman Street to
Hammersmith and adjacents during an election
in the borough of Marylebone; Portman Street
was re-occupied by the Battalion on the
28th.
Aug. 21, ” 8 1st Battalion from Dublin to St. George’s
Barracks, in two wings on the 21st and 22nd.
Sept. 2, ” 8 2nd Battalion from Portman Street to St.
John’s Wood, Magazine, Buckingham Palace,
and St. George’s Barracks and quarters
adjacent.
Feb. 14, 1838 8 1st Battalion from St. George’s _viâ_ Hounslow
to Windsor.
Feb. 15, ” 8 2nd Battalion from St. John’s Wood,
Kensington, Magazine, Buckingham Palace to
Wellington Barracks.
March 28, ” 8 2nd Battalion from London, 28th and 29th, in
four divisions to Winchester; two _viâ_
Epsom, Guildford, and Alton, and two _viâ_
Hounslow, Bagshot, and Basingstoke. From
Winchester to Portsmouth, where the
Battalion embarked, April 17th, for Canada,
in H.M.S. _Edinburgh_ and _Athol_, and
landed at Quebec on May 11th.
June 26, ” 8 1st Battalion from Windsor to London to take
part in the Queen’s Coronation, returning to
Windsor on the 30th.
Aug. 31, ” 8 1st Battalion from Windsor to Portman Street
Barracks.
March 1, 1839 8 1st Battalion from Portman Street to
Wellington Barracks.
Aug. 31, ” 8 1st Battalion from Wellington Barracks to the
Tower.
Feb. 29, 1840 8 1st Battalion from the Tower to St. John’s
Wood (4 companies), Buckingham Palace (1
company), Kensington (1 company), the
Magazine (1 company), and Wellington
Barracks (1 company).
Sept. 1, ” 8 1st Battalion from St. John’s Wood, etc., to
Wellington Barracks.
March 1, 1841 8 1st Battalion from Wellington to Portman
Street Barracks.
June 28, ” 8 1st Battalion from Portman Street to Fulham,
Parson’s Green, and Walham Green, during an
election in the borough of Marylebone;
thence the right wing to Twickenham and the
left wing to Hounslow (but not within two
miles of Brentford, Bedfont, or Kingston),
during the election in the county of
Middlesex. The Battalion returned to Portman
Street Barracks on July 9th.
Sept. 1, ” 8 1st Battalion from Portman Street to St.
George’s Barracks.
March 9, 1842 8 1st Battalion from St. George’s Barracks to
the Tower.
Sept. 1, ” 8 1st Battalion from the Tower, 7 companies to
Portman Street, 1 company to the Magazine
Barracks.
Oct. 22, ” 8 1st Battalion from Portman Street and the
Magazine to St. John’s Wood, Kensington,
Magazine, and Buckingham Palace Barracks.
Oct, 6, ” 6 Of the 2nd Battalion left Quebec to return to
England on board the H.M.S. _Calcutta_;
landed at Spithead on the 31st, and
proceeded by two trains to Winchester.
Oct. 19, ” 2 Of the 2nd Battalion, from Quebec, on board
H.M.S. _Pique_, to Spithead; arriving there
November 12th; thence to Winchester.
Nov. 22, ” 8 2nd Battalion from Winchester to St. George’s
Barracks.
March 1, 1843 8 1st Battalion from St. John’s Wood to Windsor.
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from St. George’s to Portman
Street.
Sept. 1, 1843 8 1st Battalion from Windsor to Wellington
Barracks.
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from Portman Street to St.
John’s Wood (3 companies), St. George’s
Barracks (2 companies), Buckingham Palace,
Magazine, and Kensington Barracks (1 company
each).
March 1, 1844 8 1st Battalion from Wellington to Portman
Street Barracks.
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from St. John’s Wood, etc., to
Wellington Barracks.
Aug. 30, ” 8 1st Battalion from Portman Street to the
Tower.
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from Wellington Barracks to St.
George’s Barracks.
Feb. 28, 1845 8 2nd Battalion from St. George’s Barracks to
Windsor.
March 8, ” 8 1st Battalion from the Tower to Winchester.
Sept. 1, ” 8 1st Battalion from Winchester to Portman
Street Barracks.
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from Windsor to the Tower.
Feb. 26, 1846 8 2nd Battalion from the Tower to Winchester.
Feb. 27, ” 8 1st Battalion from Portman Street to St.
John’s Wood (3 companies), Wellington
Barracks (2 companies), and to Kensington,
Buckingham Palace, and the Magazine (1
company each).
Sept. 1, ” 8 1st Battalion from St. John’s Wood, etc., to
St. George’s Barracks.
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from Winchester to Portman
Street Barracks.
March 2, 1847 8 1st Battalion from St. George’s to Wellington
Barracks.
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from Portman Street to St.
John’s Wood (3 companies), and Buckingham
Palace, Wellington, the Magazine,
Kensington, and St. George’s Barracks (1
company each).
Sept. 1, ” 8 1st Battalion from Wellington Barracks to
Chichester.
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from St. John’s Wood, etc., to
Wellington Barracks.
March 1, 1848 8 1st Battalion from Chichester to the Tower.
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from Wellington Barracks to
Windsor.
Sept. 1, ” 8 1st Battalion from the Tower to Windsor.
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from Windsor to St. George’s
Barracks.
March 1, 1849 8 1st Battalion from Windsor to St. George’s
Barracks.
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from St. George’s Barracks to
the Tower.
Sept. 1, ” 8 1st Battalion from St. George’s Barracks to
St. John’s Wood (3 companies), Wellington (2
companies), and the Magazine, Kensington,
and Buckingham Palace (1 company each).
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from the Tower to Chichester.
March 1, 1850 8 1st Battalion from St. John’s Wood, etc., to
Portman Street Barracks.
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from Chichester to St. George’s
Barracks.
Sept. 4, ” 8 1st Battalion from Portman Street to Windsor.
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from St. George’s Barracks to
St. John’s Wood (3 companies), and St.
George’s, Wellington, Kensington, Buckingham
Palace, and the Magazine (1 company each).
March 7, 1851 8 1st Battalion from Windsor to the Tower.
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from St. John’s Wood, etc., to
Wellington Barracks.
Oct. 23, 1851 8 1st Battalion from the Tower to Chichester.
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from Wellington to Portman
Street Barracks.
March 2, 1852 8 1st Battalion from Chichester to Wellington
Barracks.
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from Portman Street to Windsor.
Sept. 1, ” 8 1st Battalion from Wellington to Portman
Street.
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from Windsor to the Tower.
March 2, 1853 8 1st Battalion from Portman Street to St.
John’s Wood (3 companies), and to
Kensington, Buckingham Palace, the Magazine,
Wellington, and St. George’s Barracks (1
company each).
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from the Tower to St. George’s
Barracks.
June 14, ” 8 1st Battalion from St. John’s Wood, etc., to
Chobham Camp, _viâ_ Windsor.
July 14, ” 8 1st Battalion from Chobham Camp to St.
George’s Barracks.
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from St. George’s Barracks to
Chobham Camp, _viâ_ Chertsey.
Aug. 19, ” 8 2nd Battalion from Chobham Camp to Chichester,
in two wings, left wing on the 19th and
right wing on the 20th.
Feb. 14, 1854 8 1st Battalion from St. George’s to Chichester;
the men of the Battalion who were not to
proceed on foreign service were sent to
Windsor.
” ” 8 2nd Battalion from Chichester to Windsor,
leaving behind at the former quarter men who
were to complete the 1st Battalion to 850
rank and file.
Feb. 22, ” 8 1st Battalion from Chichester to Southampton;
thence in ss. _Orinoco_ to Malta, reaching
that place on March 4th.
Feb. 23, ” 8 2nd Battalion from Windsor to St. George’s
Barracks, and thence on the 28th to
Wellington Barracks.
April 21, ” 8 1st Battalion left Malta in H.M.S. _Vulcan_,
disembarking at Scutari on the 29th, and was
encamped there.
June 13, ” 8 1st Battalion from Scutari to Varna in the
steam-transport _Andes_, and encamped about
a mile outside the fortifications there on
the 14th.
July 1 ” 8 1st Battalion marched from Varna to Aladyn,
and was encamped there.
July 27, ” 8 1st Battalion marched from Aladyn to the
village of Gevreklek, and was encamped
there.
Aug. 16, ” 8 1st Battalion marched from Gevreklek to the
vicinity of the Adrianople Road, about two
miles to the south of Varna, and reached
their new camp on the 18th.
Sept. 1, ” 12 2nd Battalion from Wellington Barracks to
Portman Street.
Sept. 7, ” 8 Of the 1st Battalion, the left wing and the
head-quarters embarked on board the
steam-transport _Tonning_, on August 29th,
and 2 companies on H.M.S. _Simoon_; the
remaining 2 companies on H.M.S. _Vengeance_,
the next day, August 30th, whence they were
transferred to H.M.S. _Bellerophon_ on
September 4th. On September 7th the fleet
left the coast of Turkey, and sailed into
the Black Sea, approaching the Crimea, off
Eupatoria, on the 13th. Next day, the 14th,
the Battalion landed in the Crimea.
Sept. 20, ” 8 BATTLE OF THE ALMA, 1st Battalion present.
Oct. 2, ” 8 1st Battalion marched from the neighbourhood
of the Alma on September 23rd, and, taking
part in the flank march round Sevastopol,
encamped outside Balaklava near the village
of Kadikeui; on October 2nd, the Battalion
took up a position before Sevastopol.
Nov. 5, 1854 8 BATTLE OF INKERMAN. 1st Battalion present.
Jan. 31, 1855 1 Of the 2nd Battalion from Portman Street to
Kensington Barracks.
Feb. 24, ” 8 1st Battalion from before Sevastopol to
Balaklava.
March 1, ” 12 2nd Battalion from Portman Street and
Kensington to St. George’s Barracks.
March 26, ” 1 Of the 2nd Battalion from St. George’s
Barracks to Wellington Barracks. This
company rejoined head-quarters on April
10th.
June 13, ” 12 2nd Battalion from St. George’s Barracks to
the Camp at Aldershot.
June 16, ” 8 1st Battalion from Balaklava to before
Sevastopol.
Aug. 28, ” 12 2nd Battalion from Aldershot to St. George’s
Barracks, the Tower, and the Magazine and
Kensington Barracks.
Sept. 15, ” 2 Of the 2nd Battalion from the Tower to Portman
Street. Between this date and the end of
January, 1856, several changes took place in
the stations of individual companies, and
the Battalion then had 3 companies in
Portman Street, 1 company in Buckingham
Palace, the Magazine, and in Kensington
Barracks, each, and the remainder in St.
George’s Barracks.
Feb. 29, 1856 12 2nd Battalion from St. George’s Barracks,
etc., to the Tower and Portman Street.
June 4, ” 8 1st Battalion embarked at Kamiesh Bay
(Crimea), on board H.M.S. _Agamemnon_, for
England, and disembarked at Gosport on the
28th; thence to Aldershot.
June 26, ” 2 Of the 2nd Battalion from Portman Street to
rejoin head-quarters at the Tower.
July 9, ” 10 1st Battalion from Aldershot to the Tower and
St. John’s Wood.
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from the Tower to Windsor. From
August 26th to the middle of October, 1
company was encamped at Ascot; (each company
of the Battalion proceeded there in
succession for a few days).
Dec. 4, ” 2 Of the 1st Battalion from St. John’s Wood to
the Tower.
March 3, 1857 10 1st Battalion from the Tower to Aldershot.
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from Windsor to Wellington
Barracks.
Sept. 1, ” 10 1st Battalion from Aldershot to Wellington
Barracks and Buckingham Palace (1 company).
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from Wellington Barracks to
Dublin. Between October 17th and December
21st, 2 companies were at the Curragh;
(detachments of 2 companies at a time
relieved each other successively, until the
whole 10 companies had received musketry
instruction there). During the following
spring and summer 1 company at a time
proceeded to Curragh or to Ash Camp for
musketry practice.
Nov. 20, ” 1 Of the 1st Battalion from Buckingham Palace to
Wellington Barracks.
April 15, 1858 10 1st Battalion from Wellington Barracks to
Windsor. During the summer months the
companies proceeded one after another to Ash
Camp or to Ascot for musketry practice.
Sept. 1, 1858 10 1st Battalion from Windsor to St. George’s,
Kensington, and Magazine Barracks.[495]
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from Dublin to Wellington
Barracks.
April 1, 1859 10 1st Battalion from St. George’s, Kensington,
and Magazine Barracks to Wellington
Barracks. During the summer the companies
proceeded separately, one after another, to
Ash Camp for musketry.
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from Wellington Barracks to
Portman Street and St. John’s Wood Barracks.
July 1st, ” 10 2nd Battalion thence to Aldershot, returning
to the same West-end Barracks, August 2nd.
Sept. 1st, ” 10 2nd Battalion from Portman Street and St.
John’s Wood to the Tower.
Oct. 1st, ” 10 1st Battalion from Wellington Barracks to
Portman Street and St. John’s Wood Barracks.
April 3, 1860 10 1st Battalion from Portman Street and St.
John’s Wood to Wellington Barracks and
Buckingham Palace Barracks.
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from the Tower to Windsor.
Musketry by companies at Ash Camp during the
summer.
June 15, ” 10 1st Battalion from Wellington Barracks to
Aldershot, returning to same London quarters
July 17th.
June 28, ” 2 2nd Battalion from Windsor to Wellington
Barracks, returning to Windsor August 13th.
Oct. 2 ” 10 1st Battalion from Wellington and Buckingham
Palace Barracks, to St. George’s,
Kensington, and Magazine Barracks.
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from Windsor to Portman Street
and St. John’s Wood Barracks.
April 2, 1861 10 1st Battalion from St. George’s, Kensington,
and Magazine Barracks to the Tower. Musketry
by companies during the summer at Ash Camp.
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from Portman Street and St.
John’s Wood Barracks to Wellington and
Buckingham Palace Barracks.
July 19, ” 10 2nd Battalion from Wellington Barracks to
Aldershot, returnig to the former quarters
August 23rd.
Oct. 4, ” 10 1st Battalion from the Tower to Dublin by
Liverpool.
Dec. 12, ” 10 2nd Battalion from Wellington and Buckingham
Palace Barracks to the Tower, returning to
the same quarters in the West-end on
December 19th.
April 1, 1862 10 2nd Battalion from Wellington and Buckingham
Palace Barracks to Portman Street and St.
John’s Wood Barracks. Musketry by companies
to Aldershot and at Eastbourne, during the
summer.
April 16, ” 10 1st Battalion from Dublin to Wellington
Barracks.
Aug. 5, ” 10 1st Battalion from Wellington Barracks to
Aldershot.
Sept. 5, ” 10 1st Battalion from Aldershot to Windsor.
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from Portman Street and St.
John’s Wood Barracks to St. George’s, the
Magazine, Wellington, and Buckingham Palace
Barracks.
Jan. 10, 1863 1 Of the 2nd Battalion from St. George’s
Barracks to Wellington Barracks.
April 1, ” 10 1st Battalion from Windsor to Portman Street
and Kensington Barracks.
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from St. George’s Magazine,
Wellington, and Buckingham Palace Barracks
to Windsor. Musketry for both battalions by
companies at Aldershot, during the summer.
July 4, ” 4 Of the 1st Battalion from Kensington to
Wellington Barracks, returning to the former
quarter September 1st.
Sept. 15, ” 1 Of the 1st Battalion from Portman Street to
Chelsea Barracks.[496]
Sept. 25, ” 10 1st Battalion from Portman Street and
Kensington to St. George’s (7 companies),
Magazine (1 company), and Chelsea Barracks
(2 companies).
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from Windsor to Wellington
Barracks.
Oct. 1, ” 1 Of the 1st Battalion from St. George’s to
Chelsea Barracks.
Oct. 15, ” 1 Of the 1st Battalion from the Magazine to
Chelsea Barracks.
April 1, 1864 10 1st Battalion from St. George’s and Chelsea to
Wellington (8 companies), Buckingham Palace
(1 company), Magazine (1 company). Musketry
by companies during the summer at
Eastbourne.
July 5, ” 10 2nd Battalion from Wellington Barracks to
Aldershot, returning to the former station
August 2nd.
Sept. 15, ” 10 2nd Battalion from Wellington Barracks to
Windsor.
March 31,1865 10 1st Battalion from Wellington, Buckingham
Palace, and Magazine Barracks to Windsor.
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from Windsor to St. George’s (6
companies), and Chelsea Barracks (4
companies). Musketry for both Battalions by
companies at Aldershot.
Aug. 2, ” 10 2nd Battalion from St. George’s and Chelsea to
the Tower (8 companies) and St. John’s Wood
Barracks (2 companies).
Sept. 1, ” 10 1st Battalion from Windsor to Chelsea
Barracks.
Feb. 20, 1866 10 1st Battalion from Chelsea to Dublin.
March 1, ” 10 2nd Battalion from the Tower and St. John’s
Wood to Chelsea Barracks. Musketry during
the summer by companies at Aldershot.
Aug. 31, ” 10 2nd Battalion from Chelsea to Wellington,
Kensington, Buckingham Palace, and Magazine
Barracks.
Sept. 13, ” 10 1st Battalion from Dublin to the Curragh, till
October 25th.
Dec. 21, ” 1 Of the 2nd Battalion from Magazine to
Wellington Barracks.[497]
Feb. 28, 1867 10 2nd Battalion from Wellington, Kensington, and
Buckingham Palace Barracks to Dublin.
March 1, ” 10 1st Battalion from Dublin to St. George’s (6
companies) and Chelsea Barracks (4
companies). Musketry by companies at
Eastbourne during the summer.
March 9, ” 1 Of the 1st Battalion from St. George’s to
Chelsea Barracks.
Sept. 3, ” 10 1st Battalion from St. George’s and Chelsea to
the Tower (8 companies), and St. John’s Wood
(2 companies).
Oct. 21, ” 2 Of the 1st Battalion from St. John’s Wood to
the Tower.
March 4, 1868 10 1st Battalion from the Tower to Windsor.
Musketry by companies at Aldershot during
the summer.
March 4, ” 10 2nd Battalion from Dublin to Chelsea (7
companies) and St. George’s Barracks (3
companies). Musketry by companies at
Aldershot during the summer.
April 22, ” 2 Of the 2nd Battalion from St. George’s to
Chelsea Barracks.
May 16, ” 2 Of the 2nd Battalion from Chelsea to St.
John’s Wood Barracks.
May 29, ” 2 Of the 2nd Battalion from St. John’s Wood to
St. George’s Barracks.
Sept. 1, ” 10 1st Battalion from Windsor to Chelsea
Barracks.
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from Chelsea and St. George’s
Barracks to Windsor.
March 3, 1869 10 1st Battalion from Chelsea to Chelsea and St.
George’s.
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from Windsor to the Tower and
St. John’s Wood Barracks. Musketry by
companies to Aldershot during the summer.
July 6, ” 10 1st Battalion from Chelsea and St. George’s
Barracks to Aldershot, returning to former
quarters August 3rd.
Sept. 1, ” 10 1st Battalion from Chelsea and St. George’s
Barracks to Wellington Barracks.
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from the Tower and St. John’s
Wood to Wellington, Kensington, and
Buckingham Palace Barracks.
March 2, 1870 10 1st Battalion from Wellington to Wellington,
Kensington, and Buckingham Palace Barracks.
March 3, ” 10 2nd Battalion from Wellington, Kensington, and
Buckingham Palace Barracks to Wellington
Barracks. Musketry for both Battalions by
companies at Aldershot.
Sept. 1, ” 10 1st Battalion from Wellington, Kensington, and
Buckingham Palace Barracks to Windsor.
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from Wellington to Chelsea
Barracks.
March 1, 1871 10 1st Battalion from Windsor to the Tower.
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from Chelsea to Chelsea and St.
George’s Barracks. Musketry by companies for
both Battalions at Aldershot, during the
summer.
June 19, ” 1 Of the 1st Battalion from the Tower to
Kensington Barracks.
July 5, ” 1 Of the 1st Battalion from the Tower to
Kensington Barracks.
Aug. 8, ” 10 2nd Battalion from Chelsea and St. George’s
Barracks to Aldershot and neighbourhood for
manœuvres.
Sept. 26, ” 10 1st Battalion from the Tower and Kensington
Barracks to Chelsea and St. George’s
Barracks.
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from Aldershot manœuvres to
Windsor.
April 6, 1872 10 2nd Battalion from Windsor to Dublin.
” ” 1st Battalion by companies to Aldershot during
the summer for musketry.
Aug. 15, ” 10 1st Battalion from Chelsea and St. George’s
Barracks to Blandford and neighbourhood, for
Salisbury Plain manœuvres.
Aug. 19, ” 10 2nd Battalion from Dublin to the Curragh,
returning to Dublin after a few weeks.
Sept. 14, ” 10 1st Battalion from Salisbury Plain
manœuvres to Wellington Barracks.
April 24, 1873 10 2nd Battalion from Dublin to the Tower and St.
John’s Wood Barracks. The companies in
latter quarter were withdrawn from May to
July. Musketry by companies during summer at
Ash and Windsor.
1st Battalion by companies to Gravesend and
Ash for musketry during the summer.
Aug. 18, ” 10 2nd Battalion from Tower and St. John’s Wood
to Cannock Chase and neighbourhood for
manœuvres.
Sept. 12, ” 10 1st Battalion from Wellington to Chelsea
Barracks.
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from Cannock Chase manœuvres
to Chelsea and St. George’s Barracks.
April 28, 1874 10 1st Battalion from Chelsea to Windsor.
Musketry by companies at Windsor and
Aldershot.
2nd Battalion by companies to Gravesend for
musketry.
Oct. 1, ” 10 1st Battalion from Windsor to the Tower and
St. John’s Wood.
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from Chelsea and St. George’s to
Wellington Barracks.
Jan. 5, 1875 1 Of the 1st Battalion from St. John’s Wood to
the Tower.
April 3, ” 10 1st Battalion from the Tower to Wellington,
Kensington, and Buckingham Palace Barracks.
Musketry for both Battalions by companies at
Gravesend and Ash.
Oct. 1, ” 10 2nd Battalion from Wellington to Chelsea and
St. George’s Barracks.
March 29, 1876 10 1st Battalion from Wellington, Kensington, and
Buckingham Palace Barracks to Shorncliffe.
March 30, ” 10 2nd Battalion from Chelsea and St. George’s to
the Tower.
Aug. 2, ” 10 2nd Battalion from the Tower to Aldershot.
Sept. 1, ” 10 2nd Battalion from Aldershot to Windsor.
” ” 10 1st Battalion from Shorncliffe to Wellington
Barracks.
March 1, 1877 10 1st Battalion from Wellington to Chelsea
Barracks. Musketry by half-battalions at
Gravesend and Ash.
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from Windsor to Wellington,
Kensington, and Buckingham Palace. Musketry
by half-battalions at Ash.
June 22, ” 10 1st Battalion from Chelsea to Aldershot,
returning to the former quarter July 20th.
Sept. 4, ” 10 2nd Battalion from Wellington Barracks, etc.,
to Shorncliffe.
March 1, 1878 10 1st Battalion from Chelsea to the Tower.
Musketry by companies at Eastbourne.
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from Shorncliffe to Chelsea and
St. George’s Barracks. Musketry by
half-battalions at Gravesend.
July 2, ” 10 2nd Battalion from Chelsea and St. George’s
Barracks to Aldershot, returning to former
quarter, 24th.
” ” 10 1st Battalion from the Tower to Windsor.
March 4, 1879 10 1st Battalion from Windsor to Wellington and
Kensington Barracks. Musketry by
half-battalions at Aldershot.
” ” 10 2nd Battalion from Chelsea and St. George’s to
Windsor. Musketry by companies at Aldershot.
July 1, ” 10 1st Battalion from Wellington Barracks, etc.,
to Aldershot.
July 26, ” 10 1st Battalion from Aldershot to Shorncliffe.
Sept. 2, ” 10 2nd Battalion from Windsor to the Tower.
March 3, 1880 10 1st Battalion from Shorncliffe to Chelsea and
St. George’s Barracks.
March 3, 1880 10 2nd Battalion from the Tower to Wellington
Barracks. Musketry by companies for both
Battalions at Aldershot.
Dec. 6, ” 10 1st Battalion from Chelsea and St. George’s to
Dublin.
Feb. 24, 1881 10 2nd Battalion from Wellington to Wellington,
Kensington, and Buckingham Palace Barracks.
Musketry by companies at Aldershot and
Pirbright.
June 2, ” 10 1st Battalion from Dublin to New Pallas,
returning 4th.
March 4, 1882 8 1st Battalion Dublin to Chelsea Barracks.
” 7 ” 8 2nd Battalion from Wellington, Kensington, and
Buckingham Palace Barracks to Dublin.
May 10, ” 8 1st Battalion from Chelsea to Pirbright Camp,
returning to former quarter, 26th.
Aug. 1, ” 8 2nd Battalion from Dublin to Egypt, embarking
at Kingstown on board s.s. _Iberia_, and
landing at Alexandria, 13th. Moved to Ramleh
that day.
Aug. 18 ” 8 2nd Battalion from Ramleh to Alexandria,
embarked on board _Iberia_; landed at
Ismailia, 22nd; moved forward to the front,
24th.
Sept. 13, ” 8 BATTLE OF TEL-EL-KEBIR. The 2nd Battalion to
Cairo by train on the 15th.
Oct. 31, ” 8 2nd Battalion from Cairo to Alexandria by
train; embarked there on board the
_Batavia_, and reached Portsmouth on
November 16th; thence by train to London,
Chelsea Barracks.
Nov. 13, ” 8 1st Battalion from Chelsea Barracks to
Windsor.
March 1, 1883 8 1st Battalion from Windsor to the Tower.
March 27, ” 8 1st Battalion from the Tower to Wellington
Barracks (4 companies), and St. George’s
Barracks (4 companies). Musketry and company
training at Pirbright by companies, one or
two at a time; one company trained at
Wimbledon.
2nd Battalion by companies to Aldershot and
Pirbright for musketry, during the season.
July 10, ” 8 2nd Battalion from Chelsea to Pirbright Camp.
July 28, ” 8 2nd Battalion from Pirbright to Windsor.
July 31, ” 8 1st Battalion from Wellington and St. George’s
Barracks to Chelsea Barracks (south wing).
March 20, 1884 8 1st Battalion from Chelsea to Aldershot.
May 5, ” 8 1st Battalion from Aldershot to Chelsea.
2nd Battalion by companies to Pirbright for
musketry.
July 15, ” 8 1st Battalion from Chelsea to Wellington
Barracks.
Aug. 28, ” 8 2nd Battalion from Windsor to Chelsea and St.
George’s.
Feb. 19, 1885 8 2nd Battalion from Chelsea and St. George’s
Barracks to Wellington Barracks. For
musketry and company training, two companies
at a time, to Pirbright during the season.
” ” 8 1st Battalion from Wellington to Westminster
Stairs, where the Battalion embarked in two
river steamers for Gravesend; thence on
board s.s. _Manorah_, and started for
Suakin; disembarking there on March 8th, and
proceeded to camp near Suakin.
March 23, ” 8 1st Battalion from Suakin to Tofrek
(McNeill’s) Zareba, returning to near
Suakin, 28th.
April 2, ” 8 1st Battalion from Suakin to Tamai, returning
to near Suakin April 4th.
April 6, 1885 8 1st Battalion from Suakin to No. 1 Station (on
the road to Berber); thence to Handub, 8th;
thence Head-quarters and Right-half
Battalion to Otao, 18th, followed by
Left-half Battalion, 20th.
May 13, ” 8 1st Battalion from Otao to Suakin; embarked on
board s.s. _Deccan_, 16th; and steamed to
Alexandria; remained on board for some days
in the harbour; landed June 9th and marched
to Ramleh.
July 1, ” 8 1st Battalion embarked on board H.M.S.
_Orontes_, and landed in Cyprus, 5th;
marched from Limasol to the top of Mount
Troödos in that island, 9th.
Aug. 24, ” 8 1st Battalion from the camp on Mount Troödos,
to Limasol, embarked in H.M.S. _Orontes_,
26th, and reaching Spithead, September 10th,
and London, 11th, were quartered in Chelsea
(5 companies) and St. George’s Barracks (3
companies).
Sept. 16, ” 8 2nd Battalion from Wellington Barracks to the
Tower.
-----
Footnote 494:
By _Brigade Order_ , Nov. 5, 1833, the King’s Mews Barracks were
called St. George’s Barracks; and the new building erected near
Bird-cage Walk, on the site of the Armoury and Recruit House,
Westminster Barracks. The latter were immediately afterwards
called Wellington Barracks.
Footnote 495:
The new Kensington Barracks replaced the old buildings in April,
1858.
Footnote 496:
The barracks built in Chelsea were ready for occupation at this
time.
Footnote 497:
The Magazine Barracks were given up on this date as a Guards
quarter, and were handed over to the Police authorities.
-----
APPENDIX XVI.
1.
COLDSTREAM ROLL.[498]
-----
Footnote 498:
Continued from the 757th Name in Appendix No. 255 of Colonel
MacKinnon’s _Origin and Services of the Coldstream Guards_ (ii.
504).
-----
758 Francis Miles Milman, _Ens._ 3 Dec. 1800; _Lieut._ 28 April 1804;
_Capt._ 25 Dec. 1813; _Major_, 22 July 1830; _Lieut.-Col._ 10
Jan. 1837. To half-pay 8 Aug. 1837.
Sir John Lowther Johnstone, Bart., _Ens._ 17 Dec. 1800; _Lieut._
1 Dec. 1804. Promoted Lieutenant in York Hussars 23 July 1802.
Exchanged to the Coldstream from Captain in 21st Foot 1 Dec.
1804. Retired 26 March 1806.
760 Charles Maitland Christie, _Ens._ 5 March 1801; _Lieut._ 16 Aug.
1804. Retired 20 June 1810.
Frederick Morshead, _Ens._ 13 May 1801. Retired 23 May 1804.
George Heneage Finch, _Ens._ 14 May 1801; _Lieut._ 29 Dec. 1804.
To half-pay of the Royal York Rangers 28 Feb. 1805.
Thomas Gore, _Ens._ 3 Sept. 1801; _Lieut._ 4 July 1805; _Capt._
25 Dec. 1813. Promoted to Captain in 88th Foot 27 June 1805.
Exchanged to Coldstream 4 July 1805. Retired 19 Feb. 1823.
Henry W. Vachell, _Ens._ 15 Oct. 1801; _Lieut._ 28 Nov. 1805.
Died at Penzance 29 Aug. 1813.
765 Thomas Wood, _Ens._ 28 April 1802; _Lieut._ 27 March 1806.
Retired 16 Jan. 1811.
William Henry Pringle (afterwards Sir William, K.C.B.), _Capt._
17 Sept. 1802. Exchanged from Lieut.-Colonel of 4th Foot.
Exchanged to Lieut.-Colonel of 1st Foot 1 Dec. 1808.
Richard Oriel Singer, _Ens._ 24 Dec. 1802, 3 Sept. 1803. To
half-pay from date of appointment. Re-appointed from half-pay 3
Sept. 1803. Retired 4 Dec. 1803.
William Wharton Rawlins, _Ens._ 24 Feb. 1803. Retired 19 Dec.
1804.
Hon. George Pelham, _Ens._ 5 May 1803; _Lieut._ 17 April 1806.
Retired 26 June 1810.
770 Herbert Taylor (afterwards Sir Herbert, G.C.H.), _Capt._ 25 May
1803. Appointed from Lieut.-Colonel on half-pay of 9th West
India Regiment. Major-General 4 June 1813. Removed from the
Coldstream 25 July 1814, being a General Officer.
Edward Jenkinson, _Ens._ 26 May 1803; _Lieut._ 29 May 1806. Died
of wounds 24 Aug. 1809.
Matthew, Lord Aylmer (afterwards K.C.B.), _Capt._ 9 June 1803.
Exchanged from Lieut.-Colonel on half-pay of 85th Foot.
Major-General 4 June 1813. Removed from the Coldstream 25 July
1814, being a General Officer.
Charles Doyle, _Ens._ 28 July 1803. Promoted to Captain in 1st
Garrison Battalion 13 March 1806.
Thomas Thoroton, _Ens._ 28 July 1803; _Lieut._ 6 Nov. 1806.
Retired 6 March 1811.
775 Thomas Barrow, _Ens._ 12 Aug. 1803; _Lieut._ 25 Dec. 1806;
_Capt._ 2 June 1814. To half-pay of Regiment 15 June 1830.
George Thomas Baldwin, _Ens._ 1 Oct. 1803; _Lieut._ 14 May 1807.
Retired 9 March 1808.
Henry Frederick Cooke, _Lieut._ 5 Nov. 1803; _Capt._ 7 Nov. 1811.
Exchanged from Captain in 28th Foot. Exchanged to Staff in
North America 23 July 1812.
Sir Henry Sullivan, Bart., _Lieut._ 2 Dec. 1803; _Capt._ 24 Sept.
1812. Appointed from Captain in 66th Foot. Killed before
Bayonne 14 April 1814.
William Clinton Wynyard, _Ens._ 3 Dec. 1803; 23 July 1807. Died
in Sloane Street 27 April 1814.
780 William Fairfield, _Ens._ 5 Dec. 1803. Promoted to Captain in
60th Foot 25 July 1806.
George Bryan, _Ens._ 6 Dec. 1803; _Lieut._ 24 July 1807. Died of
wounds received at Talavera 30 Sept. 1809.
Hon. William George Crofton, _Ens._ 7 Dec. 1803; _Lieut._ 10
March 1808. From Lieutenant in Royal Fusiliers. Killed 14 April
1814, before Bayonne.
Daniel MacKinnon, _Ens._ 16 Jan. 1804; _Lieut._ 25 March 1808;
_Capt._ 25 July 1814; _Major_, 22 June 1826; _Lieut.-Col._ 22
July 1830. Died in London 22 June 1836.
Newton Dickinson, _Ens._ 3 Feb. 1804; _Lieut._ 12 May 1808.
Retired 31 Jan. 1810.
785 Hon. John Walpole, _Ens._ 18 Feb. 1804; _Lieut._ 23 June 1808;
_Capt._ 25 July 1814. Retired 27 April 1825.
Matthew Fortescue, _Ens._ 3 March 1804; _Lieut._ 4 Aug. 1808.
Retired 18 July 1810.
Henry Dawkins, _Ens._ 10 March 1804; _Lieut._ 25 Aug. 1808;
_Capt._ 25 July 1814. Exchanged to half-pay, unattached, 31
Aug. 1826.
Thomas Steele, _Ens._ 17 March 1804; _Lieut._ 1 June 1809;
_Capt._ 18 Jan. 1820. Exchanged to half-pay, unattached, 1 June
1829.
William Lord Alvanley, _Ens._ 31 March 1804; _Lieut._ 22 Dec.
1808. Exchanged to Captain in 50th Foot 16 Aug. 1810.
790 Hon. Charles Vere Ferrars Townshend (afterwards Lord Charles),
_Ens._ 28 April 1804. Resigned 6 Sept. 1804.
Edward Harvey, _Ens._ 24 May 1804; _Lieut._ 17 Aug. 1809. Killed
18 October 1812, before Burgos.
William Burroughs, _Ens._ 26 July 1804; _Lieut._ 28 Sept. 1809.
Died of his wounds 26 April 1814.
Francis James, _Ens._ 7 Sept. 1804. Promoted to Captain in 81st
Foot 3 March 1808.
George Bowles (afterwards Sir George, G.C.B.), _Ens._ 20 Dec.
1804; _Lieut._ 1 Feb. 1810; _Capt._ 27 May 1825; _Major_, 31
Dec. 1839. Retired upon half-pay, unattached, 30 May 1843.
795 John Boswell, _Ens._ 21 Dec. 1804; _Lieut._ 8 March 1810. Retired
12 Dec. 1810.
Hon. Francis Hay Drummond, _Ens._ 22 Dec. 1804; _Lieut._ 21 June
1810. Drowned 28 Oct. 1810, in Scotland.
Lord Alexander Gordon, _Lieut._ 28 Feb. 1805. From Captain in 5th
Foot. Appointed Captain in 59th Foot, 29 May 1806.
Thomas Sowerby, _Ens._ 28 Feb. 1805; _Lieut._ 27 June 1810;
_Capt._ 14 May 1817. Retired 16 April 1823.
Harry Parker, _Ens._ 18 April 1805. Killed 28 July 1809, at
Talavera.
800 Edward Lascelles, _Ens._ 25 April 1805; _Lieut._ 28 June 1810.
Died 30 Sept. 1815, at Barrington Park, Gloucestershire.
Hon. Edward Boscawen (afterwards Earl of Falmouth), _Ens._ 1 May
1805. Resigned 16 Nov. 1808.
Patrick Sandilands, _Ens._ 2 May 1805; _Lieut._ 19 July 1810.
Promoted to a company in Third Guards 30 Aug. 1821.
William Henley Raikes, _Lieut._ 13 June 1805; _Capt._ 3 June
1813; _Major_, 27 May 1825. Exchanged from Captain in 66th
Foot. Retired 21 June 1826.
His Royal Highness Adolphus Frederick, Duke of Cambridge, K.G.,
_Col._ 5 Sept. 1805. Died 8 July 1850.
805 Richard Greville, _Ens._ 12 Sept. 1805. Retired 7 May 1806.
John Fremantle, C.B., _Ens._ 17 Oct. 1805; _Lieut._ 2 Aug. 1810;
_Capt._ 1 Aug. 1822; _Major_ 23 June 1836; _Lieut.-Col._ 8 Aug.
1837. Retired on half-pay 31 Dec. 1839.
John Prince, _Ens._ 31 Oct. 1805; _Lieut._ 29 Oct. 1810. Died 2
Jan. 1818 in Hanover Street, London.
George Frederick Augustus, Lord Kilcoursie, _Ens._ 6 Feb. 1806;
_Lieut._ 13 Dec. 1810. Retired 24 March 1813.
James Vigors Harvey, _Ens._ 10 April 1806; _Lieut._ 17 Jan. 1811.
From Lieutenant in 4th Foot. Exchanged to half-pay of the
Regiment 6 May 1819.
810 Charles Gregory, _Ens._ 1 May 1806. Promoted to Captain in Second
Ceylon Regiment 4 Aug. 1808.
Peter Gaussen, _Ens._ 2 May 1806. Died 8 Oct. 1808, at Dartford.
William Lovelace Walton, _Ens._ 8 May 1806; _Lieut._ 7 March
1811; _Capt._ 20 Feb. 1823; _Major_, 10 Jan. 1837;
_Lieut.-Col._ 31 Dec. 1839. To half-pay 8 May 1846.
William Lockwood, _Ens._ 21 Aug. 1806; _Lieut._ 5 Sept. 1811.
Retired 7 Oct. 1812.
Edward Noel Long, _Ens._ 4 Dec. 1806. Drowned 9 March 1809, on
passage to Portugal.
815 Hon. John Ashburnham, _Ens._ 1 Jan. 1807. From Lieutenant in the
Royal Fusiliers. Drowned at sea, Dec. 1809.
Hon. John Wingfield, _Ens._ 16 April 1807; Died at Coimbra 4 May
1811.
Paulet St. John Mildmay, _Ens._ 14 May 1807; _Lieut._ 3 Oct.
1811. Gentleman Cadet from R.M.C. Retired April 22, 1812.
Alexander Wedderburn, _Ens._ 17 Sept. 1807; _Lieut._ 7 Nov. 1811;
_Capt._ 17 April 1823. Retired 27 July 1838.
Charles White, _Ens._ 7 April 1808; _Lieut._ 30 Jan. 1812.
Retired 15 Aug. 1821.
820 Thomas Bligh, _Ens._ 21 April 1808; _Lieut._ 13 Feb. 1812.
Retired 14 May 1823.
Charles Augustus Shawe, _Ens._ 26 May 1808; _Lieut._ 23 April
1812; _Capt._ 28 April 1825; _Major_, 8 Aug. 1837;
_Lieut.-Col._ 8 May 1846. Removed 9 Nov. 1846 on promotion to
Major-General.
Lord William Fitzgerald, _Ens._ 4 Aug. 1808. Resigned 7 Sept.
1808.
George Henry Macartney Greville, _Ens._ 8 Sept. 1808; _Lieut._ 24
Sept. 1812. From Ensign in 9th Foot. Exchanged to Captain in
the Royal Fusiliers 23rd Sept. 1813.
Michael Watts, _Ens._ 20 Oct. 1808. Killed 5 March 1811, at
Barrosa.
825 Charles Antonio Ferdinand Bentinck, _Ens._ 16 Nov. 1808; _Lieut._
24 Sept. 1812; _Capt._ 27 May 1825; _Major_, 30 May, 1843;
_Lieut.-Col._ 9 Nov. 1846. Gentleman Cadet from R.M.C. Retired
on half-pay 25th April 1848.
John Talbot, _Ens._ 17 Nov. 1808; _Lieut._ 26 Nov. 1812. Retired
24 Oct. 1821.
Frederick William Buller, _Capt._ 1 Dec. 1808. Exchanged from
Lieut-Colonel of the 1st Foot. Major-General June 4, 1813.
Removed from the Coldstream 25 July 1814, being a General
Officer.
George Harvey Percival, _Ens._ 16 March 1809; _Lieut._ 25 March
1813. Gentleman Cadet from R.M.C. Died 11 Nov. 1815.
William Stothert, _Ens._ 23 March 1809; _Lieut._ 2 June 1813.
Retired 13 Dec. 1815.
830 Walter George Baynes, _Ens._ 6 April 1809; _Lieut._ 1 June 1813.
Retired 4 Oct. 1820.
John Stepney Cowell (afterwards Sir John Stepney Cowell-Stepney,
Bart.), _Ens._ 18 May 1809; _Lieut._ 9 Sept. 1813; _Capt._ 15
June 1830. Retired 21 June 1832.
Wentworth Noel Burgess, _Ens._ 1 June 1809. From Ensign in 52nd
Foot. Killed before Burgos 19 October 1812.
William Ainslie, _Ens._ 25 Aug. 1809. Died in Dover Street,
London, 24 March 1810.
John Mills, _Ens._ 21 Dec. 1809; _Capt._ 10 Jan. 1814. Resigned
31 Aug. 1814.
835 James Bradshaw, _Ens._ 4 Jan. 1810. Resigned 16 Dec. 1812.
Francis Love Beckford, _Ens._ 25 Jan. 1810. Resigned 29 Dec.
1813.
Samuel Bates Ferris, _Ens._ 1 March 1810. Retired 12 June 1811.
John Charles Buckeridge, _Ens._ 29 March 1810. Killed before
Burgos 7 Oct. 1812.
John Lucie Blackman, _Ens._ 5 April 1810; _Lieut._ 10 Jan. 1814.
Killed at Waterloo. 18 June 1815.
840 William Grimstead, _Ens._ 21 June 1810; _Lieut._ 25 Dec. 1813.
Gentleman Cadet from R.M.C. Exchanged to Captain in Royal York
Rangers 28 May 1818.
Beaumont Hotham (afterwards Lord Hotham), _Ens._ 27 June 1810;
_Lieut._ 25 Dec. 1813, 10 Nov. 1825. Gentleman Cadet from
R.M.C. Exchanged to half-pay of the Regiment 14 Oct. 1819, and
from ditto 10 Nov. 1825. Promoted to Lieut.-Colonel on
half-pay, unattached, 24 December 1825.
Hon. John Rous (afterwards Earl of Stradbroke), Ens. 28 June
1810; _Lieut._ 4 May 1814. Exchanged to Captain in 93rd Foot. 6
Nov. 1817.
Windham Anstruther (afterwards Sir W. Carmichael-Anstruther,
Bart.), _Ens._ 5 July 1810; _Lieut._ 17 March 1814. Retired 26
Feb. 1817.
Charles Shirley, _Ens._ 19 July 1810; _Lieut._ 5 May 1814.
Exchanged to half-pay of the Regiment, 4 Nov. 1819.
845 Charles Mackenzie Fraser, _Lieut._ 16 Aug. 1810. Exchanged from
50th Foot. Retired 16 March 1814.
John Harcourt Powell, _Ens._ 20 Sept. 1810. Retired 4 March 1812.
John Drummond, _Ens._ 22 Nov. 1810; _Lieut._ 26 May 1814; _Capt._
22 June 1826. Exchanged to half-pay, unattached, 13 April 1832.
Hon. Robert Moore, _Ens._ 21 March 1811; _Lieut._ 2 June 1814;
_Capt._ 1 April 1824. To half-pay of the Regiment from date of
promotion to Captain.
Charles Andrew Girardot, _Ens._ 4 April 1811; _Lieut._ 1 Sept.
1814; _Capt._ 27 July 1826. Promoted to Lieut.-Colonel
half-pay, unattached, 11 July 1826. Exchanged from ditto 27
July following. Retired 21 Sept. 1830.
850 Thomas Chaplin, _Ens._ 18 April 1811; _Lieut._ 6 Oct. 1814;
_Capt._ 31 Aug. 1826; _Major_, 8 May 1846; _Lieut.-Col._ 25
April 1848. Gentleman Cadet from R.M.C. Promoted to
Lieut.-Colonel half-pay, unattached, 15 Aug. 1826. Exchanged
from ditto 31 Aug. following. Retired 22 Aug. 1851.
Edward Clifton, _Ens._ 25 April 1811; _Lieut._ 6 July 1815.
Retired 27 Oct. 1819.
Henry Salwey, _Ens._ 13 June 1811; _Lieut._ 20 July 1815; _Capt._
15 Feb. 1827. Promoted to Lieut.-Colonel half-pay, unattached,
30 Dec. 1826. Exchanged from ditto 15 Feb. following. Exchanged
to ditto 6 Aug. 1829.
George Gould Morgan, _Ens._ 4 July 1811; _Lieut._ 26 Oct. 1815.
Exchanged to half-pay of the Regiment 25 Feb. 1819.
James Macdonell, C.B. (afterwards Sir James, K.C.B.), _Capt._ 8
Aug. 1811; _Major_, 25 July 1821; _Lieut.-Col._ 27 May 1825.
Exchanged from Lieut.-Colonel of Second Garrison Battalion.
Major-General 22 July 1830.
855 Frederick Vachell, _Ens._ 19 Sept. 1811. From Ensign in 52nd
Foot. Died of his wounds 13 May 1814.
Thomas Slingsby Duncombe, _Ens._ 17 Oct. 1811; _Lieut._ 23 Nov.
1815. Resigned 17 Nov. 1819.
Francis Eyre, _Ens._ 26 Dec. 1811. Retired 31 May 1815.
Henry Shirley, _Ens._ 30 Jan. 1812. Gentleman Cadet from R.M.C.
Retired 5 May 1813.
Hon. James Forbes, _Ens._ 13 Feb. 1812; _Lieut._ 14 Dec. 1815;
_Capt._ 22 July 1830. Cadet from R.M.C. Died at Florence 25
Feb. 1835.
860 William Pitt, _Ens._ 5 March 1812. Died of his wounds 24 April
1814.
Thomas Powys, _Ens._ 30 April 1812; _Lieut._ 22 Jan. 1818, 4 Nov.
1819. To half-pay of the Regiment from 25 Dec. 1818. Exchanged
from ditto 4 Nov. 1819. Exchanged to half-pay, unattached, 30
April 1829.
Henry Loftus, _Capt._ 23 July 1812. Exchanged from the “Staff in
North America.” Died 11 July 1823, at Stifkey, Norfolk.
Henry Gooch, _Ens._ 23 July 1812; _Lieut._ 28 Oct. 1819; _Capt._
26 Nov. 1832. Gentleman Cadet from R.M.C. Retired 11 June 1841.
Augustus Cuyler, _Ens._ 15 Oct. 1812; _Lieut._ 27 Feb. 1817. From
Ensign in 69th Foot. Promoted to Lieut.-Colonel half-pay,
unattached, 10 June 1826.
865 Mark Beaufoy, _Ens._ 12 Nov. 1812; _Lieut._ 15 May 1817, 14 Oct.
1819. To half-pay of the Regiment from 25 Dec. 1818. Exchanged
from ditto 14 Oct. 1819. Retired 9 Feb. 1825.
William Kortright, _Ens._ 26 Nov. 1812; _Lieut._ 6 Nov. 1817, 25
Feb. 1819. From Ensign in 68th Foot. Promoted to Captain in
93rd Foot 11 Sept. 1817, and exchanged from ditto 6 Nov.
following. To half-pay of the Regiment from 25 Dec. 1818;
exchanged from ditto 23 Feb. 1819. Exchanged to ditto 10 Nov.
1823.
Henry Armytage, _Ens._ 27 Nov. 1812; _Lieut._ 28 May 1818, 6 May
1819; _Capt._ 4 Dec. 1828. Promoted to Captain in the Royal
York Rangers 5 March 1818, and exchanged from ditto 28 May
following. To half-pay of the Regiment 25 Dec. 1818. Exchanged
from ditto 6 May 1819. Promoted to Lieut.-Colonel half-pay,
unattached, 21 Nov. 1828. Exchanged from ditto 4 Dec.
following. Exchanged on half-pay of the 22nd Light Dragoons, 24
Jan. 1840.
Hon. William Rufus Rous, _Ens._ 17 Dec. 1812; _Lieut._ 18 Nov.
1819. Cadet from R.M.C. Exchanged to Captain in 55th Foot, 19
Feb. 1823.
Henry John William Bentinck (afterwards Sir Henry, K.C.B.),
_Ens._ 25 March 1813; _Lieut._ 18 Jan. 1820; _Capt._ 16 May
1829; _Major_, 9 Nov. 1846; _Lieut.-Col._ 22 Aug. 1851.
Major-General 20 June 1854.
870 Francis Manby Shawe, _Ens._ 6 May 1813; _Lieut._ 5 Oct. 1820.
Exchanged to half-pay, unattached, 13 April 1826.
Humphrey St. John Mildmay, _Ens._ 9 Sept. 1813; _Lieut._ 16 Aug.
1821. Exchanged to Captain in 35th Foot, 25 Dec. 1823.
Edward Sumner, _Lieut._ 23 Sept. 1813. Exchanged from Captain in
the Royal Fusiliers. Died of his wounds 26 June 1815.
Frederick Thomas Buller, _Ens._ 30 Dec. 1813; _Lieut._ 6 Sept.
1821; _Capt._ 4 June 1829. Exchanged to Lieut.-Colonel
half-pay, unattached, 3 Feb. 1832.
Henry Frederick Griffiths, _Ens._ 25 Jan. 1814. From the Stafford
Militia. Died in the Tower of London 19 Jan. 1821.
875 James Frederick Buller, _Ens._ 26 Jan. 1814. Died 4 Jan. 1816, in
Paris.
Hon. John Montagu, _Ens._ 27 Jan. 1814; _Lieut._ 25 Oct. 1821;
_Capt._ 13 Aug. 1829. Retired 26 Jan. 1832.
George Richard Buckley, _Ens._ 17 Feb. 1814. Died 15 Aug. 1815,
in Paris.
James Hervey, _Ens._ 15 March 1814. Exchanged to half-pay of the
Regiment 15 April 1819.
Henry Vane, _Ens._ 16 March 1814; _Lieut._ 1 Aug. 1822. Died at
Sidmouth 9 Aug. 1829.
880 Francis James Douglas, _Ens._ 17 March 1814. Died 29 May 1821.
Robert Bowen, _Ens._ 24 March 1814; _Lieut._ 19 Feb. 1823;
_Capt._ 27 Jan. 1832. Promoted to Captain in 55th Foot, 30 Jan.
1823. Exchanged from ditto 19 Feb. following. Retired 15 Nov.
1833.
Frederick FitzClarence (afterwards Lord Frederick), _Ens._ 12 May
1814. Promoted to Captain in the Cape Corps of Infantry, 23
Feb. 1820.
Alexander Gordon, _Ens._ 19 May 1814. Killed at Cambrai 1 April
1818, in a duel with a French Officer.
Hon. Walter Forbes (afterwards Lord Forbes), _Ens._ 2 June 1814;
_Lieut._ 20 Feb. 1823. Retired 20 April 1825.
885 Hon. Alexander Abercromby, C.B., _Capt._ 25 July 1814. From
Lieut.-Colonel of the 28th Foot. To half-pay of the Regiment 25
Oct. 1821.
Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., _Capt._ 25 July 1814. From Major of
63rd Foot. Major-General 27 May 1825.
Sir Robert Arbuthnot, K.C.B., _Capt._ 25 July 1814. From the
Portuguese Service. Exchanged to Lieut.-Colonel half-pay,
unattached, 27 July 1826.
Hon. Hercules Robert Pakenham, C.B. (afterwards Sir H., K.C.B.),
_Capt._ 25 July 1814. From Lieut.-Colonel of 26th Foot.
Exchanged to Lieut.-Colonel half-pay, unattached, 15 May 1817.
Sir William Maynard Gomm, K.C.B. (afterwards G.C.B.), _Capt._ 25
July 1814; _Major_, 16 May 1829; _Lieut.-Col._ 23 June 1836;
_Colonel_, 15 Aug. 1863. From Major of the 9th Foot.
Major-General 10 Jan. 1837. Died 15 March 1875.
890 Henry Wyndham, _Capt._ 25 July 1814. From Lieut.-Colonel of
Dillon’s Regiment. Exchanged to Lieut.-Colonel of the 19th
Dragoons, 11 July 1816.
Charles Short, _Ens._ 13 Oct. 1814; _Lieut._ 17 April 1823;
_Capt._ 21 Sept. 1830. Gentleman Cadet from R.M.C. Retired 24
Feb. 1837.
William Leedes Serjeantson, _Ens._ 17 Nov. 1814; _Lieut._ 15 May
1823. Exchanged to Captain half-pay, unattached, 9 Dec. 1824.
Richard Beamish, _Ens._ 22 Dec. 1814. Gentleman Cadet from R.M.C.
Placed on half-pay of the Regiment from 25 Dec. 1818.
Joseph Henry, Lord Wallscourt, _Ens._ 5 Jan. 1815. Died 11 Oct.
1816.
895 Jasper Taylor Hall, _Ens._ 1 June 1815, 15 April 1819; _Lieut._
25 Dec. 1823. To half-pay of the Regiment 25 Dec. 1818.
Exchanged from ditto 15 April 1819. Promoted to Captain in 35th
Foot 13 Nov. 1823, and exchanged from ditto 25 Dec. following.
Promoted to Major half-pay, unattached, 1 Aug. 1826.
John Simon Jenkinson, _Ens._ 6 July 1815, 28 Oct. 1819. To
half-pay of the Regiment 25 Dec. 1818. Re-appointed from ditto
28 Oct. 1819. Retired 16 Jan. 1822.
William Henry Cornwall, _Ens._ 10 Aug. 1815, 5 Oct. 1820;
_Lieut._ 9 Dec. 1824; _Capt._ 10 Feb. 1832. To half-pay of the
Regiment 25 Dec. 1818. Re-appointed from ditto 5 Oct. 1820.
Promoted to Captain half-pay, unattached, 6 Nov. 1824, and
exchanged from ditto 9 Dec. following. To half-pay 26 May 1848.
Henry Murray, _Ens._ 21 Sept. 1815, 31 May 1821; _Lieut._ 21
April 1825. From Page of Honour to the Prince Regent. To
half-pay of the Regiment 25 Dec. 1818. Re-appointed from ditto
31 May 1821. Exchanged to Captain half-pay, unattached, 5 Oct.
1826.
Edward John Duke, _Ens._ 26 Oct. 1815. Exchanged to 46th Foot 20
Aug. 1818.
900 Joseph Sidney Tharp, _Ens._ 23 Nov. 1815. To half-pay of the
Regiment 25 Dec. 1818.
Hon. Percy Ashburnham, _Ens._ 28 Dec. 1815. Cadet from R.M.C. On
half-pay of the Regiment 25 Dec. 1818.
Charles Loftus, _Ens._ 25 Jan. 1816. To half-pay of the Regiment
25 Dec. 1818.
Hon. George Charles Grantley Berkeley, _Ens._ 7 Nov. 1816, 16
Aug. 1821. To half-pay of the Regiment 25 Dec. 1818.
Re-appointed from ditto 16 Aug. 1821. Exchanged to 61st Foot 19
June 1823.
Hon. Arthur Charles Legge, 27 Feb. 1817. From Ensign in 28th
Foot. To half-pay of the Regiment 25 Dec. 1818.
905 John Waters, C.B., _Capt._ 15 May 1817. From half-pay Portuguese
Service. Exchanged to Lieut.-Colonel half-pay, unattached, 15
Feb. 1827.
Thomas Kingscote, _Ens._ 15 May 1817. To half-pay of the Regiment
25 Dec. 1818.
Brinckman Broadhead, _Ens._ 17 Sept. 1817, 13 Sept. 1821;
_Lieut._ 28 April 1825; _Capt._ 20 April 1832. To half-pay of
the Regiment 25 Dec. 1818. Re-appointed from ditto 13 Sept.
1821. Retired 11 June 1847.
John Blenkinsopp Coulson, _Ens._ 22 Jan. 1818. To half-pay of the
Regiment 25 Dec. 1818.
Charles Ricketts, _Ens._ 5 March 1818. To half-pay of the
Regiment 25 Dec. 1818.
910 John Arthur Douglas Bloomfield (afterwards Lord Bloomfield),
_Ens._ 9 April 1818. From Page of Honour to the Prince Regent.
To half-pay of the Regiment 25 Dec. 1818.
Thomas Butler, _Ens._ 20 Aug. 1818. Exchanged from Ensign in the
46th Foot. To half-pay of the Regiment 25 Dec. 1818.
Hon. Henry Dundas (afterwards Viscount Melville, G.C.B.), _Ens._
18 Nov. 1819; _Lieut._ 1 April 1824. Promoted to Major,
unattached, 11 July 1826.
Frederick William Culling Smith, _Ens._ 18 Jan. 1820. From Cornet
in 2nd Dragoon Guards. Promoted to Captain in the Royal Horse
Guards 2 Jan. 1823.
Hon. William Thomas Graves (afterwards Lord Graves), _Ens._ 8
June 1820; _Lieut._ 10 Feb. 1825. From Page of Honour to the
King. Retired 15 March 1830.
915 Arthur Richard Wellesley, _Ens._ 25 Jan. 1821. From Page of
Honour to the King. Appointed Cornet in the Royal Horse Guards,
20 Dec. 1821.
Charles Murray Hay, _Ens._ 1 Nov. 1821; _Lieut._ 24 Dec. 1825;
_Capt._ 22 June 1832; _Major_, 25 April 1848. From Ensign in
43rd Foot. Major-General 20 June 1854.
920 William Harcourt, _Ens._ 20 Dec. 1821. From Cornet in the 5th
Dragoon Guards. Promoted to Captain half-pay, unattached, 19
May 1825.
George Bentinck, _Ens._ 17 Jan. 1822; _Lieut._ 13 April 1826.
Promoted to Captain half-pay, unattached, 8 April 1826.
Exchanged from ditto 13 April following. Exchanged to ditto 31
Dec. 1830.
William Brook Northey, _Ens._ 1 Aug. 1822; _Lieut._ 20 April
1826. To half-pay of the Regiment as Lieutenant and Captain
from 25 May 1828.
John Dawson Rawdon, _Ens._ 29 Jan. 1823; _Lieut._ 10 June 1826.
_Capt._ 15 Nov. 1833. From Ensign in 79th Foot. To half-pay,
unattached, 13 May, 1842.
Hon. Thomas Ashburnham, _Ens._ 30 Jan. 1823; _Lieut._ 22 June
1826; _Capt._ 27 March 1835. Exchanged to 62nd Foot 7 Jan.
1842.
Hon. Henry St. Clair Erskine, _Ens._ 20 Feb. 1823; _Lieut._ 11
July 1826. From Ensign in 85th Foot. Died 24 May 1829, in
London.
William John Codrington (afterwards Sir William, G.C.B.), _Ens._
24 April 1823; _Lieut._ 20 July 1826; _Capt._ 8 July 1836;
_Colonel_, 16 March 1875. From Ensign in 43rd Foot.
Major-General 20 June 1854. Died 6 Aug. 1884.
Ely Duodecimus Wigram, _Ens._ 29 May 1823; _Lieut._ 1 Aug. 1826;
_Capt._ 13 Jan. 1837. To half-pay, unattached, 10 Dec. 1847.
925 St. John Dent, _Ens._ 19 June 1823; _Lieut._ 15 Aug. 1826. From
Ensign in 61st Foot. Retired 2 Aug. 1830.
Hon. Henry Sutton Fane, _Ens._ 27 Nov. 1823. From Ensign in the
93rd Foot. Promoted to Captain, half-pay, unattached, 22 Oct.
1825.
Hon. James Hope (afterwards Hope-Wallace), _Ens._ 8 April 1824;
_Lieut._ 30 Dec. 1826; _Capt._ 8 Aug. 1837. Retired 29 March
1844.
Willoughby Cotton, _Ens._ 6 Nov. 1824; _Lieut._ 21 Nov. 1828.
From Ensign in 62nd Foot. To the 70th Foot 26 July 1833.
Hon. Arthur Upton, _Ens._ 10 Feb. 1825; _Lieut._ 16 May 1829;
_Capt._ 31 Dec. 1839; _Major_, 22 Aug. 1851; _Lieut.-Col._ 20
June 1854. Major-General 20 Feb. 1855.
930 Frederick Paget, _Ens._ 24 Feb. 1825; _Lieut._ 4 June 1829;
_Capt._ 24 Jan. 1840. From Ensign in the 36th Foot. (Late Page
of Honour to the King.) Retired 13 Dec. 1853.
Boyd Pollen Manningham, _Ens._ 21 April 1825. Retired 20 Sept.
1826.
Hon. Edward Bootle Wilbraham, _Ens._ 28 April 1825; _Lieut._ 13
Aug. 1829; _Capt._ 11 June 1841. Retired on half-pay 7 Aug.
1846.
Lord Montagu William Graham, _Ens._ 19 May 1825; _Lieut._ 16
March 1830. Retired 1 May 1840.
George FitzClarence (afterwards Earl of Munster), _Capt._ 6 July
1825. From Lieut.-Colonel on half-pay, unattached. Exchanged to
ditto 4 Dec. 1828.
935 Francis Russell, _Capt._ 7 July 1825. From Captain and Brevet
Lieut.-Colonel on half-pay of the 12th Dragoons. Died 24 Nov.
1832, in London.
Hon. Charles Howard, _Ens._ 22 Oct. 1825. From Ensign in the 70th
Foot. Retired 30 Sept. 1829.
John Henry Pringle, _Ens._ 24 Dec. 1825; _Lieut._ 15 June 1830;
_Capt._ 13 May 1842. To half-pay 29 Dec. 1846.
John Christie Clitherow, _Ens._ 8 April 1826; _Lieut._ 22 July
1830; _Capt._ 30 May 1843. From 2nd Lieutenant in the Rifle
Brigade. Retired 3 March 1854.
Gordon Drummond, _Ens._ 10 June 1826; _Lieut._ 3 Aug. 1830;
_Capt._ 29 March 1844; _Major_, 20 June 1854. Died 17 November
1856.
940 Lord Frederick Paulet, C.B., _Ens._ 11 June 1826; _Lieut._ 21
Sept. 1830; _Capt._ 8 May 1846; _Major_, 20 Feb. 1855;
_Lieut.-Col._ 26 Oct. 1858. From Page of Honour to the King.
Major-General 13 Dec. 1860.
Christopher Wilmot Horton, Ens. 29 June 1826; _Lieut._ 27 Jan.
1832. Retired 15 Oct. 1841.
Hugh Forbes, _Ens._ 11 July 1826. Promoted to Captain half-pay,
unattached, 24 May 1831.
John Forbes, _Ens._ 1 Aug. 1826; _Lieut._ 10 Feb. 1832; _Capt._ 7
Aug. 1846. From Ensign in 53rd Foot. Retired 27 April 1849.
Montagu George Burgoyne, _Ens._ 2 Aug. 1826; _Lieut._ 20 April
1832. Retired 31 May 1833.
945 Edward Isaac Hobhouse, _Ens._ 15 Aug. 1826; _Lieut._ 22 June
1832. Retired 1 June 1833.
Robert Vansittart, _Ens._ 21 Sept. 1826; _Lieut._ 26 Nov. 1832;
_Capt._ 9 Nov. 1846. Retired 23 June 1848.
William Stewart (afterwards Stewart-Balfour), _Lieut._ 5 Oct.
1826; _Capt._ 24 Feb. 1837. Exchanged from half-pay,
unattached. To half-pay 25 Feb. 1848.
Charles Ash Windham, _Ens._ 30 Dec. 1826; _Lieut._ 31 May 1833;
_Capt._ 29 Dec. 1846. Gentleman Cadet from R.M.C. Retired on
half-pay 22 June 1849.
Charles Philip Wilbraham (afterwards Rev. C.), _Ens._ 21 Nov.
1828; _Lieut._ 1 June 1833. Retired 11 Sept. 1840.
950 George Knox, _Lieut._ 30 April 1829; _Capt._ 27 July 1838.
Exchanged from Captain on half-pay, unattached. Retired 29 Oct.
1847.
John Frederick Gore Langton, _Ens._ 16 May 1829; _Lieut._ 15 Nov.
1833. Died 27 Oct. 1834 at Newton Park, near Bath.
James Loftus Elrington, _Ens._ 4 June 1829; _Lieut._ 5 Dec. 1834;
_Capt._ 11 June, 1847. Retired 7 April 1848.
Henry Daniell, _Ens._ 13 Aug. 1829; _Lieut._ 27 March 1835;
_Capt._ 29 Oct. 1847. Retired 2 May 1856.
Charles Atticus Monck, _Ens._ 1 Oct. 1829. Retired 24 April 1835.
955 Frederick Halkett, _Ens._ 11 June 1830; _Lieut._ 8 July 1836.
Died in Canada 25 Oct. 1840.
Hastings Dent, 15 June 1830; _Lieut._ 13 Jan. 1837. Retired 5
July 1839.
Charles Whitley Deans Dundas, _Ens._ 3 Aug. 1830; _Lieut._ 24
Feb. 1837. From Ensign in 42nd Foot. Retired 21 April 1837.
Richard Samuel Hulse, _Ens._ 21 Sept. 1830; _Lieut._ 21 April
1837. Retired 8 Aug. 1845.
Edward Harvey, _Lieut._ 31 Dec. 1830. Exchanged from Captain on
half-pay unattached. To half-pay unattached 21 June 1833.
960 Duncan Macdonald Chisholm, _Ens._ 24 May 1831; _Lieut._ 7 Aug.
1837. Retired 25 Dec. 1838.
Stephen Rowley Conroy, _Ens._ 27 Jan. 1832; _Lieut._ 8 Aug. 1837.
Retired 5 Feb. 1841.
Hon. Frederick William Child Villiers, _Ens._ 10 Feb. 1832;
_Lieut._ 27 July 1838. Exchanged to 73rd Regiment Foot 24 May
1844.
Henry Brand (afterwards Viscount Hampden), _Ens._ 20 April 1832;
_Lieut._ 25 Dec. 1838. Retired 6 Sept. 1844.
George Herbert, _Ens._ 22 June 1832. Died 1838.
965 James Du Pré Viscount Alexander (afterwards Earl of Caledon),
_Ens._ 31 May 1833; _Lieut._ 5 July 1839. Retired 27 March
1846.
Hon. Richard William Lambart, _Ens._ 1 June 1833. Retired 20 July
1838.
Wilbraham Spencer Tollemache, _Lieut._ 21 June 1833. Retired 19
July 1839.
George B. Mathew, _Lieut._ 26 July 1833. Exchanged to 85th
Regiment 17 June 1836.
George John Johnson, _Ens._ 15 Nov. 1833; _Lieut._ 19 July 1839.
Exchanged to 11th Light Dragoons 7 July 1848.
970 William Samuel Newton, _Ens._ 5 Dec. 1834; _Lieut._ 31 Dec. 1839;
_Capt._ 25 Feb. 1848; _Major_, 18 Nov. 1856; _Lieut.-Col._ 13
Dec. 1860. Retired on half-pay 2 July 1861.
Hon. Charles Grimston, _Ens._ 6 Dec. 1834; _Lieut._ 24 Jan. 1840.
Retired 1847.
George V. Mundy, _Ens._ 27 Feb. 1835; _Lieut._ 1 May 1840.
Exchanged to 33rd Regiment 10 Sept. 1841.
Peter James Bathurst, _Ens._ 27 March 1835; _Lieut._ 11 Sept.
1840. From 75th Foot. Exchanged to 11th Light Dragoons 13 April
1846.
Egerton Charles William Miles Milman, _Ens._ 24 April 1835;
_Lieut._ 5 Feb. 1841; _Capt._ 7 April 1848. Exchanged to 37th
Foot 30 Nov. 1849.
975 Hon. Robert Boyle, _Lieut._ 17 June 1836; _Capt._ 10 Dec. 1847.
From 85th Regiment. Died on board ship, off Varna, 4 Sept.
1854.
Hon. Louis Hope, _Ens._ 8 July 1836; _Lieut._ 11 June 1841.
Retired 27 Jan. 1843.
Spencer Perceval, _Ens._ 13 Jan. 1837; _Lieut._ 15 Oct. 1841;
_Capt._ 23 June 1848; _Major_, 26 Oct. 1858; _Lieut.-Col._ 2
July 1861. To Major-General 9 Nov. 1862.
Hon. Adolphus Edward Paget Graves, _Ens._ 3 Feb. 1837; _Lieut._
13 May 1842. Exchanged to 59th Regiment of Foot 11 Aug. 1843.
Matthew Edward Tierney (afterwards Sir M. Bart.), _Ens._ 10 March
1837; _Lieut._ 27 Jan. 1843; _Capt._ 27 April 1849. Retired 3
Nov. 1854.
980 William Capel Clayton, _Ens._ 21 April 1837. Retired 1 June 1841.
Hon. Thomas Vesey Dawson, _Ens._ 11 Aug. 1837; _Lieut._ 30 May
1843; _Capt._ 22 Aug. 1851. Killed in action 5 Nov. 1854, at
Inkerman.
Thomas Montagu Steele (afterwards Right Hon. Sir Thomas, G.C.B.),
_Ens._ 20 July 1838; _Lieut._ 29 March 1844; _Capt._ 31 Oct.
1851; _Major_, 13 Dec. 1860; _Lieut.-Col._ 9 Nov. 1862;
_Colonel_, 7 Aug. 1884. From 64th Regiment. To half-pay 24 Nov.
1863. Died 25 Feb. 1890.
John Agmondisham Vesey Kirkland, _Ens._ 27 July 1838; _Lieut._ 6
Sept. 1844. From Rifle Brigade. Exchanged to 20th Foot 12 June
1846.
Adolphus Frederick Alexander Woodford, _Ens._ 25 Dec. 1838.
Retired 23 April 1841.
985 Charles Henry Ellice (afterwards Sir Charles, K.C.B.), _Ens._ 10
May 1839; _Lieut._ 8 Aug. 1845. Exchanged to 82nd Regiment 20
March 1846.
James Richard Wigram, _Ens._ 5 July 1839; _Lieut._ 27 March 1846.
Retired 30 July 1847.
John Wingfield S. Fraser, _Ens._ 19 July 1839. Exchanged to 60th
Foot 21 Jan. 1842.
Charles Henry White, _Ens._ 31 Dec. 1839; _Lieut._ 8 May 1846.
From 30th Foot. To 14th Regiment Foot 4 May 1849.
Charles Lygon Cocks, _Ens._ 24 Jan. 1840; _Lieut._ 7 Aug. 1846;
_Capt._ 20 June 1854. From 54th Foot. Retired 17 April 1860.
990 Poulett George Henry Somerset, _Ens._ 1 May 1840; _Lieut._ 28
Dec. 1846; _Capt._ 3 March 1854. From 33rd Foot. Retired 21
Dec. 1855.
George John Whyte-Melville, _Ens._ 11 Sept. 1840; _Lieut._ 29
Dec. 1846. From 93rd Foot. Retired 28 Jan. 1848.
James Charles Murray Cowell, _Ens._ 25 Sept. 1840; _Lieut._ 11
June 1847; _Capt._ 20 June 1854. Killed in action 5 Nov. 1854,
at Inkerman.
William Verner (afterwards Sir William, Bart.), _Ens._ 5 Feb.
1841. Retired 18 Sept. 1846.
James Halkett, _Ens._ 23 April 1841; _Lieut._ 1 July 1847;
_Capt._ 20 June 1854. From 29th Foot. Retired 9 March 1860.
995 Sir John Edward Harington, Bart., _Ens._ 1 June 1841; _Lieut._ 2
July 1847. Exchanged to 48th Regiment 10 Nov. 1848.
Dudley Wilmot Carleton (afterwards Lord Dorchester), _Ens._ 11
June 1841; _Lieut._13 July 1847; _Capt._ 14 July 1854; _Major_,
9 Nov. 1862; _Lieut.-Col._ 22 May 1866. From 60th Foot. Retired
on half-pay 2 Sept. 1868.
George Augustus Vernon, _Lieut._ 10 Sept. 1841; _Capt._ 25 April
1848. From 33rd Foot. Retired 27 May 1853.
Hon. Augustus Charles L. FitzRoy (afterwards Duke of Grafton,
K.G., C.B.), _Ens._ 15 Oct. 1841; _Lieut._ 30 July 1847;
_Capt._ 14 July 1854. From 60th Foot. To half-pay, unattached,
23 Nov. 1855.
Hon. George Frederick Upton (afterwards Viscount Templetown,
G.C.B.), _Capt._ 7 Jan. 1842; _Major_, 20 June 1854;
_Lieut.-Col._ 20 Feb. 1855. From 62nd Foot. To Major-General 26
Oct. 1858.
1000 Charles S. Burdett, _Ens._ 21 Jan. 1842; _Lieut._ 29 Oct. 1847;
_Capt._ 22 Aug. 1854. From 60th Foot. Retired 20 Dec. 1859.
Francis William Newdigate, _Ens._ 13 May 1842; _Lieut._ 10 Dec.
1847; _Capt._ 4 Sept. 1854. From 66th Foot. Retired 29 Nov.
1859.
William Charles Lyon, _Ens._ 27 Jan. 1843; _Lieut._ 28 Jan. 1848.
From 92nd Foot. Exchanged to 92nd Foot 14 April 1848.
Lionel Daniel MacKinnon, _Ens._ 30 May 1843; _Lieut._ 25 Feb.
1848. Killed in action 5 Nov. 1854, at Inkerman.
Henry Wedderburn Cumming, _Lieut._ 11 Aug. 1843; _Capt._ 27 May
1853. From 59th Foot. Retired 20 Oct. 1854.
1005 Sir George Ferdinand Radzivill Walker, Bart., _Ens._ 29 March
1844; _Lieut._ 7 April 1848. From 26th Foot. Retired 6 Oct.
1854.
Hon. Francis John Robert Villiers, _Lieut._ 24 May 1844. From
73rd Foot. Exchanged to 60th Foot 4 April 1845.
William Gregory Dawkins, _Ens._ 6 Sept. 1844; _Lieut._ 25 April
1848; _Capt._ 6 Nov. 1854. From 49th Foot. To half-pay 23 June
1865.
William Mark Wood, _Lieut._ 4 April 1845; _Capt._ 13 Dec. 1853;
_Major_, 2 July 1861; _Lieut.-Col._ 24 Nov. 1863. From 60th
Foot. To half-pay 22 May 1866.
Hylton Jolliffe, _Ens._ 8 Aug. 1845; _Lieut._ 23 June 1848. Died
of cholera 4 Oct. in Camp before Sevastopol.
1010 William Eccles, _Lieut._ 20 March 1846. From 82nd Foot. Exchanged
to 6th Foot 21 Aug. 1849.
Ulick Canning, Lord Dunkellin, _Ens._ 27 March 1846; _Lieut._ 27
April 1849; Capt. 3 Nov. 1854. Retired 21 Dec. 1860.
Charles John Colville, _Lieut._ 13 April 1846. To half-pay 13
July 1847.
Francis Augustus Plunkett Burton, _Ens._ 8 May 1846; _Lieut._ 27
June 1851; _Capt._ 25 May 1855. Retired 30 Nov. 1855.
William Baring, _Lieut._ 12 June 1846. From 20th Foot. Retired 29
April 1853.
1015 Hon. Percy Robert Basil Feilding (afterwards Sir Percy, K.C.B.),
_Ens._ 7 Aug. 1846; _Lieut._ 21 Aug. 1851; _Capt._ 23 Nov.
1855; _Major_, 23 Oct. 1867; _Lieut.-Col._ 4 Jan. 1871. From
85th Foot. To half-pay 5 Sept. 1877.
Edward Heneage Dering, _Ens._ 18 Sept. 1846. Retired 11 July
1851.
William Henry Reeve, _Ens._ 29 Dec. 1846; _Lieut._ 22 Aug. 1851;
_Capt._ 30 Nov. 1855. Retired 20 July 1866.
Hon. Granville Charles Cornwallis Eliot, _Ens._ 11 June 1847;
_Lieut._ 31 Oct. 1851. Killed in action 5 Nov. 1854, at
Inkerman.
Charles Baring, _Ens._ 2 July 1847; _Lieut._ 29 April 1853;
_Capt._ 21 Dec. 1855; _Major_, 2 Sept. 1868. Retired 13 Aug.
1872.
1020 Henry Montolieu Bouverie, _Ens._ 13 July 1847; _Lieut._ 27 May
1853. From Rifle Brigade. Killed in action 5 Nov. 1854, at
Inkerman.
Henry Armytage, _Ens._ 30 July 1847; _Lieut._ 13 Dec. 1854;
_Capt._ 26 Oct. 1858. Retired 23 Nov. 1870.
Hon. Henry William John Byng, _Ens._ 27 Aug. 1847; _Lieut._ 3
March 1854; _Capt._ 2 May 1856. Retired 17 Nov. 1863.
Charles Rodney Morgan, _Ens._ 29 Oct. 1847. Retired 31 Dec. 1852.
Arthur George Bethel Thellusson, _Ens._ 10 Dec. 1847; _Lieut._ 20
June 1854. Retired 13 May 1859.
1025 Thomas Francis Rolt, _Ens._ 28 Jan. 1848. From 63rd Foot. Retired
18 Feb. 1853.
Robert Desmond Sulivan, _Ens._ 25 Feb. 1848. Exchanged to 2nd
Dragoon Guards 1 Aug. 1851.
Horace William Cust, _Ens._ 7 April 1848; _Lieut._ 14 July 1854.
Killed in Action 20 Sept. 1854 at the Alma.
George Warrender (afterwards Sir G., Bart.), _Lieut._ 14 April
1848. From 92nd Foot. Retired 27 June 1851.
David Robertson Williamson, _Ens._ 25 April 1848. Retired 23 July
1852.
1030 Walter Trevelyan, _Capt._ 26 May 1848. From half-pay 83rd Foot.
Died at Varna 21 Aug. 1854.
Philip Sanbrook Crawley, _Ens._ 23 June 1848; _Lieut._ 14 July
1854; _Capt._ 13 Dec. 1860. From 74th Foot. Retired 30 March
1867.
George Thomas Duncombe, _Lieut._ 7 July 1848. From 11th Light
Dragoons. To 16th Foot 22 June 1849.
Clement William Strong, _Lieut._ 10 Nov. 1848; _Capt._ 6 Nov.
1854; _Major_ 14 Aug. 1866. From 48th Foot. To half-pay 15
March 1867.
Sir James Dunlop, Bart., _Ens._ 27 April 1849; _Lieut._ 14 July
1854. Died 10 Feb. 1858 at Hyères, France.
1035 Charles Townsend Wilson, _Lieut._ 4 May 1849; _Capt._ 8 Dec.
1854. From 59th Foot. Retired 25 May 1855.
Thomas Crombie, _Capt._ 22 June 1849. From half-pay, unattached.
To ditto 9 Feb. 1855.
Hon. Arthur Edward Hardinge (afterwards Sir A., K.C.B.), _Lieut._
22 June 1849; _Capt._ 20 Feb. 1855; _Major_, 15 March 1867;
_Lieut.-Col._ 2 Sept. 1868; _Col._ 26 Feb. 1890. From 16th
Foot. To half-pay 3 Jan. 1871. Died 15 July 1892.
Hon. Augustus Charles Chichester, _Lieut._ 21 Aug. 1849. From 6th
Foot. Exchanged to 87th Regiment 6 May 1853.
Hon. George Augustus Spencer, _Capt._ 30 Nov. 1849. From 37th
Foot. Retired 31 Oct. 1851.
1040 John Earl of Strafford, G.C.B., _Col._ 15 Aug. 1850. Originally
in the Scots Guards. Died 3 June 1860.
Gerald Littlehales Goodlake, V.C., _Ens._ 27 June 1851; _Lieut._
14 July 1854; _Capt._ 29 Nov. 1859; _Major_, 14 Aug. 1872. From
Rifle Brigade. To half-pay 7 Aug. 1875.
Frederick Henry Ramsden, _Ens._ 11 July 1851, _Lieut._ 28 July
1854. From Rifle Brigade. Killed in action 5 Nov. 1854, at
Inkerman.
William Hull, _Ens._ 1 Aug. 1851. From 2nd Dragoon Guards.
Retired 17 Aug. 1852.
George Lord Bingham (afterwards Earl of Lucan), _Ens._ 14 Oct.
1851; _Lieut._ 22 Aug. 1854; _Capt._ 20 Dec. 1859. From Rifle
Brigade. Retired 15 June 1860.
1045 Harvey Tower, _Ens._ 21 Nov. 1851; _Lieut._ 4 Sept. 1854; _Capt._
9 March 1860. From 48th Regiment Foot. Died 17 Nov. 1870.
Hon. William Henry Wellesley, Viscount Dangan (afterwards Earl
Cowley), _Ens._ 23 July 1852; _Lieut._ 21 Sept. 1854; _Capt._
17 April 1860. Retired 11 Aug. 1863.
Hon. Robert Drummond Hay, _Ens._ 17 Aug. 1852; _Lieut._ 5 Oct.
1854. Died of wounds on voyage home from the Crimea 2 Oct.
1855.
Percy Scawen Wyndham, _Ens._ 31 Dec. 1852, Retired 24 Nov. 1854.
Edward Amelius Disbrowe, _Ens._ 18 Feb. 1853. From 85th Regiment.
Killed in action 5 Nov. 1854, at Inkerman.
1050 Arthur James Lyon Fremantle (afterwards Sir Arthur, K.C.M.G.),
_Ens._ 29 April 1853; _Lieut._ 6 Nov. 1854; _Capt._ 20 April
1860; _Major_, 28 April 1875; _Lieut.-Col._ 5 Sept. 1877. From
62nd Foot. To half-pay 10 Nov. 1880.
John Halkett Le Couteur, _Lieut._ 6 May 1853; _Capt._ 18 Nov.
1856. Retired 13 March 1868.
Cavendish Hubert Greville, _Ens._ 10 June 1853. Killed in action
5 Nov. 1854, at Inkerman.
Michael Walker Heneage, _Ens._ 13 Dec. 1853; _Lieut._ 23 Dec.
1854; _Capt._ 21 Dec. 1860. Retired 11 Dec. 1866.
Hon. William Arthur Amherst, Viscount Holmesdale (afterwards Earl
Amherst), _Ens._ 3 March 1854; _Lieut._ 4 March 1855. Retired
18 July 1862.
1055 Arthur St. George Herbert Stepney, C.B., _Capt._ 15 July 1854;
_Major_, 24 Nov. 1862. From 54th Foot. Retired on half-pay 14
Aug. 1866.
James Talbot Airey, C.B. (afterwards Sir J., K.C.B.), _Capt._ 15
July 1854; _Major_, 22 May 1866. From 22nd Foot. To half-pay 23
Oct. 1867.
[James Armar Butler, _Lieut._ 15 July 1854. From half-pay Ceylon
Rifles. Died of his wounds, 22 June 1854, received during the
siege of Silistria. Therefore never belonged to Regiment,
though the gazette of appointment was not cancelled.]
St. Vincent Bentinck Hawkins Whitshed (afterwards Sir St. V.
Bart.), _Ens._ 1 Aug. 1854; _Lieut._ 2 Oct. 1855. Retired 6 May
1859.
Julian Hamilton Hall, _Ens._ 2 Aug. 1854; _Lieut._ 13 Feb. 1856;
_Capt._ 30 Oct. 1866; _Major_, 29 Sept. 1877; _Lieut.-Col. com.
Battn._ 1 July 1881.[499] To half pay 29 Sept. 1882.
Godfrey James Wigram, C.B., _Ens._ 3 Aug. 1854; _Lieut._ 14 Feb.
1856; _Capt._ 11 Dec. 1866; _Major_, 10 Nov. 1880; _Lieut.-Col.
com. Battn._ 1 July 1881;[499] _Lieut.-Col. com. Regt._ 16 Dec.
1885. To half-pay 10 Nov. 1885. From ditto 16 Dec. 1885.
Major-General 25 Dec. 1889.
1060 Arthur Lambton, C.B., _Ens._ 4 Aug. 1854; _Lieut._ 15 Feb. 1856;
_Capt._ 18 Jan. 1867; _Major_, 1 July 1881;[499] _Lieut.-Col.
com. Battn._ 29 Sept. 1882. To half-pay 29 Sept. 1886.
-----
Footnote 499:
By an order, 1 July 1881, the Majors were appointed
Lieut.-Colonels commanding Battalions, and eight Captains were
promoted Major (_ante_, p. 342).
-----
George Ernest Rose, _Ens._ 24 Aug. 1854; _Lieut._ 2 May 1856.
Exchanged to Rifle Brigade 25 Aug. 1857.
Gordon Manyard Ives, _Ens._ 25 Aug. 1854. Retired 30 Nov. 1855.
Charles Pierrepont Lane Fox, _Ens._ 21 Sept. 1854. Retired 3 June
1856.
Lord Frederick George S. Leveson Gower, _Ens._ 6 Oct. 1854. From
Rifle Brigade. Died 6 Oct. 1854, at sea.
1065 Charles John Bouchier, _Lieut._ 6 Oct. 1854. Retired 12 Jan.
1855.
John Baillie Baillie, _Ens._, 20 Oct. 1854. From 6th Dragoons.
Retired 26 Oct. 1855.
Sir William Forbes, Bart. (afterwards Lord Sempill), _Ens._ 3
Nov. 1854. Retired 30 Jan. 1857.
Hon. William Edwards (afterwards Lord Kensington), _Ens._ 24 Nov.
1854; _Lieut._ 5 Feb. 1858; _Capt._ 15 March 1867. Retired 30
March 1870.
Hedworth H. Jolliffe (afterwards Lord Hylton), _Lieut._ 15 Dec.
1854. From 4th Light Dragoons. Retired 1 May 1855.
1070 Hon. William H. A. Feilding, _Lieut._ 15 Dec. 1854; _Capt._ 15
June 1860: _Major_, 7 Aug. 1875. From 62nd Foot. To half-pay 29
Sept. 1877.
John Augustus Conolly, V.C., _Lieut._ 22 Dec. 1854; _Capt._ 11
Aug. 1863. From 49th Foot. Retired 15 March 1870.
William T. Markham, _Lieut._ 23 Dec. 1854. Retired 28 Dec. 1855.
Lord Eustace H. G. B. Cecil, _Lieut._ 26 Dec. 1854; _Capt._ 2
July 1861. From 88th Foot. Retired 28 July 1863.
Christopher E. Blackett, _Lieut._ 29 Dec. 1854; _Capt._ 9 Nov.
1862. To half-pay 18 Dec. 1875.
1075 George R. FitzRoy, _Lieut._ 29 Dec. 1854; _Capt._ 28 July 1863;
_Major_, 5 Sept. 1877; _Lieut.-Col._ 10 Nov. 1880. From 41st
Foot. To half-pay 10 Nov. 1885.
Henry F. B. Maxse (afterwards Sir H., K.C.M.G.), _Lieut._ 29 Dec.
1854. From 21st Foot. To half-pay 16 March 1858.
James A. Caulfeild (afterwards Viscount Charlemont, C.B.),
_Lieut._ 12 Jan. 1855. From 17th Foot. Retired 5 Feb. 1858.
Henry J. Bagot Lane, _Ens._ 16 Jan. 1855; _Lieut._ 26 Oct. 1858;
_Capt._ 30 March 1867. Retired 25 Dec. 1867.
Alexander W. Adair, _Ens._ 17 Jan. 1855; _Lieut._ 6 May 1859.
Exchanged to 52nd Foot 16 March 1860.
1080 William Frederick E. Seymour (afterwards Lord William), _Ens._ 18
Jan. 1855; _Lieut._ 13 May 1859; _Capt._ 23 Oct. 1867; _Major_,
1 July 1881.[499] To half-pay 5 Sept. 1884.
Hon. William G. Boyle, _Lieut._ 19 Jan. 1855; _Capt._ 24 Nov.
1863. From 21st Foot. Retired 18 Jan. 1867.
Stapleton T. Mainwaring (afterwards Sir S. Bart.), _Ens._ 19 Jan.
1855. Retired 10 Dec. 1858.
Francis W. H., Lord Burghersh, C.B. (afterwards Earl of
Westmoreland), _Capt._ 9 Feb. 1855. From half-pay, unattached.
Retired 20 April 1860.
Hon. Edward Henry Legge, _Ens._ 12 Feb. 1855; _Lieut._ 29 Nov.
1859; _Capt._ 25 Dec. 1867. Retired 1 Sept. 1875.
1085 Edward Strelley Pegge Burnell, _Ens._ 13 Feb. 1855; _Lieut._ 20
Dec. 1859; _Capt._ 22 Jan. 1868; _Major_, 1 July 1881.[499]
Retired to half-pay 26 March 1884.
Rowland Hill Gordon, _Lieut._ 23 Feb. 1855. From 38th Regiment.
Exchanged to 42nd Regiment 7 Sept. 1855.
Walter Stirling, _Ens._ 23 Feb. 1855. Resigned 1 May 1857.
Frederick Horace Seymour, _Ens._ 24 April 1855; _Lieut._ 9 March
1860. Exchanged to Rifle Brigade 17 July 1860.
Hon. Richard Monck, _Lieut._ 1 May 1855; _Capt._ 17 Nov. 1863.
From Rifle Brigade. To half-pay 29 Sept. 1877.
1090 Richard Hassell Thursby, _Ens._ 4 May 1855; _Lieut._ 17 April
1860; _Capt._ 2 Sept. 1868. Retired 21 March 1871.
Charles Greenhill Gardyne, _Lieut._ 6 July 1855; _Capt._ 22 May
1866. From 92nd Foot. Retired 22 Jan. 1868.
Henry Clarke-Jervoise, _Lieut._ 7 Sept. 1855; _Capt._ 20 July
1866. From 42nd Foot. Retired 4 July 1873.
Norman Burnand, _Ens._ 26 Oct. 1855; _Lieut._ 20 April 1860;
_Capt._ 17 Feb. 1869. From 50th Foot. Retired 14 April 1874.
Sir George A. F. Houstoun Boswall, Bart., _Capt._ 23 Nov. 1855.
From half-pay, unattached. Retired 23 Nov. 1855.
1095 Frederick Charles Manningham-Buller, _Ens._ 30 Nov. 1855;
_Lieut._ 13 Dec. 1860; _Capt._ 30 March 1870; _Major_, 1 July
1881.[499] Died 10 Jan. 1884.
Hon. Henry Walter Campbell, _Lieut._ 28 Dec. 1855; _Capt._ 14
Aug. 1866. From Rifle Brigade. Retired 17 Feb. 1869.
William Wynne, _Ens._ 13 Feb. 1856; _Lieut._ 15 June 1860. Died
22 May 1863.
Ellis Philip Fox Reeve, _Ens._ 14 Feb. 1856; _Lieut._ 21 Dec.
1860; _Capt._ 30 March 1870. Retired 24 March 1871.
Hugh Bonham Carter, _Ens._ 15 Feb. 1856; _Lieut._ 2 July 1861.
Retired 18 Nov. 1873.
1100 Hugh Granville Fortescue, _Ens._ 1 April 1856; _Lieut._ 31 Dec.
1861. Retired 8 Sept. 1865.
Hon. William Henry Bruce Ogilvy, _Ens._ 16 May 1856. Retired 19
Dec. 1856.
George Gervis Cameron, _Ens._ 16 June 1856. Died 26 Sept. 1859,
in London.
John Fletcher Hathorn, _Ens._ 19 Dec. 1856; _Lieut._ 18 July
1862; _Capt._ 23 Nov. 1870. Retired 2 Aug. 1872.
Henry Arthur Herbert, _Ens._ 30 Jan. 1857; _Lieut._ 9 Nov. 1862.
Retired 23 March 1866.
1105 Philip Le Belward Egerton (afterwards Sir P. Grey-Egerton,
Bart.), _Lieut._ 25 Aug. 1857. From Rifle Brigade. Retired 31
Dec. 1861.
Henry Robert Brand (afterwards Viscount Hampden), _Ens._ 10 Dec.
1858; _Lieut._ 23 May 1863. Retired 10 Oct. 1865.
Hon. Denzil Hugh Baring, _Ens._ 6 May 1859; _Lieut._ 28 July
1863. Retired 16 May 1865.
Hon. Frederick Charles Howard, _Ens._ 13 May 1859; _Lieut._ 11
Aug. 1863. Retired 20 July 1866.
Reginald Archibald Edward Cathcart (afterwards Sir Reginald,
Bart.), _Ens._ 21 Oct. 1859; _Lieut._ 17 Nov. 1863. From 68th
Foot. Retired 3 Aug. 1866.
1110 Charles Walter Lee Mainwaring, _Ens._ 29 Nov. 1859; _Lieut._ 24
Nov. 1863. From 5th Dragoon Guards. Died 20 June 1866.
Hon. Vesey Dawson (afterwards Lord Cremorne), _Ens._ 20 Dec.
1859; _Lieut._ 16 May 1865; _Capt._ 4 Jan. 1871. Retired 19
Jan. 1876.
Edward Chaplin, _Ens._ 9 March 1860; _Lieut._ 8 Sept. 1865;
_Capt._ 22 March 1871. Retired 27 Sept. 1876.
Hon. George H. W. Windsor Clive, _Lieut._ 16 March 1860; _Capt._
13 March 1868. From 52nd Regiment. Retired 30 March 1870.
Sir Edward Archibald Hamilton, Bart., _Ens._ 17 April 1860;
_Lieut._ 10 Oct. 1865. Retired 7 May 1867.
1115 George John FitzRoy Smyth, _Ens._ 20 April 1860; _Lieut._ 23
March 1866; _Capt._ 25 March 1871; _Major_, 1 July 1881.[499]
Retired 10 Dec. 1881.
Colin, Lord Clyde, G.C.B., _Col._ 4 June 1860. Died 14 Aug. 1863.
Arthur Wilbraham, _Ens._ 15 June 1860. Retired 28 Oct. 1864.
FitzRoy William Fremantle, _Lieut._ 17 July 1860; _Capt._ 16
March 1870; _Major_, 1 July 1881.[A] From Rifle Brigade. To
half-pay 8 Dec. 1884.
Henry Robert Eyre, _Ens._ 13 Dec. 1860; _Lieut._ 21 June 1866;
_Capt._ 14 Aug. 1872. _Major_, 1 July 1881.[499] From 73rd
Regiment. To half-pay 18 April 1885.
1120 Joseph, Lord Wallscourt, _Ens._ 21 Dec. 1860; _Lieut._ 22 May
1866. Retired 25 Dec. 1867.
William Chafyn Grove, _Ens._ 16 Aug. 1861. Retired 11 Sept. 1863.
John Barton Sterling, _Ens._ 31 Dec. 1861; _Lieut._ 20 July 1866;
_Capt._ 5 July 1873; _Major_, 1 July 1881;[499] _Lieut.-Col.
com. Battn._ 10 Nov. 1885; _Lieut.-Col. com. Regt._ 5 Feb.
1890. From 8th Regiment. To half-pay 10 Nov. 1889. From ditto 5
Feb. 1890. To ditto 5 Feb. 1895.
George Gordon Macpherson, _Ens._ 18 March 1862; _Lieut._ 20 July
1866. Retired 5 March 1870.
Charles Dashwood Thomas, _Ens._ 19 Dec. 1862; _Lieut._ 3 Aug.
1866; _Capt._ 19 Nov. 1873; _Major_, 1 July 1881.[A] Died 27
April 1882.
1125 Hon. John Robert William Vesey (afterwards Viscount de Vesci),
_Ens._ 12 June 1863; _Lieut._ 14 Aug. 1866; _Capt._ 15 April
1874; _Major_, 10 Dec. 1881. To half-pay 15 Aug. 1883.
Charles Napier McMurdo, _Ens._ 28 July 1863. Retired 23 Aug.
1864.
Hon. Frederick Arthur Wellesley, _Ens._ 11 Aug. 1863; _Lieut._ 30
Oct. 1866; _Capt._ 28 April 1875. From Rifle Brigade. Retired
11 Jan. 1881.
Hon. Heneage Legge, _Ens._ 11 Sept. 1863; _Lieut._ 11 Dec. 1866.
Exchanged 9th Lancers, 9 Nov. 1873.
Richard Spencer Hall, _Ens._ 24 Nov. 1863; _Lieut._ 18 Jan. 1867;
_Capt._ 7 Aug. 1875; _Major_, 28 April 1882; _Lieut.-Col. com.
Battn._ 29 Sept. 1886. From 7th Foot. To half-pay 29 Sept.
1890.
1130 Arthur Farquhar, _Ens._ 4 Dec. 1863; _Lieut._ 15 March 1867. From
62nd Foot. Exchanged to 15th Foot 29 March 1870. Killed in the
Sudan 7 Oct. 1883.
Caledon James Alexander, _Ens._ 23 Aug. 1864; _Lieut._ 30 March
1867. Retired 24 June 1873.
William John Freschville Ramsden, _Ens._ 28 Oct. 1864; _Lieut._ 8
May 1867; _Capt._ 1 Sept. 1875; _Major_, 12 Aug. 1882. Retired
2 May 1883.
Hon. Edward Archibald Brabazon Acheson, _Ens._ 16 May 1865;
_Lieut._ 23 Oct. 1867; _Capt._ 18 Dec. 1875; _Major_, 29 Sept.
1882. To half-pay 9 March 1887.
James Steadman Hawker Farrer, _Capt._ 23 June 1865. From
half-pay, late 84th Foot. Retired 30 Oct. 1866.
1135 Henry Charles Adolphus Frederic William Aldenburg Bentinck,
_Ens._ 8 Sept. 1865; _Lieut._ 25 Dec. 1867; _Capt._ 19 Jan.
1876. Retired 16 February 1878.
Hon. Lewis Payn Dawnay, _Ens._ 10 Oct. 1865; _Lieut._ 25 Dec.
1867; _Capt._ 27 Sept. 1876. Retired 17 Dec. 1879.
Hon. Edward Henry Trafalgar Digby (afterwards Lord Digby), _Ens._
23 March 1866; _Lieut._ 23 March 1868; _Capt._ 5 Sept. 1877;
_Major_, 15 Aug. 1883. Retired 4 Dec. 1889.
William Michael Glynn Turquand, _Ens._ 22 May 1866; _Lieut._ 13
June 1868. Retired 6 Jan. 1875.
Hon. Henry William Lowry-Corry, _Ens._ 20 July 1866; _Lieut._ 2
Sept. 1868; _Capt._ 29 Sept. 1877; _Major_, 10 Jan. 1884;
_Lieut.-Col. com. Battn._ 10 Nov. 1889. To half-pay 10 Nov.
1893.
1140 Robert William Webb Follett, _Ens._ 20 July 1866; _Lieut._ 17
Feb. 1869; _Capt._ 29 Sept. 1877; _Major_, 26 March 1884;
_Lieut.-Col. com. Battn._ 29 Sept. 1890. To half-pay 29 Sept.
1894.
Hon. Evelyn Edward Thomas Boscawen, C.B. (afterwards Viscount
Falmouth), _Ens._ 20 July 1866; _Lieut._ 5 March 1870; _Capt._
16 Feb. 1878; _Major_, 8 Dec. 1884; _Lieut.-Col. com. Battn._
10 Nov. 1893; _Lieut.-Col. com._ Regt. 5 Feb. 1895. Effective
1896.
Archibald Earl of Cassilis (afterwards Marquis of Ailsa), _Ens._
3 Aug. 1866; _Lieut._ 16 March 1870. Retired 18 May 1870.
Waller Philip Hughes (afterwards Otway), _Ens._ 14 Aug. 1866;
_Lieut._ 30 March 1870; _Capt._ 4 June 1878. Retired 20 Oct.
1883.
Hervey Juckes Lloyd Bruce, _Ens._ 30 Oct. 1866; _Lieut._ 30 March
1870; _Capt._ 24 Aug. 1878. From 52nd Foot. Retired on half-pay
4 July 1883.
1145 Amelius Richard Mark Wood (afterwards Lockwood), _Ens._ 11 Dec.
1866; _Lieut._ 18 May 1870; _Capt._ 5 Oct. 1878. Retired 7 Nov.
1883.
Henry James Wigram, _Ens._ 18 Jan. 1867. Retired 13 May 1869.
Frederick Assheton Des Vœux (afterwards Sir Frederick, Bart.),
_Ens._ 15 March 1867; _Lieut._ 23 Nov. 1870. Retired 2 May
1871.
Francis Henry Lovell, _Ens._ 3 April 1867. Retired 24 November
1868.
Walter Bulkeley Barrington, _Ens._ 8 May 1867. Retired 12 May
1869.
1150 Edmund Robarts Boyle, _Ens._ 15 May 1867; _Lieut._ 4 Jan. 1871.
Retired 31 Oct. 1871.
Hon. Ronald George Elidor Campbell, _Ens._ 25 Dec. 1867; _Lieut._
22 March 1871. Killed in action at Kambula Hill, Zululand, 28
March 1879.
Henry Charles Duncombe, _Ens._ 26 Dec. 1867. Exchanged 71st Foot
27 Aug. 1870.
Lord George Francis Hamilton, _Ens._ 22 Jan. 1868. From Rifle
Brigade. Retired 5 May 1869.
Hon. Reginald James Macartney Greville-Nugent, _Ens._ 13 June
1868; _Lieut._ 25 March 1871. Retired 7 Oct. 1871.
1155 Hon. George Aubrey Vere Bertie, _Ens._ 14 Oct. 1868; _Lieut._ 3
May 1871; _Capt._ 12 Jan. 1881; _Major_, 31 Jan. 1885. Retired
11 April 1885.
Francis Aylmer Graves-Sawle, _Ens._ 25 Nov. 1868; _Lieut._ 7 Oct.
1871; _Capt._ 10 Dec. 1881; _Major_, 18 April 1885;
_Lieut.-Col. com. Battn._ 29 Sept. 1894. From 71st Regiment.
Effective 1896.
Augustus Henry Macdonald Moreton, _Ens._ 17 Feb. 1869; _Lieut._
31 Oct. 1871; _Capt._ 12 Aug. 1882; _Major_, 3 Aug. 1885.
Retired 18 April 1888.
Hon. Miles Stapleton (afterwards Lord Beaumont), _Ens._ 5 May
1869; _Lieut._ 3 Aug. 1872. Exchanged to 20th Hussars 20 Aug.
1879.
Reginald Pole-Carew, C.B., _Ens._ 12 May 1869; _Lieut._ 14 Aug.
1872; _Capt._ 4 July 1883; _Major_, 10 Nov. 1885; _Lieut.-Col.
com. Battn._ 5 Feb. 1895. Effective 1896.
1160 James Gordon Henry Graham Montgomery, _Ens._ 13 May 1869;
_Lieut._ 25 June 1873; _Capt._ 19 Sept. 1883; _Major_, 10 Nov.
1885. To half-pay 10 July 1889.
Cyril Dudley Fortescue, _Ens._ 5 March 1870; _Lieut._ 5 July
1873; _Capt._ 20 Oct. 1883. Retired 8 Sept. 1885.
Francis Capel Manley, _Ens._ 16 March 1870; _Lieut._ 19 Nov.
1873; _Capt._ 7 Nov. 1883; _Major_, 29 Sept. 1886. To half-pay
29 July 1891.
Robert Charles Goff, _Lieut._ 29 March 1870; _Capt._ 2 March
1878. From 15th Foot. Retired 5 Oct. 1878.
Hon. Charles Compton William Cavendish (afterwards Lord Chesham),
_Ens._ 30 March 1870. Transferred to 10th Hussars 1 Jan. 1873.
1165 Alexander William Maxwell Clark-Kennedy, _Ens._ 30 March 1870;
_Lieut._ 15 April 1874. Retired 12 June 1874.
Frank Wigsell Arkwright, _Ens._ 18 May 1870; _Lieut._ 13 June
1874. Retired 15 Jan. 1879.
Hon. Alfred W. Charteris, _Ens._ 27 Aug. 1870. From 71st
Regiment. Died on board _Simoon_, Gold Coast, 23 Nov. 1873.
Charles, Lord Ossulston, _Ens._ 23 Nov. 1870. Transferred to
Rifle Brigade 28 Oct. 1873.
Lionel Dudley MacKinnon, _Ens._ 4 Jan. 1871; _Lieut._ 6 Jan.
1875; _Capt._ 10 Jan. 1884. Retired 7 May 1887.
1170 Lord Douglas William Cope Gordon, _Ens._ 28 Oct. 1871; _Lieut._
28 Oct. 1871.[500] Retired 8 May 1880.
Vesey John Dawson, _Ens._ 28 Oct. 1871; _Lieut._ 28 Oct.
1871;[500] _Capt._ 25 Oct. 1884; _Major_, 10 July 1889.
Effective 1896.
Hon. Eustace Henry Dawnay, _Ens._ 28 Oct. 1871; _Lieut._ 28 Oct.
1871.[500] Retired 5 Dec. 1883.
Hon. Henry Power Charles Stanley Monck (afterwards Viscount
Monck), _Ens._ 28 Oct. 1871; _Lieut._ 28 Oct. 1871;[500]
_Capt._ 31 Jan. 1885. Retired 19 Sept. 1885.
Alfred William Maitland FitzRoy (afterwards Lord Alfred),
_Lieut._ 17 July 1872. From 52nd Foot. Retired 29 Oct. 1881.
-----
Footnote 500:
Gazetted Ensign and Lieutenant; afterwards appointed Lieutenant,
same date.
-----
1175 Douglas Beresford Malise Ronald, Marquis of Buchanan (afterwards
Duke of Montrose), _Sub.-Lieut._ 14 Aug. 1872. Transferred to
5th Lancers 27 Feb. 1875.
Hon. Henry Charles Legge, _Sub.-Lieut._ 31 Aug. 1872; _Lieut._ 31
Aug. 1873;[501] _Capt._ 18 April 1885; _Major_, 29 Sept. 1890.
Effective 1896.
Alfred Edward Codrington, _Sub.-Lieut._ 1 Feb. 1873; _Lieut._ 1
Feb. 1873;[501] _Capt._ 18 April 1885; _Major_, 4 Dec. 1889.
Effective 1896.
Hon. Charles Brand, _Sub.-Lieut._ 9 Aug. 1873; _Lieut._ 9 Aug.
1874.[501] Resigned 9 June 1880.
John Foster George Ross-of-Bladensburg, C.B., _Lieut._ 9 Aug.
1873; _Capt._ 18 March 1885; _Major_, 10 Nov. 1889. From Royal
Artillery. Promoted Lieut.-Colonel half-pay 27 July 1896.
1180 Robert Johnston Barton, _Lieut._ 10 Nov. 1873. Exchanged from
Capt. 9th Lancers. Killed in action at Inhlobane, Zululand, 28
March 1879.
John Robert Gladstone (afterwards Sir John, Bart.), _Sub.-Lieut._
6 Dec. 1873; _Lieut._ 6 Dec. 1873;[501] _Capt._ 9 Sept. 1885.
Retired 16 July 1890.
Hon. William Mansfield (afterwards Lord Sandhurst), _Sub.-Lieut._
24 Dec. 1873; _Lieut._ 24 Dec. 1875. Retired 19 Feb. 1879.
Douglas Frederick Rawdon Dawson, _Sub.-Lieut._ 21 Jan. 1874;
_Lieut._ 21 Jan. 1874;[501] _Capt._ 19 Sept. 1885; _Major_, 29
July 1891. Effective 1896.
George Vere Boyle, _Sub.-Lieut._ 18 March 1874; _Lieut._ 18 March
1876. From 60th Foot. Retired 24 Nov. 1886.
1185 John George, Viscount Lambton (afterwards Earl of Durham),
_Sub.-Lieut._ 29 April 1874; _Lieut._ 29 April 1876. Retired 6
Aug. 1879.
Hon. Frederick William Lambton, _Sub.-Lieut._ 11 July 1874;
_Lieut._ 11 July 1875.[501] Retired 11 Feb. 1880.
Hon. George Ralph Charles Ormsby-Gore, _Sub.-Lieut._ 28 Aug.
1875; _Lieut._ 28 Aug. 1875.[501] From 16th Foot. Retired 5
Sept. 1883.
Horace Robert Stopford, _Sub.-Lieut._ 28 Aug. 1875; _Lieut._ 28
Aug. 1875;[501] _Capt._ 19 Oct. 1885; _Major_, 10 Nov. 1893.
From 46th Foot. Effective 1896.
Hon. Hugh Rudolph Arbuthnot Gough, _Lieut._ 6 Oct. 1875. From
21st Foot. Retired 14 Sept. 1878.
1190 Hon. Arthur Henry Henniker-Major, _Lieut._ 20 Nov. 1875; _Capt._
10 Nov. 1885,; _Major_, 29 Sept. 1894. From West Suffolk
Militia. Effective 1896.
Arthur Henry Clarke-Jervoise (afterwards Sir A. Bart.), _Lieut._
5 Jan. 1876. Retired 6 Aug. 1879.
Hon. Anthony Lucius Dawson, _Sub.-Lieut._ 9 Feb. 1876; _Lieut._
11 Feb. 1877. From 98th Regiment. Retired 23 March 1881.
Hon. Hugh Amherst, _Lieut._ 5 Sept. 1877; _Capt._ 16 March 1887.
From 7th Royal Fusiliers. Retired 23 July 1890.
Herbert Conyers Surtees, _Sub.-Lieut._ 31 Oct. 1877; _Lieut._ 31
Oct. 1877;[501] _Capt._ 7 May 1887; _Major_, 5 Feb. 1895. From
49th Foot. Effective 1896.
1195 Edgar Vincent (afterwards Sir Edgar K.C.M.G.), _2nd Lieut._ 31
Oct. 1877; _Lieut._ 1 July 1881. From Berks Militia. Retired 25
Oct. 1883.
Walter Orlando Corbet (afterwards Sir W., Bart.), _2nd Lieut._ 31
Oct. 1877; _Lieut._ 1 July 1881; _Capt._ 25 Jan. 1888. Retired
25 April 1888.
Theophilus Basil Percy Levett, _2nd Lieut._ 13 March 1878;
_Lieut._ 1 July 1881. From 74th Foot. Retired 19 Nov. 1881.
Edward Carolus Milner, _2nd Lieut._ 13 March 1878. Died 23 April
1878.
William John Arthur Charles James Cavendish-Bentinck (afterwards
Duke of Portland), _2nd Lieut._ 25 May 1878. From 84th Foot.
Retired 26 May 1880.
1200 Guy Thomas Saunders Sebright, _2nd Lieut._ 7 Aug. 1878; _Lieut._
1 July 1881. From 106th Foot. Retired 19 Sept. 1885.
-----
Footnote 501:
Promoted to Lieutenant, ante-dated.
-----
George Pleydell Bouverie, _2nd Lieut._ 19 Oct. 1878; _Lieut._ 1
July 1881; _Capt._ 25 April 1888; _Major_, 3 April 1895.
Effective 1896.
George Francis Sutton, _2nd Lieut._ 19 Oct. 1878; _Lieut._ 1 July
1881. Died in Red Sea 18 May 1885.
Hon. Arthur Grenville Fortescue, _2nd Lieut._ 13 Nov. 1878;
_Lieut._ 1 July 1881; _Capt._ 18 July 1888. Retired 10 April
1895.
Bertram Mont Orgueil Hadsley Gosselin-Lefebvre, _2nd Lieut._ 30
Nov. 1878; _Lieut._ 1 July 1881. From 24th Foot. Retired 10
Sept. 1887.
1205 Philip Gurdon, _2nd Lieut._ 22 Jan. 1879. Retired 29 Sept. 1880.
Hon. Rowland Winn (afterwards Lord St. Oswald), _2nd Lieut._ 19
Feb. 1879; _Lieut._ 1 July 1881; _Capt._ 10 July 1889. Retired
6 Dec. 1893.
Peter Audley David Arthur Lovell, _2nd Lieut._ 22 Feb. 1879;
_Lieut._ 1 July 1881; _Capt._ 4 Dec. 1889. Retired 28 Aug.
1895.
Lawrence George Drummond, _2nd Lieut._ 13 Aug. 1879. To Scots
Guards 27 Sept. 1879.
Henry Augustus Wetherall, _Lieut._ 20 Aug. 1879; _Capt._ 26 March
1884. Exchanged from Capt. 20th Hussars. Retired 25 Jan. 1888.
1210 Hon. Edward Knatchbull-Hugessen (afterwards Lord Brabourne), _2nd
Lieut._ 27 Aug. 1879. Retired 23 March 1881.
Augustus John Henry Beaumont, Earl of Wiltshire (afterwards
Marquis of Winchester), _2nd Lieut._ 27 Sept. 1879; _Lieut._ 1
July 1881; _Capt._ 16 July 1890. Effective 1896.
Sir Charles John Hubert Miller, Bart., _2nd Lieut._ 17 April
1880; _Lieut._ 1 July 1881; _Capt._ 23 July 1890. Retired 18
May 1892.
Charles Porcher Wilson Kindersley, _2nd Lieut._ 28 April 1880;
_Lieut._ 1 July 1881; _Capt._ 29 Sept. 1890. From half-pay 52nd
Regiment. Effective 1896.
Douglas James Hamilton, _2nd Lieut._ 28 April 1880; _Lieut._ 1
July 1881; _Capt._ 1 Jan. 1891. From 109th Regiment. Exchanged
to Royal Fusiliers 23 May 1891.
1215 Hon. Alan Dudley Charteris, _2nd Lieut._ 29 Sept. 1880; _Lieut._
1 July 1881. Retired 9 July 1890.
Henry Gwynn Deane Shute, _2nd Lieut._ 30 Sept. 1880; _Lieut._ 1
July 1881; _Capt._ 27 Jan. 1891. Effective 1896.
Herbert Haldane Somers-Cocks, _2nd Lieut._ 16 Oct. 1880; _Lieut._
1 July 1881. Retired 4 Feb. 1885.
Eustace Rochester Wigram, _2nd Lieut._ 2 Feb. 1881; _Lieut._ 1
July 1881. Retired 30 April 1887.
Granville Roland Francis Smith, _2nd Lieut._ 30 March 1881;
_Lieut._ 1 July 1881; _Capt._ 29 June 1891. From 20th Hussars.
Effective 1896.
1220 Charles Arthur Andrew Frederick, _2nd Lieut._ 30 March 1881;
_Lieut._ 1 July 1881; _Capt._ 29 July 1891. Effective 1896.
Francis Alexander Newdigate, _Lieut._ 10 March 1883. Retired 7
Oct. 1885.
George Wyndham, _Lieut._ 10 March 1883. Retired 3 June 1887.
Charles Henry Copeley Du Cane, _Lieut._ 25 Aug. 1883. Transferred
to Royal Fusiliers 24 Dec. 1884.
George Dunbar Milligan, _Lieut._ 5 Dec. 1883; _Capt._ 29 July
1891. Retired 1 July 1896.
1225 Hon. Cecil Trevelyan Holland, _Lieut._ 30 Jan. 1884; _Capt._ 18
May 1892. Exchanged into Kings Royal Rifle Corps 20 July 1892.
Hon. William Lambton, _Lieut._ 6 Feb. 1884; _Capt._ 18 May 1892.
Effective 1896.
James Adare Drummond Hay, _Lieut._ 6 Feb. 1884; _Capt._ 13 July
1895. Effective 1896.
Frederick Stanley Maude, _Lieut._ 6 Feb. 1884; _Capt._ 28 Aug.
1895. Effective 1896.
Riversdale Francis John Grenfell, _Lieut._ 6 Feb. 1884. Retired
29 Jan. 1890.
1230 Frederick William Ramsden, _Lieut._ 21 May 1884. Retired 8 May
1889.
Cecil Stanley Owen Monck, _Lieut._ 23 Aug. 1884; _Capt._ 28 Aug.
1893. Effective 1896.
Hon. Victor Albert Francis Charles Spencer (afterwards Lord
Churchill), _Lieut._ 23 Aug. 1884. Retired 18 Sept. 1889.
John Richard Hall, _Lieut._ 31 Dec. 1884; _Capt._ 19 Nov. 1895.
Effective 1896.
John Trelawney Sterling, _Lieut._ 31 Jan. 1885. _Capt._ 1 July
1896. Effective 1896.
1235 Henry Blundell Hawkes, _Lieut._ 4 Feb. 1885. _Capt._ 1 July 1896.
From East Surrey Regiment. Effective 1896.
Hon. Evan Edward Charteris, _Lieut._ 7 Feb. 1885. Retired 15
March 1887.
George William Taylor, _Lieut._ 15 May 1885. From South Wales
Borderers. Retired 8 Aug. 1888.
Sydney Earle, _Lieut._ 20 May 1885. _Capt._ 27 July 1896. From
Liverpool Regiment. Effective 1896.
John Maurice Wingfield, _Lieut._ 10 June 1885. Effective 1896.
1240 Hon. Edward Michael Pakenham, _Lieut._ 7 Oct. 1885. Effective
1896.
Hon. Henry Robert Baillie-Hamilton, _Lieut._ 28 Oct. 1885.
Effective 1896.
John McNeile, _Lieut._ 14 Nov. 1885. Effective 1896.
Randal Charles Edward Skeffington Smyth, _Lieut._ 25 Nov. 1885.
Effective 1896.
James Herbert Gustavus Meredyth, Lord Athlumney, _Lieut._ 4 Dec.
1886. Effective 1896.
1245 Hon. John Beresford Campbell, _2nd Lieut._ 23 March 1887;
_Lieut._ 9 July 1890. Effective 1896.
Maurice Abel Fremantle, _2nd Lieut._ 21 May 1887; _Lieut._ 16
July 1890. From Bedfordshire Regiment. Died at Hong-Kong 16
Jan. 1892.
Francis Archibald, Viscount Drumlanrig (afterwards Lord Kelhead),
_2nd Lieut._ 18 June 1887; _Lieut._ 23 July 1890. Retired 8
July 1893.
Hugh Clement Sutton, _2nd Lieut._ 14 Sept. 1887; _Lieut._ 4 Sept
1890. Effective 1896.
Raymond John Marker, _2nd Lieut._ 15 Feb. 1888; _Lieut._ 29 Sept.
1890. Effective 1896.
1250 Geoffrey Percy Thynne Feilding, _2nd Lieut._ 25 April 1888;
_Lieut._ 27 Nov. 1890. Effective 1896.
William Henry Lambton, _2nd Lieut._ 2 May 1888; _Lieut._ 1 Jan.
1891. Effective 1896.
Hon. John Gaspard Le Marchant Romilly (afterwards Lord Romilly),
_2nd Lieut._ 5 May 1888; _Lieut._ 27 Jan. 1891. Effective 1896.
John Ponsonby, _2nd Lieut._ 15 Aug. 1888; _Lieut._ 29 June 1891.
From Royal Irish Rifles. Effective 1896.
Charles John Brinsley, Lord Newtown-Butler, _2nd Lieut._ 22 Aug.
1888; _Lieut._ 15 Oct. 1891. Effective 1896.
1255 Guy Fremantle, _2nd Lieut._ 6 Feb. 1889; _Lieut._ 17 April 1892.
From Worcestershire Regiment. Effective 1896.
Claude Julian Hawker, _2nd Lieut._ 22 May 1889; _Lieut._ 10 Aug.
1892. Effective 1896.
Reginald Longueville, _2nd Lieut._ 21 Sept. 1889; _Lieut._ 23
Feb. 1893. Effective 1896.
Cecil Edward Pereira, _2nd Lieut._ 29 Jan. 1890; _Lieut._ 6 July
1893. Effective 1896.
Thomas Elphinstone Case, _2nd Lieut._ 3 May 1890; _Lieut._ 8 July
1893. Effective 1896.
1260 Richard Arthur Starling Benson, _2nd Lieut._ 2 July 1890;
_Lieut._ 1 Jan. 1894. Effective 1896.
Julian McCarty Steele, _2nd Lieut._ 29 Oct. 1890; _Lieut._ 24
June 1896. Effective 1896.
Nevile Rodwell Wilkinson, _2nd Lieut._ 29 Oct. 1890; _Lieut._ 1
July 1896. Effective 1896.
Thomas Henry Eyre Lloyd, _2nd Lieut._ 29 Oct. 1890; _Lieut._ 27
July 1896. Effective 1896.
Ronald Anthony Markham, _2nd Lieut._ 3 Dec. 1890; _Lieut._ 24
Aug. 1896. Effective 1896.
1265 Lawrence Challoner Garratt, _2nd Lieut._ 3 Dec. 1890. Effective
1896.
Edward Gardiner Alston, _2nd Lieut._ 4 March 1891. Retired 28
Nov. 1894.
Frederick Ivor Maxse, _Capt._ 23 May 1891. Exchanged from Royal
Fusiliers. Effective 1896.
Henry Tracy Peel, _2nd Lieut._ 15 July 1891. From Kings Royal
Rifle Corps. Died of Typhoid Fever, at Holyhead, 16 Oct. 1893.
Herbert William Studd, _2nd Lieut._ 25 July 1891. Effective 1896.
1270 Hon. Claude Heathcote-Drummond Willoughby, _2nd Lieut._ 5 Dec.
1891. Effective 1896.
Harry William Ludovic Heathcoat-Heathcoat-Amory, _2nd Lieut._ 5
Dec. 1891. Effective 1896.
Eric Thomas Henry Hanbury-Tracy, _2nd Lieut._ 25 May 1892.
Effective 1892.
Sir Frederick Charles Arthur Stephenson, G.C.B., _Col._ 16 July
1892. Originally in the Scots Guards. Effective 1896.
Henry Seymour Rawlinson (afterwards Sir H., Bart.), _Capt._ 20
July 1892. Exchanged from Kings Royal Rifle Corps. Effective
1896.
1275 Reginald Champion, _2nd Lieut._ 31 Aug. 1892. From West Riding
Regiment. Retired 25 Jan. 1893.
Charles Edward Wyld, _2nd Lieut._ 8 Feb. 1893. Effective 1896.
Hon. Leslie d’Henin Hamilton, _2nd Lieut._ 22 March 1893.
Effective 1896.
Hon. Guy Victor Baring, _2nd Lieut._ 8 July 1893. Effective 1896.
Francis Charles Philips, _2nd Lieut._ 21 Oct. 1893. Transferred
to 4th Dragoon Guards 6 March 1895.
1280 Harry Anthony Chandos Pole-Gell, _2nd Lieut._ 23 Dec. 1893.
Effective 1896.
Torquhil George Matheson, _2nd Lieut._ 2 June 1894. Effective
1896.
Hon. George Arthur Charles Crichton, _2nd Lieut._ 28 Nov. 1894.
Effective 1896.
Jocelyn Henry Clive Graham, _2nd Lieut._ 6 March 1895. Effective
1896.
Francis Douglas Farquhar, _2nd Lieut._ 29 April 1896. Effective
1896.
1285 Giles Stephen Holland, Lord Stavordale, _2nd Lieut._ 5 Aug. 1896.
Effective 1896.
Ralph Henry S. Wilmot, _2nd Lieut._ 12 Aug. 1896. Effective 1896.
John Vaughan Campbell, _2nd Lieut._ 7 Sept. 1896. Effective 1896.
Francis Jenkins, _2nd Lieut._ 23 Sept. 1896. Effective 1896.
2.
COMMANDING OFFICERS OF THE COLDSTREAM GUARDS.
A.—COLONELS.
1 George Monck, Duke of Albemarle, K.G., Capt.-General, July 1650.
2 William, Earl of Craven, Lieut.-General, 6 Jan. 16-69/70.
3 Thomas Talmash (or Tolemache), Lieut.-General, 1 May 1689.
4 John, Lord Cutts, Lieut.-General, 3 Oct. 1694.
5 Charles Churchill, General, 25 Feb. 170-6/7.
6 William, Earl of Cadogan, K.T., Lieut.-General, 11 Oct. 1714.
7 Richard, Earl of Scarborough, K.G., 18 June 1722.
8 H.R.H. William, Duke of Cumberland, K.G., Field-Marshal, 30 April
1740.
9 Charles, Duke of Marlborough, K.G., 18 Feb. 174½.
10 William, Earl of Albemarle, 5 Oct. 1744.
11 James, Lord Tyrawley, Lieut.-General, 8 April 1755.
12 John, Earl of Waldegrave, K.G., General, 15 July 1773.
13 H.R.H. Frederick, Duke of York, K.G., Field-Marshal, 27 Oct. 1784.
14 H.R.H. Adolphus, Duke of Cambridge, K.G., Field-Marshal, 5 Oct.
1805.
15 John, Earl of Strafford, G.C.B., Field-Marshal, 15 Aug. 1850.
16 Colin, Lord Clyde, G.C.B., General, 22 June 1860.
17 Sir William Maynard Gomm, G.C.B., Field-Marshal 15 Aug. 1863.
18 Sir William Codrington, G.C.B., General, 16 March 1875.
19 Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas Steele, G.C.B., General, 7 Aug. 1884.
20 Hon. Sir Arthur Hardinge, K.C.B., General, 26 Feb. 1890.
21 Sir Frederick Stephenson, G.C.B., General, 16 July 1892. Effective
1896.
B.—LIEUT.-COLONELS.
1 William Gough, July 1650.
2 Ethelbert Morgan, Oct. 1659.
3 Sir James Smith, Kt., M.P., 21 July 1665.
4 Edward Sackville, Major-General, Jan. 168½ till 1688.
5 James Bridgeman, 1691.
6 Sir William Seymour, 10 Aug. 1692.
7 William Matthew, 26 Feb. 169-4/5.
8 William Mathew, 1 Oct. 1702.
9 Edward Braddock, Major-General, 10 Jan. 170¾.
10 Richard Holmes, Major-General, 28 Sept. 1715.
11 Sir Adolphus Oughton, Bart., M.P., 12 Aug. 1717.
12 John Robinson, 3 Aug. 1733.
13 John Folliot, 30 Oct. 1734.
14 George Churchill, 1 April 1743.
15 Edward Braddock, 21 Nov. 1745.
16 Hedworth Lambton, 12 May 1753.
17 Hon. Bennet Noel, Lieut.-Major-General, 22 Dec. 1755.
18 Julius Cæsar, Major-General, 12 April 1762.
19 William A’Court, 20 Aug. 1762.
20 John Thomas, 23 Dec. 1763.
21 Henry Lister, 21 Nov. 1777.
22 Harry Trelawney, 23 Nov. 1785.
23 Anthony George Martin, Major-General, 26 May 1789.
24 Thomas Slaughter Stanwix, Lieut.-General, 2 Dec. 1795.
25 Edward Morrison, Major-General, 9 May 1800.
26 Andrew Cowell, Major-General, 19 Nov. 1800.
27 Hon. Henry Brand, C.B., (afterwards Lord Dacre), 25 July 1814.
28 Alexander Woodford, C.B., 25 July 1821.
29 James Macdonell, C.B., 27 May 1825.
30 Daniel MacKinnon, 22 July 1830.
31 Sir William Maynard Gomm, K.C.B., 23 June 1836.
32 Francis Miles Milman, 10 Jan. 1837.
33 John Fremantle, C.B., 8 Aug. 1837.
34 William Lovelace Walton, 31 Dec. 1839.
35 Charles Shawe, 8 May 1846.
36 Charles Antonio Ferdinand Bentinck, 9 Nov. 1846.
37 Thomas Chaplin, 25 April 1848.
38 Henry John William Bentinck, 22 Aug. 1851.
39 Hon. Arthur Upton, 20 June 1854.
40 Hon. George Upton, C.B. (afterwards Viscount Templeton), 20 Feb.
1855.
41 Lord Frederick Paulet, C.B., 26 Oct. 1858.
42 William Samuel Newton, 13 Dec. 1860.
43 Spencer Perceval, 2 July 1861.
44 Thomas Steele, C.B., 9 Nov. 1862.
45 Mark Wood, 24 Nov. 1863.
46 Dudley Wilmot Carleton (afterwards Lord Dorchester), 22 May 1866.
47 Hon. Arthur Hardinge, C.B., 2 Sept. 1868.
48 Hon. Percy Feilding, C.B., 4 Jan. 1871.
49 Arthur Lyon Fremantle, 5 Sept. 1877.
50 George Robert FitzRoy, 10 Nov. 1880.
51 Godfrey Wigram, C.B., 16 Dec. 1885.
52 John Barton Sterling, 5 Feb. 1890.
53 Evelyn, Viscount Falmouth, C.B., 5 Feb. 1895. Effective 1896.
C.—MAJORS COMMANDING BATTALIONS.
NOTE.—Up to 1711, the Regiment contained only one Major; another
was then appointed, the senior having the rank of First Major, the
junior, Second Major. This distinction was abolished by authority,
dated September 11, 1821 (_ante_, p. 86), and the new rule applied
retrospectively to the promotion that took place in July of that
year. The Senior Major, however, still commanded the 1st
Battalion, and the junior the 2nd Battalion. In 1864, this system
was discontinued, and Majors were definitely posted to the
Battalions they were appointed to command (_ante_, p. 307).
In the following list, First and Second Majors are indicated by
_F_ and _S_ respectively; Senior and Junior Majors by _sen_ and
_jun_; Officers posted definitely to Battalions have the number
_1st_ or _2nd_ entered against their names, to show which
Battalion they commanded.
1 Abraham Holmes, July 1650.
2 Francis Nicols, Oct. 1659.
3 Sir James Smith, Kt., M.P., 11 March 166½.
4 John Miller (formerly Adjutant-General), 21 July 1665.
5 Robert Winter, 1673.
6 Thomas Mansfield, 1676. (No Major for a year).
7 John Huitson, 1682.
8 James Bridgeman, 1688.
9 Sir William Seymour, 1691.
10 Henry Withers, 10 Aug. 1692.
11 William Mathew, 26 Feb. 169-4/5.
12 Edward Braddock, 1 Oct. 1702.
13 Richard Holmes, Major-General, 10 Jan. 170¾. _F_ 25 April 1711.
14 Henry Morryson, Brigadier-General, _S_ 25 April 1711.
15 Sir Adolphus Oughton, Bart., M.P., _F_ 28 Sept. 1715.
16 John Robinson, _S_ 28 Sept. 1715; _F_ 12 Aug. 1717.
17 Sir Tristram Dillington, Bart., M.P., _S_ 12 Aug. 1717.
18 John Folliott, _S_ 8 July 1721; _F_ 3 Aug. 1733.
19 Henry Pulteney, _S_ 3 Aug. 1733; _F_ 30 Oct. 1734.
20 John Huske, _S_ 30 Oct. 1734; _F_ 5 July 1739.
21 George Churchill, _S_ 5 July 1739; _F_ 25 Dec. 1740.
22 William Douglas, _S_ 29 Dec. 1740; _F_ 2 April 1743.
23 Edward Braddock, _S_ 2 April 1743; _F_ 27 May 1745.
24 Maurice Buckland, M.P., _S_ 27 May 1745; _F_ 21 Nov. 1745.
25 Charles Russell, _S_ 21 Nov. 1745; _F_ 1 Dec. 1747.
26 Hedworth Lambton, _S_ 1 Dec. 1747; _F_ 17 Dec. 1751.
27 Hon. Bennet Noel, _S_ 17 Dec. 1751; _F_ 12 May 1753.
28 Julius Cæsar, Major-General, _S_ 12 May 1753; _F_ 25 Dec. 1755.
29 William A’Court, _S_ 29 Dec. 1755; _F_ 12 April 1762.
30 John Thomas, _S_ 12 April 1762; _F_ 20 Aug. 1762.
31 William Evelyn, _S_ 20 Aug. 1762; _F_ 23 Dec. 1763.
32 Hon. Martyn Sandys, _S_ 23 Dec. 1763.
33 William Alexander Sorell, Major-General, _S_ 11 Jan. 1769; _F_ 3
Nov. 1769.
34 Francis Craig, _S_ 3 Nov. 1769; _F_ 15 Dec. 1773.
35 Henry Lister, _S_ 15 Dec. 1773; _F_ 8 Sept. 1775.
36 Thomas Clarke, _S_ 8 Sept. 1775; _F_ 21 Nov. 1777.
37 Charles Rainsford, _S_ 21 Nov. 1777.
38 Harry Trelawney, _F_ 5 May 1780.
39 Anthony George Martin, Major-General, _S_ 7 June 1780; _F_ 23 Nov.
1785.
40 Richard Grenville, Major-General, _S_ 23 Nov. 1785.
41 Hon. Chapel Norton, Major-General, _S_ 21 April 1786; _F_ 26 May
1789.
42 George Morgan, Major-General, _S_ 26 May 1789.
43 Lowther Pennington, Major-General, _S_ 1 Feb. 1793; _F_ 1 April
1795.
44 Thomas Slaughter Stanwix, Major-General, _S_ 1 April 1795; _F_ 23
June 1795.
45 William Morshead, Major-General, _S_ 23 June 1795; _F_ 2 Dec. 1795.
46 Edward Morrison, Major-General, _S_ 2 Dec. 1795; _F_ 30 Dec. 1797.
47 Andrew Cowell, Major-General, _S_ 30 Dec. 1797; _F_ 9 May 1800.
48 Richard Earl of Caven, Major-General, _S_ 9 May 1800; _F_ 19 Nov.
1800.
49 Hon. Edward Finch, Lieut.-General, _S_ 19 Nov. 1800; _F_ 18 June
1801.
50 John Calcraft, Lieut.-General, _S_ 18 June 1801; _F_ 4 Aug. 1808.
51 Kenneth Alexander Howard, Major-General (afterwards Earl of
Effingham), _S_ 4 Aug. 1808.
52 Sir Richard Downes Jackson, K.C.B., _F_ 25 July 1814.
53 Alexander Woodford, C.B., _S_ 25 July 1825; _F_ 18 Jan. 1820.
54 Sir Henry Bouverie, K.C.B., _S_ 18 Jan. 1820; _sen._ 25 July 1821.
55 James Macdonell, C.B., _jun._ 25 July 1821.
56 John Hamilton, _sen._ 27 May 1825.
57 William Henley Raikes, _jun._ 27 May 1825.
58 Daniel MacKinnon, _jun._ 22 June 1826; _sen._ 16 May 1829.
59 Sir William Maynard Gomm, K.C.B., _jun._ 16 May 1829; _sen._ 22
July 1830.
60 Francis Miles Milman, _jun._ 22 July 1830; _sen._ 23 June 1836.
61 John Fremantle, C.B., _jun._ 23 June 1836; _sen._ 10 Jan. 1837.
62 William Lovelace Walton, _jun._ 10 Jan. 1837; _sen._ 8 Aug. 1837.
63 Charles Shawe, _jun._ 8 Aug. 1837; _sen._ 31 Dec. 1839.
64 George Bowles, _jun._ 31 Dec. 1839.
65 Charles Antonio Ferdinand Bentinck, _jun._ 30 May 1843; _sen._ 8
May 1846.
66 Thomas Chaplin, _jun._ 8 May 1846; _sen._ 9 Nov. 1846.
67 Henry John William Bentinck, _jun._ 9 Nov. 1846; _sen._ 25 April
1848.
68 Charles Murray Hay, _jun._ 25 April 1848; _sen._ 22 Aug. 1851.
69 Hon. Arthur Upton, _jun._ 22 Aug. 1851.
70 Hon. George Upton (afterwards Viscount Templetown), _sen._ 20 June
1854.
71 Gordon Drummond, _jun._ 20 June 1854; _sen._ 20 Feb. 1855.
72 Lord Frederick Paulet, C.B., _jun._ 20 Feb. 1855; _sen._ 18 Nov.
1856.
73 William Samuel Newton, _jun._ 18 Nov. 1856; _sen._ 26 Oct. 1858.
74 Spencer Perceval, _jun._ 26 Oct. 1858; _sen._ 13 Dec. 1860.
75 Thomas Montagu Steele, C.B., _jun._ 13 Dec. 1860; _sen._ 2 July
1861.
76 William Mark Wood, _jun._ 2 July 1861; _sen._ 9 Nov. 1862.
77 Dudley Wilmot Carleton (afterwards Lord Dorchester), _jun._ 9 Nov.
1862; _sen._ 24 Nov. 1863.
78 Arthur St. George Herbert Stepney, C.B., _jun._ 24 Nov. 1863.
79 James Talbot Airey, C.B., _1st_ 22 May 1866.
80 Clement William Strong, _2nd_ 14 Aug. 1866.
81 Hon. Arthur Edward Hardinge, C.B., _2nd_ 15 March 1867.
82 Hon. Percy Robert Basil Feilding, C.B., _1st_ 23 Oct. 1867.[502]
83 Charles Baring, _2nd_ 2 Sept. 1868.
84 Gerald Littlehales Goodlake, V.C., _2nd_ 14 Aug. 1872; transferred
to _1st_, 20 July 1875.
85 Arthur James Lyon Fremantle, _1st_ 28 April 1875; transferred to
_2nd_, 20 July 1875.
86 Hon. William Henry Adelbert Feilding, _1st_ 7 Aug. 1875.
87 George Robert FitzRoy, _2nd_ 5 Sept. 1877.
88 Julian Hamilton Hall, _1st_ 29 Sept. 1877.
89 Godfrey James Wigram, C.B., _2nd_ 10 Nov. 1880.
-----
Footnote 502:
From Jan. 4, 1871, to April 28, 1875, Colonel Feilding, while
Lieut.-Colonel of the Regiment, continued to command the 1st
Battalion (_ante_, 315, 334).
-----
LIEUT.-COLONELS COMMANDING.[503]
90 Arthur Lambton, C.B., _1st_ 29 Sept. 1882.
91 John Barton Sterling, _2nd_ 10 Nov. 1885.
92 Richard Spencer Hall, _1st_ 29 Sept. 1886.
93 Hon. Henry Lowry Corry, _2nd_ 10 Nov. 1889.
94 Robert William Webb Follett, _1st_ 29 Sept. 1890.
95 Evelyn Viscount Falmouth, C.B., _2nd_ 10 Nov. 1893.
96 Francis Aylmer Graves-Sawle, _1st_ 29 Sept. 1894. Effective 1896.
97 Reginald Pole-Carew, C.B., _2nd_ 5 Feb. 1895. Effective 1896.
-----
Footnote 503:
By Royal Warrant, 1 July 1881, the Majors Commanding Battalions
were called Lieut.-Colonels Commanding Battalions.
-----
3
REGIMENTAL STAFF OFFICERS.[504]
A.—ADJUTANTS.
Hon. J. Hope, _jun._ 16 May 1829; _sen._ 10 Feb. 1832. Resigned 7
July 1837.
60 C. W. Horton, _jun._ 10 Feb. 1832; _sen._ 6 July 1837. Resigned 4
Sept. 1840.
D. M. Chisholm, _jun._ 8 July 1837. Retired 25 Dec. 1838.
Lord F. Paulet, _jun._ 25 Dec. 1838. Promoted 2 May 1846.
Hon. F. W. Child Villiers, _1st Battn._ 4 Sept. 1840.[505] Resigned
27 May 1842.
W. S. Newton, _1st_ 27 May 1842. Resigned 30 Dec. 1845.
65 J. L. Elrington, _1st_ 30 Dec. 1845. Promoted 11 June 1847.
P. G. H. Somerset, _2nd Battn._ 8 May 1846. Resigned 2 March 1849.
J. Halkett, _1st_ 11 June 1847. Resigned 8 Oct. 1850.
F. W. Newdigate, _2nd_ 2 March 1849. Promoted 4 Sept. 1854.
Hon. P. Feilding, _1st_ 8 Oct. 1850. Promoted 23 Nov. 1855.
70 Hon. H. W. J. Byng, _2nd_ 4 Sept. 1854. Resigned 2 Oct. 1855.
A. J. Fremantle, _2nd_ 2 Oct. 1855. Promoted 20 April 1860.
George Lord Bingham, _1st_ 21 Dec. 1855. Resigned 7 Aug. 1856.
Hon. R. Monck, _1st_ 8 Aug. 1856. Promoted 17 Nov. 1863.
W. F. E. Seymour, _2nd_ 20 April 1860. Resigned 1 Sept. 1863.
75 H. G. Fortescue, _2nd_ 1 Sept. 1863. Retired 8 Sept. 1865.
Hon. E. H. Legge, _1st_ 17 Nov. 1863. Resigned 24 Dec. 1867.
G. J. Wigram, _2nd_ 8 Sept. 1865. Resigned 14 Sept. 1866.
G. J. Fitzroy Smith, _2nd_ 14 Sept. 1866. Promoted 25 March 1871.
Hon. F. A. Wellesley, _1st_ 25 Dec. 1867. Resigned 19 Aug. 1871.
80 Hon. J. R. W. Vesey, _2nd_ 25 March 1871. Resigned 28 April 1874.
Hon. R. G. E. Campbell, _1st_ 19 Aug. 1871. Resigned 28 Oct. 1878.
Hon. E. H. Digby, _1st_ 29 April 1874. Resigned 1 April 1876.
Hon. E. E. T. Boscawen, _2nd_ 1 April 1876. Resigned 16 Feb. 1878.
Hon. A. H. Henniker-Major, _2nd_ 16 Feb. 1878. Resigned 2 Feb.
1886.
85 Hon. H. C. Legge, _1st_ 29 Oct. 1878. Resigned 29 Oct. 1885.
Hon. E. H. Digby, _regimental_ 1 July 1881. Resigned 19 Sept. 1883.
Hon. E. E. T. Boscawen, _regt._ 19 Sept. 1883. Resigned 18 March
1887.
A. E. Codrington, _1st_ 29 Oct. 1885. Resigned 7 March 1888.
-----
Footnote 504:
Continued from Appendix No. 285 of MacKinnon’s _Origin and
Services of the Coldstream Guards_ , vol. ii., p. 521.
Footnote 505:
Adjutants ceased to change Battalions, about this time, when they
became senior, and were definitely posted to Battalions (_ante_,
22, 308).
-----
E. R. Wigram, _2nd_ 3 Feb. 1886. Resigned 26 Oct. 1886.
90 C. A. A. Frederick, _2nd_ 27 Oct. 1886. Resigned 28 Dec. 1888.
Hon. H. Amherst, _regt._ 16 March 1887. Resigned 25 March 1890.
F. S. Maude, _1st_ 7 March 1888. Time expired 6 March 1892.
Hon. W. Lambton, _2nd_ 29 Dec. 1888. Time expired 28 Dec. 1892.
Hon. A. H. Henniker-Major, _regt._ 26 March 1890. Resigned 26 Jan.
1891.
95 V. J. Dawson, _regt._ 27 Jan. 1891. Resigned 28 July 1891.
H. G. D. Shute, _regt._ 29 July 1891. Appointed Brigade-Major
Brigade of Guards 1 Jan. 1894.
R. J. Marker, _1st_ 7 March 1892. Time expired 6 March 1896.
C. S. O. Monck, _2nd_ 29 Dec. 1892. Effective 1896.
H. C. Sutton, _regt._ 1 Jan. 1894. Effective 1896.
100 H. W. Heathcote Amory, _1st_ 7 March 1896. Effective 1896.
B.—QUARTERMASTERS.
(_Previous Rank—Appointment, etc._)
28 Thomas Dwelly, _Q.-M.-Serg._; _2nd Battn._ 15 Oct. 1812. To
half-pay 25 July 1837.
Benjamin Selway, _Ens._ and _Adj._ Surrey Local Militia; _1st
Battn._ 26 Nov. 1812. Died 2 June 1836.
30 William Morse, _Sergt.-Major_; _1st_ 28 June 1836. Died 21 June
1853.
Thomas Lea, _Sergt.-Major_; _2nd_ 25 July 1837. Died 12 Feb. 1852.
Arthur Hurle, _Sergt.-Major_; _2nd_ 13 Feb. 1852. Retired 27 Feb.
1867.
Alexander Falconer, _Sergt.-Major_; _1st_ 1 July 1853. Retired 26
Feb. 1876.
Joseph Birch, _Q.-M.-Sergt._; _2nd_ 27 Feb. 1867. Retired 15 Oct.
1881.
35 William E. Reynolds, _Sergt.-Major_; _1st_ 8 March 1876.
Transferred to Guards Depôt 1 April 1885.
William Webster, _Ord. Room Sergt._; _2nd_ 15 Oct. 1881. Retired 24
July 1894.
Henry Folson, _Sergt.-Major_; _1st_ 1 April 1885. Retired 14 May
1895.
Robert Grindel, _Superintend. Clerk Reg. Ord. Room_; _2nd_ 25 July
1894. Effective 1896.
William W. Girling, _Q.-M.-Sergt._; _1st_ 15 May 1895. Effective
1896.
C.—MEDICAL OFFICERS.
31 William Whymper (Sir William), _Assist.-Surg._ 14 Nov. 1805;
_Battn.-Surg._ 25 Dec. 1813; _Surg.-Major_, 24 Feb. 1825. To
half-pay 29 April 1836.
Charles Herbert, _Assist.-Surg._ 3 March 1808. Resigned 24 Oct.
1810.
Thomas Clarke, _Assist.-Surg._ 20 April 1809. Resigned 3 Oct. 1810.
James Owen, _Assist.-Surg._ 4 Oct. 1810. Superseded 20 Feb. 1811.
35 Edward Nixon, _Assist.-Surg._ 25 Oct. 1810. Resigned 28 April 1813.
Thomas Maynard, _Assist.-Surg._ 21 Feb. 1811; _Battn.-Surg._ 28 May
1818. Died 1836.
George Smith, _Assist.-Surg._ 17 Dec. 1812; _Battn.-Surg._ 24 Feb.
1825. Retired 1836.
Septimus Worrell, _Assist.-Surg._ 29 April 1813. Exchanged to
half-pay of the Regiment 23 Aug. 1821.
William Hunter, M.D., _Assist.-Surg._ 10 Feb. 1814, 24 Feb. 1825;
_Battn.-Surg._ 4 Sept. 1836; _Surg.-Major_, 16 March 1838.
Half-pay 25 Dec. 1818. Reappointed 24 Feb. 1825. To half-pay 2
Sept. 1845.
40 Sherrington Gilder, _Assist.-Surg._ 28 May 1818, 23 Aug. 1821. On
half-pay 25 Dec. 1818. Exchanged from ditto 23 Aug. 1821.
Exchanged to half-pay First Foot Guards 20 June 1822.
Frederick Gilder, _Assist.-Surg._ 20 June 1822; _Battn.-Surg._ 16
March 1838. Exchanged from half-pay First Foot Guards 20 June
1822. To half-pay 14 April 1843.
George Chenevix, _Surg.-Major_, 4 Sept. 1836. To half-pay 16 March
1838.
James Wedderburn, _Assist.-Surg._ 21 Oct. 1836. Exchanged 2nd
Dragoons 27 Aug. 1841.
Edward Greatrex, _Assist.-Surg._ 15 March 1838; _Battn.-Surg._ 14
April 1843; _Surg.-Major_, 2 Sept. 1845. To half-pay 3 April
1851.
45 William Thomas Christopher Robinson, _Assist.-Surg._ 23 March 1838;
_Battn.-Surg._ 2 Sept. 1845; _Surg.-Major_, 4 April 1851. Died 20
Feb. 1853.
James Munro, M.D., _Assist.-Surg._ 27 Aug. 1841; _Battn.-Surg._ 4
April 1851; _Surg.-Major_, 20 Feb. 1853. From 2nd Dragoons. To
half-pay 9 Jan. 1863.
Joseph Skelton, M.D., _Assist.-Surg._ 2 Sept. 1845; _Battn.-Surg._
20 Feb. 1853. Died 8 April 1857.
Frederick Wildbore, _Assist.-Surg._ 4 April 1851. Resigned 1854.
John Wyatt, C.B., _Assist.-Surg._ 1 April 1853; _Battn.-Surg._ 9
April 1857; _Surg.-Major_, 9 Jan. 1863. From 5th Dragoon Guards.
Died 3 April 1874.
50 Charles Vidler Cay, _Assist.-Surg._ 24 Feb. 1854; _Battn.-Surg._ 9
Jan. 1863 (Surg.-Major, 12 June 1866); _Surg.-Major_, 3 April
1874. From 97th Foot. To half-pay 30 Nov. 1878.
John William Trotter, _Assist.-Surg._ 26 May 1854 (Surg.-Major, 3
April 1874). To Scots Fusilier Guards on promotion, 3 May 1876.
Thomas Lawes Rogers, _Assist.-Surg._ 8 Dec. 1854. Resigned 16 April
1858.
Francis Bowen, M.D., _Assist.-Surg._ 11 May 1855. From Medical
Staff. Appointed to Royal Hibernian School 31 May 1859.
W. H. Phipps, _Assist.-Surg._ 16 April 1858. Died 14 June 1858.
55 Andrew Spittal, M.D., _Assist.-Surg._ 28 Sept. 1858. From Medical
Staff. Resigned 29 July 1859.
Robert Farquharson, M.D., _Assist.-Surg._ 29 July 1859. From Royal
Artillery. Retired 14 Oct. 1868.
Arthur Bowen Richards Myers, _Assist.-Surg._ 26 Sept. 1859 (Surgeon
in 1873). To Scots Guards on promotion 14 March 1883.
John Henry Connel Whipple, M.D., _Assist.-Surg._ 14 Oct. 1868
(Surgeon in 1873). From 21st Foot. To Grenadier Guards on
promotion, 21 June 1885.
Constantine Caridi Read, _Battn.-Surg._ 3 April 1874;
_Surg.-Major_, 30 Nov. 1878. From Grenadier Guards. To half-pay 8
Dec. 1885.
60 James Magill, M.D., _Surg._ 3 May 1876; _Surg.-Major_, 9 Dec. 1885.
Promoted Surgeon Lieut.-Colonel 3 May 1896. Effective 1896.
George Perry, _Battn.-Surg._ 30 Nov. 1878 (Surgeon-Major 1876);
_Surg.-Major_, 9 Dec. 1885. From Scots Guards. To Brigade-Surgeon
Brigade of Guards 31 Dec. 1887. To retired pay 13 May 1888.
Alexander Charles Archibald Alexander, _Surg._ 21 April 1883;
_Surg.-Major_, 8 Nov. 1888. From Army Medical Department.
Effective 1896.
William Alexander Carte, M.B., _Surg._ 22 July 1885. From Medical
Staff Corps. To Grenadier Guards on promotion 23 May 1891.
Robert Hippesley Cox, _Surg._ 7 April 1886. Resigned 11 March 1891.
65 Ernest Harrold Fenn, C.I.E., _Surg.-Major_, 13 May 1888. From
Grenadier Guards. Seconded 8 Nov. 1888. To Scots Guards 26 Sept.
1894.
D.—SOLICITORS.
13 W. G. Carter, 29 Jan. 1824. Died 11 Nov. 1861.
R. J. P. Broughton, 7 Jan. 1862. Effective 1896.
4.
WARRANT-OFFICERS.[506]
A.—SERGEANTS-MAJOR.
FIRST BATTALION.
Appointed. Retired.
Sgt.-M. in 1821. Thomas Baker Discharged June 3, 1823.
June 4, 1823. Samuel Rook Discharged Dec. 26, 1828.
Dec. 27, 1828. William Morse (from Quarter-M. June 28, 1836.
2nd Battn.)
June 20, 1836. William Lundie Discharged March 24, 1846.
March 25, 1846. Arthur Hurle Quarter-M. Feb. 13, 1852.
Feb. 13, 1852. Alexander Falconer Quarter-M. July 1, 1853.
July 1, 1853. Anthony Talbot Dischd. Inval. Sept. 15, 1855.
Sept. 26, 1855. Shepherd Carter Discharged Feb. 24, 1865.
Feb. 25, 1865. Thomas Samson Discharged Jan. 24, 1871.
Jan. 25, 1871. William E. Reynolds Quarter-M. March 8, 1876.
March 8, 1876. Henry Risebrook Reverted Col. Sergt. Oct. 29,
1876.
Oct. 30, 1876. Edward Dutton Discharged Jan. 20, 1880.
Jan. 21, 1880. Henry Folson Quarter-M. April 1, 1885.
April 1, 1885. Frederick Dickenson Garrison Sergt.-Major, Home
(from Depôt) District, Sept. 1, 1894.
Sept. 1, 1894. Alfred Best Effective 1896.
SECOND BATTALION.
Sgt.-M. in 1821. David Newton Discharged Sept. 29, 1823.
Sept. 30, 1823. William White Discharged Oct. 16, 1826.
Oct. 17, 1826. William Morse To 1st Battn. Dec. 27, 1828.
Dec. 27, 1828. Thomas Lea Quarter-M. July 25, 1837.
July 25, 1837. Edward Geer Died March 16, 1840.
April 25, 1840. William Smeaton Died Oct. 1, 1845
Oct. 2, 1845. William Loomes Discharged Sept. 11, 1849.
Sept. 12, 1849. Richard Port Dischd. Inval. May 25, 1853.
May 26, 1853. George Pennymore Discharged Jan. 31, 1860.
Feb. 1, 1860. John K. Creagh Discharged Feb. 26, 1867.
Feb. 27, 1867. William Ewings Discharged Jan. 22, 1878.
Jan. 23, 1878. Alfred Spackman Discharged June 28, 1881.
June 29, 1881. Alfred Bustard Discharged Oct. 6, 1885.
Oct. 7, 1885. Joseph Brace Garrison Sergt.-Major,
Portsmouth, Jan. 31, 1893.
Feb. 1, 1893. James Sparkes (from Garrison Sergt.-Major, Home
Depôt) District, April 2, 1895.
April 3, 1895. Stephen Wright Effective 1896.
-----
Footnote 506:
By Royal Warrant, 1 July 1881, the Sergeant-Major, Bandmaster, and
Superintending Clerk at Regimental Orderly Room were appointed
Warrant-officers.
-----
B.—REGIMENTAL CLERKS.
Warrant-Officer. Retired.
July 1, 1881. Frederick J. Wray Retired April 30, 1892.
May 1, 1892. Robert Grindel Quarter-M. July 24, 1894.
July 25, 1894. William Johnson Effective 1896.
C.—BANDMASTERS.[507]
Warrant-Officer. Retired.
July 1, 1881. Cadwallader Thomas Invalided April 8, 1896.
April 9, 1896. John Rogan From 2nd Queen’s Royal West
Surrey Regiment. Effective
1896.
-----
Footnote 507:
See Appendix V. p. 424.
-----
D.—COLDSTREAM SERGEANTS-MAJOR OF THE GUARDS DEPÔT.
(_Found in turn by the three Regiments._)
July 1, 1881. Herbert Barrell Discharged Aug. 30, 1881.
July 1, 1883. Frederick Dickenson To 1st Coldstream Guards
April 1, 1885.
Jan. 23, 1888. Herbert Martin Retired at own request
March 17, 1891.
May 13, 1891. James Sparkes To 2nd Coldstream Guards
Jan. 31, 1893.
INDEX.
Abu Hamed, 383
Abu Klea, battle of, 384, 385
Abu Kru, battle of, 386
Airey, Col: [Gen: Sir J.], 141, 314
Aix-la-Chapelle, congress of, 67
Aladyn, 145
Aldershot, 268, 283, 296, etc. (_see_ App. xv.)
Alexander I. of Russia, 32
Alexander II. of Russia, 252, 331
Alexandria, 354;
forts of, bombarded, 355
Alison, Sir Archibald, Gen.: 355, 357, 358, 370
Alma, 167;
battle of the, 168 ff
Amherst, Hon: W. [Viscount Holmesdale; Earl Amherst], 227
Angelo, Mr., 117
Arabi Pasha, 352, 353, 357, 363
Armament of the British infantry, 126, 259, 271, 317
Army Purchase abolished, 324
Army Reform, 124, 319-349
Austria; and Russia, 133, 148, 149
Azof, Sea of, 161, 245, 253, 274
Baker Pasha, Gen:, 374
Balaklava, 197;
charge of, 198
Baltic Sea, 158
Baring, Capt: C. [Col:], 174, 314
Barracks (_see_ App. xv.)
—— Buckingham House [Palace], 97, etc.
—— Chelsea, 270, 305, etc.
—— Kensington, 97, 300, etc.
—— King’s Mews, 76;
changed to St. George’s, 97; etc.
—— Knightsbridge, 76;
given up, 97; etc.
—— Magazine, 97;
given up, 305; etc.
—— Portman Street, 76, 120;
given up, 305; etc.
—— St. George’s, 97, etc.
—— St. John’s Wood; first used, 97;
given up by Foot Guards, 305; etc.
—— Wellington, 97, 300, 305, etc.
—— Westminster, 97
—— Windsor. _See_ Windsor.
Barrell, Sergt:-Major, 310
Barton, Capt: Robert, 336, 337
Bath, Order of, ceremony of investiture, 102;
investitures in Crimea, 265
Bathurst, Lord, 19, 67, 71
Bayonet exercise, 117
Bentinck, Col: C., 118
—— Col: [Sir H.], 128, 140, 171, 216, 233, 266
Berber, 379, 380, 403, etc.
Beresford, Lord C., 382
Berlin Treaty, 338
Bertie, Capt: Hon: G., 336
Bicentenary of Coldstream, 120
Billeting system, 35
Bingham, Maj: Lord [Earl of Lucan], 141
Black Sea neutralized, 278
Blücher, Marshal, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 30, 35
Boat-race, 85
Bombardments of Sevastopol (_see_ Sevastopol), 193, 252, 255, 256,
261
Bonaparte. _See_ Napoleon I.
Bonham, Lt:-Col:, 339, 377
Boscawen, Col: Hon. E. [Viscount Falmouth], 377, 386, 408
Bosphorus, 137
Bosquet, Gen:, 155, 165, 200, 223, 244, 262
Bouverie, Sir H., 79, 83, 85, 86, 88
Bouverie, Capt: H., 227
Bouverie [Pleydell-Bouverie], Lt: G. [Maj:], 411
Bowles, Col: [Sir G.], 114, 117
Brand, Col: [Gen:] Hon. H. [Lord Dacre], 82, 83
Brigade of Guards, 13, 20, 57, 69, 77, 94, 138, 141, 150, 164, 170,
172, 188, 191, 200, 201, 213, 214-217, 220, 245, 246, 248, 251,
257, 267-269, 279, 284, 285, 300, 302, 304, 306, 313, 329, 330,
336, 344, 346, 347, 359, 360, 384, 399, 401, 406, etc.
——, General Officer appointed to command the, 290
Brighton, 97, etc.
Brown, Gen: Sir G., 141, 170
Buckingham House [Palace] Barracks. _See_ Barracks.
Buller, Maj:-Gen:, 170, 210, 212
Buller, Gen: Sir Redvers, 337, 390
Bülow, Gen:, 14, 15
Burghersh, Lt:-Col: Lord [Earl of Westmoreland], 141
Burnaby, Col: F., 385
Butler, Maj: J. A., 146, 147
Byng, Gen: Sir John [F.-M. Earl of Strafford], 8, 13, 21, 88, 122,
284, 285, 303
Byng, Capt: Hon: H., 141
Cambridge, F.-M. H.R.H. Adolphus Duke of, 57, 120, 121
Cambridge, Gen: H.R.H. Prince George [F.-M. Duke] of, 118, 165,
216, 232, 235, 285, 290, 296, 297
Camel Corps, 377, 381, 383, 391, 408
Campbell, Gen: Sir Colin [Lord Clyde], 173, 189, 251, 266, 303, 307
Campbell, Lt:-Col: Hon: H., 141, 172
Campbell, Capt: Hon: R., 336, 337
Canada, 103;
discontent in, 107;
suppression of outbreak, 108;
second outbreak, 110, 111;
legislative union, 112
Canrobert, Gen:, 145, 155, 165, 183, 184, 225, 252, 253
Canteen system, improvements in, 299, 340
Carleton, Col: Dudley [Lord Dorchester], 247, 306, 307, 314
Carnot (1815), 43
Caroline, Queen, 80
Caspian Sea, 159
Castlereagh, Lord, 31
Casualties;
Waterloo campaign, 21;
Alma, 171;
Inkerman, 226;
in Crimea, 290;
Tel el-Kebir, 368;
Abu Klea, 385;
Hashin, 399;
24th March, 1885, 401, 402
Cathcart, Gen: Hon: Sir J., 183, 184, 215, 222
Cato Street Conspiracy, 79
Caucasus, 160
Chapel Royal, Whitehall, 77
Chapel, Royal Military, at Wellington Barracks, 104, 300, 349
Chaplin, Col: T., 116, 118, 120
Charteris, Lt: Hon: Alan, 395
Charteris, Lt: Hon: Alfred, 336
Chartists, 119
Chatham, 76, etc. (_see_ App. xv.)
Chelsea Barracks. _See_ Barracks.
Chichester, 117, etc. (_see_ App. xv.)
Chobham Camp, 128, 296
Cholera, 95, 152, 183, 189, etc.
Cialdini, Gen:, 262
Circassia, 160, 255, 294
Citate, 135
Clarendon, Earl of, 255
Clinton, Gen: Sir H., 48, 88
Clive, Col:, 406
Clyde, Lord. _See_ Campbell, Sir C.
Codrington, Lt: Alfred [Maj:], 357
Codrington, Gen: Sir W., 108, 151, 170, 210, 262, 266, 276, 333,
344
Colborne, Gen: Sir J. [F.-M. Lord Seaton], 107, 111, 112, 128
Coldstream Guards, 8, 12, 13, 32, 48, 55, 69, 76, 84, 87, 100, 105,
107, 112, 117, 128, 154, 208, 213, 224, 245, 299, etc. (_see_
Brigade of Guards)
—— Colours. _See_ Colours.
—— Establishment, (1814 and 1821) 75;
(1854) 195;
(1856) 293;
changes in ’81, 342, 343
—— Name of, 90
—— Officers, lists of, (1815) 23;
in France, (1816) 49;
(1825) 87;
(1837) 99;
in Canada, 108;
(’48) 118;
(1854) 287;
to Crimea, 139;
in Bulgaria, 151;
Inkerman, 213;
(1855) May, 250;
Oct., 266;
and Dec., 274;
(1856) March, 278;
and July, 286;
(1865) 308;
(1871) 316;
(1877) 334;
Egyptian Campaign, 356;
Nile Expedition, 377, 378;
Suakin Campaign, 395;
Dec. ’85, 410
Cole, Gen: Sir L., 48
Colonial troops, 394
Colours, 272, 300, 371, 410
Colville, Gen; Sir Charles, 11, 60
Combermere, Gen: Lord, 48, 84
Connaught, Gen: H.R.H. Duke of, 356, 358
Conolly, Lt: [Col:] 201, 287
Consort, Prince, _See_ Prince Consort.
Convoy, attack on, near Gubat, 391
Convoy, attack on, near Suakin, 24th March, 1885, 401
Cookery, School of, 298
Corporal punishment in the Army, 101
Corry [Lowry-Corry], Hon: H. (_see_ App. xvi.)
Council of Military Education, 296
Cowell, Lt:-Col: 217, 227
Craufurd, Gen:, 281, 285, 304, 307
Crawley, Capt; P. [Col:], 227
Crimea, position of, 161; invasion of, 154. _See_ Crimean War.
Crimean War;
origin, 134;
commenced, 135;
formally declared, 138;
women in camp, 144;
Danube Campaign, 146;
Austrian intervention, 148, 149;
invasion of Crimea, 154;
allied forces, 154;
the Alma, 170;
siege of Sevastopol, 184 ff;
first bombardment, 193;
Balaklava, 197;
Inkerman, 204-230;
the winter 1854-55, 234;
commissariat, 235;
sickness, 241;
fall of Sevastopol, 265;
later operations, 273,274;
conclusion of, 278;
summarized, 288;
(_see_ Sevastopol, etc.)
Croydon, 97, 309, etc.
Cust, Capt:, 174
Cyprus, 355, 406
Dacre, Lord. _See_ Brand.
Dalrymple, Hon: N. 402
Daniell, Col: 247, 250
Dannenberg, Gen:, 210, 212
Davoût, Marshal, 14, 16, 17, 25, 38, 42, 43
Dawson, Lt:-Col: Hon: T. Vesey, 209, 28, 227, 228
Dawson, Capt: [Maj:] Vesey, 390
D’Erlon, Gen:, 12
Deptford, 77, etc.
Devna, Lake of, 152
Digby, Col: Hon: E. [Lord Digby], 334
Disbrowe, Lt:, 227
Dobrudsha, 146, 148, 150
Dongola, 372, 377;
advance to, 380 ff;
evacuated, 407
Dorchester, Lord. _See_ Carleton.
Double Rank, 20, 325, 342
Drummond, Col: Gordon, 150, 247, 250, 300
Drummond, Capt: Hon: R., 260
Dublin, 76, 335, 345, etc. (_see_ App. xv.)
Durham, Earl of, 107, 108, 109, 112
Earle, Maj:-Gen:, 382, 390, 391
Education, Military, Council of, 296
Edward of Saxe-Weimar, Prince. _See_ Saxe-Weimar.
Egypt, 350, 372;
dual control, 352;
British Protectorate, 371
Egyptian Army, 364
Egyptian War, Tel el-Kebir Campaign, 358-367;
Nile Campaign, 372-392;
Suakin Campaign, 393-408
Eliot, Capt: Hon: G., 151, 209, 217, 227
Eupatoria, 163, 244, 274
Evans, Gen: Sir De Lacy, 170, 210
Falconer, A., Quartermaster, 213, 335
Falmouth, Viscount. _See_ Boscawen.
Feilding, Col: Hon: P. [Gen: Sir P.] 151, 213, 227, 314, 315, 334
Feilding, Col: Hon: W. [Gen:], 334
Fenians, 311, 313
Field-Officer in Brigade Waiting, 92, 290, 291
Finsbury, 76, etc.
Fire-service, 106
First Guards. _See_ Grenadier Guards.
FitzClarence, Lt: [Gen: Lord Frederick], 80, 321
FitzRoy, Col: G. [Gen:], 334, 343, 344, 345
FitzRoy, Lt:-Col: Lord Charles [Duke of Grafton], 334, 340
Flank-march round Sevastopol, 181
Fleet in Crimean War, 138, 149, 178, 193, 273;
in Egyptian War, 355, 359
Flogging in the Army, 101
Follett, Col: R. (_see_ App. xvi.)
Forey, Gen:, 155, 165, 187
Forster, Rt: Hon: W. E., 347
Fortescue, Capt: [Lt:-Col:] Cyril, 339, 346
Fortescue, Lt: Hon: A. [Capt:] 411
Fouché, Duc d’Otranto, 7, 16, 17, 29, 42
Franco-Prussian War, 320
Fremantle, Col: [Gen: Sir A. Lyon], 334, 343, 376, 394, 406
Fremantle, Col: J., 90, 104, 105
Gemai, 380
George III., 73, 79
George IV., 69, 79, 81;
coronation, 82;
death, 96
Gevreklek, village of, 152
Ginnis, battle of, 408
Gipps, Gen: [Sir R.], 344, 345
Gladstone, Lt: [Capt: Sir J., Bart:], 395
Godfrey, Mr. [Bandmaster], 307
Gomm, Col: Sir W. [Field-Marshal], 49, 90, 98, 99, 307, 332
Goodlake, Capt: [Col:], 192, 200, 287, 334
Goodram, Private, 276
Gordon, Gen: C. G., 373;
sent to Khartum, 375;
message from, 382;
death, 389
Gordon, Col:, [R.E.], 192
Gortchakoff, Gen: Prince Michael, 134, 146, 148, 212, 226, 260,
261, 272
Graham, Gen: Sir G., 359, 363, 375, 394, 397, 404
Graham, Lance-Sergt:, 20
Graves-Sawle, Col: F., 369, 378
Grenadier Guards, 8, 48, 76, 110, 128, 212, 213, 245, etc. (_See_
Brigade of Guards)
Greville, Lt:, 217, 227
Grouchy, Marshal, 2, 9, 10, 12
Guards, Brigade of. _See_ Brigade of Guards.
—— Camel Corps. _See_ Camel Corps.
—— Club, 106
——, Coldstream. _See_ Coldstream Guards.
—— Depôt, 310
——, First. _See_ Grenadier Guards.
——, Grenadier. _See_ Grenadier Guards.
—— Medical Service. _See_ Medical Service.
——, Scots. _See_ Scots Guards.
——, Scots Fusilier. _See_ Scots Guards.
——, Third. _See_ Scots Guards.
Gubat, 387, 388, 390
Gymnastic training, 297
Halkett, Capt: F., 111
Halkett, Col: J., 213
Hall, Col: Julian [Gen:], 334, 343
Hall, Col: R. S. (_See_ App. xvi.)
Hamilton, Gen: F. [Sir F.], 315
Hamley, Sir E., 214, 358, 361
Handub, 398, 403
Hardinge, Capt: Hon: A. [Gen: Sir A.], 141, 265, 314
Hardinge, Sir H. [Lord Hardinge], 115, 126, 140, 290, 296
Hashin, battle of, 398
Hay, Col: [Gen:], 139, 151
Herbert, Col: I., 356, 378
Hicks Pasha, Gen:, 373
Higginson, Gen: Sir G., 335, 344, 345
Hill, Gen: Lord, 89, 106
Hope, Lt:-Col: Hon. James, 111
Hospital, regimental, 85
Hythe Musketry School, 127, 296
Indian troops, 358, 370, 397, 399, 400
Indigènes, 219, 223
Inkerman, 188;
opposing forces, 205;
the ground, 207;
battle of, 210 ff;
Russian retreat, 225;
losses, 229;
effects, 231
Ireland, 83, 97, 311, 345-348
Ismail Pasha (Khedive), 351
Ismailia, 357, 359
Jackson, Gen: Sir R., 79, 112
Jakdul, 382, 383
Kars, siege and fall of, 274
Kassassin, 361, 363
Kensington Barracks. _See_ Barracks.
Kerich, 161, 253, 255
Khartum, 373, 378;
Gordon sent, 375;
two plans of relief, 379;
fall of, 389
Khedive. _See_ Ismail, and Tewfik.
King’s Mews Barracks. _See_ Barracks.
Kirbekan, battle of, 391
Knightsbridge Barracks. _See_ Barracks.
Korti, 379, 381
Labedoyère, Gen:, 43
Lafayette, 4
La Marmora, Gen:, 254
Lambert, Gen: Sir J., 60, 70
Lambton, Col: A. [Gen:], 343, 401, 406
Lavalette, Gen:, 45
Leaning, Lance-Sergt:, 391
Legge, Capt: Hon: E. [Col:], 312
Lindsay, Gen: Hon: J. [Sir J.], 315
Lindsay, Lt: R. [Lord Wantage], 172, 217
Liprandi, Gen:, 197
Liverpool, Lord, 46
Lloyd, Lt: F. [Maj:], 339, 396
Louis XVIII., 7, 11, 18, 26;
restoration of, 27, 29, 30, 45, 61
Louis Napoleon. _See_ Napoleon III.
Louis-Philippe, 94, 119
Louvre, the, 41
Lovell, Capt: P., 339
Lucan, Gen: Earl of, 188
Lucan, Earl of, _See_ Bingham.
Luders, Gen:, 146, 281
Lyons, Admiral Sir E. [Lord], 178, 184
Macdonald, Marshal, 39
Macdonell, Gen: Sir James, 20, 49, 83, 86, 107, 110, 114
Mackenzie Heights, 181, 196, 261, 272, 281
MacKinnon, Col: D., 49, 55, 59, 98
MacKinnon, Capt: L. D., 189, 209, 227
M’Neill, Gen: Sir J., 395, 399, 400
Magazine barracks. _See_ Barracks
Magill, Surgn: [Surgn: Lt:-Col:], 377, 385
Mahdi, the (Muhammad Ahmad), 373, 374, 375, 408
Maitland, Gen: Sir P., 21, 49, 60
Malakoff, the, 185, 193, 255, 257, 262
Malta, 140
Manœuvres, 329
Medical service of the Brigade, changes in, 340
Menshikoff, Gen: Prince, 167, 168, 175, 181, 185, 196, 205, 231,
245
Metemmeh, 379, 387
Metropolitan police, 94
Military Chapel. _See_ Chapel, R.M.
—— Education, Council of, 296
—— Establishment reduced, 74, 293
—— reforms, (1837-54) 124;
(1871-85) 319-349
—— service, terms of, 322
Militia, 126, 268, 302
Milman, Col: F., 93, 99
Monck, Col: Hon: R., 303
Müffling, Baron, 30, 33
Muhammed Ahmad. _See_ Mahdi
Musketry, 127, 140, 296, 339
Mussa Pasha, 147
Napoleon I., after Waterloo, 1-4;
abdication, 5;
surrender, 2
Napoleon II., 5
Napoleon III., 132, 252, 253, 274, 280, 295, 302
Napoleon, Gen: Prince, 155, 165
Newton, Lt:-Col: W. S., [Gen:], 247, 250, 300, 302, 304
Ney, Marshal, 43
Nicholas I. of Russia, 117, 132, 133, 138, 252
Nightingale, Florence, 240
Nile Expedition, 372-392
Nulli Secundus Club, 92. (_see_ App: viii.)
Omar Pasha, 135, 138, 145, 147, 274
Osman Digna, 374, 380, 397
Otao, 403
Otway, Lt:-Col:, 339
Paris; (1815) provisional government, 7, 13, 16;
convention of St. Cloud, 18;
occupied by allies, 28;
review at, 31;
allies in, 39-41;
Treaty of, 48;
supplementary convention, 52;
(1856) Treaty of, 278
Paulet, Col: [Gen:] Lord F., 114, 233, 246, 250, 302, 304, 307
Paulet, Lord W., 241
Pavloff, Gen:, 211, 212
Pélissier, Marshal, 254, 256, 257, 261, 273
Perceval, Col: Spencer, 247, 250, 302, 304, 306
Perekop, isthmus of, 161, 245
Peronne, Highlanders at, 35
Pirch I., Gen:, 10, 11
Pirbright Camp, 338
Platform-money, 83, 95
Pole-Carew, Capt: [Col:] R., 357, 410
Police, 94
Portman Street Barracks. _See_ Barracks.
Portsmouth, 300
Prince Consort, 122, 126, 128, 285, 296;
death of, 304
Prince Imperial, 280
Prince of Wales; marriage of, 306;
illness, 330
Promotion, 327, 341
Public duties in London, 76, 124, 267, 310, 311
Purchase, abolition of, 324
Queen Caroline. _See_ Caroline.
Queen Victoria. _See_ Victoria.
Raglan, F.-M. Lord, 141, 168, 174, 175, 184, 205, 225, 253, 256,
257
Raikes, Col: W. H., 86
Ramsden, Capt:, 227
Redan, the, 185, 193, 255, 257, 262, 263;
evacuation of, 264
Reform agitation, 93
Reforms of Army, 124, 319-349
Regent, Prince. _See_ George IV.
Regimental hospital, 83
—— transport. _See_ Transport.
Rewards; for Waterloo, 19, 20;
in 1829, and 1836, 100;
in 1843, 125
Richelieu, Duc de, 53, 59
Rokeby, Gen: Lord, 246, 247, 282, 285, 300, 301, 304
Ross-of-Bladensburg, Capt: [Lt:-Col:], 396, 403
Rowley, Lt:-Col: C., 378, 384
Royal Military Chapel. _See_ Chapel, R.M.
Russian Empire, 130;
policy of, 131
St. Arnaud, Marshal, 145, 161, 163, 168, 174, 175, 183
St. Cloud, Convention of, 18
St. George’s Barracks. _See_ Barracks.
St. John’s Wood Barracks. _See_ Barracks.
Sandbag battery, 188, 213-224
Saxe-Weimar, Col: [Gen:] H.S.H. Prince Edward of, 212, 315, 335
Scots Fusiliers. _See_ Scots Guards.
Scots Guards, 8, 76, 87, 95, 128, 213, 245, 375, etc. (_see_
Brigade of Guards)
Scutari, 141, 142;
hospitals at, 240
Seaton, Lord. _See_ Colborne.
Sevastopol, 157;
plan of attack, 163;
disembarkation for, 164;
arrival before, 176;
harbour of, 177;
flank march round, 181;
commencement of siege, 184;
garrison and defences, 185, 186;
distribution of allies, 189;
first bombardment, 193;
Balaklava, 197;
Inkerman, 204-230;
second bombardment, 252;
third, 255;
fourth, 256;
fifth, 261;
sixth, 261;
fall of, 264, 265
Seymour, Lt:-Col: [Gen:] Lord William, 357
Shawe, Col: [Gen:], 104, 108, 118, 123
Shendi, 375, 379
Shorncliffe, 300, 311, 335 (_see_ App. xv.)
Short service system, 322
Silistria, siege of, 146, 147
Simpson, Gen: Sir James, 257, 262, 263, 276
Sinope, battle of, 135
Smoking, customs concerning, 309
Soimonoff, Gen:, 210, 212
Somerset, Col: P., 141
Soult, Marshal, 10, 12, 105
Stanlock, Private, 287
Steele, Gen: Sir T., 141, 170, 304, 306, 307, 344
Stephenson, Gen: Sir F., 128, 141, 151, 246, 335, 376, 377, 408
Stepney [Herbert-Stepney], Col:, 307, 314
Sterling, Col: J. B., 344, 368, 406
Stewart, Lt:-Col: Donald, 375
Stewart, Sir Herbert, Gen:, 368, 381, 382, 383, 386, 388, 389
Stopford, Capt: Hon: F. [Col:], 402
Strafford, Earl of. _See_ Byng.
Stratford de Redcliffe, Lord, 137, 265
Strong, Col:, 314
Strong, Private, 287
Suakin, 373, 374, 379, 397, 398
Suakin Campaign, 393-408
Sub-Lieutenant, rank of, 328, 340
Sudan, 372;
rising in, 373;
war in, 375, etc.;
evacuation of, 407
Suez Canal, 351
Suleiman Pasha, 155
Sultan of Turkey, 132, 134, 137, 314
Sutton, Lt: G., 396, 409
Sydenham, Lord, 112, 114
.sp 1
.ix
Tactics, changes in, 320, 329
Talbot, Lt:-Col. Hon: R., 389
Talleyrand, Prince, 27, 29, 41
Tamai, 398, 399, 402
Tambuk Wells, 397
Tchernaya, battle of, 261
Tel el-Kebir, 357;
Arabi’s position at, 365;
British march on, 366;
battle of, 367
Tel el-Makhuta, 360, 361
Templetown, Viscount. _See_ Upton, G.
Tewfik Pasha (Khedive), 352, 369
T’Hakul, 403
Thieleman, Gen: 9, 10, 11, 15
Third Guards. _See_ Scots Guards.
Thompson, Mr. Paulet. _See_ Sydenham, Lord.
Timofeyeff, Gen:, 226
Todleben, Gen:, 178, 186, 252, 257
Tofrek, battle of, 400, 401
Torrens, Capt: [Gen: Sir Arthur], 107, 222, 321
Tower, Capt: [Col:], 191, 195, 198, 209, 216, 259, 303
Tower of London, 76, 106, etc. (_see_ App. xv.)
Transport, in Crimea, 143, 166, 237, 238, 273
——, Regimental, 329, 338
Troödos, Mt., 406, 409
Uniform, changes in, 91, 270, 315, 340
United States, 114, 294, 304
Upton, Col: Hon: A., 151, 246
Upton, Col: [Gen:] Hon: G., [Viscount Templetown], 151, 171, 213,
222, 233, 246, 302
Vandamme, Gen:, 15
Varna, 143, 145, 153
Victor Emanuel, 295
Victoria, Queen; accession, 100;
coronation, 104;
sympathy with army, 271;
address to Crimean troops, 284
Victoria Cross, 172, 192, 201, 218, 287 (_see_ App. xiii.)
Vienna Note, the, 134
Volunteers, 302, 303
Von Sohr, Lt:-Col:, 15
Walton, Capt: [Col:], 22, 105, 116, 118
Wantage, Lord. _See_ Lindsay.
Warley, 96, 101
Warrant officers introduced, 342
Washington, Treaty of, 114
Waterloo, battle of, 1;
Napoleon after, 2-6;
operations after, 9-15;
political result, 24-27
“Waterloo men,” 19, 20
Wellington, Duke of, 8, 10, 14, 15, 17, 30, 35, 49, 62, 63, 71,
106, 119, 122;
funeral of, 123
Wellington Barracks. _See_ Barracks; and Chapel, R.M.
Wellington Pension, 20
Westmoreland, Earl of. _See_ Burghersh.
Wigram, Col: [Gen:] Godfrey, 343, 344, 356
William IV., 79, 92;
coronation, 95;
death, 100
Willis, Gen: [Sir G.], 356, 360, 368
Willson, Col: M., 378
Wilson, Col: [Gen:] Sir Charles (R.E.), 382, 386, 388
Wilson, Capt: C. T. [Col:], 191, 219, 223, 224
Wilson, Gen: Sir Robert, 45
Wiltshire, Earl of, 395
Wimbledon Camp, 303
Winchester, 116, etc. (_see_ App. xv.)
Winchester, Marquis of. _See_ Wiltshire.
Windsor, 76, 91, etc.;
drag-hounds at, 299 (_see_ App. xv.)
Wolseley, Gen: Lord [F.-M.], 356, 377, 397, 408, etc.
Women in the Crimea, 144
Wood, Gen: Sir Evelyn, 337
Wood, Col: Mark, 306, 307, 314
Woodford, Gen: Sir A., 60, 66, 77, 79, 83, 84, 86, 120
Woolwich, 77, etc.
Wyatt, Dr: J., 276, 279, 332
York, F.-M. H.R.H. Frederick, Duke of, 19, 49, 85;
death of, 88
Zeriba, McNeill’s, 400
Ziethen, Gen:, 15, 16, 64
THE END.
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, LONDON AND BECCLES.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transcriber’s Note
On p. 40, there seems to be a confusion of footnoting. There are
three references to footnotes, one of which, a †, is repeated. The
repeated anchors correspond to two separate passages in Gronow’s
_Reminiscences_. The second phrase in the first note, as printed, is
therefore assigned its own anchor, referring to the first citation
from Gronow, and eliminating the repetition.
The repeated column headings of long tables, spanning pages, have
been removed.
On pages 195 and #293, a wide table was reformatted, rotating the
rows and columns to fit this medium. The same has been done for the
two tables in Appendix XI.
In Appendix XII, a table spanning pp 441 & 442 has been re-organized
for the same reason.
In Appendix XVI, a footnote, first appearing on p. 470, is
repeatedly referenced on subsequent pages. These redundant notes
have been removed, and all references to the note in the table refer
to that first instance.
Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected,
and are noted here. When apparent errors occur in quoted material,
the lapse is noted but the original retained. The references are to
the page and line in the original.
10.31 of the northern frontier[.] Added.
25.28 _Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xiv. 632, Removed.
633.[)]
28.24 without any display[.] Added.
43.13 on the 19th of August[,/.] Replaced.
181.39 as it was, we [j]ust happened to drive Restored.
255.11 by a fierce can[n]onade Inserted.
253.13 the English, 265.[”] Added.
275.1 Captain Lord E. Cecil[;] Added.
281.41 the appearance of a ‘Field of blood. blood.’ Added.
326.42 to serve their own purposes[,/.] Replaced.
343.16 Ser[j/g]eants-Major Replaced.
366.30 the direction of their march[,/.] Replaced.
380.26 a short ac[c]ount> of the obstacles Inserted.
417.10 the Quartermaster-General’s [Department’s of _sic_
Division]
432.1 1841. _sic_: prob.
1842
461.12 Charles Antonio F[re/er]dinand Bentinck Transposed.
The following corrections are mentioned in the 'Corrigenda' section,
and we have obliged the printer by making them.
86.31 May 2[5/7]th Replaced.
90.13 May 1[5/6]th, 1829 Replaced.
118.12 November [13/9]th Replaced.
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