The PanGerman Plot Unmasked - Berlin's formidable peace-trap of 'the drawn war'

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Title: The PanGerman Plot Unmasked - Berlin's formidable peace-trap of 'the drawn war'
Author: Chéradame, André
Language: English
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THE PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED

THE PANGERMAN PLOT
UNMASKED

BERLIN’S FORMIDABLE PEACE-TRAP OF
“THE DRAWN WAR”

BY
ANDRÉ CHÉRADAME

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
THE EARL OF CROMER, O.M.

WITH MAPS

NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS
1917

_All Rights Reserved_

[Illustration]

PUBLISHER’S NOTE

As will be understood from the author’s preface, M. Chéradame’s book
was published in Paris in the summer of this year, before the important
occurrences in the Balkans accompanying and following Roumania’s entrance
into the war. In issuing this translation no consideration of these
events has been added; but their bearing on M. Chéradame’s forecast will
be noted by the reader.

The maps have been reproduced direct from the French edition, without
translating the names into English, as they answer their purpose
perfectly well in their present form.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION BY LORD CROMER xiii

AUTHOR’S PREFACE xix

PROLOGUE

PANGERMAN AND WILLIAM II. 1

I. The Pangerman Doctrine, p. 1.—II. The Kaiser as

CHAPTER I

THE PANGERMAN PLAN 11

I. The Pangerman plan of 1911, p. 11.—II. The stages by
which it has been effected, p. 16.—III. Why it has been
ignored, p. 19.

CHAPTER II

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 26

I. Why the Treaty of Bukarest suddenly raised a formidable
obstacle to the Pangerman plan, p. 26.—II. How it was that
the internal state of Austria-Hungary drove Germany to let
loose the dogs of war, p. 31.—III. General view of the
causes of the war, p. 37.

CHAPTER III

HOW FAR THE PANGERMAN PLAN WAS CARRIED OUT AT THE BEGINNING
OF 1916 45

I. German pretensions in the West, p. 45.—II. German
pretensions in the East, p. 52.—III. German pretensions in
the South and South-East, p. 56.—IV. General view of the
execution of the Pangerman plan from 1911 to the beginning
of 1916, p. 62.

CHAPTER IV

SPECIAL FEATURES GIVEN TO THE WAR BY THE PANGERMAN PLAN 66

I. All the great political questions of the old world are
raised and must be solved, p. 67.—II. As the war is made by
Germany in order to achieve a gigantic scheme of slavery,
it follows that it is waged by her in flagrant violation of
international law, p. 69.—III. A struggle of tenacity and
of duplicity on the side of Berlin _versus_ constancy and
solidarity on the side of the Allies, p. 71.

CHAPTER V

THE DODGE OF THE “DRAWN GAME” AND THE SCHEME “FROM HAMBURG TO
THE PERSIAN GULF” 77

I. What would really be the outcome of the dodge called
the “Drawn Game,” p. 78.—II. The financial consequences
for the Allies of this so-called “Drawn Game,” p. 83.—III.
The Allies and the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf,” p. 88.—IV. Panislamic and Asiatic consequences
of the achievement of the scheme “from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf,” p. 94.—V. Consequences for the world of the
achievement of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf,” p. 100.

CHAPTER VI

THE CRUCIAL POINT OF THE WHOLE PROBLEM 108

I. The obligation which the threat of the scheme “from
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” imposes on the Allies,
p. 108.—II. The capital importance of the question of
Austria-Hungary, p. 114.—III. All the racial elements
necessary for the destruction of the Pangerman plan exist
in Central Europe, p. 121.

CHAPTER VII

THE BALKANS AND THE PANGERMAN PLAN 131

I. The connexion between the Pangerman plan and the plan
of Bulgarian supremacy, p. 132.—II. Greece and Pangerman
ambitions, p. 146.—III. Roumania and the Pangerman plan, p.
152.

CHAPTER VIII

GERMAN MANŒUVRES TO PLAY THE ALLIES THE TRICK OF THE “DRAWN
GAME,” THAT IS, TO SECURE THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE
“HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN GULF” SCHEME AS THE MINIMUM RESULT
OF THE WAR 158

I. The exceptional importance of the economic union of
the Central Empires, and the danger for the Allies of
establishing a connexion between that union and their own
economic measures after the war, p. 159.—II. Reasons for
the Turko-German dodge of making a separate peace between
the Ottoman empire and the Allies, p. 167.—III. Why a
separate and premature peace with Bulgaria would play the
Pangerman game, p. 174.

CHAPTER IX

THE STILL NEUTRAL STATES WHOSE INDEPENDENCE WOULD BE DIRECTLY
THREATENED BY THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE “HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN
GULF” SCHEME AND THEREFORE BY GERMANY’S CAPTURE OF
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 183

I. The example of Portugal, p. 183.—II. Holland, p.
187.—III. Switzerland, p. 191.—IV. The States of South
America, p. 193.—V. The United States, p. 198.

CONCLUSIONS

What has been set forth in the preceding nine chapters appears
to justify the following conclusions 213

MAPS

PAGE

The Poles in the East of Germany 1

The Danes in Prussia 2

The Germans and the non-Germans in Austria-Hungary 3

The Pangerman plan of 1911 12

The Antigermanic barrier in the Balkans after the treaty of
Bukarest (10th August, 1913) 28

The nationalities in Austria-Hungary 32

The three barriers of Antigermanic peoples in the Balkans and in
Austria-Hungary 43

The German claims in the West (beginning of 1916) 46

The German claims in the East 53

The German claims in the South and South-East 57

The plan of 1911 and the extent of its execution at the beginning
of 1916 64

The great political questions raised by the war 68

The German fortress at the beginning of 1916 72

The consequences of the dodge called “The Drawn Game” 79

Asiatic consequences of the accomplishment of the scheme “From
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” 95

World-wide consequences of the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf”
scheme, as provided for by the plan of 1911 101

The crucial point of the European problem 113

Great Bulgaria 133

Serbian Macedonia 137

Greece after the treaty of Bukarest 147

Great Roumania 153

The nationalities in Turkey 170

Encroachments planned by Bulgaria on neighbouring States 181

Portugal and Colonial Pangermanism 185

The Neutral States of Europe and Pangermanism 188

Colonial Pangermanism and South America 194

Distribution of German-born Germans in the United States 201

Relation between the Pangerman plan of 1911 and the Pangerman
gains at the beginning of 1916 217

The Pangerman gains at the beginning of 1916 223

European States interested in the solution of the Austro-Hungarian
question 231

The States of Asia and America, interested in the solution of the
Austro-Hungarian question 233

INTRODUCTION.

BY THE EARL OF CROMER, O.M.

My reasons for commending M. Chéradame’s most instructive work to the
earnest attention of my countrymen and countrywomen are three-fold.

In the first place, M. Chéradame stands conspicuous amongst that very
small body of politicians who warned Europe betimes of the German danger.
The fact that in the past he proved a true prophet gives him a special
claim to be heard when he states his views as regards the present and the
future.

In the second place, I entertain a strong opinion that M. Chéradame’s
diagnosis of the present situation is, in all its main features, correct.

In the third place, in spite of the voluminous war literature which
already exists, I greatly doubt whether the special aspect of the case
which M. Chéradame wishes to present to the public is fully understood in
this country; neither should I be surprised to hear from those who are
more qualified than myself to speak on the subject that the same remark
applies, though possibly in a less degree, to the public opinion of
France.

It is essential that, before the terms of peace are discussed, a clear
idea should be formed of the reasons which led the German Government
to provoke this war. It is well that, if such a course be at all
possible, those who are personally responsible for the numerous acts of
barbarity committed by the Germans should receive adequate punishment.
But attention to points of this sort, however rational and meritorious,
should not in any degree be allowed to obscure the vital importance
of the permanent political issues which call loudly for settlement.
Otherwise, it is quite conceivable that a peace may be patched up, which
may have some specious appearance of being favourable to the Allies,
but which would at the same time virtually concede to the Germans all
they require in order, after time had been allowed for recuperation, to
renew, with increased hope of success, their attempts to shatter modern
civilization and to secure the domination of the world.

M. Chéradame explains—and I believe with perfect accuracy—the nature of
the German objective. It is, in his opinion, to lay secure and stable
foundations for the system known as Pan-Germanism. What is Pan-Germanism?
It may be doubted whether all that is implied in that term is fully
realized in this country. One interpretation may be given to the word,
which is not merely innocuous, but which may even reasonably appeal
to the sympathies of those who approve of the new map of Europe being
constituted with a view to applying that nationalist principle, which
finds almost universal favour in all democratic countries. It cannot be
too distinctly understood that the political programme now advocated by
Germany has no sort of affinity with a plan of this sort. The Germans
contend not only that all those who are generally denominated Germans by
the rest of the world should be united, but that all who are of what is
termed “German origin” should be brought into the German fold. Moreover,
they give to this latter phrase an expansion and a signification which
is condemned and derided by all who have paid serious attention to
ethnological studies. This, however, is far from stating the whole case.
The object of the German Government is to effect the whole or partial
Germanization of countries inhabited by races which cannot, by any
conceivable ethnological process of reasoning, be held to be of German
stock. In fact, M. Chéradame very correctly describes Pan-Germanism when
he says that its object is to disregard all questions of racial and
linguistic affinity and to absorb huge tracts of country the possession
of which is considered useful to advance Hohenzollern interests. In other
words, what they wish is to establish, under the name of Pan-Germanism, a
world system whose leading and most immediate feature is the creation of
an empire stretching from the Persian Gulf to the North Sea.

That this project has for a long while past been in course of preparation
by the Kaiser and his megalomaniac advisers cannot for a moment be
doubted. When, in November, 1898, William II. pronounced his famous
speech at Damascus, in which he stated that all the three hundred
millions of Mohammedans in the world could rely upon him as their
true friend, the world was inclined to regard the utterance as mere
rhodomontade. It was nothing of the sort. It involved the declaration of
a definite and far-reaching policy, the execution of which was delayed
until a favourable moment occurred and, notably, until the Kiel Canal was
completed. The whole conspiracy very nearly succeeded. In spite of their
careful attention to detail, their talent for organization, and their
elaborate preparations to meet what appears to them every contingency
which may occur, the Germans seem to have a constitutional inability to
grasp the motives which guide the inhabitants of other countries. A very
close analogy to the mistake made by the Kaiser is to be found in an
incident of recent English history. It is alleged, I know not with what
truth, that when, in 1886, Lord Randolph Churchill resigned his position
as Chancellor of the Exchequer in Lord Salisbury’s administration, he
“forgot Goschen,” who, as it will be remembered, was speedily nominated
to succeed him. The Kaiser forgot England. For various reasons, which are
too well-known to require repetition, he and his advisers were firmly
convinced that England would not join in the war. The programme was,
first, to destroy the power of France and Russia, and then, after that
had been done, to fall upon England. In one sense it was fortunate that
the Germans committed the gross international crime of invading Belgium.
Had they not done so, it is quite possible that the English nation would
not have woke up to the realities of the situation. As it was, however,
it became clear, even to the most extreme pacificists, that honour and
interest alike pointed to the necessity of decisive action. Thus as M.
Chéradame indicates, the original German plan was completely upset.
The advance on Paris had to be stayed. But the programme, which was
the result of long and deliberate contemplation, has by no means been
abandoned. On the contrary, with the adhesion of the Bulgarians, who
will eventually, unless the Allies secure a decisive victory, become the
victims of Pan-Germanism, and also that of the Turks, who were manœuvred
into the war by an adroit and absolutely unscrupulous diplomacy, a very
considerable portion of the plan has already been put into execution.

M. Chéradame states with great reason that France, Italy, Russia,
England, and all the minor Powers are vitally interested in frustrating
the German project of establishing their dominion from the Persian Gulf
to the North Sea. He also warns us against making a separate peace with
either Austria-Hungary or Turkey, both of these Powers being merely
vassals of Germany. He is very clearly of opinion that the mere cession
of Alsace-Lorraine to France and the rehabilitation of Belgium cannot
form the foundations of a durable peace. If peace were concluded on this
basis, the Germans would have achieved their main object, and, as Herr
Harden pointed out last February, even if Germany was obliged, under
pressure, to cede Alsace-Lorraine, there would still be seventy millions
of Germans firmly determined to regain possession of those provinces at
the first suitable opportunity. In fact, the realization of the German
project, although accompanied by certain temporary disabilities from the
German point of view, would eventually enable Germany to strangle Europe.

I need not dwell upon all the proposals set forth by M. Chéradame
with a view to the frustration of this plan, but the corner-stone of
his programme is similar to that advocated with great ability in this
country by Mr. Wickham Steed and Mr. Seton Watson. It is to create a
Southern Slav State, which will afford an effectual barrier to German
advance towards the East. It is essential that the immense importance of
dealing with the territories of the Hapsburgs as a preliminary to a final
settlement of all the larger aspects of the Eastern question should be
fully realized. It constitutes the key of the whole situation.

For these reasons, I hope that M. Chéradame’s work, which develops
more fully the arguments which I have very briefly stated above, will
receive in this country the attention which it certainly merits. I
should add that the book is written in a popular style, and that M.
Chéradame’s arguments can be easily followed by those who have no special
acquaintance either with Eastern policy or with the tortuous windings of
Austrian and German diplomacy during the last quarter of a century.

CROMER.

SEPTEMBER 4, 1916.

PREFACE.

The Pangerman plot is the only cause of the war. It is, in fact, the
cause at once of its outbreak and of its prolongation till that victory
of the Allies has been won which is indispensable to the liberty of the
world. In this book I propose to demonstrate this truth by a series of
documents, precise, clear, and intelligible to all. The fate of every
man in the allied countries, and even in some of the countries which
are still neutral, really depends on the issue of the formidable war
now being waged. This cataclysm, unprecedented in history, let loose
by Prussianized Germany, will have infinite reverberations in every
sphere, reverberations which will affect every one of us individually
for good or, alas! too often for ill. Every one, therefore, has a direct
interest in knowing clearly why these inevitable reverberations of the
immense struggle will be produced, and on what fundamental conditions
those of them which bode ill for the Allies, and are yet but imperfectly
understood, can and must be avoided. Hence every one of the Allies should
acquire an exact notion of the present realities. Once fortified by the
evidence, his opinion will become a force for the Allied Governments;
it will then contribute to the victory and to the imposition of the
conditions necessary for the peace.

In writing this popular book my aim has been to bring home, even to those
who are least versed in foreign affairs, the formidable problems raised
by the war. In my opinion this work is addressed to women quite as much
as to men. The reading of it may perhaps bring not only instruction but
consolation to those whose affections have been so cruelly wounded. When
they comprehend better by what an atrocious plan of slavery the world
is threatened, they will understand more fully for what a sublime, what
a stupendous cause their husbands, their sons, their plighted lovers,
are fighting or dying with such heroic self-sacrifice. May that larger
understanding of the formidable events now occurring yield to the women
of the Allies at least some alleviation of their sufferings.

But if this book is a popular work, I beg my readers to remark that it
is not the result of a hasty effort, vamped up by a mere desire to treat
of the moving, the tragic subject of the hour. The book is, indeed,
the logical conclusion of a labour on which I have been engaged for
twenty-one years. As my readers have an interest in knowing how far they
may trust me, they will allow me to explain to them how I was led to
concentrate my studies on the Pangerman policy of Germany, what has been
the result of my efforts, and how they are linked together.

* * * * *

In former days I was the pupil of Albert Sorel at the Free School of
Political Science. That great master was good enough to admit me to his
intimacy; and he brought to light and maturity the latent and instinctive
propensity which I had for foreign politics. My practical studies abroad
led me to Germany in 1894, just at the time when the Pangerman _movement_
had begun. As the movement was manifestly the modern development of the
Prussianism of the Hohenzollerns, I was then extremely struck by its
importance. The movement appeared to me so threatening for the future
that I resolved to follow all the developments of the Pangerman _plot_,
which was already the consequence of the movement, and which from 1895
onward had taken definite shape. The task which I thus laid on myself
was at once arduous, vast, and thrilling, for from that time it was
certain that the Germans based their political and military Pangerman
plan on a study of all the political, ethnographical, economic, social,
military and naval problems not only of Europe but of the whole world.
In truth, the intense labour accomplished in the cause of Pangermanism
by the Germans in the last twenty-one years has been colossal. They have
carried it out everywhere with a formidable tenacity and a methodical
thoroughness which will be the astonishment of history. Indisputably, the
Pangerman plan, which is the result of this gigantic effort, is the most
extraordinary plot which the world has ever witnessed.

I made the study of that plot for twenty-one years the work of my life,
convinced as I was, in spite of the scepticism which long greeted my
efforts to give warning of the peril, that the study would serve a useful
purpose one day.

The study has necessitated very many and very long journeys of inquiry. I
was obliged in fact to go and learn, on the spot, at least the essential
elements of the complex problems mentioned above, which have been the
base of the Pangerman plan, in order that I might be able to grasp the
most distant ramifications of the Prussian programme for dominating the
world.

This obligation led me to sojourn in very different countries. That the
reader may have an idea of at least the material extent of my inquiries,
I will indicate the number of the towns in which I have been led to work
for the purpose of discovering the constituent elements, direct and
indirect, of the Pangerman plan.

The United States, 14; Canada, 11; Japan, 11; Corea, 4; China, 11;
Indo-China, 19; British India, 24; Spain, 1; Italy, 4; Belgium,
6; Luxemburg, 1; Holland, 5; Switzerland, 4; England, 8; Greece,
2; Bulgaria, 4; Roumania, 3; Serbia, 8; Turkey, 3; Germany, 16;
Austro-Hungary, 18.

In these towns, according to the requirement of my studies, I passed
days, weeks, or months, often on repeated occasions. I endeavoured, so
far as the opportunities and the time admitted of it, to enter into
direct relations with the acting ministers, the leaders of the various
political parties, the diplomatists and the consuls, both French and
foreign, some heads of states, influential journalists, officers of
repute, military and naval attachés, well-informed merchants and
manufacturers. It was thus that, by means of information of many sorts
drawn from the most diverse sources, and checked by comparison with each
other, I have attempted to set forth the Pangerman political and military
plan.

Since 1898 I have endeavoured to draw the attention of the public to the
immense danger which that plan was laying up for the world, as my former
works testify, particularly _L’Europe et la Question d’Autriche au seuil
du XXe Siècle_, which appeared in 1901, therefore fifteen years ago, and
contained an exposition, as precise as it was then possible to make it,
of the Pangerman plan of 1895, summed up in the formula “Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf”; also _Le Chemin de fer de Bagdad_, published in 1903,
wherein I set forth the danger of that co-operation between Germany and
Turkey, which was then only nascent, but which we see full-fledged to-day.

I attempted also by numerous lectures to diffuse among the public some
notion of the Pangerman peril. I did not content myself with warning
my countrymen. I am proud to have been one of the first Frenchmen to
preach a cordial understanding between France and England at a time
when there was perhaps some merit in doing so. I deemed it, therefore,
a duty to inform the British public, so far as it lay in my power, that
the Pangerman peril concerned Great Britain quite as much as France. In
1909 the Franco-Scottish Society kindly invited me to lecture to its
members at Edinburgh, Glasgow and Aberdeen. I seized the opportunity, and
took for the subject of my lectures, “The problem of Central Europe and
universal politics.”

_The Aberdeen Free Press_, of May 8th, 1909, summed up very exactly as
follows the substance of what I said, seven years ago, to my British
hearers:

“ ... The lecturer attached enormous importance to the Pan-German
movement, which he regarded as the decisive factor in the situation,
and he pointed out that the propaganda which had gone on in Germany and
in Austria was part of a great policy to extend the boundaries of the
German State and dominate middle and south-eastern Europe. The _rapport
personnel_ established in recent years between Berlin and Vienna pointed,
he said, to the conclusion that Germany and Austria were working hand in
hand. In the recent Balkan crisis he described Aehrenthal as playing a
_partie de poker_, in which his bluff had been crowned with success. The
off-set to the Pan-German movement was to be found in the Triple Entente
between England, France and Russia, and it followed from a consideration
of European politics that the questions confronting England with regard
to the supremacy of the sea were intimately bound up with the question
which concerned the land powers of Europe. In particular, the speaker
thought that the Pan-German aspirations would be effectually combatted by
the growing social and political development of the various minor Slav
peoples in the south-east of Europe. The development of these peoples was
a thing which it was with the interests of England, France and Russia to
encourage to the utmost.”

My Scottish hearers gave me a very kind reception, of which I have
preserved a lively recollection. But truth compels me to declare that I
had the impression that the great majority of them did not believe me. I
strongly suspect that they then saw in me simply a Frenchman, who, moved
by the spirit of revenge, tried above all to stir up the British public
against Germany. The impression did not discourage me any more than many
similar instances of want of success. In 1911 the Central Asian Society
did me the honour of inviting me to express my views in London (22nd
March) on the Bagdad railway. I used this fresh opportunity to expound
a method of Franco-English co-operation which seemed to me necessary to
parry the dangers of the near future.

“Such is,” I then said, “broadly speaking, the affair of Bagdad. The most
moderate conclusion which, in my judgment, inevitably follows is that
from beginning to end the logical and methodical spirit of Germany has
got the better of the French, English, and Russian interests, which have
been compromised by our slowness to grasp the importance of the problem
confronting us, and by the lamentable want of cohesion between the
diplomacies of the three countries.

“The lesson apparently to be drawn from these considerations is, that for
the future we ought no longer to be satisfied with a hand-to-mouth policy
and with seeking solutions only when the difficulties take an acute form.

“If we wish to serve and defend our interests effectually, we must, as
Talleyrand said, keep the future in mind, and learn something of that
German method of which the good results are incontestable.

“So far as the eye can range to the visible political horizon, the
essential interests of England, France, and Russia are in agreement;
it is, therefore, to all appearance, absolutely necessary that the men
who exercise an influence on public opinion in this country, in France,
and in Russia, should enter into personal relations in order to discuss
the great national interests which they have in common, and to adopt a
useful line of conduct, while there is yet time. Such a course would be
effectual, because it would be determined before the decisive events
instead of after them, that is to say, when it is too late.

“Were we to adopt this method, which after all is very simple, the
future attempts of our adversaries against our interests would encounter
effectual obstacles, and we should no longer have to regret miscarriages
such as those of which the Bagdad affair is an example.”

Has the method thus recommended been followed? Apparently not; otherwise
could France and England have been surprised by the war?

My propaganda having had little practical result, I endeavoured at least
to keep myself well informed of the events that were happening.

In December, 1913, and January, February, and March, 1914, I made new
and minute inquiries in Central Europe, the Balkans, and Turkey, and
these inquiries were of particular value to me. The truth is, that the
treaty of Bukarest of August 10th, 1913, by reason of its far-reaching
and important consequences, had completely upset the former state of
affairs, so much so that without my journey of 1914, I should certainly
have been unable to understand the new situation. In the course of my
journey I set myself to apply, with great rigour, my method of research,
which consists essentially in trying to see the situations as they are,
without preconceived ideas, while listening to all opinions in order to
compare them afterwards and extract, if possible, the average truth.
In Serbia, in Greece, in Turkey, in Roumania, in Bulgaria, where for a
long time I had been in personal relations with people of many different
sorts, I was able to have long talks with persons in the most diverse
walks of life. In particular, I had the good fortune to be graciously
received by the sovereigns and princes of the Balkans: King Peter of
Serbia (23rd December, 1913), Prince Alexander, heir of Serbia (December,
1913), King Constantine (25th January, 1914), Prince Nicholas of Greece
(28th January), King Charles of Roumania (18th February), Tsar Ferdinand
(28th February), Prince Boris, heir of Bulgaria (29th February). If I
record the audiences which these high personages were so good as to grant
me, it is because they were really not commonplace. These sovereigns
and princes knew that I had long studied their country impartially, and
they consented to speak with me of the great interests which guided
their policies. During these various audiences, which lasted from half
an hour to two hours, I heard many points of view of real importance set
forth. No doubt each of my various interlocutors only said to me what he
wished to say; but, thanks to the multiplicity of the opinions expressed
and to the variety of my sources of information, I was able at least to
construct a general picture of the true Balkan situation, and to connect
it afterwards with the problem of Central Europe and the general policy
of Germany.

This inquiry, which in returning I completed in Hungary and Austria,
convinced me that, contrary to the opinion which has been held down to
quite recent times in many Allied circles, the treaty of Bukarest by no
means constituted an injustice, as the Allies have supposed—a belief
which has been the source of most of their mistakes in the Balkans in
1915. On the contrary, the treaty of Bukarest, particularly because it
for the first time drew Roumania out of the German orbit, appeared to
me the most astonishingly favourable event which had happened on the
Continent since 1870, and which was entirely in accordance with the
interests of France, England, and Russia. The consequences of this treaty
formed in fact, as we shall see, the most effectual arrangement that
could be conceived for arresting the Pangerman danger and maintaining
peace in Europe. But this pacific dam to keep back the Pangerman flood
was only possible on condition that the Entente powers held themselves
ready for war, which would probably have sufficed to prevent it, and
that at the same time they resolutely and unanimously supported Greece,
Roumania, and Serbia.

On the other hand, the check which the treaty of Bukarest gave to the
Pangerman plan in Europe, appeared to me so pregnant with consequences
that I considered it highly probable that the Government of Vienna,
instigated by that of Berlin, would not shrink from war for the purpose
of undoing the treaty of Bukarest, with its far-reaching effects, at the
earliest possible moment, unless the other powers put themselves on their
guard. On my return to France I tried to explain the imminence of the
danger, but no one would believe it.

In truth, German aggression caught the present Allied countries napping
for the following fundamental reason. No doubt, before the war,
Pangermanism, as a doctrine, was well enough known in some circles, but
the political and military Pangerman plan, the application of which has
been pursued methodically by the government of Berlin since the opening
of hostilities, had not been studied and taken very seriously except by
an extremely small number of private persons in France, England, and
Russia.

The efforts made by these private persons to convince the men at the helm
in the now Allied countries of the awful danger ahead, were vain. The
principal reason why their warnings fell unheeded was this. When by the
help of documents they explained that William II.’s ultimate aim was the
establishment of German supremacy on the ruins of _all_ the great powers,
they were taken for crazy dreamers, so chimerical did such formidable
projects appear.

That is why among the Allies the political and military Pangerman plot
was ignored in its true character and its extent, down to the outbreak
of war. This lack of knowledge in France is proved by a statement in
_Le Temps_ of 16th December, 1915. Before the war, “we did not believe
in the possibility of a war, and we took no pains to prepare for that
redoubtable event.” It was absolutely the same in England, as was
demonstrated by the complete surprise of Great Britain at the German
aggression.

More than that, the Kaiser’s entire plan has continued to be
misunderstood in the Allied countries down to a date which seems quite
recent. In fact, Sir Edward Carson, when explaining his resignation in
the House of Commons, November 2nd, 1915, said: “I hope that the new plan
of campaign has been definitely settled, for while I was a member of the
Cabinet, the Cabinet had no plan” (quoted by _Le Temps_, 4th November,
1915).

But if the Pangerman plan had been known in London, the English and
consequently the French would certainly have long ago adopted the
counter-plan which could not have failed to destroy it; for the
Pangerman plan consists of such definite and precise elements that the
mere recognition of them at once suggests the means of frustrating
it; in particular, the advantages and the necessity of the Salonika
expedition, which has been so sharply opposed and so tardily undertaken,
would have been understood from the beginning of 1915, when M. Briand
recommended it in principle. Besides, as anybody may convince himself,
if the Pangerman plan had been fully known, it is highly probable that
the Allies would never have perpetrated the blunders which they have
committed in the Balkans, the Dardanelles, and Serbia. It appears that
the magnitude of the Pangerman plan, and particularly the part which is
masked behind the pretended “drawn game,” has not even yet been clearly
apprehended in many circles which imagine themselves well acquainted
with the aims pursued by Germany in the war. In fact, quite recently,
in France and in England, certain important organs, though not, it is
true, of an official character, have argued that since Germany means to
extend her _Zollverein_ to Austria-Hungary, the Allies ought to form a
powerful economic league with the view of combatting the Austro-German
union _after the war_. But as we shall see, the question really could
not, except by some deplorable inadvertence, be stated in these terms
in the Allied countries. No connexion should be voluntarily established
by them between the economic union of the Allies, however natural it
may be, and the economic union of Central Europe. In truth, to permit
the future extension of the German _Zollverein_ to Austria-Hungary, in
other words, to acquiesce in that economic alliance, under any form,
between the two Central empires, which has formed the base and condition
of the whole Pangerman plot for twenty-one years (the plot of 1895),
would be to permit implicitly the seizure by Germany of fifty millions
of inhabitants, of whom nearly three-fourths are not Germans; the
inevitable consequence, as I shall prove, would be to accept the German
supremacy over the Balkans and Turkey. Now it is manifest that such
results would be in absolute contradiction to the declarations of the
Allied governments, which have proclaimed that their object in waging the
war has been to destroy Prussian militarism and not, consequently, to
allow such a new state of things as the seizure, direct or indirect, of
Austria-Hungary by Germany, which would multiply her power ten-fold.

The fact that such “inadvertences” can still be committed, after twenty
months of war, in circles which, though not official, are nevertheless
important, suffices to prove that the widest possible publicity of the
Pangerman plot throughout the great masses of the enlightened public in
the Allied countries is really needful, if not indispensable. It is also
extremely desirable that neutrals should know exactly what the Pangerman
plot is in its nature and in its extent. In particular, those Americans
who imagine that they can stand aloof from the present formidable
conflict, will then clearly understand that their future liberty really
depends on the victory of the Allied soldiers, who are fighting not only
for their own independence, but in reality for the independence of the
whole civilized world, and particularly for that of the United States.

I earnestly trust that the English edition of this book may contribute to
bring about this result. Its object is to inform public opinion exactly,
so far as the English tongue is spoken, as to the Berlin plot for the
domination of the globe. Moreover, an exact knowledge of the Pangerman
political and military plot throws a flood of light on all the essential
problems of the war: it brings out the deep-seated cause of the war; it
explains the immediate causes, which are still almost unknown; it shows
why it is indispensable to the freedom of the world that the Allies
should achieve, not a hollow and treacherous peace, but a complete
victory resulting in the destruction of Prussian militarism, which alone
can put an end to the great armaments in Europe and ensure a really
lasting peace.

In order that the demonstration may be as convincing as possible, I shall
refrain, as far as I can, from giving my readers my own personal opinions
and impressions. I shall do my utmost, above all, to lay before them
exact documents and arguments intelligible to all, thus furnishing them
with facts which will enable them to form a judgment for themselves.

In any case, this work has no other aim than to speak the truth, and to
serve a cause the justice of which will appear more and more manifest to
a world long deceived by the energetic and astute propaganda of Germany.

_5th August, 1916._

PROLOGUE.

PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM II.

I. The Pangerman Doctrine.

II. The Kaiser as originator of the Pangerman plan.

The Germans are truly methodical people. In every department of life
their plans are based on a theory; it may be a true one or a false
one, but once they have conceived it they forge ahead with bull-dog
tenacity. It is therefore necessary for us to grasp the exact meaning
of the Pangerman doctrine, for the whole universal Pangerman plot, both
political and military, springs from that tenet.

[Illustration: THE POLES IN THE EAST OF GERMANY.]

It might be supposed that the expression Pangermanism embodies the theory
in virtue of which the Germans claim to annex only the regions inhabited
by dense masses of Germans, on the borders of the Empire, which, after
all, would be in accordance with the principle of nationalities.

But Pangermanism has by no means such a restricted and legitimate aim.
Again, it might be thought that its object was to gather within the same
political fold the peoples who are more or less Germanic by origin.
Such a claim would of itself be quite inadmissible. But Pangermanism is
more than that. It is really the doctrine, of purely Prussian origin,
which aims at annexing all the various regions, irrespective of race or
language, of which the possession is deemed useful to the power of the
Hohenzollerns.

[Illustration: THE DANES IN PRUSSIA.]

It was in the name of Pangermanism, a theory bred of cupidity and
wanton greed, that Prussia charged the Parliament of Frankfort to
claim as German lands the Eastern Provinces, where in reality the Slavs
predominate to such an extent, that they still contain a population of
about four million Poles.

It was in the name of Pangermanism that in 1864 Prussia seized that part
of Schleswig which was entirely Danish.

[Illustration: THE GERMANS AND THE NON-GERMANS IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.]

It is in the name of Pangermanism that Austria-Hungary has been for long
the object of German covetousness, although the Germans in that country
are in a very small minority. Statistics show 12 millions of Germans
against 38 millions of non-Germans, and that must be above the mark, for
we have to remember that German statistics systematically exaggerate the
number of Germans dwelling in the Hapsburg Monarchy.

Already in 1859 the _Augsburg Gazette_ avowed the object of Germany’s
designs on Austria with absolute cynicism:

“We loudly declare that if Austria[1] were not a member of the
Confederation; if it were not Austria who happened to be the legitimate
owner of these non-German regions, it would be the duty of the German
nation to conquer them at all costs, because they are absolutely
necessary for her development and for her position as a great power.”

The future Marshal von Moltke, also inspired by Pangermanism, had
written, as far back as 1844: “We hope that Austria will uphold the
rights and protect the future of the Danube lands, and that Germany will
finally succeed in keeping open the mouth of her great rivers” (see V.
Moltke _Schriften_, t. II., p. 313).

The author of a pamphlet published in 1895, _i.e._ exactly twenty-one
years ago, inspired by this doctrine of fraud and protected by the
_Alldeutscher Verband_, the most powerful Pangerman Society, after
expounding the main plan of future annexations, concludes with simple
effrontery thus:

No doubt the newly-constituted Empires will not be peopled merely by
Germans, but: “Germans alone will govern; they alone will exercise
political rights; they alone will serve in the Army and in the Navy; they
alone will have the right to become landowners; thus they will acquire
the conviction that, as in the Middle Ages, the Germans are a people of
rulers. However, they will condescend so far as to delegate inferior
tasks to foreign subjects subservient to Germany” (see _Grossdeutschland
und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr_ 1950, published by Thormann und Goetsch,
Berlin, p. 48).

Identity of race and language served for a long time to justify
Pangermanism; but the facts we have shown and the explicit declarations
we have quoted prove clearly that race and language were merely a pretext
for the diffusion of the Pangerman doctrine inspired by Prussia. If we
dissect this doctrine we find it is composed of cupidity both political
and economic. The truth is that Pangermanism is a scheme of piracy to
be carried on for the benefit of the Prussian monarchy. Its object is,
by successive and indefinite expansions of territory to include within
the same boundaries, at first economic but afterwards political, such
lands and such peoples as are likely to prove a profitable possession
to the Hohenzollerns themselves and to their main support, the German
aristocracy.

To sum up, Pangermanism is a doctrine of international burglary, and
therefore it is exactly the reverse of the principle of nationality, that
noble idea ushered into the world by the French Revolution.

II.

From the Pangerman doctrine the military and political Pangerman plot was
bred and stage-managed by William II. Outside of Germany, the Kaiser was
looked upon, for a long time, as a peace-loving monarch. It is difficult
to explain how such a very serious error could have arisen. Shortly after
his accession in 1888, William II. was secretly hatching that plot which
so recently has caused the European conflagration, and subsequently, by
his public utterances, he has clearly showed his Pangerman tendencies.

On August 28th, 1898, in reply to the Burgomaster of Mayence’s speech,
the Kaiser declared that his wish was to keep inviolate the heritage
bequeathed by his “immortal grandfather.” “But,” added William, “I
can only reach that goal if our authority firmly keeps sway over our
neighbours. For this object the unity and the co-operation of every
German tribe is required.” On the 4th October, 1900, William II., on
laying the foundation stone of the Roman Museum of Saalburg, again said:

“May our German Fatherland become in the future as strongly united, as
powerful, as wonderful as was the Roman universal empire; may this end be
attained by the united co-operation of our princes, of our peoples, of
our armies and of our citizens, in order that in the times to come it may
be said of us as it used to be said of yore: _Civis Romanus sum_.”

On the 28th October, 1900, speaking at an officers’ mess, William II.
affirmed: “My highest aim is to remove whatever separates our great
German people.” Now, in September, 1900, at Stettin, the Kaiser had just
declared: “I have no fear of the future. I am convinced that my plan will
prove successful.” In the Kaiser’s mind the whole matter was summed up in
the chief formula of Pangerman domination: _From Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf_. To accomplish this object the Kaiser had decided to forge closer
and still closer links between Austria-Hungary and Germany. In order to
consolidate his supremacy over the Balkan peoples he reckoned on the
co-operation of such of their Kings as were Germanic by origin (Bulgaria
and Roumania), or on others who were strongly influenced by Germany—in
reality by himself.

Thus he arranged the marriage of his own sister, Sophia, in 1889, with
the heir of the Throne of Greece, King Constantine of to-day. Finally,
almost immediately after his accession he had begun to think of showering
his Imperial favours on the Turks and the Musulmans; this was with the
object of seizing the Ottoman Empire, later on, and of making use of the
Mahometans of the whole world as a mighty lever against all other powers.

On November 8th, 1898, at Damascus, William II. pronounced the famous
words, the full significance of which is only made clear now that we
have seen the German action develop in Turkey and Persia, and that we
have learnt about William’s endeavours to cause an agitation among the
Musulmans of Egypt, India and China:

“May His Majesty the Sultan, as well as the three hundred millions of
Musulmans who venerate him as their Khalifa, be assured that the German
Emperor is their friend for ever.”

The adulation of the sanguinary Sultan Abdul-Hamid proved of practical
use to William II. He obtained on the 27th November, 1899, the first
concession of the Bagdad railway; now that railway, although still
unfinished, has just been utilized by the German offensive both against
Russia and England.

All over his Empire William II. had encouraged the formation of military
and naval leagues—which number millions of members who, for the last
twenty years have carried on an incessant propaganda in favour of such
German armaments by land and sea—as were wanted by the Kaiser.

Again, William II. encouraged the creation of the _Alldeutscher Verband_.
This association or Pangerman Union, counts among its members a large
number of important and influential persons, and at the door of this
society must be laid the most overwhelming responsibility for the
outbreak of the war. Founded in 1894, it has organized thousands of
lectures besides scattering broadcast millions of pamphlets to spread
Pangerman notions and to get the masses of the people to favour schemes
of aggrandizement. It was due to the _Alldeutscher Verband_ that all
the Germans living outside the Empire were formed into a systematic
organization for the present war; this being specially the case in
Austria and in the United States.

Is it possible to believe that such an autocrat as William II. had
not desired this end? How could three powerful associations, with
ever-growing means of action, have carried on a most costly, as well as a
most violent propaganda, in a police-ridden country like Germany, unless
they had been approved of by the authorities usually so meddlesome or so
vigilant?

* * * * *

As to the hour of the war, who set the clock going, if it were not the
Kaiser? As a matter of fact he put the hands of the dial forward (see
Chapter II).

From November, 1913, onward, the Kaiser was busy preparing for early
hostilities; he was aware that the enlargement of the Kiel Canal would be
complete by July, 1914—therefore he arranged to be ready by that date,
and as we know war was declared on August 1st, _i.e._, a few days after
the completion of the Kiel Canal. The Arch-Duke Francis-Ferdinand, the
heir to the Austria-Hungarian throne, tempted by the Kaiser, is dazzled
by the mirage of great profits which were to accrue from a joint action
of the Central Powers. In April, 1914, the Kaiser goes on a visit to
the Archduke at Miramar, near Trieste. Again he meets him at Konopischt
in June, 1914, and is then accompanied by von Tirpitz, that notorious
Chief of Pirates, that submarine Corsair. Now comes the right moment for
drafting the bold main lines of the combined action of the German and
Austrian forces by land and sea. The murder of the Arch-Duke Ferdinand,
on June 28th, 1914, made no change in the Kaiser’s plans, it merely
precipitated events by furnishing an excellent pretext for intervention
against Serbia. Thus the criminal action of the Kaiser stands revealed;
for twenty-five years he had been elaborating the Pangerman plan.

According to Baron de Beyens, who before the war was Belgian Minister
at Berlin, “it has been maintained that William II. was an unconscious
tool in the hands of a caste and of a party who needed war in order to
assert their own power. William has, indeed, listened to them, but he has
lent them an ear because their designs chimed in with his own. In the
judgment of history it is he who is doomed to bear the responsibility
for the disasters by which Europe has been overwhelmed” (Baron Beyens,
_L’Allemagne avant la guerre_, p. 41, G. Van Oest, Paris).

* * * * *

For twenty-five years, and by order of the Kaiser, a violent Pangerman
propaganda had been carried on throughout the Empire; therefore, let
there be no mistake, William II., in declaring war, was supported in his
decision, not only by the influential circles of German opinion, but
by the large majority of the German people. A very notorious German,
Maximilian Harden, has explicitly acknowledged this fact in his review
_Zukunft_ of November, 1914:

“This war has not been forced on us by surprise; we have desired it, and
it was our bounden duty thus to desire it. Germany wages war because of
her immutable conviction that greater world expansion and freer outlets
are due to her by right of her own works” (quoted by _Le Temps_, 20th
November, 1914).

Having thus formed and perfected for twenty years the Pangerman plot of
a European conflagration, William II. had the prodigious audacity to
declare, in his Manifesto to the German people (August 1st, 1915), after
drenching Europe with streams of blood for a whole year: “Before God and
before History, I swear that my conscience is clear. I did not desire
war.”

CHAPTER I.

THE PANGERMAN PLAN.

I. The Pangerman plan of 1911.

II. The stages by which it has been effected.

III. Why it has been ignored.

The Pangerman plot in its broad outlines was laid as early as 1895,
but since that date events have happened throughout the world, which
encouraged Pangermans to enlarge the structure of their scheme.

In 1898 the Fashoda incident almost caused a breach between France and
England. In 1905 Japan compelled Russia to sign peace after a long war
which exhausted all the Tsar’s military resources and disturbed the
balance of power in Europe for a long time to the advantage of Germany.
In 1909 the Vienna Government, under cover of the veiled ultimatum
which Berlin sent to the Tsar, carried out the annexation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, countries which are almost entirely peopled by Serbians.
This seizure of a huge Slav territory was a great triumph for Germanism.
On November 3rd, 1910, at the Potsdam meeting, the Kaiser obtained
from the Tsar’s Government the abandonment of all opposition to the
completion of the Bagdad railway. England and France took up the same
attitude. On July 1st, 1911, the Kaiser ventured on the Agadir episode,
which was clearly an attempt to force a quarrel on France. It led to
the Franco-German treaty of November 4th, 1911, which ceded to Germany
275,000 square kilometres of the French Congo, while at the same time the
commerce of Morocco was heavily mortgaged in favour of Germany.

These various events deeply injured the interests of France, England and
Russia; but these powers preferred to submit to the hardest sacrifices
rather than undertake the dreadful responsibility of letting loose a
fearful war on Europe. The Pangermans misread this attitude as a sign of
weakness, and of a desire to keep the peace at all costs; and accordingly
they were encouraged to entertain high hopes of huge success in a near
future. That is why the original Pangerman plan of 1895, considerably
altered, became the perfected plan of 1911.

[Illustration: THE PANGERMAN PLAN OF 1911.]

This plan of 1911 (_see map_) provided in Europe and in Western Asia:

1º. The establishment, under German rule, of a vast Confederation of
Central Europe, comprising:

+------------------------------------+-----------+------------+
| | Square | |
| |Kilometres.|Inhabitants.|
+------------------------------------+-----------+------------+
| In the West: | | |
| Holland | 38,141 | 6,114,000 |
| Belgium | 29,451 | 7,500,000 |
| Luxemburg | 2,586 | 260,000 |
| Switzerland* | 41,324 | 3,800,000 |
| The Departments of the North of | | |
| France to the N.E. of a line drawn | | |
| from the S. of Belfort to the | | |
| mouth of the Somme about | 50,271 | 5,768,000 |
| +-----------+------------+
| Total | 161,773 | 23,442,000 |
| +-----------+------------+
| To the East: | | |
| Russian Poland | 127,320 | 12,467,000 |
| Baltic Provinces, Esthonia, | | |
| Livonia, Courland | 94,564 | 2,686,000 |
| The three Russian Governments | | |
| of Kovno, Vilna, Grodno | 121,840 | 5,728,000 |
| +-----------+------------+
| Total | 343,724 | 20,881,000 |
| +-----------+------------+
| To the South-East: | | |
| Austria-Hungary† | 676,616 | 50,000,000 |
+------------------------------------+-----------+------------+
| These three groups form a grand total of 1,182,113 Square |
| Kilometres and 94,323,000 inhabitants. |
+-------------------------------------------------------------+

* Minus eventually the French and Italian Cantons which the
Pangermans declare that they do not care to annex.

† Minus the Italian regions of the Trentino, which Berlin
decided to cede (at the expense of Austria) to Italy as the
price of her neutrality.

This confederation was thus to group under German supremacy

Square
Kilometres. Inhabitants.

Actual German Empire 540,858 68,000,000
New territories of the Confederation 1,182,113 94,000,000
----------------------
Total 1,722,971 162,000,000

of whom only 77 millions are Germans and 85 millions non-Germans.

2º. The absolute subordination of the Balkan countries (containing
499,275 square kilometres and 22 millions of non-Germans) to the Great
Central European Confederation. The Balkan States to become mere
satellites of Berlin.

3º. Germany’s political and military seizure of Turkey, which was
afterwards to be enlarged by the annexation of Egypt and Persia. It was
provided that Turkey should be dealt with in two successive stages.
During the first, the handful of “Young Turks” who have ruled the Ottoman
Empire since 1908, and who play the German game, were to remain in power
merely as figure-heads. Turkey was to retain a nominal independence
during this phase, though in reality she was to have been tied to
Germany by a treaty of military alliance. Under pretence of effecting
reforms, numerous German officials were to be placed at the head of
all the Ottoman administrations, and that would have paved the way for
the second stage. The latter had for its aim the putting of Turkey,
with her 1,792,000 square kilometres and her 20 millions of non-German
inhabitants, under the strict protectorate of Germany, to say nothing of
the subject provinces, Egypt and Persia.

* * * * *

The Germanic Confederation of Central Europe was to form a huge
_Zollverein_ or Customs Union. Treaties of Commerce of a special
character imposed on the Balkan States and on subjected Turkey would
have provided for Great Germany an economic outlet and reserved for her
exclusively those vast regions.

Finally, we can sum up the Pangerman plan of 1911 in four formulas:

Berlin—Calais; Berlin—Riga; Hamburg—Salonika; Hamburg—Persian Gulf.

The union of the three groupings—Central Europe, Balkan States and
Turkey—would have placed under the predominating influence of Berlin
4,015,146 square kilometres and 204 millions of inhabitants, of whom 127
millions were to be ruled directly or indirectly by merely 77 millions of
Germans.

This continental Pangerman plan of 1911 was to have been completed by
colonial conquests of great magnitude, of which an account is given at
the end of Chapter V.

William II. was well aware that such a project could only become an
enduring reality if all other great powers disappeared from the face
of the earth. The Kaiser had therefore positively resolved, when
hatching his Pangerman plot, to accomplish the destruction of five great
powers. It is necessary to grasp fully this fundamental truth, if we
wish to understand the nature of the present war. It was foreseen that
Austria-Hungary would disappear by her absorption under cover of entrance
into the German _Zollverein_. France and Russia were to have been
totally ruined by means of a furious preventive war which would entirely
destroy their military forces. England was to be put out of action by
a subsequent operation, which would have been an easy matter when once
France and Russia had been dismembered and reduced to utter impotence.
As to Italy—destined to become a vassal state—she was not considered
as being capable of hindering in the least the Pangerman ambitions.
One of the Kaiser’s agents for propagating this scheme wrote in 1900:
“Italy cannot be looked upon as a rival for she is too incompetent in
warfare” (_Deutschland bei Beginn des 20 Jahrhunderts_, p. 53. Military
publishers, R. Felix, Berlin, 1900).

It must be added that the Pangerman plot of 1911 did not include war
with England. When he declared hostilities in August, 1914, William II.
was convinced that England would take no share in them, at least not
immediately. The Kaiser had laid every conceivable kind of trap to add
fuel to the flames of all internal English disturbances and to deceive
the London Cabinet. At one moment he almost succeeded in his endeavours.
England’s decision to participate without delay in the struggle only
hung by a thread, but that thread was broken. If England had tarried,
if she had tarried only for a few days, German landings in Normandy,
Brittany, and as far as Bordeaux would have been effected. France being
thus rendered quickly powerless on all sides, the English intervention
would have proved futile at a later stage, and the Pangerman plan of
1911 would thus have been fully achieved. But in going to war just at
the right moment and in controlling the sea, Great Britain has, while
saving herself, furnished to civilized humanity the means of avoiding the
Prussian yoke. The initial German plan has truly been upset by English
intervention following on the respite gained by the splendid resistance
of Belgium in arms.

But the Germans are clever, they are stubborn and crafty. Adapting
themselves to new conditions thrust on them, they are still endeavouring
to make an enormous profit out of the war. We must, therefore, try to
understand what operations they have devised for carrying out, even now,
the Pangerman plot almost in its entirety.

II.

As it is necessary to open the eyes of neutrals, many of whom have been
misled by the German propaganda, we must try to expose very clearly the
inner workings of the Pangerman plot as it is revealed to us in the
searchlight of facts.

From 1892 down to the outbreak of the War, that is to say, for twenty-two
years, the Pangerman movement has developed with ever growing intensity;
a multitude of publications, giving full details of the plan, were
scattered among the German people, in order to excite in them the greed
of conquest and so prepare them for the struggle through the allurement
of plunder. Of these publications two are of special importance: first,
the pamphlet published under the auspices of the _Alldeutscher Verband_:
namely, _Grossdeutschland und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr 1950_ (Thormann
und Goetsch, Berlin, 1895), which gives the Pangerman plan of 1895:
second, the book of Otto Richard Tannenberg: _Grossdeutschland, die
Arbeit des 20ᵗᵉⁿ Jahrhunderts_ (Bruno Volger, Leipzig-Gohlis, 1911),
which gives all suitable details of the plan of 1911.

Unfortunately, although this Pangerman literature is very considerable,
full of documentary evidence and spread broadcast among the masses by
most powerful associations, whose patrons are the highest authorities
in the land, few people outside of Germany would believe in its extreme
importance. But now the facts speak for themselves. The reality, the
extent, and the successive stages of the Pangerman plan of 1911 are shown
by:

1º. The course which Germany has taken since August 1st, 1914, in her
political and military operations which have for their object not, as
many have supposed, the obtaining of securities, but the annexation of
territories in the manner set forth in Tannenberg’s book, and more or
less in accordance with the plan of 1911.

2º. The memorial delivered on May 20th, 1915, to the German Chancellor
by the League of Agriculturists, the League of German Peasants, the
Provisional Association of Christian German Peasants, now called the
Westphalian Peasants’ Association, the Central German Manufacturers’
Union, the League of Manufacturers, and the Middle-Class Union of the
Empire (_see_ _Le Temps_, 12th August, 1915). The importance of this
document cannot be overrated, for it is issued by the most powerful
associations of the Empire, including all the influential elements of
the German nation, specially the agrarians and the iniquitous Prussian
squires. Now the purport of that memorial, as will be shown, is to
demand all such annexations mentioned in the Pangerman plan of 1911, as
the development of military operations has so far rendered feasible.
Any one who knows Germany can hardly doubt that this memorial was not
handed in to Bethmann-Hollweg without a previous understanding with him.
Doubtless it was intended that this document should seem to exercise an
overmastering pressure of public opinion on William II.’s government.
But if the ideas expressed in this memorial reflect, as they certainly
do, the wishes of influential German circles, it is also unquestionable
that they correspond very closely to the scheme of aggrandizement, which
William II. has been nursing for over twenty years.

3º. The declarations made at the sitting of the Reichstag of the 11th
December, 1915, prove the exactitude of this statement. The Imperial
Chancellor said:

“If our enemies will not submit now, they will be obliged to do so
later on.... When our enemies shall offer us such peace proposals as
are compatible with the dignity and security of Germany we shall be
ready to discuss them.... But our enemies must understand that the more
unrelentingly they wage war, the higher will be the guarantees exacted.”

Bethmann-Hollweg could hardly have spoken more explicitly, but his
diplomatic game was naturally to unmask Germany’s enormous pretensions
only bit by bit, in order that the eyes of neutrals should not be opened
to the Pangerman monster in all its horror until the last moment. But
hardly had the Chancellor finished his speech than the Deputy Spahn
explained the real drift of it with great precision:

“We await,” said Herr Spahn, “the hour which will allow of peace
negotiations which will safeguard in a permanent way and by all means,
including the needful territorial annexations, all military economic and
political interests of Germany in its total extent.”

The thundering applause which greeted these words proves that they echoed
the sentiments of the overwhelming majority of the German deputies, who
at that moment still believed that it was possible for Germany to achieve
enormous annexations.

III.

The preparation of the Pangerman plan has required for over twenty
years a huge propaganda among the German masses as well as a world-wide
organization. How is it that this plan has been ignored in its nature
and in its extent by the diplomats of France, England and Russia? Such,
however, has been the case, for otherwise the war could not have come
upon these three powers as a surprise. We deal here with a matter which
at first sight seems improbable and which, therefore, needs explanation.

The diplomatic agents of the Allies are certainly not inferior personally
to those of William II., but the Kaiser’s foreign service, as a whole,
includes novel instruments of observation and influence by which,
for the last twenty years, the Government of Berlin has seconded its
official diplomacy without allowing the connexion between it and them
to transpire. None of the Allied countries have employed similar
instruments, the result being that the Entente is considerably inferior
in this department of foreign policy.

* * * * *

The Pangerman plan is founded on a very exact knowledge of all political,
ethnographical, economic, social, military and naval problems, not
only of Europe, but of the whole world; the Germans have acquired that
knowledge by means of an intense labour of over twenty-five years. But
this task has not been performed by the official German diplomats; it has
been carried out either by the members of the _Alldeutscher Verband_, the
Pangerman Union, or by the agents of the German secret service, which
has been enormously extended. These agents might be called connecting
links between the regular spies and the official diplomats; Baron von
Schenk, who worked at Athens from 1915-1916, is a sample of that category
of agents who have studied methodically all the root questions of the
Pangerman plan, who have prepared means to delude the minds of neutrals,
to paralyze the revolt of the Slavs in Austria-Hungary, to corrupt all
such neutral individuals or neutral newspapers as were susceptible of
corruption, etc. After these numerous agents had made their reports,
and when once these had been examined and summarized, they were sent to
the Wilhelmstrasse, to the great German General Staff, whose concerted
operations are always so combined as to answer both to political and
to military needs. At the same time the reports reached William II.’s
private study, and his brain was thus able to store up all technical
means necessary for the achievement of his plan of domination.

Was the diplomatic corps of the Allies so well served that it could
grasp in its universal significance the immense work of preparation
accomplished by the secret Pangerman agents? Indeed, they were not
properly supplied with the right tools for such a task, and we shall see
why it was so.

First of all it is necessary to dispel a false notion which “the man in
the street” has of diplomacy. He fondly thinks that diplomats, while
preparing clever and mysterious combinations, fashion History. Now the
experience of centuries shows that as a general rule diplomats merely
chronicle History but do not make it. My teacher, Albert Sorel, neatly
expressed that truth by saying: “Diplomats are History’s attorneys.”
In fact, the diplomacy of any country helps to prepare and to fashion
history only when there happens to be at its head a great man of large
and just ideas, who knows how to apply these ideas by all the means
available in his time.

It is a strange fact and worthy of notice, that such a great man is
rarely, if ever, a professional diplomat. For example, Richelieu,
Napoleon, Palmerston, Disraeli, Cavour, Bismarck, who all prepared and
fashioned History, were not trained diplomatists. Unfortunately, it does
not seem that Fortune has endowed any of our Allied countries, either
before or since the war, with a head capable of leading, on grand lines,
the diplomatic affairs of the Entente. The latter therefore has been only
served by those diplomats who are mere officials, and who as such await
instructions from higher quarters, and these instructions are very often
found wanting.

Besides, the diplomacy of the Allies, not being seconded, like that of
Germany, by novel means of observation, can only obtain the information
it needs by methods still so old-fashioned that they are almost identical
with those used a century ago. They are totally inadequate to point out
the sequence of ideas or the rapid development of events which in Central
Europe and the Balkans have been, as will be seen, the immediate causes
of the war; nor are the means employed by our diplomats at all sufficient
if they wish to recognize what forms the whole chain of the Pangerman
organization. Just because this organization is huge, just because it is
so complex, its total importance cannot be properly gauged unless the
connecting links between the varied elements are clearly perceived.

The typical professional diplomat lives in a world of his own. Either
his information comes from the office or it is second-hand; it rarely is
reached by direct observation of people or facts. The secretaries at the
Embassies divide their time between office work, copying documents in
copper plate hand, or social functions, pleasant enough but confined to
a particular and narrow set. Few of the secretaries know the language of
the country in which they reside, fewer still travel in the interior of
the land in order to study it.

The events which have led to the European conflagration spring from
two main causes: the stupendous scope of the German ambitions and the
progress of the Austro-Hungarian and Balkan nationalities. Now both these
factors have been revealed on many occasions, by purely local events
which, to a keen observer, would have betrayed most significantly the end
in view, but they have occurred for the most part in places far removed
from capital cities, and to appreciate fully their importance would have
needed direct observation on the spot.

This is quite contrary to the tradition followed by official diplomats.
Those of the Entente had not, at their disposal, agents who could go
and, for instance, hear the numerous lectures given by the Pangerman
propaganda, and who could have procured and translated for them the
illuminating pamphlets of the _Alldeutscher Verband_. Also they had no
means of getting into personal touch with the party leaders, either Slav
or Latin, of Austria-Hungary; often these leaders were men without a
place in parliament, frequently without fortune or social rank; all they
had was their national ideal, their strength of conviction, but they were
real and novel forces, for they acted on the popular masses with whom
they were in complete intellectual sympathy.

As the diplomatic corps of the Entente was not provided with that
indispensable aid—an organization of secondary agents of observation—they
have been reduced to accept information of a superficial and incomplete
nature. Often it was merely provided by press cuttings and even those
were frequently from papers written in a tongue which the diplomats
could not read; at best these cuttings were without any connecting link
and quite insufficient to warn them of the approach of a great peril.
We must add that in diplomatic circles of all periods—unless they are
led by some eminent man—there are certain formulas current, such as: “No
fuss,” “it is necessary to wait and see,” “we must not believe that it
has happened,” which have had a baneful influence. The result has been
a sceptical attitude which in diplomatical circles passes for essential
and in good taste. If we add to this frame of mind the absence of varied,
direct and coherent information, we can understand how it was that before
the war, when any one tried to persuade a professional diplomatist that
William II.’s political aim was nothing short of the establishment
of German supremacy over the whole world, he was soon set down as a
visionary with a head stuffed full of groundless suspicions.

Finally, we must realize that the system by which a diplomat is sent from
pillar to post, often to the antipodes, every four or five years, is not
conducive to the acquirement of a general and exact knowledge, founded
on documentary evidence, of events still in progress, in a wide zone, so
complex and so difficult to study as Central Europe and the Balkans.

These various considerations help us to understand why, during the
twenty-five years which preceded the war, no diplomat of the Allies
has been able to grasp the total Pangerman plan in its nature and in
its extent, though possibly a few of them may have indicated in their
reports now and then some local Pangerman act which aroused suspicion.
These considerations explain also, at least in part, the failure of the
diplomatic corps of the Entente in the Balkans.

* * * * *

To sum up, allied official diplomats are not personally inferior to
German official diplomats, but the latter have an enormous advantage
over their colleagues of the Entente in knowing the general plan of the
Berlin policy, in knowing, each in his own post, in what direction to
proceed and what must be done or prevented in order to attain the final
end. During the last twenty-five years the Kaiser’s foreign policy has
been constructive and framed on a definite plan, while the diplomats of
the Allies, reflecting the policy of their Governments without concrete
plans, have been hampered, because they believed obstinately in Peace, in
a vague and stagnant defensive. On the other hand, the allied diplomacy,
regarded as an instrument of observation, confined to old-fashioned
methods, is like an ordinary magnifying glass which shows nothing but
the largest objects. On the contrary, the German foreign policy, thanks
to the new, busy and secret organs, by which the German diplomacy has
been seconded, may be compared to a workshop provided with powerful
microscopes by which facts can be studied not only in their general
aspect, but also in their most minute details, details which often are
not without their importance.

Finally, the allied diplomacy, regarded as an instrument of action, still
clinging to antiquated traditional methods, may be compared to an army
which possesses only field guns, while the foreign diplomacy of Germany,
in its totality, is comparable to an army equipped both with heavy and
with field artillery.

CHAPTER II.

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR.

I. Why the Treaty of Bukarest suddenly raised a formidable
obstacle to the Pangerman plan.

II. How it was that the internal state of Austria-Hungary drove
Germany to let loose the dogs of war.

III. General view of the causes of the war.

Although the Pangerman plan is unquestionably the chief ultimate cause of
the war, yet when William II. started it in August, 1914, he did so for
nearer and for secondary reasons which we must examine carefully if we
wish to have a clear view of events.

Up to 1911, when Tannenberg published the programme of annexations, all
previous great events had favoured William II.’s aims; but from 1912
onward events suddenly raised very serious and quite unexpected obstacles
to the execution of the Pangerman plan.

In 1912, Italy conquered Libya at the cost of Turkey and against
the will and pleasure of Berlin. Again in 1912 Greece, Montenegro,
Serbia and Bulgaria became united against the Ottoman Empire; this
also was contrary to the will and pleasure of Berlin. What was quite
unexpected by the Kaiser’s Staff was the victory of the Balkan peoples
over the Turks. As Germany had upheld the latter she felt profoundly
humiliated. Then, in order to hinder the foundation of an efficient
Balkanic Confederation—that is, one constituted on the principle of
a fair balance—Vienna, and above all, Berlin, used as their tool the
Tsar Ferdinand’s well-known ambition to establish Bulgarian supremacy
in the peninsula. Accordingly instigated by the Germanic powers, the
Bulgarians in June, 1913, attacked their allies, the Serbians and Greeks.
But once more the Kaiser’s calculations were upset. Roumania, escaping
for the first time from German leading strings, intervened against
Bulgaria, which was struggling with her former allies, and thus Bulgaria
was vanquished. Now, the new condition of things which arose from the
Bukarest treaty of August 10th, 1913, suddenly formed a formidable
obstacle to the Pangerman scheme in the East, and this is the reason:

The treaty of Bukarest created in the peninsula two groups of states
sharply opposed to each other. The first was formed of the beaten and
sullen participants in the Balkan wars, Bulgaria and Turkey. The second
group was composed of those peoples who had benefited by the wars and
were satisfied with the result, to wit, Roumania, Serbia, Montenegro and
Greece. These four last states, seeing that their vital interests had
become closely bound together by the territorial annexations made at
the cost of the common enemy, had joined all their forces to insure the
maintenance of the Bukarest treaty which they considered inviolable.

On the other hand, this sharp division of the Balkan States into two
groups whose interests were diametrically opposed, reacted deeply on
general European politics. The force of events led the conquered states
of 1912 and 1913, Turkey and Bulgaria, to support Germanism in the
Balkans; on the contrary, Roumania, as well as Serbia, Montenegro and
Greece, because of their recent acquisitions, were leaning more and more
towards the Triple Entente, quite contrary to the views of Berlin and at
the cost of Turkey, which even then was bound hand and foot to Germany.

[Illustration: THE ANTIGERMANIC BARRIER IN THE BALKANS AFTER THE TREATY
OF BUKAREST (10TH AUGUST, 1913).]

Previous to the Balkan wars the Triple Entente enjoyed an influence in
the peninsula, vastly inferior to that of Germany; after the treaty of
Bukarest, however, the Entente found support in that group of states
which was most powerfully organized and which presented (see map) a very
solid barrier to the accomplishment of Pangerman designs in the East.

This new order of things lashed Berlin into a fury which though outwardly
restrained was none the less intense because the only group (Turkey and
Bulgaria) which was still under German influence, was bound to remain
for a very long time to come practically impotent and powerless to make
singly any attempt against the other group which favoured the Entente.

Indeed, Turkey, which in her defeats had lost almost the whole of her
military stores, could hardly, at the beginning of 1914, put 250,000 men
under arms. Her financial difficulties were such that, if left to her own
resources, it would have taken her many years to replace her military
power on a solid basis.

Bulgaria was in a similar financial predicament. Besides, if she had
taken action it would have been at great risk to herself, in as much as
those states which profited by the Bukarest Treaty (Roumania, Serbia and
Greece), surrounding as they do (see the arrows of the map) Bulgaria on
three sides, could then have delivered a concentric attack on Sofia.

Finally, great was the disproportion of men eligible for the army or
capable of bearing arms between the two groups.

+------------------------+-------------------------+
| Germanophile Group. | Group of the Entente. |
| | |
| Turkey 250,000 | Greece 400,000 |
| Bulgaria 550,000 | Serbia 400,000 |
| | Montenegro 50,000 |
| | Roumania 600,000 |
| ------- | --------- |
| 800,000 | 1,450,000 |
+------------------------+-------------------------+

These figures, taken in conjunction with the geographical situation, show
clearly that, left to its own resources, the Germanophile group could
attempt no attack on the Entente group.

The new balance of military forces in the Balkans which was the outcome
of the Bukarest treaty, therefore reduced almost to naught Germany’s
power of intrigue in the Peninsula.

Had peace reigned for a few years, the new Balkan situation would have
been consolidated and the obstacle to Pangerman ambition in the East
would have been still more serious. It was for these varied reasons that
Berlin decided to intervene directly. Without doubt Serbia was the pivot
on which turned the new Balkanic equilibrium. It was therefore decided
to destroy her without delay, kindling at the same time the European
conflagration, and thus by one single blow to accomplish the plan of 1911.

The Bukarest treaty was signed on the tenth of August, 1913. On November
6th, 1913, King Albert of Belgium was at Potsdam, and the Kaiser said to
him that in his opinion war with France was near and unavoidable (see
Baron Beyen’s _L’Allemagne avant la Guerre_, p. 24).

* * * * *

From this survey it follows that, if the treaty of Bukarest, through its
consequences, proved disastrous to the Pangerman aims, it was, on the
contrary, extremely advantageous to the powers of the Triple Entente, for
it brought to their side the majority of the Balkanic forces.

Unfortunately the diplomacy of the Entente had not even a notion how
favourable the situation was to them. This ignorance was due to the
old-fashioned methods of observation still used by diplomats which
prevented them from believing in the Pangerman scheme, and which also
hindered them from entertaining general and correct views of the varied
problems which form such a tangle in that large territorial zone. Indeed,
though one of the immediate causes of the war was Germany’s wish to
upset the Bukarest treaty, because the consequences of that treaty
ruined the Pangerman aims in the East, the Triple Entente powers were
no sooner at war with Germany than they did all in their power during
ten months to cancel in like manner the consequences of the Bukarest
treaty; for that was in fact the result of the Entente’s ingenuous wish
to satisfy Bulgaria at all costs. Theoretically, the attempt inspired
by the noble thought of avoiding the horrors of war in the Balkans, was
just, but in practice it was an impossibility owing to the fierce hatred
the Bulgarians entertain towards their conquerors of 1913, and above all
towards the Serbians.

What is certain is that the diplomacy of the Allies, during the first
year of war, followed such a policy in the Balkans that, evidently
without knowing it, they played entirely into the hands of Berlin.

II.

Not only were the consequences of the Bukarest treaty disastrous to
Pangerman ambitions in the Balkan peninsula, they also, to the boundless
fury of William II., considerably accelerated that internal political
evolution of Austria-Hungary which of itself had already threatened to
upset all his plans.

Unfortunately the notions held about Austria-Hungary in France, and above
all, in England, have far too long been of a very vague nature. Public
opinion in France and England was totally unable to grasp the situation,
when war broke out. It was incapable of seeing the important part played
during the war, and to be played after the war, by the populations living
in the Hapsburg Monarchy. The vast majority of these peoples devoutly
pray for the victory of the Triple Entente, for they only fight against
it because they are forcibly constrained to do so. At heart they look
to the victory of the Allies for deliverance from a hateful yoke which
has weighed on them heavily for centuries. That is why it is of the
utmost importance to educate public opinion in the allied countries as
to the actual racial facts in Austria-Hungary. Then it will be clearly
understood of what abominable treason Francis Joseph was guilty against
his peoples; then it will be clearly understood also that as these
peoples were more and more inclined, before the war, to lean to the side
of France and England, quite as much as to that of Russia, William II.
had a strong additional motive for precipitating hostilities.

[Illustration: THE NATIONALITIES IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.]

The nine different nationalities who live in the Hapsburg Monarchy can be
divided into four races:

_Germanic._ _Magyar._

Germans 12,000,000 Magyars 10,000,000
(peculiar race of
Asiatic origin)

_Latin._ _Slav._

Italians 1,000,000 { Czecks and Slovak 8,500,000
Roumanian 3,000,000 { Poles 5,000,000
{ Ruthenes 3,500,000
{ Slovenes 1,000,000
{ Serbo-Croats 6,000,000
--------- ----------
4,000,000 24,000,000

In a political sense the Germans and Magyars, forming a total of 22
millions, have agreed since 1867 to exercise and maintain for their own
profit the supremacy over the Slavs and Latins, although these latter
form the majority of the subjects of the Monarchy, since they constitute
a group of 28 million inhabitants.

Now, it is needful to note and it is important to remember, that the
figures which I quote, are incorrect, because they are those furnished by
the Government statistics at Vienna and at Budapest by German and Magyar
officials. These have their instructions to use various artful tricks
for falsifying systematically the true statistics in favour of their own
races, in order to contribute by that stratagem to the maintenance, as
long as possible, of the supremacy held by the Germans and the Magyars.
In truth, there are in Austria-Hungary far less than 22 million Germans
and Magyars, and far more than 28 Slavs and Latins. What again is
certain, is that for centuries the Slavs and Latins have been oppressed
in Austria-Hungary in the most odious fashion by a feudal aristocracy,
who engross enormous landed properties, and who exercise in the Hapsburg
Monarchy as baneful a social influence as that of the _Junkers_ in
Prussia.

With the exception of the Polish aristocracy of Galicia and a small group
of Ruthenes, who since 1867 joined hands with the Germans, all these
Slavs and Latins have been endeavouring to the very utmost, especially
for the last thirty years, to obtain, in accordance with modern justice,
such political rights as are proportionate to their numbers. In that way
they hope to win for themselves in the Monarchy the legal majority that
is their due, by reason of their being human flesh and blood liable to be
taxed and to be called on for service at the will of the Government.

These tendencies have long excited extreme alarm in William II. and his
Pangermans. This is readily understood, for, if the political power, in
the Hapsburg Monarchy, were vested, as justice demands, in the Slavs and
Latins, who hate Prussianism, that in itself would have been the ruin of
the Kaiser’s plan for the economic absorption of Austria-Hungary. Yet
this very absorption is indispensable to William II. if he is to carry
out his inadmissible plans of exclusive influence in the Balkans and in
the East. His game has therefore been, especially since 1890, to say,
in the main, to Francis Joseph and to the Magyars: “Above all, do not
concede the claims of your Slav and Latin subjects. Keep up absolutely
the Germano-Magyar supremacy. I will uphold you, with all my power,
in your struggle with the Slav-Latin elements.” For a long time these
tactics of the Kaiser were successful but they were on the point of
breaking down a short time before the war.

In spite of the most ingenious and cynical obstacles raised by the
Germans and Magyars the culture of the Slavs and Latins kept growing;
their national organizations kept progressing; also they were much more
prolific than their political rivals. All these conditions together gave
Francis Joseph and his henchmen at Budapest increasing trouble in their
efforts to resist the enlarged demands of their Latin and Slav subjects.
Berlin had already become anxious on that score, when the mental
effervescence stirred up among the Slavs and Latins of Austria-Hungary
by the result of the Bukarest treaty suddenly changed for the worse the
outlook of the Pangerman scheme.

As a matter of fact, almost the whole of the 28 million Slav and Latin
subjects of the Hapsburgs had been roused to enthusiasm by the victories
of the Slavs in the Balkans in 1912, and by the success of Roumania
in 1913; for they saw, above all, in these events, the triumph of the
principle of nationality, that is, their very own cause. Hence they
became more than ever determined in their endeavours to obtain from
Vienna and Budapest those political rights, proportionate to their
number, which the Germano-Magyars persisted in refusing, although of late
years that refusal had lost much of its energy.

If peace had been maintained, the effect of the Bukarest treaty on
Austria-Hungary would have lent irresistible force to the claims of the
Slav and Latin subjects of Francis Joseph. On the other hand, Roumania,
exulting in her annexation of the Bulgarian Dobrudja, cast longing eyes
on Transylvania, and hoped to secure it at the expense of Hungary. The
moment appeared opportune when a thorough transformation of the Hapsburg
Monarchy might be effected, and that transformation seemed relatively so
near that Roumania already looked upon Transylvania as a ripe fruit which
merely needed gathering.

If this new order of things resulting from the treaty of Bukarest had
been allowed to develop fully, the influence of Germanism would have
been infallibly ruined in the Hapsburg Monarchy, just as had happened in
the Balkans. Under the growing pressure of her Slav and Latin elements
the partition, or at any rate, the evolution towards federation of
Austria-Hungary would have become a necessity. This federalism would
not have affected the frontiers of the Hapsburg Dominions, but it would
necessarily, and without doubt, have given political preponderance to
the Slav and Latin elements, which were the most numerous and the most
prolific. Now, those elements form an enormous majority, which was and
is resolutely hostile to any alliance with Germany. Thus, progressively,
the Hapsburg Monarchy in evolution would have become more and more
independent of Berlin in regard to her foreign policy, and as it
gradually shook itself free from its bondage to Berlin, it would, as a
necessary consequence, have drawn closer and closer to Russia, France
and England. Thus Germany would have been deprived of the artificial
prop which she has found at Vienna and at Budapest ever since the days
of Sadowa through the Germano-Magyar predominance. Finally, as a result
of peaceful development, William II. would have been confronted by a
state of things in Austria-Hungary which would have opposed a far more
formidable barrier to his oriental ambitions than that which was created
in 1913 in the Balkans, as a consequence of the treaty of Bukarest.

If we bear in mind the powerful and extraordinarily important series of
after-effects which must have followed on the new situation produced by
the treaty of Bukarest and its inevitable influence on the 28 million
Slavs and Latins of Austria-Hungary, we can readily understand that
had the European peace been maintained, the chances of executing
the Pangerman plan would have been totally and simultaneously ruined
in Turkey, in the Balkans, and in Austria-Hungary; that is to say in
the three territorial zones which, as will be seen from Chapter III,
constituted by far the most important part of the regions mapped out for
Pangerman operations in the plan of 1911.

Thus we see how the internal evolution of Austria-Hungary had reached
a point at which, as the result of the treaty of Bukarest, it was just
about to escape for ever from the influence of Berlin; this would have
broken the pivot on which all the Pangerman combinations revolved. It was
that consideration which decided William II. to make war at once.

III.

The Allies will, in accordance with the general principles of justice,
bring Germany to account for her unheard of crimes, and will exact a
full reparation for the enormous moral and material injuries which she
has done them. Therefore it is necessary to set forth the causes of the
war by a general survey of the facts, to the end that in the eyes of the
civilized world, it may be clearly demonstrated that Germany must pay,
and legitimately so, the price of a responsibility which, in all justice,
should rest on her and on her alone.

To understand the practical necessity of such a survey, if we are to
influence the opinion of neutrals, it is needful to bear in mind that
all discussions which, so far, have been held on the causes of war,
have been merely based on diplomatic documents published by the various
belligerents, and that these documents merely refer to facts which
preceded the outbreak of war only by a few weeks. But in a discussion
which turns on a multitude of texts, belonging to different dates,
all more or less near each other, and therefore liable to be confused,
nothing is easier than for subtle, interested and dishonest reasoners
like the Germans, to interpret the same facts in different ways, and so
to arrive at conclusions diametrically opposed to the truth. In fact,
this is exactly what has happened.

* * * * *

Thanks to its intense intellectual mobilization, which has been foreseen
and carried out as powerfully as its military mobilization, Germany has
succeeded, by fallacious interpretations of diplomatic documents, in
profoundly misleading neutrals, even honest neutrals, as to the real
responsibility for the outbreak of war. Nothing could give a better idea
of the effect thus produced by Germany than the following remarks of the
_Swiss_ Colonel Gortsch published in the _Intelligenzblatt_ of Berne:

“The events which happened at the end of July have convinced every
reasonable man that Germany has been provoked to war, and that the
Emperor William II. has waited long before he took up this challenge.
History will lay the main guilt of the war and its intellectual
responsibility on England; Russia and France will be considered as her
accomplices.... It is the British policy, openly and selfishly free from
any scruples, which has caused the World-War” (quoted by the _Echo de
Paris_, 3rd January, 1916).

This is exactly the proposition which Bethmann-Hollweg wishes neutrals
to believe. It is an absurd proposition to be entertained by any one
who knew England intimately in the years before the war. During that
period the leaders of the British Government were led by the one guiding
thought—pleasant enough in itself, but entirely inaccurate—that war would
not occur, since Great Britain did not wish war. The whole foreign
policy of Great Britain has been inspired by this conception. It explains
the attitude of extreme conciliation taken by the London Cabinet towards
Germany at the time of the annexation of Bosnia and of Herzegovina
(1909), during the Balkan wars (1912-1913), and also when it came to the
question of the Bagdad railway, which most obviously threatened the road
to India. The Liberal Cabinet of London reflected the dominant British
opinion, which believed implicitly in Lord Haldane’s assurances. He was
considered, though quite wrongly so, to have a most perfect knowledge
of Germany, and in a speech at Tranent he affirmed to his countrymen:
“Germany has not the slightest intention of invading us” (quoted by the
_Morning Post_, 16th December, 1915). Up to the declaration of war, Sir
Edward Grey, always inclined to believe in the acumen of his friend
Lord Haldane, had resorted to every conceivable combination which might
have allowed peace to be maintained if William II. had really wished
to maintain it. Finally, does not the total unpreparedness of England
for a continental war, which has been evident since the outbreak of
hostilities, furnish the best proof of her sincerely pacific intentions
before the war?

* * * * *

Other neutrals, and even some Frenchmen, still think that the struggle is
a result of the so-called Delcassé policy. They say: “The Emperor William
frequently tried to show himself friendly to France. If his advances had
been accepted, war would have been avoided.” It is undeniable that at
certain moments William II. has tried to draw France into his own orbit,
but it was precisely in order the better to insure the accomplishment
of the Pangerman plan, which has been his main pre-occupation ever
since his accession. The present military events show clearly that if
France had been beguiled by the smile of the Berlin tempter, any further
efficient coalition of the great powers against Germany would have been
a sheer impossibility. As to France, if she had believed in William II.
she would not have suffered from war, for war would have been useless for
German ends. Indeed, without a struggle, France would have practically
been reduced to such a state of absolute slavery as has never yet been
achieved in history except as the result of a totally ruinous war.
Facts which have come to light enable us to convince ourselves by the
most indisputable evidence, that such would have been the outcome of a
“reconciliation” between France and Germany. We now know to what extent
the Germans had already gained a footing in the greater part of the
organic structure of French finance and industry. If the Paris Government
had come to terms with Berlin nothing could have stopped the total
pacific permeation of France by Germany. Little by little France would
have ceased to be her own mistress; at the end of a few years she would
have been exactly in the same position as Austria-Hungary, unable to free
herself unaided from the Prussian hug.

Finally, can we believe for a moment that, had France carried out such a
policy of “conciliation” with Berlin, it would have induced William II.
to relinquish his dreams of domination? On the contrary, his easy capture
of France in full enjoyment of peace, would merely have whetted the
hereditary appetites of the Hohenzollerns. Had France once been disposed
of by reason of her pacific permeation by Germany, the bulwark which she
now forms against the Prussian domination would have been broken. The
execution of the rest of the Pangerman plan, at the expense of Russia
and England, could then have been effected without encountering any
insuperable obstacle.

It is therefore not the policy called after M. Delcassé which has caused
the war. M. Delcassé will have quite enough to answer for in regard
to the application of his policy before and during war, without being
reproached for a general principle which evidently was theoretically
sound.

In upholding the alliance with Russia, in bringing about the slackening
of tension with Italy, in achieving the Entente Cordiale, M. Delcassé has
followed a policy, the principles of which are just. Actual events prove
it convincingly.

* * * * *

Having laid bare the fallacy of the German argument, let us now, for the
benefit of honest neutrals, attempt to give a general view of the true
causes of the war, and to indicate their sequence. Let us distinguish
between the deep-seated and the immediate causes of the struggle.

The war can be traced to a single deep and remote cause, namely, the will
of William II. to achieve the Pangerman plan; all secondary causes, that
is to say, the economic ones, spring from it. One aim of the Pangerman
plan was actually to put an end to the enormous difficulties which
Germany had created for herself by the hypertrophy of her industries, and
by thus upsetting the proper balance which had formerly existed between
her agricultural and her industrial productions.

The truth of this deep-seated and unique cause of the war is demonstrated
by:

1º. The intellectual preparation, in all domains, of the Pangerman plan
for twenty-five years.

2º. Such explicit and ancient avowals as the following. In 1898
Rear-Admiral von Goetzen, an intimate friend of the Kaiser, being at
Manilla, said to the American, Admiral Dewey, who had just destroyed
the Spanish fleet before Manilla: “You will not believe me, but in about
fifteen years my country will begin war. At the end of two months we
shall hold Paris; but that will only form one step towards our real
goal—the overthrow of England. Every event will happen exactly at its
proper time, for we shall be ready and our enemies will not” (quoted by
the _Echo de Paris_, 24th September, 1915, from the _Naval and Military
Record_).

3º. The material facts of world-wide preparation, obviously for war,
made several months previous to its outbreak, but not till the Kaiser
had decided to start it, that is, towards November, 1913. (Proofs:
declaration of William II. on 6th November, 1913, to King Albert of
Belgium; interview of the Kaiser with the Arch-Duke Ferdinand, April,
1914, at Miramar, and in June, 1914, at Konopischt, where Admiral Tirpitz
accompanied the Kaiser.)

These material facts are endless, but it will suffice to recall the
following as truly significant, because they have required a long and
complicated effort: first, the organization for the victualling of the
piratical German cruisers on all the seas of the globe, in view of a long
war of piracy; and second, the preparation of the revolt against England
in South Africa.

The immediate causes which decided William II. to precipitate the war are:

1º. The defeat of Turkey in 1912 by Italy and the Balkan
peoples—a defeat which, by threatening Berlin influence in
Constantinople, endangered the hold which Germany already had
on the Ottoman Empire.

2º. The consequences of the Bukarest treaty, which in 1913
had erected automatically a formidable barrier against the
Pangerman pretensions in the Balkans.

3º. The internal evolution of Austria-Hungary, which, because
of the steady progress made by the Latin and Slav subjects
of Francis Joseph, threatened shortly to free the Hapsburg
Monarchy from the tutelage of Berlin.

[Illustration: THE THREE BARRIERS OF ANTIGERMANIC PEOPLES IN THE BALKANS
AND IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.]

The facts of the last two groups would have completed in Central Europe
and in the Balkans the three anti-German barriers indicated on the map
(see p. 43) by deep black lines. Now, these barriers would have hindered
once and for ever the achievement of the Pangerman plan.

To parry these blows only one resource remained to William II., and that
was war—“the national industry of Prussia,” as Mirabeau used to say, and
his very pithy and apt remark has been too long forgotten.

CHAPTER III.

HOW FAR THE PANGERMAN PLAN WAS CARRIED OUT AT THE BEGINNING OF 1916.

I. German pretensions in the West.

II. German pretensions in the East.

III. German pretensions in the South and South-East.

IV. General view of the execution of the Pangerman plan from
1911 to the beginning of 1916.

In this chapter we shall inquire what relation existed between the actual
gains and the pretensions of the Pangermans at the beginning of 1916,
and those which were foreseen in the 1911 plan. In order to be quite
explicit we shall analyse successively those gains and pretensions in the
west, east, south, and south-west. This analysis will enable us finally
to present a general view of the execution of the Pangerman plan at the
period under consideration.

The map (p. 46) sums up Prussianized Germany’s pretensions which she
still expected to carry out west of the Rhine at the beginning of 1916.

The best way to prove this intention is by means of extracts from the
memorial sent by the most powerful German associations on May 20th, 1915,
to the Imperial Chancellor (quoted by _Le Temps_, 12th August, 1915). I
have mentioned (see page 18) why this document must be looked upon as of
extremely exceptional importance.

[Illustration: THE GERMAN CLAIMS IN THE WEST (BEGINNING OF 1916).]

As to what concerns Belgium the memorial says:

“Because it is needful to insure our credit on sea and our military and
economic situation for the future in face of England, because the Belgian
territory, which is of the greatest economic importance, is closely
linked to our principal industrial territory, Belgium must be subjected
to the legislation of the Empire in monetary, financial and postal
matters. Her railways and her water courses must be closely connected
with our communications. By constituting a Walloon territory and a
Flemish territory with a preponderance of the Flemish, and by putting
into German hands the properties and the economic undertakings which are
of vital importance for dominating the country, we shall organize the
government and the administration in such a manner that the inhabitants
will not be able to acquire any influence over the political destiny of
the German Empire.”

In a word, it is slavery that is promised to the Belgians. In order to
prove clearly that this means exactly the achievement of the plan Berlin
had elaborated for twenty-five years, it is important to notice that
the fate of the annexed populations, meted out in the above memorial,
is exactly the same fate mentioned in the pamphlet published under the
auspices of the _Alldeutscher Verband_, the Pangerman Union, wherein the
Pangerman plan of 1895 is set forth (_see the text already quoted, p. 4_).

The only difference to be noticed in the evolution of the Pangerman ideas
between 1895 and 1916 is that after their experience with the Slavs and
Latins of Austria-Hungary, the Germans deem it possible and advantageous,
by an application of Prussian methods of terrorism, to compel non-Germans
to fight for the benefit of Pangermany; true, these people shudder with
horror at the notion, but stiffened by a strong infusion of Germans, they
are forced to march to the shambles in order to secure slavery and bread
for their families under the German yoke.

“As to France,” continues the memorial of the 20th May, 1915, to the
Imperial Chancellor, “always in consideration of our position towards
England, it is of vital interest for us, in respect of our future on the
seas, that we should own the coast which borders on Belgium more or less
up to the Somme, which would give us an outlet on the Atlantic Ocean.
The _Hinterland_, which it is necessary to annex at the same time, must
be of such an extent that economically and strategically the ports,
where the canals terminate, can be utilized to the utmost. Any other
territorial conquest in France, beyond the necessary annexation of the
mining basins of Briey, should only be made in virtue of considerations
of military strategy. In this connection, after the experience of this
war, it is only natural that we should not expose our frontiers to fresh
enemy invasions by leaving to the adversary fortresses which threaten
us, especially Verdun and Belfort and the Western buttresses of the
Vosges, which are situated between those two fortresses. By the conquest
of the line of the Meuse and of the French coast, with the mouths of the
canals, we should acquire, besides the iron districts of Briey already
mentioned, the coal districts of the departments of the _Nord_ and of the
_Pas de Calais_. This expansion of territory, quite an obvious matter
after the experience obtained in Alsace-Lorraine, presupposes that the
populations of the annexed districts shall not be able to obtain a
political influence on the destiny of the German Empire, and that all
means of economic power which exist on these territories, including
landed property, both large and middling, will pass into German hands;
France will receive and compensate the landowners.”

In order to justify these formidable annexations the memorial of the
20th May, in harmony with the frank cynicism of the Pangerman doctrine,
adduces no argument but the convenience of Prussia and the profitableness
of the booty to be got.

“If the fortress of Longwy, with the numerous blast furnaces of the
region, were returned to the French, and if a new war broke out, with
a few long range guns the German furnaces of Luxemburg (list of which
is given) would be paralyzed in a few hours.... Thus about 20% of the
production of crude iron and of German steel would be lost....

“Let us say, bye the bye, that the high production of steel derived from
the iron-ore gives to German agriculture the only chance of obtaining
the phosphoric acid needed when the importation of phosphates is
blockaded.

“The security of the German Empire, in a future war, requires therefore
imperatively the ownership of all mines of iron-ore including the
fortresses of Longwy and of Verdun, which are necessary to defend the
region.”

These various declarations, made on high authority enable us to affirm,
that on the whole the annexations which the Pangermans intended to make
in the West would have extended in France more or less to a line drawn
from the South of Belfort to the mouth of the Somme, that is, so far
as concerns France, they would comprise a total area of 50,271 square
kilometres, which, before the war, held 5,768,000 inhabitants.

Further, as regards France, the intended annexations were, according to
Pangerman conceptions, to have had a double effect.

1º. By taking over the richest industrial and mining French regions,
Germany would secure an enormous booty.

2º. Deprived of her most productive departments, which bear the main
burden of taxes, and which hold mining elements indispensable to economic
life, France would have been maimed and reduced to a state from which it
would have been a sheer impossibility for her to recover or ever again to
become a power capable of thwarting in any shape whatsoever the future
determinations of Germany.

A few figures will enable us to verify this forecast. At the beginning
of 1916 the Germans were holding 138,000 hectares of the coal basin of
the department of the _Nord_, being 41% of the total superficies worked
in France (337,000 hectares), or about three-fourths of the total French
production. The Germans also occupied 63,000 hectares of the iron-ore
basin of Lorraine which represents 75% of the superficies of all the iron
beds worked in France (83,000 hectares), and nine-tenths of the total
production. It is clear, that were such a state of things to continue,
economic and therefore national life would be made radically impossible
in France, shorn of her vital organs. In reality France would be in a
position of entire dependence on Germany in accordance with the Pangerman
schemes for the future.

It is still necessary to mention that in the territories occupied by
Germany in the West, as well as everywhere else, the measures already
taken by the Germans in 1916 were not merely measures of military
defence, but measures for the organization and permanent possession of
the said territories. These measures to ensure permanent possession may
be classed in the following categories:

_Measures of terrorism_ applied in Prussian fashion so as to bring into
subjection all refractory elements.

_Measures of division_, such as in Belgium, the Germans take in order
to rouse, by all possible means, opposition between the Flemish and the
Walloons for the purpose of neutralizing the one by the other.

_Measures of strict and regular administration_ in order, by the bait
of some external or economic advantages, to accustom to the German yoke
those elements of the population whose moral resistance, in the opinion
of Berlin, can be most easily broken.

_Measures tending to prepare the German colonization of the new
territories._ These have mostly consisted in applying the Pangerman
theory of _Evacuation_, that is, by systematically transporting the
unfortunate women or old people whom Germany considers absolutely useless
in her future possessions. She found it, for instance, very convenient
to rid herself without delay of these poor creatures especially when
the question of feeding them cropped up; so these “useless mouths” were
promptly transferred to the shoulders of the enemy, whom Germany already
looked upon as vanquished. That is the theory of _Evacuation_, which
explains to a large extent why the German authorities have sent back to
France that part of the populations of the occupied territories in France
and Belgium whom, on exact inquiry, they regarded as human wastage.

* * * * *

No doubt, as is shown on map (p. 46), Germany did not at the beginning
of 1916 occupy quite all the territories she coveted. She missed Calais,
Belfort, and Verdun, but it is easy to see that she did so only by a
hair’s breadth.

The Western territories which were to enter into the Germanic
Confederation of the 1911 plan include:

Square Kilometres.

Holland 38,141
Belgium 29,451
Luxemburg 2,586
French Departments 50,271
-------
Total 120,449

Now Luxemburg and Belgium were entirely occupied (excepting a patch of
Belgium). If Germany was to hold Belgium, Holland, which is not occupied,
but which is geographically invested, would inevitably be forced to enter
into the Germanic Confederation. We must, therefore, consider Holland
as being virtually under Germany’s thumb. As, on the other hand, out of
50,271 square kilometres which she wished to annex at the expense of
France, Germany, at the beginning of 1916, occupied 20,300, we conclude
that the German enterprises in the West, which, according to programme,
ought to have comprised 120,449 square kilometres, in point of fact
extended directly or indirectly over 90,478 square kilometres.

Germany therefore, early in 1916, had achieved in the West an occupation
foreseen by the plan of 1911 and at the expense of non-Germans in the
proportion of 76% or three-fourths.

II.

The Pangerman plan of 1911 had provided for the permanent exclusion of
Russia as a great power by means of two measures:

1º. To carve out of the Empire of the Tsars and annex to the German
Confederation a slice of territory large enough to cut off Russia
entirely from the West.

2º. To constitute at the expense of Russia, thus reduced, new States
which should bow the knee to Berlin.

Mr. Dietrich Schaefer, the well-known historian, in the Review _Panther_,
affirmed, early in February, 1915: “It is absolutely necessary for us
to expand the sphere of our power, especially eastward ... the immense
Russian force must recede behind the Dnieper” (quoted by _L’Information_,
5th February, 1915).

A Swedish pamphlet, ascribed to the Germanophile, Adrian Molin,
explained, also early in 1915, that Germany, with the help of Sweden,
was to have given the finishing stroke in separating Russia from Europe
by means of a barrier formed of Buffer-States, to wit, Finland and
the Ukraine. Now, for the last twenty-five years in particular, the
Pangerman agents have endeavoured to sow the seeds of rebellion among
the 20 millions of Small-Russians who live in the Russian Governments
grouped around Kieff. Finally, the Moslem regions of Russia (Caucasus,
Central Asia, etc.) were to form special States under the sway of
Turkish suzerainty, and, through that channel, to bear the yoke of German
influence.

[Illustration: THE GERMAN CLAIMS IN THE EAST.]

Such were the means elaborated at Berlin to bring about the annihilation
of Russia as a great power, when once her armies had been destroyed;
and this might have happened perhaps, if the English intervention, by
enabling France to make a stand, had not prevented Germany from first
smashing France and then concentrating all her forces against the Empire
of the Tsar, in accordance with the plan of the General Staff of Berlin.

We can form an estimate of the annexations which Germany, as late as
the beginning of 1916, still hoped to effect at the cost of Russia by
examining the memorial of May 20th, 1915, addressed to the Imperial
Chancellor; although the phraseology in which it is drawn up aims at
concealing the full extent of the Pangerman demands, it yet tallies, in
its tendencies, with the programme published by Tannenberg in 1911:

“With regard to the East,” says that memorial, “the following
consideration must guide us: For the great increase of industrial
power which we expect in the West we must secure a counterpoise by the
annexation of an agricultural territory of equal value in the East.
It is necessary to strengthen the agricultural basis of our national
economy; to secure room for the expansion of a great German agricultural
settlement; to restore to our Empire the German peasants living in a
foreign land, particularly in Russia, who are now actually without the
protection of the law; finally, we must increase considerably the number
of our fellow countrymen able to bear arms; all these matters require an
important extension of the frontiers of the Empire and of Prussia towards
the East through the annexation of at least some parts of the Baltic
provinces and of territories to the South of them, while keeping in view
the necessity of a military defence of the Eastern German frontier.

“As to what political rights to give to the inhabitants of the new
territories and as to what guarantees are necessary to further German
influence and economics, we will merely refer to what we have said about
France. The war indemnity to be exacted from Russia should to a large
extent consist in the surrender of territory” (see _Le Temps_, 12th
August, 1915).

In his speech of 11th December, 1915, William II.’s Chancellor, in a
sentence full of significance, gave his hearers to understand that such
were indeed the pretensions of Germany:

“Our troops,” said he, “in conjunction with the Austro-Hungarian, are
taking up strongly fortified positions of defence far within the Russian
territory. They are ready to resume their forward march.”

Just as in the West, all the measures taken by the Germans in the East
have been not only for defence, but for organization in view of keeping
the occupied territories. These measures come under the various heads I
indicated. (_See_ p. 50.)

With the Poles, the Germans used the same tactics as with the Flemish
people of Belgium. After having terrorized the Poles, the Prussian
authorities granted them, in the use of their own language for scholastic
purposes, certain privileges which compare advantageously with the former
state of things resulting from that detestable bureaucratic régime of
Russia, which, with a complete lack of foresight, had by its vexatious
measures seriously imperilled in Poland the true interests of the empire
of the Tsars. Again, in the East the Germans promoted husbandry. They
constructed railroads and coach roads. No doubt all these steps were
taken mainly in the interest of Germany. It is quite clear that the
advantages conceded to the Poles can only be considered as temporary.
This is proved sufficiently by the Prussian system so long pursued in
Posen. However, the Germans flatter themselves that by these measures
they favourably impress some portion of the Poles, who are simple
enough to imagine that Germany will reconstitute a Polish State of 20
millions of inhabitants in order to give this State to the Poles at the
expense of Russia. It was with such an end in view that Berlin thought
of proclaiming the autonomy of Poland. At the same time Germany reckons
on establishing in Poland a system of conscription so as to utilize, by
force if necessary, the Polish recruits, just as she has done with the
Slavs of Austria-Hungary, in the interest of Pangermany.

* * * * *

From the territorial standpoint the Pangerman pretensions of the 1911
plan in the East are summarized in the following table:

Square
Kilometres. Inhabitants.

The ten Governments of Russian
Poland 127,320 12,467,000

Three Baltic Provinces (Esthonia,
Livonia, Courland) 94,564 2,686,000

The three Russian Governments
at the South of the Baltic
Provinces (Kovno, Vilna, Grodno) 121,840 5,728,000
------- ----------
Total 343,724 20,881,000

Now at the beginning of 1916, out of these 343,724 square kilometres, as
the map will show, the Germans occupied about 260,000. They therefore
had carried out in the East the plan of 1911 at the cost of non-German
populations to the extent of 75% or three-fourths.

III.

The zones of absolute influence, whether direct or indirect, which
Germany, in accordance with the 1911 plan, has tried to secure for
herself in the South and South-East of her present frontiers, comprise
three totally distinct groups of territory: Austria-Hungary, the Balkans,
and Turkey. It is therefore advisable to examine separately how at the
beginning of 1916 Germany stood in respect of each of these three groups.

[Illustration: THE GERMAN CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST.]

1º. Austria-Hungary.

Let us make no mistake, Austria-Hungary is actually as much under
William II.’s domination as is Belgium. The European conflict has
enabled Germany artfully to occupy the Empire of the Hapsburgs under
the pretence of defending it, in fact to seize it as provided for by
the plan of 1911. Since the beginning of 1915 all the troops of Francis
Joseph have been entirely under the orders of the Berlin General Staff.
Even if Austria-Hungary wished to make a separate peace, she could not
do so, for all her motive power, diplomatic and military, is exclusively
controlled by the Kaiser’s agents. The Austro-German alliance is merely
a piece of stage scenery. The much-talked of device of smuggling the
Hapsburg Empire into Germany by a back door, that is, by her entrance
into the _Zollverein_ or Customs Union, is a broad farce. It can merely
deceive those, alas still too numerous, who are insufficiently informed
of the true facts in Austria-Hungary. The Austro-German fusion in the
shape of a Customs Union is besides no novelty. The process of absorbing
Austria-Hungary was foreseen and described in detail in the Pangerman
pamphlet of 1895, showing the fundamental lines of the plan of that date.
All the fuss made at the beginning of 1916 by the German Press about the
so-called wishes of the Austro-Hungarians to enter into the _Zollverein_
has been the most “Kolossal” and the most dishonest of bluffs. In truth,
nearly three-fourths of the populations at present subject to Francis
Joseph do not want to be absorbed into Germany at any price, neither
in a political, nor in an economic fashion. All the stir made in the
Central Empires about the entrance of the Hapsburg Monarchy into the
_Zollverein_, has been the doing of Pangerman bear leaders at Berlin
or Vienna and of the Magyar aristocracy, and not at all of the Magyar
people, which is not the same thing. Let us therefore not be duped by the
bluff of the German press on the _Zollverein_ question. The microscopic
minority who wish it in Austria-Hungary plays the Berlin game. What is
undeniable is that at present Austria-Hungary is entirely under the
Prussian thumb.

2º. The Balkans.

The whole of Serbia has been overrun by the Germans. The predicament
of the Serbian population is extremely cruel. Either they have been
massacred, or systematically famished or deported to Germany to work
in the factories or on the German land. These appalling measures of
coercion have not prevented the Kaiser from addressing a manifesto: “To
_my_ noble and heroic Serbian People.” The aim was, by fine words, to
disarm morally the remainder of the Serbian population, terrorized by a
series of sufferings unsurpassed in history. As to Serbia, the Kaiser
offered part of it to Austria, always in accordance with the plan of 1895
which provided for this solution; for to give a fraction of Serbia to
Austria as a member of the _Zollverein_, is practically to put it under
the direct domination of Germany.

As to Bulgaria, the ally of Germany, she is entirely absorbed, and the
Germans there behave as rulers so far as they possibly can. Heroic
Montenegro has suffered exactly the same fate as Serbia, one part of
Albania is also occupied. If the Allies had been fatuous enough not to
understand, at the eleventh hour, the importance of Salonika, Greece
and Roumania, where Germanophile elements are not numerous but very
influential, would already have obeyed to the letter the orders of Berlin.

Supposing, for argument’s sake, that there were a German victory, we
would immediately see Germany constituting a Balkan Confederation under
the headship of Austria, considered as a Balkan power, simply because,
under the name of Austria, it would really be Germany who would impose
her will on the future confederation.

3º. Turkey.

At the beginning of 1916, before the Russian advance in Armenia, the
Ottoman Empire throughout its entire length was subjected to the
influence of Germany; that influence had even spread to Persia. We
have here an event which would have had an extreme importance for the
development of the Panislamic movement directed simultaneously against
Russia, France and England, if the Anglo-Russian attitude had not
recently put a stopper on German intrigues in the Shah’s Empire.

“The establishment of direct relations with Turkey is of inestimable
military value,” said the German Chancellor in his speech of December
11th, 1915, “while on the economic side the possibility of importing
goods from the Balkan States and from Turkey will increase our supplies
in a most satisfactory way” (see _Le Temps_, 11th December, 1915). It
would be a mistake to see in these words the result of a mere bluff, of
which the Germans are so often lavish. If the Allies left Germany time to
draw from Turkey all the military and economic resources expected from
her at Berlin, future events would evidently prove that the Imperial
Chancellor’s words deserve to be taken seriously.

* * * * *

To sum up, the Pangerman plan of 1911 provided in the South and
South-East for:

+------------------------------------+-------------+--------------+
| | Square | |
| | Kilometres. | Inhabitants. |
+------------------------------------+-------------+--------------+
| The absorption of Austria-Hungary | 676,616 | 50,000,000 |
| | | |
| The establishment of immediate | | |
| and absolute German influence on | | |
| the Balkan States | 490,275 | 22,000,000 |
| | | |
| The establishment of exclusive | | |
| German influence on Turkey | 1,792,900 | 20,000,000 |
+------------------------------------+-------------+--------------+
| Total | 2,959,791 | 92,000,000 |
+------------------------------------+-------------+--------------+

Now, at the beginning of 1916, the plan of 1911 was carried out in the
following proportions:

Austria-Hungary had her 676,616 square kilometres occupied (minus the
small area in the hands of the Italians), being more or less 100%.

In the Balkans, at the same date, under direct German influence, we have:

Square Kilometres.
Bulgaria 114,105
Serbia 87,300
Montenegro 14,180
-------
Total 215,585

equalling 43% of the total of the Balkan States’ territory.

In Turkey the German influence was exerted over almost the entire
territory, therefore in the proportion of 100%.

If we now add the figures belonging to the three territorial groups aimed
at by the 1911 plan in the South and South-East we shall see that Germany
has carried out her programme on

Square Kilometres.
Austria-Hungary 676,616
Balkans 215,585
Turkey 1,792,900
---------
Total 2,685,101

As the total plan aimed at the German direct or indirect seizure of
2,968,791 square kilometres, we see that, considered in that light, the
goal of the 1911 plan has been reached in the South and South-East in the
proportion of 89%, being roughly nine-tenths.

Now I have shown (_pp. 52 and 56_) that Germany occupied or controlled
early in 1916:

In the West over 90,478 square kilometres.

In the East over 260,000 square kilometres.

We have just seen that in the South and South-East the German plan has
been achieved over 2,685,101 square kilometres.

Of course all the territories included in that last figure are far from
having the same value, especially those of part of Turkey, but in that
figure Austria-Hungary alone claims 676,616 square kilometres, that is,
she alone represents a seizure, disguised it may be, yet not less real,
which is infinitely more considerable than the German occupations in the
West and East.

From these calculations it clearly follows that the part of the Pangerman
plan which concerns Austria-Hungary, the Balkans and Turkey, that is,
Central Europe and the East, forms by far the main part of the Pangerman
scheme. That is an observation of extreme importance for the Allies and
for Neutrals, because of the world-wide consequences which flow from the
scheme summed up in the formula, “From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.”
These consequences will be stated in Chapter V.

IV.

The Pangerman plan of 1911 (_see map, p. 12_) included:

1º. The formation of a great German Confederation which was to put under
the absolute supremacy of the present German Empire (540,858 square
kilometres and 68 million inhabitants) foreign territories situated
around Germany, which form a superficies of 1,182,113 square kilometres
and hold 94 million inhabitants.

The figures given (_pp. 52, 56 and 61_) suffice to prove that the German
seizure of these territories extended at the beginning of 1916:

Square Kilometres.
To the West 90,478
To the East 260,000
To the South (Austria-Hungary) 676,616
---------
Total 1,027,094

Germany has therefore, so far as concerns the territories to be absorbed
into the Germanic Confederation, achieved her programme in the proportion
of 86%, or about nine-tenths.

2º. The absolute subordination to Germany of all the Balkan States, whose
superficies is 499,275 square kilometres, holding 22 million inhabitants.
We have seen above (_p. 61_), that the German seizure actually extends
over 215,585 square kilometres. The German programme, therefore, as
regards the Balkans, has been achieved in the proportion of 43%.

3º. The more or less veiled seizure by Germany of the Ottoman Empire,
being 1,792,900 square kilometres, holding 20 million inhabitants. Now,
early in 1916 the exclusive German influence was felt over the whole of
Turkey. As regards her the German plan had therefore been achieved in the
proportion of 100%.

Let us now group the figures which will enable us to show in what
proportion the whole Pangerman plan of 1911 has been actually achieved by
Germany:

+-------------------------------------+-------------+-------------+
| | Provisions | Actual |
| | of the 1911 |achievements.|
| |plan. Square | Square |
| | Kilometres. | Kilometres.|
+-------------------------------------+-------------+-------------+
|1. Territories to be absorbed in the | | |
| great Germanic Confederation | 1,182,113 | 1,027,094 |
|2. Balkans | 499,275 | 215,585 |
|3. Turkey | 1,792,900 | 1,792,900 |
| +-------------+-------------+
| Total | 3,474,288 | 3,035,579 |
+-------------------------------------+-------------+-------------+

These figures prove to demonstration that early in 1916 Germany had
achieved the Pangerman plan of 1911 in the enormous proportion of 87%, or
about nine-tenths.

This figure is graphically confirmed by the annexed map; we can see at
a glance the geographical as well as superficial relations which exist
between the boundaries of the plan of 1911 and the fronts occupied early
in 1916 by armies exclusively subordinate to Berlin.

[Illustration: THE PLAN OF 1911 AND THE EXTENT OF ITS EXECUTION AT THE
BEGINNING OF 1916.]

These geographical and mathematical considerations, the importance of
which cannot escape us, explain why and under what conditions Germany
wished to make peace. She wished it simply because, as the _Frankfurter
Zeitung_ owned, without mincing matters, in December, 1915, the goal of
the war had been reached.

Nine-tenths of the whole of the Pangerman plan of 1911 having been
practically achieved, in spite of England’s intervention, which,
however, had upset the German Staff’s plan, it is absolutely clear that
the results obtained by Germany have been considerable in the extreme.
Nothing could therefore be more to her advantage now than to succeed
in putting an end to the war at a time when German influence extends
unchecked over almost the whole of the invaded territories.

These statements again explain why Berlin has for such a long time
been occupied with the most subtle and most complex manœuvres for the
opening of peace negotiations—attempts at a separate agreement with
Russia, efforts to obtain the Pope’s intervention, advances made by
the pseudo-socialists of the Kaiser towards their former comrades
of belligerent countries, incitements to pacificists of all neutral
countries, etc. Germany would have concluded peace at the moment which
was most favourable to her, so as to be able to impose on the territories
which she has either conquered or controls the special status provided
for each of them by the Pangerman plan. But of course Germany would only
have made such treaties as were compatible with her retention of all the
regions she occupied at the time. As Major Moraht said very clearly in
the _Berliner Tageblatt_: “Our military chiefs are not in the habit of
giving back what we have acquired at the price of blood and of sacrifice”
(_Le Matin_, 27th December, 1915).

Lastly, the chief reason why Berlin wanted peace is that the prolongation
of the war can only compromise and finally ruin all the results obtained
by Germany.

CHAPTER IV.

SPECIAL FEATURES GIVEN TO THE WAR BY THE PANGERMAN PLAN.

I. All the great political questions of the old world are
raised and must be solved.

II. As the war is made by Germany in order to achieve a
gigantic scheme of slavery, it follows that it is waged by her
in flagrant violation of international law.

III. A struggle of tenacity and of duplicity on the side of
Berlin _versus_ constancy and solidarity on the side of the
Allies.

The Diplomatic Corps, having ignored the Pangerman plan for reasons
already shown (_pp. 19_ _et seq._), it is quite natural that the General
Staffs and the public opinion of Allied countries should have been
equally ignorant. From this general absence of knowledge there has
resulted a vagueness and inadequacy in the view taken of the ultimate
aims of Germany in the war; and in consequence the co-ordination of the
Allied efforts has remained for a long while very imperfect. Each of the
Allied nations, in fact, was at first so taken up with its own interests
that they all lost sight of what ought to have been the common object of
their common action.

The Russians entered into the struggle against the Germans especially to
prevent Serbia from being crushed, and at the same time to put an end to
those veiled but profoundly humiliating ultimatums which Berlin for some
years has delivered to Petrograd. The Italians, specially fascinated by
Trent and Trieste, have long thought that they could limit their war to
a conflict with the house of Hapsburg, when in reality the only and true
enemy of the Italian people—as now the latter is more and more clearly
aware—is Prussian Pangermanism. As for the English, they entered the
lists for two fundamental reasons: the violation of Belgium’s neutrality
aroused their indignation, and a just sense of their own interests has
convinced them that they could not allow France to be crushed without
at the same time acquiescing in the ultimate disappearance of Great
Britain. Completely unprepared for Continental war, England has very
well understood from the beginning of hostilities that these might be
very much prolonged, but she had not the slightest notion that British
interests would be as completely threatened as they have been in Central
Europe, in Turkey, in Egypt, and in India. As to the French, the German
aggression immediately raised in their minds and in their hearts the
question of Alsace-Lorraine. This has hypnotized them to such a degree,
to their own loss, that they have too long considered the fight merely
a Franco-German war, whereas they ought to have viewed the European
conflagration in its full dimensions.

This piece-meal way of looking at the facts has been of the greatest
disservice to all the Allies. Indeed it has had the effect of preventing
them from discerning at the right time the special character which the
extraordinary extent of the Pangerman plan must necessarily give to the
war.

The very vastness of the Pangerman plan of 1911, demonstrated beyond
dispute by the facts that have come to light, suffices to prove that
Berlin meant to solve for her own profit, at one single blow, all the
great political questions latent in the old world.

[Illustration: THE GREAT POLITICAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE WAR.]

The claims of Germany on the East, shown on the accompanying map by the
thinner black line, raised the question of Poland in its immense extent
and in all its complexity. The claims of Germany towards the West, also
shown on the map by the thinner black line, involved the independence of
Holland, of Belgium, of Luxemburg, of France, threatened with the loss of
vital territories. Further, towards the West the German aggression has
brought forward the question of Alsace-Lorraine from the French point of
view. Moreover, since Germany aims at establishing her absolute supremacy
from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, in order to stretch her political
tentacles to the Far East and to the whole world by means which will be
shown in Chapter V. the present war compels the powers to face the whole
Eastern question (Balkans and Turkey, shown on the map by similar black
lines), and also the whole question of Austria. (Used in this sense the
expression Austria indicates the whole of the Hapsburg Dominion, that
is, the territory enclosed by a thick black line.) In short, the whole
of the great foreign questions are raised at one blow before the world by
the aggression of the Berlin Government.

The Germans, having studied thoroughly for a very long time all these
problems, have also provided for each of them a solution in accordance
with their most cynical interests. The result is that all these political
problems, raised simultaneously, form a tangled skein, and that the
Allies will never be really victorious till they can compel the Germans
to accept those solutions of the great problems which by the nature of
things must be the direct contrary of those foreshadowed by Berlin. The
Eastern question which is now raised in Europe is no longer the old
orthodox question but a Prussianized Eastern question coloured in all its
aspects by the present and future ambitions of the Hohenzollerns. In the
same way the question of modern Austria is no longer the old Austrian
question which consisted in the traditional struggle of the Hapsburgs
with their various nationalities. What the Allies have now to consider
in Central Europe is the question of Austria Prussianized by means of
two essential facts: the covert but exclusive influence which Berlin
has increasingly exercised over Vienna, especially for the last fifteen
years, and the hold which the Hohenzollerns have got by means of the
war over the whole of the Hapsburg Monarchy, which includes 28 millions
of Slav and Latin populations bowed under the yoke, with no hope of
deliverance except through the crushing of Prussian militarism.

II.

The Pangerman plan finally gives to the struggle which it has initiated a
character of sanguinary horror without parallel in history.

In short, William II., after having roused by means of Pangerman
propaganda amongst his people violent desires of conquest and plunder,
has declared war with the fixed idea that it will lead in Europe
and in Turkey to the supremacy of 77 millions of Germans, over 127
millions of non-Germans. The small but violent Prussophile Camarilla
of Vienna, a group of Magyar aristocrats in league with Count Tisza, a
handful of pseudo young Turks bought by Berlin, have been the Kaiser’s
accomplices. Finally, it is these few men alone who have drawn into war
50 million Austro-Hungarians and 20 million Ottomans, that is, 70 million
belligerents, the vast majority of whom certainly did not wish for a
sanguinary conflict. From all this it is clear that these peoples were
betrayed into the war by their Kings or their Turco-Magyar governments.

The origin as well as the object of the war make it therefore the most
cruelly reactionary enterprise conceivable. It is so to such a degree
that those who in France are called reactionaries and who compared to
the Prussian _Junkers_ are great Liberals, find themselves in close
agreement with the most ardent Socialists in desiring the total ruin of
an enterprise which, if successful, would put the modern world back into
the Middle Ages in the most odious fashion. But this time it would be a
mediæval state of things made immutable through the force of the most
modern science, which would stop the clock of progress. The death-dealing
electric current which runs in the metallic wires actually forming an
impassable barrier between Belgium and Holland forms a perfect symbol of
what the Pangerman prison would be for those who do not belong to the
German nationality.

On the other hand, the very fact that they pursue a plan of gigantic and
unheard of slavery has logically led the Germans, first cynically to
violate all the laws of war between belligerents, and then systematically
to commit abominable crimes against common law, whether at the expense
of neutrals whom they would terrorize, such as the factory hands of the
United States, or at the expense of the unhappy civil populations of the
“burglared” regions, populations whose sufferings are indescribable.
The events resulting from Pangerman terrorism are so numerous and so
unutterably atrocious that historians will find the greatest difficulty
in painting the Dantesque picture of all these crimes in their colossal
horror. Undoubtedly the Germans wage war in a manner which assimilates
them to vulgar burglars and assassins, and therefore to common criminals.
They have thus placed themselves beyond the pale of humanity, and those
who outside of Germany knowingly help them in their task of enslaving
Europe are nothing more or less than accomplices and should be dealt with
as such.

III.

On January 19th, 1916, in the Reichstag, Deputy Martin stated that “The
German nation would be very ill-pleased if Germany were to restore the
territories she now occupies” (_Le Temps_, 21st January, 1916). This
sentence summarizes the opinion prevalent beyond the Rhine.

In their endeavours to retain the greater part of the territories
occupied by them at the beginning of 1916 the Germans have combined
military measures with political manœuvres.

[Illustration: THE GERMAN FORTRESS AT THE BEGINNING OF 1916.]

They have entrenched themselves tremendously on all fronts which
the Allies could possibly attack. By the accumulation everywhere of
defensive works, machine-guns and heavy artillery, the Germans hope
to counter-balance the losses of their troops and thus to persevere
in their resistance to the allied attacks, till the enemy grow weary
of the dreadful struggle. The experience of the war having proved how
extremely difficult it is to pierce strongly fortified lines, the German
Headquarters Staff appears to have taken this knowledge as the base of
the following calculation:

“We have achieved nine-tenths of the annexations on which we counted;
only Calais, Verdun, Belfort, Riga and Salonika are wanting. We will
try to obtain possession of these places if opportunity offers; if not,
in order to avoid excessive risks, we shall remain everywhere in Europe
on a keen defensive, but we will pretend, all the time, to wish to take
the offensive, so as to mislead our adversaries. If the Franco-English
insist on concentrating their efforts, above all against our lines of the
Western front, as these lines are manifold and very strong, the enemy
losses will be such, that even if they succeed in throwing us back, they
will finally be so utterly exhausted as to be unable to cross the Rhine.
Therefore, they will be powerless to dictate peace to Germany.”

Surely the Allies, taught by experience, can foil this probable
calculation of their antagonists by well managed, simultaneous attacks on
the whole accessible circuit of the German fortress. In fact this is what
the Allies seem more and more inclined to do.

The indented line on the map (p. 72) shows what a strange shape is
assumed by the enormous territories which build up that fortress. For
alimentary purposes it is victualled, firstly, by the resources of
non-German countries which are occupied and most thoroughly drained,
and secondly by importations; which come through the channel of neutral
countries—Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Roumania, and Switzerland—which have
responded, more or less liberally, whether voluntarily or not, to the
pressing applications of Germany.

On the other hand, thanks to the passage through the Balkans, the German
fortress, early in 1916, had a wide open door on Persia, the Caucasus,
Central-Russian Asia, Afghanistan, India and Egypt. After having armed
all the Moslems on whom they could lay hands, and who were able to
shoulder a gun, the German Staff reckoned on striking at Great Britain
and Russia in all these directions. The successes obtained by the Tsar’s
troops in Eastern Turkey have, since then, baffled these projects.

On the other hand, as Germany has nothing whatever to gain by a
prolongation of the war, she will continue to aim at a rupture of the
Coalition by means of every possible political manœuvre. It is clear that
the defection of one of the principal Allies would necessarily place
all the others in vastly more difficult positions for continuing the
struggle. Assuming that such a thing were to happen, the Germans could,
indeed, hope to discuss peace on the base of the territories which they
actually occupy. They will therefore repeat and increase their bids for
a separate peace with one or other of their adversaries. When once their
position becomes very difficult the Germans, so as to shatter at all cost
the Coalition, will make propositions of separate peace to one of the
Allies, offering that one country almost complete satisfaction in the
hope that, swayed perhaps by a section of their people who have grown
weary of war, that Allied country will lay down her arms.

The Allied State which, contrary to its plighted faith, should separately
treat with Berlin, would soon be punished for its infamy. By allowing
Germany to conclude peace more or less on the basis of the territories
she at present holds, the traitor State would find itself afterwards
confronted by a formidable German Empire, and would inevitably become one
of its first victims.

The Germans will perhaps try to play on the Allies the “armistice trick.”
Here, again, we should have a cunning calculation founded once more on
the weariness of the combatants. It is, indeed, conceivable that a simple
armistice might end in allowing Germany to hold finally most of her
actual territorial acquisitions; but it could so end only by means of a
manœuvre which we must now expose.

No doubt they must make at Berlin the following calculation, which
theoretically has something to be said for it: “If an armistice were
signed, the Allied soldiers would think: ‘They are talking, therefore it
means peace, and demobilization will soon follow.’ Under these conditions
the effect will be the moral slackening of our adversaries.” The Germans
could not ask for anything better. They would open peace negotiations
with the following astute idea. To understand the manœuvre we must
remember the proposals of peace which that active agent, Dr. Alfred
Hermann Fried, of Vienna, was charged to throw out as a sounding-lead
on the 27th December, 1915, in an article of the _Nouvelle Gazette de
Zurich_, which made a great stir. These proposals were mixed up with
provisoes, which would allow the discussion to be opened or broken off at
any moment desired. For example, Belgium would preserve her independence,
but “on condition of treaties, perhaps also of guarantees, which would
render impossible a repetition of the events of 1914.” The occupied
departments of France would be restored unconditionally to France, but
“some small rectifications of frontiers might perhaps be desired in the
interests of both parties” (_Journal de Genève_, 29th December, 1915).
Assuming that the Allies committed the enormous mistake of discussing
peace on such treacherous terms, Germany still entrenched behind her
fronts, which would have been rendered almost impregnable, would say
to the Allies, “I don’t agree with you. After all you cannot require
of me that I should evacuate territories from which you are powerless
to drive me. If you are not satisfied, continue the war.” As, while
the negotiations were pending, all needful steps would have been taken
by the German agents to aggravate the moral slackening of the soldiers
of such Allied countries as might be most weary of the struggle, the
huge military machine of the Entente could not again be put in motion
as a whole. The real result would be, in fact, the rupture of the
Anti-Germanic Coalition, and finally the conclusion of a peace more or
less based on actual occupation. Berlin’s goal would thus have been
reached.

Finally, when the “armistice trick” shall have also failed, and the
situation of Germany shall have grown still worse, we shall see Berlin
play her last trump. Petitions against territorial annexations will be
multiplied on the other side of the Rhine. In an underhand way they will
be favoured by the Government of Berlin, which will end by saying to
the Allies: “Let us stop killing each other. I am perfectly reasonable.
I give up my claims on such of your territories as are occupied by my
armies. Let us negotiate peace on the basis of the ‘drawn game.’”

The day when this proposal will be made, the Allies will have to face
the most astute of the Berlin tricks, the most alarming German trap. At
that moment the tenacity, the clearsightedness, and the solidarity of the
Allies must be put forth to the utmost. To show the extreme necessity of
this, in the case supposed, I must baffle the German manœuvre in advance
by proving clearly in the following chapter that the dodge of the drawn
game, if it succeeded, would mask in reality a formidable success for
Germany and an irreparable catastrophe for the Allies and for the freedom
of the world.

CHAPTER V.

THE DODGE OF THE “DRAWN GAME” AND THE SCHEME “FROM HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN
GULF.”

I. What would really be the outcome of the dodge called the
“Drawn Game.”

II. The financial consequences for the Allies of this so-called
“Drawn Game.”

III. The Allies and the scheme “From Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf.”

IV. Panislamic and Asiatic consequences of the achievement of
the scheme “From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.”

V. Consequences for the world of the achievement of the scheme
“From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.”

If the Allies really wish, as their Governments have often proclaimed,
to put an end to the peril of Prussian militarism, they must resolutely
face the facts as they are, even when these are unpalatable to their
self-esteem. They must understand fully that the chance of carrying out
the Pangerman plan rests in a large measure on the ignorance of the
Allies. Berlin knew that before the war the countries now allied were
unaware of the totally new face which within recent years has been put
on all the political problems of the Balkans and Austria-Hungary by the
labours of Pangermanism and the movement of nationalities. Undoubtedly
that ignorance of the Allies has been as minutely studied and appraised
as were their military deficiencies; the conviction that the Allies
did not understand how to grapple with the situation has certainly
contributed to Berlin’s decision to unloose the dogs of war. Now, the
dodge of the “Drawn Game,” the last trump of the Berlin Government, is a
fresh gamble based on the ignorance of the Allies about foreign affairs.

The dodge of the “Drawn Game” will be based on the following train of
reasoning, which unquestionably prevails in Berlin:

“The Allied diplomats have grasped neither our plan, nor our Pangerman
organization, although that has required a preparation lasting twenty
years. The Allied diplomats have understood neither the true position of
the Balkans after the treaty of Bukarest (though that position was so
favourable to themselves), nor the importance of the Balkan forces for
the issue of the war. Still less do the Allied diplomats and the public
of their respective countries know about the real state of affairs in
Austria-Hungary. In France, and above all in England, a considerable
proportion of the public continue to believe that Austria-Hungary is
chiefly a German country, and that its more or less formal union with the
Empire is a natural and almost inevitable event. Therefore, if we are
compelled to give way in the East and in the West we may still, if we
are clever, have a chance of achieving the third part of our Pangerman
plan. The Allies will not understand the future danger in store for them
if we carry out that part which is, indeed, the principal part of our
scheme, namely, our designs on the South and South-East, symbolized by
the formula: From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.”

Indeed, the dodge of the “Drawn Game” aims at nothing less than at
that result. We must own that the German argument which has just been
summarized is not devoid of foundation; for up to now the Press of
the Allies has published articles on Austria-Hungary revealing a total
misconception of the facts, and they have thus unconsciously encouraged
the Pangerman project as regards the Hapsburg Monarchy.

[Illustration: THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DODGE CALLED THE “DRAWN GAME.”]

In the Allied Press, also, the expression: “Drawn Game” is currently
employed to mean that Germany might be considered as vanquished if she
evacuates the now occupied territories in the East and in the West;
but nobody has yet pointed out with the necessary precision that the
so-called “Drawn Game” would not be a draw at all, since it would allow
Germany to effect enormous acquisitions, which would make her much more
powerful than before the war.

And yet the Allies ought not to be again the dupes of a German stratagem;
which, if it succeeded, would involve consequences infinitely more
serious than all the former errors of the Allies. To ward off that danger
it suffices to look it full in the face and thoroughly to fathom what
would be the outcome of a peace negotiated on the so-called principle of
a “Drawn Game.”

The term “Drawn Game” evidently denotes that each country would keep the
frontiers which existed before the war; also that each country would
bear the burden of the outlays it has made during the struggle. But we
will argue on a hypothesis infinitely more favourable for the Western
Allies than that of the so-called “Drawn Game” in order to demonstrate
super-abundantly and as decisively as possible what would be concealed
behind this apparent and partial German capitulation.

Let us suppose (see map, p. 79) that, in consequence of victorious
offensives of the Allies, Germany should declare herself disposed, not
only to evacuate totally Poland, the French Departments, Belgium, and
Luxemburg, but also to restore Alsace-Lorraine to France, and even to
give, as an indemnity all the rest of the left bank of the Rhine, under
the sole and tacit condition that Germany should keep her preponderant
influence, direct or indirect, over Austria-Hungary, the Balkans and
Turkey.

There are surely in the Allied Western countries many worthy people who,
at present, no more see the result of such a peace, than a year ago
they understood the enormous influences which the Balkans would exert
on the course of the war. These good creatures, weary of the prolonged
strife, would at once say: “After all, these are most acceptable terms:
Alsace-Lorraine, the left bank of the Rhine!... let us make peace.”

If matters are probed to the bottom it will be easily seen that, should
the Allies negotiate peace with Germany on such a basis, the restitution
of Alsace-Lorraine could only be temporary; for with such a peace as
that, Germany would secure all the elements of power which might enable
her, after a very short respite, to retake Alsace-Lorraine, and in
the end to overcome all the Allies and to achieve in its entirety the
Pangerman plan, not only in Europe, but in Asia, nay in the whole world.

* * * * *

To relinquish the left bank of the Rhine, according to our hypothesis,
would mean for Germany that she would lose:

Square
Provinces. Kilometres. Population.
Rhenish-Prussia 27,000 7,000,000
Rhenish-Bavaria 5,928 1,000,000
Alsace-Lorraine 14,522 2,000,000
------ ----------
Total 47,450 10,000,000

The present German Empire would therefore be reduced to 493,408 square
kilometres and 58 million inhabitants. But this loss in the West would
be far more than counterbalanced by that close union of Austria-Hungary
to the German Empire, which would be none the less real because it would
be disguised. On this reckoning Berlin’s influence would be exercised
directly and absolutely over:

Square
Kilometres. Population.
German Empire curtailed in the West 493,408 58,000,000
Austria-Hungary 676,616 50,000,000
--------- -----------
Total 1,170,024 108,000,000

It is evident that a solid block of States, established in Central Europe
under the direction of Berlin, would exercise, simply by contiguity an
absolutely preponderant pressure on:

Square
Kilometres. Population.

The Balkans 499,275 22,000,000
Turkey 1,792,900 20,000,000
--------- ----------
Total 2,292,175 42,000,000

Therefore Berlin’s preponderant influence would be wielded, directly
or indirectly, over 3,462,199 square kilometres and over 150 million
inhabitants.

We now see clearly that in the end the dodge of the “Drawn Game” would
lead in reality to an enormous increase of the German Empire, and to the
achievement of the principal part of the Pangerman plan summarized in the
formula “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” (p. 109 of original). What
then would be the general position of Great Germany thus constituted?

“Having cut Europe in two, mistress of the Adriatic as well as of the
North Sea, secure in her fleets and in her armies, Great Germany would
be an incubus on the world. Trieste, the Hamburg of the South, would
feed her in peace and revictual her in war. Her industry, equipped with
plant of incomparable power, would flood with her wares those very
countries which she now schemes so artfully to monopolize:—Holland and
Belgium, which are already penetrated; Hungary, her client; Roumania,
her satellite; Bulgaria, a broken barrier; Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
portals of the East. And, beyond the Bosphorus, Germany would reach
Asia-Minor, that immense quarry of wealth. The huge German railroad
projected to run from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf without a break,
would link Berlin to the Far East. Then would the Emperor William’s
Brobdingnagian dream be fulfilled. Germany would rule the world by her
might and by her commercial wealth. The state of things which then would
exist might be described by slightly modifying what Metternich wrote
of Napoleonic France: ‘The German system which to-day is triumphant is
directed against all the great states in their entirety, against every
power able to maintain its own independence.’”

Such are the words which I published fifteen years ago in my book,
_L’Europe et la Question d’Autriche au seuil du XXᵉ siècle, p. 353 (Plon,
Nourrit, editeurs, Paris)_. A careful study of the Pangerman plan of
1895 had then convinced me that the whole future policy of Berlin would
tend to carry out the plan laid down in the formula “from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf.” In what I then wrote a few minute discrepancies may now be
detected, but, unfortunately, the facts of to-day show that still on the
whole my words correspond exactly with events. The dodge of the “Drawn
Game,” which the Germans keep up their sleeve, hoping still to profit by
the ignorance or the weariness of some of the Allies, would indeed have
for its indisputable object the achievement of that huge plan.

The terrible danger which this would bring upon the Allies will be better
perceived (supposing they fall into the trap laid for them) when we shall
have demonstrated with precision, what would be the consequences for them
if the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” were to succeed.

II.

If we suppose for the sake of argument that the dodge of the “Drawn
Game” were to succeed so far as to allow the Germans, by binding
Austria-Hungary to the German Empire, to carry through their plan
“from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” their success would involve certain
general financial consequences. These we must unfold, if we would clearly
understand the full extent of the craft hidden under the cloak of that
manœuvre called the “Drawn Game,” which is still to be played.

The Germans having failed to crush the Allies, begin to think that the
expenses of war may possibly fall on themselves. The _Berlin Post_
has already calculated: “If we do not receive a war indemnity we must
reckon on a yearly increase of taxes of at least four milliard marks,”
being five milliard francs for 68 million inhabitants (_Le Temps_, 1st
February, 1916).

The disappointment is certainly keen for the Germans who counted on
exacting from France alone an indemnity of 35 milliard francs; but we
must nevertheless fully understand that the dodge of the “Drawn Game”
(which, for the sake of argument, we suppose to have succeeded) would
place Germany in a financial position vastly more advantageous than that
of the Allies.

As a matter of fact, the cost of war has been much less for Germany than
for her adversaries. This is a point which must be fully considered,
all the more because it helps to explain why the economic resistance of
Germany is more prolonged than was generally expected.

From the beginning of hostilities, Austro-German troops have lived at
the vast expense of enemy or Allied territories, such as Turkey and
Bulgaria, whose accumulated resources they slowly drain. Besides, in
enemy countries, particularly in Belgium and in France, which are the
richest regions on earth, the Germans have collected a large amount of
plunder. On Belgium alone they have levied a war contribution in specie
of 480 million francs a year. Out of Belgium and France the Germans draw
large quantities of coal and iron scot free. In both these countries they
have purloined raw goods, machines, furniture, valuables, representing
the value certainly of several milliard francs. In the French towns of
the Nord alone the Germans have stolen about 550 million francs worth
of wool. Everywhere they have seized innumerable securities which they
have already tried to convert into money, though with small success, in
the United States. But if a complete victory did not compel the Germans
to restore those bonds to the Allies who own them, some at least of them
would suffer a heavy loss of capital, by the mere fact of their warrants
being detained; the effect of this would unavoidably react on the general
wealth of the Allied countries. To these losses would probably be added
those of the numerous milliards of francs, lent by the French or English
to Austria, to the Balkan States, and to Turkey, and represented by bonds
which at present are, it is true, in Allied lands, but whose value would
become exceedingly uncertain and hazardous the day that Germany ruled
from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. Teutonic good faith would then serve as
the only guarantee that dividends would be paid. The war, therefore, has
put within Germany’s power not only vast territories which have enabled
her to carry on the struggle with far less expense than the Allies, but
also the Germans have been able to lay their hands on enormous wealth,
representing tens of milliards of francs, which, being partly convertible
into specie, have reduced by that amount the direct financial war outlay
of Germany.

Clearly, the Allies are not in an equal position.

Always supposing, for the sake of argument, that peace were concluded
with Berlin on the basis of the “Drawn Game,” each one of the Allies
would have to bear, without any reduction, the immense expenses incurred
to maintain a war made by Germany. It is easy to perceive that these
war costs have been and are considerably higher for each of the Allies
and more miscellaneous than has been the case for Germany. The Allies
found it necessary to improvise an enormous war plant under most costly
conditions, while Germany had been able during peace, that is, under
relatively economical conditions, to produce all the material of her
fighting equipment.

The Allies are bound to take care of and to maintain millions of refugees
from invaded regions, whereas the Germans have only temporarily borne
such a burden and merely for a small part of Eastern Prussia. After the
war, Belgium, Russia and especially France will have to provide for some
tens of milliards of francs worth of extra charges for repairs of the
colossal damages done by the Germans in invaded territories, to private
persons, State properties, railways, roads, etc. The Germans would not
have a similar outlay, at least not anything like in the same proportion.
In their conception of the “Drawn Game” the Germans certainly reckon
that these financial differences would almost ensure, after peace, the
ulterior impotence of the Allied countries as against Great Germany.

What, for instance, would be the position of France if a war indemnity
were not paid to her? A few familiar figures, which everyone can check,
will enable us to form an opinion on that score. If the struggle lasts,
let us say, for two years, we can estimate at 50 milliards of francs
the direct outlay for France, and about 20 milliards would be required
for her indirect expenditure, that is, what must be paid after peace
for repairing the prodigious damage caused to individuals and to the
State—remaking of roads, rebuilding of railways, etc., the total of the
expenses mounting up to some 70 milliards of francs. As the national debt
of France, before the war, was 30 milliards of francs, it would therefore
have increased after peace to about 100 milliard francs.

On the other hand the budget of France in 1914 was in round figures
five milliard francs. The single item of the rise in price of daily
commodities will in itself inevitably be increased after war at least
by 10%, therefore the budget after peace will require, let us say, an
initial increase of 500 million francs. On the other hand, this same
budget would have to bear interest at 5% on the 70 milliard francs of
newly incurred war debts; this would make a yearly outlay of 3,500
million francs. Finally, it is clear that pensions to be given to the
wounded, to widows of combatants, will burden the budget by a yearly
outlay of at least a milliard francs. Probably even that figure will be
insufficient. Altogether the French budget of five milliard francs, as it
was in 1914, would have to be increased by about five milliard francs; in
other words, it will have to be doubled. Already we well know that this
figure is much below what would be needed. And yet that enormous increase
makes no allowance for sums required to effect important social reforms,
nor for the great improvements necessary to bring up the economic
national plant of France to a proper standard for resuming business
actively.

We remember how hard it was in France before the war to find, by means
of taxes, even the 500 million of francs needed for new expenditures.
How could we find annually an additional sum of five milliard francs
of taxes in a country cruelly devastated by the struggle and where the
re-organization of economic life would have to be complete? It is
obvious that the most crushing taxes levied on every person would not
suffice for such a sum to be regularly raised.

Such a situation must inevitably tend to raise for the State and for
every Frenchman individually considerable financial difficulties. The
same would apply to economic undertakings. Thousands of these, at
present in the hands of shareholders or bond-holders, would be in a most
precarious condition, or the securities would be immensely depreciated.
Landed property, overburdened by taxes and specially affected by the
shortage of labour, would lose a great part of its value. This situation
would lead to a general rise in prices for the commodities of daily life,
and that again would lay a fresh burden on the back of every Frenchman.
The financial position would be analogous for the Russians and for the
English, who of all the belligerents have spent most on the war.

The Germans, in trying their “Drawn Game” trick, reckon oil these
financial consequences to reduce the Allies to ultimate impotence. The
only way to avoid this danger is to win that complete victory which all
the Allies desire, since it would enable them to impose on Germany the
payment of the war indemnity which she unquestionably owes, as she is
responsible for the hostilities. Annuities paid to each of the Allies
will be used as the basis of loans, which will help to tide over the
serious financial difficulties that infallibly await all the belligerents
after the war.

III.

The menace involved in the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf”
creates between the Allies in Europe, a common bond of interest, which is
far superior to their own individual interests, and which ought to keep
them firmly united to the end.

France, England, Russia and Italy have an identical and an absolutely
vital interest in defeating for ever the scheme of an empire that should
reach from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. This is quite apart from the
purely humanitarian consideration that the numerous non-German peoples
who live between Bohemia and the Persian Gulf should not be finally
subservient to Germany. The achievement of the “Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf” scheme threatens all neutral states, for it would guarantee to
Germany, as we shall see presently, her domination over the world.

Always on the supposition that this scheme succeeded, it would, regarded
from the general economic point of view, place Germany in every respect
in an infinitely superior position to that of the Allies. Her direct
or indirect seizure of Austria-Hungary, of the Balkans and the Ottoman
Empire would secure for Germany an extraordinary economic power, against
which all eventual combinations of the Allies would be impotent. The
German dogged power of work, spirit of enterprise and organizing skill
need no further demonstration. We must therefore not doubt for a moment
that they would draw, to their enormous advantage, all possible profits
from Austria-Hungary, vast regions of which can still be turned to
account. The same would apply to the Balkan countries, many of which are
still quite virgin, and contain, to a considerable extent, unexplored
sources of wealth, both agricultural and mineral. This would also be true
of Asiatic Turkey. As early as 1886 the German Orientalist, Dr. Spenger,
stated: “Asia Minor is the only territory of the world which has not
yet been monopolized by a Great Power. And yet it is the finest field
for colonization. If Germany does not miss the opportunity and seizes it
before the Cossacks grab it, she will have secured the best part in the
division of the world.”

It is an illusion to imagine that the Turks would seriously raise
obstacles to the economic exploitation of their country by Germany. If
the Germans were masters of Central Europe and the Balkans, they would be
in a position to sweep away all obstacles. The Prussian Pangermans are
quite sure of it, thanks to their liege-men of Constantinople. This is
proved sufficiently by the way in which the hereditary prince of Turkey,
Yussuf-Izzedin, was “suicided” at the end of January, 1916, because
he was anti-German. The Germans would perfectly understand the art of
showering, as hitherto, the amplest personal advantages on the handful of
Young Turks of Enver Pasha’s clique, while at the same time they would
grant such nominal concessions as would enable Berlin under the same to
exploit thoroughly the Ottoman Empire.

Do not let us be deceived, if the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf” succeeded, it would place in Berlin’s hands every element of a
formidable economic power unprecedented in history. It would secure,
in fact, to Germany the exclusive monopoly of economic influence on
about three million square kilometres of European and Asiatic lands
(Austria-Hungary, Balkans, Turkey), and it would include, beside, the
seizure of numerous strategical places of the highest importance (the
coasts of the Adriatic and the Ægean Sea, the Dardanelles, etc.).

Now the permanence of these enormous advantages would be assured to
Great Germany through the expansion of Prussian militarism. For it must
be clearly understood—the point is essential—that Prussian militarism
would become considerably more powerful than it was in 1914, if the
scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” were achieved. Yet it is
the destruction of Prussian militarism which is the true, legitimate,
and necessary object of the war, an object infinitely above any mere
territorial annexation whatsoever.

The increase of power which would accrue to Prussian militarism through
the accomplishment of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” is
readily intelligible. The close attachment of Austria-Hungary to Germany,
by placing under the immediate authority of the Headquarters Staff of
Berlin a population of 108 millions, would enable it to mobilize at least
10 millions of soldiers. Now, in virtue of the central geographical
position of the two empires, and of the network of Austro-German
railways, which would be brought to the highest degree of technical
perfection, this immense army might, even more easily than to-day, be
very rapidly concentrated on any point of the periphery of the Germanic
confederation. But that is not all. The predominance of Berlin over
the Balkans and Turkey, by means of political alliances forced on the
satellite states of the South-East, would give in addition to the Berlin
Staff control of 42 million inhabitants, that is to say, of about four
millions of soldiers.

Supposing then that the mobilization applied to only ten per cent. of
the population, the accomplishment of the scheme “from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf” would place under the influence, direct or indirect, of
the Hohenzollerns, a total of about fifteen millions of soldiers. If the
mobilization applied to fourteen per cent. of the population, which is
the proportion attained by Serbia and apparently by Austria-Hungary, the
figure would be 21 millions of soldiers.

Now the course of the present war proves incontestably that the control
of great military masses, placed in a single hand and elaborated as
minutely as the Berlin Staff, forms a power infinitely greater than that
of far more numerous masses under a control which is not sufficiently
co-ordinated.

Hence the accomplishment of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf”
would place Germany in a military position considerably superior to that
of all the Allied countries together.

In any case, those who are fighting for the purpose of putting an end
to great armaments would find themselves once more plunged into the
vortex of the most rigorous militarism, for they could not contend with
Great Germany except at the cost of formidable armaments, which would
absorb all their resources and all their attention. Now, would they be
in a position to undertake such armaments in the infinitely difficult
financial situation in which, according to hypothesis, they would stand?
(see p. 86). Would they even have the resolution to undertake them, after
the frightful moral disappointment of their peoples, who would learn too
late the enormous mistake committed by their governments in negotiating
peace on the basis of the so-called “Drawn Game,” which would have
enabled Berlin to carry out its scheme of domination “from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf”?

Besides, even if the Allies were willing to attempt once more the
overthrow of the atrocious Prussian militarism, now much more oppressive
than before the war, Great Germany would certainly not give them time to
prepare for it.

We may be quite sure that the day peace was concluded on the basis
supposed, Berlin would set about organizing economically and militarily,
with the utmost speed, the immense territory over which its supremacy
would be extended. Supposing that Russia, France, England and Italy were
disposed to renew the conflict, they would, in the assumed financial and
moral situation, be certainly reduced to impotence before they could make
head against the new German colossus.

Finally, it would be ignoring completely the tenacity and ambition of
the Hohenzollerns to imagine that Great Germany, once mistress of an
empire from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, would sincerely renounce the
ambition of dominating the North Sea and the English Channel. Hence the
evacuation of Belgium and the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine, which on
our hypothesis Germany would have yielded to France, would only have
been temporary. The apparent capitulation of Berlin would have been,
therefore, nothing but a cunning device to allow Germany, driven almost
to bay, to recover herself for a renewal of the struggle. Indeed, she
is already preparing for it in union with her actual allies. _La Nation
Tchèque_, of 15th March, 1916, an excellent review edited by M. Ernest
Denis, professor at the Sorbonne, brought to light the following fact.
On the 29th February, 1916, the Chamber of Commerce of Budapest met,
all members being present, in order to study what measures to take for
a future war intended to complete the insufficient results of a peace,
looked upon as “imperfect.” In this discussion it was stated that with
the prospect of a fresh conflagration the States allied to Germany in the
present war must form an Economic Union.

Thus, already, the Hohenzollern are stirring up even their allies to
organize the future conflagration which they will set ablaze if the
Allies do not crush Prussian militarism. William II. and his Pangermans
want, at all costs, to carry out the scheme known as “from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf” because they know very well that the completion of that
scheme, as we shall see presently, would suffice to provide them with
all the means of afterwards accomplishing in its entirety their programme
of universal domination.

IV.

The Pangerman plan of 1911 provides that the results of the “Hamburg to
the Persian Gulf” scheme should be made the most of even in the furthest
points of the Far East. Facts to hand and well-known Pangerman programmes
enable us to form an idea of what help Germany meant to find in Asia
during the war, and what profit would have accrued to her afterwards from
the said scheme, if she had succeeded in finally carrying it out.

William II. tried to play the Panislamic card, which is one of the
leading trumps of the Pangerman game. In a word, the object was to stir
up a Panislamic movement, both political and military, which would help
Germany to vanquish the Entente powers, since these hold among their
possessions numerous Moslem subjects: France, particularly in Tunis,
Algiers and Morocco; Italy in Libya; Russia in the Crimea and in the
Caucasus, in the region of Kazan, in Central Asia and in Siberia; England
in Egypt, in India, in Burma, in the Straits Settlements and in the
greater part of her African Colonies.

As Panislamism is ostensibly founded on the restoration and considerable
extension of the influence and powers of the Sultan of Constantinople,
Commander of the Faithful, it could not fail to flatter deeply the
neo-nationalism of the Turks, which has manifested itself particularly
since the failure of the Allies at the Dardanelles. The result is that,
thanks to Panislamism, the Kaiser’s interests have been well served by
the Sultan’s Moslem subjects; a clever propaganda has dazzled their eyes
with a prospect of the restoration of a great empire, even greater than
in days of old.

[Illustration: ASIATIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE SCHEME
“FROM HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN GULF.”]

The Panislamic movement, minutely and long prepared during peace by
Germany, was started by her as soon as hostilities began. On the advice
of Berlin, the Sultan proclaimed, as early as the end of 1914, the Jehad
or Holy War. No doubt the Moslem insurrection has not become general,
but the Islamic agitation has nevertheless yielded local results, which
will be better understood after the war, and which have hampered the
Allies in India, in Egypt, in Libya and in the French possessions of
North Africa. Particularly in April, 1915, an insurrection of British
Indian troops at Singapore very nearly succeeded. About the same time in
Siam, numerous German officers, with the assistance of Indian and Burmese
revolutionaries, had begun to muster a small army of 16,000 men, who,
after being armed, were to attack British Burma. This Islamic agitation
was threatening to assume serious proportions, when the success of the
Russians in Armenia and in Persia fortunately checked it by striking a
heavy blow at the prestige of the Sultan, the Commander of the Faithful.

Nevertheless, what Berlin has already attempted to achieve with the help
of Islam, should serve the Allies as a strong warning of what Germany
would certainly do in time to come, if the future peace left her the
necessary means. As soon as the Turco-German junction had been effected
across Serbia in October, 1915, the Panislamic policy of the Kaiser
assumed a more decided form. At the behest of the Kaiser, his familiar
spirit at Constantinople, Enver Pacha, who then was all-powerful,
mobilized the whole of such of his Ottoman subjects as were able to
carry the arms provided for them, which only at the beginning of 1916
began to pour in from the Central Empires, after communications had
been established across invaded Serbia. At the same time, hundreds
of thousands of Armenians were systematically massacred, in order to
eliminate a non-Moslem population, which thwarted the Turco-German
plans for the future. As to the military and Panislamic activity of
the Turks, directed by the Germans, it has endeavoured to radiate from
Constantinople in many directions towards Egypt, the Caucasus, Persia,
Central-Russian Asia, Afghanistan and India.

After the war, if by our hypothesis, peace were made on the basis of a
“Drawn Game,” that is to say, if the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf” were carried out, all these other plans would be taken up again.
How would the Turks free themselves from the German clutches? Their
financial position binds them entirely to Germany. Such large personal
advantages as the Kaiser’s agents would inevitably offer to all Turks
whose help would be considered useful, would suffice to ensure Berlin’s
predominance in the Sultan’s Empire, that classical land of backsheesh
(_see_ map, p. 95).

Now, there are in Persia, in the Azerbijan, about 400,000 men who would
make quite useful soldiers, and who would provide what is necessary
for an offensive against Russia; in Afghanistan 500,000 first class
combatants would be found. Once armed they could be let loose in Northern
India, which contains about 50 million Moslems. These, so far, have
collectively remained loyal to Great Britain, but their feelings might be
subject to a change if, as a fact, Germany appeared to be victorious by
remaining mistress of the route from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. Hence
we conclude that very soon after a peace negotiated on such a basis, the
English and the Russians might have to face very grave difficulties.

That is not all; German propaganda has extended to the whole of China
by various means. First of all the 20 to 30 million Moslems who dwell
in the Celestial Empire, have been worked up by Turco-German agents in
the same way as the Moslem population in other Islamic regions. But
as the Chinese Moslems are geographically not well grouped to form a
sufficiently powerful basis for the German agitation, the latter has
fastened on the vital and motor organs of China. The German agents have
bought in China, as elsewhere, all the newspapers which could be utilized
for their object, particularly the _Peking Post_, written in English,
and the Chinese review, _Hsie-Ho-Pao_. They have also made use of the
_Ostasiatische Lloyd_, which was published at Tien-Tsin before the war.
Since its outbreak they have founded the _German China Gazette_. All
these organs have propagated everywhere in the Celestial Empire the
doctrine of German invincibility. Thanks to this, says the _Frankfurter
Zeitung_, “every coolie knows by now that Germany is victorious.”

For the moment the policy which Germany pursues in China consists in
stirring up everywhere trouble and unrest. In Northern China it upholds
the President Yuan-Shi-Kai.[2] In his set the Germans have gained
numerous followers. Thanks to their influence, German officers already
occupy very important posts in the Chinese army. But in Southern China,
Germany is rousing the populations against the authority of Yuan-Shi-Kai.
The aim of Berlin in this apparent contradictory policy, is to create
such a position in China that it will engross the attention of Japan,
and prevent her from intervening with her troops in Europe; such an
intervention has been already contemplated and would be still possible.

The present Berlin policy in the Celestial Empire has also for its object
to prepare the German policy of the future in the Far East. When once
peace is concluded, on the basis on which she counts, Germany would
pursue in China exactly the same policy which she intends to pursue
in Turkey. Then Berlin will say to the Chinese, as she now says to
the Turks, “See, we are bold financiers, enterprising manufacturers,
energetic business men. We will help you to turn your country to account.
We shall procure for you the experts whom you need. We will give you the
means of defending yourselves against your neighbours. We, who are the
finest soldiers in the world, will bring up to a proper standard your
endless and magnificent military forces, now in embryo. With your 300
millions of inhabitants you can be the absolute rulers of all Asia. We
will, therefore, build up for you a formidable army and a very powerful
navy.”

It is easy to perceive what is hidden behind this programme, with its
obvious attraction for the Chinese. In reality, it is a preparation for
the seizure by Germany of part of China, and her economic exploitation
under exactly the same conditions and by the same measures as those
already employed in Turkey. Moreover, this policy is a signal vengeance
which Germany means to wreak in the future on Japan after the victory of
which she thinks herself assured. No doubt, in order to break the union
of her adversaries, Berlin has already hinted to Tokio the idea of a
separate peace, but that is merely a piece of tactics exacted by the need
of the moment.

Never would a Great Germany, mistress of the route from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf, and exercising a predominant influence in China, forgive
Japan for having driven her out of Kiao-Chau. Now, if and when an immense
Chinese army shall have been created, under the direction of German
officers, Japan, in spite of the bravery of her soldiers, would at once
be unable to avoid the consequences of the intolerable situation in which
she would be placed through the relative smallness of her population (70
millions, with her colonies, against 300 millions of Chinese). Japan is,
therefore, directly aimed at by the scheme of domination from Hamburg to
the Persian Gulf, which really endangers her future.

Finally, we can see that thanks to a combination of Panislamism and a
Chinophile policy, at least one that is outwardly so, the achievement
of the scheme of domination from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, would
assure to Germany the means not only of dominating Europe, but also of
exercising a preponderant influence over the whole of Asia. After having
obtained for herself in Europe the possibility of drawing exclusive
profit from strategic positions of inestimable value, such as the shores
of the Adriatic, the Ægean, and the Dardanelles, Germany would be
mistress, by mere force of circumstances, of the Suez Canal and would
command besides numerous vantage points on the Chinese coasts. Thus the
defeat of the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” project is a vital question
not only for France, England, Russia, and Italy, but also for Japan.

In order to demonstrate the really extraordinary importance of the
scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” we have still to show how
its achievement would not only make Germany mistress in Europe and
preponderant in Asia, but would carry with it the accomplishment of the
Pangerman plan in its world-wide form. The world-wide elements of this
plan, graphically shown on the map herewith, have been set forth in the
book of Otto Richard Tannenberg, _The Greater Germany, the Work of the
20th Century_,[3] which appeared at Leipsic in 1911. As this book, which
_bearing date 1911_, contains the exact programme of the seizures to be
effected in Europe and Turkey, nine-tenths of which the German General
Staff has already carried out to the letter, the exceptional importance
of Tannenberg’s book is indisputable. It is demonstrated, in fact, that
the annexations and seizures which he advocated in 1911 correspond as
completely as possible with the execrable ambitions of the government of
Berlin.

[Illustration: WORLD-WIDE CONSEQUENCES OF THE “HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN
GULF” SCHEME, AS PROVIDED FOR BY THE PLAN OF 1911.]

As for the territorial acquisitions which Tannenberg advocates in Asia,
in Africa, in Oceania, and in America, they would be the perfectly
logical consequences of the accomplishment of the “Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf” project. If that project became a reality, it would be because the
European Allies, through their blunders in the management of the war,
would have had to forego the notion of beating Germany and to leave the
German General Staff to command an army of from 15 to 21 millions of men
(see p. 91). Therefore, it is obvious that on this hypothesis the Allied
peoples, after a treacherous peace, morally and financially exhausted,
having to face the formidable armies of Pangermany, would be unable to
oppose the accomplishment of those colonial schemes, which the success of
the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” plan would afford to Great Germany the
means of carrying out, since, always on the assumption in question, they
would have given way on an issue much more vital for them—that of the
independence of Europe.

Once grant this supposition, and we shall be convinced that Tannenberg’s
world-wide plan of Pangerman annexations is quite stripped of that
chimerical character which at first sight we might be disposed to ascribe
to it.

Besides, we must add that the programme, which is fully described below,
was drawn up by Tannenberg on the supposition, on which the Berlin
Government also reckoned, that England would not take part in the war.
In order to purchase her neutrality, Tannenberg advocated dividing the
colonies of the other European powers between London and Berlin. But now
that England has thrown herself into the struggle, it is clear that,
assuming Germany to be victorious, she would take possession also of
those colonies which Tannenberg proposed to assign to Great Britain,
since Britain would be incapable of resisting. It follows that the
world-wide acquisitions of Pangermany, sketched in the plan of 1911 and
summarized below, are in fact less than Germany would be able to effect,
since having presumably accomplished the scheme of domination “from
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” no organized force on earth would be
powerful enough to curb the boundless ambition of Berlin.

We have proved above that if the Allies allowed Germany to secure her
hold on Austria-Hungary, the predominant and exclusive influence of
Berlin over all the Balkans and Turkey would be inevitable. Tannenberg
(_op. cit._, p. 323) explains that finally Asia Minor, Syria, and
Mesopotamia, Palestine, Western Persia, and the larger part of Arabia
would pass under the absolute protectorate of the German Empire, making a
total of, say, 3,200,000 square kilometres and 16,500,000 inhabitants.

Once masters of the coasts of the Adriatic, the Ægean, the Dardanelles,
and Aden, helped by the Panislamic propaganda, the Turco-German seizure
of Egypt, and therefore the Suez Canal, would necessarily follow.
Germany, if she commanded these essential strategical points, would then
obviously be able to retake her colonies in Africa and Oceania.

Square Native
Kilometres. Population.

Togo 87,000 1,003,000
Kameroon 790,000 2,540,000
South-West Africa 835,000 87,000
Eastern Africa 995,000 7,510,000
Kaiser Wilhelm Land, Bismarck
Archipelago, Caroline Islands,
Marshall Islands, the Marianes,
Samoa 245,000 647,000
--------- ----------
Making a total of 2,952,000 11,787,000

Always on the assumption which we have made, the Allies, having given
way in Europe, could not prevent Great-Germany from snatching, according
to Tannenberg’s programme, the Belgian, Portuguese, and Dutch Colonies,
namely:

Square Native
Kilometres. Population.

Belgian Congo 2,365,000 15,000,000
Portuguese Angola 1,270,000 4,200,000
Dutch East Indies 2,045,000 38,106,000
--------- ----------
Total 5,680,000 57,306,000

Next would come the turn of those French colonies, the cession of which
to Great Germany was foreshadowed by Tannenberg, _op. cit._, p. 313.

Square Native
Kilometres. Population.

Morocco 416,000 3,000,000
French Congo 1,439,000 9,800,000
Madagascar 585,000 3,232,000
Mayotta and the Comoros Islands 2,000 97,000
Reunion 2,000 173,000
Obok and dependencies (East
Africa) 120,000 208,000
Indo-China 803,000 16,990,000
French Islands of Oceania 24,000 88,000
--------- ----------
Making a total of 3,391,000 33,588,000

The combination of Panislamism and the so-called Chinophile movement
would prepare for the German seizures in Asia. As we have seen (p. 99),
the Berlin plan consists first in arming China powerfully enough under
the orders of German officers, to expel the Japanese from Kiao-Chau and
from the province of Shantung. Germany would thus inflict a first and
striking vengeance on the Empire of the Rising Sun. But that would not
be all. The policy which Berlin foreshadows with regard to China is
identical with the one which it is now pursuing in Turkey. If Germany
armed China, it would be under conditions such that the Celestial Empire
would have to submit to the strict influence of Pangermany. Tannenberg
(_op. cit._, p. 321) tells us that the outcome of these tactics would
be the establishment of a vast zone of special German influence on the
whole lower course of the Yangtse-Kiang and the Hoangho, that is to say,
over that vast portion of China which forms the hinterland of Kiao-Chau,
making a total of about 750,000 square kilometres and 50 millions of
inhabitants.

Tannenberg finally gives an exact enumeration of the various German
protectorates which would be established in the southern part of South
America, where dwell many German colonists, whose aggressive tendencies
are already plain enough. “Germany,” says Tannenberg literally, “takes
under her protection the republics of Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay,
the southern third of Bolivia, so far as it belongs to the basin of the
Rio de la Plata, together with that part of southern Brazil, in which
German culture is dominant” (_op. cit._, p. 321).

Square
Kilometres. Population.

Argentina 2,950,000 7,091,000
Chili 757,000 3,415,000
Uruguay 187,000 1,225,000
Paraguay 253,000 800,000
⅓ Bolivia 500,000 666,000
⅕ Brazil 1,700,000 5,000,000
--------- ----------
Making a total of 6,347,000 18,197,000

“German South America,” concludes Tannenberg, “will provide for us in
the temperate zone a colonial region where our emigrants will be able to
settle as farmers. Chili and Argentina will preserve their language and
their autonomy. But we shall require that in the schools German shall be
taught as a second language. Southern Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay are
countries of German culture. German will there be the national tongue”
(_op. cit._, p. 337).

Even during the war, Germany has laid the train for some of these
explosions. The Chicago _Tribune_ has learned that the Committee of
Foreign Affairs for the Senate of the United States possesses the proofs
of German intrigues carried on in the American hemisphere in defiance of
the Monroe doctrine (_Le Temps_, 16th February, 1916). These official
Pangerman machinations, proved up to the hilt and entirely in harmony
with Tannenberg’s American plan of campaign, demonstrate the identity of
his colonial views with those of the government of Berlin.

To sum up, the result of the Pangerman programme for countries outside
of Europe would be to assure to Germany, under the form of colonies,
protectorates, or zones of special influence:

Square
Kilometres. Population.

In Asia 4,753,000 83,490,000
In Africa 8,906,000 46,850,000
In Oceania 2,314,000 38,841,000
In America 6,347,000 18,197,000
---------- -----------
Making a total of 22,320,000 187,378,000

Germany, which occupied or controlled, at the beginning of 1916, in
Europe, 3,576,237 square kilometres, including the Empire, and more
than 160 millions of inhabitants, would then have a universal domain of
influence reaching over 25,896,237 square kilometres and 347 millions of
inhabitants. This figure includes at the utmost 90 millions of Germans;
therefore, these will exercise their supremacy over 257 millions of
non-Germans.

It must be clearly understood also that the enormous possessions of
Pangermany in both hemispheres would be thoroughly under the domination
of Berlin; indeed, a glance at the map (p. 101) will show that the
universal Pangerman plan aims at seizing all the essential strategic
points which command the seas of the world, especially, in addition
to those already mentioned, the Straits of Gibraltar from the side of
Morocco, Cape Horn, Madagascar, and all the naval bases of Oceania.

To sum up, the complete Pangerman plan aims at procuring for Germany all
the means of domination by land and sea, which would enable Pangermany to
hold the entire world in the dreadful hug of Prussian militarism screwed
up to its highest degree of power.

Not for a moment do the Pangermans pause to reflect how criminal is
this programme of universal slavery. “War,” says Tannenberg, with his
monstrous cynicism, “must leave nothing to the vanquished but their
eyes to weep with. Modesty on our part would be purely madness” (_op.
cit._, p. 304). Now, it is a fundamental truth, of which I should like
to convince my readers, that the universal Pangerman plan is solely
and wholly based on the achievement of the scheme “from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf,” which forms its backbone. If this is broken, the whole
of the Pangerman plan falls to the ground, and the projects of Prussian
domination are destroyed for ever. The principal problem which the Allies
have to solve, if they wish to ensure their liberty and that of the whole
world, is to make impossible the achievement of the plan “from Hamburg
to the Persian Gulf.”

CHAPTER VI.

THE CRUCIAL POINT OF THE WHOLE PROBLEM.

I. The obligation which the threat of the scheme “from Hamburg
to the Persian Gulf” imposes on the Allies.

II. The capital importance of the question of Austria-Hungary.

III. All the racial elements necessary for the destruction of
the Pangerman plan exist in Central Europe.

Now that they have laid their hands on nine-tenths of the territories
which they coveted (see p. 63), the Germans will only give in at the last
extremity. Maximilian Harden has peremptorily declared: “Every means will
be enthusiastically employed against her enemies by the German people. We
will go back to the times of savagery when man was a wolf for his fellow
man” (quoted by _Le Temps_, 9th February, 1916). In face of this firm
resolution of the Germans to achieve at all costs the plan of universal
domination, a plan of which the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” project is
the necessary and sufficient backbone, the real destruction of Prussian
militarism becomes more than ever a duty. Only this result can repay the
sacrifices of the admirable “Tommies” of the Allied armies. If they are
determined to hold on as long as necessary, it is not to cover themselves
with military glory; it is to acquire the certainty “that it shall not
begin again, that their children shall not know horrors like those of the
hellish struggle initiated by Prussianized Germany.”

The Allies will certainly issue as conquerors from this dreadful war,
but on condition that in future the struggle should be directed by the
lessons of experience. These essential lessons are the outcome of the
geographical, ethnographical, economic, and strategical elements which
constitute the Pangerman plan of 1911, temporarily accomplished. Now,
these lessons of experience show that the Allies could not possibly
be content with a half-and-half victory; a complete victory alone can
guarantee them against any aggressive revival, after peace, of Prussian
militarism.

The following considerations appear strongly to justify this opinion:

“If in France,” declares Harden, “they think that the re-establishment of
peace can only be made possible by the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine,
and if necessity should oblige us to sign such a peace, the 70 millions
of Germans would very soon tear that peace to tatters” (quoted by _Le
Temps_, 9th February, 1916). Is there a single living Frenchman of sense
who would be willing to recover Alsace-Lorraine under such conditions
that it would be necessary afterwards to make incessant and exhausting
military efforts in order to keep the restored provinces? Certainly
not. The restoration of Alsace-Lorraine will only become of value for
France when the annihilation of Prussian militarism shall guarantee her
a legitimate and peaceful possession of the territories in question.
Now, as I think I have proved, it would be impossible to reckon on this
security if France allowed Berlin to carry out the scheme “from Hamburg
to the Persian Gulf,” which would furnish Germany with superabundant
means to retake Alsace-Lorraine after a short respite.

The imperious necessity of avoiding financial ruin further forces the
Allies to seek a complete victory. Indeed, such a victory alone will
enable them to escape the most frightful impoverishment, which otherwise
threatens the Allied States and their citizens. The fabulous expenses
which the present war necessitates distinguish it, financially speaking,
by a vast gulf from all the wars that have gone before.

After 1870, France was able very quickly to recover her position, and
in spite of the misfortunes of the country, individuals were able, on
the morrow of the peace, to promote the prosperity of their business.
But after the present war, if the Allies did not win a complete victory,
our States, like our individuals (see p. 88), would be faced by almost
inextricable pecuniary difficulties. The endless economic consequences
resulting from crushing taxes, which could not be regularly and
permanently collected, would be such that the States and most individuals
in the Allied countries would see themselves reduced to impotence and
therefore to poverty. This, however, is truly the situation with which
the Allies would be confronted if Germany were to achieve her plan of
domination “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” since that solution would
enable her to retain her enormous spoils of war and to lay hands on
considerable sources of wealth (see p. 85).

Now, would it not be a monstrous iniquity that the people of France,
England, Russia, and Italy should be reduced for tens of years to
terrible poverty because it suited the execrable ambition of the
Hohenzollerns to reduce Europe to slavery?

Only a complete victory can save the Allied countries from financial
ruin, because, no matter what some people say, Germany will be able to
pay the cost of the struggle she has initiated. As she is responsible
for the war, Germany already owes to the united Allies a colossal sum
which can be estimated roundly at between 250 and 300 milliards of
francs. But if the credit of the German Empire is doomed to disappear
on the day of her defeat, the material riches of Germany, which are very
considerable, will continue. They represent much more than 300 milliards
of francs. Of course Germany will only be able to pay her fabulous
debt very gradually. But when means for collecting the German revenues
shall have been systematically and leisurely studied by the conquering
Allies, when these collections of revenue shall have become assured, of
course not by written German promises, worthless scraps of paper, but
by real guarantees in harmony with those precedents of history, which
the government of Berlin strongly contributed to establish in 1870,
Germany will be perfectly able to hand to each of the great conquering
Allies about two milliards of francs a year. This annuity, thanks to
modern financial combinations, will be sufficient to allow each Allied
state to raise annual loans at relatively low rates and therefore easily
procurable; and these will permit each State to spare its citizens the
burden of taxes which would be not only crushing but fatal, and which
would be inevitable if the country had to relinquish the hope of being
recouped for its war expenses by Germany.

Now, a truly complete victory like this, which is indispensable from so
many points of view to the Allies, is perfectly possible in spite of the
faults committed by the Allies, which alone have delayed it.

A line of argument will set this possibility in a proper light. Harden
himself has been constrained, as we have already seen, to face the
hypothesis of a cession of Alsace-Lorraine to France. It is obvious that
when they have come to that pitch at Berlin, it will mean that Germany
at bay, on the brink of absolute disaster, will try to negotiate with
the Allies in order to save her plan of domination “from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf.” This would enable her, after a short respite, to recover
Alsace-Lorraine from France, as Harden also indicates. Therefore, the
effort needed at the present moment, if the Allies wish to secure a
complete instead of a doubtful victory, which in reality would mean for
them a catastrophe, would be comparatively slight. That effort would
probably only represent the hundredth part of all those already made by
the Allies. We should be mad or criminal not to make it, because it is
that last effort which will put an end to the horrible nightmare conjured
up all over the world by Prussian militarism.

* * * * *

In order to make sure of this complete victory, we need only draw the
appropriate lesson from the mistakes that have been made. As M. Briand
said in Rome, the solidarity of the Allies should be closer than ever.
“They ought to pool all their resources, all their energies, all their
vital forces.” But that co-ordination of the efforts of the Allies, which
is called for on every side, would be greatly facilitated, if the common
objective of the common action of all the Allies were thenceforth clearly
defined in its geographical, military, and political aspects.

The German aggression took the Allies by surprise, and their first duty
was to resist it. Afterwards, through the mere force of circumstances,
the operations of each of them were directed mainly to the particular
objects which each had in view. England and France have reasons of honour
and of interest for defending the absolute independence of Belgium.
France must recover its invaded departments and liberate Alsace-Lorraine.
Russia must not only reconquer its frontiers on the West, but free the
whole of Poland, to which she has promised autonomy. The empire of the
Tsars must also put an end, once for all, to the Turco-German menace on
the south of the Caucasus. Italy must recover her lost lands—_Italia
irredenta_—from the clutch of the Hapsburgs. But all these particular
objects, however legitimate and necessary, have long prevented the Allies
from seeing the war in its European dimensions, and have therefore
diverted their attention from what, alike from the geographical, the
military, and the political point of view, should be the common objective
of all their efforts, an objective of supreme importance, since its
attainment would deliver them at once from the menace of the “Hamburg
to the Persian Gulf” project, which threatens all the Allies alike; and
by striking a decisive blow at Prussian militarism it would assure the
accomplishment and the permanence of the practical results aimed at by
each of the Allies individually.

[Illustration: THE CRUCIAL POINT OF THE EUROPEAN PROBLEM.]

Now this common objective, this geographical, military and political
crux of all the problems which the Allies have to solve, is represented
by Austria-Hungary. On that subject the diplomacy of the Allies, thanks
again to M. Briand and his colleagues, appears to have entered on the
right path. The _Matin_ of 4th February, 1916, reported the reception by
M. Briand of Professor Masaryk, one of the most highly esteemed leaders
of Bohemia. In reference to this meeting the _Matin_ added the following
significant words, which deserve to be borne in mind: “M. Briand
encouraged M. Masaryk to persevere in his propaganda, and expressed to
him his good wishes and his sympathy with the legitimate claims of the
Czech-Slovak people.” But Bohemia is the corner-stone of that group
of non-German peoples included in Austria-Hungary, whose independence
is one of the conditions indispensable to the destruction of Prussian
militarism. Therefore public opinion in the Allied countries should
henceforth clearly understand the close relation which, as I have shown
above, exists between the little understood question of Austria-Hungary
and the end of the Pangerman nightmare. It will then have a fresh and
extremely powerful reason for the conviction, that the complete victory,
which the Pangerman plan renders indispensable for the Allies, cannot
fail to be theirs, provided they set their heart on it and avoid further
mistakes.

II.

In Austria-Hungary lies the crucial point of the European and even of the
world-wide problem raised by the German aggression, because:

1. Austria-Hungary has entered into the struggle in very peculiar
circumstances. This State is not an enemy of the Allies, except at the
bidding of the Hapsburg dynasty, which, by yielding to the injunctions
of Berlin, has betrayed its own peoples. In fact, Francis Joseph declared
war without even daring to consult his parliament, for he knew very well
that nearly three-fourths of his subjects, sympathizing with Russia,
France, and England, and being definitely hostile to Germany, would have
opposed, by the voice of their representatives, any sanguinary conflict
destined to turn to the advantage of Germanism.

2. It is manifest that Germany cannot maintain a war against Europe
except with the help of the Austro-Hungarian soldiers, whom she has
dexterously contrived to enlist in her cause, and of whom the vast
majority only fight because they are forced to do so by the brutal German
Staff Officers who command them.

3. It is clear that after the peace, if Germany were to evacuate all
the territories she now occupies in the East and the West, to restore
Alsace-Lorraine to France, and yet to keep her hold, more or less
disguised, on Austria-Hungary, Berlin would possess all the means for
retaking, after a short delay, Alsace-Lorraine from France, since, as
we saw in the foregoing chapter, the German hold on Austria-Hungary
inevitably implies the accomplishment of the scheme “from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf.”

4. From this last consideration it follows that if after the peace
Germany were to retain her disguised hold on Austria-Hungary, the solemn
promise given by France, England, and Russia, to re-establish Serbia in
its independence and its integrity, would be practically incapable of
fulfilment.

5. On the contrary, if the freedom from German control of at least the
majority of the Austro-Hungarian territories were assured after the
peace, this would absolutely prevent for the future any aggressive
revival of Prussian militarism. For by the very fact of that independence
the General Staff of Berlin would be deprived of troops which are
indispensable to the forcible execution of the Pangerman projects.

6. A glance at the map (p. 113) will show that in virtue of their
geographical situation nothing but the freedom of the majority of the
Austro-Hungarian territories from German control could enable the Allies
to keep their promises to Serbia, and, by definitely breaking the
backbone of the Pangerman plan, to prevent the immense danger of the
“Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” plan, the accomplishment of which all the
Allies, without any exception (France, England, Russia, Italy, Japan,
Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro) have a really vital interest to prevent.
But, as we shall see at the end of the volume, their interest in this
matter is also the interest of the whole civilized world.

The fact that public opinion in the Allied countries is not yet fully
alive to the capital, the essential importance of the Austro-Hungarian
question for the issue of the war and the future of Europe, is due to a
variety of causes which must be enumerated.

In the first place, the question of Austria-Hungary, an empire composed
of very complex racial and social elements, is undoubtedly very difficult
to grasp.

In the next place, the lamentable want of interest in foreign affairs,
which before the war prevailed in the Allied countries, is responsible
for the extreme inaccuracy of those current beliefs on the subject, which
the German press agents have successfully palmed off on the newspapers of
the present Allies.

As a result, many people in these countries, especially in England, still
imagine that Austria-Hungary, with a population of fifty millions, is
a country mainly German, which is a radically false idea. This serious
mistake is sometimes made, to my knowledge, even by men occupying very
important posts.

Evidently a large part of the public is no longer quite so ignorant as
that. Nevertheless, even for them the Austro-Hungarian question is still
full of obscurities. Need we wonder at it? The official diplomatists
themselves in general, whatever their personal intelligence, have been
able to acquire but a very superficial insight into the internal affairs
of the Hapsburg empire. The reasons for the deficiency have been already
set forth (Chapter I., § 3); they include the old-fashioned means of
observation and information which the diplomatists have been constrained
to employ.

Finally, the learned men who have studied Austria-Hungary only as
historians, that is to say, as foreigners and in books, whatever their
qualifications, have not been able to acquaint themselves with the exact
internal condition of the country, which has been completely transformed,
especially within the last ten years. But it is just this present
condition which it is important, and alone important, to comprehend.

This want of clear notions on the Hapsburg empire involves a very great
danger for the Allies. It has contributed largely to the very grave
mistakes which they have made in the general conduct of the war. An end
must be put to this ignorance. In regard to Austria-Hungary the Allies
must on no account continue to commit such a series of blunders as those
which made up their policy towards the Balkans. Their punishment for such
repeated mistakes would be even more severe than it has been.

The only way of avoiding these mistakes is to listen to the opinions
of the few men, citizens of the Allied states, who in recent years, in
virtue of their thorough-going studies and of their extensive travels in
the whole of Austria-Hungary, have been able to acquire a really exact
and general knowledge of the facts as they are at present.

Those who possess these qualifications are far from numerous. I will
mention first two Russians: M. de Wesselitsky, correspondent of the
_Novoe Vremya_ in London, who knows not only Austria-Hungary, but
all Europe, and has very profound views; and M. Briantchaninoff, of
Petrograd. I know that in official circles the ideas of the latter
gentleman are deemed too violent or extreme, but he is one of the
few Russians who have travelled much for the purpose of acquainting
themselves with foreign affairs. A very intelligent Liberal and a
clearsighted man, he has for a very long time advocated the concession
by Russia of the largest and the most genuine autonomy to Poland. His
opinion with regard to Austria-Hungary, which he has often visited,
deserves to be listened to.

Two Englishmen in particular possess an excellent knowledge of the
Hapsburg empire: Mr. Wickham Steed, foreign editor of _The Times_, who
was for ten years the remarkable correspondent of that powerful organ
at Vienna; Mr. Seton-Watson, who, under the name of _Scotus Viator_,
has published, within the last ten years, the results of his manifold
inquiries in works of the highest value dealing with the nationalities
subject to the German-Magyar yoke.

In France we find M. Louis Léger, Member of the Institute,[4] who for
fifty-one years past, has devoted special study to all the peoples of
Austria-Hungary and knows them thoroughly. Further, M. Ernest Denis,
professor at the Sorbonne, has written a remarkable history of Bohemia.
In studying on the spot for the purpose of writing this book, he has
acquired a very full knowledge of the Czech nation, which by its
geographical position in Bohemia and Moravia, forms the indispensable
basis of every reconstitution of Austria-Hungary in a modern form.
Finally, may I be allowed to cite myself, since for twenty-two years,
by a series of manifold inquiries on the spot, I have endeavoured to
understand in their detail the very complex problems which form the
Austro-Hungarian question?

Now, I have reason to believe that these men, who have thoroughly studied
Austria-Hungary, and whom therefore we ought to trust, are agreed on the
general lines of the policy which the Allies should pursue in regard to
the Hapsburg monarchy. I think that I am not mistaken when I say that the
opinions which I am about to express are on the whole in harmony with the
views of these gentlemen.

Let us first understand that those who still uphold the doctrine of
the maintenance of Austria-Hungary as she is, that is, in subjection
to the Hapsburg dynasty, are at least twenty years behind their time.
To adopt this solution would be to play the German game; for it is
practically impossible to separate the Hapsburgs from the Hohenzollerns.
It would establish the Germanic yoke on the Slav and Latin subjects of
the Hapsburgs, thus facilitating the accomplishment of the scheme “from
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.”

Finally, the Hapsburg dynasty has given too many proofs of its
incapacity, its duplicity, and its submissiveness to the suggestions of
Berlin, to allow us to consider seriously its maintenance at the head of
the Austro-Hungarian peoples.

In no way must the Allies be dupes of the comedy which the Pangermans of
Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest are getting up now in order to profit by the
ignorance of the Allies as to Austro-Hungarian facts.

All the measures tending to force Austria-Hungary into the German
_Zollverein_, which would make its political absorption inevitable, must
be looked upon as a farce, a simple act of criminal violence done to
the wishes of the immense majority of the populations in the Hapsburg
monarchy. So true is this, that certain Magyar noblemen, who up to the
present have been decided allies of Berlin, are already uttering protests
against the Prussian yoke, understanding at last that it is to be imposed
upon them. Count Theodore Batthyany, vice-president of the Independent
Left of the Hungarian Chamber, declared at the end of March, 1916: “It
is often said among us that the future Customs-Union would create in our
country better economical conditions. This is much more true for Germany,
who will hold both the reins and the whip in the combination.... Besides
the Germans make no secret of it that in the proposed compact there will
be other agricultural states which will be our future competitors (in
allusion to Turkey and the Balkan States). Certainly, from the time that
the union is concluded, all capital will come to us from Germany and
never from elsewhere. The Germans will have the monopoly of capital among
us, and you know what a monopoly is and what it costs. The money will
cost us dear” (_Le Temps_, 1st February, 1916).

In Austria, M. Nemetz, President of the Chamber of Commerce at Prague,
declared: “None of the arguments adduced in favour of a Customs-Union
with Germany will for a moment bear the light of criticism. An
insuperable obstacle is opposed to an intimate Customs-Union between
the two empires: their interests are not identical but on the contrary
competitive” (quoted by _Le Temps_, 9th February, 1916).

These categorical declarations prove what resistance the Pangerman
manœuvre has already to encounter. The Allies have much to gain from
these statements, for they prove the reality of the deep opposition
existing between the interests of Pangerman Germany and those of the
majority of the Austro-Hungarian peoples.

But there remains an essential point to prove, for it gives rise to
special anxiety in the minds of that part of the public in the Allied
countries which still harps on the false idea that Austro-Hungary is a
specially German country. This section of the public doubts whether the
application of the principle of nationalities, which the Allies demand,
would not have the effect of necessarily and considerably increasing
Germany by incorporating in it the Germans of the Hapsburg empire.

It is, therefore, necessary to demonstrate by means of figures and
accurate geographical and ethnographical arguments that this fear is
quite chimerical. Austria-Hungary contains all the elements of a new
State which can be constituted on just and lasting foundations, and under
such conditions that it would form for the future an insurmountable
barrier to Pangermanism. It is there, as we shall see, on the road from
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, in Central Europe, and nowhere else that we
shall find the solution of the problem set to the world by the hateful
ambition of the Hohenzollerns.

III.

Let us examine in figures what would be the result in Central Europe of
the application of the principle of nationalities, which ought to form
the moral base of the Allies for the reconstitution of future Europe.
The French Socialist Congress at the end of 1915, in my opinion, gave
an excellent definition of the principle of nationalities as we see it
at work in the present war. The manifesto of the Congress declared:
“No durable peace unless the small martyrized nations are restored to
their political and economic independence.... No durable peace unless
the oppressed populations of Europe have restored to them the liberty of
shaping their own destinies” (_L’Humanité_, 30th December, 1915).

As nothing in this world is absolute, it is clear that the principle of
nationalities cannot always receive in practice a complete application.
In order to constitute States with a potentiality of life, we must
take into account not only the nationalities but also the strategical,
defensive, historical, and economical needs of the majority. There
are besides countries like Macedonia and like certain regions of
Austria-Hungary, where the nationalities are so intermingled that the
application of the principle of nationality can only be relative.

On the other hand, sacrifices must sometimes be made at the cost of
the principle of nationalities for the sake of the general European
interest. Thus, for example, France cannot think of incorporating those
who speak French in Belgium and Switzerland. The first of those people
wish to remain Belgians and the second wish to remain Swiss. Their wish
must be all the more respected since the maintenance of the Belgian
state and of the Swiss state is necessary to the balance and the peace
of Europe. There are, moreover, other parts of the continent where this
consideration outweighs the principle of nationalities.

Having given these explanations and made these reservations, let us see
what would be obtained in the main by the application of the principle
of nationalities to the German empire. In virtue of this principle the
Germans ought to restore liberty to those peoples who are included by
force within their boundaries, that is to say about

Inhabitants.
Poles 5,000,000
Inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine 1,500,000
Danes 200,000
---------
Total 6,700,000

The Germany of to-day, which numbered 68 millions of inhabitants in 1914,
including the non-Germans, would be brought down to about 61,300,000, in
round figures, 61,000,000 of genuine Germans.

But the logical application of the principle of nationalities would give
to that Germany the liberty of absorbing those Germans of the Hapsburg
monarchy who on historical, strategical, and geographical grounds can be
legitimately added to Germany after its reduction from 68 to 61 millions
of inhabitants. What would be the result?

Let us look back to p. 32 and examine the map which sums up the
ethnographical situation of Austria-Hungary. On this map the Slav and
Latin nationalities subject to the Hapsburgs, named in the margin,
are indicated by different shadings. The region inhabited by Germans
and that inhabited by the Magyars have been left blank. The two last
ethnographic groups are separated by a dotted line. This map only gives
a very imperfect idea of the ethnographic facts, because it is drawn
from ethnographic documents which are German and Magyar, and which are
purposely falsified. In reality the Slav regions are a good deal more
extensive than is indicated by the blank zones (Germans and Magyars).
This is particularly true in the blank zone to the north and north-west
of the purely Czech region.

Vienna, which, however, is in the centre of a perfectly blank zone, is by
no means, as is generally believed, a purely German city. Her population
is Slav to the amount of about one-third (Poles and especially Czechs).
This fact, which is certain, is yet not recognized by any official
Austrian statistics, because these are drawn up by German functionaries
who have orders to falsify them. Their principal mode of garbling the
figures is as follows:

In the whole of Austria every Slav or Latin, who merely knows a few words
of German, is styled, much against his own will, a German. Now, all the
Slavs who live in Vienna know a few words of German. This allows the
German statisticians of the Austrian Government to conclude that there
are no Slavs in Vienna, and to set down the number of the Slavs in all
the rest of Austria at a figure considerably below the truth.

In Hungary the statistics are garbled with the same effrontery by the
functionaries of the Budapest government in favour of the Magyar element.

The following, however, are the results given for the whole of the
Hapsburg monarchy by the official Germano-Magyar statistics in the census
of 1910:

Round figures in tens
_Austria._ of thousands.

Germans 9,950,000
Czechs 6,440,000
Poles 4,970,000
Ruthenians 3,520,000
Slovenes 1,260,000
Serbo-Croatians 790,000
Italians 770,000
Roumanians 280,000
----------
Total 27,980,000

_Hungary._

Magyars 10,050,000
Roumanians 2,950,000
Serbo-Croatians 2,940,000
Germans 2,040,000
Slovaks 1,970,000
Ruthenians 480,000
----------
Total 20,430,000

_Bosnia and Herzegovina._

Serbo-Croatians (orthodox, or Moslems
of Serbian origin) 2,000,000

According to these figures there are 12 millions of Germans in the
Hapsburg empire, but we shall see that not nearly all these 12 millions
of Germans could be united to Germany. In fact:

1. As the table shows, rather more than two millions of Germans are
in Hungary, where they are scattered in small groups among the other
nationalities. They could not therefore be united to Germany.

2. Out of the 10 millions, roughly speaking, of Germans in Austria,
those of Bohemia, to the north and north-west of the purely Czech zone,
could not be united to Germany, because in that zone they are mixed up
with numerous Czechs, and because the dotted line, which on the map (p.
68) separates Bohemia from the German empire of to-day, represents the
historical and strategical boundaries of the kingdom of Bohemia. Now it
would be impossible without these boundaries to assure the independence
of the Czecho-Slovaks. Clearly we could not think of sacrificing nearly 9
millions of Czecho-Slovaks to 1 million of Germans in Bohemia, especially
as these same Germans simply squatted in the country long ago by sheer
violence and fraud.

3. By this fact the 10 millions of Germans, who might seem to be eligible
for incorporation in Germany, are reduced to about 9 millions. These
form on the map the blank group which stretches from Switzerland to the
dotted line which marks the Magyar ethnographical boundary. But there
are serious reasons for thinking that were a thorough investigation made
of the ethnographical facts, that is to say, of the mixture of Slavs
and Germans to the east of this group, and consequently between the
purely Czech group to the north of Vienna and the purely Slovene group
to the south of Vienna, the result of such an investigation would be
to show that this German group could not in its entirety be united to
Germany. As it would be out of the question here to enter into these very
difficult ethnographical details, we shall, under all possible reserve,
and purely for the convenience of demonstration, make the supposition
that the whole of this German group should be united to Germany. But from
these 9 millions of Germans we should certainly still have to subtract
the Slavs who are included in this figure through the systematic garbling
of the Austrian statistics. The typical example of the city of Vienna,
cited above, proves this necessity. As this deception is practised on an
enormous scale at the expense of the Slavs, we may allow that the true
number of Germans in this part of Austria who could be geographically
incorporated in Germany, amounts to not more than 7 or 8 millions. Let us
take this last figure. If these 8 millions of Germans were incorporated
in Germany, then Germany of to-day, reduced for the reasons indicated on
p. 123 to 61 millions, would be enlarged, at the expense of Austria, by
8 millions of inhabitants. She would then have a total of 69 millions of
inhabitants.

Therefore, as the present German empire had in 1914 a population of 68
millions of inhabitants, we see that the application of the principle of
nationalities would allow Germany to gain on the south-west just about
the equivalent of what the same principle would take from her on the
circumference of the existing empire.

Would a Germany of 69 or 70 millions of genuine Germans be really
dangerous for Europe? I do not think so, for, as we shall see, the
application of the principle of nationalities would have the effect of
withdrawing totally from the influence of Berlin’s Pangermanism all the
rest of the inhabitants of Austria-Hungary.

In fact, if out of the 50 millions of inhabitants in Austria-Hungary of
to-day about 8 millions joined Germany, 42 millions of Austro-Hungarian
subjects would remain. Of this number:

Five millions of Poles would join Poland;

Four millions of Ruthenians would join Russia;

Three millions of Roumanians would join Roumania;

One million of Italians would join Italy;

Making a total of 13 millions of inhabitants.

There would therefore remain a compact group composed of 29 millions of
inhabitants, made up of Czech-Slovaks, Magyars, and Germans, these last
diluted in the solid mass of Magyars and Serbo-Croatians. As the Magyars
and Serbo-Croatians wish to unite with the 5 million Serbians of Serbia,
we thus deduce the presence in Central Europe of a mass of 34 million
inhabitants, containing an infinitesimal proportion of Germans and so
situated geographically that they could perfectly form United States, in
which the rights of each nationality and the form of government of each
State would be respected, and which, nevertheless, would constitute an
economic territory extensive enough to correspond to modern needs.

The obstacle to the creation of such United States might seem to be the
reluctance of the Magyars, who at present play the German game, to come
to an understanding with the neighbouring nationalities. This objection
disappears when we know what is unfortunately known to none but a small
number of experts. Out of the 10 millions of Magyars, there are about 9
millions of poor labourers, almost all agricultural, cynically exploited
by the Magyar nobility, who possess nearly all the land. Now it is
these nobles, owners of enormous landed estates, who, with the Magyar
functionaries whom they nominate, are Prussophile, and not even all of
them are that. It must also be known that the 9 millions of Magyar
proletariat are not so much as represented in the parliament at Budapest,
for elections in Hungary are neither more nor less than barefaced
swindles practised for the benefit of the million Magyars who sweat their
poor compatriots. Now these 9 millions of unhappy peasants by no means
love the Prussians. More than that, they are quite ready to fraternize
with the other democratic masses represented by the nationalities which
surround them. Therefore, on the day when the true Magyar people shall
be delivered from the feudal nobility who oppress them, and shall become
in their turn masters of their own destinies, they will certainly not
stand out against the creation of the United States here adumbrated. I am
quite sure of the popular feeling on this subject, for on my last visits
to Budapest I was able to put myself in communication with the leaders
of the Magyar democratic organizations. It was thus that I learned that
even before the war they had been trying to find a basis for a mutual
understanding with the other Slav nationalities of Hungary. So strong
indeed was this tendency that it furnished the nefarious Count Tisza with
a motive for declaring war in order to elude the democratic movement,
which threatened the privileges of the Magyar nobility, of which he is
one of the leaders.

In short, we may conclude that there is in Austria-Hungary and in Serbia
a mass of 34 millions of inhabitants, who are practically free from
Germanic elements and could form in Central Europe a confederacy of
United States that might in time develop into the United States of Europe.

Thus there undoubtedly exist all the ethnographical elements which
could render possible the erection in Central Europe of a very powerful
triple barrier against every aggressive revival of Pangermanism (see p.
43). The erection of this barrier would form the solution of the great
problem set us by the Pangerman peril. It would free for ever numerous
nationalities from the Prussian yoke. It would coincide not only with the
interests of all the Allies, but also with those of the whole world. For
as I hope to prove in Chapter IX, the inhabitants of both South and North
America would be not less vitally affected than the European Allies and
Japan by the achievement of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.”

Therefore, the necessary but sufficient backbone of the Pangerman plan,
as represented by the formula “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” can be
certainly destroyed in Central Europe and there only. The net result
is that the question of Austria-Hungary constitutes the crucial point
of a problem which is not only European but universal, set to all the
civilized States by the war which Prussianized Germany has initiated and
by the execrable ambition of the Hohenzollerns.

The question of Austria-Hungary has besides an aspect of social and
universal interest, which the Liberals and Socialists of Allied or
neutral countries have not yet perhaps sufficiently contemplated.
The supremacy of Germany over Austria-Hungary would have, in fact, a
social consequence of infinite importance: a new lease of crushing and
strengthened power would be ensured to the German-Austrian aristocracy,
to the Magyar aristocracy of Hungary, to the German aristocracy of the
German empire, and above all to the execrable Prussian _Junkers_, who are
principally responsible for the war. This great and insolent triumph of
the _Junker_ spirit, supported by the means of universal domination which
would be put at the disposal of the Berlin government as a consequence
of the accomplishment of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,”
would have a disastrous after-effect by repressing those democratic
and liberal movements, which are at present developing legitimately and
necessarily, not only in the Allied countries but in the whole world.
Finally, it would entail fresh revolutionary crises, causing disturbances
which it is of serious interest to avoid, lest ideas of social justice
should lose the vantage ground of liberty which they have so painfully
conquered.

These considerations, therefore, lead us to the conclusion that the final
liberation of all the Latin and Slav peoples of Austria-Hungary from
the German yoke is a matter of universal social interest. In fact, it
constitutes an essential condition of the progress of liberal ideas, of
the pacific development and organization of democracy in the whole world.

CHAPTER VII.

THE BALKANS AND THE PANGERMAN PLAN.

I. The connexion between the Pangerman plan and the plan of
Bulgarian supremacy.

II. Greece and the Pangerman ambitions.

III. Roumania and the Pangerman plan.

In virtue of the geographical position which they occupy in the zone
“from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” the Balkan States are of extreme
importance for the making or the marring of the whole Pangerman plan.
Moreover, events have proved to the satisfaction of the most sceptical
the influence which these States exert on the issue of the struggle.
Public opinion, therefore, both in Allied and neutral countries, should
note very clearly the intimate relation which exists between the Balkan
factors and the universal Pangerman plan.

I can here touch only on the fundamental Balkan factors, those that
have a durable and permanent character, not on the attitude of certain
governments in the Eastern peninsula. That attitude for the last year
has been singularly vacillating. It shifts, in fact, under the action
of those parasitic German influences which, through the dynastic
ties of the reigning families, backed by the threats of Berlin, sway
these governments in opposition to the national interests which it is
their bounden duty to defend. Moreover, simple justice compels us to
acknowledge, that the diplomatic mistakes made by the Allies, especially
in 1915, in consequence of their imperfect acquaintance with Balkan
facts, has been singularly favourable to the success of the German
influences.

Thus, for example, at Athens, the present Cabinet, formed after the
arbitrary dissolution of the Greek parliament, and therefore destitute of
all constitutional authority, has been instigated by King Constantine,
brother-in-law of the Emperor William II., to persevere in a policy
which all influential Greeks who are free to speak their minds regard as
disastrous to the true interests of Hellenism. Similarly at Bukarest the
attitude of the Bratiano cabinet is subjected by eminent Roumanians to
searching criticism. Thus _La Roumanie_, the organ of M. Take Jonescu,
speaking of the commercial agreement between Germany and Roumania, has
recently said: “This agreement makes Roumania the dupe of Germany”[5]
(see _Le Journal_, 20th April, 1916). The final decision of certain
Balkan governments is, therefore, for the moment still in suspense, but
whatever it may be, each of the Balkan peoples would infallibly see its
future interests thwarted or menaced by the triumph of the Pangerman
plan. It is important to clear up these prospects. So far as Montenegro
and Serbia are concerned, any discussion would be superfluous, so evident
is it that a German victory would mean for these two States their
definite and final disappearance.

It is otherwise with Bulgaria. Indeed, the key of the whole Balkan
situation lies in the plan of a Bulgarian supremacy, which, as we shall
see, is closely bound up, at least in principle, with the Pangerman plan.

It was said long ago that the Bulgarians are the Prussians of the East.
Now it is just their fixed idea of achieving at any cost their dream of
dominating the Balkans which has led the Bulgarians to throw in their
lot with Berlin, without perceiving that, though they might benefit by
the first phase of this combination, they would finally fall victims to
Pangermanism.

[Illustration: GREAT BULGARIA.]

The pretensions of Bulgaria to supremacy, though even less has been known
about them than about the Pangerman plan, are nevertheless relatively
old, as is conclusively proved by the following facts:

The map printed above is a document of the highest importance, for it
enables us to detect the real policy, first of Bulgaria, and next of the
other Balkan States. This map is an exact translation and reproduction of
the map which is to be found on p. 56 of the historical part of a book
published in Bulgarian at Sofia and called: _The Soldier’s Companion_,
_Manual for the Soldiers of all arms_. This is an official work of
propaganda in the army, and therefore in the whole Bulgarian people,
since all Bulgarians go through the ranks; and it was published in
obedience to order No. 76 of March 14th, 1907, issued by the Bulgarian
Ministry of War, approved and authorized by the Chief of the Headquarters
Staff of the Bulgarian army. This manual has been recommended by the
Bulgarian Ministry of War, in circular No. 28 of March 21st, 1907. Hence
we are confronted with an official Bulgarian book dating from 1907, which
proves very clearly beyond the possibility of dispute the ideas which
have been systematically instilled into the whole Bulgarian people for at
least nine years.

In this map, entitled Great Bulgaria, which is coloured in the eighth
edition of the Bulgarian original, the part said to be “already set free
by the Bulgarians” is coloured pink (represented by large hatchings on
our map), and the parts said to be “not set free by the Bulgarians” are
coloured red (represented by closer hatchings on our map). This official
Bulgarian document helps us to understand, both what happened in the
Balkan wars, and the conduct of the government of Sofia during the
European war.

In fact, when in 1912 the Bulgarians entered into an alliance with the
Greeks and Serbians against Turkey, they were not even then true to
their Allies. At that time they had a very low opinion of the Greeks and
Serbians as soldiers. But they thought it very expedient to employ the
forces of these nations against the principal enemy, Turkey, intending
afterwards to settle accounts with their temporary allies by means of the
increase of power which they expected to gain at the expense of Turkey.
As these intentions were suspected at Belgrade and Athens, it may easily
be conceived that from the very beginning of their joint action the
Greek and Serbian governments did not repose full confidence in that of
Sofia. The distrust of the Greeks and Serbians was, moreover, thoroughly
aroused when King Ferdinand, before he allowed his troops to hurl
themselves against the lines of Chataldja, disclosed his claim to enter
Constantinople, with the evident intention of staying there if he could.

Given the Bulgarian claims in the west, which are set forth in our map,
we can further explain why in 1913 the Bulgarians, whose character is
hard and unyielding, refused all compromise when the Serbians, excluded
by Europe from the Adriatic, demanded from the Bulgarians an equitable
compensation to the south of Uskub.

Moreover, always instigated by their desire of supremacy, and stirred up
by Vienna and Berlin, the Bulgarians thought that the moment had come
to annihilate the Serbians and Greeks. So they made the sudden attack
of June 17-30, 1913, on their former allies. But the wary Serbians and
Greeks were ready for the encounter. Roumania, as little inclined to
tolerate Bulgarian supremacy as Greece or Serbia, marched her troops
to within ten kilometres of Sofia. The Bulgarians were crushed by the
Serbians at Bregalnitza, and were compelled to sign, on August 10th,
1913, the treaty of Bukarest. But from that moment, animated by a
boundless hatred of their conquerors, they had but one desire, and that
was to take vengeance on the victors, one after the other, and above all
to destroy the treaty of Bukarest at the first favourable opportunity.

Hence

1º. The treaties made by Sofia with Berlin and Constantinople, before
April, 1914, as M. Radoslavoff has disclosed (see _Havas_, quoted by _Le
Petit Parisien_, 26th March, 1916, and _Le Temps_, 10th April, 1916).

2º. Bulgaria’s participation in the European war on the side of Germany,
whose plans for the future, like the Bulgarian ambitions, were threatened
by the consequence of the treaty of Bukarest (_see_ Chapter II, § 1).

* * * * *

An examination of the Bulgarian map, which serves us as a document,
proves that the Bulgarian pretentions to supremacy, like those of
Pangermanism, aim at absorbing, regardless of language or race, the
regions whose possession is deemed useful to Bulgaria. Thus the rapacious
doctrine of the Bulgarians is absolutely identical with that of the
Prussians. This identity has facilitated the understanding between the
two peoples. In fact, the Great Bulgaria of our official document of 1907
(see the map on p. 133) includes the following: the Roumanian Dobrudja
as far as Galatz and Sulina, on which clearly the Bulgarians can lay no
justifiable claim; the shores of the Ægean Sea; the territory from Serres
to Gumuldjina, where the Greek element is dominant; the region of Nisch,
which is Serbian; the region of Prizrend, which had been recognized as
Serbian by the Bulgarians themselves in their treaty of alliance with the
Serbians in 1912. As to the region of Uskub as far as Lake Ochrida, near
Albania, the Bulgarians in their treaty with the Serbians admitted it to
be disputable. Its allotment was to be referred to the arbitration of
the Emperor of Russia, which the Bulgarians never seriously desired, and
to which they opposed a solid obstacle by their attack on the Serbians
in June, 1913. Lastly, the region south of Uskub, that is, the portion
of Macedonia which forms the south of the present Serbia, requires a
detailed exposition by itself. This is essential, for concerning Serbian
Macedonia many misconceptions have been propagated by the Allied Press
and have been the source of the mistakes committed by the Allies in the
Balkans in 1915. It is therefore absolutely necessary to correct these
misconceptions, if the Allies would avoid falling into fresh mistakes in
the Balkans, for which they would again have to pay a heavy price.

[Illustration: SERBIAN MACEDONIA.]

In short, to look the difficulties clearly in the face, we must answer
the question, Is the south of Serbia Bulgarian? (see the map, above).

The territory in the south of Serbia on which divergent opinions have
been expressed is represented with tolerable exactness:

1º. By a triangle of which the apex lies a little to the north of Veles,
and of which the other angles are formed by Guevgheli on the east and
Lake Ochrida on the west.

2º. By a strip of territory which lies to the east of this triangle, and
which, between the left bank of the Vardar and Bulgaria, contains the
regions of Kotchana, Stip, and Stroutmitza-gare. The Bulgarians contend
that all the territory formed by this triangle and this lateral strip is
incontestably Bulgarian; last year some Allied writers supported this
contention. In the first place, it was said, the treaty of San Stefano
(1878) assigned to Bulgaria what is now the south of Serbia. They forgot
that in 1878 the ethnographic study of the Ottoman empire had not yet
begun, and that at that time the Russians and the English were both
inclined, for different reasons, to consider almost all the inhabitants
of European Turkey as Bulgarians, without inquiry or distinction. The
Russians, who then aimed at establishing themselves ultimately in the
Balkans, were impelled by this aim to regard the Bulgarians as extremely
numerous. As for the English, burning with indignation at the “Bulgarian
atrocities” of Gladstone, they very generously thought of nothing but
liberating from the Turkish yoke as many Christians as possible, and
these in Macedonia were labelled indiscriminately Bulgarians.

Be that as it may, it was only after the treaty of San Stefano that the
ethnographical study of Macedonia was taken up in earnest. Moreover,
it is proper to add that most of the writers who have discussed the
subject have drawn their information, not from inquiries on the spot,
but from Belgrade, Athens and Sofia. In these three centres they
were supplied with minute statistics, very well printed, and to all
appearance perfectly convincing, but which laboured under the serious
disadvantage that they flatly contradicted each other. For my own part,
I acknowledged that I was not able to arrive at a comparatively clear
idea of the complicated ethnography of this part of Macedonia till I had
carried out my inquiries of 1914, not as before in the Balkan capitals,
but on the spot, at Uskub, at Prizrend, at Prichtina, at Monastir, at
Ochrida, and at Strouga.

This inquiry, conducted six months before the war, led me to the
following conclusions. Serbian Macedonia contains two quite distinct
groups of population.

1º. The one is formed of Turks, Albanians, Kutzo-Wallachians or
Roumanians, Greeks, Jews, and Gipsies, who are scattered all over the
country.

2º. The second group is composed of the Macedonian Slavs.

In the absence of trustworthy statistics it is impossible to say which of
these two groups is numerically the stronger. Thus, at Uskub, the Turks
and the Jews alone were reckoned as numerous as the exarchists, that is
to say, as those who, attending the churches and schools of the Bulgarian
exarchate, were considered to be Bulgarians.

But what is quite certain is that the Serbs and the Bulgarians are found
in the second group of the population, that of the Macedonian Slavs.
Now this group itself comprises four sections, namely, native Serbs,
native Bulgarians, “floating” Serbs, and “floating” Bulgarians. The
two “floating” sections seem to be more numerous than the two native
sections. This singular expression, “floating,” is justified by the
following explanation. In 1870 the Bulgarians of Macedonia, then Ottoman
subjects, obtained from the Sultan leave to be considered, from the
religious point of view, not as before members of the Greek Orthodox
Church, but as members of a separate and autonomous church, the Bulgarian
Exarchate, of which the seat was fixed at Constantinople. The Bulgarians
of Bulgaria, who also joined the new church, took advantage of the
condition of things which resulted from this creation to organize in
Macedonia a propaganda nominally religious but really political, being
designed to gain over to the Bulgarian nation as many Macedonian Slavs
as possible; and this propaganda was directed and actively assisted by
the Bulgarian Exarch, Mgr. Joseph, who resided in Constantinople and was
an Ottoman subject. In those days the Macedonian Slavs were very poor
peasants, who had been oppressed by the Turks for centuries, and the
greater number of them did not care a straw whether they belonged to one
nationality or to another. The propaganda of the Bulgarian Exarchate in
Macedonia came into conflict with the Greek propaganda, and a little
later with the Serbian propaganda, which two propagandas, the one
directed from Athens and the other from Belgrade, had one and the same
object. All three propagandas together employed in Macedonia the most
diverse means—money, schools, and terrorism—to win over the Macedonian
Slavs, who were still hesitating, to the national Bulgarian cause, to the
national Greek cause, and to the national Serbian cause.

These various propagandas very often led to extraordinary results, which
proved, the artificial character of the movements. For example, before
the European war you might find in many Macedonian villages families of
three blood brothers, of whom one would say he was a Greek, the second
would solemnly affirm that he was a Serb, and the third would swear
he was a Bulgarian. Frequently, under the influence of the forcible
arguments applied to them, their national convictions would undergo a
sudden and radical change, so that the man who yesterday was a Serb,
to-day would give himself out as a Bulgarian, or contrariwise. It is
to persons whose nationality is of this unstable and erratic character
that the adjective “floating” is appropriately applied. At the same
time there is no question that the Serbian propaganda, having started
business in Macedonia about fifteen years later than its Bulgarian
rival, had gathered into the fold fewer of those “floating” sheep,
who were still sitting on the nationalist fence, not yet having made
up their minds whether to come down on the Serbian or the Macedonian
side. The two elements which compose the Bulgarian group in Macedonia,
namely, the genuine Bulgarians and the “floating” Bulgarians, have,
besides, a geographical distribution which is comparatively definite.
Though mixed up with Turkish elements, the inhabitants of the region of
Kotchana and Istip (Stip in Serbian), on the right bank of the Vardar
and on the Bulgarian boundary (see the map on p. 137) are for the most
part indisputably genuine Bulgarians. If at the time of the treaty of
Bukarest the Serbians claimed these mountainous regions, they did so
for strategical reasons, in order to ensure the defence of the railway,
which, passing through the valley of the Vardar, connects Belgrade,
Nisch, and Uskub with Salonika, and is therefore of vital importance
for Serbia. The present war has proved that this point of view was not
without justification.

On the other hand, on the right bank of the Vardar, and therefore in
the greater part of Serbian Macedonia, the Bulgarian elements, whether
genuine or “floating,” are more or less scattered among all the other
racial elements. Undoubtedly there are to the west of the Vardar some
Bulgarians whose descent is very ancient and beyond dispute. A certain
number, who have emigrated from these regions, exercise a predominant
political influence even in Bulgaria. Thus General Boyadjeff was born at
Ochrida, and M. Genadieff was born at Monastir. But these Bulgarians by
descent are certainly a minority in the whole population of Macedonia.
For example, at Monastir, in 1914, out of 60,000 inhabitants about a
third were Bulgarians. It is true that round about Monastir and Uskub you
might find villages inhabited almost entirely by Bulgarians, but beside
these villages were others formed of different Macedonian nationalities
(Serbs, Roumanians, etc.).

As for the “floating” Bulgarians, after a Serbian occupation which had
lasted only five months since the treaty of Bukarest, many of them
already proclaimed themselves Serbs. For example, the Serbian mayor of
the little town of Strouga had been in Turkish times the pillar of the
Bulgarian propaganda in the district of Strouga. Similar cases were
very numerous. The Bulgarians of Sofia, unable to deny this wholesale
transformation into Serbians of quondam Bulgarians who had been raked
into the fold by the propaganda of the Exarchate, gave out that this
sudden conversion was the effect of that reign of terror which, according
to them, the Serbians resorted to for the purpose of establishing
their dominion in Macedonia. The allegation seems to me untenable. I
traversed most of the roads of Serbian Macedonia in the winter (January,
1914), accompanied only by one or two persons. I very often met Serbian
soldiers, who came from the garrisons on the Albanian frontier and were
going on furlough to Northern Serbia. Now these soldiers were travelling
singly or in groups of two or three. With nothing but a walking-stick
in their hand they were making their way over the 60 or 70 kilometres
which separated them from the nearest railway. If the country had really
been inhabited by convinced Bulgarians who detested the Serbians, is it
not evident that there would have been attacks on these isolated and
defenceless Serbian soldiers? But there were no such attacks, and from
personal observation I can affirm that the most complete tranquillity
prevailed in Serbian Macedonia, which in the days of the Turks had been
the scene of incessant murders; and these murders were generally brought
about by the terrorist means employed by the Bulgarian propaganda.

What is certain is, that at the beginning of 1914 the “floating”
Bulgarians, who were in fact the more numerous, acquiesced without
resistance in the Serbian rule and called themselves Serbians. The
Bulgarian Exarch, Mgr. Joseph, who had organized and directed the
Bulgarian propaganda since 1870, was not at all surprised at this result.
He acknowledged to me at Sofia, in February, 1914, that the Bulgarian
game was up in the south of Macedonia, and that in a short time most of
the adherents whom he had enlisted in former days would prove themselves
very good Serbians. Indeed, he had made up his mind to it, for he had
been opposed to the attack of June, 1913, on the Serbians and the Greeks,
and he thought that Bulgaria should accept a situation for which she
herself was responsible, and of which she must bear the consequences.

For these manifold reasons it is impossible to say that the south
of Macedonia is Bulgarian. But the Bulgarian people of Bulgaria has
been completely intoxicated by the intense propaganda which has been
organized, especially during the last thirty years, in Bulgaria itself
by Bulgarians who are natives of Ottoman Macedonia. These men, most of
them very energetic, have in reality engrossed all the important posts,
military, political, and administrative, in Bulgaria. So well have they
done the business of propaganda that the lowest Bulgarian peasant of
Bulgaria believes in his heart and soul that all Serbian Macedonia is
Bulgarian. It is easy to understand how German policy at Sofia has been
able to turn this state of mind to account for the purpose of hurrying
the Bulgarian people into the war on the side of Pangermanism.

To recapitulate, the south of Macedonia is really Macedonia, that is
to say, it is a territory inhabited by motley peoples, who are almost
everywhere jumbled up together. The Bulgarians who live there cannot
therefore rightfully claim that the treaty of Bukarest violated the
principle of nationalities to their detriment by assigning South-Western
Macedonia to Serbia. In fact, just because it is Macedonia, that is,
an extraordinary jumble of heterogeneous peoples, the principle of
nationalities cannot possibly be applied to Macedonia. In strict justice,
the destiny of this peculiar country should be settled simply and solely
with reference to the general strategical and economic needs of the
surrounding States. Now if there are Bulgarians in Macedonia there are
also Serbians, and neither strategically nor economically is the south of
Macedonia necessary to Bulgaria. On the other hand, Serbia has a really
vital interest, both economic and defensive, in maintaining a direct
geographical contact with Greece, in order to have by means of Salonika
that access to the Ægean Sea which is for her indispensable.

* * * * *

What proves, moreover, in ample measure that the exorbitant Bulgarian
pretensions are not founded on a racial basis is that at present the
ambitions of the government of Sofia considerably exceed even the extreme
limits of the map which serves us as a document (see p. 133). Indeed, not
only does Bulgaria desire to keep the region of Nisch, but she aims at
expanding as far as Hungary, which in her turn also wishes to encroach
on Serbia. In February, 1916, Mr. Take Jonescu declared at Bukarest that
he had it from a sure source that Germany had just promised to Bulgaria
the possession of Salonika and the Roumanian Dobrudja as far as Sulina
(see _Le Matin_, 25th February, 1916), that is, exactly that part of the
Roumanian Dobrudja which, according to our documentary map the Bulgarians
have coveted ever since 1907 at least. As to King Ferdinand, he wishes
to obtain for his son the whole of central Albania, which would allow
Bulgaria under colour of an eventual arrangement, more or less forced on
a few Albanian tribes, to spread from the Black Sea to the Adriatic—an
old plan familiar to all who are versed in the ambitions of the Coburg
prince at Sofia. It is, moreover, probable, so far as Albania and the
Roumanian Dobrudja are concerned, that the Berlin government will curb
the Bulgarian ambitions in order not to hurt the feelings of Vienna,
and to prolong the neutrality of Roumania by nursing the illusions of
the Bratiano cabinet. There will be plenty of time afterwards to punish
Roumania for hesitating to submit to the German yoke, when the hour for
freeing herself from it shall have passed for ever.

The secret treaty, the negotiations for which between the Kaiser and
the Tsar Ferdinand were revealed by _Le Temps_ of 29th February, 1916,
would ensure to Ferdinand the means of ultimately putting the last
touches to his plan of Bulgarian supremacy. But this treaty, linking
the fate of Bulgaria to that of Germany in a military, economic, and
political aspect, would involve the inclusion of Bulgaria in the Germanic
Confederation. Therefore, finally, always in pursuance of the plan of
1911, Bulgaria would serve as a broad bridge between the Germanic
Confederation of Central Europe and Prussianized Turkey.

This recent revelation completes the demonstration of the mode and form
in which the plan of Bulgarian supremacy is closely bound up with the
Pangerman plan of world-wide domination.

II.

The evidence of the facts as they now stand appears to be bringing the
Greeks to recognize, that if the Allies have committed faults in the
Balkans—through excess of candour, misconception of the mental factors,
and with the best intentions in the world—the government of Athens has
been equally deceived as to the surest means of safeguarding Hellenic
interests.

According to the treaty of alliance with Serbia of 16-29th June, 1913,
Greece was bound to come to the help of her ally, in case the latter were
attacked by any third power. This article was clear. It is needless to
harp on the point, for even without a treaty, it was a vital necessity
for Greece not to let the Bulgarians upset the balance of power, to
her detriment, in the Balkans and intrude themselves between her and
Serbia. That necessity imperiously required the government of Athens
not to suffer Serbia to be crushed. Now, as we know, the allied armies
under General Sarrail at the end of 1915 very nearly effected a junction
with the troops of the Voivode Putnik. It is, therefore, manifest that
if, on the landing of the Allies at Salonika, Greece had joined her
efforts to theirs, Serbia would have been saved. That is a truth which
M. Venizelos and a great part of Greek public opinion well understood,
but King Constantine would not admit it. History will prove whether in
this grave crisis of his country his relationship of brother-in-law to
the Kaiser did not greatly prejudice the judgment of the King of Greece.
What is certain is, that no rational explanation has yet been given of
King Constantine’s conduct, and that his policy has elicited the protests
of Greek colonies in foreign countries, which, being free to speak,
declared, in an appeal drawn up by their congresses in February, 1916:

“While we nurse a meaningless neutrality which provokes derision, we run
the risk, not only of failing to achieve the aspirations bequeathed to
us by our fathers, but also of losing our independence” (quoted by _Le
Temps_, 26th February, 1916).

[Illustration: GREECE AFTER THE TREATY OF BUKAREST.]

The vehemence of these protests is intelligible, for just in virtue of
the policy which for some months the government of Athens has pursued,
Greece is now confronted by vital problems which she must absolutely
solve without delay, if she would ensure her future.

The annexed map, which represents the state of Greece before and after
the war, will render intelligible the essential interests which Greece
has to defend.

Greece has always taken deeply to heart the many Greeks living in the
East outside her boundaries. She would either incorporate them or at
least ensure them a tolerable existence.

These Greeks are to be found in the ethnographical regions indicated by
cross hatchings on the map, which I have copied exactly from the map No.
2 in the _Pangerman Atlas_ of Paul Langhans, published at Gotha by Justus
Perthes in 1900. Thus the Pangermans themselves recognize the presence
of many Greeks in the south of Albania and especially in Bulgaria and
Turkey. No doubt, since the Balkan wars the density of the Greeks in
the Hellenic regions of Bulgaria and Turkey has undergone serious
modifications. Many of these Greeks have been massacred either by the
Turks or by the Bulgarians. Under the pressure of these Turko-Bulgarian
persecutions about 500,000 Greeks have been obliged, since 1912, to take
refuge in Greece. But the Greeks who have sources of exact information
estimate that there still remain about 200,000 Greeks on the Ægean coasts
of new Bulgaria, and 2,300,000 in the Ottoman empire. It is clear that
if Bulgaria and Turkey, by the help of Germany, were finally victorious,
these 2,500,000 Greeks would be lost once and for all to Greece.
Therefore, if the government of Athens would save the Greeks, it has a
primary and fundamental reason for speedily withstanding the progress
of the Bulgarians as well as of the Turks. In point of fact the Ottoman
Greeks are actually harassed most systematically by the fanatical young
Turks. On the other hand the Russian successes in Armenia make a profound
impression on public opinion at Athens, if not on the government of King
Constantine. The Greeks of Greece are too well acquainted with the
decadence of the Ottoman empire not to know that its days are numbered.
The majority of Greeks understand that the moment is approaching when,
by joining the Allies, the adversaries of Turkey, Greece should secure
for herself a voice in their councils, in order that, when peace is
concluded, she may be able to shape the destinies of the Greeks of Turkey
in conformity with Greek interests. This is all the more necessary
because these Greeks of Turkey, as the map shows, are in the peculiar
position of being dispersed in small groups over the Ottoman coasts,
without anywhere forming an aggregate large enough to confer the right of
being treated as a definite part of the Ottoman empire.

With regard to Bulgaria, the interest of Greece is twofold. It
consists, in the first place, in preventing, as speedily as possible, a
continuation of those systematic persecutions, deportations, outrages and
robberies of which the Greeks of Turkey and of the invaded regions of
Serbia are at present the victims. But, above all, Greece has a really
vital interest in preventing the government of Sofia from carrying out
its plan of supremacy in the Balkans (see the map on p. 133). It is
well known at Athens that the Bulgarians covet Salonika, and that if,
even without including that city, Great Bulgaria extended to Albania,
Greece would thereby be cut off from the north of Europe by a rancorous
and implacable neighbour, and would thus find herself in an untenable
position, alike from the military and the economic point of view. It is
this serious danger that is emphasized by the organs of M. Venizelos,
who since 1909 has been truly the saviour of Greece. As this conviction
is deeply rooted in the heart of almost all Greeks, who view with
irreconcilable aversion the Bulgarians as their hereditary enemies, it
constitutes a mental factor which, more than any other motive, will at
last, in all probability, open the eyes of Greece to the danger which
she incurs through the alliance of the Bulgarians and the Germans.

But though the Pangerman plan in itself threatens the interests of
Greece most directly, we must recognize that this truth has not yet
been sufficiently apprehended by Greek public opinion. Nevertheless, it
is manifest that Great Germany’s ultimate aim is to rule at Salonika,
perhaps not at first directly, but at all events through the agency
of the Prussianized Bulgarians. But the great railway which, starting
from Vienna, goes by Belgrade, Nisch, Uskub, and Salonika, now ends
at the Piræus, since, quite lately, the junction has been effected by
the continuation of the Greek line of Larissa from Papapouli to Guida,
a station on the trunk line from Salonika to Monastir. In consequence
of this junction line, 96 kilometres long, a great Continental railway
has just been completed, which, after peace has been concluded, will
have a considerable economic importance for Greece and even for the
whole of Europe. In fact, the distance of Marseilles from Alexandria
is 1,404 sea miles, that of Brindisi from Alexandria is 836, and that
of the Piræus from Alexandria is only 514. Supposing, then, that the
average speed of the mail steamers is 15 miles an hour, we infer that
the voyage to Alexandria takes about 93 hours from Marseilles, 55 from
Brindisi, and only 34 from the Piræus. The new railway will therefore be
greatly preferable, not only for travellers, but for perishable goods
and for the post. Hence it is indisputable that, after the peace, part
of the sea traffic of Europe will be transferred from Marseilles and the
Italian ports to the Piræus. From this transference of economic activity
certain and important profits will accrue to Greece, to say nothing of
the considerable portion of the wealthy classes of the Continent, who
spend some months of every year in Egypt, and who will then stop at
Athens before embarking and make tours to the classical ruins, leaving
behind them, as tourists do, quite appreciable sums of money, which will
be a clear gain to the country. If Serbia is re-established, Greece is
certain to draw all the profits from this new situation. On the contrary,
were the Pangerman designs in the Balkans to succeed, it would be Great
Germany that would secure for herself all the advantages to be got from
the great new trunk railway through the Balkans, the control of which
she covets as usual. But it is clear that if Germany triumphed, nothing
could prevent her from stretching her economic tentacles over Salonika,
the Piræus, and the whole of Greece, so that in this form also the
independence of Greece would be doomed.

Consequently, the Pangerman plan threatens all the vital interests of
Greece, since its success would necessarily entail for that country an
economic invasion, the ruin of Hellenism, and Bulgarian supremacy in the
Balkans. On the contrary, nothing but a victory of the Entente powers
can save Greece from these dangers. Greek public opinion understands
this better and better. Moreover, in a letter published by _Le Temps_ of
20th February, 1916, Prince Nicolas of Greece, the able diplomat of the
royal family, plainly proposed to clear up loyally the misunderstandings
that exist between the government of Athens and the Entente. In this
letter the following declarations are particularly memorable, because
coming from the brother of the King of Greece, they have a bearing which
is sufficiently obvious. “There are only two currents in Greece: the
one impels Greece to throw herself into the struggle on the side of the
Entente, the other favours neutrality. But nobody has ever uttered the
thought that in this war we should have taken part on the side of the
Central Powers. Greece has remained neutral. She has never declared that
nothing could induce her to abandon her neutrality.”

On March 9th, the _Patris_ of Athens published an article of General
Danglis, formerly Minister of War in the Venizelos Cabinet, which
concluded thus: “Greece ought without delay to proceed to the revision of
all the classes of her army capable of being called up for service; for
without any doubt Greece will be obliged to employ her forces during the
present war” (see _Le Temps_, 10th March, 1916).

III.

The serious consequence which Germany’s alliance with Bulgaria would
entail on Roumania, must ultimately oblige that country, despite the
temporizing attitude of its government, to defend its vital interests.
These interests now stand out more and more clearly. In the first place
it is certain that the plan of Bulgarian supremacy in the Balkans (see
p. 133) is as little acceptable to the Roumanians as to the Greeks.
The frontier incidents, which have multiplied lately, between the
Bulgarians and the Roumanians are manifest symptoms of the mutual and
irreconcilable dislike of the two peoples. Besides, the Roumanians have
been specially alarmed by what has happened in the part of the Dobrudja
which Bulgaria was compelled to cede to Roumania in 1913 (indicated by
crossed hatchings on the subjoined map). The syndicates of Bulgarian
peasants in this region have plainly shown their separatist tendencies.
Further, it has lately been discovered that in the New Dobrudja,
the Bulgarian system of espionage has been worked, under colour of
archæological excursions, by Germans, who afterwards transmitted to
the Bulgarian military authorities photographs and plans of great
importance. Lastly, at the beginning of 1916 Mr. Take Jonescu made known
at Bukarest that Germany had promised to Bulgaria, at the expense of
Roumania, not only the territory which Bulgaria had lost in 1913, but
also the Roumanian Dobrudja as far as Galatz and Sulina. Since then
Berlin has been obliged to throw a sop to Roumania by assuring Bukarest
that Germany will put a curb on Bulgarian ambition. But this promise, a
sort of blackmail extorted by the needs of the moment, forms but a very
precarious guarantee for the Roumanians. They feel themselves threatened
by Bulgarian ambitions, and there seems little reason to doubt that as
soon as circumstances shall appear favourable, Roumania will make an
end of the Bulgarian peril, as “she ought to have done in 1913,” if the
Roumanian Government does not allow itself to be “hypnotized” by that of
Berlin, to use the language of the _Universal_, the official connection
of which with the military authorities at Bukarest is well known (quoted
by _Le Temps_, 19th March, 1916).

[Illustration: GREAT ROUMANIA.]

On the other hand the national policy of Roumania is influenced in the
highest degree by the two questions of Bessarabia and Transylvania. As
the map on the opposite page shows, Roumania _irredenta_ is composed of
two great racial and territorial elements: about 1,000,000 Roumanians
live in Russian Bessarabia, but 3,700,000 Roumanians inhabit Transylvania
and Bukovina, that is to say, vast regions of Hungary and Austria. The
Roumanian ideal, in its entirety, would evidently be to incorporate at
the same time the Roumanian brothers of the East and the West, but as the
ideal is not practicable, a choice must be made. The partisans of Germany
at Bukarest, led by M. Carp and Marghiloman, maintain that Roumania
should elect for Bessarabia and therefore march against Russia. To this
the practical politicians of Bukarest reply: “We should certainly be
glad to incorporate the Roumanians of Bessarabia also, but that policy
would only be possible if Russia were completely destroyed by Germany,
which has not been done and cannot be done, for the facts so far prove
that Russia could not be decisively beaten. Therefore Roumania cannot be
such a fool as to incur the permanent hostility of the enormous empire
of the Tzar. Moreover, in order to incorporate the 1,000,000 Roumanians
of Bessarabia, we must abandon the 3,700,000 Roumanians of Transylvania,
besides accepting into the bargain the supremacy of the Bulgarians in the
Balkans, since they are the allies of the Central Empires.”

Such are the essential arguments which incline Roumanian opinion to make
a decided choice for the acquisition of Transylvania. In order that the
relations between Russia and Roumania should become cordial enough to
permit of an alliance between St. Petersburg and Bukarest it remains,
perhaps, for Russia to reassure Roumania with regard to the control of
the Straits. It is certainly well understood at Bukarest that after the
enormous sacrifices which she has made Russia cannot consent to remain
bottled up by the Turks in the Black Sea, and that after the peace she
must hold a preponderant position at Constantinople. On the other hand,
it is the interest of all Europe and of Russia herself that she should
ensure for the future a large amount of liberty in the control of the
Straits. I cannot see, therefore, why Bukarest and Petrograd should not
come to an understanding on this important subject.

In order to prevent, or at least retard, the intervention of Roumania, of
which Berlin is much afraid, the Kaiser’s diplomacy is putting pressure
on Vienna and on Budapest in order to obtain “large concessions” in
favour of the Roumanians of Transylvania and Bukovina. But at Bukarest
people know by experience the value to be attached to the promises of
Vienna, and especially to those of the Magyar nobility. Besides, as
Roumania desires the annexation, pure and simple, of Transylvania and
of the Roumanian region of Bukovina, she could not be content with mere
concessions. So the offers of the Central Empires at Bukarest have little
chance of being seriously considered.

They will have still less, if the Roumanians yield to the force of
evidence by recognizing, that even if the Pangerman plan were to provide
for the cession of Transylvania to Roumania, at the expense of Hungary,
that plan would still threaten their independence in the most direct
and indisputable manner. In her attempt to win Roumania to her side,
Berlin has promised to give Bessarabia, with Odessa, to Roumania at
the expense of Russia. In order to appreciate the character and the
sincerity of this offer, the Roumanians need only refer to the pamphlet
long ago circulated by the _Alldeutscher Verband_, which sets forth the
fundamental plan of 1894, and which I have often quoted. It bears the
title, _Great Germany and Central Europe in 1950_. On p. 36 that work
defines as follows the fate which Pangermanism has in store for Roumania
on the East. “In the case of a victorious war against Russia, Roumania
might get Upper Bessarabia as far as the Dniester. Austria would annex
Lower Bessarabia in the form of a Margraviate of Bessarabia, and by means
of the German colonies, which already exist, she would transform it into
a purely German region. The boundaries of this Austro-German Margraviate
of Bessarabia would include the cities of Odessa, Bender, Borodino,
Formosa, Beni, Ismail, and the mouths of the Danube at Sulina. A
reciprocal exchange of populations with the neighbouring countries would
easily ensure the exclusively German colonization of this Margraviate.
German ships of war would mount guard at the mouth of the German Danube.”
This fundamental plan, which dates from twenty-one years ago, would now
be completed, as we saw (p. 133) by the ultimate establishment in the
Roumanian Dobrudja of the Bulgarians, who would thus be in direct contact
with the new Margraviate of Prussianized Austria.

Hence, supposing the Germans were victorious, the Roumanians, who
have been much alarmed by the idea of seeing the Russians installed
at Constantinople, would be confronted by the danger of being soon
entirely cut off from both the Black Sea and from the Mediterranean. The
Bulgarians would take possession of the Roumanian Dobrudja, the Germans
would remain at Constantinople and the Dardanelles, _where they are
already_, and besides they would be dominant at Odessa and the mouths
of the Danube, according to the plan drawn up, as far back as 1844, by
the future Marshal Moltke (_see_ p. 4). The authority of that name may
satisfy the Roumanians that the scheme is no mere fantasy.

Moreover, it is plain enough that were Roumania once encircled, she could
no longer dream of creating, as she so ardently desires to do, a national
industry, since she would be no more than an economic territory reduced
to impotence, a mere dumping-ground for goods made in Pangermany.

To sum up, we see that this is really a question of life or death for
Roumania. A Prussian victory, in fact, would imperil her national
independence in the most direct and indubitable manner. It appears
that the general opinion in Roumania is alive to the danger and to the
necessity of Roumanian intervention in the conflict. It remains to be
seen whether German influences at Bukarest will be adroit enough and
powerful enough to delude the Roumanian authorities into shilly-shallying
till the decisive hour shall have come and gone.

CHAPTER VIII.

GERMAN MANŒUVRES TO PLAY THE ALLIES THE TRICK OF THE “DRAWN GAME,” THAT
IS, TO SECURE THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE “HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN GULF”
SCHEME AS THE MINIMUM RESULT OF THE WAR.

I. The exceptional importance of the economic union of the
Central Empires, and the danger for the Allies of establishing
a connexion between that union and their own economic measures
after the war.

II. Reasons for the Turco-German dodge of making a separate
peace between the Ottoman empire and the Allies.

III. Why a separate and premature peace with Bulgaria would
play the Pangerman game.

At the moment when this book is published, the Germans have certainly not
renounced the hope of keeping and establishing a definite claim to the
territories which they actually occupy on the West and on the East; but
with their usual foresight they nevertheless contemplate the possibility
of their having to consent to evacuate on the West, let us say, 90,478
square kilometres, and on the East 260,000 square kilometres, in order to
preserve almost entire the principal part of the Pangerman acquisitions,
that is to say, the gains made, directly or indirectly, to the South
and South-east, namely, Austria-Hungary (676,616 square kilometres),
the Balkans (215,585 square kilometres), Turkey (about 1,792,000 square
kilometres). Total, 2,684,201 square kilometres.

To maintain its dominion over these territories, the government of Berlin
is from now onward directing its energies to three sorts of manœuvres,
all very astute, and very well co-ordinated, though they wear different
aspects, each corresponding to each of the three territorial stages
essential to the achievement of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf.” These three stages are Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria,
which last forms the bridge between the two other stages.

As regards Austria-Hungary the Berlin programme may be summed up as
follows: _to take advantage of the occupation of the territories of the
Hapsburg Monarchy by the troops of William II. in order to impose, by
all possible means, both on Hungary and on Austria, a series of measures
called an economic union with Germany, which would leave Austria-Hungary
an appearance of independence sufficient to throw dust in the eyes of
the Allies, while at the same time it would in fact subject that empire
absolutely to the will of Berlin_.

So far, these tactics have not succeeded in putting on a semblance of
legality. Since the outbreak of war, the Pangermans of Vienna have not
even dared to summon the Austrian parliament, knowing very well that
the Slav and Latin deputies would protest most vehemently against the
subjection of their respective countries to the German empire. At present
the Germans of Vienna, while they terrorize the Austrian Slavs and try to
persuade them that the Allies have forsaken them, are striving to prepare
a meeting of the Reichsrath which might seem to sanction all that has
been done. But the reader will understand that it is no easy matter to
get up this farce, when he learns that even the Magyars, who have linked
themselves closely to Germany, are beginning to resist, now that Berlin
is forced to disclose those measures of enslavement, of which Hungary
must feel the effects, like the other States destined to pass under the
Pangerman yoke. It is said that William II.’s great Magyar accomplice,
Count Tisza himself, is protesting. At all events in the _Pesti Hirlap_
of Budapest, of 12th April, 1916, we are assured that his friend, the
Senator Eugène Rakosky, has just published the following lines, which are
particularly significant:

“All this Central European ferment will have no other result than
compelling the Hungarians to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the
Germans. They want us to make high roads for the Germans to the East.
All these Central European alliances and unions mean nothing but that we
are expected to sell our national soul and pass under the German yoke”
(quoted by _Le Temps_, 19th April, 1916).

But the Allies should have no illusion on this head. The most vehement
protests of the Magyars will be of no avail. The Germans are in
occupation of Austria-Hungary and they have the power. They may disguise
their enslavement of this vast empire under various formulas, such as
extension of the _Zollverein_, economic union of the Central Empires,
unification of the commercial laws of Austria and Germany, etc.; or they
may even, as a subterfuge, to lull the fears of the Allies to sleep, give
up the use of any positive formula, the final result will always be the
same, the political seizure by Germany of the Hapsburg Monarchy cloaked
under the decent pretext of economic measures.

To this object the Germans cling above everything else, because it
has been the basis of the whole Pangerman plan since 1895, and the
indispensable condition of achieving the scheme “from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf,” as the reader will find explained, with the reasons in
full, in my book published fifteen years ago, _L’Europe et la Question
d’Autriche au seuil du XXᵉ siècle_; they cling to it, too, because
Germany has made war for the very purpose of effecting at least this
seizure of Austria-Hungary, which is absolutely indispensable to the
plans of William II.

Nothing but the complete victory of the Allies can compel Berlin to
renounce this plan of domination and liberate the non-German peoples
of the Hapsburg Monarchy. Meantime the Germans are taking all possible
precautions against such an event. We have seen (p. 93) how already,
under their pressure, the Magyars are concerting with them the economic
measures to be taken in view of that future war, which is to complete the
results of a peace which Berlin already thinks bound to be “imperfect.”
Accordingly, the Allies cannot have the faintest doubt as to the new war
which as sure as fate will follow, sooner or later, from the economic and
necessarily political union of the Central Empires. In Chapter V we saw
that the certain consequence of this economic union would be:

1º. To secure to Germany the spoils of war and a trade monopoly over
nearly 3 millions of square kilometres containing wealth untold.

2º. On the contrary, to leave the Allies to pay all their expenses in the
war, which is equivalent to condemning their peoples to ruin.

3º. To make Prussian militarism more powerful than ever, since, radiating
from the block of Central Europe, it could command an army of from 15 to
21 millions of soldiers.

4º. To give Germany the supremacy over the majority of essential
strategic points on land and sea, which would provide Berlin with all
the means for executing gradually and completely its plan of world-wide
domination.

But it seems that these formidable consequences, which flow from the
seizure of Austria-Hungary by Germany, have not yet been sufficiently
understood in the Allied countries. That is the conclusion indicated
by the following opinions which have been published in some French and
English newspapers: “The declarations of Mr. Runciman, President of the
Board of Trade in the United Kingdom,” says _Le Temps_ of 25th March,
1916, “prove that Great Britain is resolved to work without delay for the
formation of an economic alliance against the powers of Central Europe.”

Mr. Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia, in an address at the Carlton
Club, gave his hearers to understand that the German Empire must not
be allowed to hope to reduce other countries to a state of commercial
dependence upon it (see _Le Temps_, 23rd March, 1916). In consequence
of these declarations an idea was formed of an economic understanding
between the Allies in order, according to _Le Petit Parisien_, “to make
an effective reply to the project of a Central Europe conceived by our
enemies.”

M. Jules Siegfried, in a letter to the _Temps_, 3rd April, 1916,
affirmed, with reference to this: “Germany, aware of the danger, is
seeking to form a Customs-union with Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey. It
is therefore necessary for us to guard against this danger.” Mr. Hewins,
chairman of the Business Committee of the House of Commons, stated at
London on April 6th: “But France and England, after their victory, will
possess a preponderance over the Austro-German union which will enable
them to dictate their tariffs, etc.” (see _L’Echo de Paris_, 7th April,
1916). M. Edmond Théry, in _Le Matin_ of 13th April, 1916, discussing the
same problem, concluded: “If, therefore, the Allied nations will erect
simultaneously and under identical conditions a powerful Customs barrier
between their respective home markets and the products of Germany and
her accomplices, this of itself will suffice to strike a mortal blow at
German industry, commerce, and credit.”

These declarations are amazing. How can the economic problem to be solved
by the Allies be placed, even through an obvious “inadvertence,” on a
basis so manifestly inaccurate? How, in fact, can we voluntarily admit
the least connection between the economic conference of the Allies and
the economic union of the Central empires, since that union is clearly
in flagrant contradiction with the general object of the war, which
nevertheless, the Allies are perfectly at one in pursuing? In fact, to
keep repeating that the Allies must form an economic alliance of the
Allies to compete after the war against the economic union of Central
Europe, and to prevent the German Empire from reducing other countries
besides Austria-Hungary to a commercial dependence on itself, this is, in
strict logic, to assume that the Allies agree to let Prussianized Germany
lay hands on the 50 million inhabitants of Austria-Hungary, which would
secure for Berlin the means of carrying out her scheme of domination
“from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.” But it is clear that this result is
radically incompatible with the higher ideal aim of the war which the
Allies propose as their goal, the aim which their governments incessantly
proclaim, that is, the destruction of Prussian militarism.

There has therefore unquestionably been a mistake on the part of
some French and English authorities, who are in other respects well
qualified, in the way they have put the question and in the association
of their ideas. This mistake is doubtless explained by the fact that
in England loose ideas are still prevalent as to the Pangerman plan
and Austria-Hungary. Many people on the other side of the Channel
still imagine that the majority of the population of that Empire is
German, whereas on the principle of nationalities, Germany could at
most incorporate 7 or 8 millions of Germans at present subjects of the
Hapsburg (_see_ p. 126). These loose ideas prevalent in England are
very difficult to eradicate. It is these ideas which are at the root
of the mistakes made by our British Allies in regard to the Balkans
and Salonika, whereas, on account of Egypt and India, England was more
interested than all the other Allies in the rapid execution of that
expedition.

Be that as it may, as the Allies cannot indulge in the sanguinary luxury
of fresh serious blunders, it is necessary to show why the project
of an economic understanding between the Allies should be absolutely
independent of the Berlin project of a Central European Union.

In point of fact, if this separation is not clearly effected, it will
entail the following baneful consequences, which will delay still further
the victory to gain which the Allied peoples are making such gigantic
sacrifices.

1º. To allow it to be understood in the newspapers of the Allies, even by
inadvertence, that the Allies could possibly admit of the economic union
which Germany intends to force on Austria-Hungary, would be to furnish
the German newspapers with a cordial for reviving the fainting spirits of
the German nation; for in that case the German journalists would point
out to their people that they can still count on carrying out the main
part of the Pangerman plan, which they regard as the essential object of
the war.

2º. The German scheme of capturing Austria-Hungary in an economical net
is radically incompatible with the pledges which the Allies have given
to Serbia. In his toast to the Prince of Serbia, M. Poincaré declared:
“Acting with the Serbian army, the Allies will liberate the Serbian
territory, will re-establish the independence and the sovereignty of
your noble country on a solid foundation, and will vindicate the rights
which have been infringed” (see _Le Temps_, 23rd March, 1916). Now a
mere glance at the map (p. 79) suffices to show that the capture of
Austria-Hungary by Germany would render the fulfilment of that solemn
promise impossible. Once in contact with the Balkans, Germany would be
the mistress of these countries, and for Serbia that would be a sentence
of death.

3º. To allow it to be supposed that the project of an economic union
between Germany and Austria-Hungary could be even contemplated by the
Allies, would be to give over to an agony of despair the 28 million Slav
and Latin subjects of the Hapsburg Monarchy, who look to the Allies as
their deliverers, and who, just because of their sympathies with the
Allied cause, are subjected to the most atrocious persecution. There can
be no doubt that the German press would catch at any ambiguous phrases in
the utterances of the Allied press about the “economic union” of Central
Europe in order to persuade these poor wretches that the Allies have
forsaken them for good and all, and that there is nothing left for them,
but to bow their neck to the German-Magyar yoke. But it is manifestly the
political and military interest of the Allies at the moment to let the
Slavs and Latins of Austria-Hungary know at once that they may rely on
the Allies, and that the victory of the Allied cause would mean the end
of their own serfdom. To attain that result of the war is unquestionably
a moral duty for the Allies; but more than that it is in strict
conformity with their own future interest, for the independence of 28
million Slavs and Latins of Austria-Hungary is absolutely indispensable
to the establishment of a new and lasting Europe, founded on the
principle of nationalities, and capable of forming at the same time in
Central Europe a barrier, which Pangermanism in arms will for the future
be powerless to overleap.

4º. Every mistake, or appearance of a mistake, as to the treatment which
the Western Allies intend to mete out to Austria-Hungary would excite
the liveliest protests among our Russian Allies. As M. Milioukoff well
said in a speech to the Duma: “When we have wound up bankrupt Turkey,
as we are now doing, it will be necessary to wind up another bankrupt
concern, and that is Austria-Hungary. We are certain that the numerous
nationalities which form part of the Dual Monarchy will receive their
liberty at the hands of Russia” (quoted by _Le Temps_, 27th March, 1916).
But the point of view set forth by M. Milioukoff, which is that of
everybody who really knows Austria-Hungary (see p. 118), must be shared
by all the Allies, since they intend to destroy Prussian militarism and
clearly do not wage the most frightful of all wars for the purpose of
seeing militant Prussia emerge from the struggle infinitely more powerful
than she entered into it.

These many and forcible reasons make it clear how necessary it is that
there should be no possible ambiguity in the Allied press as to the
economic conference of the Allies. It is all very well for the conference
to look ahead to the time when peace shall have been concluded, to take
“concerted measures to counteract the dirty tricks by which Germany has
compassed the destruction of her rivals,” to forestall fresh German
depredations, in time of peace, on the financial establishments of
the Allies, to prevent the Germans from manipulating the Custom-house
tariffs, with all their usual dexterity, and so forth. This is all
very well; nothing better; but on no account let there be, even in
appearance, the least connexion between these theoretical measures of the
Allies and the pretensions of Berlin to establish the economic union of
Central Europe. Besides, as Mr. Lloyd George has said, with his robust
good sense: “Before discussing the commercial system to be adopted after
the war, we must first win the war. Everything depends on that” (quoted
by _Le Temps_, 25th March). But the war will not be really won till every
revival of aggressive Pangermanism shall have been rendered impossible;
and this implies nothing less than the most energetic opposition to
Germany’s attempt to capture the majority of the countries which actually
compose the empire of the Hapsburgs.

II.

A cunning manœuvre for saving the future of Pangermanism and of Enver
Pasha’s gang in Turkey has already been broached by the Germans. As it
will certainly be attempted again, should it be in the interest of Berlin
to push it through (and everything points that way), it becomes necessary
to unmask it completely beforehand. In February, 1916, numerous Turkish
agents, installed in Switzerland and apparently working through spies in
the Allied countries, began to set afloat a rumour that Turkey was ready
to conclude a separate peace. Enver Pasha had been assassinated (which of
course was a lie), and so forth. The aim of this manœuvre was to secure
in the Allied countries the assistance of those incorrigible fools,
armed with the panoply of crass ignorance on the affairs of the East,
who nevertheless are not always without influence on men at the head
of affairs. If I am rightly informed, this clever dodge of the Turkish
agents did really succeed for a time in enlisting some of the fools I
speak of. In the opinion of these gentry the conclusion of a separate
peace with Turkey would have been a very good move, since it would have
deprived Germany of the help of her Ottoman ally, etc. These are very
dangerous illusions, and it is necessary to show how and why this measure
would play the game of Berlin and gravely imperil the victory of the
Allies.

The Turks, greatly alarmed by the Russian successes in Armenia, see at
the same time their dream of a Panislamic movement fading away. They
are obliged to acknowledge to themselves that the Germans are cynically
using them for their own selfish ends, are driving them along the road
to famine by making a clean sweep of all their food supplies, and are
sending them to slaughter for the higher interests of Pangermany. But
while the mass of the Turks may very well feel their anger beginning
to rise against the Germans, they are completely in the hands of the
Young-Turk ringleaders, who in their turn are bound over, hand and
foot, to the Germans; and more and more the Germans are masters of the
organs of administration and government in Turkey. Therefore there is no
counting on an effective revolt of the Turkish population, who moreover
are entirely destitute of the spirit of organization. On the other hand,
the Germans are far-seeing people and perfectly understand that Turkey
is hastening towards a catastrophe. _But to bring about a separate peace
between Turkey and the Allies would be equivalent to inducing the Allies
to recognize the permanence of the Ottoman empire; it would thus save
that empire from disaster, and leave the door open for Berlin to re-open
its old intrigues after the conclusion of a peace on the basis of the
“drawn game”_ (see chap. V).

On the contrary, if the question of the Ottoman East is logically settled
once for all, all hope of carrying out at a later time the Pangerman
dream “from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf” is finally shattered.
Moreover, a separate peace would also serve the turn of the Young-Turk
ringleaders, for clearly nothing else could enable them to keep their
hold on the reins of power, or could save them from being massacred by
their fellow countrymen the day that the Ottoman crash comes. We see
therefore why the rumours of a separate peace between Turkey and the
Allies, which have been circulated and afterwards denied, only to be
started again, at some other time, are really a Turko-German manœuvre.
Besides, the Arabian journal _Al-Mokattan_ of Cairo (22nd April, 1916)
has remarked that “a separate peace with Turkey would cause Germany no
uneasiness, since the retirement of Turkey from the arena would relieve
Germany from the need of helping the Turks, as she does at present.”
Finally, the _Vossische Zeitung_ has confessed that “a separate peace
between Turkey and the enemies of Germany would in no way prejudice
Austro-German interests” (quoted by _Le Journal de Genève_, 25th April,
1916).

However, it is not to be supposed that the leaders of the Entente will
allow themselves to be caught in the Turko-German trap. The Eastern
question is a regular ulcer, which has envenomed European policy for
a hundred years; it is the nightmare of the chanceries. Every attempt
to reform the Ottoman empire has always failed. The fact is that this
dry-rotten State has only been bolstered up by the mutual rivalries of
the great powers. Since the victory of the Allies is bound to secure
for the Old World a very long period of peace, that perennial source
of troubles and wars, the Turkish empire, must be stopped for good.
Moreover, justice in its broader aspect demands the same solution of the
problem.

[Illustration: THE NATIONALITIES IN TURKEY.]

In Turkey, as elsewhere, if the new settlement is to be endowed with a
potentiality of life, the principle of nationalities must be followed
as far as is practicable. Now, out of the 20 million inhabitants of the
Ottoman empire, four great nationalities (see the accompanying map)
account for about 18 millions. In the absence of statistics on which any
reliance can be placed, it is estimated that there are in Turkey about:—

Two millions of Levantines, of Europeans, of Jews, and of
miscellaneous races.

Two millions of Greeks.

Two millions of Armenians.

Eight millions of Arabs.

Six millions only of Turks.

As for the Greeks, who unfortunately do not form a coherent body (see p.
147), there are several solutions to be considered, with a view to giving
them a fraction of the Ottoman empire, if they throw themselves into the
struggle in the Balkans on the side of the Allies. With regard to the
Arabs, they detest the Turks, who have oppressed them for centuries.
The liberation of the Arabs from the Turkish yoke should therefore be
carried out so far as it is at all possible. As for the Armenians, of
whom several hundreds of thousands have just been massacred by the Turks,
it is clearly impossible to contemplate the continuance of the remnant
of this unhappy people under the iron heel of Enver Pasha, Talaat, and
the rest of that gang. With regard to the six millions, or thereabouts,
of Turks, who represent less than the third of the population of the
Ottoman empire, they really inhabit only Anatolia, that is to say, the
portion of the Ottoman empire included between the Black Sea and the
Mediterranean. Everywhere else the Turks are merely hated officials, who,
ever since the conquest by the Osmanli Sultans, have cynically sucked dry
the other populations of the Ottoman empire. No doubt the Turkish peasant
of Anatolia, when he is not a prey to one of those paroxysms of religious
fanaticism which seize him periodically, is generally a good fellow. Very
sober and long-suffering he makes an excellent soldier, but the mental
apparatus of your Anatolian Turk is several centuries behind the time. He
is incapable of self-government in our modern age. It is true that there
are some thousands of Turks who make excellent employees in the service
of the Ottoman Debt, but only on condition of their being constantly
supervised and directed by European heads of departments. Among the
Turks of Constantinople there is not a single group offering any serious
guarantee for the guidance of the Turkish masses. If the Turkish
peasant of Anatolia is undoubtedly endowed by nature with some sterling
qualities, it is equally certain that the Turks of Constantinople, with
few exceptions, are corrupt to the marrow of their bones. In these
circumstances to imagine that a really independent Turkish empire could
be set up is to nurse an absurd chimera. As for Constantinople, it is
not even a Turkish city; it is essentially cosmopolitan. Its 1,200,000
inhabitants consist of Turks (43 per cent.), Armenians (18 per cent.),
Greeks (17 per cent.), Jews (16 per cent.), Europeans, Levantines, and
miscellaneous peoples (6 per cent.).

On the other hand, it is plain enough that this amazing war cannot
close without allowing Russia to acquire a predominant position at
Constantinople. Russia certainly did not want the war, but she has
been compelled to wage it and to send millions of men to their death,
while she has had to support a formidable financial burden. For these
gigantic sacrifices Russia must receive compensation. The toll which
Russia will take of Poland in return for the autonomy granted to her—a
toll which is both just and conformable to the common interest of the
Poles as well as of the Russians—evidently cannot repay Russia for her
enormous sacrifices. That necessary compensation, therefore, Russia must
look for elsewhere. Now a glance at the map, combined with a knowledge
of the cosmopolitan character of Constantinople, will convince anybody
that Russia cannot continue to be bottled up in the Black Sea. While
it is necessary to the peace of the new Europe that the control of
the Straits should be exercised under the direction of Russia on as
liberal principles as possible, it is no less necessary for the West to
understand that justice demands for Russia a preponderant position at
Constantinople, even though the Western powers must make some undoubted
sacrifices to secure that object. If the soldiers of the Tsar have given
proof of unparalleled self-sacrifice, if, despite some cruel reverses,
they display an inflexible tenacity, it is because they are stirred
by two motives—a hatred of the Germans who have poisoned the Russian
bureaucracy, and the ardent wish for the fulfilment of that hope which
animates the poorest peasant in Russia, the hope of securing for Russia a
free outlet on the Mediterranean. These are the feelings, the depth and
power of which M. Milioukoff put into words when he said to the Duma: “We
shall not end the war without securing an outlet to the open sea. The
annexation of the Straits will not be a territorial annexation, for vast
Russia has no need of new territories, but she cannot prosper without
access to the open sea” (see _Le Journal de Genève_, 28th March, 1916).
But in spreading the rumour of a separate peace with Turkey the Germans
expect to derive the following advantage from the manœuvre. They reckon
that some Allied newspapers in the West will receive the idea favourably.
The Germans would immediately take advantage of that to stir up in Russia
a violent storm of indignation and doubt against the Western Allies.
The example of 1915 ought to serve the Allies as a warning against any
imprudence in the press. It is not sufficiently known in France that last
year the Germans traded largely on the apparent inactivity of the French
troops, at the time when the Russians were obliged to endure their long
retreat of five months. That inactivity was certainly not the effect
of any ill will of the French towards their Russian allies; it was the
consequence of that baneful theory of the Western front considered as
the principal and exclusive theatre of war, a theory which prevented the
intervention by way of Salonika, at a time when it might still have been
easily effected, between May and July, 1915. Nevertheless, that apparent
inactivity has been used by the Germans to excite discontent in Russia
against the French, and their efforts have not been unsuccessful, for
during a long time many Russians were much annoyed with the French for an
inactivity which seemed to them inexplicable. This instance may help us
to understand what a disastrous effect would be produced in Russia by the
news that in the West the newspapers or influential circles contemplate
as possible a separate peace with Turkey at the very moment when the
Russian arms are more and more successful in Armenia, and when these
successes not only console the soldiers of the Tsar for their former
reverses, but also render the Allies a substantial service by draining
the Balkan peninsula of Turkish troops, and thus facilitating the Allied
offensive from Salonika Northward.

Such are the various results aimed at by the astute new dodge of a
separate peace with the Ottoman empire. Surely it is only necessary
to recognize them to prevent the Allies from being caught in the new
Turko-German trap.

III.

Contemporaneously with the rumour of a separate peace with Turkey, in
February, 1916, a suggestion was mysteriously made to the Western Allies
that the Bulgarians also wished to treat with them. The two manœuvres, as
we shall see, are in fact closely connected. If the Bulgarians were to
come and say to the Allies: “We have been deceived, deluded by Berlin,
we have pursued an odious policy. As a proof of our good faith we will
evacuate immediately the Serbian territories which we have invaded, and
we will do all in our power to undo the mischief we have done. Grant us
peace on these terms”; in that case, clearly enough, there would be some
reason for listening to Sofia. But it would be entirely to mistake the
character of the Bulgarians and of their government to imagine that
they could even dream of such a proposal. What the Bulgarians would like
well enough would be a peace with the Allies, which should allow them to
retain their territorial acquisitions, the permanent character of which
was proclaimed by M. Radoslavoff on March 1st, 1916. Such a settlement,
moreover, as we shall see, would square exactly with the interests of
Sofia and Berlin.

At heart, the Bulgarians would be very glad of peace, since a
continuation of the war can hardly procure for them any accession to what
they already hold. On the other hand, the offensive of the Allies from
Salonika, if it is well organized, ought to mete out to the Bulgarians
the chastisement which they dread, especially since the check to the
Germans before Verdun and the Russian successes in Armenia. The Bulgarian
people is moreover deeply discontented at the heavy losses which it has
already sustained by the sword and by disease in the campaign against
Serbia. They see the whole of Bulgaria in the hands of German officers.
As for the Bulgarian army, it is in a very unsatisfactory state,
which has already led to local mutinies and many desertions. In these
circumstances Bulgaria would evidently on all accounts do a good piece of
business if she were to make a separate peace with the Allies. It must
be clearly understood that this Bulgarian manœuvre is not openly avowed
at Sofia; it is only carried on underhand, and probably, for the reasons
we shall see, with the connivance of Berlin. Nevertheless, it is very
dangerous, for, it must be said in the interest of the common Allied
cause and of the truth, it has found supporters in the Allied countries
among those who combine an invincible fatuity with ideas on the Balkans
which are forty years behind the time.

There are also some Russians who still imagine that in 1915 the Allied
diplomacy made a mistake in not undoing the consequences of the treaty
of Bukarest; whereas in point of fact that is just what has been done,
and what, as we saw in Chapter II., § I., constituted the fundamental
error of the Allied policy in the Balkans. According to these Russians
the treaty of Bukarest should have been set aside in order to restore
Bulgaria to the limits assigned to it by the treaty of San Stefano. This
is the point of view maintained as late as March, 1916, by M. Milioukoff
from the tribune of the Duma. I have explained (p. 138), why on the
west the Bulgaria of the San Stefano treaty by no means corresponded
to the racial facts, and for what reasons Macedonia, forming the south
of Serbia, is very far from being Bulgarian. A striking proof of it is
that the Bulgarians have just massacred there a quantity of Serbians.
With regard to the ethnography of the region we may introduce into the
discussion a new argument, as original perhaps as it is convincing. To
tell the truth the most accurate account of the ethnographic position
of Macedonia is that which has been handed down to us for generations
by the Cooks—it is a _Macédoine_. In the great dictionary of Larousse,
vol. x, p. 855, edition of 1873, and therefore anterior by five years
to the treaty of San Stefano (1878), we read: “_Macédoine_ (Macedonia),
a dish composed of a great number of different vegetables or fruits.
‘This word,’ says Ch. Nodier, ‘was probably first applied to a very
miscellaneous dish in allusion to the incredible medley of peoples on
whom Philip and Alexander imposed the laws of Macedonia.’”

Now these various peoples are the Turks, the Albanians, the Bulgarians,
the Jews, the Roumanians, and the Serbians, who inhabit the south of
Serbia. Thus the ancient tradition handed down by the cooks, whose
impartiality in matters of ethnography will not be disputed, undoubtedly
contradicts the theory of the ethnographical unity of Bulgaria mapped
out by the treaty of San Stefano; and it must be remembered that in
1878 Russian diplomacy had special reasons, which no longer exist, for
treating the whole of that Bulgaria as exclusively Bulgarian. The words
of M. Milioukoff prove that the erroneous ideas of 1878 still linger
in the minds of some Russians. Happily among the vast majority of our
Eastern Allies the logic of facts has dissipated those sentimental
leanings to Bulgaria which were once so strong. Indeed, the Bulgarians
themselves have powerfully assisted the Russians to arrive at a juster
appreciation of the true situation. At the end of 1915, in the first
effervescence of their affection for Germany, the newspapers of Sofia
announced that the Bulgarians are not Slavs but Tartar-Mongols, and that
this racial consideration, added to all the rest, goes to show that along
with the Turks and the Magyars they should form the “Turanian block,”
which, in association with Germany, will master and hold down the Slavs
and Latins in Europe. Hence the Bulgarian dodge of a separate peace
with the Allies has very little chance of being seriously considered in
Russia. But unfortunately some of those same Englishmen, whose erroneous
information greatly contributed to the Balkan mistakes of 1915, are
actually supporting it. I shall only refer here to Englishmen who have
no official position. Among them must particularly be named the brothers
Charles and Noel Buxton, who have long been at the head of a committee
which is called the Balkan Committee, but which in fact has always been
systematically Bulgarophile. Now by an odd coincidence the brothers
Buxton have into the bargain Germanophile leanings. _Le Temps_ of January
10th, 1916, noticed a curious book of theirs which had lately appeared,
and which the journal described as “pacificist dreams.” These gentlemen
appear to advocate a premature peace with Berlin as well as with Sofia,
a policy which is characteristic of them. Still more dangerous is the
activity of some underground workers who masquerade as correspondents of
English newspapers in the Balkans. Amongst them are some who, holding
views that were true enough in the time of Gladstone but are wrong
to-day, systematically favour the Bulgarians. Such is their prejudice
that they have failed to see the bearing of the treaty of Bukarest, and
did not so much as suspect the existence of the treaties which Bulgaria
concluded with Germany and Turkey _in the spring of_ 1914, and which have
just been disclosed by M. Radoslavoff (see p. 154). These correspondents,
in virtue of the undeserved credit given them in London, contributed
in large measure to delude the British authorities in 1915 as to the
true intentions of Bulgaria down to the moment when it stepped into the
arena at the side of Germany. From this grievous error has resulted the
crushing of Serbia, with its manifold consequences. In spite of these
plain facts staring them in the face, some incorrigible Englishmen are
still unconvinced. While they acknowledge the very great difficulties
of the actual situation of the Bulgarians, they nevertheless arrive at
this paradoxical conclusion that the Allies should make peace with the
Bulgarians and suffer them to retain their present conquests.

Be that as it may, this underhand agitation lately carried on in London
by a few but very active agents, has naturally been reprobated by
well-informed British opinion. The English who in April, 1916, gave so
warm a reception to the Prince of Serbia, are apprehensive lest a new
blunder should be perpetrated in the Balkans. To prevent that contingency
a question was put in the House of Commons on March 28th: “A member
asked for an assurance that Bulgaria would not be admitted to a separate
peace, and especially that she should not be permitted to acquire
territories at the expense of the peoples who have fought on the side
of the Allies during the war” (see _L’Œuvre_, 29th March, 1916). This
British resolution is in harmony with the interests, moral and material,
recent and future, of the Allies.

In the first place, it is useless to reckon, as some misguided people
have done, on a really effective popular Bulgarian rising against the
government. Tsar Ferdinand has always done just what he pleased in
Bulgaria, and now that he is hand in glove with Berlin, the Germans
will furnish him with the force needed to keep him on the throne. As
for the Bulgarian people, they are no doubt the victims of the present
situation, but so they will remain. Unquestionably they possess some
sterling qualities. They are industrious, energetic, and sober. But
they resemble the Prussians in many points, as the new German minister
to Sofia announced recently (see _Le Temps_, 18th March, 1916). In
fact the Bulgarian people has the keen eye to the main chance, the
duplicity, and the domineering spirit of the Brandenburgs. Moreover, the
Bulgarian people is the prey of the Bulgarian politicians, who, with
the stubbornness of mules and a doggedness of which it is impossible
to convey an idea, are perfectly irreconcilable on the question of
Macedonia. No doubt the most astute among them might very well, as in
1915, pretend to negotiate with the Allies for the purpose of delaying
the attack from the side of Salonika, of which Berlin is extremely
afraid; but to believe it possible to come to a sincere and durable
understanding with Bulgaria is merely to nurse the most pernicious of
chimeras. To conclude a premature peace with Bulgaria would also entail
on the Allies other fatal consequences, which it is easy to demonstrate.
A treaty with the Bulgarians, who in complicity with the Germans have
just massacred systematically an enormous number of Serbians, would be
a manifest act of treason to Serbia; it would be to treat the crimes of
the Bulgarians as if they actually conferred rights on the criminals.
Clearly the public opinion of the Allied nations would never tolerate
such an infamy. Besides, from a military point of view the calculation
would be wrong. In order to avoid giving battle to 350,000 Bulgarians,
whose forces must be divided between the Roumanian front and the Salonika
front, the Allies would be obliged, in the first place, to dispense
with the assistance of 150,000 Serbian soldiers, who obviously would
refuse to march the day that the Allies entered into negotiations with
the Bulgarians. Moreover, an understanding with Bulgaria would have the
effect, at once political and military, of undermining the favourable
disposition of the Greeks and Roumanians towards the Entente. As I have
shown in Chapter VII, the hatred of the Roumanians and the Greeks for the
Bulgarians is the great psychological factor in the Balkans.

The official plan of Bulgarian supremacy, set forth on the accompanying
map, may serve to explain that hatred, for it shows that Bulgarian
ambition encroaches considerably on the territories of all her
neighbours. It now even extends by way of Albania to the Adriatic. We can
therefore readily understand that this plan of Bulgarian supremacy is the
nightmare of the Greeks and the Roumanians. But these Bulgarians, like
the Prussians, because of the similarity of their characters, will never
renounce their programme of dominion until they shall have received at
the hands of the Allies, with the help of the Greeks and Roumanians, the
sound thrashing which they have earned a hundred times over, and which
is essential to the establishment of lasting peace in the Balkans. But
it is clear that if negotiations were opened for a separate peace with
the Bulgarians, the Greeks (250,000 men) and the Roumanians (600,000
men), seeing their interests once more misunderstood by the Allies, would
refuse once and for all to fight on their side.

[Illustration: ENCROACHMENTS PLANNED BY BULGARIA ON NEIGHBOURING STATES.]

Finally, a separate peace which left Bulgaria in possession of her
conquests, would enable her to build and buttress the bridge which is to
join the Central Empires to Turkey. That is just what Berlin wants in
order to execute its scheme of domination “from Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf.” In the light of that aim, the secret attempts of Bulgaria to
conclude a separate peace are seen to be the Bulgaro-German counterpart
of the Turko-German manœuvre which I have exposed above (see p. 167).

Evidently the Allies will not allow themselves to be taken in by these
clumsy tricks. The lesson taught by the faults committed in the Balkans
in 1915 is so plain that it will prevent the Allied leaders from
perpetrating any fresh blunder on a large scale. Moreover, the victory of
the Allies cannot be won, and a lasting peace cannot be established in
Europe, unless the German dodge of the “drawn game” is frustrated.

CHAPTER IX.

THE STILL NEUTRAL STATES WHOSE INDEPENDENCE WOULD BE DIRECTLY THREATENED
BY THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE “HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN GULF” SCHEME, AND
THEREFORE BY GERMANY’S CAPTURE OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

I. The example of Portugal.

II. Holland.

III. Switzerland.

IV. The States of South America.

V. The United States.

Almost all the neutral States, though as yet they are hardly aware of
it, have a vital interest, not only in compelling Germany to abandon her
conquests in the East and in the West, but also in preventing her from
establishing her supremacy over Austria-Hungary by means of the war.
This latter aim is perfectly logical, since the German supremacy over
Central Europe would secure for the government of Berlin formidable means
of domination both by land and sea (see p. 106). One of the effects of
the colossal upheaval in the mutual relation of the forces of the States
involved, in view of the abnormal concentration of the sources of power
in German hands, would be that the independence of the neutral States
would inevitably be gravely imperilled. In this chapter we shall consider
the situation of countries still neutral, which would be particularly
affected by the achievement of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf.”

The case of Portugal is typical, because here we have a small State
which, in the opinion of many, seemed for a long time as if it could keep
out of the conflict; whereas on the contrary the necessity of defending
itself against the German schemes for swallowing it up, compelled it at
last to plunge into the war.

Ever since the opening of hostilities in Europe, Portugal has been
the scene of German intrigues carried on with the greatest activity;
indeed, even before the outbreak of the European conflagration the
train had been laid as carefully in Portugal as elsewhere. Working
through reactionary centres, these intrigues ostensibly aimed at the
restoration to the throne of Emmanuel of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha-Bragança,
who had been dethroned, on October 5th, 1910, by the revolution which
gave birth to the Portuguese Republic. Afterwards, on the 4th of
September, 1913, he married the German princess Augustine-Victoria, of
Hohenzollern Sigmaringen. The German agents also brought influence to
bear on certain Portuguese anarchists in order, by every possible means,
to stir up trouble in the country which had been marked out for ruin
by the Pangerman plot of 1911. We have seen (p. 103) what Portuguese
colonies that plot had specially in view. Now in 1912 the government of
Berlin, eagerly and astutely plotting its European war on the assumption
that England would stand out of it, and that she might be lulled into
acquiescence by the bait of temporary colonial gains, availed itself of
the official negotiations with Lord Haldane to propose to the English
Cabinet that England and Germany should divide the Portuguese colonies in
Africa between them.

These colonies (the Azores, Madeira, Cape Verd, Princes Island, St.
Thomas, Guinea, Angola, Mozambique) shown on the accompanying map, are
of great importance to Portugal. With their two millions of square
kilometres, and their 8,300,000 inhabitants, they are the still
important relics of the once magnificent colonial empire of Portugal;
they are accordingly an essential base for Portuguese commerce, and
especially for a future commercial revival of Portugal, which the
government of Lisbon is naturally anxious to promote.

[Illustration: PORTUGAL AND COLONIAL PANGERMANISM.]

At the very commencement of hostilities in Europe, the Germans,
discounting their victory in Europe, invaded Angola, and it is only
lately that the Portuguese soldiers succeeded in driving them out. Thus
in point of fact a state of war has long existed between Portugal and
Germany, and it is Germany that took the offensive. Hence from the outset
the Portuguese government has had many excellent reasons for wishing well
to the cause of the Allies; and Portugal has effectively proved her good
will by all the means in her power.

By way of reprisals for the incessant German intrigues in Portugal
itself, and for the acts of war committed on her colonial territory by
the soldiers of William II., Portugal at last seized the numerous German
vessels which had been interned in her ports since the outbreak of the
European conflagration.

Germany replied in March, 1915, by an official declaration of war, which
in fact did nothing but legalize a state of things that had long existed
in consequence of the German aggression on Angola.

After this official rupture Portugal perfectly understood that, if she
wished to save her very existence, she must range herself completely on
the side of the Allies. On March 25th, 1916, the Portuguese Minister of
War issued an order to the army, in which he said:

“No one who has followed with patriotic anxiety the acts of Germany
ever since the conference of Berlin in 1885, can doubt that her victory
would involve the loss of our colonies, perhaps even of our nationality.
Therefore we must all impress it clearly on our minds, that the battles
now being fought in so many parts of the world touch us very closely;
that this war is our war, a war for our liberty, for our independence,
for the integrity of the territory of our native land, and that we should
wage it wherever our forces can strike the heaviest blow at the power of
Germany. The hatred of our barbarous foes, the Germans, should pervade
every heart, and that it may strike root and penetrate into the army,
it is necessary to explain to the soldiers the reasons of the war, to
enumerate the injuries that have been done us by the Germans, and to
set forth clearly the intentions and schemes which Germany cherishes in
regard to small nations, like Belgium, Serbia, and Portugal.”

This proclamation of the Portuguese Minister of War deserves to be
remembered, for it accurately expresses the general sentiments which will
be shared more and more by States still neutral, in proportion as they
understand more and more clearly that their future independence really
hangs on the total defeat of Germany.

II.

The following words give a summary of the views and the tactics adopted
by the Germans with regard to the Dutch in the Pangerman plan of 1895.

“When our brothers of the Low German race shall have got over their
almost childish fright at ‘annexation by the Prussians,’ they will
acknowledge that the admission of Holland into Great Germany is
advantageous to both parties. Moreover, in the bosom of Great Germany,
the Dutch would be able to preserve, to a reasonable extent, their own
particular characteristics.

“The Kingdom of the Low Countries, on entering into not only the German
Customs Union but also the Pangerman Confederation, with the retention
of all its rights, will cease to maintain an independent fleet, but
will organize an independent Army Corps, with privileges like those of
Bavaria, and also a colonial army. It will remain in possession of its
colonies, and might even undertake the administration of New Guinea and
of all the German colonies in the Pacific.

“The official language will remain Low German (Dutch) for the legislation
and the administration in State, School, and Church. High German will
not be employed except in matters that concern the Confederation.
Besides it is obvious that its use will spread rapidly, but voluntarily,
in commerce and the sciences.

[Illustration: THE NEUTRAL STATES OF EUROPE AND PANGERMANISM.]

“If the Rhine from its source to its mouth becomes a truly German river,
it will then be the Low German (or Dutch) commercial towns and seaports
near its mouth, which will chiefly benefit thereby.

“It will thus be seen that a singularly attractive prospect for the
economic and political future of the Low Countries, is being opened
up, if they will only consent to become members of the Pangerman
Confederation. God grant that our Low German cousins may at last abandon
that jealous regard for their independence as a separate State, which
we, the Germans of the Empire, also felt down to the years 1866 and
1870” (see _Grossdeutschland und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr 1950_, p. 13,
Thormann und Goetsch, S.W. Bessel-Strasse 17, Berlin, 1895).

So it seems that twenty years ago the Germans trusted to moral suasion
to open the eyes of the Dutch to the intrinsic beauties of Pangermany.
The hope was built on the familiar fact that many Dutchmen, addicted,
like their ancestors for ages before them, to the profitable occupation
of foreign trade, devote their energies to the pursuit of gain, and have
very little time, and even less taste, for situations that call for
bellicose resolutions. The same turn of mind explains why ever since
the outbreak of war the Germans have easily found in Holland plenty of
enterprising firms, which have smuggled ample supplies of all sorts into
Germany and snapped their fingers at the blockade.

However, 1895 is a long time ago, and since then Pangerman ideas have
marched with the time. As we have seen (p. 103), the plan of 1911
provides for the “conveyance” of the Dutch colonies to Pangermany under
conditions which would not allow the Low Countries to cherish the least
illusion as to the ultimate preservation of their independence.

But the revelation of the German plans for the perpetration of burglary
and the appropriation of other people’s goods, has had its effect, and
even the Dutch, in spite of their intense desire not to be drawn into the
great war, are now forced to look hard facts in the face.

In truth, the moral situation of the Dutch is hard, for they are
pulled in opposite directions by sentiments which logically lead to
contradictory decisions. On the one side, historical memories and ancient
rivalries in the commerce of the sea still inspire them with a lively
dread of England; on the other side, they are constrained to admit that
the Pangerman peril has grown imminent for their country. It is plain,
in fact (see the map on p. 188) that if Germany were to tighten her grip
on Belgium, or if she emerged from the war much strengthened by the
establishment of her supremacy over Austria-Hungary, Holland would soon
inevitably be forced, even in time of peace, to acquiesce in vassalage to
her formidable neighbour, Pangermany.

The Dutch are all the more perplexed and irresolute, before they can
screw their courage up to the sticking point, because they are sometimes
disconcerted by the action of their government, which, as everybody
knows, is open to both direct and powerful German influences. The
situation is described as follows in a few paragraphs of the _Telegraaf_,
which earned for their author a series of prosecutions on the pretext
that they endangered the neutrality of the country:—

“For our part,” said the _Telegraaf_, “we shall not cease to oppose a
Government and its accomplice Press, who under the cloak of a ‘dignified
neutrality’ are pursuing a rash policy of exportation and provisioning
Germany with articles of prime necessity, thereby enabling that country
to continue the war, and betraying not only the interests of their own
country but also the cause of humanity” (quoted by _Le Temps_, 30th
March, 1916).

As for the general and dominant tone of Dutch public opinion, Mr.
Holdert, the editor of the _Telegraaf_, who is particularly well
qualified to form an opinion on the subject, sums up as follows:

“Every time an incident occurs that might lead Holland to take a grave
decision, before you venture to predict, remember that the people over
there do not want war. With us, business, money, gain, and all that sort
of thing, is considered extremely, supremely, infinitely important.

“To-day the majority of my fellow countrymen are rolling in money. Why
trouble about anything else?

“Yes, eighty per cent. of the population are in favour of the Allies.
France especially is loved, and she could ask but little of us which we
would not give. But that affection, though real, is so to speak, remote.
We quickly turn over the page which contains the news of the war” (see
_Le Journal_, 5th April, 1916).

Thus Dutch opinion seems stagnant, yet it moves, though very, very
slowly; for people are beginning to ask themselves whether, despite all
their efforts, all their intense desire for peace, this dreadful war can
end with the Dutch sword still in the scabbard.

No doubt the military measures taken by the Hague government have been
dictated purely with the intention of defending Dutch neutrality. But
facts such as the torpedoeing of the _Tubantia_ go far to add to the
number of those clearsighted and energetic patriots, who, like the
admirable and vigorous artist Raemaekers, acknowledge and proclaim that
for the sake of her honour as well as of her interest Holland is bound to
do all in her power to favour and hasten the victory of the Allies.

III.

The Pangerman aims with regard to Switzerland, as set forth in the plan
of 1895, are summed up as follows:—

“We may then leave Switzerland to choose, whether she shall enter the
German Customs Union and the Pangerman Confederation bringing all her
cantons or only the German ones with her, or whether she shall form
part of the German Empire on equal terms as a Federal State” (see
_Grossdeutschland um das Jahr 1950_, p. 17).

The Pangerman programme is, therefore, definitely directed against
Switzerland (see the map on p. 188), but Berlin has always flattered
itself with the hope of absorbing this little State, like Holland,
without resort to force, simply in the course of nature and as a
consequence of the defeat of the great European powers.

What is certain is that before the war the prestige of Germany in German
Switzerland was so great, and the organization of the German propaganda
in this part of Helvetia was so perfect, that all the excuses published
by the Berlin government to explain and justify the violation of Belgium
were swallowed without winking by the German Swiss.

But since then a slow change of sentiment has taken place. The enormous
annexations contemplated by Germany, the atrocious manner in which she
is waging the war, and, above all, the terrible horrors perpetrated
in Serbia, have at last convinced an increasing number of Swiss that
a victory for Germany would create a formidable danger for the whole
civilized world in general, and for the independence of Switzerland in
particular.

A gentleman at Zurich, whose position affords him ample opportunity for
forming a just appreciation of the state of affairs, gave me recently the
following concise statement of the real feeling in German Switzerland:
“The majority of the intellectuals, almost all of whom have studied in
Germany, and a part of the business men, are the only resolute champions
of Prussia. They would be quite willing to see Switzerland absorbed in
Pangermany. But the Swiss who hold that view are only a small minority.
In German Switzerland most of the manufacturers, almost all of whom have
suffered very heavily in recent years through the keenness of German
competition, desire a German defeat, which would be in harmony both with
their opinions as liberals and with their interests as manufacturers, by
relieving the strain of the present fierce competition in business. As
for the mass of the German Swiss—and that is the important point—they
are by no means in love with the Prussians, as people in France wrongly
imagine. They are before all things Swiss.”

The Swiss have resolved to defend their neutrality against the first of
their neighbours that shall violate their frontier. The Allies wish for
nothing more than that. They only desire that the Swiss should impress
this truth more and more clearly on their minds, that in presence of the
formidable Pangerman ambition the victory of the Allies is a condition
essential to the maintenance of the Helvetic Confederation.

IV.

The accompanying map summarizes and recalls the Pangerman claims to such
direct German protectorates in South America as were provided for by the
plan of 1911 (see p. 105).

It is important to observe that the German designs on South America
began just at the time when the European nations, acquiescing in the
Monroe doctrine, renounced all intentions of appropriating any part of
the New World. This renunciation took place about 1898, the date of
the war between Spain and America. That was the very moment when the
Pangermanists of Berlin conceived and prepared to execute the plan of
extending in the future the power of the Hohenzollerns to Cape Horn. This
fact, taken in conjunction with many others, serves to demonstrate the
spirit of conquest and aggression, the boundless ambition which animates
the Germany of William II.

The preparations for carrying out the Pangerman plans in South America
were, as everywhere else, conducted by the organizers of the movement
most methodically.

[Illustration: COLONIAL PANGERMANISM AND SOUTH AMERICA.]

Having thus settled on their plan of 1895, they proceeded to draw up
an actual register of all the Germans existing on the face of the
terrestrial globe, in order to pick out from them such as were likely to
prove the most serviceable tools in executing the Pangerman scheme. The
general results of this register of Germans all over the world are to be
found, in a concentrated form, in the _Pangerman Atlas_ of Paul Langhans,
published by Justus Perthes at Gotha in 1900.

So far as relates to South America, this document proves that there were

In Peru in 1890 2,000 Germans
In Paraguay in 1890 3,000 ”
In Colombia in 1890 3,000 ”
In Uruguay in 1897 5,000 ”
In Venezuela in 1894 5,000 ”
In Chili in 1895 15,000 ”
In Argentina in 1895 60,000 ”
In Brazil in 1890 400,000 ”

These Germans have been strongly inoculated, especially since 1900, by
the Pangerman Societies. They have been organized with particular care
in the countries which, like Argentina, and, above all, Brazil, were
intended to be the principal German protectorates in South America.

The German law, called Delbrück’s law, of July 22nd, 1913, dealing with
the nationality of the Empire and the nationality of the State, has
greatly favoured the Pangerman organization in America. Hence it is
needful to be acquainted with at least the substance of the Delbrück
law, since it formed the last stage, and a very significant one, in the
Pangerman organization all over the world before the outbreak of war.

The second part of article 25 of that law runs as follows:—“If any person
before acquiring nationality in a foreign State, shall have received the
written permission of a competent authority of his native State to retain
his nationality of that State, he shall not lose his nationality of the
said native State. The German consul shall be consulted before granting
the said permission.”

These words afford us a measure of the depth of German astuteness.
According to this provision, a German may become a naturalized subject
of a foreign State, but if he obtains a written permission from the
competent authorities of his native German State, _he continues, in
spite of this naturalization, to enjoy, for himself and his descendants,
all the rights of a German citizen and all the protection of the German
Empire_.

These provisions being contrary to all the general principles of
international law on the subject of nationality, a German citizen who
benefits by them will take very good care not to acquaint the foreign
State whose nationality he has acquired, with the highly peculiar
situation in which he stands. By this process Germany has been able to
have in every State agents devoted to her aggressive policy, without
these States being aware of the danger they run through this secret
service. In fact, these States had, to all appearance, to do only with
fellow countrymen whom they had no right to suspect. It was only after
many months of war, when their criminal action compelled them to take
off the mask, that the dangerous power of these Germans disguised as
foreigners appeared in all its formidable and insufferable dimensions.

This state of things explains why, during the first months of the war,
intoxicated by the powerful German propaganda, and ignorant of the
disasters with which Europe and still more themselves were threatened by
the Pangerman plot, the States of South America were unable to perceive
the peril at their door and to understand that they had a direct interest
in the issue of the European war. But now public opinion in these
countries is advancing steadily towards a complete apprehension of the
truth.

Peru and Chili, one after the other, are slipping through the meshes of
the German net.

In Argentina the movement in favour of the Allies is also growing
rapidly. But it is above all in Brazil, the southern part of which
is most particularly coveted by the Germans, that the progress of
enlightenment is especially interesting to watch. For a long time the
Germans have concentrated their colonial efforts particularly on three
Brazilian States, to wit, Parana (60,000 Germans), Santa Catarina
(170,000), and Rio Grande do Sul (220,000). In these rich provinces, the
Germans, preserving the language, the traditions, the prejudices of the
Fatherland, are almost absolute masters. Only 47,000 of them are openly
citizens of the German Empire; the rest, about 400,000, are apparently
Brazilian subjects, but in virtue of the Delbrück law a considerable
part of them have in reality remained or become once more liege-men of
William II. Moreover, the budget of the German Empire included a sum of
500,000 marks to be devoted to the establishment or the support of German
schools in Brazil. In 1912 Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of William
II., in the course of his cruise, landed at the port of Itajahy to pay
a visit to his fellow countrymen in Santa Catarina. Since the outbreak
of the European war the game of the Germans in Brazil has been gradually
revealed in its true colours, and it has been lately discovered that
the numerous Rifle Clubs were in fact societies for military drill and
dangerous enough to necessitate their disarmament.

In the rest of Brazil, outside the three provinces mentioned above, the
Germans are not numerous, but they fill most of the principal posts in
business houses and banks. In the first period of the war these Germans
founded Germanophile newspapers published in Portuguese, and thereby
prevented Brazil from getting accurate information as to the origin and
course of the conflict.

But despite this clever opposition, ever since the battle of the Marne
the cause of the Allies has been steadily gaining ground in Brazil. A
powerful impulse to the movement has been given by the action of Portugal
in taking up arms, for there are 600,000 Portuguese in Brazil.

Thus in South America the tide is clearly running in favour of the
Allies. A new stage will be reached when these States come clearly to
understand that in view of Pangerman colonial ambitions, which threaten
them personally, they have a direct interest in the complete victory of
the Allies, which alone can deliver them from the fear of the German
peril. They will then reach the same definite and sound conclusion at
which, as I shall show further on, the United States is logically bound
to arrive.

When that is so, it is possible, if not probable, that these South
American States, or at least the principal among them, will no longer be
satisfied to remain neutral. They will then acknowledge that a true view
of their own interest compels them to strike, with all their might, a
blow for the common freedom.

President Wilson, by his note to Berlin of April 20th, 1916, concerning
submarine warfare, which had the character of an ultimatum, committed the
United States to a first act of intervention in the European war. The
fact that a consideration of their interests has compelled the Germans,
at least for the moment, to bow to the mandate of the United States,
seems to some people to have already closed the American intervention.
Those who hold this opinion may support it by reference to the speech
which President Wilson delivered to the Press Club at Washington, on May
18th, 1916: “There are two reasons,” said the President, “why the chief
desire of the Americans is for peace. One is that they love peace, _and
have nothing to do with the present quarrel_; the other is that they
believe that the parties to the quarrel have been forced to go to such
lengths that they can no longer keep within the limits of responsibility.
Why not let the storm go by, and then, when all is over, make up the
account?” (quoted by _Le Temps_, May 22nd, 1916).

The need for reserve, which his official position lays on President
Wilson, has evidently hindered him from disclosing his thoughts fully;
for, as we shall see immediately, it would be particularly dangerous
for the United States to imagine that they have nothing to do with the
present quarrel, and to wait for the end of it in order to make up the
account.

In reality, the true question for the United States goes far beyond that
of German piracy in submarine warfare. That question really involves
two quite distinct American interests; one of a moral, the other of a
material or political nature.

From the moral point of view the United States must consider the
barbarity with which Germany wages war, not only on the sea, but
everywhere. Not only does she constantly violate the laws of war between
belligerents, but also and above all the German authorities subject to
a frightful reign of terror all the civil anti-Germanic populations in
the territories now occupied by Pangermany from the North Sea to Bagdad.
The sufferings inflicted by the Germans on the Belgians, the Slavs of
Austria-Hungary, the Serbians, and the Armenians (whom they have caused
to be massacred wholesale) amount to millions of indescribable pangs, of
odious crimes, of atrocious martyrdoms. The Americans have intervened in
the submarine warfare in the name of humanity. Can they remain neutral
in face of this “ocean of crimes” committed by the Germans, without the
smallest excuse, over enormous stretches of territory?

From the point of view of defending their own material interests, it
is not certain that enough Americans even yet understand the magnitude
of the formidable problem which the European war compels them to face
and solve. It is quite natural that it should be so. In many circles
of France and England it is only quite lately that people have come
clearly to apprehend, as a whole, the real, the gigantic objects pursued
by Germany in the war. Hence it is not surprising that the enormity of
the German plot has not yet been grasped by the Americans of the United
States, whose ideas about Europe at the beginning of the conflict were
necessarily just as vague as the ideas of Europeans about the United
States.

[Illustration: DISTRIBUTION OF GERMAN-BORN GERMANS IN THE UNITED
STATES.]

The accompanying map will enable the reader readily to appreciate the
basis of the real problem which the war presents to the United States. As
I have explained (p. 194), the Germans set themselves after 1895 to make
a regular register of all the Germans scattered over the whole world. Our
map is drawn up in accordance with the data of map 5 in the _Pangerman
Atlas_ of Paul Langhans, which gives the results of the register. The map
shows what proportion the Germans, who had been born in Germany and had
emigrated to the United States, bore to the American population about
the year 1890. We can see that the proportion was considerable, since at
some points (see the map) it amounted to 35%. Further, the general view
presented by the map enables us to observe that in the United States
the Germans have planted themselves by preference in the industrial and
commercial regions of the East and of the Great Lakes. We can therefore
understand what followed. Ever since 1900 the _Alldeutscher Verband_ or
Pangerman Union, in obedience to secret instructions from the official
authorities in Berlin, has laid itself out to select from this mass of
Germans in the United States all such as might best serve the cause of
Prussian militarism at any given moment, in the most diverse domains,
as soon as the European conflagrations should have broken out. Hence
for the last twenty years most of the ten to fifteen million Americans
of German origin have been organized. Little by little, in the midst of
the great American Republic, there has grown up a State within a State,
a State endowed with the most powerful means of influence. In point of
fact, among the German-Americans there are manufacturers, merchants,
and bankers of colossal fortunes, who control the lives of hundreds of
thousands of workmen or employees living in dependence upon them. The
German-Americans also own many newspapers and associations. They have
therefore been able to exert a considerable influence on the policy
of the United States, and even to secure the election to Congress of
members devoted to their interests. The Delbrück law (see p. 195) has
completed the German organization in the United States, by enabling an
influential party of German-Americans to preserve the appearance of
American citizens, while all the time they remain pledged heart and soul
to forward the Kaiser’s scheme of universal slavery.

As the total population of the United States is 100 millions, it is
easy to see what may be the power of 10 to 15 million German-Americans
systematically organized for a definite purpose, when these are opposed
to 90 million Americans who, never suspecting the Pangerman peril, have
taken no kind of special precaution against their fellow citizens of
German origin.

This very peculiar state of affairs explains the strange position
occupied by the United States since the outbreak of the European War.
From that time the German-Americans, in virtue of the immense means of
influence and of action which they had prepared beforehand, have carried
on a multifarious campaign, with extraordinary audacity in furtherance of
the German game. Thus the German Ambassador, Count Bernstorff, and his
military attachés von Papen, Boy-Ed, etc., have aided and abetted in the
task of subverting the United States by a multitude of German-American
spies and agents.

During the first months of the war the German propaganda, carried on with
extraordinary activity, was easily able to deceive a considerable part
of American opinion as to the true origin of, and the responsibility
for, the carnage going on in Europe. Afterwards, when the war dragged
on, and the Allies placed considerable orders in the United States,
the understrappers of the professional German spies engaged in an
extraordinary series of outrages in order to terrorize the American
workmen employed in executing the orders of the Allies. The object of
these acts of violence, combined with the frivolous and interminable
discussions which Count Bernstorff carried on with the Government of
Washington, was first to induce the United States to issue an order
prohibiting the Allies from arming their merchant ships for the purpose
of self-defence against the German submarines; second, to persuade the
Americans that the blockade of Germany by England was maintained in a
manner contrary to the rules of international law; third, to slacken
or stop the production of munitions of war destined for the Allies;
and lastly, _supposing that the principal acquisitions contemplated by
Pangermany had been effected in Europe_, to induce President Wilson
to intervene in favour of peace under colour of putting an end to the
European butchery—an intervention which, if it took place, would have the
practical result of opening the negotiations for peace under conditions
eminently favourable to the German plans of annexation.

But at last the crimes of violence committed by the Germans in the United
States opened the eyes of the American people and roused them to anger.
We must understand that it was only gradually, and in spite of great
difficulties, that the real citizens of the United States, hemmed in by
the German organization as by a ring fence, were able to acquire true
notions as to the European war. This progress of American opinion was
further retarded by the circumstance that before the war, for various
reasons, the Allied countries unquestionably occupied a much lower place
in the esteem of the United States than Germany, which had gained for
herself very great prestige by her extraordinary activity in commerce,
industry, and science.

As to Russia, the Americans knew scarcely anything about it except the
hardships of which the Jews in that country complained. As many of
these people have emigrated to the United States, and there exercise
a great influence on the press, they have naturally fostered anything
but a sympathy for the Empire of the Tsars. The Irish-Americans devoted
themselves to the similar task of blackening England, from which the
United States had in days gone by to extort her independence. As to
France, the Americans, on the faith of superficial observations,
considered her to be in a state of hopeless decadence. The flagrant
atrocity of the prodigious German crimes committed in the United States;
on the high seas against neutral passengers; in Belgium against the
Belgians; in Serbia against the Serbians; in Armenia against the
Armenians; and, on the other hand, the magnificent resistance of the
Allies, these things have at last produced a revulsion of feeling. The
prejudices of the Americans against Russia and England have been to a
great extent mitigated, and the grand, the noble attitude of the people
of France, the tenacity and the heroism of her soldiers, have proved
that France is far indeed from decadent. To-day we may say, for it is
the truth, that France has won the deep and enthusiastic admiration of
all the really independent American citizens of the United States. This
progressive change of opinion has ranged the Americans more and more on
the side of the Allies.

But American opinion has still one stage to travel. It is this. The
American people must understand with the utmost clearness that the
victory of Germany would unquestionably mean the end of the independence
of the United States. Indeed, some Americans, more clearsighted than the
rest, have already travelled this last stage on the road to truth. In
March, 1916, Dr. Elliot, formerly President of Harvard University, and an
intimate friend, we are told, of President Wilson, declared in the _New
York Times_: “_The quickest, the best, the surest means for Americans to
defend themselves against a German invasion is to conclude with France
and England a permanent alliance, offensive and defensive, having for
its aim the maintenance of the freedom of the seas for the Allies, and
resistance to any maritime attack. It is time for all Americans to take
sides openly with the European peoples who for so many long months have
been standing up against the military despotism of Prussia._” (Quoted by
_Le Temps_, 15th March, 1916.)

Dr. Elliot has thus stated in terms as exact as they are complete the
real problem which the Americans have to solve. Clearly it reached far
beyond the controversies about the submarine warfare. It is not enough,
indeed, for the Americans to constitute themselves the champions of right
and justice against Teutonic barbarity; _they must understand that the
maintenance of the independence of the United States absolutely depends
on the complete victory of the Allies in Europe_. Already many Americans
come near to accepting this view. Thus at Carnegie Hall, New York, at the
end of May, 1916, Major Putnam, addressing 3000 members of the “Committee
of American Rights,” excited great enthusiasm by demanding that America
should at once take part in the war on the side of the Allies. His chief
argument was: “If Germany wins in this war, her next aggression will be
against our Republic.” (Quoted by _Le Temps_, May 22nd, 1916.)

But these clear ideas, involving immediate and decisive action, are as
yet shared only by a minority of Americans, better informed than the rest.

The progress of American opinion in general will be complete when from a
general view of the facts of the war, as these have occurred in America
as well as in Europe, the people shall logically infer the formidable
consequences which a German victory would entail on the United States.

That general view, which the great American Republic will probably
take in time, is as follows. It will necessarily be based on an exact
knowledge of the German plan for dealing with the United States, a plan,
by the way, which is of long standing.

In 1898, before Manilla, the German Rear-Admiral von Goetzen, a friend of
the Kaiser, said to the American Admiral Dewey: “In about fifteen years
my country will begin a great war.... Some months after we have done our
business in Europe we shall take New York and probably Washington, and we
shall keep them for a time. We do not intend to take any territory from
you, but only to put your country in its proper place with reference to
Germany. We shall extract one or two billions of dollars from New York
and other towns.” (See _Naval and Military Record_, quoted by _L’Echo
de Paris_, September 24th, 1915.) These words at the time were regarded
as mere gasconade. But now it is indisputable that even before 1898 the
Germans of Berlin had, by means of the processes described above (p.
200), been systematically laying the foundations of a State within the
United States, a State that has long been silently sapping the ground on
which stands the American Republic.

A multitude of recent and striking facts—pressure brought to bear on
politicians, monster strikes, plots and outrages against public order
executed by order of the official agents of the Kaiser, such as von
Papen, Boy-Ed, von Igel, &c—have abundantly demonstrated that the German
organization in America threatens the independence of the United States,
and is of a definitely criminal and treasonable character. A phrase in a
letter of Baron de Meysenburg, German consul at New Orleans, written on
December 4th, 1915, to von Papen, German military attaché at Washington,
who organized the principal outrages in the United States, proves that
in the minds of Germans behind the scenes the turn of the United States
was to come in due course. The latter was lately seized by the English:
“May the day of the settling of accounts come here also, and when that
day comes may our Government have found again that will of iron without
which no impression can be made on this country.” (Quoted by _Le Temps_,
January 17th, 1916.)

On the other hand the Americans cannot shut their eyes to the extreme
gravity of the recent Pangerman manœuvres in the States of South
America, particularly in Argentina and Brazil, which are regarded as
destined ultimately to become German protectorates; also in Nicaragua,
where the Kaiser’s agents have tried to get a concession of territory for
the construction of a canal to compete with the Panama canal. Lastly,
there is the undeniable fact, which brings the danger still nearer home,
that a few months ago Germany plotted the military invasion of Canada,
with the complicity of her subjects disguised as American citizens.
Common sense, therefore, tells us that, assuming that the Allies were
beaten in Europe, Germany would be the mistress of Canada, and would
practically dominate the United States. The extraordinary series of
formidable outrages which the German-Americans have already concocted and
executed on the soil of the great American Republic, is proof patent that
the existence of Pangermany would be incompatible with the independence
of the United States.

All that is more or less clearly understood in the United States; but
what American opinion still needs to be enlightened on is the immense
danger which the United States would incur through the formidable Berlin
trap called “the Drawn Game,” the most dangerous trick which the Germans
still keep up their sleeve. Seeing that many of the Allies do not yet
understand the enormous peril of a Germany yielding temporarily on the
East and on the West in order to make herself mistress once and for all
of Central Europe, the Balkans, and Turkey, it is natural enough that the
Americans should not yet have fully “realized” the vast bearings of the
dodge called “the Drawn Game.”

The map on p. 101 enables the reader to see what would be the great
danger from the American point of view. As I have explained in Chapter V,
the pretended “Drawn Game” would enable Germany to carry out her scheme
of domination “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” and would thereby
secure for Berlin the means of laying hands successively on all the
important strategical points which command the seas of the whole world.
The consequence for the United States would be that with the keys of all
the seas in her hand, Germany would be able to prosecute her intrigues
on a much greater scale in South America, Canada, and therefore in the
United States.

It is deeply to be regretted that the very distinguished American Admiral
Mahan is no more. If I may judge by his powerful book, _The Interest
of America in Sea Power Present and Future_, the tenor of which was
admirably expounded by M. Jean Izoulet some time ago, I believe that I
am not going too far when I affirm that were Admiral Mahan now alive he
would, on a review of the whole situation, sketch as follows the line of
conduct which the government of Washington ought to follow with reference
to the European war. Admiral Mahan would doubtless tell his countrymen:
“At no price, under no pretext, should the United States suffer Germany
to execute her project from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, and that because
of the consequences which the achievement of that plan would entail on
sea power all over the world. As the only sure guarantee against the
accomplishment of that plan is to be found in Central Europe (see p.
129), the United States has a direct and first-hand interest in solving
the question of Austria-Hungary on the basis of nationalities, that
solution being over and above indispensable if the world is to see the
end of the Pangerman peril and of the great armaments.”

Hence, taking everything into account, we conclude that, apart from any
question of humanity and justice, the United States have an absolutely
vital interest, not only in a partial victory of the Allies in Europe,
but in their complete victory. It is desirable that this truth should be
admitted as soon as possible, for then the measures, which the Government
of Washington could not fail to take, would signally hasten the end of
the European carnage.

Plain good sense suffices to forecast what these measures would be.

It is as clear as daylight that the expedition to Mexico is a German
trap; hence the United States have every reason for awaiting the end
of the European war before committing themselves further in that
direction. On the other hand, _now that the Allies have gripped Germany
by the throat, the Government of Washington should avail itself of this
exceptional opportunity for carrying out with the utmost speed the
destruction of that criminal and parasitic organization which the Germans
have contrived to plant in the soil of the United States_. To arrest
the ringleaders who have been guilty of inciting to treason and crimes
against the common law, _whatever their social position or wealth may
be_; to suppress the associations which are nothing but agencies of the
Berlin government—these are tasks which the Americans have every motive
for accomplishing without delay.

Obviously, too, when the United States shall have wakened up to the
truth, they will acknowledge it to be at once their interest and
their duty to give the Allies all material succour, since nothing but
their complete victory over Germany can safeguard for the future the
independence of the United States.

In the financial sphere the United States can offer the Allies immense
facilities for raising loans, which would be particularly opportune.

Mr. Guthrie, Vice-President of the French-American Committee at New York,
has explained as follows the method, at once delicate and ingenious,
whereby the United States could and should, according to him, give their
financial support to France. “The historian Perkins,” says Mr. Guthrie,
“states that the expenses incurred by France in liberating America
amounted to 772 million dollars. Of this enormous outlay, which ruined
the Royal Treasury, not a stiver was ever repaid to France. She never
claimed it, and to-day she would proudly refuse to be repaid, reminding
us that, in the treaty of alliance of 6th February, 1778, she stipulated
that she should receive no indemnity for her help and her sacrifices....
The generosity of that treaty was unprecedented in the history of the
world.... Would it not be supremely just if the American people, a
hundred and thirty-four years after the battle of Yorktown, recognized
that service—I will not call it debt—by offering the French people
commercial credit to the amount of the principal, that is to say 772
million dollars, to be repaid at France’s convenience? It would be only
the equivalent of a contribution of seven and a half dollars from each
citizen of the United States, much less than the tax that was voluntarily
and cheerfully paid by the French people to help us in the eighteenth
century. Would it not be noble and glorious, honourable alike to head and
heart, if the great American bankers could have proclaimed to the world
that they had fixed the figure at 772 million dollars in gratitude for
the past?” (see _Revue du XVIII. siècle_, janvier-avril, 1916).

In the matter of munitions of war the United States might evidently
increase her production. Lastly, as has been said already, the United
States would be in a position to furnish the Allies with men, since
this unprecedented war requires such vast numbers of soldiers. But,
as we know, the United States have not got a large army, and it is
not certain that they either would or could rapidly improvise one. A
much simpler solution might enable the United States to furnish a very
considerable body of men to the Allies. This could be effected if the
Government of Washington were to grant leave to American citizens to
enlist as volunteers in the Allied armies, on such terms as might be
agreed upon. Not only would English-speaking Americans be glad to come
and fight the Teutonic barbarians, but—and this is a fact not generally
known—there are among American citizens millions of Slavs who emigrated
formerly from Austria-Hungary and the Balkans. These American Slavs are
ardent partisans of the Allies, and many a time in the last few months
these men, working in the American munition factories, have frustrated
the German attempts at outrages. Probably hundreds of thousands of
these Slavs would gladly come as volunteers to fight in Europe for the
liberation of Austria-Hungary and the Balkans, their native land, which
they quitted as exiles long ago to escape the German-Magyar yoke. We see
then that by such voluntary enlistments the United States could very soon
contribute troops for the conflict in Europe without laying on its own
shoulders the enormous burden of creating a great army.

Succours of these various sorts, furnished by America, would evidently
hasten the course of events. We may reasonably treat them as possible,
since it is certain that a German victory would put the independence of
the United States in jeopardy.

CONCLUSIONS.

WHAT HAS BEEN SET FORTH IN THE PRECEDING NINE CHAPTERS APPEARS TO JUSTIFY
THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS.

_The temporary achievement of nine-tenths of the Pangerman plan in
accordance with the programme of 1911 serves to refute the lies
disseminated by the German propaganda as to the cause and authors of the
war._

The intellectual mobilization of Germany, as powerfully organized and
carried out as her military organization, has enabled her utterly to
deceive many neutrals in the world as to the responsibilities for the
outbreak and prolongation of the war. The Allies do not yet fully
understand how prejudicial to them this German propaganda has been, and
what dangers it still involves for the conduct of the struggle and the
conclusion of peace.

This German propaganda has been all the more successful because for
a very long time it encountered no serious opposition on the side of
the Allies. For they, ingenuously confident in the justice of their
cause, which seemed to them self-evident, have not attempted any real
intellectual mobilization. Only quite lately have the Allies begun to
organize the propaganda which must and ought to be carried on in foreign
countries; substantial progress may be anticipated in this direction.

Six main arguments have been employed to back the German propaganda.

1º. Germany has been forced to wage the war in order to resist a
coalition treacherously contrived by England. Therefore Germany, a
country of intellectual, scientific, and economic activity, obliged to
right for its existence, deserves the sympathies of the whole world.

2º. If the neutrals are seriously injured by the war and its prolongation
the responsibility rests on the Allies, who desire to destroy the German
people. The neutrals should therefore take common action and bring
pressure to bear on the Allies for the purpose of inducing them to
acquiesce in the German victory, thus ensuring the speedy restoration of
peace.

3º. To hasten this result the neutrals, and especially the United States,
ought to oppose the maritime blockade which England is maintaining,
under conditions the legitimacy of which, from the point of view of
international law, is open to question. By refusing to supply munitions
to the Allies, the United States would put an end to the butchery and
thus serve the cause of humanity.

4º. Germany is really conciliatory, she wants nothing but an equitable
peace. “We Germans,” declared Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, December 11th,
1915, “do not wish to set the peoples by the ears; on the contrary each
will bear his share in the peaceful labour of all and in the progress of
the nations.”

5º. The neutrals ought all the more to help Germany because she is
fighting to ensure for all the freedom of the seas, which at present
hateful England keeps in her own hands. The _Berliner Tageblatt_ (quoted
by _Le Matin_ of February 18th, 1916), did not scruple to assert that
the achievement by Germany of her favourite scheme “from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf” would secure for all nations the freedom of the sea. “If
the economic mission of Germany,” said that journal, “is to guard the
freedom of the road which leads from the North Sea through Central Europe
to Asia Minor, and to render it more and more accessible, in the interest
of all who reside along the road in question, then it is a necessary
consequence of this our mission that we should have a vital interest in
the sea likewise, since the Continental road in Central Europe is merely
its continuation. Our interest requires that the sea shall be freed from
the supremacy of a single people, that it shall be open to all honest
competition.”

6º. The Allies pretended that they made war on Germany because we
violated the neutrality of Belgium. This cant only serves as a cloak for
their own hypocritical cupidity. It is not for the Allies to reproach
Germany, seeing that they have themselves violated the neutrality of
Greece.

To the Allies, who can have no doubt as to the premeditated character
of the German aggression, these main arguments, on which the German
propaganda rests, of course, are nothing more nor less than “colossal”
lies, as absurd as they are cynical. Nevertheless we must bear in mind
that repeated indefatigably under every form to Germanophile neutrals in
Europe or to neutrals in America and Asia, who naturally have but vague
ideas on the complex affairs of Europe, they have enabled the Germans
gravely to prejudice the cause of the Allies through the moral, economic,
and military effects which they have produced. Hence the Allies are
deeply concerned in frustrating the world-wide German propaganda with
all possible speed. Now that great object, as we shall see later on,
the Allied Governments could, if they chose, very quickly accomplish by
pointing to the temporary success of the Pangerman plot.

Pangermanism and the dangers which it involves for the future are now
well enough known in some neutral countries, but the knowledge is still
somewhat vague, it still lacks that clear definition and that sense of
imminent peril which arouse strong convictions and prompt actions. But
if the Pangerman plan of 1911, in all its definiteness and extent, has
been ignored down to a very recent date in the Allied countries, which
nevertheless above all others are interested in knowing it, we can easily
understand that this nefarious plot for enslaving the whole world has
not yet been fully apprehended by neutral nations. But the temporary
accomplishment of the Pangerman plan in Europe, to the enormous extent
of nine-tenths, furnishes the Allies with demonstrative arguments of the
utmost cogency, and thus puts it in their power speedily to counteract
the effect of the German lies all over the world, and to prove the danger
which Pangermanism creates for all civilized States.

To achieve this object it would be enough if the Allied propaganda, which
has begun to be organized, were to be co-ordinated and founded on a small
number of positive arguments drawn from the results already attained
by Pangermanism; for these results would reveal to everybody Germany’s
long premeditation, and therefore her responsibility and the scheme of
world-wide domination which she pursues.

This Allied propaganda ought to be firmly established by the practical
and indisputable proof afforded by the geographical superposition of the
1911 plan on the territories actually taken possession of by Germany in
the course of the war; thus compared, it will be seen that the plan and
its execution tally almost exactly.

[Illustration: RELATION BETWEEN THE PANGERMAN PLAN OF 1911 AND THE
PANGERMAN GAINS AT THE BEGINNING OF 1916.]

The accompanying map exhibits this incontestable truth in a graphic
form by showing the outlines of the actual German fortress compared
with the outlines contemplated by the 1911 plan. According to it the
German conquests were to have extended to 3,474,288 square kilometres,
in addition to Germany itself. But these conquests and seizures at the
beginning of 1916 were accomplished over an area of 3,035,572 square
kilometres. This geographical proof is confirmed by many manifestoes
which have appeared on the other side of the Rhine advocating a policy of
annexation. Amongst these may particularly be noted:—

1º. The famous memorial of May 20th, 1915, which the Imperial Chancellor
caused to be presented to himself by the most important associations of
Germany (see p. 17).

2º. Germany’s manifest desire to get possession successively of Riga,
Calais, Verdun, Belfort, and Salonika, in order to complete the plan of
1911 by holding the strategical points necessary for the preservation of
the territories over which she has cast her net.

3º. The declarations made in the Reichstag on April 5th, 1916, by the
Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, which lend the force of
demonstration to the geographical proof.

To any plain man these declarations appear to amount to an official
avowal of Germany’s intention to execute the Pangerman plan. The phrases
of the Imperial Chancellor leave no room for ambiguity.

“After the war Poland will no longer be the Poland out of which the
Russian usurers have been cleared.... No. Never again must Russia be able
to march her armies to the defenceless frontier of East Prussia, nay,
of West Prussia (_thunders of applause_). Just as little is it to be
supposed that in the West we shall give up the lands where our people’s
blood has flowed, unless we receive solid guarantees for the future. We
mean to create solid guarantees in order that Belgium should not become a
vassal State of England and France, that it should not be turned into an
outwork against Germany from the military as well as the economic point
of view.” (_Loud applause._) (Quoted by _Le Temps_, April 8th, 1916.)

The Imperial Chancellor could not assert more categorically the
territorial claims of Germany on the East and on the West. As for the
claims towards the South and South-East, consequent upon Germany’s
seizure of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Turkey, Herr von
Bethmann-Hollweg made no allusion to them. His silence is intelligible.
In the first place, it was too much to expect that the Imperial
Chancellor should make a clean breast of the burglaries which Germany
has committed on the territories of her own Allies; in the second place,
Berlin affects to consider these forcible acquisitions to the South and
South-East as permanent and therefore beyond the reach of discussion.

Moreover, Deputy Spahn, leader of the Centre, who on April 5th, 1914, and
again on December 11th, 1915, took on himself to reply to the Chancellor
and to say outright what the exigencies of office obliged that gentleman
only to hint at, left no doubt as to Germany’s intentions with regard to
Central Europe. “We must,” said Herr Spahn, “bring about a lasting union
with Austria-Hungary. We must have at our command territories larger than
the German Empire. This war, which has been forced upon us, must secure
for us a position of world-wide power.” (See _Le Temps_, April 7th, 1916.)

Thus irrefragable proofs, both material and moral, combine to
demonstrate, beyond a shadow of doubt, that Germany made and continues to
wage the war for the purpose of carrying out the Pangerman plan which she
elaborated from 1895 to 1911.

II.

_Nine-tenths of the Pangerman plan of 1911 having been for the moment
achieved, the Allies can avail themselves of this fact as evidence to
counteract speedily and everywhere, the effects of the German propaganda,
and to prove to the civilized world the legitimacy and the necessity of
their military action against Prussianized Germany._

Starting from the practical proofs and the German declarations, both of
them indisputable, which we have just set forth, the propaganda of the
Allies should be able speedily to demonstrate to neutrals the absolute
falsehood of the German allegations. Hence it should prove that:

1º. Germany made the war, after very long premeditation, solely for the
sake of executing the Pangerman plan of 1895-1911, the aim of which is
to effect formidable conquests and to subject in Europe and Turkey 127
millions of non-Germans to the yoke of 77 millions of Germans (see p. 15).

2º. If the war is prolonged, it is only because Germany has not renounced
her plan of universal domination.

3º. In claiming to carry out her scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf,” Germany by no means aims at securing for the world that freedom
of the seas which, according to her, has been usurped by England; on the
contrary, the intention of the Berlin government is, by means of the
inevitable consequences of the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” scheme, to
get possession of all the strategical points necessary to ensure the
command of the sea all over the world (see p. 106).

4º. In virtue of these consequences, the accomplishment of the “Hamburg
to the Persian Gulf” scheme would directly threaten the independence of
all the civilized States in the world, especially of Japan, the States of
South America, and the United States.

5º. No comparison is possible between the violation of Belgian neutrality
by Germany and the Allies’ occupation of Salonika.

The Allies did not go to Greece to take possession of the country, as
the Germans did to Belgium. The Allies went to Greece to assist their
ally Serbia, which, moreover, was the ally of Greece, and to oppose the
spoliation of Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, and Turkey, by Germany.
The treaties which give Turkey, France, England, and Russia the right
of protecting the Hellenic constitution, greatly endangered by German
influences at Athens, are sufficient to justify, on the ground of
international law, the presence of the Allies in Greece. But it is
necessary, further, to state clearly that they are there in virtue of a
still higher right, that of safeguarding the collective liberty of the
nations. A comparison will enable us to appreciate this point of view,
the statement of which is perhaps novel. According to the civil law,
private property is inviolable. But if any man, passing a garden which
the right of private property forbids him to enter, sees on the other
side of the garden a ruffian in the act of murdering a person for the
purpose of robbing him, he not only has a moral right, but is in duty
bound to cross the garden to help his fellow who is in danger of his
life. There is not a court of justice in the world that would blame the
worthy and courageous citizen for having violated the rights of private
property in succouring his fellow man. But the Allies went to Salonika
with exactly the same intention. They have passed through Greece in order
to seize by the throat the Pangerman ruffian who is violently robbing
Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, and Turkey; who is destroying by millions
in these countries the Antigermanic civil populations; who, shrinking
from no crimes, however heinous, claims to lay hands on riches untold,
and to secure his illgotten gains by capturing the whole region from
Vienna to the Persian Gulf, which would furnish Germany with the means of
maintaining her world-wide dominion (see p. 106).

Now, as my readers have been able to see for themselves, there is, by
reason of the temporary success of the Pangerman plot, abundance of
unimpeachable arguments, numerical, geographical, ethnographical, in
support of these conclusions. These irrefragable arguments are therefore
calculated to make the greatest impression on neutrals, because they
are of a nature to appeal to their higher feelings and at the same
time to show how their own interests are jeopardized. If the Allied
propaganda is once co-ordinated and fortified by these arguments, set
forth methodically, the moral, economic, and military effects, which
the German propaganda has undoubtedly produced to the advantage of
Germany, would soon be annulled, and the Allies would justly reap similar
advantages, which would hasten the victory.

III.

_Henceforth the Allies and the neutral states must bear constantly in
mind not only Germany’s present gains on the East and on the West, but
also her Pangerman gains as a whole._

The accompanying map furnishes the justification of this conclusion. It
is obvious that the German gains on the West and the East, important
as they are, are relatively small by comparison with the enormous
seizures which Germany has effected at the expense of Austria-Hungary,
of half the Balkans, and of Turkey. We must fully understand that these
countries, especially Austria-Hungary, though they are allies of Germany,
are nevertheless as truly under the German heel as Belgium, Poland, or
the invaded departments of France. There is therefore good ground for
making no distinction between the Pangerman gains achieved by Germany
at the cost of her open enemies (France and Russia) and those which the
Government of Berlin has treacherously effected at the expense of her own
allies, like Austria-Hungary.

What the Allies and the neutral states have to consider is the Pangerman
gains taken as a whole, in order to discriminate those which are
calculated to upset the balance of power in the world, and consequently
to establish German supremacy.

[Illustration: THE PANGERMAN GAINS AT THE BEGINNING OF 1916.]

Now it is certain that if Germany were to give up her gains in the East
and the West, while maintaining her seizures in the South and South-East,
her power would at that moment be formidably increased as compared with
what it was before the war. That, therefore, would be an indisputable
and enormous victory for Pangermanism. The sketch map, inserted below,
represents this truth in a graphic form. From Berlin radiate the lines on
which are stretched the threads of that immense spider’s web which covers
the whole of the enormous Pangerman gains achieved by Germany in the
course of the war. These gains she has been able to effect by means of

1º. The very skilful political turn which she has adroitly given to her
military operations.

2º. The ignorance of the Pangerman plan among the Allies. The knowledge
of it would in fact have suggested to them from the very beginning of
the campaign the need of intervening through Salonika and the south of
Hungary, which would have destroyed the chief part of the German plan by
rendering impossible the junction of the Central Empires with Bulgaria
and Turkey.

IV.

_The temporary achievement, almost in its entirety, of the Pangerman
scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” proves that the complete
victory of the Allies is necessary for the freedom of the world._

As it is no longer possible to question either the reality or the
extent of the plan of universal domination pursued by the Germans, it
follows that all civilized States are undoubtedly concerned in the
defeat of Prussianized Germany, since a German victory would have a most
detrimental effect on their interests. Accordingly, the Neutral States
whose independence would be especially threatened by the accomplishment
of the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” scheme, have a really vital interest
in the continuance of the war by the Allies till a complete victory
crowns their arms. Such a decisive victory is a necessity not only for
Europe, but for the whole world, since the achievement of the “Hamburg
to the Persian Gulf” scheme would have world-wide consequences (see p.
107). That victory should have for its main object to deliver the world
from the Pangerman peril, and therefore to prevent any future outbreak of
the intolerable ambition of the Hohenzollerns. The victory of the Allies
involves a pledge to destroy the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” project,
which forms the indispensable but sufficient basis of the whole Pangerman
plan.

_The plan of slavery pursued by Germany is now so manifest that neutrals
or Germanophile groups are henceforth morally responsible for their
sentiments before the civilized world._

The neutrals who, in the first part of the war, displayed sympathy for
Germany, were excusable because they were deceived; but now they are in
a different position. The facts are patent. It is no longer possible for
anyone to see in Prussianized Germany anything but a ferocious burglar
and assassin practising his trade of robbery and murder at the expense
of the whole commonwealth of nations. In the fine phrase of M. Paul
Hyacinthe Loyson, Can neutrals be neutral in the face of crime? Clearly
not. As the _Daily Telegraph_ said very justly: “_Those who refuse to
occupy a vacant seat at the Round Table of chivalry will have to render
an account at the judgment bar of Humanity._” As matters now stand, in
face of the crimes committed by the “miscreants of Central Europe”—the
phrase is that of the Dutchman M. Schroeder—neutrals cannot support
Germany in any way without rendering themselves her accomplices.

This truth is made so manifest by the course of events that already a
change is coming over two neutral countries, which had been thought
Germanophile. Spanish opinion, a part of which had long been deceived by
the German propaganda, is coming round more and more. Sweden, which the
pressure and the audacious temptations of Berlin all but plunged into
the strife, to the great benefit of Pangermany, is now anxious not to
separate her cause from that of civilization; her responsible leaders
have just proclaimed that Sweden will maintain a strict neutrality.

VI.

_The declarations of the Allies, the accomplishment of the “Hamburg to
the Persian Gulf” scheme, and the question of Austria-Hungary._

In receiving the French deputies in London, on April 11th, 1916, Mr.
Asquith declared: “I have said already in November that we would not
sheathe the sword till the military domination of Prussia has been
destroyed once and for all. In this struggle we are the champions not
only of the rights of treaties but of the independence and the free
development of the weaker countries.” (See _L’Œuvre_, April 12th, 1916.)

Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with a correspondent of the _Daily News_
of Chicago affirmed: “We and our Allies are fighting for a free Europe,
an Europe freed not only from the domination of one nation by another,
but also from a hectoring diplomacy, from the danger of war, etc. The
Allies cannot tolerate any peace which would leave the wrongs done by
this war unrighted. We desire a peace that will do justice to all.”
(Quoted by _Le Temps_, May 17th, 1916.)

M. Sazonoff, speaking in the name of Russia, said: “Our victory must
be absolute. The Allies will continue to fight till mankind is rid of
Prussianism.” (Quoted by _Le Temps_, February 27th, 1916.)

At Nancy, on May 13th, 1916, M. Poincaré declared: “France will not
surrender her sons to the danger of fresh aggressions. We do not wish the
Central Empires to offer us peace, we wish that they should ask it of us;
we will not submit to their conditions, we will impose ours on them; we
do not want a peace that would leave Imperial Germany free to begin the
war again and to hang a sword for ever over the head of Europe; we want a
peace which shall receive at the hands of Justice, restored to her own,
solid guarantees of permanence and stability. So long as that peace is
not assured to us, so long as our enemies shall not confess themselves
vanquished, we shall not cease to fight.” (Quoted by _Le Temps_, May
15th, 1916.)

On May 22nd, 1916, in replying to the members of the Russian Duma, M. A.
Briand, President of the French Council, similarly declared:—

“I have said, and I repeat, while rivers of blood are flowing, while our
soldiers are sacrificing their lives with such forgetfulness of self,
the word peace is a sacrilege, if it means that the aggressor will not
be punished, and if tomorrow Europe shall run the risk of being handed
over once more to the humours and the caprices of a military caste
bloated with pride and athirst for power. It would be a dishonour to the
Allies. What answer should we have to make if tomorrow, after having
concluded such a peace, our countries were again swept into the frenzy of
armaments? What would the generations to come say if we were to commit
such a folly, and if we let slip the opportunity which now presents
itself of establishing a lasting peace on a solid basis? Peace will
result from the victory of the Allies, it can result from nothing but our
victory.” (See _Le Temps_, May 24th, 1916.)

From all these declarations of the Allies two fundamental ideas stand
clearly out:—

Prussian militarism must be destroyed;

The nationalities of Europe must be liberated from the Prussian
yoke.

But, as we have proved, the accomplishment of the “Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf” scheme has two essential objects:—

A formidable extension of Prussian militarism, which would have
at its disposal an army of 15 to 21 million men (see p. 91);

The enslavement to Germany of all the non-German nationalities
lying between the south of Saxony and the Persian Gulf.

The objects of the war pursued by the Allies and those of the government
of William II. are therefore fundamentally opposed to each other. This
opposition has been by implication excellently stated by M. Marcel
Cachin, Socialist deputy, in an article which appeared in _L’Humanité_,
of May 9th, 1916, under the title “Central Europe.”

“The general plan of our enemies can be clearly defined. In case they
were victorious, they would establish in the heart of Europe a formidable
power under the supremacy of Germany, a power which, with the annexations
avowedly aimed at, would comprise more than 130 millions of inhabitants.

“It needs no big words to show the danger which the whole of Europe
would run were such a design executed. It would be an eternal menace
to our country. No one can for a moment doubt that so long as the
existing political systems of Germany and Austria endure, such a
monstrous combination would be a permanent danger against which we should
constantly be obliged to be on our guard. And as for the Slav populations
reduced again to slavery, as for the Czechs, the Poles, the Yougo-Slavs,
the Serbians, they would naturally think of nothing but of revenge in
order to escape from serfdom and recover their national rights, which had
been trampled under foot. Were such a brutal unification as is summed up
in _Mitteleuropa_ to be unfortunately accomplished by fire and sword, we
might talk of peace after the storm, but it would be talk in vain; it
would be war again, fatal war.”

There spoke sound sense. It is clear that to have done once for all with
Prussian militarism is the only way open to the Allies to procure a
reasonable guarantee that so atrocious a war shall never be waged again,
and that millions of men shall not once more be sacrificed to the Moloch
of Pangermanism. Hence the official declarations of the Allies, quoted
above, are not the product of blind obduracy, as the German propaganda
would make some neutrals believe. In view of the formidable plan of
universal domination which the Germans still cling to, the seeming
obduracy of the Allies is on their part the highest wisdom.

VII.

_The question of Austria-Hungary, being the crucial point of the whole
problem to be solved after the war, may become the common ground on
which all common efforts should be concentrated, not only by the present
Allies, but also by the still neutral States which are virtually
threatened by the accomplishment of the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf”
scheme._

It is probable that Prussian militarism would have been already
destroyed, or on the point of being so, if in the first part of the war
the leaders of the Allied countries had not committed the three capital
mistakes which to-day are generally acknowledged—the Balkan policy of
1915, the Dardanelles, the delay in sending reinforcements to Serbia.

It is evident that these three calamitous mistakes have entailed a
considerable prolongation of the struggle and allowed Germany to build up
the immense fortress which extends from Dunkirk on the north to Egypt on
the south, and from the south of Riga to Bagdad (see the map on p. 72).
In order to overthrow the mighty walls of this formidable fortress, the
Allies must consent to sacrifices much greater and more prolonged than
would have been necessary if the mistakes now generally acknowledged
had not been committed. These sacrifices the Allied peoples accept with
a devotion and heroism which will win the imperishable admiration of
posterity. But just because the faults committed have lengthened the
duration of the struggle, the leaders of the Allied countries are in
duty bound to do everything they can to accelerate a complete victory.
That victory would be considerably hastened by the accession of the
forces, whether economic or military, of the still neutral countries
which, though they are even yet not fully aware of it, would be directly
endangered by the success of the Pangerman plan.

I have shown on p. 219 how a systematic propaganda of the Allies, taking
as its text the temporary accomplishment of the Pangerman plot, might
speedily demonstrate to neutrals the falsehood of the German sophistries
by which they have been cajoled. The same propaganda should have for
its second object to convince these neutrals that they have as much to
gain as the Allies by the destruction of Prussian militarism and of
the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” project. If once this were clearly
demonstrated it would be both legitimate and possible to request of these
neutrals that they should contribute, in the measure of their power, to
the common task of saving the civilization of the world.

In order rapidly to secure practical results from a convincing
propaganda, it is necessary to define very clearly what in the vast
welter of the present struggle is the point of vital interest common to
all the States of the World. As I have shown in the course of this book,
what would provide Germany with the means of establishing her universal
dominion would be the accomplishment, whether direct, or indirect, of
her scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.” On the other hand, I
believe I have demonstrated that to prevent the accomplishment of that
scheme it is enough, but it is necessary, that the Latin and Slav peoples
of Austria-Hungary should be freed, once for all, from the yoke which
Germany has imposed on them through the opportunity given her by the
war. For if the majority of these peoples were to be combined as a State
in place of Austria-Hungary, probably in a federal form, there would
at once be set up in Central Europe an immovable barrier which would
ensure the world against any revival of Pangerman aggression (see the map
on p. 43). On the other hand, if the independence of the Slav peoples
of Austria-Hungary were not secured against Berlin, the extension of
Prussian militarism to the Balkans and Turkey would be inevitable; the
Allied peoples would have made all their unheard-of sacrifices in vain,
and the struggle against Prussianism would be bound to continue.

[Illustration: EUROPEAN STATES INTERESTED IN THE SOLUTION OF THE
AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN QUESTION.]

From these considerations it follows that the question of
Austria-Hungary, just because its solution implies the downfall of the
“Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” castle-in-the-air, constitutes the crucial
point not only of the European problem, but of the whole problem which
the Pangerman plan of universal domination raises for all civilized
States. Consequently the solution of the question of Austria-Hungary, on
the basis of the principle of nationalities, forms the bond of common
interest not only between the belligerent Allies but also between all the
still neutral States of the world who are threatened in any degree by the
accomplishment of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.”

The annexed maps show clearly the States of the world for which the
solution of the question of Austria-Hungary has an interest greater or
less in degree but substantially identical.

It is clear that if Germany could keep her hold permanently on
Austria-Hungary, Russia would be constantly threatened. In consequence
of the extension of Prussian militarism which would result therefrom,
England would be forced to continue to maintain the formidable armaments
which she has accepted only as a temporary measure. As for France, no
restoration of Alsace-Lorraine could be lasting, if the vassal regiments
of Austria-Hungary should give the government of Berlin, after a brief
breathing-space, the power to wrench again from France the provinces
which had been temporarily ceded. Belgium would be threatened for the
same reason. As for Italy, German supremacy over Central Europe would
be the end of all Italian hopes on the Adriatic, and of all Italian
expansion over the Eastern Mediterranean. As for Serbia and Montenegro,
that dominion would be a sentence of death without appeal. For Portugal,
it would imply the loss of her territories beyond the sea in virtue of
the consequences which would follow the achievement of the plan “from
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.”

But countries still neutral, such as Greece, Roumania[6], Holland, and
Switzerland, at which the Pangerman musket is levelled point-blank,
ought also to be convinced that their most solid interests, in complete
harmony with their moral obligations to the cause of civilization, make
it their duty to lend the Allies all the support they can, whether it be
moral, economic, or military.

[Illustration: THE STATES OF ASIA AND AMERICA, INTERESTED IN THE SOLUTION
OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN QUESTION.]

The second map shows the group of States in Asia and America which,
menaced by the world-wide consequences of the “Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf” scheme, have also a high and direct interest in the solution of the
Austro-Hungarian question. Japan is already helping the Allies notably,
but her assistance might be still ampler, more effective and more direct.
The strictest view of her interest should compel her to enlarge the scope
of her succour, since nothing but the total defeat of Germany in Europe
can prevent Japan from witnessing a long series of disturbances fomented
at her expense in the Chinese Empire (see p. 98). As I have already
shown (p. 105) many States in South America are directly aimed at by the
Pangerman plan of 1911. But that plan can never be really formidable
for these States, unless Germany should one day have at her disposal the
powerful resources which would accrue to her from the accomplishment
of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.” Chili, Argentina,
Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Colombia, Brazil, have all been the object
of preparatory Pangerman manœuvres. That warning ought to convince them
without delay that they have an undoubted interest in co-operating,
to some extent, in the common cause. They could do so, particularly
Argentina and Brazil, to good purpose in the economic sphere.

As for the United States, we have seen (p. 208) that the accomplishment
of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” would really jeopardize
their independence in the gravest manner. No doubt that point of view has
not yet been generally apprehended in the United States, but a propaganda
which could easily be carried on, since the arguments in its favour are
abundant, should serve to convince the Americans that in fighting on the
battlefields of Europe the Allied soldiers are really safeguarding the
future of the great American Republic. On the day when that conviction
becomes general, the Americans will not hesitate to lend the European
Allies such assistance of various sorts as must hasten the coming of
complete victory.

To recapitulate, a series of deductions, all based on acknowledged facts
and all easily verifiable, leads to the conclusion that the formidable
problem with which German aggression has confronted the civilized
world is summed up in the solution of the Austro-Hungarian question,
because that solution, which can be worked out without prejudice to the
legitimate interests of the German people (see Chapter VI § 111), is
the only means of putting an end to the Hohenzollern plan of universal
domination, founded on the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.”

But when the question of Austria-Hungary shall have been solved, the
problems peculiar to each of the Allies will by way of corollary be
solved also. And in general, by securing the independence of the
non-German peoples of Central Europe—a measure the justice of which is
indisputable—we shall effectually protect the world as a whole against
any future eruption of the intolerable Pangerman ambition.

FOOTNOTES

[1] At that date the designation Austria was comprehensive of what we now
call Austria-Hungary.

[2] This passage was written before Yuan-Shi-Kai’s death. _Translator’s
Note._

[3] A French translation of this work, by M. Maurice Millioud, of
Lausanne, has been published by the firm of Payot.

[4] He has published an excellent pamphlet with the significant title,
_The Liquidation of Austria-Hungary_. Felix Alcan, Paris.

[5] Since this was said, Roumania has joined the Entente Powers in the
war. _Translator’s Note._

[6] This passage was written before Roumania joined the Allies in the
war. _Translator’s Note._

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