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Title: England and the Orleans Monarchy
Author: Hall, John A.
Language: English
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[Illustration: _H.M. Louis Philippe, King of the French_
_1841_]
ENGLAND AND THE
BY
MAJOR JOHN HALL
AUTHOR OF "THE BOURBON RESTORATION"
"The history of the day before yesterday is the
least known, it may be said, the most forgotten,
by the public of to-day."
GUIZOT, _Mémoires_, viii. p. 515
WITH A PORTRAIT
LONDON
SMITH, ELDER & CO., 15 WATERLOO PLACE
1912
_All rights reserved_
PRINTED BY
WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED
LONDON AND BECCLES
TO
S. H.
PREFACE
In this volume the story is told of the first _entente cordiale_ and
of the circumstances which led to its disruption. The questions which
occupied the attention of the French and the British governments at
that period have now passed into the domain of history. The resentment
evoked by the Egyptian crisis of 1840 and the controversies raised by
the Spanish marriages has died away. The attitude towards the Liberal
and national movements in Europe, adopted, on the one side, by Louis
Philippe and M. Guizot and, on the other, by Lord Palmerston, can, at
this distance of time, be reviewed dispassionately. In the light of
the knowledge of to-day, the difficulties which beset the "Citizen
King" may be estimated, and the injustice of many of the attacks made
upon the policy of Palmerston can be demonstrated.
Researches in the diplomatic correspondence of the period, both in
London and in Paris, have enabled me to place in print, for the first
time, many documents bearing upon the part played by Talleyrand in
the Belgian question and upon the secret policy of Louis Philippe
in the same affair. In these pages some new light has, I venture to
think, been thrown upon the situation in Spain during the regencies
of Christina and Espartero, and during the early years of the
rule of Isabella. In connection, also, with Palmerston's Eastern
policy, certain facts, hitherto unpublished, are now presented for
consideration.
During the eighteen years covered by this volume the Whigs were, for
the greater part of the time, in office. Amidst the Russells, the
Greys, the Spencers and the other powerful Whig families Palmerston
was an interloper. Nor was he ever a Whig. In external affairs he
remained always a _Canningite_. Some of the worst miscalculations of
Louis Philippe and his ministers were due to their inability to grasp
the fact that the foreign policy of the Whigs was in the hands of
the most "un-Whiggish" of statesmen. The period was one of political
unrest, the precursor of great wars and revolutions. France was
disenchanted and profoundly dissatisfied with her "Citizen King." In
Germany and Italy Metternich still maintained his system, but there
were symptoms that the end of his long rule was fast approaching. In
Spain the transition from autocracy to constitutionalism coincided
with a fiercely disputed succession to the throne. Turkey, in the
words of Nicholas, was "the sick man of Europe."
J. H.
_Sept., 1912._
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
LOUIS PHILIPPE
PAGES
The Revolution of July, 1880--Louis Philippe--Louis
Philippe and the military democratic party--First
communications with the Sovereigns 1-13
CHAPTER II
THE POWERS AND THE CITIZEN KING
Effect of the Revolution of July in England--Character and
system of Metternich--The _chiffon de Carlsbad_--Metternich's
policy towards the Germanic Confederation and
Prussia--Hostility of Tsar Nicholas to the new _régime_ in
France--Revolution at Brussels--Talleyrand in London--France
proclaims the principle of non-intervention--The Duchesse de
Dino and the Comte de Montrond--Great Britain proposes that
the Belgian question be submitted to a conference--Molé and
Talleyrand--Change of government in France and England 14-39
CHAPTER III
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
The Whigs in office--Talleyrand insists upon the necessity
of establishing a good understanding with England--Palmerston's
distrust of the French Liberals--State of Europe--Revolution
at Warsaw--"The Frenchmen of the North"--Belgium declared
independent and neutral--Candidates for the Belgian
throne--Bresson and Ponsonby at Brussels--British government
will treat as a case for war the enthronement of a French
prince--Flahaut in London--Lawoëstine at Brussels--The
Duc de Nemours elected King of the Belgians--Critical
situation--Louis Philippe declines the throne for his
son--Proceedings of Bresson--Anger of Talleyrand--Casimir
Périer forms a government--War in Poland and insurrection
in the Papal States--The Austrians at Bologna--Leopold of
Saxe-Coburg--Dissatisfaction of the Belgians--Reluctance of
French government to see coercion applied to the Belgians--The
protocol of 18 articles accepted by Belgium, refused by
Holland--Leopold enthroned--Roussin at Lisbon--The Dutch invade
Belgium--French army enters Belgium--Palmerston's suspicions
of Talleyrand--Stockmar's suspicions of Palmerston--Excitement
in London--Talleyrand's warning--Why the French army
remained in Belgium--King Leopold's dilemma--The French
evacuate Belgium--Londonderry attacks Talleyrand in the
House of Lords--"_l'ordre règne à Varsovie_"--Palmerston's
despatch on the Polish question--The treaty of the 24
articles--The Fortress Convention--Talleyrand's advice--French
threaten King Leopold--Palmerston stands firm--Casimir
Périer gives way--Austrians re-occupy Bologna--The
French at Ancona--Palmerston exerts himself to avert a
rupture--Solution of the difficulty--Orloff's mission to the
Hague--Lamb furnishes Palmerston with a copy of Orloff's
secret instructions--Austria and Prussia ratify--Orloff in
London--Russia ratifies with certain reservations 40-117
CHAPTER IV
THE COERCION OF HOLLAND
The Reform Bill and the House of Lords--Death of Casimir
Périer--A Republican insurrection in Paris and a Royalist
rebellion in La Vendée--Death of the Duc de Reichstadt--The
Belgian treaty--Durham at St. Petersburg--Palmerston's
proposals to the Court of the Hague--Stockmar's advice to
Leopold--France and England resolved to coerce the King of
the Netherlands--The absolute Courts--London Conference
breaks up--Scene between Louis Philippe and M. Dupin--The
_Doctrinaires_--Broglie's conditions--The position in
England--The Tories--King William IV.--Granville's
warning--Attitude of the Northern Courts--The Convention
of October 22nd, 1832--Claim put forward by French
minister at Brussels--Siege of Antwerp--Sympathies of
the Tories with the Dutch--Proposal made to Prussia by
France and England--Capitulation of Antwerp--Convention
of May 21, 1833--Palmerston's skilful conduct of the
negotiations--Talleyrand 118-144
CHAPTER V
MEHEMET ALI
The Sultan Mahmud II.--The Greek insurrection--Sultan
invokes the aid of Mehemet Ali--Intervention of the Christian
Powers--Navarino--Russo-Turkish War--Mehemet Ali--Ibrahim
Pasha lays siege to Acre--Mahmud resolves to crush his
rebellious vassal--Defeat of Hussein Pasha--Stratford Canning
at Constantinople--Mahmud appeals to England for help--Battle
of Konieh--Muravieff at Constantinople--Russia offers help--The
policy of Russia towards Turkey--Ibrahim advancing--Sultan
accepts the aid of Russia--Mehemet Ali rejects the
Sultan's terms--Russian fleet in the Bosphorus--Roussin at
Constantinople--_Ultimatum_ of the Pasha--The Convention
of Kiutayeh--Anger of Nicholas--Why Mahmud surrendered
Adana--Ponsonby and Orloff at Constantinople--Treaty of
Unkiar-Skelessi--Great Britain and France protest--Meeting
of the two Emperors at Münchengrätz--Treaty of October 15,
1833--Secret treaty of September 18, 1833--Palmerston and
Broglie vainly endeavour to arouse the fears of Metternich
145-170
CHAPTER VI
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
Dom Miguel usurps the throne of Portugal--Dom Pedro
prepares to reconquer his daughter's kingdom--Ferdinand VII.
marries Maria Christina--The Salic Law of Spain repealed--Birth
of Isabella--Stratford Canning at Madrid--Napier destroys the
Miguelite fleet--Great Britain recognizes Maria II. as Queen
of Portugal--Death of Ferdinand VII.--France and England
acknowledge the sovereignty of Isabella--Don Carlos and Dom
Miguel--Negotiations in London--Quadruple Treaty--Capitulation
of the two Pretenders--Don Carlos returns to Spain--Scope
of Quadruple Treaty enlarged--Palmerston's policy in the
Spanish question--Views and secret leanings of Louis
Philippe--Zumalacárregui--The Whigs dismissed--Wellington
at the Foreign Office--Eliot sent to Spain--Louis Philippe
refuses to take part in the negotiation--Palmerston again
at the Foreign Office--The Queen Regent appeals to France
for help--The Spanish legion--The Decree of Durango--Louis
Philippe refuses to protest--French intrigues at Lisbon--The
_Moderados_ and the _Progressistas_--Advice given to Christina
by Mr. Villiers--No vigilance maintained on the French
frontier--Mendizabal and the British minister--The secret
divulged--Threatening language of the Duc de Broglie--British
government declines Mendizabal's proposal--Palmerston's
counter-proposal--Plans of M. Thiers--Talleyrand and
England--Death of Zumalacárregui--Palmerston proposes that the
French should enter Spain--Mendizabal dismissed--Military
revolution in Spain--Scene at the Palace of La
Granja--Resignation of Thiers--The "No mention" incident--Why
Don Carlos retreated from before Madrid--Dissensions among
the Carlists fomented by Villiers--Palmerston's suspicions of
Louis Philippe--Muñagorri--Reasons which compelled Maroto to
bring the war to an end--Soult--The Convention of Bergara--Don
Carlos driven across the frontier--Cabrera and España--The
Municipal Bill--Espartero--Christina and Espartero--Abdication
of Christina 171-218
CHAPTER VII
SULTAN AND PASHA
Efforts to prevent a renewal of the struggle between
the Sultan and the Pasha--Strained relations between Great
Britain and Russia--Wellington and the Dardanelles--Ponsonby
at Constantinople--Durham at St. Petersburg--M. Thiers--M. de
Lesseps--Secret negotiations--General Chrzanowski--The Pasha's
monopolies--Ponsonby negotiates a commercial treaty--Indian
government occupies Aden--Importance of the victories of
Mehemet Ali over the Wahabites--The Pasha announces his
intention of declaring his independence--Russia and the
Court of Teheran--The Shah lays siege to Herat--Palmerston
protests--Disavowal of Simonitch and Witkewitch--The general
situation in the East--Mahmud resolves on war--Policy
of Lord Palmerston--French government obtains a credit
of 10 millions of francs--Harmony of French and British
relations--Self-restraint of Mehemet Ali--Ibrahim defeats
the Turks at Nezib--Death of Mahmud and suspension of
hostilities--The Turkish fleet treacherously surrendered to
Mehemet Ali--Strange conduct of the French admiral--France
seeks to isolate Russia--The _Collective Note of July 27,
1839_--Satisfaction of Palmerston and uneasiness of the
French government--Conversation between Bulwer and Louis
Philippe--Palmerston does not share in the general illusion
respecting the military strength of the Pasha--Brunnow's
mission to London--The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi--France
scouts the Russian proposal--The French party in the
English Cabinet--Return of Brunnow--Palmerston's letter to
Sébastiani--Guizot in London--Thiers, President of the Council
and Minister for Foreign Affairs--Guizot's despatches--Thiers
mediates in the sulphur dispute--Remains of the Emperor to be
removed to France--Proceedings of "Bear" Ellice--Metternich
alarmed--Palmerston accepts the Austrian proposal--Attitude of
M. Thiers--M. Coste and the French agents at Constantinople
and Cairo--Princess Lieven in London--Palmerston tenders his
resignation--Insurrection in Syria--The Quadrilateral Treaty of
July 15, 1840--Palmerston informs Guizot of the treaty 219-278
CHAPTER VIII
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
Language of M. Thiers and Louis Philippe on learning of
the conclusion of the treaty--Warlike declamations of the
French press--Attitude of different parties in England--Thiers'
instructions to Guizot--The conference at the Château
d'Eu--Louis Philippe seeks to alarm Queen Victoria--Louis
Napoleon at Boulogne--Guizot at Windsor Castle--Leopold's
proposals--Ibrahim suppresses the insurrection in
Syria--Palmerston's despatch of August 31--The Sultan's
_ultimatum_--Movements of the British fleet--Threatening
language of M. de Pontois--The French armaments--Warlike
language of Louis Philippe and M. Thiers--Mehemet Ali invokes
the protection of France--Interview at Auteuil between Thiers
and Bulwer--Intrigues against Palmerston in London--A Cabinet
crisis impending--Why Lord John Russell "disappointed"
Greville--Meeting of the Cabinet of October 1--Bombardment of
Beyrout--Warlike excitement in Paris--Henry Reeve--Lord John
Russell calls a Cabinet for October 10--Two despatches from
Thiers--A Cabinet crisis averted--French government reported
to have designs upon the Balearic Islands--Melbourne writes
to King Leopold--Louis Philippe and M. Thiers--Resignation
of M. Thiers--Thiers' proceedings reviewed--M. Guizot's
plans--Palmerston's communications with Guizot--Successful
progress of the operations in Syria--Proposals to Mehemet
Ali--Napier's convention and his disavowal--Mehemet Ali
submits--The _firman_ of February 13, 1841--M. Guizot manœuvres
to bring back France into the Concert of Europe--Nicholas'
proposal--Palmerston's reply--Policy of M. Guizot--Bourqueney
and Palmerston--The Convention of the Straits drafted and
initialed--Mehemet Ali refuses to accept the _firman_ of
heredity--Ponsonby's advice to the Porte--Procrastinations of
the Porte--Mehemet Ali accepts the amended _firman_--Convention
of the Straits signed--Unsatisfactory character of the
criticisms passed upon Palmerston 279-330
CHAPTER IX
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
Aberdeen and Palmerston contrasted--Why Guizot would
not conclude the right of search treaty with Palmerston--The
Chamber refuses to ratify the slave trade treaty of November
20, 1841--Conspiracies in Paris against Espartero--The
question of Isabella's marriage--Designs imputed to
Louis Philippe by Bulwer--Insurrections in Spain--The
Spanish government demands the expulsion of Christina
from France--The Salvandy affair--Pageot's mission--Count
Toreno and Lord Cowley--Louis Philippe connives at the
Spanish plots--Insurrection at Barcelona--Conduct of
M. de Lesseps--Military revolution in Spain--Fall of
Espartero--Aberdeen alarmed--Queen Victoria at the Château
d'Eu--"The cordial understanding"--The Duc de Bordeaux in
Belgrave Square--Admiral Dupetit-Thouars in the Pacific--France
proclaims a protectorate over Tahiti--Mr. Pritchard--Queen
Pomare deposed and Tahiti annexed--Dupetit-Thouars
disavowed--The Prince de Joinville's pamphlet--The Tsar
Nicholas in London--France quarrels with Morocco--Imprisonment
and expulsion of Mr. Pritchard--Excitement in London--Guizot
and Aberdeen--Bombardment of Tangier--Violence of the press
in both countries--The Comte de Jarnac--The Pritchard
affair settled--France concludes peace with the Emperor of
Morocco--Louis Philippe at Windsor Castle--Condition of
Spain--The descendants of Philip V.--Bulwer and Bresson at
Madrid--Montpensier to marry the Infanta--Queen Victoria's
second visit to Eu--The compact with Louis Philippe--State
of affairs at Madrid--The _Memorandum of February 27,
1846_--Christina and Narvaez--The Queen-Mother entrusts to
Bulwer her proposal to the Duke of Saxe-Coburg--Aberdeen
reprimands Bulwer and informs M. Guizot of the negotiation--The
Whigs once more in office 331-380
CHAPTER X
THE SPANISH MARRIAGES
Lord Palmerston in Paris--Louis Philippe and M.
Guizot disconcerted by Christina's proposal to the
Coburgs--Palmerston's despatch of July 19, 1846--Bresson's
letter to Guizot of July 12--Anger of Louis Philippe--Bulwer
implores Palmerston to promote the Coburg marriage--Palmerston
puts forward Don Enrique--Effect at Madrid of the despatch
of July 19--The double marriage announced--Correspondence
between the French Queen and Queen Victoria--Guizot's
letter to Lord John Russell--Louis Philippe's letter to his
daughter--Queen Victoria's reply--Palmerston's protest founded
upon the renunciations at Utrecht--Attitude of the Northern
Courts--Palmerston's despatches of October 31, 1846, and
January 8, 1847--Debates in the French Chamber and the British
Parliament--Christina's conduct reviewed--Louis Philippe's
Bourbon policy--Why Louis Philippe broke the compact of
Eu--Palmerston's Spanish policy from 1834 to 1846--Weakness of
Aberdeen 381-405
CHAPTER XI
PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF '48
Annexation of Cracow--Political unrest in Europe--Charles
Albert and Pius IX.--Enthusiasm in Italy--Attitude of French
government--Revival of French and British rivalry--Guizot
sends a secret agent to Vienna--Metternich realizes
the danger in Italy--The Roman plot and occupation of
Ferrara--Palmerston's despatch of September 11, 1847--Minto's
mission--Prince Consort's _Memorandum_--The situation in
Switzerland--Sympathies of the absolute Courts with the
_Sonderbund_--Palmerston's attitude--Probable reason of
Morier's recall--Palmerston's despatch of October 29, 1847--The
French proposal--Palmerston's counter-proposal--Palmerston
master of the situation--Battle of Lucerne and dissolution of
the _Sonderbund_--Crafty designs imputed to Palmerston--Policy
of the Swiss Radicals--Stratford Canning at Berne--The absolute
Courts and France present the _identic note_--Haughty reply
of the Swiss Diet--Alarm of the absolute Courts--Coloredo
and Radowitz in Paris--Revolution in Paris, Berlin and
Vienna--Charles Albert in Lombardy--_Une revolution de
mépris_--Why the rupture of "the cordial understanding"
displeased the French middle-classes--Effect of M.
Guizot's _rapprochement_ with Austria--Palmerston and
Thiers--Palmerston's policy substantially the same as
Aberdeen's--Why "the cordial understanding" failed to justify
expectations 406-444
INDEX 445-452
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
CHAPTER I
LOUIS PHILIPPE
The spontaneous rising of the French people to expel their King,
Charles X., who had ventured to infringe the Constitution, aroused the
enthusiasm of Liberals all over Europe. But the real character of the
movement which brought about the downfall of the elder branch of the
Bourbons was, at the time, very imperfectly understood. It was not a
determination to preserve at all costs the parliamentary system which
animated the combatants in the "glorious days of July." "Long live the
Charter" was the watchword of the peaceful _bourgeois_. "Down with the
Bourbons" was the war cry of the men of the barricades.
Outside the limited circle of the old Royalist families the restored
monarchy had never been popular. Yet it was unquestionably the best
and freest form of government which the country had ever enjoyed. The
reason of the unpopularity of the Bourbons lay in the circumstances
which had attended their return to France. By the large majority
of Frenchmen their restoration was deeply resented, as one of the
humiliating conditions imposed upon their country by the allied
sovereigns, after Waterloo.
In respect to her frontiers, France in 1815 had been replaced in
the position which she had occupied in 1789. Seeing the expenditure
of blood and treasure which her wars had entailed upon Europe,
these terms cannot be regarded as onerous. Nevertheless, it is not
surprising that the treaties of 1815 should have been extremely
distasteful to her. They were conceived in a spirit of suspicion and
were directed mainly towards securing Europe from a fresh outbreak of
her aggressiveness. Nor were the barriers, by which it was hoped to
confine her within her boundaries, the only cause of her irritation.
Her vanity and love of military glory had been dangerously stimulated
by the Republican and Imperial wars, and it was a bitter blow to find
that, in the final settlement, France, alone of all the great Powers,
was to acquire no increase of territory. Vexation at these conditions
was not confined to Republicans and Bonapartists. Hatred for the
treaties of 1815 was the one political sentiment which Liberals and
Royalists possessed in common.
In 1830, there was no Bonapartist party, but a strong Bonapartist
spirit existed throughout the country. Veneration for the memory
of "the man"[1] constituted the whole political philosophy of many
thousands of Frenchmen. It was to the Bonapartist element that the
Liberal party owed its chief strength and influence. Notwithstanding
that the Liberals had opposed the Emperor during the Hundred Days,
and had insisted upon his abdication after Waterloo, their alliance
with the Bonapartists was cemented in the early days of the second
Restoration. A common hatred of the Bourbons was the bond of union
between them. In the Masonic and _Carbonari_ lodges the bolder spirits
of the two parties plotted together against the monarchy. When the
reigning dynasty should have been overthrown, the conspirators
proposed to proclaim the sovereignty of the people and to declare
once more the tricolour the national flag. Then, and not till then,
could France regain her "natural frontiers."[2] It was the practice of
these military democrats invariably to assert that the Bourbons were
responsible for all the misfortunes of 1814 and 1815. They believed,
or professed to believe, that the loss of territory, which France had
sustained, was the price which the Bourbons had agreed to pay for
their restoration. So long as a Bourbon was upon the throne Waterloo
must go unavenged and France must submit to be deprived of her natural
boundaries. It was this spirit which had animated the combatants in
the Revolution of July. Men who understood and cared nothing for
constitutional questions took up arms, believing that a victory over
Charles' guards would be a first defeat inflicted upon the allied
sovereigns, and that a successful invasion of the Tuileries would be
followed by a great national war upon the Rhine.[3]
The enthronement of the Duc d'Orléans was the strange termination of a
revolution, carried out mainly by men who were animated by sentiments
such as these. Even on the evening of the third day's fighting, when
the Royal troops had been driven from Paris and when the people were
in possession of the Tuileries, the Duke's name was still unmentioned.
Most of the Liberal deputies were disposed to make their peace with
their lawful king, and to be satisfied with the withdrawal of the
unconstitutional ordinances and with the dismissal of the Prince de
Polignac and his colleagues in the government. The extreme party,
the old soldiers, the members of the former _Carbonari_ lodges, the
students of the _polytechnique_, the men who had borne the burden
of the struggle, were not prepared with an immediate solution of the
question. Beyond declaring that they would take up arms again, rather
than accept any concessions at the hands of Charles X. or the Dauphin,
they had no definite plan to bring forward. Louis Philippe was to owe
his crown to a skilfully worded placard, the work of Laffitte the
Liberal banker, and of Thiers, a clever young journalist, which on the
following morning, greeted the Parisians at every street corner. In
this proclamation the enthronement of the Duc d'Orléans was held up
as the one solution which would restore public order without further
bloodshed. A republic, it was declared, would entail both internal
strife and war abroad, whilst Charles X., the monarch who had shed
the blood of the people, must be adjudged unworthy to retain his
crown. The Duc d'Orléans, on the other hand, was a prince devoted to
the cause of the Revolution, who had never borne arms against his own
countrymen, but who, on the contrary, had worn the tricolour at Valmy
and at Jemappes. Let the people call for him and the Duke would come
forward, content to accept the Charter and his crown from their hands.
The prospect of concluding the revolution in this fashion was eagerly
adopted by the Liberal deputies and by the middle classes generally.
But the more turbulent members of the so-called Hotel de Ville
party indignantly repudiated the notion of allowing their glorious
achievements to culminate in the enthronement of "another Bourbon."
The allusions in Laffitte's and Thiers' placard to the tricolour, to
Valmy, and to the crown as the free gift of the people, left them
cold. Nor were they to be mollified by a second proclamation, in which
it was boldly asserted that the Duc d'Orléans was a Valois, not
a Bourbon.[4] No sooner was the Duke put forward as a candidate for
the throne, than the demagogues began to exhort the people to call
upon La Fayette to assume the presidency of the republic. The old man
was, as he had been forty years before, in command of the national
guards, and was once more the hero of the mob. He was, however, little
disposed to undertake the responsibility which his ultra-democratic
friends wished him to assume. Under these circumstances, Rémusat and
other of his colleagues in the Chamber, assisted, it is said, by Mr.
Rives, the American minister, had little difficulty in persuading him
that, were he to play the leading part in founding a Liberal monarchy,
it would be accounted, throughout the Old and the New World, the most
honourable act of his declining years. Accordingly, on the following
day, July 31, 1830, he agreed to receive the Duc d'Orléans, the
Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, at the Hotel de Ville. Upon his
arrival he led him to the window and, placing the tricolour in his
hands, embraced him warmly before the dense crowd upon the Place de
Grève. When this ceremony had been completed the elect of the people
rode back in triumph to the Palais Royal, exchanging enthusiastic
handgrips with citizens along the road. For the moment, even the most
truculent democrats were willing to accept La Fayette's assurance that
in an Orleans monarchy they had found "the best of republics." Ten
days later, on August 9, 1830, the Duke having sworn fidelity to the
Charter was formally invested with sovereign power in the Chamber of
Deputies, under the title of Louis Philippe, _King of the French_.
At the time of the Revolution of July Louis Philippe was in his
fifty-third year. He was the son of _Egalité_, and had been educated
according to the Liberal views of his father and of Madame de Genlis.
Although in 1794 he had deserted from the national armies along
with Dumouriez, his commander-in-chief, he could assert truthfully
that, throughout the long years of his subsequent exile, he had never
turned his arms against his own country. During his wanderings in
America and upon the continent, he had mixed with men of all sorts
and all conditions. In Switzerland, indeed, he is said to have earned
a livelihood by teaching in a school. In 1814 the idea of conferring
the crown upon him, rather than upon Louis XVIII., had found favour in
some quarters. But although, from this time forward, there had always
existed some kind of a party, to which the name of Orleanist might
have been applied, the Duke himself would appear to have been innocent
of any participation in the proceedings of his adherents.
After Waterloo the plan of substituting him for Louis XVIII. had
an increased number of supporters. Louis, who had never liked him,
began from this moment to treat him with great suspicion. Both in
England, where he continued to reside in a kind of disgrace till 1817,
and at the Palais Royal, after his return to France, he was beset
constantly by the spies of the police.[5] Charles X. had no share in
his brother's dislike and distrust of the Duc d'Orléans, and one of
his first acts, after his accession, was to raise him to the rank of
a Royal Highness. But, notwithstanding that, from the beginning of
the new reign, more cordial relations were established between the
Tuileries and the Palais Royal, there was never any real intimacy
between the King and his sagacious relative. Charles was a man of
limited intelligence and a bigot in religion. Politically he had not
changed since the time when, as the Comte d'Artois, he had emigrated
to Coblentz, and had called upon the Powers to assist him with men
and with money to re-establish the old _régime_ in France. The Duc
d'Orléans, on the other hand, was a well-informed man of the world, a
Liberal, who was neither a friend nor an enemy of the clergy.
It is clear that during the whole period of the Restoration the Duc
d'Orléans was at pains to impress upon the public how greatly he
differed in all matters, both great and small, from his cousins of
the elder branch. When the return of Bonaparte from Elba compelled
the Royal family to fly once more from France, he had not joined
Louis XVIII. at Ghent, but had gone to England and had resided,
throughout the Hundred Days, in complete retirement at Twickenham.
Moreover, before quitting Lille he had addressed a farewell letter to
the general officers serving under him, bidding them act, after his
departure, in whatever manner might appear to them the most calculated
to promote the highest interests of their country--an injunction
which aroused as much indignation among the "pure Royalists" as it
elicited commendation from the majority of Frenchmen. As they grew up,
his sons, the young princes, were educated like ordinary citizens at
the _Lycée_, and at the Palais Royal a simplicity was observed which
contrasted strongly with the ceremony maintained, on all occasions,
at the Court and in the apartments of the Dauphin. Nor could it fail
to attract remark that men whose fidelity to the reigning dynasty was
doubtful and prominent members of the Opposition were his habitual
guests.
But, although there may be some circumstances of a suspicious nature
in Louis Philippe's conduct under the Restoration, it is improbable
that he ever seriously harboured any thoughts of usurping the crown.
His general behaviour is capable of a different explanation. He had
tasted the bitterness of poverty, and appears to have been haunted
constantly by the dread that his children might, some day, be reduced
to the straits under which he had suffered in the early years of
his exile. He was too clear-sighted a man not to perceive that the
restored monarchy had no place in the affections of the people, and
that the first serious mistake on Charles' part would be the signal
for his overthrow. It became, therefore, his policy to dissociate
himself, as far as possible, from the Court in the hope that, should
the Bourbons be expelled, he might escape from the necessity of
sharing in their misfortunes. It is scarcely doubtful that the true
motives of his somewhat equivocal attitude, at this period, should be
ascribed to a keen desire to be allowed to remain in possession of his
great estates, whatever political changes might take place, rather
than to any deep-laid schemes of personal aggrandizement.[6]
At the time of the promulgation of the famous ordinances of July the
Duke was with his family at Neuilly. For the past four months he had
viewed Charles' obstinate determination to retain his ministers,
in defiance of the Chamber, with alarm. Nevertheless, the King's
_coup d'état_ seems to have taken him completely by surprise. His
chief endeavour, from the moment that it became apparent that the
execution of the ordinances would lead to serious trouble, was to
avoid committing himself with either party. Between Monday, July 26,
the day on which the decrees were published in the _Moniteur_, and
Friday, July 30, when the success of the revolution was assured,
he would not appear to have had any communication with either the
Court at Saint-Cloud or the Liberal deputies in Paris. Indeed, on
Wednesday, July 28, when the fighting in the streets assumed a very
serious character, he secretly withdrew from Neuilly and went into
hiding at Le Raincy, another of his residences near Paris. Thiers, in
consequence, when he visited Neuilly on Friday morning, was unable to
see him, and it was only at last, after repeated messages had been
sent him by Laffitte and other supporters, that he ventured to emerge
from his retreat and to return secretly, and in the dead of night,
to the Palais Royal. It is said that in arriving at this decision he
was greatly influenced by his sister, henceforward to be generally
known as Madame Adelaïde, to whose opinion in political matters he
was accustomed to attach greater weight than to that of his wife, the
sweet-natured and dignified Marie Amélie.
After a few hours in Paris any doubts and hesitations with which he
may have been beset vanished completely. The old King was in full
flight from Saint Cloud, his guards even were demoralized and were
deserting him. From country towns came the news that the tricolour had
been hoisted, amidst the greatest enthusiasm, and that the revolution
was spreading rapidly. When, on that Saturday afternoon, the Duc
d'Orléans mounted his horse to meet La Fayette at the Hotel de Ville,
he was fully determined to seize the crown, which his unfortunate
kinsman had let fall into the gutter.
Legitimist historians and others, professing to write in a more
impartial spirit, have commented most adversely upon his conduct in
this, the supreme crisis of his eventful life. It must, however, be
admitted by everybody who studies the question with an open mind
that France was irrevocably resolved to expel the Bourbons. It has,
nevertheless, been contended that, had the Duc d'Orléans consented to
undertake the regency, no serious objections would have been made to
the enthronement of the Duc de Bordeaux,[7] in whose favour Charles
and the Dauphin had abdicated on August 2. Unfortunately, however,
it was notorious that this young prince was the pupil of the Jesuits,
and the prejudice against him, on that account, was unquestionably
very strong. Without doubt, had the plan been given a trial, it must
have speedily ended in disaster. In addition to the many and great
difficulties with which Louis Philippe was confronted, during the
whole course of his reign, he must, as Regent, have been perpetually
exposed to the suspicion of acting under the inspiration of the young
King's family, and that suspicion would quickly have proved fatal.
There were, therefore, but two alternatives, either a republic or
an Orleans monarchy. Seeing the dispositions of the continental
sovereigns and the condition of France in 1830, the proclamation of
a republic, if it had not entailed war, must certainly have produced
anarchy and brought untold misery upon the people. On the other hand,
the statutory monarchy, at the time when it was set up, had the
support of the best elements of the nation, and Louis Philippe, by
accepting the crown, can justly claim to have preserved France from
the imminent danger of civil and foreign war.
Louis Philippe was a man of more than usual courage. In his early life
he had displayed it at a critical moment upon the battlefield. In his
middle age, in his famous progress to the Hotel de Ville, he had never
hesitated to ride, without a military escort, through an armed and
hostile mob. No king has probably been the object of attacks upon his
life of so determined a character as Louis Philippe. The ever-present
danger of assassination is said to have broken down the nerves of
some of the boldest of men. But, throughout his reign, the "citizen
king" always confronted this particular peril, to which he was so
constantly exposed, with a serene and lofty courage. In the face of
political difficulties, however, he was as timid as he was brave when
it was a question of meeting physical danger. His attitude towards the
Jacobinical spirit, which the "glorious days of July" had so greatly
stimulated, is characteristic of his weakness in this respect. It is
not improbable that in his heart he was secretly convinced of the
ultimate triumph of revolutionary principles. Be that as it may, he
appears to have shrunk from attacking Jacobinism openly and boldly.
He seems to have looked upon it as a most dangerous monster which it
was advisable to coax and to humour, in the hope that, by careful
handling, it might be temporarily subjugated.[8]
In the days which intervened between La Fayette's acceptation of
him and his actual enthronement, he lost no opportunity of putting
his theory into practice. Youthful Republicans were admitted into
his presence, and he submitted to be questioned about his political
principles.[9] It is probable that in some of these discussions he was
induced to promise far more than he afterwards found it convenient,
or even possible, to perform. On many occasions afterwards he was,
in consequence, reminded of a more or less mythical _Hotel de Ville
Programme_, with the conditions of which he was accused of having
broken faith. But of all the difficulties by which he was confronted
in these early days, the demand for a vigorous foreign policy was
by far the most serious to deal with. The convinced democrats, who
had been so bitterly opposed to his enthronement, were now the most
vehement in insisting upon the adoption of a spirited course of
action abroad. Without doubt, these men represented only a small
minority of the nation, but, when they talked of military glory and
of "natural frontiers," they appealed to sentiments which a "king
of the barricades" could not afford to disregard. It was a matter
of indifference to the demagogues of the party that the flower of
the army was in Algeria, that many of the regiments at home were
demoralized by their recent collision with the people, and that France
had neither allies nor financial credit. The war for which they
clamoured was to be conducted upon strictly revolutionary principles.
"Peace with the nations, war with the kings," the old cry was to be
raised once more under cover of which, in former days, France had
acquired her coveted boundaries.
Apart from the question as to whether the conditions of France and of
Europe, in 1830, were such as to render it probable that a repetition
of the methods of 1793 would be attended with success, the fact that
the first shot fired on the frontiers would be the signal for the
opening of the floodgates of revolutionary propagandism, made it of
vital moment to Louis Philippe to avert the outbreak of hostilities.
In a war, having for its loudly proclaimed object the destruction
of kings, what hope could he have that his throne, resting upon new
and untried foundations, would escape the general ruin? But although
he was resolved to use every effort to maintain the peace, it was
thoroughly in accordance with his habitual practice to cajole and
flatter the faction which desired war. Accordingly, in his replies
to the numerous patriotic addresses which were presented to him,
he would dilate in fulsome language upon the heroic conduct of the
citizens in the recent street fighting. All his speeches and his
public utterances teemed with references to Valmy and Jemappes. When
the band struck up the _Marseillaise_, he would beat time with his
finger, "casting ecstatic glances at the tricolor like one who has
found a long-lost mistress."[10] Yet, whilst he was thus appealing to
the revolutionary recollections and flattering the military vanity of
the people, all his thoughts were bent upon obtaining his recognition
by the great European Courts. No sooner, therefore, was he enthroned,
than he sent off emissaries, upon whose discretion he could depend,
bearing letters to his brother monarchs announcing his accession. But
in these communications, intended only for the eyes of the sovereigns
and their confidential advisers, he was careful to speak of the
"glorious revolution" as a lamentable catastrophe which he sincerely
deplored.[11]
CHAPTER II
THE POWERS AND THE CITIZEN KING
In 1830 England was still suffering acutely from the financial crisis
of five years before. The losses of the capitalists entailed distress
upon the working classes in the shape of unemployment and diminished
wages. The misery of the people led to the commission of acts of
violence and incendiarism upon a scale unparalleled in the recent
history of England. The advocates of parliamentary reform drew their
best arguments, in support of their cause, from the wretched condition
of the country. The elections, rendered necessary by the death of
George IV., began in the very week which saw France in the throes of
her revolution. By the Opposition the victory of the Parisians was
acclaimed enthusiastically as the triumph of a neighbouring people
over despotism and aristocratic privilege. The downfall of Polignac
was celebrated as a crushing blow to Wellington. The belief that the
Duke had connived at, if not directly inspired, the French King's
attempted _coup d'état_, was not confined to ignorant people, but was
professed by the leaders of the Whig party.[12] Whilst this supposed
connection of Wellington with Polignac increased the voting power
of the Opposition, Tory patrons of rotten boroughs, incensed at his
Catholic policy, withheld from him their support. The Duke returned
from the elections with a diminished majority, and one, moreover,
which, such as it was, in no way represented the real opinion of the
country.
Wellington had been chiefly instrumental in effecting the restoration
of the Bourbons after Waterloo. The news of their expulsion could not,
under these circumstances, fail to cause him some personal regret.
But, in addition, he was too well acquainted with French affairs not
to be aware that the triumph of the democratic party was a grave
menace to the peace of Europe. On the other hand, however, far from
being, as was supposed, upon confidential terms with Polignac, the
French expedition to Algiers had strained seriously the official
relations which alone subsisted between them. But any reluctance,
which he and his colleagues might have entertained, to recognizing
the new _régime_ in France, had to give way before the popular
enthusiasm which the revolution called forth throughout England. The
Duke, accordingly, lost no time in advising the King to acknowledge
Louis Philippe. It was a policy, he maintained, which not only
offered the best prospect of preserving peace, but which would meet
with the approval of all the great Powers.[13] Consequently, when
on August 22 General Baudrand arrived in London, bringing with him
a letter from Louis Philippe to William IV., he was accorded a good
reception in ministerial circles. Although he fancied he could detect
a little coldness in Wellington's manner, his mission achieved a
complete success. After a stay of about a week in London he returned
to Paris, taking back with him King William's answer together with a
box ornamented with a portrait of that monarch set in diamonds.[14]
Meanwhile, on August 18, Charles X. and the members of his family
had arrived at Spithead on board _The Great Britain_, the American
vessel chartered by the French government to convey them to England.
The state of public feeling made it inadvisable that they should
proceed to London or even land at Portsmouth, and they were, in
consequence, taken, a few days later, by steamer to Lulworth Castle,
in Dorsetshire, which had been prepared for their reception. The
mob which had cheered exultingly as Castlereagh's body was borne
through the streets to its last resting-place at Westminster Abbey,
which, two years later, was to threaten Wellington with violence on
the anniversary of Waterloo, would have shown scant respect for the
misfortunes of the fallen King.
Ever since the days of her crowning disaster at Wagram, Metternich
had directed the foreign policy of Austria. Clement Wenceslas von
Metternich, Chancellor of the Court and of the State, was descended
from a family of counts of the empire and was born at Coblentz in
1773. His predecessors in office, old Kaunitz, the minister of Maria
Theresa, Thugut, Cobenyl, and Stadion, had in vain attempted to cope
with republican and imperial France. Without doubt, Metternich in
the final struggle with Bonaparte was assisted by circumstances not
of his own creation, nevertheless he unquestionably proved himself,
on many occasions, a crafty, wary adversary, who could await his
opportunity patiently. The flattery which was lavished upon him at the
peace and the prominent part which he was enabled to play in the great
territorial settlement at Vienna stimulated greatly his natural vanity
and presumption. In addition, as he grew older, he began to indulge
more and more in long philosophical disquisitions upon every kind of
political subject. But under his pedantic manner, he retained always
his alert resourcefulness and shrewd common sense. In the words of
Sir Frederick Lamb, who had transacted much business with him, "he was
far too practical a man to regulate his conduct by his doctrines, and
far too ingenious a one to be at a loss for a doctrine to cover his
conduct."[15]
Without doubt, Metternich was a man of aristocratic and conservative
instincts, but, had he been differently disposed, the conditions
of the Empire must have rendered very difficult the adoption of a
Liberal policy. At the Congress of Vienna Austria had renounced all
claim to her former possessions in the Low Countries and in Western
Germany, and had withdrawn to the south and south-east to exercise an
uneasy dominion over Slavs and Italians. Progress on national lines
was hardly possible in an empire thus constituted, and circumstances
contributed to facilitate the imposition of a strictly conservative
system. The Liberal impulse, to which the War of Liberation had given
birth in Prussia, had no counterpart in Austria, nor had Francis
II., like Frederick William III., even in his darkest days, promised
constitutional reforms. At the peace, accordingly, Austria reverted
uncomplainingly to her old absolutist traditions.
In Italy Bonaparte had encouraged deliberately a spirit of
nationality. But the patriotic hopes, which he had raised, were
extinguished at the Congress of Vienna. Italy, Metternich decreed,
was to be henceforward merely "a geographical expression." By the
settlement of 1815 Austria acquired actually the provinces of Lombardy
and Venetia, but her influence extended far beyond these districts.
Austrian princes ruled over the Duchies of Tuscany, Modena and Parma.
Treaties which provided that Piacenza, Commachio and Ferrara should
be garrisoned by Austrian troops gave her military control of the
valley of the Po. Tuscany was forbidden to make either peace or war
without her consent, and the King of Naples was pledged to introduce
no constitutional changes, other than those sanctioned in the Austrian
dominions.
In the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom, as it was termed, it was
Metternich's policy to make the Lombards "forget that they were
Italians." The Austrian code of laws was introduced without regard
to native customs and prejudices. The civil service was composed
almost exclusively of Germans, and the most trifling administrative
questions had to be referred to Vienna.[16] The stagnation engendered
by this system could not fail to have a demoralizing effect. At Venice
two-fifths of the population were in receipt of charitable relief,
the middle classes were without enterprise, the aristocracy fawned
upon the Austrians. On the other hand, in Lombardy and Venetia there
were few monks and a comparatively good system of popular education
existed. The people, moreover, enjoyed equality before the law which,
except in political cases, was justly administered. But as in all
Italian States, the police were arbitrary and interfering and the
censorship of the press was enforced rigidly.
The heterogeneous composition of the Austrian Empire, which demanded
a strictly conservative policy at home, prescribed no less urgently
the preservation of peaceful relations abroad. Since the conclusion
of the great war Metternich's foreign policy had had no other object
than the maintenance of the _status quo_, by the strict observation
of existing treaties. The revolutionary spirit was the most serious
danger to the settlement of 1815. Bonaparte might be dead or a
prisoner at St. Helena, but Metternich was under no illusion that
the peril had passed away for ever. The revolutionary monster still
survived and required ceaseless watching. Only, he conceived, by a
European Confederation, ruled over by a council of the Great Powers,
could complete security be obtained against the common enemy of all
established governments. Metternich's combination of the Powers "for
the maintenance of everything lawfully existing,"[17] which has
been held up to execration under the name of the Holy Alliance, was
an adaptation to practical politics of the fantastic scheme, which
Alexander had propounded, on September 26, 1815, after a review of
his army on the plain of Vertus. According to the Tsar's manifesto
the relations of all European sovereigns were in the future to be
guided by the teachings of Christ. They were to regard each other
in the light of brothers and to look upon their subjects as their
children. The policy of Metternich's Holy Alliance was set forth in
the famous preliminary protocol of the conference of Troppau, signed,
on November 19, 1820, by the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Russia, and
Prussia. "States," it was laid down, "which have undergone a change
of government due to a revolution, the results of which affect other
States, shall cease to be members of the European Alliance. If owing
to these alterations immediate danger threaten neighbouring States,
the Powers bind themselves to bring back by force of arms the erring
State into the folds of the Alliance."
Acting upon this principle, Austria, in 1821, invaded the Kingdom
of Naples and abolished the constitution which the _Carbonari_ had
compelled Ferdinand to accept, whilst Bubna, the Austrian general
commanding at Milan, entered Piedmont and suppressed the revolution
which had broken out at Turin. The Tsar, Alexander, during these
operations, held an army upon the Galician frontier ready to march
into Italy, should his assistance be invoked. The same policy, in
1823, dictated the French armed intervention in Spain, when the
constitution, which the Liberals had proclaimed three years before,
was abolished and the absolute rule of King Ferdinand VII. was
restored. But the determination of England "to abstain rigidly from
interference in the affairs of other States" deprived the alliance of
that appearance of complete unanimity which Metternich hoped would
convince the peoples of the futility of attempting revolutions. The
Greek insurrection, the quarrel between Russia and the Porte and the
conflict of national interests to which the Eastern question gave
rise, completed the work of disruption which Castlereagh and Canning
had begun.
Metternich received the news of the revolution in Paris and of
the downfall of Charles X. at Koenigswart, his country seat in
Bohemia. Ever since the termination of the Russo-Turkish war he had
been striving to re-establish the concert of the Powers and, more
especially, to place the relations of Austria and Russia upon their
former friendly footing. Deeply as Austria was interested in all
developments affecting the integrity of Turkey, greatly as Metternich
mistrusted Nicholas' designs upon the Porte, the spread of Liberalism
constituted in his eyes an even graver danger. The Russian government
was intensely conservative and the people were little likely to be
affected by the revolutionary spirit of Western Europe. Were a serious
crisis to arise it was essential that Austria should be in a position
to look to St. Petersburg for support. A visit which Nesselrode, the
Russian Chancellor, paid to Carlsbad, in the summer of 1830, afforded
Metternich an opportunity of sounding him as to the views of his
Court, and it was upon his return from a satisfactory interview with
his old friend that he found awaiting him at Koenigswart the first
intelligence of Charles X.'s violation of the constitution. On August
6, when the complete triumph of the revolutionists in Paris was known
to him, Metternich determined to return at once to Vienna, making
another short stay at Carlsbad upon the way. At this, their second
meeting, both statesmen affixed their signatures to a short document,
which was to acquire a certain celebrity in the chanceries of Europe
under the name of the _chiffon de Carlsbad_. By this agreement the
basis was established of the policy which the absolute Powers were to
adopt towards France. No attempt would be made to interfere with her,
provided that she should abstain from seeking to infringe existing
treaties and from disturbing the internal peace of neighbouring
States.[18]
Soon after Metternich's return to Vienna, on August 26, General
Belliard arrived, bringing with him a letter from Louis Philippe to
the Emperor Francis. Some days were allowed to elapse before he was
admitted to an audience, but in the interval he had two interviews
with Metternich. The Chancellor accepted his assurances that the
King of the French would do all in his power to maintain peace at
home and abroad. At the same time, however, he gave him plainly to
understand that he had no confidence in Louis Philippe's ability to
carry out his intentions. Both the private and the official answers
of the Emperor were coldly expressed, but they contained the definite
assurance that he had no wish to interfere with the domestic affairs
of France, in which country he sincerely desired to see tranquillity
restored. He was determined to abide by treaties, and was gratified
to learn that His Majesty, the King of the French, was animated by
the same resolution. As Metternich, on September 8, placed these
documents in Belliard's hands he took the opportunity of impressing
upon him solemnly that his Imperial master, although he had decided
to acknowledge the sovereignty of Louis Philippe, viewed the events
which had taken place in France with the utmost abhorrence and was
convinced that the new _régime_ could have only a brief existence. In
truth Metternich was full of apprehensions, and, in a private letter
to Nesselrode, unburdened himself of the conviction that "the end of
old Europe was fast approaching."[19]
The Germanic Confederation had been formed with the object of
protecting Germany from external and internal dangers. The
thirty-eight States and the four free cities of which it was composed
were debarred from entering into any alliance with foreign governments
against another member of the Confederation and, in case of need,
were pledged to furnish contingents to the federal army. Austria and
Prussia, however, in order to preserve the independence of their
foreign policy, brought portions only of their territories into the
Confederation, which, in consequence, was not committed to the defence
of Hungary, Gallicia, Lombardy and Venetia, on behalf of Austria, or
to the protection of the Polish provinces of Prussia. Each State was
represented at the federal Diet at Frankfort, which assembly was in
no sense a federal parliament, but resembled rather a conference of
diplomatists, the ministers attending it being strictly bound by the
instructions furnished them by their respective Courts. Austria and
Prussia had only one vote apiece, Austria, however, held the perpetual
presidency.
Prussia in 1815 had been regarded as the champion of Liberalism. The
Constitutionalists, however, soon discovered that the hopes which
they placed in her were not destined to be realized. In the counsels
of Frederick William, the influence of Wittgenstein, the leader of
the reactionary party, and the friend of Metternich, soon superseded
that of Stein, Hardenburg and the heroes of the War of Liberation. The
conditions of the country, it must be admitted, were hardly suitable
to the immediate establishment of representative institutions. The
inhabitants of the nine provinces which, it had been decreed at the
Congress of Vienna, were to constitute the Kingdom of Prussia, were
not agreed as to the form of government under which they desired
to live. Until they had become Prussians, the Poles of the Duchy
of Posen, the Westphaliand, the Saxons, and the Rhinelanders had
existed under different codes of law and of administration. The
imposition of a uniform system upon the kingdom was a matter of urgent
necessity, and it was to administrative measures that the Prussian
government devoted its attention exclusively in the years which
followed Waterloo. It is clear that there was no strong demand for a
constitution among the mass of the people, and Frederick William III.
could listen, in consequence, without much danger, to Metternich's
warning that representative institutions must prove incompatible with
military strength.
Successful as he had been in persuading Frederick William to withhold
a constitution from Prussia, Metternich could not prevent certain
rulers of the minor States from complying with Article XIII. of the
Federal Act, and from establishing representative government within
their dominions. In 1816, the Liberal Duke of Saxe-Weimar granted a
constitution, and his example was followed by the Kings of Bavaria
and of Wurtemburg and the Duke of Baden. A wave of Liberalism swept
over Northern Germany. The universities were affected profoundly by
the new ideas. In their lecture-rooms, professors denounced existing
governments and harangued their pupils in the language of demagogues.
The agitation culminated, on March 23, 1819, in the murder of the
dramatist and publicist Kotzebue, who was said to be in the pay of
Russia, by Karl Sand, a student of Jena University and a lecturer
to the _Burschenschaft_. This crime and an attempt to assassinate
Ibell, the minister of Nassau, gave Metternich the opportunity for
which he had been waiting. In the month of July of this same year he
had an interview with Frederick William at Teplitz, in the course
of which the King promised never to give Prussia a constitution, to
place his confidence only in ministers of the type of Bernstorff and
Wittgenstein, and to sanction such repressive measures as the Austrian
Chancellor might see fit to suggest. After a conference of the
ministers of the different States at Carlsbad, Metternich's decrees
were submitted to the Frankfort Diet, on September 20, 1819, and
adopted forthwith.
Under the provisions of the celebrated _Carlsbad decrees_, the ruler
of every German State was bound to appoint commissioners to regulate
the universities and to impose a censorship upon all newspapers and
matter printed within his dominions. Furthermore, a central tribunal
was established at Mainz to inquire into the doings of the secret
societies, and upon the members of this court was conferred the power
of arresting the subjects of any German sovereign, and of demanding
from any law court the production of documents. These decrees,
however, did not constitute the sum total of Metternich's measures
of precaution. In November, 1819, he convened a council of German
ministers at Vienna, when, under the pretext of defining the functions
of the Diet, sixty-five new articles of a repressive character were
introduced into the Federal Act. The general effect of the _Vienna
resolutions_, as these measures were termed, was to impose upon the
Federation the duty of defending absolutism by force of arms in small
States in which the sovereigns might prove incapable themselves of
maintaining a despotic form of government.
Metternich's manipulation of the Diet was the great triumph of his
home policy. By converting the Federation from a combination of
States into a league of sovereigns against their own subjects, he
averted the danger that it might promote the cause of Liberalism or of
national unity. From this time forward Metternich, to all appearance,
dominated the Court and the Cabinet of Berlin, and held in leading
strings the minor princes of the Confederation. Nevertheless, the
position of Austria as a German Power was weakening steadily. At the
Congress of Vienna he had craftily withdrawn the empire from the
post of danger, and had thrust upon Prussia the task of protecting
the western flank of Germany. To his secret satisfaction, he saw her
pour out her treasure to defend the frontier from which Austria had
recoiled. He believed that by his _Carlsbad decrees_ and his _Vienna
resolutions_ he had rendered national unity impossible, and had
condemned Northern Germany to the political stagnation in which the
empire appeared contented to repose. But the enlightened bureaucratic
system of Prussia was incomparably superior to that of Austria. In
educational matters she was the foremost State in Europe, and already
she was drawing the minor States into her system of internal free
trade--the famous _Zollverein_ which was to prove so important a
factor in the struggle for Prussian hegemony and national unity. Even
in 1830, acute observers could perceive that the people were stifling
within the narrow confines of their duchies, and that, when the day
of Germany's awakening should come, it would be to the Power standing
on guard upon the Rhine that they would look for leadership.[20] But
that hour had not yet struck, and, in the question of the attitude to
be observed towards France, after the Revolution of July, Prussia, as
was her wont, shaped her policy upon that of Austria. The Emperor's
acknowledgment of Louis Philippe carried with it, accordingly,
Frederick William's recognition of the King of the French.
At St. Petersburg it was not until August 19 that any mention of
the Revolution of July was allowed to appear in the newspapers. Two
days earlier a new levy of two men in five hundred had been called
up for service in the army, all Russians had been ordered to leave
France, Frenchmen had been refused admission to Russia, and any
display of the tricolour had been forbidden. But Lord Heytesbury,[21]
the British ambassador, was informed that this increase of military
strength had no reference to French affairs, and that the recall of
Russian subjects from France was a simple measure of precaution.[22]
In the eyes of Nicholas any rising of the people against their
lawful sovereign was necessarily a highly offensive proceeding, and
in this instance it had the additional disadvantage of disturbing
a condition of affairs, the continued duration of which was very
favourable to the national policy of Russia. Under the different
governments of the Restoration an excellent understanding had been
established between the Courts of the Tuileries and of St. Petersburg.
The Eastern question, which had brought Russia to the verge of war
with England and which had interrupted the smooth course of her
relations with Vienna, had, on the contrary, drawn France towards
her. When, in the campaign of the previous year, Constantinople had
appeared to lie at the mercy of General Diebitsch, politicians as
opposed as Chateaubriand and Polignac had been disposed to look upon
the situation complacently, in the hope that the disruption of the
Turkish Empire might lead to a readjustment of the map of Europe,
which might enable France to rectify in her favour the treaties of
1815. Furthermore, since the intervention in Spain, in 1823, there had
been little cordiality between the Cabinets of London and Paris. This
estrangement had been intensified by the French occupation of Algiers,
the one important measure of foreign policy of the last government
of the Restoration. These circumstances rendered it very improbable
that Russia in the near future would have to confront a coalition of
the maritime Powers. But now that a new _régime_ had been set up in
France, the possibility of that dreaded contingency would have to be
seriously considered.
In spite of the Tsar's military preparations, Lord Heytesbury had no
fears that he proposed to attack France. Nicholas informed him that
he had directed his ambassador "to remain in Paris, but to remove
immediately from the house furnished to the Russian embassy by the
government of France." He was constantly to hold himself in readiness
to quit Paris at an hour's notice, and to leave at once, should
the English, the Prussian, the Austrian or the Dutch ambassadors
be compelled to depart. "_En âme et en conscience_ he never would
consider the Duc d'Orléans in any light except that of a usurper."
Nevertheless he had no intention of intervening, unless France were
to attempt to disseminate revolutionary doctrines in other countries
or to carry her arms beyond her frontiers.[23] In due course Baron
Atthalin arrived at St. Petersburg, bringing with him a letter from
Louis Philippe to the Tsar, and, on September 8, was received in
private audience by Nicholas. On this occasion the question of the
acknowledgment of the King of the French was avoided, the Emperor
being resolved to reserve the matter for further consideration. But
at Tsarskoye Selo, a week later, Nicholas, whilst regretting that
the British government should have so hastily decided to recognize
Louis Philippe, gave Lord Heytesbury to understand that his own
acknowledgment of the King of the French would not be deferred much
longer.[24]
In the meantime, an event had occurred which threatened seriously to
aggravate the embarrassments of the situation. The creation of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands occupied a most important place in the
territorial settlement following the overthrow of Bonaparte. British
statesmanship had been largely responsible for the union of Belgium
with Holland, and for the formation of a strong State of secondary
rank which was to act as a barrier against France. Under Wellington's
advice the great Powers, at their own expense, erected a line of
fortresses, connected with Prussian territory upon the left bank of
the Rhine, to protect the southern frontier of the new kingdom. From
a purely military point of view the plan may have been sound, but
to propose to mould the Belgians and the Dutch into a nation was to
treat as of no account the differences of race and of religion which
divided the two peoples. The Belgians soon began to complain that
they were very inadequately represented in all branches of the public
service. Questions relating to education, taxation, and the freedom of
the press increased their discontent. The Dutch, who could look back
proudly upon two centuries of independence, despised them as having
been constantly under the dominion of a foreign Power. In 1830 it was
generally recognized that the attempt to fuse the two peoples into one
nationality had failed. The Belgians, however, still remained loyal
to the House of Nassau and desired only administrative separation
under the reigning dynasty.
The Revolution of July in Paris created an immense excitement at
Brussels. The town was the favourite place of refuge for the political
offenders of all countries. Yet in spite of the prevailing unrest the
authorities neglected to take the most ordinary precautions against
a popular rising. A performance of Scribe's opera, _La Muette de
Portici_, which treats of the insurrection of the Neapolitans against
the Spaniards, furnished the spark which was to cause the explosion.
Serious rioting began on the night of August 25, and continued
throughout the following day. The military commander appears to have
acted with a strange irresolution, and on the 28th, the insurgents
being complete masters of the town, a deputation of notables carried
a respectful address to the Hague praying for the redress of their
grievances. The next three weeks were spent in fruitless attempts
to arrange a compromise. The Prince of Orange, who was personally
popular, visited Brussels, but his efforts to solve the question
met with no success. After the failure of his eldest son's mission
the King consented to dismiss van Maanen, the unpopular governor
of Brussels. But this concession was made too late. Encouraged by
emissaries of the revolutionary clubs in Paris, and emboldened by
the weakness of the government, the advocates of complete separation
pressed their demands with increasing violence. At last the King
ordered Prince Frederick of Orange to advance from the camp of
Vilvorde against the town. On September 23 the attack began. The
troops penetrated into the park, but failed to carry the barricades
which obstructed the streets beyond. After three days' fighting the
Prince abandoned the struggle and withdrew from the neighbourhood
of Brussels. The discomfiture of his army left King William no
alternative but to appeal for assistance to the Powers, whilst at
Brussels a provisional government declared Belgium independent, and
convened a national congress.
This attempt on the part of a neighbouring people to imitate "the
glorious days of July" was exceedingly gratifying to the republicans
and the military democratic party in Paris. Their orators and
journalists loudly declared that the revolt of the Belgians was an
opportunity both for extending the French frontiers, and for effecting
a breach in the treaties of 1815. Louis Philippe, however, was
resolved not to be drawn into an adventure of this kind. He knew that
the powers would never tolerate an invasion of the Low Countries,
and he realized that the French army was in no condition to oppose a
European coalition. Accordingly, as it was not in his power to silence
the cries for intervention or to repress the noisy sympathy for the
Belgians indulged in by a large section of the press, he determined
to give to foreign governments a practical proof of his pacific
intentions by despatching to London, as his ambassador, the aged
statesman who, sixteen years before, had figured so conspicuously at
the Congress of Vienna.
The Prince de Talleyrand was in his seventy-third year.
Notwithstanding the great services which, in 1814, he had rendered to
the cause of Legitimate Sovereignty, the Bourbons of the elder branch
had never been able to forget his conduct under the Republic and the
Empire. At the second Restoration he had been appointed President
of the Council, but had retired before the _Chambre introuvable_
and the Royalist reaction, and neither Louis XVIII. nor Charles X.
had given him a second opportunity of returning to office. Upon the
triumph of the popular party in July, he had promptly placed his
services at the disposal of Louis Philippe. But, in spite of his
Liberal opinions, Talleyrand retained the language, the habits, and
the appearance of a noble of the old _régime_. It might have been
expected that all the King's ingenuity would have been required to
impose so fine a gentleman upon a Cabinet, which counted among its
members the democratic M. Dupont and the elder M. Dupin, famous for
his hobnailed boots and his affectations of middle-class simplicity.
Louis Philippe's ministers, however, were agreed upon the necessity of
preserving the peace, and, when it was proposed at the Council table
that Talleyrand should be sent to London, no opposition was made to
the suggestion. Guizot, who was Minister of the Interior at the time,
supposes that those who disliked the appointment must have stated
their objections to the King in private.[25]
But if Louis Philippe and his ministers were determined to abstain
from any intervention in Belgium, they were bound to insist that
other Powers should adopt the same attitude. It was, therefore,
notified to foreign governments that French policy, in the future,
would be based strictly upon the principle of non-interference in
the domestic affairs of other nations. It was a system to which both
the great parties in England had declared their adherence, and its
adoption by France might, in consequence, be expected to facilitate
the establishment of cordial relations between the two countries.
But the declaration of such a principle could not fail to be highly
displeasing to the absolute Courts. Already movements of troops were
in progress in the Rhine provinces which suggested an intention on
the part of Frederick William of rendering military assistance to
his brother-in-law, the King of the Netherlands. Baron Werther, the
Prussian ambassador, although still without official credentials,
had been instructed to remain in Paris. Molé, Louis Philippe's first
Minister for Foreign Affairs, accordingly arranged to meet him at
a private house, where he gave him clearly to understand that the
entry of a Prussian army into the Low Countries would be regarded
as an act of war directed against France. This threat, which evoked
much indignation in Berlin and at Vienna, was effectual in inducing
King Frederick William III. to renounce any thoughts, which he may
have entertained, of reducing the Belgians to submission by force of
arms.[26]
Talleyrand arrived in London on September 24, and in a despatch,
sent off the next day, expressed his satisfaction at the reception
accorded him.[27] He was accompanied by the Duchesse de Dino, who
officiated as hostess at his table, and presided over his household.
In 1807, at the conclusion of the campaign in Poland, Talleyrand, then
Napoleon's Minister for Foreign Affairs, had obtained for his nephew,
Edmond de Périgord, the hand of Dorothée, the daughter of the last
reigning Duke of Courland. After a few years of married life, however,
husband and wife agreed to live apart, and Madame Edmond from that
time forward took up her residence with Talleyrand. She accompanied
him to Vienna, in 1814, and brought back from the Congress the title
of Duchesse de Dino. In return for the services he had rendered him,
the King of Naples had conferred this dukedom upon Talleyrand, who
had asked that the title might be assumed by his nephew. The duchess'
position in Talleyrand's household was so generally recognized that,
upon their arrival in London, King William IV., at Wellington's
request, allowed her to take rank as an ambassadress.[28] The Comte
Casimir de Montrond, another frequent guest at Valençay, and at the
house in the Rue Saint-Florentin, followed the ambassador to London.
Talleyrand's friendship with this curious individual appears to have
begun under the Directory. In the terrible days which preceded the
downfall of Robespierre, Montrond had been an inmate of the prison
of Saint-Lazare. The fortunate possession of some ready money, a
rare commodity at the time, had, however, enabled him to effect his
escape, and that of the citizeness Franquetot, the heretofore Aimée de
Coigny, Duchesse de Fleury, the heroine of André Chénier's poem.[29]
After this miraculous deliverance, Aimée de Coigny, who under the
emigration laws had divorced the Duc de Fleury, married the man to
whom she owed her life. But, after a brief and most unsatisfactory
experience of matrimony with the gay _incroyable_, she again contrived
to obtain her freedom. Montrond's introduction to London society
appears to date from the year 1812, when, having incurred the grave
displeasure of Bonaparte, he succeeded in eluding the French police
and in reaching England. He seems to have become very rapidly a
well-known and popular member of the fashionable world in London.
During all this period of his life he is believed to have been totally
without regular means of subsistence, and to have existed solely by
play, assisted by an occasional windfall in the shape of employment
upon any secret political work which Talleyrand, when in favour, was
enabled to procure for him. But from the earliest days of the Monarchy
of July his circumstances began to improve. From this time forward he
appears to have drawn a pension of about £1000 _per annum_ from the
secret service funds of the French Foreign Office.[30] This allowance
is said to have been granted him in order that "he should speak well
of Louis Philippe in the London clubs." It was, moreover, strongly
suspected that he had obtained knowledge of certain of the King's
proceedings during the emigration which His Majesty had good reasons
for wishing to keep secret.[31]
The uneasiness aroused in London by the first news of the insurrection
in Brussels developed into serious alarm, when the triumph of the
revolutionists over the Royal troops became known. Wellington openly
declared that it was a "devilish bad business," and many people began
to fear that a great European war was inevitable.[32] The British
government, whilst prepared to accept as an accomplished fact the
complete separation of Belgium from the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
held that no changes must take place of a nature to interfere with the
efficiency of the barrier fortresses, these defences "being necessary
for the security of other States." After drawing up instructions to
this effect for Lord Stuart de Rothesay, Aberdeen intimated that
the government was desirous of conferring upon the situation "in
friendly concert with France and the other Powers."[33] Talleyrand
was of opinion that it was a matter for congratulation that the first
offer of co-operation should have come from England, and strongly
recommended that the proposal should be responded to cordially. An
entirely passive attitude, he wrote, must deprive France "of that
influence which they are disposed to ascribe to her over here."[34]
Meanwhile, in Paris, notices were appearing in the papers calling
upon men to enroll themselves to assist their Belgian brothers. The
_Society of the Friends of the People_ equipped a battalion which
actually set out for the northern frontier. La Fayette was still
the recognized leader of the ultra-Liberals, and his house was a
meeting-place for the _Carbonari_ and the revolutionists of every
country. But he was occupied chiefly in encouraging insurrectionary
movements in Spain and Italy. The union of Belgium with France
was advocated mainly in the ranks of the Bonapartist or military
democratic section of the party. The protestations of Louis Philippe
and Comte Molé were probably true that the government in no way
favoured their designs, and that strict orders had been given to the
prefects to prevent the passage of arms into Belgium. On the other
hand, however, their assertions to Lord Stuart were untrue that
they were innocent of conniving at the proceedings of the Spanish
revolutionists. Broglie and Guizot, both members of the Cabinet,
admit that in order to compel the King of Spain to acknowledge Louis
Philippe, facilities for assembling their followers upon French
territory were accorded to the Spanish insurrectionary leaders.
This rather disingenuous policy appears, without question, to have
contributed materially to the establishment of diplomatic relations
between Paris and Madrid at the end of the month of October.[35]
None of the Powers evinced any intention of responding to the King
of Holland's request for military assistance to subdue the revolted
Belgians. The English proposal that a conference should be held to
consider the situation was generally regarded as the best solution of
the question. "Austria and Prussia," wrote Talleyrand on October 11,
"intend to follow the lead of England with respect to Belgium, and
there can be little doubt that Russia will adopt the same course."[36]
The French government at this time was greatly incensed at the conduct
of the Cabinet of the Hague. No official appeal for help had been
sent to Paris, but in a letter to Louis Philippe the Prince of Orange
openly accused the French authorities of encouraging the disturbances
in Belgium, and suggested that the King should make a public
declaration of his intention not to meddle with the affairs of the Low
Countries. In return, the Prince undertook to use all his influence
with the Tsar in favour of the acknowledgment of the sovereignty of
the King of the French. At a Council of Ministers it was resolved
that Talleyrand should be instructed to bring the affair to the
notice of the British Cabinet, and that Molé should draw up a note
for presentation at the Hague, expressing surprise at the continued
silence observed towards the French government. Two days later,
however, the news was telegraphed from Strasburg that General Atthalin
had passed through the town, bringing with him the Tsar's recognition
of Louis Philippe. But, upon the general's arrival, the satisfaction
caused by this intelligence was diminished by the cold and formal
language of Nicholas's letter, and by his pointed omission to address
the King as "his brother," the designation generally employed by
sovereigns in their communications with each other.[37]
The proposal of the English government that a conference should
be held upon Belgian affairs having been accepted by the
Powers, it remained only to decide upon the town in which the
deliberations should take place. London, where for some time past
the representatives of Russia, France, and Great Britain had been
engaged in settling the frontiers and discussing the future of Greece,
appeared to be the capital in which, by reason of its proximity
to Brussels, the plenipotentiaries could assemble with the least
inconvenience. France alone dissented from this view, and urgently
demanded that the conference should be held in Paris. Aberdeen, when
Talleyrand communicated to him his instructions upon the subject,
would appear to have seen little to object to in the French proposal.
Wellington, however, refused to entertain the suggestion, for a
moment. It was highly important, the Duke contended, that matters
should be settled promptly, and he was confident that he could induce
the ministers attending the conference to agree to the French and
English proposals, provided they were to meet in London. On the other
hand, were Paris to be the scene of their deliberations, they would
insist upon referring every question to their respective Courts.
Talleyrand, who considered that there was much sound reason in the
Duke's contention, was nevertheless directed to reiterate his demand.
But his further representations only evoked the reply that the English
Cabinet regarded Paris as _un terrain trop agité_, and at a subsequent
interview, on October 25, in the presence of the ambassadors of
Austria and Prussia, the Duke assured him that the Powers were
unanimous in opposing the notion of discussing the affairs of the
Low Countries amidst the _tourbillon révolutionaire_ of the French
capital.[38]
In his conversations with Lord Stuart de Rothesay in Paris, Molé,
in order to gain his ends, had recourse to a singular argument.
Talleyrand himself, he explained, constituted the true reason why the
government was desirous that the Belgian conference should not take
place in London. He never would have been accredited to the Court of
St. James' had ministers foreseen how greatly the public would resent
his appointment. To allow him to represent France at a very important
conference would expose the Cabinet to attacks which must prove
fatal to its existence. "This extraordinary reason for objecting to
our proposition," wrote Aberdeen, "does not appear to His Majesty's
government to be entitled to serious consideration." Molé nevertheless
continued to press his point with much warmth, and it was only after
several more interviews with Lord Stuart that he began to talk of
sending a second plenipotentiary to the London conference to be
associated with Talleyrand.[39] This plan, which was probably not put
forward seriously, was certainly never carried into execution. At the
end of October, the Cabinet was reconstructed, and Molé resigned the
portfolio of Foreign Affairs. After his retirement no further allusion
appears to have been made to the alleged inconvenience of Talleyrand's
presence at the London conference. Molé was perhaps jealous of
allowing him to conduct these important negotiations, in which he
probably desired himself to play the chief part. He was a highly
cultivated man, with much charm of manner, and of an ancient family,
and in Imperial days had enjoyed the favour of the Emperor, and had
held important positions. Under the Restoration he had been Minister
of Marine in Richelieu's first administration, and in this capacity
had incurred Louis XVIII.'s displeasure by intriguing against his
favourite the Duc Décazes.
The Cabinet, known as that of August 11th, had never been a united
body. Guizot, Broglie, Molé and Casimir Périer constituted the
Conservative element, whilst Laffitte and Dupont were opposed to all
measures which savoured of resistance to progress upon democratic
lines. The riots of October 17 and 18, in Paris, the mob's protest
against the apparent intention of the government to abolish the
death penalty in political cases, in order to save the lives of the
imprisoned ex-ministers of Charles X., brought matters to a crisis.
Seeing that the King decidedly inclined to the views of Laffitte and
the so-called party of _laissez-aller_ the Conservatives, advising
him to give the policy of their dissenting colleagues a fair trial,
tendered their resignations. Laffitte was accordingly charged with the
task of reconstructing the Cabinet.[40]
On November 2, the day on which the composition of the new French
ministry was published in the _Moniteur_, King William IV. formally
opened the British Parliament. In the Speech from the Throne, the
Belgians were described as "revolted subjects" and the intention was
expressed of repressing sternly disturbances at home. In the House of
Lords, Grey deprecated the employment of such language, and, in reply,
Wellington made his declaration against Reform. A fortnight later,
upon a motion of Sir Henry Parnell for referring the Civil List to a
select committee, the government was placed in a minority. The Duke
thereupon resigned and advised the King to send for Grey. Lord Grey
undertook to form a ministry upon the understanding that he was to
bring forward a measure of Reform.
CHAPTER III
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
The accession to power of Lord Grey was an event justly calculated
to raise the hopes of those who wished to see more cordial relations
established between France and England. The Whigs had been out of
office during the whole period of the Imperial wars; they had not
been concerned in the territorial settlement at the peace, nor were
they responsible for the measures which had been taken to ensure the
safe custody of Bonaparte after Waterloo. Many prominent members of
the party had avowed their sympathy for France, and, moreover, the
revolution of July had, unquestionably, contributed to the overthrow
of the Tories. Under the new _régime_ in France political power was
to rest with the _bourgeoisie_. It was by the support of the trading
and commercial classes that the Whigs purposed to carry out their
scheme of Parliamentary Reform. Nor were these the only circumstances
which seemed to indicate that the two countries would, in the future,
develop upon parallel lines. Although William IV. had succeeded to
the throne legitimately, whilst a revolution had placed the crown
upon the head of Louis Philippe, and although no two men could be
more different in character, there were, upon the surface, curious
points of resemblance between them. Both were, or were supposed to
be, Liberals, both were simple and unostentatious in their tastes and
habits, both had succeeded sovereigns of reactionary views who had
been rigid observers of courtly ceremony and etiquette.
"England," wrote Talleyrand in a despatch in which he reviewed the
situation created by the change of government, "is the country with
which France should cultivate the most friendly relations. Her
colonial losses have removed a source of rivalry between them. The
Powers still believe in the divine right of kings; France and England
alone no longer subscribe to that doctrine. Both governments have
adopted the principle of non-intervention. Let both declare loudly
that they are resolved to maintain peace, and their voices will not be
raised in vain."[41]
Lord Palmerston, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was in his
forty-sixth year. From 1811 he had continuously held the post of
Secretary-at-War in succeeding Tory administrations until the year
1828, when, with other _Canningites_, he had seceded from the Duke
of Wellington. He was an excellent linguist; indeed, in the opinion
of so competent a critic as Victor Cousin, there were not twenty
Frenchmen who could lay claim to his knowledge of their language.[42]
In the course of a visit which he had paid to Paris, in the year 1829,
Palmerston had made the acquaintance of most of the prominent members
of the Liberal party under the Restoration. From his conversations
with these men, who were now the masters of France, he had carried
away the conviction that they chafed bitterly at the treaties of 1815
and were determined, at the first opportunity, to extend the French
frontiers to the Rhine. General Sébastiani, who, on November 15, had
succeeded Marshal Maison as Minister for Foreign Affairs, had, whilst
in opposition, been one of the loudest advocates of a policy of
expansion.[43] The recollection of his boastful language and of the
aggressive schemes which he had heard him propound was always present
in Palmerston's memory, and was sensibly to influence his conduct of
his first negotiations with the French government.
The general outlook in Europe in the autumn of 1830 augured ill for
the continued maintenance of peace. Great military preparations were
reported to be in progress in Russia. Marshal Diebitsch, the hero
of the recent war with Turkey, was at Berlin upon a mission which,
although it was described, as "wholly extra official,"[44] excited
considerable apprehension in Paris. Insurrectionary movements, the
repercussion of the Revolution of July, had taken place in Saxony
and other States of Northern Germany. Metternich was said "to have
proposed certain armaments to the Diet, wholly out of proportion to
the necessities of the situation." The King of Prussia, although
he was universally credited with a sincere desire for peace, was
suspected, nevertheless, "of preparing quietly for war." The alarm was
not dispelled by the assurances which, in London, Prince Lieven gave
to both Palmerston and Talleyrand that the Russian armament was merely
a measure of precaution necessitated by treaty obligations with the
King of the Netherlands, and that, under no circumstances, would his
Imperial master take action except in combination with the Powers.[45]
On December 1 the French Chamber voted supplies for a considerable
increase of the army.
The suspicion that the three Northern Courts were meditating an
unprovoked attack upon France was unfounded. As Lord Heytesbury
pointed out, the cholera, which had made its appearance in the
Tsar's dominions, threw an insuperable obstacle in the way of
recruiting upon a large scale. Russia indeed, he considered, might
almost be looked upon as _hors de combat_.[46] Nor was Metternich
proposing to begin hostilities against France. "Austria's task,"
he instructed Esterhazy, the ambassador in London, "consists in
suppressing any insurrectionary movement in Italy." But should the
French interpose in favour of the revolutionists, their action must be
resisted vigorously. It was expedient, therefore, for the three great
continental Powers to hold their armies in readiness. "The British
government must be brought to understand that Austria cannot accept
the principle of non-intervention. England, as an insular State, can
adhere to it without danger, but when adopted by France it imperils
the existence of neighbouring Powers. The proclamation of such a
doctrine can be compared only to the complaints of thieves about the
interference of the police."[47] But, although the absolute Courts
were certainly innocent of any desire to provoke a war deliberately,
there were serious elements of danger in the situation. The King of
the Netherlands, without doubt, looked upon the outbreak of a great
European war as the only chance of regaining his Belgian provinces.
Charles X. was once more installed quietly in his old quarters at
Holyrood, but his adherents, the Legitimists, or Carlists, as they
were more usually termed, were convinced that a war must prove fatal
to the new _régime_ in France. Talleyrand suspected that they were in
league with the military party in Paris, and suggested that an agent
should be sent over to London to watch them. He had no complaints to
make about the assistance afforded him by the Home Secretary, who
placed all the information he could obtain about them at his disposal,
but, "in a country in which the police system was so bad, such reports
had little value."[48]
At the Congress of Vienna nearly the whole of those territories, known
as the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, had been constituted into the Kingdom of
Poland and assigned to the Tsar. Under the terms of the treaty, which
was guaranteed by the Five Powers, the crown of the Kingdom was to be
hereditary in the Imperial family of Russia. The Poles, however, were
to be granted a constitution, and were to be allowed to maintain a
national army. These stipulations were duly carried out by Alexander.
But, as the Tsar's Liberalism waned, the first conditions were
considerably modified, and, after the accession of Nicholas, the Poles
appear to have suspected, with perhaps good reason, that the Imperial
Cabinet purposed to abolish gradually all their special privileges.
Suddenly, on November 28, 1830, an insurrection broke out at Warsaw.
The Viceroy, the Grand Duke Constantine, was driven from the town and
several of his generals were murdered. The revolution spread rapidly
through the country, and, after some vain attempts to negotiate a
compromise, the Grand Duke retreated across the frontier with his
Russian troops. On December 5, Chlopicki, a popular Polish general,
who had served with distinction under Bonaparte, was proclaimed
Dictator. Nicholas, whilst collecting his troops to reconquer his
revolted kingdom, declared that the French revolutionary propaganda
and the creation of Lancastrian schools[49] were responsible for the
insurrection.[50]
The rebellion evoked the utmost enthusiasm in Paris. The designation
of "the Frenchmen of the North," which it became the fashion to apply
to the Poles, tickled the national vanity. It was remembered that
they had remained true to Bonaparte in his misfortunes, and that
the unsympathetic treatment which they had experienced at the hands
of the sovereigns at Vienna had been the penalty of their fidelity.
Moreover, it was a natural consequence of their hatred of the treaties
of 1815 that Frenchmen should feel drawn towards those countries
which, like Poland or Italy, had cause for dissatisfaction with the
conditions settled at the Congress of Vienna. Unquestionably this was
the secret of much of that sympathy for "oppressed nationalities"
which, from 1830 onwards, manifested itself so keenly in France. The
war party and other factions hostile to the monarchy encouraged the
popular ferment. Lord Stuart de Rothesay was disposed to think that
Louis Philippe and his ministers regarded the excitement with secret
approval, in the hope that it would distract public attention from
the impending trial of the ex-ministers of Charles X.[51] In addition
to Polignac himself three members of the Cabinet, who had signed the
ordinances of July, had failed to escape abroad. The King, however,
notwithstanding that the populace called furiously for their heads,
was determined to save their lives. This merciful intention he was
enabled to carry out successfully. On December 21 the peers adjudged
them guilty of high treason but, in deference to Louis Philippe's
wishes, sentenced them only to perpetual confinement. Meanwhile
Montalivet, the Minister of the Interior, had personally conducted the
prisoners back to Vincennes, where they were lodged in safety before
the mob, which thronged all the approaches to the Luxembourg, realized
that it had been baulked of its prey. The satisfactory conclusion of
this momentous trial was followed by an event of no less happy augury
for the future. Nettled by a resolution of the Chamber affecting his
position, La Fayette retired from the command of the national guard.
The government accepted his resignation with grave misgivings, but, to
the general surprise, the fickle multitude saw their hero replaced by
Mouton de Lobau with comparative indifference.
But of all the questions which threatened to disturb the peace of
Europe, that of Belgium, by reason of the conflict of national
interests to which it gave rise, was by far the most delicate. It
is not without cause that, for centuries, the Low Countries have
been the chief battle ground of the Powers. Bonaparte is supposed to
have described the possession of Antwerp as "a loaded pistol held
at England's head." Unquestionably, during the great war, England
had had experience of the difficulties of watching the coastline of
Belgium and Holland united to that of France. The lesson had not
been thrown away upon Lords Grey and Palmerston, who were fully
determined to resist, at all costs, the acquisition of any portion
of the Low Countries by a first-class military Power. On the other
hand France had excellent reasons for objecting to the system
under which the Kingdom of the Netherlands had been created, and
the barrier fortresses erected. In the words of General Lamarque,
the chief parliamentary spokesman of the war party, these defences
constituted, within four days' march of Paris, a _tête de pont_ behind
which the armies of a hostile coalition might assemble at leisure.
Moreover, France, in 1815, had been deprived of the fortresses of
Marienburg and Philippeville, both of which had been incorporated
into the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and it was hoped that in any
scheme of re-arrangement these two places would be restored to
her. All supporters of the new monarchy were keenly alive to the
immense satisfaction with which the smallest modification of the
hated treaties of 1815 would be received throughout the country. Men
of moderate views, such as Charles de Rémusat and Guizot, looked
upon "a brilliant diplomatic triumph" or "some acquisition of
territory towards Belgium" as conditions essential to the stability
of the Orleans throne.[52] On the other hand, it was the policy of
Austria, Prussia and Russia, as it was that of Great Britain, to
preserve intact the territorial settlement of 1815 and to resist the
aggrandisement of France. But the attitude of the Northern Courts
was also greatly influenced by the marriages which connected the
King of the Netherlands and the Prince of Orange with the Royal
family of Prussia and the Imperial House of Russia. In addition to
these considerations of relationship the sympathies of the absolute
sovereigns necessarily went out to a monarch struggling with a
rebellion of his subjects, and they could not but be reluctant to
participate in measures tending to legalize a revolution.
The first sitting of the conference of the five Powers upon Belgian
affairs took place at the Foreign Office in London, on November 4,
on which occasion it was decided to impose an armistice upon the
contending parties. According to the protocol, the Dutch and Belgian
armies "were to retire behind the line which, previous to the treaty
of May 30, 1814, separated the possessions of the sovereign prince
of the United Provinces from the territories which have since been
joined to them."[53] No further step of much importance was taken
until December 20, when Talleyrand proposed that the conference
should proclaim the independence of Belgium.[54] After a discussion
of seven hours' duration, the objections of the plenipotentiaries
of the absolute Powers were withdrawn, and the plan was acceded to
unanimously. A month later, on January 20, 1831, the frontiers of
Holland and Belgium were defined, and Belgium was declared neutral
under the guarantee of the Powers. At the sitting of January 27, the
plenipotentiaries apportioned the share of the general debt which each
State would be called upon to bear.[55]
The difficult question of selecting a sovereign for Belgium was
not lost sight of, whilst the delimitation of frontiers had been
proceeding. As early as October 19, Molé informed Lord Stuart
in confidence that M. Gendebien had brought proposals from the
provisional government in Brussels for the enthronement of one of
Louis Philippe's younger sons. But he assured the British ambassador
that, as France was about to confer upon the situation with the other
Powers, the offer would not be entertained for a moment.[56] Again
Talleyrand, on November 7, reported that "a kind of agent of the
provisional government" was in London seeking to ascertain whether the
elevation to the Belgian throne of the Duc de Leuchtenberg, a son of
Eugène de Beauharnais, would be permitted.[57] At first the Powers,
France included, had regarded the enthronement of the Prince of Orange
as the safest solution of the difficulty. But after the bombardment
of the town of Antwerp by the Dutch, at the end of October, he
became very unpopular, and, on November 24, the national congress
at Brussels resolved that all members of the House of Orange-Nassau
should be excluded from the throne.[58] In consequence, possibly,
of this action by the Belgian deputies, Lords Grey and Palmerston
appear to have mentioned the Archduke Charles of Austria to Talleyrand
as a suitable candidate. But he objected, reminding them that his
enthronement would constitute a restoration, which the most famous
of Whigs had once described as "the worst of revolutions." Moreover,
Metternich, who had no desire to extend the influence of Austria in
that direction, soon afterwards declared that the Archduke would
decline the crown, both for himself and for his children, were it to
be offered to him.[59] Talleyrand himself appears to have been the
first to suggest that Leopold of Saxe-Coburg might with advantage be
chosen to rule over the new State.[60] In putting forward this plan
he seems to have been actuated chiefly by a desire to please the
British government, but, for reasons which will be explained later,
his proposal met with very little response. Meanwhile, the language of
Mauguin and Lamarque in the Chamber, and the evident intention of the
military party to object to any settlement which should not admit of
the future union of Belgium with France, were rapidly impelling Louis
Philippe to adopt an attitude of opposition to Great Britain and the
other Powers.[61]
At the first sitting of the conference it had been decided that M.
Bresson, the first secretary of the French embassy in London, and
Mr. Cartwright, who held a similar position at the British embassy
at the Hague, should act as the commissioners of the Powers at
Brussels. Cartwright, however, had soon been recalled in order that
he might assume the duties of British minister at Frankfort, and Lord
Ponsonby had been sent to take his place at Brussels. Ponsonby was
the brother-in-law of Lord Grey and was reputed to be the handsomest
man of his time. There was a story that as a youth he had been set
upon by the mob in the Rue Saint-Honoré, in the early days of the
revolution, and that it was only the protests of the women, that he
was too good-looking to be hanged, which had saved him from "_la
lanterne_." Canning is said to have sent him to Buenos Ayres, in 1826,
upon his first diplomatic mission of importance, in order to please
George IV., whose peace of mind was disturbed by Lady Cunningham's
too evident admiration of him.[62] In Belgium, at this time, the two
chief political parties were the French party, consisting of the
advocates of a union with France, and the Orange party, the members
of which favoured the enthronement of the Prince of Orange. The first
were unquestionably by far the most numerous, but the Orangists, who
were to be found chiefly in business and commercial circles, were not
without power and influence. Bresson, from the first moment of his
arrival at Brussels, appears to have identified himself closely with
the aspirations of the French party, whilst Ponsonby espoused no less
zealously the cause of the Prince of Orange.[63] There was, thus,
keen rivalry and apparently much personal dislike between these two
representatives of the conference.
Louis Philippe would never appear seriously to have entertained
the notion of allowing one of his younger sons to accept the crown
of Belgium, or of consenting to the union of Belgium with France.
Lord Grey had given Talleyrand, who had been directed to sound the
British government upon the subject, clearly to understand that the
enthronement of a French prince would be regarded as a case for
war--a declaration, which, in the words of Sébastiani, "had at least
the merit of frankness."[64] Of all the possible candidates for the
Belgian crown Louis Philippe justly considered the Duc de Leuchtenberg
to be the most undesirable. To have allowed any one connected with the
Bonaparte family to become King of Belgium would have been exceedingly
dangerous to the French monarchy. "There are no personal objections to
him," wrote Sébastiani to Bresson, "but all considerations must give
way before the _raison d'état_."[65] The candidate for whose success
Louis Philippe was in reality most anxious, and whose selection
Sébastiani instructed both Bresson and Talleyrand to advocate
cautiously, was Prince Charles of Naples. This young prince was a
Neapolitan Bourbon, a brother of the Duchesse de Berri and a nephew
of the French queen, Marie Amélie, and Louis Philippe was always as
desirous as any king of the old _régime_ to promote the aggrandizement
of his family. But when Talleyrand mentioned his name to Lord Grey he
was told at once that his connection with the reigning House in France
constituted an insuperable objection,[66] whilst from Brussels Bresson
reported that "the Prince of Naples had no following."[67]
A second attempt, on the part of the provisional government at
Brussels to persuade Louis Philippe to accept the crown for his
son, was made in December 1830. On that occasion M. Van de Weyer
carried the proposal to Paris. British hostility was to be overcome
by the marriage of Nemours, the young prince whom it was proposed
to elevate to the throne, to an English princess, and by the
conversion of Antwerp into a free port and by the destruction of
its fortifications.[68] Louis Philippe declined the offer, but the
already-mentioned instructions sent to Talleyrand to ascertain the
views of the British government upon the subject were probably a
consequence of Van de Weyer's mission. Bresson, however, soon after
he had received Sébastiani's despatch, informing him of the King's
determination to refuse the crown for his son, expressed great
fear lest Leuchtenberg should be selected. His candidature was, he
reported, the result of a Bonapartist intrigue organized in Paris, but
the Belgians were tired of their unsettled condition and were anxious
that a ruler of some kind should be chosen.[69] Some ten days later he
forwarded intelligence of a more precise and of a yet more disquieting
nature. The French party, led by M. Gendebien, in consequence of the
refusal of Nemours, had now definitely adopted Leuchtenberg as their
candidate. Moreover, three notorious Bonapartist generals, Excelmans,
Lallemand and Fabvier, were reported to have arrived at Namur and
Liège. This news was followed the next day by a despatch in which he
complained of Ponsonby's activity on behalf of the Prince of Orange
and, at the same time, accused him of being favourable to the election
of Leuchtenberg.[70]
Louis Philippe was genuinely disquieted by Bresson's news. He was
resolved, he told Lord Granville, who, early in January, had replaced
Lord Stuart de Rothesay at the British embassy, to send the Comte de
Flahaut to London to impress upon the government the keen anxiety
with which he regarded the march of events at Brussels. By existing
treaties, he reminded him, no member of the Bonaparte family was
allowed to live in Belgium, and, in the course of conversation,
he hinted that a Neapolitan prince would be the best king for the
new State.[71] Flahaut was a distinguished general officer of the
empire and was, besides, the admitted father of that half-brother
of Louis Napoleon, who was to acquire celebrity under the name
of the Duc de Morny. During the greater part of the Restoration
period Flahaut had lived in London, where his attractive manners
and charm of conversation had made him a popular member of society.
Moreover, during his residence in England, he had married Miss Mercer
Elphinstone, a great heiress of her day.[72] The mission, upon which
he was now despatched to London, was not confined merely to the
communication to the British government of Louis Philippe's fears
respecting a Bonapartist candidate for the Belgian throne. But, as
his instructions are not to be found among the diplomatic papers of
the period, the exact nature of the proposals he was empowered to
make can only be conjectured. In a private letter to Granville, on
February 8, Palmerston speaks of a suggested offensive and defensive
alliance between France and Great Britain "which was to be kept an
entire secret from all the world," to which proposal he had replied,
"that these alliances are not popular in England, but that if France
were attacked unjustly, England would be found upon her side."[73]
From the despatches of Granville and of Talleyrand it may be inferred
with certainty that some scheme was on foot whereby France was to
acquire a part of Belgium and, in return for her consent to this plan,
England was to have the right of garrisoning Antwerp, which was to be
declared a free port.[74] Talleyrand, whilst favourable to the idea of
converting Antwerp into a Hanseatic town, was very much opposed to the
notion of assisting England to regain a footing upon the continent. It
would be too high a price to pay, he contended, even for so popular a
measure as the extension of the French frontiers into Belgium.[75]
Whilst Flahaut was thus engaged in London, Colonel the Marquis de
Lawoëstine, a former _aide-de-camp_ of Sébastiani and a Belgian of
good family, had been despatched to Brussels. In his case also the
precise object of his errand can only be surmised. It is clear,
however, that M. Juste[76] is mistaken in supposing that he was
sent to urge the national congress to elect the Duc de Nemours. "In
general," wrote Sébastiani to Bresson, when announcing the despatch of
Lawoëstine, "you must say as little as possible about his mission, but
you need make no mystery about it to Lord Ponsonby,"[77] a sentence
which precludes the possibility that his journey to Brussels can have
been connected with the election of a son of Louis Philippe. Without
doubt Lawoëstine was primarily charged to combat the candidature
of Leuchtenberg, but it would seem that he was directed quietly
to oppose Prince Charles of Naples to him. "It will be difficult,"
answered Bresson upon receipt of Sébastiani's despatch, "to keep
secret the object of Lawoëstine's mission. The candidature of Prince
Charles of Naples has been talked about and the factions in Paris are
working against him. Even M. de Mérode[78] is threatening to abandon
Prince Charles and to vote in favour of the Duc de Leuchtenberg."[79]
Lawoëstine, after "seeing all the chief people," appears to have
returned to Paris to lay before the King the urgency of the situation,
whilst the tone of Bresson's despatches, during the next few days,
became yet more alarming. The bust of the Duc de Leuchtenberg, he
reported, had been crowned at the theatre amidst cries of "_Vive
August 1^{er}, Roi des Belges_." Only, he considered, by the
nomination of the Duc de Nemours could Leuchtenberg be combated
effectually.[80] Bresson himself, probably on either January 25
or 26, seems to have paid a hurried visit to Paris. On February 1
the national congress was to proceed to elect a King for Belgium,
and, presumably, he wished to obtain fuller instructions as to the
attitude he was to adopt in the different eventualities which might
arise. By this time the 11th protocol of the London conference, that
of January 20, 1831, defining the boundaries of Holland and Belgium,
had been received by Lord Ponsonby and himself for communication to
the provisional government. The conditions of separation, as laid
down in that document, fell far short of the hopes of the Belgians.
They claimed the districts of Luxemburg and Limburg, but the Powers
assigned these provinces to Holland. The King of the Netherlands was
also Grand Duke of Luxemburg and as such was a member of the Germanic
Confederation. His position had been recognized by the conference
which, in its protocol of December 20, 1830, had formally declared
its incompetence to interfere with territories forming part of the
Confederation, a decision which excited equal dissatisfaction in Paris
and in Brussels. If she could not obtain Luxemburg for herself, France
hoped to see this province withdrawn from the Germanic Confederation
and handed over to Belgium.
On January 29 Bresson reported his return to Brussels, having
performed the journey from the French capital in twenty-five hours.
He would appear to have been empowered by Louis Philippe himself to
assure the members of the national congress that, were Nemours to be
elected, he would be allowed to accept the crown. It is probable,
however, that he was instructed only to resort to this step should
he find it impossible to oppose Leuchtenberg successfully by other
means. It may be inferred that neither Bresson nor Lawoëstine felt
any enthusiasm about the election of a Neapolitan Bourbon, and were
only too anxious to bestir themselves actively on behalf of a French
prince. "Ponsonby supports Leuchtenberg as leading up to the Prince
of Orange," wrote Bresson on the day of his return.[81] "The effect
of Lord Ponsonby's communication to the congress of the protocol of
January 20 has been very great," reported Lawoëstine, who also was
back in Brussels. "The only way of preventing the election of the Duc
de Leuchtenberg is by bringing forward the Duc de Nemours. Even at the
risk of a war with the Powers this course should be adopted. Belgium
would be with us heart and soul, and we should begin the campaign in
possession of the 23 frontier fortresses, all of which are provided
with an immense _matériel_."[82]
On receipt of this news from his agents at Brussels Sébastiani, in
order, presumably, to influence the national congress in favour of
the French candidate, despatched a letter to Bresson the contents
of which were intended for communication to the Belgian deputies.
In this document, dated February 1, Sébastiani stated that France
could not give her consent to the delimitation of frontiers or to
the apportionment of the debt, as laid down in the 11th and 12th
protocols of the London conference, unless these conditions should
be deemed satisfactory by both the States concerned. The French
government, holding that the conference had been convened for
purposes of mediation only, could not allow it to assume a different
character.[83] On February 3 the Duc de Nemours was elected King
of the Belgians, and a deputation started at once for Paris to
communicate the news officially to Louis Philippe.
In the meantime Sébastiani, on February 2, had informed Talleyrand
that, were the Belgians to elect a son of Louis Philippe for their
King, he would decline to accept the crown, but the occasion was to be
utilized for bringing forward the Prince of Naples. He was confident
that, in order to escape from the complications entailed by Nemours'
election, the Powers, at present hostile to the Neapolitan prince,
would look upon his enthronement as a happy alternative. On February 4
he again affirmed the King's intention of declining the crown for his
son, but his despatch of the following day was replete with complaints
of Ponsonby's efforts upon behalf of the Prince of Orange, a course of
conduct which, he declared, would inevitably lead to civil war. Were
serious disturbances to break out in Belgium, France would be driven
to intervene, and it was, therefore, necessary for Lords Grey and
Palmerston to understand that the situation was extremely critical.[84]
Talleyrand, however, was doing all in his power to convince his
government of the disastrous effect which the rumours from Brussels
were having upon public opinion in London. His declaration to the
conference, on February 7, that the King of the French would refuse
the crown of Belgium for his son had made a very good impression,
and it had induced the plenipotentiaries to guarantee that, were
Leuchtenberg to be elected, he would not be acknowledged by their
respective Courts.[85] But, on the same day, he reported that the
Cabinet, after a prolonged sitting, had resolved to declare war upon
France, should the crown of Belgium be accepted by Nemours, and he
begged Sébastiani to reflect most seriously upon the consequences of
a naval conflict. Bresson's behaviour at Brussels, he complained, had
placed him in a very difficult position, and if the King could not
see his way to follow his advice, his continued presence in London
could no longer serve any useful purpose, Montrond, who by his desire
was returning to Paris, would tell the King and his ministers that
in London, at the clubs and in society, the prospects of a war with
France were the chief topic of conversation.[86]
Although Louis Philippe and Sébastiani repeatedly assured Lord
Granville that there was no intention of accepting the crown for
Nemours,[87] it was not until February 17 that the King officially
received the members of the deputation and signified to them his
refusal. The interval, between their arrival in Paris and their
formal interview with Louis Philippe, appears to have been employed
in vain attempts to induce them to pronounce themselves in favour
of the Neapolitan prince. "We have tried to make them see," wrote
Sébastiani to Talleyrand, "the advantages which would accrue to all
parties from the enthronement of Prince Charles of Naples."[88]
But, in the meantime, his letter to Bresson of February 1, in which
he had declared that the French government could not adhere to the
11th and 12th protocols of the conference, had been published in the
Belgian newspapers and had caused Palmerston to instruct Granville to
demand an explanation. The ambassador was to point out that, "when
a government sees fit to disavow the acts of its plenipotentiary,
it should acquaint the parties with whom the engagement has been
made of the fact, not, as in this case, communicate its disavowal to
third parties." Palmerston's despatch concluded with the intimation
that "His Majesty's government had only allowed the conference to
continue because it was convinced that satisfactory explanations would
be forthcoming." Instructions of a like nature were received by the
Russian, the Prussian and the Austrian ambassadors."[89]
Sébastiani, whilst pretending that Bresson had no authority to make
public his letter, maintained that the London conference had no power
to do more than mediate between the contending parties, and that
France "could not be a member of a revised Holy Alliance which was
to decide arbitrarily upon the affairs of nations." Furthermore he
declined to recall M. Bresson from Brussels, unless Lord Ponsonby
were removed at the same time.[90] Fresh instances were soon
forthcoming, however, of Bresson's opposition to the decisions of the
conference of which he was nominally the agent. Since the conclusion
of the armistice between the Belgians and the Dutch, disputes had
been frequent as to the infractions of its conditions. The Dutch,
in violation of the terms imposed by the Powers, held the citadel
of Antwerp and closed the navigation of the Scheldt, whilst, as a
reprisal, the Belgians set up a blockade of Maëstricht. The conference
had, in consequence, instructed its representatives at Brussels to
warn the provisional government that, unless communications were
opened between Maëstricht and the surrounding country, the Federal
Diet would be invited to raise the blockade by force of arms. But
M. Bresson, alleging as a reason for his conduct _des motifs à lui
personnels_, declined to sign the note which Lord Ponsonby duly
presented to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.[91] Lord
Granville was in consequence directed to inform Sébastiani that the
conference could no longer regard M. Bresson as its agent.[92] When
the contents of Palmerston's despatch were read out to him Sébastiani
declared that he should retain him at Brussels as French minister.[93]
This was, however, but an empty threat. Bresson, since Louis
Philippe's refusal to allow his son to be proclaimed King, was most
unpleasantly situated towards the members of the national congress,
to whom he had given the most positive assurances that, were Nemours
to be elected, he would be permitted to accept the crown. It is very
probable that in order to overcome the hesitation of his government he
may deliberately have expressed exaggerated fears about the prospects
of Leuchtenberg's enthronement. The complete subsidence[94] of the
agitation on behalf of the Bonapartist candidate certainly accords ill
with the alarming reports about the strength of the movement in his
favour which he had transmitted to Sébastiani. But it would appear
that when he paid his visit to Paris, at the end of January, he was
himself deceived by Louis Philippe, and that his promises to the
Belgian deputies, that Nemours would accept the crown, were made under
the honest impression that the King's objection had been withdrawn.
"You know the august mouth from which issued my last orders," he
wrote to Sébastiani on February 9. "You heard them. Do not fear,
they shall remain hidden at the bottom of my heart. But I cannot go
back upon my footsteps. I cannot be the agent of another change of
policy. I must ask you to replace me. I can sacrifice my interests,
not my honour."[95] "The painful and difficult situation in which
you are placed," answered Sébastiani, "is well understood here, but
the King does full justice to your conduct and to your zeal for his
service."[96]
On March 6 Bresson formally transmitted to London his resignation of
the post of commissioner to the conference and returned to Paris,
being replaced at Brussels, as the agent of the French government,
by General Belliard. The rapid advancement which awaited him was to
compensate him amply for the loss of this appointment. But it was not
alone from foreign governments that Sébastiani received complaints
about these proceedings at Brussels. Talleyrand expressed the greatest
indignation at the ignorance in which he had been kept of the
instructions sent to Bresson. The whole affair, he pointed out, had
placed him in a false position with Palmerston and the ministers of
the Powers, and had laid him open to the most injurious suspicions.
It must appear either that he was unacquainted with the intentions of
his government, or that he was in league with Bresson to deceive the
conference.[97]
In the meantime, Paris had been the scene of disturbances which were
to change completely the course of French policy. On February 14, the
anniversary of the death of the Duc de Berri, the Carlists decided to
hold a memorial service in the church of Saint-Germain-l'Auxerrois.
But the ceremony was interrupted by a mob, which had collected at the
rumour that a portrait of the Duc de Bordeaux[98] had been crowned.
The church and the palace of the archbishop were sacked, and much
valuable and beautiful property was destroyed. The authorities made
only the feeblest attempts to restrain the rioters, and cast the
whole blame for the disorder upon the Carlists.[99] Moreover, as a
concession to the rabble, all crosses were removed from in front of
churches, the bust of Louis XVIII. was destroyed at the Louvre, and
Louis Philippe even sanctioned the erasure of the lilies from his
coat of arms. The indignation with which these despicable signs of
weakness were greeted, soon convinced him, however, that he might
with safety abandon his policy of truckling to the mob. For some time
past, the hopes of all lovers of order had been centred in, Casimir
Périer, as the one man capable of maintaining peace abroad, and of
combating anarchy at home. Negotiations were accordingly begun, and,
on March 14, the _Moniteur_ announced that Laffitte had been replaced
as President of the Council by Casimir Périer, who had, besides,
assumed the duties of Minister of the Interior. With two exceptions
the members of the new Cabinet had all held office in the Laffitte
administration. But so little were the rules of the party system
observed, that they were quite prepared to enter a government, formed
upon principles diametrically opposed to those which had guided the
policy of the former Cabinet. Casimir Périer was pledged to the stern
repression of internal disorder, and to the maintenance of external
peace. In addition, he had asked that the King should be absent from
meetings of the Cabinet--request to which Louis Philippe had given a
grudging and a qualified assent.[100]
The news that M. Casimir Périer had assumed office was received
with feelings of intense relief at the Courts and in the Cabinets
of Europe.[101] The new President of the Council belonged to a
family of high repute in banking and commercial circles. Under the
Restoration he had been an eloquent and much respected member of the
Liberal party. Heinrich Heine, who disliked the French as keenly as
he admired the English statesman, has declared that Casimir Périer
strangely resembled George Canning in personal appearance. In both
he perceived the same expression of "invalidity, over-excitement and
lassitude."[102] Sébastiani's continued retention of the portfolio of
Foreign Affairs was also a subject for congratulation. In spite of his
Corsican excitability, he had, upon the whole, won the confidence of
the ministers with whom he had had business to transact. "The Dips,"
wrote Lady Granville to her sister, "are all pleased that Sébastiani
remains, he is decidedly pacific."[103]
The state of affairs in Europe, at the time of the formation of
Casimir Périer's government, still bore a most disquieting appearance.
At the beginning of February, 1831, General Diebitsch entered Poland
at the head of a strong Russian army, and, on the 25th, there was
fought at Grochov one of the fiercest battles of the century, with
results rather favourable to the Poles. At the same time the Italian
States were in a condition of acute discontent. The Duke of Modena
had been compelled to invoke Austrian assistance against his revolted
subjects, and, on February 5, the _Carbonari_ raised the standard of
rebellion at Bologna. The States of the Pope extended from the Latin
coast across the Campagna to the marches of Ancona, and, spreading out
into the plains of Romagna, were bounded by the Po. In the opinion of
Chateaubriand,[104] who was ambassador at Rome in 1828, one of the
chief defects of the Papal government lay in the fact that "old men
appoint an old man, and he in turn makes none but old men cardinals."
This feature of the Pontifical rule seems to have attracted the
attention of Charles Greville[105] when he visited Rome, in 1830. "The
cardinals," he records, "appear a wretched set of old twaddlers, all
but about three in extreme decrepitude. On seeing them and knowing
that the sovereign is elected by and from them, nobody can wonder
that the country is so miserably governed." But it was the doctrine
that only ecclesiastics could administer a government of divine
appointment which constituted the radical vice of the Papal system.
Cardinals ruled over the four Legations of Romagna--Bologna, Ferrara,
Ravenna and Forli. Generally speaking, their administration was both
bigoted and corrupt. The finances were constantly in a condition of
hopeless confusion--a circumstance hardly to be wondered at, seeing
that a prelate in charge of the Exchequer is said to have refused to
study political economy, because some of the text books were upon
the _Index_. The roads were bad, few in number, and infested with
brigands. Taxation was light, but trade was hampered by customs
barriers. An arbitrary and interfering police system was supplemented
by the Holy Office of the Inquisition, which still repressed heresy
among Roman subjects, although it did not venture to meddle with
foreigners. Lastly, it was estimated that not more than two _per
cent._ of the population attended school.
Bologna was the most flourishing manufacturing town in the dominions
of His Holiness, and Ancona the only port which could boast of a
real trade. Probably it was because of their comparative prosperity
that the people of Romagna were in a chronic state of unrest. The
Pontifical troops, sent to suppress the insurrection, quickly proved
their inability to carry out the task, and His Holiness appealed to
Vienna for assistance. Sébastiani, so soon as he received intelligence
that this request had been made, instructed Marshal Maison to warn
Metternich that France could not consent to the entry of Austrian
troops into the Papal States, and, on February 24, he informed Apponyi
in Paris that, in accordance with its principle of non-intervention,
the French government would regard the passage of the Piedmontese or
Roman frontiers by an Imperial army as a declaration of war.[106]
But Metternich had already sent off the Comte Athanase d'Otrante, a
son of Fouché, the famous regicide and Minister of Police, to Paris,
with documents to prove that the Italian insurrections were fomented
by the Bonapartists. It was always in the power of Austria, he
pointed out significantly, to put an end to the republican agitation
in Italy, Spain, Germany or France, by simply allowing the Duc de
Reichstadt, the heretofore King of Rome, to be proclaimed Emperor
of the French.[107] It was perfectly true that the Bonapartes were
concerned in the Italian revolutionary movement. Both Prince Charles
and his brother Prince Louis Napoleon held commands in the rebel army
at Civita Castellana. Without doubt this was a circumstance calculated
to induce Louis Philippe to exercise the greatest caution. It was
decided, accordingly, to despatch the Comte de Sainte-Aulaire to Rome
to urge upon the Papal government the expediency of withdrawing from
ecclesiastics the administration of the provincial affairs of Romagna,
and of confiding the management of local business to the nobility and
middle classes. Maison was to press the Cabinet of Vienna to join
with France in persuading His Holiness to inaugurate these reforms,
whilst in London Talleyrand was to seek to obtain the co-operation of
the British government. Palmerston, who looked upon the condition of
Italy as a perpetual menace to the peace of Europe, readily consented
to instruct Sir Brooke Taylor, the British Minister at Florence, to
proceed to Rome to take part in the conference.[108] Metternich agreed
with equal alacrity to the French proposals. But it was not his policy
to allow reforms of any kind to be introduced into Italy, and he was
fully resolved that the deliberations should lead to no results of any
consequence. "We risk nothing," he wrote to Apponyi. . . . "Count
Lützow[109] is a man of character, he knows what is practicable."[110]
But the good effect of Metternich's consent to confer with the Powers,
upon the condition of affairs, in the Papal States, was dispelled
by a false report which reached Paris of the conclusion of a treaty
between Austria and His Holiness. This news was followed, on March
18, by the intelligence that an Imperial army had entered Bologna.
War, Sébastiani informed Granville, was now inevitable. Nevertheless,
in the evening, when the ambassador read over to him the account of
their conversation which he proposed to send to London, he suggested
that the words "war was very probable" should be substituted for his
statement that "war was inevitable."[111] For the next fortnight the
situation continued to wear a most critical appearance. At a Cabinet
Council, held on March 28, it was resolved to demand the evacuation
of the Papal States, and to ask the Chambers for a vote of credit, to
enable the King to mobilize the army. Casimir Périer,[112] however,
reassured Lord Granville by telling him that the Austrians would
assuredly have crushed the insurrection in Romagna before Maison's
instructions could reach Vienna, and that the message to the Chambers,
far from being a measure calculated to bring about war, would, on
the contrary, assist the King to preserve peace. Were the government
to appear indifferent to the entry of the Austrians into the Papal
States, the military party would at once raise the cry that ministers
wanted peace at any price. Louis Philippe himself expressed to the
British ambassador the greatest confidence that hostilities would
be avoided. The preservation of the temporal power of the Pope,
he went on to tell him, was a cardinal feature of French policy.
Five or six millions of his subjects professed the Roman Catholic
religion,[113] and he was determined to remain upon good terms with
the head of the Church.[114] The King of Prussia, Lord Granville was
satisfied, was resolved to take no part in the struggle, should the
Austrian intervention in Italy lead to a collision with France.[115]
Heytesbury, on the other hand, reported that Nicholas, although the
cholera was raging in Russia and notwithstanding that he had still
the Polish war upon his hands, had announced his determination "to
bring the whole force of his Empire to the assistance of his Austrian
ally."[116] But Metternich, in the meanwhile, had empowered Apponyi
to declare that no treaty had been concluded, and to support his
statement by the production of a copy of His Holiness' appeal for
help to the Emperor Francis. Moreover, he promised that the Legations
should be evacuated "as soon as they should have been purged of the
_Carbonari_ vermin with which they were infested."[117] In effect the
Austrians experienced little difficulty in dispersing the insurgents
and in restoring a semblance of tranquillity in the disturbed
districts, whilst at Rome His Holiness undertook to initiate certain
reforms, in accordance with the spirit of the proposals which the
western Powers urged him to adopt. By July 17 the complete withdrawal
of the Imperial troops from the territories of the Pope had been
carried out.
The effect of Casimir Périer's assumption of office upon the course
of the Belgian negotiations was soon apparent. Nothing more was
heard of the candidature of Prince Charles of Naples. "As a member of
the elder branch of the Bourbons, France," wrote Sébastiani, "would
reject him with indignation."[118] Under these circumstances the
French government decided to exert its influence in favour of Leopold
of Coburg, although his enthronement, Louis Philippe assured Lord
Granville, would not be well received in France. He will be looked
upon as an English viceroy, but, insinuated the King, the nation
could be reconciled to the choice of this prince, were it possible
to announce that those portions of her northern territory, of which
she had been deprived by the treaties of 1815, were to be restored to
France.[119]
Leopold, the youngest son of Francis Duke of Coburg, was born in
1790. On May 2, 1816, he married the only daughter of George IV., the
Princess Charlotte, who died the following year, five hours after
giving birth to a dead child. As a widower, the Prince continued to
live in England in enjoyment of the pension of £50,000 a year which
Parliament had settled upon him for life. In 1829 he was chosen
by the Powers for the throne of Greece, but, after signifying his
acceptation of the crown, he saw fit to change his mind, alleging
that the frontiers, which the conference purposed to impose upon the
new State, were regarded as unsatisfactory by the Greek nation. There
would appear to have been good reasons for his withdrawal, but it,
nevertheless, caused the greatest annoyance to the Tories who were
then in office. The Whigs, although less bitter against the _Marquis
Peu-à-Peu_, as George IV. nicknamed him, had certainly no very high
opinion of his ability to fill a difficult position.[120] It was
clear, however, that all hope must be abandoned of inducing the
Belgians to accept the Prince of Orange for their King. This Prince
had been spending the winter in London where, according to Greville,
"he made a great fool of himself and destroyed any sympathy there
might have been for his political misfortunes."[121] In the words
of Talleyrand, Palmerston was, in consequence, prepared to accept
"_sans chaleur_,"[122] the candidature of Leopold of Coburg, whilst
maintaining that, before electing their Sovereign, the Belgians must
adhere to the 11th and 12th protocols, which laid down the conditions
under which their country was to be separated from Holland.[123]
On April 17 Talleyrand was in a position to announce to the conference
that France now gave her unqualified assent to the proposed terms of
separation. On this occasion it was resolved, at the suggestion of
the French plenipotentiary, that, should Belgium decline to adhere
to the conditions in question, which the King of the Netherlands had
accepted, all relations should be broken off between the five Powers
and the Belgian authorities. To prove the satisfaction which this
changed attitude on the part of the French government afforded them
the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, Russia and Great Britain
met, and recorded their agreement to the principle of the destruction
of the barrier fortresses, the protocol of this conference of the four
Powers being communicated in confidence to Talleyrand.[124]
The question of the nature of the coercion which should be applied
to the Belgians, should they persist in laying claim to Luxemburg,
was not easy of solution. The Grand Duchy formed part of the Germanic
Confederation, and therefore it should have devolved upon the Federal
Diet to take the steps required for restoring the sovereignty of the
King of the Netherlands. Sébastiani, however, deprecated the idea of
employing German troops for the purpose of enforcing the decisions
of the conference. But on the understanding that both the strength
of the contingent, which was to enter Belgium, and the date on which
the military operations were to begin should be settled by the five
Powers, the French government withdrew its objections.[125] Prince
Leopold, at the same time, informed the members of the deputation,
who had come to London to offer him the crown of Belgium, that he
could not listen to their proposals, until the national congress
should have accepted the conditions of the 11th and 12th protocols.
No persuasion could move him from this resolution which met with the
full approval of the British government. Talleyrand, however, as a
compromise appears to have suggested the plan of proposing to the
King of the Netherlands the cession of the province of Luxemburg,
without the fortress, in return for a pecuniary indemnity.[126]
This solution of the difficulty was considered so practicable by
Lord Ponsonby that, upon his own responsibility, he left Brussels
and journeyed to London to urge its adoption. The conference, in
consequence of his representations, agreed to open negotiations
with the King of the Netherlands for the purchase of Luxemburg and
for "so much of the province of Limburg as would connect Maëstricht
with North Brabant."[127] But when June 1, the date which had been
assigned as that on which the Belgians must signify their agreement
to _les bases de separation_, went by without a favourable answer
having been received from Brussels, the conference withdrew Ponsonby
and decided to resort to measures of coercion. The action of the
national congress, in electing Prince Leopold King of the Belgians on
June 4, had no effect upon the decision of the Powers. "It has been
used," wrote Palmerston, "as a fresh opportunity for putting forward
pretensions to portions of the territory of the King of Holland and
by implication, at least, of repeating their determination to gain
possession of them by force."[128]
But, as the moment approached for setting in motion General Hinüber's
Federal _corps d'armée_, the French government evinced symptoms
of alarm. Sébastiani begged Talleyrand to try by all means in his
power to discover some less objectionable method of terminating
the difficulty. The King and his ministers, he assured him, placed
their entire trust in his wisdom and vast experience.[129] Casimir
Périer impressed upon Lord Granville that he would be powerless to
restrain the army, were the Prussians and the Dutch to attack the
Belgians "ranged under the tricolour." "Sufficient allowance," he
pleaded, "was not made for the weakness of a government sprung from a
revolution."[130] Talleyrand, however, reported that, in spite of his
efforts and of those of Prince Leopold to make the Belgians listen
to reason, they refused obstinately to accept the conditions imposed
upon them. At the Hague there was, he believed, a keen desire to bring
on a general war, whilst the Tsar Nicholas was not sorry that the
attention of the western Powers should be diverted from Poland to the
Low Countries. In England men's minds were concentrated exclusively
upon the Reform Bill, and the knowledge that France and Great Britain
were confronted by grave domestic problems undoubtedly encouraged
the Belgians to defy the conference. Under these circumstances, his
favourite scheme, the partition of the country, appeared to him the
only practicable solution of the question. But on this occasion the
idea of acquiring some part of Belgium offered no attractions to the
French government. "We are disposed to think," answered Sébastiani,
"that any partition would recall that of Poland, and would not be
popular."[131]
The determination of the Powers to impose by force of arms the terms
of the protocols of January 20 and 27 was, however, growing weaker.
In their desire to avoid a general war they agreed to depart from a
decision, which they had once pronounced to be irrevocable. The event
was to prove that by this concession they had sensibly increased the
danger of that armed conflict between the nations, which they were so
anxious to avert. At the sitting of the conference, on June 26, the
plenipotentiaries, "in the interests of the general peace," affixed
their signatures to a protocol of eighteen articles for acceptance
by Holland and Belgium.[132] The altered conditions, although they
did not fulfil all their aspirations, were far more favourable to the
Belgians than the terms of the former _bases de_ _séparation_. The
most important modification consisted in a provision for maintaining
a _status quo_ in Luxemburg, pending the negotiations which were to
be carried out between Belgium, on the one hand, and Holland and
the Germanic Confederation, on the other. Prince Leopold, when the
protocol of the eighteen articles was laid before him, agreed to
accept the crown provided, always, that the national congress could
be brought to assent to the new conditions which it set forth. After
several stormy debates in the assembly this stipulation was complied
with, and on July 11, a deputation arrived in London to conduct the
King to Belgium.
Leopold had been assured that, even should the King of the Netherlands
decline to accept the eighteen articles, the Powers would none the
less recognize him as the Sovereign of Belgium. But, when the refusal
of King William was known in London, the plenipotentiaries of Austria,
Prussia and Russia declared that their respective governments had
decided to withhold their recognition of him. Leopold, however, wisely
determined to adhere to his resolution and to be satisfied with the
acknowledgment of France and Great Britain. Before finally leaving
London he informed Lord Grey of his intention to renounce his English
pension. Claremont was to be kept up and all his debts were to be
paid, but, when these conditions had been fulfilled, his trustees
would pay the balance of his annuity into the English exchequer.
His decision to act in this manner was quickened, without doubt,
by learning that in the House of Lords, Londonderry, an Opposition
peer, purposed to raise the question of his retention of his English
pension.[133]
During the month of July an affair of some delicacy was amicably
settled between the Cabinets of London and Paris. For some time
past the government of M. Périer had been trying to obtain redress
for the indignities to which French subjects, especially those
suspected of affiliation to masonic lodges, were exposed in Portugal.
Palmerston admitted the justice of the French complaints and raised no
objections when it was proposed to send a fleet to Lisbon to demand
satisfaction.[134] On July 8, accordingly, Admiral Roussin forced the
entrance to the Tagus and ranged his squadron within gunshot of the
quays of Lisbon. The Portuguese government, under these circumstances,
was compelled to accede to the demands which the admiral had been
instructed to make, and the French fleet, shortly afterwards,
withdrew, carrying off with it, however, several Portuguese vessels of
war. But, although the affair gave rise to no complications between
England and France, it was seized upon by an embittered Opposition in
London, as an opportunity for denouncing the failure of the government
to protect England's "most ancient ally."[135]
The refusal of the King of the Netherlands to accept the new
conditions of separation, as defined in the protocol of the eighteen
articles, was communicated to the conference by the Dutch minister,
Verstolk. The despatch, dated July 12, 1831, concluded with the menace
that, "were any Prince to accept the crown of Belgium without having
acceded to _les bases de séparation_ as laid down in the protocol of
January 20, he would be regarded as in a state of war with His Majesty
and as his enemy."[136] The representatives of the Powers appear to
have treated these ominous words very lightly. An intimation was
conveyed to the Hague that hostilities must not break out afresh, but
no active measures were taken to prevent a rupture of the peace. It
was soon evident, however, that the King was fully resolved to put
his threat into execution. On August 1, Chassé, the Dutch general
commanding the citadel of Antwerp, denounced the armistice and gave
notice that hostilities would begin on the 4th. Leopold at once
appealed for help to France and England, and then placed himself at
the head of a wing of his army upon the Scheldt. But the retreat of
General Daine, commanding the Belgian division upon the Meuse, who
abandoned his positions without firing a shot, compelled the King to
fall back to Louvain. Here he made his dispositions for withstanding
the Dutch inroad, but, in spite of the gallant example which he set
his men, his army, at the first contact with the enemy, fled in wild
confusion. In the meantime, however, Marshal Gérard had entered
Belgium in command of 50,000 French troops, and, when Leopold was
upon the point of being surrounded, Sir Robert Adair, the British
minister at Brussels, prevailed upon the Prince of Orange to suspend
hostilities. The Dutch, shortly afterwards, began their retreat
closely followed by the French, and, by August 20, the last of the
invaders had evacuated the territory of Belgium.
It had been an easy matter to bring the actual hostilities to a close,
but the Dutch raid had none the less created precisely that situation
which British diplomacy had always striven to avoid. The French were
now in complete possession of Belgium. Palmerston, indeed, strongly
suspected them of having instigated the King of the Netherlands to
break the peace. Sir Richard Bagot, the British ambassador at the
Hague, inclined to the belief that a secret understanding existed
between the Dutch and French governments. "Talleyrand," wrote
Palmerston in a private letter to Granville, "proposed to me some time
ago that we should goad the Dutch on to break the armistice, cry
out shame upon them, fly to the aid of the Belgians, cover Belgium
with troops and settle everything as we choose." "It would seem,"
reported Granville, "that the King of Holland rather expected from the
French government approbation than opposition to his invasion."[137]
It is not improbable that the Cabinet of the Hague may have been
led to believe that a rupture of the armistice would meet with
approval in Paris. But, in order to have furthered French designs,
it should have taken place at an earlier date. Talleyrand's proposal
to Palmerston, it is clear, must have been made in June, when he was
telling Sébastiani that he could devise no other plan for settling
the question of Belgium but that of partition. Once Leopold had been
enthroned, however, he knew full well that no British government
could acquiesce in the appropriation by France of any portion of his
kingdom. The Dutch invasion, which might have served French policy,
had it occurred whilst matters were still unsettled in Belgium, became
simply an embarrassment and a certain cause of discord between France
and England, after Leopold's arrival at Brussels.[138] Talleyrand,
therefore, who regarded the maintenance of cordial relations between
the two countries as an object of far higher importance that any
extension of French frontiers into Belgium, strove by all means in
his power to second the efforts of the British government to bring
the French occupation to a close as speedily as possible. But, whilst
Palmerston attributed to French intrigues the Dutch attack upon
Belgium, he himself was suspected by Stockmar[139] of having known of
the King of Holland's plans and of having connived at the invasion. A
few weeks later, however, when in London upon a confidential mission,
Leopold's trusted counsellor satisfied himself that Palmerston was
wholly innocent of any double dealing in the affair.
Casimir Périer had been on the point of resigning, in consequence of
the defeat of the ministerial candidate for the post of President of
the Chamber, when the news reached Paris of the Dutch inroad into
Belgium. This new development at once caused him to change his plans
and to decide to remain in office. Talleyrand was instructed to
explain in London that it was only the necessity for immediate action
which had induced the French government to order a French corps to
enter Belgium, without previous consultation with the Powers. Lord
Granville, at the same time, was informed that, upon the withdrawal of
the Dutch, the French troops would return to France.[140] The news of
the French intervention in Belgium aroused great excitement in London.
The funds fell, and Palmerston was sharply questioned upon the matter
in the House.[141] Ministers, however, reassured by the accounts of
the intentions of the French government transmitted by Granville, took
a cheerful view of the situation.[142] At a sitting of the conference,
on August 6, Talleyrand announced that Marshal Gérard's occupation of
Belgium would cease directly the Dutch should evacuate the country.
On this same occasion it was agreed that the scope of the French
operations should be decided by the conference and that, under no
circumstances, should they be extended to the right bank of the Meuse.
It was further resolved that siege should not be laid to either
Maëstricht or Venlo, on account of their proximity to the Prussian
frontier.[143]
But, when the Dutch withdrew and the French showed no disposition to
follow their example, the affair began to assume a very different
complexion. Sébastiani, changing his ground completely, declared that
Marshal Gérard's occupation must continue until the conclusion of a
definite treaty of peace between Holland and Belgium. In the Chamber,
Soult, the Minister of War, stated explicitly that the retreat of the
Dutch did not entail the evacuation of Belgium by the French army.
The unfavourable impression created by these words was not removed
by Casimir Périer's promise to Lord Granville, that he would say
something from the tribune calculated to diminish the importance of
the Marshal's pronouncement. Sébastiani's conversations with the
British ambassador, and the reports forwarded by Adair from Brussels
made it too clear that the French government purposed to avail itself
of the presence of its troops in Belgium for coming to a separate
agreement with King Leopold, respecting the immediate destruction of
the frontier fortresses. This was an arrangement which the Cabinet of
Lord Grey was determined to oppose, even to the point of war.[144]
Talleyrand, as was his invariable practise in these disputes between
France and England, left no stone unturned to dissuade his government
from embarking upon a course of conduct destined inevitably to revive
the old rivalry between the two countries. Were France to break her
word and to retain her troops in Belgium, he was convinced that
Lord Grey and his colleagues would be driven from office and their
successors would be men far less well disposed towards France.
Palmerston, he wrote, was assailed by questions in the House and
must before long make some definite statement. Sébastiani, in reply,
expressed regret for the difficulties by which Lord Grey was beset,
but maintained that the French government, were it to allow the army
to return home empty handed, would be confronted by a still more
unpleasant situation. Talleyrand, however, might announce that, in
consequence of the retirement of the Dutch, 20,000 of Marshal Gérard's
troops would be recalled and that the remaining 30,000 would be
concentrated at Nivelle.[145] The news of this partial evacuation
caused much satisfaction in London, but none the less Palmerston, on
August 17, instructed Lord Granville formally to demand the complete
withdrawal of the French army corps. He was directed to remind the
French government of its pledges and to point out that, by the
protocol of April 17, the four Powers had agreed to the principle
of the destruction of the frontier fortresses, "the satisfactory
execution of which arrangement could only be impeded by any measures
having the appearance of making the protracted occupation of Belgium
by the French army bear upon it. . . ." He was to speak "in terms
of friendship and goodwill, enforcing at the same time the just
expectations of His Majesty with firmness and decision."[146]
On August 23 the conference decided to impose an armistice upon
the Dutch and Belgians, to expire on October 10.[147] The French
government, however, declared that a mere undertaking by the King of
the Netherlands, not to begin hostilities afresh, could not provide a
guarantee for the maintenance of peace of sufficient weight to permit
of the complete withdrawal of the French army. General Baudrand,
moreover, was sent to London with a letter from Louis Philippe to
Talleyrand, in which the King expressed his displeasure with his
action in signing a document of that nature. Baudrand during his
stay in England had interviews both with Grey and Palmerston.[148]
He appears to have expatiated upon the outcry which would be raised
in the Chamber, were France to gain neither moral nor material
advantages, in return for the expense to which she had been put by her
intervention in aid of the King of the Belgians. Palmerston assured
him that his colleagues and himself were sincerely anxious that M.
Casimir Périer should remain in office, but, he added pointedly,
"when to keep in a ministry of peace it became necessary to comply
with the demands of the party which was for war, it was problematical
what decree of advantage was thereby to be acquired."[149] Talleyrand
appears to have been little moved by the censure passed upon him. He
contended that he had acted for the best, and that no fears need be
entertained that the Dutch would again attack Belgium. At the same
time he continued to urge the necessity of bringing the occupation
of Belgium to a close. "There is more real anxiety over here than I
have yet seen," he wrote on August 27. "People are all talking of an
interview between the Duke of Wellington and Lord Grey." A few days
later he again pleaded earnestly for evacuation, suggesting that the
withdrawal of the troops might be carried out so slowly that some
portion of them should still be in Belgium, at the expiration of the
armistice.[150]
In the meantime General La Tour-Maubourg had arrived at Brussels,
on August 18, furnished with the draft of a treaty which he was to
conclude with the Belgian government for the destruction of the
barrier fortresses. In the first instance it was probably intended
to keep his mission a secret, but different counsels seem to have
prevailed, and, a few days after his departure, Sébastiani informed
Granville of the reason of this officer's journey to Brussels. France,
he told the British ambassador, claimed the right to negotiate with
regard to the fortresses and it was hoped that powers would be given
to Sir Robert Adair to act with La Tour-Maubourg in the matter. This
request, when in due course Granville transmitted it to London, was
refused. Palmerston, in a long interview with Talleyrand, had already
declared, in the most uncompromising language, that the pretensions of
the French government to have a voice in determining the fate of these
fortresses, erected at the expense of Great Britain, Russia, Austria
and Prussia, could not be entertained.[151] Immediately on hearing of
La Tour-Maubourg's arrival at Brussels Sir Robert Adair, guessing the
object of his mission, sought an audience with Leopold. Both to the
King and to Meulinäer, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, he asserted
emphatically that his government could never admit that the withdrawal
of Gérard's troops could be made to depend upon the conclusion of an
arrangement between France and Belgium, respecting the fortresses.[152]
Leopold was in a most difficult situation. Although he had
invoked the assistance of France and England the moment the Dutch
had announced their intention of beginning hostilities, he had
only invited Marshal Gérard actually to cross the frontier when
the misconduct of General Daine had seriously compromised his
position.[153] He appears to have greatly distrusted the intentions
of the French and to have proposed that England should occupy Antwerp
in the name of the five Powers. Three days later, however, he desired
Sir Robert Adair to consider this suggestion as withdrawn, stating
that he was satisfied with Belliard's assurances that the French
would withdraw, as soon as the Dutch should have effected their
retreat.[154] After the retirement of the Prince of Orange he was
pressed, on the one side, by Sir Robert Adair to declare that he no
longer required the presence of the French for his protection, whilst,
on the other hand, General Belliard urged him no less vigorously to
invite Marshal Gérard to remain in Belgium. Without doubt he was in
a most cruel dilemma. He had no army worthy of the name, and was at
the mercy of the Dutch should they return to the attack. Moreover,
he had every reason to apprehend that the Republican and Orangist
factions would regard the disturbed condition, to which the invasion
had reduced the country, as a favourable opportunity for putting their
designs into execution. Against the external and internal perils by
which he was threatened he could only look for active assistance to
the French. England was very jealous of French intervention in the
Low Countries, but he had no grounds for supposing that Lord Grey
would stir a finger to defend him from a rebellion of his subjects.
The British government, indeed, had declined to send the fleet to the
mouth of the Scheldt. The desire to afford the French no pretext
for remaining in Belgium undoubtedly dictated this refusal, which
nevertheless increased Stockmar's distrust of Palmerston's policy.
Adair soon discovered that, in his endeavours to obtain the speedy
departure of the French, he could expect no assistance from Leopold.
He could discern, he reported, no sense of shame nor of humiliation in
the attitude of ministers or of the people generally. They appeared to
regard the presence of Marshal Gérard's troops simply as a means of
extorting better terms from the Dutch.[155]
When Palmerston was informed of La Tour-Maubourg's mission he at once
directed Adair to remonstrate against any separate negotiation between
France and Belgium, on the question of the fortresses. But his first
interview with Meulinäer, after the receipt of his instructions,
convinced Adair that "this delicate matter had already proceeded so
far that no choice was left to him except to object _in toto_ to every
sort of communication on the subject." A solution of the difficulty
was discovered, however, in a suggestion, brought forward by the
British minister, that "the King of the Belgians should declare to
the King of the French, through M. de La Tour-Maubourg, that he was
taking measures, in concert with Great Britain, Austria, Russia and
Prussia, for the demolition of some of the fortresses erected since
1815." A few days later Adair was informed that General Goblet would
be despatched to London to negotiate a convention, whilst Leopold, on
September 8, affixed his signature to a document, wherein he undertook
to instruct his plenipotentiary to act in accordance with the wishes
of the French government in the matter of the selection of the
fortresses to be dismantled.[156]
But in Paris the ambassadors of the four Powers had protested formally
against the protracted occupation of Belgium by a French army.
Palmerston, in forwarding to Granville a memorandum of the points he
was to urge in his conference with Sébastiani, directed that this
document "was not to be handed to that minister as a note, but that
it was to be read to him confidentially . . . a course which has been
adopted out of delicacy, and under the conviction that we shall hear
in a few days that the French government has, of its own accord, given
orders for the evacuation of Belgium."[157] These representations
obtained the desired effect. At Brussels Leopold suddenly discovered
that the presence of Marshal Gérard's soldiers were no longer
necessary for his safety.[158] The announcement in the _Moniteur_,
of September 15, of the ministerial decision to recall the army from
Belgium was the signal for a violent outburst in the newspapers
against the poltroonery of the government, in yielding to the
dictation of the conference.[159] In London satisfaction at the French
withdrawal was marred by the publication of a long list of officers,
appointed by Marshal Soult, to inspect and organize the Belgian army.
This circumstance was seized upon by the Opposition as an opportunity
for attacking the foreign policy of the government. The Reform Bill
was before the House of Lords and party spirit was running high. "King
Leopold's intention to employ French officers in his army," declared
Lord Londonderry, "was more prejudicial to his independence than
the retention of 12,000 French troops in Belgium." His Lordship then
proceeded to review Talleyrand's career, and to asperse his conduct,
under the various _régimes_ which he had served, with a virulence of
language which has never since been used in that dignified assembly
about the ambassador of a friendly Power. "There was a flirtation," he
asserted amidst much laughter, "going on between the government and
France which he thought most improper. . . . To see ministers running
to consult with that individual (Talleyrand) was creating a disgust
which he thought most natural." The Duke of Wellington, however, spoke
up strongly for Talleyrand. In the many transactions upon which they
had been engaged together, he assured the House that the Prince had
always conducted himself with honour and uprightness. "He believed
that no man's public and private character had been so much maligned
as that of that illustrious individual."[160] Talleyrand was deeply
moved by the Duke's conduct on this occasion. "He was especially
grateful to him," he told Lord Alvanley, who the next day found him
perusing an account of the debate, "because he was the only public man
in the world who had ever said a good word for him."[161]
Following closely upon the announcement that the French government had
agreed to evacuate Belgium came the intelligence of the defeat of the
Poles and of the entry of the Russians into Warsaw. The news was the
signal for the outbreak of disturbances in Paris. Sébastiani's famous
statement to the Chamber "_l'ordre règne à Varsovie_," was denounced
with indignation by the demagogues. Both he and Casimir Périer were
surrounded by a furious mob upon the Place Vendôme, and were for a
time in no little danger. The rioters interrupted the performances at
the theatres, crying out that all places of amusement must be closed
on a day of mourning. The marked reluctance of the national guards
to act against their fellow-citizens imparted a serious aspect to
the situation. But the regular troops retained their discipline and
dispersed the rabble.[162] At the first outbreak of the rebellion
in Poland the French government had sought to induce England to
join with it in a proposal to mediate between the Emperor and his
revolted subjects. Talleyrand, however, who was always disposed to
create difficulties for Russia, was obliged to report regretfully
that British ministers were extremely averse to embarking upon any
diplomatic action calculated to add to the Tsar's embarrassments.[163]
In March, 1831, a false report had reached London and Paris of the
total defeat of the Poles, whereupon Sébastiani again instructed
Talleyrand to urge, in the most pressing language, the British
government to unite with France in insisting upon the humane treatment
of the rebels. Palmerston, believing the insurrection to be at an
end, readily promised to direct Lord Heytesbury to support the
representations upon their behalf which the Duc de Mortemart had been
enjoined to make at St. Petersburg.[164] Heytesbury, accordingly,
intimated to Count Nesselrode that, were any measures to be adopted
towards Poland at variance with existing engagements, both Great
Britain and France would be under the necessity of remonstrating
formally. The Kingdom of Poland, it should be remembered, had been
constituted in 1815 under the guarantee of the five Powers, and it
was, in consequence, possible to contend, with some show of reason,
that all of them were equally concerned in the maintenance of the
liberties conceded to the Poles, under the terms of the Vienna
treaty. Heytesbury's conversations with Count Nesselrode convinced
him, however, that, although the letter of that agreement might be
observed, the Polish constitution would be virtually abolished. But,
in reporting the nature of the intentions by which he conceived
the Russian government to be animated, the able and experienced
diplomatist who then represented Great Britain at St. Petersburg was
at pains to point out the difficulties of the Tsar's position. In
Russia there was a strong public opinion which even the autocratic
Nicholas could not afford to disregard. Were former conditions to
be restored in Poland, and were the authors of the cold-blooded
assassinations at Warsaw to be permitted to escape unpunished,
great indignation would be aroused throughout the Empire. His
representations had been well received, but he was plainly allowed to
see how deeply the St. Petersburg Cabinet regretted the existence of
the close understanding between France and England, which his action
had revealed. He could perceive clearly from the demeanour of his
Austrian and Prussian colleagues that neither the Court of Vienna nor
of Berlin would be disposed to interfere upon behalf of the Poles.
France not Russia, he pointed out, was now looked upon as an object of
common danger.[165]
French sympathy for the Poles was so keen that, in July, Talleyrand
was again instructed to invite the English government to join with
France in proposing "a mediation in the bloody struggle raging in
Poland." Palmerston, in reply, appears to have suggested that the
French government should set forth its views upon the matter in
writing. Talleyrand, accordingly, transmitted this request and,
at the same time, begged Sébastiani to remember, when framing his
proposals, that "he was dealing with cold-blooded people and that
it would be well therefore to avoid the use of emotional language."
But, on July 22, Palmerston informed him that the Cabinet could not
entertain the suggestion of addressing to Russia any demand for a
cessation of hostilities, nor was he able to report better success
when, in September, whilst the Belgian difficulty was at its height,
he was once more directed to approach the British government upon the
subject of Poland. "No party in the Parliament," he wrote, "was in
favour of intervention, and the newspapers merely spoke of the Poles
in sympathetic language."[166] Heytesbury, who at St. Petersburg was
in a position to judge correctly of the national resentment which
any attempt at foreign interference in Polish affairs would create,
strove to convince his government of the unwisdom of impairing the
good relations of Russia and England by raising a question in which
no British interests were involved. Remonstrances, he was prepared to
admit, might effect an improvement in the condition of the people of
the Kingdom of Poland. But, even under these circumstances, the sum of
human misery, which the rebellion must entail, would not be lessened,
inasmuch as the revolted Russo-Polish provinces, not included in the
Kingdom, would be treated with increased severity.[167]
But, with the complete suppression of the insurrection, Lord Grey
and his colleagues assumed a more sympathetic attitude towards the
vanquished Poles. In a closely reasoned despatch Palmerston, on
November 23, formulated the arguments which Heytesbury was instructed
to press upon the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. The most important
passage in this long document was that in which the interpretation
was set forth which the English government placed upon the wording
of the treaty of Vienna. The futility of the plea that no specific
constitution had been guaranteed to Poland, a contention which
Heytesbury had warned his chief the Russian government would certainly
set up, was clearly exposed. "Surely," wrote Palmerston, "it was
no forced construction of the meaning of the treaty to consider
the constitution, which the Emperor had given, as existing under
the sanction of the treaty." The constitution contained no clause
reserving to the Sovereign the right of modifying its provisions. The
action of the Poles in declaring themselves separated from Russia
could not be held to absolve the Emperor from adhering to his compact.
"Wrongs committed by one side," he concluded, "were not to be punished
by the commission of wrongs on the other."[168]
Heytesbury, after prefacing his disagreeable task of communicating
these instructions by assurances that his government was only desirous
of tendering friendly advice to a former ally, proceeded to read
out to Count Nesselrode Lord Palmerston's despatch. "The Count,"
he reported, "listened with great attention and in silence, but
his silence was not the silence of assent." The Russian Chancellor
expressed his regret that the British government should have seen
fit to make representations of this nature, notwithstanding the
intimation, conveyed to it by Prince Lieven, that the Tsar could not
admit of foreign interference in the Polish question. The official
answer of the Imperial Cabinet was in due course communicated to
Palmerston by the Russian ambassador. As Heytesbury had foreseen,
Nicholas, "strong in the support of Austria and Prussia and in the
unanimous approbation of the Russian nation,"[169] refused to adopt
the interpretation of the treaty which it was desired to place upon it
in London and in Paris.
In the meantime, important progress had been made towards a settlement
of the Belgian question. At the end of August, Baron Stockmar,
Leopold's confidential adviser, proceeded to London to watch over
his interests in conjunction with Van de Weyer, the Belgian minister
at the Court of St. James'. Stockmar realized speedily that the
Belgians would have to suffer for the defeat inflicted upon them by
the Dutch. In the treaty of peace and separation, which the conference
was resolved must be concluded without delay, they could not hope to
obtain the favourable terms conceded to them in the convention of
the eighteen articles. Should they refuse to agree to the necessary
concessions, Palmerston warned him that the conference would be
broken up, and the King of Holland would be left free to fight out
his quarrel with Leopold. Stockmar, however, continually impressed
upon his master that this was a threat which he could safely afford
to disregard. The French had always considered the union of Holland
and Belgium and the creation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands as a
diplomatic combination directed against them. Public opinion in France
might, therefore, be depended upon to compel the government to resist
any attempt on the part of the Dutch to reconstitute the kingdom by
force of arms. But, although he admitted that Leopold could only
expect active assistance from France, Stockmar strongly deprecated
the idea of using French intervention as a means of intimidating the
conference. Such a course, he was convinced, would simply incline
the four Powers to lean all the more towards Holland. Lords Grey and
Palmerston were well disposed, but they had to reckon with national
sentiment, which was more favourable to "England's ancient allies,"
the Dutch, than to the Belgians. Nevertheless, although the British
government might be unable to render him practical assistance,
Leopold, Stockmar considered, should strive to gain its moral support.
The prolonged occupation of Belgium by the French was to be deplored,
because it engendered the suspicion in London that the King was
over-anxious to place himself under the protection of France. In
order effectually to put a check upon both Dutch and French intrigues
Leopold, in Stockmar's opinion, would be well advised to propose for
the hand of a daughter of Louis Philippe.
After the French evacuation Stockmar urged unceasingly the necessity
of a speedy conclusion of a definite treaty of peace. Russia, he
pointed out, was no longer distracted by the Polish rebellion, and the
sympathies of the Tsar were entirely with the King of the Netherlands.
This was a circumstance bound to have a considerable influence upon
the policy of the Courts of Berlin and of Vienna. It was of the
highest importance, therefore, that Leopold should bring his ministers
and the Chambers to recognize that the conditions of separation,
set forth in the protocol of the eighteen articles, could no longer
be obtained, and that only those stipulations should be insisted
upon which were essential to the independent existence of Belgium.
As Stockmar had foreseen, the new treaty, known as that of the
twenty-four articles, which the conference proceeded to frame, imposed
harsher terms upon Belgium than those contained in the protocol of
June 26. That part of the province of Limburg which lay upon the
right bank of the Meuse was now assigned to Holland, and Belgium was
called upon to contribute an increased share of the public debt of
the two countries. In other respects also the Belgians had to suffer
for their military inferiority to the Dutch. Nevertheless, when all
efforts to induce the conference to modify its terms had proved
useless, Stockmar, scouting the notion of abdication, counselled
Leopold to agree to them. "Let the King," he wrote, "cry aloud against
the injustice which has been done him . . . Let him show that he went
to Belgium under perfectly different conditions . . . Let the Belgian
ministry cry out equally loud. But in the meantime let everything be
done to induce the Chambers to accept the treaty."
Leopold having let it be known that, were the deputies to refuse to
agree to the terms imposed by the conference, he would be driven to
abdicate, the Chambers, on November 3, authorized him to conclude
a formal treaty of peace and separation upon the basis of the
twenty-four articles. This document was accordingly signed in London,
on November 15, 1831, by the plenipotentiaries of Belgium and of the
five great Powers. The King of Holland refused to be a party to the
agreement, but, before the expiration of the armistice, he had been
warned that any act of hostility against Belgium would be treated as a
declaration of war against the Powers. In addition, by a supplementary
article, the contracting parties guaranteed to Belgium the execution
of the treaty. Ratifications, it was laid down, were to be exchanged
within the space of two months.[170] At various periods during these
negotiations Talleyrand had experienced considerable difficulty in
persuading the French government to agree to the decisions of the
conference. When at last it had reluctantly given its assent to the
conditions of separation he was at pains to show the advantages which
France would derive from the treaty. The Duchy of Bouillon, he
pointed out, no longer formed part of the Duchy of Luxemburg, whilst
the incorporation of Arlon with Belgium increased the strength of the
French frontier towards Longwy. Furthermore, the cession of half of
the Duchy of Luxemburg to Belgium placed the Germanic Confederation at
a greater distance from France and, inasmuch as the fortress was no
longer to form part of a military system,[171] it would cease to have
any importance. With regard to the repartition of the debt, which the
French government had objected to as pressing unduly upon Belgium,
Talleyrand contended that the general interests of Europe urgently
demanded a settlement of the whole question, and that the Belgians,
after their wretched display in the summer, had been treated with more
generosity than they had any right to expect.[172]
Whilst the conference had been framing the conditions of separation
between Holland and Belgium, the French government had brought forward
a scheme for a general disarmament. Sébastiani in the summer had
proposed a reduction of establishments to a normal peace footing, but
had found that the German Powers were unwilling to revert to ordinary
conditions of military strength, until the Polish insurrection should
be at an end. After the Russian entry in Warsaw, however, the French
overtures met with a ready response. The continental Powers agreed to
begin disarming on January 1, 1832, and to proceed until their armies
should be reduced to their peace establishments. Inasmuch as England
had not added to her naval or land forces she could not enter into an
agreement to disarm, but Lord Granville was instructed to communicate
to Sébastiani the satisfaction which so practical a manifestation of
peaceful intentions afforded to the British government.[173]
The question of the demolition of the barrier fortresses had been
proceeding side by side with the settlement of the conditions under
which Belgium was to be separated from Holland. Talleyrand, however,
was not admitted to these negotiations which were conducted between
the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia
and those of Belgium. The result of their deliberations was embodied
in a document, known as the Fortress Convention, which was signed
by the representatives of the five Powers concerned on December 14,
1831. When La Tour-Maubourg had been sent to Brussels, during the
French occupation of Belgium, he had been instructed to press for
the demolition of the fortifications of Ath, Mons, Menin, Charleroi
and Tournay. The Powers, however, elected to preserve the defences
of the two last-named towns and to dismantle in their place the
works of Philippeville and Marienburg. Palmerston, without doubt,
was mainly responsible for this decision which was to create great
dissatisfaction in Paris. He was resolved, under no circumstance, to
admit the principle of allowing France to have a voice in determining
which of the fortresses, erected at the expense of the four Powers,
should be destroyed. After her attempts to arrive at a separate
understanding with Belgium concerning them, he may have thought that
she required to be reminded of the true state of the case. Yet it
would appear that the mere fact that her plenipotentiary had not
appended his signature to the convention must have made her position
in the matter sufficiently clear to the world. But, in persuading the
members of the conference to substitute Philippeville and Marienburg
for Charleroi and Tournay, Palmerston was not actuated by a desire
wantonly to slight France. In the question of the destruction of the
Belgian fortresses Grey's Cabinet was in a very delicate position as
regards the Parliament.[174] An embittered opposition was bound to
demand to know on what grounds the government proposed to justify
its policy of sanctioning the demolition of fortifications, which
the greatest captain of the day had pronounced to be necessary to
the security of Europe. Now Wellington, it would appear, considered
Charleroi and Tournay as of more importance to the defence of Belgium
than Philippeville and Marienburg, and Lord Grey and his colleagues
could not afford to disregard his opinion. It must be remembered also
that, on several occasions during the course of the negotiations,
France had shown a strong desire to regain possession of these two
places of which she had been deprived after Waterloo, and it was hoped
that, were their fortifications to be demolished, they would cease to
offer the same attractions to her.[175]
Without doubt the decision of the Powers to deprive France of any
voice in the settlement of the question of the fortresses placed her
in a very anomalous position. She was a party to the treaty which
established the independence, defined the frontiers and guaranteed
the neutrality of Belgium, nevertheless Austria, Prussia, Russia
and Great Britain had proceeded to conclude at once a separate
convention with Belgium against her. By her own action, however, she
was debarred from bringing forward this aspect of the case as an
argument against her exclusion from the fortress agreement. Far from
raising any objections to the conduct of the four Powers in drawing
up the protocol of April 17, without consultation with her, she had
expressed the greatest satisfaction with its contents. At her request
it was communicated to her officially, in order that an allusion
might be made to it in the Speech from the Throne. Louis Philippe, in
opening the Parliament on July 23, 1831, accordingly announced the
early destruction of the barrier fortresses, as a proof that the four
Powers had abandoned the system established against France in 1815.
In point of fact the apprehensions of her aggressive spirit had been
intensified by the Revolution of July and, in deciding to demolish
some of the frontier defences of the Low Countries, the Powers had not
been actuated by any desire to propitiate the new _régime_. But once
the partition of the Kingdom of the Netherlands had been accomplished,
it was recognized that the Belgians alone could not keep in repair and
efficiently defend the twenty-three barrier fortresses. Ill-equipped
and insufficiently garrisoned they would not have contributed to the
protection of Belgium, but would have offered a constant temptation
to the French to lay hands upon them. If France, however, chose to
imagine that in this matter the policy of the Powers was dictated by
a desire to please her, it was unnecessary to inform her that she was
labouring under a delusion. It was probably the knowledge that the
fiction contained in the paragraph of the King's Speech, referring to
the fortresses, could not be maintained for long, which had induced
the French government to attempt to negotiate a separate agreement
with Belgium.[176]
Both Palmerston and Stockmar appear to have been convinced that
Talleyrand had prompted his government to protest against the fortress
convention.[177] But their suspicions with regard to him seem to have
been unfounded. In pursuance of his instructions, in his conversations
with Grey and Palmerston, he was bound to employ those arguments most
calculated to induce them to make some concessions to the wishes of
his Court, but his despatches show that he disapproved strongly of
the attitude he was directed to adopt. On December 15, in forwarding
a copy of the fortress treaty, the contents of which he knew would be
exceedingly displeasing to his government, he told Sébastiani plainly
that La Tour-Maubourg's mission to Brussels was largely responsible
for the determination of the four Powers to select the fortresses for
destruction, without regard to the wishes of France. That affair,
moreover, in his opinion, had been managed in a very clumsy fashion.
When the government decided to try to arrange a separate understanding
with Belgium, it should have conducted its negotiations in the
strictest secrecy.[178]
Sébastiani, for the reason which has already been explained, was
precluded from objecting openly to the exclusion of France from the
fortress convention, and was compelled to confine his protests to
remonstrances against the selection of Philippeville and Marienburg
for demolition. Talleyrand was instructed to contend that the
fortifications of these two places, having been erected before 1815,
could not be held to fall within the category of works constructed
at the expense of the Powers. Furthermore, he was to urge that it
was incompatible with the complete independence of Belgium, which
France was anxious to see established, that the Powers should specify
which fortresses King Leopold was to dismantle.[179] Talleyrand,
however, reported that Lord Palmerston was quite unshaken by these
arguments. The British minister gave him clearly to understand that
La Tour-Maubourg's proceedings at Brussels had impressed him most
unfavourably. At the same time, pointing out that Philippeville and
Marienburg were the fortresses in closest proximity to the frontier
of France, he hinted that the French government must have some secret
reason for objecting to their demolition. "Nevertheless," reported
Talleyrand, "I still believe that he is well disposed towards us. He
is, however, in a difficult position as regards the Commons. . . .
We must bring pressure to bear upon the Belgians."[180] Sébastiani's
fears that the policy of the Powers aimed at the re-establishment of
the Holy Alliance, were, he assured him, in language no less emphatic
than that used by Granville in Paris, entirely without foundation.
Far too much importance, he urged, was attached to the fortress
convention. The King's government, in his opinion, would be well
advised to accept it, and to declare publicly that its provisions
were in harmony with the protocol of April 17. Russia was no longer
occupied with the rebellion of the Poles, and the Northern Courts
were evincing a strong disposition to draw together closely. Under
these conditions, he regarded it as essential that France should
maintain friendly relations with England. "It was a matter of far
more real importance than the question of the fortresses."[181] But
his endeavours to soothe the irritation of his government met with
no success. He was instructed to announce in London that France,
seeing that satisfaction was denied her in the affair of the fortress
convention, would refuse to ratify the treaty of separation of
November 15, 1831. Furthermore, Casimir Périer, who, on account of
Sébastiani's state of health, had taken charge of the portfolio of
Foreign Affairs, declared that, "in view of the general uncertainty
respecting the course of events in Belgium and Holland, the signature
of the proposed convention of disarmament must be postponed."[182]
The French agents in the meanwhile had not been idle at Brussels. On
December 12 General Tiburce Sébastiani, the brother of the minister,
arrived. "Ostensibly," reported Adair, "he has come to visit this
town and Antwerp, but his real purpose is to prevent the accession
of the Belgian government to the fortress convention." This officer
certainly brought a letter for Belliard containing instructions
which justified the British minister's conclusions, but his mission
appears also to have been connected with some unfounded rumour, which
had reached the French government, that the Orangists were about
to put into execution their designs against Leopold's throne.[183]
That monarch now found himself once more, as he himself described
it, "between the hammer and the anvil."[184] Louis Philippe[185]
wrote indignantly complaining that the agreement of September 8,
entered into with La Tour-Maubourg, had not been complied with. In
vain Leopold produced the instructions, with which Goblet and Van
de Weyer, who had negotiated the convention, had been furnished,
and protested that the Belgian plenipotentiaries had been forced to
sign, under the threat that the Powers would refuse to ratify the
treaty of separation, should they persist in opposing their wishes
with respect to the fortresses. General Belliard, at the same time,
intimated that, were the Dutch again to attack Belgium, no assistance
from France could be expected. To Adair, who, on the other hand,
begged him to stand firm, Leopold had expressed his determination
to disregard the French objections and to adhere to the convention.
But at the threat that, were his Kingdom again to be overrun, France
would leave him to his fate, his resolution broke down and Goblet
was directed to announce in London that the Belgian ratification of
the fortress agreement would be withheld.[186] Stockmar, writing
from London, impressed upon King Leopold that his refusal to ratify
the convention of December 14 would be eagerly seized upon by the
absolute Powers as an excuse for withholding their adhesion to the
treaty of separation. Already the news that differences had arisen
between France and England, upon the subject of the fortresses,
had enabled Metternich to reply to Mr. Forbes, the British _chargé
d'affaires_, who had been instructed to urge him to transmit to London
the necessary authority for an exchange of ratifications, that France
was holding back and that it was important that all the Powers should
act together in the matter. Prince Metternich was torn between his
fears that the continued state of uncertainty as to the affairs of
the Low Countries might lead to a war, and his desire to propitiate
Russia. Nicholas was believed to have counselled the King of the
Netherlands to agree to the treaty, but to be resolved, none the less,
to withhold his own ratification until that sovereign's reluctance to
accept the conditions of separation should have been overcome.[187] M.
Casimir Périer, in the meanwhile, however, was beginning to realize
that Palmerston was determined not to yield to the outcry about the
fortresses, and that were France, on that account, to decline to
ratify the treaty of separation not only would the labours of the
London conference for the past year be rendered nugatory, but the good
relations which had been established with England would be seriously
impaired. Moreover, should the negotiations break down, Lord Grey
might be compelled to resign, and he had good reason to apprehend,
that a change of government in England would be followed quickly
by his own downfall. An important group of deputies in the Chamber
gave him their votes, only because they believed that his alliance
with the Whigs ensured the maintenance of peace. But this reason for
their support of him would disappear on the day on which the Tories
should return to office.[188] Under these circumstances Talleyrand
was directed to obtain from the representatives of the four Powers
"some declaration calculated to reassure the King's government as to
the spirit in which the fortress convention had been drawn up." This
result was achieved by means of a document in which it was affirmed
that the arrangements respecting the fortresses were consistent with
the independence, neutrality and sovereignty of Belgium, and that that
country stood upon an equal footing as regards the five guaranteeing
Powers. Casmir Périer declared himself well pleased to receive this
empty satisfaction and, forthwith, announced his intention of adhering
to the treaty of separation.[189] On January 31, accordingly, the two
western Powers exchanged ratifications with Belgium and, at the same
time, it was resolved to keep open the protocol, in the hope that the
Northern Courts would before long confirm the signatures of their
plenipotentiaries.[190]
Scarcely had this difficulty been settled when grave complications
arose in another direction. The promises of the Pope, that reforms
would be introduced into the administration of local affairs in
Romagna, had not been carried out. The intention manifested by
the Roman government to disregard its pledges was followed by
a recrudescence of unrest in the Legations. M. Casimir Périer,
accordingly, proposed that, were foreign intervention to be required
to maintain the authority of His Holiness, a French corps should
occupy Ancona. But Metternich demurred, and, as an alternative,
suggested that a French naval force should be sent to the Adriatic to
act in combination with the Austrian squadron. On February 1, however,
the news arrived that the Austrians had entered Bologna, whereupon
M. Casimir Périer at once ordered a French regiment to be embarked
at Toulon for Ancona. Were that town to be occupied by the Austrians
before the French expedition could arrive, the troops, Lord Granville
was informed in confidence, would be landed at Civita Vecchia. The
action of the French government would, M. Casimir Périer declared to
the British ambassador, hasten the departure of the Austrians and
induce Prince Metternich to press the Court of Rome to adopt those
reforms by which alone permanent tranquillity could be established in
the Legations.[191]
The more detailed information as to the course of events in Romagna,
transmitted by Sainte-Aulaire and the British consul at Rome,
suggested the existence of a secret understanding between His
Holiness and the Cabinet of Vienna. At Forli the Pontifical troops
were reported to have shot down in cold blood peaceful and unarmed
inhabitants, and their behaviour created the impression that they were
anxious to produce disorder, in order to furnish Cardinal Albani,
the Legate, with a pretext for invoking the aid of Austria.[192]
Suspicions on this score were heightened by the fact that, although
Marshal Radetzky only received the application for assistance on
January 23, his orders, in which he styled himself commander-in-chief
of the army of Italy, were dated on the 19th, four days before the
arrival of the cardinal's demand for intervention.[193] Upon learning
of these proceedings the Comte de Sainte-Aulaire at once notified
to Cardinal Bernetti, the State Secretary, that the entry of an
Imperial army into the Papal States would be followed by the immediate
occupation of Ancona by a French force. Bernetti appears reluctantly
to have acquiesced, but, after the expedition had sailed from Toulon,
acting, without doubt, at the dictation of the Austrian ambassador,
he formally protested against the disembarkation of any French troops
within the dominions of the Pope.[194] When the news first reached
Vienna that the French had taken steps to occupy Ancona, Metternich,
concealing his annoyance, was at pains to impress upon the public
that this measure was the result of a previous understanding with
Austria.[195] On the other hand, at St. Petersburg the intelligence
that the French had intervened in Italy was held to have rendered war
inevitable, and Nicholas forthwith declared his intention of giving
armed assistance to Austria.[196] From London Talleyrand reported
that Palmerston spoke very guardedly when he sought to ascertain the
views of the British government upon the matter. In his own opinion,
and this aspect of the case he on more than one occasion brought to
the notice of M. Casimir Périer, it was much to be regretted that the
demonstrations in Italy had taken place before Austria should have
ratified the Belgian treaty. The accounts, moreover, of the lawless
proceedings of the French commander at Ancona, which soon began to
arrive, created a very general alarm. Not only had the troops forced
their way into the citadel, but a proclamation was issued by Captain
Gallois, drawn up in terms so hostile to Austria, as to amount
practically to a declaration of war. That individual, however, who was
either a member of, or in league with, the French secret societies,
the agents of which were striving to stir up a revolution in Italy,
was promptly disavowed and the fact of his recall to France was
communicated to foreign governments. Nevertheless, wrote Talleyrand,
the affair has created a most painful impression. "The territory of
an independent sovereign has been violated at a time of profound
peace and the tricolour has been hoisted over a fortress which does
not belong to France."[197] In a conversation which he had had with
William IV. at a _levée_, His Majesty spoke to him most strongly about
the impropriety of these proceedings which, ministers also informed
him, had greatly increased their difficulties in both Houses. They
could have added with perfect truth that their relations with their
sovereign had suffered considerably owing to this affair.[198]
The Austrian policy of deliberately encouraging misgovernment in the
Italian States and of placing every obstacle in the way of reforms
was hateful to Lord Palmerston. Apart from other considerations he
was convinced that a continuance of this state of affairs must,
sooner or later, drive France to intervene in such a manner as to
render a war inevitable with Austria.[199] Already, on February
20, before he had received the news of the arrival of the French
expedition at Ancona, he had directed Mr. Seymour, the British
minister at Florence, to proceed to Rome "to represent the anxiety
of His Majesty's government to see those causes, which have produced
so much difficulty, effectually removed." He was to urge that no
measures would appear "to afford so good a hope of success as a
complete adoption of those reforms which were pointed out in the
memorandum of May 21, 1831." Lastly, he was to impress upon Cardinal
Bernetti that, "if the reports be true that the ranks of the papal
troops, which recently entered the Legations, have been replenished
by emptying the prisons of criminals and by calling down the lawless
bands from the mountains, the Roman government cannot divest itself
of a deep responsibility for the melancholy events which marked the
entry into Cesena and Forli. The innocent blood which was wantonly
shed in the streets of those towns might well be accepted as a full
atonement for the political offences of the people of Romagna."[200]
When the story became known of the manner in which the French entry
into Ancona had been carried out, Palmerston readily agreed to do all
in his power to soothe the irritation of Austria and to assist to
remove the bad impression created by Captain Gallois' lawlessness.
Seymour was further instructed to inform Cardinal Bernetti that the
British government was fully satisfied that the French occupation
of Ancona was but a temporary measure, which the condition of the
Legations had occasioned. He was to reiterate the necessity for the
immediate introduction of the promised reforms and "to draw the
serious attention of the Roman government to the fact, that the course
which it was pursuing with respect to the Legations, had already had
the effect of turning the eyes of the population of those provinces
towards Austria. . . . The system of administration established in
Lombardy and Venetia, although not free from defects, was looked upon
with envy by the subjects of the Pope.[201] At Vienna Sir Frederick
Lamb was directed to assure Prince Metternich that the occupation of
Ancona would cease as soon as His Holiness should have carried out his
engagements.[202]
Metternich, reported Lamb, received the news of the French proceedings
at Ancona very calmly. He expressed himself as confident that Gallois'
actions would be disavowed by his government. "The Emperor," he
declared, "would be justified in falling upon the French at Ancona,
but he was too great a sovereign to receive an insult from the
captain of a frigate or the colonel of a regiment." It was to England
that Austria looked for support at this crisis. She ruled the seas and
it rested with her to decide whether, or not, France should hold the
command of the Mediterranean. About a week after this conversation had
taken place Metternich informed Lamb that he was perfectly satisfied
with the explanations which Marshal Maison had been instructed to
give, and that no demand would be made to the French government for
the evacuation of Ancona, so long as the Austrians continued to occupy
the Legations.[203]
This condition of affairs was allowed to prevail for some years. Both
Powers retained their troops in the Papal States, and the embarrassing
necessity under which the French government was placed of making
the occupation of Ancona depend upon the presence of an Austrian
garrison at Bologna constituted Metternich's revenge for M. Périer's
intervention in Italy.
The attention of the _corps diplomatique_ had not been concentrated
exclusively upon the complications to which the French proceedings
at Ancona might give rise. Early in the month of February it was
known that Count Orloff had been despatched by the Tsar on a special
mission to the Hague. It was in deference to the wishes of Nicholas
that the Courts of Vienna and of Berlin had decided to withhold their
ratification of the treaty of separation of November 15, 1831, and
the keenest curiosity prevailed as to the instructions with which
the Tsar's emissary had been furnished. In respect to the condition
of affairs in the Low Countries Russia was in a somewhat peculiar
situation as regards England. During the Napoleonic war Russia had
borrowed at Amsterdam a sum of 25,000,000 florins. At the peace
the King of the Netherlands and the King of Great Britain agreed
respectively to bear one-half of the charge of this debt. But it was
provided that, should at any time the King of the Netherlands be
deprived of his sovereignty over the Belgian provinces, this charge
should cease. The contingency referred to in the treaty had come
about, under circumstances never contemplated by the statesmen by whom
it had been drawn up. They had hoped to give Russia a direct interest
in preserving the union, but it was now the British government
which desired to see it abolished and the Tsar who wished it to be
maintained. Without doubt, according to the letter of the treaty,
England was no longer bound to pay a share of the Russian-Dutch
loan. Judged by the spirit of it, however, she could not honestly
escape from the charge which she had undertaken to bear. This last
construction of the agreement was adopted by Palmerston, who admitted
the British liability in a new convention, by the terms of which
the Tsar guaranteed that, should the stipulations made for the
independence and neutrality of Belgium be endangered by the course
of events, he would contract no other engagements without a previous
agreement with his Britannic Majesty. Palmerston had thus earned the
gratitude of the Tsar and had, in addition, made it difficult for him
to intervene actively on behalf of the King of Holland.[204] Ministers
were debarred, however from referring to this inner history of the
affair in Parliament, where their policy in the matter of the Russian
loan was severely attacked both by the Tory Opposition and by the
Radicals, who deprecated the notion of voting pecuniary assistance to
the autocratic government of Russia.
The Count Alexis Orloff, whose journey to the Hague was the subject
of so much speculation in the chanceries of Europe, was the natural
son of a younger brother of Gregory Orloff, the lover of Catherine
II. and a prominent actor in that palace revolution of 1762, which
cost the Emperor Peter III. his throne, and very probably his
life. After serving in the Napoleonic wars, the Count Alexis had
gained the lasting gratitude of his imperial master by his resolute
behaviour, which had contributed not a little to upset the designs
of the _Decembrists_, as those military conspirators were termed,
who, in 1825, had sought to prevent the accession of Nicholas. Ever
afterwards, in consequence, Alexis Orloff was selected by the Tsar for
the most delicate and secret missions. No notice of his departure was
given to any member of the _corps diplomatique_ at St. Petersburg.
Count Nesselrode, after he had started, merely informed Lord
Heytesbury that he had been sent to the Hague to extract a categorical
statement from the King of the Netherlands as to whether he would
accept the treaty of separation, and, in the event of his declaring
that he would withhold his consent, to signify to him that he must
not look to Russia for support.[205] This was in substance all that
Mr. Chad, the British minister at Berlin, could discover about the
objects of Orloff's mission during the Count's stay in the Prussian
capital. But he noted that the general effect of his visit to Berlin
had been to incline the Prussian government to espouse more warmly
the cause of the King of the Netherlands, a result which, he pointed
out, was inconsistent with the purpose which the Tsar's emissary was
alleged to have in view.[206] Fuller information, however, on that
score was soon forthcoming from Vienna. On February 25, Sir Frederick
Lamb was able to transmit to Lord Palmerston a copy of Orloff's
secret instructions. These contained a clause to the effect that the
Emperor of Russia would not recognize the King of the Belgians, until
he should have been acknowledged by the King of the Netherlands.
Furthermore, the Count was directed to protest against any measures
of coercion, which France and England might decide to adopt against
Holland, and to declare that the Tsar would regard all concessions,
obtained by such means, as null and void. Lastly, whilst in London,
whither he was to proceed when he had completed his task at the Hague,
Orloff was "to assist by all means in his power the endeavours which,
for the past twelve months, Prince Lieven and Count Matuszewic[207]
had been making to prevent a union of the British Cabinet with that of
the Palais Royal."[208]
During his stay at Berlin, Orloff tried to win over the Prussian
government to the Tsar's views upon the Belgian question. But his
attempts were unsuccessful. Ancillon, the chief minister, was greatly
alarmed at the disturbance of the European Concert to which he feared
the Russian policy must lead. Were Austria, Prussia and Russia to
make their ratification of the separation treaty depend upon the
acceptation of its conditions by the King of the Netherlands, the
Powers must necessarily fall into two opposing groups: France and
Great Britain on the one side, and the three Northern Courts on the
other. Rather than help to create so perilous a situation, Prussia
would, with much regret be obliged to "_aller en avant_ _et de
ratifier_." Ancillon seems to have succeeded in extracting from
Orloff a promise that he would for the present, at least, refrain
from communicating the secret clauses of his instructions to the
King of the Netherlands, and to have directed the Prussian minister
at St. Petersburg to endeavour to persuade Nicholas to cancel them.
Metternich, reported Lamb, regarded the matter in the same light as
Ancillon, and was resolved to assimilate his policy to that of the
Court of Berlin. It was presumably for the purpose of thwarting the
Russian plan that a copy of Orloff's secret instructions was placed in
the hands of the British ambassador.[209]
When France and England had ratified the treaty of separation,
Palmerston at once instructed the British representatives at Vienna
and at Berlin to urge the Austrian and Prussian Courts to follow the
example of the western Powers. Metternich, wrote Lamb, eluded the
question, and insisted upon the necessity of waiting to hear the
result of Orloff's mission.[210] At Berlin, Mr. Chad was enjoined
to remind M. Ancillon that the action of the Prussian government in
refusing to ratify was a violation of its promises.[211] In M. Casimir
Périer's opinion, the policy of the absolute Courts was dictated by
the hope that a second rejection of the Reform Bill by the House of
Lords might lead to a change of government in England.[212] In the
meanwhile, Count Orloff had arrived at the Hague on February 20.
At Berlin, he had intimated that under no circumstances would his
stay in Holland be prolonged beyond ten days.[213] Nevertheless, the
period which he had assigned for the duration of his visit was greatly
exceeded. There was reason to believe, however, that communications
had reached him from his Court which, if they did not absolutely
annul, unquestionably modified his instructions and brought them
more into harmony with the views of the constitutional Powers.[214]
Without doubt, the repugnance evinced at Vienna and at Berlin to break
with the London conference was largely responsible for the changed
disposition of Nicholas. But the arrival at St. Petersburg, after
Orloff had left, of the draft of a proposed new treaty of separation,
in which the King of the Netherlands put forward the most absurd
pretensions, would seem to have impressed the Tsar most unfavourably.
He appears to have grown very suspicious that the Dutch Court, acting
under the inspiration of the French legitimists, was striving to
embroil the Great Powers in a war.[215]
Palmerston, under these circumstances, decided to exercise an
increased pressure upon the wavering resolution of the Northern
Courts. The sittings of the conference, he announced, would be
suspended until the signatory Powers of the treaty of separation
should have ratified that agreement. Furthermore, on March 16, Sir
Charles Bagot, the British ambassador, was instructed to protest
against Count Orloff's continued stay at the Hague.[216] The threat
that the London conference would be dissolved appears to have excited
considerable alarm at Berlin.[217] Although the obstinacy of the King
of the Netherlands was proof against all remonstrances, Palmerston's
action, which had the support of the French government, was probably
successful in bringing Orloff's mission to an end. In any case,
on March 22, Verstolk, the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs,
officially informed Nicholas' envoy that the King could not accept
the separation treaty of the twenty-four articles as it existed. No
sooner had he made this statement than Count Orloff at once handed
him the declaration which he had been instructed to deliver. The note
in question was to the effect that, although His Imperial Majesty
would not participate himself in any measures of coercion to force
the King to accept the treaty, he should not oppose those steps which
his allies might resolve to take in order to impose its conditions
upon Holland. Directly they learnt that Orloff had delivered his
declaration, the Austrian and Prussian ministers sent separate notes
to M. Verstolk, notifying the adhesion of their respective Courts to
the course pursued by the Russian Cabinet. Orloff, two days later,
took leave of the King and started for London.[218]
The failure of Orloff's mission deprived the Austrian and Prussian
Cabinets of all reasonable excuse for withholding their assent to the
treaty. Indeed, before the Russian agent had taken his departure from
the Hague, Metternich informed Sir Frederick Lamb that the Austrian
ratification would be forwarded to London without further delay. The
presence of the French in Italy, and the fear that the course upon
which the absolute Courts had embarked would tend to promote a close
alliance between England and France were factors in the situation,
which, in the opinion of the British ambassador, had greatly
influenced Metternich's decision.[219] Accordingly, on April 18, at
the London Foreign Office the Austrian and Prussian plenipotentiaries
exchanged ratifications of the treaty of November 15, 1831, with
the representative of Belgium. The Prussian minister, Bülow, had
been furnished with a discretionary power either to proceed with the
matter or to await the Russian ratification, and he appears to have
yielded to the pressure brought to bear upon him by Palmerston and
Talleyrand.[220] Both the Prussian and Austrian ratifications were
accompanied by reservations with respect to the rights of the Germanic
Confederation in Connection with any cession or exchange of a portion
of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.[221]
It was resolved, as on former occasions, to keep open the protocol
in order that Russia might still be enabled to become a party to
the treaty. Lieven and Matuszewic, the Russian plenipotentiaries,
had authority to ratify, but with reservations respecting three
articles of the treaty which concerned the navigation of the Scheldt,
the construction of a road, and the share of the debt to be borne
by Belgium. But, were a limited ratification of this description
to be accepted, Russia would necessarily be placed in a different
situation as regards Belgium to that occupied by the other contracting
parties. This was a development to which Palmerston was altogether
opposed. On the other hand, he was desirous above all things to avoid
the necessity of excluding Russia from the treaty. The rift in the
European Concert, which such a result would disclose, must encourage
the King of the Netherlands to resist the decisions of the conference
and might endanger the general peace. The representatives of the
Powers, not excepting Orloff, Lieven and Matuszewic were, however,
sincerely anxious to discover a way out of the difficulty. At Brussels
it was contended with some reason that the limited ratification
of Russia might be held to invalidate the treaty as a whole. But
Stockmar, the counsellor of Leopold, pointed out that the existing
governments in France and England considered that their acts of
ratification bound them indissolubly to the treaty. The struggle over
the Reform Bill had, however, entered upon its final stage, and it was
doubtful whether Lord Grey and his colleagues would emerge from it
successfully. Under these circumstances, urged Stockmar, it was well
to remember that both Wellington and Aberdeen had declared that they
should not consider the treaty of the twenty-four articles as binding,
until it should have been ratified by all the signatory Powers. Were
Grey to fall, and were a Tory Cabinet to be formed, Russia very
probably might altogether refuse to ratify.[222]
On May 4 the deliberations of the conference at the Foreign Office
were prolonged far into the night. Talleyrand's powers of persuasion,
Palmerston's determined will and skill in argument were alike directed
to the task of devising some solution of the problem, which all
parties might accept with dignity. The desired result was at last
attained by means of an explanation of the purpose of the Russian
reservation, which was inserted into the protocol. According to this
declaration, the Russian plenipotentiaries asserted that their Court
had no other intention than to leave open the matters contained in the
three articles in question for subsequent settlement by Holland and
Belgium. Under these conditions, Van de Weyer agreed to accept the
Russian ratification with the proviso, which was also to be embodied
into the protocol, that his Court laid claim to the full benefit of
the engagements contracted towards Belgium by the five Powers. That
same night Orloff departed from England.[223] Nicholas had been very
gratified by the flattering welcome which had been accorded to his
favourite in London society.[224] His satisfaction on this point
contributed, doubtless, to the happy termination of the negotiation.
But the statesmanlike conduct of Van de Weyer was, at the time, little
appreciated in political circles in Brussels, where he was censured
for accepting the limited ratification of Russia.[225]
CHAPTER IV
THE COERCION OF HOLLAND
The Cabinets of Lord Grey and of M. Casimir Périer had always regarded
the execution of the separation treaty as a measure which must
necessarily follow its ratification by the five contracting Powers.
But, during the spring and early summer of 1832, ministers, both in
France and in England, were confronted by an internal situation of
exceptional gravity. The Lords, on April 14, had passed the second
reading of the third Reform Bill by a narrow majority. On May 7,
however, three days after Russia had ratified the Belgian treaty,
Lord Lyndhurst successfully carried against the government a motion
postponing the clause which disfranchised the boroughs. The Cabinet,
therefore, decided to advise the King "to advance to the honour of the
peerage such a number of persons as might ensure the success of the
Bill in all its essential principles."[226]
In the early days of the struggle the King had been a keen advocate
of parliamentary reform. But the violent opposition which the measure
had excited had sensibly altered his feelings. Nor was it only with
respect to the Bill that His Majesty was beginning to entertain
misgivings. The conduct of foreign affairs had, for some time past,
caused him grave anxiety. He perceived, he wrote to Lord Grey, a
dangerous tendency on the part of the government to subscribe to
all the democratic theories which found favour in Paris. He realized
the importance of good relations with France, and he was prepared to
admit that it might be due to the existence of such an understanding
that war had been avoided in the Belgian question. But he mistrusted
France and could not believe that she had abandoned her schemes of
conquest and of territorial expansion. He held, therefore, that it
was impolitic to "unite too closely with her in the prosecution of
measures tending to give umbrage and alarm to other Powers."[227]
In consequence of these criticisms Lord Grey signified his willingness
to resign. But a second letter from the King and a conversation,
in which His Majesty assured him that he still enjoyed his full
confidence, induced him to remain in office. A fortnight later,
however, when the King declined to follow the advice, contained in the
Cabinet minute of May 8, to create a sufficient number of peers to
enable the Bill to pass, the government resigned. But the excitement
throughout the country and the attitude of the House of Commons
compelled Lord Lyndhurst and the Duke of Wellington to abandon all
hope of forming a ministry. In face of their inability to carry out
the task with which he had entrusted them, the King had no alternative
but to send for his late ministers and to give them the guarantees,
which they made an indispensable condition to their acceptation of
office. Lord Grey, however, was spared the necessity of resorting to
the powers which the crown had placed at his disposal. In deference
to the King's wishes[228] Wellington and the chief opponents of the
measure agreed to stay away from the House, and on June 4, in their
absence, the Bill was passed into law.
France was less fortunate. Her domestic difficulties were only
temporarily overcome after grave disorder and much bloodshed. The
cholera, brought back by the Russian armies from Turkey, had spread
westwards. The disease, which made its first appearance in England
in the latter months of 1831, did terrible execution in Paris during
the spring and summer of 1832. M. Casimir Périer, who had been in bad
health for some time past, was its most illustrious victim. His death,
on May 16, 1832, was the signal for a furious outburst of hostility
on the part of the parliamentary opponents of his system. At the same
time the avowed enemies of the Orleans monarchy, both Republican and
Carlist, actively prepared to take advantage of the situation. _The
Society of the Friends of the People_, in defiance of the police,
held meetings at which armed insurrection was preached openly. "I was
present at one of them," wrote Heinrich Heine, "the smell reminded me
of an old file of the _Moniteur_ of 1793 grown dirty from too much
reading."[229]
The funeral, on June 5, of General Lamarque, the most prominent
advocate in the Chamber of the union of Belgium with France, was
chosen by the revolutionary leaders as a favourable occasion for
striking their blow. But the authorities were upon the alert and both
regular troops and national guards were quickly upon the scene of
action. Nevertheless, it was not until artillery had been brought up
that, on the following day, June 6, the great barricade at the Cloître
Saint-Merri was stormed and that this formidable insurrection was
finally suppressed. Nor was it only in the streets of Paris that the
government had to deal with an armed rising. On June 4 the Duchesse de
Berri, the mother of the Duc de Bordeaux, the lawful King of France
in the eyes of the Carlists, raised the standard of rebellion in La
Vendée. But her insurrection, which had been undertaken against the
advice of the wiser of the Carlists and of the old Royalist leaders
in the West, was, in a few days, stamped out completely. The defence
of the Château de la Pénissière, where a handful of Carlist gentlemen
made a brave stand against overwhelming odds, imparted, however,
a tinge of heroism to this, the last and the least famous of the
Royalist rebellions of La Vendée.
Following quickly upon the defeat of the republicans in Paris and of
the Carlists in the West, came the news that the Duc de Reichstadt,
the heretofore King of Rome, was dying of consumption at Vienna. But
Metternich, in transmitting this information, desired that Louis
Philippe's attention should be especially directed "to his successor
in the eyes of the Bonapartists." The young Louis Bonaparte, he
begged him to remember, was not under the safeguard of the Emperor
of Austria, but, on the contrary, "was deeply involved in all the
machinations of the revolutionary societies."[230] Few people,
however, shared Metternich's forebodings, and the death of the Duc
de Reichstadt, which took place on July 22, 1832, was generally
considered, even by staunch Imperialists, to have disposed effectually
of the chances of a Bonapartist restoration.[231] But neither the
successful suppression of two rebellions, nor the decease of a
dangerous pretender to the throne could make up for the loss of the
President of the Council. The death of M. Casimir Périer had deprived
the Cabinet of its strength and prestige. Louis Philippe, whilst
doing full justice to the courage and abilities of his late minister,
was perhaps not altogether sorry that his masterful personality no
longer presided at the council table. The _rôle_ of a constitutional
monarch was never to his taste. He longed always to take a direct
part in the management of public affairs, and rather liked his people
to think that his was the hand which guided the ship of State. He
was, therefore, in no great hurry to appoint a new President of the
Council. He soon perceived, however, that a prolongation of this state
of affairs would be prejudicial to the best interests of the monarchy
both at home and abroad.
For the past two months the London conference had been engaged upon
fruitless efforts to induce the King of the Netherlands to agree to
the separation treaty. Moreover, His Majesty's obstinacy was not
the only difficulty with which the representatives of the Powers
had to deal. The Belgians clamoured loudly for the execution of the
treaty, and declared that, so long as the Dutch retained possession
of Antwerp, they must decline to discuss any modification of its
conditions.[232] Oblivious of their disasters of the year before, they
even began to talk of ejecting the Dutch by force, and, as though to
prove the seriousness of their intentions, proceeded to enrol Polish
officers in their army, and to make other warlike preparations.[233]
Although determined that the main conditions of the treaty must be
left untouched, the members of the conference were anxious that
the minor points in dispute should form the subject of amicable
discussions between the Dutch and Belgian representatives. It was on
this principle that all their proposals had been made. But neither at
the Hague nor at Brussels was any disposition evinced to listen to
reasonable suggestions for a compromise.
At last, on July 10, the plenipotentiaries decided to forward their
final proposals to the Hague and to announce, at the same time, that,
if they were not accepted, no further modifications of the original
treaty would be submitted. Little hope, however, was entertained that
the King's obduracy would be overcome without a resort to force.
But before proceeding to adopt more active measures the British
government decided to dispatch Lord Durham upon a special mission to
St. Petersburg. Ill-health had recently compelled Lord Heytesbury to
relinquish his post, and his successor had not as yet been appointed.
The King of the Netherlands, it was believed, still trusted that
the Tsar would intervene on his behalf, should France and England
begin hostilities against him. Lord Durham was therefore charged
to endeavour to persuade the Emperor Nicholas "to give immediate
instructions to the Russian plenipotentiaries at the conference to
co-operate cordially and effectually in whatever measures might
appear best calculated to effect an early execution of the treaty."
He was to state most positively that France and England, under any
circumstances, were resolved to fulfil the engagements which they had
contracted towards Belgium. Lastly, he was to explain the views of His
Majesty's government upon Italian, German and Polish affairs.[234]
Seeing that it was the object of the British government to conciliate
the Tsar, in order to induce him to take part in measures which could
not be otherwise than extremely distasteful to him, it is strange that
this particular minister should have been selected for the mission.
As one of the most advanced politicians in the Cabinet Lord Durham
would hardly seem to have been the person best qualified to propitiate
the Emperor Nicholas. But at the time his suitability was perhaps
only a secondary consideration. On the question of the creation of
peers to enable the Reform Bill to pass, he had seriously differed
from Lord Grey, his own father-in-law, and it may have been the wish
to avoid a complete rupture between them that prompted his despatch
to St. Petersburg. The Emperor, however, whatever may have been the
real nature of his feelings with respect to Durham's appointment,
evinced not the slightest resentment. On the contrary, he appeared
to be at pains to pay him the greatest honours and, during the whole
period of his six weeks' stay in the Russian capital, the ambassador
was the object of his most flattering attentions. Durham, who was
highly gratified by the warmth of the Imperial reception and by the
marked deference with which he was treated, was, for his part, no
less anxious to create a favourable impression. When removed from
the turmoil of party politics he rarely failed to display those
statesmanlike qualities which he unquestionably possessed. Yet in
spite of all his efforts, on this occasion, his embassy, in so far
as its immediate objects were concerned, proved a complete failure.
Under no circumstances would the Tsar agree to join in any hostile
action against Holland. But, whilst the autocrat assured him that such
was his irrevocable determination, he told him that he was equally
resolved not to oppose those measures which other Powers might see
fit to adopt, in order to obtain the execution of the separation
treaty.[235] This categorical statement of Nicholas' intention not
to interpose, should coercion be applied to Holland, was the one
satisfactory piece of news which Lord Durham was enabled to transmit.
In all his conversations the Tsar manifested his extreme dislike of
Louis Philippe and expressed his determination to render military
assistance to Austria and Prussia, should France attempt to interfere
in German affairs.[236] Lord Durham was not long in discovering that
no good purpose would be served by adverting to Poland. The greatest
indignation prevailed throughout Russia at the conduct of the
Poles, and he quite agreed with Lord Heytesbury that the Tsar dared
not disregard the national resentment which their insurrection had
provoked. Only force, he saw clearly, would induce him to admit that
other Powers had a right to interfere with his treatment of his Polish
subjects, and England most certainly had no intention of making the
question a case for war. He conceived, therefore, that he might depart
from the letter of his instructions and confine his observations upon
the subject to a mere informal expression to Count Nesselrode of the
interest felt by the British government in the general welfare of
Poland.[237]
Before the end of July, it was known in London that the King of
the Netherlands was determined to reject the proposals which the
conference had declared must be the last which could be submitted
to him. Nevertheless Palmerston, encouraged seemingly by the
language of Van Zuylen, the Dutch plenipotentiary, decided to make a
further attempt to avert the necessity of an appeal to force.[238]
Accordingly, he drew up a fresh scheme for the settlement of the
points in dispute, and showed it confidentially to the Dutch
representative. Van Zuylen professed to be on the whole well satisfied
with Palmerston's proposals, and held out distinct hopes that they
might serve as the basis of a definite agreement between Holland and
Belgium. But, before any progress could be made in the matter, it was
necessary to induce the Belgians to abandon their declared intention
of refusing to negotiate, until the Dutch should have evacuated the
citadel of Antwerp. In order to try to persuade the Belgian government
to adopt a less uncompromising attitude, Baron Stockmar, early in
August, proceeded to Brussels as the semi-official representative
of the conference. King Leopold's confidential adviser saw clearly
that the Belgians must appear in a very unfavourable light should the
negotiations break down, owing to their obstinate refusal to recede
from the position they had taken up. He had never approved of the
policy of the Meulinäer Cabinet, and had always deprecated the warlike
preparations upon which that minister had ostentatiously embarked.
As he constantly pointed out to the King, the chances of success in
a single-handed contest with Holland were necessarily very doubtful.
Moreover, under any circumstances, the Great Powers were pledged to
intervene to put an end to the struggle, and, in such a case, Belgium,
if the aggressor, would certainly be dealt with very harshly. One
measure, however, which Stockmar had constantly advocated, was now
an accomplished fact. In the month of May, the Princess Louise, a
daughter of the King of the French, had been affianced to Leopold,
and the marriage had been duly celebrated on August 9, at the Château
de Compiègne. But the newly married king showed as little disposition
to adopt the counsels of his father-in-law[239] as he had those of
the sagacious Stockmar. Indeed, the language of many leading Belgians
at this period suggested that they were encouraged to defy the
Powers, from the security which they considered was assured to them
by the family ties uniting their sovereign to the reigning House in
France.[240] Leopold, without doubt, had no share in so dangerous an
illusion, but his ministers had pledged themselves to the Chambers
to insist upon the surrender of Antwerp as a preliminary to any
fresh negotiations, and he seems to have thought that it would
be too unpopular a step to dismiss them on that account. Stockmar
returned to London on August 18. His visit to Brussels had failed
in its object, but he still continued to press his views upon King
Leopold. A prolongation of the _status quo_ constituted, he argued,
no disadvantage to Belgium. Although it was the case that the Dutch
held the citadel of Antwerp, which, by the terms of the treaty,
should have passed out of their possession, their retention of it
was counterbalanced by the Belgian occupation of parts of Limburg
and Luxemburg, which, under the conditions of separation, had been
assigned to Holland. Moreover, even the absolute Powers were prepared
to admit that a continued refusal on the part of the Court of the
Hague to evacuate Antwerp, would justify the Belgians in declining
to pay their share of the public debt, jointly contracted by the two
countries before their separation. Before long, the force of this
reasoning began to be appreciated at Brussels, where both Adair and
La Tour-Maubourg, the British and French ministers, were using their
best endeavours to persuade the King to conform to the wishes of their
respective governments. In diplomatic circles the conviction was
gaining ground that the King of the Netherlands was merely trifling
with the Powers, and that he had still no intention of bringing the
negotiations to a conclusion.[241] Should these suspicions prove
correct, Leopold probably realized that it must be to his advantage to
display a readiness to meet the wishes of the conference, at a time
when the members of it would necessarily be heartily disgusted at the
dilatory and evasive attitude adopted by the Cabinet of the Hague.
Under the influence of these various considerations his resolution
rose to the required point.[242] The Meulinäer government was
dismissed, General Goblet was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs,
and powers were transmitted to Van de Weyer to enter into negotiations
with the Dutch plenipotentiary upon the basis of the new proposals,
_Le thème de Lord Palmerston_, as they were called by the diplomatists.
Accordingly, on September 20, M. Van de Weyer officially informed
the conference that he was authorized to discuss with the Dutch
plenipotentiaries the points in dispute between the two countries.
But in a note dated the same day, Van Zuylen, ignoring completely
the _thème de Lord Palmerston_, claimed the execution of the treaty
on the terms set forth in the Dutch counter proposal of June 30. The
conference, thereupon, called upon him definitely to state whether
he was empowered to negotiate with Belgium in accordance with the
proposals submitted by the British plenipotentiary. To this demand
he returned an answer which was unanimously held to be highly
unsatisfactory, and, on October 1, in consequence, the representatives
of the five Powers met to consider the steps which should now be
taken to bring matters to a conclusion. As had been foreseen, it was
clear at once that the prospects of arriving at an agreement were
hopeless. According to the absolute Powers, coercion must be confined
to a declaration authorizing the Belgians to withhold payment of
their share of the Dutch-Belgian debt, until the citadel of Antwerp
should be handed over to them. France and England, on the other hand,
deriding the notion that pressure of this kind would suffice to
overcome the obstinacy of the King of the Netherlands, called for the
application of sterner measures. To this demand the plenipotentiaries
of the northern Powers opposed the irrevocable resolution of their
respective Courts not to participate in any hostile acts against
Holland. In face of this irreconcilable divergence of opinion, the
conference broke up, the representatives of France and England
announcing the intention of their governments to take steps to ensure
the prompt execution of the terms of the separation treaty.[243]
But, although the concert of the Powers had thus ceased to exist,
there was still no distinct understanding between France and England,
as to the measures by which the Dutch were to be compelled to evacuate
Antwerp. Louis Philippe's continued inability to reconstruct his
Cabinet necessarily increased the reluctance of the British government
to agree definitely to combined action with France. When, towards
the end of June, the King had become convinced of the necessity of
strengthening the ministry his thoughts, in the first place, had
turned towards M. Dupin. His oratorical powers, the considerable
following which he commanded in the Chamber, and the support which he
had given to M. Casimir Périer, furnished excellent reasons for his
inclusion in a government which was to carry on the policy of the late
President of the Council. But insurmountable difficulties had arisen.
It is not clear whether M. Dupin's objections to joining the Cabinet
should be ascribed to conscientious doubts about the future policy of
the government, or merely to disappointed ambition, because the King
was not prepared to confer upon him the Presidency of the Council.
According to one account, he is said to have pointed to his hobnailed
boots and to have asked insolently whether they were to debar him from
transacting business with "_Milord_ Granville." But, whatever may have
been the true cause of his misunderstanding with his royal master,
their discussion unquestionably grew very heated and culminated in the
King seizing him by the collar and ejecting him from the room.[244] A
strong sense of personal dignity, however, was never a characteristic
of Louis Philippe, and, notwithstanding this scene, he soon reopened
negotiations with M. Dupin. But this second attempt to arrange
matters was attended with no better success than the first. Baffled
in this direction, Louis Philippe was compelled to make overtures to
the _Doctrinaires_. Under the Restoration this designation had been
applied to a small but distinguished group of politicians, of whom the
best known were Royer-Collard, Guizot, Broglie and Barante. All were
strong advocates of limited monarchy and, generally speaking, fervent
admirers of the British constitution. Their system of government was
based upon the theory that, in the modern France which the Revolution
had created, no _régime_ could endure which did not depend for support
upon the middle classes. The political principles which found favour
with the _bourgeoisie_, constituting as they did a _juste milieu_
between the reactionary sentiments of the old aristocracy and the
revolutionary tendencies of the labouring classes, were precisely
those to which, in the opinion of the _Doctrinaires_, all future
governments would have to conform. Accordingly, they had accepted
the Monarchy of July and both Broglie and Guizot had sat in Louis
Philippe's first Cabinet. But, holding that insurrection must be put
down with a firm hand, they had always supported Casimir Périer.
Louis Philippe had no great liking for the _Doctrinaires_. As strict
constitutionalists they were necessarily opposed to the direct
interference of the sovereign with the business of the State.
Moreover, they were unquestionably unpopular in the country. On this
occasion, however, when compelled by circumstances to seek their
assistance, he hoped to overcome this last objection by nominating
a popular soldier, in the person of Marshal Soult, to the presidency
of the council. All through his reign Louis Philippe was inclined to
place a military man at the head of the government. Not only were
appointments of this kind invariably well received, but he soon
discovered that soldiers, brought up in the school of Bonaparte,
were seldom troubled with constitutional scruples about the exact
position of the sovereign in a limited monarchy. But, at the same
time, he was careful to assure Lord Granville that the Marshal's
duties, as President of the Council, would be purely nominal. "Under
any circumstances," said Louis Philippe, "his appointment need excite
no apprehensions abroad, his love of peace is notorious, indeed, his
description of himself as _l'apôtre de la paix_ has almost passed into
a byword."[245] The Duc de Broglie, the son-in-law of Madame de Stael,
into whose hands the King proposed to confide the portfolio of Foreign
Affairs, was a cultivated man but of reserved and somewhat displeasing
manners. He enjoyed, however, a high reputation for honourable dealing
and integrity of purpose and was, moreover, on terms of friendship
with Lord Lansdowne and other prominent members of the Whig party.
His selection, therefore, might be expected to meet with the cordial
approval of the British government.
The Duc de Broglie, however, was not prepared to accept
unconditionally the task which the King proposed he should undertake.
After one of his first interviews with Louis Philippe he met Lord
Granville at Talleyrand's house in the Rue Saint-Florentin and
explained the situation to him. The French public, he told the
ambassador, were weary of the interminable negotiations about Belgium,
and it was only by a military exploit, such as the capture of the
citadel of Antwerp, that the Cabinet would be able to obtain the
support of the Chamber. It was useless to attempt to disguise the
grave character of the situation. Were the government to be overthrown
by a parliamentary majority, the King would be forced to depend upon
the Left, and be rendered powerless to control the violence of extreme
members of the party. The Duke went on to assure him that he was
not ignorant of the suspicion with which the entry of a French army
into Belgium would be regarded. There was no pledge, no guarantee,
however, which he would not be prepared to give that, eight days after
the capture of the citadel, every French soldier should be withdrawn
from Belgium.[246] This conversation had been regarded by Lord
Granville as quite unofficial, but, on the following day, October 5,
Sébastiani informed him that "the King purposed to defer concluding
his ministerial arrangements until the British ambassador should
be enabled to state the opinion of his government, respecting the
conditions under which alone the Duc de Broglie would undertake the
direction of foreign affairs."[247] It is evident, however, that other
counsels must have prevailed seeing that, on the morning of October
11, the _Moniteur_ contained the names of the members of the new
Cabinet. The despatches of Mareuil, the _chargé d'affaires_ in London,
respecting the intentions of the British government, were, it may be
presumed, considered so satisfactory as to render further assurances
unnecessary. The ministry presided over by Marshal Soult, assisted by
four such men as Broglie, Guizot, Humann, and Thiers, could almost
aspire to the name of "a government of all the talents."
The British government was in a difficult situation. The elections
were impending, and a Reformed Parliament, bent upon retrenchment and
the settlement of domestic questions, was little likely to regard
with favour any policy which might conceivably lead to serious
complications with foreign Powers. The very indifferent display of the
Belgians, in their short campaign of the year before, had deprived
them of all popular sympathy. In commercial circles, especially, the
idea of embarking upon hostilities against England's old allies,
the Dutch, was strongly deprecated.[248] Although the unreasonable
attitude of the King of the Netherlands, during the past twelve
months, had alienated from him the support of _The Times_[249] and
of many persons who derived their opinions from its columns, there
was unquestionably something to be said upon his behalf. He had
adhered to the protocols of January 20 and January 27, 1831, which the
plenipotentiaries had declared must form the basis of any separation
treaty. Nevertheless, in order to conciliate the Belgians, they had
gone back upon their decision, and both the convention of the eighteen
articles and the separation treaty of November 14, 1831, had been
framed upon different conditions.
The Tories had always supported the Dutch, and during the stormy
months which had preceded the passing of the Reform Bill, had
delivered some damaging attacks upon the foreign policy of the
government. It was certain that they would vehemently denounce any
combined action with France in the Dutch-Belgian question. Nor
would it be politic to disregard their attacks and merely to treat
them as the venomous outburst of party animosity. Notwithstanding
that the republicans had been crushed in the streets of Paris and
that the Carlist rebellion in La Vendée had been stamped out, the
situation in France undoubtedly presented many disquieting symptoms.
The hiding place of the Duchesse de Berri was still undiscovered,
and her presence in the west prevented the complete restoration
of tranquillity. The great difficulty which Louis Philippe was
experiencing in forming a government of moderate men afforded food
for yet more serious reflection. The possibility could not be ignored
that, in the near future, he might be compelled to select his
ministers from the Left--from the party, the leading members of which
proclaimed unceasingly that the treaties of 1815 must be abrogated and
that Belgium must be united to France.
King William IV., moreover, was strongly opposed to hostile action
against Holland. The "Jack Tar animosity"[250] which he always
entertained for the French blazed up afresh at the notion of England
and France engaging upon joint operations in the Low Countries. The
King's dislike to the policy of his ministers was encouraged by the
Howes and the Fitzclarences,[251] who used their best endeavours to
persuade him to refuse his consent to all measures of coercion. In
view of the little sympathy which the cause of Belgium evoked in the
country, and of the many difficulties by which they were beset, Lords
Grey and Palmerston might not improbably have felt disposed to adopt
some middle course, more in harmony with the views of the Court and
of the absolute Powers. But a refusal on their part to resort to
force, in order to obtain the execution of the treaty, would not have
restrained the French from beginning hostilities. "I should deceive
your Lordship," wrote Granville on October 19, "were I to hold out
any expectation that the British government, by withholding its
concurrence, could prevent a French army from entering Belgium."[252]
It was to be apprehended, however, that a refusal of the English
Cabinet to join with France in the application of coercion to Holland
might lead to the resignation of the Duc de Broglie. In that case
it was more than probable that the direction of French policy, at a
most important moment, might pass from the hands of a statesman of
moderate views into those of some politician of advanced opinions, in
whom it would be impossible to feel the same confidence. This was a
consideration which, without doubt, carried the greatest weight with
the English ministers and exercised a deciding influence over their
resolutions.
It was soon apparent that the withdrawal of their plenipotentiaries
from the conference would be the extent of the support which the
Northern Courts purposed to give to the King of the Netherlands.
The neutral attitude, which the Tsar had promised Lord Durham he
should adopt, rendered it certain that Austria would not move a man
to the assistance of Holland. Metternich was much concerned at the
recrudescence of a demand for more Liberal institutions in Germany, a
state of affairs which had called forth from the Diet fresh decrees
of a repressive character. The prevailing unrest, however, made it
the more desirable that the Dutch-Belgian question, with all the
possibilities of danger attaching to it, should be promptly settled.
Furthermore, the burden of military establishments was already
grievously straining the Imperial exchequer.[253] But, although
Metternich had no thought of opposing the action of the constitutional
Powers in the Low Countries, he chafed bitterly at the undignified
attitude which his Court was compelled to adopt. At one time he would
impute the whole blame for the situation which had arisen to the
plenipotentiaries at the conference who, by manifesting too plainly
their dread of war, had allowed Palmerston to see that he might,
without danger, conduct matters as he chose.[254] At other times
the Cabinet of Berlin was the object of his fretful complaints. Had
Prussia on the first outbreak of the insurrection at Brussels marched
an army into the Low Countries, the revolution would have been stamped
out, and all the subsequent trouble would have been avoided. France,
in that case, he professed to believe, might have threatened, but
would never have dared to intervene.[255]
The break-up of the conference and the intention avowed by the two
constitutional Powers of expelling the Dutch from Antwerp, although
not unexpected, caused considerable perturbation at Berlin. Ancillon,
the chief minister, declared that Prussia would agree to the weekly
deduction of a million florins from Belgium's share of the debt
due to Holland, for so long a period as the Dutch should retain
possession of the citadel of Antwerp. Nor would his Court be prepared
seriously to oppose a blockade of the Scheldt by the two maritime
Powers. The entry of a French army into the Low Countries, however,
was a different matter, and one which would compel Prussia to take
steps to safeguard her interests. But, neither the angry language of
M. Ancillon at Berlin nor the veiled threats indulged in by Baron
Werther in Paris, excited any real apprehension. Nevertheless, as
both the French and English governments were sincerely desirous of
conciliating the absolute Powers, it was resolved to propose that,
pending the settlement of the Dutch-Belgian question, Prussia should
occupy Venlo and that part of Limburg which the treaty had assigned to
Holland.[256]
It was not until October 22 that the convention, to regulate the
conditions under which France and England were to apply coercion
to Holland, was signed in London. The French government chafed
impatiently at this delay, for which King William's reluctance
to agree to the measures advocated by his ministers was chiefly
responsible. Notwithstanding Talleyrand's[257] explanations of the
delicate situation in which Lord Grey was placed, the Duc de Broglie,
on October 21, informed Lord Granville that his government could wait
no longer. The very existence of the Cabinet, he assured him, was at
stake. Unless he were to be in a position to announce to the Chambers,
which were about to reassemble, that definite steps were to be taken
in order to expel the Dutch from Antwerp, he and his colleagues would
assuredly be driven from office. If no news were received from London
within the next twenty-four hours, the Cabinet, he had no doubt,
would resolve to march an army against Antwerp, in the event of the
King of the Netherlands refusing to comply with a summons to evacuate
the citadel. This resolution would, however, be at once transmitted
to London, and would be kept entirely secret until the British
government should have had time to reply to it. But, to the great
joy of Louis Philippe and his ministers, the arrival, on October 29,
of the convention signed in London relieved them from the necessity
of deciding upon their course of action, without having previously
obtained the concurrence of the English government.[258]
By the terms of the convention of October 22, 1832, the King of the
Netherlands was to be summoned to enter into an engagement by November
2 to withdraw his troops, before the 12th of the same month, from the
territory which the separation treaty had adjudged to Belgium. Should
he refuse to comply, France and England agreed to lay an embargo
upon the Dutch shipping within their respective harbours, to order
their cruisers to seize all Dutch vessels at sea, and to blockade the
coast of Holland with their combined fleets. If, by November 15, the
required evacuation should not yet have taken place, a French army
would enter Belgium. But its operations were to be limited strictly to
the capture of the citadel of Antwerp and the forts dependent upon it,
and, when this result should have been attained, it was to withdraw
immediately. At the same time, a note was to be addressed to the
government at Brussels calling for the evacuation of Venlo and those
places still occupied by Belgium, which, under the provisions of the
separation treaty, had been assigned to Holland.[259] This demand,
however, would be of a purely formal character, and was to be made
upon the understanding that it need only be complied with, should the
King of the Netherlands agree to the concessions required of him.[260]
Immediately upon receipt of the convention in Paris, the French
fleet at Cherbourg was ordered to unite with the British squadron at
Spithead. This junction was duly effected, and, on November 4, the
King of the Netherlands having declined to comply with the demand
which had been presented to him, the combined fleets set sail for
the mouth of the Scheldt, whilst, two days later, both governments
laid an embargo upon the Dutch shipping within their ports. The Duc
de Broglie, in the meanwhile, had instructed La Tour-Maubourg, the
French minister at Brussels, to negotiate a convention for the entry
of a French army into Belgium. The French government had always
insisted that the operations, for the reduction of the citadel of
Antwerp, must be carried out exclusively by its own troops. The
Belgian army was to be entirely separated from them, and was to
do no more than hold itself in readiness to repel an invasion,
should the Dutch make an incursion across their frontiers. King
Leopold reluctantly assented to these conditions, which necessarily
deprived his people of an excellent opportunity of wiping out their
humiliations of the year before. It came, therefore, as a disagreeable
surprise when, on the occasion of the exchange of the ratifications of
the convention, La Tour-Maubourg handed in a statement reserving to
the French government the right of demanding payment for the expenses
of the expedition. This claim, it was afterwards explained, would not
be enforced immediately, but would be allowed to stand over until
some future occasion. In Palmerston's opinion, however, the fact that
payment was to be deferred made the demand no less objectionable. Were
it to be admitted, Belgium must necessarily be placed in a position of
dangerous dependence upon France. His vigorous protests achieved the
desired result. After some discussion the French government agreed to
abandon its claim for the repayment of its expenses.[261] In all other
respects matters proceeded with perfect smoothness. In accordance
with the terms of the convention, on November 16th, a French force of
60,000 men, under the command of Marshal Gérard, crossed the Belgian
frontier and laid siege to the citadel of Antwerp, the Duc d'Orléans
and the Duc de Nemours, the two eldest sons of Louis Philippe,
accompanying the headquarters staff of the army of operations.
In London the application of coercion of so vigorous a nature was
far from evoking the universal applause which it called forth in
Paris. Among the general public the entry of Marshal Gérard's army
into Belgium was regarded with suspicion, and a meeting of London
merchants was held, and a petition was forwarded to the King, praying
that hostile measures might not be taken against the Dutch. The
Tories openly declared that they placed all their hopes in General
Chassé, the commandant of the citadel of Antwerp. If only that gallant
officer could contrive to repel the French, the Grey Cabinet, they
conceived, might be forced to resign. Possibly there were sanguine
members of the party who fancied that the prowess of a Dutch general
might pave the way to the repeal of the Reform Act. In the meantime
all their sympathies went out to a drunken sailor who, from the dock
in the police-court, proclaimed the union of the British flag with the
tricolour to be a national disgrace.[262]
The proposal that Prussia should occupy Venlo and parts of Limburg,
and the limitations which the convention of October 22 set upon the
scope of the French operations, somewhat reconciled the German Powers
to the forcible ejection of the Dutch from Antwerp.[263] Nevertheless,
after having in the first instance declared its readiness to take
temporary possession of portions of the disputed territory, the
Court of Berlin, at the instigation, it was suspected, of the Tsar,
declined to entertain the suggestion. Inasmuch as the acquisition of
the citadel of Antwerp by the Belgians depended upon the success of
the French arms, they could not reasonably be expected to yield up,
even to a third party, any territory which they actually occupied,
before the operations under Marshal Gérard should have achieved their
desired result. Accordingly, in the formal proposal of Talleyrand
and Palmerston, which was submitted to Bülow on October 30, it was
provided that the Prussian occupation of Venlo and parts of Limburg
and Luxemburg should begin, only when the French expedition should
have accomplished its object. Ancillon, however, declared that
this suggestion was altogether inadmissible. Prussia, it was true,
had signified her willingness to hold certain districts of the Low
Countries. But she had only consented to take temporary possession
of them for the security of her own interests during the French
operations against Antwerp. To occupy any portion of Holland, after
the withdrawal of Marshal Gérard's army, would amount, in effect, to
the application of military pressure to the King of the Netherlands
to compel him to accept the conditions of the separation treaty.
Such a proceeding would be wholly inconsistent with the policy which
the Court of Berlin had invariably pursued, and to which it was
resolved to adhere. Prussia, therefore, would content herself with the
concentration of an army of observation upon the Meuse, for so long a
period as the French might see fit to remain in Belgium.[264]
In the meantime the siege of the citadel of Antwerp had been
proceeding steadily, although hardly with the rapidity which the
British government, in its impatience to see the affair concluded,
could have wished.[265] At last, after having sustained a very heavy
bombardment and having done all that honour required, General Chassé,
on December 22, agreed to surrender. But the two detached forts of
Lillo and Liefkenshoek, which, owing to the opening of the dykes,
could only have been reduced by a long blockade, were not included in
the capitulation. The arrangements connected with the transference of
the fortress to the Belgian military authorities were quickly carried
out, and, on December 27, the French army began its homeward march.
The operations of Marshal Gérard had placed the Belgians in possession
of the citadel of Antwerp, and had infused vitality into the Soult
government, but they had not succeeded in overcoming the reluctance
of the King of the Netherlands to adhere to the separation treaty.
It remained to be seen whether the embargo which France and England
continued to maintain, and the loss entailed by the non-payment of
the Belgian share of the Netherlands debt, would suffice to break
down his obstinacy. After this state of affairs had continued for
some four months distinct symptoms began to manifest themselves in
Dutch commercial circles of discontent at the prolongation of the
crisis. About this same time also the Russian and Prussian Cabinets
became imbued with the notion that the conclusion of the Dutch-Belgian
affair might lead to a separation between France and England. Their
intimate union had grown up in the course of the negotiations, the
final settlement of the question, it was hoped, might cause them to
drift asunder. The agents of the northern Courts at the Hague were,
accordingly, instructed to urge the King to terminate definitely his
troublesome quarrel with Belgium and the maritime Powers.[266]
This combination of internal and external pressure was more than the
Dutch Cabinet could withstand. On May 21, 1833 a convention was signed
in London by the plenipotentiaries of Holland, on the one side, and
those of Great Britain and France, on the other, stipulating that,
so long as the relations between Holland and Belgium should not be
settled by a definite treaty, His Netherlands Majesty would never
begin hostilities against Belgium, and would leave the navigation
of the Scheldt entirely free. France and England in return engaged
to remove the embargo, immediately upon the ratification of this
convention.[267]
The convention of May 21, 1833, was, in effect, an agreement for
the maintenance of the _status quo_. It constituted, however, a
condition of affairs very favourable to the Belgians. The retention
of the districts of Limburg and Luxemburg, which, according to the
twenty-four articles, should have formed part of Holland, compensated
them amply for the small inconveniences imposed upon them by the
refusal of the Court of the Hague to acknowledge their independence
and the sovereignty of their King. Five years later, in 1838, this
fact was brought home to them when, the King of the Netherlands having
announced his intention of adhering to the separation treaty, the
Powers insisted upon the surrender to him of those territories. By
that time, however, Leopold had obtained the recognition of all the
great European Courts with the exception of that of Russia, whilst,
relieved from the fear of aggression on the part of the Dutch, his
kingdom had already begun to thrive and to prosper greatly.
It was the firm and skilful hand of Palmerston which had guided the
conference through a sea of dangers to the creation of a free and
independent Belgium. But if the chief credit for the successful
termination of these protracted negotiations should be given to the
English statesman, second honours, without doubt, should be assigned
to Talleyrand. The veteran diplomatist was no friend to Belgium, but
he was a consistent supporter of the British alliance. The exceptional
position, which his age and his reputation permitted him to assume,
enabled him on many occasions to uphold successfully the English
policy against his own sovereign and his government. In 1814, at the
Congress of Vienna, friendship with England had been the object of
his untiring efforts. But, if he looked upon a close understanding
with that Power as highly advantageous to the restored Bourbons, he
regarded it as a matter of vital necessity to the Monarchy of July. An
intimate union with England, he was convinced, was Louis Philippe's
best security against the malevolent hostility of the Northern Courts.
The Belgian conference had shown that, in the person of Lord
Palmerston, a worthy successor to Canning had entered the arena of
European politics. As was the case with that statesman, Palmerston
soon came to be regarded with the bitterest dislike in the Courts and
Cabinets of the absolute Powers. Metternich hoped devoutly that the
Tories might soon be back in office, and, not without good reason,
expressed a pious wish that never again might a conference take
place in London.[268] The real weakness of the absolute Courts had
transpired all too clearly in the course of the negotiations.
CHAPTER V
MEHEMET ALI
Scarcely had the withdrawal of the French troops from Belgium been
effected, than grave news was received from the east. At Konieh,
in Asia Minor, on December 21, 1832, Ibrahim Pasha, the son of
Mehemet Ali, the rebellious viceroy of Egypt, was reported to have
inflicted so signal a defeat upon the Turkish army, as to place it
beyond the Sultan's power to resist his advance to the shores of the
Bosphorus. The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, with all the fearful
complications which it would entail, appeared to be upon the point of
taking place.
The Sultan, Mahmud II., had always been keenly alive to the necessity
of remedying the decrepit condition of his Empire. But only a Peter
the Great could have eradicated effectually the many evils from which
Turkey was suffering, and Mahmud was merely an Oriental despot. All
through his reign, however, he set himself resolutely to destroy the
almost independent power which some of his Pashas had begun to assume
over the provinces which they governed. He imposed the European dress
upon his ministers and officials, he introduced the French system of
drill into his army, and he exterminated the janissaries, when they
rebelled against his innovations. Even at a time of profound peace
reforms of this superficial character could have effected little
real improvement. Under the actual conditions under which they were
carried out they proved a cause of anarchy and a further source of
weakness to the State.
In 1821 the Sublime Porte was called upon to deal at the same time
with the rebellion of Ali, the celebrated "Lion of Janina," and with
the more serious national rising of the Greeks. After the struggle in
the Morea had been carried on for three years, with ruthless barbarity
on both sides, the Sultan was reluctantly compelled to invoke the
aid of his too powerful vassal, the Pasha of Egypt. The intervention
of the well-equipped fleet of Mehemet Ali deprived the Greeks of the
sea power, which had been the secret of their success. Nevertheless,
Ibrahim's invasion of the Morea in 1825, by compelling the Powers
to interfere, gave Greece her independence. The romantic episodes
of the struggle, the classic memories with which the theatre of war
was associated, had gained for the insurgents the popular sympathies
of the western nations. The philhellenism of the French and English
people gradually drove Villèle[269] and Canning to concert measures
for terminating the conflict with Nicholas, whose subjects were eager
to strike a blow on behalf of their co-religionists.
Negotiations proceeded slowly, but, on July 6, 1827, Great Britain,
France and Russia bound themselves by treaty to obtain the autonomy
of the Morea. Moreover, in a secret article, it was provided that
an armistice was to be proposed to both sides to be enforced by
such means as might "suggest themselves to the prudence of the High
Contracting Parties." Three months later, on October 20, the allied
fleets of the three Christian Powers, under the command of Codrington,
the senior admiral, were face to face with the Mussulman armada in the
Bay of Navarino. Immediate hostilities were probably not intended,
but a dispute about the position of a fire-ship led to an exchange
of shots. Before nightfall the "untoward event" had come to pass--the
Turkish and Egyptian fleets had been destroyed completely.
Mahmud in his fury proclaimed a holy war, and declared null and void
the convention of Akkerman, which he had recently concluded with
Russia for the settlement of certain points, long in dispute between
the two Powers. Canning was dead and Wellington was determined to
abstain rigidly from anything in the nature of hostile action against
Turkey. Nevertheless, under the conditions which had been created by
Canning's departure from the traditional policy of his party, he could
do nothing to prevent Nicholas from appealing to the last argument
of princes. On May 6, 1828, the Russians crossed the Pruth and the
war began, which British and Austrian diplomacy had always striven
to avert. The Turks, however, in a struggle with their hereditary
foes displayed unexpected powers of resistance, and it was not until
September 14, 1829, when Constantinople appeared to lie at the mercy
of the invaders, that peace was concluded at Adrianople.
In accordance with his promises to the Powers, Nicholas had exacted
no cession of territory in Europe. But Turkey had been compelled to
grant a practical independence to the Danubian principalities, to pay
a heavy war indemnity and to surrender to Russia Anapi and Poti on
the eastern shore of the Black Sea. Moreover, the Sultan was forced
to acknowledge the complete independence of Greece, which was placed
under the guarantee of Great Britain, France and Russia. The loss of
the Morea was a serious blow to the Porte. Not only was the Turkish
navy deprived of its finest recruiting ground, but the countenance
given by the Powers to the rising of the Greeks necessarily had a most
disturbing effect upon all the Christian subjects of the Sultan.
Whilst the power of the Sultan was thus sensibly diminished, Mehemet
Ali, who had taken no part in the Russian war, was preparing to avail
himself of the embarrassed condition of the Empire for the prosecution
of his own designs. This remarkable man was born at Cawala, a small
seaport town in Roumelia, in 1769, the year which gave birth to
Napoleon Bonaparte and to Wellington. His father was a yeoman farmer
and he himself, in early life, was a small trader in tobacco. In 1798,
however, Bonaparte's descent upon Egypt gave him his opportunity.
Young Ali sailed for the country in which he was so rapidly to acquire
fame, in the rank of second-in-command to a regiment of Bashi-Bazouks.
In the troublous times which followed, his military talents and his
statesmanlike qualities soon brought him into prominence. In 1804, the
sheikhs of Cairo elected him Pasha, and, two years later, a, _firman_
of the Sultan confirmed their selection. The last obstacle to his
complete ascendency over Egypt was removed, on March 1, 1811, by the
terrible affair known as the massacre of the Mamelukes. The Beys and
chiefs, to the number of 470, were invited to witness the ceremony of
investing his second son with the command of the army destined for
operations against the Wahabites. These men versed in all the wiles
and stratagems of eastern politics complied, and walked blindly into
the trap set for them by one who, they must have known, was their
deadly enemy. On leaving the citadel of Cairo they were relentlessly
shot down by a picked body of the Pasha's Albanian troops, at a point
where the road becomes a narrow winding pathway cut out of the rock.
Alone Emin Bey, by blindfolding his horse and by forcing him through a
gap and down a high, precipitous bank, succeeded in escaping from the
scene of slaughter.[270]
During the next few years Mehemet Ali won a high reputation in the
Moslem world by his wars against the Wahabites, and by his deliverance
of the Holy Cities of Medina and Mecca from these enemies of the
true faith. He had always entertained a great liking and admiration
for Europeans, and his experience of French and English troops had
impressed him with the superiority of western over eastern methods.
As early as 1803 he had begun to build up a fleet, and with the
assistance of Colonel Sèves, known in Egypt as Soliman Pasha, a former
aide-de-camp of Marshal Ney, he hoped to obtain an army trained and
disciplined on a European model. His efforts had been so far crowned
with success, that, but for the intervention of the Powers, his son
Ibrahim would, unquestionably, have crushed the Greek rebellion.
Mehemet Ali's curious experiment in state socialism can be discussed
more conveniently later on. Suffice it to say that, unsound as was
his economic system, and destined as it was largely to contribute to
his ultimate undoing, it, for a time, furnished him with ample funds
for the prosecution of his ambitious schemes. By nature he appears
to have been rather a kind-hearted than a cruel man. To some extent,
without doubt, he was an oppressor of the people, yet at the same time
he constantly protected them from the ill-treatment and exactions
of his officials. But, although he was too large-minded to find any
satisfaction in useless tyranny, when he conceived that reasons of
state called for their application, he would resort unhesitatingly
to the most ruthless measures.[271] In passing judgment on Mehemet
Ali, however, it must always be remembered that he was an altogether
illiterate man, who had only taught himself to read in middle life by
dint of great perseverance. Nor should it be forgotten that Egypt,
when he assumed the supreme control, was in a state of confusion and
anarchy almost impossible to realize.
It was not loyalty which had prompted Mehemet Ali to assist the Porte
to crush the Greek insurrection. In 1822 he had obtained the island of
Crete from the Sultan, and the Morea and the pashalics of Syria and
Damascus were to have been his rewards in 1825. The intervention of
the Powers had deprived him of the Morea, which he had always regarded
as one of the gates of Constantinople. After the Russo-Turkish war,
however, he felt confident of his ability to take forcible possession
of Syria, the eastern avenue of approach to the Imperial city. A
quarrel with Abdullah Pasha of Acre furnished him with an excuse for
setting his army and his fleet in motion. On November 1, 1831, a force
of about 10,000 Egyptians, under Ibrahim, entered Syria and laid siege
to the fortress of Saint-Jean d'Acre.
To the commissioner of the Porte sent to remonstrate with him for
thus invading a neighbouring pashalic, without the permission of the
Sultan, Mehemet Ali loudly protested the loyalty of his intentions.
The presumptuous Abdullah, he swore, had "insulted his beard whitened
in the service of his sovereign," and, in the interests of the Porte,
he now proposed to chastise his arrogance. These assurances were,
however, estimated at their true value, and neither the Sultan nor
his ministers had had any doubts that the Pasha was now launched
upon a career of conquest.[272] The destruction of his powerful
vassal had, for many years past, been an object very near to Mahmud's
heart. To accomplish this purpose, he was prepared to strain to their
uttermost the exhausted resources of the empire. His favourite,
Hosrew, the _Seraskier_,[273] was the sworn enemy of Mehemet Ali,
and both the Grand Vizier and the _Capudan Pasha_[274] were the
creatures of this minister.[275] On the other hand, however, the
_Ulemas_ and the _Mullahs_ argued in favour of an arrangement with
the rebellious viceroy, even at the price of large concessions. The
three guaranteeing Powers had settled upon the boundaries of the new
Kingdom of Greece, and Sir Stratford Canning was about to arrive at
Constantinople to arrange the final conditions of separation with
the Porte. But, were peace to be maintained with the Pasha of Egypt,
contended the true Mussulman party, a united front could be turned to
Europe, and the concessions demanded, in respect of Greece, might be
scornfully rejected.[276]
Notwithstanding his wrath, this consideration appears to have carried
some weight with the Sultan. But his hesitation was not of long
duration. Hussein Pasha, a former janissary, and Mahmud's chief
instrument in the destruction of his comrades, was appointed to the
command of the troops in Syria. No pains were spared to render the
army of operations as efficient and as numerous as possible, and,
early in May, both Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim were declared outlaws.
Meanwhile, the siege of Acre had been proceeding, but the defence was
stubborn, and it was not until May 27, 1832, that Ibrahim carried the
fortress by storm. The victorious general now set his face northwards.
On June 15, Damascus opened its gates, and, on July 9, he defeated the
advanced Turkish troops at Homs. A week later, he entered Aleppo, and,
on July 29, routed Hussein Pasha himself, who had taken up a strong
position near Alexandretta. This victory left him free to pass the
Taurus mountains and to enter Asia Minor.
It was to the politic attitude which he had observed towards the
people of the country through which he had passed, rather than to any
superiority of his Arab troops over the Turks, that the success of
Ibrahim's invasion should be ascribed. In those wild and mountainous
districts any resistance on the part of the inhabitants must have
greatly impeded the advance of an army. Ibrahim, however, maintained
the strictest discipline, and paid promptly for all the requirements
of his troops. The people, contrasting his behaviour with the
treatment they had been accustomed to experience at the hands of the
Turks, were strongly impressed in favour of the Egyptians.[277] The
Emir Beshir, the powerful chief of the Lebanon, threw in his lot with
the invaders. The warlike Druses and the Maronites tendered Ibrahim
their services. Christians were won over by promises of equal rights,
and Moslems by the prospect of escaping from Ottoman oppression.
Ibrahim's troops were equipped in European fashion, but there was
nothing about their uniform which could offend the most rigid
Mussulman. He himself was dressed in the same simple manner as his
soldiers, and he affected always to be a strict observer of Turkish
customs. Although in private, in the company of the Christian officers
of his staff, he would often indulge freely in French wine, in public
he was never seen to drink anything stronger than water.[278]
Ibrahim's rapid succession of victories and his continued advance
filled the Sultan with consternation. Having resolved to throw all the
resources of the Empire into the struggle with Mehemet Ali he could
not afford to quarrel with the Christian Powers. Stratford Canning,
accordingly, experienced little difficulty in bringing the Porte
to agree to the conditions under which it was proposed that Greece
should be separated from Turkey. Soon after his arrival, however, on
May 17, in the course of a confidential talk, Mustafa-Effendi, the
Sultan's private secretary, let fall certain expressions indicative of
a desire on the part of his master to enter into a close and intimate
connection with England.[279] On August 7, 1832, on the occasion of
Sir Stratford's audience for the purpose of taking leave, the Sultan
"honoured him with the gift of his portrait suspended by a gold
chain and set in brilliants," a mark of His Highness' consideration
which, the ambassador reported, "was without precedent."[280]
Direct proposals for the conclusion of an alliance between England
and Turkey were immediately afterwards made to him both by the
_Reis-Effendi_[281] and by the Sultan himself.[282] Furthermore, M.
Maurojeni, the Turkish _chargé d'affaires_ at Vienna, was sent to
London to sound the British government upon the subject, and, on
October 18, Namic Pasha, a major-general of the Imperial Guard, set
out for England with a letter from His Highness to King William IV.
praying for naval assistance on the coast of Syria.[283]
Had the decision rested with Palmerston alone it is possible that
aid of some kind might have been furnished to the Porte. But the
majority of the members of the Cabinet were strongly averse to
embarking upon any fresh adventure, while the Belgian question was
still unsettled. Moreover, since the conclusion of the great war,
the naval establishments had been cut down to so low a point that it
would have been highly inconvenient to reinforce the Mediterranean
squadron. The British _chargé d'affaires_ at Constantinople was,
therefore, instructed to inform the Porte that "naval assistance was
a matter of greater difficulty than at first sight it would appear
to be." Nevertheless, the request was regarded as a striking proof
of the Sultan's confidence in British friendship, and His Majesty's
government would at once convey to Mehemet Ali "an expression of
regret that he should so far have forgotten what was due to his
Sovereign."[284] This was all the comfort which Mandeville was able
to give to the distracted Turkish ministers, at the moment when the
news reached Constantinople that the Grand Vizier had been completely
defeated at Konieh, that he himself was a prisoner in Ibrahim's hands
and that, in the words of the _Reis-Effendi_, "the Turkish army
existed no longer."[285]
A few days before the arrival of the news of the disaster at Konieh,
the Russian general, Muravieff, suddenly appeared at Constantinople.
On December 23 both he and Boutenieff, the Russian ambassador, had a
conference with the _Reis-Effendi_ and the _Seraskier_, and, on the
27th, the general was received in private audience by the Sultan,
to whom he presented a letter from the Tsar. No mystery was made of
the fact that Muravieff had been charged to proceed to Cairo, to
warn Mehemet Ali that, should he persist in refusing to make his
submission to the Sultan, he would bring down upon himself the wrath
of the Emperor Nicholas. But both Mandeville and Varennes, the French
_chargé d'affaires_, were soon satisfied, notwithstanding the secrecy
with which the Russian proceedings were surrounded, that an offer of
military assistance had been tendered to the Porte. Their information
was correct.[286] Boutenieff had offered to place a squadron of
the Black Sea fleet at the Sultan's disposal, but his Highness,
with profuse expressions of gratitude, had declined the proffered
assistance. Rather than accept help from Russia, he was prepared
to humble his pride and to send Halil Pasha to attempt to arrange
a settlement with his rebellious vassal. On January 5, 1833, this
decision was conveyed to Boutenieff, whereupon Muravieff at once set
out upon his mission to Mehemet Ali, the Sultan's envoy, Halil Pasha,
having already started upon his way to Alexandria.
There had, for a long time past, been a disposition in England
to regard French relations with Egypt with suspicion. Ever since
Bonaparte's descent upon the country, Egypt was believed to have a
sentimental attraction for the French. Now that by their acquisition
of Algiers, they had gained a footing upon the African shore of
the Mediterranean, this feeling of distrust had increased. It was
remembered that Polignac had seriously entertained the notion of
subsidizing Mehemet Ali and of employing a corps of Egyptian troops
in the Algerian expedition. During the course of Ibrahim's campaign
in Syria, both Stratford Canning and Mandeville had looked with sour
disapproval upon Varennes' efforts to persuade the Porte to allow
France to mediate between the Sultan and the Pasha.[287] But both
the French and English governments were agreed as to the necessity
of preserving the Ottoman Empire and were resolved to prevent, if
possible, the Porte from falling completely under the influence of
Russia. The Duc de Broglie, when he learnt that offers of assistance
had been made to the Sultan by Boutenieff, at once suggested the
joint mediation of France and England in the Turco-Egyptian dispute,
and was greatly disappointed to find that his proposal met with no
response in London. Palmerston, for the present, was content to direct
Lord Ponsonby to proceed from Naples to Constantinople, as ambassador
to the Porte, and to despatch Colonel Campbell to Egypt, in the
capacity of British agent and consul-general, with instructions to
communicate "freely and confidentially" with the French and Austrian
representatives at Alexandria.[288]
It was one of the ironies of the situation that, at this time, when
Russia was suspected of intending to put into execution long-matured
schemes against the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, her traditional
policy towards Turkey had in fact been completely reversed. As far
back as the year 1802 the minister, Kotchuby, taking as his text
Montesquieu's doctrine that no Power can have a better neighbour
than a weak State, had drawn up a memorandum to prove that the
preservation, not the destruction, of Turkey should be the object of
Russian policy. More recently, in 1829, when the terms of the peace
of Adrianople were under consideration, the members of the eastern
committee had endorsed Kotchuby's views, and the Tsar Nicholas had
reluctantly adopted their conclusions.[289] Muravieff's instructions
had been drawn strictly in this spirit. Mehemet Ali, Nesselrode laid
down, must not be allowed to reach Constantinople and to overthrow the
existing _régime_. Such a development would be opposed to the Imperial
policy, which aimed at maintaining Turkey in her present "stationary
condition." Should the Pasha succeed in establishing himself at
Constantinople, Russia would be placed "in contact with a strong and
victorious Power instead of a weak and defeated neighbour."[290]
Meanwhile, Ibrahim who was still at Konieh was believed to be on
the point of moving forward to Brusa.[291] Both to Colonel Duhamel,
Muravieff's aide-de-camp, and to a messenger despatched to him by M.
de Varennes, he returned the same answer. He was a soldier and must
obey his orders, his father alone could decide upon his movements. He
should be sorry to displease the Emperor Nicholas, but he must abide
by his instructions.[292] Ibrahim's uncompromising attitude overcame
the Sultan's hesitation. Boutenieff was informed that the promised
naval assistance would be thankfully accepted and that, in addition,
His Highness craved for the despatch of 30,000 Russian troops for
the defence of his capital. The Sultan knew well that to invoke the
military protection of the Tsar must lower him in the eyes of his
subjects and of every true Mussulman. But, upon the whole, he regarded
it as less dangerous than to allow Ibrahim to advance to the shores of
the Bosphorus. It was in vain, therefore, that Varennes and Mandeville
exerted themselves to induce the Porte to withdraw the demand for
Russian help.[293] "A drowning man," said the _Reis-Effendi_, "will
clutch at a serpent."[294]
Early in February Muravieff was back at Constantinople. The terms
which Halil Pasha had been empowered to offer had not been accepted,
but Mehemet Ali had promised Muravieff that, for the present, the
Egyptian army should not advance beyond Kiutayeh.[295] Upon the news
that no immediate forward movement on the part of Ibrahim was to be
apprehended, both the French and British ministers again endeavoured
to persuade the Porte to ask that the despatch of the Russian succour
might be delayed. According to the _Reis-Effendi_ such a request was
actually made to Boutenieff, who replied that he had no ship at his
disposal to send to Sevastopol, although a Russian brig of war was at
the time at anchor in front of the embassy.[296] On the other hand,
accounts of these proceedings, derived from Russian sources, state
that the question of postponing the departure of the fleet was never
seriously raised.[297] Be that as it may, on February 20, 1833, the
Russian squadron, consisting of four sail of the line, three large
frigates, a corvette and a brig, entered the Bosphorus and anchored at
Buyukdere.
Three days earlier, on February 17, Admiral Roussin, the newly
appointed French ambassador to the Sublime Porte, arrived at
Constantinople. Upon the appearance of the Russian fleet he at once
instructed his _dragoman_ to warn the Porte that, unless the admiral
in command were requested to depart within twenty-four hours, he
should consider his mission at an end. At the same time he tried
to induce the British minister to make a similar representation.
Mandeville, however, could only reply that he had no authority "to
hold language of so high and energetic a character." Roussin appears
to have seen very soon that he had acted with undue precipitation,
and that his own withdrawal would not hasten by an hour the departure
of the Russian ships. But his next step was scarcely more judicious.
On the 21st, he affixed his signature to a document guaranteeing that
Mehemet Ali would make peace with the Sultan, upon the terms proposed
by Halil Pasha and which had already been rejected. In return the
Sublime Porte was to undertake to refuse "foreign succour" of any kind
in the future.[298]
It was hoped to satisfy Mehemet Ali by conferring upon him the
government of the districts of Acre, Naplous, Jerusalem and Tripoli.
He, however, was resolved to extend his rule over the whole of Syria,
and to acquire, in addition, the pashalic of Adana and the seaports
of Selefkeh and Alaia. Adana possessed an especial value in his
eyes, by reason of its forests from which he proposed to obtain the
timber necessary for the building of his ships. He understood the
difficulties of the Sultan's position and he was well informed about
the rivalries of the Powers.[299] He perceived clearly that he was
never likely again to have so favourable an opportunity for pressing
his demands upon the Porte. On March 23, accordingly, Reshid Bey
arrived at Constantinople bringing a letter in which Mehemet Ali
rejected scornfully Admiral Roussin's proposals. He would rather, he
declared, meet with an honourable death than submit to be deprived of
territories which were his by right of conquest. At the same time,
Ibrahim was directed to march on Constantinople if, within five days
of Reshid's arrival, the Sultan should not have agreed to the required
concessions.[300]
Terrible consternation prevailed in the _Seraglio_, and great
was the perplexity at the French and British embassies. Roussin
counselled a complete surrender to Mehemet Ali, and Mandeville had
no alternative to propose. It was decided, finally, that a Turkish
plenipotentiary should proceed, accompanied by M. de Varennes, to
Ibrahim's headquarters at Kiutayeh with authority to offer the
pashalics of Damascus and Aleppo.[301] Ibrahim, however, would not
entertain the idea of a compromise, and Varennes could only report the
failure of his mission and advise the cession of Adana. In opposition
to the recommendations of Mandeville, but with the approbation of
Admiral Roussin, the Sultan consented to yield up to his vassal this
valuable district.[302] The preliminaries of this agreement, known as
the Convention of Kiutayeh were signed on April 8, 1833, and Ibrahim
forthwith began his preparations for retiring into Syria.
In the meantime, however, on April 6, a second division of the
Russian fleet had arrived in the Bosphorus and 5000 troops had been
disembarked on the Asiatic shore opposite to the British embassy
at Therapia. The Tsar Nicholas was greatly incensed at Admiral
Roussin's attempts to induce the Porte to ask for the withdrawal of
his squadron. Pozzo di Borgo was, in consequence, charged to protest
vigorously in Paris against the admiral's conduct, and the complaints
of the Russian ambassador were warmly supported by his colleagues of
Austria and Prussia. Broglie, although he might allow Lord Granville
to perceive that he was not altogether convinced of the wisdom of
Roussin's actions, invariably met the representations of the agents
of the Northern Courts with the reply that the admiral's conduct
was fully approved of by his government.[303] At Constantinople
Boutenieff declared emphatically that nothing short of the complete
evacuation of Asia Minor by the Egyptians would induce his Imperial
master to recall either his fleet or his troops to Sevastopol.[304]
When the list of the pashalics to which Mehemet Ali had been appointed
was officially made public, it was seen that no mention had been
made of the province of Adana. Upon hearing of this breach of the
Convention of Kiutayeh, Ibrahim promptly arrested the homeward
march of his army.[305] A few days later, however, on April 22,
a third division of the Russian fleet and a second detachment of
troops entered the Bosphorus. These reinforcements, which should
have added to the Sultan's powers of resistance, became, in effect,
the determining cause of his decision finally to give way about
Adana. Ever since the entry of Ibrahim into Asia Minor, the people
of Constantinople had been deprived of their usual sources of
supply. The necessity of provisioning the Russian fleet and _corps
d'armée_ had greatly aggravated the difficulties of the situation.
Confronted by the prospect of a famine and a rising of the populace,
Mahmud elected to humble his pride and to obtain the withdrawal of
the Egyptians at the price of the surrender of Adana.[306] Yet he
could not bring himself openly to nominate his rebellious vassal
to the governorship of this important province. Ibrahim was, in
consequence, officially appointed collector of the crown revenues of
the district. Mehemet Ali, provided he could exercise an effective
dominion over Adana, was content, in this instance, to waive his
claim to be styled its Pasha. In point of fact he was delighted that
matters had been so satisfactorily arranged. Under Campbell's threat
that, should he persist in claiming Adana, the coast of Egypt would
be blockaded by the British fleet, he had actually announced his
intention of withdrawing his demand, when the news arrived that the
Sultan had invested his son with the administration of the territory
in dispute.[307] Relations of amity were thus once more officially
established between the Sublime Porte and the Pasha.
On May 1 Lord Ponsonby, the newly appointed British ambassador,
arrived at Constantinople, preceding by three days Count Orloff, the
_generalissimo_ of the Russian military and naval forces in the Black
Sea and the Bosphorus, and Ambassador-Extraordinary to the Sublime
Porte. His appointment was due to the Tsar's desire to be represented
at Constantinople by some one who could be depended upon resolutely to
oppose Admiral Roussin. Boutenieff appears to have been considered as
somewhat deficient both in energy and strength of character. Orloff
had been furnished with very wide powers, but he was charged to regard
the task of convincing the Sultan and his ministers that their safety
entirely depended upon the degree of support which, in the future, the
Tsar might be disposed to afford them, as the primary object of his
mission. He must be admitted to have carried out his instructions most
faithfully. From the day of his arrival Russian influence was supreme
at the Porte and in the Divan. Roussin's request that French war ships
should be allowed to pass through the Dardanelles was peremptorily
refused. Ponsonby saw clearly that, for the time being, he must submit
to be overshadowed completely by the Russian ambassador. For the
present he could only gaze moodily from his windows at the Russian
encampment in the valley of Unkiar-Skelessi and endeavour to restrain
his French colleague from affording Orloff any excuse for delaying
the departure of his troops. At last, on July 9 and 10, the Egyptian
withdrawal behind the Taurus mountains having been completely carried
out, the Tsar's soldiers were embarked and his ships sailed out of the
Bosphorus.[308]
For some weeks prior to the departure of the Russian expedition,
it had been reported that an offensive and defensive treaty was on
the point of being concluded between the Tsar and the Sultan.[309]
The truth of this rumour was confirmed after Orloff had quitted
Constantinople. It would appear that it was the Sultan himself who
first suggested an alliance, at an audience accorded to Orloff shortly
after his arrival, and that Ahmed Pasha acted as the intermediary
between the palace and the Russian embassy in the very secret
negotiations which followed. The diplomatic instrument, known as the
Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, concluded between the Porte and Russia on
July 8, 1833, for a duration of eight years, consisted of six public
and one secret article. The public articles merely proclaimed the
existence of peace and friendship between the two Empires and provided
for their mutual succour in case of need. The whole importance of
the treaty lay in the secret clause in which it was stipulated that,
inasmuch as Russia had no intention of exercising her right to ask
for military assistance, the Porte, in return, would, "upon demand
and in accordance with the principle of reciprocity,"[310] close the
Dardanelles to the warships of all nations.
It appears that, when it became necessary to inform the Turkish
ministers of the projected treaty, they one and all evinced the
greatest repugnance to the idea of an alliance with their hereditary
enemies. But, at the news that the British fleet was approaching the
Dardanelles, they withdrew their objections. They had besought the
British government for naval assistance in the struggle with Mehemet
Ali, and their request had been refused. The arrival, on June 25, in
the Bay of Tenedos of Sir Pulteney Malcolm's squadron, which, a few
months earlier, could have intercepted the communications with Egypt
and changed the course of the campaign, now only served to revive
painful recollections of Admiral Duckworth's proceedings in 1807.[311]
The question of access to the sea, which bathes the coasts of the
richest provinces of the Empire, must necessarily be a matter of the
highest importance to Russia. The principle of regarding the Black
Sea as a _mare clausum_ found a place in the treaty concluded between
the Porte and Russia, on December 23, 1798. It was again inserted
into the treaty of September 23, 1805, but with this important
addition--that to the Russian fleet was granted a right of passage to
the Mediterranean through the straits. These conditions, however, had
been terminated by the outbreak of hostilities in 1806, and in the
subsequent treaty of peace, signed at Bucharest on May 10, 1812, no
mention was made of the special privilege which Russia had obtained
seven years before. Again in the treaty of peace concluded between
Great Britain and Turkey, on January 5, 1809, England undertook to
observe "the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire," which declared
the straits of Constantinople closed to the warships of the Powers.
But this arrangement, which had ever since been regarded as a law of
nations, was suddenly terminated by the act, signed at the palace of
Unkiar-Skelessi, restoring Russia to the favoured position which she
had enjoyed for a brief space of time in 1805. No specific mention,
it was true, had been made of her right of passage to and from the
Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, although for obvious
reasons both Russian and Turkish ministers might prefer to elude a
direct statement on the subject, they unquestionably placed this
interpretation upon Orloff's treaty.[312] It was in this light also
that it was looked upon by Lord Palmerston and the Duc de Broglie.
At the suggestion of Broglie,[313] as it would appear, the French
and English governments resolved to instruct their representatives
at Constantinople to advise the Porte not to ratify the treaty. But,
should the Sultan confirm the signatures of his plenipotentiaries,
they were to hand in a note, pointing out that by the treaty the
relations of Turkey with Russia seemed to have been placed upon an
entirely new footing. In the event of this changed situation leading
to the armed interference of Russia in the internal affairs of Turkey,
France and Great Britain were resolved to act as the circumstances
might appear to require, "equally as if the treaty above mentioned
were not in existence."[314] Directly it had been reported that this
note had been presented to the Porte, a copy of it was transmitted to
the French and British ministers at St. Petersburg, for communication
to the Imperial Cabinet. Nesselrode in reply contended that the treaty
was purely defensive and aimed solely at the preservation of Turkey.
It had, it was true, changed the relations of the two Empires towards
each other. It had converted a state of hostility and suspicion
into one of friendship and confidence. His Majesty the Emperor was
determined, should circumstances demand it, faithfully to carry out
the obligations which he had contracted, "as though the declaration
contained in the French and British notes did not exist."[315] In
return Lord Palmerston reiterated the dissatisfaction with which the
treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi was regarded in England. This despatch was
in due course communicated to Count Nesselrode by Mr. Bligh, the
British _chargé d'affaires_, who, as he placed it in the hands of the
Russian chancellor, added that his government "was resolved not to
be drawn into a controversy upon a question in which it differed so
widely from the Imperial Cabinet."[316]
In the meantime, a meeting had taken place, in September, at
Münchengrätz, between the Tsar of Russia, the Emperor of Austria
and the Crown Prince of Prussia. The object of this interview
had been officially ascribed solely to a desire upon the part of
Nicholas to become better acquainted with the Emperor Francis.[317]
This explanation, which was received with contemptuous derision by
Palmerston,[318] and which Bligh "could scarcely read with becoming
gravity," deceived nobody. In point of fact weighty political matters
were the subject of the deliberations of these potentates and their
confidential advisers. The formation of a league of the three Northern
Courts to resist the doctrine of non-intervention had, ever since
the Revolution of July, been the favourite scheme of Nicholas and
Metternich. Frederick William III., however, was doubtful of the
wisdom of openly resuscitating the Holy Alliance. He was strongly
impressed with the dangers of a policy, which must necessarily draw
a sharp dividing line between the absolute and the constitutional
Powers. For this reason neither the King of Prussia nor his chief
minister travelled to the little town on the Bohemian frontier to
assist at the deliberations. But, after the two Emperors had set out
on their return to their respective capitals, Nesselrode journeyed
to Berlin and succeeded in inducing the King of Prussia to become a
party to the convention to which Nicholas and Francis had given their
adherence. By this treaty, signed at Berlin, on October 15, 1833,
the right of every independent sovereign to call to his aid another
sovereign was proclaimed. Should one of the three Courts see fit to
render material assistance to any sovereign, and should such action
be opposed by another Power, the three Courts would consider any
interference of this kind in the light of an act of hostility directed
against them all.
In consequence of the objections of the King of Prussia, the plan of
transmitting this convention to the French government was abandoned.
But the principle, which it involved, formed the subject of separate
despatches, couched in more or less threatening language, which the
agents of the three Northern Courts in Paris duly communicated to
the Duc de Broglie. The Duke, however, declared emphatically that,
whatever her attitude might be as regards more distant States,
France would assuredly resist by force of arms any intervention in
Switzerland, Belgium or Piedmont. Moreover, he caused a circular to be
sent to all French representatives at foreign Courts clearly defining
the line of action which would be adopted in cases of intervention.
The boldness of his language came as a disagreeable surprise to
Metternich. The Northern Courts, when they made their communications
to the French government, had not intended to provoke a defiant
rejoinder of this kind.
At their meeting at Münchengrätz, however, the two Emperors had not
been concerned exclusively with the question of intervention, and with
their policy towards France. On September 18, 1833, Nesselrode and
Metternich signed a convention, pledging Russia and Austria to combine
for the preservation of the Ottoman empire. The contracting parties
specifically undertook to oppose any extension of the authority of
Mehemet Ali over the European provinces of Turkey. Lastly, should the
existing _régime_ at Constantinople be overturned, Russia and Austria
agreed to act in concert on every point relating to the establishment
of a new order of affairs.[319]
Unfortunately, Nicholas saw fit to insist that absolute secrecy
should be observed with regard to this convention, which might, with
so much advantage, have been communicated to the western Powers. He
probably feared that Russia's changed policy towards Turkey would be
ascribed to alarm, engendered by Admiral Roussin's hostile attitude
at Constantinople. Sincerely desirous as he was to conciliate the
English government, he would not consent to admit, so long as France
and Great Britain were intimately united, that Russia had renounced
her old ambition of establishing her power upon the Bosphorus.
But, although his pride would not allow him frankly to explain his
eastern policy to the British government, he was at pains to convince
Mr. Bligh of the purity of his intentions. He was a "_chevalier
anglais_," he reminded him at the conclusion of a long talk about the
Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, and, pointing to his star of the Garter,
twice repeated the words "_Honi soit_ _qui mal y pense_."[320] But
assurances of this kind carried no weight with the English government.
Russia was universally believed to be moving steadily towards
Constantinople. The chief organs of the press accused her daily of
secretly preparing to conquer or to absorb the Ottoman empire. The
most extreme Radicals in the reformed Parliament, and Tory gentlemen,
the hunting friends of Matuszewic,[321] at Melton, were alike
convinced of the duplicity and of the aggressive character of Russian
policy.
It was necessarily a matter of the deepest interest to both Palmerston
and Broglie to ascertain the spirit in which Metternich would
regard the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. The despatches from Vienna,
however, speedily dispelled the hope that the dominant position
which Russia had acquired at Constantinople would meet with the
disapproval of Austria. Metternich's lips were sealed on the subject
of the Austro-Russian convention respecting Turkey, and he could,
in consequence, only declare emphatically that he felt no distrust
of Russia, and was satisfied that she harboured no hostile designs
against Turkey. If England, he reminded Lamb,[322] had not refused
the Sultan the assistance for which he had asked, he would not have
been driven to look to Russia as his sole protector against Mehemet
Ali. Neither Palmerston nor Broglie believed that these expressions of
confidence in the honest intentions of Russia represented Metternich's
real convictions. Both attributed his attitude to his intense fear
of revolution, which made him wilfully blind to the schemes which
Russia was maturing so craftily. But, so long as he should continue
in this frame of mind, they were agreed that it would be "imprudent
for Great Britain and France to found upon the treaty any measures
of decided hostility."[323] For the present, therefore, they were
content to exercise the greatest vigilance, and to be prepared for
fresh developments. Every endeavour, however, was to be made to open
the eyes of the Sultan to the real nature of his position, and to
induce him to withdraw from the fatal alliance into which he had been
inveigled. At the same time it was greatly to be desired that Russia
should be afforded no excuse for intervening under the stipulations
of Orloff's treaty. A fresh quarrel between the Porte and Mehemet Ali
was the only circumstance which could possibly justify such action
on her part. The whole influence of Great Britain and France must,
accordingly, be exerted to prevent the Pasha from committing any
renewed act of aggression.[324]
CHAPTER VI
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
The growing power of Mehemet Ali, and the increasing decrepitude of
the Ottoman Empire were not the only subjects which, in the year 1833,
engaged the serious attention of the European Cabinets. A civil war
was in progress in Portugal, and Spain was threatened with the same
calamity. Dom Pedro, the Emperor of Brazil, had, on the death of his
father, abdicated the crown of Portugal in favour of his seven year
old daughter, Donna Maria de Gloria. At the same time he had appointed
his brother, Dom Miguel, to the Regency, on the understanding that he
would agree to observe the Charter, and to marry his niece, the young
Queen. Dom Miguel gave the required assurances, but upon his arrival
at Lisbon, early in the year 1828, he proceeded to abrogate the
constitution, and shortly afterwards to usurp the throne. His unlawful
assumption of the crown was followed by harsh and reactionary measures
against Liberals and Freemasons, which culminated in the establishment
of a veritable reign of terror. It was in consequence of this state
of affairs, that, in July, 1831, a French fleet had, with the full
approval of the British government, been dispatched to the Tagus to
exact reparation for outrages committed on French subjects.[325]
Meanwhile, a successful revolution in Brazil had compelled Dom Pedro
to seek refuge in England, where he arrived with his daughter at
the very moment when Admiral Roussin's squadron was before Lisbon.
The fallen Emperor threw himself heart and soul into the task of
reconquering his daughter's kingdom. Lord Grey's Cabinet regarded his
warlike preparations with tacit approval, whilst the French government
openly encouraged him, and allowed his followers to assemble at
Belle-Isle. The constitutional fleet, commanded by Sartorius, a
British naval officer, set sail from that port on February 10, 1832,
and, by the following month of July, Dom Pedro was master of Oporto.
But, though he constantly succeeded in defeating the Miguelite forces
sent to re-take the city, his cause made little or no progress in
other parts of the country.
Whilst these events were taking place in Portugal the health of the
King of Spain had been visibly declining. Under ordinary circumstances
it would have been a matter for congratulation, rather than for
regret, that any country should be relieved from the rule of such a
man as Ferdinand VII. In this particular instance, however, it was
too probable that a fiercely disputed succession would be the legacy
which he would bequeath to his unfortunate subjects. His third wife,
Maria Amalia of Saxony, had died on May 17, 1829, and he, thereupon,
announced his intention of re-marrying. His choice fell upon an
intelligent and attractive woman in the person of his niece, Maria
Christina of Naples. His first three marriages had been childless, but
his fourth wife, Christina, presented him with a daughter on October
10, 1830. By the ancient law of Spain females could succeed to the
throne, in the event of there being no direct male heirs. But in 1713,
Philip V., in order to prevent the union of the Spanish and French
crowns, had been forced to issue a Pragmatic Sanction, which gave the
preference of succession always to the male line. This act, however,
was repealed in 1789 by Charles IV., who restored the ancient law.
This return to the old order of succession was not, however, made
public until May 19, 1830, when Christina succeeded in persuading
Ferdinand to allow the decree of Charles IV. to be promulgated.
Consequently, when some five months later her daughter was born,
she was promptly proclaimed Princess of the Asturias, a title only
conferred upon an heiress to the throne. A fierce struggle then began
between Christina and Don Carlos, who had hitherto been looked upon
as his brother's successor. This prince was the champion of the ultra
clerical--the so-called _Apostolical_ party--whereas Christina, who,
during her passage through France, had promised to use her influence
on behalf of the Spanish political exiles, represented the hopes of
the Liberals. Thus, in September, 1832, when Ferdinand was supposed
to be at the point of death, the _Apostolical_ minister, Calomarde,
succeeded in procuring the abrogation of the law of 1789. But the King
most unexpectedly recovered, and, under the influence of Christina,
caused the decree of Charles IV. to be promulgated a second time.
Calomarde, moreover, was disgraced and dismissed and a comparatively
Liberal Cabinet was formed.
From the moment of Dom Pedro's return to Europe, the French Cabinet
had endeavoured to persuade the British government to join with
France in expelling Dom Miguel from Portugal. Palmerston, however,
had declined to interfere actively.[326] He was very unwilling that
France should be afforded an opportunity of extending her influence
in Portugal, and he, moreover, suspected Louis Philippe of scheming
to marry one of his sons to Donna Maria. But, provided it could be
brought about without a French intervention, he was sincerely anxious
that the usurper should be overthrown and that a Liberal _régime_
should be set up at Lisbon. The dismissal of Calomarde appears to have
suggested to him that the King of Spain might not be found unwilling
to render assistance to the constitutional cause in Portugal. Under
ordinary circumstances Ferdinand could scarcely have been expected to
regard with a friendly eye the establishment of a limited monarchy
in a country bordering upon Spain. But the birth of his daughter
had introduced a new element into the situation. Dom Miguel derived
his strength from the support of the _Apostolical_ party, which
in Spain looked upon Don Carlos as its champion. There were some
grounds, therefore, for hoping that Ferdinand's paternal anxiety to
see his daughter Isabella's succession to the throne assured might
prove stronger than his natural aversion to the growth of Liberal
institutions in a neighbouring State.
The task of inducing Ferdinand to intervene on behalf of Donna Maria
was entrusted to Sir Stratford Canning, who was generally selected
for the most difficult negotiations. Canning arrived in Madrid, upon
his special mission, at the beginning of January, 1833. His first
conferences with the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs convinced
him that he had little prospect of bringing his task to a successful
conclusion. Compared to a man of the type of Calomarde, Cea Bermúdez,
his successor, might seem to be a Liberal. In point of fact, however,
although he was strongly opposed to Don Carlos and the clerical party,
he was even more hostile to representative institutions in any shape.
An enlightened despotism, in his opinion, constituted the best form
of government for Spain. Accordingly, he made it very clear that the
change of ministry had in no way modified the views of the Court as
to the situation in Portugal. It would be, he declared, altogether
inconsistent with honour and good faith for the King to participate in
any measures directed against the sovereignty of Dom Miguel.[327]
Stratford Canning, notwithstanding that his task seemed almost
hopeless, remained some four months in the Spanish capital. So long
as Cea Bermúdez was in power it was plainly useless to expect that
Ferdinand could be induced to enter into the views of the British
government. Canning, accordingly, set himself to work to undermine
the position of that minister. For a brief moment he seems to have
been sanguine that, by means of "a difference of opinion in the
Cabinet," he might be able to effect his purpose. But his hopes were
speedily dispelled. The three ministers opposed to Cea Bermúdez with
whom he had established communication were suddenly dismissed by the
King.[328] Nor was he more fortunate with Queen Christina, with whom
he contrived "to open a direct and confidential intercourse."[329]
She appeared to agree with him that the triumph of Dom Miguel in
Portugal could not fail to react disastrously upon the fortunes of her
daughter, but she either could not, or would not influence the King to
regard matters in the same light.
Sir Stratford's difficulties had been aggravated by the news that Dom
Pedro's resources were exhausted, and that his position at Oporto was
desperate. But a few weeks after Canning's departure from Madrid the
situation in Portugal assumed a very different complexion. Sartorius,
the admiral of the constitutional fleet, had been replaced by Charles
Napier, who from the first appears to have judged the political and
strategical situation correctly. The mere possession of Oporto and
victorious sallies against the Miguelite lines would never, he saw
clearly, win the crown for Donna Maria. A bold move on Lisbon itself
could alone give the victory to the constitutionalists. The capital,
in his opinion, might be captured, provided he could obtain the
command of the sea. Having succeeded in persuading Dom Pedro and his
advisers to adopt his views, he sought out the Miguelite fleet, and,
on July 5, 1833, despite the inferiority of his ships, completely
destroyed it off Cape St. Vincent.[330] Three weeks later, Lisbon was
occupied by Terceira, the constitutional general, in the name of Donna
Maria.
The capture of Lisbon compelled the Miguelites to raise the siege of
Oporto. The civil war continued, nevertheless, in other parts of the
country. No sooner, however, was Dom Pedro, the Regent, installed in
the capital than the British government recognized the sovereignty
of Queen Maria, and undertook to protect her from aggression on the
part of the King of Spain.[331] But the fear that Ferdinand might
send military assistance to Dom Miguel was speedily set at rest. On
September 29, 1833, he died, and Christina, thereupon, assumed the
government in the name of her daughter Isabella, who was at once
acknowledged as Queen of Spain by France and Great Britain. The
partisans of her uncle Don Carlos were, however, upon the alert. The
Basque provinces rose in arms to the cry of "Long live Carlos V. Long
live the Inquisition," and Don Carlos was proclaimed King, on October
7, at Vittoria.[332]
Don Carlos himself was fortunately absent from Madrid at the time of
his brother's death. Some few months earlier he had been practically
exiled from Spain and had joined Dom Miguel in Portugal. The presence
of the Spanish Pretender at the headquarters of the Portuguese Usurper
appears at last to have brought home to Christina and her minister,
Cea Bermúdez, that the fortunes of Isabella must largely depend upon
the success of the constitutional cause in Portugal. Mr. Villiers, the
British minister newly accredited to the Court of Madrid, experienced,
in consequence, none of those difficulties which had baffled Stratford
Canning's ingenuity, whilst Ferdinand was alive. The Queen Regent's
government consented, after some little hesitation, to propose to the
contending parties in Portugal the joint mediation of Great Britain
and Spain, and, when Dom Miguel declined to consider this offer,
Cea Bermúdez announced that his refusal had released Spain from all
engagements which she had contracted towards him.[333]
At the news that Ferdinand was dead and that serious disturbances had
broken out, the French government proceeded to concentrate troops in
proximity to the Spanish frontier. These military movements excited
considerable alarm in London, where it was feared that they were a
prelude to an active intervention. Palmerston, however, was soon
satisfied that neither Louis Philippe nor the chief members of his
government wished to despatch an army across the Pyrenees.[334] In
the opinion of Duc de Broglie, the expulsion of Dom Miguel from
Portugal was a necessary preliminary to any attempt to settle Spanish
affairs. Both he and his colleagues, he declared, were prepared to
respect England's traditional dislike to any foreign intrusion in
Portugal. But, under these circumstances, they had a right to expect,
he contended, that great Britain should herself take the necessary
measures for terminating a situation, which threatened to disturb the
tranquillity of neighbouring States.[335]
Although very anxious to see peace restored, the British government
wished to escape from the necessity of landing a military force
in Portugal. It hoped to attain the desired result by concerting
measures with Spain for the expulsion of both Pretenders. Seeing that
Don Carlos was levying war from Portuguese territory against the
government of the Queen Regent, the right of Spain to intervene was
beyond question. In January, 1834, Cea Bermúdez had been succeeded by
Martinez de la Rosa. The new minister entered readily into the plans
of the British government and agreed to despatch an ambassador to
London, provided with full powers to conclude a convention. Strict
secrecy was observed about the negotiations, and it was only, on April
13, 1834, when all the details had been settled, that Palmerston
showed Talleyrand a draft of the proposed treaty. Spain was to send an
army against Dom Miguel, whilst England was to furnish Dom Pedro with
naval assistance. It was not intended to invite France to be a party
to this agreement; she would merely be asked to adhere to it.[336]
Talleyrand's account of this transaction was sent to Admiral de Rigny,
not to the Duc de Broglie. The refusal of the Chamber to ratify his
proposals for settling a long-standing dispute with the United States,
respecting the indemnity to be paid for the seizure of certain ships
between the years 1806 and 1812, had driven the Duke to resign. The
conditions of the projected treaty caused the greatest irritation in
Paris. "The effect would be disastrous," wrote Rigny, "were it to
appear that France had entered into the agreement under the protection
of England."[337] Talleyrand was, accordingly, directed to insist
that France should be made a party to the treaty. After a lengthy
and, at times, a heated discussion, Palmerston gave way and, on April
22, 1834, the instrument, known as the Quadruple Treaty, was signed
by the representatives of Great Britain, France, Spain and Portugal.
An article had been inserted into it stipulating that, "should the
co-operation of France be deemed necessary by the High Contracting
Parties the King of the French would engage to do, in this respect,
whatever might be settled by common consent between himself and his
august allies."
The immediate object of the alliance was rapidly achieved. The
junction of a Spanish army under General Rodil with the constitutional
forces, operating in Tras-os-Montes, was followed, on May 16, by a
decisive victory over Dom Miguel at Asserceira. A week later both
Pretenders capitulated at Evora Monte. Dom Miguel agreed to accept
a small pension[338] and to retire to Italy, whilst Don Carlos, at
his own request, was conveyed to England on board H.M.S. _Donegal_.
But the elation of the allies at the rapid success which had crowned
their operations was of brief duration. After a stay of little more
than a week in London Don Carlos departed secretly, and, contriving to
cross France undetected, reached Spain, where he appeared at the head
of his followers in Biscay on July 9. This new development, both the
French and British governments agreed, must be met by an extension of
the scope of the Quadruple Treaty. Certain additional articles were,
accordingly, formally annexed to it, on August 18, 1834. By the first
of these, the King of the French undertook to hinder supplies and arms
from reaching the Carlists from his southern provinces. By the second,
His Britannic Majesty pledged himself to furnish Her Most Catholic
Majesty with arms and ammunition and, in case of need, to supply naval
succour; whilst by the third, the Regent of Portugal promised to
render whatever military assistance it might be in his power to give.
In thus deciding to afford Queen Isabella material assistance,
the French and English governments appear to have been strangely
oblivious of their loudly proclaimed principle of "abstention from
interference in the affairs of other States." It was, doubtless, the
inconsistency of their conduct in this respect which elicited from
Talleyrand his cynical definition of the word non-intervention as
"_un mot métaphysique et politique qui signifie à peu près la même
chose qu' intervention_."[339] Both governments had, unquestionably,
excellent reasons for desiring to put an end to a state of civil war
and anarchy, which interfered with English trade, and had a disturbing
effect upon the internal condition of France. In addition, there was
the consideration, to which Palmerston attached much weight, that the
Quadruple Treaty, by proclaiming the intimate union of the Liberal
Powers, would counterbalance the league which the absolute Courts
had, in the previous autumn, concluded at Münchengrätz.[340] Martinez
de la Rosa, Christina's chief minister, had been engaged in framing
a constitutional Charter and the _Estatuto Real_,--the result of his
labours--was about to be made public. Spain might, therefore, claim
to be numbered among the Liberal Powers of Europe. But there would
seem to have been another, and a more exclusively national reason,
for the support which the English government decided to extend to the
cause of constitutionalism in Spain. For the past century Spain had
constantly followed the impulse of France and that state of affairs
had, on many occasions, proved detrimental to British interests.
"Foreign influence, however," wrote Lord Palmerston some years
later, "can best be exerted over the Court of a despotic monarch and
becomes much weaker, if not entirely paralyzed, when it has to act
upon the constitutional representatives of a free people. The British
government, therefore, perceived that, by assisting the Spanish people
to establish a constitutional form of government, they were assisting
to secure the political independence of Spain, and they had no doubt
that the maintenance of that independence would be conducive to
important British interests."[341]
One of the chief reasons, therefore, which led England to enter into
the Quadruple Treaty was to destroy that influence which, for more
than a century, France had been striving to establish over the Spanish
government. Her statesmen had constantly laid it down as the first
principle of their policy that her ascendency must be supreme at the
Court at Madrid. It was essential, they argued, that France should
have no fears of an attack from beyond the Pyrenees, should she be
engaged in war with her powerful eastern neighbours. On that account
the Salic Law, the Duc de Broglie explained to Lord Granville, was
distinctly advantageous to France, inasmuch as it debarred females
from succeeding to the Spanish throne. Now that it was abolished, he
pointed out, the French government had to contemplate the possibility
that an Austrian Archduke might some day aspire to the hand of the
Queen of Spain.[342] Louis Philippe not only endorsed the views of
his minister in this matter, but frankly confessed to the British
ambassador that the triumph of absolutism, in the person of Don
Carlos, would suit him infinitely better than the establishment of a
Liberal monarchy at Madrid. In that case "he was greatly afraid that
the Peninsula would become the resort of all the revolutionists and
republicans in Europe."[343]
These being Louis Philippe's opinions, it seems strange that he
should not have attempted to dissuade his ministers from committing
him to the Quadruple Treaty. The adoption of such a course, however,
would have been very dangerous. The "citizen King" might in his heart
greatly prefer _les capuchons_ to _les bonnets rouges_,[344] but he
dared not publicly proclaim these sentiments. Moreover, had France
abandoned the English alliance she would not have been received into
the league of the absolute Courts. Louis Philippe, consequently, if he
wished to avoid complete isolation, was compelled to appear to adopt
the British policy. But his secret leanings being what they were and
Palmerston's object being what it was, it is not surprising that,
from the moment of the conclusion of the Quadruple Treaty, symptoms
of serious disagreement should have manifested themselves in the
relations of the two governments.
Before the close of the year 1834 the Carlists were masters of the
whole of Biscay and Navarre, with the exception of some of the larger
towns. It was not alone the influence of the priests and the monks
which induced the people of these provinces to espouse the cause
of the Pretender so enthusiastically. They knew well that, were a
representative form of government to be established throughout Spain,
the _Fueros_,[345] those special rights and privileges to which
they were devotedly attached, must either be abolished or greatly
curtailed. A leader arose in Zumalacárregui, who quickly proved
his superiority over the constitutional generals sent against him.
Henceforward the struggle between the Carlists and the _Christinos_
was carried on with a barbarity unknown in Europe for centuries.
Neither side gave nor expected quarter. After every engagement wounded
and unwounded prisoners were ruthlessly massacred. Such was the
condition of affairs when a change of government took place in England.
Lord Grey had resigned, on July 9, 1834, on a question of Irish
policy and had been succeeded as Prime Minister by Lord Melbourne.
Signs were plentiful that the Whigs were losing their popularity in
the country, and the King resolved to dismiss his ministers at the
first opportunity. The death of Lord Spencer gave him the pretext
for which he was seeking. Althorp's removal to the Upper House, he
told Melbourne, had left the government so weakly represented in the
Commons that he should call upon his ministers to resign. Sir Robert
Peel, accordingly, undertook to form a new government, and Wellington
accepted the post of Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The Duke had never
approved of his predecessor's policy of intervening in the disputed
succession to the Spanish throne. But, soon after he had taken up his
duties at the Foreign Office, an opportunity arose of interposing
in a manner more in accordance with his views. In the course of a
conference with Mr. Villiers, Martinez de la Rosa had suggested that
the French and British governments should propose to both parties
some arrangement for the exchange of prisoners and, generally, for
mitigating the horrors of the war. The opening of communications
with Don Carlos on these lines might with advantage be made to serve
a double purpose. The commissioners, selected to proceed to the
headquarters of the Pretender, might be instructed to impress upon
him the hopelessness of his position, and to explain to him that he
could obtain no assistance from the absolute Courts. An authoritative
statement to that effect would, in the opinion of Martinez de la Rosa,
be more useful than "six victories by her Majesty's troops." It would
furnish Don Carlos with the excuse, for which he was believed to be
seeking, for abandoning the struggle.[346]
Lord Eliot was, accordingly, dispatched to Spain. Ostensibly, his
mission had no other object than the negotiation of some agreement for
terminating the inhuman methods of warfare, which both parties had
adopted. In reality, however, he carried with him secret instructions
based upon the suggestions of Martinez de la Rosa. Whilst in Paris he
was to communicate these to the Duc de Broglie, who was once more at
the head of the Foreign Office, in order that the French commissioner
might be furnished with identical instructions.[347] Hitherto, there
had been no great cause for complaint as to the manner in which France
performed the duties imposed upon her by the additional articles of
the Quadruple Treaty. It was, therefore, with the utmost confidence
that the request would be promptly complied with, that Wellington
had decided to invite the French government to appoint some person
to repair with Eliot to the seat of war. But Lord Cowley, who, upon
the change of government, had succeeded Lord Granville as British
ambassador in Paris, speedily ascertained that the Duke's proposal
was regarded with much disfavour. Nor was he long in doubt as to
the quarter from which the opposition to it was inspired. Louis
Philippe himself assured him, on April 2, that he dared not allow
communications to be opened with Don Carlos, except in response to
an official invitation from the government of the Queen Regent.
But, although the Spanish ambassador shortly afterwards made the
desired request, the King still hesitated to comply with it. He was
greatly afraid, he told Lord Cowley, that Don Carlos would refuse to
entertain the suggested proposals. Were the Pretender to take such
a course, popular indignation would be aroused in France, and the
government might be forced to march an army into Spain to enforce its
demands.[348]
Eliot, in the meanwhile, had proceeded, unattended by a French
colleague, to the headquarters of Don Carlos. He experienced little
difficulty in inducing both contending parties to conclude a
convention for the proper custody and exchange of prisoners of war.
But no success attended his efforts to carry out the secret and more
important part of his mission. Don Carlos resolutely declared that he
never would abandon the struggle. Nor could Eliot flatter himself that
any of his arguments had in the smallest degree shaken the Pretender's
determination to assert his right to the crown. Having exhausted all
his powers of persuasion he set out on his return journey. As a
result of his visit to the theatre of war he brought back to England
the conviction that, without foreign assistance, the government of
the Queen Regent would never contrive to pacify Alava, Biscay and
Navarre.[349] Some weeks before he arrived in London Sir Robert Peel's
brief administration had come to an end. Melbourne had been recalled
and Palmerston was once more at the Foreign Office.
Upon learning of the failure of Eliot's mission, the government of
the Queen Regent resolved to apply to France for military assistance
against Don Carlos. Palmerston, who at this time regarded a French
intervention as the worst of evils, lost no time in directing Villiers
to protest. No more telling indictment of the whole policy of the
Quadruple Treaty exists than the despatch which, on this occasion,
Palmerston himself sent off to Madrid. The British minister was to
represent that to appeal for foreign aid, before all the resources at
the disposal of the Queen Regent had been exhausted, "would little
redound to the honour of the Spanish government." A settlement, he
was to remind Queen Christina's advisers, brought about by French
or British bayonets, "could only be temporary and would never be
acquiesced in as legitimate and final by the nation."[350] It was
very far, however, from Louis Philippe's desire to despatch troops to
Spain in support of the constitutional throne of Isabella. But, as
Palmerston was also strongly opposed to direct French intervention,
the King felt that he might with safety consult the British government
about the propriety of acceding to the Spanish demand. Palmerston, as
he had foreseen, had numerous objections to urge against the entry
of a French army into Spain. The French ambassador at Madrid was,
accordingly, instructed to inform Martinez de la Rosa that his appeal
could not be complied with.[351] But, whilst making it perfectly clear
that direct intervention was out of the question, M. de Rayneval was
authorized to suggest that the foreign legion at Algiers might be
transferred from the French to the Spanish service, and to promise
that facilities for enlisting soldiers in France would be granted to
the Spanish government.
The Cabinet of Madrid readily accepted this limited form of
assistance. Help of the same description, but upon a more extended
scale, was also furnished by Great Britain. The Foreign Enlistment
Act was suspended and officers and men were encouraged to enter the
service of the Queen of Spain. In England, where the war in the
Peninsula was remembered with pride, volunteers were easily obtained.
In France, for obvious reasons the appeals of the Spanish recruiting
agents met with far less response. Nevertheless, before the autumn
of 1835 some 4000 men, chiefly from Algiers, were transported
to Spain, whilst rather more than double that number of British
volunteers, under the command of De Lacy Evans, the Radical member
for Westminster, were conveyed to the seat of war. Don Carlos,
however, retaliated promptly. From his headquarters at Durango he
issued a proclamation announcing that the Eliot Convention could
not be permitted to apply to foreigners. Any person not of Spanish
nationality, caught in arms against him, would be shot. The moment
this decree was brought to the notice of the British government
Colonel Wylde, the officer attached to the headquarters of the Queen's
armies, was directed to protest against it.[352] Wylde obtained access
to Don Carlos and read out to him the declaration which Palmerston
had drawn up. But the threats contained in it had no effect upon
the Pretender, who replied that his proclamation was lawful, under
the circumstances, and that his officers had the strictest orders to
conform to it.[353] The only reprisal to which the British government
could resort was to signify to its naval commanders that, in the event
of Don Carlos applying for protection on board any of His Majesty's
ships, such protection was to be denied to him.[354]
The French government altogether declined to associate itself with
Great Britain in protesting against the Decree of Durango. Lord
Granville, who upon the return of the Whigs to office had resumed his
post in Paris, found Louis Philippe and his chief ministers, with the
exception of the Duc de Broglie, strongly opposed to any step of that
kind. France, they argued, was differently circumstanced to Great
Britain, inasmuch as she was not a party to the Eliot Convention.
Moreover, were she to use threatening language to Don Carlos and
were he to disregard her menaces, she would be driven to send troops
across the frontier, and both the French and English governments had
agreed that direct intervention was highly inexpedient for the moment.
In vain Lord Granville protested that to remonstrate against the
barbarity of the decree was a duty which the government owed to the
men, who had been transferred from the French to the Spanish service.
Neither that argument, nor the consideration that any appearance
of lack of harmony between the French and British Cabinets must
necessarily encourage the Pretender, had the smallest effect upon
Louis Philippe or upon the majority of his ministers.[355]
Lord Palmerston's indignation at Louis Philippe's conduct was
increased by the news which he was receiving from Lisbon. Dom Pedro
had died on September 24, 1834, and the Cortes had, thereupon,
declared the Queen to be of age, although she was not yet sixteen
years of age. Shortly afterwards she had married Augustus of
Leuchtenberg, the young duke whose candidature for the Belgian
throne had so alarmed Louis Philippe in 1830. Their married life,
however, was of brief duration. On March 25, 1835, Maria became a
widow and the Cortes at once urged her to lose no time in contracting
a second alliance. The young queen was quite ready to comply and
soon, afterwards, informed her ministers, Marshal Saldanha and the
Duke of Palmella, that she purposed marrying either the Duc de
Nemours or the Prince de Joinville, both sons of Louis Philippe. Her
selection of the French princes, wrote Lord Howard de Walden,[356]
was to be ascribed to the influence of her aunt, the Marquise de
Loulé, who was afterwards discovered to have been in the pay of Louis
Philippe.[357] The British minister, however, succeeded in obtaining
from Saldanha a promise in writing that he would resign, sooner than
allow the French marriage to take place.[358] In Paris, meanwhile,
Louis Philippe emphatically denied to the British ambassador that
he had ever entertained the idea of bringing forward one of his sons
as a candidate for the hand of the Queen of Portugal.[359] It seems
certain, nevertheless, that some intrigue with that purpose in view
had been in progress, and that it was not persevered with on account
of the opposition of the British government. In the opinion of Lord
Howard de Walden, it was to be attributed to the machinations of the
French party at the Court of Lisbon that Queen Maria, about this
time, displayed the greatest reluctance to sanction the despatch of
a Portuguese division to the assistance of the _Christinos_.[360]
But before long it was announced that she was betrothed to Prince
Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, a nephew of the King of the Belgians. The
marriage was celebrated on April 9, 1836, and from that moment the
influence of the French party at the Court diminished.
But the proceedings of the French agents at Lisbon and Louis
Philippe's sympathy for the Spanish Carlists were secrets, as yet
known only to certain ministers and diplomatists. It was otherwise
with the increasing rivalry between the British envoy and the French
ambassador accredited to the Court of the Queen Regent at Madrid.
It was the subject of comment in the newspapers that France openly
favoured the cause of one, whilst England no less ostentatiously
gave her support to the other, of the two great political parties
which Spanish constitutionalism had called into existence. Most of
the leading men in the Cortes had been in exile, until the death of
Ferdinand, on account of their participation in the revolutionary
movement of 1820. Some, like Martinez de la Rosa, had sought refuge
in France, whilst others, prominent among them being the financier
Mendizabal, had repaired to England. Their political views had, in
consequence, been greatly influenced by the statesmen with whom they
had come into contact in the countries in which they had resided. Thus
Martinez de la Rosa, whose literary abilities had brought him to the
notice of M. Guizot, had adopted the theories of the _Doctrinaires_
and in framing the _Estatuto Real_--the Spanish Constitution of
1834--he had taken the French Charter of 1814 for his model. His
followers, the _Moderados_ as they were called, consisted mainly of
the nobility, military and civil officials, and, generally, of persons
who, although opposed to Don Carlos, disliked democratic institutions.
Their opponents, the _Exaltados_, or _Progressistas_, as they were
more usually termed, were made up chiefly of members of the trading
and commercial classes in the large towns. The extreme wing of this
party advocated the restoration of the Constitution of 1812, which
recognized the sovereignty of the people and provided for government
by a single chamber. It was this code which, in 1820, Riego and his
followers had imposed upon King Ferdinand. But, although only the
more violent of the _Progressistas_ may have desired that the very
defective Constitution of 1812 should be re-established without
amendments, the whole party derided the _Estatuto Real_ as too timid
an experiment in representative government.
A party, which aimed at imposing salutary checks upon the development
of democracy and the leaders of which were in close personal
relationship with some of his ministers, was naturally regarded with
a friendly eye by Louis Philippe. From 1834 onwards the _Moderados_
derived an artificial strength, which to some extent counterbalanced
the numerical superiority of their opponents, by reason of the support
given them by Louis Philippe and by Christina, the Queen Regent.
It was no less logical that the _Progressistas_ should develop
rapidly into "the English party." For reasons which have already
been explained Palmerston desired that Spain should be free and
independent. But, before Don Carlos could be crushed and the civil
war terminated, the cause of the Queen must be made popular with the
Spanish people. From Palmerston's point of view, therefore, it was
essential that political power should rest with the party which sought
to place the government upon a broad and national basis. Objectionable
in many respects as were the principles of the _Progressistas_, they
were, in the opinion of the British government, unquestionably better
adapted to the immediate requirements of the situation than the narrow
and restricted views of the _Moderados_.
The strength of the democratic movement, which had begun at the death
of Ferdinand, drove Martinez de la Rosa from office in June, 1835. But
his successor, Count Toreno, was not more successful in his efforts
to stem the rising tide of Liberalism, and, in the following month
of September, Christina reluctantly consented to allow Mendizabal to
form a _Progressista_ Cabinet. Louis Philippe and his ministers were
greatly annoyed and declared that Toreno's fall was due to English
intrigue.[361] Villiers, it was perfectly true, had taken part in
the negotiations which had preceded the change of government. He had
discussed the situation, not only with Toreno and Mendizabal, but
with the Queen Regent herself. To Christina he explained that he had
no authority to speak in the name of the British government. She,
however, replied that she required no more than "the advice of an
Englishman in whom she had entire confidence." Villiers, therefore,
told her plainly that, inasmuch as she had not the necessary force at
her disposal for arresting by violent means the advance of democracy,
she must submit to the formation of a more Liberal government. The
Queen's dread of Mendizabal appears to have been overcome temporarily
by Villiers' assurance that that statesman had no intention of
restoring the Constitution of 1812.[362]
After the downfall of the _Moderados_, the French authorities no
longer attempted to prevent supplies from reaching the Carlists. Upon
the road from Bayonne to Irun, an uninterrupted stream of waggons
was to be seen openly conveying stores and provisions of all kinds
to the insurgents.[363] The Pretender, wrote Villiers, had received
assurances from Louis Philippe that in the future he intended to
remain absolutely neutral.[364] To all representations upon this
subject, whether made by the British or the Spanish ambassador, the
French ministers returned evasive replies. Although from time to
time Lord Granville succeeded in extracting a promise that greater
vigilance would be exercised upon the frontier, the lucrative trade,
which the inhabitants of southern France were carrying on with the
armies of the Pretender, was never interfered with seriously.
Mendizabal, in the meantime, was devoting himself assiduously to the
task of prosecuting the war against Don Carlos. But his efforts to
carry on the operations vigorously were hampered by the penury of the
treasury, and by the impossibility of raising a loan abroad. It was
under these circumstances that he made a proposal to Mr. Villiers
which, when it was divulged to the Duc de Broglie, increased the
ill-feeling which was rapidly growing up between the French and the
English governments. Modern views about the advantages of unrestricted
commercial intercourse had not as yet penetrated into Spain. The
imposition of prohibitory duties upon almost all articles made
abroad was still regarded as essential for the protection of Spanish
trade. England necessarily suffered greatly from this system, which
brought no revenue into the Spanish exchequer, and benefited only
the smuggler. The question had often been the subject of discussion
between the two governments, but Spain had hitherto always evaded her
promises to reform her tariff. Mendizabal, however, now undertook
that, provided England would guarantee the interest of a loan of a
million and a half sterling, Spain would admit the chief articles of
British manufacture upon a low scale of duty. Villiers was without
authority to conclude any agreement of that kind. But, as Mendizabal
assured him that any delay would be most inconvenient, he decided to
draw up the necessary documents. The moment the treaty had been signed
by Mendizabal and himself, he forwarded it to Palmerston, explaining
the reasons which had led him to act without instructions. "The
Queen," he wrote in conclusion, "Mendizabal and his English private
secretary, Southern,[365] and himself, were the only persons who had
any knowledge of the transaction."[366]
When the projected agreement and Villiers' covering despatch reached
Paris, whither they had been transmitted, as was the custom, under
flying seal, Granville was so impressed with the necessity of keeping
the matter secret, that he did not even allow the _attachés_ of his
embassy to know of the affair. Furthermore, his own observations upon
the subject were conveyed to Lord Palmerston in a private letter.
"It will not be liked here," he warned his chief. "It is already
thought that Mendizabal is entirely under English influence, and this
admission of English manufactures at a reduced duty, even though
purchased by the guarantee of a loan, will very much confirm the
impression."[367] But all these precautions were of no avail. Within a
few days, Broglie received intelligence of the transaction both from
the French ambassador at Madrid, and from some Spanish agent in Paris.
It seems highly probable that the secret was disclosed by Christina
herself. Perhaps she wished to ingratiate herself with Louis Philippe,
whilst by exposing Mendizabal to his wrath, she may have hoped to
facilitate the return to power of the _Moderados_.
M. de Rayneval having obtained his information "under the seal of the
most profound secrecy," Broglie could not make representations on the
subject of the proposed treaty to the British government. Rayneval,
however, was directed to protest against it at Madrid, and to warn
Mendizabal that, if the affair were to be concluded, "the Quadruple
Alliance would certainly undergo modifications of a nature which Spain
would regret."[368] But the British government, in the meanwhile,
"whilst fully appreciating the motives which had prompted Villiers
to sign the treaty without instructions," had decided not to advise
the King to ratify it. "His Majesty's government," wrote Palmerston,
"does not consider that it would be consistent with the spirit of the
alliance that two out of four should make separately, and without
previous communication with the others, an engagement. . . . Great
Britain would expose herself to the charge of having severed herself
from her allies in order to grasp at an object conducive to her own
particular interests."[369] At the same time, however, he enclosed
the project of a new commercial treaty, which Villiers was to invite
Mendizabal to consider. England, according to its provisions, asked
for no exclusive advantages, the only stipulation being that British
goods should be placed upon a footing of equality with those of the
most favoured nation. The Spanish minister, however, professed his
inability to proceed with the matter. Great Britain's guarantee to a
loan was a condition, he declared, essential to the conclusion of any
commercial treaty. The proposal to admit English cotton goods would be
deeply resented by Spanish manufacturers, and he must, in consequence,
be in a position to show that, by consenting to it, he had gained
some great political advantage.[370] Without doubt, also, he was not
insensible to Broglie's threats. He foresaw that, although there was
to be no concealment about Palmerston's treaty, and notwithstanding
that France was to be given full information about the negotiations,
her objections to the "reciprocal equality," and "mutual facilities,"
for which England stipulated, would not on that account be diminished.
Nor was he mistaken. When the matter was revived under the ministry
of Comte Molé, that statesman summed up the French case with perfect
frankness. Equality of opportunity for trading in Spain, he informed
Lord Granville, would act solely for the benefit of England, seeing
that the French merchants were possessed of less capital, and
were less industrious and enterprising than their British rivals.
Palmerston, as may be supposed, entered with zest upon the task of
denouncing the selfishness of founding an objection to a reform of
the Spanish tariff upon so unworthy a reason.[371]
Broglie's instructions to Rayneval respecting the commercial
treaty were among his last acts as Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Parliamentary and other difficulties, in the creation of which
Louis Philippe is supposed to have taken a part, brought about the
resignation of the government. M. Thiers, thereupon, notwithstanding
that he had been a member of Broglie's Cabinet, undertook to form a
new ministry. At the time of the Revolution of July, M. Thiers had
been known merely as one of the editors of the _National_ and as
the author of a very popular and successful _History of the French
Revolution_. Louis Philippe's enthronement, in which he had been so
prominently concerned, enabled him to abandon journalism and to embark
upon the career of a politician. Only two years later, on October 11,
1832, he was appointed Minister of the Interior in Marshal Soult's
first government. In that capacity, by means of a bribe judiciously
administered to the Jew Deutz, he succeeded in discovering the
hiding-place of the Duchesse de Berri at Nantes--a mystery which,
until he took the matter in hand, had baffled the ingenuity of the
police. Having accomplished this object and having no desire to be
remembered in history as "the Fouché of the Monarchy of July," he
promptly exchanged the portfolio of the Interior for that of Commerce
and of Public Works.[372]
Ever since the conclusion of the Quadruple Treaty, Louis Philippe had
been quietly endeavouring to improve his relations with the absolute
Powers, in general, and with Austria, in particular. Early in the
year 1835 he appears to have embarked, without the knowledge of his
ministers or of Sainte-Aulaire, the French ambassador at Vienna,
upon a confidential correspondence with Metternich.[373] Without
doubt, his flattering advances to the Chancellor were made with the
hope that a marriage might be arranged between his eldest son, the
Duc d'Orléans, and an Austrian Archduchess. Neither Broglie nor
Sainte-Aulaire shared the King's illusions on that subject. Broglie
was firmly convinced that there could be no intimacy between the
Monarchy of July and the Northern Courts, and it was chiefly on that
account that Louis Philippe had been so anxious to drive him from
office. But, whilst Louis Philippe had frequently been annoyed by the
independence and uncompromising honesty of the _Doctrinaire_ Duke, he
had always admired the resourcefulness and political adroitness of M.
Thiers. For some time past M. Thiers had been desirous of obtaining
the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, and he appears to have satisfied
the King that, were it to be confided to him, he would promote the
dynastic object which was constantly in His Majesty's mind. He was,
it was said, greatly attracted by the prospect of raising "the
matrimonial blockade" which the Legitimists exultingly declared had
been established round the Orleans throne.[374]
It has generally been supposed that Talleyrand was largely responsible
for the overtures made to the Court of Vienna by Louis Philippe, and
for the coolness which set in, about the same time, in the relations
of France and England. This view of the case may be correct, but it is
difficult to believe that the reasons, usually given to explain his
changed attitude towards England, can be true. At the end of the year
1834 Talleyrand had retired from his embassy in London. His advanced
age and his increasing infirmities were the reasons officially given
for his resignation. It was notorious, however, that he had been
frequently annoyed by Palmerston's unceremonious behaviour towards
him, and it has been suggested that the lack of deference with which
he had been treated had caused him greatly to modify his opinions
about the advantages of a close friendship with England.[375] It is,
however, most improbable that Talleyrand, who, up to the time of his
departure from London, unceasingly endeavoured to extend the scope of
the alliance,[376] should have changed his views completely, because
Palmerston may have kept him waiting in an ante-room or may have
failed to treat him with that respect to which his age and his long
diplomatic career entitled him. Nevertheless, it is not to be denied
that, notwithstanding the marked attentions which had been paid him at
Court and in London society, he had returned to France in a somewhat
dissatisfied frame of mind. The recently published memoirs of the
Duchesse de Dino show plainly that, in 1834, he no longer entertained
his former admiration for England and English institutions. But it
was to the new conditions created by the Reform Act that his altered
dispositions should be ascribed. Although he had been in favour
of that measure, in his heart he, doubtless, loathed the idea of
government by the people. Like Lord Grey himself, once the Bill had
become an accomplished fact, he was horrified at the ugly aspect of
democracy. Believing, therefore, that Great Britain was advancing
rapidly towards a revolution he would naturally counsel Louis Philippe
to draw as close as circumstances would permit to conservative
Austria.[377] Nor was there anything in this advice which should be
regarded as unfriendly towards England. At Vienna in 1814, be it
remembered, he had insisted upon the necessity of an alliance between
France, Great Britain and Austria, as the only means of checking the
insatiable ambition of Russia.
Meanwhile, the civil war in Spain continued and the prospects of
the constitutional cause were gloomy. During the summer of 1835,
however, the Carlists sustained a loss the magnitude of which was
hardly appreciated at the time. Whilst superintending the operations
against Bilbao Zumalacárregui sustained a wound and died a few days
later. The original injury was of a trifling character and his
death has generally been ascribed to the unskilful treatment of the
doctors. But Colonel Wylde, as he was returning from his interview
with the Pretender on the subject of the Decree of Durango, received
some curious details about the last hours of the famous Carlist
chief from an English surgeon who had dressed his wound. According
to this person, a dose of laudanum, not a _Christino_ bullet, was
the cause of death. Furthermore, Wylde's informant asserted that the
doctors had under various pretexts refused to allow the body to be
opened. This story, taken in connection with the detestation with
which Zumalacárregui was regarded by the _Apostolical_ section of his
party, led Wylde to suspect that he might have been the victim of foul
play.[378] Be that as it may, his death had an effect upon the cause
of absolutism and bigotry which may be compared with that of Dundee at
Killikrankie.
The _Christinos_, however, appeared incapable of taking advantage
of the loss which their opponents had sustained. Even Mendizabal
was unable to infuse the required energy into the counsels of the
Queen's generals. "Everything," wrote Wylde on February 12, 1836,
"seems to stagnate for want of money." The British legion had
suffered cruelly during the winter. Sickness had thinned its ranks,
the pay of officers and men was in arrears, and the whole force was
in a state of acute discontent.[379] Under these circumstances the
British government decided to intervene more effectually. Hitherto,
Lord John Hay's squadron off the north coast of Spain had only
been allowed to transport troops and stores, and to give indirect
assistance to the _Christinos_. But the admiral was now ordered to
take an active part in the operations of the Queen's armies. At the
same time, Lord Palmerston's objections to the entry of a French
army into Spain disappeared completely. He asked that the French
_cordon_ of observation should be advanced across the frontier and
that the valley of Bastan should be occupied. The measure which he
proposed "would not entail extensive military operations, but would
enable General Cordoba to enclose the Carlists in a small space
and to deprive them of all supplies."[380] The British government,
doubtless, hoped that M. Thiers, who had always professed to be in
favour of armed intervention, would, now that he was President of
the Council, be able to induce Louis Philippe to consent to it. But
that illusion, if it was ever entertained, was soon dispelled. The
course proposed by Palmerston was incompatible with that policy of
conciliating the absolute Courts, upon which M. Thiers had embarked.
He was, consequently, compelled to explain to Lord Granville that he
had altogether changed his mind about the expediency of intervention,
owing to the wide development of the Carlist insurrection, and to the
revolutionary character which the government at Madrid had recently
assumed. Louis Philippe expressed himself in more emphatic language.
Never, he told the British ambassador, would he allow the French flag
to be carried beyond the frontier.[381]
The unsatisfactory progress of the war necessarily had a damaging
effect upon the position of Mendizabal's Cabinet. Dissensions broke
out among his followers, and Christina, who had only accepted him
with reluctance, most unwisely decided to dismiss him. She had been
prompted to take this disastrous step, Palmerston suspected, by her
French advisers.[382] The dissolution of the Cortes, which the change
of ministry entailed, was followed by a most suspicious inaction on
the part of the Queen's generals. The Carlists, on the other hand,
displayed unwonted activity. Insurgent bands penetrated to within
twenty miles of La Granja, where the Queen Regent was in residence.
Ramon Cabrera, "the Tiger of the Maestrargo," who, as a reprisal for
the murder of his mother, refused to recognize the Eliot Convention,
desolated Aragon, whilst de Lacy Evans, on July 11, 1836, suffered a
reverse at Fuentarabia, on which occasion all the British prisoners
were shot, in accordance with the Pretender's decree.[383] Meanwhile,
the _Progressistas_ were carrying all before them at the elections,
and their victories were followed by grave revolutionary outbreaks.
But neither civil disorder nor military disasters could rouse M.
Isturiz, the new President of the Council, or his colleagues to
action. In the words of Mr. Villiers, "they appeared to consider that
calmness in adversity constituted the whole duty of the responsible
advisers of the crown."[384]
The condition of affairs rapidly assumed a most alarming appearance.
The Constitution of 1812, was proclaimed in many of the chief towns.
At Madrid, Quesada, the Captain-General, disarmed the national guards,
and declared the city in a state of siege, whilst at La Granja, the
Queen Regent announced her firm intention of resisting the demands
of the revolutionists. But, on the evening of August 12, her guards
mutinied, and, led by their sergeants, invaded the palace. On two
nights in succession, the unfortunate Christina was compelled to
receive deputations of non-commissioned officers, many of whom were
under the influence of liquor. Circumstanced as she was, with no loyal
troops at her disposal, she had no alternative but to yield. After
promising to accept the Constitution of 1812, to raise the state of
siege, and to re-establish the national guards, she was allowed to
depart for the capital. But when the news of these events reached
Madrid, the people rose, murdered Quesada, and carried his head in
triumph through the streets. Order was, however, gradually restored by
Calatrava, the _Progressista_ minister, whom the revolted sergeants
had imposed upon Christina.[385]
Some weeks before these events took place M. Thiers had had to abandon
all hope of bringing his matrimonial negotiations to a successful
conclusion. It was in vain that he had refused to join with England
in protesting against the Austrian occupation of the free town
of Cracow. It was to no purpose that he had forced the Federal
government to expel all political refugees from Switzerland. The Duc
d'Orléans'[386] proposal for the hand of an Austrian Archduchess was
declined. In order to hide his discomfiture and to punish Metternich,
M. Thiers resolved to take up the Spanish affair vigorously. Direct
intervention, however, he looked upon as out of the question. Not
only would the King oppose it, but it would be very unpopular with
the country. Nevertheless, by a process to which he gave the name
of "armed co-operation" he proposed to attain the desired result.
He prepared, accordingly, largely to reinforce the French legion
in Spain, which he intended should be commanded by some well-known
general. Louis Philippe reluctantly assented to these initial
proceedings, but, when the news arrived of the military revolt at La
Granja, he promptly placed his _veto_ upon all measures of that kind.
Never, he declared, would he allow assistance to be supplied to the
Jacobins in power at Madrid.[387] Thiers and his fellow-ministers, in
consequence, resigned.
Under Molé, to whom the King confided the portfolio of Foreign Affairs
and the formation of a new Cabinet, France for all practical purposes
withdrew from the Quadruple Treaty. The _depôts_ formed by Thiers were
broken up and three battalions, which he had raised for the service of
Queen Isabella, were sent to Algiers. It would be highly dangerous,
Molé informed the British ambassador, to expose French soldiers to the
influence of the revolutionary societies in Spain.[388] In vain Lord
Palmerston protested that in no way could the spirit of anarchy be
combated so effectually as by the expulsion of Don Carlos from the
Peninsula.[389] That argument and his contention that the stability of
the Orleans monarchy depended upon the triumph of the constitutional
cause in Spain were alike unheeded.[390] In order to show their
displeasure at the manner in which the French government was thus
evading its engagements, Lord Melbourne and his colleagues decided
to omit the customary reference to France from the King's Speech at
the opening of Parliament in 1837. But the "no mention" incident,
although it caused Louis Philippe the keenest annoyance and created a
great sensation in Paris,[391] had no effect upon Molé's resolution
to refuse assistance of any kind to the government at Madrid. The
only safe policy for France, the King informed Granville a few months
later, was to look upon Spain as infected with the plague and to have
as little communication with her as possible.[392]
Although Calatrava, whom the sergeants at La Granja had raised to
the head of the Queen Regent's government, was invariably spoken of
by Louis Philippe and Comte Molé as a dangerous revolutionist, he
was far from deserving that appellation. Not only was he successful
in infusing a certain vigour into the conduct of the war, but he
contrived, in addition, to frame a constitution which, in spite of its
imperfections, effected a happy compromise between the Jacobinical
code of 1812 and the ultra-monarchical _Estatuto Real_. The year
1836 closed with a brilliant success for the arms of the Queen
Regent. Powerfully assisted by the bluejackets and marines of Lord
John Hay's squadron, the _Christinos_ stormed the formidable lines
of Luchana and relieved the city of Bilbao. Henceforward the name
of Baldomero Espartero, the victorious general, was to figure very
prominently in Spanish politics. Nevertheless, during the campaign of
the ensuing year, complete success appeared to be within the grasp
of the Pretender. Eluding Espartero, who was preparing to attack him
in the Basque provinces, Don Carlos, who had been liberally supplied
with money by the Tsar and the Kings of the Netherlands[393] and of
Sardinia, marched southwards on Madrid. But, when the capital lay at
their mercy, his generals were ordered to retrace their footsteps,
recross the Ebro and re-enter the northern provinces.
Various reasons have been given for the sudden retreat of the Carlists
from before Madrid.[394] The most probable explanation appears to be
that Don Carlos had secretly arranged with Christina that, upon the
arrival of his army in the vicinity of the capital, the gates were to
be thrown open, and that the marriage of his son with Isabella was
to be announced and peace proclaimed.[395] It would seem, however,
that at the last moment Christina decided that this scheme was
impracticable and the Pretender, finding, in consequence, that no
movement in his favour was likely to break out in Madrid, gave the
order to retreat. The remainder of the year 1837 was spent by the
Carlist leaders in fierce quarrels and bitter recriminations. But the
condition of the Queen's armies was still more pitiable. Officers
and men were unpaid and wholly without confidence in their generals.
Horrible excesses were committed by the mutinous regiments. Generals
Escalera and Sarsfield were murdered by their men, and, although
Espartero upon his arrival from Madrid, succeeded in restoring some
semblance of discipline, he dared not undertake offensive operations
with troops so completely demoralized.
The Pretender's advance upon Madrid proved fatal to the Calatrava
Cabinet. That government, which had been created by the action of
the sergeants at La Granja, was destroyed by a _pronunciamento_ on
the part of the officers of a brigade which had been hurried south,
when Don Carlos was threatening the capital.[396] The downfall of
the _Progressista_ Cabinet was, doubtless, one of the reasons which
led the Queen Regent to break her compact with the Pretender. A
transition ministry was formed, whilst Christina cautiously prepared
to recall the _Moderados_. Throughout the country party differences
were submerged in the general desire for peace, and the opinion was
rapidly gaining ground that, without French assistance, the Pretender
could never be expelled. This idea was sedulously encouraged by
the Court party, and, as was suspected, by agents of the French
government. These conditions at the elections, at the close of the
year 1837, produced an overwhelming majority for the _Moderados_.
It was soon evident, however, that the electors had been completely
deluded in imagining that the triumph of the Conservative party would
be followed by French intervention. The political effacement of the
_Progressistas_ had not altered the determination of Louis Philippe
and Comte Molé to withhold all assistance from the government of the
Queen Regent.[397]
Villiers, the British minister at Madrid, was now convinced that
in the dissensions of the Carlists lay the only hope of preserving
the crown for Isabella. The animosity was extreme between the
_Provinciales_, whose chief object in supporting the Pretender was
to ensure the maintenance of their highly prized _Fueros_, and the
_Castillanos_, as that section of the party was called which followed
the lead of the fanatical Bishop of Léon.[398] In order to widen
this breach Villiers instructed Lieutenant Turner, a British officer
attached to the division of the Queen's army at Pampeluna, to open up
a secret communication with the discontented Navarrese chiefs. Turner
experienced little difficulty in executing his mission, and was soon
able to report that the men of Biscay and Navarre would be prepared
to discuss terms of peace upon the basis of the recognition of their
local rights and privileges. But all the leaders with whom he had
conferred had stipulated that any compromise which, might be arrived
at, must have the guarantee of Great Britain.[399]
The news of these proceedings was most agreeable to Lord Palmerston,
who forthwith drew up precise instructions for the future conduct
of the negotiations. Whilst suggesting that on the subject of the
_Fueros_ the Queen Regent's government would be well advised to make
concessions, he laid it down distinctly that Great Britain could
not guarantee the conditions of peace.[400] A copy of this despatch
was sent to Lord Granville in Paris, who was directed to invite the
French government to act with England in the affair. In Palmerston's
opinion it was most important to draw France "into an open and avowed
mediation for the purpose of reuniting the northern provinces to the
rest of the Spanish dominions."[401] He was convinced that Louis
Philippe cherished secret hopes that the civil war might lead to the
secession of Biscay and Navarre and their incorporation into France.
There can be little doubt that he was entirely mistaken in imagining
that either the King of the French or his ministers entertained any
views of this kind. It is possible, however, that the separatist
movement, which unquestionably existed in Catalonia, may have been
encouraged by French agents, with the object of preventing the
conclusion of a commercial treaty with England. The threat of the
manufacturers of Barcelona that the Catalans would proclaim their
independence, should the duty upon English cotton goods be lowered,
was one of the chief reasons which deterred the Cabinet of Madrid from
accepting Palmerston's commercial proposals.[402]
Louis Philippe, however, would not hear of allowing the French
ambassador to be the organ of any communications with the discontented
Carlist chieftains. He had been accused most unfairly, he told Lord
Granville, of sympathizing with Don Carlos, and to accede to the
British request would expose him to further suspicion.[403] A new
French ambassador was at this moment about to proceed to Madrid, who
appears to have been admirably adapted for the part which the King
desired that his envoy should play at Christina's Court, whilst the
issue of the struggle between constitutionalism and absolutism was so
extremely uncertain. "A more inoffensive person," wrote the British
_chargé d'affaires_ about a year later, "than the Duc de Fezensac does
not exist. He has no political principles and has never taken the
slightest interest in the questions which agitate the country. I have
observed that, as a soldier, he would now and then demonstrate some
curiosity about the movements of the armies and seem glad when the
advantage had been on the side of the Queen's troops."[404]
In the meantime Mr. Turner's secret relations with the Navarrese
chiefs had been betrayed. The sudden imprisonment of the disaffected
officers and the murder of one of his emissaries compelled him to
suspend his proceedings.[405] A counter-insurrection, however, broke
out against Don Carlos to the cry of "_Peace and the Fueros_," under
the leadership of an individual named Muñagorri. From Bayonne,
where "the French authorities coldly permitted him to remain," he
endeavoured to foment disaffection in, and to encourage desertion
from, the Pretender's armies.[406] Villiers at one time expected great
results from this new development, but, before long, he was forced
to realize that Muñagorri, a Basque lawyer, had not the influence
required for bringing the enterprise to a successful conclusion.[407]
Never, in the opinion of both Villiers and of Wylde, had the
constitutional cause presented so gloomy an appearance as in the
closing months of the year 1838. The Queen's generals had suffered
heavy defeats in the open field and Espartero had been compelled
to abandon his operations against Morella, Cabrera's stronghold.
Political rather than strategical considerations appear to have
dictated the conduct of the campaign. Fearing that Espartero might
grow too powerful, the Cabinet was suspected of having deliberately
neglected to reinforce him, whilst keeping his rival and enemy,
Narvaez, who commanded the army of reserve, liberally supplied with
troops.[408] In England no minister would have ventured to propose
that any further assistance, either in men or money, should be sent
to the _Christinos_, who had greatly fallen in the public estimation.
The commercial classes were indignant that, notwithstanding the help
which the Queen's cause had received, prohibitory duties upon British
manufactures should still be maintained. The newspapers were full of
the complaints of the soldiers of the legion, who had returned home
with their claims upon the Spanish treasury unsatisfied. The policy of
encouraging these men to enter Isabella's services was now universally
condemned. The good name of the British army had, it was feared,
suffered from their misconduct at the seat of war. The action of the
government, in conferring a knighthood of the Bath upon De Lacy Evans,
in no way lessened this impression.[409]
But, in the early spring of 1839, the news arrived of strange
proceedings in the Pretender's camp. Maroto, the Carlist
commander-in-chief, having discovered the existence of a plot to
overthrow him, had caused four general officers to be shot at Estella,
on February 18. Don Carlos, who was in secret sympathy with the
conspirators, thereupon deprived Maroto of his command and proclaimed
him a traitor. That officer, however, knew that he could count upon
the devotion of his men, and he, accordingly, boldly marched upon
Tolosa, where the wretched Don Carlos was residing, and compelled him
both to revoke his decree and to dismiss his _Apostolical_ advisers.
But Maroto, although he had on this occasion triumphed so completely,
was well aware that at any moment his troops might turn against
him, and that his life depended upon a speedy termination of the
war. Notwithstanding that Turner's attempts to incite the Navarrese
chieftains to rebellion had failed, and that Muñagorri's insurrection
had practically collapsed, the longing for peace had not diminished
among the men of Biscay and Navarre. After the executions at Estella
and his coercion of Don Carlos, Maroto had no alternative but to adopt
the popular cry of "_Paz y Fueros_." Instead of an obscure lawyer, the
commander-in-chief of the Pretender's armies was now at the head of
the counter-insurrection against him.[410]
Whilst the Carlist general had thus the strongest possible inducement
for coming to terms with the _Christinos_, other circumstances had
arisen which contributed to the undoing of the Pretender. Espartero
was now all powerful and in a position to carry on the war,
untrammelled by the intrigues of the Court and of the Cabinet.[411]
In France Molé had fallen and Soult was once more at the head of
the government. The Marshal, in the previous year, had represented
Louis Philippe at the coronation of Queen Victoria, and had returned
to France delighted with the welcome accorded him in London by all
classes of the population.[412] He was, consequently, very well
disposed towards England and far more inclined than any of his
predecessors to act up to the spirit of the Quadruple Treaty. No
sooner was he in power than orders were sent to the French ships,
stationed off the north coast of Spain, identical in every respect
with those with which the British admiral was furnished. At the same
time, the authorities upon the frontier were strictly enjoined both
to prevent supplies from reaching the Carlists and to embarrass the
movements of the Pretender's armies by all means in their power.[413]
Maroto's first definite proposals of peace seem to have been made to
Lord John Hay, either on July 27 or 28. It is probable, however, that
for some time past he had been in more or less direct communication
with Espartero, with whom he had served in South America. The
negotiations, once formally begun, continued for the next month.
Espartero, however, wisely refused to grant any suspension of
hostilities, and, whilst showing himself always ready to listen to
reasonable proposals, pushed on his military operations vigorously.
The question which proved the most difficult of settlement was that
of the _Fueros_, which the Biscayans and Navarrese stipulated must
be maintained in their integrity. The Queen Regent's government,
in accordance with Palmerston's advice, was only prepared to make
such concessions with regard to them, as might be compatible with
the representative form of government which Spain had adopted. The
recognition of the sovereignty of Isabella, the regency of Christina
and the Constitution of 1837 were also insisted upon. Colonel Wylde
was present at most of the conferences which took place. He was
authorized to explain to any Carlist officers, with whom he might be
enabled to converse, that, "although it would not be consistent with
the dignity of the Spanish nation that Her Majesty's government should
guarantee any arrangement, they could rely upon the good offices of
the British government should, at any time, the government of Madrid
depart from its agreements."[414]
Espartero's skilful conduct of the negotiations, combined with the
personal reasons which made it imperative for Maroto to conclude
a peace, triumphed at last over all obstacles. On August 29, a
convention was signed at Vergara settling the points in dispute and
providing for the capitulation of Maroto's army. Two days later the
21 battalions specified in the treaty marched into the camp of the
_Christinos_ and, having been harangued by Espartero, proceeded
to fraternize joyfully with the Queen's troops.[415] Don Carlos,
nevertheless, was still able to command the fidelity of a certain
number of his regiments. But Espartero, the moment the capitulation
of Maroto's people had been completed, pressed these remnants of
the insurgent army with the utmost vigour. Their resistance was
soon overcome, and, on September 15, 1839, Don Carlos with a few
thousand followers was driven across the frontier. On reaching French
territory they were at once disarmed, the Pretender and the members
of his family being conveyed to Bourges, where they were detained
under strict supervision. It was not without difficulty that Louis
Philippe's ministers had obtained his consent to that measure of
precaution.
Although Don Carlos had abandoned the struggle, Cabrera in the
Maestrargo, and the no less bloodthirsty Count of España in Catalonia,
still carried on the war with ruthless barbarity. In November,
however, España, having incurred the displeasure of the Carlist
_junta_, was removed from his command. His body shortly afterwards
was taken out of the river Segre "tied neck and heels."[416] Without
doubt he had been murdered by the escort which was supposed to convey
him to a place of confinement. But it was not till the month of July,
1840, that Espartero succeeded in driving Cabrera and his lieutenant,
Balmaceda, into France and in breaking up the last of the Carlist
bands.
Spain, however, was not destined to enjoy the blessings of internal
peace and tranquillity. Christina had never really accepted the
principles of constitutional government, and most of the leading
_Moderados_ shared her dislike to democratic institutions. With the
object, accordingly, of rendering nugatory certain of the Liberal
provisions of the constitution the party, during the session of 1840,
introduced a bill abolishing the election of municipal officers, and
establishing a system under which they were, in the future, to be
appointed by the central government. The Spaniards, however, have
always been tenacious of their municipal rights and privileges, and
the proposed law was, in consequence, greatly disliked by the people.
The Queen Regent and her _Moderado_ advisers would have cared little
for popular opposition, provided always that they could have obtained
the support of one man. "Espartero," in the words of Mr. Southern,
the British _chargé d'affaires_, "now formed one of the bodies of the
State."[417] The general who had succeeded in terminating the civil
war was, for the time being, the idol of the nation.
Espartero, however, was deaf to the blandishments of the _Moderados_,
and publicly declared that he regarded the municipal bill as
unconstitutional.[418] Christina, nevertheless, was confident that
he would never resist her personal appeal. She had always recognized
the importance of winning his gratitude. For his services he had been
created Count of Luchana, Duke de la Victoria, and a Spanish grandee
of the first class. After his capture of Cabrera's stronghold, in
1840, she had conferred upon him the additional title of Duke of
Morella. When the municipal law was under discussion in the Chamber,
she suddenly announced her intention of proceeding to Caldes, near
Barcelona, with Isabella, who was alleged to have been ordered sea
bathing. But the significance of her journey to the coast lay in the
fact that it would enable her to meet, and to confer with, Espartero,
who was directing the final operations in Cabrera's country.[419] Her
interview with the all-powerful general took place, in due course, at
Lerida, but it disappointed her expectations. Espartero advised her
strongly to refuse her assent to the bill, although it had been passed
by both Chambers. It was notorious that the _Moderado_ majority had
been obtained by means of corruption and intimidation at the elections
of the previous year, and that it in no way represented the will of
the nation. Christina wavered. At one time she decided to follow the
counsels of Espartero, at another she resolved to adhere firmly to
her _Moderado_ policy. Meanwhile, the country was growing dangerously
excited, and Barcelona was the scene of serious rioting. Christina, in
consequence, decided to move the Court to Valencia, where O'Donnell,
on whom she could depend, commanded the troops. Upon her arrival, she
boldly announced that she purposed to commission Modesto Cortazar,
a former minister of Joseph Bonaparte, to form an ultra-_Moderado_
Cabinet. At the news, the country rose, _juntas_ sprang into existence
in the principal towns, and a provisional government was established
at Madrid.[420]
Villiers was no longer at Madrid. On succeeding to the earldom of
Clarendon, he had returned home, where a seat in the Cabinet had been
found for him. When he learnt of the critical state of affairs in
Spain, Palmerston at once directed Mr. Aston, Clarendon's successor,
to seek out Christina, wherever she might be, and to attempt to
convince her of the imprudence of the course upon which she had
embarked.[421] But before he could reach Valencia, she had abandoned
the struggle, and had sullenly surrendered the direction of affairs
to Espartero. She fully intended, she informed Aston at his first
audience, to resign the regency, and no words of his could turn her
from her resolution.[422] It was not alone the desire to avoid the
disagreeable necessity of having to accept a _Progressista_ government
which had prompted her to arrive at this decision. Gonzalez Bravo
and the Radicals possessed the proof of her marriage to Nuñoz, the
guardsman, by whom she had already had several children. In order
to retain the regency, and especially the emoluments appertaining
to it, she had allowed it to be generally believed that she was the
mistress of the handsome and low-born soldier. But now that her secret
had been betrayed, her marriage might be adduced at any moment as a
reason for declaring her incompetent to hold the post of Regent.[423]
Only by a voluntary abdication could she escape from this further
humiliation. Accordingly, on October 12, 1840, she signed the act
whereby she resigned the regency, and left it to the Cortes to appoint
her successor. A few days later she parted from her daughters, and
set out for France. On May 18 of the following year, Espartero was
duly elected Regent, whilst Argüelles, a veteran _Progressista_, was
nominated guardian of Queen Isabella.
Christina's abdication passed almost unnoticed outside Spain. The
quarrel between the Sultan and the Pasha had broken out afresh, and
England and France were upon the verge of war.
CHAPTER VII
SULTAN AND PASHA
It will be remembered that, in the autumn of 1833, both France
and Great Britain ineffectually protested against the treaty of
Unkiar-Skelessi. But so long as Russia and Austria were closely
united, neither Palmerston nor Broglie were prepared to enforce their
demands by actual measures of hostility. Both, however, were resolved
vigilantly to watch the course of events at Constantinople, and to
interpose should the Russian fleet return to the Bosphorus. Being thus
anxious to avoid a collision with Russia, it became their policy to
prevent a fresh outbreak of hostilities between the Sultan and Mehemet
Ali, in order that the Tsar should be furnished with no excuse for
intervention. It was soon apparent, however, that the preservation of
peace between Mahmud and his powerful vassal would prove a difficult
matter. Already, in the summer of 1834, only a little more than a year
after the conclusion of the Convention of Kiutayeh, there was once
more grave danger of an armed conflict between the Sultan and the
Pasha of Egypt.
In 1832, the Syrians had welcomed Ibrahim as their deliverer from
Turkish misrule. But no sooner had they become the subjects of the
Pasha, than their disenchantment began. The introduction of the
conscription into Syria was fiercely resented. In the spring of 1834,
the whole country was in a state of rebellion, and it required
sixteen months of arduous operations, attended with much bloodshed,
before Ibrahim could disarm the tribes, and restore the authority of
his father over the revolted districts.[424] But in the eyes of the
Sultan, the insurrection was an opportunity for attacking Ibrahim
under favourable conditions, and for wiping out the humiliations of
the former campaign. Accordingly, he prepared to renew the struggle,
and it was only in deference to the protests of the Powers that he
refrained from carrying out his intention.[425] At the same time the
consuls at Alexandria insisted that Mehemet Ali must strictly comply
with the conditions of the Convention of Kiutayeh, and afford Mahmud
no pretext for beginning hostilities. Nevertheless, on September 4,
1834, the Pasha officially informed the agents of the Powers that he
was resolved to proclaim his complete independence.[426] He soon,
however, perceived the necessity of postponing the execution of this
design, in face of the unanimous declaration of the different Cabinets
that he must abandon "a project which the policy of Europe could not
allow him to realize."[427]
But, although the five Powers thus combined to check the ambitious
schemes of Mehemet Ali, the suspicion with which the policy of
Russia towards Turkey was regarded by France and England was in no
way diminished. So strained were the relations of Great Britain and
Russia, at the beginning of 1834, that Nicholas, notwithstanding
his inveterate dislike of Louis Philippe, allowed Nesselrode to
make certain discreet advances towards France. These half-hearted
overtures, however, led to no results. Although Broglie indulged in
less provocative language than the British minister, and deprecated
the idea of another naval demonstration in Levantine waters, he was
in complete agreement with Palmerston in the eastern question.[428] A
personal dispute served to increase the tension which existed between
the Imperial Cabinet and the English government. Notwithstanding
Prince Lieven's intimation that the Tsar would greatly dislike the
appointment,[429] Palmerston had allowed Sir Stratford Canning
to be gazetted as ambassador to the Russian Court. Nesselrode,
thereupon, informed Mr. Bligh, the British _chargé d'affaires_, that
Sir Stratford would not be received. His "suspicious, overbearing
and irritable disposition" appears to have been the reason assigned
for the objections which were made to his appointment. Palmerston,
however, absolutely refused to send any one else in his place. "The
whole thing," he believed or affected to believe, "was a mere remnant
of the _Apostolical_ and Holy Alliance abomination of the name of
Canning."[430] But Nesselrode was equally unyielding and no British
ambassador was, in consequence, accredited to the Russian Court.
Matters continued upon this footing until Nicholas, in the spring
of 1834, decided to recall Prince Lieven from London and merely to
appoint a _chargé d'affaires_ to replace him. The departure of the
Lievens created a great sensation, and was by many people regarded
as a prelude to a complete rupture between Russia and Great Britain.
The ambassador was a commonplace person, but his wife[431] was a
conspicuous figure in the fashionable and political world. Besides
being well acquainted with most of the prominent diplomatists in
Europe, she had, during her long stay in England, enjoyed the
confidence of Grey, Aberdeen and other statesmen. It may be imagined
how bitterly she deplored the necessity of exchanging a life, replete
with political interest in London, for an existence at the Court of
St. Petersburg, bereft of all the excitement in which she delighted.
It was to her influence, she considered, that Palmerston owed his
appointment as Foreign Secretary, and she never forgave him for his
share in the events which led up to her husband's recall.[432]
Whilst the Duke of Wellington was at the Foreign Office, during Sir
Robert Peel's "Hundred Days," Anglo-Russian relations perceptibly
improved. The Duke's views upon the question of the Dardanelles
differed from those which Broglie and Palmerston had hitherto
entertained. In his opinion England and France should endeavour to
effect the closure of the straits to the warships of all nations. The
evil arising from the passage of Russian ships from the Black Sea
to the Mediterranean would not, he maintained, be diminished by the
opening of the Dardanelles to the fleets of the Powers. Accordingly,
he cancelled Palmerston's secret instructions of March 10, 1834,[433]
authorizing Ponsonby, should the Porte ask for assistance against
Russia, to call upon the Mediterranean squadron to enter the
Dardanelles. Moreover, apart from this particular question, it was
not fitting, in the eyes of the Duke, that "the King's ambassador
should have the power of placing the country in a state of war
with another Power."[434] Wellington also proposed to restore the
diplomatic relations of the two countries to their normal condition
by the despatch of an ambassador to St. Petersburg. But his selection
of Lord Londonderry for this post was disapproved of by the House of
Commons. Londonderry was an ultra-Tory who was supposed to have used
unsympathetic language about the Polish insurrection, and, had he not
voluntarily declined the mission, the government would certainly have
suffered a defeat upon the question of his appointment.[435]
Palmerston, upon his return to the Foreign Office in the spring
of 1835, was struck by the soundness of the Duke's opinion upon
the subject of the Dardanelles.[436] Ponsonby was, in consequence,
given no further authority over the movements of the Mediterranean
squadron. No man at this time was more absolutely persuaded of the
Machiavellian character of Russian policy than Lord Ponsonby. Neither
words nor deeds could shake his opinion upon that point. Although the
Russian envoy at Constantinople had co-operated with his colleagues in
preventing a renewal of the struggle between the Sultan and the Pasha,
the British ambassador was none the less convinced that Nicholas was
secretly scheming to create a pretext for intervention. Again, when M.
de Boutenieff assisted him in obtaining redress for the ill-treatment
of a British subject at the hands of the Turkish police, he explained
his conduct by suggesting that "the Russian minister was perhaps taken
by surprise, and that those honourable feelings, which are natural
to him, operated upon him."[437] Nor would he allow that the Cabinet
of St. Petersburg was actuated either by disinterested or generous
motives when, in 1836, it consented to remit some of the indemnity due
from Turkey and to evacuate Silistria. That fortress, he declared, was
of no value to Russia, and, by relinquishing it, she "would obtain
the advantage of making the world believe in her moderation."[438]
Being thus convinced that the Tsar and his advisers entertained the
most sinister designs against the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, he
concluded that a secret understanding must exist between Russia and
Mehemet Ali, the powerful and disaffected vassal of the Sultan.
The effect of Lord Ponsonby's alarmist despatches was to some extent
counteracted by the more statesmanlike reports of Lord Durham, his
nephew by marriage. The Duke of Wellington's intention to send an
ambassador of St. Petersburg had enabled the Whigs, upon their return
to power, to despatch Lord Durham in that capacity to the Russian
capital. Durham, during the two years he was in Russia, travelled
through the southern provinces and made an exhaustive study of the
resources of the country. The result of his observations and enquiries
convinced him that Russia's power for offensive war had been greatly
exaggerated. Furthermore, he was persuaded that the Tsar Nicholas
and almost all intelligent Russians were sincerely desirous of
establishing a good understanding with England, and had altogether
abandoned the idea of acquiring Constantinople. In short, he saw no
reason why "a rival and an enemy should not be converted into a friend
and an ally."[439]
Meanwhile, Palmerston and Broglie had been quietly endeavouring to
induce Austria to join with France and Great Britain in guaranteeing
the integrity of Turkey. But Metternich, having contracted the
secret agreement with Russia[440] for the maintenance of the Ottoman
Empire, was not disposed to incur the Tsar's displeasure by entering
into a second compact. Broglie, finding that his advances met with
no response, suggested that France and England should separately
conclude a treaty for the object which both their governments had at
heart and invite Austria to adhere to it. Palmerston[441] acquiesced
in this plan, but was unable to obtain the assent of his colleagues
to its execution. Before any further discussion of the subject could
take place Broglie fell, and the Presidency of the Council and the
direction of Foreign Affairs passed into the hands of M. Thiers.
The new minister professed to be as anxious as his predecessor to
preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but it was apparent, at
once, that his first political object, to which all other questions
of European diplomacy would for the present be subordinated, was the
negotiation of a marriage between the Duc d'Orléans and an Austrian
Archduchess.[442]
With the downfall of the Duc de Broglie the harmony, which had
hitherto characterized French and British relations, began to
diminish. Both Whigs and Tories had scrupulously abstained
from raising the delicate question of the French occupation of
Algiers.[443] Broglie and the _Doctrinaires_ were opposed to the
permanent retention of the colony, and a considerable section of the
Chamber looked upon it as a useless and expensive encumbrance. M.
Thiers, however, thought otherwise. He was in favour of "nationalizing
the Arabs"--an expression which Mr. Aston[444] interpreted to mean
that he was contemplating their extermination. No sooner was he in
office than he began to prepare an expedition against the Bey of
Constantine, with whom the French authorities had a long-standing
dispute. At the same time, whilst protesting that he had no thought of
extending French domination over either Tunis or Tripoli, he refused
to recognize the sovereignty of the Sultan over those regencies. To
support this policy he sent Admiral Hugon to Tunis to oppose, by force
if necessary, the entry of the Ottoman squadron into the bay. "I
really believe," privately wrote the British _chargé d'affaires_ to
Lord Palmerston, "that in order to gain popularity he wishes for a war
with Turkey, provided he could make it appear that it was undertaken
to protect French interests."[445]
Whilst M. Thiers thus set himself to consolidate the French rule over
Algeria a secret negotiation was initiated, at Constantinople and at
Cairo, for the purpose of establishing, under the guarantee of the
French government, the relations of the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt
upon a more secure foundation. Campbell appears to have received
the first intelligence of what was taking place from his Austrian
colleague. The news caused him to pay a visit to M. Ferdinand de
Lesseps,[446] who, in the absence of M. Mimaut, was acting as French
consul-general. Lesseps was in a great state of indignation, and in
his wrath was inclined to be communicative. M. Thiers, he confided
to Campbell, before he left Paris, had told him that an important
negotiation was in progress, but that he would not discuss it with
him as, upon his arrival at Alexandria, he could learn all about it
from a perusal of the documents at the consulate. Mimaut, however,
had carefully removed every paper relating to the affair, and he was,
in consequence, in complete ignorance of all that had passed. He had
endeavoured, he added ingenuously, to make Boghos Bey believe that
he was acquainted with the transaction, but the astute secretary of
the Pasha had discovered the true state of the case and had promptly
changed the conversation.[447]
Soon after Campbell's interview with Lesseps, on December 11, 1836,
Sarim Effendi, who was described by Mehemet Ali as a confidential
agent of the Sultan, arrived at Alexandria. Ostensibly his mission was
concerned with questions of arrears of tribute. In reality, however,
he appears to have been empowered to propose some repartition of
territory. The statements upon the subject which Campbell succeeded
in extracting from Mehemet Ali were conflicting. At one time he told
the British consul that the Sultan was willing to invest him with the
hereditary government of Egypt and the Pashalic of Acre, whilst, on
another occasion, he asserted that the hereditary tenure of all the
territories which he actually occupied had been offered to him, on
condition that he would undertake to reduce his army.[448] In Paris
Lord Granville was unable to obtain any information about this affair.
In answer to his enquiries he was told that Roussin had, "with the
object of saving the dignity of the Sultan, held out to the Pasha
the prospect of obtaining for his son the reversion of his Syrian
possessions, in return for the abandonment of the other territories
which he occupied." But he was assured that the admiral had acted
without instructions from his government, which had, on the contrary,
"discountenanced his proceedings."[449]
If Mahmud really empowered Sarim Effendi to make substantial
concessions to the Pasha, such conduct on his part is altogether
inconsistent with the sentiments of implacable hostility which he had
constantly entertained towards his powerful vassal. In the spring of
1836 he had shown a strong disposition to renew the struggle, and
had sent a secret agent to London to solicit help. His appeal was
rejected, but Palmerston intimated that the British government was
constrained to urge him to keep the peace from fear that his military
resources would be unequal to the contest, rather than from any desire
to see the _status quo_ in Syria maintained.[450] Finding that no
assistance would be forthcoming from England, Mahmud may have listened
to the advice of the French government to make further concessions
to Mehemet Ali, in order to put an end to the armed peace which was
draining his depleted treasury. But the conditions, whatever they
may have been, which were proposed to the Pasha were not accepted.
Nevertheless, the negotiation, although it led to no direct results,
had an important influence upon the march of events. It disclosed to
Mehemet Ali that France and England were pursuing different objects in
the East, and gave him grounds for hoping that he need no longer fear
a combination of the two naval Powers against him.
But, although the Sultan may have been disappointed and annoyed at
the refusal of Great Britain to assist him actively, he could derive
comfort from the knowledge that the power of Mehemet Ali was regarded
with misgivings in England. Ponsonby's influence at the Porte grew
in proportion as it became more and more evident that his government
disapproved of the Egyptian occupation of Syria, and was prepared
to uphold the sovereignty of Turkey over Tunis and to resist French
encroachments. On the other hand, the Russian ambassador, who declared
unceasingly that under no circumstances must the _status quo_, as
established by the Convention of Kiutayeh, be disturbed, found his
authority diminish. Early in 1836, shortly before the arrival in
England of the Sultan's secret agent, Palmerston had despatched
General Chrzanowski, an able and experienced Polish officer, to
Asia Minor. He had served in the Turkish campaign of 1828-1829, and
was, Palmerston considered,[451] "just the sort of man to be of the
greatest use to Reshid Pasha."[452] But as the Russians, by whom he
was looked upon as a deserter, would greatly resent his employment,
he was instructed to avoid Constantinople, and to proceed direct to
Smyrna. He would never appear to have been given a command or to
have been employed officially by the Sultan, who probably scarcely
ventured to defy his powerful neighbour so openly. He was allowed,
however, to travel about Asia Minor, and to study the strategical
situation. He was thus enabled to furnish Palmerston with excellent
military advice, in return for the salary which Lord Ponsonby
was instructed to pay him, from the moment of his arrival in the
East.[453] Several Prussian officers, among them a certain Major von
Moltke, destined to become very famous, were at this time serving with
the Turkish army, to the re-organization of which, in preparation for
the coming struggle, Palmerston unceasingly urged the Sultan to devote
his whole attention.
Whilst instructing Ponsonby to impress upon the Turkish ministers
the necessity of increasing the efficiency of the army, Palmerston
was intent on creating embarrassments for Mehemet Ali. The economic
system, which he had established in Egypt, and which he was imposing
upon Syria, presented an excellent field for hostile criticism. By
often very equivocal methods the Pasha had gradually expropriated the
former freeholders, and had converted them into his own tenants. He
would then buy at a fixed rate their produce, and thus, before long,
the sale of almost all articles of prime necessity became a monopoly
of the State. At first his system appeared to work well, but, when
he began to pile up his armaments, he met the increased expenditure
which they entailed by reducing the price, which he had hitherto paid
to the unfortunate occupiers of the soil. In order to compensate
themselves these people were necessarily compelled to raise the
price of all articles which the government did not take from them.
In 1838 Colonel Campbell computed that, as the result of the Pasha's
administration, articles of ordinary consumption in Egypt were from
six to ten times dearer than they had been under the rule of the
Mamelukes. Moreover, Mehemet Ali, ever since the year 1816, had been
busily endeavouring to convert Egypt into a manufacturing country.
With this object he had imported at great expense skilled workmen and
machinery from France and England. The native labour required was
obtained in the same manner as the army was recruited. Men, women and
children were impressed and compelled to work in the factories. But by
their unskilfulness they injured the machinery, nor did the articles
which they turned out pay the cost of manufacture. The result of this
experiment was that some 30,000 peasants, who might with advantage
have been engaged in agriculture, were forced to labour unprofitably
in the factories of the government. The Pasha, however, was too
ignorant of the most elementary principles of political economy to
understand the folly of these proceedings, in which he was encouraged
to persevere by the foreign merchants, who sold him machinery or who
bought his cotton and his indigo upon very advantageous terms.[454]
The British government had always been desirous to put an end to the
old system of _capitulations_,[455] and to negotiate a new commercial
treaty with the Porte. But as many influential persons in Turkey were
interested in the preservation of existing abuses, the proposals of
successive ambassadors had constantly been eluded. At the beginning
of 1838, however, Palmerston directed Ponsonby to bring the matter
forward again, and to lay great stress upon the prejudicial effect
which the abolition of monopolies throughout the Ottoman Empire would
not fail to have upon the personal position of Mehemet Ali.[456] This
argument attained the desired result. Mahmud quickly resolved that
no vested interests should be allowed to interfere with a commercial
arrangement, which must either seriously embarrass Mehemet Ali or,
should he refuse to adhere to it, bring him into conflict with Great
Britain. The Sultan's consent having been obtained, Ponsonby entrusted
to Henry Bulwer the negotiation which was brought to a satisfactory
conclusion on August 19, 1838.[457]
In the meantime, it had not escaped the vigilance of the Indian
government that the protracted resistance of the Wahabites was
weakening, and that Mehemet Ali was upon the point of making
himself master of the whole of Arabia. The importance of Aden as
an intermediate coaling station between Bombay and Suez had been
realized, and it happened, most opportunely, that a quarrel[458]
between the ruler of that port and the East India Company enabled the
Governor-General to take action at the very moment when the absorption
of the Yemen by the Pasha was imminent.[459] The management of the
affair was confided to Captain Haines of the Bombay navy, who, early
in 1838, was able to inform Ibrahim that the Sultan of Aden had ceded
the port to the East India Company "_par simple motif d'amitié et de
son cosentement_."[460] Nevertheless, the expedition sent from India
to take possession of the place encountered, on January 16, 1839, a
fierce resistance which was only overcome after a sharp engagement.
Palmerston, upon receipt of the news of its cession, at once directed
Campbell to warn Mehemet Ali that any movement of his troops against
Aden would be treated as an attack upon a British possession. The
Pasha, although unable wholly to conceal his chagrin, accepted the
situation with a good grace.[461]
Ever since the beginning of the year 1838, great military preparations
had been in progress both in Egypt and Syria. The consuls, had in
consequence, been instructed to inquire of Mehemet Ali the reason of
his armaments. It was whilst they were engaged in warning him that any
aggression upon the Sultan would bring down upon him the vengeance of
the Powers that the news arrived of the submission of Nejd, the great
central district of Arabia, extending from Medina and Mecca to the
Persian Gulf.[462] It was impossible to calculate what might result
from the enhanced prestige which he had thus acquired in the eyes of
the faithful. The immediate effect was seen, a few days later, when
he sent for the consuls and announced to each of them separately his
unalterable resolution to proclaim his independence. "The interests of
his family," he declared to Campbell, "imperiously called upon him to
fix their future state, and it was _les larmes aux yeux et le coeur
serré_ that he had taken his present resolution." Nevertheless, he
would wait a reasonable time in the full persuasion that the British
government would take such steps as would permit of an amicable and
satisfactory settlement.[463]
The Cabinets of the Powers were not greatly disturbed by the Pasha's
threats. Palmerston alone showed any anxiety to arrange the military
measures which might be put into force against Mehemet Ali, should he
proceed to carry out his declared intentions.[464] But it was soon
evident that the Pasha had no desire to bring on a crisis. Although he
continued to impress upon the consuls that he was fully as determined
as ever to obtain for his children the succession of the countries
which he governed, he at the same time announced his intention of
proceeding to Upper Egypt to inspect his gold mines. Furthermore,
he duly transmitted his yearly tribute to the Sultan. Nevertheless,
his military preparations were not relaxed and reinforcements were
continuously despatched to Ibrahim in Syria. It was clear that he
had no intention of affording the Powers a pretext for taking active
measures against him, but hoped, by keeping them and the Porte in a
constant state of apprehension, to weary them into conceding him some
of his demands.[465] In pursuance of this astute policy he accepted
the British commercial treaty with the utmost unconcern. He was
confident, he assured Campbell, that he could derive a larger revenue
from duties on exports and imports than he had ever obtained under
his system of monopolies.[466] M. Molé, on the other hand, testified
his surprise and annoyance at the success which had attended Lord
Ponsonby's negotiations. He was greatly afraid, he told Granville,
that Mehemet Ali would now be provoked into an immediate declaration
of independence. But, upon learning that the Pasha had announced his
intention of adhering to the terms of the British treaty, he promptly
instructed Roussin to conclude, on behalf of France, a similar
arrangement with the Porte.[467]
Whilst the aims and ambitions of Mehemet Ali were once more
attracting the attention of the Powers, Anglo-Russian relations again
assumed a threatening aspect. Both the British and Indian governments
had, for some time past, been disturbed by the ascendency which Russia
was acquiring over the Court of Teheran, and by the intrigues of her
agents in Afghanistan. Encouraged by Count Simonitch, the Russian
envoy, the Shah, who entertained pretensions to the sovereignty of
Afghanistan, at the close of the year 1837, marched against Herat.
Before the siege had been long in progress both the British and
Russian ministers arrived upon the scene--the one to endeavour to
bring about a cessation of hostilities, and the other to direct the
operations of the Persian army. Whilst Macneil and Simonitch thus
strove for supremacy in the camp of Mohammad, Eldred Pottinger, a
subaltern of the Indian army, who had reached Herat disguised as a
horse-dealer, stimulated by his example the courage of the garrison.
At the same time Captain Witkewitch, a secret agent of Count
Simonitch, arrived at Cabul, for the purpose of drawing Dost Mohammad
into the Russo-Persian alliance and of counteracting the influence of
Alexander Burnes, who, like his Russian rival, was in Afghanistan upon
a mission which was described as commercial. The idea of a Russian
agent established at Cabul, free to intrigue with Ranjit Singh, the
Maharajah of Lahore, and supported by the whole weight of Mohammedan
Persia, seriously alarmed Lord Auckland, the Governor-General.[468]
To combat this danger he conceived the fatal plan of sending an
Anglo-Indian army into Afghanistan to overthrow the Barakzai dynasty,
and to set up in the place of Dost Mohammad an exiled Sadozai prince,
a pensioner of the Indian government.
The conduct of the Russian agents in Persia and Afghanistan was made
the subject of a note which, on October 26, 1838, Clanricarde,
the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, was directed to deliver
to Count Nesselrode. The Russian Chancellor, whilst deprecating
the construction placed by Palmerston on some of Count Simonitch's
actions, admitted that he had exceeded his instructions and undertook
to recall him.[469] This promise was duly carried out. Consequently,
when Witkewitch arrived at St. Petersburg he was coldly informed
that he must forthwith return to his post at Orenburg. In despair at
finding that the negotiations, which he had conducted so skilfully,
were to be disavowed, the unfortunate man blew out his brains.[470]
Only a little more than two years later Burnes, his rival, perished at
Cabul at the hands of an infuriated mob.
The assurances and explanations of Count Nesselrode were accepted as
satisfactory by Lord Palmerston. The visit of the Tsarewitch, the
future Alexander II., to London, in the spring of 1839, contributed
still further to restore harmonious relations. Nevertheless, the
general situation which confronted Palmerston was disquieting.
Russia, which by means of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi had assumed
the exclusive protectorship of Turkey, now appeared to exercise a
dangerous ascendency over the Court of Persia. Although the Shah
had been compelled to raise the siege of Herat, and although the
proceedings of Simonitch and Witkewitch had been disavowed, there was
room for grave anxiety. Distant as was the frontier line of the Sutlej
from the most advanced Cossack posts, the presence of Russian agents
in the intervening States foreboded trouble. At Lahore, Hyderabad and
Cabul, the appearance of a new power in Central Asia could not fail
to be eagerly discussed.
But it was not alone the advance of Russia beyond the Caspian which
gave those responsible for the safety of British India cause for
uneasy reflection. At this time, when the introduction of steam as a
means of transport was making the question of rapid communication a
matter of the first importance, Mehemet Ali was building up an Arab
Empire which already extended from Khartum to the Taurus mountains
and the Persian Gulf. Whether in the future the Indian mail would be
carried over the Isthmus of Suez, or whether Colonel Chesney should
succeed in establishing steam communication by way of the Euphrates,
the ruler of Egypt was master of either route. Nor did he stand
alone. Whilst busily engaged in strengthening her own position as
a Mediterranean power, England's most formidable naval rival was
showing a marked disposition to befriend him. In Syria France was
the acknowledged protector of the Catholics, and her influence was
reported to have increased of late years.[471] From Algiers she was
extending her grasp over the whole north coast of Africa, whilst in
Spain she was striving to re-establish that predominating influence
which she had formerly exercised. It seemed possible that France, in
alliance with Spain and Mehemet Ali, might yet be enabled to realize
Napoleon's dream of converting the Mediterranean into a "French lake."
When Mehemet Ali had announced his intention of shaking off his
allegiance, Mahmud had seemed to defer to the pacific counsels of the
Powers, and had refrained from ordering his troops in Asia Minor to
invade Syria. But, before the spring of 1839, it was clear that he
was resolved to appeal to arms, and that all the efforts of diplomacy
to prevent a renewal of the conflict would be fruitless. It was not
alone his bitter hatred of his rebellious vassal which prompted the
Sultan to disregard the advice of the ambassadors at Constantinople.
His sole claim to the Khalifate rested upon the protection of Mecca,
and, inasmuch as Mehemet Ali was in possession of the Holy Cities,
were he to declare himself independent, Mahmud must forfeit his
right to command the temporal obedience of Mohammedans. Already
Constantinople was seething with disaffection, and he is said to have
been aware that a plot had been formed to depose him and to enthrone
his son, under the guardianship of Mehemet Ali.[472]
Mahmud was dying from a complication of disorders, but he gave his
whole expiring strength to his military preparations. Men, horses
and guns were hurried across the Bosphorus and forwarded to Hafiz
Pasha in Asia Minor. Moltke with his plane-table was busily engaged
in exploring the country up to Nezib, "a small town hidden among the
olive trees close against the Syrian frontier."[473] At the news
that the Porte was bent upon war, Mehemet Ali, curtailing his visit
to Khartum, hastily returned to Cairo, whilst at Constantinople
the ambassadors made a last endeavour to dissuade the Sultan from
disturbing the peace.[474] But Mahmud was not to be diverted from his
object, and in Paris, on May 23, 1839, it was known that Hafiz Pasha
had crossed the Euphrates and that hostilities were about to begin.
French historians have generally imputed duplicity to the British
government in this affair. Palmerston, they say, whilst pretending
that he was anxious to dissuade the Sultan from war, was in point
of fact allowing Lord Ponsonby, his agent at Constantinople, to
encourage the Turkish ministers to break the peace. Ponsonby was
unquestionably opposed to the policy of maintaining the _status quo_
in Syria. In his opinion Mehemet Ali was the sore which was sapping
the strength of the Ottoman Empire, and, seeing that it was a British
interest that Turkey should be in a condition to resist Russia, he
held that England should assist the Sultan to crush his too-powerful
vassal.[475] It is undeniable that Palmerston allowed him a liberty
of action and of language which he would not have tolerated in any
other ambassador. There can be no doubt, moreover, that he regarded
the Egyptian question in very much the same light as Ponsonby. But
he differed from him in one very important particular, inasmuch as
he considered that the moment had not yet come when Mahmud could,
with a reasonable chance of success, try conclusions with the Pasha.
France, he was well aware, would never join in an attack upon Mehemet
Ali. Indeed, it was rather a question whether she would not openly
espouse his cause. The possibility of a combination between Russia and
France could not be dismissed as a development outside the range of
practical politics.[476] Hitherto, Nicholas' dislike of Louis Philippe
had rendered the chance of such a contingency very remote. But, were
England to adopt a separate policy in the east, it was improbable that
the Tsar would allow his personal animosity to stand in the way of an
alliance, which he might consider would serve the best interests of
his Empire. Accordingly, when, at the close of the year 1838, Reshid
Pasha, the _Reis-Effendi_, arrived upon a special mission to London,
he discovered, to his disappointment, that Palmerston was not prepared
to hold out any hopes that the British government would join in an
attack upon Mehemet Ali. Only, Palmerston explained, in the event of
the Pasha beginning hostilities, could England furnish the Sultan with
naval assistance. Mahmud being intent upon war, a purely defensive
alliance could be of no service to him, and was declined.[477] If the
bellicose policy of the Sultan had received any encouragement from
Lord Ponsonby, Reshid's conferences at the Foreign Office in London
must have made it clear that the ambassador had been using language
which he had no authority to employ. When, therefore, the Sultan
ordered Hafiz Pasha to advance, he was perfectly aware that he was
acting in opposition to the wishes of the British government, which
did not believe that he had an army capable of defeating Ibrahim's
Arab and Egyptian troops.
Directly it was known that the Turkish army had been set in motion
and that all hope of maintaining the peace must be abandoned, the
Soult Cabinet asked the Chamber for a credit of ten million francs.
The sum demanded was accorded by an overwhelming majority and, in
the debates which followed, the deputies were enabled to declare
their views upon the eastern question. The sympathies of the majority
were plainly on the side of Mehemet Ali, and ministers were given
clearly to understand, by the long succession of orators who in turn
ascended the tribune, that with the large sum which had been placed at
their disposal they must do something both great and glorious.[478]
Soult, in the meanwhile, had despatched two officers, the one to
Constantinople and the other to Alexandria, with instructions to
proceed, after conferring with Admiral Roussin and M. Cochelet, to
the headquarters of the two armies, in order to endeavour to bring
about a suspension of hostilities. The friendly feelings towards
England entertained by Marshal Soult, and the better understanding
with regard to Spanish affairs between the French and English
governments, which followed his assumption of office, have already
been mentioned. Their co-operation in the eastern question was no less
cordial. "We are in complete accord," said Palmerston to Bourqueney,
the French _chargé d'affaires_ in London; "our communications are not
those of one government with another but of two colleagues in the
same Cabinet."[479] It was decided that both the French and British
fleets should proceed to the Levant, and that the admirals should be
instructed to do all in their power to induce the opposing generals
to suspend hostilities. Both Soult and Palmerston, however, were
agreed that the great danger in the situation lay in the possibility
that Nicholas might avail himself of the outbreak of war for invading
Turkey, under the plea that Constantinople must be protected against
Ibrahim. They, accordingly, resolved to intimate to the Porte that, in
the event of Russian aid being invoked, or of a Russian fleet entering
the Bosphorus, permission should be given to the French and British
squadrons to pass through the Dardanelles into the Sea of Marmora.[480]
Mehemet Ali, when the news arrived that the Turks had crossed the
Euphrates, displayed the greatest self-restraint. In his heart he
was, doubtless, eager for the fray, but he was determined that the
responsibility for the outbreak of the war should rest with the
Sultan. Accordingly, he delivered a written communication to the
representatives of the Powers, in which he undertook to withdraw
his troops to Damascus, provided the Turkish army would recross
the river.[481] It was only on June 10, upon receipt of a report
from Ibrahim that his cavalry had been attacked within the Egyptian
frontier, that he directed him to assume the offensive.[482] But three
days after these orders had been despatched Captain Caillier, the
officer sent off by Marshal Soult, arrived at Alexandria. He was the
bearer of despatches from the Marshal to M. Cochelet, instructing him
to declare to Mehemet Ali that the Powers were taking steps to settle
the eastern question, and that they must insist upon the immediate
withdrawal of the Egyptian army within the boundaries of Syria. The
Pasha, after some little hesitation, consented to write to his son
enjoining him not to pursue the Turks beyond the frontiers of Syria
and to halt wherever Caillier might come up with him.[483] But before
Marshal Soult's emissary could reach Ibrahim's headquarters that
general had completely defeated the Turks, on June 24, 1839, in a
great battle near Nezib.
Before the news of this disaster could reach Constantinople Mahmud was
dead, and when, shortly afterwards, the intelligence of the complete
defeat of Hafiz Pasha was brought to the Turkish ministers, they kept
the matter strictly secret. Abd-ul-Mejid, the sixteen-year-old son of
the deceased Mahmud, was proclaimed Sultan, and the ambassadors of
the Powers were invited to a conference on July 3. On this occasion
Nourri-Effendi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, announced that the
Porte had no reason to suppose that any engagement had yet taken
place between the two armies. Nevertheless, the Sultan purposed to
send "one of the eminent men of his Court" to offer Mehemet Ali a
full pardon for the past and to assure him of his favour in the
future. Furthermore, he was prepared to confer upon him the hereditary
government of Egypt, provided he would abandon Syria and the other
territories over which he now exercised his dominion. Pending the
result of this negotiation orders had been sent to Hafiz Pasha to
suspend hostilities.[484]
It was not until July 8 that the true facts were generally known
in Constantinople, and, on the evening of that day, Lord Ponsonby
was informed by the French ambassador of a fresh disaster. Admiral
Lalande, who with a small French squadron was lying at the entrance
to the Dardanelles, reported that the _Capudan Pasha_ had sailed away
with, he believed, the intention of delivering up his fleet to Mehemet
Ali. Osman Bey, the second in command of the Turkish squadron, had had
an interview with the French admiral,[485] and had declared that the
Sultan had been murdered by Halil and Hosrew Pasha, both of whom were
in league with the Russians. Under these circumstances the _Capudan
Pasha_ determined to place his ships in safety. On this pretext he
proceeded with all speed to Alexandria, where he delivered up to the
Pasha his whole fleet, consisting of twenty-one sail, of which eight
were of the line.
The indifference with which Admiral Lalande had heard of the
treacherous intentions of the _Capudan Pasha_, and the apathy
which had characterized his proceedings, could not fail to attract
attention. Marshal Boult himself, in discussing the surrender of
the Turkish fleet with Lord Granville, was forced to admit that
Lalande's conduct appeared to him inexplicable.[486] In the course
of the next few months, however, further light was thrown upon the
matter. An Armenian, a certain Avedick, the confidential _dragoman_
of the _Capudan Pasha_, was smuggled out of Alexandria on board a
British ship. This man, when he arrived at Constantinople, agreed to
disclose all he knew to Reshid Pasha. According to his statement,
Admiral Lalande, accompanied by the Prince de Joinville, came on
board the Turkish flagship, and held a consultation with Osman,
the _Reala Bey_,[487] who seems to have been the evil genius of
the _Capudan Pasha_. On learning of his intention to proceed to
Alexandria, the French officers, far from attempting to detain him,
applauded his resolution, bidding him only to be careful to avoid
H.M.S. _Vanguard_, which was in Besika Bay. Ponsonby, in forwarding
the papers connected with this affair, emitted the opinion that,
although many circumstances appeared to confirm the truth of the
_dragoman's_ story, "he could not feel it to be true of an honourable
man like Admiral Lalande."[488] Palmerston either adopted this view,
or more probably, deemed it impossible to base a formal representation
to the French government upon Avedick's unsupported statement. But
after the abdication and death of his father, the Prince de Joinville
saw fit to publish, under an assumed name in the _Revue des Deux
Mondes_;[489] an account of these transactions which confirmed the
_dragoman's_ allegations in every particular. Throughout the French
fleet there was, says His Royal Highness, a bitter hatred of England
and an intense desire to avenge former defeats. The Pasha of Egypt
was regarded as the ally of France in a struggle, which every man
hoped and believed, would take place in the near future. Admiral
Lalande was, therefore, clearly justified in encouraging the _Capudan
Pasha_ to surrender his fleet to Mehemet Ali. Although thirteen years
had elapsed since the events referred to in this article had taken
place, the Prince evidently experienced the greatest satisfaction
in remembering that Captain Walker, and the other British naval
instructors of the Ottoman fleet, had been carried off to Alexandria
on ships which were to be handed over to England's enemy, the Pasha of
Egypt.
These successive disasters, Lord Palmerston maintained, should make no
difference in the policy of the Powers. On the contrary, the battle
of Nezib had made it the more imperative that steps should be taken
to check the progress of the victorious Ibrahim.[490] Metternich
held the same opinion. Russia, however, appeared disposed to adopt
a different view of the situation. In 1838, when Mehemet Ali was
threatening to proclaim his independence, she had refused to acquiesce
in Palmerston's proposal that the Turco-Egyptian question should be
submitted to a conference of the Powers.[491] But in the following
spring, when it was plain that the Sultan was resolved to embark
upon war, she had not appeared disinclined to entertain Metternich's
suggestion that the seat of the negotiations should be established at
Vienna. "Each Cabinet," Metternich proposed, "might send its opinion
to its representatives at Vienna, leaving a certain latitude for
discussion, and from a comparison of the five opinions, one should
be sought in which all might coincide."[492] By this arrangement much
delay would be obviated, and the same advantages could be obtained as
by the summoning of the conference, to which Nicholas had objected.
But at the news that, as a consequence of the death of Mahmud and of
the defeat sustained by the Turkish arms at Nezib, the Porte purposed
to open a direct negotiation with the Pasha, the Cabinet of St.
Petersburg once more evinced a strong disinclination to assent to the
plan of establishing a European concert for the settlement of the
eastern question.[493] The disposition which Nicholas thus manifested
to diverge from the policy advocated by Great Britain and Austria, was
hastily seized by France as an opportunity for isolating Russia. The
Soult Cabinet, accordingly, insisted upon the necessity of counselling
the Porte to avoid any precipitate action, and only to treat with
Mehemet Ali through the intermediary of the Powers.[494] Palmerston,
as may be supposed, lost no time in expressing to the Marshal the
satisfaction which he derived from seeing that he was animated by
sentiments coinciding so completely with his own.[495]
In the meanwhile Akiff-Effendi, the Turkish envoy, sent to treat
with Mehemet Ali, had returned to Constantinople, after a fruitless
mission to Cairo. The Pasha had protested his loyalty to the young
Sultan, but he had none the less received the _Capudan Pasha_ and
his officers with open arms and clearly meant to retain the Ottoman
fleet. Moreover, he had declared emphatically that he must be invested
with the hereditary government of both Syria and Egypt, and had
expressed indignation that his old enemy Hosrew Pasha, the Grand
Vizier, had not been dismissed. He had, however, undertaken that, for
the present, Ibrahim should not advance into Asia Minor.[496] It was
clear to the ambassadors at Constantinople that the Porte, if left
to itself, would consent to all the Pasha's demands. "I consider the
Ottoman Empire to be delivered over to Mehemet Ali," wrote Ponsonby
on July 26.[497] But, on the following day, Baron Stürmer received
despatches from Vienna.[498] Metternich had either foreseen, or had
obtained early information, that the Turkish ministers would make
further concessions, and he, accordingly, informed the _Internuncio_
that the five Powers were determined to resist the pretensions of
Mehemet Ali, and directed him to urge his colleagues to unite with him
in representing to the Porte the necessity of allowing the conditions
of peace to be settled by the Powers. Lord Beauvale[499] and M. de
Sainte-Aulaire had, it is said, at Metternich's request, written in
the same strain to Ponsonby and to Roussin.[500] A meeting of the
representatives of the five Powers was immediately convened and a note
was drawn up, informing the Porte "that agreement among the five Great
Powers, on the question of the East, was secured," and inviting it to
suspend any definitive resolution without their concurrence. M. de
Boutenieff, the Russian minister, appears to have made no difficulty
about affixing his signature to this document, which was to be known
as the _collective note of July_ 27, 1839. When it was presented to
them, the Turkish ministers expressed the utmost gratitude, and
promised to suspend all negotiations and to inform Mehemet Ali that
the affair was now in the hands of the five Powers.[501]
The news that the _collective note_ had been delivered, and that it
had been accepted by the Porte in the desired spirit, afforded the
keenest satisfaction at Vienna and in London. Palmerston, agreeing
with Ponsonby, perceived that it had destroyed the Treaty of
Unkiar-Skelessi, and that the days of Russia's exclusive protectorship
over Turkey were at an end. One of the chief objects of his eastern
policy had thus been attained, and he could devote his whole attention
to the other--the curtailment of the power of Mehemet Ali. In Paris,
on the other hand, the situation created by the _collective note_
awoke serious misgivings. Since the battle of Nezib, French enthusiasm
for Mehemet Ali had increased alarmingly. "Men," wrote Véron,[502]
"defended the claims of the Pasha with the same fervour as, in 1828,
they had espoused the cause of Greek independence." Ministers, under
these circumstances, could only reflect ruefully that, now that France
was a party to the _collective note_, they must join with the Powers
in devising measures for depriving Mehemet Ali of the fruits of his
victories. Nor could they escape from the dilemma by disavowing
Admiral Roussin, seeing that he had only acted in strict accordance
with the policy which Soult himself had advocated, in the secret
hope of isolating Russia. But it was evident that the Cabinet of St.
Petersburg was reconciled to the necessity of allowing the eastern
question to be settled by the Powers, and it was to be apprehended
that both Russia and Austria would adopt the hostile attitude towards
Mehemet Ali which Palmerston had already assumed.
Palmerston had invariably proclaimed the opinion that the whole
of Syria must be restored to the Sultan, before a permanent peace
could be established in the East. The Egyptian desert, he had always
insisted, must be interposed between the Pasha and the territories
under the direct rule of the Porte.[503] Soult had hitherto contrived
to elude a discussion upon this point by declaring that France and
England must, in the first place, concert measures for checkmating the
designs of Russia upon the integrity of Turkey.[504] Palmerston, so
long as he was doubtful about the Tsar's intentions, had been content
to leave in abeyance the question of the future position of Mehemet
Ali. But his tone changed from the moment that he became aware that
Russia had adhered to the _collective note_. The French government on
various pleas had declined to entertain his proposal that the French
and English squadrons should combine for the purpose of obtaining
from Mehemet Ali the surrender of the Turkish fleet.[505] On August
20, however, in a dispatch which Mr. Bulwer, the British _chargé
d'affaires_ was directed to communicate to Marshal Soult, he insisted
that the restitution of the Turkish ships must be regarded as an
indispensable preliminary to any negotiations between the five Powers
and the Pasha. Furthermore, he declared that the decision as to the
measures, which should be taken to obtain this result, "should emanate
from Vienna, which was to be the central point of the negotiations
instead of London or Paris," and that Sir Robert Stopford would be
instructed to comply with whatever directions he might receive from
Lord Beauvale, "either with or without the co-operation of anyone of
the other squadrons."[506]
The French government, however, displayed a marked reluctance
to enter into any general discussion of the Egyptian question.
Notwithstanding that Soult had himself suggested Vienna as the seat of
the negotiation, when he was under the impression that Russia would
object to confer with the Powers on the affairs of the East, he now
deprecated the selection of that capital.[507] The French government,
reported Bulwer, on August 30, will refuse to consent to any measures
of coercion against the Pasha, "until the whole question--that portion
of it relative to the Dardanelles and Russia as well as that relating
to Egypt and Mehemet Ali--is decided."[508] About a fortnight later,
Bulwer was enabled to ascertain Louis Philippe's opinions upon the
situation. It was advisable, the King considered, to discover what
would satisfy the Pasha, and then to insist upon the Porte making the
required concessions. When Bulwer objected that such a course was
hardly consistent with the _collective note of July_ 27, His Majesty
gave him to understand that "in affairs of this kind, all notions of
honour and dignity among States need not be greatly considered. I want
peace," said he, "nothing but peace, and I see no way of preserving it
but by soldering up this affair as soon as possible." The discussion
then turned upon the military means which were available for the
coercion of the Pasha. "Naval measures," Louis Philippe declared,
"would prove insufficient; bayonets were needed, and we (England?)
had no bayonets to employ."[509]
The very high estimate which had been formed in France of the power of
Mehemet Ali was the chief reason of the attitude which her government
now proceeded to adopt. Palmerston, on the other hand, had no share
in the illusions which were very generally entertained as to the
strength of the Pasha. Nor had the battle of Nezib caused him to
alter his views. Yet neither Sir Robert Stopford,[510] the admiral
of the Mediterranean squadron, nor Colonel Campbell, the British
consul-general at Alexandria, agreed with him. Both were convinced
that the expulsion of Ibrahim from Syria would prove a most difficult
undertaking, and Campbell was to owe his recall to his strongly
expressed opinion upon this point.[511] Palmerston appears to have
placed the greatest faith in General Chrzanowski, the Pole, who for
the past three years had been attached to the British embassy at
Constantinople. This officer had made a careful study of the brief
campaign which had terminated at Nezib, and was not prepared to admit
that Ibrahim's victory was due to the superiority of the Egyptian army
over that of the Turks.[512] The result, he considered, would have
been very different had Hafiz Pasha elected to follow the advice of
Moltke, instead of listening to the foolish talk of the _Mullahs_,
who ranked as lieutenant-generals, and were present in large numbers
at his headquarters.[513] On the morning of June 24, when the battle
had only lasted an hour, no less than twelve Egyptian battalions fled
from the field, whilst three others deserted in a body to the Turks.
The panic, which set in shortly afterwards among the troops of Hafiz
Pasha, was caused by a change of position on the part of a brigade
of their own cavalry. It was significant that, although the battle
had consisted only of an artillery duel, and although the Egyptian
infantry had never been really engaged, Ibrahim had not ventured to
pursue. The report of General Jochmus,[514] a Hanoverian who had
served upon the staff of the British legion in Spain, and who was now
in the pay of the Foreign Office, pointed to the same conclusions.
Chrzanowski, moreover, was convinced that Ibrahim would be unable
to keep up his communications with Egypt, were he to be deprived
of the command of the sea. A corps of 15,000 Turkish troops acting
in combination with the disaffected tribes, and supported by the
British fleet, would, he believed, suffice to compel him to evacuate
Syria.[515]
Whilst symptoms of disagreement between the French and English
governments were beginning to appear, Russia made an unexpected
move. Shortly after the arrival at St. Petersburg of a despatch from
Count Medem, in which he reported that Marshal Soult had declared to
him that France would never consent to apply coercion to the Pasha,
Baron Brunnow, the Russian minister at Stuttgart, was sent upon a
special mission to London. "It would not be possible," Nesselrode
informed Clanricarde, "for the Emperor to have chosen any person
more thoroughly acquainted with the foreign affairs and policy of
Russia than the Baron."[516] The proposals, which upon his arrival in
London, on September 15, Brunnow was empowered to make, filled Lord
Palmerston with astonishment. The Imperial Cabinet, he was instructed
to declare, agreed with the English government in thinking that alone
the hereditary pashalic of Egypt should be conferred upon Mehemet Ali,
who must be made to restore to the Sultan Arabia, Syria and Crete. The
Emperor was ready to enter into a treaty to enforce these measures
upon the Pasha, and he, therefore, suggested that such military
operations as might be necessary in Syria or in Egypt should be
undertaken by Great Britain, France and Austria, whilst, in the event
of Ibrahim advancing to the Bosphorus, the defence of Constantinople
should devolve upon Russia. It was, however, to be clearly understood
that any assistance which Russia might afford would be given, not by
reason of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, but in virtue of engagements
about to be contracted between the Powers of Europe and the Sultan.
Furthermore, the Emperor was ready to adopt the view of the British
government and to consider "as a permanent principle and standing
rule," that the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles should be closed to the
war ships of all nations. Lastly, Baron Brunnow was authorized to
promise that, if Russia and England should come to an understanding on
these matters, the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi would not be renewed.[517]
The Tsar's sudden determination to abandon those advantages, which
he was supposed to have acquired by the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi,
has always been ascribed to his desire to separate France and
England. Without doubt, this consideration entered largely into his
calculations. But he was also annoyed with Metternich and was anxious
to thwart his plan of establishing the seat of the negotiations
at Vienna. Moreover, it was now realized that Orloff's treaty was
a document of no practical value. Russia, by reason alone of her
geographical position, could never be prevented from exercising her
influence over the counsels of the Porte. Nor could the stipulation
that the Sultan must close the Dardanelles at the demand of Russia
be of any real utility, seeing that the maritime Powers had refused
to accept this condition, and that Turkey would be unable to carry
out her engagements in the face of their opposition. In a general way
the doctrine that a weak State makes an excellent neighbour might
be sound, but it was plainly inapplicable to Turkey--the custodian
of straits so vitally important to Russia as the Bosphorus and the
Dardanelles. Under these circumstances, there was much to be gained by
waiving the purely illusory advantage to be derived from the Treaty of
Unkiar-Skelessi, and by agreeing that the closure of the straits to
the warships of the Powers should be declared a law of nations.[518]
Brunnow made no secret of the fact that his Imperial master would be
only too pleased, were France to refuse to accede to his proposals.
His desire was soon gratified. When the project was communicated
to it by Lord Palmerston, the French government flatly declined to
entertain it. The Russian overture, wrote Marshal Soult, was clearly
a device for separating France and England, and it was with "feelings
of painful astonishment" that he perceived "a man of such enlightened
judgment as Lord Palmerston entertain it with so much complacency."
Russia, he proceeded, had betrayed her real intentions by insisting
that she alone should undertake the defence of Constantinople. If
her motives were such as she pretended, why this repugnance to the
idea of "the flags of the allied Courts floating side by side with
her own" in the Bosphorus? "Never," he concluded, "with our consent
shall a foreign squadron of war appear before Constantinople, unless
ours appears there also."[519] Whilst he thus declined absolutely to
consider Baron Brunnow's propositions, Marshal Soult put forward a
plan for the settlement of the questions in dispute between the Porte
and Mehemet Ali. But the solution of the difficulty, suggested by the
French government, when it came to be examined, was found to amount to
little more than an arrangement whereby the Pasha was to obtain the
hereditary tenure of Arabia, Syria and Egypt, in return for which he
was to restore to the Sultan the district of Adana.[520]
In Palmerston's opinion the entry of a Russian fleet into the
Bosphorus, or of a Russian army into Asia Minor, at the demand of the
Powers, was a very different proceeding to an intervention in virtue
of a separate engagement between the Porte and the Cabinet of St.
Petersburg. Had the decision rested with him alone he would gladly
have accepted the Russian proposal. But both it and Marshal Soult's
despatch had to be considered by the Cabinet, some of the members of
which held opinions very opposed to his own. Lord Holland and several
of his colleagues--"our Whig friends"[521] as Lord Palmerston called
them--were either completely indifferent to the Imperial aspect of the
question, or regarded it as a minor consideration. In their eyes the
point at issue was simply whether England should break with Liberal
France, in order to enter into a compact with autocratic Russia. The
French party in the Cabinet gained the upper hand and Palmerston
had to agree to certain concessions. He had already consented, in
deference to the wishes of France and Austria, to allow his demand
for the restoration by Mehemet Ali of the Turkish fleet to be merged
in the larger question of the territorial settlement, and he was now
obliged to inform Sébastiani that the English government would be
prepared to see, in addition to that of Egypt, the hereditary tenure
of the province of Acre, exclusive of the fortress, conferred upon
the Pasha. At the same time Baron Brunnow was to be told that Her
Majesty's government was ready to adopt the whole arrangement which
he had proposed, with the exception of one single point--should it be
necessary for a Russian force to enter the Bosphorus, a British force
must enter the Dardanelles.[522]
Brunnow had no instructions to discuss the question raised by the
English Cabinet, and he was, in consequence, obliged to bring his
mission to an unsuccessful conclusion. But he and Palmerston parted
from each other upon most excellent terms and with little doubt that
their negotiations were suspended, rather than finally broken off.
The French government heard of the Baron's departure with intense
satisfaction, and, a few days later, on October 15, Sébastiani
communicated to Lord Palmerston a despatch, in which Marshal Soult
emphatically declared that the proposal to cede to Mehemet Ali the
Pashalic of Acre was inadmissible. So trifling a concession, he
averred, would merely drive the Pasha to seek to obtain by the sword
the frontiers to which he considered himself entitled. Palmerston
listened to the words of the ambassador in silence, and when he had
concluded his statement, informed him that the offer regarding Acre
must now be considered as definitely withdrawn.[523]
It was significant of the divergent courses upon which the two
governments were embarked that, almost at the same time, Admiral
Roussin was recalled from Constantinople, and Colonel Campbell from
Alexandria--the Frenchman because of his hostility to,[524] and
the Englishman because of his sympathy with, Mehemet Ali.[525] For
several weeks after Brunnow's departure from London, the situation
remained unchanged. Palmerston was content to wait in the confident
expectation that Nicholas would not refuse to accede to the British
proposal. The Soult Cabinet, convinced that no agreement between
England and Russia on the question of the Dardanelles was to be
apprehended, was equally satisfied to remain inactive. "In the French
councils," reported Bulwer, "there is a mixture of positiveness and of
vagueness--positiveness as to what will not be done, vagueness as to
what may be done."[526]
Early in December Sébastiani transmitted to his government the
information, which he had received from Palmerston, that the Emperor
had agreed to the English conditions, and that Brunnow would shortly
return to London to negotiate a convention. This news came as an
unpleasant surprise to the French Cabinet. Under the circumstances,
however, Soult could only express satisfaction at this most unexpected
concession, which, he admitted, completely altered the character of
the Russian proposals. But, at the same time, he cast the gravest
doubts upon the good faith of the Imperial Cabinet, and reiterated his
conviction that its real object was to effect a breach in French and
English relations.[527] In due course Brunnow arrived in London, and
in a note written at Holland House, on January 5, 1840, Palmerston
made Sébastiani acquainted with the result of his first deliberations
with the Russian envoy. "Brunnow," he informed him, "is empowered to
negotiate with the object of bringing about a permanent and definite
solution of the Turkish and Egyptian question, in order to ensure the
independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Baron Neumann has
arrived from Vienna and has expressed to us that Austria is entirely
with us and Russia in this important affair. I think I can say for
certain that Prussia will look at matters in the same light. It only
remains for us, therefore, to secure a European accord on a question
which is incontestably the most important that we have had to deal
with these last years. We sincerely hope that the co-operation of
France will not be refused. . . ."[528]
Louis Philippe and his ministers were convinced, however, that, when
the Powers came to consider the measures which would be required
for expelling the Pasha from the territories which he occupied,
they would soon discover the magnitude of the task upon which they
purposed to embark. Harsh conditions, they were confident, would never
be imposed upon him, once it was realized that their enforcement
would entail the invasion of Syria by a large Russian army. They
were, in consequence, not apprehensive, although fully informed that
negotiations were in progress, that any definite arrangement would
be concluded without their participation. Nevertheless, on January
27, 1840, Sébastiani[529] reported that Palmerston had replied in the
affirmative to Neumann's official inquiry as to whether, in the event
of the four Powers arriving at an agreement, and France withholding
her consent, the clauses of the treaty would be acted upon in spite of
her abstention. But, on the following day, the ambassador informed his
government that the English Cabinet had decided that the Porte must
be a party to any convention which might be concluded, and that the
negotiations would, in consequence, be suspended until the arrival of
the Turkish plenipotentiary. This was the last news of any importance
transmitted by Sébastiani. Soult and his colleagues, in order to
propitiate the _Doctrinaires_, whose support was essential to their
parliamentary existence, had insisted upon his recall and upon the
appointment of M. Guizot to the embassy in London.[530]
Although he had studied English constitutional history so deeply,
Guizot had never visited England, and, moreover, he had not before
been engaged upon a diplomatic mission. He had, however, formed a
friendship with Princess Lieven, who was well acquainted with most of
the chief statesmen and members of the _corps diplomatique_ of the
time, and who, besides, had been a leader of English society. After
her husband's recall from London,[531] the Princess quickly tired of
St. Petersburg, and, upon the plea of ill-health, took up her abode in
Paris. At Talleyrand's death in 1838, she moved into an apartment in
his famous house in the Rue Saint-Florentin, where her _salon_ soon
acquired a European celebrity. Her friendship with Guizot, which was
to endure to the day of her death, is said to have begun, in 1837, at
Chatenay, Madame de Boigne's house, near Paris. The Princess was at
the time fifty-three years of age, whilst the grave _Doctrinaire_ was
three years her junior.[532]
Guizot arrived in London on February 28, and, on the following day
in Paris, the Soult Cabinet was defeated and resigned. The King
was, in consequence, reluctantly compelled to commission M. Thiers
to form a government. Thiers, who himself assumed the direction of
Foreign Affairs, was probably honestly desirous of maintaining a
good understanding with England. But he was a convinced believer
in the military strength of Mehemet Ali, and was determined to
uphold his claim to the hereditary tenure of Syria. In his opinion,
the _collective note of July_ 27, 1839, was the cause of all the
difficulty; it was "the rut in which the coach had stuck."[533] But,
although he was secretly resolved to escape from the obligations
which his predecessors had contracted, he was not prepared openly to
repudiate them. On the contrary, he admitted readily that he was bound
to refrain from attempting to arrange matters between the Porte and
Mehemet Ali, except in co-operation with the other signatory Powers.
Should, however, the Sultan spontaneously agree to terms acceptable to
the Pasha, the Powers could hardly interfere to prevent a settlement
which the Porte itself pronounced satisfactory.[534] If such a result
could be brought about, the _collective note_ would become a dead
letter, and France would regain her full liberty of action. Moreover,
Mehemet Ali would attain the object of his ambition in a large measure
owing to the goodwill of the French government.
Soult had instructed Guizot to declare that France was sincerely
anxious to establish a permanent and lasting peace in the East. But
to attain the desired result, she was convinced that Mehemet Ali
must, at least, be given the hereditary tenure of Syria and Egypt. He
was to impress upon Palmerston that the real object of the "trifling
concessions," which Brunnow had been empowered to make, was to obtain
the signature of England to some agreement to which France would
refuse to adhere.[535] Thiers, in his first despatch, expressed his
approval of these instructions, and of the language which M. Guizot
had employed in carrying them out. He directed him to persevere with
his arguments and constantly to impress upon the British government
that France had no "_parti pris_," no "_système irrévocable_," nor
was she bound by either promises or engagements to the Pasha. Her
sole desire was to contribute to the establishment of peace upon a
firm and durable foundation. The coercion of Mehemet Ali would demand
a vast expenditure of military strength, and Lord Palmerston would,
doubtless, agree that the armed intervention of Russia would greatly
menace the independent existence of the Ottoman Empire.[536] Thiers,
whose judgment on this, as on many other occasions, was greatly
influenced by his hopes, was persuaded that the decision to call in a
Turkish plenipotentiary, and the delay which it entailed, signified
that the plans of Palmerston and Brunnow had encountered some serious
obstacle. But the longer the negotiations could be drawn out, the
better he would be pleased. Whilst matters were drifting to a deadlock
in London, his agents, he trusted, would be enabled quietly to effect
some definite arrangement at Constantinople or at Cairo.[537]
Guizot in his _Mémoires_ has described at length his proceedings in
London. As he himself admits, he entertained an exaggerated belief
in the strength of Mehemet Ali.[538] But, on the other hand, he had
not Thiers' serene confidence that England would never conclude an
agreement for the settlement of the Turco-Egyptian question without
the co-operation of France. On March 12, when relating a conversation
he had had with Lord Palmerston in one of the drawing-rooms at
Stafford House, he expressed the opinion "that the British government
regarded the present moment as a favourable opportunity for settling
affairs in the East, and that a sudden resolve might be taken to
act without us." Again, a few days later, he sent M. Thiers a
warning couched in more emphatic language. Full powers to conclude
a convention, Lord Palmerston informed him, had been transmitted to
Nourri-Effendi, the Turkish ambassador in Paris, who would shortly
arrive in London. "It is possible, therefore, that we may be on the
eve of important decisions. . . . The British government has two
interests at stake in the eastern question--the wish to keep Russia
from Constantinople and the fear of French influence in Egypt. . . .
The present moment is looked upon as favourable for the attainment
of these objects. By a singular combination of circumstances, Russia
is both prepared to abandon her pretensions to exercise an exclusive
protectorship over the Ottoman Empire, and to assist England to weaken
the Pasha of Egypt. . . . Great Britain, consequently, is far from
regarding the present situation as embarrassing, but on the contrary
deems it a most fortunate development which she must make use of to
the best advantage. . . . She is aware, however, that in prosecuting
this policy she may impair her good understanding with France. To
retain our friendship she will make some concessions, but I am
disposed to think that she has no intention of allowing the present
opportunity of attaining her ends in the East to escape."[539]
Matters, nevertheless, proceeded very slowly. Nor was the situation
altered by the arrival, early in April, of Nourri-Effendi. The Porte
in sending him to London only desired to make manifest its intention
of conferring with its allies. When the deliberations should begin in
earnest, it purposed to be represented by Chekib-Effendi, who had been
appointed Ottoman ambassador at the Court of St. James', and another
month must elapse before he could reach England. Guizot, however,
reported that he perceived a strong tendency upon the part of both
Austria and Prussia to draw closer to France. Bülow had asked him in
confidence whether the concession to Mehemet Ali of the governorship
of Syria for his life would meet with the approval of his government.
Neumann had also talked to him in the same strain. But Thiers was
little disposed to accept any compromise. These overtures, in his
opinion, were symptoms that the Powers were beginning to realize that
they were in a false position. Before long, he was certain, they
would adopt the French view of the question in its entirety. Until
some agreement should be arrived at with England, he recommended
that Guizot should abstain, as far as possible, from any discussions
with the ministers of the Northern Courts.[540] Nor was Palmerston's
suggestion admissible that the Turco-Egyptian difficulty should be
submitted to a conference of the Powers. Under existing conditions,
"the differences between France and her allies were too marked to
permit of any general deliberation conducing to a satisfactory
result."
In the month of March, Palmerston's brother, Sir William Temple, the
British minister at Naples, had been instructed to insist upon the
immediate execution of the King's promise to abolish the sulphur
monopoly and to ask for an indemnity on behalf of the English
merchants who had suffered by its imposition. Upon King Ferdinand's
refusal to comply with this demand, Admiral Sir Robert Stopford was
directed to blockade the coast and to seize and send to Malta such
Neapolitan merchant vessels as he could capture. Thiers, having
ascertained that his offer would be acceptable to both parties,
proposed to mediate in the dispute. He was glad of the opportunity,
which was thus afforded him, of displaying both that France and
England were still upon excellent terms and of extending French
influence in Italy. Thiers' mediation was successful. The Neapolitan
Court conceded the British demands, and, early in July in consequence,
the blockading squadron was free to carry out Palmerston's policy in
another direction. Soon after it had accepted his offer to settle
the sulphur dispute, Thiers made a second proposal to the English
government. In this instance he was probably desirous simply of
acquiring popularity at home.[541] On May 10, Guizot formally asked
that the remains of Napoleon might be handed over to a deputation of
officers and conveyed back to France, on board a French warship, for
interment in Paris. Palmerston made no difficulty about immediately
complying with this request.
The extraordinary confidence of both Louis Philippe and of M. Thiers
that, under no circumstances, would Great Britain separate herself
from France in the eastern question[542] reposed upon their joint
conviction that Palmerston's colleagues in the government would never
allow him to disturb the harmony of French and English relations. Mr.
Ellice,[543] the brother-in-law of Lord Grey, and a former Cabinet
minister, was largely responsible for encouraging this erroneous
belief, which was to bring the two countries to the verge of war.
Since about the year 1835, "Bear Ellice," as he was generally known,
by reason of his connection with the Canadian fur trade, had been much
in Paris. Although he appears to have disliked the responsibilities
of office, he was keenly interested in public affairs and was
an inveterate political gossip. Grey, who was well aware of his
brother-in-law's vanity and peculiarities, nicknamed him _le grand
faiseur_. In Paris he frequented Princess Lieven's _salon_, where
he was consulted and listened to with a deference which he enjoyed
exceedingly.[544] Not only was he very intimate with M. Thiers, but,
according to Creevey,[545] "Louis Philippe could scarcely bear to
have him out of his sight." "I hear," wrote Palmerston at a most
critical time, "that Thiers says he has three agents upon whom he can
rely--Guizot, Flahaut[546] and Ellice."[547]
Guizot had quickly discovered that the Cabinet was not united upon the
eastern question. At Holland House, where he was a constant guest,
neither his host nor hostess concealed from him their antagonism
to Palmerston. Clarendon, notwithstanding the insight into Louis
Philippe's diplomacy which he had acquired at Madrid, was a declared
opponent of any solution of the Turco-Egyptian difficulty which might
endanger the French alliance. Charles Greville, with whom Guizot
appears to have become very friendly, had no scruples about informing
him of any dissensions in ministerial circles. The vindictive clerk
of the council detested Palmerston and distrusted his policy. Dedel,
the Dutch minister, in talking over these events a year or two later
with the Duchesse de Dino,[548] expressed the opinion that Guizot's
great mistake lay in imagining that intrigue played as large a part
in public affairs in London as in Paris. Palmerston, he told her, had
proofs of his proceedings, which would have justified him in demanding
his recall. This last statement is probably somewhat exaggerated.
Guizot, however, whatever he may have done, appears to have judged the
situation with great discernment. "Not to mention Lords Holland and
Clarendon," he wrote to Thiers on June 1, "Melbourne and Lansdowne
would be very loath to see the French alliance dissolved. . . Yet
Palmerston, I believe, is as firm as ever, and I am far from certain
whether those of his colleagues who disagree with him would stand up
to him very firmly, when it comes to the point."[549]
The overtures which Bülow and Neumann had made to Guizot were followed
by a definite proposal from Austria. Metternich was alarmed. He
believed that Palmerston had formed a totally erroneous opinion of
the military situation. He was certain that naval assistance alone
would not enable the Turks to regain possession of Syria. He had no
intention of allowing Austrian troops to be employed in the East, and
Russia had recently sustained reverses in the Caucasus which might
make it difficult for her to send an imposing force into Asia Minor.
Great Britain was engaged upon warlike operations in Afghanistan, and
was, besides, threatened with trouble in China and Canada. It would
be, therefore, an arduous undertaking to attempt to coerce the Pasha
without the co-operation of France. To obtain her assistance, he
suggested that Syria should be divided into two portions. The southern
half, including the fortress of Acre, might, he proposed, be given
to Mehemet Ali. But, should the French government be not satisfied
with this concession, Austria would agree to enforce these conditions
upon the Pasha in combination with England and Russia and without the
participation of France.[550]
Palmerston reluctantly decided to agree to the Austrian proposal and,
on May 8, officially informed Guizot that the British government
adhered to it. But this concession only served to strengthen Thiers'
belief that the Powers would before long adopt his views completely.
Chekib-Effendi had not yet arrived, and there was, therefore, no
necessity for returning an immediate answer. Even when the Turkish
plenipotentiary reached London, Palmerston appeared to be in no hurry
to resume the negotiations. On the other hand, Guizot was inclined
to think that the representatives of the other Powers were growing
restless. Even Brunnow seemed disposed to adopt a more conciliatory
attitude, and there appeared to be a growing feeling that no
settlement could be concluded without the assent of France. Thiers'
answer to the Austrian plan of partitioning Syria could not, however,
be indefinitely postponed, and, on June 16, he directed Guizot to tell
Lord Palmerston that he could not entertain it. "We could not," he
wrote, "suggest it to Mehemet Ali; he would refuse it, and we could
not refute his arguments which we should ourselves consider to be
sound and well founded." He was greatly struck by the account which
Guizot had sent him of Brunnow's attitude, "which could only be
ascribed to disasters in Circassia. It was clear that Russia was not
ready to embark upon serious operations elsewhere."[551]
When Thiers thus declined to consider the Austrian proposal,
he believed that his hopes of bringing about secretly a direct
arrangement between the Sultan and the Pasha were about to be
realized. Mehemet Ali had been unable wholly to conceal his
disappointment on learning of the _collective note of July_ 27, 1839.
When it was officially communicated to him by the consuls of the
Powers, he declared firmly that there could be no peace until the
hereditary tenure of Syria should be conferred upon him and until
his enemy Hosrew Pasha, the Grand Vizier, should be dismissed from
office.[552] Since then, he had sometimes angrily asserted that
he would wait no longer and that he should order Ibrahim to march
upon Constantinople, whilst, on other occasions, he had shown a
disposition to adopt a more conciliatory attitude. Throughout the
winter and the spring he pressed on his military preparations. Some
of these, however, proved very unsuccessful--an attempt to form a
national guard in Egypt itself breaking down completely.[553] At the
same time he appears to have experienced great difficulty in keeping
Ibrahim's army in Syria supplied with money, food, and clothing,[554]
whilst, to add to his embarrassments, in the spring, the Druses and
other tribes began to display renewed symptoms of disaffection.[555]
Palmerston, now that he no longer feared the separate intervention
of Russia, would probably have been well pleased could the Pasha have
been provoked into some act of aggression against the Sultan. But he
was too sagacious to be moved from his attitude of prudent inaction
by the threatening language of Campbell's successor, Colonel Hodges,
which, however, caused some alarm at Vienna and at St. Petersburg,
where neither Metternich nor Nesselrode entertained Palmerston's
contemptuous disbelief in the military power of Mehemet Ali.[556]
M. Thiers seems to have been wilfully blind to the difficulties of
the Pasha's position, and to have persuaded himself that it was from
respect to the wishes of the French government that Ibrahim abstained
from advancing into Asia Minor.
M. Cochelet, the French consul-general, was probably instructed[557]
to urge Mehemet Ali to refrain from hostilities, to limit his demands
to the hereditary tenure of Syria and Egypt and, generally, to depend
upon the good offices of France for the attainment of his wishes. M.
Thiers, however, was well aware that his plan of bringing about a
direct arrangement between the Sultan and the Pasha would encounter
far more serious difficulties at Constantinople than at Cairo.
Ever since the arrival of M. de Pontois, the successor of Admiral
Roussin, Ponsonby had constantly reported that the French minister was
endeavouring to persuade the Porte to conclude a peace with Mehemet
Ali, without reference to the Powers.[558] But the advice of M. de
Pontois had hitherto been disregarded. Hosrew, Reshid, and Halil
Pasha, the most influential of the Turkish ministers, were very
hostile to Mehemet Ali and firm supporters of the British policy.
Soon after his accession to office, Thiers appears to have decided to
supplement the efforts of the recognized representative of the French
government by those of an unofficial agent. At the beginning of May,
a correspondence was opened between M. Jacques Coste[559] and Fethi
Ahmed Pasha, the Minister of Commerce and brother-in-law to the young
Sultan. Under ordinary circumstances there would be nothing to excite
attention in the fact that a prominent French journalist should write
on political matters to a Turkish statesman, whom he had known as
Ottoman ambassador in Paris. But the close intimacy which notoriously
existed between M. Coste and M. Thiers gives importance to this
particular correspondence. Certainly both Palmerston and Ponsonby and,
indeed, Ahmed Pasha himself, who delivered the original letters into
the hands of the British ambassador, appear to have been satisfied
that the sentiments and advice contained in them emanated from M.
Thiers.[560]
The primary object which M. Coste had in view was to persuade Fethi
Ahmed Pasha that it was essential for the Porte promptly to conclude
a peace with Mehemet Ali. All the powers, he contended, were pursuing
selfish ends with the sole exception of France, and she was both
resolved not to intervene herself and not to allow any other Power
to interfere actively in the Turco-Egyptian dispute. Her hands were
free and she was strong enough to enforce her will upon Europe. The
perfidy of England's policy was manifest. As in 1839, Great Britain
now proposed to incite the Porte to make war upon the Pasha. If she
could achieve this object she would, of a surety, encourage Russia to
intervene in order to crush the Egyptians, whilst at the same time she
would insist at Vienna and in Paris upon the necessity of preventing
the occupation of Constantinople by the armies of the Tsar. Should she
be enabled to carry out her Machiavellian plan of bringing about a
general war she purposed, in the confusion, quietly to lay hands upon
Egypt, which she had long coveted for herself. He was sorry to hear
that Chekib-Effendi, when passing through Paris, had declared to M.
Thiers that it would be better that England should take Egypt, than
that it should continue in the possession of a rebellious vassal of
the Sultan. Such reasoning was deplorably unsound. "That which England
takes she keeps," whereas, in the future, it should be an easy task
for the Sultan to compel the descendants of Mehemet Ali to give back
the territories which must now be surrendered temporarily. Writing on
June 8, M. Coste suggested, as a compromise, that Syria might be given
to Ibrahim and Adana to another son of the Pasha. They would certainly
quarrel among themselves, and the Porte might avail itself of their
dissensions for expelling them altogether. Let the Sultan be assured
of the wisdom of the old saying, "_diviser pour regner_."[561] This
curious correspondence continued intermittently until the fall of M.
Thiers in September. But after the end of June, Coste's communications
became less frequent and were less cordially expressed. On July 8
he explained that the silence with which his well-meant advice had
been received "had placed him in an awkward position with M. Thiers,"
whilst to Prince Vogoride, a son of the Prince of Samos, another of
his correspondents, he conveyed his surprise and annoyance that his
letters, written "_en quelque sorte sous la dictée d'un tres haut
personnage_" should have elicited no response.[562]
Whilst the French agents at Constantinople were thus striving to
render nugatory the provisions of the _collective note_, another
attempt to achieve the desired result was being made in a different
quarter. The Sultana Mother was believed to have been concerned in
the secret negotiation conducted by Sarim-Effendi,[563] under the
patronage of Admiral Roussin and M. Mimaut, during M. Thiers' first
administration, and her support was now obtained to the plan of a
direct arrangement between the Sultan and the Pasha. The sudden
dismissal, on May 19, of Hosrew, the Grand-Vizier, was the result
of her intrigues.[564] The first news of this event was conveyed to
Mehemet Ali by M. Cochelet. The Pasha at once declared that the fall
of his old enemy had removed the last obstacle to a satisfactory
conclusion of his quarrel with the Sultan. He should, he announced,
forthwith send back the Turkish fleet, and Sami Bey, his confidential
secretary, should proceed without delay to Constantinople to make the
necessary arrangements.[565] Nevertheless, some three weeks elapsed
before the Pasha's emissary started upon his journey, and it was
only on June 13, on the eve of his departure, that the object of
his mission was disclosed to Colonel Hodges and the other agents of
the Powers.[566] But Cochelet, on May 26, duly reported this new
development to his government in a despatch, a copy of which M. Thiers
transmitted to M. Guizot with instructions that its contents must, for
the present, be kept strictly secret. In spite of these precautions,
however, Cochelet's confidential communication appears to have been
divulged to Apponyi, the Austrian ambassador in Paris, who, on June
16, was enabled to inform Neumann in London of the negotiation which
had been initiated between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan.[567] Meanwhile,
at Constantinople, Lord Ponsonby had discovered that a potent
influence was at work to induce the young Sultan to surrender Syria
in exchange for his fleet. But, encouraged by the British ambassador,
both Reshid and Fethi Ahmed Pasha declared that they should resign,
were any compact of that kind to be concluded, and their firm attitude
defeated the insidious schemes of the Sultana Mother, and rendered
abortive the mission of Sami Bey.[568]
M. Thiers, however, was confident that the news of Hosrew's dismissal
would be followed quickly by the intelligence that the Sultan and
the Pasha had settled their differences amicably. This unexpected
development would, he was convinced, place a totally new complexion
upon the Turco-Egyptian question. But in point of fact, Palmerston
had been informed by Neumann of the negotiation which was to be
opened between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan. Thus, when the news
reached London of the mission of Sami Bey to Constantinople, he was
fully prepared for it. Far from being suddenly confronted by the
embarrassing prospect that the settlement of the affair was about to
pass out of his control, he was, on the contrary, enabled to adduce
the proceedings of the French agents at Constantinople and at Cairo,
as a reason for promptly concluding a treaty for the protection of
the young Sultan from the machinations of his enemies.
Thiers' illusions were by no means shared by Guizot. The ambassador
divined correctly that the crisis of the affair was approaching. Since
the rejection of the Austrian proposals Palmerston, he reported, had
pointedly avoided all discussion of the eastern question with him.
But from the moment that the news arrived that a direct negotiation
was in progress between Cairo and Constantinople he had been very
busy. This last development, moreover, had made a great impression
upon the representatives of the Powers, and those of them, who had
lately been inclined to adopt the French view of the question, were
now, it was evident, less favourably disposed. Cabinet councils had
been held, dissensions had arisen, and Palmerston, he believed, had
threatened to resign. It was probable, he considered, that Great
Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia would agree to some form of
joint action in the East, and that France would be formally asked
whether or not she would participate in whatever measures they might
resolve to adopt.[569] This idea that no treaty would be actually
concluded until France should have been invited to adhere to it, was
the one point upon which M. Guizot may be held to have misled M.
Thiers. Princess Lieven, who was staying at Stafford House, is said
to have encouraged his delusion. She appears to have tried to extract
from Bülow, the Prussian minister, some information about the progress
of the negotiations. Her enquiries, however, only elicited from him
the fact that he was still without the new letters of credence which
the recent death of Frederick William III. had rendered necessary.
From this circumstance Guizot seems to have inferred that there was
no immediate danger of the conclusion of a treaty between the four
Powers, inasmuch as Bülow had not yet been officially accredited to
the Court of St. James'.[570]
As Guizot had correctly surmised, Palmerston experienced the
greatest difficulty in inducing his colleagues to adopt his views.
Both Holland and Clarendon strongly deprecated the conclusion of
any treaty to which France would not be a party, and Melbourne and
Lansdowne seemed disposed to agree with them. Palmerston, thereupon,
placed his resignation in the hands of the Prime Minister.[571]
In a long letter, on July 5, in which he recapitulated the whole
history of the Turco-Egyptian question, he explained the reasons
which made it impossible for him to remain at his post. Were Great
Britain to elude the engagements which she had contracted towards
the Sultan, because France was not prepared to co-operate with the
other signatory Powers, Russia would resume once more "her separate
and isolated position" towards Turkey. England, he contended, would
thus by her own deliberate act, re-establish that protectorship of
Russia over Turkey, which had for so long been a cause of apprehension
to other Powers. "The ultimate results of such a decision would be
the practical division of the Ottoman Empire into two separate and
independent States, whereof one would be a dependency of France and
the other a satellite of Russia." Never would he consent to be an
instrument for the execution of a policy which, he believed, must
entail disastrous consequences upon his country. Unless, therefore,
his colleagues were prepared to pursue the course which he advocated
he must retire, even though his resignation should lead to a break up
of the government.[572]
The most recent intelligence from the East had, moreover, supplied
Palmerston with an argument which had a great effect in overcoming the
resistance of his opponents in the Cabinet. A formidable insurrection
was reported to have broken out in Syria, where the tribes were in
open rebellion against Mehemet Ali. He could, therefore, contend that
the treaty, which he urged his colleagues to conclude with Russia,
Austria and Prussia, was a Liberal measure, inasmuch as it meant
the delivery of an oppressed people from a tyrannical ruler. This
last consideration, combined with the desire to avoid the crisis
which must result from the resignation of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, induced the dissenting members of the Cabinet reluctantly
to assent to Palmerston's proposals.[573] Accordingly, on July 15,
"a convention for the pacification of the Levant" was signed by the
plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, on
the one side, and that of the Sublime Porte on the other. In view of
the expediency of speedily affording military succour to the Syrians,
it appears to have been agreed that Bülow should be considered as
empowered to act on behalf of his Court.
By the convention which was thus concluded the four Powers
undertook actively to assist the Sultan to reduce the Pasha to
submission--Austria and Great Britain engaging to intercept all
communication by sea between Egypt and Syria. To this instrument was
annexed a _Separate Act_ in which were laid down the terms which the
Porte purposed to offer to Mehemet Ali. The hereditary tenure of
Egypt was to be conferred upon him together with the governorship
for life of the greater part of the pashalic of Acre. But, if he
should not accede to these conditions within a space of ten days,
the offer of Acre would be withdrawn. A further delay of ten days
would, however, be accorded him in which to consider the second
proposal which would be limited to the hereditary pashalic of Egypt.
If, after the specified term had elapsed, he should still refuse to
accept the proffered conditions, the Sultan would be free to bring
the negotiations to a conclusion and "to follow such ulterior course
as his own interests and the counsels of his allies might suggest
to him." In a third document, known as _The Reserved Protocol_, it
was laid down that, inasmuch as "the state of affairs in Syria, the
interests of humanity and grave considerations of European policy"
made it desirable that active operations should begin with as little
delay as possible, the naval measures to which Austria and Great
Britain were pledged would be initiated at once, without waiting for
the ratification of the convention.[574]
The decision of the four Powers to conclude this treaty had not been
communicated to M. Guizot. French historians have adduced the secrecy
which was observed as a proof of Palmerston's malevolent intentions
towards France. But no other course could have been pursued with
safety. It was certain that France would not take part in coercing the
Pasha,[575] and it was no less certain that she would warn him of the
measures which the allies were proposing to adopt against him.[576]
Inasmuch, therefore, as it was advisable that the naval commander in
the Mediterranean should receive his orders before Mehemet Ali could
be aware of the nature of the pressure which was to be brought to bear
upon him, it was impossible to acquaint M. Guizot with the resolution
of the Powers. Nor was the expediency of enabling the British fleet
to forestall any hostile move on the part of the Pasha the only
reason which made secrecy desirable. Although Palmerston was not
apprehensive that the French government would proceed to extremities,
it was possible that M. Thiers might decide actively to support the
Pasha. In that case war could not be avoided and it was very necessary
that Sir Robert Stopford should receive the earliest information of
the intentions of his government. No communication, accordingly, was
made to the French ambassador until the couriers from London had
obtained a start of forty-eight hours. But, on July 17, Palmerston
invited M. Guizot to call at the Foreign Office, where he read out
to him a _memorandum_ acquainting him with the convention which had
been concluded. The numerous efforts which had been made to induce
France to co-operate with the other Powers were insisted upon, and
great regret was expressed that she had not seen fit to comply with
the several proposals which had been communicated to her. Palmerston
then proceeded to explain the general nature of the measures of
coercion which it was intended to apply to Mehemet Ali, without,
however, supplying the ambassador with a copy of the treaty. Guizot,
after disputing the accuracy of certain statements contained in the
_memorandum_, took his departure. The situation was so grave that he
must receive instructions from his government before he could discuss
it.[577]
CHAPTER VIII
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
Henry Bulwer,[578] who during the absence of Lord Granville from
Paris was in charge of the embassy, was agreeably surprised at the
calmness with which M. Thiers received the news of the conclusion
of the treaty. At their first interview, after the arrival of
Guizot's despatch, he contented himself with expressing a pained
astonishment that England should have treated her ally with so little
consideration. The affair would, he feared, arouse the greatest
indignation throughout the country and, for the present, he must
beg him to observe the strictest secrecy about it.[579] A few days
later, in the course of a long and confidential conversation with
Louis Philippe, Bulwer was enabled to judge of the King's opinion of
the situation. Adopting the contention, which Thiers was instructing
Guizot to urge in his conferences with Palmerston, that no definite
proposals for settling the eastern question had ever been made to the
French government, Louis Philippe complained of the secret manner
in which the treaty had been negotiated. "Ah, Mr. Bulwer," said he,
"I know you wished to read me a lesson, I know it, but it may be a
perilous one for all parties." Assuming a more confidential tone, the
King then proceeded to explain the difficulties by which he might
be confronted. It would not be easy, he feared or affected to fear,
to maintain peace. Thiers, he had reason to believe, would wish him
to go to war, and in that case he might be placed in a very delicate
position. "How do you think I should stand," he asked plaintively,
"were Thiers at the head of a large parliamentary party to announce
that he had resigned, sooner than submit to the dishonour of France?"
It was to be hoped that the coercion which the four Powers proposed
to apply to Mehemet Ali would either at once prove effectual, or fail
completely and be promptly abandoned. The sooner the affair could
be settled the better. For his part, only this was a circumstance
which Bulwer must never disclose to M. Thiers, he had taken steps to
induce the Pasha to refrain from ordering Ibrahim to pass the Taurus
mountains.[580] On August 3, before leaving Paris for the Château
d'Eu, Louis Philippe discussed the situation in the same spirit with
Lord Granville.[581]
The conclusion of the Treaty of July 15 was announced in London on
the 25th, and two days later, the news was published in the Paris
papers. The expectation of the King and of M. Thiers that it would
arouse a dangerous excitement was fully realized. The _bourse_ was
panic-stricken and securities fell heavily. The Chambers were not
sitting, but the press with one accord gave voice to the popular
indignation. The decision of the four Powers to adopt, without
consultation with France, hostile measures against her _protégé_
Mehemet Ali, was denounced as a national insult which must be wiped
out in blood. The tone of the _Constitutionel_, which was notoriously
inspired by the President of the Council, was nearly as bellicose
as that of the _National_, the organ of the republican and military
party. M. Thiers, if he did not actually encourage, certainly did
nothing to allay, the excitement, which was increased, on August 1, by
the publication of a Royal ordinance decreeing substantial additions
to both the army and the navy.
In London the affair only began to attract much public interest, when
the extent of the resentment which it had aroused in Paris became
known. The High Tories, who had always disliked the French alliance,
were delighted to think that that combination was at an end. The more
moderate members of the party, however, who followed the leadership
of Wellington, Peel and Aberdeen, whilst agreeing as to the necessity
of driving Mehemet Ali from Syria, regretted that means had not been
found of inducing France to adhere to the treaty. _The Times_,[582]
which was very antagonistic to Palmerston, supplied its readers, on
August 3, with an article by Henry Reeve in which he expressed a
sincere hope that relations with France "would not be imperilled for
the sake of a desperado like Mehemet Ali," and, at the same time,
suggested that throughout the negotiations the Foreign Office had not
improbably been the dupe of Russia. The Radicals adopted this view,
and furthermore, deprecated any intervention in Turkish affairs.
It was only in their quarter of the House that the policy of the
government encountered any real hostility. But even their attack was
not pressed with much spirit, and Palmerston, on August 6, a few days
before the prorogation of Parliament, had no difficulty in repelling
Joseph Hume's allegation that the insurrection in the Lebanon had been
fomented by British agents.[583]
Guizot, in the meanwhile, had had several conferences at the Foreign
Office, and had discussed the situation with both Melbourne and
John Russell. The position which the French government intended to
assume was set forth in a _memorandum_ which he was instructed to
read to Lord Palmerston. No formal proposals for a treaty, M. Thiers
contended, had ever been made to France. Various suggestions, it was
true, for settling the Turco-Egyptian question had been put forward,
with none of which she had been able to agree. She had always looked
upon Mehemet Ali as an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, and
considered his strength as necessary to the preservation of Turkey.
Hence she had constantly opposed the idea of wresting Syria from him
by force, and she was now disposed to think that the four Powers
had scarcely realized the magnitude of the task upon which they had
embarked so light-heartedly. "Treat Lord Palmerston," wrote M. Thiers,
"as he treated you. Read out to him this written declaration. Question
him boldly. Ask him whether he has any plans for helping the rising
in Syria, and what measures he proposes to adopt should the Pasha
return a flat refusal to the Sultan's demands? Press him hard. Place
him in the position of having to confess that he has acted in a very
foolhardy fashion. . . . Be careful, however, to frame your questions
in such a way that, should he decline to answer them, you are not
compelled to announce a rupture of relations. For the moment France
must restrain herself."[584]
There is no reason to suppose that Guizot displayed any lack of skill
in the performance of his prescribed task. He was, however, unable
to report that he had achieved the smallest measure of success.
Palmerston, whilst expressing his deep regret that a divergence of
opinion should have alienated the two Cabinets, and admitting the
hope, which Guizot himself was convinced was sincere, that their
separation would be of brief duration, was clearly determined to carry
out the treaty to the letter. As regards the military situation in
Syria--the point upon which M. Thiers laid the greatest stress--he
was full of confidence. Ibrahim, surrounded by a hostile population
and deprived of communication by sea with Egypt, would, he felt
certain, be reduced to impotence. Melbourne, however, displayed
far less confidence, and the Austrian and the Prussian ministers,
with whom Guizot also conversed, adopted an almost apologetic tone.
Indeed, throughout this affair, it would seem that the appellation of
"time-serving dog" applied by Charles Greville to Neumann might with
equal justice have been applied to Bülow, his Prussian colleague.[585]
Whilst news from the East was eagerly awaited Guizot was summoned
to the Château d'Eu, where he would be enabled to confer with both
the King and M. Thiers. From the subsequent proceedings of the chief
actors in these transactions, as well as from the somewhat meagre
account of his visit which M. Guizot has given in his _Mémoires_,
it is not difficult to surmise the nature of the plan which it was
resolved to adopt. France was to arm upon an imposing scale, and her
representatives at the different Courts were to assume an attitude of
dignified resentment. Such a course possessed a twofold advantage.
Abroad, it could not fail to have a great effect upon the timid
Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin, and might even incline them to withhold
their ratification of the treaty. At home, warlike preparations would
be popular, and might prevent people from enquiring too closely into
the policy which had resulted in the isolation of France. Moreover, M.
Thiers was glad of the opportunity, which the crisis afforded him,
of strengthening the army and of repairing the effect of many yeas of
military neglect.
But, although the King and his minister were thus resolved to show
a menacing front to Europe, Guizot was supplied with confidential
instructions of a most pacific character. Palmerston, they were
convinced, had grossly miscalculated the strength of Mehemet Ali,
and it was to be hoped that the unexpected difficulties which the
execution of the treaty could not fail to encounter would produce a
great revulsion of feeling, not only at the continental Courts, but
among the majority of the members of the British Cabinet. Should,
therefore, M. Guizot perceive signs of a disposition to adopt a less
uncompromising attitude towards Mehemet Ali and to draw nearer to
France, he was to encourage it by all means in his power. Provided
the Treaty of July 15 could be declared to be at an end, the French
government would gladly join with the Powers in guaranteeing
the integrity of Turkey, on the basis of the maintenance of the
conditions of the Convention of Kiutayeh. M. Thiers, it will be
seen, was thus ready to consent to restrict Mehemet Ali to the life
government of both Syria and Egypt, a state of affairs to which he
had always declared that it was useless to expect him to submit. As
an alternative to this solution of the difficulty, France might be
invited to mediate on behalf of the Pasha with the allied Powers. In
that case the hereditary tenure of Egypt and the life government of
Syria for Mehemet Ali would be the basis of the negotiation.[586]
This was another arrangement which a few weeks before M. Thiers had
rejected as altogether inadmissible. The Comte Walewski, a natural son
of Napoleon, who had been sent upon a special mission to Egypt, on
August 2, for the purpose of counselling the Pasha to refrain from
beginning hostilities, was, accordingly, instructed to suggest to
Mehemet Ali that he should defer his dispute with the four Powers and
the Porte to the mediation of France.
But in addition to these instructions Guizot carried back with him to
London a letter from Louis Philippe to his son-in-law, the King of
the Belgians. Leopold was at Windsor Castle, consumed with anxiety
at the thought of the dangers to which a European war must expose
his newly established Kingdom. Louis Philippe's letter of August 13
was plainly intended to be read by Queen Victoria, and was drawn up
with the object of seriously alarming her, and of prejudicing her
against Palmerston. "The situation in which France finds herself,"
wrote the King, "is neither of her choice nor of her creation. It
was said of the death of the Duc d'Enghien that it was worse than a
crime, it was a blunder. I say now of the Treaty of July 15, that it
is worse than a blunder, it is a misfortune of which the consequences
are incalculable. The situation is particularly painful for me who
have always scouted the notion that England could ever enter into
an alliance without France. I find I am wrong. For the present we
can only wait and see. But there is one thing we must do and that is
to arm, and we are doing so vigorously. Our _rôle_ must be one of
expectation. We must see what England means to do, before deciding
what France shall do, either in the way of restoring or preserving the
balance of power."[587]
A few hours before M. Guizot departed from England to visit the King
at Eu, a steamer left the Thames having on board Louis Napoleon, who,
with some fifty followers, a tame eagle and a bundle of proclamations,
purposed to overthrow the Orleans Monarchy. His destination was
Boulogne, where a subaltern officer of the garrison had been drawn
into the plot. On the morning of August 6, the Imperial Pretender
disembarked at Vimereux and presented himself before the 42nd regiment
upon the barrack square. But his appearance aroused no enthusiasm.
Finding that their plans had miscarried, the conspirators attempted
to regain their ship. Their flight was, however, intercepted by the
police and the national guards, who captured the whole party and
lodged them in the gaol. Four years before Louis Napoleon had made
a similar attempt at Strasburg. On that occasion he had not been
brought to trial, but had simply been placed on board a ship and sent
off to America. This second offence, however, could not be treated
with the same leniency. On September 28, he was arraigned before the
peers and sentenced to perpetual imprisonment in the fortress of Ham.
The affair excited little public interest and was generally treated
with contemptuous indifference. Certain French newspapers, however,
published accounts of meetings between the Pretender and Palmerston,
and declared that his attempt must have been connived at by the
British government. But at his first interview with Baron Bourqueney,
who had come over to London to take charge of the embassy during the
absence of Guizot, Palmerston was enabled to pledge his word of honour
that, for "the past two years, neither he nor Lord Melbourne had set
eyes upon Louis Bonaparte or upon any of the adventurers by whom he
was surrounded."[588] His assurance was readily accepted and the
matter was quickly forgotten.
Upon his return to London, Guizot found awaiting him an invitation to
Windsor. Among the party at the Castle were the King of the Belgians,
Melbourne, Palmerston, and Wellington. Leopold, to whom Guizot at
once delivered Louis Philippe's letter, applied himself diligently to
the task of extricating his father-in-law from his difficulties. With
the view of terminating the isolation in which France was placed, he
proposed that the convention of the four Powers for the pacification
of the Levant should be merged in a larger instrument, to which she
might be a party. But Palmerston, with whom he had a long conference,
whilst acknowledging the advantages to be derived from a general
agreement to uphold the integrity of Turkey, declared emphatically
that no plan of that kind could be considered, until the Treaty of
July 15 should have been executed in all its details. On August 20, at
the termination of his visit, Guizot carried back with him to London
the conviction that Leopold's efforts had in no way modified the
situation. He had, however, been able to derive some small consolation
from the evident desire of the Queen and of Prince Albert to treat him
with unusual consideration, whilst he had noted with satisfaction that
Melbourne had appeared depressed and even Palmerston seemed out of
spirits.[589]
From the French point of view the news from Syria was of a distinctly
reassuring character. The insurrection in the Lebanon, upon the wide
development of which Palmerston was supposed to have confidently
depended for the realization of his plans, had been suppressed without
difficulty by Ibrahim Pasha. This circumstance, combined with the
efforts of King Leopold, revived the active opposition of those of
Palmerston's colleagues who disapproved of his eastern policy. They
urged, accordingly, the expediency of making some friendly advances
towards France. Palmerston consented with an unexpected alacrity
to meet their wishes. He had not answered Thiers' _memorandum_ of
July 21, and he now proposed that he should reply to it and thus
re-open communications with the French government. But his long
despatch of August 31, was scarcely so conciliatory as some of his
fellow-ministers would have desired. It was in effect an amplification
of the _memorandum_ which, on July 17, he had read out and handed to
M. Guizot. It gave a luminous account of the negotiations and set
forth the British case with admirable clearness, but only in the
concluding paragraphs was a vague hope expressed that, after the
complete execution of the Treaty of July 15, France would once more
resume her place in "the union of the five Powers."[590] The document
was intended for publication and, in drawing it up, Palmerston had
been more concerned to convince his countrymen of the justice of his
cause than to conciliate the French government. As the event was to
prove, he had judged correctly in supposing that a lucid exposition
of his policy would greatly strengthen his hand, and enable him to
counteract the intrigues of the French party, in the Cabinet. When,
about a month later, his despatch was communicated to the press, it
silenced the opposition of all fair-minded persons.[591] Guizot,
suspecting at once the real object which Palmerston had in view, lost
no time in urging upon Thiers the necessity of presenting, no less
skilfully, the French case to the public.[592]
The conclusion of the Treaty of July 15 was known at Constantinople
on August 3. The Porte, acting under the advice of the ambassadors
of the four Powers, proceeded without loss of time to carry out its
conditions. Rifat Bey, accompanied by Mr. Alison of the British
embassy, was despatched to Egypt with the Sultan's _ultimatum_, and
measures were promptly taken for rendering effective aid to the
Syrian insurgents.[593] At the same time as the documents relating
to the treaty were sent to Constantinople, the instructions of the
Admiralty were forwarded to Sir Robert Stopford, commanding the
British Mediterranean Squadron. All communication by sea was to be
cut off between Egypt and Syria. If the Pasha's fleet should be
discovered within the harbour of Alexandria, it was not to be allowed
to leave. Should an Egyptian squadron be cruising off the Syrian
coast, the admiral was to use his own discretion as to the means to be
employed for carrying out the intentions of his government. Peaceful
persuasion was to be tried in the first instance, but, should it
prove ineffectual, force must be resorted to without hesitation. Five
thousand stands of arms from the stores at Malta were placed at his
disposal, for distribution among the insurgent mountaineers. Lastly,
Stopford was warned to be on his guard against "any sudden movement
of the French squadron, in consequence of orders which might be sent
from Paris, under the first impulse of irritation which the French
government would naturally feel at finding itself placed in a separate
and isolated position."[594]
The French naval force in the Mediterranean was at this time extremely
efficient[595] and, in point of numbers, slightly superior to the
British. Ever since the beginning of the year, Palmerston had made the
strength of the Toulon fleet the subject of numerous representations
to the French government.[596] Should, therefore, warlike counsels
prevail in Paris the initial advantages of the naval situation would
be on the side of France. But, as early as July 25, Palmerston was so
satisfied that no danger of that kind was to be apprehended, that he
desired that Stopford should be informed that the French government
had clearly "no intention of opposing by force the measures which
the allies had resolved to execute."[597] That officer, on receipt
of his instructions, had proceeded to Alexandria, both to support by
his presence the demands which Rifat Bey was pressing upon the Pasha
and to prevent the egress of the Egyptian fleet. A few days before
his arrival, the squadron, which Mehemet Ali had recently sent to the
coast of Syria,[598] had hastily returned to Alexandria, upon the
advice, as it was believed, of the French admiral.
Whilst he was in these waters, Stopford was joined by Admiral Bandiera
with two Austrian frigates, one of which was commanded by the
Archduke Charles Frederick. Commodore Charles Napier, famous for his
destruction of the Miguelite Meet, had at the same time been detached
to the coast of Syria with five sail of the line and some smaller
vessels. Arriving off Beyrout, on August 12, Napier found that the
insurrection, which he had been informed was in full progress, had
been suppressed. Nevertheless, two days later, he took up a position
"abreast of the town" and sent an officer on shore to notify to the
governor that the four Powers had decided to restore Syria to the
Sultan, and to demand that the arms taken from the inhabitants of
the Lebanon should be restored to them. Furthermore, he issued a
proclamation calling upon the Syrians to return to their allegiance to
the Sultan, and proceeded to detain a number of small vessels carrying
provisions and military stores for the use of Ibrahim's army. But, as
the twenty days allowed Mehemet Ali for considering the demands of
the Porte had not yet expired, he did not consider himself justified
in beginning actual hostilities. Finding, therefore, that Soliman
Pasha[599] was not disposed to comply with his summons and that his
proclamation produced no effect, he withdrew his squadron to a better
anchorage and employed his time in reconnoitring the coast.[600]
M. de Pontois, the French ambassador to the Sublime Porte, had, in
the meanwhile, not been idle. On August 16, on receipt presumably of
instructions from M. Thiers, he sent his _dragoman_ to Reshid Pasha,
the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. The message, of which M.
Cor was the bearer, was to the effect that France was deeply offended
at the action of the Ottoman plenipotentiary in signing the Treaty of
July 15, and that she was resolved to support Mehemet Ali and actively
to oppose the measures of coercion which the allies were proposing
to apply to him.[601] M. de Pontois himself further declared to the
Russian minister that he regarded war between France and England
as inevitable. This threatening language was at once reported by
the representatives of the Powers to their respective Courts and
Lord Ponsonby, at the same time, sent to warn the British admirals
that an outbreak of hostilities with France was to be seriously
apprehended.[602] A few days later, however, the French ambassador,
whether in consequence of fresh instructions from Paris, or whether
because on considering the matter he was afraid he had said too much,
saw fit to disavow the language imputed to him.[603] This was the
attitude adopted by M. Thiers when, in due course, representations
on the subject of M. de Pontois' menaces were made to him by the
Powers. The full brunt of his ill-humour fell, as was usual, upon
the Austrian ambassador, who met with a very warm and disagreeable
reception. "_Vous pouvez dire à Reshid Pasha qu'il en a menti,_"[604]
was the only statement which Apponyi could extract from him. Guizot,
but in more courteous terms, conveyed the same explanation to Lord
Palmerston. No written communication having passed between M. de
Pontois and Reshid Pasha, the matter was allowed to drop.[605] It was
evident that whatever might have been the precise words used by M.
Cor, the message of the French ambassador to the _Reis-Effendi_ was
a rather clumsy attempt to frighten the Sultan into withholding his
ratification of the treaty.
France meanwhile was arming in most ostentatious fashion. On September
13 the fortification of Paris was decreed by a Royal ordinance. This
was a measure which had been under consideration for some time past,
but which had always been set aside on account of the difficulty
of inducing the Chambers to consent to the required expenditure.
Thiers, as a student of the campaign of 1814, had constantly advocated
it, whilst Louis Philippe was also in favour of it because, as
was generally believed, he hoped that a circle of forts round the
capital would greatly facilitate the suppression of any revolutionary
movement. M. Thiers gave his closest personal attention to the
military preparations. With the journalists and stock-jobbers, by whom
he was surrounded,[606] his conversation turned on war unceasingly. In
the early days of August he had hinted at a campaign upon the Rhine,
whilst the papers which he inspired denounced the treaties of 1815 and
talked of "natural frontiers." But his thoughts soon assumed a new
direction. The _débordement_,[607] when it came, would be in Italy,
where Austria was to be assailed at her most vulnerable point. Lying
on the floor, with his maps spread out before him, like the great
man about whom he had written so much, he planned vast military and
diplomatic combinations.[608]
Nor was Louis Philippe less warlike than his minister. All Paris heard
of the indignant and threatening language which he had used to the
Prussian and Austrian ambassadors. Taking them aside at the Tuileries,
he had bitterly reproached them for the ingratitude which their Courts
had displayed towards him. For ten years he had held the revolution in
check and his reward had been the Quadrilateral Treaty of July. But,
and at this point his voice could be heard far beyond the confines
of the room in which the interview took place, "they had better not
provoke him too far. He had discarded the red cap. Some day, perhaps,
they might be disagreeably surprised to find that he had resumed
it."[609] This threat, which was uttered as though it had escaped him
in the heat of passion, was well calculated to give Metternich much
cause for uneasy reflection. At the same time the King's eldest son,
the Duc d'Orléans, a keen and ambitious soldier, loudly proclaimed
that France had been insulted. With perfect sincerity he declared his
belief in the necessity of war. "If the worst came to the worst," he
told his friends, "he had rather be killed in action upon the Rhine,
than be shot in a street fight and die in the gutter."[610]
Under the influence of the revolutionary recollections evoked by
the anti-dynastic press, and of the threats of war to be waged upon
Jacobinical principles,[611] indulged in by the organs of M. Thiers,
public excitement in Paris rose to an alarming pitch. The situation
was complicated by a series of strikes in different trades. Bands
of men deprived of their employment marched through the streets
singing the _Marseillaise_. The secret republican societies fomented
the discontent of the working classes and fanned the flame of war.
Disturbances took place, and the authorities were apprehensive of an
attack by the mob upon the British embassy.
Towards the middle of September the news reached Paris that, in
consequence of the Sultan's demands, conveyed to him by Rifat Bey,
Mehemet Ali had invoked the protection and mediation of France.[612]
Furthermore, at the instance of the Comte Walewski, he had declared
his readiness to restore to the Sultan the island of Crete, the Holy
Cities and the province of Adana. Although maintaining his claim to
the hereditary tenure of Egypt, he had announced that he would be
satisfied, as regards Syria, were the government of Tripoli, Damascus
and Aleppo to be conferred upon his son Ibrahim for his life. Thiers
perceived, at once, that in these proposals lay his last chance of
preventing without war the full execution of the Treaty of July 15.
Notwithstanding that he still derided the notion that a blockade of
the coast would suffice to make Mehemet Ali relax his hold upon Syria,
in his heart he was, doubtless, beginning to suspect that he had
overestimated the military power of the Pasha. Napier's proceedings at
Beyrout and his detention of the Egyptian store ships and transports
had not been followed by that vigorous offensive, which, he had
always predicted, Ibrahim would assume the moment any act of war was
committed against him.
Hitherto M. Thiers, in his intercourse with the British _chargé
d'affaires_, with whom he was in private life on very friendly terms,
had never made use of those asperities of language and warlike threats
which he had sometimes indulged in with Werther and Apponyi. But,
on the morning of September 18, when Mr. Bulwer called upon him,
he resolved to adopt new tactics. As they paced up and down a long
gallery in his house at Auteuil, M. Thiers declared emphatically that
he considered the Pasha's last proposals both just and reasonable. If
England would agree to join with France in pressing their acceptance
upon the Porte and the Powers, there would once more be established
the intimate relations between the two governments which the
Quadrilateral Treaty had interrupted. But if not, then seeing that
Mehemet Ali had made these concessions at the instance of France, she
would "be bound to support him." As he concluded he looked Bulwer full
in the face and asked him whether he realized the full import of these
words. "Perfectly," replied he imperturbably, "you mean to declare for
the Pasha and go to war with us in his favour." Before they parted,
however, M. Thiers somewhat modified the gravity of his statement,
by saying that he had spoken as a private individual, not as the
President of the Council.
A few hours later Bulwer returned to Auteuil. Before leaving M. Thiers
he had told him that he would like him to see the account of their
conversation which he proposed to send to London. The despatch which
he, accordingly, placed in his hands began by stating that, in the
writer's opinion, the moment had come when M. Thiers purposed saying
to the King, "You must follow me even to war, or I will leave you
exposed to public opinion as expressed by the newspapers." It was
certain, however, that the King would not accept such a programme,
and that, were M. Thiers to place his resignation on those grounds,
it would be unhesitatingly accepted. This was very far from the kind
of message which Thiers wished conveyed to Lord Palmerston. "My dear
Bulwer," he said, "you are greatly mistaken, you will ruin your
promising career. The King is far more warlike than I am."[613] Bulwer
saw no occasion to argue that point, and, having produced the desired
effect, he readily agreed merely to relate to his chief the substance
of their morning's conversation. In a private and confidential
despatch, however, he stated that this interview had left a strong
impression upon his mind that M. Thiers had, in reality, an earnest
desire to maintain peace.[614]
These so-called concessions of Mehemet Ali were, Lord Palmerston
declared, unworthy of serious consideration. Whether Syria were
governed by Ibrahim or by Mehemet Ali was a matter of very little
importance. The object with which the treaty had been concluded must
be relentlessly pursued. Syria must be replaced under the direct rule
of the Porte. Until the Egyptian desert should intervene between the
territories of the Sultan and those administered by his too-powerful
vassal, there could be no permanent peace in the East. No arguments of
M. Guizot could induce him to adopt a less uncompromising attitude.
The Pasha's proposals indicated, he maintained, that he already
perceived the necessity of bowing to the inevitable, and that he
would, before long, yield to all the demands of the Powers.[615]
Certain of his colleagues, however, altogether dissented from this
view of the case. Mehemet Ali's concessions, they contended, had
created an opportunity for terminating the differences with France and
for drawing her into the negotiations.
The French party in the Cabinet had recently received a great
accession of strength. Lord John Russell, the Colonial Secretary
and the leader of the House of Commons, had cordially approved
of the Treaty of July 15. Nevertheless, early in September, he
appears to have been seized with grave misgivings as to the wisdom
of carrying out its provisions. A letter from Lord Spencer to his
brother the Duke of Bedford, expressing the fear that Palmerston's
policy would lead to a war with France, seems to have made a great
impression upon him.[616] Moreover, "Bear" Ellice[617] was actively
engaged in propagating alarmist rumours and in discoursing upon the
indignation which the Anglo-Russian alliance had aroused in France.
There are grounds for believing that the intrigue, of which he was
the soul, aimed at driving Palmerston to resign, in order that
Clarendon might replace him at the Foreign Office.[618] Be that
as it may, the inspiration of M. Thiers can plainly be discerned
in the correspondence of Mr. Ellice with both Russell and with
Melbourne.[619] Charles Greville also appears to have spent much time
with Guizot in inveighing against the presumptuous recklessness of
Palmerston and in discussing the votes and opinions of different
members of the Cabinet.[620] But the French ambassador could listen to
even more congenial sentiments in the social circle presided over by
Lord and Lady Holland. M. Thiers, a few weeks after Holland's death,
openly declared in the Chamber that, throughout this crisis, he had
always been able to depend upon the support of that statesman.[621]
It is impossible to say how far he was justified in making such a
statement. It is undeniable, however, that matters, which should have
been treated as Cabinet secrets, were known in Paris. In commenting
upon M. Thiers' amazing indiscretion, _The Times_,[622] which cannot
be charged with partiality to Palmerston, positively asserted, as
a notorious fact, that "every transaction within the doors of the
British council-chamber were as well known upon the _bourse_ as in
the deepest recesses of Downing Street or Whitehall." This statement
is to a great extent confirmed by Bulwer, who relates that, in
consequence of certain information which he had acquired in Paris, he
was enabled to warn Palmerston of an attack which was to be made upon
him in the Cabinet.[623] "The talking at Holland House," wrote Lord
Melbourne, "is irremediable. They cannot help it, and they are not
themselves aware how much they talk."[624] It was always a subject of
complaint against Palmerston that he would come to important decisions
and would embark upon grave measures of policy, without reference
to his colleagues. The conduct of certain of his "Whig friends
and grandees"[625] upon this occasion was, it must be admitted,
calculated to dispose him to confide in them as seldom as possible.
Negotiations, John Russell insisted, must be opened with France on the
basis of the Pasha's last proposals. If this course were not adopted,
he announced his intention of retiring from office. His resolution
was not to be shaken either by the remonstrances of Melbourne that
his resignation must destroy the government, or by Palmerston's
representations that his present conduct was inconsistent with his
former approval of the treaty.[626] The French party seemed to be on
the point of triumphing. Palmerston appeared to be placed between two
alternatives--he must either retire, or consent to suspend coercive
measures against Mehemet Ali and make conciliatory advances to France.
Nevertheless, contrary to expectations, a crisis was averted. Lord
John agreed greatly to modify his demands and Palmerston consented to
a slight compromise. "Russell," records Greville, "has disappointed
me. He is not the man I took him for."[627] But in point of fact an
influence, unsuspected by Greville, had been brought to bear upon
him. Melbourne had conveyed to him a message from the Queen that she
was not in a condition[628] to bear, without danger, the anxiety to
which she must be subjected by the course he threatened to pursue.
But Her Majesty placed her chief objection to anything in the nature
of a Cabinet crisis, at this particular moment, on other grounds than
those of her own state of health. She desired Lord John to reflect
most seriously upon the injury, which the country must suffer in the
eyes of foreign Powers, from so public an exhibition of ministerial
weakness and vacillation at a time of national emergency.[629]
Metternich had been greatly alarmed by the threatening aspect of
affairs, and had, some weeks before, submitted a paper to King
Leopold, for transmission to Louis Philippe, defining the attitude
which, in his opinion, the French government should adopt. Whilst
signifying her dissent from the policy of coercing Mehemet Ali, she
might, he suggested, declare her adherence to the main principle of
the treaty--the necessity of preserving the integrity of Turkey.
Should the event prove that the Pasha was not to be subdued by force,
she might announce her readiness to discuss with the Powers the means
by which, in the future, the security of the Ottoman Empire might
be maintained.[630] Palmerston, who was in possession of a copy of
this document, expressed himself as willing to make an overture to
the French government on the basis of Metternich's suggestions. At
a Cabinet Council, on October 1, this solution of the difficulty
was agreed to unanimously.[631] It was a small concession which
Palmerston could well afford to make. Before the French government
could be approached on the subject, the consent of the Powers, which
were parties to the Quadrilateral Treaty, would have to be obtained.
Brunnow, without doubt, would at once declare that he must refer the
matter to his Court, and long before an answer could be received
from St. Petersburg, the guns would have spoken in the East and the
whole situation would be altered. Nor was this expectation falsified.
The representatives of the Powers, following the lead of Brunnow,
announced that they were without instructions and must submit the
proposal to their Courts. But already the news had arrived of the
success with which hostilities had been opened in Syria.[632]
At Constantinople Mehemet Ali's reply to the demands made to him
by Rifat Bey was held to be unsatisfactory, and, with the full
approval of the ambassadors of the allied Powers, the Porte decided
to treat his counter-proposals in the light of a rejection of the
Sultan's _ultimatum_. He was, accordingly, declared deposed from the
governorship of Egypt and of the other territories which he ruled, and
a blockade was proclaimed both of the Syrian and Egyptian coasts. The
representatives of the Powers at the same time recalled the consuls
from Alexandria, and every effort was made to carry out promptly the
stipulations of the Treaty of July 15.[633] Sir Robert Stopford,
leaving a portion of his command to watch the Egyptian fleet, sailed
with the remainder of his force and the Austrian squadron to join
Napier off Beyrout, where Captain Walker, who had been placed in
command of the Turkish fleet, had already arrived. On September
11, the governor of Beyrout having been ineffectually summoned to
surrender, fire was opened upon the forts. After sustaining a heavy
bombardment, Soliman Pasha withdrew the garrison into the hills.
Two days before, a Turkish division and detachments of British and
Austrian marines had landed at Jounié Bay. Commodore Napier, under
whose direction these operations were carried out, entrenched his
force securely and proceeded to distribute arms and ammunition to the
mountaineers, who flocked into his camp in large numbers. Meanwhile,
Ibrahim, who with the main Egyptian army was not far distant, looked
on helplessly, and appeared to be incapable of offering any serious
resistance to the operations of the allies.[634]
The news from the East created a profound sensation in Paris. "The
cannon of Beyrout," wrote Heine,[635] "re-echoes painfully in the
heart of every Frenchman." Young men eagerly proffered their services
at the recruiting offices. At the opera and at the theatres excited
audiences insisted on singing the _Marseillaise_. On the question of
peace or war the Cabinet was supposed to be nearly equally divided.
M. Thiers was reported to have urged the necessity of energetic
action, but it was notorious that General Cubières, the Minister of
War, and Roussin, the Minister of Marine and the former ambassador
at Constantinople, were in favour of pacific measures. Henry Reeve,
the friend of Greville and the future editor of his famous journals,
was at this time in Paris. Politically he was in complete accord with
Lord Holland and the French party, and, during his stay in Paris,
was in regular correspondence with Lord Lansdowne, a member of the
Melbourne Cabinet, who, although not actively opposed to Palmerston,
only gave him a half-hearted support. Reeve was well acquainted with
most of the French ministers, and was on very friendly terms with
Léon Faucher and several other prominent journalists and politicians.
In fact, during these critical days, he may be said, in his own
words, "to have had his board and lodging in the Cabinet." He was
in constant communication with M. Thiers, "who was everything that
he could wish."[636] Consequently, he would ingenuously convey to
his patron[637] those opinions, which the crafty French minister
considered might with advantage be disseminated in governmental
circles in London.
Amidst all this excitement, whilst in Paris the _bourse_ was panic
stricken and in London the funds were falling, Palmerston remained
perfectly calm. He had never believed in the danger of a conflict
with France, and, in his opinion, the progress of events in the East
had rendered still more remote the chances of war.[638] He could not
admit that the French people or the French King would ever allow any
government to embark upon hostilities with the whole of Europe, in
order to preserve Syria for Mehemet Ali. He wrote reassuringly to the
Queen[639] to this effect, and strove to calm the apprehensions of his
colleagues and to instil into them some of his robust common sense.
But the edict of the Porte, by which Mehemet Ali had been deprived
of the government of Egypt, had once more stirred his opponents to
action. According to Lord John Russell, it was a measure which had
never been contemplated by the treaty and had clearly been adopted
in consequence of the violent counsels of Lord Ponsonby. Palmerston,
although he personally approved of the deposition of the Pasha, had,
nevertheless, immediately instructed Granville to inform M. Thiers
that it was merely a measure of coercion, and was not intended to
prejudge any arrangement which the Sultan might, hereafter, be
disposed to make in favour of Mehemet Ali, should he, "at an early
moment, accept the conditions of the treaty."[640] Lord John, however,
was not to be pacified. War, he asserted, appeared to be imminent,
and he insisted upon the necessity of holding a meeting of the
Cabinet.[641] Grave consequences, wrote Melbourne to the Queen, were
to be apprehended from the Council which he had called for October
10.[642]
But once again a crisis was averted. On the morning of the day on
which the meeting of the Cabinet was to take place, Guizot presented
himself at the Foreign Office with two despatches from M. Thiers. The
first, dated October 3, purported to be an answer to Lord Palmerston's
despatch of August 31. It was a long and rambling statement of the
French case. The chief argument consisted in an attempt to show that
France, throughout the negotiations, had never departed from the
principle embodied in the _collective note of July 27, 1839_. Then,
as now, France considered that that instrument had been drawn up for
the purpose of guaranteeing the independence and integrity of Turkey.
She had always believed that the object which it had in view was to
enable the Sultan to escape from the exclusive protection of a certain
great Power. She had never understood that the policy of preserving
the Ottoman Empire was bound up with any question of "territorial
limitations, more or less advantageous, between the Sultan and the
Viceroy."[643] The second, and more important, despatch bore the date
of October 8, and dealt with the _firman_ of the Sultan deposing
Mehemet Ali from the government of Egypt. France, declared M. Thiers,
was prepared to leave the question of Syria to the chances of the
war, which had actually begun. But the edict expelling the Pasha from
Egypt was a different matter. It threatened to disturb the balance of
power in the East, and France could, therefore, not consent to see it
carried into execution.[644] Certain writers have pompously asserted
that, on this occasion, M. Thiers "formulated the _casus belli_." It
must be borne in mind, however, that he had already been informed by
Lord Granville of the light in which the British government regarded
the Porte's decree of deposition. Hence many of his contemporaries
treat his despatch of October 8 with derision. That famous document,
they contend, merely "forced an open door."[645]
The extreme moderation with which M. Thiers had expressed himself came
as a great surprise to the British government. M. Guizot, sincerely
as he desired to see peace maintained, was strongly of opinion that
so mild an exposition of the French case was strangely inconsistent
with the warlike attitude which his government had adopted, since
the beginning of the crisis. He contented himself, in consequence,
with placing M. Thiers' despatches in Lord Palmerston's hands, and
made no attempt to discuss or to defend the opinions expressed in
them.[646] Their contents, when communicated to the assembled British
ministers, removed at once the danger that acute differences of
opinion might lead to a disruption of the government. At the Cabinet
Council of October 10, it was simply decided that Lord Ponsonby
should be directed to urge the Porte to reinstate Mehemet Ali in
the governorship of Egypt and to make the appointment hereditary in
his family, provided he would consent to make an early submission
to the Sultan. At the same time, it was agreed that a copy of these
instructions should be sent to Lord Granville for communication to the
French government.[647]
But, in spite of the pacific language used by M. Thiers in his
despatches, the situation still gave cause for anxiety. The lower
classes in Paris had been greatly stirred by the Jacobinical
declamations of the Radical press. On October 15, as Louis Philippe
was entering the Tuileries, he narrowly escaped the bullet of an
assassin. The would-be regicide, an individual named Darmès,
when arrested and questioned, declared that he was by profession
"a conspirator and an exterminator of tyrants." This outrage
and other anarchical symptoms were not without effect upon the
_bourgeoisie_.[648] The signs of the times pointed clearly to the
probability that war abroad would be followed by a revolution at home.
Meanwhile, rumours were current that the government was preparing
some sudden act of aggression--an "_Anconade_"[649] as it was called.
It was said that the military occupation of some position in Turkey
was contemplated. The sudden recall, however, to Toulon of the French
fleet, which had been cruising in Greek waters, seemed to prove, not
only that the government could have no such intention, but that it
was desirous of avoiding the danger of any chance collision with the
British squadron operating off the Syrian coast. Nevertheless, after
the return home of Admiral Hugon's fleet, reports about the warlike
plans of M. Thiers assumed a more concrete form. Lord Granville,
on October 12, received information from a person, who stipulated
for a special remuneration should his intelligence prove accurate,
that the French government had decided to seize one of the Balearic
Islands.[650]
The strategic importance of these Spanish islands had been enhanced by
the French occupation of Algiers. Situated about midway between Toulon
and the African coast, they would, in the hands of France, enable her
to control the western Mediterranean. The British Foreign Office and
the Admiralty had, in consequence, been always on the alert, lest she
should by any means succeed in establishing herself at Port Mahon.
It had been ascertained that many of the inhabitants were not at all
averse to the idea of a French annexation of Minorca.[651] But, in
addition to the military advantages to be derived from the occupation
of the Balearic Islands, there were political reasons which made both
Palmerston and Bulwer suspect that M. Thiers might regard a _coup
d'éclat_ in Spain as a useful counterstroke to the Treaty of July
15.[652] The struggle between Christina[653] and the _Progressistas_
had been raging for some weeks past, and now appeared certain to
terminate in the complete defeat of the Queen Regent. Upon the subject
of Spanish affairs the British government held views which were
diametrically opposed to those entertained at the absolute Courts.
Any stroke directed against Espartero and the Radicals could not
fail to be applauded at Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg. A French
intervention in Spain might, therefore, be the means of sowing discord
between Great Britain and her continental allies.
Lord Granville at once sent off a special messenger to Madrid to warn
the British minister of the blow which was impending, and Palmerston
also wrote to Mr. Aston to the same effect. Espartero,[654] when the
news was communicated to him, undertook to strengthen the garrison of
Port Mahon, and promised to resist manfully any French aggression.
Melbourne, at the same time, took the opportunity of remonstrating
strongly with Louis Philippe through the King of the Belgians.[655]
England, he wrote, could not sit still whilst France continued to arm
and to threaten. She must, if the present situation were prolonged,
take measures to safeguard her interests. This communication probably
reached Louis Philippe on October 19. So long as he had believed
that Mehemet Ali was capable of offering a serious resistance to
the allied Powers, he had approved of the menacing attitude of his
government. But, when the Pasha's impotence was made manifest, he
realized the expediency of adopting different tactics. He understood
the difficulties of M. Thiers' position. Already the more extreme of
the various groups composing his parliamentary majority were beginning
to testify their displeasure at the pacific tone of his despatch of
October 8, which had been published in the English papers. At the
approaching meeting of the Chambers heated and violent recriminations
were to be apprehended. Louis Philippe, however, had also perceived
that, notwithstanding the clamour of the newspapers, a healthy current
of public opinion was running in the direction of peace. People
were beginning to realize that, under existing conditions, war and
revolution were synonymous terms. Some of M. Thiers' colleagues had,
moreover, it is said, privately intimated that, if peace were to be
maintained, the King must take upon himself to dismiss his present
ministers.[656] But the adoption of this disinterested advice was
fraught with certain unpleasant consequences. For the past fortnight
the _Constitutionel_, M. Thiers' chief organ, had been insinuating
that all his efforts to uphold the honour and dignity of France
were frustrated by the Sovereign. The King was, therefore, under no
illusions as to the manner in which his minister purposed to cover his
retreat.
The Chambers were to assemble on October 28. M. Thiers, about a
week before, submitted to Louis Philippe a draft of the proposed
Speech from the Throne. It contained a distinctly warlike paragraph,
and announced that 150,000 more men would be called up for service
with the colours. The King objected, and whilst the matter was under
discussion, he received Lord Melbourne's letter. It is very possible
that a perusal of its contents may have served to overcome his last
hesitations. He refused to employ the language which his minister
proposed to place in his mouth. M. Thiers, thereupon, tendered his
resignation, which was promptly accepted. Marshal Soult agreed to form
a new government, of which the real head was to be M. Guizot, the
French ambassador in London, into whose charge the King had confided
the portfolio of Foreign Affairs.
M. Thiers was not wholly responsible for the position in which France
found herself at the time of his downfall. When he took office, the
mistakes of his predecessor had already carried the country a great
distance upon the road to isolation. Nevertheless, the brief period
of his second administration affords an instructive example of the
many mistakes which a very able man may commit. The two principal
objects which he set himself to achieve were utterly incompatible. He
sincerely desired to retain the friendship of Great Britain and, at
the same time, he proposed to establish Mehemet Ali as the ruler of an
independent State, which was to owe its separate existence to French
patronage. But, inasmuch as Lord Palmerston was resolved to drive the
Pasha out of Syria and greatly to restrict his power, he was obliged
to seek to attain his ends by tortuous methods. Thus, whilst he strove
to prolong and to embarrass the negotiations in London, he endeavoured
secretly, and in flagrant violation of the _collective note of July
27, 1839_, to cajole the Porte into conceding the demands of the
Pasha. He was able to persuade himself that the young Sultan and his
ministers, rather than follow the congenial advice of the Powers
which desired to curb the ambition of Mehemet Ali, would listen to
the unpalatable counsels of France, the friend of their arch-enemy
the Viceroy of Egypt. A policy founded upon so erroneous a conception
of human nature was fore-doomed to failure. The intrigues of the
French agents at Alexandria and Constantinople[657] were exposed, the
correspondence of M. Coste found its way into Lord Palmerston's drawer
at the Foreign Office, and the treaty between the four Powers and the
Porte was concluded on July 15.
But M. Thiers was guilty of another error. He, the student of war,
the _Napoleon civil_, as Metternich named him, altogether failed
to understand the strategic situation in the East. Unlike Lord
Palmerston, who foresaw that the Pasha's position in Syria would be
untenable, from the moment that he was deprived of the command of
the sea, Thiers conceived it possible that Ibrahim could assume the
offensive in Asia Minor, and at the same time maintain, in the midst
of a hostile population and through a most difficult country, his
communications with Egypt. His plans were, accordingly, based upon
the supposition that the Powers would experience serious difficulty
in expelling the Egyptians from Syria. The Pasha's resistance, he
was confident, would not be overcome before the winter, and would,
doubtless, necessitate the intervention of a Russian army. But, were
the Tsar to despatch a large force to Asia Minor, national jealousies
and suspicion would be aroused. Then France, having completed her
military preparations, could enter upon the scene and impose her
will upon a disunited and disheartened coalition. In pursuance of
this plan, M. Thiers made divers attempts to draw the chief Italian
States into an alliance with France. But his proposals were unheeded
both at Turin and at Naples.[658] In one direction only would his
overtures appear to have met with any response. King Otho, the young
Bavarian prince whom the protecting Powers had placed upon the throne
of Greece, attracted by the prospect of obtaining Crete, seems to have
promised to invade Thessaly, whenever France should give the signal
for a general outbreak of hostilities.[659]
But all these schemes were rendered abortive by the state of impotence
to which Ibrahim was reduced by the arrival of the British fleet in
Syrian waters. After the success of Stopford's operations at Beyrout,
M. Thiers was forced either to resign or to plunge France, with King
Otho for her only ally, into a war with the whole of Europe. It is
impossible to believe that he can ever have thought seriously of
adopting this last alternative. But Louis Philippe's unalterable
resolution to maintain the peace made it safe for him to advocate a
bellicose policy, seeing that he would never be called upon to carry
it out. By proposing certain warlike measures, such as the seizure of
the Balearic Islands and a large increase of the army, he intended to
compel the King to dismiss him. Thus he would be enabled to escape
from the difficulties in which he was involved, whilst upon Louis
Philippe would rest the reproach of having tamely submitted to the
dictation of Lord Palmerston.
The injury done to the House of Orleans was not, however, the
only consequence of M. Thiers' proceedings in 1840. His warlike
declamations and the frequent allusions in his newspapers to the left
bank of the Rhine awoke recollections in Germany which had slumbered
for a generation. The amazing popularity of Becker's _Song of the
Rhine_[660] testifies to the strength of the national sentiment which
the French threats had aroused. The significance of this, and other
manifestations of German feeling, did not escape Prince Metternich.
"M. Thiers," he wrote bitterly, "likes to be compared to Napoleon.
With respect to Germany he resembles him closely, indeed, he may
justly be said to surpass him. In six weeks he has accomplished as
much in that country as the Emperor during ten years of war and
oppression."[661]
The Soult-Guizot Cabinet had been formed upon the basis of the
maintenance of peace. But innumerable difficulties confronted it.
Whilst pursuing a strictly pacific policy, ministers could not afford
to disregard the national susceptibilities which the events of the
past few months had aroused. Guizot, accordingly, before leaving
London, and after his return to France, declared constantly that the
fate of the new ministry was in the hands of the British government.
If only he could be enabled to state that the Powers were prepared to
make concessions to M. Thiers' successors, which they would not have
made to M. Thiers himself, he was confident that he could defeat his
opponents. But, if it were resolved rigorously to execute the treaty
against Mehemet Ali, he and his colleagues would surely be overwhelmed
and the King would be forced to call the war party into his counsels.
Without doubt, his friends Reeve and Greville proved most useful in
propagating this opinion.[662] Palmerston, however, was quite unmoved.
He scouted the notion that France would resort to extreme measures
in defence of the Pasha, and he was determined that the British
interests, involved in the expulsion of Mehemet Ali from Syria, should
not be sacrificed in order to strengthen the parliamentary position of
a foreign government.
At the time of M. Thiers' resignation, his despatch of October 8 was
still unanswered. But, before M. Guizot had been long installed at
the Foreign Office, he received Lord Palmerston's reply to it. The
contents of this document caused him the greatest irritation. After
exposing with remorseless logic the fallacies of M. Thiers' arguments,
Palmerston laid down the principle that the future government of
Egypt concerned the Porte alone. He has generally been blamed for
not employing a more conciliatory tone in this, his first important
communication with M. Guizot, who was not responsible for the opinions
of his predecessor in office. Palmerston, however, had two distinct
objects in view, and it is open to question whether he would have
attained his ends, had he employed less uncompromising language. His
despatches, both of November 2 and November 20, were clearly written
with the purpose of convincing M. Guizot of the necessity of regarding
Syria as altogether lost to Mehemet Ali, and of thus putting an end
to the efforts which were being made to preserve for him the southern
portion of Palestine. Secondly, by intimating that the Pasha's
reinstatement in the government of Egypt would depend upon his prompt
compliance with the Sultan's demands, Palmerston evidently intended to
force M. Guizot to exert all his influence over Mehemet Ali in favour
of a complete surrender.[663]
Events, meanwhile, had been moving rapidly in Syria. Before the
middle of October the Turkish flag waved once more over Beyrout and
Saïda, the ancient Sidon, whilst Napier, at the head of a Turkish
division and some detachments of British and Austrian marines,
completely defeated and put to flight the redoubtable Ibrahim. As
early as October 5, Palmerston had desired the Lords of the Admiralty
to advise Sir Robert Stopford of the importance of promptly restoring
the fortress of Acre to the Sultan.[664] The allied commanders appear
to have been somewhat undecided as to the propriety of attacking this
famous stronghold, the key of Syria. In view of the lateness of the
season, Stopford himself was very reluctant to embark upon operations
against it.[665] But Palmerston's despatch overcame his irresolution
and induced him to listen to the bolder counsels of Napier, Walker,
and Jochmus. Acre, which had successfully resisted Bonaparte and which
had held Ibrahim in check for six months, surrendered, on November 3,
to the British admiral after an engagement of a few hours' duration.
The moment the news reached London, Stopford was directed to send "a
competent officer" to Mehemet Ali to signify to him that, provided he
would restore the Turkish fleet and give an undertaking in writing to
evacuate Syria, Adana, Arabia, the Holy Cities and Crete, the Powers
would recommend the Porte to reappoint him to the governorship of
Egypt.[666] But, before these instructions could take effect, Napier,
who had arrived off Alexandria with his squadron, had seen fit to
conclude, upon his own responsibility, an agreement with Mehemet Ali.
In this unauthorized convention, which was signed on November 27, it
was stipulated that the Pasha should surrender the Turkish fleet and
evacuate Syria, on the understanding that the four Powers in return
would guarantee to him the hereditary tenure of the Pashalic of
Egypt.[667]
Napier, who was a strong Radical, appears to have been privately urged
by certain members of the Cabinet to seize the first opportunity of
concluding a peace with Mehemet Ali.[668] But, whatever his reasons
may have been for acting in so irregular a manner, the main provisions
of his treaty, unquestionably, accorded with the instructions sent
to Stopford on November 14. Palmerston, in consequence, decided
to signify his approval of the arrangement, with one important
reservation.[669] Under no circumstances "could Great Britain
singly, or the four Powers jointly, guarantee to a subject a grant
of administrative authority made to him by his Sovereign, within
the dominions of that Sovereign." But at Constantinople Napier's
proceedings aroused the greatest indignation, and the Sublime Porte,
with the full concurrence of the ambassadors of the Powers, pronounced
the convention null and void.[670] The same course was adopted by
Stopford, who sent Captain Fanshawe, his flag captain, to Alexandria
to declare that the convention of November 27 could not be ratified,
and that Mehemet Ali must submit unconditionally to the terms which
the Powers were prepared to offer to him.[671]
Mehemet Ali could not do otherwise than yield. The fall of Acre had
decided the fate of Syria. Fanshawe's task was thus easy of execution,
and, on December 16, he arrived at Constantinople bringing with him
a letter from Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier, in which the Pasha
conceded every demand and, with regard to Egypt, threw himself upon
the generosity of the Sultan.[672] The Turkish ministers, however,
were little disposed to show mercy to a fallen enemy who, in the days
of his strength, had caused them so much anxiety. Nor were the British
ambassador and the Austrian _internuncio_ in favour of treating
Mehemet Ali leniently. But Metternich had been terribly alarmed by the
French armaments, and had sent strict instructions to his agent at
Constantinople to terminate the eastern question with as little delay
as possible. Baron Stürmer was, in consequence, reluctantly obliged
to counsel the Porte to confer upon the Pasha the hereditary tenure
of Egypt. Ponsonby, however, was more tenacious of his opinions, and,
although Palmerston, after the Cabinet Council of October 10, had
directed him to advise the Turkish government to grant the heredity to
Mehemet Ali,[673] he declined to join with his colleagues in pressing
the Porte to adopt this measure. He was doubtful, he declared, whether
the Pasha's letter to the Grand Vizier should be regarded as an act of
complete submission. Before pronouncing a decided opinion upon that
point, he must wait in order to see whether the Pasha by his actions
intended to prove the sincerity of his promises.[674] But, on January
10, 1841, he received Palmerston's despatch on the subject of Napier's
convention, wherein it was distinctly laid down that Great Britain
approved of the principle of conferring the heredity upon Mehemet
Ali.[675] This second intimation of the views of his government was
too clear for even Ponsonby to venture upon disregarding it. He was,
in consequence, obliged to advise the Porte to make the required
concession. The Turkish ministers no sooner perceived that the
Powers were unanimously in favour of it, than they promised to take
the necessary steps for investing Mehemet Ali with the hereditary
government of Egypt.[676]
Two days before this concession was extorted from the Porte, Mehemet
Ali surrendered the Ottoman fleet to the commissioners sent to receive
it. Furthermore, he gave the necessary orders for the evacuation of
Crete and the other territories which he had promised to restore to
the Sultan. His son Ibrahim, with the remnants of the army of Syria,
had by this time arrived at Gaza, on the Egyptian frontier. He had
himself been attacked by jaundice, and his troops had suffered cruelly
in their retreat.[677] But their losses would have been far heavier,
had it not been for the Napier Convention. The British officers
employed in Syria had considered themselves in honour bound to observe
the armistice, which was one of the conditions of that irregular
agreement.[678]
Mehemet Ali having thus made his submission, it remained only to
determine the conditions under which the hereditary governorship of
Egypt should be conferred upon him. The Porte was very naturally
desirous to circumscribe in every possible way, the powers which it
had reluctantly consented to delegate. Some weeks, accordingly, were
spent in discussing the affair with the ambassadors. But, at last, on
February 13, 1841, the Porte issued a _firman_ of investiture, and
sent off a special envoy to Egypt to present it to Mehemet Ali.[679]
The French government, meanwhile, rigidly abstained from any kind of
interference, M. Guizot from the tribune of the Chamber declared his
intention of preserving the peace, whilst at the same time maintaining
the armaments which, by reason of her isolation, France could not
afford to reduce. The Opposition inveighed fiercely against the
attitude which the government proposed to adopt. M. Thiers gave his
version of the negotiations and protested that, had he been able to
remain in office, he would have armed upon a gigantic scale, not only
in order to prevent the execution of the Treaty of July, but in order
to obtain a revision of the territorial settlement of 1815. To support
their statements, he and his former colleagues recklessly divulged
the contents of confidential documents, and disclosed military
secrets.[680] Nevertheless, ministers obtained a majority in both
Chambers on the question of their foreign policy. The attention of the
assembly, during the remainder of the session, was chiefly directed
to matters connected with the fortification of Paris. The enormous
expenditure entailed by that measure, and by the other military
preparations of M. Thiers had a very sobering effect upon the popular
Chamber. The crisis, it was computed, would cost the country not less
than one hundred and fifty millions of francs.[681]
No sooner had M. Guizot emerged successfully from the initial stages
of the parliamentary struggle, than he applied himself diligently to
the task of bringing back France into the Concert of the Powers.
The German Courts, he was well aware, were most anxious to terminate
a situation pregnant with dangerous possibilities. In the eyes of
Metternich and of Baron Werther, the Prussian minister, the isolation
of France threatened the peace of Europe, and, in order to put an
end to it, they were prepared to settle "_tant bien que mal_,"[682]
the eastern question. Under ordinary circumstances the Tsar Nicholas
might have been expected to oppose the resumption by France of her
place in the Concert of the Powers. But he had now strong reasons
of his own for desiring that her isolation should cease. He had
instructed Brunnow to undertake that the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi
should not be renewed, because experience had proved that it was of no
practical value.[683] The Cabinet of St. Petersburg had arrived at the
conclusion that, for the better protection of the southern provinces
of Russia, the question of the Dardanelles should be regulated by some
European agreement. But no compact of that nature would be likely to
endure, unless France were to be made a party to it.[684]
Although it suited Nicholas that France should re-enter the European
Concert, his dislike of Louis Philippe, and of the _régime_ of July
was as strong as ever. Whilst proposing to close the eastern question
with some "final transaction to which France might be invited to
adhere,"[685] he also suggested that the treaty for the pacification
of the Levant should be converted into a quadruple alliance,
"providing against the contingency of an attack by France upon the
liberties of Europe." His main reason, he informed Lord Clanricarde,
for making this proposal, was to establish a close understanding with
Great Britain.[686] Metternich had not "the spirit of a gentleman,"
and neither England nor Russia ought to place any confidence in
him.[687] The British government, however, was unable to entertain the
suggestion. "All formal engagements of the Crown," Lord Clanricarde
was instructed to explain, "must be submitted to Parliament, and
Parliament might not approve of an engagement which should bind
England prospectively." Nor was there any way in which this difficulty
could be overcome. It would not be removed by the verbal agreement
into which the Imperial Cabinet had declared its readiness to enter,
should the constitutional obstacles to the conclusion of a more
formal compact prove insuperable. "A verbal engagement would bind the
ministers who made it, but might be disavowed by their successors,
and thus the Russian government might be led to count upon a system
of policy which might not eventually be pursued. . . . Under these
circumstances," concluded Lord Palmerston, "it seems to Her Majesty's
government that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg should be satisfied to
trust to the general tendency of the policy of Great Britain, which
leads her to watch over the maintenance of the balance of power."[688]
Whether or not M. Guizot obtained any inkling of the Tsar's proposals,
he appears to have ascertained quickly that the three absolute
Courts wished to close the eastern question in order that France
should resume her place in the Concert. But he was very far from
certain whether Lord Palmerston's views coincided with those of
his continental allies. He was not without fear that it might be
the secret intention of Great Britain to drive Mehemet Ali out of
Egypt. From the moment he had taken office, he had declared that the
fate of Syria must be left to the chances of war, but that no French
government could acquiesce in the expulsion of the Pasha from his
Egyptian governorship. So long, however, as France maintained her
armaments Metternich would be most unlikely to consent to any further
measures of hostility against Mehemet Ali. Thus by playing upon the
fears of the German Courts, he could bring considerable pressure to
bear upon Palmerston. Nor was it only in this way that he proposed
to counteract the schemes which he suspected the British minister of
harbouring. Lord Holland was dead, and the French party was greatly
discredited, but he could still depend upon the assistance of "Bear"
Ellice,[689] Greville and his other English friends, whenever an
opportunity of thwarting Palmerston should arise. For the purpose of
organizing as much opposition as possible to the Foreign Secretary, he
had, in the month of November, 1840, despatched Baron Mounier upon a
special mission to London.[690] At the same time Baron Bourqueney, the
French _chargé d'affaires_, was instructed confidentially to discuss
the situation with his colleagues, but, under no circumstances, was
he to make any direct proposals to Lord Palmerston. He was constantly
to declare that the isolation of France must continue, so long as the
treaty of July should be in existence.
M. Guizot had made no mistake in supposing that Palmerston would
rather have seen Mehemet Ali deposed than invested with the
hereditary tenure of Egypt. But, as he pointed out to the Ottoman
ambassador, it was his rule in all affairs "to be content with what
was practical,"[691] and Lord Beauvale's despatches from Vienna
made it clear that Metternich would never consent to take part in
expelling the Pasha from Egypt.[692] Palmerston, therefore, accepted
the situation and was prepared to be satisfied with an arrangement
which restricted the authority of Mehemet Ali to his Egyptian
Pashalic. He was opposed to the plan, which had been proposed at
one time, of inviting France to participate in the final settling
between the Sultan and the Pasha. As the avowed protector of Mehemet
Ali she could not, he contended, fail to bring a dangerous element
of discord into the conference.[693] Nevertheless, at the beginning
of January, 1841, Baron Bourqueney, after having been his guest for
a few days at Broadlands, felt convinced that "he was really anxious
to discover some way of bringing back France into the concert,
although he was still undecided as to the manner in which it should
be effected."[694] The correctness of this surmise was before long
confirmed by the event. After the decision of the four Powers to press
the Porte to confer the heredity upon Mehemet Ali had been embodied
in the _collective note_ of January 30, 1841, Palmerston himself took
the initiative and invited Baron Bourqueney to call upon him at the
Foreign Office, in order to discuss future arrangements.
The conferences which were thus begun on February 18 continued until
March 5, and resulted in the framing of two diplomatic instruments.
The first, termed the protocol, was only to be signed by the
representatives of the Powers which were parties to the Treaty of
July 15, 1840. The difficulties which had induced the Porte to invoke
the assistance of the four Courts being now at an end, the wish was
recorded "of expressing in the most formal manner the respect due to
the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it has,
at all times, been prohibited for ships of war of foreign Powers to
enter the straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus." With this
principle, which was of general and permanent application, France was
to be formally invited to concur. The second document consisted of a
treaty, known as The Convention of the Straits, according to which the
Sultan undertook to close the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to the
warships of all foreign nations, and the Sovereigns of Great Britain,
France, Prussia, Austria and Russia pledged themselves to uphold this
ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire.[695]
M. Guizot, after the plenipotentiaries had agreed to certain small
verbal alterations, pronounced himself satisfied with both documents.
Nevertheless, the full powers to sign, which Baron Bourqueney was
expecting to receive, were not transmitted. For the present, he
was merely authorized to initial the convention.[696] The news had
reached Paris that Mehemet Ali was greatly displeased with the
conditions attached to his _firman_ of investiture, and that he had,
in consequence, refused to accept it. The decree in question had never
been submitted to the approval of the ambassadors at Constantinople,
and it now appeared that the heredity, which it professed to confer,
was of an entirely fictitious nature. At the death of Mehemet Ali, it
was provided that his successor was to be chosen by the Sultan from
among any of his descendants. Furthermore, the appointment of all
officers of the Egyptian army, above the rank of captain, was to be
regulated by the Porte. Lastly, the Pasha complained that the amount
of the tribute imposed upon him was far too heavy. Rather than submit
to conditions so humiliating he would once more appeal to arms.[697]
Three months elapsed before the points in dispute could be settled.
Meanwhile, the French government resumed its attitude of complete
aloofness, and M. Guizot declared that no powers to sign could be
sent to London, so long as the possibility existed that coercion
might once more be applied to the Pasha under the terms of the Treaty
of July. To the great annoyance of the German Courts, Palmerston
was resolutely opposed to any declaration that the objects of that
treaty had been attained. A premature dissolution of the alliance,
he maintained, would only encourage Mehemet Ali to adopt a more
defiant attitude, and must increase the difficulties of adjusting his
relations with the Sultan.[698] "A question," he insisted, "could not
be really finished merely by saying that it was so."[699] Metternich
was compelled reluctantly to admit the force of this argument.[700]
But, whilst he acknowledged the necessity of maintaining the alliance,
his agents insinuated freely that Palmerston desired to embarrass the
negotiations, in order to drive Mehemet Ali to commit some act of
violence.
The conduct of Lord Ponsonby, it must be admitted, suggested that
his chief had no great wish to discover a peaceful solution of the
Egyptian question. When the news arrived at Constantinople that
Mehemet Ali had refused to accept the _firman_, he at once advised
the Porte to hold no further communication with him. The Sublime
Porte, he declared, need no longer fear the military power of
Mehemet Ali. "His destruction might be the consequence[701] of his
again venturing to defy the Sultan." The patience with which Lord
Palmerston submitted to Ponsonby's deviations from his instructions
is undeniably suspicious. It is practically certain, however, that
no secret understanding existed between them. Palmerston's personal
views with regard to Mehemet Ali accorded so completely with those
of his agent, that he was induced to regard with a lenient eye his
reluctance to carry out a distasteful task. But, whilst treating him
with great forbearance, he never allowed Lord Ponsonby to impose his
opinions upon him. On January 26, 1841, in a despatch endorsed by
Queen Victoria with the significant words "highly approved,"[702] he
told him plainly that his counsels to the Porte were not in harmony
with his instructions. Again, on March 16, he prescribed the necessity
of overcoming the obstacles to a settlement so emphatically, that
Ponsonby wrote in reply, that he perceived that "the end which he was
expected to attain was the arrangement of this affair with Mehemet Ali
at any rate" (_sic_).[703] Nor can it reasonably be contended that
his tone changed after the Pasha's refusal to accept the conditions
of the _firman_ of investiture. On the contrary, in his instructions
of April 10, he laid stress upon the necessity of adjusting the
points in dispute with as little delay as possible, and absolutely
dissented from Ponsonby's view that the Sultan should hold no direct
communication with Mehemet Ali.[704]
Ponsonby was, therefore, obliged to join with his colleagues in
advising the Porte to modify the _firman_ of February 13. Their
representations, combined with an intimation from Baron Stürmer that
Austria[705] would withdraw from the alliance if her counsels were
disregarded, soon produced the desired effect. On April 14, Ponsonby
was able to report that the Divan had decided that the succession
of Mehemet Ali should be regulated in accordance with the principle
of primogeniture, that he should have the power of dealing with the
promotion of all officers below the rank of brigadier-general, and
that the amount of his tribute should be reduced.[706] Nevertheless,
some weeks elapsed before the Porte could be induced to embody
these concessions in a new _firman_. For this delay Ponsonby was in
no way responsible. On the contrary, he appears to have entered a
vigorous protest against the procrastinating policy of the Turkish
ministers.[707] Greatly to Metternich's annoyance, however, Palmerston
persisted in refusing to declare that the objects of the Treaty of
July had been fully achieved. The French government, therefore,
continued to withhold from Baron Bourqueney the authority to sign the
Convention of the Straits. But M. Guizot was consumed with anxiety
to conclude the affair, and in consequence of Palmerston's attitude
he was now compelled to instruct his agents in Egypt to urge Mehemet
Ali to accept the amended _firman_, which they were to declare was no
longer open to any reasonable objections.[708]
Mehemet Ali was too astute to offer any further resistance. On July
8, 1841, Ponsonby's singularly laconic despatch reached London,
announcing "the satisfactory intelligence"[709] that the Pasha had
accepted the new _firman_, and had made a complete submission to the
Sultan. The representatives of the Powers which were parties to the
Treaty of July, thereupon, affixed their signatures to the protocol,
which they had initialed four months before, announcing that the
objects of their alliance had been fully attained. Three days later
the isolation of France was formally terminated. On July 13, the
plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia and
France signed the Convention of the Straits by which their respective
Sovereigns pledged themselves to uphold the principle of the closure
of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to the warships of the Powers.
The conclusion of the Convention of the Straits was the last important
act of the Melbourne government. After sustaining a defeat on the
sugar question, on May 18, ministers, in the subsequent motion of want
of confidence brought forward by Sir Robert Peel, found themselves
in a minority of one. At the general elections which followed, the
Conservatives obtained a decisive victory. The Whigs, in consequence,
retired from office, and Lord Palmerston was replaced at the Foreign
Office by Lord Aberdeen.
Palmerston's conduct of the Turco-Egyptian affair has been the
subject of much adverse criticism. M. Thureau-Dangin and other French
writers have asserted that his eastern policy, in 1840, was based
upon the desire deliberately to injure France. The Treaty of July,
they contend, was simply a retaliation upon Louis Philippe, because
he had declined to interfere more actively in the civil war in Spain.
Nor does Palmerston escape censure at the hands of the chief English
historian of this period. Sir Spencer Walpole,[710] re-echoing the
views of Lord Holland and the French party, charges him with having
sacrificed the greater to the lesser object. The good understanding
with France, which Palmerston compromised so recklessly, was a
matter, he argues, of far more importance to England than any question
connected with the rule of the Sultan or of the Pasha over Syria and
Arabia. Furthermore, he accuses him of inconsistency. His alliance
with the absolute Courts, in 1840, was a complete negation of the
policy which, in 1834, had led him to conclude the Quadruple Treaty
with Liberal France for the maintenance of constitutionalism in Spain
and Portugal.
To these different charges there are certain obvious answers. It
has been shown that Palmerston, far from maliciously desiring to
exclude France from the treaty for the pacification of the Levant,
honestly endeavoured to persuade her to combine with Great Britain,
and the other Powers in the affair. It was only when he perceived
that M. Thiers was secretly working to establish conditions in the
Mediterranean, which could not fail to have a prejudicial effect
upon his country's highest interests, that he decided to act without
her. He by no means undervalued the importance of good relations
with France, but, in order to preserve them, he was not prepared to
shut his eyes to proceedings which might some day imperil the safety
of British India. The public statements of M. Thiers and of certain
of his colleagues are alone sufficient to justify Lord Palmerston's
policy in 1840. Under the question as to whether Syria and Arabia
should be restored to the direct rule of the Sultan, which Sir Spencer
Walpole dismisses as a secondary consideration, lay the question as to
whether a great naval Power should gain a footing upon the shores of
the Persian Gulf.
The reasoning by which the same writer seeks to justify his accusation
of inconsistency is still more unconvincing. The Treaty of July was
concluded for a definite purpose which involved no repudiation of
the principles underlying the Quadruple Treaty of 1834. Yet Sir
Spencer Walpole, apparently, regards it as a betrayal of Liberalism
that England, in a question of eastern policy, should have separated
herself from a constitutional Power and have allied herself with
the absolute Courts of Russia, Austria and Prussia. Under any
circumstances such a contention would be difficult to uphold, but
when applied to France, in 1840, it becomes altogether inadmissible.
Neither Louis Philippe nor his principal ministers were Liberals in
the proper sense of the word. Treaty engagements notwithstanding,
their attitude towards the cause of liberty in Spain, although not so
openly proclaimed, was almost as unsympathetic as that of the Cabinets
of the autocratic monarchies. Louis Philippe, Molé, Guizot and even
Thiers, when they did not actively oppose it, did nothing to assist
the development of popular government in Europe.
But whatever verdict may be passed upon Palmerston's Egyptian policy,
his rare skill and determination in carrying it out must command
universal admiration. Although ruin, disgrace and perhaps impeachment
must have been the penalty of failure, he never wavered in his
resolution to execute his treaty in all its details. His indomitable
spirit stimulated the courage of his allies abroad and triumphed over
the opposition of his fellow-ministers at home. When he quitted the
Foreign Office British prestige stood at a height which it had not
reached since the Battle of Waterloo. His most persistent detractors
had been forced to admit the correctness of his military judgment and
his prescience in treating as of no account the warlike threats of
Louis Philippe and of M. Thiers.
"Palmerston," wrote Reeve regretfully, "has bowled out every
one."[711] Charles Greville was moved to enthusiasm. "The elder
Pitt," he records, "could not have manifested more decision and
resource. Success is much more attributable to Palmerston than to our
naval and military commanders, and, probably, solely to him."[712]
CHAPTER IX
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
Lord Aberdeen, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Sir Robert Peel's
Cabinet, had held the same office in the government of the Duke of
Wellington. He had had to deal, as will be remembered, with the
question of the recognition of Louis Philippe and with the attitude
which England was to observe towards the revolution in Belgium. His
first experience of diplomacy had been gained in the days of the great
war. In 1813, as quite a young man, he had been sent upon a special
mission to Vienna, and had been concerned in the negotiations which
had resulted in the entry of Austria into the coalition. During the
campaign in Germany he had accompanied the headquarters of the allied
armies and had been profoundly impressed by the scenes of which he had
been a witness. Whether justified or not, the belief prevailed widely
that, should complications arise, the spectacle of Leipsic after
"the battle of the nations" would be ever present before the eyes of
England's Foreign Secretary.[713]
With regard to the more important questions which the Foreign Office
had in hand, or with which it had recently been called upon to deal,
Aberdeen was in substantial agreement with Palmerston. He approved
of his policy in the Egyptian affair and endorsed his views as to
the necessity of encouraging Spain to shake off the influence of
France. But he was at the same time intensely desirous of replacing
Franco-British relations upon their former intimate footing, and of
allaying the irritation which the Treaty of July had aroused. To
attain this end he was prepared to make far greater concessions than
any to which Palmerston would have consented. No one was so convinced
as he of the truth of the saying, ascribed to the Duke of Wellington,
that the peace of Europe would remain unbroken, so long as France
and England were united. It was not in their policies, but in their
personal characters, that lay the real difference between Aberdeen
and Palmerston. Aberdeen was by nature conciliatory. Palmerston was
instinctively combative, and would rarely deny himself the pleasure
of relentlessly exposing the fallacies of an opponent's arguments.
Aberdeen, although in some respects more of a Liberal than his
predecessor, had a scholar's abhorrence, which had been intensified by
his former relations with Metternich and other continental statesmen,
of all movements of a revolutionary character. Palmerston was a man of
coarser fibre, but of wider sympathies, than his grave and studious
successor.
Notwithstanding the earnest desire of both Lord Aberdeen and of
M. Guizot to bring matters to a successful conclusion, the first
important transaction between the new British government and the
French Foreign Office led to no satisfactory result. In 1831, and
again in 1833, France and England had contracted certain engagements
towards each other for the purpose of suppressing the slave trade.
They had agreed that their cruisers should stop and overhaul any
suspected vessel, whether flying the French or the British flag.
Palmerston, however, had not been content with an arrangement, which
limited the right of search to ships purporting to be of French or
English nationality. He, accordingly, in combination with France, made
representations on the subject to the other Powers and succeeded in
inducing them to agree to the principle which the French and English
governments had adopted. The new convention, to which all the chief
European Powers were to be parties, was ready for signature at the
time when it became evident that a change of government in England was
about to take place. Palmerston, who had always been keenly interested
in suppressing the slave trade, was particularly anxious that his
name should be affixed to an international agreement which, he hoped,
would prove the means of abolishing a traffic which he abhorred.
M. Guizot, however, saw fit purposely to delay matters in order to
deprive him of this satisfaction. Nor did he make any secret of his
reasons for acting in this manner. Palmerston's attitude towards him,
he complained to Henry Bulwer, had been unfriendly. In his dispatch
of November 2, 1840,[714] he had shown a total lack of consideration
for the difficulties of his position, and in a recent speech to his
constituents at Tiverton he had made some highly offensive remarks
about the manner in which the French military authorities in Algeria
were carrying on their war with the Arab tribes.[715]
But, once Lord Aberdeen was installed in Downing Street, M. Guizot's
objections to proceeding with the slave trade convention disappeared.
The necessary powers were sent to Sainte-Aulaire, the French
ambassador, and, on December 20, 1841, the treaty, regulating the
right of search, was signed in London. It was soon clear, however,
that M. Guizot had been mistaken in supposing that the Chamber
would agree to ratify the agreement into which he had entered. The
opposition to slavery had never been so pronounced in France as in
England, and the Treaty of July had greatly stimulated the old feeling
of jealousy of British maritime supremacy. By reason of England's
naval preponderance, the duty of stopping suspected vessels must
necessarily devolve chiefly upon her officers. Both in the French
Chambers and in the press it was hotly contended that the new treaty
was but a device, by means of which England purposed to arrogate to
herself the right of policing the sea. So keen was this feeling that
M. Guizot was forced to inform the British government that France
would be unable to ratify. Popular opposition, it was thought, would
diminish with time, and the protocol was accordingly kept open, in the
hope that France might still become a party to the treaty. But this
expectation was not fulfilled, and on November 9, 1842, the definite
withdrawal of France was officially communicated to Lord Aberdeen.
The affair caused no little resentment and disappointment in England.
Three years later, however, M. Guizot was enabled to re-open the
question. By that time the relations of the two countries were upon
a more friendly footing, and the Duc de Broglie and Dr. Lushington,
the commissioners of their respective governments, succeeded, in
consequence, in arriving at an agreement. The new treaty, signed on
May 29, 1845, fulfilled all the essential conditions of previous
conventions, but provided that, in future, the right of search
in African waters should be exercised by a joint Franco-British
squadron.[716]
Spanish affairs, however, were destined to be the question which was
to occupy the chief attention of the two governments. It has been
related how, in the autumn of 1840, Christina had been forced to
quit Spain, and how, in the spring of the following year, the Cortes
had elected Espartero sole Regent of the kingdom. This solution
of the difficulty was by no means acquiesced in as satisfactory
by all parties. The elevation of the popular general to the head
of the government was necessarily regarded as a victory for the
_Progressistas_ and, consequently, as a triumph for English diplomacy.
Indeed, since the abdication of the Queen-Mother, the _Moderados_, as
a parliamentary party, had almost ceased to exist. But their leaders
still continued to correspond with Christina, whose house in the Rue
de Courcelles in Paris soon became the centre of a vast conspiracy
against the new Regent.
Whilst it was thus a matter of common notoriety that the _Moderado_
chiefs, together with General Narvaez and other military rivals of
Espartero, were plotting in Paris[717] to overthrow the new order of
affairs in Spain, the question of the young Queen's marriage suddenly
sprang into prominence. Isabella was not yet twelve years of age,
but already the selection of her husband was the subject of grave
deliberations in Paris and in London. Christina had always considered
it to be vitally important that her daughter should marry a member of
one of the great reigning families. As far back as the year 1838, at
a most critical period of the civil war, when it was evident that no
assistance was to be expected from Louis Philippe, she had suggested
to the British minister that Isabella might be affianced to an English
prince. If the difficulties arising from the difference of religion
should prove insurmountable, she would be satisfied with the betrothal
of her daughter to a member of the House of Coburg, "on account
of the excellent education which the princes of that family had
received, and on account of their near connection with Her Britannic
Majesty."[718] Villiers was without instructions upon the point,
but he took upon himself to declare unhesitatingly that the English
match could never be effected. Christina, thereupon, announced her
intention of marrying her daughter to a son of the Archduke Charles of
Austria. It was a combination which, "she was now convinced, afforded
the best means of pacifying the country." The negotiations at Vienna,
she informed him, would be entrusted to M. de Cea Bermúdez and their
success would largely depend upon the amount of support given them by
the British government.[719]
Palmerston, upon receiving Villiers' despatch, immediately conveyed
to him "Her Majesty's gracious approbation of the course which he had
pursued."[720] At the same time, he informed him that the British
government could not possibly take part in M. de Cea's negotiations
at Vienna, "without in the first instance communicating thereupon
with the government of France and, as the King of the French would
be extremely averse to such a marriage, it was not probable that
such a communication would contribute much to the accomplishment of
the object." Nor was there any likelihood, he predicted, that the
Austrian Cabinet would entertain the offer. This view of the case
was soon borne out by the event. Metternich at once disclaimed any
intention of listening to Christina's proposals, whilst M. Molé, who,
notwithstanding the secrecy which had been observed, was aware of the
reasons of M. de Cea's presence at Vienna, declared to Lord Granville
that "the armed intervention of France would, undoubtedly, be the
consequence of any attempt to place an Austrian prince upon the throne
of Spain."[721]
The triumph of the constitutionalists and the termination of the civil
war necessarily invested Isabella with an importance which she had
not possessed, whilst the issue of the struggle was uncertain. Once
the stability of her throne seemed assured, she appeared to Louis
Philippe in the light of a most eligible daughter-in-law. In the
month of November, 1839, Christina's former minister, Count Toreno,
was understood to be engaged in negotiating a marriage between a son
of the King of the French and the young Queen of Spain. The scheme,
reported the British _chargé d'affaires_, had numerous supporters. But
the Queen Regent had informed him privately that "she was hostile to
the match and had other views for her daughter."[722] It is probable
that Christina was perfectly sincere in thus declaring her intentions
to Mr. Southern. Nor is there any reason to suppose that, after
her abdication, her objections to the French marriage diminished.
But, inasmuch as she was residing in Paris and hoped to obtain the
assistance of Louis Philippe to her schemes for overturning Espartero,
she was necessarily compelled to conceal her real sentiments. The
re-establishment of French ascendancy at the Court of Madrid occupied
a foremost place in the policy both of the King and of M. Guizot. So
long, however, as Espartero and the _Progressistas_ were in power
there was little prospect that they would be enabled to bring their
plans to a successful conclusion. Under the circumstances, therefore,
they were disposed to regard with a friendly eye the proceedings of
the military and _Moderado_ malcontents in Paris. Bulwer strongly
suspected that some kind of a compact existed, whereby Louis Philippe
promised indirectly to assist the conspirators, and Christina, in
return, undertook to employ her parental influence over Isabella
in favour of her marriage with the Prince de Joinville or the Duc
d'Aumale.[723]
The insurrection against Espartero broke out early in October, 1841.
The standard of rebellion was raised by O'Donnell at Pampeluna and by
the generals commanding the garrisons of Vittoria and Saragossa. But
their plans, which had been so carefully matured in Paris, miscarried,
and the loyal troops experienced little difficulty in dispersing their
followers and in restoring tranquillity. Madrid, in the meanwhile,
had been the scene of one of the most dramatic episodes in recent
history. On the night of October 7, Generals Concha and Diego Leon,
at the head of a band of military conspirators, penetrated into the
palace with the object of carrying off the young Queen. But when they
attempted to ascend the grand staircase they encountered a determined
party of halberdiers. A furious struggle then ensued. The crash of
musketry reverberated through the palace, and bullets struck the
walls of the room in which the terrified Isabella had sought refuge
with her attendants. But help was soon forthcoming. The resistance of
the halberdiers had enabled the national militia, which was animated
by strong Liberal and _Progressista_ sentiments, to assemble. At
the appearance of the citizen soldiers the conspirators either fled
or laid down their arms. Some of their leaders escaped to France,
but Leon was captured and, a few days later, paid the penalty of
his treason, his youth, his good looks and his former distinguished
services earning for him a sympathy which the circumstances of his
case in no way justified.
"With respect to the share of the French government in organizing
and promoting this enterprise," wrote Lord Aberdeen, "I do not think
it necessary to enter into an enquiry at present. We have received
the most positive assurances that they have been entirely strangers
to the undertaking. Whatever may be the value of these assurances,
the attempt having happily failed, there appears to be no advantage
in testifying suspicion and distrust."[724] He, accordingly,
directed Bulwer to do all in his power to persuade Olozaga, the
Spanish minister, to adopt as moderate a tone as possible in his
communications with M. Guizot. The Spanish government was naturally
deeply incensed at the encouragement which the conspirators had
received in Paris, and their representations on the subject included
a demand for the expulsion of Christina from France. This was
peremptorily refused and the relations of the two countries began to
assume a very disquieting appearance. In Bulwer's opinion, were Louis
Philippe to receive any encouragement from Austria or Prussia, he
might not improbably embark upon a war with Spain. "Should hostilities
break out," he warned Lord Aberdeen, "Barcelona would be the French
objective, on account of the effect which its capture would have on
those Courts which are fearful of the democratic opinions prevailing
there."[725]
Aberdeen's instructions to Mr. Aston, the British minister at Madrid,
were of the same nature as those transmitted to Bulwer in Paris. He
was to warn the Spanish ministers of the folly of provoking a rupture
with France. But, at the same time, he was to assure Espartero that
"the policy of Great Britain would continue to be directed towards the
maintenance of the real independence of Spain and to her protection
from whatever quarter she might be threatened."[726] Meanwhile, the
British government would make every effort to induce the Northern
Courts formally to acknowledge the sovereignty of Isabella.[727]
Whether designedly or not, however, the endeavours of Lord Aberdeen
in this direction were frustrated by France. Owing in a great measure
to his good offices, the Spanish government withdrew its demand for
Christina's expulsion.[728] Louis Philippe, thereupon, directed M.
de Salvandy, who some weeks earlier had been appointed ambassador at
Madrid, to proceed to his post. But this measure, which seemed to
foreshadow the establishment of more harmonious relations between
the two countries, led to a most unfortunate complication. Salvandy,
upon his arrival at Madrid, insisted upon being allowed to place
his credentials in the hands of Isabella herself and absolutely
declined to present them to Espartero, the Regent. Both sides invoked
precedents in support of their attitude and pressed their arguments
with the greatest warmth. Finally, Salvandy withdrew from Madrid
taking with him all the members of his embassy, with the exception of
his second secretary, the Duc de Glücksberg, a son of Louis XVIII.'s
favourite minister, the Duc Décazes.
It is unnecessary to discuss the various questions of diplomatic
etiquette raised in this controversy. Whilst, upon the whole,
inclining to the French point of view, Lord Aberdeen was of opinion
that the dispute could have been amicably adjusted without great
difficulty. The attitude of Mr. Aston, he considered, had not been
altogether satisfactory, and he was disposed to impute blame to him
for not having discovered some basis for a compromise. Not content
with censuring him, he allowed M. Guizot to be furnished with a copy
of the letter in which his disapproval was expressed.[729] When
Salvandy was appointed to the Court of Madrid Bulwer had described
him as "a man of letters, but pompous and ridiculous in manner and
unlikely to acquire an influence over the young Queen of Spain."[730]
But, if it was the secret desire of Louis Philippe to provoke a
quarrel with Espartero, he was perhaps the most suitable person he
could have selected for the purpose. The dispute involving, as it
was supposed to have done, the monarchical principle had effectually
dispelled all hope that the absolute Powers would agree to renew
diplomatic relations with the Court of Madrid--a circumstance which
Louis Philippe, in conversation with the British ambassador, affected
"to deplore most deeply."[731] So far as France was concerned,
however, the Duc de Glücksberg was left at Madrid without official
title, in order merely to carry on the ordinary business between the
two countries.
But in all matters relating to Spanish affairs the question of
Isabella's marriage occupied the foremost place. Louis Philippe now
protested that he had never for a moment entertained the idea of
putting forward one of his sons as a candidate for her hand. But,
after making this assertion, he invariably added that he should object
to her marrying any prince who did not belong to either the Spanish
or Neapolitan branch of the House of Bourbon.[732] Accordingly, in
February, 1842, he sent M. Pageot, who had been for several years
first secretary of the French embassy at Madrid, to London, for the
purpose of obtaining the accession of the British government to the
principle that the husband of the Queen of Spain must be a descendant
of Philip V. After leaving London Pageot was to proceed to Vienna,
where he was to hold the same language to Prince Metternich.
Neither in London nor at Vienna, however, was M. Pageot able to
bring his mission to a successful conclusion. Lord Aberdeen declared
emphatically that England could not recognize the right of France
to dispose of the hand of Isabella. The British government looked
upon the matter "as an exclusively Spanish affair, which ought to be
regulated solely by considerations affecting the happiness of the
Queen and the welfare of her people." At these words M. Pageot, at
once, interposed with the remark that he presumed that he was now at
liberty to inform his government that England would not object to her
marriage with a French prince. But Aberdeen, with equal promptitude,
added an important amendment to his first statement. The marriage of
the Queen of Spain with a son of Louis Philippe would, he asserted,
upset the balance of power, and England would always oppose any
combination calculated to produce political consequences of that
nature.[733] Metternich was no less emphatic in protesting against the
pretensions of the King of the French to dictate on such a subject to
an independent State. Nor was he less decided in declaring that the
general interests of Europe would be endangered by Isabella's marriage
with a son of Louis Philippe. In his opinion the whole Spanish
question might be amicably settled by the betrothal of the Queen
to a son of Don Carlos, without any sacrifice of their respective
rights, as in the case of Ferdinand and Isabella in the fifteenth
century. This was a view of the case, however, with which the
British government was unable to concur. "Prince Metternich," wrote
Aberdeen,[734] "has been misled by a fancied historical analogy. The
solution, he suggests, might have been productive of good whilst the
civil war was in progress and whilst Don Carlos was in possession of
the northern provinces. But, now that he and his adherents have been
driven from Spain as fugitives, it would be regarded with the utmost
repugnance by the majority of Spaniards. A marriage of the Queen with
a son of Don Carlos, although it might reconcile the personal claims
of each, would inevitably bring into fierce and hostile contact the
passions and opinions of their adherents."
Pageot's mission, therefore, had done little to advance the question
of Isabella's marriage. Meanwhile, Count Toreno, Christina's
confidential adviser in Paris, had, on several occasions, sought
out Lord Cowley, the British ambassador, for the express purpose of
informing him that the Queen-Mother would prefer to see her daughter
married to a Coburg rather than to a Bourbon prince.[735] At the same
time Espartero was known to be engaged in attempting to negotiate her
marriage with the third son of the King of Bavaria. Louis Philippe,
for his part, was more than ever determined to restrict her choice
of a husband to the Bourbon candidates, and, in Lord Cowley's
opinion, had serious thoughts "of supporting his pretensions by an
armament."[736] It was, however, by more indirect methods that he
proposed to attain his ends. All through the spring and summer of
1842 the Spanish malcontents, both in Paris and upon the frontiers,
displayed renewed activity. The Carlists and the _Christinos_,
having concluded an alliance based upon the marriage of Isabella
with a son of the Pretender, openly prepared for united action
against their common enemy, the Regent Espartero.[737] This compact
was, doubtless, the reason of the seeming approval, given by Louis
Philippe, to Metternich's utterly impracticable plan for settling the
Spanish difficulty.[738] Neither the representations of the Spanish
government nor a strong protest from Lord Aberdeen[739] had any
effect in inducing the French authorities to place any check upon the
proceedings of the conspirators.
In November, 1842, a formidable insurrection broke out at Barcelona.
The rising assumed from the outset a republican character, and, in
their first conflicts with the troops, the insurgents were uniformly
successful. The arrival of reinforcements, however, soon altered the
aspect of affairs and enabled General Van Halen to re-establish the
authority of the Regent. Once more Louis Philippe and Christina were
loudly accused of having promoted the outbreak. The Queen-Mother,
reported Lord Cowley, undoubtedly supplied the revolutionists with
money, and General Atthalin, a close personal friend of the King and
an officer of his household, had been in secret communication with
the organizers of the movement. "The Spanish government," wrote Mr.
Aston, "considers that the insurrection at Barcelona has been promoted
by France with the twofold object of preventing the conclusion of
a commercial treaty with Great Britain and of causing the downfall
of the Regent.[740] The complaints, which the Spanish _chargé
d'affaires_ was instructed to make in Paris, bore especially upon the
proceedings of M. Ferdinand de Lesseps,[741] the French consul at
Barcelona, who was accused of having actively assisted the insurgents.
M. Guizot, however, who, according to Lord Cowley, had taken no part
in these intrigues, defended the conduct of Lesseps and directed the
Duc de Glücksberg to obtain a retractation of the charges brought
against him from the Cabinet of Madrid.[742] The situation thus
assumed a very dangerous appearance, and Lord Aberdeen intervened
once more in the interests of peace. Let the Spanish government, he
urged, institute a calm and dispassionate inquiry into all the facts
alleged against the French consul and let no reparation be demanded
of the French government, unless there be evidence of his culpability
sufficient to satisfy all impartial persons.[743] This advice was
accepted, and, after a thorough examination of all the circumstances
of the case, a disavowal of certain of the more serious charges was
inserted in the _Gazette_ at Madrid. Nevertheless, as Lord Aberdeen
pointed out, "few people could read with impartial attention the
various documents without coming to the conclusion that M. de Lesseps
did very considerably exceed the limits of his consular duties," and
he, therefore, ventured to express the hope that the French government
"would no longer retain him in the place where his undue activity had
been displayed.[744]
Under ordinary circumstances, Louis Philippe would not have hesitated
to dispense with the services of a consul, who had shown sympathy
with a republican insurrection. But it being his secret policy to
create every kind of embarrassment for Espartero he declined to
recall M. de Lesseps.[745] The refusal of the French government
aroused great indignation in Spain and materially contributed to
increase the difficulties which were threatening to overwhelm the
Regent.[746] The popular general, the idol of the nation, was now an
object of execration with all parties. His stern repression of anarchy
had gained for him the hatred of the extreme democrats, whilst his
ignorance of the principles of representative government had involved
him in innumerable disputes with the Cortes. The only remedy which he
could apply to the situation was to prorogue the Chambers and assume
the powers of a military dictator. But the army was no longer his
willing instrument. The senior officers, with few exceptions, held
_Moderado_ opinions, and, for the past two years, General Narvaez and
other agents of Christina had been busily engaged in undermining their
loyalty. In the month of June, 1843, Brigadier Prim raised the cry
of "Down with Espartero," to which his troops responded eagerly. The
revolution spread rapidly. Whilst regiment after regiment deserted
the cause of the Regent, Narvaez appeared before Madrid at the head
of a division. After a feeble resistance on the part of the national
militia the capital opened its gates. In the south meanwhile, on July
29, Espartero, having been abandoned by his troops, embarked at Cadiz
on a British ship, and sought refuge in England, where he was feasted
by the City of London and acclaimed by the populace.
For some weeks prior to these events the threatening aspect of
affairs had been a frequent subject of discussion between Louis
Philippe, M. Guizot, and Lord Cowley. Both the King and his minister
had but one remedy to suggest for the many ills from which Spain
was suffering. Espartero, they declared, would speedily find that
all his difficulties would disappear, were he to devote his whole
attention to effecting the marriage of Isabella with a Bourbon.
If England desired to see the dangers now threatening the Regent
averted, let her join with France in urging him to adopt this
policy.[747] Aberdeen, however, declined to entertain this request.
The matter, he maintained, was one in which no Foreign Power had a
right to interfere, whilst, "as to whether the proposed marriage
would be likely to answer the expectations of those who counselled
it, Her Majesty's government did not feel called upon to express
an opinion."[748] But as the situation in Spain daily increased in
gravity, Lord Cowley became persuaded that a fresh complication was to
be apprehended. Should Espartero be overthrown, he warned his chief,
it was greatly to be feared that the victorious party would demand the
marriage of Isabella with a son of Louis Philippe. If such an alliance
were to be proposed, the French nation would be flattered and might
not improbably insist upon the offer being accepted, "even at the risk
of war."[749]
The downfall of Espartero and the new danger to which Cowley had
drawn his attention caused Lord Aberdeen's resolution to waver. He
now proposed that France and England should unite their efforts for
the purpose of restoring order in Spain. Under the circumstances this
was practically an intimation that he was prepared to reconsider
his often-repeated declaration that the marriage of Isabella was an
exclusively Spanish affair. It was certainly interpreted in this sense
by Louis Philippe and M. Guizot, who accepted the offer with the
utmost alacrity. It was their policy to affect the greatest confidence
that, in their hour of triumph, Christina and her friends would
defer to the advice of France in all matters. But in their hearts
they had doubtless grave misgivings upon the subject, and they were,
consequently, only too delighted to obtain the support of England to
their schemes. Marshal Sébastiani was at once despatched to London to
confer upon the situation.[750] He was to assure Lord Aberdeen that
Louis Philippe would never allow one of his sons to marry the Queen
of Spain. Personally the King would prefer that she should marry a
son of Don Carlos, but he would not oppose her union with any member
of either the Spanish or Neapolitan branch of the House of Bourbon.
Scarcely, however, had the marshal arrived in England than it was
announced that Queen Victoria purposed to pay the king of the French
a visit at the Château d'Eu, near le Tréport. Her Majesty was to
be accompanied by her Foreign Secretary, who would thus be enabled
personally to discuss matters with M. Guizot.
The Queen duly arrived at Eu, on September 2, and prolonged her stay
until the 7th, as the guest of the King. In every respect the visit
proved an immense success.[751] Her Majesty's affectionate regard for
Louis Philippe was destined, before long, to diminish greatly, but she
appears always to have looked back with pleasure upon the days spent
in company with his family at Eu.[752] Although social amenities
were the feature of the visit, Lord Aberdeen and M. Guizot were
enabled to discuss grave matters of State. Both appear to have been
equally satisfied with the result of their informal conferences,[753]
and their agreement upon Spanish affairs was afterwards confirmed
by Aberdeen in an official despatch. "All that can at present be
done," he wrote, "is that both governments should act cordially and
unreservedly together, taking for the principle of their conduct
the real good of Spain, without reference to the supposed separate
interests of either. . . . Her Majesty's government are still of
opinion that to the Queen and the nation should be left the selection
of the Royal Consort. But they will not be found unwilling to offer
such friendly counsel to the Spanish government as may aid them in
coming to a sound decision. With this view, although Her Majesty's
government cannot admit that the preferable claims of any prince
or family are such as to control the free choice of the Spanish
government, they would be fully disposed to concur in the proposition
of the Cabinet of the Tuileries and to recommend that the selection
of the Queen's Consort should be made from the descendants of Philip
V. . . ."[754]
Shortly after the conclusion of the Queen's visit to Eu, M. de
Jarnac,[755] the French _chargé d'affaires_ in London, was the guest
of Lord Aberdeen at Haddo. On one occasion his host placed in his
hands a letter in which he referred to the "cordial understanding,"
which he now believed had been established between France and
England.[756] This designation struck M. Guizot as singularly happy,
and both he and Louis Philippe henceforward constantly employed it to
describe the complete accord existing between the French and British
governments.
An occasion quickly arose which enabled England to show that "the
cordial understanding" was, so far as she was concerned, no diplomatic
fiction. The Duc de Bordeaux, more commonly known by the title of
Comte de Chambord which he shortly afterwards assumed, arrived in
London, towards the end of November. The prince was the posthumous
son of the Duc de Berri and the sole surviving male representative
of the elder branch of the Bourbons. No sooner was he installed in
the house, which had been taken for him in Belgrave Square, than
hundreds of French legitimists flocked to London. They were for the
most part members of the old noble families, but among the pilgrims
was M. Berryer, the distinguished advocate and parliamentary orator.
Even old Chateaubriand, who since the Revolution of July had taken no
part in politics, journeyed to London to testify his devotion to the
prince, whom he and his party acclaimed as _Henri V. King of France
and Navarre_.[757] These proceedings aroused considerable excitement
in France and caused Louis Philippe and his ministers some uneasiness.
The French ambassador had already been instructed to urge that Queen
Victoria should refuse to receive the young prince, on the ground that
it was the evident intention of his adherents to give to his visit the
character of a political demonstration against the House of Orleans.
The Queen[758] had promptly signified her readiness to comply with
this demand. It was not possible, however, to accede to a further
request, made after the arrival of the Duc de Bordeaux in London,
that the proceedings in Belgrave Square should be forcibly put a
stop to, seeing that they in no way infringed the law of England. An
intimation was, nevertheless, conveyed to His Royal Highness that
Her Majesty greatly disliked these demonstrations and would, in
consequence, be pleased to hear that he had decided to curtail his
stay in London. This message produced the required effect. The Duc de
Bordeaux, a few days later, departed from Belgrave Square, and, during
the remainder of the time which he spent in England, his conduct was
irreproachable.[759]
The promptitude with which the Queen and her government had responded
to his wishes was very gratifying to Louis Philippe. In their Speeches
from the Throne, both Sovereigns, at the opening of their respective
Parliaments, alluded to "the cordial understanding" which had been
established between their governments. Nevertheless, before the close
of the session of 1844, the two countries were once more upon the
brink of war. In the year 1839, a company had been formed at Nantes
for the purpose of founding a French colony in New Zealand. The
undertaking was supported by the government, which proposed annexing
both islands. But, before the arrival of the French expedition,
Captain Hobson proclaimed the sovereignty of Her Britannic Majesty
over New Zealand, and its acquisition was duly notified in the
_London Gazette_ of October 2, 1840. The French government bowed
before the accomplished fact, but prepared to seek another outlet in
the Pacific. The following year, accordingly, a squadron, under the
command of Admiral Dupetit-Thouars, was dispatched to take possession
of the Marquesas Islands, where it was proposed to establish a penal
colony. Not content, however, with carrying out his instructions the
admiral, upon his own responsibility, proceeded to declare a French
protectorate over Tahiti, the most important of the islands of the
Society group. More than fifty years before, Tahiti had been visited
by the first English missionaries. Owing to their unremitting efforts,
the islanders had gradually been converted to the Protestant religion
and had acquired civilized habits. On two occasions the Sovereign,
Queen Pomare, had offered to place herself under the protection of the
British flag, but both Canning and Palmerston had declined to accede
to her proposal. In August, 1842, Admiral Dupetit-Thouars anchored off
the island. He came to exact reparation for the alleged ill-treatment
of two French priests. He demanded a large indemnity and threatened
a bombardment, unless payment were made within twenty-four hours. It
was altogether out of the power of Queen Pomare to comply with these
conditions. Resistance was, however, out of the question. By the
advice of the French consul, M. Meerenhout, she begged to be allowed
to place herself under the protection of France. It was M. Meerenhout
who was supposed to have counselled the French admiral to make his
descent upon the island.[760]
The admiral's report of his proceedings at Tahiti afforded little
satisfaction either to the King or to M. Guizot.[761] But to have
disavowed him would have exposed them to the charge of truckling
to England--an accusation which would probably have proved fatal
to the existence of the government. The establishment of a French
protectorate over the islands was, accordingly, published in the
_Moniteur_ of March 20, 1843. The announcement was much resented
in England. It was not possible, however, for England to object to
France assuming a responsibility which she herself had twice declined
to undertake. Lord Aberdeen's communications with M. Guizot on the
subject were, consequently, confined to the expression of a hope that
the British missionaries would not be interfered with, and that the
sovereign rights of Queen Pomare would be respected. With both these
requests the French government readily promised to comply.[762] But,
in the meantime, affairs at Tahiti had not been progressing smoothly.
When the Queen was induced to invoke the protection of France, Mr.
Pritchard, the British consul, was absent from the island on a visit
to Australia. Pritchard had, for a long time past, been engaged in
missionary work and in trading in the South Seas. According to his
own statement, however, upon his appointment to the post of consul at
Tahiti, he had severed his connection with the Methodist missionary
society of which he had been a member.[763] Meerenhout, the French
consul, on the other hand, was an ardent Roman Catholic, but, like
his British colleague, he too combined the business of trading with
his official duties.[764] Racial prejudice, sectarian zeal and trade
rivalry account sufficiently for the bitter enmity which existed
between the two men. The news of Admiral Dupetit-Thouars' proceedings
reached Pritchard at Sidney, and his own correspondence shows that he
started upon his return journey with the intention of doing everything
in his power to induce the British government "to interfere" and with
the expectation of finding "many difficulties to encounter."[765]
His first act upon his arrival at Tahiti was to instigate Queen
Pomare, over whom he appears to have had great influence, to write
to Her Britannic Majesty. In this curious document Queen Pomare,
after inviting her "sister friend" to commiserate with her in the
difficulties in which she was involved with the French, begged her
"to send a large ship of war" to her assistance. The circumstances
under which the demand for French protection had been extorted from
her were narrated, much space being devoted to the part played in the
transaction by M. Meerenhout, "a very bad and troublesome man."[766]
It was evident to Lord Aberdeen that the attitude adopted by Mr.
Pritchard might at any moment produce some disagreeable incident, the
danger of a chance collision being enhanced by the ill-feeling which
prevailed between the French and British naval officers. He decided,
therefore, to appoint Major-General Miller, upon whose prudence and
judgment he could depend, consul-general of the Pacific Islands,
and to place under his orders all the British consuls in the South
Seas. At the same time, he sent off instructions to Mr. Pritchard
enjoining him to recommend a prudent line of conduct to Queen Pomare
and carefully "to avoid any expression calculated to encourage her
or her chiefs to expect assistance from England." Her Majesty's
government, whilst strongly disapproving the action of the French
authorities at Tahiti and deploring the humiliations inflicted upon
the Queen, "was precluded from interfering authoritatively on her
behalf."[767] But, before this despatch could reach its destination,
Admiral Dupetit-Thouars reappeared at Tahiti. On this occasion he had
returned to complain of some incident connected with the hoisting
of a flag. After a few days spent in investigating the matter, he
pronounced the islanders to be animated by a thoroughly bad spirit.
On November 6, 1843, Queen Pomare was declared deposed, and Tahiti
a French possession. Having issued this proclamation the admiral
proceeded to land troops and to occupy the island. In his despatch to
his government, explaining the reasons which had induced him to take
this step, he imputed the chief blame for the unrest of the natives to
Mr. Pritchard.[768]
The news of these events reached Europe in the month of February,
1844, and evoked a great outburst of indignation in England. Louis
Philippe and M. Guizot were again placed in a most embarrassing
situation. Should they refuse to uphold the action of the admiral,
their conduct would be assailed on all sides as a cowardly betrayal
of French interests at the bidding of England. On the other hand, the
ratification of his act, if it should not entail war, must certainly
put an end to "the cordial understanding," the maintenance of which,
for the present, was essential to the successful execution of their
Spanish policy. Of these two alternatives, the second unquestionably
presented the greatest disadvantages. At a Cabinet Council, on
February 25, it was decided to adhere to the protectorate, but to
disavow the last proceedings of Admiral Thouars and to reinstate
Queen Pomare in the sovereignty of which she had been deprived.[769]
A few weeks later, on April 10, Lord Aberdeen informed Mr. Pritchard
that he would be transferred to the Navigator Islands. In deciding to
remove him from Tahiti, the government in no way desired to express
disapprobation of his past conduct, but, for the sake both of his own
comfort and of the maintenance of good relations with France, it was
felt to be advisable to replace him by some person who had not been
connected with the transactions of the past two years.[770] This
measure of precaution was, however, of no avail. A month before the
despatch of these instructions Mr. Pritchard had departed from Tahiti,
but under very different circumstances from those contemplated by Lord
Aberdeen. The disavowal of Admiral Thouars was made the subject of a
fierce attack in the Chamber upon the Soult-Guizot Cabinet. In the
course of the debates, certain deputies displayed great hostility to
England and indulged in much intemperate language. This ebullition
of temper was not treated very seriously in England. But it was a
different matter when the Prince de Joinville, who was a strong
supporter of Admiral Thouars, saw fit to publish a pamphlet, in which
the question of a war with Great Britain was discussed in all its
bearings. Only the year before His Royal Highness had been the guest
of Queen Victoria at Windsor, and the appearance of his work, entitled
_Note sur l'état des forces navales de la France_, created a most
disagreeable impression at Court, upon the government and upon all
classes of the people. Louis Philippe, who had never authorized the
publication of his son's imprudent pamphlet, was genuinely distressed
and did all in his power to suppress it.[771]
Public attention, however, was speedily diverted from the Prince
de Joinville to the Tsar. Suddenly, on May 31, 1844, the Court was
informed that Nicholas would arrive on a visit to England within the
next twenty-four hours. At Ascot races and at the various festivities
which were hastily arranged in his honour, his appearance excited
universal curiosity. On every occasion it was plainly his intention
to impress, not only the Court and high society, but all classes of
the people with the sincerity of his desire to establish the most
friendly relations between his empire and Great Britain.[772] To
Peel, Aberdeen and Wellington, with whom he had some confidential
conversations, he was at pains to contrast his respect and affection
for England with the dislike and the contempt with which he regarded
Louis Philippe, M. Guizot, and the French nation generally. Sir Robert
Peel, however, appears to have told him plainly that he and his
colleagues were most desirous that, at the death of Louis Philippe,
his crown should pass to his next heir in the Orleans line without
disturbance or opposition. But having given emphatic expression to his
hatred of the July Monarchy, Nicholas put forward a distinct proposal.
Turkey was sick, very sick, upon the point of death. It would be a
critical moment when the Ottoman empire should break up completely.
Nevertheless, he apprehended danger only from the ambitious and
aggressive spirit of the French. Let, therefore, England, Austria and
Russia agree to act in concert, without reference to France, and all
would be well.[773] The British ministers would not appear altogether
to have rejected this proposition. But it is difficult to believe
the story[774] that distinct pledges on the subject were given, and
that Nicholas, in consequence, was tempted to embark upon those
measures which were to result in the Crimean war. It is unnecessary,
however, to discuss here whether the conferences of 1844 were in any
degree responsible for the war ten years later. The Tsar's visit had
no immediate effect upon the European situation in general, or upon
Franco-British relations in particular. Nothing that he had said or
done during his nine days' stay in England had in any way impaired
"the cordial understanding." He had probably a shrewd idea, however,
that complications in more than one direction would, before long,
greatly endanger its existence. An instinctive perception of coming
trouble may have been the secret of his sudden determination to visit
England.
On June 6, three days before the departure of the Tsar, Aberdeen was
informed officially that French troops might not improbably be ordered
to enter the territory of the Emperor of Morocco.[775] The famous Arab
chieftain, Abd-el-Kader, with whom the French had been at war for a
long time past, had recently sought refuge within the frontiers of
the Moorish empire. On former occasions, when hard pressed, he had
eluded capture in this manner. Representations had frequently been
made at Fez, on the subject of the facilities which were alleged to
have been afforded him for renewing the struggle. These complaints,
however, had hitherto produced little or no effect, and Marshal
Bugeaud, the governor of Algiers, consequently urged the adoption of
stronger measures. Neither Louis Philippe nor his ministers desired
to begin hostilities, but, on May 30, 1844, a French force, under
General de Lamoricière, was attacked by a body of Moroccan cavalry
upon the Algerian side of the frontier. The situation at once assumed
a very grave character. The French consul at Tangier was instructed to
proceed to Fez to demand the punishment of the Moorish commander, the
expulsion of Abd-el-Kader, and the withdrawal of the troops assembled
close to the French frontier. At the same time, a squadron under
the Prince de Joinville was despatched to Moroccan waters[776] and
preparations were made for reinforcing Marshal Bugeaud.
The news that hostilities were impending caused great dissatisfaction
in England. Ministers were questioned upon the subject in both
Houses and the press commented upon the affair with much acrimony.
Under pretext of obtaining redress for some more or less imaginary
grievance, Morocco, it was predicted, would be invaded and, without
doubt, permanently occupied. The fate which had befallen the Dey
of Algiers was assuredly reserved for the Emperor of Morocco. This
general feeling of uneasiness and suspicion was increased by the
selection of the Prince de Joinville, the author of the recent
pamphlet, for the command of the squadron sent to cruise off
Tangier.[777] The two governments, nevertheless, maintained their
friendly communications. M. Guizot gave the most positive assurances
that every effort would be made to settle the affair peacefully, and
undertook that, should hostilities break out, Tangier[778] would
not be bombarded nor would any portion of Morocco be appropriated.
Aberdeen was not prepared to deny that the French government had grave
cause for complaint. Although it had been considered necessary for
the protection of British interests that a squadron should be sent to
the Moroccan coast, the British fleet in those waters, he promised
the French ambassador, would be numerically inferior to that of the
Prince de Joinville.[779] Had he regarded it as in the smallest degree
probable that his proposal would be accepted, he would, doubtless,
have suggested that England should act as mediator in the quarrel.
But, in spite of the fact that "the cordial understanding" had
been loudly proclaimed, the idea of allowing England to interfere
would have been so unpopular in France that no government could
have ventured to entertain it. Under these circumstances Aberdeen
could only direct Mr. Drummond Hay, the British consul at Tangier,
to proceed to Fez and to endeavour to prevail upon the Emperor to
acquiesce in the French demands. Notwithstanding that the Moors had
a second time attacked the column of General de Lamoricière, strong
hopes were entertained, at the end of July, that actual war might
still be averted.
On July 30, 1844, _The Times_ announced the startling news that Mr.
Pritchard, the British consul at Tahiti, had arrived in England,
after having been arrested, cast into a dungeon and finally expelled
from the island by the French military authorities. In answer to a
question put to him, the following night, by Sir Charles Napier in
the House of Commons, Sir Robert Peel declared that, if the reports
which the government had received were true, "a gross outrage" had
undoubtedly been perpetrated. But, when the next day M. de Jarnac
spoke to Lord Aberdeen on the subject, he was authorized to inform
M. Guizot that the Prime Minister could not admit that his words had
been correctly reported in the morning papers.[780] The first accounts
of Mr. Pritchard's case would seem to have been somewhat inaccurate.
When all the circumstances were brought to light, it was evident that
the British government had just cause to complain of the treatment
which he had experienced, but it was, at the same time, no less clear
that his own conduct had been most injudicious. Immediately upon the
proclamation of French sovereignty over Tahiti, Mr. Pritchard struck
his flag and sent a protest to Admiral Thouars. From this moment he
assumed so anomalous a position that it is not surprising that the
French governor, Admiral Bruat, should have refused to recognize
it. According to Pritchard's own statement, he "continued to perform
his functions as consul, except in corresponding with the French
authorities, and continued to act as the accredited agent of Great
Britain to Queen Pomare." Furthermore, he appears to have invited the
deposed Queen to take up her abode in his house, where she stayed
until, "considering it not safe to remain on shore," she decided
to go on board H.M.S. _Dublin_, which was lying in the harbour of
Papeite.[781]
The natives meanwhile were growing restless and evincing a
determination to resist the imposition of foreign rule. Their
hostility, in the opinion of the French officers, was to be ascribed
mainly to the pernicious example set them by Mr. Pritchard. No event
of importance, however, occurred until March 2, 1844, on which date,
during the absence of the governor from Papeite, a French sentry was
alleged to have been assaulted by a native. M. d'Aubigny, the senior
officer on the spot, thereupon proclaimed martial law throughout the
island and decreed the arrest of Mr. Pritchard, who was forthwith
imprisoned in an underground chamber beneath the guard room of a
block house. After he had been in captivity for four days and had
endured much discomfort, Admiral Bruat returned to Papeite. The
governor, perceiving at once that his subordinate had acted with undue
precipitation, ordered the release of Mr. Pritchard and his removal
to a British vessel, _The Cormorant_, which, on March 13, quitted the
island and carried him to Valparaiso.[782]
"Never since I have been in this country," wrote M. de Jarnac, "have I
seen anything to equal the excitement which the news from Tahiti has
aroused. The religious party took up the case at once. Meetings of the
'_Saints_' have been convened, violent speeches have been delivered
all over the country, and pictures representing certain of the
events connected with the affair have been exhibited. The papers are
very violent. Lord Aberdeen appears to be growing more apprehensive
daily. He is convinced that some form of satisfaction must be given.
He wishes, however, to leave the initiative of proposing it to
Your Excellency: but I happen to know that the plan of sending Mr.
Pritchard straight back to Tahiti has been under discussion by the
Cabinet."[783] In France the excitement was scarcely less intense.
The newspapers, with one accord, called loudly upon the government
to stand by its officers, and to deny Great Britain any kind of
reparation, even at the risk of war. The production of _Charles_ IV.
at the Opera House evoked a furious manifestation of hostility to
England. Fortunately, however, the session was brought to a close on
August 5, and, in the meantime, M. Guizot resolutely refused to make
any statement about the affair in the Chambers.[784]
But although the prorogation afforded him some relief, M. Guizot
was, nevertheless, in a position of extreme difficulty. His friends
unceasingly warned him that he must resist the demands of England,
or be prepared to succumb to the outburst of popular indignation
which any concessions would provoke.[785] Under these circumstances
he decided that complete inaction was, for the present, the safest
course to adopt. "The greater the excitement," he instructed Jarnac,
"the more necessary it becomes to allow it time to cool down. For
the moment we must abstain from all discussion of the subject."
Nevertheless, when interviewing Aberdeen, he would do well to
bring forward those arguments which he himself was employing in
his conversations with Lord Cowley. Stress should be laid upon
the fact that Pritchard had ceased to act as consul. As a private
individual whose presence was regarded as prejudicial to good order,
the colonial authorities had a universally acknowledged right to
expel him. At the same time, however, it could not be denied that
"some of the proceedings which had attended his removal had been
irregular. . . ."[786]
Hitherto Lord Aberdeen had studiously refrained from formulating any
precise demand. But, on August 13, after a meeting of the Cabinet,
he directed Cowley to give M. Guizot clearly to understand that,
unless satisfaction in some shape were voluntarily offered, he must
transmit "a formal and detailed statement of the grounds upon which
Her Majesty's government founded its expectations of redress."[787]
In England anger at the continued silence of the French government
was rising to a dangerous pitch. On August 14, at a meeting at Exeter
Hall, at which Mr. Pritchard himself was present, men, who in most
international disputes would have advocated peace at any price,
gave utterance to the most warlike sentiments. Two days later came
the news that the answer of the Emperor of Morocco to the French
_ultimatum_ having been considered unsatisfactory, Tangier had been
bombarded. "War," wrote M. de Jarnac, "is now generally regarded as
inevitable."[788] Lord Cowley was instructed to represent that "the
attack upon Tangier, after the repeated assurance of M. Guizot that it
would be respected under all circumstances, had greatly surprised the
British government . . . any occupation of the coast of Morocco could
not fail to be viewed in a very serious light by Great Britain, and
must lead to evils of great magnitude.[789]"
M. Guizot, however, adhered resolutely to his plan "of allowing time
for the excitement to cool down" in England, and he still forbore
to offer any satisfaction for the treatment to which Mr. Pritchard
had been subjected. Both he and the King appear to have strangely
underestimated the intensity of the resentment to which the Tahiti
affair had given rise. "The two governments," he informed Jarnac,
"were not yet agreed in their appreciation of the facts imputed to Mr.
Pritchard," and it was, consequently, impossible for the present to
discuss the nature of the reparation which might be due to him. Again,
a few days later, he directed him to inform Lord Aberdeen that his
despatch of the 13th would have to be deliberated upon by the Council,
"many of the members of which were absent from Paris."[790] Meanwhile,
the press of both countries was busily engaged in embittering the
quarrel. Some highly offensive attacks upon the private life of Mr.
Pritchard appeared in the French papers, whilst _The Times_ published
letters, purporting to have been written by naval officers who had
witnessed the bombardment of Tangier, in which the most insulting
doubts were cast upon the seamanship of the Prince de Joinville and
upon the fighting qualities of the French sailors.[791] M. Guizot,
however, continued to display a lofty indifference to the popular
excitement on both sides of the Channel. He was content to enjoin M.
de Jarnac to impress upon Lord Aberdeen that it "would be a disgrace,
were the peace of the world to be disturbed on account of Pritchard,
Pomare and d'Aubigny."[792]
But the young diplomatist in charge of the French embassy in London
was, fortunately, alive to the dangers of the situation. Ever since
the first arrival of the news from Tahiti, M. de Jarnac had sought
to convince his government that the affair was highly serious. Nor
was it only to M. Guizot that he addressed his warnings. Having been
charged to deliver a letter from the King to Prince Albert, he took
the opportunity, thus afforded him, of communicating his fears to
Louis Philippe himself. He begged him to believe that at a recent
Cabinet Council Lord Aberdeen had been the only minister to oppose a
large increase of the navy. "Were it not for the confidence reposed
in the wisdom of Your Majesty, the situation would resemble in many
unfortunate particulars that of 1840."[793] He daily adjured M. Guizot
to reflect most seriously upon the danger of deferring any longer his
reply to the British government. "People in England are discussing
alliances and talk of nothing but war. M. de Nesselrode is staying at
Brighton. He affects to be unconcerned with politics. But it is said
that he remains here in order that he may be upon the spot, should
a serious disagreement arise between France and England. If that be
his object, fortune may have favoured his designs in a remarkable
manner."[794]
The British Parliament was to be prorogued on September 5, and,
unless an announcement could be made in the Queen's Speech that a
settlement had been arrived at, war, it was generally felt, could
scarcely be avoided. Even M. Guizot began to realize that, if the
peace was to be preserved, he must propose some form of reparation.
On several occasions Jarnac had hinted that the British government
might very possibly be satisfied, were a pecuniary indemnity to be
offered to Mr. Pritchard.[795] Unquestionably, the payment of a sum
of money would be regarded in France as less objectionable than most
other forms of reparation. But, having proposed to the King and the
Cabinet that the affair should be settled on those lines, and having
obtained their assent, M. Guizot still deferred transmitting an offer
of pecuniary compensation to London. In a despatch, dated August 29, a
copy of which was to be given to Lord Aberdeen, he stoutly maintained
the right of the authorities at Tahiti to expel Mr. Pritchard from
the island. His imprisonment, however, and certain other acts of
which M. d'Aubigny had been guilty, could not be defended, and that
officer would, in consequence, receive in due course a notification
of the censure which the government had passed upon his conduct. He
could concede no more, he told Lord Cowley, and he fully intended
to retire from office, if further redress were to be demanded.[796]
Nevertheless, he appears privately to have informed M. de Jarnac
that he was transmitting a second despatch, containing an offer of
a money payment to Mr. Pritchard, which he was to communicate to
Lord Aberdeen, should the British government regard the reprimand,
administered to M. d'Aubigny, as an inadequate reparation. This,
as he doubtless expected, was the view taken of his first despatch
by the Cabinet in London. Jarnac, in consequence, lost no time in
assuring Lord Aberdeen that an offer of a pecuniary indemnity would
be made. Had he not taken this responsibility upon himself, he was
convinced that the customary announcement that "friendly relations
existed with other countries" would have been omitted from the Queen's
Speech, and "the whole of Europe would have been thrown into a state
of perturbation." On the following day, September 4, he placed in the
hands of Lord Aberdeen the official offer of the French government
to indemnify Mr. Pritchard by the payment of a sum of money, the
amount of which was to be determined by the admirals commanding the
French and British fleets in the Pacific. Aberdeen pronounced the
proposed satisfaction "rather slender," but assured him that he
might now consider the matter as settled.[797] Twenty-four hours
later Parliament was prorogued, and the happy termination of the
Pritchard affair was announced in the Speech from the Throne. "The
danger," wrote Queen Victoria to the King of the Belgians, had been
"imminent."[798]
The settlement of the Tahiti dispute was quickly followed by the
welcome news that France had concluded peace with the Emperor of
Morocco. Marshal Bugeaud, on August 14, had won a decisive victory
over the Moors on the river Isly, whilst at sea the Prince de
Joinville, after silencing the forts of Tangier, had, on August 15,
destroyed the defences of Mogador. Neither the King nor M. Guizot
desired to prosecute the campaign any further. They had obtained
all the advantages which they could hope to derive from active
hostilities. They had proved that they were not to be deterred, by
the irritation which their action had called forth in England, from
inflicting a severe punishment upon the Moors. The national thirst
for military glory had been sufficiently appeased by the successes
which had already been achieved. Under these circumstances, they were
not disposed to be exacting in their conditions. Provided the Emperor
would submit to the terms set forth in their original _ultimatum_,
they would not insist upon an indemnity, but would recall their troops
and forthwith suspend hostilities. The Court of Fez promptly acceded
to these moderate demands, and, on September 10, 1844, a treaty of
peace was signed at Tangier.
The cessation of hostilities between France and Morocco removed much
of the resentment which recent events in the Mediterranean and in
the Pacific had aroused in England. Notwithstanding that, at the end
of August, 1844, the two countries had been upon the brink of war,
Louis Philippe, early in October, was enabled to return the visit
which Queen Victoria, the year before, had paid him at the Château
d'Eu. During his stay in England the King was installed with much
magnificence as a Knight of the Garter at Windsor, and, on every
occasion on which he was seen in public, was accorded a hearty welcome
by the people. Isabella's marriage still occupied the foremost place
in his thoughts. That question, however, had made but little progress,
in spite of the overthrow of Espartero and of the triumph of Christina
and the _Moderados_.
After the flight of the Regent Spain had passed under the rule of
Ramon Maria Narvaez, the Captain-General of Castile, an able and
unscrupulous adventurer. The Liberals, who had joined with the
_Moderados_ in encompassing the downfall of Espartero, were quickly
forced to realize the magnitude of their folly. Parliamentary
government was practically abolished, and any attempts to resist
the authority of the dictator were mercilessly repressed. Over two
hundred executions for political offences, during the space of one
year, broke the spirit of the democratic party, and gave the country
an outward appearance of tranquillity. The difficulty of selecting a
Regent in the place of Espartero had, in the meantime, been overcome
by the unconstitutional declaration of the Cortes, on November 8,
1843, that the Queen was of full age, although she had only entered
upon her fourteenth year. The question having thus been settled,
Christina, in the spring of 1844, left Paris and returned to Madrid,
accompanied by her husband, Nuñoz, henceforward to be known as the
Duke of Rianzarez.
In 1844 the eldest son of Don Carlos, the two sons of Don Francisco
de Paula, and Count Trapani, the brother of the King of Naples, and
of Christina herself, were, for all practical purposes, the only
unmarried male descendants of Philip V. If, therefore, the principle
proclaimed by Louis Philippe were to be adhered to, Isabella's choice
of a husband must be restricted to these four princes. To each one,
however, there were serious objections. Although a suitable candidate
in other respects, the son of Don Carlos was ineligible on political
grounds.[799] The idea of her daughter's marriage with either of the
sons of Don Francisco de Paula was most distasteful to Christina.
Notwithstanding that their mother, the Infanta Carlotta, was her
sister, she had for a long time past looked upon her as her worst
enemy. Nor had the death of this princess, early in 1844,[800] greatly
diminished the animosity with which she regarded this branch of the
family. But in addition to the feud which had existed for so many
years between Christina and their mother, both young men for different
reasons were objectionable in themselves. The appearance of the elder,
Don Francisco de Asis, Duke of Cadiz, was ridiculous and effeminate,
and he, moreover, was generally believed to be impotent. Christina,
however, appears to have regarded the loudly professed Liberalism
of Don Enrique, Duke of Seville, as a more serious objection to his
marriage with her daughter than the physical unfitness of his elder
brother. The fourth candidate, Count Trapani, was an unattractive,
backward youth of sixteen, whose life had hitherto been spent within
the walls of a Jesuit College at Rome. The difficulties, however,
in the way of his marriage with Isabella were mainly political.
Metternich greatly disliked the notion of a closer connection between
the absolute Court of Naples and the constitutional monarchy of
Spain.[801] Furthermore, the Spanish people despised the Neapolitans,
and could not fail to resent the idea of selecting the Royal Consort
from the Neapolitan branch of the Bourbons.[802]
Count Trapani, nevertheless, was chosen by Louis Philippe and M.
Guizot as the most suitable husband for Isabella. In the summer of
1844, the French agents, both at Naples and at Madrid, were instructed
to further his candidature by all means in their power.[803]
Christina's feelings on the subject cannot be precisely determined.
There can be little doubt, however, that she never gave the project
her hearty support. Probably she realized that it was impracticable
by reason of the dislike with which it was certain to be regarded by
Spaniards of all classes. It is significant that one of her first
acts, after her return to Madrid, was to assure Mr. Bulwer that she
had no intention of submitting to the dictation of Louis Philippe,
and that she still hoped to arrange the marriage of Isabella with
Leopold, the son of Prince Ferdinand of Coburg.[804] Henry Bulwer had
been appointed British minister at Madrid, soon after the downfall
of the Regent. Aberdeen appears to have been anxious that a man,
less wedded than Aston to Palmerstonian traditions, should carry
out the new policy of cordially co-operating with France for the
general welfare of Spain. The French government, once Espartero had
been expelled, had hastened to resume normal diplomatic relations
with the Court of Isabella. Accordingly, almost at the same time as
Bulwer was sent to Madrid, the Comte Bresson, whose proceedings at
Brussels in 1831 have been related, was transferred from Berlin to the
Spanish capital as French ambassador. Far from acting harmoniously
together, however, they appear to have cordially disliked each other.
Bresson is described by Bulwer,[805] in his _Life of Palmerston_, as
a person sprung from the middle classes, and "consequently vulgarly
pre-occupied with his position as ambassador." Bresson,[806] for his
part, considered his English colleague as "_pas élevé_," and as a man
against whom he must constantly be on his guard, lest he should take
some liberty with him.
At the close of the year of 1844, a further complication was added to
the many difficulties which surrounded the question of the Queen's
marriage. "I believe," wrote Lord Cowley,[807] "that Louis Philippe
is thinking of the marriage of Montpensier[808] with the sister of
Isabella." The supposition was perfectly correct. It is impossible,
however, to say with certainty when the King first decided to put
forward his son as a candidate for the hand of the Infanta Fernanda.
According to Guizot,[809] the suggestion was not made until the autumn
of 1844, and it was then propounded, he alleges, for the purpose of
reconciling Christina and the Spanish people to the insignificance
of the Neapolitan alliance. But it was always, he asserts, made
perfectly clear that the Montpensier marriage could not take place
until the Queen had married and borne a child. Be that as it may, it
was not considered advisable to inform Lord Aberdeen of this project.
During the next few months, however, the new matrimonial scheme was
the subject of many rumours, and, in the month of July, 1845, a visit
of the Duke of Rianzarez to Paris was so generally believed to be
connected with this affair, that it was felt that some explanation
must be given to the British government.[810] M. Guizot, accordingly,
informed Mr. Bulwer, who happened to be in Paris on his way to London,
that he wished Lord Aberdeen to know that "King Louis Philippe and
Queen Christina were desirous to settle the marriage for private and
personal reasons into which the Infanta's fortune entered." It would
not take place for some time, he assured him, and in any case not
until Isabella had had children.[811]
On September 8, 1845, Queen Victoria paid a second visit to Louis
Philippe at the Château d'Eu. Her Majesty, Prince Albert, Aberdeen and
Peel had been considerably disturbed by the news brought by Bulwer
from Paris. But on the very day of the arrival of the Royal party at
Eu, both the King and M. Guizot declared to Lord Aberdeen, "in the
most positive and explicit manner, that until the Queen was married
and had children, they should consider the Infanta precisely as her
sister, and that any marriage with a French prince would be entirely
out of the question. . . . I distinctly understood," wrote Aberdeen
to Peel a few hours after he had received these assurances, "that it
was not only a marriage and a child, but children that were necessary
to secure the succession. I thought this was as much as we could
desire at present, and that the question of a marriage with a French
prince might safely be left to be considered, whenever the contingency
contemplated should arrive. Many things may happen in the course of a
few years."[812]
On the very day that Queen Victoria arrived at Eu, the Duc and the
Duchesse de Nemours and the Duke d'Aumale left Pampeluna, where they
had been the guests of the Spanish Royal family. The real object
of their visit would never appear to have transpired.[813] Bulwer,
for reasons which in due course he explained to Aberdeen, was not
present at Pampeluna, and delayed returning to Spain until the French
princes had recrossed the frontier. The interview, he understood,
had been arranged for the purpose of "pushing on the marriage with
Count Trapani, a marriage most unpopular in the country." He had,
therefore, decided to stay away. By absenting himself, his government
would not incur "the odium which must stigmatize all those by whom
the Neapolitan match may be conceived to have been brought about." On
the other hand, should the visit of the French princes not achieve
the desired result, they would be unable to impute its failure "to
the intrigues of the British minister." Upon his return to Madrid,
Bulwer experienced great difficulty in obtaining any information
about the state of affairs. Bresson assured him that Isabella's
health "was declared to be such as to render her marriage for the
present inopportune."[814] Christina gave him to understand that
matters were still undecided. "But her language was not that of entire
confidence, and she seemed divided between the wish to say nothing
and the desire to say enough to prevent any subsequent charge of
want of frankness." Upon the whole, he was inclined to think that
some plan was contemplated, "which it was not yet judged expedient
to avow."[815] From divers sources he learnt that the Queen-Mother,
Bresson and Carini, the Neapolitan ambassador, were suspected of an
intention "privately to betroth Isabella to Trapani, and to force
his acceptance upon the Cortes." Narvaez had been induced to support
their unconstitutional designs, "in the belief that he would be more
necessary with an unpopular, than with a popular prince."[816]
Meanwhile, M. Bresson at Madrid and M. Guizot in Paris were greatly
dissatisfied with the aspect of affairs. The King of Naples had always
been reluctant to allow his brother to be put forward as a suitor
for the hand of the Queen of Spain. He distrusted Louis Philippe
exceedingly, he was fearful of offending the Court of Vienna, he was
on bad terms with his sister Christina, and, in point of fact, had not
officially acknowledged the sovereignty of Isabella. Nevertheless,
under the vigorous pressure brought to bear upon him from Paris, he
agreed to renew diplomatic relations with the Court of Madrid, and
to empower his ambassador to discuss his brother's marriage. But,
having surmounted the difficulties at Naples, Louis Philippe and
M. Guizot were confronted by more serious obstacles at Madrid. As
time went on, the unpopularity of the Neapolitan match tended rather
to increase than to diminish. So universal was the dislike to this
connection that Guizot judged it prudent to warn Bresson to maintain
friendly relations with Don Francisco de Paula,[817] seeing that it
might be necessary before long to insist upon Isabella's marriage
with one of his sons. As the prospects of the Bourbon candidates grew
less favourable the Coburg marriage, greatly to the annoyance of
Louis Philippe, began to be discussed as a necessary alternative. The
impending visit of Prince Leopold to his brother the King of Portugal
gave rise to many rumours. There was an intrigue on foot, reported
Bresson, to promote the chances of that prince, and Bulwer, he was
convinced, was more or less concerned in it.[818]
Under these circumstances M. Guizot decided to direct M. de Jarnac to
confer upon the situation with Lord Aberdeen. He was to intimate to
him that, in fulfilment of the compact at Eu, he should now bestir
himself actively on behalf of the Bourbon candidates, and make it
perfectly clear to the Coburgs that no member of their family could be
allowed to marry Isabella. This was more than Aberdeen was prepared
to undertake. He, however, assured M. de Jarnac upon his honour that
the Coburgs should receive no encouragement either from the Court or
from the government, and promised him that they would be advised to
abandon their supposed intention of visiting Madrid.[819] Aberdeen
was at this time in receipt of Bulwer's despatch of October 30,
1845, informing him of his suspicion that Christina and Narvaez
were purposing to accomplish the Trapani marriage, in violation of
the article of the constitution which prescribed that the sovereign
must communicate his intention of contracting a matrimonial alliance
to the Cortes. He at once replied by charging him to express to the
general the sincere hope of the British government that no such plan
was under consideration. "Say to him," he wrote in conclusion, "that
you are instructed to offer no opposition to the marriage of the Queen
to Trapani, provided it be openly accomplished according to legal
forms, still less are you authorized to espouse the cause of any other
candidate."[820]
Mere friendly neutrality, however, could be of little service to
Louis Philippe and M. Guizot. A further disappointment, moreover,
was in store for them. At the end of January, 1846, General Narvaez,
who, as a supporter of the Neapolitan alliance, had been growing
very unpopular, resigned office after a violent quarrel with his
fellow-ministers.[821] When the news reached Paris that the one man
who might have effected the Trapani marriage was no longer at the
head of affairs, it was decided to make another, and a more direct,
attempt to force the British government to take action on behalf
of the Bourbon candidate. Jarnac was, accordingly, supplied with a
document, which he was to read to Lord Aberdeen. This extraordinary
paper, known as the _Memorandum of February 27_, 1846, set forth the
following conclusions: "The Count Trapani is greatly compromised: 1.
By the demonstration which has been made against him; 2. By the fall
of General Narvaez. The sons of Don Francisco de Paula are greatly
compromised: 1. By their mistaken conduct; 2. By their intimacy with
the Radical party; 3. By the dislike of the Queen-Mother and of the
young Queen herself to them. The sons of Don Carlos are for the time
out of the question. The actual situation of the descendants of Philip
V. is consequently bad. Efforts are being made to marry Prince Leopold
of Coburg either to the Queen Isabella or to the Infanta Fernanda.
Lisbon is the chief seat of these machinations. It is said that Prince
Leopold, who is to leave Lisbon on February 24, intends to visit
Madrid. Many circumstances appear to confirm the truth of this rumour.
If the present state of affairs be prolonged we may find ourselves
compelled, in order that our policy in Spain may not receive a check
which we are determined not to suffer, to declare ourselves liberated
from all engagements with regard to either marriage. Such a situation
would arise, were the marriage of the Queen or the Infanta with Prince
Leopold of Coburg or with any other prince, not a descendant of Philip
V., to appear probable or imminent. In that case we should take
immediate steps to ward off the blow by demanding the hand of either
the Queen or the Infanta for the Duc de Montpensier. We are sincerely
desirous of averting the necessity of resorting to so extreme a
measure. We see only one way in which the crisis can be avoided. The
English Cabinet must co-operate actively with us in promoting the
claims of one of the descendants of Philip V., no matter which, and in
arranging his marriage with Queen Isabella, and in preventing, in the
meanwhile, the marriage of the Infanta either with Prince Leopold or
with any other prince, not a descendant of Philip V."[822]
Aberdeen appears to have listened in silence and to have made no
protest against the unwarrantable assumptions contained in this
document. No copy of it was given to him, nor would he seem to have
asked for one.[823] Meanwhile, strange events were taking place in
Spain. The Miraflores Cabinet was quickly overthrown and, on March
17, 1846, Narvaez was once more at the head of the government. His
return to power was quickly followed by the promulgation of decrees
restricting the liberty of the press and suspending the sittings of
the Cortes.[824] Bulwer was convinced that it was decided forthwith
to betroth Isabella to Trapani, regardless of public opinion and of
legal forms.[825] But, if Narvaez ever contemplated a _coup d'état_
of this nature, he soon relinquished the idea. His tenure of office
was of very brief duration. On April 5 he was dismissed and ordered
to quit Madrid immediately. The mystery which surrounds these sudden
changes of government has never been satisfactorily unravelled. It
is certain that they were connected, more or less directly, with
Isabella's marriage. At first sight it would seem as though Christina
had resolved to discard Narvaez, because she perceived that he
was powerless to effect the Trapani marriage. Nevertheless, this
apparently obvious explanation is probably erroneous. The Queen-Mother
was never really desirous that her daughter should marry her uncle,
Trapani. But she wished to ruin Narvaez, whose secret aim it was to
diminish the influence of the Court and of the Church.[826] It is
possible, therefore, that she may have insisted upon his supporting
the Neapolitan alliance in order simply to discredit him. In this
crafty fashion she may have hoped to rid herself of the man who, she
had once declared, "was more arrogant than Espartero."[827]
On April 8, 1846, the following message[828] was received in Paris
from M. Bresson, who, doubtless, had some person in his employ in
close attendance upon Isabella. "_La reine est nubile depuis deux
heures._"[829] Whether or not this news was communicated to Lord
Cowley by M. Guizot, it was certainly known at once at the British
embassy. Christina could no longer invoke physical reasons for
delaying her daughter's marriage. But, meanwhile, the number of
Bourbon candidates was rapidly diminishing. Trapani was too unpopular,
and Don Enrique, Duke of Seville, the younger son of Don Francisco de
Paula, had recently been concerned in an insurrection in Gallicia,
and had been ordered to leave Spain. The only available husband for
Isabella among the descendants of Philip V. was, therefore, Don
Enrique's elder brother, Don Francisco, Duke of Cadiz, whom both
she and her mother disliked and despised. Christina, under these
circumstances, resolved to revert to the matrimonial combination
which she had constantly regarded as the best. The moment was not
unfavourable for openly defying Louis Philippe. Narvaez, the minister
who had always been looked upon as the chief tool of the French Court,
was in disgrace, and Isturiz, his successor, was her devoted servant.
She accordingly determined to propose to the Duke of Saxe-Coburg that
Isabella should marry his son, Prince Leopold. After informing him of
its contents, she gave the letter containing this offer to Mr. Bulwer,
asking that it might be conveyed to Lisbon by his messenger. The
British minister complied with her request and reported the affair to
his chief.
Lord Aberdeen was seriously annoyed, and at once informed M. de
Sainte-Aulaire of what had passed, assuring him that he should
administer a severe rebuke to Mr. Bulwer. Bulwer, he considered, had
violated his instructions, both in undertaking to transmit the offer
to Lisbon and in concealing Christina's proceedings from M. Bresson.
In consequence of the strictures passed upon his conduct, Bulwer
offered to resign. Aberdeen, however, in a friendly letter insisted
upon his remaining at his post.[830] A few days later, on June 29,
1846, Sir Robert Peel announced that he and his colleagues had retired
from office, and that Lord John Russell had undertaken to form a
government. On June 25, on the very day on which their Corn Bill had
been carried through the House of Lords, ministers had been defeated
in the Commons by a Radical and Protectionist coalition. In the new
administration the seals of the Foreign Office passed into the keeping
of Lord Palmerston.
CHAPTER X
THE SPANISH MARRIAGES[831]
At the close of the year 1845, when Peel had resigned office on
account of the dissensions in his Cabinet on the question of the
Corn Laws, Lord John Russell had in vain attempted to form a
government. His failure had been due to the objections urged by Lord
Grey to Palmerston's return to the Foreign Office.[832] Peel had,
in consequence, agreed to withdraw his resignation and to carry on
the government. But it was soon clear that the Protectionists, if
they could not prevent the passage of his Corn Bill, would certainly
encompass his downfall at the first opportunity. Palmerston, under
these circumstances, judged it advisable to take steps to remove the
impression that his nomination as Foreign Secretary would create alarm
in France and imperil "the cordial understanding." He, accordingly,
decided to visit Paris with the object of dispelling this idea. His
intimate knowledge of the French language and his considerable powers
of conversation, combined with the personal charm of Lady Palmerston,
soon achieved the desired result. In the previous month of December,
the prospect that "_ce terrible Lord Palmerston_" would be once again
at the Foreign Office had spread dismay in ministerial circles.
But, in the following spring, when he returned to England, after a
few weeks' stay in Paris, the amiable qualities and the friendly
dispositions of "_ce cher Lord Palmerston_" were the chief topic of
conversation in the political _salons_.[833]
Louis Philippe and his Foreign Minister had been most disagreeably
surprised by the disclosure of the proposal made by Christina to
the Duke of Saxe-Coburg. Lord Aberdeen's straightforward conduct
in the affair could not undo the fact that the Queen-Mother had
deliberately, and without the knowledge of the French ambassador,
opened a negotiation for the marriage of Isabella to a prince,
who was not a descendant of Philip V. In pursuance of this policy
the Duke of Sotomayor, the Spanish ambassador in London, had been
instructed to inquire officially in what light the British government
would regard the selection of a prince, who was not a Bourbon, as
the future husband of the Queen. To this question Lord Aberdeen had
replied that, "should it be found that no descendant of Philip V.
could safely be chosen, consistently with the happiness of the Queen
or with a due regard to the tranquillity of the country, it could be
no cause of displeasure to Great Britain were a prince from some other
family to be selected." He could not believe that in such a case "the
enlightened Court of the Tuileries" would interfere. "But, if contrary
to all reason and probability, an attempt were made to control the
wishes and feelings of the Queen and the clearly understood will of
her people, Spain would not only receive the warmest sympathy of Great
Britain but of all Europe."[834]
M. Guizot appears to have been even more annoyed than Louis Philippe
at Christina's proposal to the Coburgs. He is said, indeed, to
have attempted to persuade the King to counteract it, by demanding
the hand of Isabella for his son Montpensier. But neither Louis
Philippe nor the young Duke himself were prepared to resort to so
extreme a measure. The King, for the present, was content to address
acrimonious complaints to Christina,[835] and to instruct M. Bresson
to make a strong representation to the Spanish ministers.[836] At the
same time, both he and M. Guizot decided to take steps to effect a
reconciliation between the Queen-Mother and General Narvaez, whose
return to power they regarded as essential to the success of their
plans. Meanwhile, Jarnac spoke of Palmerston, with whom he had had his
first interview on July 14, as "fairly well intentioned and rather
timid." This description of his attitude, M. Guizot admitted, was
most satisfactory. "Nevertheless, between him and me," he pointed out
to his royal master, "there can be nothing more than a marriage of
reason." He purposed, therefore, so to arrange matters that he might
be enabled to communicate his views directly to Lord John Russell.
"It will require nice handling to speak to one about foreign affairs
without offending the other. But, on occasions, we may have to do
so."[837]
Bresson appears to have expressed himself strongly in favour of
abandoning the Trapani marriage. In his opinion the matter resolved
itself simply into choosing one of the sons of Don Francisco. Jarnac
was, accordingly, instructed to propose to Lord Palmerston that these
two princes should be the objects of the joint support of France and
England. "London," wrote M. Guizot to Louis Philippe, "will certainly
favour Don Enrique, on account of his intimate connection with the
_Progressistas_. . . . Evidently Cadiz would be the best selection
for the Queen, Spain, and ourselves. Nevertheless, I do not think it
advisable to propose him directly."[838] Although Christina's overture
to the Duke of Saxe-Coburg at Lisbon had been made early in June, no
answer had yet been returned to it. The prudent Coburgs would seem to
have regarded it as inexpedient to incur the lasting enmity of Louis
Philippe, for the sake of seeing a member of their family raised to
the position of King-Consort of Spain. Upon his arrival in England,
at the end of June, the Duke was strongly advised in this sense both
by King Leopold and by Prince Albert. He, accordingly, resolved to
reject Christina's offer, on the ground of the injury which must
result to Spain from a marriage contracted in opposition to the wishes
of France.[839] This decision, however, would not appear to have been
communicated directly to Louis Philippe. Nevertheless, the private
letters, during the months of July and August, both of Bresson and
Guizot, show plainly that they were aware that the Coburgs had no
intention of entertaining the Queen-Mother's proposal.[840]
Palmerston, whilst in opposition, appears to have known nothing of
the details of the Spanish marriage question. Until informed of it
by Aberdeen, with whom he had a long conversation in the first days
of July, he was completely ignorant of Christina's proposal to the
Coburgs.[841] From 1834 to 1841, however, he had constantly been
engaged in combating the _Moderados_, and, upon his return to office
in 1846, he at once reverted to his former policy of favouring the
_Progressistas_. Under these circumstances, the candidature of Don
Enrique, whose connection with the extreme wing of the Liberal party
had been the cause of his exile and disgrace, would naturally enlist
his approval and support. Nevertheless, in his first communication to
Mr. Bulwer, he expressed no preference for any particular candidate.
Spanish affairs, he wrote in his famous despatch of July 19, appeared
to be divided into two questions--the marriage of the Queen and the
condition of the country. In respect to the first, he had nothing
to add to those instructions with which Bulwer had been supplied
by his predecessor in office. There were three candidates in the
field--Prince Leopold of Coburg and the two sons of Don Francisco de
Paula--and "Her Majesty's government could only hope that the choice
might fall upon the one most likely to secure the happiness of the
Queen and promote the welfare of the Spanish nation." The greater part
of the despatch, however, was concerned with the second question--the
political condition of the country. On that point, although Lord
Palmerston had no particular instructions to give, he had some very
severe criticisms to offer. "After a struggle of now thirty-four
years' duration for constitutional freedom, Spain," he declared,
"finds herself under a system of government almost as arbitrary in
practice, whatever it may be in theory, as any which has existed in
any former period of her history. She has indeed a Parliament, but
all freedom for discussion has been overborne by force. . . . There
is, indeed, by law liberty of the press, but that liberty has, by
the arbitrary acts of the government, been reduced to the liberty of
publishing what may be agreeable to the executive. . . . This system
of violence seems, in some degree, to have survived the fall of its
author[842] and not to have been as yet entirely abandoned by the
more moderate men who have succeeded him in the government. . . . It
was certainly not for the purpose of subjecting the Spanish nation
to a grinding tyranny that Great Britain entered into the Quadruple
Alliance and gave that active assistance, which contributed so
materially to the expulsion of Don Carlos from Spain. . . ."[843]
This despatch was not to be communicated to the Spanish Minister for
Foreign Affairs, but was intended to enable Mr. Bulwer to express,
"to those persons who might have the power of remedying the existing
evils," the opinions of his government upon the state of the country.
But, having sent it to Madrid, Palmerston, on July 20, confidentially
informed M. de Jarnac of its contents and allowed him to be supplied
with a copy of it. It is plain that he must have had some reason for
thus communicating to the French _chargé d'affaires_ a despatch,
replete with sentiments which could not but be otherwise than very
distasteful to his government. Without doubt, he must have known
that Bulwer's instructions would be at once passed on from Paris to
Madrid, and it can only, therefore, be supposed that he wished the
Spanish ministers to learn in this manner exactly what he thought
about them. Perhaps, also, he was not sorry that M. Guizot should
have an opportunity of realizing the very low estimation in which he
held his political friends, the _Moderados_. To the marriage question
he obviously attached little importance, and his remarks upon that
subject were, doubtless, drawn up far less carefully than those which
had reference to the actual condition of Spain.
Louis Philippe, at this time, was somewhat disturbed by a letter from
M. Bresson to M. Guizot, dated July 12, in which the ambassador gave a
lengthy account of his recent proceedings at Madrid. The Queen-Mother,
he reported, urged various objections to the Duke of Cadiz.
"Isabella," she declared, "had an insurmountable aversion to him and
she herself had grave doubts about his virility. This last statement,"
wrote M. Bresson, "took us upon very delicate ground. She adverted
to his voice, his hips, and his general bodily conformation, and I
replied by insisting that his rigid morality was to be ascribed solely
to his consuming passion for the Queen, her daughter. Furthermore, I
pointed out, that his desire to marry was inconsistent with the idea
that he was incapable of fulfilling the conditions of matrimony."
Christina's opinion upon that point was probably little influenced by
arguments such as these. But, when M. Bresson took upon himself to
assure her that, "in any Bourbon combination" the marriage of the Duc
de Montpensier with the Infanta could be announced simultaneously with
that of the Queen, she received the information with "every appearance
of sincere pleasure." Rianzarez also expressed to him his satisfaction
with this arrangement, which would remove the great political
objection to the Queen's marriage with Cadiz or, even, with Trapani.
Bresson, however, was of opinion that her union with the former could
be effected more easily and expeditiously than with the latter, and
he, accordingly, suggested that his regiment should be brought to
Madrid, in order that, "by constantly seeing him, Isabella might grow
accustomed to his voice and hips."[844]
The Queens, Louis Philippe declared at once, must be given to
understand clearly that Bresson had no right to promise that the
two marriages would be concluded simultaneously. He was not to be
moved from this decision by Guizot's insinuation that possibly the
ambassador had not gone quite so far as His Majesty imagined. On the
contrary, he replied, he had very little doubt that he had committed
himself even more deeply than he admitted. It was while he was in this
mood that Jarnac's copy of Palmerston's despatch of July 19 reached
Paris. A perusal of its contents caused the King a considerable amount
of annoyance,[845] yet it would not appear to have weakened his
determination to insist upon the disavowal of M. Bresson.[846] But the
question, as to how far the despatch of July 19 was responsible for
the final decision of Louis Philippe, will be discussed later on.
Although in his official instructions he had expressed no preference
for any particular candidate, Palmerston soon informed Bulwer,
privately, that Don Enrique was the British candidate.[847] The
selection of that prince called forth no objections from M. de
Jarnac. On the contrary, as late as August 16, he gave Palmerston
definitely to understand that, provided he would adhere to that
arrangement, France would join with him in pressing it upon the
Court of Madrid.[848] Bulwer, however, was filled with dismay on
learning that he was expected to support the suit of Don Enrique.
He had little fault to find with him personally. He considered him
manly, enterprising and ambitious, and described him as resembling
in many respects Prince Louis Napoleon.[849] There was one objection
to him, however, and that was an insuperable one--nothing short of a
successful revolution would induce Christina to accept him. "Let me
caution your Lordship again and again," he wrote on August 4, "against
appearing to listen to the counsels of the _Progressistas_ and Don
Enrique, if you wish to retain the confidence of the palace."[850]
No sooner was Palmerston installed at the Foreign Office, than Bulwer,
reverting to his former scheme, began to plead earnestly in favour
of the Coburg marriage. France, he maintained, in order to carry out
successfully her plans of aggrandisement in Algeria, Morocco, Tunis
and Egypt must exercise a paramount influence at Madrid. It followed,
therefore, that all her ambitious designs would be checkmated by the
Queen's marriage outside the Bourbon line. "The policy of maintaining
good relations with France," he was not disposed to dispute it, "was
a great and wise policy. But what would happen," he asked, "were
Louis Philippe to die? In that event would not the power of a great
military nation fall into the hands of three or four enterprising
young men, burning for glory in their several careers? The policy of
good relations with France depended," he much feared, "upon the life
of a man of seventy-four and upon the well or the ill-directed aim of
an assassin."[851] The Coburg marriage, Christina assured him, could
still be arranged. Let the management of the affair be entrusted to
him and he would undertake to bring it to a successful conclusion.
France would oppose it vigorously, and it must, therefore, be prepared
in secrecy. Indeed, he acknowledged that his plan must needs "wear
the aspect of an intrigue, in order to avoid the effects of an
intrigue."[852]
Palmerston, however, was not to be diverted from his intention by
these arguments. The Court, the government, and the Coburgs themselves
were alike agreed that Louis Philippe's hostility to it had rendered
the Spanish proposal unacceptable. On August 22, therefore, he
addressed a lengthy despatch to Bulwer, in which he laid it down as
the deliberate opinion of the British government that Don Enrique was
the most suitable candidate.[853] But, before this communication could
reach Madrid, the affair to which it referred had been definitely
settled. The French government had not failed to turn its knowledge
of Palmerston's dispatch of July 19 to account. M. Bresson, in
pursuance of M. Guizot's[854] instructions, had been busily engaged in
representing it as a declaration of hostility against the _Moderado_
government in Madrid. Nuñoz, the brother of the Duke of Rianzarez,
informed Mr. Bulwer that all hope of arranging the Coburg marriage
had been abandoned, that Palmerston "would listen to no other
alliance but that of Don Enrique, who is looked upon by the Court as
an open adversary and a disguised rebel," and that a _Progressista_
insurrection was being prepared in London.[855] Only a week after
he had transmitted this news, the British minister, on August 29,
reported that the Queen, the night before at 12 o'clock, had made
up her mind in favour of Don Francisco de Asis, Duke of Cadiz.
Furthermore, he had to inform Lord Palmerston that the marriage of
the Duc de Montpensier would take place at the same time. "I learn,"
he wrote in conclusion, "that directly the Queen had signified her
intention of marrying her cousin, Count Bresson formally asked the
hand of the Infanta for the Duke of Montpensier, stating that he had
powers to enter upon and conclude that affair."[856]
M. Guizot, on September 1, communicated this news to Lord Normanby,
the new British ambassador in Paris.[857] Palmerston, who was
yachting with Her Majesty on the south coast of England, received
the information of the conclusion of the double marriage in a letter
from the Comte de Jarnac. Louis Philippe eluded the disagreeable
task of apprising Queen Victoria that he had broken his compact, by
allowing his own Queen, Marie Amélie, to convey the intelligence
to her. The reply which she received was short and cold. "You will
remember," wrote Queen Victoria, "what passed between the King and
myself at Eu. . . . You will, doubtless, have heard that, in order
to be agreeable to your King, we declined to arrange the marriage
of our cousin, Prince Leopold, with the Queen of Spain. . . . You
will, therefore, easily understand that the sudden announcement of
this double marriage could only cause us surprise and the keenest
regret. . ."[858]
M. Guizot explained his conduct by referring to the _Memorandum of
February 27, 1846_, of the existence of which Palmerston was now for
the first time informed. In that document France had reserved to
herself the right of departing from the agreement at Eu, should at any
time a Coburg marriage appear "imminent or probable." Palmerston's
inclusion of Prince Leopold among the available candidates in his
despatch of July 19, combined with Christina's overture at Lisbon,
in the previous month of May, had created a situation, M. Guizot
insisted, which released France from all her engagements. But,
although he firmly maintained this contention and instructed M. de
Jarnac to hold the same language in London, his conduct was not that
of a man confident in the justice of his cause. Besides attempting
to induce Lord Aberdeen to declare that, under the circumstances, a
departure from the compact at Eu was permissible, he drew up a bitter
attack upon Lord Palmerston and sent it to Jarnac with instructions
to forward it to Lord John Russell. But in both cases he met with
disappointment. Aberdeen told him frankly that he could not adopt his
view of the case, and that he had no fault to find with the language
or the conduct of his successor in office.[859] John Russell showed
his letter to Palmerston, and informed M. de Jarnac that his colleague
had his hearty approval and support.[860] Louis Philippe, meanwhile,
had compiled a lengthy statement of his case and had sent it to
his daughter, the Queen of the Belgians, in order that it might be
placed before Queen Victoria. But neither his laboured attempts to
extenuate his own conduct nor his insinuations about Lord Palmerston
produced the desired effect. After a careful consideration of his
letter, replied the Queen on September 27, she had failed to discover
any reasons which could justify him in breaking his promise. She had
arrived at this conclusion, she begged him to believe, "by the help
of her own eyes," not, as he had suggested, by the aid of those of
Lord Palmerston.[861]
The protests of the Queen, however, were as ineffectual as the
official remonstrances of Bulwer at Madrid and of Normanby in Paris.
On October 10, 1846, the double marriage was duly solemnized at the
palace, in the hall called "_de Embajadores_." The British minister
was not present at the ceremony, which was witnessed by a great crowd
of persons. "One _viva_ only was heard, and that not very loud,
when the Infante Don Francisco descended from his carriage."[862]
Louis Philippe and M. Guizot had attained their object, but they had
sacrificed "the cordial understanding." In England, the authors of
the Spanish marriages stood condemned by the Court, by the Cabinet,
and by public opinion. There was no thought of an appeal to arms, but
it was felt that in the future the relations of the two governments
could no longer be carried on in the same spirit of close and friendly
intimacy. Palmerston, founding his case upon the renunciation made at
the Peace of Utrecht[863] by the Duc d'Orléans of that day, sought to
induce the Powers to declare that any children, which might be born
to the Duc de Montpensier and the Infanta, would be excluded from
succeeding to the Spanish throne. Throughout Europe, however, there
were ominous signs of a recrudescence of the revolutionary spirit,
and Metternich, in consequence, had strong reasons for desiring to
propitiate Louis Philippe and M. Guizot. He, therefore, refused to
pronounce himself and simply adopted an attitude of neutrality, taking
care to point out that the trouble could never have arisen, had the
legitimist principle been upheld and had Don Carlos been enthroned.
Russia and Prussia, which like Austria had never acknowledged the
sovereignty of Isabella, followed the example of the Court of Vienna
and declined to be drawn into the controversy.
Palmerston's conduct was, unquestionably, ill-advised in thus
attempting to apply to Spain, in the middle of the nineteenth century,
the stipulations of diplomatic instruments framed when the conditions
of Europe were very different. But, if his objections to the Infanta's
marriage, founded upon the Treaty of Utrecht, were unsuccessful, he
was afforded the satisfaction of completely refuting the pleas set up
by M. Guizot in justification of his actions. The argument which forms
the main contention of his despatches, both of October 31, 1846 and
of January 8, 1847, is unanswerable. The _Memorandum of February 27,
1846_, to which the French government attached so much importance was,
he pointed out, unofficial and verbal. No record of it was to be found
at the Foreign Office. M. de Jarnac had never mentioned it to him,
"until after the event had happened for which it was now quoted as a
justification." But, "even admitting for the sake of argument that Her
Majesty's present government were to be held bound by it, how could it
justify a departure from the engagement of Eu? The imminent danger,
specified in that _memorandum_, was the likelihood that either the
Queen or the Infanta should be about immediately to marry a foreign
Prince, not being a descendant of Philip V. But if that likelihood had
ever existed, it had at all events ceased to exist, when M. Bresson
demanded the hand of the Infanta for the Duc de Montpensier. Not only
had it then ceased to exist, but with respect to the Queen, whose
marriage was then the immediate and only subject of discussion, it
had been succeeded by an impossibility; because when Count Bresson
demanded the hand of the Infanta the marriage of the Queen to the
Infant Don Francisco had actually been resolved upon and settled."[864]
Both in the French Chambers and in the British Parliament the Spanish
marriages were the subject of debate, at the opening of the session of
1847. The publication of the English _blue-book_ created a profound
sensation in France.[865] After reading the correspondence, no one
could any longer maintain that England had encouraged the candidature
of Prince Leopold of Coburg, or that Louis Philippe had been justified
in breaking the agreement of Eu. Nevertheless, in spite of the light
which was thus thrown upon the proceedings which led up to the
marriages, the true history of the case was only imperfectly revealed.
Even to-day, the real motives which actuated some of the principal
actors in the affair are still largely a matter of conjecture.
Palmerston[866] himself believed, and his opinion has been adopted by
the majority of English writers, that a secret understanding existed
between Christina and Louis Philippe. The Queen-Mother's overture to
the Duke of Saxe-Coburg has been represented as a trap craftily laid
for the British government. England, it was calculated, would never
resist the temptation of actively supporting the candidature of Prince
Leopold, and Louis Philippe would, in consequence, be furnished with
a pretext for repudiating his promises.[867] But, plausible as this
explanation of Christina's conduct may sound, it cannot stand the test
of a close examination.
Had the Queen-Mother never manifested any anxiety to marry her
daughter to a Coburg, until she requested Bulwer to transmit her
proposal to Lisbon, her proceedings, it must be admitted, would be
open to grave suspicion. But the facts of the case are very different.
On at least three previous occasions, when she cannot possibly have
been acting in collusion with Louis Philippe, she had declared her
predilection for the Coburg match. In 1838, during the civil war,
she mentioned the matter to Lord Clarendon.[868] In 1841, after her
abdication, when she was living in Paris, she sent Count Toreno to
Lord Cowley to inform him that she regarded a Coburg Prince as the
most suitable husband for Isabella.[869] No sooner was she back at
Madrid, in 1844, than she expressed herself in the same spirit to Mr.
Bulwer.[870] To the very last she appears to have struggled against
the dictation of the King of the French. Finding that the Coburgs were
fearful of incurring the wrath of the Court of the Tuileries, she did
all in her power to persuade Louis Philippe not to insist upon her
daughter's marriage with a Bourbon, "who had none of the qualities
calculated to make her happy." As late as the middle of July, 1846,
she sent the Marquis of Miraflores to Paris to plead her cause with
him. But the "Citizen King" was inflexible. "Royal marriages," he
reminded her, "were not like of those of private individuals."[871]
Nevertheless, she still refused to yield, and when she at last gave
way and compelled the unfortunate Isabella to marry the Duke of Cadiz,
it was the ill-judged intervention of Lord Palmerston which was the
cause of her surrender, not the expostulations and threats of Louis
Philippe.
In Spain, in 1846, the victory of one party over another meant
something more than that a particular set of politicians had been
temporarily replaced in office by their opponents. Disgrace, exile
and even loss of liberty were the fate which generally awaited the
leaders of a defeated party. Christina herself, after the triumph
of the _Progressistas_ in 1836, had had to submit to the insolent
dictation of a band of mutinous sergeants and had seen her _Moderado_
ministers forced to fly from the country. Four years later the same
party, in its hour of victory, had humiliated her as a woman and as
a Queen and had driven her to resign the regency. She was not by
nature vindictive, but she, doubtless, regarded a _Progressista_
with feelings very similar to those which her father or her brother
entertained for a _Carbonaro_. It may be imagined, therefore, with
what dismay she read Palmerston's despatch of July 19. In every
line of it the intention of befriending her enemies was apparent.
Palmerston, it was clear to her, was declaring that Don Enrique was
the only suitable husband for Isabella, simply in order to promote the
fortunes of the _Progressistas_.
Once convinced that the _Moderado régime_ was endangered by the
hostility of Lord Palmerston, Christina determined to comply with
Louis Philippe's demands and thus obtain his protection. The Duke
of Cadiz was hastily summoned to Madrid and Isabella was compelled
to accept him for a husband. It is not absolutely certain whether
the Queen-Mother insisted upon the simultaneous announcement of
Montpensier's marriage with her second daughter, or whether the
proposal came from M. Bresson. It is highly probable, however, that
she made it an indispensable condition to her acceptation of Cadiz.
The fact that the Infanta was betrothed to a son of Louis Philippe
would conciliate the French party and would be looked upon by people,
generally, as some compensation for the extreme insignificance of the
King Consort. Moreover, from her point of view there was another, and
a far stronger reason, in favour of the simultaneous conclusion of the
two marriages. Once the elder brother was the husband of the Queen, it
would be very difficult to prevent the marriage of the younger, Don
Enrique, with the Infanta.[872] That danger could be averted only by
the announcement that she was betrothed to, and was shortly to marry,
Montpensier.
Notwithstanding that he owed his crown to a popular revolution, Louis
Philippe attached the highest importance to the natural alliances of
the Bourbons. The maintenance of relations with Spain on the footing
of consanguinity was, in consequence, the constant aim of his policy.
In the pursuit of this object he found a ready instrument in his
Foreign Minister. By upholding the principle that Isabella's husband
must be a descendant of Philip V., M. Guizot purposed to disprove
the reproach of his opponents that this foreign policy was weak and
subservient to England.[873] His motives are perfectly comprehensible.
But the reasons which induced the King to break the compact of Eu,
by consenting to allow his son's marriage to take place at the same
time as that of the Queen, have never been satisfactorily explained.
Louis Philippe was very angry upon learning, on July 20, 1846, that
M. Bresson, in order to overcome Christina's repugnance to the Duke
of Cadiz, had held out to her the inducement that Montpensier's
marriage with the Infanta might be concluded simultaneously. Turning
a deaf ear to the timid remonstrances of M. Guizot, he insisted upon
the necessity of acquainting the Queen-Mother that his ambassador
had greatly exceeded his instructions. His private correspondence,
discovered at the Tuileries after the Revolution of '48, makes his
sentiments upon that point absolutely clear.[874] Nevertheless, in
the course of the next three weeks all his scruples vanished, and he
allowed M. Bresson to be furnished with the powers necessary for the
conclusion of the double marriage.
According to the official French version of the affair, it was
the despatch of July 19 which caused the King to change his mind.
Seeing that Palmerston had placed Coburg at the head of the list
of candidates, he, rightly or wrongly, conceived that the danger,
specified in the _Memorandum of February 27, 1846_, had become
"probable and imminent," and that he was, in consequence, released
from all his engagements to England. But his secret correspondence
with M. Guizot completely disproves this assertion. In forwarding, on
July 24, the despatch to the King, Guizot himself made no suggestion
of that nature. On the contrary, he expressed the extremely judicious
opinion that Palmerston was very indifferent about Coburg and was
rather trying to regain his influence over the _Progressistas_. Louis
Philippe took the same view of the case. He was greatly annoyed at
the strictures passed upon his friends, the _Moderados_, predicted
that Palmerston's proceedings would lead to the _bouleversement_ of
Spain, but "all that," he wrote, "makes it the more necessary that our
disavowal of the simultaneous marriage plan should reach Christina
at once. The more we suspect bad faith in others the more must we be
careful to keep our own hands clean."[875] The letters published in
the _Revue retrospective_ show that he adhered to these admirable
sentiments for some ten days longer. There is no document, however,
or trustworthy evidence to explain why, probably about August 13 or
14, he suddenly decided to adopt a totally different view of the
matter. Under these circumstances it is only possible to suggest the
following explanation.
Louis Philippe in the question of the Spanish marriages had a twofold
object in view. To his Bourbon policy was subjoined the _bourgeois_
policy of the _père de famille_, who was desirous of obtaining for
his son the large fortune which was supposed to be the portion
of the Infanta. Palmerston, however, was determined to prevent
the accomplishment of this plan. To the well-known instructions
transmitted to Bulwer, on August 22, was appended a despatch, marked
_separate and confidential_, in which he laid down the principle that
Montpensier's marriage with the Infanta "would be as objectionable,
and in some respects more so, than his marriage with the Queen."[876]
It is true that the contents of this despatch were unknown to Louis
Philippe and his agents, and moreover, that before it reached Bulwer's
hands the affair had been concluded. But Guizot was, undoubtedly,
aware of Palmerston's opinions on the subject. Indeed, in a letter to
the King, on August 8, he expressed the fear that, although Coburg
might be abandoned so far as Isabella was concerned, Palmerston
would probably attempt to marry him to the Infanta. "After our first
battle," he wrote, "we shall have to fight another, and a very sharp
one."[877] Louis Philippe himself, a few days later, appears to
have been disturbed by a letter which his Queen had received from
Christina. The tone of it he considered unpleasant, "and it contained
no mention of Montpensier's marriage." . . . "Our situation,"
he informed Guizot, "has, in consequence, much changed for the
worse."[878]
It is evident, therefore, that on August 12, Louis Philippe was
aware that danger threatened his project of marrying his son to the
Infanta from two quarters. Palmerston was resolved to oppose it, and
the Queen-Mother, if not actually hostile to it, was showing some
reluctance to support it. But in the course of the next day or two,
news would probably be received from Madrid of the effect which the
despatch of July 19 had had upon Christina and her ministers. Under
these circumstances, a great effort was, doubtless, made to persuade
the King to give Bresson a free hand. Guizot, Madame Adelaïde,[879]
and other members of his family assuredly represented to him that
the present opportunity must not be allowed to escape. Christina was
thoroughly frightened, and would be prepared to accept both Cadiz and
Montpensier, provided only that the two marriages could take place
simultaneously. Should there be either hesitation or delay, however,
Palmerston would have time to mature his plans, and the Infanta and
her fortune would be lost to them.
If the theory, here put forward, be correct, that it was Palmerston's
hostility to Montpensier's projected marriage which caused Louis
Philippe to break his promise to England, the question arises,
whether, under the circumstances, he was not justified in regarding
himself as released from his engagements. M. Thureau-Dangin[880]
contends that the King, having undertaken at Eu to postpone his son's
marriage with the Infanta until the Queen should have children,
had a right to expect that, in the interval, England should do
nothing to facilitate her marriage with any other prince. Aberdeen,
unquestionably, did not regard the matter in that light. He simply
looked upon Montpensier's marriage with the Infanta as delayed for
several years, until, by the birth of heirs to Isabella, it should
have lost its political significance. Even then, when it should be
less objectionable, he did not consider that England was bound to
consent to it, and, in the meantime, as he pointed out to Peel,
"many things might happen."[881] Palmerston most certainly would
have repudiated the notion that the compact of Eu debarred him from
recommending the alliance of the Infanta with Leopold of Coburg. "We
can admit of no parity of position," he told Jarnac, "between a son
of the King of the French and the third son of a German nobleman as
closely related to the French, as to the British, Royal Family."[882]
M. Guizot, in the _Memorandum of February 27_, undoubtedly declared
that the Bourbon principle applied equally to the Queen and the
Infanta, but he clearly had not much faith in his ability to make good
that contention. He was perfectly aware of Palmerston's sentiments
with respect to Montpensier's marriage, but he never attempted to
argue that, because of them, the King was released from his promise.
Throughout the controversy he confined himself to asserting, what
he knew to be untrue, that Palmerston's proceedings had rendered
"probable and imminent" the alliance of a Coburg prince with Queen
Isabella.
In most English accounts it is taken for granted that Louis Philippe
selected the Duke of Cadiz as a husband for Isabella, in order to
make certain that the succession to the Spanish throne should pass
to the descendants of Montpensier. But the circumstances do not
warrant this assumption. Count Trapani, whose physical fitness was
never called into question, was always his favourite candidate. It
was only in the last resort, when, owing to the unpopularity of the
Neapolitan connection, he was forced to bring forward another Bourbon,
that he fell back upon Cadiz. The suspicions which existed about the
virility of this young prince did not deter the King from seeking to
impose him upon Isabella. He cannot, however, be fairly charged with
having expressly chosen him, because he believed him to be impotent.
Don Enrique and the sons of Don Carlos being for different political
reasons out of the question, he had no option but to renounce his
Bourbon principle, or to insist upon the Queen's marriage with the
Duke of Cadiz.
The experience of England during the eighteenth century had taught
her to look with dread upon the prospect of having to struggle
single-handed against the two Bourbon Powers. The lesson of 1783 was
never forgotten by her statesmen. Under the Restoration, when the
absolute rule of Ferdinand VII. was re-established by French bayonets,
Mr. Canning, to avert the dangers of a close alliance between the
Courts of Madrid and of the Tuileries, acknowledged the revolted
Spanish colonies and "called in the new world to redress the balance
of the old." Palmerston was confronted by a different situation. Spain
was weaker, but France had acquired Algiers and was upon terms of
suspicious friendliness with Mehemet Ali. In alliance with the Pasha
of Egypt in the east and with Spain in the west, she might, it was to
be feared, obtain a complete control of the Mediterranean. It was,
therefore, Palmerston conceived, a matter of the first importance that
her influence over the Cabinet of Madrid should be destroyed. This
object, in his opinion, could never be successfully attained until
Spain should be endowed with Liberal institutions, and should adopt a
national, not a dynastic, policy. It was with this end in view that he
entered into the Quadruple Treaty, by which England engaged to assist
the _Christinos_ to expel Don Carlos from the Peninsula. Without
doubt, the idea upon which his policy was based was statesmanlike;
nevertheless, the methods by which he hoped to accomplish his purpose
were deplorably unsound. The treaty of 1834 involved interference in
the domestic affairs of Spain, and that in combination with the very
Power the ascendancy of which over the Spanish government it was his
secret object to diminish.
Any military advantages which the _Christinos_ may have derived from
the Quadruple Treaty were more than counterbalanced by the harm, which
the jealous interference of France and Great Britain in her internal
affairs, inflicted upon Spain. Long after the Pretender had fled and
outward peace had been restored, the political settlement of the
country was retarded by the rivalry and intrigues of the ambassadors
and ministers of the two Powers. The marriages of 1846, and all the
evils which they brought in their train, were an outcome of the policy
which Palmerston had inaugurated twelve years before. But he had not
been in power during the whole of this period, and, when he returned
to the Foreign Office, the marriage question was already far advanced.
Aberdeen was not responsible for the Quadruple Treaty, and he was
sincerely desirous of putting an end to the practice of meddling with
internal politics, which both the French and British agents at Madrid
had adopted. Nevertheless, his weakness and irresolution in dealing
with M. Guizot were the cause of much mischief. Had he adhered to
his first pronouncement that England would object to any alliance
which threatened to disturb the balance of power, but that, with that
exception, she looked upon the Royal marriages as an exclusively
Spanish affair, none of the subsequent complications could have
arisen. Unfortunately, however, after the downfall of Espartero, he
undertook to observe a kind of benevolent neutrality towards the
principle of the French government--that Isabella's husband must
be a Bourbon. The compact of Eu and the different interpretations
which were placed upon it, the pretensions set up in the _Memorandum
of February 27_, 1846, were the consequences of the modifications
introduced into his original declaration.
CHAPTER XI
PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF '48.
Whilst France and England had been quarrelling over the Spanish
marriages, events of greater importance had been taking place in
Central Europe. The Polish nationalists had planned an insurrection
which was to break out simultaneously in Prussian and Austrian Poland.
At Posen, the authorities obtained early intelligence of the projected
rising, and were enabled to suppress it without difficulty. But in
Gallicia, in February, 1846, the Austrian military commander was
suddenly called upon to deal with a formidable rebellion. Colonel
Benedek,[883] however, by allowing the Polish peasants to wreak their
hatred upon their landlords, succeeded in dividing the forces opposed
to him and in subduing one revolution by another. The free town of
Cracow was the scene of severe fighting, and, after the defeat of the
insurgents, was occupied by Russian troops. The measure was to be
merely temporary, and the town, it was announced, would be evacuated,
directly order should be restored. But, when it was evident that the
Spanish marriage question had hopelessly divided France and England,
the Northern Courts adopted a different attitude. On November 15,
1846, the Austrian, the Prussian and the Russian ministers in London
informed Palmerston that the independent existence of Cracow was
incompatible with the public tranquillity of Europe, and that, in
consequence, it had been decided that the Republic should, in the
future, form part of the Austrian Empire.[884] A similar communication
was, at the same time, made to the French government. The Republic of
Cracow having been constituted by a treaty between Austria, Russia,
and Prussia, on May 3, 1815, these three Powers maintained that
they had a right to undo what they had done, without consultation
with the other Powers which were parties to the general settlement
of 1815.[885] Both France and England at once entered a formal
protest. M. Guizot, having attained his object in Spain, was now bent
upon re-establishing "the cordial understanding," and would gladly
have made a joint representation to the three Powers with great
Britain.[886] But his hope that the annexation of Cracow would prove
the means of reuniting France and England was not realized. Palmerston
contented himself with directing Normanby to furnish the French
government with a copy of the remonstrance which he addressed to the
Court of Vienna.[887]
Metternich was not disturbed by these representations. It was out of
the power of England to enforce her views, and Louis Philippe and M.
Guizot were careful at once to reassure him about their veritable
intentions. Public indignation had been aroused in France by the
extinction of the little republic and, under the circumstances, it
had been necessary to protest officially. But let the Chancellor
understand, Louis Philippe informed the Austrian ambassador, that
the remonstrance which M. de Flahaut had been instructed to make at
Vienna was "merely talk which could hurt no one."[888] Metternich,
however, although he was thus speedily relieved from all anxiety as
to the attitude which the western Powers purposed to adopt towards
his proceedings in Gallicia, had much cause for uneasiness in other
directions. Germany was seething with discontent, and the King of
Prussia, by deciding to summon the combined Estates, was evincing
a regrettable disposition to acquiesce in the popular demand for a
greater measure of political rights. In Italy affairs presented a yet
more alarming appearance. For the past fourteen years the Peninsula
had been outwardly at peace. But Metternich's vigilance had not been
lulled to sleep by this seeming acquiescence in existing conditions.
A movement, he was well aware, was in progress infinitely more
dangerous than the local insurrections planned in the secrecy of the
_Carbonari_ lodges. Mazzini, by means of his society of _Young Italy_,
and Gioberti, d'Azeglio and Balbo, by their writings, were teaching
the people to dream of independence and of national unity. Hitherto
Metternich, in his policy of repression, had always been able to count
upon the whole-hearted support of the different Italian governments.
But now the Sovereign of the most important State in the Peninsula
was strongly suspected of encouraging the propagation of these new
doctrines.
Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, had, as the Prince of Carignano,
displayed Liberal tendencies. In the Piedmontese rebellion of 1821
his conduct had been equivocal, but, since his accession, in 1831, he
had shown a firm determination to uphold the absolutist traditions
of his House. Nevertheless, he now permitted both d'Azeglio and
Balbo to reside unmolested within his dominions and, in spite of
Metternich's remonstrances, his police scarcely interfered with the
free circulation of their subversive writings. In the summer of 1846,
it was already apparent that the relations between the Courts of Turin
and of Vienna were no longer upon their former friendly footing.
Ostensibly a question of tariff was the only cause of dispute. In
reality, however, it was Charles Albert's increasing sympathy with
the Italian national movement which was the reason of the prohibitive
duty, placed by Metternich, upon the wines of Piedmont.[889] Matters
were in this state when, on June 1, 1846, the Pope, Gregory XVI.,
died. Fifteen days later, Cardinal Mastai-Ferretti, Archbishop of
Imola, was elected to succeed him, and assumed the title of Pius IX.
The condition of the Papal States was deplorable. The finances were
in disorder, and the government depended for its existence upon the
protection of Austria and upon the presence of its Swiss auxiliary
troops. The new Pope, it was hoped, would consent to the introduction
of certain necessary measures of reform. The expectation that Pius
IX. would not pursue the reactionary policy of his predecessor proved
well founded.[890] On July 16, 1846, a month after his election,
His Holiness proclaimed a general amnesty for political offences.
The educated classes had eagerly absorbed the doctrines of Balbo,
d'Azeglio, and Gioberti, and the Liberal tendencies manifested by
the new Pope aroused an immense enthusiasm. Nor was his popularity
confined to his own dominions. The quiet and unpretending priest
suddenly found himself magnified into a national hero. Patriots, who
had begun to look to Charles Albert as the future liberator of Italy,
now placed all their hopes in Pius IX. It was not possible for him
to withstand the enthusiasm which his concessions had called forth.
In the spring of 1847, a modified liberty was granted to the press,
and the formation of a Council of State, to be chosen by the Pope
from elected provincial delegates, was decreed. Lastly, on July 5,
the establishment of a civic guard was announced. The Grand Duke of
Tuscany, fearful that invidious comparisons would be drawn between
his methods of government and those of His Holiness, made haste to
initiate similar reforms at Florence.[891]
In the opinion of Louis Philippe, the death of Gregory XVI. amounted
to a public misfortune. A Liberal Pope could not but add materially
to the political unrest which had suddenly affected the whole of
Europe.[892] Nevertheless, neither he nor M. Guizot were as yet
prepared to join with Austria in counselling the Papal government
to resist the popular demand for reforms. France was at the time
represented at Rome by a man of considerable ability and learning,
Count Rossi, an Italian political exile and a naturalized Frenchman.
In the first instance he was instructed to counsel the adoption of
a strictly _juste milieu_ policy.[893] The new Papal government
should be based upon the principles of an enlightened conservatism.
His Holiness would be well advised promptly to introduce certain
much-needed reforms into his system of administration. Let him
beware, however, of listening to those who would propose violent and
ill-considered changes. Above all, let him avoid giving unnecessary
offence to Austria.[894] But, after his quarrel with England over the
Spanish marriages, M. Guizot decided to revise his Italian policy.
In every part of the world France and England were opposed to each
other. M. Guizot's own relations with Lord Normanby were very far
from friendly. The public denial of the French minister that he had
used certain words, imputed to him by the British ambassador, had
been followed by a personal quarrel, which had only been arranged by
the intervention of Count Apponyi, the Austrian ambassador.[895] At
Madrid, the consequences of the distasteful marriage forced upon the
young Queen were already apparent. Isabella was practically separated
from her husband, and her relations with General Serrano were a cause
of scandal. French and British rivalry was actively maintained by
Bresson and by Bulwer, who, with the full knowledge of Palmerston, was
deeply involved in all the intrigues of the palace.[896] At Athens,
where King Otho had been compelled to grant a constitution, Lyons and
Piscatory, the British and French ministers, were closely identified
with different political parties. In South America, a dispute between
Lord Howden and Comte Walewski threatened to put an end to the
mediation of France and England in the war, which for some time past
had been in progress between Buenos Ayres and Monte Video.[897]
M. Guizot, under these circumstances, resolved to make approaches
to Austria. The British government alone was disposed to sympathize
sincerely with the Liberal movement which was causing so much anxiety
to the absolute Courts. If only he could arrive at an agreement with
Metternich as to the policy to be adopted towards German, Swiss
and Italian affairs, England would be isolated completely. But the
negotiation of such an understanding was a delicate matter. An
alliance between the government of the "Citizen King" and the Cabinet
of Vienna, for the maintenance of despotism and of the settlement of
1815, was an unnatural combination which might prove fatal to its
promotor. Public opinion in France was on the side of the peoples
struggling for political freedom. M. Thiers, the leader of the
Opposition, had loudly declared that this was only the principle upon
which French policy could be based. M. Guizot, therefore, considered
it advisable, in his intercourse with Metternich, not to make use
of the ordinary channels of communication, but to employ a secret
agent. In the spring of 1847, accordingly, he sent to Vienna, a
certain Klindworth,[898] who on several former occasions appears to
have been entrusted with confidential missions by the French Foreign
Office. He was to assure Prince Metternich that the French government
was determined to uphold the territorial _status quo_, and was
prepared to co-operate with Austria in opposing the introduction of
any fundamental changes in the system of government of the different
Italian States.[899]
M. Guizot, furthermore, entered into a direct correspondence with
Prince Metternich. But no precise agreement as to their respective
policies was concluded.[900] Guizot appears to have been mainly
concerned to assure the Austrian Chancellor of the high esteem which
he entertained for his perspicacity and judgment. Nor did he, on
occasions, disdain to employ language which can only be described as
that of fulsome adulation.[901] Metternich could not be otherwise
than pleased and flattered by the advances thus made to him. He was
not, however, disposed to set an undue value upon the protestations of
M. Guizot. He had little doubt that, were Austria to invade the Papal
States, France would at once dispatch an army to Italy, proclaiming
that she had taken His Holiness under her protection. But, although
no formal compact resulted from M. Guizot's overtures at Vienna,
his desire to propitiate Prince Metternich was reflected in his
instructions to his agents at the different Italian Courts. By the
spring of 1847, it was evident that the Italian Liberal movement was
regarded with nearly as much disapproval by the government of Louis
Philippe as by the Cabinet of Vienna.
Metternich was under no illusions as to the true meaning of the events
which were taking place in Italy. Above the popular expressions
of joy at the reforms, conceded by the Pope or by the Grand Duke
of Tuscany, rose the threatening cry for the expulsion of the
foreigner. Unless the Liberal movement could be crushed, the Emperor,
he perceived clearly, would have to fight to retain his Italian
possessions. "Nationality," he bade Buol warn Charles Albert, "was
the new device which the revolutionists had inscribed upon their
banners."[902] Resolutely he prepared for the struggle which he saw
was impending. Troops were poured into Lombardy and the Austrian
garrison at Ferrara was strengthened. Moreover, he was strongly
suspected of fomenting a counter-revolutionary plot at Rome, with the
object of forcibly displacing the Liberal advisers of His Holiness,
and of surrounding him with members of the reactionary party. The
discovery of this conspiracy, in which the governor of Rome was
involved, caused an immense excitement. No certain evidence could
be procured of the participation of Austrian agents in the affair.
It was significant, however, that the garrison of Ferrara received
a substantial accession of strength on the very day fixed upon by
the conspirators for the execution of their plans.[903] But, if
Metternich's connection with the Roman plot of July 1847 may be held
to be not proven, his intention to provoke the Liberal and national
party into some ill-considered act of violence, which should furnish
him with a pretext for armed intervention, admits of no doubt.
Hitherto, as specified by the treaty, the garrison at Ferrara[904]
had been confined to the citadel. But now the Austrians proceeded to
occupy the whole town, the troops adopting a most insulting attitude
towards the population, and especially towards the civic guard. But
this clumsy device for bringing on a collision failed in its object.
In the words of the British minister at Florence, the newly enrolled
citizen soldiers "observed the most extraordinary moderation under the
most contumelious treatment."[905] The Austrian proceedings at Ferrara
called forth a strong protest from His Holiness, who, at the same
time requested Charles Albert to send a frigate to Civita Vecchia for
his personal protection. His Sardinian Majesty promptly complied with
this demand, whereupon, the French ambassador tendered an offer of
assistance on the part of his government. This proposal, however, was
declined, no doubt being entertained at Rome, that France and Austria
were acting together in Italian affairs.[906] Thus Metternich, by his
aggressive attitude, had only succeeded in creating a bond of union
between the Papal government and the Court of Turin.[907]
At the end of July, 1847, Metternich resolved to inquire of the
different Powers, which were parties to the treaties of 1815, whether
they, as "the principal guardians of the political peace,"[908]
intended to maintain the territorial divisions of the Italian
peninsula as settled by the Congress of Vienna. The revolution, he
told Lord Ponsonby, must now be considered as complete in the Roman
States and in Tuscany. A revolution, he explained, was accomplished,
once a government had been deprived of all power. But the real object
of the party which had triumphed at Rome was to create a united Italy.
The Emperor, however, while studiously respecting the independence of
the sovereign States of the Peninsula, was determined to preserve his
own Italian kingdom.[909] The British government, wrote Palmerston
in reply, holds that the stipulations of treaties must everywhere
be observed, and that no changes in an agreement can properly be
effected, except with the concurrence of all the Powers which are
parties to it. But Her Majesty's government, at the same time, is no
less strongly of opinion that the right to carry out internal reforms
is a right inherent to independent sovereignty.[910] A month later, on
September 11, when the threatening communications made by Count Buol
to the Court of Turin, and the proceedings of the military commander
at Ferrara suggested that Austria might be contemplating some act of
aggression against the Kingdom of Sardinia and the Papal dominions,
Palmerston reverted to this subject. "The crowns of Great Britain and
of Sardinia," he warned Metternich, "had long been bound together
by the ties of an intimate and faithful alliance, and Great Britain
could neither forget nor repudiate claims founded upon such honourable
grounds." The Papal States were an essential element in the political
independence of the Italian Peninsula, and no invasion of them could
take place "without leading to consequences of great gravity and
importance."[911]
At the time when Palmerston was holding this language, the British
government had decided upon a measure, which was afterwards the
subject of much criticism. In the month of April, the Papal _nuncio_
in Paris had expressed to Lord Normanby a fear that His Holiness would
experience great difficulty in carrying out his projected reforms.
It was plain that no assistance would be forthcoming from the French
government, and it was, in consequence, very necessary that the cause
of social improvement in Italy should receive "a more active moral
support from England." If there were constitutional objections to the
establishment of direct diplomatic relations with the Holy See,[912]
might not some one, he suggested, in the confidence of Her Majesty's
government, be sent to Rome for the purpose of communicating with
the Pope and his ministers?[913] The Russell Cabinet was strongly
in favour of acceding to this request, but the manner in which the
British government should extend its "moral support" was somewhat
difficult to determine. Palmerston advocated that Lord Minto, the
Lord Privy Seal, should be sent upon a special mission to Turin,
Florence and Borne. The Queen, however, raised certain objections
to this plan. In an able _memorandum_ Prince Albert pointed out
that to despatch a member of the government to Italy, to encourage
the rulers of the different States to adopt measures, which Austria
regarded as highly dangerous to her existence as an Italian power,
was "a most hostile step towards our old and natural ally." It would
be more friendly, he contended, and certainly more honest, to let
it be clearly understood at Vienna that an attack upon any Italian
Sovereign, who was desirous of effecting administrative reforms,
would be looked upon as a violation of treaties to which England
was a party. But His Royal Highness was ready to admit that, by
adopting such a policy, England would be morally bound to uphold the
independence of the Italian States, whereas the projected mission
of Lord Minto would not commit her actively to interfere on their
behalf.[914] After some further discussion and correspondence
Palmerston carried his point. On September 11, his already quoted
despatch was sent off to Vienna, and, a week later, Lord Minto was
supplied with his instructions and started upon his journey.
Moderate as was the language which Lord Minto was directed to
hold at the different Italian Courts, his mission was necessarily
regarded with extreme disapproval at Vienna. Yet Minto had no mandate
to encourage the movement in favour of Italian unity, nor was he
instructed to counsel the adoption of any measures which could be
regarded as even an indirect attempt to deprive the Emperor of his
Italian possessions. On the contrary, he was to insist upon the
necessity of maintaining the peace. At Turin, he was to warn Charles
Albert of the danger of allowing his natural irritation at the
interference of Austria in his affairs to betray him into some act,
which might furnish the Court of Vienna with a pretext for attacking
him. But Metternich, being determined to place an absolute check upon
the development of Liberal ideas, was naturally greatly annoyed that
a British minister should visit Florence, Rome and Turin for the
purpose of congratulating the Sovereigns upon the reforms which they
had already carried out, and of urging them to persevere in the same
course in the future.[915]
Another task, however, had been confided to Lord Minto, besides
that of counselling the Italian rulers to advance with prudence and
circumspection along the path of reform. On his way to Turin he
was instructed to visit Switzerland, where a very grave condition
of affairs had arisen. By the _Federal Pact_ of 1815 Switzerland
consisted of twenty-two sovereign and independent Cantons, each of
which possessed one vote in the Federal Diet. The repercussion of
the revolution of 1830, in France, was acutely felt in Switzerland,
and, about that time, the cantonal constitutions were revised in a
democratic spirit. Some nine years later, however, the Conservatives,
by raising the cry that religion was in danger, succeeded in many of
the Cantons in regaining their lost power. The victorious party made
no attempt, even in those Cantons where their ascendency was the most
complete, to repeal the Liberal legislation of the past few years.
On the contrary, in the very Catholic cantons of Lucerne and of the
Valais, the popular _veto_ and the _referendum_ were introduced. It
was plainly the opinion of the clergy that their influence over the
people would enable them to obtain, by means of these democratic
institutions, the rejection of any measure of which they disapproved.
In the Canton of Aargau, however, of which the population was half
Protestant and half Catholic, the clerical party failed to establish
its ascendency by peaceful means. An attempt was, accordingly, made to
overturn the existing government by force. But the insurrection proved
unsuccessful and the eight monasteries, the inmates of which were
proved to have been actively concerned in the plot, were suppressed.
The existence of these establishments had been guaranteed by an
article of the _Federal Pact_, and the action of the Grand Council of
Aargau, in decreeing their abolition, was, in consequence, brought
before the Federal Diet. The matter was not settled until the year
1843, when the Canton of Aargau agreed to restore four suppressed
female convents; a compromise which was accepted as satisfactory
by the majority of the Diet. But scarcely had this controversy,
which had evoked intense bitterness of feeling, been settled, then
disturbances broke out in the Valais. The clerical party in that
Canton contrived, after severe fighting, to overturn the Radical
government. The success of this revolution, it was clear, was largely
due to the secret assistance which the reactionaries had received from
the Grand Council of Lucerne. Such conduct was the more inexcusable
seeing that, at the time, Lucerne was the _directing Canton_ and,
therefore, the more bound to observe an attitude of impartiality.
The Jesuits were generally regarded as the chief instigators of the
affair, and throughout the greater part of Switzerland a feeling of
extreme hostility arose against them. But the men in power at Lucerne
were indifferent to the dislike with which the Order was regarded
by the majority of their countrymen, and they, forthwith, proceeded
to call in the Jesuits and to give them the complete control of all
the educational establishments in their Canton. Meanwhile, with the
admitted connivance of the Radical governments of Berne, Aargau and
Soleure, volunteers were being enrolled and, at the end of the year
1844, and again in April, 1845, armed bands, known as the _corps
francs_, deliberately attacked Lucerne. But, having concluded an
alliance with Uri, Zug, and Unterwalden, Lucerne successfully repelled
these invaders. In this same year the expulsion of the Jesuits from
the whole of Switzerland was moved in the Federal Diet.
As far back as the year 1832, the Cantons of Uri, Schwyz and
Unterwalden, had entered into a combination, known as the _League of
Sarnen_, with the object of resisting the democratic tendencies of the
age. The association was, subsequently, strengthened by the accession
of Fribourg, Zug, Lucerne, and, in 1844, of the Valais. Early in the
year 1846, the character of the league was transformed completely.
From a peaceful association it was converted into a military alliance,
for the purpose of upholding the right of every independent Canton to
live under such laws as its legislature might enact. The _Sonderbund_,
as this alliance of the seven Catholic Cantons was called, was at
once denounced as an infraction of Article VI. of the _Federal Pact_,
prescribing that "no alliance, prejudicial either to the general
confederacy or to the rights of other Cantons, could be formed by
separate Cantons among themselves." A motion to that effect was,
accordingly, brought forward in the Federal Diet, but no decision
in its favour was obtained. Before the next year, however, in some
cases by constitutional means, in others, as at Geneva, by force and
violence, the composition of the governments in several Cantons was
changed and Radical Grand Councils were installed in power. Under
these circumstances, a majority was easily obtained in favour both of
the expulsion of the Jesuits and of declaring the illegality of the
_Sonderbund_. The allied Catholic Cantons, however, refused to submit
to this decision of the Federal Diet and proclaimed their intention
of resisting, by arms if necessary, any attempt to interfere with
their independence. Thus, at the time when Lord Minto departed for the
continent, all the signs pointed to the probability that Switzerland
would, before long, be the scene of a bloody civil war.
The rapid advance of democracy in Switzerland had necessarily excited
the alarm of the absolute Courts. Moreover, between the years 1830
and 1840, not only the Cabinet of Vienna but the French government
had had, on several occasions, good cause to complain that, unchecked
by the authorities, political refugees were allowed to concert their
measures for disturbing the peace of neighbouring States. After 1840,
the internal disputes and the increasing lawlessness of the country
began to attract the serious attention of all the Powers responsible
for the settlement of 1815. Both Lord Aberdeen and M. Guizot were
agreed that, could the question of the Jesuits be arranged, the
chief element of danger in the situation would be removed. The
French minister consented readily to exert his influence to induce
the Pope to recall them. Let it be well understood at Rome, he wrote
to Rossi, on June 6, 1845, that, should a Radical government be
established at Geneva, there would be a majority in favour of the
expulsion of the Order in the Federal Diet. Make it perfectly clear
to His Holiness that "the fate of the disciples of Loyola is in the
hands of the followers of Calvin."[916] Prince Metternich was at this
time instructing the Austrian ambassador at Rome to employ similar
arguments. But Gregory XVI. showed no disposition to interfere, and
all hope had soon to be abandoned of obtaining his co-operation in the
affair.[917] In the following year, the overthrow of the Conservative
governments at Geneva and in the Canton of Vaud, and the prospect
that, in the ensuing session, the Radicals would be in a majority
in the Federal Diet, increased Metternich's uneasiness. Hitherto,
France had set her face resolutely against intervention in any shape
or form. But, in the autumn of 1846, Louis Philippe, being anxious
to assure himself of the neutrality of the Northern Courts in the
question of the Spanish marriages, the Austrian Chancellor took the
opportunity of proposing that the Powers should seriously take in hand
the affairs of Switzerland. M. Guizot was rather disposed to accede to
this suggestion, but the King, being still hopeful of re-establishing
"the cordial understanding," refused to sanction any participation
in measures which might lead eventually to armed intervention.[918]
In the spring of 1847, however, when it was clear that England had
no intention of forgetting the affront which she had received in the
matter of the Spanish marriages, and when, in consequence, M. Guizot
was desirous of effecting a close understanding with Austria, French
policy towards Switzerland was altered to suit the exigencies of the
situation.
The sympathies of Metternich and of all the absolute Courts were
necessarily on the side of the _Sonderbund_.[919] The continental
Cabinets were agreed that it would be highly dangerous, in the
unsettled state of Europe, to allow the league of the Catholic and
Conservative Cantons to be dissolved by their Radical neighbours.
Federal unity, Metternich maintained, was clearly the object for
which the democrats were striving, and it was on that account that
they desired to undermine cantonal independence. But any revision of
the _Federal Pact_ would, he argued, release from their engagements
the Powers which had guaranteed the neutrality and independence of
Switzerland, and would justify them in intervening. Louis Philippe and
M. Guizot, although fully disposed to endorse his views, dared not
venture to employ French troops to fight the battle of the Jesuits.
They, accordingly, insinuated that, if Austria were to take the first
step, public opinion in France might be reconciled to the notion of a
French intervention. This ingenuous proposal was promptly declined.
Metternich had no idea of incurring the odium of invading Switzerland
and of allowing France to declare that similar action on her part had
been rendered necessary by the aggressiveness of Austria.[920] Thus
in Swiss, as in Italian affairs, M. Guizot and Prince Metternich,
notwithstanding the harmony of their sentiments, found it impossible
to devise any practical plan for concerted action.
England, as a party to the settlement of 1815, had an unquestionable
right to be consulted in any arrangement tending to alter the
political position of Switzerland in the European system. But, owing
to her geographical situation, she was less directly concerned
than France, Austria or Prussia in the internal condition of the
Confederation. The British government was, consequently, in a
position to regard the question from a more detached and impartial
standpoint. Moreover, the letters of Mr. Grote,[921] the historian
of Greece, to the _Spectator_, supplied the English public with far
better information about Swiss politics than was to be obtained in the
official press of continental States. Palmerston had no intention of
discussing the questions as to whether the alliance of the Catholic
Cantons should be looked upon as an infraction of the _Federal Pact_,
and as to whether the action of the Radical majority in the Diet, in
decreeing the expulsion of the Jesuits, constituted a violation of
cantonal sovereignty and independence. It is clear that, from an early
date, he adopted the view, propounded by Mr. Grote, that, whereas the
so-called Radical Cantons represented the wealth, the intelligence,
the industry, the population and the progressive elements of
Switzerland, the Cantons of the _Sonderbund_ were, in every respect,
the stationary and backward portions of the Republic. From these
premises it followed logically that, although it might be possible
for the allied Catholic Cantons to break up the Confederation, it
was not in their power to guide it or to hold it together.[922] He,
therefore, proposed both to Prince Metternich and M. Guizot, that they
should endeavour to persuade the Catholic leaders to dissolve their
alliance.[923] This solution of the difficulty, as may be supposed,
was not adopted by either of the statesmen to whom it was made. On
the contrary, Metternich at this time was arranging to furnish the
_Sonderbund_ with arms, and was seriously considering whether he
should place the services of an Austrian general at its disposal,
while M. Guizot was giving secret instructions for the despatch of
warlike stores to Lucerne from the arsenal at Besançon.[924]
Lord Minto, in his conversations with M. Ochsenbein, the President of
the Federal Diet, was charged to counsel forbearance and moderation.
"Her Majesty's government," wrote Palmerston, "as the sincere
and disinterested friend of Switzerland, could not but exhort all
parties to abate pretensions, however just they may be thought, and
to yield somewhat of rights, however valid they may be considered,
rather than begin an appeal to arms, the consequences of which it
would be easier to lament than to foresee." He was not prepared to
deny that the _Federal Pact_ might stand in need of revision. It
was alleged, however, that the Diet proposed "to sweep away the
separate sovereignty of the several Cantons in order to blend the
whole of Switzerland into one single Republic." He must, therefore,
remind the Swiss government that "the fundamental principle upon
which the arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna, in regard to
Switzerland, repose, is the separate sovereignty of the several
Cantons." Any attempt to alter the basis of the political organization
of the Republic would inevitably entail civil war and foreign
intervention.[925]
Yet, notwithstanding the pacific spirit in which Lord Minto's
instructions were drawn up, Palmerston has been freely accused of
inciting the Radical Cantons to begin hostilities. Animosity to
Louis Philippe and his principal minister, assert his detractors,
was at this period the mainspring of his policy. Thus, when the
French government evinced a disposition to favour the cause of the
_Sonderbund_, Palmerston, having satisfied himself of the military
superiority of the Radical Cantons, secretly urged them to attack
their weaker neighbours, in the hope that the forcible dissolution of
the Catholic alliance would entail the downfall of M. Guizot. This
charge has been reiterated in the recently published letters of Sir
Robert Morier. Mr. David Morier, Sir Robert's father, had been for
many years British minister in Switzerland. In the summer of 1847,
however, being in England on leave, he was not allowed to return to
his post, because, says his son, he was instinctively a peacemaker
and, therefore, no longer a suitable instrument to execute the policy
upon which Lord Palmerston had decided to embark.[926] But a perusal
of Mr. Morier's despatches suggests another, and an infinitely more
probable, explanation of his recall. When affairs in Switzerland were
beginning to assume a dangerous aspect, he is to be found expressing
views with which Lord Palmerston would have heartily agreed. Writing
to Lord Aberdeen, in June, 1844, on the subject of the Jesuits, Mr.
Morier points out that this intrusion of a powerful foreign agency
into all the concerns of the Confederation raises the question
whether, "self-preservation being the first law of States, the claim
of cantonal sovereignty should not be made to yield to the exigencies
of the general welfare." Again, some months later, speaking of the
introduction of the Jesuits into Lucerne, he warns his chief that
Lucerne "must be inscribed upon the list of Cantons with Fribourg,
Schwyz and the Valais, subjected, henceforward, through their Jesuit
institutions, to the influence of a foreign and anti-national power of
the most dangerous tendency to the peace of the Confederation."[927]
But, during the winter of 1846, an unprovoked assault was committed
upon one of his sons, Burnet Morier, by an excited Radical of Berne.
The young man with commendable promptitude felled his assailant to
the ground,[928] and, under these circumstances, Palmerston probably
considered that the affair need not be made the subject of an official
demand for reparation. Mr. Morier, however, thought otherwise,
and his indignation appears to have transformed him into a strong
supporter of the _Sonderbund_. The contrast between the sentiments,
contained in his _memorandum_ on Swiss affairs, submitted to the
Foreign Office in February, 1847,[929] and those expressed in his
earlier despatches, must have given Lord Palmerston food for serious
reflection. Without doubt, he must have come to the conclusion that a
man burning with resentment against the Radical leaders was hardly as
qualified, as his son seems to have supposed, to exercise a moderating
influence upon the passions of contending parties.
Lord Minto, having arrived in Switzerland, lost no time in placing
himself in communication with M. Ochsenbein. The election of this
person, who two years before had commanded the _corps francs_ in their
raid upon Lucerne, to the post of President of the Federal Diet, had
greatly exasperated the Catholics. Lord Minto, however, reported that
he found him most reasonable, and, to all appearances, sincerely
desirous of discovering some means of averting an outbreak of
hostilities. The Jesuits, he assured the English minister, constituted
the chief obstacle to a peaceful settlement, and, could they be
removed, all danger of war would disappear. Palmerston, on receiving
this information, at once instructed Minto, who by that time had
passed on to Italy, to use every endeavour, while at Rome, to persuade
His Holiness to intervene.[930] But, meanwhile, in Switzerland the
chances of maintaining the peace were hourly diminishing. Both sides
were now openly preparing for war, and, on October 29, the deputies of
the Catholic Cantons formally quitted the Federal Diet. On that same
day Lord Palmerston made a last effort to avert a rupture. He enjoined
the British _chargé d'affaires_ at Berne to seek out M. Ochsenbein
and to endeavour to prevail upon him to postpone the execution of any
irrevocable measure, until the result of Lord Minto's mission to Rome
should be known. M. Ochsenbein's only reply to this communication was
hastily to convene the Diet, which forthwith decreed the dissolution
of the _Sonderbund_ by the armed forces of the Federal executive.[931]
Two days later, on November 6, the Duc de Broglie, who had recently
succeeded Sainte-Aulaire, as ambassador in London, submitted a project
of intervention to Lord Palmerston. Let the Powers, proposed M.
Guizot, offer to mediate on the basis that the question of the Jesuits
should be settled by the Pope, and that the other points in dispute
should form the subject of a conference, at which each of the Cantons
should be represented. In the meantime, the contending parties would
be invited to suspend hostilities--a refusal to comply releasing the
Powers from their engagements to the Confederation and entitling them
to enforce their demands by whatever measures they might subsequently
agree to adopt.[932] Palmerston's official answer was not sent off to
Paris until November 16. It was in the form of a counter-proposition.
The British government, he declared, "could not go the length of
thinking" that the outbreak of civil war could release the Powers from
those pledges into which they had entered to maintain the neutrality
of Switzerland. Furthermore, it considered that the presence of the
Jesuits upon the territory of the Confederation, in opposition to the
wishes of the majority of the Cantons, constituted a real grievance.
Her Majesty's government, under the circumstances, before consenting
to join with France and the other Power in offering to mediate, must
make two conditions. In the first place, the removal of the Jesuits,
whether by a decision to be obtained from the Pope, or by an act of
sovereign authority on the part of the Cantons in which the Order was
established, must be the basis of any arrangement proposed by the
Powers to the contending parties. Secondly, it was to be distinctly
understood that a refusal by either side to accept mediation must not
be made the ground for armed interference in the internal affairs of
Switzerland.[933]
In Paris, at Berlin, and at Vienna, it had been intended to hold very
different language to M. Ochsenbein and his colleagues. Nevertheless,
M. Guizot, although stipulating for certain trifling modifications,
accepted the British proposal. The assent of Prussia and of Austria
was obtained, but it was given with the utmost reluctance.[934]
Palmerston was, in point of fact, completely master of the situation.
The condition of Germany was so unsettled, the appearance of affairs
in Italy was so alarming, that Metternich could not attack the
Radicals of Berne except in combination with France and, in the Swiss
question, Louis Philippe and M. Guizot dared not act with the absolute
Courts in opposition to the constitutional government of England.[935]
Nicholas, having no direct interest in the matter, was content to
adopt whatever course might commend itself to the Cabinet of Vienna.
The five governments being thus agreed, an _identic note_ was, on
November 26, drawn up in London for presentation to the President
of the Diet, and to the official organ of the _Sonderbund_ by the
representatives of the Powers in Switzerland. But, while ministers and
diplomatists had been talking and writing, the Federal executive had
acted. No sooner had the Diet, on November 4, decreed the forcible
suppression of the _Sonderbund_ than the Genevese general, Dufour,
who had at his disposal an army of 100,000 men and 260 guns, was
ordered to begin operations. The isolated canton of Fribourg having
been easily overwhelmed, the Federal commander advanced with his whole
force against Lucerne. Salis-Soglio, a Protestant of the Grisons,
whose army amounted to some 80,000 troops with 74 guns, awaited him
in a selected position between the Reuss and the Lake of Zug. The
decisive battle was fought on November 23, Dufour's victory was
complete. On the following day, the Jesuits and the executive council
having fled, Lucerne surrendered. The Valais, the last of the seven
Cantons to abandon the struggle, capitulated on the 29th. Twenty-five
days after the Diet had formally resolved upon its suppression, the
_Sonderbund_ ceased to exist.
In almost all accounts of these events Palmerston's proceedings
have been misrepresented. According to his detractors, he cunningly
inveigled the Powers into an exchange of views with the pretended
object of averting civil war in Switzerland, while in reality he was
secretly urging the Federal executive to open the campaign against
the _Sonderbund_.[936] Even Liberals, in sympathy with his policy,
describe him as having deliberately protracted the negotiations
in London, in order that the Radicals should be able to crush
the Catholic Cantons without fear of foreign interference.[937]
Palmerston, it is perfectly clear, was strongly opposed to direct
intervention and, moreover, was disposed to think that an unsolicited
offer on the part of the Powers to assist the Swiss to settle their
internal disputes would inflame their national pride, and rather
tend to aggravate, than to diminish, the gravity of the situation.
It is possible, therefore, that he may to some extent have delayed
the negotiations. But the alleged waste of time cannot at the most
have exceeded a very few days, seeing that the French note was only
submitted to him on November 9, and that his counter-proposal had been
agreed to by the Powers and was ready for transmission to Switzerland
on the 26th. To contend that Palmerston supposed that, by delaying
the negotiations for two or three days, he would enable the Radicals
to achieve their purpose, is to credit him with a knowledge of the
military weakness of the _Sonderbund_ which he most certainly did not
possess. If he in any way retarded the final drafting of the proposed
offer of mediation, it is infinitely more probable that he so acted in
the hope that Minto's efforts at Rome to induce the Pope to recall the
Jesuits from Lucerne might prove successful and that, in consequence,
the two parties might be able to settle their quarrel without an
appeal to arms and without foreign interference.
Sir Robert Morier, however, asserts most positively that Palmerston
"instigated Peel to perform his celebrated feat of precipitating
the war of the _Sonderbund_."[938] In his _Mémoires_ M. Guizot has
reproduced a letter from M. de Bois-le-Comte, the French ambassador
to the Confederation, in which it is stated that, upon receipt of the
news from London that the Powers intended to propose mediation, Mr.
Peel sent the chaplain of the British legation to the headquarters of
General Dufour to apprise him of the state of affairs and to urge him
immediately to march upon Lucerne and try conclusions with the army of
the _Sonderbund_.[939] It is evident that, if there be any foundation
of truth in these stories, neither the instructions with which Lord
Minto, a member of the government, was supplied, nor the official
despatch of October 29, which was to be communicated to M. Ochsenbein,
can have been the expression of Lord Palmerston's real policy. His
veritable intentions must have been conveyed in private letters[940]
to the British _chargé d'affaires_ at Berne, it never having been
suggested that he employed any secret agent in the affair. The
question as to who acted as British minister to the Confederation, at
this period, is, therefore, of extreme importance. It is inconceivable
that Palmerston, if he really were engaged in prosecuting the
Machiavellian designs imputed to him, should not have replaced Mr.
Morier by an Arthur Aston, a Henry Bulwer, or some other tried and
trusted agent. But in point of fact the business of the legation,
during the whole of this critical time, was left in charge of a young
secretary, Mr. Peel. Now Peel was the eldest son of Sir Robert, who,
to the day of his death, never forgave Palmerston for his desertion of
the Tory party in 1828.[941] Is it credible that Palmerston can have
entrusted the conduct of an affair of the kind, suggested by M. Guizot
and Sir Robert Morier, to a comparative stranger, a young man of
twenty-five, the son of his political opponent and personal enemy?
Nevertheless, it is highly probable that Palmerston's despatch of
October 29, although written with a very different object, did,
in effect, precipitate the conflict between the Radical Cantons
and the _Sonderbund_. As Mr. Peel, without doubt, rightly divined,
M. Ochsenbein, notwithstanding the pacific language which he had
held to Lord Minto, had no real desire to see the dispute amicably
settled.[942] Federal unity was the end which he and his friends had
set themselves to attain, and they were convinced that nothing but
physical force would induce the Catholic and Conservative Cantons to
renounce their sovereign rights. By "blood and iron" alone could the
success of their policy be achieved. Hence the prospect that England
intended to exert herself at Rome, in favour of Papal intervention,
may have driven the Radicals of Berne to immediate action. They may
have argued that, should His Holiness consent to recall the Jesuits
and should the _Sonderbund_, in consequence, be peacefully dissolved,
an excellent opportunity would be lost of reducing the Conservative
Cantons to submission.
The _identic note_ of November 26, 1847, was to have been communicated
to the contending parties, on behalf of Great Britain, by Sir
Stratford Canning. His instructions, however, provided that he
should not present it if, upon his arrival in Switzerland, he should
find that the _Sonderbund_ had capitulated and that the war was at
an end.[943] Canning, in consequence, made no offer of mediation,
but remained about three weeks in Switzerland for the purpose of
impressing upon M. Ochsenbein and his colleagues the expediency of
treating the defeated Cantons with consideration, and of refraining
from any measures which might furnish other Powers with a pretext
for intervention. France, Austria, and Prussia, however, adopted a
different procedure. M. de Bois-le-Comte received the _identic note_
on November 29, and, forthwith, despatched a copy of it both to the
Federal Diet and to the leaders of the _Sonderbund_, notwithstanding
that Lucerne had already surrendered and that it was evident that the
Valais could not hold out much longer.[944] His example was followed
by the ministers of Austria and Prussia. To these communications
the executive at Berne, the members of which had expressed to Sir
Stratford Canning their gratification at the attitude adopted by Great
Britain, sent an answer couched in very decided language. The offer
of mediation was rejected, not only because hostilities had ceased,
but because it was impossible to recognize the principle upon which
the proposal was based. If the Confederation were at war with another
State, it might, or might not, entertain an offer of mediation, but it
could not admit, under any circumstances, the claim of the Powers to
treat as belligerents the Cantons of the _Sonderbund_. The treaties
by which the Confederation had been constituted provided only for one
Diet and for one Federal executive. The alliance of the seven Cantons
was simply an act of rebellion which the central government had been
strong enough to deal with effectually.[945]
The overthrow of the _Sonderbund_ and the haughty reply returned by
the Diet to the French, the Austrian, and the Prussian notes caused a
profound sensation. The inability of the absolute Courts and of the
government of M. Guizot to render assistance to the Cantons, which
had sought to resist the decrees of the majority in the Swiss Diet,
was made manifest to the world. Italian nationalists, German Liberals,
French reformers, acclaimed the victory of the Radical executive as
a triumph for their cause. In governmental circles, at Vienna and
at Berlin, there was no disposition to under-rate the gravity of
the situation. Largely owing to the restraining influence of Lord
Minto, central Italy still presented a certain outward appearance of
tranquillity.[946] But Sicily and Naples were in open revolution, and
King "Bomba," who had, hitherto, set his face sternly against all
reforms, was, in January, 1848, compelled to concede a constitution.
Meanwhile, throughout the Peninsula the feeling of hostility to
Austria was growing in intensity. Encouraged by Lord Minto, Sardinia,
Tuscany, and the Papal States agreed to abolish all internal lines
of customs and to form a commercial league, after the manner of the
German _Zollverein_.[947] The significance of this measure was clearly
perceived by Metternich. On December 14, he directed Diedrichstein
to acquaint Palmerston that the condition of Italy would necessitate
a large increase of the Austrian army in Lombardy.[948] "You and I,"
he confided to his old friend, Radetzky, "are not destined to end
our days in peace. . . . It has been reserved for the present age to
witness the spectacle of a Liberal Pope."[949]
The forcible dissolution of the alliance of the Catholic Cantons made
it the more necessary, the German Cabinets declared, for the Powers
vigilantly to watch over the proceedings of the Federal Diet. The
conference, which it had been proposed to hold upon Swiss affairs,
must, they insisted, still take place.[950] The British government,
however, altogether dissented from this view. The _Sonderbund_ no
longer existed, the Jesuits had fled, and Palmerston, therefore,
could see no occasion for any deliberations upon the domestic affairs
of the Confederation. England, in any case, he announced, must now
decline to take part in a conference. M. Guizot adopted a different
attitude. If Palmerston were resolved to pose as the patron of
Radicals and revolutionists, why should not he come forward as the
champion of order and stability? The Austrian, Count Coloredo, and
the Prussian, General von Radowitz, who had been despatched to Paris
by their respective governments, found him most favourably disposed.
It was very flattering to his vanity that at this crisis the Courts
of Vienna and of Berlin should be prepared to defer to his opinions
and should send their emissaries to Paris to consult him. But from
London he received a word of warning which made a considerable
impression upon him. It would evoke, wrote his friend the Duc de
Broglie, recollections of the Holy Alliance and savour overmuch of the
deliberations at Laybach and Verona,[951] were France to take part in
a conference which England had declined to attend.[952]
In his conversations with Coloredo and Radowitz, M. Guizot,
consequently, deprecated the notion of assembling a conference. Let
them for the moment, he urged, be content with formally declaring to
the Diet that the Powers were resolved not to suffer the violation of
the principle of cantonal sovereignty and independence. Should their
representations be unheeded, the question of active intervention
could be more conveniently discussed at a later date. He had, they
must not forget, his parliamentary position to consider. In the
coming session, M. Thiers was preparing to assail his foreign policy
with the utmost virulence. Metternich consented readily to adopt
these suggestions. Far from desiring to aggravate the difficulties
of M. Guizot, he considered it of supreme importance that he should
remain in office.[953] A joint note, dated January 18, 1848, was,
accordingly, drawn up and presented to the Federal executive. Coloredo
and Radowitz, thereupon, quitted Paris. It was clearly inexpedient
that these agents of the absolute Courts should be present in the
French capital, during the heated debates to which the reply to the
Address was expected to give rise. But their deliberations were to
be regarded as merely suspended, not as definitely concluded. In the
spring they were to return and resume their discussions. But this
plan was not destined to be realized. Before the time appointed for
their second meeting with M. Guizot, the storm burst and swept away
the Orleans Monarchy. The revolutionary contagion spread rapidly to
Berlin and to Vienna. Metternich, compelled to fly, sought refuge
in England, in company with Prince Wittgenstein, M. Guizot, and
other ultra-conservative statesmen. At the news of the downfall
of the redoubtable Chancellor the Milanese flew to arms. After a
memorable conflict of five days' duration, Radetzky retired upon the
Quadrilateral, to prepare for the struggle with Charles Albert, who
had thrown down the gauntlet to Austria and marched to the assistance
of the Lombards.
A history of Franco-British relations, during the reign of Louis
Philippe, is not concerned with the internal reasons which contributed
to his downfall. It is sufficient to point out that the existence of
the Orleans Monarchy was necessarily precarious, seeing that it was in
the nature of a compromise which had only been grudgingly acquiesced
in by the nation. The revolution by which it was overwhelmed was, in
the words of Lamartine, "_une revolution de mépris_." All classes were
thoroughly disgusted with the policy of M. Guizot and indignant at the
numerous public and private scandals[954] brought to light, during
the year 1847. In a constitutional State a change of government is
the remedy provided for such a condition of affairs. Louis Philippe,
however, was too attached to his system of personal government
willingly to part with a minister, who never attempted to restrict
him to the _rôle_ of a constitutional sovereign.[955] His last
Cabinet, he protested, to the day of his death, had the support of
the majority of the Chamber. But the servile body of placemen, which
formed the ministerial party, in no way represented the opinion of the
nation. The people with one accord condemned the proceedings of the
government and identified the King with the unpopular actions of his
principal minister. On February 23, 1848, a demonstration in favour of
parliamentary reform, followed by a tumult in the streets, sufficed to
destroy the discredited _régime_.
The rupture of "the cordial understanding" with England was followed
so closely by the downfall of the monarchy, as to suggest that there
must have been a connection between the two events. That the quarrel
with England was one of the contributory causes of the revolution is
almost universally admitted. English writers have generally referred
to the events of '48 with some complacency, as the just retribution
which promptly overtook Louis Philippe. So shrewd an observer as
Baron Stockmar appears to have been convinced that the revelations
in connection with the Spanish marriages did the "Citizen King" an
incalculable amount of harm in the eyes of the French people and
precipitated his overthrow.[956] Now, it is clear that the Spanish
marriages had one effect which took those who were responsible for
them completely by surprise. M. Guizot had confidently anticipated
that, whatever other consequences might flow from them, they would be
acclaimed as a great diplomatic triumph achieved at the expense of
England. But the event completely falsified his expectations. The men,
who in the question of the right of search, in the Pritchard affair,
and in many other matters, had constantly accused him of truckling
to England, were the first to denounce him for having sacrificed
"the cordial understanding" to a purely dynastic object. It is more
than probable that the indignation professed by M. Thiers and his
friends was not very sincere and was, to a large extent, assumed for
purposes of party politics. But their words, none the less, made a
deep impression upon the middle-classes which had hitherto steadfastly
supported the _régime_ of July. These people, says Lord Normanby,
were convinced that their material interests had suffered owing to
the rupture of the English alliance. The construction of railways in
France had led, as in England, to a wild outburst of speculation. The
undue inflation of prices was followed by the inevitable reaction.
This unexpected depreciation in the value of the shares of the new
companies was not, however, ascribed to its true causes. Disappointed
speculators persuaded themselves that their losses were due to the
disinclination of the British public to invest in French railways,
owing to the change which the Spanish marriages had wrought in the
political relations of the two countries.[957]
But in so far as the revolution of '48 is concerned, the true
importance of the break-up of "the cordial understanding" consists in
the policy which M. Guizot, in consequence, saw fit to adopt. It is
undeniable that his attitude towards the Italian national movement and
in the Swiss question was severely condemned by the majority of his
countrymen, and proved most injurious to the monarchy. Men perceived
clearly that the only result of his unnatural alliance with the
Cabinet of Vienna had been enormously to diminish French influence at
Rome and at Turin. In Switzerland his policy was seen to have been
even more ineffectual.[958] All his efforts had been directed to the
preservation of the _Sonderbund_. Nevertheless, the alliance of the
reactionary cantons had been promptly and ignominiously dissolved,
whilst his proffered mediation had been rejected with a haughty
intimation that the victorious party intended to settle its affairs
without his interference. It has been urged, however, in his defence
that his difficulties were greatly aggravated by Lord Palmerston,
whose deliberate purpose it was to thwart him on every occasion. A
secret alliance, it has been said, existed between the British Foreign
Minister and M. Thiers. Gossip on this subject had been rife ever
since the close of the year 1844. It would seem that about that time
some friendly messages from Palmerston were conveyed to M. Thiers by
Sir John Easthope,[959] the proprietor of the _Morning Chronicle_,
which was generally regarded as Palmerston's especial organ. In the
following year, when M. Thiers visited London, Sir Anthony Panizzi,
an Italian political exile, and the chief librarian of the British
Museum, took great credit to himself for having cemented a good
understanding between the two statesmen.[960] Palmerston afterwards
denied absolutely that their interviews were in any way connected
with a "conspiracy against M. Guizot."[961] Greville, however,
accuses him of having, during the controversy on the subject of the
Spanish marriages, permitted Lord Normanby to supply M. Thiers with
the diplomatic documents bearing upon the question. Greville was
so ready to believe anything discreditable about Palmerston that
he cannot, as a rule, be looked upon as an altogether trustworthy
witness. But, at the time referred to, he was in a position to speak
of his own knowledge of what was taking place, inasmuch as he was
in Paris for the express purpose of trying to re-establish "the
cordial understanding" and was, moreover, the guest of Lord Normanby
at the British embassy.[962] His testimony, therefore, coupled with
the corroborative evidence to be found in the published letters of
Panizzi, does suggest that certain of Thiers' very damaging criticisms
of M. Guizot may have been inspired by Lord Palmerston.[963] But,
had the policy of M. Guizot been supported by public opinion, the
intrigues of a foreign minister with his chief political opponent
would have tended to strengthen, rather than to weaken, his position.
The whole affair, indeed, is not of much importance. Some of Thiers'
newspaper articles may have been based upon information improperly
supplied to him by the agents of Lord Palmerston, but his great
speech on the Spanish marriages was not delivered until February 4,
1847,[964] when the British _blue book_ was at the disposal of any one
who might desire to purchase it.
But the more serious charge has been made that Palmerston's whole
policy, at this period, was subordinated to his desire to avenge
the defeat he had sustained in the Spanish marriages.[965] His
attitude in the Swiss and Italian questions has been fully explained.
It is difficult to see how any British minister could have acted
differently. Had Aberdeen been in office, it may safely be surmised
that, out of consideration for Austria, he would not have advocated
the despatch of one of his colleagues upon such a mission, as was
confided to a member of Lord John Russell's government. But, without
doubt, he would have furnished his agents at the Italian Courts with
instructions substantially the same as those drawn up for the guidance
of Lord Minto. In the Swiss affair both Aberdeen and Palmerston sought
to avert civil war and foreign intervention by inducing the Pope to
recall the Jesuits from Lucerne. There is, in short, a continuity in
the British policy, whether conducted by Aberdeen or by Palmerston,
not to be found in that of M. Guizot. His _rapprochement_ with the
Cabinet of Vienna obliged him to adopt towards the Liberal and
national movements in progress throughout Europe the views of Prince
Metternich. The precise reasons which induced him to make overtures
to Austria can only be conjectured. Having shattered "the cordial
understanding," he may have thought that he must be able to show that
he had substituted for the English, the Austrian, alliance. Perhaps
he may have had some idea of isolating England, by means of the close
relations which he proposed to establish between the government of the
"Citizen King" and the absolute Courts. But, be his motives what they
may, his dealings with Metternich, in 1847, were unquestionably one of
the chief reasons of the revolution of '48.[966]
For the first time, between the years 1830 and 1848, the attempt was
seriously made by the French and English governments to establish,
as a primary principle of policy, the necessity of maintaining close
and intimate relations between the two countries. The result, on the
whole, disappointed expectations. The great work of Talleyrand's old
age, the cementing of a good understanding between the Whigs and
the Orleans' Monarchy, without doubt, deterred the absolute Courts
from intervening in French affairs after the Revolution of July.
Unquestionably, also, it averted a great war in the question of the
separation of Belgium from Holland. But, on subsequent occasions, it
did not prevent grave differences of opinion from arising between
the two governments. The time had not yet come when "the cordial
understanding" could be placed upon a firm and durable basis. The
maintenance of the settlement, agreed to after the great war, was
still the foundation of British policy in Europe. France, on the
other hand, chafed bitterly at the conditions imposed upon her by the
Congress of Vienna. Even among the peace-loving middle-classes the
hope was fondly entertained that the man would arise who, "_à grands
coups de sabre_," should destroy the treaties of 1815 and give back
to France her "natural frontiers." Bonapartism was a living force
by reason of the existence of this feeling. Louis Philippe and his
ministers sought to allay the restlessness which it engendered by
an active policy in the Mediterranean and in more distant waters.
Suspicions and jealousies, the consequences of more than a hundred
years of war and rivalry, were thus kept alive. French and British
officials, whether of high rank or of low degree, continued to regard
each other with instinctive hostility. Bulwer was no less anxious
to outwit his colleague, Bresson, than was Pritchard to thwart his
fellow-consul, Meerenhout. Nevertheless, the policy which finally
broke up the alliance was not a policy which commended itself to the
French people. Palmerston's views upon European affairs, between 1846
and 1848, accorded far more with the sentiments of the majority of
Frenchmen than did those of M. Guizot; and his quarrel was not with
the French nation, but with the government of Louis Philippe.
INDEX
Abd-el-Kader, Algerian chief, 358
Abdullah Pasha, 150
Abd-ul-Mejid, Sultan of Turkey, 242
Aberdeen, Earl of, 34, 37, 38, 116, 222, 281, 327, 331, 332, 333, 334,
339, 340, 342, 343, 344, 345, 347, 348, 349, 352, 354, 355, 356, 357,
358, 359, 360, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 371, 372, 373, 375, 376,
377, 379, 380, 382, 385, 392, 401, 404, 421, 426, 442
Adair, Sir Robert, 76, 79, 82, 83, 84, 100, 101, 127
Adelaïde, Madame, sister of Louis Philippe, 9, 401
Ahmed Pasha, 165
Akiff-Effendi, 246
Albani, Cardinal, 104
Albert, Prince Consort of Queen Victoria, 287, 365, 372, 384, 417
Alexander I., Tsar of Russia, 19, 44
Alexander, Tsarewitch, _afterwards_ Alexander II., 236
Ali Pasha, 146
Alison, Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople, 289
Althorp, Viscount. _See_ SPENCER, EARL
Alvanley, Lord, 86
Ancillon, Johann Peter, 111, 112, 136, 141
Apponyi, Count, 66, 68, 273, 292, 295, 411
Argüelles, Agustín, 218
Aston, Arthur, 217, 226, 307, 339, 340, 344, 371, 432
Atthalin, General, Baron, 27, 36, 344
Aubigny, Captain de, 361, 365, 366
Auckland, Earl of, 235
Aumale, Duc d', son of Louis Philippe, 338, 373
Avedick, Armenian _dragoman_, 244
Azeglio, Marquis de, 408, 409
Bagot, Sir Charles, 76, 113
Balbo, Count Cesare, 408, 409
Balmaceda, Carlist chief, 215
Bandiera, Admiral, 290
Barante, Baron de, 130
Baudrand, General, 15, 81
Beauharnais, Eugène de, 48
Beauvale, Lord, 17, 107, 108, 111, 112, 114, 169, 247, 250, 322
Becker, German poet, 312
Bedford, Duke of, 297
Belliard, General, 21, 61, 83, 100, 101
Benedek, Colonel, 406
Berri, Duc de, 62, 350
Bern, Duchesse de, 51, 120, 134, 197
Bernetti, Cardinal, 104, 106, 107
Bernstorff, Count, 24
Berryer, Pierre-Antoine, 350
Beshir, Emir, 152
Bligh, British _chargé d'affaires_ at St. Petersburg, 166, 168, 221
Boghos Bey, 227
Boigne, Comtesse de, 259
Bois-le-Comte, French Ambassador to the Swiss Confederation, 431, 434
Bordeaux, Duc de, 9, 62, 120, 350, 351
Bourqueney, Baron, 241, 286, 321, 322, 323, 326
Boutenieff, Russian Minister at Constantinople, 154, 155, 156, 157,
158, 161, 162, 223, 247
Bravo, Gonzalez, 217
Bresson, Comte, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 371,
374, 375, 379, 380, 383, 384, 387, 388, 390, 391, 394, 395, 397, 398,
399, 401, 411, 444
Broglie, Duc de, 35, 39, 130, 131, 132, 135, 137, 138, 156, 160, 165,
167, 169, 177, 178, 181, 184, 188, 193, 195, 196, 197, 198, 219, 221,
222, 225, 226, 334, 428, 436
Bruat, Admiral, 360, 361
Brunnow, Baron, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 261, 267, 300, 319
Bubna, Field-Marshal, 19
Bugeaud, Marshal, Duc d'Isly, 358, 367
Bülow, Baron, 114, 141, 263, 266, 274, 275, 276, 283
Bulwer, Henry, Lytton, _afterwards_ Lord Dalling, 232, 249, 250, 257,
279, 280, 295, 296, 298, 307, 333, 337, 339, 341, 370, 371, 372, 373,
374, 375, 378, 379, 380, 385, 386, 388, 390, 393, 396, 400, 411, 432,
444
Buol, Count, 413, 415
Burnes, Sir Alexander, 235, 236
Cabrera, Ramon, 202, 210, 214, 215, 216
Caillier, Captain, 242
Calatrava, Josè Maria, 203, 205, 207
Calomarde, Spanish statesman, 173, 174
Campbell, Colonel, 156, 162, 226, 227, 230, 232, 233, 234, 251, 257
Canning, George, 20, 50, 63, 144, 146, 147, 352, 403
Canning, Sir Stratford, _afterwards_ Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, 151,
153, 155, 174, 175, 177, 221, 433, 434
Carini, Neapolitan Ambassador at Madrid, 374
Carlos, Don, Pretender to the Spanish throne, 173, 174, 176, 178, 179,
182, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 191, 192, 193, 205, 206, 207, 209, 210,
211, 214, 342, 343, 344, 348, 369, 377, 386, 394, 403
Carlotta, Infanta, 369
Cartwright, Thomas, 49, 50
Castlereagh, Viscount, _afterwards_ Second Marquis of Londonderry, 16,
20
Cea, Bermúdez, Spanish statesman, 174, 175, 177, 178, 336
Chad, British minister at Berlin, 110, 112
Charles X., King of France, 1, 4, 6, 8, 16, 20, 21, 30, 39, 43, 45
Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, 408, 409, 413, 414, 418, 437
Charles, Archduke of Austria, 49, 336
Charles Frederick, Archduke of Austria, 290
Charles, of Naples, Prince, 51, 55, 57, 59, 69
Charlotte, Princess, daughter of George IV., 69
Chassé, General, Baron, 76, 140, 142
Chateaubriand, Vicomte de, 26, 64, 350
Chekib-Effendi, 263, 267, 271
Chesney, Colonel Francis, 237
Chlopicki, General, 44
Chrzanowski, General Adalbert, 229, 251, 252
Clanricarde, Marquis of, 236, 252, 319, 320
Clarendon, Earl of, 177, 184, 186, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 203, 207,
208, 210, 216, 217, 265, 266, 275, 297, 336, 396
Cochelet, Adrien-Louis, 241, 242, 269, 272, 273
Codrington, Admiral, Sir Edward, 146
Coloredo, Count, 436, 437
Concha, General, 338
Constantine, Paulovitch, Grand Duke, 144
Cor, _dragoman_ to French Embassy at Constantinople, 291, 292
Cordoba, General, 201
Cortazar, Modesto, 216
Coste, Jacques, 270, 310
Cousin, Victor, 41
Cowley, Earl, 185, 343, 345, 347, 363, 366, 371, 379, 396
Cubières, General de, 302
Cunningham, Marchioness of, 50
Daine, General, 76, 83
Darmès, regicide, 306
Décazes, Duc, 39, 340
Dedel, Dutch Envoy in London, 266
Deutz, Agent of Duchesse de Bern, 197
Diebitsch, Marshal, Count, 26, 42, 64
Diedrichstein, Baron von, 435
Dino, Duchesse de, 32, 199, 266
Dost Mohammad, Amir of Kabul, 235
Drummond-Hay, British Consul at Tangier, 360
Duckworth, Admiral, 164
Dufour, General, 430, 432
Duhamel, Colonel, 157
Dupetit-Thouars, Admiral, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 360
Dupin, André Marie Jean Jacques, 31, 129
Dupont, Jacques, 31, 39
Durham, Earl of, 123, 124, 135, 224
Easthope, Sir John, 440
Eliot, Lord, _afterwards_ Earl of St. Germans, 184, 185
Ellice, Edward, 265, 297, 321
Elphinstone, Miss Mercer, 53
Emin Bey, 148
Enrique, Don, Duke of Seville, 370, 379, 384, 385, 388, 389, 390, 397,
398, 403
Escalera, General, 207
España, Count of, 214
Espartero, General Baldomero, 206, 207, 210, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216,
217, 307, 335, 338, 339, 340, 341, 343, 344, 346, 347, 368, 369, 371,
378, 404
Etterhazy, Prince, 43
Evans, Sir George de Lacy, 187, 202, 211
Excelmans, General, _afterwards_ Marshal, 52
Fabvier, General, Baron, 52
Fanshawe, Captain, 315
Faucher, Léon, 302
Ferdinand VII., King of Spain, 20, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 190,
191, 192, 403
Ferdinand I. (IV.), King of the Two Sicilies, 19
Ferdinand II. ("Bomba,") King of the Two Sicilies, 264, 374, 435
Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, King Consort of Maria II., Queen of
Portugal, 190
Ferdinand, Duke of Saxe-Coburg, 371, 379, 382, 384, 395
Fernanda, Infanta, 372, 377, 391, 394, 395, 397, 398, 400, 401
Fethi Ahmed Pasha, 270, 273
Fezensac, Duc de, 209
Flahaut, General, Comte de, 53, 54, 265, 407
Forbes, British _chargé d'affaires_ at Vienna, 101
Francis II., Emperor of Austria, 17, 21, 26, 68, 166
Francis IV., Duke of Modena, 64
Francisco de Paula, Infante, 369, 375, 385, 393
Francisco de Asis, Don, Duke of Cadiz, _afterwards_ king Consort of
Isabella II., Queen of Spain, 370, 379, 384, 387, 391, 395, 396, 397,
398, 401, 402, 403
Frederick William III., King of Prussia, 17, 22, 23, 24, 26, 31, 32,
68, 167, 274
Frederick William IV., King of Prussia, 166, 408
Frederick William, Crown Prince of Prussia. _See_ FREDERICK WILLIAM IV.
Gallois, Captain, 105, 107
Gendebien, Alexandra, Joseph, 48, 52
George IV., King of Great Britain, 14, 50, 69
Gérard, Marshal, 76, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 139, 140, 141, 142
Gioberti, Vincenzo, 408, 409
Glücksberg, Duc de, 340, 341, 345
Goblet, General, 84, 100, 101, 128
Granville, Earl of, 53, 54, 58, 59, 60, 67, 69, 72, 76, 77, 78, 79,
80, 82, 85, 95, 99, 103, 129, 131, 132, 134, 137, 160, 181, 185, 188,
193, 194, 196, 202, 205, 208, 209, 228, 234, 244, 279, 280, 303, 304,
305, 306, 307, 336
Granville, Countess of, 63
Gregory XVI., Pope, 409, 410, 421
Greville, Charles, 64, 70, 265, 283, 297, 299, 302, 312, 321, 329, 441
Grey, 2nd Earl, 39, 40, 46, 49, 51, 57, 74, 79, 80, 81, 83, 89, 92,
96, 98, 102, 116, 118, 119, 123, 134, 137, 140, 172, 183, 199, 222,
265
Grey, 3rd Earl, 381
Grote, George, 423, 424
Guizot, François, 31, 35, 39, 47, 130, 132, 191, 259, 260, 261, 263,
264, 265, 266, 267, 273, 274, 275, 277, 278, 279, 282, 283, 284, 285,
286, 288, 292, 296, 297, 304, 305, 309, 312, 313, 318, 320, 321, 323,
324, 326, 329, 332, 333, 334, 337, 339, 341, 345, 347, 348, 349, 352,
353, 355, 356, 357, 359, 360, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 370, 372,
374, 375, 376, 379, 383, 384, 386, 387, 388, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394,
398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 404, 407, 410, 411, 412, 413, 421, 422, 423,
424, 425, 428, 429, 431, 432, 434, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 444
Haines, Captain, 232.
Hafiz Pasha, 228, 240, 242, 243, 251, 252
Halen, General Van, 344
Halil Pasha, 155, 158, 159, 243, 269
Hay, Admiral, Lord John, 201, 207, 213
Heine, Heinrich, 63, 120, 302
Heytesbury, Lord, 26, 27, 28, 42, 68, 87, 88, 89, 90, 110, 123, 125
Hinüber, General, 72
Hobson, Captain William, 351
Hodges, Colonel, 269, 272
Holland, Lord, 255, 266, 275, 298, 302, 321, 327
Holland, Lady, 298
Hosrew Pasha, 150, 243, 247, 268, 269, 272, 273
Howard de Walden, Lord, 189, 190
Howden, Lord, 411
Hugon, Admiral, 226, 306
Humann, Jean-Georges, 132
Hume, Joseph, 281
Hussein Pasha, 151
Ibell, Charles, 24
Ibrahim Pasha, 145, 146, 149, 150, 151, 152, 154, 155, 157, 158, 159,
160, 161, 219, 220, 232, 234, 240, 241, 242, 245, 247, 251, 252, 253,
268, 269, 271, 280, 283, 287, 291, 294, 295, 296, 301, 310, 311, 314,
317
Isabella II., Queen of Spain, 174, 176, 180, 186, 204, 206, 208, 211,
213, 216, 335, 337, 338, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 347, 348, 368, 369,
370, 371, 374, 375, 377, 378, 379, 382, 383, 387, 388, 391, 394, 396,
397, 400, 401, 402, 403, 405, 411
Isturiz, Francisco, Javier de, 202, 379
Jarnac, Philippe de Bohan-Chabot, Comte de, 349, 360, 361, 362, 363,
364, 365, 366, 375, 376, 383, 384, 386, 388, 391, 392, 394, 402
Jochmus, General, 252, 314
Joinville, Prince de, son of Louis Philippe, 189, 244, 338, 356, 358,
359, 364, 367
Klindworth, secret diplomatic agent, 412
Kotchuby, Russian minister, 156
Kotzebue, Augustus, 24
La Fayette, Marquis de, 5, 9, 11, 35, 46
Laffitte, Jacques, 4, 9, 39, 62, 63
Lalande, Admiral, 243, 244, 245
Lallemand, General, Baron, 52
Lamarque, General, Comte, 46, 120
Lamartine, Alphonse de, 438
Lamb, Sir Frederick. _See_ BEAUVALE, LORD
Lamoricière, General Christophe Léon Louis Juchault de, 358, 360
Lansdowne, Marquis of, 181, 266, 275, 302
La Tour-Maubourg, Marie-Charles-César de Faÿ, General, Marquis de, 82,
84, 95, 98, 99, 100, 127, 139
Lawoëstine, Colonel, Marquis de, 54, 55, 56
Leon, General Diego, 338
Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, _afterwards_ Leopold I., King of the Belgians,
49, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 79, 82, 84, 85, 91, 92, 93, 99, 100,
101, 126, 127, 139, 143, 285, 287, 300, 307, 367, 384
Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, Prince, 371, 375, 377, 379, 385, 391, 392,
395, 402
Lesseps, Viscomte Ferdinand de, 227, 345, 346
Leuchtenberg, Duc Auguste de, 48, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 58, 60, 189
Lieven, Prince, 42, 90, 115, 221
Lieven, Princess, 222, 259, 265, 274
Lobau, Marshal Mouton de, 46
Londonderry, 3rd Marquis of, 74, 85, 223
Louis XVIII., King of France, 6, 7, 30, 39, 62, 340
Louis Philippe, King of the French, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15,
21, 22, 26, 27, 28, 30, 34, 35, 40, 45, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56,
57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 66, 67, 69, 81, 92, 97, 100, 121, 124, 129, 130,
131, 134, 137, 144, 173, 177, 182, 185, 186, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192,
193, 195, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202, 204, 205, 207, 209, 212, 214, 220,
239, 250, 258, 264, 265, 279, 285, 287, 292, 293, 300, 305, 307, 308,
309, 311, 319, 327, 329, 331, 335, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343,
344, 347, 348, 350, 351, 355, 356, 357, 358, 365, 368, 369, 370, 371,
372, 374, 375, 376, 379, 382, 383, 384, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392,
393, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 407, 410, 413, 422, 423,
425, 429, 437, 438, 439, 443, 444
Louise, Princesse, daughter of Louis Philippe, consort of Leopold I.,
King of the Belgians, 126, 392
Loulé, Marquise de, 189
Lushington, Doctor, 334
Lützow, Count, 67
Lyndhurst, Lord, 118, 119
Lyons, Sir Edmund, 411
Maanen, Cornelius van, 29
Macneil, British minister at Teheran, 235
Mahmud II., Sultan of Turkey, 145, 146, 147, 150, 152, 153, 157, 159,
161, 163, 165, 169, 219, 220, 227, 228, 229, 232, 237, 238, 239, 240,
242, 246
Maison, Marshal, Marquis, 41, 64, 66, 67, 108
Malcolm, Sir Pulteney, 164
Mandeville, British _chargé d'affaires_ at Constantinople, 154, 155,
157, 158, 160
Maria II., Queen of Portugal, 171, 173, 174, 176, 189, 190
Maria Amalia of Saxony, 3rd wife of Ferdinand VII., King of Spain, 172
Maria Christina, 4th wife of Ferdinand VII. and Queen Regent of Spain,
172, 173, 175, 176, 177, 186, 192, 194, 195, 202, 203, 206, 207, 209,
213, 215, 216, 217, 218, 307, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 343, 344,
346, 348, 368, 369, 370, 372, 374, 376, 378, 379, 382, 383, 384, 385,
387, 389, 392, 395, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401
Marie Amélie, Queen of the French, Consort of Louis Philippe, 9, 51,
391
Mareuil, French _chargé d'affaires_ in London, 132
Maroto, General Rafael, 211, 212, 213, 214
Martínez de la Rosa, Francisco, 178, 180, 184, 187, 190, 192
Matuszewic, Count, 111, 115, 169
Mauguin, François, 49
Maurojeni, Turkish _chargé d'affaires_ at Vienna, 153
Mazzini, Giuseppe, 408
Medem, Count, 252
Meerenhout, French consul at Tahiti, 352, 353, 354, 444
Mehemet Ali, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158,
159, 161, 164, 168, 169, 170, 171, 219, 220, 224, 227, 228, 229, 230,
231, 232, 233, 234, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 245, 246, 247,
248, 249, 250, 251, 253, 255, 256, 260, 261, 262, 263, 266, 267, 268,
269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 276, 277, 278, 280, 281, 282, 284, 285, 290,
291, 294, 295, 296, 297, 299, 300, 301, 303, 305, 308, 309, 310, 312,
313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 403
Melbourne, Viscount, 183, 186, 205, 266, 275, 282, 283, 286, 287, 297,
298, 299, 303, 307, 309, 326
Mendizabal, Juan Alvarez, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 201, 202
Mérode, Comte Félix de, 55
Metternich, Clement Wenceslas, Prince, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
24, 25, 42, 43, 49, 65, 67, 68, 101, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 112, 114,
121, 135, 144, 166, 167, 168, 169, 198, 204, 225, 245, 247, 254, 266,
269, 293, 300, 310, 312, 316, 319, 320, 321, 322, 324, 326, 332, 336,
342, 343, 344, 370, 393, 407, 408, 409, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416,
418, 421, 422, 423, 424, 429, 435, 437, 442, 443
Meulinäer, Dutch statesman, 82, 84, 126, 128
Miguel, Dom, usurping King of Portugal, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177,
178, 179
Miller, Major-General, 354
Mimaut, French consul-general at Alexandria, 227, 272
Minto, Earl of, 417, 418, 421, 424, 425, 427, 428, 431, 432, 433, 435,
442
Miraflores, Marquis of, 378, 396
Mohammad, Shah of Persia, 235, 236
Molé, Louis, Comte, 31, 35, 36, 38, 39, 48, 196, 204, 205, 207, 212,
234, 329, 336
Moltke, Major Helmuth von, _afterwards_ Field-Marshal, 230, 238, 251
Montalivet, Comte de, 45
Montpensier, Duc de, son of Louis Philippe, 371, 372, 377, 383, 387,
391, 393, 394, 397, 398, 400, 401, 402
Montrond, Comte Casimir de, 32, 58
Morier, Burnet, 426
Morier, David, 425, 426, 432
Morny, Duc de, 53
Mortemart, Duc de, 87
Mounier, Baron, 321
Muñagorri, Basque lawyer, 210, 212
Muravieff, General, 154, 155, 156, 158
Mustafa-Effendi, 153
Namic Pasha, 153
Napier, Commodore, Sir Charles, 175, 290, 295, 301, 313, 314, 315,
316, 317, 360
Napoleon, Prince Charles, 66
Napoleon, Prince Louis, _afterwards_ Napoleon III., 53, 66, 121, 285,
286
Narvaez, General Ramon Maria, 211, 335, 346, 368, 374, 376, 378, 379,
383
Nemours, Duc de, son of Louis Philippe, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60,
61, 139, 189, 373
Nesselrode, Charles Robert Count, 20, 22, 87, 88, 90, 110, 125, 156,
165, 166, 167, 168, 220, 221, 236, 252, 269, 365
Neumann, Baron, 258, 263, 266, 273, 283
Nicholas I., Tsar of Russia, 20, 26, 27, 28, 36, 44, 68, 73, 88, 90,
101, 105, 108, 109, 112, 113, 116, 123, 124, 135, 140, 146, 147, 154,
156, 157, 160, 163, 166, 168, 220, 223, 224, 239, 241, 246, 253, 257,
319, 356, 357, 429
Normanby, Marquis of, 391, 393, 407, 411, 416, 439, 441
Nourri-Effendi, 242, 262, 263
Nuñoz. _See_ RIANZAREZ, DUKE OF
Nuñoz, brother of Duke of Rianzarez, 390
Ochsenbein, Ulrich, 424, 427, 428, 429, 432, 433
O'Donnell, General, 216, 338
Olozaga, Salustiano de, 339
Orange, Prince Frederick of, 29
Orange, William, Prince of, 29, 36, 47, 48, 50, 52, 57, 70, 76, 83
Orléans, Duc de. _See_ LOUIS PHILIPPE, King of the French
Orléans, Duc de, eldest son of Louis Philippe, 139, 198, 204, 225, 293
Orloff, General, Count Alexis, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115,
116, 162, 163, 170, 254
Osman Bey, 243
Otho, King of Greece, 311, 411
Otrante, Comte Athanase de, 65
Pageot, French diplomatist, 341, 342, 343
Palmella, Duke of, 189
Palmerston, Viscount, 41, 42, 46, 49, 53, 58, 59, 60, 61, 66, 70, 72,
75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 95, 96, 98,
99, 102, 105, 106, 107, 109, 112, 113, 115, 116, 125, 128, 134, 136,
139, 141, 143, 144, 153, 156, 166, 169, 173, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181,
182, 186, 187, 189, 192, 194, 195, 196, 199, 201, 202, 204, 208, 209,
213, 217, 219, 221, 222, 223, 225, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233,
236, 238, 239, 240, 241, 244, 245, 246, 248, 249, 251, 253, 254, 255,
256, 257, 258, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 270, 273, 274,
275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 281, 282, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290,
292, 296, 297, 298, 299, 302, 303, 304, 305, 307, 309, 310, 311, 312,
313, 314, 315, 320, 321, 322, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 330, 331, 332,
333, 336, 352, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 388, 389, 390, 391,
392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 406, 407,
411, 415, 416, 417, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433,
435, 436, 440, 441, 442, 444
Palmerston, Lady, 382
Panizzi, Sir Anthony, 441
Parnell, Sir Henry, 39
Pedro I., Emperor of Brazil, 171, 172, 173, 175, 176, 178, 189
Peel, Sir Robert, 183, 186, 222, 281, 327, 331, 357, 360, 372, 373,
380, 381, 401, 432
Peel, Robert, son of Sir Robert, 431, 432, 433
Périer, Casimir, 39, 62, 63, 64, 67, 68, 72, 75, 78, 79, 81, 86, 100,
102, 103, 105, 108, 112, 118, 120, 121, 129, 130
Périgord, Comte Edmond de, 32
Piscatory, French minister at Athens, 411
Pius IX., Pope, 409, 414
Polignac, Prince Jules de, 3, 14, 15, 26, 45, 155
Pomare, Queen of Tahiti, 352, 353, 354, 361, 365
Ponsonby, Viscount, 50, 52, 54, 55, 56, 59, 60, 71, 72, 156, 162, 223,
224, 229, 230, 231, 232, 234, 239, 240, 243, 244, 247, 248, 269, 270,
273, 291, 303, 305, 316, 324, 325, 326, 415
Pontois, French ambassador at Constantinople, 269, 291, 292
Pottinger, Eldred, 235
Pozzo di Borgo, Charles, Count, 160
Prim, Brigadier-General, _afterwards_ Marshal, 346
Pritchard, George, 353, 354, 355, 356, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365,
366, 367, 444
Quesada, General, 203
Radetzky, Field-Marshal, Count, 104, 435, 437
Radowitz, General von, 436, 437
Ranjit Singh, Maharajah of Lahore, 235
Rayneval, Alphonse Gérard de, 187, 195, 197
Reeve, Henry, 281, 302, 312, 329
Reichstadt, Duc de, son of Napoleon I., 67, 121
Rémusat, Comte Charles de, 5, 47
Reshid Bey, 159
Reshid, Mustafa, Pasha, 229, 239, 240, 244, 269, 273, 291, 292
Rianzarez, Duke of, 369, 372, 387
Riego, Rafael del, 179
Rifat Bey, 288, 290, 294, 301
Rigny, Admiral, Comte de, 178, 179
Rives, American minister in Paris, 5
Rodil, General, 179
Rossi, Comte Pellegrino, 410, 421
Roussin, Albin Reine, Admiral, Baron, 75, 158, 159, 160, 162, 168,
172, 228, 234, 241, 247, 248, 257, 272, 302
Royer-Collard, Pierre Paul, 130
Russell, Lord John, 282, 297, 299, 303, 380, 381, 383, 392, 416, 442
Sainte-Aulaire, Louis-Clair de Beaupoil, Marquis de, 66, 104, 193,
247, 333, 380, 428
Saldanha, Marshal, Duke of, 189
Salis-Soglio, Ulrich von, 430
Salvandy, Comte de, 340, 341
Sami Bey, 272, 273
Samos, Prince of, 272
Sand, Karl Ludwig, 24
Sarim-Effendi, 227, 228, 272
Sarsfield, General Pedro, 207
Sartorius, Sir George, 172, 175
Sébastiani, General, _afterwards_ Marshal, 41, 51, 52, 54, 57, 58, 59,
60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 77, 79, 80, 82, 85, 86, 87, 89,
94, 98, 99, 100, 132, 256, 257, 258, 259, 348
Sébastiani, General Tiburce, 100
Serrano, General, 411
Sèves, Colonel. _See_ SOLIMAN PASHA
Seymour, George, 106, 107
Simonitch, Count, 235, 236
Soliman Pasha, 149, 291, 301
Sotomayor, Duke of, 382
Soult, Marshal, Duc de Dalmatie, 79, 85, 131, 132, 142, 197, 212, 240,
241, 242, 243, 246, 248, 249, 250, 252, 254, 255, 256, 257, 259, 260,
309, 356
Southern, secretary to British legation and _chargé d'affaires_ at
Madrid, 194, 215, 337
Spencer, Earl, 183, 297
Stockmar, Baron, 77, 84, 91, 92, 93, 98, 101, 115, 116, 125, 126, 127,
439
Stopford, Admiral, Sir Robert, 249, 251, 264, 278, 289, 290, 301, 311,
314, 315
Stuart de Rothesay, Lord, 34, 35, 38, 45, 48, 53
Stürmer, Baron, 247, 316, 326
Talleyrand-Périgord, Prince de, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 41,
42, 43, 48, 49, 51, 54, 57, 58, 59, 61, 66, 70, 71, 72, 76, 77, 78,
79, 80, 81, 82, 86, 87, 88, 93, 94, 95, 98, 99, 102, 105, 115, 116,
137, 141, 144, 178, 179, 180, 198, 259, 443
Taylor, Sir Brooke, 66
Temple, Sir William, 264
Terceira, Duke of, 176
Thiers, Louis-Adolphe, 4, 8, 132, 197, 198, 201, 203, 204, 225, 226,
227, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273,
274, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 288, 291, 292, 294, 295, 296,
297, 298, 302, 304, 305, 306, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 318, 328,
329, 412, 437, 439, 440, 441
Toreno, Count, 192, 337, 343, 396
Trapani, Count, 369, 370, 373, 374, 376, 378, 379, 384, 387, 402
Turner, Lieutenant, 208, 210, 212
Varennes, French _chargé d'affaires_ at Constantinople, 154, 155, 157,
160
Véron, Doctor Louis-Désiré, 248
Verstolk van Soelen, Johan Gijsbert, Dutch statesman, 71, 113
Victoria, Queen of Great Britain, 212, 285, 299, 303, 325, 348, 350,
356, 367, 368, 372, 373, 391, 392, 417
Villèle, Jean-Baptiste de, 146
Villiers, George. _See_ CLARENDON, EARL OF
Vogoride, Prince Nicolae, 272
Walewski, Comte, 284, 294, 411
Walker, Captain, 245, 301, 314
Wellington, Duke of, 14, 15, 28, 32, 34, 37, 41, 81, 86, 96, 116, 119,
147, 183, 185, 222, 223, 224, 281, 287, 331, 332, 357
Werther, Baron, 31, 136, 295, 319
Weyer, Silvain van de, 52, 91, 100, 116, 117, 128
William I., King of the Netherlands, 29, 43, 47, 55, 70, 71, 72, 74,
75, 76, 77, 80, 91, 93, 101, 109, 110, 112, 113, 115, 122, 123, 125,
127, 133, 135, 137, 138, 141, 142, 143
William IV., King of Great Britain, 15, 32, 39, 40, 106, 118, 134,
137, 153, 183
Witkewitch, Captain, 235, 236
Wittgenstein, Prince, 22, 24, 437
Wylde, Colonel, 187, 200, 201, 210, 213
Zumalacárregui, General, 183, 200
Zuylen, Baron van, 125, 128
FOOTNOTES:
[1] H. Heine, _Letters from Paris_ (translated by Leland), I. pp. 62,
63, 66, 67, 68, and 354.
[2] The "_pré carré_," the sea, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees.
[3] N. Senior, _Conversations with Thiers, Guizot, etc._, I. pp. 288,
323, and 334.
[4] L. Blanc, _Histoire de dix ans._, I. p. 383.
[5] F. Daudet, _Revue des Deux Mondes_. 1^{er} décembre, 1909. "La
police politique sous la Restauration."
[6] Guizot, _Mémoires_, II. pp. 12-16.
[7] The son of the Duchesse de Berri. The Duc de Berri had been
murdered at the Opera House on February 13, 1820, and his son had been
born in the following September. The Duc de Bordeaux was therefore
the grandson of Charles X. and the nephew of the Duc d'Angoulême, the
Dauphin. He is better known by the title of the Comte de Chambord.
[8] L. Vitet, "La monarchie de" 1830, _Revue des Deux Mondes_. 1^{er}
décembre, 1860.
[9] L. Blanc, _Histoire de dix ans._, I. pp. 384-388.
[10] H. Heine, _Letters from Paris_ (translated by Leyland), I. pp.
141, 142.
[11] Metternich, _Memoires_, V. pp. 26-28.
[12] Affaires étrangères 631, Angleterre, Baudrand à Molé, août 28,
1830. H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, I. p. 330. _Edinburgh Review_,
October, 1830. Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. pp. 131-134. C. Greville,
_Journals_, II. pp. 94, 95. _Correspondence of Princess Lieven with
Earl Grey_, II. Grey to Princess Lieven, July 29, 1830.
[13] _Despatches and Correspondence of Wellington_, VII. Wellington to
Aberdeen, August 12th, 1830, pp. 162-169, _Memorandum upon Relations
with France_. C. Greville, _Journal_, II. p. 21.
[14] Affaires étrangères 631, Angleterre: Baudrand à Molé, 23 août,
1830; Vaudreuil à Molé, 28 août, 1830.
[15] F.O. Austria 243, Lamb to Palmerston, September 3, 1833.
[16] Bolton King, _History of Italian Unity_, I. pp. 51-61.
[17] Metternich, _Memoires_, IV. p. 222: Metternich à Esterhazy, 7
août, 1825.
[18] Metternich, _Memoires_, V. pp. 10-17.
[19] Metternich, _Memoires_, V. pp. 17-30.
[20] E. Quinet, _De l'Allemagne_. _Revue des Deux Mondes_, V. Premier
semestre.
[21] William A'Court, first Baron Heytesbury (1779-1860).
[22] F.O. Russia 186, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, August 17, 18, 19, 1830.
[23] F.O. Russia 186, Heytesbury to Aberdeen (most secret and
confidential), August 20, 1830.
[24] F.O. Russia 186, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, September 8, 14, 1830.
[25] Guizot, _Mémoires_, II. pp. 86-87.
[26] Broglie, _Souvenirs_, IV. pp. 41-42.
[27] Affaires étrangères, 631 Angleterre. Talleyrand à Molé, 25
septembre, 1830. Barante, _Souvenirs_, IV. p. 9.
[28] C. Greville, _Journals_, II. p. 57.
[29] _La Jeune Captive._
[30] There is an interesting article on the subject of Montrond, by
H. Welschinger, in the _Revue de Paris_ of the 1^{er} février, 1895,
entitled "Un ami de Talleyrand." His name figures constantly in T.
Raikes' _Journal_, _Chroniques de Madame de Dino_, C. Greville's
_Journals_, H. Greville's _Diary_, Gronow's _Recollections_, etc.
[31] T. Raikes, _Journal_, I. p. 268, and III. pp. 153-154. Among the
papers discovered at the Tuileries, after the Revolution of 1848, and
published in the _Revue Retrospective_, p. 37, Montrond's name appears
opposite a sum of 36,000 francs in the accounts of the secret service
funds of the Foreign Office for the year 1842.
[32] Affaires étrangères, 631 Angleterre, Vaudreuil à Molé 31 août,
1830. Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. pp. 144-147.
[33] F.O. France 405, Aberdeen to Stuart, October 3, 1830.
[34] Affaires étrangères, 681 (_bis_) Angleterre Talleyrand a Molé, 3,
6, 8 octobre, 1830.
[35] F.O. France 405, Aberdeen to Stuart, October 12, 1830. F.O.
France 414, Stuart to Aberdeen, October 1, 8, 11, 1830, Guizot,
_Mémoires_, II. pp. 95-98. Broglie, _Souvenirs_, IV. pp. 28-29. L.
Blanc, _Histoire de dix ans._, II. pp. 103-114.
[36] Affaires étrangères, 631 (_bis_) Angleterre, Talleyrand à Molé,
11 octobre, 1830.
[37] Affaires étrangères, 631 (_bis_) Angleterre, Molé à Talleyrand,
13 octobre, 1830. F.O. France 414 & 415, Stuart to Aberdeen, 12, 15
October, 1830.
[38] Affaires étrangères, 631 (_bis_) Angleterre, Molé à Talleyrand,
9, 20 octobre, 1830; Talleyrand à Molé, 15, 23, 25 octobre, 1830; 1
novembre, 1830.
[39] F.O. France 405, Aberdeen to Stuart, October 22, 1830. F.O.
France 415, Stuart to Aberdeen, October 18, 22, 25, 31, 1830.
[40] Broglie, _Souvenirs_, IV. pp. 87-91. Guizot, _Mémoires_, II. pp.
128-135.
[41] Affaires étrangères, 681 (_bis_) Angleterre, Talleyrand à
Sébastiani, novembre 27, 1830.
[42] N. Senior, _Conversations with Thiers, Guizot, etc._, II. p. 280.
C. Greville, _Journals_, III. p. 210.
[43] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, I. pp. 315-316, 322; II. p. 8
[44] F.O. Russia 186, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, September 4, 1830.
[45] Affaires étrangères, 631 (_bis_) Angleterre, Maison à Talleyrand,
13, 15, 22 novembre, 1830. F.O. France 416, Stuart to Aberdeen and
Palmerston, November 22, 26, 29, 1830.
[46] F.O. Russia 187, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, October 12, 1830.
[47] Metternich, _Memoires_, V. pp. 43-48 and 51-57; Metternich à
Esterhazy, 21 octobre, 1830. _Memoire pour Orloff_, 6 octobre, 1830.
[48] Affairs étrangères, 601 (_bis_) et 632, Angleterre, Talleyrand à
Molé, 29 octobre, 1830; Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 20 novembre, 1830,
10, 21 novembre, 1831.
[49] Schools upon the system advocated by Joseph Lancaster
(1778-1838), _i.e._ upon the monitorial system. (_Dictionary of
National Biography._)
[50] Affaires étrangères, 631 (_bis_) Angleterre, Talleyrand à
Sébastiani, 28 décembre, 1830. Metternich, _Memoires_, V. p. 79,
Metternich à Ficquelmont, 31 décembre, 1830.
[51] F.O. France 417, Stuart to Palmerston, December 10, 1830.
[52] Barante, _Souvenirs_, IV. pp. 174 and 187, Rémusat à Barante,
2 avril, 1831; Guizot à Barante, 8 avril, 1831. Cf. also N. Senior,
_Conversations with Thiers, Guizot, etc._, Conversation with Victor
Cousin, May 20, 1856.
[53] _State Papers_, XVIII. pp. 728, 729.
[54] _State Papers_, XVIII. pp. 749, 750. Affaires étrangères, 631
(_bis_) Angleterre, Talleyrand, à Sébastiani, 20 décembre, 1830.
[55] _State Papers_, XVIII. pp. 759-773.
[56] F.O. France 415, Stuart to Aberdeen, October 19, 1830.
[57] Affaires étrangères, 631 (_bis_) Angleterre, Talleyrand à Maison,
7 novembre, 1830.
[58] _State Papers_, XVII. p. 1242.
[59] Affaires étrangères, 631 (_bis_) Angleterre, Talleyrand à
Sébastiani, 27 novembre, 1830; Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 25 décembre,
1830. Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Sébastiani à Bresson, 25 déc,
1830.
[60] Affaires étrangères, 631 (_bis_) Angleterre, Sébastiani à
Talleyrand, 2 décembre, 1830; Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 30 décembre,
1830.
[61] F.O. France 416, Stuart to Palmerston, December 31, 1830; January
3, 1831.
[62] Lord Lamington, _In the Days of the Dandies_, pp. 127, 128.
_Dictionary of National Biography_, Ponsonby, John, Viscount
(1770-1855).
[63] Affaires étrangères, 187 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 19
décembre 1830; 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 8, 14, 18 janvier,
1831 (particulière et confidentielle).
[64] Affaires étrangères, 631 (_bis_) and 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani
à Talleyrand, 3, 10, 19 janvier, 1831; Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 7
janvier, 1831.
[65] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Sébastiani à Bresson, 19
janvier, 1831.
[66] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 17
janvier, 1831.
[67] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 6
janvier, 1831.
[68] Affaires étrangères, 187 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 6
décembre, 1830.
[69] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 6
janvier, 1831.
[70] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 17
janvier, 1831 (particulière); 18 janvier, 1831 (particulière et
confidentielle).
[71] F.O. France 426, Granville to Palmerston, January 21, 1831.
[72] T. Raikes' _Journal_, III. p. 182.
[73] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, II. pp. 37-40; Palmerston to
Granville, February 8, 1831.
[74] F.O. France 426, Granville to Palmerston, January 14, 21, 22,
1831.
[75] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 25
janvier, 1831.
[76] T. Juste, _Sylvain Van de Weyer_, pp. 135-137 and notes.
[77] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Sébastiani à Bresson, 19
janvier, 1831.
[78] The leader of the Catholic party in Belgium.
[79] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 21
janvier, 1831.
[80] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 22, 24
janvier, 1831.
[81] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 29
janvier, 1831.
[82] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Lawoëstine à Sébastiani, 29
janvier, 1831.
[83] F.O. Belgium 4, Ponsonby to Palmerston, February 4, 1831.
[84] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 2,
4, 5 février, 1831.
[85] _State Papers_, XVIII. pp. 774-775.
[86] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 7,
9, 10 février, 1831.
[87] F.O. France 426, Granville to Palmerston, February 4, 9, 1831.
[88] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 8
février 1831.
[89] F.O. France 424, Palmerston to Granville, February 8, 1831.
[90] F.O. France 426 and 427, Granville to Palmerston, February 11,
12, 1831.
[91] F.O. Belgium 4, Ponsonby to Palmerston. February 11, 1831.
[92] F.O. France 424, Palmerston to Granville, February 25, 1831.
[93] F.O. France 427, Granville to Palmerston, February 28, 1831.
[94] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 12
février, 1831.
[95] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 9
février, 1831.
[96] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Sébastiani à Bresson, 12
février, 1831.
[97] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 13
février, 1831.
[98] The Comte de Chambord, the posthumous son of the Duc de Berri, in
whose favour Charles X. and the Duc d'Angoulême had abdicated.
[99] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 27
février, 1831.
[100] F.O. France 427, Granville to Palmerston, March 14, 1831.
[101] Metternich, _Mémoires_, V. pp. 128-130; Metternich à Apponyi, 21
mars, 1831. H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, II. pp. 51-53, Palmerston
to Granville, March 15, 1831.
[102] H. Heine, _Letters from Paris_ (translated by C. Leland), I. pp.
114, 115, 118.
[103] _Letters of Harriet, Countess Granville_, II. p. 93, Lady
Granville to Lady Carlisle, March 14, 1841.
[104] Chateaubriand, _Mémoires_, IV. p. 451.
[105] C. Greville, _Journal_, I. pp. 310-311.
[106] F.O. France 427, Granville to Palmerston, February 21, 24, 1831.
[107] Metternich, _Memoires_, V. pp. 157-161; Metternich à Apponyi,
16, 19 février, 1831.
[108] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand,
I^{er} mars, 1831; Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 8, 24 mars, 1831. F.O.
France 427 and 428, Granville to Palmerston, March 7, 21, 1831.
[109] The Austrian ambassador at Rome.
[110] Metternich, _Memoires_, V. p. 125, Metternich à Apponyi, 12
mars, 1831.
[111] F.O. France 427, Granville to Palmerston, March 18, 1831.
[112] F.O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, March 28, 1831.
[113] Louis Philippe evidently considered that the large majority of
his subjects had no religion at all.
[114] F.O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, April 1, 1831.
[115] F.O. France 427, Granville to Palmerston, March 14, 1831.
[116] F.O. Russia 191, Heytesbury to Palmerston, March 21, 1831.
[117] F.O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, April 4, 1831.
[118] Affaires étrangères, 682 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 24
mars, 1831. F.O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, March 25, 1831.
[119] F.O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, April 1, 1831.
[120] Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. pp. 80-127.
[121] C. Greville, _Journals_ (I), II. p. 133. Affaires étrangères,
632 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 4 avril, 1831.
[122] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 28
mars, 1831.
[123] F.O. France 424, Palmerston to Granville, March 18, April 1,
1831. F.O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, April 1, 1831.
[124] _State Papers_, XVIII. pp. 798-796. Affaires étrangères, 132
Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 17 avril, 1831. F.O. France 424,
Palmerston to Granville, April 17, 1831. F.O. France 428, Granville to
Palmerston, April 22, 1831.
[125] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 12
août 1831. F.O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, April 8, 11, 1831.
[126] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 3
mai, 1831.
[127] F.O. France 424, Palmerston to Granville, May 17, 1831.
[128] F.O. France 424, Palmerston to Granville, June 7, 1831.
[129] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 9
juin, 1831.
[130] F.O. France 429, Granville to Palmerston, June 10, 1831.
[131] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani,
13, 15, and 22 juin, 1831; Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 25 juin, 1831.
[132] _State Papers_, XVIII. pp. 802-806.
[133] Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. pp. 161-172.
[134] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 4
mars, 1831, 16 avril, 1831, 13 juin, 1831. Talleyrand à Sébastiani,
June 16, 1831.
[135] C. Greville, _Journals_, (I) II. p. 178.
[136] _State Papers_, XVIII. pp. 807-817.
[137] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, II. pp. 96-98, Palmerston to
Granville, August 5, 1831. F.O. France 430, Granville to Palmerston,
August 8, 1831.
[138] Affaires étrangères, 634 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 15
août, 1831.
[139] Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. pp. 177-179. F.O. Belgium 6, Adair to
Palmerston, August 22, 1831.
[140] Affaires étrangères, 134 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand 4
août, 1831. F.O. France 430, Granville to Palmerston, August 4, 1831.
[141] Affaires étrangères, 634 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 7,
9 août, 1831.
[142] C. Greville, _Journals_ (I) II, pp. 178-179.
[143] _State Papers_, XVIII. pp. 824-825.
[144] F.O. France 430, Granville to Palmerston, August 5, 7, 13, 14,
15, 1831. F.O. Belgium 6, Adair to Palmerston, August 21, 1831.
[145] Affaires étrangères, 634 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani,
11, 12, 15 août, 1831; Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 14, 15 août, 1831.
[146] F.O. France 425, Palmerston to Granville, August 17, 1831.
[147] _State Papers_, XVIII. pp. 830-831.
[148] Affaires étrangères, 634 Angleterre, Louis Philippe à
Talleyrand, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 27 août, 1841.
[149] F.O. France 425, Palmerston to Granville, August 31, September
5, 1831. Affaires étrangères, 634 Angleterre, Baudrand à Sébastiani,
31 août, 1831.
[150] Affaires étrangères, 634 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 27
août, 1 septembre, 1831.
[151] F.O. France 430, Granville to Palmerston, August 22, 1831.
F.O. France 425, Palmerston to Granville, August 31, 1831. Affaires
étrangères, 634 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 19 août, 1831;
Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 22 août, 1831. Affaires étrangères, 192
Belgique, Sébastiani à La Tour-Maubourg, 15 août, 1831.
[152] F.O. Belgium 6, Adair to Palmerston, August 21, 1831. Affaires
étrangères, 192 Belgique, La Tour-Maubourg à Sébastiani, 20 août,
1831.
[153] Affaires étrangères, 192 Belgique, Belliard à Sébastiani, 7, 9
août, 1831.
[154] F.O. Belgium 6, Adair to Palmerston, August 11, 14, 1831.
[155] F.O. Belgium 6, Adair to Palmerston, August 19, 22, 1831.
Affaires étrangères, 192 Belgique, Belliard à Sébastiani, 19, 21
août; Meulinäer à Gérard, 22 août, 1831. Leopold à Gérard (undated)
undertaking that troops left in Belgium will be the object of his
minute attention and will be retained no longer than necessary.
[156] F.O. Belgium 6, Palmerston to Adair, August 27, 1831; Adair to
Palmerston, August 30, and September 6, 1831. Affaires étrangères, 192
Belgique, Belliard à Sébastiani, 1, 3, 8 septembre, 1831.
[157] F.O. France 425, Palmerston to Granville, September 5, 1831.
[158] F.O. Belgium 7, Adair to Palmerston, September 11, 1831.
[159] F.O. France 431, Granville to Palmerston, September 10, 16, 1831.
[160] _The Times_, September 30, 1831.
[161] T. Raikes' _Journal_, I. p. 137.
[162] F.O. France 431, Granville to Palmerston, September 19, 21, 1831.
[163] Affaires étrangères, 631 (_bis_) Angleterre, Talleyrand à
Sébastiani, 21 décembre, 1830; Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 25 décembre,
1830; 3 janvier 1831.
[164] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 9
mars, 1831; Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 13, 25 mars, 1831.
[165] F.O. Russia 191, Heytesbury to Palmerston, April 13, 30, 1831.
[166] Affaires étrangères, 634 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand,
7 juillet, 1831; Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 14, 20, 22 juillet, 4
septembre, 1831.
[167] F.O. Russia 193, Heytesbury to Palmerston, October 8, 10, 1831;
November 12, 18.
[168] F.O. Russia 190, Palmerston to Heytesbury, November 23, 1831.
[169] F.O. Russia 198 & 199, Heytesbury to Palmerston, December 18,
1831, January 2, 1832. Affaires étrangères, 635 Angleterre, Talleyrand
à Sébastiani, 19 novembre, 1831.
[170] Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. pp. 179-209.
[171] As the system of the barrier fortresses was to be abandoned.
[172] Affaires étrangères, 634 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand,
13 septembre, 1831; Talleyrand à Sébastiani, septembre 29, 1831; 635
Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 4 octobre, 1831; Talleyrand à
Sébastiani, 10, 12, 15, 17, 20 octobre, 1831; Sébastiani à Talleyrand
22 octobre, 1831, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 16 novembre, 1831.
[173] F.O. France 426, Palmerston to Granville, October 28, 1831; 431,
Granville to Palmerston, September 26, 30, 1831.
[174] Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. pp. 216-218, 225, 230. H. Bulwer, _Life
of Palmerston_, II. pp. 116-120; Palmerston to Granville, August 25,
1831.
[175] F.O. Belgium 7, Palmerston to Adair (secret), November 16, 1831.
_Correspondence of Earl Grey with King William IV._, I. p. 338, Grey
to Taylor, August 26, 1831.
[176] Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. pp. 212, 219-221. _Correspondence of
Earl Grey with King William IV._, I. pp. 341-342, Taylor to Grey,
August 27, 1831.
[177] Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. pp. 222-225, and 231-232.
[178] Affaires étrangères, 635 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani,
15 décembre, 1831. Affaires étrangères, 635 Angleterre, Sébastiani à
Talleyrand 16, 19 décembre, 1831.
[179] F.O. France 431, Granville to Palmerston, December 16, 1831.
[180] Affaires étrangères, 635 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani,
22, 24, 25, 27, 30 décembre, 1831.
[181] F.O. France 442, Granville to Palmerston, December 19, 1831.
[182] F.O. France 432, Granville to Palmerston, December 23, 30, 1831.
Affaires étrangères, 635 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, C.
Périer à Talleyrand, 31 décembre, 1831.
[183] F.O. Belgium 7, Adair to Palmerston, December 16, 1831. Affaires
étrangères, 194 Belgique, Tiburce Sébastiani à Sébastiani, 12
décembre, 1831; Belliard à Sébastiani, 13 décembre, 1831.
[184] Affaires étrangères, 194 Belgique, Belliard à Sébastiani, 23
décembre, 1831.
[185] Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. p. 234.
[186] Affaires étrangères, 194 Belgique, Belliard à Sébastiani, 13,
18, 19 décembre, 1831. F.O. Belgium 7, Adair to Palmerston, December
20, 1831. Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. pp. 225-230.
[187] Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. pp. 226-229. Metternich, _Memoires_,
V. pp. 217-224, Metternich à Apponyi, Metternich à Ficquelmont, 27
décembre, 1831. F.O. Austria 234, Forbes to Palmerston, January 7 and
20, 1832. Affaires étrangères, 636 Angleterre, Talleyrand à C. Périer,
25 janvier, 1832.
[188] _Despatches and Memoranda of Duke of Wellington_, VIII. pp.
277-279 (State of parties in the French Chamber). Heinrich Heine,
_Letters from Paris_, translated by C. Leland, I. p. 125. "And should
Lord Grey fall with him will fall Casimir Périer. Both keep themselves
upright by their mutual tendency to tumble down, like two drunkards
who remain standing by leaning one against the other."
[189] Affaires étrangères, 635 and 636 Angleterre, C. Périer à
Talleyrand, 9, 11 janvier, 1832; Talleyrand à Périer, 23 janvier,
1832. Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. pp. 231-233. F.O. France 444, Granville
to Palmerston, January 27, 1832.
[190] _State Papers_, XIX. pp. 92-93.
[191] F.O. France 444, Granville to Palmerston, January 30, February
1, 13, March 2, 1832.
[192] F.O. Rome 25, Freeborn to Bidwell, January 29, 1832.
[193] F.O. France 445, Freeborn (British consul at Rome) to Granville,
February 1, 1832; Granville to Palmerston, February 13, 1832. F.O.
Austria 234, Forbes to Palmerston, February 6, 1832.
[194] F.O. France 445, Granville to Palmerston, March 5, 1832. F.O.
Austria 234, Forbes to Palmerston, February 14, 1832. F.O. Rome
25, Freeborn to Bidwell, February 1, 1832; Freeborn to Palmerston,
February 18, 1832.
[195] F.O. Austria 234, Forbes to Palmerston, February 11, 1832.
[196] F.O. Russia 199, Heytesbury to Palmerston, March 14, 1832.
[197] Affaires étrangères, 636 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani,
22, 23 mars, 1832.
[198] _Correspondence of Earl Grey with King William IV._, II. pp.
351-355. The King to Grey, April 16, 1832, II. pp. 358-368. Grey to
the King, April 17, 1832; Grey to Sir H. Taylor, April 17, 1832.
[199] F.O. Austria 234, Lamb to Palmerston, April 25, 1832.
[200] F.O. Tuscany 62, Palmerston to Seymour, February 20, 1832.
[201] F.O. Tuscany 62, Palmerston to Seymour, March 7, 1832. F.O.
France 445, Granville to Palmerston, March 14, 1832.
[202] Affaires étrangères, 636 Angleterre, Talleyrand à C. Périer, 6
mars, 1832.
[203] F.O. Austria 234, Lamb to Palmerston, March 1, 2, and 12, 1832.
Affaires étrangères, 636 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 27 mars,
1832.
[204] F.O. Russia 190 & 199, Palmerston to Heytesbury, November 23,
1831; Heytesbury to Palmerston, January 3, 1832. Stockmar, _Memoirs_,
I. pp. 268-270. _State Papers_, XVIII. pp. 928-931.
[205] F.O. Russia 199, Heytesbury to Palmerston, February 4, 1832.
_Correspondence of Earl Grey with King William IV._, II. p. 215; Grey
to Taylor, February 13, 1832.
[206] F.O. Prussia 181, Chad to Palmerston, February 12, 13, 1832.
[207] Russian plenipotentiary at the conference which was settling the
affairs of Greece.
[208] F.O. Austria 234, Lamb to Palmerston, February 25, 1832.
[209] F.O. Austria 234, Lamb to Palmerston, March 12, 1832.
[210] F.O. Austria 234, Lamb to Palmerston, March 1, 1832.
[211] F.O. Prussia, 180, Palmerston to Chad, February 3, 1832.
[212] F.O. France, 445, Granville to Palmerston, March 2, 1832.
[213] F.O. Prussia 181, Chad to Palmerston, February 12, 1832.
[214] F.O. Prussia 181, Chad to Palmerston, March 4, 1832.
[215] F.O. Russia 199, Heytesbury to Palmerston, February 11, 19, 27,
1832.
[216] F.O. Netherlands 180, Palmerston to Bagot, March 16, 1832.
[217] F.O. Prussia 180, Chad to Palmerston, March 25, 1832.
[218] F.O. Netherlands 181, Bagot to Palmerston, March 23, 1832.
[219] F.O. Austria 234, Lamb to Palmerston, March 12, 1832.
[220] Affaires étrangères, 636 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 20
avril, 1832.
[221] _State Papers_, XIX. pp. 95-97.
[222] Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. pp. 252-257.
[223] F.O. France 442, Palmerston to Hamilton, May 8, 1832. _State
Papers_, XIX. pp. 98-99.
[224] F.O. Russia 199, Heytesbury to Palmerston, April 15, May 18,
1832.
[225] Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. pp. 258-259.
[226] _Correspondence of Earl Grey with King William IV._, II. pp.
394-395.
[227] _Correspondence of Earl Grey with King William IV._, II. pp.
351-355; the King to Grey, April 16, 1832.
[228] _Annual Register_, 1832, p. 187.
[229] H. Heine, _Letters from Paris_ (translated by C. Leland), I. p.
2.
[230] Metternich, _Mémoires_, V. p. 288; Metternich à Apponyi, 21
juin, 1832.
[231] H. Heine, _Letters from Paris_ (translated by C. Leland), I. p.
355.
[232] _State Papers_, XIX. pp. 102-105. Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. p. 262.
[233] Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. p. 243.
[234] F.O. Russia 200, Palmerston to Durham, July 3, 1832.
[235] F.O. Russia 200, Durham to Palmerston, July 18, 1832.
[236] _Ibid._, July 18, 27, August 2, September 8, 12, 1832.
[237] F.O. Russia 200, Durham to Palmerston, August 22, 1832.
[238] Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. pp. 277-278.
[239] F.O. France 448, Granville to Palmerston, August 3, 6, 1832.
[240] F.O. Belgium 13, Adair to Palmerston, September 7, 1832. F.O.
France 448 & 449, Granville to Palmerston, August 27, 29, September 3,
1832.
[241] F.O. France 449, Granville to Palmerston, September 18, 1832.
[242] Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. pp. 278-285.
[243] _State Papers_, XIX. pp. 150-190.
[244] F.O. France 447, Granville to Palmerston, June 29, 1832; _D. de
Dino Chronique_, I. pp. 73-74.
[245] F.O. France 449, Granville to Palmerston, September 28, 1832.
[246] F.O. France 449, Granville to Palmerston, October 4, 1832.
[247] _Ibid._, October 5, 1832.
[248] Affaires étrangères, 639 Angleterre, Mareuil à Sébastiani, 8
octobre, 1832.
[249] _The Times_, January 31, 1834. Leading article explaining
its changed attitude in the Dutch-Belgian question and why it had
supported the King of the Netherlands in 1830 and 1831.
[250] C. Greville, _Journals_, III. p. 33.
[251] Stockmar, _Memoirs_, I. p. 273.
[252] F.O. France 449, Granville to Palmerston, October 19, 1832.
[253] F.O. Austria 236, Lamb to Palmerston, November 24, 1832.
[254] Metternich, _Mémoires_, V. pp. 397-406; Metternich à
Schwartzenberg, 13 novembre, 1832; Metternich à Trauttmansdorff, 13
novembre, 1832.
[255] Metternich, _Mémoires_, V. pp. 411-413; Metternich à Clam, 13
novembre, 1832.
[256] F.O. France 449, Granville to Palmerston, October 8, 1832. F.O.
Prussia 184, Minto to Palmerston, September 29, October 7, 13, 1832.
Affaires étrangères, 639 Angleterre, Mareuil à Sébastiani, 11 octobre,
1832.
[257] Affaires étrangères, 639 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Broglie, 18
octobre, 1832.
[258] F.O. France 449, Granville to Palmerston, October 21, 22, 24,
1832.
[259] _State Papers_, XIX. pp. 258-263.
[260] F.O. Belgium 13, Adair to Palmerston, October 30, 1832.
[261] F.O. France 443 and 450, Palmerston to Granville, November 20,
30, 1832; Granville to Palmerston, November 9, 22, December 7, 1832.
[262] T. Raikes, _Journal_, I. pp. 88, 92, 93, 102, and 112. C.
Greville, _Journals_, II. p. 329.
[263] F.O. Prussia 184, Minto to Palmerston, October 18, 1832. F.O.
France 449, Granville to Palmerston, October 29, 1832.
[264] F.O. Prussia 184, Minto to Palmerston, November 5, 7, 21, 24,
28, 29, December 22, 1832.
[265] Affaires étrangères, 639 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Broglie, 1
décembre, 1832.
[266] F.O. France 465, Aston to Palmerston, May 3, 11, 1833. F.O.
Netherlands 186, Jerningham to Palmerston, February 15, April 18, May
24, 1833.
[267] _State Papers_, XX. pp. 282-286.
[268] Metternich, _Mémoires_, V. pp. 406-411; Metternich à
Trauttmansdorff, 13 novembre, 1832.
[269] Minister to Louis XVIII. and Charles X.
[270] C. A. Murray, _Memoir of Mohammed Ali_, pp. 31-35.
[271] N. Senior, _Conversations and Journals in Egypt and Malta_, I.
p. 27.
[272] F.O. Turkey 213, Mandeville to Palmerston, January 26, 1832.
[273] Commander-in-Chief and Minister of War.
[274] High Admiral.
[275] F.O. Turkey 210, S. Canning to Palmerston, March 7, 1832.
[276] F.O. Turkey 211, S. Canning to Palmerston, May 17, 1832.
[277] F.O. Turkey 213, Mandeville to Palmerston, October 27, 1832
(Report of Captain Maunsell, R.N., of H.M.S. _Alfred_).
[278] F.O. Turkey 223 & 224, Mandeville to Palmerston, March 11,
1833 (Report of Mr. A. Pisani); Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 24, 1833
(Memorandum of Mr. Kennedy).
[279] F.O. Turkey 211, S. Canning to Palmerston, May 17, 1832.
[280] F.O. Turkey 212, S. Canning to Palmerston, August 7, 1832.
[281] Minister for Foreign Affairs.
[282] F.O. Turkey 212, S. Canning to Palmerston (cipher, separate and
secret), August 9, 1832.
[283] F.O. Turkey 213, Mandeville to Palmerston, October 18, 1832.
[284] F.O. Turkey 213, Palmerston to Mandeville, December 5, 1832.
[285] F.O. Turkey 213, Mandeville to Palmerston, December 28, 1832.
[286] F.O. Turkey 212, Mandeville to Palmerston, December 31, 1832. S.
Goriainow, _Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles_, pp. 30-31. F.O. Turkey
222, Mandeville to Palmerston (cipher), January 8, 1833. F.O. France
463, Granville to Palmerston, January 21, 28, 1833.
[287] F.O. Turkey 211 and 212, S. Canning to Palmerston, May 17, 22,
1832. F.O. Turkey 213, Mandeville to Palmerston, September 26, October
26, 1832 (cipher).
[288] F.O. France 463, Granville to Palmerston, January 21, 28,
February 7, 1833. F.O. Turkey 227, Palmerston to Campbell, February 4,
1833.
[289] S. Goriainow, _Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles_, pp. ix. 27, 48,
49, 50.
[290] S. Goriainow, _Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles_, pp. 29-30.
[291] On the Sea of Marmora.
[292] F.O. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, January 13, 26, 1833.
[293] F.O. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, January 28, February
3, 4, 1833. S. Goriainow, _Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles_, p. 31.
[294] F.O. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, February 15, 1833.
[295] About 150 miles beyond Konieh, and 80 miles from Brusa.
[296] F.O. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, February 11, 23, 1833.
[297] S. Goriainow, _Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles_, p. 32.
[298] F.O. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, February 23, 1833.
[299] F.O. Turkey 228, Campbell to Palmerston, March 31, 1833.
[300] F.O. Turkey 223 Mandeville to Palmerston, March 26, 27, 1833.
[301] F.O. Turkey 223, Mandeville to Palmerston, March 31, 1833.
[302] _Ibid._, April 14, 1833.
[303] F.O. France 464, Granville to Palmerston, March 18, 22, 29, 1833.
[304] F.O. Turkey 223, Mandeville to Palmerston, April 11, 1833.
[305] _Ibid._, April 23, 1833.
[306] _Ibid._, May 4, 1833.
[307] F.O. Turkey 228, Campbell to Palmerston, May 2, 3, 7, 9, 13, 15,
1833.
[308] S. Goriainow, _Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles_, pp. 33-37. F.O.
Turkey, Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 22, June 7, July 7, 1833.
[309] F.O. France 466, Granville to Palmerston, July 12, 1833. F.O.
Turkey 224, Pisani to Ponsonby (secret and confidential), June 17,
1833; Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 22, 1833.
[310] "_Au besoin et d'après le principe de reciprocité._"
[311] S. Goriainow, _Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles_, p. 41.
[312] S. Goriainow, _Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles_, pp. 42-44.
[313] F.O. France 466, Aston to Palmerston, August 2, 1833.
[314] F.O. Turkey 221, Palmerston to Ponsonby, August 27, 1833.
[315] F.O. Russia 208, Bligh to Palmerston, October 24, 1833.
[316] _Ibid._, December 28, 1833.
[317] F.O. Russia 207, Bligh to Palmerston, August 24, 1833. F.O.
France 466, Aston to Palmerston, August 30, 1833.
[318] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, II. pp. 165-166.
[319] S. Goriainow, _Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles_, pp. 51-52.
[320] F.O. Russia 208, Bligh to Palmerston, December 21, 1833
(confidential).
[321] Matuszewic figures in the well-known picture, "The Melton
Breakfast."
[322] F.O. Austria 243, Lamb to Palmerston, September 3, October 1,
December 26, 1833.
[323] F.O. France 481, Granville to Palmerston, February 3, 1834.
[324] F.O. Turkey 221, Palmerston to Ponsonby, December 6, 1833.
[325] _Vide_ p. 75.
[326] F.O. France 430, Granville to Palmerston, July 28, 1831. F.O.
France 425, Palmerston to Granville, August 10, 1831.
[327] F.O. Spain 403, Canning to Palmerston, January 22, 1833.
[328] _Ibid._, March 20, 29, 1833.
[329] _Ibid._, February 7, 1833 (most secret).
[330] C. Napier, _War in Portugal_, I. pp. 160-161 and 176-206.
[331] F.O. Portugal 398, Palmerston to Russell, August 7, 1833.
[332] F.O. France 469, Granville to Palmerston, October 10, 1833.
[333] F.O. Spain 412, Villiers to Palmerston, October 7, 15, 19, 24,
31, November 8, 23, December 8, 1833.
[334] _Ibid._, October 27, 1833 (cypher). F.O. France 465, Granville
to Palmerston, November 1, 15, 29, 1833.
[335] F.O. France 468 & 480, Granville to Palmerston, December 16,
1833, January 17, March 14, 1834. Affaires étrangères, 643 Angleterre,
Talleyrand à Broglie, 10 mars, 1834.
[336] Affaires étrangères, 643 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Rigny, 13, 14
avril, 1834. Guizot, _Mémoires_, IV. pp. 86-92.
[337] Affaires étrangères, 643 Angleterre, Rigny à Talleyrand, 17
avril, 1834.
[338] About £1500 _per annum_.
[339] T. Raikes, _Journal_, I. p. 106.
[340] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, II. pp. 166-174 and 180-185.
[341] F.O. Spain 694, Palmerston to Bulwer, August 22, 1846
(confidential).
[342] F.O. France 467, Granville to Palmerston, September 13, 1833.
Guizot, _Mémoires_, IV. pp. 57-74.
[343] F.O. France 468, Granville to Palmerston, November 1, 1833.
[344] F.O. Netherlands 206, Disbrowe to Palmerston, December 8, 1837
(most secret). Report of a conversation repeated to the British
minister by the Carlist agent, Saint-Sylvain (Baron de Los Valles), in
which Louis Philippe is supposed to have said, "_Je préfère toujours
les capuchons aux bonnets rouges_."
[345] The _Fueros_ of Biscay and Navarre overrode the general laws
of Spain. So long as the system remained in force in these provinces
the right of taxation, the levy of military forces, and all matters
connected with land tenure, were vested in local legislative bodies.
[346] F.O. Spain 439 and 440, Villiers to Wellington, February 11,
1835; Wellington to Villiers, February 17, 1835.
[347] F.O. Spain 439, Wellington to Villiers, March 27, 1835. F.O.
Spain 446, Wellington to Eliot, March 26, 1835 (secret).
[348] F.O. France 501, Cowley to Wellington, April 3 (secret and
confidential), 17, 20, 24 (separate and confidential), 1835. F.O.
France 497, Wellington to Cowley, April 2, 1836. F.O. Spain 446, Eliot
to Wellington, March 30, 1835 (private).
[349] F.O. Spain 446, Eliot to Wellington, April 20, 28, 1835; Eliot
to Palmerston, May 6, 1835.
[350] F.O. Spain 439, Palmerston to Villiers, May 22, 1835.
[351] F.O. France 502, Granville to Palmerston, June 8, 1835.
[352] F.O. Spain 447, Palmerston to Wylde, July 13, 1835.
[353] F.O. Spain 447, Wylde to Palmerston, August 2, 1835.
[354] F.O. France 504, Granville to Palmerston, August 17, 1835.
[355] F.O. France 503, Granville to Palmerston, July 17, August 10,
1835.
[356] F.O. Portugal 436 & 439, Howard de W. to Palmerston, June 13,
November 12, 21 (secret), December 13, 1835.
[357] _Revue Retrospective_, p. 41. Marquise de Loulé, Subvention
Accidentelle, 6000 francs.
[358] F.O. Portugal 436, Howard de W. to Palmerston, June 23, 1835
(confidential), contains following enclosure:--
"Lisbon, June 22, 1835.
"MY DEAR LORD,
"You may give Lord Palmerston the most positive assurance
that I should resign my position as a minister to the crown the
moment it is out of my power to prevent the marriage of the
queen with any prince that would put an end to the relations
existing between France and England.
"(Signed), SALDANHA."
[359] F.O. France 501, Cowley to Palmerston, May 8, 1835 (separate and
confidential).
[360] F.O. Portugal 438, Howard de W. to Palmerston, October 23, 1835
(secret).
[361] Guizot, _Mémoires_, IV. p. 146.
[362] F.O. Spain 444, Villiers to Palmerston, September 15, 1835.
[363] F.O. France 504, 505 and 517, Granville to Palmerston, August
21, October 5, 9, 19, 1835; Palmerston to Aston, August 30, 1836.
[364] F.O. Spain 444, Villiers to Palmerston, September 15, 1835
(secret and confidential).
[365] Secretary to the British Legation at Madrid.
[366] F.O. Spain 445, Villiers to Palmerston, November 28, 1835, (most
secret and confidential).
[367] F.O. France 506, Granville to Palmerston, December 4, 1835
(private letter).
[368] Guizot, _Mémoires_, IV. pp. 147-149 and 421-425; Broglie à
Rayneval, 12, 19 décembre, 1835.
[369] F.O. Spain 439, Palmerston to Villiers, December 21, 1835
(secret).
[370] F.O. Spain 457, Villiers to Palmerston, January 2, 1836.
[371] F.O. France 518 and 527, Granville to Palmerston, December 5,
1836; Palmerston to Granville, December 27, 1836.
[372] Thureau Dangin, _Monarchie de Juillet_, II. p. 178 (note).
[373] Metternich, _Mémoires_, VI. pp. 31-53 and 270.
[374] Thureau Dangin, _La Monarchie de Juillet_, III. pp. 74-75.
[375] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, II. pp. 221-223.
_Correspondence of Princess Lieven with Earl Grey_, II., Princess
Lieven to Grey, August 26, 1835. T. Raikes' _Journal_, III. pp.
265-266. C. Greville, _Journals_ (1), III. pp. 20, 314, 385, 386.
[376] Affaires étrangères, 644 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Rigny, 16, 26
juin, 1834.
[377] Affaires étrangères, 644 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Louis
Philippe, 22 novembre, 1834. In this letter occurs the following
sentence, "possibly the honour may be reserved for Wellington of
arresting England on the path of decadence."
[378] F.O. Spain 447. Extract of a private letter from Colonel Wylde,
dated Puente de la Reyna, August 8, 1835.
[379] F.O. Spain 464, Wylde to Palmerston, February 12, 18, 1836
(confidential).
[380] F.O. France 516, Palmerston to Granville, March 14, 1836.
[381] F.O. France 520, Granville to Palmerston, March 18, 1836.
[382] F.O. Spain 456, Palmerston to Villiers, June 1 (No. 44), August
22, 1836. F.O. France 59 and 525, Palmerston to Ashton, August 30,
1836; Granville to Palmerston, October 7, 1836.
[383] F.O. Spain 464, Wylde to Palmerston, July 13, 16, 1836.
[384] F.O. Spain 460, Villiers to Palmerston, July 24, 1836.
[385] F.O. Spain 460, Villiers to Palmerston, August 6, 9, 13, 14, 16,
17, 1836.
[386] The Duc d'Orléans married on May 30, 1837, the Princess Helena
of Mecklenburg-Schwerin.
[387] F.O. France 524, Aston to Palmerston, August 26, 1836.
[388] F.O. France 525, Granville to Palmerston, September 23, 1836.
[389] F.O. France 518, Palmerston to Granville, September 29, 1836.
[390] F.O. France 564, Granville to Palmerston, October 26, 1836.
[391] F.O. France 539, Granville to Palmerston, February 3, 1837
(confidential). H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, II. p. 243. H.
Greville, _Diary_, I. p. 113. Malmesbury, _Memoirs of an ex-Minister_,
I. p. 272. C. Greville, _Journals_ (1), III. pp. 385-386.
[392] F.O. France 542, Granville to Palmerston, July 3, 1837
(confidential).
[393] F.O. Netherlands 206, Disbrowe to Palmerston, October 6,
December 8, 1837 (most secret and confidential).
[394] F.O. Netherlands. Disbrowe to Palmerston, December 8, 1837 (most
secret).
[395] A. S. Hume, _Modern Spain_, pp. 345-346.
[396] Hubbard, _Histoire de l'Espagne_, IV. pp. 92-93.
[397] F.O. Spain 485, Villiers to Palmerston, December 30, 1837. F.O.
France 544, Granville to Palmerston, October 27, 30, 1837 (secret and
confidential).
[398] F.O. Spain 486, Wylde to Palmerston, December 10, 1837. F.O.
Spain 485, Villiers to Palmerston, December 24, 1837.
[399] F.O. Spain 503, Villiers to Palmerston, April 21, 1838 (secret).
[400] F.O. Spain 499, Palmerston to Villiers, May 7, 1838.
[401] F.O. France 356, Palmerston to Granville, May 7, 1838.
[402] F.O. Spain 526 and 527, Clarendon to Palmerston, February 2,
1839; Southern to Palmerston, March 30, June 1, 1839.
[403] F.O. France 561, Granville to Palmerston, May 14, 1838 (secret
and confidential).
[404] F.O. Spain 530, Southern to Palmerston, June 22, 1839.
[405] F.O. Spain 504, Villiers to Palmerston, May 26, 1838 (cypher).
[406] F.O. Spain 505, Villiers to Palmerston, June 16, 23, 30, July 7,
1838.
[407] F.O. Spain 505 and 506, Villiers to Palmerston, June 9, 1838;
Hervey to Palmerston, July 14, 1838.
[408] Hubbard, _Histoire de l'Espagne_, IV. pp. 111-118.
[409] C. Greville, _Journals_ (2), I. p. 65.
[410] F.O. Spain 526, Clarendon to Palmerston, February 27, March 7,
1839. Hubbard, _Histoire de l'Espagne_, IV. pp. 141-148.
[411] Hubbard, _Histoire de l'Espagne_, IV. p. 151.
[412] C. Greville, _Journals_ (2), I. pp. 104-108.
[413] F.O. France 583, Granville to Palmerston, June 10, 1839. F.O.
Spain 530, Southern to Palmerston, June 15, 1839.
[414] F.O. Spain 579 (supplementary), Palmerston to Wylde, August 10,
1839.
[415] F.O. Spain 579 (supplementary), Wylde to Palmerston, August 26,
29, September 1, 1839.
[416] F.O. Spain 534 and 535, Southern to Palmerston, October 19,
1839; Jerningham to Palmerston, November 25, 1839.
[417] F.O. Spain 531, Southern to Palmerston, July 27, 1839.
[418] F.O. Spain 535, Jerningham to Palmerston, December 7, 1839,
January 4, 1840.
[419] F.O. Spain 552, Aston to Palmerston, May 23, 30, June 8, 1840.
[420] F.O. Spain 553, Aston to Palmerston, July 21, August 22,
September 3, 1840. Hubbard, _Histoire de l'Espagne_, IV. pp. 228-229.
[421] F.O. Spain 547, Palmerston to Aston, September 3, 1840
(confidential).
[422] F.O. Spain 554 and 555, Aston to Palmerston, September 22, 1840;
Scott to Palmerston, October 1, 1840; Aston to Palmerston, October 11,
1840.
[423] Hubbard, _Histoire de l'Espagne_, IV. pp. 233-235.
[424] F.O. Turkey 283, Campbell to Palmerston, August 23, 1836.
[425] F.O. France 485 and 487, Granville to Palmerston, June 23, 1834;
Aston to Palmerston, August 13, 1834, September 15, 1834. F.O. Turkey
234, Palmerston to Ponsonby, August 23, 1834.
[426] F.O. Turkey 246, Campbell to Palmerston, September 4, 5, 1834
(secret and confidential).
[427] F.O. Turkey 244, Palmerston to Campbell, October 26, 1834. F.O.
France 488, Granville to Palmerston, October 27, 1834.
[428] F.O. France 480 and 483, Granville to Palmerston, January 24,
March 14, April 18, 1834.
[429] Sir Stratford Canning, who had been created Lord Stratford de
Redcliffe, was ambassador to the Porte at the time of the Crimean War.
The negotiations are said to have been influenced by Nicholas' dislike
of him.
[430] F.O. Russia 201 and 207, Palmerston to Bligh, October 27, 1832;
Bligh to Palmerston, November 17, 1832; Palmerston to Bligh, December
14, 1832; Bligh to Palmerston, January 9, May 29, June 19, 1833 (the
whole of this correspondence is in the form of private letters).
[431] The following article appeared in _The Times_ of May 28, 1834:
"The recall of Prince Lieven, or rather of Madame la Princesse, is
an event. We cannot say of Her Serene Highness that the _petit nez
retroussé_ has occasioned much mischief, whatever her organs of speech
or her implements of writing may have done. . . . There never figured
on the courtly stage a female intriguer more restless, more arrogant,
more (politically and therefore we mean it not offensively) odious and
insufferable than this supercilious ambassadress. She fancied herself
a 'power,' she was, however, more frequently a dupe," etc., etc.
[432] E. Daudet, _Une Vie d'Ambassadrice_, pp. 170, 180-183.
[433] F.O. Turkey 234, Palmerston to Ponsonby, March 10, 1834 (secret).
[434] F.O. France 497, Wellington to Aston, March 17, 1835.
[435] C. Greville, _Journals_ (1), III. pp. 225-229.
[436] F.O. Turkey 271, Palmerston to Ponsonby, June 20, 1836.
[437] F.O. Turkey 274, Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 15, 1836.
[438] F.O. Turkey 273, Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 14, 1836.
[439] F.O. Russia 223, Durham to Palmerston, February 6, 1836, March
3, 1836 (confidential); cf. Barante, _Souvenirs_, V. pp. 277-278,
299-300, 346.
[440] _Vide_ p. 168.
[441] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, II. p. 360, Palmerston to
Melbourne, July 5, 1840.
[442] F.O. France 520, Granville to Palmerston, February 26, 1836.
[443] F.O. France 489, Granville to Wellington, December 12, 1834.
[444] British _chargé d'affaires_ in Paris.
[445] F.O. France 523, Aston to Palmerston, July 25, 29, 1836 (private
letter).
[446] Lesseps, Ferdinand, Vicomte de, conceived in 1854 the great
scheme of cutting the Suez Canal.
[447] F.O. Turkey 284, Campbell to Palmerston, October 30, November
18, 1836.
[448] F.O. Turkey 284 and 319, Campbell to Palmerston, December 20,
1836, January 21, 24, April 7, 11, 1837.
[449] F.O. France 562, Granville to Palmerston, June 25, 1838.
[450] F.O. Turkey 271 and 274, Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 8, 1836
(secret); Palmerston to Ponsonby, May 7, 1836 (secret). "His Majesty's
government do not expect that any communication which he (the Sultan's
agent) is to make will induce them to consider an attack upon Mehemet
Ali, in the present relative strength of the two parties, as anything
but an act of the most extreme impolicy."
[451] F.O. Turkey 271, Palmerston to Ponsonby, March 7, 1836 (private
and confidential).
[452] The Turkish Commander in Asia Minor.
[453] F.O. Turkey 271, Palmerston to Ponsonby, March 29, 1836 (secret
and confidential).
[454] F.O. Turkey 342, Campbell to Palmerston, January 22, 1838.
[455] The name given to the immunities and privileges granted in the
sixteenth century to France, and gradually extended to other Powers.
[456] F.O. Turkey 328, Palmerston to Ponsonby, February 6, 1838.
[457] F.O. Turkey 332, Ponsonby to Palmerston, August 19, 1838.
[458] On the subject of the alleged ill-treatment of the crew of a
ship-wrecked vessel sailing under British colours.
[459] F.O. Turkey 342, Campbell to Palmerston, January 16, 1838.
[460] _Ibid._, March 27, 1838.
[461] F.O. Turkey 343, Palmerston to Campbell, June 8, 1838; Campbell
to Palmerston, June 9, September 1, 1838.
[462] F.O. Turkey 342, Palmerston to Campbell, February 6, March 16,
1838; Campbell to Palmerston, April 3, 5, May 19, 21, 1838.
[463] F.O. Turkey 342, Campbell to Palmerston, May 25, 1838.
[464] F.O. France 557, Palmerston to Granville, July 3, 1838.
[465] F.O. Turkey 343, Campbell to Palmerston, August 16, 24,
September 5, 8, 1838.
[466] F.O. Turkey 343, Campbell to Palmerston, September 28, 1838.
[467] F.O. France 564, Granville to Palmerston, September 21, 28,
October 5, 1838. F.O. Turkey 332, Ponsonby to Palmerston, October 29,
1838.
[468] H. Rawlinson, _Russia and England in the East_, pp. 139-151.
[469] _Correspondence relating to Persia and Afghanistan_, Palmerston
to Clanricarde, October 26, 1838; Nesselrode à Pozzo, 20 octobre,
1838; Palmerston to Pozzo, December 20, 1838; Nesselrode à Pozzo, 20
janvier, 1839.
[470] F.O. Russia 252, Clanricarde to Palmerston, May 25, 1839.
[471] F.O. Turkey 274, Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 7, 1836.
[472] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, II. pp. 291-294.
[473] _Lettres du Maréchal Moltke sur l'Orient_, II. pp. 310-311.
[474] _Levant correspondence_, Palmerston to Ponsonby, April 12,
1839. F.O. Turkey 355, Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 20, 23, 1839
(confidential).
[475] F.O. Turkey 332, Ponsonby to Palmerston, September 5 (secret),
October 3, 13, November 9, December 31, 1838.
[476] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, II. pp. 267-269; Palmerston to
Granville, June 8, 1838.
[477] _Levant correspondence_, Reshid à Palmerston, 26 avril, 1839;
Palmerston to Reshid, May 6, 1839; Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 6,
1839. F.O. Turkey 355, Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 22, 1839.
[478] Thureau Dangin, _Monarchie de Juillet_, IV. p. 48.
[479] Guizot, _Mémoires_, IV. _Pièces Historiques_, Bourqueney à
Soult, 20 juin, 1839.
[480] _Levant correspondence_, Palmerston to Ponsonby, July 18, 1839;
Palmerston to Beauvale, July 23, 1839.
[481] _Levant correspondence_, Campbell to Palmerston, May 19, 1839.
[482] _Ibid._, June 14, 1839.
[483] _Ibid._, June 16, 1839.
[484] _Levant correspondence_, Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 3, 1839.
[485] _Ibid._, July 8, 1839.
[486] F.O. France 584, Granville to Palmerston, July 29, 1839.
[487] Vice-Admiral.
[488] F.O. Turkey 360, Ponsonby to Palmerston, November 27, 28, 30,
December 3, 1839.
[489] _Revue des Deux Mondes_, 1^{er} août, 1852, _L'Escadre de
la Méditerranée_. See also curious remarks of M. Thureau-Dangin,
_Monarchie de Juillet_, IV. pp. 53-56.
[490] _Levant correspondence_, Palmerston to Granville, July 30, 1839;
Palmerston to Beauvale, August 1, 1839; Guizot, _Mémoires, Pièces
historiques_, Bourqueney à Soult, 23 juillet, 1839.
[491] F.O. Russia 243, Palmerston to Clanricarde, October 10, 1838.
[492] _Levant correspondence_, Dalmatie à Bourqueney, 17 juin, 1839;
Beauvale to Palmerston, June 14, 1839; Palmerston to Beauvale,
June 28, 1839; Palmerston to Granville, June 29, 1839; Beauvale to
Palmerston, June 30, 1839; W. Russell to Palmerston, July 6, 1839;
Beauvale to Palmerston, July 10, 1839.
[493] _Ibid._, Clanricarde to Palmerston, July 27, 1839; Nesselrode à
Kisseleff, 15-27 juillet, 1839.
[494] _Ibid._, Granville to Palmerston, July 30, 1839; Soult à
Bourqueney, 26 juillet, 1839.
[495] _Ibid._, Palmerston to Granville, July 30, 1839.
[496] _Levant correspondence_, Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 21, 22,
1839.
[497] _Ibid._, July 26, 1839.
[498] _Ibid._, July 29, 1839.
[499] Sir Frederick Lamb, created Baron Beauvale in 1839.
[500] Thureau-Dangin, _Monarchie de Juillet_, IV. p. 58 (note).
[501] _Levant correspondence_, Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 29, 1839.
[502] L. Véron, _Mémoires d'un Bourgeois de Paris_, V. pp. 17, 19.
[503] _Levant correspondence_, Palmerston to Beauvale, June 28, 1839.
[504] Guizot, _Mémoires, Pièces historiques_, Soult à Bourqueney, 17
juin, 1839.
[505] _Levant correspondence_, Granville to Palmerston, August 8, 9,
19, 1839.
[506] _Levant correspondence_, Palmerston to Bulwer, August 20, 1839;
Palmerston to Admiralty, August 24, 1839; Palmerston to Beauvale,
August 25, 1839.
[507] _Ibid._, Bulwer to Palmerston, August 26, 1839.
[508] _Ibid._, August 30, 1839.
[509] F.O. France 586, Bulwer to Palmerston, September 16, 1839
(secret and confidential).
[510] F.O. Turkey 358, Stopford to Ponsonby, August 21, 1839.
[511] F.O. Turkey 372, Palmerston to Campbell, August 13, and
September 11, 1839 (separate).
[512] F.O. Turkey 358, Ponsonby to Palmerston, September 10, 1839
(report of General Chrzanowski on battle of Nezib); also Ponsonby to
Palmerston, July 29, 1839.
[513] _Lettres du Maréchal de Moltke sur l'Orient_, p. 340.
[514] F.O. Turkey 358, Ponsonby to Palmerston, August 12, 1839 (report
of General Jochmus on battle of Nezib).
[515] F.O. Turkey 357, Ponsonby to Palmerston, August 7, 1839
(enclosing Chrzanowski's plan for bringing Mehemet Ali to reason).
[516] _Levant correspondence_, Clanricarde to Palmerston, August 27,
28, 1839.
[517] _Ibid._, Palmerston to Clanricarde, October 25, 1839.
[518] S. Goriainow, _Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles_, pp. 52-82.
[519] _Levant correspondence_, Dalmatie à Sébastiani, 26 septembre,
1839.
[520] _Ibid._, Palmerston to Bulwer, September 28, 1839.
[521] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, II. p. 348.
[522] _Levant correspondence_, Palmerston to Clanricarde, October 25,
1839.
[523] Guizot, _Mémoires_, IV. pp. 365-367.
[524] F.O. France 586, Bulwer to Palmerston, September 13, 1839.
[525] F.O. Turkey 372, Palmerston to Campbell, September 11, 1839
(separate).
[526] F.O. France 587, Bulwer to Palmerston, October 4, 1839.
[527] Guizot, _Mémoires_, IV. pp. 367-370.
[528] Affaires étrangères, 654 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Soult, 5
janvier, 1840.
[529] _Ibid._, 27 janvier, 1840.
[530] Guizot, _Mémoires_, IV. pp. 369-375.
[531] _Vide_ p. 221.
[532] F. Daudet, _Une Vie d'Ambassadrice_, pp. 236-239. The _liaison_
of Princess Lieven with Guizot is the origin of Balzac's story, _Les
Secrets de la Princesse de Cadignan_. Guizot figures in the character
of d'Arthez.
[533] Guizot, _Mémoires_, V. p. 63.
[534] _Ibid._, V. p. 64.
[535] Guizot, _Mémoires_, V. _Pièces historiques_, Soult à Guizot, 19
février, 1840.
[536] Affaires étrangères, 634 Angleterre, Thiers à Guizot, 12 mars,
1840.
[537] Guizot, _Mémoires_, V. p, 207.
[538] Guizot, _Mémoires_, V. p. 65.
[539] Affaires étrangères, 654 Angleterre, Guizot à Thiers, 12, 16
mars, 1840.
[540] Affaires étrangères, 654, 655 Angleterre, Guizot à Thiers, 13,
16 avril, 1840; Thiers à Guizot, 14, 20 avril, 1840.
[541] Affaires étrangères, 655 Angleterre, Guizot à Thiers, 10 mai,
1840.
[542] Guizot, _Mémoires_, V. pp. 61, 62.
[543] Ellice, Edward (1781-1863) had been a member of Lord Grey's
government from 1830 to 1834.
[544] _Correspondence of Princess Lieven with Earl Grey_, III.; P.
Lieven to Grey, April 13, 1836; Grey to P. Lieven, May 6, and October
22, 1836.
[545] _Creevey Papers_, II. p. 309.
[546] _Vide_ p. 53.
[547] F.O. France 600, Palmerston to Granville, October, 1840 (private
letter, part of which is given in Bulwer's _Life of Palmerston_).
[548] Duchesse de Dino, _Chronique_, III. p. 228.
[549] Affaires étrangères, 655 Angleterre, Guizot à Thiers, 1 juin,
1840.
[550] Metternich, _Mémoires_, VI. pp. 430-432, and 454-464.
[551] Affaires étrangères, 655 Angleterre, Guizot à Thiers, 8 mai, 1,
9, 13 juin, 1840; Thiers à Guizot, 16 juin, 1840.
[552] _Levant correspondence_, Campbell to Palmerston, August 7, 1839.
[553] _Levant correspondence_, Campbell to Palmerston, September 2,
26, 1839; Campbell to Ponsonby, October 19, 1839; Young to Palmerston,
October 16, 1839; Hodges to Palmerston, January 4, 13, 14, 16, 23,
February 12, 1840.
[554] _Levant correspondence_, Wagner to Koenigsmark, November 26,
1839.
[555] F.O. Turkey 392, Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 3, 1840 (secret).
[556] F.O. Russia 260, Clanricarde to Palmerston, February 24, May 23,
1840.
[557] The despatches of the French consuls at this period are not
available for inspection.
[558] F.O. Turkey 359, 360, Ponsonby to Palmerston, October 30,
November 24, December 18, 1839; F.O. Turkey 392, Ponsonby to
Palmerston, January 28, 29, 1840. _Levant correspondence_, Ponsonby to
Palmerston, November 13, 1839.
[559] Coste (Jacques), 1798-1859, founder and manager of the _Temps_,
the organ of the _tiers parti_. This venture proved a disastrous
failure, and M. Coste in 1840 was in pecuniary difficulties. There are
frequent allusions to his embarrassments in his correspondence with
Fethi Ahmed Pasha.
[560] F.O. Turkey 394, Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 29, 1840 (separate
and confidential)--"Your Lordship knows the intimacy which exists
between M. Coste and M. Thiers, and he (Coste) undoubtedly does
speak (as he asserts) the sentiments of the President of the French
ministry." Lord Ponsonby goes on to state that the original letters
have been in his hands. The copies transmitted contain many notes in
Palmerston's handwriting.
[561] F.O. Turkey 395, Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 13, 1840 (separate
and confidential).
[562] F.O. Turkey 395, Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 30, 1840 (separate
and confidential).
[563] _Vide_ p. 227.
[564] F.O. Turkey 405, Hodges to Palmerston, June 17, 19, 1840.
[565] Guizot, _Mémoires_, V. pp. 205, 206.
[566] _Levant correspondence_, Hodges to Palmerston, June 16, 1840.
[567] Affaires étrangères, 655 Angleterre, Guizot à Thiers, 11
juillet, 1840.
[568] F.O. Turkey 394, Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 23, 1840.
[569] Guizot, _Mémoires_, V. pp. 218-220.
[570] Thureau-Dangin, _La Monarchie de Juillet_, IV. p. 221. H.
Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, III. p. 432; Palmerston to Hobhouse,
July 27, 1843.
[571] C. Greville, _Journals_ (2), I. pp. 308-309.
[572] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, II. pp. 356-363; Palmerston to
Melbourne, July 5, 6, 1840.
[573] To the Cabinet minute submitting to the Queen the expediency of
making the treaty, the dissent of Holland and Clarendon was appended.
C. Greville, _Journals_ (2), I. p. 304.
[574] _Levant correspondence_, Part I. pp. 689-700.
[575] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, II. pp. 426-433; Palmerston to
Hobhouse, July 27, 1843.
[576] Metternich, _Mémoires_, IV. p. 436; Metternich à Apponyi, 4
août, 1840.
[577] Affaires étrangères, 655 Angleterre, Guizot à Thiers, 17
juillet, 1840. Guizot, _Mémoires_, V. pp. 220-228.
[578] He had been transferred from Constantinople to Paris as
secretary of embassy in 1839.
[579] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, II. p. 315. _Levant
correspondence_, Bulwer to Palmerston, July 20, 1840.
[580] F.O. France 604, Bulwer to Palmerston, July 27, 1840 (most
confidential).
[581] _Ibid._, Granville to Palmerston, August 3, 1840 (confidential).
[582] _The Times_, July 27, August 1, 3, 1840.
[583] _Ibid._, August 7, 1840.
[584] Affaires étrangères, 655 Angleterre, Thiers à Guizot (undated,
probably, 21 juillet, 1840). Guizot, _Mémoires_, V. pp. 230-235.
[585] C. Greville, _Journals_ (2), I. p. 329.
[586] Guizot, _Mémoires_, V. p. 271-272.
[587] Affaires étrangères, 665 Angleterre, Louis Philippe au Roi des
Belges, 13 août, 1840.
[588] Affaires étrangères, 655 Angleterre, Bourqueney à Thiers, 8
août, 1840.
[589] Affaires étrangères, 655 Angleterre, Guizot à Thiers, 21, 22
août, 1840. Guizot, _Mémoires_, V. 278-290.
[590] _Levant correspondence_, Palmerston to Bulwer, August 31, 1840.
[591] _The Times_, October 7, 1840.
[592] Guizot, _Mémoires_, V. pp. 290-296.
[593] _Levant correspondence_, Ponsonby to Palmerston, August 5, 8,
1840.
[594] Admiralty (in letters) 5503 Syria, Palmerston to Admiralty, July
16, 17, 23, 1840 (secret).
[595] C. Napier, _War in Syria_, I. p. 10.
[596] _Levant correspondence_, Palmerston to Granville, December 10,
13, 1839, January 3, February 14, March 5, 17, 1840.
[597] Admiralty (in letters), 5503 Syria, Palmerston to Admiralty,
July 25, 1840 (secret).
[598] _Levant correspondence_, Hodges to Palmerston, July 23, 1840.
[599] Colonel Sèves.
[600] C. Napier, _War in Syria_, I. pp. 29-49. Admiralty (in letters),
5503 Syria, Napier to Stopford, August 21, 1840.
[601] _Levant correspondence_, Ponsonby to Palmerston, August 17, 1840.
[602] F.O. Turkey 396, Ponsonby to Palmerston, August 19, 1840.
[603] _Levant correspondence_, Ponsonby to Palmerston, August 22, 1840.
[604] F.O. France 605, Bulwer to Palmerston, September 7, 1840.
[605] _Levant correspondence_, Palmerston to Guizot, September 9, 1840.
[606] H. Heine, _Letters from Paris_ (translated by Leland), II. p.
160.
[607] T. Raikes' _Journal_, IV. p. 43.
[608] H. Heine, _Letters from Paris_ (translated by Leland), II. p.
160.
[609] F.O. France 605, Bulwer to Palmerston, August 31, 1840. Thureau
Dangin, _Monarchie de Juillet_, IV. pp. 242-243. _The Times_,
September 1, 1840.
[610] H. Heine, _Letters from Paris_ (translated by Leland), II. p.
39. _Letters of Queen Victoria_, October 2, 1840 (I. K. Leopold to
Queen Victoria).
[611] H. Heine, _Letters from Paris_ (translated by Leland), II. p.
141.
[612] _Levant correspondence_, Hodges to Palmerston, August 24, 1840.
[613] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, II. p. 324-327.
[614] F.O. France 605, Bulwer to Palmerston, September 18, 1840
(private and confidential).
[615] Affaires étrangères, 655 Angleterre, Guizot à Thiers, 20
septembre, 1840. Guizot, _Mémoires_, V. pp. 317-323.
[616] S. Walpole, _Life of Lord John Russell_, I. pp. 347-348. C.
Greville, _Journals_ (2), I. p. 304.
[617] _Vide_ p. 265.
[618] C. Greville, _Journals_ (2), II. p. 106.
[619] _Melbourne Papers_, pp. 472-473.
[620] C. Greville, _Journals_ (2), I. pp. 310-311, in particular, and
Chapters VIII. and IX. in general.
[621] _The Times_, December 1, 1840.
[622] _The Times_, December 7, 1840.
[623] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, II. pp. 343-344.
[624] _Melbourne Papers_, II. p. 479.
[625] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, II. p. 348.
[626] _Melbourne Papers_, pp. 467-480. C. Greville, _Journals_ (2), I.
pp. 312-318.
[627] C. Greville, _Journals_ (2), I. p. 331.
[628] The Princess Royal was born November 21, 1840.
[629] S. Walpole, _Life of Lord John Russell_, I. pp, 352-353.
[630] _Levant correspondence_, Palmerston to Granville, October 6,
1840.
[631] C. Greville, _Journals_ (2), I. pp. 324-327. S. Walpole, _Life
of Lord John Russell_, p. 354. _Melbourne Papers_, pp. 483-484.
[632] _Levant correspondence_, Schlemnitz to Palmerston, October 9,
1840; Brunnow to Palmerston, October 12, 1840; Neumann to Palmerston,
October 12, 1840.
[633] _Levant correspondence_, Ponsonby to Palmerston, September 10,
14, 1840; Hodges to Palmerston, September 22, 1840.
[634] C. Napier, _War in Syria_, I. pp. 47-68.
[635] H. Heine, _Letters from Paris_ (translated by Leland), II. p. 49.
[636] _Memoirs of H. Reeve_, I. p. 130.
[637] _Ibid._, pp. 122-129.
[638] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, II. pp. 333-334.
[639] _Letters of Queen Victoria_, Palmerston to the Queen, October
11, 1840.
[640] _Levant correspondence_, Palmerston to Granville, October 2,
1840.
[641] S. Walpole, _Life of Lord John Russell_, I. pp. 354-357.
[642] _Letters of Queen Victoria_, Melbourne to the Queen, October 9,
1840.
[643] _Levant correspondence_, Thiers à Guizot, 3 octobre, 1840.
[644] _Ibid._, 8 octobre, 1840.
[645] L. Vérnon, _Mémoires d'un Bourgeois de Paris_, V. p. 27.
[646] C. Greville, _Journals_ (2), I. p. 337. _Letters of Queen
Victoria_, Melbourne to the Queen, October 11, 1840.
[647] _Levant correspondence_, Palmerston to Ponsonby, October 15,
1840; Palmerston to Granville, October 17, 1840.
[648] Thureau-Dangin, _La Monarchie de Juillet_, IV. p. 343.
[649] _Levant correspondence_, Palmerston to Granville, October 8,
1840.
[650] F.O. France 606, Granville to Palmerston, October 12, 1840.
_Levant correspondence_, Granville to Palmerston, October 12, 1840.
[651] Admiralty (in letters) 5495, Martin to Stopford, April 26, 1840.
[652] F.O. France 605, Bulwer to Palmerston, September 14, 1840
(confidential).
[653] _Vide_ p. 217.
[654] F.O. Spain 555, Scott to Palmerston, October 23, 1840 (secret);
Aston to Palmerston, November 7, 1840. _Levant correspondence_,
Palmerston to Aston, October 15, 1840. H. Bulwer, _Life of
Palmerston_, II. pp. 341-343.
[655] _Melbourne Papers_, p. 487.
[656] Guizot, _Mémoires_, IV. pp. 400-402. Thureau-Dangin, _La
Monarchie de Juillet_, IV. pp. 344-346.
[657] _Vide_ pp. 269-273.
[658] F.O. Sardinia 112, Abercromby to Palmerston, November 28,
December 30, 1840. F.O. Sicily 169, Temple to Palmerston, September
16, 1840. Thureau-Dangin, _Monarchie et Juillet_, IV. pp. 274-275.
[659] F.O. Austria 208, Beauvale to Palmerston, February 2, 5, 1841.
F.O. Russia 271, Clanricarde to Palmerston, February 3, 1841.
[660] "Sie sollen ihn nicht haben, den frien deutschen Rhein."
[661] Metternich, _Mémoires_, VI. p. 447.
[662] _Memoirs of H. Reeve_, pp. 134-135. _Melbourne Papers_, p. 492.
C. Greville, _Journals_ (2), I. pp. 347-349.
[663] _Levant correspondence_, Palmerston to Granville, November 2,
20, 1840; Granville to Palmerston, November 5, 1840.
[664] Admiralty (in letters) 5503, Syria, Palmerston to Admiralty,
October 5, 1840 (secret).
[665] F.O. Turkey 397, Ponsonby to Palmerston, October 7, 1840
(confidential).
[666] _Levant correspondence_, Palmerston to Admiralty, November 14,
1840.
[667] _Levant correspondence_, Barrow to Leverson, December 15, 1840.
[668] _Ibid._, Ponsonby to Palmerston, December 16, 1840 (enclosure
I.); Napier to Ponsonby, December 14, 1840, "I was led to believe by
letters which I had received from different members of the Government
that they were most anxious to settle the Eastern question speedily."
[669] _Ibid._, Palmerston to Admiralty, December 15, 1840; Palmerston
to Ponsonby, December 17, 1840.
[670] _Ibid._, Ponsonby to Palmerston, December 8, 1840.
[671] Admiralty (in letters) 5504, Syria, II., Stopford to Admiralty,
December 10, 1840.
[672] _Levant correspondence_, Ponsonby to Palmerston, December 16,
23, 1840.
[673] _Ibid._, Palmerston to Ponsonby, October 15, 1840.
[674] _Ibid._, Ponsonby to Palmerston, December 23, 1840.
[675] _Ibid._, Palmerston to Ponsonby, December 17, 1840.
[676] _Levant correspondence_, Ponsonby to Palmerston, January 10, 13,
1841.
[677] _Ibid._, Barrow to Backhouse, February 1, 28, 1841.
[678] F.O. Turkey 399, Ponsonby to Palmerston, December 13, 1840.
F.O. Austria 208, Beauvale to Palmerston, March 5, 1841. _Levant
correspondence_, Ponsonby to Palmerston, February 21, 1841. Admiralty
(in letters) 5504, Syria, II., Backhouse to Admiralty, April 17, 1841.
[679] _Levant correspondence_, Ponsonby to Palmerston, February 14,
15, 1841; Chekib Effendi to Palmerston, March 11, 1841.
[680] _Ibid._, Granville to Palmerston, December 4, 1840.
[681] F.O. France 607, Granville to Palmerston, November 27, 1840.
[682] Guizot, _Mémoires_, VI. p. 78.
[683] _Vide_ p. 253.
[684] S. Goriainow, _Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles_, p. 83.
[685] _Levant correspondence_, Nesselrode to Brunnow, December 10, 22,
1840.
[686] F.O. Russia 271, Clanricarde to Palmerston, January 18, 1841
(confidential).
[687] _Ibid._, March 9, 1841 (confidential).
[688] F.O. Russia 269, Palmerston to Clanricarde, January 11, 1841.
[689] Among the despatches in vol. 653 Angleterre, is an extract from
a letter from M. ---- to M. Guizot, dated November 28, 1840; the
writer gives the views of Melbourne, Russell and Lansdowne. He also
speaks of a conversation with Esterhazy, and talks of an interview of
two hours' duration with Palmerston. The author of this communication
was perhaps Ellice. The evidence of Greville's _Journal_ seems to
make it very improbable that he was responsible for it. Nor can the
authorship of it be imputed to Reeve.
[690] Guizot, _Mémoires_, VI. pp. 49-50.
[691] _Levant correspondence_, Palmerston to Ponsonby, January 29,
1841.
[692] F.O. Austria 208, Beauvale to Palmerston, January 17, 1841.
[693] _Levant correspondence_, Palmerston to Bloomfield, December 2,
1840.
[694] Affaires étrangères, 657 Angleterre, Bourqueney à Guizot, 7
janvier, 1841 (confidentielle et réservée).
[695] _Levant correspondence_, Palmerston to Ponsonby, March 16, 1841.
[696] _Ibid._, Granville to Palmerston, March 12, 15, 1841.
[697] _Levant correspondence_, Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 6, 9, 17,
27, 1841. Guizot, _Mémoires_, VI. pp. 95-98.
[698] _Ibid._, Palmerston to Ponsonby, April 10, 1841.
[699] _Ibid._, Palmerston to W. Russell, April 21, 1841.
[700] _Ibid._, Beauvale to Ponsonby, April 19, 1841; Beauvale to
Palmerston, April 22, 1841.
[701] _Levant correspondence_, Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 27, 1841
(enclosures).
[702] F.O. Turkey 427, Palmerston to Ponsonby, January 26, 1841.
[703] _Ibid._, 433, Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 6, 1841
(confidential).
[704] _Levant correspondence_, Palmerston to Ponsonby, April 10, 1841.
[705] _Levant correspondence_, Beauvale to Palmerston, April 9, 14,
1841.
[706] _Ibid._, Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 14, 1841.
[707] _Ibid._, Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 12, 26, 1841.
[708] Guizot, _Mémoires_, VI. pp. 111-112.
[709] _Levant correspondence_, Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 21, 1841.
[710] S. Walpole, _History of England from 1815_, IV. pp. 334-338.
[711] _Memoirs of Henry Reeve_, p. 141.
[712] C. Greville's _Journals_ (2), I, p. 356.
[713] Jarnac, _Lord Aberdeen, Revue des Deux Mondes_, 15 juillet, 1860.
[714] _Vide_ p. 313.
[715] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, II. pp. 376-383. Guizot,
_Mémoires_, VI. pp. 130-145 and 412-417. In the speech complained of,
Palmerston, besides denouncing the alleged cruelties committed by the
French army, was so ill-advised as to draw a comparison between the
tranquil condition of Afghanistan under a British military occupation
and the disturbed state of Algeria. How spurious was the peace of
which he boasted was proved, six months later, by the overwhelming
disaster which overtook Elphinstone's army.
[716] Guizot, _Mémoires_, VI. pp. 220-241.
[717] F.O. France 623, Bulwer to Palmerston, April 26, 1841.
[718] F.O. Spain 509, Villiers to Palmerston, November 17, 1838
(secret).
[719] _Ibid._, 510, Villiers to Palmerston, December 1, 1838 (secret).
[720] _Ibid._, 500, Palmerston to Villiers, November 30, 1838 (secret).
[721] F.O. France 580, Granville to Palmerston, March 1, 1839.
[722] F.O. Spain 534, Southern to Palmerston, November 9, 1839
(cypher).
[723] F.O. France 623, Bulwer to Palmerston, April 23 (private and
confidential), 26, 1841. F.O. France 629, Bulwer to Aberdeen, October
18, 25, 1841 (confidential).
[724] F.O. France 621, Aberdeen to Bulwer, October 22, 1841.
[725] _Ibid._, 630, Bulwer to Aberdeen, November 8, 9, 1841 (private
and confidential).
[726] F.O. Spain 571, Aberdeen to Aston, November 18, 1841.
[727] F.O. Austria 297, Aberdeen to Gordon, December 4, 1841.
[728] F.O. France 630, Bulwer to Aberdeen, November 19, 1841; Cowley
to Aberdeen, November 26, 1841.
[729] Guizot, _Mémoires_, pp. 316, 334. C. Greville, _Journals_ (2),
II. pp. 73-75.
[730] F.O. France 628, Bulwer to Aberdeen, September 17, 1841.
[731] _Ibid._, 631 and 647, Cowley to Aberdeen, December 29, 1841,
January 21, 1842 (secret and confidential).
[732] _Ibid._, 630 and 631, Bulwer to Aberdeen, November 8, 1841
(private and confidential); Cowley to Aberdeen, December 3, 1841
(secret and confidential), December 6 and 24 (confidential).
[733] F.O. Austria 304, Aberdeen to Gordon, March 16, 1842. Guizot,
_Mémoires_, VIII. pp. 115-116.
[734] F.O. Austria 304, Aberdeen to Gordon, April 26, 1842. Guizot,
_Mémoires_, VIII. pp. 118-122.
[735] F.O. France 631 and 649, Cowley to Aberdeen, December 6, 1841
(confidential); May 6, 1842 (confidential).
[736] _Ibid._, 649, Cowley to Aberdeen, April 4, May 6, 1842
(confidential).
[737] F.O. France 648 and 649, Cowley to Aberdeen, February 4,
February 14, March 4, April 15, 1842.
[738] _Ibid._, 649, Cowley to Aberdeen, May 13, 1842.
[739] _Ibid._, 645, Aberdeen to Cowley, February 18, 1842.
[740] _Ibid._, 653, Cowley to Aberdeen, December 2, 1842 (secret and
confidential). General Atthalin's intimacy with Mdme. Adelaïde, Louis
Philippe's sister and political confidant, was notorious. _Madame
Atthalin_ was one of the least offensive of the names applied to her by
the legitimists. The story that she was secretly married to General
Atthalin appears to be unfounded. F.O. Spain 604, Aston to Aberdeen,
November 21, 1842.
[741] _Vide_ p. 227.
[742] F.O. France 653 and 665, Cowley to Aberdeen, December 2 (secret
and confidential), December 13 and 19, 1842 (secret and confidential),
January 20 and 22 (secret and confidential), January 2 and 6
(confidential), January 30, 1843.
[743] F.O. Spain 597, Aberdeen to Aston, December 27, 1842.
[744] F.O. France 663, Aberdeen to Cowley, February 14, 1843.
[745] F.O. France 666, Cowley to Aberdeen, March 6, 13, 31, 1843.
[746] F.O. Spain 624, Aston to Aberdeen, March 6, 1843.
[747] F.O. France 667, Cowley to Aberdeen, May 29 (secret and
confidential), June 2, 1843 (confidential).
[748] F.O. Spain 622, Aberdeen to Aston, June 7, 1843 (confidential).
[749] F.O. France 668, Cowley to Aberdeen, July 3, 1843 (secret and
confidential).
[750] F.O. France 669, Cowley to Aberdeen, August 14, 1843 (secret and
confidential).
[751] _Ibid._, 670, Cowley to Aberdeen, September 11, 1843
(confidential). C. Greville, _Journals_ (2), II. p. 200.
[752] _Letters of Queen Victoria_, Vols. I. and II.
[753] Guizot, _Mémoires_, VI. pp. 188-195.
[754] F.O. France 664, Aberdeen to Cowley, December 15, 1843.
_Correspondence relating to the marriage of the Queen and Infanta of
Spain presented to Parliament_, 1847.
[755] Philippe de Rohan-Chabot, Comte de Jarnac, First Secretary of
the French embassy in London.
[756] Jarnac, _Lord Aberdeen, Revue des Deux Mondes_, 15 juillet, 1860.
[757] _Letters of Queen Victoria_, Aberdeen to Queen Victoria,
December 1, 1843.
[758] _Ibid._, Prince Albert to Peel, October 21, 1843.
[759] _Letters of Queen Victoria_, Queen Victoria to King of the
Belgians, December 12, 1843. Guizot, _Mémoires,_ VIII. pp. 53-66. C.
Greville, _Journals_ (2), pp. 211-214.
[760] F.O. Pacific Islands 26, Miller to Bidwell, September 17, 1844.
[761] Guizot, _Mémoires_, VII. p. 56.
[762] F.O. France 666 and 669, Cowley to Aberdeen, April 7, August 30,
1843. F.O. France 664, Aberdeen to Cowley, August 25, October 3, 1843.
[763] F.O. Pacific Islands 27, Pritchard to Aberdeen, August 17, 1844.
[764] _Ibid._, 26, Miller to Bidwell, September 17, 1844.
[765] _Ibid._, 20, extract from a letter from Consul Pritchard, dated
Sidney, January 3, 1843.
[766] F.O. France 664, Aberdeen to Cowley, October 3, 1843
(enclosures).
[767] F.O. Pacific Islands 20, Aberdeen to Pritchard, September 25,
1840.
[768] F.O. France 695, Cowley to Aberdeen, April 14, 1844. Guizot,
_Mémoires_, VIII. pp. 64-69.
[769] F.O. France 693, Cowley to Aberdeen, February 19, 25, 1844.
[770] F.O. Pacific Islands 27, Aberdeen to Pritchard, April 10, 1844.
[771] F.O. France 696, Cowley to Aberdeen, May 20, 31, 1844 (secret
and confidential). _Letters of Queen Victoria_, Queen Victoria to King
of the Belgians, May 24, October 17, 1844.
[772] _Letters of Queen Victoria_, Queen Victoria to King of the
Belgians, June 4, 11, 1844. C. Greville, _Journals_ (2), II. pp.
243-246.
[773] Stockmar, _Memoirs_, II. pp. 106-110. T. Martin, _Life of Prince
Consort_, I. pp. 215-219.
[774] Malmesbury, _Memoirs of an ex-Minister_, I. p. 402.
[775] F.O. France 697, Cowley to Aberdeen, June 3, 1844. Affaires
étrangères, 663 Angleterre, Guizot à Sainte-Aulaire, 6 juin, 1844.
[776] Affaires étrangères, 663 Angleterre, Guizot à Sainte-Aulaire, 13
juin, 1844. F.O. France 697, Cowley to Aberdeen, June 14, 1844.
[777] Guizot, _Mémoires_, VII. pp. 52-59.
[778] England asked that Tangier should be respected on the ground
that all the European consuls resided there.
[779] F.O. France 697, Cowley to Aberdeen, June 10, July 12, 15, 1844.
Affaires étrangères, 663 Angleterre, Guizot à Sainte Aulaire, 13 juin,
1844; Jarnac à Guizot, 6 juillet, 1844.
[780] Affaires étrangères, 664 Angleterre, Jarnac à Guizot, 1 août,
1844.
[781] F.O. Pacific Islands 20 and 27, Pritchard to Aberdeen, November
10, 23, 1843, January 26, 1844.
[782] Guizot, _Mémoires_, VII. pp. 74-82.
[783] Affaires étrangères, 664 Angleterre, Jarnac à Guizot, 4 août,
1844.
[784] F.O. France 699, Cowley to Aberdeen, August 2, 5, 1844 (secret
and confidential).
[785] _Ibid._, August 9, 1844 (secret and confidential).
[786] Affaires étrangères, 664 Angleterre, Guizot à Jarnac, 8 août,
1844.
[787] F.O. France 691, Aberdeen to Cowley, August 13, 1844.
[788] Affaires étrangères, 664 Angleterre, Jarnac à Guizot, 22 août,
1844.
[789] F.O. France 691, Aberdeen to Cowley, August 23, 1844.
[790] Affaires étrangères, 664 Angleterre, Guizot à Jarnac, 15, 18
août, 1844.
[791] _The Times_, August 21, 1844.
[792] Guizot, _Mémoires_, VII. p. 97.
[793] Affaires étrangères, 664 Angleterre, Jarnac à Louis Philippe, 14
août, 1844.
[794] _Ibid._, 664 Angleterre, Guizot à Jarnac, 28 août, 1844.
[795] Affaires étrangères, 664 Angleterre, Jarnac à Guizot, 10, 27
août, 1844.
[796] F.O. France 691, Cowley to Aberdeen, August 28, 30, 1844 (secret
and confidential).
[797] Affaires étrangères, 664 Angleterre, Guizot à Jarnac, 29 août,
2 septembre, 1844; Jarnac à Guizot, 4 septembre, 1844. Guizot,
_Mémoires_, VII. pp. 98-104.
[798] _Letters of Queen Victoria_, Queen Victoria to King of the
Belgians, September 15, 1844.
[799] F.O. France 700, Cowley to Aberdeen, November 15, 1844
(confidential). Guizot, _Mémoires_, VIII. pp. 197-198.
[800] _Ibid._, 724, Cowley to Aberdeen, May 2, 1845 (secret and
confidential).
[801] F.O. France 700, Cowley to Aberdeen, November 22 (confidential),
December 13, 1844 (secret and confidential).
[802] T. Martin, _Life of the Prince Consort_, I. pp. 349-350.
[803] Guizot, _Mémoires_, VIII. p. 199.
[804] F.O. Spain 651 and 652, Bulwer to Aberdeen, April 1, May 15,
1844 (private and confidential).
[805] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, III. p. 213.
[806] Guizot, _Mémoires_, VIII. pp. 160-161.
[807] F.O. France 700, Cowley to Aberdeen, December 16, 1844 (secret
and confidential).
[808] Youngest son of Louis Philippe.
[809] Guizot, _Mémoires_, VIII. pp. 211, 223, 224.
[810] F.O. France 726, Cowley to Aberdeen, July 25, 1845
(confidential).
[811] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, III. p. 215.
[812] _Letters of Queen Victoria_, Aberdeen to Peel, September
8, 1845. T. Martin, _Life of Prince Consort_, I. p. 305. Guizot,
_Mémoires_, VIII. pp. 225-227. F.O. France 728, Cowley to Aberdeen,
October 6, 1845 (secret and confidential).
[813] Guizot, in his detailed account of the Spanish marriages, makes
no mention of the visit.
[814] F.O. Spain 678, Bulwer to Aberdeen, October 9, 1845.
[815] _Ibid._, October 30, 1845.
[816] _Ibid._, October 10, 30, 1845 (cipher, confidential).
[817] _Revue retrospective_, pp. 295, 296.
[818] Guizot, _Mémoires_, VIII. pp. 227-234.
[819] _Ibid._, pp. 228-235.
[820] _Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and the
Infanta of Spain_, Aberdeen to Bulwer, November 17, 1845.
[821] F.O. Spain 696, Bulwer to Aberdeen, February 28, 1846.
[822] Guizot, _Mémoires_, VIII. pp. 251-255.
[823] C. Greville, _Journal_ (2), III. pp. 9 and 54. T. Martin, _Life
of Prince Consort_, I. pp. 355-356.
[824] F.O. Spain 696, Bulwer to Aberdeen, March 19, 1846.
[825] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, III. p. 217.
[826] F.O. Spain 698, Bulwer to Aberdeen, July 8, 1846.
[827] Guizot, _Mémoires_, VIII. pp. 248-249.
[828] It would be conveyed from the Spanish frontier by Chaptal's
system of telegraphy.
[829] F.O. France 751, Cowley to Aberdeen, April 8, 1846 (private and
confidential).
[830] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, III. pp. 219-226. T. Martin,
_Life of Prince Consort_, I. pp. 350-352. Guizot, _Mémoires_, VIII.
pp. 261-264.
[831] Practically the whole of the correspondence relating to this
affair has been removed from the _archives des affaires étrangères_ in
Paris. But in the volume marked "828 _Espagne_" the following unsigned
and undated note is to be found:--"In the question of the Spanish
marriages there was a private correspondence between the King and M.
Bresson, and also between the latter and M. Guizot. After the death of
the ambassador the minutes of his letters and the original answers of
the King and of the minister (Guizot) were handed over to M. Guizot
by his widow, and were carried off by him in February, 1848. But it
is certain that Madame Bresson retained improperly a copy of this
correspondence which her husband had made, and which it was her duty
to return to the Foreign Office." (M. Bresson committed suicide at
Naples in November, 1847.)
[832] _Letters of Queen Victoria, Memorandum by the Prince Albert_,
December 20, 1845.
[833] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, III. pp. 192-193. C. Greville,
_Journals_ (2), II. p. 388. Guizot, _Mémoires_, VIII., pp. 279-282.
[834] _Correspondence relating to the Queen and Infanta of Spain_,
Aberdeen to Sotomayor, June 22, 1846.
[835] _Revue retrospective_, pp. 52-53.
[836] F.O. France 753, Cowley to Aberdeen, July 13, 1846 (private and
confidential); _Revue retrospective_, p. 171.
[837] _Revue retrospective_, p. 171.
[838] _Revue retrospective_, pp. 170 and 181-182.
[839] T. Martin, _Life of Prince Consort_, I. p. 352.
[840] _Revue retrospective_, pp. 180-181, 196, 197; Guizot à Louis
Philippe, 8 août, 1846:--"You can be quite happy about Coburg. No
Coburg possible. Palmerston has had a long confidential talk on the
subject with the Queen, Prince Albert and King Leopold. This news
reaches me from an excellent quarter."
[841] Guizot, _Mémoires_, VIII. pp. 180-181.
[842] General Narvaez.
[843] _Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and
Infanta of Spain_, Palmerston to Bulwer, July 19, 1846.
[844] _Revue retrospective_, pp. 180-181.
[845] F.O. France 753, Cowley to Palmerston, July 27, 1846 (private
and confidential).
[846] _Revue retrospective_, pp. 182-185, 402-403.
[847] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, III. pp. 264-276.
[848] _Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and the
Infanta of Spain_, Palmerston to Bulwer, August 16, 1846.
[849] F.O. Spain 698, Bulwer to Palmerston, July 19, 1846 (secret and
confidential).
[850] _Ibid._, August 4, 1846 (secret and confidential).
[851] _Ibid._
[852] F.O. Spain 698, Bulwer to Palmerston, July 19, 1846 (secret and
confidential).
[853] _Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and the
Infanta of Spain_, Palmerston to Bulwer, August 22, 1846.
[854] Guizot, _Mémoires_, VIII. p. 301.
[855] F.O. Spain 698, Bulwer to Palmerston, August 22, 1846 (secret
and confidential).
[856] _Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and the
Infanta of Spain_, Bulwer to Palmerston, August 29, 1846.
[857] _Ibid._, Normanby to Palmerston, September 1, 1846.
[858] _Letters of Queen Victoria_, Queen of the French to Queen
Victoria, September 8, 1846; Queen Victoria to Queen of the French,
September 10, 1846.
[859] _Revue retrospective_, pp. 324-326.
[860] C. Greville, _Journals_ (2), III. p. 10.
[861] T. Martin, _Life of Prince Consort_, I. pp. 503-516.
[862] _Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and the
Infanta of Spain_, Bulwer to Palmerston, October 11, 1846.
[863] _Ibid._, Palmerston to Normanby, September 22, 1846; Palmerston
to Bulwer, September 28, 1846.
[864] _Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and the
Infanta of Spain_, Palmerston to Normanby, October 31, 1846, January
8, 1847.
[865] C. Greville, _Journals_ (2), III. p. 48.
[866] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, III. p. 320.
[867] T. Martin, _Life of Prince Consort_, I. p. 351. Stockmar,
_Memoirs_, II. p. 156.
[868] _Vide_ p. 335.
[869] _Vide_ p. 343.
[870] _Vide_ p. 370.
[871] _Revue retrospective_, pp. 52-53. _Correspondence relating
to the marriages of the Queen and Infanta of Spain_, Palmerston to
Bulwer, October 31, 1846, January 8, 1847.
[872] This, in M. Thiers' opinion, was Christina's motive, _vide_ L.
Fagan, _Life of Sir A. Panizzi_, I. p. 228, Thiers to Panizzi, January
17, 1847.
[873] Stockmar, _Memoirs_, II. pp. 134 and 197.
[874] _Revue retrospective_, pp. 182-184.
[875] _Ibid._, pp. 184-185.
[876] F.O. Spain 694, Palmerston to Bulwer, August 22, 1846 (separate
and confidential).
[877] _Revue retrospective_, p. 197.
[878] _Ibid._, p. 198.
[879] R. Arnaud, _Adelaïde d'Orléans_, p. 348.
[880] Thureau-Dangin, _La Monarchie de Juillet_, VI. pp. 220-221.
[881] _Letters of Queen Victoria_, Aberdeen to Peel, September 8, 1845.
[882] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, III. pp. 268-276.
_Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and Infanta of
Spain_, Palmerston to Normanby, September 22, 1846.
[883] Afterwards Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian army in Bohemia in
the war with Prussia in 1866.
[884] _State Papers_, XXXV. pp. 1069-1071.
[885] Metternich, _Mémoires_, VII. p. 282.
[886] F.O. France 757, Normanby to Palmerston, November 20, 1846.
[887] _State Papers_, XXXV. pp. 1082-1095.
[888] Thureau-Dangin, _Monarchie de Juillet_, VII. p. 276.
[889] _Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy_, Abercromby to
Palmerston, January 12, 1847. Metternich, _Mémoires_, VII. pp. 228-245.
[890] _Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy_, Scarlett to
Aberdeen, June 18, 1846; Hamilton to Aberdeen, June 30, 1846.
[891] _Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy_, Scarlett to
Palmerston, April 17, 1847.
[892] Thureau-Dangin, _La Monarchie de Juillet_, VII. pp. 230-231.
[893] _Correspondence relating to affairs of Italy_, Cowley to
Palmerston, July 17, 31, 1846.
[894] Guizot, _Mémoires_, VIII. pp. 342-356.
[895] F.O. France 778, Normanby to Palmerston, February 26, 1847
(private and confidential).
[896] The despatches contained in F.O. Spain 720-727 afford abundant
evidence of this.
[897] H. Bulwer, _Life of Palmerston_, III. pp. 199-200.
[898] _Revue Retrospective._ His name frequently occurs among those in
receipt of secret service money. For his mission to Vienna, he appears
to have received 10,000 francs.
[899] Metternich, _Mémoires_, VIII. pp. 395-404; Thureau-Dangin, _La
Monarchie de Juillet_, VII. pp. 239-240.
[900] _Ibid._, pp. 388-404.
[901] _Ibid._, pp. 404-405 (note), Guizot à Metternich, 7 novembre,
1847, "J'ai appris avec grand plaisir que la santé de Votre Altesse
était excellente; J'en fais mon compliment a l'Europe."
[902] Metternich, _Mémoires_, VIII. pp. 228-229, Metternich à Buol, 29
mai, 1846.
[903] _Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy_, Abercromby
to Palmerston, June 10, 1847; Hamilton to Palmerston July 20, 1847;
Clinton Dawkins to Palmerston, July 17, 1847, Hamilton to Palmerston,
July 25, 1847; Palmerston to Ponsonby, September 27, 1847.
[904] Ferrara was in the Papal States, but Austria had the right of
garrisoning _la place de Ferrare_.
[905] _Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy_, Hamilton to
Palmerston, August 14, 1847.
[906] _Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy_, Abercromby to
Palmerston, August 19, 1847.
[907] _Ibid._, Abercromby to Palmerston, August 24, 1847.
[908] _Ibid._, Metternich to Diedrichstein, August 2, 1847. In
this despatch occurs the famous sentence, "Italy is a geographical
expression."
[909] _Ibid._, Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 30, 1847.
[910] _Ibid._, Palmerston to Ponsonby, August 12, 1847.
[911] _Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy_, Palmerston to
Ponsonby, September 11, 1847.
[912] A secretary of the British legation at Florence resided at Rome,
and directed his reports to the minister at Florence.
[913] _Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy_, Normanby to
Palmerston, April 19, 1847; Palmerston to Normanby, April 27, 1847;
Normanby to Palmerston, April 30, 1847.
[914] T. Martin, _Life of the Prince Consort_, I. pp. 428-434. Prince
Albert's _Memorandum_ is dated, Ardverikie, August 29, 1847.
[915] _Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy_, Palmerston to
Minto, September 18, 1847.
[916] Guizot, _Mémoires_, VIII. pp. 434-435.
[917] _Correspondence relating to affairs of Switzerland_, Cowley to
Aberdeen, February 3, 21, 1845; Gordon to Aberdeen, February 19, 1845.
[918] F.O. France 756, Normanby to Palmerston, October 23, 1846
(secret and confidential). Metternich, _Mémoires_, VII. pp. 178-180.
[919] Metternich, _Mémoires_, VII. pp. 451-466.
[920] Metternich, _Mémoires_, VII. pp. 335-336; Metternich à Apponyi,
20 juin, 1847.
[921] G. Grote, _Seven letters on the recent politics of Switzerland_
(originally published in _Spectator_), London, 1847.
[922] G. Grote, _Seven letters on the recent politics of Switzerland_,
pp. 173 and 181.
[923] _Correspondence relating to the affairs of Switzerland_,
Palmerston to Ponsonby, August 9, 17, 1847; Palmerston to Normanby,
August 17, 1847.
[924] _Ibid._, Minto to Palmerston, October 4, 1847; Peel to
Palmerston, October 14, 1847.
[925] _Correspondence relating to the affairs of Switzerland_,
Palmerston to Minto, September 18, 1847.
[926] Mrs. Rosslynn Wemyss, _Memoirs and letters of Sir R. Morier_, I.
p. 38.
[927] _Correspondence relating to the affairs of Switzerland_, Morier
to Aberdeen, June 4, November 25, 1844.
[928] Mrs. Rosslynn Wemyss, _Memoirs and letters of Sir R. Morier_, p.
53.
[929] _Correspondence relating to the affairs of Switzerland_, Morier
to Palmerston, February 18, 1847 (enclosure).
[930] _Ibid._, Minto to Palmerston, October 4, 1847; Palmerston to
Minto, October 22, 1847.
[931] _Correspondence relating to the affairs of Switzerland_,
Palmerston to Peel, October 29, 1847; Peel to Palmerston, November 4,
6, 1847.
[932] _Ibid._, Guizot à Broglie, 4 novembre, 1847.
[933] _Correspondence relating to the affairs of Switzerland_,
Palmerston to Normanby, November 16, 1847.
[934] _Ibid._, Normanby to Palmerston, November 18, 1847; Palmerston
to Normanby, November 19, 1847; Broglie à Guizot, 20 novembre,
1847; Guizot à Broglie, 19 novembre, 1847; Howard to Palmerston,
November 21, 1847; Palmerston to Broglie, November 26, 1847; Howard
to Palmerston, November 22, 1847; Metternich, _Mémoires_, VII. pp.
493-502.
[935] F.O. France 783, Normanby to Palmerston, November 6 (cypher), 8,
1847 (private and confidential). Guizot, _Mémoires_, VIII. pp. 468-502.
[936] Thureau-Dangin, _La Monarchie de Juillet_, VII. pp. 186-198.
[937] _Cambridge Modern History_, XI. p. 250.
[938] Mrs. Rosslynn Wemyss, _Memoirs and letters of Sir R. Morier_, I.
p. 38.
[939] Guizot, _Mémoires_, VIII. pp. 506-508.
[940] One private letter was certainly written by Palmerston to Peel.
It is dated November 17, 1847, marked _private_, and begins--"My
dear Sir." Peel is asked to ascertain privately, "throwing out the
idea as his own," in what light the Diet would regard the proposal
of mediation which Palmerston informs him, in confidence, he has
just sent to Paris. He then proceeds to warn him to be on his guard
against M. de Bois-le-Comte. "Keep well with him," he says, "but it is
well that you should know he is one of the most artful, cunning and
intriguing of the French diplomatists." (F.O. Switzerland 92).
[941] C. Greville, _Journals_ (2), I. p. 364 (note).
[942] F.O. Switzerland 94, Peel to Palmerston, November 6, 1847.
[943] _Correspondence relating to the affairs of Switzerland_,
Palmerston to S. Canning, November 27, December 1, 1847.
[944] _Correspondence relating to the affairs of Switzerland_, Hervey
to Palmerston, December 3, 1847.
[945] _Ibid._, Peel to Palmerston, December 7, 1847; Canning to
Palmerston, December 8, 11, 1847.
[946] _Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy_, Minto to
Palmerston, October 29, 1847
[947] _Ibid._, Minto to Palmerston, October 5, November 9, 1847.
[948] _Ibid._, Metternich to Diedrichstein, December 14, 1847.
[949] Metternich, _Mémoires_, VII. p. 476.
[950] Metternich, _Mémoires_, VII. pp. 513-530.
[951] As a result of the conference at Laybach in 1821 Austria
received a mandate to intervene at Naples and to abolish the
constitution wrung from Ferdinand. The congress of Verona in 1822
preceded a French intervention in Spain for the purpose of restoring
the absolute rule of Ferdinand VII.
[952] Thureau-Dangin, _La Monarchie de Juillet_, VII. p. 210.
[953] Guizot, _Mémoires_, VIII. pp. 513-515. Metternich, _Mémoires_,
VII. pp. 563, 564.
[954] Notably the trial and conviction of MM. Teste and de Cubières,
ex-ministers, for fraud in connection with a mining concession and the
murder of the Duchesse de Choiseuil-Praslin by her husband. The Duke,
a peer of France, took poison in prison. The Duchess was the daughter
of Marshal Sébastiani.
[955] F.O. France 781 Normanby to Palmerston, July 30, 1847 (private
and confidential).
[956] Stockmar, _Memoirs_, II. p. 203.
[957] F.O. France 781, Normanby to Palmerston, July 30, 1847 (private
and confidential).
[958] E. Regnault, _Histoire de huit ans_, III. pp. 308-309.
Thureau-Dangin, _La Monarchie de Juillet_, VII. pp. 232-294.
[959] F.O. France 700, Cowley to Aberdeen, December 23, 1844 (private
and confidential). C. Greville, _Journals_ (2), II. p. 267.
[960] L. Fagan, _Life of Sir A. Panizzi_, I. pp. 253-254.
[961] _Letters of Queen Victoria_, Palmerston to Melbourne, December
26, 1845.
[962] C. Greville, _Journals_ (2), III. p. 40, also pp. 16-49.
[963] L. Fagan, _Life of Sir A. Panizzi_, I. pp. 208-248.
[964] E. Regnault, _Histoire de huit ans_, III. pp. 190-198.
[965] Thureau-Dangin, _La Monarchie de Juillet_, VII. pp. 115-148.
[966] E. Regnault, _Histoire de huit ans_, III. p. 304.
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