| By Author | [ A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z | Other Symbols ] |
| By Title | [ A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z | Other Symbols ] |
| By Language |
|
Download this book: [ ASCII ] Look for this book on Amazon Tweet |
Title: Fancies versus Fads
Author: Chesterton, G. K. (Gilbert Keith)
Language: English
As this book started as an ASCII text book there are no pictures available.
*** Start of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Fancies versus Fads" ***
FANCIES VERSUS FADS
BY THE SAME AUTHOR
CHARLES DICKENS
ALL THINGS CONSIDERED
TREMENDOUS TRIFLES
ALARMS AND DISCURSIONS
A MISCELLANY OF MEN
THE BALLAD OF THE WHITE HORSE
WINE, WATER, AND SONG
THE FLYING INN
A SHILLING FOR MY THOUGHTS
THE USES OF DIVERSITY
FANCIES VERSUS
FADS
BY
G. K. CHESTERTON
METHUEN & CO. LTD.
36 ESSEX STREET W.C.
LONDON
_First Published in 1923_
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
INTRODUCTION
I have strung these things together on a slight enough thread; but as
the things themselves are slight, it is possible that the thread (and
the metaphor) may manage to hang together. These notes range over very
variegated topics and in many cases were made at very different times.
They concern all sorts of things from lady barristers to cave-men, and
from psycho-analysis to free verse. Yet they have this amount of unity
in their wandering, that they all imply that it is only a more
traditional spirit that is truly able to wander. The wild theorists of
our time are quite unable to wander. When they talk of making new roads,
they are only making new ruts. Each of them is necessarily imprisoned in
his own curious cosmos; in other words, he is limited by the very
largeness of his own generalization. The explanations of the Marxian
must not go outside economics; and the student of Freud is forbidden to
forget sex. To see only the fanciful side of these serious sects may
seem a very frivolous pleasure; and I will not dispute that these are
very frivolous criticisms. I only submit that this frivolity is the last
lingering form of freedom.
In short, the note of these notes, so to speak, is that it is only from
a normal standpoint that all the nonsense of the world takes on
something of the wild interest of wonderland. I mean it is only in the
mirror of a very moderate sense and sanity, which is all I have ever
claimed to possess, that even insanities can appear as images clear
enough to appeal to the imagination. After all, the ordinary orthodox
person is he to whom the heresies can appear as fantasies. After all, it
is we ordinary human and humdrum people who can enjoy eccentricity as a
sort of elfland; while the eccentrics are too serious even to know that
they are elves. When a man tells us that he disapproves of children
being told fairy-tales, it is we who can perceive that he is himself a
fairy. He himself has not the least idea of it. When he says he would
discourage children from playing with tin soldiers, because it is
militarism, it is we and not he who can enjoy in fancy the fantastic
possibilities of his idea. It is we who suddenly think of children
playing with little tin figures of philanthropists, rather round and
with tin top-hats; the little tin gods of our commercial religion. It is
we who develop his imaginative idea for him, by suggesting little leaden
dolls of Conscientious Objectors in fixed attitudes of refined
repugnance; or a whole regiment of tiny Quakers with little grey coats
and white flags. He would never have thought of any of these substitutes
for himself; his negation is purely negative. Or when an educational
philosopher tells us that the child should have complete equality with
the adult, he cannot really carry his idea any farther without our
assistance. It will be from us and not from him that the natural
suggestion will come; that the baby should take its turn and carry the
mother, the moment the mother is tired of carrying the baby. He will
not, when left to himself, call up the poetical picture of the child
wheeling a double perambulator with the father and mother at each end.
He has no motive to look for lively logical developments; for him the
assimilation of parent and child is simply a platitude; and an
inevitable part of his own rather platitudinous philosophy. It is we and
not he who can behold the whole vista and vanishing perspective of his
own opinions; and work out what he really means. It is only those who
have ordinary views who have extraordinary visions.
There is indeed nothing very extraordinary about these visions, except
the extraordinary people who have provoked some of them. They are only a
very sketchy sort of sketches of some of the strange things that may be
found in the modern world. But however inadequate be the example, it is
none the less true that this is the sound principle behind much better
examples; and that, in those great things as in these small ones, sanity
was the condition of satire. It is because Gulliver is a man of moderate
stature that he can stray into the land of the giants and the land of
the pygmies. It is Swift and not the professors of Laputa who sees the
real romance of getting sunbeams out of cucumbers. It would be less than
exact to call Swift a sunbeam in the house; but if he did not himself
get much sunshine out of cucumbers, at least he let daylight into
professors. It was not the mad Swift but the sane Swift who made that
story so wild. The truth is more self-evident in men who were more sane.
It is the good sense of Rabelais that makes him seem to grin like a
gargoyle; and it is in a sense because Dickens was a Philistine that he
saw the land so full of strange gods. These idle journalistic jottings
have nothing in common with such standards of real literature, except
the principle involved; but the principle is the right one.
But while these are frivolous essays, pretending only to touch on topics
and theories they cannot exhaustively examine, I have added some that
may not seem to fit so easily even into so slight a scheme.
Nevertheless, they are in some sense connected with it. I have opened
with an essay on rhyme, because it is a type of the sort of tradition
which the anti-traditionalists now attack; and I have ended with one
called “Milton and Merry England,” because I feel that many may
misunderstand my case against the new Puritans, if they have no notion
of how I should attempt to meet the more accepted case in favour of the
old Puritans. Both these articles appeared originally in the “London
Mercury,” and I desire to express my thanks to Mr. J. C. Squire for his
kind permission to reprint them. But, in the latter case, I had the
further feeling that I wished to express somewhere the historical
sentiment that underlies the whole; the conviction that there did and
does exist a more normal and national England, which we once inhabited
and to which we may yet return; and which is not a Utopia but a home. I
have therefore thought it worth while to write this line of introduction
to show that such a scrap-book is not entirely scrappy; and that even to
touch such things lightly we need something like a test. It is necessary
to have in hand a truth to judge modern philosophies rapidly; and it is
necessary to judge them very rapidly to judge them before they
disappear.
G. K. C.
CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION v
THE ROMANCE OF RHYME 1
HAMLET AND THE PSYCHO-ANALYST 20
THE MEANING OF MOCK TURKEY 35
SHAKESPEARE AND THE LEGAL LADY 46
ON BEING AN OLD BEAN 55
THE FEAR OF THE FILM 61
WINGS AND THE HOUSEMAID 68
THE SLAVERY OF FREE VERSE 74
PROHIBITION AND THE PRESS 80
THE MERCY OF MR. ARNOLD BENNETT 86
A DEFENCE OF DRAMATIC UNITIES 93
THE BOREDOM OF BUTTERFLIES 99
THE TERROR OF A TOY 105
FALSE THEORY AND THE THEATRE 111
THE SECRET SOCIETY OF MANKIND 117
THE SENTIMENTALISM OF DIVORCE 124
STREET CRIES AND STRETCHING THE LAW 130
THE REVOLT OF THE SPOILT CHILD 136
THE INNOCENCE OF THE CRIMINAL 142
THE PRUDERY OF THE FEMINISTS 149
HOW MAD LAWS ARE MADE 155
THE PAGODA OF PROGRESS 161
THE MYTH OF THE “MAYFLOWER” 166
MUCH TOO MODERN HISTORY 173
THE EVOLUTION OF SLAVES 179
IS DARWIN DEAD? 186
TURNING INSIDE OUT 193
STRIKES AND THE SPIRIT OF WONDER 205
A NOTE ON OLD NONSENSE 212
MILTON AND MERRY ENGLAND 219
FANCIES VERSUS FADS
The Romance of Rhyme
The poet in the comic opera, it will be remembered (I hope), claimed for
his æsthetic authority that “Hey diddle diddle will rank as an idyll, if
I pronounce it chaste.” In face of a satire which still survives the
fashion it satirized, it may require some moral courage seriously to
pronounce it chaste, or to suggest that the nursery rhyme in question
has really some of the qualities of an idyll. Of its chastity, in the
vulgar sense, there need be little dispute, despite the scandal of the
elopement of the dish with the spoon, which would seem as free from
grossness as the loves of the triangles. And though the incident of the
cow may have something of the moonstruck ecstasy of Endymion, that also
has a silvery coldness about it worthy of the wilder aspects of Diana.
The truth more seriously tenable is that this nursery rhyme is a
complete and compact model of the nursery short story. The cow jumping
over the moon fulfils to perfection the two essentials of such a story
for children. It makes an effect that is fantastic out of objects that
are familiar; and it makes a picture that is at once incredible and
unmistakable. But it is yet more tenable, and here more to the point,
that this nursery rhyme is emphatically a rhyme. Both the lilt and the
jingle are just right for their purpose, and are worth whole libraries
of elaborate literary verse for children. And the best proof of its
vitality is that the satirist himself has unconsciously echoed the
jingle even in making the joke. The metre of that nineteenth-century
satire is the metre of the nursery rhyme. “Hey diddle diddle, the cat
and the fiddle” and “Hey diddle diddle will rank as an idyll” are
obviously both dancing to the same ancient tune; and that by no means
the tune the old cow died of, but the more exhilarating air to which she
jumped over the moon.
The whole history of the thing called rhyme can be found between those
two things: the simple pleasure of rhyming “diddle” to “fiddle,” and the
more sophisticated pleasure of rhyming “diddle” to “idyll.” Now the
fatal mistake about poetry, and more than half of the fatal mistake
about humanity, consists in forgetting that we should have the first
kind of pleasure as well as the second. It might be said that we should
have the first pleasure as the basis of the second; or yet more truly,
the first pleasure inside the second. The fatal metaphor of progress,
which means leaving things behind us, has utterly obscured the real idea
of growth, which means leaving things inside us. The heart of the tree
remains the same, however many rings are added to it; and a man cannot
leave his heart behind by running hard with his legs. In the core of all
culture are the things that may be said, in every sense, to be learned
by heart. In the innermost part of all poetry is the nursery rhyme, the
nonsense that is too happy even to care about being nonsensical. It may
lead on to the more elaborate nonsense of the Gilbertian line, or even
the far less poetic nonsense of some of the Browningesque rhymes. But
the true enjoyment of poetry is always in having the simple pleasure as
well as the subtle pleasure. Indeed it is on this primary point that so
many of our artistic and other reforms seem to go wrong. What is the
matter with the modern world is that it is trying to get simplicity in
everything except the soul. Where the soul really has simplicity it can
be grateful for anything--even complexity. Many peasants have to be
vegetarians, and their ordinary life is really a simple life. But the
peasants do not despise a good dinner when they can get it; they wolf it
down with enthusiasm, because they have not only the simple life but the
simple spirit. And it is so with the modern modes of art which revert,
very rightly, to what is “primitive.” But their moral mistake is that
they try to combine the ruggedness that should belong to simplicity with
a superciliousness that should only belong to satiety. The last Futurist
draughtsmanship, for instance, evidently has the aim of drawing a tree
as it might be drawn by a child of ten. I think the new artists would
admit it; nor do I merely sneer at it. I am willing to admit, especially
for the sake of argument, that there is a truth of philosophy and
psychology in this attempt to attain the clarity even through the
crudity of childhood. In this sense I can see what a man is driving at
when he draws a tree merely as a stick with smaller sticks standing out
of it. He may be trying to trace in black and white or grey a primeval
and almost prenatal illumination; that it is very remarkable that a
stick should exist, and still more remarkable that a stick should stick
up or stick out. He may be similarly enchanted with his own stick of
charcoal or grey chalk; he may be enraptured, as a child is, with the
mere fact that it makes a mark on the paper--a highly poetic fact in
itself. But the child does not despise the real tree for being different
from his drawing of the tree. He does not despise Uncle Humphrey because
that talented amateur can really draw a tree. He does not think less of
the real sticks because they are live sticks, and can grow and branch
and curve in a way uncommon in walking-sticks. Because he has a single
eye he can enjoy a double pleasure. This distinction, which seems
strangely neglected, may be traced again in the drama and most other
domains of art. Reformers insist that the audiences of simpler ages were
content with bare boards or rudimentary scenery if they could hear
Sophocles or Shakespeare talking a language of the gods. They were very
properly contented with plain boards. But they were not discontented
with pageants. The people who appreciated Antony’s oration as such would
have appreciated Aladdin’s palace as such. They did not think gilding
and spangles substitutes for poetry and philosophy, because they are
not. But they did think gilding and spangles great and admirable gifts
of God, because they are.
But the application of this distinction here is to the case of rhyme in
poetry. And the application of it is that we should never be ashamed of
enjoying a thing as a rhyme as well as enjoying it as a poem. And I
think the modern poets who try to escape from the rhyming pleasure, in
pursuit of a freer poetical pleasure, are making the same fundamentally
fallacious attempt to combine simplicity with superiority. Such a poet
is like a child who could take no pleasure in a tree because it looked
like a tree, or a playgoer who could take no pleasure in the Forest of
Arden because it looked like a forest. It is not impossible to find a
sort of prig who professes that he could listen to literature in any
scenery, but strongly objects to good scenery. And in poetical criticism
and creation there has also appeared the prig who insists that any new
poem must avoid the sort of melody that makes the beauty of any old
song. Poets must put away childish things, including the child’s
pleasure in the mere sing-song of irrational rhyme. It may be hinted
that when poets put away childish things they will put away poetry. But
it may be well to say a word in further justification of rhyme as well
as poetry, in the child as well as the poet. Now, the neglect of this
nursery instinct would be a blunder, even if it were merely an animal
instinct or an automatic instinct. If a rhyme were to a man merely what
a bark is to a dog, or a crow to a cock, it would be clear that such
natural things cannot be merely neglected. It is clear that a canine
epic, about Argus instead of Ulysses, would have a beat ultimately
consisting of barks. It is clear that a long poem like “Chantecler,”
written by a real cock, would be to the tune of Cock-a-doodle-doo. But
in truth the nursery rhyme has a nobler origin; if it be ancestral it is
not animal; its principle is a primary one, not only in the body but in
the soul.
Milton prefaced “Paradise Lost” with a ponderous condemnation of rhyme.
And perhaps the finest and even the most familiar line in the whole of
“Paradise Lost” is really a glorification of rhyme. “Seasons return, but
not to me return,” is not only an echo that has all the ring of rhyme in
its form, but it happens to contain nearly all the philosophy of rhyme
in its spirit. The wonderful word “return” has, not only in its sound
but in its sense, a hint of the whole secret of song. It is not merely
that its very form is a fine example of a certain quality in English,
somewhat similar to that which Mrs. Meynell admirably analysed in one of
her last beautiful essays, in the case of words like “unforgiven.” It is
that it describes poetry itself, not only in a mechanical but a moral
sense. Song is not only a recurrence, it is a return. It does not
merely, like the child in the nursery, take pleasure in seeing the
wheels go round. It also wishes to go back as well as round; to go back
to the nursery where such pleasures are found. Or to vary the metaphor
slightly, it does not merely rejoice in the rotation of a wheel on the
road, as if it were a fixed wheel in the air. It is not only the wheel
but the wagon that is returning. That labouring caravan is always
travelling towards some camping-ground that it has lost and cannot find
again. No lover of poetry needs to be told that all poems are full of
that noise of returning wheels; and none more than the poems of Milton
himself. The whole truth is obvious, not merely in the poem, but even in
the two words of the title. All poems might be bound in one book under
the title of “Paradise Lost.” And the only object of writing “Paradise
Lost” is to turn it, if only by a magic and momentary illusion, into
“Paradise Regained.”
It is in this deeper significance of return that we must seek for the
peculiar power in the recurrence we call rhyme. It would be easy enough
to reply to Milton’s strictures on rhyme in the spirit of a sensible if
superficial liberality by saying that it takes all sorts to make a
world, and especially the world of the poets. It is evident enough that
Milton might have been right to dispense with rhyme without being right
to despise it. It is obvious that the peculiar dignity of his religious
epic would have been weakened if it had been a rhymed epic, beginning:--
Of man’s first disobedience and the fruit
Of that forbidden tree whose mortal root.
But it is equally obvious that Milton himself would not have tripped on
the light fantastic toe with quite so much charm and cheerfulness in the
lines:--
But come thou Goddess fair and free
In heaven yclept Euphrosyne
if the goddess had been yclept something else, as, for the sake of
argument, Syrinx. Milton in his more reasonable moods would have allowed
rhyme in theory a place in all poetry, as he allowed it in practice in
his own poetry. But he would certainly have said at this time, and
possibly at all times, that he allowed it an inferior place, or at least
a secondary place. But is its place secondary; and is it in any sense
inferior?
The romance of rhyme does not consist merely in the pleasure of a
jingle, though this is a pleasure of which no man should be ashamed.
Certainly most men take pleasure in it, whether or not they are ashamed
of it. We see it in the older fashion of prolonging the chorus of a song
with syllables like “rumty tumty” or “tooral looral.” We see it in the
similar but later fashion of discussing whether a truth is objective or
subjective, or whether a reform is constructive or destructive, or
whether an argument is deductive or inductive: all bearing witness to a
very natural love for those nursery rhyme recurrences which make a sort
of song without words, or at least without any kind of intellectual
significance. But something much deeper is involved in the love of rhyme
as distinct from other poetic forms, something which is perhaps too deep
and subtle to be described. The nearest approximation to the truth I can
think of is something like this: that while all forms of genuine verse
recur, there is in rhyme a sense of return to exactly the same place.
All modes of song go forward and backward like the tides of the sea; but
in the great sea of Homeric or Virgilian hexameters, the sea that
carried the labouring ships of Ulysses and Æneas, the thunder of the
breakers is rhythmic, but the margin of the foam is necessarily
irregular and vague. In rhyme there is rather a sense of water poured
safely into one familiar well, or (to use a nobler metaphor) of ale
poured safely into one familiar flagon. The armies of Homer and Virgil
advance and retreat over a vast country, and suggest vast and very
profound sentiments about it, about whether it is their own country or
only a strange country. But when the old nameless ballad boldly rhymes
“the bonny ivy tree” to “my ain countree” the vision at once dwindles
and sharpens to a very vivid image of a single soldier passing under the
ivy that darkens his own door. Rhythm deals with similarity, but rhyme
with identity. Now in the one word identity are involved perhaps the
deepest and certainly the dearest human things. He who is home-sick does
not desire houses or even homes. He who is love-sick does not want to
see all the women with whom he might have fallen in love. Only he who is
sea-sick, perhaps, may be said to have a cosmopolitan craving for all
lands or any kind of land. And this is probably why sea-sickness, like
cosmopolitanism, has never yet been a high inspiration to song.
Songs, especially the most poignant of them, generally refer to some
absolute, to some positive place or person for whom no similarity is a
substitute. In such a case all approximation is merely asymptotic. The
prodigal returns to his father’s house and not the house next door,
unless he is still an imperfectly sober prodigal. The lover desires his
lady and not her twin sister, except in old complications of romance.
And even the spiritualist is generally looking for a ghost and not
merely for ghosts. I think the intolerable torture of spiritualism must
be a doubt about identity. Anyhow, it will generally be found that where
this call for the identical has been uttered most ringingly and
unmistakably in literature, it has been uttered in rhyme. Another
purpose for which this pointed and definite form is very much fitted is
the expression of dogma, as distinct from doubt or even opinion. This is
why, with all allowance for a decline in the most classical effects of
the classical tongue, the rhymed Latin of the mediæval hymns does
express what it had to express in a very poignant poetical manner, as
compared with the reverent agnosticism so nobly uttered in the rolling
unrhymed metres of the ancients. For even if we regard the matter of the
mediæval verses as a dream, it was at least a vivid dream, a dream full
of faces, a dream of love and of lost things. And something of the same
spirit runs in a vaguer way through proverbs and phrases that are not
exactly religious, but rather in a rude sense philosophical, but which
all move with the burden of returning; things to be felt only in
familiar fragments ... _on revient toujours_ ... it’s the old story ...
it’s love that makes the world go round; and all roads lead to Rome: we
might almost say that all roads lead to Rhyme.
Milton’s revolt against rhyme must be read in the light of history.
Milton is the Renascence frozen into a Puritan form; the beginning of a
period which was in a sense classic, but was in a still more definite
sense aristocratic. There the Classicist was the artistic aristocrat
because the Calvinist was the spiritual aristocrat. The seventeenth
century was intensely individualistic; it had both in the noble and the
ignoble sense a respect for persons. It had no respect whatever for
popular traditions; and it was in the midst of its purely logical and
legal excitement that most of the popular traditions died. The
Parliament appeared and the people disappeared. The arts were put under
patrons, where they had once been under patron saints. The English
schools and colleges at once strengthened and narrowed the New Learning,
making it something rather peculiar to one country and one class. A few
men talked a great deal of good Latin, where all men had once talked a
little bad Latin. But they talked even the good Latin so that no
Latinist in the world could understand them. They confined all study of
the classics to that of the most classical period, and grossly
exaggerated the barbarity and barrenness of patristic Greek or mediæval
Latin. It is as if a man said that because the English translation of
the Bible is perhaps the best English in the world, therefore Addison
and Pater and Newman are not worth reading. We can imagine what men in
such a mood would have said of the rude rhymed hexameters of the monks;
and it is not unnatural that they should have felt a reaction against
rhyme itself. For the history of rhyme is the history of something
else, very vast and sometimes invisible, certainly somewhat indefinable,
against which they were in aristocratic rebellion.
That thing is difficult to define in impartial modern terms. It might
well be called Romance, and that even in a more technical sense, since
it corresponds to the rise of the Romance languages as distinct from the
Roman language. It might more truly be called Religion, for historically
it was the gradual re-emergence of Europe through the Dark Ages, because
it still had one religion, though no longer one rule. It was, in short,
the creation of Christendom. It may be called Legend, for it is true
that the most overpowering presence in it is that of omni-present and
powerful popular Legend; so that things that may never have happened,
or, as some say, could never have happened, are nevertheless rooted in
our racial memory like things that have happened to ourselves. The whole
Arthurian Cycle, for instance, seems something more real than reality.
If the faces in that darkness of the Dark Ages, Lancelot and Arthur and
Merlin and Modred, are indeed faces in a dream, they are like faces in a
real dream: a dream in a bed and not a dream in a book. Subconsciously
at least, I should be much less surprised if Arthur was to come again
than I should be if the Superman were to come at all. Again, the thing
might be called Gossip: a noble name, having in it the name of God and
one of the most generous and genial of the relations of men. For I
suppose there has seldom been a time when such a mass of culture and
good traditions of craft and song have been handed down orally, by one
universal buzz of conversation, through centuries of ignorance down to
centuries of greater knowledge. Education must have been an eternal
_viva voce_ examination; but the men passed their examination. At least
they went out in such rude sense masters of art as to create the Song of
Roland and the round Roman arches that carry the weight of so many
Gothic towers. Finally, of course, it can be called ignorance,
barbarism, black superstition, a reaction towards obscurantism and old
night; and such a view is eminently complete and satisfactory, only that
it leaves behind it a sort of weak wonder as to why the very youngest
poets do still go on writing poems about the sword of Arthur and the
horn of Roland.
All this was but the beginning of a process which has two great points
of interest. The first is the way in which the mediæval movement did
rebuild the old Roman civilization; the other was the way in which it
did not. A strange interest attaches to the things which had never
existed in the pagan culture and did appear in the Christian culture. I
think it is true of most of them that they had a quality that can very
approximately be described as popular, or perhaps as vulgar, as indeed
we still talk of the languages which at that time liberated themselves
from Latin as the vulgar tongues. And to many Classicists these things
would appear to be vulgar in a more vulgar sense. They were vulgar in
the sense of being vivid almost to excess, of making a very direct and
unsophisticated appeal to the emotions. The first law of heraldry was to
wear the heart upon the sleeve. Such mediævalism was the reverse of mere
mysticism, in the sense of mere mystery; it might more truly be
described as sensationalism. One of these things, for instance, was a
hot and even an impatient love of colour. It learned to paint before it
could draw, and could afford the twopence coloured long before it could
manage the penny plain. It culminated at last, of course, in the energy
and gaiety of the Gothic; but even the richness of Gothic rested on a
certain psychological simplicity. We can contrast it with the classic by
noting its popular passion for telling a story in stone. We may admit
that a Doric portico is a poem, but no one would describe it as an
anecdote. The time was to come when much of the imagery of the
cathedrals was to be lost; but it would have mattered the less that it
was defaced by its enemies if it had not been already neglected by its
friends. It would have mattered less if the whole tide of taste among
the rich had not turned against the old popular masterpieces. The
Puritans defaced them, but the Cavaliers did not truly defend them. The
Cavaliers were also aristocrats of the new classical culture, and used
the word Gothic in the sense of barbaric. For the benefit of the
Teutonists we may note in parenthesis that, if this phrase meant that
Gothic was despised, it also meant that the Goths were despised. But
when the Cavaliers came back, after the Puritan interregnum, they
restored not in the style of Pugin but in the style of Wren. The very
thing we call the Restoration, which was the restoration of King
Charles, was also the restoration of St. Paul’s. And it was a very
modern restoration.
So far we might say that simple people do not like simple things. This
is certainly true if we compare the classic with these highly coloured
things of mediævalism, or all the vivid visions which first began to
glow in the night of the Dark Ages. Now one of these things was the
romantic expedient called rhyme. And even in this, if we compare the
two, we shall see something of the same paradox by which the simple like
complexities and the complex like simplicities. The ignorant liked rich
carvings and melodious and often ingenious rhymes. The learned liked
bare walls and blank verse. But in the case of rhyme it is peculiarly
difficult to define the double and yet very definite truth. It is
difficult to define the sense in which rhyme is artificial and the sense
in which it is simple. In truth it is simple because it is artificial.
It is an artifice of the kind enjoyed by children and other poetic
people; it is a toy. As a technical accomplishment it stands at the same
distance from the popular experience as the old popular sports. Like
swimming, like dancing, like drawing the bow, anybody can do it, but
nobody can do it without taking the trouble to do it; and only a few can
do it very well. In a hundred ways it was akin to that simple and even
humble energy that made all the lost glory of the guilds. Thus their
rhyme was useful as well as ornamental. It was not merely a melody but
also a mnemonic; just as their towers were not merely trophies but
beacons and belfries. In another aspect rhyme is akin to rhetoric, but
of a very positive and emphatic sort: the coincidence of sound giving
the effect of saying, “It is certainly so.” Shakespeare realized this
when he rounded off a fierce or romantic scene with a rhymed couplet. I
know that some critics do not like this, but I think there is a moment
when a drama ought to become a melodrama. Then there is a much older
effect of rhyme that can only be called mystical, which may seem the
very opposite of the utilitarian, and almost equally remote from the
rhetorical. Yet it shares with the former the tough texture of something
not easily forgotten, and with the latter the touch of authority which
is the aim of all oratory. The thing I mean may be found in the fact
that so many of the old proverbial prophecies, from Merlin to Mother
Shipton, were handed down in rhyme. It can be found in the very name of
Thomas the Rhymer.
But the simplest way of putting this popular quality is in a single
word: it is a song. Rhyme corresponds to a melody so simple that it goes
straight like an arrow to the heart. It corresponds to a chorus so
familiar and obvious that all men can join in it. I am not disturbed by
the suggestion that such an arrow of song, when it hits the heart, may
entirely miss the head. I am not concerned to deny that the chorus may
sometimes be a drunken chorus, in which men have lost their heads to
find their tongues. I am not defending but defining; I am trying to find
words for a large but elusive distinction between certain things that
are certainly poetry and certain other things which are also song. Of
course it is only an accident that Horace opens his greatest series of
odes by saying that he detests the profane populace and wishes to drive
them from his temple of poetry. But it is the sort of accident that is
almost an allegory. There is even a sense in which it has a practical
side. When all is said, _could_ a whole crowd of men sing the “Descende
Cœlo,” that noble ode, as a crowd can certainly sing the “Dies Irae,” or
for that matter “Down among the Dead Men”? Did Horace himself sing the
Horatian odes in the sense in which Shakespeare could sing, or could
hardly help singing, the Shakespearean songs? I do not know, having no
kind of scholarship on these points. But I do not feel that it could
have been at all the same thing; and my only purpose is to attempt a
rude description of that thing. Rhyme is consonant to the particular
kind of song that can be a popular song, whether pathetic or passionate
or comic; and Milton is entitled to his true distinction; nobody is
likely to sing “Paradise Lost” as if it were a song of that kind. I have
tried to suggest my sympathy with rhyme, in terms true enough to be
accepted by the other side as expressing their antipathy for it. I have
admitted that rhyme is a toy and even a trick, of the sort that delights
children. I have admitted that every rhyme is a nursery rhyme. What I
will never admit is that anyone who is too big for the nursery is big
enough for the Kingdom of God, though the God were only Apollo.
A good critic should be like God in the great saying of a Scottish
mystic. George Macdonald said that God was easy to please and hard to
satisfy. That paradox is the poise of all good artistic appreciation.
Without the first part of the paradox appreciation perishes, because it
loses the power to appreciate. Good criticism, I repeat, combines the
subtle pleasure in a thing being done well with the simple pleasure in
it being done at all. It combines the pleasure of the scientific
engineer in seeing how the wheels work together to a logical end with
the pleasure of the baby in seeing the wheels go round. It combines the
pleasure of the artistic draughtsman in the fact that his lines of
charcoal, light and apparently loose, fall exactly right and in a
perfect relation with the pleasure of the child in the fact that the
charcoal makes marks of any kind on the paper. And in the same fashion
it combines the critic’s pleasure in a poem with the child’s pleasure in
a rhyme. The historical point about this kind of poetry, the rhymed
romantic kind, is that it rose out of the Dark Ages with the whole of
this huge popular power behind it, the human love of a song, a riddle, a
proverb, a pun or a nursery rhyme; the sing-song of innumerable
children’s games, the chorus of a thousand campfires and a thousand
taverns. When poetry loses its link with all these people who are easily
pleased it loses all its power of giving pleasure. When a poet looks
down on a rhyme it is, I will not say as if he looked down on a daisy
(which might seem possible to the more literal-minded), but rather as if
he looked down on a lark because he had been up in a balloon. It is
cutting away the very roots of poetry; it is revolting against nature
because it is natural, against sunshine because it is bright, or
mountains because they are high, or moonrise because it is mysterious.
The freezing process began after the Reformation with a fastidious
search for finer yet freer forms; to-day it has ended in formlessness.
But the joke of it is that even when it is formless it is still
fastidious. The new anarchic artists are not ready to accept everything.
They are not ready to accept anything except anarchy. Unless it observes
the very latest conventions of unconventionality, they would rule out
anything classic as coldly as any classic ever ruled out anything
romantic. But the classic was a form; and there was even a time when it
was a new form. The men who invented Sapphics did invent a new metre;
the introduction of Elizabethan blank verse was a real revolution in
literary form. But _vers libre_, or nine-tenths of it, is not a new
metre any more than sleeping in a ditch is a new school of architecture.
It is no more a revolution in literary form than eating meat raw is an
innovation in cookery. It is not even original, because it is not
creative; the artist does not invent anything, but only abolishes
something. But the only point about it that is to my present purpose is
expressed in the word “pride.” It is not merely proud in the sense of
being exultant, but proud in the sense of being disdainful. Such outlaws
are more exclusive than aristocrats; and their anarchical arrogance goes
far beyond the pride of Milton and the aristocrats of the New Learning.
And this final refinement has completed the work which the saner
aristocrats began, the work now most evident in the world: the
separation of art from the people. I need not insist on the sensational
and self-evident character of that separation. I need not recommend the
modern poet to attempt to sing his _vers libres_ in a public house. I
need not even urge the young Imagist to read out a number of his
disconnected Images to a public meeting. The thing is not only admitted
but admired. The old artist remained proud in spite of his unpopularity;
the new artist is proud because of his unpopularity; perhaps it is his
chief ground for pride.
Dwelling as I do in the Dark Ages, or at latest among the mediæval
fairy-tales, I am yet moved to remember something I once read in a
modern fairy-tale. As it happens, I have already used the name of George
Macdonald; and in the best of his books there is a description of how a
young miner in the mountains could always drive away the subterranean
goblins if he could remember and repeat any kind of rhyme. The impromptu
rhymes were often doggerel, as was the dog-Latin of many monkish
hexameters or the burden of many rude Border ballads. But I have a
notion that they drove away the devils, blue devils of pessimism and
black devils of pride. Anyhow Madame Montessori, who has apparently
been deploring the educational effects of fairy-tales, would probably
see in me a pitiable example of such early perversion, for that image
which was one of my first impressions seems likely enough to be one of
my last; and when the noise of many new and original musical
instruments, with strange shapes and still stranger noises, has passed
away like a procession, I shall hear in the succeeding silence only a
rustle and scramble among the rocks and a boy singing on the mountain.
Hamlet and the Psycho-Analyst
This morning, for a long stretch of hours before breakfast, and even as
it were merging into breakfast, and almost overlapping breakfast, I was
engaged in scientific researches in the great new department of
psycho-analysis. Every journalist knows by this time that
psycho-analysis largely depends on the study of dreams. But in order to
study our dreams it is necessary to dream; and in order to dream it is
necessary to sleep. So, while others threw away the golden hours in
lighter and less learned occupations, while ignorant and superstitious
peasants were already digging in their ignorant and superstitious
kitchen-gardens, to produce their ignorant and superstitious beans and
potatoes, while priests were performing their pious mummeries and poets
composing lyrics on listening to the skylark--I myself was pioneering
hundreds of years ahead of this benighted century; ruthlessly and
progressively probing into all the various horrible nightmares, from
which a happier future will take its oracles and its commandments. I
will not describe my dreams in detail; I am not quite so ruthless a
psychologist as all that. And indeed it strikes me as possible that the
new psychologist will be rather a bore at breakfast. My dream was
something about wandering in some sort of catacombs under the Albert
Hall, and it involved eating jumbles (a brown flexible cake now almost
gone from us, like so many glories of England) and also arguing with a
Theosophist. I cannot fit this in very well with Freud and his theory of
suppressed impulses. For I swear I never in my life suppressed the
impulse to eat a jumble or to argue with a Theosophist. And as for
wandering about in the Albert Hall, nobody could ever have had an
impulse to do that.
When I came down to breakfast I looked at the morning paper; not (as you
humorously suggest) at the evening paper. I had not pursued my
scientific studies quite so earnestly as that. I looked at the morning
paper, as I say, and found it contained a good deal about
Psycho-Analysis, indeed it explained almost everything about
Psycho-Analysis except what it was. This was naturally a thing which
newspapers would present in a rather fragmentary fashion; and I fitted
the fragments together as best I could. Apparently the dreams were
merely symbols; and apparently symbols of something very savage and
horrible which remained a secret. This seems to me a highly unscientific
use of the word symbol. A symbol is not a disguise but rather a display;
the best expression of something that cannot otherwise be expressed.
Eating a jumble may mean that I wished to bite off my father’s nose (the
mother-complex being strong on me); but it does not seem to show much
symbolic talent. The Albert Hall may imply the murder of an uncle; but
it hardly makes itself very clear. And we do not seem to be getting much
nearer the truth by dreaming, if we hide things by night more completely
than we repress them by day. Anyhow, the murdered uncle reminds me of
Hamlet, of whom more anon; at the moment I am merely remarking that my
newspaper was a little vague; and I was all the more relieved to open my
“London Mercury” and find an article on the subject by so able and
suggestive a writer as Mr. J. D. Beresford.
Mr. J. D. Beresford practically asked himself whether he should become a
psycho-analyst or continue to be a novelist. It will readily be
understood that he did not put it precisely in these words; he would
probably put psycho-analysis higher, and very possibly his own fiction
lower; for men of genius are often innocent enough of their own genuine
originality. That is a form of the unconscious mind with which none of
us will quarrel. But I have no desire to watch a man of genius tying
himself in knots, and perhaps dying in agony, in the attempt to be
conscious of his own unconsciousness. I have seen too many unfortunate
sceptics thus committing suicide by self-contradiction. Haeckel and his
Determinists, in my youth, bullied us all about the urgent necessity of
choosing a philosophy which would prove the impossibility of choosing
anything. No doubt the new psychology will somehow enable us to know
what we are doing, about all that we do without knowing it. These things
come and go, and pass through their phases in order, from the time when
they are as experimental as Freudism to the time when they are as
exploded as Darwinism. But I never can understand men allowing things so
visibly fugitive to hide things that are visibly permanent, like morals
and religion and (what is in question here) the art of letters. _Ars
longa, scientia brevis._
Anyhow, as has been said, psycho-analysis depends in practice upon the
interpretation of dreams. I do not know whether making masses of people,
chiefly children, confess their dreams, would lead to a great output of
literature; though it would certainly lead, if I know anything of human
nature, to a glorious output of lies. There is something touching in the
inhuman innocence of the psychologist, who is already talking of the
scientific exactitude of results reached by the one particular sort of
evidence that cannot conceivably be checked or tested in any way
whatever. But, as Mr. Beresford truly says, the general notion of
finding signs in dreams is as old as the world; but even the special
theory of it is older than many seem to suppose. Indeed, it is not only
old, but obvious; and was never discovered, because it was always
noticed. Long before the present fashion I myself (who, heaven knows, am
no psychologist) remember saying that as there is truth in all popular
traditions, there is truth in the popular saying that dreams go by the
rule of contraries. That is, that a man does often think at night about
the very things he does not think by day. But the popular saying had in
it a certain virtue never found in the anti-popular sciences of our day.
Popular superstition has one enormous element of sanity; it is never
serious. We talk of ages like the mediæval as the ages of faith; but it
would be quite as true a tribute to call them the ages of doubt; of a
healthy doubt, and even a healthy derision. There was always something
more or less consciously grotesque about an old ghost story. There was
fun mixed with the fear; and the yokels knew too much about turnips not
occasionally to think of turnip-ghosts. There is no fun about
psycho-analysis. One yokel would say, “Ar, they do say dreams go by
contraries.” And then the others would say “Ar,” and they would all
laugh in a deep internal fashion. But when Mr. J. D. Beresford says that
Freud’s theory is among scientific theories the most attractive for
novelists, “it was a theory of sex, the all but universal theme of the
novel,” it is clear that our audience is slower and more solemn than the
yokels. For nobody laughs at all. People seem to have lost the power of
reacting to the humorous stimulus. When one milkmaid dreamed of a
funeral, the other milkmaid said, “That means a wedding,” and then they
would both giggle. But when Mr. J. D. Beresford says that the theory
“adumbrated the suggestion of a freer morality, by dwelling upon the
physical and spiritual necessity for the liberation of impulse,” the
point seems somehow to be missed. Not a single giggle is heard in the
deep and disappointing silence. It seems truly strange that when a
modern and brilliant artist actually provides jokes far more truly
humorous than the rude jests of the yokels and the milkmaids, the finer
effort should meet with the feebler response. It is but an example of
the unnatural solemnity, like an artificial vacuum, in which all these
modern experiments are conducted. But no doubt if Freud had enjoyed the
opportunity of explaining his ideas in an ancient ale-house, they would
have met with more spontaneous applause.
I hope I do not seem unsympathetic with Mr. Beresford; for I not only
admire his talent, but I am at this moment acting in strict obedience to
his theories. I am--I say it proudly--acting as a disciple of Freud, who
apparently forbids me to conceal any impulse, presumably including the
impulse to laugh. I mean no disrespect to Mr. Beresford; but my first
duty, of course, is to my own psychological inside. And goodness knows
what damage might not be done to the most delicate workings of my own
mental apparatus (as Mr. Arnold Bennett called it) if I were to subject
it to the sudden and violent strain of not smiling at the scientific
theory which is attractive because it is sexual, or of forcing my
features into a frightful composure when I hear of the spiritual
necessity for the liberation of impulse. I am not quite sure how far the
liberation of impulse is to be carried out in practice by its exponents
in theory; I do not know whether it is better to liberate the impulse to
throw somebody else out of an express train in order to have the
carriage to oneself all the way; or what may be the penalties for
repressing the native instinct to shoot Mr. Lloyd George. But obviously
the greater includes the less; and it would be very illogical if we were
allowed to chuck out our fellow-traveller but not to chaff him; or if I
were permitted to shoot at Mr. George but not to smile at Mr. Beresford.
And though I am not so serious as he is, I assure him that in this I am
quite as sincere as he is. In that sense I do seriously regret his
seriousness; I do seriously think such seriousness a very serious evil.
For some healthy human impulses are really the better for the relief by
words and gestures, and one of them is the universal human sense that
there is something comic about the relations of the sexes. The impulse
to laugh at the mention of morality as “free” or of sex science as
“attractive” is one of the impulses which is already gratified by most
people who have never heard of psycho-analysis and is only mortified by
people like the psycho-analysts.
Mr. Beresford must therefore excuse me if, with a sincere desire to
follow his serious argument seriously, I note at the beginning a certain
normal element of comedy of which critics of his school seem to be
rather unconscious. When he asks whether this theory of the nemesis of
suppression can serve the purposes of great literary work, it would seem
natural at first to test it by the example of the greatest literary
works. And, judged by this scientific test, it must be admitted that our
literary classics would appear to fail. Lady Macbeth does not suffer as
a sleep-walker because she has resisted the impulse to murder Duncan,
but rather (by some curious trick of thought) because she has yielded to
it. Hamlet’s uncle is in a morbid frame of mind, not, as one would
naturally expect, because he had thwarted his own development by leaving
his own brother alive and in possession; but actually because he has
triumphantly liberated himself from the morbid impulse to pour poison in
his brother’s ear. On the theory of psycho-analysis, as expounded, a man
ought to be haunted by the ghosts of all the men he has not murdered.
Even if they were limited to those he has felt a vague fancy for
murdering, they might make a respectable crowd to follow at his heels.
Yet Shakespeare certainly seems to represent Macbeth as haunted by
Banquo, whom he removed at one blow from the light of the sun and from
his own subconsciousness. Hell ought to mean the regret for lost
opportunities for crime; the insupportable thought of houses still
standing unburned or unburgled, or of wealthy uncles still walking about
alive with their projecting watch-chains. Yet Dante certainly seemed to
represent it as concerned exclusively with things done and done with,
and not as merely the morbidly congested imagination of a thief who had
not thieved and a murderer who had not murdered. In short, it is only
too apparent that the poets and sages of the past knew very little of
psycho-analysis, and whether or no Mr. Beresford can achieve great
literary effects with it, they managed to achieve their literary effects
without it. This is but a preliminary point, and I shall touch the more
serious problem in a few minutes, if the fashion has not changed before
then. For the moment I only take the test of literary experience, and of
how independent of such theories have been the real masterpieces of man.
Men are still excited over the poetic parts of poets like Shakespeare
and Dante; if they go to sleep it is over the scientific parts. It is
over some system of the spheres which Dante thought the very latest
astronomy, or some argument about the humours of the body which
Shakespeare thought the very latest physiology. I appeal to Mr.
Beresford’s indestructible sense of humanity and his still undestroyed
sense of humour. What would have become of the work of Dickens if it had
been rewritten to illustrate the thesis of Darwin? What even of the work
of Mr. Kipling if modified to meet the theories of Mr. Kidd? Believe me,
the proportions are as I have said. Art is long, but science is
fleeting; and Mr. Beresford’s subconsciousness, though stout and brave,
is in danger of being not so much a muffled drum as a drum which
somebody silences for ever; by knocking a hole in it, only to find
nothing inside. But there is one incidental moral in the matter that
seems to me topical and rather arresting. It concerns the idea of
punishment. The psycho-analysts continue to buzz in a mysterious manner
round the problem of Hamlet. They are especially interested in the
things of which Hamlet was unconscious, not to mention the things of
which Shakespeare was unconscious. It is in vain for old-fashioned
rationalists like myself to point out that this is like dissecting the
brain of Puck or revealing the real private life of Punch and Judy. The
discussion no longer revolves round whether Hamlet is mad, but whether
everybody is mad, especially the experts investigating the madness. And
the curious thing about this process is that even when the critics are
really subtle enough to see subtle things, they are never simple enough
to see self-evident things. A really fine critic is reported as arguing
that in Hamlet the consciousness willed one thing and the
subconsciousness another. Apparently the conscious Hamlet had
unreservedly embraced and even welcomed the obligation of vengeance, but
the shock (we are told) had rendered the whole subject painful, and
started a strange and secret aversion to the scheme. It did not seem to
occur to the writers that there might possibly be something slightly
painful, at the best, in cutting the throat of your own uncle and the
husband of your own mother. There might certainly be an aversion from
the act; but I do not quite see why it should be an unconscious
aversion. It seems just possible that a man might be quite conscious of
not liking such a job. Where he differed from the modern morality was
that he believed in the possibility of disliking it and yet doing it.
But to follow the argument of these critics, one would think that
murdering the head of one’s family was a sort of family festivity or
family joke; a gay and innocent indulgence into which the young prince
would naturally have thrown himself with thoughtless exuberance, were it
not for the dark and secretive thoughts that had given him an
unaccountable distaste for it. Suppose it were borne in upon one of
these modern middle-class critics, of my own rank and routine of life
(possibly through his confidence in the messages at a Spiritualist
séance) that it was his business to go home to Brompton or Surbiton and
stick the carving-knife into Uncle William, who had poisoned somebody
and was beyond the reach of the law. It is possible that the critic’s
first thought would be that it was a happy way of spending a
half-holiday; and that only in the critic’s subconsciousness the
suspicion would stir that there was something unhappy about the whole
business. But it seems also possible that the regret might not be
confined to his subconsciousness, but might swim almost to the surface
of his consciousness. In plain words, this sort of criticism has lost
the last rags of common sense. Hamlet requires no such subconscious
explanation, for he explains himself, and was perhaps rather too fond of
doing so. He was a man to whom duty had come in a very dreadful and
repulsive form, and to a man not fitted for that form of duty. There was
a conflict, but he was conscious of it from beginning to end. He was not
an unconscious person; but a far too conscious one.
Strangely enough, this theory of subconscious repulsion in the dramatic
character is itself an example of subconscious repulsion in the modern
critic. It is the critic who has a sort of subliminal prejudice which
makes him avoid something, that seems very simple to others. The thing
which he secretly and obscurely avoids, from the start, is the very
simple fact of the morality in which Shakespeare did believe, as
distinct from all the crude psychology in which he almost certainly did
not believe. Shakespeare certainly did believe in the struggle between
duty and inclination. The critic instinctively avoids the admission that
Hamlet’s was a struggle between duty and inclination; and tries to
substitute a struggle between consciousness and subconsciousness. He
gives Hamlet a complex to avoid giving him a conscience. But he is
actually forced to talk as if it was a man’s natural inclination to kill
an uncle, because he does not want to admit that it might be his duty to
kill him. He is really driven to talking as if some dark and secretive
monomania alone prevented us all from killing our uncles. He is driven
to this because he will not even take seriously the simple and, if you
will, primitive morality upon which the tragedy is built. For that
morality involves three moral propositions, from which the whole of the
morbid modern subconsciousness does really recoil as from an ugly jar of
pain. These principles are: first, that it may be our main business to
do the right thing, even when we detest doing it; second, that the right
thing may involve punishing some person, especially some powerful
person; third, that the just process of punishment may take the form of
fighting and killing. The modern critic is prejudiced against the first
principle and calls it asceticism; he is prejudiced against the second
principle and calls it vindictiveness; he is prejudiced against the
third and generally calls it militarism. That it actually might be the
duty of a young man to risk his own life, much against his own
inclination, by drawing a sword and killing a tyrant, that is an idea
instinctively avoided by this particular mood of modern times. That is
why tyrants have such a good time in modern times. And in order to avoid
this plain and obvious meaning, of war as a duty and peace as a
temptation, the critic has to turn the whole play upside down, and seek
its meaning in modern notions so remote as to be in this connexion
meaningless. He has to make William Shakespeare of Stratford one of the
pupils of Professor Freud. He has to make him a champion of
psycho-analysis, which is like making him a champion of vaccination. He
has to fit Hamlet’s soul somehow into the classifications of Freud and
Jung; which is just as if he had to fit Hamlet’s father into the
classifications of Sir Oliver Lodge and Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. He has
to interpret the whole thing by a new morality that Shakespeare had
never heard of, because he has an intense internal dislike of the old
morality that Shakespeare could not help hearing of. And that morality,
which some of us believe to be based on a much more realistic
psychology, is that punishment as punishment is a perfectly healthy
process, not merely because it is reform, but also because it is
expiation. What the modern world means by proposing to substitute pity
for punishment is really very simple. It is that the modern world dare
not punish those who are punishable, but only those who are pitiable. It
would never touch anyone so important as King Claudius--or Kaiser
William.
Now this truth is highly topical just now. The point about Hamlet was
that he wavered, very excusably, in something that had to be done; and
this is the point quite apart from whether we ourselves would have done
it. That was pointed out long ago by Browning in “The Statue and the
Bust.” He argued that even if the motive for acting was bad, the motive
for not acting was worse. And an action or inaction is judged by its
real motive, not by whether somebody else might have done the same thing
from a better motive. Whether or no the tyrannicide of Hamlet was a
duty, it was accepted as a duty and it was shirked as a duty. And that
is precisely true of a tyrannicide like that for which everybody
clamoured at the conclusion of the Great War. It may have been right or
wrong to punish the Kaiser; it was certainly even more right to punish
the German generals and admirals for their atrocities. But even if it
was wrong, it was not abandoned because it was wrong. It was abandoned
because it was troublesome. It was abandoned for all those motives of
weakness and mutability of mood which we associate with the name of
Hamlet. It might be glory or ignominy to shed the blood of imperial
enemies, but it is certainly ignominy to shout for what you dare not
shed; “to fall a-cursing like a common drab, a scullion.” Granted that
we had no better motives than we had then or have now, it would
certainly have been more dignified if we had fatted all the region-kites
with this slave’s offal. The motive is the only moral test. A saint
might provide us with a higher motive for forgiving the War-Lords who
butchered Fryatt and Edith Cavell. But we have not forgiven the
War-Lords. We have simply forgotten the War. We have not pardoned like
Christ; we have only procrastinated like Hamlet. Our highest motive has
been laziness; our commonest motive has been money. In this respect
indeed I must apologize to the charming and chivalrous Prince of Denmark
for comparing him, even on a single point, with the princes of finance
and the professional politicians of our time. At least Hamlet did not
spare Claudius solely because he hoped to get money out of him for the
salaries of the Players, or meant to do a deal with him about wine
supplied to Elsinore or debts contracted at Wittenburg. Still less was
Hamlet acting entirely in the interests of Shylock, an inhabitant of the
distant city of Venice. Doubtless Hamlet was sent to England in order
that he might develop further these higher motives for peace and pardon.
“’Twill not be noticed in him there; there the men are as mad as he.”
It is therefore very natural that men should be trying to dissolve the
moral problem of Hamlet into the unmoral elements of consciousness and
unconsciousness. The sort of duty that Hamlet shirked is exactly the
sort of duty that we are all shirking; that of dethroning injustice and
vindicating truth. Many are now in a mood to deny that it is a duty
because it is a danger. This applies, of course, not only to
international but internal and especially industrial matters. Capitalism
was allowed to grow into a towering tyranny in England because the
English were always putting off their popular revolution, just as the
Prince of Denmark put off his palace revolution. They lectured the
French about their love of bloody revolutions, exactly as they are now
lecturing the French about their love of bloody wars. But the patience
which suffered England to be turned into a plutocracy was not the
patience of the saints; it was that patience which paralysed the noble
prince of the tragedy; _accidia_ and the great refusal. In any case,
the vital point is that by refusing to punish the powerful we soon lost
the very idea of punishment; and turned our police into a mere
persecution of the poor.
The Meaning of Mock Turkey
Having lately taken part in a pageant of Nursery Rhymes, in the
character of Old King Cole, I meditated not so much on the glorious past
of the great kingdom of Colchester, as on the more doubtful future of
Nursery Rhymes. The Modern Movements cannot produce a nursery rhyme; it
is one of the many such things they cannot even be conceived as doing.
But if they cannot create the nursery rhyme, will they destroy it? The
new poets have already abolished rhyme; and presumably the new
educationalists will soon abolish nurseries. Or if they do not destroy,
will they reform; which is worse? Nursery rhymes are a positive network
of notions and allusions of which the enlightened disapprove. To take
only my own allotted rhyme as an example, some might think the very
mention of a king a piece of reactionary royalism, inconsistent with
that democratic self-determination we all enjoy under some five
Controllers and a committee of the Cabinet. Perhaps in the amended
version he will be called President Cole. Probably he will be confused
with Mr. G. D. H. Cole, the first President of the Guild Socialistic
Republic. With the greatest admiration for Mr. Cole, I cannot quite
picture him as so festive a figure; and I incline to think that the
same influences will probably eliminate the festivity. It is said that
America, having already abolished the bowl, is now attempting to abolish
the pipe. After that it might very reasonably go on to abolish the
fiddlers; for music can be far more maddening than wine. Tolstoy, the
only consistent prophet of the Simple Life, did really go on to denounce
music as a mere drug. Anyhow, it is quite intolerable that the innocent
minds of children should be poisoned with the idea of anybody calling
for his pipe and his bowl. There will have to be some other version,
such as: “He called for his milk and he called for his lozenge,” or
whatever form of bodily pleasure is still permitted to mankind. This
particular verse will evidently have to be altered a great deal; it is
founded on so antiquated a philosophy, that I fear even the alteration
will not be easy or complete. I am not sure, for instance, that there is
not a memory of animism and spiritism in the very word “soul,” used in
calling the monarch a merry old soul. It would seem that some other
simple phrase, such as “a merry old organism,” might be used with
advantage. Indeed it would have more advantages than one; for if the
reader will say the amended line in a flowing and lyrical manner, he
cannot but observe that the experiment has burst the fetters of formal
metre, and achieved one of these larger and lovelier melodies that we
associate with _vers libre_.
It is needless to note the numberless other examples of nursery rhymes
to which the same criticism applies. Some of the other cases are even
more shocking to the true scientific spirit. For instance, in the
typically old-world rhyme of “Girls and boys come out to play,” there
appear the truly appalling words: “Leave your supper and leave your
sleep.” As the great medical reformer of our day observed, in a striking
and immortal phrase, “All Eugenists are agreed upon the importance of
sleep.” The case of supper may be more complex and controversial. If the
supper were a really hygienic and wholesome supper, it might not be so
difficult to leave it. But it is obvious that the whole vision which the
rhyme calls up is utterly imcompatible with a wise educational
supervision. It is a wild vision of children playing in the streets by
moonlight, for all the world as if they were fairies. Moonlight, like
music, is credited with a power of upsetting the reason; and it is at
least obvious that the indulgence is both unseasonable and unreasonable.
No scientific reformer desires hasty and destructive action; for his
reform is founded on that evolution which has produced the anthropoid
from the amoeba, a process which none have ever stigmatized as hasty.
But when the eugenist recalls the reckless and romantic love affairs
encouraged by such moonlight, he will have to consider seriously the
problem of abolishing the moon.
But indeed I have much more sympathy with the simplicity of the baby who
cries for the moon than with the sort of simplicity that dismisses the
moon as all moonshine. And in truth I think that these two antagonistic
types of simplicity are perhaps the pivotal terms of the present
transition. It is a new thing called the Simple Life against an older
thing which may be called the Simple Soul; possibly exemplified, so far
as nursery rhymes are concerned, by the incident of Simple Simon. I
prefer the old Simple Simon, who, though ignorant of the economic
theory of exchange, had at least a positive and poetic enthusiasm for
pies. I think him far wiser than the new Simple Simon, who simplifies
his existence by means of a perverse and pedantic antipathy to pies. It
is unnecessary to add that this philosophy of pies is applicable with
peculiar force to mince-pies; and thus to the whole of the Christmas
tradition which descended from the first carols to the imaginative world
of Dickens. The morality of that tradition is much too simple and
obvious to be understood to-day. Awful as it may seem to many modern
people, it means no less than that Simple Simon should have his pies,
even in the absence of his pennies.
But the philosophy of the two Simple Simons is plain enough. The former
is an expansion of simplicity towards complexity; Simon, conscious that
he cannot himself make pies, approaches them with an ardour not unmixed
with awe. But the latter is a reaction of complexity towards simplicity;
in other words, the other Simon refuses pies for various reasons, often
including the fact that he has eaten too many of them. Most of the
Simple Life as we see it to-day is, of course, a thing having this
character of the surfeit or satiety of Simon, when he has become less
simple and certainly less greedy. This reaction may take two diverse
forms; it may send Simon searching for more and more expensive and
extravagant confectionery, or it may reduce him to nibbling at some new
kind of nut biscuit. For it may be noted, in passing, that it probably
will not reduce him to eating dry bread. The Simple Life never accepts
anything that is simple in the sense of self-evident and familiar. The
thing must be uncommonly simple; it must not be simply common. Its
philosophy must be something higher than the ordinary breakfast table,
and something drier than dry bread. The usual process, as I have
observed it in vegetarian and other summaries, seems in one sense indeed
to be simple enough. The pie-man produces what looks like the same sort
of pie, or is supposed to look like it; only it has thinner crust
outside and nothing at all inside. Then instead of asking Simple Simon
for a penny he asks him for a pound, or possibly a guinea or a
five-pound note. And what is strangest of all, the customer is often so
singularly Simple a Simon that he pays for it. For that is perhaps the
final and most marked difference between Simon of the Simple Spirit and
Simon of the Simple Life. It is the fact that the ardent and
appreciative Simon was not in possession of a penny. The more refined
and exalted Simon is generally in possession of far too many pennies. He
is often very rich and needs to be; for the drier and thinner and
emptier are the pies, the more he is charged for them. But this alone
will reveal another side of the same paradox; and if it be possible to
spend a lot of money on the Simple Life, it is also possible to make a
great deal of money out of it. There are several self-advertisers doing
very well out of the new self-denial. But wealth is always at one end of
it or the other; and that is the great difference between the two
Simons. Perhaps it is the difference between Simon Peter and Simon
Magus.
I have before me a little pamphlet in which the most precise directions
are given for a Mock Turkey, for a vegetarian mince-pie, and for a
cautious and hygienic Christmas pudding. I have never quite understood
why it should be a part of the Simple Life to have anything so deceptive
and almost conspiratorial as an imitation turkey. The coarse and comic
alderman may be expected, in his festive ribaldry, to mock a turtle; but
surely a lean and earnest humanitarian ought not to mock a turkey. Nor
do I understand the theory of the imitation in its relation to the
ideal. Surely one who thinks meat-eating mere cannibalism ought not to
arrange vegetables so as to look like an animal. It is as if a converted
cannibal in the Sandwich Islands were to arrange joints of meat in the
shape of a missionary. The missionaries would surely regard the
proceedings of their convert with something less than approval, and
perhaps with something akin to alarm. But the consistency of these
concessions I will leave on one side, because I am not here concerned
with the concessions but with the creed itself. And I am concerned with
the creed not merely as affecting its practice in diet or cookery but
its general theory. For the compilers of the little book before me are
great on philosophy and ethics. There are whole pages about brotherhood
and fellowship and happiness and healing. In short, as the writer
observes, we have “also some Mental Helps, as set forth in the flood of
Psychology Literature to-day--but raised to a higher plane.” It may be a
little risky to set a thing forth in a flood, or a little difficult to
raise a flood to a higher plane; but there is behind these rather vague
expressions a very real modern intelligence and point of view, common to
considerable numbers of cultivated people, and well worthy of some
further study.
Under the title of “How to Think” there are twenty-four rules of which
the first few are: “Empty Your Mind,” “Think of the Best Things,”
“Appreciate,” “Analyse,” “Prepare Physically,” “Prepare Mentally,” and
so on. I have met some earnest students of this school, who had
apparently entered on this course, but at the time of our meeting had
only graduated so far as the fulfilment of the first rule. It was more
obvious, on the whole, that they had succeeded in the preliminary
process of emptying the mind than that they had as yet thought of the
best things, or analysed or appreciated anything in particular. But
there were others, I willingly admit, who had really thought of certain
things in a genuinely thoughtful fashion, though whether they were
really the best things might involve a difference of opinion between us.
Still, so far as they are concerned, it is a school of thought, and
therefore worth thinking about. Having been able to this extent to
appreciate, I will now attempt to analyse. I have attempted to discover
in my own mind where the difference between us really lies, apart from
all these superficial jests and journalistic points; to ask myself why
it is exactly that their ideal vegetarian differs so much from my ideal
Christian. And the result of the concentrated contemplation of their
ideal is, I confess, a somewhat impatient forward plunge in the progress
of my initiation. I am strongly disposed to “Prepare Physically” for a
conflict with the ideal vegetarian, with the holy hope of hitting him on
the nose. In one of Mr. P. G. Wodehouse’s stories the vegetarian rebukes
his enemy for threatening to skin him, by reminding him that man should
only think beautiful thoughts; to which the enemy gives the unanswerable
answer: “Skinning you is a beautiful thought.” In the same way I am
quite prepared to think of the best things; but I think hitting the
ideal vegetarian on the nose would be one of the best things in the
world. This may be an extreme example; but it involves a much more
serious principle. What such philosophers often forget is that among the
best things in the world are the very things which their placid
universalism forbids; and that there is nothing better or more beautiful
than a noble hatred. I do not profess to feel it for them; but they
themselves do not seem to feel it for anything.
But as my new idealistic instructor tells me to analyse, I will attempt
to analyse. In the ordinary way it would perhaps be enough to say that I
do not like his ideals, and that I prefer my own, as I should say I did
not like the taste of nut cutlet so much as the taste of veal cutlet.
But just as it is possible to resolve the food into formulæ about
proteids, so it is partly possible to resolve the religious preference
into formulæ about principles. The most we can hope to do is to find out
which of these principles are the first principles. And in this
connexion I should like to speak a little more seriously, and even a
little more respectfully, of the formula about emptying the mind. I do
not deny that it is sometimes a good thing to empty the mind of the mere
accumulation of secondary and tertiary impressions. If what is meant is
something which a friend of mine once called “a mental spring clean,”
then I can see what it means. But the most drastic spring clean in a
house does not generally wash away the house. It does not tear down the
roof like a cobweb, or pluck up the walls like weeds. And the true
formula is not so much to empty the mind as to discover that we cannot
empty the mind, by emptying it as much as we can. In other words, we
always come back to certain fundamentals which are convictions, because
we can hardly even conceive their contraries. But it is the paradox of
human language that though these truths are, in a manner past all
parallel, hard and clear, yet any attempt to talk about them always has
the appearance of being hazy and elusive.
Now this antagonism, when thus analysed, seems to me to arise from one
ultimate thing at the back of the minds of these men; that they believe
in taking the body seriously. The body is a sort of pagan god, though
the pagans are more often stoics than epicureans. To begin with, it is
itself a beginning. The body, if not the creator of the soul in heaven,
is regarded as the practical producer of it on earth. In this their
materialism is the very foundation of their asceticism. They wish us to
consume clean fruit and clear water that our minds may be clear or our
lives clean. The body is a sort of magical factory where these things go
in as vegetables and come out as virtues. Thus digestion has the first
sign of a deity; that of being an origin. It has the next sign of a
deity; that if it is satisfied other things do not matter, or at any
rate other things follow in their place. And so, they would say, the
services of the body should be serious and not grotesque; and its
smallest hints should be taken as terrible warnings. Art has a place in
it because the body must be draped like an altar; and science is
paraded in it because the service must be in Latin or Greek or something
hieratic tongue. I quite understand these things surrounding a god or an
altar; but I do not happen to worship at that altar or to believe in
that god. I do not think the body ought to be taken seriously; I think
it is far safer and saner when it is taken comically and even coarsely.
And I think that when the body is given a holiday, as it is in a great
feast, I think it should be set free not merely for wisdom but for
folly, not merely to dance but to turn head over heels. In short, when
it is really allowed to exaggerate its own pleasures, it ought also to
exaggerate its own absurdity. The body has its own rank, and its own
rights, and its own place under government; but the body is not the King
but rather the Court Jester. And the human and historical importance of
the old jests and buffooneries of Christmas, however vulgar or stale or
trivial they appear, is that in them the popular instinct always
resisted this pagan solemnity about sensual things. A man was meant to
feel rather a goose when he was eating goose; and to realize that he is
such stuff as stuffing is made of. That is why anyone who has in these
things the touch of the comic will also have the taste for the
conservative; he will be unwilling to alter what that popular instinct
has made in its own absurd image. He will be doubtful about a Christmas
pudding moulded in the shape of the Pyramid or the Parthenon, or
anything that is not as round and ridiculous as the world. And when Mr.
Pickwick, as round and ridiculous as any Christmas pudding or any world
worth living in, stood straddling and smiling under the mistletoe, he
disinfected that vegetable of its ancient and almost vegetarian sadness
and heathenism, of the blood of Baldur and the human sacrifice of the
Druids.
Shakespeare and the Legal Lady
I wonder how long liberated woman will endure the invidious ban which
excludes her from being a hangman. Or rather, to speak with more
exactitude, a hangwoman. The very fact that there seems something
vaguely unfamiliar and awkward about the word, is but a proof of the
ages of sex oppression that have accustomed us to this sex privilege.
The ambition would not perhaps have been understood by the prudish and
sentimental heroines of Fanny Burney and Jane Austen. But it is now
agreed that the farther we go beyond these faded proprieties the better;
and I really do not see how we could go farther. There are always
torturers of course; who will probably return under some scientific
name. Obscurantists may use the old argument, that woman has never risen
to the first rank in this or other arts; that Jack Ketch was not Jemima
Ketch, and that the headsman was called Samson and not Delilah. And they
will be overwhelmed with the old retort: that until we have hundreds of
healthy women happily engaged in this healthful occupation, it will be
impossible to judge whether they can rise above the average or no.
Tearful sentimentalists may feel something unpleasing, something faintly
repugnant, about the new feminine trade. But, as the indignant
policewoman said the other day, when a magistrate excluded some of her
sex and service from revolting revelations, “crime is a disease,” and
must be studied scientifically, however hideous it may be. Death also is
a disease; and frequently a fatal one. Experiments must be made in it;
and it must be inflicted in any form, however hideous, in a cool and
scientific manner.
It is not true, of course, that crime is a disease. It is criminology
that is a disease. But the suggestion about the painful duties of a
policewoman leads naturally to my deduction about the painful duties of
a hangwoman. And I make it in the faint hope of waking up some of the
feminists, that they may at least be moved to wonder what they are
doing, and to attempt to find out. What they are not doing is obvious
enough. They are not asking themselves two perfectly plain questions;
first, whether they want anybody to be a hangman; and second, whether
they want everybody to be a hangman. They simply assume, with panting
impetuosity, that we want everybody to be everything, criminologists,
constables, barristers, executioners, torturers. It never seems to occur
to them that some of us doubt the beauty and blessedness of these
things, and are rather glad to limit them like other necessary evils.
And this applies especially to the doubtful though defensible case of
the advocate.
There is one phrase perpetually repeated and now practically
stereotyped, which to my mind concentrates and sums up all the very
worst qualities in the very worst journalism; all its paralysis of
thought, all its monotony of chatter, all its sham culture and shoddy
picturesqueness, all its perpetual readiness to cover any vulgarity of
the present with any sentimentalism about the past. There is one phrase
that does measure to how low an ebb the mind of my unfortunate
profession can sink. It is the habit of perpetually calling any of the
new lady barristers “Portia.”
First of all, of course, it is quite clear that the journalist does not
know who Portia was. If he has ever heard of the story of the “Merchant
of Venice,” he has managed to miss the only point of the story. Suppose
a man had been so instructed in the story of “As You Like It” that he
remained under the impression that Rosalind really was a boy, and was
the brother of Celia. We should say that the plot of the comedy had
reached his mind in a rather confused form. Suppose a man had seen a
whole performance of the play of “Twelfth Night” without discovering the
fact that the page called Cesario was really a girl called Viola. We
should say that he had succeeded in seeing the play without exactly
seeing the point. But there is exactly the same blind stupidity in
calling a barrister Portia; or even in calling Portia a barrister. It
misses in exactly the same sense the whole meaning of the scene. Portia
is no more a barrister than Rosalind is a boy. She is no more the
learned jurist whom Shylock congratulates than Viola is the adventurous
page whom Olivia loves. The whole point of her position is that she is a
heroic and magnanimous fraud. She has not taken up the legal profession,
or any profession; she has not sought that public duty, or any public
duty. Her action, from first to last, is wholly and entirely private.
Her motives are not professional but private. Her ideal is not public
but private. She acts as much on personal grounds in the Trial Scene as
she does in the Casket Scene. She acts in order to save a friend, and
especially a friend of the husband whom she loves. Anything less like
the attitude of an advocate, for good or evil, could not be conceived.
She seeks individually to save an individual; and in order to do so is
ready to _break_ all the existing laws of the profession and the public
tribunal; to assume lawlessly powers she has not got, to intrude where
she would never be legally admitted, to pretend to be somebody else, to
dress up as a man; to do what is actually a crime against the law. This
is not what is now called the attitude of a public woman; it is
certainly not the attitude of a lady lawyer, any more than of any other
kind of lawyer. But it is emphatically the attitude of a private woman;
that much more ancient and much more powerful thing.
Suppose that Portia had really become an advocate, merely by advocating
the cause of Antonio against Shylock. The first thing that follows is
that, as like as not, she would be briefed in the next case to advocate
the cause of Shylock against Antonio. She would, in the ordinary way of
business, have to help Shylock to punish with ruin the private
extravagances of Gratiano. She would have to assist Shylock to distrain
on poor Launcelot Gobbo and sell up all his miserable sticks. She might
well be employed by him to ruin the happiness of Lorenzo and Jessica, by
urging some obsolete parental power or some technical flaw in the
marriage service. Shylock evidently had a great admiration for her
forensic talents; and indeed that sort of lucid and detached admission
of the talents of a successful opponent is a very Jewish
characteristic. There seems no reason why he should not have employed
her regularly, whenever he wanted some one to recover ruthless interest,
to ruin needy households, to drive towards theft or suicide the souls of
desperate men. But there seems every reason to doubt whether the Portia
whom Shakespeare describes for us is likely to have taken on the job.
Anyhow, that is the job; and I am not here arguing that it is not a
necessary job; or that it is always an indefensible job. Many honourable
men have made an arguable case for the advocate who has to support
Shylock, and men much worse than Shylock. But that is the job; and to
cover up its ugly realities with a loose literary quotation that really
refers to the exact opposite, is one of those crawling and cowardly
evasions and verbal fictions which make all this sort of servile
journalism so useless for every worthy or working purpose. If we wish to
consider whether a lady should be a barrister, we should consider sanely
and clearly what a barrister is and what a lady is; and then come to our
conclusion according to what we consider worthy or worthless in the
traditions of the two things. But the spirit of advertisement, which
tries to associate soap with sunlight or grapenuts with grapes, calls to
its rescue an old romance of Venice and tries to cover up a practical
problem in the robes of a romantic heroine of the stage. This is the
sort of confusion that really leads to corruption. In one sense it would
matter very little that the legal profession was formally open to women,
for it is only a very exceptional sort of woman who would see herself as
a vision of beauty in the character of Mr. Sergeant Buzfuz. And most
girls are more likely to be stage-struck, and want to be the real Portia
on the stage, rather than law-struck and want to be the very reverse of
Portia in a law court. For that matter, it would make relatively little
difference if formal permission were given to a woman to be a hangman or
a torturer. Very few women would have a taste for it; and very few men
would have a taste for the women who had a taste for it. But
advertisement, by its use of the vulgar picturesque, can hide the
realities of this professional problem, as it can hide the realities of
tinned meats and patent medicines. It can conceal the fact that the
hangman exists to hang, and that the torturer exists to torture.
Similarly it can conceal the fact that the Buzfuz barrister exists to
bully. It can hide from the innocent female aspirants outside even the
perils and potential abuses that would be admitted by the honest male
advocate inside. And that is part of a very much larger problem, which
extends beyond this particular profession to a great many other
professions; and not least to the lowest and most lucrative of all
modern professions; that of professional politics.
I wonder how many people are still duped by the story of the extension
of the franchise. I wonder how many Radicals have been a little
mystified, in remarking how many Tories and reactionaries have helped in
the extension of the franchise. The truth is that calling in crowds of
new voters will very often be to the interest, not only of Tories, but
of really tyrannical Tories. It will often be in the interest of the
guilty to appeal to the innocent; if they are innocent in the matter of
other people’s conduct as well as of their own. The tyrant calls in
those he has not wronged, to defend him against those he has wronged. He
is not afraid of the new and ignorant masses who know too little; he is
afraid of the older and nearer nucleus of those who know too much. And
there is nothing that would please the professional politician more than
to flood the constituencies with innocent negroes or remote Chinamen,
who might possibly admire him more, because they knew him less. I should
not wonder if the Party System had been saved three or four times at the
point of extinction, by the introduction of new voters who had never had
time to discover why it deserved to be extinguished. The last of these
rescues by an inrush of dupes was the enfranchisement of women.
What is true of the political is equally true of the professional
ambition. Much of the mere imitation of masculine tricks and trades is
indeed trivial enough; it is a mere masquerade. The greatest of Roman
satirists noted that in his day the more fast of the fashionable ladies
liked to fight as gladiators in the amphitheatre. In that one statement
he pinned and killed, like moths on a cork, a host of women prophets and
women pioneers and large-minded liberators of their sex in modern
England and America. But besides these more showy she-gladiators there
are also multitudes of worthy and sincere women who take the new (or
rather old) professions seriously. The only disadvantage is that in many
of those professions they can only continue to be serious by ceasing to
be sincere. But the simplicity with which they first set out is an
enormous support to old and complex and corrupt institutions. No modest
person setting out to learn an elaborate science can be expected to
start with the assumption that it is not worth learning. The young lady
will naturally begin to learn Law as gravely as she begins to learn
Greek. It is not in that mood that she will conceive independent doubts
about the ultimate relations of Law and Justice. Just as the
Suffragettes are already complaining that the realism of industrial
revolution interferes with their new hobby of voting, so the lady
lawyers are quite likely to complain that the realism of legal reformers
interferes with their new hobby of legalism. We are suffering in every
department from the same cross-purposes that can be seen in the case of
any vulgar patent medicine. In Law and Medicine, we have the thing
advertised in the public press instead of analysed by the public
authority. What we want is not the journalistic Portia but the
theatrical Portia; who is also the real Portia. We do not want the woman
who will enter the law court with the solemn sense of a lasting
vocation. We want a Portia; a woman who will enter it as lightly, and
leave it as gladly as she did.
The same thing is true of a fact nobler than any fiction; the story, so
often quoted, of the woman who won back mediæval France. Joan of Arc was
a soldier; but she was not a normal soldier. If she had been, she would
have been vowed, not to the war for France, but to any war with
Flanders, Spain or the Italian cities to which her feudal lord might
lead her. If she were a modern conscript, she would be bound to obey
orders not always coming from St. Michael. But the point is here that
merely making all women soldiers, under either system, could do nothing
at all except whitewash and ratify feudalism or conscription. And both
feudalism and conscription are much more magnanimous things than our
modern system of police and prisons.
In fact there are few sillier implications than that in the phrase that
what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. A cook who really
rules a kitchen on that principle would wait patiently for milk from the
bull, because he got it from the cow. It is neither a perceptible fact
nor a first principle that the sexes must not specialize; and if one sex
must specialize in adopting dubious occupations, we ought to be very
glad that the other sex specializes in abstaining from them. That is how
the balance of criticism in the commonwealth is maintained; as by a sort
of government and opposition. In this, as in other things, the new
regime is that everybody shall join the government. The government of
the moment will be monstrously strengthened; for everybody will be a
tyrant and everybody will be a slave. The detached criticism of official
fashions will disappear; and none was ever so detached as the deadly
criticism that came from women. When all women wear uniforms, all women
will wear gags; for a gag is part of every uniform in the world.
On Being an Old Bean
I was looking at some press cuttings that had pursued me down to a
remote cottage beside a river of Norfolk; and as it happened, those that
caught my eye were mostly not from the vulgar monopolist press, but from
all sorts of quieter and even more studious publications. But what
struck me as curious about the collection as a whole was the selection,
among half a hundred things that were hardly worth saying, of the things
that were considered worth repeating. There seemed to be a most
disproportionate importance attached to a trivial phrase I had used
about the alleged indecorum of a gentleman calling his father an old
bean. I had been asked to join in a discussion in the “Morning Post,”
touching the alleged disrespect of youth towards age, and I had done so;
chiefly because I have a respect for the “Morning Post” for its courage
about political corruption and cosmopolitan conspiracies, in spite of
deep disagreement on other very vital things. And I said what I should
have thought was so true as to be trite. I said that it makes life
narrower and not broader to lose the special note of piety or respect
for the past still living; and that to call an old man an old bean is
merely to lose all intelligent sense of the significance of an old man.
Since then, to my great entertainment, I seem to have figured in
various papers as a sort of ferocious heavy father, come out on my own
account to curse the numerous young sprigs who have called me an old
bean. But this is an error. I should be the last to deny that I am
heavy, but I am not fatherly; nor am I ferocious, at any rate I am not
ferocious about this. Individually I regard the question with a
detachment verging on indifference. I cannot imagine anybody except an
aged and very lean vegetarian positively dancing with joy at being
called an old bean; and I am not a very lean vegetarian. But still less
can I imagine anyone regarding the accusation with horror or resentment;
the sins and crimes blackening the career of a bean must be
comparatively few; its character must be simple and free from
complexity, and its manner of life innocent. A philosophic rationalist
wrote to me the other day to say that my grubbing in the grossest
superstitions of the past reminded him of “an old sow pig rooting in the
refuse of the kitchen heap,” and expressed a hope that I should be
dragged from this occupation and made to resume “the cap and bells of
yore.” That is something like a vigorous and vivid comparison; though my
Feminist friends may be distressed at my being compared to a sow as well
as a pig; and though I am not quite clear myself about how the animal
would get on when he had resumed the cap and bells of yore. But it would
certainly be a pity, when it was possible to find this image in the
kitchen heap, to be content with one from the kitchen garden. It would
indeed be a lost opportunity to work yourself up to the furious pitch of
calling your enemy a beast, and then only call him a bean.
From the extracts I saw, it would seem that certain ladies were
especially lively in their protest against my antiquated prejudices; and
rioted in quite a bean-feast of old beans. The form the argument
generally takes is to ask why parents and children should not be
friends, or as they often put it (I deeply regret to say) pals. Neither
term seems to me to convey a sufficiently distinctive meaning; and I
take it that the best term for what they really mean is that they should
be comrades. Now comradeship is a very real and splendid thing; but this
is simply the cant of comradeship. A boy does not take his mother with
him when he goes bird-nesting; and his affection for his mother is of
another kind unconnected with the idea of her climbing a tree. Three men
do not generally take an aged and beloved aunt with them as part of
their luggage on a walking tour; and if they did, it would not be so
much disrespectful to age as unjust to youth. For this confusion between
two valuable but varied things, like most of such modern confusions, is
quite as liable to obscurantist as to mutinous abuse; and is as easy to
turn into tyranny as into licence. If a boy’s aunts are his comrades,
why should he need any comrades except his aunts? If his father and
mother are perfect and consummate pals, why should he fool away his time
with more ignorant, immature and insufficient pals? As in a good many
other modern things, the end of the old parental dignity would be the
beginning of a new parental tyranny. I would rather the boy loved his
father as his father than feared him as a Frankenstein giant of a
superior and supercilious friend, armed in that unequal friendship with
all the weapons of psychology and psycho-analysis. If he loves him as a
father he loves him as an older man; and if we are to abolish all
differences of tone towards those older than ourselves, we must
presumably do the same to those younger than ourselves. All healthy
people, for instance, feel an instinctive and almost impersonal
affection for a baby. Is a baby a comrade? Is he to climb the tree and
go on the walking tour; or are we on his account to abolish all trees
and tours? Are the grandfather aged ninety, the son aged thirty, and the
grandson aged three, all to set out together on their travels, with the
same knapsacks and knickerbockers? I have read somewhere that in one of
the Ten or Twelve or Two Hundred Types of Filial Piety reverenced by the
Chinese, one was an elderly sage and statesman, who dressed up as a
child of four and danced before his yet more elderly parents, to delight
them with the romantic illusion that they were still quite young. This
in itself could not but attract remark; but this in itself I am prepared
to defend. It was an exceptional and even extraordinary festivity, like
the reversals of the Saturnalia; and I wish we could have seen some
vigorous old gentleman like Lord Halsbury or the Archbishop of
Canterbury performing a similar act of piety. But in the Utopia of
comradeship now commended to us, old and young are expected normally to
think alike, feel alike and talk alike; and may therefore normally and
permanently be supposed to dress alike. Whether the parents dress as
children or the children as parents, it is clear that they must all
dress as pals, whatever be the ceremonial dress of that rank. I imagine
it as something in tweeds, with rather a loud check.
As I considered these things I looked across the kitchen garden of the
cottage, and the association of peas and beans brought the fancy back to
the foolish figure of speech with which the discussion began. There is a
proverb, which is like most of our popular sayings, a country proverb,
about things that are as like as two peas. There is something
significant in the fact that this is as near as the rural imagination
could get to a mere mechanical monotony. For as a matter of fact it is
highly improbable that any two peas are exactly alike. A survey of the
whole world of peas, with all their forms and uses, would probably
reveal every sort of significance between the sweet peas of sentiment
and the dried peas of asceticism. Modern machinery has gone far beyond
such rude rural attempts at dullness. Things are not as like as two peas
in the sense that they are as like as two pins. But the flippant phrase
under discussion does really imply that they are as like as two beans.
It is really part of the low and levelling philosophy that assimilates
all things too much to each other. It does not mean that we see any
fanciful significance in the use of the term, as in a country proverb.
It is not that we see an old gentleman with fine curling white hair and
say to him poetically, “Permit me, venerable cauliflower, to inquire
after your health.” It is not that we address an old farmer with a deep
and rich complexion, saying, “I trust, most admirable of beetroots, that
you are as well as you look.” When we say, “How are you, old bean,” the
error is not so much that we say something rude, but that we say nothing
because we mean nothing.
As I happened to meet at that moment a girl belonging to the family of
the cottage, I showed her the cutting, and asked her opinion upon the
great progressive problem of calling your father an old bean. At which
she laughed derisively, and merely said, “As if anybody would!”
The Fear of the Film
Long lists are being given of particular cases in which children have
suffered in spirits or health from alleged horrors of the kinema. One
child is said to have had a fit after seeing a film; another to have
been sleepless with some fixed idea taken from a film; another to have
killed his father with a carving-knife through having seen a knife used
in a film. This may possibly have occurred; though if it did, anybody of
common sense would prefer to have details about that particular child,
rather than about that particular picture. But what is supposed to be
the practical moral of it, in any case? Is it that the young should
never see a story with a knife in it? Are they to be brought up in
complete ignorance of “The Merchant of Venice” because Shylock
flourishes a knife for a highly disagreeable purpose? Are they never to
hear of Macbeth, lest it should slowly dawn upon their trembling
intelligence that it is a dagger that they see before them? It would be
more practical to propose that a child should never see a real
carving-knife, and still more practical that he should never see a real
father. All that may come; the era of preventive and prophetic science
has only begun. We must not be impatient. But when we come to the cases
of morbid panic after some particular exhibition, there is yet more
reason to clear the mind of cant. It is perfectly true that a child will
have the horrors after seeing some particular detail. It is quite
equally true that nobody can possibly predict what that detail will be.
It certainly need not be anything so obvious as a murder or even a
knife. I should have thought anybody who knew anything about children,
or for that matter anybody who had been a child, would know that these
nightmares are quite incalculable. The hint of horror may come by any
chance in any connexion. If the kinema exhibited nothing but views of
country vicarages or vegetarian restaurants, the ugly fancy is as likely
to be stimulated by these things as by anything else. It is like seeing
a face in the carpet; it makes no difference that it is the carpet at
the vicarage.
I will give two examples from my own most personal circle; I could give
hundreds from hearsay. I know a child who screamed steadily for hours if
he had been taken past the Albert Memorial. This was not a precocious
precision or excellence in his taste in architecture. Nor was it a
premature protest against all that gimcrack German culture which nearly
entangled us in the downfall of the barbaric tyranny. It was the fear of
something which he himself described with lurid simplicity as The Cow
with the India-rubber Tongue. It sounds rather a good title for a creepy
short story. At the base of the Albert Memorial (I may explain for those
who have never enjoyed that monument) are four groups of statuary
representing Europe, Asia, Africa, and America. America especially is
very overwhelming; borne onward on a snorting bison who plunges forward
in a fury of western progress, and is surrounded with Red Indians,
Mexicans, and all sorts of pioneers, O pioneers, armed to the teeth. The
child passed this transatlantic tornado with complete coolness and
indifference. Europe however is seated on a bull so mild as to look like
a cow; the tip of its tongue is showing and happened to be discoloured
by weather; suggesting, I suppose, a living thing coming out of the dead
marble. Now nobody could possibly foretell that a weather-stain would
occur in that particular place, and fill that particular child with that
particular fancy. Nobody is likely to propose meeting it by forbidding
graven images, like the Moslems and the Jews. Nobody has said (as yet)
that it is bad morals to make a picture of a cow. Nobody has even
pleaded that it is bad manners for a cow to put its tongue out. These
things are utterly beyond calculation; they are also beyond counting,
for they occur all over the place, not only to morbid children but to
any children. I knew this particular child very well, being a rather
older child myself at the time. He certainly was not congenitally timid
or feeble-minded; for he risked going to prison to expose the Marconi
Scandal and died fighting in the Great War.
Here is another example out of scores. A little girl, now a very normal
and cheerful young lady, had an insomnia of insane terror entirely
arising from the lyric of “Little Bo-Peep.” After an inquisition like
that of the confessor or the psycho-analyst, it was found that the word
“bleating” had some obscure connexion in her mind with the word
“bleeding.” There was thus perhaps an added horror in the phrase
“heard”; in hearing rather than seeing the flowing of blood. Nobody
could possibly provide against that sort of mistake. Nobody could
prevent the little girl from hearing about sheep, any more than the
little boy from hearing about cows. We might abolish all nursery rhymes;
and as they are happy and popular and used with universal success, it is
very likely that we shall. But the whole point of the mistake about that
phrase is that it might have been a mistake about any phrase. We cannot
foresee all the fancies that might arise, not only out of what we say,
but of what we do not say. We cannot avoid promising a child a caramel
lest he should think we say cannibal, or conceal the very word “hill”
lest it should sound like “hell.”
All the catalogues and calculations offered us by the party of caution
in this controversy are therefore quite worthless. It is perfectly true
that examples can be given of a child being frightened of this, that or
the other. But we can never be certain of his being frightened of the
same thing twice. It is not on the negative side, by making lists of
vetoes, that the danger can be avoided; it can never indeed be entirely
avoided. We can only fortify the child on the positive side by giving
him health and humour and a trust in God; not omitting (what will much
mystify the moderns) an intelligent appreciation of the idea of
authority, which is only the other side of confidence, and which alone
can suddenly and summarily cast out such devils. But we may be sure that
most modern people will not look at it in this way. They will think it
more scientific to attempt to calculate the incalculable. So soon as
they have realized that it is not so simple as it looks, they will try
to map it out, however complicated it may be. When they discover that
the terrible detail need not be a knife, but might just as well be a
fork, they will only say there is a fork complex as well as a knife
complex. And that increasing complexity of complexes is the net in which
liberty will be taken.
Instead of seeing in the odd cases of the cow’s tongue or the bleating
sheep the peril of their past generalizations, they will see them only
as starting points for new generalizations. They will get yet another
theory out of it. And they will begin acting on the theory long before
they have done thinking about it. They will start out with some new and
crude conception that sculpture has made children scream or that nursery
rhymes have made children sleepless; and the thing will be a clause in a
programme of reform before it has begun to be a conclusion in a serious
study of psychology. That is the practical problem about modern liberty
which the critics will not see; of which eugenics is one example and all
this amateur child-psychology is another. So long as an old morality was
in black and white like a chess-board, even a man who wanted more of it
made white was certain that no more of it would be made black. Now he is
never certain what vices may not be released, but neither is he certain
what virtues may be forbidden. Even if he did not think it wrong to run
away with a married woman, he knew that his neighbours only thought it
wrong because the woman was married. They did not think it wrong to run
away with a red-haired woman, or a left-handed woman, or a woman
subject to headaches. But when we let loose a thousand eugenical
speculations, all adopted before they are verified and acted on even
before they are adopted, he is just as likely as not to find himself
separated from the woman for those or any other reasons. Similarly there
was something to be said for restrictions, even rather puritanical and
provincial restrictions, upon what children should read or see, so long
as they fenced in certain fixed departments like sex or sensational
tortures. But when we begin to speculate on whether other sensations may
not stimulate as dangerously as sex, those other sensations may be as
closely controlled as sex. When, let us say, we hear that the eye and
brain are weakened by the rapid turning of wheels as well as by the most
revolting torturing of men, we have come into a world in which
cart-wheels and steam-engines may become as obscene as racks and
thumbscrews. In short, so long as we _combine_ ceaseless and often
reckless scientific speculation with rapid and often random social
reform, the result must inevitably be not anarchy but ever-increasing
tyranny. There must be a ceaseless and almost mechanical multiplication
of things forbidden. The resolution to cure all the ills that flesh is
heir to, combined with the guesswork about all possible ills that flesh
and nerve and brain-cell may be heir to--these two things conducted
simultaneously must inevitably spread a sort of panic of prohibition.
Scientific imagination and social reform between them will quite
logically and almost legitimately have made us slaves. This seems to me
a very clear, a very fair and a very simple point of public criticism;
and I am much mystified about why so many publicists cannot even see
what it is, but take refuge in charges of anarchism, which firstly are
not true, and secondly have nothing to do with it.
Wings and the Housemaid
Among the numberless fictitious things that I have fortunately never
written, there was a little story about a logical maiden lady engaging
apartments in which she was not allowed to keep a cat or dog, who,
nevertheless, stipulated for permission to keep a bird, and who
eventually walked round to her new lodgings accompanied by an ostrich.
There was a moral to the fable, connected with that exaggeration of
small concessions, in which, for instance, the Germans indulged about
espionage, or the Jews about interest. But this faded fancy returned to
my mind in another fashion when a very humane lady suggested the other
day that every domestic servant, including the butler, I presume, should
be described as “a home-bird.” Unless the lady is mis-reported, which is
likely enough, she wanted servants called home-birds because they keep
the home-fires burning, which, as many will be ready to point out, is
hardly the particular form in which the domesticity of the nest commonly
expresses itself. But I am not at all disposed to deride the lady’s real
meaning, still less her real motives, which referred to a real movement
of social conscience and sentiment, however wrongly expressed. She was
troubled about the implied insolence of calling servants servants and
apparently even of talking about “maids” or “the cook.” Therefore she
evolved the ornithological substitute; about which, of course, it would
be easy to evolve a whole aviary of allegorical parodies. It would be
easy to ask whether a private secretary is to be called a secretary
bird, or, perhaps, the telephone girl a humming-bird. But it will be
enough to say generally of the proposal, in its present verbal form,
that one has only to submit it to any living and human housemaid in
order to find that particular home-bird developing rapidly into a
mockingbird. Nevertheless, as I have said, we should not merely dismiss
any social doubts thus suggested, or any impulse towards a warmer
respect for work generally grossly undervalued. Too many people, of the
more snobbish social strata, have treated their servants as home-birds;
as owls, for instance, who can be up all night, or as vultures, who can
eat the refuse fit for the dustbin. I would not throw cold water on any
indignation on this score; but I note it as typical of the time that the
indignation should fail on the side of intelligence. For it is the mark
of our time, above almost everything else, that it goes by associations
and not by arguments; that is why it has a hundred arts and no
philosophy.
Thus, for instance, the lady in question lumps together a number of
terms that have no logical connexion at all. There is at least a meaning
in objecting to one person calling another a servant. As I shall suggest
in a moment, there is not much sense in changing the name when you do
not change the thing; and there is a great deal of nonsense in denying
the status of the servant at the moment when you are making it more
servile. Still, anybody can see how the term might be held to hurt
human dignity; but the other terms mentioned cannot hurt human dignity
at all. I cannot conceive why it should insult a cook to call her a
cook, any more than it insults a cashier to call him a cashier; to say
nothing of the fact that dealing with cookery is far nobler than dealing
with cash. And the third title certainly tells entirely the other way.
The word “maid” is not only a noble old English word, with no note of
social distinction; for a mediæval king might have praised his daughter
as “a good maid.” It is a word loaded with magnificent memories, in
history, literature, and religion. Joan the Maid suggests a little more
than Joan the maid-servant. As it says in Mr. Belloc’s stirring little
poem:--
By God who made the Master Maids,
I know not whence she came;
But the sword she bore to save the soul
Went up like an altar flame.
It is needless here to trace the idea back to its splendid sources; or
to explain how the word maid has been the highest earthly title, not
only on earth but in heaven. “Mother and maiden was never none but she.”
Here at least modern humanitarian criticism has gone curiously astray,
even for its own purposes; any servant may well be satisfied with the
dignity of being called the maid, just as any workman may be rightly
honoured by the accident which calls him the man. For in a modern
industrial dispute, as reported in the papers, I always feel there is a
final verdict and sentence in the very statement of the case of Masters
_versus_ Men.
The true objection lies much farther back. It begins with the simple
fact that the home-bird is not in her own home. When that particular
sparrow stokes the fire, as above described, it is not her own fireside;
when we happen to meet a canary carrying a coalscuttle, the canary is
not generally a coal-owner. In short, wherever we find pelicans,
penguins, or flamingoes keeping the home-fires burning, they may all be
earnestly wishing that they could fly away to their homes. Now a
moderate amount of this temporary and vicarious domesticity is a natural
enough accident in social relations, so long as it does not obscure and
obstruct more individual and direct domesticity. In short, there is no
particular harm in the maid being a housemaid in someone else’s house,
if she normally has a chance of being a housewife in her own. As I shall
suggest in a moment, this is what was really implied in certain older
institutions to which the wisest are now looking back. But in any case
it is odd that the home-bird should thus plume itself at this moment;
for the trend of the time is certainly not towards any domesticity,
direct or indirect. The birds have long been netted or caged, by cold,
fear and hunger, into larger and more terrorist systems. The happy
home-birds are keeping the factory fires burning. The only legal and
industrial tendency seems to be to shut up more and more of the women,
those strange wild fowl, in those colossal cages of iron. Nor is the
change one of mere æsthetic atmosphere; we know now that it is one of
economic fact and may soon be one of legal definition. In a word, it is
queer that we should suddenly grow sensitive about calling people
servants when we are in the act of making them slaves. Indeed, in many
concrete cases we may already be said to be making them convicts. The
true moral meaning of much that is called the improvement of prisons is
not that we are turning prisoners into a better sort of people, but
rather that we are treating a better sort of people as prisoners. The
broad arrow is broadened in so liberal a fashion as to cover those who
would once have been counted respectable; and there is a sense in which
the broad arrow, becoming broader, is bound to become blunter. The
prison becomes utilitarian as well as disciplinary, as the factory
becomes disciplinary as well as utilitarian. The two become simply and
substantially the same; for they have to treat the same sort of
impecunious people in the same sort of impersonal way. People may differ
about the definition of that common condition or status. Some may
eagerly salute persons involved as home-birds. Others may prefer to
describe them as jail-birds.
For the rest, if anybody wants to strike the central stream of moderate
sanity in the servant problem, I recommend him first to read with a
close attention or preferably to sing in a loud voice, the song called
“Sally in Our Alley.” In that great and gloriously English lyric, the
poet does not disguise the accidental discomforts of the great system of
apprenticeship which was part of the glory of the Guilds. He even
exhibits his Christian prejudices by comparing his master to a Turk. He
actually entertains, as every reflective social reformer must, the
hypothetical alternative of the Servile State, and considers the
relative advantages of a slave that rows a galley. But the point is that
what makes him refuse and endure is hope, the sure and certain hope of a
glorious emancipation; not the hopeless hope of a chance in a scramble,
with a general recommendation to get on or get out, but a charter of
knowledge and honour, that “when his seven long years are past,” a door
shall open to him, which our age has shut on the great multitude of
mankind.
The Slavery of Free Verse
The truth most needed to-day is that the end is never the right end. The
beginning is the right end at which to begin. The modern man has to read
everything backwards; as when he reads journalism first and history
afterwards--if at all. He is like a blind man exploring an elephant, and
condemned to begin at the very tip of its tail. But he is still more
unlucky; for when he has a first principle, it is generally the very
last principle that he ought to have. He starts, as it were, with one
infallible dogma about the elephant; that its tail is its trunk. He
works the wrong way round on principle; and tries to fit all the
practical facts to his principle. Because the elephant has no eyes in
its tail-end, he calls it a blind elephant; and expatiates on its
ignorance, superstition, and need of compulsory education. Because it
has no tusks at its tail-end, he says that tusks are a fantastic
flourish attributed to a fabulous creature, an ivory chimera that must
have come through the ivory gate. Because it does not as a rule pick up
things with its tail, he dismisses the magical story that it can pick up
things with its trunk. He probably says it is plainly a piece of
anthropomorphism to suppose that an elephant can pack its trunk. The
result is that he becomes as pallid and worried as a pessimist; the
world to him is not only an elephant, but a white elephant. He does not
know what to do with it, and cannot be persuaded of the perfectly simple
explanation; which is that he has not made the smallest real attempt to
make head or tail of the animal. He will not begin at the right end;
because he happens to have come first on the wrong end.
But in nothing do I feel this modern trick, of trusting to a fag-end
rather than a first principle, more than in the modern treatment of
poetry. With this or that particular metrical form, or unmetrical form,
or unmetrical formlessness, I might be content or not, as it achieved
some particular effect or not. But the whole general tendency, regarded
as an emancipation, seems to me more or less of an enslavement. It seems
founded on one subconscious idea; that talk is freer than verse; and
that verse, therefore, should claim the freedom of talk. But talk,
especially in our time, is not free at all. It is tripped up by
trivialities, tamed by conventions, loaded with dead words, thwarted by
a thousand meaningless things. It does not liberate the soul so much,
when a man can say, “You always look so nice,” as when he can say, “But
your eternal summer shall not fade.” The first is an awkward and
constrained sentence ending with the weakest word ever used, or rather
misused, by man. The second is like the gesture of a giant or the
sweeping flight of an archangel; it has the very rush of liberty. I do
not despise the man who says the first, because he _means_ the second;
and what he means is more important than what he says. I have always
done my best to emphasize the inner dignity of these daily things, in
spite of their dull externals; but I do not think it an improvement that
the inner spirit itself should grow more external and more dull. It is
thought right to discourage numbers of prosaic people trying to be
poetical; but I think it much more of a bore to watch numbers of
poetical people trying to be prosaic. In short, it is another case of
tail-foremost philosophy; instead of watering the laurel hedge of the
cockney villa, we bribe the cockney to brick in the plant of Apollo.
I have always had the fancy that if a man were really free, he would
talk in rhythm and even in rhyme. His most hurried post-card would be a
sonnet; and his most hasty wires like harp-strings. He would breathe a
song into the telephone; a song which would be a lyric or an epic,
according to the time involved in awaiting the call; or in his
inevitable altercation with the telephone girl, the duel would be also a
duet. He would express his preference among the dishes at dinner in
short impromptu poems, combining the more mystical gratitude of grace
with a certain epigrammatic terseness, more convenient for domestic good
feeling. If Mr. Yeats can say, in exquisite verse, the exact number of
bean-rows he would like on his plantation, why not the number of beans
he would like on his plate? If he can issue a rhymed request to procure
the honey-bee, why not to pass the honey? Misunderstandings might arise
at first with the richer and more fantastic poets; and Francis Thompson
might have asked several times for “the gold skins of undelirious wine”
before anybody understood that he wanted the grapes. Nevertheless, I
will maintain that his magnificent phrase would be a far more real
expression of God’s most glorious gift of the vine, than if he had
simply said in a peremptory manner “grapes”; especially if the culture
of compulsory education had carefully taught him to pronounce it as if
it were “gripes.” And if a man could ask for a potato in the form of a
poem, the poem would not be merely a more romantic but a much more
realistic rendering of a potato. For a potato is a poem; it is even an
ascending scale of poems; beginning at the root, in subterranean
grotesques in the Gothic manner, with humps like the deformities of a
goblin and eyes like a beast of Revelation, and rising up through the
green shades of the earth to a crown that has the shape of stars and the
hue of heaven.
But the truth behind all this is that expressed in that very ancient
mystical notion, the music of the spheres. It is the idea that, at the
back of everything, existence begins with a harmony and not a chaos;
and, therefore, when we really spread our wings and find a wider
freedom, we find it in something more continuous and recurrent, and not
in something more fragmentary and crude. Freedom is fullness, especially
fullness of life; and a full vessel is more rounded and complete than an
empty one, and not less so. To vary Browning’s phrase, we find in prose
the broken arcs, in poetry the perfect round. Prose is not the freedom
of poetry; rather prose is the fragments of poetry. Prose, at least in
the prosaic sense, is poetry interrupted, held up and cut off from its
course; the chariot of Phœbus stopped by a block in the Strand. But when
it begins to move again at all, I think we shall find certain
old-fashioned things move with it, such as repetition and even measure,
rhythm and even rhyme. We shall discover with horror that the wheels of
the chariot go round and round; and even that the horses of the chariot
have the usual number of feet.
Anyhow, the right way to encourage the cortège is not to put the cart
before the horse. It is not to make poetry more poetical by ignoring
what distinguishes it from prose. There may be many new ways of making
the chariot move again; but I confess that most of the modern theorists
seem to me to be lecturing on a new theory of its mechanics, while it is
standing still. If a wizard before my very eyes works a miracle with a
rope, a boy and a mango plant, I am only theoretically interested in the
question of a sceptic, who asks why it should not be done with a garden
hose, a maiden aunt and a monkey-tree. Why not, indeed, if he can do it?
If a saint performs a miracle to-morrow, by turning a stone into a fish,
I shall be the less concerned at being asked, in the abstract, why a man
should not also turn a camp-stool into a cockatoo; but let him do it,
and not merely explain how it can be done. It is certain that words such
as “birds” and “bare,” which are as plain as “fish” or “stone,” can be
combined in such a miracle as “Bare ruined quires where late the sweet
birds sang.” So far as I can follow my own feelings, the metre and fall
of the feet, even the rhyme and place in the sonnet, have a great deal
to do with producing such an effect. I do not say there is no other way
of producing such an effect. I only ask, not without longing, where else
in this wide and weary time is it produced? I know I cannot produce it;
and I do not in fact feel it when I hear _vers libres_. I know not where
is that Promethean heat; and, even to express my ignorance, I am glad to
find better words than my own.
Prohibition and the Press
An organ of the Nonconformist Conscience, while commenting very kindly
on my recent remarks about America, naturally went on to criticize,
though equally kind, my remarks about Prohibition. Now, so far as I am
concerned, the problem is not so much Prohibition with a large P as
prohibition with a small one. I mean, I am interested not so much in
liquor as in liberty. I want to know on what principle the
prohibitionists are proceeding in this case, and how they think it
applies to any other case. And I cannot for the life of me make out.
They might be expected to argue that there is something peculiar in
principle about the position of liquor, and make that the basis for
attacking liquor. But in point of fact they do not attack liquor; they
do quite simply attack liberty. I mean that they are satisfied with
saying about this liberty what can obviously be said about any
liberty--that it can be, and is, abominably abused. If that had been a
final objection to any form of freedom, there never would have been any
form of freedom. And there most notably would never have been the
particular forms of freedom which are most sacred to the Nonconformist
Conscience. The Nonconformists have demanded liberty to secede, though
they knew it led to an anarchy of sects and spiteful controversies.
They have demanded the licence to print, though they knew it involved
the licence to print twenty falsehoods to one truth. I suppose there is
nothing in history of which the modern Puritan would be more innocently
proud than the thing called the Liberty of the Press, which arose out of
the pamphleteering of the seventeenth century, and especially the great
pamphlet of Milton. Yet everything that Milton says, about allowing
controversy in spite of its dangers, could be applied word for word to
the case of allowing drinking in spite of its dangers. Is not the virtue
that shuts itself up in a temperance hotel a fugitive and cloistered
virtue? Is not the morality that dare not have wine on the table, or in
the town, emphatically one that dares not sally out to meet its enemy?
All Milton’s arguments for freedom are arguments for beer; and, of
course, Milton himself would certainly have applied them to beer. The
highly successful brewer to whom he was Latin secretary--a gentleman of
the name of Williams, otherwise Cromwell--would hardly have been pleased
with him if he had not applied them to beer.
For instance, the critic whom I am here venturing to criticize says that
people differ about Prohibition according to their knowledge or
ignorance of the dreadful state of the slums, the ravages of alcoholism
in our industrial cities, and all the rest of it. Whether or no this be
a good argument against the public-house, there is no doubt that I could
easily turn it against the public press. I could insist that I am a
common Cockney Fleet Street journalist who has done nightly work for
daily papers and fed off nocturnal potato-stalls; whereas he is probably
a cultivated Congregationalist minister writing in a library of
theological works. I might say that I know better than he does, or than
most people do, the cynicism and the vulgarity and the vices of
journalism. But, as a matter of fact, the vices of journalism have by
this time become as evident to the people who read journals as to the
people who write them. All responsible people are complaining of the
power and condition of the press, and no people more than these earnest
and ethical Nonconformists. It is they who complain most bitterly that a
Jingo press can manufacture war. It is they who declare most indignantly
that a sensational press is undermining morality. They often, to my
mind, unduly confuse matters of morality with matters of taste. They
often, to my mind, denounce as mere Jingoism what is simply the deeply
democratic and popular character of patriotism. But nobody will deny
that to a large extent they are legitimately and logically alarmed about
the abuses and absurdities of the newspapers. But they have not yet used
this as an argument for a veto upon all newspapers. Why in the world
should they use the parallel evils as an argument for a veto on all
public-houses?
For my part I do feel very strongly about the frivolity and
irresponsibility of the press. It seems impossible to exaggerate the
evil that can be done by a corrupt and unscrupulous press. If drink
directly ruins the family, it only indirectly ruins the nation. But bad
journalism does directly ruin the nation, considered as a nation; it
acts on the corporate national will and sways the common national
decision. It may force a decision in a few hours that will be an
incurable calamity for hundreds of years. It may drive a whole
civilization to defeat, to slavery, to bankruptcy, to universal famine.
Even at this moment there are prominent papers wildly urging us to
war--not with our foes but with our friends. There are some journalists
so wicked as to want war, almost for its own sake; there are more
journalists so weak-minded as to work for war without even wanting it.
Let me give one example out of fifty of the sort of phrases that flash
by us when we turn over the papers. A headline in enormous letters
announces that the French are “scuttling” out of the disputed areas in
the Near East. The phrase about scuttling, and the policy of scuttle,
has been familiar and firmly established in English journalism as
meaning a cowardly and servile surrender, admitting abject defeat. And
the suggestion is that the French, being notoriously a nation of
cowards, having that tendency to panic produced by a habit of dancing
and a diet of frogs, can vividly be pictured as scampering with screams
of terror from the sight of a Turk with a drawn sabre. This is the way
our newspapers improve our relations with our Allies. Only the newspaper
men seem to have got a little mixed in their eagerness to expatiate on
the wide field of French vileness and ignominy. Only a little while ago
the same papers were telling us that the French were furious
filibusters, forcing war in every corner of the world. We were told that
it was France which was militaristic and aggressive, and all her rivals
were made to scuttle. We were told that it was the Frenchman and not the
Turk who was the terrible person holding the drawn sabre. In plain
words, these journalists are resolved to show that whatever the French
do is wrong. If they advance, they are arrogant; if they retreat, they
are cowardly. If they keep an army beyond the Rhine, they are pursuing a
policy of militarism; if they withdraw an army from somewhere else,
they are pursuing a policy of scuttle. Where M. Poincaré is ready to
fight, he is a fire-eater who cares for nothing but fighting; where he
is not ready to fight, he is a poltroon who is always notoriously too
timid to fight. The careful selection of language of this sort, for a
given period, might quite possibly land us in a European war--a war in
which we should be certainly on the wrong side, and almost certainly on
the losing side.
Suppose I come forward with this great reform of the Prohibition of the
Press. Suppose I suggest that the police should forcibly shut up all the
newspaper-offices, as the other reformers wish to shut up all the
public-houses. What answer will the Puritan moralists make to me, or on
what principle do they distinguish between the one reform and the other?
There is no kind of doubt about the harm that journalism does; and their
own line of argument precludes them from appealing merely to the good
that it does. As a matter of fact, far better poems have been written in
taverns than are ever likely to appear in daily papers. And, from
Pantagruel to Pickwick, this form of festivity has a roll of literary
glory to its credit which is never likely to be found in the back files
of any newspaper that I know of. But the Puritans do not discuss the
healthier tradition of wine; they consider their argument sufficiently
supported by the unhealthy effects of gin and bad beer in the slums. And
if we adopt that principle of judging by the worst, then the worst
effects of the press are far wider than the worst effects of the
public-house. What exactly is the principle by which they distinguish
between lawful and unlawful liberty, or mixed and unmixed licence? I
have a rough-and-ready test, which may be right or wrong, but which I
can at least state; but where has their test been stated? I say that the
simplest form of freedom is that which distinguishes the free man from
the slave--the ownership of his own body and his own bodily activities.
That there is a risk in allowing him this ownership is obvious, and has
always been obvious. The risk is not confined to the question of drink,
but covers the whole question of health. But surely the other forms of
freedom, such as freedom to print, are very much more indirect and
disputable. A newspaper may be made the instrument of the vilest sort of
swindling or starving of a whole people. Why are we to grant the remote
right, and deny the intimate right? Moreover, a newspaper is a new
thing; if our fathers had the right to it, they never knew it. Fermented
liquor is as old as civilization, or older. But what I have asked for
again and again is simply the principle of the Prohibitionists: and I am
asking still.
The Mercy of Mr. Arnold Bennett
Mr. Arnold Bennett recently wrote one of his humorous and humane
_causeries_, pleading very properly for social imagination and the
better understanding of our fellows. He carried it however to the point
of affirming, as some fatalists do, that we should never judge anybody
in the sense of condemning anybody, in connexion with his moral conduct.
Some time ago the same distinguished writer showed that his mercy and
magnanimity were indeed on a heroic scale by reviewing a book of mine,
and even saying many kind things about it. But to these he added a doubt
about whether true intelligence could be consistent with the acceptance
of any dogma. In truth there are only two kinds of people; those who
accept dogmas and know it, and those who accept dogmas and don’t know
it. My only advantage over the gifted novelist lies in my belonging to
the former class. I suspect that his unconsciousness of his dogmas
extends to an unconsciousness of what he means by a dogma. If it means
merely the popular idea of being dogmatic, it might be suggested that
saying that all dogmatism is unintelligent is itself somewhat dogmatic.
And something of what is true of his veto on dogma is also true on his
veto of condemnation; which is really a veto on vetoes.
Mr. Arnold Bennett does not darken the question with the dreary
metaphysics of determinism; he is far too bright and adroit a journalist
for that. But he does make a simple appeal to charity, and even
Christianity, basing on it the idea that we should not judge people at
all, or even blame them at all. Like everybody else who argues thus, he
imagines himself to be pleading for mercy and humanity. Like everybody
else who argues thus, he is doing the direct contrary. This particular
notion of not judging people really means hanging them without trial. It
would really substitute for judgment not mercy but something much more
like murder. For the logical process through which the discussion passes
is always the same; I have seen it in a hundred debates about fate and
free-will. First somebody says, like Mr. Bennett: “Let us be kinder to
our brethren, and not blame them for faults we cannot judge.” Then some
casual common-sense person says: “Do you really mean you would let
anybody pick your pocket or cut your throat without protest?” Then the
first man always answers as Mr. Bennett does: “Oh no; I would punish him
to protect myself and protect society; but I would not _blame_ him,
because I would not venture to judge him.” The philosopher seems to have
forgotten that he set out with the idea of being kinder to the
cut-throat and the pick-pocket. His sense of humour should suggest to
him that the pick-pocket might possibly prefer to be blamed, rather than
go to penal servitude for the protection of society.
Now of course Mr. Bennett is quite right in the most mystical and
therefore the most deeply moral sense. We do not know what God knows
about the merits of a man. Nor do we know what God knows about the
needs of a community. A man who poisons his little niece for money may
have mysterious motives and excuses we cannot understand. And so he may
serve mysterious social purposes we cannot follow. We are not infallible
when we think we are punishing criminals; but neither are we infallible
when we think we are protecting society. Our inevitable ignorance seems
to me to cut both ways. But even in our ignorance one thing is vividly
clear. Mr. Bennett’s solution is not the more merciful, but the less
merciful of the two. To say that we may punish people, but not blame
them, is to say that we have a right to be cruel to them, but not a
right to be kind to them.
For after all, blame is itself a compliment. It is a compliment because
it is an appeal; and an appeal to a man as a creative artist making his
soul. To say to a man, “rascal” or “villain” in ordinary society may
seem abrupt; but it is also elliptical. It is an abbreviation of a
sublime spiritual apostrophe for which there may be no time in our busy
social life. When you meet a millionaire, the cornerer of many markets,
out at dinner in Mayfair, and greet him (as is your custom) with the
exclamation “Scoundrel!” you are merely shortening for convenience some
such expression as: “How can you, having the divine spirit of man that
might be higher than the angels, drag it down so far as to be a
scoundrel?” When you are introduced at a garden party to a Cabinet
Minister who takes tips on Government contracts, and when you say to him
in the ordinary way “Scamp!” you are merely using the last word of a
long moral disquisition; which is in effect, “How pathetic is the
spiritual spectacle of this Cabinet Minister, who being from the first
made glorious by the image of God, condescends so far to lesser
ambitions as to allow them to turn him into a scamp.” It is a mere
taking of the tail of a sentence to stand for the rest; like
saying ’bus for omnibus. It is even more like the case of that
seventeenth century Puritan whose name was something like
“If-Jesus-Christ-Had-Not-Died-For-Thee-Thou-Hadst-Been-Damned Higgins”;
but who was, for popular convenience, referred to as “Damned Higgins.”
But it is obvious, anyhow, that when we call a man a coward, we are in
so doing asking him how he can be a coward when he could be a hero. When
we rebuke a man for being a sinner, we imply that he has the powers of a
saint.
But punishing him for the protection of society involves no regard for
him at all. It involves no limit of proportion in the punishment at all.
There are some limits to what ordinary men are likely to say that an
ordinary man deserves. But there are no limits to what the danger of the
community may be supposed to demand. We would not, even if we could,
boil the millionaire in oil or skin the poor little politician alive;
for we do not think a man deserves to be skinned alive for taking
commissions on contracts. But it is by no means so certain that the
skinning him alive might not protect the community. Corruption can
destroy communities; and torture can deter men. At any rate the thing is
not so self-evidently useless as it is self-evidently unjust and
vindictive. We refrain from such fantastic punishments, largely because
we _do_ have some notion of making the punishment fit the crime, and not
merely fit the community. If the State were the sole consideration, it
may be inferred a priori that people might be much more cruel. And in
fact, where the State was the sole consideration, it was found in
experience that they were much more cruel. They were much more cruel
precisely because they were freed from all responsibilities about the
innocence or guilt of the individual. I believe that in heathen Rome,
the model of a merely civic and secular loyalty, it was a common
practice to torture the slaves of any household subjected to legal
enquiry. If you had remonstrated, because no crime had been proved
against the slaves, the State would had answered in the modern manner:
“We are not punishing the crime; we are protecting the community.”
Now that example is relevant just now in more ways than one. Of course I
do not mean that this was the motive of all historical cruelties, or
that some did not spring from quite an opposite motive. But it was the
motive of much tyranny in the heathen world; and in this, as in other
things, the modern world has largely become a heathen world. And modern
tyranny can find its prototype in the torturing of heathen slaves in two
fundamental respects. First, that the modern world has returned to the
test of the heathen world, that of considering service to the state and
not justice to the individual. And second, that the modern world, like
the heathen world, is here inflicting it chiefly on subordinate and
submerged classes of society; on slaves or those who are almost slaves.
For the heathen state is a Servile State. And no one has more of this
view of the state than the State Socialists. The official Labour
Politician would be the first to say in theory that punishment must not
be a moral recompense, but merely a social regulation. And he would be
the first to say in practice that it is the poor and ignorant who must
be regulated. Doubtless it is one thing to be regulated and another to
be tortured. But when once the principle is admitted broadly, the
progress towards torture may proceed pretty briskly. In the
psychological sphere, it is already as bad as it has ever been. It may
come as a surprise to the humanitarian to learn it; but it is none the
less true, that a mother may undergo moral torture in the last degree,
when her children are taken from her by brute force. And that incident
has become so common in the policing of the poor nowadays as hardly to
call for notice. And that example is particularly relevant to the
present argument. Nobody could pretend that the affectionate mother of a
rather backward child _deserves_ to be punished by having all the
happiness taken out of her life. But anybody can pretend that the act is
needed for the happiness of the community. Nobody will say it was so
wicked of her to love her baby that she deserves to lose it. But it is
always easy to say that some remote social purpose will be served by
taking it away. Thus the elimination of punishment means the extension
of tyranny. Men would not do things so oppressive so long as they were
vindictive. It is only when punishment is purged of vengeance that it
can be as villainous as that.
For that matter, it would be easy to find examples much nearer than this
one to the torturing of the Roman slaves. There is a very close parallel
in the Third Degree, as applied by the police to the criminal class on
suspicion, especially in America; for the criminal class is a submerged
class like the slaves; and it is but an experiment on the nerves in one
way instead of another, like a preference for the rack rather than the
thumbscrew. But the point is that it is applied to the criminal type
without any proof that it is in this case criminal; and the thing is
justified not by the criminality of the individual but by the needs of
the State. The police would answer exactly as the pagans answered: “We
are not punishing the crime; we are protecting the community.”
This tyranny is spreading. And there is no hope for liberty or democracy
until we all demand again, with a tongue of thunder, the right to be
blamed. We shall never feel like free men until we assert again our
sacred claim to be punished. The denunciation of a man for what he chose
to do is itself the confession that he chose to do it; and it is beneath
his dignity to admit that he could have done nothing else. The only
alternative theory is that we can do nothing but what we do, and our
rulers can do anything whatever to restrain us. Compared with that, it
would be better that roaring mobs should rise all over England,
uproariously demanding to be hanged.
A Defence of Dramatic Unities
Injustice is done to the old classical rules of artistic criticism,
because we do not treat them as artistic criticism. We first turn them
into police regulations, and then complain of them for being so. But I
suspect, with the submission proper to ignorance, that the art canons of
Aristotle and others were much more generally artistic, in the sense of
atmospheric. We allow a romantic critic to be as dogmatic as Ruskin, and
still feel that he is not really being so despotic as Boileau. If a
modern, like Maeterlinck, says that all drama is in an open door at the
end of an empty passage, we do not take it literally, like a notice
requiring an extra exit in case of fire. But if an ancient, like Horace,
says that all drama demands a closed door, which shall hide Medea while
she murders her children, then we do receive it as something rigid and
formal, like the order to close the shutters on Zeppelin nights. Now how
far the classical critics took their rules absolutely I do not know. But
I am substantially sure that there is a true instinct at the back of
them, whatever exceptions be allowed at the edges. The unities of time
and place, that is the idea of keeping figures and events within the
frame of a few hours or a few yards, is naturally derided as a specially
artificial affront to the intellect. But I am sure it is especially
true suggestion to the imagination. It is exactly in the artistic
atmosphere, where rules and reasons are so hard to define, that this
unification would be most easy to defend. This limitation to a few
scenes and actors really has something in it that pleases the
imagination and not the reason. There are instances in which it may be
broken boldly; there are types of art to which it does not apply at all.
But wherever it can be satisfied, something not superficial but rather
subconscious is satisfied. Something re-visits us that is the strange
soul of single places; the shadow of haunting ghosts or of household
gods. Like all such things, it is indescribable when it is successful:
it is easier to describe the disregard of it as unsuccessful. Thus
Stevenson’s masterpiece, “The Master of Ballantrae,” always seems to me
to fall into two parts, the finer which revolves round Durisdeer and the
inferior which rambles through India and America. The slender and
sinister figure in black, standing on the shore or vanishing from the
shrubbery, does really seem to have come from the ends of the earth. In
the chapters of travel he only serves to show that, for a boy’s
adventure tale, a good villain makes a bad hero. And even about Hamlet I
am so heretical as to be almost classical; I doubt whether the exile in
England does not rather dwarf than dignify the prisoner of Denmark. I am
not sure that he got anything out of the pirates he could not have got
out of the players. And I am very sure indeed that this figure in black,
like the other, produces a true though intangible effect of tragedy
when, and because, we see him against the great grey background of the
house of his fathers. In a word, it is what Mr. J. B. Yeats, the poet’s
stimulating parent, calls in his excellent book of essays “the drama of
the home.” The drama is domestic, and is dramatic because it is
domestic.
We might say that superior literature is centripetal, while inferior
literature is centrifugal. But oddly enough, the same truth may be found
by studying inferior as well as superior literature. What is true of a
Shakespearian play is equally true of a shilling shocker. The shocker is
at its worst when it wanders and escapes through new scenes and new
characters. The shocker is at its best when it shocks by something
familiar; a figure or fact that is already known though not understood.
A good detective story also can keep the classic unities; or otherwise
play the game. I for one devour detective stories; I am delighted when
the dagger of the curate is found to be the final clue to the death of
the vicar. But there is a point of honour for the author; he may conceal
the curate’s crime, but he must not conceal the curate. I feel I am
cheated when the last chapter hints for the first time that the vicar
had a curate. I am annoyed when a curate, who is a total stranger to me,
is produced from a cupboard or a box in a style at once abrupt and
belated. I am annoyed most of all when the new curate is only the tool
of a terrible secret society ramifying from Moscow or Thibet. These
cosmopolitan complications are the dull and not the dramatic element in
the ingenious tales of Mr. Oppenheim or Mr. Le Queux. They entirely
spoil the fine domesticity of a good murder. It is unsportsmanlike to
call spies from the end of the earth, as it is to call spirits from the
vasty deep, in a story that does not imply them from the start. And this
because the supply is infinite; and the infinite, as Coventry Patmore
well said, is generally alien to art. Everybody knows that the universe
contains enough spies or enough spectres to kill the most healthy and
vigorous vicar. The drama of detection is in discovering how he can be
killed decently and economically, within the classic unities of time and
place.
In short, the good mystery story should narrow its circles like an eagle
about to swoop. The spiral should curve inwards and not outwards. And
this inward movement is in true poetic mysteries as well as mere police
mystifications. It will be assumed that I am joking if I say there is a
serious social meaning in this novel-reader’s notion of keeping a crime
in the family. It must seem mere nonsense to find a moral in this fancy,
about washing gory linen at home. It will naturally be asked whether I
have idealized the home merely as a good place for assassinations. I
have not; any more than I have idealized the Church as a thing in which
the curates can kill the vicars. Nevertheless the thing, like many
things, is symbolic though it is not serious. And the objection to it
implies a subtle misunderstanding, in many minds, of the whole case for
the home as I have sometimes had occasion to urge it. When we defend the
family we do not mean it is always a peaceful family; when we maintain
the thesis of marriage we do not mean that it is always a happy
marriage. We mean that it is the theatre of the spiritual drama, the
place where things happen, especially the things that matter. It is not
so much the place where a man kills his wife as the place where he can
take the equally sensational step of not killing his wife. There is
truth in the cynicism that calls marriage a trial; but even the cynic
will admit that a trial may end in an acquittal. And the reason that
the family has this central and crucial character is the same reason
that makes it in politics the only prop of liberty. The family is the
test of freedom; because the family is the only thing that the free man
makes for himself and by himself. Other institutions must largely be
made for him by strangers, whether the institutions be despotic or
democratic. There is no other way of organizing mankind which can give
this power and dignity, not only to mankind but to men. If anybody likes
to put it so, we cannot really make all men democrats unless we make all
men despots. That is to say, the co-operation of the commonwealth will
be a mere automatic unanimity like that of insects, unless the citizen
has some province of purely voluntary action; unless he is so far not
only a citizen but a king. In the world of ethics this is called
liberty; in the world of economics it is called property, and in the
world of æsthetics, necessarily so much more dim and indefinable, it is
darkly adumbrated in the old dramatic unities of place or time. It must
indeed be a mistake in any case to treat such artistic rules as rigidly
as if they were moral rules. It was an error if they ever were so
treated; it may well be a question whether they were ever meant to be so
treated. But when critics have suggested that these classical canons
were a mere superficial varnish, it may safely be said that it is the
critics who are superficial. Modern artists would have been wiser if
they had developed sympathetically some of the Aristotelian æsthetics,
as mediæval philosophers developed sympathetically the Aristotelian
logic and ethics. For a more subtle study of the unities of time and
place, for example, as outlined for the Greek drama, might have led us
towards what is perhaps the last secret of all legend and literature.
It might have suggested why poets, pagan or not, returned perpetually to
the idea of happiness as a place for humanity as a person. It might
suggest why the world is always seeking for absolutes that are not
abstractions; why fairyland was always a land, and even the Superman was
almost a man.
The Boredom of Butterflies
There is one thing which critics perhaps tend to forget when they
complain that Mr. H. G. Wells no longer concerns himself with telling a
story. It is that nobody else could interest and excite us so much
without telling a story. It is possible to read one of his recent novels
almost without knowing the story at all. It is possible to dip into it
as into a book of essays, and pick up opinions here and there. But all
the essays are brilliant essays, and all the opinions are striking
opinions. It does not much matter who holds the opinions; it is possible
that the author does not hold them at all, and pretty certain that he
will not hold them long. But nobody else could make such splendid stuff
out of the very refuse of his rejected opinions. Seen from this side,
even what is called his failure must be recognized as a remarkable
success. The personal story may fade away, but it is something of an
achievement to be still interesting after becoming impersonal; like the
achievement of the Cheshire cat who could grin when he was no longer
there. Moreover, these impersonal and even irresponsible opinions of Mr.
Wells, though never conclusive, are always suggestive; each is a good
starting-point for thought, if only for the thought that refutes it. In
short, the critics of Mr. Wells rather exaggerate the danger of his
story running to speculation, as if it were merely running to seed.
Anyhow, they ought to remember that there are two meanings in running to
seed; and one of them is connected with seed-time.
I have, however, a particular reason for mentioning the matter here. I
confess there is more than one of Mr. Wells’s recent novels that I have
both read and not read. I am never quite sure that I have read all
Shakespeare or all Boswell’s Johnson; because I have so long had the
habit of opening them anywhere. So I have opened the works of Mr. Wells
anywhere, and had great fun out of the essays that would have seemed
only long parentheses in the story. But, on getting to rather closer
grips with the last of his stories, “The Secret Places of the Heart,” I
think I have caught a glimpse of a difficulty in this sort of narrative
which is something deeper than mere digression. In a story like
“Pickwick” or “Tristram Shandy” digression is never disappointment. But
in this case, differing as I do from the merely hostile critics, I
cannot dispel the atmosphere of disappointment. The story seems
inconclusive in a sense beyond anything merely inconsistent; and I fancy
I can guess why.
A pedantic logician may perhaps imagine that a thing can only be
inconclusive at the conclusion. But I will boldly claim the liberty in
language of saying that this sort of thing is inconclusive from the
start. It begins inconclusive, and in that sense begins dull. The hero
begins by telling the doctor about a mutable flux of flirtation, about
his own experiments as a philanderer, always flitting like a butterfly
from flower to flower. Now, it is highly probable that the diary of a
butterfly would be very dull, even if it were only the diary of a day.
His round need be no more really amusing than a postman’s, since he has
no serious spiritual interest in any of his places of call. Now, by
starting his hero as a philosopher and also philanderer, and taking
seriously his philosophy of philandering, the author as good as tells
us, to start with, that his hero will not have any serious adventures at
all. At the beginning of the story, he practically tells us that there
will be no story. The story of a fickle man is not a story at all;
because there is no strain or resistance in it. Somebody talked about
tales with a twist; and it is certain that all tales are tales with a
tug.
All the most subtle truths of literature are to be found in legend.
There is no better test of the truth of serious fiction than the simple
truths to be found in a fairy tale or an old ballad. Now, in the whole
of folk-lore there is no such thing as free love. There is such a thing
as false love. There is also another thing, which the old ballads always
talk of as true love. But the story always turns on the keeping of a
bond or the breaking of it; and this quite apart from orthodox morality
in the matter of the marriage bond. The love may be in the strict sense
sinful, but it is never anarchical. There was quite as little freedom
for Lancelot as for Arthur; quite as little mere philandering in the
philosophy of Tristram as in the philosophy of Galahad. It may have been
unlawful love, but it certainly was not lawless love. In the old ballads
there is the triumph of true love, as in “The Bailiff’s Daughter of
Islington”; or the tragedy of true love, as in “Helen of Kirkconnel
Lea”; or the tragedy of false love, as in the ballad of “Oh waly, waly
up the bank.” But there is neither triumph nor tragedy in the idea of
_avowedly_ transient love; and no literature will ever be made out of
it, except the very lightest literature of satire. And even the satire
must be a satire on fickleness, and therefore involve an indirect ideal
of fidelity. But you cannot make any enduring literature out of love
_conscious_ that it will not endure. Even if this mutability were
working as morality, it would still be unworkable as art.
The decadents used to say that things like the marriage vow might be
very convenient for commonplace public purposes, but had no place in the
world of beauty and imagination. The truth is exactly the other way. The
truth is that if marriage had not existed it would have been necessary
for artists to invent it. The truth is that if constancy had never been
needed as a social requirement, it would still have been created out of
cloud and air as a poetical requirement. If ever monogamy is abandoned
in practice, it will linger in legend and in literature. When society is
haunted by the butterfly flitting from flower to flower, poetry will
still be describing the desire of the moth for the star; and it will be
a fixed star. Literature must always revolve round loyalties; for a
rudimentary psychological reason, which is simply the nature of
narrative. You cannot tell a _story_ without the idea of pursuing a
purpose and sticking to a point. You cannot tell a story without the
idea of the Quest, the idea of the Vow; even if it be only the idea of
the Wager.
Perhaps the most modern equivalent to the man who makes a vow is the man
who makes a bet. But he must not hedge on a bet; still less must he
welsh, or do a bolt when he has made a bet. Even if the story ends with
his doing so, the dramatic emotion depends on our realizing the
dishonesty of his doing so. That is, the drama depends on the keeping or
breaking of a bond, if it be only a bet. A man wandering about a
race-course, making bets that nobody took seriously, would be merely a
bore. And so the hero wandering through a novel, making vows of love
that nobody took seriously, is merely a bore. The point here is not so
much that morally it cannot be a creditable story, but that artistically
it cannot be a story at all. Art is born when the temporary touches the
eternal; the shock of beauty is when the irresistible force hits the
immovable post.
Thus in the last novel of Mr. Wells, what is inconclusive in the second
part is largely due to what is convincing in the first part. By the time
that the hero meets his new heroine on Salisbury Plain, he has seriously
convinced us that there is nothing heroic about him, and that nothing
heroic will happen to him; at any rate in that department. He
disenchants the enchantment beforehand, and warns the reader against
even a momentary illusion. When once a man looks forward as well as
backward to disillusionment, no romance can be made of him.
Profligacy may be made romantic, precisely because it implies some
betrayal or breaking of a law. But polygamy is not in the least
romantic. Polygamy is dull to the point of respectability. When a man
looks forward to a number of wives as he does to a number of cigarettes,
you can no more make a book out of them than out of the bills from his
tobacconist. Anything having the character of a Turkish harem has also
something of the character of a Turkey carpet. It is not a portrait, or
even a picture, but a pattern. We may at the moment be looking at one
highly coloured and even flamboyant figure in the carpet; but we know
that on every side, in front as well as behind, the image is repeated
without purpose and without finality.
The Terror of a Toy
It would be too high and hopeful a compliment to say that the world is
becoming absolutely babyish. For its chief weak-mindedness is an
inability to appreciate the intelligence of babies. On every side we
hear whispers and warnings that would have appeared half-witted to the
Wise Men of Gotham. Only this Christmas I was told in a toy-shop that
not so many bows and arrows were being made for little boys; because
they were considered dangerous. It might in some circumstances be
dangerous to have a little bow. It is always dangerous to have a little
boy. But no other society, claiming to be sane, would have dreamed of
supposing that you could abolish all bows unless you could abolish all
boys. With the merits of the latter reform I will not deal here. There
is a great deal to be said for such a course; and perhaps we shall soon
have an opportunity of considering it. For the modern mind seems quite
incapable of distinguishing between the means and the end, between the
organ and the disease, between the use and the abuse; and would
doubtless break the boy along with the bow, as it empties out the baby
with the bath.
But let us, by way of a little study in this mournful state of things,
consider this case of the dangerous toy. Now the first and most
self-evident truth is that, of all the things a child sees and touches,
the most dangerous toy is about the least dangerous thing. There is
hardly a single domestic utensil that is not much more dangerous than a
little bow and arrows. He can burn himself in the fire, he can boil
himself in the bath, he can cut his throat with the carving-knife, he
can scald himself with the kettle, he can choke himself with anything
small enough, he can break his neck off anything high enough. He moves
all day long amid a murderous machinery, as capable of killing and
maiming as the wheels of the most frightful factory. He plays all day in
a house fitted up with engines of torture like the Spanish Inquisition.
And while he thus dances in the shadow of death, he is to be saved from
all the perils of possessing a piece of string, tied to a bent bough or
twig. When he is a little boy it generally takes him some time even to
learn how to hold the bow. When he does hold it, he is delighted if the
arrow flutters for a few yards like a feather or an autumn leaf. But
even if he grows a little older and more skilful, and has yet not
learned to despise arrows in favour of aeroplanes, the amount of damage
he could conceivably do with his little arrows would be about
one-hundredth part of the damage that he could always in any case have
done by simply picking up a stone in the garden.
Now you do not keep a little boy from throwing stones by preventing him
from ever seeing stones. You do not do it by locking up all the stones
in the Geological Museum, and only issuing tickets of admission to
adults. You do not do it by trying to pick up all the pebbles on the
beach, for fear he should practise throwing them into the sea. You do
not even adopt so obvious and even pressing a social reform as
forbidding roads to be made of anything but asphalt, or directing that
all gardens shall be made on clay and none on gravel. You neglect all
these great opportunities opening before you; you neglect all these
inspiring vistas of social science and enlightenment. When you want to
prevent a child from throwing stones, you fall back on the stalest and
most sentimental and even most superstitious methods. You do it by
trying to preserve some reasonable authority and influence over the
child. You trust to your private relation with the boy, and not to your
public relation with the stone. And what is true of the natural missile
is just as true, of course, of the artificial missile; especially as it
is a very much more ineffectual and therefore innocuous missile. A man
could be really killed, like St. Stephen, with the stones in the road. I
doubt if he could be really killed, like St. Sebastian, with the arrows
in the toy-shop. But anyhow the very plain principle is the same. If you
can teach a child not to throw a stone, you can teach him when to shoot
an arrow; if you cannot teach him anything, he will always have
something to throw. If he can be persuaded not to smash the Archdeacon’s
hat with a heavy flint, it will probably be possible to dissuade him
from transfixing that head-dress with a toy arrow. If his training
deters him from heaving half a brick at the postman, it will probably
also warn him against constantly loosening shafts of death against the
policeman. But the notion that the child depends upon particular
implements, labelled dangerous, in order to be a danger to himself and
other people, is a notion so nonsensical that it is hard to see how any
human mind can entertain it for a moment. The truth is that all sorts of
faddism, both official and theoretical, have broken down the natural
authority of the domestic institution, especially among the poor; and
the faddists are now casting about desperately for a substitute for the
thing they have themselves destroyed. The normal thing is for the
parents to prevent a boy from doing more than a reasonable amount of
damage with his bow and arrow; and for the rest, to leave him to a
reasonable enjoyment of them. Officialism cannot thus follow the life of
the individual boy, as can the individual guardian. You cannot appoint a
particular policeman for each boy, to pursue him when he climbs trees or
falls into ponds. So the modern spirit has descended to the
indescribable mental degradation of trying to abolish the abuse of
things by abolishing the things themselves; which is as if it were to
abolish ponds or abolish trees. Perhaps it will have a try at that
before long. Thus we have all heard of savages who try a tomahawk for
murder, or burn a wooden club for the damage it has done to society. To
such intellectual levels may the world return.
There are indeed yet lower levels. There is a story from America about a
little boy who gave up his toy cannon to assist the disarmament of the
world. I do not know if it is true, but on the whole I prefer to think
so; for it is perhaps more tolerable to imagine one small monster who
could do such a thing than many more mature monsters who could invent or
admire it. There were some doubtless who neither invented nor admired.
It is one of the peculiarities of the Americans that they combine a
power of producing what they satirize as “sobstuff” with a parallel
power of satirizing it. And of the two American tall stories, it is
sometimes hard to say which is the story and which the satire. But it
seems clear that some people did really repeat this story in a
reverential spirit. And it marks, as I have said, another stage of
cerebral decay. You can (with luck) break a window with a toy arrow; but
you can hardly bombard a town with a toy gun. If people object to the
mere model of a cannon, they must equally object to the picture of a
cannon, and so to every picture in the world that depicts a sword or a
spear. There would be a splendid clearance of all the great
art-galleries of the world. But it would be nothing to the destruction
of all the great libraries of the world, if we logically extended the
principle to all the literary masterpieces that admit the glory of arms.
When this progress had gone on for a century or two, it might begin to
dawn on people that there was something wrong with their moral
principle. What is wrong with their moral principle is that it is
immoral. Arms, like every other adventure or art of man, have two sides
according as they are invoked for the infliction or the defiance of
wrong. They have also an element of real poetry and an element of
realistic and therefore repulsive prose. The child’s symbolic sword and
bow are simply the poetry without the prose; the good without the evil.
The toy sword is the abstraction and emanation of the heroic, apart
from all its horrible accidents. It is the soul of the sword, that will
never be stained with blood.
False Theory and the Theatre
A theatrical manager recently insisted on introducing Chinese labour
into the theatrical profession. He insisted on having real Chinamen to
take the part of Chinese servants; and some actors seem to have resented
it--as I think, very reasonably. A distinguished actress, who is clever
enough to know better, defended it on the ground that nothing must
interfere with the perfection of a work of art. I dispute the moral
thesis in any case; and Nero would no doubt have urged it in defence of
having real deaths in the amphitheatre. I do not admit in any case that
the artist can be entirely indifferent to hunger and unemployment, any
more than to lions or boiling oil. But, as a matter of fact, there is no
need to raise the moral question, because the case is equally strong in
relation to the artistic question. I do not think that a Chinese
character being represented by a Chinese actor is the finishing touch to
the perfection of a work of art. I think it is the last and lowest phase
of the vulgarity that is called realism. It is in the same style and
taste as the triumphs on which, I believe, some actor-managers have
prided themselves: the triumphs of having real silver for goblets or
real jewels for crowns. That is not the spirit of a perfect artist, but
rather of a purse-proud parvenu. The perfect artist would be he who
could put on a crown of gilt wire or tinsel and make us feel he was a
king.
Moreover, if the principle is to be extended from properties to persons,
it is not easy to see where the principle can stop. If we are to insist
on real Asiatics to act “Chu Chin Chow,” why not insist on real
Venetians to act “The Merchant of Venice”? We did experiment recently,
and I believe very successfully, in having the Jew acted by a real Jew.
But I hardly think we should like to make it a rule that nobody must be
allowed to act Shylock unless he can prove his racial right to call upon
his father Abraham. Must the characters of Macbeth and Macduff only be
represented by men with names like Macpherson and Macnab? Must the
Prince of Denmark be native there and to the manner born? Must we import
a crowd of Greeks before we are allowed to act “Troilus and Cressida,”
or a mob of real Egyptians to form the background of “Antony and
Cleopatra”? Will it be necessary to kidnap an African gentleman out of
Africa, by the methods of the slave trade, and force him into acting
Othello? It was rather foolishly suggested at one time that our allies
in Japan might be offended at the fantastic satire of “The Mikado.” As a
matter of fact, the satire of “The Mikado” is not at all directed
against Japanese things, but exclusively against English things. But I
certainly think there might be some little ill-feeling in Japan if gangs
of Japanese coolies were shipped across two continents merely in order
to act in it. If once this singular rule be recognized, a dramatist
will certainly be rather shy of introducing Zulus or Red Indians into
his dramas, owing to the difficulty in securing appropriate dramatic
talent. He will hesitate before making his hero an Eskimo. He will
abandon his intention of seeking his heroine in the Sandwich Islands. If
he were to insist on introducing real cannibals, it seems possible that
they might insist on introducing real cannibalism. This would be quite
in the spirit of Nero and all the art critics of the Roman realism of
the amphitheatre. But surely it would be putting almost too perfect a
finishing touch to the perfection of a work of art. That kind of
finishing touch is a little too finishing.
The irony grew more intense when the newspapers that had insisted on
Chinamen because they could not help being Chinamen began to praise them
with admiration and astonishment because they looked Chinese. This opens
up a speculation so complex and contradictory that I do not propose to
follow it, for I am interested here not in the particular incident but
in the general idea. It will be a sufficient statement of the
fundamental fact of all the arts if I say simply that I do not believe
in the resemblance. I do not believe that a Chinaman does look like a
Chinaman. That is, I do not believe that any Chinaman will necessarily
look like _the_ Chinaman--the Chinaman in the imagination of the artist
and the interest of the crowd. We all know the fable of the man who
imitated a pig, and his rival who was hooted by the crowd because he
could only produce what was (in fact) the squeak of a real pig. The
crowd was perfectly right. The crowd was a crowd of very penetrating and
philosophical art critics. They had come there not to hear an ordinary
pig, which they could hear by poking in any ordinary pigsty. They had
come to hear how the voice of the pig affects the immortal mind and
spirit of man; what sort of satire he would make of it; what sort of fun
he can get out of it; what sort of exaggeration he feels to be an
exaggeration of its essence, and not of its accidents. In other words,
they had come to hear a squeak, but the sort of squeak which expresses
what a man thinks of a pig--not the vastly inferior squeak which only
expresses what a pig thinks of a man. I have myself a poetical
enthusiasm for pigs, and the paradise of my fancy is one where the pigs
have wings. But it is only men, especially wise men, who discuss whether
pigs can fly; we have no particular proof that pigs ever discuss it.
Therefore the actor who imitated the quadruped may well have put into
his squeak something of the pathetic cry of one longing for the wings of
the dove. The quadruped himself might express no such sentiment; he
might appear, and generally does appear, singularly unconscious of his
own lack of feathers. But the same principle is true of things more
dignified than the most dignified porker, though clad in the most superb
plumage. If a vision of a stately Arab has risen in the imagination of
an author who is an artist, he will be wise if he confides it to an
actor who is also an artist. He will be much wiser to confide it to an
actor than to an Arab. The actor, being a fellow-countryman and a
fellow-artist, may bring out what the author thinks the Arab stands for;
whereas the real Arab might be a particular individual who at that
particular moment refused to stand for anything of the sort, or for
anything at all. The principle is a general one; and I mean no
disrespect to China in the porcine parallel, or in the figurative
association of pigs and pigtails.
But, as a matter of fact, the argument is especially apt in the case of
China. For I fear that China is chiefly interesting to most of us as the
other end of the world. It is valued as something far-off, and therefore
fantastical, like a kingdom in the clouds of sunrise. It is not the very
real virtues of the Chinese tradition--its stoicism, its sense of
honour, its ancient peasant cults--that most people want to put into a
play. It is the ordinary romantic feeling about something remote and
extravagant, like the Martians or the Man in the Moon. It is perfectly
reasonable to have that romantic feeling in moderation, like other
amusements. But it is not reasonable to expect the remote person to feel
remote from himself, or the man at the other end of the world not to
feel it as this end. We must not ask the outlandish Oriental to feel
outlandish, or a Chinaman to be astonished at being Chinese. If,
therefore, the literary artist has the legitimate literary purpose of
expressing the mysterious and alien atmosphere which China implies to
him, he will probably do it much better with the aid of an actor who is
not Chinese. Of course, I am not criticizing the particular details of
the particular performance, of which I know little or nothing. I do not
know the circumstances; and under the circumstances, for all I know, the
experiment may have been very necessary or very successful. I merely
protest against a theory of dramatic truth, urged in defence of the
dramatic experiment, which seems to me calculated to falsify the whole
art of the drama. It is founded on exactly the same fallacy as that of
the infant in Stevenson’s nursery rhyme, who thought that the Japanese
children must suffer from home-sickness through being always abroad in
Japan.
This brings us very near to an old and rather threadbare theatrical
controversy, about whether staging should be simple or elaborate. I do
not mean to begin that argument all over again. What is really wanted is
not so much the simple stage-manager as the simple spectator. In a very
real sense, what is wanted is the simple critic, who would be in truth
the most subtle critic. The healthy human instincts in these things are
at least as much spoiled by sophistication in the stalls as by
elaboration on the stage. A really simple mind would enjoy a simple
scene--and also a gorgeous scene. A popular instinct, to be found in all
folklore, would know well enough when the one or the other was
appropriate. But what is involved here is not the whole of that
sophistication, but only one particular sophistry, and against that
sophistry we may well pause to protest. It is the critical fallacy of
cutting off a real donkey’s head to put it on Bottom the Weaver; when
the head is symbolical, and in that case more appropriate to the critic
than to the actor.
The Secret Society of Mankind
With that fantastic love of paradox which gives pain to so many critics,
I once suggested that there may be some truth in the notion of the
brotherhood of men. This was naturally a subject for severe criticism
from the modern or modernist standpoint; and I remember that the
cleverest refutation of it occurred in a book which was called “We
Moderns.” It was written by Mr. Edward Moore, and very well written too;
indeed the author did himself some injustice in insisting on his own
modernity; for he was not so very modern after all, but really quite
lucid and coherent. But I will venture to take his remark as a text here
because it concerns a matter on which most moderns darken counsel in a
highly incoherent manner. It concerns the nature of the unity of men;
which I did certainly state in its more defiant form as the equality of
man. And I said that this norm or meeting-place of mankind can be found
in the two extremes of the comic and the tragic. I said that no
individual tragedy could be so tragic as having to die; and all men have
equally to die. I said that nothing can be funnier than having two legs;
and all men can join equally in the joke.
The critic in question was terribly severe on this remark. I believe
that the words of his condemnation ran as follows: “Well, in this
passage, there is an error so plain, it is almost inconceivable that a
responsible thinker could have put it forward even in jest. For it is
clear that the tragic and comic elements of which Mr. Chesterton speaks
make not only mankind, but _all life_, equal. Everything that lives must
die; and therefore it is, in Mr. Chesterton’s sense, tragic. Everything
that lives has shape; and therefore it is, in Mr. Chesterton’s sense,
comic. His premises lead to the equality not of mankind, but of all that
lives; whether it be leviathan or butterfly, oak or violet, worm or
eagle.... Would that he had said this! Then we who affirm inequality
would be the first to echo him.” I do not feel it hard to show that
where Mr. Moore thinks equality wrong is exactly where it is right; and
I will begin with mortality; premising that the same is true (for those
who believe it) of immortality. Both are absolutes: a man cannot be
somewhat mortal; nor can he be rather immortal.
To begin with, it must be understood that having an equality in being
black or white is not even the same as being equally black or white. It
is generally fair to take a familiar illustration; and I will take the
ordinary expression about being all in the same boat. Mr. Moore and I
and all men are not only all in the same boat, but have a very real
equality implied in that fact. Nevertheless, since there is a word
“inner” as well as a word “in,” there is a sense in which some of us
might be more in the boat than others. My fellow passengers might have
stowed me at the bottom of the boat and sat on top of me, moved by a
natural distaste for my sitting on top of them. I have noticed that I am
often thus packed in a preliminary fashion into the back seats or basic
parts of cabs, cars, or boats; there being evidently a feeling that I am
the stuff of which the foundations of an edifice are made rather than
its toppling minarets or tapering spires. Meanwhile Mr. Moore might be
surveying the world from the masthead, if there were one, or leaning out
over the prow with the forward gestures of a leader of men, or even
sitting by preference on the edge of the boat with his feet paddling in
the water, to indicate the utmost possible aristocratic detachment from
us and our concerns. Nevertheless, in the large and ultimate matters
which are the whole meaning of the phrase “all in the same boat,” we
should be all equally in the same boat. We should be all equally
dependent upon the reassuring fact that a boat can float. If it did not
float but sink, each one of us would have lost his one and only boat at
the same decisive time and in the same disconcerting manner. If the King
of the Cannibal Islands, upon whose principal island we might suffer the
inconvenience of being wrecked, were to exclaim in a loud voice “I will
eat every single man who has arrived by that identical boat and no
other,” we should all be eaten, and we should all be equally eaten. For
being eaten, considered as a tragedy, is not a matter of degree.
Now there is a fault in every analogy; but the fault in my analogy is
not a fault in my argument; it is the chief fault in Mr. Moore’s
argument. It may be said that even in a shipwreck men are not equal, for
some of us might be so strong that we could swim to the shore, or some
of us might be so tough that the island king would repent of his rash
vow after the first bite. But it is precisely here that I have again,
as delicately as possible, to draw the reader’s attention to the modest
and little-known institution called death. We are all in a boat which
will certainly drown us all, and drown us equally, the strongest with
the weakest; we sail to the land of an ogre, _edax rerum_, who devours
all without distinction. And the meaning in the phrase about being all
in the same boat is, not that there are no degrees among the people in a
boat, but that all those degrees are nothing compared with the
stupendous fact that the boat goes home or goes down. And it is when I
come to the particular criticism on my remarks about “the fact of having
to die” that I feel most confident that I was right and that Mr. Moore
is wrong.
It will be noted that I spoke of the fact of having to die, not of the
fact of dying. The brotherhood of men, being a spiritual thing, is not
concerned merely with the truth that all men will die, but with the
truth that all men know it. It is true, as Mr. Moore says, that
everything will die, “whether it be leviathan or butterfly, oak or
violet, worm or eagle”; but exactly what, at the very start, we do not
know is whether they know it. Can Mr. Moore draw forth leviathan with a
hook, and extract his hopes and fears about the heavenly harpooner? Can
he worm its philosophy out of a worm, or get the caterpillar to talk
about the faint possibility of a butterfly? The caterpillar on the leaf
may repeat to Blake his mother’s grief; but it does not repeat to
anybody its own grief about its own mother. Can he know whether oaks
confront their fate with hearts of oak, as the phrase is used in a
sailor’s song? He cannot; and this is the whole point about human
brotherhood, the point the vegetarians cannot see. This is why a
harpooner is not an assassin; this is why eating whale’s blubber, though
not attractive to the fancy, is not repulsive to the conscience. We do
not know what a whale thinks of death; still less what the other whales
think of his being killed and eaten. He may be a pessimistic whale, and
be perpetually wishing that this too, too solid blubber would melt, thaw
and resolve itself into a dew. He may be a fanatical whale, and feel
frantically certain of passing instantly into a polar paradise of
whales, ruled by the sacred whale who swallowed Jonah. But we can elicit
no sign or gesture from him suggestive of such reflections; and the
working common sense of the thing is that no creatures outside man seem
to have any sense of death at all. Mr. Moore has therefore chosen a
strangely unlucky point upon which to challenge the true egalitarian
doctrine. Almost the most arresting and even startling stamp of the
solidarity and sameness of mankind is precisely this fact, not only of
death, but of the shadow of death. We do know of any man whatever what
we do not know of any other thing whatever, that his death is what we
call a tragedy. From the fact that it is a tragedy flow all the forms
and tests by which we say it is a murder or an execution, a martyrdom or
a suicide. They all depend on an echo or vibration, not only in the soul
of man, but in the souls of all men.
Oddly enough, Mr. Moore has made exactly the same mistake about the
comic as about the tragic. It is true, I think, that almost everything
which has a shape is humorous; but it is not true that everything which
has a shape has a sense of humour. The whale may be laughable, but it is
not the whale who laughs; the image indeed is almost alarming. And the
instant the question is raised, we collide with another colossal fact,
dwarfing all human differentiations; the fact that man is the only
creature who does laugh. In the presence of this prodigious fact, the
fact that men laugh in different degrees, and at different things,
shrivels not merely into insignificance but into invisibility. It is
true that I have often felt the physical universe as something like a
firework display: the most practical of all practical jokes. But if the
cosmos is meant for a joke, men seem to be the only cosmic conspirators
who have been let into the joke. There could be no fraternity like our
freemasonry in that secret pleasure. It is true that there are no limits
to this jesting faculty, that it is not confined to common human jests;
but it is confined to human jesters. Mr. Moore may burst out laughing
when he beholds the morning star, or be thrown into convulsions of
amusement by the effect of moonrise seen through a mist. He may, to
quote his own catalogue, see all the fun of an eagle or an oak tree. We
may come upon him in some quiet dell rolling about in uproarious mirth
at the sight of a violet. But we shall not find the violet in a state of
uproarious mirth at Mr. Moore. He may laugh at the worm; but the worm
will not turn and laugh at him. For that comfort he must come to his
fellow-sinners: I shall always be ready to oblige.
The truth involved here has had many names; that man is the image of
God; that he is the microcosm; that he is the measure of all things. He
is the microcosm in the sense that he is the mirror, the only crystal we
know in which the fantasy and fear in things are, in the double and real
sense, things of reflection. In the presence of this mysterious
monopoly the differences of men are like dust. That is what the equality
of men means to me; and that is the only intelligible thing it ever
meant to anybody. The common things of men infinitely outclass all
classes. For a man to disagree with this it is necessary that he should
understand it; Mr. Moore may really disagree with it; but the ordinary
modern anti-egalitarian does not understand it, or apparently anything
else. If a man says he had some transcendental dogma of his own, as Mr.
Moore may possibly have, which mixes man with nature or claims to see
other values in men, I shall say no more than that my religion is
different from his, and I am uncommonly glad of it. But if he simply
says that men cannot be equal because some of them are clever and some
of them are stupid--why then I shall merely agree (not without tears)
that some of them are very stupid.
The Sentimentalism of Divorce
Divorce is a thing which the newspapers now not only advertise, but
advocate, almost as if it were a pleasure in itself. It may be, indeed,
that all the flowers and festivities will now be transferred from the
fashionable wedding to the fashionable divorce. A superb iced and
frosted divorce-cake will be provided for the feast, and in military
circles will be cut with the co-respondent’s sword. A dazzling display
of divorce presents will be laid out for the inspection of the company,
watched by a detective dressed as an ordinary divorce guest. Perhaps the
old divorce breakfast will be revived; anyhow, toasts will be drunk, the
guests will assemble on the doorstep to see the husband and wife go off
in opposite directions; and all will go merry as a divorce-court bell.
All this, though to some it might seem a little fanciful, would really
be far less fantastic than the sort of things that are really said on
the subject. I am not going to discuss the depth and substance of that
subject. I myself hold a mystical view of marriage; but I am not going
to debate it here. But merely in the interests of light and logic I
would protest against the way in which it is frequently debated. The
process cannot rationally be called a debate at all. It is a sort of
chorus of sentimentalists in the sensational newspapers, perpetually
intoning some such formula as this: “We respect marriage, we reverence
marriage, holy, sacred, ineffably exquisite and ideal marriage. True
marriage is love, and when love alters, marriage alters, and when love
stops or begins again, marriage does the same; wonderful, beautiful,
beatific marriage.”
Now, with all reasonable sympathy with everything sentimental, I may
remark that all that talk is tosh. Marriage is an institution like any
other, set up deliberately to have certain functions and limitations; it
is an institution like private property, or conscription, or the legal
liberties of the subject. To talk as if it were made or melted with
certain changing moods is a mere waste of words. The object of private
property is that as many citizens as possible should have a certain
dignity and pleasure in being masters of material things. But suppose a
dog-stealer were to say that as soon as a man was bored with his dog it
ceased to be his dog, and he ceased to be responsible for it. Suppose he
were to say that by merely coveting the dog, he could immediately
morally possess the dog. The answer would be that the only way to make
men responsible for dogs was to make the relation a legal one, apart
from the likes and dislikes of the moment. Suppose a burglar were to
say: “Private property I venerate, private property I revere; but I am
convinced that Mr. Brown does not truly value his silver Apostle spoons
as such sacred objects should be valued; they have therefore ceased to
be his property; in reality they have already become my property, for I
appreciate their precious character as nobody else can do.” Suppose a
murderer were to say: “What can be more amiable and admirable than
human life lived with a due sense of its priceless opportunity! But I
regret to observe that Mr. Robinson has lately been looking decidedly
tired and melancholy; life accepted in this depressing and demoralizing
spirit can no longer truly be called life; it is rather my own exuberant
and perhaps exaggerated joy of life which I must gratify by cutting his
throat with a carving-knife.”
It is obvious that these philosophers would fail to understand what we
mean by a rule, quite apart from the problem of its exceptions. They
would fail to grasp what we mean by an institution, whether it be the
institution of law, of property, or of marriage. A reasonable person
will certainly reply to the burglar: “You will hardly soothe us by
merely poetical praises of property; because your case would be much
more convincing if you denied, as the Communists do, that property ought
to exist at all. There may be, there certainly are, gross abuses in
private property; but, so long as it is an institution at all, it cannot
alter merely with moods and emotions. A farm cannot simply float away
from a farmer, in proportion as his interest in it grows fainter than it
was. A house cannot shift away by inches from a householder, by certain
fine shades of feeling that he happens to have about it. A dog cannot
drift away like a dream, and begin to belong to somebody else who
happens just then to be dreaming of him. And neither can the serious
social relation of husband and wife, of mother and father, or even of
man and woman, be resolved in all its relations by passions and
reactions of sentiment.” This question is quite apart from the question
of whether there are exceptions to the rule of loyalty, or what they
are. The primary point is that there is an institution to which to be
loyal. If the new sentimentalists mean what they say, when they say they
venerate that institution, they must not suggest that an institution can
be actually identical with an emotion. And that is what their rhetoric
does suggest, so far as it can be said to suggest anything.
These writers are always explaining to us why they believe in divorce. I
think I can easily understand why they believe in divorce. What I do not
understand is why they believe in marriage. Just as the philosophical
burglar would be more philosophical if he were a Bolshevist, so this
sort of divorce advocate would be more philosophical if he were a
free-lover. For his arguments never seem to touch on marriage as an
institution, or anything more than an individual experience. The real
explanation of this strange indifference to the institutional idea is, I
fancy, something not only deeper, but wider; something affecting all the
institutions of the modern world. The truth is that these sociologists
are not at all interested in promoting the sort of social life that
marriage does promote. The sort of society of which marriage has always
been the strongest pillar is what is sometimes called the distributive
society; the society in which most of the citizens have a tolerable
share of property, especially property in land. Everywhere, all over the
world, the farm goes with the family and the family with the farm.
Unless the whole domestic group hold together with a sort of loyalty or
local patriotism, unless the inheritance of property is logical and
legitimate, unless the family quarrels are kept out of the courts of
officialism, the tradition of family ownership cannot be handed on
unimpaired. On the other hand, the Servile State, which is the opposite
of the distributive state, has always been rather embarrassed by the
institution of marriage. It is an old story that the negro slavery of
“Uncle Tom’s Cabin” did its worst work in the breaking-up of families.
But, curiously enough, the same story is told from both sides. For the
apologists of the Slave States, or, at least, of the Southern States,
made the same admission even in their own defence. If they denied
breaking up the slave family, it was because they denied that there was
any slave family to break up.
Free love is the direct enemy of freedom. It is the most obvious of all
the bribes that can be offered by slavery. In servile societies a vast
amount of sexual laxity can go on in practice, and even in theory, save
when now and then some cranky speculator or crazy squire has a fad for
some special breed of slaves like a breed of cattle. And even that
lunacy would not last long; for lunatics are the minority among
slave-owners. Slavery has a much more sane and a much more subtle appeal
to human nature than that. It is much more likely that, after a few such
fads and freaks, the new Servile State would settle down into the sleepy
resignation of the old Servile State; the old pagan repose in slavery,
as it was before Christianity came to trouble and perplex the world with
ideals of liberty and chivalry. One of the conveniences of that pagan
world is that, below a certain level of society, nobody really need
bother about pedigree or paternity at all. A new world began when slaves
began to stand on their dignity as virgin martyrs. Christendom is the
civilization that such martyrs made; and slavery is its returning enemy.
But of all the bribes that the old pagan slavery can offer, this luxury
and laxity is the strongest; nor do I deny that the influences desiring
the degradation of human dignity have here chosen their instrument
well.
Street Cries and Stretching the Law
About a hundred years ago some enemy sowed among our people the heresy
that it is more practical to use a corkscrew to open a sardine-tin, or
to employ a door-scraper as a paperweight. Practical politics came to
mean the habit of using everything for some other purpose than its own;
of snatching up anything as a substitute for something else. A law that
had been meant to do one thing, and had conspicuously failed to do it,
was always excused because it might do something totally different and
perhaps directly contrary. A custom that was supposed to keep everything
white was allowed to survive on condition that it made everything black.
In reality this is so far from being practical that it does not even
rise to the dignity of being lazy. At the best it can only claim to save
trouble, and it does not even do that. What it really means is that some
people will take every other kind of trouble in the world, if they are
saved the trouble of thinking. They will sit for hours trying to open a
tin with a corkscrew, rather than make the mental effort of pursuing the
abstract, academic, logical connexion between a corkscrew and a cork.
Here is an example of the sort of thing I mean, which I came across in a
daily paper to-day. A headline announces in staring letters, and with
startled notes of exclamation, that some abominable judicial authority
has made the monstrous decision that musicians playing in the street are
not beggars. The journalist bitterly remarks that they may shove their
hats under our very noses for money, but yet we must not call them
beggars. He follows this remark with several notes of exclamation, and I
feel inclined to add a few of my own. The most astonishing thing about
the matter, to my mind, is that the journalist is quite innocent in his
own indignation. It never so much as crosses his mind that
organ-grinders are not classed as beggars because they are not beggars.
They may be as much of a nuisance as beggars; they may demand special
legislation like beggars; it may be right and proper for every
philanthropist to stop them, starve them, harry them, and hound them to
death just as if they were beggars. But they are not beggars, by any
possible definition of begging. Nobody can be said to be a mere
mendicant who is offering something in exchange for money, especially if
it is something which some people like and are willing to pay for. A
street singer is no more of a mendicant than Madame Clara Butt, though
the method (and the scale) of remuneration differs more or less. Anybody
who sells anything, in the streets or in the shops, is begging in the
sense of begging people to buy. Mr. Selfridge is begging people to buy;
the Imperial International Universal Cosmic Stores is begging people to
buy. The only possible definition of the actual beggar is not that he is
begging people to buy, but that he has nothing to sell.
Now, it is interesting to ask ourselves what the newspaper really
meant, when it was so wildly illogical in what it said. Superficially
and as a matter of mood or feeling, we can all guess what was meant. The
writer meant that street musicians looked very much like beggars,
because they wore thinner and dirtier clothes than his own; and that he
had grown quite used to people who looked like that being treated anyhow
and arrested for everything. That is a state of mind not uncommon among
those whom economic security has kept as superficial as a varnish. But
what was intellectually involved in his vague argument was more
interesting. What he meant was, in that deeper sense, that it would be a
great convenience if the law that punishes beggars could be _stretched_
to cover people who are certainly not beggars, but who may be as much of
a botheration as beggars. In other words, he wanted to use the mendicity
laws in a matter quite unconnected with mendicity; but he wanted to use
the old laws because it would save the trouble of making new laws--as
the corkscrew would save the trouble of going to look for the
tin-opener. And for this notion of the crooked and anomalous use of
laws, for ends logically different from their own, he could, of course,
find much support in the various sophists who have attacked reason in
recent times. But, as I have said, it does not really save trouble; and
it is becoming increasingly doubtful whether it will even save disaster.
It used to be said that this rough-and-ready method made the country
richer; but it will be found less and less consoling to explain why the
country is richer when the country is steadily growing poorer. It will
not comfort us in the hour of failure to listen to long and ingenious
explanations of our success. The truth is that this sort of practical
compromise has not led to practical success. The success of England came
as the culmination of the highly logical and theoretical eighteenth
century. The method was already beginning to fail by the time we came to
the end of the compromising and constitutional nineteenth century.
Modern scientific civilization was launched by logicians. It was only
wrecked by practical men. Anyhow, by this time everybody in England has
given up pretending to be particularly rich. It is, therefore, no
appropriate moment for proving that a course of being consistently
unreasonable will always lead to riches.
In truth, it would be much more practical to be more logical. If street
musicians are a nuisance, let them be legislated against for being a
nuisance. If begging is really wrong, a logical law should be imposed on
all beggars, and not merely on those whom particular persons happen to
regard as being also nuisances. What this sort of opportunism does is
simply to prevent any question being considered as a whole. I happen to
think the whole modern attitude towards beggars is entirely heathen and
inhuman. I should be prepared to maintain, as a matter of general
morality, that it is intrinsically indefensible to punish human beings
for asking for human assistance. I should say that it is intrinsically
insane to urge people to give charity and forbid people to accept
charity. Nobody is penalized for crying for help when he is drowning;
why should he be penalized for crying for help when he is starving?
Every one would expect to have to help a man to save his life in a
shipwreck; why not a man who has suffered a shipwreck of his life? A man
may be in such a position by no conceivable fault of his own; but in any
case his fault is never urged against him in the parallel cases. A man
is saved from shipwreck without inquiry about whether he has blundered
in the steering of his ship; and we fish him out of a pond before asking
whose fault it was that he fell into it. A striking social satire might
be written about a man who was rescued again and again out of mere
motives of humanity in all the wildest places of the world; who was
heroically rescued from a lion and skilfully saved out of a sinking
ship; who was sought out on a desert island and scientifically recovered
from a deadly swoon; and who only found himself suddenly deserted by all
humanity when he reached the city that was his home.
In the ultimate sense, therefore, I do not myself disapprove of
mendicants. Nor do I disapprove of musicians. It may not unfairly be
retorted that this is because I am not a musician. I allow full weight
to the fairness of the retort, but I cannot think it a good thing that
even musicians should lose all their feelings except the feeling for
music. And it may surely be said that a man must have lost most of his
feelings if he does not feel the pathos of a barrel-organ in a poor
street. But there are other feelings besides pathos covered by any
comprehensive veto upon street music and minstrelsy. There are feelings
of history, and even of patriotism. I have seen in certain rich and
respectable quarters of London a notice saying that all street cries are
forbidden. If there were a notice up to say that all old tombstones
should be carted away like lumber, it would be rather less of an act of
vandalism. Some of the old street cries of London are among the last
links that we have with the London of Shakespeare and the London of
Chaucer. When I meet a man who utters one I am so far from regarding him
as a beggar; it is I who should be a beggar, and beg him to say it
again.
But in any case it should be made clear that we cannot make one law do
the work of another. If we have real reasons for forbidding something
like a street cry, we should give the reasons that are real; we should
forbid it because it is a cry, because it is a noise, because it is a
nuisance, or perhaps, according to our tastes, because it is old,
because it is popular, because it is historic and a memory of Merry
England. I suspect that the subconscious prejudice against it is rooted
in the fact that the pedlar or hawker is one of the few free men left in
the modern city; that he often sells his own wares directly to the
consumer, and does not pay rent for a shop. But if the modern spirit
wishes to veto him, to harry him, or to hang, draw and quarter him for
being free, at least let it so far recognize his dignity as to define
him; and let the law deal with him in principle as well as in practice.
The Revolt of the Spoilt Child
Everybody says that each generation revolts against the last. Nobody
seems to notice that it generally revolts against the revolt of the
last. I mean that the latest grievance is really the last reform. To
take but one example in passing. There is a new kind of novel which I
have seen widely reviewed in the newspapers. No; it is not an improper
novel. On the contrary, it is more proper--almost in the sense of
prim--than its authors probably imagine. It is really a reaction towards
a more old-fashioned morality, and away from a new-fashioned one. It is
not so much a revolt of the daughters as a return of the grandmothers.
Miss May Sinclair wrote a novel of the kind I mean, about a spinster
whose life had been blighted by a tender and sensitive touch in her
education, which had taught her--or rather, expected her--always to
“behave beautifully.” Mrs. Delafield wrote a story with the refreshing
name of “Humbug” on somewhat similar lines. It suggests that children
are actually trained to deception, and especially self-deception, by a
delicate and considerate treatment that continually appealed to their
better feelings, which was always saying, “You would not hurt father.”
Now, certainly a more old-fashioned and simple style of education did
not invariably say “You would not hurt father.” Sometimes it preferred
to say, “Father will hurt you.” I am not arguing for or against the
father with the big stick. I am pointing out that Miss Sinclair and the
modern novelists really _are_ arguing for the father with the big stick,
and against a more recent movement that is supposed to have reformed
him. I myself can remember the time when the progressives offered us, as
a happy prospect, the very educational method which the novelists now
describe so bitterly in retrospect. We were told that true education
would only appeal to the better feelings of children; that it would
devote itself entirely to telling them to live beautifully; that it
would use no argument more arbitrary than saying “You would not hurt
father.” That ethical education was the whole plan for the rising
generation in the days of my youth. We were assured beforehand how much
more effective such a psychological treatment would be than the bullying
and blundering idea of authority. The hope of the future was in this
humanitarian optimism in the training of the young; in other words, the
hope was set on something which, when it is established, Mrs. Delafield
instantly calls humbug and Miss Sinclair appears to hate as a sort of
hell. What they are suffering from, apparently, is not the abuses of
their grandfathers, but the most modern reforms of their fathers. These
complaints are the first fruits of reformed education, of ethical
societies and social idealists. I repeat that I am for the moment
talking about their opinions and not mine. I am not eulogizing either
big sticks or psychological scalpels; I am pointing out that the outcry
against the scalpel inevitably involves something of a case for the
stick. I have never tied myself to a final belief in either; but I
point out that the progressive, generation after generation, does
elaborately tie himself up in new knots, and then roar and yell aloud to
be untied.
It seems a little hard on the late Victorian idealist to be so bitterly
abused merely for being kind to his children. There is something a
little unconsciously comic about the latest generation of critics, who
are crying out against their parents, “Never, never can I forgive the
tenderness with which my mother treated me.” There is a certain irony in
the bitterness which says, “My soul cries for vengeance when I remember
that papa was always polite at the breakfast-table; my soul is seared by
the persistent insolence of Uncle William in refraining from clouting me
over the head.” It seems harsh to blame these idealists for idealizing
human life, when they were only following what was seriously set before
them as the only ideal of education. But, if this is to be said for the
late Victorian idealist, there is also something to be said for the
early Victorian authoritarian. Upon their own argument, there is
something to be said for Uncle William if he did clout them over the
head. It is rather hard, even on the great-grandfather with the big
stick, that we should still abuse him merely for having neglected the
persuasive methods that we have ourselves abandoned. It is hard to
revile him for not having discovered to be sound the very
sentimentalities that we have since discovered to be rotten.
For the case of these moderns is worst of all when they do try to find
any third ideal, which is neither the authority which they once
condemned for not being persuasion, nor the persuasion which they now
condemn for being worse than authority. The nearest they can get to any
other alternative is some notion about individuality; about drawing out
the true personality of the child, or allowing a human being to find his
real self. It is, perhaps, the most utterly meaningless talk in the
whole muddle of the modern world. How is a child of seven to decide
whether he has or has not found his true individuality? How, for that
matter, is any grown-up person to tell it for him? How is anybody to
know whether anybody has become his true self? In the highest sense it
can only be a matter of mysticism; it can only mean that there was a
purpose in his creation. It can only be the purpose of God, and even
then it is a mystery. In anybody who does not accept the purpose of God,
it can only be a muddle. It is so unmeaning that it cannot be called
mystery but only mystification. Humanly considered, a human personality
is only the thing that does in fact emerge out of a combination of the
forces inside the child and the forces outside. The child cannot grow up
in a void or vacuum with no forces outside. Circumstances will control
or contribute to his character, whether they are the grandfather’s stick
or the father’s persuasion or the conversations among the characters of
Miss May Sinclair. Who in the world is to say positively which of these
things has or has not helped his real personality?
What is his real personality? These philosophers talk as if there was a
complete and complex animal curled up inside every baby, and we had
nothing to do but to let it come out with a yell. As a matter of fact,
we all know, in the case of the finest and most distinguished
personalities, that it would be very difficult to disentangle them from
the trials they have suffered, as well as from the truths they have
found. But, anyhow, these thinkers must give us some guidance as to how
they propose to tell whether their transcendental notion of a true self
has been realized or no. As it is, anybody can say of any part of any
personality that it is or is not an artificial addition obscuring that
personality. In fiction, most of the wild and anarchical characters
strike me as entirely artificial. In real life they would no doubt be
much the same, if they could ever be met with in real life. But anyhow,
they would be the products of experience as well as of elemental
impulses; they would be influenced in some way by all they had gone
through; and anybody would be free to speculate on what they would have
been like if they had never had such experiences. Anybody might amuse
himself by trying to subtract the experiences and find the self; anybody
who wanted to waste his time.
Therefore, without feeling any fixed fanaticism for all the old methods,
whether coercive or persuasive, I do think they both had a basis of
common sense which is wanting in this third theory. The parent, whether
persuading or punishing the child, was at least aware of one simple
truth. He knew that, in the most serious sense, God alone knows what the
child is really like, or is meant to be really like. All we can do to
him is to fill him with those truths which we believe to be equally true
whatever he is like. We must have a code of morals which we believe to
be applicable to all children, and impose it on this child because it is
applicable to all children. If it seems to be a part of his personality
to be a swindler or a torturer, we must tell him that we do not want any
personalities to be swindlers and torturers. In other words, we must
believe in a religion or philosophy firmly enough to take the
responsibility of acting on it, however much the rising generations may
knock, or kick, at the door. I know all about the word education meaning
drawing things out, and mere instruction meaning putting things in. And
I respectfully reply that God alone knows what there is to draw out; but
we can be reasonably responsible for what we are ourselves putting in.
The Innocence of the Criminal
A phrase, which we have all heard, is sometimes uttered by some small
man sentenced to some small term of imprisonment, for either or both of
the two principal reasons for imprisoning a man in modern England: that
he is known to the police, and that he is not known to the magistrate.
When such a man receives a more or less temperate term of imprisonment,
he is often reported as having left the dock saying that he would “do it
on his head.” In his own self-consciousness, he is merely seeking to
maintain his equilibrium by that dazed and helpless hilarity which is
the only philosophy allowed to him. But the phrase itself, like a great
part of really popular slang, is highly symbolic. The English pauper
(who tends to become numerically the preponderant Englishman) does
really reconcile himself to existence by putting himself in an inverted
and grotesque posture towards it. He does really stand on his head,
because he is living in topsy-turvydom.
He finds himself in an Upsidonia fully as fantastic as Mr. Archibald
Marshall’s, and far less fair and logical; in a landscape as wild as if
the trees grew downwards or the moon hung below his feet. He lives in a
world in which the man who lends him money makes him a beggar; in
which, when he is a beggar, the man who gives him money makes him a
criminal; in which, when he is a criminal and “known to the police,” he
becomes permanently liable to be arrested for other people’s crimes. He
is punished if his home is neglected, though there is nobody to look
after it, and punished again if it is not neglected, and the children
are kept from school to look after it. He is arrested for sleeping on
private land, and arrested again for sleeping on public land, and
arrested, be it noted, for the positive and explicit reason that he has
no money to sleep anywhere else. In short, he is under laws of such
naked and admitted lunacy that they might quite as well tell him to
pluck all the feathers off the cows, or to amputate the left leg of a
whale. There is no possible way of behaving in such a pantomime city
except as a sort of comic acrobat, a knockabout comedian who does as
many things as possible on his head. He is, both by accident and design,
a tumbler. It is a proverb about his children that they tumble up; it is
the whole joke about his drunkenness that he tumbles down. But he is in
a world in which standing straight or standing still have become both
impossible and fatal. Meredith rightly conceived the only possible
philosophy of this modern outlaw as that of Juggling Jerry; and even
what is called his swindling is mostly this sort of almost automatic
juggling. His nearest approach to social status is mere kinetic
stability, like a top. There was, indeed, another tumbler called in
tradition Our Lady’s Tumbler, who performed happier antics before a
shrine in the days of superstition; and whose philosophy was perhaps
more positive than Juggling Jerry’s or Meredith’s. But a strenuous
reform has passed through our own cities, careful of the survival of the
fittest, and we have been able to preserve the antic while abolishing
the altar.
But though this form of reaction into ridicule, and even self-ridicule,
is very natural, it is also very national; it is not the only human
reaction against injustice, nor perhaps the most obvious. The Irishman
has shot his landlord, the Italian has joined a revolutionary secret
society, the Russian has either thrown a bomb or gone on a pilgrimage,
long before the Englishman has come finally to the conclusion that
existence is a joke. Even as he does so he is too fully conscious that
it would be too bad as a tragedy if it were not so good as a farce. It
is further to be noticed, for the fact is of ominous importance, that
this topsy-turvy English humour has, during the last six or seven
generations, been more and more abandoned to the poorer orders. Sir John
Falstaff is a knight; Tony Weller is a coachman; his son Sam is a
servant to the middle classes, and the recent developments of social
discipline seem calculated to force Sam Weller into the status of the
Artful Dodger. It is certain that a youth of that class who should do
to-day a tenth of the things that Sam Weller did would in one way or
another spend most of his life in jail. To-day, indeed, it is the main
object of social reform that he should spend the whole of his life in
jail; but in a jail that can be used as a factory. That is the real
meaning of all the talk about scientific criminology and remedial
penalties. For such outcasts, punishment is to be abolished by being
perpetuated. When men propose to eliminate retribution as “vindictive,”
they mean two very simple things: ceasing altogether to punish the few
who are rich, and enslaving all the rest for being poor.
Nevertheless this half-conscious buffoon who is the butt of our society
is also the satirist of it. He is even the judge of it, in the sense
that he is the normal test by which it will be judged. In a number of
quite practical matters it is he who represents historic humanity, and
speaks naturally and truthfully where his judges and critics are
crooked, crabbed and superstitious. This can be seen, for instance, if
we see him for a moment not in the dock but in the witness-box. In
several books and newspapers I happened to read lately, I have noticed a
certain tone touching the uneducated witness; phrases like “the
vagueness characteristic of their class,” or “easily confused, as such
witnesses are.” Now such vagueness is simple truthfulness. Nine times
out of ten, it is the confusion any man would show at any given instant
about the complications which crowd human life. Nine times out of ten,
it is avoided in the case of educated witnesses by the mere expedient of
a legal fiction. The witness has a brief, like the barrister: he has
consulted dates, he has made memoranda, he has frequently settled with
solicitors exactly what he can safely say. His evidence is artificial
even when it is not fictitious; we might almost say it is fictitious
even when it is not false. The model testimony, regarded as the most
regular of all in a law court, is constabulary testimony; if what the
soldier said is not evidence, what the policeman says is often the only
evidence. And what the policeman says is incredible, as he says it. It
is something like this: “I met the prisoner coming out of Clapham
Junction Station and he told me he went to see Mrs. Nehemiah Blagg, of
192, Paardeburg Terrace, West Ealing, about a cat which he had left
there last Tuesday week which she was going to keep if it was a good
mouser, and she told him it had killed a mouse in the back kitchen on
Sunday morning so he had better leave it. She gave him a shilling for
his trouble, and he went to West Ealing post-office where he bought two
halfpenny stamps and a ball of string, and then to the Imperial Stores
at Ealing Broadway, and bought a pennyworth of mixed sweets. Coming out
he met a friend, and they went to the Green Dolphin and made an
appointment for 5.30 next day at the third lamp-post in Eckstein
Street,” and so on. It is frankly impossible for anybody to say such a
sentence; still more for anybody to remember it. If the thing is not a
tissue of mere inventions, it can only be the arbitrary summary of a
very arbitrary cross-examination, conducted precisely as are the
examinations of a secret police in Russia. The story was not only
discovered bit by bit, but discovered backwards. Mountains were in
labour to bring forth that mouse in West Ealing. The police made a
thorough official search of the man’s mental boxes and baggage, before
that cat was let out of the bag. I am not here supposing the tale to be
untrue--I am pointing out that the telling of it is unreal. The right
way to tell a story is the way in which the prisoner told it to the
policeman, and not the way in which the policeman tells it to the court.
It is the way in which all true tales are told, the way in which all men
learn the news about their neighbours, the way in which we all learned
everything we know in childhood; it is the only real evidence for
anything on this earth, and it is not evidence in a court of law. The
man who tells it is vague about some things, less vague about others,
and so on in proportion; but at his very vaguest, among the stiff
unreason of modern conditions, he is a judgment on those conditions. His
very bewilderment is a criticism, and his very indecision is a decision
against us. It is an old story that we are judged by the innocence of a
child, and every child is, in the French phrase, a terrible child. There
is a true sense in which all our laws are judged by the innocence of a
criminal.
In politics, of course, the case is the same. I will defer the question
of whether the democracy knows how to answer questions until the
oligarchy knows how to ask them. Asking a man if he approves of Tariff
Reform is not only a silly but an insane question, for it covers the
wildest possibilities, just as asking him whether he approves of Trouser
Reform might mean anything from wearing no trousers to wearing a
particular pattern of yellow trousers decorated with scarlet snakes.
Talking about Temperance, when you mean pouring wine down the gutter, is
quite literally as senseless as talking about Thrift, when you mean
throwing money into the sea. The rambling speech of yokels and tramps is
as much wiser than this as a rambling walk in the woods is wiser than
the mathematical straightness of a fall from a precipice. The present
leaders of progress are, I think, very near to that precipice; about all
their schemes and ideals there is a savour of suicide. But the clown
will go on talking in a living and, therefore, a leisurely fashion, and
the great truth of pure gossip which sprang up in simpler ages and was
the fountain of all the literatures, will flow on when our intricate and
tortured society has died of its sins.
The Prudery of the Feminists
In the ultimate and universal sense I am astonished at the lack of
astonishment. Starting from scratch, so to speak, we are all in the
position of the first frog, whose pious and compact prayer was: “Lord,
how you made me jump!” Matthew Arnold told us to see life steadily and
see it whole. But the flaw in his whole philosophy is that when we do
see life whole we do not see it steadily, in Arnold’s sense, but as a
staggering prodigy of creation. There is a primeval light in which all
stones are precious stones; a primeval darkness against which all
flowers are as vivid as fireworks. Nevertheless, there is one kind of
surprise that does surprise me, the more, perhaps, because it is not
true surprise but a supercilious fuss. There is a kind of man who not
only claims that his stone is the only pebble on the beach, but declares
it must be the one and only philosopher’s stone, because he is the one
and only philosopher. He does not discover suddenly the sensational fact
that grass is green. He discovers it very slowly, and proves it still
more slowly, bringing us one blade of grass at a time. He is made
haughty instead of humble by hitting on the obvious. The flowers do not
make him open his eyes, but, rather, cover them with spectacles; and
this is even more true of the weeds and thorns. Even his bad news is
banal. A young man told me he had abandoned his Bible religion and
vicarage environment at the withering touch of the one line of
Fitzgerald: “The flower that once has blown, for ever dies.” I vainly
pointed out that the Bible or the English burial service could have told
him that man cometh up as a flower and is cut down. If that were
self-evidently final, there would never have been any Bibles or any
vicarages. I do not see how the flower can be any more dead, when a
mower can cut it down, merely because a botanist can cut it up. It
should further be remembered that the belief in the soul, right or
wrong, arose and flourished among men who knew all there is to know
about cutting down, not unfrequently cutting each other down, with
considerable vivacity. The physical fact of death, in a hundred horrid
shapes, was more naked and less veiled in times of faith or superstition
than in times of science or scepticism. Often it was not merely those
who had seen a man die, but those who had seen him rot, who were most
certain that he was everlastingly alive.
There is another case somewhat analogous to this discovery of the new
disease of death. I am puzzled in somewhat the same way when I hear, as
we often hear just now, somebody saying that he was formerly opposed to
Female Suffrage but was converted to it by the courage and patriotism
shown by women in nursing and similar war work. Really, I do not wish to
be superior in my turn, when I can only express my wonder in a question.
But from what benighted dens can these people have crawled, that they
did not know that women are brave? What horrible sort of women have they
known all their lives? Where do they come from? Or, what is a still
more apposite question, where do they think they come from? Do they
think they fell from the moon, or were really found under
cabbage-leaves, or brought over the sea by storks? Do they (as seems
more likely) believe they were produced chemically by Mr. Schafer on
principles of abiogenesis? Should we any of us be here at all if women
were not brave? Are we not all trophies of that war and triumph? Does
not every man stand on the earth like a graven statue as the monument of
the valour of a woman?
As a matter of fact, it is men much more than women who needed a war to
redeem their reputation, and who have redeemed it. There was much more
plausibility in the suspicion that the old torture of blood and iron
would prove too much for a somewhat drugged and materialistic male
population long estranged from it. I have always suspected that this
doubt about manhood was the real sting in the strange sex quarrel, and
the meaning of the new and nervous tattoo about the unhappiness of
women. Man, like the Master Builder, was suspected by the female
intelligence of having lost his nerve for climbing that dizzy
battle-tower he had built in times gone by. In this the war did
certainly straighten out the sex tangle; but it did also make clear on
how terrible a thread of tenure we hold our privileges--and even our
pleasures. For even bridge parties and champagne suppers take place on
the top of that toppling war-tower; an hour can come when even a man who
cared for nothing but bridge would have to defend it like Horatius; or
when the man who only lives for champagne would have to die for
champagne, as certainly as thousands of French soldiers have died for
that flat land of vines; when he would have to fight as hard for the
wine as Jeanne D’Arc for the oil of Rheims.
Just as civilization is guarded by potential war, so it is guarded by
potential revolution. We ought never to indulge in either without
extreme provocation; but we ought to be cured for ever of the fancy that
extreme provocation is impossible. Against the tyrant within, as against
the barbarian without, every voter should be a potential volunteer.
“Thou goest with women, forget not thy whip,” said the Prussian
philosopher; and some such echo probably infected those who wanted a war
to make them respect their wives and mothers. But there would really be
a symbolic sense in saying, “Thou goest with men, forget not thy sword.”
Men coming to the council of the tribe should sheathe their swords, but
not surrender them. Now I am not going to talk about Female Suffrage at
this time of day; but these were the elements upon which a fair and sane
opposition to it were founded. These are the risks of real politics; and
the woman was not called upon to run such a risk, for the very simple
reason that she was already running another risk. It was not laws that
fixed her in the family; it was the very nature of the family. If the
family was a fact in any very full sense, and if popular rule was also a
fact in any very full sense, it was simply physically impossible for the
woman to play the same part in such politics as the man. The difficulty
was only evaded because the democracy was not a free democracy or the
family not a free family. But whether this view was right or wrong, it
is at least clear that the only honourable basis for any limitations of
womanhood is the same as the basis of the respect for womanhood. It
consisted in certain realities, which it may be undesirable to discuss,
but is certainly even more undesirable to ignore. And my complaint
against the more fussy feminists (so called from their detestation of
everything feminine) is that they do ignore these realities. I do not
even propose the alternative of discussing them; on that point I am
myself content to be what some call conventional, and others, civilized.
I do not in the least demand that anyone should accept my own deduction
from them; and I do not care a brass farthing what deduction anybody
accepts about such a rag as a modern ballot-paper. But I do suggest that
the peril with which one half of humanity is perpetually at war should
be at least present in the minds of those who are perpetually bragging
about breaking conventions, rending veils, and violating antiquated
taboos. And, in nine cases out of ten, it seems to be quite absent from
their minds. The mere fact of using the argument before mentioned, of
woman’s strength vindicated by war work, shows that it is absent from
their minds.
If this oddity of the new obscurantism means, rather, that women have
shown the moral courage and mental capacity needed for important
concerns, I am equally unable to summon up any surprise at the
revelation. Nothing can well be more important than our own souls and
bodies; and they, at their most delicate and determining period, are
almost always and almost entirely confided to women. Those who have been
appointed as educational experts in every age are not surely a new order
of priestesses. If it means that in a historic crisis all kinds of
people must do all kinds of work, and that women are the more to be
admired for doing work to which they are unaccustomed, or even
unsuited, it is a point which I should quite as warmly concede. But if
it means that in planning the foundations of a future society we should
ignore the one eternal and incurable contrast in humanity; if it means
that we may now go ahead gaily as if there were really no difference at
all; if it means, as I read in a magazine to-day, and as almost anyone
may now read almost anywhere, that if such and such work is bad for
women it must be bad for men; if it means that patriotic women in
munition factories prove that any women can be happy in any factories;
if, in short, it means that the huge and primeval facts of the
family no longer block the way to a mere social assimilation and
regimentation--then I say that the prospect is not one of liberty but of
perpetuation of the dreariest sort of humbug. It is not emancipation, it
is not even anarchy; it is simply prudery in the thoughts. It means that
we have Bowdlerized our brains as well as our books. It is every bit as
senseless a surrender to a superstitious decorum as it would be to force
every woman to cut herself with a razor, because it is not etiquette to
admit that she cannot grow a beard.
How Mad Laws are Made
Any one of the strange laws we suffer is a compromise between a fad and
a vested interest. The fashionable way of effecting a social reform is
as follows. To make the story clearer, and worthier of its wild and
pointless process, I will call the two chief agents in it the March Hare
and the Hatter. The Hatter is mad, in a quiet way; but he is merely mad
on making hats, or rather on making money. He has a huge and prosperous
emporium which advertises all possible hats to fit all possible heads;
but he certainly nourishes an occult conviction that it is really the
duty of the heads to fit the hats. This is his mild madness; in other
respects he is a stodgy and rather stupid millionaire. Now, the man whom
we will call the March Hare is at first sight the flat contrary of this.
He is a wild intellectual and the leader of the Hatless Brigade. It does
not much matter why there is this quarrel between the Hare and the Hat;
it may be any progressive sophistry. Perhaps it is because he is a March
Hare; and finds it hard to keep his hat on in a March wind. Perhaps it
is because his ears are too long to allow him to wear a hat; or perhaps
he hopes that every emancipated member of the Hatless Brigade will
eventually evolve ears as long as a hare’s--or a donkey’s. The point is
that anyone would fancy that the Hare and the Hatter would collide. As
a matter of fact they co-operate. In other words, every “reform” to-day
is a treaty between the two most influential modern figures--the great
capitalist and the small faddist. They are the father and mother of a
new law; and therefore it is so much of a mongrel as to be a monster.
What happens is something like this. The line of least resistance is
found between the two by a more subtle analysis of their real respective
aims. The intuitive eye of friendship detects a fine shade in the
feelings of the Hatter. The desire of his heart, when delicately
apprehended, is not necessarily that people should wear his hats, but
rather that they should buy them. On the other hand, even his
fanatically consistent colleague has no particular objection to a human
being purchasing a hat, so long as he does not wreck his health, blast
his prospects and generally blow his brains out, by the one suicidal act
of putting it on. Between them they construct a law called the Habitual
Hat-Pegs Act, which lays it down that every householder shall have not
less than twenty-three hat-pegs and that, lest these should accumulate
unwholesome dust, each must be covered by a hat in uninterrupted
occupation. Or the thing might be managed some other way; as by
arranging that a great modern nobleman should wear an accumulation of
hats, one on top of the other, in pleasing memory of what has often been
the itinerant occupation of his youth. Broadly, it would be enacted that
hats might be used in various ways; to take rabbits out of, as in the
case of conjurers, or put pennies into, as in the case of beggars, or
smash on the heads of scarecrows, or stick on the tops of poles; if only
it were guaranteed that as many citizens as possible should be forced to
go bareheaded. Thus, the two most powerful elements in the governing
class are satisfied; of which the first is finance and the second
fidgets. The Capitalist has made money; and he only wanted to make
money. The Social Reformer has done something; and he only wanted
something to do.
Now every one of the recent tricks about temperance and economy has been
literally of this type. I have chosen the names from a nonsense story
merely for algebraic lucidity and universality; what has really happened
in our own shops and streets is every bit as nonsensical. But quite
recent events have confirmed this analysis with an accuracy which even
the unconverted can hardly regard as a coincidence. I have already
traced the truth in the case of the liquor traffic; but many
public-spirited persons of the Prohibitionist school have found it very
difficult to believe. All “temperance legislation” is a compromise
between a liquor merchant who wants to get rid of his liquor and a
teetotaller who does not want his neighbours to get it. But as the
capitalist is much stronger than the crank, the compromise is lop-sided
as such; the neighbours do get it, but always in the wrong way. But
again, since the crank has not a true creed, but only an intellectual
itch, he cares much more to be up and doing than to understand what he
has done. As I said above, he only wants to do something; and he has
done something; he has increased drunkenness. Anyhow, all such reforms
are upon the plan of my parable. Sometimes it is decreed that drink
shall only be sold in large quantities suitable to large incomes; that
is exactly like allowing one nobleman to wear twenty hats. Sometimes it
is proposed that the State should take over the liquor traffic; we
hardly need to be told what that means, when it is the Plutocratic
State. It means quite simply this: the policeman goes to the hatter and
buys his whole stock of hats at a hundred pounds a piece, and then
parades the street handing out hats to those who may take his fancy, and
by blows of the truncheon forcing every man Jack of the rest of them to
pay a hundred pounds for a hat he does not get. Merely to divert the
rivers of ale or gin from private power to public power or from poor men
to rich men, or from good taverns to bad taverns, is the sort of effort
with which the faddists are satisfied and the liquor lords much more
than satisfied.
There was a curious case of the same thing in the attempt to economize
food during the Great War. The reformers did not wish _really_ to
economize food; the great food profiteers would not let them. The fussy
person wants to force or forbid something, under the conditions defining
all such effort; it must be something that will interfere with the
citizen and will not interfere with the profiteer. Given such a problem,
we might almost predict, for instance, that he will propose the
limitation of the number of courses at a restaurant. It will not save
the beef; it is not meant to save the beef; but to save the
beef-merchant. There will actually be more food bought, if the cook is
not allowed to turn the scraps into kickshaws. But why should a
plutocracy including food profiteers object to more food being bought?
Why, for that matter, should the pure-minded social idealist object to
more food being bought, as long as it is the wrong food that is sold?
His quite disinterested aim is not that food should be restricted, but
merely that freedom should be restricted. When once he is assured that
a sufficient number of thoughtless persons are really getting what they
don’t want, he says he is building Jerusalem in England’s green and
pleasant land. And so he is; if the expression signifies handing over
England to the wealthier Jews.
Now the only way in which this conclusive explanation can be countered
is by ridiculing, as impossible, the notion that so fantastic a compact
can be clearly and coolly made. And of course it is not so made. The two
attitudes are not logically interlocked, like the antlers of stags; they
simply squeeze each other out of shape, as in a wrestle of two rival
jelly-fish. We should be far safer if they had the intellectual honesty
of a bargain or a bribe. As it is, they have an almost creepy quality
which justifies the comparison to shapeless beasts of the sea. I defy
any rational man to deny that he has noticed something moonstruck and
mis-shapen, as apart from anything unjust or uncomfortable, about the
little laws which have lately been tripping him up; laws which may tell
him at any minute that he must not purchase turpentine before a certain
tick of the clock, or that if he buys a pound of tea he must also buy a
pennyworth of tin-tacks. The strictly correct word for such things is
half-witted; and they are half-witted because each of the two
incongruous partners has only half his will. They have not, for
instance, the sweeping simplicity of the old sumptuary laws or even the
old Puritan persecutions. But they are also half-witted because even the
one mind is not the whole mind; it is largely the subconscious mind,
which dares not trust itself in speech. The Drink Capitalist dares not
actually say to the teetotaller, “Let me sell a quart bottle of whisky
to be drunk in a day, and then I will let you pester a poor fellow who
makes a pot of beer last half an hour.” That is exactly what happens in
essence; but it is easy to guess what happens in external form. The
teetotaller has twenty schemes for cutting off free citizens from the
beverage of their fathers; and out of these twenty the liquor lord,
without whose permission nothing can be done, selects the one scheme
which will not interfere with him and his money. It is even more
probable that the temperance reformer himself selects, by an instinct
for what he would call practical politics, the one scheme which the
liquor lord is likely to look at. And it matters nothing that it is a
scheme too witless for Wonderland; a scheme for abolishing hats while
preserving hatters.
It might be a good thing to give the control of drink to the State--if
there were a State to give it to. But there is not. There is nothing but
a congested compromise made by the pressure of powerful interests on
each other. The liquor lords may bargain with the other lords to take
their abnormal tribute in a lump instead of a lifetime; but not one of
them will live the poorer. The main point is that, in passing through
that plutocratic machinery, even a mad opinion will always emerge in a
shape more maniacal than its own; and even the silliest fool can only do
what the stupidest fool will let him.
The Pagoda of Progress
There is one fashionable fallacy that crops up everywhere like a weed,
until a man feels inclined to devote the rest of his life to the
hopeless task of weeding it out. I take one example of it from a
newspaper correspondence headed “Have Women Gone Far Enough?” It is
immediately concerned with alleged impropriety in dress; but I am not
directly interested in that. I quote one paragraph from a lady
correspondent, not because it is any worse than the same thing as stated
by countless scholars and thinkers, but rather because it is more
clearly stated--
“‘Women have gone far enough.’ That has always been the cry of the
individual with the unprogressive mind. It seems to me that until
Doomsday there will always be the type of man who will cry ‘Women have
gone far enough'; but no one can stop the tide of evolution, and women
will still go on.”
Which raises the interesting question of where they will go to. Now, as
a matter of fact, every thinking person wants to stop the tide of
evolution at some particular mark in his own mind. If I were to propose
that people should wear no clothes at all, the lady might be shocked.
But I should have as much right as anyone else to say that she was
obviously an individual with an unprogressive mind. If I were to propose
that this reform should be imposed on people by force, she would be
justly indignant. But I could answer her with her own argument--that
there had always been unprogressive people, and would be till Doomsday.
If I then proposed that people should not only be stripped but skinned
alive, she might, perhaps, see several moral objections. But her own
argument would still hold good, or as good as it held in her own case;
and I could say that evolution would not stop and the skinning would go
on. The argument is quite as good on my side as on hers; and it is
worthless on both.
Of course, it would be just as easy to urge people to progress or evolve
in exactly the opposite direction. It would be as easy to maintain that
they ought to go on wearing more and more clothes. It might be argued
that savages wear fewer clothes, that clothes are a mark of
civilization, and that the evolution of them will go on. I am highly
civilized if I wear ten hats, and more highly civilized if I wear twelve
hats. When I have already evolved so far as to put on six pairs of
trousers, I must still hail the appearance of the seventh pair of
trousers with the joy due to the waving banner of a great reform. When
we balance these two lunacies against each other, the central point of
sanity is surely apparent. The man who headed his inquiry “Have Women
Gone Far Enough?” was at least in a real sense stating the point
rightly. The point is that there _is_ a “far enough.” There is a point
at which something that was once neglected becomes exaggerated;
something that is valuable up to that stage becomes undesirable after
that stage. It is possible for the human intellect to consider clearly
at what stage, or in what condition, it would have enough complication
of clothes, or enough simplification of clothes, or enough of any other
social element or tendency. It is possible to set a limit to the pagoda
of human hats, rising for ever into infinity. It is possible to count
the human legs, and, after a brief calculation, allot to them the
appropriate number of trousers. There is such a thing as the
miscalculation of making hats for a hydra or boots for a centipede, just
as there are such things as bare-footed friars or the Hatless Brigade.
There are exceptions and exaggerations, good and bad; but the point is
that they are not only both good and bad, but they are good and bad in
opposite directions. Let a man have what ideal of human costume or
custom he likes. That ideal must still consist of elements in a certain
proportion; and if that proportion is disturbed that ideal is destroyed.
Let him once be clear in his own mind about what he wants, and then,
whatever it is that he wants, he will not want the tide of evolution to
wash it away. His ideal may be as revolutionary as he likes or as
reactionary as he likes, but it must remain as he likes it. To make it
more revolutionary or more reactionary is distortion; to suggest its
growing more and more reactionary or revolutionary for ever is demented
nonsense. How can a man know what he wants, how can he even want what he
wants, if it will not even remain the same while he wants it?
The particular argument about women is not primarily the point; but as a
matter of fact it is a very good illustration of the point. If a man
thinks the Victorian conventions kept women out of things they would be
the happier for having, his natural course is to consider what things
they are; not to think that any things will do, so long as there are
more of them. This is only the sort of living logic everybody acts upon
in life. Suppose somebody says, “Don’t you think all this wood could be
used for something else besides palings?” we shall very probably answer,
“Well, I dare say it could,” and perhaps begin to think of wooden boxes
or wooden stools. But we shall not see, as in a sort of vision, a vista
of wooden razors, wooden carving-knives, wooden coats and hats, wooden
pillows and pocket-handkerchiefs. If people had made a false and
insufficient list of the uses of wood, we shall try to make a true and
sufficient list of them; but not imagine that the list can go on for
ever, or include more and more of everything in the world. I am not
establishing a scientific parallel between wood and womanhood. But there
would be nothing disrespectful in the symbol, considered as a symbol;
for wood is the most sacred of all substances: it typifies the divine
trade of the carpenter, and men count themselves fortunate to touch it.
Here it is only a working simile, but the point of it is this--that all
this nonsense about progressive and unprogressive minds, and the tide of
evolution, divides people into those who stick ignorantly to wood for
one thing and those who attempt insanely to use wood for everything.
Both seem to think it a highly eccentric suggestion that we should find
out what wood is really useful for, and use it for that. They either
profess to worship a wooden womanhood inside the wooden fences of
certain trivial and temporary Victorian conventions; or else they
profess to see the future as a forest of dryads growing more and more
feminine for ever.
But it does not matter to the main question whether anybody else draws
the line exactly where I do. The point is that I am not doing an
illogical thing, but the only logical thing, in drawing the line. I
think tennis for women normal and football for women quite abnormal; and
I am no more inconsistent than I am in having a wooden walking-stick and
not a wooden hat. I do not particularly object to a female despot; but I
do object to a female demagogue. And my distinction is as much founded
on the substance of things as my eccentric conduct in having a wooden
chair and table but not a wooden knife and fork. You may think my
division wrong; the point is that it is not wrong in being a division.
All this fallacy of false progress tends to obscure the old common sense
of all mankind, which is still the common sense of every man in his own
daily dealings: that everything has its place and proportion and proper
use, and that it is rational to trust its use and distrust its abuse.
Progress, in the good sense, does not consist in looking for a direction
in which one can go on indefinitely. For there is no such direction,
unless it be in quite transcendental things, like the love of God. It
would be far truer to say that true progress consists in looking for the
place where we can stop.
The Myth of the “Mayflower”
Agnosticism, the ancient confession of ignorance, was a singularly sane
and healthy thing so far as it went. Unfortunately it has not gone as
far as the twentieth century. It has declared in all ages, as a heathen
chief declared in the dark ages, that the life of a man is like the
flight of a bird across a firelit room, because we know nothing of
whence it comes or whither it goes. It would seem natural to apply it
not only to man but to mankind. But the moderns do not apply the same
principle but the very opposite principle. They specialize in the
unknown origins and in the unknown future. They dwell on the prehistoric
and on the post-historic or prophetic; and neglect only the historic.
They will give a most detailed description of the habits of the bird
when he was a sort of pterodactyl only faintly to be traced in a fossil.
They will give an equally detailed description of the habits of the bird
a hundred years hence, when he shall have turned into a super-bird, or
the dove of universal peace. But the bird in the hand is worth far less
to them than the two mysterious birds in these two impenetrable bushes.
Thus they will publish a portrait with life, letters, and tabletalk of
the Missing Link, although he is missing; they will publish a plan and
documented history of how the Social Revolution happened, though it has
not happened yet. It is the men who are not missing and the revolutions
that have happened that they have rather a habit of overlooking. Anyone
who has argued, for instance, with the young Jewish intellectuals who
are the brain of Bolshevism knows that their whole system turns on the
two pivots of the prehistoric and the prophetic. They talk of the
Communism of prehistoric ages as if it were a thing like the Crusades in
the Middle Ages; not even a probable conjecture but a proved and
familiar fact. They will tell you exactly how private property arose in
primitive times, just as if they had been there. And then they will take
one gigantic leap over all human history, and tell you about the
inevitable Communism of the future. Nothing seems to matter unless it is
either new enough to be foretold or old enough to be forgotten.
Mr. H. G. Wells has hit off his human habit in the account of a very
human character, the American girl who glorifies Stonehenge in his last
novel. I do not make Mr. Wells responsible for her opinions, though she
is an attractive person and much too good for her Lothario. But she
interests me here because she typifies very truly another variation upon
this same tendency. To the prehistoric and the post-historic must be
added a third thing, which may be called the unhistoric. I mean the bad
teaching of real history that such intelligent people so often suffer.
She sums up exactly what I mean when she says humorously that Stonehenge
has been “kept from her,” that Notre Dame is far less important, and
that this is the real starting-point of the “Mayflower.”
Now the “Mayflower” is a myth. It is an intensely interesting example
of a real modern myth. I do not mean of course that the “Mayflower”
never sailed, any more than I admit that King Arthur never lived or that
Roland never died. I do not mean that the incident had no historic
interest, or that the men who figured in it had no heroic qualities; any
more than I deny that Charlemagne was a great man because the legend
says he was two hundred years old; any more than I deny that the
resistance of Roman Britain to the heathen invasion was valiant and
valuable, because the legend says that Arthur at Mount Badon killed nine
hundred men with his own hand. I mean that there exists in millions of
modern minds a traditional image or vision called the “Mayflower,” which
has far less relation to the real facts than Charlemagne’s two hundred
years or Arthur’s nine hundred corpses. Multitudes of people in England
and America, as intelligent and sympathetic as the young lady in Mr.
Wells’ novel, think of the “Mayflower” as an origin or archetype like
the Ark or at least the Argo. Perhaps it would be an exaggeration to say
that they think the “Mayflower” discovered America. They do really talk
as if the “Mayflower” populated America. Above all, they talk as if the
establishment of New England had been the first and formative example of
the expansion of England. They believe that English expansion was a
Puritan experiment; and that an expansion of Puritan ideas was also the
expansion of what have been claimed as English ideas, especially ideas
of liberty. The Puritans of New England were champions of religious
freedom, seeking to found a newer and freer state beyond the sea, and
thus becoming the origin and model of modern democracy. All this
betrays a lack of exactitude. It is certainly nearer to exact truth to
say that Merlin built the castle at Camelot by magic, or that Roland
broke the mountains in pieces with his unbroken sword.
For at least the old fables are faults on the right side. They are
symbols of the truth and not of the opposite of the truth. They
described Roland as brandishing his unbroken sword against the Moslems,
but not in favour of the Moslems. And the New England Puritans would
have regarded the establishment of real religious liberty exactly as
Roland would have regarded the establishment of the religion of Mahound.
The fables described Merlin as building a palace for a king and not a
public hall for the London School of Economics. And it would be quite as
sensible to read the Fabian politics of Mr. Sidney Webb into the local
kingships of the Dark Ages, as to read anything remotely resembling
modern liberality into the most savage of all the savage theological
frenzies of the seventeenth century. Thus the “Mayflower” is not merely
a fable, but is much more false than fables generally are. The revolt of
the Puritans against the Stuarts was really a revolt _against_ religious
toleration. I do not say the Puritans were never persecuted by their
opponents; but I do say, to their great honour and glory, that the
Puritans never descended to the hypocrisy of pretending for a moment
that they did not mean to persecute their opponents. And in the main
their quarrel with the Stuarts was that the Stuarts would not persecute
those opponents enough. Not only was it then the Catholics who were
proposing toleration, but it was they who had already actually
established toleration in the State of Maryland, before the Puritans
began to establish the most intolerant sort of intolerance in the State
of New England. And if the fable is fabulous touching the emancipation
of religion, it is yet more fabulous touching the expansion of empire.
That had been started long before either New England or Maryland, by
Raleigh who started it in Virginia. Virginia is still perhaps the most
English of the states, certainly more English than New England. And it
was also the most typical and important of the states, almost up to
Lee’s last battle in the Wilderness. But I have only taken the
“Mayflower” as an example of the general truth; and in a way the truth
has its consoling side. Modern men are not allowed to have any history;
but at least nothing can prevent men from having legends.
We have thus before us, in a very true and typical modern picture, the
two essential parts of modern culture. It consists first of false
history and second of fancy history. What the American tourist believed
about Plymouth Rock was untrue; what she believed about Stonehenge was
only unfounded. The popular story of Primitive Man cannot be proved. The
popular story of Puritanism can be disproved. I can fully sympathize
with Mr. Wells and his heroine in feeling the imaginative stimulus of
mysteries like Stonehenge; but the imagination springs from the mystery;
that is, the imagination springs from the ignorance. It is the very
greatness of Stonehenge that there is very little of it left. It is its
chief feature to be featureless. We are very naturally and rightly moved
to mystical emotions about signals from so far away along the path of
the past; but part of the poetry lies in our inability really to read
the signals. And this is what gives an interest, and even an irony, to
the comparison half consciously invoked by the American lady herself
when she asked “What’s Notre Dame to this?” And the answer that should
be given to her is: “Notre Dame, compared to this, is _true_. It is
history. It is humanity. It is what has really happened, what we know
has really happened, what we know is really happening still. It is the
central fact of your own civilization. And it is the thing that has
really been kept from you.”
Notre Dame is not a myth. Notre Dame is not a theory. Its interest does
not spring from ignorance but from knowledge; from a culture complicated
with a hundred controversies and revolutions. It is not featureless, but
carved into an incredible forest and labyrinth of fascinating features,
any one of which we could talk about for days. It is not great because
there is little of it, but great because there is a great deal of it. It
is true that though there is a great deal of it, Puritans may not be
allowed to see a great deal in it; whether they were those brought over
in the “Mayflower” or only those brought up on the “Mayflower.” But that
is not the fault of Notre Dame; but of the extraordinary evasion by
which such people can dodge to right and left of it, taking refuge in
things more recent or things more remote. Notre Dame, on its merely
human side, is mediæval civilization, and therefore not a fable or a
guess but a great solid determining part of modern civilization. It is
the whole modern debate about the guilds; for such cathedrals were built
by the guilds. It is the whole modern question of religion and
irreligion; for we know what religion it stands for, while we really
have not a notion what religion Stonehenge stands for. A Druid temple is
a ruin, and a Puritan ship by this time may well be called a wreck. But
a church is a challenge; and that is why it is not answered.
Much Too Modern History
All wise men will agree that history ought to be taught more fully in
the form of world history. In that respect at least Mr. Wells gave us an
excellent working model. England is meaningless without Europe, more
meaningless than England without Empire. But those who would broaden
history with human brotherhood too often suffer from a limitation not
absent even from Mr. Wells. They exchange the narrowness of a nation for
the narrowness of a theory, or even a fad. They think they have a
world-wide philosophy because they extend their own narrowness to the
whole world. A distinguished professor, who is a member of the League of
Nations Union, has been telling an interviewer what he thinks
history-books should teach. And it seems to me that, according to his
view if correctly reported, the new histories would be rather more
prejudiced and limited than the old.
He begins with a small but singular error, which itself shows some lack
of the imagination that can see two sides of a question. He says,
“Textbooks of history should aim at truth. It should not be possible for
one version of the American War of Independence to be taught in American
schools, and another in English schools.”
Now, in point of fact, the same version of that story is taught both in
English and American schools. It is the other version, a very tenable
one, that is not allowed to be taught anywhere. No American historian,
however American, could be more positive that George III was wrong and
George Washington right than all the English historians are. What would
show real independence of mind would be to state the case for George
III. And there was a very real case for George III. I will not go into
it here, but every honest historical student will agree with me. Perhaps
the fairest way of putting it is this: that it was not really a case of
a government resolved on tyranny, but of a nation resolved on
independence. But if we sympathize with national independence, surely
there is something to be said for intellectual independence. And the
professor is far from being really sympathetic with intellectual
independence. He is so far from it that he wants both sides forced to
tell the same story, apparently whether they like it or not. As a fact,
they do agree; but apparently in any case the professor would coerce
them into agreement. And his extraordinary reason for this course is
that history should aim at truth.
But suppose I do aim at truth, and sincerely come to the conclusion that
North was a patriot and Burke a sophist? How would the professor prevent
it being “possible” for me to teach what I think is true? The truth is
that it has never occurred to these progressive professors that there
could be any view of any question except their own, or what they call
their own. For it is only a tradition they have been taught; a
tradition as narrow as North’s and now nearly as old.
But the professor goes on to say something much more interesting and
curious. After saying very truly that the past, the Plantagenet period
for instance, should not be made a mere matter of kings and battles, he
goes on to say, “What we want to see is the textbook of history and the
teaching of it brought more closely into touch with the realities of the
modern world--the world of the division of labour between different
countries, of the application of science to industry, of the shortening
of the spaces of the earth by improvements in transport--and with all
that these realities imply.”
Now it seems to me obvious that what we want is exactly the opposite. A
child can see these realities of the modern world, whether he is taught
any history or not. He will see them whether you want him to or not. As
he grows up he will learn by experience all about the improvements in
transport, its acceleration by Zeppelins and its interruption by
submarines. He will realize for himself that the modern world is the
world of the division of labour between nations. For he will know that
England has been turned into an isolated workshop with hardly food
enough for a fortnight, with the potential alternative of surrender or
starvation or eating nails. He will by the light of nature know all
about the application of science to industry--in war by chemical
analyses of poison gas, in peace by bright little pamphlets about phossy
jaw. He will know “all that these realities imply,” about which also
there is very much that might be said. But even if we consider only the
somewhat cheerier products of the division of labour and the
application of science to industry, there is quite as little need
laboriously to instruct the infant in what he can see for himself. A
child has a very pure and poetical love of machinery, a love in which
there is nothing in the least evil or materialistic. But it is hardly
necessary to devote years to proving to him that motor-cars have been
invented, as he can see them going by in the street. It is not necessary
to read up in the British Museum the details with which to demonstrate
that there are really such things as tube stations or motor-bicycles.
The child can see these things everywhere, and the real danger obviously
is that he should think they had existed always. The danger is that he
should know nothing of humanity, except as it is under these special and
sometimes cramping conditions of scientific industry and the division of
labour. It is that he should be unable to imagine any civilization
without tube stations, whatever its substitutes in the way of temples or
trophies of war. It is that he should see man as a sort of
cyclist-centaur, inseparable from his motor-bike. In short, the whole
danger of historical ignorance is that he may be as limited to his local
circumstances as a savage on an island, or a provincial in a decayed
town, or a historical professor in the League of Nations Union.
The whole object of history is to enlarge experience by imagination. And
this sort of history would enlarge neither imagination nor experience.
The whole object of history is to make us realize that humanity could be
great and glorious, under conditions quite different and even contrary
to our own. It is to teach us that men could achieve most profitable
labour without our own division of labour. It is to teach us that men
could be industrious without being industrial. It is to make us
understand that there might be a world in which there was far less
improvement in the transport for visiting various places, and there
might still be a very great improvement in the places visited.
The professor is perfectly right in saying that a history of the
Plantagenet period ought not merely to record the presence of kings and
armies. But what ought it to record? Is it to record only the absence of
motors and electric lights? Should we say nothing of the Plantagenet
period except that it did _not_ have motor-bikes? I venture to suggest
that we might record the presence of some things which the whole people
had then and have not got now, such as the guilds, the great popular
universities, the use of the common lands, the fraternity of the common
creed.
I fear the professor will not follow me into matters so disturbing to
his perfect picture of progress. But, in conclusion, there is one little
question I should like to ask him, and it is this. If you cannot see
Man, divine and democratic, under the disguises of all the centuries,
why on earth should you suppose you will be able to see him under the
disguises of all the nations and tribes? If the Dark Ages must be as
dark as they look, why are the black men not so black as they are
painted? If I may feel supercilious towards a Chaldean, why not towards
a Chinaman? If I may despise a Roman for not having a steam-plough, why
not a Russian for not wanting a steam-plough? If scientific industry is
the supreme historical test, it divides us as much from backward
peoples as from bygone peoples. It divides even European peoples from
each other. And if that be the test, why bother to join the League of
Nations Union?
The Evolution of Slaves
A very curious and interesting thing has recently happened in America.
There has suddenly appeared an organized political attack on Darwinian
Evolution, led by an old demagogue appealing entirely to the ideals of
democracy. I mean no discredit to Mr. Bryan in calling him a demagogue;
for I should have been far more heartily on his side in the days when he
was a demagogue than in the days when he was a diplomatist. He was a
much wiser man when he refused to allow the financiers to crucify
humanity on a golden cross, than when he consented to allow the Kaiser
to crucify it on an iron cross. The movement is religious and therefore
popular; but it is Protestant and therefore provincial. Its opponents,
the old guard of materialism, will of course do their best to represent
it as something like the village that voted the earth was flat. But
there is one sharp difference, which is the point of the whole position.
If an ignorant man went about saying that the earth was flat, the
scientific man would promptly and confidently answer, “Oh, nonsense; of
course it’s round.” He might even condescend to give the real reasons,
which I believe are quite different from the current ones. But when the
private citizen rushes wild-eyed down the streets of Heliopolis, Neb.,
calling out “Have you heard the news? Darwin’s wrong!” the scientific
man does not say, “Oh, nonsense, of course he’s right.” He says
tremulously, “Not entirely wrong; surely not entirely wrong”; and we can
draw our conclusions. But I believe myself there is a deeper and more
democratic force behind this reaction; and I think it worthy of further
study.
I recently heard a debate on that American system of class privilege
which we call for convenience Prohibition; and I was very much amused by
one argument that was advanced in its favour. A very intelligent young
American, a Rhodes scholar from Oxford, advanced the thesis that
Prohibition was not a violation of liberty because, if it were fully
established, its victims would never know what they had lost. If a
generation of total abstainers could once grow up “without the desire”
for drink, they would not be conscious of any restraint on their
freedom. The argument is ingenious and promising and opens up a wide
field of application. Thus, if I happen to find it convenient to keep
miners or other proletarians permanently underground, I have only to
make sure that all their babies are born in pitch darkness and they will
certainly never imagine the light of day. My action therefore will not
only be just and benevolent in itself, but will obviously involve not
even the faintest infringement of the ideal of freedom. Or if I merely
kidnap all the babies from all the mothers in the country, it is obvious
that the infants will not remember their mothers, and in that sense will
not miss them. There is therefore no reason why I should not adopt this
course; and even if I hide the babies from their mothers by locking them
up in boxes, I shall not be violating the principle of liberty; because
the babies will not understand what I have done. Or, to take a
comparison even closer in many ways, there is an ordinary social problem
like dress. I come to the conclusion that ladies spend too much money on
dress, that it is a social evil because families suffer from the
extravagance, and rivalries and seductions distract the state. I
therefore decree, on the lines of Prohibitionist logic, that the law
shall forbid anybody to wear any clothes at all. Nobody who grows up
naked, according to this theory, will ever have any regrets for beauty
or dignity or decency; and therefore will have suffered no loss. I
cannot sufficiently express my admiration for the extraordinary
simplicity which can smooth the path of Prussianism with this large,
elementary and satisfactory principle. So long as we tyrannize enough we
are not tyrannizing at all; and so long as we steal enough our victims
will never know what has been stolen. Seriously, everybody knows that
the rich planning the oppression of the poor will never lack a sycophant
to act as a sophist. But I never dreamed that I should live to enjoy so
crude and stark and startling a sophistry as this.
But the last example I gave, that of the normality of clothes or of
nakedness, has a further relevance in this connexion. What is really at
the back of the minds of the people who say these strange things is one
very simple error. They imagine that the drinking of fermented liquor
has been an artifice and a luxury; something odd like the strange
self-indulgences praised by the decadent poets. This is simply an
accident of the ignorance of history and humanity. Drinking fermented
liquor is not a fashion like wearing a green carnation. It is a habit
like wearing clothes. It is one of the habits that are indeed man’s
second nature; if indeed they are not his first nature. Wine is purest
and healthiest in the highest civilization, just as clothing is most
complete in the highest civilization. But there is nothing to show that
the savage has not shed the clothes of a higher civilization, retaining
only the ornaments; as a good many fashionable people in our own
civilization seem to be doing now. And there is nothing to show that
ruder races who brew their “native beers” in Africa or Polynesia have
not lost the art of brewing something better; just as Prohibitionist
America, before our very eyes, has left off brewing Christian beer and
taken to drinking fermented wood-pulp and methylated spirit. The very
example of modern America falling from better to baser drinks, under a
dismal taboo, is a perfect model of the way in which civilizations have
relapsed into savagery, and produced the savages we know. But the point
is that drink, like dress, is the rule; and the exceptions only prove
the rule. There are individuals who for personal and particular reasons
are right to drink no liquor but water; just as there are individuals
who have to stay in bed, and wear no clothes but bedclothes. There have
been sects of Moslems and there have been sects of Adamites. There have
been, as I have said, barbarized peoples fallen so far from civilization
as to wear grotesque garments or none, or to drink bad beer or none. But
nobody has ever seen Primitive Man, naked and drinking water; he is a
myth of the modern mythologists. Man, as Aristotle saw long ago, is an
abnormal animal whose nature it is to be civilized. In so far as he ever
becomes uncivilized he becomes unnatural, and even artificial.
Now at the back of all this, of course, the real difference is
religious. I only take this one case of what is called temperance for
the sake of the wider philosophy that underlies it. When my young
American friend talked of the next generation growing up without the
desire for “alcohol,” he had at the back of his mind a certain idea. It
is the idea which I have just seen expressed by another American in a
high-brow article, in the words: “Evolution does not stand still. We are
not finished. The world is not finished.” What it means is that the
nature of man can be modified to suit the convenience of particular men;
and this would certainly be very convenient. If the rich man wants the
miners to live underground, he may really breed for it a new race as
blind as bats and owls. If he finds it cheaper to run the schools and
school inspections on Adamite principles, he can hope to produce
Adamites not merely as a sect but as a species. And the same will be
true of teetotalism or vegetarianism; nature, having evolved man who is
an ale-drinking animal, may now evolve a super-man, or a sub-man, who
shall be a water-drinking animal. Having risen from a monkey who eats
nuts to a man who eats mutton, he may rise yet higher by eating nuts
again.
Thinking people, of course, know that all that is nonsense. They know
there is no such constant flux of adaption. So far from saying that the
evolution of man has not finished, they will point out that (as far as
we know) it has not begun. In all the five thousand years of recorded
history, and in all the prehistoric indications before it, there is not
a shadow or suspicion of movement or change in the human biological
type. Even evolution, let alone natural selection, is only a conjecture
about things unknown, compared with the broad daylight of things known
in all those thousands of years. The only difference is that evolution
seems a probable conjecture, and natural selection is on the face of it
an extravagantly improbable one. All this, which is obvious to thinking
people, has at last become obvious even to the most unthinking; and
_that_ is the meaning of the attack on Darwinism in America and the
battle of Mr. Bryan against the Missing Link. The secret is out. The
obscurantism of the professors is over. Those of us who have humbly
hammered on this point from time to time suddenly find ourselves
hammering on an open door. For these changes almost always come
suddenly; which is alone enough to show that human history at least has
never been merely an evolution. As Darwinism came with a rush, so
Anti-Darwinism has come with a rush; and just as people who accepted
evolution could not be held back from embracing natural selection, so it
is likely enough that many, who now see reason to reject natural
selection, will not be stopped in their course till they have also
rejected evolution. They will merely have a vague but angry conviction
that the professors have been kidding them, as they had before that the
parsons had been kidding them. But behind all this there will be a very
real moral and religious reaction; the meaning of which is what I have
described in this article. It is the profound popular impression that
scientific materialism, at the end of its hundred years, is found to
have been used chiefly for the oppression of the people. Of this the
most evident example is that evolution itself can be offered as
something able to evolve a people who can be oppressed. As in the
argument about Prohibition, it will offer to breed slaves; to produce a
new race indifferent to its rights. Morally the argument is quite
indistinguishable from justifying assassination by promising to bring up
children as suicides, who will prefer to be poisoned.
Is Darwin Dead?
Mr. Ernest Newman, that lively and acute critic, once rebuked the
arrogance of those of us who confessed that we knew nothing about music.
Why he should suppose we are arrogant about it, if he does think so, I
cannot quite understand. I, for one, am fully conscious of my
inferiority to him and others through this deficiency; nor is it, alas,
the only deficiency. I have sometimes thought it would be wholesome for
anybody who has succeeded pretty well by some trick of some trade, to
have a huge notice board or diagram hung in front of him all day;
showing exactly where he stood in all the other crafts and competitions
of mankind. Thus the poet’s eye in a fine frenzy rolling, as it rose
from the paper on which an entirely new type of villanelle had just
sprung into being, would encounter the disconcerting facts and figures
about his suitability to be a professional acrobat or a pearl-diver. On
the other hand, the radiant victor in the great International Egg and
Spoon Race can see at a glance how very far down he stands, so to speak,
in the queue of those waiting for the post of Astronomer Royal. Most of
us have at least one or two gaps in our general culture and information;
and sometimes whole departments of knowledge are practically hidden from
whole generations and classes of mankind. There is something very
defective and disproportionate about even the ideal culture of a modern
man. It may be that Mr. Newman is deeply read in that mediæval theology
which is still the subconscious basis of most morality; but it is also
possible that he is not. He may have at his fingers’ ends that military
art which has often turned the fortunes of history; but he may not. He
would be none the less a highly cultivated gentleman, if he did not. Yet
the mystical and the military mind have been at least as pivotal and
practical in history as the musical mind. I can admire them all, but I
have no claim to possess any of them.
But my ignorance of music happens to assist me with a convenient
metaphor in the more controversial matter of my ignorance of science. I
once made some remarks about the decline of Darwinism, in a review of
the Wells “Outline of History.” This aroused rather excited criticism;
but one comparatively calm critic challenged what really interests me in
the matter: he said that my conundrums about the wing of the bat and
similar things “could easily be solved on purely Darwinian lines by any
competent zoologist, or even by one so incompetent as myself.” The
conundrum in question, of course, concerns the survival value of
features in their unfinished state. If a thing can fly it may survive,
and if it has a wing it may fly; but if it cannot fly with half a wing,
why should it survive with half a wing? Yet Darwinism pre-supposes that
numberless generations could survive before one generation could fly.
Now it is quite true that I am not even an incompetent zoologist; and
that my critic is more competent than I, if only in the mere fact of
being a zoologist at all. Nevertheless, I adhere to my opinion, and do
so for a reason that seems to me worthy of some little consideration. I
do it because this does happen to be exactly one of those questions on
which, as it seems to me, the independent critic has really a right to
check the specialist. For it is a larger question of logic, and not a
smaller question of fact. It is like the difficulty of believing that a
halfpenny can fall head or tail a hundred times running; which has
nothing to do with the numismatic value of the coin. It is like the
difficulty of believing that a mere tax could make a loaf cheaper, which
has nothing to do with the agrarian craft of growing corn. There is a
general tide of reason flowing against such improbabilities, even if
they are possibilities; they would still be exceptions, and reason would
be on the side of the rule. And whatever the details of natural history,
this thing is against the very nature of things.
To explain what I mean I will take this parallel of the technique of
music, of which I know even less than of the technique of natural
history. To begin with a simple though moving musical instrument,
suppose an expert told me that a coach-horn could be blown quite as well
if it were only two feet long. I should believe him; partly because it
seems probable enough, and partly because I know nothing about the
matter. I am not even an incompetent coach-horn blower. But I should
certainly not believe him if he told me, as a generalization about all
musical instruments, that half a musical instrument was better than no
music, or even as good as any music. I should disbelieve it because it
is inconsistent with the general nature of a musical instrument, or any
instrument. I should disbelieve it long before I had thought of the
thousand particular instruments to which it does not apply. I should
not primarily need to think of the particular examples, though they are
obvious enough. A stringed instrument cannot even be called stringed
without two fixed points to hold both ends of the string. At the stage
when the fiddle-strings floated like filaments in the void, feeling
their way towards an evolutionary other end of nowhere, there could be
nothing serving any purpose of a fiddle. A drum with a hole in is not a
drum at all. But an evolutionary drum has to turn slowly into a drum,
when it has begun by being only a hole. I cannot see any survival for a
bagpipe that begins by being slit; I think such bagpipes would die with
all their music in them. I feel a faint doubt, mingled with fascination,
about the idea that a violin could grow out of the ground like a tree;
it would at least make a charming fairy story. But whether or no a
fiddle could grow like a tree, I feel sure nobody could play on it while
it was still only a twig. But all these, as I say, are only examples
that throng into the mind afterwards, of a principle seen in a flash
from the first. Of things serving particular purposes, by a balance and
arrangement of parts, it _cannot_ be generally true that they are fit
for use before they are finished for use. It is against the general
nature of such things; and can only be true by an individual
coincidence. I can see for myself, for instance, that some particular
case like the trunk of an elephant might really be compared to the
simpler case of the coach-horn. Length and flexibility _are_ mere
matters of degree; and I might possibly find it convenient if my nose
were six inches longer, and sufficiently lively to be able to point
right and left at various objects on the tea-table. But this is simply
an accident of the particular qualities of length and laxity, not a
general truth about the qualities of growth and use. It is not in the
least true that I should experience the least convenience from the
membrane between my fingers thickening or widening a little; even if an
evolutionist at my elbow comforted and inspired me with the far-off
divine event when my descendant should have the wings of a bat. Until
the membrane can really be spread properly from point to point it is
like the fiddle-string before it is stretched properly from point to
point. It is no nearer serving its ultimate purpose than if it were not
there at all. But it would be easy to find a similar animal parallel to
the drum with a hole in it. There are monsters who would die instantly
if they could not close the holes in their head under water. One
supposes they would have died swiftly, before their closing apparatus
could develop slowly. But the principle is a general one, and is
involved in the very nature of any apparatus. It is only by way of
figure of speech, in defence of the freedom of the ignorant, that I take
the type of a musical apparatus. I take it because I am entirely
ignorant of musical instruments. I am of the candid class of those who
have “never tried” to perform on the violin. I cannot play upon this
pipe; especially if it be a bagpipe. But if anybody tells me that the
wildest pibroch rose from a whisper gradually, as a hole in the wind-bag
was filled up gradually--why then I shall not be so rude, I hope, as to
say that there is a windbag in his head, but I shall venture to say that
there is a hole in his argument. And if he says that pieces of wood came
together slowly, stick by stick, to form a fiddle, and that before it
was yet a fiddle at all the sticks discoursed most excellent
music--why, I fear I shall be content to say “fiddlesticks.”
There is another answer often made which seems to me even more
illogical. The critic generally says it is unreasonable to expect from
the geological record that continuous gradation of types which the
challengers of Darwinism demand. He says that only a part of the earth
can be examined and that it could not in any case prove so much. This
mode of argument involves an amazing oblivion of what is the thing to be
proved, and who is trying to prove it. By hypothesis the Darwinians are
trying to prove Darwinism. The Anti-Darwinians are not trying to prove
anything; except that the Darwinians have not proved it. I do not demand
anything, in the sense of complaining anything or the absence of
anything. I am quite comfortable in a completely mysterious cosmos. I am
not reviling the rocks or cursing the eternal hills for not containing
these things. I am only saying that these are the things they would have
to contain to make me believe something that somebody else wants me to
believe. These traces are not things that the Anti-Darwinian demands.
They are things that the Darwinian requires. The Darwinian requires them
in order to convince his opponent of Darwinism; his opponent may be
right or wrong, but he cannot be expected to accept the mere absence of
them as proof of Darwinism. If the evidences in support of the theory
are unfortunately hidden, why then we do not know whether they were in
support of the theory. If the proofs of natural selection are lost, why
then there are no proofs of natural selection; and there is an end of
it.
And I would respectfully ask these critics what would be thought of a
theological or miraculous argument which thus based itself on the very
gaps in its own evidence. Let them indulge in the flight of fancy that I
have just told them, let us say, that I saw the Devil at Brighton: and
that the proof of his presence there can still be seen on the sands, in
gigantic marks of a cloven hoof as big as the foot of an elephant.
Suppose we all search the sands of Brighton and find no such thing. And
suppose I then say that, after all, the tide might have washed away the
footprints, or that the fiend may have flown through the air from his
little country seat at the Dyke, or that he may have walked along the
hard asphalt of Brighton parade, as proudly as once upon the flaming
marl. To those acquainted with Brighton parade this will seem probable
enough; but there would be a fallacy in merely saying that the evil
spirit may have done all this. The sceptic will not unnaturally reply:
“Yes, he may; and he may not; and it may be a legend; and you may be a
liar; and I think our little investigation is now concluded.” I am very
far indeed from calling the Darwinian a liar; but I shall continue to
say that he is not always a logician.
Turning Inside Out
When the author of “If Winter Comes” brought out another book about the
life of the family, it was almost as much criticized as the first book
was praised. I do not say that there was nothing to criticize, but I do
say that I was not convinced by the abstract logic of the criticism.
Probably the critics would have accepted it as a true story if the
author had not been so incautious as to give it a true moral. And the
moral is not fashionable in the press at the moment; for it is to the
effect that a woman may gain a professional success at the price of a
domestic failure. And it is the convention of journalism at this moment
to support what is feminist against what is feminine. Anyhow, while the
story might be criticized, the criticisms can certainly be criticized.
It is not really conclusive to say that a woman may be ambitious in
business without her children going to the bad. It is just as easy to
say that a woman may be ambitious in politics without helping to murder
an old gentleman in his bed. But that does not make “Macbeth” either
inartistic or untrue. It is just as easy to say that a woman may be
ambitious in society without tricking her husband into a debtor’s
prison, so that she may spend the time with a bald-headed nobleman with
red whiskers. But that does not make the great scene in “Vanity Fair”
unconvincing either in detail or design. The question in fiction is not
whether that thing must occur, but whether that sort of thing may occur,
and whether it is significant of larger things. Now this business of the
woman at work and the woman at home is a very large thing, and this
story about it is highly significant.
For in this matter the modern mind is inconsistent with itself. It has
managed to get one of its rather crude ideals in flat contradiction to
the other. People of the progressive sort are perpetually telling us
that the hope of the world is in education. Education is everything.
Nothing is so important as training the rising generation. Nothing is
really important except the rising generation. They tell us this over
and over again, with slight variations of the same formula, and never
seem to see what it involves. For if there be any word of truth in all
this talk about the education of the child, then there is certainly
nothing but nonsense in nine-tenths of the talk about the emancipation
of the woman. If education is the highest function in the State, why
should anybody want to be emancipated from the highest function in the
State? It is as if we talked of commuting the sentence that condemned a
man to be President of the United States; or a reprieve coming in time
to save him from being Pope. If education is the largest thing in the
world, what is the sense of talking about a woman being liberated from
the largest thing in the world? It is as if we were to rescue her from
the cruel doom of being a poet like Shakespeare; or to pity the
limitations of an all-round artist like Leonardo da Vinci. Nor can
there be any doubt that there is truth in this claim for education. Only
precisely the sort of which it is particularly true is the sort called
domestic education. Private education really is universal. Public
education can be comparatively narrow. It would really be an
exaggeration to say that the schoolmaster who takes his pupils in
freehand drawing is training them in all the uses of freedom. It really
would be fantastic to say that the harmless foreigner who instructs a
class in French or German is talking with all the tongues of men and
angels. But the mother dealing with her own daughters in her own home
does literally have to deal with all forms of freedom, because she has
to deal with all sides of a single human soul. She is obliged, if not to
talk with the tongues of men and angels, at least to decide how much she
shall talk about angels and how much about men.
In short, if education is really the larger matter, then certainly
domestic life is the larger matter; and official or commercial life the
lesser matter. It is a mere matter of arithmetic that anything taken
from the larger matter will leave it less. It is a mere matter of simple
subtraction that the mother must have less time for the family if she
has more time for the factory. If education, ethical and cultural,
really were a trivial and mechanical matter, the mother might possibly
rattle through it as a rapid routine, before going about her more
serious business of serving a capitalist for hire. If education were
merely instruction, she might briefly instruct her babies in the
multiplication tables, before she mounted to higher and nobler spheres
as the servant of a Milk Trust or the secretary of a Drug Combine. But
the moderns are perpetually assuring us that education is not
instruction; they are perpetually insisting that it is not a mechanical
exercise, and must on no account be an abbreviated exercise. It must go
on at every hour. It must cover every subject. But if it must go on at
all hours, it must not be neglected in business hours. And if the child
is to be free to cover every subject, the parent must be free to cover
every subject too.
For the idea of a non-parental substitute is simply an illusion of
wealth. The advanced advocate of this inconsistent and infinite
education for the child is generally thinking of the rich child; and all
this particular sort of liberty should rather be called luxury. It is
natural enough for a fashionable lady to leave her little daughter with
the French governess or the Czecho-Slovakian governess or the Ancient
Sanskrit governess, and know that one or other of these sides of the
infant’s intelligence is being developed; while she, the mother, figures
in public as a money-lender or some other modern position of dignity.
But among poorer people there cannot be five teachers to one pupil.
Generally there are about fifty pupils to one teacher. There it is
impossible to cut up the soul of a single child and distribute it among
specialists. It is all we can do to tear in pieces the soul of a single
schoolmaster, and distribute it in rags and scraps to a whole mob of
boys. And even in the case of the wealthy child it is by no means clear
that specialists are a substitute for spiritual authority. Even a
millionaire can never be certain that he has not left out one governess,
in the long procession of governesses perpetually passing under his
marble portico; and the omission may be as fatal as that of the king
who forgot to ask the bad fairy to the christening. The daughter, after
a life of ruin and despair, may look back and say, “Had I but also had a
Lithuanian governess, my fate as a diplomatist’s wife in Eastern Europe
would have been very different.” But it seems rather more probable, on
the whole, that what she would miss would not be one or other of these
special accomplishments, but some commonsense code of morals or general
view of life. The millionaire could, no doubt, hire a mahatma or
mystical prophet to give his child a general philosophy. But I doubt if
the philosophy would be very successful even for the rich child, and it
would be quite impossible for the poor child. In the case of comparative
poverty, which is the common lot of mankind, we come back to a general
parental responsibility, which is the common sense of mankind. We come
back to the parent as the person in charge of education. If you exalt
the education, you must exalt the parental power with it. If you
exaggerate the education, you must exaggerate the parental power with
it. If you depreciate the parental power, you must depreciate education
with it. If the young are always right and can do as they like, well and
good; let us all be jolly, old and young, and free from every kind of
responsibility. But in that case do not come pestering us with the
importance of education, when nobody has any authority to educate
anybody. Make up your mind whether you want unlimited education or
unlimited emancipation, but do not be such a fool as to suppose you can
have both at once.
There is evidence, as I have noted, that the more hard-headed people,
even of the most progressive sort, are beginning to come back to
realities in this respect. The new work of Mr. Hutchinson’s is only one
of many indications among the really independent intelligences, working
on modern fiction, that the cruder culture of merely commercial
emancipation is beginning to smell a little stale. The work of Miss
Clemence Dane and even of Miss Sheila Kaye-Smith contains more than one
suggestion of what I mean. People are no longer quite so certain that a
woman’s liberty consists of having a latch-key without a house. They are
no longer wholly convinced that every housekeeper is dull and prosaic,
while every bookkeeper is wild and poetical. And among the intelligent
the reaction is actually strengthened by all the most modern excitements
about psychology and hygiene. We cannot insist that every trick of
nerves or train of thought is important enough to be searched for in
libraries and laboratories, and not important enough for anybody to
watch by simply staying at home. We cannot insist that the first years
of infancy are of supreme importance, and that mothers are not of
supreme importance; or that motherhood is a topic of sufficient interest
for men, but not of sufficient interest for mothers. Every word that is
said about the tremendous importance of trivial nursery habits goes to
prove that being a nurse is not trivial. All tends to the return of the
simple truth that the private work is the great one and the public work
the small. The human house is a paradox, for it is larger inside than
out.
But in the problem of private versus public life there is another
neglected truth. It is true of many masculine problems as well as of
this feminine problem. Indeed, feminism falls here into exactly the same
mistake as militarism and imperialism. I mean that anything on a grand
scale gives the illusion of a grand success. Curiously enough,
multiplication acts as a concealment. Repetition actually disguises
failure. Take a particular man, and tell him to put on a particular kind
of hat and coat and trousers, and to stand in particular attitudes in
the back garden; and you will have great difficulty in persuading
yourself (or him) that he has passed through a triumph and
transfiguration. Order four hundred such hats, and eight hundred such
trousers, and you will have turned the fancy costume into a uniform.
Make all the four hundred men stand in the special attitudes on
Salisbury Plain, and there will rise up before you the spirit of a
regiment. Let the regiment march past, and, if you have any life in you
above the brutes that perish, you will have an overwhelming sense that
something splendid has just happened, or is just going to begin. I
sympathize with this moral emotion in militarism; I think it does
symbolize something great in the soul, which has given us the image of
St. Michael. But I also realize that in practical relations that emotion
can get mixed up with an illusion. It is not really possible to know the
characters of all the four hundred men in the marching column as well as
one might know the character of the one man attitudinizing in the back
garden. If all the four hundred men were individual failures, we could
still vaguely feel that the whole thing was a success. If we know the
one man to be a failure, we cannot think him a success.
That is why a footman has become rather a foolish figure, while a
foot-soldier remains rather a sublime one. Or rather, that is one of the
reasons; for there are others much more worthy. Anyhow, footmen were
only formidable or dignified when they could come in large numbers like
foot-soldiers--when they were in fact the feudal army of some great
local family, having some of the loyalty of local patriotism. Then a
livery was as dignified as a uniform, because it really was a uniform. A
man who said he served the Nevilles or rode with the Douglases could
once feel much like a man fighting for France or England. But military
feeling is mob feeling, noble as mob feeling may be. Parading one
footman is like lunching on one pea, or curing baldness by the growth of
one hair. There ought not to be anything but a plural for flunkeys, any
more than for measles or vermin or animalculæ or the sweets called
hundreds and thousands. Strictly speaking, I suppose that a logical
Latinist could say, “I have seen an animalcula”; but I never heard of a
child having the moderation to remark, “I have eaten a hundred and
thousand.” Similarly, any one of us can feel that to have hundreds and
thousands of slaves, let alone soldiers, might give a certain
imaginative pleasure in magnificence. To have one slave reveals all the
meanness of slavery. For the solitary flunkey really is the man in fancy
dress, the man standing in the back-garden in the strange and the
fantastic coat and breeches. His isolation reveals our illusion. We find
our failure in the back-garden, when we have been dreaming a dream of
success in the market-place. When you ride through the streets amid a
great mob of vassals (you may have noticed) you have a genial and not
ungenerous sense of being at one with them all. You cannot remember
their names or count their numbers, but their very immensity seems a
substitute for intimacy. That is what great men have felt at the head of
great armies; and the reason why Napoleon or Foch would call his
soldiers “_mes enfants_.” He feels at that moment that they are a part
of him, as if he had a million arms and legs. But it is very different
if you disband your army of lackeys; or if (as is, after all, possible)
you have not got an army of lackeys. It is very different if you look at
one lackey; one solitary solemn footman standing in your front hall. You
never have the sense of being caught up into a rapture of unity with
_him_. All your sense of social solidarity with your social inferiors
has dropped from you. It is only in public that people can be so
intimate as that. When you look into the eyes of the lonely footman, you
see that his soul is far away.
In other words, you find yourself at the foot of a steep and staggering
mountain crag, that is the real character and conscience of a man. To be
really at one with that man, you would have to solve real problems and
believe that your own solutions were real. In dealing with the one man
you would really have a far huger and harder job than in dealing with
your throng of thousands. And _that_ is the job that people run away
from when they wish to escape from domesticity to public work,
especially educational work. They wish to escape from a sense of failure
which is simply a sense of fact. They wish to recapture the illusion of
the market-place. It is an illusion that departs in the dark interiors
of domesticity, where the realities dwell. As I have said, I am very far
from condemning it altogether; it is a lawful pleasure, and a part of
life, in its proper proportion, like any other. But I am concerned to
point out to the feminists and the faddists that it is not an approach
to truth, but rather the opposite. Publicity is rather of the nature of
a harmless romance. Public life at its very best will contain a great
deal of harmless romancing, and much more often of very harmful
romancing. In other words, I am concerned with pointing out that the
passage from private life to public life, while it may be right or
wrong, or necessary or unnecessary, or desirable or undesirable, is
always of necessity a passage from a greater work to a smaller one, and
from a harder work to an easier one. And that is why most of the moderns
do wish to pass from the great domestic task to the smaller and easier
commercial one. They would rather provide the liveries of a hundred
footmen than be bothered with the love-affairs of one. They would rather
take the salutes of a hundred soldiers than try to save the soul of one.
They would rather serve out income-tax papers or telegraph forms to a
hundred men than meals, conversation, and moral support to one. They
would rather arrange the educational course in history or geography, or
correct the examination papers in algebra or trigonometry, for a hundred
children, than struggle with the whole human character of one. For
anyone who makes himself responsible for one small baby, as a whole,
will soon find that he is wrestling with gigantic angels and demons.
In another way there is something of illusion, or of irresponsibility,
about the purely public function, especially in the case of public
education. The educationist generally deals with only one section of the
pupil’s mind. But he always deals with only one section of the pupil’s
life. The parent has to deal, not only with the whole of the child’s
character, but also with the whole of the child’s career. The teacher
sows the seed, but the parent reaps as well as sows. The schoolmaster
sees more children, but it is not clear that he sees more childhood;
certainly he sees less youth and no maturity. The number of little girls
who take prussic acid is necessarily small. The boys who hang themselves
on bed-posts, after a life of crime, are generally the minority. But the
parent has to envisage the whole life of the individual, and not merely
the school life of the scholar. It is not probable that the parent will
exactly anticipate crime and prussic acid as the crown of the infant’s
career. But he will anticipate hearing of the crime if it is committed;
he will probably be told of the suicide if it takes place. It is quite
doubtful whether the schoolmaster or schoolmistress will ever hear of it
at all. Everybody knows that teachers have a harassing and often heroic
task, but it is not unfair to them to remember that in this sense they
have an exceptionally happy task. The cynic would say that the teacher
is happy in never seeing the results of his own teaching. I prefer to
confine myself to saying that he has not the extra worry of having to
estimate it from the other end. The teacher is seldom in at the death.
To take a milder theatrical metaphor, he is seldom there on the night.
But this is only one of many instances of the same truth: that what is
called public life is not larger than private life, but smaller. What
we call public life is a fragmentary affair of sections and seasons and
impressions; it is only in private life that dwells the fullness of our
life bodily.
Strikes and the Spirit of Wonder
There is a story which pleases me so much that I feel sure I have
repeated it in print, about an alleged and perhaps legendary lady
secretary of Madam Blavatsky or Mrs. Besant, who was so much delighted
with a new sofa or ottoman that she sat on it by preference when resting
or reading her correspondence. At last it moved slightly, and she found
it was a Mahatma covered with his Eastern robe and rigid in prayer, or
some more impersonal ecstasy. That a lady secretary should have a seat
any gentleman will approve; that a Mahatma should be sat on no Christian
will deny; nevertheless, there is another possible moral to the fable
which is a reproach rather to the sitter than the seat. It might be put,
as in a sort of vision or allegory, by imagining that all our furniture
really was made thus of living limbs instead of dead sticks. Suppose the
legs of the table were literally legs--the legs of slaves standing
still. Suppose the arms of an armchair really were arms--the arms of a
patient domestic permanently held out, like those of an old nurse
waiting for a baby. It would be calculated to make the luxurious
occupant of the easy-chair feel rather like a baby; which might do him
good. Suppose every sofa were like that of Mrs. Besant’s
secretary--simply made of a man. They need not be made merely of
Theosophists or Buddhists--God forbid. Many of us would greatly prefer
to trust ourselves to a Moslem or Turk. This might, with strict
accuracy, be called sitting on an Ottoman. I have even read, I think, of
some oriental potentate who rejoiced in a name sounding like “sofa.” It
might even be hinted that some of them might be Christians, but there is
no reason, of course, why all of them should not be praying. To sit on a
man while he was praying would doubtless require some confidence. It
would also give a more literal version of the possession of a Prie-Dieu
chair. It would be easy to expand the extravagance into a vision of a
whole house alive, an architecture of arms and legs, a temple of temples
of the spirit. The four walls might be made of men like the squares in
military formation. There is even, perhaps, a shadow of the fantasy in
the popular phrases that compare the roof to the human head, that name
the chimney-pot hat after the chimney, or lightly allude to all modern
masculine head-dresses as “tiles.” But the only value of the vision, as
of most visions--even the most topsy-turvy ones--is a moral value. It
figures forth, in emblem and enigma, the truth that we do treat merely
as furniture a number of people who are, at the very least, live stock.
And the proof of it is that when they move we are startled like the
secretary sitting on the praying man; but perhaps it is we who should
begin to pray.
In the current criticisms of the Strikes there is a particular tone,
which affects me not as a matter of politics, but rather of philosophy,
or even of poetry. It is, indeed, the servile spirit expressed, if not
in its poetry, at least in its rhetoric. But it is a spirit I can
honestly claim to have hated and done my best to hammer long before I
ever heard of the Servile State, long before I ever dreamed of applying
this test to Strikes, or indeed of applying it to any political
question. I felt it originally touching things at once elemental and
every day--things like grass or daylight, like stones or daisies. But in
the light of it, at least, I always rebelled against the trend or tone
of which I speak. It may roughly be described as the spirit of taking
things for granted. But, indeed, oddly enough, the very form of this
phrase rather misses its own meaning. The spirit I mean, strictly
speaking, does not take things for granted. It takes them as if they had
not been granted. It takes them as if it held them by something more
autocratic than a right; by a cold and unconscious occupation, as stiff
as a privilege and as baseless as a caprice. As a fact, things generally
are granted, ultimately by God, but often immediately by men. But this
type of man is so unconscious of what he has been given that he is
almost unconscious of what he has got; not realizing things as gifts, he
hardly realizes them as goods. About the natural things, with which I
began, this oblivion has only inward and spiritual, and not outward and
political, effects. If we forget the sun the sun will not forget us, or,
rather, he will not remember us to revenge himself by “striking” at us
with a sunstroke. The stars will not go on strike or extinguish the
illumination of the universe as the electricians would extinguish the
illumination of the city. And so, while we repeat that there is a
special providence in a falling star, we can ignore it in a fixed star.
But when we at once ignore and assume thousands of thinking, brooding,
free, lonely and capricious human creatures, they will remind us that we
can no more order souls than we can order stars. This primary duty of
doubt and wonder has nothing to do with the rights or wrongs of special
industrial quarrels. The workmen might be quite wrong to go on strike,
and we should still be much more wrong in never expecting them to go on
strike. Ultimately, it is a mystical but most necessary mood of
astonishment at everything outside one’s own soul--even one’s own body.
It may even involve a wild vision in which one’s own boots on one’s own
feet seem to be things distant and unfamiliar. And if this sound a shade
fantastic, it is far less fantastic than the opposite extreme--the state
of the man who feels as if he owned not only his own feet, but hundreds
of other human feet like a huge centipede, or as if he were a universal
octopus, and all rails, tubes and tramlines were his own tentacles, the
nerves of his own body, or the circulation of his own blood. That is a
much worse nightmare, and at this moment a much commoner one.
Tennyson struck a true note of the nineteenth century when he talked
about “the fairy-tales of science and the long result of time.” The
Victorians had a very real and even childlike wonder at things like the
steam-engine or the telephone, considered as toys. Unfortunately the
long result of time, on the fairy-tales of science, has been to extend
the science and lessen the fairy-tale, that is, the sense of the
fairy-tale. Take for example the case of a strike on the Tubes. Suppose
that at an age of innocence you had met a strange man who had promised
to drive you by the force of the lightning through the bowels of the
earth. Suppose he had offered, in a friendly way, to throw you from one
end of London to the other, not only like a thunderbolt, but by the same
force as a thunderbolt. Or if we picture it a pneumatic and not an
electric railway; suppose he gaily promised to blow you through a
pea-shooter to the other side of London Bridge. Suppose he indicated all
these fascinating opportunities by pointing to a hole in the ground and
telling you he would take you there in a sort of flying or falling room.
I hope you would have agreed that there was a special providence in a
falling room. But whether or no you could call it providential, you
would agree to call it special. You would at least think that the
strange man was a very strange man. You would perhaps call him a very
strange and special liar, if he merely undertook to do it. You might
even call him a magician, if he did do it. But the point is this, that
you would not call him a Bolshevik merely because he did not do it. You
would think it a wonderful thing that it should be done at all; passing
in that swift car through those secret caverns, you would feel yourself
whirled away like Cinderella carried off in the coach that had once been
a pumpkin. But though such things happened in every fairy-tale, they
were not expected in any fairy-tale. Nobody turned on the fairies and
complained that they were not working, because they were not always
working wonders. The press in those parts did not break into big
headlines of “Pumpkins Held Up; No Transformation Scenes,” or “Wands
Won’t Work; Famine of Coaches.” They did not announce with horror a
“Strike of Fairy Godmothers.” They did not draw panic-stricken pictures
of mobs of fairy godmothers, meeting in parks and squares, merely
because the majority of pumpkins still continued to be pumpkins. Now I
do not argue that we ought to treat every tube-girl as our fairy
godmother; she might resent the familiarity, especially the suggestion
of anything so near to a grandmother. But I do suggest that we should,
by a return to earlier sentiments, realize that the tube servants are
doing something for us that we could not do for ourselves; something
that is no part of our natural capacities, or even of our natural
rights. It is not inevitable, or in the nature of things, that when we
have walked as we can or want to, somebody else should carry us further
in a cart, even for hire: or that when we have wandered up a road and
come to a river, a total stranger should take us over in a boat, even if
we bribe him to do so. If we would look at things in this plain white
daylight of wonder, that shines on all the roads of the fairy-tales, we
come to see at last the simplest truth about the Strikes, which is
utterly missed in all contemporary comments on them. It is merely the
fact that Strikers are not _doing_ something: they are doing nothing. If
you mean that they should be _made_ to do something, say so, and
establish slavery. But do not be muddled by the mere word “strike” into
mixing it up with breaking a window or hitting a policeman on the nose.
Do not be stunned by a metaphor; there are no metaphors in fairy-tales.
A Note on Old Nonsense
The Suffragettes have found out that they were wrong; I might even be so
egotistical as to say they have found out that we were right. At least
they have found out that the modern plutocratic parliamentary franchise
is what I for one always said it was. In other words, they are startled
and infuriated to find that the most vital modern matters are not
settled in Parliament at all, but mostly by a conflict or compromise
between Trusts and Trade Unions. Hence Mrs. Flora Drummond actually
cries aloud that she is being robbed of her precious vote; and says
dramatically “We women are being disenfranchized”--apparently by
“Soviets.” It is as if somebody who had just spent half a million on a
sham diamond, that ought never to have deceived anybody, should shriek
from the window that thieves had stolen the real diamond that never
existed at all.
Whether or no there are Soviets, there are undoubtedly Strikes; and I do
not underrate the difficulty or danger of the hour. There is at least a
case for blaming men for striking right and left, illogically and
without a system; there is a case for blaming them for striking steadily
and logically in accordance with a false system; there is a case for
saying that “direct action” implies such a false system. But there is
no case whatever for blaming them for having depreciated the waste paper
of the Westminster ballot-box; for that was depreciated long before the
war, and long before the word “Soviet” came to soothe and satisfy the
mind of Mrs. Drummond. It is absurd to blame the poor miners for
discrediting the members of Parliament, who could always be trusted to
discredit themselves. It was not the wild destructive Soviet which
decided that Parliament should not know who paid the bills of its own
political parties; it was Parliament itself. It was not a mad Bolshevist
addressing a mob who said that the men of the parliamentary group have
to treat charges of corruption among themselves differently from those
outside; it was the greatest living parliamentarian in a great
parliamentary debate. Miners had no more to be with it than missionaries
in the Cannibal Islands; it was not because men could not get coal that
they wanted to get coronets; and the empty coal-scuttle did not fill the
party chest. But in any case the policy of people like Mrs. Drummond
seems to require explanation. I can only fall back on the suggestion I
have already made; that she and her friends insisted on taking shares in
a rotten concern. They were quite sincere; so far as anybody can be
quite sincere who flatly refuses to listen to reason. They have no right
to complain if those who had to listen to their lawlessness will not
listen to their legalism.
As a fact such a lady is rather contemptuous than complaining. She says
the miners do not want Nationalization; which may or may not be true.
But she explains the demand by the old disdainful allusion to agitators;
or Labour leaders who “have to beat the big drum or lose their jobs.”
Nobody of course could possibly connect Mrs. Flora Drummond with the
idea of a big drum; any more than with a big horse or a uniform or a
self-created military rank. But this particular school of Feminists must
not be too fastidious in the present case. The miners are poor and
rudely instructed men; and cannot be expected to have that touch of
quiet persuasiveness and softening courtesy, by which the Militant
Suffragettes did so much to defend the historic dignity of their sex.
They have to fall back on something only too like a big drum, having no
skill in the silvery flutings of the W.S.P.U., or that tender lute which
Miss Pankhurst touched at twilight. But under all the disadvantages of
the coarser sex, the advocates of Nationalization have not yet used all
the methods that precedent might suggest to them. Mr. Smillie has not
cut up any Raphaels or Rembrandts at the National Gallery; nor even set
fire to any of the theatres he may happen to pass when he is out for a
walk. Mr. Bonar Law, on returning home at evening, does not find Mr.
Sidney Webb, a solitary figure chained to his railings. One of the
Suffragettes distinguished herself by getting inside a grand piano; but
it is seldom that we open our own private piano and find a large
coal-miner inside the instrument. The coal-miner may be better at the
big drum than the grand piano; but he remains on the outside of both;
and his drum is really smaller than some. The big drum, however, is
rather a convenient metaphor for something obvious and loud and hollow;
and the true moral in the matter is that recent English history was a
procession led far too much by the big drum; and the agitation about
mere Parliamentary votes was one of the most recent and most remarkable
examples of it.
What will be the future of the present industrial crisis I will not
prophesy; but I do know that every element in the past, which has led to
this impasse in the present, has been thus glorified as a mere novelty
by such a noisy minority. It was just because sanguine and shallow
people found it easier to act than to write, and easier to write than to
think, that every one of the changes came which now complicate our
position. The very industrialism which makes us dependent on coal, and
therefore on coal-miners and coal-owners, was forced on us by fussy
efficient fools, for whom anything fresh seemed to be free. Neither
miners nor mine-owners could have put out the fire by which Shakespeare
told his Winter’s Tale. The unequal ownership, which has justly
alienated the workers, was hurried happily through because the owners
were new, and it did not matter that they were few. The blind hypocrisy
with which our press and publicists hardened their hearts in the great
strikes before the war, was made possible by loud evasions about
political progress and especially by the big drum of Votes for Women. I
have begun this essay on a controversial note, with the echo of an old
controversy; and yet I do not mean to be merely provocative. The
Suffragettes are only doing what we all do; and I have only put them
first as an example of accumulated abuses for which we are all
responsible. I do not mean to blame the Suffragettes as they blame the
Socialists; but only to point to an impasse of impenitence for which we
are all to blame.
I am more and more convinced that what is wanted nowadays is not
optimism or pessimism, but a sort of reform that might more truly be
called repentance. The reform of a state ought to be a thing more like
the reform of a thief, which involves the admission that he has been a
thief. We ought not to be merely inventing consolations, or even merely
prophesying disasters; we ought, first and foremost, to be confessing
our own very bad mistakes. It is easy enough to say that the world is
getting better, by some mysterious thing called progress--which seems to
mean providence without purpose. But it is almost as easy to say the
world is getting worse, if we assume that it is only the younger
generation that has just begun to make it worse. It is easy enough to
say that the country is going to the dogs, if we are careful to identify
the dogs with the puppies. What we need is not the assertion that other
people are going to the dogs, but the confession that we ourselves have
only just come back from the swine. We also are the younger generation,
in the sense of being the Prodigal Son. As somebody said, there is such
a thing as the Prodigal Father. We could purchase hope at the dreadful
price of humility. But all thinkers and writers, of all political
parties and philosophical sects, seem to shrink from this notion of
admitting they are on the wrong road and getting back on to the right
one. They are always trying to pretend, by hook or crook, that they are
all on the same somewhat meandering road, and that they were right in
going east yesterday, though they are right in going west to-day. They
will try to make out that every school of thought was an advance on the
last school of thought, and that no apology is due to anybody. For
instance, we might really have a moderate, cautious, and even
conservative reform of the evils affecting Labour, if we would only
confess that Capitalism itself was a blunder which it is very difficult
to undo. As it is, men seem to be divided into those that think it an
achievement so admirable that it cannot be improved upon, and those who
think it an achievement so encouraging that it _can_ be improved upon.
The former will leave it in chaos, and the latter will probably improve
it into slavery. Neither will admit what is the truth--that we have got
to get _back_ to a better distribution of property, as it was before we
fell into the blunder of allowing property to be clotted into monstrous
monopolies. For that involves admitting that we have made a mistake; and
that we none of us have the moral courage to do.
I suggest very seriously that it will do good to our credit for courage
and right reason if we drop this way of doing things. The conversions
that have converted the world were not effected by this sort of
evolutionary curve. St. Paul did not pretend that he had changed slowly
and imperceptibly from a Pharisee to a Christian. Victor Hugo did not
maintain that he had been very right to be a Royalist, and only a little
more right to be a Republican. If we have come to the conclusion that we
have been wrong, let us say so, and congratulate ourselves on being now
right; not insinuate that in some relative fashion we were just as right
when we were wrong. For in this respect the progressive is the worst
sort of conservative. He insists on conserving, in the most obstinate
and obscurantist fashion, all the courses that have been marked out for
progress in the past. He does literally, in the rather unlucky metaphor
of Tennyson, “let the great world spin for ever down the ringing grooves
of change.” For anyone who changes in that fashion has only got into a
groove. There is no obligation on anybody to invent evolutionary excuses
for all these experiments. There is no need to be so much ashamed of our
blunders as all that. It is human to err; and the only final and deadly
error, among all our errors, is denying that we have ever erred.
Milton and Merry England
Mr. Freeman, in contributing to the “London Mercury” some of those
critical analyses which we all admire, remarked about myself (along with
compliments only too generous and strictures almost entirely just) that
there was very little autobiography in my writings. I hope the reader
will not have reason to curse him for this kindly provocation, watching
me assume the graceful poses of Marie Bashkirtseff. But I feel tempted
to plead it in extenuation or excuse for this article, which can hardly
avoid being egotistical. For though it concerns one of those problems of
literature, of philosophy and of history that certainly interest me more
than my own psychology, it is one on which I can hardly explain myself
without seeming to expose myself.
That valuable public servant, “The Gentleman with the Duster,” has
passed on from Downing Street, from polishing up the Mirrors and
polishing off the Ministers, to a larger world of reflections in “The
Glass of Fashion.” I call the glass a world of reflections rather than a
world of shadows; especially as I myself am one of those tenuous shades.
And the matter which interests me here is that the critic in question
complains that I have been very unjust to Puritans and Puritanism, and
especially to a certain ethical idealism in them, which he declares to
have been more essential than the Calvinism of which I “make so much.”
He puts the point in a genial but somewhat fantastic fashion by saying
that the world owes something to the jokes of Mr. G. K. Chesterton, but
more to the moral earnestness of John Milton. This involves rather a
dizzy elevation than a salutary depression; and the comparison is rather
too overwhelming to be crushing. For I suppose the graceful duster of
mirrors himself would hardly feel crushed, if I told him he did not hold
the mirror up to Nature quite so successfully as Shakespeare. Nor can I
be described as exactly reeling from the shock of being informed that I
am a less historic figure than Milton. I know not how to answer, unless
it be in the noble words of Sam Weller: “That’s what we call a
self-evident proposition, as the cats'-meat-man said to the housemaid
when she said he was no gentleman.” But for all that I have a
controversial issue with the critic about the moral earnestness of
Milton, and I have a confession to make which will seem to many only too
much in the personal manner referred to by Mr. Freeman.
My first impulse to write, and almost my first impulse to think, was a
revolt of disgust with the Decadents and the æsthetic pessimism of the
’nineties. It is now almost impossible to bring home to anybody, even to
myself, how final that _fin de siècle_ seemed to be; not the end of the
century but the end of the world. To a boy his first hatred is almost as
immortal as his first love. He does not realize that the objects of
either can alter; and I did not know that the twilight of the gods was
only a mood. I thought that all the wit and wisdom in the world was
banded together to slander and depress the world, and in becoming an
optimist I had the feelings of an outlaw. Like Prince Florizel of
Bohemia, I felt myself to be alone in a luxurious Suicide Club. But even
the death seemed to be a living or rather everlasting death. To-day the
whole thing is merely dead; it was not sufficiently immortal to be
damned. But then the image of Dorian Gray was really an idol, with
something of the endless youth of a god. To-day the picture of Dorian
Gray has really grown old. Dodo then was not merely an amusing female;
she was the eternal feminine. To-day the Dodo is extinct. Then, above
all, everyone claiming intelligence insisted on what was called “Art for
art’s sake.” To-day even the biographer of Oscar Wilde proposes to
abandon “art for art’s sake,” and to substitute “art for life’s sake.”
But at the time I was more inclined to substitute “no art, for God’s
sake.” I would rather have had no art at all than one which occupies
itself in matching shades of peacock and turquoise for a decorative
scheme of blue devils. I started to think it out, and the more I thought
of it the more certain I grew that the whole thing was a fallacy; that
art could not exist apart from, still less in opposition to, life;
especially the life of the soul, which is salvation; and that great art
never had been so much detached as that from conscience and common
sense, or from what my critic would call moral earnestness.
Unfortunately, by the time I had exposed it as a fallacy, it had
entirely evaporated as a fashion. Since then I have taken universal
annihilations more lightly. But I can still be stirred, as man always
can be by memories of their first excitements or ambitions, by anything
that shows the cloven hoof of that particular blue devil. I am still
ready to knock him about, though I no longer think he has a cloven hoof
or even a lame leg to stand on. But for all that there is one real
argument which I still recognize on his side; and that argument is in a
single word. There is still one word which the æsthete can whisper; and
the whisper will bring back all my childish fears that the æsthete may
be right after all. There is one name that does seem to me a strong
argument for the decadent doctrine that “art is unmoral.” When that name
is uttered, the world of Wilde and Whistler comes back with all its cold
levity and cynical connoisseurship. The butterfly becomes a burden and
the green carnation flourishes like the green bay-tree. For the moment I
do believe in “art for art’s sake.” And that name is John Milton.
It does really seem to me that Milton was an artist, and nothing but an
artist; and yet so great an artist as to sustain by his own strength the
idea that art can exist alone. He seems to me an almost solitary example
of a man of magnificent genius whose greatness does not depend at all
upon moral earnestness, or upon anything connected with morality. His
greatness is in a style, and a style which seems to me rather unusually
separate from its substance. What is the exact nature of the pleasure
which I, for one, take in reading and repeating some such lines, for
instance, as those familiar ones:
Dying put on the weeds of Dominic
Or in Franciscan think to pass disguised.
So far as I can see, the whole effect is in a certain unexpected order
and arrangement of words, independent and distinguished, like the
perfect manners of an eccentric gentleman. Say instead “Put on in death
the weeds of Dominic,” and the whole unique dignity of the line has
broken down. It is something in the quiet but confident inversion of
“Dying put on” which exactly achieves that perpetual slight novelty
which Aristotle profoundly said was the language of poetry. The idea
itself is at best an obvious and even conventional condemnation of
superstition, and in the ultimate sense a rather superficial one. Coming
where it does, indeed, it does not so much suggest moral earnestness as
rather a moralizing priggishness. For it is dragged in very laboriously
into the very last place where it is wanted, before a splendidly large
and luminous vision of the world newly created, and the first innocence
of earth and sky. It is that passage in which the wanderer through space
approaches Eden; one of the most unquestionable triumphs of all human
literature. That one book at least of “Paradise Lost” could claim the
more audacious title of “Paradise Found.” But if it was necessary for
the poet going to Eden to pass through Limbo, why was it necessary to
pass through Lambeth and Little Bethel? Why should he go there viâ Rome
and Geneva? Why was it necessary to compare the débris of Limbo to the
details of ecclesiastical quarrels in the seventeenth century, when he
was moving in a world before the dawn of all the centuries, or the
shadow of the first quarrel? Why did he talk as if the Church was
reformed before the world was made, or as if Latimer lit his candle
before God made the sun and moon? Matthew Arnold made fun of those who
claimed divine sanction for episcopacy by suggesting that when God said
“Let there be light,” He also said “Let there be Bishops.” But his own
favourite Milton went very near suggesting that when God said “Let there
be light,” He soon afterwards remarked “Let there be Nonconformists.” I
do not feel this merely because my own religious sympathies happen to be
rather on the other side. It is indeed probable that Milton did not
appreciate a whole world of ideas in which he saw merely the
corruptions: the idea of relics and symbolic acts and the drama of the
deathbed. It does not enlarge his place in the philosophy of history
that this should be his only relation either to the divine demagogy of
the Dogs of God or to the fantastical fraternity of the Jugglers of God.
But I should feel exactly the same incongruity if the theological animus
were the other way. It would be equally disproportionate if the approach
to Eden were interrupted with jokes against Puritans, or if Limbo were
littered with steeple-crowned hats and the scrolls of interminable
Calvinistic sermons. We should still feel that a book of “Paradise Lost”
was not the right place for a passage from Hudibras. So far from being
morally earnest, in the best sense, there is something almost
philosophically frivolous in the incapacity to think firmly and
magnanimously about the First Things, and the primary colours of the
creative palette, without spoiling the picture with this ink-slinging of
sectarian politics. Speaking from the standpoint of moral earnestness,
I confess it seems to me trivial and spiteful and even a little vulgar.
After which impertinent criticism, I will now repeat in a loud voice,
and for the mere lust of saying it as often as possible:
Dying put on the weeds of Dominic
Or in Franciscan think to pass disguised.
And the exuberant joy I take in it is the nearest thing I have ever
known to art for art’s sake.
In short, it seems to me that Milton was a great artist, and that he was
also a great accident. It was rather in the same sense that his master
Cromwell was a great accident. It is not true that all the moral virtues
were crystallized in Milton and his Puritans. It is not true that all
the military virtues were concentrated in Cromwell and his Ironsides.
There were masses of moral devotion on the other side, and masses of
military valour on the other side. But it did so happen that Milton had
more ability and success in literary expression, and Cromwell more
ability and success in military science, than any of their many rivals.
To represent Cromwell as a fiend or Milton as a hypocrite is to rush to
another extreme and be ridiculous; they both believed sincerely enough
in certain moral ideas of their time. Only they were not, as seems to be
supposed, the only moral ideas of their time. And they were not, in my
private opinion, the best moral ideas of their time. One of them was the
idea that wisdom is more or less weakened by laughter and a popular
taste in pleasure; and we may call this moral earnestness if we like.
But the point is that Cromwell did not succeed by his moral
earnestness, but by his strategy; and Milton did not succeed by his
moral earnestness, but by his style.
And, first of all, let me touch on the highest form of moral earnestness
and the relation of Milton to the religious poetry of his day. “Paradise
Lost” is certainly a religious poem; but, for many of its admirers, the
religion is the least admirable part of it. The poet professes indeed to
justify the ways of God to men; but I never heard of any men who read it
in order to have them justified, as men do still read a really religious
poem, like the dark and almost sceptical Book of Job. A poem can hardly
be said to justify the ways of God, when its most frequent effect is
admittedly to make people sympathize with Satan. In all this I am in a
sense arguing against myself; for all my instincts, as I have said, are
against the æsthetic theory that art so great can be wholly irreligious.
And I agree that even in Milton there are gleams of Christianity. Nobody
quite without them could have written the single line: “By the dear
might of Him that walked the waves.” But it is hardly too much to say
that it is the one place where that Figure walks in the whole world of
Milton. Nobody, I imagine, has ever been able to recognize Christ in the
cold conqueror who drives a chariot in the war in heaven, like Apollo
warring on the Titans. Nobody has ever heard Him in the stately
disquisitions either of the Council in Heaven or of Paradise Regained.
But, apart from all these particular problems, it is surely the general
truth that the great religious epic strikes us with a sense of
disproportion; the sense of how little it is religious considering how
manifestly it is great. It seems almost strange that a man should have
written so much and so well without stumbling on Christian tradition.
Now in the age of Milton there was a riot of religious poetry. Most of
it had moral earnestness, and much of it had splendid spiritual
conviction. But most of it was not the poetry of the Puritans; on the
contrary, it was mostly the poetry of the Cavaliers. The most real
religion--we might say the most realistic religion--is not to be found
in Milton, but in Vaughan, in Treherne, in Crashaw, in Herbert, and even
in Herrick. The best proof of it is that the religion is alive to-day,
as religion and not merely as literature. A Roman Catholic can read
Crashaw, an Anglo-Catholic can read Herbert, in a direct devotional
spirit; I gravely doubt whether many modern Congregationalists read the
theology of “Paradise Lost” in that spirit. For the moment I mention
only this purely religious emotion; I do not deny that Milton’s poetry,
like all great poetry, can awaken other great emotions. For instance, a
man bereaved by one of the tragedies of the Great War might well find a
stoical serenity in the great lines beginning “Nothing is here for
tears.” That sort of consolation is uttered, as nobly as it could be
uttered, by Milton; but it might be uttered by Sophocles or Goethe, or
even by Lucretius or Voltaire. But supposing that a man were seeking a
more Christian kind of consolation, he would not find it in Milton at
all, as he would find it in the lines beginning “They are all gone into
the world of light.” The whole of the two great Puritan epics do not
contain all that is said in saying “O holy hope and high humility.”
Neither hope nor humility were Puritan specialities.
But it was not only in devotional mysticism that these Cavaliers could
challenge the great Puritan; it was in a mysticism more humanistic and
even more modern. They shine with that white mystery of daylight which
many suppose to have dawned with Wordsworth and with Blake. In that
sense they make earth mystical where Milton only made heaven material.
Nor are they inferior in philosophic freedom; the single line of
Crashaw, addressed to a woman, “By thy large draughts of intellectual
day,” is less likely, I fancy, to have been addressed by Adam to Eve, or
by Milton to Mrs. Milton. It seems to me that these men were superior to
Milton in magnanimity, in chivalry, in joy of life, in the balance of
sanity and subtlety, in everything except the fact (not wholly remote
from literary criticism) that they did not write so well as he did. But
they wrote well enough to lift the load of materialism from the English
name; and show us the shining fields of a paradise that is not wholly
lost.
Of such was the Anti-Puritan party; and the reader may learn more about
it from the author of “The Glass of Fashion.” There he may form a
general idea of how, but for the Puritans, England would have been
abandoned to mere ribaldry and licence; blasted by the blasphemies of
George Herbert; rolled in the mire of the vile materialism of Vaughan;
tickled to ribald laughter by the cheap cynicism and tap-room
familiarities of Crashaw and Treherne. But the same Cavalier tradition
continued into the next age, and indeed into the next century; and the
critic must extend his condemnation to include the brutal buffooneries
of Bishop Ken or the gay and careless worldliness of Jeremy Collier.
Nay, he must extend it to cover the last Tories who kept the tradition
of the Jacobites; the careless merriment of Dean Swift, the godless
dissipation of Dr. Johnson. None of these men were Puritans; all of them
were strong opponents of political and religious Puritanism. The truth
is that English literature bears a very continuous and splendid
testimony to the fact that England was not merely Puritan. Ben Jonson in
“Bartholomew Fair” spoke for most English people, and certainly for most
English poets. Anti-Puritanism was the one thing common to Shakespeare
and Dryden, to Swift and Johnson, to Cobbett and Dickens. And the
historical bias the other way has come, not from Puritan superiority,
but simply from Puritan success. It was the political triumph of the
party, in the Revolution and the resultant commercial industrialism,
that suppressed the testimony of the populace and the poets. Loyalty
died away in a few popular songs; the Cromwellians never had any popular
song to die. English history has moved away from English literature. Our
culture, like our agriculture, is at once very native and very
neglected. And as this neglect is regrettable, if only as neglect of
literature, I will pause in conclusion upon the later period, two
generations after Milton, when the last of the true Tories drank wine
with Bolingbroke or tea with Johnson.
The truth that is missed about the Tories of this tradition is that they
were rebels. They had the virtues of rebels; they also had the vices of
rebels. Swift had the fury of a rebel; Johnson the surliness of a
rebel; Goldsmith the morbid sensibility of a rebel; and Scott, at the
end of the process, something of the despair and mere retrospection of a
defeated rebel. And the Whig school of literary criticism, like the Whig
school of political history, has omitted or missed this truth about
them, because it necessarily omitted the very existence of the thing
against which they rebelled. For Macaulay and Thackeray and the average
of Victorian liberality the Revolution of 1688 was simply an
emancipation, the defeat of the Stuarts was simply a downfall of tyranny
and superstition; the politics of the eighteenth century were simply a
progress leading up to the pure and happy politics of the nineteenth
century; freedom slowly broadening down, etc., etc. This makes the
attitude of the Tory rebels entirely meaningless; so that the critics in
question have been forced to represent some of the greatest Englishmen
who ever lived as a mere procession of lunatics and ludicrous
eccentrics. But these rebels, right or wrong, can only be understood in
relation to the real power against which they were rebelling; and their
titanic figures can best be traced in the light of the lightning which
they defied. That power was a positive thing; it was anything but a mere
negative emancipation of everybody. It was as definite as the monarchy
which it had replaced; for it was an aristocracy that replaced it. It
was the oligarchy of the great Whig families, a very close corporation
indeed, having Parliament for its legal form, but the new wealth for its
essential substance. That is why these lingering Jacobites appear most
picturesque when they are pitted against some of the princes of the new
aristocratic order. That is why Bolingbroke remains in the memory,
standing in his box at the performance of “Cato,” and flinging forth his
defiance to Marlborough. That is why Johnson remains rigid in his
magnificent disdain, hurling his defiance at Chesterfield. Churchill and
Chesterfield were not small men, either in personality or in power; they
were brilliant ornaments of the triumph of the world. They represented
the English governing class when it could really govern; the modern
plutocracy when it still deserved to be called an aristocracy also. And
the whole point of the position of these men of letters is that they
were denying and denouncing something which was growing every day in
prestige and prosperity; which seemed to have, and indeed had, not only
the present but the future on its side. The only thing it had not got on
its side was the ancient tradition of the English populace. That
populace was being more and more harried by evictions and enclosures,
that its old common lands and yeoman freeholds might be added to the
enormous estates of the all-powerful aristocracy. One of the Tory rebels
has himself made that infamy immortal in the great lines of the
“Deserted Village.” At least, it is immortal in the sense that it can
never now be lost for lovers of English literature; but even this record
was for a long time lost to the public by under-valuation and neglect.
In recent times the “Deserted Village” was very much of a deserted poem.
But of that I may have occasion to speak later. The point for the moment
is that the psychology of these men, in its evil as well as its good, is
to be interpreted not so much in terms of a lingering loyalty as of a
frustrated revolution. Some of them had, of course, elements of
extravagance and morbidity peculiar to their own characters; but they
grew ten times more extravagant and more morbid as their souls swelled
within them at the success of the shameless and the insolence of the
fortunate. I doubt whether anybody ever felt so bitter against the
Stuarts. Now this misunderstanding has made a very regrettable gap in
literary criticism. The masterpieces of these men are represented as
much more crabbed or cranky or inconsequent than they really were,
because their objective is not seen objectively. It is like judging the
raving of some Puritan preacher without allowing for the fact that the
Pope or the King had ever possessed any power at all. To ignore the fact
of the great Whig families because of the legal fiction of a free
Parliament is like ignoring the feelings of the Christian martyrs about
Nero, because of the legal fiction that the Imperator was only a
military general. These fictions do not prevent imaginative persons from
writing books like the “Apocalypse” or books like “Gulliver’s Travels.”
I will take only one example of what I mean by this purely literary
misunderstanding: an example from “Gulliver’s Travels” itself. The case
of the under-valuation of Swift is a particularly subtle one, for Swift
was really unbalanced as an individual, which has made it much easier
for critics not to keep the rather delicate balance of justice about
him. There is a superficial case for saying he was mad, apart from the
physical accident of his madness; but the point is that even those who
have realized that he was sometimes mad with rage have not realized
what he was in a rage with. And there is a curious illustration of this
in the conclusion of the story of Gulliver. Everyone remembers the ugly
business about the Yahoos, and the still uglier business about the real
human beings who reminded the returned traveller of Yahoos; how Gulliver
shrank at first from his friends, and would only gradually consent to
sit near his wife. And everybody remembers the picturesque but hostile
sketch which Thackeray gives of the satire and the satirist; of Swift as
the black and evil blasphemer sitting down to write his terrible
allegory, of which the only moral is that all things are, and always
must be, valueless and vile. I say that everybody remembers both these
literary passages; but, indeed, I fear that many remember the critical
who do not really remember the creative passage, and that many have read
Thackeray who have not read Swift.
Now it is here that purely literary criticism has a word to say. A man
of letters may be mad or sane in his cerebral constitution; he may be
right or wrong in his political antipathies; he may be anything we
happen to like or dislike from our own individual standpoint. But there
is one thing to which a man of letters has a right, whatever he is, and
that is a fair critical comprehension of any particular literary effect
which he obviously aims at and achieves. He has a right to his climax,
and a right not to be judged without reference to his climax. It would
not be fair to leave out the beautiful last lines of “Paradise Lost” as
mere bathos; without realizing that the poet had a fine intention in
allowing that conclusion, after all the thunder and the trumps of doom,
to fall and fade away on a milder note of mercy and reasonable hope. It
would not be fair to stigmatize the incident of Ignorance, damned at the
very doors of heaven at the end of Bunyan’s book, as a mere blot of
black Calvinist cruelty and spite, without realizing that the writer
fully intended its fearful irony, like a last touch of the finger of
fear. But this justice which is done to the Puritan masters of
imagination has hardly been done to the great Tory master of irony. No
critic I have read has noticed the real point and climax of that passage
about the Yahoos. Swift leads up to it ruthlessly enough, for an artist
of that sort is often ruthless; and it is increased by his natural
talent for a sort of mad reality of detail, as in his description of the
slowly diminished distance between himself and his wife at the
dinner-table. But he was working up to something that he really wished
to say, something which was well worth saying, but which few seem to
have thought worth hearing. He suggests that he gradually lost the
loathing for humanity with which the Yahoo parallel had inspired him,
that although men are in many ways petty and animal, he came to feel
them to be normal and tolerable; that the sense of their unworthiness
now very seldom returns; and indeed that there is only one thing that
revives it. If one of these creatures exhibits Pride----.
That is the voice of Swift, and the cry arraigning aristocracy. It is
natural for a monkey to collect nuts, and it may be pardonable for John
Churchill to collect guineas. But to think that John Churchill can be
proud of his heap of guineas, can convert them into stars and coronets,
and can carry that calm and classic face disdainful above the
multitude! It is natural for she-monkeys to be mated somehow; but to
think that the Duchess of Yarmouth is proud of being the Duchess of
Yarmouth! It may not be surprising that the nobility should have
scrambled like screaming Yahoos for the rags and ribbons of the
Revolution, tripping up and betraying anybody and everybody in turn,
with every dirty trick of treason, for anything and everything they
could get. But that those of them who had got everything should then
despise those who had got nothing, that the rich should sneer at the
poor for having no part of the plunder, that this oligarchy of Yahoos
should actually feel superior to anything or anybody--that does move the
prophet of the losing side to an indignation which is something much
deeper and nobler than the negative flippancies that we call blasphemy.
Swift was perhaps more of a Jeremiah than an Isaiah, and a faulty
Jeremiah at that; but in this great climax of his grim satire he is none
the less a seer and a speaker of the things of God; because he gives the
testimony of the strongest and most searching of human intellects to the
profound truth of the meanness and imbecility of pride.
And the other men of the same tradition had essentially the same
instinct. Johnson was in many ways unjust to Swift, just as Cobbett was
afterwards unjust to Johnson. But looking back up the perspective of
history we can all see that those three great men were all facing the
same way; that they all regretted the rise of a rapacious and paganized
commercial aristocracy, and its conquest over the old popular
traditions, which some would call popular prejudices. When Johnson said
that the devil was the first Whig, he might have merely varied the
phrase by saying that he was the first aristocrat. For the men of this
Tory tradition, in spirit if not in definition, distinguished between
the privilege of monarchy and that of the new aristocracy by a very
tenable test. The mark of aristocracy is ambition. The king cannot be
ambitious. We might put it now by saying that monarchy is authority; but
in its essence aristocracy is always anarchy. But the men of that school
did not criticize the oligarch merely as a rebel against those above;
they were well aware of his activities as an oppressor of those below.
This aspect, as has already been noted, was best described by a friend
of Johnson, for whom Johnson had a very noble and rather unique
appreciation--Oliver Goldsmith.
A recent and sympathetic critic in the _Mercury_ used the phrase that
Mr. Belloc had been anticipated by Disraeli in his view of England as
having evolved into a Venetian oligarchy. The truth is that Disraeli was
anticipated by Bolingbroke and the many highly intelligent men who
agreed with him; and not least by Goldsmith. The whole view, including
the very parallel with Venice, can be found stated with luminous logic
and cogency in the “Vicar of Wakefield.” And Goldsmith attacked the
problem entirely from the popular side. Nobody can mistake his Toryism
for a snobbish submission to a privilege or title:
Princes and lords, the shadow of a shade,
A breath can make them, as a breath has made:
But a bold peasantry, a nation’s pride,
When once destroyed can never be supplied.
I hope he was wrong; but I sometimes have a horrible feeling that he may
have been right.
But I have here, thank God, no cause for touching upon modern politics.
I was educated, as much as my critic, in the belief that Whiggism was a
pure deliverance; and I hope I am still as willing as he to respect
Puritans for their individual virtue as well as for their individual
genius. But it moves all my memories of the unmorality of the ’nineties
to be charged with indifference to the importance of being earnest. And
it is for the sake of English literature that I protest against the
suggestion that we had no purity except Puritanism, or that only a man
like the author of “Paradise Lost” could manage to be on the side of the
angels.
* * * * *
On Peace Day I set up outside my house two torches, and twined them with
laurel; because I thought at least there was nothing pacifist about
laurel. But that night, after the bonfire and the fireworks had faded, a
wind grew and blew with gathering violence, blowing away the rain. And
in the morning I found one of the laurelled posts torn off and lying at
random on the rainy ground; while the other still stood erect, green and
glittering in the sun. I thought that the pagans would certainly have
called it an omen; and it was one that strangely fitted my own sense of
some great work half fulfilled and half frustrated. And I thought
vaguely of that man in Virgil, who prayed that he might slay his foe and
return to his country; and the gods heard half the prayer, and the other
half was scattered to the winds. For I knew we were right to rejoice;
since the tyrant was indeed slain and his tyranny fallen for ever; but I
know not when we shall find our way back to our own land.
_Printed in Great Britain by_ Butler & Tanner Ltd., _Frome and London_
* * * * *
A FEW OF
MESSRS. METHUEN’S
PUBLICATIONS
=Armstrong (Warwick W).= THE ART OF CRICKET. _Fourth Edition._
Illustrated. Crown 8vo, 6s. net.
=Atkinson (T. D.).= ENGLISH ARCHITECTURE. Illustrated. _Sixth Edition._
Fcap. 8vo, 5s. net.
=Bain (F. W.)=--
IN THE GREAT GOD’S HAIR (_Seventh Edition_); A DRAUGHT OF THE BLUE
(_Seventh Edition_); AN INCARNATION OF THE SNOW (_Fourth Edition_); A
MINE OF FAULTS (_Fifth Edition_); A DIGIT OF THE MOON (_Fourteenth
Edition_); THE LIVERY OF EVE (_Third Edition_); A HEIFER OF THE DAWN
(_Eleventh Edition_); AN ESSENCE OF THE DUSK (_Fifth Edition_); THE
DESCENT OF THE SUN (_Eighth Edition_); THE ASHES OF A GOD (_Third
Edition_); BUBBLES OF THE FOAM (_Third Edition_); A SYRUP OF THE BEES
(_Second Edition_); THE SUBSTANCE OF A DREAM (_Second Edition_). Fcap.
8vo, 5s. net each. AN ECHO OF THE SPHERES. Wide Demy, 10s. 6d. net.
=Baker (C. H. Collins).= CROME. Illustrated. Quarto, £5 5s. net.
=Bateman (H. M.).= A BOOK OF DRAWINGS. _Fifth Edition._ Royal 4to, 10s.
6d. net. SUBURBIA. Demy 4to, 6s. net. MORE DRAWINGS. Royal 4to, 10s. 6d.
net.
=Beckford (Peter).= THOUGHTS ON HUNTING. In a series of Familiar Letters
to a Friend. With an Introduction and Notes by J. OTHO PAGET.
Illustrated. _Fifth Edition._ Demy 8vo, 6s. net.
=Belloc (H.)=--PARIS. Illustrated. _Fourth Edition._ Crown 8vo, 8s. 6d.
net. HILLS AND THE SEA. _Thirteenth Edition._ Fcap. 8vo, 6s. net. Also
Fcap. 8vo, 2s. net. ON NOTHING. _Fourth Edition._ Fcap. 8vo, 6s. net.
Also Fcap. 8vo, 2s. net. ON EVERYTHING. _Fourth Edition._ Fcap. 8vo, 6s.
net. Also Fcap. 8vo, 2s. net. ON SOMETHING. _Third Edition._ Fcap. 8vo,
6s. net. Also Fcap. 8vo, 2s. net. FIRST AND LAST. _Second Edition._
Fcap. 8vo, 6s. net. THIS AND THAT AND THE OTHER. _Second Edition._ Fcap.
8vo, 6s. net.
=Braid (James)=, Open Champion, 1901, 1905, 1906, 1908, and 1910. ADVANCED
GOLF. Illustrated. _Eleventh Edition._ Demy 8vo, 14s. net.
=Chandler (Arthur), D.D.=, late Lord Bishop of Bloemfontein. ARA CŒLI; An
Essay in Mystical Theology. _Seventh Edition._ 5s. net. FAITH AND
EXPERIENCE. _Third Edition._ 5s. net. THE CULT OF THE PASSING MOMENT.
_Fifth Edition._ 6s. net. THE ENGLISH CHURCH AND RE-UNION. 5s. net.
SCALA MUNDI. 4s. 6d. net.
=Chesterton (G. K.)=--THE BALLAD OF THE WHITE HORSE. _Sixth Edition._ 6s.
net. ALL THINGS CONSIDERED. _Fourteenth Edition._ 6s. net; also Fcap.
8vo, 2s. net. TREMENDOUS TRIFLES. _Sixth Edition._ 6s. net; also Fcap.
8vo, 2s. net. ALARMS AND DISCURSIONS. _Second Edition._ 6s. net. A
MISCELLANY OF MEN. _Third Edition._ 6s. net. THE USES OF DIVERSITY. 6s.
net. WINE, WATER, AND SONG. _Eleventh Edition._ 1s. 6d. net.
=Clouston (Sir T. S.).= THE HYGIENE OF MIND. Illustrated. _Seventh
Edition._ Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d. net.
=Clutton-Brock (A.)=--THOUGHTS ON THE WAR, 1s. 6d. net; WHAT IS THE
KINGDOM OF HEAVEN? 5s. net; ESSAYS ON ART, 5s. net; ESSAYS ON BOOKS, 6s.
net; MORE ESSAYS ON BOOKS, 6s. net.
=Conrad (Joseph).= THE MIRROR OF THE SEA: MEMORIES AND IMPRESSIONS.
_Fourth Edition._ Fcap. 8vo, 6s. net; also Fcap. 8vo, 2s. net.
=Dickinson (G. Lowes).= THE GREEK VIEW OF LIFE. _Fourteenth Edition._
Crown 8vo, 5s. net.
=Dobson (J. F.).= THE GREEK ORATORS. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. net.
=Drever (James).= THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE. _Third Edition._ Crown
8vo, 6s. net.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDUSTRY. Crown 8vo, 5s. net.
=Einstein (A.).= RELATIVITY: THE SPECIAL AND THE GENERAL THEORY. _Seventh
Edition._ Crown 8vo, 5s. net.
SIDELIGHTS ON RELATIVITY. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. net.
THE MEANING OF RELATIVITY. Crown 8vo, 5s. net.
_Other Books on the_ =Einstein Theory=. SPACE--TIME--MATTER. By HERMANN
WEYL. Demy 8vo, 18s. net.
EINSTEIN THE SEARCHER: HIS WORK EXPLAINED IN DIALOGUES WITH EINSTEIN. By
ALEXANDER MOSZKOWSKI. Demy 8vo, 12s. 6d. net.
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF RELATIVITY. By LYNDON BOLTON, M.A.
Crown 8vo, 5s. net.
RELATIVITY AND GRAVITATION. By various Writers. Edited by J. MALCOLM
BIRD. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. net.
RELATIVITY AND THE UNIVERSE. By HARRY SCHMIDT. _Second Edition._ Crown
8vo, 5s. net.
THE IDEAS OF EINSTEIN’S THEORY. By J. H. THIRRING, Ph.D. Crown 8vo, 5s.
net.
=Evans (Lady).= LUSTRE POTTERY. With 24 Plates. Royal Quarto, £2 12s. 6d.
net.
=Fyleman (Rose).= FAIRIES AND CHIMNEYS. _Twelfth Edition._ Fcap. 8vo, 3s.
6d. net.
THE FAIRY GREEN. _Seventh Edition._ Fcap. 8vo, 3s. 6d. net.
THE FAIRY FLUTE. _Second Edition._ Fcap. 8vo, 3s. 6d. net.
THE RAINBOW CAT AND OTHER STORIES. Fcap. 8vo, 3s. 6d. net.
=Gibbins (H. de B.).= THE INDUSTRIAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND. With 5 Maps and a
Plan. _Twenty-seventh Edition._ Crown 8vo, 5s.
=Gibbon (Edward).= THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE. Edited, with
Notes, Appendices, and Maps, by J. B. BURY. Illustrated. Seven Volumes.
Demy 8vo, each 12s. 6d. net. Also Seven Volumes. Unillustrated. Crown
8vo, each 7s. 6d. net.
=Glover (T. R.).= THE CONFLICT OF RELIGIONS IN THE EARLY ROMAN EMPIRE.
_Ninth Edition._ Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d. net.
THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION AND ITS VERIFICATION. _Second Edition._ Crown
8vo, 6s. net.
POETS AND PURITANS. _Second Edition._ Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d. net.
VIRGIL. _Fourth Edition._ Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d. net.
FROM PERICLES TO PHILIP. _Third Edition._ Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d. net.
=Grahame (Kenneth)=, Author of “The Golden Age.” THE WIND IN THE WILLOWS.
With a Frontispiece by =Graham Robertson=. _Twelfth Edition._ Crown 8vo,
7s. 6d. net. _Illustrated Edition._ With drawings in colour and line, by
NANCY BARNHART. Small 4to, 10s. 6d. net.
=Hall (H. R.).= THE ANCIENT HISTORY OF THE NEAR EAST FROM THE EARLIEST
TIMES TO THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS. Illustrated. _Fifth Edition._ Demy 8vo,
£1 1s. net.
=Herbert (A. P.).= THE WHEREFORE AND THE WHY, NEW RHYMES FOR OLD CHILDREN.
Illustrated by GEORGE MORROW. Fcap. 4to, 3s. 6d. net.
“TINKER, TAILOR....” A Child’s Guide to the Professions. Illustrated by
GEORGE MORROW. Fcap. 4to, 3s. 6d. net.
LIGHT ARTICLES ONLY. Illustrated by GEORGE MORROW. _Second Edition._
Crown 8vo, 6s. net.
=Holdsworth (W. S.).= A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW. Vols. I., II., III. Each
_Second Edition_. Demy 8vo, each £1 5s. net.
=Hutton (Edward)=--THE CITIES OF UMBRIA (_Fifth Edition_); THE CITIES OF
LOMBARDY; THE CITIES OF ROMAGNA AND THE MARCHES; FLORENCE AND NORTHERN
TUSCANY, WITH GENOA (_Third Edition_); SIENA AND SOUTHERN TUSCANY
(_Second Edition_); VENICE AND VENETIA; THE CITIES OF SPAIN (_Fifth
Edition_); NAPLES AND SOUTHERN ITALY. Illustrated. Crown 8vo. Each 8s.
6d. net. ROME (_Fourth Edition_), 6s. net.
=Inge (W. R.)=. CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM. (The Bampton Lectures for 1899).
_Fifth Edition._ Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. net.
=Jenks (E.)=. A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW. _Second Edition._ Demy 8vo,
12s. 6d. net.
=Julian (Lady)=, Anchoress at Norwich, A.D., 1373. REVELATIONS OF DIVINE
LOVE. A Version from the MS. in the British Museum. Edited by GRACE
WARRACK. _Seventh Edition_. Crown 8vo, 5s. net.
=Kidd (Benjamin).= THE SCIENCE OF POWER. _Ninth Edition._ Crown 8vo, 7s.
6d. net.
SOCIAL EVOLUTION. A New Ed. Demy 8vo, 8s. 6d. net.
A PHILOSOPHER WITH NATURE. _Second Edition._ Crown 8vo, 6s. net.
=Kipling (Rudyard).= BARRACK-ROOM BALLADS. _228th Thousand. Fifty-fifth
Edition._ Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. net. Also Fcap. 8vo, 6s. net; leather 7s.
6d. net. Also a Service Edition. Two Volumes. Square Fcap. 8vo. Each 3s.
net.
THE SEVEN SEAS. _161st Thousand. Thirty-fourth Edition._ Crown 8vo, 7s.
6d. net. Also Fcap. 8vo. 6s. net; leather, 7s. 6d. net. Also a Service
Edition. Two Volumes. Square Fcap. 8vo. Each 3s. net.
THE FIVE NATIONS. _129th Thousand. Twenty-third Edition._ Crown 8vo, 7s.
6d. net. Also Fcap. 8vo, 6s. net; leather, 7s. 6d. net. Also a Service
Edition. Two volumes. Square Fcap. 8vo. Each 3s. net.
DEPARTMENTAL DITTIES. _102nd Thousand. Thirty-fourth Edition._ Crown
8vo, 7s. 6d. net. Also Fcap. 8vo, 6s. net.; leather, 7s. 6d. net. Also a
Service Edition. Two Volumes. Square Fcap. 8vo. Each 3s. net.
THE YEARS BETWEEN. _95th Thousand._ Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. net. Also Fcap.
8vo, 6s. net; leather, 7s. 6d. net. Also a Service Edition. Two Volumes.
Square Fcap. 8vo. Each 3s. net.
TWENTY POEMS FROM RUDYARD KIPLING. Fcap. 8vo, 1s. net.
A KIPLING ANTHOLOGY--VERSE: Selected from the Poetry of RUDYARD KIPLING.
_Second Edition._ Fcap. 8vo, 6s. net. Leather, 7s. 6d. net.
=Lamb (Charles and Mary).= THE COMPLETE WORKS. Edited by E. V. LUCAS. A
New and Revised Edition in Six Volumes. With Frontispiece. Fcap. 8vo.
Each 6s. net. The Volumes are:--
I. MISCELLANEOUS PROSE. II. ELIA AND THE LAST ESSAYS OF ELIA. III. BOOKS
FOR CHILDREN. IV. PLAYS AND POEMS. V. and VI. LETTERS.
=Lankester (Sir Ray).= SCIENCE FROM AN EASY CHAIR. First Series.
Illustrated. _Thirteenth Edition._ Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. net. Also Fcap.
8vo, 2s. net.
SCIENCE FROM AN EASY CHAIR. Second Series. Illustrated. _Third Edition._
Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. net. Also as MORE SCIENCE FROM AN EASY CHAIR. Fcap.
8vo, 2s. net.
DIVERSIONS OF A NATURALIST. Illustrated. _Third Edition._ Crown 8vo, 7s.
6d. net.
SECRETS OF EARTH AND SEA. Illustrated. Crown 8vo, 8s. 6d. net.
=Lescarboura (A. C.).= RADIO FOR EVERYBODY. Edited by R. L. SMITH-ROSE,
M.Sc. Illustrated. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. net.
=Lodge (Sir Oliver)=--MAN AND THE UNIVERSE, Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. net; also
Fcap. 8vo, 2s. net; THE SURVIVAL OF MAN; A Study in Unrecognised Human
Faculty, Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. net; also Fcap. 8vo, 2s. net; REASON AND
BELIEF, 2s. net; THE SUBSTANCE OF FAITH, 2s. net; RAYMOND REVISED, 6s.
net.
=Lucas (E. V.)=--THE LIFE OF CHARLES LAMB, two volumes, 21s. net; EDWIN
AUSTIN ABBEY, R.A., 2 vols., £6 6s. net; VERMEER OF DELFT, Fcap. 4to,
10s. 6d. net. A WANDERER IN HOLLAND, 10s. 6d. net; A WANDERER IN LONDON,
10s. 6d. net; LONDON REVISITED, 10s. 6d. net; A WANDERER IN PARIS, Crown
8vo, 10s. 6d. net; also Fcap. 8vo, 6s. net; A WANDERER IN FLORENCE, 10s.
6d. net; A WANDERER IN VENICE, 10s. 6d. net; THE OPEN ROAD: A Little
Book for Wayfarers, Fcap. 8vo, 6s. 6d. net; THE FRIENDLY TOWN: A Little
Book for the Urbane, 6s. net; FIRESIDE AND SUNSHINE, 6s. net; CHARACTER
AND COMEDY, 6s. net; THE GENTLEST ART: A Choice of Letters by
Entertaining Hands, 6s. 6d. net; THE SECOND POST, 6s. net; HER INFINITE
VARIETY: A Feminine Portrait Gallery, 6s. net; GOOD COMPANY: A Rally of
Men, 6s. net; ONE DAY AND ANOTHER, 6s. net; OLD LAMPS FOR NEW, 6s. net;
LOITERER’S HARVEST, 6s. net; CLOUD AND SILVER, 6s. net; A BOSWELL OF
BAGHDAD AND OTHER ESSAYS, 6s. net; 'TWIXT EAGLE AND DOVE, 6s. net; THE
PHANTOM JOURNAL, AND OTHER ESSAYS AND DIVERSIONS, 6s. net; GIVING AND
RECEIVING, 6s. net; SPECIALLY SELECTED: A Choice of Essays, illustrated
by G. L. STAMPA, 7s. 6d. net; URBANITIES, illustrated by G. L. STAMPA,
7s. 6d. net; YOU KNOW WHAT PEOPLE ARE, illustrated by GEORGE MORROW, 5s.
net; THE BRITISH SCHOOL: An Anecdotal Guide to the British Painters and
Paintings in the National Gallery, 6s. net: ROVING EAST AND ROVING WEST:
Notes gathered in India, Japan, and America, 5s. net.
=McDougall (William).= AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. _Seventeenth
Edition._ Cr. 8vo, 8s. 6d. net.
BODY AND MIND: A HISTORY AND A DEFENCE OF ANIMISM. With Diagrams. _Fifth
Edition._ Demy 8vo, 12s. 6d. net.
=Maeterlinck (Maurice)=--THE BLUE BIRD: A Fairy Play in Six Acts, 6s. net
and 2s. net. THE BETROTHAL, Fcap. 6s. net, paper 3s. 6d. net; MARY
MAGDALENE, 5s. net and 2s. net; DEATH, 3s. 6d. net; OUR ETERNITY, 6s.
net; THE UNKNOWN GUEST, 6s. net; THE WRACK OF THE STORM, 6s. net; THE
MIRACLE OF SAINT ANTHONY: A Play in One Act, 3s. 6d. net; THE
BURGOMASTER OF STILEMONDE: A Play in Three Acts, 5s. net; MOUNTAIN
PATHS, 6s. net; TYLTYL, Told for Children (illustrated), 21s. net. (The
above books are Translated by A. TEIXEIRA DE MATTOS.) POEMS, 5s. net.
(Done into English by BERNARD MIALL).
THE GREAT SECRET. (Translated by BERNARD MIALL), 7s. 6d. net.
=Methuen (A.).= AN ANTHOLOGY OF MODERN VERSE. With Introduction by ROBERT
LYND. _Ninth Edition._ Fcap. 8vo, 6s. net. Thin paper, leather, 7s. 6d.
net.
SHAKESPEARE TO HARDY: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LYRICS. Fcap. 8vo, 6s.
net. Leather, 7s. 6d. net.
=Milne (A. A.).= NOT THAT IT MATTERS. _Third Edition._ Fcap. 8vo, 6s. net.
IF I MAY. _Third Edition._ Fcap. 8vo, 6s. net.
THE SUNNY SIDE. Crown 8vo, 6s. net.
=Norwood (Gilbert).= GREEK TRAGEDY. Demy 8vo, 12s. 6d. net.
=Oxenham (John).= Nine Volumes of Poems. Small pott 8vo, 1s. 3d. net each
volume. BEES IN AMBER. 2s. net. ALL’S WELL; THE KING’S HIGH WAY; THE
VISION SPLENDID; THE FIERY CROSS; HEARTS COURAGEOUS; HIGH ALTARS; ALL
CLEAR! GENTLEMEN--THE KING! 2s. net.
=Petrie (W. M. Flinders).= A HISTORY OF EGYPT. Illustrated. Six Volumes.
Crown 8vo, each 9s. net. I. FROM THE IST TO XVITH DYNASTY. _Ninth
Edition._ (10s. 6d. net). II. THE XVIITH AND XVIIITH DYNASTIES. _Sixth
Edition._ III. XIXTH TO XXXTH DYNASTIES. _Second Edition._ IV. EGYPT
UNDER THE PTOLEMAIC DYNASTY. J. P. MAHAFFY. _Second Edition._ V. EGYPT
UNDER ROMAN RULE. J. G. MILNE. _Second Edition._ VI. EGYPT IN THE MIDDLE
AGES. STANLEY LANE-POOLE. _Second Edition._
=Pollard (A. F.).= A SHORT HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR. With 19 Maps. _Second
Edition._ Crown 8vo, 10s. 6d. net.
=Pollitt (Arthur W.).= THE ENJOYMENT OF MUSIC. Crown 8vo, 5s. net.
=Rees (J. F.).= A SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND. 1815-1918.
Crown 8vo, 5s. net.
=Smith (S. C. Kaines).= LOOKING AT PICTURES. Illustrated. Fcap. 8vo, 6s.
net.
=Stancliffe.= GOLF DO’S AND DON’TS. Being a very little about a good deal;
together with some new saws for old wood--and knots in the golfer’s line
which may help a good memory for forgetting. _Eighth Edition._ Fcap.
8vo, 2s. 6d. net.
QUICK CUTS TO GOOD GOLF. _Second Edition._ Fcap. 8vo, 2s. 6d. net.
=Stevenson (R. L.).= THE LETTERS OF ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON TO HIS FAMILY
AND FRIENDS. Selected and Edited by SIR SIDNEY COLVIN. Four Volumes.
_Fifth Edition._ Fcap. 8vo, 6s. net each.
=Tilden (W. T.).= THE ART OF LAWN TENNIS. Illustrated. _Fourth Edition._
Crown 8vo, 6s. net.
LAWN TENNIS FOR YOUNG PLAYERS: LAWN TENNIS FOR CLUB PLAYERS: LAWN TENNIS
FOR MATCH PLAYERS. Each Fcap. 8vo, 2s. 6d. net.
=Tileston (Mary W.).= DAILY STRENGTH FOR DAILY NEEDS. _Twenty-seventh
Edition._ Medium 16mo, 3s. 6d. net.
=Turner (W. J.).= MUSIC AND LIFE. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. net.
=Underhill (Evelyn).= MYSTICISM. A Study in the Nature and Development of
Man’s Spiritual Consciousness. _Eighth Edition._ Demy 8vo, 15s. net.
THE LIFE OF THE SPIRIT AND THE LIFE OF TO-DAY. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. net.
=Vardon (Harry).= HOW TO PLAY GOLF. Illustrated. _Fifteenth Edition._
Crown 8vo, 5s. 6d. net.
=Waterhouse (Elizabeth).= A LITTLE BOOK OF LIFE AND DEATH. Selected and
Arranged. _Twenty-first Edition._ Small Pott 8vo, cloth, 2s. 6d. net;
paper, 1s. 6d.
=Wilde (Oscar).= THE WORKS OF OSCAR WILDE. Fifteen Volumes. Fcap. 8vo,
each 6s. 6d. net. Some also Fcap. 8vo, 2s. net. I. LORD ARTHUR SAVILE’S
CRIME AND THE PORTRAIT OF MR. W. H. II. THE DUCHESS OF PADUA. III.
POEMS. IV. LADY WINDERMERE’S FAN. V. A WOMAN OF NO IMPORTANCE. VI. AN
IDEAL HUSBAND. VII. THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST. VIII. A HOUSE OF
POMEGRANATES. IX. INTENTIONS. X. DE PROFUNDIS AND PRISON LETTERS. XI.
ESSAYS. XII. SALOME, A FLORENTINE TRAGEDY, AND LA SAINTE COURTISANE.
XIII. A CRITIC IN PALL MALL. XIV. SELECTED PROSE OF OSCAR WILDE. XV. ART
AND DECORATION.
A HOUSE OF POMEGRANATES. Illustrated. Crown 4to, 21s. net.
FOR LOVE OF THE KING: A Burmese Masque. Demy 8vo, 8s. 6d. net.
=Wilding (Anthony F.)=, Lawn-Tennis Champion 1910-1911. ON THE COURT AND
OFF. Illustrated. _Eighth Edition._ Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. net.
=Young (G. Winthrop).= MOUNTAIN CRAFT. Illustrated. Demy 8vo, £1 5s. net.
The Antiquary’s Books
Illustrated. Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d. net each volume. ANCIENT PAINTED GLASS
IN ENGLAND; ARCHÆOLOGY AND FALSE ANTIQUITIES; THE BELLS OF ENGLAND; THE
BRASSES OF ENGLAND; CELTIC ART IN PAGAN AND CHRISTIAN TIMES;
CHURCHWARDENS’ ACCOUNTS; THE DOMESDAY INQUEST; THE CASTLES AND WALLED
TOWNS OF ENGLAND; ENGLISH CHURCH FURNITURE; ENGLISH COSTUME, from
Prehistoric Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century; ENGLISH MONASTIC
LIFE; ENGLISH SEALS; FOLK-LORE AS AN HISTORICAL SCIENCE; THE GILDS AND
COMPANIES OF LONDON; THE HERMITS AND ANCHORITES OF ENGLAND; THE MANOR
AND MANORIAL RECORDS; THE MEDIÆVAL HOSPITALS OF ENGLAND; OLD ENGLISH
INSTRUMENTS OF MUSIC; OLD ENGLISH LIBRARIES; OLD SERVICE BOOKS OF THE
ENGLISH CHURCH; PARISH LIFE IN MEDIÆVAL ENGLAND; THE PARISH REGISTERS OF
ENGLAND; REMAINS OF THE PREHISTORIC AGE IN ENGLAND; THE ROMAN ERA IN
BRITAIN; ROMANO-BRITISH BUILDINGS AND EARTHWORKS; THE ROYAL FORESTS OF
ENGLAND; THE SCHOOLS OF MEDIÆVAL ENGLAND; SHRINES OF BRITISH SAINTS.
The Arden Shakespeare
Demy 8vo, 6s. net each volume.
An edition of Shakespeare in Single Plays. Edited with a full
Introduction, Textual Notes, and a Commentary at the foot of the page.
_Thirty-seven Volumes are now ready._
Classics of Art
Edited by Dr. J. H. W. LAING
Illustrated. Wide Royal 8vo, from 15s. net to £3 3s. net. THE ART OF THE
GREEKS; THE ART OF THE ROMANS; CHARDIN; DONATELLO; GEORGE ROMNEY;
GHIRLANDAIO; LAWRENCE; MICHELANGELO; RAPHAEL; REMBRANDT’S ETCHINGS;
REMBRANDT’S PAINTINGS; TINTORETTO; TITIAN; TURNER’S SKETCHES AND
DRAWINGS; VELAZQUEZ.
The “Complete” Series
Illustrated. Demy 8vo, from 5s. net to 18s. net THE COMPLETE AIRMAN; THE
COMPLETE AMATEUR BOXER; THE COMPLETE ASSOCIATION FOOTBALLER; THE
COMPLETE ATHLETIC TRAINER; THE COMPLETE BILLIARD PLAYER; THE COMPLETE
COOK; THE COMPLETE FOXHUNTER; THE COMPLETE GOLFER; THE COMPLETE HOCKEY
PLAYER; THE COMPLETE HORSEMAN; THE COMPLETE JUJITSUAN (Crown 8vo); THE
COMPLETE LAWN TENNIS PLAYER; THE COMPLETE MOTORIST; THE COMPLETE
MOUNTAINEER; THE COMPLETE OARSMAN; THE COMPLETE PHOTOGRAPHER; THE
COMPLETE RUGBY FOOTBALLER, ON THE NEW ZEALAND SYSTEM; THE COMPLETE SHOT;
THE COMPLETE SWIMMER; THE COMPLETE YACHTSMAN.
The Connoisseur’s Library
Illustrated. Wide Royal 8vo, 31s. 6d. net ENGLISH COLOURED BOOKS;
ETCHINGS; EUROPEAN ENAMELS; FINE BOOKS; GLASS; GOLDSMITHS’ AND
SILVERSMITHS’ WORK; ILLUMINATED MANUSCRIPTS; IVORIES; JEWELLERY;
MEZZOTINTS; MINIATURES; PORCELAIN; SEALS; WOOD SCULPTURE.
Eight Books by R. S. Surtees
With the original Illustrations in Colour by J. LEECH and others.
Fcap. 8vo, 6s. net and 7s. 6d. net. ASK MAMMA; HANDLEY CROSS; HAWBUCK
GRANGE; HILLINGDON HALL; JORROCKS’S JAUNTS AND JOLLITIES; MR. SPONGE’S
SPORTING TOUR; MR. FACEY ROMFORD’S HOUNDS; PLAIN OR RINGLETS?
Plays
Fcap. 8vo, 3s. 6d. net KISMET; MILESTONES; TYPHOON; AN IDEAL HUSBAND;
THE WARE CASE; GENERAL POST; THE GREAT ADVENTURE; THE HONEYMOON; ACROSS
THE BORDER. (Crown 8vo.)
Fiction
Novels by RICHARD BAGOT, H. C. BAILEY, ARNOLD BENNETT, G. A. BIRMINGHAM,
MARJORIE BOWEN, EDGAR RICE BURROUGHS, G. K. CHESTERTON, JOSEPH CONRAD,
DOROTHY CONYERS, MARIE CORELLI, BEATRICE HARRADEN, R. S. HICHENS,
ANTHONY HOPE, W. W. JACOBS, E. V. LUCAS, STEPHEN MCKENNA, LUCAS MALET,
A. E. W. MASON, W. B. MAXWELL, ARTHUR MORRISON, JOHN OXENHAM, SIR
GILBERT PARKER, ALICE PERRIN, EDEN PHILLPOTTS, RICHARD PRYCE, “Q,” W.
PETT RIDGE, H. G. WELLS, and C.N. and A. M. WILLIAMSON.
A Complete List can be had on application.
Methuen’s Two Shilling Series
This is a series of copyright books--fiction and general
literature--which has been such a popular success. If you will obtain a
list of the series you will see that it contains more books by
distinguished writers than any other series of the same kind. You will
find the volumes at all booksellers and on all railway bookstalls.
*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Fancies versus Fads" ***
Copyright 2023 LibraryBlog. All rights reserved.