The Nineteenth and Their Times - Being an Account of the Four Cavalry Regiments in the British Army That Have Borne the Number Nineteen and of the Campaigns in Which They Served

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Title: The Nineteenth and Their Times - Being an Account of the Four Cavalry Regiments in the British Army That Have Borne the Number Nineteen and of the Campaigns in Which They Served
Author: Biddulph, J. (John)
Language: English
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THE NINETEENTH AND THEIR TIMES

I ordained that the rights of the Warrior should not be
infringed; that the soldier who had grown old in the service
should not be deprived of his place or his pay; and that the
deeds of the soldier should not be concealed. For men who
exchange their comfort for perishable glory deserve to be
compensated, and are worthy of reward and encouragement.

--_Institutes of Timour._

[Illustration: Alexandra 1899. (signature of the Princess of Wales)

_Copyright by permission of Miss Alice Hughes._

Walker & Boutall ph. sc.]

THE NINETEENTH
AND THEIR TIMES

Being an Account of the Four Cavalry
Regiments in the British Army That
Have Borne the Number Nineteen and
of the Campaigns in Which They Served

COLONEL JOHN BIDDULPH

[Illustration: FROM AN OLD SEAL]

London
John Murray, Albemarle Street
1899

DEDICATED

BY PERMISSION TO

HER ROYAL HIGHNESS

THE PRINCESS OF WALES

PREFACE

Four cavalry regiments in the British Army have borne the number
Nineteen.

The first was raised in Ireland, in 1759, during the Seven Years’
War, and was known as Drogheda’s Horse. In 1763, its number was
changed to Eighteen, which number it bore till it was disbanded in
1821. The history of its achievements has been written by Captain H.
Malet.

The second regiment that bore the number was raised at a critical
period in our history, in 1779. It had but a brief and uneventful
existence, and was disbanded in 1783.

The third regiment was raised as the Twenty-Third Light Dragoons in
1781, for service in India, where it was immediately sent; the first
British cavalry regiment that went to India. On the disbandment of
the second regiment, in 1783, the Twenty-third was re-numbered the
Nineteenth, and, for fourteen years, it continued to be the only
British cavalry regiment in India. During the twenty-four years
of its sojourn in the East it bore a conspicuous share in every
important military undertaking of the time, with the exception of the
campaign against Holkar when it was too far distant from the scene of
action to take part. Those twenty-four years, from Warren Hastings
to Wellesley, mark the turning point of our power in India. When
the Nineteenth landed at Madras our very existence in Southern India
hung in the balance. The gallantry of our army was paralysed by the
feebleness of the administration that directed their efforts. When
the regiment re-embarked for England, the supremacy of our military
power had been fully established. Under their distinguished leader,
John Floyd, the Nineteenth played no small part in the campaigns
of 1790, ’91, and ’92, against Tippoo, attracting to themselves an
amount of interest in Southern India that no other regiment did. They
assisted at the capture of Pondicherry, and the crowning victory of
Seringapatam. It was their good fortune to serve under the Duke of
Wellington in the first independent commands he held in the field.
They took part in the destruction of the noted freebooter Dhoondia
Wao; a short but stirring campaign that deserves more notice than
it generally receives. At Assaye, the charge of the Nineteenth and
the native cavalry brigaded with them restored the fortunes of the
fight at a critical moment. They played their part at Argaum, and,
a few months before sailing from India, were actors with Gillespie
in his remarkable feat at Vellore. Soon after the declaration of
war by the United States against Great Britain, in 1812, they were
sent to Canada. The conditions of that war afforded little scope for
cavalry action, so that the share of the Nineteenth in the various
operations was a subordinate one. The campaigns on the Canadian
frontier have been so completely eclipsed by our struggles against
Napoleon in Europe, that the arduous nature of the lake and forest
warfare carried on by a mere handful of British troops and Canadian
militia is hardly known. A squadron of the Nineteenth, under an
officer whose whole career was identified with the regiment, formed
for eighteen months part of the small band that upheld the honour
of the British arms under Sir Gordon Drummond, at Lundy’s Lane and
other actions on the Niagara frontier. In the course of the wholesale
reductions that took place after Waterloo this fine regiment ceased
to exist, and its place in the Army List knew it no more.

The fourth regiment, the one that now bears the title of the
Nineteenth Princess of Wales’ Own Hussars, was originally raised
by the East India Company on the outbreak of the Mutiny of the
Bengal Army, and received its present number on the transfer of its
services to the Crown. In 1882, they formed part of the expedition
to Egypt under Lord Wolseley, to put down the rebellion of Arabi
Pasha. In 1884, they formed part of the expedition to Suakin under
Sir Gerald Graham, and fought at El-Teb and Tamai, suffering severe
losses in the first of the two actions. In 1885, they were selected
by Lord Wolseley to form part of the expedition to Khartoum; the
only horsemen that accompanied the force. The Head Quarters of the
regiment formed part of the Desert Column, under Sir Herbert Stewart,
and fought at Abu Klea and Abu Krou, while a squadron of the regiment
accompanied the River Column, under General Earle, and were present
at the action at Kirbekan. A third portion of the regiment was at the
same time employed at Suakin, where it experienced serious losses.
For its services in 1885 the regiment was granted the distinctive
title it now bears; a proof that it is no unworthy successor of the
regiment that helped to strengthen the foundations of our power in
India, under Cornwallis, Harris and Wellington, and whose honourable
badges it wears, in addition to those it has won for itself.

The history of a regiment of the British Army is part of the history
of the Empire at some of its most momentous epochs. To understand
it properly, requires a setting of general history that cannot be
dispensed with. In compiling these annals I have chiefly aimed at
providing a work that shall be of interest and use to those who have
served, or, in the future may serve, in the regiment. At the same
time there is much which will, I believe, be of interest to the
student of Indian Military History, and will not be unacceptable to
the general reader.

The bones of British soldiers lie scattered far and wide. In every
portion of the globe, their unmarked graves are strewed on mountain
and plain, by stream and forest, by swamp and desert; silent
witnesses of their devotion to their Sovereign and country. But they
have not died in vain, if the remembrance of their achievements
survives, to swell the hearts and nerve the arms of their successors,
and to remind their countrymen what they owe to their sufferings and
their valour.

In compiling these Annals I have received assistance from many
unexpected sources. To Mr W. C. L. Floyd I am indebted for much
assistance from the papers of his grandfather, under whom the 19th
Light Dragoons won their spurs in the Mysore campaigns; to Major
General Gillespie, who has kindly placed at my disposal the only
authentic portrait of his celebrated grandfather; and to Lieut.
General Sir Francis Norman, who collected notes of the career of
the old 19th Light Dragoons, many years ago. My thanks are also due
to Mr James Wilson and Major Ernest Cruikshank of the Lundy’s Lane
Historical Society, who have done so much to rescue from oblivion
the details of the war on the Niagara frontier, and to Mr Douglas
Brymner, the Dominion Government Archivist at Ottawa. I am also
indebted to Mr S. M. Milne for the kindly interest he has taken
in my work; to Lt. Colonel Frank Barrow who placed at my disposal
the letters written by his distinguished brother during the Soudan
campaigns of 1884 and 1885, to Colonel K. J. W. Coghill, C.B., who
commanded the regiment at Tel-el-Kebir, and to Colonel J. C. Hanford,
C.B. (formerly Hanford-Flood) who commanded the squadron with the
River Column, without whose encouragement and aid this work would not
have been undertaken. I refrain from adding more names, but the list
of those to whom my thanks are due is not exhausted.

CONTENTS

PART I

THE NINETEENTH LIGHT DRAGOONS

DROGHEDA’S HORSE--1759-1763

PAGE

State of affairs in Europe in 1756--Declaration of War against
France--Increase of the Army--Early Years of the War--Invasion
expected--Orders for raising the 19th Light Dragoons--Death of
George II.--End of the Seven Years’ War--Reduction of Military
Establishments--19th Light Dragoons become the 18th--Uniform of
the Regiment 1

PART II

THE NINETEENTH LIGHT DRAGOONS

1779-1783

War in America--Declaration of War by France--Increase
of the Army--Orders for raising the 19th Light
Dragoons--Uniform--Peace proclaimed--Reduction of Military
Establishments--Regiment disbanded 10

PART III

THE TWENTY-THIRD, AFTERWARDS THE NINETEENTH LIGHT DRAGOONS

(1781-1822)

CHAPTER I.--1781-1782

THE TWENTY-THIRD LIGHT DRAGOONS.

Alarming state of Public Affairs--Want of Cavalry in
India--Orders for raising the 23rd Light Dragoons--Colonel
Sir John Burgoyne--Regiment embark for India--Arrive
in Madras--Desperate State of Affairs--Madras
Misgovernment--Horses for the Regiment 19

CHAPTER II

TROUBLES AT MADRAS--1783-1785

Sultan Tippoo Sahib of Mysore--Operations in Southern
India--Death of Sir Eyre Coote--Attack on Cuddalore--Peace
with France--Tippoo makes Peace--Strained relations between
civil and military in India--The E.I. Company’s military
establishment--The King’s troops in India--Misconduct of
Madras Government--Quarrel between Council and General
Stuart--Complaints of Council against Burgoyne--Arrest of
Stuart--Council appoint Lang to supersede Bourgoyne--Burgoyne
refuses to give over command of the King’s troops--Strange
delusions of the Council--Imminent Conflict between King’s
and Company’s troops--Unworkable arrangement--Fresh
quarrel--Burgoyne arrested--Mutiny of native cavalry--Court
Martial on Burgoyne--His acquittal--His death--End of the
quarrel--Burgoyne justified 35

CHAPTER III

CHANGE OF NUMBER--1786-1789

Regiment moved to Shevtamodoo--John Floyd--Number of regiment
changed to 19th--Uniform--Sir William Howe appointed
Colonel--Foundation of Indian native cavalry system laid by
Floyd and the 19th Light Dragoons 58

CHAPTER IV

WAR WITH TIPPOO--1790

War with Tippoo--19th take the field--Advance on
Coimbatore--Division under Floyd detached towards Guzzulhutti
Pass--Frequent skirmishes--Satyamunglum--Dispersion
of the Army--Advance of Tippoo--19th hotly
engaged--Tippoo’s Body-Guard destroyed--Retreat from
Satyamunglum--Casualties--March in pursuit of Tippoo--Private
Parkes--The Tapoor Pass--Tippoo eludes pursuit, and ravages the
Carnatic--Army returns to Madras 66

CHAPTER V

CORNWALLIS’ CAMPAIGNS--1791-1792

Cornwallis takes command of the Army--Advance on
Bangalore--Order of March--Floyd’s reconnoissance--Imprudent
advance--Floyd badly wounded--Casualties--Capture of
Bangalore--Advance on Seringapatam--Battle of Arikera--Army
in great straits--Forced to retreat--Junction of Mahratta
contingent--19th sent to Madras--Rejoin Cornwallis--Advance
on Seringapatam--Night attack--Floyd detached to meet
Abercromby--Seringapatam invested--Peace made--Tippoo’s
hostages--19th return to Shevtamodoo 81

CHAPTER VI

FALL OF MYSORE--1793-1799

France declares War--Expedition against Pondicherry--Surrender
of Pondicherry--Peace reigns in India--Lunkia Naik--Floyd’s
large allowances--French adventurers in India--Tippoo’s
growing hostility--Disarmament of Nizam’s force under
French officers--Army formed under General Harris--Tippoo’s
intrigues--Galloper Guns--Advance on Mysore--Battle of
Mallavelly--Seringapatam invested--The Bombay Army--The Rajah
of Coorg--Signal guns--Seringapatam taken--Tardy recognition in
England of services performed in India--Badge of “Seringapatam” 99

CHAPTER VII

DHOONDIA WAO--1800-1802

Floyd leaves 19th--Dhoondia Wao--Force formed under Colonel
Wellesley to capture him--Advance on Ranee Bednore--Capture
of Koondgul, Dummul, Gudduck--Division of Dhoondia’s force
destroyed at Manoli--Dhoondia doubles back--Again hemmed
in--Dhoondia crosses Malpurba river--Pursuit drawing to a
close--Dhoondia caught at Conaghul--Dhoondia killed, and
his force destroyed--19th return to Mysore--The Rajah of
Bullum--Regiment ordered to Arcot 114

CHAPTER VIII

INDIA IN 1803

State of affairs in India in 1803--The Mahratta
Confederacy--The Peishwa--Scindia--European Adventurers in
India--Scindia’s disciplined forces--Perron--Quarrels among
the Mahratta Chiefs--Peishwa takes refuge in Bombay--Places
himself under protection of the British--Scindia’s hostility
aroused--Mahratta combination against the British--Peishwa
restored to Poona--Preparations for hostilities--Summary of
campaign that followed 125

CHAPTER IX

ASSAYE AND ARGAUM--1803-1804

Capture of Ahmednuggur--Battle of Assaye--Death of Lieut.
Colonel Maxwell--Honorary Colour granted to 19th--Battle of
Argaum--Capture of Gawilghur--Berar Rajah makes peace--Scindia
makes peace--March against banditti--Their dispersal--Grant of
badges for Assaye 136

CHAPTER X

THE VELLORE MUTINY--1805-1807

Lieut. Colonel Gillespie--19th at Arcot--Mutiny of Vellore--A
military wonder--19th ordered to England--A quarter of a
century’s changes--The “Terrors of the East”--Farewell
orders--19th land in England 157

CHAPTER XI

WAR WITH UNITED STATES--1808-1813

19th in Ireland--United States declare War--19th
ordered to Canada--United States’ plans--Operations of
1812--Mackinaw--Detroit--Armistice--Battle of Queenston
Heights--General Brock killed--Montreal threatened--Operations
of 1813--Proctor’s victory at Frenchtown--Fort Meigs--United
States’ victory on Lake Erie--Battle of the Thames; Proctor’s
defeat--York captured--Fort George and Erie evacuated--Stoney
Creek: Harvey’s brilliant exploit--Fitzgibbon’s success
at Beaver Dam--Arrival of squadron of 19th on Niagara
frontier--Engagement on Lake Ontario--Fort George
re-occupied--Fort Niagara surprised--Black Rock and Buffalo
captured--Abortive attack on Sackett’s Harbour--United States’
operations against Montreal--Battle of Chateaugay--Battle of
Chrystler’s Farm--Importance of Kingston and Sackett’s Harbour 172

CHAPTER XII

THE NIAGARA FRONTIER--1814-1821

United States’ plans--Attempt on Mackinaw--La
Colle--State of affairs on Niagara frontier--Drummond’s
raid on Oswego-Dover--Advance of U.S. force--Capture
of Fort Erie--Battle of Chippewa--Critical position of
British force--Battle of Lundy’s Lane--Retreat of U.S.
forces--Fort Erie invested--Assault on Fort Erie--Sergeant
Powell--Conclusion of operations on Niagara frontier--Prevost’s
abortive attack on Plattsburgh--Defeat of British squadron
on Lake Champlain--Other operations--Bladensberg--Capture
of Washington--General Ross killed--Victory at
Baltimore--Expedition against New Orleans--Its defeat--Fort
Bowyer captured--Treaty of Ghent--Sir William Payne--Sir
John Vandeleur--Badge “Niagara” granted--Regiment returns to
England--Equipped as Lancers--Embark for Ireland--Disbanded 193

PART IV

THE NINETEENTH “PRINCESS OF WALES’ OWN” HUSSARS

1858-1899

CHAPTER I

RAISING OF THE REGIMENT--1858-1882

The East India Company raises European Cavalry regiments--Their
formation--The Bengal 1st European Light Cavalry--Services
transferred to the Crown--The “White Mutiny”--Made 19th Light
Dragoons, afterwards Hussars--General Pattle--Regiment at
Meerut--General Hall--Regiment ordered to England--Badges
of old 19th Light Dragoons granted--Regiment ordered to
Ireland--Guidons of old 19th Light Dragoons presented to the
regiment--Regiment returns to England--Ordered on active
service 220

CHAPTER II

TROUBLES IN EGYPT--1882-1884

Troubles in Egypt--Arabi’s rebellion--Capture of
Ismailia--Kassassin--Tel-el-Kebir--End of the War--19th at
Cairo--Badges granted--Troubles in Eastern Soudan--Osman
Digna--Regiment ordered to Suakin--Wreck of the _Neera_--Battle
of El Teb--Heavy losses of the 19th--Battle of Tamai--Osman
Digna’s camp burned--Regiment returns to Cairo--Badges granted 233

CHAPTER III

CAMPAIGN ON THE NILE--1884-1899

Troubles in the Western Soudan--Expedition to relieve
Khartoum--19th ordered up the Nile--Korti--The Desert
Column--Action at Abu Klea--Action at Abu Krou--Quartermaster
Lima killed--The horses--Metemmeh--Fall of Khartoum--Return
of the Column--The River Column--Action at Kirbekan--Return
of the Column--Summer Quarters--Regiment returns to
Cairo--Squadron sent to Suakin--Serious losses--Returns to
Cairo--Designation granted of “Princess of Wales’ Own”--Death
of Colonel Barrow--19th returns to England--Badge of “Mysore”
granted--19th embarks for India--Bangalore--Secunderabad 246

APPENDIX A.

Yearly Lists of the Officers of the Nineteenth 271

APPENDIX B.

Casualties in the Nineteenth Hussars during the Egyptian
Campaign of 1882 304

APPENDIX C.

Special Honours granted to Nineteenth Hussars for Egyptian
Campaign of 1882 305

APPENDIX D.

Casualties in the Nineteenth Hussars during the Campaign near
Suakin, 1884 306

APPENDIX E.

Special Honours granted to Nineteenth Hussars for Campaign near
Suakin, 1884 307

APPENDIX F.

Addresses to Nineteenth Hussars by Major General G. Graham,
C.B., V.C., and Brigadier General H. Stewart. Trinkitat, 5th
March 1884 308

APPENDIX G.

Casualties in the Nineteenth Hussars during the Soudan Campaign
of 1885 310

APPENDIX H.

Special Honours granted to Nineteenth Hussars for Soudan
Campaign, 1885 311

APPENDIX I.

Address to Nineteenth Hussars by General Lord Wolseley, G.C.B.
Korti, 23rd March 1885 312

APPENDIX K.

Report by Colonel Barrow on the Arab horses ridden by the
Nineteenth Hussars during the Nile Campaign of 1885 313

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

HER ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCESS OF WALES--
_Photogravure--From a Photograph by Miss
Alice Hughes_ _Frontispiece_

AN OLD NINETEENTH--_From an old Seal_ _On Title page_

GENERAL SIR JOHN FLOYD, BART.--_Photogravure_ _To face page_ 59

MYSORE CAMPAIGNS--_Map_ ” ” 69

AN OFFICER IN THE UNIFORM OF THE NINETEENTH LIGHT
DRAGOONS, 1792--_Coloured Plate_ ” ” 99

THE MARCH OF THE ARMY IN PURSUIT OF DHOONDIA WAO
IN JULY, AUGUST, AND SEPTEMBER 1800--_Map_ ” ” 117

BATTLE OF ASSAYE--_Map_ ” ” 139

MAJOR GENERAL R. R. GILLESPIE--_Photogravure--From
a Miniature_ ” ” 168

GUIDONS OF THE NINETEENTH LIGHT DRAGOONS--_Coloured
Plate_ ” ” 172

THE CANADIAN FRONTIER IN 1812--_Map_ ” ” 175

BATTLE OF LUNDY’S LANE, 9 P.M., 25TH JULY 1814--_Map_ ” ” 204

OFFICERS IN THE UNIFORM OF THE NINETEENTH LANCERS,
1817--_Coloured Plate_ ” ” 218

AN OFFICER IN THE UNIFORM OF THE NINETEENTH HUSSARS,
1882--_Coloured Plate_ ” ” 232

COLONEL PERCY BARROW--_From a Photograph, Half-tone_ ” ” 264

PART I

THE NINETEENTH LIGHT DRAGOONS

DROGHEDA’S HORSE

1759-1763

From the signing of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), to the
outbreak of the Seven Years’ War (1756), the peace, nominally
existing between England and France, was continually broken, out of
Europe, by both parties. In India, under the veil of alliance with
opposing Native Princes, war was actively prosecuted, and it was with
difficulty that British interests maintained a precarious footing
in that country. In North America, the French claimed the whole
continent, except the ill defined New England settlements along the
coast, and denied the right of the English to trade in the interior.
Keeping themselves in the background, they waged a bloody war against
the English settlers, by means of the Indians, whom they subsidized,
and whose disguise they often adopted. Both in the East and the West,
French officials were acting with the support and countenance of the
Court of Versailles, and the English officials on the spot were not
slow to retaliate when occasion offered. It was evident that a crisis
could not long be averted, but it was advantageous to the French to
postpone an open rupture as long as possible, while the French navy
was being strengthened. On the other hand, it was the interest of
England to hasten the rupture, when war was seen to be inevitable,
since the objects to be fought for were beyond the seas. The English
navy was, at that time, greatly superior in strength to the French
navy, while the French military forces were eight or ten times as
strong as the English army, which had been greatly reduced since the
conclusion of the late war. As time went on, less pains were taken
to conceal the warlike measures undertaken on either side. In the
beginning of 1755, Braddock’s ill-fated expedition was dispatched to
New England, while a counter-expedition for Canada was sent out from
Brest and Rochefort, a few weeks later. Neither side was acting in
good faith: on both sides, secret instructions for active hostilities
were given to the commanders. In June, two French ships, with troops
on board, were captured by Boscawen off the coast of Newfoundland.
Exactly a month later, Braddock’s force was cut to pieces by the
French and Indians. Still the pretence of peace was preserved. In
April 1756, a French expedition sailed from Toulon to attack Minorca,
which for half a century had been a British possession. Byng’s
well-known failure to relieve Minorca ensued, and the place fell on
27th June.

Meanwhile the absurdity of maintaining the semblance of peace under
such circumstances had become patent to the British cabinet, and in
May, war was formally declared. In August, the coalition of France
and Austria, soon to be joined by Russia, was declared against
Prussia, and Great Britain found herself engaged in hostilities in
Germany, India and America at the same time.

The early years of the war were neither fortunate nor creditable to
Great Britain. After the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, the Army within
the three kingdoms had been reduced to about eighteen thousand men.
In December 1755, an increase of fifteen thousand men had been voted.
But armies are not made in a day, and the direction of affairs was
in incompetent hands. Pitt, who alone commanded the confidence of
the country, was regarded with disfavour by the King. In November
1756, Pitt was recalled to office, and a new spirit was infused
into the management of affairs. A Militia Bill was introduced, the
regular Army was increased to forty-five thousand men, and steps
were taken for enlisting into the service of the State the Highland
clans who had so recently been in arms against the Crown. In April
1757, Pitt was dismissed from office, and all again was confusion.
For three months England was without a Government; at the end of that
time, Pitt was again in office. But the ill effects of the political
contest at home were reflected in the ill-success of our arms abroad,
and two years were to elapse before the nation felt secure. The year
1757 was a gloomy one in England. A French invasion was believed to
be imminent: an expedition, dispatched in May, against Louisbourg in
America, failed, owing to the feebleness and tardiness of execution
on the part of those to whom it was entrusted: Fort William Henry
was taken by Montcalm, and its garrison massacred by the Indians. In
Europe, an expedition, dispatched in September, against Rochefort,
failed, through the disagreements of the naval and military officers
in command. The Duke of Cumberland was forced to evacuate Hanover,
and sign the convention of Kloster-Severn, and many months were
to elapse before the triumph of Clive at Plassy became known in
England. In 1758, matters improved somewhat. In July, Louisbourg was
taken, but an attack on Ticonderago in the same month was defeated,
and Lord Howe, described by Wolfe as “the noblest Englishman that has
appeared in my time, and the best soldier in the British army,” was
slain in a skirmish. In Germany, the British troops, under Prince
Ferdinand of Brunswick, drove the French out of Hanover, while two
successful raids were made on the French coast, in which Cherbourg
and St. Servan were temporarily occupied, and a great quantity of
warlike stores destroyed or captured.

Pitt’s genius was now beginning to be felt in every branch of the
service, and, from this time, matters improved steadily, by land and
sea. In May 1759, Guadaloupe was captured. In July, Rodney destroyed
the French boats in Havre prepared for the invasion of England, while
Hawke blockaded Brest. In August, Boscawen defeated a French fleet
in the Bay of Lagos. In the same month, the French were decisively
defeated at Minden by an inferior English and Hanoverian force:
on the 13th September, Quebec was taken by Wolfe, who fell in the
moment of victory, and French interests in America received their
death blow. To complete the year’s triumphs, on 20th November, Hawke
destroyed a French fleet under Conflans in Quiberon Bay, in an action
fought in the midst of a tempest. The nation could breathe freely
again; there was no more fear of invasion, and England was confident
of ultimate success. But Pitt’s efforts were not relaxed, and many
regiments of Cavalry and Infantry were added to the Army during the
year.

By Royal Warrants, dated respectively 17th March, 4th August, 10th
October and 17th November 1759, the 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th Light
Dragoons were raised for service abroad and at home. In December,
steps were taken to raise the 19th Regiment of Light Dragoons in
Ireland, and, in the following month, a Notification to that effect
was issued from Dublin Castle.

_By the Lord Lieutenant General and General Governor of Ireland._

[Sidenote: 1760.]

Bedford,

His Majesty having been pleased to Order a Regiment of Light
Dragoons to be forthwith raised in this Kingdom, under the
Command of the Earl of Drogheda,[1] to consist of one Lieutenant
Colonel Commandant, one Lieutenant Colonel, one Major, three
Captains, six Lieutenants, six Cornets, one Chaplain, one
Surgeon, one Surgeon’s Mate, one Adjutant, six Quartermasters,
eighteen Serjeants, eighteen Corporals, twelve Drummers, six
Hautboys, and six Troops of seventy Men per Troop: and His
Majesty’s Letter being shortly expected for placing the said
Regiment upon the Military Establishment of this Kingdom from the
seventh day of December last past inclusive, to be paid at such
times and in such manner as other Regiments of Dragoons in this
Kingdom are paid, the pay of such Commission and Staff Officers
and the Subsistance of the Non Commission Officers to commence
from the date of their respective Commission, Warrants, and
Appointments, and the Subsistance of the private Men, approved
by the Officer who shall be appointed to review them from the
Days of their being severally attested inclusive. And whereas We
have authorized and required the said Earl of Drogheda by Beat
of Drum or otherwise, forthwith to raise such number of able
bodied Protestants in this Kingdom, as shall be willing to enlist
themselves and may be wanting to compleat the said Regiment to
the Establishment before mentioned, in the Execution of which
Service the said Earl of Drogheda or one of the Field Officers
of the said Regiment is to make the like returns to your Office
as are usually made upon raising Regiments: We do hereby give
you Notice thereof and do direct you upon Receipt of the Returns
aforesaid to allow the names of all such Recruits on the Muster
Rolls of the said Regiment in Order to their being entered for
Pay, pursuant to His Majesty’s Letter aforesaid. Given at His
Majesty’s Castle of Dublin the 15th Day of January 1760.

By His Grace’s Command

RICHARD RIGBY.

To the Muster Master General of this Kingdom or his Deputy.

A month later followed the Royal Warrant.

[Sidenote: 1760.]

_George R._--Right Trusty and Right Entirely Beloved Cousin and
Councillor. We greet you well. Whereas the Commissioners of our
Treasury have laid before us your Letter of the 29th of December
last transmitting unto them the following Establishment of a
Regiment of Light Dragoons to be raised according to a Proposal
from Charles Earl of Drogheda which had been laid before and
approved by Us and also an Estimate of the Expence of each
particular to be provided and defrayed by Us for the use of the
said Regiment which said Establishment for One Year commencing
from the seventeenth day of December last will amount to the
sum of seventeen thousand four hundred and thirteen pounds ten
shillings and tenpence according to the following particulars
thereof that is to say--

Per day. Per annum.
For one Lieutenant Colonel
Commandant £0 7 0 £127 15 0
One Lieutenant Colonel 0 7 0 127 15 0
One Major 0 5 0 91 5 0
One Chaplain 0 6 8 121 13 4
One Surgeon 0 4 0 73 0 0
One Mate 0 2 6 45 12 6
One Adjutant 0 4 0 73 0 0

For One Troop

Captain 10 sh. and two
servants at 1/2 each £0 12 4 £225 1 8
Lieutenant 6 sh. and one
Servant at 1/2 0 7 2 130 15 10
Cornet 5 sh. and one Servant
at 1/2 0 6 2 112 10 10
Quarter Master 0 4 0 73 0 0
Three Sergeants at 2/8 each 0 8 0 146 0 0
Three Corporals at 1/10 each 0 5 6 100 7 6
Two Drummers at 1/8 each 0 3 4 60 16 8
One Hautboy at 1/6 0 1 6 27 7 6
Seventy Men at 1/6 each 5 5 0 1,916 5 0
-------- -------------
7 13 0 2,792 5 0
For five Troops more 38 5 0 13,961 5 0
-------- -------------
General Total £47 14 2 £17,413 10 10
-------- -------------

And We being graciously pleased to approve thereof and also of
the several Particulars by you proposed in your said Letter
Our Will and Pleasure is and we do hereby direct authorize and
require that you give the necessary orders and Directions for
placing the said Regiment on the Military Establishment of that
our Kingdom from the seventh day of December last past inclusive
for the several allowances of Pay in the said Establishment
specified as aforesaid to be paid at such times and in such
manner as other Regiments in that Kingdom are paid the Pay of
each Commissioned and Staff Officers and the subsistence of
the Non Commissioned Officers to commence from the date of
their respective Commissions Warrants and Appointments and the
subsistence of the private Men approved by the Officer who
shall be appointed to review them from the days of their being
severally attested inclusive as also for issuing out of our
Revenues at Large in that Kingdom to the said Charles Earl of
Drogheda or his Agent the sum of seventeen hundred and seventy
pounds five shillings clear of all Fees and Deductions for four
hundred and seventy four Cloaks at the rate of one pound twelve
shillings and sixpence for each Cloak as also for issuing out
of our said Revenues at large in that our Kingdom to the said
Charles Earl of Drogheda or his Agent the sum Six Thousand Seven
hundred and Fifty pounds clear of all Fees and Deductions for
Four hundred and Fifty horses at the rate of Fifteen pounds for
each Horse and likewise for issuing out of our said Revenues at
large there to the Master and Principal Officers of the Ordnance
the sum of Seven hundred and Sixty Six pounds clear of all
Fees and Deductions for defraying the expense of four hundred
and thirty two Firelocks and Bayonets at the rate of one pound
fifteen shillings for each Firelock and Bayonet for the use of
the said Regiment and for so doing this shall be as well to you
as to our Lieutenant Deputy or other Chief Governor or Governors
of that our Kingdom as to all other our Officers and Ministers
who shall or may be concerned herein a Sufficient Warrant and
so we bid you very heartily farewell. Given at our Court of St.
James the 12th day of February 1760 in the 33rd Year of our reign.

By His Majesty’s Command,

HOLLES NEWCASTLE.
H. B. LEGGE.
JAMES OSWALD.

Entered at the Signet office
the 25th February 1760

GEO. BROWN, _Dy._

To Our Right Trusty and Right Entirely Beloved Cousin and
Councillor John Duke of Bedford Lieutenant General and General
Governor of our Kingdom of Ireland and to Our Lieutenant Deputy
or other Chief Governor or Governors of that Our Kingdom for the
time being.

On the 24th March, the Muster Master General was again addressed,
and instructed that, in consequence of an application from the Earl
of Drogheda, “the orders relating to the Magistrates attesting the
men raised to be Protestants and to making returns of the several
places where the recruits were enlisted may be dispensed with, proper
certificates that the men are Protestants having been obtained from
the Clergymen of the Parishes where such men were severally enlisted,
and all other requisites in the Earl of Rothes’ said instructions
having been complied with.”

On 25th October 1760, George II. died; in February 1763, the Peace of
Paris was concluded, and the Seven Years’ War came to an end. During
the whole of this time, the Regiment, which was generally known as
“Drogheda’s Horse,” remained in Ireland; but little or nothing can
be learned concerning it. Considerable reductions of establishment
were made directly peace was assured. The 17th (Aberdour’s Horse),
which had never been able to complete its strength, ceased to exist,
and the 18th Light Dragoons became the 17th. The 19th in the same way
became the 18th, under which number it gained much distinction in
the West Indies, Holland, the Peninsula, and Waterloo, being finally
disbanded in 1821. Lord Drogheda, who had raised the regiment,
continued to be its Colonel Commandant till its disbandment, nearly
sixty two years afterwards, an unbroken term of service with one
regiment probably unparalleled.

It is impossible at this date to ascertain what was the uniform of
the regiment, before its number was changed. It certainly wore the
red light dragoon coat of the period, and the facings were probably
white, with red and white lace, similar to what it wore after its
number was changed, until blue was substituted for red in all the
Light Dragoon regiments.

PART II

THE NINETEENTH LIGHT DRAGOONS

1779-1783

War in America--Declaration of War by France--Increase of the
Army--Orders for raising the 19th Light Dragoons--Uniform--Peace
proclaimed--Reduction of Military Establishments--Regiment
disbanded.

“The year of which we treat, presented the most aweful appearance
of public affairs, which this country had perhaps beheld for many
ages.”[2] The condition of affairs in England, in 1779, was truly
alarming. Since the spring of 1775, Great Britain had been striving
to subdue her rebellious colonies in America. The war was mismanaged,
the Ministry was incapable: the successes gained were barren of
results, while serious disasters had been experienced. In March 1778,
France, which had long been secretly aiding the rebellious colonies,
threw off the mask, and openly espoused their cause. The warlike
spirit of the country was roused, and those who would have conceded
peace on almost any terms to American demands, refused to consider
it at the intervention of France. The French forces however effected
nothing of importance during the year; towards the end of it, the
probability of Spain joining the coalition against England became
known, though the actual declaration of war was delayed till June
1779. The national spirit was now thoroughly roused, but there was
great apprehension of invasion. Supplies were freely voted, great
additions were made to the naval and military establishments, camps
were formed in many places in the south of England, the militia were
embodied, and militia camps formed at Cox Heath, Warley, Portsmouth,
Plymouth, Chatham, and Aldborough. The most strenuous efforts were
made to place the defences of the country on an efficient footing.

In April, the following Letter of Service was addressed to Major
General Russell Manners, Lieutenant-Colonel of the 2nd Dragoon Guards.

_Warrant._

_George R._ Whereas we have thought fit to order a Regiment of
Light Dragoons to be forthwith formed under your Command which
is to consist of six troops with four Sergeants four Corporals
one Trumpeter one Hautboy and fifty-four private men and horses
in each Troop beside the usual number of Commissioned Officers:
These are to authorize you by beat of drum or otherwise to raise
so many men in any County or part of our Kingdom of Great Britain
as shall be wanted to complete the said Regiment to the numbers
above mentioned. And all Magistrates Justices of the Peace
Constables and other our Civil Officers whom it may concern are
hereby required to be assisting unto you in providing Quarters
impressing carriages and otherwise as there shall be occasion.

Given this 25th day of April 1779 in the 19th year of our Reign.

By His Majesty’s Command
C. JENKINSON.

To Our Trusty and Wellbeloved Russell Manners Esq.
&c. &c. &c.

On the same day, similar Warrants were issued for raising the 20th
and 21st Light Dragoons.

In July, a small Corps of Light Dragoons, known as Lister’s Corps,
was raised, and in August, the 22nd Light Dragoons was formed. At the
same time, all out pensioners of Chelsea were inspected to see which
of them “were fit for garrison or other duty.”

The 19th Light Dragoons were formed by drafts from the 1st and
2nd Dragoon Guards, and the 4th and 10th Dragoons, and encamped
at Salisbury; where also were the 11th Light Dragoons. The 15th,
20th, and 21st Light Dragoons were encamped on Lexden Heath near
Colchester. On the 9th October 1779, the 19th were inspected by
Lieutenant-General James Johnston, when the effective strength was
355 Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates, and 347 horses. The
Inspecting Officer reported that the Officers wore scarlet, with
silver button holes and green lappels, and “were mostly young genteel
men with a good air, and great attention, and tolerable horsemen.”
The Non-Commissioned Officers were said to be too tall for Light
Dragoons, few of them being under 5 ft. 10 in.

Further orders for recruiting were issued in February 1780, and
again in February 1781. Regimental clothing accounts were formidable
things in those days, and two years after the Regiment was raised
it was found that the clothing money of the men drafted to the 19th
Light Dragoons from other Regiments had been paid, for two years, to
the wrong person; so the following warrant, directing Major-General
Manners to refund, was issued.

_“Warrant to make good a deficiency in the Offreckonings of the
several Regiments of Dragoon Guards and Dragoons within specified
from 25th April 1779 to 5th July 1781 out of ye Offreckonings of
ye 19th 20th and 21st Regiments of Light Dragoons which were
formed by sundry Non Commissioned Officers and Private Men turned
over from the said Regiments of Dragoon Guards and Dragoons.”_

_George R._

[Sidenote: 1781.]

Whereas we were pleased to direct that our several Regiments of
Dragoon Guards and Dragoons should be augmented from the 25th
March 1778 and also further augmented from 25th August following
and Whereas on the 25th April 1779 We were pleased to order three
Regts. of Light Dragoons to be formed (out of a proper number
of Non Commissioned Officers and Private Men turned over to
them from the several Regiments of Dragoon Guards and Dragoons
as specified in the State hereunto annexed), and whereas in
Consequence of this We were pleased to direct that each Troop of
our said Regiments of Dragoon Guards and Dragoons should from the
25th April 1779, be reduced so as to consist of Two Sergeants,
Two Corporals, One Trumpeter, One Hautbois and thirty seven
Private Men, and no more besides the usual Commissioned and other
Officers, whereby a Deficiency hath arisen in the Assignment of
the Offreckoning of each of our said Corps between 25th April
1779 and 5th July 1781 and We having been most humbly besought to
grant Our Warrants to make good the said deficiency It appearing
that the several Colonels above mentioned did turn over the Non
Commissioned Officers and Private Men (Specified against each of
their names in the State annexed) fully clothed and appointed
according to our Regulations, Our Will and Pleasure therefore
is that out of the Offreckonings arising on the Establishment
of each of the new Corps specified in the annexed State and
directed by our Warrant of the 29th March 1781, to be retained
in your hands, you do pay from time to time to the said several
Colonels or their Assigns the Amount (as the same hath or shall
become payable according to the custom of the Service) of the
Offreckonings of the Non Commissioned Officers and Private Men
turned over to the New Corps that have accrued from 25th April
1779 to 5th July following as also that shall accrue from 6th
July 1779 to 5th July 1781, in full satisfaction of the Claims of
the said several Colonels of Our said Regiments of Dragoon Guards
and Dragoons for the deficiency on their respective Assignments
already passed by them up to 5th July 1779 and 5th July 1781, And
for so doing &c. Given &c. this 20th day of June 1781 in the 21st
Year of our Reign.

By His Majesty’s Command

C. JENKINSON.

_“State of the numbers of Non Commissioned Officers and Privates
the amount of whose Offreckonings, from 25th April 1779 to 5th
July following, as also from 6th July 1779 to 5th July 1781 are
to be paid over from the three new Regiments of Light Dragoons.”_

From Major General Russell Manners’ 19th Regiment of Light
Dragoons as follows Viz:

Serjts. Corpls. Ptes.
To the 1st Regt: of Dragoon Guards Assignees
of late Gen. John Mostyn 6 6 78
2nd Dragoon Guards Lord Viscount Townshend’s 6 6 84
4th Dragoons Lieut: Gen: Carpenter’s 6 6 84
10th Dragoons Assignees of late Sir John
Mordaunt 6 6 60
-------------------
Total to be paid out of Major Gen: Manners’
Offreckonings 24 24 306
===================

From Salisbury the 19th Light Dragoons were moved to Shropshire, and
were quartered at Ludlow and Bridgenorth during the summer of 1780,
with three troops at each place. The declaration of war by Holland,
in January 1781, caused their transfer to Norwich, and, during
the summer of that year, they were distributed between Saxmundham,
Bungay, Beccles, Yarmouth, Halesworth, and Woodbridge, with a troop
at each place. In October, the Regiment was inspected at Yarmouth by
Major-General Tryon, who reported “This Regiment is a good corps, and
fitt for any Service.” Each Dragoon was armed with a sword, a pair of
pistols, carbine and bayonet.

In the following spring, the Regiment was at Bury St. Edmunds and
Sudbury, three troops at each place. Soon afterwards they were moved
to the neighbourhood of London, for employment on revenue duties,
and, in August, we find the Head quarters of the Regiment with three
Troops at Epsom; the other three troops being quartered at Croydon,
Mitcham, and Horsham. Soon afterwards, a Troop was sent to Bromley,
and another to Ewell, one Troop being withdrawn from Epsom.

But the Regiment was not destined to see active service. In November
1782, the preliminary articles of peace had been signed, by which
England recognised the independence of the United States, and the
usual reduction of military establishments took place. In June 1783,
the Regiment was disbanded under the following order--

_Orders and Instructions for Disbanding the 19th Regiment of Light
Dragoons._

[Sidenote: 1783.]

Whereas We have thought fit to Order that Our 19th Regiment of
(Light) Dragoons, under your Command be forthwith disbanded,
Our Will and Pleasure is, that you, or such person or persons
as you shall appoint for this Service, do immediately repair to
the respective Quarters of the Troops of Our Said Regiment, and
disband them accordingly and that in the disbanding of them the
following Rules be observed--

[Sidenote: 1st.]

Before such disbanding You are to cause an exact Muster to be
taken of the several Troops of the said Regiment, which You may
draw together at some convenient place and You are to transmit
to Our Secretary at War, for Our Information, an Account of their
Condition and Numbers at the time of Disbanding, together with an
exact List of the Names and Rank of the Officers, specifying also
if any of them holds their Commissions to which Pay is annexed.

[Sidenote: 2nd.]

It being Our Intention only to pay off at present, and clear the
Non Commissioned Officers and Private Men of Our Said Regiments,
(and give an allowance of Half Pay to the Commissioned Officers
entitled thereto, from the time of their Disbanding), You are
to take care before their Disbanding, that the Quarters of each
Troop be duly satisfied, that the Accounts between the Non
Commissioned Officers and Private Men hereby disbanded, and their
Officers, be made up, and that they be fully satisfied, and paid
their Arrears, Grass Money, and all other just pretentions, to
the day of their being disbanded, whereof the said Officers, are
to take Acquittances, and Discharges from them respectively,
distinguishing each head of Payment.

[Sidenote: 3rd.]

That care be taken, that the Arms delivered out of Our Stores
of Ordnance, and indented for, be returned into Our said Stores
again, and Acquittances taken for the same, from such persons as
shall be appointed to receive them.

[Sidenote: 4th.]

That care be taken that each Non Commissioned Officer and Private
Man hereby to be disbanded be permitted to carry away with him
his Cloak and Clothes which he now wears, and that their Horses
be disposed of according to the regulation following.

[Sidenote: 5th.]

Where any Dragoon who shall be discharged in pursuance hereof,
hath served Us, One whole year, He shall be entitled to Three
Pounds in lieu of His Horse, and all the Horses of the disbanded
Men are to be Sold, and an account kept, in order to the disposal
of the Surplus Money in such Manner as We shall direct.

[Sidenote: 6th.]

That the Dragoons who in pursuance of the above Regulation are
entitled to £3 as aforesaid, be paid six days full pay, and
those who are not so entitled, be paid Eighteen days full pay,
from the day of Disbanding, exclusive; which We are pleased to
give them, as of Our Royal Bounty, to carry them to the places
of their former Residence: You are therefore to cause payment
thereof to be made to each of them respectively and to take
Receipts for the same from each Non Commissioned Officer, and
Private Dragoon, And all such Acquittances, Discharges, and
Receipts, are to be transmitted to the Agent of the Regiment, to
be produced to Our Secretary at War, as Vouchers for the several
Payments herein directed, and for which You are to draw Bills on
the said Agent.

[Sidenote: 7th.]

You are also to send to Our Secretary at War, an Authentic List,
attested in the best manner by Yourself, or Officer performing
this Service; of the names of the Non Commissioned Officers and
Private Men, so disbanded, and to give them passes in case they
shall desire the same, to the places of their former Residence,
allowing them a convenient time to repair thither, and giving
them a strict charge that they do not presume to travel with
Arms, nor more than three in Company together, upon pain of
the severest punishment, And to the end that the said Non
Commissioned Officers and Private Dragoons may be sensible of
the care We have taken of them upon their dismission, You are to
cause these Our directions to be read at the head of each Troop,
for a more ready compliance with Our Pleasure hereby signified,
and see the same put into Execution--Given at Our Court at St.
James’s, this 12th day of June, 1783, in the twenty third Year of
Our Reign.

By His Majesty’s Command,
R. FITZ PATRICK.

To Our Trusty and Welbeloved Russell Manners Esq. Lt. Gen.
Commandant of our 19th Regt, of (Light) Dragoons or to the
Officer Commanding in Chief of our said Regt.

In a “Report of the Lt. Generals Johnston, Mocher and Sloper,
relative to the appointments of the 19th, 20th and 21st Regts. of
Light Dragoons &c.,” it is stated that the appointments are little
better than lumber. The following paragraph refers to the 19th Light
Dragoons--

“In regard to the seventh regiment, no report having been sent
us with your letter, and no officer having appeared before us to
give us any insight into the transaction between the Colonels of
that and the 19th Regiment of Light Dragoons, we can only say,
that as the 19th light Regt. was raised at the same time, and has
had pretty near the same duty, we imagine the same objections
will lay against the appointments of that regiment, as to the
others.

To Lt. Gen. FAWCETT,
Adjt. Gen. &c.”

PART III

THE TWENTY-THIRD, AFTERWARDS THE NINETEENTH LIGHT DRAGOONS

(1781-1822)

CHAPTER I.--1781-1782.

THE TWENTY-THIRD LIGHT DRAGOONS.

Alarming state of Public Affairs--Want of Cavalry in
India--Orders for raising the 23rd Light Dragoons--Colonel
Sir John Burgoyne--Regiment embark for India--Arrive in
Madras--Desperate State of Affairs--Madras Misgovernment--Horses
for the Regiment.

Alarming as was the state of our affairs in 1779, it was much worse
in 1781. In January, a rupture occurred with Holland, so that Great
Britain found herself simultaneously at war with France, Spain and
Holland, while engaged at the same time with her revolted Colonies
in America. The navy was overtaxed and inadequate to the demands
made on it, and the command of the sea had passed into the hands of
our enemies. Gibraltar had been besieged since July 1779, the siege
continuing till February 1783, the only assistance that could be
given being in the shape of stores and reinforcements at uncertain
intervals. In America, things had gone from bad to worse. On 19th
October 1781, Cornwallis was forced to capitulate at Yorktown with
the whole of his army, a disaster which practically brought the
war in America to a close, though it lingered on for nearly a year
and a half longer. In India, affairs were nearly as bad. The three
most important of the native powers at that time were Hyder Ali of
Mysore, the Mahrattas, and the Nizam of Hyderabad, and matters had so
turned out that we were at war with them all three. On the outbreak
of war between England and France, the French settlements quickly
fell into our hands. Hyder Ali was much under French influence, and
the fall of the French Settlement at Mahé, which was detrimental to
his interests, aroused his resentment. He was an able soldier and
administrator, and his army was, at that time, the best organised
among the native powers. Collecting his forces, he fell like an
avalanche on the Carnatic which he desolated. Some troops sent
against him, under Colonel Baillie, were literally annihilated;
another force, under Sir Hector Munro, was obliged to retreat, so
that at the end of 1780, the Company’s authority in the South of
India extended little beyond the precincts of the town of Madras.
Reinforcements were sent from Bengal under Sir Eyre Coote. The
results of the campaign of 1781 were, however, indecisive, in spite
of a victory gained by Sir Eyre Coote, at Porto Novo (1st July), and
some minor successes. It was estimated that one-third of the British
forces were lost in the campaign. In Western India, the Bombay
Government had engaged in hostilities against the Mahrattas, and met
with disaster. On the coast a powerful French fleet had appeared
under Suffren, one of the ablest seamen France ever produced. The
European forces of the East India Company were at that time in a
miserable state. Public recruiting in England was forbidden, and the
ranks were filled with the refuse of society. Felons with fetters
on them were shipped as soldiers; foreigners and adventurers of all
ranks were received; many of whom only wanted a passage to India, in
order that they might desert, as soon as possible, after they landed
in the country; invalids, vagrants, and men under the proper size
for military service. The whole were “in a most wretched condition,
almost indeed without subordination.” The only reliable European
troops in the country were the King’s troops, and the Company’s
Artillery into which the best of their recruits were drafted. Lord
Cornwallis, writing six years later of some troops he had recently
inspected, says:

“What shall I say of the Company’s Europeans? I did not think
Britain could have furnished such a set of wretched objects--I
would infinitely rather take the 73rd regiment upon service with
me, than the whole six Company’s battalions--Indeed I have great
doubts whether by drafting the whole six, I could complete one
serviceable battalion to the present establishment.”

It is only by appreciating the condition and circumstances of our
military services in India at this time, and the jealousy existing in
the highest quarters in England of the exercise of the authority of
a Government by the East India Company, that the almost independent
position held by the King’s troops in India can be understood. The
chief want was in Cavalry, and it is a proof of the ill-judged
parsimony or poverty of the Company that, in a country so well
adapted for that arm, where the cavalry of the enemy were counted by
tens of thousands, they should have failed, till the time treated of,
to produce an efficient mounted Corps. M. le Maitre de la Tour, a
French officer in the service of Hyder Ali, writing about the events
then occurring, says:

“ ... The English have never yet succeeded in the attempt to form
a good troop of European horse in India. As they have sent a
regiment of dragoons[3] from England, it is probable that their
arrival may place the affair on another footing. Though it may
not immediately be conceived, the reason of the want of success
in forming their intended troop of horse, consisted in the good
discipline to which they were desirous of subjecting them.

“The excellence of the English cavalry is sufficiently
acknowledged in Europe: and its advantages consist less in the
goodness of the horse, than in the choice of the horsemen. The
pay of a horseman in England is such as renders his situation
very eligible; so that the sons of rich farmers and tradesmen are
very desirous of entering into the service. This being the case,
it is in the power of the officers to select handsome well-formed
men of good character, and to keep them in good discipline merely
by the fear of being dismissed. The officers who were first
entrusted with the formation of a body of cavalry in India,
thought to establish and preserve the same discipline among them,
without attending to the great difference of time, place, and
persons. The recruits sent from England to India are in general
libertines, and people of bad character: and, as the Company will
not dismiss a soldier, all the punishment inflicted on a horseman
is, to reduce him to serve in the infantry; so that a man is no
sooner put among the cavalry, than he is sent back to his former
station. The French have succeeded in forming very good cavalry
in India, by attending more to their horsemanship, and less to
their discipline and manners.”

Hyder Ali’s cavalry numbered at that time about twenty-five thousand
horsemen, among which was a body of French dragoons and hussars. The
Company maintained no Cavalry establishment, beyond a small European
troop formed, as related by M. le Maitre de la Tour. When at war,
they borrowed a few hundreds of horsemen from the Nawab of Arcot,
unpaid, undrilled, and undisciplined.

Sir Eyre Coote, the Commander-in-chief in India, was loud in his
demands for Cavalry. In his dispatch on his victory at Porto Novo he
wrote:

“From the want of a corps of cavalry on our side equal in
number to the service required, we were, with victory decidedly
declared, obliged to halt just beyond the enemy’s grounds, not
being able to take advantage of so distinguished a day; for with
a corps of cavalry, the enemy’s guns, stores, &c., would, to a
certainty have fallen into our hands.”

Again, after the battle of Arnee, (2nd June 1782) he wrote:

“There was nothing wanting to have enabled me on this occasion
to ruin and disperse Hyder’s army, but a respectable body of
cavalry. One thing is certain, that had I such a corps we should
have captured the greatest part, if not the whole of his cannon.”

Under the urgent demands made on them, the Court of Directors applied
to the Crown for the loan of a Cavalry Regiment, and, in accordance
with the usual practice at that date, it was determined to raise a
Regiment for service in India. On the 24th Sept. 1781, the following
Warrant was issued to Colonel Sir John Burgoyne Bart., of the 14th
Light Dragoons, a cousin of General Burgoyne who surrendered at
Saratoga in 1777.

_Warrant for forming a Regiment of (Light) Dragoons under the
Command of Colonel Sir John Burgoyne Bart._

[Sidenote: 1781.]

George R.

Whereas We have thought fit to Order a Regiment of Light Dragoons
to be forthwith formed under your Command which is to consist of
Six Troops with Four Serjeants, Four Corporals, One Trumpeter,
One Hautboy, and Fifty four Private Men in each Troop, beside the
usual Number of Commissioned Officers; These are to Authorize you
by beat of Drum or otherwise to raise so many men in any County
or part of Our Kingdom of Great Britain, as shall be wanted to
complete the said Regiment, to the Numbers above mentioned. And
all Magistrates, &c., Given &c. this 24th day of September 1781,
in the Twenty first Year of Our Reign.

By His Majesty’s Command,
C. JENKINSON.

To Our Trusty and Well-beloved Sir John Burgoyne Bart. Colonel
of Our 23rd Regiment of (Light) Dragoons, or to the Officer
appointed by Him to raise Men, for Our said Regiment.

In the London Gazette, for the same date, the following appointments
are made.

_23rd Light Dragoons._

Colonel Sir John Burgoyne, Bart. of 14th Dragoons is appointed to
be Colonel.

Major John Floyd of 21st Dragoons to be Lieutenant Colonel.

Captain Thomas Nash of 16th Dragoons to be Major.

_To be Captains of Troops._

Captain Jonathan Thomas of 15th Dragoons.

Captain Lieutenant Lewis Majendie of 15th Dragoons.

Captain Lieutenant John Campbell of 20th Dragoons.

Lieutenant John Beckwith of 15th Dragoons to be Captain
Lieutenant.

_To be Lieutenants._

Lieutenant William Gilbert Child of 21st Dragoons.

Lieutenant William Walton of 21st Dragoons.

Cornet John Fullerton of 21st Dragoons.

Cornet Guy Henry Crawford of 21st Dragoons.

Cornet T. J. Venables Hinde of 16th Dragoons.

The roll of officers was completed in subsequent Gazettes, but
several changes took place before the embarkation of the Regiment.

Colonel Sir John Burgoyne, Bart, of Sutton Park in Bedfordshire,
was an officer who had served in several Regiments, the 7th
Royal Fusiliers, the 52nd Foot, the 58th Foot, and was Lieutenant
Colonel of the 14th Light Dragoons at the time of his appointment
as Colonel of the 23rd Light Dragoons. He also held the offices of
Comptroller of the Port of Chester, and Muster Master of foreign
troops serving in North America. On being appointed to serve in
India, he was granted local rank as Major General in the East Indies
from 1st June 1781, and was subsequently made Major General in the
Army, 20th November 1782.[4] It is probable that the regiment was
largely composed of drafts from the regiments that furnished it with
officers, viz.: the 8th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 20th, and 21st Light
Dragoons. The Regiment was first brought together in the vicinity
of his home, and, under order dated 28th December, marched from
Bedford to Portsmouth to embark for India. The following orders and
instructions had previously been issued, and subsequent events were
to show how much the admonition as to disputes with the officers of
the East India Company were needed.

_Orders and Instructions to Sir John Burgoyne Colonel of the 23rd
Regiment of (Light) Dragoons for the Conduct of his Regiment on
their passage to the East Indies dated 29th November 1781._

George R.

You will before embarking call together the Officers of the
Regiment under Your Command, and recommend to them in a
particular manner the avoiding all manner of disputes with the
Officers of the East India Company, and that they use their
utmost Endeavours to live with them in the greatest harmony, as
the contrary behaviour will be very displeasing unto Us, as well
as detrimental to the Service they are jointly to be employed
in;--the respective Officers of Companies are to recommend the
same to the Non Commissioned Officers and Soldiers under their
Command; The Officers of the East India Company having the same
orders, as to their behaviour to Our Land Forces.

You will give the strictest orders for keeping up good discipline
and regularity both whilst the Troops are on board the East India
Companie’s Ships, and on Shore, and if any Commissioned, Non
Commissioned Officer or Soldier shall be guilty of any Crime or
disorder whilst on board the said Ships, he shall be immediately
confined, and you will order Courts Martial to be held and the
delinquent to be punished there.

The Officers of our said Forces on board the said Ships, shall
give the necessary orders for the Men under their Command,
consulting with the Commanders of the said Ships, in every
thing relating to their Service on board, dividing the Men into
Watches, with a proportionable Number of Commissioned and Non
Commissioned Officers.

The necessary Orders shall likewise be given for airing the
bedding daily, for keeping the births (_sic_) clean and sweet,
for preventing gaming, and selling Drams or spirituous liquors
and putting out the Lights between Decks with all which
Commissioned Officers shall be chargeable.

No Officers or Soldiers shall go on Shore out of any of the said
Ships, without the Consent of the Captain of the Ship as well
as ye Commanding Officer of the Land Forces, and whenever any
men are allowed to go on Shore, Commissioned or Non Commissioned
Officers are to be sent with them, who are to be answerable for
their Conduct whilst on Shore, and are to make a report thereof
upon their return on board.

Weekly returns of the Officers and Men of Our said Forces, on
board each Ship, shall be constantly made out, and sent to You,
as often as opportunity offers, and Monthly returns of Our said
Forces under your Command shall be transmitted by You for Us,
to Our Secretary at War, as also a Report of every thing that
happens when you have an opportunity of sending them.

You will transmit with as much expedition as the opportunity of
time, distance and place can admit, the original proceedings and
Sentences of every General Court Martial, to the Commander in
Chief in the East Indies who is to send the same to the Judge
Advocate General in London.

In every thing you will consider the honour of Our Forces,
the good of Our Service, and the Interest of the East India
Company whose Territories and Commerce You are sent to protect
and establish, You will therefore chearfully (_sic_) concur
in all things which the principal Officers of the East India
Company shall judge conducive thereto, and for that purpose you
will use your utmost endeavours to preserve a good harmony and
understanding betwixt Our Land Forces and those of the East India
Company.

Given at Our Court at St James’s this 29th day of November 1781,
in the Twenty first Year of Our Reign.

By His Majesty’s Command
BARRINGTON.

In a letter, dated London 25th January 1782, from the East India
Directors to the President and Council at Fort St. George, the Madras
authorities were thus advised of the dispatch of the Regiment to
India--

“His Majesty having been graciously pleased to order a Regiment
of Light Dragoons, dismounted, and two Regiments of Foot[5] to
proceed to the East Indies for the protection and defence of the
Company’s possessions, we hereby inform you that they embark on
board the ships now under dispatch for India. Instructions have
been given by our Chairman and Depy. Chairman to provide horses
to be in readiness for the Dragoons, in order to render them fit
for immediate service upon their arrival: and we rely upon these
instructions having been duly complied with. The strength of the
Regiments and Lists of the Officers are as follows--

_Establishment of a Regiment of Light Dragoons commanded by
Colonel Sir John Burgoyne, Bart._

1 Colonel and Captain.
1 Lt.-Colonel and Captain.
1 Major and Captain.
3 Captains more.
6 Lieutenants.
6 Cornets.
6 Quarter Masters.
1 Chaplain.
1 Adjutant.
1 Surgeon.
1 Surgeon’s Mate.
24 Serjeants.
24 Corporals.
6 Trumpeters.
6 Hautbois.
324 Private men.
---
412
===

_List of the Officers of the Twenty Third Regiment of Light
Dragoons._

Regiment. Army.
_Colonel_ _Sir_ John 24 Sept. 1781. 29 Aug. ’77.
Burgoyne, Bt. Maj.-Gen.
E. Indies,
1st June ’81.

_Lt. Colonel_ John Floyd do.

_Major_ Thomas Nash do.

_Captains_ Jonathan Thomas do. 28 June 1779.
John Beckwith 27th.
Thomas Crewe Dodd 28th.

_Capt.-Lieut._ John Petley 29th.

_Lieutenants_ Wm. Gilbert Child 24th. 26 Feb. 1780.
William Walton 25th. 23 March ’81.
Guy Henry Crawford 27th.
T. S. Venables Hinde 28th.
William Sage 3rd Dec. 9 Oct. ’78.

_Cornets_ George Williams 24th Sept.
John Campbell 25th do.
Thomas Eyre 26th.
John Horsefall 27th.
John Jaffrey 28th.
Robert Anstey 29th.

_Adjutant_ Robert Hilton 24th Sept. ’81.

_Surgeon_ John M‘Cullock 24th Sept. ’81.”

On the 5th January 1782, the Regiment embarked at Portsmouth, on
board the ships _Ceres_ and _Royal Henry_ forming part of the
East India fleet sailing under convoy of Vice Admiral Sir Richard
Bickerton. In the same fleet sailed the two newly raised Infantry
Regiments, a Hanoverian regiment raised to serve the East India
Company for seven years, drafts for four King’s regiments then
serving in India, and some recruits, raised in Ireland, for the
Company’s service. Lieutenant Colonel Floyd, with the greater part
of the Regiment, was on board the _Ceres_. Sir John Burgoyne, with
the rest of the Regiment, sailed in the _Royal Henry_. Floyd was
in command of the Regiment: Sir John Burgoyne being apparently in
command of the whole of the Troops. The voyage was an uneventful
one, though not without some apprehension of meeting a French
fleet. It was known that a French fleet was fitting out in Brest,
under the Comte de Guiche, to intercept them. On the 27th February,
intelligence was received of a combined French and Spanish fleet of
41 sail of the line and 18 frigates, that was cruising to intercept
the convoy. The frigate that brought the intelligence had also passed
close to a French squadron of 14 sail, that had only just missed the
convoy: probably the squadron from Brest. But no enemy was seen, and
on 28th April, the fleet was safely anchored in Rio, where it lay
till 3rd June. In those days it was the custom to carry beer for
troops at sea, as a protection against scurvy. The log of the _Ceres_
records that on 3rd March the beer had come to an end, and spirits
were served to the troops. On the 15th March, the log records that
there was “delivered to Lieut. Colonel Floyd, Commanding Officer of
the troops on board, 1 Chest of Tea belonging to the Honble Company,
for the use of the military.” Later on again the issue of spruce
beer to the troops is recorded. It is evident that much attention,
according to the medical lights of that day, was paid to the health
of the troops, with a view to landing them in India in as healthy
a condition as possible. On the 31st March, they crossed the line
with all the ceremonies observed on those occasions, now long since
obsolete. The log records that at P.M. the Captain “mustered the
ship’s Company to know who had crossed the Line before, when we found
81 who had not, who all agreed to pay the usual forfeit except one
Seaman and two Boys who were accordingly ducked three times from ye
Lee Main Yard Arm.” We may be sure that all on board relieved the
monotony of the voyage by taking part in the rough festivities of the
day. Lt. Colonel Floyd says in a private letter, “Our dragoons are
divided into two watches, and relieve each other every four hours, so
the half of them are always on deck, chiefly for the sake of their
health, and to assist the seamen in the operations of the ship,
at which they now begin to be very handy.” On the 15th July, when
nearing the Cape, a Danish ship “fresh from the Cape” was spoken,
and gave news that, on the 13th, 4 French sail of the line and 9
transports were to have sailed for the Mauritius: also, that on 26th
June, a French frigate and 12 transports with troops had sailed from
the Cape. But nothing more eventful occurred, and on 6th Sept., the
whole fleet anchored in Bombay. There the convoy was broken up, and,
on 15th, the _Ceres_ and _Royal Henry_ sailed for Madras, where they
cast anchor on 19th and 20th October. Hardly had they done so, when
bad weather set in; the ships were blown from their anchorage, and,
it was not till 26th and 27th October, that the Regiment disembarked;
the first British Cavalry Regiment to land in India. Three deaths
occurred among the men during the voyage, Private Jonas Bateman on
23rd April, Private Joseph Gardner on 4th June, and Private Simon
Kemp on 23rd September.

The reinforcements were sorely needed. So badly had the East India
Company’s affairs prospered that, in October, there appeared a
probability of the whole of the British establishments in southern
India being destroyed. Every where was discord, and disaster. The
relations of the Madras Council, both with the naval and military
commanders, were greatly strained. Sir Eyre Coote had been obliged
to return to Bengal for a time on account of his health, and Sir
Hector Munro, Commander-in-Chief in Madras, had resigned his command,
while the pay of the Native Army was many months in arrears. So
great had been the losses among the European officers, that, in
spite of the stringent orders of the Court of Directors, the Madras
Government had granted Commissions to anybody they could lay their
hands on. Four naval actions had taken place off the coast during
the year, between the French fleet under Suffren and the English
fleet under Hughes, without any decisive result, though the balance
of advantage was with the French. Trincomalee had been captured by
the French, and the shattered English ships had no place nearer than
Bombay where they could refit. By land, operations had been equally
unsuccessful. In February, a British detachment consisting of about
100 Europeans, 1500 sepoys, 360 Cavalry, and 9 field pieces under
Colonel Brathwaite, was forced to surrender to a combined Mysore and
French force, and, in April, Cuddalore yielded to the same enemy.
The operations of Sir Eyre Coote, who was at that time Commander in
Chief in India had not been successful. In an attempt on Arnee he was
outmanœuvred by Hyder, several small reverses were experienced, and,
finally, he had fallen so seriously ill that he was forced to resign
his command, and sail for Bengal. Negapatam was attacked by Suffren
and Hyder in July, and was only saved by the timely appearance of the
British fleet. To make matters worse, famine was raging in Madras.
The country had been abandoned to the undisturbed possession of
the enemy; great numbers of natives had flocked into the town for
protection from Hyder’s Cavalry, and the ill success of our arms,
together with scarcity of funds and bad management, prevented the
collection of adequate supplies. “Hundreds perished daily.”[6]

In the beginning of October, there were only 30,000 bags of rice in
the place, the monthly consumption being 50,000. A large quantity of
rice was afloat in the roads but could not be landed, owing to all
the harbour boats being taken up for the service of the fleet.[7] On
15th October, a terrible storm arose: the fleet was blown off the
coast, the flag ship being so much damaged that she was kept afloat
with difficulty; several merchant ships were stranded or foundered
at their anchors, and all the rice afloat was lost. “The shore for
several miles was covered with wrecks and with the bodies of the
dead and dying.”[8] Before the storm, the Admiral had declared his
intention of carrying his ships round to Bombay, and had positively
refused to stop on the coast, though the absence of the fleet
imperilled the safety of Madras. Some relief had been gained by the
establishment of peace with the Mahrattas, in May (treaty of Salbye),
though the final ratifications were not exchanged till February 1783:
so that even in this quarter peace was not definitely secured.

It was under these depressing circumstances that the 23rd Light
Dragoons landed in India, not to leave it again until the British
arms were triumphant everywhere; a result to which the Regiment
contributed in no small degree. Their arrival gave promise that
future successes in the field should not be so barren in results
as had frequently been the case in the past. In their dispatch of
31st October 1782, the Madras Government, showing their satisfaction
at the arrival of the 23rd Light Dragoons, quote Sir Eyre Coote’s
opinion that “a body of cavalry would have procured him the most
solid and decisive advantages over the enemy” in the earlier
operations.

The regiment landed with a strength of 360 privates fit for duty,
and, by all accounts, appears to have been a splendid lot of men.
Madras letters described the troops landed as “remarkably healthy,
and as fine a body of men as ever came to India ... particularly
Burgoyne’s men, who, when mounted, will be as fine a body of men
as ever went into the field.” A contemporary writer mentions them
as “this sightly corps,” and Burgoyne himself, in the midst of his
troubles two years later, writes, “the men are now the finest you
can imagine.” Immediately after landing, firelocks were served out
to the men, and a party of them were exercised in heavy gun drill.
In the course of the general mismanagement that distinguished the
Madras administration at that day, the regiment was first quartered
in Fort St. George, in what has been described as “a suffocating
bombproof, from which three or four hundred French prisoners,
afflicted with various pestilential diseases had been recently
removed. The consequences were such as might have been expected. A
fatal mortality so much prevailed that no less than two or three
of the men were daily sent to their graves.” In consequence of the
scarcity of provisions, biscuit was issued to all the European troops
instead of rice. After a time, the regiment was moved to San Thomé,
four or five miles from Madras. The four hundred horses ordered to
be in readiness for the regiment, were not forthcoming, the few
horses available in Madras not being large enough to carry European
dragoons. An application for horses had been made to Bengal, but
received a discouraging reply. An allowance of Rs. 600 per horse was
therefore made to Sir John Burgoyne, to do his best with in mounting
the regiment. The Bengal government were ready to send horses but
could not find means of transport. In the Calcutta _Gazette_ for
21st December an advertisement appears, asking owners and freighters
of ships to quote rates, and state what number of horses they would
convey to Madras for government. A week later, the _Gazette_ mentions
that “Lt. Colonel Eyre’s regiment of (native) cavalry is arrived at
Cowgatchy from Monghyr. It is reported that this regiment is to be
dismounted, and the horses sent to Madras for the European cavalry
lately arrived there.” But freight for the horses was not obtained.
Bengal had been denuded of troops, and it was impossible to send
the horses by land without a strong escort. It was not till June
following that four hundred horses arrived from Bengal, by land, and
the regiment was at last complete.

CHAPTER II

TROUBLES AT MADRAS

1783-1785

Sultan Tippoo Sahib of Mysore--Operations in Southern
India--Death of Sir Eyre Coote--Attack on Cuddalore--Peace
with France--Tippoo makes Peace--Strained relations between
civil and military in India--The E. I. Company’s military
establishment--The King’s troops in India--Misconduct of
Madras Government--Quarrel between Council and General
Stuart--Complaints of Council against Burgoyne--Arrest of
Stuart--Council appoint Lang to supersede Burgoyne--Burgoyne
refuses to give over command of the King’s troops--Strange
delusions of the Council--Imminent Conflict between King’s and
Company’s troops--Unworkable arrangement--Fresh quarrel--Burgoyne
arrested--Mutiny of native cavalry--Court Martial on
Burgoyne--His acquittal--His death--End of the quarrel--Burgoyne
justified.

In little more than a month after the Regiment landed, the death
of Hyder Ali occurred. It brought no relief to British interests.
His son and successor, Tippoo, was an experienced soldier, though
inferior to Hyder in ability. He was noted for his religious
fanaticism and a violent temper, joined to a most barbarous cruelty
of disposition. To this was added a spirit of implacable hostility
to the English, the only European power in the country that appeared
formidable to him. Possessed of a full treasury and a powerful
army, he at once took the field with a force that contained 900
European troops, 250 Topasses,[9] and 2000 French sepoys, besides
many thousands of his own Mysore troops. To oppose him, the Madras
Government could dispose only of some 2950 European, and 11,500
native troops. With this force, Major General Stuart took the field
in January, and made his way by slow marches to Vellore. Meanwhile,
Tippoo was forced to withdraw to the westward to defend Mysore from
an attack on that side. On the arrival at Bombay of reinforcements in
Sir Richard Bickerton’s convoy, about 500 of the Company’s recruits,
destined for Madras, were detained, and, on the arrival of the King’s
troops at Madras, about 400 of them were at once sent back to Bombay.
Out of this material a force had been organized, under Major General
Matthews, to advance against Mysore from the west coast. After the
capture of several places, the force was hemmed in at Bednore, and
obliged to surrender to Tippoo, on 30th April 1783. A great loss
was experienced at this time in the death of Sir Eyre Coote at
Madras, on 27th April, three days after his return to resume command
of the operations. After this nothing was done till June, when an
ineffective attack was made on Cuddalore by Major General Stuart.
The French were on the point of striking a counter blow which would
probably have proved successful, when the announcement of peace in
Europe changed the complexion of affairs. The French force with
Tippoo was withdrawn, but otherwise the war continued. At this point
the Mahrattas intervened. Tippoo’s character and his great power
rendered him a menace to the other native Princes, and it was no
part of the Mahratta policy that he should be allowed to crush the
English. They therefore called on him to desist from hostilities.
On his refusing to comply, they signed a treaty of alliance against
him with the English. In the meantime, a successful expedition
under Colonel Fullarton, strengthened by the troops set free by the
peace with France, had penetrated into Mysore, from the south, and
threatened Seringapatam. Under these circumstances, Lord Macartney
and the Madras Council induced Tippoo to sign a treaty of peace, 11th
March 1784; a treaty discreditable to themselves, and disapproved of
by Warren Hastings.

In a letter, dated 6th September 1783, addressed to the Court of
Directors, the Select Committee of the Madras Council states that
Sir John Burgoyne’s regiment, being reported fit for service, had
been ordered to take the field. But the regiment did not move
from San Thomé. The Council desired to send the regiment into the
field without Burgoyne. On the latter notifying his intention of
accompanying his regiment, under orders from General Stuart, the move
was countermanded. The incident was part of the fast ripening quarrel
between the Civil Government and the King’s officers, which must be
mentioned on account of the serious results it had on the fortunes of
the Colonel of the 23rd Light Dragoons.

From the time of their first military establishment in India, the
Company had always evinced great distrust of their military officers,
a feeling that was not without some justification in view of the
character of the adventurers, who at first took service with the
Company. The Company’s troops on their part were under the influence
of the feeling, prevalent in England, that the exercise of sovereign
rights by a company of merchants was derogatory to the dignity of
the Crown. Hence it arose that the Company’s officers were less
deferential to the authority of the Company, than they should have
been, while the Company became more exacting of the respect due to
them, and made it their policy to keep down the army, in numbers, in
rank, and in authority. This feeling of jealousy became intensified
when the services of King’s troops were placed at the disposal of the
Company; and many quarrels detrimental to the public service ensued.
At the time we are treating of, the King’s troops in India were the
mainstay of the Company’s power. The Company was under stringent
engagements to pay them regularly, instead of allowing their pay to
fall into arrears, as was always the case with their own troops. They
were to be commanded as far as possible by King’s officers only, and
the Commander in Chief at each Presidency was appointed by the Crown.
Every King’s officer, whatever the date of his commission, took rank
above all Company’s officers holding similar commissions, and every
field officer of King’s troops, while in India, was given a step of
Brevet rank above his regimental rank. This naturally caused some ill
feeling between the King’s and Company’s officers. The arrangement
had first been made when there was only a single battalion of King’s
troops in India. As the number of King’s troops increased, the extra
rank given to the officers became a very serious grievance to the
Company’s officers, which was further aggravated by the Company’s
policy of maintaining a very small number of field officers, and
of having their regiments commanded by Captains. The instructions
for avoiding disputes with the Company’s officers, that were issued
to Sir John Burgoyne, before sailing from England, had been a
stereotyped formula of orders for all officers sent with troops to
India for more than twenty years past: but such admonitions were of
little use under conditions that made friction inevitable.

The Madras Government was possessed at that time of a perverse
spirit, that led them into all kinds of extravagancies and never
ending quarrels. The Members of the Council fought amongst
themselves; they evaded or disobeyed the orders of the Court of
Directors, and ignored the authority of the Governor General.
Individually, they commanded little respect. Collectively, they
mismanaged everything. They interfered in military matters, that in
a time of war were peculiarly in the province of the chief military
authority; and they frittered away the forces at their disposal in
ill-conceived and badly equipped expeditions that frequently ended
in disaster. Finally, they quarrelled with everybody who was not
immediately under their orders, and wrote long winded complaints to
the Court of Directors and to Bengal, instead of doing their best
under the trying circumstances of the time. The King’s officers on
their side were also difficult to deal with. They asserted their
right to direct how and where the King’s troops should be employed,
and, in other respects, claimed an independence of the Civil
Government incompatible with public interests. In 1780, when the
Commander in Chief, Sir Eyre Coote, had been sent down from Bengal,
after the disaster to Colonel Baillie’s army, he was furnished with
orders for the suspension of the acting Governor, Mr Whitehill,
against whom the gravest charges had been made, and he was specially
invested with powers that to a great extent made him independent
of the Madras Council, including the exclusive direction of the
treasure transmitted for the prosecution of the war. The temporary
grant of such powers was necessary under existing circumstances, but
was none the less resented by the Madras Council; though there was
little active opposition till the assumption of the Governorship by
Lord Macartney in June 1781. The Council complained that more was
not accomplished, Sir Eyre Coote complained that his troops were
sent into the field without supplies; the Council sent an expedition
against the Dutch settlements, without consulting the General, and an
open rupture occurred, in which the Admiral took part, in consequence
of dispatches addressed to both Commanders being opened by the
Resident at Tanjore. At this stage of the quarrel, Sir Eyre Coote’s
health forced him to leave for Bengal. The command devolved on Major
General Stuart, and the quarrel went on worse than ever.

Lord Macartney at once assumed the direction of the campaign, and
made himself ridiculous by forcing Stuart to destroy three of his
own forts, the preservation of which was anxiously desired by Sir
Eyre Coote. Stuart, on his side, claimed the right of exercising the
special powers that had been conferred on Sir Eyre Coote. Stuart’s
position was a peculiar one. While on the King’s half pay list, in
1775, his services were lent to the Company, who conferred on him the
rank of Brigadier General. In October 1781, the Crown gave him the
commission of Major General in India, and, three months later, his
commission was antedated. His position, however, differed from that
of other General Officers, in that he was not borne on the strength
of any regiment, and his status in England was only that of a half
pay Colonel. He had done good service already in the campaign against
Hyder, in which he had lost a leg by a cannon shot.

In December 1782, Stuart withdrew the garrison of Masulipatam for
service elsewhere, without consulting the Government, and at once
both parties entered into a paper war, that absorbed all the energies
that should have been devoted to the war with Tippoo and the French.
Each party bombarded the other with notes and minutes, that continued
to be exchanged after the army had taken the field for Cuddalore,
and the Council wrote to London and Calcutta in the gloomiest terms,
expressing their fears of General Stuart’s designs.[10] In neither
quarter did they elicit any sympathy. In terms of measured sarcasm
Warren Hastings pointed out that their “collected mass of complaint
and invective” was directed in turn against every single British
authority in India except themselves, including the Naval Commander
in Chief, as well as against the Nawab of Arcot and his ministers.

The Madras Government had become contemptible alike in the eyes of
friends and enemies, and it was impossible to work with them. Lost
to all sense of public duty, they formed the project of refusing
to place the troops under command of Sir Eyre Coote on his return
in April. Sir Eyre Coote was, on this occasion, nominated by the
Bengal Government to take the command of all the troops on the Coast,
except the garrison actually required at Madras. Not an unreasonable
arrangement, as Sir Eyre Coote was Commander in Chief in India, and
the Madras Government was dependent for money on Bengal. The Madras
Government sent peremptory orders for Stuart to hasten his march,
in order that the troops might be far distant when Sir E. Coote
arrived, and passed a resolution that he should not have the command.
A letter addressed by the Madras Council to Sir Eyre Coote when he
was dying, drew down upon them a censure from Warren Hastings that
was calculated to penetrate the most pachydermatous self-conceit,
but it had apparently no effect on Lord Macartney and his Council.
Even before Sir Eyre Coote’s death, the feeling of Lord Macartney and
the Council against the King’s officers was shown by a minute of the
Council, at the time of the preparation of the army for the siege
of Cuddalore, wherein an attempt was made to deprive the Generals
bearing the King’s commission of any employment in the field. In it,
an endeavour was made to elicit from Major General Stuart an opinion
that the public interests would be best served by leaving those
officers, five in number, in garrison. This idea was resisted by
Stuart, and Major General Bruce was sent with the army to Cuddalore.
The frigate that conveyed the news of the cessation of hostilities
with France, to the army before Cuddalore, brought also peremptory
orders to Stuart to embark at once for Madras, to answer charges of
misconduct. Bruce was forced by ill health to return a few days later.

The command of the force in the field then devolved temporarily on
Colonel Gordon, till Sir John Burgoyne took command of the returning
army on 13th August. But Sir John Burgoyne had likewise come under
the displeasure of the Select Committee. In the same letter[11] to
the Court of Directors in which they announced the supersession of
Stuart, and their intention to give the command to Burgoyne, they
wrote--

“Sir John Burgoyne expecting a Preference to be given to his men
in point of accommodations and every other respect above all
other Corps of His Majesty’s or the Company’s troops, and making
no allowance for the calamities of the times and the Exigencies
of our situation, has been loud and frequent in his complaints,
and the utmost endeavours on our Part to show attention to
himself as well as to his Regiment have fallen short of the sense
he entertained of the claims of both.”

In another part of the same letter they stated that Burgoyne had
claimed to be a Major General, but they had only his word for it, as
the fact had not been notified to them. Yet, in the Directors’ letter
of 25th January 1782, Burgoyne’s rank as Major General in the East
Indies from 1st June 1781, is precisely stated.

Burgoyne was justifiably angry at the treatment his regiment had
experienced. Nothing had been done by the Madras Government to
have horses in readiness for the regiment on arrival. The quarters
in which the men were first placed were so unhealthy, that by the
middle of July, less than nine months after landing, 78 had died.
His own claims to the rank and allowances of a Major General were
challenged; while, in common with all the senior officers of King’s
troops, he was exasperated by the animus displayed against them by
Lord Macartney and the Council, and the openly avowed intention to
ignore their just claims, in defiance of the intentions of the Crown.
In a letter, dated 3rd September 1783, in which he reports to the
Ministry at home, the fact of his having assumed the command of the
army returning from Cuddalore, he dwells on the grievances of the
King’s General officers, especially “the declaration of the Governor,
who says no King’s officer shall ever Command in Chief here, let
his rank be what it may; and that a junior officer in the Company’s
service should have rank given him superior to what any King’s
officer may have to entitle him to command.” It is evident that the
violent measures shortly afterwards taken by Lord Macartney, were in
pursuance of a long contemplated scheme for getting rid of the King’s
General officers.

From the beginning, Stuart had been quarrelsome and unreasonable in
his dealings with the rest of the Council. The Council complained
loudly of the slowness of his advance on Cuddalore. For this he does
not appear to have been responsible, as the delay was caused by
his having to wait for the squadron and store ships which did not
arrive before Cuddalore till after the army had encamped before the
place. Among other causes of quarrel was the desire of the General
to give effect to the views of the Bengal Government in the affairs
of the Nawab of Arcot; views which were strenuously opposed by the
rest of the Council. Soon after the return of the army to Madras
the Council passed a resolution dismissing Stuart from the service,
and conferring the Commander in Chiefship on Burgoyne. On the 17th
September this was announced to Burgoyne, who was addressed as
Commander in Chief, and requested to attend the Council immediately.
In a General order of the same date, the Council, anticipating
objections, justified their action by arguing that Stuart held only a
half pay commission from the King, and that the Company could do as
they pleased with him as he held no position under the Crown in India.

As Burgoyne entered the Fort a salute was fired from the ramparts,
but he at once informed the Council that, while they could dispose
of the command of the Company’s forces as they pleased, he had no
power to supersede Stuart who held the King’s commission of Major
General, and the command of the King’s troops _de jure_, and, so
long as he was able to act, could only be deprived of his command by
the King’s order. On this he was told that, if he did not accept the
command, it was intended to make Lieutenant Colonel Lang a Company’s
officer, a Lieutenant General, and appoint him Commander-in-Chief.
Burgoyne continued firm in his resolve, but was detained till 8 in
the evening on various pretexts. Meanwhile, without his knowledge,
arrangements were made for Stuart’s arrest, and a letter was sent to
Lieutenant Colonel Lang appointing him Commander-in-Chief of the army
with the rank of Lieutenant General. The order issued a few hours
previously, appointing Burgoyne Commander-in-Chief, was ignored as if
it had never existed. Burgoyne was then told that he might retire.
On leaving the Council room, he found the gates closed and the
drawbridges drawn up, and learned that Stuart had been arrested by a
company of sepoys, in his own house, and brought, a close prisoner,
into the Fort, under circumstances of much indignity. The excuse
afterwards assigned by the Select Committee for this extraordinary
proceeding was, that they believed Stuart was about to seize the
Government by force.

On the following day Burgoyne wrote to the Select Committee,
expressing his intention of taking command of the King’s troops,
since Stuart was incapacitated from acting. He received no reply,
and, on arrival at the camp he found two orders, one constituting
Lang a Lieutenant General, and the other directing Lang to take
command of the whole army; thus superseding Burgoyne and four other
Major Generals and several Lieutenant Colonels, who had been senior
to Lang.

Burgoyne at once assembled the King’s Officers in his tent, and
related to them what had passed. For his own part, he said, he
should consider himself wanting in his duty, to pay obedience to
any other than a senior officer of the King’s appointment: that
General Stuart being deprived of the possibility of acting, the
command of the King’s troops devolved on himself. He did not
attempt to bias the opinions of any of the gentlemen present: he
recommended the avoidance of altercation or even discussion with the
Company’s officers, lest unforeseen consequences might ensue. The
officers present said they would obey no orders but those of the
Commander-in-Chief representing the King, viz.: Sir John Burgoyne.

The same afternoon Lang arrived in camp, and met the King’s officers
in Burgoyne’s tent, where he delivered an order from the Council
instructing Burgoyne to surrender the command of the Army to him.
Burgoyne replied that he would give over the command of the Company’s
troops to whomsoever the Council chose to appoint, but that his duty
to the King required that he should not deliver over the command
of the King’s troops to any person not regularly authorized by His
Majesty: he placed his tents at Colonel Lang’s service. Lang replied
that he had a house at the Mount, and remained silent some time,
till, on the officers calling out that they would obey Sir John
Burgoyne only, he got up and went away. On the same day a letter
was addressed to the Admiral by Sir John, asking for advice and
support, and requesting an asylum on board the flag ship, in the
event of any attempt being made on his person. The Admiral was so
situated that he might have discreetly acted as mediator between
the contending parties had he been so disposed; but, perhaps, his
previous experiences of the Madras Council made him unwilling to be
mixed up in the quarrel. Anyhow, he refused to have anything to do
with the matter.

Very little was needed to produce a conflict between the King’s and
Company’s troops that night. The King’s troops had been exasperated
at the animosity displayed by the Council towards Sir Eyre Coote and
the King’s officers in general. They were alarmed at the violence
offered to General Stuart, and were resolved to repel by force any
repetition of this violence in Burgoyne’s case. In order to prevent
surprise, guards were posted round the Camp. The Council, on their
part, had been haunted all along by the idea that the King’s Officers
aimed at subverting the Government. Two battalions of Bengal Sepoys
with some guns were ordered down to protect Lang’s house, and the
gates of the Fort were kept shut. Each party expected to be attacked,
and, for the next forty-eight hours, a very slight occurrence might
have precipitated a disastrous conflict.

The following day, Burgoyne summoned Major Generals Bruce, Campbell,
Ogle, and Adams to confer with him, and a remonstrance, signed by
the five, was drawn up and forwarded to the Council; to the effect
that they were determined not to act under Lang’s orders. Lang had
meanwhile issued orders for the Army to march on the following day,
in order to test their obedience. Lieut. Colonel Floyd was also
senior to Lang by the date of his commission. Several regiments gave
assurances of support to Burgoyne and Floyd. At a conference of the
senior officers a course of action was determined on, and Burgoyne
withdrew from the camp, at midnight, to his house in Madras. The
vedettes round the camp were at once withdrawn. The next morning,
Floyd likewise withdrew from the army; handing over his command to
Lt. Colonel Mackenzie of the 73rd, who was junior to Lang by date of
commission. The force marched, and took up fresh ground in rear of
their former position.

On reaching Madras, Burgoyne addressed a letter to the Select
Committee notifying his withdrawal from the camp, and offering
himself for arrest if Government had a mind to seize his person. The
offer was somewhat embarrassing to the Select Committee, who evaded
the point by saying that, as Burgoyne had refused to take command of
the Army, Lang had been appointed in his place, and there was nothing
more to be said in the matter. On this, Burgoyne deputed Floyd to
carry a letter to Lord Macartney, in which he asserted his position
as senior officer bearing the King’s commission, and pointed out that
he alone had power to convene Courts Martial.[12]

Lord Macartney was a man of violent temper and overbearing
disposition that kept him in continual hot water. He demanded
unhesitating submission to his views from all with whom he came in
contact. His relations with the supreme government at Calcutta were
as unyielding as with those in immediate contact with him at Madras.
His chief merit was his personal honesty in money matters, at a time
of great laxity; a merit on which he was by no means silent, and
which he did not insist on in his colleagues. He threw himself with
ardour into the chronic quarrels carried on by the Madras Council
with the Bengal Government and the military authorities, and, in
pursuit of the quarrels, lost sight of the great interests at stake,
and brought the Madras settlement to the verge of anarchy. Even
before Sir Eyre Coote’s death he had been induced to believe that
General Stuart had designs against the Government. This belief, for
which not a scrap of evidence was ever brought forward, led him into
a line of conduct that brought about corresponding and increasing
opposition from Stuart. After Stuart’s arrest, the same suspicion
was transferred to Burgoyne, with even less presumption of justice
than had existed in Stuart’s case. Burgoyne proposed an interview
in the presence of witnesses. Had Lord Macartney been less bent on
the quarrel, he would have grasped the opportunity of coming to
some understanding. Instead of this he used the most uncompromising
language to Floyd. “Government would not recede; Government must
be peremptory;” and he still affected to treat Burgoyne as having
refused the command of the army. The following day, Burgoyne received
a letter from the Select Committee arguing the old point of General
Stuart’s commission, and asserting that Burgoyne had acknowledged the
validity of Lang’s promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, in
spite of which he had withdrawn from camp without Lang’s permission.
The Committee would not contest with him about any authority he
might undertake to exercise, unless it endangered the public safety,
but would not countenance his resumption of command. Lang’s command
extended to the King’s as well as the Company’s troops, and they (the
Committee) would convey dispatches addressed to either Commander
in Chief, to Lang. If Sir John Burgoyne thought proper to act as
Commander in Chief, and to convene Courts Martial, the Committee
had no objection “unless their duty forced them to interfere.” Such
unworkable arrangements were bound to lead to further quarrels.
On the same day, as previously proposed by him, Sir John Burgoyne
had an interview with Lord Macartney, Major General Bruce and Lt.
Colonel Floyd being present. Throughout the quarrel, Burgoyne had
been actuated by a desire to arrive at some working arrangement that
would enable the public service to be carried on, while preserving
the rights of the King whose senior representative he was. In this
spirit he sought an interview with the Governor. But there was no
corresponding desire for peace on the side of the Governor and
Council, and Lord Macartney’s behaviour was disingenuous. Burgoyne
asked for explanations to some parts of the Select Committee’s
letter, which he discussed generally. Lord Macartney would give no
direct answer, and was very guarded in what he said. He was only a
Member of the Government, not authorized to decide, but only to speak
their sentiments, and to represent matters to the other Members.
Would Sir John put down in writing what questions he pleased, he
would engage to lay them before the Select Committee, and obtain
replies to them. Lord Macartney’s intention was to obtain the same
control over the King’s troops, as he exercised over the Company’s
troops. To gain this end he was resolved to give the command to a
Company’s officer, who would naturally be more pliable than a King’s
officer, though it was a recognised principle with the British
Government to keep the command of the King’s troops under an officer
of their own appointment. It is almost incredible that this miserable
quarrel should have gone on at a time of the greatest public
distress, when Tippoo was triumphant in the field, and it was still
uncertain that the Mahrattas would not take up arms again.

Stuart was, shortly afterwards, shipped off to England under close
arrest, in a ship specially purchased for the purpose, though, for
want of funds, the pay of the troops was in some instances over two
years in arrears. During imprisonment, he was denied the use of pen
and ink, and was only allowed to see Burgoyne on public business
in presence of the officer on duty over him. At the time of his
embarkation, he believed that it was intended to put him to death at
sea.

Burgoyne assumed the command of the King’s troops without further
direct opposition, but the Council lost no opportunity of thwarting
him and lowering his authority, while they encouraged others to
resist it. Burgoyne, on his part, cast moderation aside, and was
bent on pushing his claims to extremity. He ignored General Lang,
and issued orders that clashed with those of the civil government,
producing confusion, perplexity, and relaxation of discipline in
every rank. The Major Generals, who had joined in signing the
protest against Lang’s promotion, and several others among the
officers commanding regiments withdrew their support from Burgoyne.
In October, Burgoyne placed Lieutenant Colonel Sterling of the
36th under arrest for disobedience of orders: the Select Committee
released him. The soldiers too had their grievances about batta which
should have been paid to them, but was withheld by Lord Macartney.
The men of the 98th were on the eve of mutiny, and the men of
Burgoyne’s own regiment formed the project of going to the Fort in a
body to ask redress. Burgoyne sternly repressed both movements, but
the Select Committee gave him credit for causing them. A fresh crisis
in the quarrel was inevitable.

In December, General Ogle reported certain matters seriously
affecting the private character of an officer of the 73rd. The rest
of the officers of the regiment refused to allow the matter to be
patched up, as General Ogle desired. Burgoyne had no option but to
convene a General Court Martial, which he did, appointing Lieutenant
Colonel Straubenzee of the 52nd as President. The Court was also
to try two soldiers of the 98th, who had appealed from a Regimental
Court Martial. On such occasions it was customary for the Council to
appoint the Judge Advocate. They refused to nominate one for this or
any Court Martial Sir John might order to assemble, and refused to
grant a place in the Fort for the Court to assemble in. They also
forbade Straubenzee to leave Poonamallee where he was commanding.
Burgoyne then arranged for the Court to assemble at Poonamallee,
but without making the change known, and ordered Straubenzee still
to hold himself in readiness to preside. He also ordered Colonel
Sterling to appear for trial before the Court. The Select Committee
thereupon, on the 31st December, issued an order placing Burgoyne
under arrest for disobedience of orders in September, and for
exciting mutiny and sedition, and appointed Major General Alan
Campbell to command the King’s troops. No attempt was made on this
occasion to place the King’s troops under Lang.

The absurdity of the Select Committee’s action, both in Stuart’s
and Burgoyne’s cases, was shown by their inability to form a Court
Martial for the trial of those officers. They tried to get Burgoyne
to proceed to England, but he refused to go. He proceeded, for a
time, to Pondicherry under open arrest, while the dual commands of
the King’s and Company’s forces continued. For the next eighteen
months Lord Macartney’s quarrels and intrigues, added to his unjust
measures touching the pay and allowances of the army, produced
results that bid fair to end in the ruin of the British government on
the Coast.

In April 1784, a mutiny occurred among four newly formed Native
Cavalry Regiments at Arnee. Arrears of pay for twelve months were
owing to them, and they likewise had unsatisfied claims on the Nawab
of Arcot, from whose service they had been transferred. They seized
the fort of Arnee, and imprisoned their officers. A month’s pay
was given them, but they held out for the whole arrears. The 36th
Foot and one hundred men of the 23rd Light Dragoons were dispatched
to Arcot, to join General Lang. On the night of the 15th May they
marched for Arnee, which they reached soon after daybreak, and after
a brief parley the mutineers laid down their arms.[13] In October,
one of the King’s infantry regiments at Arcot broke out into open
mutiny, but were overawed by the men of the 23rd, and the two other
regiments in garrison, who stuck to their officers. These were by no
means the only instances of grave insubordination both among King’s
or Company’s troops, due to Lord Macartney’s ill-advised measures.
The officers had to complain of broken faith as well as the men.

Sir John Burgoyne’s arrest did not prevent him from looking after
the welfare of the regiment. There had been many casualties among
the horses,[14] as well as among the men; and Lord Macartney is said
to have conceived the idea of gradually allowing the 23rd Light
Dragoons to disappear from want of horses and men, and of raising
a corps of European cavalry in their place. As the men died, the
extra horses were taken from the regiment, and Lt. Colonel Floyd
was forbidden to entertain recruits, of whom a certain number were
procurable, probably from Infantry regiments on the spot. Sir John
thereupon addressed the Bengal Government, by whom a reference was
made to Madras recommending the deficiencies to be made good. The
Madras Government thought the regiment was very well as it was, and
demurred to corresponding with Sir John while he was under arrest.
The Bengal Govt. pointed out that that need not prevent them from
corresponding with the next officer in the regiment. They dwelt on
the importance of maintaining the regiment in an efficient state, and
expressed their sense of the value of the services rendered by the
Regiment in dealing with the Mutiny of the Native Cavalry at Arnee,
and their “desire of giving the Company’s service the full benefit
of the good discipline of H.M.’s 23rd Light Dragoons.” The Madras
Government replied that they would be glad if the Bengal Govt. would
take over the whole of the charges of the regiment. For their part,
they thought it useless to recruit for the regiment, when there were
already more men than horses, and it would be better to transfer
the superfluous men to the Infantry, as horses were expensive, and
a diminution in their number was a useful economy. Warren Hastings
brushed all such cobwebs aside, and sent 147 horses from Hyderabad
to remount the regiment. In spite of their protests, the Madras
Government entered into a correspondence with Sir John which was
characterized on both sides by much bitterness. A detachment of the
regiment was at this time at Ellore in the Masulipatum district.

There seems to have been some expectation at this time that the
regiment would be recalled to England, probably on account of Lord
Macartney’s recommendations to the Court of Directors. Anyhow, a
Madras letter, dated 26th May 1785, published in the _Calcutta Public
Advertiser_, says: “The 23rd Regiment is to remain in India. The
appointments and recommendations of Sir John Burgoyne, are approved
of.” In the middle of July, a detachment of the regiment was sent to
Arcot, but was almost immediately recalled to San Thomé.

Meanwhile, Sir John Burgoyne’s troubles were coming to an end. On
the news of the quarrels, resulting in Burgoyne’s arrest, reaching
England, much interest was excited in the highest quarters. The
matter was twice discussed in the House of Commons, on the 19th July
and 9th August, and it was generally recognised that the trouble had
primarily arisen from a faulty system. Burgoyne was held to have
been correct in his behaviour, and received reassuring letters,
written by the King’s commands, pending the official settlement of
the question. It was determined to appoint at once a new Commander in
Chief of Madras, besides filling the vacancy caused by the death of
Sir Eyre Coote, and to remove the chief actors in the quarrel on both
sides. Burgoyne continued under arrest till the nearly simultaneous
arrival in Madras, at the beginning of June, of Lieut. General Robert
Sloper as Commander in Chief in India, and Lieut. General Sir John
Dalling as Commander in Chief in Madras. General Sloper brought with
him instructions to convene a Court Martial for Burgoyne’s trial,
and for Burgoyne’s return to England after the trial, whatever its
result might be. Lord Macartney, at the same time, received orders
for the surrender of the assignment to the Nawab of Arcot, and
private intelligence of the appointment of his successor. He had
been severely wounded, a few months before, in a duel with one of
the Council, due to his own overbearing temper, and his health was
bad. Believing that he was about to be recalled, he resigned his
post, and sailed for Calcutta to confer with the Bengal Government
before sailing for Europe. While in Calcutta, he received news of
his appointment to succeed Warren Hastings; but his health would not
permit him to stop in India, and he sailed for England.[15]

General Sloper appointed a Court Martial on Burgoyne, with Sir
John Dalling as President. The Madras Council at once claimed the
right to appoint the Prosecutor, which being disallowed, they wrote
complaints in their usual style to the Court of Directors. Another
grievance with the Council was, that they were not given a copy of
the Proceedings. Their desire apparently was to prosecute the quarrel
through Lord Macartney in England. The wish of the Government in
England, and of the Court of Directors, was to bury the unseemly
quarrel as speedily as possible, and the Proceedings were withheld.
A year and a half later, the Madras Government were still writing to
the Governor General for a copy. The exact charges, of which there
were nineteen, cannot now be ascertained, but they partially related
to Sir John Burgoyne’s behaviour in September 1783, more than three
months before the date of his arrest, and charged him with causing
and exciting mutiny and sedition, and refusing to take command of the
King’s troops. On the 11th July, after sitting for nineteen days, the
Court came to the following resolutions--

[Sidenote: 1st.]

That Major General Sir John Burgoyne did not refuse to take upon
him the command of the King’s troops after Major General Stuart
was put under an arrest; but that he declined superseding that
Major General, so long as he viewed him especially appointed by
the King, and he remained in the capacity of acting as such.

[Sidenote: 2nd.]

That the line of conduct pursued by Major General Sir John
Burgoyne on the 19th September and quitting camp the eve of that
day, was productive of the happiest consequences.

[Sidenote: 3rd.]

That in no instance whatsoever did Major General Sir John
Burgoyne disobey any orders immediately proceeding from the
Government.

[Sidenote: 4th.]

That the equivocal situation of Lieut. General Lang, from his
standing in both services,[16] and this Government having
at present no charter rights to confer such high ranks, well
warranted his Majesty’s general officers in witholding from him
their obedience.

[Sidenote: 5th.]

That the orders sent to Lieut. Colonel Sterling by Major
General Sir John Burgoyne, seem to be solely for promoting good
discipline in his Majesty’s troops, and to respect only their
internal economy, which, as the King’s Commander in Chief, he had
not only a right to give, but enforce also.

[Sidenote: 6th.]

That in the instance for which Major General Sir John Burgoyne
was originally put in arrest, it appears the government acted
from half information, not having before them the postscript to
the General Orders of Major General Sir John Burgoyne.

[Sidenote: 7th.]

That the letters before the Court from Major General Sir John
Burgoyne to Lord Macartney or the Presidency, so far from being
mutinous or seditious, are not even disrespectful. The facts
which they assert are strong; but in the manner and expression
they are as decent and proper as the circumstances which gave
them birth could reasonably admit.

SENTENCE.

The Court having thus maturely considered of the evidence and
records in support of the prosecution, and likewise the defence
and those in support of it, is of opinion that the Prisoner Major
General Sir John Burgoyne Bart. is not guilty of the charges
alledged against him; and doth therefore most fully and honorably
acquit him of all and every part of the same.[17]

(Signed)

JOHN DALLING,

Lieut. General & President.

Immediately on the close of the proceedings, the Council addressed
Burgoyne in peremptory and discourteous terms, desiring him to
leave the country; and there appeared every chance of a fresh
quarrel arising, when some influence (probably Sir John Dalling’s)
intervened, and thenceforward there was peace. Burgoyne’s claims
for arrears of pay and allowances, for himself as Commander in
Chief, his Aide-de-camp, and his secretary, for the period he had
been under arrest, were admitted; his passage money was advanced to
him, and he was preparing to sail, when death overtook him on the
23rd of September at the age of forty-six. A tablet to his memory
was placed in St. Mary’s Church in the Fort, by the officers of the
King’s troops. Lang was withdrawn from the service by the Court
of Directors who granted him a special pension of one thousand a
year. Stuart, a few years later, was given the Colonelcy of H.M.’s
31st. In consequence of these disputes, the offices of Governor and
Commander-in-Chief were, soon after, vested in the same person, in
each of the Presidencies. In order to prevent a recurrence of the
dispute in General Sloper’s case, it was ordered, at the time of his
appointment, that in the event of the Company ceasing to employ him,
his right to command the King’s troops should also cease. A project
for amalgamating the King’s and Company’s forces in India, in order
to put an end to the rivalry between the two services, was seriously
considered two years later, but the only change made was to put an
end to the supersession of the Company’s by the King’s officers.

In studying the details of this unhappy quarrel, the conviction
forces itself upon one that there were persons in the background,
who, for their own purposes, fomented the dispute, and aggravated
the differences between the principal parties, by filling their
minds with suspicions and ideas that were equally groundless and
mischievous. This is plainly stated to have been the case by
an officer of the 73rd Highlanders who published a Narrative of
the war with Hyder. “Had it not been for the cordiality and good
fellowship which universally subsisted betwixt the King’s and
Company’s officers, who had shared the fatigues of war together,
notwithstanding the artful steps that had been taken to sow the seeds
of dissension amongst them, these broils might have terminated in
a manner very fatal to the settlement.”[18] Long afterwards, Lord
Macartney acknowledged his mistake. In December 1797, speaking to Sir
David Baird, he said, “Had I known as much of you military gentlemen,
when I was in India, as I have learned since, we never should have
had any difference.” Sir John Burgoyne’s justification was complete.

CHAPTER III

CHANGE OF NUMBER

1786-1789

One of the first acts of Sir John Dalling, after composing the
quarrels between the Civil Government and the King’s troops in
Madras, was to draw up a scheme for brigading the troops in
Cantonments. The scheme never took shape, beyond the formation of a
large Cantonment, in February 1786, at Wallajabad, near Conjeveram,
about fifty miles from Madras. Among the troops detailed for the new
Cantonment were the 23rd Light Dragoons. Before leaving their
quarters at San Thomé, they were reviewed by the Commander-in-Chief.
Being the only English Cavalry regiment in the country, the review
attracted some attention, and the following account was published in
the _Madras Courier_ for 29th March 1786.

[Illustration:

_Lieut: General Sir John Floyd Bart._

_from a portrait believed to be by A. W. Devis._

_Walker & Boutall ph. sc._]

“The review of the 23rd Dragoons on Saturday last, was far
superior to any expectation that had been formed of it, displayed
the most brilliant military exhibition that has ever been seen
in India, and it is presumed, equal to any that has taken place
at anytime in Europe. It reflects the highest honour on the
Commanding Officer, whose great military knowledge, joined
to indefatigable exertions, has brought the regiment to that
degree of perfection which, while it pleases and astonishes,
teaches the very useful, though long doubted lesson, that men
can be disciplined, and horses trained in this country equally
as well as in Europe. The most particularly striking manœuvre
was a charge at full speed for near three hundred yards in
a perfect line; and that of two squadrons dispersing, and
pursuing, supported by the regiment; these were performed with
the exactness of mechanical precision, and produced the most
beautiful effect; but what is very extraordinary the horses were
all perfectly obedient, and scarcely a single accoutrement of the
riders was discomposed.

“A Correspondent observes, that too much praise cannot be given
to the 23rd dragoons, for the excellent manner in which they
performed their manœuvres, at the review on Saturday last; that
the men were in the highest perfection of discipline; and that
the officers, the finest body belonging to any one corps that
he recollects to have seen, were so perfectly masters of every
manœuvre, and led each motion with so much judgment, that it were
impossible for any troops under them to make a single mistake.”

The 23rd Light Dragoons were not cantoned at Wallajabad, but Floyd
was directed to select a spot within a certain indicated area. He
fixed on Shevtamodoo, about two miles from Conjeveram, and nine miles
from Wallajabad.

“The spot is extremely beautiful, exceeding anything I have met
with in India, except among the hills. My barracks are building
something within the edge of an open grove of immense tamarinds.
The Officers’ barracks are within the grove. A plain extends
about half a mile in front, and something less in breadth along
the north bank of the river Paliar, above the ordinary level of
the country, with a large lake on the other side of the ground
towards its extremity, with a small woody island in it skirting
the whole plain. The plain is sprinkled by nature’s masterly hand
with enormous banyan trees, far exceeding the size of the very
largest trees known in Europe. My own barracks will stand at some
distance, nearly in the middle of the plain, under the largest of
these extraordinary trees.”[19]

It was here that Floyd laid the foundation of that excellence in
discipline and efficiency, that fitted the regiment to play the
distinguished part it was destined in after years to fill, with such
success, in the stirring affairs of southern India. This will be a
suitable place to give some account of this distinguished soldier.

John Floyd, born in 1748, was the son of an officer in the 1st
Dragoon Guards who served at Minden, and died in Germany six weeks
after the battle. In recognition of his father’s services, John Floyd
was given a commission in the 15th (Elliott’s) Light Dragoons, in
the year after the regiment was raised, and was present with it at
the battle of Emsdorf, on the 16th July 1760, when only twelve years
old. There he had his horse shot under him, while charging the French
ranks, and was only saved by a brother officer who cut down his
assailant. The sword of the French hussar is still preserved in the
family.

The 15th Light Dragoons under Sir John Elliott and Lord Pembroke were
regarded at that time as the school for British Light Cavalry. Lord
Pembroke had made a special study of military equitation, concerning
which he had written a book,[20] that went through several editions,
and was a recognized text book on military riding. He interested
himself in Floyd, and took pains to give him a complete education,
and made him a proficient horseman. Later, on Lord Pembroke obtaining
the command of the Royal Dragoons, he employed Floyd for twelve
months in teaching his system to that regiment. In 1777-78-79, Floyd,
under Lord Pembroke’s auspices, visited nearly every Court in Europe,
and reported on their armies. In December 1778, he was appointed
Major of the 21st Light Dragoons, and, on the formation of the 23rd
Light Dragoons for Indian service, he was selected to be its Lt.
Colonel. No better choice could have been made. A thorough soldier,
and a horseman from his youth up, brought up in the school of two
such cavalry soldiers as Sir John Elliott and Lord Pembroke, he was
an enthusiastic believer in the power of cavalry. Writing from San
Thomé in 1784, he says:

“You may depend upon it, the first military miracle that is to be
performed in India, will be wrought by cavalry. No one here has
an idea of that arm; a small body of well disciplined Europeans
on horseback, judiciously led, will defeat and destroy myriads of
Indian enemies. If I am of the party, it may perhaps afford me an
opportunity of deserving your applause.”

All soldiers know how an able commander can impress his character on
a regiment, to endure long after his connexion with it has ceased.
Such was the case with the regiment that gathered laurels as the 19th
Light Dragoons, and no small part of its glory was due to its first
Lieutenant Colonel, John Floyd. The correctness of his views as to
the great part cavalry might play, and the excellence of his system,
were demonstrated on many a field in which the regiment fought during
its career in India.

It has already been shown[21] how, in June 1783, the 19th Light
Dragoons and all Cavalry regiments above that number, on the
establishment in England, were disbanded. For three years, the fate
of the 23rd seems to have hung in the balance. At last, on 26th
April 1786, an order was issued to the effect that henceforward
the regiment was to be numbered the 19th, instead of the 23rd, a
designation under which it was destined to win itself fame and
honour.[22]

Before this, a change was made in the uniform of all the Light
Dragoon regiments in the service. Hitherto, all mounted regiments had
worn scarlet. In 1784, it was determined to distinguish the Light
Dragoons, by dressing them in blue, and the following order gives the
whole dress in detail.

_Regulations for the Clothing of the Light Dragoons, April 1784._

[Sidenote: 1784. April.]

The Clothing of a private Light Dragoon to consist of a Jacket
and Shell under waistcoat and leather Breeches.

The Jacket and Shell to be of blue cloth, the Collars and Cuffs
of the Royall Regiments to be Red;--and those of the other
Regiments to be of the colour of the facing of the Regiment,
looped upon the breast, and edged with white _thread_ Cord, and
to be lined with white, the 11th and 13th Regiments excepted,
which are to be lined with Buff.

The under waistcoat to be of flannel with Sleeves, and made so as
to be buttoned within the waistband of the Breeches.

The Breeches to be of Buckskin.

_N.B._--The make of the Dress and method of placing the Cord
upon the Breast of the Jacket, to be exactly conformable to the
pattern approved of by His Majesty.

OFFICERS AND QUARTER MASTERS.

The Dress Uniform of the Officers and Quarter Masters of the
Light Dragoons to be made according to the King’s regulation of
the 19th December 1768, excepting that the Coats are to be Blue
and faced with the same colour as the private Men, and that the
Royall Regiments are to be faced with scarlet.

FIELD UNIFORM OF THE OFFICERS AND QUARTER MASTERS.

The Jacket and shell to be made up in the same manner as those of
the Men, excepting that the Shell is to have Sleeves, and that
the Looping is to be of Silver, the 13th Regiment excepted which
is to be of gold.

SERJEANTS.

The Serjeants of the Light Dragoons to be distinguished by Gold
or silver looping.

CORPORALS.

The Corporals of the Light Dragoons to be distinguished by a Gold
or Silver Cord round the Collar and Cuff.

TRUMPETERS.

The Trumpeters to have a Jacket and Shell the Colour of the
facing of the Regiment, with Lace instead of Looping in front and
down the Seams.

_N.B._--A Pattern Suit of Clothing made up according to these
Regulations, will be deposited at the Army-Comptroller’s
Office--Horse Guards.

No record now exists to show what facings were worn by the Regiment
up to this date. Probably, their facings had never been decided on,
owing to their departure from England so soon after embodiment,
as, in December 1786, an order was issued, approving a pattern of
yellow cloth for their facings. The blue jacket with primrose yellow
facings and white or silver braid, continued to be the uniform of
the regiment till December 1802, when an order came into force for
Dragoon regiments, serving in India, to wear grey instead of blue.
In February 1786 an order was issued directing the Colonels of Light
Dragoon regiments to supply their men with blue cloaks instead of red.

The vacancy caused by the death of Sir John Burgoyne was filled by
the appointment of Lieutenant General the Hon. Sir William Howe,[23]
K.B., Colonel of the 23rd Foot, to be Colonel. He was an officer who
had seen much active service, principally in America, where he had
gained the reputation of a brave rather than of a skilful soldier.
As a young man he took part in the conquest of Quebec by Wolfe, and
led the forlorn hope of twenty-four men that forced the entrenched
path by which Wolfe’s force scaled the heights of Abraham. He served
at the siege of Belleisle (1761), where he was wounded. He commanded
the British troops at the pyrrhic victory of Bunker’s Hill; and
gained victories over the revolted colonists at Long Island and at
Brandywine.

We get a glimpse of the regiment on 15th December 1788, when they
were inspected by the Governor and Commander in Chief, Sir Archibald
Campbell, who, in a minute to the rest of the Government, recorded
that “H.M.’s 19th Regiment of Light Dragoons were complete in
horses and accoutrements, and their discipline equal to any Corps
in Europe.” In a general order he said “The rapid and accurate
manner with which the several evolutions were performed, and the
extraordinary velocity of their charge, than which nothing could
be more regular and correct, does infinite honour to Colonel Floyd
and the officers under his command, by whose unremitting zeal and
attention the discipline of the corps has been carried to so high a
state of perfection.”

The regimental muster rolls for 1788 and 1789 show that the strength
of the 19th, in those years, varied from 300 to 350 men present at
Shevtamodoo. The strength in horses seems to have exceeded that in
men, but the wear and tear in horseflesh was apparently very great,
and remounts in considerable numbers were constantly required.

It was during these years spent by the regiment at Shevtamodoo, that
the Madras Government dealt in earnest with the question of forming a
service of Native Cavalry. To assist them in this work they selected
Floyd, who was given a free hand in all that concerned the discipline
and equipment of the Native regiments. The system founded by him may
be said to have lasted nearly up to the present time.

From this time up to the date of their departure from India, the 19th
Light Dragoons never ceased to furnish non-commissioned officers and
privates as instructors to the Native Cavalry, not only in Madras,
but also in Bengal. In every muster roll they are shown on duty, at
Madras, Vellore, Hyderabad, Seringapatam, Poonamallee, and other
military stations in the Madras Presidency. In Bengal there were
always from four to sixteen sergeants, corporals, and privates on
this duty, as long as the regiment was in India, and, for a time,
some were on similar duty in Bombay and Poona. A General Order,
dated Fort William 3rd December 1795, sanctions the sergeants of the
19th Light Dragoons “now on service in this presidency instructing
the native cavalry, to receive the pay and allowances of Sergeant
Majors of Cavalry.” In 1798 a General Order was issued, directing
“the brass chapes and sockets to be made up according to the pattern
furnished by Major General Floyd.” And in December 1805, a few months
before the regiment left India, each native cavalry regiment in the
Presidency was ordered to send a detachment to Arcot, for instruction
in one uniform system by Lieutenant Neville, 19th Light Dragoons.
The system observed in the Company’s native cavalry up till 1857,
may be said to have been founded by Colonel Floyd and the 19th Light
Dragoons.

CHAPTER IV

WAR WITH TIPPOO

1790

War with Tippoo--19th take the field--Advance on
Coimbatore--Division under Floyd detached towards Guzzulhutti
Pass--Frequent skirmishes--Satyamunglum--Dispersion of the
Army--Advance of Tippoo--19th hotly engaged--Tippoo’s Body-Guard
destroyed--Retreat from Satyamunglum--Casualties--March in
pursuit of Tippoo--Private Parkes--The Tapoor Pass--Tippoo eludes
pursuit, and ravages the Carnatic--Army returns to Madras.

In 1790, the Government of India again became involved in war with
Tippoo. He had been constrained to sign the peace of Mangalore by the
withdrawal of the French alliance, and the coalition of the British
and Mahrattas against him. But the war had been a triumph for Mysore
arms. South of the Kistna river, Mysore was the most powerful state
in India, and no single power could hold its own against the son of
Hyder Ali. But Tippoo failed to realize the increase of power of the
English Company, due to five years of peace. In 1785, a quarrel broke
out between him and the Mahrattas, who allied themselves with the
Nizam, and invaded Mysore territory. The campaign that ensued was
in Tippoo’s favour, and peace was concluded between the contending
parties in April 1787. Tippoo’s warlike restlessness continued to be
a menace to the other powers in India. In the end of 1787, overtures
for an alliance against him, were made to Calcutta by the Mahrattas.
To this, Lord Cornwallis, who had assumed the direction of affairs
as Governor General and Commander in Chief in September 1786, gave
a refusal. But nothing could keep Tippoo quiet. In 1788 he sent
an embassy to France, to propose an alliance against the English,
and, in December 1789, he attacked the Rajah of Travancore whom we
were bound by treaty to protect. Preparations were at once made to
punish the aggression, and orders were transmitted to Madras for the
commencement of operations against Mysore.

The time had come for the 19th Light Dragoons to show their worth.
One morning, early in January, came the news that war was imminent,
and that the Regiment was to join the army ordered to assemble at
Trichinopoly. “My men were on horseback, going to water, when the
news arrived, and they received it with three most cordial cheers.
Nothing but good humour and high hope prevail in the Army. My
regiment is ready in all that depends on us, and willing beyond
description.”[24] But great delay ensued, and some weeks elapsed
before a move was made. The Madras Government disobeyed the stringent
orders of Cornwallis, to warn Tippoo that an attack on Travancore
would entail war, and to take all necessary steps for prosecuting
war if the attack was made. There was a complete want of military
preparation. Fortunately, on 19th February, Major General Medows
arrived from England with full powers as Governor and Commander in
Chief in Madras, and preparations for the campaign were made in
earnest. A force was assembled near Wallajabad, and marched for
Trichinopoly on 29th March. The 19th Light Dragoons at this time
mustered 355 sabres. Meanwhile Tippoo took advantage of the delay
to prosecute his conquest over Travancore, which he would have
completed, had not a small force from Bombay, under Colonel Hartley,
landed in Travancore, in the end of April, and taken up a strong
defensive position. On 24th May, General Medows took command of the
army at Trichinopoly, amounting to about 15,000 men. On the same day,
Tippoo turned his back on Travancore, and made his way northwards to
confront his foes.

Mysore, the heart of Tippoo’s Kingdom, is a high plateau from 2000
to 3000 feet above the sea, open towards the north, but fenced in
to the East, South and West by precipitous, cliff-like ranges that
overlook the low country outside, and are only passable for an army
at certain places. Tippoo had also extensive possessions in the low
country, from which he drew large revenues and plentiful military
supplies. According to the plan of operations adopted, Medows was
to advance on Mysore from the southward, and, if possible, enter it
by the Guzulhutti Pass, after making himself master of the rich low
country about Coimbatore, where abundant supplies could be obtained.
As this movement would uncover Madras, a small force was held at
Conjeveram, under Colonel Kelly, which was augmented later by a force
of six battalions of sepoys and some artillery, that were dispatched
overland from Bengal. On the west, a force from Bombay under
Major General Abercromby[25] was destined to act against Tippoo’s
possessions in Malabar, and, if events rendered it desirable, to
effect a junction with Medows. On the occurrence of Tippoo’s attack
on Travancore in December, the Peishwa had renewed his offers of
alliance to Lord Cornwallis. This time they were accepted, and a
triple convention between the Peishwa, the Nizam and the British,
was concluded. By it, the two former engaged to attack Tippoo’s
Northern possessions at once with 25,000 horse, and after the rains,
to act with their utmost means. So dilatory were their movements,
that it was not till the following year that their operations had any
share of importance in the campaign.

[Illustration: Map

to illustrate MYSORE CAMPAIGNS

_Walker & Boutall sc._]

On the 26th May, the army marched from Trichinopoly, but, owing to
badness of transport, it was not till 15th June that Karoor was
occupied. Avaracoorchi and Darapooram were occupied, on the 5th
and 10th July respectively. Tippoo was at this time at Coimbatore,
where it was hoped he would make a stand. The siege guns and stores
were therefore deposited in Darapooram, and the army advanced.
Information was soon received of his having gone northward, and
ascended the defiles on to the Mysore plateau, leaving a force of
Cavalry numbering from 3000 to 5000, under Said Sahib, as a corps
of observation. After recovering the heavy guns, the advance was
continued, watched by Said Sahib who fell back on Coimbatore, with
the intention of burning the town on the near approach of the British
force. To prevent this, Floyd with the cavalry was dispatched to
occupy the town, which was accomplished on 21st July, the main body
arriving the following day, while Said Sahib fell back to Demiacotta
on the Bhowani river. Floyd, with the 19th Light Dragoons, three
regiments of Native Cavalry, two companies of sepoys and four 6
pr. guns, was dispatched in pursuit. About ten o’clock at night on
the 22nd, after a thirty-mile march, he surprised near Demiacotta
a small body of horse, about thirty of whom were made prisoners.
The exaggerated accounts they gave him, led him to believe that the
force with Said Sahib was larger than had been supposed. The Fort of
Demiacotta having taken the alarm, opened fire, and, there being no
forage obtainable, Floyd considered it prudent to fall back a few
miles. On the 28th, he moved forward again, and, on reaching the
banks of the river, discovered that Said Sahib had carried his force
across the river, and was encamped on the other side. The Bhowani
river, at this time, was only fordable at certain places. A few long
shots from the six pounders made Said Sahib decamp, and direct his
march towards the Guzulhutti Pass. Floyd then fell back to Velladi,
and remained in observation of the two roads leading from Coimbatore
to the Bhowani river, moving occasionally to Shawoor and Occarro. On
the 16th of August, Colonel Floyd with a Corporal and six Dragoons,
set out from Shawoor to visit Occarro, where there was a troop of
Native Cavalry on detachment duty. On arrival at Occarro, it was
reported to him that there was a body of the enemy’s horse in the
neighbourhood. Taking twelve men of the troop with his original
escort, he went in search of them, and discovered them close to
the village. He immediately charged them, and put the whole body
to flight. Four days later, Major Affleck[26] of the 19th Light
Dragoons, with two troops of the 19th and an equal number of the
5th Native Cavalry, while patrolling, fell in with a large body of
the enemy’s horsemen whom they instantly attacked, killing upwards
of forty, and capturing twenty horses. Not many days after this, an
equally successful skirmish occurred under the command of Lieut.
Bayly of the 19th Light Dragoons, who, with a troop of the 19th and
two troops of Native Cavalry, put a large body of the enemy’s horse
to rout, and drove them into the river. In a private letter written
four months later, Floyd says: “Among a great number of cavalry
skirmishes I was always successful, and fully established for the
first time in India, the infinite superiority of European over Native
horse.”

While Floyd was thus engaged to the north of Coimbatore, a force
under Colonel Oldham was sent against Erode, which surrendered,
on the 6th August, after a feeble resistance. Another force, under
Colonel Stuart, was sent against Dindigal, which surrendered, after
one unsuccessful assault, on the 23rd August. Several other small
forts in the neighbourhood were also captured. Further reinforcements
were sent to Stuart, who was directed to proceed against Palghat. A
breach was effected, and the place surrendered on 22nd September;
but, before this, events had occurred that completely altered the
aspect of affairs.

On the 26th of August, having been reinforced by three battalions of
sepoys and five guns, Floyd crossed the Bhowani, and made himself
master of the Fort of Satyamunglum, which was taken by surprise
without any loss. A native battalion was placed in the Fort, and all
Said Sahib’s detached horsemen were driven into the Guzulhutti Pass.
The force was then withdrawn to the south bank of the river, the
fords of which were constantly visited by strong patrols. Further
reinforcements reached Floyd, whose force now consisted of the 19th
Light Dragoons and three regiments of Native Cavalry, H.M. 36th, and
four battalions of sepoys, with eleven guns of different calibres.
Exclusive of the artillerymen, the force numbered about two thousand
eight hundred fighting men.

So far, all had gone well in spite of much sickness in the army, and
great difficulties due to the heavy rains. A chain of posts had been
established to the foot of the Guzulhutti Pass, the flanks of the
army were well protected, and Tippoo’s garrisons had been expelled
from every important place in the Coimbatore district. The force
under Medows, at Coimbatore, had been reduced to three native and
two European battalions without their flank companies. Floyd, with
the force already mentioned, was watching the Guzulhutti Pass, some
forty miles to the northward. With Stuart besieging Palghat, some
thirty miles south west of Coimbatore, were one regiment of Native
Cavalry, one European and five Native battalions of Infantry, besides
six European companies belonging to three different Regiments, and
a detachment of Artillery. Besides this, there were detachments
occupying Karoor, Erode, Darapooram, Dindigal, and a few other
small posts. Nothing but the fall of Palghat was wanting to permit
of a concentrated forward movement on the Guzulhutti Pass. To the
eastward, the force that had been left at Conjeveram under Colonel
Kelly had been reinforced by the division from Bengal, and had
moved to Arnee, where Colonel Kelly’s death gave the command to
Colonel Maxwell. It consisted of one regiment of Native Cavalry,
three European and eight Native battalions of Infantry, and some
Artillery, amounting altogether to nine thousand five hundred men.
To the southward on the Travancore border was Colonel Hartley,
with one European and four Native battalions of Infantry, moving
towards Palghat, which he reached after its capture. The whole
force was dangerously scattered, and Tippoo, who had excellent
intelligence of all that occurred, was not slow to take advantage of
the circumstance. So far, the only active measure he had undertaken
had been the dispatch of a small body of marauding horse into the
Carnatic by the Changama Pass. They plundered and burned Porto Novo,
but did little other damage.

Leaving Seringapatam on the 2nd September, with forty thousand men
and a large train of Artillery, Tippoo reached the Guzulhutti Pass
on the 9th, and completed the descent in the two following days.
Floyd was not unaware of the increased force in his front, and of
the reports of Tippoo’s advance, and, in his report to Medows,
suggested the advisability of his falling back towards Coimbatore.
But the intelligence was disbelieved, and he was ordered to maintain
his position. He was at that time encamped on the south side of the
Bhowani opposite to Satyamunglum. On the 12th Floyd dispatched an
express messenger to Medows telling of the increased forces of the
enemy, and that Tippoo was advancing in person. At two o’clock in the
morning of the 13th, Cavalry picquets of the 19th Light Dragoons and
2nd and 5th Native Cavalry, under Captain Child of the 19th, were
ordered to reconnoitre towards the Poongar ford, about ten miles up
the river. A few hours later, the 5th Native Cavalry, under Major
Darley, was ordered to follow in support. By some mischance, Darley
took a different road from that which Child had followed. Tippoo had
however begun to pass his troops over the river the day before, after
the withdrawal of the morning reconnoissance, and Child suddenly
found himself opposed by a considerable body of horse. Charging them
at once, he drove them into the river, whereby many were killed and
drowned: he then fell back by the same road. The country all around
was laid out in small enclosures with cactus hedges, rendering it
very difficult to see any distance. Major Darley, advancing by the
other road, charged and overthrew a body of about two hundred horse,
inflicting great loss, but was, immediately after, nearly surrounded
by some six or seven thousand of the enemy’s Cavalry. Sending back
news to the camp, he took up a position on some high ground where
his flanks were protected by cactus hedges, and kept the enemy at
bay by carbine fire. After some time he was joined by the 3rd Native
Cavalry, and, a little later, Floyd with the 19th Light Dragoons,
and the picquets under Captain Child, attracted by the firing,
came up. On seeing these reinforcements, the enemy drew off, Floyd
followed them up and inflicted heavy losses on them. Two squadrons
of the 19th charged a large body of the Sultan’s Body Guard that had
got entangled in an enclosure from which there was no outlet, and
put upwards of five hundred, it is said, to the sword. The enemy’s
leader was slain by a private dragoon, while his standard bearer
was cut down and the standard taken by a Corporal. The green flag of
Islam was also captured. The field was cleared of every opponent,
and the cavalry returned to camp. Scarcely had they dismounted when
a large force was seen approaching on the north bank of the river,
whence some heavy guns were brought to bear. At the same time, a
second force was perceived approaching the left flank along the
south bank. This necessitated a change of position by our troops,
and the Sultan contented himself with keeping up a heavy cannonade,
without a closer attack. During the whole day, the force remained in
this trying position. Floyd’s eleven guns were not only outnumbered,
but were obliged to husband their ammunition which was limited.
The cannonade ceased at nightfall, and the enemy withdrew to some
distance. Tippoo never liked camping too close to the English, for
fear of a night surprise. Of the English guns, three were disabled,
and there had been serious casualties among the troops, the horses,
and the gun bullocks. Many of the bullock drivers had also deserted.
The night was very dark with heavy rain, the Infantry lay on their
arms, and the Cavalry remained at the heads of their horses. About
midnight, it was determined to fall back upon Coimbatore, through
Shawoor, the force having been driven from the direct line of retreat
through Velladi. It was necessary first to bring the garrison of
Satyamunglum across the river. In doing this, great delay ensued, and
it was four o’clock before the troops could be put in motion. Owing
to the destruction among the gun bullocks, three guns were obliged
to be left behind. Fortunately for the English, the Sultan’s army
had been greatly inconvenienced by the heavy rain during the night,
and it was some hours before Tippoo could collect a sufficient force
to follow the retreat. When he moved, his well-equipped artillery
soon caught up the slow-moving British column, and pressed heavily
on its flanks and rear. The first attack was made by a body of
Cavalry, who fell upon the baggage, the greater part of which was
lost, and the Surgeon’s mate, Sutherland, of the 19th Light Dragoons
killed. The force reached Occarro about eleven o’clock, but after a
short halt was obliged to resume its march, as Tippoo’s army was now
moving on its flank. Owing to the exhaustion of the gun bullocks,
three more guns were obliged to be left behind there. The safety of
the remaining guns was assured by a number of officers sacrificing
their baggage, and giving their private bullocks to draw the guns.
On account of the close nature of the country, the rear guard duty
had to be taken by the Infantry, and the Cavalry was sent forward.
During the whole march, the force was exposed to a continuous fire
of musketry, heavy guns, and rockets, which was especially directed
against H.M.’s 36th. On approaching Shawoor, the enemy pressed so
closely on the column, that the Infantry were obliged to form up
and show a front, while the Cavalry, unable to act among the cactus
hedges, led the column. At this moment, a report was spread that
General Medows had arrived to their assistance, and a detachment
of the 19th Light Dragoons which had passed through Shawoor, and
appeared on the opposite side of the village, was mistaken for the
head of his column. The news was greeted with cheers; and Tippoo was
also deceived by the report which spread through both armies. The
Infantry advanced, and drove back the enemy, whose discomfiture was
completed by the Cavalry, who pursued on both flanks, and completely
cleared the field. The force remained in Shawoor during the night,
without being molested, Tippoo, who at first believed the news of
Medow’s arrival, having drawn off to some distance. Floyd fired
three signal guns to show his position to General Medows, who had
marched on the same day to Floyd’s assistance, but not being aware
of his retreat by the Shawoor route, had marched on Velladi, where
he encamped that evening. Floyd had received intelligence of Medow’s
march on Velladi, and, recognizing the great importance of forming
a junction, marched again before daylight, and reached Velladi on
the evening of the 15th. The enemy did not pursue, and the troops
were enabled to get food and rest, after being three days without
either. Medows however was not at Velladi, having gone on towards
Demiacotta, to which circumstance may be ascribed the peaceful march
of Floyd’s troops on the 15th. The junction between the two forces
was effected on the 16th. The Sultan, on hearing of Medows’ movement
towards Demiacotta, withdrew on the same day to the north side of
the Bhowani. Had he acted with greater energy, and pressed Floyd’s
force on the 15th, he might have won a great success. The troops
were exhausted, and would have yielded to determined attacks on the
third day of their retreat. In such an event, the disaster would
certainly have extended to Medows’ force, which consisted only of
five incomplete battalions, and Stuart’s force at Palghat would also
have been involved in ruin. The respect with which Tippoo treated the
retreating force was largely due to the gallant bearing of the 19th,
and especially to the severe lesson they taught the enemy on the
13th. In addition to the six guns abandoned, the losses of the whole
detachment under Floyd, during the 13th and 14th, were as follows:--

_Europeans_--
Killed 43
Wounded 98
Missing 7

_Natives_--
Killed 128
Wounded 137
Missing 148

_Horses_--
Killed 22
Wounded 8
Missing 28

The Infantry were the principal sufferers. The losses of the 19th
Light Dragoons amounted to

_Killed_--
1 Assistant Surgeon.
5 Troopers.

_Wounded_--
1 Quarter-Master.
8 Troopers.
_Horses_--
5 killed.
3 wounded.

Five officers killed and eight wounded were among the casualties
of the force, and nearly the whole of the baggage was lost. The
losses of the enemy were very heavy, among the slain being Tippoo’s
brother-in-law and many leaders of note. In spite of their tactical
success, the result of the two days’ fighting was to depress the
spirits of Tippoo’s men, while the minds of the British troops were
proportionately elated at their successful retreat, in presence of
such an overwhelming force. Floyd received much credit, and Medows
was generous enough to acknowledge his error, in leaving the force
in such an exposed position. Tippoo ascribed his want of success to
the cactus hedges, and, some years later, ordered them to be levelled
throughout the whole district. The gallant bearing of the 19th Light
Dragoons in this portion of the campaign, made an impression that
spread to every Native Court in southern India, and gained them a
reputation for fighting, that clung to them during the whole of their
service in India.

On the 18th, Medows marched from Velladi, and returned to Coimbatore
on the 23rd, after visiting Shawoor. At Coimbatore, he was joined by
Colonel Stuart from Palghat. On the 29th he left Coimbatore again,
marching northward to the Bhowani. Tippoo meanwhile had gone towards
Erode, which fell into his hands on the 25th. From Erode, Tippoo
marched towards Karoor, hoping to cut off a large convoy destined for
Medows’ army. Medows followed, and received his convoy safely on the
7th October. Tippoo meanwhile marched on Darapooram, which he took on
the 8th, and then marched towards Coimbatore, where Medows had left
stores and heavy guns with but a feeble garrison. Fortunately, under
orders from Medows, Colonel Hartley, on reaching Palghat, had sent
on three sepoy battalions, which reached Coimbatore in time to save
it from attack, and Tippoo turned off northwards when within a few
miles of the place. Medows reached Coimbatore on the 15th, and, after
strengthening the defences, again marched for Erode, which he reached
on the 2nd November. Some slight skirmishing with a small party of
the enemy’s horse occurred on the march, during which Private Parkes
of the 19th Light Dragoons signalised himself, while on flanking
duty, by attacking, single handed, six horsemen whom he encountered
in a narrow road, and bringing in three horses and a prisoner.

Meanwhile, Maxwell’s force had advanced from Arnee, and entered the
Baramahal district near Vaniembadi on the 24th October. This forced
Tippoo to leave the Coimbatore district, and march northward to
intercept Maxwell. So well was the movement covered, that several
days elapsed before Medows discovered where he had gone. But Tippoo,
failing to find Maxwell in a position favourable for attack, withdrew
after threatening him for four days, and was nearly caught between
two fires by Medows’ advancing force. On the 17th, the two armies
formed a junction, 12 miles south of Cauveripatam. Supplies were
abundant, and Medows was now at the head of the finest army the
Company had ever put into the field. But Tippoo’s excellent system
of intelligence, and the greater mobility of his army gave him the
great advantage of choosing his own field of action, so long as he
was not brought to bay in the heart of his own country. He calculated
with justice that, if he moved in the direction of the Carnatic,
Medows would be obliged to follow him, and relinquish his projects
on Mysore. Accordingly, on the 18th, he put his army in motion for
Trichinopoly by the Tapoor Pass. As fortune would have it, Medows
marched on the same day, with the intention of traversing the same
Pass, and reached it after the Sultan’s army had begun to enter
it. The British advance brigade, under Colonel Floyd, consisted
of the 19th Light Dragoons, three regiments of Native Cavalry and
three sepoy battalions. The Sultan’s rear was covered by a body of
two thousand Cavalry, who showed a bold front. Medows became over
cautious, and waited for his artillery. So well were the Mysore
Cavalry handled, that no advantage was gained beyond the cutting off
from the Pass of three battalions which were forced into the jungle.
Tippoo’s baggage also was unable to enter the Pass, but suffered no
loss; the main body got through, and continued its march without
mishap. Thus was let slip an opportunity of striking a severe blow
under most advantageous conditions.

Tippoo continued his march on Trichinopoly, wasting the country as he
proceeded, and hoping to make himself master of the place, which was
not strongly defended, before Medows could reach it. But the swollen
state of the Cauvery river saved the place from attack, and Tippoo
withdrew, in time to avoid Medows, who arrived before Trichinopoly
on the 14th December. Two days before this, Lord Cornwallis arrived
in Madras, with the intention of taking command of the army in the
field; and at once summoned Medows to bring the force to Madras.
Meanwhile, Tippoo turned northwards, and, ravaging the country as
he passed, attacked Tiaghur, a small rock fortress, under the walls
of which a great number of the country people had gathered for
protection. Here also Tippoo was rejoined by his heavy baggage,
which had become separated from him at the Tapoor Pass. After two
assaults, which were repulsed with heavy loss to the assailants,
the Sultan left Tiaghur, and marched on Trinomalli which was not
garrisoned. After a feeble resistance from the inhabitants, the place
was plundered, and great barbarities committed. Turning eastward,
Tippoo took Permacoil, where there was only a single company of
Native Infantry, whose commander had orders to retreat if threatened.
Owing to treachery, Tippoo was able to surround the place before this
could be done. Tippoo then marched towards Pondicherry, where he
remained some time, and dispatched an embassy to France, proposing
an alliance, and asking for a force of 6000 French troops to be
sent him. Medows followed the Mysore force as far as Trinomalli,
whence he turned towards Madras. The siege-guns and heavy stores
were left at Arnee, with a division under Major General Musgrave,
and the remainder of the force reached Vellout, eighteen miles from
Madras, on the 27th January 1791. Before this, a brilliant success
had been gained by Colonel Hartley, who, with three battalions,
completely routed a large Mysore force near Calicut, on the 10th
December, capturing Tippoo’s lieutenant and two thousand four hundred
prisoners, in the action and in the subsequent pursuit. The Bombay
force under General Abercromby, whose movements had been greatly
delayed, was not able to commence operations till the beginning of
December. Then Tippoo’s garrisons in Malabar were quickly captured,
and the whole province occupied.

The Mahrattas and the Nizam had been tardy in their operations.
Both were unwilling to come within Tippoo’s reach, until they could
be certain of his being fully occupied with the English forces. On
the 25th August, the Mahrattas commenced operations, and, on 18th
September, laid siege to Dharwar. The attack was so badly conducted,
that the place did not capitulate till 4th April following, when the
Mahratta force, under Pareshram Bhow and Hari Punt, moved on toward
Seringapatam. The Nizam moved in concert with the Mahrattas, but
delayed greatly, after crossing the Kistna, before attacking Kopaul,
the siege of which was begun on the 28th October. The fortress
capitulated on the 18th April following.

According to a muster roll taken at Clive’s Choultry on 24th
December, the 19th Light Dragoons had fifty men in hospital, out of a
total of 270 non-commissioned officers and troopers present. Fourteen
deaths occurred in the preceding six months. During the same period,
50 horses had died, and 14 had been rendered unfit for further
service, out of a total effective strength of 386.

CHAPTER V

CORNWALLIS’ CAMPAIGNS

1791-1792

Cornwallis takes command of the Army--Advance on Bangalore--Order
of March--Floyd’s reconnoissance--Imprudent advance--Floyd
badly wounded--Casualties--Capture of Bangalore--Advance on
Seringapatam--Battle of Arikera--Army in great straits--Forced
to retreat--Junction of Mahratta contingent--19th sent to
Madras--Rejoin Cornwallis--Advance on Seringapatam--Night
attack--Floyd detached to meet Abercromby--Seringapatam
invested--Peace made--Tippoo’s hostages--19th return to
Shevtamodoo.

Cornwallis assumed command of the army, at Vellout, on the 29th
January 1791. By taking the field in person, he ensured the fullest
co-operation of the civil and military administration, while it was
hoped that his presence at the head of the troops, would induce the
Nizam and the Mahrattas to prosecute the war with more vigour than
they had yet shown. Instead of attacking Mysore from the south, as
had been done in the preceding year, Cornwallis proposed to operate
on a more direct line. The considerations that had led to the
rejection of this line in 1790, were, that Seringapatam could not
be approached without first taking Bangalore, a place only second
to Seringapatam in strength. The siege of Bangalore would have to
be carried on at a distance of ninety miles from the nearest depôt,
Amboor; and the country between Seringapatam and Bangalore was
unfertile, and not likely to furnish much in the way of supplies.

The army left Vellout on the 5th February. Tippoo, who had remained
in the neighbourhood of Pondicherry, on hearing of the movement,
hastily regained Mysore by the Changama and Palicode Passes.
Cornwallis, after making a feint towards Amboor, which completely
deceived the Sultan, turned northwards, and carried the army through
the Mooglee Pass without opposition. Without firing a shot, the whole
army was concentrated on the Mysore plateau by the 18th February.
Here the army was joined by sixty-seven elephants from Bengal, the
first occasion of these animals being employed in any considerable
number by a British force. Hitherto, the movements of our armies had
been greatly hampered by the difficulties of moving heavy siege guns;
but on this occasion, by yoking the bullocks four instead of two
abreast, and by the use of elephants to lift and push the guns in bad
ground, the heavy guns were able to move with nearly as much ease as
any other part of the army.

Among other beneficial changes made by Lord Cornwallis, was an
improvement in the order of march of the army. Before this war, our
armies in India had marched with few cavalry and very small trains
of artillery. They moved in a single column two or three files deep,
with the stores, baggage and camp followers on one flank, covered by
a strong party. This order was fatiguing to the troops, made rapid
movement impossible, caused great delay in assuming any formation
on coming in contact with the enemy, and exposed the camp followers
and baggage to great losses from the enemy’s cavalry. Colonel
Fullarton, in his brief campaign of 1783, remedied this, to some
extent, by making the army move on a broad front of three brigades,
the artillery and baggage following in rear covered on each flank
by other brigades. The troops marched with intervals to permit of
speedily forming line in any direction.

At the commencement of the campaign of 1790 the old order was
reverted to. The battering train, which marched in rear of the
column, often fell so far behind, that it did not reach the camping
ground till the following day. It was then placed in the centre of
the column. This only had the effect of delaying all in rear of
the guns, and separating the army into two portions. It was then
tried to improve matters, by placing the heavy guns in front of the
column. This answered better when the guns were few, but with a large
battering train gave bad results. The plan adopted by Cornwallis,
was to make the infantry and cavalry move in parallel columns, some
distance apart. Between them, moved two columns one composed of
artillery and stores, while the other was composed of the baggage and
camp followers, controlled by a baggage master. The army thus moved
in a huge oblong, with the fighting men on the flanks. The front
was covered by the advance guard, consisting of a cavalry regiment
and the infantry picquets coming on duty. In the same way, the rear
was covered by a regiment of cavalry and the infantry picquets last
on duty, forming the rear guard. The same order was observed in
encamping. The infantry and cavalry camped in two lines, facing
outwards, with the artillery, engineer corps, stores, baggage and
camp followers in the space between. The order thus established by
Cornwallis during this campaign, may be said to have held good in
India up till the present day.

This appearance of a British army on the plateau of Mysore, marks
the increase that had taken place in the military power of the East
India Company during the past five years. In our previous wars with
Hyder Ali and Tippoo, the operations of our armies had been confined
to the low-lying country below the Ghauts, and the scene of warfare
had been almost always the Company’s own territories in the vicinity
of Madras, or the territories of our native allies in the Carnatic.
Now, for the first time, the war was carried into the very heart of
Mysore territory.

Tippoo’s movements, at this time, were characterised by unwonted
indecision and want of energy. Instead of impeding and harassing
the march of the army, he contented himself with watching the
advance, with the intention rather of taking advantage of any mistake
committed by the English commander, than of following any plan of his
own.

On the 5th March, the British force reached Bangalore, and took
up its ground without any loss, beyond a few casualties caused by
a distant cannonade on the march. On the following day, the army
changed ground, and took up a better position on the North West face
of the pettah.[27] In the afternoon, Colonel Floyd was detached
to the south west of the town, to cover a reconnoissance by the
engineers. He had with him his own brigade, consisting of the 19th
Light Dragoons under Captain Child, and five Regiments of native
Cavalry, besides a Brigade of three battalions of Infantry, with a
detachment of Artillery under Major Gowdie.

The work was satisfactorily accomplished, and the force was about
to return, when a body of the enemy’s horse appeared. Leaving the
infantry and guns, Floyd moved against it, and, on its giving way,
discovered some Mysore infantry, and guns, with large masses of
baggage and stores, elephants, bullock carts, camels and all the
paraphernalia of an Eastern Army on the march. Tippoo was changing
his ground, and, by accident, the reconnoitring party had crossed the
rear of his line of march. Disregarding his orders, Floyd allowed
himself to be persuaded to attack, by the young officers who were
clamorous for the fray. The temptation was irresistible, and the
cavalry advanced at a gallop. Some parties of infantry were charged
and broken, and nine guns captured. As the advance continued, the
ground became much broken with ravines and low rocky hills. The
horses were exhausted, and the enemy, collecting their forces, opened
a heavy fire of musketry and rockets that checked the advance. At
this moment, Floyd fell from his horse, apparently dead, with a
musket ball in his head. At his fall, the squadron behind him made a
half wheel to avoid trampling on their leader. This threw the line
into confusion, the flank squadrons took it for a signal to retire,
and, in a few moments, the whole force was falling back. Fortunately
for Floyd, Corporal Murray and Private Buchanan remained with him,
and, examining his wound, found that it was not mortal. Murray
remained with him, while Buchanan galloped after the regiment, and in
a short time returned with a troop of the 19th, under Cornet Roderick
Mackenzie: Floyd was mounted on Buchanan’s horse and brought back to
the regiment. He was able to halt the regiment, and show a front to
the enemy, which checked them; but darkness was coming on; the enemy
pressed on, and the confusion was very great. The exhausted horses
were scarcely able to get back through the ravines they had cleared
with ease in their advance, and had it not been for the good judgment
of Major Gowdie, who had advanced a mile beyond the place where he
had been left, and covered the retreat with his brigade, the losses
would have been very great. Lord Cornwallis, who had been able to see
what was occurring from the encampment, put a division in motion,
and met the whole detachment returning. Floyd’s wound was caused by
a bullet through his cheek, which lodged in his neck. It was never
extracted, and he carried it to his grave, but he was sufficiently
recovered to take up his command again eleven days later. The losses
of the detachment were as follows:--

_Killed_--
1 Officer.
1 Trumpeter.
18 Rank and File.
36 Horses.

_Wounded_--
2 Officers (European).
3 Native Officers.
43 Rank and File.
7 Horses.

_Missing_--
2 Trumpeters.
1 Rank and File.
228 Horses.

The losses of the 19th Light Dragoons were--

_Killed_--
1 Trumpeter.
2 Rank and File.
11 Horses.

_Wounded_--
1 Lieutenant Colonel.
7 Rank and File.

_Missing_--
4 Horses.

Major Skelly, Lord Cornwallis’ aide-de-camp, writing of the event a
short time afterwards, says: “I never saw Lord Cornwallis completely
angry before that evening. To this day he cannot speak of that
night’s business without evident signs of disapprobation.”

The loss of so many horses at this early stage of the campaign was
a serious one, as they could not be replaced. The cavalry had been
constantly employed for the last three days, and the horses had not
been regularly fed. Those that did not succumb on this occasion were
of little use for the remainder of the campaign.

On the following day, the pettah was taken by assault, and some
much-needed supplies were obtained: but there was great scarcity
of forage, and horses and transport animals suffered greatly. “The
draught cattle were daily dying at their pickets; grain and every
other necessary, including ammunition, were at the lowest ebb.” In
these straits, Lord Cornwallis resolved to try and take the Fort by a
_coup-de-main_. On the night of the 21st, the assault was delivered
by moonlight, and in an hour the Fort was captured under the eyes of
the Sultan, who made no serious attempt to cause a diversion.

The capture of Bangalore was the first great blow that had
been struck against the power of Mysore, by any foe, since its
establishment by Hyder Ali.

Leaving a garrison in the place, Cornwallis moved northward, on the
28th, with the twofold object of forming a junction with a corps of
the Nizam’s cavalry, and of meeting a convoy that was expected from
Amboor. After some delay, caused by false intelligence purposely
spread by Tippoo, the British force was joined at Cotapilli, on
13th April, by 10,000 irregular horse of the Nizam’s, and, a week
later, the much-needed convoy, escorted by four thousand men, was
met at Venkitagheri. The combined force then returned to Bangalore,
which was reached on the 28th. Arrangements were at once made for
the siege of Seringapatam, against which the Sultan sought to guard
himself, by wasting the intervening country; a measure that was not
without effect on subsequent events.

On the 13th May, the British force reached Arikera, about nine miles
from Seringapatam. The army moved with extreme difficulty, and
there was great distress, owing to the inadequate transport and the
wasted state of the country. The Nizam’s cavalry refused to forage
beyond the outposts, and added to the scarcity: great quantities of
ammunition were dependent for carriage on the private resources of
officers and other individuals with the army. Before laying siege
to Seringapatam, it was Cornwallis’ object to cross the Cauvery
at Caniembadi, and form a junction with the Bombay force, under
Abercromby, which was shortly expected. The Sultan, who had hitherto
confined himself to harassing the line of march, found it necessary
to offer battle, to prevent if possible the threatened junction. With
this purpose he took up an extremely strong position about three
miles from Seringapatam, with his right resting on the Cauvery, and
his left on a rugged hill. His front was covered by a deep, swampy
ravine the passages of which were defended by batteries along the
whole front. Cornwallis determined to turn Tippoo’s left wing, and,
by a night march, to place himself between Seringapatam and a great
portion of the Mysore army. Halting at Arikera on the 14th, the
force marched at night, leaving the camp standing, with the heavy
guns and stores. Unfortunately, there was a storm of extraordinary
violence that lasted several hours, which added to the confusion and
difficulties of a night march, and, when day broke, the force had
only accomplished three or four miles. All hope of surprise was at
an end, but Cornwallis continued his advance. To meet the movement,
Tippoo threw back his left, and in order to cover his change of
front, detached a large corps of cavalry and infantry, with eight
guns, to occupy a strong rocky ridge on his left, at right angles
to the line of march of the British column. Owing to the depth of
the ravine to be crossed, and the weakness of the gun bullocks, it
took two hours before the British force could form up in line for
attack; during which it was exposed to a galling artillery fire, and
to some charges of cavalry, which were repulsed. The British force
was disposed, with nine battalions under Major General Medows, in the
first line, opposite to the enemy’s main body; four battalions in
the second line, under Lt. Col. Harris; while five battalions, under
Lt. Col. Maxwell, were destined to attack the enemy’s corps on the
ridge to the right. The cavalry under Floyd, consisting of the 19th
Light Dragoons and five Regiments of Native Cavalry, and the Nizam’s
horse, were left on the opposite side of the ravine, out of reach of
artillery fire.

The action commenced by an advance of Maxwell’s force against the
ridge, which was taken, while the cavalry crossed the ravine, and
fell on the rear of the Mysore infantry, inflicting considerable
loss. But the exhausted horses could not raise a gallop, and they
were obliged to fall back from a strong body of infantry, that
had rallied and made a stand in some broken rocky ground. At this
juncture, the Nizam’s horse, which had followed the British cavalry
across the ravine, threw itself in an unwieldy mass in front of the
left wing, preventing its advance, and detaining it under the fire of
the enemy’s batteries in Seringapatam. This unfortunate circumstance,
which by many was ascribed to treachery on the part of the Nizam’s
commander, saved the enemy from destruction. The British line was
for some time unable to advance, and the enemy’s guns and infantry,
in great confusion, were able to withdraw under protection of their
batteries across the river. Four guns were taken. The British loss
was 81 killed, 339 wounded, and 6 missing. Of this, the 19th Light
Dragoons lost

_Killed_--
1 Officer. Cornet James Patterson.
2 Troopers.

_Wounded_--
2 Officers. Cornet Roderick Mackenzie.
Cornet John Fortnam.
2 Troopers.

_Horses_--
13 Killed.
11 Wounded.

The army was now in such a state, owing to want of proper supplies,
want of carriage, and an epidemic of smallpox, that it was
necessary to join hands with the Bombay force under Abercromby,
before undertaking the siege. Abercromby had encountered great
difficulties in ascending the Passes into Mysore, and so excellent
was the work done by Tippoo’s cavalry, that Cornwallis was without
any precise information as to his advance. Nor was anything known
of the Mahratta contingent, beyond the fact that they had captured
Dharwar. Cornwallis therefore resolved on continuing his march on
Caniembadi, to meet Abercromby. “For two marches, all the battering
train and almost every public cart in the army were dragged by the
troops,” and Cornwallis came to the conclusion, that the state of
his force rendered a retirement on Bangalore imperative. The siege
train and heavy stores could be carried no farther, and it was
resolved to destroy them. On the 21st May, orders were despatched
to Abercromby, who was then at Periapatam, about 25 miles to the
westward, to destroy his heavy stores, and retire below the Passes,
and Cornwallis’ army was retained five days in position, to cover
Abercromby’s movement. On the 22nd, the whole of the battering train
and heavy stores were destroyed, and on the 26th, the first march
of six miles was made in retreat. The distress was very great:
the troops were on half rations, and the only way of carrying what
grain was available was to distribute it among the fighting men.
“Great part of the horses of the cavalry were so reduced by want
and fatigue, that they could no longer carry their riders; and
many, unable to march, were shot at their pickets. The ground at
Caniembadi, where the army had encamped but six days, was covered,
in a circuit of several miles, with the carcasses of cattle and
horses.”[28] “All that occurred of mortality among the cattle, during
the siege of Bangalore, fell far short of the horrible scene and
pestilential air of this disgusting ground.”[29]

In the middle of the first day’s painful march, a body of two
thousand cavalry appeared on the left flank. Preparations were
made to meet them, and shots were fired, when it was suddenly
discovered that they were the advanced guard of the Mahratta force.
It was not known that they were within a hundred and fifty miles of
Seringapatam, and not one of the numerous messengers they had sent to
convey notice of their approach, had succeeded in escaping Tippoo’s
scouts. There were, in fact, two forces; one, under Hari Punt,
consisting of twelve thousand horse, and the other, under Pareshram
Bhow, of twenty thousand horse and foot, with two battalions of
Bombay sepoys, under Captain Little. They brought with them abundant
supplies, and plenty once more reigned in the British camp. Their
cavalry foraged boldly in every direction, bringing in supplies from
great distances, in striking contrast to the behaviour of the Nizam’s
force. But they came too late to permit of an attack on Seringapatam.
Had Cornwallis known of their approach five days sooner, all would
have been well, and another campaign would have been spared him. But
his siege train no longer existed, the Bombay force had descended
the Ghauts, and there was nothing for it but to adhere to his resolve
of falling back. The allied forces remained in the vicinity of
Seringapatam till the 6th June, when they leisurely moved northwards
to Nagmunglum, and thence eastward to Bangalore, taking the small
hill fort of Hooliadroog on the way. “So reduced were the horses of
our cavalry from want and fatigue, that the only service they could
now render was to walk on slowly with the sick and wounded soldiers
on their backs, for whom we were in great want of conveyance; and it
was highly pleasing to see the cheerfulness with which the troopers
walked by the side of their horses, while their distressed comrades
of the infantry rode upon the march.”[30] The Mahratta cavalry
effectually prevented the march being harassed by the enemy, from
whom they took some convoys and elephants.

Pending the completion of arrangements for another advance on
Seringapatam, the Mahratta force withdrew northwards to Sara; the
Nizam’s force also withdrew to Gunjicotta, which, with several other
small places, had been captured by a force of the Nizam’s.

The 19th Light Dragoons with the rest of the cavalry were sent, under
Floyd, to the Carnatic, to recruit. The regiment reached Madras early
in August; and, as horses to remount the cavalry were not procurable,
three native cavalry regiments were dismounted in order to complete
the horses required for the 19th. The 3rd and 5th Native cavalry had
their ranks partially filled in the same way, so that by the end of
the monsoon these three Regiments were ready to rejoin the army.

“The 19th Light Dragoons, which under their gallant leader, had
made so powerful an impression on the minds of the enemy during
the war, was again completely remounted; and with the addition
of the draughts and recruits that had arrived from England, was
in nearly as great force as when it first took the field. This
favourite corps was reviewed by General Musgrave at the Mount
in the beginning of October, when it shewed near four hundred
mounted, both men and horses in perfect order.”[31]

Meanwhile, the army at Bangalore was engaged in securing the passes
into the Carnatic, and in reducing the numerous hill fortresses
that abounded in Mysore. The most important of these, Nundydroog
and Savandroog, were taken by assault on the 19th October and 21st
December, respectively. Tippoo, on his side, had not been idle.
In the middle of June a large Mysore force invested Coimbatore,
which was weakly held. The defence was obstinate, and after a two
months’ siege the place was relieved from Palghat. In October, it
was invested a second time, and, the attempts to relieve it being
unsuccessful, Coimbatore was forced to surrender, on 3rd November.
Several parties of Mysore horse also succeeded in making raids into
the Carnatic, doing much mischief. One party penetrated to within
a few miles of Madras, early in January, after the cavalry had
marched to rejoin Cornwallis, and carried off much plunder. During
the preceding half century, the country within fifty miles of Madras
had been the constant scene of warlike operations. In that period,
Madras had fallen to a French attack, and been held by them for four
years. Again, it had been frequently threatened and once besieged,
by France, and Hyder had dictated a peace within sight of Fort St.
George. Too often, the inhabitants of Madras had heard the sound
of an enemy’s guns, and seen the sky red with the glare of burning
villages: and now again the horsemen of Mysore were plundering and
burning within sight of the Mount. But it was for the last time.
Shevtamodoo was plundered and burned by one of these parties.

In the meantime, large convoys of supplies and material were being
forwarded to Bangalore, the last and most important, conveying
all the ammunition for the army, being escorted by the 19th Light
Dragoons under Colonel Floyd. Ascending by the Pednaikdirgum Pass,
on the 23rd December, and marching by Kolar, Ooscotta and Bangalore,
he joined Cornwallis at Magre, near Ootradroog, on the 12th January
1792. Everything was now ready for an advance on Seringapatam,
and the army was in a more efficient state than it had been at
any time since the war began. Owing to Lord Cornwallis’ excellent
arrangements, supplies of all sorts were in the greatest abundance.
The only deficiency was in horses for the Cavalry. The losses
experienced in this respect, in the previous year, had not been made
good, and this arm of the service was represented only by the 19th
Light Dragoons, six troops, the 3rd Native Cavalry, six troops,
the 5th Native Cavalry, four troops, and the Body Guards of Lord
Cornwallis and General Medows, one troop each. The force altogether
consisted of 22,033 men, of which about 15,500 were infantry. The
advance was still delayed by the absence of the Nizam’s force, which
was occupied in the siege of Gurramconda. On the 25th January it
arrived, under the command of the Nizam’s son, Secunder Jah. Part of
the Mahratta contingent, under Hari Punt, had already joined Lord
Cornwallis, but the greater part, under Pareshram Bhow, had gone off
on a plundering expedition to the northwestward, in defiance of the
agreement made six months before. It did not join the British force,
till the campaign was over.

The Bombay army, under Abercromby, consisting of eight thousand four
hundred men, was also on the march from the westward. Ascending by
the Poodicherim Pass, Abercromby directed his march by Periapatam
and Eratoor, so as to join hands with Cornwallis in front of
Seringapatam.

On the 31st January, Cornwallis held a review of his whole force
at Hooliadroog, for the benefit of his allies. As the Nizam’s son
reached the right of the line “a salute of 21 guns was fired from the
park, while the cavalry, with drawn swords and trumpets sounding,
received him with due honours as he passed their front. He returned
the officers’ salute, and looked attentively at the troops. The 19th
Dragoons, of which they had all heard, attracted their particular
notice.”[32] On the following day, the army marched, and encamped
within sight of Seringapatam, at about seven miles’ distance, on the
5th February. No opposition on the march was experienced.

Seringapatam is situated on an island in the Cauvery river, four
miles in length and a mile and a half broad. At the western end of
the island was the fortress, the eastern portion being also strongly
defended by connected batteries and redoubts. On the north side, on
what may be called the main land, was an oblong space about three
miles in length, enclosed by a hedge of cactus and other thorny
plants, and commanded by redoubts on the highest points. In this
space Tippoo was encamped. He believed that he could protract the
defence, till the coming of the monsoon and the scarcity of supplies
should force Cornwallis to raise the siege; he further believed that
no serious attack would be made on the position, till the arrival
of Abercromby’s force. But Cornwallis had plans of a very different
nature. The 6th being spent in reconnoitring, orders were issued,
about sunset, for the troops to parade at once for a night attack.
About 8 o’clock all was ready, and the infantry advanced in three
columns, the centre column being headed by Cornwallis in person. The
cavalry were left to guard the camp, and the artillery were left
behind also. When all was ready, Cornwallis sent word of his plans to
his native allies, who were dismayed at hearing of an advance against
a fortified camp without artillery, and that his lordship should have
gone to fight “like a common soldier.” Moving in silence, the heads
of the columns, which were more than a mile apart, came in touch with
the enemy about half past ten. The attack was completely successful.
One redoubt after another was carried, Tippoo’s camp was taken, some
of the troops, in their ardour, crossing the stream and penetrating
to the farther side of the island. The brunt of the fighting fell on
the centre column, which, towards daylight, was heavily attacked by
the Mysore troops, who had recovered from their first surprise. The
fighting continued till five o’clock in the afternoon of the 7th, the
last serious attack being headed by Tippoo’s French regiment. But
nothing availed to dislodge the British troops from the positions
they had gained, and Tippoo was forced to withdraw on to the island,
where also our troops had made good their footing. Our loss amounted
to 535 of all ranks, killed, wounded and missing. Eighty guns and
an enormous quantity of supplies were captured. The enemy’s loss
was estimated at four thousand killed, great numbers having been
forced into the river and drowned. Greater still was the loss caused
by desertion; numbers of the enemy having taken advantage of the
confusion, to throw down their arms and make off to their homes.
The whole loss to the Sultan, in killed, wounded and missing, was
estimated at twenty thousand men.

On the 12th, the cavalry under Floyd were detached to meet
Abercromby, with whom he effected a junction on the 14th. In a
private letter, still extant, he writes:--

“On the 11th February I convoyed 13,000 Brinjarries (Brinjara
bullocks carrying grain) into camp. On the 12th February, I was
detached with nine squadrons, one battalion of sepoys, and about
1500 allied horse, to meet General Abercromby, and his army.

On the 14th of February, I was attacked by full 4000 of the
enemy’s horse, who had got in among my baggage, and attached
themselves to my allied horse. I soon recovered every article
of my baggage, but was forced to stop there, not being able to
distinguish friend from foe. The Nizam’s Horse under a son of
the Nawab of Canoul, and the Mahratta Horse also kept firm. The
enemy drew off, rather worsted by the allied horse. Immediately,
the head of Abercromby’s column appeared at a distance, and the
enemy made for them. I posted my battalion, my allied horse, and
my baggage, and ranged along between the enemy and Abercromby’s
with the nine squadrons of our own horse; the enemy collected and
went clear off.”

Dirom, the principal chronicler of the campaign, says:--

“Tippoo had meant a more serious opposition to this junction,
and for that purpose had detached the whole of his cavalry on
the evening of the 13th; they had crossed (the Cauvery) a few
miles above the fort, and lay in wait till Colonel Floyd moved in
the morning of the 14th. The detachment of allies, in spite of
the Colonel’s orders, and the remonstrance of Major Scott, who
was sent with them, remained loitering on the ground for some
time after the Colonel had marched: the Sultan’s horse seized
the opportunity, and attacked them with great vigour. They stood
their ground for some time, and then retreating towards Colonel
Floyd, he returned to support them, and soon put the enemy to the
rout.”

On the 16th, Abercromby joined Cornwallis on the north side of
Seringapatam, without further hindrance, and preparations were made
for prosecuting the siege. On the 19th, Abercromby made a detour,
and, crossing the Cauvery, invested the place from the south. A
strong Brigade, under Colonel Stuart, was entrenched on the island,
and Floyd with the Cavalry was stationed about four thousand yards
to the eastward, linking up the distance between Cornwallis and
Abercromby. Seringapatam was completely invested. On the 22nd,
an attack on Abercromby’s force was repulsed with loss, and then
Tippoo, who had been for some days in negotiation with Cornwallis,
realised that the time for surrender had arrived. The losses he had
experienced in the fighting of the 6th and 7th, rendered prolonged
resistance impossible.

It was no part of Lord Cornwallis’ policy to destroy the Mysore
State, but the disposition of Tippoo, “a faithless and violent
character on whom no dependence could be placed” required that his
power should be so far curtailed, as to render him less dangerous. On
the 23rd February, the preliminaries of peace were signed by Tippoo,
and warlike operations ceased, much to the disgust of the army,
whose minds were inflamed to an extraordinary degree against the
Sultan, on account of the barbarous cruelties inflicted by him on all
prisoners that fell into his hands. One of the stipulations was that
two of Tippoo’s sons should be handed over, as hostages for the due
performance of the treaty of peace. On the 26th, the young princes
were received by Lord Cornwallis with much ceremony. The occasion
seems to have made a great impression at the time. Three,[33] if not
more, pictures of the event were painted by A. W. Devis, a well-known
artist, who was present. In all of them, Colonel Floyd is prominently
represented, a fine martial figure. Cornet Hale and Captain Child of
the 19th Light Dragoons also appear in some of the pictures. This
was evidently regarded in India as the most striking event in Lord
Cornwallis’ career in the country. The base of the statue erected to
him in Madras, has another representation of the scene.

The Princes remained in British territory till March 1794, when they
were sent back to the Sultan with all honour.

[Illustration: AN OFFICER OF THE XIX^{TH} LIGHT DRAGOONS, 1792.

_to face p. 99._]

A considerable amount of prize money gained during the war was
further enhanced by the surrender of their respective shares by Lord
Cornwallis and General Medows, and by liberal gratuities from the
Government. The share of every private soldier amounted to £14, 11.
9., the shares of other ranks being in proportion.

Sixty-seven forts and eight hundred and one guns were captured during
the three campaigns; of which, fifty-six forts and six hundred and
fifty-six guns were captured by the British forces, the remainder
falling to their native allies.

On the 20th March, the Treaty of Peace was duly ratified, and on
the 26th, the army marched from Seringapatam, for Madras, which was
reached about the end of May. The 19th Light Dragoons returned to
their old quarters at Shevtamodoo.

A medal for the three campaigns, 1790-92, was bestowed on the Bengal
native troops who took part in them.

CHAPTER VI

FALL OF MYSORE

1793-1799.

On the 1st February 1793, the French National Convention declared war
against Great Britain. The news was at once dispatched to India by
the British Consul at Alexandria, and reached Calcutta on the 11th
June. Lord Cornwallis acted with great promptitude, and, without
awaiting further communications from England, issued orders for
taking possession of the French territories in India. The troops in
the vicinity of Wallajabad, among whom were the 19th Light Dragoons,
were at once put in motion under Colonel Floyd, and encamped before
Pondicherry on the 11th July, while the place was blockaded by sea by
such ships as were available. On the 28th July, Colonel Brathwaite,
who had succeeded Major General Medows as local Commander in Chief,
took command of the force, which by this time amounted to 10,500
men. According to the returns of 1st August, the strength of the
19th Light Dragoons, at that date, was 274, exclusive of sick. Siege
operations were commenced on the 10th August, and fire was opened
on the 20th. On the 22nd Pondicherry capitulated, and was taken
possession of on the following day. The British loss amounted to 248
killed, wounded, and missing. One hundred and sixty-six guns, with a
great quantity of military stores, fell into the hands of our troops,
and Pondicherry ceased to be a French possession until the Peace of
Amiens. The part taken in the siege by the cavalry was naturally a
subordinate one, as the enemy had no force in the field that could
interrupt operations.

On the fall of Pondicherry, the 19th Light Dragoons returned for a
time to their old quarters at Shevtamodoo. Colonel Floyd remained
at Pondicherry, in command of the place, for a few months, when he
was appointed to command the Southern Division of the Madras forces,
with his Head Quarters at Trichinopoly. In 1794, we find the 19th
quartered at Seringham, near Trichinopoly. In the following year,
they were encamped on the Trichinopoly plain, and in 1796, they were
moved into the cavalry cantonments at Trichinopoly.

For five years the war was confined to Europe. The French flag was
not seen on the coasts of India, nor was any Frenchman in arms, with
the exception of those in the service of Native States, to be found
in the country. While war raged in Europe, the peace of India was
practically undisturbed. In the beginning of June 1795, a detachment
of the 19th was employed in the capture of an insurgent Polygar
chief, named Lunkia Naik, under the following circumstances. On the
night of the 7th June, Lieutenant Oliphant, with a detachment of
two native officers and twenty-two sepoys, surprised and captured
Lunkia Naik, at Manapur, about twenty-four miles from Trichinopoly.
The Chief’s retainers gathered to the rescue in large numbers, and
attacked Oliphant, who had retired with his prisoner into a Choultry,
where he defended himself for nine hours, repelling several assaults.
The following morning, two troops of the 19th appeared, drove off the
assailants, and brought Oliphant’s detachment back to Trichinopoly,
with Lunkia Naik securely tied to a trooper.

Towards the end of 1796, the 25th Light Dragoons landed in Madras
from England.

In his first regimental order to the regiment, when it was raised,
Sir John Burgoyne took occasion to point out that service in India
was “not less honourable than lucrative.” There could be no doubt on
the latter point, so far as the senior officers were concerned. The
advantages given to the King’s officers in point of rank over the
Company’s officers, had the intended effect of throwing most of the
chief commands into their hands, and the allowances that were granted
in some cases, showed how strong a shake they were able to give to
the “pagoda tree.” Lieutenant Colonel Stapleton Cotton (afterwards
Lord Combermere) in a letter from Madras in January 1797, wrote--

“As the command of a station is everything here ... I am very
desirous of getting the rank of Colonel, which would ensure a
command. An officer commanding at any station receives full
batta, which, if a Colonel, is very considerable. I now only
receive half batta, as a Lieutenant Colonel, and my King’s pay.
On the Bengal establishment every officer receives full batta,
and the Commanding Officer double full batta. A Bengal command is
a sure fortune in five years. General Floyd is now (including his
King’s pay as Major General and Lieutenant Colonel of the 19th
Light Dragoons, his Company’s pay, and his allowance from the
Company and the Nizam as Commandant of the Southern District) in
the receipt of from £14,000 to £16,000.”

Events were in progress, that were, before long, destined to bring
the British armies in India into the field again. British authority
in India was menaced by French hostility in a peculiarly subtle and
dangerous form. The memory of his defeats and losses in 1792, had
long rankled in Tippoo’s mind, and his animosity against the English
was inflamed by the numerous French officers in his employ, through
whom he maintained informal relations with France. In Hyderabad,
there was a fairly disciplined force of 14,000 infantry, with an
adequate proportion of artillery, commanded by French officers in
the Nizam’s service, who flew the tricolour flag, and were in secret
correspondence with Tippoo. In upper India, Scindia’s disciplined
battalions were also commanded by a French officer. Fortunately, the
Mahrattas were at this time too much occupied with their own quarrels
to meddle with affairs in the South. The news of French successes,
under Bonaparte, induced Tippoo to believe that the time had arrived
to strike a blow against the English.

In March 1796, he dispatched an embassy to Cabul, inviting Zeman
Shah to invade India, conquer Delhi, and join hands with him in
destroying the British, the Portuguese, the Mahrattas, and the
Nizam. In the following year, Tippoo despatched ambassadors to the
Mauritius, proposing an offensive and defensive alliance against
the English, and asking for a French force, which he engaged to pay
and to furnish with all necessary supplies. But the Governor of the
Mauritius had no troops to spare, and could only send under 100 men,
among whom were several officers and artificers, who landed in India
in April 1798. A few weeks later, Tippoo despatched an embassy to
Paris. In May 1798, Lord Mornington, afterwards known as the Marquis
of Wellesley, arrived in India to take up the office of Governor
General, and Tippoo’s dealings with the French became known, a
few days after his arrival. It was known also that a great French
expedition was preparing in the Mediterranean, which was believed
to be aimed at Egypt, as in fact it was. The times were critical,
and demanded prompt action: the new Governor General was not the
man to waste time, when action was required. The first move made
by Lord Mornington was to break up the force at Hyderabad, which
for the moment was the most dangerous factor in the situation. The
Nizam and his ministers were loyal to the British alliance, but the
French officers present had become possessed of so much influence,
that the Hyderabad Government had lost control of them, while their
arrogance and overbearing conduct filled the Nizam and his ministers
with alarm. The Nizam therefore willingly entered into a Treaty
engaging himself to get rid of his French officers, and to break up
the formidable body they had created. By dexterous measures, and
by taking advantage of a mutiny that occurred in the force, it was
surrounded and disarmed without bloodshed, on 22nd October. One
hundred and twenty-four French officers, whose lives were at the
time in danger from their own men, were removed and shipped off to
Calcutta, and a serious danger successfully averted.[34] Four days
before this occurrence, intelligence of the invasion of Egypt by
Bonaparte reached Calcutta. Meanwhile, by way of precaution against a
sudden blow from Tippoo, a force was collected at Wallajabad, among
which was the 19th Light Dragoons, who marched from Trichinopoly at
the beginning of August. From Wallajabad the regiment was moved to
Madras; their muster roll, dated 20th September, shows that they
were cantoned at the Mount on that date. The effective strength of
the regiment, then present, was 361 of all ranks; of whom 12 were
recruits recently received from England, and 30 were volunteers
from the 12th, 19th, 73rd, and 74th Regiments. So valuable were
European Cavalry, that on the bare prospect of war their numbers were
at once filled up from the Infantry. The dispersal of the French
Contingent at Hyderabad having been accomplished, Lord Mornington
addressed Tippoo with regard to his dealings with the French
Government. Preparations were at the same time made for an advance
on Seringapatam from the Bombay coast, while the Madras forces
assembled at Vellore. Tippoo’s replies were evasive. His object was
to gain time, till the arrival of the expected French force. Delay
was dangerous, and it was evident that further negotiations could
lead to no good result, so, early in February 1799, the advance of
the army was determined on. Meanwhile, Shah Zeman had reached Lahore,
and, though he was unable to advance farther south, and was forced to
return to Cabul, on account of his own territories being invaded by
Persia, his presence in the Punjab necessitated the preparation of a
British force in the North, to hold him in check.

Up till this time the artillery of the British Army in India was
entirely drawn by bullocks. An attempt to furnish artillery of
greater mobility was now made. While the army lay at Vellore, an
order was issued for attaching to each regiment of European dragoons
and native Cavalry two 6 Pr. guns, in order to increase their
independent action.

“The plan adopted by Government for attaching flying artillery
to the cavalry corps having been communicated to the heads of
regiments respectively, the Commander in Chief is now pleased
to direct that the detail of European artillery and gun lascars
to be attached to each regiment be sent to the several corps
from the 1st and 2nd battalions of artillery agreeably to the
following arrangements, viz: 1 Lieutenant Fireworker, 1 Serjeant,
1 Corporal, 1 Syrang, 2 Second Tindals and 20 Lascars for each
regiment of European dragoons, and 1 Serjeant, 1 Gunner, 1 First
Tindal, and 18 Lascars for each regiment of native Cavalry.
(G.O.C.C. 13th January 1799).”[35]

Little mention of these guns is anywhere made during the ensuing
campaign, though their efficiency on subsequent occasions is
frequently mentioned. Thorn, the historian of the Mahratta War,
writing four years later of the formation of the army under the
Commander in Chief, says:--

“Among the different military improvements practised on these
occasions, the use of the galloper guns was one of the most
important, as afterwards appeared in the terror which they
produced on the Mahratta horse. Two of these guns, of six
pounders, were attached to each regiment; and nothing could
exceed the celerity and exactness of the manœuvres made with them
at full speed by this large body of cavalry &c. &c.”[36]

In spite of the good service done by the galloper guns on many
occasions, difficulties as to their control in the field frequently
arose, after the formation of a corps of artillery drawn by horses,
in 1805, owing to their not having formed an integral part of the
Regiment they were attached to.

At first the guns closely attended their regiment, in action,
seconding its efforts with their fire when possible. In line of
battle they were placed in pairs, in the intervals between different
corps. After a time this system was discontinued, and the guns were
brigaded together under command of a Cavalry officer, or they were
brigaded with Artillery guns, in which case difficulties arose as to
their command. In 1815, it was ordered that, whenever galloper guns
were brigaded, they should be commanded by an Artillery officer. But
complaints were made that the want of uniform training rendered them
unfit to be brigaded with Horse Artillery guns, and they were finally
abolished in May 1819.

The 19th Light Dragoons, taking their galloper guns with them,
as well as those for the 25th Light Dragoons and the 1st Native
Cavalry, marched from Madras on 23rd January, to join the army
under General Harris, which was assembled at Vellore to the number
of nearly 21,000 men. On the 14th February, the whole force moved
forward. The Cavalry under Major General Floyd comprised the 19th,
430 strong, the 25th Dragoons, and four Regiments of Native Cavalry:
2635 sabres in all, divided into two Brigades. On the 20th, the army
was joined by 16,000 men from Hyderabad, about 10,000 of which were
the contingent furnished by the Nizam, who, throughout the campaign,
co-operated most heartily with the British Commander. The command of
the Nizam’s Contingent was given to Colonel the Honourable Arthur
Wellesley,[37] who had with him also his own regiment, the 33rd
Foot. Simultaneously, the force from Bombay consisting of 6400 men
under Lieutenant General Stuart,[38] advanced from Cannanore, and, on
2nd March, encamped on the Mysore frontier, near Periapatam.

Marching by Rycottah, General Harris crossed the Mysore frontier
on 5th, and directed his march northwards, as if for the purpose
of attacking Bangalore. When in sight of that place he turned
southwards, and encamped five miles from Mallavelly, on the 26th
March. Meanwhile, Tippoo had not been idle. On the 6th, he crossed
the frontier near Periapatam, and attempted to cut off a detached
Brigade of the Bombay force at Sedaseer. In spite of his great
numerical superiority, the attack was repulsed with heavy loss,
and Tippoo withdrew to Seringapatam. He had between seventy and
eighty thousand men, about thirty thousand of which were in or near
Seringapatam, the whole in a state of complete efficiency.

As General Harris’ force approached their camping ground, on the
26th, the Cavalry found themselves confronted by a large body of
the enemy commanded by Tippoo in person. As the Infantry closed
up, the Sultan slowly moved off, and the British force encamped
within sight of the enemy, who withdrew towards Mallavelly. At
daybreak, on the 27th, the army marched on Mallavelly, while the
Nizam’s contingent under Wellesley moved parallel to it, on the
left, enclosing the baggage between the two bodies. The front was
covered by Major General Floyd with five regiments of Cavalry. On
approaching Mallavelly, the heights beyond the village were seen
to be occupied by infantry, while a large force of cavalry were on
the British right. Wellesley’s division was directed to attack the
enemy’s right, supported by Floyd and his cavalry, while the right
wing of the army entered Mallavelly, and attacked the enemy’s centre.
As the force advanced, the enemy drew back, as though declining an
action, and preparations were made by the British troops for marking
out a new encampment. While this was in progress, the enemy suddenly
opened fire from twelve or fourteen guns, which did some execution.
Upon this, the infantry picquets, the 25th Light Dragoons and a
Native Cavalry Regiment pushed forward, and occupied a village in
front of the enemy’s left, in which was a party of the enemy’s horse
and rocket men, while the rest of the army formed line of battle.
In the meanwhile, Colonel Wellesley’s division advanced, supported
by Major General Floyd, with the 19th Light Dragoons, and 1st and
3rd regiments of Native cavalry. As the British force advanced,
nearly simultaneous attacks were made by the enemy on both flanks.
On the right a large body of cavalry hovered on the flanks, while
a smaller corps charged the 1st Brigade under Major General Baird.
The steady fire of the 12th Foot and the Scotch Brigade repulsed
them with considerable loss. On the left, a body of men, about 2000
strong, advanced in good order against the 33rd, till it was thrown
into confusion by a heavy fire at sixty paces’ distance. Seizing
the moment, Floyd charged with his three regiments of Cavalry, and
completely routed them, taking six standards and sabreing many men.
“Into them, with disciplined impetuosity, dashed General Floyd
at the head of the old 19th Light Dragoons and two regiments of
Native Cavalry, who in a few minutes sabred nearly the whole of
the fugitives.”[39] The retreat of the enemy became general, as
the advance of the British continued, and by two o’clock they had
completely withdrawn from the field. After the action, the army
returned and camped near Mallavelly. This success was purchased with
a loss of only seven killed, fifty-three wounded and six missing.
The 19th Light Dragoons, which suffered the most among the Cavalry
Regiments, had eight wounded, among them Captain Kennedy, three
horses killed, twenty-two wounded, and three missing. It is said
that, of the column charged by Major General Floyd, all but 230 were
put _hors de combat_.

On the 29th and 30th, the army crossed the Cauvery at Sosilay. This
move was entirely unexpected by Tippoo, who had made up his mind
that the army would march directly on Seringapatam to attack it, as
Cornwallis had attacked it seven years before. In this belief, he had
wasted the whole country in the vicinity on the north bank of the
river. By this adroit move General Harris was favourably situated to
join hands with the Bombay force on its arrival, while he was able
to draw abundant supplies from the villages in his neighbourhood,
and from the rich country in his rear, which Tippoo had preserved
for himself. Continuing his march westward, within five miles of
Seringapatam, and watched, but not molested by Tippoo’s cavalry,
General Harris took up ground for the siege, on the 5th April,
opposite the west face of the fort of Seringapatam, and at a distance
of two miles from it. The left of the army rested on the river; the
cavalry were encamped in the rear of the army.

On the 6th April at daybreak, Floyd with four regiments of Cavalry,
among them the 19th Light Dragoons, six regiments of Infantry, twenty
guns, and a corps of the Nizam’s horse, marched westward to join the
Bombay force under Major General Stuart. On the 8th, he established
communication with Stuart, and on the 10th, the two forces were
united at Periapatam. During the whole march, Floyd’s force was
closely attended by the enemy’s cavalry, who were however unable to
make any impression.

The Rajah of Coorg, our constant and loyal ally, had accompanied
Major General Stuart to Periapatam, from which place he was to return
to look after his own territories, and to arrange for forwarding
supplies to the army.

“His romantic character rendered him an object of peculiar
interest to General Floyd and the officers of the division
from the eastward; and a squadron of the 19th Dragoons sent as
an escort with General Stuart (the first European cavalry the
Rajah had ever seen) was a novelty at which he expressed his
admiration.... He accepted with enthusiasm the invitation to see
the line of the eastern division under arms, and was received
with suitable honours. He expressed a just admiration, but
continued after his return to General Floyd’s tent, to testify
his particular and unwearied admiration of the 19th regiment,
intimating a wish to procure at a proper time for his own
personal use, one of the dragoon’s swords.... On his rising to
take leave General Floyd unclasped his own sword, and in a few
words judiciously suited to the occasion, begged that he might be
permitted to present it for the Rajah’s use.”[40]

At half-past seven in the evening of the 13th, Floyd’s signal guns
were heard in General Harris’ camp, and were answered ten minutes
later to show that they were understood.[41] Twenty-four hours later,
the united forces of Floyd and Stuart joined General Harris in front
of Seringapatam. On the same date letters reached the army from the
Governor General congratulating them on the success at Mallavelly.
These letters were brought by a native messenger, written on a very
narrow slip of paper, and sealed up in a quill. This was the general
method of communication, public and private, as would appear from the
following notice in the _Calcutta Gazette_.

_Fort William, Public Department, 10th April 1799._

“Notice is hereby given that all letters, whether public or
private, for the Grand Army in the Field, are in future to be
limited to a small slip of paper not exceeding one eighth of a
sheet of quarter-post, rolled (not folded up), which restriction
will continue until further notice.”

Some of these notes, 2 inches wide by 6⅜ inches long, are still in
existence.

Some solicitude was experienced at this time concerning supplies,
and the cavalry were busily employed in protecting and bringing in
convoys. On the 16th, Floyd, with five regiments of cavalry and the
left wing of the army, brought in a party of Brinjarries who had been
sent out to the southward to collect cattle and grain. On the 19th,
Floyd marched again with the whole of the regular cavalry, a brigade
of infantry, and the Nizam’s cavalry, towards the Coveripoorum Pass,
for the purpose of protecting two large convoys of provisions en
route from Coimbatore and the Baramahal. On the 30th, he was joined
by the convoy from Rykottah, at the head of the Pass, but it was
not till the 6th May that the Coimbatore convoy arrived, and on the
11th, the whole returned to Seringapatam bringing with them forty
thousand bullocks, most of which carried loads of grain, twenty-one
thousand nine hundred sheep and other necessaries, thus placing the
subsistence of the army out of danger for many days.

But the campaign was already at an end. A practicable breach having
been made, at one o’clock on the 4th May, Seringapatam was stormed
by the British troops, and after two hours’ desperate fighting the
British colours were planted in the fortress. Tippoo’s dead body was
found at night under a heap of slain, the short-lived Mahommedan
Kingdom of Mysore was at an end, and the most imminent menace to
British rule in India was averted. This gallant feat of arms cost the
British force a loss of 367 in killed, wounded, and missing, of whom
321 were Europeans. Nine hundred and twenty-nine guns and an enormous
quantity of warlike material fell into the hands of the victors. The
French officers found in Seringapatam had commissions from the French
Government. By Tippoo’s orders, all the European prisoners who fell
into his hands during the siege had been barbarously put to death.
A number of prisoners also, who had fallen into his hands in former
wars, and who had been detained, in breach of agreements in 1784 and
1792, were massacred by his orders at the commencement of hostilities.

In an order published after the siege, General Harris thus spoke of
the Cavalry Division:--

“The advantage derived from the exertions of the Cavalry upon
every occasion, although opposed by such superior numbers on the
part of the enemy, are so important, as to give this corps the
strongest claims to the warmest approbation of the Commander in
Chief, which he requests Major General Floyd will take an early
occasion of conveying to them.”

The 19th Light Dragoons remained in Mysore during the settlement of
the country, in the course of which the representative of the old
ruling family was replaced on the Mysore throne. On the 13th November
they parted from Wellesley at Ooscottah, and marched for Vellore, and
so back to their old quarters at Trichinopoly, which they reached
about the end of the year.

Great reluctance appears to have been felt by the Government in
England, to treat services performed under the East India Company as
worthy of recognition by the Crown. The Court of Directors issued a
medal in 1808 to the officers and men of the King’s and Company’s
troops who had taken part in the operations in Mysore, but the royal
permission for the King’s troops to wear the medal in England was
not granted till 1815, in which year General Harris was raised to
the peerage for his services in 1799. In 1818 his lordship made a
special representation for some permanent badge to be bestowed on the
regiments concerned, when permission to bear the word “Seringapatam”
on colours and appointments was granted.

HORSE GUARDS,
_24th June 1818_.

SIR,

I have the honour to acquaint you, that His Royal Highness the
Prince Regent, in the Name and on the Behalf of His Majesty
has been pleased to approve of the 19th Regiment of Light
Dragoons (Lancers) being permitted to bear on its Colours and
Appointments, in addition to any other Badges or Devices which
may have heretofore been granted to the Regiment, the Word
“Seringapatam,” in commemoration of the distinguished gallantry
displayed by the Regiment in the Storming and Capture of
Seringapatam, in the month of May 1799.

I have &c.

HARRY CALVERT
A. G.

M. General
Sir J. O. VANDELEUR, K.C.B.
Colonel of the 19th Lancers.

CHAPTER VII

DHOONDIA WAO

1800-1802

Floyd leaves 19th--Dhoondia Wao--Force formed under Colonel
Wellesley to capture him--Advance on Ranee Bednore--Capture of
Koondgul, Dummul, Gudduck--Division of Dhoondia’s force destroyed
at Manoli--Dhoondia doubles back--Again hemmed in--Dhoondia
crosses Malpurba river--Pursuit drawing to a close--Dhoondia
caught at Conaghul--Dhoondia killed, and his force
destroyed--19th return to Mysore--The Rajah of Bullum--Regiment
ordered to Arcot.

For nearly nineteen years, ever since the regiment had existed,
the 19th Light Dragoons had served under Major General Floyd in
quarters and in the field, and now the time had come for separation.
In January 1800, Floyd sailed for England, the last of the officers
originally appointed to the regiment. Soon after his arrival in
England, he was appointed Colonel of the 26th Light Dragoons, and
his connection with his old regiment was permanently severed.
He afterwards become Colonel of the 8th Light Dragoons, and was
appointed Governor of Gravesend and Tilbury. He maintained his
interest in everything calculated to improve our cavalry system to
the end of his life. A General Order from the Adjutant General’s
office in Dublin, dated 7th October 1811, contains a Riding Lesson,
“suggested by Lieut. General Floyd,” which Officers Commanding
cavalry regiments are directed to practise. It is the foundation of
our present riding school system. In 1816, he was created a Baronet
for his services, and died at the age of 70, two years later.

The regiment did not remain long at Trichinopoly. It was soon called
on to take part in a short but remarkable campaign. When Seringapatam
fell, there was a prisoner in Tippoo’s power, named Dhoondia Wao, a
noted freebooter, who had at one time been in the service of Hyder
Ali. During Lord Cornwallis’ campaign in 1791-92, he had deserted
from the Mysore service. After the conclusion of peace, he collected
a party of desperate men, and committed depredations in the country
round Dharwar. Being hard pressed on one occasion by the Peishwa’s
troops, he took refuge in Mysore territory, thinking to make his
peace with Tippoo. On falling into Tippoo’s hands, he was forcibly
converted to Mohammedanism, and thrown into prison, where he remained
till Seringapatam fell. In the confusion consequent on the capture
of the place, he was set at liberty by an officer who did not know
his character. He at once collected a number of Tippoo’s disbanded
soldiers, and made for the Bednore district. In the confusion
consequent on the overthrow of Tippoo’s power, he gained possession
of many of the principal forts in the province. His adherents rapidly
increased in number, and he ravaged the surrounding country, his
exactions being accompanied by acts of the most atrocious cruelty.
Being provided with artillery, ammunition and money, he asserted
his right to the Bednore province, and assumed the title of King of
the Two Worlds. It was the golden age of adventurers. Forty years
earlier, Hyder Ali had founded a kingdom on the ruins of the ancient
principality of Mysore. In the far north Runjeet Singh was founding
a Sikh State in the Punjab. Between the Ganges and the Jumna,
Perron was aiming at forming a province under French protection.
On the borders of the Indian desert, Thomas, the Irish sailor, had
established an independent principality in Hurrianah, while other
adventurers like Ameer Khan and Ghuffoor Khan, the future founders of
the States of Tonk and Jowrah, traversed the centre of India at the
head of plundering hordes. Outside British territory was universal
confusion and anarchy, in which any man possessed of a bold heart and
a discerning brain might hope to carve out a Kingdom for himself,
whatever his faith or nationality. Any Chief whose service promised
plenty of plunder could command a following, which in a few months of
successful enterprize might swell to the dimensions of an army. But
Dhoondia had neither the talents nor the opportunity to become more
than a brigand on an unusually large scale.

[Illustration: SKETCH MAP

to illustrate the march of the Army in pursuit of Dhoondia Wao in
July, August, and September 1800.

_Walker & Boutall sc._]

Early in July 1799, the Commander in Chief sent two flying columns
into the field against him, and the Head Quarters of the Army
were also moved northwards for the same purpose. Several forts in
the hands of Dhoondia’s men were taken by storm, a number of the
freebooters were killed in various encounters, and, on the 17th
August, Dhoondia himself was defeated and forced to take refuge
in the Peishwa’s territory. There he was attacked by one of the
Peishwa’s officers named Dhoondia Punt Gokla, his elephants,
bullocks, and guns captured, and his remaining followers dispersed.
It was thought that the last had been heard of Dhoondia Wao, but in a
few months he was in the field again with a larger force than ever.
Having been joined by the whole of Tippoo’s disbanded cavalry and a
number of disaffected men from the Hyderabad country, he obtained
possession of several places in the Southern Mahratta country, and
threatened to re-enter Mysore. Dhoondia’s head quarters were in what
is now the Dharwar district, from whence he ravaged impartially the
Peishwa’s and Nizam’s territories adjoining, as well as the newly
conquered Mysore country under British administration. His belief, no
doubt, was that the three powers concerned would never act in unison,
and that, if at any time he was hard pressed on one side, he would
always be able to secure a retreat by crossing into the adjoining
territory, where mutual jealousies would afford him a temporary
asylum. A force of 5000 horse and a large body of infantry, sent
against him by the Peishwa, was defeated. His adherents increased in
numbers, till it was found that he was at the head of 40,000 men, and
beyond the control of the feeble government of the Peishwa, in whose
territory he had established himself. Owing to these circumstances,
in the beginning of May 1800, orders were sent to Colonel the Honble.
A. Wellesley, who was in full civil and military charge of Mysore,
directing him to assemble a field force, as speedily as possible,
and pursue and destroy Dhoondia Wao’s forces wherever he should find
them. To prevent Dhoondia from again securing himself by taking
refuge in the Peishwa’s country, the consent of the Peishwa was
obtained for the British troops to follow Dhoondia into Mahratta
territory, if necessary. The campaign was one of unusual character.
The task was not the subjugation and occupation of a particular
tract of country, nor the coercion of an enemy with whom terms
were eventually to be made. The object in view was the extirpation
of a band of freebooters, whose numbers had swelled to those of a
formidable army, provided with artillery and ample resources, and who
had possessed themselves of a province belonging to a power with whom
we were in alliance. “You are to pursue Dhoondia Wao wherever you
may find him, and to hang him on the first tree.” So ran Wellesley’s
instructions. By the 24th June, Wellesley’s force, which assembled
at Chitteldroog, had crossed the Toombadra river near Hurryhur,
and on the 27th, it marched on Ranee Bednore. The force consisted
of H.M.’s 19th and 25th Light Dragoons, three regiments of Native
Cavalry, two regiments of European Infantry, and five regiments of
Native Infantry. A detachment of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force,
between three and four thousand strong, co-operated under Lieut.
Colonel Bowser: the Peishwa also sent a force to assist, acting
independently. A body of the Nizam’s horse also joined Wellesley’s
force. On reaching Ranee Bednore, the advanced guard was fired on:
the fort was at once attacked and carried by escalade, and Dhoondia’s
garrison, about 500 in number, put to the sword. So atrocious had
been the cruelties committed by Dhoondia’s men, that quarter was
seldom given to any of them found in arms. The next few days were
spent in clearing the neighbourhood of Dhoondia’s partisans, and in
obtaining supplies, Wellesley then moved to Deogheri, where four
days were spent in making a bridge across the Werdah river, and
constructing a small redoubt to protect it. Meanwhile, a disaster
had occurred to the northward. Dhoondia Punt Gokla, the Mahratta
Chief who had inflicted a defeat on Dhoondia Wao the previous year,
was at Kittoor, with 10,000 horse, 5000 foot and eight guns, for the
purpose of co-operating with the British. He was suddenly attacked
by Dhoondia Wao on 30th June, his guns taken, his force routed, and
himself killed.

Wellesley, having crossed the Werdah river, marched to Savanoor on
the 12th July, leaving a small detachment to protect the bridge.
The plan Wellesley had in his mind, and which he eventually carried
out, begins to appear. It was to seize all fortified places in
Dhoondia’s hands, and, if he still remained in arms, gradually
drive him eastwards into one of the narrow angles formed by the
Kistna, Toombadra and other rivers, and destroy him. It was the
time of full monsoon, and the rivers could only be crossed by the
aid of boats, which were difficult to procure. If Dhoondia was kept
constantly on the move, he would be unable to make them. At Savanoor,
Wellesley received news that Dhoondia was advancing to attack him.
He accordingly took up a position in front of the town. Dhoondia
reconnoitred the position, and retreated, without attacking, to
Koondgul. Wellesley followed him, and, reaching that place after a
twenty-two mile march, and after the troops had been above twelve
hours under arms, carried it by escalade on the same day. But
Dhoondia had gone on, leaving only a garrison of 600 men behind him.
On the 16th, Wellesley relieved Sirhetty which was being besieged by
one of Dhoondia’s adherents, and then returned to Savanoor for the
baggage and stores he had left behind there in his rapid advance.

On the 19th, Wellesley was joined at Savanoor by the Mahratta Cavalry
that had been so roughly handled on the 30th June, when Dhoondia
Punt Gokla was killed, and on the 22nd, he moved in the direction of
Dummul, where the King of the Two Worlds was said to be. Dhoondia
had however moved off, leaving a garrison of 1000 men in the place.
The garrison was summoned, but refused to surrender. The place
was immediately attacked and carried by escalade, 26th July. On
the following day, Wellesley marched to Gudduck, and occupied the
fort which was evacuated before his arrival. Dhoondia, having thus
lost all his forts in Savanoor and in the Dharwar country, moved
northwards with the intention of crossing the river Malpurba. While
encamped at Soondooti, he heard of Wellesley’s approach, and broke up
his army into three divisions. One division with the baggage encamped
opposite Manoli, without crossing the river. Wellesley’s intention
had been to await the arrival of Lieut. Colonel Bowser’s column
that was operating to the eastward, but on hearing of the division
of Dhoondia’s force, and of the baggage being on the Malpurba
near Manoli, he resolved to attack at once. Making a rapid march
of twenty-six miles, he fell upon the enemy with the cavalry at 3
o’clock in the afternoon of the 30th, effecting a complete surprise.
The enemy were driven into the river, where great numbers of those
who escaped the swords of the horsemen were drowned: six guns, and
a great number of animals, especially horses, were captured, and the
whole force destroyed.

Meanwhile, Dhoondia with another Division had doubled back westward
along the south bank of the Malpurba. His adherents were beginning to
leave him. Part of the Hyderabad detachment, augmented by a native
cavalry regiment from Wellesley’s force, was now placed under Colonel
Stevenson, and directed to follow Dhoondia along the Malpurba, while
Wellesley moved parallel with Stevenson in the same direction, at
a distance of fifteen miles from the river. On the 5th August,
Wellesley reached Kittoor, where he halted for some days, for the
purpose of making boats to cross the Malpurba. Here he learned that
Dhoondia had crossed the Malpurba near its sources, and had again
turned eastward to Cowdelghee. Stevenson meanwhile had marched on
Hanoor. Dhoondia’s track was marked by the dead bodies of human
beings and animals.

The 16th, 17th and 18th were occupied by Wellesley in crossing the
Malpurba, to Hoobli: Lieut. Colonel Capper with a Brigade of infantry
and a regiment of native cavalry were left on the south side of the
river. At this time, Stevenson was marching along the south bank of
the Gutpurba river by Hanoor, Gokauk, Cowdelghee and Bhagelcottah;
Bowser was at Shapoor; while Wellesley moved eastwards along the
north bank of the Malpurba. Dhoondia was steadily being pressed into
the fork of the Gutpurba and Malpurba rivers. South of the Malpurba,
Capper was moving parallel with the other British forces, through
Soondooti, Hooli, and Jellahal. The only chance of Dhoondia’s escape
was by a ford across the Malpurba, a little above its junction with
the Kistna, but the swollen state of the river seemed to render the
passage improbable. Still, to provide for this contingency, the
Mahratta cavalry with Capper were directed to push on and hold the
ford; but the rough handling they had received on the 30th June, at
Kittoor, was still fresh in their minds, and they refused to leave
the British camp. As fortune would have it, the improbable happened.
The Malpurba suddenly fell, and Dhoondia crossed it on the 24th and
25th. He was however obliged to abandon five guns, some ammunition,
arms &c. and ten thousand grain-carrying bullocks, all of which fell
into Wellesley’s hands. Capper, who had taken the forts of Hooli and
Syringhi by escalade on the 22nd, was at Jellahal when he crossed.

Dhoondia was now in the fork of the Kistna and Toombadra rivers,
and had placed himself, for the moment, so far on the flank of
his pursuers that, by rapid marching, he might have doubled back
to Savanoor, where he would have done much mischief in destroying
supplies prepared for Wellesley; or he might have crossed the
Toombadra, with the aid of some local Chiefs who were believed to
be favourable to him, and entered Mysore. To prevent the execution
of either design, Wellesley crossed the Malpurba at Jellahal, and
marched, first to Hunmunsagur, and then southward to Khanagheri,
which he reached on the 7th September: Stevenson continued his march
westward, crossed the Malpurba, and reached Hoonagoonda, on the 5th;
from thence he continued eastward towards Deodroog. Between the
two forces, were the Nizam’s and Peishwa’s horse, collected in one
body. The chase was now drawing to a close. On the 8th, Wellesley
left Khanagheri with the cavalry, and pressed on to Buswapore, the
infantry and baggage following more slowly. On the 9th, he reached
Yepalpurri, the infantry being fifteen miles behind at Shinoor.
On the same day, Dhoondia broke up his camp at Mudgheri and moved
northwards towards the Kistna, but, sighting Stevenson’s force, he
turned south again, and encamped three miles from Conaghul, and
about nine miles from Wellesley at Yepalpurri.

Wellesley had news of Dhoondia’s position the same evening, but the
night was so bad, and the horses of the cavalry so fatigued, that
he did not move till next day. Marching early on the 10th, he came
on Dhoondia’s force, consisting of about 5000 horsemen, at Conaghul
six miles from Yepalpurri. Dhoondia had left his camp and baggage,
and was on the march westward, with the view of passing between the
Nizam’s and Mahratta cavalry and Wellesley’s force, which he believed
to be at Shinoor. He drew up at once in a very strong position, with
his rear and left flank covered by the village and rock of Conaghul,
“and stood for some time with apparent firmness.” Wellesley formed
the 19th and 25th Light Dragoons and 1st and 2nd Native Cavalry into
one line, and charged at their head.

“Such was the rapidity and determination of the charge made by those
four regiments, which I was obliged to form in one line in order at
all to equalise in length that of the enemy, that the whole gave way,
and were pursued by my cavalry for many miles.”[42] Dhoondia’s body
was recognised among the slain, and brought into camp on a galloper
gun of the 19th. The same evening, Colonel Stevenson came up with the
remains of the retreating enemy near Deodroog, and entirely dispersed
them, capturing their remaining guns, baggage and cattle.

The episode of Dhoondia Wao is an instance of the danger likely to
arise out of the overthrow of a military government, when a large
number of disbanded men are suddenly thrown out of employ without
means of subsistence. It was the overthrow of Tippoo’s kingdom
and the dispersal of his large army that enabled Dhoondia to
gather together so formidable a force. In like manner, it was the
disbanding of so many French officers and soldiers in 1814, that gave
Napoleon’s return from Elba a chance of success, and, in more recent
times, the trouble that arose after the conquest of Burmah in 1886
was partly due to the large number of armed men suddenly deprived of
means of subsistence, and left without control.

The short three months’ campaign had been a most harassing one to the
troops, and especially to the cavalry, while it lasted. Writing to
the Commander in Chief, at the close of operations, Wellesley says
“The 19th and 25th Light Dragoons were in fine order when they joined
the force, and I am happy to say they remain so in spite of the very
harassing nature of the operations in which they have been engaged.”

The 19th had been commanded by Major Paterson during the campaign.
At its close the regiment returned to Seringapatam with Wellesley.
Early in 1801, they were moved to Cheyloor. The country was still in
a very disturbed state. Several of the Hindoo feudatory Chiefs, known
as Polygars, claimed independence for themselves on the overthrow
of Tippoo’s rule; and, from their jungle fastnesses, committed
depredations on the surrounding country. Chief among them were
the Pyche Rajah, Kistnapah Naik, and a zemindar chief who styled
himself the Rajah of Bullum. The Mysore forces were unable to deal
effectually with them without the aid of British troops. Towards
the end of the year, arrangements were made to settle accounts with
the Rajah of Bullum, and, on the 8th January 1802, Wellesley left
Seringapatam with 540 European infantry of the 77th and the Regiment
de Meuron, four battalions of Sepoys, 500 pioneers, ten guns, and
four mortars. On the 8th, he was joined, at Chinroypatam, by the 19th
Light Dragoons, under Major Paterson, and the 5th Native Cavalry,
with their galloper guns.

The Rajah of Bullum occupied a tract of dense forest, called
Arrekeery, near the Coorg border, about eighteen miles in
circumference, covering the approach to Mysore by the Bissolee Pass.
In this tract of forest were a number of fortified villages defended
by dense bamboo hedges, and all approaches through the forest were
defended by bamboo barriers. For two years the Bullum Rajah had
been able to defy the newly resuscitated power of the Mysore Rajah;
plundering the adjoining British districts in Canara, and closing
the road between Mysore and the coast. After three days spent in
reconnoitring the ground, Wellesley delivered his attack at 10 A.M.
on the 16th. The infantry, in three divisions, entered the forest
simultaneously at three different points. The 19th accompanied
the column headed by Wellesley, which was destined to attack the
principal posts. The attack was completely successful, and, after
a brief conflict, all resistance ceased. The loss of the troops
was trifling. The 19th had two men wounded. The Rajah managed to
escape, but was captured three weeks later by some Mysore horsemen.
Before returning to Seringapatam, Wellesley reviewed the 19th at
Hassan on the 13th February, when he issued the following brief
order: “Colonel Wellesley will have great pleasure in reporting
to the Commander-in-Chief the excellent state in which he found
the 19th Light Dragoons.” The Regiment then marched to Sara, where
arrangements were made to build barracks for them. Hardly were the
barracks completed, when so much sickness broke out in the regiment,
that they were moved back to their old quarters at Cheyloor at the
beginning of June. A fortnight later, as matters did not improve,
they were ordered to Arcot. They were soon to take the field again,
to encounter the most formidable army then existing in India.

CHAPTER VIII

INDIA IN 1803

State of affairs in India in 1803--The Mahratta Confederacy--The
Peishwa--Scindia--European Adventurers in India--Scindia’s
disciplined forces--Perron--Quarrels among the Mahratta
Chiefs--Peishwa takes refuge in Bombay--Places himself under
protection of the British--Scindia’s hostility aroused--Mahratta
combination against the British--Peishwa restored to
Poona--Preparations for hostilities--Summary of campaign that
followed.

In order to understand the state of affairs existing in India at the
beginning of 1803, a brief retrospect is necessary. The Mogul Empire
had ceased to exist except in name. The old Emperor Shah Alum, still
occupied the palace at Delhi, but only as a blind pensioner of the
Mahrattas. Everywhere on the ruins of Mahommedan rule new Hindoo
States had come into vigorous existence, and were even beginning to
quarrel over the spoils. In the North the Sikhs, and to the East
the Goorkhas, were fast forming powerful States. In the South, the
short-lived kingdom of Hyder Ali and Tippoo had been swept out of
existence, while the power of the Nizam was gradually growing weaker
under the encroachment of his Mahratta neighbours. In the great
tract of country stretching from the Sutlej to the Kistna, and from
the Company’s territories in Bengal to the Bay of Cambay, a tract
measuring approximately a thousand miles from North to South, and
from East to West, the supremacy of the Mahratta Chiefs was complete.
Calcutta, Benares, Bombay, Hyderabad, and Madras were all within easy
striking distance of their predatory hordes. Their principal Chiefs
were the Rajah of Satara, the Peishwa with his seat of government
at Poona, the Scindia with his capital at Oojain, the Holkar whose
capital was at Indore, the Gaekwar at Baroda, the Bhonslay of Berar,
whose capital was Nagpore, and the Rajah of Kolapore. The nominal
Chiefship of the whole confederacy rested in the Rajah of Satara,
the descendant of Sivaji, the founder of the Mahratta power. But the
Satara Rajahs had long sunk into the grade of petty princes devoid of
military or political influence. As the power of the Satara Rajahs
declined, that of the Peishwa, the hereditary Prime Minister, rose.
Ruling at first in the name of the Satara Chief, the Peishwas had in
time grown into independent princes, wielding the whole power of the
Mahratta Confederacy. But the power of the Peishwas in its turned
waned, so that, in 1776, the Peishwa Rughonath Rao was forced to seek
asylum with the English in Bombay. Since then a partial revival of
the Peishwa’s power had taken place under the protection of Scindia,
who had become the foremost Chief in the Confederacy; and partly
owing to the abilities of the Peishwa’s Minister, Nana Farnawis.

At the beginning of 1803, Scindia was the most powerful Chief in
India. Drawing great revenues from a vast area, he held Delhi with
its pensioner monarch in the North, received tribute from the Rajpoot
States in the centre, and had a predominant voice in the Councils
of the Poona Court in the Deccan. The fiction of ruling in the name
of the Satara Chief had long ceased to be maintained: government
in the name of the Peishwa was fast becoming a fiction. A cardinal
point in the policy of Nana Farnawis was to promote friendship with
the English Government, in order to preserve some check on Scindia’s
predominance. One of the most important sources of Scindia’s power
was the large force maintained by him, disciplined and commanded by
Europeans. At that date, India swarmed with adventurers of every
nationality, two-thirds of whom were of French extraction. Their
presence in India was an important factor in the politics of the
day. Every Chief, however unimportant he might be, had Europeans to
lead his troops. The first Chief in India to thoroughly recognize
the importance of European organization and discipline had been
Hyder Ali of Mysore. But his efforts had been directed rather to
forming complete Corps of European Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry,
which never exceeded a few hundreds in number. He also had many
Europeans as leaders of his native troops, but little was done by
him to discipline native troops on the European model. It was Madho
Rao Scindia who first developed the system of disciplining his
native troops in European fashion under the celebrated De Boigne,
which quickly rendered him the most powerful Chief in India. At the
time of which we are treating, his nephew and successor, Dowlut Rao
Scindia, had in his service a force estimated at 43,650 men, with
464 guns, armed and disciplined in European fashion, and commanded
by Europeans. This formidable body of men had lived in a state of
continuous warfare ever since it was first raised in 1784. At the
head of Scindia’s disciplined forces was the Frenchman Perron, who,
had raised himself practically to an independent position. Acting as
Scindia’s lieutenant in the North, he ruled over a great tract of
country, extending from the Jumna to the foot of the Himalayas, and
from the Sutlej to the Chumbul, and, owing to difficulties in which
Scindia had become recently involved in the Deccan, he entertained
dreams of independence. Perron was known to be in correspondence with
the French Directory at Paris, and the British government was again
threatened with the possibility of the establishment of French power
in India on the ruins of the Native States in the North-West and the
Deccan. Perron and the British Governor General each recognised in
the other his most formidable foe. Next in importance to Scindia,
among the Mahratta Chiefs, was Holkar, whose military talents made
him Scindia’s most dangerous rival. His disciplined battalions,
commanded by Europeans, were second only in number and efficiency
to Scindia’s. Fortunately the dissensions between these Chiefs had
reached a height that made co-operation between them out of the
question.

From the conclusion of the Treaty of Salbye, 17th May 1782, to the
end of 1802, no serious clash of interests had occurred between the
British government and the Mahratta Chiefs. While Scindia and Holkar
alternately extended their conquests at the expense of the Mahommedan
and Rajpoot States, or strove together for supremacy at Poonah, the
British Government preserved an attitude of neutrality, till events
occurred that led Scindia into direct collision with the British
power.

In 1798, dissensions broke out between Scindia and the widows of
his late uncle Madho Rao Scindia; in the following year, the ladies
fled for protection to the Rajah of Kolapore, who was then at war
with the Peishwa. Raising a large force, the Kolapore Chief advanced
on Poona, and severe fighting ensued. The Peishwa and Scindia were
hard pressed, the flame spread, and the whole Southern Mahratta
country was thrown into disorder. Taking advantage of his rival’s
difficulties, Holkar took the field in Malwa, and ravaged Scindia’s
territories. Perron meanwhile was fully occupied in the North in
preparations to resist a threatened Afghan invasion, and could
render no assistance to his master. At this juncture Nana Farnawis
died (13th March 1800), and a fresh dispute over his property arose
between Scindia and the Peishwa. Fresh umbrage was taken by Scindia
at the permission granted by the Peishwa for British troops to
follow Dhoondia Wao into Mahratta territory. In the midst of these
embarrassments, Scindia’s presence in Malwa to oppose Holkar became
imperatively necessary, and he left Poona. His movements were,
however, so slow and ill-considered that Holkar was able to overwhelm
in succession two of his disciplined brigades, under M‘Intyre and
Hessing (July 1801), and plundered Oojain. Roused by this disaster,
Scindia quickly dealt a counterstroke on the 14th Oct. 1801, when
he signally defeated Holkar in front of Indore, and plundered that
city. Failing however to follow up the blow, his possessions in
Kandeish were devastated by Holkar, who was soon in the field again,
moving towards Poona. Scindia’s General, Sadasheo Bhow, interposed
between Holkar’s army and the capital; but Holkar was not to be
denied, and, on 25th Oct. 1802, the combined armies of Scindia and
the Peishwa were completely defeated at Poona, after a sanguinary
engagement which was fought under the eyes of the British Resident.
Dismayed at this catastrophe, the Peishwa fled to the coast, where
he was received on board a British vessel, and conveyed to Bassein,
near Bombay. There, on the 31st December, was signed the Treaty of
Bassein, by which the Peishwa formally placed himself under the
protection and guidance of the British Govt., with whom he concluded
an offensive and defensive alliance. It soon became evident that the
Peishwa’s treaty had aroused Scindia’s hostility, and that he was
preparing for war.

Till recently, Scindia had viewed the Company’s power with
comparative indifference. Their undertakings had not always been
successful; their resources, so far as he was able to judge, were
greatly inferior to his own, and, with his disciplined battalions,
he believed himself able to give a good account of any army the
British Government could bring into the field. His resentment was
first awakened by the treaty concluded in September 1798 between the
Company and the Nizam, on whom the Mahratta Chiefs conceived that
they had claims. On the outbreak of the war between Tippoo and the
English, Scindia formed the project of attacking the Nizam, but the
fall of Tippoo, before he could take the field, caused him to abandon
the plan, and Scindia became aware that the Company’s power was more
formidable than he had suspected. It was, however, no policy of
wanton aggression on our part that brought about the wars waged by
the Marquis of Wellesley. The real contest was between the British
and French power in India. England and France were locked in a deadly
struggle, which in India, on the French side, was fought out by
Native Chiefs directed by French officers in correspondence with the
French Directory in Paris. Had it not been so, our policy would have
been directed to smoothing over matters in India, while our whole
weight was thrown into the scale elsewhere. But circumstances did
not allow of this, and it was in pursuance of the policy forced on
us, that, first, Tippoo the centre of French influence in India was
struck down; next, the French party at Hyderabad were dispersed by
our assuming protection of the Nizam; and finally Scindia, the Rajah
of Berar and Holkar were humbled by the defeat of their disciplined
armies by Lake and Wellesley.

The assumption of the protectorate of the Peishwa, was regarded
by Scindia as a challenge for the mastery of India. A defensive
alliance was offered to him by the British, which he rejected, and
his apprehensions were worked on by the Bhonslay Rajah of Berar,
who was the prime mover in the war that followed. The quarrel with
Holkar was patched up, and an alliance was formed between Scindia,
Holkar and the Bhonslay to be directed against the Peishwa, the
Nizam, and the East India Company. An able and comprehensive plan
for simultaneous action was devised by Perron, by which one hundred
and fifteen thousand predatory horse and ninety-four battalions
would have at once carried fire and sword into the Company’s and
the Nizam’s territories, and would have prevented any co-operation
between the three powers thus assailed. But the plan came to nothing.
Perron’s intrigues had aroused the distrust of Scindia, while the
long existing animosity between Scindia and Holkar was too recent
and too bitter to allow of prompt co-operation. The Mahratta Chiefs
calculated on the British forces not moving till after the rainy
season, and expected no active hostilities before October. Holkar’s
forces were so tardily set in motion, that they were still on the
Nerbudda when the battle of Assaye was fought. On receipt of the news
he withdrew his troops to Indore, and avoided compromising himself
farther.

Scindia, having suspended all operations against Holkar, had marched
southwards to Burhanpore, towards the end of February, where he was
joined by the Nagpore Rajah. Their joint forces then advanced towards
the Nizam’s frontier where they encamped.

As soon as Scindia’s hostile intentions became known, a force of
nearly 20,000 men was assembled at Hurryhur, on the north-west
frontier of Mysore, under Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley. The
restoration of the Peishwa to his capital was the first thing to be
done. On the 9th March, Wellesley marched for Poona with 10,617 men,
among whom were the 19th Light Dragoons, drawing 412 sabres. The
remainder of the force was commanded by Colonel Stevenson, acting in
concert with Wellesley. On the 20th April, Wellesley reached Poona,
the last sixty miles being covered in 32 hours by the cavalry, who
had been pushed on ahead to save the city from being plundered.[43]
Holkar’s forces withdrew on his approach, and, on the 13th May, the
Peishwa arrived from Bassein escorted by British troops. Wellesley
then advanced to Walkee, six miles from Ahmednuggur, while
negotiations with the confederated Mahratta Chiefs continued. By the
end of July all hope of preserving peace had disappeared. The British
Resident with Scindia was therefore directed to withdraw, which he
did on the 3rd August.

The campaign that ensued was remarkable, not only for its complete
success, but for the extended nature of the operations carried on
simultaneously by a number of bodies of troops, acting to a great
extent in complete independence of each other, after the signal for
hostilities had been given. No better lesson in the art of war could
be studied than in the dispositions made by the Marquis of Wellesley
to bring matters to a successful issue, when the maintenance of
peace was no longer possible. A brief resumé of them here will not
be out of place. As the negotiations with Scindia made the warlike
intentions of that Chief more and more evident, troops were assembled
at various points, so that, on the outbreak of hostilities, the
distribution of forces on both sides was as follows.

The combined Mahratta Chiefs, without Holkar, could dispose of 87
battalions of Infantry, 500 guns, and over 80,000 Cavalry. In the
north, Perron had his Head Quarters at Alyghur, a fortress on which
much dependence was placed. He had over 16,000 regular Infantry,
about 5000 regular Cavalry, and a great number of irregular troops.
En route to join him from the Deccan were 25,000 men, under a French
officer, Dudrenec, of whom nearly 8000 were regular Infantry. With
Scindia, in the Deccan, were over 16,000 Infantry and upwards of
50,000 Mahratta Cavalry. In Bundelcund, under Shumshere Bahadoor,
were about 3000 regular Infantry, 20 guns, and 10,000 Cavalry.
All fortresses and fortified towns were strongly held, and there
were many detached corps of considerable strength in Cuttack and
elsewhere.

On the British side, a force under the Commander-in-Chief, General
Lake, consisting of 10,500 men, was assembled at Cawnpore, destined
to act against Perron. At Allahabad, a force of 3500 men, under Lt.
Colonel Powell, was assembled to operate in Bundelcund. At Chunar
and Mirzapore, 2000 men were stationed under Major General Deare,
to cover Benares and act on the defensive. From the Saone, near
Sasseram, to Pachet on the Damodar river, a similar force was so
disposed, under Lt. Colonel Broughton, as to cover the Company’s
territories in that region. This force was afterwards reinforced, and
took the offensive in the eastern provinces of Berar. Farther to the
south east, at Midnapore, a force of 1300 men, under Colonel Fenwick,
was posted to cover the frontier and threaten Cuttack. At Ganjam, a
force of 3540 men was ready, under Lt. Colonel Campbell, to operate
in Cuttack, supported by 500 men at Balasore, under Captain Morgan,
and 854 men under Lt. Colonel Ferguson, at Jalasore. The Cuttack
operations were however carried out by Lieut. Colonel Harcourt, in
consequence of the serious illness of Lt. Colonel Campbell at the
very commencement of field operations.

In the Deccan, to operate against Scindia, 8900 men, under Major
General the Honourable Arthur Wellesley, were encamped at Walkee near
Ahmednuggur. Farther to the eastward, and north of the Godavery, was
Colonel Stevenson with the Hyderabad subsidiary force, consisting
of 7900 men and the Nizam’s own troops, acting as a separate corps
in co-operation with Wellesley. In Guzerat, 7350 men under Colonel
Murray, acting under the orders of Wellesley, furnished a corps of
2187 men north of the Nerbudda, covering Baroda, and a second corps
of 2094 men, south of the Tapti between Songhur and Surat: the
remainder being employed to garrison Surat, Cambay, and Baroda, thus
effectually cutting off Scindia’s access to the coast. In addition
to these, garrisons of 1600 men and 2000 men were posted at Poona
and Hyderabad respectively, to ensure tranquillity and protect those
capitals, while a reserve of 4032 men, under Major General Campbell,
was stationed at Moodgul, south of the Kistna.

That the strain on the Company’s resources was very great is evident
from the fact that the Governor General sent his Body Guard into the
field, though he himself remained in Calcutta. The truest policy
demanded that the war should be actively prosecuted and brought
to a decisive termination as soon as possible, before further
complications should arise; not the least of which was the expected
arrival of a French squadron from Europe. How clearly this policy was
recognised and adopted, and how splendidly it was carried out may be
seen from the mere record of achievements. The rapidity with which
blow after blow was struck, will be best gathered from the following
table:--

_7th August_ General Lake commenced his advance towards
Delhi.

_8th_ ” The fortified town of Ahmednuggur taken
by assault, by Major General Wellesley.

_10th_ ” Fort of Ahmednuggur capitulated: taken
possession of on 12th.

_26th_ ” General Lake encamped on the frontier;
received authority to commence hostilities.

_29th_ ” Perron’s camp outside Alyghur captured by
General Lake: Perron flies to Agra.

” ” Broach, in Guzerat, taken by assault, by
Lt. Colonel Woodington.

_4th September_ Alyghur taken by storm by General Lake;
281 guns captured.

_6th_ ” Lt. Colonel Powell leaves Allahabad, and
advances on Bundelcund, which he
enters 14th.

_7th_ ” Perron surrenders to General Lake.

_8th_ ” Ganjam force advances.

_11th September_ Battle of Delhi: total defeat of Bourquien,
Perron’s lieutenant, by General Lake:
68 guns captured. General Lake
enters Delhi.

_14th_ ” Manikpatam, in Cuttack, occupied by
Lieut. Colonel Harcourt.

_17th_ ” Champaneer taken by assault, by Lt.
Colonel Woodington: Pawaghur surrenders.

_18th_ ” Juggernaut occupied by Lt. Colonel Harcourt.

_21st_ ” Balasore taken by Captain Morgan.

_23rd_ ” Scindia and the Berar Rajah defeated at
Assaye, by Major General Wellesley:
102 guns captured.

_3rd October_ Soorong, in Cuttack, occupied by Captain
Morgan.

_8th_ ” Agra invested by General Lake.

_10th_ ” Shumshere Bahadoor defeated, near
Capsah, by Lt. Colonel Powell.

” ” Force outside Agra defeated by General
Lake: 26 guns captured: town occupied.

_12th_ ” Force of 2500 men outside Agra, forced to
capitulate to General Lake.

_14th_ ” Barabuttee, in Cuttack, taken by assault by
Lt. Colonel Harcourt.

_16th_ ” Burhanpore occupied by Colonel Stevenson.

_18th_ ” Fort of Agra capitulates to General Lake:
164 guns captured.

_21st_ ” Asseerghur, attacked on 18th, surrenders
to Colonel Stevenson.

_1st November_ The last of Perron’s forces totally defeated
at Laswaree, by General Lake: 72
guns captured.

_2nd_ ” Defiles from Cuttack into Berar occupied
by Lt. Colonel Harcourt.

_29th_ ” Scindia and the Berar Rajah totally defeated
at Argaum, by Major General Wellesley:
38 guns taken.

_4th December_ Calpee surrendered to Lt. Colonel Powell.

_15th_ ” Gawilghur taken by assault by Colonel
Stevenson: 52 guns captured.

_17th_ ” Peace signed by the Rajah of Berar in
Wellesley’s Camp.

_30th_ ” Reserve, under Major General Campbell,
defeats a large body of 10,000 Pindarees,
at Moodianoor.

_30th December_ Peace signed by Scindia in Wellesley’s
Camp.

_4th February 1804_ Gwalior, which had been surrendered by
Treaty on 21st December to Lt.
Colonel Powell, capitulates; having
been besieged by that officer since
27th December, in consequence of
the refusal of the garrison to surrender
the fortress.

Our interest is, however, mainly with the forces commanded by Major
General Wellesley.

CHAPTER IX

ASSAYE AND ARGAUM

1803-1804

Wellesley reached Ahmednuggur on the 8th August. The fort was an
exceedingly strong one, and the pettah or fortified town was also
strongly held. An immediate assault on the pettah was ordered, which
was completely successful. The town was taken, at a cost of 27 killed
and 92 wounded: the 19th Light Dragoons had one man wounded. This
was a brilliant opening to the campaign, which impressed friends and
enemies alike. A Mahratta Chief, commanding a body of the Peishwa’s
horse in Wellesley’s camp, wrote to his friends in Poona: “These
English are a strange people, and their General a wonderful man: they
came here in the morning, looked at the pettah wall, walked over it,
killed all the garrison and returned to breakfast!” In attacking
fortified places that did not require regular siege operations,
Wellesley successfully followed the plan, both in 1800 and on this
occasion, of attacking by escalade directly he appeared before the
place.

At daybreak on the 10th, a battery was opened against the fort, which
surrendered on the 12th.

After arranging for the settlement of the Ahmednuggur district,
Wellesley crossed the Godavery at Toka, and advanced to Aurungabad,
which he reached on the 29th August. The crossing of the Godavery
took seven days to complete. Scindia’s force meanwhile had entered
the Nizam’s territory by the Ajunta Pass, and had taken Jaulna. The
Mahratta army then moved southwards, as if intending to cross the
Godavery and attack Hyderabad, but were baffled by Wellesley moving
southward along the left bank of the Godavery. They therefore turned
northward again, from Partoor, towards the Ajunta Pass, and encamped
in the neighbourhood of Bokerdun and Assaye. In the interval,
Stevenson, who had been operating to the north-eastward, returned and
retook Jaulna on the 2nd September. On the 6th, and again on the 9th,
he surprised the camps of two parties of Mahratta horse, after which
he halted at Budnapore, near Jalgaum. Wellesley was delayed on the
Godavery till the 18th, pending the arrival of a large convoy.

On the 21st, he reached Jalgaum, where he concerted a plan of
operation with Stevenson. According to the best information, the
enemy was believed to be at Bokerdun and Jaffirabad, about thirty
miles distant, but the enormous numbers of the enemy’s cavalry made
it impossible to procure trustworthy information by reconnoissance.
It was agreed that the two forces should advance next day by
separate roads, and fall on the enemy on the 24th. At the end of
the first day’s march, on the 22nd, news was brought to Wellesley,
at Paugri, that the enemy was moving westward, and was making for
the Ajunta Pass. The news was false. Stevenson’s line of march lay
about fifteen miles westward of Wellesley’s. On the 23rd, Wellesley
made a fourteen-mile march to Naulniah. On arriving there, he found
that, instead of being ten or twelve miles from the enemy, as he had
anticipated, he was only half that distance from them. He was also
told that their cavalry had moved off, and the infantry were about to
follow. It was necessary to ascertain the truth at once. The baggage
was accordingly left at Naulniah, under charge of a battalion of
Native Infantry and the rearguard picquets,[44] and the rest of the
force moved forwards. The General, at the same time, pushed on ahead
with the Cavalry. Without counting the force detached to guard the
baggage in Naulniah, Wellesley’s force consisted of nearly 6000 men
(of whom about 1600 were Europeans), and 14 guns, of which eight were
the 6 Pr. galloper guns of the Cavalry. There were also contingents
of the Mysore and Peishwa’s horsemen. After going about three miles,
he suddenly, about one o’clock, came in sight of the enemy’s camp
beyond the Kaitna, near the village of Assaye, in a peninsula formed
by the junction of the Kaitna and Juah rivers. The Kaitna was only
passable at certain points; the Juah had less water in it, but had
very steep banks. Along both rivers the ground was much broken by
ravines.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF ASSAYE

23rd. September 1803.

_Walker & Boutall sc._]

Wellesley’s position was a difficult one. He had unexpectedly come
into close contact with a vastly superior force ready to receive
him, instead of being in the act of moving off, as he had been led
to expect. Stevenson’s force, in co-operation with which he had
intended to fight the action, was ten or twelve miles away. Should
he retreat to Naulniah and wait for Stevenson, he would be followed
and forced to fight under disadvantageous circumstances, and, owing
to the enemy’s great superiority in cavalry, would probably lose a
portion of his baggage. He resolved to cross the river and attack
at once. He saw that if he could carry his force across the Kaitna
anywhere near its junction with the Juah, the great superiority in
numbers of the Mahrattas would be to a certain extent neutralized by
the narrower front on which they would be obliged to engage. At the
same time, should his attack fail, Wellesley was liable to be forced
back into the acute angle formed by the two rivers, and be destroyed,
like Charles XII. at Pultava. It was a choice of risks, and Wellesley
chose the smaller one. The direct ford was commanded by the powerful
Mahratta artillery, which made crossing at that point extremely
hazardous. Examining the ground with his glasses, Wellesley noticed
the two villages of Peepulgaon and Waroor close together on opposite
sides of the river, and, in spite of the denial of his guides,
jumped to the conclusion that there must be a ford there. A search
showed that he was right, and word was sent back for the infantry to
direct their march on Peepulgaon. Meanwhile the Cavalry (A. in plan)
remained facing a large body of the enemy’s Cavalry (B. in plan),
that had crossed the river. By this time, the Mahratta camp had been
struck, and their army appeared drawn up in a long line (C. in plan),
covered by the Kaitna, with a great mass of cavalry on the right, and
the guns on the left.

As the British force moved across the enemy’s front, part of it came
within range of the Mahratta Artillery, but beyond a Staff Officer
being slightly wounded, and the General’s orderly dragoon having
his head carried off by a round shot, no loss was incurred. The
crossing of the Kaitna was effected without opposition, and the
British force was drawn up across the fork between the two rivers
in three lines (F. in plan). The first two lines, with an interval
of about 300 paces between them, were composed of infantry, H.M.’s
78th Regiment being on the left of the first line, and H.M.’s 74th
on the right of the 2nd line. The cavalry formed the third line.
The Peishwa’s and Mysore cavalry remained on the south side of the
Kaitna (D. in plan), to keep in check a large body of the enemy’s
cavalry. There was a good deal of delay in crossing the Kaitna, which
was taken advantage of by the enemy to change front to the left of
their first line, and they now occupied a long line (E. in plan),
with its left resting on the village of Assaye, and defended along
the whole front by upwards of one hundred guns. The village of Assaye
was occupied with infantry, and had a number of guns disposed in
front of it. The Mahratta line of battle, exclusive of a large body
of troops detailed to guard stores and baggage, consisted of thirteen
battalions of disciplined infantry, one hundred and fifteen guns, and
over thirty-five thousand horsemen. There were also a large number of
undisciplined infantry.

While the British lines were forming, the movement was covered by
artillery fire. This was quickly responded to by the Mahratta guns,
which caused such severe losses among the British gun bullocks, that
the guns had to be left behind when the advance was made.

Wellesley had not given the enemy credit for being able to change
their front with so large a force, without falling into disarray. On
perceiving the alteration in the enemy’s position, he saw that it was
necessary to extend his front. He accordingly ordered the picquets,
which formed the right of the first line, to move obliquely to the
right, so as to allow the native infantry battalions in the second
line to come up on the right of the first line, H.M.’s 74th being
directed to take the right of the whole. Wellesley’s intention was to
force back the enemy from their guns, then, operating by his left, to
throw them back on the Juah, and complete their destruction with his
cavalry. Wellesley himself led the left of the line, while Lieutenant
Colonel Maxwell and the cavalry were ordered to support the right,
which was still greatly outflanked. Particular orders were given to
the officer in command of the picquets, which formed the battalion
of direction, to keep out of gunshot of Assaye. But the losses
caused by the Mahratta artillery were so severe, that the advance
became necessary before the formation was complete. Every shot told,
knocking over men, horses, and bullocks, and putting several of
the British guns out of action. Wellesley on the left, impatient
to advance, sent repeated messages to the officer commanding the
picquets. He was told that the guns were disabled, to which he
replied “Well, tell him to get on without them.”

As the line advanced, the Mahratta infantry gave ground, abandoning
their guns. By mistake, the officer commanding the picquets continued
his oblique movement too far, and led direct on Assaye, masking the
74th; a mistake that had an important influence on the course of
the battle. This caused a great gap in the British line, separated
the picquets and H.M. 74th from the rest of the line, and brought
them under a tremendous fire of artillery and small arms. They
were further impeded in their advance and thrown into disarray, by
having to pass some cactus hedges. The Mahratta infantry, as they
fell back from their guns, separated into two distinct bodies. The
greater number threw back their right, forming a second line (H. in
plan), with the Juah river at its back, and its left still resting
on Assaye; while one whole Brigade, under a German named Pohlman,
continued to retreat directly to its rear (M. in plan). At the same
time, great numbers of the enemy threw themselves down, pretending to
be dead, and allowed the British line to pass over them. The British
line swung round to its right (I. in plan), to attack the enemy’s
second line, and, here the first critical period of the battle
occurred. The picquets and H.M. 74th Foot were no longer able to
advance under the terrible fire to which they were exposed. Numbers
fell at every step; all formation was lost, and a body of Mahratta
horse, wheeling round the village of Assaye, charged the 74th in
flank, sabreing numbers of them. They also recaptured some of their
own guns, and gained possession of some of the British guns that had
not been able to keep up with the advance, killing the gunners and
turning the guns against the British rear. It was a critical moment,
and, with a soldier’s instinct, Maxwell saw that the time for action
had come. Advancing with his brigade, Maxwell charged the enemy’s
left, driving them into the Juah with great slaughter: then, as the
rest of the line advanced and drove the enemy into the nullah, the
Cavalry crossed the Juah, and charged the broken masses of the enemy
(J. in plan), making a horrid slaughter of them, and driving them off
the field.

“The 19th Light Dragoons, who only drew 360 swords, received the
intimation with one loud huzza! Accompanied by the 4th native
cavalry who emulated their conduct throughout this arduous day,
the 19th passed through the broken but invincible 74th, whose
very wounded joined in cheering them as they went on, cut in and
routed the horse, and dashed on at the infantry and guns. Never
did cavalry perform better service or contribute more to the
success of a battle.”[45]

But the battle was not yet over. A great body of the enemy still
remained, holding Assaye and the ground between the village and the
Juah, while the guns they had got possession of in different parts
of the field played on the rear of the exhausted British troops.
Pohlman’s brigade also was unbroken, and threatened an attack. Two
sepoy battalions sent successively against Assaye were repulsed.
Maxwell’s cavalry were still across the Juah in pursuit of the broken
Mahratta battalions, and, had the Mahratta horsemen behaved at this
juncture with the same spirit that had led them to charge the 74th,
the day might have been theirs. At this crisis, Maxwell with the
cavalry returned from across the Juah, and formed up on the left of
the British line. Directing Maxwell with the 19th Light Dragoons and
two of his native regiments to face Pohlman’s brigade, Wellesley
took H.M.’s 78th and a regiment of Native Cavalry, and moved against
Assaye. The enemy did not await the attack, but retreated across
the Juah in tolerable order. In this movement, the General had his
horse killed by a cannon shot. Then, moving along the whole line
first occupied by the enemy (E. in plan), he recaptured all the
guns, not without some severe fighting. Meanwhile, Maxwell led the
19th Light Dragoons and the two native regiments (L. in plan),
to charge Pohlman’s brigade. Both men and horses were exhausted
with the efforts they had made, and the attack, instead of being
delivered perpendicular to the enemy’s front, was made obliquely
against Pohlman’s left. The well disciplined Mahrattas reserved their
fire till they could deliver it with good effect, and Maxwell fell
dead pierced by a grape shot. The fall of their leader checked the
squadrons almost at the moment of contact, and the British horsemen
swept to the left, receiving the fire of the Mahratta infantry as
they passed, at so close a distance, that several of the squadron
officers had their horses wounded with bayonets. No further effort
was made, the squadrons “halted, and then walked, and then trotted
back.”[46] The British troops were so few in numbers, so weakened and
fatigued by their exertions, as to be incapable of farther efforts,
and Pohlman marched off the field without farther molestation.
Thus ended the conflict. The Mysore and friendly Mahratta horse,
who throughout the contest had only one casualty, would not pursue
without the British cavalry, and the British cavalry were too
exhausted to give them a lead. Out of the small British force, there
were, among the Europeans, 198 killed, 442 wounded, and 4 missing;
among the Natives, 230 killed, 696 wounded, and 14 missing. The
19th Light Dragoons, who had the greatest share of casualties among
the cavalry, lost two officers killed, Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell
and Captain Boyle, four officers wounded, Captains Cathcart and
Sale, and Lieutenants Wilson and Young; fifteen Rank and File and
eighty-seven horses killed, thirty-six Rank and File and thirty-six
horses wounded, two horses missing. Of the enemy, it was computed
that twelve hundred lay dead on the field, and four thousand eight
hundred were wounded. One hundred and two guns,[47] seven stands of
colours, and a vast quantity of ammunition and stores remained in the
hands of the victors.

It was eight o’clock in the evening before the field was entirely
clear of the enemy. The cavalry were then sent back to Naulniah
to bring on the camp equipage, &c., which they did the following
morning. The rest of the force bivouacked as best they could on the
bloody field. Wellesley, who had had one horse killed, and another
wounded with a spear, passed the night on the ground, close to an
officer whose leg was shot off, and within five yards of a dead
officer.

“The General was so overcome by his great and gallant exertions
throughout the day, so overpowered both in mind and body, that
during the greater part or whole of the following night he sat on
the ground with his head bent down between his knees, and said
not a word to any one!”[48]

Long after his victorious career was ended, he spoke of Assaye as
the bloodiest battle for the number engaged that he ever saw. Of
the ten officers forming the General’s staff eight were wounded
or had their horses shot. The 74th and the picquet battalion were
almost annihilated; one picquet half company alone had 21 killed, 22
wounded, and three missing. The 74th lost 401 of all ranks, killed
and wounded. Two of the native cavalry regiments, being newly raised,
were not as forward as they should have been, so that the brunt of
the cavalry work was borne by the 19th Light Dragoons and the 4th
Native Cavalry. Much of the heavy loss suffered by the British troops
was due to the misunderstanding of Wellesley’s orders by the officer
commanding the picquets, though, as Wellesley generously said, in a
letter written a month later, “I must acknowledge that it was not
possible for a man to lead a body into a hotter fire than he did the
picquets on that day against Assaye.” The early use of the cavalry,
however, prevented the total destruction of the enemy that he had
intended. The exhaustion caused by their efforts too early in the
battle, prevented them from entirely breaking up and routing the
disciplined Mahratta infantry.

A singular circumstance is said to have occurred after the battle.
Each of the Commanders of the three armies, put to death his head spy.

“Colonel Stevenson, because he suspected or believed his own
to have led him intentionally astray from the road: General
Wellesley, by reason of his own having given him false
intelligence respecting the march of the Mahratta Army to pass
the Ajunta Ghaut; and Scindia, from his man not having made
him acquainted with the separation of the two divisions of the
British Army.”[49]

Ample testimony has been borne to the conspicuous gallantry of the
19th in this hard fought field.

“Nothing could exceed the zeal of some of the cavalry,
particularly the 19th dragoons; every officer and man fought
as if on his arm depended the victory. As instances may be
mentioned, Lieutenant Nathan Wilson, who with his arm shattered
by a grape shot, and dangling by his side, charged on at the
head of his troop. Lieutenant Alex. Grant of the Madras Native
Infantry, Major of brigade to Colonel Maxwell, observing a gun
pointed ready to discharge on the flank of the 19th dragoons,
the match suspended on the touch-hole, with a noble impulse, in
hopes of preventing it, darted forward almost on its muzzle, and
with such force, that his horse stuck between the cannon and its
wheel: in this situation the gun went off, as he was in the act
of endeavouring to prevent it, by cutting down the artillery man.
Captain George Sale was attacking a man who defended himself
with a pike or short spear, a weapon with which all Scindia’s
Artillery men were armed; the man’s comrade standing on a gun,
made a thrust from above at Captain Sale, but it was turned off
by the breastbone and glanced off diagonally across his chest;
his covering serjeant named Strange, laid the man dead who
wounded his officer, but in the act was himself speared through
the lungs, by another man from below the gun. Captain Sale went
on but begged the serjeant to fall in the rear; this however he
gallantly refused, and rode out the day. Captain Sale and others
afterwards saw him when in hospital, blow out a candle from his
lungs--the reader will be pleased to learn that the gallant
serjeant recovered.”[50]

Among other incidents may be mentioned the case of Cornet Serle of
the 19th who was under arrest at the time of the action, for some
disagreement with his commanding officer. At the commencement of the
battle he broke his arrest, and joined his corps, and, by his gallant
behaviour throughout the day, regained permission to wear his sword
again.

Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell’s splendid service was fittingly
recognized by the East India Company, who granted a pension of £300
to his widow, “although we find that there is no example of the
Company’s making any allowance to the widow of a King’s Officer.”[51]

“As long as the word Assaye exists, and has a meaning will the
valiant deeds and reckless bravery of the old 19th Light Dragoons
the 74th and 78th Highlanders be remembered.”[52]

In his dispatch to the Governor General, dated the day after the
battle, Wellesley wrote: “I have also to draw your Excellency’s
notice to the conduct of the Cavalry commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
Maxwell, particularly that of the 19th Dragoons”: and, in a General
Order published in Calcutta on the 30th October, it was said, “The
Governor General in Council has remarked with great satisfaction
the gallant and skilful conduct of the Cavalry, commanded by Lt.
Colonel Maxwell and particularly of His Majesty’s nineteenth regiment
of Light Dragoons, a corps distinguished in India by a long and
uninterrupted course of arduous service and of progressive honour.”
Honorary colours in commemoration of the battle were granted to
the 19th Light Dragoons, the 74th and 78th “to be used by those
corps while they shall continue in India, or until His Majesty’s
most gracious pleasure be signified through his Excellency the
Commander-in-Chief.”

The damage inflicted on the Mahratta host was far in excess of that
indicated by their loss in men and material. Many of the disciplined
battalions had been destroyed, and hearty co-operation between the
leaders was at an end. They fled northwards through the Ajunta Pass,
abandoning some guns which were afterwards picked up by Stevenson,
and then separated. Scindia, who believed that he had not been
loyally supported by the Berar Rajah, retreated to Thalnair in
Khandesh; the Berar Rajah retired to his fortress at Gawilghur, while
five battalions belonging to the Begum Somroo, four of which had
been employed to guard the Mahratta camp, and therefore took no part
in the action, retreated to Burhanpore, whence they made their way
back to Sirdhana in the North West, and took no further part in the
campaign.

The sound of Wellesley’s guns at Assaye was heard by Stevenson, who
at once broke up camp and attempted to join him; but being without
information, and misled by his guides, he marched first on Bokerdun,
which he did not reach till next day, being entangled in a nullah
during the night. His force was greatly harassed by night marching
and want of rest, so that he did not join Wellesley till the evening
of the 24th. All the 25th he remained at Assaye, in order that his
surgeons might assist the wounded, and, on the 26th, marched in
pursuit of the enemy. Wellesley remained encamped near the field of
battle till the 8th October, to make arrangements for the care of
his numerous wounded, and for the captured guns and stores. Nor was
there urgent necessity for an immediate move, till something was
known of the movements of the enemy. The General’s first movements
after the battle were in the direction of Aurungabad, as Scindia
showed an intention of marching on Poona. Then, learning that
Scindia had turned back towards Burhanpore, on which place Stevenson
was advancing, Wellesley turned northwards to Ajunta. Stevenson
meanwhile had occupied Burhanpore on the 15th, and attacked the
fortress of Asseerghur, which surrendered on the 21st. Wellesley,
hearing that Scindia and the Berar Rajah had joined forces again, and
were threatening Stevenson, descended the Ajunta Pass on the 18th,
and moved northwards; but, on receiving news that Asseerghur had
fallen, and that the confederates had again separated, he retraced
his steps, ascended the Pass on the 25th, and marched to Aurungabad
to protect some convoys which were threatened by the Berar Rajah.
From Aurungabad he made several attempts to surprise the Bhonslay’s
camp without success, although he forced him to move his camp five
times between the 29th and the 31st.

Wellesley continued moving slowly eastwards, to cover the Nizam’s
territory, till the 11th November, when he struck northwards from
Patree to Rajoora, which he reached on the 23rd. For some days,
Scindia, under the influence of his defeat at Assaye in conjunction
with bad news from his forces in the North West, had made overtures
for a cessation of hostilities, and, on the 23rd, an armistice was
agreed on; the principal condition of which was that Scindia should
separate himself from the Berar Rajah, and take up a position fifty
miles east of Ellichpore.

The agreement was not however faithfully observed by Scindia, some
of whose troops took part in the subsequent battle. The Berar Rajah,
meanwhile, had entered his own territories, and was encamped at
Argaum. On the 27th, Wellesley reached Akola, and, about 2 o’clock
in the afternoon on the 29th, he joined Stevenson at Parterly, for
the purpose of undertaking the siege of Gawilghur with their united
forces.

The Berar Rajah, who was encamped at Argaum about six miles from
Parterly, had meanwhile opened negotiations with Stevenson for a
suspension of hostilities, so preparations were made for encamping at
Parterly. On putting out the picquets to take up the ground, they
were molested by parties of the enemy, and, a reconnoissance showed
the Mahratta army drawn up in battle array, on an extensive plain
in front of the village of Argaum. The troops were at once ordered
to fall in, and the two divisions moved to the front in parallel
columns. At about 1000 yards in front of the enemy was the village
of Sirsoni. It was Wellesley’s intention to pass by the left of the
village, and then, wheeling to the right, to form line in front of
it, parallel with the Mahratta line of battle. The column was led
by the native infantry picquets, accompanied by some field pieces
drawn by bullocks, followed by two native infantry battalions, all
of whom had taken part in the battle of Assaye. On the head of the
column clearing the village, the Mahratta guns opened fire with
great effect. The bullock drivers lost their presence of mind and
the management of their cattle, which turned round and threw into
confusion the ranks behind them. The troops coming up in rear, not
knowing the cause of the confusion, and suffering from the cannonade,
were seized with panic, and fell back in disorder, to seek shelter
behind the village. Wellesley, who was close by, giving orders to the
brigadiers, seeing what had happened,

“stepped out in front hoping by his presence to restore the
confidence of the troops; but seeing that this did not produce
the desired effect, he mounted his horse, and rode up to the
retreating battalions; when, instead of losing his temper,
upbraiding them and endeavouring to force them back to the spot
from which they had fled, as most people would have done, he
quietly ordered the officers to lead their men under cover of the
village, and then to rally and get them into order as quickly as
possible. This being done, he put the column again in motion,
and leading these very same runaways round the other side of the
village, formed them up on the very spot he originally intended
them to occupy, the remainder of the column following and
prolonging the line to the right.”[53]

The lesson is one to be borne in mind by those to whose lot it may
fall to rally troops thrown into disorder under fire.

In order to cover the formation, some guns were brought into action
on each side of the village, and, as each battalion came into
position, it was made to lie down, which further helped to steady the
troops. The infantry were formed into a single line, with Stevenson’s
division on the left, while the six cavalry regiments of the two
divisions, under command of Lieutenant Colonel the Honble. Arthur St
Leger, were formed in two lines in rear of the right. The British
left was covered by the native auxiliary horse. The Mahratta line was
about five miles in length, the infantry and guns in the centre, with
cavalry on both flanks.

It was half past four in the afternoon before the British line
advanced. On the signal being given, the British cavalry moved
rapidly forward, and brought their galloper guns into action against
a great body of the enemy’s cavalry and rocket men. Meanwhile, the
infantry advanced steadily against the Mahratta centre. When almost
within musket shot, a body of the enemy’s infantry, nearly a thousand
strong, composed of Arabs or Pathans, dashed forward against the
74th and 78th, and perished almost to a man under the Highland
musket and bayonet. Almost at the same moment, a body of Scindia’s
cavalry charged the British left, and were repulsed with loss, while
the 19th and the five native regiments on the right charged the
cavalry in front of them. The Mahrattas did not stand the shock,
but broke and fled, and at once the whole of the enemy’s force was
dissolved in flight. The cavalry pursued for many miles, killing
great numbers, and capturing many elephants and camels, and much
baggage. Thirty-eight guns and many standards fell into the hands of
the victors. The British loss amounted to 46 killed, 308 wounded
and 7 missing. As at Assaye, the principal loss fell on the 74th and
78th, who, between them, lost 13 killed, and 84 wounded. The 19th
Light Dragoons had 6 men wounded. The battle of Argaum was fought on
a perfectly level plain intersected by small water courses, without
any buildings or other natural obstacles between the two lines, after
they had been formed, and was carried out exactly like a field day as
then practised. The pursuit of the enemy by the British cavalry was
maintained for six miles, and was then taken up and continued by the
allied Mysore and Nizam’s horse for another twenty miles. The loss
of the enemy, in the battle and subsequent pursuit, was estimated at
five thousand men. At Assaye, the principal Mahratta loss fell on
Scindia’s troops; at Argaum the loss fell chiefly on the Berar forces.

The victory at Argaum effected a complete separation of the Mahratta
confederate chiefs. Scindia still had a considerable force in the
field, but it had ceased to be formidable after Assaye. The Berar
Rajah’s field army had disappeared, and his territories lay open to
the invading British force. Scindia’s capital was far off, and he
might yet give trouble, so Wellesley determined to finish once for
all with the Berar Rajah, in order that he might be able to devote
undivided attention to Scindia afterwards.

The day following the battle, Stevenson marched in pursuit of the
enemy: Wellesley followed a day later, and the two divisions were
re-united at Ellichpore on the 5th December. Thence they marched on
Gawilghur, a fortress of great strength, regarded as the key of the
Deccan, in which the defeated infantry from Argaum had taken refuge.
The place was taken by assault on the 15th, with the loss of 13
killed, no wounded, and three missing. Fifty-two guns, together with
a great quantity of small arms and military stores, fell into the
hands of the victors. Nagpore, the Berar Rajah’s capital, now lay
open to the British troops, and the Rajah hastened to sue for peace.
The negotiation was conducted with the decision that characterized
all Wellesley’s actions, and peace was concluded at Deogam, on the
17th, two days after the fall of Gawilghur. His hands being now free
on this side, Wellesley gave notice to Scindia, that, on the 27th, he
should regard the agreement for suspension of hostilities at an end,
unless that Chief came to definite terms. Left without an ally, with
his armies defeated both in the North-West and in the Deccan, Scindia
had no hope of continuing the struggle with success, and peace was
signed in Wellesley’s camp on the 30th December, at Surjee Anjengaum.

Thus triumphantly ended a war which for boldness of conception of
campaign, rapidity of execution, the great extent over which it was
waged, and the hard fighting that characterized it both in the North
and South, stands in marked contrast to any war we had previously
waged in India.

“The seat of war, extending over the continent of India exhibited
in the short space of four months as many general battles, eight
regular sieges and storming of fortresses, without including
that of Gwalior, which was not captured till the beginning of
the next year; in all of which British valour prevailed over
accumulated obstacles, the combination of formidable powers, and
every advantage arising from local position, military means and
numerical strength.... Their (the Mahratta) numerous armies,
amounting on an average to two hundred and fifty thousand men,
were defeated in every engagement; while the corps organized
by their French auxiliaries, consisting at the least of forty
thousand more, and upon whom the fullest reliance was placed,
were completely destroyed; in all which reverses the confederates
left in the hands of the victors upwards of one thousand
pieces of cannon, with ammunition, treasure and stores in
proportion.”[54]

But the most valuable result to England was that she learned from the
Assaye campaign that she had in her army a General who was fit to
cope with the best Generals of Europe.

The war was over, and arrangements were made for the return of the
troops to their quarters. Leaving Stevenson’s division, Wellesley
turned southwards to Jaulna, which he reached on the 19th January
1804. A few days before the conclusion of peace, in writing to the
Commander-in-Chief, Wellesley remarked: “The 19th Dragoons have now
better horses than I have ever seen with them.” It was well that it
was so, for a severe effort was still required of them. The Nizam’s
dominions were at that time infested with banditti, mostly disbanded
soldiers, who plundered the country in all directions, and had become
so daring that they had not hesitated to attack detachments of
British troops. On reaching Jaulna, news was brought to Wellesley of
a large body of freebooters who were plundering the country to the
southward. Crossing the Godavery, he marched to Neemgaum, where, on
the 2nd February, he received information of the whereabouts of the
marauders. He accordingly made up a light flying column consisting
of the 19th Light Dragoons and the rest of the cavalry that had
been with him at Assaye, the remnants of the gallant 74th, a sepoy
battalion, and details from other sepoy regiments, 150 pioneers, and
four guns,[55] and marched on the 3rd, reaching Sailgaon on the 4th,
a distance of about thirty miles in a direct line. Marching again the
same night, he came up with the freebooters about 9 A.M. on the 5th.
The cavalry charged at once, slaying great numbers and dispersing
them, at the same time capturing their guns, camp, and stores. An
unfortunate mishap occurred on this occasion. The 19th mistook
some of the allied Mahratta horse for the enemy, and charged them,
cutting down two or three of them, and having one of their own number
cut down, before the mistake was discovered. The achievement was
remarkable for the long and rapid marching performed by the troops.
Writing of it, two days later, Wellesley says:

“The exertion made by the troops is the greatest I ever
witnessed. Everything was over by 12 o’clock on the 5th, and, I
think that, by that time, the infantry must have marched 60 miles
from six in the morning of the 4th. We halted from 12 in the day
till 10 at night on the 4th, so that we marched 60 miles with
infantry in twenty hours.”

Well might he add:

“I think we now begin to beat the Mahrattas in the celerity of
our movements.”

The force then marched for Poona.

Hardly had peace been secured, when Holkar, who had hitherto held
aloof, took the field. The 19th Light Dragoons took, however, no part
in the campaign that followed, but remained encamped at Panwell near
Bombay till the end of 1804, when they marched for Arcot.

In 1807, the royal permission was given to the regiment to wear
a badge of the Elephant with the word “Assaye,” on colours and
appointments, in commemoration of the gallantry displayed by the
regiment in the battle and during the campaign. Nothing can be traced
of the honorary standard presented to the regiment for Assaye There
can be no doubt that it was given to the 19th as it was to the 74th
and 78th.

HORSE GUARDS,
_15th April 1807_.

MY LORD

I have received the Commander in Chief’s directions to inform
you, that the Marquis of Wellesley and Major General the Honble.
Sir Arthur Wellesley have represented to H.R.H. the distinguished
services of the 19th Light Dragoons in the course of the arduous
Campaigns which occurred during the period of his Lordship’s
Government in India, and have earnestly solicited permission,
that the Regiment may be distinguished by some emblematical Badge.

The Commander in Chief has with great satisfaction submitted this
representation to the King, and His Majesty has in consequence
thereof been most graciously pleased to approve of the “Elephant”
being used in Colours and Appointments of the 19th Light Dragoons
with the word “_Assaye_” superscribed, in Commemoration of the
Gallantry and good Conduct displayed in the Action fought at that
place on the 23rd of September 1803.

I have the honour to be &c.

HARRY CALVERT,
A.G.

General Visct. HOWE, K.B.
or O.C. 19th Light Dragoons.

CHAPTER X

THE VELLORE MUTINY

1805-1807

Lieut. Colonel Gillespie--19th at Arcot--Mutiny of Vellore--A
military wonder--19th ordered to England--A quarter of a
century’s changes--The “terrors of the East”--Farewell
orders--19th land in England.

“‘Trumpeter, sound for the Light Dragoons,
Sound to saddle and spur,’ he said,
‘He that is ready may ride with me,
And he that can may ride ahead.’”
--_Newbolt._

In January 1801, a second Lieut. Colonel had been added to the
establishment of the regiment, in the person of Major Edgar Hunter,
promoted from the 2nd Dragoon Guards, without purchase. Lt. Colonel
Hunter remained in England, and never joined the regiment. The
vacancy caused by Maxwell’s death at Assaye was filled for a time
by the Governor General, at Sir Arthur Wellesley’s recommendation,
appointing Lieutenant Colonel William Wallace of the 74th Highlanders
to command the 19th Light Dragoons. But the appointment was
not confirmed in England, and, the following year, Wallace was
transferred to H.M. 80th, to make way for Major James Kennedy, who
had been promoted to fill the vacancy. A little later, Lieutenant
Colonel Sir Robert Wilson was brought from half-pay of Hompesch’s
Mounted Riflemen to be Lieutenant Colonel, in place of Hunter, who
was placed on half-pay. But Wilson also did not join the regiment,
and, three months later, exchanged into the 20th Light Dragoons with
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Rollo Gillespie, who, during the short
time he was with the 19th, was destined to perform one of the most
curious feats of arms ever done by an individual.

In an age prolific of daring deeds Gillespie was already widely
known as the hero of many a desperate adventure. Headstrong and
impetuous by nature, in action he was a brave and gallant soldier
to whom nothing appeared impossible. The only child of a Scotch
gentleman settled in Ireland, at the age of ten Gillespie was
gazetted as Ensign to the 45th Foot, from which he was transferred
as Lieutenant to the 104th. On that regiment being disbanded in the
beginning of 1783, he was transferred as Cornet to the 6th Dragoon
Guards, then quartered in Ireland. Four years later, he was concerned
in an affair that attracted much notice at the time, and nearly
brought his military career to an abrupt close. While quartered at
Athy in Kildare, an altercation took place one day in Gillespie’s
room, between one of his brother officers, named Mackenzie, and
a Mr Barrington, brother of Sir Jonah Barrington, whose estate
was in the neighbourhood. In a duelling age, the Barringtons were
remarkable for their fire-eating propensities. A meeting was fixed
upon for the following morning, Barrington insisting on fighting
in a particular part of his family estate. Gillespie attended as
second to Mackenzie. Shots were exchanged without result, and it was
proposed by the seconds that the affair should be considered at an
end. Barrington objected, and a fierce quarrel arose between him and
Gillespie. A challenge to fight on the spot was given and accepted.
Gillespie, knowing Barrington’s reputation as a duellist, drew out
his handkerchief, proposing that each should hold one end of it. Both
fired at the same moment: Barrington fell shot through the heart, but
Gillespie escaped with only a slight wound, the bullet having glanced
off a button. Gillespie was tried at the summer assizes of 1788, at
Maryborough, for wilful murder, and acquitted by the jury, with a
verdict of justifiable homicide.

In 1792, Gillespie was promoted to a Lieutenancy in the newly raised
20th Light Dragoons, which was enlisted for service in Jamaica,
and maintained at the expense of the island. In the attack of
Port-au-Prince in St Domingo he distinguished himself, along with
Captain Rowley of the Navy, by swimming ashore, their swords in
their mouths, as bearers of a flag of truce. They were fired on as
they swam, and would have been shot on landing, if Gillespie had not
made himself known as a freemason to the Governor, who was also a
fellow craftsman. While in St Domingo, an attack at night was made on
Gillespie’s house by eight men. Awakened by the cries of his servant,
who was being murdered, he attacked the assailants with his sword,
and killed six of them. The remaining two fled, after inflicting
a dangerous wound on him. On exchanging to the 19th, he obtained
permission to find his way out to India overland, and travelled
through Germany, which was then in the hands of the French, Austria,
Servia, Constantinople, where he fought a successful duel with a
French Officer who picked a quarrel with him, Aleppo and Baghdad. The
journey was a hazardous one at that time, and he had more than one
narrow escape. On reaching Arcot, the command of the whole garrison
devolved on him, in virtue of his brevet rank. Hardly had he assumed
the command, when an event occurred at the neighbouring station of
Vellore that will always be associated with Gillespie’s name.

Matters relating to food, dress and other petty details of social
life, which in Europe are treated as matters of personal caprice,
have, in the East, become so intermingled with religious observances,
that they have, in the course of time, come to be regarded as an
essential part of the religion of the people, and of paramount
importance in the conduct of their lives. Nowhere are these
quasi-religious observances so tenaciously held as in India, and
nowhere do they relate more to matters which in other countries
are held to be of trivial importance. The lesson is one that is
continually forcing itself on the notice of Indian administrators,
and is continually being forgotten.[56]

After the fall of Seringapatam, in 1799, the strong fortress of
Vellore was selected to be the place of residence of the numerous
family of Tippoo Sultan. Beyond being required to reside in Vellore,
they were under no restraint. They were in receipt of large money
allowances from the British Government, and they had gathered around
them a swarm of needy followers who were ripe for any mischief. In
November 1805, Lieutenant General Sir J. Cradock, who had assumed the
command of the forces in Madras a few months earlier, issued an order
establishing a new pattern of turbans for the native army. Two months
later, a volume of regulations for the army was issued from the
Adjutant General’s office, in which Native soldiers were forbidden
from wearing caste marks on their faces while in uniform, and the
shaving and trimming of beards and mustachios was prescribed, in a
manner to assimilate sepoys to English soldiers. In April, made-up
patterns of the new turbans were sent to different regiments. The
men took it into their heads that these turbans closely resembled
the hats worn by half-castes and native Christians; and, connecting
this with the orders about caste marks and shaving, leaped to the
conclusion that their forcible conversion to Christianity was
intended. A sepoy battalion at Vellore at once made known their
refusal to wear the turban. The Commander-in-Chief, unable to
understand the feelings aroused by his orders, treated the refusal
as a mere matter of insubordination. The battalion was sent away
from Vellore, another being brought in its place; and a number of
non-commissioned officers and men in the battalion were punished.
Hardly had this taken place, when it became known that in other
places the same objections to the new turban had been manifested. The
attention of Government was now roused, but still nothing was done to
repeal the obnoxious order. The punishment that had been meted out
to the battalion at Vellore only served to confirm the fears of the
rest of the native garrison. Meetings were held, at which retainers
of the Mysore princes attended, and did their best to foment
mischief and increase the fears of the sepoys, while at the same
time communications were opened with other sepoys in the different
Madras garrisons, encouraging them to combine in resisting the attack
on their religion. In the beginning of July, the garrison of the
fort consisted of four companies of H.M.’s 69th regiment amounting
to 11 officers and 372 rank and file, and a battalion and a half
of sepoys, amounting to 35 native officers and 1775 rank and file,
with their European officers. A considerable number of the sepoys
lived in the pettah, their arms being kept in the fort. The fort and
garrison were under the command of Colonel Fancourt of H.M.’s 34th
Regt. No suspicion existed that any danger threatened; while the
Government departments were still corresponding with each other, and
deliberating about the new turban, and the feeling it had caused in
the native army, without further warning, the storm burst.

It happened that a field day for one of the sepoy battalions had been
ordered for the early morning of the 10th July. It was customary on
such occasions for the sepoys, instead of remaining in their huts
in the pettah, to sleep inside the fort, in order to get under arms
without delay in the morning. The sepoy guards inside the fort
were furnished by the other native battalion. So favourable did the
opportunity appear to the mutineers, that it led to a premature
explosion of the plot that had been formed in concert with sepoys
in other stations. At three o’clock in the morning of the 10th, a
general attack by the sepoys was suddenly made on the men of the 69th
and the European officers in the fort. At the same moment, the guards
and sentries were attacked and overpowered, the sick men in hospital
massacred, the officers’ quarters surrounded and fired into, while
the principal body of mutineers poured volley after volley into the
barracks where the 69th were sleeping, and brought two fieldpieces
to play on them, obtained from the magazine. The men surprised and
shot down in their sleep, and without officers, could do little more
than shelter themselves as they best might, and hold the entrance
to the barracks. Colonel Fancourt, with several other officers, was
shot down at once, and the complete massacre of every European in
the fort appeared inevitable. Without waiting for the completion of
their work, the mutineers brought out one of the sons of Tippoo, and
proclaimed him Sultan, hoisting at the same time a Mysore flag that
had been prepared for the occasion.

In the confusion and darkness, a few officers and a sergeant of the
69th, named Brady, managed to meet in the quarters of one of the
officers. After maintaining themselves some time, they broke out and
forced their way into the 69th barracks, on which a heavy fire was
still kept up. Having rallied the survivors, they sallied out through
the windows, and gained the adjoining ramparts under a heavy fire. It
was now broad daylight, and the men, who had had at the outset only
six cartridges each, had scarcely any ammunition left. Nevertheless,
they made their way along the ramparts, driving the mutineers before
them, till they reached the Magazine which was on the opposite
side of the fort. Finding that all the ball ammunition had been
already removed by the mutineers, they retraced their steps as far
as the work over the main gateway, after pulling down the rebel
flag. Here they resolved to make their last stand, their numbers
greatly reduced, the only unwounded officers left being two Assistant
Surgeons, and the whole party being exposed to a continual fire to
which they were scarcely able to respond. They had obtained a few
cartridges from the pouches of dead mutineers, with which they still
kept up a feeble appearance of defence. In the confusion of making
their way along the ramparts to the Magazine, some thirty men of the
69th, with two or three officers, got separated from the main body.
Finding a rope suspended from the wall, which had been used to admit
mutinous sepoys, they let themselves down by it, and took refuge in a
small detached redoubt, where Lt. Colonel Forbes with a few unarmed
sepoys who had remained faithful, had taken post. Hopeless as the
whole situation appeared at this juncture, help was fast approaching.
It happened that Major Coates of the 69th and several of the native
infantry officers resided outside the walls. On being aroused by the
firing and tumult, and being unable to enter the fort, Coates guessed
what had happened, and at once dispatched an officer to Arcot with a
letter to Gillespie.

Gillespie had appointed that very morning to ride over to Arcot,
to breakfast with Colonel Fancourt. He had mounted his horse at
daybreak, and started on his ride, accompanied by Captain Wilson of
the 19th, when he was met by Coates’ messenger riding at full speed,
who told him that the gates of the fortress were shut, that there
was heavy firing and a dreadful noise within. Making at once for
the Cavalry lines, Gillespie was in a few minutes hastily galloping
along the road to Vellore, at the head of a squadron of the 19th
under Captain Wilson, and a troop of the 7th Native Cavalry, leaving
orders for the rest of the cavalry and the galloper guns of the 19th
to follow as soon as possible, under Lieut. Colonel Kennedy. As the
troopers approached the walls, they were seen by the little party who
still held out over the gateway. The 69th had been in Jamaica four
years before. To Sergeant Bradys astonishment, he beheld at the head
of the little band of dragoons the well-known Colonel Gillespie, whom
he had seen only a short time before in the West Indies. “If Colonel
Gillespie be alive, God Almighty has sent him from the West Indies
to save our lives in the East!” he exclaimed. The moment was indeed
most critical. The small party over the gateway had fired their last
cartridge, and the sepoys, who for a time had dispersed to plunder,
were gathering to complete their work. On seeing the relief party
advancing, a great number of the mutineers retired to the further
ramparts, leaving the gateway and one bastion in possession of the
little party under Sergeant Brady. The entrance to the fortress was
through four successive gates. The two outer gates were fortunately
open, and the drawbridge was down. Encouraged by Gillespie, some of
the 69th let themselves down by their pouch and bayonet belts, and
opened the third gate from within, not without losing several of
their number, but the fourth and the strongest gate was beyond their
powers. In order to open it, Gillespie formed the desperate expedient
of forcing the wicket and opening the gate from the inside. The
wicket was forced, and Gillespie for a brief interval, accompanied
by Captain Wilson and three men on foot, stood inside the fort,
exposed to the fire of the square and palace yard full of men. But
their efforts to break the locks and force the bars were fruitless,
and, seeing that perseverance in the attempt could only end in their
destruction, the little party withdrew. Still casting about for some
means of joining the party over the gateway, Gillespie suddenly
spied a rope. The end was at once thrown up and secured, and in a
few minutes, by its assistance, Gillespie joined the remnants of the
69th over the gateway. Seeing a pair of regimental colours on the
wall Gillespie seized them, and, collecting as many of the 69th as
he could find, at once headed a bayonet charge against a three gun
battery, out of which the enemy were driven. Though there was not
a single round of ammunition procurable, a gun, turned round and
pointed towards the mutineers, held them in check, at a time when
every minute was valuable. But the effect did not last long, and just
as it seemed as if no further effort could be made to stave off the
impending fate of the party, the remainder of the 19th with their
galloper guns suddenly appeared at the gate. Forcing his way back to
the wall above the gateway, Gillespie gave orders for the gate to be
burst open, which was done with the first shot. The great square was
full of men ready to dispute the entrance of the cavalry, and the
entrance being very narrow, and moreover being commanded by two guns,
Gillespie called on the remnant of the 69th for one final effort.
Putting himself at their head, a gallant bayonet charge was made to
clear the entrance for the cavalry, which was attended with further
loss. The dragoons poured in, headed by Captain Skelton of the 19th,
and supported loyally by some of the 7th native cavalry, and the
work of retribution commenced. Between three and four hundred of the
mutineers were cut down in the fort, while numbers, who escaped by a
sally port, were caught and slain outside, by a squadron of the 19th
under Lieutenant Young, and a party of the 7th Native Cavalry under
Lieutenant Woodhouse. One party of mutineers maintained themselves
for some time in one of the barracks, firing on all who approached;
till some of the 19th dismounted and stormed the building, putting
them all to the sword. By 10 o’clock all was over, and the safety of
the fortress secured, but Gillespie has left it on record that, had
he delayed scaling the wall for five minutes, none of those inside
the fort could have escaped. The loss of the 69th amounted to 115
rank and file killed, and 76 wounded. Of the officers of different
regiments, fifteen were killed and five wounded. Several, who had
been unable to make their way to the 69th barracks, saved themselves
by concealment during the tumult. Among the 19th Light Dragoons, one
trooper was killed and three wounded, a loss that would have been
much greater but for the gallantry of the 69th in clearing a space
for the cavalry to form in after entering the fort. Gillespie was
accidentally ridden down by a dragoon, and badly bruised, in the
_mêlée_.

Investigation showed that the sepoys in many other stations were
prepared to mutiny, and, but for the failure at Vellore, which
was the centre of disaffection, would have risen. By Gillespie’s
resolution and intrepidity in stamping out the mutiny before it could
gather force, a great and unexpected danger had been averted. Well
might the Commander-in-Chief say that Gillespie had performed “a
military wonder.” The princes of Tippoo’s family were at once sent
down to Madras, escorted by the 19th Light Dragoons, and embarked for
Calcutta, on board the _Culloden_, on the 30th. The 19th remained in
Madras three days, encamped by the Race Stand, and then returned to
Arcot. Gillespie was employed at Wallajabad and other places where
dangerous symptoms of disaffection had appeared. At the same time, he
was appointed to be Inspector and Exercising officer of Cavalry in
the Presidency, but the appointment was discontinued as unnecessary,
a year later, by the Court of Directors. To show their appreciation
of his services, the Court of Directors granted Gillespie a money
reward of £2500. A proportionate sum was granted to Sergeant Brady,
who was also recommended for a Commission, and each non-commissioned
and private of the 19th Light Dragoons who had been employed at
Vellore, received a gratuity of one month’s pay. Suitable rewards
were also given to the men of the native cavalry, who behaved loyally
on the occasion. In consequence of the mutiny, both the Governor and
the Commander-in-Chief were recalled to England.

Gillespie’s connection with the 19th practically terminated three
months later, when the regiment left India, and the rest of his
career does not come within the scope of this history. On the
regiment sailing for England, he remained in India, and, in the
following year, exchanged into the 8th Light Dragoons with Lieut.
Colonel John Ormsby Vandeleur. His gallant deeds at the conquest of
Java, and subsequently, while in command of the troops there, can
never be forgotten. His death was in keeping with his whole life.
He fell under the walls of Kalunga in the Deyrah Dhoon, on the 31st
October 1814, at the beginning of the first Nepaul War, while vainly
trying to force an entrance at the head of some dismounted dragoons,
after the first attack had failed. His remains were carried to Meerut
for interment. By the irony of fate, on the 10th May 1857, the first
shots of the great sepoy mutiny were fired within a mile of the
monument over his grave, and were the beginning of events that at
one time threatened to involve British power in the East in ruin,
and that have changed the whole course of Indian history. If that
gallant spirit was still permitted to take interest in the events of
that day, how it must have chafed at the exhibition of incapacity and
indecision that led to such disastrous consequences. In view of what
happened at Vellore, it is allowable to believe that the Great Mutiny
of 1857 would never have assumed the proportions it did, had the
first outbreak been met by the same display of energy and resolution
as was shown, under similar circumstances, fifty-one years earlier.
On the 2nd January 1815, before the news of his death reached
England, Gillespie was gazetted as K.C.B. A monument to his memory,
by Chantrey, was erected in St Paul’s Cathedral, at the expense of
the nation.

[Illustration: _Major General R. R. Gillespie_

_from a miniature in the possession of his grandson Colonel
Gillespie._

_G. Chinnery, pinx._
_Walker & Boutall, ph. sc._]

The time had now arrived when the 19th was to bring to a close its
long and distinguished career in India. Orders were received for
the regiment to march to Madras, for embarkation to Europe by the
next homeward bound fleet. At Poonamallee, on 5th October, they made
over their horses to the 25th Light Dragoons, who had been brought
down from Bengal, by sea, to take their place. In the twenty-four
years that had elapsed since the regiment had landed in India, great
were the changes it had witnessed. At the time of its arrival, the
very existence of the British settlements in Southern India hung
by a thread. England had then been at war with France, and the two
countries were still at war. But the conditions were changed. Now
the French flag had disappeared from India, and not a single native
power dared meet a British army in the field, without risking its
own existence. From a trading corporation the East India Company had
grown into a great and powerful government, whose supremacy in India
was unchallenged. In achieving this result, the 19th Light Dragoons
had played no small part. On their first arrival in India the
prevailing sentiment with which they were regarded was curiosity. The
horsemen of native powers were numbered by tens of thousands. Their
method was to waste and ravage the country round an enemy’s force, to
harass the line of march, to cut off stragglers, to intercept convoys
and to wear down an enemy by these indirect methods. To charge home,
sword in hand, into the ranks of an unbroken enemy was foreign to
their ideas of properly conducted warfare. The first appearance of
the 19th in the field came therefore as a surprise to friend and
foe; it was like the introduction of a new weapon. Before the first
campaign against Tippoo was six months old, the reputation of the
19th Light Dragoons had penetrated to every part of southern India.
The impression thus created grew with every successive appearance of
the regiment in the field of action; and, as long as they remained in
India, they continued to evoke an amount of interest and attention
that was bestowed on no other regiment in the service. One who
charged with them at Assaye and Argaum, and fought his way into
Vellore with them, though not belonging to the regiment, wrote of
the nineteenth as “a fine specimen of what a regiment ought to be.
They called themselves the ‘Terrors of the East.’ Indeed, such was
the respect in which they were held by the natives, that when they
embarked for England, all the black town of Madras was emptied to see
them off.” Before sailing, an entertainment in their honour was given
by the Commander-in-Chief, and the subjoined orders were published:--

_General Order (Madras Govt.)._

_Fort St. George, October 10th, 1806._

[Sidenote: 1806.]

On the occasion of the intended return of His Majesty’s 19th
regiment of light dragoons to Europe, the right honourable the
governor in council feels the greatest satisfaction in testifying
in the most public manner, his highest approbation of that
distinguished and valuable corps. From the period of the arrival
of his majesty’s 19th dragoons in India, in the year 1782, until
the present time, that regiment has shared in almost every action
of difficulty and of glory, in which the British arms have
been engaged during that long and eventful interval, and has
deservedly established a degree of reputation seldom equalled,
never surpassed. His lordship in council deems it unnecessary
at this moment to enumerate the various instances in which his
majesty’s 19th dragoons have rendered the most important service
to their country: but the glory acquired by that regiment in the
field of Assaye, and the important advantages which resulted
from its bravery, discipline and activity, on a late memorable
occasion, (furnish?) an instance which cannot be omitted, and
which can never be obliterated from the annals of this country,
or from the memory of the British nation. His lordship in council
was pleased, by a general order under date the 27th August, 1805,
to confer a particular mark of his lordship’s approbation on his
majesty’s 74th regiment, at the period of the embarkation of
that distinguished corps for Europe, by granting to the officers
a donation of three months’ full batta. Impressed with similar
sentiments on the present occasion, his lordship in council
has, in consideration of the long and brilliant services of his
majesty’s 19th regiment of dragoons, resolved to extend to the
officers of that regiment a donation of the same amount, which is
accordingly directed to be paid previously to their departure.

_General Order. (Lieut. General Sir J. Cradock)_

_Head Quarters, Choultry Plain,_

_Oct. 13th, 1806._

[Sidenote: 1806.]

The eulogium that government has been pleased to express in
their late order upon the services of his majesty’s 19th light
dragoons, throughout its long and distinguished course in
this Country, leaves to the commander-in-chief but little to
add, except his warmest wishes for the continuance of their
uninterrupted honor and success, in other regions of the British
Empire. The records of government everywhere proclaim the value
of his majesty’s 19th light dragoons, in India, and stamp
the occasions, where this regiment has perhaps secured the
foundations of our empire.

Such subjects belong to the highest authority, and have only
been briefly mentioned with grateful acknowledgment. The bounded
limits of an order were unequal to the history.

It therefore only remains with the commander-in-chief, to
state the humbler sentiments of approbation of the discipline,
good order, obedience, and harmony that prevail in the 19th
light dragoons, which confirm all opinion, that such are the
foundations that lead to glory, cause admiration and respect,
while a regiment remains in a foreign country, and ensures to
them, on their departure the deepest regret.

And so, on the 20th October 1806, twenty-four years to a day since
they first arrived in Madras, the 19th Light Dragoons with their
honours thick upon them, embarked in the _Streatham_, _William
Pitt_, and _Jane Duchess of Gordon_, to sail for England three days
later, under convoy of the squadron commanded by Rear Admiral Sir
Edward Pellew. The voyage was uneventful. Table Bay was reached
30th December, and St Helena 23rd January. On the 18th April 1807,
the regiment disembarked at Tilbury, one detachment being landed at
Plymouth, and marched to Northampton. A muster taken a week after
landing shows the strength of the regiment to have been 245 rank
and file. Recruiting parties were at once sent out to Birmingham,
Glasgow, Dublin and Waterford.

CHAPTER XI

WAR WITH UNITED STATES

1808-1813

19th in Ireland--United States declare War--19th
ordered to Canada--United States’ plans--Operations of
1812--Mackinaw--Detroit--Armistice--Battle of Queenston
Heights--General Brock killed--Montreal threatened--Operations
of 1813--Proctor’s victory at Frenchtown--Fort Meigs--United
States’ victory on Lake Erie--Battle of the Thames; Proctor’s
defeat--York captured--Fort George and Erie evacuated--Stoney
Creek: Harvey’s brilliant exploit--Fitzgibbon’s success at Beaver
Dam--Arrival of squadron of 19th on Niagara frontier--Engagement
on Lake Ontario--Fort George re-occupied--Fort Niagara
surprised--Black Rock and Buffalo captured--Abortive attack
on Sackett’s Harbour--United States’ operations against
Montreal--Battle of Chateaugay--Battle of Chrystler’s
Farm--Importance of Kingston and Sackett’s Harbour.

During the following six years the regiment remained at home,
and took no part in the stirring events then occurring in Spain
and Portugal. At the end of 1808, they moved from Northampton to
Norwich and Ipswich, with a detachment at Birmingham, while their
recruiting parties were actively engaged in different parts of the
United Kingdom. In March 1809, the regiment moved to Romford, and, in
December, embarked for Ireland. For two years the regiment remained
in quarters at Tullamore, Philipstown and Longford. By an order dated
23rd April 1811, the establishment was augmented from 400 to 570
privates, making the total strength of all ranks 685. In March 1812,
the regiment marched to Clonmel, and in June, to Dublin. The regiment
was soon to proceed on active service again.

[Illustration: KING’S GUIDON.

SQUADRON GUIDON.

GUIDONS OF THE XIX^{TH} LIGHT DRAGOONS.

_to face p. 172._]

On the 18th June, 1812, the United States declared war against
England. The declaration reached the British Government on the 30th
July; but, as the British Orders in Council respecting the trade of
neutral nations, that had been put forward on the American side as
the chief reason for the war, had been rescinded on 23rd June, it
was still believed in England that peace would be maintained. In
spite of the hostilities that immediately commenced, it was not till
October that conditional orders for reprisals were issued, and the
formal declaration of war by Great Britain was not made till 9th
January 1813. The war party in the States had the upper hand at the
time: they were determined on war, and cared little for the pretext.
To outward appearance, it seemed, in 1812, that England could not
much longer hold out against Napoleon, who had the whole continent
of Europe, except Russia, at his feet, while the British armies in
Spain seemed to make no progress. In truth Napoleon’s power was
already beginning to totter. The British armies in Spain, hardened
and consolidated by three years of war under their great leader, were
invincible. Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz had fallen, and Wellington had
already begun his victorious advance that was to carry him across the
Pyrenees. At the same time Napoleon was preparing for his disastrous
invasion of Russia which dealt the first deadly blow to his power.
But the war party in the United States were unable to discern this.
The British troops in Canada were few in number, the colonists were
believed to be lukewarm in their loyalty to Great Britain, and the
war party promised their countrymen that Canada would prove an easy
prey. Under the thin veil of resenting injuries a war of conquest was
intended.

On 6th March 1813, an order was issued for three squadrons of the
19th Light Dragoons, completed to eighty rank and file per troop,
to be held in readiness to embark for North America, under Lieut.
Colonel the Hon. J. O’Neill. The horses of the officers, sergeants
and corporals were to be taken, but all other horses were to be left
behind. In the same month the regiment reached Cork, and embarked
on 4th April, in company with other troops, under convoy of the
_Sybelle_ frigate and _Cygnet_ sloop; almost the first reinforcements
sent from England to Canada since the United States’ declaration of
war. They reached Quebec about the 17th May,[57] and were at once
sent to La Prairie on the St Lawrence near Montreal.

The war in which the regiment was about to engage, was one in which
cavalry could play only a subordinate part. The country in which
they were to operate was a vast expanse of forest and swamp, with a
few sparsely inhabited clearings. The chief mode of communication
was by boat. The war was one to be fought out by small bodies of men
far from their supports, wielding the axe and the oar as much as the
rifle: forage was hard to get, and there was little place for mounted
men. Under these conditions, the 19th Light Dragoons were only
engaged in small detachments, never more than a squadron, seldom more
than a troop. Their duties were of a most harassing kind, on outpost
and reconnoissance duty. Never once did they have an opportunity of
crossing swords with the enemy’s cavalry. The only cavalry charges
recorded during the war were those made by the United States’ cavalry
that overwhelmed Proctor’s force at the battle of the Thames, and the
charge repulsed by the 89th at Chrystler’s Farm.

[Illustration: THE CANADIAN FRONTIER

in 1812.

_Walker & Boutall sc._]

Immediately on landing, one troop, taking with it only ten horses,
was dispatched to Upper Canada. With it went Lieut. Colonel O’Neill
and a convoy of ammunition. The three hundred horses, that were to
have been ready by 1st July, had not been obtained. A fortnight
later, a second troop followed, with sixty-five horses, most of
which had been brought from Ireland with the regiment. The squadron
was destined for the Niagara frontier, where it was engaged, under
Captain Lisle, till the end of the war.

Meanwhile, in spite of the belief in England that war would not
be prosecuted by the States, when the rescinding of the orders in
Council was known, hostilities had been in active progress from the
first declaration. The British regular troops in Canada, in June
1812, were about 4500 in number; of which 3000 were in garrison at
Quebec and Montreal, the remainder being scattered along the Upper
Canada frontier. Their small number was effectively supplemented
by the Canadian militia, who fought for the protection of their
homes with a gallantry and devotion that could not be exceeded.
Their numbers were however liable to constant fluctuations owing
to the frequent necessity for their presence at their homes for
agricultural purposes. A considerable number of Indians also, at
times, co-operated; allies of doubtful value, who could never be
relied on, and whose numbers varied from day to day. In population
and resources the United States were in the proportion of more than
ten to one compared to Canada. On the British side therefore the war
was necessarily of a defensive character. The points on which Canada
was most vulnerable were, 1. on the Detroit frontier between Lake
Huron and Lake Erie; 2. on the Niagara frontier between Lake Erie and
Lake Ontario; and, 3. on the line of the St Lawrence between Kingston
and Montreal. The United States’ plan was to invade Canada on all
three points, and three separate expeditions were prepared for the
purpose. The first attack was made on the Detroit frontier, where,
under pretence of punishing some Indians, troops had been assembled
before the declaration of war.

Before noticing the more important operations of 1812, it is
necessary to mention the capture of the United States’ fort and
island of Mackinaw, which was effected by a party of regulars,
militia and Indians, under Captain Roberts, on 17th July, and
retained till the end of the war. The capture was of some importance,
as the island commanded the navigation between Lakes Michigan and
Huron.

On the 12th July, a United States’ force of 2500 men, under General
Hull, crossed from Detroit, and occupied the small village of
Sandwich. On the same day Hull issued a proclamation that struck the
keynote of the war. In it he called on the Canadians to seek his
protection, threatening them with a war of extermination should they
venture to take up arms against him. Acting in the spirit of this
proclamation, the United States’ troops throughout the war committed
excesses against the non-combatant population that had long been
condemned by all civilized nations, and effectually alienated any
sympathy they might have found among the Canadians. The reprisals,
that are inevitable in such cases, followed, and the war was marked
by a rancour on both sides, that contrasted strongly with the more
decorous but not less deadly warfare that was being waged by French
and British troops in Spain.

The small British force of 350 men in the neighbourhood of Detroit,
consisting mainly of militia, and not counting Indians, were gathered
at Amherstberg under Lieutenant Colonel Proctor. Hull, instead
of advancing at once, and overwhelming it, remained at Sandwich,
indulging in petty outpost affairs. Proctor passed a small force
across the river, and cut off his supplies, which forced Hull to
withdraw his force, on the 7th August, from the Canadian side, and
retreat to Detroit. On the 12th, Major General Brock, commanding
in Upper Canada, reached Amherstberg with three hundred men, and,
three days later, crossed the river, and advanced on Detroit. On the
16th, Hull capitulated with his whole force. Over fifteen hundred
prisoners, thirty-three guns, 2500 stands of arms and the Michigan
territory passed into the hands of the British.

At this time a lull in the war took place through the action
of Lieutenant General Sir George Prevost, Governor, and
Commander-in-Chief of Canada, who, throughout the war, was the
evil genius of the British cause. In the United States’ manifesto
the British Orders in Council had been put forward as the chief
cause of the war. On hearing that the orders had been repealed, Sir
George Prevost believed that the war would not be persevered with.
He accordingly, in spite of the hostilities that had occurred,
proposed an armistice to the United States’ commander of the force
threatening Montreal, till the latter should receive further orders
from Washington. But the United States’ government were determined
on war, and hostilities were resumed on 8th September. The armistice
was of much advantage to the States, as, while it lasted, they were
able to convey without hindrance, by water, the supplies collected
at Oswego for the use of their troops destined to act on the Niagara
frontier, at a time when the British had an undoubted superiority on
Lake Ontario.

The United States’ force threatening the line between Lakes Erie and
Ontario numbered 6300 men, under General Van Rensselaar. To oppose
them, Major General Brock had but 1200 men (by one account 1500),
a large proportion of which were militia and Indians. These troops
were posted at Fort Erie and Fort George, the two extreme points of
the line, with a few companies at Queenston and one or two other
points to command landing places. Early in the morning of the 13th
October, about 1600 United States’ troops crossed at Queenston, and
made good their footing. In the course of the fighting General Brock
fell at the head of his men, and the United States’ commander was
badly wounded. Reinforcements coming up, in the afternoon, from Fort
George, under Major General Sheaffe, brought the British-Canadian
force on the spot up to about 1000 men including Indians. An attack
was made on the enemy’s position: they were driven into their boats,
and the United States’ General Wadsworth, with 958 officers and
men were made prisoners. One gun and a colour were also captured.
The loss on the British side cannot be exactly stated. Besides the
General, one officer was killed and two wounded. Among the rank and
file there were about 16 killed and 70 wounded, and about a dozen
Indians: but the success was dearly bought with the death of Sir
Isaac Brock.[58]

At one in the morning of 28th November, another attempt was made
to cross, about two miles below Fort Erie. But the crossing was
mismanaged, and the whole attempt carried out in a half-hearted way.
After inflicting and sustaining some loss, the United States’ troops
re-embarked, and thus ended for the year all serious operations on
this part of the frontier.

The United States’ force intended to operate against Montreal was
equally unsuccessful. Assembled at Plattsburg on Lake Champlain,
about 7000 strong, under General Dearborn, it advanced to the
frontier on 15th November. On this being known in Montreal, the
available troops, about 1900 strong more than half of which were
militia, advanced to La Prairie. Nothing however occurred beyond an
unimportant skirmish between small detachments, after which, Dearborn
retreated to Plattsburg, and went into quarters for the winter. Thus
ended hostilities for the year. At every point the United States’
forces had been foiled by inferior numbers. Fort Detroit and the
State of Michigan, together with the island of Mackinaw, commanding
the navigation between Lakes Michigan and Huron, remained in British
hands. The only real success gained by the United States was in the
naval strength they had been able to develop on the Lakes, owing
to superior resources, and to the absence of any assistance to
Canada from England. The superiority thus bloodlessly established
had important results on the subsequent course of the war in Upper
Canada. By sea, successes were scored by the United States in five
frigate duels, mainly due to the superior size and armament of the
United States’ ships. Effectual measures were then taken in England,
and the United States’ flag practically disappeared from the high
seas for the rest of the war. The complete mastery of the sea by
Great Britain caused the U.S. government to direct their naval
resources to the Canadian lakes, a result that had an important
bearing on the succeeding years’ warfare.

The United States’ plan of operations for the following year was, as
before, to invade Canada with three separate corps. The first was
destined to retake Detroit, and acquire possession of Amherstberg.
The second attack was to be made from the eastern end of Lake
Ontario, to capture Kingston and Toronto, then known as York, and
then, in co-operation with a force collected at Buffalo, to act
against Forts George and Erie on the Niagara frontier. The third
was to operate against Montreal, by a combined advance from the
neighbourhood of Plattsburg, and from the eastern end of Ontario.

On the Detroit frontier the Canadian forces numbered about 2,300 men,
more than half of which were Indians, under Colonel Proctor; opposed
to a U.S. force of double that number, under General Harrison.

On the 18th January, a force of 1000 men under General Winchester,
advancing from Sandusky, drove in the British picquets at Frenchtown,
forty-five miles from Detroit. On the 22nd, Colonel Proctor
advancing from Detroit with four guns and 950 men, half of whom
were Indians, attacked General Winchester in front of Frenchtown,
and gained a complete victory. Winchester with 538 men were taken
prisoners. In consequence of the greatly superior numbers of the
U.S. troops in the neighbourhood, Proctor then withdrew to Detroit
and Sandwich. Little further occurred till 23rd April, when Proctor
led a small expedition against a U.S. work on the Miami river called
Fort Meigs. The attempt was unsuccessful, and Proctor returned
to Sandwich about 12th May. The only noteworthy incident was the
severe punishment inflicted on the U.S. force in a sortie on the
5th May, in which nearly 500 were taken prisoners. The British loss
was comparatively small. On the 2nd August, Proctor made a similar
attempt on a fort newly constructed at the mouth of the Sandusky
river. After an attempt to storm, which was repulsed with the
loss of 100 killed and wounded, he retired. After this no further
movement on either side occurred till September, when a change in
the situation was wrought by a success gained by the U.S. navy on
the lake. On 10th September, a naval action was fought on Lake Erie,
between six British and nine U.S. ships, in which the latter were
completely victorious. This rendered Proctor’s position extremely
critical. He at once evacuated Detroit and Amherstberg, and, with a
force of less than 1000 men, not counting Indians, retreated along
the river Thames, closely followed by Harrison. On the 5th October,
he decided to make a stand. Attacked by a greatly superior force, he
was at once overwhelmed by charges of cavalry, of which Harrison had
1200 in the field, and the greater part of his men made prisoners.
Proctor, with some 200 men only, made good his retreat to Ancaster,
eighty-five miles distant. The celebrated Indian Chief, Tecumseh, was
slain on this occasion, and the state of Michigan passed again into
United States’ keeping. Harrison, after destroying Moravian town, in
the neighbourhood of which the action had been fought, returned to
Detroit and Amherstberg, and, shortly afterwards, embarked with a
portion of his force for the Niagara frontier.

Active operations at the eastern end of Lake Ontario commenced in
April. Early in that month, a United States’ force of about 6000 men
was collected at Sackett’s Harbour, which was the United States’
chief naval depot on the lake. On 27th, the U.S. lake squadron with
2000 troops on board appeared off Toronto,[59] and at once began to
land under the guns of the fleet. Major General Sheaffe, who had 500
regular troops and militia and some Indians, after ineffectually
opposing the landing, was forced to withdraw towards Kingston, and
the town was occupied by the enemy. General Pike, commanding the
U.S. troops, was killed, and both sides suffered considerable loss
by the explosion of a magazine. On the 8th May, after burning the
public buildings, the U.S. force withdrew, and were conveyed to the
mouth of the Niagara river, where they landed, with a view to joining
in operations against Forts George and Erie. The vessels were then
employed in bringing further re-inforcements from Sackett’s Harbour,
for the contemplated attack on Fort George.

The British force on the Niagara frontier consisted at this time
of 1800 regular troops, 500 militia, and 40 Indians, under Major
General Vincent. On 27th May, the U.S. force, numbering 6000 to 7000
men, under General Dearborn, crossed under cover of the guns of the
flotilla and of Fort Niagara. After a stubborn contest, in which
they suffered a loss of 445 killed and wounded, the British troops
evacuated Fort George, and retired to Burlington Heights at the head
of Lake Ontario. Fort Erie was also evacuated. Four days later,
Dearborn detached 3500 men under Generals Chandler and Winder to
follow Vincent, and, on 5th June, the U.S. force encamped at Stoney
Creek, seven miles from Vincent’s position. In this critical position
Vincent resolved on a night attack. At 2 o’clock in the morning, 700
men of the 8th and 49th regiments, led by Colonel Harvey, penetrated
the U.S. camp. Four guns were captured; the greatest confusion was
caused in the surprised camp, from which the enemy were driven. In
order to conceal the smallness of his force, Harvey withdrew before
daylight, taking with him two guns and 123 prisoners, among whom were
the two United States Generals. In this spirited affair the British
loss amounted to 23 killed, 136 wounded and 55 missing. The U.S.
force, after burning its tents and stores, fell back precipitately to
Forty-mile Creek, 11 miles in rear of the field. Two days later, a
small British squadron from Kingston, under Sir James Yeo, bringing
some reinforcements for Vincent, appeared and drove the U.S. force
from their camp which was taken possession of. Harvey’s gallant
exploit had saved the frontier. On the 24th June, in retaliation for
the affair at Stoney Creek, a U.S. force under Colonel Boerstler
attempted to surprise an outpost of Canadian rangers at Beaver Dam,
under Lieutenant Fitzgibbon. Through the loyalty of the wife of a
Canadian farmer, Fitzgibbon received timely warning. Disposing of
his little force of 200 men, mostly Indians, to the best advantage,
the advancing enemy were caught in an ambush, and, after suffering
some loss, Boerstler capitulated with 25 officers, 519 men, two guns
and a stand of colours. Fifty-six of the U.S. force were killed and
wounded, Boerstler himself being among the latter. At the moment of
capitulation, a reinforcement of 200 men under Major du Haren joined
Fitzgibbon, and enabled him to guard his prisoners. These successive
reverses dispirited the U.S. troops in this part of the frontier to
such an extent, that they suffered themselves to be blockaded in Fort
George by very inferior numbers. On the 4th and 11th of July, Forts
Schlosser and Black Rock were captured by separate _coups de main_,
and the military stores destroyed or carried off. In the second
affair Lieutenant Colonel Bisshopp, an officer of great promise, was
unfortunately killed. On the 31st July, the United States’ squadron
on Ontario paid a second visit to Toronto, which was undefended, and
burned some more buildings. This unexpected move on the part of the
enemy occurred just as the first troop of the 19th dispatched from
Lower Canada was near Toronto, and the ammunition and baggage were
captured.

Meanwhile, Major General de Rottenburg had taken over command on the
Niagara frontier, from Vincent, and, on 20th July, the first troop of
the 19th from Lower Canada joined the army at Four Mile Creek. Two
days later we find the General reporting “two of our cavalry vedettes
were taken yesterday by the enemy.” On the 17th August, Lieutenant
Gladwin of the 19th was wounded in a skirmish near Fort George. About
the 20th August, Sir George Prevost joined de Rottenburg, bringing
with him some reinforcements, among which was the second troop of
the 19th Light Dragoons, completing the squadron under Captain
Lisle. On the 24th, a demonstration was made against Fort George.
The advance was led by thirty of the 19th, under their Lieutenant
Colonel the Hon. J. O’Neill. Beyond driving the enemy, for a short
time, out of the town of Newark, and capturing 60 or 70 prisoners
the demonstration was without result. The British force suffered the
loss of an officer and ten men, who advanced too far, and were taken
prisoners. On the 11th September an engagement took place between the
two Ontario squadrons, the day after the engagement on Lake Erie,
already mentioned. In this also the U.S. squadron had the best of it,
but there were no decisive results. In both engagements the British
squadrons were at a disadvantage through want of regular sailors: the
greater part of their crews consisting of Canadians and soldiers.
Early in September, Sir George Prevost returned to Kingston, leaving
General de Rottenburg in command. On the 1st October, part of the
U.S. force embarked at Niagara, and were conveyed to Sackett’s
Harbour to join in operations against Kingston and Montreal, leaving
General McClure in command at Fort George and Niagara. The following
day, the 49th and 104th Regiments, under de Rottenburg, started for
Kingston, which they reached on the 16th, leaving Vincent in command
on the Niagara frontier. Their presence secured Kingston from attack,
and helped to furnish the force that triumphed at Chrystler’s Farm.
Two companies of de Watteville’s regiment, proceeding from Toronto to
Kingston, were less fortunate, being captured by the U.S. squadron.
On the 9th October, the news of Proctor’s defeat on the Thames
reached Vincent, causing him to withdraw from the neighbourhood
of Fort George, and fall back to Burlington Heights; where he was
joined by the remains of Proctor’s force. The difficulty in obtaining
supplies, always great, were apparently almost insurmountable at this
time; for we find Vincent recommending that Major Lisle’s squadron
should return to Kingston and Montreal. The discouragement in the
British force was very great. Sir George Prevost, believing that
Upper Canada was lost, sent orders to Vincent to collect his troops,
and bring them to Kingston; but the order was not obeyed.

The U.S. troops in Fort George under McClure, at this time indulged
in a series of cruel and wanton excesses against the Canadian
inhabitants in the neighbourhood. In order to put some check on
these excesses Vincent detached a small force of about 500 men under
Colonel Murray in the direction of Fort George. With them went a
troop of the 19th. As Murray advanced, McClure’s outposts fell back.
On Murray making a sudden dash forwards, McClure precipitately
abandoned Fort George, on 12th December, and retreated across
the Niagara river, after burning the little town of Newark: an
inhuman act at such an inclement season of the year, and the more
inexcusable, in that he left in the Fort, without destroying them,
his tents standing, a great quantity of stores, and some guns. “With
the same intention, Queenston was deliberately bombarded with red-hot
shot from the batteries at Lewiston. Many isolated farm houses were
destroyed by marauding parties of soldiers, or, when they proved too
substantial for instant demolition, were rendered uninhabitable by
removal of the doors and windows. The few cattle still remaining in
the possession of the country people were mercilessly slaughtered or
driven away, and their grain and flour removed or destroyed.”[60]
At this juncture, Lieutenant General Drummond,[61] who had been
appointed to the command of Upper Canada, arrived and took command
of the troops. Following up the success at Fort George, Drummond
resolved on attacking Niagara. On the night of the 18th December,
a force of 550 men of the 41st and 100th, under Colonel Murray,
was silently ferried across the river, three miles above the Fort.
Advancing silently in two columns, with unloaded muskets and
bayonets fixed, the enemy’s picquets were seized before any alarm
could be given: one party escaladed one of the bastions, while the
other entered by the gate that had been left open for the relief
of sentries. The garrison made but a feeble resistance, and, in
a few minutes the British force was in complete possession of the
Fort, with 27 guns, over 3000 stand of arms and 344 prisoners. The
drummers of the 100th found their way to the roof of the principal
building, and played “The British Grenadiers” as a signal of success
to their comrades across the river. This brilliant success was gained
with a loss of only six men killed and five wounded. A few hours
later, a second force was ferried across, and seized Lewiston after
a slight skirmish, capturing two guns and other military stores. In
retaliation for the burning of Newark, Lewiston and four neighbouring
villages were laid in ruins.

The U.S. force, about 2500 strong, was now commanded by General Hall,
and quartered at Black Rock and Buffalo. Intent on following up his
success, Drummond placed his head quarters near Fort Erie. On the
night of the 29th, Major General Riall, with 600 men and about 100
Indians, crossed the Niagara river about two miles below Black Rock,
drove in a U.S. picquet, and took up a position at a bridge over a
small stream. At daylight on the 31st, the Royal Scots, about 800
strong, with a detachment of Major Lisle’s squadron of the 19th Light
Dragoons, the whole under command of Lt. Colonel Gordon, crossed
over, under fire, to land above Black Rock. Joining hands with Riall,
Black Rock was attacked and occupied after a short resistance, the
defending force retreating to Buffalo. The advance was continued, and
Buffalo taken after a poor resistance: 130 prisoners and 8 guns were
captured, and four armed vessels of the U.S. squadron on Lake Erie,
burned. Black Rock and Buffalo were burned to the ground. The work
was completed by Major Lisle’s squadron, which swept the frontier
from Buffalo to Lewiston, bringing the operations to an end on the
2nd January 1814. The British troops were then withdrawn to the
Canadian side, with the exception of a garrison left in Fort Niagara.
Thus closed operations at this part of the frontier for the year.

The operations of the year on the eastern frontier have now to be
recorded. Taking advantage of the frozen state of the St Lawrence,
skirmishing parties of U.S. troops, from Ogdensburg, crossed the
river in January and February, and committed depredations on the
Canadian side. In order to put an end to these attacks, Major
Macdonell, with 480 men and three field pieces, crossed the ice
on the morning of the 22nd February, drove the enemy from their
position, capturing 11 guns and over 70 prisoners. After burning
two armed schooners and two gunboats, as well as the barracks,
Macdonell returned to the Canadian shore. This brilliant little
affair was accomplished with the loss of eight killed and fifty-two
wounded. On the 27th May, an expedition, under Sir George Prevost,
sailed from Kingston to capture Sackett’s Harbour. Owing to the
incapacity and irresolution of Sir George Prevost, the affair ended
in failure. After unnecessary delay, which enabled the enemy to
make preparations for defence, the troops landed, on 29th, and
drove the enemy from their positions. In anticipation of having to
capitulate, their navy-yard and ships were set on fire by the enemy,
and a great quantity of naval stores and provisions, captured at
York, destroyed; when Sir George Prevost, against the advice of his
officers, gave the order to retreat, at the moment that success was
in his grasp. The troops re-embarked and returned to Kingston, with
about 100 prisoners, having suffered a loss of 50 killed and 211
wounded. The capture of Sackett’s Harbour by the British would have
had a tremendous influence on the war. It was the principal United
States’ base on the lake, and its capture would have given Canada
the complete supremacy of Lake Ontario as long as the war lasted,
besides the possession of the great quantities of naval and military
stores that had been collected there by the United States’ Government.

On the 3rd June, an attack was made by four armed vessels of the U.S.
squadron on Lake Champlain, upon the post of Isle aux Noix, about 40
miles from Montreal; resulting in the capture of two U.S. sloops.
On 29th July, a flotilla, composed of the two captured vessels and
three gunboats, transported over land from the St Lawrence, embarked
about 1000 men of the 13th and 100th regiments under Lieutenant
Colonel Murray, and arrived, the next day, before Plattsburg. The
U.S. militia in charge of the place, retired without making any
resistance. The barracks and blockhouses were burned, and a quantity
of naval stores carried off. Four thousand U.S. troops under
General Hampton, destined to act against Montreal, lay inactive at
Burlington, without interfering with Murray.

Nothing further of importance happened till October, when the U.S.
preparations for the attack on Montreal were complete. For this
purpose, a corps of 8800 men, under General Wilkinson, was assembled
at Grenadier Island, at the eastern end of Ontario, fully provided
with boats. At the same time a second corps of about 5700 men, under
General Hampton, was assembled on Lake Champlain. The two corps were
intended to join hands at St Regis, and act in combination. The first
movement was made by Hampton. Advancing from Plattsburg, he reached
Four Corners on the Chateaugay river, about 8th October. To oppose
him, Sir G. Prevost detached a body of Canadian militia, about 1000
strong, under Lt. Colonel de Salaberry, who, after some skirmishing
to ascertain the direction of Hampton’s advance, took up a position
on the west bank of the Chateaugay river.

On the 21st, Hampton crossed the frontier, and advanced, cutting
roads for his guns, and repairing bridges as he moved forward.
During the night of the 25th, Hampton detached a brigade under
Colonel Purdy to ford the Chateaugay river, march down the right
bank, and take the Canadian position in rear, while he himself
assailed it in front. De Salaberry’s position, a naturally strong
one in a dense forest, intersected by ravines, had been further
strengthened by breaking down bridges in the front, and making
timber breastworks. Hampton commenced his attack at 10 o’clock on
the morning of the 26th, but it was not pushed home. By keeping his
men under cover, and placing buglers in the woods, de Salaberry gave
the impression to the enemy of having a much greater number of men
than had been supposed. Meanwhile, Purdy’s brigade, which had lost
its way in the woods, came up, attracted by the firing, and overthrew
a company of Canadians on the right bank. Re-inforcements coming up
under Macdonell, the officer who distinguished himself at Ogdensburg
in February, Purdy was driven into the woods with loss and confusion,
and took no further part in the battle. So disorganised were his
troops that, during the following night, they opened fire on each
other, causing themselves further losses. Seeing the failure of the
flank attack on which he had principally depended, and believing the
Canadian force in his front to be stronger than it was, Hampton drew
off and fell back, first on Four Corners, and, a few days later, to
Plattsburgh; whence his force shortly afterwards went into winter
quarters. This brilliant affair was fought entirely by the Canadian
militia at a cost of 5 killed, 16 wounded, and four missing. A month
after the action, an officer and twenty-five men of the 19th Light
Dragoons were dispatched to join de Salaberry at Chateaugay.

It was not till 5th November that Wilkinson’s corps left Grenadier
Island, in a flotilla of between two and three hundred open boats,
protected by gunboats, and entered the St Lawrence. According to
the original plan, the capture of Kingston had been intended; but
this was relinquished on the arrival there of the re-inforcements
sent under de Rottenburg. On arriving near Ogdensburg, the force was
landed on the south bank of the river, and marched down to a point
14 miles below that place, in order to avoid the risk of passing
the small Canadian post of Fort Wellington at Prescott. The boats
were brought down at night with muffled oars. On the 9th, the force
was again landed, this time on the left bank, in order to pass the
rapid known as the Long Sault. The following day, one division, under
General Brown, marched to occupy Cornwall; the other division, under
General Boyd, was retained at the head of the rapid, to oppose a
British force that was hanging on their rear.

Directly the start of the U.S. expedition down the St Lawrence was
known in Kingston, as many men as could be safely spared, had been
detached under Lieutenant Colonel Morrison of the 89th, convoyed by
a few gunboats, to follow on Wilkinson’s rear. At Fort Wellington,
Morrison received a further accession of force, which brought up
his numbers to 800 rank and file. On the 9th, he landed, thirteen
miles lower down, and, in a few hours, was in touch with Wilkinson’s
force. During the following day some skirmishing took place, and then
Morrison, finding that Boyd was preparing to attack him in force,
took up a position at a place named “Chrystler’s Farm.” Morrison’s
force was made up of some companies of the 49th, 89th, some militia,
three 6 Pr. guns and thirty Indians. Boyd had 2500 men, among which
was a strong force of cavalry, and ten guns. Unlike all previous
actions in this war, the battle of Chrystler’s Farm was fought in
open country. This conferred an advantage on the better trained and
disciplined British troops, that atoned for their inferiority in
numbers. The action commenced about 2 o’clock in the afternoon of
the 11th, and, after three hours’ fighting, in the course of which
a charge of United States’ dragoons was defeated by three companies
of the 89th, Boyd fell back, repulsed at every point, with the loss
of one gun, 339 killed and wounded, among the former of whom was the
U.S. General Covington, and over 100 prisoners. The British loss was
21 killed, 148 wounded and 12 missing. Boyd fell back on his boats,
and embarked after the action, crossing over to the right bank of
the river. The following day, he descended the rapid, and joined
Brown’s force near Cornwall. The cavalry, and some of the artillery,
marched along the Canadian bank, without embarking. Morrison, with
his small force, continued his march down the left bank. On his force
being re-united, Wilkinson learned that he could expect no aid from
Hampton. He at once decided on giving up the attempt on Montreal, and
retreating by the only way open to him. Embarking his whole force,
on the 13th, he descended the St Lawrence to the mouth of the Salmon
river, and ascended that river seven miles to French Mills. Here he
lay, expecting to be attacked, till 12th February, when he set fire
to his boats, huts, and blockhouses, and retreated to Plattsburgh and
Burlington on Lake Champlain.

Thus, in loss and disaster, ended the second and most serious attempt
against Montreal, made during the war. A handful of Canadians at
Chateaugay, in the woods that gave their special fighting powers
a signal opportunity, and a small number of British troops at
Chrystler’s Farm, where the field of action gave full scope to their
training and discipline, had saved Canada.

Of the three invasions of the Canadian frontier, the one by Detroit
was alone successful. Proctor’s defeat on the Thames was irreparable.
Fortunately for Canada, it was the point at which the enemy’s success
was least important. Vincent’s spirited affair at Stoney Creek was
the turning-point of the year’s campaign. Had he been overwhelmed,
the Niagara frontier would have been lost, and the re-inforcements
that saved Kingston from attack could not have been spared. The fall
of Kingston might have led to the fall of Montreal.

The operations of the year showed the extreme importance to Canada
of the mastery on Ontario, and the retention of Kingston. The whole
country was an almost trackless forest. The only way of moving troops
and stores was by water. Full subsistence for the troops in Upper
Canada could not be procured among the scanty population, and they
were largely dependent for rations on pork and biscuit from England.
So long as the waterway was open, the defence of the Niagara frontier
was possible. As the supremacy of the U.S. navy on Lake Erie made
it impossible for the British to continue the war on the Detroit
frontier, so a decisive defeat on Lake Ontario would have lost the
Niagara frontier also. But, till the end of the war, the U.S. navy
never succeeded in establishing more than a temporary supremacy on
Ontario.

The failure of Wilkinson’s expedition showed the risk of attacking
Montreal, while Kingston was strongly held by a hostile force. An
expedition, once launched on the St Lawrence, could not re-ascend
against the current, and was liable to be caught between two fires,
as actually happened in Wilkinson’s case. The true objective of the
United States, throughout the war, was Kingston; the possession of
which would have made them masters of Upper Canada without a further
effort, and would have placed Montreal in jeopardy. But Kingston was
never seriously attacked during the whole war.

On the Canadian side, the importance of gaining possession of
Sackett’s Harbour was not clearly recognized. The capture and
retention of that place would have practically secured the Niagara
frontier, and assured the safety of Montreal. But Sir George
Prevost’s half-hearted and abortive attack in May, was the only
attempt made during the war. To both sides, the capture of their
enemy’s depôt on the lake was of supreme importance. The keys of
successful attack and defence were at Sackett’s Harbour and Kingston.

CHAPTER XII

THE NIAGARA FRONTIER

1814-1821

United States’ plans--Attempt on Mackinaw--La Colle--State
of affairs on Niagara frontier--Drummond’s raid on
Oswego--Dover--Advance of U.S. force--Capture of Fort
Erie--Battle of Chippewa--Critical position of British
force--Battle of Lundy’s Lane--Retreat of U.S. forces--Fort Erie
invested--Assault on Fort Erie--Sergeant Powell--Conclusion of
operations on Niagara frontier--Prevost’s abortive attack on
Plattsburgh--Defeat of British squadron on Lake Champlain--Other
operations--Bladensberg--Capture of Washington--General Ross
killed--Victory at Baltimore--Expedition against New Orleans--Its
defeat--Fort Bowyer captured--Treaty of Ghent--Sir William
Payne--Sir John Vandeleur--Badge “Niagara” granted--Regiment
returns to England--Equipped as Lancers--Embark for
Ireland--Disbanded.

The plans of the United States’ government for the campaign of 1814
varied considerably from those of the preceding years. They realised
the mistake they had made in advancing on Montreal without first
getting possession of Kingston, and they recognized the delusion on
which they had acted, in believing that the Canadians would welcome
their troops wherever they appeared on Canadian soil. It was, indeed,
the unflinching loyalty of the Canadians to the British flag that
had so far preserved Canada, as the troops England had been able to
spare, would, by themselves, have been inadequate for the purpose.
The United States’ plans for 1814 were therefore directed to the
following objects. To retake the island of Mackinaw; to renew the
invasion of the Niagara frontier; and, after getting possession of
Forts George and Niagara, to proceed against Kingston. The United
States’ officers on the Niagara frontier, had also learned that
enthusiasm without discipline was of little value, when opposed
in the open field to a disciplined enemy; the winter and spring
therefore were utilised by them in enforcing a higher degree of drill
and discipline than had hitherto been aimed at. This resulted in a
marked improvement in the fighting qualities of their troops during
the remainder of the war.

In the middle of April, a reinforcement of 100 men, conveying a
quantity of much-needed supplies and stores, under Colonel McDouall,
was sent from Toronto to Mackinaw, which was reached after a most
difficult journey on 18th May. A great number of Indians then
flocked into the post, which prompted McDouall to fit out a small
expedition of 150 men with 500 Indians against a small post that had
been lately established at Prairie du Chien on the Mississippi, 200
miles north-west of the present town of Chicago. Moving by water, the
expedition, under Colonel M‘Kay, was completely successful, and the
post was captured with two guns, and 61 prisoners, on 19th July, at
a cost of only three Indians wounded.

On 26th July, a U.S. expedition from Detroit, consisting of five
armed vessels and about 750 troops, arrived off Mackinaw, and landed
on 4th August, when they were completely repulsed in an attack on
McDouall’s position, regaining their ships with loss and confusion.
No further attempt was made, but part of the expedition uselessly
remained in the vicinity for some time, losing two armed vessels,
which were taken, on 3rd and 6th September, by a small party of
seamen and militia under Lieutenants Bulger and Worseley. No further
fighting took place in this quarter, and Mackinaw remained in the
hands of the British till the end of the war.

On the 30th March, General Wilkinson at the head of 4000 U.S. troops
advanced from Plattsburgh, crossed Lake Champlain on the ice, and
attacked a small British force, in a stone mill at La Colle, under
Major Handcock. Wilkinson was repulsed with some loss, and returned
to Plattsburgh.

The position of the British troops on the Niagara frontier early in
the year was very discouraging. The hardships they had undergone
during the operations in December had caused great sickness, so that
the abandonment of Fort Niagara was at one time seriously entertained.

“The region between Chippewa and Erie had been so completely
laid waste that it remained almost uninhabited. In addition
to his troops, Drummond had several thousand non-combatants
to feed, and, in the destitute condition of the country, this
seemed an almost hopeless task. Most of the western Indians that
had survived General Proctor’s defeat, as well as the whole
Six Nations from the Grand River, three thousand persons in
all, of whom two-thirds were helpless women and children, had
sought refuge near the British cantonments at Burlington. Their
depredations so harassed and alarmed many of the inhabitants in
the vicinity, that they abandoned their farms, and took shelter
in the soldiers’ quarters. The homeless fugitives from the
Niagara were also dependent upon the over-taxed commissariat.
Thus, while his armed force numbered less than two thousand,
between seven and eight thousand rations were issued daily....
The Indians daily consumed twice as much flour as the whole
of the troops. In the garrison of Fort Erie alone, not much
exceeding one hundred persons, no less than sixty-nine cases of
ague were reported in a single week.”[62]

A great number of Indians on the United States’ side were forced
to take up arms. Marauding parties from Detroit made frequent
incursions, carrying off loyal inhabitants, and destroying Delaware
and Point aux Pins. By the end of January, Black Rock was re-occupied
by United States’ troops, whence they annoyed Fort Erie by artillery
fire. It was in the midst of these difficulties that Drummond was
obliged to send the re-inforcements under McDouall to Mackinaw, as
already mentioned, and to further weaken his available forces by
withdrawing a regiment from Toronto to strengthen Kingston.

By great exertions and the employment of soldiers in the shipyards,
the British naval forces on Ontario had established a superiority.
Drummond wished to attack Sackett’s Harbour, and destroy the enemy’s
vessels there; but Sir George Prevost refused to provide the
necessary troops. On the 5th May, Drummond made a successful dash
from Kingston, with a force of about 1000 troops, upon Oswego. They
landed on the 6th, captured the fort, destroyed all military stores
that could not be carried off, and re-embarked. This successful
attack delayed the United States’ operations on the Niagara frontier
for several weeks, and enabled a strict blockade of Sackett’s Harbour
to be established.

Early in March, Major Lisle, with a troop of the 19th Light Dragoons
and a few militia, was placed in the little village of Dover, near
Long Point on Lake Erie, to watch any attempt of the enemy from that
side against Burlington. On the 15th May, eight hundred U.S. infantry
crossed the lake in armed vessels, and landed. Major Lisle withdrew
his men, and Dover was burned to the ground; after which the invading
force re-embarked.

By the end of June, the United States’ troops on the Niagara frontier
had gathered in great numbers, and it was evident that an invasion
was imminent. Drummond had vainly urged on Sir George Prevost
the necessity of reinforcing the troops on the frontier; but Sir
George was convinced that the principal attack would come from Lake
Champlain, and withheld the much-needed troops. From Toronto to
Long Point on Lake Erie, Drummond’s force did not much exceed 4000
men. A number of important points had to be guarded, and the force
under General Riall on the actual frontier was only about 2200 men,
including Indians, distributed on a length of thirty-six miles, and
including the garrison in Niagara. Only about seven hundred men were
available for field operations. At the end of June, the strength of
Major Lisle’s squadron was six officers, eleven sergeants, and one
hundred and eighteen rank and file, in five different detachments, at
Fort George, Queenston, Chippewa, Fort Erie, and Long Point.

On the morning of the 3rd July, the United States’ force, 4000
strong, under General Brown, was ferried across in two divisions
above and below Fort Erie, under cover of a fog. A picquet of the
19th Light Dragoons narrowly escaped being cut off, and the fort
was at once invested. It was occupied at that time by a garrison of
170 men, and, though in no condition to make a proper defence, it
was expected to maintain itself for a short time. It was however
surrendered after the exchange of a few cannon shots. Riall, with
his inferior numbers, contented himself by maintaining a small corps
of observation in his front, while he himself remained encamped on
the left bank of the Chippewa. On the 4th, Brown advanced, driving
before him the corps of observation which destroyed the bridges as it
fell back. A detachment of the 19th Light Dragoons under Lieutenant
Horton, covering the rear, became involved in a skirmish in which
they drove a party of the enemy into a house, which would probably
have been captured had not assistance come to them. Four men and
eight horses of the 19th were wounded in the skirmish. Brown encamped
that night within sight of Riall’s position.

Riall was reinforced on the 5th by the arrival of the 8th regiment
from Toronto, and, greatly under-estimating Brown’s force, which now
amounted to about 5000 men with nine guns, he resolved on leaving
his field works, and attacking. At three in the afternoon, Riall,
whose force now amounted to about 1900 men, threw forward a body
of militia and Indians on his right flank. After some desultory
skirmishing they were driven back by increasing numbers, and fell
back on the three light infantry companies, who received their
assailants under U.S. General Porter with a terrific volley, driving
them back in complete disorder, till they themselves were in turn
forced to fall back by superior numbers. Riall, meanwhile, had passed
the Chippewa, and drawn up his whole force in order of battle with
three guns. After some cannonading, he formed six companies of the
Royal Scots, and five companies of the 100th in two columns, and led
them against the enemy’s centre. They were received with a tremendous
fire against which they were unable to advance: almost every field
officer, excepting Riall himself, was struck down, and the columns,
suffering heavy losses, were obliged to withdraw, leaving their dead
and many of their wounded on the field. The 8th regiment covered the
retreat, which was not pressed, and the force recrossed the Chippewa
to its former position. “The guns were removed only by the gallant
exertions of some troopers of the 19th Dragoons, who attached their
own horses to the carriages, and rode off with them in the teeth of
the enemy.”[63] The British loss amounted to 515 killed, wounded, and
missing, which fell principally on the Royal Scots and 100th, who
lost 422 officers and men out of a total of 950 engaged. The 19th
Light Dragoons had one sergeant and five men wounded. General Riall,
in his dispatch after the battle, says:--

“I am particularly obliged to Major Lisle of the 19th Light
Dragoons for the manner in which he covered and protected one
of the 24-pounders which had been disabled. Lieutenant Colonel
Pearson has reported to me, in the most favourable terms, the
excellent manner in which Lieutenant Horton, with a party of the
19th Light Dragoons observed the motions of the enemy, while he
occupied the position he took on his first landing (on 3rd July),
and during his advance to this place.”

In consequence of this repulse, nearly the whole of his Indians
and many of the militia left Riall, in order to look after their
families. On the 8th, Brown threw a bridge across the Chippewa, three
miles up the stream, thus turning Riall’s right. Riall thereupon
broke up his camp, and withdrew to Fort George. Brown continued
his advance, occupied Queenston Heights, and took up a position,
investing Fort George, with his right resting on the Niagara river,
and his left on the lake. Riall, after strengthening the garrisons
in the forts, withdrew in the direction of Burlington Heights. To
do this, he executed a remarkable night march, to avoid the enemy
by whom he was hemmed in. At midnight, his force entered the lake,
which is very shallow for a hundred yards from the shore, and, wading
through the water for two miles and a half, he marched round the
left wing of the investing army, without being detected by their
vedettes. For ten days Brown lay inactive, looking for the arrival of
the U.S. Ontario squadron to enable him to strike a decisive blow.
But the squadron had been blockaded in Sackett’s Harbour ever since
the capture of Oswego, and was unable to render him any assistance.
Frequent skirmishes took place, in which the United States’ troops
suffered losses, often at the hands of the Canadians who were roused
to fury by the outrages committed on them. On one occasion the U.S.
General Swift was killed by a patrol of the 8th regiment; a wagon
train was destroyed, and the picquet guard at Erie cut off to a man.
In retaliation for these losses, the United States’ troops burned the
village of St David’s, and destroyed every dwelling-house between
Queenston and Niagara Falls; under circumstances of such barbarity
that the Colonel in command was dismissed from the army.

Meanwhile, Riall received some reinforcements from Toronto, and
a great number of militia again joined him, badly armed and
undisciplined, but exasperated beyond measure at the brigand-like
acts of the invaders. This enabled him to advance, and threatened
Brown’s communications. On the 20th, Brown advanced to Fort George,
and commenced preparations for a siege, in the hopes that Riall would
again hazard an engagement with inferior forces to relieve the Fort.
Two days later, Riall with 1700 regular troops, 700 militia, and
some Indians, took post in front of Twelve Mile Creek, in readiness
to fall upon Brown if he should commence active operations against
Fort George. On the 23rd, Brown received intelligence that the U.S.
squadron was closely blockaded in Sackett’s Harbour, and was in no
position to render him assistance. He at once broke up his camp,
and withdrew to the right bank of the Chippewa, with the intention
of depositing all unnecessary baggage and stores at Erie, and then
making a rapid advance on Burlington and Toronto. On the same day,
General Drummond reached Toronto, from Kingston, with the 89th
regiment. These were at once sent forward, under Lieutenant Colonel
Tucker, to Fort Niagara, with instructions to take drafts from the
garrisons of the different forts, and to march, on the 25th, to
Lewiston, where Brown had established a base of supplies. Riall was,
at the same time, ordered to advance towards the Chippewa. Drummond
himself embarked for Niagara, on the afternoon of the 24th, leaving
Toronto with only a few invalids as a garrison.

At midnight of the 24th, Riall detached about 900 men under
Lieutenant Colonel Pearson, with whom was a troop of the 19th Light
Dragoons under Major Lisle, to advance and occupy the high ground
near the Niagara Falls. By seven o’clock the next morning, after
a fourteen-mile march, Pearson occupied a hill by Lundy’s Lane,
within three miles of the United States’ camp, and one mile from
the Niagara Falls. At the same time, Drummond landed and commenced
his march along the left bank of the Niagara river, while Tucker,
in accordance with previous orders, marched along the right bank on
Lewiston. Lewiston was captured at noon, and the two parties reunited
at Queenston. Sending back part of the force, Drummond, with 815 men
and two guns, held on his way to Lundy’s Lane. Brown, on receiving
intelligence of Tucker’s advance on Lewiston, believing that his
more considerable stores at Fort Schlosser were threatened, and that
Pearson’s party at Lundy’s Lane was only a strong patrol, resolved to
make a countermove on Queenston and Fort George. Riall’s remaining
brigades at Twelve Mile Creek were under arms at daybreak to support
Pearson. Their advance was then countermanded, and they remained in
camp till noon, when a force, numbering 1230 rank and file, with four
guns, under Colonel Scott, was ordered to march at once for Lundy’s
Lane. On neither side was there any immediate expectation of a battle.

A little before five in the afternoon Brown detached a force of about
1800 men and two guns under General Scott to advance on Queenston. On
coming in contact with Pearson’s outposts, Scott became aware that
the force in front of him was stronger than he had supposed, and
delayed his attack, while he sent back to Brown for more troops.
Riall, who had ridden on to join Pearson, took Scott’s brigade for
the advance of Brown’s whole force. He at once sent back word to the
force advancing from Twelve Mile Creek, which was still three miles
away, to retire on the heights near Queenston, and ordered Pearson to
retreat on that point. After retiring half a mile, Riall and Pearson
met Drummond advancing. Drummond at once took the command, ordered
the position at Lundy’s Lane to be re-occupied, and sent word to
countermand Riall’s last order to Colonel Scott, whom he directed to
press on and join him.

Scott (U.S.), fearing an ambush, advanced with great caution, which
just allowed time for the British force to regain the hill before
it could be occupied by the enemy. Drummond’s force now amounted to
about 1700 men, thus disposed. On the summit of the hill were two
guns: a little behind them were five companies of the Royal Scots,
a detachment of the 41st, the 89th, with their left resting on the
road running parallel with the river from Queenston to Niagara Falls.
The line was prolonged towards the river by some of the 8th and some
militia. On the road, somewhat retired, was Major Lisle’s troop of
the 19th Light Dragoons. Both flanks were thrown forward, the woods
on the right of the line being occupied by the Glengarry regiment, a
corps of the Macdonald clan raised in Canada, that fought all through
the war with great distinction. By a curious coincidence, Drummond
had under his command three regiments, in which he had served as a
regimental officer; the Royal Scots, the 8th, and the 41st.

Scott commenced his attack about half past six, along the entire
front. On Drummond’s right and centre, the attack was not pushed
home, and the British guns on the hill, from their advantageous
position, had a decided superiority over the attacking artillery.
But on Drummond’s left, the attack was successful. A battalion,
ordered by Scott to make a wide turning movement through the dense
forest between the road and the river, suddenly attacked the Canadian
militia in flank, threw them into disorder, and captured some
prisoners, occupied the road, and forced back Lisle’s troop of the
19th for over a mile. At this juncture, General Riall was severely
wounded, and, being taken to the road, was conducted by mistake, in
the growing darkness, into a party of the enemy, by whom he was at
once made prisoner. The Canadian militia, however, quickly recovered
themselves, and formed up in rear of the 89th, at right angles to
them, covering the flank and rear of the British position. They also
cleared the road to the rear, and the enemy made no further headway
on this flank during the remainder of the battle.

Scott now made a determined attack, with the rest of his troops,
on the British centre. It was repulsed after some severe fighting,
in which both sides suffered heavily. A lull in the action then
occurred, during which the artillery on both sides maintained their
fire. Scott, while reforming his ranks, was joined by Brown and
the rest of the United States’ troops; at the same time, Drummond
was joined by the rear division of Riall’s troops, which had been
marching and counter-marching, under conflicting orders, since they
left Twelve Mile Creek. With them came the second troop of the 19th.

“For a few minutes firing almost ceased, and this interval was
employed by the United States’ artillerymen in bringing forward
fresh supplies of ammunition, and a daring officer, Captain
Brooke, stealthily crept up the hillside until within a few yards
of the British battery, with a dark lantern, which he suspended
in a thicket, as a guide for his gunners to take aim by; for
although the moon had risen, its light was rendered faint and
uncertain by drifting clouds of smoke and dust, and the position
of either line of battle was simply indicated at intervals, by
the flash of their guns.”[64]

Drummond employed part of his reinforcement to strengthen his right,
while the remainder formed a second line in rear of the first. A
field gun was also brought up in line with the two guns on the hill.

The United States’ commander was now convinced that the capture
of the hill and the guns on it was necessary to success. Forming
a brigade, 1400 strong, in the hollow of the hill, he sent them
straight against the guns. Part of them recoiled under the heavy
fire, but one battalion was able to approach under a screen of dense
thickets, and gained a position behind a log fence within twenty
yards of the guns without being observed. Pouring in a volley, they
rushed on the gunners with the bayonet, and were at once masters of
the guns, which were turned upon the British line. A large body of
United States’ infantry were then brought up on to the hill, and
their artillery ascended the slope at a gallop. In doing this, one
gun, of which the drivers were killed by a sudden volley, was taken
by the horses into the British ranks, and secured.

“The remainder of the British artillery was at the same time
brought forward, until the muzzles of the (opposing) guns were
only a few yards asunder, and the battle thenceforward became a
confused, ferocious and sanguinary struggle, waged frequently
at the bayonet’s point, or with clubbed muskets, the British
striving desperately to regain the ground they had lost, and
their opponents to thrust them down into the hollow beyond, and
drive them from the field. Regiments, companies, and sections
were broken up and mingled together. They retired, rallied, and
were led to the charge again.”[64]

[Illustration: BATTLE OF LUNDY’S LANE

9 p.m. 25th. July, 1814.

From L.L.H.S. Publications.

_Walker & Boutall sc._]

For over two hours this desperate struggle in the dark continued,
with varying fortunes. At one moment, the 103rd, a young regiment,
was forced back in disorder; at another the U.S. guns were captured,
and two of them spiked. Neither side could make headway, in spite of
frequent attacks and counter-attacks. Drummond was severely wounded
but kept the field: nearly one-third of the British force were killed
and wounded. The U.S. forces were in equally bad case. Three of their
generals were wounded, while the rank and file had lost heavily. In
the confusion and darkness the whole force had become disorganized;
Scott’s brigade, that had commenced the fight, had dwindled to a few
companies: there were an enormous number of stragglers. Closing their
ranks for a last attack the wearied British troops, headed by the
light company of the 41st, regained possession of the hill and of
the guns, just as Brown had decided on withdrawing. Desultory firing
continued for a few minutes: it was not till near midnight that the
British troops, wearied by prolonged marching and fighting, remained
in undisturbed possession of the field. Two of the enemy’s guns
remained in their possession, while one British gun was carried off.

Thus ended the battle of Lundy’s Lane, the most severely contested
action of the war. On the British side both generals were severely
wounded, one of them being taken prisoner. Out of a total strength
of somewhat less than 3000, the total British loss amounted to 5
officers and 76 men killed, 30 officers and 532 men wounded, 14
officers and 219 men missing and prisoners. The disproportion of
wounded to killed, in this and other actions, was mainly due to the
frequent use of buckshot by the enemy. The heaviest losses fell on
the Royal Scots and 89th, who, out of a total of about 900 present,
suffered a loss of 426. The 19th Light Dragoons had two wounded and
one missing, together with three horses killed, ten wounded, and one
missing. The United States’ loss was never correctly stated. Of the
four generals engaged, three were wounded, while the disorganization
of their force of about 4500 men engaged, and the loss of 16 officers
killed and 56 wounded, makes it probable that their loss in killed
and wounded was not less than 1200. Several hundred prisoners
remained in the hands of the British. In his dispatch, General
Drummond writes, “In reviewing the action from its commencement, the
first object which presents itself as deserving of notice, is the
steadiness and good countenance of the squadron of the 19th Light
Dragoons, under Major Lisle, and the very creditable and excellent
defence made by the incorporated militia-battalion &c.” This refers
to the first period of the action when the left of the line was
forced back.

The following day, General Ripley, who had succeeded to the command
of the United States’ troops, advanced across the Chippewa to see
to his dead and wounded; finding the field in occupation of the
British, he immediately retired, broke down the bridge, destroyed a
quantity of camp equipage and stores, and retired precipitately to
Erie, which he reached on 27th. The light troops, cavalry and Indians
were sent in pursuit, and made a few prisoners. On reaching Erie,
Ripley at once set to work to enlarge and strengthen the defences, in
anticipation of attack.

Drummond, after repairing the bridge, and receiving some
reinforcements that brought his effective strength up to 3150 men,
followed in Ripley’s footsteps, and appeared before Erie, which he
invested on 3rd August. Ripley’s position was now very strong, with
new earthworks and batteries extending from the fort to the edge of
the lake. On the river side he was covered by the batteries at Black
Rock: while from the lake, his defences were flanked by the fire of
three gunboats. On the night of the 3rd, Drummond threw a small party
of about 450 men across the river to capture the batteries at Black
Rock. Failing to effect a surprise, they recrossed, with the loss
of 25 men k.w.m. Two days later, the spirits of the besieged were
raised by the arrival of General Gaines to supersede Ripley. On the
night of the 12th, a daring exploit was performed by Captain Dobbs
of the Royal Navy. With 75 seamen from Lake Ontario, he attacked
and captured, in open boats transported overland, two of the three
gunboats on Lake Erie: the third gunboat cut its cable, and escaped.
On the 13th, Drummond’s batteries opened fire on the enemy’s works,
and continued the cannonade on the following day, preparatory to a
grand assault. At 2 A.M. on the 15th, the assault was delivered in
three columns. The right column, headed by Sergeant Powell of the
19th Light Dragoons, “who was perfectly acquainted with the ground,
volunteered to act as guide, and preceded the leading subdivision in
the most intrepid style,” was to attack a work called Snake Hill at
the border of the lake. The picquet of cavalry under Captain Eustace,
19th Light Dragoons was detailed to act with the right column. The
rest of the squadron was drawn up in the rear of the most advanced
battery, in readiness to receive prisoners, and conduct them to
the rear. The centre and left columns were to assault the fort at
different points. The scaling ladders with the right attack were
too short; after prolonged efforts, and suffering great losses,
the column was obliged to retire without gaining a footing. The
left column also was beaten back, losing its leader and many men.
The centre column, which was the weakest of the three, led by Lt.
Colonel Drummond, the general’s nephew, alone effected a lodgment,
and maintained its position till daylight, in spite of the most
desperate efforts of the garrison. Lt. Colonel Drummond fell; but
his men, reinforced from the left column, continued to resist all
attacks made to dislodge them, till a tremendous explosion of stored
ammunition took place, killing many, and forcing the remainder to
retire. Almost every officer with the centre and left columns was
killed or wounded. This disastrous repulse cost the British force a
loss of 905 of all ranks, killed, wounded and missing; great part of
the loss being ascribed to the explosion.

Drummond continued the blockade, and his troops now began to suffer
greatly from sickness. On the 2nd September, General Brown, who
had recovered from his wound received at Lundy’s Lane, resumed
command of the U.S. forces at Erie, in place of Gaines who had
been severely wounded. On the morning of the 7th, a United States’
picquet, consisting of an officer and 21 men, was surprised and
cut off to a man, by a small party of infantry and a detachment of
the 19th Light Dragoons under Captain Eustace, the whole commanded
by Captain Powell, D.A.Q.M.G. The General Order of the same day
says: “Sergeant Powell, 19th Light Dragoons, has been named to the
Lieutenant General as having again distinguished himself on this
occasion.” This brave soldier was subsequently taken prisoner, and
is believed to have died before he could be exchanged. On the 17th
September, favoured by a heavy fall of rain, Brown made a sortie
in three strong divisions. The battery guards were surprised, and
the whole line of entrenchments was for a time in the assailants’
hands; till Drummond, bringing up troops from the camp, drove out the
enemy, and recovered possession of his batteries. The sortie cost
the British troops 609 killed, wounded and prisoners, in addition
to three of their few heavy guns destroyed, and other damage. This,
together with continuous bad weather and increasing sickness among
his troops, caused Drummond to give up the blockade, on the 21st, and
withdraw his Head Quarters across the Chippewa on the 24th, which was
done without molestation. A strong body of troops was maintained in
advance of the Chippewa, occupying the line of the Black Creek. In
his dispatch of 2nd October to Sir George Prevost, Drummond reports
the capture by the enemy of a patrol of a corporal and six men of
the 19th Light Dragoons. “The Dragoons must have been most culpably
careless and confident, or the circumstance could not have happened.”
About the 8th October, General Izard, with a large body of U.S.
troops, arrived by land at Lewiston, from Sackett’s Harbour. Instead
of crossing the river to Drummond’s rear, as he should have done, he
continued along the river to Black Rock, and assumed the command at
Erie. Izard’s force now amounted to over 8000 men, from whom some
decisive action was to be expected. Izard advanced to Black Creek,
and offered battle, which Drummond was not strong enough to accept.
Beyond some skirmishing, Izard made no further use of his superiority
of force, awaiting co-operation from the lake. But the U.S. squadron
on Ontario was held fast in Sackett’s Harbour by Sir James Yeo. Izard
remained inactive till 20th October, when he fell back, and carried
his force across the river to Black Rock and Buffalo. On the 5th
November, he blew up Fort Erie and evacuated the place. Drummond at
once disposed the men in winter quarters. Major Lisle’s squadron was
ordered to hold itself in readiness to proceed to Lower Canada, and
one troop under Captain Eustace was sent to Ancaster.

Several times during the summer marauding parties from the United
States, taking advantage of the undefended state of the Detroit
frontier, had crossed the border, plundering and burning, and
carrying off peaceable inhabitants. Drummond was unable to spare any
force to meet this evil, and the province suffered cruelly. Towards
the end of October, a mounted force of 1500 undisciplined men, under
General McArthur, crossed the border by Lake St Clair, and marched
to Moravian town on the Thames river, continuing eastwards in the
direction of Burlington Heights, where only a few militia and some
300 of the 103rd, under Lt. Colonel Smelt, were stationed. Smelt at
once moved forward to Grand River with about 170 men of the 103rd,
27 of the 19th Light Dragoons, 150 militia and some Indians. After
making a demonstration of crossing, McArthur turned back and regained
Detroit, on the 17th November, without having effected anything
beyond the destruction of a great quantity of property. “Both in
their advance and in their retreat their progress was marked by
plunder and devastation.” Captain Eustace and his party marched to
Dover.

A return, dated 8th November, shows that out of 7552 men on the
frontier between Toronto and Long Point, 1327 were in hospital at
that date. The total strength of the 19th Light Dragoons’ squadron
was 123, of whom 34 were sick.

The operations for the year were at an end on this part of the
frontier. Fort Niagara still remained in British hands, and the
projected attack on Kingston had not been made. The only results
of the strenuous efforts made by the United States’ government, at
this point, had been to show the improvement of their troops, both
in generalship and fighting power, since the beginning of the war.
Beyond this, there was nothing to show for the offensive operations
undertaken by the United States during the year.

The abdication of Napoleon, and the peace concluded in Paris at
the end of May, set free for service in America the troops serving
under Wellington in the south of France. A number of regiments
were embarked at once for Quebec, so that, by the end of August,
Sir George Prevost had upwards of 16,000 British troops in Lower
Canada. With them came instructions to attack Plattsburgh, which,
to observers at a distance, appeared to be the point from which
the most formidable attack might be directed against Montreal. The
strategy was at fault, as the experience of the preceding year had
shown that, while Kingston continued to be held in force, no attack
from Plattsburgh was likely to be successful. On the other hand, a
British success at Plattsburgh could lead to no decisive result.
The true point of attack was Sackett’s Harbour, on Lake Ontario.
The occupation and retention of this point would have destroyed the
U.S. naval power on the lake; Montreal and Kingston would have been
secured from attack; and Sir Gordon Drummond would have been master
of the situation on the Niagara frontier. The U.S. government gauged
the situation more correctly, and denuded Plattsburgh of troops to
reinforce Sackett’s Harbour. The event showed that Plattsburgh was
only of secondary importance.

For the expedition against Plattsburgh Sir George Prevost formed
three brigades on the frontier extending from the Richelieu river
to the St Lawrence commanded by Major Generals Power, Robinson and
Brisbane. The whole division was under command of Major General de
Rottenburg, and amounted to 11,000 men. With it was the rest of the
19th Light Dragoons not engaged on the Niagara frontier.

On the 3rd of September, Sir George Prevost, advancing by Chateaugay
from the St Lawrence, crossed the frontier to Chazy, and, on the 5th,
reached, without opposition, a point eight miles from Plattsburgh.
The U.S. troops about Plattsburgh, at the time, amounted to about
1500 men, of inferior quality, under General Macomb. This force was
augmented by about 3000 militia from the surrounding neighbourhood
during the operations, but neither in quality or numbers was it
fit to stand before the troops under Prevost. On the 6th, the army
advanced on Plattsburgh, driving in the U.S. pickets and outposts.
So feeble was the resistance made that General Macomb mentions in
his dispatch that the British troops pressed on in column, not even
deigning to fire, except by their flankers and advanced patrols, on
the militia that they brushed out of their way. In the advance, the
19th Light Dragoons had one man and two horses wounded, two men and
six horses missing. Plattsburgh stands on the Saranac creek which
runs at right angles into Lake Champlain. The high ground on the
south side of the Saranac was occupied by Macomb with some hastily
constructed redoubts. The houses on the north of the Saranac were
occupied by British troops, on the 6th. On the lake lay the U.S.
squadron, consisting of four vessels and ten gunboats. The British
squadron, consisting of four vessels and twelve gunboats, was still
at the north end of Lake Champlain, awaiting the completion of the
flag-ship which had only been launched ten days previously, and whose
crew had hardly joined her from Quebec. Sir George Prevost had only
to advance on the 7th to make himself master of the feeble defences
opposed to him, when he suddenly conceived the idea that he must
await the co-operation of his lake squadron. For four days Prevost
lay inactive, while he urged Captain Downie with his ill-prepared
ships to join him, and engage the enemy’s squadron: the time was
utilised by Macomb in strengthening his defences and collecting
reinforcements. On the 11th, the British squadron appeared in sight,
and engaged the U.S. ships, while Prevost put his troops tardily in
motion. They forded the Saranac, and ascended the opposing heights,
when, with victory in their grasp, they suddenly received the order
to withdraw to their former positions. The British lake squadron,
after a most deadly contest of over two hours, had been completely
defeated, and Sir George Prevost at once threw up the sponge. The
same night, leaving his sick and wounded, together with a quantity
of stores, he commenced a retreat, which much resembled a flight,
to the Canadian frontier. In the many wars in which the British army
has fought, it would be hard to find a parallel instance in which
British troops have been so mishandled. The co-operation of the fleet
was unnecessary, as the enemy’s squadron could not have maintained
its position with the whole of Plattsburgh in British hands. Nine
thousand of Wellington’s veterans, who had defeated Napoleon’s
choicest troops again and again, were made to retreat from an
inferior force that could not have withstood them for an hour, with a
loss of less than 40 killed since they had crossed the frontier. No
wonder that the enemy first took the retreat for a _ruse de guerre_,
and that a British General broke his sword, vowing he would never
serve again. In the whole of the operations against Plattsburgh,
the land forces under Prevost’s immediate command suffered a total
loss of 37 killed, 150 wounded and 55 missing. In their anger at the
fiasco, an immense number of men deserted during the retreat, causing
a greater loss than a successful prosecution of the enterprise could
possibly have entailed. The 19th Light Dragoons while covering the
retirement, lost five men and horses taken prisoners.

Only brief mention need be made of land operations elsewhere, as
they do not come within the scope of operations in which the 19th
Light Dragoons were concerned. In the middle of August, a combined
military and naval expedition fitted out from Bermuda, under Major
General Ross and Vice Admiral Cockburn, landed at Benedict in the
Potomac river, 50 miles from Washington, and marched on that town. At
Bladensberg, on the 24th, Ross encountered a U.S. army of about 8000
men under General Winder, and gained a complete and easy victory,
taking 10 guns.[65] Washington was occupied the same evening. On
the following evening, after burning the most important public
buildings, in retaliation for the outrages committed on the Canadian
non-combatants, the force retired, and re-embarked on the 29th,
without molestation.

At daylight on the 12th September, the same force landed 13 miles
from Baltimore, and advanced on that place. On first coming in touch
with the enemy, Ross was killed by a chance shot. Colonel Brook
assumed the command, and at about five miles from Baltimore a United
States’ force of about 7000 men was encountered and overthrown in
less than half an hour. Two field pieces and many prisoners were
captured. Preparations were then made for a combined attack on the
city, when it was discovered that the harbour was so effectually
closed by sunken vessels, that naval co-operation was impossible.
It being considered that, under these circumstances, the loss that
must be incurred in taking the place by storm would be out of
proportion to any benefit to be gained, the troops were withdrawn,
and re-embarked without the slightest molestation, on the 15th. The
troopships, after hovering on the coast, rather aimlessly for another
month, then set sail for Jamaica, where an expedition was preparing
against New Orleans.

The mistake that had been made by the United States government
in the early part of the war, in under-rating the difficulty of
conquering Canada, and in believing that the inhabitants would join
the invaders, was now to be repeated by the British government.
British Ministers had been brought to believe that the inhabitants of
Louisiana were disaffected to the U.S. government, and that the State
could easily be taken possession of. With this object, an expedition
against New Orleans had been planned in England; and, it was in order
to save the troops for this purpose, that the attack on Baltimore had
been abandoned. New Orleans, though a great commercial centre, was
devoid of any military importance, and the expedition was destined to
furnish another example of the faulty strategy that was exhibited on
both sides during the war.

On the 8th December, the expedition under Major General Sir
Edward Pakenham, appeared off the coast, and, on the night of the
12th, captured the enemy’s squadron of gunboats. On the 16th, the
landing of the troops commenced, at the mouth of the Pearl river.
Considerable delay ensued, owing to the swampy nature of the
ground, and the advance did not approach the city till the 23rd.
General Jackson, in command at New Orleans, occupied a long line of
entrenchments at right angles to the river. He was also assisted by
armed vessels on the Mississippi which inflicted severe losses on the
British troops, and greatly delayed their advance. On the morning
of the 8th January, the attack was made, and repulsed with heavy
slaughter. Pakenham fell at the head of his men; Major General Gibbs
died of his wounds the following day, and Major General Keane was
severely wounded. The total loss amounted to 2119 killed, wounded and
missing. So strongly were the enemy posted, that his loss did not
exceed about 80 men. Under this disastrous repulse the expedition
withdrew on the 18th, and re-embarked. A portion of the expedition
was then directed against Fort Bowyer, on Mobile Point, which
capitulated, on 12th February, without resistance. Twenty-eight guns
and over 300 prisoners fell into the hands of the British.

In the middle of March, news was received that a Treaty of Peace had
been signed at Ghent on 24th December, and the war was at an end.

During the summer of 1814, the Head Quarters of the regiment was
moved from La Prairie to Chambly, where they remained as long as
the regiment was in Canada. The four troops left behind in Ireland
had been moved, on the embarkation of the regiment for Canada,
to Radipole Barracks, near Weymouth; and thence to Maidstone, in
February 1814. In July of the same year, the regiment lost its
Colonel, Lord Howe, by death. In his place, Lieutenant General Sir
William Payne Bt., was transferred as Colonel, from the 23rd Light
Dragoons. He was an officer who had served in the Royal Dragoons,
and commanded the British Cavalry at the battle of Talavera. His
connection with the regiment was very brief, as, in the following
January, he was appointed Colonel of the 12th Light Dragoons. In his
place, Major General Sir John Ormsby Vandeleur K.C.B., Lieutenant
Colonel in the regiment, was appointed Colonel.

Sir John Vandeleur had entered the army in 1781, and saw service in
Flanders in 1794, and at the Cape of Good Hope in 1796. He commanded
a brigade of cavalry, under Lake, in the wars against Scindia and
Holkar, 1803-5, and especially distinguished himself at Laswaree,
and on other occasions. In 1807, he exchanged into the 19th as
already mentioned.[66] In 1811, he commanded an infantry brigade in
Spain, under Wellington, and, at Ciudad Rodrigo, led the assault
after Craufurd’s fall, when he was severely wounded. Afterwards he
commanded the 4th cavalry brigade at Waterloo, and succeeded to the
command of the whole of the cavalry, on Lord Uxbridge being wounded.

During 1814, gold lace was substituted for silver in the uniform of
the regiment.

In May 1815, sanction was granted, under the following order, for
Major Lisle’s squadron to wear the badge “Niagara” for their services
on the Niagara frontier. The privilege seems to have been extended
later to the whole regiment.

[Sidenote: 1815.

19th Light Dragoons (Squadron under Major Lisle). Royal Scots--1st
Battalion. 8th or King’s--1st Battalion. 41st--Fl. Cos. 89th--2nd
Batt. 100th--103rd--Glengarry Lt. Inf. Fencibles.]

HORSE GUARDS
_19th May 1815_.

Sir,

I have had the honour to lay before the Commander-in-Chief your
letter of the 26th February last, and am directed to acquaint
you in reply that His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has been
pleased, in the Name and on the behalf of His Majesty, to approve
of the Regiments named in the Margin, being permitted to bear on
their Colors and Appointments in addition to any other Badges,
or Devices, which may have been heretofore permitted to be borne
by those Regiments the Word “Niagara,” in consequence of the
distinguished Conduct of those Corps in the Capture of Fort
Niagara by Assault on the 19th December 1813, and in the Battle
at Lundy’s Lane, in North America, on the 25th July 1814.

I have &c.

H. CALVERT
A. G.

Lt. General
Sir GEORGE PREVOST Bt.
or General Officer Commanding Canada.

Detachments of the regiment were quartered at La Prairie, Isle aux
Noix, Blairfindie, Quebec, Montreal, and St John’s.

In 1816, the whole of the ten troops of the regiment, amounting to
620 rank and file, appear to have been in Canada. At the very end
of the year, the strength of the Canadian establishment was fixed
at 5000 rank and file. In order to bring it down to this number,
the 19th were held under orders to return to England, but, it was
not till the following 6th August that they embarked at Quebec,
and landed at Tilbury, 13th September. On landing they marched to
Romford, where they remained till the following March.

The execution done by the Polish lancers at Waterloo induced the
military authorities in England to arm four regiments with lances.
Accordingly, the 9th, 12th, 16th, and 23rd Light Dragoons were
equipped as Lancers, in September 1816. But great reductions in the
military establishments were in progress, and, in October 1817, the
23rd were disbanded, their horses being made over to the 19th, whose
establishment was reduced to eight troops. At the same time, the 19th
were ordered to be equipped as lancers.[67]

In March 1818, the regiment was moved to Hounslow and Hampton Court,
with detachments at Pimlico and Kensington. On the 26th May, the
regiment, together with the 10th Hussars, was reviewed at Hounslow by
the Prince Regent, and, in November, they were on duty, at Datchet,
for Queen Charlotte’s funeral.

The regimental muster rolls show that in October the regiment had 455
rank and file.

In June of the following year the regiment moved to Brighton, with
troops at Hastings, Arundel and Rottingdean.

A year later (June 1820), the regiment was ordered to Nottingham,
with troops at Mansfield, Sheffield, Loughborough, Peterborough and
Derby. In spite of the distance, they marched to Hounslow to be
reviewed, on 4th August, in company with the 10th Hussars and 12th
Lancers, by George IV., when His Majesty expressed his “unqualified
approbation” of the three regiments.

[Illustration: OFFICERS OF THE XIX^{TH} LANCERS, 1818.

_to face p. 218._]

During the winter, the regiment marched to Manchester, and, in the
end of May, embarked for Ireland, where they were quartered at
Newbridge. But further reductions were in progress, and, on 23rd
August 1821, warrants were issued for the disbandment of the 18th
Light Dragoons and 19th Lancers, which were carried into effect on
10th September. The strength of the 19th, at the time of disbandment,
was 103 officers and non-commissioned officers, 336 rank and file,
273 horses.

PART IV

THE NINETEENTH “PRINCESS OF WALES’ OWN” HUSSARS

(1858-1899)

CHAPTER I

RAISING OF THE REGIMENT

(1858-1882)

The East India Company raises European Cavalry regiments--Their
formation--The Bengal 1st European Light Cavalry--Services
transferred to the Crown--The “White Mutiny”--Made 19th Light
Dragoons, afterwards Hussars--General Pattle--Regiment at
Meerut--General Hall--Regiment ordered to England--Badges of old
19th Light Dragoons granted--Regiment ordered to Ireland--Guidons
of old 19th Light Dragoons presented to the regiment--Regiment
returns to England--Ordered on active service.

In May 1857, the mutiny of the Bengal Native Army occurred, which so
profoundly changed the nature of British administration in India.
Through carelessness and false economy, the East India Company
had allowed the number of European troops in India to sink to a
dangerously low level, in proportion to the number of native troops.
As against some 230,000 native soldiers, the European troops numbered
less than 40,000 men, of whom about 23,500 were royal troops. The
Company’s European troops in India consisted, at that time, of nine
battalions of Infantry, seventeen troops of Horse Artillery, and
forty-eight companies of Foot Artillery. Apart from other measures
for restoring tranquillity, it was determined to raise three
additional battalions of Infantry, and to replace the mutinous Bengal
Native Cavalry by Europeans. Of the ten regiments of regular Bengal
Native Cavalry, seven had mutinied, and two had been disarmed.

In November 1857, intimation was sent to the Governor General that
it had been decided to form four regiments of Cavalry, for the
Company’s service, of men recruited in England, of ages between 20
and 30 years, and of a standard height not less than 5 ft., and not
exceeding 5 ft. 4 in. Each regiment was to consist of ten troops,
with 70 privates per troop, together with the usual number of
officers, non-commissioned officers and staff. All accoutrements,
arms, and equipments were to be of a lighter description than those
in common use by British Cavalry: and the men were to be collected at
a depot in England (Warley), to be trained for three months, before
being embarked for India. A lower standard of height than that of
the Royal Army was adopted, with the intention that the recruiting
for the Royal Army should not be interfered with, and it was thought
that, by tapping a new stratum of recruits, men would be easily
obtained. These anticipations were justified. The whole nation had
been roused by the sufferings of our countrywomen in India, and
recruits flocked in. Three weeks later, the Court of Directors were
obliged to write to the Governor General that, in consequence of the
very rapid recruiting, accommodation could not be provided for the
men, in England, and it was necessary to embark a large body of them,
for Calcutta, at once.

With regard to these undersized men, it may be said here, that a
large number of them made excellent soldiers in time; but there was
a considerable proportion of them, big men on short legs, over 25
years of age at the time of enlistment, who were unfit for cavalry
purposes.

After being kept some time near Calcutta, the men were gradually
forwarded to Allahabad, where they were collected in June 1858, an
almost undisciplined mob, without permanent officers, without horses,
and without equipments. On the 17th June, we find Major General
Sir William Mansfield (afterwards Lord Sandhurst) writing to Major
General Sir Hope Grant, then in the field against the rebels: “We
are about to organize the four regiments of Bengal Dragoons, and to
divide the recruits into four bodies without delay. How would it suit
you to have one of these young corps attached to the ‘Bays’ (2nd
Dragoon Guards), and another to the 7th (Hussars)? Not a man has ever
been on a horse, and the men are at present armed with _muskets_.”

By the end of June, the apportioning of the men into regiments was
complete, and, on the 3rd July, the regiment with which our interest
lies, became established as the Bengal 1st European Light Cavalry,
to be quartered at Allahabad. The other three regiments marched for
various cantonments in North Western India. A fifth regiment was
formed at Peshawur, in November, of volunteers from Royal infantry
regiments, who had been formed into a cavalry corps for temporary
service during the Mutiny.

To officer each of these regiments, the officers of two of the ten
mutinied or disbanded Bengal Native Cavalry regiments were utilized:
but, instead of placing them upon a single list, they were kept on
separate lists for promotion, which were styled Right and Left Wings,
corresponding to their late regiments. All officers newly appointed,
who had belonged to neither of the old Native regiments, were to be
borne on the strength of the Right Wing, so that, in process of time,
the Left Wing was destined to disappear; but the process would have
been one of thirty years or more, according to the rate of promotion
then existing in the Company’s service.

The Bengal 1st European Light Cavalry was officered by the surviving
officers of the 1st and 3rd Bengal Native Cavalry, both of which
regiments had mutinied. For remounts, the men were given a number of
horses hastily purchased at the Cape of Good Hope and in Australia,
most of them wild unbroken bush horses that had never been handled.
An officer who served with the regiment at this time, writing of it
forty years afterwards, says:--

“No regiments were ever raised under such absurd conditions, and,
if the object had been to prove them a failure, no course better
calculated to achieve that end could have been pursued. The only
old soldiers sent to assist us were two or three infantry men
from a Fusilier regiment, none higher in rank than Corporal.
When the authorities were addressed on this subject, one or two
cavalry soldiers, I think from the 7th Hussars, were sent; the
highest in rank being a Lance Corporal who was promptly made a
Troop Sergeant Major, and I don’t think turned out a success. The
horses, like the men, were all untrained, and some of the horses
from the Cape were perfect devils, very difficult to clean, and
for some time impossible to ride or to shoe. I have a vivid
recollection of one roan, who stood in his stall for days covered
with mud, because no one could go near him. Out of the crowd of
raw recruits, we had to find all our Non-Commissioned officers
from Troop Sergeant Major downwards, so it may be imagined what
little respect was paid to the highest grades.”

On the 1st November 1858, the Crown assumed the government of India,
and the East India Company thenceforth ceased to exist. No attention
was paid to the view that might be taken of the change, in the
ranks of the Company’s army. The British soldier, though he yields
to discipline, never forgets that he is a soldier by his own free
will; he objects to be treated like a conscript. The late Company’s
European soldiers quickly came to believe that their rights had been
infringed. Had they been asked to volunteer for service under the
Crown, they would have done so almost to a man; but they objected
to be handed over “like bullocks,” as they expressed it. The Indian
government consulted its legal advisers, who treated the objection as
a purely technical one, prompted by a wish for the offer of a bounty.
So long as the men were retained for the local service for which they
had enlisted, it was considered that they had no grievance. It was
decided that the men had no case, and a General Order to this effect
was published in April 1859. The agitation quickly assumed a serious
aspect, and, during May, there was a time when, in a few cantonments,
a collision between the Royal and the late Company’s European troops
appeared possible. The movement was not confined to the newly raised
regiments, but was equally shared in by the old soldiers of the late
Company, who had shown their fine qualities on many a hard fought
field. The behaviour of the 1st Bengal European Light Cavalry was
similar to that of the local European forces in most other places.
All guards and barrack duties were performed without demur, but the
men refused to turn out for parade. On one occasion the canteen was
broken into, and an attempt was made to release prisoners. Mutinous
language was used to officers in a few instances, and shots fired
in defiance, but not with evil intent. Under the circumstances
already related, it is surprising that nothing worse occurred. In one
instance alone, in one of the newly raised infantry regiments, was
there a dangerous attempt to act as an organized armed body hostile
to the State. This was speedily repressed, and the ringleader shot.

The Calcutta government quickly recognized its mistake. In the end
of June, orders were published allowing the men the option of
discharge, but no bounty was offered to those who elected to remain,
while those who took their discharge were not allowed the option of
re-enlistment, as long as they remained in the country. Under the
feeling of exasperation that had grown up, upwards of 10,000 men
elected to take their discharge, of whom 2800 re-enlisted on reaching
England.

The trouble with the Indian local European forces, in 1859, has been
frequently cited as a cogent reason against the maintenance of a body
of British troops in India, for local service only; a measure that
would overcome many difficulties now felt in army administration.
Those who study the events of 1859 must recognize that the trouble
arose, not from the conditions of service, but from the mistakes
of those in authority at Calcutta. The “White Mutiny” was no mere
outbreak against discipline: it was the vindication of the men’s
claim to be consulted in the disposal of their services.

While these events were in progress, orders were received for the
regiment to march to Cawnpore, which it did in June.

Early in 1861, it was determined to cease the maintenance of any
European force for local service in India, and, on 6th May, the
officers, non-commissioned officers and men were called on to
volunteer for General Service. They responded, almost to a man, and
the regiment received the designation of the 19th Light Dragoons. In
the same way, the Bengal 2nd and 3rd European Light Cavalry became
the 20th and 21st Light Dragoons; the 4th and 5th being disbanded.
At the same time, the establishment was assimilated to that of other
British cavalry regiments in India, viz. nine troops (one at the
depot in England) with 585 corporals and privates: 693 of all ranks.
Three months later, under Horse Guards order of 17th August 1861,
the designation of the regiment was changed to the 19th Hussars.
The standard for recruits was assimilated to that of other Hussar
regiments.

At the beginning of February 1862, the regiment was moved to Lucknow.

On the 30th July, in the same year, the complete roll of officers was
gazetted.

_Lieutenant Colonel_ Charles Vanbrugh Jenkins.

_Major_ John Hatfield Brooks.
Roland Richardson.

Henry Cadogan Craigie.
_Sir_ John Hill, _Bt. Bt. Major_.
Henry Edward Ellice.
Robert Baring.
_Captain_ Melville Clarke.
Hugh Henry Gough, _V.C._, _Brevet Major_.
Frederick Peter Luard.
Richard Talbot Plantagenet Stapleton
Charles Manners Sutton Fairbrother.

Charles Hay Fairlie.
Abel Henry Chapman.
Cecil Clarke Jervoise.
Arthur George Webster.
_Lieutenant_ Robert Morris.
Edward Stirling Rivett-Carnac.
John Biddulph.
George Cortlandt Buller Taylor.
Charles John Prinsep.
Albert Hearsey.

Elliot Alexander Money.
Joseph Boulderson.
_Cornet_ Frederick Henry Huth.
Charles Robert St. Quintin.
Francis Dallas Harding.
Seymour Duncan Barrow.

_Riding Master_ George Couch.

_Adjutant_ Abel Henry Chapman.

_Paymaster_ Henry Octavius Currie.

The greater number of them had belonged to the Company’s 1st and 3rd
Bengal Native Cavalry.

In September, General William Pattle C.B. was gazetted to be Colonel
of the regiment. He was an old Company’s officer who had entered the
service in 1800. He served under Lord Lake in the Mahratta campaigns
of 1803 and 1804, and was present at the battles of Alyghur, Delhi,
Laswaree, the siege of Bhurtpore &c. He served through the Mahratta
war of 1817-18, and commanded the cavalry under Sir Charles Napier,
during the conquest of Scinde, and at the battles of Meeanee and
Hyderabad.

Under orders from the War office, dated 6th January 1863, the
establishment was reduced by one troop, leaving seven service troops
and one at Maidstone.

In the autumn, orders were received for the regiment to march to
Meerut, where it arrived 28th November. Here the regiment remained
till the end of 1867. The only events to be noticed during these four
years are a reduction of establishment by 56 privates in 1866: and
the presence of the regiment at the great Durbar held by the Viceroy,
Sir John Lawrence, at Agra, in November 1866, when the 19th were
brigaded with the 2nd Dragoon Guards.

In the beginning of 1865, the regiment lost its Colonel by death. In
his place Lieutenant General John Hall was appointed Colonel.

On the 10th December 1867, the Head Quarters of the regiment, with
four troops, marched for Benares, being followed, a month later, by
the remaining three troops, who marched to Cawnpore.

In the ordinary course of relief, the regiment was intended to leave
India in 1872. In a sudden fit of economy, the Indian Government
decided to get rid of two cavalry regiments, so that, without any
previous warning, the regiment received telegraphic orders, on 18th
January 1870, to proceed to England immediately. Similar orders were
sent to the 7th Hussars, then serving in India. Volunteering was at
once opened to men electing to serve in other regiments remaining in
India, and, on 24th January, the regiment was re-united at Allahabad,
whence it proceeded to Bombay, where it embarked on board the _Jumna_
on the 14th February. So unexpected had been the move, that a draft
for the regiment, from England, joined it four days before sailing.
The strength of the regiment leaving India, was as follows: 18
officers, 51 sergeants and corporals, 7 trumpeters, 257 privates, 28
women and 55 children.

On the 22nd March, the regiment landed at Dover, and proceeded to
Canterbury, whence all the Cavalry Depot troops, excepting those
of the 20th and 21st Hussars, had been moved to Maidstone. But the
British Government were as unwilling to have the home military
establishment increased by the two regiments thus sent from India,
as the Indian Government had been to retain them, and the idea of
disbanding two regiments was entertained. The Manchester school was
predominant; shortsighted financial considerations alone had any
weight. The changes rung in the establishment of the regiment for
the next four months show the hesitating counsels that prevailed.
On the 1st April, one troop was absorbed. A month later, the
establishment was nominally fixed at 25 officers, 457 Sergeants and
privates, and 300 horses, but recruiting to make the regiment up to
that strength was forbidden. At the end of June the establishment of
horses was reduced to 200. A week later, the war between France and
Germany broke out, while the question of the strength of military
establishments was still being bandied about between the Treasury and
the War Office. On the 1st August, orders were received to complete
the strength of the regiment up to 540 of all ranks, which was done
by the end of September. The number of horses was also raised to 350.

Consequent on the increase of establishment, an eighth troop was
formed in February 1871.

In May, the Head Quarters of the regiment and five troops marched to
Brighton; the other three troops going to the camp at Shorncliffe.

On the 17th June, an inspection of the regiment was held at Brighton
by its Colonel, General John Hall.

In August 1872, the regiment marched to Aldershot, and, a few days
after arrival, marched to take part in the Wiltshire manœuvres at
Pewsey, where it was brigaded under the command of Major General
Shute C.B.; returning to Aldershot in September.

During 1872, the regiment lost its Colonel, Lieutenant General Hall,
who was succeeded by General John Yorke C.B. He was an old officer of
the Royal Dragoons, which regiment he commanded in the Crimean War,
and was severely wounded at Balaclava.

In June 1873, the regiment marched to Windsor, to take part in the
review held in honour of H.M. the Shah of Persia, on the 24th;
returning to Aldershot the following day.

In August, manœuvres were held at Dartmoor, in which the regiment
took part; proceeding by train as far as Exeter, and returning to
Aldershot by route march. The fine appearance of the regiment, and
its proficiency in outpost and reconnoissance duties attracted more
than usual attention on this occasion.

Early in 1874, the regiment was granted the privilege of wearing the
badges so gloriously earned by the old 19th Light Dragoons.

HORSE GUARDS _24th Feb. 1874_.

SIR,

I have the honor, by desire of His Royal Highness the Field
Marshall Commanding in Chief to acquaint you that Her Majesty has
been graciously pleased to approve of the regiment under your
command being permitted to wear the badges granted to the old
19th Light Dragoons for achievements during the present Century,
viz.:

The Elephant

“Assaye” “Niagara”

J. W. ARMSTRONG,
Depy. Adj. General

To the
Officer Commanding
19th Hussars.

It will be observed that the “Seringapatam” badge, granted to the
old 19th Light Dragoons for four campaigns in the last century, was
withheld. The 23rd of September is now observed as an annual holiday
in the regiment, in commemoration of Assaye.

On the 19th May, the regiment took part in the review held at
Aldershot, in honour of H.I.M. the Emperor of Russia.

At the end of June, the regiment marched to new quarters at Hounslow,
with a troop at Hampton Court, and another at Kensington.

At the end of July 1875, the regiment marched to Leeds, with troops
at Preston and Bury.

In June 1876, the regiment proceeded to Ireland. After going through
the drill season at the Curragh, it went into quarters at Longford,
Gort, Castlebar, Dunmore, and Athlone. In the following spring it
returned to the Curragh, and, in October, marched to Dublin, where it
was quartered in the Royal Barracks and Arbour Hill. In the following
August, it again marched to the Curragh, whence, after a month, it
marched for Ballincollig, with out-quarters at Cork, Cahir, Limerick,
Bandon, Fermoy, and afterwards Waterford. In these quarters the
regiment remained till May 1880, when it was again ordered to the
Curragh. In August, the regiment again marched to Dublin, leaving
one squadron at the Curragh. Three months later, a wing was ordered
to Ballinrobe and Lough Mask, by rail, in aid of the civil power,
returning to Dublin after a fortnight’s work, in, what was then
called, the “Boycott” campaign.

In May 1881, the regiment moved to Dundalk, with two troops at
Belfast and one at Belturbet. The time was one of much excitement in
Ireland, when the Land League conspiracy was in full force, and the
regiment was employed, during the winter, in much harassing work in
support of the civil power.

While at Belfast the regiment became possessed of some greatly prized
relics of the old 19th Light Dragoons, through the generosity of a
lady whose husband had served in the old regiment. As is well known,
all cavalry regiments except Hussars and Lancers, at the beginning
of the century, had a standard or guidon for each squadron. After
their return from India, and shortly after the conferring of the
Elephant and Assaye badges (1807) the 19th Light Dragoons received
a new set of guidons.[68] On the regiment being equipped as Lancers
(1817) the guidons could no longer be used, and, on the disbanding
of the regiment they became the property of the Colonel, Sir John
Vandeleur. At his death he bequeathed them to his relative Major
William Armstrong of Farney Castle, Thurles, who had served in the
19th from 1809 to 1819. Major Armstrong’s widow now made known her
wish to restore the guidons to the regiment that bears the number and
badges which the old regiment so worthily earned. On the 28th March
1882, the Belfast squadron paraded, under Lieutenant Colonel Coghill,
and received the guidons with a royal salute. The Princess of Wales’
Own Yorkshire Regiment (formerly the 19th Foot) lent the services of
their band, and the guidons were marched in all honour, through the
town, to barracks, where they were deposited in the Mess Room, after
a royal salute and an address to the squadron from Colonel Coghill.

The honorary guidon granted to the old regiment for Assaye, has not
been traced. If it is still in existence, it is to be hoped that the
possessor will restore it to its rightful guardians.

According to the old custom one guidon in each regiment was known
as the King’s. The King’s guidon was of crimson silk with the
Union badge in the centre. The regimental guidons were of the same
colour as the regimental facings, with the regimental badge in the
centre. Guidons were discarded on active service, after 1811, if not
earlier.[69]

[Illustration: AN OFFICER OF THE XIX^{TH} HUSSARS, 1882.

_to face p. 232._]

In June 1882, the regiment received orders to return to England,
and, while on the march for Aldershot, where it arrived 14th July,
news was received that it was to proceed at once to Egypt on active
service. Weak and sickly men were drafted into Depot, to remain
behind, the four squadrons being completed by volunteers from other
regiments and from the Reserve. The following officers also were
attached to the regiment, for service.

_Captain Lord_ St. Vincent 16th Lancers.
_Lieutenant Sir_ G. Arthur 2nd Life Guards.
” Scott 3rd Hussars.
” Crabbe ” ”
” Morris 7th Hussars.
” Ridley ” ”
” Holland 15th Hussars.
” de Crespigny ” ”
” _Hon._ R. Leigh ” ”
” Blagrove ” ”
” La Terriere 18th Hussars.

CHAPTER II

TROUBLES IN EGYPT

1882-1884.

In June 1879, Mahomed Ismail, the Khedive of Egypt, was deposed by
the Sultan, at the instance of England and France, in favour of
his son Mahommed Tewfik, and a control of Egyptian finances was
established by the two western powers. In the beginning of 1881, a
spirit of insubordination began to show itself among the officers of
the Egyptian army, who quickly recognised their own power to enforce
demands, and adopted as leader, one of their number, Said Ahmed
Arabi, better known as Arabi Pasha. By September, the pretensions
of the army had so far increased that, they forced the Khedive to
dismiss his Ministers. Attempts were soon afterwards made to get rid
of the Anglo-French control. Arabi’s influence increased daily; he
caused himself to be appointed Minister of War; and, by April 1882,
had practically got the whole of the country into his hands. The
Khedive was helpless. In May, the French and English fleets were
sent to Alexandria, in order to strengthen the Khedive’s hands.
But matters did not improve: Arabi openly assumed the direction of
affairs, and began to strengthen the forts commanding the Alexandria
harbour. On the 11th June, serious riots broke out in Alexandria,
in the course of which a number of Europeans were killed, and their
houses pillaged. It was seen in England that a military expedition
to restore order would probably be necessary, and preparations, in
anticipation, began to be made.

In the meantime, the work on the Alexandria fortifications had so
far advanced as to endanger the safety of the fleets. The French
Government was unwilling to take action: the remonstrances of the
British Admiral were met by evasions and denials from Arabi Pasha.
At last, on 11th July, after due notice, the forts were bombarded
and destroyed by the British fleet. A force of seamen and marines
was landed to secure the safety of the Khedive, and put an end to
the pillaging and burning of the town by Arab marauders, and, on
the 17th, two battalions of British infantry, from Cyprus, under
Major General Sir Archibald Alison, landed to hold the town. On the
20th, the British Government definitely decided to send a military
expedition to Egypt, to restore the Khedive’s authority. The French
Government refused to co-operate, and withdrew from further action.

The force sent from England and the Mediterranean stations amounted
to 25,450 men, of whom 2400 were cavalry: the whole being commanded
by Lieutenant General Sir Garnet Wolseley. There being no fear of
their being attacked at sea, they were sent without convoy, as
soon as the ships could be got ready. By the 11th August, the last
transport had sailed from England for Alexandria. The 19th Hussars
were among the last to go. On the 10th August, they embarked at
Southampton, in the _Assyrian Monarch_ and the _Montreal_, with a
total strength of 33 officers, 553 non-commissioned officers and
privates, and 464 horses, under command of Lieutenant Colonel K. J.
W. Coghill. Previous to this, a detachment of 20 men under Lieutenant
Aylmer had sailed in the _Orient_ as escort to H.R.H. the Duke
of Connaught. It was also arranged for a Contingent from India to
operate from Suez, consisting of one battalion of British infantry,
three battalions of Native infantry, and three regiments of Native
cavalry, under command of Major General Sir Herbert Macpherson.

Arabi’s army, at the beginning of July, consisted only of about 9000
men. By calling out reserves, and enlisting Arabs, it soon reached
the number of 60,000 men, and eventually amounted to 100,000.

Before the expedition left England, it had been determined to seize
the Suez Canal, and advance on Cairo from Ismailia; but, as it was
expedient that the Canal should not be blocked or injured, Alexandria
was appointed as the rendezvous of the troops on the Mediterranean
side, and measures were taken to spread the belief that the advance
on Cairo would be made from that place.

The greater part of the troops being gathered at Alexandria, on
the 18th August, preparations were made as if an attack on Aboukir
was intended. Troops were re-embarked, and sailed under convoy of
the fleet, at noon on the 19th, anchoring in Aboukir Bay the same
afternoon. After dark, while demonstrations of bombarding the Aboukir
forts were made, the transports weighed anchor, entered the Canal,
and commenced landing at Ismailia on the 20th. The movement was
unexpected by the enemy, and no resistance was experienced. By the
22nd, complete command had been gained of the whole Canal from Port
Said to Suez. On the 21st, Nefisha, four miles in front of Ismailia,
was occupied. Early on the 24th, a small force was pushed forward
to El Magfar, which was occupied after a slight skirmish, in which
Lieutenant Aylmer’s detachment of the 19th Hussars took part. At El
Magfar, it was found necessary to push on to Tel-el-Mahuta, to secure
the water supply. The place was strongly occupied by the enemy, and
the small British force was exposed to long range fire of guns and
small arms, for many hours, while reinforcements were coming up,
which did not happen till the evening. The next morning, the whole
force advanced, and occupied Tel-el-Mahuta after a slight opposition,
while the cavalry pushed forward, and occupied the enemy’s camp at
Mahsamah without resistance. Seven guns, with a large quantity of
small arms, ammunition and stores, fell into the hands of the British
troops. Early on the 26th, Kassassin was occupied by a brigade of
infantry under Major General Graham, and the troops from Suez began
to arrive at Ismailia.

The 19th Hussars, in the _Assyrian Monarch_ and the _Montreal_, did
not reach Alexandria in time to take part in these operations. They
reached Ismailia on the 24th, and completed their disembarkation
by the evening of the 26th. The duty assigned to them was to act
as Divisional troops; the Right Wing, consisting of two squadrons
under Lieutenant Colonel Coghill, formed part of the 1st Division
under Lieutenant General Willis; the remaining two squadrons, under
Lieutenant Colonel A. G. Webster, formed part of the 2nd Division
under Lieutenant General Sir E. Hamley. One troop was detailed as
escort to Sir Garnet Wolseley throughout the campaign. The Right Wing
joined the Head Quarters of the 1st Division at Tel-el-Mahuta, on the
evening of the 27th.

On the 28th, a demonstration was made by the enemy against Graham’s
force at Kassassin. The Right Wing of the 19th was ordered in support
to Mahsamah; but, on its being ascertained that no serious attack
was intended they returned to Tel-el-Mahuta. Graham, having been
reinforced, and expecting the Heavy Cavalry Brigade to join him, made
a general advance after sunset. The orders for the heavy cavalry had,
however, miscarried, and did not reach Major General Lowe for several
hours. Making a wide sweep into the desert, Lowe fell upon the left
of the enemy in the dark, and charged, rolling up their infantry;
the darkness made pursuit impossible. The sound of the heavy firing,
caused the Division at Tel-el-Mahuta to turn out again, but after a
brief advance they returned to camp, with the exception of the 19th
Hussars, who pushed on to Kassassin, which they reached at daybreak.
It was not till noon, after visiting the scene of the previous
night’s encounter, that they were able to off-saddle and rest.

The following twelve days were spent in preparing for the advance
on Tel-el-Kebir, 13 miles from Kassassin, where Arabi’s army had
constructed a formidable line of entrenched works. During these days,
the 19th Hussars and the Indian Native Cavalry were employed in
continual outpost and reconnoissance duties. On the 5th, Lieutenant
Holland was badly wounded.

By the 8th, all was ready for massing the whole force at Kassassin
preparatory to the advance on Tel-el-Kebir. Early on the 9th, Arabi
advanced in force on Kassassin, attacking in two separate bodies
simultaneously, one in front from Tel-el-Kebir, and the other in
flank from Es Salihiyeh. Willis repelled the double attack with ease,
and pushed the enemy back to within cannon shot of Tel-el-Kebir,
capturing four guns.

Soon after dark on the 12th, the whole force consisting of 17,000
men, with 61 guns, moved out of camp to some high ground in front of
Kassassin, in preparation for an attack on Arabi Pasha’s entrenched
lines. At 1.30 in the morning, the troops moved silently forwards
through the desert, their march directed by a naval officer steering
by the stars. The four infantry brigades, in two lines, led the
way, supported on the right by the heavy cavalry brigade and horse
artillery, and on the left by the naval brigade. In rear of the
naval brigade, followed the 19th Hussars under Lieutenant Colonel
Coghill. One troop of the regiment remained at Mahsamah, and another
at Tel-el-Mahuta, to guard those points. At five in the morning
the attack was delivered; after half an hour’s severe fighting, the
British infantry was in complete possession of the lines. While the
heavy cavalry pushed on to Zagazig to cut off fugitives, the 19th,
under Coghill, passed through an opening in the entrenchments, and
seized the Tel-el-Kebir railway station and bridge, cutting off a
great number of fugitives. Thence the pursuit was continued for
three hours, when the 19th returned to the enemy’s late camp. In
the afternoon they started again in the track of the heavy cavalry,
leaving a troop to protect burial parties, and reached Belbeis that
evening. On the following evening Cairo was taken possession of, and
Arabi surrendered himself. The only casualty in the regiment was
Lieutenant Barclay who was struck by a fragment of shell from one of
the first guns fired by the enemy at Tel-el-Kebir.

The war was over. A medal, with clasp for Tel-el-Kebir, was given to
all who took part in the campaign. The medals were presented to the
regiment by Lady Dufferin, in Her Majesty’s name, in the following
February. H.H. the Khedive also gave a star.

A few weeks after the arrival of the regiment in Cairo, a virulent
epidemic attacked the horses. In order to shake it off, the regiment
was moved to Helouan, at the end of the first week in November, with
248 sick horses, 56 having died in Cairo. A good deal of sickness
also set in among the men. In the following March the regiment
returned to Cairo, and occupied the Abassiyeh barracks, having lost
18 men and 141 horses in the interval. When the regiment went to
Egypt it had four coloured squadrons, chesnut, bay, brown, and black,
while the band were mounted on greys. Experience showed that the
greys bore the climate better than any others; the chesnuts also bore
the climate well. The dark coloured horses suffered most, and were
more liable, than the others, to sore backs. In respect to age, the
percentage of deaths among horses between five and ten years, was
double that among horses between ten and fifteen years. In the hurry
of departure from England, about twenty horses, over fifteen years of
age, were taken. They were employed as waggon horses, and had perhaps
harder work than those under saddle; yet they stood the climate and
work better than all the others.

Affairs in Lower Egypt, to outward appearance, seemed to be settling
down so satisfactorily that, in November, the regiment received
orders to hold itself in readiness to proceed to England. This
prospect endured only for a week, when news from Upper Egypt was
received, altering all arrangements.

While the British government were busying themselves with Lower
Egypt, they paid scanty attention to the Soudan, which they regarded
as a burden and encumbrance that Egypt would do well to get rid of.
The Khedive’s government did not hold this view, and continued to
occupy themselves in dealing with a movement that had originated in
Kordofan, the importance of which was greatly under-estimated at
the time. Simultaneously with the insubordination of the Egyptian
army and the rise of Arabi Pasha, another pretender to power, of a
more serious type had arisen in the South. In May 1881, an Arab,
in Kordofan, named Mahomed Ahmed, proclaimed himself to be the
Mahdi, and preached a religious war. Matters were not improved by
communications from Arabi, published in the Soudan, proclaiming
that the Khedive’s government was at an end, and that no obedience
should be paid to it. By the end of 1882, the Mahdi had gathered a
large force of fighting men, and had inflicted several disastrous
defeats on the Egyptian troops. In April 1883, an Egyptian force,
which came to be known as the “English Army,” was organized at
Khartoum, under the command of Major General Hicks, who had with
him a number of English officers, to advance on Kordofan, and put
down the revolt.[70] In October, this force was utterly destroyed,
and the whole of the Soudan was in a blaze. It was at once realized
that the reconquest of Kordofan and the complete suppression of
the Mahdi would require operations on a scale that could not then
be undertaken. A complete withdrawal from the Western Soudan was
therefore determined on. To effect this, Colonel Gordon with £40,000
was sent to Khartoum. Meanwhile, the uprising of the tribes had
developed in another direction.

In August 1883, a slave trader, named Osman Digna, in the Eastern
Soudan, had raised the tribesmen, in the name of the Mahdi, and
attacked the Egyptian posts in the vicinity of Suakin, the principal
seaport of the Soudan, laying siege to Sinkat and Tokar. An Egyptian
force for the relief of these places was organized in Cairo, and
sent down, under Major General Baker, in December. On the 4th
February 1884, while advancing to the relief of Tokar, it was utterly
destroyed, Baker and his staff making their escape with difficulty.
The fall of Sinkat and massacre of its garrison quickly followed. The
presence of British men-of-war at Suakin, alone saved that place.
It was evident that without British troops nothing could be done.
But beyond securing the safety of Suakin and effecting the relief of
Tokar, the British Government had no definite plans.

To effect these objects, a force was organized at Cairo, under Major
General Graham, and dispatched from Suez. The 19th Hussars commanded
by Lieutenant Colonel A. G. Webster, left Cairo on the 17th February,
and embarked in the _Osiris_ and the _Neera_, with a strength of
20 officers, 457 non-commissioned officers and men, and 395 horses.
Three hundred of the horses were small Syrian Arabs procured from the
Egyptian cavalry. The force was destined to land at Trinkitat, about
50 miles south of Suakin, and the nearest point on the coast to Tokar.

The _Osiris_ reached Trinkitat on the 22nd February, and the
portion of the 19th on board, disembarked the following day. In a
reconnoissance made on the 24th, they came in touch with the enemy at
once. The _Neera_, less fortunate, struck on a rock off Suakin, and
became a total wreck, though men and horses were all saved; but they
did not reach Trinkitat till the 25th. The regiment was brigaded with
the 10th Hussars and mounted infantry, about 750 men in all, under
Colonel Herbert Stewart. On the 28th, the whole force, consisting of
about 4500 men, moved from Trinkitat to Fort Baker, but, before this,
the news of the fall of Tokar had been received.

On the 29th, the force advanced against the enemy, who occupied a
strong position at El Teb. Moving in a large square, they found the
Arab force in position on an isolated ridge covered with bush scrub,
and protected with parapets and rifle pits. A squadron of the 10th
Hussars covered the front and left face of the square; a troop of the
19th covered the right face. The rest of the cavalry were disposed in
rear of the square, in three lines, commanded respectively by Lieut.
Colonel Wood, 10th Hussars, Lieut. Colonels Barrow and Webster, 19th
Hussars. By their defeat of General Baker, and the capture of Tokar,
the enemy had become possessed of guns, small arms and ammunition,
which they used very efficiently. As the British force came within
range, the cavalry cleared away from the front of the square, which
moved to the right, across the front of the position, so as to attack
the left flank of the enemy, and the British guns came into action.
In forty minutes, the enemy’s guns being silenced, the square moved
forward again. As they approached the ridge, the enemy’s fire ceased,
and, in small groups of twenty and thirty men, the Arabs dashed at
the face of the square with the most reckless valour. Not one of them
succeeded in reaching it. Again the British infantry advanced, and
again with desperate courage a great force of Arabs hurled themselves
on the British bayonets. There are no braver men than the Arabs of
the Soudan. Armed with sword and spear, in spite of hundreds being
shot down, many of them succeeded in coming hand to hand with their
foes and the matter was decided by the bayonet. Thus, fighting at
every step, the British infantry swept steadily along the whole line
of the enemy’s position, capturing seven guns in their progress. The
enemy’s number was computed at from 6000 to 10,000 men. Of these,
over 2000 lay dead on the ridge. As the remainder drew off across
the plain beyond, the first two lines of British cavalry swept round
the end of the ridge, and pursued. After driving the main body of
the enemy before them for some distance, it was found necessary to
return to encounter a large body of the enemy they had passed in
the broken ground, and that now interposed between them and the
infantry. The 10th Hussars, and two squadrons of the 19th under
Lieutenant Colonel Barrow, charged a large body of Arabs composed of
horsemen, men on camels, and footmen, and at once became involved in
a desperate hand to hand conflict. This body of Arabs had not been
engaged with our infantry, and were quite fresh. Thirty Arab horsemen
charged one of the leading squadrons, three of them getting through
and wheeling their horses in pursuit regardless of the second line.
The Arab swordsmen and spearmen, taking advantage of the scrub and
broken ground, hamstrung horses as they passed, and then attacked
the riders. Captain Freeman of the 19th and several men were
killed, and many wounded. Of all those who lost their horses in the
_mêlée_, Colonel Barrow alone escaped alive. His horse was killed,
and he received a thrust from a spear that passed through his arm
and penetrated his side. Surrounded by numbers of the enemy, he must
have been killed, had it not been for the devotion of Quarter Master
Sergeant William Marshall who rode to his assistance, seconded by
Sergeant Fenton and Private Boseley. Marshall gave the Colonel his
hand. Running in this fashion, in rear of the charging squadrons,
Barrow, with the heavy spear swaying to and fro in his side,
managed to get free of the enemy before he sank down. His attendant
trumpeter, in spite of sixteen terrible wounds, kept his horse going,
and escaped from the press, to die of his injuries later. Captain
Jenkins, on whom the command of the two squadrons devolved, on Barrow
being disabled, was engaged by three of the enemy at once. His horse
was wounded in three places, but he himself escaped with a slight
wound. Horsemen, as a rule, have little difficulty in dispersing and
driving before them disordered infantry: but, so extraordinary was
the activity and bravery of the Arabs, and the skill with which they
used their spears and two-handed swords that, in the uneven ground
covered with low mimosa bushes, they were more than a match for
horsemen. It was not till some men had dismounted, and opened fire on
them, that they sullenly drew off and retreated.

Meanwhile, the other two squadrons of the regiment, acting
independently under Lieutenant Colonel Webster and Major
Hanford-Flood, had cleared the flank of numerous small parties of
the enemy. By 1.30 the action was at an end. The total British
loss was 34 killed or died of wounds, and 155 wounded. To this
the 19th Hussars contributed one officer killed, two wounded, 13
non-commissioned officers and men killed or died of wounds, 20
wounded; a heavier loss than fell on any other regiment engaged
at El Teb. Every single casualty in the regiment was caused in
hand-to-hand combat, by sword or spear. For his gallant behaviour,
Quartermaster Sergeant William Marshall received the Victoria Cross.
Lieutenant Colonel Barrow’s wound was of so terrible a nature that it
was not thought possible he could survive, but he lived to go through
another and more arduous campaign.

On the following day the force advanced on Tokar. Sergeant James Fatt
of the 19th while scouting in advance, rode boldly into the village,
while it was still uncertain whether there would be any opposition,
and brought out one of the villagers. Osman Digna’s camp was taken
without resistance: two guns and a great quantity of small arms,
ammunition and stores, captured from General Baker’s force, being
taken by the cavalry.

On the 5th March, the regiment paraded, for inspection by General
Graham and Colonel Stewart, and received complimentary addresses from
both officers.

On the 6th, the force re-embarked at Trinkitat, and landed at Suakin
the following day, to encounter Osman Digna in person, who was
encamped at Tamai, sixteen miles from Suakin. On the night of the
12th, the whole force bivouacked in front of Osman Digna’s position;
the infantry at about one mile, the cavalry four miles in rear of
the infantry. At eight the next morning, the advance commenced:
the two infantry brigades in squares, the cavalry in rear of the
left. The Arab skirmishers, who had pelted the British encampment
with rifle fire during the night, fell back, increasing in numbers
as they retired. Seeing a great number of the enemy in front of
them, massed in a ravine, the front line of the 2nd brigade charged
with the bayonet, destroying the formation of their square. The
active Arabs broke into the opening, stabbing and slashing at close
quarters. Numbers followed, and for a few minutes a catastrophe was
imminent. The cavalry galloped forward on the left, dismounted, and
poured volley after volley into the flank of the advancing Arabs,
while the bayonet and spear contended for victory within the square
itself. The 1st brigade, which had repulsed a similar charge, swept
the right face of the 2nd brigade square with its fire, and, in a few
minutes, the last surviving Arab who had penetrated the square had
paid the penalty. The ranks were reformed, and the infantry advance
was resumed, the cavalry clearing away the numerous small parties of
the enemy who still clung to the broken ground. The battle was over.
In those few minutes over 2000 of the enemy had fallen, out of an
estimated number of 12,000: of the British force, 109 officers and
men were killed, and 112 wounded. The 19th Hussars lost one killed
and two wounded.

On the following day the force advanced to Tamai, burned Osman
Digna’s camp, and returned to Suakin. For a fortnight the force
lay at Suakin, the cavalry and mounted infantry being employed in
daily reconnoissances. On the 27th, the whole force advanced for a
distance of 25 miles to ascertain if the enemy remained in any force.
A few hundreds only were found. Beyond some desultory skirmishing,
which drew from the General in command a highly complimentary order,
nothing serious occurred, and the force returned to Suakin.

“Too high praise can scarcely be given to the Cavalry and Mounted
Infantry, who bore the brunt of a long skirmish on rocky ground
unsuited for cavalry action, and who, the following morning,
although nearly twenty-four hours without water for their horses,
performed admirable scouting duty during the advance of the force
in a mountainous district, when distant peaks and ridges had to
be crowned and watched.”[71]

It being considered that the objects of the expedition had been
fully attained, the force was broken up and withdrawn. The 19th
embarked on the 1st April, and returned to Cairo on the 6th.

By G.O. 10 of January 1885 the regiment was permitted to add the date
“1884” to the badges on its appointments. A medal with clasps for El
Teb and Tamai were granted to those present.

CHAPTER III

CAMPAIGN ON THE NILE

1884-1899

Troubles in the Western Soudan--Expedition to relieve
Khartoum--19th ordered up the Nile--Korti--The Desert
Column--Action at Abu Klea--Action at Abu Krou--Quartermaster
Lima killed--The horses--Metemmeh--Fall of Khartoum--Return of
the Column--The River Column--Action at Kirbekan--Return of the
Column--Summer Quarters--Regiment returns to Cairo--Squadron sent
to Suakin--Serious losses--Returns to Cairo--Designation granted
of “Princess of Wales’ Own”--Death of Colonel Barrow--19th
returns to England--Badge of “Mysore” granted--19th embarks for
India--Bangalore--Secunderabad.

In the meantime, matters in the Western Soudan had steadily been
getting worse. In March, the Mahdi’s forces had reached Khartoum;
by the end of May Berber had fallen, cutting off communication
between Khartoum and Cairo, and the wave of rebellion rolled steadily
northward. Still the Government in England did nothing. They had
resolutely ignored the whole Soudan question, and allowed matters to
drift. Gordon’s urgent advice to occupy Berber with British troops,
in order to keep open the route to Suakin, had been disregarded, and
his demand for Zobehr Pasha to be sent to Khartoum, as the only
chance of saving the situation, was emphatically refused. It was not
till August, that the British Cabinet recognised that some effort
might be required to relieve Khartoum, and even to defend Lower Egypt
from the Mahdi. By the middle of August preparations were made for
dispatching a small body of troops to Wady Halfa, and a squadron of
the 19th Hussars was held in readiness. Then followed more delay. It
was not till the middle of September that preparations for an advance
beyond Wady Halfa began to be made in earnest.

On the 25th October, three squadrons of the regiment, under Lieut.
Colonel Barrow, left Cairo, and reached Wady Halfa, by rail and
steamer, on 12th November, with a total strength of 21 officers, and
353 Non-Commissioned officers and men. Two instances of the eager
spirit to get to the front, that animated the whole regiment, must
not go unrecorded. At the moment of leaving the barracks in Cairo,
a man met with an accident that necessitated his being left behind.
In a minute one of the men detailed to remain at Cairo stepped
forward in his place, in marching order, with kit complete. He had
got himself ready on the chance of some such opportunity occurring,
and it is pleasant to know that he got it. At Assiout, next morning,
a stowaway was discovered, a bandboy, who accounted for himself by
saying “He was the only _man_ in the band without a medal, and he
could not stand it.”

Experience had shown that English horses could not stand hard work
under a tropical sun, with scarcity of water and desert fare. It
was therefore decided, before leaving Cairo, to mount the regiment
entirely on the small Syrian Arab horses used by the Egyptian
cavalry. Three hundred and fifty of these little horses had been sent
up in advance, and were taken over by the regiment on arrival at Wady
Halfa. The regiment was at this time in superb condition. The men
had an average of seven years’ service, and most of them had been
through the preceding campaigns of Tel-el-Kebir and Suakin. From Wady
Halfa the regiment marched, by squadrons, to Korti, where it arrived
on the 20th December.

Here was assembled the expeditionary force, under General Lord
Wolseley; perhaps the most singular force ever put into the field
by Great Britain, to fight in one of the most remarkable campaigns;
starting from a base a thousand miles from the sea. In addition to
the 19th Hussars, who were the only horsemen with the force, and
nine battalions of infantry, there were four Camel Corps, composed
respectively of picked men from different Heavy and Light Cavalry
regiments, the Foot Guards, and Infantry of the Line; a Naval Brigade
of Bluejackets and Marines; a Battery of Royal Artillery, and two
Camel Batteries. The boats by which the Nile had been ascended had
been built in England, and were managed by Canadian voyageurs, some
of whom were of Indian blood, and by Kroomen from the west coast of
Africa, while the camels were managed by Arab drivers brought for the
purpose from Aden.

The original intention had been to follow the course of the river the
whole way to Khartoum, but now a fresh disposition became necessary.
A letter from Gordon, dated 4th November, was received, showing that
provisions in Khartoum were running short, and time would not allow
of the slow but less hazardous advance along the river. The new plan
was to send a compact flying column across the desert to Metemmeh,
under Brigadier General Sir Herbert Stewart, for the purpose of
opening communication with Khartoum. A second column, under Major
General W. Earle, was to ascend the river, clearing away all parties
of the enemy, and, eventually, to recapture Berber. The rest of the
force was to remain at Korti, where Lord Wolseley’s Head Quarters
were fixed. The 19th Hussars were destined to furnish a contingent to
both columns.

THE DESERT COLUMN

The task before the Desert Column was no easy one. Between Korti
and Metemmeh 176 miles of barren desert have to be traversed. At
two places only is water in any considerable quantity procurable;
at Jakdul 98 miles from Korti, and at Abu Klea, about 53 miles from
Jakdul. The first operation was to establish a post at Jakdul, where
as yet the enemy had not appeared.

On the 30th December, a force of 1107 men of all ranks, with 2200
camels, started from Korti, under Sir Herbert Stewart. With them went
2 officers and 32 men of the 19th. Being the only horsemen with the
force, the whole of the scouting duties devolved upon the men of the
19th. The rest of the force were mounted on camels. One gallon of
water for each man, and two for each horse, were carried on camels.
In the early morning of the 2nd January, the Jakdul wells were
reached, in 63 hours after leaving Korti. Only a few stragglers of
the enemy were sighted. On the same evening the force set out on its
return to Korti, leaving a garrison of 420 men at Jakdul.

On the 8th January, Sir Herbert Stewart again started with the main
column, consisting of 1607 men, 2228 camels, and 306 camel drivers.
The 19th Hussars, on this occasion, mustered 135 officers and men,
with 155 horses, under Lieut. Colonel Barrow. On the 14th, the column
left Jakdul: about 1800 combatants of all ranks, with 1118 camels.
Early on the 16th, the 19th were pushed on ahead of the column,
and came in touch with the enemy in front of the Abu Klea wells. A
patrol, under Major French, pursued a small body of men right into
the gorge leading to the wells, and captured one of them, on the spot
where next day’s action was fought. A number of horsemen appearing
and threatening to cut him off, French was obliged to relinquish
his prisoner, and retire to the entrance of the gorge. Here Barrow
dismounted his men in order to keep the road open for Stewart’s
force. Though threatened on both flanks by the enemy’s horsemen, the
position was easily held by carbine fire, and the power of the enemy
to dispute the advance of the column at this point was checkmated.
On the arrival of the column a zeriba was formed for the night,
three and a half miles from the water. As the camp was being formed,
the enemy appeared in considerable numbers, and opened a distant
fire, wounding one man and several horses of the 19th. As darkness
closed in the enemy became bolder, and, during the whole night, the
force was exposed to a constant fire which did little harm beyond
disturbing the much needed rest of the men. At daybreak, the fire
increased in intensity; several officers and men were struck down,
and the 19th had several horses killed and disabled while standing at
their pickets. At 9 A.M. the force was formed in square, preparatory
to an advance towards the water which was of such vital importance.
While the square was forming, the 19th were ordered to move out and
hold in check a body of some 500 of the enemy, horsemen and footmen
combined, who threatened to get round to the rear of the square.
An hour after the hussars had left, the square advanced. The small
force moved slowly, frequent halts being necessary to permit of the
camels, loaded with ammunition and water, closing up. The ground was
uneven, with ravines and hollows that prevented the full strength of
the enemy being seen. Suddenly a great body of Arabs, 5000 strong,
rose from a fold in the ground, and rushed at the square. So rapid
and overwhelming was their attack, aided by the inequalities of the
ground, and the fact that the fire from the square was at first
impeded by its own retiring skirmishers that, in spite of the heavy
fire poured upon them, the Arabs succeeded in penetrating the square,
as at Tamai, stabbing and slashing in every direction. At the same
moment, a squadron of horsemen charged the square, but were repulsed.
For five minutes the hand-to-hand conflict raged, till the last Arab
who penetrated the formation was killed. The remainder, who had been
heavily punished by rifle and artillery fire drew off, though for
a time it seemed doubtful if they would not renew the attack. The
19th, who had helped the square with dismounted fire, followed and
cut off many stragglers, but the number of the enemy was too great
to admit of a charge on the main body. The horses also were hardly
able to move out of a walk, having been thirty hours without water.
In this brief conflict the small British force lost 74 killed, and 94
wounded, some of whom died of their injuries. As at El Teb and Tamai,
the fatal skill with which the Arabs used their weapons is shown
by the relative numbers of killed and wounded. Of the Arabs, whose
strength was estimated at about 9000 men, 1100 dead were counted in
close proximity to the square.

On the retreat of the enemy, Barrow pushed on and occupied the wells,
from which the enemy had to be driven by carbine fire. It was late at
night before the infantry obtained the much needed water.

The greater part of the 18th was spent in building a small fort at
Abu Klea, and establishing a post there, for the protection of the
wounded and defence of the wells. While this was in progress, the
19th returned to the battle field and buried the British dead. Late
in the afternoon the small column moved out, to traverse the 25 miles
of desert that must be crossed before the Nile could be reached. The
19th Hussars led the way. As night closed in, progress became very
slow. Men and camels were exhausted, and, in the darkness, great
confusion ensued. Night marching over an unknown route is a doubtful
expedient. In the early morning of the 19th, the line of the Nile,
with villages, was sighted about six miles distant. But between
them and the column was a gravel ridge on which the enemy appeared,
and soon, dense masses of them were visible, swarming out to meet
the column. In view of the distress for want of water, it had been
Sir Herbert Stewart’s wish to reach the Nile without fighting; but
this was now impossible. The camels were collected together, and a
zeriba of brushwood, saddles, boxes &c. formed. By 8 o’clock the
enemy’s fire became heavy. Among the earliest to be struck was the
commander of the column, Sir Herbert Stewart, who received a wound
that afterwards proved mortal. Speaking to Colonel Barrow just before
he received the fatal wound, he said, “Take care of the 19th Hussars,
they have done well.” The command devolved on Colonel Sir Charles
Wilson. It was necessary to drive the enemy away, but nothing could
be done till the zeriba was complete, and, owing to the exhaustion of
the men, the work proceeded slowly. In the interval there were many
casualties, and here the 19th Hussars lost Quarter Master A. G. Lima,
who was killed by a shot through the head.

At last all was ready. The 19th Hussars came in, and picketted their
horses, which were so exhausted as to be scarcely able to carry the
men. Colonel Barrow and his men were detailed to assist in holding
the zeriba, while the rest of the force marched out to engage the
enemy. By 2 o’clock the square had formed up outside the zeriba,
and moved off. With it went a few dismounted men of the 19th, under
Lieutenant Craven.

As the square moved towards the Nile, the enemy’s fire increased,
and many men fell. The progress made was very slow. The bush and
sandhills on three sides swarmed with Arabs. As the square neared the
ridge, the men dropped fast under the heavy rifle fire to which they
were exposed. Suddenly the enemy’s fire ceased, and a great swarm of
Arabs poured down on the square. There were no skirmishers to mask
the fire, as at Abu Klea, and the Arabs were met by a steady fire
that swept away the foremost ranks wholesale. Not an Arab lived to
reach the square, and a ringing British cheer went up as the enemy
were seen to be flying in all directions. The way to the Nile was no
longer closed. Half an hour after dark the river was reached, near
the village of Abu Krou. It was not till the afternoon of the 20th
that the 19th Hussar horses were able to drink. Half of them had been
72 hours without water; none of them less than 56 hours, yet only
3 succumbed. If English horses had been employed, probably not one
would have survived.

“The cavalry horses were quite done up. The way in which Barrow
managed to bring the 19th Hussars across the desert is one of
the best things in the expedition; but the horses had only had
a short drink at Abu Klea, and then they had barely enough to
wash their mouths out until they got to the Nile on the 20th. The
scouting of the Hussars during the march was admirably done; they
were ubiquitous. But want of food and water no horses can fight
against, and they were but a sorry spectacle as they moved out of
the zeriba to go down to the river. They reached the Nile almost
useless as cavalry, and could only be employed for scouting
purposes, at short distances from the camp.”[72]

During the whole march from Korti the entire scouting duty had been
taken by the 19th Hussars, so that, each day, they covered far more
ground than the rest of the force. The men also were thoroughly
exhausted with the tremendous efforts they had been called on to
make, but their health continued to be good. There was wonderful
freedom from sickness of any kind. The casualties in the whole force
on the 19th January, amounted to 1 officer and 22 non-commissioned
officers and men killed; 8 officers and 90 non-commissioned officers
and men wounded. Many non-combatants also were killed or wounded.

The 20th was occupied in placing the village of Gubat in a state of
defence, and, at dawn of the 21st, Barrow and his Hussars rode out to
reconnoitre Metemmeh, preparatory to an attack in force. So exhausted
were the horses that all the Hussars could do was to ride up in a
body to some high ground on the north of the village, while the rest
of the force opened fire from the east side. While the attack was
proceeding, four small steamers sent down by Gordon from Khartoum on
the 14th December, appeared in sight, and landed some native troops.
They brought intelligence of Arab reinforcements being on the march
from Khartoum. It was important to husband ammunition, and incur no
further losses of men, so the attack was withdrawn. But the Arab
reinforcements never reached Metemmeh. The news of the disastrous
defeats their comrades had sustained at Abu Klea and Abu Krou, caused
them to retrace their steps.

Reconnoissances having shown that no large force of the enemy was in
the vicinity, Sir Charles Wilson started on the 24th for Khartoum,
with two of the steamers, taking with him two hundred men. On the
28th, after great difficulties, Khartoum was reached, and found to
be in the hands of the Arabs. The town had been captured by the
Mahdi, two days before, and Gordon was dead. On the 4th February,
Sir Charles Wilson and his party rejoined the camp at Gubat, after
adventures that read more like a page of romance than of modern
history. In the interval, both his steamers had been wrecked, and
the whole party had been continuously under fire for eight days
and a half. In the meantime, the force at Gubat received some
reinforcements and supplies from Korti. The 19th were engaged in
daily skirmishes with the outlying pickets of the enemy who showed
a wholesome respect for them: “Even the fierce Baggara horsemen
appeared unwilling to cross swords with our Hussars,” wrote one who
was present with the force. On the 11th, Major General Sir Redvers
Buller arrived to take command of the force, with orders to retire on
Abu Klea.

On the 14th February, Gubat was evacuated, and Abu Klea reached on
the 15th, followed by the enemy who annoyed the force with long range
rifle fire. At Abu Klea, on the 17th, a smart skirmish took place
which cost the force 3 killed and 27 wounded. Among the killed was
Sergeant Horwood of the 19th Hussars, who was acting as Sergeant
Major with the Mounted Infantry. It had been intended to occupy
Abu Klea permanently, in view of a second advance on Khartoum in
the autumn; but want of food, scarcity of water, and the complete
breakdown of transport necessitated Buller’s withdrawal to Korti. On
the 16th, the 19th Hussars marched out for Jakdul, leaving at Abu
Klea with Sir R. Buller a small detachment under Major French. The
march was a painful one, about half the men being on foot. While on
the march they heard of Sir Herbert Stewart’s death near Jakdul.
Wishing to be present at the funeral of the commander they had
served under in two campaigns, they made a long forced march into
Jakdul, but arrived too late. They had the melancholy satisfaction
of erecting a walled enclosure, with headstone, round his grave. On
the 3rd March they left Jakdul, and reached Korti on the 8th. On
the 23rd February the last of the desert column left Abu Klea, and
returned to Korti, 16th March. In a dispatch from Jakdul, dated 26th
February, Sir R. Buller wrote of the 19th Hussars:--

“I wish expressly to remark on the very excellent work done
by the small detachment of the 19th Hussars, both during our
occupation of Abu Klea and during our retirement. Each man has
done the work of ten, and it is not too much to say that the
force owes much to Major French and his 13 troopers.”

Meanwhile, the men of the 19th, left at Korti, had not been idle. In
February they were engaged in establishing two watering posts in the
desert, distant respectively twelve and thirty miles from Korti, for
the use of the retiring force. The water was conveyed in tin lined
biscuit boxes, and every animal in camp was pressed into the service.

THE RIVER COLUMN

The primary object of General Earle’s column was to clear the river
line of all hostile parties as far as Abu Hamed, punishing, _en
route_, the Monassir tribe of Arabs who had treacherously murdered
Colonel Stewart and a small party sent down by Gordon from Khartoum,
in September. At Abu Hamed a base was to be established for a further
advance on Berber. The force, under General Earle, consisted of four
battalions of infantry, a battery of Egyptian Artillery, an Egyptian
Camel Corps, and one squadron of the 19th Hussars; the latter under
Major Hanford-Flood, amounting to 91 sabres and 107 horses. The total
strength of the force was about 3000 officers and men.

The force left Korti, in detachments, for Hamdab, about 50 miles
up the river, whence the final start was to be made. On the 18th
January, 60 men of the 19th Hussars together with the Egyptian Camel
Corps, under Major Flood, made a forced march into the desert to
surprise a party of the enemy collected at the wells of El Kooa, 35
miles from Hamdab. The Arabs having received timely notice of their
coming, hastily broke up their camp and disappeared, before Flood’s
arrival. The detachment returned to Hamdab after 32 hours’ absence.

On the 24th, the start was made; the Hussars, Camel Corps and
baggage, marching along the left bank, the infantry and stores in
boats. Progress was very slow, the banks of the river being rough
and difficult, and the frequent rapids and cataracts causing great
labour in tracking the boats up. On the 27th, the cavalry skirmishers
first came in touch with the enemy, but beyond a harmless interchange
of shots at long range nothing occurred. This happened frequently,
the enemy falling back, day by day, as the river column advanced.
The progress of the boats was very slow owing to the succession of
rapids here formed by the Nile. Major Flood’s men worked and camped
independently, reconnoitring along the left bank, far ahead of the
main body, and, owing to the rocky nature of the ground, often at a
considerable distance from the river. The rocky ridge, on which the
battle of Kirbekan was afterwards fought, was ascended and mapped,
and a reconnoissance of the 19th Hussars was pushed some way into the
Shukook Pass, five days before the action. On the 6th February, a two
days’ halt at Birti became necessary, in consequence of the fall of
Khartoum making a change of plans possible. The enemy meanwhile had
fallen back to the Shukook Pass.

On the 8th, the advance was resumed, and it became known that the
enemy, about 1000 strong, had advanced from the Shukook Pass, and
taken position in some extremely strong ground at Kirbekan, in front
of the Pass, about 14 miles from Earle’s Head Quarters. The 8th
and 9th were employed in reconnoitring, and closing up the troops
preparatory to the attack. On the 8th, Major Flood, with twenty of
his men, exchanged volleys with the enemy, and drove in some of their
advanced posts. On the 9th, the whole of the mounted troops felt
the enemy again. That night the troops bivouacked in their allotted
stations, the most advanced of the infantry being only a short mile
from the enemy’s position.

On the morning of the 10th, General Earle, with 1196 men of all
ranks, moved forward to the attack. The enemy occupied a position
on a line of low rocky eminences at right angles to the river, and
a detached steep ridge in echelon with the rocky eminences. It was
determined to march right round the rear of their position by the
desert side, closing their retreat, and attack them in flank and rear
from the river side. Two companies of the Staffordshire regiment,
with two guns were left in front of the position to occupy the
enemy’s attention, and keep down their fire. The 19th Hussars led the
way, and the force marched right round the enemy’s position till the
river was again reached in the enemy’s right rear. As soon as they
saw their retreat was cut off, a number of the enemy tried to escape
by swimming the river, many of them being shot in the attempt. But a
considerable number of them still held their ground. The Black Watch
were accordingly ordered to assault the line of rocky eminences,
while the Staffordshire regiment assaulted the ridge. As the Black
Watch won their way along the lower eminences, a desperate rush was
made by a body of the enemy, which was repulsed, and the eminences
crowned by the Highlanders; the Arabs gallantly fighting to the last
man. In the moment of victory, General Earle was killed by a shot
from a hut which he had incautiously approached. The assault on the
high steep ridge offered greater difficulties, but the position was
gallantly carried by the Staffordshire men. Both regiments had their
commanding officers killed.

In the meantime, Flood’s Hussars and the Egyptian Camel Corps had
gained the entrance to the Shukook Pass, and captured one of the
enemy’s camps, in which were a number of standards, camels and
donkeys. The enemy opened fire from the surrounding hills without
effect. The victory was purchased with the loss of three officers
and nine men killed, four officers and forty-four men wounded. The
enemy’s force was subsequently ascertained to have been from fifteen
hundred to two thousand men, but of these only about six hundred
fought well.

The advance of the column was continued, on the 12th, under Colonel
H. Brackenbury, on whom the command had devolved by General Earle’s
death. The enemy had disappeared, but progress was slow, through
the continuous rapids. On the 20th, a suitable place was found for
crossing the Nile. A scouting party of the 19th was first rowed
across, and brushed away some of the enemy’s scouts. By the afternoon
of the 21st, the whole force was transported to the right bank, at
Hebbeh, the scene of Colonel Stewart’s murder in September. The
murderers had fled, and beyond the destruction of their property no
other punishment could be meted out to them. By the evening of the
23rd, the whole force was concentrated at Huella, 26 miles from Abu
Hamed.

All was ready for the advance on Abu Hamed, where a strong force of
the enemy was known to be posted. Hardly had the troops commenced
their march, on the 24th, when orders were received from Korti
directing their return to Merawi. Sir Redvers Buller’s withdrawal
from Abu Klea rendered a farther advance on Berber out of the
question, and the River Column had to return. While the main body
commenced to descend the river, Major Flood’s squadron scouted
another six miles towards Abu Hamed, without seeing an enemy.
Descending by the right bank, Merawi was reached on the 5th March,
and, on the 6th, after recrossing the river to Abu Dom, the River
Column was broken up. One troop of the 19th was left at Abu Dom,
while the remainder marched for Korti.

In spite of the extremely hard work, the health of the troops, as
with the Desert Column, had been excellent. Not a single man of Major
Flood’s party had been on the sick list, from the time of leaving
Korti till the date of return. Of the horses, three had succumbed.
The performance of the small Arab horses both with the River and
Desert Columns, carrying a heavy weight, on scanty fare and less
water, is a marvel of endurance.

The next few days were spent in arranging for the distribution of
the troops into summer quarters, in anticipation of the advance on
Khartoum in the autumn. The quarters selected for the 19th were
Merawi, Abu Dom, Tani, Kurot, Abu Kussi, and Dongola. By the 1st
April, they were all located in the assigned positions. Before
leaving Korti, the regiment was inspected by Lord Wolseley, who
addressed them in terms of commendation that will long be remembered
in the regiment.

OPERATIONS NEAR SUAKIN

While their comrades had thus been busy on the Nile, the remnant
of the regiment left at Cairo had found work to do. The effect
of the operations, near Suakin, in March 1884, had been quite
temporary. Osman Digna had recovered his authority, and was again
threatening the port. It was also considered that, by making a
diversion at Suakin, the operations near Berber and the reopening
of the Suakin-Berber road would be facilitated. It was determined,
therefore, to send a sufficient force to crush Osman Digna, and to
make a railway line to Berber. The capture of Berber, before the
great heat of the summer set in, was then considered feasible.

Before the force, which was to be commanded by Lieut. General Sir
Gerald Graham, could arrive, a weak squadron of the 19th Hussars,
under Captain Apthorp, was dispatched from Cairo on the 24th January,
together with two Horse Artillery guns, followed next day by a
battalion of infantry. On landing at Suakin, reconnoissances were
instituted to ascertain the strength and position of the enemy. On
the 1st February, a small force of all arms reconnoitred, under Major
General Fremantle, towards Hasheem, 8 miles west of Suakin. The Arabs
were found in great numbers, in a position too strong to attack. The
infantry were formed in square, while the cavalry and guns were sent
forward to try and draw the enemy out of their position. But the
memory of El-Teb and Tamai were too fresh in the Arab mind for them
to be induced to attack the arrayed infantry. They refused to quit
their position, and after a prolonged skirmish, General Fremantle’s
force returned to camp. One Egyptian trooper was wounded, and the
19th Hussars lost a horse.

On the 3rd, Captain Apthorp was sent with 40 of his own men and 40
Egyptian troopers to reconnoitre along the Berber road. At Hamdoob,
10 miles from Suakin, a camp and village, occupied by the enemy, was
surprised and burnt. While the small party were thus occupied, a
great body of Arabs, 5000 strong, had moved from Tamai and Hasheem
to intercept them, and took post in a ravine two miles from Hamdoob,
completely blocking their return to Suakin. The Arab force was so
well concealed that the squadron was almost in contact with them
before their presence was discovered, and the great mass of Arabs,
footmen and men mounted on camels, bore down on the small body of
cavalry at once. There was no time to dismount and fire, and it was
hopeless to attempt to break through: nothing was left them but to
ride for Suakin by a circuitous route. Turning eastwards the squadron
started on a long gallop round the enemy’s flank. The Arabs followed
in overwhelming numbers, and, moving on a shorter line, together with
their knowledge of the ground, were able to harass the squadron for
several miles. The 19th lost 8 men and 11 horses, while the Egyptian
troop lost three men and six horses.

The number of Arabs in the neighbourhood of Suakin was too great to
allow of distant reconnoissances, little more of interest occurred,
therefore, till the arrival of Sir Gerald Graham’s force. Early in
March, they began to arrive, but the whole force was not completed
till nearly the middle of April. On the 17th March, the 19th Hussar
squadron re-embarked for Cairo in order to join the Head Quarters of
the regiment at Dongola, in readiness for the advance on Khartoum in
the autumn.

Our interest with the Suakin force ceases here. It is sufficient
to say that it amounted to 12,500 men, composed of troops from
England, a contingent of native troops from India, and a contingent
from New South Wales consisting of two batteries of artillery, and
500 infantry. It had also with it a balloon detachment, the first
occasion on which balloons were used by British troops in warfare.
On the 20th March, it fought a successful action at Hasheem, and
again on the 22nd, at Tofrik, when an enormous number of the enemy
were killed at a rather heavy cost to the British troops engaged. On
the 3rd April, Tamai was occupied, and the last of the enemy’s force
broken up. By the end of April, 18 miles of railway were completed,
and the tribes in the neighbourhood had given in their submission;
when the intention of the British Government to abandon the advance
on Khartoum became known. On the 17th May, the withdrawal of the
troops commenced, and again Suakin was left with only a small force
to protect the port.

We left the three squadrons of the 19th at Dongola and other stations
south of that place, with all thoughts concentrated on preparations
for the autumn advance on Khartoum. The regimental establishment
was increased by 110 men, bringing up the strength to 740 sabres.
Four strong squadrons were being prepared for the field: but over
13 years were to elapse before Khartoum was again seen by British
troops. About the 22nd April it was announced that the intention
of advancing on Khartoum in the autumn had been abandoned, and
orders were issued for the withdrawal of the troops. The retirement
commenced on the 26th May, when Merawi was evacuated. The troops were
withdrawn down the river in detachments, each post being evacuated
in turn as it became the southernmost point of occupation. On the
22nd June, the Head Quarters of the 19th marched out of Dongola, the
last of the force to leave for Lower Egypt. At Wady Halfa the hot
and tedious march came to an end, and from that point the regiment
reached the railway at Assiout in barges. At Wady Halfa, Korosko and
Assouan they made over their horses to the 20th Hussars, and, by
the 14th August, the regiment was reunited in Cairo. In the whole
campaign the regiment had suffered a total loss of two officers,
Lt. Colonel Taylor (died of fever) and Quarter Master Lima, and 18
non-commissioned officers and men.

In July 1885, Her Majesty was graciously pleased to confer on the
regiment the designation of “Princess of Wales’ Own,” in recognition
of “its distinguished services in Egypt and the Soudan.”

By G.O. 10 of January 1886 the regiment was permitted to bear on its
appointments, the words “Nile 1884-85” “Abu Klea,” in commemoration
of the ascent of the river Nile and the operations in the Eastern
Soudan.

[Illustration: COLONEL PERCY BARROW, C.B.

_From a Photograph._]

At the beginning of 1886, the regiment experienced a severe loss
in the death of its commander, Colonel Percy Barrow. The desperate
wound he had received at El Teb, on the 19th February 1884, was
one from which complete recovery was impossible. In spite of grave
inconvenience to himself, he had gone through the most arduous part
of the Nile campaign without flinching, while the skill and judgment
with which he handled his men during the march of the Desert Column
won the applause of the whole force. While preparing the regiment
for some regimental games, a violent exertion re-opened the old
wound, and after thirty hours of intense suffering he expired on the
13th January, in his 38th year. In him the army lost a soldier of
great promise. The son of a well known Indian Officer, Major General
Lousada Barrow, who commanded a Corps of Volunteer Cavalry in the
Indian Mutiny and at the relief of Lucknow, Percy Barrow entered the
19th Hussars as Cornet in 1868. In 1879, he was selected to command a
corps of Mounted Infantry and some irregular troops in the Zulu war;
and served through the Boer war of 1881 in command of the Mounted
Infantry. The soldierly spirit that animated him, and his intense
devotion to everything that concerned the welfare of the regiment,
can only be appreciated by those who have been privileged to read his
letters written in quarters and in the field. Telegrams of condolence
to the regiment from Her Majesty the Queen and from Her Royal
Highness the Princess of Wales testified to the general appreciation
of the loss the public service had suffered in his death. His remains
were removed to England and interred at Saltwood near Hythe. To
command the regiment, his brother-in-law, Colonel Boyce Combe, was
transferred from the 10th Hussars to the 19th.

In May, the regiment was ordered to proceed to England, and embarked
at Alexandria on the 19th, in the _Geelong_ and the _Iona_, leaving
their horses behind them. On the 6th and 7th June, they landed at
Harwich and Woolwich, and proceeded to Norwich, three troops being
sent to Colchester. The regiment was much gratified at the receipt,
on landing, of a telegram, welcoming them to England, from H.R.H. the
Princess of Wales. In July, one of the Colchester troops was recalled
to Head Quarters. The establishment of the regiment was fixed at 24
officers, 469 warrant officers non-commissioned officers and men, and
300 horses.

In the following March, the two troops at Colchester were sent to
Birmingham, being replaced, in September, at Colchester by two troops
from Head Quarters.

In October, the establishment was increased by 132 rank and file and
80 horses. For this purpose the necessary horses were transferred to
the regiment from the 14th and 21st Hussars. A month later, by which
time 56 recruits had been enlisted, the order was cancelled, and the
horses were transferred to the 18th and 20th Hussars. At the end of
the year, the Colchester squadron rejoined Head Quarters.

In April 1888, the regiment marched from Norwich and Birmingham to
Hounslow, Hampton Court and Kensington.

In September, the regiment was brought on the strength of the 1st
Army Corps, and its establishment increased to 707 of all ranks with
424 horses.

In March 1889, under Army Order No. 136, the regiment was granted
permission to wear “Mysore” on its appointments, in commemoration of
the campaigns against Tippoo in the last century, in which the old
19th Light Dragoons had borne so distinguished a part. The badge is
certainly more appropriate than the old one of “Seringapatam” which
was discarded.

In the same month the regiment lost its Colonel, Major General John
Yorke, C.B. In his place Major General and Honorary Lieut. General
Coote Synge Hutchinson was gazetted to the regiment. He was an old
2nd Dragoon Guards’ officer, and had served with that regiment
through the Indian Mutiny.

In the following June, the regiment marched to Aldershot. On the 3rd
July, it was employed in London on the occasion of H.M. the Shah of
Persia visiting the City.

In September 1890, the regiment took part in the manœuvres on
Berkshire Downs.

On the 26th June 1891, a special inspection of the regiment was held
by H.R.H. the Princess of Wales; and, on the 8th July, the 19th took
part in a review at Hounslow before H.I.M. the German Emperor.

The regiment was again destined for foreign service. At the end of
July, it marched to Shorncliffe, and, on 1st September, embarked at
Portsmouth, in the _Euphrates_, for India, arriving at Bombay on the
28th, whence it was forwarded by train to Secunderabad in relief of
the 7th Hussars. In November the regiment was transferred, by train,
to Bangalore.

Towards the end of 1892 the squadron system was substituted for the
troop system in the regiment.

In October 1896, the 19th P.W.O. Hussars were transferred to
Secunderabad. Here we must take leave of the regiment. The history
of a regiment in quarters possesses little interest. “Soldiers in
peace are like chimneys in summer.” When the time comes for the 19th
P.W.O. Hussars to take the field again, they will be found like their
predecessors, over one hundred years ago, “ready in all that depends
upon them, and willing beyond description.”

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A.

YEARLY LISTS OF THE OFFICERS OF THE NINETEENTH.

+--------------+------------------++-----------------+------------------+
| | 1763[73] || 1779 | 1780 |
+--------------+------------------++-----------------+------------------+
| | || | |
|_Colonel_ | ||Russell Manners, |Russell Manners. |
| | || _Major General_.| |
| | || | |
|_Lieut.Colonel|Charles, _Earl of_|| | |
| Commandant_ | Drogheda. || | |
| | || | |
|_Lieut. | Richard Gorges. || Robert Laurie. | Francis Augustus |
| Colonel_ | || | Eliott. |
| | || | |
|_Major_ |Francis Caulfield.|| Richard Grant. | Richard Grant. |
| | || | |
| |Chas. Wilson Lyon.|| John Hamilton. | John Hamilton. |
|_Captain_ |Francis Brooke. || Fewster Johnson.| Fewster Johnson. |
| |Thomas, _Lord_ || John Morris. | John Morris. |
| | Knapton. || | |
| | || | |
|_Capt. | || _Hon._ Chas. | _Vacant._ |
| Lieutenant | || Gunter Legge. | |
| and Captain_| || | |
| | || | |
|_Capt. |Clotworthy Rowley.|| | |
| Lieutenant_ | || | |
| | || | |
| | Charles Burton. || Nassau Smith. | Francis Gregory. |
| | Thomas Walmesley.|| Geo. Chas. | Tho. Chas. Hardy.|
|_Lieutenant_ | William Burton. || Brathwaite. | Geo. Chas. |
| |Skeffington Smith.|| Francis Gregory.| Brathwaite. |
| | William Moore. ||Tho. Chas. Hardy.| John Petley. |
| | || John Petley. | William Wills. |
| | || | |
| | Robert Nicholson.|| John Bailey. | John Bailey. |
| |Lawrence Chaloner.|| Geo. Montgomery.| Richard Warner. |
|_Cornet_ | William Scott. || ---- Smith. | William Tooke |
| | John Moore. || Richard Warner. | Harwood. |
| | Gorges Crofton. || _Vacant._ | Francis Drake. |
| | _Vacant._ || _Vacant._ | George Street. |
| | || | _Vacant._ |
| | || | |
|_Chaplain_ | Henry Blacker. || _Vacant._ | Charles Mayo. |
| | || | |
|_Adjutant_ | Thomas Walmesley.|| _Vacant._ | George Street. |
| | || | |
|_Surgeon_ | Alexander Eason. || Christopher | Christopher |
| | || Arden. | Arden. |
| | || | |
| | || Messrs Bisshopp | |
|_Agents_ | || & Brummell, | |
| | || Vine Street, | |
| | || St James’. | |
+--------------+------------------++-----------------+------------------+

+--------------+------------------+------------------+------------------+
| | 1781 | 1782 | 1783 |
+--------------+------------------+------------------+------------------+
| | | | |
|_Colonel_ | Russell Manners. | Russell Manners. | Russell Manners. |
| | | | |
|_Lieut. | R. Mason Lewis. | R. Mason Lewis. | R. Mason Lewis. |
| Colonel_ | | | |
| | | | |
|_Major_ | Benjamin Lambert.|William,_Viscount_| John Callander. |
| | | Fielding. | |
| | | | |
| | John Hamilton. | John Hare. | John Hare. |
|_Captain_ | _Sir_ James | John Petley. | John Petley. |
| | Erskine. | | |
| | John Quantock. |Wm. Tooke Harwood.|Wm. Tooke Harwood.|
| | | | |
|_Capt. | John Hare. | Thomas Carteret | Thomas Carteret |
| Lieutenant | | Hardy. | Hardy. |
| and Captain_| | | |
| | | | |
| | Thomas Carteret | John Bailey. | John Bailey. |
| | Hardy. | Richard Kelsall. | Richard Kelsall. |
|_Lieutenant_ | John Petley. | Francis Drake. | George Street. |
| | John Bailey. | George Street. | Thomas Townley |
| | Richard Warner. | _Vacant._ | Parker. |
| | Robert Kelsall. | | Wm. Cave Brown. |
| | | | |
| | William Tooke | | |
| | Harwood. | Henry Geo. Grey. | Charles Richard |
| | Francis Drake. | Henry Goodricke. | Vaughan. |
| | George Street. | Wm. Cave Brown. | Edward Walbanke. |
|_Cornet_ | Henry Geo. Grey. | Charles Richard |George Donithorpe.|
| | Francis Thomas | Vaughan. | John Monk. |
| | Hammond. | E. Walbanke. | ---- Cary. |
| | Francis Philip | _Vacant._ | Philip Gresley. |
| | Bodingfield. | | |
| | | | |
|_Chaplain_ | Charles Mayo. | Charles Mayo. | Samuel Bethell. |
| | | | |
|_Adjutant_ | George Street. | George Street. | Digby Hamilton. |
| | | | |
|_Surgeon_ |Christopher Arden.|Christopher Arden.|Christopher Arden.|
| | | | |
+--------------+------------------+------------------+------------------+

+--------------+------------------+------------------+------------------+
| | 1800 | 1801 | 1802 |
+--------------+------------------+------------------+------------------+
| | | | |
|_Colonel_ |William,_Viscount_|William,_Viscount_|William,_Viscount_|
| | Howe, _K.B._ | Howe, _K.B._ | Howe, _K.B._ |
| | | | |
|_Lieut. | John Floyd. | Patrick Maxwell. | Patrick Maxwell. |
| Colonel_ | | Edgar Hunter. | Edgar Hunter. |
| | | | |
|_Major_ | Patrick Maxwell. | Thomas Paterson. | John Bayly. |
| | Thomas Paterson. | John Bayly. | _Vacant._ |
| | | | |
| | John Bayly. | James Kennedy. | James Kennedy. |
|_Captain_ | Walter Monteath. | John Fortnam. | John Fortnam. |
| | Arthur Brabazon. | James Cathcart. | James Cathcart. |
| | _Vacant._ | Robert Lisle. | Robert Lisle. |
| | | | |
|_Captain | | | |
| Lieutenant |James Kennedy. | Henry Roberts. | Henry Roberts. |
| and Captain_| | | |
| | | | |
| | | John Banger. | John Banger. |
| | John Fortnam. | Thomas Hassall. | George John Sale.|
| | Roderick | George John Sale.| Henry Skelton. |
| | Mackenzie. | Henry Skelton. | Wallace Boyle. |
| | James Cathcart. | Patrick Anderson.| Nathan Wilson. |
| | John Banger. | Wallace Boyle. | Patrick Anderson.|
|_Lieutenant_ | Robert Lisle. | Nathan Wilson. | Edward Geils. |
| | Henry Roberts. | Edward Geils. | Henry Young. |
| | Thomas Hassall. | Henry Young. | Thomas Vaughan |
| | George John Sale.| Thomas Vaughan | George Tuite. |
| | Henry Skelton. | George Tuite. | Thomas Johnson. |
| | Patrick Anderson.| Thomas Johnson. | Robert Torrens. |
| | Edward Darvall. | Robert Torrens. | John Crooks. |
| | | John Crooks. | F. Cumberlege. |
| | | F. Cumberlege. | Joseph Dowson. |
| | | | |
| | | | Michael Thomas |
| | | Michael Thomas | Harris. |
| | | Harris. | William Lewis |
| | Wallace Boyle. | John Christopher | Herries. |
| | Nathan Wilson. | Ridout. | Charles Cobbe. |
| | Edward Geils. | William Lewis | ---- Port. |
|_Cornet_ | Henry Young. | Herries. | George Hutchins |
| | George Tuite. | Charles Cobbe. | Bellasis. |
| | Philip Bailey. | George Hutchins | William Serle. |
| | _Vacant._ | Bellasis. | Charles Abdy |
| | | ---- Port. | Chapman. |
| | | William Serle. | John Montague |
| | | | Jackson. |
| | | | |
|_Paymaster_ | | | |
| | | | |
|_Adjutant_ | John Crooks. | John Crooks. | John Crooks. |
| | | | |
|_Surgeon_ | Thomas Browne. | Thomas Browne. | Thomas Browne. |
| | | | |
|_Asst.Surgeon_| John Murray. | John Murray. | John Murray. |
| | William Beville. | James Colgan. | James Colgan. |
| | | | |
|_Vety.Surgeon_| Joseph Erratt. | Joseph Erratt. | Joseph Erratt. |
+--------------+------------------+------------------+------------------+

+--------------+------------------+------------------+------------------+
| | 1803 | 1804 | 1805 |
+--------------+------------------+------------------+------------------+
| | | | |
|_Colonel_ |William,_Viscount_|William,_Viscount_|William,_Viscount_|
| | Howe, _K.B._ | Howe, _K.B._ | Howe, _K.B._ |
| | | | |
|_Lieut. | Patrick Maxwell. | Edgar Hunter. | James Kennedy. |
| Colonel_ | Edgar Hunter. |_Sir_ Robt.Wilson.| R. R. Gillespie. |
| | | | |
|_Major_ | John Bayly. | John Bayly. | John Fortnam. |
| | | James Kennedy. | James Cathcart. |
| | | | |
| | | John Fortnam. | Robert Lisle. |
| | James Kennedy. | James Cathcart. | Henry Roberts. |
| | John Fortnam. | Robert Lisle. | George John Sale.|
|_Captain_ | James Cathcart. | Henry Roberts. | Henry Skelton. |
| | Robert Lisle. | George John Sale.| Hugh Henry. |
| | Henry Roberts. | Henry Skelton. | Nathan Wilson. |
| | | Hugh Henry. | Patrick Anderson.|
| | | Wallace Boyle. | Edward Geils. |
| | | | |
|_Capt. Lieut. | George John Sale.| | |
| and Captain_| | | |
| | | | |
|_Lieutenant_ | John Banger. | Nathan Wilson. | |
| | Henry Skelton. | Patrick Anderson.| |
| | Wallace Boyle. | Edward Geils. | Henry Young. |
| | Nathan Wilson. | Henry Young. | George Tuite. |
| | Patrick Anderson.| George Tuite. | Robert Torrens. |
| | Edward Geils. | Thomas Johnson. | John Crooks. |
| | Henry Young. | Robert Torrens. | Charles Cobbe. |
| | George Tuite. | John Crooks. | Richard Miller. |
| | Thomas Johnson. | F. Cumberlege. | William Serle. |
| | Robert Torrens. | Joseph Dowson. | C. A. Chapman. |
| | John Crooks. | Charles Cobbe. | Benjamin Jones. |
| | F. Cumberlege. | Richard Miller. | Alan Twaddle. |
| | Joseph Dowson. | John David Duval.| |
| | Richard Miller. | Wm. L. Herries. | |
| | | | |
| | Michael T.Harris.| Geo. H. Bellasis.| Geo. H. Bellasis.|
| | Wm. L. Herries. | William Serle. | John Atkins. |
| | Charles Cobbe. | C. A. Chapman. | James Verner. |
|_Cornet_ | ---- Port. | John Atkins. | Colin Anderson. |
| | Geo. H. Bellasis.| James Verner. | Chas. T. Wilson. |
| | William Serle. | Colin Anderson. | H. A. Gladwin. |
| | C. A. Chapman. | Charles Townsend | Robert Kennedy. |
| | John M. Jackson. | Wilson. | J. W. Fullerton. |
| | | | |
|_Paymaster_ | Lawrence Neville.| Lawrence Neville.| Lawrence Neville.|
| | | | |
|_Adjutant_ | John Crooks. | John Crooks. | John Crooks. |
| | | | |
|_Surgeon_ | John Abercromby. | John Abercromby. | John Abercromby. |
| | | | |
|_Asst.Surgeon_| John Murray. | John Murray. | John Murray. |
| | James Allerdice. | James Allerdice. | James Allerdice. |
| | | | |
|_Vety.Surgeon_| Joseph Erratt. | Joseph Erratt. | Joseph Erratt. |
+--------------+------------------+------------------+------------------+

+--------------+------------------+------------------+------------------+
| | 1806 | 1807 | 1808 |
+--------------+------------------+------------------+------------------+
| | | | |
|_Colonel_ |William,_Viscount_|William,_Viscount_|William,_Viscount_|
| | Howe, _K.B._ | Howe, _K.B._ | Howe, _K.B._ |
| | | | |
|_Lieut. | James Kennedy. | James Kennedy. | James Kennedy. |
| Colonel_ | Robt. R. | Robt. R. | J. O. Vandeleur. |
| | Gillespie. | Gillespie. | |
| | | | |
|_Major_ | John Fortnam. | James Cathcart. | James Cathcart. |
| | James Cathcart. | Hugh Henry. |_Hon._ John Bruce.|
| | | | Richard O’Neill. |
| | | | |
| | Robert Lisle. | Robert Lisle. | Robert Lisle. |
| | Henry Roberts. | Henry Roberts. | Henry Roberts. |
| | George John Sale.| George John Sale.| George John Sale.|
|_Captain_ | Henry Skelton. | Henry Skelton. | Henry Skelton. |
| | Hugh Henry. | Nathan Wilson. | Nathan Wilson. |
| | Nathan Wilson. | Patrick Anderson.| Patrick Anderson.|
| | Patrick Anderson.| Edward Geils. | Edward Geils. |
| | Edward Geils. | | Henry Young. |
| | | |_Sir_George Tuite.|
| | | | Robert Torrens. |
| | | | |
| | Henry Young. | Henry Young. | John Crooks. |
| | George Tuite. | George Tuite. | John Atkins. |
| | Robert Torrens. | Robert Torrens. | James Verner. |
| | John Crooks. | John Crooks. | C. A. Chapman. |
| | Charles Cobbe. | Charles Cobbe. | William Dunbar. |
|_Lieutenant_ | William Serle. | C. A. Chapman. | Chas. T. Wilson. |
| | C. A. Chapman. | William Dunbar. | H. A. Gladwin. |
| | William Dunbar. | Thomas Keighley. | Lewis B. Buckle. |
| | Thomas Keighley. | Alan Twaddle. | Robt. John Edgar.|
| | Benjamin Jones. | William Serle. | Benjamin Burton. |
| | Alan Twaddle. | James Verner. | Thomas Coulthard.|
| | | Robert Kennedy. | R. W. Maxwell. |
| | | Thomas Martin. | |
| | | Chas. T. Wilson. | |
| | | H. A. Gladwin. | |
| | | Edward Taylor. | |
| | | | |
| | John Atkins. | John Atkins. | Henry Young. |
| | James Verner. | Colin Anderson. | Benjamin Jones. |
| | Colin Anderson. | Henry Young. | James Rathbone. |
| | Chas. T. Wilson. | Samuel Saunders. | G. A. Moultrie. |
|_Cornet_ | H. A. Gladwin. | John Edgar. | |
| | Robert Kennedy. | Lewis B. Buckle. | |
| | ---- Smith. | Charles Warden. | |
| | J. W. Fullerton. | | |
| | John Edgar. | | |
| | Lewis B. Buckle. | | |
| | | | |
|_Paymaster_ | Lawrence Neville.| Lawrence Neville.| Lawrence Neville.|
| | | | |
|_Adjutant_ | ---- Smith. | Samuel Saunders. | James Rathbone. |
| | | | |
|_Surgeon_ | John Abercromby. | John Murray. | John Murray. |
| | | | |
|_Asst.Surgeon_| John Murray. | James Allerdice. | James Allerdice. |
| | James Allerdice. | | |
| | | | |
|_Vety.Surgeon_| Joseph Erratt. | Joseph Erratt. | Joseph Erratt. |
+--------------+------------------+------------------+------------------+

APPENDIX B.

CASUALTIES IN THE NINETEENTH HUSSARS DURING THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN OF
1882.

_Wounded._

_Lieutenant_ H.C. Holland (attached), 6th September.
D. E. D. Barclay, 13th September.

APPENDIX C.

SPECIAL HONOURS GRANTED TO NINETEENTH HUSSARS FOR EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN
OF 1882.

_Companionship of the Bath._

_Lieutenant Colonel_ K. J. W. Coghill.

_Order of the Medjidie (4th Class)._

_Captain_ J. C. Hanford-Flood.

_Order of the Osmanieh (4th Class)._

_Lieutenant Colonel_ A. G. Webster.
_Major_ A. M. Taylor.

_Brevets._

_Major_ A. M. Taylor to be _Lieutenant Colonel_.
_Captain_ J. C. Hanford-Flood to be _Major_.

_Mentioned in Dispatches._

_Lieutenant Colonel_ K. J. W. Coghill.
A. G. Webster.

_Captain_ J. C. Hanford-Flood.

APPENDIX D.

CASUALTIES IN THE NINETEENTH HUSSARS DURING THE CAMPAIGN NEAR SUAKIN,
1884.

EL TEB (29th February).

_Killed_--

_Captain_ F. A. Freeman.

_Sergeant_ F. Keith.
H. Grey.
W. D. Brown (_died of wounds_).

_Corporal_ H. Ibbott.
P. Hughes.

_Lance Corporal_ C. Maney.

_Trumpeter_ R. Fanning (_died of wounds_).

_Private_ H. Cottle.
C. Singleton.
H. Williams.
W. Wilkinson.
P. Webb.
S. Garside (_died of wounds_).

_Wounded_--

_Lieutenant Colonel_ P. H. S. Barrow.
_Captain_ C. B. H. Jenkins.
_Troop Sergeant Major_ T. Taylor.
_Sergeant_ H. Phipps.
_Saddler_ J. Ferguson.
_Corporal_ C. Masters.

_Private_ H. Reeves. F. Floyd.
D. C. Price. J. Waitt.
E. Fitzpatrick. W. Hollinshead.
A. Hubbard. F. Hainning.
J. Bartley. W. Lennon.
J. Todd. R. Shepperd.
J. Sankey. J. Raines.
T. O’Connor Lee. E. R. Cheeseman.

TAMAI (13th March).

_Killed_--

_Private_ W. Page.

_Wounded_--

_Lance Corporal_ R. Williams.
_Private_ T. Hamilton.

APPENDIX E.

SPECIAL HONOURS GRANTED TO NINETEENTH HUSSARS FOR CAMPAIGN NEAR
SUAKIN, 1884.

_Companionship of the Bath._

_Lieutenant Colonel_ A. G. Webster.
P. H. S. Barrow.

_Mentioned in Dispatches._

_Lieutenant Colonel_ A. G. Webster.
P. H. S. Barrow.

_Major_ J. C. Hanford-Flood.

_Captain_ C. B. H. Jenkins.

_Regimental Sergeant Major_ A. G. Lima.

_Quarter Master Sergeant_ W. Marshall.

_Troop Sergeant Major_ T. Taylor.

_Sergeant_ H. Phipps.
W. S. Fenton.

_Private_ J. Bosely.

_Victoria Cross._

_Quarter Master Sergeant_ William T. Marshall.

_Distinguished Service Medal._

_Troop Sergeant Major_ T. Taylor.

_Sergeant_ H. Phipps.
W. S. Fenton.

_Private_ J. Boseley.

APPENDIX F.

ADDRESS TO NINETEENTH HUSSARS BY MAJOR GENERAL G. GRAHAM, C.B.,
V.C. TRINKITAT, 5TH MARCH 1884.

“COLONEL WEBSTER,

“I congratulate you on the efficient state of your Regiment, and I
wish to express my high appreciation of the conduct of the officers,
non-commissioned officers and men who have displayed unceasing
energy in the discharge of their duties. From the commencement of
the campaign, no other regiment has done more valuable service,
or displayed greater dash and daring, than the 19th Hussars,
especially on the 29th February. I wish to convey to the officers,
non-commissioned officers and men, my high opinion of their conduct,
and, before leaving, I wish the regiment every success in its future
career.”

ADDRESS TO NINETEENTH HUSSARS BY BRIGADIER GENERAL H. STEWART.
TRINKITAT, 5TH MARCH 1884.

“COLONEL WEBSTER, OFFICERS, NON-COMMISSIONED
OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE 19TH HUSSARS,

“It affords me great pleasure to thank you for the valuable
services you have rendered during the campaign, especially on the
29th February at Fort Teb, where you displayed extreme coolness,
unparalleled courage and fearlessness and cheerful and ready
obedience to orders, when under a heavy fire, and surrounded by an
almost innumerable foe. As a cavalry officer I had not the chance
to notice each act of bravery as others had, but the conduct of the
regiment, and its steadiness and boldness were noticed by several
Infantry Officers who were better able to see and judge than I, and
who have spoken to me in the highest possible terms of the way in
which it discharged its difficult duties.

“Your loss has been heavy, but your victory has been sure. I mourn
the fate of my comrades in arms, and of your second in command Lieut.
Colonel Barrow.

“I had heard of your drill, and I proved the efficiency of the
regiment when it was on the Curragh, and its present state of
efficiency is admirable. Words are inadequate to convey to you how
much I would wish to thank you, but I do thank you from the bottom of
my heart.”

APPENDIX G.

CASUALTIES IN THE NINETEENTH HUSSARS DURING THE SOUDAN CAMPAIGN
OF 1885.

ABU KLEA (16th and 17th January).

_Killed_--

_Corporal_ J. Walker.

_Private_ W. Purton.

_Wounded_--

_Farrier Sergeant_ J. Short.

_Private_ J. Whitefield
C. Ray.
J. Whelan.

ABU KROU (19th January).

_Killed_--

_Quartermaster_ A. G. Lima.

_Wounded_--

_Private_ D. Godfrey.
J. Pullan.

ABU KLEA (17th February).

_Killed_--

_Sergeant_ Horwood.

OPERATIONS NEAR SUAKIN (3rd February).

_Killed_--

_Lance Corporal_ W. Hardy.
W. Coyle.

_Private_ W. Campbell.
W. Cooper.
B. Coppstone.
P. King.
T. Rafferty.
St. Clair.

APPENDIX H.

SPECIAL HONOURS GRANTED TO NINETEENTH HUSSARS FOR SOUDAN
CAMPAIGN, 1885.

_Order of the Medjidie_ (_4th Class_).

_Major_ C. B. H. Jenkins.

_Order of the Osmanieh_ (_4th Class_).

_Lieutenant Colonel_ J. C. Hanford-Flood.

_Brevets._

_Lieutenant Colonel_ P. H. S. Barrow to be _Colonel_.

_Major_ J. C. H Flood to be _Lieutenant Colonel_.

_Mentioned in Dispatches._

_Lieutenant Colonel_ P. H. S. Barrow.
J. D. P. French.

_Major_ J. C. Hanford-Flood.

_Captain_ J. C. Ker Fox.

_Troop Sergeant Major_ W. T. Beale.

_Sergeant_ R. O. Chislett.

_Distinguished Service Medal._

_Troop Sergeant Major_ W. T. Beale.

_Sergeant_ R. O. Chislett.

_Corporal_ P. Breslan.

_Lance Corporal_ W. Woolley.
H. Baker.

_Private_ W. Lennon.

APPENDIX I.

ADDRESS TO NINETEENTH HUSSARS BY GENERAL LORD WOLSELEY, G.C.B.
KORTI, 23RD MARCH 1885.

“I am very much pleased with your general appearance and smart turn
out this afternoon, which reflects great credit upon the Regiment.

“I know the wear and tear to which your clothing and equipment has
been put, and your appearance to-day is highly creditable; but I
tell you what is more creditable, and that is the admirable manner
in which you have done your work during the campaign, both with the
River and Desert Column. The late Genl. Sir H. Stewart told me,
after the campaign of 1884 in the Eastern Soudan, of the good work
you did there, and said that there was no regiment of cavalry in
Her Majesty’s Service which knew its work more thoroughly, or could
have performed it better than the 19th Hussars, and that you were
everything a Hussar regiment should be.

“He was no bad judge, and I know you will value what he said.

“I for my part have heard this opinion confirmed on all sides, during
the campaign, and, from what I have personally seen of you, I believe
it to be true. Your success is due not only to the Officers and
Non-Commissioned Officers, who have taught you, and who lead you, but
to the Private Soldiers, each one of whom knows his work as a Cavalry
Soldier, and does his duty so thoroughly.

“This is of the highest importance in a Light Cavalry Regiment, and
you have proved its value. You have several months of hot weather in
front of you, but I know you will face it cheerfully, as your duty;
and I hope that you will keep well, so that when the autumn comes,
and we advance on Khartoum, I may see the 19th Hussars leading the
way, and giving a good account of the enemy, as they have done before.

“I shall have very much pleasure in reporting to H.R.H. the Field
Marshal Commanding in Chief what I have told you to-day.”

APPENDIX K.

REPORT BY COLONEL BARROW ON THE ARAB HORSES RIDDEN BY THE
NINETEENTH HUSSARS DURING THE NILE CAMPAIGN OF 1885.

_Description of Horse._

Arab stallion. Average height, 14 hands; average age, 8 years to 9
years; some 15 per cent. over 12 years; bought by Egyptian Government
in Syria and Lower Egypt; average price, 18_l._

_Work done previous to Campaign._

Some 50 per cent. had been through the campaign in the Eastern Soudan
with the 19th Hussars in February and March 1884, and returned in a
very exhausted state, and about 10 per cent. had been at Tel-el-Kebir.

In June 1884 the whole number were taken by Lieutenant-Colonel
Taylor, with the Egyptian Cavalry, from Cairo to Assouan in barges,
and remained there for two months.

In September 1884 they were marched by Major Grenfell from Assouan
to Wady Halfa, 210 miles, and there awaited the arrival of the 19th
Hussars. 350 of these ponies were handed over to the 19th Hussars on
13th November 1884, all except some 10 per cent., being in a very
fair marching condition.

_The March up the Nile._

The 19th Hussars marched by squadrons from Wady Halfa to Korti,
distance 360 miles. Average daily march about 16 miles, not including
halts.

Halts were made for one day at Absarat, one day at Dongola, and two
days at Shabadood when crossing the river.

The ration was supposed to be 8 lb. of grain, barley or dhourra, and
10 lb. of dhourra stalk; but owing to scarcity of grain, the horses
generally received about 6 lb. of grain and 10 lb. of dhourra stalks.

They arrived at Korti in very good condition.

_Halt at Korti._

The horses remained at Korti from 20th December to 7th January, and
received 8 lb. green dhourra stalk daily instead of dry stalk. They
improved during the halt at Korti.

On the 30th December 40 horses proceeded to Jakdul, 100 miles, and
performed the reconnaissance duties of the column. The march to
Jakdul was performed in 63 hours, 15 hours’ rest there, and the
return journey in 63 hours. Six horses returned the 100 miles in 46
hours; the last 50 miles in 7½ hours.

During the 141 hours of this march the horses were ridden for 83
hours.

_Desert March._

From the 8th to the 19th of January, the 19th Hussars, strength
as below, marched across the desert with General Sir H. Stewart’s
Column:--

Officers 8
Men 127
Horses 155

In addition, therefore, to one extra horse for each Officer, there
were 12 spare horses.

The following table will show the daily work performed and amount of
food and water given daily to each horse.

The 40 horses referred to in previous paragraph returned to Korti on
the 5th, and started again on the 8th, as fit as any horses in the
troop.

There was not one casualty out of the 40:--

+---------+----------------------+-----+----+----------+--------+------+
| | | No. of | When | Amount | Food |
| Date. | Time of March. |Hours. | Watered. | of |Grain.|
| | | Miles.| | Water.| |
|---------+----------------------+-----+----+----------+--------+------+
| | | | | | | lb. |
|Janry.8th| 2p.m. to 6p.m. | 4 | 16 | ... ... | ... | 6 |
| | | | | | | |
| ” 9th | 2.45a.m. to 10a.m. | 7¼ | 29 | 10.30a.m.| 1½ gal.| 6 |
| | 2p.m. to 6p.m. | 4 | 16 | 6.15p.m.| ½ ” | |
| | | | | | | |
| ” 10th | 3a.m. to 9am. | 6 | 24 | ... ... | ... | 6 |
| |12.15p.m. to 4.30p.m. | 4½ | 17 | 4.45p.m.| ¼ gal.| |
| | | | | | | |
| ” 11th | 3.30a.m. to 12.30p.m.| 9 | 36 | 12.45p.m.|F’ldr’nk| 6 |
| | | | | | | |
| ” 12th | ... ... ... | ... | ...| 9a.m. | ” | 6 |
| |12.30p.m. to 4.30p.m. | 4 | 16 | 4.45p.m.| ” | |
| | | | | | | |
| ” 13th | Halt at Gakdul | ... | ...| 8.30a.m.,| ” | 6 |
| | | | | 4.45p.m.| | |
| | | | | | | |
| ” 14th | ... ... ... | ... | ...| 6a.m., | ” | 6 |
| | | | | 1p.m. | | |
| | 2.30p.m. to 6.30p.m. | 4 | ...| ... ... | ... | |
| | | | | | | |
| ” 15th | 5a.m to 10a.m. | 5 | 20 | 10.30a.m.| 1¼ gal.| 5 |
| | 1.30p.m. to 6p.m. | 4½ | 18 | ... ... | ... | |
| | | | | | | |
| ” 16th | 4.30a.m. to 4p.m. | 11½ | 40 | 6p.m. | ½ gal.| 4 |
| | | | | | | |
| ” 17th | 8a.m. to 4p.m. | 8 | 32 | 4p.m. | 2 gal.| 4 |
| | | | | | | |
| ” 18th | ... ... ... | ... | ...| 7a.m. | 1 gal.| 3 |
| | 4p.m. to 12p.m. | 8 | 32 | ... ... | ... | ... |
| | | | | | | |
| ” 19th | 12p.m. to 9a.m. | 9 | 36 | ... ... | ... | 1 |
| | 9a.m. to 12 noon | 21 | ...| ... ... | ... | ... |
| | | | | | | |
| ” 20th | 12 noon to 1p.m. | 13 | ...| ... ... | ... | ... |
| | ... ... ... | 1 | 4 | 2p.m. |F’ldr’nk| ... |
+---------+----------------------+-----+----+----------+--------+------+

It will be seen from the above table, that the average forage ration
for the first 10 days was about 5 lb. to 6 lb. of grain, and 2
gallons of water, the horses performing 31 miles daily, not counting
one day’s halt.

When the final advance was made on Matammeh, the horses marched to
the Nile without having received a drop of water for 55 hours, and
only 1 lb. of grain. Some 15 to 20 horses received no water for 70
hours.

_The Halt at Gubat._

During the period, 20th January to 14th February, the horses received
no grain, but were fed on dhourra stalk, or green dhourra stalk,
about 8 lb. daily; two days before marching they received 6 lb. of
grain.

They performed outpost and patrol duty, averaging some 8 miles daily.
Under the above conditions the horses recovered from the effort made
during the desert march, but many were in a weak state.

_Return to Korti and Dongola._

The first 75 miles, the horses performed the whole distance on 4 lb.
of grain and 3 gallons of water, the remainder of the journey water
was plentiful, and the 8 lb. of grain was supplied. Two marches of
over 40 miles were performed, which shows that the horses were still
able to march. After two weeks’ rest at Korti, the horses marched
strong and well to Dongola and other stations, receiving plenty of
food and water, and after two months’ halt they were in quite as good
condition as when they left Wady Haifa.

_The Return March--Dongola to Wady Haifa._

On the return march to Wady Haifa the distance, some 250 miles, was
performed at the average rate of some 16 miles a day, with one halt
for two days.

The marching was done mostly at night, but the horses were generally
exposed to a hot sun all day, as there was not much shelter for them
under the palm trees.

Except two fractures from kicks, no horses were lost or left on the
line of march.

The horses were conveyed from Wady Haifa to Assouan in barges, and
after two weeks’ rest at Assouan were handed over to the 20th Hussars
in quite as good order as when they left Wady Haifa nine months
previously.

The attached statement gives a list of casualties.

I think it may be considered a most remarkable circumstance, that out
of 350 horses during nine months on a hard campaign, only 12 died
from disease.

This result must be attributed to the two facts:--

1. That the climate of the Soudan is most suitable for horses.

2. That the Syrian horse has a wonderful constitution, and is
admirably suited for warfare in an eastern climate.

_Conclusion._

The distance actually marched from point to point, not taking any
account of reconnaissances, &c., was over 1500 miles.

The weight carried was reduced to the minimum, but averaged about
14 stone. The weather during the last four months of the campaign
was trying. Food was often very limited, and during the desert march
water very scarce. Under the above conditions, I venture to think
that the performances of the regiment on the Arab ponies, will
compare with the performance of any horsemen on record.

* * * * *

_Casualty Return of Arab ponies, 19th (Princess of Wales’ Own)
Hussars, 13th November 1884 to 1st July 1885._

SUMMARY.

Killed in action 20
Destroyed 37
Drowned 1
Missing 1
Died 12
--
Total 71
===

DISEASE.

Bullet wounds 23
Exhaustion 31
Fractures 7
Paralysis 1
Enteritis 1
Farcy 1
Purpura hæmorrhagica 1
Rupture of intestine 1
Rupture of stomach 1
Saddle gall 1
Colic spasmodic 1
Missing 1
Drowned 1
--
Total 71
===

_Casualty Return of Arab Ponies, 19th (Princess of Wales’ Own)
Hussars, from 13th November 1884, to 1st July 1885, showing the
period during which the horses died._

+----------------------+----------+------------+-------------+--------+
| Period. |Number of |Destroyed or|Destroyed or | Killed |
| | horses | died from | died from | in |
| |effective.|debility and|other causes.| action.|
| | | exhaustion.| | |
+----------------------+----------+------------+-------------+--------+
| | | | | |
|Wady Haifa to Korti, | 350 | ... | 5 | ... |
| 13th November to | | | | |
| 8th January | | | | |
| | | | | |
|Korti to Matammeh and | 155 | 19 | 5 | 20 |
| back, 8th January | | | | |
| to 8th March | | | | |
| | | | | |
|At Korti, 8th January | 73 | ... | 2 | ... |
| to 8th March | | | | |
| | | | | |
|With River Column, | 107 | 3 | 1 | ... |
| 1st January to | | | | |
| 8th March | | | | |
| | | | | |
|Korti, Dongola, and | 347 | 5 | 9 | ... |
| other Stations, | | | | |
| 9th March to | | | | |
| 20th June | | | | |
| | | | | |
|Dongola, Assouan, | 380 | ... | 2 | ... |
| 21st June to | | | | |
| 1st July 1885 | | | | |
| +----------+------------+-------------+--------+
| Total deaths | ... | 27 | 24 | 20 |
+----------------------+----------+------------+-------------+--------+

_A few practical lessons learnt._

1. When water was limited to two gallons or less it was given in
small quantities, not all at once. Even one pint to the horses, or
just enough to moisten their mouths, enabled them to come up to
time again. On one occasion, late at night, the horses were much
exhausted--we were 35 miles from water, and less than one pint left
per horse--the horses could not eat, their mouths were so parched. I
had a sack of dhourra meal, and with the water made a number of moist
balls of meal. These balls revived the horses, and they marched on
their 35 miles next morning. I obtained this hint, previous to the
campaign, from General V. Baker, who told me that the Turkomans used
to carry in skins balls of grease, or oil and meal.

2. The horses were saved on every possible occasion, and by every
possible device. The men never sat on their horses’ backs for a
moment longer than necessary. Marches in column were avoided,
extended line being used, so that each horse had pure air to breathe;
when picketed, horses always had plenty of room and their heads to
the breeze; when possible, they were washed two or three times a
week, which tended much towards their healthy condition.

3. Several horses were severely wounded, but recovered rapidly,
although in a very exhausted condition.

4. The horses were fed, whenever possible, on the grass of the Bayuda
Desert. This grass was very dry. The horses chewed it, but ate very
little. During the last few days of the march to Matammeh, there was
no opportunity for giving the horses any grass.

On several occasions, tins of mouldy biscuit, unfit for issue to the
men, were obtained from the Commissariat, and the biscuit given to
the horses.

They ate this greedily and worked on it.

P. H. S. BARROW,
_Lieut.-Colonel, 19th Hussars_.

CAIRO, _1st August 1885_.

INDEX

Abercromby, Gen., 68, 80, 90, 94

Aboukir, 235

Abu Dom, 260

Abu Hamed, 256, 259

Abu Klea, action at, 249-251, 255

Abu Krou, 253

Abu Kussi, 260

Adams, Major Gen., 46

Affleck, Major, 70

Agra, 134, 135, 227

Ahmednugger, 132, 133, 134;
captured, 136

Aix-la-Chapelle, Treaty of, 1

Ajunta Pass, 137, 138, 148, 149

Akola, 149

Aldborough, 11

Aldershot, 229, 266

Alexandria, 234

Allahabad, 133, 134, 222, 227

Alyghur, 132, 134

Amboor, 82

Ameer Khan, 115

America, War in, 10, 19

Amherstberg, 176, 179

Ancaster, 180, 209

Anstey, Robert, 28

Apthorp, Capt., 261

Arabi Pasha, 233;
his rebellion, 233;
number of men, 235;
surrenders, 238

Arcot, 52, 124

Argaum, 135, 149;
battle of, 150-152

Arikera, 88;
battle of, 89

Armstrong, J. W., 229

Armstrong, Major William, 231

Army, increase of the, 3, 11;
size of letters, 111

Arnee, 31, 72, 78, 80;
battle of, 23;
mutiny at, 51

Arrekeery, 124

Arthur, Lieut. Sir G., 232

Assaye, battle of, 131, 135, 138-144, 154;
village, 137, 140

Asseerghur, 135, 149

Assiout, 263

Assouan, 263

_Assyrian Monarch_, 234, 236

Athy, 158

Aurungabad, 137, 148, 149

Austria, coalition with France, 2

Avaracoorchi, 69

Aylmer, Lieut., 234

Badajoz, 173

Badges, 113, 156, 217, 246, 264, 266

Baillie, Colonel, 20

Baird, Major Gen. Sir David, 58, 108

Baker, Fort, 241

Baker, Major Gen., 240, 241

Balasore, 133, 135

Baltimore, 214

Bangalore, 82, 94, 107, 266;
captured, 87

Barabuttee, 135

Baramahal, 78

Barclay, Lieut., 238

Baring, Capt. R., 226

Baroda, 126, 133

Barrington, 27;
Sir Jonah, 158;
Mr, 158

Barrow, Major Gen. Lousada, 264

Barrow, Lieut. Col., 241, 242, 243, 247, 249, 253, 254, 319;
death, 264, 309

Barrow, Cornet S. D., 226

Bassein, Treaty of, 129

Bateman, Private Jonas, 30

Bayly, Lieut., 70

_Beatson’s Mysore War_, extract from, 110, _note_

Beaver Dam, 182

Beccles, 15

Beckwith, Lieut. John, 24, 28

Bednore, 36, 115

Begum Somroo, 148

Belbeis, 238

Belfast, 231

Belleisle, siege of, 64

Benares, 133, 227

Benedict, 213

Bengal, 1st European Light Cavalry, formation of, 222;
services transferred to the Crown, 223;
the “White Mutiny,” 224;
at Cawnpore, 225;
designated 19th Light Dragoons, 225;
19th Hussars, 226

Berber, 246

Bhagelcottah, 120

Bhonslay, Rajah of Berar, 126, 130, 148;
encamped at Argaum, 149;
defeated, 152;
sues for peace, 153

Bhowani river, 69

Bickerton, Vice-Adm. Sir R., 29, 36

Biddulph, Lieut. J., 226

Birti, 257

Bisshopp, Lieut. Col., 183

Bissolee Pass, 124

Black Rock, Fort, 183;
occupied, 186

Bladensberg, 213

Blagrove, Lieut., 232

Blairfindie, 217

Boerstler, Col., 182

Bokerdun, 137

Bombay, 30, 227, 266

Boscawen, 4

Boseley, Private, 243

Boulderson, Cornet J., 226

Bourquien, 135

Bowser, Lieut. Col., 118

Bowyer, Fort, 215

Boyd, 104, _note_;
Gen., 190, 191

Boyle, Capt., 144

Brackenbury, Col. H., 259

Braddock, his expedition to New England, 2

Brady, Sergeant, 162, 167

Brandywine, 64

Brathwaite, Col., 31, 100

Brest, blockade of, 4

Bridgenorth, 14

Brighton, 228

British troops, position of on the Niagara frontier, 195

Broach, 134

Brock, Major Gen., 176, 177;
death, 178

Bromley, 15

Brook, Col., 214

Brooke, Capt., 203

Brooks, Major J. H., 226

Broughton, Lieut. Col., 133

Brown, Gen, 190, 197, 208;
Geo., 8

Bruce, Major Gen., 41, 46, 49

Brunswick, Prince Ferdinand of, 4

Buchanan, Private, 85

Budnapore, 137

Buffalo, 179;
taken, 186

Bulger, Lieut., 195

Buller, Major Gen. Sir Redvers, 255, 256

Bullum, Rajah of, 123

Bundelcund, 132, 134

Bungay, 15

Bunker’s Hill, 64

Burgoyne, Col. Sir John, in command of the 23rd Regiment of
Light Dragoons, 23, 24, 29;
Orders and Instructions, 25-27;
on the treatment of his regiment, 42;
Commander-in-Chiefship conferred, 43;
refuses to accept, 44;
difficulties of his position, 45-48;
interview with Lord Macartney, 49;
assumes command, 50;
arrest, 51;
court-martial, 54;
acquitted, 56;
his death, 57

Burhanpore, 131, 135, 148

Burlington Heights, 181, 184, 196

Bury St Edmunds, 31

Buswapore, 121

Cabul, 102

Cairo, 238

Calicut, 80

Calpee, 135

Calvert, Harry, 113, 156, 217

Cambay, Bay of, 125

Campbell, Major Gen. Alan, 46, 51

Campbell, Sir Archibald, inspection of the 19th Light Dragoons, 64

Campbell, Capt. Lieut. John, 24, 28

Campbell, Lieut. Col, 133

Canara, 124

Caniembadi, 88, 90

Cannanore, 107

Capper, Lieut. Col., 120

Capsah, 135

Cathcart, Capt., 144

Cauveripatam, 78

Cauvery river, 79, 88, 95, 97, 109

Cawnpore, 133, 227

_Ceres_, 29

Chambly, 215

Champaneer, 135

Champlain Lake, 178, 188, 195

Chandler, Gen., 182

Changama Pass, 72, 82

Chapman, Lieut. A. H., 226

Charlotte, Queen, her funeral, 218

Chateaugay river, 188;
battle, 188

Chatham, 11

Chazy, 211

Cherbourg, 4

Cheyloor, 123

Chicago, 194

Child, Lieut., W. G., 24, 28;
Capt., 73, 84, 98

Chinroypatam, 123

Chippewa, 197;
battle of, 198

Chitteldroog, 117

Chrystler’s Farm, 184;
battle of, 190

Chumbul, 127

Chunar, 133

Ciudad Rodrigo, 173

Clair, St, Lake, 209

Clarke, Capt. M., 226

Clonmel, 172

Coates, Major, 163

Cockburn, Vice-Adm., 213

Coghill, Lieut. Col., K. J. W., 231, 234, 236

Coimbatore, 68, 69, 74, 77, 93

Colle, La, 195

Combe, Col. Boyce, 265

Combermere, Lord, 102

Conaghul, 122

Conflans, 4

Conjeveram, 59, 68

Connaught, Duke of, 235

Coorg, 124;
Rajah of, 110

Coote, Sir Eyre, his victory at Porto Novo, 20;
on the want of cavalry, 22;
forced to resign, 31, 39;
his death, 36, 41;
treatment by the Madras Government, 41

Cornwallis, Lord, 21, 79;
capitulates, 20;
assumes command of the army, 81;
his advance on Bangalore, 82;
improvement in the order of march, 82;
captures Bangalore, 87;
attack on Seringapatam, 96;
takes possession of French territories, 100

Cotapilli, 87

Cotton, Lieut. Col. Stapleton, 101

Couch, G., 226

Coveripoorum Pass, 111

Covington, Gen., 191

Cowdelghee, 120

Cowgatchy, 34

Cox Heath, 11

Crabbe, Lieut., 232

Cradock, Lieut. Gen. Sir J., 160

Craigie, Capt. H. C., 226

Craven, Lieut., 253

Crawford, Lieut. G. H., 24, 28

Crespigny, Lieut. de, 232

Croydon, 15

Cuddalore, 31;
attack on, 36;
siege of, 41

_Culloden_, 166

Cumberland, Duke of, evacuates Hanover, 3

Currie, H. O., 226

Cuttack, 132, 135

_Cygnet_, 174

Dalling, Lieut. Gen. Sir J., Commander-in-chief in Madras, 54

Damodar River, 133

Darapooram, 69, 72, 78

Darley, Major, 73

Dartmoor, 229

Datchet, 218

David’s, St, village, burnt, 200

De Boigne, 127

Dearborn, Gen., 178, 181

Deare, Major Gen., 133

Delaware, 195

Delhi, 126;
battle of, 135

Demiacotta, 69, 76

Deodroog, 121, 122

Deogam, 153

Deogheri, 118

Desert Column, 249

Detroit, Fort, 178;
frontier, 175

Devis, A. W., 98

Deyrah Dhoon, 167

Dharwar, 80, 90, 115

Dhoondia, Punt Gokla, 116, 118

Dhoondia Wao, 115;
head quarters, 116;
adherents, 117;
defeated and killed, 122

Dindigal, 71, 72

Dirom, extract from, 97

Dobbs, Capt., 207

Dodd, Capt. Thomas Crewe, 28

Domingo, St, 159

Dongola, 270, 263

Dover, village of, burnt, 196

Dowlut Rao Scindia, 127

Downie, Capt., 212

Dragoons, Light, 19th Regiment of, 5;
notification to raise, 5;
Royal Warrant, 6-8;
change of number, 9;
uniform, 9, 12;
formation, 12;
strength, 12;
clothing accounts, 12;
quartered at various places, 14;
disbanded, 15

Dragoons, Light, 23rd, formation of, 23;
appointments, 24;
despatched to India, 27;
strength, 28, 65, 100, 104, 171, 210, 219;
list of the officers, 28;
embark, 29;
at Madras, 30, 32, 92;
appearance, 33;
casualties among the horses, 52;
review, 59;
at Shevtamodoo, 59, 99;
change of number, 62;
uniform, 62-64;
under orders, 67;
casualties, 76, 86, 90, 144, 152, 205;
remounted, 92;
return to Trichinopoly, 100, 112;
badges granted, 113, 155, 216;
expedition against Dhoondia Wao, 117;
at Cheyloor, 123;
the battle of Assaye, 142;
conspicuous gallantry, 146;
honorary colours granted, 147;
battle of Argaum, 150;
march against banditti, 154;
encamped at Panwell, 155;
return to England, 168, 171, 218;
approbation of their services, 169-171;
in Ireland, 172, 218;
ordered to Canada, 173;
equipped as lancers, 218;
disbanded, 219

Drogheda, Earl of, 5

Drummond, Lieut. Gen., 185, 195;
his attack on Oswego, 196;
at Toronto, 200;
Lundy’s Lane, 201-205;
wounded, 205;
blockade of Fort Erie, 206-208

Drummond, Lieut. Col., 207

Dublin, 172

Dudrenec, 132

Dufferin, Lady, 238

Dummul, 119

Earle, Major Gen. W., 248, 256;
death, 258

East India Company, condition of the European forces, 20;
want of cavalry, 21;
jealousy of the King’s Officers, 37;
raises European cavalry regiments, 221;
cease to exist, 223

Egypt, Khedive of, deposed, 233

El Kooa, 257

El Magfar, 235

El Teb, battle of, 241-244

Ellice, Capt. H. E., 226

Ellichpore, 152

Elliott, Sir John, 60

Ellore, 53

Emsdorf, battle of, 60

England, condition of, in 1779, 10;
in 1781, 19

Epsom, 15

Eratoor, 95

Erie, Fort, 177, 179, 186, 197;
evacuated, 181;
assault on, 206-208;
Lake, 175, 177;
naval action on, 180

Erode, 71, 72, 77

Es Salihiyeh, 237

_Euphrates_, 266

Europe, state of affairs in 1756, 1;
peace in, 36

Eustace, Capt., 207, 208, 209

Ewell, 15

Eyre, Thomas, 28

Fairbrother, Capt. C. M. S., 226

Fairlie, Lieut. C. H., 226

Fancourt, Col., 161

Fatt, Sergeant James, 244

Fawcett, Lieut. Gen., 18

Fenton, Sergeant, 243

Fenwick, Col., 133

Ferguson, Lieut. Col., 133

Finglass, Capt., 104, _note_

Fitzgibbon, Lieut., 182

Fitz-Patrick, R., 17

Floyd, Lieut. Col. John, 24, 28, 29, 46, 49, 94, 98, 100, 106;
his birth, 60;
commission in the 15th Light Dragoons, 60;
appointed Major of the 21st and Lieut. Col. of the 23rd, 61;
his advance on Coimbatore, 69;
takes the Fort of Satyamunglum, 71;
retreat, 74;
reaches Velladi, 76;
casualties, 76;
reconnoissance, 84;
wounded, 85;
on the attack at Seringapatam, 96;
charge at Mallavelly, 108;
sails for England, 114;
appointed Colonel of the 26th Light Dragoons, 114;
death, 114

Forbes, Lieut. Col., 163

Fortnam, Cornet John, 90

Forty-mile Creek, 182

Four Mile Creek, 183

France, coalition with Austria, 2;
declares war against England, 10, 99

Freeman, Capt., 242

Fremantle, Major Gen., 261

French, Major, 250, 255, 256

French Mills, 191

Frenchtown, 179

Fullarton, Col., 36, 82

Fullerton, Cornet John, 24

Gaekwar of Baroda, 126

Gaines, Gen., 207

Ganjam, 133, 134

Gardner, Private Joseph, 30

Gawilghur, 135, 148, 149, 152

_Geelong_, 265

George II., his death, 9

George IV., his review of the regiments, 218

George, Fort, 33, 177, 179, 183, 197, 199;
evacuated, 181;
re-occupied, 185

Ghent, Treaty of Peace signed at, 215

Ghuffoor Khan, 115

Gibbs, Major Gen., 215

Gibraltar, siege of, 19

Gillespie, Lieut. Col. R. R., 157;
his career, 158;
treatment of the Vellore mutiny, 163-166;
death, 167

Gladwin, Lieut., 183

Godavery, 133, 137, 154

Gokauk, 120

Gordon, Col., 42, 186, 240, 246

Gough, Capt. H. H., 226

Gowdie, Major, 84, 86

Graham, Major Gen., 236, 240, 244, 245, 261, 308

Grand River, 210

Grant, Lieut. Alex., 146

Grant, Major Gen. Sir Hope, 222

_Grant Duff’s History of the Mahrattas_, extracts from, 142, 146

Grenadier Island, 188, 189

Guadaloupe captured, 4

Gubat, 254;
evacuated, 255

Gudduck, 119

Guiche, Comte de, 29

Guidons, 231, 232

Gunjicotta, 92

Guns, galloper, 105

Gurramconda, 94

Gutpurba river, 120

Guzerat, 133, 134

Guzulhutti Pass, 68, 70, 71, 72

Gwalior, 136, 152, 153

Hale, Cornet, 98

Halesworth, 15

Hall, Gen., 186

Hall, Lieut. Gen. John, 227, 228

Hamdab, 256

Hamdoob, 261

Hamley, Lieut. Gen. Sir E., 236

Hampton, Gen, 188

Handcock, Major, 195

Hanford-Flood, Major, 243, 256

Hanoor, 120

Hanover, 3

Harcourt, Lieut. Col., 133, 135

Harding, Cornet F. D., 226

Haren, Major du, 182

Hari Punt, 81, 91, 94

Harris, Gen., 89, 106, 107, 109;
on the Cavalry Division, 112;
raised to the peerage, 113

Harrison, Gen., 179

Hartley, Col., 68, 72, 78, 80

Harvey, Col., 182

Hasheem, 261, 262

Hassan, 124

Hastings, Warren, 37, 40

Havre, 4

Hawke, blockades Brest, 4;
destroys a French fleet, 4

Hearsey, Lieut. A., 226

Hebbeh, 259

Helena, St, 171

Helouan, 238

Hessing, 129

Hicks, Major Gen., 240

Hill, Capt. Sir J., 226

Hilton, Robert, 28

Hinde, Lieut. T. J. V., 24, 28

Holkar, 126, 128;
hostilities against Scindia, 129;
alliance, 130

Holland, Lieut., 232, 237

Holland, declaration of war in 1781, 14

Honorary Colours for Assaye, 147, 231

Hoobli, 120

Hooli, 120

Hooliadroog, 92, 95

Hoonagoonda, 121

Horsefall, John, 28

Horsham, 15

Horton, Lieut., 197, 199

Horwood, Sergeant, 255

Hounslow, 218, 230, 265, 266

Howe, Lord, 4;
Lieut. Gen. the Hon. Sir W., 156;
appointed Colonel of the 19th Light Dragoons, 64;
his death, 216

Huella, 259

Hughes, 31

Hull, Gen., 176

Hunmunsagur, 121

Hunter, Major Edgar, 157

Huron, Lake, 175, 179

Hurrianah, 115

Hurryhur, 117, 131

Hussars, 19th, 226;
ordered to England, 227, 232, 265;
badges granted, 229, 246, 264, 266;
in Ireland, 230;
restoration of guidons, 231;
ordered to Egypt, 232;
to Suakin, 240;
casualties, 243, 245, 304, 306, 310;
return to Cairo, 246;
ordered up the Nile, 247;
designation of “Princess of Wales’ Own” conferred, 264;
ordered to India, 266;
honours granted, 305, 307, 311

Hutchinson, Major Gen. Coote Synge, 266

Huth, Cornet F. H., 226

Hyder Ali, of Mysore, 20, 31;
death, 35

Hyderabad, 65, 102;
dispersal of the French contingent, 103

India, results of the campaign of 1781, 20;
condition of the European troops, 20;
want of cavalry, 21;
state of affairs in, 31;
relations between civil and military, 37

Indore, 126, 129

_Iona_, 265

Ireland, 230

Ismailia, 235

Izard, Gen., 209

Jackson, Gen., 215

Jaffirabad, 137

Jaffrey, John, 28

Jakdul, 249, 255

Jalasore, 133

Jalgaum, 137

_Jane, Duchess of Gordon_, 171

Jaulna, 137, 154

Jellahal, 120

Jenkins, Capt., 243;
Lieut. Col. C. V., 226

Jenkinson, C., 11, 14, 24

Jervoise, Lieut. C. C., 226

Johnston, Lieut. Gen. James, 12, 18

Jowrah, State of, 115

Juah river, 138, 141

Juggernaut, 135

Jumna, 127

_Jumna_, 227

Kaitna River, 138

Kalunga, 167

Kandeish, 129

Karoor, 69, 72, 78

Kassassin, 236

Keane, Major Gen., 215

Kelly, Col., 68, 72

Kemp, Private Simon, 30

Kennedy, Lieut. Col., 157, 164;
Capt., 109

Khanagheri, 121

Khartoum, 240;
expedition to relieve, 247;
captured by the Mahdi, 254;
preparations for the advance on abandoned, 263

Kingston, 175, 179, 181, 184

Kirbekan, 257;
victory at, 258

Kistna river, 66, 120

Kistnapah Naik, 123

Kittoor, 118

Kloster-Severn, convention of, 3

Kolapore, Rajah of, 126, 128

Kolar, 94

Koondgul, 119

Kopaul, 81

Kordofan, 239

Korosko, 263

Korti, 248, 249, 253, 255, 256

Kurot, 260

La Prairie, 178, 215, 217

La Terriere, Lieut., 232

Lagos, Bay of, 4

Lahore, 104

Lake, Gen., 133, 134, 135

Lang, Lieut. Col., appointed Commander-in-Chief, 44;
withdrawn from the service, 57

Laswaree, 135

Lawrence, St, 175, 187, 191

Lawrence, Sir John, 227

Leeds, 230

Leger, St, Lieut. Col. the Hon. Arthur, 151

Legge, H. B., 8

Leigh, Lieut. Hon. R., 232

Lewiston captured, 186, 201

Lexden Heath, 12

Lima, Quarter Master A. G., 252, 263

Lisle, Capt., 175, 183, 184, 186;
Major, 196, 199, 201, 209

Lister’s Corps, 12

Little, Capt., 91

Longford, 172

Long Island, 64

Long Point, 196, 197

Long Sault, 190

Louisbourg, expedition against, 3, 4

Lowe, Major Gen., 236

Luard, Capt. F. P., 226

Ludlow, 14

Lundy’s Lane, 201;
battle of, 202-205

_Lundy’s Lane Hist. Society_, extracts from, 185, 195, 198, _notes_

Lunkia Naik, 101

Macartney, Lord, 32, _note_, 36;
Governor of Madras, 39;
character, 47;
his treatment of Sir J. Burgoyne, 48;
interview with him, 49;
resigns his post, 54;
sails for England, 54;
duels, 55

Macdonell, 187, 189

Mackenzie, Lieut. Col., 47, 158;
Cornet Roderick, 85, 90

Mackinaw, island of, 176, 178, 194

Macomb, Gen., 211

Macpherson, Major Gen. Sir H., 235

Madho Rao Scindia, 127

Madras, 30;
famine in, 31;
mismanagement of the administration, 33, 38;
council, 38;
treatment of Sir E. Coote, 41;
native cavalry, 65

Magre, 94

Mahé, 20

Mahomed Ahmed, 239

Mahommed Tewfik, 233

Mahrattas, 20, 80;
arrival of, 91;
supremacy, 125;
quarrels, 128

Mahsamah, 236, 237

Maidstone, 216

Majendie, Capt. Lieut. Lewis, 24

Malabar, 80

Mallavelly, 107;
battle of, 108

Malpurba, 119, 120

Malwa, 128

Manapur, 101

Mangalore, peace of, 66

Manikpatam, 135

Manners, Major Gen. R., Letter of service to, 11;
warrant to refund clothing money, 12

Manoli, 119

Mansfield, Major Gen. Sir W., 222

Marshall, Quartermaster Sergeant W., 243

Maryborough, 159

Matthews, Major Gen., 36

Mauritius, 103

Maxwell, Lieut. Col., 72, 78, 89, 141;
killed, 143;
pension to his widow, 147

McArthur, Gen., 209

McClure, Gen., 184, 185

M‘Culloch, John, 28

McDouall, Col., 194

Medows, Major Gen., 67, 89;
in command of the army, 68;
advance on Coimbatore, 69, 77

Meerut, 167, 227

Meigs, Fort, 180

Merawi, 259, 260;
evacuated, 263

Metemmeh, 248, 249, 254

Miami river, 180

Michigan, Lake, 176, 179

Midnapore, 133

Militia Bill, 3

Milne, S. M., _Standards and Colours of the Army_, 232

Minden, 4

Minorca, fall of, 2

M‘Intyre, 129

Mirzapore, 133

Mitcham, 15

M‘Kay, Col., 194

Mobile Point, 215

Mocher, Lieut. Gen., 18

Money, Cornet E. A., 226

Monghyr, 34

Montcalm, 3

Montreal, 175, 179, 217;
preparations for the attack on, 188

_Montreal_, 234, 236

Moodgul, 134

Moodianoor, 135

Mooglee Pass, 82

Morgan, Capt., 133, 135

Mornington, Lord, 103

Morris, Lieut. R., 226, 232

Morrison, Lieut. Col., 190, 191

Mudgheri, 121

Munro, Sir Hector, 20, 25 _note_;
resigns his command, 31

Murray, Col., 133, 185, 188;
Corporal, 85

Musgrave, Major Gen., 80, 93

Mysore, 68;
fall of, 112

Nagmunglum, 92

Nagpore, 126, 153;
Rajah, 131

Nana Farnawis, 126, 128

Nash, Capt. Thomas, 24, 28

Naulniah, 138, 144

Neemgaum, 154

_Neera_, wreck of the, 241

Nefisha, 235

Negapatam, 31

Nerbudda, 131, 133

Neville, Lieut., 66

New Orleans, 214;
expedition against, 215

Newark, 183;
burnt, 185

Newbridge, 218

Newcastle, Holles, 8

Niagara, Fort, 181;
success at, 186;
frontier, 175;
position of the British troops, 195

Nizam of Hyderabad, 20, 80, 106;
the horse, 89;
decrease of his power, 125

Noix, Isle aux, 188, 217

Northampton, 171

Norwich, 14, 265

Nundydroog, 93

Occarro, 70

Ogdensburg, 187, 189, 190

Ogle, Major Gen., 46, 50

Oldham, Col., 70

Oliphant, Lieut., 101

O’Neill, Lieut. Col. the Hon. J., 174, 183

Ontario, Lake, 175, 177, 181

Oojain, 126, 129

Ooscotta, 94, 112

Ootradroog, 94

_Orient_, 234

_Osiris_, 241

Osman Digna, 240

Oswald, James, 8

Oswego, 177, 196

Pachet, 133

Pakenham, Major Gen. Sir E., 215

Palghat, 71, 77

Paliar river, 60

Palicode Pass, 82

Pareshram Bhow, 81, 91, 94

Paris, Peace of, in 1763, 9

Parkes, Private, 78

Parterly, 149

Partoor, 137

Paterson, Major, 123

Patree, 149

Patterson, Cornet James, 90

Pattle, Gen. William, 226

Paugri, 138

Pawaghur, 135

Payne, Lieut. Gen. Sir W., 216

Pearl river, 215

Pearson, Lieut. Col., 199, 201

Pednaikdirgum Pass, 94

Peepulgaon, 139

Peishwa, 125;
under the protection of the British Government, 129

Pellew, Rear Adm. Sir E., 171

Pembroke, Lord, his book on military equitation, 60

Periapatam, 90, 94, 107, 109

Permacoil, 80

Perron, 115, 127, 128;
number of his troops, 132

Persia, Shah of, 229, 266

Petley, Capt. Lieut. John, 28

Pewsey, 229

Philipstown, 172

Pike, Gen., 181

Pitt, his management of affairs, 3

Plattsburgh, 178, 179, 188, 189, 195;
expedition against, 211-213

Plymouth, 11, 171

Pohlman, 142

Point aux Pins, 196

Pondicherry, 51, 80;
capitulates, 100

Ponies, Arab, 313-317;
casualties, 317, 318

Poodicherim Pass, 94

Poona, 125, 129, 131

Poonamallee, 51, 65

Poongar Ford, 73

Porter, Gen., 198

Porto Novo, 20, 72

Portsmouth, 11, 266

Potomac river, 213

Powell, Lieut. Col., 133, 134, 135, 136;
Sergeant, 207, 208

Prairie du Chien, 194

Prescott, 190

Prevost, Lieut. Gen. Sir George, 177, 183, 184, 197, 209;
fails to capture Sackett’s Harbour, 187;
failure of his expedition against Plattsburgh, 211-213

Prinsep, Lieut. C. J., 226

Proctor, Lieut. Col., 176, 179;
victory over Gen. Winchester, 180;
retreats to Ancaster, 180

Purdy, Col., 189

Pyche, Rajah, 123

Quebec, 174, 217;
taken, 4

Queenston, 185, 197, 199

Quiberon Bay, 4

Quintin, St, Cornet C. R., 226

Radipole, Barracks, 216

Rajoora, 149

Rajpoot, States, 126

Ranee Bednore, 117

Regis, St, 188

Rensselaar, Gen. Van., 177

Riall, Gen., 186, 197;
despatch after the battle of Chippewa, 199;
night march, 199;
wounded, 203

Richardson, Major R., 226

Ridley, Lieut., 232

Rigby, Richard, 6

Ripley, Gen., 206

River Column, 256

Rivett-Carnac, Lieut. E. S., 226

Roberts, Capt., 176

Rochefort, 3

Rodney, 4

Romford, 172, 218

Ross, Major Gen., 213;
killed, 214

Rottenburg, Major Gen. de, 183, 184

Rowley, Capt., 159

_Royal Henry_, 29

Rughonath Rao, 126

Runjeet Singh, 115

Russia, Emperor of, 230

Rycottah, 107

Sackett’s Harbour, 181, 184;
failure to capture, 187;
U.S. Squadron blockaded, 196, 199, 200

Sadasheo Bhow, 129

Sage, Lieut. William, 28

Said Sahib, 69

Salaberry, Lieut. Col. de, 188

Salbye, Treaty of, 32, 128

Sale, Capt., 144, 146

Salisbury, 12, 14

Salmon river, 191

Sandhurst, Lord, 222

Sandusky, 179, 180

Sandwich, 176, 180

Saone, 133

Sara, 92, 124

Saranac creek, 212

Sasseram, 133

Satara, Rajah of, 125

Satyamunglum, Fort of, 71

Savandroog, 93

Savanoor, 118, 121

Saxmundham, 15

Schlosser, Fort, 183, 201

Scindia, 126;
hostilities, 129;
retreats to Thalnair, 148;
armistice, 149;
peace signed, 153

Scott, Col., 201, 202, 203;
Lieut., 232;
Major, 97

Secunder Jah, 94

Secunderabad, 266

Sedaseer, 107

Sepoys, mutiny, 161-166

Seringapatam, 65, 72, 82, 95;
advance on, 88, 94;
siege, 109;
taken, 112

Seringham, 100

Serle, Cornet, 147

St Servan, 4

Seven Years’ War, 2, 9

Shah Alum, 125

Shapoor, 120

Shawoor, 70, 74

Sheaffe, Major Gen., 178, 181

Shevtamodoo, 59, 94

Shinoor, 121, 122

Shorncliffe, 228, 266

Shropshire, 14

Shukook Pass, 257

Shumshere Bahadoor, 132, 135

Shute, Major Gen., 229

Sinkat, 240

Sirdhana, 148

Sirhetty, 119

Sirsoni, 150

Sivaji, 126

Skelly, Major, 87

Skelton, Capt., 165

Sloper, Lieut. Gen. R., 18;
Commander-in-Chief in India, 54

Smelt, Lieut. Col., 210

Snake Hill, 207

Songhur, 133

Soondooti, 119, 120

Soorong, 135

Sosilay, 109

Soudan, 239

Stapleton, Capt. R. T. P., 226

Sterling, Lieut. Col., 50

Stevenson, Col., 120, 131, 133, 137;
occupies Burhanpore, 149

Stewart, Col. H., 241, 244, 248, 308;
wounded, 252;
death, 255

Stoney Creek, 182

Strange, Sergeant, 146

Straubenzee, Lieut. Col., 50

_Streatham_, 171

Stuart, Major Gen., 25 _note_, 36, 39;
his position, 40;
charges against, 42;
dismissal, 43;
arrest, 44;
shipped off to England, 49;
colonelcy of H.M.’s 31st, 57

Stuart, Lieut. Gen., 107, 109;
Col., 71, 77, 97

Suakin, 240, 244, 260

Sudbury, 15

Suez Canal, 235

Suffren, 20, 31

Surat, 133

Surjee Anjengaum, 153

Sutherland, 75

Sutlej, 127

Sutton Park, 24

Swift, Gen., 200

_Sybelle_, 174

Syringhi, 121

Table Bay, 171

Tamai, 263;
battle of, 244

Tani, 260

Tapoor Pass, 79

Tapti, 133

Taylor, Lieut. Col., G.C.B., 226, 236

Tecumseh, slain, 180

Tel-el-Kebir, 237

Tel-el-Mahuta, 235, 236

Thalnair, 148

Thames, Battle of the, 180

Thomas, Capt. J., 24, 28

Thomas, 115

Thomé, San, 33, 37

_Thorn’s Memoir of the War in India_, extracts from, 105, 153

Tiaghur, 79

Ticonderago, 4, 64, _note_

Tilbury, 171, 218

Tippoo, Sahib of Mysore, 35;
treaty of peace, 36;
war with, 66;
advance, 72;
march on Trichinopoly, 78;
loss at Seringapatam, 96;
surrenders, 98;
animosity against the English, 102;
various embassies, 102;
killed, 112

Tofrik, 262

Toka, 137

Tokar, 240, 244

Tonk, State of, 115

Toombadra river, 117, 121

Toronto, 179, 183

Tour, M. le Maitre de la, on the English troops in India, 21

Travancore, Rajah of, 67

Trichinopoly, 67, 69, 79, 100

Trincomalee captured, 31

Trinkitat, 241, 244

Trinomalli, 80

Tryon, Major Gen., 15

Tucker, Lieut. Col., 200

Tullamore, 172

Twelve Mile Creek, 200

United States declare war against England, 173;
plan of invading Canada, 175, 179, 193

Uxbridge, Lord, 216

Vandeleur, Major Gen. Sir J. O., 113, 167, 216, 231

Vaniembadi, 78

Velladi, 70, 74

Vellore, 36, 65, 104, 106;
mutiny at, 160-166

Vellout, 80, 81

Venkitagheri, 87

Vincent, St, Capt. Lord., 232;
Major Gen., 181, 184

Wadsworth, Gen., 178

Wady Haifa, 247, 263

Walkee, 131, 133

Wallace, Lieut. Col. W., 157

Wallajabad, 59, 67, 100, 104

Walton, Lieut. William, 24, 28

Warley, 11

Waroor, 139

Warrants, Royal, 6-8, 11, 13, 15-17, 23, 25-27

Washington, 213

Watteville, de, 184

Webster, Lieut. Col. A. G., 226, 236, 240, 241, 243, 308

Wellesley, Col. the Hon. A., 103, 106;
expedition against Dhoondia Wao, 117;
Scindia, 131;
distribution of troops, 132;
captures Ahmednugger, 136;
battle of Assaye, 138-144;
of Argaum, 150-152;
march against banditti, 154

Wellington, Field Marshal the Duke of, 106, _note_

Wellington, Fort, 190

Werdah river, 118

Whitehill, Mr, 39

Wilkinson, Gen., 188, 190, 195

William Henry, Fort, taken, 3

_William Pitt_, 171

Williams, Cornet George, 28

Willis, Lieut. Gen., 236

Wilson, Nathan, Capt., 144, 146, 163, 164;
Lieut. Col. Sir R., 157;
Col. Sir C., 252, 254;
_From Korti to Khartoum_, 253

Winchester, Gen., 179;
taken prisoner, 180

Winder, Gen., 182, 213

Windsor, 229

Wolfe, 4

Wolseley, Lieut. Gen. Sir G., 234, 248, 312

Wood, Lieut. Col., 241

Woodbridge, 15

Woodhouse, Lieut., 165

Woodington, Lieut. Col., 134

Worseley, Lieut., 195

Yarmouth, 15

Yeo, Sir James, 182

Yepalpurri, 121, 122

Yorke, Major Gen. John, 229, 266

Yorktown, 20

Young, Lieut., 144, 165

Zeman Shah, 102, 104

Zobehr Pasha, 246

Printed at

The Edinburgh Press

9 & 11 Young Street

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Charles, 6th Earl of Drogheda, Governor of Meath, and Lieutenant
Colonel of the 1st Irish Horse.

[2] Annual Register, 1779.

[3] The 23rd Light Dragoons.

[4] The commissions of Sir Hector Munro, General Stuart, and Sir John
Burgoyne were afterwards antedated to 9th May 1777, to ensure the
succession of one of them to the command of the troops in India next
to Sir Eyre Coote.

[5] 101st and 102nd.

[6] Madras Govt. Dispatch to Court of Directors 31st Oct. 1782.

[7] This was the reason given by the Madras Council. According to
another account, the rice was not landed, because the Governor, Lord
Macartney, had laid an embargo on it, and would neither give an
adequate price for it, nor suffer it to be landed for sale to the
people.

[8] _Annual Register._

[9] Portuguese half castes and native Christians.

[10] “We conceive that there is a slight transition from refusal to
employ the King’s troops upon a requisition by the Civil Government,
to the employing them without a requisition, and we submit to you
to what uses such an authority might be applied, and where the
consequences might end.”--_Letter to Court of Directors, December
1782._

[11] _13th August 1783._

[12] The power of ordering Courts Martial for the trial of officers
and soldiers, both in the service of the King and those acting under
the Company, was vested in the Commander in Chief of His Majesty’s
forces for the time being.

[13] Twelve of the ringleaders were selected for execution. Eleven
of them were blown away from guns: the twelfth was pardoned after
the gun had missed fire three times. This was the recognised mode of
execution in India for military mutiny, and the Company’s European
troops were equally liable to this punishment.

[14] 135 horses died or were cast between 1st June 1783 and 10th May
1785.

[15] Soon after his arrival in England he received a challenge
from General Stuart, by whom he was wounded in a duel, fought near
Kensington, 8th June 1786. A letter from Sir John Burgoyne, written
whilst under arrest, shows his intention of calling Lord Macartney to
account in a similar way.

[16] This would seem to show that Lang, like Stuart, also held a
half-pay commission from the King.

[17] _Calcutta Gazette. 18th August 1785._

[18] Narrative of the Military operations on the Coromandel Coast.
_Innes Munro._ 1789.

[19] _Lieut. Colonel Floyd, private letter, 18th April 1786._

[20] _Military equitation, or a Method of Breaking Horses, and
Teaching Soldiers to ride, by Henry, Earl of Pembroke._

[21] _See_ page 15.

[22] In the same order the 73rd Highland Regiment was re-numbered the
71st, and the 78th was re-numbered the 72nd.

[23] Brother of Lord Howe, who was killed at Ticonderago, and of the
famous Admiral. He succeeded as 5th Viscount Howe in 1799, and died
in July 1814.

[24] _Lieut. Colonel Floyd, private letter, 14th January 1790._

[25] Younger brother of the famous Sir Ralph Abercromby.

[26] Afterwards Lieut. General Sir James Affleck, Colonel of the 16th
Light Dragoons: died 1833.

[27] The fortified town as distinguished from the fort.

[28] _Dirom._

[29] _Wilks._

[30] _Dirom._

[31] _Dirom._

[32] _Dirom._

[33] One of these is now the property of the Junior United Service
Club.

[34] Among the Europeans in the Nizam’s service was one Captain
Finglass, who had formerly been a Quarter Master in the 19th Light
Dragoons. He commanded a corps, and, in company with another corps
commander, an American named Boyd, made known his determination to
uphold the Company’s authority against French intrigues. Some time
after the disarmament of the Nizam’s troops he was reinstated in his
position in the Nizam’s service.

[35] In November 1802 the number of gun lascars was reduced to 1
First Tindal and 10 men for each European Regiment.

[36] _Thorn._

[37] Afterwards Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

[38] Not the officer of the same name who was formerly
Commander-in-Chief in Madras.

[39] _Lord Combermere’s correspondence._

[40] _Wilks’s Mysore._

[41] “Time and the number of guns formed the principle of our
signals; for example, three guns at half-past seven denoted a
position two marches from Seringapatam: two guns at eight might have
denoted any other communication. And in this manner may detachments
or armies on some occasions communicate intelligence, which, by
messenger, might be impracticable. To ascertain that the signal of
the Bombay army was understood, it was agreed to fire the same number
of guns, in our camp ten minutes afterwards.”--_Beatson’s Mysore
War._ General Floyd’s signal to establish communication with General
Stuart on the 8th was two guns fired precisely at four o’clock; and,
a little afterwards, four guns at intervals of a minute each. In
about half an hour afterwards the same signal was repeated.--_Memoirs
of a Field Officer._

[42] _Wellesley correspondence._

[43] The rest of the army did not reach Poona till the 23rd.

[44] According to the order of march observed, the advanced guard was
composed of one half company from each Infantry Regiment, forming the
picquets coming on duty, under the Field Officer of the day. In the
same way, the rearguard was formed of the picquets coming off duty.

[45] _Grant Duff’s History of the Mahrattas._

[46] _Life of Mountstuart Elphinstone._

[47] _History of the Madras Army._ The number of guns captured at
Assaye is generally stated as 98. This apparently does not include
some guns abandoned by the enemy between the field of battle and the
Ajunta Pass, which fell into the hands of Stevenson’s corps.

[48] _M.S. note in India Office Library._

[49] _M.S. note in India Office Library._

[50] _Grant Duff’s Mahrattas._

[51] _Court of Directors’ Letter, 3rd July 1805._

[52] _Milne’s Standards and Colours of the British Army._

[53] _Twelve years of military adventure._

[54] _Thorn’s Memoir of the War in India._

[55] The force would appear a very large one to deal with a band
of freebooters, but according to one who was present they numbered
upwards of 50,000 men. Though this was probably an exaggeration, it
suffices to show that they were very numerous.

[56] “Nothing would appear to be more trivial to the public interests
than the length of the hair on the upper lip of a sepoy, yet to the
individual himself, the shape and fashion of the whisker is a badge
of his caste, and an article of his religion.”--_Report of Special
Commission on mutiny at Vellore._

[57] _Quebec Mercury_, 18th May 1813.

[58] He had been created a Knight of the Bath for his victory at
Detroit.

[59] The present town of Toronto was known as York in 1813.

[60] _Lundy’s Lane Hist. Society._

[61] Afterwards Sir Gordon Drummond, K.C.B.

[62] _Lundy’s Lane Historical Society._

[63] _Lundy’s Lane Historical Society._

[64] L.L.H.S.

[65] The force actually engaged on the British side consisted only
of a single Division of 1500 men and a Naval rocket battery. Ross
attacked without waiting for his Rear Division and the rest of the
Naval Brigade.

[66] _See_ page 167.

[67] Horse Guards order, dated 28th October 1817.

[68] It is not quite certain whether the guidons were new ones given
to the Regiment in 1808, or the old ones with the badges embroidered
on them in that year.

[69] _Standards and Colours of the Army_, by S. M. Milne. I am mainly
indebted to Mr Milne for the drawings from which the accompanying
Plate was prepared.

[70] The force was mainly composed of the men who had fought against
us under Arabi. They could hardly have been expected to fight well.

[71] G.O. by Sir G. Graham.

[72] Sir Charles Wilson, in _From Korti to Khartoum_.

[73] Number of regiment changed to the Eighteenth in this year.

[74] Number of the regiment changed in this year to the Nineteenth.

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

Some placenames have been adjusted to be consistent within the
book. Some have been left unchanged even when they are probably
incorrect, for example ‘Ticonderago’ and ‘Chumbul’.

Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
the text and consultation of external sources.

In Appendix A which has tables of the officer lists for most
years from 1760 to 1899, lists for the years 1764 to 1778,
1822 to 1858 and 1862 were absent from the original book.

The { and } bracketing has been removed from the tables in the
Appendices, and from the tables on pages 14, 28 and 226, in order
to save table space and make the etext more readable. In the
tables of Appendix A, sometimes a space has been removed to fit a
name or title in a cell; for example, ‘_Asst. Surgeon_’ has been
changed to ‘_Asst.Surgeon_’.

Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,
and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained: for example,
overtaxed, over-taxed; reinforcements, re-inforcements; aweful;
feudatory; necessaries; signalised; chesnut.

Pg 66: ‘up acccording to’ replaced by ‘up according to’.
Pg 97: ‘Abercomby joined’ replaced by ‘Abercromby joined’.
Pg 144 Footnote 46: ‘Life of Mounstuart’ replaced by
‘Life of Mountstuart’.
Pg 163: ‘hastily gallopping’ replaced by ‘hastily galloping’.
Pg 177: ‘Sir George Prevot,’ replaced by ‘Sir George Prevost,’.
Pg 194: ‘on the Mississipi,’ replaced by ‘on the Mississippi,’.
Pg 215: ‘Mississipi which’ replaced by ‘Mississippi which’.
Pg 227: ‘battles of Meanee’ replaced by ‘battles of Meeanee’.
Pg 230: ‘Abor Hill’ replaced by ‘Arbour Hill’.
Pg 236: ‘at Mahsama without’ replaced by ‘at Mahsamah without’.

Index: ‘Jaffrabad,’ replaced by ‘Jaffirabad,’.
Index: ‘Mahsama,’ replaced by ‘Mahsamah,’.
Index: ‘M‘Arthur,’ replaced by ‘McArthur,’.
Index: ‘M‘Clure,’ replaced by ‘McClure,’.
Index: ‘M‘Douall,’ replaced by ‘McDouall,’.

*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The Nineteenth and Their Times - Being an Account of the Four Cavalry Regiments in the British Army That Have Borne the Number Nineteen and of the Campaigns in Which They Served" ***

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