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Title: History of the Peninsular War Volume IV (of 6)
Author: Southey, Robert
Language: English
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HISTORY
OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR.
G. WOODFALL, ANGEL COURT, SKINNER STREET, LONDON.
HISTORY
OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR.
“Unto thee
“Let thine own times as an old story be.”
DONNE.
BY ROBERT SOUTHEY, ESQ. LL.D.
POET LAUREATE,
HONORARY MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SPANISH ACADEMY, OF THE
ROYAL SPANISH ACADEMY OF HISTORY, OF THE ROYAL
INSTITUTE OF THE NETHERLANDS, OF THE
CYMMRODORION, OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, ETC.
A NEW EDITION.
_IN SIX VOLUMES._
VOL. IV.
LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET.
MDCCCXXVIII.
Ἱστορίας γὰρ ἐὰν ἀφέλῃ τις τὸ διὰ τί, καὶ πῶς, καὶ τίνος χάριν ἐπράχθη,
καὶ τὸ πραχθὲν πότερα εὔλογον ἔσχε τὸ τέλος, τὸ καταλειπόμενον αὐτῆς
ἀγώνισμα μὲν, μάθημα δὲ οὐ γίγνεται· καὶ παραυτίκα μὲν τέρπει, πρὸς δὲ
τὸ μέλλον οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ τὸ παράπαν.
POLYBIUS, lib. iii. sect. 31.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XXIV.
PAGE
Victor retreats across the Tagus 1
Alburquerque proposed for the command in La Mancha 2
Plan of detaching a Spanish force toward Segovia 4
Jealousy entertained of Cuesta 5
Sir Arthur confers with Cuesta 6
He requires that the passages toward the north be occupied 7
Junction of the British and Spanish armies 8
Opportunity of attacking the French lost by Cuesta’s indecision 9
Distress of the British army for means of transport 10
Sir Arthur halts 12
Cuesta advances in pursuit of the French 12
Junction of Joseph and Sebastiani with Victor 13
Cuesta’s vanguard attacked by the French 14
Alburquerque saves Cuesta from defeat 15
Cuesta retreats to the Alberche 16
Sir Arthur prevails on him to cross that river 16
Position of the allies in front of Talavera 17
Sir Arthur nearly made prisoner 18
Battle of Talavera 19
Cuesta decimates some of his troops 29
State of Talavera 31
Movements of Sir Robert Wilson 32
Movements of Soult, Ney, and Mortier 33
Cuesta neglects to secure the passes 33
Intelligence of Soult’s advance 34
Soult occupies Plasencia 35
Sir Arthur marches against him 36
Cuesta determines to follow Sir Arthur 38
Cuesta joins the British 39
They retreat across the Tagus 40
Colonel Mackinnon removes part of the wounded 41
Defeat of the Spaniards at Arzobispo 43
Movements of Marshal Ney 45
Action with Sir Robert Wilson at the Puerto de Baños 46
The French enter Talavera 48
Victor behaves well to the English wounded 49
Murder of the Bishop of Coria 50
Venegas’s army kept inactive before and after the battle of
Talavera 51
His useless attempt upon Toledo 53
He complains of Cuesta 55
The Intruder’s movements after the battle 56
Venegas prepares to fight at Aranjuez 57
Aranjuez and its gardens 59
The French repulsed there 63
Deliberations concerning the army of La Mancha 63
Venegas resolves to attack the enemy 65
The French attack him 66
Battle of Almonacid 67
CHAPTER XXV.
Soult proposes to invade Portugal 71
Sir Arthur Wellesley raised to the Peerage 74
Marquis Wellesley arrives in Spain 75
Distress of the army for provisions 75
Disputes with Cuesta concerning supplies 77
Mr. Frere requires the removal of Cuesta 80
Cuesta resigns the command 82
Eguia succeeds _ad interim_ 84
Calvo sent to see to the supplies 85
Lord Wellington declares his intention of falling back 86
Correspondence with Eguia and Calvo 88
Marquis Wellesley proposes a plan for supplying the armies 91
His ill opinion of the Spanish government 93
Lord Wellington objects to taking a position on the Guadiana 95
Alburquerque appointed to the command in Extremadura 96
Lord Wellington withdraws to Badajoz 98
Expedition to Walcheren 100
Inquiry into the conduct of the Duke of York 101
Changes in the British ministry 102
Lords Grey and Grenville refuse to join it 103
Disposition of the French and Spanish armies 105
Neediness of the intrusive government 106
Measures of severity 108
Kellermann’s edict 108
Measures of Joseph’s ministers 109
The Central Junta announces that the Cortes will be assembled 112
Declaration which was first proposed 114
Objections to it by Mr. Frere 117
Unpopularity of the Central Junta 119
Their difficulties and errors 120
Scheme for overthrowing them 127
Commission appointed by the Junta 128
Romana’s address 129
Reply of the Junta 136
Guerillas 144
D. Julian Sanchez 145
The French repulsed from Astorga 147
Battle of Tamames 148
The French retire from Salamanca 149
Marshal Soult appointed Major-General 150
The Junta resolve on risking a general action 150
Areizaga appointed to the command 151
State of Madrid 152
Condition of the British army 154
Disposition of the French troops 155
Areizaga advances from the Sierra Morena 157
The Austrian commissioner remonstrates against his purpose 158
Battle of Ocaña 159
Treatment of the prisoners 162
Battle of Alba de Tormes 164
CHAPTER XXVI.
Gerona 167
Strength of the garrison 170
Crusaders enrolled 170
Company of S. Barbara 170
St. Narcis appointed Generalissimo 171
All mention of a capitulation forbidden 172
St. Cyr would have reduced the city by blockade 173
The bombardment begins 174
St. Cyr draws nearer Gerona 176
S. Feliu de Guixols and Palamos taken by the French 177
Assault of Monjuic 178
Succours intercepted 182
The ravelin taken 184
Monjuic abandoned 185
Verdier expects the town to fall 186
Battery planted on the cathedral 187
Distress of the city 189
Attempt to introduce succours 189
Garcia Conde enters with reinforcements 191
Inadequacy of this relief 192
Los Angeles taken and the garrison put to the sword 194
Unsuccessful sally 195
The French repulsed in a general assault 196
St. Cyr resolves to reduce the city by famine 201
O’Donnell enters the city 202
Failure of the attempt to relieve it 203
St. Cyr gives up the command to Augereau 204
O’Donnell effects his retreat 205
Magazines at Hostalrich taken by the French 207
Augereau offers favourable terms 208
Destruction of a French convoy by the British ships 209
Increased distress in the city 211
Report concerning the state of health 212
Some of the outworks taken by the French 214
Last sally 215
Alvarez becomes delirious 216
Capitulation 217
Death of Alvarez 220
Eroles escapes 221
CHAPTER XXVII.
Buonaparte divorces the Empress Josephine 222
Farther requisition for the armies in Spain 224
Display of Spanish flags at Paris 225
Address of the Central Junta to the nation 227
State of public opinion in England 233
Lord Wellington’s views with regard to Portugal 235
The King’s speech 236
Earl St. Vincent 237
Lord Grenville 238
Honourable Mr. Ward 239
Mr. Ponsonby 240
Mr. Whitbread 240
Mr. Perceval 242
Vote of thanks to Lord Wellington opposed by the Earl of Suffolk 244
Earl Grosvenor 244
Earl Grey 244
Marquis Wellesley 244
Lord Grenville 247
General Tarleton 247
Mr. Whitbread 248
Pension voted for Lord Wellington 248
Opposed by Sir Francis Burdett 249
Mr. Whitbread 250
Mr. Wilberforce 251
Mr. Canning 251
The Common Council petition against the pension 252
Marquis of Lansdowne 254
Lord Holland 255
Marquis Wellesley 257
CHAPTER XXVIII.
Supineness of the Central Junta 264
Romana refuses the command 266
Montijo and D. Francisco Palafox imprisoned 266
Attempts to produce a false confidence 267
Scheme of Count Tilly 268
The Junta announce their intention to remove 270
Murmurs at Seville 272
Invasion of Andalusia 273
The French pass the Sierra Morena 274
False hopes held out to the people by the Central Junta 274
Instructions to Alburquerque 275
Insurrection at Seville against the Central Junta 277
Saavedra takes upon himself the temporary authority 279
The French enter Seville 279
They overrun Andalusia 280
They push for Cadiz 281
Alburquerque’s movements 282
Cadiz saved by Alburquerque 284
He is appointed governor of Cadiz by the people 284
A Junta elected at Cadiz 285
Resignation of the Central Junta 286
A Regency appointed 288
Last address of the Central Junta 289
The Regents 295
Their injustice toward the members of the Central Junta 296
Proclamation of the Intruder 299
Language of the despondents in England 301
The Isle of Leon 303
Victor summons the Junta of Cadiz 306
Ill will of the Junta towards Alburquerque 307
The troops neglected 308
Alburquerque applies to the Regency in their behalf 310
The Junta publish an attack against Alburquerque 311
He resigns the command, and is sent ambassador to England 312
CHAPTER XXIX.
The Regency 314
Schemes for delivering Ferdinand 316
Baron de Kolli’s attempt 316
Overtures for peace 321
Buonaparte’s intention of establishing a Western Empire 323
Money voted for the Portugueze army 326
Debates upon this subject 326
Marquis Wellesley 326
Lord Grenville 328
Lord Liverpool 332
Earl Moira 333
Lord Sidmouth 334
Marquis of Lansdowne 334
Lord Erskine 335
Lord Holland 335
Mr. Perceval 338
Sir John Newport 339
Mr. Villiers 339
Mr. Curwen 340
Mr. Leslie Foster 340
General Ferguson 349
Mr. Fitzgerald 350
Lord Milton 350
Mr. Bankes 350
Mr. Jacob 351
Mr. Whitbread 352
Mr. Huskisson 354
Mr. Bathurst 354
Reform in the Portugueze army 356
CHAPTER XXX.
O’Donnell appointed to the command in Catalonia 367
Garcia Conde made governor of Lerida 367
Rapid promotion in the Spanish armies 368
Conduct of the people of Villadrau 369
Hostalrich 371
Commencement of the siege 372
First success of O’Donnell 373
Desertion from the French army 373
Want of concert between the provinces 374
Negligence of the Valencian government 376
The force on the Valencian frontier dispersed 377
Suchet advances against Valencia 378
He retreats 380
Conspiracy discovered in that city 381
The French boast of success 382
O’Donnell’s successful operations 383
Siege of Hostalrich 387
Retreat of the garrison 390
Las Medas and Lerida surrendered 394
Augereau superseded by Marshal Macdonald 395
Fort Matagorda taken by the French 396
Storm at Cadiz 398
Cruel usage of the French prisoners in the bay 399
Escape of the prison ships 400
Insurrection and massacre of the prisoners at Majorca 402
Prisoners sent to Cabrera 402
Their inhuman treatment there 403
Marshal Soult’s edict 404
Counter edict of the Regency 405
CHAPTER XXXI.
Inactivity before Cadiz 407
The Regents send for Cuesta 407
Badajoz secured by Romana 408
The British take a position on the frontiers of Beira 408
Astorga summoned by the French 410
Siege of Astorga 411
Its surrender 412
Affair at Barba del Puerco 414
Massena appointed to the army of Portugal 415
Ciudad Rodrigo 416
The French besiege it 417
D. Julian Sanchez 418
Marshal Ney summons the place 418
Situation of Lord Wellington 420
Spirit of the inhabitants 420
Nunnery of S. Cruz attacked 421
Convent of S. Domingo recovered 422
Julian Sanchez effects his escape from the city 423
State of the British army 425
A practicable breach made 426
The place capitulates 428
Conduct of the French 429
Speculations upon the campaign 431
La Puebla de Sanabria occupied by the French 434
The Portugueze retake it 436
CHAPTER XXXII.
Massena’s proclamation to the Portugueze 440
The French invest Almeida 441
Almeida 442
Fort Conception abandoned 444
Affair on the Coa 445
Desponding letters from the army 448
Apprehensions expressed in England 450
Ney summons the governor of Almeida 451
Portugueze officers in Massena’s army 452
The Portugueze ordered to retire before the enemy 454
Siege of Almeida 455
Surrender of the place 456
The Portugueze prisoners enlist and desert 457
Condemnation of their conduct 458
Militia forced into the French service 459
They escape and rejoin the allies 460
Changes in the Portugueze Regency 461
Conduct of the Portugueze government 463
Arbitrary arrests at Lisbon 465
Apprehensions of the British government 467
Movements of Regnier’s corps, and of General Hill 470
Massena advances into Portugal 471
Ney and Regnier join him at Celorico 472
The French army collected at Viseu 474
Lord Wellington crosses to the Serra de Busaco 474
Busaco 476
Battle of Busaco 478
Behaviour of the Portugueze troops 482
Massena marches into the Porto road 484
Colonel Trant’s movements 485
The allies withdraw from Busaco 487
Trant retreats to the Vouga 487
The allies cross the Mondego 489
Flight of the inhabitants from Coimbra 490
The French enter Coimbra 490
The Portugueze people fly before the enemy 491
Hopes and expectations of the French 493
Confusion at Condeixa 494
Leiria forsaken 495
Alcobaça forsaken by the monks 496
Surprise at Alcoentre 497
The French discover the lines 498
Feelings of the British army 499
Lines of Torres Vedras 500
Romana joins the allies 504
Trant surprises the French in Coimbra 504
He escorts his prisoners to Porto 507
Difficulties of Massena’s situation 509
His demonstrations in front of the lines 511
Montbrun sent against Abrantes 512
The French army subsists by plunder 513
Deserters form themselves into a corps of plunderers 515
State of Lisbon 516
Opinions of the opposition in England 517
General La Croix killed 518
Massena retreats from the lines 520
Lord Wellington advances to Santarem 521
Both armies go into cantonments 522
The King’s illness 523
Proceedings concerning a Regency 525
Mr. Perceval 527
Troops sent to Portugal 530
Issues of money required 531
Conduct of Lord Grenville as Auditor of the Exchequer 532
State of the opposition 536
Their expectations 538
Language of the anarchists 538
Mr. Perceval popular at this time 542
Schemes for a new ministry 544
The King’s opinion during an interval of amendment 545
The Prince Regent announces his intention of making no change 546
Mr. Perceval’s reply 547
HISTORY
OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR.
CHAPTER XXIV.
SIR A. WELLESLEY ENTERS SPAIN. BATTLE OF TALAVERA. RETREAT OF THE
BRITISH ARMY. DEFEAT OF THE SPANIARDS AT PUENTE DEL ARZOBISPO
AND ALMONACID.
♦1809.♦
♦VICTOR RETREATS BEYOND THE TAGUS.♦
The head-quarters of Marshal Victor, after he returned from his
movement in favour of Soult to his former position, were at Truxillo:
Cuesta was on his left flank, having his head-quarters at Fuente del
Maestro, and his advance at Calemonte on the Guadiana, a league from
Merida. The British General had formed a plan for cutting off the
enemy’s retreat by a movement through Castello Branco and Plasencia
to the bridge of Almaraz; this he relinquished, because it did not
coincide with Cuesta’s opinion, and because he found it impossible
to prevail upon that general to choose a secure position, or to
concentrate his army, which was distributed with so little judgement
in an open country, that if Victor had attacked it, an easier victory
might have been obtained than that of Medellin. The French have
seldom suffered such opportunities to pass, and Sir Arthur was very
apprehensive that the army, which had been raised with such exertions,
would be dispersed before he could effect a junction with it. But
Victor was content to forego this advantage rather than risk the
danger of being cut off from Madrid by such an operation as Sir Arthur
had meditated; he broke up, therefore, at the beginning of June,
and retreated across the Tagus at Almaraz; Cuesta followed, without
obtaining any advantage over him in his retreat, and sufficiently
fortunate that the French Marshal was in too much fear of a better
army, to profit by the want of discipline in the Spaniards and the want
of skill in their commander.
♦ALBURQUERQUE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMAND IN LA MANCHA.♦
When Sir Arthur had given up his original plan, it was concerted that
he should join Cuesta at Badajoz. Victor’s retreat rendered this
unnecessary; it was then agreed that he should advance, as he had at
first proposed, by way of Plasencia. The army of La Mancha at this
time, consisting of 16,000 foot and 1300 horse, was under Venegas,
subject to Cuesta’s orders. This was the side on which the French
were most exposed; Alburquerque, by one operation, though it had only
partially succeeded, had retarded the plans of the enemy for more than
a month, and, had he not been withheld by the positive orders of men
who were unworthy to control him, there is reason for believing that he
would have prevented many of the disasters which afterwards occurred.
His patriotism was undoubted; no man, indeed, ever more passionately
loved his country: his military talents were of the highest promise;
and when these moral advantages concurred, his rank and illustrious
family ought to have been considered as circumstances to recommend him,
giving him, as they would have done, additional claims to the respect
of the army and of the nation. With both he was exceedingly popular,
especially among the La Manchans; and having been a successful general,
almost the only one who had obtained any success, the soldiers had
an opinion of his good fortune as well as of his talents. Mr. Frere,
who estimated the Duke as he deserved, was exceedingly desirous that
he should have the command in La Mancha, and suggested it to Cuesta.
“An army,” he said, “which had been torn by factions, thrown into
confusion by the successive removal of its officers, and discouraged
by ill fortune, could have no hope of being speedily re-established
and conducted to victory, except by a general who was known to them
for his successes, and who was personally popular among them, and in
the province wherein he was to act. The Duque de Alburquerque was the
only one who united in himself these advantages; and for the situation
which he at present held, Venegas would not be less useful, having
always served under General Cuesta, and not only near his person,
but immediately under his eyes.” Unhappily Cuesta was jealous of the
Duke’s popularity; and the Supreme Junta were jealous of his rank and
influence. Mr. Frere’s advice was rejected, and this may be considered
as one cause of the failure of the campaign.
♦PLAN OF DETACHING A SPANISH FORCE TOWARD SEGOVIA.♦
It had at first been doubted whether the French would make any thing
more than a show of resistance on this side of Madrid; and a plan was
proposed for menacing their retreat and the rear of the metropolis, by
detaching a considerable Spanish corps through the Puerto de Arenas
to Avila, Arevalo, and Segovia. Such a movement, it was thought,
would compel the enemy either to retreat, or to detach a force of
correspondent magnitude; and thus a material advantage would be
afforded to the British army, which, when concentrated, amounted only
to 20,000 men. Cuesta had about 38,000, well armed but ill disciplined,
and ill clothed also, which, in their state of discipline, was an evil
of more consequence than may immediately be obvious. The Intruder, with
9000 of his guards, and the greater part of the garrison of Madrid,
had joined Sebastiani in La Mancha, and attempted to bring Venegas to
action; finding this in vain, they left 2000 men to defend Toledo, and
prepared to bring their whole disposable force, consisting of about
50,000, against the united Spanish and British armies. But the Spanish
army was in such a state, that little could be expected from its
co-operation: a smaller force would, under such circumstances, be of
greater assistance, as being more manageable and more likely to follow
the example and catch the spirit of their better disciplined allies.
If, therefore, a large detachment of these troops, by moving toward
Segovia, could draw off a body of the French to watch them, they would
render more service by such a diversion than could be expected from
them in the field. For this reason such a movement was advised both by
Sir Arthur and Mr. Frere; that minister not being deterred from the
performance of his duty by the clamour raised against him in England,
but delivering his opinion to the British general upon the same
footing, he said, as he should have done had he been holding a private
conversation with Sir Arthur, and as he should equally have ventured
to do had he been residing ♦JEALOUSY ENTERTAINED OF CUESTA.♦ casually
in Spain in a private character. There was another reason which made
the Junta wish to see Cuesta’s army diminished. A suspicion had for
some time prevailed that Cuesta had not forgiven his arrest, and that
the same temper which led him to those violent measures whereby he
had provoked that act of vigour, would tempt him to take some serious
vengeance whenever it was in his power. This, it was thought, was more
to be apprehended now than at any former time, because the army which
his rival, Blake, commanded, had just at this time been shamefully
dispersed, and thus the great obstacle to such a project was removed.
The Junta were afraid to supersede Cuesta, even if they knew whom to
appoint in his place; and they were afraid even to propose this measure
of detaching a part of his army, under a commander of sufficient
popularity to oppose his designs: but it was not doubted that if such a
measure were proposed by the British General as a military plan, they
would joyfully accede to it.
Cuesta was wronged by these suspicions; ... he was obstinate,
intractable, and unfit for command; but a right honest man, and one
who, from a sense of duty as well as from natural courage, would at any
time have laid down his ♦JULY 10. SIR ARTHUR CONFERS WITH CUESTA.♦
life for the service of Spain. Sir Arthur, whose head-quarters were now
at Plasencia, went to confer with him at Almaraz. Fourteen thousand of
the Spaniards were at this time stationed at the Puente del Arzobispo;
the remainder were about two miles from the bridge of Almaraz, encamped
under the Pass of Miravete. Victor had taken up a position upon the
Alberche, near Talavera. There, Sir Arthur stated his opinion, the
enemy ought to be attacked by the united force of the allies; but it
would be desirable to detach a corps of 10,000 towards Avila to turn
their right: Cuesta approved the proposal, but desired they might be
British troops. Sir Arthur replied, that the British ♦1809. JULY.♦
army, to act with advantage, must act in a body; and the Spaniards
could better spare such a detachment, being indeed more numerous than
was either necessary for the operations on the Alberche, or convenient,
considering their state of discipline. These representations were lost
upon Cuesta, who estimated his own importance by the numbers under
his command; he refused to make any large detachment, but offered
to send two battalions of infantry and a few cavalry to join Sir R.
Wilson’s Portugueze brigade, and march upon Arenas, and thence to
Escalona, in communication with the left of the British army. Had Sir
Arthur’s advice been followed, it was his intention to have recommended
Alburquerque to the command; but it was the fate of Spain to be almost
always deprived of the services of this brave and able general by the
jealousy of meaner minds.
♦HE REQUIRES THAT THE PASSES BE OCCUPIED.♦
Sir Arthur proposed also that the Spaniards should occupy the passes at
Perales and Baños, and thus cut off the communication between Victor
and the French forces in the north of Spain. It was neither known what
the amount of that force might be, nor where it was distributed, nor
in what condition it was: but the march of Mortier with some 15,000
men from Aragon to their assistance had been ascertained, and it was
certain therefore that a movement might be apprehended from that
quarter. The proposal was received with some ill humour on Cuesta’s
part, for he was surrounded by intriguers, some of whom perhaps sought
to serve the enemy by embroiling the allies, and others who, having as
much national pride as professional ignorance, had as much selfishness
as either; these persons had persuaded the hasty old man that Sir
Arthur sought to weaken the Spanish army by dividing it, in order to
obtain for himself the glory of expelling the French from Madrid, which
was now, they represented, within Cuesta’s reach. He was prevailed
upon however, by his Adjutant-General, O’Donoju, to promise that this
should be done; and if the performance fell far short, the detachment
being incompetent in force, and almost wholly unprovided, the failure
must be imputed to his erring judgement and the disorderly state of the
commissariat department, not to any want of faith or perverse purpose
on his part.
♦JUNCTION OF THE BRITISH AND SPANISH ARMIES.♦
In pursuance of the arrangements at this interview, the British army
broke up from Plasencia on the 17th and 18th of July, and formed a
junction with Cuesta on the 20th at Oropesa. Sir R. Wilson marched from
his position on the Tietar on the 15th, and reached Escalona on the
23d, threatening Madrid on that side, from which he was about eight
leagues distant. Venegas had been directed to break up from Madrilejos
at the same time as the British army, march by Tembleque and Ocaña,
cross the Tagus by the ford at Fuente Duenas, and advance to Arganda,
so to threaten Madrid, which would then be within a few hours’ march.
Had this plan been followed, either a considerable body of the French
must have been detached against Venegas, or he would have entered the
capital without resistance.
♦OPPORTUNITY OF ATTACKING THE FRENCH.♦
But Sir Arthur was destined throughout the campaign to have his
plans continually frustrated by the misconduct of those from whom he
looked for cordial co-operation. On the 22d the combined armies moved
from Oropesa, and the advance attacked Victor’s rear-guard, which
was drawn up in order of battle, upon a plain about a league from
Talavera. Their right wing was turned by Brigadier-General Anson,
and Alburquerque attacked them in front, and drove them back. They
retreated to a position upon the Alberche, a league beyond the town,
and the combined armies advanced, and encamped that night in the vine
and olive-yards between the town and the French. Sir Arthur had a
narrow escape that day; while he was reconnoitring, a three-pound shot
was fired at him with so good an aim, that it cut a bough from a tree
close to his head. He determined to attack the enemy the following
morning, and bring Victor to action before he should be joined by
Sebastiani and the Intruder. Nothing could be more favourable to his
views than this unskilful halt of the enemy, an opportunity being thus
presented for beating them, as he had hoped, in detail. The columns
were formed for this purpose at an early hour, and at five in the
morning they received orders to march. But when Cuesta was informed
of the determination which had been taken, no arguments could induce
him to make up his mind, and give the ♦LOST BY CUESTA’S INDECISION.♦
necessary instructions: at midnight he remained undecided, and the
orders therefore were necessarily countermanded, ... not more to the
disappointment of the army, than to the sore vexation of the General,
who knew the whole importance of the opportunity which had thus been
lost. So unaccountable was this conduct in Cuesta, that it has been
supposed he scrupled at fighting upon a Sunday. Whatever his reasons
were, they have never been explained, and could not have been more
valid than this would have been: but thus the fair occasion was let
pass; for when, on the morning of the 24th, he was ready to offer
battle, it appeared that Victor, profiting by the precious time which
had been given him, had decamped during the night, and retired to St.
Olalla, and from thence towards Torrejos, to effect that meditated
junction which Sir Arthur’s measures would have frustrated.
♦DISTRESS OF THE BRITISH ARMY FOR WANT OF TRANSPORT.♦
This retreat surprised Cuesta as much as if his own procrastination
had not deprived Spain of the victory which prompter measures would
have secured. The British General had foreseen the consequence of so
ill-timed a delay, and the disappointment was the more grievous because
he could not pursue the French. From the hour in which he entered
Spain he had never been able to procure means of transport: ... he
required none for the baggage of individuals, ... only for provisions,
ammunition, money, and military stores, things indispensable for an
army: and these were not to be obtained. The country was in a state of
total disorganization; and what was more extraordinary, the government
seemed to be totally ignorant of this, and to suppose that nothing more
was required of it than to issue edicts, which would be carried into
effect as if things were in their ordinary course. This inconvenience
had been so severely felt, that Sir Arthur, before he left Plasencia,
informed Cuesta it would be impossible for him to undertake any farther
operations after their arrangements against Victor should have been
carried into effect, unless the necessary means of transport were
supplied. Justice to his Majesty, and to the army with which he had
been intrusted, required this determination, he said, and he was
equally bound in justice to communicate it to General Cuesta without
delay. The means which he required were such as every country in which
an army was acting was bound to afford; and if the people of Spain were
either unwilling or unable to supply what the British army required,
they must do without its services. This declaration had been made as
early as the 16th; a week had now elapsed, there had not been the
slightest effort to remedy the evil, and from the same cause the troops
were now in actual want of provisions. For the Spanish commissariat was
in the most deplorable state; and that of the British army, which was
far from being in a good one, could effect nothing in a country where
they exerted no authority themselves, and the government would exert
none for them. The evil was aggravated by the junction of two large
armies, in a country which had scarcely ever been without troops to
exhaust it during the preceding twelve months. When the two combined
armies became competitors for food, the inhabitants naturally preferred
their own countrymen: ... it was afterwards discovered also, that, with
a stupid selfishness, which admits neither of justification or excuse,
they concealed the greater part of their stores from both.
♦SIR ARTHUR HALTS.♦
Thus painfully circumstanced, Sir Arthur could not proceed. He
conceived also that his engagement with Cuesta was fulfilled by the
removal of Victor from the Alberche; for if advantage were duly taken
of that movement, it gave the Spanish General possession of the course
of the Tagus, and opened the communication with La Mancha and Venegas.
He halted from absolute necessity, and he determined even to return
to Portugal, if he were not properly supplied. Cuesta appeared fully
sensible of the propriety of this determination, and trusting that good
fortune would put him in possession of Madrid, which now seemed just
within his reach, he, having means of transport in abundance, ♦CUESTA
ADVANCES IN PURSUIT OF VICTOR.♦ advanced four leagues in pursuit of
Victor, to the village of Bravo; Sir Arthur, meantime, taking up a
position at Talavera, to wait the issue of a movement which was
undertaken against his opinion, moved two divisions of infantry and a
brigade of cavalry, under General Sherbrooke, across the Alberche to
Casalegas, to keep up the communication with Cuesta and with Sir Robert
Wilson. Near that village the body of a Spanish peasant was found, whom
the French soldiers had a little before burnt, or rather scorched to
death. It lay with the arms lifted and the hands clenched, as if in the
act of prayer, the features distorted, and the whole corpse stiffened
in one dreadful expression of agony!
♦JUNCTION OF JOSEPH AND SEBASTIANI WITH VICTOR.♦
Joseph Buonaparte and Marshal Jourdan left Madrid on the 23d, and
halted that night at Navalcarnero, designing to form a junction with
Victor at Casalegas, and to order Sebastiani thither as soon as that
general, in pursuance of his instructions, should have returned from
Consuegra and Madrilejos, where he was watching Venegas, to Toledo.
Another object which Jourdan had in view was to check Sir Robert
Wilson, whose force he supposed to be considerably greater than it was,
and of whose enterprising spirit the French stood in fear. But Victor,
who was well informed of the plans of his enemies, perceived, that if
he fell back upon Navalcarnero to join the Intruder, it would be easy
to interpose between them and Sebastiani, in which case the junction
of their whole force in this quarter would be rendered exceedingly
difficult, if not impossible. Apprising Joseph, therefore, of his
movements, he retreated to the left bank of the Guadarrama, at its
confluence ♦JULY 25.♦ with the Tagus near Toledo. Sebastiani reached
that city the same day, and the Intruder, marching to the same point,
fixed his head-quarters at Vargas, two leagues distant, so that the
whole force which he could bring against the allies was now united.
It consisted of 45,000 men, after 3000 were left to defend Toledo.
They resolved immediately, now that this great object was effected, to
act upon the offensive; and on the next day they began their march to
Torrejos.
♦CUESTA’S VANGUARD ATTACKED BY THE FRENCH.♦
Cuesta had by this time advanced to St. Olalla. He there learnt that
Victor had turned off towards Toledo; and so far was he from divining
the obvious intent of such a movement, that he supposed the French were
in full retreat, and that he had nothing to do but to pursue them. From
some strange misconception, too, he supposed the English were about to
follow him; they were very short of provisions and means of conveyance,
he informed his own government, but he was doing all in his power to
persuade them of the necessity of putting themselves in motion. He
thus deceived himself and his government, instead of making efforts to
supply the wants of the English army, or assisting them with his own
means of transport. These he possessed in sufficient quantity; and it
was discovered when too late, that food in abundance might have been
procured, had proper means been used for obtaining it. In the morning
of the 25th Cuesta dispatched intelligence that he was in pursuit of
the French; in the evening he discovered that he was in some danger
of being attacked by them, and on the following day his outposts were
assailed in Torrejos, and driven in. General Zayas advanced with the
vanguard to meet the French; he was attacked by Latour Maubourg,
with the French advanced guard, and suffered considerable loss; but
Zayas was a good officer, and maintained his ground against superior
numbers while he sent to require support. ♦ALBURQUERQUE SAVES CUESTA
FROM DEFEAT.♦ Alburquerque had requested that his division might be
the first to support the vanguard, either in case of its attacking
the enemy or being attacked. While Cuesta made arrangements for the
retreat of the whole army beyond the Alberche, the Duque advanced time
enough to save Zayas from complete rout, and the army from that utter
defeat which must necessarily have resulted. The vanguard was flying
at the moment when he arrived; he charged the enemy, checked them, and
gave the van time to re-form, and fall back in good order. But for
this timely success the army would have been dispersed, for all the
artillery and baggage were in the streets of St. Olalla, carts of bread
were there also blocking up the way, the commissaries had taken flight,
and the men, catching that panic which want of order in an army never
fails to occasion on the first approach of danger, had begun to throw
away their arms, that they might neither be incumbered with them in
running away, nor supposed to be soldiers if they were overtaken.
♦CUESTA RETREATS TO THE ALBERCHE.♦
Alburquerque would have pursued his success had he not been compelled
to retreat by repeated orders from the commander-in-chief, at the
moment when he was about to attack a disheartened enemy, with troops
confident in their own courage and in the skill of their leader, and
heated by the advantage which they had gained. He had, however, done
much in saving the army, for never were the movements of an army
conducted in a more wretched and disorderly manner; like a rabble upon
a pilgrimage, such was Alburquerque’s description, they proceeded
without any regard to distance, order, or method, and with the whole
park of artillery; they had neither provisions, staff, nor settled
plan; and they stopped upon their marches to repose like flocks of
sheep, without taking up any position, so that, if the French had known
the condition they were in, defeat must have been inevitable whenever
they were unexpectedly attacked. Saved from that total dispersion which
must have ensued, had not Alburquerque thus checked the French in their
career, the Spanish army retreated twenty miles from St. Olalla to the
Alberche unmolested, thus again forming a junction with the British,
and bivouacked on the left bank. At daybreak Sir Arthur crossed, and
having with some difficulty penetrated to the old General’s tent, found
him asleep there, and the army in that state of disorder which is ♦SIR
ARTHUR PREVAILS ON HIM TO CROSS THAT RIVER.♦ usually consequent upon
a forced retreat. He pointed out the necessity of passing the river
without loss of time, and taking up his ground on the right of the
British position. Fortunately Cuesta yielded to this advice, although
he thought it unlikely that the enemy would venture to attack them:
there was a report that they had detached 15,000 men towards Madrid,
and this strengthened his opinion. In fact, had Venegas performed his
part of the concerted operations, either this must have been done by
the French, or Madrid would have fallen. But though this General was
under Cuesta’s orders, and had been instructed how to act in pursuance
of the plan arranged with the British Commander, counter orders were
sent him by the Supreme Junta; and he, in consequence, disconcerted
the whole arrangement by employing himself in a useless cannonade of
Toledo; thus permitting the French to bring their whole force against
the allies.
♦POSITION OF THE ALLIES IN FRONT OF TALAVERA.♦
Sir Arthur, as soon as the Spaniards fell back to the Alberche,
expected a general action, and immediately prepared for it, recalling
Sherbrooke from Casalegas to his station in the line. The position
extended something more than two miles. The British were on the left;
there the ground was open, and commanded by a height upon which a
division of infantry was stationed under Major-General Hill. Still
farther upon the left was a low range of mountains separated from the
height by a valley about 300 fathoms wide, and here a ravine running
from north to south covered the left and centre of the position, and
terminated at the beginning of the olive grounds on the right. The
valley was not occupied, because it was commanded by the height, and
because the mountains were thought too distant to be of any consequence
in the expected battle. The right, consisting of Spaniards, extended
immediately in front of Talavera down to the Tagus: this part of the
ground was covered with olive trees, and much intersected by banks and
ditches. The high road leading from the town to the bridge of Alberche
was defended by a heavy battery in front of the Ermida, or chapel of
Nuestra Señora del Prado, which was occupied by Spanish infantry. All
the avenues to the town were defended in like manner; the town itself
was occupied, and the remainder of the Spanish foot formed in two lines
behind the banks, on the road which led to the position of the British.
In the centre between the allied armies was a commanding spot, on
which the British had begun to construct a redoubt. Brigadier-General
Alexander Campbell was posted here with a division of infantry; and
General Cotton’s brigade of dragoons, with some Spanish cavalry, in the
open ground in his rear.
♦SIR ARTHUR NEARLY MADE PRISONER.♦
When Sherbrooke was recalled from Casalegas, General Mackenzie had
been left with a division of infantry and a brigade of horse as an
advanced post near Casa de Salinas, in a wood on the right of the
Alberche, which covered the left of the British army. About two in
the afternoon of the 27th the enemy appeared in strength on the left
bank; Victor forded the Alberche, and before Mackenzie’s division
could be withdrawn from the wood on the left, it was attacked by very
superior forces under Generals Lapisse and Chaudron Rousseau. Sir
Arthur, from a tower immediately in their rear, which he had ascended
for the purpose of observation, saw the men falter when about to be
attacked by such overpowering numbers, and descending just in time,
with difficulty mounted his horse in the midst of the affray, and
escaped being made prisoner. Had he been taken at that moment, or had
Marlborough, a century before, been recognised and detained when he
fell into the hands of a French partisan on the Meuse, how differently
would the latter days of Buonaparte and of Louis XIV. have closed, and
how different at this hour would have been the condition of England,
of Europe, and of the world! The British suffered considerably, but
they withdrew in perfect order, and took their place in the line.
Meantime the other divisions of the French crossed, and advanced
within cannon-shot of ♦BATTLE OF TALAVERA.♦ the allied army. They
cannonaded the left of the British position, and they attacked the
Spanish infantry with their horse, hoping to break through and win
the town; but they were bravely withstood and finally repulsed. The
action ceased a little before nine at night. A little before eleven the
first line of the Spanish left opened a tremendous fire; Sir Arthur,
who was near the spot, observed that the fire was admirably well kept
up, and hoped they would do as well next day; but as he suspected that
at that moment there was nothing to fire at, he wished to stop it.
While he was speaking, three battalions of Spaniards, alarmed at their
own noise, gave way, and fairly took to their heels. The vacancy was
promptly filled up; and these very men the next day bore their full
share of the battle, and behaved as steadily as the best troops could
have done. Victor had marked the height on which General Hill was
posted; he considered it to be the key of the position, and thought
that, if he could beat the English from thence, it would be impossible
for them to maintain the field afterwards. This might best be done
during the night. He therefore ordered Ruffin to attack the hill with
three regiments, Vilatte to support him, and Lapisse to make a feint
upon the centre of the allied armies, which might serve as a diversion.
The attack was made soon after night had closed; for a moment it
was successful, and they got possession of the height. General Hill
instantly attacked them with the bayonet, and recovered the post. At
midnight the attempt was repeated, and failed again. According to
the French account, one of the regiments destined for this service
lost its way, owing to the darkness, and another was impeded by the
ravine. Both sides suffered considerably at this well-contested point.
The armies lay upon the field, the cavalry with their bridles round
their arms; but there was little rest during the night; both sides
were on the alert and alarm, and in different parts of the field the
videttes of each army were sometimes fired on by their own countrymen,
being mistaken for enemies. Whole battalions of the enemy got into the
English line, some crying that they were Spaniards, some that they were
German deserters: the trick was soon discovered, and, in the reception
which they met with, it is not unlikely that many a poor German, who
really intended to desert, lost his life. These night-engagements
were carried on with the most determined fury; the men, after they
had discharged their muskets, frequently closed, and fought with the
butt-end.
The French had ascertained, in the course of the evening, that any
attack upon the town, posted as the Spaniards were, was hopeless;
that the centre also was very strong, both from the rugged ground and
the olive-yards which covered it, and the works which had been thrown
up there. The left was the most practicable point of attack, and the
difficulty of carrying that they had severely experienced. There,
however, they made a third attempt at daybreak, with three regiments
under General Ruffin advancing in close columns. They proceeded
triumphantly, as they supposed, nearly to the summit; when they were
again charged and again beaten back, but they fell back in good order.
Sir Arthur, for the better security of this post, now sent two brigades
of horse into the valley on the left. Alburquerque had at this time
been ordered by the Spanish commander to go with his cavalry to a place
near the town, where it was impossible for them to act, and there
was not even room for them, the ground being thickly wooded. On this
occasion he ventured to act from his own judgement; observing that the
English cavalry were charged by very superior numbers, he hastened to
support them, and his opportune arrival enabled them to occupy the
position. Cuesta perceived the advantage of this movement, and suffered
the Duke to choose his own ground, who accordingly took the post of
danger with the English horse. To annoy this body, the French sent
their riflemen to the heights on the left of the valley; thus occupying
the ground which Sir Arthur had supposed beyond the bounds to which the
action would extend. It proved of no advantage to them; for Cuesta,
marking the movement, dispatched Camp-marshal Bassecourt against them
with the fifth division of Spanish infantry, and dislodged them with
great loss.
About eleven, the enemy having been baffled in all their attempts,
intermitted the attack, rested their troops, and, it is said, cooked
their dinners upon the field. Wine and a little bread were served out
to the British troops. A brook which flows into the Tagus separated the
French and English in one part of the field, and during this pause men
of both armies went there to drink, as if a truce had been established.
Their muskets were laid down and their helmets put off while they
stooped to the stream, and when they had quenched their thirst, they
rested on the brink, looking at each other. The heat and exasperation
of battle were suspended; they felt that mutual respect which proofs
of mutual courage had inspired, and some of them shook hands across
the brook, in token that although they were met to shed each other’s
blood, brave men knew how to value a brave enemy. At such a moment it
was natural for Englishmen to have no other feeling; ... the atrocities
by which Buonaparte’s soldiers in the Peninsula had disgraced their
profession, their country, and their nature, were for the time
forgotten. This interval also was taken for bringing off the wounded
who lay intermingled as they had fallen. And here also a redeeming
sense of humanity was manifested; all hostility being suspended among
those who were thus employed, and each striving who should with most
alacrity assist the other in extricating the common sufferers. About
noon Victor ordered a general attack along the whole line. His own
three divisions were to attack the hill once more. Sebastiani was to
form his first division in two lines on the left of Lapisse; Leval,
with a brigade just then arriving from Aranjuez, to be stationed to
the left of this division, a little in the rear; still further left,
Milhaud, with his dragoons, was to observe Talavera; Latour Maubourg’s
infantry and Merlin’s light-horse formed in the rear of Victor to
support his corps, and advance into the open ground now occupied by
him, as soon as he should have won the hill. The reserve was placed in
a third line behind Sebastiani’s corps.
From the moment this general attack commenced, the firing of musketry
was heard on all sides like the roll of a drum, with scarcely a
moment’s interruption during the remainder of the day, the deeper sound
of a heavy cannonade rising above it like thunder. The operations
of the French were deranged by a blunder of Leval’s division, which
they attribute to the ruggedness of the ground, and the impossibility
of preserving the line among the olive-trees and vines. Instead of
forming in _echellon_ in the rear, it advanced to the front, and
before it had finished deploying it was attacked. Sebastiani sent a
brigade to its support, and it fell back to the ground which it was
designed to occupy. This occasioned some delay. When the line was
formed, Sebastiani waited till Victor had begun the attack. Lapisse
first crossed the ravine, supported by Latour Maubourg’s cavalry, and
by two batteries, each of eight pieces of cannon. Vilatte threatened
the hills and covered the valley, and Ruffin, skirting the great chain
of mountains to the left, endeavoured to turn the flank of the British
army. The attack upon the hill was exceedingly formidable, but, like
all the former, it failed. Lapisse was mortally wounded, his men were
driven back, and Victor himself rallied them, and brought them once
more to the contested point; their retrograde movement had exposed
Sebastiani’s right, and there also the French suffered considerably.
While Victor led his troops once more to the foot of that hill which
had so often been fatal to the assailants, Vilatte with the columns in
the valley advanced to his support. General Anson’s brigade, consisting
of the 1st German light dragoons and the 23d dragoons, with General
Fane’s heavy cavalry, were ordered to charge them. The French formed
in two solid squares; they were protected by a deep ravine, which
was not perceived till the horses were close to it; and they kept
up a tremendous fire of artillery and musketry. This was the most
destructive part of the whole action; numbers of men and horse fell
into the ravine, ... numbers were mown down. But the portion which
got over were collected as well as he could by the Honourable Major
Ponsonby, and led upon the bayonets of the enemy. They passed between
two columns of infantry, against which they could effect nothing, then
galloped upon the regiment of chasseurs which supported them. Here
they were charged by some regiments in reserve, surrounded, broken,
dispersed, and almost destroyed, losing two-thirds of their number. The
rest (Lord William Russell was among them) passed through the intervals
of the French columns, and retired within their own lines. Injudicious
and unfortunate as the charge was, the desperate courage with which
officers and men had advanced upon almost certain destruction
astonished the enemy; it put an end to their efforts on that side, and
no further attempt was made upon the hill, which was now covered with
dead, dying, wounded, and exhausted troops.
The attack upon the centre was made at the same time. General
Campbell was supported by Eguia and Henestrosa, and by a regiment of
Spanish horse; the allies repulsed the enemy, and while the Spaniards
turned their flank, the English took their cannon. A column, chiefly
consisting of Germans, advanced with excellent steadiness through a
heavy fire of artillery, like men who, having obtained the highest
military character, were resolved to keep it. They were received by
Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke’s men with a volley of musketry which
staggered them; the whole British division then rushed forward with
the bayonet, and by that irresistible charge the enemy were driven
back with great slaughter. But the brigade of Guards advanced too
far in pursuit; they were attacked by the French reserve, they were
cut down by a close fire of artillery from a wood; in a few minutes
all their mounted officers were killed, with more than 500 men, and
at that moment the fate of the day appeared worse than doubtful. But
Sir Arthur’s foresight secured the victory which had been so long
contested. Seeing the advance, and apprehending the consequence, he
moved a battalion of the 48th from the heights to their support; and
this timely succour, with the assistance of the second line of General
Cotton’s cavalry, saved the brigade from that total destruction which
must else have been inevitable. The broken Guards passed through the
intervals of the 48th, re-formed behind it, and then in their turn
supported the regiment which had preserved them. Upon their advance,
the enemy, whose heart now failed them, retired: the Guards renewed the
huzzas with which they had advanced, and the cry was taken up along
the whole line. It was the shout of victory on the part of the allies;
for though the light troops continued to fire, and from time to time a
heavy cannonade was renewed, the enemy made no further attempt.
A circumstance more horrid than unfrequent in war occurred toward the
close of the action; the long dry grass took fire, and many of the
wounded were scorched to death. It was night before the battle ended,
and the allies were far from certain that it would not be renewed on
the morrow. The moon rose dimly, the night was chill and damp because
of the heavy dew; the troops lay in position on the ground, without
covering, and without food; even water was scarce; but the officers
and the generals were faring alike, and neither murmuring was heard
for their privations, nor apprehension felt for what the morrow might
bring forth. The French had made large fires along the whole front of
their line. At daylight the troops were under arms, and in order of
battle, ... but the enemy had disappeared, a rear-guard only being in
sight on the left of the Alberche. The Intruder had been a spectator of
the whole action. During the night contradictory reports were brought
him, some affirming that another attack must ensure the victory, others
that Victor’s right had been turned, and he could not possibly keep his
ground. In this dilemma Joseph sent to ascertain which was the true
report, and retired to rest, in expectation of having the favourable
one confirmed, the reserve bivouacking round him. At daybreak he
was awakened by Sebastiani, who had fallen back with his corps upon
the reserve during the night, and who came with tidings that he had
been compelled to make this retrograde movement, because Victor was
retreating along the foot of the hills to Casalegas. This intelligence
left no time for deliberation. The Intruder began to retreat also,
but in perfect order; Milhaud’s division formed the rear, and Latour
Maubourg brought off many of the wounded. Twenty pieces of cannon were
taken by the conquerors; the prisoners were not many.
Our loss had been very heavy; 801 killed, 3913 wounded, 653 missing.
The Spaniards had 1250 killed and wounded. Generals Mackenzie and
Langworth fell. Two bullets passed through Sir Arthur’s clothes, and he
received a severe contusion on the shoulder from a spent musket-ball.
During the second action no attack was made upon the main body of
Cuesta’s army; the position was too strong, and the French rightly
judged, that if, by bringing their whole force to bear upon the
English, they could defeat them, Cuesta’s discomfiture must necessarily
follow. On this day, therefore, they were in the proportion of more
than two to one to the troops whom they engaged. The British entered
the field 18,300 effective men; they were opposed to not less than
48,000. The presence of the Spaniards was of vital importance, by the
security which they afforded to the right of our army; and essential
service was afforded by those who came into action on the second day,
especially by Alburquerque and Bassecourt, and by two battalions under
Brigadier-General Whittingham, in their service, who came forward
to support the Guards; but the brunt of the battle was borne by the
British, as the loss which they sustained evinces. From their loss
that of the defeated enemy might fairly be computed, if the numbers
left upon the field had not afforded surer ground. Both Spaniards and
English state it at not less than 10,000 men; the number of their dead
was so great, that Cuesta ordered out his troops by battalions to burn
them.
♦CUESTA DECIMATES SOME OF HIS TROOPS.♦
The Spaniards, where they were well commanded, behaved well; but
melancholy proofs were given of the inefficient state of their armies.
The whole of their commissariat took flight as soon as the action
began, with all the people belonging to them; so that after the battle
the allies found themselves in total want of food and resources. Three
or four corps threw down their muskets without having once discharged
them, and dispersed; some of them plundered the baggage. Cuesta was
so indignant at this, that after the action he ordered the division
to be decimated, and it was only after much entreaty from the British
Commander that he consented to re-decimate those on whom the lot had
fallen, and six officers and some thirty men were actually executed.
Sir Arthur remarked upon this occasion, with equal humanity and wisdom,
that fear of disgrace would affect the Spaniards more than fear of
death, and that for this reason, among others, exertions ought to be
made for clothing them in uniform. Marching to battle as they did,
without any thing to distinguish them for soldiers, in the first panic
they threw away their arms and accoutrements, and pretended to be
peasants. Men dressed as soldiers could not thus at once put off the
marks of their profession, and that being the case, they would feel
that their safety depended upon keeping their arms and standing their
ground; and when the whole army was uniformly clothed, it would be easy
to deprive the soldier who should misbehave of a part of his uniform,
or to fix upon him some mark of disgrace,--a mode of punishment, he
said, the most effectual as well as the most humane. Cuesta had just
experienced the good effect of such measures; the regiments whom he
deprived of one of their pistols for misconduct at the battle of
Medellin, behaved so well from that time, and exerted themselves so
strenuously on all occasions to wipe off their disgrace, that, after
the battle of Talavera, the pistol was restored to them.
♦STATE OF TALAVERA.♦
The wounded of both armies were brought in promiscuously, and many
of them laid in the streets and in the squares till shelter could be
allotted for them: even for this inevitable necessity no order having
been taken by the Spanish authorities. It is worthy of notice, that a
greater proportion recovered of those who were left a night upon the
field, than of such as were earlier housed, and this is explained by
the effect of the free air in preventing fever. Needful accommodations
for these poor creatures were not to be found in a city which the
French had visited. They had destroyed the public buildings, overturned
the altars, and opened the tombs. Furniture of every kind they had
carried off to their camp, and what they had no other use for, they had
consumed as fuel. Frenchmen like, they had a theatre in their camp. The
soldiers’ huts were so remarkable for neatness and regularity, as to be
an object of curiosity to the British officers; but it was remarked as
one proof of the wanton destruction caused by the Intruder’s armies,
that they were all thatched with unthreshed straw. It ought to be
mentioned as a contrast to this, that when the British troops halted by
day or night amid olive-groves, they were not allowed to cut the trees
either for fuel or for shelter.
♦MOVEMENTS OF SIR R. WILSON.♦
The day after the action a light brigade, 3000 strong, and a troop
of horse-artillery, under Brigadier-General Craufurd, arrived from
Lisbon to reinforce the British army, which thus found itself nearly
as strong as before the action. But a battle so well contested, and so
gloriously won, was rendered of no avail, by the complicated misconduct
of the Spanish government and of the Spanish general. The same want
of provisions and of the means of transport, which had compelled Sir
Arthur to halt at Talavera, prevented him from pursuing his victory.
The Intruder, ignorant of this, trembled for Madrid, expecting every
hour to hear that Venegas, Sir R. Wilson, and the combined forces were
marching upon that city, where the people were looking out for their
deliverers. Sir Robert had proceeded with his corps to Navalcarneiro,
notwithstanding the immediate neighbourhood of the enemy’s army. The
detachment reached the Guadarrama: he had established a communication
with Madrid, Belliard was preparing to withdraw from the city into the
Retiro, which had been fortified as a citadel, and Sir Robert had made
arrangements for entering the metropolis on the night of that very
day when he and his corps were recalled, because a general action was
expected. Some insurrectionary movements had already appeared, which
Belliard had been able to suppress; but it was certain that the moment
an army came to the assistance of the citizens, he would no longer be
able to keep them down. Joseph’s hope, therefore, was from an attack
upon the rear of the allies, to be made by the collected forces of
Soult, Ney, and Mortier, under command of the former.
♦MOVEMENTS OF SOULT, NEY, AND MORTIER.♦
Soult, after his retreat from Galicia, occupied Zamora, Salamanca,
and Leon, with the remains of his army, which he had found means
to reequip. Ney’s corps was quartered at Astorga, Benevente, and
Leon; Mortier’s at Medina del Campo, and Valladolid. Apprised of the
movements of the English, Soult gave orders on the 20th for collecting
the whole at Salamanca, and four days afterwards was instructed by
Jourdan, in the Intruder’s name, to advance as speedily as possible
upon the rear of the enemy by way of Plasencia. Sir Arthur, from the
commencement of the campaign, was aware of the existence of this
force in the north, and the manner in which it would attempt to act.
His own army was so small, that it was not possible for him to spare
detachments for securing the passes of the long mountain-ridge which
the French ♦CUESTA NEGLECTS TO SECURE THE PASSES.♦ must cross. But
Cuesta had sent the Marquess de la Reyna, with two battalions from his
own army and two from Bejar, to occupy the Puerto de Baños, and given
orders to the Duque del Parque to secure the Puerto de Perales, by
detachments from Ciudad Rodrigo. The former point Sir Arthur considered
safe; but, doubting the Duque’s power to spare a sufficient force
for the latter, he directed Beresford, with the Portugueze troops, to
defend this pass, as the greatest service which, in their then state of
discipline, they were capable of performing.
♦INTELLIGENCE OF SOULT’S ADVANCE.♦
Two days after the battle, intelligence was brought to Talavera that
12,000 rations had been ordered at Fuente Duenas for the 28th, and
24,000 at Los Santos on the same day, for a French army, which it was
supposed was on its march to the Puerto de Baños. Cuesta upon this
discovered some anxiety respecting that post, and proposed that Sir
R. Wilson with his corps should be sent thither. This could not be
assented to, for his corps was stationed in the mountains towards
Escalona, still keeping up a communication with the people of Madrid,
... an advantage too important to be foregone. Of this Cuesta appeared
sensible; yet he could not be prevailed upon to send a detachment
from his own army; and Sir Arthur, considering that they had no other
grounds for believing this was the point which was threatened than that
the rations were ordered, which might be a feint, and hoping too that
the troops already there might prove sufficient, and even that the
news of his late victory might deter the French from proceeding, did
not press the Spanish general further that day. Night brought with it
the anxious feeling that a point had now become of prime importance,
concerning which he could not be satisfied that proper means had been
♦JULY 31.♦ taken for its defence; and in the morning he again pressed
Cuesta upon the subject, urging him to detach thither a division of
infantry, with its guns, and a commanding officer on whom he could
rely. “Certainly,” he declared, “he never would have advanced so far,
if reason had not been given him to believe that pass was secure. The
division would not be missed at Talavera; if it arrived in time it
would perform a service of the greatest moment; and even if the enemy
should have crossed the mountains before its arrival, it would then be
in a situation to observe him.” But Cuesta was not to be persuaded.
That day and the following elapsed; on the third came tidings that
the French had entered Bejar; and then the Spanish general dispatched
Bassecourt with a force which might have sufficed had it been sent in
time.
♦SOULT OCCUPIES PLASENCIA.♦
Mortier began his march from Salamanca on the 27th, Soult followed
on the 30th, Ney two days afterwards, all taking the same route.
The advance fell in with the Marquess de la Reyna’s out-posts at La
Calzala, and pursued them to Bejar and Col de Baños. The two battalions
on which Cuesta had relied before the appearance of danger, consisted
of only 600 men, supplied with twenty rounds of ammunition! Even this
was more than they employed; they attempted to blow up the bridge
called Cuesper de Hombre, and failing in that, retired without firing
a shot. ♦1809. AUGUST.♦ The battalions of Bejar dispersed as soon as
they saw the enemy. Yet such was the strength of this position, that
the very sight of the Spaniards delayed Mortier’s march, in consequence
of the dispositions which he thought it necessary to make for forcing
it if it had been defended, and he did not enter Plasencia till the
first of August. The occupation of that place was of the greatest
importance; the French had now intercepted sir Arthur’s communication
with Portugal, and were enabled to manœuvre upon his rear if he
advanced toward Madrid, or remained at Talavera.
♦SIR ARTHUR MARCHES AGAINST HIM.♦
Cuesta now proposed that half the British army should march against
Soult, while the other half maintained the post at Talavera. Sir Arthur
said he was ready either to go or stay with the whole British army, but
he would not divide it; the choice was left to him, and he preferred
going, thinking his own troops were most likely to accomplish the
object of the march, perhaps even without a contest. It appears that
he was not aware of the enemy’s force: Cuesta estimated it at twelve
or fourteen thousand, and Sir Arthur did not at that time suppose it
to be larger. He preferred the alternative of going for another reason
also, feeling it of more importance to him that the communication
through Plasencia should be opened than it was to the Spaniards, though
highly important to them also. The movements of Victor in front induced
him to suppose that the enemy, despairing of any better success at
Talavera than they had already experienced, intended to fall upon Sir
R. Wilson, and force a passage by Escalona: thus to act in concert
with Soult between the Alberche and the Tietar. Sir Robert also felt
himself seriously menaced, and some letters which he intercepted gave
him sufficient information to ascertain that these were the plans of
the enemy; he therefore informed the British General that he should
remove his artillery to St. Roman, occupy the Panada with 300 men, a
strong height behind Montillo with 600 more, from whence there was a
good retreat to St. Valuela, and return with the rest to a position,
in readiness either to occupy Valuela, or obey such instructions as
he might receive. In this state of things, Sir Arthur perceived how
possible it was that Cuesta might be forced to quit Talavera before
he could return to it, and this made him uneasy for his hospital. At
all events, he thought it too far advanced. He therefore entreated
Cuesta to make a requisition for carts, and remove the wounded as
expeditiously as was consistent with their safety, by first sending
them to an intermediate station at no great distance, from whence they
might gradually be passed to the place which should ultimately be fixed
upon. He wrote to Bassecourt, requesting that he, with that division
which had been dispatched to secure the passes after they had been
lost, would halt at Centiello, and watch the vale of Plasencia; and
he again recommended to the Spanish commander, that Venegas should be
ordered to threaten Madrid by the road of Arganda, that being the only
means whereby it was possible to alarm the enemy, and make him divide
his forces.
♦AUG. 3.
CUESTA DETERMINES TO FOLLOW SIR ARTHUR.♦
Having thus taken every precaution, he marched to Oropesa, with the
intention of either compelling Soult to retreat, or giving him battle.
At five in the evening he learned that the enemy were at Naval Moral,
not more than eighteen miles distant; thus having placed themselves
between him and the bridge of Almaraz, as if they meant to cut off
his retreat across the Tagus. An hour afterwards dispatches came from
Talavera, inclosing an intercepted letter from Jourdan to Soult,
wherein the latter was told that the British army was at least 25,000
strong, and yet he was ordered to bring it to action wherever he could
find it; from this Cuesta inferred that Soult could not have less than
30,000 men, and this was the precise number at which the friar, on
whom the letter had been found, stated his army. But the most grievous
part of the intelligence was, that Victor was again advancing, and
had reached St. Olalla, and that Cuesta, seeing himself threatened
both in front and in flank, and apprehending the British would require
assistance, was determined to march and join them. Painful as it was
thus to abandon the wounded, he considered that he must have abandoned
them if he were driven from the position, and that position being now
open on the left, he did not think himself able to maintain it. Sir
Arthur immediately wrote to represent that the danger was far less
imminent than Cuesta apprehended; the enemy, he thought, were not
likely to attack Talavera, nor to occupy the British long. It would be
time to march when they knew that the French had forced their way at
Escalona, or were breaking up from St. Olalla. Victor was certainly
alone, and Sebastiani and the Intruder occupied by Venegas. At all
events he urged him to delay his march till the next day, send off his
commissariat and baggage before him, and halt in the woods till the
wounded were arrived at the bridge of Arzobispo. Soult’s force, he
said, was certainly overrated.
Sir Arthur’s mistake upon this subject arose from his being ignorant
that Mortier had formed a junction with this army. He supposed that it
consisted only of the corps of Soult and Ney, who had brought out of
Galicia 18,000 men, the remains of 36,000 with which they entered that
country. Cuesta, however, was better informed; and he himself altered
his opinion of the enemy’s force when he considered the positive orders
which the Intruder had given for attacking the British army, supposing
it to consist ♦CUESTA JOINS THE BRITISH.♦ of 25,000 men. Cuesta had
not asked Sir Arthur’s advice, and did not wait to receive it: he left
Talavera before it reached him, marched all night, and joined the
British at Oropesa soon after daylight on the 4th. His apprehension of
danger to himself was well founded: it was not without great exertions
and heavy loss that the combined armies had repulsed the French at
Talavera; well, therefore, might he despair of withstanding them alone
if they returned to the attack. But the danger which by this hasty
retreat he averted from himself, he brought upon Venegas and Sir
Arthur; and the latter, in addition to the mortification of having
his wounded fall into the hands of the enemy, saw himself exposed
to an attack in front and in rear at the same time by two armies,
each superior ♦THEY RETREAT ACROSS THE TAGUS.♦ to his own. It was
absolutely necessary to retreat, otherwise nothing but two victories
could extricate the troops from their perilous situation, and they were
little capable of extraordinary exertions, not having had their full
allowance of provisions for several days. The bridge of Almaraz had
been destroyed, and when the Marquess de la Reyna abandoned his post
at the pass, he made for this point, with the intention of removing
the bridge of boats that had been placed there; the boats indeed might
be still in the river, but it was thought impossible to reach Almaraz
without a battle. If he moved on to give the enemy battle, the French
from Talavera would break down the bridge of Arzobispo, and thus
intercept the only way by which a retreat was practicable; the same
danger would be incurred if he took a position at Oropesa. Nothing
remained, therefore, but to cross at Arzobispo, while it was yet in
his power, and take up a defensive post upon the Tagus: the sooner a
defensive line should be taken, the more likely were the troops to
be able to defend it. On the day, therefore, that Cuesta formed his
unfortunate junction, Sir Arthur retreated by this route, and crossed.
Cuesta followed on the night of the 5th.
♦COL. MACKINNON REMOVES SOME OF THE WOUNDED.♦
Sir Arthur had left Colonel Mackinnon in command at Talavera with the
charge of the sick and wounded, amounting, with those attached to the
hospital, to about 5000 persons. On the evening of one day the charge
had been given him, and on the next at noon Cuesta informed him that
Soult was at Plasencia with 30,000 men, and that Victor was in his
front, only six leagues distant; the monk who discovered their plans,
being the bearer of a letter from the Intruder to Soult, was in the
room: it was his intention to retire at dusk with the Spanish army and
join Sir Arthur, and the hospital had better be got off before that
time. Colonel Mackinnon had been instructed, in case of such necessity,
to make for Merida by way of the Puente del Arzobispo: but it was with
difficulty he could procure from Cuesta seven waggons to remove a few
of the wounded. There was no alternative but to recommend those whom
there was no possibility of removing to the honour and humanity of the
French commanders; and Colonel Mackinnon, who had lived in France,
and was in every respect one of the most accomplished officers in the
British army, did this in a manner which was believed to have had great
effect in obtaining for them the humane and honourable treatment they
received. All who were able to march were ordered to assemble at three
that afternoon, and proceed to Calera that night, ... a town which the
French had completely destroyed. The next day they were overtaken at
Arzobispo by the British army, and instead of passing the night there,
as had been intended, were ordered to proceed. Forty bullock-cars were
added to their means of transport, but in such ill repair for some
of the worst roads in the world, that only eleven of them reached
Deleitosa. A more difficult six days’ march could hardly be conceived,
and the difficulty was of a kind more trying to a brave and feeling
mind than danger. There was only a commissary’s clerk to provide for
them, and the runaway Spaniards were plundering the small magazines
in all the villages. Reports that the French had crossed the Tagus,
and were in their front, alarmed his men, who were in no condition for
the field, and many of them took to the mountains. Mackinnon mustered
his force in a convent near Deleitosa; it consisted then of 2000 men,
and these he conducted to Elvas, without magazines, with no assistance
from the magistrates, who, on the contrary, sometimes evinced a hostile
disposition; and with such want of humanity on the part of the people
(made callous by selfishness, and selfish by necessity), that he was
often obliged to use violent means, or the men must have been starved.
♦DEFEAT OF THE SPANIARDS AT ARZOBISPO.♦
The British army was now stationed at Deleitosa, whence they could
defend the point of Almaraz and the lower parts of the Tagus. Cuesta
remained at Arzobispo; but so little in concert with Sir Arthur, that
he moved his head-quarters, and suffered three days to elapse without
sending him any information of his plans or movements. On the night
of the 7th, he removed to Peraleda de Garbin, leaving two divisions
of infantry and Alburquerque’s division of cavalry to defend the
passage of the river. This was an imprudent measure, for the enemy
were in force on the left bank; they had already attempted to win the
bridge, and were now erecting batteries. The bridge was barricaded, and
defended by several batteries with embrasures connected by a covered
way, and upon these works the general relied with such confidence, that
he thought he might safely withdraw the greater part of his army to
more convenient quarters. Cuesta ought to have understood the nature
of this post; he had been blamed for abandoning it in the former part
of the year: satisfied, however, with having fortified the bridge,
he never thought of examining whether ♦AUG. 8.♦ the river might not
be fordable. Mortier, who commanded the corps of the French which
led the pursuit, erected batteries to call off the attention of the
Spaniards, while he ordered the chief of his staff, Dombrowsky, with
two good ♦OPERATIONS DE M. SOULT, 524.♦ swimmers, to sound the Tagus.
His officer of engineers had observed, that when the Spanish horse
were brought to drink they went some way into the river; trial was
made where this indication promised some hope of success, and a good
ford, passable even for infantry, was found there, not two hundred
yards above the bridge and the Spanish batteries. Soult, who had
now come up, resolved to effect the passage in the heat of the day,
when the Spaniards would be taking their mid-day sleep, and might be
surprised. He calculated upon a carelessness which he was sure to
find. The Spaniards relied upon the river for their defence, never
having deemed it needful to ascertain how far it might be relied on:
the passage was accomplished almost as soon as they were aware of the
attempt; the works of the bridge were taken in the rear, some of the
Spanish artillerymen were cut down ♦NAYLIES, 174.♦ at their guns,
and others, in a manner not to be justified by any laws of war, were
compelled to turn them upon their countrymen; the works were presently
demolished, and the way opened for Girard’s infantry. Alburquerque’s
cavalry were reposing under some trees, a short league from the scene
of action; at the first alarm they ♦NAYLIES, 175.♦ hastened to support
their countrymen; and their charge was made with such resolution and
effect, that Soult is said to have thought of firing grape upon them
through his own men, as the only means of repelling them. But succours
came to the French in time for preventing this atrocious expedient; and
the Spaniards, horse and foot alike, retreated, or rather fled through
a mountainous country, which favoured their escape, leaving their
ammunition, their baggage, and the whole of their artillery. The slain
were estimated by the French at 1600 men, most of whom were cut down
in a pursuit from which the enemy returned with every man his sabre
red with blood. Some of the French were drowned in the passage, their
other loss was trifling. The same frightful circumstance as at Talavera
occurred after the action; the herbage took fire; the wind spread the
flames far and wide, among stubble, dry shrubs, and groves of ♦NAYLIES,
177.♦ ilex and of olives; ... on all sides the cries of the wounded
were heard; and through the night muskets, which the fugitives had
thrown away, went off, cartridges took fire, and cassoons of artillery
exploded.
♦MOVEMENTS OF MARSHAL NEY.♦
The commonest precaution might have saved the Spaniards from this
defeat, in which, though the loss of men was not great, that of
artillery and ammunition was considerable, and the moral effect upon
the troops of more importance than either. It seems, indeed, that Soult
advanced to Arzobispo in the sole hope of profiting by the negligence
of the Spanish commanders to strike some such blow; for the enemy had
no intention at this time of carrying the war into Extremadura, finding
Almaraz too well defended, and the fords, which were said to exist
below the bridge, impassable. Ney had formed the design of crossing
them, and taking possession of the defiles of Deleitosa and Xaraicejo,
thus to cut off the retreat of the English toward Portugal; but those
points were secured by Sir Arthur, as well as the passage of the river,
and the French Marshal was ordered back to Salamanca to secure that
part of the country, in concert with Kellermann, against the Duque del
Parque and the Conde de Noroña, who had been prevented from occupying
the enemy on that side for want of artillery and cavalry; the former,
however, was now beginning to act on the offensive. Ney began his march
on the 9th to the Puerto de Baños, in his way towards Old Castille; and
this brought him in contact with Sir Robert Wilson.
♦ACTION WITH SIR R. WILSON AT THE PUERTO DE BAÑOS.♦
When the British commander left Talavera, Cuesta’s advanced guard was
in communication with Sir Robert, and that officer was informed of the
intended retreat of the Spaniards, that he might in like manner fall
back. But he was advanced too far for this to be practicable; after a
long march through the mountains, he found himself, on the night of the
14th, six leagues from Arzobispo; the high road between Oropesa and
Talavera was to be crossed, and Victor was in possession of Talavera;
thinking it, therefore, too late to reach Arzobispo, he determined
to move by Puerto de San Julien and Centinello, and cross the Tietar
toward the mountains. On the 11th he reached Baños, and had set out
the following morning on the road of Grenadilla, to restore by this
route his communication with the allied armies, when a cloud of dust
was perceived on the road of Plasencia, and a peasant assured him
it proceeded from a body of the enemy. Readily believing what was so
probable, he turned back, and took post in front of Baños, placing 200
Spanish infantry under Colonel Grant in advance of Aldea Nueva. The
enemy’s chasseurs and voltigeurs advanced in considerable bodies under
General Lorset; and Grant, after a resistance in which the Spaniards
demeaned themselves gallantly, was compelled to fall back. The French
then attempted to cut off Sir Robert’s own legion, which was posted
between Aldea Nueva and Baños: he had strengthened his position by
every means which the time allowed, so that they could only advance
gradually, and with severe loss from the fire of musketry which was
kept up upon them. At length part of the Merida battalion on the right
gave way, and a road was thus left open by which the position might
have been turned. Then Sir Robert ordered a retreat upon the heights
above Baños, and from thence sent to secure the road of Monte Mayor,
which turned the Puerto de Baños, a league in the rear, and by which
the French were directing a column. Don Carlos d’Espagna came up at
this time with his battalion of light infantry, took post along the
heights commanding the road to Baños, and enabled Sir Robert to detach
a party to the mountain on the left, commanding the main road. On the
Extremadura side this Puerto is not a pass of such strength as on the
side of Castille. Sir Robert had no artillery, and the French were not
less than treble the number of his troops; nevertheless he maintained
his ground for nine hours. At six in the evening, three columns of the
enemy succeeded in gaining the height on the left; his post was then no
longer tenable, and he retired along the mountains, leaving open the
main road, along which a considerable column of cavalry immediately
hastened. It came in sight of the battalion of Seville, which had
been left at Bejar with orders to follow on the morrow; but when Sir
Robert was obliged to retire, and the action commenced, he ordered it
to the pass to watch the Monte Mayor road and the heights on the rear
of his left. As soon as the French cavalry came nigh, an officer with
some dragoons rode on, and called out to the Spanish commanders to
surrender. They were answered by a volley that killed the whole party;
the Spaniards then began to mount the heights; they were attacked and
surrounded by two bodies, one of horse, the other of foot; but they
succeeded in cutting their way through, and Ney, having forced the
pass, hastened on to Salamanca. Sir Robert’s loss was not considerable,
and after halting two days at Miranda de Castañas, to rest his men, and
collect those who were dispersed, he proceeded on his way.
♦THE FRENCH ENTER TALAVERA.♦
The retreat of Cuesta from Talavera, however much both the former and
subsequent conduct of that general may deserve censure, was, under his
circumstances, at least an excusable measure. About 1500 of the wounded
were left, whom there was no time to remove; most of whom, indeed,
were not in a state to bear removal. Cuesta had hardly begun his march
before the French were in sight. When Victor entered the town, he found
some of the wounded, French and English alike, lying on the ground in
the Plaza. After complimenting the English, and observing that they
understood the laws and courtesies of war, he told them there was one
thing which they did not understand, and that ♦VICTOR BEHAVES WELL TO
THE ENGLISH WOUNDED.♦ was how to deal with the Spaniards. He then sent
soldiers to every house, with orders to the inhabitants immediately to
receive and accommodate the wounded of the two nations, who were lodged
together, one English and one Frenchman; and he expressly directed that
the Englishman should always be served first. Many had already died
in the square, and the stones were covered with blood; Victor ordered
the townsmen to come with spades and besoms, remove and bury the dead,
and cleanse the Plaza; he was speedily obeyed, and then the French
said the place was fit for them to walk in. This was done a few hours
after they entered the town. The next day the troops were assembled
at noon, and liberty of pillaging for three hours was allowed them.
Every man was provided with a hammer and a small saw for this purpose
in his knapsack, and they filed off by beat of drum in regular parties
to the different quarters of the town upon this work, as a business
with which they were well acquainted. Nothing escaped their search:
they discovered corn enough to supply the French army for three months;
these magazines had been concealed both from the Spanish and English
generals, and the owners were now punished for their treachery to their
countrymen and their allies, by the loss of the whole. Dollars enough
to load eight mules were also found hidden beneath some broken wheels
and rubbish in a yard belonging to one of the convents.
♦MURDER OF THE BISHOP OF CORIA.♦
The behaviour of Victor to the wounded English deserves more especially
to be mentioned, because Soult was carrying on the war with unrelenting
barbarity. From Plasencia he laid waste the fertile vale in which that
city stands with fire and sword. Serradilla, Pasanon, Arroyo-Molinos,
El Barrado, Garganta la Olla, Texada, Riolobos, Malpartida, and La
Oliva, were burnt by his troops, who, when they were not otherwise
employed, went out upon the highways, robbed every person whose ill
fortune compelled them to travel in this miserable country, and usually
killed those whom they robbed. D. Juan Alvarez de Castro, the Bishop of
Coria, in his eighty-sixth year, was murdered by these wretches. When
Lapisse, in the month of June, marched from Salamanca to Alcantara, the
Bishop with great difficulty and fatigue escaped; but the hardships
which he then underwent were too much for one in such extreme old age,
and when Soult quartered himself in this part of the country, he was
confined to his bed in the village of Los Hoyos. Had he been removed
he must have died upon the road; it was, therefore, not a matter of
choice but of necessity that he should remain and take his chance.
Three of his clergy and some of his domestics remained with him; and
a few old men took refuge under the same roof, thinking the presence
of their venerable pastor would render it a safe asylum. The French
entered the village, and took possession of the house where the old
prelate lay in bed. His chaplains met them, and intreated protection
for their spiritual father, and his domestics waited upon them, hoping
to obtain favour, or at least to escape injury. But after these
ruffians had eaten and drunk what was set before them, they plundered
the house of every thing which could be converted to their own use, and
destroyed whatever they could not carry away. Then they fell upon the
unhappy people of the house, one of whom they killed, and wounded six
others; lastly, they dragged the Bishop from his bed, and discharged
two muskets into his body.
♦VENEGAS’S ARMY KEPT IN INACTION BEFORE AND AFTER THE BATTLE OF
TALAVERA.♦
The plans of the enemy on the side of Extremadura were effected;
they who had so lately trembled for Madrid had seen the allied
armies recross the Tagus, and they gave themselves credit for the
fortunate issue of a campaign, in which, if it had not been for the
misconduct of the Spanish General and of the Central Junta, they must
have been driven to the Ebro. On the side of La Mancha they were
not less successful. Venegas, on the 14th of July, had received
orders to occupy the attention of the enemy, and divert them from
the allied armies as much as possible, without endangering himself
In consequence he advanced his army from El Moral, Ynfanles, Puerto
Elano, and Valdepeñas, to Damiel, La Solana, El Corral de Caraquel,
and Manzanares, keeping his head-quarters still at Santa Cruz de
Mudela, and expecting intelligence which would justify him in advancing
to Consuegra and Madrilejos. At this time he supposed it was the
intention of the combined armies to march upon Madrid; and when the
want both of provisions and means of transport rendered it impossible
for the British army to proceed, Cuesta gave him no intelligence of
this, thereby exposing him to be destroyed, if the French, instead
of marching upon Talavera, had directed their attack against him.
Cuesta’s whole conduct respecting the British army was so utterly
unreasonable, that it can only be accounted for by ascribing it to
obstinacy and incapacity. The wants of the British army were palpable;
he had them before his eyes, and could at any moment have satisfied
himself of the truth of every complaint which he received; yet he
concealed the real state of things both from his own government and
from Venegas, to both of whom it was of such essential importance that
they should be accurately informed. The Spanish government received
true intelligence from Mr. Frere, and in consequence they dispatched
a courier to Venegas, directing him to suspend his operations, and
take up a defensive position. Cuesta’s neglect rendered it prudent
to dispatch these orders; but one evil produced another. Two hours
after the arrival of the courier, Venegas received intelligence of
the victory of Talavera, which was the more unexpected, because the
Intruder, true to the French system, had published an Extraordinary
Gazette, stating that he had defeated the allied armies on the 26th.
Venegas ordered Te Deum to be sung in the neighbouring churches, and
celebrated the victory by a general discharge: but he failed to improve
it; and, instead of considering that the circumstances under which
the Junta had dictated his instructions were now entirely changed, he
adhered strictly to them, and lost the opportunity of advancing to
Madrid; thus consummating the series of blunders by which a campaign so
well planned, and a victory so bravely won, were rendered fruitless.
Had he pushed for that city immediately, he might have entered it; Sir
Robert Wilson would have joined him there, the resources of the city
would have been secured for the allies, and the recovery of the capital
would have raised the whole country far and near against the French. If
Alburquerque had commanded this army, the momentous opportunity would
not have been lost.
♦HIS USELESS ATTEMPT UPON TOLEDO.♦
Venegas therefore remained with his vanguard at Aranjuez, and his
head-quarters at Ocaña, while another division of his army under
Lacy was employed in an idle attempt upon Toledo, which, as he did
not choose to destroy the houses from whence the enemy fired at
him, because it was a Spanish town, could not possibly succeed, and
therefore ought not to have been made. On the third day after the
battle Cuesta wrote to Venegas, directing him to advance upon Madrid.
“This operation,” he said, “must oblige Victor to detach a large part
of his force toward the capital, in which case the allies would pursue
him to that city, and if any unforeseen accident should compel Venegas
to retire, he might retreat by Arganda and along the skirts of the
mountains.” This letter was written at eleven at night. Twelve hours
afterwards Cuesta forwarded a second dispatch, stating that Victor’s
army had marched in the direction of Torrijos and Toledo. Venegas, upon
receiving the first, ordered his whole force to unite at Aranjuez,
meaning to lose no time in reaching the capital. The contents of the
second staggered him; if the enemy marched for Toledo, they would
fall on his rear-guard; if they went through Torrijos direct upon
Madrid, they had the start, and would get between him and that city. He
determined, therefore, still to collect his force in the neighbourhood
of Aranjuez, and there wait for fresh orders; and he reminded Cuesta
how indispensably necessary it was that their movements should be
combined.
♦VENEGAS COMPLAINS OF CUESTA.♦
His army was collected on the night of the 3d, leaving only 600 foot
and 200 horse in the neighbourhood of Toledo. The next day he received
another dispatch from Cuesta, telling him of his march from Talavera
to reinforce Sir Arthur. This letter was written with preposterous
confidence; he was going, he said, to secure the victory against Soult,
after which they should return to attack Victor. Meantime he advised
Venegas to bear in mind, that general actions with better disciplined
troops than their own did not suit them. Venegas felt the danger of
his own situation, but his prevailing feelings were indignation and
resentment at the multiplied proofs of incapacity which Cuesta had
given. He wrote to his government, stating “that he was thus left to
himself with an army inferior in number to the enemy, and, by the
acknowledgement of the captain-general, inferior in discipline also:
how much more deeply should he have been committed, if, in obedience
to that general’s orders, he had marched upon Madrid, relying on the
promised support of the allied armies!” The reflection was just as well
as natural; but Venegas ought to have reflected also, that if he had
marched upon Madrid in time, that support would not have failed him.
He added that no choice was left, save of commencing a retreat, which
would dispirit the troops and destroy the national enthusiasm in all
the places which they had occupied and must now abandon. Consequences
like these, which were immediately before his eyes, made him determine
to remain where he was, and fight if he were attacked, preferring to be
cut to pieces rather than submit to a shameful flight.
♦THE INTRUDER’S MOVEMENTS AFTER THE BATTLE.♦
The enemy were well aware of the danger to which they had been
exposed from the army of La Mancha. The Intruder, after his defeat
at Talavera, retreated to Santa Olalla, leaving Victor to take up
a position behind the Alberche, and watch the combined armies. The
next day he moved to Bargas and Olias, near Toledo. On the night of
the 31st, he received advices from Victor, who, being alarmed by Sir
Robert Wilson’s movements, was about to fall back to Maqueda; at the
same time he learnt that Venegas was collecting his force at Aranjuez
and threatening Madrid. Alarmed at this, he ordered Sebastiani and the
corps of reserve to take up a position at Illescas, from whence they
might either advance rapidly to support Victor, or to attack Venegas.
Victor’s next advices expressed further fears from the troops at
Escalona, whose force he supposed to be far greater than it was: “If
the enemy advanced in that direction,” he said, “as seemed probable, he
should retire to Mostoles.” Joseph, trembling for the capital, moved
to that place himself in the night between the 3d and 4th: Mostoles is
only twelve miles from Madrid, ... so near had the scene of action been
brought. From thence, having learnt that Victor’s apprehensions had
subsided, he turned back on the following night to Valdemoro, summoned
Sebastiani thither, and ordered an attack to be made upon Venegas.
♦VENEGAS PREPARES FOR BATTLE AT ARANJUEZ.♦
That general expected such an attack from the moment when he was
apprised of Cuesta’s retreat. At daybreak on the 5th, he went from his
head-quarters at Tembleque to reconnoitre the position at Aranjuez. The
Queen’s Bridge was the only one which had not been broken down; his
first measure was to recall Lacy with the advanced guard from Puente
Largo on the Xarama, that he might secure his retreat over this bridge
in time; then he resolved to occupy the range of heights adjacent to
Ontigola, beginning from Mount Parnaso, and to defend the passage of
the river. Having directed these measures, he returned to his quarters,
leaving Giron in command of the three divisions upon the Tagus. Three
hours had hardly elapsed before Giron sent word that large columns of
horse and foot and artillery were marching upon Puente Largo, and that
some had already crossed the Xarama; this was followed by tidings that
a great dust was seen in the direction of the ford of Añover. It could
not now be doubted that a serious attack was about to be made; the ford
would certainly be attempted, and Venegas was apprehensive that he
should be assailed in the rear at the same time by troops from Toledo.
He therefore ordered Lacy to cross the Queen’s Bridge, and break it
down; and marched his reserve from Ocaña to the height on the left of
the road between that town and Aranjuez, where they might be ready to
resist an attack on the side of Toledo or the ford, and to support the
retreat of the other divisions, who, if they found themselves unable to
guard the river, were instructed to retreat to Ocaña; but their orders
were to defend the passage to the utmost, and maintain every position
inch by inch.
Lacy could not commence his retreat soon enough to avoid an attack;
a strong body of cavalry from the Cuesta de la Reyna fell upon his
rear, but they resisted the enemy, and, retiring in good order over
the Queen’s Bridge, broke it down, and took post upon some heights
which protected it: the bridge itself was defended by Don Luis Riquelme
with three battalions and four pieces of cannon; another battalion
was stationed in the Plaza de S. Antonio. D. Miguel Antonio Panes, a
captain of artillery, only son of the Marquis of Villa Panes, defended
the broken Puente de Barcas with two eight-pounders and two companies.
Other troops were stationed at the ford of the Infante Don Antonio’s
garden, at the Puente Verde, at the Vado Largo, or broad ford, and in
the Calle de la Reyna. A reserve was placed on each side the road to
Ocaña, and in the walks immediately adjoining the palace, on the left
of which the whole of the cavalry stood ready to charge the enemy in
case they should win the passage of the river, or attack the Spaniards
in the rear by a party which might have crossed at some remoter point.
♦ARANJUEZ AND ITS GARDENS.♦
The ground whereon a battle has been fought is never passed over by
an intelligent traveller without producing a meditative train of
thought, however transient, even if the scene has no other interest;
but when the local circumstances are remarkable, the impressions become
deeper and more durable, especially if the war were one in which,
after any lapse of time, the heart still feels a lively concern.
Aranjuez had been for nearly two centuries the spring residence of
the Spanish court. It stands in a rich and lovely country, where the
Xarama falls into the Tagus, in what was once a peninsula. Charles
V. had built a hunting-seat there, which Philip III. enlarged into a
palace, yet such a palace as was designed for comfort and comparative
retirement, rather than for splendour. In his time a canal was made
between the two rivers, partly with the intent of giving the place
a character of safety, that the King might be secure there with no
larger body of guards than his dignity required. Succeeding monarchs
each added something to the embellishment of the grounds, and Charles
IV., when Prince of Asturias, made a garden which was called by his
name. Aranjuez itself was a poor village till the time of Grimaldi’s
administration, when a town was built there under his directions, and
partly on the Dutch plan; the streets being long, spacious, straight,
and uniform, with rows of trees, for beauty and for shade, ... only
the canals were wanting. The population had increased to some 10,000
persons, who depended in great measure for their prosperity upon the
annual residence of the court.
The pride of Aranjuez was in its gardens; they were in the French
style, but with a charm which that style derived from a Spanish
climate. Long and wide avenues were overbowered with elms, which loved
the soil, and which, by the stateliness of their growth, and the deep
umbrage of their ample branches, repaid the care with which water from
the Tagus was regularly conducted to their roots. That river also
supplied numerous fountains, each in the centre of some area, square or
circular, hex- or oct-angular, where, in peaceful times, at all hours
of the day, some idlers or ruminators were seen on the marble benches,
enjoying the shade, and the sight and the sound of the water, which
was thrown up by statues of all kinds, appropriate or preposterous,
beasts, harpies, sea-horses, Tritons, and heathen gods and goddesses,
in jets or curvilinear shoots, intersecting each other, falling in
regular forms, sparkling as they played, cooling the air around, and
diffusing a sense of freshness even in the hottest noon. In some
places the loftiest trees were made to bear a part in these devices of
wanton power, the pipes being conveyed to their summit; in others the
fountains set music in motion when they played. There was one fountain
which served as a monument of one of the proudest victories that had
ever been achieved by Spain, the central part being formed from a block
of marble which had been taken in one of the Turkish ships at Lepanto.
But this was a place where the strength of vegetation made art
appear subordinate, and the magnificence which all these elaborate
embellishments produced was subservient to delight and comfort. The
elms, which were the largest of their kind, had attained a growth which
nothing but artificial irrigation in a genial soil and hot climate
could have given them. The poplar and the tamarisk flourished in like
manner; the latter grew along the banks of the Tagus with peculiar
luxuriance. Every approach to Aranjuez was shaded with trees, from
which avenues branched off in all directions, opening into glades,
and diversified with bowers. Nor was this royal expenditure directed
only to the purposes of splendid enjoyment. The Spanish Kings, with an
intention better than the success which attended it, endeavoured to
improve the agriculture of the country, by setting their subjects an
example upon the royal domains. The best fruits in the Peninsula were
cultivated for sale in the royal gardens; the finest oil in Spain was
produced there, and wine from vineyards of the choicest grapes was
collected in cellars of unequalled extent. They had attempted also to
naturalize the camel there, and at one time from two to three hundred
of these animals fed in the royal pastures, and were occasionally
employed for burthen. But though they bred, and appeared to thrive
there, the experiment was given up; the native animals, which are
reared with so much less cost and care, being better suited to the
soil, and surface, and climate of Spain.
The banks of the Tagus at Aranjuez, and the gardens which it had so
long been the pride and pleasure of the Spanish Kings to embellish,
were now to be made the scene of war. About two in the afternoon the
French appeared upon the right bank, and began the attack along the
whole line. They opened a heavy fire on all points, but more especially
upon the ford of Don Antonio’s garden, and the reserve from the walks
were sent to strengthen that post. Panes at the Puente de Barcas was
struck by a ball, which carried away his leg; a glance convinced him
that the wound was mortal: “Comrades,” said he, “stand by these guns
till death ... I am going to heaven:” and, as they bore him from the
field, the only anxiety he expressed was, that another officer should
take his place without delay. Don Gaspar Hermosa succeeded him, after
planting a mortar at the Puente ford in the midst of the enemy’s fire.
The Spanish artillery was excellently served this day, and frequently
silenced that of the French. One mortar placed in the thicket opposite
the islet, made great havoc among the enemy. Lacy, perceiving his own
post secure, and that the main attack was made upon the left, at the
Puente Verde, the gardens of the Prince and of Don Antonio, removed his
division thither without waiting for orders. The firing continued till
the approach of night, when the French, baffled in all their attempts,
retired. The loss of the Spaniards was between two and three hundred;
they computed that of the French at three hundred killed, and about a
thousand wounded. The French force consisted of fourteen or fifteen
thousand, being the whole of Sebastiani’s corps. They themselves
carefully avoided all mention of the action, saying only that they
worsted the advanced guard of Venegas, and drove it beyond the Tagus.
Giron, who commanded, was rewarded with the rank of camp-martial; and
the Junta testified its sense of the heroism of Panes, who died a few
hours after he was wounded, by exempting the title in his family from
the duties called _lanzas_ and _medias anatas_ for ever, appointing
his father a gentleman of the bed-chamber, and ordering a letter to be
written to him, as a document to be preserved in the archives of his
house, expressing, in the most honourable terms, the sense which the
country entertained of the services rendered to it both by father and
son.
♦DELIBERATIONS CONCERNING THE ARMY OF LA MANCHA.♦
The French after this repulse recrossed the Xarama, and, as Venegas
had foreseen, prepared to attack him from the other side. According
to their official statement, they thought it would be a long and
difficult work to rebuild the bridges at Aranjuez, and that it would
be less dangerous to force the passage of the Tagus at Toledo, where
the Spaniards remained masters of the bridge. The Spanish General,
therefore, disposed his troops at Aranjuez, Ocaña, La Guardia, and
Tembleque, ready to march, as circumstances might require, to some
point where he could only be attacked in front, and might be freed
from the apprehension that the enemy would cut off his retreat by way
of Toledo, and, having disabled him, penetrate to the Sierra Morena,
the armies of Cuesta and Sir Arthur being too far off to prevent them.
The necessity of retreating was indeed obvious; and the Junta were of
opinion that he had no other course left than that of abandoning La
Mancha, and taking post at the pass of Despeñaperros. Mr. Frere thought
it would be better, if La Mancha were untenable, to occupy the passes
with a part of his army only (for it was not to be supposed that at
this time the French could make any serious attempt upon Andalusia),
and march with or detach the rest upon the left of the enemy, through
a country which they had never been able to occupy, Cuenca, Molina,
and as far as Arragon; a movement upon the two former points would
threaten the capital, upon the latter it would give the Spaniards a
decided superiority in that quarter, and interrupt the communication
of the French with France. In the present state of things, Mr. Frere
perceived how desirable it was that the Spaniards should have as many
small armies as possible; their system of military subsistence and
discipline being so imperfect, defeats became dangerous, and even
destructive, in proportion to the size of the army; in small bodies
they were comparatively of little importance: in small bodies the
Spaniards had almost uniformly been successful; and such diversions
would harass and distract the French, and waste their force.
♦VENEGAS RESOLVES TO ATTACK THE ENEMY.♦
Mr. Frere spoke upon this plan to one of the leading members of the
war department, and would have delivered in his advice in writing, if
Marquis Wellesley had not at that time been daily expected to arrive
at Seville and supersede him. This circumstance, and the confidence
which Venegas expressed in the spirit of his troops (for he seemed
disposed to risk a battle rather than abandon La Mancha,) induced him
to wait for the Marquis’s arrival; and then it was too late. For on the
same day that Mr. Frere recommended this proposed diversion, Venegas
received advices from the fifth division, under General Zerain, by
Toledo, that the French had received a reinforcement of 8000 ♦AUG. 8.♦
men, and were about to attack him. Upon this the general ordered the
fourth division from Tembleque to advance to his support. While they
were on their way, Sebastiani, having collected ♦AUG. 9.♦ his whole
corps at Toledo, attacked Zerain, who retreated in good order to
Sonseca, and from thence turned to Almonacid to join the troops which
had been sent to his assistance. At Almonacid Venegas assembled his
whole army on the 10th, and believing that the number of the enemy did
not exceed 14,000, the same reasons which had made him stand his ground
at Aranjuez, after the retreat of the combined armies, induced him once
more to give the French battle. He could not bear to abandon the people
of La Mancha, who had welcomed him with enthusiasm on his advance: he
knew how injurious it was, not merely to the general character of an
army, but to the individual feelings of the soldiery, to be perpetually
giving way before the enemy, losing ground, and losing reputation
and hope also; and his success at Aranjuez made him confident in the
courage and conduct of his troops. Before he delivered his own opinion,
he summoned the different chiefs of division to council, and they
perfectly accorded with his pre-determination. This was on the 10th; he
resolved to let the troops rest the next day, that they might recover
from their march, and it was agreed to attack the enemy at daybreak on
the 12th. Meantime it was supposed more accurate information of their
number might be obtained.
♦HE IS ATTACKED BY THEM.♦
Delay has ever been the bane of the Spanish councils, and Venegas
should have remembered, that in offensive war every thing depends
upon celerity. Victor had now opened a communication with Soult, and
the Intruder being thus delivered from all fear of the allied armies,
joined Sebastiani, with the reserve, on the 9th. While Venegas was
deliberating, his position was reconnoitred; and on the morning of the
day which he had allowed for rest he was attacked by an army of little
less than double the force at which he had computed it. The Spaniards,
however, were not taken by surprise. The right wing, under Vigodet,
extended to some rising ground beyond the village of Almonacid: the
centre, consisting of two divisions, under Camp-marshal Castejon,
were in the plain before the village. Lacy commanded the left, which
was supported by a height, detached from the range of hills that run
north and south, beginning at Toledo. Giron was stationed, with three
battalions, as a reserve, behind the centre; the rest of his division
were posted, part on the heights to the left, part at an advanced
battery, and the remainder upon the Castle hill, behind the village.
The cavalry, under Camp-marshals the Marquis of Gelo, D. Tomas Zerain,
and the Viscount de Zolina, were placed in two bodies, one on each wing.
♦BATTLE OF ALMONACID.♦
The Intruder was in the field; but Sebastiani was the real commander.
That general perceived that the event of the day depended upon the
possession of the hill on the Spaniards’ left, and he ordered Laval
to attack it with his two divisions. Laval formed in close columns,
by divisions and brigades, and attacked the hill both in front and on
the right at once. The French suffered considerably in this attack.
Count Sobolesky and another chief of battalion were killed, several
of equal rank wounded; but they had the advantage of numbers as well
as discipline. The colonel who commanded on the hill was wounded, and
before Giron could reach the spot with the reserve, the battalions
which were posted there gave way. These battalions, instead of rallying
when they found themselves supported, confused the troops who came to
support them. The height, upon which the fate of the day depended, was
lost; and the enemy, having won it, attacked the Spaniards in flank.
Lacy upon this wheeled to face the enemy, and for a while withstood
them; 200 cavalry, led by Don Nicholas Chacon, charged one of their
columns, which, forming itself into a square, withstood the attack; and
Chacon, having his horse shot under him, and some of his best officers
and soldiers killed, was compelled to withdraw. In the centre the enemy
were equally successful, and at length the Spaniards fell back along
the whole of their line. Nevertheless the ground was well contested,
and Venegas took up a second position behind Almonacid, supported by
the Castle hill. Here he was presently attacked at all points; his
cavalry made another charge, which failed for lack of numbers, not
of spirit, and the general then perceived that there was no hope of
recovering the day. He therefore commenced his retreat, and ordered
Vigodet, whose division was at this time the least exposed, to bring up
and cover the rear. Vigodet performed this service with great coolness,
recovered and spiked one of the cannon which had been taken, and
began at length to fall back himself in good order. At this time some
ammunition carts, which were blown up on his right, that they might
not fall into the enemy’s hands, frightened the horses of the little
cavalry which covered his own retreat, and the French, taking advantage
of their confusion, charged him vigorously. The second in command
of the division, D. Francisco de Reyna, checked the pursuers, while
Vigodet rallied the scattered horse, and collected about 1000 men,
under whose protection he left the field. They retreated by different
routes to Herencia, meaning to fall back to Manzanares, Membrilla, and
Solana. As far as Herencia the movement was effected in good order,
only a few soldiers, straggling from their ranks to drink at the few
wells in that arid country; but when the van reached Manzanares, a cry
arose that the French had got before them on the road of Valdepeñas,
to cut off their retreat. This false report, either originating in
treason or in cowardice, spread through the troops: from that moment
subordination was at an end, and they forfeited the credit which had
been gained in the action, by dispersing.
Sebastiani stated the loss of the Spaniards at 4000 killed, 4000
prisoners, an immense number wounded, 100 ammunition waggons,
and thirty-five pieces of cannon. The whole of the artillery and
baggage was certainly lost; but the number of prisoners was grossly
exaggerated, because the Spaniards did not disperse till they had
accomplished their retreat; and the French, with that inconsistency
which so often betrayed the falsehood of their official accounts,
admitted that none of their corps could be overtaken. He gave no
account of his own loss; Venegas estimated it at 8000, ... an
exaggeration as great as that of the French general; but that the
French suffered severely was evident, because they were long crippled
for any further operations. Venegas retired to La Carolina, his men
assembled at the passes of the Sierra, and in a few days he was again
at the head of a respectable army. The enemy had now effected every
thing which they proposed; they had driven Cuesta and the British
beyond the Tagus on one side, and on the other had recovered possession
of La Mancha; and the Intruder, rejoicing in the issue of a campaign,
which opened under such inauspicious aspects, returned triumphantly to
Madrid. The disgrace of Talavera sate easy upon the French; ... with
their usual contempt of truth, they affirmed that they had won the
victory; and the situation of the contending armies a few weeks after
the battle gave credit to the impudent assertion.
CHAPTER XXV.
PLANS OF THE FRENCH. SIR A. WELLESLEY RAISED TO THE PEERAGE.
MARQUIS WELLESLEY ARRIVES IN SPAIN. ALTERATIONS IN THE BRITISH
MINISTRY. STATE OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT. THE BRITISH ARMY
RETREATS TO THE FRONTIERS OF PORTUGAL. BATTLES OF TAMAMES,
OCANA, AND ALBA DE TORMES.
♦1809. AUGUST.♦
Never during the war had the prospect appeared so hopeful as when Sir
Arthur entered Spain. For the first time Buonaparte had been repulsed
at all points in a great battle; and for the first time also a spirit
of national resistance had broken forth in Germany, ... the only
spirit by which his tyranny could be overthrown. The Spaniards seemed
to acquire strength from their defeats, learning confidence in their
resources, if not experience from misfortunes; while the British army,
by the passage of the Douro and the discomfiture of Soult, had once
more made the enemy feel what they might apprehend from such troops and
such a commander.
♦SOULT PROPOSES IMMEDIATELY TO INVADE PORTUGAL.♦
The Peninsula was but a secondary object in the all-grasping schemes
of Buonaparte’s ambition. At first he had expected to secure it
without a struggle; nor was he yet so undeceived concerning the real
nature of the resistance to be experienced there, as to believe that
any serious effort would be required for completing its conquest. In
Germany it was, he thought, that the fate of Europe must be decided;
and this opinion was proclaimed in England by those who, on every
occasion, sought to persuade the public that resistance to such a
statesman and such a general, wherever it was attempted, could only
end in defeat, and humiliation, and ruin. Under this impression he had
ordered the intrusive government, which was in fact entirely under his
orders, to content itself with protracting the war till the campaign
in Germany should be brought to a close. That campaign was now ended.
The battle of Wagram had re-established his shaken power; an armistice
had immediately been sued for, and in the negotiations which followed,
the house of Austria surrendered more than the French king Francis I.
had lost at Pavia. The news of this great success did not, however,
induce the Intruder to deviate from his instructions. M. Soult, the
most enterprising as well as the ablest of the French officers who
were employed in Spain, proposed at this time a plan for re-entering
Portugal. The line which should have secured the communication of the
British army with Lisbon he occupied, now that that army had found
it necessary to retreat across the Tagus. He proposed, therefore, to
move from Plasencia against Beresford’s inefficient force, while Ney,
advancing from Salamanca, should act upon its left flank. That army, if
not absolutely destroyed, would be prevented from forming a junction by
way of Alcantara with Sir Arthur; and the French, by rapidly pursuing
this advantage, might occupy Abrantes, and once more take possession of
Lisbon, in which case Soult, ♦CAMPAIGN OF 1809, PP. 49–52. IB. APP.
C-K.♦ still deceiving himself with regard to the disposition of the
Portugueze, thought they would submit to an enemy whom they found it
hopeless to resist. The plan was boldly conceived, though M. Soult had
not sufficiently taken into his calculation the character of the troops
with which he would again be brought in contact: but it was rejected
by Joseph, who was at that time guided chiefly by M. Jourdan. That
General, distinguished for his signal successes in the revolutionary
war, held the high situation of Major-General of the army of Spain; and
he preferring what seemed the surer though the slower course, resolved
implicitly to follow the Emperor Napoleon’s instructions, and undertake
no offensive operation for the present. A plan, he said, had been
laid down for invading Portugal, and would be executed in the month
of February. It was their intention to subjugate the south of Spain
before this should be undertaken; and if the British Commander had
possessed as little foresight as appeared in the conduct of the Spanish
government, or if the British army had not derived better support from
the Portugueze than from the Spaniards, the French might have succeeded
in both parts of their intended operations.
♦SIR A. WELLESLEY RAISED TO THE PEERAGE.♦
The Central Junta expressed its sense of Sir Arthur Wellesley’s
services, by nominating him one of the Captain-generals of the army (a
rank nearly equivalent to that of our field-marshal), and presenting
him, in the name of Ferdinand, with some horses selected from the best
breeds of Andalusia. “This tribute,” they said, “was of small value
in comparison with the services which he had rendered to Spain, and
still less in proportion to the wishes of those who offered it: but for
hearts like his, the satisfaction resulting from great achievements
was their best recompense; not was it in the power of man to bestow
any reward which could equal the glory of being one of the principal
deliverers of a great and generous people, of listening to their
blessings, and of deserving their gratitude.” Sir Arthur accepted the
horses, and the appointment also, provided he should receive permission
from his own sovereign; but he declined the pay attached to it, not
thinking it becoming that he should burthen the finances of Spain
during such a contest. In England, also, he was recompensed with new
honours. As soon as the news of his victory arrived, he was raised to
the peerage by the titles of Baron Douro of Wellesley, and Viscount
Wellington of Talavera, and of Wellington in the county of Somerset.
♦AUG. 1. MARQUIS WELLESLEY ARRIVES IN SPAIN.♦
On the fourth morning after the battle, while the bells of Cadiz were
ringing, the cannon firing, and the people rejoicing with higher hopes
than had been felt since the surrender of Dupont, Marquis Wellesley
landed in that harbour to supersede Mr. Frere. A great concourse
assembled to see him land, and as he set foot on shore, a French flag
was spread before him, that he might tread upon it in honour of his
brother’s victory. The people drew his carriage, which in that country
is an unusual mark of respect. The Marquis gave one of them a purse of
gold to distribute among his comrades: but the man returned it, and,
in the name of the people, assured him they desired no reward, being
happy that they had this opportunity of expressing the sentiments of
the whole nation. Both at Cadiz and at Seville the Marquis was received
with every mark of public honour, and with the most enthusiastic
expressions of attachment and gratitude to the British nation. But
the first dispatches from Sir Arthur opened ♦DISTRESS OF THE ARMY FOR
PROVISIONS.♦ upon him a disheartening prospect. The combined armies,
amounting to not less than 60,000 men, and 16,000 or 18,000 horse,
were depending entirely for their daily supply upon the country,
which did not contain a population in many square miles equal to the
number of the army, and could not of course produce a sufficiency for
its sustenance. Extremadura indeed is the worst peopled and least
cultivated province of the whole Peninsula. It was necessary to
send to a great distance for supplies, which, scanty as they were,
could not be procured regularly, nor without great difficulty. The
troops were ill fed, and frequently received no rations whatever.
Effectual measures, Sir Arthur said, must be taken, and that speedily.
No army could serve to any purpose unless it were properly fed; and
it was absurd to suppose that a Spaniard, or a man or animal of any
country, could make exertions without a due supply of food; in fact
the Spaniards were more clamorous, and more exhausted, if they did not
receive it regularly, than the English. The English, however, were in
a state of great distress; from the 3d till the 7th they had had no
bread; then about 4000 pounds of biscuit were divided among 30,000
mouths, and the whole supply ♦AUG. 8.♦ was exhausted. “The army,” said
Sir Arthur, “will be entirely lost, if this treatment continues. If
efficient measures had been adopted by the government when the distress
of the British troops was first represented to them, the benefit must
ere this have been experienced. There had been no neglect on the part
of Mr. Frere: the evil was owing to the poverty and exhausted state of
the country; to the inactivity of the magistrates and people; to their
disinclination to taking any trouble, except that of packing up their
property, and removing when they heard of the approach of a French
patrole; to their habits of insubordination and disobedience, and to
the want of power in the government and their officers.”
♦DISPUTES WITH CUESTA CONCERNING SUPPLIES.♦
Cuesta’s unaccommodating temper aggravated the evil. He was applied
to after the battle for ninety mules to draw the British artillery in
place of those lost in the action; there were at that time hundreds
in his army employed in drawing empty carts, and yet he refused to
part with any. Five guns belonging to Alburquerque’s division having
been taken at Arzobispo, the Duke endeavoured to make over to the
British army the mules attached to them; but Cuesta took them for
himself. His own cavalry were plentifully supplied with barley, while
hundreds of the British horses died for want of it. In other respects,
his men suffered as many privations as the English; and vexation at
this and at the untoward issue of the campaign, combined with bodily
infirmity, seems to have bewildered him: he lent ear to every complaint
against the allies; and at a time when they were literally starving,
both men and horses, he wrote to their General, stating that his own
troops were in want of necessary food, because all that he ordered
for their use was intercepted by the British and their commissaries.
The English, he said, actually sold biscuit and meat; and he heard
continual complaints and saw continual traces that they plundered all
the places through which they passed, and even followed the peasantry
to the mountains, for the purpose of stripping them even to the shirt.
Sir Arthur positively denied that any thing going to the Spanish army
had been stopped by the British; as for the tale of his soldiers
selling provisions, he observed, that it was beneath the dignity of his
Excellency’s situation and character to notice such things, and beneath
his own to reply to them. He was concerned that General Cuesta should
conceive there was any reason for complaining of the British troops;
but, continued he, “when troops are starving, which those under my
command have been, as I have repeatedly told your Excellency since I
joined you, and particularly when they had no bread from the 3d to the
7th, it is not astonishing that they should go to the villages and even
to the mountains to look for food where they think they can get it. The
complaints of the inhabitants, however, should not have been confined
to the conduct of the British; here in Deleitosa I have seen Spanish
soldiers, who ought to have been elsewhere, take off the doors of the
houses which were locked up, in order that they might plunder the
houses; and they afterwards burnt the doors.”
To preserve discipline among starving troops is indeed impossible, and
neither Cuesta nor Sir Arthur could be responsible for their men under
such circumstances; but the letter of the former brought the question
respecting provisions to a point, and Sir Arthur called upon him to
state distinctly whether he understood that the Spanish army was to
have not only all the provisions which the country could afford, but
all those also which were sent from Seville; whether any magazines had
been formed, and from whence the troops were to draw provisions? “I
hope,” said he, “that I shall receive satisfactory answers to these
questions to-morrow morning; if not, I beg that your Excellency will be
prepared to occupy the posts opposite Almaraz, as it will be impossible
for me to remain any longer in a country in which no arrangement is
made for provisioning my troops, and in which it is understood that all
the provisions which are either found in the country, or are sent from
Seville (as I have been informed, for the use of the British army) are
to be applied solely and exclusively to the Spanish troops.” On the day
that this correspondence took place, an English commissary arriving
from Truxillo with bread and barley for the British army, was stopped
on the way, and deprived of all his barley and part of his bread by
a detachment of Spanish horse. Whatever momentary irritation might
be occasioned by circumstances like these, Sir Arthur commiserated
the sufferings of the Spanish army too sincerely to harbour any
resentment; but he perceived the absolute necessity of withdrawing.
“It is useless,” he said to the British ambassador, “to complain; but
we are not treated as friends, much less as the only prop on which the
cause of Spain can depend. But, besides this want of good-will, which
can easily be traced to the temper of the General, there is such a
want of resources in the country, and so little exertion in bringing
forward what is to be found; that if the army were to remain here much
longer, it would become totally useless. The daily and increasing loss
of horses from deficiency of food, and from the badness of what there
is, is really alarming.” Ney’s return to Old Castille strengthened
him in this resolution; it satisfied him that no serious attack upon
Andalusia was intended for the present, and he thought it not unlikely
that this corps of the enemy was about to invade Portugal, for the sake
of drawing him out of Spain.
♦MR. FRERE REQUIRES THE REMOVAL OF CUESTA.♦
The necessity of removing Cuesta from the command appeared so urgent
to Mr. Frere, that he deemed it his duty to present a memorial upon
the subject, though Marquis Wellesley was expected two days afterward
at Seville. ♦AUG. 9.♦ He dwelt upon his abandonment of the wounded
at Talavera, and upon the imminent danger to which he had exposed
Venegas by concealing from him, as well as from his government, the
true state of the combined armies, and the inability of the English to
proceed. The dismissal of Cuesta, he said, could not long be delayed,
and it was important that it should take place instantly, and another
commander appointed: either the choice being left to Sir Arthur, or the
Junta itself appointing the Duke of Alburquerque, who possessed his
confidence and that of the army, and whose abilities had been tried
and approved. This was the only satisfaction which could be given to
the British General and his army, and even this would be little: “the
wound,” said Mr. Frere, “is very deep, and the English nation could
not have received one more difficult to heal than the abandonment of
their wounded at Talavera.” This was the last act of Mr. Frere in his
public capacity; and it was consistent with the whole conduct of that
minister, who, during his mission never shrunk from any responsibility,
nor ever, from the fear of it, omitted any effort which he thought
requisite for the common welfare of his own country and of Spain. In
presenting such a memorial, while his successor was, as it were, at the
door, he was conscious that he might appear to be acting irregularly in
his public character; and in his private one, that it might alter the
feelings with which he could have wished to take leave of his friends
in Spain; but, in addition to the urgency of the case, he considered
also that it would be peculiarly unpleasant for Marquis Wellesley
to begin his mission with an altercation in which his brother was
concerned. Mr. Frere’s situation had been unfavourable to any thing
like a controlling influence; the intelligence which announced the
intended assistance of a British force had been accompanied with an
intimation of his recall, and for some months he had, as he expressed
himself, literally been a minister only from day to day, looking
for the arrival of his successor by the first fair wind. The Junta
expressed their sense of his zealous services by conferring upon
him the Castillian title of Marquez de la Union (which he received
permission from his own government to retain); and, in reply to the
momentary outcry which misrepresentation and party spirit had raised
against him in England, they represented his conduct such as they
conceived it to be, and as it truly was. This had never prevented him
from using the strongest language and taking the highest tone toward
the very persons who had been foremost in this friendly act; but he
felt how unfavourable his situation was, and, knowing that that of
Marquis Wellesley would in all respects be very different, he hoped
the Marquis might be able to remedy the existing evils as far as they
were capable of being remedied. The task, however, was no easy one.
“It might seem,” he said, “that a British minister ought before that
time to have established a regular system for securing the subsistence
of the armies; but the evil lay deep; it arose from an old despotic
government, and from eighteen years of the basest corruption, intrigue,
and public pillage. The effects of all this still continued, the system
itself was not wholly done away, and even a sovereign in ordinary times
would find it difficult to remedy it.”
♦CUESTA RESIGNS THE COMMAND.♦
Marquis Wellesley, on his arrival, did not think it expedient to
insist on Cuesta’s removal. That General, he observed, was said to be
deficient in every quality necessary for an extensive command, except
courage; his temper rendered him peculiarly unfit for acting with an
allied army, and it was scarcely possible that another officer with
equal disqualifications should be found in the Spanish service. But
the government was under some apprehension of his influence, which
was supposed to be extensive and dangerous, though it rested on no
other foundation than the precarious one of undeserved popularity. The
Marquis, therefore, limited his interference to a strong expression
of his sense of the General’s misconduct, being of opinion that his
removal might be effected more willingly and with less danger if it
appeared to be the consequence of his own actions, rather than the
result of a direct application from the British ambassador. The Junta,
however, were desirous that such a direct application should be made;
and Marquis Wellesley then addressed a note to Garay, stating that it
was impossible to hope for any degree of co-operation, or even for any
aid from the troops of Spain to the British army, if the chief command
remained in the hands of General Cuesta. Cuesta had wisely anticipated
such a measure. Two days after the date of that letter to Sir Arthur,
in which he complained so preposterously of the British troops, a
paralytic stroke deprived him of the use of one leg; feeling himself
then completely incapacitated, he delivered over the army to the second
in command, D. Francisco de Eguia, and requested permission to resign,
that he might go to the baths of Alhama. When, therefore, the Marquis
delivered in his note, he was informed that Cuesta’s resignation had
been accepted.
♦EGUIA SUCCEEDS AD INTERIM TO THE COMMAND.♦
Eguia was well acquainted with the military topography of Spain, but
had no other qualification for the command of an army: at the battle
of Medellin he did not venture to depart from his orders without
receiving fresh ones from Cuesta, at a time when it was impossible for
Cuesta to communicate with him, and by this imbecility he completed
the destruction of the army that day. Mr. Frere, knowing that the
military Junta would be most likely to confirm him in the command,
because he was one of the old school, wrote a private note to Garay,
deprecating such an appointment. Alburquerque was the proper person for
the command; but the Junta were jealous of his rank, his popularity,
his talents, and his enlightened views; and Marquis Wellesley soon
discovered that, if he were named to the command, the army under him
would certainly be reduced. Till, however, a successor to Cuesta should
be chosen, the command devolved upon Eguia; and when that General
notified this to the British Commander, he accompanied the intelligence
with the fairest professions, desiring him to depute a confidential
officer, who, with another appointed on the part of the Spaniards,
might regulate the distribution of provisions in such a manner that
the English army should be supplied in preference to the Spaniards.
Lord Wellington expressed, in reply, his perfect confidence in the
intentions of Eguia, and sent some officers to Truxillo, there to meet
any whom Eguia might appoint, and settle some practicable arrangement:
a preference like that which was spoken of he well perceived was
impossible.
♦CALVO SENT TO SEE TO THE SUPPLIES.♦
When first the Junta were informed of the distress of the British army,
nothing appeared to hurt them so much as that their own troops should
have been supplied while their allies were in want, and they ordered
Cuesta, in every instance, to supply the British troops in preference
to his own. They directed the Junta of Badajoz to send two members of
their body into the vale of Plasencia, and secure the persons of those
magistrates who, having engaged to furnish means for the British army,
had failed in their engagement; to supersede them also, and place at
the disposal of the British commissary every thing which he might
require. Before these measures could be executed, Soult entered from
Old Castille, and the whole of the fertile country on that side of the
Tagus fell into the possession of the enemy. When the complaints of
the British General became louder, the Junta, alarmed at his intended
retreat into Portugal, deputed D. Lorenzo Calvo, one of their own body,
to the armies, hoping that his exertions, aided by his authority, would
effectually remedy the evil. Calvo was considered a man of energetic
character and activity, and, having been bred up in commerce, had
acquired those habits of business which were necessary for the service
in which he was now employed. True to that system of dissimulation,
which, by the old school, was esteemed essential in all business of
state, he was charged to invest Cuesta with the order of Charles III.
lest that General should take umbrage at the distinction conferred upon
Lord Wellington, though at this very time the Junta were so offended at
Cuesta’s conduct, that nothing but their fears had prevented them from
immediately displacing him.
♦LORD WELLINGTON DECLARES HIS INTENTION OF FALLING BACK.♦
But neither Eguia’s professions, nor the measures of the government,
nor the presence of one of its members, produced any relief to the
British army. Had it been in a condition for service, and provided
with means of transport, Lord Wellington had it in view to act against
the French at Plasencia, for which purpose he ordered materials to be
collected for repairing the Puente de Cardinal; but his cavalry had
now consumed all the forage within reach; they were obliged to go from
twenty to thirty miles to procure it, and frequently when they had
gone so far, the Spaniards, being themselves in equal want, deprived
them of it on their return. The horses were at length so much reduced
that they were scarcely able to relieve the outposts. More than a
month had now elapsed since the British General informed Cuesta that,
if he were not supplied, he could not remain in Spain. In the course
of that time, if proper measures had been taken, supplies might have
been forwarded from the farthest part of Andalusia; but not a mule or
cart, or article of provision of any kind had been obtained under any
order from, or arrangement made by, the government. Lord Wellington
applied for a remount of only an hundred mares, which could not be
used in the Spanish cavalry, because they used stallions; even these
he could not procure, nor did he receive an answer to his application.
It was now become absolutely necessary to withdraw, and on the 18th of
August, he requested Marquis Wellesley to give notice to the government
that he was about so to do. “Since the 22d of last month,” said he,
“the horses have not received their regular deliveries of barley, and
the infantry not ten days’ bread. I have no doubt the government have
given orders that we should be provided as we ought to be, but orders
are not sufficient. To carry on the contest to any purpose, the labour
and service of every man and of every beast in the country should be
employed in the support of the armies; and these should be so classed
and arranged as not only to secure obedience to the orders of the
government, but regularity and efficiency in the performance of the
service. Magazines might then with ease be formed, and transported
wherever the armies should be stationed. But as we are now situated,
50,000 men are collected upon a spot which cannot afford subsistence
for 10,000, and there are no means of sending to a distance to make
good the deficiency: the Junta have issued orders, which, for want of
arrangement, there are no persons to obey; and the army would perish
here, if I were to remain, before the supplies could arrive.”
♦CORRESPONDENCE WITH EGUIA AND CALVO.♦
Prepared as both the Spanish government and general ought to have been
for such a determination, both manifested the greatest astonishment
when it was announced. Eguia wrote to Lord Wellington, repeating his
protestations, that he should have every thing which he required, and
that the Spaniards should go without any thing, rather than the British
should be in want. “An English commissary,” he said, “should reside
at Truxillo, who should have a key of the magazines, and take the
proportion for the British army, though his own should perish. If,” he
continued, “notwithstanding these conclusive protestations, the British
General persisted in marching into Portugal, it would be apparent
that other causes induced him to take that step, and not the want of
subsistence.” Upon this insulting assertion, Lord Wellington informed
Eguia that any further correspondence between them was unnecessary. He
entered, nevertheless, into a sufficient explanation of the real state
of affairs. The magazines of Truxillo, according to a return sent by
Eguia himself, did not contain a sufficiency to feed the British army
alone for one day. No doubt was entertained of the exertions of the
Spanish General, nor of his sincerity. “The deficiencies,” said Lord
Wellington, “arise not from want of orders of your Excellency, but
from the want of means in the country, from the want of arrangement in
the government, and from the neglect of timely measures to supply the
wants which were complained of long ago.” A letter from Calvo to Lord
Wellington implied the same suspicion concerning the motives of his
retreat as Eguia had done, though in more qualified terms. This member
of the Junta came forward with something more specious than vague
promises and protestations. “He bound himself,” he said, “to provide
the army, within three days, with all the rations which it might
require; and within fifteen days to have magazines formed in places
appointed by the British General, containing all the articles which
the army could consume in one or two months; and to provide also carts
and mules, both of draft and burthen, sufficient for the transport of
these magazines.” He then protested that 7000 rations of bread, 50,000
pounds of flour, 250 _fanegas_ of barley, 50 of rye, 100 of wheat, and
60 _arrobas_ of rice were ready, with means of transport for them, and
before the morrow noon would reach the British army in their present
position. “My activity,” said Calvo, “shall not rest until continual
remittances of the same articles prove that my promises deserve to
be confided in; and if there were in your Excellency’s intention any
disposition to alter your purpose of retreat, I am certain I should
obtain the satisfaction of hearing your Excellency yourself confess
that I had surpassed your hopes.” At the time when Lord Wellington
received this letter, he had in his possession an order dated only
five days back, and signed by this very member of the Supreme Junta,
ordering to the Spanish head-quarters, for the use of the Spanish army,
all the provisions which the British commissary had provided in the
town of Guadalupe and its neighbourhood. Well, therefore, might he
reply to him, that he could have no confidence in his assurances. “As
for the promise,” said he, “of giving provisions to the British army
to the exclusion of the Spanish troops, such a proposal can only have
been made as an extreme and desperate measure to induce me to remain
in Spain; and were it practicable, I could not give my consent to it.
The Spanish army must be fed as well as the British. I am fully aware,”
he continued, “of the consequences which may follow my departure,
though there is now no enemy in our front; but I am not responsible
for them, whatever they may be. They are responsible who, having been
made acquainted with the wants of this army more than a month ago, have
taken no effectual means to relieve them; who allowed a brave army,
which was rendering gratuitous services to Spain, and which was able
and willing to pay for every thing it received, to starve in the midst
of their country, and be reduced by want to a state of inefficiency;
who refused or neglected to find carriages for removing the officers
and soldiers who had been wounded in their service, and obliged me to
give up the equipment of the army for the performance of this necessary
act ♦AUG. 20.♦ of humanity.” On the following day Lord Wellington began
his retreat in the direction of Badajoz.
♦MARQUIS WELLESLEY PROPOSES A PLAN FOR SUPPLYING THE ARMIES.♦
He halted at Merida, and eight days after his departure, being then
four marches from Xaraicejo, he found none of the supplies on the
road which had so confidently been promised. Having, however, been
able to separate his troops, and being out of reach of Eguia’s army,
he now procured regular supplies. Marquis Wellesley meantime had
been indefatigable in pressing upon the government the necessity
of a regular plan for provisioning the armies; and he found, upon
investigation, that orders enough had been issued, but no means
had been employed either to enforce the execution of those orders,
or to ascertain in what respects they had failed, or what were the
causes either of their total failure or of their partial success. No
magazines or regular depots had been established, no regular means of
transport provided, nor any persons regularly appointed to conduct and
superintend convoys, under the direction of the general commanding the
army; nor had any system been adopted for drawing from the more fertile
provinces, by a connected chain of magazines, resources to supply the
deficiency of those poorer countries in which the army might be acting.
At the solicitation of the Junta, Marquis Wellesley delivered in a plan
for remedying these evils. It was less easy of execution in Spain than
it would have been in England, where the system of our stagecoaches
and waggons has disciplined a great number of persons in the detail of
such arrangements; yet, with due exertions on the part of government,
it might speedily have been established. Two days elapsed, and no
notice was taken of the proposal; he requested a reply, and after two
days more Garay put into his hand a long string of regulations for
the internal management of the magazines when they should have been
formed. Marquis Wellesley again anxiously inquired whether the Junta
were disposed to adopt the plan which he had formed at their request,
and whether any steps had been taken for carrying it into effect? At
length, after it had been nine days in their hands, he was informed
that they assented to it,--but this was all; it was a mere verbal
assent, and no measures whatever were taken for beginning arrangements
of such urgent necessity. The government at the same time expressed
its confidence that the British army would now rejoin the Spaniards,
and make a forward movement against the enemy. Marquis Wellesley
suspected some of the Junta of treason. “This proposition,” said he to
his government, “accords with the general tenor of those professions
of zeal for active war, which have particularly characterized the
declarations of the Junta since the army has been deprived of the
means of movement and supply. Far from affording any just foundation
of confidence in their intentions, such declarations of activity and
enterprise, unaccompanied by any provident or regular attention to
the means and objects of the war, serve only to create additional
suspicions of ignorance, weakness, or insincerity. No person acquainted
with the real condition of the British and Spanish forces at ♦AUG. 30.♦
this time, could reasonably advise a forward movement against the enemy
with any other view than the certain destruction of the allied armies.”
♦HIS ILL OPINION OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT.♦
The conduct of the Junta gave strong grounds for such a suspicion.
The real cause which had checked the progress of a victorious army,
and finally reduced it to a state unfit for service, could not be
concealed; public opinion loudly imputed this evil to the negligence of
government, and the government endeavoured, by ungenerous artifices, to
divert the general indignation. Rumours were set afloat that the real
cause of the retreat of the British army was very different from the
assigned one; they had not fallen back upon Portugal because there had
been any deficiency either in their means of supply or of transport,
but because of certain political considerations, inconsistent with the
security and honour of Spain, and with the good faith of Great Britain.
Demands, it was whispered, had been made in the King of England’s
name, for the cession of Cadiz, of the Havannah, and even of the whole
island of Cuba; changes had been required in the form of the Spanish
government, as preliminary conditions to the further operations of the
British troops in Spain, and Lord Wellington had retreated only because
these demands were refused. These reports, which, if not invented
by the government, certainly were not discountenanced by them, were
absolutely and entirely false; nothing had been asked from Spain except
subsistence for the army employed in her defence. Marquis Wellesley,
however, though he perceived the criminal misconduct of the government,
and though he affirmed that in the last campaign no rational motives
could be imagined for the conduct of some of the generals and officers,
unless it were supposed that they concerted their operations with the
French instead of the British general, did justice to the people of
Spain. “Whatever insincerity or jealousy towards England existed, was
to be found,” he said, “in the government, its officers, and adherents;
no such unworthy sentiment prevailed among the people.” They had done
their duty, and were still ready to do it; and, notwithstanding the
vexations which he experienced, and the alarm and even ill-will which
the retreat of the British excited, he remembered, as became him,
that the cause of Spain and England was the same: while, therefore,
he expressed his opinion that the Cortes ought to be assembled, and
a more efficient government formed than that of so ill-constituted
and anomalous a body as the Junta, he listened willingly to every
suggestion for employing the British troops in any practicable manner.
Might it not be possible, it was said, for them to take up a position
on the left bank of the Guadiana, occupying Merida as an advanced post,
their right at Almendralejo, and their left extending toward Badajoz?
Portugal might be covered by this position; Seville protected at the
same time, and a point of support given to the left of the Spanish
army, which should in that case be cantoned in Medellin, Don Benito,
and Villa Nueva de la Serena.
♦LORD WELLINGTON OBJECTS TO TAKING A POSITION ON THE GUADIANA.♦
This plan the Marquis proposed to his brother; but that able general
was of opinion that the Guadiana was not defensible by a weaker
against a stronger army, being fordable in very many places, and
affording no position. The Spanish army, he thought, was at that time
in the best position in that part of the country, one which they
ought to hold against any force that could be brought against them,
if they could hold any thing; while they held it they covered the
Guadiana effectually, and their retreat from it was always secure.
He, therefore, recommended that they should send away the bridge of
boats which was still opposite Almaraz, and remain where they were
as long as possible. For the British army, Lord Wellington said, he
saw no chance at present of its resuming offensive operations; and he
desired that no hopes might be held out to the Junta of any further
co-operation on his part with the Spanish troops, which in their
present state were by no means to be depended on. He saw the difficulty
to which this determination might reduce the Spanish government; their
army might be seized with a panic, run off, and leave every thing
exposed to instant loss. All he could say to this was, that he was
in no hurry to withdraw from Spain; he wanted to refresh his troops;
he should not enter Portugal till he had heard Marquis Wellesley’s
sentiments; if he did enter it he should go no farther than the
frontier, where he should be so near, that the enemy, unless in very
great force, would not venture across the Guadiana, leaving the British
army upon their flank and rear; in fact, therefore, he should be as
useful to Spain within the Portugueze frontier as upon the Guadiana,
and even more so, because the nearer he went to Portugal, the more
efficient he should become. The best way to cover the Guadiana and
Seville, was by a position on the enemy’s flank.
♦ALBURQUERQUE APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND IN EXTREMADURA.♦
As an inducement to Lord Wellington to remain, and co-operate with
the Spanish army, the Junta proposed to place the corps which they
designed to leave in Extremadura under his command. This was to consist
of 12,000 men, a number inadequate to the service for which they were
required; but the true reason was perceived by the British General;
he had by this time had ample opportunities of discovering that the
Junta, in the distribution of their force, did not consider military
defence and military operations so much as political intrigues and the
attainment of trifling political objects. The Junta of Extremadura
had insisted that Alburquerque should have the command in their
province; the government was weak enough in authority to be obliged
to yield this, and weak enough in judgement to diminish as far as
possible the army which they unwillingly entrusted to this envied
and most ill-treated nobleman. Lord Wellington, who could not have
accepted the command unconditionally without permission from his own
court, declined it altogether under present circumstances, as being
inconsistent with those operations which he foresaw would soon become
necessary for the British army. He had intelligence that a council of
war held at Salamanca had recommended an attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo:
the loss of that place would cut off the only communication which the
Spanish government had with the northern provinces, and would give the
French secure possession of Old Castille, and probably draw after it
the loss of Almeida. It would, therefore, be incumbent upon him to make
exertions for relieving Ciudad Rodrigo. The cabildo of that city, just
at this time when Lord Wellington was contemplating their approaching
danger, and how best to succour them, gave an example of the spirit
which too many of these provincial authorities displayed toward the
British army. 100,000 pounds of biscuit had been ordered there, and
paid for by a British commissary; and when Marshal Beresford sent for
it, that it might be deposited in the magazines at Almeida, the cabildo
seized 30,000 pounds of this quantity, upon the ground that debts due
to that city by Sir John Moore’s army had not been paid, ... although
part of the business of the commissary who was sent to Ciudad Rodrigo
was to settle these accounts, and discharge the debts in question.
♦LORD WELLINGTON WITHDRAWS TO BADAJOZ.♦
This was a specimen of that ill-will towards England which prevailed in
many places among persons of this rank; and Marquis Wellesley perceived
that such persons, if not favoured by the government, were certainly
not discountenanced. The same spirit was manifested but too plainly by
the persons employed about Cuesta’s army. While they were professing
that the English army should be served in preference to their own
people (even to the exclusion of them, if needful), they never offered
to supply a single cart or mule, or any means of transport from their
own abundance. Lord Wellington, for want of such means, was compelled
to leave his ammunition behind him, and then no difficulty was found
in transporting it to the Spanish stores. No difficulty was found
in transporting the bridge of boats from Almaraz to Badajoz; yet
if these means of transport, with which the Spanish army was always
abundantly provided, had been shared with the British army, many of the
difficulties under which it suffered would have been relieved, and its
separation, says Lord Wellington, certainly would not have taken place
when it did. The distress which his men suffered would not have been
felt in an equal degree by the French, or by any people who understood
how to manage their food. Meat they had always in sufficiency, and
their chief want was of bread, ... they were not ingenious enough to
make a comfortable meal without it, though flour or rice was served out
in its stead. But the want of food for the cavalry, and of means of
transport, which actually rendered the British army inefficient, could
not be remedied by any dexterity of the men, or any foresight of the
general, and is wholly imputable to the conduct of the Spanish generals
and the Spanish government. Spain was grievously injured by this
unpardonable misconduct. The English ministry were at this very time
proposing to increase Lord Wellington’s force to 30,000 men, provided
the supreme command were vested in the British general, and effectual
arrangements made for their supply. But in the present state of things,
both the Marquis and his brother perceived that any co-operation
with the Spanish armies would only draw on a repetition of the same
disasters. The intent was therefore abandoned, ♦1809. SEPTEMBER.♦ and
Lord Wellington at the beginning of September, proceeded to Badajoz,
stationing his army, part within the Portugueze frontier, and part on
the Spanish territory, in a position which would menace the flank and
rear of the French if they advanced toward Andalusia.
♦EXPEDITION TO WALCHEREN.♦
While the allied armies were thus rendered inefficient, not by the
skill or strength of the enemy, but by the inexperience and incapacity
of the Spanish authorities, the mightiest force that had ever left the
British shores was wasted in a miserable expedition to the Scheldt,
and upon objects so insulated, and unimportant at that crisis, that if
they had been completely attained, success would have been nugatory.
Had that force been landed in the north of Germany, as the Austrian
government proposed, it has since been known, that what Schill did
with his single regiment, would have been done by Blucher and the
whole Prussian army. Marquis Wellesley had always disapproved of its
destination, looking upon the plan as at once absurd and ruinous.
Destructive to the last degree it proved, from the unwholesome nature
of the country to which it was sent: a cause which of all others might
with most certainty have been foreseen, and yet by some fatality seems
to have been overlooked by all who were concerned in planning the
expedition or consulted upon it. The only consolation, if consolation
it may be deemed, for the misemployment of such a force, was in the
knowledge that, owing to the state of the Spanish counsels, and the
temper of the Spanish generals, it could not have acted in Spain.
♦INQUIRY INTO THE CONDUCT OF THE DUKE OF YORK.♦
The British government meantime had to struggle with difficulties at
home as well as abroad, and of the most unexpected kind. During the
former part of the year parliament was occupied with an inquiry into
the conduct of the Duke of York as commander-in-chief, which ended
in his resigning the office. The circumstances which were disclosed
rendered this resignation becoming and necessary; but perhaps there
never was another instance in which the reaction of public opinion was
at once so strongly and so justly manifested. For when the agitation
was subsided which had been raised, not so much by the importance
of the business itself, as by the unremitting efforts of a set of
libellers the vilest and most venomous of their kind, it was then
perceived that the accusation had originated in intrigue and malice;
that the abuses which were brought to light were far less than had been
supposed to exist, and that in proving them it had been proved also
that the greatest improvements had been introduced into that department
by his Royal Highness, and that the general administration was
excellent. From that time, therefore, the Duke acquired a popularity
which he had never before possessed; and the efforts which had been
made with persevering malignity to ruin him in the good opinion of the
nation, served only to establish him there upon the strongest and
surest grounds.
♦ALTERATIONS IN THE MINISTRY.♦
This inquiry had occupied a full third of the whole session, to the
grievous interruption of public business, and the more grievous
excitement of the people, even to the extinction in most minds of
all other public interest whatever. The ministry meantime had other
causes of disquiet, which did not transpire till the session had
closed. Mismanaged arrangements for the removal of Lord Castlereagh
from the war department, induced him to challenge Mr. Canning, with
whom the wish for his removal originated, but who in the course
of the affair had been as ill used as himself. Both parties in
consequence resigned; the Duke of Portland did the same, compelled by
the state of his health, for he died almost immediately afterwards,
and thus the administration was broken up. Lord Liverpool, the only
remaining secretary of state, performed the business of the other two
departments, while the remaining members of the cabinet looked about
in dismay, and almost in despair, for new colleagues and for a new
head. ♦SEPT. 23.♦ Their situation appeared so forlorn that official
letters were addressed to Earl Grey and Lord Grenville, informing them
that his Majesty had authorized Earl Liverpool and Mr. Perceval to
communicate with their lordships for the purpose of forming an extended
and combined administration, and requesting them to come to town, that
as little time as possible might be lost in forwarding so important
an object. Earl Grey replied, that had his Majesty been pleased to
signify he had any commands for him personally, he should not have lost
a moment in showing his duty by prompt obedience to his royal pleasure;
but when it was proposed that he should communicate with the existing
ministers, for the purpose of forming a combined administration with
them, he should be wanting in duty to the King, and in fairness to
them, if he did not at once declare that such a union was, as far as
it regarded him under the then circumstances, impossible: this being
the answer which he was under the necessity of giving, his appearance
in London could be of no advantage; and it might possibly be of
detriment to the country, if, in consequence of a less decisive answer,
any farther delay should take place in the formation of a settled
government.
Lord Grenville, who was in Cornwall, replied, he should lose no time in
repairing to town, and begged leave to defer all observations upon the
business till his arrival. The day after his arrival he sent an answer
conformable to that of Earl Grey, declining the proposed communication,
because it could not be productive of any public advantage. “I trust,”
he added, “I need not say that this opinion is neither founded in any
sentiment of personal hostility, nor in a desire of unnecessarily
prolonging political differences. To compose, not to inflame, the
divisions of the empire, has always been my anxious wish, and is now
more than ever the duty of every loyal subject; but my accession to
the existing administration could not in any respect contribute to
this object, nor could it be considered in any other light than as a
dereliction of public principle. This answer, which I must have given
to any such proposal, if made while the government was yet entire,
cannot be varied by the retreat of some of its members. My objections
are not personal, they apply to the principle of the government itself,
and to the circumstances which attended its appointment.”
Nothing but extreme necessity could have induced the remaining
ministers to make these overtures; and when their advances were thus
rejected, great hopes were entertained by the adverse party, that
they would not be able to keep their ground as an administration. It
was even affirmed and believed that some of the highest offices were
offered to different persons, and that none could be found to accept
them. The only hope of the ministry rested upon Marquis Wellesley;
hints were thrown out that he would not join any arrangement in which
Mr. Canning was not included; this opinion, however, proved erroneous,
the Marquis accepted the office which Mr. Canning vacated, the Earl
of Liverpool was transferred from the home to the war department,
and the situation which he had vacated was filled by Mr. Ryder. Lord
Palmerstone was made secretary at war in the room of Sir James
Pulteney, and Mr. Perceval took the place of the Duke of Portland,
... thus uniting in himself, as Mr. Pitt and Mr. Addington had done
before him, the offices of first lord of the treasury and chancellor
of the exchequer. The loss of the Duke was only that of a name; that
of Mr. Canning was greatly regretted, as was also the secession of Mr.
Huskisson, who resigned his seat at the treasury at the same time;
but though the ministry was weakened by their departure, it was well
understood that the opposition would derive no aid from them; and, on
the whole, government was thought to have gained by these changes more
than it had lost, in consequence of the high reputation of Marquis
Wellesley, and the almost general desire of the nation to see him in
administration. His brother, Mr. Henry Wellesley, was appointed to
succeed him as ambassador to Spain.
♦DISPOSITION OF THE FRENCH AND SPANISH ARMIES.♦
The disposable force of the enemy in Spain at this time was estimated
at 125,000 men, well provided with cavalry and artillery, exclusive
of the garrisons in Barcelona and the strong places upon the
Pyrenean frontier. Of these, about 35,000 were employed in Arragon
and Catalonia, the rest were in the two Castilles and Extremadura,
70,000 being in the field under Victor, Soult, Ney, Sebastiani, and
Mortier, ... the remainder employed in garrisons, and in keeping up the
communication between the different places in their possession. Sick
and wounded were not included, and an allowance was made for the loss
of 10,000 men at Talavera. At the lowest estimate, this was the number
of the enemy; the force of the Spaniards was miserably inferior. Blake,
after the rout at Belchite, had reassembled a small army, scarcely
exceeding 6000 men, with which he was endeavouring, from time to time,
to relieve Gerona. Noroña had 15,000 men in Galicia; but a tenth part
of these were without arms, and he had neither cavalry nor artillery.
The Duke del Parque had 9000 men at Ciudad Rodrigo, and Eguia and
Venegas had about 50,000 in their two armies. But the inefficient state
of these troops had been lamentably proved; both cavalry and infantry
were for the most part undisciplined, and the latter neither properly
clothed nor accoutred, notwithstanding large supplies of all things
needful had been sent from England.
♦NEEDINESS OF THE INTRUSIVE GOVERNMENT.♦
The Intruder meantime, now that immediate danger was averted, had
leisure to feel the wretched state to which his subserviency to a
wicked brother had reduced him. He was, indeed, in possession of
Madrid, and half the kingdom was overrun by his troops; but how were
those troops to be paid, or how was he to support the expenses of his
court and government? Whatever might be the issue of the war in the
Peninsula, the vast colonial empire of Spain could never be his, and
the resources which still continued to arrive from thence were enjoyed
by the legitimate government. Whereever his authority extended, trade
was at an end, the people were impoverished, and the sources of revenue
destroyed. The first-fruits of plunder also had now been consumed.
Andalusia, indeed, offered a harvest as yet untouched, and which would
ere long be at his disposal; but till the opportunity arrived, it was
necessary to glean whatever had been spared in the former pillage. An
edict was issued, denouncing severe punishment against those who should
secrete papers or effects belonging to the suppressed monasteries, and
offering a reward for the discovery of such property, proportionate to
its value. He had previously confiscated the property of all Spaniards
in foreign countries, who should not forthwith return in obedience to
his command; he now called upon those in whose hands property, papers,
or effects had been left by others when forsaking their place of
residence, to deliver them up for the use of the treasury. Any persons
buying or selling gold, silver, or jewels, which had belonged to a
suppressed convent, or to an insurgent, were to be severely punished;
and those who assisted the insurgents in any manner were to be put
to death. Another decree sequestered the revenues of all archbishops
and bishops, and appointed pensions from the state instead. Another
commanded all persons possessing plate to the amount of more than ten
dollars, except in plates, knives, and spoons, to give in an account
thereof within three days; the mint was immediately to pay a fourth
of its value, and the remainder was promised within four months. All
plate which should be concealed after this edict was to be forfeited,
and a fourth of its value given to the informer; and silversmiths were
forbidden to purchase any articles in silver, except such as were
permitted to be in use by the present decree.
♦MEASURES OF SEVERITY.♦
These measures proved the neediness of the intrusive government. Its
atrocious character had already been amply demonstrated; if farther
proof were needed, it was to be found in a decree by which all persons
whose sons were serving in what it called the insurgent armies were
required to furnish a man to the Intruder’s service for every son, or
a proportionate sum of money; the elder brothers, or other nearest
relations or guardians of those who had no father, were subjected
to the same law; and those who had no money either for procuring
the substitute or paying the fine were to be imprisoned, or sent
into France. But it was reserved for this government to introduce a
new species of barbarity, which had never before been heard of in
war. Kellermann, whom the English had rescued with such difficulty
from the vengeance of the Portugueze at Lisbon, was at this time
governor-general of what the French called Upper Spain, ♦OCT. 28.♦ that
is, of the provinces of Salamanca, Zamora, Toro, Leon, Valladolid,
Palencia, Burgos, Soria, Santander, Biscay, Guipuzcoa, and Alava.
♦KELLERMANN’S EDICT.♦ Throughout this whole tract of country he placed
all horses and mares above a certain height in requisition for the
French armies, ordering them to be taken to the respective country
towns, and there delivered for that purpose; and every horse or mare
below the size named, or under thirty months old, with every mare that
should be three months gone with foal, was to have the left eye put
out by the owner, and to be in other ways rendered unfit for military
service. A fine of four times the value of the beast was to be exacted
from any one who disobeyed this edict, and all French officers were
charged to see it carried into execution. Nothing can more strikingly
evince their moral degradation, than that their general should have
ordered them to enforce the execution ♦MEASURES OF JOSEPH’S MINISTERS.♦
of an edict like this. These were the measures pursued in the name of
a King who was represented as being equally philosophic and humane,
who was to remedy all the evils of long misrule, to relieve the people
from all grievances, restore Spain to its ancient prosperity, and
confer upon it a happiness which it had never before enjoyed! In an
unhappy hour had Joseph’s ministers entered his service, persuading, or
seeking to persuade, themselves that they might benefit their country
by giving their countenance to a perfidious and odious usurpation. The
ablest men who have ever endeavoured to do good by evil means, have
felt their best intentions frustrated in the attempt. These ministers,
worthy, as under other circumstances they might have been of their
station, found themselves now the mere instrument of that very military
power which they had flattered themselves that they should be allowed
to direct. Still, however, seeking some excuse to their own hearts,
and to posterity, they took advantage of the time for attempting
alterations, which would have been most salutary if the nation had been
prepared for them, ... but for which it was so little prepared, that
the premature attempt only attached the Spaniards the more to the very
evils from which it was intended to deliver them. One sweeping decree
abolished all the regular orders in Spain, whether monastic, mendicant,
or clerical; the individuals belonging to them were ordered to quit
their convents within fifteen days, resume their secular habits, and
repair to their native places, where pensions were promised them. It
was certain that the intrusive government had neither the means nor
the intention of paying these pensions; but the whole property of the
suppressed orders was seized for the use of the state. The reason
assigned for this measure in the preamble to the decree was, that these
communities had taken a hostile part against the government, which,
while it thus abolished them, wished to recompense those individuals
who had conducted themselves well. Better reasons, Urquijo and his
colleagues well knew, would only have exasperated a people whose souls
were thoroughly enslaved to the superstitions which debased them;
but the cause which was thus assigned exasperated them as much, and
this feeling was kept up and disseminated every where by the ejected
members, who, wherever they went, excited the compassion of their
countrymen and inflamed their hatred of the intrusive government. Some
prudence as well as humanity was shown, by exempting the nuns from this
decree; they were subjected to the ordinary, and forbidden to receive
pupils. The military orders were abolished also, except that of the
Golden Fleece, and the one which the intrusive government had itself
instituted. This was needlessly offending the national pride, which was
in like manner wounded by the removal of the tax raised under the name
of the _Voto de Santiago_; the relief, even had circumstances allowed
it to be felt, would not have compensated for the outrage upon Spanish
feeling. In taking away the privilege of sanctuary, and suppressing all
ecclesiastical jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases, the ministers
acted as they would have wished to do, had they held their offices by
a better tenure; and in making strangulation the mode of death for all
criminals of whatever rank, and decreeing that degradation was implied
in the sentence. But when an edict affected to abolish all dignities
and titles which had not been conferred by the Intruder, and required
the traitorous nobles in his service to receive from him a confirmation
of the peerage which they had disgraced, the futility of the decree
only provoked contempt.
♦THE CENTRAL JUNTA ANNOUNCE THAT THE CORTES WILL BE ASSEMBLED.♦
Joseph’s ministers had leisure for legislative speculations and for
dreams of reformation. The real business of government was not in
their hands; in all essential points they were mere ciphers, and
seemed to feel that they were so. The Central Junta was in a situation
as much more trying as it was more honourable. The difficulties
and embarrassments of every kind with which they were beset might
have confused heads more experienced in affairs of state; and their
exertions under the pressure of immediate danger left them little
time for those measures of effectual reform, which Spain so greatly
needed, but which were looked for more eagerly by the British nation
than by the Spaniards, for as a people the Spaniards were contented
with their old system, and attached to it even with all its evils and
abominations. The general wish in England was that the Cortes should be
convened, and this was desired as sincerely by the British government
as by Jovellanos and those other noble minded Spaniards who hoped
through regular and constitutional means to restore the liberty and the
prosperity of their country. It was long after the installation of the
Junta before the disasters of the day allowed them leisure for thinking
of the morrow. To this their delay in taking measures for assembling
the Cortes must be ascribed, more than to their love of power, which
they were ill able to wield, or of the patronage which they unworthily
bestowed. But to these motives the delay was imputed; and by not
following the advice of Jovellanos when the act would have appeared
spontaneous and graceful, they lost the opportunity of obtaining that
popularity which even the semblance of disinterestedness is sure to
acquire. It was not till eight months after their installation that a
decree came forth for re-establishing the legal representation of the
monarchy in its ancient Cortes. The time was left indefinite, but the
edict said it would be convoked in the course of the ensuing year, or
earlier, if circumstances should permit.
The language of the Supreme Junta on this, as on every other occasion,
was worthy of the position in which the national government was placed,
and of the principles on which it professed to act. “The Spanish
people,” they said, “must leave to their posterity an inheritance
worthy of the sacrifices which were made for obtaining it. The Supreme
Junta had never lost sight of this object; and the progress of the
enemy, which had hitherto occupied their whole attention, rendered
more bitter the reflection, that all their disasters were solely owing
to the disuse of those institutions which, in happier times, secured
the welfare and the strength of the state. The ambition of some, and
the indolence of others, had reduced those institutions to nothing;
and the Junta, from the moment of its installation, solemnly bound
itself to restore them. The time was now arrived for this great work.
Desirous, therefore, that the nation should appear with the dignity
due to its heroic efforts; that the rights of the people should be
placed beyond the reach of encroachments; and that the sources of
public felicity should run freely as soon as the war ceased, and repair
whatever inveterate arbitrary power had scorched, or the present
devastation had destroyed, the Junta decreed, that the Cortes should
be re-established, and would immediately proceed to consider the
method of convening it; for which end it would nominate a committee of
five of its members. It would also investigate, in order to propose
them to the nation assembled in Cortes, the means of supporting the
holy war in which they were engaged; of insuring the observance of
their fundamental laws; of meliorating the legislation and abolishing
the abuses which had crept into it; of collecting and administering
the revenue, and of reforming the system of public education. And
to combine the information necessary for such discussions, it would
consult the councils, provincial Juntas, tribunals, magistracies,
corporations, bishops, and universities, and the opinion of intelligent
and enlightened persons.”
♦DECLARATION WHICH WAS FIRST PROPOSED.♦
A declaration in stronger terms had been submitted to the Junta, and
rejected by them at the instigation of Mr. Frere. “Spaniards,” it
was there said, “it is three ages since the laws on which the nation
founded its defence against tyranny have been destroyed. Our fathers
did not know how to preserve the liberty which had been bequeathed to
them; and although all the provinces of Spain successively struggled
to defend it, evil stars rendered their efforts useless. The laws,
from that time forward, have been only an expression more or less
tyrannical, or beneficent, of a particular will. Providence, as if
to punish the loss of that prerogative of free men, has paralysed
our valour, arrested the progress of our intellect, and impeded our
civilization, till we have come to that condition, that an insolent
tyrant formed the project of subduing the greatest nation of the globe,
without reckoning upon its will, and even despising its existence.
In vain has the prince sometimes attempted to remedy some of the
evils of the state: buildings cannot be erected on sand, and without
fundamental and constituted laws, it is useless for the philosopher
in his study, or the statesman in the theatre of business, to exert
himself for the good of the people. The best projects are not put in
execution, or not carried through. Good suggestions are followed by
evil ones; economy and order, by prodigality and rapine; a prudent and
mild minister, by an avaricious and foolish favourite; and thus the
ship of the state floats without sails and helm, till, as has happened
to the Spanish monarchy, it is dashed to pieces on a rock. How, but
by the re-establishment of freedom, could that blood be recompensed
which flows in every part of the Peninsula; those sacrifices which
Spanish loyalty is offering every instant; that moral resistance, as
universal as it is sublime, which disconcerts our enemies, and renders
them hopeless even in the midst of their victories? When this dreadful
contest is concluded, the Spaniard shall say proudly to himself, ‘My
fathers left me slavery and wretchedness for my inheritance; I leave
to my descendants liberty and glory.’ Spaniards, this is the feeling
which, by reflection in some, and by instinct in all, animates you now;
and it shall not be defrauded of its expectations. Our detractors say
that we are fighting to defend old abuses, and the inveterate vices of
our corrupted government; let them know that your struggle is for the
happiness, as well as the independence of your country; that you will
not depend henceforward on the uncertain will or the variable temper
of a single man; nor continue to be the plaything of a court without
justice, under the control of an insolent favourite, or a capricious
woman; but that on the edifice of your ancient laws you will rear a
barrier between despotism and your sacred rights. This barrier consists
in a constitution to aid and support the monarch when he is just, and
to restrain him when he follows evil councils. Without a constitution
all reform is precarious, all prosperity uncertain; without it the
people are no more than flocks of slaves, put in motion at the order
of a will, frequently unjust, and always unrestrained; without it
the forces of the whole society, which should procure the greatest
advantages for all its members, are employed exclusively to satisfy the
ambition, or satiate the frenzy of a few, or perhaps of one.”
♦OBJECTIONS BY MR. FRERE.♦
When this paper was communicated to Mr. Frere, he saw serious
objections, which he stated to Garay, and which the Junta, though they
would otherwise have published the proclamation, readily admitted. That
ambassador perceived, more clearly perhaps than any other person at
that time, the danger to be apprehended from convoking a legislative
assembly in a nation altogether unprepared for it by habits, feelings,
education, or general knowledge. He considered it a delicate and
dangerous point in every respect, and said, “that if the decision of
the question were left in his hand, notwithstanding the necessity
for widening the basis of the government, the failure of all the
political experiments which had been made in these latter times, and
the impossibility which had been found (by a fatality peculiar to the
present age) of forming a permanent establishment, even in affairs
less essential than the formation of a free constitution for a great
nation, would make him waver. But taking the decision for granted, he
thought the manner in which it was proposed to announce it likely
to produce bad effects in Spain; and he could venture,” he said, “to
assure D. Martin de Garay, that it would undoubtedly create them in
England. If the Spaniards had indeed passed three centuries under
arbitrary government, they ought not to forget that it was the price
which they paid for having conquered and peopled the fairest portion of
the world, and that the integrity of that immense power rested solely
upon these two words, Religion and the King. If the old constitution
had been lost by the conquest of America, the first object should be
to recover it; but in such a manner as not to lose what had cost so
much in the acquisition: and for this reason, they ought to avoid,
as a political poison, every enunciation of general principles, the
application of which it would be impossible to limit or qualify, even
when the Negroes and Indians should quote it in favour of themselves.
And allowing that a bad exchange had been made in bartering the
ancient national liberty for the glory and extension of the Spanish
name; allowing that the error should at all hazards be done away; even
though it were so,” Mr. Frere said, “it did not appear becoming the
character of a well-educated person to pass censures upon the conduct
of his forefathers, or to complain of what he may have lost by their
negligence or prodigality, still less so if it were done in the face
of the world; and what should be said of a nation who should do this
publicly, and after mature deliberation?”
This was true foresight,--and yet the English ambassador approached
Charybdis in his fear of Scylla. He spoke to the Spaniards of Religion
and the King; in England the truest and most enlightened lovers of
liberty can have no better rallying words; in Spain those words
had for three hundred years meant the inquisition and an absolute
monarch, whose ministers, so long as they could retain his favour,
governed according to their own will and pleasure, unchecked by any
constitutional control. The government did not obtain by their decree
for ♦UNPOPULARITY OF THE JUNTA.♦ convoking the Cortes the popularity
which they had perhaps expected. The measure had been long delayed, and
therefore was supposed to have been unwillingly resolved on. So much,
indeed, had been expected from the Central Junta, that no possible
wisdom on their part, no possible success, could have answered the
unreasonable demand. The disappointment of the nation was in proportion
to its hopes, and the government became equally the object of suspicion
and contempt. Some of the members had large estates in those provinces
which were occupied by the French, and it was suspected that where
their property was, there their hearts were also. Their subsequent
conduct proved how greatly they were injured by this distrust. They
were not censured for their first disasters, which the ablest men
under like circumstances could not have averted. Had they obtained
accurate intelligence of the strength and movements of the enemy when
Buonaparte entered Spain; had they exerted themselves as much in
disciplining troops as in raising and embodying them, and had they
supplied them with regularity and promptitude; it would not have been
possible to have stopped the progress of such a force. Something was
allowed for the confidence which the battle of Baylen had inspired, and
for the enthusiasm of the people, which the government had partaken.
Neither would the nation have been disposed to condemn, even if it had
perceived, errors which arose from the national character. But when,
after the bitter experience of twelve whole months, no measures had
been adopted for improving the discipline of the armies, or supplying
them in the field, the incapacity of the Junta became glaring, and
outcries against them were heard on all sides.
♦THEIR DIFFICULTIES AND ERRORS.♦
One of the weightiest errors for which they were censured was for not
exerting themselves more effectually to bring the whole strength of the
country against the invaders. They had promised to raise 500,000 men
and 50,000 cavalry. Granada was the only province which supplied its
full proportion, and Granada even exceeded it; its contingent was about
28,000, whereas it furnished nearly forty. But this depended more upon
the provincial Juntas than upon the central government, whose decrees
were of no avail in those parts which the enemy possessed, and were ill
observed in others, where the local administrations, from disgust, or
jealousy, or indolence, or incapacity, seemed to look on as spectators
of the dreadful drama, rather than to perform their parts in it, as
men and as Spaniards. Neither is it to the want of numbers that their
defeats were to be attributed; there were at all times men enough in
the field; arms, equipments, and discipline were wanting. It is unjust
to judge of the exertions of the Spanish Junta by those of the National
Convention in France, who had the whole wealth and strength of a
populous and rich country at their absolute disposal, and who began the
revolutionary war with officers, and tacticians, and statesmen capable
of wielding the mighty means which were put into their hands. The fault
of the Junta was in relying too much upon numbers and bravery, and too
little upon their fortresses. The general under whom the great captain
Gonzalo de Cordova learnt the art of war had left them a lesson which
they might profitably have remembered. He used to say, that fortresses
ought to be opposed to the impatience and fury of the French, and that
the place for stationing raw troops was behind walls and ramparts.
The most important errors which the Junta had hitherto committed were,
the delay in convoking the Cortes, and their conduct towards Sir
Arthur Wellesley’s army; but the national character contributed in no
slight degree to both. For it was not the known aversion of Florida
Blanca to the name of a representative assembly, nor the fears of some
of the Junta, nor the love of power in others, which protracted the
convocation of the Cortes, so much as their reverential adherence to
established forms. This was evident in Jovellanos himself, who regarded
it as equally profane and dangerous to approach this political ark of
the covenant, without scrupulously observing all the ceremonies and
solemnities which the law prescribed. Precedents on points of this
kind are not to be found in Spain as they are in England. Antiquaries
were to be consulted, archives examined, old regulations adapted to
new circumstances,--and this when the enemy was at the gates. The
defect may well be pardoned, because of the virtues with which it
was connected. Had the Spaniards regarded with less veneration the
deeds and the institutions of their ancestors, they would never have
supported that struggle which will be the wonder of succeeding ages.
Their conduct toward the English army sprang from a worse fault;
from that pride which made them prone to impose upon others and upon
themselves a false opinion of their strength. It is the national
failing, for which they have ever been satirized, by their own writers
as well as by other nations. They will rather promise and disappoint,
than acknowledge their inability; of this, their history for the last
two centuries affords abundant examples; they had yet to learn, that
perfect sincerity is as much due to an ally as to a confessor. In
many cases the government was itself deceived; the same false point of
honour prevailing in every department, from the lowest to the highest,
it received and acted upon exaggerated statements and calculations; but
in others, it cannot be denied, that pride led to the last degree of
meanness, and that promises were held out to the English general, which
those who made them must have known it was impossible to perform.
Yet it must be admitted that the errors of the Junta were more
attributable to the character of the nation than of the individuals;
and those individuals were placed in circumstances of unexampled
difficulty. Four-and-thirty men, most of them strangers to each other,
and unaccustomed to public business, were brought together to govern a
nation in the most perilous crisis of its history, without any thing to
direct them except their own judgement, and almost without any other
means than what the patriotism of the people could supply. They had
troops indeed, but undisciplined, unofficered, unprovided, half armed,
and half clothed. The old system of government was broken up, the new
one was yet to be formed. They had neither commissariat nor treasury;
the first donations and imposts were exhausted; so also were the
supplies which England had liberally given, and those from America had
not yet arrived. Added to these difficulties, and worse than all, was
that dreadful state of moral and social anarchy into which the nation
had been thrown, and which was such that no man knew in whom he could
confide. To poison food or water in time of war is a practice which
all people, who are not absolute savages, have pronounced infamous by
common consent; but it is a light crime compared to the means which
Buonaparte employed for the subjugation of Spain,--means which poisoned
the well-springs of social order, and loosened the very joints and
fibres of society. Morla, when he betrayed his country, committed an
act of treason against human nature. The evil had been great before,
but when a Judas Iscariot had been found in Morla during the agony of
Spain, in whom could the people confide? “Suspicion,” says Jovellanos,
“and hatred were conceived and spread with frightful facility. How many
generals, nobles, prelates, magistrates, and lawyers, were regarded
with distrust, either because of their old relations with Godoy, or
because they were connected with some of the new partizans of the
tyranny; or for the weakness, or indecision, or ambiguity of their
conduct; or for the calumnies and insinuations which rivalship and envy
excited against them! It was considered as a crime to have gone to
Bayonne, to have remained at Madrid, or resided in other places which
were occupied by the intrusive government; to have submitted to swear
allegiance to it, to have obeyed its orders, or to have suffered even
compulsively its yoke and its contempt. What reputation was secure?
Who was not exposed to the attacks of envy, to the imputations of
calumny, and to the violence of an agitated populace?”
From this state of things it necessarily arose, that the Junta acted in
constant fear and suspicion of those whom they employed. Their sense
of weakness and their love of power increased the evil. Fearing the
high spirit of Alburquerque, and the influence which rank and talents
conjoined would give to his deserved popularity among the soldiers,
they cramped him in a subordinate command, while they trusted those
armies which were the hope of Spain to Cuesta, because they were afraid
of offending him, and to Venegas, for the opposite reason, that they
were sure of his obsequious submission. Some odium they incurred by
permitting a trade with towns which the enemy occupied. For the sake,
as was alleged, of those Spaniards who were compelled to live under
the yoke, and also for the advantage of the colonies, they had granted
licences for conveying sugar, cacao, and bark, to those parts of the
kingdom. ♦JULY 14.♦ These licences were only to be trusted to persons
of known and approved patriotism, who were likewise to be strictly
watched, and liable to be searched upon any suspicion. The weakness of
such a concession in such a war, as well as the obvious facility which
it afforded to the French and their traitorous partizans, excited just
reprehension; and at the close of the year ♦DEC. 28.♦ the Junta found
it necessary to revoke their edict, acknowledging that, in spite of all
precautions, it was found prejudicial to the public safety. Some of the
members were suspected of enhancing the price of necessaries for the
army, by their own secret monopolies; others were said to be surrounded
by venal instruments, through whom alone they were accessible. These
imputations were probably ill-founded or exaggerated; certain, however,
it is, that never had any government fewer friends. Men of the most
opposite principles were equally disaffected toward it. Its very
defenders had no confidence in its stability, and were ready to forsake
it. They who dreaded any diminution of the regal authority, could not
forgive its popular origin; they who aspired to lay the foundation
of a new and happier order of things, were discontented, because the
measures which were taken towards the reformation of the state were
slowly, and, as they deemed, reluctantly adopted. Those wretches who
were sold to France were the enemies of any government which resisted
the usurpation; and those whose timid natures, or short-sighted
selfishness, disposed them to submission, naturally regarded it with
dislike, because it delayed the subjection of the country. Among the
people, who were actuated by none of these feelings, it was sufficient
to render the Junta unpopular that it was unfortunate. The times
rendered them suspicious; their own conduct and their power made them
obnoxious to many; and their ill-fortune, more than their errors, made
them disliked by all.
♦SCHEME FOR OVERTHROWING THEM.♦
Influenced by some of these motives, and perhaps in no little degree
by jealousy, the Junta of Seville were particularly hostile to the
government, and a plan was formed in that city for overthrowing it: the
members were to be seized, and some of the most obnoxious transported
to Manilla in a ship which was prepared for the purpose. Some regiments
had been gained over, and it is said even the guards of the Junta;
but as the persons who designed this revolution had for their direct
object the good of Spain, they considered it a mark of confidence due
to Great Britain to make the English ambassador acquainted with their
purpose; for in fact, so far were the Spanish people from regarding
the interference of Great Britain with jealousy, that they were
disappointed because their ally did not interfere more frequently, and
with more effect. Marquis Wellesley, of whom it had been said by Mr.
Whitbread that he would, if opportunity should offer, take Spain and
Portugal as Buonaparte had done, had now an opportunity of showing in
what manner he thought himself bound to act by a government which he
knew to be weak, and suspected to be treacherous. At the very time when
this foul imputation was brought against him in parliament, he gave to
that government just so much information of its danger, as, without
compromising the safety of any persons concerned, enabled the Junta to
prevent the intended insurrection.
The general wish was less for the convocation of the Cortes, than for
the establishment of a regency, from which more unanimity and more
vigour was expected, than from the present divided council. The people
of Cadiz said the fate of Spain was in Marquis Wellesley’s hands, that
he ought to remove the Junta, and establish an energetic government.
Those persons who respected hereditary claims would have had the
Archbishop of Toledo appointed regent, as being the only Bourbon in
the country; but he was young; and what weighed against him more than
the want of either talents or character, was, that he was believed to
be governed by his sister, the wife of Godoy. Others looked to Romana,
knowing his dislike to the Junta, and hoping that he would assume the
government himself, or intrust it to able hands. Another project was
to appoint both these personages regents, with the Duke del Infantado,
and two other colleagues. It was thought that the army would gladly
have seen the supreme authority vested in one of their own body, either
Romana or Infantado. But both these noblemen were free from any such
ambition; and Montijo, who was always intriguing for power, was so well
known, that he was the last person whom any party would have trusted.
♦COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE JUNTA.♦
The warning which had thus been given was not lost upon the Junta, and
they attended to the representations which accompanied it; they knew
their weakness, and perceived their danger; admitted that the existing
government was not suited to the state of affairs, and nominated a
commission for the purpose of inquiring in what manner it might best be
replaced. Romana was included in the commission, and upon this occasion
he delivered in a paper, which, if they had required additional proof
of his hostility, and their own unstable tenure, would amply have
♦ROMANA’S ADDRESS. OCT. 4.♦ afforded it. “There were three cases,”
he said, “either of which ought to produce a change in the system
of a government: When a nation, which ought only to obey, doubts
the legitimacy of the authority to which it is to submit; when such
authority begins to lose its influence; when it is not only prejudicial
to the public weal, but contrary to the principles of the constitution.
The existing government was objectionable upon all these grounds: it
was founded upon a democratic principle of representation, inconsistent
with the pure monarchical system of Spain, and with the heroic loyalty
of the Spaniards, and which, if it continued, would subvert the
monarchy. As often as he meditated upon this subject, he doubted the
lawfulness of the existing government; and this opinion was general in
the provinces through which he had passed. Among the services which he
had endeavoured to perform for his king and country, it was not the
least that he had yielded obedience to the orders of this government,
and made the constituted authorities in Leon, Asturias, and Gallicia
do the same; considering this absolutely necessary to preserve the
nation from anarchy. A government, though illegal, might secure the
happiness of the people, if it deserved their confidence, and they
respected its authority; but the existing government had lost its
authority. The people, who judge of measures by the effects which they
see produced, complain that our armies are weak for want of energy in
the government; that no care has been taken for supplying them; that
they have not seen the promised accounts of the public expenditure,
and how the sums which have arrived from America, those which our
generous allies have given, the rents of the crown, and the voluntary
contributions, have been expended: they look in vain for necessary
reforms; they see that employments are not given to men of true
merit, and true lovers of their country; that some members, instead
of manifesting their desire of the public good, by disinterestedness,
seek to preserve their authority for their own advantage; that others
confer lucrative and honourable employments on their own dependents
and countrymen; that for this sole reason ecclesiastical offices have
been filled up, the rents of which ought to have been applied to the
necessities of the state; that that unity which is necessary in the
government, is not to be found, many of the Junta caring only for the
interests of their particular provinces, as if they were members of
some body different from that of the Spanish monarchy; that they had
not only confirmed the military appointments made by the provincial
Juntas, without examining the merits of the persons appointed, but had
even assigned recompences to many who were destitute of all military
knowledge, having never seen service, nor performed any of those duties
which were confided to them; that the Junta, divided into sections,
dispatched business in matters altogether foreign to their profession,
and in which they were utterly unversed, instead of referring them to
the competent and appropriate ministers; that horses taken from their
owners, instead of being sent to the armies, were dying for hunger on
the dry sea-marshes; finally, that many of the most important branches
of administration were in the hands of men, suspicious, because of
their conduct from the commencement of the public misfortunes, and
because they were the creatures of that infamous favourite, who had
been the author of all the general misery. Such,” said Romana, “are the
complaints of the people: there is but one step to disobedience; the
enemy will profit by the first convulsion, and anarchy or servitude
will then be the alternative.”
The Marquis then stated, that the time for which some provinces had
appointed their representatives to the Junta was expired; that others
had empowered them not to exercise the sovereign authority, but to
constitute a government which might represent the monarch: in neither
case could these provinces be expected to acknowledge an authority
which they had never conferred. The commission, he proceeded to say,
had proposed that the Junta should reduce itself to five persons,
in whom the executive power should be vested; and that in rotation
each member of the existing body should enter into this supreme
executive council, which should also preside over the Cortes when it
was assembled. This project discovered the love of power in the Junta
more unequivocally than any other part of their conduct. What Romana
proposed in its stead was as prudent in itself as it was inconsistent
with his previous positions. After maintaining that the powers of the
existing government were from the first illegal, and that even such as
they were, they had, for part of the members, expired, he recommended
nevertheless that this government should, as representing legitimately
or illegitimately the Cortes, appoint a regent, or a council of
regency, consisting of three or of five persons, especially advising,
as a proof of generosity and patriotism, that they should nominate
none of their own body. A Junta should be formed, under the title of
the Permanent Deputation of the Realm, to represent the Cortes till
the Cortes should be assembled; it should consist of five members
and a procurador-general, and one of these members should always be
chosen from their American brethren, as forming an integral part of
the nation. But the Cortes should be assembled with as little delay
as circumstances would permit, and then no laws should be passed, or
contributions imposed, without its consent. “If,” said he, “I have in
some cases connected the supreme power with the nation, I have done no
more than revive the constitutional principles of the Spanish monarchy,
which have been stifled by the despotism of its kings and their
ministers.” However hostile to the principles of civil liberty the
first positions of Romana appeared, the most zealous friends of freedom
might have been contented with his conclusions.
“Ought we,” said he, “to fear that an adventurer, who usurps the
throne of Ferdinand, should appear among us, if we had a government
like this, emanating from the consent of the people, from submission
to the true God, and from the necessity of our mournful and perilous
situation? Would our armies then be defective in numbers, and in
subordination and discipline? would they be so filled with ignorant
and cowardly officers, so unprovided with food, so irregularly paid,
and so destitute of all equipments? would men be appointed generals,
because they would support the persons who appointed them, or because
they knew how to command an army and how to save the country? With
such a government, the nation would have invincible armies, the armies
would have generals, the troops would be officered, and the soldiers
would learn subordination and discipline. When Spain shall see that
auspicious day, I shall think it the first day of her hope, and the
most happy of her glorious revolution. Such,” he continued, “is my
opinion; but I ought not to forget that I have publicly controverted it
by my actions. For who sustained your sovereign authority in the army
and province which I governed? Gallicia, whom didst thou obey? Didst
thou respect in me any power but that of the Central Junta, or did I
consent that thou shouldst separate thyself from a government which I
was sanctioning by my own obedience? Asturias, didst not thou see the
powerful arm upraised which thou hadst implored so earnestly, and the
blow of its power fall upon a Junta, which, after having acknowledged
the sovereignty of the Central, and received from it succours, of
which my soldiers, naked and exhausted, were in want, domineered like
a despot, and had even disobeyed the express will of our King, D.
Ferdinand? Nevertheless,” said he, addressing the Central Junta, “you
rewarded this scandalous disobedience; and removed me covertly from
the command, in order that guilty Spaniards might be honoured with
the greater distinction. My opinions were the same then that they are
now; but circumstances imperiously required a government, and any
government is better than none. Then it was my duty to obey; now I
should not perform what is due to my character, if I did not declare
what I believe to be required for the salvation of my country. How
indeed should I be silent; how should I suffer the fire of patriotism
to be extinguished, seeing the sacrifice of so many victims in our
glorious cause; faithful wives murdered with their daughters, after the
most foul and unutterable outrages; nuns driven from their cloisters,
some wandering about, many more the prey of lustful impiety; ministers
of the altar forced from the sanctuary; temples turned into stables
and dens of uncleanness; towns reduced to servitude; opulence to
squalid beggary; armies composed of the bravest spirits of the nation,
which have disappeared in the hottest struggles of their native land,
consumed by hunger, naked, and destitute; seeing, in fine, that such
revenues and the liberal donations of Spain and America have not even
supplied the first necessities of the soldier? How could I remain a
tranquil spectator of such great and mournful objects, and not think
them superior to the nearest personal interest, to our self-love, and
to our very existence? As a Spaniard,” he concluded, “I am ready to
suffer a thousand deaths in defence of our liberty; and in my rank I
have rendered homage to the descendant of the Pelayos, the Jaymes, and
the Garcias. As a general, I will join myself to the last soldier who
shall have resolution to revenge his country in the last period of her
independence; but as a representative of the nation, I must be excused
from occupying that distinguished place, unless a legitimate government
be immediately established, which foreign powers will not hesitate to
acknowledge, which will represent our sovereign, and which will save a
people who are resolved to die for their God, for their king, and for
the happiness of their posterity.”
♦REPLY OF THE JUNTA.♦
It is proof of full political freedom in the Spanish press at this
juncture, that this paper should have appeared, being little short of
a declaration of hostility against the existing government. But though
the high monarchical principles with which Romana began his manifesto
displeased the democratic party, and the glaring inconsistency of
his proposal weakened the effect which his authority might otherwise
have produced, the government felt the necessity of doing something
to conciliate the nation; they determined to convoke the Cortes,
and announced the resolution in a paper which may be considered as
their official apology. In this paper, without directly referring to
Romana’s ♦OCT. 28.♦ charges, they replied to them. “Spaniards,” said
they, “it has seemed good to Providence that in this terrible crisis
you should not be able to advance one step towards independence,
without advancing one likewise toward liberty. An imbecile and decrepit
despotism prepared the way for French tyranny. Political impostors
then thought to deceive you by promising reforms, and announcing, in
a constitution framed at their pleasure, the empire of the laws, ...
a barbarous contradiction, worthy of their insolence. But the Spanish
people, that people which before any other enjoyed the prerogatives
and advantages of civil liberty, and opposed to arbitrary power the
barrier which justice has appointed, need borrow from no other nation
the maxims of political prudence, and told these impudent legislators,
that the artifices of intriguers and the mandates of tyrants are not
laws for them. You ran to arms; and fortune rendered homage to you, and
bestowed victory in reward for your ardour. The immediate effect was
the reunion of the state, which was at that time divided into as many
factions as provinces. Our enemies thought they had sown among us the
deadly seed of anarchy, and did not remember that Spanish judgement
and circumspection are always superior to French intrigue. A supreme
authority was established without contradiction and without violence;
and the people, after having astonished the world with the spectacle of
their sublime exaltation and their victories, filled it with admiration
and respect by their moderation and discretion.
“The Central Junta was installed, and its first care was to announce,
that if the expulsion of the enemy was the first object of its
attention in point of time, the permanent welfare of the state was
the principal in importance; for to leave it sunk in the sea of old
abuses, would be a crime as enormous as to deliver you into the hands
of Buonaparte; therefore, as soon as the whirlwind of war permitted, it
resounded in your ears the name of the Cortes, which has ever been the
bulwark of civil freedom; a name heretofore pronounced with mystery
by the learned, with distrust by politicians, and with horror by
tyrants; but which henceforth in Spain will be the indestructible basis
of the monarchy, the most secure support of the rights of Ferdinand
and his family, a right for the people, and an obligation for the
government. That moral resistance, which has reduced our enemies to
confusion and despair in the midst of their victories, must not receive
a less reward. Those battles which are lost, those armies which are
destroyed; those soldiers who, dispersed in one action, return to offer
themselves for another; that populace which, despoiled of almost all
they possessed, returned to their homes to share the wretched remains
of their property with the defenders of their country; that struggle of
barbarity on the one hand, and of invincible constancy on the other,
present a whole as terrible as magnificent, which Europe contemplates
with astonishment, and which history will one day record, for the
admiration and example of posterity. A people so generous ought only to
be governed by laws which bear the great character of public consent
and common utility, ... a character which they can only receive by
emanating from the august assembly which has been announced to you.”
The Junta now betrayed that undue desire of retaining their power,
which, though not their only error, was the only one which proceeded
from selfish considerations. “It had been recommended,” they said,
“that the existing government should be converted into a regency
of three or of five persons, and this opinion was supported by
the application of an ancient law to our present situation; but a
political position which is entirely new, occasions political forms and
principles absolutely new also. To expel the French, to restore to his
liberty and his throne our adored King, and to establish a solid and
permanent foundation of good government, are the maxims which gave the
impulse to our revolution, are those which support and direct it; and
that government will be the best which shall best promote these wishes
of the Spanish nation. Does a regency promise this security? What
inconveniences, what dangers, how many divisions, how many parties, how
many ambitious pretensions within and without the kingdom; how much,
and how just, discontent in our Americas, now called to have a share in
the present government! What would become of our Cortes, our liberty,
the cheering prospects of future welfare and glory which present
themselves? What would become of the object most valuable and dear to
the Spanish nation ... the rights of Ferdinand? The advocates for this
institution ought to shudder at the danger to which they expose them,
and to bear in mind that they afford to the tyrant a new opportunity
of buying and selling them. Let us bow with reverence to the venerable
antiquity of the law; but let us profit by the experience of ages. Let
us open our annals and trace the history of our regencies. What shall
we find? ... a picture of desolation, of civil war, of rapine, and of
human degradation, in unfortunate Castille.”
The weakness of this reasoning proved how the love of power had blinded
those from whom it proceeded. The Junta wished to evade the law of the
Partidas, because it did not specify a case which it could not possibly
have contemplated, though the law itself was perfectly and directly
relevant. They assumed it as a certain consequence of a regency,
that the colonies would be disgusted; that the Cortes would not be
convoked; that the rights of Ferdinand would be disregarded; and that
new opportunities of corruption would be afforded to France; and they
forgot to ask themselves what reason there could be for apprehending
all or any of these dangers, more from a council of regency than from
their own body. Romana’s manifesto contained nothing more flagrantly
illogical than this. Having thus endeavoured to set aside this project
by alarming the nation, they admitted that the executive power ought
to be lodged in fewer hands, and said, that with that circumspection,
which neither exposed the state to the oscillations consequent upon
every change of government, nor sensibly altered the unity of the body
which it was intrusted with, they had concentrated their own authority;
and that from this time those measures which required dispatch,
secrecy, and energy, would be directed by a section formed of six
members, holding their office for a time.
The remainder of the manifesto was in a worthier strain. “Another
opinion,” they said, “which objected to a regency, objected also to
the Cortes as an insufficient representation, if convoked according to
the ancient forms; as ill-timed, and perhaps perilous in the existing
circumstances; and in fine as useless, because the provincial Juntas,
which had been immediately erected by the people, were their true
representatives; but as the government had already publicly declared
that it would adapt the Cortes, in its numbers, forms, and classes, to
the present state of things, any objection drawn from the inadequacy
of the ancient forms was malicious, as well as inapplicable. Yes,
Spaniards,” said they, “you are about to have your Cortes, and the
national representation will be as perfect and full as it can and
ought to be, in an assembly of such importance and eminent dignity.
You are about to have your Cortes; and at what time, gracious God! can
the nation adopt this measure better than at present? When war has
exhausted all the ordinary means, when the selfishness of some, and the
ambition of others, debilitate and paralyse the efforts of government;
when they seek to destroy from its foundations the essential principle
of the monarchy, which is union; when the hydra of federalism, so
happily silenced the preceding year by the creation of the central
power, dares again to raise its heads, and endeavour to precipitate
us into anarchy; when the subtlety of our enemies is watching the
moment of our divisions to destroy the state; this is the time, then,
to collect in one point the national dignity and power, where the
Spanish people may vote and call forth the extraordinary resources
which a powerful nation ever has within it for its salvation. That
alone can put them in motion; that alone can encourage the timidity
of some, and restrain the ambition of others; that alone can suppress
importunate vanity, puerile pretensions, and infuriated passions.
Spain will, in fine, give to Europe a fresh example of its religion,
its circumspection, and its discretion, in the just and moderate use
which it is about to make of the liberty in which it is constituted.
Thus it is that the supreme Junta, which immediately recognized this
national representation as a right, and proclaimed it as a reward, now
invokes and implores it as the most necessary and efficacious remedy;
and has therefore resolved that the general Cortes shall be convoked on
the first day of January in the next year, in order to enter on their
august functions the first of March following. When that happy day has
arrived, the Junta will say to the representatives of the nation,
“‘Ye are met together, O fathers of your country! and re-established in
all the plenitude of your rights, after a lapse of three centuries.
Called to the exercise of authority by the unanimous voice of the
kingdom, the individuals of the supreme Junta have shewn themselves
worthy of the confidence reposed in them, by employing all their
exertions for the preservation of the state. When the power was placed
in our hands, our armies, half formed, were destitute; our treasury
was empty, and our resources uncertain and distant. We have maintained
in the free provinces unity, order, and justice; and in those occupied
by the enemy, we have exerted our endeavours to preserve patriotism
and loyalty. We have vindicated the national honour and independence
in the most complicated and difficult diplomatic negotiations; and we
have made head against adversity, ever trusting that we should overcome
it by constancy. We have, without doubt, committed errors, and would
willingly, were it possible, redeem them with our blood; but in the
confusion of events, among the difficulties which surrounded us, who
could be certain of always being in the right? Could we be responsible,
because one body of troops wanted valour and another confidence;
because one general had less prudence and another less good fortune?
Much Spaniards, is to be attributed to your inexperience, much to
circumstances, but nothing to our intention; that ever has been to
deliver our King, to preserve to him a throne for which the people has
made such sacrifices, and to maintain it free, independent, and happy.
We have decreed the abolition of arbitrary power from the time we
announced the re-establishment of our Cortes. Such is, O Spaniards! the
use we have made of the unlimited authority confided to us; and when
your wisdom shall have established the basis and form of government
most proper for the independence and good of the state, we will resign
it into the hands you shall point out, contented with the glory of
having given to the Spaniards the dignity of a nation legitimately
constituted.’”
♦GUERILLAS.♦
Had the nation been more alive to such hopes as were thus held out,
the pressure of events and the presence of imminent danger would have
distracted their thoughts from all speculative subjects. Frustrated as
their expectations of immediate deliverance had been, their confidence
was not shaken; the national temper led them to think lightly of every
disaster, but to exaggerate every trifling success; and the defeats
at Arzobispo and Almonacid were less felt or thought of by the body
of the people, than the successful exploits of those predatory bands,
who, under the name of Guerillas, were now in action every where.
The government partook of this disposition; and it must be ascribed
as much to this as to policy, that the official as well as the
provincial journals published every adventure of this kind more fully
and circumstantially than some of those actions wherein their armies
had disappeared. The example which Mina and the Empecinado had set
was followed with alacrity and tempting success, rich opportunities
being offered by the requisition of plate from churches and from
individuals, which the intrusive government was at this time enforcing.
The guerillas were on the watch, and intercepted no trifling share
of the spoils. One party surprised a convoy with eighty _quintals_
of silver near Segovia. The French, who found themselves sorely
annoyed by this species of warfare, though they were as yet far from
apprehending all they should suffer by it, endeavoured to raise a
counter-force of the same kind in Navarre, under the name of Miquelets.
But that appellation, which was so popular among the Spaniards, had no
attraction for them when it was pressed into the usurper’s service,
and the scheme only evinced the incapacity of those who projected it,
for the guerillas depended for information, shelter, every thing which
could contribute either to their success or their safety, upon the good
will of their countrymen; who then would engage in an opposite service,
with the certainty that every Spaniard would regard him as an enemy and
traitor, and as such endeavour secretly or openly to bring about his
destruction?
♦D. JULIAN SANCHEZ.♦
Among the persons who became most eminent for their exploits in
this desultory warfare, D. Julian Sanchez began at this time to be
distinguished. He raised a company of lancers in ♦1809. OCTOBER.♦ the
district of Ciudad Rodrigo, and acted with such effect against the
enemy in the plains of Castille, that General Marchand, who commanded
the sixth corps at Salamanca, threatened to execute the vengeance which
the guerillas at once eluded and defied, upon those whom he suspected
of favouring them. Specifying, therefore, eight of the principal
sheep-owners in that part of the country, he declared that they should
be kept under a military guard in their own houses, and the severest
measures be enforced against their persons and property, if the bands
of robbers, as he called them, did not totally disappear within eight
days after the date of his proclamation. He declared also that the
priests, _alcaldes_, lawyers, and surgeons of every village, should
be responsible with their lives for any disorders committed by the
guerillas within their respective parishes; adding, that every village
and every house which the inhabitants might abandon on the approach of
the French should be burnt. This served only to call forth an indignant
reply from Sanchez, containing some of those incontrovertible truths
which made the better part of the French themselves detest the service
in which they were employed.
Ney’s corps was at this time in Salamanca, under General Marchand,
occupying also Ledesma and Alba de Tormes. Soult’s head-quarters were
at Plasencia; he occupied Coria, Galesteo, and the banks of the Tietar
and the Tagus, as far as the Puente del Arzobispo; Mortier’s corps was
at Talavera, Oropesa, La Calzada de Oropesa, and Naval Moral; Victor’s
advanced posts were at Daymiel, his head-quarters at Toledo; Sebastiani
was at Fuenlebrada, and his corps extended from Aranjuez to Alcala. On
the side of La Mancha or Extremadura, they could not hope to open a way
to Seville, unless the government by an act of suicidal madness should
encounter the certain consequences ♦THE FRENCH REPULSED FROM ASTORGA.♦
of a general action. Remaining, therefore, on the defensive here, they
prepared for offensive operations on the side of Salamanca, with a view
to the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and a third invasion of Portugal. Sir
Robert Wilson’s representations respecting the importance of that point
had not been neglected by the government; the force which the Duque del
Parque commanded there was now respectable in numbers, and had acquired
some experience as well as confidence in that desultory warfare
which Sir Robert had begun, and which D. Julian Sanchez had so well
continued. Preparatory to their movements on this quarter, the French
attempted to carry Astorga by a sudden attack, for which purpose, with
a force of 2600 men, they advanced from the Ezla, and endeavoured to
force the Bishop’s Gate. D. Jose Maria de Santocildes, who commanded
there, was neither wanting in principle nor in ♦OCT. 9.♦ conduct. His
measures for defence were well taken and well executed, and after a
four hours’ action, the enemy retreated with the loss of more than 200
men.
♦BATTLE OF TAMAMES. OCT. 18.♦
A movement of more importance was presently undertaken against the
Duque del Parque, who had taken a strong position on the heights near
Tamames. Marchand commanded the French corps, consisting of 10,000
foot, 1200 horse, with fourteen pieces of cannon; and nothing but
his contempt of the enemy could have induced him to attack them in
such a post. He came on in full confidence, forming his columns with
ostentatious display, as if to exhibit the perfect facility with which
their evolutions were made. As it was soon apparent that the main
attack would be upon the left, being the weakest part of the position,
the Duke ordered Count de Belveder, with half the reserve, to support
this point. Carrera, who commanded the left wing, stood the attack
well; a small party of cavalry, still further to the left, were posted
in a wood, from whence it was intended that they should issue, and
charge the flank of the enemy; but Carrera’s second brigade making
a movement for the purpose of allowing their artillery to play, the
French horse charged them at full speed before they were well formed,
broke in upon them, and cut down the Spaniards at their guns: ... for a
moment the day seemed lost. The Duke, with his staff, came up in time
to the place of danger. Mendizabal, who was second in command, sprang
from his horse, and rallied those who were falling back; the young
Principe de Anglona distinguished himself in the same manner; and
Carrera, whose horse had received two musket-balls, and one wound with
a sabre, put himself at the head of his men, charged the French with
the bayonet, routed them and recovered the guns. Meantime an attack
was made upon the right and centre; but here the Spaniards were more
strongly posted, and D. Francisco de Losada, who commanded in that
part, repulsed them. They retreated in great disorder, leaving more
than 1100 on the field; their wounded were not less than 2000.
♦THE FRENCH RETIRE FROM SALAMANCA. OCT. 21.♦
On the third day after the battle, the Duke moved forward, hoping to
surprise the enemy in Salamanca. He crossed at Ledesma on the 23d, and
marched all the night of the 24th; at daybreak he reached the heights
which command Salamanca to the northward, but the French had retreated
during the night to Toro, carrying with them the church plate and all
their other plunder. They had remained five days in hope of receiving
a reinforcement from Kellermann, who, with a weak corps, occupied the
country between Segovia and Burgos; but seeing no succour approach, the
loss which they had sustained rendered it necessary for them to retire
with all speed, upon the unexpected intelligence that the Spaniards
were within three leagues of the city.
♦MARSHAL SOULT APPOINTED MAJOR GENERAL.♦
The people of Salamanca did not long enjoy their deliverance. While
Kellermann was reinforced with one brigade, another from Dessoles’
division was directed toward that city, preparatory to more important
movements; activity having now been given to the French armies, and
union, which had long been wanted, by the appointment of Marshal Soult
to the rank of Major-General in place of Marshal Jourdan, who was
recalled to Paris. This change was highly acceptable to the troops
in general, though there prevailed a feeling of personal ill-will
toward Soult on the part of some of his fellow marshals which had
not existed toward his predecessor; but more confidence was reposed
in him, the reputation which Jourdan had obtained in the days of
the National Convention not having been supported by his subsequent
fortune. The Duque del Parque, perceiving that more serious operations
were likely to be directed against him, urged the government to act
on the offensive in La Mancha, as a means ♦THE JUNTA RESOLVE ON
RISKING A GENERAL ACTION.♦ of averting the danger from himself; and
the Junta needed little encouragement at this time for measures of the
most desperate temerity. The ablest members of that body partook so
strongly of the national temper, that they were wholly incapacitated
for understanding the real state either of their own armies, or of the
allies, or of their enemies. Their infatuation might seem incredible,
if it were not proved both by their conduct and by documents which they
themselves laid before the nation, stating upon what grounds they had
acted. They had persuaded themselves that if Sir Arthur, after Cuesta
rejoined him, had given battle to Soult, according to his original
intention, the destruction of Soult’s army would have been easy and
certain, the annihilation of Victor’s army easy ♦EXPOSICION DE LA
JUNTA CENTRAL. RAMO DIPLOMATICO, P. 27.♦ as a consequent measure, the
recovery of Madrid easy, and the expulsion of the French as far as
the Ebro, or even to the Pyrenees. By some fatality, they said, the
British General had chosen that line of conduct which was precisely the
most prejudicial to the Spanish cause. By some stranger fatality they
themselves persisted in believing that the British army had been at
all times amply supplied with means of subsistence and of transport,
that it was at any time capable of advancing, and (as if themselves
incapable of understanding that the British Commander and the British
Ambassador meant what they said in their repeated representations)
that it would advance if the Spaniards evinced the determination and
the ability to act without them. And with this persuasion they deluded
their General as well as themselves.
♦AREIZAGA APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND.♦
Rash as he was, even Cuesta would hardly have been so deluded. Upon his
resignation Eguia had only held the command while the government could
look about for a successor. Castaños was under a cloud; the inquiry
which he demanded had never been granted, and though public opinion was
beginning to regard him as his past services and real worth deserved,
there was no thought of again employing him. Alburquerque was an
object of jealousy; Romana of dislike and fear. Areizaga therefore,
who had been highly commended by Blake for his conduct in the battle
of Alcañiz, was removed from the command at Lerida to be placed at
the head of 50,000 men. Alburquerque, who had from 9000 to 10,000
in Extremadura, was ordered to join Parque, and place himself under
his orders; while Areizaga, with the greatest force that they could
collect, was instructed ♦STATE OF MADRID.♦ to advance upon Madrid.
What they knew concerning the state of that city might well excite
their feelings, and raise in them a strong desire of delivering its
inhabitants from their bondage; but there was nothing to encourage
the extravagant hopes which they entertained. The national feeling
existed nowhere in greater strength, though there was no other place
wherein so many traitors were collected; all who in other parts of the
country had made themselves conspicuous as partizans of Joseph, having
fled thither when they could not abide in safety elsewhere. To leave
the capital was an enterprise of the utmost danger for those who were
willing to sacrifice every thing, and take their chance in the field
against the invaders: any one might enter; but in the course of a few
hours it was known who the stranger was, whence he came, where he was
harboured, what was his business, and who were his connexions, ...
every thing which the most vigilant police, and the most active system
of espionage could discover. The tradesmen and those whose means
of subsistence were not destroyed by the revolution were oppressed
by heavy and frequent exactions; the Intruder’s ministers knew the
impolicy of this, but nevertheless were compelled to impose these
burdens; and after the atrocities which they had sanctioned, they
could suffer nothing more either in character or in peace of mind.
Otherwise, even in Madrid, where a strong military force kept every
thing in order, and where none of the immediate evils of war were felt,
there were sights which might have wrung the heart. Men and women, who
had been born and bred in opulence, begged in the streets, as soon as
evening had closed, ... the feelings of better times preventing them
from exposing their misery in the daylight. But what most wounded
the Spanish temper was the condition of their clergy, and monks, and
friars, who, suffering as it were as confessors under the intrusive
government, worked as daily labourers for their support, employing
in hard and coarse labour hands which, the Spaniards said, were
consecrated by the use of holy oil, and by contact with the Body of our
Lord!
Overlooking all impediments in the way of their desires, the Junta
calculated so surely upon delivering the capital, that they fixed upon
a captain-general, a governor, and a corregidor, who were to enter upon
their functions as soon ♦JOVELLANOS, § 103.♦ as it should be recovered;
and they charged Jovellanos and Riquelme to draw up provisional ♦1809.
NOVEMBER.♦ regulations for securing tranquillity there when the enemy
should withdraw. This confidence arose from a national character which
repeated disasters could neither subdue nor correct. The rashness with
which they determined to bring on a general action, at whatever risk,
appeared to them a prudent resolution. Now that the continental war was
terminated, and Buonaparte had no other employment for his armies, it
was certain that more troops than had been withdrawn from Spain would
be marched into it, for the purpose of effecting its subjugation; they
thought it therefore the best and surest policy to make a great effort
before the numbers of the enemy should be thus formidably increased.
Former failures had neither disheartened nor instructed them; and they
furthered the equipment of the army with a zeal which, if it had been
excited two months before in providing for their allies, might have
realized the hopes wherein they now indulged.
♦CONDITION OF THE BRITISH ARMY.♦
The new commander partook the blind confidence of his government.
In some degree he appears to have been deceived by them; for he was
neither informed of Lord Wellington’s determination not to advance, nor
of the condition of the British army, which was such at that time as
to render an advance impossible. From causes which physiologists have
not yet been able to ascertain, the country where they were quartered,
upon the Guadiana, is peculiarly unhealthy during the dry season, when
that river ceases to be a stream, and, like its feeders, is reduced
to a succession of detached pools in the deeper parts of its course.
The troops suffered so much more than the natives, partly because the
disease laid stronger hold on constitutions which were not accustomed
to it, and partly from the peculiar liableness of men, when congregated
in camps, to receive and communicate endemic maladies, that more than a
third of their whole number were on the sick list; and the inhabitants
of the country, aware as they were that this plague belonged to it,
ascribed its greater prevalence and malignity among the strangers to
their having eaten mushrooms, holding the whole tribe themselves in
abhorrence, and not thinking the ordinary causes of the disease could
account for the effects which they witnessed. Areizaga was ignorant of
all this, and the government allowed him to advance with an expectation
that the British army was to follow and support him.
♦DISPOSITION OF THE FRENCH TROOPS.♦
Knowing the condition of that army, it seems almost incredible that
the Junta could have deceived themselves when they thus deceived their
general. But unlikely as it was that they should have given orders for
a forward movement of such importance, without such co-operation, they
hoped perhaps to deceive the enemy, by reports that Lord Wellington
and Alburquerque would advance along the valley of the Tagus. The
French were never able to obtain good intelligence of the English
plans; they could, however, to a certain point, foresee them, as a
skilful chess-player apprehends the scheme of an opponent who is not
less expert than himself at the game; they had learnt to respect the
British army in the field, but they thought the British Commander was
more likely from caution to let pass an opportunity of success, than
to afford the enemy one by rashness. This opinion they had formed from
the events of the late campaign, being fully aware of the danger to
which they had been exposed, and unacquainted with the difficulties
which had frustrated Sir Arthur’s plans, ... difficulties indeed which
they who were accustomed always to take whatever was needful for their
armies either from friend or foe, without any other consideration
than that of supplying their own immediate wants, would have regarded
with astonishment, if not contempt. When Marshal Soult therefore
prepared at this time to act against the Spaniards, the English force
hardly entered into his calculations. He had 70,000 men available for
immediate service in one direction. One corps of these, under Laborde,
watched the Tagus, with an eye to Alburquerque’s movements. Victor
observed the roads from Andalusia to Toledo and Aranjuez, having his
cavalry in advance at Madrilejos and Consuegra; Sebastiani, with the
fourth corps, was in the rear of Victor, securing the capital, from
which neighbourhood a division had been sent to support Marchand after
his defeat at Tamames. The reserve, under Mortier, was at Talavera;
Gazan occupied Toledo with two weak regiments; and Joseph was with his
guards at Aranjuez, relying upon the fortune of Napoleon, and now, when
the Continent was effectually subdued, and reinforcements had already
begun to enter the Peninsula, believing himself in secure possession of
the crown of Spain.
♦AREIZAGA ADVANCES FROM THE SIERRA MORENA.♦
On the 3d of November, Areizaga’s army, consisting of 43,000 foot, 6600
cavalry, and sixty pieces of cannon, began their march from the foot
of the Sierra Morena into the plains, taking with them eight days’
provision. The advanced guard, of 2000 cavalry under Freire, were
one day’s march in front; the infantry followed in seven divisions,
then the rest of the cavalry in reserve, and the head-quarters last,
marching from twenty to thirty miles a day; they had no tents, and took
up their quarters at night in the towns upon the road. They advanced
forces by Daymiel on the left, others along the high road to Madrid,
by Valdepeñas and Manzanares. The French retired before them, and in
several skirmishes of cavalry the Spaniards were successful. Latour
Maubourg escaped with a considerable body of horse from Madrilejos by
the treachery of a deserter, who apprised him of his danger just in
time for him to get out of the town as the Spaniards entered it. They
continued their way through Tembleque to Dos Barrios; then, by a flank
march, reached S. Cruz de la Zarza; threw bridges across the Tagus,
and passed a division over. Here they took a position; the French
pushed their patroles of cavalry near the town, and Areizaga drew out
his army in order of battle. An action upon that ground did not suit
the enemy, and the Spanish general was frantic enough to determine upon
leaving the mountains, and giving them battle in the plain.
♦THE AUSTRIAN COMMISSIONER REMONSTRATES AGAINST HIS PURPOSE. NOV. 16.♦
Baron Crossand, who was employed in Spain on a mission from Austria,
was with the army, and, dreading the unavoidable consequences of such
a determination, presented a memorial to Areizaga, reminding him, that
only the preceding day he had admitted how dangerous it would be thus
to hazard the welfare of his country. None of the motives, he said,
which should induce a prudent general to risk a battle were applicable
in the present case; he had nothing to urge him forward, and the most
fertile provinces of Spain were in his rear: by meeting the enemy upon
their own ground, the advantage of position was voluntarily given them,
and the superiority of numbers which the Spaniards possessed was not
to be considered as an advantage, in their state of discipline; so far
indeed was it otherwise that the French founded part of their hopes
upon the disorder into which the Spaniards would fall in consequence
of their own multitude. A victory might procure the evacuation of
Madrid and of the two Castilles, but these results were light in the
balance when weighed against the consequences of defeat. The wisest
plan of operations was to entrench himself upon the strong ground which
the left bank of the Tagus afforded; from thence he might send out
detachments toward Madrid and in all directions, and act in concert
with the Dukes of Parque and Alburquerque, patience and caution
rendering certain their ultimate success.
♦BATTLE OF OCAÑA.♦
These representations were lost upon Areizaga; he marched back to Dos
Barrios, and then advanced upon Ocaña into the open country. About 800
French and Polish cavalry were in the town; they were driven out by the
Spanish horse; a skirmish ensued, in which four or five hundred men
fell on both sides. In this affair the French general Paris was borne
out of the saddle by a lancer, and laid dead on the field. He was an
old officer, whom the Spaniards represent as a humane and honourable
man, regretting that he should have perished in such a cause. Areizaga
bivouacqued that night; and the French, who had now collected the corps
of Sebastiani and Mortier, under command of the latter, crossed the
Tagus before morning. At daybreak Areizaga ascended the church tower of
Ocaña, and seeing the array and number of the enemy, it is said that
he perceived, when too late, what would be the result of his blind
temerity. He arrayed his army in two equal parts, one on each side the
town; and his second line was placed so near the first, that, if the
first were thrown into disorder, there was not room for it to rally.
Most of the cavalry were stationed in four lines upon the right flank,
a disposition neither imposing in appearance nor strong in reality. The
artillery was upon the two flanks.
About seven in the morning, Zayas, who had often distinguished himself,
attacked the French cavalry with the advanced guard, and drove them
back. Between eight and nine the cannonade began. The Spanish artillery
was well served; it dismounted two of the French guns, and blew up some
of their ammunition-carts. Mortier having reconnoitred the ground,
determined to make his chief attack upon the right, and, after having
cannonaded it for a while from a battery in his centre, he ordered
Leval, with the Polish and German troops, to advance, and turn a ravine
which extended from the town nearly to the end of this wing of the
Spanish army. Leval formed his line in compact columns; the Spaniards
met them along the whole of their right wing, and their first line
wavered. It was speedily reinforced; the right wing was broken, and a
charge of cavalry completed the confusion on this side. The left stood
firm, and cheered Areizaga as he passed; an able general might yet
have secured a retreat, but he was confounded, and quitted the field,
ordering this part of the army to follow him. Lord Macduff, who was
with the Spaniards, then requested the second in command to assume
the direction; but while he was exerting himself to the utmost, the
French cavalry broke through the centre, and the rout was complete.
The Spaniards were upon an immense plain, every where open to the
cavalry, by whom they were followed and cut down on all sides. Victor,
who crossed the Tagus at Villa Mensiger, pursued all night. All their
baggage was taken, almost all their artillery; according to the French
account, 4000 were killed, and 26,000 made prisoners: on no occasion
have the French had so little temptation to exaggerate. Their own loss
was about 1700.
This miserable defeat was the more mournful, because the troops that
day gave proof enough both of capacity and courage to show how surely,
under good discipline and good command, they might have retrieved the
military character of their country. No artillery could have been
better served. The first battalion of guards, which was 900 strong,
left upon the field fourteen officers, and half its men. Four hundred
and fifty of a Seville regiment, which had distinguished itself with
Wilson at Puerto de Baños, entered the action, and only eighty of
them were accounted for when the day was over. Miserably commanded as
the Spaniards were, there was a moment when the French, in attempting
to deploy, were thrown into disorder, by their well-supported fire,
and success was at that moment doubtful. The error of exposing the
army in such a situation must not be ascribed wholly to incapacity
in Areizaga, who had distinguished himself not less for conduct than
courage at Alcañiz; it was another manifestation of the national
character, of that obstinacy which no experience could correct, of that
spirit which no disasters could subdue.
♦TREATMENT OF THE PRISONERS.♦
There was none of that butchery in the pursuit by which the French
had disgraced themselves at Medellin. The intrusive government had at
that time acted with the cruelty which fear inspires; feeling itself
secure now, its object was to take prisoners, and force them into its
own service; and for this purpose a different sort of cruelty was
employed. While the Madrid Gazette proclaimed that the French soldiers
behaved with more than humanity to the captured Spaniards, that they
might gratify their Emperor’s brother by treating his misled subjects
with this kindness, the treatment which those prisoners received was
in reality so brutal, that if the people of Madrid had had no other
provocation, it would have sufficed for making them hate and execrate
the Intruder, and those by whom his councils were directed. They were
plundered without shame or mercy by the French troops, and any who
were recognized as having been taken before, or as having belonged to
Joseph’s levies, were hurried before a military tribunal, and shot
in presence of their fellows. Even an attempt to escape was punished
with death by these tribunals, whose sentence was without appeal!
They were imprisoned in the Retiro, and in the buildings attached to
the Museum, where they were ill fed and worse used; and they who had
friends, relations, or even parents, in Madrid, were neither allowed to
communicate with, nor to receive the slightest assistance from them. By
such usage about 8000 were forced into a service, from which they took
the first opportunity ♦RIGEL, 2. 406.♦ to desert, most of them in the
course of a few months having joined the guerillas.
The defeat of Areizaga drew after it that of the Duke del Parque. Too
confident in his troops, he remained in his advanced situation, amid
the open country of Castille, till the army which he had defeated was
reinforced by Kellermann’s division from Valladolid. The Duke knew
there were 8000 French infantry and 2000 horse in Medina del Campo,
and, thinking that this was all their force, took a position at Carpio,
upon the only rising ground in those extensive plains, and there waited
for their attack. The enemy advanced slowly, as if waiting for other
troops to come up. Seeing this, the Duke gave orders to march against
them, and the French retreated, fighting as they fell back, from about
three in the afternoon till the close of day, when they entered Medina
del Campo. The Duke then discovered that a far greater force than he
had expected was at hand, and fell back to his position at Carpio,
there to give his troops rest, for they had been thirty hours without
any. At midnight the French also retired upon their reinforcements.
During the following day the Duke obtained full intelligence; it now
became too evident that he could no longer continue in his advanced
situation, and he began his retreat from Carpio in the night. In
the evening of the next day he halted a few hours at Vittoria and
Cordovilla, and at ten that night continued his march, being pursued
by Kellermann, who did ♦BATTLE OF ALBA DE TORMES.♦ not yet come near
enough to annoy him. On the morning of the 28th he reached Alba de
Tormes, and there drew up his troops to resist the enemy, who were
now close upon him. He posted them upon the heights which command the
town on both sides of the Tormes, in order to cover his rear-guard,
the bridges, and the fords; the whole cavalry was on the left bank.
General Lorcet began the attack, and was repulsed by the infantry and
artillery: two brigades of French horse then charged the right wing of
the Spaniards; their cavalry were ordered to meet the charge; whether
from some accidental disorder, or sudden panic, they took to flight
without discharging a shot, or exchanging a single sword stroke;
part of them were rallied and brought back, but the same disgraceful
feeling recurred; they fled a second time, and left the right flank
of the army uncovered: the French then charged the exposed wing with
an overpowering force, and, in spite of a brave resistance, succeeded
in breaking through. The victorious cavalry then charged the left of
the Spaniards; but here it was three times repulsed. Mendizabal and
Carrera formed their troops into an oblong square, and every farther
attempt of the enemy was baffled: night now came on; this body, taking
advantage of the darkness, retreated along the heights on the left
bank of the town, and the Duke then gave orders to fall back in the
direction of Tamames. They marched in good order till morning, when, as
they were within eight miles of that town, and of the scene of their
former victory, a small party of the enemy’s horse came in sight, and
a rumour ran through the ranks that the French were about to charge
them in great force. The very men who had fought so nobly only twelve
hours before now threw away firelocks, knapsacks, and whatever else
encumbered them: the enemy were not near enough to avail themselves of
this panic; and the Duke, with the better part of his troops, reached
the Peña de Francia, and in that secure position halted to collect
again the fugitives and stragglers. Kellermann spoke of 3000 men killed
and 2000 prisoners: and all the artillery of the right wing was taken.
By this victory the French were enabled without farther obstacle to
direct their views against Ciudad Rodrigo, and to threaten Portugal:
and Lord Wellington removed in consequence from his position in the
vicinity of Badajos to the north of the Tagus, there to take measures
against the operations which he had long foreseen. Alburquerque’s
little army was now the only one which remained unbroken; but what
was this against the numerous armies of the French? even if it were
sufficient to cover Extremadura, what was there on the side of La
Mancha to secure Andalusia, and Seville itself? Every effort was made
to collect a new army under Areizaga at the passes of the Sierra, and
to reinforce the Duke del Parque also; ... but the danger was close at
hand.
CHAPTER XXVI.
SIEGE OF GERONA.
♦1809.♦
While the Central Junta directed its whole attention toward Madrid,
and expended all its efforts in operations, so ill concerted and ill
directed, that the disastrous termination was foreseen with equal
certainty both by their friends and foes, Catalonia was left to defend
itself; and a sacrifice of heroic duty, not less memorable than that
which Zaragoza had exhibited, was displayed at Gerona.
♦GERONA.♦
Gerona (the Gerunda of the Romans, a place of such unknown antiquity
that fabulous historians have ascribed its foundation to Geryon) is
situated upon the side and at the foot of a hill, where the little
river Onar, which divides the city from the suburbs, falls into
the Ter. Two centuries ago it was second only to Barcelona in size
and importance; other places in the principality, more favourably
situated for commerce, and less overlaid with monks and friars, had
now outgrown it, for of about 14,000 inhabitants, not less than a
fourth were clergy and religioners. In the thirteenth century it was
distinguished by the defence[1] which Ramon Folch of Cardona made
there against Philip III. of France; a memorable siege, not only for
the resolution with which Ramon held out, and for the ability with
which he obtained honourable terms at last, concealing from Philip the
extremity of famine to which the place was reduced, but also for the
singular destruction which was brought upon the besiegers by a plague
of flies[2]. Their bite is said to have been fatal to the horses, of
which such numbers died, that their carcasses produced pestilence;
two-thirds of the army perished, and the remainder found it necessary
to retreat into their own country, carrying home in their coffins the
chiefs who had led them into Spain. In the succession-war, Gerona was
signalized by the desperate resistance which it made against Philip V.
After it had fallen, the Catalans blockaded it during eight months;
M. Berwick raised the blockade, and the French minister proposed to
him to demolish the works; his plea was, that the expense of keeping
a garrison there might be spared; but his intent, that the Spaniards
might have one strong-hold the less upon their frontier. But Berwick
required an order from Louis XIV. to warrant him in a proceeding which
must necessarily offend the King of Spain; and Louis was then withheld
by a sense of decency from directly ordering what he wished to have had
done. The fortifications after that time had been so neglected, that
when Arthur Young was there in 1787, he thought they were not strong
enough to stop an army for half an hour: the old walls, however, had
now been well repaired; and the city was also protected by four forts
upon the high ground above it. But its principal defence was the
citadel, called here, as at Barcelona, Monjuic, which commanded it from
an eminence about sixty fathoms distant. This was a square fort, 240
yards in length on each side, with four bastions, and for outworks the
four towers of Saints Luis, Narcis, Daniel, and Juan.
♦FORCE OF THE GARRISON.♦
The garrison amounted only to 3400 men, but they were commanded by
Mariano Alvares, ♦VOL. I. P. 465; VOL. II. P. 322.♦ and the inhabitants
were encouraged by having twice driven the enemy from their walls.
After the battle of Valls it was certain that the French, having no
force to oppose them in the field, would make a third attempt to
obtain possession of this important place, and that they would make it
in sufficient strength and with ample means, lest they should incur
the disgrace of a third repulse. No means, therefore, were neglected
of providing for defence; but while every military preparation which
the circumstances permitted was made, Alvarez felt and understood
that his surest reliance must be placed upon that moral resistance of
which the Zaragozans had set them so illustrious an example. Like the
♦CRUSADERS ENROLLED.♦ crusaders of old, the inhabitants took the cross,
and formed eight companies of an hundred men each; the women also,
maids and matrons alike, enrolled themselves in an association which
they ♦COMPANY OF ST. BARBARA.♦ called the Company of St. Barbara, to
perform whatever duties lay within their power, as their countrywomen
had done at Zaragoza. The French scoffed at these things, as indicating
the fanaticism of a people whom they considered greatly inferior to
themselves. Light-minded, as well as light-hearted, and regardless of
any higher motive than may be found in the sense of mere military duty
(for it was the direct object of Buonaparte’s institutions to eradicate
or preclude every better principle), they were incapable of perceiving
that the state of mind which their nefarious conduct had called forth,
sanctified such measures.
♦ST. NARCIS APPOINTED GENERALISSIMO.♦
These were demonstrations of the religious feeling with which the
Geronans devoted themselves to the cause of their country, and to the
duty of self-defence. With more reason might the French deride the
part which in that city was assigned to the Patron Saint, though such
derision would come with little consistency from those among them who
professed to believe in the Romish church. St. Narcis, as the Saint is
called in the clipt language of that province, had obtained as much
credit for defeating Duhesme in his first attempt upon Gerona, as for
sending the plague of flies against the French King Philip. A meeting
had in consequence been held of the municipality, the chapter, the
heads of the religious houses, and all the chief persons of the city,
Colonel Julien Bolivar presiding as the king’s lieutenant. Resolutions
were passed, that seeing St. Narcis had always vouchsafed his especial
protection to the principality of Catalonia, as had been manifested
during the former invasions of the French, and recently by the
defeat of Duhesme, which was wholly owing to his favour; and seeing
moreover that for the purpose of resisting the tyranny and oppression
of Napoleon Buonaparte it was necessary to appoint a commander who
should be capable of directing their operations and repulsing such an
enemy, ... no one could so worthily fill that office as the invincible
patron and martyr St. Narcis; and therefore, in the name of Ferdinand
the King, they nominated him Generalissimo of all the Spanish forces
by land and sea, and confided to him the defence of Gerona, of its
district, and of the whole principality. On the following Sunday, the
Junta, with all the clergy and other persons of distinction, went in
procession to notify this appointment to the Saint in his shrine in the
church of St. Felix; the shrine was opened, and a general’s staff, a
sword, and a belt, all richly ornamented, were deposited by the relics
of the chosen commander; and the enthusiastic joy which the ceremony
excited was such, that the Spaniards said it seemed as if the glory of
the Lord had descended and filled the church, manifesting that their
devotion was approved and blessed by Heaven!
♦ALL MENTION OF CAPITULATING FORBIDDEN.♦
This display of national character and of Romish superstition had
taken place in the first fervour of their feelings after a signal
deliverance. The spirit of the Geronans did not fail when danger
was again at hand; and the governor, seeing and relying upon this
disposition of the people, thought it advisable, before the time of
trial approached, to restrain by fear the few treacherous subjects
who might be waiting, when opportunity offered, to declare themselves;
♦APRIL 1.♦ he published an edict, therefore, forbidding all persons
from speaking of capitulation on pain of immediate death, without
exception of class, rank, or condition. Both by the garrison and the
people it was received with acclamations. The military Junta of the
city proposed that the streets should be unpaved as a precaution
against bombardment; this was opposed by the board of police, upon the
ground that it would be prejudicial to health; the question, therefore,
was referred to the medical board, who found it convenient to avoid a
physical discussion, and compromised the matter by deciding that the
paving should be taken up in the squares and streets through which the
troops must necessarily pass.
♦ST. CYR WOULD HAVE REDUCED THE CITY BY BLOCKADE.♦
General Reille, who was to have commanded the besieging army, was
at this time superseded by General Verdier. This army consisted of
18,000 men; to make up that number Marshal St. Cyr was compelled to
weaken the corps of observation under his own command, which was thus
reduced to about 12,000; but from such armies as the Catalans could
bring into the field, and such counsels as directed them, he well knew
how little there was to apprehend. ♦ST. CYR, 164.♦ In this confidence
St. Cyr would have preferred blockading the city to besieging it, and
would have waited till it should be reduced by famine, whereby all
the loss which the besiegers sustained might have been spared. But
he was neither consulted nor listened to, holding the command at this
time only till Marshal Augereau ♦1809. MAY.♦ should arrive. On the
6th of May the besiegers first appeared on the heights of Casa Roca
and Costarroja on the other side the Ter, and began to form their
lines without opposition. A battery of eleven mortars was planted
upon Casa Roca, from whence it commanded the city; works were erected
against Monjuic also; the garrison being far too weak to impede these
operations, and no efforts being made for impeding them from without.
When the lines were completed, and every thing ready to commence the
bombardment, they sent a flag of truce requiring Alvarez to spare
himself and the city the evils which must inevitably attend resistance.
D. Mariano admitted the officer to his presence, and bade him tell his
general, that in future the trouble of sending flags of truce might
be spared, for he would hold no other communication with him than at
the mouth of the cannon. The French commander found means of conveying
a letter to him afterwards, with the significant observation that he
might probably repent having thus cut himself off from the only means
of communication which ♦THE BOMBARDMENT BEGINS.♦ were allowed in war.
It was on the 12th of June that the summons was sent, and on the night
of the 13th, about an hour after midnight, the bombardment began.
Then for the first time the _generale_ or alarm was beat, a sound
which afterwards became so frequent in this ♦1809. JUNE.♦ devoted
city: roused from their sleep, the aged and the children repaired to
cellars and other places of imagined security, which they who could
had provided for this emergency, and the female company of St. Barbara
hastened to their posts. An ill-judged sally was made early on the 17th
against some works which were supposed to be the base of a battery
against the Puerto de Francia: it was successful, but the success was
of little importance and dearly purchased; many brave men fell, and 110
were brought back wounded. The bombardment continued, and among other
buildings the military hospital was destroyed: the people, while it was
in flames, observed that its destruction was deserved, for, instead
of proving a place of help and healing for the sick, covetousness and
peculation had made their profit there upon human misery. The hospitals
of St. Domingo and St. Martin were also rendered uninhabitable;
one other had been made ready, another was to be prepared, and the
difficulty of providing for the sick and wounded increased at the time
when their numbers were daily increasing. About the end of the month an
epidemic affection of the bowels become prevalent, occasioned partly
by the perpetual agitation of mind which the people endured, partly by
sleeping in damp subterranean places, where the air never circulated
freely, and where many had nothing but the ground to lie on. In July,
a bilious fever is usually endemic in Gerona; it seized especially upon
the lower classes now, and upon the refugees from those places which
had been taken or burned by the enemy; and it affected the wounded also.
♦ST. CYR DRAWS NEARER GERONA.♦
During these operations St. Cyr, retaining the command till Augereau,
who was disabled by an attack of gout at Perpignan, should arrive
to supersede him, had remained in his position ♦P. 368.♦ near Vich.
The capture of the French troops near Monzon, and Blake’s success at
Alcañiz, had so alarmed the enemy at Zaragoza and at Madrid, that
orders were dispatched for him to return towards Tarragona, and combine
his movements with Suchet, who, it was deemed, would otherwise be in
danger. But King Joseph’s orders were respected almost as little by the
French commanders as by the Spanish nation. Marshal St. Cyr represented
that his army had always been left to itself, having no relation
with any other corps, and being specially destined for subjugating
Catalonia, which the Emperor Napoleon had thought quite sufficient
employment for it, and which, in fact, would long continue to require
all its efforts. On the other hand, Verdier was entreating him to
approach nearer Gerona, and this he prepared to do, being aware that
Blake’s immediate object, after collecting the runaways from Belchite,
must be to introduce supplies and reinforcements into the besieged
city. His first care was to send the sick and wounded to Barcelona,
the only place where they could be in safety. This done, no time was
lost in breaking up from quarters which he was unwilling to abandon;
for though the want of meat and wine had been severely felt there by
the troops and officers, as well as by the invalids, there had been no
lack of bread; and the country through which they had to pass not being
practicable for carriages of any kind, no more could be taken with them
than the soldiers could carry for ♦JUNE 18.♦ themselves. The movement
was so luckily timed, that they reached S. Coloma de Farnes, just as
a small detachment of Blake’s army arrived there, escorting some 1200
cattle to Gerona: the whole convoy fell into their hands, ♦ST. CYR,
167–172.♦ with an abundance of wine also, the want of which is felt by
the French soldiers more severely than any other privation.
♦PALAMOS TAKEN BY THE FRENCH.♦
St. Cyr’s head-quarters were now at Caldas de Malavella, and he
occupied a line extending from Oña in advance of Bruñola to S. Feliu de
Guixols, of which place his troops took possession at this time, after
a brave but ineffectual resistance. It was a point of considerable
importance, being the port most convenient for those Spanish vessels
which cut off the communication between France and Barcelona for all
ships which were not under a strong escort. Palamos was of still more
importance at this juncture, because from thence Gerona communicated
by sea with Tarragona. This place was attacked by Italian troops under
General Fontane; it was carried by assault, and the only persons who
were spared were the few who threw themselves into the sea, and were
received prisoners when the fury of the invaders had spent itself[3].
On the other hand, the Catalans were not always unsuccessful in
their endeavours to annoy the invaders. Rovira, formerly a canon,
and therefore called Doctor Colonel Rovira (one of the most able and
enterprising partizans who appeared during the contest), intercepted
a convoy and a train of artillery horses, to supply the loss of which
St. Cyr was obliged to part with the horses belonging to his corps.
And a battalion which Augereau had sent to fix up proclamations in
the villages beyond the frontier, was routed by Colonel Porta before
it had disposed of three of ♦ST. CYR, 173, 190.♦ its papers. Augereau
having, in the campaign of 1794, served in that province, and left a
good name there, had counted upon the effect of his proclamations, not
considering that he was now engaged in a cause in which every heart and
every understanding, every principle and every feeling, were against
him.
♦ASSAULT OF MONJUIC.♦
Verdier meantime prosecuted the siege, in full expectation of
bringing it to a speedy conclusion. ♦1809. JULY.♦ The outworks were
soon rendered untenable, and the redoubts which covered the front of
Monjuic were carried with a facility which made him undervalue his
opponents. At ♦ST. CYR, 175.♦ the beginning of July, three batteries
played upon three sides of this little fortress: that which was planted
against the north front consisted of twenty four-and-twenty pounders;
while the French were battering it, the angle upon which the flag was
hoisted fell into the ditch; D. Mariano Montorro descended for it in
the midst of the fire, brought it up in safety, and replanted it upon
the wall. The breach was soon wide enough for forty men abreast. The
fire of the garrison had ceased, for they perceived that the French
were secured by their trenches, and powder was too precious to be
used unless its effects were certain: the enemy, who had not learned
the temper of the men with whom they were contending, judged from
this silence, that their hearts or ammunition had failed, and in the
night between the fourth and fifth they assaulted the breach. But
it was for this that the garrison had reserved their fire, and they
poured it so destructively upon the columns which approached, that
the French retreated with great loss. For three days they continued
their fire upon the breach. Between two and three on the morning of
the 8th, 6000 men again assaulted it; and at the same time the town
was bombarded[4]. D. Blas de Furnas, second in command at Monjuic, was
in the thickest of the fight; he strained his voice till from exertion
it totally failed, but still his presence and his actions encouraged
all who saw him. The enemy came on, filled the fosse, and proceeded
to the breach ... “Woe to him,” says Samaniego, the historian of the
siege, and himself one of the besieged, “woe to him who sets his foot
upon the fosse of Monjuic!” A mortar, which lay masked among the
ruins of the ravelin, and discharged 500 musket-balls at every shot,
was played full upon the enemy by D. Juan Candy, and the havoc which
it made was tremendous. Three times during that day the assault was
repeated, with the utmost resolution on the part of the assailants,
who were never thrown into confusion, though all their efforts were
unavailing, and though they left 1600 of their number slain. The day,
however, was disastrous to the Geronans also, though not from any evil
which it was possible for strength or courage to have averted. The
tower of St. Juan, which stood between the west curtain of the castle,
the city, and the Calle de Pedret, was blown up. In what manner the
magazine took fire was never known. Part of its little garrison were
fortunately employed in active service elsewhere; the rest were buried
in the ruins, from whence twenty-three persons were extricated alive
amid the incessant fire which the enemy kept up upon the spot. Their
preservation was in great measure owing to the exertions of D. Carlos
Beramendi. The company of St. Barbara distinguished themselves that
day: covered with dust and blood, under the burning heat of July, and
through the incessant fire of the batteries and musketry, they carried
water and wine to the soldiers, and bore back the wounded.
The severe loss which the French sustained in this second attempt
convinced them, that while one stone remained upon another, Monjuic
was not to be taken by assault. From this time, therefore, they
continued to batter it on three sides; and, practising the surest and
most destructive mode of warfare, stationed sharpshooters in their
trenches on every side, so that for one of the garrison to be seen
was almost certain death. So perilous was the service become, that
the centinels were changed every half hour, yet nine were killed in
one day at one post, and scarcely one escaped unwounded. It became at
length impossible to observe the operations of the enemy, so thick
were their marksmen, and with such fatal certainty did they take their
aim: no other means remained than that of sending some one into the
fosse, who, lifting up his head with the most imminent hazard, took a
momentary glance. By the beginning of August the besiegers had pushed
their parallels to the edge of the fosse; their labour was impeded by
the stony soil, which rendered it necessary to bring earth from some
distance; for this, however, they had hands enough, and they had no
apprehension to hurry and disturb them, that any army powerful enough
to raise the siege could be brought against them.
♦SUCCOURS INTERCEPTED.♦
Meantime the Spaniards were preparing for an attempt to introduce
succours. For this purpose they threatened the right of the covering
army, hoping to draw their attention upon that point, while 1500 men
passed through the French line near Llagostera, where General Pino
had his head-quarters. They succeeded perfectly in this difficult
attempt, through their knowledge of the country, ... but a straggler
who lagged behind fell into the enemy’s hand, and upon information
which was obtained from him, it was understood that they would direct
their course to Castellar de la Selva, and endeavour to pass through
the besieging army in the night. There was time to take measures for
intercepting them, and being turned aside from thence at nightfall,
when they were beginning to debouche, they fell in at daybreak with
Pino, who was in pursuit, and scarcely a third escaped: the rest
were made prisoners, and sent into France. It was learnt from the
prisoners ♦JULY 11.♦ that the Spaniards did not intend to make any
serious effort for raising the siege till the besiegers should be
weakened by those diseases which the season would infallibly produce.
Reports, nevertheless, were current that such an effort would be made
on Santiago’s day, when the patron of Spain might be expected once
more to inspire or assist his faithful votaries. The French would have
deemed themselves fortunate if this report had been verified; for
according to the barbarous system of warfare which Buonaparte pursued,
they were left to provide subsistence for themselves as they could;
... the soldiers had to cut the corn, thresh it, and grind it for
themselves; and though St. Cyr had given orders that biscuit for four
days’ consumption should always be kept in readiness, in case it should
be necessary to collect the army for the purpose of giving battle, not
more than half that quantity could ever be provided. More than once
also ammunition became scarce, great part coming from Toulouse, and
even from so remote a point as Strasbourg. ♦ST. CYR, 164.♦ Unhappily
the Spaniards were in no condition to profit by the embarrassments of
the enemy; and nothing was done by England for Catalonia, where, during
the first years of the struggle, so much might have been done ♦VOL.
II. P. 328.♦ with effect. The army which in the preceding autumn had
been ordered thither from Sicily, and detained by its general for the
protection of that island, was employed at this time in an expedition
against Naples, as a diversion in favour of the Austrians; and thus the
means which might have saved Gerona were misdirected.
♦THE RAVELIN TAKEN.♦
Meantime the main attacks of the besiegers were directed against
the ravelin which was now the main defence of Monjuic. While it
was possible to maintain it, the garrison contended who should be
stationed there, as at the post of honour. It was repeatedly attacked
by night, but the defenders were always ready, and always repulsed the
assailants. It was now discovered that the enemy were mining; this was
distinctly ascertained by the sounds which were heard in the direction
of the fosse. The castle was founded upon a rock, and therefore the
officers apprehended no immediate danger from operations of this
nature. The purpose of the French was to destroy a breast-work which
protected that gate of the castle through which was the passage to the
ravelin: the breast-work was almost wholly of earth, and its explosion
did no hurt, but it left the gate exposed. A battery, already prepared,
began to play upon it, and the communication between the castle and
the ravelin was thus rendered exceedingly difficult. A sally was made
against this battery, and the guns were spiked; a priest was one of the
foremost in this adventure: he received a ball in his thigh, and fell;
the enemy pressed on to kill him; one of their officers, at the hazard
of his own life, protected him, and in this act of humane interference
was slain by the Spaniards, ... ♦1809. AUGUST.♦ a circumstance which
their journalists recorded with becoming regret. The success which had
been obtained was of little avail, for the French had artillery in
abundance: in the course of a few hours they mounted other pieces in
place of those which had been rendered useless, and continued their
fire upon the gate and the ravelin. At the same time they formed a
covered way from their own parapet to the breach of the ravelin; by
this, on the night between the 4th and 5th of August they poured a
sufficient body of troops through the breach to overpower the forty
men who were stationed there; but having won the place, they could
not maintain it, exposed as it was to musketry from the castle. It
was, therefore, left for the dead who covered it. About forty hours
afterwards, a few Spaniards determined to go and bring off the arms
which the French had not had time to carry away; they found a lad of
sixteen who had lain thus long among the carcasses; he was the only one
of his comrades who escaped death or captivity, ... they brought him
off, and he was sent to the hospital half dead with exhaustion.
♦MONJUIC ABANDONED.♦
The guns of Monjuic had now been silenced; the enemy were so near,
that sometimes the Spaniards knocked them down with stones: it was
with difficulty that the governor, D. Guillerme Nasch, could restrain
his men: impatient at remaining inactive, they earnestly solicited
permission to sally out upon the most desperate attempts. The garrison
had held out seven-and-thirty days since a practicable breach was made.
A week had elapsed since the ravelin was lost, and three sides of the
castle were now entirely in ruins; there was little water left, and
that little foul and unwholesome; the number of soldiers was every
day diminished by disease as well as by the chances of war. Under
these circumstances, the governor deemed it his duty to preserve the
men who were still left, that they might assist in the defence of the
city. On the evening of the 11th he abandoned the ruins, and retired
into Gerona, every man taking with him two hand-grenades and as many
cartridges as he could carry. Matches were left in the magazine, and
the retreat was effected with only the loss of one man, who was killed
by a shell when he had entered the gates.
♦VERDIER EXPECTS THE TOWN TO FALL.♦
Elated with this success, ... a success dearly purchased, and bringing
no glory to the conqueror, ... Verdier assured his government that
Gerona could not now hold out longer than from eight to fifteen days.
He planted one battery against the bulwark of St. Pedro, and another
upon Monjuic, which commanded all the works in the plain, and the
whole line of the city from St. Pedro to the tower of Gironella. Other
batteries, placed by St. Daniel’s Tower, commanded Fort Calvary, the
Castle of the Constable, and one of its advanced posts. While they were
forming these, and throwing up works nearer the city than they could
approach before the fall of Monjuic, a little respite was necessarily
afforded to the besieged; but, that no rest might be given them,
shells were thrown in from time to time by night and day. From the
commencement of the siege Alvarez had felt the want of men, and had
repeatedly solicited a reinforcement of 2000; even then the garrison
would hardly have amounted to half its complement. Nothing but the want
of men prevented him from making more frequent sallies, ... in all that
were made, the desperate courage and high sense of duty which inspired
the Spaniards gave them a decided advantage. “Never,” said he, in his
report to the government, “never have I seen the precious enthusiasm of
all who are within this city abated even for a moment; and a thousand
times would they have sallied out, if I had not, because of their
scanty numbers, been compelled to forbid them.” Just after the fall
of Monjuic, D. Ramon Foxa, and D. Jose Cantera, brought him 700 men,
a trifling number considering the state of Gerona, and the importance
of defending it; but they were volunteers, and went with willing and
prepared minds to make the sacrifice which was required of them.
♦A BATTERY PLANTED ON THE CATHEDRAL.♦
Alvarez now planted upon the roof of the cathedral a battery of three
cannon. The little opposition which was made to this as an act of
profanation was soon overcome, for the clergy felt that, as when
fighting in the field, they were employed in the service of the altar,
so, in such a war, the temple could not be desecrated by using it as a
fortress. Till now a watch had been kept upon the tower, to observe the
movements of the enemy, and ring the alarm whenever an attack was about
to be made. It was composed of the clergy of the cathedral, with one
of the Canons at their head: now that the battery was planted there,
this guard made their station a place of arms also, and annoyed the
besiegers with musketry. The cathedral had been hitherto the hospital
for wounded officers; it now became necessary to remove them to a safer
quarter, for the enemy directed their fire thither with a perseverance
that discovered how much they were annoyed from thence. In the frequent
removal of the hospitals which the bombardment occasioned, the company
of St. Barbara was of the most essential service; throughout the whole
siege, these heroic women shrunk from no duty, however laborious,
however perilous, or however painful. Three of the leaders are
especially mentioned, Dona Lucia Joana de Fitzgéralt, D. Mariangela
Vivern, and D. Maria Custi, commandants of the three divisions of St.
Narcis, St. Dorothy, and St. Eulalia.
At the end of August, several breaches had been made by the batteries
of Monjuic, and it was every day apprehended that they would be made
practicable. Alvarez then declared in his general orders, that if
any of the defenders flinched from the breach when it was attacked,
they should immediately be considered as enemies, and fired upon
accordingly. The besiegers continually constructed new works, they
had troops at command, artillery in abundance, and ♦DISTRESS OF THE
CITY.♦ engineers of the greatest skill. The garrison was considerably
reduced; the hospitals were no longer able to contain the numbers
who required admission: the contagion increased, and became more
virulent; the magazines were exhausted of all their provisions except
wheat and a little flour, and famine began to be severely felt. Not a
word of capitulation was permitted within the city, nor a thought of
it entertained; but Blake was well aware that it was now absolutely
necessary to make a great effort for the relief of the place, and throw
in troops and ♦ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE SUCCOURS.♦ supplies. This was
exceedingly difficult; for, although the enemy occupied an extensive
line, it might easily be contracted, and they would certainly employ
their whole force to prevent the entrance of supplies into a place
which they had strictly blockaded for more than three months. The only
means of succeeding would be to divert their attention upon various
points, and make them suppose that the Spaniards intended to give
battle in the quarter directly opposite to that by which the convoy was
to proceed. Blake’s head-quarters were at S. Ilari when he began his
movements; he ordered Don Manuel Llanden, lieutenant of the regiment
of Ultonia, with as many troops as could be allotted for this service,
and as many of the Somatenes as he could collect on the way, to march
to the heights of Los Angeles, which are north of Gerona, dislodge the
enemy from that position, where they had only a small body of infantry,
and protect the convoy which was to be introduced on that side. Blake
then advanced two hours’ march towards the Ermida, or Chapel of Pradro,
with the reserve, that he might be ready to give assistance wherever
it was wanted; from thence he dispatched the colonel of the regiment
of Ultonia, D. Enrique O’Donnell, with 1200 foot and a few cavalry, to
attack the French at Bruñolas, his object being to make them suppose
that the convoy was proceeding in that direction.
♦SEPT. 1.♦
O’Donnell, by the error of his guides, was led more than two hours’
march out of the direct road, and thus prevented from attacking the
enemy at daybreak, according to his intention. This, however, did not
frustrate the plan. Bruñolas was a strong position, the enemy were
posted in two bodies, and they had a redoubt with entrenchments on the
top of the mountain. Stationing one part of his men at the foot of the
ascent, to defeat the purpose of the enemy, which he perceived was
to attack his principal column in flank, he ordered Sarsfield, with
the greater part of his force, to attack the French in front; it was
done with complete success; they were driven from their entrenchments,
and reinforcements came hastening towards them, this, as Blake had
designed, being supposed to be the point which it was of most
importance to ♦1809. SEPTEMBER.♦ secure. O’Donnell having succeeded in
this diversion, now descended into the plain, lest he should be turned
by superior numbers. There was some difficulty in the descent, owing
to its steepness and the proximity of the enemy, nevertheless it was
effected in perfect order, and having reached the plain, he halted,
and formed in order of battle. Another division of the Spaniards under
General Loygorri joined him, and they continued in that position to
occupy the attention of the French, and draw more of their troops from
the side of the Ter during the whole of the day.
While O’Donnell thus successfully executed his orders on one side,
D. Juan Claros acted on another in concert with the Doctor Colonel
Rovira. Rovira dislodged the enemy from the castle of Montagut, which
they had fortified. Claros at the same time attacked them on the left
bank of the Ter, dislodged them from the height which they occupied
on that part of the river, killed the Westphalian General Hadelin,
burnt their encampments at Sarria and Montrospe, and won the battery
of Casa Enroca. Llanden meantime obtained possession of the heights
of Los Angeles: this opened a way for ♦GARCIA CONDE ENTERS WITH
REINFORCEMENTS.♦ the convoy, with which Garcia Conde, at the head of
4000 foot and 500 horse, advanced from Amer, crossed the Ter, and
hastened along the right bank toward Gerona. The attention of the enemy
had been so well diverted by the attacks on other points, that the
Spaniards were enabled to break through the force which had been left
there, set fire to the tents, and effect their entrance. Six hundred
men sallied at the same time from the city to the plain of Salt, partly
to assist in confusing the enemy, but more for the purpose of restoring
water to the only two mills within the walls. In this they failed;
for, since the French had broken the water-courses, it was discovered
that the weather had completed their destruction; ... had not this
detachment thus uselessly employed their time, they might have carried
off the besiegers’ magazines from Salt.
♦INADEQUACY OF THIS RELIEF.♦
These operations, so honourable to Blake who planned, and to the
officers who executed them, were performed during a day of heavy and
incessant rain, which concealed their movements from the enemy. Of
the troops who got into Gerona, 3000 remained there. Alvarez did not
conceal from them the desperate nature of the service upon which they
had entered; he addressed both officers and men, telling them, that
if any one among them dreaded the thoughts of death, now was the time
to leave the city, for the Geronans and their defenders had sworn to
perish rather than surrender, and he asked if they were willing, to
swear the like? They readily took the oath. Conde, with the rest of the
army and the beasts of the convoy, accomplished his return as happily
as his entrance. Of all Blake’s actions this was the only one which
was completely successful. But more might have been done, and ought
to have been attempted. If he had given the French battle, a victory
would have delivered Gerona; and a defeat could only have produced
the dispersion of his own troops, in a country which they knew, where
every man was friendly to them, and where they would presently have
re-assembled. He had little to lose, and every thing to gain. Even if,
instead of retreating as soon as his object of introducing supplies
was effected, he had continued to threaten the enemy, without risking
an action, an opportunity of attacking them at advantage must have
been given him; for of the two days’ biscuit which had been reserved
for such an occasion, one had been consumed, and the French army could
not have been kept together for want of supplies. Blake was highly
and deservedly extolled for the skill with which he had conducted his
operations; but the attempt, though it had succeeded in all parts,
was miserably inadequate to the object. The stores, which after so
much preparation and with such skilful movements had been introduced,
contained only a supply for fifteen days. Hopes indeed were held out of
others which were to follow, but it was impossible not to perceive that
the enemy would be more vigilant hereafter, and that the introduction
of a second convoy would be rendered far more difficult than that of
the first. Alvarez was so well convinced of this, that he immediately
reduced the rations one half, preparing at once with invincible
resolution for the extremity which he knew was ♦ST. CYR, 231.♦ now to
be expected; and then, it is said, that for the first time there was
some desertion from the Spanish troops.
♦LOS ANGELES TAKEN, AND THE GARRISON PUT TO THE SWORD.♦
The Spaniards, after the late action, had occupied with 500 men the
convent of N. Señora de los Angeles, which was situated upon the
highest ground in the vicinity, and having been fortified, was now
an important point, as facilitating both ingress and egress for the
besieged, while it remained in their hands. Mazuchelli, therefore,
with the Italian troops, was ordered to take it. According to his
statement the Spanish commandant Llanden fired upon the officer who
summoned him; and therefore when the post was carried, after a brave
resistance, every man was put to the sword except three officers,
whom the Italian commander saved, and Llanden himself, who leapt from
one of the ♦ST. CYR, 243.♦ church-windows, and effected his escape.
The Italian soldiers had become mercilessly ferocious in the course
of this war, exasperated, it is said, by the murder of some of their
sick and wounded ♦IB. 262.♦ who had fallen into the hands of Rovira
and other guerilla chiefs. In these dreadful cases, where cruelty
excites revenge, and revenge provokes fresh cruelty, there is a fearful
accumulation of guilt on all the parties who thus aggravate the evils
of war: but that the inhumanity of the invaders was carried on upon
a wider scale, that it was systematically encouraged and sometimes
enjoined, and that it extended to women and even children, is as
certain ... as that the provocation was given by them, and the example
set, ... an example which neither the Spaniards nor Portugueze were
likely to be slow in following. The enemy were less fortunate in an
attack upon the irregular forces under Claros and Rovira, who with
incessant activity intercepted their communication with Figueras.
Verdier attacked them at S. Gregori, where they were well posted and
well commanded, for these leaders were men well fitted for the sort of
warfare in which they were engaged, and the French were compelled to
retire with the loss of one of their generals.
♦UNSUCCESSFUL SALLY.♦
The besiegers were at this time compelled for want of ammunition to
suspend their efforts till a supply could be received from France. The
time was not lost by the garrison in strengthening their works, works
however which derived their main strength from the unconquerable spirit
of the inhabitants. When the supplies arrived the enemy directed their
fire upon the three points of St. Lucia, St. Cristobal, and the Quartel
de Alemanes, or Quarter of the Germans. This latter building rested
in part of its foundation upon the wall itself, and the object of the
enemy was to beat it down, that they might enter over its ruins as by a
bridge. The fire from the cathedral, from the Sarracinas, and from the
tower of Gironella, was well kept up in return; but the French had so
greatly the advantage both in the number and size of their artillery,
that Alvarez ordered a sally, in the ♦SEPT. 15.♦ hope of spiking their
guns. That it might be the more unexpected, the gate of S. Pedro, which
had been walled up since the loss of Monjuic, was re-opened, and the
Spaniards advanced with such rapidity upon the enemy’s works, that
the attack was made almost as soon as they were seen. In many points
it was successful, in some the Spaniards failed, and when they were
thrown into confusion they were unable to rally. In some few of the
persons chosen for the sally, something worse than want of discipline
discovered itself, ... they lagged behind in the assault, and, without
sharing the danger, fell in with their braver comrades on their return.
So much was done, and so much more must have been effected, if all
had behaved equally well, that Colonel Marshal, an Englishman in the
Spanish service, exclaimed, “We have lost a great victory!”
♦THE FRENCH REPULSED IN A GENERAL ASSAULT.♦
The guns which had been rendered useless were soon replaced, and an
incessant fire was kept up upon the three great breaches; on the 18th,
the French engineers declared that all three were practicable. Monjuic
had taught the enemy not to be too confident of success; the breaches
indeed were of such magnitude that it seemed scarcely possible they
should fail in storming them, but they knew that victory must be dearly
purchased. In the evening, therefore, they sent a white flag; it was
not noticed from the town, and the officers who accompanied it made
signs to the Spaniards; there was no firing at this time, and the
men, both of the besieging army and the town, were looking silently
and intently on, to await the issue. Alvarez at length sent a verbal
order to the French officers to retire, ... they requested to be
heard, and were told from the walls to retire on peril of their lives;
they persisted in offering a letter, and then both the castle of the
Constable and the tower of Gironella fired. As soon as the officers
reached their own lines, the batteries were again opened, some upon
the breaches, others throwing shells into the town. During the night
this was kept up, and the enemy collected troops upon the heights of
Campdura and in Monjuic, for the assault. At daybreak they were seen
in motion in different parts, with the purpose, it was supposed, of
calling off attention from the real points of danger. The whole ♦SEPT.
19.♦ forenoon was employed in preparation. Between three and four, the
watch on the cathedral informed Alvarez that troops were descending
from Monjuic to St. Daniel. At the same time the like intelligence
arrived from the forts of the Constable and of the Capuchines; and
another messenger from the cathedral followed, with tidings that the
enemy were advancing in force both from Monjuic and St. Daniel against
the breaches, and that many of them carried instruments for sapping.
The alarm was now rung from the cathedral, and beaten through the
streets; there was scarcely any interval between the alarm and the
attack, so near to the walls were the points of which the enemy were
in possession: 2000 men came on straight from Monjuic, an equal number
advanced between Monjuic and St. Daniel, a third body from S. Miguel;
at the same time a movement of troops was seen in the woods of Palau;
they advanced against the three bridges, the Puerto de Francia, and
forts Calvary and Cabildo. It was not without surprise that the enemy
found the Geronans prepared to receive them at all these points. Nasch,
the defender of Monjuic, had his post at the Quartel de Alemanes,
where one of the principal breaches was made. Colonel Marshall was at
the breach of St. Lucia; a company of crusaders, composed entirely of
clergy, were stationed at the breach of St. Cristobal; the rest of the
garrison, and crusaders, and all the other townsmen manned the walls.
The company of St. Barbara were distributed among the different posts,
to perform their important functions, and proclamations were made,
inviting the other women of Gerona to assist them in this awful hour.
At the Quartel de Alemanes the enemy mounted the breach with the utmost
resolution, and they succeeded in forcing their way into the first
quadrangle of that great building; the French batteries continued to
play upon the walls and the buildings adjoining the breach, and a
huge fragment fell upon those who were foremost in the assault, just
at the moment when part of the Ultonia regiment was about to charge
them: a few of the Spaniards were buried with them in the ruins. The
Geronans then rushed on, drove back the enemy, presented themselves in
the breach, and fought hand to hand with the assailants. Frequently
such was the press of the conflict, and such the passion which inspired
them, that impatient of the time required for reloading their muskets,
the defendants caught up stones from the breach, and brained their
enemies with these readier weapons. Four times the assault was repeated
in the course of two hours, and at every point the enemy were beaten
off. Alvarez, during the whole assault, hastened from post to post,
wherever there was most need of his presence, providing every thing,
directing all and encouraging all; he had prepared cressets to light
up the walls and breaches in case the enemy should persist in their
attempt after darkness closed; but they withdrew long before night
set in, hastily and in disorder, leaving 800 of their best men slain.
Among them was that Colonel Floresti, whom this very Mariano Alvarez
had admitted into Monjuic at Barcelona, when the French took their ♦SEE
VOL. I. P. 201.♦ treacherous possession of that fortress.
Of the besieged forty-four fell in this glorious day, and 197 were
wounded. Our brave countryman, Colonel Marshall, died of his wounds,
as did D. Ricardo Maccarty, another officer of the same regiment,
who was Irish either by birth or extraction. A glorious success had
been gained, one that filled the conquerors with the highest and most
ennobling pride; this joy it brought with it, but it brought no rest,
no respite, scarcely even a prolongation of hope. There was neither
wine to distribute to the soldiers after their exertions, nor even
bread; a scanty mess of pulse or corn, with a little oil, or a morsel
of bacon in its stead, was all that could be served out, ... and this
not from the public magazines, but given by the inhabitants, who, in
the general extremity, shared their stores with the soldiers, lamenting
that they had nothing better to bestow. “What matters it?” said these
brave Spaniards, “the joy of having saved Gerona to-day will give us
strength to go on!” A party went out to bring in any of the wounded
enemies who might have been left among the dead; one had been stript by
a miquelet, but upon perceiving what was the object of their search, he
discovered himself to be living. “Having been wounded,” he said, “he
feigned death as the only chance of escaping death, for he had been
led to believe that the miquelets and the peasants gave no quarter.”
The man who had stripped him happened to be present when he spoke; he
immediately re-clothed him, ran to bring him water, and took charge
of him till he could be removed to the hospital. While the Spaniards
were employed in this humane office, a fire was opened upon them from
the enemy’s works, occasioned, no doubt, by some error of the French
centinels: it drove them in, and the remainder of the wounded were
consequently left to perish. One wretched German, by the breach of St.
Lucia, lay groaning for twenty hours before death relieved him.
♦ST. CYR RESOLVES TO REDUCE THE CITY BY FAMINE.♦
The loss which they had sustained in this assault thoroughly
discouraged the besiegers; and when St. Cyr, for the sake of proving to
the Spaniards that he was not to be outdone by them in perseverance,
would have made a second effort, the officers whom he consulted were
unanimously of opinion that it ought not again to be attempted. The
Marshal, however unwilling to make an acknowledgement so honourable to
the people against whom he was employed, was compelled then to admit
that Gerona could only be reduced by famine, and to determine upon
pursuing that course, which of all others is the most wearying to the
soldiers, and the most painful to a general who has not extinguished in
himself all sense of humanity. Every day now added to the distress of
the besieged. Their flour was exhausted; wheat they had still in store,
but men are so much the slaves of habit, that it was considered as one
great evil of the siege, that they had no means of grinding it; two
horse-mills, which had been erected, were of such clumsy construction,
that they did not perform half the needful work, and the Geronans,
rather than prepare the unground corn in any way to which they had not
been accustomed, submitted to the labour of grinding it between two
stones, or pounding it in the shell of a bomb with a cannon-ball. For
want of other animal food, mules and horses were slaughtered for the
hospital and for the shambles; a list was made of all within the city,
and they were taken by lot. Fuel was exceedingly scarce, yet the heaps
which were placed in cressets at the corners of the principal streets,
to illuminate them in case of danger, remained untouched, and not a
billet was taken from them during the whole siege. The summer fever
became more prevalent; the bodies of the sufferers were frequently
covered with a minute eruption, which was usually a fatal symptom:
fluxes also began to prevail[5].
♦O’DONNELL ENTERS THE CITY.♦
The hope of relief was the only thing talked of in Gerona, and day
and night the people, as well as the watchmen, looked eagerly on all
sides for the succours of which they were so greatly in need, and
which they knew Blake was preparing. That general, on the 21st of
September, had assembled a convoy at Hostalrich; on the morning of
the 26th a firing was heard towards Los Angeles, and a strong body
of the garrison sallied out to assist the convoy. Wimpfen had the
command of the advancing army. When they reached the heights of S.
Pelayo, before La Bisbal, O’Donnell was sent forward, with 1000 men,
to open a way through the enemy: this officer, who was generally not
less successful than enterprising in his attempts, broke through the
enemy, set fire to one of their encampments, and made way for 160 laden
beasts, which entered safely through the Puerta del Areny. The joy
of the besieged was but of short endurance; they looked to see more
troops and more supplies hastening on: 10,000 men they knew had been
sent upon this service, 1000 had effected their part, why could not
the nine follow? After gazing for hours in vain, they could no longer
deceive themselves with hope; it was but too certain that the rest of
the convoy had been intercepted. They then began to censure the general
who had attempted to introduce it on that side, where the way was
craggy, and led through such defiles, that a handful of men would be
sufficient to defeat his purpose: their disappointment vented itself in
exclamations against Blake, and they blamed him for remaining at the
head of an army after so many repeated misfortunes as he had sustained.
♦FAILURE OF THE ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE IT.♦ That general was not more
censured by the Catalans than by the enemy for his conduct during the
siege. The French condemned his want of promptitude and enterprise,
being conscious themselves that for want of resources they must have
been seriously endangered, if they had been repeatedly and vigorously
attacked, or even threatened. But Blake, after the panic at Belchite,
could have no confidence in his men: nor was this his only misfortune;
though in other respects a good officer, he wanted that presence of
mind which is the most essential requisite for a commander, and he was
therefore better qualified to plan a campaign than to execute his own
arrangements. When he succeeded in the former attempt for relieving
Gerona, if the fair occasion had been seized the enemy might have then
been compelled to raise the siege; but it was let pass for want of
alacrity and hope. This second effort was miserably unsuccessful; nine
parts of the convoy fell into the enemy’s hand, and there was a loss of
more than 3000 men, for the ♦ST. CYR, 262.♦ Italians gave no quarter.
St. Cyr thought that the men who had got into the city could not
possibly retreat from it, and must therefore accelerate its surrender;
and believing that the ♦ST. CYR GIVES UP THE COMMAND TO AUGEREAU.♦
business of the siege was done, he went to Perpignan for the purpose
of making arrangements for the better supply of the army, and getting
rid of an irksome command which his successor seemed in no haste to
assume. His situation had long been painful. The service itself was one
to which no casuistry could reconcile an honourable mind; the system
of preying upon the country gave a barbarous character to it, which,
if the cause itself had been less odious, must have been intolerable
to one bred up in those feelings and observances by which the evils
of war were mitigated: and if Marshal St. Cyr had been insensible to
these reflections, he had much personal mortification to endure. There
was reason to suspect that the army was neglected, because he was an
object of displeasure to the government which employed him; and he was
made to feel that the officers under him were, for his sake, debarred
from the honours and advancement which they were entitled to expect.
Finding therefore that Augereau was not incapacitated by ill health
♦ST. CYR, 264, 268.♦ from assuming the command, he communicated to him
his determination of holding it no longer, and was rewarded for his
services by two years of disgrace and exile.
♦O’DONNELL EFFECTS HIS RETREAT.♦
Marshal Augereau had not been many hours before Gerona when O’Donnell
with his thousand men broke through the besieging army, and
accomplished his retreat more daringly and not less successfully than
he had effected his entrance. It was O’Donnell who first formed the
Geronans into companies, and disciplined them: he had not remained
in the city during the siege, because it was rightly thought he
would be better able to assist it from without; and he had displayed
such skill and intrepidity in intercepting a convoy at Mascara, in
concert with Rovira, that the Central Junta promoted him to the rank
of brigadier. When, in the unhappy attempt at relieving the city, he
and his division only had entered, he took up his station between the
fort of the Capuchins and of La Reynana; but Gerona stood in need of
provisions, not men; a thousand troops added nothing to her useful
strength, the Geronans were strong enough without them to resist
an assault if another were made; with them they were not numerous
enough to sally and raise the siege; the continuance of O’Donnell
then could only serve to hasten the fall of the city, by increasing
the consumption of its scanty stores, and to weaken his own men by
the privations in which they shared. It was agreed, therefore, with
Alvarez that he should cut his way through the enemy; and a few
families thought it better to follow him in this perilous attempt,
than remain in a city where it now became apparent that they who
escaped death could not long escape captivity. The place was completely
surrounded, so that to elude the enemy was impossible; the only hope
was to surprise them, ♦OCT. 13.♦ and then force a way. One night,
after the moon was down, they left their position in silence: the
Geronan centinels at St. Francisco de Paula mistook them for an enemy,
and fired: but it is not unlikely that this accident, which might so
easily have frustrated the enterprise, facilitated it, by deceiving
the French, who, when they heard the alarm given from the city, could
never imagine that an attempt was about to be made upon their camp.
To make way by the mountains, O’Donnell knew would be impossible, in
the darkness, without confusion; ♦1809. OCTOBER.♦ therefore, though
the enemy’s posts were more numerous on the plain, he judged it safer
to take that course. The plan was ably carried into effect; his men
surprised the first post, fell upon them with sword and bayonet, not
firing a gun, cut them off without giving the alarm, and sparing two
prisoners, made them their guides through the encampment. They passed
five-and-twenty posts of the enemy, through many of which they forced
their way: Souham was surprised in his quarter, and fled in his shirt,
leaving behind him as much booty as the Spaniards had time to lay hands
on. The alarm spread throughout the whole of the lines, but it was too
late; by daybreak the Spaniards reached S. Colona, where Milans was
posted with part of Blake’s army, and it was not till they were thus
placed in safety that a body of 2000 foot and 200 horse, who had been
sent in pursuit of them, came up. O’Donnell was promoted to the rank of
camp-marshal for this exploit.
♦MAGAZINES AT HOSTALRICH TAKEN BY THE FRENCH.♦
But an immediate change took place in the condition of the besieging
army under the new commander. Their wants were immediately supplied
from France, they were largely reinforced, and encouragement of every
kind was given them, as if to show that the disfavour which they had
experienced had been wholly intended toward Marshal St. Cyr. Augereau
being thus in strength, sent General Pino against the town of
Hostalrich, where magazines were collected for Blake’s army, and for
the relief of Gerona. The town was occupied by 2000 troops; Blake was
too distant to act in support of this important post; the Spaniards,
after a gallant resistance, were driven into the citadel by superior
numbers; the magazines were lost, and the greater part of the town
burnt.
♦AUGEREAU OFFERS FAVOURABLE TERMS.♦
The French purchased their success dearly; but it cut off the last
possibility of relief from Gerona. The besieged now died in such
numbers, chiefly of dysentery, that the daily deaths were never less
than thirty-five, and sometimes amounted to seventy. The way to the
burial place was never vacant. Augereau straitened the blockade; and,
that the garrison might neither follow the example of O’Donnell,
nor receive any supplies, however small, he drew his lines closer,
stretched cords with bells along the interspaces, and kept watch-dogs
at all the posts. The bombardment was continued, and always with
greater violence during the night than the day, as if to exhaust the
Geronans by depriving them of sleep. He found means also of sending
letters into the city, sparing no attempts to work upon the hopes and
fears of the people; he told them of his victory at Hostalrich, ... of
the hopeless state of Blake’s army, ... of the peace which Austria had
made; ... he threatened the most signal vengeance if they persisted
in holding out, and he offered to grant an armistice for a month,
and suffer supplies immediately to enter, provided Alvarez would
capitulate at the end of that time, if the city were not relieved.
There was a humanity in this offer such as no other French general had
displayed during the course of the Spanish war; but Alvarez and the
Geronans knew their duty too well to accept even such terms as these
after the glorious resistance which they had made. With such an enemy,
and in such a cause, they knew that no compromise ought to be made:
they had devoted themselves for Spain, and it did not become them, for
the sake of shortening their own sufferings, to let loose so large a
part of the besieging army as this armistice would have left at liberty
for other operations.
♦DESTRUCTION OF A FRENCH CONVOY BY THE BRITISH SHIPS.♦
While the people of Gerona opposed this heroic spirit of endurance
to the enemy, an affair took place at sea, which, if it brought no
immediate relief to the Catalans, convinced them at least that they
were not wholly neglected by Great Britain. Lord Collingwood having
obtained intelligence that an attempt would be made from Toulon for
throwing supplies into Barcelona, sailed from Minorca about the middle
of October, and took his station a few leagues off Cape St. Sebastian,
on the coast of Catalonia. On the 23d the enemy’s fleet came in sight,
consisting of three ships of the line, two frigates, two armed store
ships, and a convoy of sixteen sail. Rear Admiral Martin was ordered
to give chase; he fell in with the ships of war off ♦OCT. 25.♦ the
entrance of the Rhone, but they escaped him that night, because the
wind blew directly on shore. The next morning he renewed the chase, and
drove two of them, one of eighty guns, the other of seventy-four, on
shore, off Frontignan, where they were set fire to by their own crews;
the other ship of the line and one frigate ran on shore at the entrance
of the port of Cette, where there was little probability that the
former could be saved, but they were under protection of the batteries.
The second frigate had hauled her wind during the night, and got into
Marseilles road.
Two brigs, two bombards, and a ketch belonging to the convoy, were
burnt by the Pomona while Admiral Martin was in chase. The other
vessels made for the bay of Rosas; a squadron pursued, and found them
moored under the protection of the castle, Fort Trinidad, and several
batteries newly erected by the French. Four of these vessels were
armed; the largest was of 600 tons, carrying sixteen nine-pounders, and
110 men; she was inclosed in boarding nettings, and perfectly prepared
for action. The English boats, however, boarded them all, though they
were bravely defended, and though a constant fire was kept up from the
forts and from the beach. Of the eleven ships, three had landed their
cargoes, but all were taken or burnt; and of the whole convoy there
only escaped the frigate, which put into Marseilles, and one of the
store-ships, which probably succeeded in reaching Barcelona.
♦INCREASED DISTRESS OF THE CITY.♦
It was no unimportant service thus to straiten the French in that
city, ... but it was a success which brought no relief to Gerona,
where the devoted inhabitants seemed now abandoned to their fate.
Hitherto the few mules and horses which remained unslaughtered had
been led out to feed near the walls of St. Francisco de Paula, and
of the burial ground: ... this was now prevented by the batteries
of Palau and Montelivi, and by the French advanced posts; and these
wretched animals, being thus deprived of their only food, gnawed the
hair from each other’s tails and manes before they were led to the
shambles. Famine at length did the enemy’s work; the stores from which
the citizens had supplied the failure of the magazines were exhausted;
it became necessary to set a guard over the ovens, and the food for
the hospitals was sometimes seized upon the way by the famishing
populace. The enemy endeavoured to tempt the garrison to desert, by
calling out to them to come and eat, and holding out provisions. A few
were tempted; they were received with embraces, and fed in sight of
the walls, ... poor wretches, envying the firmer constancy of their
comrades more than those comrades did the food, for lack of which
their own vital spirits were well-nigh spent! None of that individual
animosity was here displayed which characterized the street-fighting
♦1809. NOVEMBER.♦ at Zaragoza, ... the nature of the siege was not such
as to call it forth; and some of those humanities appeared, which in
other instances the French generals systematically outraged in Spain.
The out-sentries frequently made a truce with each other, laid down
their arms, and drew near enough to converse; the French soldier would
then give his half-starved enemy a draught from his leathern bottle,
or brandy flask, and when they had drunk and talked together, they
returned to their posts, scoffed at each other, proceeded from mockery
to insult, and sometimes closed the scene with a skirmish.
♦REPORT OF THE STATE OF HEALTH.♦
The only disgraceful circumstance which occurred during the whole
siege was the desertion of ten officers in a body, two of whom were
men of noble birth; they had been plotting to make the governor
capitulate, and finding their intentions frustrated, went over to the
enemy in open day. Except in this instance, the number of deserters
was very small. Towards the end of November many of the inhabitants,
having become utterly hopeless of relief, preferred the chance of
death to the certainty of being made prisoners, and they ventured to
pass the enemy’s lines, some failing in the attempt, others being
more fortunate. At this time Samaniego, who was first surgeon to the
garrison, delivered in to Alvarez a report upon the state of ♦NOV. 29.♦
health: as he gave it into his hands, he said something implying the
melancholy nature of its contents; Alvarez replied, “this paper then,
perhaps, will inform posterity of our sufferings, if there should be
none left to recount them!” He then bade Samaniego read it. It was a
dreadful report. There did not remain a single building in Gerona which
had not been injured by the bombardment; not a house was habitable;
the people slept in cellars, and vaults, and holes amid the ruins; and
it had not unfrequently happened that the wounded were killed in the
hospitals. The streets were broken up; so that the rain water and the
sewers stagnated there, and the pestilential vapours which arose were
rendered more noxious by the dead bodies which lay rotting amid the
ruins. The siege had now endured seven months; scarcely a woman had
become pregnant during that time; the very dogs, before hunger consumed
them, had ceased to follow after kind; they did not even fawn upon
their masters; the almost incessant thunder of artillery seemed to make
them sensible of the state of the city, and the unnatural atmosphere
affected them as well as humankind. It even affected vegetation. In
the gardens within the walls the fruits withered, and scarcely any
vegetable could be raised. Within the last three weeks above 500
of the garrison had died in the hospitals; a dysentery was raging
and spreading; the sick were lying upon the ground, without beds,
almost without food; and there was scarcely fuel to dress the little
wheat that remained, and the few horses which were yet unconsumed.
Samaniego then adverted with bitterness to the accounts which had been
circulated, that abundant supplies had been thrown into the city; and
he concluded by saying, “if by these sacrifices, deserving for ever
to be the admiration of history, and if by consummating them with the
lives of us who, by the will of Providence, have survived our comrades,
the liberty of our country can be secured, happy shall we be in the
bosom of eternity and in the memory of good men, and happy will our
children be among their fellow-countrymen!”
♦SOME OF THE OUTWORKS TAKEN BY THE FRENCH.♦
The breaches which had been assaulted ten weeks before were still
open; it was easier for the Geronans to defend than to repair them,
and the French had suffered too much in that assault to repeat it. A
fourth had now been made. The enemy, learning from the officers who
had deserted that the ammunition of the place was almost expended,
ventured upon bolder operations. They took possession by night of
the Calle del Carmen; from thence they commanded the bridge of S.
Francisco, which was the only means of communication between the old
city and that part on the opposite side of the Ter; from thence also
they battered Forts Merced and S. Francisco de Paula. During another
night they got possession of Fort Calvary, which they had reduced to
ruins, and of the Cabildo redoubt: this last success seems to have
been owing to some misconduct, for the historian of the siege inveighs
upon this occasion against the pernicious measure of intrusting boys
with command, as a reward for the services of their fathers. The city
redoubts fell next. The bodily strength as well as the ammunition of
the Geronans was almost exhausted, and these advantages over them were
gained with comparative ease. The enemy were now close to the walls,
and thus cut off the forts of the Capuchins and of the Constable, the
only two remaining outworks. The garrisons of both amounted only to 160
men; they had scarcely any powder, little water, and no food. These
posts were of the last importance; it was resolved to make a sally for
the sake of relieving them, and the garrison of the town gave up for
this purpose their own miserable rations, contributing enough for the
consumption of three days. The ration was at this time a handful of
wheat daily, or sometimes, in its stead, the quarter of a small loaf,
and five ounces of horse’s or mule’s flesh, every alternate day.
♦LAST SALLY OF THE GARRISON.♦
The few men who could be allotted for this service, or indeed who were
equal to it, sallied in broad day through the Puerto del Socorro,
within pistol-shot of the redoubts which the enemy now possessed; they
were in three bodies, two of which hastened up the hill toward the two
forts, while the third remained to protect them from being attacked
in the rear from the Calle del Carmen. The sally was so sudden, so
utterly unlooked for by the besiegers, and so resolutely executed, that
its purpose was accomplished, ♦1809. DECEMBER.♦ though not without
the loss in killed and wounded of about forty men, which was nearly a
third of those who were employed in it. This was the last effort of the
Geronans. The deaths increased in a dreadful and daily accelerating
progression; the burial-places were without the walls; it had long been
a service of danger to bury the dead, for the French, seeing the way
to the cemetery always full, kept up a fire upon it; hands could not
now be found to carry them out to the deposit-house, and from thence to
the grave; and at one time 120 bodies were lying in the deposit-house,
uncoffined, in sight of all who passed the walls.
♦ALVAREZ BECOMES DELIRIOUS.♦
The besiegers were now erecting one battery more in the Calle de la
Rulla; it was close upon one of the breaches, and commanded the whole
space between Forts Merced and S. Francisco de Paula. This was in the
beginning of December; on the 4th Alvarez was seized with a nervous
fever, occasioned undoubtedly by the hopeless state of the city. On
the 8th the disorder had greatly increased, and he became delirious.
The next day the Junta assembled, and one of their body was deputed to
examine Samaniego and his colleague Viader, whether the governor was
in a state to perform the duties of his office. They required a more
specific question; and the Canon who had been deputed then said, it
was feared that, in the access of delirium, the governor might give
orders contrary to his own judgement, if he were in perfect sanity of
mind, and contrary to the public weal, when the dreadful situation of
the city was considered. The purport of such language could not be
mistaken; and they replied, that, without exceeding the bounds of their
profession, they could pronounce his state of health to be incompatible
with the command, and his continuance in command equally incompatible
with the measures necessary for his recovery.
♦CAPITULATION.♦
Samaniego and his colleague went after this consultation to visit the
governor, whom they found in such a state that they judged it proper
for him to receive the _viaticum_, thinking it most probable that,
in the next access of fever, he would lose his senses and die, ...
for this was the manner in which the disorder under which he laboured
usually terminated. Being thus delivered over to the priests, Alvarez,
before the fit came on, resigned the command, which then devolved
upon Brigadier D. Julian de Bolivar: a council was held during the
night, composed of the two Juntas, military and civil; and the result
was, that in the morning, D. Blas de Furnas, an officer who had
greatly distinguished himself during the siege, should treat for a
capitulation. The whole of the 10th was employed in adjusting the
terms. They were in the highest degree honourable. The garrison were to
march out with the honours of war, and be sent prisoners into France,
to be exchanged as soon as possible for an equal number of French
prisoners then detained in Majorca and other places. None were to be
considered prisoners except those who were ranked as soldiers; the
commissariat, intendants, and medical staff were thus left at freedom.
The French were not to be quartered upon the inhabitants; the official
papers were neither to be destroyed nor removed; no person was to be
injured for the part which he had taken during the siege; those who
were not natives of Gerona should be at liberty to leave it, and take
with them all their property; the natives also who chose to depart
might do so, take with them their moveable property, and dispose as
they pleased of the rest.
While the capitulation was going on, many of the enemy’s soldiers came
to the walls, bringing provisions and wine, to be drawn up by strings,
... an honourable proof of the temper with which they regarded their
brave opponents. During the night the deserters who were in Gerona,
with many other soldiers and peasants, attempted to escape: some
succeeded, others were killed or taken in the attempt, and not a few
dropped with weakness upon the way. To those who remained, the very
silence of night, it is said, was a thing so unusual, that it became
a cause of agitation. At daybreak it was found that the soldiers had
broken the greater part of their arms, and thrown the fragments into
the streets or the river. When the garrison were drawn up in sight of
the French, their shrunken limbs and hollow eyes and pale and meagre
countenances sufficiently manifested by what they had been subdued.
The French observed, not without admiration, that in the city, as well
as at Monjuic, most of the guns had been fired so often that they were
rendered useless; brass itself had given way, says Samaniego, before
the constancy of the Geronans.
The first act of the French officer who was appointed governor was
to order all the inhabitants to deliver in their arms, on pain of
death, and to establish a military commission. _Te Deum_ was ordered
in the cathedral; it was performed with tears, and a voice which could
difficultly command its utterance. Augereau would fain have had a
sermon like that which had been preached before Lasnes at Zaragoza,
but not a priest could be found who would sin against his soul by
following the impious example. A guard was set upon Alvarez; he amended
slowly, and the physicians applied for leave for him to quit the city,
and go to some place upon the sea-shore; it was replied, that Marshal
Augereau’s orders only permitted him to allow the choice of any place
on the French frontier, or in the direct road to France. He chose
Figueras, and, having recovered sufficiently to bear the removal, was
hurried off at ♦DEC. 24.♦ midnight without any previous notice, and
under a strong escort. The Friars, who had been all confined in the
church of St. Francisco, with a cannon pointed against the door, and
a match lighted, were marched off at the same time, in violation of
the terms. The sick and wounded Spaniards were hastily removed to
St. Daniel; they were laid upon straw, and being left without even
such necessaries as they had possessed in the city, except that they
were better supplied with food, many died in consequence. There was
a grievous want of humanity in this; but no brutal acts of outrage
and cruelty were committed, as at Zaragoza; and, when so many of the
French generals rendered themselves infamous, Augereau, and the few who
observed any of the old humanities of war, deserve to be distinguished
from their execrable colleagues.
♦DEATH OF ALVAREZ.♦
The Central Junta decreed the same honours to Gerona and its heroic
defenders as had been conferred in the case of Zaragoza. The rewards
which Mariano Alvarez had deserved by his admirable conduct were to be
given to his family, if, as there was reason to fear, he himself should
not live to receive them. The sad apprehension which was thus expressed
was soon verified. He died at Figueras. It was said, and believed, in
Catalonia, that Buonaparte had sent orders to execute him in the Plaza
at Gerona, and that the French, fearing the consequences if they should
thus outrage the national feeling, put him out of the way by poison[6].
His death was so probable, considering what he had endured during the
siege, and the condition in which it left him, that no suspicion of
this kind would have prevailed, if the public execution of Santiago
Sass and of Hofer, and the private catastrophe of Captain Wright and of
Pichegru, had not given dreadful proof that the French government and
its agents were capable of any wickedness. In the present imputation
they were probably wronged, but it was brought on them by the opinion
which their actions had obtained and merited.
♦EROLES ESCAPES.♦
About 600 of the garrison made their escape from Rousillon. Eroles was
one; than whom no Spaniard rendered greater services to his country
during the war, nor has left to posterity a more irreproachable and
honourable name.
CHAPTER XXVII.
PROCEEDINGS IN FRANCE AND IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT.
♦1809.♦
♦BUONAPARTE DIVORCES THE EMPRESS JOSEPHINE.♦
The year had thus closed in Spain as triumphantly for the invaders
as it began; and yet the French felt, and could not but feel, that
the subjugation of that kingdom was more distant at this time than
they had supposed it to be when they entered upon the invasion, in
the wantonness of insolent power. Buonaparte, when he recapitulated
the exploits of the year to his senate, intimated an intention of
returning thither to complete the conquest. “When I shall show myself
beyond the Pyrenees,” said he, “the frightened leopard will fly to
the ocean to avoid shame, defeat, and death. The triumph of my arms
will be the triumph of the genius of good over that of evil; of
moderation, order, and morality, over civil war, anarchy, and the
evil passions.” He neither mentioned nor alluded to the battle of
Talavera; the circumstances of that well-fought field had been so
completely concealed from the French nation, that they were fully
persuaded the English had suffered a great defeat; but the lesson
had not been lost upon Buonaparte. That battle, and the repulse at
Esling, made him for the first time feel the insecure foundation of
his power; it taught him that his armies were not invincible. His
hatred for England, implacable as it was, had not prevented him from
regarding with admiration the military genius of Marlborough, though
he was incapable of appreciating the principles and feelings which
induced that excellent commander on every occasion to mitigate by every
means in his power the miseries of war. He despised the counsels, and
egregiously miscalculated the resources of Great Britain; but he was
compelled in his heart to render reluctant justice to the national
spirit, which Vimeiro and Coruña, and the Douro and Talavera, had shewn
him could be displayed by her armies no less than by her fleets; and
he could not but secretly and ominously apprehend, that such victories
as those of Blenheim and Ramillies might be achieved by such soldiers.
It is believed that this feeling determined him to connect himself by
marriage with one of the great continental powers. Secret arrangements
for this having been made with the house of Austria, he divorced
the Empress Josephine at the close of the year by an act of his own
government, and with her full acquiescence, reasons of state being made
the plea, as they were the motives, for this measure. In the manner of
the separation, in the provision which was made, and in the honours
which were reserved for Josephine, due regard was shown her: she was
a gentle and benevolent woman; and had Buonaparte in his moral nature
been half as worthy of the throne, the world might have loved and
revered the memory of both.
♦FARTHER REQUISITION FOR THE ARMIES IN SPAIN.♦
But triumphantly as the war with Austria had been concluded, the
prospect of peace was yet far distant. The war-minister reported,
that the French armies in Spain consisted of 300 battalions and 150
squadrons, and it would be sufficient, without sending any additional
corps, to keep them at their full establishment: 30,000 men collected
at Bayonne afforded means for accomplishing this, and for repulsing
any force which the English might send to that country. In this state
of things, no other levy was necessary than such as would supply the
contingent indispensably requisite for replacing in the battalions of
the interior the drafts which were daily made from them. There remained
from the conscription of the years 1806, 7, 8, 9, 10, more than 80,000
men, who, though ballotted, had not been called into actual service;
it was proposed to call out 36,000, and then to declare those classes
free from any future call. “By these means, sire,” said the minister,
“your armies will be maintained at their present strength, and a
considerable number of your subjects will be definitively released
from the conscription.” There were also at the Emperor’s disposal
25,000 men, afforded by the conscription for 1811; but upon these it
was not proposed to call, unless events should disappoint his pacific
intentions.
Thirty thousand men stationed at Bayonne to supply the constant
consumption of his army in Spain, 36,000 to be raised for replacing
the drafts from the interior, and 25,000 to be taken by anticipation,
before the conscription in its regular course ought to have reached
them, and to be held in readiness for farther demands of blood; this
was the prospect held out at the conclusion of the Austrian war; these
were the sacrifices which the French were called upon to make, not for
defence, not for the interests, not for the honour of France, but to
support a wanton and execrable usurpation, which had no other cause
than the individual ambition of Buonaparte.... ♦DISPLAY OF SPANISH
FLAGS.♦ He felt how needful it was to persuade the French that a war
which they knew to be so destructive was not as inglorious as it was
unjust, and for this purpose a parade was made of the victories which
had been obtained in Spain. The flags taken at Espinosa, Burgos,
Tudela, Somosierra, and Madrid, were presented to the legislative body;
a detachment of the grenadiers of the imperial guard was introduced,
and seated on the right and left of Buonaparte’s statue, that the
stage might be full. Rhetorical speeches were delivered, and the
session concluded like a stage spectacle, with a flourish of trumpets,
and cries of Long live the Emperor! In this exhibition, Buonaparte
addressed himself to the ruling passion of the people over whom he
reigned. “Without glory,” he said, “there could be no happiness for a
Frenchman;” and the moral feeling of the nation had been so debased
that they believed glory might be attained in a war thus flagrantly
and infamously unjust. ♦1810. JANUARY.♦ The prevailing weakness of his
own character also was betrayed in this display; no other successes
were brought forward than those which had been won while he was in
Spain; for though he liberally rewarded his generals in all ways, and
left them also at full liberty to enrich themselves by exaction and
plunder, he was jealous of any celebrity that they might attain, and
desired, more from personal vanity than from political considerations,
that in every success the French should look to him, and to him alone,
as the author of their victories.
While France was thus rejoicing in the triumphs of its armies, the
Central Junta saw the whole extent of their danger, and rested their
hopes upon the goodness of their cause and the character of the
Spanish nation, with a composure which nothing could shake. Never was
a nation more truly represented in its defects and in its virtues, in
its strength and in its weakness. While in their administration they
committed the same errors, deceiving themselves and others, which in
former wars had rendered the Spaniards[7] the most inefficient and
impracticable of all allies; their language was that of the loftiest
fortitude, and their public papers breathed a spirit worthy of their
station. One of the most splendid of these orations was issued during
the fearful pause after the defeat of their armies at Ocaña and at Alba
de Tormes, when the peace with Austria left Buonaparte at leisure to
♦ADDRESS OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA TO THE NATION.♦ direct his whole force
against Spain. “Our enemies,” said they, “exhort us to submit to the
clemency of the conqueror. Because in their own degraded hearts they
find nothing but baseness when they are weak, and atrocity when they
are strong, they imagine that the Spaniards must abandon all their
lofty hopes. Who has told them that our virtue is of so low a standard?
Does fortune oppose to us greater obstacles? we will redouble our
exertions! Are our dangers augmented? we shall acquire the greater
glory! Slaves of Buonaparte, waste not time in sophistries which can
deceive no one; speak frankly and say, we will be the most wicked of
men, because we believe ourselves the most powerful: ... this language
is consistent and intelligible; but do not attempt to persuade us
that the abandonment of our rights is wisdom, and that cowardice is
prudence! Submit?... Do these sophists know to what they advise the
most high-minded nation upon earth? It would be a stain without example
in our annals, if after such efforts, such incredible events, we were
to fall at the feet of the crowned slave who has been sent to us as
king. And for what? That from the midst of his banquets, his ruffian
parasites, and his prostitutes, he may point out the churches which are
to be burnt; the estates which are to be divided among his satellites;
the virgins and matrons who are to be taken to his seraglio; the youths
who are to be sent as the tribute to the Minotaur of France!
“Spaniards, think not that the Junta speak thus to excite you by the
arts of language; what need of words, when things speak for themselves?
Your houses are destroyed; your churches demolished; your fields laid
waste; your families dispersed and wandering through the country, or
hurried into the grave. Have we made so many sacrifices, have the
flames of war consumed half Spain, that we should abandon the other
half to the far more deadly peace which the enemy prepares for it?
For no one will beguile himself with the insidious parade of the
improvements which the French hold out. The Tartar who commands them
has decreed, that Spain shall have neither industry, nor commerce,
nor population, nor political representation whatever: ... to be made
a waste and solitary sheep-walk for supplying French manufactures
with our wools; to become a nursery of men who may be hurried away to
slaughter; such is the destiny which he would impose upon the most
highly favoured of all countries! Shall we then, submitting to this,
submit also to the destruction of our religion; abandon the interests
of heaven and the faith of our fathers to the sacrilegious mockery
of these banditti; and forsake the sanctuary which, during seven
centuries, and in a thousand and a thousand battles, our forefathers
maintained against the Saracens? If we should do this, the victims who
perished in that contest would cry to us from their graves, Ungrateful
and perfidious race, shall our sacrifices be in vain, and is our blood
of no estimation in your eyes? No, patriots! rest in peace, ... and let
not that bitter thought disturb the quiet of your sepulchres!
“There is no peace, there can be none in this state of things! That
Spain may be free, is the universal wish of the nation; and if that
cannot be obtained, at least it may become one immense desert, one
wide grave, where the accumulated remains of French and Spaniards may
exhibit to future ages our glory and their shame. But fortune is not so
inimical to virtue as to leave to its defenders only this melancholy
termination. It is written in heaven, and the history of all ages
attests the truth, that a people who decidedly love their liberty and
independence must ultimately establish them, in despite of all the
artifice and all the violence of tyranny. Victory, which is so often
a gift of fortune, is sooner or later the reward of constancy. What
defended the little republics of Greece from the barbarous invasion of
Xerxes? What reconstructed the Capitol when it was almost destroyed by
the Gauls? What preserved it from the mighty arms of Hannibal? What, in
times nearer our own, protected the Swiss from German tyranny, and gave
independence to Holland in spite of the power of our ancestors?
“Spaniards, the Junta announces to you frankly what has happened in
the continent, because it would not have you ignorant for a moment
of the new danger which threatens the country: they announce it in
the confidence, that, instead of being dismayed, you will collect
new strength, and show yourselves more worthy of the cause which you
defend, and of the admiration of the universe: they announce it to
you, because they know that the determination of the Spaniards is to
be free at whatever cost; and all means however violent, all resources
however extraordinary, all funds however privileged, must be called
out to repel the enemy. The ship’s treasures must be thrown overboard
to lighten her in the tempest and save her from shipwreck. Our country
is sinking; ... strength, riches, life, wisdom, council, ... whatever
we have is hers. The victory is ours, if we carry on to the end of our
enterprise the sublime enthusiasm with which it began. The mass with
which we must resist the enemy must be composed of the strength of
all, and the sacrifices of all; and then what will it import that he
pours upon us anew the legions which are now superfluous in Germany,
or the swarm of conscripts which he is about to drag from France? We
began the contest with 80,000 men less; he began it with 200,000 more.
Let him replace them if he can; let him send or bring them to this
region of death, as destructive to the oppressors as to the oppressed!
Adding to the experience of two campaigns the strength of despair and
of fury, we will give to their phalanxes of banditti the same fate
which their predecessors have experienced; and the earth, fattened with
their blood, shall return to us with usury the fruits of which they
have deprived us! Let the monarchs of the North, forgetful of what
they are, and of what they are capable, submit to be the slaves of
this new Tamerlane; let them purchase at such a price the tranquillity
of a moment, till it comes to their turn to be devoured! What is this
to us, who are a mighty people, and resolved to perish or to triumph?
Did we ask their consent when, twenty months ago, we raised our arms
against the tyrant? Did we not enter into the contest alone? Did we not
carry it on for a campaign alone?... Nothing which is necessary for our
defence is wanting. Our connexion is daily drawn closer with America,
to whose assistance, as timely as it was generous, the mother country
is deeply indebted, and on whose zeal and loyalty a great part of our
hope is founded. The alliance which we have formed with Great Britain
continues and will continue; that nation has lavished for us its blood
and its treasures, and is entitled to our gratitude and that of future
ages. Let, then, intrigue, or fear, prevail with weak governments and
misled cabinets; let them, if they will, conclude treaties, illusory
on the part of him who grants, and disgraceful on the part of those
who accept them; let them, if they will, relinquish the common cause
of civilized nations, and inhumanly abandon their allies! The Spanish
people will stand alone and erect amid the ruins of the European
continent. Here has been drawn, never to be sheathed, the sword of
hatred against the execrable tyrant; here is raised, never to be beaten
down, the standard of independence and of justice! Hasten to it, all ye
in Europe who will not live under the abominable yoke; ye who will not
enter into a league with iniquity; ye who are indignant at the fatal
and cowardly desertion of these deluded princes, come to us! Here the
valiant shall find opportunities of acquiring true honour; the wise and
the virtuous shall obtain respect; the afflicted shall have an asylum.
Our cause is the same; the same shall be our reward. Come! and, in
despite of all the arts and all the power of this inhuman despot, we
will render his star dim, and form for ourselves our own destiny!”
Two things are remarkable in this paper; the total change, or rather
restoration of public feeling, which must have been effected, before
a Spanish government would hold up the resistance of the Dutch to
Philip as a glorious example to the Spanish people; and the want of
foresight and information in the Junta, who could not only rely upon
the attachment of the colonies, but even venture to declare, that the
hopes of the country rested in great measure upon them. But though the
Spanish government deceived itself in looking for hope where none was
to be found, and in its exaggerated opinion of its military strength,
it was not mistaken in relying upon the national character, and that
spirit of endurance which constituted ♦STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN
ENGLAND.♦ its moral strength. Upon this it was, and upon the extent and
nature of the Peninsula, that those persons who from the commencement
looked on with unshaken confidence to the final expulsion of the
invaders, founded their judgement. The Continent, notwithstanding its
extent, fell under the yoke of France, because the spirit of the people
was not such as to supply the want of magnanimity and of wisdom in
their rulers: the Tyrolese were subdued notwithstanding their heroism,
because, in so small a territory as the Tyrol, numbers, remorselessly
employed, must necessarily overcome all resistance. But no force can be
sufficient to conquer and keep in subjection a peninsula, containing
about 170,000 square miles, and twelve millions of inhabitants, if the
people carry resistance to the uttermost. Their armies may be defeated,
their towns occupied, their fortresses taken, their villages burnt,
... but the country cannot be conquered while the spirit of the nation
remains unsubdued. In Spain the mountains form a chain of fastnesses
running through the whole Peninsula, and connecting all its provinces
with each other. In such a country, therefore, when the war ceases
to be carried on by army against army, and becomes the struggle of a
nation against its oppressors, pursued incessantly by night and day,
the soldier, no longer acting in large bodies, loses that confidence
which discipline gives him; while the peasant, on the other hand, feels
the whole advantage which the love of his country, and the desire of
vengeance, and the sense of duty, and the approbation of his own heart,
give to the individual in a contest between man and man. The character
of the Spaniards was displayed in their annals. The circumstances of
their country remained the same as when Henri IV. said of it, that
it was a land wherein a weak army must be beaten, and a strong one
starved. They who were neither ignorant of history nor of human nature
considered these things; and therefore, from the commencement of the
struggle, regarded it with unabated hope.
But never since the commencement of the French revolution had the
affairs of England, of Europe, and of the world, worn so dark an aspect
as at this time. The defeats which the Spaniards had sustained were
far more disheartening than those of the preceding winter, because
they evinced that neither had the armies improved in discipline, nor
the government profited by experience. It was but too plain, that,
notwithstanding the show of resistance made at the Sierra Morena, the
kingdoms of Andalusia were in fact open to the enemy; so supine was the
Central Junta, as to make it even probable that Cadiz itself might be
betrayed or surprised; and if, now that Buonaparte had no other object,
he should march a great force against the English in Portugal, there
were few persons who had sufficient knowledge of the country and of the
character of the people, to look onward without dismay.
♦LORD WELLINGTON’S VIEWS WITH REGARD TO PORTUGAL.♦
Lord Wellington calculated upon both. He knew that man is naturally
brave, that the men of any country therefore may, with good training,
be made good soldiers, and that if the Spanish troops were no longer
what they had been under the Prince of Parma, the fault was not in
the materials, but in the composition of their armies. The Portugueze
were as proud a people as the Spaniards, and had in their history as
much cause for pride; but they were not so impracticable. The removal
of their court removed all those intrigues and jealousies which would
otherwise have been at work; the nation felt itself at this time
dependent upon England; but there was no humiliation in this; any such
sentiment was precluded by old alliance, the confidence of hereditary
attachment, and the consciousness that it was willing and able to
do its own part in its own defence. Whatever measures the British
government advanced were cordially adopted; and Lord Wellington,
during the mortifying inaction to which he was reduced, had the
satisfaction of knowing that the Portugueze troops were every day
improving in military habits and feelings, and that he might reckon
upon them in the next campaign as an efficient force. In all his views
and opinions concerning the course to be pursued, Marquis Wellesley
entirely agreed with him; and the Marquis, when he returned to England
to take his place in administration, proposed that every effort should
be made for placing Portugal in the best state of preparation. He knew
that we might rely upon the Spaniards for perseverance through all
reverses and under every disadvantage; but it was on the Portugueze
that we must place our trust for regular and effectual co-operation.
♦THE KING’S SPEECH.♦
When parliament assembled this was referred to in the king’s speech.
“The efforts,” it was said, “of Great Britain, for the protection of
Portugal, had been powerfully aided by the confidence which the Prince
Regent had reposed in his majesty, and by the co-operation of the local
government, and of the people of that country. The expulsion of the
French from that kingdom, and the glorious victory of Talavera, had
contributed to check the progress of the enemy. The Spanish government
had now, in the name and by the authority of Ferdinand VII., determined
to assemble the general and extraordinary Cortes of the nation. This
measure, his majesty trusted, would give fresh animation and vigour
to the councils and the arms of Spain, and successfully direct the
energies and spirit of the Spanish people to the maintenance of the
legitimate monarchy, and to the ultimate deliverance of their country.
The most important considerations of policy and of good faith required,
that as long as this great cause could be maintained with a prospect
of success, it should be supported, according to the nature and
circumstances of the contest, by the strenuous and continued assistance
of the power and resources of Great Britain.”
In the debates which ensued it was a melancholy thing to see how
strongly the spirit of opposition manifested itself even in those
persons whose opinions and feelings regarding the justice and necessity
of the war were in entire ♦SPEECH OF EARL ST. VINCENT;♦ sympathy with
the government. Earl St. Vincent inveighed in the strongest terms
against the ministers, to whose ignorance and incapacity, to whose
weakness, infatuation, and stupidity, he said, all our disasters and
disgrace were owing. After panegyrizing Sir John Moore as one of
the ablest men who ever commanded an army, he spoke of the battle
of Talavera as a victory which had been purchased with the useless
expenditure of our best blood, which led to no advantage, and which
had had all the consequences of defeat. “It is high time,” said he,
“that parliament should adopt strong measures, or the voice of the
country will resound like thunder in their ears. Any body may be a
minister now: they pop in, and they pop out, like the man and woman in
a peasant’s barometer; they rise up like tadpoles; they may be compared
to wasps, to hornets, to locusts; they send forth their pestilential
breath over the whole country, and nip and destroy every fair flower
in the land. The conduct of his majesty’s government has led to the
most frightful disasters, which are no where exceeded in the annals of
history. The country is in that state which makes peace inevitable;
it will be compelled to make peace, however disadvantageous, because
it will be unable to maintain a war so shamefully misconducted and so
disastrous in its consequences.”
♦LORD GRENVILLE;♦
Lord Grenville spake in a similar temper. The day must come, he
said, when ministers would have to render an account to parliament
of the treasures which they had wasted, and the lives which they had
sacrificed. Their measures had uniformly failed, and presented nothing
but an unbroken series of disgraceful, irremediable failures. And yet
they had the confidence, the unblushing confidence, to tell us of a
victory! Gilded disasters were called splendid victories, and the
cypress that droops over the tombs of our gallant defenders, whose
lives have been uselessly sacrificed, was to be denominated blooming
laurels! He spake of what might have been done if an army had been
sent either to Trieste or to the north of Germany; condemned the
Walcheren expedition, as the plan and execution of that miserable
enterprise deserved, and pronounced a condemnation not less unqualified
upon the plans which had been pursued in Spain, where, he said, they
had persisted in expecting co-operation from an armed peasantry,
persevering in error after the absurdity of such an expectation had
been proved. Why too had the army in that country been exposed in
unhealthy situations? But the Lords had a duty to perform; having seen
what had taken place before in Spain and Portugal, they could not
exculpate themselves for having continued to repose confidence in such
ministers. They must exert themselves in this most imminent crisis of
their country. “You cannot be ignorant,” said he, “of its tremendous
situation, and where can you look? To the government! See it, my Lords,
broken, distracted, incompetent, incapable of exerting any energy,
or inspiring any confidence! It is not from the government that our
deliverance is to be expected; it must be found, if it be found at all,
in your own energy and in your own patriotism.” And he concluded with
moving as an amendment to the address, that vigorous and effectual
proceedings should be instituted, as the only atonement which could be
made to an injured people!
♦HONOURABLE MR. WARD;♦
The language of the opposition in the House of Commons was not
more temperate. “Lord Wellington’s exploits at Talavera,” said the
Honourable Mr. Ward, “left the cause of Spain as desperate as they
found it, and in their consequences resembled not victories, but
defeats. For by what more disastrous consequences could defeat have
been followed, than by a precipitate retreat, by the loss of 2000 men
left to the mercy of the enemy upon that spot where they had just
fought and conquered, but fought and conquered in vain; that spot
which, as it were in mockery to them, we had endeavoured to perpetuate
in the name of the general? By what worse could it have been followed
than by the loss of all footing in Spain, the ruin of another army,
and the virtual renunciation of all the objects of the war? William
III. used by his skilful generalship to render defeat harmless, ... our
generals made victory itself unavailing.”
♦MR. PONSONBY;♦
Mr. Ponsonby said it was a crisis which called upon the House of
Commons to put forth its penal powers; and that had he a choice between
punishment and pardon, he should prefer punishment, because the
circumstances of the country imperiously required some solemn example.
♦MR. WHITBREAD;♦ Mr. Whitbread directed the force of his invective
against Marquis Wellesley. “To Spain,” he said, “he had gone, after
delays which ought to be accounted for; and what were his services
when he got there? Why, he went through the mummery of dancing on the
French flag! He visited the Junta, went through all the routine of
etiquette and politics, made a speech about reform, took his glass
after dinner, and religiously toasted the Pope. On his return, of
course, when the places were going, he came in for his share, and
made one of the administration which the Chancellor of the Exchequer
had at length compiled; but in what manner had he compiled it? His
first application was to two noble lords, with whose principles he
had been at war all his political life: they rejected the tender in a
manner worthy of their dignity, and the rebuff which they gave would
have daunted any man of less temerity than himself. There was not a
man, from the Orkneys to the Land’s End, who did not pronounce him
and his administration weak, incapable, and insufficient. Even with
the addition of the two colleagues who had deserted them they were
feeble, but they then stood on a principle, or rather in opposition
to a principle; but now, having been rejected by all who were worthy,
the weak, and old, and infirm, were collected from the hedges and high
roads, and consorted with for want of better.
“Let our relative situation with the enemy,” he pursued, “be well
considered! Austria gone, the French force concentrated, and Spain
their only object. We are told that Portugal may be defended by 30,000
men; but would not Buonaparte know our force to a drummer? and where
we had 30,000 he would have three score. Who would struggle against
such fearful odds? We held our ground in that country just at the will
of the French Emperor, and at his option he could drive us out of it.
And what could we expect from our present ministry, ... or rather
from a single man, for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in fact, stood
alone? Marquis Wellesley, of whom such account had been made, might
be considered as completely insignificant. Who was he? The governor
of India, ... the man who had scarcely escaped the censure of that
house for his cruel tyranny! the man who had assailed the press, that
sacred palladium of the people! the friend of despotism! the foe to
liberty! Could this man say to Buonaparte, in the noble indignation
of insulted virtue, ‘I have not done as you have!’ Alas! if such a
man had strength, he would indeed be a fearful acquisition to such a
government; but he was known, and therefore weak and harmless. Peace,”
Mr. Whitbread concluded, “should be the cry of the nation. Peace, ...
particularly because the thraldom of millions of our fellow-subjects
was the tenure by which this incapable junto held their offices.”
♦MR. PERCEVAL.♦
Mr. Perceval replied to this speech in all its parts. “As to the
situation,” he said, “which he had the honour to hold in his Majesty’s
council, he must state, in the most explicit manner, that it was not
an object of his own desire; on the contrary, if his wishes had been
realized, another person would then have held the office of first lord
of the treasury. When, by his Majesty’s directions, he had applied
to Lords Grey and Grenville, for the purpose of forming an extended
administration, the first proposition which he should have made to
them, if they had given him an opportunity of stating it, would have
been, that it should be left to themselves to determine who should be
the first lord of the treasury.” This was a confession of weakness:
twelve months before, Mr. Perceval was strong in the opinion of the
people; but now the deplorable Walcheren expedition hung about him like
a mill-stone, and, even in his own feelings, weighed him down. Having
said what he could in defence of that expedition, he rose into a higher
strain, when speaking of the Spaniards, and the unjust and unfeeling
manner in which their conduct had been represented. “Was it liberal,”
he said, “that the defenders of Zaragoza and Gerona should be said
to have displayed no generosity, no enthusiasm, no patriotism? Well,
indeed, might those persons censure what was done to aid the Spanish
cause, who could assert that the cause did not deserve success! But
neither in ancient nor in modern history could an example be found of
a country maintaining a contest like that which this degraded Spain,
and this degraded Spanish government, had so long supported. Never, in
recent times, had 250,000 Frenchmen been so long in a country without
subduing it. Spain was not subdued; but what effect upon the Spaniards
such language as had been used that night might produce, it was
impossible to predict!”
♦VOTE OF THANKS TO LORD WELLINGTON OPPOSED BY THE EARL OF SUFFOLK.♦
When a vote of thanks to Lord Wellington was moved in the House of
Lords, it was opposed by the Earl of Suffolk, who argued that the best
mode of assisting Spain was by a floating force, which might be landed
wherever it could be most useful; by such a mode of warfare, he said,
Gerona, during its long and glorious defence, ♦EARL GROSVENOR;♦ might
have been relieved. Earl Grosvenor also opposed the vote, and made some
judicious remarks upon the practice of raising men to the peerage whose
fortunes were not adequate to support the rank. The ends of military
fame, he said, would be better promoted if different orders of military
merit were established; the same spirit of valour might be excited, and
all inconveniences to the constitution ♦EARL GREY;♦ avoided. Earl Grey
denied that the battle of Talavera was a victory; it had been trumpeted
as such, he said, by ministers, but in so doing they had practised an
unworthy deception. Lord Wellington had betrayed want of capacity and
want of skill: the consequences had been most disastrous, nor did we
yet know the extent of the evil. One army had been compelled to retreat
into Portugal, where he feared it was in a very critical situation,
and where, from the unhealthiness of the position which it occupied,
disease had made such an alarming progress among the troops, that he
believed their numbers did not at that time exceed 9000 effective men.
♦MARQUIS WELLESLEY;♦
Marquis Wellesley replied, that he knew the circumstances which had
influenced his brother in all his movements during the campaign, and
the plain statement of those circumstances triumphantly vindicated
him. “Against strange mismanagement,” he said, “such unlooked for,
such unaccountable casualties as had occurred during that campaign,
and frustrated a plan so wisely contrived, no human prudence on Sir
Arthur’s part could provide. Concerning the necessity of a radical
change in the government of Spain, his opinions,” he continued, “were
not unknown. But it surely was not to be expected that Spain could
reach at once the vigour of a free government, just emerging as she
was from that dreadful oppression which had broken down the faculties
of her people, ... from those inveterate habits and ancient prejudices
which had so long contracted her views and retarded her improvement,
and from the disconnexion and disunion between her different
provinces. The change which was desired could not be the work of a
day. But were we therefore to desert the Spaniards in this crisis of
their fortunes, and abandon them to the mercy of their invaders?...
As for the circumstances which attended and followed the battle of
Talavera, nothing more perhaps, in a military sense, could be said
of the result, than that the British troops had repulsed the attack
of a French army almost double their numbers, the efforts of which
had been chiefly directed against them. But was there no skill, no
bravery, no perseverance displayed in the mode in which that repulse
was effected? Did no glory redound from it to the British arms? Had
it not been acknowledged, even by the enemy, as the severest check
they had yet sustained? That victory had saved the south of Spain from
absolute destruction, had afforded time for Portugal to organize her
army, and had enabled Lord Wellington to take a position where he might
derive supplies from Spain, at the same time that he drew nearer to his
own magazines. He should not attempt to diminish the disasters which
afterwards befel the Spanish armies; both his noble brother and himself
had earnestly advised them to keep on the defensive; but, flushed with
the victory of Talavera, and too sanguine of success, they advanced at
all points, and the result had fatally justified the propriety of the
advice which had been given them. This, however, was not the present
subject. It was enough for him to have shown that Lord Wellington had
arrested the progress of the French armies into the south of Spain, and
procured a breathing time for Portugal; that country was placed in a
greater degree of security than at any time since it had been menaced
by France, and such essential improvements had been introduced into the
Portugueze army, that it would be enabled effectually to co-operate
with the British troops. These advantages were fairly to be ascribed
to Lord Wellington; and he did not hesitate to say, that his brother
was as justly entitled to every distinction which his sovereign had
conferred, and to every honour and reward which it was in the power of
that house to bestow, as any noble lord who for his personal services
had obtained the same distinctions, or who sat there by descent from
his illustrious ancestors.”
To this temperate and able speech, which showed that means had been
taken with due foresight, and that with due perseverance there ♦LORD
GRENVILLE.♦ was a well-grounded hope of success, Lord Grenville replied
by arguing from the misconduct of the Spanish ministers against our
own. “Let the house,” he said, “consider how much dependence the
administration had placed upon such a government as that of the
Spaniards, and then ask themselves if they could be justified in
supporting them in a continuance of error. We were now told that
reliance was to be placed upon the co-operation of the Portugueze; but
they ought to judge of the future from the past, to recollect that for
want of co-operation it had been found necessary to retreat, and that
the remnant of the army was in a situation not unlike that in which it
was placed by its advance to Talavera.”
♦FEB. 1.♦
The vote of thanks was opposed in like manner ♦GENERAL TARLETON;♦ in
the House of Commons. General Tarleton said, that Lord Wellington’s
dispatches were vain-glorious, partial, and incorrect; that he had
been deficient in information concerning the amount and situation of
Soult’s army; and that he had been compelled to a precipitate retreat,
after abandoning his sick and wounded. ♦MR. WHITBREAD.♦ Mr. Whitbread
affirmed, that the battle had been more a repulse than a victory; nor
could he, he said, withhold a tear, when he thought of the British
blood which had been spilt in sacrifice to incapacity and folly. The
consequence of the battle was, that the army had no other retreat than
that through Deleitosa, and their condition during that retreat was
such, that many hundred perished on the road from famine. The Spanish
cause, he concluded, was now more hopeless than ever. But the motion
received a powerful support from Mr. Windham, who, setting all party
views aside, followed the feelings of his own generous nature. “The
unproductive consequences of this victory,” he said, ... “for a victory
it was, and a glorious victory, ... were not to be put in comparison
with the military renown which we had gained. Ten or fifteen years
ago, it was thought on the continent that we might do something at
sea, ... that an Englishman was a sort of sea-animal; but our army was
considered as nothing. Our achievements in Egypt first entitled us to
the name of a military power; the battle of Maida confirmed it; and
he would not give the battles of Vimeiro, Coruña, and Talavera, for a
whole Archipelago of sugar islands.”
♦PENSION VOTED FOR LORD WELLINGTON. FEB. 16.♦
The vote was carried in both houses without a division. But the
opposition tried their strength in the House of Commons upon the
King’s message, recommending that a pension of 2000_l._ should be
settled upon Lord Wellington, and the two next heirs to his title
in succession. “With the grant of the peerage,” ♦MR. CALCRAFT;♦ Mr.
Calcraft said, “that house had nothing to do; he was sorry it had been
conferred; but though there was no remedy for it, the house ought not
to add to it the pension. Pensions and thanks might be voted, but they
could not permanently blind the country; whatever the public opinion
might be now, it would not be with ministers upon this subject a
month hence, when the whole fruits of Lord Wellington’s victories and
campaigns would develope themselves to public view. It was mournful
and alarming to hear that Lord Wellington had said he could defend
Portugal with 50,000 men, provided 30,000 of them were British; for if
the French were in earnest in their designs upon that country, before
three months Lord Wellington and his army would be in England. Neither
Portugal nor any other country could be defended by victories like that
of Talavera.”
It was said by General Craufurd, a peerage might be an incumbrance
to Lord Wellington without a pension. General Loftus also remarked,
that he had always been one of the most liberal men in existence,
and the state of his circumstances was therefore, he imagined, far
from sufficient for the support of the dignity ♦OPPOSED BY SIR
FRANCIS BURDETT;♦ to which he was elevated. Sir Francis Burdett took
this occasion for touching a popular note. “If Lord Wellington’s
liberality,” he said, “had brought him into difficulty or debt, who
was it whom they called upon to free him from the incumbrance? ...
the people; ... who already owed debts enough, not in consequence of
any prodigality of their own, but through the impositions of their
representatives. As to the military part of the question, he could only
say, that the result was failure, ... failure as complete as failure
could be. But even if the occasion had been such as to deserve reward,
he should object to making any appeal for that purpose to the people’s
purse. What was become of the patronage of the government? Where were
the sinecures, which were always defended because they afforded a fund
for such purposes as these? Yet application was made to the people, ...
and this by a government who, while they perpetually threw the burden
upon the people, had greater means of rewarding merit at their disposal
than all the combined merit of Europe could possibly exhaust.”
♦MR. WHITBREAD;♦
The same strain of argument was pursued by Mr. Whitbread. “It was
often argued,” he said, “that the expectation of one of those great
places falling in satisfied many a claimant: if so, why should not
Lord Wellington wait for one of them? It was an important part of the
question, whether, supposing the peerage to have been merited, the
circumstances of the new peer were such as to require the pension; for
if they were not, it would be a scandalous waste of the public money.
Nor was it necessarily to follow, that whenever the king was advised to
grant a peerage to any officer, the House of Commons was bound to vote
him a pension.”
This produced from Mr. Wellesley Pole a ♦MR. WILBERFORCE;♦ statement
of his brother’s fortune. Mr. Wilberforce then appealed to the house,
whether, if Lord Wellington had devoted the great talents which
confessedly belonged to him to the bar, or to any other liberal
pursuit, he would not have rendered them infinitely more productive
than it appeared that he had done by actively employing them in the
service of his country? and he protested against the unjust and
impolitic illiberality of opposing such a grant upon such grounds.
The same opinion ♦MR. CANNING.♦ was delivered by Mr. Canning. “The
victories of Lord Wellington,” he said, “had re-established our
military character, and retrieved the honour of the country, which
was before in abeyance. If the system of bestowing the peerage was to
be entirely changed, and the House of Lords to be peopled only by the
successors to hereditary honours, Lord Wellington certainly would not
be found there. But he would not do that noble body the injustice of
supposing that it was a mere stagnant lake of collected honours: it was
to be occasionally refreshed by fresh streams. It was the prerogative
of the crown to confer the honour of the peerage; it was the duty of
that house to give it honour and independence. The question was,
whether they would enable Lord Wellington to take his seat with the
proudest peer in the other house, or whether they would send him there
with the avowed intention that it was only to the crown he was to look
for support. It was their duty to take care if the crown made a peer,
that it should not make a generation of peers wholly dependent on its
favour for their support.”
There was a great majority upon this question, 213 voting for the
grant, 106 against it. But the current of popular opinion in the
metropolis set in with the opposition at this time; for the Walcheren
expedition, like a pestilential vapour, clouded the whole political
♦THE COMMON COUNCIL PETITION AGAINST THE PENSION.♦ horizon. The
common council presented a petition against the pension: a measure so
extraordinary, they said, in the present state of the country, and
under all the afflicting circumstances attending our armies in Spain
and Portugal under that officer’s command, could not but prove highly
injurious in its consequences, and no less grievous than irritating
to the nation at large. In the military conduct of Lord Wellington,
the lord mayor and common council added, they did not recognise any
claims to national remuneration; and they conceived it to be a high
aggravation of the misconduct of his majesty’s unprincipled and
incapable advisers, that they had, in contempt and defiance of public
opinion, recommended this grant to parliament. There was neither
reason nor justice in making it, and therefore they prayed that it
might not pass into a law. When the second reading was moved, Mr.
Whitbread said he trusted that as this petition had been presented,
the minister would not press it that day. Mr. Perceval replied he saw
no necessity for any such forbearance, and the bill passed by a great
majority, 106 dividing against 36.
In these debates ministers were completely triumphant. Some of their
opponents accused them of having done too much, others of having
done too little, and some would fain have persuaded the people of
Great Britain, that our army had obtained no victory at Talavera. The
charge of having taken no measures for conciliating the Spaniards, by
obtaining for them a restoration of those political rights which had
been so long withheld, was abundantly disproved by the papers laid
before parliament. There it appeared that Mr. Stuart, Mr. Frere, and
Marquis Wellesley, had each pressed upon the existing government the
necessity of convoking the Cortes. The great error which the ministry
had committed, was in their neglect of Catalonia. In the commencement
of the struggle this fault was not imputable to them, but to the
general, who disobeyed his instructions to convey his army to that most
important scene of operations: the effects of that fatal error were to
a certain extent irremediable; but no subsequent attempt was made, and
the French were suffered to take fortress after fortress, without an
effort on our part to relieve them. Still the conduct of administration
toward Spain was far more worthy of commendation than of censure; if
not without error, if not always successful, it had uniformly been
brave and generous: we had every motive of policy for assisting the
Spaniards in their struggle, but the assistance was given in a manner
worthy of the nation which gave, and of the noble people who received
it.
The result of any discussion upon this subject was anticipated by the
public; they, in spite of the efforts of factious news-writers, and
journalists of higher pretensions, whose want of feeling was more
disgraceful even than their want of foresight, continued to feel
concerning Spain like freemen and like Englishmen. Nor was Mr. Windham
the only member of opposition who expressed this sentiment. When in
♦MARQUIS OF LANSDOWN; JUNE 8.♦ the course of the session the Marquis
of Lansdown moved for a vote of censure upon ministers for rashness
and ignorance, the strong bias of party spirit did not prevent him
from rendering justice, in some respects, both to his own countrymen
and to Spain. “Whatever he might think of the policy which led to the
battle of Talavera,” he said, “or of its consequences, he should ever
contemplate the action itself as a proud monument of glory to the
general who commanded, and to the army who won that ever-memorable
day. No success, he affirmed, could be expected in Spain under such a
government, or with armies so constituted and commanded as the Spanish
armies, or where supplies could not be procured; these things ought to
have been known; but these things were no reflection on the Spanish
national character. The Spaniards had displayed acts of the most
splendid heroism which had ever been recorded; they had converted the
walls of Zaragoza and Gerona into fortifications almost impregnable.
Their disasters were imputable, not to the people, but to those who
could suppose that a junta of persons put together in any manner
composed a government, and that a crowd of men collected in any way was
an army. Still he was ready to confide in the Spanish people, and to
believe that much might yet be done by their efforts; and he cherished
the hope, and would cherish it to the last, that if ever Europe was
saved, our own country would be an important agent in that great event.
But it was not by co-operating in rash expeditions with such armies as
that of Cuesta.”
♦LORD HOLLAND;♦
Lord Holland spoke to the same purport, while the intent of his speech
was to fix a censure on the ministers. He condemned them for having
sent out Mr. Stuart and Mr. Frere without adequate instructions,
particularly with regard to the most important point, the arrangement
of a system for redressing the grievances of the Spanish people and
restoring their rights. But on that point the British government
was fully justified. He condemned them also for neither having sent
an adequate force, nor given proper instructions, nor made adequate
provision for that force which they did send: but the event had shown,
that a larger force had been sent than could be provided, in the
inexperienced state of our own commissariat, and in the disordered
state of Spain. He said that ministers ought equally to be condemned
by those who disapproved of our interposing at all in the affairs of
Spain, and by those who were most interested in the success of the
Spaniards: if, indeed, there was any difference, the friends of Spain
must condemn them most, because they were peculiarly mortified by the
disappointment of their wishes, a disappointment which the misjudging
policy of these ministers had produced. He was one who had felt this
mortification, for no event had ever excited a livelier interest in
his mind, not even the dawn of the French revolution. But having thus
spoken to justify the vote of censure which he was about to give,
Lord Holland argued in defence of the principle which his own party
vehemently and even virulently opposed. He dwelt upon the importance of
supporting Spain to the utmost, and upon the perilous facilities which
Cadiz and Lisbon would afford for the invasion of Ireland, if those
ports were suffered to fall into the hands of the French. If, after
all efforts, he said, Spain should ultimately be subdued, his advice
was, that we should promote the establishment of such a system of
government in the Spanish colonies as good statesmen could approve, the
only system which ought to be approved in any country, a system founded
upon the opinions and wishes of the people.
♦MARQUIS WELLESLEY.♦
Marquis Wellesley replied to the general attack which was made upon
ministers, in a manner worthy of his reputation as a statesman. He
pointed out the solid advantages which had been gained during the last
campaign, by securing Portugal, and giving time for the Portugueze
to form an army, which was now in a state to co-operate with the
British troops; he showed also what advantages had been gained to the
Spaniards, had the Junta known how to profit by them, or followed the
advice which both he himself and Lord Wellington had pressed upon them
in vain. Then, in a clear and masterly manner, he enforced the duty
and necessity of supporting the cause of Spain. “Justly,” he said,
“had it been stated by the noble Marquis, that if ever Europe was to
be delivered, England must be the great agent in her deliverance; and
justly he might have added, that the fairest opportunity for effecting
that deliverance opened, when Spain magnanimously rose to resist the
most flagrant usurpation of which history records an example. Not
only were we called upon by the splendour, the glory, the majesty of
the Spanish cause, to lend our aid; a principle of self-preservation
called upon us also: these efforts on the part of Spain afforded us
the best chance of providing for our own security, by keeping out of
the hands of France the naval means of Spain, which Buonaparte was so
eager to grasp, knowing they were the most effectual weapons he could
wield against the prosperity and the power of Great Britain. The views
of Buonaparte, in his endeavours to subjugate Spain, were obvious,
even to superficial observers. The old government had placed at his
disposal the resources of that country, but the old government was
feeble and effete; and, however subservient to his will, he knew it
was an instrument which he could not pitch to the tone of his designs.
He therefore resolved to seize upon the whole Peninsula, and to
establish in it a government of his own. He may have been prompted to
this partly by his hatred to the Bourbon race, partly by the cravings
of an insatiable ambition, partly by the vain desire of spreading his
dynasty over Europe, partly by mere vanity: but his main object was,
that he might wield with new vigour the naval and colonial resources
of Spain, to the detriment of Great Britain. This alone could suit the
vastness of his designs; this alone could promise to gratify his mortal
hatred of the British name. By the entire subjugation of the Peninsula,
and the full possession of its resources, he knew that he should
be best enabled to sap the fundamental security of these kingdoms.
Therefore how highly important was it to keep alive there a spirit
of resistance to France! There were no means, however unprincipled,
which Buonaparte would scruple to employ for the attainment of his
ends. To him force and fraud were alike, ... force, that would stoop
to all the base artifices of fraud, ... fraud, that would come armed
with all the fierce violence of force. Every thing which the head of
such a man could contrive, or the arm execute, would be combined and
concentrated into one vast effort, and that effort would be strained
for the humiliation and destruction of this country. Universal dominion
is, and will continue to be, the aim of all French governments; but
it is pre-eminently the object to which such a mind as Buonaparte’s
will aspire. England alone stands in the way of the accomplishment
of that design, and England he has therefore resolved to strike down
and extirpate. How then were these daring projects to be met? How,
but by cherishing, wherever it may be found, but particularly in the
Peninsula, the spirit of resistance to the usurpations of France? If
we have saved the navy of Portugal; if we have saved the Spanish ships
at Ferrol; if we have enabled the Portugueze government to migrate to
their colonies; if we have succeeded in yet securing the naval and
colonial resources both of Portugal and Spain; how have these important
objects been achieved, but by fomenting in both these kingdoms a spirit
of resistance to the overwhelming ambition of Buonaparte? To this end
must all our efforts be now directed. This is the only engine which
now remains for us to work in opposition to Buonaparte’s gigantic
designs. Why then should we depart from that salutary line of policy?
what is there to dissuade or discourage us from adhering to it? I can
discover nothing in the aspect of Spanish affairs that wears any thing
like the hue and complexion of despair. If, indeed, it had appeared
that this spirit began to languish in the breast of the Spaniards, if
miscarriages, disasters, and defeats had been observed to damp the
ardour and break down the energies of the Spanish mind, then might it
be believed that further assistance to the Spanish cause would prove
unavailing. But, fortunately for this country, not only is there life
still in Spain, but her patriotic heart still continues to beat high:
the generous and exalted sentiment, which first prompted us to lend our
aid to the cause of Spain, should therefore be still maintained in full
force, and should still inspirit us to continue that aid to the last
moment of her resistance. The struggle in which Spain is now engaged
is not merely a Spanish struggle. In that struggle are committed the
best, the very vital interests of England. With the fate of Spain the
fate of England is now inseparably blended. Should we not therefore
stand by her to the last? For my part, my lords, as an adviser of the
crown, I shall not cease to recommend to my sovereign to continue to
assist Spain to the latest moment of her resistance. It should not
dishearten us that Spain appears to be in the very crisis of her fate;
we should, on the contrary, extend a more anxious care over her at a
moment so critical. For in nations, and above all in Spain, how often
have the apparent symptoms of dissolution been the presages of new
life, and of renovated vigour? Therefore, I would cling to Spain in
her last struggle; therefore, I would watch her last agonies, I would
wash and heal her wounds, I would receive her parting breath, I would
catch and cherish the last vital spark of her expiring patriotism. Nor
let this be deemed a mere office of pious charity; nor an exaggerated
representation of my feelings; nor an overcharged picture of the
circumstances that call them forth. In the cause of Spain, the cause of
honour and of interest is equally involved and inseparably allied. It
is a cause in favour of which the finest feelings of the heart unite
with the soundest dictates of the understanding.”
Full use was made of these debates by the French government, which was
at this time employing every artifice for making the people believe
that Great Britain was on the brink of ruin. The King’s speech, as
usual, was falsified, and sent abroad. There it was said, that whatever
temporary and partial inconveniences might have resulted from the
measures which were directed by France against our trade and revenue,
the great source of our prosperity and strength, those measures had
wholly failed of producing any general effect. The official French
paper substituted for these words a sentence, in which the King was
made to tell his parliament, they must be aware that the measures
adopted by France to dry up the great sources of our prosperity had
been to a certain degree efficient. It was said that we were not merely
on the verge of national bankruptcy, but actually suffering under all
the horrors of famine; that our crops of every kind had failed; we were
obliged to feed our cattle with sugar and molasses, and had nothing
but sugar, cocoa, and coffee, and the skin and bones of these cattle
for ourselves. To a certain degree, Buonaparte and his journalists may
have perhaps believed the falsehoods which they circulated; they read
in our factious newspapers of decaying trade, diminished resources,
and starving manufacturers; and the opposition told them, that France
was certain of success in whatever she attempted on the Continent;
that the cause of Spain was hopeless; that it was impossible for us
to carry on the war; that if we did not grant the Roman Catholics all
that they demanded, Ireland would be lost, and the loss of Ireland
would draw after it the downfal of the British empire. Speeches of this
tenour were carefully translated for the use of the Emperor’s subjects,
and circulated throughout the Continent: but when the French saw it
asserted, upon the authority of English members of parliament, that the
Spaniards and Portugueze had nothing worth fighting for; that they were
inimical in their hearts to England; that Buonaparte was reforming the
abuses of their old government, and redressing their grievances; when
they saw it affirmed in the English House of Commons, that the people
of Spain must know Marquis Wellesley would, if opportunity should
offer, take both Spain and Portugal as Buonaparte had done; when they
saw the same persons who represented Sir John Moore as a consummate
general vilify the talents of Lord Wellington, deny his merits, oppose
the rewards which were so justly conferred on him, and maintain, in
the face of their insulted country, that the British army had gained
no victory at Talavera; it appeared to them impossible that language,
at once so false, so absurd, and so co-operative with the designs of
France, could have been uttered by an English tongue; such speeches
were supposed to have been invented in France, and they attributed to
the artifices of their own government what were in reality the genuine
effusions of perverse minds, irritable tempers, and disappointed
faction.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
THE FRENCH ENTER ANDALUSIA. DISSOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA AND
APPOINTMENT OF A REGENCY. ALBURQUERQUE’S RETREAT.
♦1810.♦
♦SUPINENESS OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦
The Central Junta manifested none of that energy after the rout at
Ocaña which they had so successfully exerted after the battle of
Medellin. The whole extent, not of the loss alone, but of the danger
also, had then been fairly stated, and bravely regarded. The danger was
more immediate now; so imminent indeed, that it was scarcely possible
they should have deceived themselves with any expectation of seeing
it averted; but they did not venture to proclaim the whole truth, and
call forth in the southern provinces a spirit like that which the
Catalans displayed, and which might have made their cities and strong
places emulate Zaragoza and Gerona. Instead of this, they suffered a
fallacious hope to be held out, that if the enemy should enter the
kingdoms of the south, the passes would be occupied behind them; the
Dukes of Parque and Alburquerque would hasten to the scene of action,
and another day like that of Baylen might be expected. Fuller accounts
were given in the official gazette of an affair of guerillas than of
the battle of Ocaña; and details were published of their victory at
Tamames, after the army by which it was gained had been routed at Alba
de Tormes.
♦GENERAL DISCONTENT.♦
They obtained a few addresses thanking them for having convoked the
Cortes, which, it was said, would like an elixir of life revivify the
social body to its very extremities, and congratulating them upon their
triumph over internal divisions, and over those who would hastily and
inopportunely have established a regency. But their enemies were more
active than their friends, or rather than their dependants, for other
friends they had none; and their congratulations were as premature
as their triumph was short-lived. Romana’s declaration against them
was not the only symptom that they had lost the confidence of the
army as well as of the people. The Conde de Noroña being at this time
removed from the command in Galicia, addressed a proclamation to the
Galicians, telling them the country was in danger, and that for his
part he had given up all dependence upon the existing government.
His repeated applications for money and arms had never obtained the
slightest notice, and seemed rather to have given offence. Under
such circumstances it remained for them to act for themselves, and
he advised them to form a separate Junta for their own kingdom, and
be governed by it. A similar disposition prevailed in many of the
provinces, and Spain seemed on the point of relapsing into that state
from which the formation of the Central Junta had delivered it. They
were saved from it only by the progress of the enemy.
♦ROMANA REFUSES THE COMMAND.♦
So effectually were the Junta humbled, that they requested Romana
would repair to Carolina, where the wreck of Areizaga’s army was
collecting, and offered him full powers for whatever measures he might
think necessary. But Romana was too much disgusted with the government
to serve under them, and saw the consequences too clearly to place
himself in a responsible situation where failure was certain. They
then recalled Blake from Catalonia, where ill fortune had made him
unpopular, appointing O’Donnell, in whom the soldiers and the people
had great confidence, to succeed him; but this removal could not be
effected in time; Castaños was not called upon, perhaps from a sense
of the injustice with which he had been treated; and Areizaga was
thus left in the command, neither to the satisfaction of the troops,
the people, or himself, for he had now a full consciousness of his
weakness, his danger, and his incapacity.
♦MONTIJO AND D. FR. PALAFOX IMPRISONED.♦
The government for its own safety had found it necessary to imprison
Montijo and D. Francisco Palafox, and they had removed the most
formidable person for popular talents in the Seville Junta, by sending
Padre Gil on a mission to Sicily. That Junta, however, was busily at
work, though the better members took no part in its intrigues; and the
efforts which should have been made for organizing a civic and national
resistance, the spirit and disposition for which were not wanting,
were employed in exciting resentment against the government. This
temper was not mitigated by some financial measures, which were of a
nature rather to betray its weakness than show its resources. Half the
plate and jewels of every family and individual was called for, as a
forced loan; and a heavy tax, in the form of a license, imposed upon
every one who kept a carriage of any kind, the license being granted to
those only whose profession or whose infirmities rendered it necessary.
All funds which had been bequeathed or appropriated to pious purposes
were for the present to be taken for war expenses, those of hospitals
and public schools alone excepted; vacant _encomiendas_ and vacancies
in the military orders were not to be filled up, that the revenues
might be made available for the same emergency; and a scale was formed
for reducing the pay of all persons in the public service, soldiers
who were actually employed alone excepted. These measures, which
disappointed some in their expectations, and bore heavily upon the
scanty means of others, produced more discontent than relief.
♦ATTEMPTS TO EXCITE A FALSE CONFIDENCE.♦
The Junta could at this time have had no reasonable hope of preventing
the French from entering Andalusia. They could have no reliance upon
the remains of Areizaga’s army, for the most mournful circumstances
attending such battles as that of Ocaña is, that the worst men escape,
and that the best and steadiest are those who fall. Parque’s force was
not so completely broken up; it had lost more in reputation than in
actual strength, but its strength was comparatively small, and it was
at a distance. What reliance they had was upon Alburquerque’s corps,
which consisted of only 12,000 men; ... his head-quarters were at Don
Benito, having 2000 men at Truxillo, and some advanced parties upon the
Tagus. But their immediate danger was not from the side of Extremadura,
and what was such a corps against the armies which the French would now
bring into the field! Fallacious statements were circulated to make
the Andalusians rely upon the strength of the passes, and the measures
which had been taken for defending them. It was affirmed that Areizaga
had been joined by considerable reinforcements, and abundantly supplied
with means of every kind; that his army had been re-organized; that
that general, who had gained the confidence of the nation, would soon
be at the head of its four divisions; and that the works in the passes
were such, that all the force which Napoleon might send against them
would be unable to effect their way.
♦SCHEMES OF COUNT TILLY.♦
Such statements, which could only deceive the people into a false
security, may very possibly have been designed for that effect by some
of those agents of the government, who were now looking to obtain
favour with the Intruder, The members of the Junta themselves stand
clearly acquitted of any such intention. One of them, and only one,
had at this time his own projects in view, and they were not so much
those of a traitor, as of a desperate adventurer, in the delirium of
revolutionary ambition. This was the Conde de Tilly, a man equally
destitute of principle and of character, and who, as sometimes happens
in the crooked paths of political expediency, had been promoted from
the provincial to the Central Junta, because such promotion was the
readiest means of removing him from a situation which he disgraced!
This man, being destitute of any private worth and of all national
feeling, could have no hope for his country; and finding no farther
hope there for himself, he had turned his thoughts toward the colonies.
His plan was to get four or five thousand troops at his disposal, and
when the crisis which he foresaw should arrive, seize what money there
might be in the treasury, hasten to Cadiz, take possession of the ships
there, sail for Mexico, and there establish himself at the head of an
independent government. The difficulties which he might find from the
British squadron at his outset, or the Mexicans on his arrival, were
overlooked in this frantic scheme. A few days before the battle of
Ocaña he opened it to a general officer, whom he wished to engage in
the project; that officer informed Castaños, who was then residing at
Algeziras, and to whom those persons who saw that some change in the
executive government must soon take place, were looking as one in whom
the nation might confide. The adventurer was arrested in consequence,
and died not long afterwards a prisoner in one of the castles at Cadiz.
♦THE JUNTA ANNOUNCE THEIR INTENTION TO REMOVE.♦
At the commencement of Areizaga’s unhappy operations, the Junta and the
general had encouraged each other in a delusion so unreasonable that
it might almost be called insane. But now if it had been possible for
the government, after the experience of Somosierra, to deceive itself
concerning the strength of the passes, and the reliance which might be
placed upon them, their commander would have awakened them from that
dream. Areizaga had lost his presumption at Ocaña, and was prepared for
defeat before he was attacked. He made known his utter hopelessness
to the Junta, and by sending away great part of his stores, for the
purpose of securing them, betrayed it also to the army and to the
people. In their former danger, after the battle of Medellin, the Junta
had declared that they would never change their place of residence till
some peril or public reason rendered their removal necessary; that in
such case of emergency they would make their intention known, would
remove to the situation where they could with most advantage attend
to the defence of the country, and would never abandon the continent
of Spain while there was one spot in it which they could maintain
against the invaders. It was debated now whether they should act in
conformity to this declaration. The intention of such a removal had
been indicated when the Isle of Leon was named as the place where the
Cortes were to assemble; and there were some members who objected to
an earlier removal, on the ground that it would greatly increase the
general alarm. But the majority rightly perceived that the danger was
close at hand, and therefore that no time was to be lost. They did
not, however, venture openly to state the true and obvious motives
for this resolution when they announced it to the public. The Isle
of Leon, they said, was the fittest place for the Cortes to hold its
sittings, because there were buildings there applicable to the purpose;
from thence their decrees could be communicated to every part of
the Peninsula, whatever might be the vicissitudes of war; and there
they might devote themselves to their arduous functions with perfect
tranquillity, which was hardly attainable amid the distractions of a
great city. But this having been determined, the Junta found itself in
the predicament provided for by a decree of the preceding year, wherein
it had been declared, that at whatever place the representatives of the
nation should be convoked, to that place the government must remove its
seat. They gave notice, therefore, that on the first of February they
should meet in the Isle of Leon; and they made immediate preparations
for the removal.
♦MURMURS AT SEVILLE.♦
The people of Seville could not but perceive that their city was to
be abandoned to the enemy; this was obvious. What other designs the
members of the Junta might have formed, every one guessed, according
as he suspected or despised this unfortunate administration. Some
said they were sold to the French, and the Junta were only pretending
to fly, that they might deceive other provinces with a show of
patriotism, and sell them as they had sold Andalusia. Others acquitted
them of treason, to fix upon them the charge of peculation: a few of
the members, they said, were, for their known virtue and talents,
entitled to the love of their countrymen; the rest were a sordid race,
who, having appropriated to themselves the free gifts which had been
contributed for the use of the army, while they left the soldiers to
perish for want of food and clothing, were now about to fly to England
or to the Canaries, and there enjoy in safety the riches of which they
had defrauded their brethren and their country. Those persons who
could command the means of removal hastened to secure themselves in
the sea-ports; others, whose fortunes rooted them to the spot, and who
were thus compelled to share its fate, or whose bolder spirits were
impatient of flight or of submission, joined in imprecations upon the
government by which they believed themselves to have been sacrificed;
... whether the cause had been guilt or imbecility, the effect to them
and to the country was the same.
♦1810. JANUARY.
INVASION OF ANDALUSIA.♦
The preparations of the French having now been completed, the Intruder
put himself at the head of the French army, and advanced to take
possession of the kingdoms of Andalusia. The actual command was vested
in Marshal Soult, having Victor, Mortier, and Sebastiani under him.
The Intruder was accompanied by Azanza, O’Farrell, and other of his
ministers, who, believing that Spain was now conquered, and that Great
Britain must withdraw from a contest which it was impossible she could
maintain, were confirmed in that opinion[8] by the speeches of the
opposition in the British parliament, and by the authority of certain
English newspapers. The French, to exaggerate their easy triumph,
affirmed that the Spanish general, confiding in the entrenchments which
he had thrown up at the entrance of the defile, in the cuts which had
been made in the roads, and the mines which had been dug at the brink
of the precipices, considered his position impregnable. But Areizaga
had not been more censurable at Ocaña for rashness than he was now for
the total want of that confidence with which he was thus reproached.
Had he known how to have excited in his men either the hope or the
despair of enthusiastic devotion to their country and their cause, the
strength of the position would have afforded him such advantages, that
the enemy must have sought some other entrance into Andalusia. There
was no attempt at this; the remembrance of his former defeat acted
both upon him and his soldiers, and the Sierra Morena was defended no
better than the Somosierra had been. The men gave way at every point,
with scarcely a show of resistance, because they saw, by the conduct
of their general, that it was not expected they should stand their
ground. One division took flight at Navas de Tolosa, where one of the
most celebrated victories in Spanish history had been gained over the
Moors. The operations began on the 20th of January, and the Intruder’s
head-quarters were established the next day at Baylen, a name of which
the French reminded the Spaniards now with bitter exultation.
♦FALSE HOPES HELD OUT TO THE PEOPLE BY THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦
On the same day, the Junta informed the people of Seville that the
pass of Almaden had been forced; but the danger, they said, was not
so great as terror might perhaps represent it. The division stationed
there, having been far too weak for maintaining the post, was gone to
join Alburquerque, who threatened the flank of the enemy; the Duke
del Parque was advancing by rapid marches; their junction would form
an army superior to the French force at Almaden, which would thus be
checked in its career, or driven back; while Areizaga’s army occupied
the other passes, and was ready to hasten to the defence of Seville,
whither also the two dukes would repair in case of necessity. This,
they said, was the true state of things, which the government had
neither exaggerated nor dissembled. They had issued orders for marching
off all the men in arms who could be collected to join the armies, and
for supplying them; and they called upon the people of this capital to
lay aside all terror, to suffer no confusion or tumult, but to display
the same courage and calmness which they had so honourably manifested
in times of greater danger. For the French, they said, depended more
upon the distrust and disunion which they hoped to create than upon
their own strength.
♦INSTRUCTIONS TO ALBURQUERQUE.♦
While the Junta thus admonished the people to be calm, they themselves
were bewildered by the danger which pressed upon them. The series of
their instructions to Alburquerque, from the time when they first
clearly saw that Andalusia was seriously threatened, exhibits their
incapacity and their wavering councils in the most extraordinary
manner. A month before the attack was made, Alburquerque warned them
that the pass of Almaden was threatened, and explaining in what
manner such a movement on the part of the enemy would threaten his
own position, observed how expedient it was to call his troops from
Truxillo and the advanced posts upon the Tagus. Their answer was,
that if the enemy made the movement which he apprehended, he must
endeavour to prevent them, by taking a good position, where he might
fight them to advantage; meantime the force at Truxillo must not be
lessened, and he must not forget to leave a competent garrison in
Badajoz. By another dispatch they enjoined him to act offensively and
with energy, to destroy the plans of the French for penetrating by
the road of La Plata. Another ordered him to hold himself ready for
marching as soon as he should receive instructions; and had he been
a man of less decision, it would thus have suspended his movements
till those instructions arrived. His army was thus upon the Guadiana
when the passes were forced, and the enemy moved a column along the
road of La Plata, to occupy Guadalcanal, and thus prevent him from
entering Andalusia. This purpose Alburquerque understood, and made his
own movements so judiciously, that when they expected to take easy
possession of Guadalcanal, they found him there with the main body of
his infantry, while the horse escorted his artillery to St. Olalla
and Ronquillo; and thus the whole army was ready to move wherever
its services were required. Here he received those instructions for
which he had been too zealous and too good an officer to wait. They
directed him to approach the enemy as near as possible, to oppose them
if they attempted to enter Andalusia, and if they should retreat upon
La Mancha, to harass them as much as possible; for it appears that
the Junta even indulged this hope. Alburquerque informed them, that
an army, consisting of 8000 disposable men and 600 horse, could not
approach very near to watch the movements of a hostile force, more than
three-fold its own number; if he added to his own little division that
which was destined to garrison Badajoz, which had at this time scarcely
400 effective men, it would only increase his own troops to 11,700,
which would still be insufficient either to occupy the line of defence,
which they instructed him to take up, or to observe the enemy with any
hope of impeding them: nevertheless he would do all that was possible.
On the 21st the Junta ordered him to march immediately for Cordoba, in
consequence of the enemy’s having occupied the pass called Puerto del
Rey; the next morning they summoned him to Seville, by the shortest
route, and with the utmost expedition; before night they changed their
purpose, and sent off another express, ordering him ♦MANIFESTO DEL
DUQUE DE ALBURQUERQUE, 45–70.♦ to Cordoba. This vacillation was imputed
to treason, especially as the war-minister, D. Antonio Cornel, had long
been suspected by the people. Certain it is, that if Alburquerque had
obeyed these orders, his own army must have been cut off, and Cadiz
would inevitably have been taken by the enemy, according to their aim
and expectation: but the error of the Junta is sufficiently accounted
for by their incapacity and their alarm.
♦INSURRECTION AT SEVILLE AGAINST THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦
The termination of their power was at hand. When this last order was
expedited to Alburquerque, every hour brought fresh tidings of the
progress of the enemy, the murmurs of the people becoming louder as
their agitation increased, and their danger appeared more imminent.
The Junta were hastening their departure for Cadiz; their equipages
were conveyed to the quays, and the papers from the public offices were
embarked on the Guadalquiver. This alone would have made the populace
apprehend the real state of things, even if it had been possible to
keep them in ignorance of the disasters which so many breathless
couriers announced. During the nights of the 22d and 23d the patroles
were doubled; no disturbance, however, took place; the agents of
Montijo and Francisco Palafox were preparing to strike an effectual
blow, and carefully prevented a premature explosion. On the morning
of the 24th the people assembled in the square of St. Francisco, and
in front of the Alcazar; some demanded that the Central Junta should
be deposed; others, more violent in their rage, cried out, that they
should be put to death; but the universal cry was, that the city should
be defended; and they took arms tumultuously, forbade all persons to
leave the city, and patrolled the streets in numerous small parties to
see that this prohibition was observed. The tumult began at eight in
the morning, and in the course of two hours became general: they who
secretly directed it, cried out that the Junta of Seville should assume
the government, went to the Carthusian convent in which Montijo and
Francisco Palafox were confined, delivered them, and by acclamation
called on Saavedra to take upon himself the direction of public affairs
in this emergency.
♦SAAVEDRA TAKES UPON HIMSELF THE TEMPORARY AUTHORITY.♦
D. Francisco Saavedra, at that time minister of finance and president
of the Junta of Seville, was a man of great ability and high character;
but he was advanced in years, and it was believed that poison had been
administered to him, at the instigation of Godoy, which had in some
degree affected his intellects. Whatever foundation there may have been
for this belief, he betrayed no want either of intellect or of exertion
on this occasion; he calmed the people by consenting to exercise the
authority with which they invested him; assembled the members of the
provincial Junta; issued a proclamation enjoining the Sevillians to
remain tranquil; and by making new appointments, and dispatching new
orders to the armies, satisfied the populace for the time. Montijo
left the city to assist in collecting the scattered troops; and Romana
was re-nominated to that army from which the Central Junta had removed
him. The people, however, called upon Romana to take upon himself the
defence of the city, and stopped his horses at the gate; but Romana
evaded the multitude, and hastened towards Badajoz to secure that
important fortress, as the best service which he could then perform.
♦THE FRENCH ENTER SEVILLE.♦
Every thing was in confusion now. The Central Junta were hastening how
they could to Cadiz. Saavedra with five other members of ♦JOVELLANOS,
P. 13. § 6.♦ the Seville Junta took the same course, separating
themselves from their unworthy colleagues, some of whom, they now
perceived, were corrupted by the enemy, and others betrayed by their
selfishness and their fears. These persons remained to receive their
reward from the intrusive government, or make their terms with it;
and Seville, in spite of the disposition of its inhabitants, received
the yoke like Madrid. This had been foreseen, and the Central Junta
had been urged to break up the cannon foundry, and destroy the stores
which they could not remove; but every thing was left to the French.
The ♦THEY OVERRUN ANDALUSIA.♦ virtue indeed which had been displayed
at Zaragoza and Gerona appeared the more remarkable when it was seen
how ignobly the Andalusian cities submitted to the invaders, who
sent off their detachments in all directions, not so much to conquer
the country, as to take possession of it. Jaen, which had boasted of
its preparations for defence, where six-and-forty pieces of cannon
had been mounted, and military stores laid in to resist a siege,
submitted as tamely as the most defenceless village. Granada, also,
where a crusade had been preached, was entered without resistance by
Sebastiani. The people of Alhama were the first who opposed the enemy;
their town, which had only the ruins of Moorish works to protect it,
was carried by storm; and Sebastiani fought his way from Antequera
to Malaga through armed citizens and peasantry, headed by priests
and monks. The French say that this insurrection, as they called it,
put on an alarming appearance; and it is evident, from the struggle
made in this quarter by a hasty and undisciplined multitude, that if
the provincial authorities had displayed common prudence in preparing
for the invasion, and common spirit in resisting it, Andalusia might
have proved the grave of the invaders. While Sebastiani thus overran
Granada, Mortier was detached on the other hand to occupy Extremadura,
which it was thought was left exposed by the retreat of the English;
but Alburquerque, disobeying the express commands of the government,
had garrisoned Badajoz, Romana had repaired in time to that fortress,
and the designs and expectations of the enemy in that important quarter
were effectually baffled.
♦THE FRENCH PUSH FOR CADIZ.♦
This was not their only disappointment. The possession of the country,
and all the open towns, was of little importance when compared with
that of Cadiz. If it were possible that the fate of Spain could depend
upon any single event, that event would have been the capture of Cadiz
at this time; and the French therefore pushed on for it with even more
than their accustomed rapidity. The city was utterly unprepared for
an attack: there were not a thousand troops in the Isle of Leon, and
not volunteers enough to man the works; the battery of St. Fernando,
one of its main bulwarks of defence, was unfinished. While the scene
of action was at a distance, the people of Cadiz thought the danger
was remote also; and but for the genius and decision of a single man,
Buonaparte might have executed his threat of taking vengeance there for
the loss of his squadron.
♦ALBURQUERQUE’S MOVEMENTS.♦
At four on the morning of the 24th Alburquerque received that dispatch
from the Central Junta, which, countermanding his march to Seville,
ordered him to make for Cordoba. A counter-order of some kind he seems
to have expected; for, in acknowledging this dispatch, he expressed
his satisfaction that he had not commenced his movements according to
the instructions received the preceding night, in which case he must
have had the inconvenience of a counter-march; at the same time he
said, that the troops which he had directed to garrison Badajoz, and
which he was now ordered to recall, could not join him without great
danger, and without leaving that place defenceless, ... a point of
such importance, that though these orders were positive, he would not
obey them unless they were repeated. At this time he was at Pedroso
de la Sierra, whither he had advanced from Guadalcanal, pursuant to
the first instructions, requiring him to move upon Cordoba. There
was the Guadalquivir to cross, and Alburquerque, not being certain
that his artillery could pass the bridge of Triana, determined to
have it ferried over at Cantillana. He was near that ferry when the
last dispatches reached him, written on the 23d, and repeating the
order to march towards Cordoba: but Alburquerque at this time knew
that the Junta were flying from Seville, though they had given him no
intimation of their design, and knew also that Cordoba must then be in
the enemy’s possession. He did not therefore hesitate for a moment to
disobey orders, which must have led to the destruction of his army,
... an army, in the fate of which, inconsiderable as it was, the fate
of Spain was more essentially involved, than in that of any which she
had yet sent into the field. Having crossed at Cantillana, he made the
main body proceed to Carmona, while he himself, with part of his little
cavalry, advanced towards Ecija, where the French had already arrived,
to ascertain their movements, and if possible alarm them by his own,
and make them suppose that his army covered Seville: but the French
general, as well as Alburquerque, was aware that Seville was a point of
far inferior importance to that upon which the invaders had fixed their
attention; and the enemy were now pushing on the chief part of their
force by El Arahal and Moron to Utrera, in order to cut off the Duke
from Cadiz. The least delay or indecision, from the moment he began his
march, would have proved fatal. Instantly perceiving their object, he
ordered his troops to make for Utrera, where his artillery and cavalry
arrived almost at the same time with the French; from thence he
marched with the infantry by Las Cabezas to Lebrija, across the marsh,
at a season when it was deemed impracticable; thus enabling it to reach
Xerez in time, while the cavalry accompanied the artillery along the
high road, skirmishing as it retreated, delaying the pursuers, and
sacrificing itself for the preservation of the rest of the army and of
Cadiz. On the night of the 30th he performed this march from Utrera to
Lebrija; and on the same night the people of Cadiz were relieved by an
express from him, saying, that he was between them and the French, and
should reach ♦CADIZ SAVED BY ALBURQUERQUE.♦ the city in time to save
it. The following morning he arrived at Xerez, having gained a day’s
march upon the enemy: they found themselves outstript in rapidity, and
outmanœuvred; and on the morning of the 2d of February, Alburquerque,
with his 8000 men, entered the Isle of Leon, having accomplished a
march of sixty-five leagues, 260 English miles. Thus Cadiz was saved.
♦HE IS APPOINTED GOVERNOR OF CADIZ BY THE PEOPLE.♦
Yet the means of defence had been so scandalously neglected, that the
Isle of Leon must have been lost if the French had ventured to make a
spirited attack upon it; and Cadiz would then speedily have shared the
same fate. In general, the French calculate with sufficient confidence
upon the errors of their enemies, ... a confidence which has rarely
deceived them in the field, and has almost invariably succeeded in
negotiation. Here, however, they did not think it possible that works
so essential to the salvation of the government should have been
left unfinished; and, knowing that the troops were under a man whom
they trusted and loved, they knew that, naked, and exhausted, and
half-starved as those troops were, behind walls and ramparts, they
would prove desperate opponents. Having saved this all-important place
by his presence, the Duke lost no time in securing it; he exerted
himself night and day: the people, he says, when they are guided by
their first feelings, usually see things as they are; they blessed him
as their preserver, and he was appointed governor by acclamation.
♦A JUNTA, ELECTED AT CADIZ.♦
While Alburquerque was on his march, a change in the government had
been effected. Venegas had been appointed governor of Cadiz by the
Central Junta, apparently in reward for that blind obedience to their
instructions, which, more than any other circumstance, frustrated Sir
Arthur Wellesley’s victory. Both Mr. Frere and the British general
distrusted his military talents. The people of Cadiz, with less
justice, suspected his fidelity, and he was not without fear that he
might become the victim of suspicion in some fit of popular fury. His
danger became greater as soon as it was known that the Central Junta
had been deposed at Seville, and were flying in various directions;
but Venegas, with prudent foresight, went to the Cabildo, and, saying
that the government from which he had received his appointment existed
no longer, resigned his command into their hands, and offered to
perform any duty to which they should appoint him. This well-timed
submission had all the effect which he could wish; the Cabildo were
flattered by it, the more, because such deference of the military to
the civil authority was altogether unprecedented in that country; and
they requested him to continue in his post, and act as their president,
till a Junta could be elected for the government of the town. Measures
were immediately taken for choosing this Junta, and the election was
made in the fairest manner. A balloting-box was carried from house to
house; the head of every family voted for an electoral body; and this
body, consisting of about threescore persons, then elected the Junta,
who were eighteen in number. A mode of election so perfectly free and
unobjectionable gave to the Junta of Cadiz a proportionate influence
over the people; but they themselves, proud of being, as they imagined,
the only legally-constituted body in Spain, became immediately jealous
of their power, and hostile to the establishment of any other.
♦RESIGNATION OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦
It was, however, essential to the salvation of the country that some
government should be established, which would be recognized by the
whole of Spain. The members of the Central Junta, who had arrived in
the Isle of Leon, would fain have continued their functions; they found
it vain to attempt this, and then, yielding to necessity, they suffered
themselves to be guided by Jovellanos, who represented to them the
necessity of appointing a regency, not including any individual of
their own body. Mr. Frere, acting as British minister till Marquis
Wellesley’s successor should arrive, exerted that influence which he so
deservedly possessed, first to enforce the advice of Jovellanos upon
his colleagues, and afterwards to make the Junta of Cadiz assent to
the only measure which could preserve their country from anarchy; but
so little were they disposed to acknowledge any authority except their
own, that, unless the whole influence of the British minister had been
zealously exerted, their acquiescence would not have been obtained. The
Archbishop of Laodicea, who was president of the Central Junta, the
Conde de Altamira, Valdes, and Ovalle, had been seized at Xerez, and
were in imminent danger from the blind fury of the populace, if some
resolute men had not come forward and saved them, by persuading the mob
to put them under custody in the Carthusian convent, as prisoners of
state. They were indebted for their liberation to Castaños, who in this
time of danger had hastened to the Isle of Leon, and took measures for
having them safely conducted thither. Their arrival made the number of
members three-and-twenty; and on the 29th of January this government
issued its last decree. Voluntarily they cannot be said to have laid
down their power, but the same presiding mind which pervaded their
former writings made them resign it with dignity. “Having,” they said,
“reassembled in the Isle of Leon, pursuant to their decree of the
13th, the dangers of the state were greatly augmented, although less
by the progress of the enemy than by internal convulsions. The change
of government which they themselves had announced, but had reserved
for the Cortes to effect, could no longer be deferred without mortal
danger to the country. But that change must not be the act of a single
body, a single place, or a single individual; for in such case, that
which ought to be the work of prudence and of the law, would be the
work of agitation and tumult; and a faction would do that, which ought
only to be done by the whole nation, or by a body lawfully representing
it. The fatal consequences which must result from such disorder were
apparent; there was no wise citizen who did not perceive, no Frenchman
who did not wish for them. If the urgency of present calamities, and
the public opinion which was governed by them, required the immediate
establishment of a Council of Regency, the appointment of that council
belonged to none but the supreme authority, established by the national
will, obeyed by it, and acknowledged by the provinces, the armies, the
allies, and the colonies of Spain; ... the sole legitimate authority,
which represented the unity of the power of the monarchy.”
♦A REGENCY APPOINTED.♦
After this preamble they nominated as regents Don Pedro de Quevedo y
Quintana, Bishop of Orense; D. Francisco de Saavedra, late president
of the Junta of Seville; General Castaños; Don Antonio de Escaño,
minister of marine; and D. Esteban Fernandez de Leon, a member of the
council of the Indies, as representative of the colonies. To these
persons the Junta transferred its authority; providing, however, that
they should only retain it till the Cortes were assembled, who were
then to determine what form of government should be adopted; and that
the means which were thus provided for the ultimate welfare of the
nation might not be defeated, they required that the regents, when they
took their oath to the Junta, should swear also that they would verify
the meeting of the Cortes at the time which had been appointed. The
new government was to be installed on the ♦LAST ADDRESS OF THE CENTRAL
JUNTA.♦ third day after this decree. The Junta accompanied it with a
farewell address to the people, condemning the tumult at Seville, and
justifying themselves, like men who felt that they had been unjustly
accused, because they had been unfortunate. Neither their incessant
application to the public weal, they said, had been sufficient to
accomplish what they desired, nor the disinterestedness with which
they had served their country, nor their loyalty to their beloved but
unhappy king, nor their hatred to the tyrant and to every kind of
tyranny. Ambition, and intrigue, and ignorance had been too powerful.
“Ought we,” they said, “to have let the public revenues be plundered,
which base interest and selfishness were seeking to drain off by a
thousand ways? Could we satisfy the ambition of those who did not think
themselves sufficiently rewarded with three or four steps of promotion
in as many months? or, could we, notwithstanding the moderation which
has been the character of our government, forbear to correct, with the
authority of the law, the faults occasioned by that spirit of faction,
which was audaciously proceeding to destroy order, introduce anarchy,
and miserably overthrow the state?”
Then drawing a rapid sketch of the exertions which they had made
since they were driven from Aranjuez, ... “Events,” they said, “have
been unsuccessful, ... but was the fate of battles in our hands? And
when these reverses are remembered, why should it be forgotten that
we have maintained our intimate relations with the friendly powers;
that we have drawn closer the bonds of fraternity with our Americas;
and that we have resisted with dignity the perfidious overtures of
the usurper? But nothing could restrain the hatred which, from the
hour of its installation, was sworn against the Junta. Its orders
were always ill interpreted, and never well obeyed.” Then, touching
upon the insults and dangers to which they had been exposed in the
insurrection at Seville, ... “Spaniards,” they continued, “thus it is
that those men have been persecuted and defamed, whom you chose for
your representatives; they who without guards, without troops, without
punishments, confiding themselves to the public faith, exercised
tranquilly, under its protection, those august functions with which you
had invested them! And who are they, mighty God! who persecute them?
the same who, from its installation, have laboured to destroy the Junta
from its foundations; the same who have introduced disorder into the
cities, division into the armies, insubordination into the constituted
authorities. The individuals of the government are neither perfect nor
impeccable; they are men, and as such liable to human weakness and
error. But as public administrators, as your representatives, they will
reply to the imputations of these agitators, and show them where good
faith and patriotism have been found, and where ambitious passions,
which incessantly have destroyed the bowels of the country. Reduced
from henceforward by our own choice to the rank of simple citizens,
without any other reward than the remembrance of the zeal and of the
labours which we have employed in the public service, we are ready, or,
more truly, we are anxious, to reply to our calumniators before the
Cortes, or the tribunal which it shall appoint. Let them fear, not us;
let them fear, who have seduced the simple, corrupted the vile, and
agitated the furious; let them fear, who, in the moment of the greatest
danger, when the edifice of the state could scarce resist the shock
from without, have applied to it the torch of dissension, to reduce it
to ashes. Remember, Spaniards, the fate of Porto! an internal tumult,
excited by the French themselves, opened its gates to Soult, who did
not advance to occupy it till a popular tumult had rendered its defence
impossible. The Junta warned you against a similar fate after the
battle of Medellin, when symptoms appeared of that discord which has
now with such hazard declared itself. Recover yourselves, and do not
accomplish these mournful presentiments!
“Strong, however, as we are in the testimony of our own consciences,
and secure in that we have done for the good of the state as much as
circumstances placed within our power, the country and our own honour
demand from us the last proof of our zeal, and require us to lay down
an authority, the continuance of which might draw on new disturbances
and dissensions. Yes, Spaniards, your government, which, from the
hour of its installation, has omitted nothing which it believed could
accomplish the public wish; which, as a faithful steward, has given
to all the resources that have reached its hands no other destination
than the sacred wants of the country; which has frankly published its
proceedings; and which has evinced the greatest proof of its desire for
your welfare, by convoking a Cortes more numerous and free than any
which the monarchy has ever yet witnessed, resigns willingly the power
and authority which you have confided to it, and transfers them to the
Council of Regency, which it has established by the decree of this
day. May your new governors be more fortunate in their proceedings! and
the individuals of the Supreme Junta will envy them nothing but the
glory of having saved their country, and delivered their King.”
Thus terminated the unfortunate but ever-memorable administration
of the Central Junta, a body which had become as odious before its
dissolution, as it was popular when it was first installed. If in
their conduct there had been much to condemn and much to regret, it
may be admitted, upon a calm retrospect, that there was hardly less
to be applauded and admired. Spain will hereafter render justice to
their intentions, and remember with gratitude that this was the first
government which addressed the Spaniards as a free people, the first
to sanction those constitutional principles of liberty which had for
so many generations been suppressed. It was to be expected, when such
tremendous events were passing, and such momentous interests at stake,
that their errors would be judged of by their consequences without
reference to their causes. An unsuccessful administration is always
unpopular; and in perilous and suspicious times, when the affairs of
state go ill, what is the effect of misjudgement, or weakness, or
inevitable circumstances, is too commonly and too readily imputed
to deliberate treason. Such an opinion had very generally prevailed
against the Central Junta; but when this power was at an end, and
nothing would have gratified the people more than the exposure and
punishment of the guilty, not even the shadow of proof could be found
against them. They were inexperienced in business, they had been
trained up in prejudice, they partook, as was to be expected, of the
defects of the national character; but they partook, and some of
them in the highest degree, of its virtues also: and their generous
feeling, their high-mindedness, and unshaken fortitude, may command an
Englishman’s respect, if it be contrasted not merely with the conduct
of the continental courts, but with the recorded sentiments of that
party in our own state, who, during this arduous contest, represented
the struggle as hopeless, and whose language, though it failed either
to dispirit or to disgust the Spaniards, served most certainly to
encourage the enemy. England has had abundant cause to be grateful to
Providence, but never, in these latter times, has it had greater than
for escaping, more than once, the imminent danger of having this party
for its rulers. They would have deserted the last, the truest, of our
allies; they would have betrayed the last, the only hope of Europe and
of the world; they would have sacrificed our honour first, and when
they had brought home the war to our own doors, which their measures
inevitably must have done, the lasting infamy which they had entailed
upon the nation would have been a worse evil than the dreadful and
perilous trial through which it would have had to pass.
♦1810. FEBRUARY.
THE REGENTS.♦
In their choice of the regents the Junta seem to have looked for the
fittest persons, without regard to any other considerations. Three
of them were well known. The Bishop of Orense was venerable for his
public conduct, as well as for his age and exemplary virtues; no man
had contributed more signally to rouse and maintain the spirit of
the country. Castaños had received from the Junta a species of ill
treatment which was in the spirit of the old government, but for
which they made amends by this appointment. When he was ordered as a
sort of banishment to his own house at Algeziras, the people of that
place, greatly to their honour, mounted a volunteer guard before the
house, as a mark of respect; and the Junta, in the last days of their
administration, when they turned their eyes about in distress, called
upon him to take the command, and resume the rank of captain-general
of the four kingdoms of Andalusia. The call was too late, but he came
to the Isle of Leon in time to rescue some members of that body from
the populace of Xerez; and in nominating him to the regency, they
seem to have consulted the wishes of the people. Saavedra was in full
popularity, and had given good proof of disinterested zeal during
the tumult at Seville. Instead of securing his private property, he
occupied himself in calming the people, and in preserving the public
treasure and the more valuable public records; and as there was a
want of vessels, he embarked the public property on board the one
which had been hired for his own effects. Escaño had been minister of
marine at Madrid, and was known as a man of business and fidelity.
Leon’s appointment was not agreeable to the Junta of Cadiz, who felt
their power, and were determined to derive from it as much advantage as
possible; he therefore declined accepting the office on the plea of ill
health, and D. Miguel de Lardizabal y Ariba, a native of the province
of Tlaxcalla, in New Spain, and member of the council of the Indies,
was appointed in his stead.
♦THEIR INJUSTICE TOWARDS THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦
A government was thus formed, which, receiving its authority from the
Supreme Junta, derived it ultimately from the same lawful source, ...
the choice of the people and the necessity of the state. In such times,
and in a nation which attaches a sort of religious reverence to forms,
it was of prime importance that the legitimacy of the new government
should be apparent, and its right of succession clear and indisputable.
For this Spain was principally indebted to Jovellanos, the last and not
the least service which that irreproachable and excellent man rendered
to his country. But it was the fate of Jovellanos, notwithstanding
the finest talents, the most diligent discharge of duty, the purest
patriotism, and the most unsullied honour, to be throughout his life
the victim of the unhappy circumstances of Spain. Seven years’
imprisonment, by the will and pleasure of the despicable Godoy, was a
light evil compared with the injustice which he now endured from that
government which he, more than any other individual, had contributed
to appoint and to legitimate. The council of Castille, which first
acknowledged the Intruder, and then acknowledged the Junta, in the
same time-serving spirit attacked the Junta now that it was fallen,
affirmed that its power had been a violent usurpation, which the
nation had rather tolerated than consented to, and that the members
had exercised this usurped power contrary to law, and with the most
open and notorious selfishness and ambition. The people, not contented
with their compulsory resignation, accused them of having peculated the
public money; and the regency, yielding to the temper of the times,
and perhaps courting popularity, acted as if it believed this charge,
registered their effects, and seized their papers. Even Jovellanos was
ordered to retire to his own province, which happened at that time to
be free from the enemy, and there place himself under the inspection
of the magistrates. This act is inexpiably disgraceful to those from
whom it proceeded; upon Jovellanos it could entail no disgrace. He had
long learnt to bear oppression, and patiently to suffer wrong; but this
injury came with the sting of ingratitude, it struck him to the heart,
and embittered his few remaining days.
This rigorous treatment of the Central Junta was the work of their
implacable enemy, the council of Castille, a body which they ought
to have dissolved and branded for its submission to the Intruder;
and of the Junta of Cadiz, a corporation equally daring and selfish,
who thought that in proportion as they could blacken the character
of the former government, they should increase their own credit
with the people. The members of that government had given the best
proof of innocence; not one of them had gone over to the enemy, nor
even attempted to conceal himself at a time when the popular hatred
against them had been violently excited. Several of them had embarked
on board a Spanish frigate for the Canaries; when their baggage was
seized, it was, at their own request, examined before the crew, and
the examination proved that they had scarcely the means of performing
the voyage with tolerable comfort. Tilly died in prison without a
trial. This was a thoroughly worthless man, and it might probably have
appeared that he had found means of enriching himself when he was sent,
in the manner of the republican commissioners in France, to superintend
the army which defeated Dupont. But Calvo, who was arrested also and
thrown into a dungeon, without a bed to lie on or a change of linen,
and whose wife also was put in confinement, was irreproachable in his
public character. He had been one of the prime movers of that spirit
which has sanctified the name of Zaragoza, and during the first siege
repeatedly led the inhabitants against the French. All his papers had
been seized; he repeatedly called upon the regency to print every one
of them, to publish his accounts, and bring him to a public trial; but
he was no more attended to than if he had been in the Seven Towers of
Constantinople. After the Cortes assembled he obtained a trial, and was
pronounced innocent.
♦PROCLAMATION OF THE INTRUDER.♦
The Intruder, following his armies, and thinking to obtain possession
of Cadiz, and destroy the legitimate government of Spain, issued a
proclamation at Cordoba, characterized by the impiety and falsehood
which marked the whole proceedings of the French in this atrocious
usurpation. “The moment was arrived,” he said, “when the Spaniards
could listen with advantage to the truths which he was about to utter.
During more than a century the force of circumstances, which masters
all events, had determined that Spain should be the friend and ally of
France. When an extraordinary revolution hurled from the throne the
house which reigned in France, it was the duty of the Spanish branch to
support it, and not lay down its arms until it was re-established. But
it required a spirit of heroism to adopt such a resolution, and the
cabinet of Madrid thought it better to wait for that from the progress
of time, which it wanted courage to obtain by arms.” This truth, for
such the Intruder might well call this part of the proclamation, marks,
as much as the falsehoods which accompanied it, the devilish spirit
by which the French councils had long been possessed; having allured
the Spanish Bourbons by oaths and treaties to their own destruction,
France now reproached them with the very conduct which she had tempted
them to pursue. The paper proceeded to affirm, that, during its whole
alliance with France, Spain had been watching an opportunity of falling
upon her. “The conqueror of Europe,” it continued, “would not allow
himself to be duped. The princes of the house of Spain, not having
the courage to fight, renounced the crown, and were content to make
stipulations for their private interests. The Spanish grandees, the
generals, the chiefs of the nation, recognized those treaties. I,”
said the Intruder, “received their oaths at Madrid, but the occurrence
at Baylen threw every thing into confusion. The timid became alarmed,
but the enlightened and conscientious remained true to me. A new
continental war, and the assistance of England, prolonged an unequal
contest, of which the nation feels all the horrors. The issue was never
doubtful, and the fate of arms has now declared so. If tranquillity
is not immediately restored, who can foresee the consequence? It is
the interest of France to preserve Spain entire and independent, if
she become again her friend and ally; but if she continue her enemy,
it is the duty of France to weaken, to dismember, and to destroy her.
God, who reads the hearts of men, knows with what view I thus address
you. Spaniards! the irrevocable destiny is not yet pronounced. Cease
to suffer yourselves to be duped by the common enemy. Employ your
understanding: it will point out to you in the French troops, friends
who are ready to defend you. It is yet time: rally around me! and may
this open to Spain a new era of glory and happiness.”
♦LANGUAGE OF THE DESPONDENTS IN ENGLAND.♦
If the Spaniards had had as little wisdom, or as little sense of
national honour, as the party who opposed the measures of government
in England, they would have believed the Intruder, and submitted to
him. This party, who, at the time of Sir John Moore’s retreat, told us
that the Spaniards had then yielded, and that their fate was decided,
now declared, with a little more prudence in their predictions, that
the show of resistance must soon be at an end. The king’s message,
declaring that Great Britain would continue its assistance to the
great cause of Spain, as the most important considerations of policy
and of good faith required, excited in them the gloomiest forebodings.
“We were then still,” they said, “to cling to the forlorn hope of
maintaining a footing in Portugal! Our resources were still farther
to be drained in supporting our ally, or rather in supporting a system
which did not arouse its own people to its defence; and for our
efforts, however strenuous, in the support of which we did not receive
either their gratitude or their co-operation. It was reported,” they
said, “that the English army had made a retrograde movement to Lisbon,
and actually embarked in the transports at the mouth of the Tagus.
Having uniformly declared their opinion, that this expedition, under
Lord Wellington, was injurious to the most important interests of the
country, as they affected both its resources and its character, they
should most sincerely and warmly congratulate the public if such were
its termination.” That is, they would have congratulated us if we had
broken our faith, deserted our allies, fled before our enemies, left
Buonaparte to obtain possession of Cadiz and Lisbon, and then waited
tremblingly for him upon our own shores, with our resources carefully
husbanded till it pleased him to come and take them!
“It has been conjectured,” said these hopeful politicians, “that Cadiz
might be abundantly supplied from the opposite coast of Barbary. But
those who hazarded this opinion were not precisely informed of the
state of things on the African coast. The Emperor of Morocco was
extremely unfriendly to his Christian neighbours. Cadiz, to be sure,
was an interesting point, which it was our interest to maintain as
long as possible; but they had no expectation that Cadiz, when really
attacked, could long hold out. It could not be supplied with fuel with
which to bake bread for the inhabitants for one week.” While this party
thus displayed their presumptuous ignorance, and vented their bitter
mortification in insults against the ministry and against our allies,
they endeavoured to direct attention toward the Spanish colonies,
saying that the great, and indeed only object, of this country, should
be to establish a mercantile connexion with the empire which was to
be erected there, and recommending that we should take immediate
measures for assisting the emigration of the Spanish patriots! Happily
the councils of Great Britain were directed by wiser heads, and the
people of Spain actuated by better principles and by a braver spirit.
“We are supported,” said Romana to his countrymen, “by the illustrious
English nation, who are united with the brave Portugueze, our brethren,
possessing a common interest with ourselves, and who never will abandon
us.” The people and the government had the same confidence in British
honour. English and Portugueze troops were dispatched from Lisbon to
assist in the defence of Cadiz, and Ceuta was delivered in trust to an
English garrison.
♦THE ISLE OF LEON.♦
The Isle of Leon forms an irregular triangle, of which the longest side
is separated from the main land by a channel, called the river of
Santi Petri, ten miles in length, and navigable for the largest ships.
This side is strongly fortified, and the situation also is peculiarly
strong. The bridge of Zuazo, built originally by the Romans, over the
channel, is flanked with batteries, and communicates with the continent
by a causeway over impassable marshes. There are two towns upon the
island; that which bears the same name, and which contains about 40,000
inhabitants, is nearly in the middle of the isle; the other, called
St. Carlos, which stands a little to the north, was newly erected, and
consisted chiefly of barracks and other public buildings. Cadiz stands
on the end of a tongue of land seven miles in length, extending from
the isle into the bay; this isthmus is from a quarter to half a mile
broad, flanked on one side by the sea, and on the other by the bay of
Cadiz. Along this isthmus, an enemy who had made himself master of
the island must pass; new batteries had been formed, new works thrown
up, and mines dug; and if these obstacles were overcome, his progress
would then be opposed by regular fortifications, upon which the utmost
care and expense had been bestowed for rendering the city impregnable.
Before this unexpected and unexampled aggression on the part of France,
the great object of the Spanish government had been to render Cadiz
secure from the sea: as soon, therefore, as the approach of the enemy
was certain, one of the first operations was to demolish all those
works on the main land from whence the shipping could be annoyed. This
was a precaution which Admiral Purvis had strongly advised after the
battle of Medellin, and again as soon as the more ruinous defeat of
Areizaga was known. Upon the first report that the enemy were hastening
toward Cadiz, in the hope of surprising it, he requested Admiral Alava
to remove the ships, and place them in the lower part of the harbour,
where they might be secure; but it was not till Mr. Frere had strongly
urged the necessity of this precaution that the Spanish Admiral, after
much reasoning on his part, reluctantly complied. The ill spirit which
at this time prevailed among the naval officers arose rather from
the pitiable situation in which they found themselves, than from any
predilection for the French, or the more natural feeling of hostility
toward the English in which they had grown up. Men being wanted for
the land service, and not for the fleet, the navy had been neglected
during this contest: the ships were ill manned and miserably stored,
the pay far in arrears; and the officers had latterly disregarded their
duty as much as they thought themselves disregarded by the government,
... hopelessness producing discontent, and discontent growing into
disaffection. This temper could produce no ill effect when the regency
and the people were so well disposed. The fleet was removed in time;
and the hulks also in which the miserable prisoners were confined were
moved lower down into the bay, and moored under the guns of the English
and Spanish ships.
The British Admiral had represented in time how important it was that
the batteries on the north side of the harbour should be kept in an
efficient state. The danger now was from the land side, not from the
sea, and by good fortune the land quarter had been strengthened some
fifty years before, at a cost and with a care which had then been
deemed superfluous. But the Spanish government had not forgotten
that it was on that side Essex had made his attack, and England was
the enemy against whom those precautions were taken. At that time
every villa and garden upon the isthmus had been destroyed. During
after-years of security the ground had again been covered, and was now
to be cleared again. The Spaniards, roused by the exertions and example
of Alburquerque, as much as by the immediate danger, laboured at the
works, and carefully removed every building on the isthmus. Night and
day these labours were carried on, and the sound of explosions was
almost perpetual. The wood from the demolished buildings was taken into
the city for fuel.
♦VICTOR SUMMONS THE JUNTA OF CADIZ.♦
Marshal Victor, before he understood how well the isle was secured,
sent a summons to the Junta of Cadiz, telling them he was ready to
receive their submission to King Joseph. Jaen, Cordova, Seville,
and Granada, he said, had received the French with joy; he expected
the same reception from the people of Cadiz; and as the fleets and
arsenals were the property of the nation, he demanded that they
should be preserved for their rightful sovereign. They returned an
answer, signed by every individual of their body, declaring that they
acknowledged no one for King of Spain but Ferdinand VII. Soult, also,
representing the English as the enemies of Spain, insinuated, in a
summons to Alburquerque, that it was their intention to seize Cadiz
for themselves. Alburquerque replied, no such design was entertained
by the British nation, who were not less generous than they were great
and brave; their only object was to assist in the defence of Cadiz with
all the means in which they abounded, an assistance which the Spaniards
solicited and gratefully received. Cadiz, he added, had nothing to
fear from a force of 100,000 men; the Spaniards knew that the French
commanded no more than the ground which they covered, and they would
never lay down their arms till they had effected the deliverance of
their country.
♦ILL-WILL OF THE JUNTA TOWARDS ALBURQUERQUE.♦
The service which Alburquerque had rendered was so signal, and its
importance so perfectly understood by all the people of Cadiz, that
he was deservedly looked upon as the saviour of the place. Having
been appointed governor in obedience to the general wish, he became
in consequence president of the Junta, as Venegas had been before
him, whose obedient policy was now rewarded by the highest station
to which a subject could be appointed, that of viceroy of Mexico.
Alburquerque had not solicited these appointments; on the contrary, he
remonstrated against them, pointing out how impossible it was, that,
having the command of the army, he could attend to other duties at the
same time; and in consequence of his representations, D. Andres Lopez
de Sagastizabel was nominated to act as his deputy in both capacities.
The Junta of Cadiz had obtained their power unexceptionably, but no
men ever made a more unworthy use of it; they had reluctantly assented
to the formation of the regency, and when it was formed, endeavoured
to restrain and overrule it, and engross as much authority as possible
to themselves, in which, unhappily for Spain, and more unhappily for
Spanish America, they were but too successful. Alburquerque became the
marked object of their dislike, because he had recognised the regency
at a moment when, if he had hesitated, they would have struggled to
get the whole power of government into their own hands. That spirit,
which had never condescended to conceal its indignant contempt for
Godoy, could not stoop to court the favour of a Junta of mercantile
monopolists. Not that he despised them as such; his mind was too full
of noble enterprises to bestow a thought upon them, otherwise than as
men who were called upon to do their duty while he did his.
♦THE TROOPS NEGLECTED.♦
His first business had been to complete the unfinished works of
defence, especially the _cortadura_, or cut across the isthmus, where
the battery of St. Fernando was erected; and lest any attempt should
be made to pass beside it at low water, the iron gratings from the
windows of the public buildings were removed, and placed on the beach
as a chevaux-de-frise. While these things were going on, the people
of Cadiz manifested a disgraceful indolence; they assembled in crowds
on the ramparts, wrapt in their long cloaks, and there stood gazing
silently for hours, while the English were employed in blowing up
the forts round the bay; appearing, says an eye-witness, indifferent
spectators of the events around them, rather than the persons for whose
security these exertions were made. Meantime the troops, whose rapid
march had placed these idlers out of fear, were neglected in a manner
not less cruel to the individuals than it was detrimental to the public
service. The points to be protected were so many, that the numbers of
this little army did not suffice to guard them, without exhausting the
men by double duty. Alburquerque requested that the regiments might be
filled from the numberless idle inhabitants of the isle and of Cadiz,
who, while they were idle, were at such a time worse than useless.
Unless this were done, he said, it was not only impossible for his men
to undertake any offensive operations, or even to improve themselves in
discipline, but they must be wasted away with fatigue and consequent
infirmities. These representations were in vain; neither was he more
successful in requiring their pay, a supply of clothing, of which they
stood evidently in need, and those common comforts in their quarters,
which were as requisite for health as for decency. The Junta of Cadiz
had seven hundred pieces of cloth in their possession, yet more than
a month elapsed, and nothing was done toward clothing the almost
naked troops. Alburquerque asserts, as a fact within his own positive
knowledge, that the reason was, because the Junta were at that time
contending with the Regency, to get the management of the public money
into their own hands, and meant, if they had failed, to sell this cloth
to the government, and make a profit upon it, as merchants, of eight
reales _per vara_!
♦ALBURQUERQUE APPLIES TO THE REGENCY IN THEIR BEHALF.♦
It is not to be supposed that the Junta were idle at this time; they
had many and urgent duties to attend to; but no duty could be more
urgent than that of supplying the wants and increasing the force of
the army. The Duke applied to them in vain for six weeks, during which
time he discovered that the Junta looked as much to their private
interest as to the public weal; for from the beginning, he says, their
aim was to get the management of the public expenditure, not merely for
the sake of the influence which accompanies it, but that they might
repay themselves the sums which they had lent, and make their own
advantage by trading with the public money. At length he applied to
the Regency. The regents, feeling how little influence they possessed
over the Junta, advised the Duke to publish the memorial which he
had presented to them, thinking that it would excite the feelings
of the people. In this they were not deceived; ... the people, now
for the first time called upon to relieve the wants of the soldiers,
exerted themselves liberally, and there was not a family in which some
contribution was not made for the defenders of the country. But the
Junta were exasperated to the last degree by this measure, which their
own culpable neglect had rendered necessary. Alburquerque’s memorial
contained no complaint against them; it only stated the wants of the
soldiers, and requested that, unless those wants were supplied, he
might be relieved from a command, the duties of which, under such
circumstances, it was not possible for him to perform. Though he was
persuaded of their selfish views, he had no design of exposing an
evil which there was no means of remedying; and when he understood
how violently they were offended, he addressed a letter to them,
disclaiming any intention of inculpating them, in terms which nothing
but his earnest desire of avoiding all dissensions that might prove
injurious to the country could ♦THE JUNTA ATTACK ALBURQUERQUE.♦ either
dictate or justify. This did not prevent the Junta from publishing an
attack upon him, in reply, of the most virulent nature. They reproached
him with having exposed the wants and weakness of the army; entered
into details as frivolous in themselves as they were false in their
application, to show that they had done every thing for the soldiers;
declared, with an impudence of ingratitude which it is not possible
to reprobate in severer terms than it deserves, that his cavalry had
retreated too precipitately, and ought to have brought in grain with
them; and concluded by a menacing intimation, that the people of Cadiz
were ready to support them against any persons who should attempt to
impeach their proceedings. If the Junta of Cadiz had no other sins
to answer for, this paper alone would be sufficient to render their
name odious in history; so unprovoked was it in its temper, so false
in its details, so detestable for its ingratitude. Had Alburquerque
been capable of consulting his own safety by a precipitate retreat,
Portugal, as he said, and the English army were at hand, ... and he
needed not to have undertaken an arduous march of 260 miles in the
face of a superior enemy, and in direct disobedience of the orders
of his government. If the cavalry which saved Cadiz, and which they
thus wantonly accused of retreating too precipitately, had been even a
quarter of an hour later, it could not have entered the Isle of Leon.
“This,” said the indignant Duke, “is the patriotism of the Junta of
Cadiz; the enemy is at the gates, and they throw out a defiance to the
general and the army who protect them!”
♦HE RESIGNS THE COMMAND.♦
But Alburquerque was too sincere a lover of his country to expose it to
the slightest danger, even for the sake of his own honour. He could
not resent this infamous attack without exciting a perilous struggle;
and without resenting it he felt it impossible to remain at the head of
the army. Having thus been publicly insulted, a reparation as public
was necessary to his honour, and that reparation, for the sake of
Spain, he delayed to demand. The Regency would have had him continue
in the command; he however persisted in resigning. No injustice which
could be done him, he said, would ever have made him cease to present
himself in the front of danger, had he not been compelled to withdraw
for fear of the fatal consequences of internal discord. Accordingly, he
who should have been leading, and who would have led, the men who loved
him to victory, came over to England as ambassador, with a wounded
spirit and a broken heart.
CHAPTER XXIX.
ATTEMPTS TO DELIVER FERDINAND. OVERTURES FOR A NEGOTIATION MADE
THROUGH HOLLAND. PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT CONCERNING PORTUGAL.
REFORM OF THE PORTUGUEZE ARMY.
♦1810.♦
♦THE REGENCY.♦
The regency was acknowledged without hesitation in those provinces
which were not yet overrun by the enemy, and every where by those
Spaniards who resisted the usurpation; yet with the authority which
they derived from the Supreme Junta a portion of its unpopularity had
descended upon them. The necessity of their appointment was perceived,
and the selection of the members was not disapproved: in fact, public
opinion had in a great degree directed the choice; nevertheless, when
they were chosen, a feeling seemed to prevail that the men upon whom
that unfortunate body had devolved their power could not be worthy of
the national confidence. Like their predecessors, they were in fact
surrounded by the same system of sycophancy and intrigue which had
subsisted under the monarchy. The same swarm was about them: it was
a state plague with which Spain had been afflicted from the age of
the Philips. Hence it came to pass that the national force, instead
of being invigorated by the concentration of legitimate power, was
sometimes paralysed by it. For if a fairer prospect appeared to open
in the provinces where the people had been left to themselves and to
chiefs of their own choosing, too often when a communication was opened
with the seat of government, this unwholesome influence was felt in the
appointment of some inefficient general, who was perhaps a stranger to
the province which he was sent to command.
A central government was, however, indispensable, as a means of
communication first with England, and eventually with other states,
but more especially as keeping together the whole body of the monarchy
both in Europe and in America. The Spanish nation was not more sensible
of this than the British ministry. The French, and they who, like the
French, reasoning upon the principles of a philosophy as false as it
is degrading, believe that neither states nor individuals are ever
directed in their conduct by the disinterested sense of honour and of
duty, supposed that the continuance of these temporary administrations
must be conformable to the wishes of the British cabinet, whose
influence would be in proportion to the weakness and precarious tenure
of those who held the government in Spain. But that cabinet had no
covert designs; they acted upon the principle of a plain, upright,
open policy, which deserves, and will obtain, the approbation of just
posterity; and so far were they from pursuing any system of selfish
and low-minded cunning, that at this time, when the regency was formed,
they were taking measures for effecting the deliverance of Ferdinand
from captivity.
♦SCHEMES FOR DELIVERING FERDINAND.♦
Montijo, before his hostility to the Junta was openly declared, had
proposed a scheme to them for this purpose; but he was too well known
to be trusted, and when he required as a preliminary measure that
50,000 dollars should be given him, Calvo, who was the member appointed
to hear what he might propose, plainly told him that his object was
to employ that sum in raising a sedition against the government; upon
which Montijo told him that he had a good scent, and thus the matter
ended. A similar proposal was made by some adventurer in Catalonia; the
provincial government was disposed to listen to it, but they referred
it to General Doyle, and he soon ascertained that the projector only
wanted to get money and ♦BARON DE KOLLI’S ATTEMPT.♦ decamp with it.
Meantime the British ministers had formed a well-concerted plan,
but dependent upon some fearful contingencies, ... the fidelity of
every one to whom in its course of performance it must necessarily be
communicated, and the disposition of Ferdinand to put his life upon the
hazard in the hope of recovering his liberty and his throne. The Baron
de Kolli, who was the person chosen for this perilous service, was one
who in other secret missions had proved himself worthy of confidence.
He took with him for credentials the letter in which Ferdinand’s
marriage in the year 1802 had been announced by Charles IV. to the King
of England, and also letters in Latin and in French from the King,
communicating to the prisoner the state of affairs in Spain, and saying
how important it was that he should escape from captivity, and show
himself in the midst of his faithful people. A squadron, commanded by
Sir George Cockburn, landed Kolli in Quiberon Bay, and to that part of
the coast Ferdinand was to have directed his flight, for which every
needful and possible provision had been made, measures having also been
devised for sending the pursuers upon a wrong scent. The scheme had
been well laid, and with such apparent probability of success, that it
is said the Duke of Kent requested permission to take ♦KOLLI’S MEMOIRS,
39.♦ upon himself the danger of the attempt. The squadron was provided
with every thing which could conduce to the convenience and comfort of
Ferdinand and his brother; with this view a Roman Catholic priest had
been embarked, with a regular set of ornaments and consecrated plate
for the Romish service.
Kolli made his way to Paris, completed his arrangements, and was
arrested at Vincennes within a fortnight from the day whereon he
landed. He had been betrayed by a pretended royalist in the pay of
the British government, and by the Sieur Richard, whom he had trusted
because he had served bravely under the unfortunate ♦1810. MARCH.♦
Prince de Talmont in La Vendée. His credentials and his other papers
were seized; and when he was examined by Fouché, who was then minister
of police, he had the mortification of being told that the character
of the person for whose service he had thus exposed himself had been
entirely mistaken, for that no credentials would induce Ferdinand to
hazard such an attempt. It was afterwards proposed to him, that as his
life and the fortune of his children were at stake, he should proceed
to Valençay, and execute his commission, to the end that he might hear
from Ferdinand’s own lips his disavowal of any connexion with England,
... or that if that prince really entertained a wish to escape, an
opportunity might be given him of which the French government might
make such use as it deemed best. Kolli rejected this with becoming
spirit; and the purpose of the police was just as well answered by
sending Richard to personate him. But Ferdinand no sooner understood
the ostensible object of his visitor, than he informed the governor of
Valençay that an English emissary was in the castle.
It is very possible that Ferdinand may have perceived something
in Richard’s manner more likely to excite suspicion than to win
confidence; for the man was not a proficient in villany, and not
having engaged in it voluntarily, may have felt some compunction
concerning the business whereon he was sent. His instructions were, if
he should succeed in entrapping Ferdinand, to bring him straight to
Vincennes, there probably to have been placed in close confinement: the
supposition that a tragedy like that of the Duc D’Enghein was intended
cannot be admitted without supposing in Buonaparte far greater respect
for the personal character of his victim than he could possibly have
entertained. An official report was published, containing a letter
in Ferdinand’s name, wherein the project for his escape was called
scandalous and infernal, and a hope expressed that the authors and
accomplices of it might be punished as they deserved. Other papers were
published at the same time, with the same obvious design of exposing
Ferdinand to the indignation or contempt of his countrymen and of his
allies. There was a letter of congratulation to the Emperor Napoleon
upon his victories in Austria; an expression of gratitude for his
protection, and of implicit obedience to his wishes and commands;
details of a fête which he had given just before this occurrence in
honour of the Emperor’s marriage with the Archduchess Maria Louisa; and
a letter requesting an interview with the governor of Valençay upon a
subject of the greatest moment to himself, being his wish to become
the adopted son of the Emperor, an adoption which, the writer said,
would constitute the happiness of his life, and of which he conceived
himself worthy by his perfect love and attachment to the sacred person
of his majesty, and entire submission to his intentions ♦1810. APRIL.♦
and desires. But it was so notoriously the system of Buonaparte’s
government to publish any falsehoods which might serve a present
purpose, that these letters, whether genuine or fabricated, obtained no
credit[9].
As soon as the official report appeared in the English newspapers, Mr.
Whitbread asked in the House of Commons whether the letter purporting
to be written by his Majesty to Ferdinand VII. was to be looked upon as
a document which had any pretensions to the character of authenticity?
a question which Mr. Perceval declined answering. Of course this
afforded a topic for exultation and insult to the opponents of the
government. The Spaniards felt very differently upon the occasion.
Whether those who were desirous of forming a new constitution for
Spain, or even of correcting the inveterate abuses of the old system,
thought it desirable to see Ferdinand in possession of the throne,
before their object was effected, may well be doubted; but whatever
their opinions might be upon that point, the attempt at delivering
him excited no other feelings than those of gratitude and admiration
towards Great Britain. ♦ESPAÑOL, T. I. 120.♦ “With what pleasure,” said
the best and wisest of their writers, “does the good man who observes
the mazes of political events, behold one transaction of which humanity
alone was the end and aim! With what interest does he contemplate an
expedition intended, not for speculations of commerce, nor for objects
of ambition, but for the deliverance of a captive King, in the hope of
restoring him to his throne and to his people!”
♦OVERTURES FOR PEACE.♦
The British cabinet was sounded to see whether it would offer such
compensations and exchange of prisoners as might extricate Kolli from
his perilous situation. This curious proposal was connected with some
insidious overtures for peace made then, partly for the purpose of
deceiving the French people into a belief that the continuance of the
war was owing alone to the inveterate feeling of hostility in England;
but more with the design of preparing the Dutch for the annexation of
their country to the French empire, an intention which was first avowed
in these overtures. Louis Buonaparte was drawn into this transaction
by a solemn assurance that no such intention was really entertained;
but that it was held forth merely as a feint, in the hope of alarming
the British government, and inducing it to make peace, for the sake
of averting a political union, which of all measures must be most
dangerous to England. The overture was properly rejected upon the
ground, that it would be useless, or worse than useless, to open a
negotiation when it was certain that insurmountable difficulties must
occur in its first stage. A few weeks only elapsed before the purpose
which had been solemnly disavowed by Buonaparte’s ministers to Louis
was carried into effect, by a compulsory treaty, in which that poor
king ceded to France the provinces of Zealand and Dutch Brabant, the
territory between the Maas and the Waal, including Nimeguen, together
with the Bommelwaard and the territory of Altena, inasmuch as it
had been adopted for a constitutional principle in France that the
_thalweg_ or stream of the Rhine formed the boundary of the French
empire. About two months after this act of insolent and wanton power an
army was ordered into Holland to complete the usurpation, and Louis,
giving the only proof of integrity and courage which was possible in
his unhappy circumstances, abdicated the throne, and retired into
the Austrian dominions, leaving behind him a letter to the Dutch
legislature, which contained a full vindication of his own conduct,
and an exposure of Napoleon’s traitorous policy, which, given as it was
in the most cautious language, and with a remainder of respect and even
brotherly affection, might alone suffice to stamp the character[10] of
that brother with lasting infamy. During his short and miserable reign
Louis had done what, considering in what manner he had been placed
upon the throne, it might have seemed almost impossible that he should
do, he had gained the affections of the Dutch people; not by any good
which he did, for his tyrannical brother neither allowed him time nor
means for effecting the benevolent measures which he designed, but
by the interest which he took in their sufferings, and by his honest
endeavours to prevent or mitigate those acts of tyranny which were
intended to increase the distress of a ruined country, and prepare it
for this catastrophe.
♦BUONAPARTE’S INTENTION OF ESTABLISHING A WESTERN EMPIRE.♦
The conquest of Holland had been an old object of French ambition;
but wider views than Louis XIV. entertained during the springtide of
his prosperity were at this time disclosed ♦FEB. 17.♦ by Buonaparte.
A _senatus consultum_ appeared early in the year, decreeing that the
Papal States should be united to, and form an integral part of the
French empire. The city of Rome was declared to be the second in the
empire (Amsterdam was named the third); the Prince Imperial was to take
the title of King of Rome, and the Emperors, after having been crowned
in the church of Notre Dame at Paris, were before the tenth year of
their reign to be crowned in St. Peter’s also. The measures that were
designed to follow upon this decree were unequivocally intimated, in
that semi-official manner by which Buonaparte’s schemes of ambition
were always first announced. “The Roman and German imperial dignity,”
it was said, “which, with regard to Rome, had long been an empty name,
had ceased to exist upon the abdication of the Emperor Francis; from
that time, therefore, the great Emperor of the French had a right to
assume the title. Napoleon, who revoked the gifts which Charlemagne
made to the bishops of Rome, might now, as legitimate lord paramount
of Rome, like his illustrious predecessor, style himself Roman and
French Emperor. He restores to the Romans the eagle which Charlemagne
brought from them, and placed upon his palace at Aix la Chapelle; he
makes them sharers in his empire and his glory; and a thousand years
after the reign of Charlemagne, a new medal will be struck with the
inscription _Renovatio Imperii_. After ages of oblivion, the Empire
of the West reappears with renovated vigour; for Napoleon the Great
must be looked on as the founder of a revived Western Empire, and in
this character he will prove a blessing to civilized Europe. The peace
of Europe will thus be completely re-established. The great number of
well-meaning people, to whom Napoleon’s power seemed oppressive, while
they considered themselves as exempt from any engagement towards him,
will fulfil their new duties with inviolable fidelity. Considered in
this point of view, the re-establishment of the Western Empire is a
duty which Napoleon owes not less to the law of self-preservation, than
to the repose of Europe.”
No opposition to this project could have been offered by the
continental princes; the yoke was upon their necks: it only remained
for him to complete the subjugation of the Peninsula, and this appeared
to him and his admirers an easy task, to be accomplished in one short
campaign. There was no longer any Spanish force in the field capable
of even momentarily diverting the French from their great object of
destroying the English army, and obtaining possession of Portugal, and
to that object Buonaparte might now direct his whole attention and his
whole power.
Lord Wellington had foreseen this, and clearly perceiving also what
would be the business of the ensuing campaign, had prepared for the
defence of Portugal in time. It was necessary that we should carry on
the war in that country as principals rather than as allies, and for
this full power had been given by the Prince of Brazil. As yet little
had been done toward the improvement of the Portugueze army; like the
government, it was in the worst possible condition; both were in the
lowest state of degradation to which ignorance, and imbecility, and
inveterate abuses ♦MONEY VOTED FOR THE PORTUGUEZE ARMY.♦ could reduce
them. Early in the session, parliament was informed that the King had
authorized pecuniary advances to be made to Portugal, in support of its
military exertions, and had made an arrangement for the maintenance of
a body of troops not exceeding 30,000 men. Twenty thousand we already
had in our pay, the sum for whom was estimated at 600,000_l._; for
the additional ten, it was stated at 250,000_l._ to which was to be
added 130,000_l._ for the maintenance of officers to be employed in
training these levies, and preparing them to act with the British
troops. This led to a very interesting ♦MARQUIS WELLESLEY;♦ debate in
the House of Lords. Marquis Wellesley affirmed, “that Portugal was
the most material military position that could be occupied for the
purpose of assisting Spain: great disasters, he admitted, had befallen
the Spanish cause, still they were far from sinking his mind into
despair, and still he would contend, it was neither politic nor just
to manifest any intention ♦1810. FEBRUARY.♦ of abandoning Portugal.
What advantage could be derived from casting over our own councils,
and over the hopes of Portugal and Spain, the hue and complexion of
despair? To tell them that the hour of their fate was arrived, ...
that all attempts to assist, or even to inspirit their exertions in
their own defence, were of no avail, ... that they must bow the neck
and submit to the yoke of a merciless invader, ... this indeed would
be to strew the conqueror’s path with flowers, to prepare the way for
his triumphal march to the throne of the two kingdoms! Was it then
for this that so much treasure had been expended, ... that so much of
the blood had been shed of those gallant and loyal nations? Whatever
disasters had befallen them, they were not imputable to the people of
Spain. The spirit of the people was excellent, and he still ventured to
hope that it would prove unconquerable. All their defeats and disasters
were solely to be ascribed to the vices of their government. It was the
imbecility, or treachery, of that vile and wretched government which
first opened the breach through which the enemy entered into the heart
of Spain; that delivered into hostile hands the fortresses of that
country; and betrayed her people defenceless and unarmed into the power
of a perfidious foe. Let us not contribute to accomplish what they have
so inauspiciously begun! Let not their lordships come to any resolution
that can justify Portugal in relaxing her exertions, or Spain in
considering her cause as hopeless. Yet what other consequence would
result from prematurely withdrawing the British troops from Portugal,
or retracting the grounds upon which we had hitherto assisted her?”
♦LORD GRENVILLE;♦
Lord Grenville replied. “He felt it,” he said, “an ungrateful task, ...
a painful duty, ... to recal the attention of their lordships to his
former predictions, which they had despised and rejected, but which
were now, all of them, too fatally fulfilled. His object, however,
was not a mere barren censure of past errors, but rather, from a
consideration of those errors, to conjure them to rescue the country
from a continuance of the same disasters, and to pay some regard to the
lives of their fellow-citizens. Were they disposed to sit in that house
day after day, and year after year, spectators of wasteful expenditure,
and the useless effusion of so much of the best blood of the country,
in hopeless, calamitous, and disgraceful efforts? It was a sacred duty
imposed upon them to see that not one more life was wasted, not one
more drop of blood shed unprofitably, where no thinking man could say
that, by any human possibility, such dreadful sacrifices could be made
with any prospect of advantage. Was there any man that heard him, who
in his conscience believed that even the sacrifice of the whole of that
brave British army would secure the kingdom of Portugal? If,” said
he, “I receive from any person an answer in the affirmative, I shall
be able to judge by that answer of the capacity of such a person for
the government of this country, or even for the transaction of public
business in a deliberative assembly. By whatever circumstances, ...
by whatever kind of fate it was, I must say, that I always thought
the object of the enterprise impossible; but now I believe it is
known to all the people of this country, that it has become certainly
impossible. Was it then too much to ask of their lordships that another
million should not be wasted, when nothing short of a divine miracle
could render it effectual to its proposed object?” In these strong and
explicit terms did Lord Grenville declare his opinion, that it was
impossible for a British army to secure Portugal; and thus distinctly
did he affirm, that the opinion of a statesman upon this single point
was a sufficient test of his capacity for government.
After touching upon the convention of Cintra and Sir John Moore’s
retreat, he spoke of the impolicy of our conduct in Portugal. “If
those,” he said, “who had the management of public affairs had
possessed any wisdom, any capacity for enlightened policy in the
regulation of a nation’s interests and constitution, any right or
sound feelings with regard to the happiness of their fellow-creatures,
here had been a wide field opening to them. They had got possession of
the kingdom of our ally, with its government dissolved, and no means
existing within it for the establishment of any regular authority
or civil administration, but such as the British government alone
should suggest. Here had been a glorious opportunity for raising the
Portugueze nation from that wretched and degraded condition to which
a lengthened succession of mental ignorance, civil oppression, and
political tyranny and prostitution had reduced it. Was not that an
opportunity, which any men capable of enlarged and liberal views of
policy, and influenced by any just feelings for the interests of their
fellow-creatures, would have eagerly availed themselves of? Would not
such men have seized with avidity the favourable occasion to rescue the
country from that ignorance and political debasement, which rendered
the inhabitants incapable of any public spirit or national feeling?
Here was a task worthy of the greatest statesmen; here was an object,
in the accomplishment of which there were no talents so transcendant,
no capacity so enlarged, no ability so comprehensive, that might
not have been well, and beneficially, and gloriously employed. It
was a work well suited to a wise and liberal policy, to an enlarged
and generous spirit, to every just feeling and sound principle of
national interest, ... to impart the blessings of a free government to
the inhabitants of a country so long oppressed and disgraced by the
greatest tyranny that had ever existed in any nation of Europe.”
Then after arguing that time had been lost in arming and disciplining
the Portugueze, he relapsed into his strain of unhappy prophecy. “He
did not,” he said, “mean to undervalue the services or the character
of the Portugueze soldiery, whom he considered as possessing qualities
capable of being made useful, but he would never admit that they
could form a force competent to the defence of the kingdom; they
might be useful in desultory warfare, but must be wholly unfit for
co-operation with a regular army. He was not afraid, therefore, of
any responsibility that might be incurred by his stating, that if the
safety of the British army was to be committed on the expectation of
such co-operation, it would be exposed to most imminent and perhaps
inevitable hazard. But if these 30,000 men were not composed of
undisciplined peasants and raw recruits, but consisted of British
troops, in addition to the British army already in Portugal, he should
consider it nothing but infatuation to think of defending Portugal,
even with such a force. Against a power possessing the whole means of
Spain, as he must suppose the French to do at this moment, Portugal
was the least defensible of any country in Europe. It had the longest
line of frontier, compared with its actual extent, of any other nation;
besides, from its narrowness, its line of defence would be more likely
to be turned; and an invading enemy would derive great advantages
from its local circumstances. As to the means of practical defence
afforded by its mountains, he should only ask, whether the experience
of the last seventeen years had taught the world nothing; whether its
instructive lessons were wholly thrown away? Could it be supposed that
a country so circumstanced, with a population without spirit, and a
foreign general exercising little short of arbitrary power within it,
was capable of any effectual defence?” Lord Grenville concluded this
memorable speech, by moving, as an amendment to the usual address,
“that the house would without delay enter upon the consideration of
these most important subjects, in the present difficult and alarming
state of these realms.”
♦EARL OF LIVERPOOL;♦
“It was not the fault of ministers,” Lord Liverpool replied,
“nor of the person whom they had sent thither as his majesty’s
representative, if the exertions of the Portugueze government were not
correspondent to the dangers of the crisis. The state of the country
must be recollected, which might truly be said to have been without
a government; all the ancient and established authorities having
disappeared with the Prince Regent. But, under these unpromising
circumstances, every thing was done which could be done. There was
no time lost; there was no exertion untried; there was no measure
neglected. Never were greater exertions made to provide a sufficient
force, and never were they more successful. The noble baron had
triumphantly asked, what have we gained in the Peninsula? We have
gained the hearts and affections of the whole population of Spain and
Portugal; we have gained that of which no triumphs, no successes of
the enemy could deprive us. In Portugal, such is the affection of the
inhabitants, that there is no want of a British soldier that is not
instantly and cheerfully supplied. Look to Spain! What is the feeling
of the people, even in this awful moment of national convulsion and
existing revolution? It is that of the most complete deference to the
British minister and government; and so perfect is their confidence
in both, that they have placed their fleet under the orders of the
British admiral. Would a cold, cautious, and phlegmatic system of
policy have ever produced such proofs of confidence? Would indifference
have produced those strong and signal proofs of affection? Whatever
might be the issue of the contest, to this country would always remain
the proud satisfaction of having done its duty. He trusted we should
never abandon Spain, so long as any hope remained of the possibility
of ultimate success. We were bound by every sentiment of honour and
good faith to support a people who had given proofs of honour, of good
faith, and of bravery, which have never been exceeded by any nation.”
♦EARL MOIRA;♦
Earl Moira replied to this, by delivering opinions which, as a
soldier, he would never have conceived, if he had not been possessed
by party spirit. “Every thing which the ministers attempted,” he
said, “betrayed, as the universal opinion of the public pronounced, a
total want of judgement, foresight, and vigour; and, as the climax of
error, they now seemed resolved to defend Portugal, ... according to
a plan of defence, too, which was perfectly impracticable. For it was
utterly ridiculous to suppose, that the ideas of Count La Lippe, as to
the practicability of defending Portugal from invasion, could now be
relied upon. We should be allowed to retain Portugal, under our present
system, just so long as Buonaparte thought proper. The administration
of these men had been marked by the annihilation of every foreign
hope, and the reduction of every domestic resource; they who vaunted
of their resolution and power to protect and liberate the Continent,
had only succeeded in bringing danger close to our own shores? And
why? because they sacrificed the interests of the nation, and violated
every principle of public duty, to gratify their personal ambition and
personal cupidity. He was speaking the language of ninety men out of a
hundred of the whole population of the country, when he asserted, that
they deserved marked reprobation, and exemplary punishment.”
♦LORD SIDMOUTH;♦
Viscount Sidmouth regretted the opportunities which had been lost, but,
with his English feeling and his usual fairness, insisted that it was
incumbent upon us to stand by our allies to the uttermost. The Marquis
of Lansdown objected to the measures of ministry more temperately than
his colleagues in opposition, maintaining that it was bad policy to
become a principal ♦LORD, ERSKINE;♦ in a continental war. Lord Erskine
spoke in a strain of acrimonious contempt, mingled with irrelevant
accusations and unbecoming levity. “There really,” said he, “seems to
be a sort of predestination, which I will leave the reverend bench to
explain, that whenever the French take any country, or any prisoners,
they shall have some of our money also. I can hardly account for the
infatuation which possesses those men, who suppose they can defend
Portugal by sending a supply of British money there. It might as well
be expected to accomplish that by sending over the woolsack, with my
noble and learned friend upon it.”
The ministers must have been well pleased with the conduct of their
opponents; they could not have desired any thing more favourable to
themselves than the intemperance which had been displayed, and the
rash assertions and more rash predictions, which had been so ♦LORD
HOLLAND.♦ boldly hazarded against them. Lord Holland upon this occasion
made a remarkable speech, observing, in allusion to Lords Sidmouth
and Buckinghamshire, that “he could not understand how these lords
could give their confidence to ministers without being assured that
their confidence was deserved. We were obliged in honour,” he said,
“to do what we could for Portugal, without injury to ourselves, ... in
honour, ... for that was the only motive that ought to interest the
feelings, or excite the hearts of this or any other nation. But if we
were to embark in the cause of that sinking people, we were not to
load them with our imbecility, in addition to their own weakness. A
great plan was necessary; nothing neutral or narrow, nothing minute,
nothing temporary, could enter into it; but for this qualities were
requisite which no man could hope for in the present ministry. Where
was the address, the ability, the knowledge, the public spirit, that
were the soul of success in such a cause? He found them shifting from
object to object, and hanging their hope on every weak and bending
support, that failed them in the first moment of pressure. He thought,
that for defence no government could be too free; by that he meant
too democratic; the words might not be synonymous, but it was in such
governments that men felt of what they were capable. There was then
the full stretch of all the powers. There was a great struggle, a
great allay of the baser passions; but there rose from them a spirit
vigorous, subtilized, and pure; there was the triumph of all the
vehement principles of the nation; the rapid intelligence, the bold
decision, the daring courage, the stern love of country. It was in the
hour of struggle that men started up among the ranks of the people;
those bright shapes of valour and virtue that gave a new life to the
people; those surpassing forms of dignity and splendour that suddenly
rose up, as if by miracle, among the host, rushed to the front of the
battle, and, as in the days of old, by their sole appearance turned
the victory. But where was the symptom of a love for free government
in the conduct of the ministry? The government of Portugal had been
absolutely in their hands; had they disburdened it of its obstructions
to freedom? Had they pointed its aspect towards democracy? Then as if
the cause had been rendered desperate because the British ministry had
not introduced democratic principles into the governments of Spain and
Portugal, he supported the opinion of his party, and maintained that
it would be criminal to force a nation to a defence which might draw
down ruin on them. But if we were to withdraw from the contest, it was
possible for us to do so without degrading the country by any base
avidity for little gains, by seizing upon any of those little pieces of
plunder, which were so tempting, and apt to overpower our resistance to
the temptation. We might leave the country of our ally with the spirit
of friendship and the purity of honour. It was of great moment to us,
in even that meanest and lowest view of policy, to leave the people
of the Peninsula our friends; but we must be actuated by a higher
principle, and be regretted and revered by those whom we were forced
to abandon. He could not expect this from his majesty’s ministers, and
therefore could not think their hands fit to wield the resources, or
sustain the character of the British empire.” Lord Holland therefore
voted for the amendment, the object of which was, that the cause of the
Peninsula should be given up as hopeless.
♦MARCH 9.
MR. PERCEVAL;♦
The debate was not less interesting in the Lower House, when Mr.
Perceval moved for a sum not exceeding 980,000_l._ for the defence of
Portugal; “a vote,” he said “so consistent with the feelings which
the house had professed on former occasions, that he should not have
expected any opposition to it. He reminded the house how those who
opposed it had been always of opinion that it was impossible for Spain
to hold out so long; that if she succeeded at all, she must succeed at
once; but that she could never maintain a protracted contest against
the disciplined armies and enormous resources of France. This was
their declared and recorded opinion; but what was the fact? Spain had
continued the struggle. France might occupy the country with an army,
but her power would be confined within the limits of her military
posts, and it would require nearly as large an army to keep possession
of it as to make the conquest. There never had existed a military power
capable of subduing a population possessing the mind, and heart, and
soul of the Spaniards. The very victories of their enemies would teach
them discipline, and infuse into them a spirit which would ultimately
be the ruin of their oppressors. Under these circumstances, would it
be wise to abandon Portugal? The last Austrian war had arisen in great
measure out of the contest in the Peninsula; and during the progress of
that war, however calamitous the result had proved, it would be in the
recollection of the house, that one other day’s successful resistance
of the French by the Austrians might have overthrown the accumulated
power of the enemy. Such events might again take place, for no man
could anticipate, in the present state of the world, what might arise
in the course of a short time; but be that as it might, as long as the
contest was, or could be, maintained in the Peninsula, the best policy
of this country was to support it.”
♦SIR J. NEWPORT;♦
To this Sir John Newport replied, “if any question could provoke
opposition, it must be that which would make them continue efforts in
a cause which every one but the ministers considered hopeless. As for
the recorded opinion of parliament, parliament was pledged to support
the Spaniards while they were true to themselves; but that they had
been true to themselves he denied.” Then assuming that the French must
necessarily drive us out of Portugal, he asked what was to be done
with the 30,000 Portugueze soldiers? “Were they to be brought to this
country, and added to the already enormous foreign army in its service?
Or were they to be sent to Brazil? Or to be left fully equipped, and
ready to add to the military force of Buonaparte?” In the course of his
speech Sir John Newport endeavoured to show that the Portugueze levies
had not been ♦MR. VILLIERS;♦ expedited as they ought to have been. Mr.
Villiers, who had been our minister in Portugal, made answer, “that the
government there was administered with great vigour; large supplies of
money had been raised to meet the public exigencies; the old military
constitution of the country had been restored: the finances were ably
administered and well collected; and the war department conducted with
energy and ability. If Spain,” he said, “had done its duty equally with
Portugal, in supporting the efforts of Great Britain, its cause would
already have triumphed, and there would not now have been a Frenchman
upon the Spanish territory.”
♦MR. CURWEN;♦
Mr. Curwen said, “that as the Portugueze people had suffered a French
army to overrun their country without any resistance, he was not for
placing much reliance upon the Portugueze troops. If the enemy could
point out what he would wish that we should undertake, his first wish
would be, that we should attempt to defend Portugal. Buonaparte,” he
said, “could not receive more cheering hopes of ultimate success,
than he would derive from learning that the present ministers were to
continue in office, and that the House of Commons still persisted in
placing a blind confidence in them, and enabling them to enter upon
measures which, in their inevitable result, could not fail to answer
all his purposes. The vote of the house this night, if it should decide
against attempting the defence of Portugal, would be more important
than if we were to take half the French army prisoners.”
♦MR. LESLIE FOSTER;♦
Mr. Leslie Foster then rose, and his speech, in the spirit which it
breathed, and the knowledge which it displayed, formed a singular
contrast to the harangues of the opposition. “The present proposition
of his majesty,” said he, “is partly connected with his past conduct
towards the Peninsula; it is but a continuance and extension of the
same spirit of British resistance. It is now, however, open to the
reprehension of two classes of politicians; those who think we never
ought to have committed ourselves for the salvation of Portugal and
Spain; and those who, having approved of that committal while the
event appeared doubtful, think that the overwhelming power of France
has at length brought this tragedy so nearly to a close, that nothing
is left for us, but to escape if possible from being sharers in its
catastrophe. Hope, they contend, has vanished; there is no longer room
for prediction; history has already recorded, in letters of blood, the
fate that awaits our perseverance. To me the aspect of the Peninsula
appears an enigma, which it is no reflection on any ministers not
perfectly to have understood; a revolution bursting out at a period the
least expected, exhibiting events in its progress the most singularly
contradictory, and pregnant with results which I still think no man
living can foresee. If, on the one hand, we are referred to the apathy
of Gallicia during the retreat of Sir John Moore, ... if we are desired
to remember Ocaña and Tudela, and all the other defeats which the
Spaniards have endured, and endured without despondency, ... must we
not in candour remember that there was a battle of Baylen? Are we to
shut our eyes to the extraordinary phenomenon, that in Catalonia, the
very next province to France, the French, at this hour, appear to be
as often the besieged as the besiegers? and can we forget Zaragoza
and Gerona? But above all, shall we not do justice to that singular
obstinacy, to give it no more glorious a character, which has sustained
their spirit under two hundred defeats, and which, in every period of
the history of Spain, has formed its distinguishing characteristic? The
expulsion of the Moors was the fruit of seven centuries of fighting
uninterrupted, and of 3600 battles, in many of which the Spaniards had
been defeated. In the beaten but persevering Spaniards of these days we
may trace the descendants of those warriors, as easily as we recognize
the sons of the conquerors of Cressy and of Agincourt in the English
who fought at Talavera. We may trace the same fortitude and patience,
the same enthusiastic superstition, the same persevering insensibility
of failure, and, I will add, the same absolute indifference as to
liberty, constitution, or cortes, that distinguished the expellers of
the Moors. Because we feel that freedom is the first of blessings,
it is too much to say that other nations are to be raised in arms by
no other motives than its influence. History should have taught us,
that there is another spirit prompting men to war, and which once
poured all Europe forth in the Crusades; and however we may pronounce
on the motives of our ancestors, the fact we cannot deny, that the
greatest spectacle of embattled nations ever exhibited on the theatre
of war was under governments and systems which indeed were not worth
the defending. I believe we may consider the inhabitants of the
Peninsula, first, as a multitude of hardy and patient peasantry, buried
in ignorance and superstition, and accustomed from their cradles,
by the traditions and the songs of their ancestors, to consider the
sword as the natural companion of the cross; and almost inseparably
to connect in idea the defence of their religion with the slaughter
of their enemies; and with these predispositions goaded into madness
by ecclesiastics, as ignorant almost as their flocks; but without an
idea or a wish for freedom; with _Fernando Settimo_ in their mouths,
as a watch-word, and fighting, if you will, for the continuance of
the Inquisition. And with these qualifications it is my most firm
conviction, that they would have overwhelmed all the armies of France,
but that it was their misfortune to be cursed with a nobility in all
respects the opposite of the peasantry, differing from them, not merely
in their moral qualities, but even in their physical appearance; a
nobility of various degrees of worthlessness, but with a few brilliant
exceptions, generally proportioned to the rank of their nobility; and
further cursed by a government (I speak not of their kings but of the
Junta) both in its form and in its substance the most abominable that
ever repressed or betrayed the energies of a nation; hence desperate
from repeated treason, destitute of confidence, not in themselves but
in their commanders, unable to stand before the French in battle, but
still more unable to abstain from fighting. One rare and unquestionable
feature they presented, ... a nation that would fight with France; and
certain I am, that if we had not tried the experiment of fighting by
their side, these very men, who now most loudly condemn the course we
have pursued, would be calling for the impeachment of these ministers,
who had neglected such glorious opportunities; who, in the crisis of
the fate of France, had shrunk from the only field where there was a
prospect of contending with success; who had coldly refused our aid
to the only allies who were ever worthy of British co-operation. It
is too much a habit to call for the fruits of our battles, tacitly
assuming that nothing but the absolute and complete attainment of our
object can justify having fought them. I never can agree to measure
the justification of a battle by the mere fruits of victory! yet even
on this ground I must contend, that never were there laurels the
more opposite of barren, than those which have been reaped by our
countrymen in Spain. We, indeed, wanted not to be convinced that our
army, like our navy, equalled in science, and exceeded in courage,
that of any other nation in the world: but if we have any anxiety for
our character with other armies, if reputation is strength, and if the
reputation of a nation, as well as of an individual, consists not in
the estimation in which it holds itself, but in the estimation in which
it is held by others, it is a false vanity that causes us to shut our
eyes and ears to the opinions of other nations. Spain at least had
been convinced by the exertions of her government, misrepresenting our
failure at Buenos Ayres, and other scenes of our misfortunes, that
Great Britain, omnipotent by sea, was even ridiculous on land. So much
so, that when the army of General Spencer was landed near Cadiz, than
which a finer army never left the English shore, it was the wonder as
well as the pity of the Spaniards, that such noble-looking soldiers
should be so absolutely incapable of fighting. The ‘beautiful’ army
was even the emphatic denomination by which the British forces were
distinguished; and when Sir John Moore was known to be at length on his
march, that the beautiful army, the ‘_hermoso exercito_,’ was actually
advancing, was a subject of Spanish surprise, at least as much as of
Spanish exultation; but when that army had commenced its retreat, old
impressions were revived with tenfold force, ‘_hermoso_’ was no longer
the epithet bestowed on it, but one which it is impossible for me to
repeat. Nor let it be said that Coruña was a full vindication of its
fame! We indeed know that British heroism never shone more conspicuous
than on that day; but the ray of glory which illuminated that last
scene of our retreat, was but feebly reflected through the rest of
Spain from that distant part of the Peninsula. The French returned in
triumph to Madrid, and boasted that they had driven us into the sea;
... it was certain we were no longer on the land; ... and under such
circumstances it is not surprising that Spain should have declined
to have given to us all the credit which we really deserved. Some
gentlemen, I see, are of opinion that it is no great matter what the
Spaniards thought about us; but are we equally indifferent to the
opinions of the French? Let us not too hastily conclude that they did
full justice to our merits. We are told, indeed, that at Maida and in
Egypt we had set that point at rest. Of Maida, I shall only say, that
within the last month it has been, for the first time, mentioned in
any newspaper of France, and that I believe nine-tenths of the French
soldiers have never heard either of the battle, or of the existence
of such a place; and as to Egypt, their opinion is universally that
which General Regnier, in his most able, but untrue representation, of
those events, has laboured to impress, namely, that the treachery of
Menou, and the detestation in which the army held the service in Egypt,
and their anxiety to return to France, were the real causes of their
expulsion; and that an overwhelming force of ninety thousand men, of
English, Turks, and Indians, which he says, and which they believe, we
brought against them, furnished a decent excuse for their surrender.
Let us remember too, that it was after these proofs of British military
excellence, that Buonaparte, on the heights of Boulogne, parcelled out
in promise to his soldiers the estates of the ‘_nation boutiquiere_:’
let us remember also our own opinions in those days, how general
engagements were to be avoided; ... how a system of bush-fighting was
to be adopted in Kent; ... and our hopes that England might be saved
after London might be lost, ... or what inundations we should make to
protect it. Such language was then termed ‘caution:’ but on the proud
eminence on which we are now placed, we may afford to acknowledge
there was in it some mixture of distrust in the good old bayonet of
Britain. Where are the promises of Buonaparte now? The very ridicule
of such assertions would render it impossible for him to repeat them.
It is these guilty ministers who have taught to him, and what I think
of much more consequence, have taught to England, another style of
conversation. They have fairly tried that point, so carefully avoided
by their predecessors; they have brought our armies to a meeting with
the finest armies of France; and have added more to our strength, as
well as to our glory, by fighting in Spain, than their predecessors
by abstaining from it in Poland.... Such is the view which I take of
what is past: With respect to the second point, whether the time is
indeed come, when our further assistance can only be destruction to
ourselves, without being serviceable to our allies, a very little time
must show us that; and if there are indeed good grounds of hope, any
premature expression of our despondency will certainly extinguish them.
The Junta is at length demolished. The French are again dispersed over
every part of the Peninsula: the people are still every where in arms.
Let us not damp that spirit which may effect much, and which must
effect something, ... which must at least give long employment to the
forces of our enemy. If, indeed, it depended solely upon us, whether
our allies should continue that sacrifice of blood which they have so
profusely shed, I should not think us justifiable in purchasing our
quiet at such a price: but convinced as I am, that whether we stand
by them, or forsake them, those gallant nations will still continue
to bleed at every pore, our assistance assumes a new character;
and independent of the advantages to be derived to ourselves, ...
independent of 200,000 Frenchmen already fallen, ... independent of
not less than 300,000 more required even to preserve existence in
the Peninsula, ... independent of Brazil and South America, for ever
severed from our enemies, ... and independent of the fleets of the
Peninsula, I trust, rescued from their grasp, ... independent of these
gains to ourselves, there is another feeling binding upon a nation,
as well as upon an individual, not to forsake our friend because he
is in his greatest danger!... Still, however, I acknowledge a limit
there must be, beyond which we cannot go, and whenever we can agree in
declaring that
Funditus occidimus, neque habet Fortuna regressum,
then, indeed, the first laws of self-preservation will call on us to
discontinue the contest. But surely Great Britain will not utter such
a sentiment until her allies shall be disposed to join in it. They do
not despair, and I will never despair of them so long as they do not
despair of themselves, ... so long as I should leave it in their power
to say to us at a future day, ‘Whence these chains?... If you had stood
firm a little longer, ... if you had not so soon fainted, ... we should
not at this day be in the power of our enemies!’”
♦GENERAL FERGUSON;♦
General Ferguson was the first person who rose after Mr. Leslie Foster
had concluded this able and manly speech. “He had been in Portugal,”
he said, and “he did not think there were 30,000 soldiers in that
country; those that were there had certainly, through the exertions of
General Beresford and other British officers, attained an appearance
of discipline: but he feared that an army adequate to the task of
defending Portugal must be able to make a stand in the first instance;
and if obliged to retreat, must still, as opportunity offered, return
to the charge; and thus make resistance after resistance. Now he was
decidedly of opinion, from what he had seen and heard of them, that
on the very first defeat the little discipline of the Portugueze army
would vanish, and a dispersion be the consequence.”
♦MR. FITZGERALD;♦
Mr. Fitzgerald asked whether ministers had employed transports to bring
away our cavalry from Portugal? in this service, he said, our money
would be best employed. He had never heard of any achievement performed
by the Portugueze, except, indeed, that 2000 of them, with the Bishop
of Porto at their head, had entered Porto, and taken twenty-four
Frenchmen ♦LORD MILTON;♦ prisoners. Lord Milton repeated the erroneous
proposition of the Marquis of Lansdowne, that it was highly improper to
act as principals in a foreign country, instead of as auxiliaries. “No
reasonable man,” he affirmed, “could vote a million of the public money
for such a purpose, when the French were under the walls of Cadiz.
It had often been the practice to subsidize foreign troops, but he
believed it had never before entered the head of any English statesman
to grant subsidies to the Portugueze, ... to those, in fact, among whom
the materials for ♦MR. BANKES;♦ an army could not be found.” Mr. Bankes
talked of the money: “We had it not to spare, and if we had, even then
we ought not to spare it. Too much had already been furnished to the
Spaniards. Where were we to find more? specie we had not, and paper
would not answer. The enemy were now perhaps in possession of Cadiz,
which had escaped immediate capture only through an accident. The
Cortes had not even a town in Spain to meet in. It was quite romantic
to expect that a British army, of 20,000 or 25,000 men, even with
whatever co-operation Portugal could give, would be able to maintain
the war there as a principal against France. He must oppose the motion,
and recommend that the resources of the country should be husbanded for
our defence.”
♦MR. JACOB;♦
Upon this, Mr. Jacob, who had recently returned from Spain, denied that
France had any complete occupation of that country, either civil or
military. In Catalonia, he said, it would be difficult to say, whether
there were at that moment more Spanish towns besieged by the French,
or towns occupied by French troops besieged by the Spaniards; and the
communications were so completely cut off, that the French could not
send a letter from Barcelona to Gerona, without an escort of at least
500 cavalry to protect it. Generally speaking, throughout the whole of
Spain, those towns only were surrendered which were under the influence
of the nobility and gentry of large estates; but the mass of the people
were patriotic, and the villages were defended after the towns had
been betrayed. And not only the villages, but the mountains, were
still obstinately defended. He believed, that among the nobility and
gentry, where there were two brothers, the man of great possessions
was always for submitting to the enemy, while the other joined the
patriotic standard. We had been accustomed to consider civil wars as
the most horrible of all kinds of hostilities, but never was any civil
war so horrible as that which was now raging in Spain. The massacre,
the pillage, and the violence offered to women, were unparalleled.
He had lately been witness to some of these atrocities. The town of
Puerto Real had surrendered upon terms, and Victor, upon entering it,
published a proclamation, promising the most perfect security to all
the inhabitants. Nevertheless, he had hardly taken possession before he
ordered the men, who were mostly artificers at the docks in Cadiz, to
be imprisoned, and the females were marched down to St. Mary’s, to be
violated by his army.
It might have been thought that such a statement as this could have
produced but one effect, or at least that no man could have been
found who would attempt to weaken its effect, by ♦MR. WHITBREAD;♦
recriminating upon his own country. Mr. Whitbread, however, after
observing that he believed Mr. Jacob had gone to Spain upon a mission,
half commercial, half diplomatic, demanded of him whether he had been
an eye-witness of these atrocities; and if he were, or if he were
not, why he had detailed them, unless it was to inflame the house
upon a question where their judgement only ought to decide? “Abuses,
no doubt,” he said, “must have prevailed; but were gentlemen aware of
none committed under circumstances of less provocation, when the clergy
received the mandates of power to ascend their pulpits, and issue from
them falsehoods not more rank than they were notorious?” Such is the
language which Mr. Whitbread is reported to have uttered upon this
occasion. He proceeded to ask, “Where was the spirit of the Spaniards?
where were its effects? were they seen in suffering the French to pass
over the face of their country, like light through an unresisting
medium? We were gravely told that the post could not pass unmolested;
no doubt this was a most serious calamity, and a conclusive proof of
the energy of the popular spirit, ... only, unfortunately, we had the
same proof in Ireland! Spain,” he averred, “had not done its duty ...
no matter from what cause; the people had, however, some excuse, they
had been under the selfish sway of an aristocracy, that only wanted
to use them as an instrument for effecting their own narrow purposes;
their implicit confidence had been abused by the blind bigotry of an
intolerant priesthood, ... a priesthood that, whatever it preached,
practised not the gospel; they had had the sword in their hands as
often as the crosier, and they had had, he feared, in their hearts
any thing but the meekness, humility, charity, and peace, that their
blessed Master had inculcated by his pure precepts, enforced by the
example of his spotless life, and sealed by the last sufferings of his
all-atoning death. While,” said Mr. Whitbread, “I value those precepts
and that example, I never can take pleasure in setting man against his
fellow-man in a hopeless struggle. I think the present cause hopeless,
and as such I never will consent to its being uselessly and cruelly
protracted.”
Mr. Huskisson and Mr. Bathurst spoke like men in whom the principle
of opposition was not the pole star of their political course. The
♦MR. HUSKISSON;♦ question, Mr. Huskisson said, was, whether we were to
withhold from his majesty’s ministers the means by which the contest
might be rendered ♦MR. BATHURST.♦ more likely to be successful. Mr.
Bathurst said, it was enough for him to know that an alliance with
Portugal had been concluded, and that Portugal, in virtue of that
alliance, demanded our assistance. An amendment was moved by Mr.
Tierney, tending to refuse the grant, and 142 members voted for it,
over whom ministers had a majority of sixty-two. In the Lords, the
numbers had been 94, and 124.
To comment upon the language of the opposition in these debates would
be superfluous. The ignorance which they displayed of the national
character of the Spaniards and Portugueze, and of the nature of the
seat of war, the contemptuous superiority which they assumed, and
the tone in which they ridiculed and reviled our allies, were of
little moment; but the debate was of main importance, because the
party committed themselves completely upon the defence of Portugal,
declaring, in the most confident and positive terms, that it was
hopeless, and ought not to be attempted. Their journalists took up
the subject in the same strain, and followed the unhappy pattern of
prediction which had been set them. One of two things, they said,
must necessarily happen to these 30,000 Portugueze troops; either
they must fall into the hands of the French, or we must bring them
out of Portugal. The possibility that, with a British army, they
might be able successfully to defend their country, these men had
neither wisdom, nor knowledge, nor virtue to contemplate. Could it be
doubted for a moment, they said, that Spain would be subdued, from one
extremity to the other, before the end of six months? They copied,
too, as faithfully, the false and slanderous representations which
were made of the Portugueze. A thousand Portugueze, they said, would
fly before a single French company, just as so many gipsies would run
away from a constable. We might raise a better legion in Norwood. Was
there an English colonel who would give five shillings a dozen for
such recruits, or a serjeant who would be at the expense of a bowl of
punch for fourscore of them? The French and their partizans did not
fail to make due use of what was thus advanced in their favour; but
the Portugueze were too well acquainted with the real character and
feelings of this nation to have their faith in British friendship
shaken by the gross misrepresentations of a virulent party: and they
knew, perhaps, that statesmen who take part against the government and
against the allies of their country, and writers who pervert to the
most wicked and perilous purposes the freedom of the press, are the
concomitant evils of a free constitution like ours, under which both
public and private libellers breed like vermin in a genial climate.
♦REFORM OF THE PORTUGUESE ARMY.♦
Meantime the Portugueze army, which, under a system of complicated
abuses, had been reduced to the lowest possible state of degradation,
was reformed in all its branches by the indefatigable exertions of
Marshal Beresford. He had to contend not only with the inveterate
evils which had grown up during the long perversion of government, but
with that spirit of insubordination which, at the outbreak of these
troubles, the general anarchy had produced. The soldiers had begun
to claim and exert the power of choosing their own officers; an end
was immediately put to this ruinous license, and at the same time
means were taken for removing the cause of complaint wherever it had
originated, by recalling the officers as well as the men to a sense of
their duty, and by introducing British officers in sufficient number
to give the army consistence and effect till they might gradually be
replaced by native Portugueze. Equal justice, which in that country
had been as little known as liberty of conscience, was promised and
administered; the troops were told that the Marshal was at all times
ready to hear their complaints, through the proper channel; and that if
any officer excused himself from forwarding the complaint of a soldier,
the soldier might address it directly to the commander-in-chief. But
the Marshal said it was his duty to be impartial, and the officers had
as much right to justice as the soldiers. Severe penalties had been
denounced against desertion, but with so little effect, that nearly
seven hundred cases occurred during the month of April in this year;
the punishment of death was then inflicted on one offender, and two
others were degraded to Angola. At the same time the officers were not
allowed to absent themselves from their duty under pretext of illness;
certificates to this effect had been so greatly abused, that they were
no longer to be regarded without such actual inspection as the Marshal
might appoint; and one person of high family was dismissed the service
for a subterfuge of this kind. Courts-martial were made to understand
their proper functions by being reprimanded in general orders; and
the _Misericordia_ which had interfered to suspend the execution of
an officer who had received money from the French, and entered their
service, was informed that its privileges did not extend to these
cases, and that the sentence must be carried into effect.
It was necessary to raise the military character in the opinion
of the soldiers themselves, as well as of the nation. But before
this could be done, the sense of cleanliness and decency was to be
restored: for the troops, in that sullen state of self-neglect which
discomfort and hopelessness produce, had well-nigh lost all sense of
either. The Commander-in-chief told them that many of the evils which
the army suffered were occasioned by the want of cleanliness; that
health could not be preserved without it, that the soldiers must wash
themselves frequently, and that it grieved him to say, he must require
the officers to set them an example; that fatigue was no excuse for
neglecting this essential duty, for after a long march nothing was so
refreshing; that every officer must be responsible for the cleanliness
of the men under his command, and that he himself would never excuse
any officer whom he should see dirty. He gave orders that the men
should be provided with soap, brushes, and combs; that they should
brush their clothes and clean their shoes every day, and be punished
if they neglected this; and as the summer approached, he required the
officers, whenever an opportunity occurred, to make the men bathe by
companies. The Portugueze soldiers, it was said, like those of every
other country, desired to appear with a military air, and with that
propriety which belongs to the military character, and the men who most
affected this appearance were always the best soldiers; it was the
business of the officers, therefore, to see that they were provided
with every thing necessary for maintaining it. While this indispensable
attention to cleanliness was exacted, every possible provision was
made both for their health[11] and comfort. A dispensation was
obtained from the Pope’s Legate, allowing the troops the use of meat
while on service, every day in the year, except on Ash-Wednesday and
Good-Friday. The huge regimental kettles, which, after the Mahommedan
custom, were still used in the Portugueze army, and which, from the
inconvenience of carrying them, frequently did not come up with the
troops till long after they were wanted, were laid aside, and light tin
vessels substituted, which might be always at hand. An injurious custom
of marching in their cloaks when it rained, and even using the blanket
at such times as an additional covering, was prohibited; the men, they
were told, knew by experience, that no clothing could protect them
against the rain during a wet march, and therefore they were ordered
to keep cloak and blanket dry for their own comfort when they reached
the journey’s end. The officers and non-commissioned officers were
in the habit of kicking and striking the soldiers; wherever British
officers commanded this was immediately forbidden, and their example,
with the decided opinion of Marshal Beresford, nearly, or altogether,
put a stop to the unmanly practice. The ordinary punishment, though
less disgraceful and severe than the abominable system of flogging,
proved more frequently fatal; it consisted in striking the soldier on
the back, across the shoulders, with the broad side of a sword. The
number of strokes, or _pancadas_, never exceeded fifty; but men have
not unfrequently been known to drop down dead after receiving thirty,
from a rupture of the aorta. Marshal Beresford ordered a small cane to
be used instead of the sword; and thus, without altering the national
manner of punishment, rendered it no longer dangerous.
There were other evils which were beyond his power. When the troops of
the line were recruited, it was neither done by ballot nor by bounty:
a certain number were demanded from each district; the captain of
that district picked whom he chose, sent them to prison till he had
collected the whole number, then marched them to join their regiment.
The Marshal introduced the easy improvement of sending them to a
recruiting depôt, to be drilled before they joined; but he fixed
upon the peninsula of Peniche, a swampy and unwholesome spot, which
proved fatal to many, acting with double effect upon the depressed,
half-starved, and ill-treated peasants, who were sent thither. The
sick, the lame, and the lazy, were crowded into the same dungeon when
recruited by the Capitam Mor; contagion was thus generated, and very
often those, and those especially, who were fit for the service, were
carried off by disease. The depôt was afterwards removed to Mafra,
which is a healthy situation.
Over the method of levying troops Marshal Beresford had no control. But
the hospitals, which were infinitely more destructive to the army than
the sword of the enemy, and would have destroyed it much faster than
it could have been recruited, were greatly improved under a British
inspector, though the government would not permit his regulations to be
carried into effect to their full extent. Still a great and material
improvement was accomplished. The commissariat had been so conducted,
as to be at once inefficient for the army, and oppressive for the
people. A board of administration at Lisbon had its intendants in
every province, and its factors in every town. Government contracted
for provisions and forage, at fixed prices, with the board, and the
board directed its agents to purchase what might be required for the
troops on the spot. Payment was made by bills upon the board, which
in the best times were seldom taken up till twelve months after they
became due, and in the present state of things were considered to be
worth nothing. The farmer, therefore, naturally concealed his grain;
it was seldom that magazines were formed, or any provision made
against scarcity; and what the farmer could not or would not sell at
the disadvantageous rate which the factors offered, was usually taken,
when it could be found, by force. Marshal Beresford got commissaries
appointed to the different brigades, but he could not get money for
them, and therefore they were of little use. To reform the civil
establishments of the army was almost as difficult as it would have
been to reform the government; the utmost exertions of the Marshal,
aided as they were by Lord Wellington’s interference, availed nothing,
... being opposed by every species of low cunning and court intrigue.
For the old corruptions existed in full vigour, notwithstanding the
removal of the court to Brazil; and the body politic continued to
suffer under its inveterate disease, a _morbus pediculosus_, from
which nothing but a system of reform, wisely, temperately, firmly, and
constitutionally pursued, could purify it, and restore it to health and
strength.
Much, however, was done for Portugal, ... enough to be ever remembered
by that country with gratitude, and by Great Britain with a generous
and ennobling pride. An English commissariat, scrupulously exact in
all its dealings, relieved the farmers in great measure from the
oppression of their own government. The soldiers learnt to respect
their officers and themselves; they rapidly improved in discipline;
they acquired confidence, and became proud of their profession. The
government itself found it necessary to alter its old system of secrecy
and delusion; the dispatches of Lord Wellington and Marshal Beresford
were published in the Lisbon Gazette, and the people of Portugal were
officially informed of the real circumstances of the war, as fairly and
as fully as they had been in the War of the Acclamation.
CHAPTER XXX.
SIEGE OF HOSTALRICH. ATTEMPT UPON VALENCIA. CAPTURE OF LERIDA.
OPERATIONS BEFORE CADIZ.
♦1810.♦
If proof had been wanting that men of any country may be made good
soldiers under good discipline, it might have been seen at this time in
Buonaparte’s armies, where the Italians, who in their own country ran
like sheep before the French, were now embodied with them, and approved
themselves in every respect equal to their former conquerors. These
men, who were taken by the conscription to bear part in a war wherein
they had no concern, who had no national character to support, nothing
but the spirit of their profession to animate them, were nevertheless
equal to any service required from them, and needed no other excitement
than that they were fighting for pay, and plunder, and life. Was it
then to be doubted, that if the same care were bestowed in training,
the same results would be seen in the Spaniards and Portugueze,
who were under the influence of every passion and every principle
which can strengthen and elevate the heart of man, ... both people
too being alike remarkable for national feeling, and for patience
under difficulties and privations, docility to their superiors, and
faithful attachment to those in whom they trust? It was not indeed to
be expected that the Spaniards would so far acknowledge their military
degradation as to put themselves under the tuition of an ally; Spain
had not abated sufficiently of its old pretensions, thus to humiliate
itself. Neither indeed was that degradation so complete as it had been
in Portugal. The Spanish artillery was most respectable; and there
were officers in the army who had studied their profession, and whose
talents might have raised them to distinction in the proudest age of
Spanish history. But the Portugueze were conscious of their weakness,
and in this knowledge they found their strength: for when that brave
and generous people, in the extremity of their fortune, submitted
implicitly to the direction of their old hereditary ally, ... when they
offered hands and hearts for the common cause, and asked for assistance
and instruction, the ultimate success of that cause became as certain
as any thing can possibly be deemed by human foresight. With Portugal
for the scene of action, and her population ready for every sacrifice
that duty might require, it remained only for Great Britain to feel and
understand its own strength, and employ its inexhaustible resources in
exertions adequate to the occasion.
But Great Britain as yet hardly understood its strength. The cold
poison which was continually instilled by party writers into the public
ear had produced some effect even upon the sound part of the nation.
From the commencement of the war it had been proclaimed as a truth too
certain to be disputed, that England could no longer as a military
power compete with France, consequently that we must rely upon our
insular situation, and husband our resources. These opinions had been
so long repeated, that they had acquired something like the authority
of prescription; the government itself seemed to distrust the national
power, and in the fear of hazarding too much, apportioned always for
every service the smallest possible force that could be supposed
adequate to the object, instead of placing at the general’s disposal
such ample means as might ensure success. The first departure from this
over-cautious system was in the expedition to Walcheren, where a great
armament was worse than wasted. That miserable enterprise weakened the
government, and in some degree disheartened it; and Lord Wellington,
in addition to the other difficulties of his situation, had long to
struggle with insufficient means. But the exertions and the experience
of the last year had not been lost: the British army had acquired a
reputation which, however successfully Buonaparte concealed it from
the French people, was felt by his soldiers and his generals: time had
been gained for training the Portugueze troops, and preparing for the
defence of Portugal; and the British Commander having proved both his
enemies and his allies, had clearly foreseen the course which the war
would take, and determined upon his own measures with the calmness of
a mind that knew how to make the best advantage of the events it could
not control.
♦O’DONNELL APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND IN CATALONIA.♦
While both parties were preparing for a campaign in Portugal, in which
the enemy expected to complete the conquest of the Peninsula, and
Lord Wellington felt assured that the tide of their fortune would be
turned; while the war before Cadiz was pursued with little exertion
or enterprise on either side, and the cities of Andalusia were
occupied without a struggle by the invaders; in Catalonia the contest
was carried on with renewed vigour. The fall of Gerona enabled the
besieging army to undertake farther operations; but the Catalans, as
well as the French, had changed their commander. Upon Blake’s recall
to the south, D. Juan de Henestrosa had succeeded to the command;
the provincial Junta however, in accord with the general wish of the
people and of the troops, appointed O’Donnell in his stead, and this
nomination was ♦GARCIA CONDE MADE GOVERNOR OF LERIDA.♦ confirmed by the
Regency. It gave offence to Garcia Conde, who was an older officer, and
had also distinguished himself during the siege of ♦VON STAFF, 246.♦
Gerona. He resigned the command of the first division in disgust: this
act of intemperance, however, was overlooked, and he was made governor
of Lerida, a post of great importance at that time, but to which his
services and his character seemed fairly to entitle him. The Duque del
Parque had more reason for displeasure at O’Donnell’s promotion; in
the belief that he was to have the command in Catalonia by the express
desire of the Catalan people, he had taken leave of his own army, and
Romana had been appointed to succeed him.
♦RAPID PROMOTION IN THE SPANISH ARMIES.♦
If heroes who carry victory with their single presence were to be
produced as if by miracle, according to Lord Holland’s supposition,
by democratic institutions, during such struggles as that in which
the Spaniards were engaged, fairer opportunities for their appearance
could not have been afforded under the most democratic forms than
were given both by the Central Junta and by the Regency. There had
been a flagrant exception in the case of Alburquerque; the union of
high rank, deserved popularity, and great military talents in his
person, had excited unworthy jealousies in some, and worse passions in
others: but in every other instance, promotion had rapidly followed
upon desert; a rash and even ruinous confidence had been shown where
any promise of ability appeared; and men were raised so rapidly, that
they became giddy with their sudden elevation. But Henrique O’Donnell
justified the expectations which had been formed of him. While the
French proclaimed in their official accounts, that now Gerona had
been taken, little more was required for the complete subjugation of
Catalonia; that the Ampurdam was already reduced; that the peasants,
as they were taken in arms, were hung up in great numbers upon the
trees along the road side, and that the French communications had at
length been rendered secure, the fall of Gerona, like that of Zaragoza,
had animated the Spaniards, not discouraged them: they looked to the
spirit which the garrison and the inhabitants had displayed, not to the
surrender which famine had rendered inevitable, and in the religious
and heroic endurance which had there been manifested, found cause for
more ennobling pride and surer hope than a victory in the field would
have given them. Eroles was charged by the superior Junta to enforce
the decree for embodying every fifth man. He called upon the Catalans
in language suited to the times, reminding them of their forefathers
who spread terror through the Greek empire; and referring to those
regiments of the Gerona garrison, which but a little while before the
siege had been filled up with men thus levied, as having exemplified
not less illustriously the powerful effects of discipline. By this
means the army was recruited, and the men hoping for change of fortune
with every change of commander, entered cheerfully upon the service
under O’Donnell, who had hitherto only been known by his adventurous
exploits and his success.
♦CONDUCT OF THE PEOPLE OF VILLADRAU.♦
In the other parts of Spain, grievously as all had suffered, the
scene of action had frequently been shifted; but in Catalonia there
had been no intermission. From the commencement till the termination
of the war, the struggle was carried on there without an interval
of rest. A memorable instance of the provincial spirit was given at
this time by the people of Villadrau, an open town, in the plain of
Vich; on the approach of an enemy’s detachment, which they had no
means of resisting, the whole of its inhabitants, in the middle of
February, retired to the mountains. The French Commandant, finding
the place utterly deserted, wrote to the Regidor, telling him that if
the inhabitants were not brought back by the following day, he should
be obliged to report their conduct to Marshal Augereau, and take the
necessary measures for reducing them to obedience: at the same time he
assured him that the most effectual means should be used for preserving
order. This answer was returned by the Regidor: “All these people,
that the French nation may know the love they bear to their religion,
their King, and their country, are contented to remain buried among the
snows of Montsen, rather than submit to the hateful dominion of the
French troops.” So many families, in the same spirit, forsook their
homes, rather than remain subject to the invaders, that the superior
Junta, at O’Donnell’s suggestion, issued an order for providing them
with quarters in the same manner as the soldiers. The exceptions to
this spirit were found, where they were to be expected, in the rich
commercial towns, as at Reus. If the people of Barcelona, like those of
Villadrau, and of so many smaller places, had abandoned their houses,
that city could not long have been held by the enemy; in that case the
blockade might have been as rigorous, and almost as effectual by land
as by sea: but provisions for the use of the inhabitants were allowed
by the Spanish generals to enter; and therefore, though the French
might be sometimes inconvenienced, it was certain that they would never
be exposed to any serious danger of famine.
♦HOSTALRICH.♦
The communication between Gerona and that city was impeded by
Hostalrich, a modern fortress, overlooking a small and decayed town,
which had once been fortified. It is situated on high and broken
ground, seven leagues from Gerona. The intermediate country is of the
wildest character, consisting of mountains covered with pines; the
road winds through sundry defiles, so narrow, that in most places the
river nearly fills up the way; the pass is so difficult, that in one
part it has obtained the name of El Purgatorio; and the outlet is
commanded by this fortress. Part of the town had been burnt during the
siege of Gerona, when the magazines which had been collected there were
taken by the enemy. An enemy’s division, under the Italian General
Mazzuchelli, occupied it now, preparatory to the siege of the castle;
the inhabitants, upon their approach, took refuge in the church, and
there defended themselves till a detachment of the garrison sallied,
and relieved them; and before the blockade of the fortress was
pressed, they had time to remove and seek shelter where they could. The
garrison meantime prepared for a Spanish defence. This fortress, said
the governor Julian de Estrada, is the daughter of Gerona, and ought to
imitate the example of its mother!
♦COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE.♦
The siege began on the 13th of January: a week afterwards one of the
outworks, called the Friars’ Tower, was attacked; the officer in
command, D. Francisco Oliver, was killed by a hand-grenade, which
exploded as he was in the act of throwing it; and the man who succeeded
him, immediately, either through cowardice, or from a worse motive,
surrendered his post. Augereau, who was at this time come to inspect
the siege and accelerate the operations, thought it a good opportunity
to intimidate the governor. He therefore summoned him to surrender,
saying, that the garrison should in that case be allowed the honours
of war, and marched as prisoners into France; giving them two hours
to reply, and warning them that if they refused to submit upon this
summons, they must not expect to be treated like soldiers, but should
suffer capital punishment, as men taken in rebellion against their
lawful king. Estrada replied, that the Spaniards had no other king
than Ferdinand VII. The siege was carried on with little vigour till
the 20th of February, when the French began to bombard the fort; but
the men who defended it showed themselves worthy of the cause in which
they were engaged, and of their commander; and here, as at Gerona, the
French, with all their skill, and all their numbers, found that the
strength of a fortress depends less upon its walls and bulwarks, than
upon the virtue of those who defend it.
♦FIRST SUCCESS OF O’DONNELL.♦
The force under Augereau’s command was sufficiently large for carrying
on the siege of Hostalrich, commencing operations against Lerida,
and acting at the same time against O’Donnell, whose troops the
French Marshal despised, as consisting merely of raw levies. He was
soon taught to respect them and their General; for when he himself
went to Barcelona with a considerable convoy of stores, and 1500 of
the garrison were sent to occupy O’Donnell’s attention, not a fifth
part of the number effected their retreat into the city. More than
500 of the French were slain, and nearly as many taken ♦DESERTION
FROM THE FRENCH ARMY.♦ prisoners. They suffered a greater loss from
desertion. Buonaparte had pursued the wicked policy of forcing into
his own service the Austrian prisoners taken in the late war; 800 of
these men went over to the Spaniards in a body, stipulating only that
they might keep their arms, and remain together, till they should
be distributed among the regiments of the line. General Doyle had
addressed proclamations to the soldiers in the French service, not only
in the French and Spanish languages, but in Italian, Dutch, German, and
Polish also, setting before them the real cause of a war, the nature of
which they saw and felt. The Catalans too had learnt the good policy
of distinguishing between the French and the foreigners in the French
army, treating the latter, when they were taken, with kindness, as men
who had been brought against them by compulsion. The effect of this
system, and of the proclamations, was such as greatly to alarm the
enemy. They lost in this manner more than 6000 men, wretched as the
service was to which the men went over. It was not possible for them
to take any effectual means for checking this evil, when such constant
opportunities were offered in the desultory warfare which they were
compelled to carry on.
♦WANT OF CONCERT BETWEEN THE PROVINCES.♦
Had the Spanish army been even in a tolerable condition, this
cause must have produced the ruin of the French in Catalonia; but
the deserters found that they were exchanging a bad service for a
worse. The French troops, though by a policy not less ruinous than
detestable, left to supply themselves as they could, were, even at the
worst, better provided than the Spaniards in their best state. They
had always the benefit of system, regularity, and order; while the
Spaniards suffered as much from the confusion which insubordination
and the total want of method occasioned, as from neglect on the part
of the local authorities and the provincial government. Owing to these
combined causes their armies were often in a state of destitution.
Unanimous as Spain was in its feeling of indignant abhorrence at the
insolent usurpation which Buonaparte had attempted, it was divided
against itself whenever provincial interests appeared to clash. Neither
Catalonia nor Valencia would at this time make common cause with
Arragon, although they were engaged with the same passionate feeling,
for the same object, against the same enemy, and although their own
safety was immediately involved in the fate of that kingdom. The
Arragonese army consisted of about 13,000 men in three divisions, one
of which was near Teruel, another near Tortosa, and the third on the
line of the Cinca; the men were without pay, without arms, without
clothing; the officers on a fourth part of their appointments. Twenty
thousand men would eagerly have joined that army, if they could have
been armed and fed; the people had given abundant proof of their zeal,
and spirit, and devotion, and the army had done its duty: yet Valencia
would spare them none of its own ample resources, and the Catalan
government even stopped the supplies which were intended for Arragon.
The Arragonese felt this the more indignantly, because, while Lazan
was at their head, his rank and influence ensured some attention to
his representations on their behalf; but Lazan, whether or not justly,
had been arrested, as being implicated in the intrigues of Montijo and
D. Francisco Palafox, and was kept a close prisoner in Peñiscola. The
judge who officially inquired into his conduct declared that there was
not the slightest proof ♦1810. FEBRUARY.♦ against him; and upon the
overthrow of the Central Junta, Saavedra dispatched an order for his
liberation; but the Junta of Valencia, with that order in their hands,
detained him in strict confinement.
♦NEGLECT OF THE VALENCIAN GOVERNMENT.♦
No province had as yet suffered so little as Valencia; the people were
proud of the spirit and signal success with which they had repelled
Marshal Moncey from the walls of their capital; their country was the
most fertile and most populous part of Spain; men were in abundance,
wealth was not wanting, and there were more appearances of activity
and preparation than were any where else to be seen. In every town and
village militia and guerilla bands were formed; about 50,000 were thus
embodied, the greater part armed with fire-arms; and besides these
there were 11,000 troops of the line; but with this force nothing
was undertaken. Good service might have been rendered on one side by
harassing the enemy’s communications in La Mancha; and scenes of more
important action were open both in Arragon and Catalonia, ... even on
their own borders; but the will, courage, and means were inefficient,
for want of capacity in their leaders. They waited for the enemy upon
their own ground, in hope and in confidence, but without foresight
or system. General Doyle endeavoured to convince the provincial
government that no time should be lost in fortifying the important
points of Morella, Oropesa, and Murviedro. He inferred from some of
Suchet’s movements an intention to establish himself in the latter
place, which would have cut off the communication between Catalonia
and the rest of Spain, and have given him command of the Huerta de
Valencia, and of the whole country to the very gates of Tortosa. But
in the confidence and confusion which prevailed alike in the people
and in the officers and the rulers, nothing was done; and so far were
they from storing Tarragona, and forming a depôt at Peñiscola, as the
importance of the crisis required, that Tortosa itself had not at this
time provisions for a week’s consumption. They relied upon the defence
of their frontier, upon their own numbers and resources, upon fortune
and Providence; for themselves, they were ready to meet the danger
manfully whenever it should come, ... but as for any system of defence,
to fortune and Providence that seemed to be left.
♦THE FORCE ON THE VALENCIAN FRONTIER DISPERSED.♦
The Valencians were in this state when the half-armed, half-clothed,
half-hungered Arragonese, with whom their abundant means ought to have
been shared, were dispersed, and the frontier in consequence was left
open. General Caro determined to march upon Teruel, which the French
had entered, but the movements of an active enemy soon compelled him
to change this determination. One division of Suchet’s army advanced
from Alcañiz upon Morella; no means had been taken for strengthening
that important point, the Valencians therefore fell back from thence,
and from San Mateo also, and the enemy, without experiencing any
opposition, proceeded by Burriol with all speed toward Murviedro.
Meantime Suchet with the other division advanced upon the same point
by way of Alventosa; there he encountered a brave resistance from the
vanguard of Caro’s army, and after a contest, which lasted nearly the
whole day, was repulsed. The Spanish commander, expecting a renewal of
the attack, requested a reinforcement from Segorbe; he was informed in
reply, that General Caro had ordered the troops to fall back upon the
capital. This disheartened men who were too prone to interpret an order
for retreating as a signal for flight; they dispersed upon the next
attack, leaving the artillery upon the ground; Segorbe was entered in
pursuit, and Suchet, having sacked that place, effected a junction with
the other division of his army at Murviedro.
His corps consisted of about 12,000 men, with thirty field-pieces; a
force manifestly insufficient for its object, if he had not counted
upon the success of his machinations in the capital. ♦SUCHET ADVANCES
AGAINST VALENCIA.♦ From thence he advanced to the Puig, and having
fixed his head-quarters on the spot ♦MARCH 6.♦ where King Jayme el
Conquistador had encamped when he undertook the conquest of Valencia,
he addressed a letter to the Captain General Caro, saying, that he
came not to make war upon the happy capital of the finest kingdom
in Spain, nor to lay waste the delicious country which surrounded
it, but to offer protection and peace, such as Jaen, and Granada,
♦1810. MARCH.♦ and Cordoba, and Seville were enjoying. Andalusia had
submitted; the army, having discharged its duty, had entered into the
service of King Joseph Napoleon; and the militia, consisting of men
enlisted by force, and under the penalty of death if they refused,
had been dismissed. Religion was respected, justice observed, private
property untouched; and General Caro was now invited to open the gates
of Valencia, that the French might enter, and he might deserve the
blessings of his country. Wherefore should he prolong a contest, the
issue of which the Spaniards themselves could now no longer consider
doubtful? They had done enough to prove their courage, and it was time
that their sufferings should have an end. The Captain General’s answer
contained some stinging truths, and some remarkable falsehoods. It
contrasted the professions of General Suchet with his actual conduct;
and it assured him that the French had been completely defeated between
Puerto Real and the Isle of Leon, that they had evacuated Seville
in consequence, and were in full retreat toward the Sierra Morena.
Authentic intelligence was so irregularly communicated, and the most
extravagant reports so eagerly propagated and so readily believed,
that it is very possible the Captain General of Valencia believed the
incredible statement which he advanced. Suchet addressed a summons
also to the inhabitants of Valencia, calling upon them as proprietors
and parents to consult their own interest and their duty, by preserving
their beautiful and flourishing city from the calamities of war. They
returned for answer, that they were prepared to sacrifice every thing
in the defence of their just cause; that having defeated Moncey in a
similar attempt, they had good reason now to hope for the same success;
and that it was for his Excellency, who so humanely deprecated the
effusion of blood, to consider whether the best method of avoiding that
evil was not to abstain from an attack?
♦HE RETREATS FROM VALENCIA.♦
Suchet, in fact, had no intention of making one. It was, however,
expected by the Valencians; and in that expectation the superior Junta,
by Caro’s advice, had removed to St. Felipe, a city to which it seems
strange that its old name of Xativa should not have been at this time
restored. There they were to exert themselves for supplying the capital
and annoying the invaders, a military Junta being appointed meantime
within the city, to dispose of the peasantry who had flocked thither,
and to direct the labours of a willing people. A former Junta had been
assembled after the dispersion at Alventosa, and in the course of the
ensuing night every member had been arrested upon a charge of treason.
An edict also was passed, confiscating the property of all who had fled
from the city at this time, their absence being interpreted as proof
either of cowardice or of treachery. Such severity was not without
cause. Relying upon their intelligence in the city, the van of the
French army entered the suburb of Murviedro, and occupied the College
of Pius V. the Royal Palace, and the Zaidia, all which are without the
walls on the farther bank of the Turia. From the palace they fired upon
the bridge; and they exasperated, if it were possible to exasperate,
the hatred of the Spaniards, by exposing the images which they had
taken from the churches on their march and in the suburbs to the fire
of the city, having stript some of their taudry attire, and dressed up
others in regimentals. But finding their hopes fail, and not being in
sufficient force to venture upon an attack, they decamped during the
night of the 11th, retreating with such celerity, that they abandoned
great part of their plunder.
♦A CONSPIRACY DISCOVERED IN THAT CITY.♦
The Valencians imputed their deliverance on this occasion to their
Patroness and Generalissima, the Virgin, under her invocation of Maria
Santissima de los Desamparados, and to the Saints who were natives of
Valencia. A deliverance it was; for a plan had actually been formed to
assassinate the Captain General, and proclamations in favour of King
Joseph and his French allies were found upon the chief mover of this
treason, Colonel Baron de Pozoblanco. This person, who appears to have
been a revolutionary fanatic, suffered under the hangman; his head
was exposed upon a stake in the market-place, with an inscription
under it, announcing his crime, and charging him also with belonging
to the sect of the illuminated Egyptian freemasons, which was said to
be extending itself from Madrid into La Mancha, Murcia, and Valencia,
and to have converted the different appellations of the Virgin into
distinctive names for its own organization.
♦THE FRENCH BOAST OF SUCCESS.♦
Suchet’s expedition was not made without loss; some of his garrisons
and smaller parties were cut off by the Arragonese troops in his rear,
under D. Pedro Villacampa. The Castle of Benasque had been taken before
he marched against Valencia, and that capture completed his military
possession of the north of Arragon; but the people, when deprived of
their fortresses, found fastnesses in their mountains, and waged from
thence a wearying and wasting war against their oppressors; and Mina’s
prisoners were escorted from the frontier of Navarre to Lerida, through
a country of which the French called and fancied themselves masters.
This desultory warfare was carried on in Catalonia also with no less
skill than success. Augereau had supposed, that after the reduction
of Gerona little more was necessary for the complete subjugation of
the province; he boasted of a victory in the plain of Vich, the most
glorious, it was said, which the French had yet obtained, wherein
O’Donnell had lost 7000 men, with the whole of his baggage, and after
which he could find no place of safety till he had taken refuge under
the walls of Tarragona. Souham in like manner proclaimed that the
famous Rovira had fled before him, notwithstanding his vaunts of the
incursions, robberies, and assassinations upon which he prided himself.
It was presently seen with what little foundation the invaders boasted
of these triumphs.
♦O’DONNELL’S SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS.♦
O’Donnell’s movements were not in consequence of a defeat. Having
experienced the superiority which the enemy’s discipline gave them
in the management of large bodies, he had immediate recourse to that
system of warfare, in which enterprise, celerity, and the ardour of
the soldiers, are of more avail than tactics. Therefore he retreated
rapidly from Moya to Terrasa, leaving Manresa uncovered: the
inhabitants of that city forsook it on the approach of the French; and
O’Donnell continuing ♦MARCH 16.♦ to lead the invaders on, fell back,
first to Villa-franca del Panades, then to Torre-dembarra, finally
under the walls of Tarragona, executing these movements in good order,
and without loss. The enemy, in pursuit, as they believed, of a flying
army, occupied Manresa with 1500 men, left 900 in Villa-franca, and
proceeded till they also came in sight of Tarragona. One division
occupied Vendrell, and extended to Arco de Barra, upon the high road
to Barcelona; but in a few days this division joined the main body,
which was at Coll de Santa Cristina, and they immediately advanced
♦MARCH 28.♦ towards Valls. O’Donnell, profiting by this movement,
sent Camp Marshal D. Juan Caro against Villa-franca; Caro proceeded by
forced marches, and surprised the enemy on the following ♦MARCH 30.♦
morning; between 200 and 300 were killed, and 640 made prisoners, not a
man escaping. Caro himself was wounded; the command of his detachment
devolved upon Brigadier D. Gervasio Gasca, and they proceeded toward
Manresa, to attack the enemy, who occupied that town.
A body of 500 or 600 had already been sent to reinforce the French
in Manresa, and had effected their junction, though not without the
loss of two carts of ammunition, and forty killed, in an action with a
party of somatenes and of expatriates, as those Spaniards were called
whose homes were occupied by the enemy. Augereau no sooner heard of
the loss in Villa-franca, than, apprehending a similar attack upon
Manresa, he ordered a further reinforcement of 1200 men from Barcelona,
to proceed thither with the utmost celerity. Gasca, receiving timely
intelligence of their movement, instead ♦APRIL 3.♦ of proceeding
upon Manresa, marched to intercept this column, and fell in with it
between Esparraguera and Abrera; 400 were left upon the field, 500 made
prisoners, and the remainder fled toward Barcelona, not more than 200
reaching that city. The Spaniards, after this second success, prepared
to execute their projected attack upon the enemy in Manresa, and the
Marquis de Campoverde took the command for this purpose: but the men
had exerted themselves too much in forced marches and in action to
perform a third enterprise with the same celerity as the two former;
and on the night before the attack should have been made, Schwartz,
who headed the French detachment, evacuated the town, and took the
road to Barcelona by Santa Clara, Barata, and Marieta. He began his
retreat at eleven on the night of the 4th. Brigadier D. Francisco
Milans, who was stationed at St. Fructuos, passing the night under
arms, to be ready for the attack at seven on the following morning, was
apprised of the enemy’s retreat between four and five, and dispatched
the corps of expatriates, under Rovira, in pursuit, while the rest of
the division followed as fast as possible. Rovira, whom the French had
lately reviled as a wretch who was flying before them, passing in two
hours over a distance which was the ordinary journey of four, in their
pursuit, overtook them at Hostalet, and attacked them with his usual
intrepidity. Schwartz, whose force consisted of 1500 men, formed them
into a column, and continued to retreat, fighting as he went. Rovira,
however, so impeded his movements, that he gave time for Milans to come
up with him near Sabadell; the Spaniards then charged with the bayonet;
500 of the French fell, 300 were made prisoners; Schwartz himself was
wounded, and owed his life to the swiftness of his horse. Some of the
French, after having surrendered, were said to have fired upon the
Spaniards, and this was assigned as the cause why the number of the
slain exceeded that of the prisoners.
The amount of the killed and taken in these actions falls far short of
the sum of the French loss; for the desertion was very great, every
defeat giving the Germans, who were forced into their wicked service,
an opportunity of escaping from it. The whole loss which they sustained
from these well-planned enterprises was not less than 5000. O’Donnell
hoped that he should now be enabled to relieve Hostalrich; but the
main body of the French returning toward Barcelona from Reus, which
they had taken possession of a few days before, compelled Campoverde’s
division to fall back, and thus prevented the attempt. In Catalonia,
indeed, though more military talent and far more energy were displayed
than in the other provinces, it was less a war of armies than of the
people against a great military force. Wherever the French moved in
large bodies, the Catalans could not resist them, or resisted in vain;
in general actions and in sieges, the enemy were sure to be successful;
the French, therefore, and they in this country who would have had
us abandon the Peninsula to their mercy, concluded that the party
which won battles, and captured fortresses, must necessarily soon
become masters of the country; and they reasoned thus, because they
never took into their calculation the national character, the natural
strength of Spain, and the moral strength of man.
♦1810. FEBRUARY.
SIEGE OF HOSTALRICH.♦
The effect of that moral power was shown not less admirably at
Hostalrich than it had been at Zaragoza and Gerona, though the three
sieges differed from each other in all their circumstances. The little
town of Hostalrich was not included within the works, and the fortress
contained no other inhabitants than its garrison. The bombardment
began on the 20th of February. The adjutant, D. Jose Antonio Roca, was
writing a dispatch for the governor to the commander-in-chief, when a
shell burst so near them, that one of the fragments entered the room
and swept away every thing from off the table: Roca picked up his
paper, and, remarking that the sand which it carried with it might save
him the trouble of telling the general they were bombarded, continued
his dispatch. A private soldier, who went out of the works for water,
received a musket-ball in his groin as he was returning; he laid one
hand upon the wound, and carrying in the pitcher steadily with the
other, met his serjeant, to whom he delivered it; then groping in the
wound for the ball, which probably had not gone deep, he pulled it out
with his fingers, and gave it to the serjeant, saying, “I deposit this
ball in your hands; keep it for me, and as soon as I am cured, this
very bullet shall revenge me upon the first Frenchman at whom I can
get a shot.” And as he went to the hospital he charged his comrades,
in case he should not live to take vengeance for himself, that they
would take it for him. Such was the spirit with which Hostalrich was
defended. “Let every circumstance of the siege be made known!” said
this brave garrison; “if we are successful, the detail will give hope,
and confidence, and joy to every true patriot; if we are unfortunate,
it will excite a different feeling, but it will never produce shame or
dismay.”
♦1810. MARCH.♦
Verdier, who now commanded the besieging force, addressed a new summons
to the governor at the time of O’Donnell’s retreat to Tarragona,
representing that movement as the consequence of a total defeat. “The
wreck of the Spanish army,” he said, “was seeking a moment’s shelter
in Tarragona and Tortosa, vigorously pursued by Augereau in person,
who would immediately commence the siege of both places. The siege of
Lerida was already far advanced, and its fall inevitable. Hostalrich
was a fort of no other use than as it interrupted the communication
between Gerona and Barcelona; and this purpose it no longer effected,
the French having made a new road, and communicating freely between
those cities. The object, therefore, for defending it, no longer
existed; and longer resistance, instead of adding to the governor’s
glory, would be called a vain obstinacy, draw upon him the reproaches
of posterity, and make him responsible for the blood which should be
shed.” Considering these circumstances, the French general summoned
him to surrender, and offered him the honours of war. The Marshal Duke
of Castiglione, Augereau, he added, revoking his former declaration,
had authorized him to propose these terms. “You will do well, sir,”
he continued, “to accept them with glory; if you delay, they will
without doubt be refused to you; and you will then be obliged to suffer
conditions, which, however rigorous they may appear, are dictated by
justice, seeing that a protracted resistance is neither justified by
honour nor by reason.” Estrada replied, by simply referring him to his
former determination, and to the conduct of the garrison.
The situation of the fortress, upon a craggy height, secured it against
an assault, while there were any resolute men to defend it. The
bombardment continued till every building within the walls had been
destroyed, except a casemate, which served as an hospital, and was only
large enough to hold one-and-twenty beds; the remainder of the sick
and wounded were secured in a mine, and the garrison also had their
quarters under ground. Supplies had been introduced about the middle of
the siege; all other attempts had been defeated, and would have been
of no avail at length had they succeeded, because the cisterns were
destroyed. Estrada had the example of O’Donnell’s retreat from Gerona
before him, and determined to make his way through the enemy’s lines,
rather than capitulate. This he concerted with O’Donnell, ♦1810. MAY.♦
who, for the purpose of deceiving the besiegers, ordered some vessels
to approach Arenys de Mar, the nearest part of the coast, sent one
detachment to call off their attention on the side of Orsaviña and
Monnegre, and another on the southern skirts of Monseny, toward Breda.
Augereau, who had come to witness the capture of a fortress which had
resisted him for four months, sent in a last summons on the evening
of the 11th of May, offering the same terms which had been granted
to Gerona; he allowed the governor two hours for consideration, and
declared, that if the fort was not then delivered up, the whole of
the garrison should be put to the sword. Estrada laid this before his
officers, and with one consent they returned for answer, that they
thanked the Marshal for thinking them worthy of being thus named with
Gerona, but that they were not yet in a condition which should make
them yield. On the following morning, the men, to their great joy, were
informed of the resolution which had been taken.
♦RETREAT OF THE GARRISON.♦
The French expected such an attempt, and judged, from the stir which
they beheld in the fort, that it would be made in the ensuing night.
That evening, therefore, they strengthened their post at Tordera on the
right, thinking, as the men themselves did, that the governor would
make for Arenys de Mar, where the ships were awaiting him. At ten,
the garrison descended the glacis on the side of the high road of St.
Celoni, and crossed the road and the space between the fort and the
heights of Masanas. It was broad moonlight. Two advanced parties, to
the right and left, fell upon the enemy’s picquets with the bayonet;
those, however, who escaped gave the alarm; but the garrison had gained
the start, ascended to St. Jacinto, and hastened toward St. Feliu
de Buxaleu. A league from Hostalrich they fell in with an enemy’s
encampment, and routed them; this gave the alarm to another body of
2000 French, whose station was near, on the road to Arbucias; but they
were received so resolutely, that they soon gave over the pursuit.
Thus all was effected which could be done by skill and courage; one
division lost its way, and many of the men dropt on the road, their
strength failing them on this great exertion, from the want of rest and
food, which they had long endured. Among them was the noble Julian de
Estrada, who thus fell into the hands of the enemy: this was a heavier
loss to his country than that of the fortress which he had defended so
well; for in the course of the war, Catalonia had but too much cause
bitterly to regret the loss of such men as Estrada and Alvarez. Five
hundred men reached Vich in safety on the following day, 132 joined
them on the next, being part of the battalion of Gerona, who had lost
their way and fallen in with the enemy; stragglers continually came in,
and on the evening of that day, the number who had accomplished their
retreat amounted to 800, though the French asserted, that every man
was either killed or taken.
In such an enterprise, it was impossible to bring off the sick and
wounded; the comptroller of the hospital, D. Manuel Miguel Mellado,
remained with them to go through the form of delivering up the ruins,
and provide for their safety. Such of the invalids as were best able
mounted guard, the gates were closed, and the drawbridges raised; and
in this state Mellado anxiously waited for what might happen. Half an
hour before midnight, a brisk fire of musketry was poured in upon the
flanks of the ravelin, and of St. Francisco. Mellado called out to
the enemy to cease firing, for the fort was theirs; and he requested
them to wait till the morning, that he might deliver a letter from
the governor to the French general. They replied, they would suffer
no delay, the gates must instantly be opened; otherwise, they had
ladders, and would enter and put every man to the sword. He, however,
told them he would not open the gates till he had seen their general;
upon this they renewed their fire, setting up a loud shout like men
who were about to obtain possession of their prey. Mellado hastened
to the bulwark of St. Barbara, where he apprehended the escalade
would be made, and there he perceived that the enemy, who had found
a rope-ladder in the covered way, were endeavouring to grapple the
drawbridge with it; but, either from the weight of the rope, which
rendered it difficult to be thrown, or because the irons were not
sufficiently sharp to lay hold, their attempts were frustrated. This
Mellado could not foresee; and knowing that no time was to be lost, he
hastened out through a covered way to the nearest work of the enemy,
and called out to the commandant, requesting him to stop the assault,
and send him to the general, that he might deliver the governor’s
letter; the party who were flanking the ravelin, no sooner heard his
voice than they fired a volley towards it; upon which, without waiting
for an answer, he hastened to the nearest centinel of the French, and
the captain of the guard conducted him to the French commandant in the
town; whom he entreated to have compassion upon the wounded in the
fort, and call off the assailants. This officer was a man of humanity,
and instantly sent off to suspend the assault, while Mellado, who was
now delivered from his fears for his poor defenceless countrymen,
was escorted to the general. In the morning the gates were opened
to the enemy. The French soldiers gave sufficient proof how little
mercy the wounded would have found at their hands, had they been
under no control, for they stript the clothes and blankets from the
beds of these helpless men. Mazzachelli gave orders that they should
be conveyed to Gerona; and Mellado, having seen this performed, and
perceiving that it was intended to detain him and his assistants as
prisoners, took the first opportunity of making his escape.
♦LAS MEDAS AND LERIDA SURRENDERED.♦
At the very time when the garrison of Hostalrich, after a four months’
defence, and a bombardment, during which between three and four
thousand shells were thrown into the place, ♦MAY 13.♦ thus gallantly
effected their retreat, the Catalans suffered another loss. The islands
and fortress of Las Medas, which were of material importance from
their position on the coast, were surprised by a party of Neapolitan
infantry, and given up in a manner which the French imputed to
cowardice, though, by their own account, treason, on the part of the
commander, was the only intelligible cause of the surrender. Lerida
also was rather betrayed than yielded by Garcia Conde. The town was
entered by assault: and the castle, where the works were uninjured,
and which, under Alvarez or Estrada, might have rivalled Gerona, was
surrendered the next day. For this there was no excuse; O’Donnell’s
last orders to the governor had been, that if the city should be
taken, he was to defend the fortresses; and if no such orders had
been given, his duty required him to hold out to the last extremity.
The commander-in-chief, who rewarded the defenders of Hostalrich with
a medal, stigmatized this conduct as it deserved; but he reminded
the Catalans, that Tarragona, Tortosa, Cardona, Berga, Seu de Urgel,
Coll de Ballaguer, and Mequinenza, still remained as bulwarks of the
principality; that if all these were lost, there would be their
inaccessible mountains; and that when they began the war, they had
neither army nor fortresses, for all their fortified places had been
dismantled. A wound which he had received during the siege of Gerona,
and which had never been healed, because he never allowed himself rest
enough from the incessant and anxious activity of his situation, became
now so threatening, that he was constrained for a while to withdraw
from ♦AUGEREAU SUPERSEDED BY MARSHAL MACDONALD.♦ the command. Augereau
also, about the same time, was recalled. His success in sieges did not
expiate, in Buonaparte’s eyes, for the loss in men and reputation which
he had sustained from an enemy who were now become as wary as they were
active and enterprising. Marshal Macdonald, Duke of Tarento, succeeded
him. The plunder of Barcelona was sent into France under Augereau’s
escort; and a number of commercial adventurers from that country, who,
being deceived by the French official accounts, had supposed that Spain
was actually subdued, and gone thither with the intent of forming
establishments, gladly seized the first opportunity of returning in
safety.
If the war was carried on by the Catalans with an unwearied and
unremitting energy which was not displayed in other parts of Spain,
it was not wholly owing to that enterprising and unconquerable spirit
by which they have always been characterized, but in some degree to
the natural strength of the province, and still more to the advantage
which they derived from having many places in their possession which
could not be reduced without a regular siege. Throughout Spain there
existed the same feeling of indignation against the invaders, ...
but where the country, the villages, and the towns were alike open,
there was not the same possibility of resistance; plains could not be
defended by peasantry; nor could the contest be maintained by large
bodies against a superior enemy, when there were neither fortified
towns nor natural fastnesses on which they could retire. In such
parts the war was carried on by guerilla parties, who made incursions
from the mountainous districts into the plains, and whenever it was
necessary to disperse, found friends every where. Wherever the French
were nominally masters of the country, the guerillas harassed their
communication, cut off their small parties, and diminished their
numbers by a mode of warfare as disheartening to the enemy as it was
consuming and inglorious; while in the stronger parts of the kingdom,
such as Asturias, and the province of Cuenca, and the mountains of
Ronda, the inhabitants perseveringly defended their native soil.
♦FORT MATAGORDA TAKEN BY THE FRENCH.♦
Cadiz, however, was the point whereon all eyes were at this time
turned, in expectation of great events. Victor had been left to command
the siege, if siege it may be called. The French occupied the shore of
the bay, fortified their own position, and endeavoured to annoy the
shipping and the town; a regular attack upon the isle was too perilous
for them to attempt. Fort Matagorda was the only point from which it
was thought possible that they could injure the town: it had been built
for the defence of the arsenal, opposite to the broadest part of that
tongue of land which connects Cadiz with the Isle of Leon. From thence
it was apprehended they might with the largest land mortars throw
shells to the gates of the city; Ormond indeed had planted his cannon
there, in the fruitless attempt upon Cadiz in Queen Anne’s reign.
The fort, like the other land-works, had been dismantled upon their
approach; but when it was seen that they were beginning to reconstruct
it, it was deemed advisable that they should be dispossessed, and
that the post should be maintained as long as possible against them.
Accordingly they were compelled to abandon it, and the hasty works
which could be re-erected were garrisoned by a party of British
soldiers and seamen under Captain Maclean. They defended it for nearly
two months, till it was reduced to a heap of ruins; and having lost
in the last two days sixteen killed and fifty-seven wounded, were
brought off by the boats of the British squadron, under the fire of
the enemy’s batteries, with little loss. The manner in which this weak
fort was defended taught the French what they might expect if they
should attempt the Isle of Leon, for the defence of which a formidable
line of works behind the Santi Pietri had now been executed under the
direction of General Sir Thomas Graham, who had arrived from England to
command the auxiliary forces there. These works extended to the ocean
on the right, and on the left occupied the Caraccas as an advanced
post. The French also were more intent upon securing themselves in
their cantonments than upon annoying the Spaniards. They fortified
Puerto Real, Puerto Santa Maria, and Chiclana, formed entrenched camps
between these places, and strengthened the Trocadero, where they
established batteries from whence to bombard the town. Having presently
found the inefficiency of the field artillery, which was all that
they had brought with them, they fished up the guns from the French
and Spanish ships which had been wrecked upon that coast after the
battle of Trafalgar. Most of the heavy pieces with which two-and-twenty
batteries were now mounted were recovered in this manner from the sea.
♦STORM AT CADIZ.♦
The French, though disappointed in their main object here by
Alburquerque’s sagacity, and the prompt assistance of the British
forces, were in high spirits. They were in a fine country; their
quarters were at once commodious and secure; and a few weeks after
their arrival the winds and waves threw into their possession no
inconsiderable booty. For during a tremendous gale, which continued
four days with unabated violence, three line of battle ships, one
frigate, and about forty merchantmen were driven[12] to the side
of the bay which they occupied, and went on shore at the height of
the spring side. The men were taken out by the boats of the British
squadron, and the ships were set on fire by the enemy’s red-hot shot;
but no small part of the lading fell into their ♦CRUEL USAGE OF THE
FRENCH PRISONERS IN THE BAY.♦ hands. During the tempest the French on
board the prison ships could not receive their supplies of provisions
and water from the shore; their signals of distress were disregarded
by the Spaniards; and if the British Admiral had not sent his boats
to their relief as soon as the gale abated, very many more of these
miserable men than actually perished must have fallen victims, the
Spaniards being in no haste to encounter the swell for the sake of
enemies whom they seem to have considered as out of the pale of
humanity. In the case of these prisoners, indeed, they had cast off
all compassion, and the obduracy of the national character was fully
manifested towards them, the negligence of the government being in
this instance hardly less criminal than the avarice ♦1810. MAY.♦
and brutality of those whom it employed. Admiral Pickmore perceiving
with how little care the pontoons were secured, proposed to the
Spanish Admiral that chains should be used as bridles to their cables;
application was made to the Admiral in command at the Caraccas; they
were promised from time to time, but never sent; and, as the British
Commander had foreseen, ♦MAY 15.♦ the prisoners in the Castilla, nearly
700 in number, and mostly officers, cut the cable one night, when
wind and tide were in their favour, ♦ESCAPE OF TWO PRISON SHIPS.♦ and
hoisting a sail which they had made from their hammocks, ran for the
opposite coast. English boats were presently sent after them, while
it was doubted whether the vessel had not by accident parted from her
anchor; but when they reached her it was impossible to board, the
pontoon being light, her ports all down, no steps on the side, nor
ropes over it, and the French prepared, not only with musketry, but
with cannon-ball of twenty-four and thirty-six pounders, which had
been used for ballast in the vessel: two hundred men were stationed to
throw these by hand, and the boats were presently disabled when such
missiles were showered upon them. Fort Puntales and the gun and mortar
boats opened their fire upon the pontoon, the vessel was burnt, but the
fugitives, with little loss, effected their escape[13].
A week later the French had nearly obtained possession of a rich
prize. The S. Elmo, line of battle ship, with 250,000_l._ on board,
in attempting to work out of the bay, got under their battery of S.
Catalina. She was saved by the exertions of the officers and men in
all the boats of the British squadron. Having turned her head round,
the greater part of them went on board, and fought her guns with good
effect till out of the enemy’s reach. The French had better fortune
with the Argonauta pontoon; the prisoners on board that vessel, about
six hundred in number, followed the example of their comrades in the
Castilla; a third of these were killed by the fire which was kept up
upon them; the remainder escaped from the burning hulk. But though
the Spaniards had taken no precautions for rendering such attempts
impracticable, they felt how dangerous it was to keep so large a body
of prisoners in the bay while a French army was in possession of
the shores. Two ships of the line were at this time under orders to
carry part of them to the Canaries; and more would have been sent to
Majorca and Minorca, whither 5000 had been transported in the preceding
year, if the inhabitants had not at this crisis been in a state of
excitement, which would have rendered a farther importation dangerous
both to the prisoners themselves and to the government. Serious
disturbances had broken out in both islands, not from any spirit of
disaffection, but from distress, and indignation that so many of
these unhappy persons should be cast among them, and no adequate means
provided for their subsistence. The Minorcans were less likely to be
patient under such misgovernment than any other Spaniards, remembering
the prosperity and good order which they had enjoyed while their island
was in possession of the English: with them, however, the ebullition of
♦INSURRECTION AGAINST THE PRISONERS AT MAJORCA.♦ popular feeling past
harmlessly off, while Majorca became the scene of a disgraceful and
dreadful tragedy. Some fugitives landed at Palma from those parts of
the south which had lately fallen under the French yoke; they brought
horrible tales concerning the invasion of Andalusia and the conduct
of the invaders; and the people, excited by these horrors, cried out
for vengeance upon the prisoners. Troops were called out to protect
these unfortunate men, but the soldiers would not act against their
countrymen; and when the commander, General Reding, as the only means
of saving the prisoners, consented that they should be sent to the
desert island of Cabrera, many were butchered in his presence, in spite
of his entreaties and exertions, and many thrown into the sea, before
the embarkation could be effected; nor could it have been effected, if
the soldiers had not at length been provoked to fire upon the mob.
♦PRISONERS SENT TO CABRERA.♦
Five thousand at first, and afterwards half as many more, were landed
upon Cabrera, a rocky island about fifteen miles in circumference,
with no other inhabitants than a handful of soldiers, who were
stationed there to prevent the Barbary corsairs from making it a place
of rendezvous. A few tents were provided for the superior officers,
the remainder were left to shelter themselves as they could. There
was but one spring on the island, and in summer this was dry: they
discovered some old wells, which had been filled up, and which, when
cleared, yielded bad water, and very little of it. The supplies from
Palma were sent so irregularly, sometimes owing to the weather, but
far more frequently to inhuman negligence, that scores and hundreds
of these miserable creatures ♦THEIR INHUMAN TREATMENT THERE.♦ died of
hunger and thirst; many were in a state of complete nakedness, when
in mere humanity clothing was sent them by the British commander in
the Mediterranean: and at other times they were kept alive by barrels
of biscuit and of meat which the English ships threw overboard for
them, to be cast on shore. But in the third year of their abode, the
captain of a Spanish frigate, whose name ought to have been recorded,
remonstrated so effectually upon the manner of their treatment,
that from that time they were regularly supplied with food. He gave
them potatoes and cabbage and tobacco seed, from which they raised
sufficient for their consumption; and having by persevering labour,
♦MÉMOIRES D’UN OFFICIER FRANÇAIS, PRISONNIER EN ESPAGNE, 255, 287.♦
without any other tools than a single knife, broken six feet into a
rock, on the surface of which there was appearance enough of moisture
to excite their hopes, they obtained a supply of water. Some of
them used the skulls of their own dead, for want of other vessels,
to contain it; ... and others, with no such excuse of necessity,
manufactured buttons from their bones! About 1500 entered the Spanish
service rather than endure a banishment to which no end could be
foreseen; and some 500, chiefly officers, were in compassion removed to
England. At the end of the war not more than 2000 remained in Cabrera,
nearly half of those who had been landed there having sunk under their
sufferings. The Spaniards departed from the straight path of probity
when they broke the terms of capitulation which had been granted ♦SEE
VOL. I. P. 501.♦ at Baylen. They committed that breach of faith in
deference to popular outcry, and to the sophistry of one who soon
proved himself a traitor, ... the most odious of all those men whom
the Revolution either found wicked or made so: and in the subsequent
treatment of the prisoners humanity was as little regarded, as honour
had been in detaining them. Many and grievous were the errors which the
Spaniards committed in the course of the war; but this is the only part
of its history which will be remembered for them as a national reproach.
♦M. SOULT’S EDICT.♦
On the other hand, the French had as yet abated nothing of that
insolent cruelty with which they began the contest, supposing that
they could intimidate the Spanish nation. Soult, ♦MAY 9.♦ who had
recommended that all the commanding ♦SEE VOL. III. P. 446.♦ officers
employed in Spain should be _impassible_, ... incapable of any feeling
by which they might even possibly be moved to compunction, ... issued
at this time an edict not less extraordinary than Kellermann’s. After
various enactments, some of which were as impracticable as they were
rigorous, imposing penalties upon the inhabitants of those districts
in which the patriotic parties should commit any crimes, as this
Frenchman was pleased to denominate their hostilities against the
invaders of their country; he pronounced, “that there was no Spanish
army, except that of his Catholic Majesty, King Joseph Napoleon; all
parties, therefore, which existed in the provinces, whatever might be
their number, and whoever might be their commander, should be treated
as banditti, who had no other object than robbery and murder; and all
the individuals of such parties who might be taken in arms should be
immediately condemned and shot, and their bodies exposed along ♦COUNTER
EDICT OF THE REGENCY.♦ the highways.” When the Regency found that this
decree was actually carried into effect, they ♦AUG. 15.♦ reprinted it,
with a counter decree by its side, in French and Spanish, declaring
anew, “that every Spaniard capable of bearing arms was in these times
a soldier; that for every one who should be murdered by the French, in
consequence of the edict of the ferocious Soult, who called himself
Duke of Dalmatia, the three first Frenchmen taken in arms should
infallibly be hanged; three for every house which the enemy burnt in
their devastating system, and three for every person who should perish
in the fire.” Soult himself they declared unworthy of the protection
of the law of nations, while his decree remained unrepealed. They gave
orders, that if he were taken, he should be punished as a robber; and
they took measures for circulating both decrees throughout Europe, to
the end that all persons might be informed of the atrocious conduct
of these enemies of the human race; and that those inhabitants of the
countries which were in alliance with France, or, more truly, which
were enslaved by her, who were unhappy enough to have children, or
kinsmen, or friends serving in the French armies in Spain, might see
the fate prepared for them by the barbarity of a monster, who thought
by such means to subdue a free and noble nation.
CHAPTER XXXI.
ASTORGA TAKEN BY THE FRENCH. SIEGE AND FALL OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.
♦1810.♦
♦INACTIVITY BEFORE CADIZ.♦
Hostilities were carried on before Cadiz with equal languor on both
sides, the French making no attempt on the Isle of Leon, and the
Spaniards none for breaking up the land-blockade. On the enemy’s part
this inaction was occasioned by their knowledge of the strength of the
works; on that of the Spaniards by want of energy in the government,
and want of spirit ♦THE REGENCY SEND FOR CUESTA.♦ in the people of
Cadiz. The Regency, immediately upon their appointment, had sent for
Cuesta to reside either in the city or the isle, that they might profit
by his advice, regarding him, they said, as the main pillar of the
country: they expressed their deep sorrow for some outrages which had
been committed against his venerable age, and their determination to
inflict exemplary punishment upon the offenders: they ordered that part
of his appointments should forthwith be paid, and promised the whole
arrears as soon as it should be possible to discharge them. The time,
however, for Cuesta’s services, either in the field or the council,
was past; and the old General employed his latter days in composing a
vindictive attack upon the fallen Junta, which called forth on their
part a complete justification of their conduct towards him. On that
score they had nothing wherewith to reproach themselves; but they must
have felt some self-condemnation in reflecting that the two generals,
who in the hour of extreme danger had acted with promptitude and
success, were the men in whom they had least confided. Alburquerque
they had regarded with jealousy, and Romana they had deprived of his
command in deference to the deputies of Asturias.
♦BADAJOZ SECURED BY ROMANA.♦
The service which Romana had rendered at that crisis was only of less
importance than the preservation of the Isle of Leon. He had secured
Badajoz when a corps of 12,000 men from Seville thought to have
obtained possession of it by a coup-de-main: some Portugueze had come
to his assistance, and their artillerymen distinguished themselves when
the enemy ventured to approach the walls. Baffled in this attempt, the
French retired to Merida, Zafra, and S. Marta, where they were annoyed
by the division of his army under D. Carlos O’Donnell, brother to the
commander in Catalonia.
♦THE BRITISH TAKE A POSITION ON THE FRONTIERS OF BEIRA.♦
Lord Wellington had nearly 9000 sick when his head-quarters were
removed from Badajoz; but when, in clear anticipation of the enemy’s
intentions, he took a position on the frontiers of Beira, they rapidly
recovered strength in that salubrious country. On the side of Alentejo
he knew that the invasion would not be attempted; attempts in that
quarter had always proved unsuccessful: if Badajoz and Elvas had been
reduced, Lisbon was secured by the Tagus, and there is no other part
of Portugal in which an army would suffer so much from disease, and
from want of water; this indeed Loison ♦SEE VOL. II. P. 181.♦ had
experienced. On the side of Gallicia the French had so lately felt
how difficult it was to retreat, that it was altogether unlikely they
would risk the same danger again, even if it had not been necessary
again to obtain possession of that province as a preliminary measure.
It appeared certain, therefore, that the attempt would be made by way
of Beira, the only remaining and most practicable route for an invading
army. Their first step must be to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo. This, he
knew, had been recommended by a council of war held in September at
Salamanca; and its success, he then observed, would do more evil than
the French could effect in any other way; for it would cut off the only
communication of the Spanish government with the northern provinces,
give the enemy the command of Castille, and probably draw after it the
loss of Almeida. Looking, therefore, to Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida as
the points of which the enemy must obtain possession before they could
march either upon Lisbon or Porto, he chose a position in the segment
of a circle, of which the convex part was opposed to the quarter from
whence the invasion was expected. Guarda, Celorico, Pinhel, and the
west bank of the Coa, were its four main points; the Coa, with its
tributary streams, flowing in front of his line along the greater part
of its extent. That river rises in the Sierra de Xalma, which is a
part of the Serra da Gata, and enters Portugal by Folgosinho; another
stream, which is also regarded as its source, rises near Sabugal; it
receives many smaller rivers, and falls into the Douro near Villa Nova
de Foscoa. Its waters are supposed to be excellent for dying wool and
tempering steel, but unwholesome.
♦ASTORGA SUMMONED BY THE FRENCH.♦
Before the French entered upon their operations in this quarter, they
thought it necessary to obtain complete possession of Leon, that their
communication might be open with Valladolid. They had been repulsed in
an attempt upon Astorga, in the preceding September, by Santocildes,
who remained as governor there. That city was surrounded with walls,
which gave it an appearance of antiquity, not of strength. They had
been erected many centuries ago, and were so massive, and at the same
time considered as of so little consequence for purposes of defence,
that the poor were permitted to dig holes in them which served for
habitations. The garrison consisted of about 3000 men, of whom from
500 to 600 were on the hospital list. Some attempts had been made to
render the city defensible, according to the system of modern warfare,
by the enemy, after Buonaparte entered it in pursuit of Sir J. Moore;
and when the Spaniards recovered it, they added to these works. Still
the fortifications were such, that though the French might deem them
sufficient against an armed peasantry, or a guerilla party, it was
never expected that any resistance would be made there against a
regular force. After the French had overrun Andalusia, and when they
were proclaiming, that the brigands had been put to the sword, and the
Napoleonic throne established in Cadiz, ... for this falsehood was
in such phrase asserted in their Spanish gazettes, ... Loison, whose
head-quarters were at Bañeza, the nearest town, wrote to the governor,
telling him, that King Joseph had entered Seville amid the acclamations
of the inhabitants; that Andalusia had submitted; the ♦FEB. 16.♦ Junta
was dissolved; and almost all the people of Spain, awakened now to a
sense of their true interest, had had recourse to the clemency of their
sovereign, who received them like a father. He urged Santocildes to
imitate so good an example, and appoint a place where they might meet
and confer upon such terms as must needs persuade him to this wise and
honourable course. Santocildes replied to this overture, that he knew
his duty, and would do it.
♦SIEGE OF ASTORGA.♦
On the 21st of March, Junot invested Astorga with 12,000 men, of whom
about a tenth part were cavalry, by means of which he became master
of the open country. The vigorous measures of Santocildes obstructed
his operations so much, that a month elapsed before he opened his
batteries. They began on three sides ♦1810. MARCH.♦ at once, at
daybreak on the 20th of April, and soon effected a breach on the
north, by the Puerta de Hierro; but immediately behind the breach the
Spaniards pulled down a house, the foundations of which served as a
formidable trench; they kept up their fire during the night, and at
eleven the following morning Junot once more summoned the governor to
surrender, declaring that, if he held out two hours longer, the city
should be stormed, and the garrison put to the sword. The governor
having returned a becoming answer, the batteries renewed their fire;
the bombardment was recommenced; the cathedral was set on fire, with
many other houses, and a whole street in the suburbs; and the French,
thinking to profit by the confusion, assaulted the breach: 2000 men
were appointed for this service: great part perished before they could
reach the wall; the remainder mounted the breach; the works within
impeded them, a destructive fire was poured upon them, and after an
hour and a half they were repulsed. At the same time the suburb was
assaulted, and with the same success; the enemy being three times
baffled in their attempts. Their loss this day amounted to 1500 men.
♦ITS SURRENDER.♦
Had the city been well stored, it would have cost the besiegers still
dearer; but after this signal success, Santocildes found himself with
only thirty round of cartridges remaining for the men, and eight only
for the artillery. Junot passed the night in making a covered way from
the trenches to the foot of the breach, where he lodged a large body
of picked men. Meantime a council of war was held; the impossibility
of resisting with advantage for want of ammunition was admitted; some
officers proposed that they should cut their way through the besiegers;
... the strength of the enemy’s cavalry was one impediment to this,
but it was rejected on account of the inhabitants; for Astorga was not
like Hostalrich, where the garrison had only themselves to provide
for; and unless terms were made for the town’s-people, what they might
expect from such conquerors as Junot and Loison was but too well
known. Fresh works of defence were thrown up within the breach while
this deliberation was going on, that nothing might be omitted, and
at daybreak a capitulation was proposed. They demanded and obtained
the honours of war for themselves; security for the inhabitants, both
in person and property; that the men should keep their knapsacks,
and the officers their horses, swords, and baggage. This part of the
capitulation was broken, and the officers were plundered as they left
the town. Even Junot, however, returned Santocildes his sword, saying,
that so brave a man ought not to be without one. In the course of
the siege the enemy lost 2500 in killed alone; so dearly was Astorga
purchased. But the more gallant its resistance, the more was that
misconduct to be regretted which had infected the provincial Juntas as
strongly as the Central Government. Since July last Gallicia had been
entirely delivered from the enemy; the population of that province,
when the census of 1797 was taken, amounted to nearly a million and
a half; the people had shown their spirit, and if due exertions had
been made on the part of the civil and military authorities, an army
might have been formed there, capable not only of preserving Astorga,
but of essentially co-operating with the British and Portugueze in the
subsequent operations.
♦AFFAIR AT BARBA DEL PUERCO.♦
After this conquest, Junot, leaving a small garrison in Astorga,
marched into Old Castille, where Ney had previously been joined by the
corps of Loison, Regnier, and Kellermann. The campaign had already
begun here. In the beginning of March the French army were upon the
Tormes, with their advanced posts upon the Agueda. Lord Wellington was
at Viseu, and his advanced posts, under General Craufurd, were upon
the Agueda also, and between ♦MARCH 19.♦ that river and the Coa. The
first time that the British and French troops met after the battle
of Talavera was in an affair of outposts, at Barba del Puerco: four
companies of the 95th, under Lieutenant-Colonel Beckwith, were posted
at that place; the French had a strong party immediately opposite, on
the other side the Agueda, in the village of St. Felices. The only
bridge below Ciudad Rodrigo is between these villages, and as the
river at this season was swollen with rain, this was the only passage.
The country is rocky and mountainous, and though the advanced sentries
of both parties were within a few yards of the bridge, it was not
expected that either would attempt to annoy the other; so great were
the obstacles which the nature of the ground presented. The French,
however, collected a brigade in St. Felices, and after night had
closed marched 600 men toward the bridge. About midnight they were all
assembled there, and made the advanced sentries prisoners; a picquet of
eighty men, posted behind the rocks, immediately fired upon them and
retreated in excellent order; they pushed on up the mountain, hoping
to surprise the remainder of the men, but were presently repulsed. The
loss was trifling on either side. Marshal Ney, however, ventured to
assert, that the English had been routed at the point of the bayonet,
and that their transports were ready at Porto and Lisbon.
♦MASSENA APPOINTED TO THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL.♦
The French had learnt at Vimeiro, and Coruña, and Talavera, to respect
British valour, but they had not yet been taught to respect English
policy; and they fully expected that if they brought a superior force
against him, Lord Wellington would fly through Portugal, and seek
shelter in his ships. Preparations, therefore, were made for this third
invasion, with an army far exceeding in number those which Junot and
Soult had commanded, even if they had been united, and under Massena,
a general ♦1810. APRIL.♦ of higher rank than either. No general in
the French service had enjoyed so high a reputation since Hoche,
and Pichegru, and Moreau had disappeared. Buonaparte, in his first
campaigns, called him, in his own inflated style, the favourite Child
of Victory; and after the late Austrian war, created him Prince of
Essling, because his skill and exertions had contributed mainly to the
escape of the French from utter destruction at the battle of Aspern.
He was appointed commander-in-chief of the provinces of the north of
Spain, including the kingdoms of Old Castille, Leon, and Asturias; the
provinces of St. Andero, Soria, Valladolid and Palencia, Toro, Zamora,
Salamanca and Avila; the army under him was named the army of Portugal;
and, as Soult had done before him, it is believed that he went to make
the conquest of Portugal, expecting to be rewarded with its crown for
his success.
♦CIUDAD RODRIGO.♦
In the later wars between Spain and Portugal, the three cities where
the Spaniards used to collect their armies before they invaded the
enemy’s country were Tuy, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajoz. Of these
fortresses, Tuy, like Valença on the opposite frontier, is now of
little strength or importance, Badajoz a strong place, Ciudad Rodrigo
hardly to be ranked in the third order of fortresses. It was built
some centuries ago, when the site was sufficiently convenient for a
fortified town; but the situation is bad; the works were old and
imperfect, and it had other local disadvantages. It is commanded from
many points; and one height, within 500 toises of the city, exceeds
by about fifty yards the highest of its buildings. There were no
bomb-proofs; and the suburbs, in which there were four convents, and
the number of gardens without the walls, materially assisted the
operations of a besieging army. The population of the city had been
estimated at about 10,000; but it appears not much to have exceeded
half that number. The garrison amounted to 4950, including 600
townsmen; the greater part of the others being volunteers, or men newly
raised. Camp Marshal D. Andres Perez de Herrasti was governor, an old
man, who had been the friend and comrade of Mariano Alvarez.
♦THE FRENCH BESIEGE IT.♦
On the 25th of April 6000 French appeared before the place, and
encamped in the _Termino_ of Pedro Toro, a league to the eastward.
On the 30th, the second division, consisting of from 4000 to 5000,
arrived and encamped in the _Termino_ of Valde Carros, a league to the
north. Five days afterwards another encampment was formed between the
two. On May 15th, another division, of about 7000 men, encamped to
the westward, upon Monte de Ibanrey. So large a force was necessary,
because the English were near at hand. By the 4th of June the city
was completely invested. This was not effected without repeated
skirmishes, in which the enemy suffered considerable loss. In these
♦1810. MAY.♦ affairs, D. Antonio Camargo, commandant of the volunteers
of Avila, greatly distinguished himself; but the individual who, above
all others, annoyed the enemy by his incessant enterprise, ♦D. JULIAN
SANCHEZ.♦ was D. Julian Sanchez, the son of a farmer, near the banks
of the Guebra. Till the invasion of his country, he had cultivated
his father’s lands; but when his father, mother, and sister had been
murdered by the French, he made a vow of vengeance, and, at the head
of one of those bands which the Spaniards call _guerrillas_, well
performed it. On one occasion he surprised, in his father’s house, a
French colonel, infamous for his atrocities, and put him to death,
first telling him who it was that inflicted his merited punishment in
this world, and sent him to render account for his crimes in the next.
♦MARSHAL NEY SUMMONS THE TOWN.♦
This enterprising leader made repeated assaults upon the enemy,
not hesitating, at the head of sixty, eighty, or an hundred of his
lancers, to attack three or four times his own number. Camargo, and
D. Jose Puente, commandant of the cavalry regiment of Ciudad Rodrigo,
co-operated ably with him, and the French suffered daily and hourly
losses from their indefatigable activity. They suffered also greatly
from the artillery of the town, which was excellently served. Ney
carried on his operations in a manner which the Spaniards thought
prodigal of the lives of his men, beginning his approaches where, in
their judgement, a general more sparing of his army would ♦1810. JUNE.♦
have terminated them. To protect these works, he ordered a great number
of holes to be dug, where he posted sharpshooters, by whom the garrison
were greatly annoyed. On the 24th of June, Massena arrived and took the
command, and at three on the following morning the batteries opened,
and a constant fire from six-and-forty pieces of heavy artillery was
kept up day and night till the evening of the 28th, when, having made
a breach of about five-and-twenty yards in length, Ney required the
governor to surrender, “sending him,” he said, “this last summons by
order of the Prince of Essling, commander-in-chief of the army of
Portugal, then present, whose honour and humanity were well known, but
who, if the defence were uselessly prolonged, would be compelled to
treat him with all the rigour authorized by the laws of war. If he had
any hope of being succoured by the English, he was doubtless by that
time undeceived; for if such had been their intention, they would not
have waited till the city was reduced to its present deplorable state.
He had, therefore, to choose between an honourable capitulation, and
the terrible vengeance of a victorious army; and a positive answer was
requested.” Herrasti replied, “that after forty-nine years’ service,
he could not but know the laws of war and his military duties; the
fortress was not in a state to capitulate; and whenever circumstances
made it his duty, he would then apply for terms, after securing his
honour, which was dearer to him than life.”
♦SITUATION OF LORD WELLINGTON.♦
How galling it must have been for Lord Wellington to witness the
progress of the siege, knowing his inability to relieve the town, may
well be conceived. His outposts were near enough to hear even the
musketry; but with so large a proportion of his troops half-disciplined
and untried, he could not act upon the offensive against an enemy
greatly superior in numbers, without incurring the most imminent
danger. The only possible plan by which Portugal could be saved he had
laid down for himself, and from that plan no circumstances, however
painful to his own feelings, or however derogatory in appearance to his
reputation, could induce him to swerve. He was in communication with
Romana at Badajoz; but in the state of the Spanish armies, any plan
of co-operation for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo was impossible. It
was, however, of great importance that the place should be resolutely
defended to the last extremity, and in this hope Romana and the English
general were not disappointed. ♦SPIRIT OF THE INHABITANTS.♦ The minds
of the people had been prepared for this extremity; they had their
patriotic writers and their poets; the exploits of Julian Sanchez
excited the emulation of the youth, and the conduct of the old governor
gave confidence to all. The examples of Zaragoza, and Gerona, and
Hostalrich, and Astorga, animated the women and children, as well as
those who bore arms; for in a cause like theirs they had seen their
countrymen acquire a glory when unsuccessful, which could not have been
greater had they been victorious. The women and children, when they saw
their houses burning, gave way neither to fear nor lamentation, but
exerted themselves to quench the flames, and carried refreshment and
ammunition to the troops amid the hottest fire. There were two blind
beggars in the city: no one supposed that these unfortunate men could
render any service during the siege, but zeal taught them how to be
serviceable; they carried water to the walls by day, and ammunition by
night, with such unwearied activity, that it was the intention of the
governor and the Junta, if the town had been saved, to have rewarded
them with pensions for life.
♦THE NUNNERY OF S. CRUZ ATTACKED.♦
It was of great consequence to the Spaniards to keep possession of
those buildings without the walls, which would otherwise afford
protection to the besiegers, but which also afforded such means for
annoying them while they could be defended, that it had not been
thought advisable to demolish them before the siege. The nunnery
of Santa Cruz was the most important of these buildings. D. Ramon
Castellanos was posted there with a company of sixty men, when three
hundred of the enemy’s grenadiers, with a party of sappers, assailed
it in the night, half the party attacking it in the rear, the other
in ♦1810. JULY.♦ the front. They blew up the first and second gates;
hand grenades were thrown on both sides; the Spaniards, having the
advantage of the building, kept up a most destructive discharge of
musketry; the commander of the one party was killed, the captain of
engineers, who commanded the other, wounded, but he did not retire till
he had set fire to the convent. Seeing the flames, the governor made
signal for Castellanos to abandon the post, who accordingly let down
his men from a window into one of the inner courts of the convent, and
descending himself the last, they forced their way with the bayonet. It
was a little after midnight when they reached the gate of La Colada:
but seeing, while they took food and rested after the action, that the
enemy had extinguished the flames, Castellanos went to the governor,
and represented to him that his honour was concerned in recovering the
post. He led his men at three in the morning, after only two hours’
respite, to the assault, and surprising the French, drove them from
their dearly purchased conquest, where they left 158 dead, and 45
wounded behind them, the remainder of the wounded having been removed
during the short time that they retained possession.
♦CONVENT OF ST. DOMINGO RECOVERED. JULY 2.♦
They were driven from the convent of St. Domingo in a manner not less
worthy of remembrance. After they had won the building, Herrasti was
very desirous of recovering it, and yet hesitated at giving orders for
the attempt, knowing the exhausted state of the garrison, and how ill
any loss of men could be afforded. A serjeant, by name Manuel Martin,
happened to hear what was the state of the governor’s feelings upon
this subject. This man, who was a native of Zamora, had made himself
well known to the French: they called him _agua y vino_, water and
wine, the words which he always used when engaged in action with them;
wine being his signal for attack, and water that for retreat. He had
distinguished himself greatly during the siege, and had at this time a
wound in his arm, which however did not prevent him from going to the
governor, and soliciting permission to make an attack upon the enemy
in this convent, saying, that if he could not drive them out, at least
he could annoy them there. Accordingly, choosing out five-and-twenty
comrades, he attacked the convent with such well-directed vigour, that
the enemy, though greatly superior in numbers, were terrified and took
to flight, many of them leaving their knapsacks and muskets behind
them. This was so signal an exploit, that Manuel Martin was deservedly
promoted for it, and a badge of distinction was given to each of the
soldiers.
♦JULIAN SANCHEZ EFFECTS HIS ESCAPE FROM THE CITY.♦
But against such a force as surrounded them, all that the Spaniards
could do was to hold out to the uttermost, and sell the fortress as
dearly as possible. Massena boasted of having 100,000 men in the field;
he had 66,000 infantry and 6000 horse, of whom as many as could be
advantageously employed carried on the siege, while the others kept
the British army in check, Lord Wellington having only 51,000 under
his command, including 3000 cavalry, and half this force composed of
Portugueze, who were as yet untried, and consequently in whom little
reliance could then be placed. They were, however, brigaded with the
British in the proportion of one battalion to two, and were every
day acquiring confidence and character. The siege was less murderous
than that of Zaragoza, because the city was much smaller and less
populous, and, having the advantage of regular works, did not require
the same kind of defence. When Herrasti and the Junta saw that it was
not possible to hold out much longer, they ordered Julian Sanchez
and his lancers to make their escape while it was yet practicable,
reminding Sanchez how important it was that his services should still
be continued, and telling him he would be of more assistance to Ciudad
Rodrigo in the field than he could now be within the walls. A little
before midnight Sanchez collected his troops in the plaza; the two of
his company who were married men took their wives behind them; they
sallied out, and their leader, in the spirit of Scanderbeg, instead
of contenting himself with merely effecting his own retreat, charged
a post of cavalry, routed them, and carried away eight prisoners with
their horses. The two women were armed with pistols, and one of them,
by name Marta Fraile, saved her husband, by shooting a dragoon who was
about to attack him on one side.
♦STATE OF THE BRITISH ARMY.♦
The British army meantime, though it could render no assistance, was
far from being idly or ill employed. There had been a prevailing
feeling of despondency before the siege began, and an expectation
that the town would surrender as soon as the enemy should have opened
their fire. The progress of the siege produced more respect for
the Spaniards, and the active service in which the men soon found
themselves engaged produced cheerfulness and hope. The picquets
occupied the line of the Azava from Carpio on the right to its junction
with the Agueda; the enemy had 8000 men on the left bank of the Agueda,
behind that river and the Azava, which was fordable in many places. The
head-quarters of the light division, under Major-General Craufurd, were
at Gallegos, a short league distant, in an open country; the greatest
alertness, therefore, was necessary, and the men slept at their horses’
heads, the horses bridled and the reins in hand. The Germans were
selected for the outpost duty, being at that time the only troops in
the army who were acquainted with it: the 16th light dragoons requested
to be intermixed with them on duty, men and officers; a compliment
which gratified the brave men to whom it was paid, and the greatest
harmony was always preserved. The picquets were brought to the greatest
perfection, and the division soon attained that alertness which could
only be learnt in such service. The Portugueze behaved well on the
first opportunity which was afforded, and obtained the good opinion of
their allies; so that every thing went on satisfactorily in the allied
army, except that in a trifling and ill-executed affair Colonel Talbot
fell, a gallant officer, who had distinguished himself at Talavera, and
was deservedly and greatly lamented.
♦A PRACTICABLE BREACH MADE.♦
The French general, to whom time was of more consequence than any cost
of lives, pressed the siege with the utmost vigour, but with heavy
loss, owing to the repeated sallies of the garrison, and the excellent
manner in which the artillery of the Spaniards was served. In hope of
forcing the governor to surrender by the cries of the inhabitants,
he bombarded the town, and almost destroyed it; but the people were
not to be shaken in their purpose, the names of Numantia and Zaragoza
were in every mouth, and they were resolved in their turn to transmit
a memorable example to posterity. Meantime the regular advances of
the besiegers were carried on without intermission, and by the 2d of
July a practicable breach had been opened in the Baluarte del Rey.
The Spaniards made every exertion to defend it with sacks of earth,
estacades, and whatever other obstacles they could oppose to the enemy;
but the French did not yet venture an assault; they had so severely
experienced the valour of their opponents, that they had determined
not to storm the town till the works should be reduced to such a
state, that they might avail themselves of the whole advantage of their
numbers. They made three mines, one under the counterscarp, the other
two under the curtain of the wall and part of the Calle del Seminario,
or College-street, near the Cathedral. The besieged were aware of their
progress, but all efforts at impeding it were useless, and at three in
the morning of the 10th, the counterscarp was blown up, forming not
only an open breach, but such a way to it that carts might ascend from
the glacis.
Immediately afterwards the French renewed the fire from all their
batteries, and kept it up without intermission for twelve hours. During
this time the cry of the soldiers and the inhabitants, women and boys,
as well as their husbands and fathers, was, that they would beat off
the enemy or die; but the officers and the Junta were well aware, that
any farther resistance would only afford the French a pretext for
carrying their threats into execution, and putting all to the sword.
Thirty thousand men were ready to storm the city that evening. It was
not without much difficulty that the people could be induced to hear
of a council of war, nor would they have suffered one to be held, had
they not seen such undoubted proofs of the patriotism and courage
of those who now told them that a surrender was become inevitable.
There were some in the council who proposed to follow the example of
Julian Estrada at Hostalrich, and force their way with the bayonet
through their enemies; but here, as at Astorga, it was urged that they
were in different circumstances, and had therefore different duties;
their business now was to preserve 5000 inhabitants, who would else
be exposed to the unrestrained vengeance and brutality of the enemy.
Finally, it was resolved to capitulate, but not till the latest moment,
when there was no longer the slightest hope or possibility of relief.
♦THE TOWN CAPITULATES. JULY 10.♦
Massena’s orders to Ney were to assault the town that evening; the
French advanced for this purpose, and were at the foot of the breach,
in the act of mounting, when the white flag was hoisted: the officer
who planted it in the breach descended with the terms of capitulation,
and presented them to Ney, who sternly told him it was now too late
for any thing. The Spaniard, however, had recourse to Massena, who was
at that time supposed to be more humane than Ney. The first article
was, that the garrison should march out with the honours of war; the
rest were in like manner such as are usual in the like circumstances.
Massena having cast his eye over them, said, “Tell your governor, this
is no time to ratify the terms in writing; but I grant all which he
requires, and am going to give orders accordingly.” He then sent his
adjutant-general to bid Ney suspend the assault. Loison immediately
marched through the breach, and took possession of the town; and
General Simon, notwithstanding Massena’s pledged word, made the
garrison deposit their arms in the arsenal.
♦CONDUCT OF THE FRENCH.♦
The other terms were at the moment fulfilled; and when Herrasti, the
next day, requested that the capitulation might be signed, in order
that he might transmit it to his own government, Massena replied,
that as he saw the articles observed, he neither could nor ought to
require more. The people had escaped the horrors of an assault; but in
other respects they soon found they were at the mercy of a conqueror
who acknowledged no other law than his own pleasure. Herrasti had
stipulated for the liberty of the civil officers; they, however, were
declared prisoners of war. The members of the Junta were thrown into
the vilest dungeon of the public gaol, from whence, after having
endured for eight-and-forty hours every kind of insult and ill
treatment, they were marched on foot to Salamanca, in company with the
governor, who alone was permitted to retain his horse. The clergy were
arrested and shut up for two days in the church of St. Juan; the old
and infirm were then suffered to go to their houses, but forbidden the
exercise of their functions; the lay brethren were ordered to serve in
the hospitals, and all the others sent prisoners to Salamanca. The next
measures were, to impose a contribution of 1,800,000 reales, and to set
from six to eight hundred men at work to destroy the batteries, fill
up the trenches, and repair the works, compelling them to labour like
slaves, giving them no provisions, and allowing them little rest.
The account which the French published of their conquest was, according
to their system, full of falsehoods. They asserted that the garrison
had surrendered at discretion, which could only be contradicted, not
disproved, because Massena had broken his word. This falsehood is
worthy of remark, because it shows so strikingly the characteristic
baseness of Buonaparte’s generals. Ciudad Rodrigo was evidently at
their mercy; a generous enemy would have rejoiced to show his sense of
the merits of those who had opposed him, and would have known that in
refusing them the honours of war, he deprived them only of a barren
form; for the merit of their gallant and heroic defence it was not
in his power to efface. Massena, not satisfied with thus injuring
Herrasti’s honour, cast upon him a fouler aspersion, making him say,
that he and the garrison would have surrendered sooner, if they had
not been intimidated by the inhabitants. In reality, such had been
the noble spirit of the soldiers, that it was only by the entreaties,
as well as the arguments of the superior Junta of Castille, whose
residence was in that city, that they were prevailed upon to give up
their intention of attempting to cut their way through the besiegers.
The French general did not forget to insult the English, and endeavour
by his falsehoods to exasperate the Spaniards against them. “Ciudad
Rodrigo,” he said, “fell in their presence; they promised to succour
it; made the inhabitants prolong their defence by this deceitful hope;
and suffered the place to fall without making the slightest effort
for its relief. Thus they had excited against them the universal
indignation of the garrison and the people, who united in exclaiming
against their perfidy.”
This justice, however, Massena did to Ciudad Rodrigo, that he admitted
the defence had been most obstinate. It was impossible, he said,
to form an idea of the state to which it was reduced. Every thing
had been battered down; not a single house remained uninjured. The
killed he estimated at more than 2000. The Spaniards stated it at
only sixty-three of the inhabitants, and 237 of the garrison. Seven
thousand soldiers, he said, laid down their arms: ... the number at the
commencement of the siege was 4950. Six hundred made their escape on
the night of the capitulation, and more than 1500 before they reached
Salamanca. Above two-and-forty thousand shells were thrown into the
city, and nearly five-and-twenty thousand from it. The quantity of
powder consumed by the garrison during the last sixteen days was 893
quintales, ... the quintal being 132 lbs. The French gave no statement
of their own loss; it was probably very considerable; ♦SPECULATIONS
UPON THE CAMPAIGN.♦ the Spaniards estimated it at 3400. The capture,
however, occasioned the greatest exultation in Paris, and the Moniteur
mingled with its own insults the echoes of our factious journalists.
“The good sense of the English people,” it said, “enabling them to
foresee the dishonour and destruction of their army in Portugal, they
are convinced that the most fortunate event which could befal it would
be a catastrophe like that of Moore’s. They are too much accustomed to
calculate chances and events not to know, that alone against France
they can, in such a contest, meet nothing but disaster, and obtain
nothing but disgrace.” “Men of sound judgement, like Grenville or
Grey, are numerous in England,” said the Moniteur, “but they are at
present without any influence there.” Then, returning to its natural
tone of insult, it ridiculed the strength of Lord Wellington’s army,
amounting to the dreadful number of 24,000 English. “The cries of the
inhabitants of Ciudad Rodrigo,” it said, “were heard in his camp, which
was only six leagues distant: but all ears were shut against them;
the English made no attempt to succour that city: ... they were the
laughing-stock of Europe; every coffee-house waiter knew their weakness
on land, as well as their influence at sea. Ciudad Rodrigo was one of
the last bulwarks of the insurrection; its capture made the catastrophe
more imminent for England, who would now find it necessary to call to
the helm more prudent men, better acquainted with the nature of the
resources and of the strength of their country, and therefore more
moderate.”
In England, too, we were told, that if Ciudad Rodrigo were taken, the
efforts of the English might be considered to be at an end; the French
would then be able to advance without fear of a check; the harvest
also being now begun, whatever grain there was in the country they
would be able to secure for themselves, and so form magazines, the
want of which had hitherto chiefly retarded their advance. At one time
these politicians cried out, “that Lord Wellington could not permit
the enemy quietly to prosecute the siege of so important a fortress.”
At another, “they would not suppose him capable of fighting a useless
battle: for they trusted he was not so prodigal of the blood of his
followers. They trusted that his operations would be justified by
the event.” Then again “they were not competent to speak from their
own knowledge, yet certainly it did appear a doubtful policy to be
patiently waiting till Massena had time to concentrate his troops,
and make all his arrangements for an attack on the British position.”
“The plan of overwhelming Lord Wellington, by bringing an immense
superiority to bear upon him, was one which obviously presented itself;
there seemed no insurmountable difficulty in the execution; obstacles
there might be, from want of provisions and other circumstances, but
the skill and perseverance of the French in combating them forbade
us to place much reliance upon such grounds.” In this manner, always
presaging evil, and consistent in nothing but despondency, sometimes
borrowing the tone of the Moniteur, and sometimes setting it, did these
journalists of a disappointed party labour to deaden the hearts and
hopes of their countrymen; while their more daring, but hardly more
mischievous coadjutors addressed their weekly invectives to the readers
and auditors in pot-houses and tap-rooms, abusing their ignorance,
appealing to, and inflaming their worst passions, and crying out
against the measures of their own government, while upon the crimes
of Buonaparte they observed a silence which sufficiently indicated
their sympathy with his system, their wishes for the extension of his
tyranny, and their hopes of his eventual success.
♦LA PUEBLA DE SANABRIA OCCUPIED BY THE FRENCH.♦
The fall of Ciudad Rodrigo enabled Massena to detach a force for the
relief of Astorga, where General Mahy, who commanded in Galicia, was
blockading the French garrison. This object was easily effected.
General Taboada at this time occupied Puebla de Sanabria, where he
was exerting himself to organize a body of troops for the field:
General Echavarria was engaged in like manner at Alcañizas. In such
feeble, uncombined efforts the spirit of the country was spent, and
its resources frittered away; for as soon as men enough were brought
together to attract the enemy’s attention, they were either dispersed
or destroyed. This was the fate of Echavarria’s corps; it was surprised
by a French detachment under General La Croix, and nearly annihilated.
The alarm spread to Silveira’s head-quarters at Braganza, and Colonel
Wilson (his second in command) hastened with the advanced guard to
Echavarria’s support; but he arrived only to find the ground covered
with dead and wounded Spaniards, the enemy having retired to Carvales,
after completely accomplishing the purpose of their expedition. Massena
boasted soon afterwards of a like success at Sanabria; but the results
were very different. The French magnified the importance of this post,
saying that it commanded the entrance into Portugal, and shut up the
communication with Galicia. They said also, that Lord Wellington had
enjoined the Spanish governor to make an obstinate defence; but that
the governor reproached him in reply for having deceived the commandant
of Ciudad Rodrigo, and broken his word with him; told him it was
evident he intended to do nothing for Spain, but only, for the sake
of fomenting divisions, held out hopes of assistance which were never
realized; yet nevertheless offered to shut himself up in the fortress,
and bury himself in its ruins, if the English general would send him
one Englishman for two Spaniards, to assist in its defence. The answer
of Lord Wellington, the French papers said, might easily be conceived;
and the Spanish general therefore abandoned the town, where General
Serras found twenty pieces of artillery, and provisions for 3000 men
for six months. After this the French made no farther mention of the
Puebla de Sanabria.
♦THE PORTUGUEZE RETAKE IT.♦
D. Francisco Taboada Gil, the officer who was thus falsely represented
as insulting the English general, had communicated not with him but
with the Portugueze commander, Silveira, at Braganza, with whom it
was agreed that he should evacuate the place if it were attacked by
a superior force. Taboada accordingly ♦JULY 29.♦ fell back upon the
Portillas de Galicia; Silveira, having ascertained that Serras had
returned with the greater part of his troops to Mombuey, concerted
measures with the Spanish general for surprising the garrison which
the French had left in Sanabria, and on the fourth day after they had
taken possession of their boasted conquest, the enemy found themselves
♦AUG. 3.♦ invested in the fort. They were summoned; but the commander
replied, that he had men and ammunition to defend himself with, and
that he expected speedily to be succoured by Marshal Massena. On the
following morning a detachment of about seventy French cavalry came on
to attack the advanced guard of the Portugueze, under Captain Francisco
Texeira Lobo, whose force was about equal; but while he charged them in
front, another small party of Portugueze, by his instructions, wheeled
round and attacked them in the rear: they were instantly broken, and
twenty-eight were left upon the field, thirty prisoners, and ♦1810.
AUGUST.♦ forty horses taken. The remainder of that day was spent in
vain endeavours to force an entrance into the fort: the assailants
burnt the gates, but the enemy blocked them up effectually with stones;
the Portugueze and Spaniards then got possession of a house adjoining,
from whence they attempted to make a way through, but the enemy soon
battered it down. On the morrow, one mortar and one three-pounder were
planted against them; the first became useless after a few discharges,
and Silveira, the next morning, sent for a six-pounder from Braganza.
He was now apprized that Serras was advancing in force to relieve the
garrison. Silveira left the Spaniards to maintain the blockade, and
drew up in order of battle upon the river Tera; but Serras, having
reconnoitred his force, thought proper to retire upon Mombuey. The
six-pounder, from Braganza, was an iron gun, in such a state, that when
it arrived it was of no avail; and a twelve-pounder, which on the 8th
was brought from the same place, proved in the same condition: this was
a serious disappointment, for Silveira was now apprized that Serras
was collecting reinforcements. Six hundred horse had entered Zamora,
on their way to him, and two battalions of Italian troops were joining
him from Benevente, ♦AUG. 9.♦ Leon, and Astorga. Unable to batter the
place, because of the wretched state of his artillery, which had been
long left to rust in a dilapidated fortress, he tried the effect of
mining; here experience and skill were wanting, and only the face of
the curtain was thrown down. The garrison, however, who were Swiss,
dreaded that a second attempt might prove more successful; and their
commandant, pleading that he and his men were not French, proposed
and obtained good terms, delivering up the place on condition that
they should be allowed to embark from Coruña, and return to their own
country, on their parole, not to bear arms against the allied powers.
The artillery of the place, and the stores, were restored to the
Spaniards; but Silveira retained for the Portugueze an eagle, the first
which they had taken from their enemy. Sixty of the Swiss entered into
the service of the allies.
Serras was in sight of Silveira’s advanced posts when this capitulation
was concluded; he had with him from 4000 to 5000 foot, and about 800
cavalry. The allied Portugueze and Spaniards were inferior in number,
and still more in discipline, and with this unequal force pressing hard
upon them they broke up from Sanabria, at a time when the prisoners
were come three hours march on the way to Coruña. Colonel Wilson,
who had been ordered on an important duty to head-quarters, returned
in time to assume the command of the rear-guard, and with it cover
their retrograde movement. He checked the French in a sharp affair
of cavalry, after which he took the open road to Braganza, Silveira
retreating with the foot upon the heights of Calabor, where the enemy,
if they should continue the pursuit, could derive no advantage from
their horse. But having arrived too late for saving the garrison,
they advanced no farther than Pedralva, and from thence returned to
Sanabria, then to Mombuey. This was the termination of General Serras’s
success at the Puebla de Sanabria; the whole of the garrison which he
left there were taken prisoners, and the eagle which was taken with
them was deposited with proper triumph in the cathedral at Lisbon, as
the first trophy of the regenerated Portugueze.
CHAPTER XXXII.
CAPTURE OF ALMEIDA. CONDUCT OF THE PORTUGUEZE GOVERNMENT. BATTLE OF
BUSACO. RETREAT OF THE BRITISH AND PORTUGUEZE TO THE LINES OF
TORRES VEDRAS. THE KING’S ILLNESS.
♦1810. JULY.♦
♦MASSENA’S PROCLAMATION TO THE PORTUGUEZE.♦
From Ciudad Rodrigo Massena addressed a proclamation to the Portugueze.
“Inhabitants of Portugal,” he said, “the Emperor of the French has put
under my orders an army of 110,000 men, to take possession of this
kingdom, and to expel the English, your pretended friends. Against you
he has no enmity: on the contrary, it is his highest wish to promote
your happiness, and the first step for securing it is to dismiss
from the country those locusts who consume your property, blast your
harvests, and palsy your efforts. In opposing the Emperor, you oppose
your true friend; a friend who has it in his power to render you the
happiest people in the world. Were it not for the insidious counsels of
England, you might now have enjoyed peace and tranquillity, and have
been put in possession of that happiness. You have blindly rejected
offers calculated only to promote your benefit, and have accepted
proposals which will long be the curse of Portugal. His majesty has
commissioned me to conjure you that you would awake to your true
interests; that you would awake to those prospects which, with your
consent, may be quickly realized; awake so as to distinguish between
friends and enemies. The King of England is actuated by selfish and
narrow purposes; the Emperor of the French is governed by principles
of universal philanthropy. The English have put arms into your hands,
arms which you know not how to use: I will instruct you. They are to be
the instruments of annihilation to your foes: ... and who those foes
are I have already shown. Use them as you ought, and they will become
your salvation! Use them as you ought not, and they will prove your
destruction! Resistance is vain. Can the feeble army of the British
general expect to oppose the victorious legions of the Emperor? Already
a force is collected, sufficient to overwhelm your country. Snatch the
moment that mercy and generosity offer! As friends you may respect
us, and be respected in return; as foes you must dread us, and in the
conflict must be subdued. The choice is your own, either to meet the
horrors of a bloody war, and see your country desolated, your villages
in flames, your cities plundered; or to accept an honourable and happy
peace, which will obtain for you every blessing that by resistance you
would resign for ever.”
On the same day that Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered, the enemy’s cavalry
appeared on the ♦THE FRENCH INVEST ALMEIDA.♦ plains of Almeida. Lord
Wellington’s head-quarters at this time were at Alverca: his position
was a defensive line, about thirty miles in extent, along the frontier
mountains of Beira; but as the line formed a segment of a circle, the
points were not distant from each other in proportion to its length.
The infantry extended from Celorico to Guarda on the one side, and to
Fort Conception, one of the outworks of Almeida, on the other. The
cavalry were in advance near Fort Conception, and at Sabugal, and on
the Coa. The enemy’s superiority in horse was very great, but the
nature of the ground deprived them of the advantage which this must
otherwise have given them. They now proceeded to invest Almeida. The
operations of the siege were conducted by the second corps, under
Marshal Ney. Junot, with the 8th, had his head-quarters at S. Felices,
and his cavalry at Villar de Porco, Fuente Guinaldo, and Fuentes
d’Onoro, ground which had not then been rendered memorable in military
history. While this portion of the army covered the siege, Serras with
a division of 7000 men at Benevente threatened Tras os Montes, and
Bonnet with 8000 at Astorga was ready to enter Galicia and the province
of Entre Douro e Minho.
♦ALMEIDA.♦
Dumouriez, forgetting Elvas at the time, has called Almeida the
strongest place in Portugal. It is perhaps more important from its
situation, but very far inferior to it in strength. This town was
founded by the Moors, and is said to have been one of those which
Ferrando the Great won from them while the Cid served under him, in
his first wars. When the tide of success was for a while turned by
the entrance of the Almoravides into Spain, Talmayda, as it was then
called, fell again into the hands of the misbelievers, from whom it
was finally reconquered, in 1190, by King Sancho I. of Portugal.
Payo Guterres distinguishing himself in the conquest, obtained from
it the appellative of _O Almeydam_, the Almeydan, and transmitted to
his descendants the surname of Almeyda, conspicuous in Portugueze and
Indian history, but disgraced at this time by the representative of
the family, who was then engaged in Massena’s army as a traitor. King
Diniz, the ruins of whose magnificent works are to be seen in every
part of Portugal, rebuilt the city, and is supposed to have removed it
from a valley, a little way north of its present site. The castle was
built by him, and repaired by King Emanuel. In the later wars between
Spain and Portugal, Almeida has always been considered a place of
great importance, being the bulwark of the latter country on its most
accessible side; but, like other things of more essential consequence
to the strength of a kingdom, it had long been neglected. In 1809 there
were not a dozen gun-carriages fit for service, nor any wood in store
for the construction of others; the embrazures were falling to decay,
and the palisades of the covert-way had been mostly broken, or carried
away for fire-wood. The works were originally ill constructed, and the
place had the great disadvantage of being commanded on one side by a
hill. Its population in 1747 was 2463; and Almeida is not one of the
few places in Portugal which have been progressive since that time.
♦FORT CONCEPTION ABANDONED.♦
The same causes which rendered it impossible for Lord Wellington to
relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, made it necessary for him to leave Almeida to
its own means of defence; but the works had been repaired, the garrison
was strong, and Brigadier Cox, an English officer in the Portugueze
service, was appointed to the command. With the example of Ciudad
Rodrigo before it, there was no reason to doubt that Almeida would make
a vigorous resistance, and probably hold out so long as materially
to derange the plans of the enemy. Fort Conception was abandoned
and blown up at the enemy’s approach. General Craufurd, however,
continued to occupy a position near Almeida with 3200 British and 1100
Portugueze troops, eight squadrons of cavalry included. The chain of
his cavalry outposts formed a semicircle in front of the town, their
right flank resting on the Coa, near As Naves, about three miles above
this fortress, and their left, in like manner, resting upon the same
river, about three miles below it, near Cinco Villas. The centre was
covered by a small stream, and on the right and centre, where it was
expected that the enemy would advance, the cavalry posts were supported
by piquets of infantry. There was but one road by which the artillery
and cavalry could retreat, that leading from Almeida to the bridge,
which is about a mile west of the town. The nature of the ground made
it difficult for the enemy to approach this road on the left of the
allies, and on the south the infantry were placed to cover it, having
their right flank resting on the Coa above the bridge, their front
covered by a deep rocky ravine, and their left in some enclosures near
a windmill[14], on the plain, about 800 yards south of the town.
♦AFFAIR ON THE COA.♦
On the morning of July 24th, the centre of the British line of piquets
was attacked; they were supported by the 14th light dragoons and two
guns, but were withdrawn when a considerable column of the enemy
appeared with artillery, and began to form on the other side of the
rivulet. The force which Marshal Ney, who directed these movements,
brought into the field, consisted of 20,000 foot and between 3000 and
4000 horse, being in fact his whole corps. Fifteen squadrons of cavalry
crossed the rivulet as soon as the piquets retired, and formed with
artillery in front, and about 7000 infantry on their right; other
troops meantime were advancing upon the right of the British position,
the side on which they might best expect to cut off the retreat of
the allies to the bridge. General Craufurd now perceived that it was
impossible for him to prevent the investment of Almeida, and that
he was on the wrong side of the Coa. The artillery and cavalry were
therefore ordered to retreat along the only road which was practicable
for them; the infantry from the left to move off in _echelon_; the
right it was necessary to hold till the last, to prevent the enemy from
approaching the bridge by a road coming from Junca, which runs in the
bottom of the valley by the river side.
On the left, the men had to retreat through thick vineyards,
intersected with deep trenches, and with walls six or seven feet high;
they could not take advantage of this ground, for the enemy were in
such force, that there was imminent danger of being overpowered, and
cut off before they could reach the bridge. One of these walls General
Craufurd had considered as a complete defence against cavalry; it
enclosed a vineyard, in which some companies had been stationed, but
there had been a heavy rain during the whole of the preceding night,
and the troops had pulled down this wall in many places to make use of
the stones for forming a shelter; through these openings the enemy’s
horse entered, and here they made most of the prisoners who were taken
in the action. To retire in order over such ground was impossible,
but the retreat was made with characteristic coolness. On the other
side the bridge, the ground was equally unfavourable for re-forming;
the 43d and part of the 95th regiments were ordered to form in front
of the bridge, and defend it as long as they could, while the rest of
the troops should pass over and take a new position. They obeyed these
orders so literally, that they defended it all day; three times the
enemy attempted to force the passage, and each time they were repulsed
at the point of the bayonet; at length, when night closed, and every
thing had passed over, and the enemy had ceased to assail them, these
brave men retreated from the post where so many of their comrades
had fallen: the heaviest loss necessarily fell upon these gallant
regiments; the total, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, amounted to
330[15]. Colonel Hall of the 43d, who was among the slain, had only
joined from England the preceding day. The loss was to be regretted
because there was no object to be gained by engaging the French at
such disadvantage; but never did men behave more gallantly than those
who were engaged that day, British and Portugueze alike. They effected
their retreat under the most unfavourable circumstances, without
losing a gun, a trophy, or a single article of field equipment; and
they inflicted upon the enemy a loss, which, by his own account, was
nearly equal to the sum of ours, and which in reality doubled its
amount. After this the infantry were withdrawn to the neighbourhood of
Celorico, leaving the outpost duty to be performed by cavalry alone.
♦DESPONDING LETTERS FROM THE ARMY.♦
Massena asserted that one of our couriers had been taken with
dispatches, which represented that the English had never been engaged
in so brisk an affair; that they were in full rout; and that it was
impossible to form an idea of their deplorable condition. Of the
condition of that army, and the full rout to which he had driven
them, it was not long before Massena obtained some correct personal
knowledge; but it is probable that some desponding letters had fallen
into his hands, and it is likely also that he expected to drive the
British army before him full speed to Lisbon. Letters had been written
from that army to Porto, in which the writers had delivered it as
their opinion that our forces must inevitably retreat, Massena having
such an overpowering superiority, that Portugal could not possibly
be defended against him. These letters excited such alarm among the
British merchants in that city, that the vice-consul applied to our
admiral at Lisbon, requesting he would take into consideration the
necessity of having a sufficient force off the Douro to protect the
British subjects, who might be compelled to embark without the least
delay. They were in the utmost consternation, he said. Admiral Berkeley
thought it proper to send this requisition to Lord Wellington, who in
consequence issued general orders upon the subject. “He would not make
any inquiry,” he said, “to ascertain the authors of these letters,
which had excited so much consternation in a place where it was most
to be wished that none should exist. He had frequently lamented the
ignorance displayed in letters from the army, and the indiscretion
with which those letters were published. It was impossible that many
officers could possess a sufficient knowledge of facts to be able to
form a correct opinion of the probable events of the campaign, yet when
their erroneous opinions were published, they could not but produce
mischievous effects. He requested, therefore, that the officers, on
account of their own reputation, would refrain from giving opinions
upon matters, with regard to which they could not possibly possess
the necessary knowledge for giving it with correctness; and if they
communicated to their correspondents facts relating to the position of
the army, its strength, the formation of its magazines, preparations
for cutting down or blowing up bridges, &c., they would at least tell
their correspondents not to publish these letters in newspapers, unless
it was certain that the publication could not prove injurious to the
army and to the public service.”
♦APPREHENSIONS EXPRESSED IN ENGLAND.♦
There was cause for this reproof. The effect of such agueish
predictions in Portugal could only be to make the Portugueze believe
we should forsake them, and thus dispose them for submission to the
enemy; while, in England, they assisted the party of the despondents,
whose journalists were labouring to strike their country with a dead
palsy. “We had been lulled,” they said, “into the most dangerous
confidence. Massena was only waiting for the advance of his flanks,
that he might, with his whole combined army, either force our handful
of men to a battle, or surround them: all that could be expected was,
that the survivors might be enabled to retire to their ships with
eclat.” By the next dispatches it appeared, that it was more easy
for a journalist to imagine such a manœuvre, than for Massena to
execute it; but this had no other effect than to make them change the
note of alarm. “If Massena,” they then said, “did not destroy Lord
Wellington’s army by fighting, it could only be because he meant
to destroy it by not fighting; for Massena was the most consummate
captain of all Buonaparte’s generals. And did ministers anticipate with
complacency the continuance of our army in Portugal through the winter?
The rainy season was approaching; might it not be the deep policy of
this arch-statesman and conqueror to keep our army there? He would be
content to devote Massena and his troops to destruction, if it would
facilitate some ulterior plan; he might mean to ruin us by the expense
of our forces there; and what should we say, if it were really a part
of his policy to keep them there, while he, having possession of the
Dutch, the Danish, and the Swedish fleets and ports, made a descent
upon England or Ireland? They trusted ministers were upon their guard,
and that they destined their troops at home for a service more imminent
than the reinforcement of Lord Wellington.”
♦NEY SUMMONS THE GOVERNOR OF ALMEIDA.♦
While these writers, in the pure spirit of faction, were thus advising
a diversion in favour of the enemy, Ney, who conducted the siege of
Almeida, directed Loison to summon the governor. This general, who
was peculiarly odious in that country for his cruelty and rapacity,
addressed ♦JULY 24.♦ the governor as a Portugueze, admonishing him
not to hazard the interests of his nation for a vain point of honour.
“None,” said he, “knows better than you do, that the French come to
deliver you from the yoke of the English. There is not a Portugueze
who is ignorant of the little consideration which his country enjoys
among that people. Have they not given abundant proofs of the little
attention which they pay to a nation worthy of esteem, and for a
long time the ally of France? Their occupation of all the civil and
military posts proves to demonstration, that the intention of the
English government is to consider Portugal as one of her colonies.
The conduct which the English have held with regard to the Spaniards,
whom they promised to defend, but abandoned, should open your eyes,
and convince you that they will do the same with regard to Portugal.
Sir Governor, his excellency has charged me to offer you the most
honourable capitulation, by which you may retain the government of
your fortress, and your garrison be admitted into the number of those
Portugueze troops that have remained faithful to the interests of their
country. In your hands therefore, is placed the fate of Almeida, and of
your companions in arms. If you refuse to accede to this proposal, you
will become responsible for all the blood shed unavailingly, in a cause
which is foreign to the Portugueze nation.” Brigadier Cox happened to
be in the covered-way, close to the barrier gate, when the flag of
truce arrived with this summons. Without permitting the French officer
to enter, he returned a verbal answer, that the fortress would be
defended to the last extremity.
♦PORTUGUEZE IN MASSENA’S ARMY.♦
The Portugueze troops, of whom Loison spake as being engaged in the
service of France, were the remainder of those whom Junot had hurried
away from their own country. The men, Buonaparte was too wary to send
back; but Massena brought with him a few nobles, who, having long
preyed upon the country which they disgraced, completed their infamy by
betraying it. To these traitors Loison appealed in his summons, saying,
they could assure the governor of the honourable manner in which
they had been treated. The Marquis of Alorna, D. Pedro de Almeida,
was the most conspicuous among them; he and his accomplices used all
their influence to persuade their countrymen to submission; but the
Portugueze had already experienced the effects of non-resistance, and
the inhabitants of Castello Mendo, and a few other villages on the
borders of Beira, were the only persons who were unfortunate enough to
be deceived. These poor people, instead of abandoning their habitations
on the approach of the enemy, in obedience to the orders which had been
issued, remained in them, fearing to encounter the evils of wandering
in search of shelter, and hoping, that, as they submitted to the enemy
without resistance, their property would be safe, their women preserved
from violation, and their lives secured. But the French, conscious of
the wickedness of the cause in which they were engaged, seemed, like
the pirates of the last century, to have considered themselves in a
state of reprobation, and to have committed crimes which make humanity
shudder, as if for the purpose of manifesting their desperate defiance
of God and man. “The inhabitants of these submissive villages suffered
all the evils which a cruel enemy could inflict; their property was
plundered; their houses burnt; their women atrociously violated; and
those, whose age and sex did not provoke the brutal violence of the
soldiers, fell victims to the confidence which they placed in promises
made only to be broken.” In these words the enormities which the French
committed were proclaimed by the Portugueze government, and by the
British general.
♦THE PORTUGUEZE ORDERED TO RETIRE BEFORE THE ENEMY. AUG. 4.♦
That general addressed a proclamation to the Portugueze upon the
occasion, telling them they now saw what they had to expect from the
French. They now saw that no means remained for avoiding the evils with
which they were threatened, but a determined and vigorous resistance,
and a firm resolution to obstruct as much as possible the advance
of the enemy, by removing out of his reach all such things as might
contribute to his subsistence, or facilitate his progress. “The army
under my command,” said he, “will protect as large a portion of the
country as is possible; but it is obvious that the people alone can
deliver themselves by a vigorous resistance, and preserve their goods
by removing them out of the reach of the enemy. The duties, therefore,
that bind me to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, and
to the Portugueze nation, oblige me to make use of the power and
authority with which I am furnished, for compelling the careless and
indolent to make the necessary efforts to preserve themselves from the
dangers which threaten them, and to save their country. In conformity
with this, I make known and declare, that all magistrates and persons
in authority who shall remain in the villages or towns, after
having received orders from the military officer to remove, and all
persons, of whatever class they may be, who shall maintain the least
communication with, or aid and assist in any manner the enemy, shall be
considered as traitors to the state, and tried, and punished as such an
enormous crime requires.” The manner in which Lord Wellington assumed
this power, in the name of the Prince Regent of Portugal, and of the
Portugueze nation, was as wise as the assumption itself was necessary
in such circumstances. The Portugueze people also were fully sensible
that their duty and their interest were the same, and never did any
people act with more determined zeal in defence of their country.
♦SIEGE OF ALMEIDA.♦
Massena opened his trenches on the night of August 15. While a false
attack was made against the north of the town, 2000 men dug the first
parallel to a depth of three feet; and on Sunday the 26th, at five
in the morning, eleven batteries, mounted with sixty-five pieces of
cannon, opened their fire. The garrison consisted of 5000 men, of whose
spirit no doubt was entertained; the fortress was well provided,
and its works had been placed in so respectable a state, that Lord
Wellington had reason to think it might delay the enemy till late in
the season, even if he should be unable to find an opportunity of
relieving it. These well-founded expectations were frustrated by one
of those chances which sometimes disconcert the wisest plans, and
disappoint the surest hopes of man. On the night after the batteries
opened, the large powder magazine in the citadel, with two smaller ones
contiguous to it, blew up. More than half the artillerymen, a great
number of the garrison, and many of the inhabitants, perished in this
dreadful explosion; many of the guns were dismounted, and the works
were rendered no longer defensible, even if means of defence had been
left; but, except a few cartridges for immediate use, and thirty-nine
barrels of powder in the laboratory, the whole of the ammunition was
destroyed.
♦SURRENDER OF THE PLACE.♦
Great as the calamity was, the evil would have been far more alarming
had it proceeded, as was at first supposed, from treason; but,
according to the best information which could be collected, it was
altogether accidental: the magazine was bomb-proof; and they were
taking ammunition from it, when a shell fell upon one of the carts. The
lieutenant-governor had behaved well till the batteries opened; he was
then so terrified, that he shut himself up in the bomb-proofs. Having
thus proved himself a coward, mere shame made him a traitor: and after
the explosion he took advantage of the confusion to counteract the
governor’s attempt at holding out longer. Another traitor was found
in the major of artillery. He had behaved well during the siege; but
when he was sent out to propose terms of capitulation, for the purpose
of gaining favour with the enemy he communicated to him the whole
extent of the disaster; so that Massena, knowing the place was at his
mercy, was enabled to dictate what terms he pleased. The garrison
were made prisoners of war, with this exception, that the militia,
having deposited their arms, should return to their homes, and not
serve during the war. It was ten at night when the capitulation was
concluded; in the course of half an hour the French recommenced their
fire upon the town, and kept it up till morning, when the Portugueze
were assured in reply to their remonstrances, that it had been owing
to a mistake on the part of the artillery officers: undoubtedly it
had been so; but the commander is chargeable with something worse
♦COMPILAÇAM DAS ORDENS DO DIA, 1810, P. 168.♦ than error, for having
suffered it to continue through the night without thinking it worth
while to send an order which would instantly have stopped it.
♦THE PORTUGUEZE PRISONERS ENLIST AND DESERT.♦
The terms were broken by the French with their wonted perfidy. They
tried persuasions first, and employed Alorna and the other traitors
who were with him to seduce their countrymen. Accordingly, when the
Portugueze laid down their arms upon the esplanade, they were invited
to volunteer into the French service; but not a man was found base
enough to come forward and accept the invitation. On the following
day, when the troops of the line and the militia had been separated,
they were tried separately. The troops were told, that unless they
accepted the alternative which was offered them, they must immediately
be marched into France; the hardships which they would suffer on their
march, and the treatment to which they would be exposed afterwards,
were represented to them in strong terms; and officers and men, with an
unanimity which might well have been suspected, agreed then to enlist
in the enemy’s service. They found means of informing Marshal Beresford
that they did this only for the sake of remaining within reach of their
own country, and making their escape as soon as possible; and the truth
of this declaration was proved by the numbers who soon rejoined the
allied army. Upon this occasion Marshal Beresford acted in a manner
becoming the British ♦CONDEMNATION OF THEIR CONDUCT.♦ character. He
expressed in general orders his strong disapprobation of such conduct;
for the soldiers, he said, some allowance was to be made; they were
excusable on the score of their want of education, their undoubted good
intention, and their feeling that the enemy with whom they had to deal
scrupled at no means, however unworthy, for the attainment of his ends.
Yet even in them it was to be discommended, and he doubted not that
henceforth those whom the fortune of war might throw into the enemy’s
♦1810. SEPTEMBER.♦ hands would take their lot patiently, and suffer any
thing rather than bring a stain upon the national honour. Nothing could
excuse the officers for conduct so base, so abominable, and so unworthy
of the Portugueze name. They had sinned against knowledge, and thereby
rendered themselves false and infamous; they had contracted a voluntary
engagement with the determination of not keeping it, placing themselves
in a miserable predicament, which rendered it only less infamous to
break their faith than to observe it. He should therefore report them
to their prince, that they might be dismissed with ignominy from the
service, and answer for their conduct according to the laws. At the
same time he published the names of five officers who, under a proper
sense of duty, had withstood the contagion of ill example.
♦MILITIA FORCED INTO THE FRENCH SERVICE.♦
There were three militia regiments in Almeida, those of Trancoso,
Guarda, and Arganil. Neither man nor officer of these could be induced
to serve against his country, nor self-seduced to tamper with his own
conscience. But instead of dismissing them according to the terms,
Massena said, that if they would not serve by fair means, they should
by force; and gave orders for forming a corps of pioneers, by detaining
200 men and seven officers from each regiment. Marshal Beresford
observed upon this, after honourably contrasting the conduct of the
militia with that of the regular troops, that the Portugueze, to
their misfortune, were too well acquainted with French morality for
this iniquity to surprise them: it was but one injury the more which
that outraged nation had to revenge, ... and his army would revenge
it. “Never,” said he, “even though Almeida is lost, never since the
beginning of the war has this kingdom been in so good a state for
resisting the enemy. Soldiers of the Portugueze army, if you remember
that we have the English army to co-operate with us, which has beaten
the enemy whenever it encountered them, ... if you call to mind who is
the commander of that army, and that he is yours also, ... if you have
confidence in him and in yourselves, the invaders never can conquer
Portugal. Your general has full confidence in the result, because he
confides in the inherent loyalty and valour of the nation, and in its
determination of sacrificing every thing to its fidelity, its liberty,
and its independence!”
♦THEY ESCAPE AND REJOIN THE ALLIES.♦
Massena asserted that the Porto regiment hated the English, and
therefore he should retain it in his service; but he belied his own
assertion by adding that he should keep a watchful eye on the men,
and not place them in important posts. If he judged in any degree of
the Portugueze people by the few traitorous nobles and fidalgos with
whom he was conversant, he was speedily undeceived. A night had not
elapsed before great part both of the officers and men were missing,
and in less than a fortnight nearly the whole escaped. The men, instead
of taking the opportunity of deserting, rejoined their countrymen in
arms; and the officers, unconscious of having done any thing unworthy,
presented themselves to the commander of the first detachment they
could reach, in a condition which pleaded for them, exhausted with
fatigue and hunger. They protested, when they found it necessary to
excuse themselves, that they had taken no oath of fidelity to the
French, and that to avoid it when it was to be tendered, they had fled
at all hazards, not waiting for safer opportunities. A representation
in their favour was made by Silveira; and Marshal Beresford in
consequence mitigated his former censure. It would, he said, be the
greatest satisfaction to him if he should find it confirmed that these
officers had not pledged themselves to the enemy; but what he wished to
enforce upon them was, that an officer ought to consider not merely the
end at which he aims, but the means also by which to bring it about,
that both may be alike honourable. He referred their conduct therefore
to a council of inquiry, under Silveira.
♦CHANGES IN THE PORTUGUEZE REGENCY.♦
The Portugueze regency now declared Alorna a traitor, and offered
a reward of a thousand moidores for bringing him in alive or dead.
The Marquis of Ponte de Lima, the Marquis of Loule, the Count of St.
Miguel, the Count of Ega, Gomes Friere de Andrade, and D. José Carcome
Lobo, were also declared traitors, and their property declared to be
confiscated: but they had powerful friends in the state; and it is said
that, notwithstanding the decree, their property remained untouched, in
the hands of persons in whom they could confide. A change had lately
taken place in the Portugueze regency. The Marquez das Minas resigned,
in consequence of an illness which soon proved fatal. The other two
members were, the Bishop of Porto, who was Patriarch elect, and the
Marquis Monteiro Mor. Four new members were now added; the Principal
Sousa, brother to the Conde de Linhares, who was minister in Brazil,
and to the Portugueze ambassador in England; the Conde de Redondo;
Ricardo Raymundo Nogueira, who had been law professor at Coimbra; and
the English ambassador, Mr. Stuart. Admiral Berkeley was at the same
time appointed by the Prince of Brazil commander-in-chief of the naval,
as Lord Wellington had been of the military force of Portugal. There
are few things in the annals of Great Britain more honourable to the
national character than the perfect confidence reposed in the English
nation by its old ally, and the manner in which that confidence was
requited. While the enemies of both countries were endeavouring to
incense the Portugueze against the English, by telling them that the
British government designed to usurp Portugal; and while the enemies
of administration were traducing and insulting the Portugueze people,
crying out that they would not defend themselves and could not be
defended by us, and therefore that we ought not to attempt to defend
them, the English army and the Portugueze people were acting with the
most perfect unanimity, for the common interests and common safety of
Great Britain and Portugal.
♦CONDUCT OF THE PORTUGUEZE GOVERNMENT.♦
The spirit of the people, without which all other means of defence must
have been ineffectual, was what England could neither give nor take
away; but for the measures by which that spirit was so directed as to
secure its end, Portugal was indebted to British councils. Military
and financial resources, of which the nation had not supposed itself
capable, were called forth; and the Portugueze were addressed by their
rulers in language to which they had long been unaccustomed, ... the
language of hope and confidence, and of conscious rectitude as well
as conscious strength. Like the Supreme Junta, the regents reminded
the Portugueze of their heroic ancestors; they spake of the wickedness
of the enemy, the inexpressible miseries which would accompany their
yoke, and the certainty of glorious success, if those exertions and
sacrifices were made which the emergency required; but the Portugueze
regency did not, like the Spaniards, speak to the people of the causes
which had rendered this invasion possible, and produced the decay of
Portugal; nor did they hold out the promise of the restoration of their
rights, the redress of their grievances, and the due execution of
their laws. Such promises were not necessary as excitement; a people
who were literally defending their hearths and altars, and fighting
to save their wives and daughters from violation and butchery, or to
revenge them, needed no additional feeling to goad them on: ... as
pledges they were not held out; because the government had not the
prudence to think of reforming itself. In providing for the defence
of the country, it acted providently and bravely, with wisdom and
with vigour; but in other things, the old leaven discovered itself,
and made it apparent that the pleasure of the minister was still the
law of Portugal. A decree was published, assigning to the widows,
children, or dependent brethren of those who had fallen at Almeida,
the full pay of the deceased, and half pay to the families of those
who were made prisoners. “The Prince,” it said, “would not believe
that any of his faithful vassals could have entered the service of the
enemy; and if any had been compelled to do so, he trusted they had only
yielded to compulsion, with the purpose of effecting their escape. He
suspended, therefore, his justice; but if a month elapsed before such
persons acquitted themselves by appearing, they would be considered as
traitors.” Now, the treason of the lieutenant-governor and the major
of artillery was open and undoubted: Lord Wellington had stated it in
his dispatches to the minister at war; their names were given in those
dispatches here in England, but suppressed in Portugal, out of favour
to their connexions.
♦ARBITRARY ARRESTS AT LISBON.♦
In another respect the conduct of the Portugueze regency was more
inexcusable. Eight-and-forty persons, of all ranks and professions, and
many of them unacquainted with each other, were seized in the night;
ten of them were sent to the tower of St. Julian, and the rest to the
Limoeiro, the common prison of the city. The most alarming rumours
were scattered abroad. A formidable and extensive conspiracy, it was
said, had been discovered, which had nothing less for its object than
a general massacre of the British, for the purpose of delivering up
the country to the French. These reports reached England, and received
their first contradiction from the Portugueze government themselves,
who found it expedient to declare, that neither Lord Wellington nor
Mr. Stuart had any part in their proceedings upon this occasion;
that the stories of the conspiracy, and of the arms which had been
discovered, were false; and that the individuals who had been arrested
had been sent out of the kingdom, only because it was the opinion of
the police that their residence in it might be prejudicial to the
public tranquillity. Some of these individuals were permitted to come
to England, others were sent to the Azores, after they had suffered
every kind of inconvenience, privation, and indignity, to the alarm and
distress of the families of all, and the ruin of some; ... there was
neither proof nor accusation against them; the whole, as a public act,
was one of those acts which mark the unheeding and unfeeling folly of
an ignorant and obstinate despotism, but of which the secret springs
are to be found in private malice or cupidity.
The manner in which the Portugueze government declared, that neither
Marshal General Lord Wellington, nor the minister plenipotentiary
of his Britannic Majesty, nor any individual of the British nation,
had any part in these proceedings, nor any previous knowledge of
them, make it apparent that the British general and the British
minister disapproved of an act of tyranny which was thus in reality
disclaimed on their part. They could not prevent that of which they
were not apprised before it was done, nor after it was done could
they express their disapprobation better than by requiring to have it
thus distinctly stated, that the regency had neither acted upon their
advice, nor received their sanction. It was the more to be regretted,
because the other measures of the government entitled them to respect
and gratitude. They had restored order in the country, and brought
its resources into action, and their public acts and declarations
corresponded to the spirit of the people. The ringleaders of the
mutiny, which, in its consequences, had given Soult possession of
Porto, were brought to trial and condign punishment; and after the most
impartial examination of his conduct, General Bernardim Freire de
Andrada, who had been murdered at Braga, was declared to have served
his country faithfully and well, and the memory of those unfortunate
men who perished in the same tumult was cleared of all imputation. An
army more numerous than Portugal had ever before possessed was formed,
equipped, and disciplined; and the government, when it reminded the
people of their strength, did not fear to tell them of their danger.
It announced the loss of Almeida, ... “a loss,” said the regents,
“greatly to be lamented for the death of part of its defenders, and
the unhappiness of others, who have thus fallen into captivity, but of
little importance to the great cause of the salvation of the country.
Wellington at the head of the allied armies; Beresford directing our
troops, who are indebted to him for their organization and their
discipline; brave soldiers, and a faithful people, who have sworn to
defend their prince and their native land to the last extremity; these
are the bulwarks which defend us; and these an army of slaves, who are
continually wasting away by want and desertion, will never be able to
beat down.”
♦APPREHENSIONS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.♦
The Portugueze, and those especially who were intrusted with the
government of their country, cannot be extolled above their merits, for
the spirit which they displayed at this crisis, the most momentous, and
to ordinary minds the most appalling of the whole war. Their merit is
the greater because there was not that vigour in the British cabinet
which the emergency required; and because with all their confidence in
British fidelity, they could not have been without some apprehension
of seeing the defence of Portugal abandoned by Great Britain. The
enemy had exultingly proclaimed that the English would fly to their
ships, and some colour for the boast was afforded by the fact that a
fleet large enough to receive the troops was lying in the Tagus, and
evidently detained there for such a service. The heavy baggage of the
army was actually kept on board; and Lord Wellington was at that time
acting under instructions of a character to excite in him any thing
rather than confidence or hope. They were to this effect, that his
majesty would be better pleased if the army were withdrawn too soon,
than that its embarkation should be endangered by the least delay.
Such instructions must inevitably have drawn on the disgrace and
ruin which they anticipated, if they had been addressed to a man of
inferior capacity, or meaner mind. A want of courage and of generosity
was implied in them which is but too characteristic of British
ministries. Instead of assuring the commander of support, whatever
might be the issue, if nothing on his part were left undone, he was
made to understand that any risk which he incurred must be upon his own
responsibility, and that any disaster which he might sustain would be
imputed to his decision. But Providence was with us, and directed the
course of events to a glorious and happy issue, notwithstanding our
repeated errors.
Lord Wellington had the farther mortification of knowing that the
army, satisfied as he was with its conduct in all respects, partook
that despondency which the pestilent activity of a faction at home was
continually labouring to produce, and which the events of the campaign
had hitherto tended to confirm. His plans had been long meditated and
wisely formed; but the reasonable expectations which he founded upon
them were disappointed by the accident that drew after it the fall
of Almeida. That place might easily have held out till the autumnal
rains should have rendered it impossible for the French to advance,
and scarcely practicable for them to have subsisted their army upon
that frontier. To gain time at this juncture was for him to gain every
thing: here he thought to have wintered in the sure expectation that
every day would render the Portugueze troops more efficient, and with
the reasonable hope that, through Marquis Wellesley’s influence in
the cabinet, he should receive such reinforcements as would enable
him to act upon the offensive. Accident had frustrated this intent;
the enemy were enabled to advance, elated with their fortune, and
relying upon it as the only divinity in which they were encouraged
to trust; and Massena, whose plans had hitherto succeeded beyond his
calculations, and even to the extent of his hopes, had the advantage of
relying upon the disposition as well as the efficiency of his army,
and the full support of a government which placed ample means at his
command, crippled him with no restrictions, and threatened him with no
responsibility.
♦MOVEMENTS OF REGNIER’S CORPS, AND OF GENERAL HILL.♦
Upon the fall of Almeida Lord Wellington’s head-quarters were removed
to Gouvea, and the whole of his infantry retired to the rear of
Celorico, the outposts continuing in advance of that town. Massena
waited till he had been joined by Regnier’s corps, consisting of
17,000 men, which, having acted with little success against Romana
in Extremadura, had crossed the Tagus at Barca de Alconete, early in
July. According to the plan which Buonaparte had laid down for the
conquest of Portugal, this corps was to have moved by the right bank
of the Tagus upon Abrantes; but this design having been altered when
the allied army was found more numerous and efficient than the French
cabinet had supposed, Regnier had moved upon Zarzamayor, Penamacor, and
Monsanto, in the hope of striking a blow against Lieutenant-General
Hill, who had advanced with 13,000 men from Abrantes to Portalegre,
for the purpose of supporting Romana. The French hoped either that
he would expose himself to an attack, or that Lord Wellington might
be tempted to make a movement against Regnier, of which Massena was
prepared to take advantage; but the British generals were not thus to
be circumvented: and Massena as well as Lord Wellington, directing his
attention to a single object, Regnier joined the invading force, while
Hill was stationed at Sarzedas, to cover the road upon Abrantes to
Lisbon, or move to Ponte de Murcella, and unite with the main body on
the line of its retreat: in either case Major-General Leith’s division,
which was kept at Thomar in reserve to support him, was to take the
same direction.
♦MASSENA ADVANCES INTO PORTUGAL.♦
Had Massena despised the allied army in truth as he affected to
do, he would now have marched by Castello Branco, Abrantes, and
Santarem, direct upon Lisbon, leaving Lord Wellington behind him; but
he remembered the fate of Junot, and had too much respect for the
enemy with whom he had to contend. Relying, however, upon numbers and
fortune, and taking into account the indecision and timidity which
seemed to characterize the British counsels, he expected that Lord
Wellington, being too weak to risk a battle, would retreat, if not fly
before him, with no other hope than that of reaching the ships and
securing his embarkation. Under this imagination he ordered the French
army to provide itself for seventeen days, by which time he expected
to finish the campaign triumphantly. The only impediment which he
apprehended on the way was from the difficulty of transport. For this
reason very few women were allowed to accompany the army; they were
left at Ciudad Rodrigo, where so many had assembled to share in the
spoils and pleasures of Lisbon with their friends and husbands, that
the place, because of the round of gaieties which was there kept up,
was called Little Paris. From thence they were to follow when the easy
conquest should be completed; and this was thought so certain, that
engagements were made for parties to be given in the capital. With this
confidence, and this levity of mind, the French entered upon their
third invasion of Portugal. They began their march in three bodies,
Junot’s corps with the artillery and cavalry proceeding by Pinhel
and Trancoso, Ney’s by Alverca, and Regnier’s by Guarda. At the same
time, Lord Wellington, aware of the enemy’s intent, began to retreat
towards Coimbra deliberately, and with such evident forethought and
determination, that this retrograde movement did not in the slightest
degree abate the spirits of the army. No stores were abandoned, no men
and horses foundered; the operations were all performed with regularity
and ease; the soldiers suffered no privations, and underwent no
unnecessary fatigue; the inhabitants retired under their protection,
and assisted them in breaking up the bridges, destroying the mills,
and laying waste the country; so that Massena found a desert as he
advanced. In the town of Celorico there were only two inhabitants,
and nothing but bare walls. At that ♦NEY AND REGNIER’S CORPS JOIN
HIM AT CELORICO.♦ place the corps of Regnier and Ney effected their
junction. The appearance of the former made it evident that there was
no intention of acting upon the Tagus; and it appeared also, upon
their taking the road by Fornos, that it was Massena’s intention to
proceed upon the right side of the Mondego, not upon the left by way of
Penalva and Ponte de Murcella, where he thought Lord Wellington would
be prepared to resist him in a strong position: he calculated upon
turning this position, and so making himself master of Coimbra and the
resources which the fertile country about that city would supply. But
he did not calculate upon the foresight and decision of the British
General, nor upon the spirit of the Portugueze people: he hoped to
delude them by promises, and to find them as he advanced remaining
patiently in their towns and villages, in expectation of the conquest
which awaited them. With ♦SEPT. 20.♦ this intent he gave orders that
the troops should halt before they entered Viseu, till the inhabitants
might be assured of protection for themselves and their property. No
persons were found abroad there; the soldiers were still forbidden to
enter any house forcibly on pain of severe punishment, and Massena
himself remained a while in the streets, expecting the effect of his
condescending patience. Night was setting in, and the word was at
length given that the soldiers might quarter themselves. The doors were
presently broken open, ... but neither inhabitants nor provisions were
there; every thing had been carried away, all had fled; even no lights
were to be found, except those which were burning in the churches. The
only living souls remaining there were a few poor wretches in the
hospital, who were in too pitiable a state for removal: one medical
attendant had been left with them; he also had fled upon the entrance
of the French, but upon the information of his patients he was pursued
and overtaken, and ordered to continue at his post, and assure the
town’s-people when they ventured back that no ill treatment was to be
apprehended from the French conquerors.
♦THE FRENCH ARMY COLLECTED AT VISEU.♦
Here Junot, with the artillery and cavalry, joined the army; but this
junction, which completed the concentration of the French force, was
impeded by Colonel Trant with some Portugueze militia and dragoons,
who attacked the convoy near Tojal. Had this enterprise been executed
as well as it was planned and timed, a blow might have been inflicted
which the enemy would have felt severely; but the French, by their
prompt discipline and judicious boldness, deterred the militia from
pursuing their success, ♦JONES’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR, I. 297.♦ and
the park fell back on Trancoso. This delay, however, was no light
advantage for the allies: it compelled Massena to remain two days at
Viseu waiting for his artillery, and the time thus gained enabled Lord
Wellington to collect his force upon the ground whereon, now that
Massena’s movements were foreseen, he had determined to withstand him.
♦LORD WELLINGTON CROSSES TO THE SERRA DE BUSACO. SEPT. 21.♦
On the day after the French commander arrived at Viseu, General
Hill joined the British army at Ponte de Murcella; the bridge was
destroyed, and he was left there with his division, while the rest of
the army crossed the Mondego, and Lord Wellington himself proceeded
to the Serra de Busaco, a mountainous ridge eight miles in length,
and terminating precipitously on the Mondego; the Serra de Murcella,
in like manner, terminating on the opposite bank. By daylight on the
following morning the light division and the cavalry, with General
Pack’s Portugueze brigade, assembled in the plain of Mortagoa, having
their picquets upon the Criz; the bridge over that little river was
destroyed. That day the enemy appeared in sight, and on the morrow,
about three in the afternoon, drove in the picquets; some skirmishing
ensued, the allies retreated to the rear of the plain, and at night
began their march over the Serra. The place appointed for their bivouac
was on the other side, two leagues distant, but the acclivity was so
steep, that owing to this cause, and to the impediment occasioned by
the breaking down of some artillery waggons, they did not reach it
till it was daylight. It was generally supposed in the army at this
time that no stand would be made, but Lord Wellington’s determination
soon became apparent. Had his army indeed been numerous enough to have
occupied the whole ridge, no enemy could have ventured to attack him
there, the ascent being too steep for cavalry, and the height of the
position above the ground in its front such as to render the use of
artillery on the part of the assailants almost unavailing: occupied
as it was, it was impregnable. The general elevation of the ridge is
from nine to twelve hundred feet, and it is crossed by two roads, both
leading from the north to Coimbra, the one passing near the convent,
the other about a league to the southward.
♦BUSACO.♦
Busaco, which was now to become famous in British and Portugueze
history, had long been a venerable name in Portugal. It is the only
place in that kingdom where the barefooted Carmelites possessed what in
monastic language is called a desert; by which term an establishment is
designated where those brethren whose piety flies the highest pitch may
at once enjoy the advantages of the eremite and the discipline of the
cœnobite life, and thus indulge the ♦GENERAL MACKINNON’S JOURNAL, P.
74.♦ heroism of ascetic devotion in security. The convent, surrounded
by an extensive and almost impervious wood, stands in what may be
called the crater of the loftiest part of the ridge: its precincts,
which included a circumference of about four miles, were walled in.
Within that circuit were various chapels and religious stations; and
on the summit of the mountain, which is within the inclosure, a stone
cross was erected of enormous size, upon so huge a foundation, that
three thousand cart-loads of stone were employed in constructing its
base. The cells of the brethren were round the church[16], not in a
regular building, but accommodated to the irregularities of the ground,
and lined with cork, which was every where used instead of wood because
of the dampness of the situation. Every cell had its garden and its
water-course for irrigating it, the cultivation of these little spots
being the only recreation which the inhabitants allowed themselves
as lawful. In one of these gardens the first cedars which grew in
Portugal were raised. It was indeed one of those places where man has
converted an earthly Paradise into a Purgatory for himself, but where
superstition almost seems sanctified by every thing around it. Lord
Wellington’s head-quarters were in the convent; and the solitude and
silence of Busaco were now broken by events, in which its hermits,
dead as they were to the world, might be permitted to partake all the
agitations of earthly hope and fear.
On the 26th Generals Hill and Leith joined the army. This corps had
made so rapid and arduous a march, that Massena regarded its junction
as impossible, and reckoned therefore that the force which he wished
to attack must necessarily be weak in front, if indeed Lord Wellington
should venture to give him battle. That general arrived on the same
day at Mortagoa, and the bridge over the Criz was re-established for
his artillery, the army having crossed at a ford a little way above.
Some skirmishing took place, and at S. Antonio do Cantaro the French
were resisted in a manner which made them first apprehend that a
determined stand was to be made against them. Massena himself upon this
reconnoitred the position, after which he asked one of the unworthy
Portugueze who accompanied him, if he thought the allies would give him
battle? He ♦RELAÇAM DA CAMPANHA DE MASSENA. INVESTIGADOR PORTUGUEZ,
VOL. VI. 59.♦ was answered, that undoubtedly they would, seeing they
showed themselves in such strength. The French Marshal replied, I
cannot persuade myself that Lord Wellington will risk the loss of his
reputation; but if he does, ... I have him! To-morrow we shall effect
the conquest of Portugal; and in a few days I shall drown the leopard!
♦BATTLE OF BUSACO. SEPT. 27.♦
About two on the following morning the French army was in motion.
Ney’s corps formed in close column on the right, at the foot of the
hill, and on the road which leads to the convent; Regnier’s on the
left, upon the southern road which passes by S. Antonio do Cantaro;
Junot’s was in the centre, and in reserve; the cavalry was in the
rear, the ground not permitting it to act. The allied British and
Portugueze army was posted along the ridge of the Serra, forming the
segment of a circle, the extreme points of which embraced every part
of the enemy’s position, and from whence every movement on their part
could be immediately observed. The troops had bivouacked that night in
position, as they stood: Lord Wellington in the wood near the centre,
the general officers at the heads of their divisions and brigades. The
orders were that all should stand to their arms before daylight; and
the whole army were in high spirits, deeming themselves sure of an
action, and of success. Before daybreak the rattling of the enemy’s
carriages was heard, and a few of their guns were brought to fire upon
a smaller number of British ones which had been placed to command the
road. At dawn the action began on the right, and after some firing
by the light troops in advance of the position, the enemy attacked a
village which was in front of the light division, and which, though
its possession was of advantage to the French, Lord Wellington chose
rather to let them occupy, than suffer an action to be brought on upon
less favourable ground than that which he had chosen, and where he was
sure of success. The nature of the ground, upon which this assurance
was founded, facilitated the enemy’s movements to a certain degree,
but no farther; its steepness and its inequalities covered their
ascent, and they gained the summit with little loss. Regnier’s corps
was the first that was seriously engaged: it ascended at a part where
there were only a few light troops; and being thus enabled to deploy
without opposition, the French possessed themselves for a moment,
in considerable strength, of a point within the line. Their first
column was received by the 88th regiment alone, part of Major-General
Mackinnon’s brigade, which was presently reinforced by half the 45th,
and soon afterwards by the 8th Portugueze: their second found the 74th,
with the 9th and 21st Portugueze, ready to receive them on the right.
Being repulsed there, they tried the centre with no better fortune;
the remainder of Major-General Picton’s division coming up, he charged
them with the bayonet, and dislodged them, greatly superior in numbers
as they were, from the strong ground which they had gained; at the
same time, Major-General Leith arriving with a brigade on their flank,
joined in the charge, and they were driven down the hill with great
slaughter, leaving 700 dead upon the ground. Few prisoners were taken.
Marshal Ney meantime was not more fortunate with his division. Part
of it he formed in column of mass, and ordered it to ascend upon
the right of the village which he had occupied. They came up in the
best possible order, though not without suffering considerably from
the light infantry; the ground, however, covered them in part by
its steepness. Major-General Craufurd, who commanded on that side,
judiciously made his troops withdraw just behind the crest of the ridge
whereon they were formed: he himself remained in front, on horseback,
observing the enemy. No sooner had they reached the summit than the
guns of his division opened a destructive fire upon them; and the men
appearing suddenly at a distance only of some twenty paces, advanced
and charged. Instantly the French were broken: the foremost regiments
of the column were almost destroyed, and those who escaped fled down
the steep declivity, running, sliding, or rolling, as they could.
General Simon, who commanded the column, was wounded and taken. Massena
was now convinced that the attack could not succeed, and therefore
halted the support at the foot of the hill. He endeavoured to decoy
Lord Wellington out of a position which had been proved impregnable;
but the British commander persisted in the sure system on which he had
resolved, and the remainder of the day was employed in skirmishing
between the light troops. They were directed to retire when pressed,
and give the enemy an opportunity of repeating the attack. But the
enemy had received too severe a lesson to venture upon a repetition,
and as night approached they were drawn off to some distance, near the
ground where Junot and the reserve were stationed. The village which
they had been allowed to occupy in the morning still remained in their
possession. Major-General Craufurd sent to the officer who commanded
there, saying it was necessary for his corps, and requiring him to
abandon it. The reply was, that he would die in defence of the post
with which he was intrusted. This tone ♦MEMOIRS OF THE EARLY CAMPAIGNS,
171.♦ was neither called for by the occasion nor justified by the
event. Six guns were immediately opened upon him; some companies of the
43d and of the Rifle Corps were ordered to charge the village; the
French were instantly driven out, and the advanced post of the light
division resumed possession.
♦BEHAVIOUR OF THE PORTUGUEZE TROOPS.♦
Victories of greater result at the time have been gained in Portugal,
but never was a battle fought there of more eventual importance to the
Portugueze nation; for the Portugueze troops, whom the French despised,
whom the enemies of the ministry in England reviled, and whom perhaps
many of the British army till then mistrusted, established that day
their character both for courage[17] and for discipline, and proved,
that however the government and the institutions of that kingdom had
been perverted and debased, the people had not degenerated. Lord
Wellington bore testimony to their deserts: he declared that he had
never seen a more gallant attack than that which they made upon the
enemy who had reached the ridge of the Serra; they were worthy, he
said, of contending in the same ranks with the British troops in that
good cause, which they afforded the best hopes of saving. Marshal
Beresford bestowed high and deserved praise upon them in general
orders; and the opportunity was taken of granting a free pardon to all
who were under arrest for military offences, that they might rejoin
their regiments, and emulate their comrades, to whose good conduct
they were indebted for this forgiveness; but persons who had been
apprehended for robbery or murder were excepted from the amnesty, for
these, it was properly observed, were not to be considered merely as
military crimes. After this battle, the knighthood of the Bath was
conferred on Marshal Beresford, in consideration of those exertions by
which the Portugueze troops had been qualified to bear their part in it
so honourably[18].
The loss of the British in this memorable action amounted to 107
killed, 493 wounded, and thirty-one taken; that of the Portugueze to
90 killed, 512 wounded, and twenty taken. One French general, three
colonels, thirty-three officers, and 250 men were made prisoners;
2000 were left dead on the field; the number was ascertained, because
Massena sent a flag of truce requesting permission to bury them; it was
not thought proper to comply with the request, and they were buried by
the conquerors. Most of their wounded, who were very numerous[19], were
left to the mercy of the peasants; General Craufurd, whose division was
the last that withdrew from the Serra, saved as many as he could from
their hands, and lodged them in the convent. Unground maize was found
in the knapsacks of the French.
♦MASSENA MARCHES INTO THE PORTO ROAD.♦
Massena having in person directed the operations of the day, had
purchased at some cost the conviction that his boast was not here to
be realized. He consulted with Ney, Regnier, Junot, and Freirion; and
they called in the Portugueze traitors to inquire of them by what
course a position might be turned, which they found themselves unable
to force. None of these unworthy men happened to be acquainted with
that part of the country; the French commander turned from them in
evident displeasure, as if they ought to have possessed the information
of which he stood in need, and he ordered General Montbrun out with a
strong detachment to explore the ways, telling him to send Generals
St. Croix and Lamotte in different directions on the same service. On
the following day two peasants were brought in; promises could draw
nothing from them, but they yielded to threats of torture and death,
and informed the enemy that there was a pass[20] over the Serra de
Caramula, communicating with the great road between Porto and Coimbra,
and coming into it near Sardam. By this course Massena immediately
determined to proceed. There had been skirmishing throughout the
morning between the light troops; the better to conceal their
movements, the French set fire to the woods; but the summit of Busaco
commands a most extensive prospect over the whole country[21]: early
in the afternoon a large body of their horse and foot was observed in
motion from the left of their centre to the rear, and from thence their
cavalry were seen in march along the road leading from Mortagoa, over
the mountain, toward Porto. Lord Wellington at once apprehended their
purpose, and perceived that it was now too late to prevent or to impede
it.
♦COLONEL TRANT’S MOVEMENTS.♦
Orders had been dispatched from the Ponte de Murcella on the 19th to
Colonel Trant, who was then acting as Brigadier with some Portugueze
militia, that he should occupy the villages of Sardam and Aguada. The
division which he commanded formed part of the force under General
Bacellar, who was then at Moimenta da Beira, and whose instructions
were to consider the defence of the Douro, and more especially of
Porto as his principal object. The orders were that Trant should march
by S. Pedro do Sul, which was the nearest line, but the worst road,
and through a country exhausted of provisions, in consequence of the
passage of the enemy by Viseu, and the abandonment of the intermediate
district by its inhabitants. Partly for these considerations General
Bacellar directed him to make a circuit by Porto, but chiefly because
he had ascertained that a French detachment of 1500 men had entered S.
Pedro; and because he considered it his main business to provide for
the protection of Porto, which he also supposed to be Lord Wellington’s
object in ordering this movement. Trant proposed to attack the enemy
at S. Pedro, and force his way, if possible; Bacellar would not permit
him to make the attempt, because he thought it too hazardous for
troops like his; and Trant in consequence took the circuitous route.
He left his men near the points which he had been instructed ♦SEPT.
28.♦ to occupy, early on the morning after the battle, and proceeded
to the head-quarters at Busaco, where he arrived before eleven in
the forenoon, and was then first apprized that it had been intended
he should occupy the village of Boyalva, and defend the pass over
the Serra de Caramula. He offered instantly to return and occupy the
intended ground; and there was time for doing it, but the offer was
declined. Lord Wellington had not detached any part of his own army to
these passes, because in case of failure, the troops must have been cut
off from the main body; whereas the Portugueze, if compelled to retire,
might fall back upon Porto, according to their destination. Had the
ground been stronger than it was, it was not to be supposed that 1500
militia could maintain it against Massena’s army; for to that number
Trant’s force was reduced, the men having marched 190 miles in nine
successive days, and many, while traversing the district in which they
were raised, had absented themselves, without leave, to revisit their
families. They might possibly have held it long enough to bring on a
general action, if Lord Wellington had thought it advisable again to
venture one; but the same motives which withheld him from giving battle
for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, or Almeida, influenced him still:
he had indeed more confidence in the Portugueze troops, but the other
reasons existed in their full strength: adhering to his long concerted
plans, which were laid for sure though slow success, he determined upon
committing nothing to the mere fortune of war; Trant therefore returned
to Sardam, to act as ♦THE ALLIES WITHDRAW FROM BUSACO.♦ opportunity
might offer, and Lord Wellington during the night withdrew his army
from Busaco. General Hill recrossed the Mondego, retiring toward
Santarem by way of Thomar, and Lord Wellington marched on Coimbra,
leaving Craufurd with a few piquets on the Serra, where he performed
the humane office of providing for the wounded French, who had been
abandoned by their countrymen, for want of means to remove them.
♦TRANT RETREATS TO THE VOUGA.♦
On the evening of the 28th the enemy’s cavalry entered Boyalva,
driving in a piquet of the Light Dragoons. It is an open village, on
the western slope of the hill, where there is no defile, and where
the ground is not broken. Trant was then at Sardam, where, during the
following day and night, he occupied one half the united villages,
the enemy’s cavalry occupying the other. As he could no longer be of
service here, and was aware that he should be attacked in the course of
the day if he remained longer, early on the 30th he resolved to retire
behind the Vouga. La Croix, who, with a column of horse, was scouring
the country upon the right flank of the invading army, fell in with
his outposts, attacked them, and drove them in with the loss of one
officer and five-and-twenty men[22]. The infantry, by good fortune,
had effected their passage; they formed in defence of the bridge, and
La Croix having no infantry, did not attempt to force it. The Vouga
was at this time fordable, and therefore Trant marched in the night to
Oliveira, on the Porto road, from whence, if it should be necessary, he
could in one day reach the Douro, and cross it for the defence of that
city. There were then no other troops to defend it, and if the enemy
had pursued, Porto might have been a second time in their power. That
this was not done is not surprising, because it did not consist with
the scheme of Massena’s operations; but that the French should have
neglected so fair an opportunity of dispersing Trant’s force, which
if not dispersed might be expected presently to harass their rear,
must be accounted among those errors with which the whole course of
human events is marked, and in which the religious mind perceives the
superintendence of a higher power than man.
♦THE ALLIES CROSS THE MONDEGO.♦
The allies being on the shorter line to Coimbra, were sufficiently in
advance of the enemy for all their movements to be conducted with the
same coolness and order which had characterized the whole retreat. On
the 30th the infantry crossed from Coimbra into the great Lisbon road.
The rear-guard of cavalry bivouacked in front of Fornos, and remained
bridled up all night, in a very dangerous situation, the enemy having
pushed a strong force close to ♦OCT. 1.♦ them. In the morning they were
driven in some confusion through Fornos by a large body of horse and
foot: they formed on the great plain of Coimbra, and the French seeing
the three brigades of cavalry with six guns of the horse artillery
ready to receive them, did not venture to leave the inclosures. Before
noon the rear-guard received orders to retire, and crossed the Mondego
accordingly at the fords near S. Martinho do Bispo. The enemy pushed
on their horse, came up just as the passage had been effected, and
attempted to cross, as if in pursuit: they were charged, and driven
back by a squadron of the 16th, after which they dismounted, and fired
with their carbines ineffectually across the river. The passage might
have been defended with good prospect of success, but this was not
consistent with Lord Wellington’s plans, which were to draw the French
to a point where they should be at the greatest distance from their
resources, and where his own would be at hand.
♦1810. OCTOBER.
FLIGHT OF THE INHABITANTS FROM COIMBRA.♦
When it was known in Coimbra that the enemy were approaching, and the
retreat of the British made it evident that the city would be at their
mercy, a cry soon arose that the French had actually entered, and the
whole of the inhabitants who had not yet provided for their safety ran
shrieking toward the bridge. On all other sides they were cut off from
flight. The bridge, which is long and narrow, was presently choked
by the crowd of fugitives; and multitudes in the hurry of their fear
rushed into the Mondego, and made their way through the water, which
was in many parts three or four feet deep. The gateway, which was the
city prison, is near the bridge, and the screams of the prisoners, who
beheld this scene of terror from their grates, and expected something
far more dreadful from the cruelty of the French than they had reason
to apprehend from the laws of their own country, were heard amid all
the uproar and confusion. Lord Wellington heard them, and in compassion
sent his aide-de-camp, Lord March, to set them at liberty.
♦THE FRENCH ENTER COIMBRA.♦
Massena expected to find great resources in Coimbra, a large and
flourishing city situated in the finest part of a beautiful and
fertile country. He found it utterly deserted, like every place which
the French had hitherto entered on their march. With the intent of
securing the stores, he forbade all pillage, and gave orders that
only the brigade which was to be left in garrison there should enter.
In defiance of these orders Junot commanded his men to make their
way in, and break open the houses, as the owners had thought proper
to abandon them. Such directions were eagerly obeyed; the men forced
the guard, which, in pursuance of Massena’s instructions, had been
stationed at the gate of S. Sophia; the other troops immediately joined
them in their occupation, and Massena neither attempted to enforce his
own orders, nor manifested any displeasure during the scene of wanton
waste and havoc which ensued. The magazines of the allied army had been
removed, and Montbrun, who was dispatched to Figueira for the chance
of overtaking them there, arrived too late: but provision enough, it
is said, was found in Coimbra to have served the enemy for a month’s
consumption, if proper measures had been adopted for its preservation.
The people who so unanimously forsook their homes had had neither time
nor means for removing their property. So long as it was uncertain
in which direction the invaders would move, and while a possibility
remained that they might be successfully resisted upon the way, the
people of Coimbra had lived in hope that this dire necessity might be
averted; and when it came upon them, so many cars were required for the
sick and wounded, and other services of the enemy, that few or none
were left for them.
♦THE PORTUGUEZE PEOPLE FLY BEFORE THE ENEMY.♦
It is the custom throughout the south of India, that when a hostile
army approaches, the natives bury their treasure, forsake their
houses, take with them as much food as they can carry, and seek the
protection of some strong place, or conceal themselves among the woods
and mountains. People in these deplorable circumstances are called the
Wulsa of the district. The Wulsa has never been known to depart on
the approach of a British force, if unaccompanied by Indian allies.
This, however, is no peculiar honour of the British name; it belongs
rather to the European character, for no such spectacle had ever been
exhibited in European warfare till the present campaign. The orders of
the Regency and of the commander-in-chief might have been issued in
vain, if the Portugueze people had not from cruel experience felt the
necessity of this measure for their individual safety. The alternative
was dreadful, and yet better than that of remaining at the mercy of
such invaders. It was a miserable sight to see them accompanying the
columns of the retreating army, well-ordered as the movements of
that army were, and resolutely, as on the few occasions which were
offered, it met and checked the pursuers. All ranks and conditions were
confounded in the general calamity: families accustomed to the comforts
of a delightful climate and fruitful country followed the troops on
foot; there was no security for age, or sex, or childhood, but in
flight[23]. Every thing was left behind them except what the women
could carry; for even in this extremity the men very generally observed
the national prejudice, which deems it disgraceful for man to bear a
burthen.
♦HOPES AND EXPECTATIONS OF THE FRENCH.♦
Boastful as the French commander was, and confident in his own fortune,
and in the hitherto unchecked prosperity of the Emperor Napoleon, the
battle of Busaco made him apprehend that the enterprise in which he had
engaged was not so easy as he had imagined, nor so free from all risk
of disasters. There were not fewer than 5000 sick and wounded whom it
was necessary to leave at Coimbra; as many more had been left at Busaco
dead on the field, or abandoned there because their condition was
hopeless, or for want of means to remove them. But a loss of 10,000 men
upon his march, without any commensurate diminution of the allies, had
not been allowed for in his calculations; and he found himself unable
to leave a guard of sufficient strength at Coimbra, without weakening
his army too much. He thought therefore that the surest course by which
he could secure his sick and wounded was to pursue the English with all
his force, and drive them out of the country, for he still persuaded
himself that they were flying to their ships. This opinion he expressed
in dispatches which were intercepted. The other generals partook the
same delusion; they no longer despised the British troops, but they had
not yet been taught to respect the councils of the British government,
and the nature of its policy they could neither believe nor comprehend;
for it appeared to them incredible that any government should act upon
principles of integrity and honour. They supposed that Lord Wellington
would embark as soon as he reached Lisbon, and that it was his
intention to carry off as many of the Portugueze youth as he could get
on board, by way of securing some compensation for the expenses of the
war!
♦CONFUSION AT CONDEIXA.♦
With these expectations they followed the retreating army, not with the
ardour of pursuit, but ready to avail themselves of any opportunity
that might present itself, and cautious how they offered any to an
enemy whom they no longer affected to despise. The single occasion
which occurred in their favour they were not near enough to seize. It
was at Condeixa (the Conimbrica of the Romans); the town is built on
the ridge of the hill, and the road passes through it along a narrow
street; the people of the vicinity crowded in simultaneously with
the troops, and the inhabitants at the same time hurried to join in
a retreat which they had delayed till the last minute. They were in
great alarm, the way was blocked up by some of the country carts, and
had it not been for the good discipline which the troops observed in
this scene of confusion, and the exertions of the officers, the enemy
might have obtained no inconsiderable advantage. But they were not near
enough to profit by the favourable opportunity: order was restored
in time; and this was the only moment of serious danger during the
whole retreat. Massena pushed forward to this town, without halting at
Coimbra; but he found it necessary to remain here three days, for the
purpose of resting his troops and collecting such provisions as the
inhabitants had not been able to remove, and the retreating army had
left untouched. As the enemy advanced, the allies retired a march or
two before them; the infantry proceeded with as little molestation as
if they had been marching through a country which was in peace; the
cavalry covered the retreat, and no stragglers were to be seen.
♦LEIRIA FORSAKEN.♦
Some skirmishing took place near Pombal, with trifling loss on the
part of the allies, and more on that of the enemy. Ney and Junot
took this line of march, while Regnier advanced ♦OCT. 5.♦ upon the
road to Thomar. Leiria was forsaken by its whole population: a city
thus deserted offered such temptation, that discipline could not be
maintained in the retreating army without some examples of severity,
and one British and one native soldier were punished with death for
breaking into a chapel and plundering it. Here the allied army divided,
one part taking the road to Alcobaça, the other to Rio Mayor. ♦ALCOBAÇA
FORSAKEN BY THE MONKS.♦ The monks of Alcobaça performed on this
occasion toward the British officers their last act of hospitality.
Most of them had already departed from the magnificent and ancient
abode, where the greater part of their lives had been spent peacefully
and inoffensively, to seek an asylum where they could; the few who
remained prepared dinner for their guests in the great hall and in
the apartments reserved for strangers, after which they brought them
the keys, and desired them to take whatever they liked, ... for they
expected that every thing would be destroyed by the French. Means were
afforded them, through General Mackinnon’s kindness, for saving some
things which they could not otherwise have removed; and then the most
venerable edifice in Portugal for its antiquity, its history, its
literary treasures, and the tombs which it contained, was abandoned to
an invader who delighted in defiling whatever was held sacred, and in
destroying whatever a generous enemy, from the impulse of feeling and
the sense of honour, would carefully have preserved.
♦SURPRISE AT ALCOENTRE.♦
The rains now commenced, and set in with their accustomed severity in
that country. By this time the infantry had reached their positions;
but the cavalry who covered the rear were exposed to the whole severity
of the weather, bivouacking every night, because the enemy were so
close that it would have been imprudent for them to occupy a village.
Sir Stapleton Cotton, however, having reached the little town of
Alcoentre, took up his quarters there; the French, expecting that in
this heavy and incessant rain the English would apprehend no enterprise
on their part, took advantage of the weather, and endeavoured to
surprise him there; his piquets were driven in; and almost as soon as
the alarm could be given, they were in the town, and in possession of
six guns. A squadron from the 16th came down in time, charged them
in the street, recovered the guns, and drove them to the other end
of the town. Some severe skirmishing occurred on the following day,
in which the 3d regiment of French hussars behaved most gallantly.
At daybreak on the 10th the enemy had lost sight of the allies, and
when they reached Moinho do Cubo, where the roads to Alenquer and
Lisbon divide, they knew not which course to take. Two peasants were
brought in by their detachments, and were asked which way the English
had retreated, and where their lines were, ... for by this time
Massena had found cause to doubt whether a general who retreated so
deliberately had no other intention than to embark and fly as soon as
he reached Lisbon. The men answered that they could give no information
on either point, because they knew nothing; military punishment was
immediately inflicted upon them, to extort what they were determined
not to disclose, and they both endured it till they fainted, thus
giving the French another proof of national resolution, and of the
feeling of the Portugueze towards them. Being thus disappointed of the
intelligence which they expected, the French vanguard, which consisted
of 10,000 men, divided. The division which took the Alenquer road came
in sight of a column of the allies on ♦THE FRENCH DISCOVER THE LINES OF
THE ALLIES.♦ the heights beyond that town; on the following day this
column retreated in good order to Sobral, and was driven out of it: the
French were pursuing their advantage when a peasant fell into their
hands, who, unlike his countrymen, answered without hesitation all the
interrogatories which were put to him; he told the commander that they
were close upon the British lines, and pointed out to him where the
batteries were, in constructing which he had himself laboured. Had it
not been for his warning, this ♦INVESTIGADOR PORTUGUEZ, T. VI. 64.♦
body of the enemy would presently have been in a situation from which
it could hardly have escaped. They halted instantly, and fell back;
Massena was informed of the discovery which had been made; and three
days elapsed before the invaders again approached the works of the
allies so nearly.
♦FEELINGS OF THE ARMY.♦
The army had commenced their retrograde movement from the frontiers
with an impression that the cause wherein they were engaged had become
hopeless, and that when they reached Lisbon they should be embarked,
and abandon Portugal. This opinion had been altered by the course of
events during the retreat, and by the manner in which that retreat had
been conducted. There had been no alarm, no confusion, no precipitance
upon the march. Nothing could have been conducted with greater ease to
the troops; not a straggler had been taken, not a gun abandoned, not
an article of baggage lost; the infantry had never even been seen by
the enemy, except at Busaco, where they gave them battle, and signally
defeated them: and the cavalry had taken on the way more prisoners from
the enemy than the allies lost, a circumstance which probably never
occurred in any former retreat. The troops, therefore, became confident
that their commander had no thought of abandoning the contest; and that
an embarkation was not his object, but that he was acting upon some
settled plan, which he was well able to carry to the end. But when they
entered the lines which they were to occupy, their surprise was hardly
less than that of Massena and his army, at the foresight which they
there saw displayed, and the skill with which a strong position had
been rendered impregnable.
♦THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS.♦
At the close of the last century Sir Charles Stuart had perceived
that, if the French should ever seriously attempt the conquest of
Portugal, here was the vantage ground of defence; and Lord Wellington,
in his campaign against Junot, had observed this part of the country
at leisure, and came to the same conclusion. Portugal, he said in
the House of Commons, could be defended, but not on the frontier;
the defence must be on the strong ground about Lisbon; and that
consideration, he added, was in his mind when the Convention of Cintra
was made. As soon, therefore, as the impossibility of co-operating with
the Spaniards to any good effect had been fully proved, and it became
apparent that the decisive struggle must be made in Portugal, upon this
ground he resolved to make it. Early in the year it was stated in the
English newspapers that men were employed in fortifying this position,
but no mention of it had subsequently appeared, and it is truly
remarkable that works of such magnitude and importance should have
been commenced and perfected without exciting the slightest attention
during their progress. They extended from Alhandra on the Tagus to the
mouth of the little river Sizandro: the direct line across the country
between these points is about six-and-twenty miles; the line of defence
was about forty. All roads which could have afforded any advantage to
the enemy were destroyed, and others opened by which the allies might
effect their communications with most facility. In some places, streams
were dammed and inundations formed; in others the sides of the ravines
and hills were scarped perpendicularly; intrenchments were thrown up
wherever they could be serviceable; every approach was commanded by
cannon, placed in posts which had been rendered inaccessible; and
at all the most important points redoubts were erected capable of
resisting even if the enemy should establish themselves in their rear,
and well provided with stores and ammunition for defence.
These works, the most celebrated of their kind, were constructed
under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, of the engineers,
assisted by Captain Chapman. Lieutenant-General Hill commanded on the
right, having his head-quarters at Alhandra; ... the great approach to
Lisbon is on this side, but the ground is strong; no means had been
neglected for strengthening it, and gun-boats from the Tagus could
assist in the defence. That river covered the right, the left was
closed by the heights above Sobral, and communicated there with the
corps of the centre. Major-General Picton commanded on the left; his
head-quarters were at Torres Vedras, a town which, being better known
than any other included within the works, became for ever memorable
in military history, by giving name to these formidable lines. The
weakest part of the whole position was between Torres Vedras and the
sea; but the artificial defences were proportionately strong, ... and
where it would otherwise have been most accessible, it was rendered
most secure by inundations extending some six miles along the Sizandro
to the sea. The centre extended from the heights of Sobral de Monte
Agraço to Torres Vedras: in the former little town Marshal Beresford
had his head-quarters; Lord Wellington’s were about two leagues from
the latter, at the Quinta de Pero Negro, near Enxara dos Cavalleiros.
The heights above Sobral formed the principal point of defence on
this part of the line; and the villages of Ordasqueyra and Runa,
which are upon the road between Sobral and Torres Vedras, were also
strongly fortified, because they commanded the only pass to the latter
town within Monte Junto. That mountain, which runs due north from
Runa for some fourteen miles, contributed mainly to the strength of
the position. It prevented all military communication between Sobral
and Torres Vedras, except by the line which the allies occupied in
strength. Lord Wellington might be attacked either from the east by
Sobral, or by Torres Vedras from the west; but he could bring his
troops from the one point to the other in a few hours, along a safe and
easy communication; whereas for the enemy to have communicated between
the same points would have required at least two days, for they must
have rounded the Serra at its northern point.
In the rear of this line, and nearly parallel to it, at a distance
of from six to eight miles, was a second fortified position,
extending from behind Alverca to Bucellas, thence along the Serras to
Montachique, by the park wall of Mafra to Gradil, and so along the
heights to the mouth of a little stream called S. Lorenzo. Strong works
covered the communication between these lines. And lest, contrary to
all probabilities and human foresight, a position so fortified and
occupied should be found untenable against the invaders, works were
constructed at the mouth of the Tagus, at St. Julian’s, which would
have secured the embarkation of the troops. The heights at Almada, on
the south of the Tagus, which command Lisbon and its anchorage, were
also fortified, in case Mortier should carry into effect a co-operation
on the side of Alentejo, which it was not doubted was part of the
French ♦WORKS AT ALMEIDA.♦ plan. Ten thousand men, consisting in part
of marines, were destined to serve in this quarter. The redoubts in the
position were manned by Portugueze militia, who, with a certain number
of regular troops, were quite equal to the duties which might be there
required. The troops of the line, British and Portugueze, were thus
disposable to act in moveable columns, and oppose the enemy wherever
they might attempt to penetrate. The allies were joined here by Romana
with 6000 Spaniards, from Extremadura; here they might be efficiently
employed, but in that quarter they could be of little service. ♦ROMANA
JOINS THE ALLIES AT LISBON.♦ Badajoz, which Romana had secured at
the critical time, had now by his exertions been well provided and
garrisoned, ... and this junction had been arranged as soon as it
became certain that the decisive stand must be made in the lines of
Torres Vedras.
The French had suffered severely from the weather during the latter
days of their march, so that both horses and men were greatly exhausted
when they arrived at the point where their advance was stopped. It was
no easy task to reconnoitre these lines, many of the most important
points being concealed behind the hills; but Massena, after a careful
inspection, saw enough to convince him, that if he attacked them a
repulse might be expected, more fatal in its results than that which
he had received at Busaco. And his hopes were not raised by the
intelligence which now reached him of the consequences which that
defeat had drawn after it. It was then perceived how great an error
had been committed in not pursuing Colonel Trant beyond the Vouga, and
dispersing the Portugueze militia under his command.
♦COLONEL TRANT SURPRISES THE FRENCH IN COIMBRA.♦
That officer, who well understood the weakness both of his forces and
of his position, ... for the Vouga was at that time fordable, ... had
retreated by a night march to Oliveira, not without apprehension that
the enemy would send a detachment against Porto, where they would have
found no other troops to defend it than the small and ill disciplined
body which he could have carried thither. When he had ascertained that
this was not their purpose, but that the whole army was advancing in
pursuit of Lord Wellington, and had left their wounded in Coimbra,
he lost no time, but immediately concerted means for surprising
them in that city. The Army of the North, as it was called, under
Lieutenant-General Bacellar, consisted of three divisions of militia,
... that of Tras os Montes, under Silveira, that of the Minho, under
Brigadier-General Miller, and that of Porto, under Trant. It had
also two regiments of Portugueze cavalry and three brigades of field
artillery, ... this constituted its whole force. When Trant was sent
round by Porto to Sardam, the other divisions were disposed so as to
close upon the enemy’s rear; and the advanced guard, under Colonel
John Wilson, followed them through Vizeu, and along the lower falls
of the Caramula, intercepting their communications and taking their
stragglers. This body was near enough to see from a distance the action
at Busaco; and when Massena, withdrawing from thence, concentrated
his army at Mortagoa, Colonel Wilson fell in with a detachment of his
rear-guard, and in an affair of nearly equal numbers captured thirty
mounted dragoons, and several infantry. As he proceeded he found
the villages laid waste, and filled with the enemy’s dead and dying;
and many of their wounded, falling into his hands, were committed to
the surgeon’s care, and saved from the death to which the invading
army in its haste had abandoned them. With this officer, and with
Brigadier-General Miller, Trant intended to combine his movements; and
having written to them, advanced from Oliveira to Mealhada, expecting
to join them there, ... but the country through which they came had
been completely wasted, so that the want of supplies, and the exhausted
state of the horses, rendered it impossible for them to advance so
rapidly as he had hoped. Delay would give the enemy leisure to prepare
for defence, whereas it was probable that at this time they had no
apprehension of an attack, and were ignorant that any troops were so
near them: Mealhada is scarcely twelve miles from Coimbra, and by a
rapid movement Trant thought he might be able with his own division
to effect what, if time were lost and the French on their guard, the
united bodies might find it difficult to accomplish. He determined,
therefore, to proceed. At a little distance from Os Fornos he fell in
with an enemy’s detachment, pushed on his cavalry so as to cut them
off from Coimbra, and made them all prisoners, except a few who fell
before the others surrendered. Then he ordered his horse to advance at
a gallop along the principal road, cross the bridge over the Mondego,
and take post on the Lisbon road, thus cutting off the communication
between Massena’s army and the garrison. While the cavalry were
crossing, an irregular fire was kept up upon them from St. Clara’s, a
nunnery on the south of the river which the enemy occupied: as soon
as the passage was effected, the French here proposed to capitulate;
but Trant would hear of no capitulation, ... they must surrender at
discretion, he said, and he would exert all his means to protect them
from the people. The infantry meantime entered the city; and after a
contest which continued about an hour, the French were made prisoners.
Six or seven hundred convalescents thought themselves strong enough to
defend the convent in which they were quartered, imprudently therefore
they refused to surrender: the building was presently stormed, and most
of them fell victims to Portugueze vengeance.
♦HE ESCORTS HIS PRISONERS TO PORTO.♦
Colonel Trant found more difficulty in protecting the French than
in taking them prisoners. The militia and armed peasantry under his
command were exasperated almost to madness by the conduct of an enemy
whose route from Pinhel might be traced by the smoke of burning
villages. Coimbra itself presented a spectacle sufficient to excite
the bitterest feelings of indignation. The French had ransacked every
house, and church, and public building; they had for pure wantonness
set fire to some of the houses, and they had heaped up promiscuously
in the streets all the provisions which the army could not carry
with it. Enough had been found in shops, and private houses, and in
the convents of that populous and flourishing city, to have supplied
the army for no inconsiderable time, if it had been collected in
magazines: but Massena relied upon having the resources of Lisbon at
his disposal; and the commissary-general, whom he had left as governor
in Coimbra, however well he understood the importance of preserving the
stores which had here fallen into his hands, was unable to restrain
a soldiery, who from the commencement of the war had been permitted
to indulge in licenses of every kind. About 800 of Trant’s men were
natives of Coimbra or its district; not a few of the inhabitants, upon
the recovery of the city, appeared from their hiding-places: the enemy
had been surprised and taken in the very act of havoc; and nothing but
the greatest exertions on the part of Trant, and the respect with which
he was regarded, could have saved the prisoners from the vengeance of
those who, in addition to their strong national feeling, were under the
sense of private and present injuries, and those of the deepest kind.
For though the greater part of the population had taken flight, in so
populous a city there had been many for whom flight was impossible, ...
age and sickness had detained some: others were bound by duty to the
sick and aged; and others again, under the fear of casting themselves
upon the world as wanderers, and the hope that by remaining with their
property they might preserve a part at least, had waited for the evil
under their own roofs, or hesitated whither to fly, till it had been
too late; and these unhappy persons had found no protection from the
established laws of war, or the common usages of humanity. Under these
circumstances there was no other means of preserving the prisoners
but by marching them to Porto. Brigadier Miller and Colonel Wilson,
who had formed a junction on the day that Trant’s dispatches reached
them, having pushed on with all speed to support him in his attempt,
arrived at Coimbra a few hours after him. Leaving them therefore in the
city with part of his brigade, with the other he convoyed 4000 of the
French, going himself to protect them, as well knowing that, unless he
were present, they would never reach Porto alive, ... for his men had
been raised in that country, which was the scene of Soult’s cruelties,
and some of them were from that village of Arrifana, where horrors had
been perpetrated of which ♦SEE VOL. III. P. 269.♦ the military murders
committed under General Thomieres’ orders were the least part.
♦DIFFICULTIES OF MASSENA’S SITUATION.♦
Above 150 officers and 5000 men were made prisoners by this well-timed
enterprise; 3500 muskets were taken, nearly the whole of which were
charged; and hence the number of effective men may be estimated.
A great number of kine and sheep were found, which the enemy had
collected; had they crossed the Vouga they might have carried off from
2000 to 3000 head of cattle in one or two days’ sweep of the country
between that river and the Douro. In the commissariat, as well as
in the hospital department, Massena suffered a loss here which was
severely felt; the capture of his wounded under such circumstances
was not more mortifying to him than the disappointment was painful
of those hopes which he had founded upon the possession of Coimbra.
Instead of having a garrison in that important quarter, occupied in
collecting for him the resources of a fertile country, and facilitating
his intercourse with Spain, his communications were now impeded; he
was cut off from Beira and the northern provinces; the Portugueze,
encouraged by success, were acting in his rear, and in front there was
a formidable force in a position, which he soon perceived it would be
hopeless to attack. He had no other means of subsistence for his army
than what might be procured by force, and any reinforcement must be
strong enough to fight its way from the very frontier of France, for a
small party could nowhere pass in safety. But the sea was open to the
allies; ... every day witnessed the arrival of supplies and stores in
the Tagus, and it was reasonably to be expected that Lord Wellington
would soon receive reinforcements enough for enabling him to act upon
the offensive. Massena felt now the difficulties of the situation in
which his own confidence and that of Buonaparte had placed him. But
he manifested no sense of weakness; and having well reconnoitred the
right of the lines, he placed his three corps separately in bivouac in
front of it, and determined, but with due caution, to make at least a
trial of that fortune which had never failed him till he was opposed to
British enemies.
♦HIS DEMONSTRATIONS IN FRONT OF THE LINES.♦
There was a redoubt in an important point of the position, at the foot
of the heights above Sobral; opposite to this, at a little distance,
the French established one, and Massena having strictly observed the
ground, gave orders for attacking the British redoubt, and took his
station on a hill to see the issue of this his first ♦EARLY CAMPAIGNS,
191.♦ operation. The Honourable Colonel Cadogan of the 73d commanded
there, and not only were the enemy repulsed, but their own redoubt was
attacked, carried, and maintained. Convinced by the trial how little
was to be hoped from any bolder measures, Massena ventured no farther.
To cover his own plans, he still however maintained his position,
and made such demonstrations, that the allies were daily under arms
before daylight, with their general-in-chief ready to direct their
operations, expecting and hoping that a general attack might be made,
and in full assurance that it could only end in the defeat ♦COLONEL
JONES’S ACCOUNT, I. 308.♦ and destruction of the enemy. But the French
commander was not now so confident in his own troops, nor so ignorant
of those to whom he was opposed, as to incur the danger of a defeat
which must have been irreparable. The demonstration was made for the
purpose of covering certain movements in his rear, and after a week of
anxious and eager hope, the allies were convinced that no attempt would
be made to force their inexpugnable position.
♦MONTBRUN SENT AGAINST ABRANTES.♦
Having consulted with Marshal Ney, Regnier, Junot, and Montbrun,
Massena determined upon sending to Buonaparte to request
reinforcements, and taking a position in the interior of Portugal
till they should arrive. As a preparatory measure, Montbrun was
sent with the advanced guard, and with Loison’s division to occupy
Abrantes. Meantime he established his head-quarters at Alenquer,
those of Regnier’s corps were at Villa Franca, of Junot’s opposite
to Sobral, and of Ney’s in front of Torres Vedras. Montbrun was
detained two days at Santarem by an inundation of the Tagus, which
covered the Campos de Golegam; as soon as the waters had retired, he
advanced to Barquinha; that place, like Santarem, was deserted, but
the inhabitants, relying too much upon protection from Abrantes, and
from the river, had collected large magazines there, which they had now
no time for removing. When he reached the Zezere, thinking to cross
at Punhete, he found that the bridge of boats had been destroyed, and
that a detachment from the garrison of Abrantes was entrenched in the
town, which stands on the left bank. The Zezere is at all times a
rapid and formidable stream; at that season it was nowhere fordable;
the banks are high and difficult, and after consulting with the other
generals, Montbrun determined to set the town on fire, that, under
cover of the conflagration, he might throw a bridge across, and effect
his passage: this resolution was taken at night; in the morning it was
found that the allies had withdrawn; the river was then bridged without
opposition, and the enemy advanced upon Abrantes. But that city was
well provided against any sudden attack; and the French, perceiving
that nothing was to be done there, retired to Punhete, and Barquinha,
and Golegam. Montbrun’s next orders were to take possession of Torres
Novas and Thomar. Colonel Wilson had been instructed to proceed with
his corps of militia towards these towns, for the purpose of confining
the enemy’s detachments on that side; but he, and Trant, and Miller,
were charged always to keep in view the necessity of preserving their
communication with the Lower Douro. Wilson, after the recapture of
Coimbra, had followed the enemy through Leiria, and afterwards occupied
the road from Ponte de Murcella to Thomar. But this town had been taken
possession of by Montbrun, and there and at Torres Novas stores were
found which relieved for a while the distress of the invaders, who
depended for their subsistence entirely upon what they could find.
♦THE FRENCH ARMY SUBSISTS BY PLUNDER.♦
It was because Massena was too strong in numbers to be beaten without
a greater expense of lives than Lord Wellington could then afford,
that the British commander trusted to famine, and to that worrying
system of national warfare which no army can withstand. Famine would
soon and surely have compelled the invaders to retreat if the orders
of the Regency had been duly observed, and the country completely
cleared of all stores before the enemy approached. But the local
magistrates had not taken effectual measures for enforcing these
orders; while the danger was at a distance, they had continued to
hope it might be averted, or at least that it would not reach their
particular districts; and in very many places the farmers had secreted
their stores, that they might not be constrained to sell them to the
commissioners at a low price and at long credit. The precautionary
measures of the government were so far carried into effect, that the
enemy were severely distressed, and finally found it necessary to
abandon their enterprise; but they were able to subsist some months
upon what they found, for nothing escaped their search. The French
soldiers had been so long accustomed to plunder, that they proceeded
in their researches for booty of every kind upon a regular system.
They were provided with tools for the work of pillage, and every piece
of furniture in which places of concealment could be constructed they
broke open from behind, so that no valuables could be hidden from
them by any contrivance of that kind. Having satisfied themselves
that nothing was secreted above ground, they proceeded to examine
whether there was any new masonry, or if any part of the cellar or
ground-floor had been disturbed: if it appeared uneven, they dug there:
where there was no such indication, they poured water, and if it were
absorbed in one place faster than another, there they broke the earth.
There were men who at the first glance could pronounce whether any
thing had been buried beneath the soil, and when they probed with an
iron rod, or, in default of it, with sword or bayonet, it was found
that they were seldom mistaken in their judgement. The habit of living
by prey called forth, as in beasts, a faculty of discovering it: there
was one soldier whose scent became so acute, that if he approached the
place where wine had been concealed, he would go unerringly to the spot.
♦DESERTERS FORM THEMSELVES INTO A CORPS OF PLUNDERERS.♦
But before supplies could be brought in by this marauding system, the
distress which was felt in the invading army occasioned a considerable
desertion. The more desperate deserters, instead of going over to
the British lines, collected in strong parties in the country about
Alcobaça, Nazaré, and As Caldas da Rainha, and at length formed
themselves into a regular army of robbers, calling themselves the
11th corps, under their officers and general. When they fell in with
a detachment of their countrymen, they compelled them to join with
them, and in a short time their numbers amounted to more than 1600.
The annoyance became at length more serious to Massena than to the
Portugueze; he sent two strong detachments against them, and it was
not till after an obstinate action that they surrendered to a superior
force, ... their leaders were then shot, and the men returned to a
course of duty which differed very little from their predatory life.
♦STATE OF LISBON.♦
There was necessarily great distress meantime at Lisbon, because so
many families had taken refuge there in a state of destitution; but
that distress was alleviated by the care of the government, and by a
religion in which alms-giving ranks high in the scale of religious
works, and is enjoined as a regular compensation for sin. Thousands of
these poor fugitives were hutted in the open country; many were sent
across the river, and they who came from those parts of the country
which, by the recovery of Coimbra, were delivered from the French,
returned home. Provisions were dear, but there was neither danger nor
dread of famine. That country from which the capital receives all its
garden produce was within the British lines; on the other side the
river Alentejo and Algarve were free from the enemy; and the latter
fertile province, with that part of the former which is considered
as the granary of the south of Portugal, perfectly secure from them,
unless the subjugation of the kingdom were effected. The Barbary coast
was close at hand; ships from America and England were daily arriving,
and the supply of wheat was soon fully equal to the consumption of the
army and of the increased population.
But the opposition writers in England endeavoured to raise an
alarm, “that Lisbon, not Massena, was in danger of famine; he,” they
said, “could drive in upon our lines the population ♦OPINIONS OF THE
OPPOSITION IN ENGLAND.♦ of the surrounding country to increase our
difficulties, and to relieve his own could send his foraging parties
into an immense track of country as yet untouched. England, meantime,
must send out not merely regiment after regiment, but cargo after cargo
of grain throughout the winter; and what if the bar of the Tagus should
be locked up by adverse winds? Massena, we might be sure, with the
talents and prudence universally ascribed to him, did not act without
a confident prospect of success. It had been said in the Gazette, that
he possessed only the ground on which his army stood; this was an
_erratum_, where for Massena we ought to read Wellington. Our situation
in Portugal would become infinitely more disagreeable than his, even
if he did not, bringing his whole force to bear on one, two, or three
points, by his superior numbers thus concentrated, break the lines in
which Lord Wellington’s army was so much drawn out. He would have the
most productive part of the kingdom open to him; we should have only
Lisbon and its vicinity, with the whole Portugueze army to maintain,
as well as the British; nay, with the whole population of Lisbon,
increased by the fugitives who had taken asylum there, deprived of
their usual resources, and thrown upon us even for daily bread! What a
delicate and irksome part then would our troops have to support, if
they were to pass the winter upon those mountains, possessing no part
of Portugal but that in which they were posted, incessantly harassed
by the French in their front, with a Portugueze army double their own
number within their lines, and a starving metropolis in the rear? The
French had obviously the advantage; they could remain in their post as
long or as short a time as they pleased: they could retire and return
at their discretion. They might wait for the reinforcements which the
despot their master would draw to their aid from every quarter of
subjected Europe: they were likely to accumulate, while the British
must in the nature of things decrease. Massena was in truth master of
the game he had to play. The most disastrous thing that could happen
to us, next to positive defeat, would be the necessity of keeping our
position on these heights for the winter; and we trust,” said these
hopeful directors of public opinion, “we trust that we shall not have
to incur that calamity! Lord Wellington may reembark his troops without
much molestation; and rather than he should be driven to the necessity
of continuing in these positions for the winter, we confess, we wish
that he were re-embarked.”
♦GENERAL LA CROIX KILLED.♦
The people of Lisbon had not been without some apprehension that the
British government would withdraw, rather in hopelessness than in
weakness, from the contest. The merchants, therefore, had prepared to
take flight, some for Brazil, others for England. But when they saw
with what determination the lines were manned, this apprehension was
laid aside; the fullest confidence succeeded, and all persons relied
upon the skill of Lord Wellington, the strength of his position, and
the discipline and courage of the allied armies. Such was the security
which they felt behind his impregnable lines, that parties resorted to
Alhandra for the sake of seeing them, as idlers flock from London to
behold a review. A battalion of British seamen had been formed to serve
in defending that part of the position. Land service was a jubilee to
these men; they had the town of Alhandra to themselves, the inhabitants
having forsaken it, and there those who were off guard sat in large
armed chairs of embossed leather, two centuries old, smoking and
drinking in the open streets. In reconnoitring this part of the line
from the side of Villa Franca, General La Croix was killed by a shot
from the water. Frequent skirmishes took place on the right flank and
in the rear of the French encampment; but the piquets, by one of those
agreements which mutual convenience will sometimes produce between
enemies, did not fire upon each other, and this gave occasion for some
of the old humanities of war. Some of our men even went and drank
wine with the French, till an order was issued prohibiting a sort of
intercourse which could neither with propriety nor safety be permitted.
♦1810. NOVEMBER.
MASSENA RETREATS FROM THE LINES.♦
Certain movements of the enemy seemed at this time to indicate an
intention of crossing the Tagus. Laborde was sent to garrison Santarem.
He threatened to destroy the little town of Chamusca on the Alentejo
side (noted for its sweet wine), if the boats there were not sent
over for his use: upon which the inhabitants burnt them. A detachment
advanced toward Villa Velha, in hopes of winning the bridge there, but
it had been removed in time. Abrantes secured the passage against them
at one practicable point; and Major-General Fane was sent into Alentejo
to observe the enemy at Santarem, with a sufficient force to defeat any
attempt that might be made in that quarter. Meantime Massena’s apparent
inactivity was regarded with some wonder, and made the subject of
pasquinades in his own army. Sickness and desertion were daily reducing
his numbers; his only possibility of success depended upon effecting
a plan of co-operation with Soult; but time must elapse before that
could be attempted, and without reinforcements he could not maintain
his ground in Portugal the while. For these he had applied pressingly,
and having determined where to await them, and prepared accordingly,
after remaining a month in front of the British lines, he broke up from
his bivouac on the night of the 14th of November, for the purpose of
retiring into cantonments. The allies were immediately put in motion
to follow him, but the movement was so ably conducted, on the enemy’s
part, that not above 400 prisoners were taken during the retreat.
♦LORD WELLINGTON ADVANCES TO SANTAREM.♦
Lord Wellington, not knowing what might be Massena’s intention, could
not pursue him with his whole force; Picton’s division was retained
in its station, in case the enemy should move round Monte Junto for
the purpose of making an attack on that side; and Hill was sent across
the Tagus with his corps, to protect Alentejo, and communicate with
Abrantes, if that place should be attacked. With the remainder of
the army Lord Wellington followed the French, and came up with them
near Santarem, where they occupied a position strong in itself, and
rendered formidable by retrenchments and abbattis. It was where the
high road, which is in that place a raised causeway walled on either
side, crosses a wide morass, through which the Rio Mayor makes its
way to the Tagus. The approach was defended by breastworks and trees
cut down, and the causeway was commanded from a hill, close to its
termination on the Santarem side, by artillery, which would have swept
its whole length. Demonstrations for attacking them were made, rather
to ascertain whether a retreat from the country were intended, than
with any intent of assailing a position so well chosen and secured.
Had this indeed been seriously designed, the heavy rain which fell
during the night, and rendered the fords of the Rio Mayor impassable,
must have frustrated it. Perceiving that the enemy were in considerable
force there, instead of being, as had been at first supposed, only the
rear-guard, and having ascertained that Massena’s ♦BOTH ARMIES GO INTO
CANTONMENTS.♦ purpose was to canton his troops in the finest part of
that country, Lord Wellington retained only his light division in front
of Santarem, and cantoned the army at Cartaxo (where his head-quarters
were fixed), Azambuja, Alcoentre, Alenquer, and Villa Franca, from
whence they might at any time fall back within their lines, if
the enemy should receive such reinforcements as might render this
expedient. Massena’s head-quarters were first at Santarem, but he soon
removed them to Torres Novas: Regnier was left at Santarem with his
corps; Junot’s was cantoned at Pernes; Ney’s at Thomar, Torres Novas,
and Punhete; the companies of artificers at Barquinha, and a reserve
of cavalry at Ourem. In this state both armies prepared to pass the
winter, both expecting reinforcements, and each ready to take advantage
of any favourable opportunity that circumstances might present.
“If this,” said the despondents in England, “be termed the defence
of a country, the Portugueze or any other people may well exclaim,
God preserve us from such defenders!” “The campaign,” they predicted,
“would be renewed in February, with such an accumulation of force
on the part of the enemy, as must make the protection even of Lisbon
hopeless, much less the deliverance of the Peninsula.” “They knew how
galling it must be to the pride of the nation thus to be foiled, and
thus, in expedition after expedition, to see the treasures and the
blood of their countrymen squandered in vain; but if the public would
give confidence to men of shallow intellects, ... to men who, having no
real stake in the country, submitted to execute the projects, however
extravagant, of the Junta who had so long misguided us, ... they must
bear the calamity and disgrace of constant miscarriage. It was a most
erroneous view of British policy, to conceive that we could ever, with
our limited population and commercial habits, become a military people;
and it would be just as rational for the French to strive to cope with
us by sea, as for us to enter the lists with them by land. All that
they now prayed for was, that our eyes might be at length opened to the
true policy which we ought to pursue, that of retrieving our finances,
and employing our resources upon objects truly British.” This was the
language of the opposition, and it excited now for the first time the
fears of the English public, because circumstances as melancholy as
they were unforeseen seemed to render it probable that they would soon
have it in their power to act upon the principles which they professed.
♦THE KING’S ILLNESS.♦
Toward the latter end of October the Princess Amelia died, after a
protracted and painful illness, which she had endured with exemplary
meekness and resignation. Aware of what must be its termination,
she had some of her hair set in a ring, and one day when her blind
father, making his daily visit, came to her bed-side, and held out his
hand to her, she put this sad memorial upon his finger silently. Her
dissolution occurred so soon afterwards, that she never knew the fatal
consequences. The King had suffered intense anxiety during her illness,
and when he felt this last indication of his daughter’s love, feeling
at the same time but too surely all that it implied, it affected him so
strongly as to bring on the recurrence of a malady which had rendered
the appointment of a regent necessary two-and-twenty years before.
There was, however, good reason for hope, because the disease of mind
was not constitutional and hereditary; they who had the best grounds
for forming an opinion believed that its foundation was laid by extreme
anxiety and consequent insomnolence during the latter years of the
American war. The physicians confidently expected that it would prove
of short continuance, and therefore parliament having met according
to summons, adjourned for a fortnight without a dissentient voice.
At the expiration of that term a second adjournment for a similar
time was proposed, upon the same grounds, and carried against a small
minority: that time also having elapsed, a report of the privy council
was laid before parliament, containing the examination of the King’s
physicians, all of whom declared it highly ♦1810. DECEMBER.♦ probable
that he would recover. Upon this report the house adjourned for a
third fortnight, but not without warm debate and a great increase
of numbers to the minority. At the end of this third adjournment
ministers informed parliament that although a considerable degree of
progressive amendment had taken place, and the same confident hopes of
ultimate recovery were still entertained, yet the immediate state of
his Majesty’s health was not such as could warrant them to propose a
farther adjournment. It became necessary, therefore, to deliberate in
what manner a regency should be formed.
♦PROCEEDINGS CONCERNING A REGENCY.♦
During the subsequent proceedings, ministers were accused in the most
vehement language of flagrant usurpation, and of grossly violating the
constitution. They were called a parcel of second-rate lawyers and
needy adventurers, who in their desperate ambition cared not for the
fate of the nation, so they could only contrive to keep their places
and retain the command of the public purse. Their proceedings, it was
said, were miserable shams and pretences, tending to inflict a mortal
stab upon the constitution of the country, and to vest the government
in an oligarchical House of Commons. Mr. Perceval would fain persuade
that house to make him governor of the country, and let him put the
crown in his pocket. Parliament, therefore, was exhorted to withdraw
from ministers as speedily as possible the power which they enjoyed,
for the day of their dismissal, it was said, would be the best day
England had ever seen. Among the evils which might be expected from
the suspension of the executive power, it was urged that no assistance
could be sent to Lord Wellington, no money drawn from the exchequer,
however indispensable a supply might be at this time. Lord Holland
dwelt upon this argument; to which Lord Liverpool replied, he was not
aware of any injury to the public service from any such delay, nor
that ministers had abstained from any acts, from which, under other
circumstances, they would not have advised his Majesty to abstain.
At whatever risk to themselves, he said, they would do that which
they deemed most conducive to the safety, honour, and interest of the
country, leaving it for the justice of parliament to consider of, and
decide upon, the grounds of their justification. This reply was not
received as it ought to have been. Lord Holland made answer, it was
highly proper that indemnity should follow statesman-like measures,
called for by necessity; but those who had assumed the functions of
the executive power could not be entitled to indemnity for measures
rendered necessary by a delay which they themselves had caused. And the
Duke of Norfolk observed in the same tone, that if no inconvenience had
resulted from the suspension of the executive power, then had ministers
in effect taken the sovereignty into their own hands.
♦MR. PERCEVAL.♦
Upon this subject Mr. Perceval spoke with characteristic manliness. “We
have not,” said he, “been blind to these things. If ministers should
find it necessary to take such steps, they would be justified under the
particular circumstances of the case; but they would act under a heavy
responsibility, and parliament would be bound in duty to examine their
conduct afterwards. I am deeply convinced, that I stand in a situation
of as deep responsibility as ever a minister stood in; a double
responsibility, a responsibility to the public, and a responsibility
to the King my master. I feel this to be our situation; and parliament
must have felt it so too, in suffering the delays that have already
taken place. Gentlemen opposite may put what construction they please
upon what I am about to say; but I do contend boldly before parliament,
and before my country, that if, under these circumstances, any measure,
in any of the public departments, required the sign manual, the officer
at the head of that department would act most culpably if he did not
issue the necessary orders to his inferior upon his responsibility.
This is the view I have of the situation and of the duties of his
Majesty’s ministers; and although gentlemen on the other side have
thought proper to insinuate that our measures have been influenced by
a desire of retaining our offices, I am sure the house will not be of
opinion that our situation is particularly enviable, or one that could
by any possibility be an object of choice. We feel ... we admit ...
all the inconvenience of the present state of things; but, considering
the duration to be but short, are they in any degree equal to the
inconvenience of appointing another person to execute the functions of
the sovereign; or, in other words, of appointing a regent, unless the
necessity of the case absolutely requires it? It is not from feelings
of delicacy only that his Majesty’s ministers have acted, but from the
conviction that the preserving to his Majesty the power of exercising
his authority immediately upon his recovery, without the interruption
of a regent, would be a great national advantage. The regent, when
appointed, would of course act as he thought best for the interests
of the state; and even admitting that the plans which he would adopt
would be better than those now pursued, yet I contend, that this
change from a bad to a better system, with the probability of again
shortly recurring to the old system, would be much more injurious to
the welfare of the public, than the inconveniences which have been so
strongly urged by the gentlemen on the other side of the house.
“The delay which has taken place has been no covert delay: it has been
perfectly open, and the reason why it was asked was fairly stated. We
have had no disguise, no subterfuge; our object was broadly and fairly
stated to parliament. Sir, I say again, that ministers feel deeply the
heavy responsibility of their situation: they know that their conduct
will necessarily be examined and scrutinized by parliament; they
know that they may have to request justice from parliament for their
conduct, at a time when those who are now censuring their conduct with
so much acrimony may possess a greater sway than they do at present. Is
such a situation, then, a desirable one? Is it an object of ambition?
Is it possible that any man, or set of men, can covet such a situation,
or wish to retain it, except from the imperious sense of the duty which
they owe to their sovereign and to their country? That duty I will
perform to the best of my humble abilities, and cheerfully submit my
conduct to the justice of parliament and of my country.
“It has been asked, whether, if under the present circumstances the
evacuation of Portugal were deemed necessary, any order could be sent
out to Lord Wellington for that purpose? And do gentlemen really
believe that any difficulty exists upon such a subject? Do they really
believe that Lord Wellington would refuse to obey an order transmitted
to him, by his Majesty’s secretary of state, for that purpose, merely
because he had heard of the King’s indisposition? Undoubtedly they do
not: the case they have put is then an imaginary one.... Sir, in the
office which I have the honour to hold, money must be taken out of the
Exchequer for the public service; it is the bounden duty of ministers
to see that service performed; and do the honourable gentlemen opposite
think that I would hesitate to draw the money for that purpose?”...
At this a loud cry of Hear! hear! was raised from the opposition
benches.... “Sir,” pursued Mr. Perceval, “I am unable to account for
the distinction which the gentlemen opposite appear to me to make
between the two cases which I have put. When I said that ministers
would not hesitate to give orders for the evacuation of Portugal, if
it were deemed necessary, they seemed, by their silence at least,
to acquiesce in what I said; but when I spoke of applying the money
voted for the public service to the public service, they affect great
astonishment, as if the principle of the two cases was not the same.
But do they think that where money has been voted by parliament, and
ordered by parliament to be applied to a particular service, that I
would hesitate to have that public service performed, for fear of the
responsibility that would attach to me? Do they think that I would
endanger the best interests of the country, from any consideration of
personal danger to myself? Do they think that I would risk a mutiny
in the army or the navy, rather than take upon me the responsibility
of issuing their pay? No, sir, if I could be guilty of such conduct,
I should be unfit indeed for the situation which I hold! I should be
guilty of a base dereliction of my duty to my sovereign and my country!”
♦TROOPS SENT TO PORTUGAL.♦
This was no empty language; and however the manly appeal might be
lost upon those persons to whom it was immediately addressed, it was
not lost upon the people of England. The ministers, with a spirit
which alone might be sufficient to atone for all their errors, and
entitle them to the lasting gratitude of these kingdoms, had ordered
off reinforcements to Lord Wellington, on their own responsibility,
at a crisis when they held their power by so precarious a tenure,
that it was not unlikely their successors’ orders for the evacuation
of Portugal might be upon the seas at the same time. For that this
was the policy which the opposition intended to pursue, if, as they
now fully expected, they were to be invested with power, ♦ISSUES OF
MONEY REQUIRED.♦ was what they themselves avowed. Issues of money also
became necessary for the army and navy: money had been appropriated
by parliament for these services; but the exchequer act requires that
the issue should be under the great seal, or under the privy seal, or
by authority of an act of parliament. Mr. Perceval thought that under
the existing circumstances it would be proper to use the privy seal:
the keeper of the privy seal was willing to take upon himself this
responsibility; but the signature of Mr. Larpent, clerk of the privy
seal, was likewise necessary, and that gentleman refused to affix it,
pleading scruples on account of his oath of office. Mr. Perceval upon
this issued an order from the Treasury to the Exchequer, deeming this
sufficient, and thinking also that it was better for the responsible
servants ♦1811. JANUARY.♦ of the crown to risk the censure, or wait
the indemnity of parliament, than to procrastinate public business, by
bringing such topics into discussion in the house from time to time.
♦JAN. 1. CONDUCT OF LORD GRENVILLE AS AUDITOR OF THE EXCHEQUER.♦ But
when these warrants were brought to Lord Grenville, in his capacity
of Auditor of the Exchequer, he returned an answer to Mr. Perceval,
requiring time “to consider the nature and extent of the duties which
this new and unexpected course of proceeding imposed upon him;” and
therefore requesting to know when it was necessary that the money
should be issued. He was informed, “that, according to the usual
course of supplying the weekly issues to the navy and army, it would
be necessary that sums should be issued for both services, beyond
the amount of the existing credit at the exchequer, either on the
morrow, or the next day at farthest; but if an actual issue could
be made within six days, no serious inconvenience was apprehended.”
Lord Grenville then desired that the opinions of the Attorney and
Solicitor General should be taken. These law officers pronounced,
that they “did not think the warrant of the Lords Commissioners of
the Treasury was in law a sufficient authority imperative upon the
Auditor, nor, consequently, a legal sanction for his proceeding to obey
the same; nor that any discretion was left to him by the law on this
occasion, for the exercise of which he would not be responsible.” The
Lords Commissioners of the Treasury transmitted this opinion to Lord
Grenville, informing him at the same time “that their sense of the
mischief to the public service, which would arise if any delay should
take place, appeared to render it indispensable that the warrants
should be forthwith complied with, and that they were consequently
ready to take upon themselves the responsibility of any act which
might be essential for that purpose.” Lord Grenville replied, that it
was matter of the deepest concern to him to be made the involuntary
cause of any, even the shortest delay, in an issue of his Majesty’s
treasury, stated to him from such high authority to be important to the
public service. “If,” said he, “I could be satisfied of the propriety
of my doing what is required, there is no personal responsibility
which I would not readily incur for the public interests; but I cannot
persuade myself, that I could obey those warrants, without a breach of
my official duty in that point, which is above all others peculiarly
obligatory on the person placed in the situation of Auditor of the
Exchequer; nor without a high and criminal violation both of a positive
statute, and also of the essential principles of our monarchical and
parliamentary constitution.
“I am told,” he continued, “that I must act on my own discretion, for
the exercise of which I must alone be responsible. This responsibility,
if it legally attaches upon me, I certainly cannot transfer to any
other persons, and least of all to your lordships, whatever willingness
you have expressed to take it on yourselves. My attempting to do so
would itself be criminal; tending to confound the official relations in
which I have the honour to stand towards your lordships, and to annul
those checks which the law has established for ensuring the faithful
discharge of our respective duties, and thereby the security of the
public treasure. But I beg leave humbly to submit to your lordships,
that the law has in truth invested me with no discretion on this
subject. The exigencies of the public service, which your lordships
have condescended to detail to me in these your warrants, are matters
of state, of which, as Auditor of the Exchequer, I have no knowledge,
and can take no cognizance; my official duty is strictly limited to
an observance of the accustomed forms of the exchequer, and of the
laws which have from time to time been passed for its regulation. To
these I am bound to adhere; and it is on the fullest consideration
which this pressure of time has permitted me to give them, that I am
compelled to decline, but with all due respect to your lordships, a
compliance with the requisition contained in those warrants, to which
this letter refers.” His lordship concluded, by recommending that the
difficulty should be submitted to the consideration of the two houses
of parliament, with whom rested the right and duty to provide the
means of removing it, and to whose pleasure he would defer with entire
submission.
♦JAN. 3.♦
Mr. Perceval immediately laid this correspondence before parliament,
saying, “that, though, if it had not been for the difficulty thus
unexpectedly started, he should not have thought it expedient to bring
the subject under their immediate notice, yet he had always anticipated
it as his duty to submit it to their consideration, not for the purpose
of obtaining a previous vote of indemnity, but, having incurred the
responsibility of action, with the view of calling on the house to
determine whether or not ministers had acted justifiably.” He now
moved a resolution, that the Lords of the Treasury should issue their
warrants for the payment of such sums as were necessary, and that the
Auditors and officers of the Exchequer should obey those warrants.
In the course of the debate he noticed the argument, that public
inconvenience was now proved to have arisen from the delay occasioned
by adjournments. “We have,” said he, “this marked, monstrous,
abominable, and aggravated case before us, ... and what is it? what
is this great public inconvenience? Why, that ministers have found it
necessary to come to parliament to authorize the issue of money, for
services for which that very money has been appointed!”
The resolution passed without a division; but, in the Upper House,
twenty Peers, among whom were all the Royal Dukes, protested against
it; because, they said, the principle on which it was founded would
justify the assumption of all the executive power of the crown by
the two houses of parliament, during any suspension of the personal
exercise of the royal authority. This business attracted more notice
than it otherwise would have done, because, upon Lord Grenville’s
accession to the first place in the ministry after the death of Mr.
Pitt, a bill had been passed, empowering him to hold at the same time
the offices of First Lord of the Treasury and Auditor of the Exchequer;
offices which, it was argued in support of the bill, might without
inconvenience be held by the same person. The imprudence of bringing
thus to recollection a measure, which at the time had called forth
strong animadversions, did not tend to lessen the unpopularity of Lord
Grenville and the coalition with which he acted.
♦STATE OF THE OPPOSITION.♦
That party fully expected their return to power. They were strong in
borough influence, while Mr. Perceval, owing to the course which he
pursued concerning the regency, lost the support of those members
of the royal family who had been most closely connected with their
father’s government. Their journalists were numerous and active, and
they depended upon the Prince’s favour. But though all the various
sects and subdivisions of opposition had united in one cry against
the king’s ministers, there were too many points of difference
between them to be easily accommodated. On the question of what is
insidiously termed catholic emancipation they were agreed; but only on
that question: the Grenvilles were at variance with all their allies
upon the subject of parliamentary reform, and the reformists were
at variance among themselves as to the nature and extent of their
purposed reformation. The war also was another ground of dissension.
One party would have sacrificed our allies, our interest, and our
honour, for the sake of obtaining vile popularity, by concluding a
nominal and deceitful peace. They saw no difficulty in accommodating
our differences with all our enemies; according to them, their country
was in the wrong upon every disputed point; we had therefore only to
concede every thing to America, and suffer Buonaparte, without farther
opposition, to govern Spain and Portugal in his own way: then we might
have illuminations for a definitive treaty, transparencies of Peace
and Plenty, and quartern loaves and pewter pots carried in jubilant
procession, in honour of the reduced prices of bread and porter. This
would have been the foreign policy of the radical reformers; that of
Lord Grenville and the despondents would have been equally ruinous;
believing it impossible that we could resist the military power
of France, and yet knowing that peace would be only a snare, they
would have carried on a timid defensive war, without the hope or the
possibility of bringing it to a glorious termination. Lord Holland, on
the contrary, would have acted with additional vigour in aid of Spain;
in this he would have been supported by Earl Moira and Mr. Sheridan,
and perhaps by the Marquis of Lansdowne and Mr. Ponsonby.
♦THEIR EXPECTATIONS.♦
The hopes, however, of the opposition were raised to the highest pitch,
and their partizans scarcely even attempted to conceal their joy at
an event, which, as they fully expected, was to restore them to their
places. The disposition of the Prince was well known to be favourable
to these hopes: he had a personal regard for some of the leaders of
the party, and it was believed that many of his political opinions had
been imbibed from Mr. Fox. It was therefore probable that a change of
ministry would take place; and all the opponents of government, however
greatly they differed among themselves as to their ultimate objects,
from the regular opposition, under Lords Grey and Grenville, down to
the very dregs of the revolutionary faction, vied with each other in
exulting over a falling enemy.
♦LANGUAGE OF THE ANARCHISTS.♦
Two years before the King’s illness, one of their journalists had said,
that “of all monarchs, since the revolution, the successor of George
III. would have the finest opportunity of becoming nobly popular.”
This sentence, connected as it was with the anticipation of “a crowd
of blessings that might be bestowed upon the country, in the event of
a total change of system,” had unwisely been selected for prosecution
by Sir Vicary Gibbs, and the defendants were of course acquitted. Such
language was perfectly consistent in the Foxites; but in the mouths
of the anarchists, the flattery which was now used toward the Prince
appeared not a little extraordinary. “Never,” they said, “was there so
fair an opportunity for producing a great and salutary effect, as the
Prince now had. We want a change of the whole system, a radical and a
sweeping change of it; and it is because we hope that such a change
would be the consequence of giving full powers to the Prince, that we
wish to see full powers given to him. Is not the Prince of Wales as
likely to be able to judge of political systems as his father, ...
afflicted as the latter unhappily has been in more ways than one, and
bent down with age as he now is? Is not the Prince as likely to be
able to choose proper advisers as his father was, or ever can be? Why
then should powers, of any sort, belonging to the kingly office, be
withheld from him? I know it has been said, that we are _bidding_ for
the Prince; and who can bid above us? We have to offer him _hearts_,
and _sinews_, and _lives_, if he needs them, and we ask for nothing
but our well-known rights in return. We want to strip him of nothing.
We grudge him and his family nothing that the constitution awards
them, or that they could ever wish for, in the way of splendour. All
we have to beseech of him is, that he will resolve to be the ruler of
a free people, and not the leader of a faction.” ... “His succession
to power,” we were told by another of these journalists, “with such
opportunities before him, and at so momentous a time, appeared a lot so
enviable, that it might turn philosophy itself into ambition. Hitherto
he had been seated in that domestic privacy, which he had learnt how to
value and dignify. And so wonderfully had past circumstances held back
the cause of radical reform, and so favourable for it were the present,
that Fate seemed purposely to have reserved the amiable task for his
royal highness, that with one restoring breath he might melt away the
accumulated oppressions of half a century.”
The wishes of this party concerning the King’s resumption of authority
were sufficiently expressed. They told us, it was exposing the
government to the contempt of foreign powers, to have a person at the
head of affairs who had long been incapable of signing his name to a
document, without some one to guide his hand; a person long incapable
of receiving petitions, of even holding a levee, or discharging
the most ordinary functions of his office; and now, too, afflicted
with this mental malady! They cited cases to show how doubtful and
precarious were the appearances of recovery from mental derangement;
observed that persons having been so afflicted were easily hurried,
and inferred that a man subject to hurries was not fit to wield the
executive power. When they were charged by their opponents with thus
disclosing a determination, that if they acceded to power the King
should never resume his functions, the manner in which the charge was
repelled was such as confirmed it. “Every one,” they said, “expresses
regret that the King, or that any other human being, should be
afflicted with blindness. But old age is old age, and blindness is
blindness, in a King as well as in other men; and when blindness is
unhappily added to old age, and to both are added _mental derangement_,
is it unreasonable that people whose happiness or misery must, in a
great degree, depend upon their government, should be solicitous that
_great caution_ should be used in the resumption of the royal authority
by a person thus afflicted?”... “Throw him into a corner!” exclaimed a
ministerial writer, when he exposed with indignation the wishes of this
party; “tell him, this is the lot reserved for a king who has reigned
so long!” The reply to this was any thing rather than a confutation or
denial of the charge. “We have had nothing to do with the _lot_,” said
a mouthpiece of the anarchists; “we have had no hand in making the King
either old, or blind, or mentally deranged. The _lot_ has fallen upon
him. The first is the lot of every man, and is generally esteemed a
very fortunate lot; the second is nothing very rare, and it is by no
means an unfrequent companion of old age; and the third, and all three,
are the work of nature, and not of any of us. And as to the King’s
having reigned so long, there is neither merit nor demerit in that,
either in him or his people.”
♦MR. PERCEVAL POPULAR AT THIS TIME.♦
Whether the agitators and anarchists really believed that the Prince
could be so infatuated as to countenance their plans for a radical
and sweeping change, ... or whether they held out this hope to their
dupes and disciples, in order that their certain disappointment might
engender a deadlier disaffection, is best known to themselves; but if,
abstaining from their indecent attempts to show that the King ought
never to be permitted to resume his authority, they had talked of no
other reform than that of curtailing the power of what they called
the borough-mongering faction, there never was a time when the better
part of the people would have been so well inclined to listen to their
arguments. Mr. Perceval had never stood so high in public estimation as
at this moment. When first he came into power, the tide of popularity
was in favour of him and his colleagues: because any men would have
been popular who succeeded to the administration which was then
displaced; but a series of untoward events had for a time lessened his
hold upon the country, without in any degree diminishing the general
dislike with which his opponents were regarded. The unhappy expedition
to Walcheren drew after it a cry of grief and disappointment, against
which, perhaps, he could scarcely have borne up, if Sir Francis
Burdett, by a factious dispute with the House of Commons, had not,
most unintentionally, but most effectually, drawn off the public
attention at the very moment when the decision upon the inquiry came
on. It was always asserted by his enemies, that he held his situation,
not through any weight of influence in the country, nor of talents
in parliament, but through the confidence and especial favour of the
King; and that nothing could be more unfit than that the British prime
minister should be thus dependent upon, and literally, as it were,
the servant of the crown. They who argued thus against Mr. Perceval’s
administration did not perceive how strong an argument they supplied
against that system, to which they themselves owed their only power;
certain, however, it is, that Mr. Perceval was thought a weak minister,
because he wanted that influence; and a sense of this weakness seems
sometimes to have made him assent to measures which he would gladly
have prevented, if he had held his situation by a stronger tenure. But
when the prop upon which he really had leaned, and by which it was
believed that he was entirely supported, was suddenly taken away, then
it was that he felt his own resources, and the people saw him confident
in his motives and measures, and with the strength of integrity hold
on his steady course; not to be deterred from what he knew to be his
duty, either by the clamours and threats of the faction within doors,
and the demagogues without; nor by the expressed displeasure of the
Prince, in whose power it would presently be to dismiss him from
office. Then, perhaps, for the first time, he became conscious of his
own powers, and the dignity of his nature shone forth; it was seen that
the man, whose individual character was without a spot, carried the
pure principles of his privacy into public action, and possessed the
steadiness and intrepidity of a statesman in as eminent a degree as the
milder and most endearing virtues of domestic life. Mr. Perceval never
held so high a place in public opinion as the favoured minister of the
King, in full and secure possession of power, as now, when he was only
the faithful servant of a master who was no longer sensible of his
services, and no longer capable of supporting him.
♦SCHEMES FOR A NEW MINISTRY.♦
Accustomed as the various members of opposition were to coalitions, and
compromises, and concessions, it was no easy task to form a coherent
ministry out of such heterogeneous elements. At the very commencement
of the arrangements, Lords Grey and Grenville could not accord, and
the Earl left town in disgust; they found it, however, expedient to
agree, and he returned in time to give counsel when the Prince had
to answer the proposed restrictions sent to him by parliament. It is
said that the answer which these lords had advised was shown by the
Prince to Mr. Sheridan, and that Mr. Sheridan declared it would prove
of the most pernicious consequences, inasmuch as it could hardly
fail to involve the Prince in a dispute ♦1811. FEBRUARY.♦ with the
House of Commons. This opinion was followed, and the answer which
was delivered was composed according to Mr. Sheridan’s counsel. The
two leading opposition lords were offended at this, and intimated,
that as his Royal Highness had not deemed it proper to adopt their
advice, they could not be of any service to him in the intended
arrangement. The Prince upon this requested Lord Holland to form an
administration; but Lord Holland had no influence, and was utterly
unable to ensure majorities. The Prince, therefore, who now began to
feel the difficulties of government, was driven back to Lords Grey and
Grenville, and a temporary conciliation took place. The triumph of
the opposition seemed now to be complete; they thought the field was
their own, and that nothing remained but to distribute the spoils. This
distribution, however, excited claims and contentions, of which the
Prince heard more than he liked.
♦THE KING’S OPINION DURING AN INTERVAL OF AMENDMENT.♦
When the time of the regency drew near, Mr. Perceval waited on the King
at Windsor, and found him well enough to converse upon public affairs,
though not sufficiently recovered to bear the weight of business. He
inquired anxiously concerning the Prince’s conduct, and expressed
great joy at finding that he had not thrown himself entirely into the
hands of a party who were directly hostile to all the measures of his
father’s government; and he desired that the Queen would write to the
Prince, to signify this approbation, and to request that he might
not be harassed on his return to society by having to ♦THE PRINCE
REGENT ANNOUNCES HIS INTENTION OF MAKING NO CHANGE. FEB. 4.♦ change
an ephemeral administration. The Prince, it is said, was well pleased
to be thus relieved from the difficulties in which he found himself
involved by jarring opinions and contending claims. He made known his
determination of making no change to the opposition; and on the day
before the regency bill passed, he officially acquainted Mr. Perceval
that it was his intention not to remove from their stations those whom
he found there as the King’s official servants. “At the same time,”
said he, “the Prince owes it to the truth and sincerity of character,
which, he trusts, will appear in every action of his life, explicitly
to declare, that the impulse of filial duty and affection to his
beloved and afflicted father leads him to dread that any act of the
Regent might, in the smallest degree, have the effect of interfering
with the progress of his Sovereign’s recovery. This consideration
alone dictates the decision now communicated to Mr. Perceval. Having
thus performed an act of indispensable duty, from a just sense of
what is due to his own consistency and honour, the Prince has only to
add, that, among the many blessings to be derived from his Majesty’s
restoration to health, and to the personal exercise of his royal
functions, it will not, in the Prince’s estimation, be the least, that
that most fortunate event will at once rescue him from a situation of
unexampled embarrassment, and put an end to a state of affairs ill
calculated, he fears, to sustain the interests of the united kingdom in
this awful and perilous crisis, and most difficult to be reconciled to
the genuine principles of the British constitution.”
♦MR. PERCEVAL’S REPLY.♦
Mr. Perceval replied, that, in the expression of the Prince’s anxiety
for the speedy restoration of his father’s health, he and his
colleagues could see nothing but additional motives for their most
anxious exertions to give satisfaction to his Royal Highness, in the
only manner in which it could be given, by endeavouring to promote his
views for the security and happiness of the country. “Mr. Perceval,”
he continued, “has never failed to regret the impression of your Royal
Highness with regard to the provisions of the regency bill, which his
Majesty’s servants felt it to be their duty to recommend to parliament.
But he ventures to submit to your Royal Highness, that, whatever
difficulties the present awful crisis of the country and the world may
create in the administration of the executive government, your Royal
Highness will not find them in any degree increased by the temporary
suspension of the exercise of those branches of the royal prerogative
which has been introduced by parliament, in conformity to what was
intended on a former similar occasion; and that whatever ministers
your Royal Highness might think proper to employ, would find in that
full support and countenance, which, as long as they were honoured
with your Royal Highness’s commands, they would feel confident they
would continue to enjoy, ample and sufficient means for enabling
your Royal Highness effectually to maintain the great and important
interests of the united kingdom. And Mr. Perceval humbly trusts, that,
whatever doubts your Royal Highness may entertain with respect to the
constitutional propriety of the measures which have been adopted,
your Royal Highness will feel assured, that they could not have been
recommended by his Majesty’s servants, nor sanctioned by parliament,
but upon the sincere, though possibly erroneous, conviction, that
they in no degree trenched upon the true principles and spirit of the
constitution.”
The opposition had made so sure of coming into power, that they let
the list of their intended arrangement get abroad; “an arrangement,”
they told us, “of one united, compact body of men, all holding
the same principles, and all animated by the same views; and an
administration,” they added, “of more internal strength, by the ties of
mutual friendship, ... of more public influence, by talents, integrity,
and stake in the country, never had been submitted to any Prince.” A
meeting of the common council was called by their city partizans, to
prepare an address of congratulation to the Regent upon the change
of men and measures which he was about to make. Their disappointment
was in proportion to their hopes; they affirmed, however, that the
Prince’s determination would be received with real satisfaction by the
friends of Lords Grey and Grenville, who must all feel that nothing
but a sense of imperious duty could have induced them to undertake the
irksome and arduous task of office in such times. “Three months,” they
said, “had already elapsed under a total suspension of the functions
of government, ... three months the most important, perhaps, that
had ever occurred in our history; another month must have been added
to the delay, if the Prince had yielded to his patriotic sentiments,
and recurred all at once to the principles upon which he thought the
administration would be most beneficially conducted. Thus much time
must have been required for the re-election of those who would have
vacated their seats, and for the re-establishment of the routine of
office; but this delay might certainly, in a moment of such emergency,
be productive of the most serious evil.” But while the Whigs thus
affected the language of resignation, the radical journalists declared,
“that a ministry formed by the two joint opposition lords would have
excluded almost all the Prince’s friends; that from those lords the
people could have expected nothing; but that they would have hoped for
something from an arrangement that should have placed Lord Holland
at the head of affairs, to the great mortification of those less
popular and less liberal leaders. It was as well to retain Perceval
and Liverpool, as to supersede them by Grey and Grenville.” Whigs and
anarchists, however, both agreed in asserting, that the Prince had
no confidence whatever in his ministers. “He signs papers,” said one
of these journalists, “receives addresses, expresses his opinions
respecting courts marshal and criminal, and has ten or a dozen people
to walk before him; but with regard to the nation, he can only wish its
prosperity, and has no more to do with its government than a keeper of
geese.”
But the great and quiet majority of the nation regarded the Prince
Regent’s determination with grateful joy: they anticipated, from the
wisdom and feeling which dictated it, a perseverance in the true
course of policy and honour, and in that anticipation looked on to
a triumphant issue of the war, with a hope which from thenceforward
suffered no abatement.
END OF VOL IV.
G. Woodfall, Printer, Angel Court, Skinner Street, London.
FOOTNOTES
[1] _Non est memoriæ ... quod in castro vel civitate aliquâ tales
fuerint defensores._ Gesta Comitum Barcinonensium, Marca Hispanica, 568.
[2] This would naturally be deemed miraculous, and the miracle was
ascribed to St. Narcissus and other saints, whose graves the French had
disturbed, and scattered their remains about. One statement is, that
the flies proceeded from St. Narcissus’s tomb. _Muscæ istæ partim erant
lividæ, partim virides, in quâdam sui parte colorem rubeum denotantes._
(Gesta Com. Barcin. 569, ut supra.) _Ceterum, qui locorum periti sunt
quæ circum Gerundam visuntur_, says the Archbishop Pierre de Marca, _ii
testantur haud procul eâ urbe videri rupes ex quibus vulgò oriuntur
etiamnum muscæ quales e scpulchro Sancti Narcissi prodiisse fabulantur.
Quod si ita est, non ultra inquirendum est in earum originem quæ
Gallico tum exercitui insultârunt, quas manifestum est ortas esse ex
rupibus illis._ Marca Hispanica, 468.
The flies are described differently in the _Acta Sanctorum_ (Mart. t.
ii. 624), where the miracles of St. Narcissus are given _ex hispanico
Ant. Vincentii Domenecci. Ex ipso sancti præsulis sepulchro exierunt
innumera examina muscarum, cœruleo partim, partim viridi colore
tinctarum, rubrisque striis dispunctarum; quæ virorum equorumque
subingressæ nares, non priùs deserebant occupatos, quàm spiritum
vitamque abstulissent, concidentibus humi mortuis. Tanti enim erat
veneni efficacia, ut seu virum seu equum momordissent, morsum continuò
mors sequeretur._ These authorities are given because they relate to
a curious fact in natural history, ... if there be any truth in the
story; and that there was a plague of insects can hardly be doubted.
That their bite was so deadly, and that they proceeded from the tomb,
I should have hesitated as little as the reader to disbelieve, if
some other accounts had not seemed to show that both these apparent
improbabilities may be possible. It is said that one part of Louisiana
is infested by a fly whose bite is fatal to horses. And about twenty
years ago, at Lewes, when a leaden coffin, which had been interred
about threescore years, was opened, the legs and thighbones of the
skeleton were found to be “covered with myriads of flies, of a species,
perhaps, totally unknown to the naturalist. The wings were white,
and the spectators gave it the name of the coffin-fly. The lead was
perfectly sound, and presented not the least chink or crevice for the
admission of air”: and the flies which were thus released are described
as being active and strong on the wing.
If, however, some long lost species had reappeared from the tomb, and
multiplied so as to become a plague, it would have continued in the
country. But if Pierre de Marca was rightly informed that a fly which
corresponds in appearance to the description is still found there, it
certainly possesses none of the tremendous powers which the legend
ascribes to it.
[3] Marshal St. Cyr has the following remark upon this carnage, after
observing that it proved useful as an example to other towns: _La
gloire de defendre ses foyers domestiques, menacés par l’étranger, est
grande, la plus grande de toutes, peut-être: mais la vertu qui y fait
prétendre, ne serait point la première des vertus, si elle pouvait
être pratiquée sans peril._ It must cost the heart something to reason
thus even in a just war. Marshal St. Cyr tells us, indeed, that _le
soldat devient naturellement cruel à la longue_: ... the more careful,
therefore, should he be not to sear his feelings and his conscience by
such reflections as this.
[4] An instance of heroism worthy of record was displayed by Luciano
Aucio, a drummer belonging to the artillery, who was stationed to give
the alarm whenever a shell was thrown: a ball struck off his leg at the
knee; but when the women came to remove him, he cried out, “No, no;
my arms are left, and I can still beat the drum to give my comrades
warning in time for them to save themselves!” This brave lad was the
only person during the siege who recovered after an amputation of the
thigh.
[5] Two singular cases of contusion of the brain were observed at this
time in the hospitals: one man did nothing but count with a loud and
deliberate voice from forty to seventy, always beginning at one number
and ending at the other, and this incessantly through the whole night.
Another continually uttered the most extraordinary blasphemies and
curses, exhausting the whole vocabulary of malediction, without any
apparent emotion of anger: this case did not prove fatal, but the man
was left in a state of helpless idiocy.
[6] A man deposed that he had seen the body when it was buried hastily,
by night; the face, he said, was swollen, and the eyes forced out of
their sockets. Supposing this testimony were true, the appearance would
denote strangulation rather than poison; but that Alvarez should have
been privately murdered is altogether improbable.
[7] Burnet says of the wars in the reign of William III. “The late king
told me that in these campaigns the Spaniards were both so ignorant and
so backward, so proud and yet so weak, that they would never own their
feebleness or their wants to him. They pretended they had stores when
they had none; and thousands when they scarce had hundreds. He had in
their councils often desired that they would give him only a true state
of their garrisons and magazines; but they always gave it false; so
that for some campaigns all was lost, merely because they deceived him
in the strength they pretended they had. At last he believed nothing
they said, but sent his own officers to examine every thing.” Vol. ii.
p. 7.
[8] Memoria de Azanza y O’Farrell, § 193, pp. 169, 170. They plead this
in justification or excuse for themselves.
[9] The account of Kolli’s examination had in one part been palpably
falsified. He was represented as saying that it was the Duke of Kent’s
wish to send Ferdinand to Gibraltar; but that he would not have
assisted in this plan, because it would have been in fact sending
him to prison! The whole of these documents are printed in Louis
Goldsmith’s Recueil de Decrets, Ordonnances, &c. t. iv. pp. 302–14; and
by Llorente, in his Mémoires pour servir à l’Histoire de la Revolution
d’Espagne, t. ii. pp. 306–342. This unworthy Spaniard expresses there a
decided opinion that Kolli himself was the person who went to Valençay,
as the official report stated. The Baron, however, has published his
own story, and it is confirmed by the declarations of Richard and
Fouché, authentically made after the restoration of the Bourbons.
One curious fact appears in the Baron de Kolli’s Memoirs. Diamonds to
the amount of 200,000 francs were taken from him by the police when he
was seized. After the restoration he reclaimed them. The result of his
application was a royal ordonnance, in which the King decided, that
the other effects belonging to the claimant should be restored to him,
but that the diamonds seized at Paris are, and remain, confiscated, as
having been given to the Sieur de Kolli by a government then at war
with France. And his renewed applications were answered by a repetition
of this ordonnance!
[10] Notwithstanding the facility with which, in many instances, Louis
was deluded by his brother, and the curious simplicity of character
which he exhibits, it is impossible to peruse his _Documens Historiques
et Reflexions sur le Gouvernement de la Hollande_, without feeling
great respect for him. His conduct was irreproachable, his views
benevolent even when erroneous, his intentions uniformly good; and
excellent indeed must that disposition have been, which in such trying
circumstances always preserved its natural rectitude.
It appears by these documents that the throne of Spain was offered to
him before Joseph was thought of, and that he rejected the proposal
as at once impolitic and iniquitous. But it is curious to see how
completely he had been deceived concerning the course of events in the
Peninsula, and still more extraordinary that in the year 1820 (when his
book was published) he appears to have obtained no better information
upon that subject than was communicated in the Moniteur during his
brother’s reign.
[11] The prejudice against mercury prevailed so strongly among the
native practitioners, that the commander-in-chief, at a time when
syphilitic diseases were thinning the ranks, found it necessary to
enforce its use in the army and in all the military hospitals.
[12] Some days after the storm the boats of the Triumph picked up
about thirty tons of quicksilver, in leathern bags of fifty pounds
each, which were cast on shore from the wreck. They were stowed below
in the storerooms and after-hold, and the bags having been thoroughly
soaked in the sea, decayed and burst before the danger was perceived.
As much of the quicksilver as possible was collected, but it insinuated
itself every where, and not less than ten tons weight was supposed to
have got between the timbers, which could only be cleared by docking
the ship and removing a plank at the lowest part near the keel. The
provisions were spoilt; two or three hundred of the crew were so
severely affected, that it was necessary to remove them immediately,
many of them being in a state which left little chance of recovery; and
the ship was sent to Gibraltar to have all her stores taken out, and
undergo a thorough clearance.
[13] A minute and interesting account of this escape was published at
Lausanne, 1817, with this title, _Relation du Séjour des Prisonniers de
Guerre Français et Suisses sur le Ponton la Castille, dans la Baie de
Cadix, et de leur Evasion le 15 May, 1810. Par L. Chapuis, de Lausanne,
Chirurgien major_.
[14] Upon this windmill the governor intended to mount a gun, and the
gun was lying in it, but not as yet mounted, and consequently useless;
another dismounted gun was lying near the mill. These guns of course
could be of no use in the action which ensued, but they figured in
Marshal Massena’s account of it.
[15] Massena’s official statement of this action was a masterpiece of
impudent falsehood. He asserted that General Craufurd’s force consisted
of 2000 horse and 8000 foot, and that they were all posted under the
guns of the fortress; that they gave way before the French, our cavalry
not daring to meet them with the sabre, and the infantry pursued at a
running step; that we lost sixty officers, of whom twenty-four were
buried in the field of battle; 400 killed, 700 wounded, 400 prisoners,
one stand of colours, and two pieces of cannon, while the loss of
the conquerors did not amount to 300. He took no colours, and the
two pieces of cannon were the dismounted guns at the windmill. In a
subsequent dispatch Massena assured the war-minister that all his
troops were burning with impatience to teach the English army what they
had already taught Craufurd’s division. Our own gazette had already
shown the veracity of this boaster’s account; but this new insult
called forth a counter-statement from General Craufurd, from which this
detail has chiefly been drawn, and to the truth of which the whole
British army were witnesses.
[16] The author of _Der Feldzug von Portugal in den Jahren 1811 und
1812_ (_Stutgard und Tubingen_, 1816) is mistaken in calling it the
burial-place of the kings of Portugal.
[17] Some of the Portugueze charging a superior force got so wedged in
among the French, that they had not room to use their bayonets; they
turned up the butt ends of their muskets, and plied them with such
vigour, that they presently cleared the way.
[18] Ten ensigns’ commissions were sent out after this action by the
commander-in-chief to Lord Wellington, as rewards for the same number
of non-commissioned officers who had distinguished themselves.
[19] The Portugueze officer who was with Massena, and whose journal is
printed in the _Investigador Portuguez_, states the number of killed
and wounded whom the French left on the ground at 4600.
[20] There are in fact three passes over this Serra, all of them
practicable for cavalry.
[21] Cardoso says, that to the east the Serra de Castello Rodrigo may
be distinguished, which is thirty leagues off, the Serra de Minde to
the south, and that of Grijo to the north, fifteen leagues distant.
Westward is the mouth of the Mondego and the coast.
[22] A loss which was magnified to 500 in Massena’s dispatches.
[23] The under-gardener of the Botanical Garden at Coimbra, with
his family, consisting of his wife (a young woman of eighteen, with
an infant at the breast) and her mother, having tarried too long to
accompany the army, was overtaken in the little town of Soure by some
stragglers from the enemy’s advanced guard, who were in search of
plunder. These miscreants secured the husband by fastening his hands
behind him: they tied the mother in the same manner; the villain then,
to whom the wife was allotted, either by agreement among them, or by
virtue of his authority, endeavoured to tear the infant from her arms,
that he might proceed to violate her in presence of her mother and
her husband. Failing in this, and enraged at a resistance which he
had not expected, he drew back a few yards, presented his musket, and
swore he would fire at her if she did not yield. “Fire, devil!” was
her immediate reply, and at the word she and her infant fell by the
same shot. The ruffians stripped her body, and compelled the husband
to carry the clothes on his back to Thomar, whither they carried him
prisoner. During his detention there he pointed out the murderer to
a Portugueze nobleman then serving with Massena; but whatever this
traitor may have felt at the crime, he did not venture to report it
to the French commander, and demand justice upon the criminal: the
hopes of co-operation on the part of the Portugueze people which he
had held out had been proved so utterly false, that Massena treated
him with contemptuous dislike, and moreover every thing was permitted
to their soldiers by the French generals in that atrocious campaign.
The gardener effected his escape to Coimbra, where a subscription was
raised for him, but he soon died, broken-hearted. The man himself
related this tragedy to the British officer, from whom I received it.
It is recorded here as an example of the spirit which the invaders
frequently found in those Portugueze women who were unfortunate enough
to fall into their hands.
Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant
preference was found in this book. Simple typographical errors were
corrected and some unbalanced quotation marks were remedied. Other
errors of these types were not changed because the corrections were not
obvious to the Transcriber.
Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained; occurrences
of inconsistent hyphenation have been changed only when there was a
predominant preference throughout the book.
The source book used many Sidenotes, printed in italics. Most match
entries in the Table of Contents, but some are either dates or
citations. To preserve proximity with the original text, if they were
printed mid-paragraph, that is where they appear here. Depending on
the format in which you are reading this eBook, Sidenotes may be
distinguished from regular text by being shown in some combination
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may appear next to or below each other, depending on the width of the
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The original Table of Contents used “ib.” when the page number was the
same as the one in the previous entry. This eBook uses the actual page
numbers.
Page 201: “not to be outdone” was missing the “to”; restored by
Transcriber.
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