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Title: History of the Peninsular War Volume III (of 6)
Author: Southey, Robert
Language: English
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HISTORY
OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR.
LONDON:
PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.
HISTORY
OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR.
“Unto thee
“Let thine own times as an old story be.”
DONNE.
BY ROBERT SOUTHEY, ESQ. LL.D.
POET LAUREATE,
HONORARY MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SPANISH ACADEMY, OF THE
ROYAL SPANISH ACADEMY OF HISTORY, OF THE ROYAL
INSTITUTE OF THE NETHERLANDS, OF THE
CYMMRODORION, OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, ETC.
A NEW EDITION.
_IN SIX VOLUMES._
VOL. III.
LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET.
MDCCCXXVIII.
Ἱστορίας γὰρ ἐὰν ἀφέλῃ τις τὸ διὰ τί, καὶ πῶς, καὶ τίνος χάριν ἐπράχθη,
καὶ τὸ πραχθὲν πότερα εὔλογον ἔσχε τὸ τέλος, τὸ καταλειπόμενον αὐτῆς
ἀγώνισμα μὲν, μάθημα δὲ οὐ γίγνεται· καὶ παραυτίκα μὲν τέρπει, πρὸς δὲ
τὸ μέλλον οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ τὸ παράπαν.
POLYBIUS, lib. iii. sect. 31.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XVI.
PAGE
Treaty between Great Britain and Spain 1
Surrender of Coruña 3
Situation and strength of Ferrol 5
Surrender of Ferrol 6
Exultation of the French 8
Pursuit of Romana’s army 10
Dismay in Galicia 11
Romana retreats toward Monterrey 12
Blake leaves the army 13
The French cease the pursuit 14
Buonaparte is advised that Austria is arming 15
Change in his views concerning Spain 16
He returns to France 18
His professions to the Spaniards at Madrid 19
Registers opened 24
The people of Madrid take the oath of allegiance to Joseph 25
Addresses to the Intruder 26
Edicts of the Intruder before his return to Madrid 27
His entrance into Madrid 29
Edicts against the patriots 31
Circular epistle to the clergy 32
Condition of Madrid 34
False intelligence published by the intrusive government 36
Unwillingness of the Spaniards to believe that Morla was a
traitor 37
Proofs of his prior treachery 38
Morla’s letter to the Central Junta 39
His letter to the governor of Cadiz 41
Arrest and cruel imprisonment of the French at Cadiz 42
Death of Florida Blanca 43
Marques de Astorga chosen president of the Central Junta 44
Catalonia 45
Siege of Barcelona 46
St. Cyr appointed to command the French 48
He determines upon besieging Rosas 50
Dilapidated state of that fortress 52
Preparations for the siege 52
British squadron in the Bay of Rosas 54
Disposition of the Italian troops to desert 56
Attack upon Fort Trinidad repulsed 57
The French establish themselves in the town 59
Lord Cochrane arrives, and throws himself into Fort Trinidad 59
Gallant defence of the fort 60
The citadel captured, and the fort evacuated 62
St. Cyr marches to relieve Barcelona 63
He discovers a mountain path near Hostalrich 64
Indecision of General Vives 67
He marches against the French 68
Rout of the Spaniards at Llinas 68
Retreat of the Spaniards from Barcelona to the Llobregat 71
St. Cyr marches against them 72
Indecision of the Spaniards 73
The Spaniards routed and pursued to Tarragona 76
CHAPTER XVII.
The Spaniards not discouraged by their reverses 80
Condition of Infantado’s army at Cuenca 81
Dreams of offensive operations 83
Movement against the French at Tarancon 84
Venegas falls back from Tarancon to Ucles 84
Rout of the Spaniards at Ucles 86
Cruelties committed there by the French 88
Infantado collects the fugitives 89
Retreat from Cuenca 91
Loss of the artillery 92
Infantado frustrates a movement of the enemy against the
Carolina army 94
He is superseded by Cartaojal 95
Calumnies against Castaños 96
His memorial to the Central Junta 99
Conde de Montijo’s intrigues 100
Progress of the French in Castille and Leon 101
New levies raised by the Spaniards 102
Temporizing conduct of certain magistrates 103
Sir Robert Wilson 103
He raises a Portugueze legion at Porto 104
Sir Robert goes to Ciudad Rodrigo 106
He refuses to return to Porto 107
Effect of his movements 108
Part of the legion detained at Porto 109
Displeasure of the authorities there 110
Rank given him by the Spanish government 110
Proposal that British troops should be admitted into Cadiz 111
Objections of the Spanish government 112
Troops arrive in the bay 114
Mr. Frere’s representations to the Central Junta 114
Reply of the Spanish government 116
Their proposal for employing the troops 117
Conference with Mr. Frere 117
Mr. Frere requests Cuesta’s opinion 120
Cuesta’s reply 122
Close of the discussion 123
Insurrection at Cadiz 127
Confidence of the people in the English 129
Proclamation of the governor 130
Murder of D. Juan de Heredia 131
The tumult subsides 131
Proclamation of the Central Junta 132
CHAPTER XVIII.
Castaños accused at Zaragoza as a traitor 135
State of public feeling in that city 136
Measures of precaution 137
None of the inhabitants leave the city 139
Supposed miracles 140
Works of defence 141
The city crowded with soldiers 144
Preparations within the city 145
Marshal Moncey reconnoitres the Torrero 145
The French appear before the city 146
They take the Torrero 146
Unsuccessful attack upon the suburbs 148
Moncey summons Palafox to surrender 149
The investment of the city completed 150
Proclamation of Palafox to the people of Madrid 152
Junot takes the command of the French 153
St. Joseph’s and the Redoubt of the Pillar taken 153
Rumours of success, and rejoicings in the city 154
An infectious disease appears in the city 155
Attempts of Lazan and Francisco Palafox to succour the city 157
Condition of the army in Catalonia 158
Reding takes the command 159
The army re-formed at Tarragona 160
Conduct of the French under St. Cyr 162
Orders to attempt the relief of Zaragoza 164
Tardiness in obeying them 166
Defeat of the peasantry 166
Alcañiz occupied by the French 166
Movements in Navarre and Aragon 167
Marshal Lasnes takes the command 167
He summons Palafox to surrender 168
The French enter the city, but with great loss 168
They establish themselves in the Trinidad Convent 171
Convents of S. Augustin and S. Monica won 171
The enemy proceed by mining 173
Progress of the pestilence 174
First talk of surrender in the city 176
The contest carried on by fire 177
Convent of Jesus in the suburb taken 179
St. Francisco taken 180
The French begin to murmur 182
Not even an attempt is made to relieve the city 183
The suburbs taken 185
The university taken 186
Palafox transfers his authority to a Junta 186
Condition of the besieged 187
Flag of truce sent to the French 189
Last efforts of the besieged 190
D. Pedro Maria Ric goes out to treat with Marshal Lasnes 192
Capitulation 194
Farther conditions asked, and refused 196
Conduct of the French 198
Treatment of the prisoners 198
Palafox compelled by threats of death to sign orders for
delivering up four fortresses 201
He is sent into France 202
Demands of the French 203
Lasnes makes his entrance 204
Baseness of the suffragan bishop 204
Language of the French upon their triumph 206
Decree of the Central Junta 206
Address to the nation 208
Honours decreed to the inhabitants of Zaragoza 211
Falsehoods of the French government 212
CHAPTER XIX.
Portugal threatened by the French 214
Preparations of the English for evacuating Lisbon 214
Address of the Portugueze Regency to the nation 215
State of public feeling at Lisbon 216
Marshal Soult ordered to enter Portugal from Galicia 218
Difficulty of providing for the French army 219
His confidence of success 220
Combined plans of the French 220
Vigo and Tuy occupied by the French 221
Preparations for crossing the Minho below Tuy 221
Failure of the attempt 223
Soult marches by way of Orense 223
Romana rouses the Galicians 224
Opinion of his strength 225
Villages burnt by the French 226
Intended plan of co-operation between Romana and Silveira 226
Difference between Marshals Soult and Ney 227
Rout of Romana’s army 228
The French remove their sick and wounded to Monterrey 229
Situation of Chaves 230
Silveira retires from Chaves 231
Some mutinous officers resolve to defend it 232
Surrender of Chaves 232
The French establish their hospital there 234
Preparations for defence at Porto 235
Advance of the French from Chaves 237
Tumults at Braga 238
General Freire murdered 240
The Portugueze routed before Braga 242
The French enter Braga 243
They appear before Porto 245
Oliveira murdered 246
The Bishop leaves the city 247
Porto taken 247
Massacre there 248
Soult remains in Porto 250
Disposition of the inhabitants 251
Marshal Soult’s views respecting the Liberals and the Jews 252
His hopes of becoming King of Northern Lusitania 254
He visits the Church of N. Senhor de Bouças 256
Chaves retaken by Silveira 260
Proceedings at Coimbra 262
Colonel Trant takes a position upon the Vouga 265
Cruelties of the French 268
Positions of the French and Portugueze 269
Romana captures the garrison at Villa Franca 270
Efforts of the Galicians 273
Barrios sent into Galicia 275
The Portugueze and Galicians blockade Tuy 276
Vigo 277
The Spaniards appear before Vigo 278
Recapture of that place 279
Blockade of Tuy 283
The Portugueze recross the Minho 284
The French in Tuy relieved and withdrawn 284
CHAPTER XX.
Plans of the intrusive government 286
Effect of the war upon the French soldiery 287
Temper of the Spanish generals in La Mancha and Extremadura 290
Reforms in the Spanish army 291
The Duque del Alburquerque 291
He proposes offensive operations 292
They are undertaken when too late 293
The Duke sent to join Cuesta 294
Cartaojal advances against the French 294
Rout of the Carolina army at Ciudad Real 295
Operations of Marshal Victor 295
The French cross the Puente del Arzobispo 296
Cuesta retreats from the Puerto de Miravete 297
Skirmishes at Truxillo and Miajadas 298
Junction with Alburquerque’s division 301
Cuesta offers battle at Medellin 301
Battle of Medellin 303
Misconduct of the Spanish cavalry 304
Cuesta thrown and wounded 304
Dispersion of the Spanish army 305
No quarter given 306
Escape of Alburquerque 307
The remnant of the Spanish army collect 308
Cuesta disgraces those who had behaved ill 309
The Junta act wisely and generously upon these defeats 310
Their appeal to the people 311
Tribunal of public safety 312
Correspondence on the Intruder’s part with the Junta 313
Measures for securing Badajoz 317
A crusade proclaimed there 318
Regulations concerning the ejected religioners 319
Plans of the intrusive government 320
Sir Robert Wilson’s conduct at Ciudad Rodrigo 321
Attempt to surprise that fortress 323
The French summon it 324
March of Lapisse to unite with Victor 325
The French enter Alcantara 325
Junction of Lapisse and Victor 327
CHAPTER XXI.
Conduct of the opposition in England 328
Return of the troops from Coruña 332
The King’s speech 333
Proceedings in Parliament 334
Lord Sidmouth 334
Earl St. Vincent 335
Lord Grenville 335
Earl of Liverpool 336
Mr. Ponsonby 338
Mr. Whitbread 339
Debates on the overture from Erfurth 341
Lord Grenville 341
Lord Auckland 341
Mr. Canning 341
Lord Henry Petty 343
Mr. Whitbread 343
Mr. Croker 346
Mr. Whitbread’s speech circulated by the French government 347
Debates on the campaign in Portugal 348
Both parties agree in extolling Sir John Moore 348
Inquiry into the campaign in Spain called for 349
Lord Grenville 349
Lord Erskine 349
Mr. Ponsonby 350
Lord Castlereagh 354
Mr. Tierney 354
Mr. Canning 357
Mr. Windham 361
Sir John Moore’s dispatches 367
Mr. Frere’s correspondence with Sir John Moore 372
Earl Grey 373
Earl of Liverpool 374
Mr. Canning 377
Earl Grey 381
Expedition to the Scheldt 382
Troops sent to Portugal 384
Earl of Buckinghamshire 384
CHAPTER XXII.
Feelings of the Portugueze toward the English 387
Sir Arthur Wellesley’s instructions 388
General Beresford appointed commander-in-chief of the
Portugueze army 389
He begins to reform the army 390
Intercepted letter from General Kellermann to Soult 392
Laborde sent to attack Silveira at Amarante 393
State of Penafiel when the French entered 394
The Bridge of Amarante 395
Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick killed in defending it 397
The French endeavour to throw a bridge over the river 398
Repeated attempts to effect the passage 399
Plan for demolishing the Portugueze entrenchments 400
The French win the bridge 401
Situation of the enemy 402
Sir Arthur Wellesley lands at Lisbon 404
He communicates his plans to Cuesta 404
Views of the Philadelphes in Marshal Soult’s army 406
The Sieur D’Argenton goes to Sir Arthur Wellesley to explain
their views 409
Advance of the British army towards Porto 410
D’Argenton is arrested 411
Soult prepares to retreat from Portugal 412
The French driven from Albergaria 413
They are driven from their position at Grijo 414
Measures of Soult to prevent the passage of the Douro 415
Passage of that river 416
Deliverance of Porto 418
Soult and Loison effect a junction on their retreat 421
Sir Arthur pursues the French 422
Sufferings of the enemy in their flight 423
Loss of the French at Puente de Misarella 425
The pursuit given over at Montalegre 425
Movement of troops from Aragon 426
Reasons for not continuing the pursuit 427
Victor enters Portugal by way of Alcantara, and speedily
retreats 428
Soult reaches Orense 429
Romana enters Asturias, and displaces the Junta 429
Combined movements of the French against Romana 430
Romana escapes by sea 431
Ney returns into Galicia 432
The French in Lugo relieved by Soult 433
Mahy returns to Mondoñedo 434
The French driven from Compostella 435
Combined operations of Marshals Ney and Soult in Galicia 436
Romana rejoins his army 437
Proceedings of Soult 437
Cruelties exercised by the French 439
Defeat of the French at the Bridge of S. Payo 440
The Spaniards retaliate upon the invaders 443
Soult retreats out of Galicia 443
Ferrol and Coruña evacuated by the French 444
Soult complains of certain officers 446
He recommends a plan for securing Galicia 447
Romana summoned to take his place in the Central Junta 448
He orders a monument to be erected to Sir John Moore 449
His farewell to the army 450
Address of the Central Junta to the Galicians 451
CHAPTER XXIII.
Proceedings of the French after the fall of Zaragoza 456
State of the Catalan army 457
Reding determines to act on the offensive 460
The Spaniards driven from Igualada 461
Failure of the French against the Abbey of the S. Creus 462
Reding takes the field, and collects his scattered troops 465
He is advised to retreat 466
Battle of Valls 469
The French received at Reus 472
Arrangement concerning the wounded 473
Alarm at Tortosa 474
Lazan separates his army from Reding’s command 475
Mortality in Tarragona 476
St. Cyr removes to the plain of Vicq 477
Vicq deserted by its inhabitants 480
Arrest of the persons in office at Barcelona for refusing the
oath 481
Prisoners sent into France 483
Barcelona relieved by sea 484
Reding dies of his wounds 484
Peasants of the Vallés 486
Blake appointed to the command 488
Movements of the Aragonese 488
Monzon recovered by the Spaniards 490
Capture of a French detachment 491
Blake moves upon Alcañiz 492
The French withdraw 495
Suchet comes against him 496
Defeat of the French before Alcañiz 497
Anniversary of the insurrection at Valencia 499
Celebration of S. Ferdinand’s day 500
Executions in Barcelona 502
Blake advances toward Zaragoza 504
Suchet attacks the Spaniards 505
Blake retreats to Belchite 506
Flight of the Spaniards 507
Blake’s resignation not accepted 509
Commencement of the Guerillas 511
Porlier 511
The Empecinado 511
Renovales in the valleys of Roncal 512
He defeats a French detachment 512
A second party defeated 513
Proclamation of the Duque de Mahon 514
Executions and reprisals 516
Attempts to win over Renovales 517
Troops sent from Zaragoza against him 520
He capitulates for the valleys 522
Xavier Mina 523
Siege of Gerona commenced 526
HISTORY
OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR.
CHAPTER XVI.
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN. SURRENDER OF CORUNA AND
FERROL. SITUATION OF ROMANA’S ARMY. BUONAPARTE RETURNS TO FRANCE.
PROCEEDINGS AT MADRID. OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.
♦1809. JANUARY.♦
♦TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN.♦
Happily for the interests of Great Britain, and for its honour, which
is paramount to all interests, the British government entertained
more generous hopes than its General had done, and acted upon wiser
views. At the very time when the Spaniards had sustained the heaviest
losses, and our own army was known to be in full retreat, a treaty
was signed at London between Great Britain and the Spanish nation
acting in the name of Ferdinand. It proclaimed a christian, stable,
and inviolable peace between the two countries, perpetual and sincere
amity, and strict alliance during the war with France; and it
pronounced an entire and lasting oblivion of all acts of hostility done
on either side in the course of the late wars wherein they had been
engaged against each other. His Britannic Majesty engaged to assist
the Spaniards to the utmost of his power, and not to acknowledge any
other King of Spain, and of the Indies thereunto appertaining, than
Ferdinand VII., his heirs, or such lawful successor as the Spanish
nation should acknowledge; and the Spanish government engaged, on
behalf of Ferdinand, never to cede to France any portion of the
territories or possessions of the Spanish monarchy in any part of the
world. The contracting parties bound themselves to make common cause
against France, and not to make peace except by common consent. It was
agreed by an additional article, that as the existing circumstances
did not admit of the regular negotiation of a treaty of commerce with
all the care and consideration due to so important a subject, such
a negotiation should be effected as soon as it was practicable; and
meantime mutual facilities afforded to the commerce of both countries,
by temporary regulations, founded on reciprocal utility. Another
separate article provided that the Spanish government should take the
most effectual measures for preventing the Spanish squadrons, in all
their ports, from falling into the power of France. Before the treaty
could reach Spain, the mischief against which this latter article was
intended to provide had been done in the ports of Galicia.
♦SURRENDER OF CORUÑA.♦
There were Englishmen at Coruña, who, when Sir John Moore was
preparing to embark, doubted whether the inhabitants would protect
his embarkation. In the bitterness of grief and shame they said,
“should the Galicians tell us that we came into their country and by
the imposing display of our well-equipped army prevented them from
defending their native mountains; that they entrusted their passes to
us and we abandoned them to the enemy; that disregarding any service
which seemed immaterial to our own safety, we let the French occupy the
approaches to their city; ... should the volunteers of Coruña tell us
this (they said), and throw down their arms when they see us flying to
our ships, ... we should have little right to complain of desertion or
abandonment!” But the Spaniards are a more generous people than these
doubts implied. Astonished indeed they were at the manner in which an
army that had excited by its proud appearance the highest hopes as well
as the highest admiration, had retreated through one of the strongest
and most defensible countries in Europe; but severely as these hopes
were disappointed, and cruelly as they suffered in consequence, they
were not betrayed into one unworthy act or expression of resentment.
The Governor of Coruña, D. Antonio de Alcedo, had made vigorous
preparations as soon as it seemed likely that the enemy might enter
Galicia. His name will be remembered as the author of a Geographical
Dictionary of Spanish America, much more accurate and copious than
any former work relating to those countries. It would be well for him
could it be forgotten in the history of his own. While he expected that
the British army would make a stand, and maintain Coruña and Ferrol
at least, even if they abandoned the field, he held brave language,
calling upon the inhabitants to supply stakes, beams, fascines and
butts for additional works, and exhorting the women to busy themselves
in providing sacks to be filled with earth. “If the French come,” said
he in his proclamation, “I will take such measures that Coruña shall be
not less gloriously distinguished than Gerona, Valencia, and Zaragoza.
But should fortune prove adverse to us, as a chastisement from God for
our sins, I will bury myself in the ruins of this fortress rather than
surrender it to the enemy: thus finishing my days with honour, and
trusting that all will follow my example.” Wherever in Spain a Governor
was found willing to set such an example, the resolution to follow it
was not wanting.
Coruña is a regular fortress, and might long have held out against
any means which Marshal Soult could have brought against it. But when
an English army with the sea open to them for succours did not think
of maintaining it, it is not surprising that the inhabitants should
have despaired of making a successful resistance. Their Governor was
prepared to play the traitor; he had still however honour enough left
not to propose a capitulation till the last transport was beyond the
enemy’s power. Terms were then easily agreed on, the one party asking
♦JAN. 19.♦ only what the other would have imposed. Alcedo stipulated
for a general amnesty; that all persons in office should retain their
appointments on taking an oath to the Intruder; and that the military
who took that oath might either continue in the service or receive
their dismissal at their own option, such as refused the oath becoming
prisoners of war. He himself set the example of swearing allegiance to
Joseph Buonaparte; and soon in his own person properly experienced with
what fidelity the French kept their engagements, for they presently
dismissed him from his government and sent him into France.
♦SITUATION AND STRENGTH OF FERROL.♦
Coruña and Ferrol are situated on the opposite sides of a spacious
bay which receives in four deep inlets the rivers Mero, Mandeu, Eume
and Juvia. Ferrol is placed in the deepest and most capacious of
these inlets, and nothing which skill and expense could effect had
been spared during the last half century for improving the natural
advantages of the harbour, and rendering it impregnable. It had
thus been rendered one of the strongest naval establishments in the
world, being also one of the most commodious. To force the passage
is impossible, ships having for the distance of a league to file one
by one along a shore defended by forts. Equal care had been taken to
protect it on the land side. There were at this time eight ships of the
line in the harbour, of which three were of the largest size, ... three
frigates, and a considerable number of smaller vessels. From Betanzos
to Ferrol was but a march of fourteen miles farther than from Betanzos
to Coruña; and it was a topic of exultation for the French, that the
English in the precipitance of their flight had not marched upon Ferrol
instead of Coruña, where they might have occupied a fortress strong
enough to be called impregnable, and have secured the squadron. It was
still fresh in remembrance that when Sir James Pulteney had landed
on the coast there with a part of that army by which the French were
afterwards expelled from Egypt, he deemed it more prudent to re-embark
his troops without attempting any thing, than to hazard an attack
against so formidable a place. It is indeed almost impossible to lay
regular siege to it: the nature of the ground being such that trenches
cannot be opened there.
♦SURRENDER OF FERROL.♦
Marshal Soult found in Coruña a battering train sufficient for making
a feint of besieging Ferrol; that it would not be in his power to take
it he well knew; ... but he reckoned upon the pusillanimity and treason
of the commanders, and upon the fortune of Buonaparte. The population
was estimated at 8000, double the number in Coruña; but the peasantry
from the adjacent country had flocked thither, and there were 8000
men within its walls, burning with hatred and indignation against the
French, and requiring only a leader in whom they could confide. The
persons in authority they suspected, and with too much reason. One of
these, the admiral D. Pedro Obregon, they displaced and threw into
prison; it was only removing one traitor to make room for another. D.
Francisco Melgarejo, who succeeded to the command of the squadron,
opened a correspondence with the enemy by water; and the military
commanders, equally ready to betray their country and their trust, sent
messengers round by land at the same time. Accordingly General Mermet
had no sooner made a demonstration of investing the town, than the
Castles of La Palma and San Martin were abandoned to him; and as the
disposition of the people was of no avail against the vile purposes
of their chiefs civil and military, the town ♦JAN. 26.♦ was delivered
up, upon the same terms as Coruña; a few additional articles being
added, stipulating for the arrears of pay, as also that if resistance
were made in any part of Galicia, no inhabitant of Ferrol should be
compelled to serve against his countrymen. Obregon was then released
from prison, and placed by the French at the head of the arsenal; he
and the comrades of his treason took the oath of allegiance to the
Intruder; and those persons who had been most active in arresting
him and in promoting the national cause were seized and reserved for
punishment.
♦EXULTATION OF THE ENEMY.♦
If the Central Junta had at one time dissembled the danger of the
country (or rather partaken too much of that unreasoning confidence
which was one characteristic of the Spaniards), they never attempted
to conceal its disasters, nor to extenuate them. On such occasions
their language was frank and dignified, becoming the nation which
they represented. In announcing the loss of Coruña and Ferrol,
they pronounced the surrender of those strong places to have been
cowardly and scandalous, and promised to condemn the persons who had
thus betrayed their duty, to condign punishment. The enemy meantime
failed not to blazon forth their triumphs in this Galician campaign:
to represent the battle of Coruña as a victory on their part was a
falsehood, which all circumstances, except those of the action itself,
tended to confirm; ... and the results of the campaign had been so
rapid, and apparently so complete, as to excite their own wonder. Three
British regiments, they said, the 42d, 50th, and 52d, had been entirely
destroyed in the action, and Sir John Moore killed in attempting to
charge at their head, with the vain hope of restoring the fortune of
the day. The English had lost every thing which constitutes an army,
artillery, horses, baggage, ammunition, magazines, and military
chests. 80 pieces of cannon they had landed, they had re-embarked no
more than 12. 200,000 weight of powder, 16,000 muskets, and 2,000,000
of treasure (about £83,000) had fallen into the hands of the pursuers,
and treasure yet more considerable had been thrown down the precipices
along the road between Astorga and Coruña, where the peasantry and the
soldiers were now collecting it. 5000 horses had been counted which
they had slaughtered upon the way, ... 500 were taken at Coruña, and
the carcasses of 1200 were infecting the streets when the conquerors
entered that town. The English would have occupied Ferrol and seized
the squadron there, had it not been for the precipitance of their
retreat, and the result of the battle to which they had been brought at
last. Thus then had terminated their expedition into Spain! thus, after
having fomented the war in that unhappy country, had they abandoned
it to its fate! In another season of the year not a man of them would
have escaped; now the facility of breaking up the bridges, the rapidity
of the winter torrents, shortness of days, and length of nights, had
favoured their retreat. But they were driven out of the peninsula,
harassed, routed, and disheartened. The kingdom of Leon, the province
of Zamora, and all Galicia, which they had been so desirous to cover,
were conquered and subdued; and Romana, whom they had brought from the
Baltic, was, with the wreck of his army, reduced to less than 2500
men, wandering between Vigo and Santiago, and closely pursued.... This
was the most stinging of all the French reproaches. Wounded to the
heart as we were that an English army should so have retreated, still
we knew that wherever our men had been allowed to face the enemy they
had beaten them; and that, however the real history of the battle of
Coruña might be concealed from the French people, the French army had
received a lesson there, which they would remember whenever it might be
our fortune to encounter them again. But that we should have drawn such
a force in pursuit of Romana, who, if he were taken prisoner, would be
put to death with the forms of justice, by a tyrant who made mockery
of justice, was of all the mournful reflections which this disastrous
expedition excited, the most painful and the most exasperating.
♦PURSUIT OF ROMANA’S ARMY.♦
At this time indeed Romana’s situation might have appeared hopeless to
any but a Spaniard, and few Spaniards would have regarded it with such
equanimity as this high-minded nobleman. In the virtuous determination
of doing his duty to the uttermost, whatever might betide, he trusted
Providence with the event, and gave way to no despondent or repining
thought. A detachment under G. Franceschi had pursued his army after it
had separated from Sir J. Moore at Astorga, and according to the French
statements taken some 3000 men, and killed a great number before he
entered the Val de Orras. The charge of completing its destruction was
then transferred by Soult to M. Ney, and he dispatched G. Marchand’s
division and a regiment of cavalry as amply sufficient for the intended
service. Romana left his vanguard under D. Gabriel de Mendizabal to
cover the Val de Orras, and the Riberas del Sil; ... one division was
posted at Pueblo de Tribes and Mendoya, to support him if he should
be attacked, and defend the bridge over the Bivey; the others were
distributed where they could find subsistence, and at the same time
afford support to the more advanced.
♦DISMAY IN GALICIA.♦
The country was in a state of the utmost alarm. The Vizconde de
Quintanilla, one of the deputies for Leon to the Central Junta, had
been sent to Romana’s army, and disagreeing with him before the retreat
commenced, had preceded him, in the hope of taking some measures which
might be serviceable to the common cause. Manifest as it was that Sir
J. Moore had given up that cause in his heart as hopeless, it had
never been apprehended that he would retreat with such precipitation,
and abandon Coruña and Ferrol to their fate; ports the maintenance of
which was of so great importance to Great Britain as long as she took
any part in the contest. Of all the Spaniards the Galicians had least
reason to fear that the war would be brought to their own doors; and
their consternation was extreme when they saw the enemy among them.
Quintanilla repaired to Santiago, from which city the Archbishop had
fled, having been insulted by the people, and dreading farther outrages
from the insubordination which these dreadful times produced. As it
seemed that nothing could be done for resisting the enemy, Quintanilla
endeavoured at least to disappoint them of their expected booty, and
proposed that the church plate should be removed. In such treasure that
city was peculiarly rich, having been during many centuries more in
vogue than any other place of pilgrimage in Europe; but his advice was
rejected, upon the ground that the populace, who were suspicious of
whatever was done, would not suffer it.
♦ROMANA RETREATS TOWARD MONTERRY.♦
Romana’s was a buoyant spirit, not to be depressed by any dangers. He
had read the British General rightly, but his confidence in the British
character was unshaken; and in the expectation that something would be
attempted upon the coast, he moved one of his divisions from Mazeda
to Taboada and other villages near Lugo, for the purpose of observing
and harassing the enemy. This movement was ordered the day before the
battle of Coruña. On the afternoon of the 17th he was apprised that
5000 French were at St. Esteban de Ribas del Sil, three leagues from
Orense, and in the night advice came from Mendizabal that he had been
attacked by a detachment moving upon that city. Romana reconnoitred
this force; they were plainly waiting for reinforcements, but even in
their present state he was not strong enough to resist them; for as
soon as he entered Galicia, the whole of the new levies had dispersed:
they belonged to that province, and feeling themselves within reach
of home, believed with some reason that they could provide better
for themselves than it was in the power of their general and their
government to provide for them.
At his last interview with Sir J. Moore it had been arranged that the
British army should make its stand at Villafranca, and there defend the
entrance into Galicia, while the Marquis should endeavour to collect
and reform his troops upon the river Sil. But because this resolution,
fatally for Sir J. Moore, had been abandoned, Romana’s left flank and
rear were exposed to the enemy. They were at leisure to direct their
efforts against him, and he saw that the only way of escape open for
him was by Monterry. In that direction therefore he moved, and fixed
his head-quarters on the 21st at Villaza, a league from that town, on
the side of Portugal. Here, ♦BLAKE LEAVES THE ARMY.♦ to his surprise
and displeasure, he found that Blake, who had continued with the army
till this day, had left it without giving him any intimation of his
departure, taken with him the officers whom he could trust, and left
directions for others to follow him through Portugal. The camp-marshal,
D. Rafael Martinengo, was missing also: his conduct, though irregular,
was afterwards honourably explained; he had gone to collect stragglers.
With regard to General Blake, serving only as an individual after he
had been removed from the command, he was at liberty to retire whither
and when he pleased, ... but not thus, in a manner derogatory to the
commander, subversive of discipline, and injurious to the army. His
disappearance, and that of the officers who followed him, increased
the distrust and despondency of the troops; and the reports which they
spread to excuse themselves for thus withdrawing, contributed still
farther to dishearten the people. “I assure your excellency,” said
Romana, when he communicated this to the war minister, “that I never
gave a more trying proof of patriotism, love to my King, and gratitude
to the government which in his name has conferred so many honours
upon me, than in taking upon myself the command of this army in such
circumstances, and retaining it, though abandoned by those who ought
to have assisted me. I know not wherein this patriotism consists which
is so loudly vaunted ... any reverse, any mishap, prostrates the minds
of these people, and, thinking only of saving their own persons, they
sacrifice their country, and compromise their commander.”
♦THE FRENCH CEASE THE PURSUIT.♦
The next intelligence was of Sir J. Moore’s death in action with M.
Soult. The first thought which occurred to Romana was that this would
not have happened if they had given battle to that very Soult at
Saldaña. It was his firm persuasion that if the British force and his
ill-fated troops had been united in October, they might have driven
the French beyond the Pyrenees. The British had now actually embarked.
Coruña and Ferrol were still points of hope; and if the governors
there performed their duty, he could yet render them some service in
the field. With this view he moved to cover the province of Tuy; but
having reached La Guironda, he learnt in the night that the French with
superior forces were at hand. His troops, though well equal to the
business of harassing an enemy that should be otherwise employed, would
have been lost if brought to action; he returned therefore to Oimbra,
with the intention, if he should be pursued, of entering Portugal, and
making through Tras-os-Montes for Ciudad Rodrigo, there to refit his
army, or reinforce some other with the remnant that was left. A little
respite was allowed him, for the French did not think the wreck of this
army of sufficient consequence to fatigue themselves by pursuing and
hunting it down. Where he and his handful of fugitives were secreting
themselves they knew not, and on his part Romana knew as little what
was passing in other parts of Spain.
♦BUONAPARTE ADVISED THAT AUSTRIA IS ARMING.♦
Buonaparte had never appeared so joyous as when he left Madrid with
the expectation of surprising Sir John Moore. He had intended ♦DE
PRADT, 211.♦ to go to Lisbon, and the troops had actually received
orders to hold themselves in readiness for beginning their march toward
that capital, but the desire of encountering a British army made him
change his intention; and Lisbon was thus doubly preserved from a
second subjugation, for this movement interposed between the British
and Portugal, and if Sir J. Moore had retreated thither, he would have
abandoned Lisbon as he did Coruña. When there was no longer a hope of
overtaking the English, Buonaparte stopped at Astorga; it was more
consistent with his dignity that a detachment of his army should hunt
them to the coast, than that he should continue the pursuit in person.
Beyond that city, therefore, he would not have proceeded, even if
dispatches had not reached him there which recalled him into France. He
had designs against Austria, concerning which the Emperor Alexander had
been deceived at Erfurt: his intention had been to complete the easy
subjugation of Spain before he began to execute these further projects
of insatiable ambition; but he was informed that Austria, instead of
waiting for the blow, was preparing to avail herself of the advantage
which the Spanish war afforded her. The news was not unwelcome to him;
for he had now entertained a new train of ambitious and perfidious
thoughts, which made him desirous of leaving Spain. From Astorga he
turned back to Valladolid, and remained there a few days to make his
last arrangements before he returned into France.
♦CHANGE IN HIS VIEWS CONCERNING SPAIN.♦
An attachment to his family was almost the only human part of
Buonaparte’s character; but when any object of aggrandisement
presented itself to his all-grasping desires, that attachment stood
as little in his way as the obligations of truth, honour, and justice.
He had been sincere in his intention of giving Spain to Joseph, while
he thought it an easy gift, and one which in its results would prove
beneficial to the giver. The resistance which had been made to the
intrusion, and the reverses which his arms had for a time experienced,
disturbed and mortified him; and in that temper of mind which escapes
self-condemnation by reproaching others, he imputed to Joseph’s flight
from Madrid, as a consequence, the very spirit of resistance which had
rendered that measure necessary for his own preservation. For this
reason there had been no cordiality at their meeting; he had treated
Joseph with disrespect, as well as coldness, and leaving him in the
rear, had issued edicts by his own authority, and in his own name. This
had been resented by Joseph, as far as one who was the receiver of a
stolen crown could resent it: having been made King, he represented
it was proper he should appear to be such; to debase him was not
the way of rendering him more acceptable to a proud and high-minded
nation. In addition to this there was another cause of discontent
between them. Whatever country Buonaparte entered, that country was
made to support his army; war was to him no expense, ... the cost fell
always upon his enemies or his allies. Thus he had expected to proceed
in Spain; ... but even when he was master of Madrid the intrusive
government had no other revenue than the duties which were paid at
his gates, and Joseph, instead of paying his brother’s armies, looked
to him for the maintenance of his own court. Joseph had represented
also the impolicy of continuing to exasperate the people by a system
of military exactions; and Napoleon, impatient of any contradiction,
instantly perceived that a King of Spain, whether of the Buonaparte
or the Bourbon dynasty, must have a Spanish feeling incompatible with
that entire subserviency to himself which he expected and required.
Having so lately and so solemnly guaranteed the integrity of Spain,
and proclaimed his brother king, he could not at once subvert his own
arrangements; ♦DE PRADT, 207–225.♦ but he avowed to M. de Pradt at this
time that when he had given that kingdom, he did not understand the
value of the present: follies would be committed, he said, which would
throw it again into his hands, and he would then divide it into five
viceroyalties.
♦HE RETURNS TO FRANCE.♦
He apprehended no difficulty in this: any military opposition which
could be attempted he despised, the more entirely because of the ease
with which the Spanish armies had been dispersed, ... and the moral
obstacles he was still incapable of appreciating. A dispatch reached
him from Galicia, and upon reading it he said to those about him,
“Every thing proceeds well. Romana cannot resist a fortnight longer.
The English will never make another effort; and three months hence the
war will be at an end.” One of the marshals hinted at the character of
the people and of the country. “It is a La Vendée,” he replied; “I have
tranquillized La Vendée. Calabria also was in a state of insurrection,
... wherever there are mountains there are insurgents; but the kingdom
of Naples is tranquil now. It is not enough to command an army well,
... one must have general views. The continental system is not the
same as in the time of Frederick; the great powers must absorb the
smaller. The priests have considerable influence here, and they use
it to exasperate the people: but the Romans conquered them; the Moors
conquered them; and they are not near so fine a people now as they were
then. I will settle the government firmly; I will interest the nobles,
and I will cut down the people with grape-shot. What do they want?
the Prince of Asturias? Half the nation object to him: ... besides he
is dead to them. There is no longer any dynasty to oppose to me. They
say the population is against us. Why Spain is a perfect solitude, ...
there are not five men to a square league. Besides, if it ♦JONES’S
ACCOUNT OF THE WAR, VOL. I. 165.♦ be a question of numbers, I will pour
all Europe into their country. They have to learn what a first-rate
power can effect.” With this flagitious determination the remorseless
tyrant returned into France.
♦PROFESSIONS TO THE SPANIARDS AT MADRID.♦
Before he left Madrid to march against the English, an address
framed by the traitors of that city in the name of the magistrates
and citizens was presented to him by the Corregidor. They thanked
him for his gracious clemency, that in the midst of conquest he had
thought of the safety and welfare of the conquered, and forgiven all
which had been done during the absence of Joseph, their king: and they
entreated that it might please him to grant them the favour of seeing
King Joseph once more among them, to the end that under his laws that
capital and the whole kingdom might enjoy the happiness which they
expected from the benevolence of their new sovereign’s character. The
tyrant replied to this in one of his characteristic harangues. “I am
pleased,” he said, “with the sentiments of the city of Madrid. I regret
the injuries she has suffered, and am particularly happy that, under
existing circumstances, I have been able to effect her deliverance, and
to protect her from great calamities, and have accomplished what I owed
to myself and my nation. Vengeance has had its due: it has fallen upon
ten of the principal culprits; ... the rest have entire and absolute
forgiveness.” He then touched upon the reforms by which he thought
to reconcile the Spaniards to a foreign yoke. “I have preserved the
spiritual orders, but with a limitation of the number of monks: they
who were influenced by a divine call shall remain in their cloisters;
with regard to those whose call was doubtful, or influenced by worldly
considerations, I have fixed their condition in the class of secular
priests. Out of the surplus of monastic property I have provided for
the maintenance of the pastors, that important and useful branch of the
clergy. I have suppressed that court which was a subject of complaint
to Europe and the present age. Priests may guide the minds of men, but
must exercise no temporal or corporal jurisdiction over the citizens.
I have annulled those privileges which the grandees usurped during
times of civil war. I have abolished feudal rights, and henceforth
every one may set up inns, ovens, mills, employ himself in fishing
and rabbit-hunting, and give free scope to his industry, provided he
respects the laws. The selfishness, wealth, and prosperity of a small
number of individuals were more injurious to your agriculture than the
heat of the Dog-days. All peculiar jurisdictions were usurpations, and
at variance with the rights of the nation. I have abolished them. As
there is but one God, so should there be in a state but one judicial
power.
“There is no obstacle,” he continued, “which can long resist the
execution of my resolutions. But what transcends my power is this,
to consolidate the Spaniards as one nation, under the sway of the
king, should they continue to be affected with those principles of
hatred to France which the partizans of England and the enemies of the
continent have infused into the bosom of Spain. I can establish no
nation, no king, no independence of the Spaniards, if the king be not
assured of their attachment and fidelity. The Bourbons can no longer
reign in Europe. The divisions of the royal family were contrived by
the English. It was not the dethronement of King Charles and of the
favourite, that the Duke del Infantado, that tool of England, had
in view. The intention was, to establish the predominant influence
of England in Spain; a senseless project, the result of which would
have been a perpetual continental war. No power under the influence
of England can exist on the continent. If there be any that entertain
such a wish, the wish is absurd, and will sooner or later occasion
their fall. It would be easy for me, should I be compelled to adopt
that measure, to govern Spain, by establishing as many viceroys in
it as there are provinces. Nevertheless, I do not refuse to abdicate
my rights of conquest in favour of the king, and to establish him in
Madrid, as soon as the 30,000 citizens which this capital contains,
the clergy, nobility, merchants, and lawyers shall have declared their
fidelity, set an example to the provinces, enlightened the people,
and made the nation sensible that their existence and prosperity
essentially depend upon a king and a free constitution, favourable to
the people, and hostile only to the selfishness and haughty passions
of the grandees. If such be the sentiments of the inhabitants, let the
30,000 citizens assemble in the churches; let them, in the presence
of the holy sacrament, take an oath, not only with their mouths, but
also with their hearts, and without any jesuitical equivocation, that
they promise support, attachment, and fidelity to their king; let the
priests in the confessional and the pulpit, the merchants in their
correspondence, the lawyers in their writings and speeches, infuse
these sentiments into the people: ... then will I surrender my right
of conquest, place the king upon the throne, and make it my pleasing
task to conduct myself as a true friend of the Spaniards. The present
generation may differ in their opinions; the passions have been too
much brought into action; but your grandchildren will bless me as their
renovator; they will reckon the day when I appeared among you among
their memorable festivals; and from that day will the happiness of
Spain date its commencement. Thus,” he concluded, addressing himself
to the Corregidor, “you are informed of the whole of my determination.
Consult with your fellow-citizens, and consider what part you will
choose; but whatever it be, make your choice with sincerity, and tell
me only your genuine sentiments.”
There was something more detestable in this affectation of candour
and generosity than in his open and insolent violence. “Consult!
and consider what part you will choose, and make your choice with
sincerity!”... The Spanish nation had made their choice! They had made
it at Baylen and at Reynosa, at Cadiz and at Madrid, at Valencia and at
Zaragoza; for life or for death; deliberately, and yet as if with one
impulse, ... with enthusiasm, and yet calmly, ... had that noble people
nobly, and wisely, and religiously made their heroic choice. They had
written it in blood, their own and their oppressors’. Its proofs were
to be seen in deserted houses and depopulated towns, in the blackened
walls of hamlets which had been laid waste with fire, in the bones
which were bleaching upon the mountains of Biscay, and in the bodies,
French and Spaniard, which were at that hour floating down the tainted
Ebro! Here, in the capital, their choice had been recorded; they who
had been swept down by grape-shot in its streets, or bayoneted in the
houses, they who had fallen in the heat of battle before its gates,
and they who in cold blood had been sent in droves to execution, alike
had borne witness to that choice, and confirmed it, and rejoiced in
it with their dying breath. And this tyrant called upon the people of
Madrid now to tell him their sentiments, ... now when their armies were
dispersed, and they themselves, betrayed and disarmed, were surrounded
by his legions!
♦REGISTERS OPENED.♦
Registers were opened in every quarter, and, if French accounts could
be believed, 30,000 fathers of families rushed thither in crowds, and
signed a supplication to the conqueror, entreating him to put an end to
their misfortunes, by granting them his august brother Joseph for their
king. If this impossible eagerness had really been manifested, it could
admit of no other solution than that the people of Madrid, bitterly
as they detested and heartily as they despised Joseph, yet thought it
a less evil to be governed by him than by the tyrant himself, ... for
this was the alternative allowed them. But a census of this kind, as
it is called, like those which coloured Buonaparte’s assumption, first
of the consulship for life, and then of an hereditary throne, was
easily procured, when neither threats, nor persuasions, nor fraud, nor
violence were spared.
♦THE PEOPLE OF MADRID TAKE THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO JOSEPH.♦
The ceremony of voting and taking the oath was delayed till after
Buonaparte’s departure, “because,” said the French journalists, “a
suspicion of fear might else have attached to it. The act was now more
noble, as being entirely free, ... as being confirmed by the weightiest
considerations whereby a people can be influenced, their interest,
their happiness, and their glory.” With such language the better part
of the French nation were insulted, and the unreflecting deceived,
while all knowledge of the real state of things was shut out by the
vigilance of a government, conscious enough of wickedness to know that
it required concealment. The votes were then exacted, the host was
exposed in all the churches, and the priests were compelled to receive
from their countrymen at the altar, and as they believed in the actual
and bodily presence of their Saviour and their God, a compulsory oath
of allegiance to the Intruder. The Catholic system has a salvo in such
cases; and the same priests who administered the oath were believed
by the French themselves to have released those who took it from its
obligations.
♦ADDRESSES TO THE INTRUDER.♦
The higher ranks in Madrid had shown themselves from the commencement
of these troubles as deficient in public spirit as they had long been
in private virtues. Scarcely an individual in that capital who was
distinguished for rank, or power, or riches, had stood forward in the
national cause, so fallacious is the opinion that those persons will be
most zealous in the defence of their country, who have what is called
the largest stake in it. Addresses from all the councils and corporate
bodies of the metropolis were dispatched to Buonaparte while he tarried
at Valladolid, ... all alike abject, and all soliciting that they might
be indulged with the presence of their king. The Council of state, by
a deputy, expressed its homage of thanks for the generous clemency of
the conqueror. “What gratitude,” said he, “does it not owe you for
having snatched Spain from the influence of those destructive councils
which fifty years of misfortune had prepared for it; for having rid it
of the English armies, who threatened to fix upon its territories the
theatre of continental war! Grateful for these benefits, the Council
of state has still another supplication to lay at the feet of your
majesty. Deign, sire, to commit to our loyalty your august brother,
our lord and King. Permit him to re-enter Madrid, and to take into his
hands the reins of government; that under the benevolent sway of this
august prince, whose mildness, wisdom, and justice, are known to all
Europe, our widowed and desolate monarchy may find a father in the best
of Kings.” D. Bernardo Yriarte spoke for the Council of the Indies. “It
entirely submits itself,” he said, “to the decrees of your Majesty,
and to those of your august brother, the King our master, who is to
create the happiness of Spain, as well by the wisdom and the assemblage
of the lofty virtues which he possesses, as by the powerful support
of the hero of Europe, upon whom the Council of the Indies founds its
hopes of seeing those ties reunited, which ought always to unite the
American possessions with the mother country.” The Council of finance
requested that it might behold in Madrid the august and beloved brother
of the Emperor, expecting from his presence the felicity and repose of
the kingdom. The Council of war supplicated him, through an effect of
his august beneficence, to confer upon the capital the felicity of the
presence of their sovereign, Joseph I. This was the theme upon which
all the deputations rung their changes. The Council of marine alone
adding an appropriate flattery to the same request, expressed its hope
of contributing to the liberty of the seas.
♦EDICTS OF THE INTRUDER BEFORE HIS RETURN TO MADRID.♦
Joseph meantime had exercised his nominal sovereignty in passing
decrees. By one the circulation of French money was permitted till
farther measures concerning it should be announced; by another all
persons entitled to any salary or pension from the government were
deprived of it till they should have taken the oath of allegiance to
him. He made an attempt also in the autumn, before reinforcements
entered Spain, to place the persons belonging to his army under civil
protection: and for this purpose required that in every district
occupied by the army, from eight to thirty stand of arms should be
deposited in every town-house, and an equal number of the respectable
inhabitants registered to serve as an escort therewith for any officer
or serjeant either on his road as an invalid, or in the execution of
any commission. They were also to act as a patrol, for the purpose
of preventing any insults or outrages which might be offered to the
military, and if men did not volunteer for this service, which would
entitle them to pay and rewards, the magistracy were to fix upon
those whom they deemed fit to discharge it. He created also a new
military order by the name of the _Orden Militar de España_. The Grand
Mastership was reserved to himself and his successors; and the two
oldest Captains General of the Army and the Fleet were always to be
Grand Chancellor and Grand Treasurer: but the order itself was open to
soldiers of every rank who should deserve it. A pension of 1000 _reales
vellon_ was attached to the order, and the device was a crimson star,
bearing on one side the Lion of Leon with this motto ... _Virtute et
Fide_; on the other the Castle of Castille with _Joseph Napoleo,
Hispaniarum et Indiarum Rex, instituit_. Decrees were also issued for
raising new regiments, one to be called the Royal Foreign, and the
other the first of the Irish Brigade.
♦JOSEPH’S ENTRANCE INTO MADRID.♦
On the 22d of January the Intruder re-entered that city, from which he
had been driven by the indignation of a whole people. At break of day
his approach was announced by the discharge of an hundred cannon; a fit
symphony, announcing at once to the people by what right he claimed
the throne, and by what means he must sustain himself upon it. From
the gate of Atocha to the church of St. Isidro, and from thence to the
palace, the streets were lined with French troops, and detachments
were stationed in every part of the city, more for the purpose of
overawing the inhabitants than of doing honour to this wretched puppet
of majesty, who, while he submitted to be the instrument of tyranny
over the Spaniards, was himself a slave. The cavalry advanced to the
Plaza de las Delicias to meet him; there he mounted on horseback, and
a procession was formed of his aides-de-camp and equerries, the grand
major domo, the grand master of the ceremonies, the grand master of
the hounds, with all the other personages of the drama of royalty, the
members of the different councils, and those grandees who, deserting
the cause of their country, stained now with infamy names which had
once been illustrious in the Spanish annals. At the gate of Atocha
the governor of Madrid was ready to present him with the keys. As
soon as he entered another discharge of an hundred cannon proclaimed
his presence, and all the bells struck up. He proceeded through the
city to the church of St. Isidro, where the suffragan Bishop, in his
pontificals, the canons, vicars, and rectors, the vicar-general, and
the prelates of the religious orders, received him at the gate, and
six of the most ancient canons conducted him to the throne. Then
the suffragan Bishop addressed him in the only language which might
that day be used, the language of servility, adulation, impiety, and
treason. The Intruder’s reply was in that strain of hypocrisy which
marked the usurpation of the Buonapartes with new and peculiar guilt.
This was his speech:
“Before rendering thanks to the Supreme Arbiter of Destinies, for my
return to the capital of this kingdom entrusted to my care, I wish to
reply to the affectionate reception of its inhabitants, by declaring
my secret thoughts in the presence of the living God, who has just
received your oath of fidelity to my person. I protest, then, before
God, who knows the hearts of all, that it is my duty and conscience
only which induce me to mount the throne, and not my own private
inclination. I am willing to sacrifice my own happiness, because I
think you have need of me for the establishment of yours. The unity of
our holy religion, the independence of the monarchy, the integrity of
its territory, and the liberty of its citizens, are the conditions
of the oath which I have taken on receiving the crown. It will not be
disgraced upon my head; and if, as I have no doubt, the desires of the
nation support the efforts of its king, I shall soon be the most happy
of all, because you through me will all be happy.”
♦EDICTS AGAINST THE PATRIOTS.♦
Two rows of banqueting tables were laid out in the nave of the church,
where the civil and military officers of the intruder, and the members
of the councils, were seated according to their respective ranks. High
mass was performed by the chapel-royal, and a solemn Te Deum concluded
the mockery. That done, Joseph proceeded with the same form to the
palace, and a third discharge of an hundred guns proclaimed his arrival
there. On the day which followed this triumphal entry, its ostentatious
joy, and the affected humanity and philanthropy of his professions,
he issued a decree for the formation of special military tribunals,
which should punish all persons with death who took arms against him,
or enlisted others for the patriotic cause: the gallows was to be the
mode of punishment, and over the door of the sufferer’s house a shield
was to be placed, for infamy, recording the cause and manner of his
ignominious death. Any innkeeper or householder in whose dwelling a
man should be enlisted for the Junta’s service should undergo the same
fate; but if they gave information, 400 reales were promised them,
or an equivalent reward. The very day that this decree was issued,
mingling, like his flagitious brother, words of blasphemy with deeds of
blood, he addressed a circular epistle to the Archbishops and Bishops
of the realm, commanding them to ♦CIRCULAR EPISTLE TO THE CLERGY.♦
order a Te Deum in all the churches of their respective dioceses. “In
returning to the capital (this was his language), our first care,
as well as first duty, has been to prostrate ourselves at the feet
of that God who disposes of crowns, and to devote to him our whole
existence for the felicity of the brave nation which he has entrusted
to our care. For this only object of our thoughts we have addressed
to him our humble prayers. What is an individual amid the generations
who cover the earth? What is he in the eyes of the Eternal, who alone
penetrates the intentions of men, and according to them determines
their elevation? He who sincerely wishes the welfare of his fellows
serves God, and omnipotent goodness protects him. We desire that, in
conformity with these dispositions, you direct the prayers of the
faithful whom Providence has entrusted to you. Ask of God, that his
spirit of peace and wisdom may descend upon us, that the voice of
passion may be stifled in meditating upon such sentiments as ought to
animate us, and which the general interests of this monarchy inspire:
that religion, tranquillity, and happiness may succeed to the discords
to which we are now exposed. Let us return thanks to God for the
success which he has been pleased to grant to the arms of our august
brother and powerful ally the Emperor of the French, who has had no
other end in supporting our rights by his power than to procure to
Spain a long peace, founded on her independence.”
A heavy load of national guilt lay upon the nations of the Peninsula;
and those persons, who, with well-founded faith, could see and
understand that the moral government of the world is neither less
perfect, nor less certain in its course, than that material order
which science has demonstrated, ... they perceived in this dreadful
visitation the work of retribution. The bloody conquests of the
Portugueze in India were yet unexpiated; the Spaniards had to atone
for extirpated nations in Cuba and Hayti, and their other islands,
and on the continent of America for cruelties and excesses not less
atrocious than those which they were appointed to punish. Vengeance had
not been exacted for the enormities perpetrated in the Netherlands,
nor for that accursed tribunal which, during more than two centuries,
triumphed both in Spain and Portugal, to the ineffaceable and eternal
infamy of the Romish church. But the crimes of a nation, like the vices
of an individual, bring on their punishment in necessary consequence,
... so righteously have all things been ordained. From the spoils of
India and America the two governments drew treasures which rendered
them independent of the people for supplies; and the war which their
priesthood waged against knowledge and reformation succeeded in
shutting them out from these devoted countries. A double despotism, of
the throne and of the altar, was thus established, and the result was a
state of degradation, which nothing less than the overthrow of both, by
some moral and political earthquake, loosening the very foundations of
society, could remove. Such a convulsion had taken place, and the sins
of the fathers were visited upon the ♦CONDITION OF MADRID.♦ children.
Madrid, the seat of Philip II., “that sad intelligencing tyrant,” who
from thence, as our great Milton said, “mischieved the world with his
mines of Ophir,” that city which once aspired to be the mistress of the
world, and had actually tyrannized over so large a part of it, was now
itself in thraldom. The Spanish cloak, which was the universal dress of
all ranks, was prohibited in the metropolis of Spain, and no Spaniard
was allowed to walk abroad in the evening, unless he carried a light.
All communication between the capital and the southern provinces, the
most fertile and wealthiest of the kingdom, was cut off. Of the trading
part of the community, therefore, those who were connected with the
great commercial cities of the south coast were at once ruined, and
they whose dealings lay with the provinces which were the seat of war
were hardly more fortunate. The public creditors experienced that
breach of public faith which always results from a violent revolution.
The intrusive government acknowledged the debt, and gave notice of its
intention to pay them by bills upon Spanish America: for this there
was a double motive, the shame of confessing that the Intruder was
unable to discharge the obligations of the government to whose rights
and duties he affected to succeed, and the hope of interesting the
holders of these bills in his cause: but so little possibility was
there of his becoming master of the Indies, that the mention of such
bills only provoked contempt. While commercial and funded property
was thus destroyed, landed property was of as little immediate value
to its owner. No remittances could be made to the capital from that
part of Spain which was not yet overrun; and the devastations had
been so extensive every where as to leave the tenant little means of
paying the proprietor. These were the first-fruits of that prosperity
which the Buonapartes promised to the Spaniards, ... these were the
blessings which Joseph brought with him to Madrid! He, meantime, was
affecting to participate in rejoicings, and receiving the incense
of adulation, in that city where the middle classes were reduced to
poverty by his usurpation, and where the wives whom he had widowed,
and the mothers whom he had made childless, mingled with their prayers
for the dead, supplications for vengeance upon him as the author of
their miseries. The theatre was fitted up to receive him, the boxes
were lined with silk, the municipality attended him to his seat, he
was presented with a congratulatory poem upon his entrance, and the
stage curtain represented the ♦1809. FEBRUARY.♦ Genius of Peace with
an olive-branch in his left hand, and a torch in his right, setting
fire to the attributes of war. Underneath was written, ♦FEB. 18.♦ “Live
happy, Sire! reign and pardon!” At the very time when this precious
specimen of French taste complimented the Intruder upon his clemency,
an extraordinary criminal Junta was formed, even the military tribunals
not being found sufficiently extensive in their powers for the work
of extermination which was begun. It was “for trial of assassins,
robbers, recruiters in favour of the insurgents, those who maintained
correspondence with them, and who spread false reports.” Persons
apprehended upon these charges were to be tried within twenty-four
hours, and sentenced to the gallows, and the sentence executed without
appeal.
♦FALSE INTELLIGENCE PUBLISHED BY THE INTRUSIVE GOVERNMENT.♦
Another of the Intruder’s decrees enjoined that the Madrid Gazette
should be under the immediate inspection of the Minister of Police,
and copies of it regularly sent to every Bishop, parochial priest,
and municipality, that the people might be informed of the acts of
government, and of public events. Joseph’s ministers, under whatever
self-practised delusion they entered his service, conformed themselves
in all things now to the spirit of Buonaparte’s policy, and employed
force and falsehood with as little scruple as if they had been trained
in the revolutionary school. While they affected to inform the people
of what was passing, they concealed whatever was unfavourable,
distorted what they ♦1809. JANUARY.♦ told, and feigned intelligence
suited to their views. They affirmed that the English goods taken at
Bilbao, S. Andero, and the ports of Asturias, would defray the expenses
of the war; and that England itself was on the point of bankruptcy.
Such multitudes, it was affirmed, had repaired to Westminster Hall to
give bail for their debts, that it seemed as if all London had been
there; numbers were thrown down by the press, and trodden under foot,
... many almost suffocated, and some were killed. Such falsehoods were
not too gross for the government where it could exclude all truer
information; where this was not in its power, it resorted to the more
feasible scheme of exciting suspicions against England; and here the
Buonapartes had a willing agent in Morla.
♦UNWILLINGNESS OF THE SPANIARDS TO BELIEVE THAT MORLA WAS A TRAITOR.♦
Prone as the Spaniards were in these unhappy times to suspect any
person, and to act upon the slightest suspicion, they were slow in
believing that Morla had proved false. The people of Cadiz would
hardly be convinced that their governor, whose patriotic addresses
were still circulating among them, could possibly have gone over to
the Intruder. So many measures of utility, so many acts of patriotism
and of disinterested vigilance in his administration, were remembered,
that the first reports of his perfidy were indignantly received; a fact
so contrary to all their experience was not to be credited, and they
felt as if they injured him in listening to such an accusation. He had
established among them a reputation like that which a Cadi sometimes
enjoys in Mahommedan countries, where his individual uprightness
supplies the defects of law, and resists the general corruption of
manners. A peasant, whom he had acquitted upon some criminal charge,
brought him a number of turkeys, as a present in gratitude for his
acquittal. Morla put him in prison, consigned the turkeys to the gaoler
for his food, and set him at liberty when he had eaten them all.
There was neither law, equity, nor humanity in this, ... yet it had
an extravagant, oriental ostentation of justice, well calculated to
impress the people with an opinion of his nice honour and scrupulous
integrity. But this man, who in all his public writings boasted of his
frankness and of his honourable intentions, was in reality destitute
both of truth and honour; and the revolution, which developed some
characters and corrupted others, only unmasked his. Early in these
troubles Lord Collingwood and Sir Hew Dalrymple had discovered ♦PROOFS
OF HIS PRIOR TREACHERY.♦ his duplicity. He had signed, and was believed
to have written, Solano’s ill-timed and worse-intended proclamation,
in which the English were spoken of with unqualified reprobation, and
as the real enemies against whom all true Spaniards ought to unite;
and when warned by Solano’s fate, he joined in the national cause,
the desire of injuring that cause by every possible means seems to
have been the main object of his crooked policy. When Castaños wanted
the assistance of General Spencer’s corps, he threw out hints to that
General that it would be required for the defence of Cadiz; though,
from jealousy of the English, at that very time he prevented the Junta
from bringing the garrison of Ceuta into the field, and had given it as
his decided opinion that no English troops should be admitted into any
Spanish fortress. And while he endeavoured to make the Junta of Seville
suspicious of English interference, he recommended to the accredited
agents of England, that they should interfere early and decidedly in
forming a central government, and appointing a commander-in-chief, and
that their influence should be strengthened by marching an army into
Spain.
♦MORLA’S LETTER TO THE CENTRAL JUNTA;♦
But the most prominent feature of Morla’s sophisticated character was
his odious hypocrisy. In the letter which announced to the Central
Junta the capitulation of Madrid he bestowed the highest eulogiums
upon the Intruder and himself. “Yesterday,” said he, “as a Counsellor
of State I saw Prince Joseph, our appointed King, and the object of
the rabble’s contumely. I assure you, with all that ingenuousness
which belongs to me, that I found him an enlightened philosopher, full
even to enthusiasm of the soundest principles of morality, humanity,
and affection to the people whom his lot has called him to command.
My eulogies might appear suspicious to those who do not know me
well; I suppress them therefore, and only say thus much, that the
Junta, according to circumstances, may regulate its own conduct and
resolutions upon this information. My whole aim and endeavour will
always be for the honour and integrity of my country. I will not do
myself the injustice to suppose that any of the nation can suspect
me of perfidy; my probity is known and accredited, and therefore I
continue to speak with that candour and ingenuousness which I have
always used.” He also delivered his opinion as an individual who was
most anxious for the good of the nation, that the governor of Cadiz
should be instructed not to let the English assemble either in or near
that city in any force; but that, under pretext of securing himself
from the French, he should throw up works against them, reinforce the
garrison, and secretly strengthen the batteries toward the sea. And
that advices should be dispatched to the Indies, for the purpose of
preventing treasure or goods from being sent, lest they should fall
into the hands of these allies, who having no longer any hope of
defending the cause, would seek to indemnify themselves at the expense
of the Spaniards. The Junta published this letter as containing in
itself sufficient proofs of perfidiousness and treason in the writer.
And they observed that at the very time when this hypocrite was
advising them to distrust the English, and arm against them, large sums
had been remitted them from England, farther pecuniary aids were on
the way, their treasures from America had been secured from the French,
by being brought home in British ships, and Great Britain had given the
most authentic proof of its true friendship with Spain, by refusing to
negotiate with Buonaparte.
♦AND TO THE GOVERNOR OF CADIZ.♦
Shortly afterwards a letter of Morla’s was intercepted, written in the
same strain to D. Josef Virues, the provisional governor of Cadiz. The
thorough hypocrite talked of the good which he had done in surrendering
Madrid, and the consolation which he derived from that reflection; he
lamented over his beloved Cadiz and its estimable inhabitants, who
had given him so many proofs of their confidence and affection, and
wished that he could avert the dangers that impended over them with
the sacrifice of his own blood. “If it became an English garrison,” he
said, “it would be more burdensome to the nation than Gibraltar, and
the commerce of the natives would be ruined: much policy as well as
courage would be required to prevent this. I need not,” he concluded,
“exhort your excellency to defend Cadiz with the honour and patriotism
which become you; but when you have fulfilled this obligation,
honourable terms may save the city, and secure its worthy inhabitants.”
In consequence of this letter it became necessary to remove Virues
from the command, more for his own sake than for any distrust of his
principles, though he had at one time been Godoy’s secretary, and
though Morla had been his friend and patron. Unwilling, and perhaps
unable to believe that one whom he had so long been accustomed to
regard with respect and gratitude was the consummate hypocrite and
traitor which he now appeared to be, Virues attempted to excuse Morla
as having acted under compulsion, an excuse more likely to alleviate
for the time his own feelings than to satisfy his judgement. But he
felt that under these circumstances it was no longer proper for him
to remain in possession of an important post: high as he stood in the
opinion of his countrymen, the slightest accident might now render
him suspected; and at this crisis it was most essential that the
people should have entire confidence in their chiefs. He therefore
gladly accepted a mission to England, and D. Felix Jones, who had
distinguished himself in the operations against Dupont, was appointed
governor. Instead of additional defences toward the sea, new works were
begun on the land side, to protect the city against its real enemies,
and Colonel Hallowell came from Gibraltar to direct them. Ammunition
and stores in abundance were sent from Seville. The new governor began
by taking measures of rigorous precaution. No person whatever, not even
an Englishman, was permitted to go a mile beyond the city without a
passport. Every Frenchman ♦ARREST AND CRUEL IMPRISONMENT OF THE FRENCH
AT CADIZ.♦ in the place was arrested and sent on board the ships. This
was intended for their own security as well as the safety of the city;
for so highly were the people incensed against that perfidious nation,
and such was their fear of treachery in every person belonging to it,
that they purposed putting all whom they should find at large to death;
and it was said that three hundred knives had been purchased at one
shop, to be thus employed. Had there been leisure, or had the Spaniards
been in a temper for humane considerations, these persons ought to have
been supplied with means of transport to their own country; instead of
which they were consigned to a most inhuman state of confinement. The
property also of all French subjects, under which term the natives of
all countries in subjection to France were included, was confiscated;
... and in consequence above three hundred shops were shut up, and
more than as many families reduced to ruin. Thus it is, that in such
times injustice provokes retaliation, wrongs lead to wrongs, and evil
produces evil in miserable series.
♦DEATH OF FLORIDA BLANCA.♦
At this juncture, when every hour brought tidings of new calamities and
nearer danger, Florida Blanca, the venerable president of the Central
Junta, died, at the great age of eighty-one; fatigue, and care, and
anxiety having accelerated his death. When the order of the Jesuits
was abolished, he was ambassador at Rome, and is believed to have been
materially instrumental in bringing about that iniquitous measure; and
it was under his ministry that Spain joined the confederacy against
Great Britain during the American war. These are acts of which
he had abundant reason to repent; but there were specious motives
for both; and this must be said of Florida Blanca, that of all the
ministers who have exercised despotic authority in Spain, no other
ever projected or accomplished half so much for the improvement of the
people and the country. Whatever tended to the general good received
his efficient support, and twenty years of subsequent misrule had not
been sufficient to undo the beneficial effects of his administration.
It was Godoy’s intention that his exile from the court should be felt
as a disgrace and a punishment; but the retirement to which it sent him
suited the disposition and declining years of the injured man, and he
passed his time chiefly in those religious meditations which are the
natural support and solace of old age. Many rulers and statesmen have
retired into convents when they have been wearied or disgusted with
the vanities and vexations of the world; few have been called upon,
like Florida Blanca, in extreme old age, to forsake their retirement,
their tranquillity, and their habits of religious life, for the higher
duty of serving their country in its hour of danger. The Central Junta
manifested their sense of his worth by conferring a grandee-ship upon
his heir, and all his legitimate descendants who should succeed him
in ♦MARQUES DE ASTORGA PRESIDENT OF THE JUNTA.♦ the title. He was
succeeded as president by the Marques de Astorga, a grandee of the
highest ♦1808.♦ class, and the representative of some of the proudest
names in Spanish history. The education of this nobleman had been
defective, as was generally the case with Spanish nobles, and his
person excited contempt in those who are presumptuous and injurious
enough to judge only by appearances. But he had not degenerated from
the better qualities of his illustrious ancestry: they who knew him
best, knew that he possessed what ought to be the distinctive marks of
old nobility: he was generous, magnanimous, and high-spirited, without
the least apparent consciousness of being so.
♦CATALONIA, 1808.♦
After the fall of Madrid there was yet one quarter to which the Junta
might look with reasonable hope, amid the disasters that crowded upon
them. If Barcelona could be recovered, the acquisition of that most
important place would balance the worst reverses which they had yet
sustained. But ill fortune every where pursued them, and there was this
to aggravate the disappointment, that their losses in Catalonia were
more imputable to misconduct than to any want of strength. A force had
been collected there fully equal both in numbers and discipline (had
it been directed with common prudence) to the services expected from
it. After the arrival of the troops from Portugal and Majorca, and
the Granadan army, it consisted of about 28,000 regular troops, and
1600 cavalry, besides the garrisons of Rosas, Hostalrich, and Gerona,
who were nearly 6000. The sea being commanded by their allies, was
open to them along the whole line of coast, except at Barcelona; and
the people, who have always been eminently distinguished for their
activity, industry, hardihood, and invincible spirit of independence,
were ready to make any sacrifices and any exertions for the deliverance
of their native land. The province too was full of fortified places,
and even in so defensible a country as Spain peculiarly strong by
nature. But to counterbalance these advantages, there were the
confusion and perplexity, as well as the distance of the Central Junta;
the inexperience and rashness of those who had taken upon themselves
the local government; want of science, of decision, and of ability in
the generals; want of authority every where; the fearful spirit of
insubordination, which on the slightest occasion was ready to break
out; ... and, above all, that reckless and unreasonable confidence
which had now become part of the Spanish character.
♦SIEGE OF BARCELONA.♦
There was some excuse for this confidence in the Catalans; they knew
their own temper and the strength of their country; and they had
obtained some signal successes before any regular troops came to their
assistance. But this remembrance, and the knowledge that so large
a regular force was in the field, induced a fatal belief that the
difficulties of the struggle were over, and that nothing remained to
complete their triumph but the recovery of Barcelona. And this, they
said, might easily be effected: the enemy there were weak, in want of
provisions, sickly, dispirited by defeat and desertion; the English
squadron at hand to assist in an attack upon Monjuich and the citadel;
and the inhabitants ready upon the first appearance of success to rise
upon their invaders and open the gates. Among the French and Italians
themselves, there were some, they affirmed, who would gladly forsake
the wicked cause wherein they were engaged, and by contributing to
deliver up these places atone for the treachery in which they had
been compelled to bear a part. This was the cry of the people; and
these representations were strengthened by some of the citizens, who
were perpetually proposing plans contradictory to each other, and
alike impracticable: the Supreme Junta represented the people but too
faithfully, partaking their inexperience, their impatience, and their
errors; and General Vives, surrounded by ignorant advisers, controlled
if not intimidated by popular opinion, and himself altogether
incompetent to the station which he filled, wasted the precious weeks
in a vain display before Barcelona; not perceiving or not regarding
that the possession of the city would have been useless to him while
the French possessed the citadel and Montjuich; that he had no means
for besieging those strong places; ... and above all, that if the
French were prevented from relieving them, they must inevitably soon
fall into his hands without a blow.
♦ST. CYR APPOINTED TO COMMAND THE FRENCH IN CATALONIA.♦
Duhesme, in fact, had announced to his government that his provisions
would not hold out beyond the month of December; and to throw in
supplies by sea was impossible. Buonaparte was well aware of the
danger, and saw in part what consequences might be apprehended
from it. He knew how Barcelona had been defended in the Succession
war, and had calculated that if it were now to be recovered by the
Spaniards it would cost him not less than fourscore thousand lives to
regain possession of it. Such a sacrifice he would have made without
one compunctious feeling; but that blood might have been expended
without effecting the purchase, ... for if such a siege had been
undertaken, England must and would have made exertions commensurate
to the occasion. That these consequences did not follow was owing to
the errors and incapacity of his opponents, not to his own measures.
In other cases the force which he prepared was always fully equal
to the service for which it was designed; in the present, it was so
inadequate, as to excite in the General, Gouvion Saint Cyr, a suspicion
that failure on his part would be more agreeable to the Emperor than
success. That General had belonged to the army of the Rhine, which was
an original sin in Buonaparte’s eyes; and having a command in Naples he
had refused to obtain addresses from the troops soliciting the First
Consul to take upon himself the imperial dignity; ... an irremissible
offence. Moreover, great commander as Buonaparte was, he was jealous of
any victories which were not obtained when he was in the field, so that
the renown might redound to himself. Indulging at once this littleness
of mind, and his personal or political dislike, it was his wish that
Gouvion St. Cyr should not distinguish himself by any brilliant
success; at the same time he knew the miserable state of the Spanish
armies, and still more of the counsels by which they were directed,
well enough to rely upon his relieving Barcelona. His instructions were
to effect that object, to collect considerable magazines in Figueras
at the enemy’s expense; to subdue the valleys, making ♦ST. CYR, 26.
42. DO. PIÈCES JUSTIFICATIVES, NO. 7.♦ them feel the whole weight of
the war, and in fine to crush the enemy: having these objects in view,
every thing was left to his own discretion.
When St. Cyr arrived at Perpignan, at the end of August, the town was
full of sick and wounded, for whose relief no preparation had been
made, so little had any reverses been expected. He found there some
Tuscan regiments, the poor Queen of Etruria’s guards, and a battalion
from the Valais ... for even that country was called upon to contribute
from its recesses to this insatiable tyrant’s demand for human life.
These troops had been sent back from Figueras by General Reille as
being quite unable to take the field, not for want of discipline only,
but of equipments, arms, and even necessary clothing. So miserable
was their condition, that it was deemed prudent to quarter them in
remote places, and train them out of sight, lest they should excite
indignation as well as commiseration in the people, who in the south of
France had always been ill affected toward Buonaparte, and suffering
at this time from the loss of their trade with Spain, detested the
injustice of the war, and were in a temper which might have ♦ST. CYR,
19. 34.♦ produced formidable consequences if any serious invasion
had been attempted on that side. During the autumn troops continued
to arrive there, mostly consisting of conscripts from Genoa, Naples,
and other parts of Italy: under good training they soon became good
soldiers, and only less to be trusted than the French because they
were more inclined to desert. These forces when collected amounted to
18,000 men. Reille had 4000 at Figueras, and 8000 were with Duhesme in
Barcelona.
♦HE DETERMINES UPON BESIEGING ROSAS.♦
Early in November St. Cyr received orders to enter Spain, and he
determined to commence his operations with the siege of Rosas.
While the fine roadstead which that fortress commands was open to
the English, there was scarcely a chance of throwing supplies into
Barcelona by sea; to escort them by land was not possible while Gerona
and Hostalrich were in possession of the Spaniards; and if those places
had been taken they could not be provisioned unless Rosas also were
held by the French. Rosas is situated four leagues east of Figueras,
in the bottom of the bay, where the plain of Ampurdan touches ♦1808.
NOVEMBER.♦ the skirts of the Pyrenees. The town, containing then about
1200 inhabitants, is built along the shore, and completely commanded by
the fortress; the fortress, which is an irregular pentangle, the town,
and a smaller fort, called, after a custom too prevalent in Catholic
countries, Fuerte de la Trinidad, forming a semi-circle round the bay.
This place had sustained a most gallant siege of ten weeks in 1795
after Figueras, strong as it was, had been surrendered without defence;
and when the commander, D. Domingo Yzquierdo, could maintain the almost
demolished works no longer, he succeeded in embarking the remains of
his garrison. ♦MARCILLAC. 299–313.♦ During the peace nothing had been
done to repair the works, as if no future war was to be apprehended.
Even after the present struggle had commenced, six months, in that
supineness which belongs to the Spanish character, had been suffered
to elapse without taking any measures for strengthening and securing
a place of such evident importance. There were many persons, and even
some members of the nearest Juntas, who were acquainted with the
details of the last siege, and knew what repairs were necessary, and
also what the points were which it was most material to strengthen. But
their attention was wholly engrossed by local and immediate interests,
and the pressing representations which the commandant of engineers
repeatedly addressed to the higher authorities produced no effect.
Nothing could rouse them from their dream of recovering Barcelona by
force of arms.
♦DILAPIDATED STATE OF THAT FORTRESS.♦
The Governor, however, D. Pedro O’Daly, Lieutenant-Colonel of the
regiment of Ulster, as soon as he apprehended an attack had made some
preparations; he ordered all strangers who had taken refuge there to
depart, and sent away by sea such of the garrison as were incapable of
service. The ditches were cleared, parapets formed, and guns mounted.
The north angle of the fort had been demolished by the explosion of a
magazine; a wall of stones without mortar was run up by the peasants;
it closed the breach, but that part of the works remained useless. The
stores were as incomplete as the works: there were neither measures
for the powder, nor saws for the fusees, ... hats and axes were used
instead. The buildings within the fort were in ruins, an old church and
one other edifice being all that were serviceable. Before the former
siege a line nearly half a mile in length, with some redoubts, had been
formed from the citadel to that part of the mountain range which is
called Puig-rom, for the purpose of covering the town; but it was now
in all parts so dilapidated, that though the garrison as well as the
inhabitants were aware how much they needed this additional ♦CABAÑES,
C. 10.♦ protection, any attempt at re-establishing it was deemed
hopeless.
♦PREPARATIONS FOR THE SIEGE.♦
Preparations for the siege had been made at Figueras, and in order to
deceive the Spaniards a report had been encouraged that the design was
against Gerona. St. Cyr established his head-quarters at Figueras, and
General Reille, to whom the conduct of the siege had been entrusted,
encamped before Rosas with his own division and that of the Italian
General Pino. General ♦NOV. 6.♦ Souham took a position between Figueras
and the Fluvia, to protect the besiegers on that side against any
attempt which might be made from Gerona; and Chabot was stationed
nearer the frontier, the General being well aware that the opposition
which he had to apprehend was not so much from regular troops as from
the whole population of the country. But the measures of the Catalans
were so ill-directed at this time, that the invaders suffered more
from the weather, and from the gross neglect of their own government
in sending them supplies, than from all the efforts of their enemies.
St. Cyr was obliged to send his cavalry back into France to the
neighbourhood of Beziers, that the horses might not perish for want
of fodder during the siege; and when he wrote pressingly for supplies
for his men, directions were sent him in return to collect and convoy
provisions to Barcelona. He ♦ST. CYR, 34–41♦ was desired not to regard
any reports concerning the rabble opposed to him, for it was nothing
more, and the time was fixed within which the Emperor expected that he
would be master of Barcelona and of the country ten leagues round. In
reply to this he stated that he would not break up the siege of Rosas
without positive orders; that it was sufficiently hazardous to advance
leaving Gerona behind him; but if Rosas were left also, Figueras would
be again blockaded by the Spaniards, and must fall, because it was not
possible to store it: so that the ♦DO. PIÈCES JUSTIF. 45–16.♦ only way
to secure that most important fortress was to take Rosas.
♦BRITISH SQUADRON IN THE BAY OF ROSAS.♦
However much St. Cyr and the government under which he acted differed
in other points, they both knew the incapacity of the forces opposed to
them, and relied upon it. They knew that there would be no difficulty
in routing the Spaniards whenever they were brought to action, that
nothing was to be apprehended from any combined operations, and that
neither by sea or land was any such exertion as the time required to
be expected from the English, ... the siege of Rosas would otherwise
have been a more perilous undertaking than the march to Barcelona.
The English had just force enough in the Bay to give the French an
opportunity of boasting that the siege was effected in spite of them,
and to show what might have been done if a flying squadron with troops
on board had been on the coast ready to act wherever it might be most
serviceable. Captain West was in the bay in the Excellent, with the
Lucifer and Meteor, bomb-vessels; and when the enemy, having taken
possession of the heights which encompass the whole bay, had driven
the troops in, and the peasants from the nearest villages with them,
and entered the town, these vessels bore a part in the action, and
assisted in dislodging them. Five-and-twenty marines were then sent
to reinforce Fort Trinidad, and the rest of the marines, with fifty
seamen, went cheerfully to assist in defending the citadel. Upon this
a report was spread by the enemy, who were always endeavouring to make
the Spaniards jealous of their allies, that the English had taken
possession of the place; and as while this report was circulated they
succeeded in intercepting all communications from Rosas to Gerona, the
Junta of that city wrote to Captain West, requesting an explanation of
his conduct. The artifice was then discovered; but not till the end had
been answered of deceiving the Junta for a time, and thus preventing
them from taking such measures for the relief of the place as might
have been in their power.
Reille had expected to take Rosas by a sudden attack. The commandant of
the engineers had served in that same capacity at the last siege, and
was therefore well acquainted with the place and with its weakness. On
the evening of the 9th a breach was made in the ramparts of the citadel
sufficient for twenty men abreast; but it was so dark that the enemy
did not discover the extent of the mischief. Immediate intelligence
was sent to the ships; one of the bomb-vessels was then stationed
where it could flank the breach, and the boats appointed to enfilade
the shore with carronades, while more seamen were landed to repair
the damage. British seamen are made of such materials, that it is
indifferent to them on what service they are employed; whether at sea
or ashore, whatever is to be done by courage, activity, intelligence,
and strenuous exertion, they can accomplish. The Spaniards exerted
themselves with emulous alacrity, and this, against which the enemy
had directed their fire as the weakest part of the works, was by their
united labour placed in a respectable state of defence.
♦DISPOSITION OF THE ITALIAN TROOPS TO DESERT.♦
Reille now found that neglected as Rosas had been, with its feeble
works, its unsupported garrison, and its insufficient stores, it was
necessary to proceed against it by regular siege. Some difficulties
he encountered from the state of the weather, some from the sallies
which were made to interrupt him; but his greatest uneasiness arose
from the desertion of the Italians, which was so frequent as to leave
no doubt that in case ♦ST. CYR, 38.♦ of any serious reverse the whole
division would go over to the Spaniards. The state of durance in which
the Pope was held had probably offended their religious feelings, and
the Tuscans perhaps in their indignation for the treatment of the Queen
of Etruria felt some sympathy with the Spaniards. But Buonaparte cared
not for the hearts of men, so their hands were at his service and
their lives at his disposal. And such are the effects of discipline,
that the Italians, who when left to themselves are the worst troops
in the world, became as efficient as the best soldiers in his army.
One regiment at this siege was composed of subjects turned out from
others, the refuse of the whole Italian army: example, encouragement,
and restraint, made them behave well in the field, ... and how they
behaved out of it was a matter of indifference to their officers and
the government which employed them. Two companies of Italians having
been surrounded and made prisoners by the Somatenes, under an old man
of seventy, (who had been a captain of Miquelets in the last war, and
now acted under the orders of the Spanish commander, D. Juan Claros),
St. Cyr gave orders to seize an equal number of the inhabitants, and
send them into France; there to be confined till an exchange should
take place; and this he did to give a humaner character to the war,
upon so brutal a system had it been carried on by his predecessors.
His plea was that the peasantry had entrapped his troops by leading
them astray; but the Catalans did not understand upon what principle he
acted, and were more exasperated than if he had pursued the old system
of burning their villages, because they believed that their countrymen
were thus carried off as recruits for Buonaparte’s armies in the north.
Among the Italian prisoners was the wife of an officer who accompanied
her husband in man’s attire.
♦ATTACK UPON FORT TRINIDAD REPULSED.♦
On the 16th the French attempted to carry Fort Trinidad by assault.
They were repulsed; returning in greater strength, they forced the
outer gate, and endeavoured to force the second; but here such a
steady fire of musquetry and hand-grenades was kept up against them,
that they retired a second time, leaving many of their men under the
walls. Captain West expecting a third attack, reinforced the fort with
a party of marines, who entered by means of a rope-ladder under an
incessant fire. Nothing could be more cordial than the co-operation
of the Spaniards and English at this time; but they were not strong
enough to prevent the enemy from erecting batteries, which compelled
the ships to keep at a distance, and a brave but unsuccessful attack
from Gerona upon Souham’s division on the Fluvia was the only effort
made to relieve them: on that side the Spaniards would have done
more had it not been for want of cavalry. There were two regiments
in Tarragona with excellent horses, but so miserably in want of
equipments, that it was impossible for them to take the field; there
was no money to equip them, and while they were thus remaining inactive
the enemy were overrunning the Ampurdan, and carrying on the siege of
Rosas at their will, because the Spaniards had no cavalry to keep them
in check. The French acted with a full knowledge of the Spaniards’
embarrassments, and in full reliance upon the paralysing imbecility
which such difficulties must needs produce; nevertheless St. Cyr was
far from feeling at ease, knowing that Barcelona must fall unless it
were speedily succoured, and that if the force which was now idly
besieging it were brought to the relief of Rosas, Catalonia might
speedily be cleared of its invaders, and Rousillon become in its turn
the scene of invasion. It was therefore necessary to press the siege,
the farthest day which had been appointed for his reaching ♦THE FRENCH
ESTABLISH THEMSELVES IN THE TOWN.♦ Barcelona being past. During the
night of the 27th an attack was made upon the town; the helpless part
of the inhabitants had been removed by sea at the first approach of
danger; there were about 500 men stationed there, some of whom were
peasants, the others part of the garrison: they defended themselves
with a courage to which the French, who are seldom just to their
enemies, bore witness; but they were overpowered; about 300 fell, and
hardly fifty escaped into the citadel. The conquerors immediately
established batteries under cover of the houses, then set fire to the
houses, and cut off the communication between the citadel and the fort.
They rendered it also impossible for the English to communicate with
the citadel. Captain West had at this time been superseded by Captain
Bennett of the Fame; and when an officer from the Marques de Lazan came
on board his ship with dispatches for the governor, some lives were
lost in an unsuccessful attempt at landing him.
♦LORD COCHRANE THROWS HIMSELF INTO FORT TRINIDAD.♦
The citadel was soon in a desperate state, and the fort might have
been considered so; for it was at this time battered in breach, and
a passage to the lower bomb-proof being nearly effected, the marines
of the Fame were withdrawn. At this juncture Lord Cochrane arrived
in the Imperieuse. During the month of September this gallant officer
with his single ship had kept the whole coast of Languedoc in alarm,
destroyed the newly-constructed semaphoric telegraphs (which were
of the utmost consequence to the numerous coasting convoys of the
French) at Bourdique, La Pinede, St. Maguire, Frontignan, Canet, and
Foy; demolished fourteen barracks of the gens-d’armes; blown up a
battery and the strong tower upon the lake of Frontignan; and not only
prevented any troops from being sent from that province into Spain,
but excited such dismay there, that 2000 men were drawn from Figueras
to oppose him. The coasting trade was entirely suspended during this
alarm; and with such consummate prudence were all his enterprises
planned and executed, that not one of his men was either killed or
hurt, except one, who was singed in blowing up the battery.
♦GALLANT DEFENCE OF THE FORT.♦
Lord Collingwood, with his wonted prudence, had entrusted Cochrane
with discretionary orders to assist the Spaniards wherever it could
be done with most probability of success, and he hastened to the Bay
of Rosas as soon as he knew of the siege, ... too late, and yet in
time to signalize himself. Captain Bennett, though he had withdrawn
his own men, did not alter Lord Collingwood’s orders, and Cochrane
threw himself into Fort Trinidad with eighty seamen and marines,
at a time when the garrison, amounting to the same number, would
else have surrendered, perceiving that further resistance had been
thought unavailing by the English themselves. ♦1808. DECEMBER.♦
This garrison was changed, and the new men brought with them fresh
hope and unexhausted strength. Cochrane formed a rampart within the
breach of palisadoes and barrels, ships’ hammock-cloths, awning, &c.
filled with sand and rubbish; these supplied the place of walls and
ditches. Sanson, the commandant of the engineers, pronounced the breach
practicable. His opinion was relied on with the more confidence because
he was well acquainted with the place; but the Captain who was ordered
to lead the assault thought otherwise; he had been in the Spanish
service, and in garrison at that very fort, and he said that it was
not possible to enter there; nevertheless he would make the attempt if
he were ordered, with the certainty of perishing in it, and leading
his party to destruction. Under such circumstances it requires more
firmness to give the order than to obey, ... but it is of a different
kind. The order was given, and the officer perished as he had foreseen
and foretold. Two of his companions escaped by the humanity of the
English, who, instead of killing four men whose lives were at their
mercy, suffered two to retire, while they drew up the others by a
rope, to secure them as prisoners. When the breach had been rendered
practicable, a more formidable assault was made. Lord Cochrane had
prepared for it with that sportiveness by which English sailors are
as much characterised as schoolboys. He not only stationed men with
bayonets immediately within the breach, to give the assailants an
immediate greeting, but he laid well-greased planks across the breach,
upon which many of the French slipped and fell in endeavouring to pass;
and he hung ropes there with fish-hooks fastened to them, by which not
a few were caught in their retreat. The enemy suffered a severe loss on
this occasion. There was in Lord Cochrane’s conduct here, and in all
places, that contempt of danger which in former ages would have been
imputed to a reliance upon charms, and which never fails to inspire
confidence. Once, while the besiegers were battering the fort, the
Spanish flag fell into the ditch: he let himself down by a rope through
a shower of balls to recover it, returned unhurt, and planted it again
upon the ♦THE CITADEL CAPTURED, AND THE FORT EVACUATED.♦ walls. The
citadel at length having been battered in breach till it was no longer
tenable, capitulated, and the garrison, marching out with the honours
of war, were sent prisoners[1] into France. Two thousand men, who had
given proof of steadiness and courage, were thus lost to Spain. Lord
Cochrane then saw that any farther resistance in Fort Trinidad was
impossible; and having maintained its shattered walls twelve days after
they had been deemed untenable, he embarked all the men, and blew up
the magazine.
♦ST. CYR MARCHES TO RELIEVE BARCELONA.♦
The French had thus been detained a whole month before a neglected
and ill-provided fortress. But the men who so often during this war
heroically defended half-ruined works, had too much reason to feel how
little it availed by their exertions to gain time for generals who knew
not how to use it. By the French commanders every thing was calculated,
... by the Spanish, nothing. On the day after the capitulation the
conquerors marched from Rosas; on the next day the whole army was
collected on the Fluvia, the cavalry having returned from France. The
force disposable for the relief of Barcelona consisted of 15,000 foot
and 1500 horse: more than twice their number might have been brought
against them, besides the Miquelets, who were esteemed by the French
themselves as the best light troops in Europe, and the whole peasantry,
always remarkable for their hardihood, and now animated with a hatred
of their invaders as intense as it was well-founded. To deceive an
enemy who was easily deceived, St. Cyr manœuvred as if he intended to
besiege Gerona. One precaution, and one only, had been effectually
taken by the Spaniards: they had broken up the road along the coast,
so as to render it impracticable, and any attempt at repairing it must
have been made under the guns of the English squadron. Hostalrich
commanded the other road, but this was not passable for artillery. He
sent back his guns and his ammunition waggons to Figueras, and having
reached La Bisbal, distributed to every soldier four days’ biscuit and
fifty cartridges, and with ♦DEC. 12.♦ no farther ammunition than ten
rounds per man more, which were carried upon mules, set off to force
his way to Barcelona, sure of well storing it when he arrived there
from the magazines of the besiegers.
♦HE DISCOVERS A MOUNTAIN PATH NEAR HOSTALRICH.♦
Claros, who saw the enemy debouche from La Bisbal, dispatched immediate
intelligence to General Vives, and taking a position with his Miquelets
and a party of Somatenes at Col de la Grange, opposed their march.
If this system had been well followed up, the French must soon have
expended their cartridges; but every thing had been concerted on their
part, and with the Spaniards in their multitude of counsellors there
was neither concert nor wisdom; and so ♦CABAÑES, P. II. P. 92.♦ well
were the French prepared, that they were better acquainted with the
country than the Spaniards themselves. In passing near Palamos they
received some shot from the English ships; it was the only part of the
route they had chosen which exposed them to this danger. They encamped
that night in the Val de Aro. The destination of the army could then no
longer be concealed; still it was of importance to keep the Spaniards
in doubt concerning its course, and St. Cyr profited by every hour
which they passed in indecision. The next day he arrived at Vidreras.
Lazan’s troops were seen behind them, to the right, on the heights of
Casa de la Selva; and on the 14th some skirmishing took place near
Mallorquinas between these troops and the rear of the French. This
gave them little interruption, and no alarm: what St. Cyr apprehended
was, that he should find Vives upon the Tordera, a strong position,
where some bodies of Miquelets and peasantry, well posted, might
have made him expend his ammunition, and easily have frustrated his
design; but it was the fate of the Spaniards now never to profit by the
opportunities which were offered them. Passing by Masanet and Martorell
de la Selva, upon the heights which command Hostalrich, he halted his
right at Grions and his left at Masanes, while search was made for a
mountain path, which leading out of reach of shot from the fortress,
comes into the Barcelona road beyond it. A man who had formerly kept
sheep in these parts had assured him that such a path existed, in
opposition to the statement of all the smugglers whom St. Cyr consulted
before he left Perpignan, and it was in reliance upon his single but
sure testimony that this course was taken. The officers of the staff
went to look for it, and returned exhausted with fatigue, declaring
that no such path was there. St. Cyr then, who had full reliance upon
his informant, set out himself, and after two hours’ search discovered
it, but in the attempt he had nearly fallen into the hands of a party
of Somatenes.
By this path, on the 15th, the French succeeded in passing Hostalrich;
they started at daybreak, and had just regained the high road when
the garrison, having discovered the way which they had taken, came
out and annoyed their rear. In the course of the day they lost about
two hundred men by repeated attacks of the Miquelets: and the troops,
harassed by these skirmishes and by a fatiguing march, in which they
had to cross many torrents, would fain have halted for the night when
they arrived at Puente de la Tordera. The defile of Treinta-pasos was
before them six miles in length, and St. Cyr knew that if they did not
pass it that night, they must fight their way through on the morrow. He
urged them forward therefore, leaving a handful of men at the entrance,
to keep the Miquelets in check. The Spaniards had endeavoured to impede
the way by breaking up the road and felling trees across it: but they
had neglected to occupy this important pass, and by eleven o’clock the
whole of the French ♦ST. CYR, 52–63.♦ army bivouacqued on the plain a
league from Llinas.
♦INDECISION OF GENERAL VIVES.♦
General Vives, during the whole time that the French were before
Rosas, had been occupied with the insane purpose of laying regular
siege to Barcelona. From this dream he was disturbed by advices from
Gerona that the firing at Rosas had ceased; and any hope which might
have remained was soon put an end to by certain intelligence of its
surrender from the British squadron. The Spanish Commander had taken
none of the ordinary means for obtaining information of the enemy’s
movements; he knew as little of their strength as of their plans:
he was ill acquainted with the country, and the persons by whom he
was surrounded were utterly ignorant of military affairs, and might
have perplexed a firmer spirit and a clearer understanding, by their
contrarious and vacillating counsels. It was a moment at which a blow
might have been struck not less momentous than the battle of Baylen;
for the destruction of St. Cyr’s army (and destruction must have been
the consequence of defeat) would have drawn after it the recovery of
Barcelona and Figueras, and effectual assistance might then have been
afforded to Zaragoza. But the unreasonable hopes which he had long
indulged were followed by an ominous prostration of mind. Fretted as
well as embarrassed by want of money; alarmed by tidings of the rout
at Tudela, and of the appearance of the enemy again before Zaragoza;
still more alarmed by receiving no advices from the side of Madrid,
and therefore with too much reason apprehending the worst, he had no
government to look to for orders, no reliance upon others, and none
♦DEC. 11.♦ upon himself. Four days were wasted in hopeless indecision;
then came intelligence at midnight from the Junta at Gerona that St.
Cyr was on his march, and, having sent his artillery to Figueras, it
was evident that Barcelona was his object. Immediately General Reding
was dispatched with his division, consisting of about 4000 men, to
oppose him. Succeeding advices left no doubt of the direction of the
French; a council of war was held; Caldagues was of ♦HE MARCHES AGAINST
THE FRENCH.♦ opinion that the General should march against the enemy
with the greater part of his force, leaving only enough to keep up the
blockade: he took however not more than 5000 with him, and, having
dispatched instructions to the Marques de Lazan, followed Reding, and
having ♦DEC. 15. CABAÑES, P. 9. C. II.♦ joined him at Granollers, set
out from that place at midnight just when the French had passed without
opposition through the defile of Treinta-pasos: the Spaniards as they
left Granollers saw the fires of the enemy’s bivouac.
♦ROUT OF THE SPANIARDS AT LLINAS.♦
The intention was to occupy an advantageous position between Villalba
and Llinas: the artillery and the want of order in some of the raw
troops impeded their march; it was morning when the head of the column
arrived at Cardedeu, and before Vives could reach the ground which
he had intended to take he came in sight of the enemy, and his men,
after a night march of eight hours, had to draw up for battle. The
French were refreshed by rest: but they had consumed their biscuit,
and so much of their ammunition had been expended in skirmishing with
the Miquelets, that what remained would not have been sufficient for
an hour in action. St. Cyr had formed them in one column at daybreak.
When the Spanish artillery began to play upon the head of that column,
Pino, of whose division it was composed, sent an aide-de-camp, to ask
if any change was to be made in the dispositions for battle. St. Cyr’s
reply was, “We have neither time nor means to make dispositions. In
this covered country it would take at least three hours to reconnoitre
the enemy well, ... in less than two, Lazan might arrive to attack us
in the rear, and Milans might fall upon our left. We have not a minute
to lose; but must bring our whole force to bear upon the centre of
their line.” Notwithstanding these orders, the first brigade deployed,
and attacking the left of Reding’s division suffered considerably,
and began to give way. St. Cyr, when he saw his orders disobeyed,
instructed Pino to execute his original plan with the second brigade,
and, changing the direction of Souham’s division, sent it to turn
General Reding’s right. Two battalions were ordered to make a false
attack upon the left of the Spanish position. Here the rout began. The
centre was forced at the same time; and Vives and his staff, seeing all
hope lost on that side, hastened to the right, where the advantage
had hitherto appeared to be with Reding. But they carried panic with
them; Souham’s division decided the battle in that quarter with equal
celerity, and the steadiness with which some of the old troops behaved
was not supported well enough to save the Spaniards from a total and
scandalous defeat. It was eight o’clock when they formed for action,
and before nine they were in full flight. General Vives lost his horse,
and, escaping on foot across the mountains, reached Mataro, and got
on board a vessel. There was an end of all order: officers and men
shifted as they could, each for himself. One column alone under Colonel
Ybarrola retreated unbroken; and two out of fourteen guns were brought
off by a Sub-lieutenant named Uzurrun. Reding, who had been saved
by the speed of his horse from close pursuit, fell in with these at
Mommalo, rallied what fugitives could be collected, and retreated with
them by S. Culgat, across the Llobregat to Molins de Rey. The artillery
had been well served, and the French loss by their own account amounted
to 600 men. Of the Spaniards 2000 are said to have been taken, of
whom 800 were wounded. Their killed were about 400. The loss in men
was trifling, for the fugitives dispersed in all directions, and the
conquerors wasted no time in pursuit: but the most favourable ♦CABAÑES,
P. 3. C. 11. ST. CYR, 63–70.♦ opportunity which presented itself to
the Spaniards during the whole war was lost, ... the opportunity of
cutting off a second French army, which would have drawn after it the
recovery of Barcelona, and a second deliverance of Zaragoza.
♦RETREAT OF THE SPANIARDS FROM BARCELONA TO THE LLOBREGAT.♦
The firing was heard at Barcelona, from whence Duhesme, seeing so large
a part of the besieging force drawn off, sallied against the remainder:
he was bravely received, and repulsed at all points. But when night
came, Caldagues, who had been left in the command, hearing the fatal
issue of the battle, withdrew behind the Llobregat, removing almost
the whole of his artillery, but leaving copious magazines which Vives,
with that want of discretion that characterized all his conduct, had
collected at Sarrea, and which it was now impossible to save. The
retreat was effected without molestation; but so miserable a scene
had not for many generations been witnessed in Catalonia. The country
around Barcelona was one of the most flourishing and delightful parts
of the whole kingdom, bearing every mark of industry and opulence and
comfort. The whole population of that vicinity followed the retreat,
men, women, and children carrying upon their backs such effects as they
could bear, and leaving all the rest to the spoilers. The nuns of three
convents were among the fugitives: about an hundred of these poor women
were so advanced in years that they were hardly able to walk, ... since
childhood they had never been beyond the walls of their cloister, and
now they were thus driven abroad into the world. Reding had reached
Molins de Rey at midnight, and by great exertions restoring some order
among the troops which he had collected in his flight, took a position
upon the heights that command the bridge.
♦ST. CYR MARCHES AGAINST THEM.
DEC. 17.♦
St. Cyr entered Barcelona on the following morning, ill satisfied with
Duhesme for not having interposed to cut off the fugitives; and still
more displeased when he found that the distress of the garrison for
provisions had been greatly exaggerated, and that in consequence of
these false representations he had been compelled to undertake a march
so perilous that nothing but the gross incapacity of his opponents
♦DEC. 20.♦ could have saved the army from[2] destruction. He rested his
men three days, and on the fourth took a position on the left bank of
the Llobregat in face of the Spaniards, that they might have no time to
strengthen themselves in the advantageous post which they occupied, nor
to be joined by the troops under Lazan and Milans. But these officers
had no intention of joining; and Reding, upon whom the temporary
command had devolved, was less able than a Spaniard would have been to
struggle with the difficulties in which he found himself. A Spanish
General would neither have foreseen defeat nor have been cast down by
it; he would have thought a change of fortune as likely as a change
of weather; he would have relied upon the Saints and the Virgin, his
good cause and the insuperable constancy of his countrymen. But Reding
saw only the fearful realities of his situation; he knew that his
own knowledge of the art of war was of no avail when he could depend
neither upon officers nor men; and his sole hope was, that a speedy and
honourable death might remove him from the sight of calamities which
he deemed it impossible to avert. A more pitiable condition cannot be
conceived, ... except that of the brave and honourable men employed
against him, who from a sense of military duty served with their utmost
efforts a cause which they knew to be infamously unjust, and acting
in obedience to a merciless tyrant with miscreants worthy of such a
master, aided and abetted crimes at which their hearts revolted ...
sinning thus against God and man, against the light of conscience and
against their own souls.
♦INDECISION OF THE SPANIARDS. DEC. 18.♦
On the second day after the rout, Vives, who had landed at Sitges,
appeared upon the Llobregat, and having approved of Reding’s
dispositions, left him in the command while he went to Villafranca to
take measures with the Junta for calling out the whole peasantry of
the country, and for reuniting the dispersed troops. There was the
difficult task of providing for the army, ... their magazines had been
abandoned to the enemy, and they were in a country which now for six
months had been the immediate scene of war. They were without clothes
and without shelter, and a piercing wind from the mountains swept down
the valley of the Llobregat. ♦DEC. 20.♦ While they were employed in
felling trees and erecting huts, the alarm was given that the French
were taking a position in front of them. The men were immediately
placed under arms, and dispositions were made for maintaining a post
strong in itself, and defended by numerous artillery. But it was soon
perceived that the attack would not be made that day. St. Cyr fixed
his head-quarters in the centre at San Feliu, having his left at
Cornella and his right at Molins de Rey. He saw by the movements of the
Spaniards that they expected the main attack would be at that place,
by the bridge over which the high road passes to Tarragona, and a
little way beyond branches off to Zaragoza. They had in fact made such
preparations that it was impossible for the French to debouch there
while the point was defended with any resolution. St. Cyr therefore
ordered General Chabran to draw their attention thither during the
night, and not to make any real attempt till he should see both the
centre and the right of the enemy turned: for the river was fordable
in several places, and the Spaniards with strange improvidence had
taken no means for rendering it impassable in those points. Indeed
as soon as they were satisfied that the attack was delayed till the
morning, Reding held a council of war in his tent; and all who were
present agreed that considering the temper of the troops after their
late defeat, it would be imprudent to hazard another engagement....
Some were for retreating to Ordal, and occupying a position there; ...
it was not so defensible as that which they proposed to abandon; but
to men in their state of mind it seemed better, because it was at a
distance: others were for retiring at once to Tarragona, where the army
might be re-organized in safety. Reding himself thought it certainly
advisable to retreat: but he who had no fear of death was miserably
afraid of responsibility; and wanting resolution to act upon his own
judgement, dispatched a courier to solicit instructions from General
Vives, who was seven leagues off. Night came on; the troops were under
arms, exposed to severe cold and snow; the fires of both armies were
seen along their whole lines; ... an alarm was kept up at the bridge by
Chabran’s division, and from time to time the Spanish batteries fired
where they saw any movement on the opposite bank. At midnight no answer
from Vives had arrived; and Reding, not doubting that it would confirm
the opinion of the council, issued orders that the troops should be in
readiness to commence their retreat as soon as it came. But Vives also
sought to shift the responsibility from himself; and when his answer
arrived, which was not till four in the morning, its purport was, that
Reding was to retire to Ordal if he could not maintain himself on the
Llobregat. Reding now felt that the night had been lost in this ruinous
indecision, and finding the responsibility which he dreaded thrown back
upon him, deemed it better to die where he was than commence a retreat
with the certainty of being instantly and closely pursued. He made
this determination known to the officers who were about his person,
exhorting them to do their duty like true Spaniards, and die in defence
of their country: ♦CABAÑES, P. 3. C. 12.♦ they shook hands with him in
pledge of their promise, and in this temper waited for the attack.
♦DEC. 21.
THE SPANIARDS ROUTED, AND PURSUED TO TARRAGONA.♦
At break of morning on the shortest day in the year, the left wing of
the French under General Souham forded the river at St. Juan d’Espi,
and ascended the right bank to protect the centre, which in like
manner crossed in a line from St. Feliu, opposite to the right of the
Spaniards. The first brigade of the centre effected its passage before
any such intention was perceived or apprehended by their opponents.
The Spaniards could have given no greater proof of negligence than
in leaving undefended points which were so easily defensible, and
upon which the security of their position depended; but in making
dispositions as soon as they discovered the enemy’s movements, they
evinced a degree of skill which convinced the French that there were
officers among them who would have been formidable antagonists had they
commanded troops upon whom they could have relied. The first brigade,
however, was in time to establish itself with little opposition upon
the heights of Llors and S. Coloma; the second followed, and placed
itself at the foot of those heights, masked, in column, and ready to
debouch. Chabot’s troops crossed at the same ford, and marched to the
left of the others, with the intention of turning the Spaniards’ right.
The effect of these movements was, that the Spanish troops, dismayed,
as their officers had anticipated, by the late reverses, easily gave
way: the right was driven back behind the centre; that being attacked
also, was thrown back upon the left toward the bridge; their retreat
upon Villa Franca was cut off by Chabot: a detachment from the French
right, which had crossed at a ford above the bridge, intercepted them
also on the way to Martorell; and if Chabran had then forced the
passage of the bridge, they would have been beset on all sides, and
driven together for slaughter like wild beasts at a royal hunt in the
East. Chabran, however, not willing to expose his men to a loss which
might be spared, waited till Souham’s troops arrived on the opposite
bank, and then debouched from the bridge. There are no troops in the
world except the Spaniards, says St. Cyr, who could have escaped from
such a situation. They did it by abandoning every thing, and flying
every man his own way. General Reding and the officers who had pledged
themselves to die with him in maintaining the position had not even
an opportunity of dying afforded them, unless they had sought it like
suicides. The country being craggy, wooded, and full of ravines,
favoured the fugitives, so that during an active pursuit of fifteen
hours not more that some 1100 prisoners were taken. Caldagues was
among them, and the good service which he had performed in relieving
Gerona did not exempt him now from a suspicion of having betrayed the
Spaniards in favour of his countrymen. The pursuit was followed to the
very gates of Tarragona, and some of the fugitives did not stop till
they reached the Ebro. All the artillery, consisting of 50 pieces of
cannon, was taken; and large magazines of ammunition were found at
Villa Franca, to the great relief of the French, who had not enough in
Barcelona for a month’s consumption. Chabran’s division established
itself at Martorell, Chabot’s at S. Sadurni, Souham’s at Vendrell and
upon the left bank of the Gaya, Pino’s at Villa Franca, Villa Nueva,
and Sitjas. St. Cyr fixed his head-quarters at Villa Franca. Thus far
he had completely succeeded in whatever he had proposed: ... there was
no longer an army in the field to oppose him; Barcelona was not only
relieved, but stored and rendered secure; and Zaragoza (which in a
moral if not a military point of view was an object of more importance)
♦ST. CYR, 82–88. CABAÑES, P. 3. C. 12.♦ was precluded from all
succour in that quarter, from whence alone an effectual effort might
reasonably have been expected.
CHAPTER XVII.
MOVEMENTS OF THE CENTRAL ARMY UNDER THE DUKE DEL INFANTADO. BATTLE
OF UCLES. RETREAT FROM CUENCA. CARTAOJAL APPOINTED TO THE
COMMAND. PROGRESS OF THE FRENCH. SIR ROBERT WILSON ENTERS CIUDAD
RODRIGO. NEGOTIATION CONCERNING THE ADMISSION OF BRITISH TROOPS
INTO CADIZ.
♦1808. DECEMBER.♦
♦THE SPANIARDS NOT DISCOURAGED BY THEIR REVERSES.♦
Sir John Moore’s movements, fatal as they were to his army and himself,
and most injurious to public opinion in England, were not without
some good effect, though far inadequate to the price at which it was
purchased. They drew into Galicia those forces which would otherwise
have taken possession of Lisbon and of Seville, and they afforded the
Junta time for raising new levies and bringing new armies into the
field. The spirit of the nation was in no degree abated; their numerous
defeats, the loss of their capital, and the treachery of chiefs in whom
they had entirely trusted, seemed rather to exasperate than dismay
them; and there would have been no lack of strength had there been
arms for the willing people, officers to discipline them, a government
which could have provided for their support, and generals capable of
directing their zeal and courage. A memorable instance of the national
disposition was displayed in the little town of Luzena. According to
a decree of the Junta, four men of every hundred were to be drawn for
military service; all who were liable to the lot assembled, 400 in
number, and when the magistrate was proceeding to ballot for sixteen,
the whole 400 volunteered, and marched off that same day to join the
troops at Seville.
♦CONDITION OF INFANTADO’S ARMY AT CUENCA.♦
Had the British army made a stand in Galicia, as there was every reason
to expect, the Duke del Infantado was to have advanced from Cuenca
upon Ocaña and Aranjuez, and in conjunction with the army collected
at La Carolina, under the Marques del Palacio, to have pushed for
Madrid. The retreat of Sir John Moore frustrated this plan; the Duke
was then ordered to remain on the defensive, and new levies were sent
to reinforce him as fast as they were raised. But in the miserable
circumstances of his army, increase of numbers was no increase of
strength. Arms, clothing, and provision were wanting; it was alike
without resources, discipline, or system; in want of efficient officers
of every rank, and those which there were, were divided into cabals and
factions. The province of Cuenca was the best point which could have
been chosen for deriving supplies from La Mancha, Murcia, and Valencia,
the two latter provinces as yet unexhausted by the war; but it was not
a military position. The city stands upon high ground, where the Huecar
falls into the Jucar at the skirts of Monte de S. Christobal, and it
is completely commanded by the ♦INFANTADO, MANIFIESTO, 32–37.♦ heights.
All that the Duke could hope for in case he were attacked was to secure
his retreat, and for this purpose he occupied some eminences on the
left bank of the Huecar, leaving the road to Valencia by Moya open
for his artillery. The van was stationed at Jabaya, four leagues from
Cuenca, in the direction of Madrid.
The Duke had acquired some reputation in the former war with France
when serving as Colonel of a regiment which he had raised himself.
He had now given the highest proof of devotion to his country, in
accepting a command under circumstances which rendered success
absolutely impossible, and yet where any disaster would compromise
his reputation, and expose him to the suspicion and fury of his own
soldiers. In endeavouring to restore order among the troops, and to
obtain food and clothing for them, he was indefatigable; no man could
have exerted himself with greater activity and zeal. The condition of
his army indeed, officers as well as men, was pitiable. The military
chest having been taken to Zaragoza, they were without pay; and a great
proportion of those who had endured the fatigue and sufferings of
the retreat were now sinking under the effects. They lay upon straw,
half-naked, in that severe season, and in the keen climate of that
high country, ... hundreds were perishing thus. The Duke established
hospitals, collected beds from the city and from all the places
within reach, appointed officers to the sole charge of seeing that the
sick were supplied, and ordered the friars to attend upon them. His
authority was exerted as far as it would extend, and when that failed,
he begged for their support. These exertions were not without effect;
the progress of disease was ♦INFANTADO, 42–44.♦ stopped, men and stores
were obtained, subordination was restored, and with little efficient
strength there was the appearance as well as the name of an army.
♦DREAMS OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.♦
The Spaniards were not sensible how low they had fallen as a military
people. Remembering what they had been, no lessons, however severe,
could make them see themselves as they were; and this error was not
confined to the multitude; it was partaken by all ranks, and seemed,
indeed, inherent in the national character. It was an error which
exposed their armies always to defeat, and yet as a nation rendered
them invincible; ... the French could have invaded no people whom it
would have been so easy to rout, none whom it was so impossible to
subdue. Infantado had his full share of this delusion; he planned
extensive and combined operations, such as required good troops,
intelligent officers, and ready means; ... he thought of relieving
Zaragoza, ... of recovering Madrid; or of pursuing the left wing
of that army which was then employed against the English; ... and
this with men and leaders whose incapacity was manifest upon every
occasion. Upon intelligence that about 1500 French cavalry were
scouring the country on both sides of the Tagus, and plundering great
part of the provinces of Cuenca and La Mancha, he concerted a scheme
for surprising them at Aranjuez and ♦MOVEMENT AGAINST THE FRENCH AT
TARANCON FRUSTRATED.♦ Tarancon, sending Venegas with 4000 foot and 800
horse to attack them in the latter place, while D. Antonio de Senra,
with an equal force of foot and 1000 horse, was to fall upon Aranjuez,
overcome the enemy there, and intercept those who would retreat thither
in their endeavour to escape from Tarancon. The attempt failed, wholly
through mismanagement. Senra stopped short at El Horcajo, in fear of
a detachment of French cavalry at Villanueva del Cardete, though that
force had been calculated upon in the combinations of Infantado. The
division with Venegas lost their way in the night and the snow; some
went in one direction, some in another, ... the cavalry who were thus
separated had no directions how to act; and the infantry, instead of
surprising the enemy in Tarancon, were themselves surprised ♦INFANTADO,
45–55.♦ by them. There were, however, some good troops among them, who
stood firm, and the ♦DEC. 25.♦ French, being very inferior in number,
retreated with some loss to Aranjuez.
♦VENEGAS FALLS BACK FROM TARANCON TO UCLES.♦
This failure had the ill effect of creating discord among the
Spaniards. Infantado blamed the commanders; they reproached the
officers under them; and both were willing to excuse themselves by
supposing that what had failed in the execution had been planned
unskilfully. Yet, as some advantage had been gained, the Duke resolved
to pursue it.... The left bank being now cleared as far as Aranjuez,
he hoped to take possession of that point and of Ocaña, and as in that
rainy season the Tagus was nowhere fordable, his purpose was to remove
the boats, break down the bridges, and place himself at Toledo. Venegas
therefore was ordered to canton his troops in Tarancon, Ucles, and the
neighbouring villages, preparatory to this movement, and his force
was increased to 8000 foot and 1900 horse, ... the commander-in-chief
retaining with himself about 10,000, of whom a third part were without
arms, and a considerable number otherwise unfit for service. This
♦1809.♦ was their position at the beginning of the year. Of what was
passing in other parts they were ill-informed, and the false reports
which abound in such times were always on the favourable side. They
believed the French in Madrid were in hourly fear that this army would
appear before the capital; and that Romana had entirely destroyed the
enemy at Guadarama. Some movements, however, on the part of the French
about Aranjuez made Venegas resolve to fall back from Tarancon upon
Ucles. He apprehended that it was their intention to attack the part
of his force which was stationed at this latter place, and he resolved
therefore to march his troops thither as a better position than
Tarancon, and one where he might cover the army.
♦1809. JANUARY.
ROUT OF THE SPANIARDS AT UCLES.♦
Ucles is a decayed town, where the Knights of Santiago had their
chief convent in the bright ages of that military order: here their
banner was kept which Gregory XI. had blessed, and which the Kings of
Spain delivered to every new master on his appointment: hither the
knights from all the other provinces resorted when their services
were required, and from hence they had set forth for the conquest of
Cordoba, and Seville, and Jaen, and Murcia. To a Spaniard of these
times it was a melancholy place, for the proud as well as the mournful
recollections which it recalled; for here Alonso VI. had lost his
only son, in the most disastrous defeat that the Christians had ever
suffered from the Moors since the destruction of the kingdom of the
Goths. He fell in battle with the Almoravides; and because seven Counts
had died bravely in defending the Infante, the African fanatics, in
their insolent triumph, called the spot where they fell the Place of
the Seven Swine. This ill-omened ground was now to become the scene of
an action disgraceful to the Spaniards for the facility with which they
were routed, and infamous to the French for the enormous wickedness
with which they abused their victory.
Venegas supposed that the French were bringing forces against him
across the Tagus, by the ferry at Villamanrique. His danger was from a
different quarter. Victor had marched from Toledo against Infantado’s
army, knowing as little of the Spaniards’ movements as they did of his,
but with such troops, that his only anxiety was to find the enemy, and
bring them to action wherever they might be found. Victor himself, with
General Ruffin’s division, went by way of Alcazar, and General Villate,
taking the direction of Ucles, discovered the Spaniards there on the
morning of the 13th. Venegas apprehended an attack on his right, or
in the rear; but the French crossed the brook, and fell upon the left
wing of the Spaniards, who were stationed upon some high and broken
ground, commanding the convent and the town. If the general erred in
not strengthening this position, the troops allowed him no time for
remedying his error; they retreated precipitately to the town, and
when orders came to occupy the convent it was too late; ... the enemy
were within the enclosure, and fired from thence, as under cover of a
parapet. The panic presently spread, the raw levies disordered those
who would have done their duty, and many officers made a brave but vain
sacrifice of their own lives in endeavouring to rally and encourage the
men. The fugitives in one direction came upon the enemy’s artillery,
under General Cenarmont, and were cut down with grape-shot; in another
they fell in with Victor and the remaining part of the French army. One
body, under D. Pedro Agustin Giron, seeing that all was lost, made
their way desperately through the enemy in good order, and got to
Carrascosa, where they found the Duke. It was a series of errors on the
part of the Spaniards, and the consequences were as disastrous as they
could be. The French boasted of having taken 300 officers and 12,000
men, ... the whole force, however, which Venegas had with him did not
amount to this, but the loss was very great. The prisoners were marched
to ♦ROCCA, P. 79.♦ Madrid, and such as fell by the way from hunger and
exhaustion were shot by their inhuman captors.
♦CRUELTIES COMMITTED THERE BY THE FRENCH.♦
Never indeed did any men heap upon themselves more guilt and infamy
than those by whom this easy conquest was obtained. The inhabitants
of Ucles had taken no part in the action; from necessity they could
only be passive spectators of the scene. But they had soon cause to
lament that they had not rather immolated their wives and children
with their own hands, like the Numantians of old, and then rushed upon
the invaders to sweeten death with vengeance, instead of submitting to
the mercy of such enemies. Plunder was the first object of the French,
and in order to make the townspeople discover where their valuables
were secreted, they tortured them. When they had thus obtained all the
portable wealth of the place, they yoked the inhabitants like beasts,
choosing especially the clergy for this outrage, loaded them with their
own furniture, and made them carry it to the Castle Hill, and pile it
in heaps, where they set fire to it, and consumed the whole. They then
in mere wantonness murdered above threescore persons, dragging them
to the shambles, that this butchery might be committed in its proper
scene. Several women were among these sufferers, and they might be
regarded as happy in being thus delivered from the worse horrors that
ensued: for the French laid hands on the surviving women of the place,
amounting to some three hundred, ... they tore the nun from the altar,
the wife from her husband’s corpse, the virgin from her mother’s arms,
and they abused these victims of the foulest brutality, till many
of them expired on the spot. This was not all, ... but the farther
atrocities which these monsters perpetrated cannot even be hinted at
without violating the decencies of language and the reverence which is
due to humanity. These unutterable things were committed in open day,
and the officers made not the slightest attempt at restraining the
wretches under their command; they were employed in securing the best
part of the plunder for themselves. The Spanish government published
the details of this wickedness, in order ♦GAZETA DEL GOBIERNO, APRIL
24, 1809.♦ that if the criminals escaped earthly punishment, they might
not escape perpetual infamy.
♦INFANTADO COLLECTS THE FUGITIVES.♦
Infantado was severely censured for exposing his advanced guard
fourteen leagues from his head-quarters, so that support was
impossible; and an equal want of judgement had been shown by Venegas
in not falling back upon the main body, which he knew was actually
on the way to join him. The Duke left Cuenca on the morning preceding
the action, and took up his quarters that night at Horcajada. Desirous
to know for what reason Venegas had retreated from Tarancon, he rode
forward on the 13th with his aides-de-camp, and when he reached
Carrascosa, which is a league and half from Ucles, some carriers
informed him that as they were leaving that town they heard firing at
the outposts. Part of his troops were at Carrascosa; they had heard
nothing; and the Duke was preparing to sit down to table with their
general, the Conde de Orgaz, when news came that horse and foot were
approaching in disorder. Immediately he mounted and rode forward; the
first person whom he met was the commandant of the light troops, D.
Francisco Copons y Navia, an officer in whom he had great confidence:
seeing him without his battalion, he knew that some fatal blow must
have been sustained, and asking what had happened, was told that the
troops at Ucles were all either killed or taken. His first impulse
was to rush forward, and throw himself upon the enemy’s bayonets. A
timely thought of duty withheld him from this act of desperation. The
troops under Giron, who had fought their way through the French, came
up now in good order; with these and with such fugitives as could be
brought together, he made dispositions which checked the pursuit in
this direction, and retired when the evening was ♦INFANTADO, 119–132.♦
closing to Horcajada. They rested there during the early part of the
night, and setting forward at three in the morning, reached the Venta
de las Cabrejas before daybreak.
♦RETREAT FROM CUENCA.♦
Here, while the troops were receiving their rations, the generals held
a council whether they should retreat to the borders of Valencia,
and take up a position for the defence of that kingdom, which was
threatened on the side of Daroca; or join the Marques del Palacio in La
Mancha, and if compelled, fall back to La Carolina or Despeña-Perros;
or march for Zaragoza, to attack the besiegers, and raise the siege.
This was gravely proposed; but the madness of making such an attempt
with an unprovided, undisciplined, routed army, dispirited by a long
series of disasters, and above all, by the scandalous defeat of the
preceding day, was universally acknowledged. The scheme of joining
Palacio, and making for the Sierra Morena, was likewise rejected,
because in the plains of La Mancha they would be exposed to the enemy’s
cavalry; and it was resolved without a dissentient voice to retreat
into Valencia, where there were great resources for refitting and
increasing the troops. This being determined, the army reached Cuenca
that night, and continued its retreat on the following morning, the
artillery being sent off in the middle of the night by a better road,
to join them at Almodovar del Pinar. But four-and-twenty hours of the
heaviest rain rendered this road also impassable; and in spite of every
exertion the greater number of the guns could not be got farther than
Olmedilla, one league from Cuenca, by the following midnight, and there
the escort left them. The Duke, who was with the artillery himself,
in hope of expediting the most difficult part of their movements, had
preceded them to Tortola, where a few of the guns had arrived, and
whither the rest were to be brought next day, the worst part of the
road being past. He sent orders therefore that one regiment of horse
and another of foot should be dispatched to Tortola, for the purpose
of escorting the artillery when it should be thus brought together,
and went himself to join the army at ♦LOSS OF THE ARTILLERY.♦ Valera
de arriba. On his arrival there on the evening of the 16th he found
that no infantry had been sent; being barefooted and exhausted by
marching in such weather, they had been deemed actually incapable of
the service. Presently advice arrived that a company of the Ordenes
Militares, which he had left at Tortola, had thought proper to leave
the place immediately after his departure: that a party of enemy’s
cavalry had come up, and that the regiment of dragoons at the very
sound of the French trumpets had taken flight, abandoning the guns to
them. He now ordered a battalion of infantry and the Farnese regiment
of dragoons to hasten and retake them: the night was dark, the distance
considerable, the roads in the worst imaginable state; and when at
daybreak they came to Tortola, scarcely an hundred infantry could be
mustered, the rest having lost the way, or dispersed. The dragoons
behaved well, and twice made themselves masters of the guns, but to no
purpose; they were embedded in the soil too deeply to be removed at
once; and while they were vainly labouring there, reinforcements came
up to the enemy, and many brave men were sacrificed before the regiment
desisted from the attempt at saving these guns, which with such
exertions had been brought thither from Tudela. Infantado knew that any
farther effort, considering the state of his army, must be hopeless,
and would moreover expose him to the imminent danger of having his
retreat cut off, for one column of the enemy appeared to be taking the
direction of Almodovar; and in fact when the Duke reached that place,
it was ascertained that they were within three leagues of it. After a
few hours’ rest therefore he ordered the retreat to be continued to La
Motilla del Palancar, near Alarcon; and being, however unfortunate as
a commander, willing to perform a soldier’s part to the last, took his
station with his own family and his orderly dragoons, as an outpost,
within three miles of the enemy. This had an excellent effect upon the
troops; so many indeed had deserted since the rout at Ucles, that few
perhaps remained except those who acted upon a sense of duty, and their
movements were now conducted with more composure. Infantado remained
at La Motilla till he was assured that the French had turned aside
from the pursuit; removing then to Albacete and Chinchilla, he gave
his troops a few days’ necessary ♦INFANTADO, 133–141.♦ rest, and issued
directions for the better observance of discipline and order.
♦INFANTADO FRUSTRATES A MOVEMENT OF THE ENEMY AGAINST THE CAROLINA
ARMY.♦
On the 25th the army moved to Hellin and Tobarra, the object being to
cover Murcia, call off the attention of the enemy from Valencia, and
receive reinforcements from both those kingdoms and from Andalusia.
Infantado was more enterprising and more hopeful than some of the
generals under his command, who would have had him retreat to the
city of Murcia, there to refit his troops, or take shelter even at
Carthagena. The minister at war submitted to his consideration whether
it would not be advisable to take up a position between the Peñas de S.
Pedro and Carcelen, for the purpose of communicating with the Sierra
Morena by the Sierra de Alcaraz. This the Duke thought a bad position
in itself, even if it were not in a desert, and without water; and as
he had ascertained that Victor was moving upon Villarrobledo with the
intention of cutting off the vanguard of the Carolina army at Villarta,
he took measures for averting a blow, which, if it had succeeded, would
have left the passes of the Sierra Morena open to the enemy. It had
been intended that this detachment, consisting of 5000 men, should
have co-operated with him in his projected movement upon Toledo, which
had been so fatally frustrated at Ucles; they were therefore under
his command. He now ♦1809. FEBRUARY.♦ sent orders that they should
instantly retire to S. Cruz de Mudela, or to El Viso; and while he
hastened thither himself to join them, sent off 500 horse, divided
into four parties, to act as _guerillas_ in the rear of the French.
They did this with great success, imposing upon them by their rapidity
and boldness: and the Duke by forced marches reached S. Cruz de Mudela
in time to save the Carolina troops, the enemy having just arrived in
front of them. The French, seeing a force which they had not expected,
and were not in strength to attack, retired toward Toledo, leaving
the open country to the Spaniards: and Infantado then communicated
♦INFANTADO, 180–189.♦ with General Cuesta, that he might act in concert
with the army of Extremadura.
♦INFANTADO SUPERSEDED BY CARTAOJAL.♦
The troops had now recovered heart; the advanced guard, under the Duque
del Alburquerque, gained some advantage at Mora, where, ♦FEB. 18.♦
by a well-planned expedition, he surprised the French; and Infantado
thought that he had performed no inconsiderable service to his country,
in having gathered up the wreck of the central army, and brought it
into an efficient state, when he received an order from the Supreme
Junta to give up the command to the ♦FEB. 6.♦ Conde de Cartaojal.
He obeyed reluctantly, and with the feelings of an injured man. The
government at that time perhaps, like the people, attributed too large
a part of their disasters to the generals, and therefore appointed
and displaced them upon no better ground than that of complying
with public opinion. The soldiers appear to have been well satisfied
with the Duke; they indeed had seen the incessant exertions which he
had made for supporting them when the government could send them no
supplies: but the officers were divided into cabals, and there was a
strong party against him. His offended pride did not however abate
his desire of continuing to serve his country in the field, and he
requested permission to remain with the army as Colonel of the Royal
Spanish Guards; but he was informed that this was incompatible with
his elevated rank, and therefore he was ♦FEB. 12.♦ called to Seville.
No inquiry concerning the rout at Ucles was instituted; the opinion
prevailed that it was imputable to his error in exposing the advanced
guard at such a distance from the body of his army; but the faults with
which he charged Venegas were overlooked, and the government continued
to place a confidence in that General, to which, in any other capacity
than that of a commander, his honourable character and personal
qualities entitled him.
♦CALUMNIES AGAINST CASTAÑOS.♦
The French, at the commencement of their revolutionary war, sent
every unsuccessful general to the scaffold, the Convention in its
bloody acts keeping pace with the bloodiest desires of a deceived and
infuriated populace. The Central Junta contracted no such guilt, though
humanity is not the characteristic of the Spaniards, and justice in
state affairs had in that country for centuries been unknown. They
gave ♦1809.♦ no ear to vulgar or malignant accusations; but, on the
other hand, they allowed their generals no opportunity of vindicating
themselves. Upon this ground Castaños, as well as Infantado, had
cause to complain. The order which called him from the command of the
central army during its retreat intimated no dissatisfaction at his
conduct; on the contrary, it summoned him to take the presidency of the
Military Junta, saying that the fate of armies depended upon the plans
which were laid down for them. That restless intriguer, the Conde de
Montijo, who had visited him at his head-quarters at Tudela, professed
the warmest friendship towards him, and spoken of him in the language
of unbounded admiration, left the army suddenly two days before the
battle, and wherever he went reported that Castaños was a traitor,
and had sold the country to the French. This nearly proved fatal to
the General, when, in obedience to his summons, he set out to join
the Central Junta, taking with him merely such an escort as his rank
required: for he soon found that fifteen horse and thirty foot were
not sufficient to protect him from imminent danger; the clamour which
Montijo raised had spread far and wide, and they could not enter a
village without preparations as serious as if they were about to engage
in action. At Miguel-turra, in La Mancha, the Junta exerted themselves
ineffectually to restrain the populace, who were crying out, Kill
him! kill him! The members of that body, the better to secure him,
gathered round his person, and accompanied him on foot; the rabble
pressed upon them with blind fury, and their lives, as well as that of
Castaños, would have been sacrificed, if his cavalry had not charged
the multitude sword in hand, and opened the way. But the danger was
not over when he had been housed; the house was beset, and it was only
by the exertions of the better classes, and especially of a priest,
that he was enabled to leave the place before daybreak the following
morning. It became necessary for them to avoid all populous places,
and take up their lodging in the smallest and most retired hamlets;
and yet with these precautions his life was frequently threatened. In
addition to this evil there was the uncertainty of knowing whither to
direct his course: three times on his journey he found that the Central
Junta had changed their place of residence; and when he finally made
for Seville, it was with a belief that they had removed to Puerto de
Santa Maria. Upon approaching Seville, he was ordered to take up his
abode in the monastery of S. Geronimo de Buenavista, and there await
the farther determination of the government. Montijo had accused him as
an instrument of Tilly, engaged with him in treasonable designs, and
also in a scheme for rendering Andalusia independent, and making it the
head of a confederacy of ♦CASTAÑOS, REPRESENTACION, 15–18.♦ provinces.
This was the mere fabrication of a man who scrupled at no means for
promoting his own insane ambition, and as such the Junta received it;
but they deemed it expedient to treat the general as if he were under
their displeasure, lest a suspicion, which in its consequences might be
most fatal to the country, should be raised against themselves.
♦HIS MEMORIAL TO THE JUNTA.♦
Castaños was not aware of the accusation which had been thus preferred;
least indeed of all men could he have supposed that a charge of
federalism would have been brought against him, who had with so much
decision and effect opposed the dangerous disposition of the provincial
authorities to consult their own security alone. But he complained of
the injurious restraint in which he was placed, and in an able and
temperate memorial appealed to his past services, showed that the
defeat at Tudela was not imputable to any error or indiscretion on his
part (his opinion having been over-ruled by their representative, D.
Francisco Palafox), and required that his conduct might be judged of by
the circumstances in which he was placed, and the actual condition of
his army, not as if he had commanded 80,000 effective men. An army in
the field, he said, was like a musical instrument with many keys and
many registers: if these did not answer to the touch, if many strings
were wanting, and the others not in tune, the best musician would be
deemed a sorry performer by those who heard the broken and jarring
sounds which he produced, and knew not the state of the instrument.
Still, he maintained, the French were far from being able to subdue
Spain. Castaños was not unsupported while he thus defended himself with
the confidence of an innocent and injured man. The Junta of Seville
honourably espoused his cause, and the government allowed him to remove
to his own house at Algeciras, there to remain while the inquiry into
his conduct which he demanded should be carried on.
♦INTRIGUES OF MONTIJO.♦
Montijo was one of those men who in disordered times are intoxicated
with ambition and vanity. His object in seeking the ruin of Castaños
was to obtain a command for himself. He represented to the Junta that
the resources by which the miracle of restoring the country might be
effected could only be drawn from Andalusia; but that to call them
forth activity, energy, patriotism, and above all the confidence of
the public were required. Under any other circumstances he should have
blushed to designate himself as the person in whom these qualifications
were united, and unhappily the only person who possessed the last; but
in such an emergency a good Spaniard must sacrifice even his modesty.
Spain might still be saved if he were commissioned to take what cavalry
he could raise, put himself at the head of the forces in La Mancha, and
march upon Madrid; and he pledged his sacred word of honour that he
would resign the command as soon as the French should be driven back to
the Ebro. ♦1809. JANUARY.♦ This proposal met with as little attention
as it deserved; and Montijo then joined the army of Carolina, there to
sow fresh intrigues, and meet with deserved humiliation.
♦PROGRESS OF THE FRENCH IN CASTILLE AND LEON.♦
The French themselves were at this time in such a situation, that the
desultory and harassing warfare which the Junta of Seville advised
at the commencement of the struggle might now have been pursued
against them with great effect. A disposition in some of the marshals
to disregard Joseph, and act without any deference to his wishes or
commands, had shown itself before Buonaparte left Spain; the attention
of the French cabinet was directed toward Austria, and the affairs
of Spain were left to the intrusive government, which had in fact no
control over the armies by whom alone it was to be supported. But as
there was no enemy in the field alert and able enough to take advantage
of the fair occasions which offered, the French commanders believed
the struggle was at an end, and that they had only to march over the
country and receive the submission of the inhabitants. While Victor
occupied Toledo, waiting only a convenient season to disperse the
hasty levies which were brought together for the defence of Andalusia,
General Dorneau marched against Zamora, scaled the walls of that
ancient city, and put to death those inhabitants who, in the flagitious
language of the French bulletin, were called the most guilty. Castille
and Leon were overrun, and wherever they went those scenes of
profanation, violence, and murder were exhibited, in which Buonaparte’s
soldiers were systematically allowed to glut the worst passions of
corrupted and brutalized humanity.
♦NEW LEVIES RAISED BY THE SPANIARDS.♦
Yet while the country was thus at the mercy of the French, the panic
which their appearance every where excited extended nowhere beyond
their immediate presence. In all places which were not actually
occupied by the enemy, the local authorities acted as if no enemy had
been at hand, and their own government had been as efficient as it was
legitimate. The enlisting went on, and promises of speedy triumph and
sure deliverance were held forth with a confidence which no reverses
could shake. The fugitives from the different armies no sooner reached
their own homes than they were again enrolled to be embodied, and
exposed again to privations and sufferings such as those from which
they had so hardly escaped. Before their strength was recruited, they
were sent off to form new armies, neither better disciplined, better
commanded, nor better provided than those which had been routed and
dispersed. They went hungered, half naked, and cursing their fortune,
without confidence in their officers, each other, or themselves, yet
believing fully that the deliverance of Spain would be effected with
a faith which seemed to require and perhaps very generally expected
miracles for its fulfilment. Human means indeed seem to have been
provided as little as if they had not been taken into the account.
♦TEMPORIZING CONDUCT OF CERTAIN MAGISTRATES.♦
This unreasoning confidence brought with it evil as well as good.
Many of those who had something to lose, and hoped that part at least
might be saved by submission, took either side according as the scale
inclined. When the enemy was absent, they joined the national voice,
which expressed what were their real feelings: if the French appeared,
they were ready to take the oaths, and act under them, as far as was
necessary for their own safety or advantage, longing at the same time
and looking for the day of deliverance and vengeance. In many places,
the magistracy acted with no other view than that of averting from
themselves and their immediate jurisdiction as much of the common
misery as they could. This was particularly the case in those parts of
Leon and Castille which lay most open to the enemy. The enrolment was
rigorously enforced there, and men were hurried off: but any means of
local defence were rather dreaded than desired. Offers of assistance
were made from Ciudad Rodrigo to Ledesma and Salamanca, and both cities
declined the proffered aid, as unnecessary; but in truth, because they
believed it to be unavailing, and had determined not to provoke the
enemy by resistance.
♦SIR ROBERT WILSON.♦
Ciudad Rodrigo had at that time become a point of great interest, owing
to a well-timed movement of Sir Robert Wilson’s with a small body of
Portugueze volunteers. This adventurous officer had been rewarded by
the Emperor of Germany with the order of Maria Theresa, for a brilliant
affair in which the 15th regiment of dragoons was engaged during the
siege of Landrecy. He served afterwards in Egypt, and published a
history of the British expedition to that country, in which work he
charged Buonaparte with the massacre of his prisoners at Jaffa, and the
empoisonment of his own sick and wounded. The facts were boldly denied
at the time, and willingly disbelieved by Buonaparte’s admirers; they
have since been substantiated by ample evidence, and by his own avowal;
but the merit of having first proclaimed them was Sir Robert Wilson’s,
and it marked him for an object of especial vengeance should he ever
fall into the hands of the tyrant, whose true character he had been
the first to expose. This rendered him more conspicuous than he would
have been for his rank, which was that of Lieutenant-Colonel. Having,
in pursuance of the convention, superintended the embarkation of the
French at Porto, and by great exertions contributed to save them from
the just fury of the populace, he applied himself with ♦HE RAISES A
PORTUGUEZE LEGION AT PORTO.♦ characteristic activity and enterprise to
raising and disciplining a Portugueze legion in that city. The plan
was entirely approved by Sir Hew Dalrymple, and zealously forwarded
by the Bishop. Two thousand men presently presented themselves, and
that number might have been increased five-fold could he have relied
upon resources for them; for the alertness with which they learned our
discipline, the confidence which they acquired, the pride which they
felt at being displayed, and which their officers partook in displaying
them, excited the emulation of their countrymen. Some jealousy was felt
at Lisbon, and some obstacles were thrown in his way, upon the pretext
that an invidious distinction would be occasioned between these and the
other Portugueze troops. Sir John Cradock, however, when the command in
that capital devolved upon him, authorised Sir Robert to act according
to his own judgement. His first thought had been to embark for
Carthagena, and march from thence to Catalonia. Afterwards, Asturias
seemed a nearer and more important point. But after Blake’s army had
been dispersed, and before Sir John Moore and Sir David Baird had
formed a junction, he resolved to march toward the frontiers, thinking
that he might move from Miranda or Braganza, and so to facilitate the
communication between them, and cover, as far as his means permitted,
the approach to the northern provinces. With this intent he marched the
first division of his legion, consisting of 700 men with six pieces of
cannon; they were to be followed by the second, under Baron Eben, an
Hanoverian officer in the British service; and this by the third. And
Sir J. Cradock had ordered a battalion of Portugueze infantry and a
regiment of cavalry to join him.
♦SIR ROBERT GOES TO CIUDAD RODRIGO.♦
When Sir Robert reached Lamego, he there found information, that a
small British detachment which had been stationed in Ciudad Rodrigo,
had, in consequence of the approaching danger, forsaken it. Always
hopeful himself, and well aware of what importance it was that that
position should be maintained, he left his troops, and hastened thither
to consult with the Junta. It was a point from which he could act
upon that division of the enemy who were then forcing their way into
Extremadura, ... or, co-operate with any Spanish force that might take
the field from Salamanca. The people, on their part, declared their
determination to defend the place resolutely; his aid, therefore, was
accepted as frankly as it was offered, and the legion accordingly
advanced from Lamego through a country almost impracticable at that
season. By dint of human exertion, carts and artillery were drawn up
steeps which hitherto had been deemed inaccessible for carriages.
Sometimes men and officers, breast-deep in the water, dragged the guns
through torrents so formidable, that cattle could not be trusted to
perform that service. Sometimes, where the carriages would have floated
and have been swept away, the wheels were taken off, and they were
slidden over on the foot-bridges. Sometimes they were hauled along
causeways and connecting bridges so narrow, that the wheels rested on
half their fellies upon the stones which were set edge upwards on the
verge of the road. It was the first march these troops had ever made,
but notwithstanding the severity of such labour, performed at such a
season, and during incessant rain, not a man deserted, and there was
no straggling, no murmuring amid all their difficulties: they sung as
they went along, and reached their resting-place at night with unabated
cheerfulness.
♦HE REFUSES TO RETURN TO PORTO.♦
Sir Robert had plainly stated to the Junta that his legion was not to
form part of the garrison, but that in every operation without the
walls he should think it his duty to aid, and even in defence of the
suburbs before the Salamanca gate, as long as his return over the
bridge was assured. The Junta and the people of that city displayed a
hearty willingness to co-operate with their allies in any manner that
might appear most conducive to the common cause; and from that generous
spirit they never departed during all the vicissitudes of the war. At
first there was a fair prospect of acting offensively; but when the
authorities at Ledesma and Salamanca declined the assistance which was
offered them from this quarter, Sir Robert, instead of maintaining the
line of the Tormes, as he had hoped to do, formed on the Agueda, having
his head-quarters at San Felices. When he had marched from the coast,
it was with the hope of facilitating the plans and contributing to the
success of a British army perfectly equipped and disciplined, strong
in itself, and confident in its commanders and its cause. He now learnt
that that army was retreating with a speed which the most utter defeat
could hardly have precipitated: at the same time he was privately
advised to fall back on Porto. But though weak himself, he ♦EFFECT OF
HIS MOVEMENTS.♦ had already ascertained that the French in that part of
Spain were not strong, that the activity and appearance of his little
corps had imposed upon them a salutary opinion of his strength, and
that his continuance there was of no trifling importance, not merely
as covering the removal of the British stores from Almeida, but as
checking the enemy’s advance in that direction, counteracting the
report which they busily spread and indeed believed themselves, that
the English had entirely abandoned Spain, encouraging the Spaniards,
and gaining time for them to strengthen the works of Ciudad Rodrigo,
and for training a brave and well-disposed people.
This became of more consequence when the Junta of that city had, in
their own language, “the melancholy honour of being the only one which
held out in all Castille,” Ledesma and Salamanca having, without a show
of resistance, admitted the enemy. For him to obtain intelligence was
as easy, owing to the disposition of the people, as it was difficult
for the French. Having ascertained that they had few cavalry and
only 1500 foot in Salamanca, that they were proportionally weak in
the country about Zamora and Villalpando, and that they had not
occupied Ledesma for want of men, he entered Ledesma, carried off,
in Ferdinand’s name for the Junta of Rodrigo, the treasure and money
which had been raised there for the French in obedience to requisition,
and compelled them to seek and convoy what provisions they extorted
from the country. They had given public notice that every person who
disobeyed their requisitions should be punished with death. Sir Robert
sent forth a counter-proclamation, declaring, that if this threat were
effected, he would hang a Frenchman for every Spaniard. By incessant
activity, attacking their posts in open day, he kept them perpetually
on the alarm, and made them apprehend a serious attack on Salamanca
itself. Upon that score their apprehensions would have been realized,
if the whole force which Sir Robert had raised had been then at his
command; or if even with such poor means as he possessed he had not
been withheld by orders from Lisbon. But the ♦PART OF THE LEGION
DETAINED AT PORTO.♦ remaining corps of his legion had been detained at
Porto, and when he had applied for them, and for clothing and military
stores, he had been answered that the men were wanted for the defence
of Porto itself, and that, even if stores might have been spared,
they could not be sent without imminent danger from the people. It
was in vain for him to represent that the measures which he had taken
were those which were best adapted for the protection of Portugal,
by covering her weakest side; that Portugal must be defended beyond
her frontiers; that the service in which he was engaged was of all
others that in which the troops might soonest acquire the discipline
and experience in which the Portugueze soldiers were so notoriously
deficient; that he wanted the men only; not provisions, those he could
assure to them; not money, for if what had been received from England
for the express use of the legion were withheld from it, he would
apply elsewhere. ♦DISPLEASURE OF THE AUTHORITIES THERE.♦ Reasoning
was of no avail when the danger from the side of Galicia appeared to
be so near as in reality it was; and the Bishop of Porto, though he
had warmly encouraged the formation of the legion, as an important
measure towards restoring the military character of his countrymen,
and though Sir Robert had succeeded in gaining his good opinion to a
high degree, was nevertheless offended at the disrespect which seemed
to be shown to him and the other Portugueze authorities, by the manner
in which that officer was now acting as if wholly independent of them.
From the Spanish government, however, ♦RANK GIVEN HIM BY THE SPANISH
GOVERNMENT.♦ Sir Robert received as much encouragement as he could
have desired in his most sanguine hopes. They gave him the rank of
Brigade-General, and placed the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo and the
troops in the province at his disposal. And this proof of confidence
was given at a time when a misunderstanding had arisen between the two
cabinets, which might have been fatal to the common cause, if each
party had not rendered full justice to the upright intention of the
other.
♦1809. FEBRUARY.
PROPOSAL THAT BRITISH TROOPS SHOULD BE ADMITTED INTO CADIZ.♦
As soon as the dispersion of Blake’s army was known in England, the
British government anticipating the disasters which would follow,
considered Cadiz as the ultimate point of retreat to which the
Spaniards would be driven; there, supported by that fortress on one
side, and by Gibraltar on the other, they might make a stand which
no force that France could bring against them could overpower.
Accordingly, when Sir John Moore’s first intention of retreating was
communicated, government resolved that his army should immediately be
transferred to the south of Spain, for it was impossible to foresee the
miserable state to which the manner of his retreat would reduce it. But
the representations of that general concerning the little assistance
which he received from the Spaniards, and the little patriotism which
he could discover, so far influenced ministers, that they thought it
improper to hazard an army in the south, unless a corps of it were
admitted into Cadiz. The treachery of Morla, and the danger of similar
treasons, rendered this precaution advisable. Upon this subject Mr.
Frere was instructed to communicate with the Junta, and as it was not
apprehended that the required proof of confidence would be refused,
General Sherbrooke, with 4000 men, was ordered to sail immediately for
Cadiz. He was not to require the command of the garrison, ... that
might have offended the feelings of the Spaniards. If, however, the
Junta should not admit him, he was then to proceed to Gibraltar, and
any operations in the south were necessarily to be abandoned, though
there was no intention even in that case of abandoning the cause of
Spain. Sir John Cradock also was instructed to sail for Cadiz, if he
should find it necessary to abandon Portugal; but he was not to take
this step till he had been apprized of the determination of the Spanish
government.
♦OBJECTIONS OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT.♦
Before it was known that the Junta had quitted Aranjuez, Sir George
Smith had been sent to Cadiz on a local mission, to provide for the
possible case of British troops being necessary for the defence of that
city, at a time when it might be impracticable to obtain the opinion
of the central government. When the government was removed to Seville,
his mission ceased with the necessity of it. He, however, not only
considered it as still existing, but went beyond his instructions;
informed the governor of Cadiz that he had authority to require that
British troops should be admitted to garrison that place; and sent
to Sir John Cradock, directing him to dispatch troops thither from
Lisbon, ... a measure which was not to have been taken except at the
direct solicitation of the Spanish authorities at Cadiz. And this he
did without waiting for their consent, and without consulting or even
communicating with the English ambassador. The Junta immediately
conceived that some secret designs were on foot, with which Mr. Frere
had not been entrusted, because he had not been thought a proper
instrument; and that minister had the vexation of hearing the justice
which they did to his frankness urged as a ground for unjust ♦FEB. 7.♦
suspicions. “Cadiz,” they said, “was not threatened, and a measure
so extraordinary as that of admitting English troops there might
compromise the Supreme Junta with the nation. Many would imagine
that the prognostics of Morla, which the government had considered
as dreams, had assumed at least an air of reality; and however the
Junta might be persuaded of the purity of the motives by which Great
Britain was influenced, it would not be in their power to counteract
this imagination. Spain had addressed herself to Great Britain, and had
obtained succours and good offices, which would for ever redound to the
honour of England. Spain had opened her heart to unbounded gratitude;
but never could believe that her misfortunes obliged her to this. Let
the allied troops disembark in small divisions, so as to leave room for
each other, proceed without delay to occupy cantonments at Xeres, Port
St. Mary’s, and the neighbourhood, and then pursue their march into the
interior. It would be easy to fall back upon Cadiz if that should be
necessary; but that necessity was at all events very distant.” This,
as the final resolution of King Ferdinand, the Junta (governing in
his name) communicated to Mr. Frere: “trusting,” they said, “in his
discernment and in his religious probity, that he would feel the truth
of their representations, and give the most peremptory orders for the
British troops to abide by what had been agreed upon, and under no
pretext whatever to remain in the fortress of Cadiz.”
♦TROOPS ARRIVE IN THE BAY.♦
During these discussions, the two regiments under General Mackenzie,
which Sir George Smith had so precipitately ordered from Lisbon,
arrived in the bay. About the same time Mr. Frere received a copy of
the instructions intended for Sir John Moore, directing him, in case
he could not keep his ground in the north, to embark his troops, and
carry them round either to Lisbon or to the south of Spain. These the
ambassador communicated to the Junta; and at the same time informed
them that the British government expected Buonaparte would have driven
back the English army into Galicia, and marched himself into Andalusia
to make himself master of Seville, and shut the door against every
hope of succour. Expecting that he would pursue this plan, government,
while it sent these instructions to Sir John Moore, dispatched the
corps under General Sherbrooke, with a view of preventing at least the
surrender of Cadiz, and ensuring to the auxiliary army ♦MR. FRERE’S
REPRESENTATIONS TO THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦ some safe landing-place. In such
a scheme, Mr. Frere argued, there was nothing unreasonable; it did not
become the British ministers to risk their army without any place of
retreat from an enemy who was less formidable for his military force
than for the means of corruption which he employed, ... means which
the capitulation of Madrid evinced to have been not less successful
in Spain than in other countries. Should the English then expose
themselves to the danger arising from the enemy’s intrigues, only in
deference to the injurious suspicions which that very enemy wished
to excite against them in the minds of the Spanish government, ... a
government to which that of his Britannic Majesty had never ceased
to offer proofs of disinterestedness and of good faith? “The members
of the Junta,” said Mr. Frere, “will do me the justice to admit that
I have never endeavoured to promote the interests of my nation, but
as being essentially connected with those of their own. If, however,
I have always been guided by the same sentiments and the same views
which a Spanish politician might have, I do not think it is to depart
from them, if I deliver the same opinion which I should give had I the
honour of occupying a place in the council of your nation; namely,
that the whole policy of the Spanish government rests essentially on
a persuasion of perfect good faith on the part of England, and that
it is important to confirm it more and more by testimonies of mutual
confidence, and by avoiding the slightest appearance of distrust
between government and government.”
One other point Mr. Frere adverted to, which, though less important,
was of great weight. The precariousness of commerce, occasioned by the
supposed insecurity of Cadiz, was prejudicial to the finances of Spain.
There was no longer a place in the peninsula where British goods could
be deposited; and the government was therefore under the necessity of
cutting off all mercantile intercourse between the colonies and the
rest of the civilized world, or of affording to foreign commerce a
security which it could not find in the sole protection of a Spanish
garrison. On this head he appealed to the custom-house registers, and
to the applications made by neutrals for permission to reship goods,
which ♦REPLY OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT. FEB. 17.♦ they did not deem
any longer safe. A note was transmitted in reply to this, saying,
that the Junta would dispatch an extraordinary courier to London, and
empower their minister there to settle a point of so much importance
in a manner agreeable to the interests of both nations. Meantime, the
English troops which were at present in the bay, and those which should
arrive there, might disembark, for the purpose of proceeding to Port
St. Mary, San Lucar, Xeres, and the other places proposed for their
cantonment. No misfortune which could happen to the Spanish cause could
prevent the English from falling back on Gibraltar and Cadiz; and this
step would prevent the inconvenience and perhaps sickness to which they
might be exposed by remaining on board ship or in Cadiz, the appointed
stations being in a country the most healthy in the world.
♦THEIR PROPOSAL FOR EMPLOYING THE TROOPS.♦
Having thus considered the convenience of the troops, the Junta
submitted two propositions to Mr. Frere, the only person, they said,
alluding to Sir George Smith’s interference, whom they acknowledged
as the representative of the British nation. First, that the British
troops should proceed to Catalonia, and garrison the maritime ports of
that principality, thus enabling the Spanish army in that quarter to
march to the relief of Zaragoza. Secondly, that they should co-operate
with Cuesta: that general was threatened by a force not very superior
in number to his own, and the assistance of the English might give him
the superiority; thus Cadiz would be secured, and time given to set on
foot the troops who were now only waiting for muskets from England.
The note concluded by expressing a feeling of honourable pain in the
Junta, that England should distrust the safety of Cadiz unless it were
garrisoned by English troops. They asserted, that the constancy and
valour of the Spanish nation, manifested in this arduous struggle,
entitled it to the respect of Europe; and, gently hinting at what had
passed in Galicia, they requested that a veil might be drawn over it.
Cadiz was not situated like Coruña, the same events therefore could not
possibly occur there.
♦CONFERENCE WITH MR. FRERE. FEB. 18.♦
Upon the receipt of this note, Mr. Frere requested a conference. They
proposed to him that he should name a governor for Cadiz. He replied,
it was a responsibility with which he would not charge himself for all
the world. Four months ago he should have chosen Morla, Espeleta six
months before that: both had been found wanting in the day of trial,
though neither had been placed in a situation so trying as that of a
governor holding out in the last remaining garrison. Then replying to
the argument, that the Junta could not act against popular opinion, “it
must likewise be recollected,” he said, “that the British government
could not proceed in opposition to an opinion equally decided in
England; and which of the two pretensions was the more just? England
was willing to expose an English army to any hazard which resulted
absolutely from the nature of things; but England would not consent
that that danger should be aggravated in the slightest degree, out of
deference to the caprice of popular opinion, or suspicions which were
unworthy of either country. England required of Spain that it should
place confidence in the British government, binding itself by the most
formal engagements; Spain offered the choice of a governor and the
chance of his fidelity. Our proposal was in every respect the fairest
and the most rational, and it could not be expected that we should
depart from a demand of right, for the sake of conferring a favour. Mr.
Frere offered to propose to General Mackenzie, that he should leave
1000 men in Cadiz, and proceed with the rest to act in concert with
Cuesta for the protection of Seville, and that when General Sherbrooke
arrived, 3000 should proceed to the same direction, and he should
content himself with garrisoning Cadiz with 2000 men, and proceed with
or forward the remainder of his own force to General Mackenzie. To
this proposition the Junta had so nearly acceded, that the agreement
was only broken off by their insisting that the public mind could not
be reconciled to the admission of 2000 troops into Cadiz, and offering
to admit half the number, a force which Mr. Frere judged altogether
inadequate to a purpose for which his own government allotted four
times that amount.
The conference, which was conducted on both sides with perfect
moderation and temper, concluded with a fair avowal from the Junta,
that they were convinced of the good faith of the British government,
and of the advantage that would result to Spain from the admission
of British troops into Cadiz, if that were to be the indispensable
condition of their co-operation; but that their own existence
as a government depended upon popular opinion; and the English
ambassador could not be ignorant what numerous and active enemies
were endeavouring to undermine them. The Junta of Seville, who gave
themselves great credit for resisting the introduction of the English
into Cadiz last year when the French were advanced as far as Ecija,
were upon the watch now, and calling the attention of the people to
the conduct of the Central Junta in the present instance. Mr. Frere
made answer, that he could not of course expect his opinion should be
submitted to upon a subject on which their existence as a government
and their personal security (for such in fact was the case) were
involved. But he advised them to consider whether the responsibility to
which they exposed themselves in the other alternative was not equally
dangerous, and whether their enemies would not be as ready and as able
to make a handle of the rejection of British assistance as of its
acceptance.
♦MR. FRERE REQUESTS CUESTA’S OPINION.♦
Mr. Frere was aware that the uppermost feeling in the minds of some
of the Junta was an apprehension of the resentment which Cuesta might
entertain against them, convinced as that general must have been of
their weakness by the manner of his appointment. Being desirous,
therefore, of obtaining his opinion in favour of the measure which the
British government proposed, or at least in such terms as would remove
all fear of his declaring himself in opposition to it, he wrote to
him, explaining what Great Britain was willing to do in aid of Spain,
and what condition was required. That condition, he said, was to be
considered as indispensable, not only in the opinion of government,
but in that of the nation, the individuals of which did not at that
moment consider Cadiz as sufficiently secure even for a place of
disposal for their merchandize, so that they were daily soliciting
permission to re-export it; and it might easily be judged whether the
nation would risk its army upon an assurance which individuals did not
consider sufficient for their woollen and cotton. Lisbon had twice been
garrisoned by British troops, without the smallest inconvenience to
the Portugueze government. Madeira had in like manner been garrisoned:
the Portugueze knew us by long experience; they knew also the internal
state of England; knew that the English government never entertained
a thought of abusing the confidence of its allies; and the state of
public opinion was such in England, that it could not do this, even
though it wished it. Under the present circumstances, the political
question came before General Cuesta, both as a commander and a patriot,
who, as he must be interested in any thing that might appear to injure
the honour and independence of his country, so also he could not regard
with indifference any thing that might derange the military plans
of his government, and perhaps its political relations, by repeated
acts of mistrust and mutual displeasure. 4300 good British troops
might at this time march to co-operate with him upon the frontier of
Extremadura, they would be followed by 1500 more as soon as General
Sherbrooke arrived, and the auxiliary army would be delayed no longer
than was necessary to dispose of its wounded and prisoners, and to
be re-equipped. The question therefore was, whether General Cuesta
could dispense with the present reinforcement, and Spain with the aid
of an auxiliary army; for these were the points to be decided by the
resolution of admitting or sending back the British troops, such being
the alternative in which those troops were placed by the orders under
which they left Lisbon.
♦CUESTA’S REPLY.♦
Cuesta returned a reply in terms of proper respect, both for the
British government and his own. He did not, he said, discover any
difficulty which should prevent the British troops from garrisoning
Cadiz; but he was far from supposing that the Central Junta could be
without good ground for their objections, and that they should have
objections was sufficient to prevent him from giving any opinion unless
they consulted him. With regard to the 4300 men, there could be no
doubt but that he stood in need of them; and he hoped that England
would lend him much greater assistance, particularly if from any change
of circumstances the Central Junta should no longer appear repugnant
to the condition which the British government required. This reply did
not alter the determination which Mr. Frere had made, of sending the
troops back to Lisbon, considering Seville as comparatively safe, and
conceiving that the principle which the English ministry had originally
laid down, of not attaching small corps of British troops to a Spanish
army, was one he should not be justified in departing from, for any
object less important than the security of Cadiz or the capital. He
communicated this determination to Don Martin de Garay, alleging that
the information which he had lately received from Lisbon rendered such
a measure necessary.
♦CLOSE OF THE DISCUSSION.♦
Garay’s answer closed the discussion. It was meant to be at the same
time conciliatory, and capable of being produced for the exculpation
of the Junta. He represented, “that if any immediate attack upon Cadiz
was to be feared, ... if the Spanish forces were incapable of defending
that point, ... if there were no others of the greatest importance
where the enemy might be opposed with advantage, the Junta would not
fear to hurt the public feeling by admitting foreign troops into
that fortress, because public feeling would then be actuated by the
existing state of things. But no such emergency existed; the armies
were strengthening themselves in points very distant from Cadiz; the
enemy had much ground to pass, and many difficulties to conquer, before
he could threaten it; time could never be wanted for falling back upon
that fortress; it was easy to be defended, ... it was to be considered
as a last point of retreat, and extreme points ought to be defended
in advance, never in themselves, except in cases of extreme urgency.
The army of Extremadura defended Andalusia on that side, those of the
centre and La Carolina at the Sierra Morena; the enemy for some time
past had not been able to make any progress; and there if superior
forces could be collected against him, a decisive blow might be
struck. Catalonia too was bravely defending itself, and Zaragoza still
resisted the repeated attacks of an obstinate and persevering besieger.
Either in Extremadura, or with the central army or in Catalonia, the
assistance of Great Britain would be of infinite service. This was the
opinion of the Junta; this was the opinion of the whole nation, and
would doubtless be that of every one who contemplated the true state
of things. If the auxiliary troops already in the bay, or on their
passage, should disembark in the neighbourhood of Cadiz, and proceed
to reinforce General Cuesta, they would always find a safe retreat in
Cadiz in case of any reverse; but should a body of troops, already very
small, leave part of its force in Cadiz, in order to secure a retreat
at such a distance, the English ambassador himself must acknowledge
that such assistance could inspire the Spaniards with very little
confidence, particularly after the events in Galicia. But it appeared
to Mr. Frere that the presence of these troops was necessary at Lisbon,
and therefore he had given orders for their return. Of this measure
the same might be said as of the proposed one for securing Cadiz.
Lisbon was not the point where Portugal could be defended; the greatest
possible number of troops ought to be employed in those advanced lines
where the enemy was posted, and where he might be routed decisively.
For all these reasons the Supreme Junta were persuaded, that if
the British government should determine that its troops should not
act in union with theirs, except on the expressed condition, this
non-co-operation could never be imputed to them. The Junta must act
in such a manner, that if it should be necessary to manifest to the
nation, and to all Europe, the motives of their conduct, it might
be done with that security, and with that foundation, that should
conciliate to them the public opinion, which was the first and main
spring of their power.”
Thus terminated the discussion concerning the admission of English
troops into Cadiz. Mr. Frere warned the Junta of the ill consequences
which must result to Spain, if it should appear that the efforts and
offers which the King of England had made should have the effect of
producing embarrassment to his government at home. It appears, indeed,
as if both governments acted more with reference to their enemies at
home, than from any real importance which they could attach to the
point in dispute. With the Spanish government this was confessedly the
case; they did not, and could not, possibly suspect the good faith
of England: ... between Spain and England, the honourable character
of one country was sufficient security for the other; but they stood
equally in fear of a set of men who criticised all their measures with
factious acrimony, because their own enthusiastic hopes of complete
triumph and thorough reformation had not been fulfilled; and of Morla
and the other traitors, whose aim was to excite suspicion of Great
Britain. Under the influence of this feeling, they opposed a measure
which they did not think otherwise objectionable, but which they
opposed the more firmly because they did not perceive that it was
necessary. The English ministry on their part wanted a point of defence
against the opposition, who, as they omitted no means of wounding the
pride and calumniating the character of the Spaniards, were continually
saying that they did not desire our assistance, and that they had no
confidence in us. It was against this party at home that Cadiz was
wanted as a point of defence, ... not as a point of retreat upon a
coast where we possessed Gibraltar, and where also we were sure of
the disposition of the people in Cadiz itself, whatever might be the
conduct of its governor. The governor at Coruña had failed in his duty,
but still the embarkation of the English was protected by that fortress.
Mr. Frere concluded this unpleasant transaction according to his
own judgement. He had the satisfaction of finding that the ministry
perfectly accorded with him. They sent him Sir George Smith’s
instructions, authorising him, if he thought proper, to communicate
them to the Supreme Junta. They recalled Sir George, and assured the
Junta that no such separate or secret commission, as they apprehended
to have been given to him, ever had been, or ever would be, entrusted
to any officer or other person; and that it never could be in the
contemplation of the English government to select any other channel of
communication than the King’s accredited minister, in a transaction
of such importance, much less to engage in such a transaction without
the entire consent and concurrence of the Spanish government. They
dispatched orders after General Sherbrooke, directing him to proceed to
Lisbon instead of Cadiz. Nevertheless, if at any time the Junta ♦PAPERS
RELATING TO SPAIN AND PORTUGAL, C.♦ should require a British force
for the actual garrison of Cadiz, Mr. Frere was authorized to send to
Lisbon for that purpose, and the commanding officer there was ordered
to comply with his requisition.
♦INSURRECTION AT CADIZ.♦
While this question was discussed at Seville, Cadiz itself became the
scene of an insurrection, in which the popular feeling in favour of
the English was unequivocally expressed. The people of that city were
dissatisfied with the Central Junta; they complained that, instead of
informing them of the true state of affairs, their government kept
them in ignorance; and having been deceived by Morla, the slightest
circumstance sufficed to make them suspect any one who had the means
of betraying them. A corps of foreigners had been raised from the
prisoners taken at Baylen; they consisted chiefly of Poles and
Germans, who might have fought with a better will against Buonaparte
than for him, but who were less to be relied on than deserters, because
they had enlisted to escape confinement. This corps was ordered to do
garrison duty at Cadiz; while the volunteers of that city and of Port
St. Mary’s were drafted to other parts. But the people, thinking that
if Cadiz wanted defenders, it could by none be so faithfully defended
as by its own children, determined to oppose both measures, and on the
morning of the 22d of February they broke out in insurrection. Their
first act of violence was to seize a courier charged with dispatches
from the Junta to the Marquis of Villel, a member of that body, and its
representative in this important fortress. The Marquis had rendered
himself suspected by setting persons at liberty who were confined for
their supposed attachment to the French, and by imposing restrictions
upon the public amusements. A report that he had committed women of
respectable rank to the house of industry, and threatened others with
the same scandalous punishment, excited indignation in the rabble;
they seized and were dragging him to the public jail, where, if he
had arrived alive, it is little probable that he could long have been
protected from popular fury. But P. Moguer, a capuchin friar, persuaded
them to commit him to the capuchin convent, and pledged himself to
produce his person, that he might suffer condign punishment, if his
treason should be proved.
Luckily the confidence of the people was possessed by the governor,
Don Felix Jones, and in a still greater degree by the guardian of
the Capuchins, Fr. Mariano de Sevilla. The former represented to
General Mackenzie, that it would tend to re-establish tranquillity
if an assurance were given that the English would take no part in
the tumult; for they had been called upon to land and assist against
the traitors. Accordingly the British General sent some officers who
could speak the Spanish language, and they, in the presence of the
governor and the principal capuchin friars, distinctly declared, that
the British troops would by no means interfere in any thing relating
to the internal concerns of the people, but that they were ready to
assist in defending the town to the last extremity. This seemed for a
time to allay their agitation. In the course of a few hours they again
became tumultuous; still an opinion prevailed that they were betrayed,
and that measures were arranged for delivering up Cadiz to the French.
They called for the dismissal of those whom they suspected, and they
required that two British officers should be appointed to inspect the
fortifications, jointly with two Spanish officers, and to direct the
preparations ♦CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE IN THE ENGLISH.♦ for defence.
General Mackenzie deputed two officers for that purpose; and all those
of his staff accompanied the most active and popular of the friars to
a balcony, from whence these orators harangued the people, assuring
them of the co-operation of the British troops and the support of the
British nation, and frequently appealing to the British officers to
confirm by their own voices the pledges given in their name and in
their presence. This satisfied the populace, and they dispersed with
loud huzzas, in honour of King George and King Ferdinand.
♦PROCLAMATION OF THE GOVERNOR.♦
On the following morning the governor issued a proclamation, in which,
considering the discontent which had been manifested, “and keeping
in mind,” he said, “the loyalty of the inhabitants at all times, but
particularly under the present circumstances, and the good and signal
services which they had done, and daily were doing, he dismissed from
office four persons whose discharge had been loudly demanded; and
declared also, that if the people wished to have the Junta of Cadiz
suppressed, their desire should be fulfilled. He assured them that no
foreign troops should be admitted; but that officers of their faithful
ally the British nation were invited to examine the posts and works of
the city and its dependencies, and that every thing necessary for its
defence should be concerted with them. He promised that the papers of
the Marquis should be examined without delay; that there should be no
longer any cause of complaint respecting the ignorance in which the
people were kept of public affairs, for that whatever occurred should
punctually and faithfully be made public; that the enlistment of
the inhabitants for the provincial regiment of Ciudad Rodrigo should
cease till further consideration; and that no part of the volunteers,
the light troops, and companies of artillery should be ordered away.”
Notwithstanding the popularity of Don Felix Jones, it was thought
advisable that this proclamation should be countersigned by the
guardian of the Capuchins.
♦MURDER OF D. J. DE HEREDIA.♦
Still the tumult continued. Caraffa, who had been second in command of
the Spanish troops in Portugal, was confined in the Castle of Catalina,
under a charge of misconduct or treachery, with the viceroy of Mexico
and other prisoners, who had been sent home from New Spain. The mob
proceeded thither, and demanded the prisoners, that they might put them
to death. Colonel Roche, who had just arrived from Seville with another
English officer, interposed, addressed the people, and succeeded in
dissuading them from their purpose. But shortly afterwards they fell
in with Don Joseph de Heredia, a particular object of their suspicion,
who that very day had at their demand been dismissed from his office of
collector of the public rents. He was stepping into a boat to make his
escape to Port St. Mary’s: the attempt cost him his life, and he was
murdered upon ♦THE TUMULT SUBSIDES.♦ the spot. The popular fury seemed
now to have spent itself, and the clergy and friars, who throughout
the whole insurrection had exerted themselves to pacify the people,
and protect the threatened victims, succeeded in restoring peace. To
have attempted to quell the mob by force would have occasioned great
bloodshed, for they had got possession of arms and of the park of
artillery.
♦PROCLAMATION OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦
Fifty of the rabble, who had been most conspicuous for violence, were
seized by the volunteers of Cadiz, and imprisoned. The Central Junta
addressed a proclamation to the people of that city, reprehending them
with dignified severity for their conduct. “It was absurd,” they said,
“to apprehend danger in so populous and so brave a city from a single
battalion of foreigners, even if there could be any reason to doubt
the fidelity of Poles and Germans, who had been forcibly dragged into
Spain, and were in every quarter deserting from the flag under which
they had been compelled to march. As little reason was there for their
suspicion of the Marquis. His papers were now before the Junta, and
nothing was expressed in them but zeal for the country, and diligence
to promote all means for the security of Cadiz. Let the state of those
means before his arrival be compared with the works projected and
executed since. And had the people no other way of manifesting their
disapprobation than by tumult? No one came to the Junta to complain of
the Marquis’s conduct; no one informed them that their commissioner at
Cadiz had lost the confidence of the people. Some anonymous letters
only had reached the government, some on one side, some on the
other, but all contemptible in the eye of equity. But what was the
course which would have become the open and generous character of the
Spaniards? To have made their complaint frankly and nobly, and the
government would have done them justice.”
The Junta then warned them to beware of the insidious arts of the
enemy. “It is not,” said they, “the traitors who fled with the French
and returned with them who do most injury to their country; but it
is the obscure agitators, hired by them or by the tyrant, who abuse
the confidence and mislead the patriotism of the people. It is they
who, disseminating distrust and suspicion, lead you through crooked
and guilty paths to the precipice, and to subjugation; it is they who
convert loyalty into rage, and zeal into sedition. The Junta have
proofs enough of these infernal machinations in the intelligence
which they receive every day, and in the correspondence which
they intercept.” But, notwithstanding the government declared its
persuasion of Villel’s innocence, it was not thought proper completely
to exculpate him without such farther inquiry as might satisfy the
people: this proclamation, therefore, announced that a commission
would be appointed to examine his conduct, and that it would not be
composed of members of the Central Junta, in order to avoid all shadow
of partiality in an affair so serious. “Any person,” said the Junta,
“shall be heard who desires to accuse him, and the sentence will be
adjudged according to law. He himself demands in justice that this may
be done; his honour, the estimation of the government, and the public
satisfaction, necessarily prescribe it. If the Marquis be culpable,
he shall be punished in proportion to his abuse of the high functions
and national confidence which he has enjoyed; but if he be declared
innocent, it is necessary that the reparation made to his good name be
as solemn and public as the aggression was cruel and scandalous.” These
proceedings satisfied the people, of whom the better sort were grieved
at the excesses which had been committed; and their suspicions against
the Marquis were in some degree removed when Don Felix Jones, to whom
his papers were delivered, declared that no indication of treason was
to be discovered in them.
CHAPTER XVIII.
SECOND SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA.
♦1808. DECEMBER.♦
The Central Junta perfectly understood and truly represented the
spirit of the nation, partaking in some things its blindness and its
obstinacy, but also its exalted feeling, its true heroism, and its
incomparable devotion to the cause of national independence. Its
information concerning the real state of affairs was as imperfect as
its other arrangements. In the correspondence concerning Cadiz, Garay
assured the British Ambassador that Zaragoza was still holding out, not
considering that by little less than miracle that glorious city could
have held out so long, and not knowing that the enemy had then been
eight days in possession of its ruins.
♦CASTAÑOS ACCUSED AT ZARAGOZA AS A TRAITOR.♦
Palafox was not present at the battle of Tudela. He had embarked on
the river just before the action began, little apprehending that it
was so near, and believing that his presence was required at Zaragoza.
This was one cause among the many which led to the misfortunes of that
day; for Castaños, who would otherwise have been with his own troops,
remained with ♦REPRESENTACIONES, &C. DEL G. CASTAÑOS, P. 195.♦ the
Aragonese to supply his place, and each army was thus deprived of
the General who knew the troops, and in whom they trusted. During
the short time that these Generals had acted together, there had
been no want of confidence and frankness between them: but after
their separation, and the refusal of Castaños to throw his troops
into Zaragoza instead of retreating toward Madrid, in obedience
to the orders of the Central Junta, the disasters which had been
sustained were imputed by Palafox to his errors. He had been far from
apprehending, he said, that he should have to prepare for a second
siege; and never could any combination of his own have placed him under
such a necessity. The charge of incapacity against Castaños was more
broadly made in an official account of the action by General O’Neille,
and he was publicly accused of having sold the army and betrayed his
country.
♦STATE OF PUBLIC FEELING IN THAT CITY.♦
Castaños himself did Palafox the justice to believe that he had been
deceived by malicious representations. The other charges proceeded
from men who sought to shelter their own misconduct by appearing as
accusers, or from private malice, which in such times never loses the
opportunity of exerting itself with sure effect. Zaragoza was in a
state of tremendous agitation; the same spirit was still prevailing
there which had so wonderfully repulsed the French, but that spirit had
broken the bonds of order; and Palafox, who was so well able to direct
the popular feeling in the hour of danger, found it necessary at other
times in many things to yield to it. His power was absolute while he
held it; but though it had been confirmed to him by the Supreme Junta,
it was in fact held only by the tenure of popular opinion, which among
large masses of men, and more especially in perilous circumstances,
is always influenced less by the considerate and the wise, than by
the headstrong, the audacious, and the profligate. Victims whom
♦CAVALLERO, P. 67.♦ he dared not interfere to save were sacrificed,
and the utmost he could do in behalf of any accused persons, was to
secure them in prison, and ♦MEASURES OF PRECAUTION.♦ thus respite them
from immediate death. During the former siege the French who resided
in the city had been put under arrest; and there had been the twofold
anxiety of guarding against any correspondence between them and the
besiegers, and protecting them against the fatal effects of popular
suspicion, which at any moment might have produced a massacre of these
unfortunate persons. To prevent both the inconvenience and the danger,
Palafox sent them away to distant places of confinement; but it was
necessary to prepare the people for this by a proclamation, appealing
to their honour, and courage, and humanity, and cautioning them against
the enemy’s emissaries, who were seeking to bring a stain upon their
cause by exciting them to acts of murder. The prisoners and deserters
were also removed. The nuns were permitted to remove to other convents
not within the scene of immediate danger, where they might occupy
themselves without interruption in their holy exercises. Aware that
in so large a city there must be persons whom their own wealth would
have bribed to betray their country, and who would fain have submitted
for the sake of preserving their property, Palafox decreed that the
inhabitants of Zaragoza, of whatever rank or condition, should consider
themselves bound to devote their persons, their property, and their
lives to its defence; that the rich should foster, and assist, and
clothe the poor, enable them to maintain their respective posts, and
remunerate them for the zeal with which they defended their lives,
their estates, and their common country. If any man were unnatural
enough to disregard this sacred duty, which he owed both to his
native land and his religion, he should be fined in proportion to the
magnitude of his offence, and the amount of the fine appropriated to
the subsistence of the army. All persons who served the cause of the
enemy, by pasquinades, by endeavouring to excite a want of confidence
in the chiefs, the people, or the army, or by raising disturbances
and riots, should be carried before the newly-appointed judge of the
police, who would pass judgment according to their crimes, and suitable
to the danger of the country; but before he imposed the punishment of
death, he should consult the captain-general. Every house was ordered
to be well supplied with vessels of water, in order to extinguish
fires; and the officers of the ward were charged to superintend this
important measure of preparation. Persons entering or leaving the city
were to be watched with care, because the enemy assumed the dress of
the Spaniards, and, greatly superior as they were, resorted to every
artifice. “All these measures,” said Palafox, “should be obeyed with
religious respect, because they are all directed to the good of our
country, which, in happier times, will recompense all the sacrifices
we make, ... sacrifices so acceptable in the sight of God, and of the
Virgin Mother of God, who is our celestial protectress.”
♦NONE OF THE INHABITANTS LEAVE THE CITY.♦
Three days were allowed for all women, all men above threescore, and
all boys under fourteen, to leave the city; a general order being
issued, that whithersoever they might go, they should be welcomed,
and provided for. But not one of the inhabitants left the place. The
sentiment of patriotism was as ardent in the women as in the men;
they thought it a worse evil to seek bread and protection apart from
their husbands and fathers than to abide the siege with them, and
triumph or perish together: and even if this sentiment had not been
so general and so strong, whither were they to betake themselves for
security in a land which was every where overrun or threatened by the
enemy’s armies? In no place would they have imagined themselves so
secure as in Zaragoza itself, which had been so wonderfully defended
and delivered, and which they believed to be invincible through the
protection of Our Lady of the Pillar, who had chosen it for the seat
of her peculiar worship. During the former siege prints of that idol
had been distributed by women in the heat of action, and worn by the
men in their hats both as a badge and an amulet. The many remarkable
escapes and deliverances which had occurred ♦SUPPOSED MIRACLES.♦ were
ascribed not to all-ruling and omnipresent Providence, but to the
immediate interference ♦MEMORIA DE LO MAS INTERESANTE, &C. 121.♦ of
the _Magna Mater_ of Zaragoza. Palafox himself had been trained up
with more than common care in the superstition of the place; he and
his brethren in their childhood had been taken every day to attend
mass in the Holy Chapel where the image was enshrined, dressed at such
times in the proper costume of the Infantes, as a mark of greater
honour to the present Goddess. An appearance in the sky, which at other
times might have passed unremembered and perhaps unnoticed, had given
strong confirmation to the popular faith. About a month before the
commencement of the first siege a white cloud appeared at noon, and
gradually assumed the form of a palm tree; the sky being in all other
parts clear, except that a few specks of fleecy cloud hovered about
the larger one. It was first observed over the church of N. Señora del
Portillo, and moving from thence till it seemed to be immediately above
that of the Pillar, continued in the same form about half an hour, and
then dispersed. The inhabitants were in a state of such excitement,
that crowds joined in the acclamation of the first beholder, who cried
out, A miracle! and after the ♦1808.♦ defeat of the besiegers had
confirmed the omen, a miracle it was universally pronounced to have
been, the people proclaiming with exultation that ♦DO. 11.♦ the Virgin
had by this token prefigured the victory she had given them, and
promised Zaragoza her protection as long as the world should endure.
♦WORKS OF DEFENCE.♦
In many recorded instances superstition such as this has deluded men
to their destruction. But the Zaragozans knew that to obtain the
divine support, wherein they trusted, they must deserve it by works
as well as faith, and that the manner in which heavenly aid would be
manifested would be by blessing their human exertions. Palafox himself,
confidently as he had expected that the army which he commanded would
be successful in the field, had not been negligent in preparing to
withstand a second siege. Works of considerable extent and importance
had been designed, and executed as far as time and means permitted.
It was impossible to convert so large a city into a good fortified
place, accessible as it was on all sides, and every where commanded
within reach of cannon; but with a population so resolute in defending
themselves, every thing became of consequence which could impede the
enemy. The houses within 700 _toises_ of the place were demolished,
and their materials employed in the fortifications; and the numerous
and valuable plantations of olive trees within the same distance
were cut down: there was reason to regret that this precaution had
not been carried farther. During the autumn the works had not been
prosecuted with vigour, because all men of a certain age were required
for military service, and those who might have been disposable for
such employment were busied in the vintage, or in gathering hemp.
Moreover volunteers did not offer themselves for this labour, while the
danger appeared remote; and when there were so many demands upon the
treasury, the expense of wages could ill be defrayed. It so happened
that no mischief resulted from this dangerous economy: after the battle
of Tudela there were hands enough at the General’s disposal; and the
French allowed time for completing all that had been intended, while
they were collecting means and materials for a siege, the difficulties
of which they had been taught how to estimate. The works were directed
by the Commander of the Engineers, Colonel San Genis; and what was
defective in them was imputable not to any want of science, but to
the difficulty of fortifying the whole circuit of a great city. The
Aljafaria, which had been the palace of the Moorish kings, then of the
kings of Aragon, and was now called the Castle of the Inquisition,
because it contained the prisons of that accursed tribunal, had been
converted into a fortress by Philip V., and was now repaired and
strengthened. It was a square, with four tower-bastions, surrounded by
a good ditch, and communicating with the city by a double caponiere.
From thence to the bridge over the Guerva the place was protected by a
long line of wall and batteries; two Capuchin convents which came into
the line were fortified, and served to flank it. A ditch was carried
from one of these to the bridge, and the bridge itself secured by a
_tête-de-pont_. A double retrenchment extended from thence to the
memorable Convent of St. Engracia, which was made a sort of citadel;
and from that Convent to the Ebro the old wall had been strengthened;
this part of the city being covered also by the bed of the Guerva, and
by the Convent of St. Joseph on the farther bank of that river, which
had been well fortified, and was the most salient point of the whole
circle, serving as a strong _tête-de-pont_ to protect the besieged when
they sallied in the direction of Valencia. The suburb beyond the Ebro
was defended by redoubts and fleches, with batteries and traverses at
the entrance of the streets. The artillery amounted to 160 pieces,
the greater part being four, eight, and twelve pounders: what pieces
there were of larger calibre had mostly been recovered from the canal
into which the French had thrown them on their retreat. Great part of
the cannon balls also were what the French had fired or left behind
them. To prevent all danger from the explosion of their magazines,
it was determined not to prepare a stock of gunpowder, but to make
it day by day as it should be wanted; and this could easily be done,
because Zaragoza was the place where all the saltpetre of Aragon was
refined. There was no want of musquets, either for the inhabitants or
the troops and peasantry with whom the city was crowded. The stores
contained corn, wine, brandy, oil, salt-fish, and pulse, sufficient for
six months’ ♦CAVALLERO, 74–80. ROGNIAT, 4–6.♦ consumption for 15,000
men; this ought to have been the amount of the garrison; but fatal
circumstances, and the more fatal error of supposing that the means of
defence would be in proportion to the number of the defenders, had ♦THE
CITY CROWDED WITH SOLDIERS.♦ doubled it. Palafox would have had the
central army, as well as his own troops, take refuge there after the
battle of Tudela. Castaños indeed led away the wreck of that army in
a different direction; but there were other persons in authority who,
not having the same foresight, thought the best means of succouring
Zaragoza was by increasing its garrison. The Central Junta fell into
this error, and ordered the Valencian government to send thither all
the force it could raise, which was not absolutely required for its own
safety. A Walloon battalion, which had served during the former siege,
was sent from Tarragona. A proclamation was issued from Zaragoza,
inviting the dispersed soldiers to repair thither, and fill up the
places of their brethren who had fallen in that holy cause, and were
already in glory, enjoying their reward. By these means not less than
30,000 regular troops were collected there; as many as 15,000 peasants
entered the city to share in the dangers and merit of its defence; and
the hospitals were ♦CAVALLERO, 82.♦ filled with the sick and wounded
from Tudela, who had all been removed hither as the place to which they
could most easily be conveyed.
♦PREPARATIONS WITHIN THE CITY.♦
Except in the great and fatal error of thus crowding the city with
men, the means of defence were wisely provided. That the enemy would
effect an entrance was not doubted; traverses therefore were made in
the streets which were near the wall, the doors and the windows of
the ground-floor were walled up, communications opened within from
house to house, and the house-tops parapeted to secure the defendants.
Every householder, providing for life as well as death, laid in ample
supplies. The convents were well stored. In the general fervour of
national feeling men were as liberal of their means as of their lives.
Nor was this feeling confined to those who could gratify it by taking
an active part in military service, and by the expectation or the
enjoyment of vengeance: among instances of a rarer heroism that of
a physician may be noticed, Miguel Guillen by name, who came from
Valencia, and, refusing all pay, devoted himself to the service of the
hospitals.
♦M. MONCEY RECONNOITRES THE TORRERO.♦
Marshal Moncey, on whom the odious service of besieging Zaragoza had
been imposed, fixed his head-quarters at Alagon, while he waited for
reinforcements, and preparations were making to commence it. At the
end of November he reconnoitred the Torrero, a point which it was
♦1808. DECEMBER.♦ necessary to occupy before he could begin the siege;
some warm skirmishes ensued, which tended to encourage the Spaniards,
because the enemy, when they had well examined the ground, returned
to Alagon. The importance of the Torrero seems not to have been duly
appreciated by the Zaragozans; they contented themselves with throwing
up some slight works there, faced with unburnt bricks. Moncey had with
him 17,000 men, and was joined by Mortier with 14,000 in the middle of
December. Meantime a battering train of sixty pieces was brought from
Pamplona; projectiles also were supplied from the same arsenal; the
country was compelled to furnish means of transport as far as Tudela,
and there they were embarked upon the canal. ♦THE FRENCH APPEAR BEFORE
THE CITY.♦ All being ready, they appeared before Zaragoza on the 20th.
Gazan’s division crossing the Ebro at Tauste marched to Zuera and Villa
Nueva; Suchet’s took a position upon the right bank of the river,
within a league of the city; and Moncey, following the right bank of
the canal, placed one of his divisions on the left of the ♦ROGNIAT, 3.♦
Guerva, opposite the great sluice, the two others on the right.
♦THEY TAKE THE TORRERO.♦
Buonaparte had declared that bombs and mines should bring Zaragoza to
reason; and in the spirit of that declaration had prepared the fullest
means for overpowering moral resistance by military force. Skilled as
he was in the art of war, he did not, like a Mahommedan conqueror,
reckon upon numbers for success: to have employed a larger army (even
if the Austrian war had not occurred) would have been wasting men here
who might be more serviceably employed in other quarters; there was the
difficulty of feeding them, and no danger could be apprehended from
any efforts which might be made to raise the siege; but the number of
engineers was unusually large, and the means of destruction were in
proportion. General Lacoste commanded this department; he was perfect
master of his profession, and having served with Buonaparte in Egypt,
had acquired at the siege of Cairo some knowledge of the kind of
difficulties with which he had now to contend. During the night the
enemy erected a battery which commanded the Torrero, and was opened
upon it at daybreak: a false attack was made upon that post in front,
where the canal covered it; meantime another brigade, which under cover
of the olive-yard of St. Joseph had got possession of an aqueduct the
preceding evening, passed the canal under that aqueduct, and moved
rapidly up the left bank with the intention of interposing between the
city and the point of attack. The Spaniards were thrown into confusion
by the explosion of an ammunition-cart; and the exertions of a very
able officer, and the example of a few steady corps, were not able
to restore order or confidence. But, considering the distance of the
Torrero from the city, they had expected to lose it, and prepared
accordingly; so that by blowing up the Puente de America they
prevented the cavalry from pursuit, and retreated in good order. The
officer who had drawn off his men from this position during the former
siege had been put to ♦SEE VOL. II. P. 12.♦ death with circumstances
of great cruelty. It ♦SEBASTIAN HERNANDEZ, 3–5.♦ was fortunate for San
Marc, the general of the Valencian troops, who now commanded there,
♦ROGNIAT, 6. CAVALLERO, 89.♦ that Palafox knew how to appreciate his
excellent talents and distinguished worth. For being a Frenchman, he
was peculiarly obnoxious to suspicion; and if he had fallen a victim to
popular jealousy, the Zaragozans would have lost the ablest military
man employed in their defence.
♦UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK UPON THE SUBURBS.♦
Meantime Gazan’s division moved from Zuera and Villa Nueva, drove
back a corps of Swiss, who were posted on the road to Villa Mayor,
dislodged them with the loss of some 300 from the Torre del Arzobispo,
and attempted to enter the suburbs by a coup-de-main. This was in
conformity to Lacoste’s opinion. Its success would materially have
facilitated the progress of the besiegers, who might then have
established breaching batteries upon the left bank of the Ebro, and
opened a way into the city by demolishing the line of houses on the
quay. D. Josef Manso, of the royal guards, commanded on that side; and
after a severe action, repulsed the enemy: they renewed the attack with
their reserve, and the Spaniards gave way. Palafox, who saw from a
window what was passing, hurried across the bridge, cut down some of
the runaways, and by his voice and example changed the fate of the day.
Time had been gained for San Marc to arrive there with the troops who
had retired from the Torrero, ♦ROGNIAT, 7. CAVALLERO, 90, 1.♦ and the
enemy were repelled with a loss which they stated at 400 men, and the
Spaniards at 4000.
♦MONCEY SUMMONS PALAFOX TO SURRENDER.♦
On the following day Moncey, who had fixed his head-quarters at the
Torrero, addressed a letter to Palafox and the magistrates of Zaragoza,
warning them that the city was now besieged on all sides, and all
its communications cut off, and that he might now employ against it
every means of destruction which the laws of war allowed. Madrid, he
said, had capitulated, and thereby saved itself from the miseries
which a longer resistance must have drawn on. Zaragoza, however she
might confide in the courage of her inhabitants, could not possibly
succeed against the means which were now brought against her, and her
total destruction must be inevitable if she caused those means to be
employed. He called upon them to spare the effusion of blood, and
save so fine and so estimable a city, and to inspire the people with
peaceful sentiments, as the way to deserve their love and gratitude. On
his part, he promised them every thing compatible with his feelings,
his duty, and the power which the Emperor had given him. Marshal
Moncey was an upright and honourable man, unstained by any of the
revolutionary crimes; what his feelings were may therefore well be
supposed. Gladly would he have induced the Zaragozans to submit, that
he might have saved himself from the enormous guilt of destroying the
city and its inhabitants for resisting what he and every man in the
French army who acknowledged the difference between right and wrong,
felt in their hearts to be an insolent and iniquitous usurpation.
Palafox replied to the summons, and told him it was in vain to think
of appalling men by the horrors of a siege, who had endured one, and
who knew how to die. If Madrid had capitulated (which he could not
believe), it had been sold: and what then? Madrid was but a single
place, and there was no reason why Zaragoza should yield, when there
were 60,000 men determined to defend it. The Marshal had tried them
yesterday, and his troops had left at the gates witnesses enough of
that determination. It might be more fitting for him to assume a
lofty tone, and talk to the Marshal of capitulating, if he would not
lose his army before the town. The spirit of eleven million Spaniards
♦CAVALLERO, 92. SEBASTIAN HERNANDEZ, 6, 7.♦ was not to be extinguished
by oppression; and they who had resolved to be free, were so. As
for the blood which Marshal Moncey was desirous of sparing, it was
as glorious for the Spaniards to lose it in such a cause, as it was
ignominious for the French to be the instruments of shedding it.
♦THE INVESTMENT OF THE CITY COMPLETED.♦
During that and the ensuing day General Gazan completed the investment
of the suburb. One of his brigades extended on the right of the Zuera
road, the other on the left, with two battalions at the bridge over the
Galego on the road to Valencia. The swampy nature of the ground, upon
which the inhabitants relied in some degree for their protection on
that side, was favourable to the besiegers also, for it enabled them to
form inundations along the greater part of their line, which secured
them against any sorties. On the right bank Suchet’s division, forming
the left of the besieging army, extended from the Ebro to the valley
of the Huerba; that valley was occupied by Morlot’s; Meusnier’s was
encamped on the heights of the ♦ROGNIAT, 7.♦ Torrero; and Grandjean’s
extended from thence to the Ebro on the other end of the bow, where a
bridge of boats was laid, to establish their communication with the
troops on the side of the suburb. It was determined to make three
attacks; one upon the Castle of the Inquisition, with the view of
employing the garrison on that side, which was their strongest part;
one upon the bridge over the Huerba, where the name of that Pillar
which was regarded as the palladium of the city had been given to
the redoubt; and the third upon S. Joseph’s: this was the immediate
object of the enemy; they deemed it the weakest point, and thought to
connect their attack against it with an attempt upon the suburb, where
Lacoste still hoped that the French might establish themselves. The
weather was peculiarly favourable to their operations, being at once
mild and dry; the nights were long and dark, and every morning a thick
fog effectually covered them from the fire of the besieged, who could
never see where to point their guns till it ♦CAVALLERO, 95.♦ was near
mid-day. Meantime they were not idle; a line of counter-approaches was
commenced which compelled the enemy to prolong their works, lest they
should be enfiladed; sallies were made from S. Joseph’s to interrupt
them, and to cut down the olive-trees and destroy the buildings which
afforded them cover; and on the last day of the year the Spaniards made
a general attempt along the whole line. ♦CAVALLERO, 94. ROGNIAT, 9.♦
It was every where repulsed; but Palafox, who knew of what importance
it was to excite a spirit of emulation in the troops, ordered those
who had distinguished themselves by some partial success to wear a red
riband as a badge of honour on the breast. He addressed a proclamation
♦PROCLAMATION OF PALAFOX TO THE PEOPLE OF MADRID.♦ also to the people
of Madrid. The dogs by whom he was beset, he said, scarcely left him
time to clean his sword from their blood, but they still found their
grave at Zaragoza. The defenders of that city might be destroyed, but
compelled to surrender they could not be: and he promised that, so soon
as he was at liberty, he would hasten to the deliverance of Madrid. All
Palafox’s proclamations were in the same spirit; his language had the
high tone, and something of the inflation of Spanish romance, suiting
the character of those to whom it was directed.
♦1809. JANUARY.
JUNOT TAKES THE COMMAND OF THE FRENCH.♦
At the beginning of the year Mortier received orders to move upon
Calatayud with Suchet’s division. It was thought that they would be
more serviceably employed in keeping that part of Aragon in awe,
than in forwarding the operations of the siege. The position which
they left was filled up by extending Morlot’s division, and securing
its front by three redoubts. Moncey and Mortier, holding independent
commands, appear to have been mutually jealous of each other; and
Gazan, conceiving that his orders required him only to cover the siege,
refused to make any farther attempt upon the suburb, after the severe
repulse which he had sustained, strongly as the commandant of the
engineers advised a second attack. The arrival of Junot to take the
command did not put an end to this disunion: there were indeed plain
indications, that if Buonaparte had died at this time, his generals,
like Alexander’s, would have made some atonement to mankind by taking
vengeance upon each other. The works, however, went on, under a heavy
fire; and on the 10th eight batteries were opened against St. Joseph
and the redoubt of the Pillar. Colonel Mariano de Renovales commanded
the former post, a man who made himself conspicuous throughout the
whole course of the war by his activity and enterprising courage. An
old brick convent, ♦ST. JOSEPH’S AND THE REDOUBT OF THE PILLAR TAKEN.♦
and works faced with unburnt bricks, were soon demolished; and in the
night it was found necessary to remove the heavy artillery into the
town, as it could no longer be used. A brave sally was made at midnight
against one of the batteries; but the adventurers were taken in flank
by two guns placed at the right of the second parallel, and being
exposed to a murderous fire in front, retreated with considerable loss.
The next day, the convent being in ruins, and the breach practicable,
an assault was made in the evening; at the same time a party of the
enemy, turning the convent, effected an entrance by a bridge which
the besieged had neglected to remove, and obtained possession of the
ruins. The French employed three days in repairing the works and
connecting them with their second parallel. It had been an easy but an
important conquest; for they were now secured against the garrison on
that side by the river, and by an escarp eight feet high. On the 15th
they attacked the redoubt ... it was defended by the second regiment
of Aragonese volunteers, and it was not till the works were reduced to
ruins, and the flower of that regiment ♦ROGNIAT, 11, 14. CAVALLERO,
96.♦ had perished, that the survivors retreated into the city, and blew
up the bridge. A second parallel was then opened against the town,
which had now no longer any defence on this side but its feeble wall
and the houses themselves.
♦RUMOURS OF SUCCESS, AND REJOICINGS IN THE CITY.♦
Meantime a tremendous bombardment was kept up upon this devoted city.
The enthusiasm of the inhabitants was not abated by the loss of their
outworks: from the beginning they knew that this contest must come to
the knife’s point, and the event of the former siege made them look
with full hope for a similar deliverance. They were encouraged also by
false rumours which arrived announcing a victory over Buonaparte by
the combined armies of Romana and Sir John Moore. Palafox immediately
announced it in an extraordinary gazette; it was just as night closed;
the people crowded into the streets and squares, the bands of all
the regiments were collected, bells were rung, salutes fired, and
the multitude with shouts and acclamations of joy went in tumultuous
procession to the Church of the Pillar, to return thanksgiving, and
join in the hymn of _Salve Regina_. The besiegers heard the music and
the uproar, and ascribed to the artifices of Palafox and the other
leaders what was in fact the genuine impulse ♦ROGNIAT, 15. SEB.
HERNANDEZ, 13.♦ of public feeling. By good fortune the bombardment was
suspended at the time, but in the course of the night more than six
hundred shells were thrown into the city.
♦AN INFECTIOUS DISEASE APPEARS IN THE CITY.♦
The worst evil arising from the bombardment was one which had not been
anticipated from that cause, and against which, had it been foreseen,
it would hardly have been possible to provide. A great number of the
inhabitants retired into cellars, the women especially retreated there
with their children, for security from the shells. In these long low
vaults, where wine and oil had formerly been kept, they were crowded
together day and night, where it was necessary to burn lamps during
the day, and where fresh air entered as scantily as daylight. Such
places soon became hot-beds of infection, and other causes contributed
to extend the calamity. On the first day of the siege, when the attack
was made upon the suburbs, part of the troops, exhausted by the
previous exertions, were under arms for some hours in the Cozo, exposed
first to a heavy snow, and then to a severe frost: this produced a
catarrh, which proved infectious, and was soon followed by all the
dreadful symptoms of camp contagion. The number of soldiers and of
countrymen would at any time have crowded the city, but more especially
now, when the inhabitants of all those houses which were prepared
and blockaded for street warfare were compelled to seek quarters in
the inner parts of the town. The Murcian and Valencian troops came
from a country where great part of their food consisted in fresh or
preserved fruits; the mere change of diet from such aliment to garrison
stores was sufficient to produce disease. They had also been used to
drink well water: change of water is a cause of illness as frequent
as it is unsuspected; and that of the Ebro, though it is preferred
by the Aragonese to any other, is thought unwholesome for those who
are not accustomed to it. To these causes must be added scantiness of
food (an evil consequent upon the fatal error of crowding the place
with men), unusual exertions, and the impossibility of recruiting
exhausted strength by needful sleep in a city which was now bombarded
without intermission; and among that part of the population who were
not immediately engaged in the defence, fear, anxiety, and perpetual
agitation of mind, predisposing the body for endemic disease.
♦ATTEMPTS OF LAZAN AND FRANCISCO PALAFOX TO SUCCOUR THE CITY.♦
Every rumour of success, however preposterous in its circumstances,
and incredible in itself, was readily believed by the Zaragozans; they
were too ill-informed to judge of probabilities, or to understand the
real condition of their country; but this they knew, that if in other
parts the Spaniards did their duty as devoutly as they themselves were
discharging it, the deliverance of Zaragoza and the triumph of Spain
were certain. They were always in hope that some vigorous effort would
be made for their relief; and, to accelerate this, D. Francisco Palafox
left the city, embarked at night in a little boat, and descending the
Ebro and getting to Alcañiz, began to organize the peasantry, who lost
no opportunity of harassing the enemy’s communications. His situation,
like that of the Marquez de Lazan, was truly pitiable; not only their
brother, but their wives and families, were in Zaragoza, ... to them
more than to any other individuals the inhabitants looked for succour,
from the same hereditary feeling which had made them at the beginning
of their troubles turn as it were naturally to the house of Palafox
for a leader. But both were ordinary men, unequal to the emergency in
every thing except in good-will. General Doyle was in Catalonia; he
had passed through Zaragoza on his way to that province, had commanded
the Spanish cavalry in a spirited and successful affair at Olite a
few days before the battle of Tudela, and as a complimentary memorial
of that service, Palafox had formed a legion, and named it after him.
From him also, as an Englishman, the Zaragozans expected aid, and if
zeal and activity could have supplied the place of adequate means,
their expectations would not have been disappointed. He had been
indefatigable in his exertions for storing the city before the French
encamped around it: he succeeded by repeated representations to the
local and provincial Juntas in making them put Mequinenza in a state of
defence, ... an old town with a castle which commanded the navigation
of the Ebro, about half way between Zaragoza and its mouth; and he
was now endeavouring to make Reding attempt something in aid of the
besieged city.
♦CONDITION OF THE ARMY IN CATALONIA.♦
St. Cyr had not known how to improve a victory so well as the Spaniards
did how to remedy a defeat. As soon as the fugitives from Molins de Rey
brought the first tidings of their rout to Tarragona, the populace,
supposing themselves to be betrayed, rose tumultuously, and took the
power into their own hands. They blocked up the gates, unpaved the
streets, and removed the stones to the windows and varandas, that
they might be ready for a civic defence. They got possession of the
arsenal, and distributed the arms and ammunition; they moved the
artillery from one place to another, at the will of any one who fancied
himself qualified to give orders; and they called out for the head of
Vives, as the traitor who had been the cause of all their misfortunes.
In this imminent danger Vives made a formal resignation of the ♦REDING
TAKES THE COMMAND.♦ command, and Reding, upon whom it devolved, was
enabled to save his life by letting him be put in confinement. The
superior Junta, apprehensive alike of the populace and of a siege or
an immediate assault, got out of the city as soon as they could (for
the people had forbidden any person to leave it), and fixed themselves
at Tortosa, leaving, however, two of their members to represent them
in the Junta of that district. If while this insubordination prevailed
the French had attempted to carry the place by a coup-de-main, they
might probably have succeeded; but St. Cyr was not so well acquainted
with the inability of the Spaniards as with the difficulties of his own
position. A few days after the battle a strong detachment of French
appeared before the city; the generale was beaten, the somaten was
sounded from the Cathedral, one of the forts fired, and the place was
in the utmost confusion, when a flag of truce arrived, with a request
that an aid-de-camp of M. St. Cyr might be allowed to confer with
General Vives. Reding, to whom the letter was delivered, suspected
that the real intent must be to discover the state of the place;
he communicated it to the Junta, and two of their members, with two
officers, were sent out to know the purport of the mission. It was
not without difficulty that these persons could get out of the gate,
so fearful were the people of being betrayed; the general opinion
was, that the French had sent to summon the town, and the universal
cry was, that they would not capitulate, they would listen to no such
proposals, they would die for their king, their religion, and their
country. It proved, however, that the aid-de-camp came only to propose
an exchange of prisoners. The impolicy of agreeing to this was obvious;
but Reding knew how ill the prisoners on both sides were treated, and
thought it due to humanity to exchange them. The advantage was wholly
on the enemy’s side; they received disciplined soldiers, who had now
been many months in the country, and had had opportunities since their
capture of observing the state of the Spaniards, and even learning
their intentions, for every thing like secrecy seemed to be despised;
and they gave in return ♦CABAÑES, P. III. C. 13.♦ only men of the new
levies, not exchanging a single dragoon or artilleryman, nor one of the
Swiss troops.
♦THE ARMY RE-FORMED IN TARRAGONA.♦
Reding was fully sensible how injurious it was that the enemy should
thus be enabled to fill up their ranks; he suffered it, however, for
the sake of mitigating the evils of a war in which he considered
success absolutely hopeless. From the same hopelessness he committed
the greater error of suffering himself to be surrounded by persons,
some of whom were suspected by the superior Junta, and others by
himself: but with this there was a generous feeling mingled; he would
not, because they were unpopular, cease to employ men of whom he had
a good opinion, nor would he upon a strong suspicion of guilt dismiss
others as if they were guilty. His despondency was rooted in the
constitution of his mind, but it did not make him omit any efforts
for enabling the army again to take the field; and it was one happy
part of the Spanish character, that no defeat, however complete and
disgraceful, produced any effect in dispiriting the nation. The very
men who, taking panic in battle, threw down their arms and fled,
believed they had done their country good service by saving themselves
for an opportunity of better fortune; and as soon as they found
themselves in safety, were ready to be enrolled and take their chance
again. Such of the runaways as had reached the Ebro, when they could
get no farther, turned back, and came in troops to Tarragona. They came
in pitiable condition, and without arms: ... Reding knew not where to
look but to the English for money and muskets, and a failure of powder
also was apprehended, the materials having hitherto been supplied from
Zaragoza. It would have been madness to have attempted punishing any
of these fugitives; the better mode of impressing upon them a sense
of military duty was to let them see that their superiors could not
behave ill with impunity: Reding therefore degraded one colonel and
several inferior officers for their conduct at Molins de Rey, and made
them serve in the ranks; but by posting them in advanced parties gave
them an opportunity of retrieving their character and their rank. The
government never acted with so much energy as when it was refitting an
army after a defeat: its efforts were then such as the danger required.
Two regiments arrived from Granada, a Swiss one from Majorca; supplies
were sent from Valencia; men came in from all quarters as the hopes of
the people rose, and by the middle of January the force in Tarragona
was not inferior to that which had been so shamefully dispersed at
Granollers. The men recovered heart, and acquired confidence from
frequent success in the desultory warfare wherein Reding practised
them. But he himself continued[3] to despond; ♦CABAÑES, P. III. C. 13.♦
and, in sad anticipation of defeat, deferred acting, when activity and
enterprise might have found or made opportunities for success.
♦CONDUCT OF THE FRENCH UNDER ST. CYR.♦
It was their victories which made the French most sensible of the
difference between this and the other wars wherein they had been
engaged; ... the spoils of the field were the only fruits of success.
These indeed had been of signal consequence in Catalonia; they had
enabled St. Cyr to relieve Barcelona, to refit his troops, and to
strengthen himself with a park of field-pieces. He had profited by
the first panic to dislodge the Spaniards from the pass of Bruch,
which they had twice so gloriously defended; his troops had entered
Igualada after the success, and the dangerous impression which his
ostentation of justice and his observance of the humanities of war were
likely to produce upon the wealthier classes, was seen by the conduct
of the inhabitants, who seemed to think it a matter of indifference
whether their houses were occupied by the national troops or by the
French. But the system upon which Buonaparte carried on this wicked
war rendered it impossible for any general to persist in a course
of honourable conduct. The army which he had ordered into Catalonia
was left to provide for itself, in a province which had now been
many months the seat of war, and which never even in peace produced
half its own consumption of corn. It had also to store the places
of Rosas, Figueras, and Barcelona; for no attempt was made to bring
provisions from France by land ... (the pass indeed between Bellegarde
and Figueras was so dangerous to the French, that they called it the
Straits of Gibraltar); and it was seldom that a vessel could escape
the vigilance of the British cruisers. Eleven victuallers intended for
Barcelona were lying in the port of Caldaques under convoy of a cutter
and a lugger, when Lord Cochrane landed his men, drove the French
from the town, took their batteries, and captured the whole. St. Cyr,
however humane by nature, however honourable by principle, was engaged
in a service with which humanity and honour were incompatible: he could
support his army by no other means than by plundering the inhabitants,
and the Catalans were not a people who would endure patiently to be
plundered. The difficulty was increased by the Moorish custom still
retained in that part of Spain of preserving corn, not in barns or
granaries, but in mattamores. In the towns these subterranean magazines
were emptied before the French could enter; in the country they were
so easily concealed, that, after long and wearying search, it was a
rare fortune to discover one. And the Miquelets and Somatenes were
so constantly on the alert, that frequently when the marauders had
seized their booty they were deprived of it. In this sort of warfare
their loss was generally greater than that of the natives, who on such
occasions had them at vantage. How considerable ♦ST. CYR, 92–99.♦ it
must have been may be in some degree estimated from the fact, that in
the course of seven weeks St. Cyr’s foraging parties fired away not
less than two million cartridges.
♦ORDERS TO ATTEMPT THE RELIEF OF ZARAGOZA.♦
But plainly as it would have been the policy of the Spaniards to
confine themselves to the slow and sure method of weeding out their
invaders, till they could bring their regular troops into a fit state
for taking the field, the pressing danger of Zaragoza called for
immediate efforts. Francisco Palafox, looking every where for that aid
which was nowhere to be found, had gone to Cuenca, and proposing that
Infantado should march the central army to his brother’s relief, had
been present at a council where the proposal was discussed, and had
seen with his own eyes how utterly incapable that army was of engaging
in such an attempt, or even of attempting ♦INFANTADO, MANIFIESTO,
87.♦ such a march. Orders to undertake something for its relief had
been dispatched from the Central Junta to the provinces of Valencia
and Catalonia. The Valencians were offended with Palafox for having
detained General St. Marc with a division of their army; no man
contributed more by his military talents to the defence of the city
than that general, but he and his men were now cooped up to die of
pestilence, when they might have effectually served the Zaragozans in
the field. Want of will therefore made the Valencians take only half
measures, and these so tardily as to be of no avail. Neither did Reding
manifest the feeling which he ought to have partaken upon this subject,
partly because the sense of his own difficulties possessed him, and
partly perhaps from a personal dislike to the Palafox family. One
natural consequence of thus delaying succour in quarters where there
was most ability was to produce premature and rash attempts on the
part of those who felt more generously. Palafox ♦TARDINESS IN OBEYING
THEM.♦ had written to say, that as long as provisions lasted, and there
were ruins to shelter them, Zaragoza would not surrender. The place
chosen for a depot was Mequinenza, and there, chiefly by the exertions
of General Doyle, stores in considerable quantity were collected; but
impatient of waiting, when time was so precious, till a well-concerted
attempt to introduce supplies could be made, a Colonel who had ♦DEFEAT
OF THE PEASANTRY.♦ several thousand peasants under his command moved
to Belchite, within five leagues of Zaragoza, with a convoy under
protection of this force, which was as unmanageable in a body, as it
might have been efficient in its proper mode of warfare. The enemy, at
the beginning of the siege, had stationed General Vathier at Fuentes
with 600 cavalry and 1200 foot to command the country and collect
provisions. This movement of the peasants was too near him to be
concealed; he fell upon them, routed them with some slaughter, and got
possession of all their stores. ♦ALCAÑIZ OCCUPIED BY THE FRENCH.♦ The
pursuit led him as far as Ixar, and from thence he proceeded against
Alcañiz. The peasantry whom Francisco Palafox had collected there drew
up on the heights before the town, and withstood the attack with more
firmness ♦ROGNIAT, 17.♦ than might have been expected from such a
force; but they were not equal to contend with disciplined troops; and
Vathier occupied the towns of Alcañiz and Cuspe as long as the siege
endured.
♦MOVEMENT IN NAVARRE AND ARAGON.♦
These misfortunes did not discourage the Spaniards, and the movements
of the inhabitants both in Navarre and Aragon were formidable enough
to excite some uneasiness in the besiegers. While the Navarrese bands
interrupted their communication with Pamplona, the mountaineers of
Soria threatened Tudela, and those of the Sierra de Muela endangered
their hospitals and establishments at Alagon Lazan, meantime, with
his brother Francisco, occupied the country from Villa Franca de Ebro
to Licineña and Zuera, and sending detachments as far as Capavrosa
to intercept the enemy’s convoys, straitened Gazan’s division in
their camp. More than once the French were without meat, and upon
half rations of bread; and they might have been foiled a second time
before Zaragoza, more shamefully than the first, if the heroism of the
inhabitants had been in any degree seconded from without, and if the
want of capacity in the Spanish leaders had not been as glaring as
the want of order in the field and of reason in their councils. The
besiegers had felt some ill effects from the latter cause; but an end
was put to jarring pretensions and contrarient views when ♦M. LASNES
TAKES THE COMMAND.♦ Marshal Lasnes arrived on the 22d of January to
take the command. He had previously ordered Mortier to leave Calatayud,
and act with Suchet’s division on the left of the Ebro; having
dispersed the force which Francisco Palafox had collected there, they
took possession of Zuera, and scouring the country as far as Pina,
Sarineña, ♦ROGNIAT, 18, 20.♦ and Huesca, secured the besiegers from
interruption on that side. The French Marshal hoped that this might
abate the spirit of the Zaragozans as much as it had cheered them ♦HE
SUMMONS PALAFOX TO SURRENDER. JAN. 25.♦ when they saw the force of
their countrymen upon the surrounding heights; and he addressed a
letter to Palafox, telling him that the force upon which he had relied
for relief had been destroyed, that the English had fled to Coruña and
embarked there, leaving 7000 prisoners, and that Romana had escaped
with them, his army with their officers having yielded to the Emperor:
that Infantado had been defeated at Ucles with the loss of 18,000 men;
and that if after this true statement he persisted in withstanding a
force more than sufficient for effecting its purpose, the destruction
of the city and of its inhabitants must rest upon his head. Palafox
♦CAVALLERO, 107. SEB. HERMANDEZ, 14, 15.♦ replied, that M. Lasnes
would cover himself with glory if he were to win the city by force of
manly courage with the sword, and not by bombarding it; but that the
Zaragozans knew their duty, and would not surrender.
♦THE FRENCH ENTER THE CITY, BUT WITH GREAT LOSS.
JAN. 26.♦
All the outworks had now been taken except the Castle of the
Inquisition, which had never been seriously attacked, because its
possession was of no importance to the enemy. The batteries against
the city itself were completed, and on the day after the summons fifty
pieces opened their fire upon the wall, and on the morrow three
practicable breaches were made. One was by an oil-mill, a building
standing alone, without the walls, and close to them; the enemy had
established themselves in it during the night. The second was to the
left of this, immediately opposite S. Joseph’s; the third in the
monastery of S. Engracia. All these were attacked. A column issuing
from the oil-mill presently reached the first, and the explosion of
two fougades at the foot of the breach scarcely appeared to impede
their progress. But they found an inner intrenchment, well constructed
and mounted with two guns; and when they attempted to carry this the
bell of the Torre Nueva rang, the inhabitants manned the adjacent
houses, and a fire was opened from roofs and windows which it was
neither possible to return nor to withstand. Profiting, however, by
the cover which the exploded fougades afforded them, they succeeded
in lodging themselves upon the breach. On the left they were more
successful; after gaining the ramparts, they made their way into the
opposite house, which the artillery had breached, and into the two
adjoining ones; their progress was then stopped, but they established
themselves within the walls, and repaired and lengthened for their own
use a double caponier, by which the besieged used to communicate with
S. Joseph’s. The attack upon the third breach was more formidable.
After a severe struggle the enemy entered the convent of S. Engracia,
obtained possession of its ruins and of the nunnery of S. Joseph, which
stood near, and of which little more than the mere shell was remaining.
Piercing the walls of this, they enfiladed the curtain from S. Engracia
to the bridge of the Huerba, and taking the _tête-de-pont_ in reverse,
became masters of the bridge, over which fresh troops joined them to
follow up their success. They pushed on to the Capuchin convent of La
Trinidad, which made part of the line; forty artillerymen, who were
stationed there without support, as a place not in danger of attack,
were cut to pieces at their guns, and the convent was taken. It was
recovered by the Spaniards; but two battalions came to support the
assailants, who took it a second time, and maintained their conquest,
though at a dear price. The greater part of the French who occupied
the curtain fell under the fire from the houses. They suffered also
considerably in a vain attempt to possess themselves of a single house
which defended an imperfect breach to the right of all their other
attacks. Their whole loss was stated by themselves at 600, that of
the besiegers at eight. The Spaniards, with better reason, believed
that a much greater proportion of the enemy had fallen; and the French
had in fact received so severe a lesson, that they determined not to
♦ROGNIAT, 22, 26. CAVALLERO, 102–105.♦ risk any more direct attacks,
but proceed always as much as possible under cover: there was danger
otherwise that the troops would become impatient of so fatal a
service, and even that all their efforts might be unavailing.
♦THE ENEMY ESTABLISH THEMSELVES IN THE TRINIDAD CONVENT.♦
As it was now no longer necessary to carry on the false attack upon
the Aljafaria, the engineers were called from thence to fortify the
Trinidad convent, and establish a communication with it and with a
house by the bridge; commanding in this manner the whole intermediate
space. During the night the Spaniards endeavoured to recover the
ruins of S. Engracia and the adjoining houses, but without success.
They attempted twice also to regain the Trinidad, and once succeeded
so far as to force open the church door: the enemy had formed an
epaulement within of bags of earth, and fought to advantage behind that
protection. A friar was at the head of the assailants, with a sword
in one hand and the crucifix in the other; one of his brethren was
killed in the act of administering extreme unction to a Spaniard who
was mortally wounded; another took the holy oil from the slain, and
continued to perform the same office to his dying countrymen. Women
also mingled with the combatants, distributing cartridges to them, and
bearing refreshments to their sons, ♦ROGNIAT, 25, 28. CAVALLERO, 105.♦
their husbands, and fathers, and sometimes rushing upon the enemy when
these dear relatives fell, to revenge their deaths, and to die with
them.
♦CONVENTS OF S. AUGUSTIN AND S. MONICA WON.♦
The French had in vain attempted to get possession of the convents
of S. Augustin and ♦FEB. 1.♦ S. Monica. Having been repelled in
assaulting ♦1809. FEBRUARY.♦ the breaches, they sprung a mine under
the partition wall, and by that means effected an entrance, turning all
the works which the Spaniards had constructed for their defence. They
forced their way into the church. Every column, every chapel, every
altar, became a point of defence, which was repeatedly attacked, taken,
and retaken, and attacked again; the pavement was covered with blood,
and the aisles and nave of the church strewed with the dead, who were
trampled under foot by the combatants. In the midst of this conflict
the roof, which had been shattered by bombs, fell in; the few who were
not crushed, after a short pause which this tremendous shock and the
sense of their own escape occasioned, renewed the fight with increased
desperation: fresh parties of the enemy poured in: monks, and citizens,
and soldiers came to the defence, and the contest was continued upon
the ruins and the bodies of the dead and the dying. It ended in favour
of the invaders, who succeeded in keeping the disputed position. Taking
advantage of the opportunity afforded while the attention of the
Spaniards was directed to this point, they entered the Rua Quemada,
where no attack was at that time apprehended, and got possession of one
side of the street to the angle which it makes with the Cozo: their
sappers were beginning to pierce the walls of the houses, barricade
the doors and windows, and establish traverses in the street, when the
Zaragozans charged them with redoubled spirit, drove them out with
considerable loss, and recovered four houses which had been taken on a
preceding day. At the same time an attack was made on the side of S.
Engracia, when, after exploding two mines, the Poles got possession of
some ruined houses; but in obtaining this success, General Lacoste, the
♦ROGNIAT, 27, 30. CAVALLERO, 106.♦ French commandant of engineers, was
killed. His opponent, Colonel San Genis, had fallen the preceding day:
he was succeeded by Colonel Zappino, Lacoste by Colonel Rogniat.
♦THE ENEMY PROCEED BY MINING.♦
Now that the city was open to the invaders, the contest was to be
carried on once more in the streets and houses. But the French had
been taught by experience that in such domestic warfare the Zaragozans
derived a superiority from the feeling and principle which inspired
them, and the cause wherein they were engaged. They had learned that
the only means of conquering it was to destroy it house by house, and
street by street; and upon this system of destruction they proceeded.
Three companies of miners and eight of sappers carried on this
subterranean war. The Spaniards had officers who could have opposed
them with not inferior skill; but men were wanting, and the art of
sapping and mining is not one which can be learned on the spot where it
is wanted; their attempts therefore were frequently discovered, and the
men suffocated in their own works. Nor indeed had they been more expert
could powder have been supplied for their consumption. The stock with
which the Zaragozans began had been exhausted; they had none but what
they manufactured day by day, and no other cannon-balls than those
which had been fired against them, and which they collected and fired
back upon the enemy.
♦PROGRESS OF THE PESTILENCE.♦
The Zaragozans expected miracles for their deliverance; and they
exerted themselves so excellently well, that the French, with all their
advantages, would have found themselves unequal to the enterprise in
which they were engaged, and other armies must have been brought up to
supply more thousands for the slaughter, if the defenders had not been
suffering under an evil which in their circumstances it was equally
impossible to prevent or to alleviate. The consequences of that evil,
when it had once appeared, were but too surely to be apprehended; and
in bitter anticipation, yet while a hope ♦MIRALLES, ELOGIO DE ZARAGOZA,
P. 42.♦ remained, an Aragoneze exclaimed, Zaragoza surrenders not, if
God is neutral! If the seasons had only held their ordinary course,
this heroic people might a second time have delivered themselves. In
that part of Spain January is commonly a wet month. Had the rains
fallen as usual, the enemy would hardly have been able to complete
their approaches; had the weather, on the contrary, been severe, it
might have stopped the contagion, and then the city would have had
hands as well as hearts for its defence. But the season proved at once
dry enough for the ground to be in the most favourable state for the
besiegers’ operations, and mild enough to increase the progress of
the disease, which was now more destructive than the enemy, though no
enemy ever employed the ♦CAVALLERO, 71.♦ means of destruction with less
remorse. When once the pestilence had begun it was impossible to check
its progress, or confine it to one quarter of the city. It was not long
before more than thirty hospitals were established; ... as soon as one
was destroyed by the bombardment the patients were removed to some
other building which was in a state to afford them temporary shelter,
and thus the infection was carried to every part of Zaragoza. The
average of daily deaths from this cause was at this time not less than
three hundred and fifty; men stretched upon straw, in helpless misery
lay breathing their last, and with their dying breath spreading the
mortal taint of their own disease, who, if they had fallen in action,
would have died with the exultation of martyrs. Their sole comfort was
the sense of having performed their duty religiously to the uttermost
... all other alleviations were wanting; neither medicines nor
necessary food were to be procured, nor needful attendance ... for the
ministers of charity themselves became victims of the disease. All that
the most compassionate had now to bestow was a little water in which
rice had been boiled, and a winding-sheet. The nuns, driven from their
convents, knew not where to take refuge, nor where to find shelter for
their dying sisters. The Church of the Pillar was crowded with poor
creatures, who, despairing of life, hoped now for nothing more than to
die in the presence of the tutelary saint. The clergy were employed
night and day in administering the sacraments to the dying, till they
themselves sunk under the common calamity. The slightest wound produced
gangrene and death in bodies so prepared for dissolution by distress
of mind, agitation, want of proper aliment and of sleep. For there was
now no respite neither by day nor night for this devoted city; even
the natural order of light and darkness was destroyed in Zaragoza: by
day it was involved in a red sulphureous atmosphere of smoke and dust,
which hid the face of heaven; by night the fire of cannon and mortars,
and the flames of burning houses, kept it in a state of horrible
illumination. The cemeteries could no longer afford room for the dead;
huge pits were dug to receive them in the streets and in the courts
of the public buildings, till hands were wanting for the labour; they
were laid before the churches, ♦SEBASTIAN HERNANDEZ, P. 17. CAVALLERO,
P. 108.♦ heaped upon one another, and covered with sheets; and that
no spectacle of horror might be wanting, it happened not unfrequently
that these piles of mortality were struck by a shell, and the shattered
bodies scattered in all directions.
♦FIRST TALK OF SURRENDER IN THE CITY.♦
On the 1st of February the situation of the city appeared so desperate,
that persons of approved and unquestionable patriotism came to the
Regent of the Royal Audience of Aragon, D. Pedro Maria Ric, and
besought him to represent to Palafox the necessity of capitulating; but
Ric, with a spirit like that of Palafox himself, could not submit to
this while there was any possibility of prolonging the defence. He knew
that of all examples there is none which makes so sure and so powerful
an impression as that of heroic suffering; and that if Zaragoza were
defended to the last gasp, the influence of its fall under such
circumstances would be not less honourable and hardly less salutary
than a happier termination. Nor indeed would the people have consented
to a surrender; their spirit was unsubdued, and the principle which
supported it retained all its force. The worst effect of their sense
of increasing danger was, that it increased their suspicions, always
too easily excited; and ♦D. P. M. RIC, SEMANARIO PATRIOTICO, NO. 28,
P. 214. CAVALLERO, P. 110.♦ to those suspicions several persons were
sacrificed, being with or without proof hung during the night in the
Cozo and in the market-place. The character indeed of the struggle was
such as to excite the most implacable indignation and hatred against
an enemy, who having begun the war with such unexampled treachery,
prosecuted it with a ferocity equally unexampled in later ages.
♦THE CONTEST CARRIED ON BY FIRE.♦
Four days the French were employed in forming three galleries to cross
the Rua Quemada. They failed in two; the third opened into the cellar
of an undefended house; thence they made way along great part of the
street from house to house, and crossing another street by means of
a double epaulement of bags of earth, established themselves in the
ruins of a house which formed an angle of the Cozo and of the Rua del
Medio, Their next object was to get possession of the Escuelas Pias, a
building which commanded some traverses made for defending the Cozo.
The French often attacked it, and were as often repulsed; they then
attempted the adjoining houses. The system of blowing up the houses
exposed them to an evil which had not been foreseen, for when they
attempted to establish themselves upon the ruins, the Spaniards from
the dwellings near fired upon them with sure effect. They endeavoured
therefore so to proportion the charge in their mines as to breach the
house without destroying it; but to deprive them of the cover which
they would thus have obtained, the Zaragozans with characteristic
desperation set fire now to every house before they abandoned it. They
began this mode of defence here, maintaining the entrance till they
had prepared the building for burning; for so little wood was used in
the construction, that it was necessary to smear the floors and beams
with melted resin, to make them more combustible. When all was ready
they then set fire to the place, and retired into the Escuelas Pias,
interposing thus a barrier of flames between them and the assailants.
The enemy endeavoured in vain to extinguish the fire under a shower
of balls; and the time thus gained was employed by the Zaragozans in
forming new works of defence. Unable to win the Schools by any other
means, the enemy at length prepared a mine, which was discovered too
late ♦ROGNIAT, 30, 1. CAVALLERO, 121. FEB. 7.♦ for the Spaniards
to frustrate their purpose, but in time to disappoint them of their
expected advantage by setting fire to the disputed edifice.
♦CONVENT OF JESUS TAKEN IN THE SUBURBS.♦
On the same day operations were renewed against the suburbs, where
the enemy, at the commencement of the siege, had received so severe
a repulse. General Gazan, availing himself of an ambiguity in his
orders, had, after that lesson, contented himself with keeping up the
blockade; nor could any representation induce him to engage in more
active operations, till M. Lasnes arrived with authority to enforce his
orders. The Convent of Jesus, situated on the road to Barcelona, formed
part of the defence on that side; the engineers, not having time to
rase it, deeming it better that it should be occupied than abandoned
for the enemy. Trenches were now opened against this building, and
twenty battering pieces soon effected a breach, which was carried
almost as easily as it had been made; but when the enemy, flushed with
success, entered the suburbs in pursuit of the retreating garrison,
they were driven out with great slaughter, as on their former attempt.
♦ROGNIAT, 34, 35.♦ They entrenched themselves, however, on the ruins of
the convent, established a communication with it, and lodgements on the
right and left.
The attack in the centre was pursued with the same vigour, and
resisted with the same desperate determination. Every door, every
staircase, every chamber was disputed; the ♦S. FRANCISCO TAKEN.♦
French abandoned all attacks to the left for the sake of concentrating
their efforts here, that they might the sooner reach the Cozo, extend
themselves along it to the right as far as the quay, and thus connect
their operations with those of Gazan on the other side the Ebro: and
these increased efforts were met with proportionate exertions by the
Zaragozans. Grenades were thrown from one floor to another, and bombs
were rolled among the enemy, when they were so near that the Spaniards
who rolled them expected themselves also to perish by the explosion.
Their resolution seemed, if it were possible, to increase with their
danger; every spot was defended with more obstinacy than the last;
and this temper would have been, as it deserved to be, invincible,
if pestilence the while had not been consuming them faster than fire
and sword. The sense of honour as well as of duty was carried to its
highest point; the officers preferred dying upon the stations which
they had been appointed to defend, rather than to live after having
lost them, though every possible resistance had been made. On this
side, after having occupied and been driven from the vaults of the
Hospital, which had been reduced to ruins in the former siege, the
enemy succeeded at length in carrying a gallery to the great convent
of S. Francisco; ... a countermine was prepared, which compelled them
to stop before they could get under the walls of the convent. The
engineer, Major Breuille, immediately charged the mine with three
thousand weight of powder, and fired it, having drawn by feigned
preparations for an assault as many Spaniards as he could within
the sphere of destruction. The explosion was terrible, and brought
down part of the building: the enemy rushed through the breach, and
making way into the church, formed an epaulement there to establish
themselves. Some Zaragozans who were acquainted with the building got,
by passages connected with the tower, upon the cornices of the church;
others mounted the roof, and broke holes in it, and from thence they
poured down grenades upon the invaders, and drove them from their post.
The ruins of this convent, which had been burnt during the first siege,
and now shattered by the mine, were disputed two whole days, till the
defenders at length were driven from the last chapel by the bayonet.
For the advantage now both in numbers and in physical power was on the
side of the enemy, the pestilence having so wasted the Spaniards, that
men ♦ROGNIAT, 36. CAVALLERO, 126.♦ enough could not be provided to man
the points which were attacked without calling up from the hospitals
those who had yet strength enough to use a weapon.
From the tower of this building the French commanded the Cozo for a
musket-shot distance ♦THE FRENCH BEGIN TO MURMUR.♦ on either side.
After many desperate attempts their miners succeeded in crossing that
street; but they were baffled in their attacks upon the University,
and so many of their officers and best soldiers had fallen in this
murderous struggle, that the disgust which ought to have been excited
by their abominable cause was produced by the difficulty which they
found in pursuing it. Not the men alone, but the officers also, began
to complain that they were worn out, though they had as yet only taken
a fourth part of the town; it was necessary, they said, to wait for
reinforcements, otherwise they should all be buried in these cursed
ruins, before they could drive the fanatics from their last retreat.
Marshal Lasnes represented to them, that destructive as the mode of war
was, it was more so to the besieged than to them, whose operations were
directed by more skill, and carried on by men trained to such service;
that pestilence was doing their work; and that if these desperate
madmen chose to renew the example of Numantia, and bury themselves
under the ruins of their city, bombs and mines would not now be
♦ROGNIAT, 38.♦ long in destroying the last of them. Marshal Lasnes was
a man after the Emperor Napoleon’s own heart; with so little honourable
feeling, that he regarded the Zaragozans merely as madmen; and with so
little human feeling, that he would have completed the destruction of
the city and its last inhabitants with the same insensibility that he
declared his intention of doing so.
♦NOT EVEN AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO RELIEVE THE CITY.♦
S. Genis had repeatedly said, “Let me never be appealed to if there is
any question of capitulating, for I shall never be of opinion that we
can no longer defend ourselves.” In the same spirit Palafox wrote to
his friend General Doyle: “Within the last forty-eight hours,” said he,
“6000 shells have been thrown in; two-thirds of the city are in ruins;
but we will perish under the ruins of the remaining part, rather than
surrender.” It was not by any promises or hopes of external succour
that this spirit was supported. Palafox well knew that no efforts would
be wanting on the part of his brothers, or of his friends; but he knew
also what divided counsels and jarring interests were opposed to them,
and that willing lives were all they could have had at their command.
General Doyle with great exertions got together ammunition and stores
at Mequinenza, in the beginning of February; and the Marques de Lazan
took the field from Lerida with a nominal force of 7000 foot and 250
horse to attempt something for the relief of the besieged city. It was
soon learnt by their spies that a corps of 10,000 foot and 800 horse
was ready to oppose them; and rather than make an attempt which must
inevitably have ended in the utter rout of his ill-disciplined troops,
Lazan waited at Monzon, to be joined by a division from Valencia,
which the Junta of that kingdom had at last consented to send across
the Ebro. But a French division in Aragon threatened to impede the
junction: ammunition was wanted from Lerida, which the Junta of that
city demurred at granting; time was consumed in miserable counsels and
hopeless expectation, Lazan looking to Reding for some great exertion,
and Reding deterred from attempting any thing, though with a superior
force, by total want of confidence in his army, and the suspicion that
whatever passed at his head-quarters was immediately communicated
to the enemy; and thus while Lazan and his brother were in the most
pitiable distress, knowing the state of Zaragoza, where their families
were suffering under the unexampled horrors of such a siege, ... while
every man in their division partook that feeling which the situation
of the besieged excited in all their countrymen ... an anxiety as
unexampled as it was great, ... and while every where it was expected
that some efforts such as the occasion required would be made; even
the most ready and devoted courage was of no avail where preparation,
order, discipline, prompt judgement, and vigorous authority were all
wanting; and though the province and the nation were in arms, Zaragoza
was left to its fate without even an attempt to save it.
♦PROGRESS OF THE PESTILENCE.♦
Meantime pestilence was consuming the Zaragozans faster than fire and
sword. The points which were not immediately threatened were now
wholly manned by men who rose from their straw in the hospitals, and
sate at their posts, unable to support themselves standing, wrapped in
their blankets, and shivering or panting for breath, as the ague or
the hot fit of the disease might prevail. The officer whose dreadful
task it was to choose out patients for the service became in his turn
a victim to the contagion. Hopeless of finding relief any where, the
sick resigned themselves quietly to their fate; the dying and the
dead were buried together beneath the houses which were blown up, or
consumed in the flames; and the French found court-yards and chambers
filled with corpses, and said themselves that they were fighting now
only to obtain possession of a cemetery. ♦ROGNIAT, 39. CAVALLERO,
129.♦ The ravages of the disease were such, that many, bearing up with
invincible resolution to the last, fell in the streets and died. The
enemy did not remit their attacks while death was thus doing their
work; they profited by the weakness of the besieged, and opening a fire
♦FEB. 18.♦ from their batteries on both sides the Convent of Jesus
upon the suburbs, made another attempt upon the feeble works where
they had twice been repulsed with such great loss. A fire ♦THE SUBURBS
TAKEN.♦ from fifty pieces soon made the way open, and the bridge being
flanked by some of their guns, no succour could be sent from the city.
Baron de Versaje, who commanded there, and had distinguished himself
in the defence, was killed in repairing to his post. A breach was
made in the Convent of S. Lazarus on the left bank; the garrison,
exhausted by privations and fatigue and sickness, opposed all the
resistance in their power, ... the greater number dying in its defence;
and this edifice being taken, the Spaniards could neither retreat
from the suburbs, nor hope to support themselves there, when they
could no longer be supplied with food or ammunition from the city.
Finding themselves separated by the enemy into two columns, the one
body crossed the bridge with considerable loss, and effected their
retreat into the town; the other cut their way through the enemy, and
endeavoured to escape in the open country ♦ROGNIAT, 41. CAVALLERO,
137.♦ along the bank of the Ebro; they were pursued by the French
horse, and after sustaining a second action till their powder was
exhausted, were taken prisoners to the number of 1500.
♦THE UNIVERSITY TAKEN.♦
The loss of the left bank exposed to the enemy the only part of the
city which had not yet been open to their direct attacks, but had only
suffered from the bombardment. On the other side, the University,
after repeated attempts, had been taken, and the traverses which the
Spaniards had so well defended in the Cozo. Palafox had now been
seized with the disease. Capitulation had been mentioned at the last
council in which he was present, and when it was asked how long the
city could hold out, his answer had been, _hasta la ultima tapia_;
“to the ♦PALAFOX TRANSFERS HIS AUTHORITY TO A JUNTA.♦ last mud-wall.”
Being now utterly disabled, he transferred all his authority, civil
and military, on the night of the 18th, to a Junta, naming Ric to be
the president. That noble-minded Spaniard immediately summoned the
members, and they began their functions at one on the morning of the
19th. The chiefs of the various military departments were summoned to
deliver ♦CONDITION OF THE BESIEGED.♦ their opinions. The general of
cavalry represented, that there remained only sixty-two horses, and
those weak and unserviceable, the rest having died of hunger. From a
statement of the infantry it appeared that there were only 2822 men fit
for service. Ammunition was nearly exhausted; there was none but what
was manufactured in the Inquisition, and that would be destroyed if a
shell should fall there. The commandant of engineers reported that the
fortifications were demolished, there were neither men nor materials
for repairing them, and all the cloth which could serve for bags of
earth had been consumed. All the officers who had thus been consulted
gave their opinion that the place ought to be surrendered, and that
the Junta would be responsible to God and the King for the lives which
every hour were sacrificed, if they persisted in resistance, now that
it was become manifestly impossible to save the city. Having heard
this melancholy representation, the Junta required General San Marc,
who was one of their members, to express his judgement; the eminent
talents and courage which he had displayed during the whole siege would
render his opinion decisive both with them and the commander-in-chief
and the people. He stated, that if the enemy made a general attack,
which the preparations that were observed appeared to indicate, the
loss of the city was inevitable, and would be followed by every
imaginable horror. It was known with what fury the French treated every
place which they conquered, and their rage would be greater here, on
account of the hatred which they and their general and their bloody
Emperor bore towards a city that had once put them to such shame, and
now cost them so dearly. If the attacks were partial, such as those
which were repeatedly made every day, they might hold out two days
longer, or possibly four, provided men could be found for defence and
for the works; longer than four days it was not possible to maintain
the contest: San Marc concluded by declaring, that unless there were
well-founded expectations of speedy relief, it was unjustifiable ♦RIC,
SEM. PATR. 215, 6.♦ to sacrifice the lives which in these days must be
lost, the loss of the city in that short time being unavoidable.
Upon this the Junta proceeded to make inquiry what expectations of
relief there were: for this purpose the Duke of Villahermosa was sent
to Palafox; but Palafox was now so ill that he could give no account
of any thing, for the fever had fixed upon his brain. His secretary
was applied to for any letters and documents which might be in his
possession: he delivered in two, both of which were dated long back.
One was a letter from Francisco Palafox, saying, that after making
the utmost exertions to collect troops, but in vain, he was then
at Tortosa, assembling the peasantry with some soldiers from the
garrisons on the coast, and that he designed to strengthen this force
with some gun-boats that were to be sent up the Ebro. The other was
a scrap of paper, written in enigmatical terms (for it had to pass
through the enemy’s lines), and, as it was supposed, by the Conde de
Montijo. It said, that the writer and the Duke del Infantado wished
to come to the relief of Zaragoza, but the Central Junta had ordered
that the Swiss should go, and that they were to fall upon Madrid. The
Swiss was understood to mean General Reding; but he was so situated
that no succour could be expected from him; for he was in Catalonia,
and the enemy being masters of the suburbs, it was not possible for
him now to cross the bridge. Moreover there could be no doubt, that
other divisions of the French gave him full employment. These papers,
therefore, only confirmed the Junta in their apprehensions that the
French were victorious every where, and that in the ♦RIC, 216, 7.♦
general distress of the country they could expect no relief.
♦FLAG OF TRUCE SENT TO THE FRENCH.♦
While they were deliberating the bombardment was renewed. They knew
that the city could not hold out; twenty-six members voted for a
capitulation, eight, with Ric among them, that they should still
continue their resistance, urging that there was a possibility of
being succoured. Such was the high spirit of these brave men, that
the opinion of the minority was followed: for they who had voted for
surrendering had done so for the sake of others, ... for themselves,
there was not one among them who would not rather have died than
capitulated. They agreed to send a flag of truce to the enemy,
requesting a suspension of hostilities for three days, that officers
might in the meantime be sent to ascertain the situation of the Spanish
armies, and according to the intelligence which might thus be obtained,
they would then treat for a surrender. Lasnes, when he had summoned
the city, had proposed this method himself, ... he now resented the
proposal as an insult, and vented the most ferocious threats against
the city, unless it were immediately delivered up. The flag was
remanded with a second letter, reminding him that the proposal was
originally his own: he did not vouchsafe to answer in any other manner
than ♦RIC, 217, 8.♦ by a shower of bombs, and by ordering the attack to
be renewed.
♦LAST EFFORTS OF THE BESIEGED.♦
In the evening of that day the quarter of the Tanneries was lost, a
part of the strand leading to the stone bridge, and the Puerto del
Angel, a point of great importance. Four cannon in the battery of the
wooden bridge were spiked, treacherously it was supposed, ... but
there was no time for ascertaining this and punishing the traitors.
The handful of men who remained were at their posts, manifesting their
wonted resolution; but they were too few for the severe service to
which they were exposed, and San Marc applied to Ric to reinforce with
only 200 the points which were attacked, ... more he did not ask for,
knowing the deplorable state of the city. Ric had already charged Don
Miguel Marraco, a beneficed priest of the Church of the Pillar, whom
the general had commissioned to organise the peasantry, to provide men
for the works, ... he now sent him a note which would have excited
him to new exertions had there been any remissness on his part. Don
Mariano Cerazo, an honourable citizen, who had distinguished himself
by his zeal and his influence with the people, was called upon in
like manner; and certain priests also, who had united for the purpose
of training and encouraging the peasantry, were requested in this
emergency to furnish men. These measures, before the pestilence had so
widely extended itself, would in a quarter of an hour have produced
a thousand armed men. Ric ordered also the alarm to be beaten in the
New Tower, and taking advantage of a favourable moment, when the enemy
were driven back by the bayonet from the Convent del Sepulcro, he sent
the public crier through the streets to proclaim this success, and
summon the people by sound of trumpet to complete the victory. But
disease had subdued them; of the surviving population, the few who were
not suffering under the disorder were attending their sick or dying
friends, and neither hope nor despair could call them out, ... hope,
indeed, they had none, and the dreadful duty in which they were engaged
rendered them insensible to all evils but those before their eyes.
San Marc was joined by only seventeen men; ill tidings came upon him
from every quarter; one commander complained that he was cut off at his
station, another that he was on the point of being so, a third that he
was undermined, ... from every quarter they called for troops and ♦RIC,
218, 9.♦ labourers and ammunition, at a time when all were wanting.
♦D. P. MARIA RIC GOES OUT TO TREAT WITH M. LASNES.♦
Thus situated, the Junta ordered the almoners of the different parishes
to inform their parishioners of the state of the city, and report
the opinion which they should form in consequence. Two-thirds of
the city had been destroyed; thirty thousand of the inhabitants had
perished, and from three to four hundred persons were daily dying of
the pestilence. Under such circumstances the Junta protested that they
had fulfilled their oath of fidelity, _for Zaragoza was destroyed_; and
they dispatched a flag of truce to the French commander, requesting a
suspension of hostilities for four-and-twenty hours, that they might
in that time negotiate for a capitulation. A French officer came with
the reply, requiring the Junta to wait upon Marshal Lasnes within two
hours, and declaring that after that time was expired he would not
listen to any terms. Ric instantly summoned the Junta, and as they
could not all be immediately collected, he proceeded with some of them
toward Marshal Lasnes, leaving some to acquaint the others with the
result of the flag of truce, and to act as circumstances might require.
They took a trumpeter with them to announce a parley, because the
firing was still continued on both sides; but, notwithstanding this,
the Spanish deputies were fired at from one of the enemy’s batteries.
Ric protested against this violation of the laws of war, and refused
to proceed till he was assured that it should not be repeated. An
aide-de-camp of the French general had just before arrived, with
instructions that the Junta should repair to the Casa Blanca, not
to the suburbs, as had been first appointed; this officer went for
an escort of infantry, and conducted Ric and his colleagues to the
general’s presence. Lasnes received them with an insolent indifference,
while his despite for the brave resistance which he had found betrayed
itself in marks of affected contempt. He took some turns about the
room, then addressing himself to Ric, began to inveigh against the
Zaragozans for not believing him when he said that resistance was
in vain, ... for which, he said, they deserved little consideration
from his hands. He reproached the Junta also. Ric interrupted him.
The Junta, he said, had commenced their sittings on the yesterday,
and therefore could not be responsible for any thing before that
time. The Marshal himself must feel, that if they had surrendered
without having ascertained the absolute necessity of surrendering,
they would have failed in their duty. When they were informed of the
actual state of affairs, they had considered of a capitulation, and
addressed a letter, proposing measures which he himself had suggested
in the summons to which he now alluded. This had offended him, and
he did not condescend to notice their second letter in explanation
of the first. They had then dispatched a third flag, requesting a
suspension of four-and-twenty hours, because they were accountable to
the people, and that time was necessary for ascertaining the public
will. Zaragoza, which had so nobly distinguished itself by the manner
of its resistance, must also distinguish itself in the manner of
capitulating, when capitulation was become inevitable. “Acting upon
these principles,” said Ric, “it is my duty to declare that I bring
neither powers nor instructions, neither do I know the will of the
people; but I believe they ♦RIC, 229–231.♦ will accept a capitulation,
provided it be reasonable, and becoming the heroism with which Zaragoza
has defended itself.”
♦CAPITULATION.♦
The manner and the manliness of this declaration were not lost even
upon Lasnes: in spite of himself he felt the superiority of the men
who stood before him, and, abstaining from farther insults, he said,
that the women and children should be safe, and that the negotiation
was concluded. Ric replied, it was not yet begun; for this would be
surrendering at discretion, and Zaragoza had no such thought. If
the Marshal insisted upon this, he might renew his attacks on the
city, “And I and my companions,” said the noble Aragoneze, “will
return there, and continue to defend ourselves; we have yet arms
and ammunition, and daggers: war is never without its chances; and
if we are driven to despair, it yet remains to be seen who are to be
victorious.” This answer did not appear to irritate the French general;
he knew, indeed, that though farther resistance could not possibly save
Zaragoza, every inch which he had to win must be dearly purchased,
and, for the honour of France, the sooner the siege was concluded the
better; ... it had already lasted too long. There was another reason,
too, why he did not refuse to grant terms, ... it would be in his power
to break them. He called for his secretary, and dictated the preamble
of the capitulation and some of the articles. The first stipulated
that the garrison should surrender prisoners. Ric proposed that they
should march out, as became them, with the honours of war; Lasnes would
not consent to make any alteration in the words of the article, but
he promised that those honours should be allowed them, and that the
officers should retain their baggage, and the men their knapsacks. Ric
then required that Palafox might be at liberty to go whithersoever he
pleased, with all his staff. It was replied, that an individual could
never be the subject of capitulation; but Marshal Lasnes pledged his
word of honour that Palafox should go to any place he pleased; and
he specified Mallen or Toledo. Those places, Ric replied, would not
suit him, because they were occupied by French troops, and it was
understood that he thought of going to Majorca. Lasnes then gave his
word of honour that he might go to any place which he thought best.
It was demanded that all persons, not included in the garrison, who
wished to leave Zaragoza, in order to avoid the contagion, should be
allowed passports. Lasnes replied, all who wished it might go out, ...
he pledged his word to this; ♦RIC, 231, 2.♦ but it was not necessary,
he said, to insert an article upon this head, and he was desirous of
terminating the capitulation.
♦FARTHER CONDITIONS ASKED, AND REFUSED.♦
While copies of the capitulation were drawing out, the French general
produced a plan of the city, and laid his finger upon the part which
was that night to have been blown up, telling Ric that 44,000 lbs. of
powder were already lodged for the explosion, and that this would have
been followed by a cannonade from seventy pieces of artillery, and a
bombardment from thirty mortars, which they were at that time mounting
in the suburbs. The duplicates being signed, Ric and his companions
returned to lay the terms before the other members of the Junta;
and they, who had ascertained the opinion of their fellow-citizens,
accepted, ratified, and signed the act. Some farther stipulations,
however, they still thought desirable; they wished it to be stated in
the articles, that the garrison were to march out with the honours
of war; for, as only the written capitulation would appear in the
gazettes, if this were not expressed it would not be understood. They
required also, that the peasants who had been formed into temporary
corps should not be prisoners of war, urging, that they ought not to
be considered as regular soldiers, and representing the injury which
it would be to agriculture if they were marched away. And at the
petition of the clergy, they requested that an article might be added,
securing to them the punctual payment of their revenues from the funds
assigned by the government for that purpose. With these proposals
Ric returned to Marshal Lasnes; the two former were in every respect
unexceptionable; the last was the only one upon which any demur might
have been looked for. The French commander, however, broke into a fit
of rage, snatched the paper out of Ric’s hand, and threw it into the
fire. One of his generals, sensible of the indecency of this ♦RIC,
232–4.♦ conduct, rescued it from the flames; and Ric, unable to obtain
more, received a ratified copy of the capitulation, and returned to the
city.
The French, by their own account, threw above 17,000 bombs during
the siege, and expended near an hundred and sixty thousand weight of
powder. More than 30,000 men, and 500 officers, the flower of the
Spanish armies, lay buried beneath the ruins of Zaragoza; and this is
far from the amount of lives which were sacrificed in this memorable
and most virtuous defence, the number of women and children who
perished by the bombardment, by the mines, by famine and pestilence,
remaining untold. The loss of the besiegers was carefully concealed;
it was sufficient to cripple their army; the Paris papers declared,
that one part was to march against Lerida, another against Valencia,
and neither of these movements could be effected.
♦CONDUCT OF THE FRENCH.♦
On the evening of the capitulation the French troops entered. They
began immediately to pillage. General Laval was appointed governor. He
ordered all the clergy of the city to go out and compliment Marshal
Lasnes; ... the yoke was upon their necks; they went forth to appear
at this ceremony, like prisoners in a Roman triumph, and as they went,
the French soldiers were permitted to rob them of their apparel in
the streets. Laval, when complaint was made to him of such outrages,
observed, that his troops had to indemnify themselves for the plunder
which they looked upon as certain, and which ♦RIC, 235.♦ they would
have had in another day, if the capitulation had not disappointed them.
♦TREATMENT OF THE PRISONERS.♦
When the French entered the city six thousand bodies were lying in the
streets and trenches, or piled up in heaps before the churches. The
people, still unsubdued in spirit, were with difficulty restrained
from declaring that the capitulation was concluded without their
consent, and rushing upon the invaders with the determination of
taking vengeance and dying in the act. The armed peasants, instead
of delivering up the weapons which they were no longer permitted to
use, broke them in pieces with generous indignation. General O’Neille
died before the surrender; St. Marc was one of the many hundreds whom
the pestilence carried off within a few days after it. P. Basilio
escaped from the danger of the war and of the contagion. He was a
man of exemplary life and great attainments; and having been tutor
to Palafox, and fought by his side in both sieges, remained now at
his bedside, to wait upon him in his illness, and administer, if need
should be, the last offices of religion to his heroic and beloved
pupil. There the French found him, as they had ever found him during
the siege, at the post of duty; and they put him to death for having
served his country with all his heart, and with all his soul, and with
all his strength. P. Santiago Sass suffered a like martyrdom. The
officers received orders to come out of the city, on pain of being
shot if they remained ♦FEB. 22.♦ there after four-and-twenty hours.
Immediately upon forming without the town for their march, they were,
in contempt of the capitulation, plundered of every thing, stripped of
the devices of their different ranks, and pushed in among the common
soldiers as leaders of insurgents. It was affirmed in the French
bulletin that 17,000 men laid down their arms: there were not more than
four-and-twenty hundred capable of bearing them; the rest were in the
hospitals, and this, with five-and-twenty hundred taken in the suburbs
and during the siege, was the number which was marched off for France.
Two hundred and seventy of these men, who from fatigue and weakness
could not keep up the pace which their ferocious guard required, were
butchered and left on the road, where their companions in the next
division might march over their bodies. Augustina Zaragoza was among
the prisoners. She had distinguished herself in this siege as much as
in the former. At the commencement she took her former station at the
Portillo, by the same gun which she had served so well; “See, general,”
said she, with a cheerful countenance, pointing to the gun when Palafox
visited that quarter, “I am again with my old friend.” Her husband
was severely wounded, and she pointed the cannon at the enemy, while
he lay bleeding among his companions by her side. Frequently she was
at the head of an assaulting party, sword or knife in hand, with her
cloak wrapt round her, cheering the soldiers, and encouraging them
by her example; constantly exposed as she was, she escaped without a
wound: yet once she was thrown into a ditch, and nearly suffocated
by the dead and dying who covered her. At the close of the siege she
was too well known by the French to escape notice, and they made her
prisoner. Fortunately, as it proved, she had at that time taken the
contagion, and was removed to the hospital, where, as she was supposed
to be dying, little care was taken to secure her. Feeling herself
better, she availed herself of this, and effected her escape. Another
heroine, whose name was Manuella Sanchez, was shot through the heart.
Donna Benita, a lady of distinction, who headed one of the female corps
which had been formed to carry provisions, bear away the wounded, and
fight in the streets, escaped the hourly dangers to which she exposed
herself, only to die of grief upon hearing that her daughter had been
killed. During the siege six hundred women and children perished, not
by the bombardment and the mines, but in action, by the sword, or
bayonet or bullet.
♦TREATMENT OF PALAFOX.♦
Marshal Lasnes had pledged his word of honour that Palafox should be
at liberty to go wherever he would, as soon as he should be able to
travel; in contempt of that pledge, he was immediately made prisoner,
surrounded entirely by French, and left even in want of necessary
food. Ric, who was ever ready to exert himself when any duty was to be
performed, remonstrated against this treatment both verbally and in
writing. He could obtain little immediate ♦HE IS COMPELLED BY THREATS
OF DEATH TO SIGN ORDERS FOR DELIVERING UP OTHER FORTRESSES.♦ relief,
and no redress. Arrangements were concerted for his escape, and so
well laid, that there would have been every prospect of success, if he
had been sufficiently recovered to make the attempt. They were not,
however, altogether fruitless; for M. Lasnes having extorted from him,
by threats of immediate death if he refused, orders to the governors of
Jaca, Benasque, Monzon, and Mequinenza, to deliver up those places to
the French, he found means to advise his brother, the Marques de Lazan,
of the iniquitous proceeding, and to direct that no obedience should
be given to orders so obtained. Unfortunately Jaca and Monzon had been
entrusted to commanders who waited only for an opportunity of betraying
their charge, and they opened the gates to the enemy. Before Palafox
had recovered he was hurried away into France, a country from which and
to which, while it was under the iron yoke of Buonaparte, no prisoner
returned. On the way he was treated with insolence and barbarity, and
robbed even to his very shirt. Buonaparte, who, feeling no virtue in
himself, acknowledged none in others, had already reproached him as a
coward and a runaway in the field; he now, with contradictory calumny,
reviled him for having defended Zaragoza against the will of the
inhabitants. “The people,” it was said in the French papers, “held him
in such abhorrence, that it was necessary to station a guard before
his door, for otherwise he would have been stoned. An idea of the
detestation in which he and the monks of his party were held could only
be formed by remembering the hatred with which those men were regarded
in France, who governed by terror and the guillotine.” Yet while they
thus asserted at one time that Palafox defended the city against the
will of the people, at another they affirmed that the Spanish troops
would have surrendered long before, being perfectly sensible that
resistance was unavailing after the French had entered the city, but it
did not depend upon them, ... they were obliged to submit to the wills
of the meanest of the inhabitants. Any one who should have expressed a
wish to capitulate would have been punished with death: such a thought
could not be uttered till two-thirds of the city were lying in ruins,
and 20,000 of its defenders destroyed by disease.... No higher eulogy
could be pronounced upon Zaragoza than was comprised in the very
calumnies of its unworthy conqueror.
♦DEMANDS OF THE FRENCH.♦
Before the main body of the French made their entry they demanded of
Ric 50,000 pair of shoes, 8000 pair of boots, and 1200 shirts, with
medicines and every requisite for an hospital. Several of the officers
demanded for themselves double equipage and linen, curtains, pens,
paper, and whatever they wanted, insisting that plenty of every thing
should be supplied them, and the best of its kind, at the expense of
the city. A service of china was required for Junot; and this merciless
oppressor, who had escaped the proper punishment of his crimes in
Portugal, insisted that a tennis-court should be fitted up for his
amusement, in a city of which two-thirds were then lying in ruins,
beneath which so large a proportion of the inhabitants lay buried! Ric
resisted demands which it was impossible for the city to supply. The
French generals, provoked at his refusal to engage for the maintenance
of their household, threatened to send in a squadron of hussars.
He replied, that well they might, since the gates of the city were
demolished and in their power, but that from that moment they would
not advance a foot of ground till they had moistened it with French
blood. Another member of the Junta, who had less courage, undertook
that these ruffians should be satisfied as far as was possible. Ric,
who was too true a Spaniard to live under the government of the
Intruder, ♦RIC, 245–9.♦ renounced the high office which he held, and,
not being considered a prisoner, obtained his liberty.
♦LASNES MAKES HIS ENTRANCE.♦
Lasnes made his entrance on Sunday the 5th of March; his approach
was announced by the discharge of 200 cannon, and he proceeded in
triumph through that part of the city which remained standing, to the
Church of the Pillar. The wretched inhabitants had been compelled
to adorn the streets with such hangings as could be found, and to
witness the pomp of festive triumph, and hear the sounds of joy
and exultation. ♦BASENESS OF THE SUFFRAGAN BISHOP.♦ The suffragan
bishop of the diocese, a traitor who had fled from the town when it
took arms, and now returned thither to act as the instrument of the
oppressors, met Lasnes at the great door of the church, and conducted
him in procession, with the crucifix and the banner, to a throne
prepared before the altar, and near the famous idol, which had escaped
destruction. Then the wretch addressed a sermon to his countrymen upon
the horrors of war! “They had seen,” he said, “in their unhappy city,
the streets and market-places strewn with dead, parents expiring and
leaving their children helpless and unprotected, babes sucking at the
dry breast of the famished mother, palaces in ruins, houses in flames,
dead bodies heaped at the doors of the churches, and hurried into
common graves without any religious ceremony. And what had been the
cause of all this ruin? I repeat it,” said the villanous time-server,
“I shall always repeat it, your sins and your seditious spirit, your
forgetfulness of the principles of the gospel. These horrors have
ceased: and to whom are you indebted for this unexpected happiness? To
God in the first place, who raises and destroys monarchies according to
his will; after God, to the Virgin of the Pillar, who interceded for
us; and in the next place to the generous heart of the great Napoleon,
the man who is the messenger of God upon earth to execute his divine
decrees, and who is sent to punish us for our sins. Nothing can equal
his power except his clemency and his goodness! He has granted us the
inestimable favour of peace; oh that, at the expense of my tears and
my blood, I could render it eternal! It is fitting, O my God, that
for this great and unexpected mercy, this signal mercy, we should all
exclaim, _Te Deum Laudamus!_ We praise thee, O God!” Such were the
blasphemies which this hoary traitor uttered over the ruins of his
heroic city! It is not possible to record them without feeling a wish,
that some one of the noble-hearted Zaragozans, who at that hour of
bitterness were wishing themselves in the grave, had smitten him upon
the spot in the name of his religion and his country.
♦LANGUAGE OF THE FRENCH.♦
The oath of obedience and allegiance was then administered to those
persons who either retained or accepted office under the Intruder’s
government. A superb entertainment followed, at which Lasnes and his
chief officers sate down to a table of four hundred covers, and at
every health which was drunk to the family of Buonaparte the cannons
were discharged. The transactions of the day furnished a fine topic
for the journalists at Paris. “All the people,” they said, “manifested
their joy at so sudden and happy a change in acclamations of ‘long
live the Emperor!’ they were edified by the behaviour of their
conquerors during the religious ceremony; that ceremony had melted
the most obdurate hearts, the hatred of the French was eradicated
from all breasts, and Aragon would soon become one of the most
submissive provinces in Spain!” At the time when these falsehoods
were circulated in France, Junot issued a proclamation, declaring,
that every Aragoneze found in arms should be punished with death.
Upon this the Supreme Junta addressed an order to their generals,
requiring them to apprise the French commanders to whom they might be
opposed, that every Spaniard who was capable of carrying arms was a
soldier, so their duty required them to be, and ♦DECREE OF THE CENTRAL
JUNTA.♦ such the Supreme Junta declared them: “This,” they said, “was
not a war of armies against armies, as in other cases, but of an
army against a whole nation, resisting the yoke which a tyrant and
usurper sought to force upon them; every individual, therefore, of that
nation was under the protection of the laws of war, and the general
who should violate those laws was not a soldier, but a ruffian, who
would provoke the indignation of Heaven, and the vengeance of man.
The Junta well knew,” they said, “that the French, when they were
victorious, ridiculed principles which the observance and respect of
all nations had consecrated, and that they did this with an effrontery
and insolence equal to the affectation with which they appealed to them
when they were vanquished. The Spaniards were, however, in a condition
to enforce that justice which they demanded. Three Frenchmen should
suffer for every Spaniard, be he peasant or soldier, who might be put
to death. Europe would hear with admiration as well as horror, that
a magnanimous nation, which had begun its struggle by making 30,000
prisoners, was forced, in opposition to its natural character, to
decimate those prisoners without distinction, from the first general to
the meanest in the ranks. But it was the chiefs of their own nation who
condemned these unfortunate wretches, and who, by imposing upon Spain
the dreadful necessity of retaliation, signed the death of their own
countrymen when they murdered a Spaniard.”
♦ADDRESS TO THE NATION.♦
The Junta pronounced the funeral oration of Zaragoza, in an address
to the people. “Spaniards,” said they, “the only boon which Zaragoza
begged of our unfortunate monarch at Vittoria was, that she might be
the first city to sacrifice herself in his defence. That sacrifice has
been consummated. More than two months the murderous siege continued;
almost all the houses were destroyed, those which were still standing
had been undermined; provisions were nearly exhausted, ammunition all
consumed; 16,000 sick were struggling with a mortal contagion, which
every day hurried hundreds to the grave; the garrison was reduced to
less than a sixth part; the general dying of the pestilence; O’Neille,
the second in command, dead; St. Marc, upon whom the command then
devolved, prostrated by the fever: so much was required, Spaniards, to
make Zaragoza yield to the rigour of fate, and suffer herself to be
occupied by the enemy. The surrender was made upon such terms as the
French have granted to other towns, and those terms have been observed
as usual by the perfidious enemy. Thus only were they able to take
possession of those glorious precincts, filled only with demolished
houses and temples, and peopled only with the dead and the dying; where
every street, every ruin, every wall, every stone, seemed mutely to say
to the beholder, Go, tell my king, that Zaragoza, faithful to her word,
hath joyfully sacrificed herself to maintain her truth.
“A series of events, as mournful as they are notorious, frustrated all
the efforts which were made to relieve the city; but the imagination
of all good men accompanied her defenders in their dangers, was
agitated with them in their battles, sympathised in their privations
and efforts, and followed them through all the dreadful vicissitudes
of their fortune; and when strength failed them at last through a
continued resistance, which they had prolonged almost beyond belief,
in the first moment of grief it seemed as if the light of liberty had
been at once extinguished, and the column of independence overthrown.
But, Spaniards, Zaragoza still survives for imitation and example!
still survives in the public spirit which, from her heroic exertions,
is for ever imbibing lessons of courage and of constancy. For where
is the Spaniard, priding himself upon that name, who would be less
than the Zaragozans, and not seal the liberty of his country, which he
has proclaimed, and the faith to his king, which he has promised, at
the cost of the same perils and the same labours? Let the base, the
selfish, and the cowardly be dismayed by them; not the other towns of
Aragon, who are ready to imitate and to recover their capital; not the
firm and faithful patriots, who see in that illustrious city a model to
imitate, vengeance to be exacted, and the only path of conquest. Forty
thousand Frenchmen, who have perished before the mud walls of Zaragoza,
cause France to mourn the barren and ephemeral triumph which she has
obtained, and evince to Spain, that three cities of equal resolution
will save their country, and baffle the tyrant. Valour springs from
valour; and when the unhappy who have suffered, and the victims who
have died there, shall learn that their fellow-citizens, following
them in the paths of glory, have surpassed them in fortune, they will
bless their destiny, however rigorous it has been, and rejoice in the
contemplation of our triumphs.
“Time passes away, and days will come when these dreadful convulsions,
with which the genius of iniquity is now afflicting the earth, will
have subsided. The friends of virtue and patriotism will come to the
banks of the Ebro to visit those majestic ruins, and beholding them
with admiration and with envy, Here, they will say, stood that city
which in modern ages realised, or, more truly, surpassed those ancient
prodigies of devotement and constancy, which are scarcely credited in
history! Without a regiment, without other defence than a weak wall,
without other resources than its courage, it first dared to provoke
the fury of the tyrant: twice it withstood the force of his victorious
legions. The subjection of this open and defenceless town cost France
more blood, more tears, more slaughter, than the conquest of whole
kingdoms: nor was it French valour that subdued it; a deadly and
general pestilence prostrated the strength of its defenders, and the
enemy, when they entered, triumphed over a few sick and dying men, but
they did not subdue citizens, nor conquer soldiers.”
♦HONOURS DECREED TO THE INHABITANTS.♦
This address was followed by a decree, declaring “that Zaragoza, its
inhabitants, and garrison, had deserved well of their country, in an
eminent and heroic degree: That whenever Palafox should be restored
to liberty, to effect which no efforts on the part of the government
should be wanting, the Junta, in the name of the nation, would confer
upon him that reward which might seem most worthy of his unconquerable
constancy and ardent patriotism: That every officer employed in the
siege should be promoted one step, and every private soldier enjoy
the rank and the pay of serjeant: That all the defenders of Zaragoza,
and its inhabitants, and their heirs, should enjoy personal nobility:
That pensions, conformable to their rank and circumstances, should
be granted to the widows and orphans of all who had perished there:
That the having been within the walls during the siege should be
considered as a claim in future pretensions: That Zaragoza should be
exempt from all contributions for ten years, from the time when peace
should be established; and that at that time the rebuilding of the
public edifices, with all possible magnificence, should be begun at
the expense of the state, and a monument erected in the great square
of the city, in perpetual memory of the valour of the inhabitants
and their glorious defence: That in all the cities of the kingdom
an inscription should forthwith be set up, relating the most heroic
circumstances of the two sieges, and a medal be struck in its honour,
as a testimony of national gratitude. Finally, the Junta promised the
same honours and privileges to every city which should resist a like
siege with like constancy, and proposed rewards for the best poem and
best discourse upon this memorable event; the object being not only to
hold up the virtues of the Zaragozans to the present generation and to
posterity, but to inflame the hearts of the Spaniards with the same
ardent patriotism, the same love of freedom, and the same abhorrence of
tyranny.”
♦FALSEHOODS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.♦
The capitulation was published by the Intruder’s ministers in the
Madrid gazette, and inserted in a French journal printed in the same
capital. That journal was suppressed by order of Buonaparte as soon
as he was informed of this; and it was stated in his bulletin that
Lasnes would allow no capitulation, and had only published certain
provisions as his[4] pleasure; and that the French possessed themselves
of the whole town by force. Had the facts been thus, it would not
have derogated in the slightest degree from the heroism of a people
who had discharged their duty to the uttermost. But the falsehood is
worthy of notice, not only as showing Napoleon Buonaparte’s systematic
disregard of truth, but as exemplifying also that want of generosity
which peculiarly characterized him, and made him incapable of doing
justice in any one instance to the principles, virtues, talents, or
even courage, of those by whom he was opposed.
CHAPTER XIX.
INVASION OF PORTUGAL BY MARSHAL SOULT.
♦1809.♦
♦PORTUGAL THREATENED BY THE FRENCH.♦
The conquest of Portugal was announced by Buonaparte not less
confidently than his sentence of subjugation against Zaragoza; and no
difficulty was expected in effecting it. It was stated in the bulletins
that the rage of the Portugueze against the English was at its utmost
height; that they were as indignant at the perfidy of their allies
as they were disgusted by their difference of manners and religion,
by their brutal intemperance, and by that arrogance which made these
islanders odious to the whole continent; that bloody affrays between
them were occurring every day, and that the British garrison of Lisbon
had embarked in order to abandon a people whom they had deceived and
outraged. The real state of things gave some plausibility to these
falsehoods; for the French were well informed of the alarm that
prevailed in Lisbon, which was indeed such as seemed to justify their
vaunts, and might easily ♦PREPARATIONS BY THE ENGLISH FOR EVACUATING
LISBON.♦ enable them to accomplish their purpose. Preparations had
been made for evacuating that capital; transports were collected in
the Tagus, and notice officially given to the British merchants to
hold themselves in readiness for immediate embarkation in case the
enemy should advance towards them. These measures were taken early in
January, before it was known that Sir John Moore was retreating. As
soon as intelligence of his retreat was received, the ♦ADDRESS OF THE
REGENCY TO THE PORTUGUEZE.♦ Regency communicated it to the people.
“Portugueze,” they said, “the governors of the kingdom do not mean to
deceive you. They themselves announce that the armies of Moore and
Romana have retired to the interior of Galicia, leaving our frontiers
uncovered; that those frontiers, from their great extent, are exposed
to invasion; that the Emperor of the French is accustomed to employ
his whole force when he attacks a nation; that his rapid marches give
no time for the reunion of troops to act against him on the defensive;
and that he presses on to the capital, endeavouring to surprise the
government, and to spread anarchy and confusion. This mode of warfare
exposes some cities and towns to the ravages of invasion; but such
partial ravages are not the ruin of a state. It was in the centre of
Portugal that our ancestors sealed our independence with their blood.
Knowing this, the governors have directed their measures accordingly;
strong passes, formed by nature to be the bulwarks of our liberty, and
deep rivers, which cannot without danger be crossed, will be defended
in a military manner; and if, in spite of this, the enemy of Europe
should proceed to Lisbon, he will find around it a determined people,
who will cause the glorious deeds of those times to be remembered,
when the walls of that city were the scene of their heroism and their
triumph.”
♦STATE OF PUBLIC FEELING AT LISBON.♦
This was wise language, and though it proceeded from a government on
which they had little reason to rely, the Portugueze answered the
appeal with enthusiasm. The squares were filled, the streets lined with
volunteers, practising their evolutions with a zeal deserving better
teachers than it found. In these ranks the old man and the stripling
stood side by side, ... all pedantry of inches and proportion was
forgotten; the strength to carry arms, and the heart to use them, were
the only qualifications required. Some were armed with fowling-pieces,
some with bayonets screwed upon poles, some with pikes and halberds,
which for centuries had hung idly in the hall; bullets were piled up
in heaps at every stall, with flints and ramrods; and rusty weapons
of all kinds were brought out from the dust to answer the general
demand for arms. The children with their flags and wooden guns were
playing at soldiers, imitating the discipline of their fathers with
that spirit which, if well fostered and directed, would render any
country invincible. There was no want of courage, of enthusiasm, or of
patriotic feeling; but the people had none to direct and train them,
none to whom they could look with confidence.
It was the beginning of February before the news arrived of Sir John
Moore s death, and that his army had withdrawn from Spain. Fourteen
thousand English troops had been left at Lisbon when that army
began its march. Some regiments had advanced to the frontiers, that
they might be near the commander-in-chief if he should require to
be reinforced, or find it expedient to fall back upon them. These,
learning that he had retreated by a different route, and that superior
forces were hastening against them, returned by forced marches to the
capital. Every thing was in confusion there. One day the cavalry was
embarked, the next it was relanded. The sea batteries were dismantled,
and their guns shipped for Brazil; those at Fort St. Julien alone were
left mounted, as a defensible post if the British troops should be
forced to embark precipitately. The women belonging to the army were
sent on board. These preparations exasperated the people: they were
eager to do whatever should be required of them in the defence of their
country: that their own governors wanted courage or ability to stand by
them was nothing more than what they expected; but from the English,
the old and faithful friends of the Portugueze, they looked for that
assistance which England had never refused to Portugal in its time of
need. The feeling which this intended abandonment produced was rather
anger than fear; and they resented it more as if they felt ashamed
for allies long trusted, and always found worthy, than alarmed for
the consequences to themselves. A party of the armed populace seized
the English Ambassador’s baggage, which was ♦FEB. 24.♦ packed up for
removal. The government affected to consider this as the work of French
emissaries, though it was evidently a manifestation of the general
temper. Threats of condign punishment were denounced against any person
who should again offer insult to a British subject; and the people were
assured it was only by the powerful assistance of the British army that
their national independence could be maintained.
♦M. SOULT ORDERED TO ENTER PORTUGAL FROM GALICIA.♦
The bulletins had announced that Marshal Soult would cross the Minho
from Tuy on the 11th of February, reach Porto by the 20th, and Lisbon
by the 28th. His instructions were to march along the coast, as the
shortest and most convenient line, where, though there was no high
road, there were no mountains, and the ways every where practicable
for carriages; he was to govern the country as Junot had done, and
induce the people as soon as possible to request from Napoleon a King
of his appointment. The nominal force allotted him was 50,000 men,
and the staff might have sufficed for twice that amount; but the
efficient numbers fell far short. They had suffered much in the battle
of Coruña; they had suffered also by their rapid advance through so
difficult a country in the severest weather; and in means also they
were deficient; for though it was their system to take whatever they
required, they were now in a province where little was to be found.
Plate, jewels, indigo, Peruvian bark, whatever marketable plunder
Galicia afforded, these dealers in wholesale rapine shipped from Coruña
for France. Articles ♦DIFFICULTY OF PROVIDING FOR THE FRENCH ARMY.♦
of immediate necessity were not so readily obtained. The military
hospitals were in want of every thing, even rags for the wounded, for
linen here was a luxury not in general use. The mills of that country
(which are of the simplest construction, working by a single horizontal
wheel) were so small that ninety of them could not supply more flour
in a day than was required for the daily consumption of the invading
army; and as the invaders could find no Spaniards to serve them, they
were obliged to draw not only millers, but bakers and butchers from
the regiments. Grain was scarce, Galicia being a grazing province,
which at no time produced more than a third of what its own inhabitants
required. The summary mode of stripping them by requisitions, to which
the French as usual resorted, was in this instance impeded by their own
people: for the detachments who were stationed in different parts to
keep the communication open, finding how scanty the resources were, and
apprehending that if food were sent away they should be left without
it, suffered the ♦MÉM. SUR LES OPERATIONS DU M. SOULT, 56, 60.♦ orders
of the commissariat to be neglected, and took care of themselves alone.
♦HIS CONFIDENCE OF SUCCESS.♦
Marshal Soult, however, entered upon his expedition in full confidence
of success. He believed that a great proportion of the British troops
had perished by shipwreck during the heavy gales which had prevailed
after their embarkation; that they had determined as soon as he should
approach Lisbon to blow up the magazines and arsenals, and abandon the
place; ♦INTERCEPTED LETTER TO JOSEPH. FEB. 4.♦ that they talked of
nothing more enterprising than a landing at Quiberon; and that this was
a mere vaunt, for certainly it would be long before their army would be
again in a condition to show itself.
♦COMBINED PLANS OF THE FRENCH.♦
The plan which had been laid down for him was well concerted. Marshal
Victor was to manœuvre on the side of Badajoz, and send a column in the
direction of Lisbon to facilitate the operations against that city.
Lapisse was to threaten the frontier between the Douro and Almeida,
occupy Ciudad Rodrigo, march upon Abrantes as soon as Soult should have
reached ♦OPER. DU M. SOULT, P. 50.♦ Porto, and when that general was
master of Lisbon, Lapisse was then to join Victor, and enter Andalusia,
the conquest of the south of Spain as well as Portugal being considered
certain. Ney, meantime, was to occupy Galicia, and communicate with the
army of Portugal. Leaving him in command of this province, which was
said to be subjugated, Soult removed his head-quarters to Santiago, and
ordered General Lahoussaye from Mellid to march upon Ribadavia and
Salvatierra, obtain intelligence of Romana’s movements, and ascertain
what means might be found there for crossing the Minho. General
Franceschi at the same time was dispatched with his light cavalry to
take possession of Tuy, and examine whether the passage might not
best be effected near that city; and General Merle with a division
of infantry was sent from Betanzos to Pontevedra to support them.
Franceschi ♦VIGO AND TUY OCCUPIED BY THE FRENCH.♦ fell in with a body
of Spaniards at Redondela, and took from them four guns. Profiting
by the panic which the fugitives were likely to impart, he sent a
detachment to summon Vigo, and the governor was weak or treacherous
enough to surrender a fortified and well-provided town at the first
summons of a division of cavalry. Tuy also, which in former wars had
been a place of great importance, the strongest upon that frontier, was
entered without resistance. Somewhere below this city it was resolved
to attempt the passage, and there accordingly the main body of the army
was collected.
♦PREPARATIONS FOR CROSSING THE MINHO BELOW TUY.♦
Two rivers, the Lama and Tamboga, which rise in the north-east part
of Galicia, unite and form the Minho; but the Sil, which joins it
with an equal body of waters, is believed to have been the Minius of
the ancients. It is the boundary between Spain and Portugal along a
considerable line; upon that line it is never fordable, except at one
place above Melgaço, and there only after an unusual continuance of
dry weather. There is no bridge over it below the city of Orense, and
the Portugueze had been sufficiently aware of their danger to remove
all the boats to their own side of the river. Just at its mouth it is
joined from the Portugueze side by the river Coura; each stream has
formed a bar, and upon an island between these bars the Portugueze
had a fortress and a small Capuchine convent. On the Spanish side,
immediately at the mouth of the river, Mount St. Thecla rises, a place
of great local celebrity, because of an annual pilgrimage, and known to
sailors as a sea-mark. ♦FEB. 10.♦ On the other side of this mountain is
the little port and town of S. Maria de la Guardia, and thither Soult
went with the captain of a French frigate and some seamen who had been
prisoners at Coruña, to reconnoitre and consult concerning the passage.
Means of transport were found in the fishing-boats of Guardia; but
it would have been difficult to double the point in them when laden
as they must have been for that service, and they would have been
perilously exposed to the fire of the island. He determined, therefore,
to carry the boats overland a distance of about three miles to a lake
or broad, from which the little river Tamuga issues, and enters the
Minho above the village of Campos Ancos. There was great difficulty
in removing them, and still more in conveying two pieces of artillery
to the same place. Means, however, for transporting three hundred men
at once were collected, and the troops appointed for this service
were exercised in embarking and disembarking on the lake, where it
could be done in safety. The attempt was to be made at high-water,
and under favour of the night, though little danger was apprehended
from the old frontier fortress of Caminha, in the face of ♦FAILURE OF
THE ATTEMPT.♦ which they were to cross; for the works, originally ill
planned and ill situated, had long been neglected, and the French held
in equal contempt the place and the people by whom it was garrisoned.
However, in order to deceive them, the troops were withdrawn from the
opposite shore, and a feint made of marching up the river. ♦FEB. 15.♦
The flotilla descended the Tamuga easily and in good order; but when
they came into the great stream the want of sailors was felt. The
boats separated; those that were best manned reached the shore; but
the Portugueze were upon the alert. General Bernardim Freire, who had
been appointed to the command of Porto and of that province, had sent
a detachment with two six-pounders to this point. They kept up a fire
with good effect; the tide turned; the other boats unable to stem it,
or approach the shore, where they could assist their comrades, found
it necessary to return; some were sunk, and about forty men were made
prisoners.
♦SOULT MARCHES BY WAY OF ORENSE.♦
Four days had been consumed in preparations for this vain attempt.
It was impossible to wait till the river should have fallen so as to
render the passage practicable, for the troops could not be supplied
where they were, and they were beginning to suffer from inaction.
Soult therefore left General Lamartiniere to command at Tuy, with 350
men, besides 900 who were on the sick list. Some public money had been
found in that city, and six-and-thirty field-pieces were left there,
besides some guns and ammunition which had been brought from Vigo. It
was thought a position of some importance at this time, and this force
sufficient to maintain it. He then marched for Orense, making this
long circuit to cross the river with less unwillingness because he had
received intelligence from Lahoussaye ♦OPERATIONS DU M. SOULT, 73, 80.♦
that the peasantry were in a state of insurrection in consequence of
Romana’s proclamations.
♦ROMANA ROUSES THE GALICIANS.♦
Romana indeed had not been inactive during the short respite which had
been allowed him. Had the French rightly appreciated his unconquerable
spirit, and apprehended the effect which such a man was capable of
producing upon a brave and generous peasantry, they would have deemed
his single destruction of more importance to their cause than the
capture of Ferrol ♦FEB. 13.♦ and Coruña. By this time he had collected
some 9000 men; to form an efficient army was in his circumstances
impossible, utterly destitute as he was of means; but what was of more
consequence, he had roused the country; his presence was infinitely
important there, and his name and his example hardly less so in other
parts of Spain, for in every part the people were encouraged by a
persuasion that their countrymen elsewhere were more fortunate than
themselves. Every where except upon the spot it was believed by the
Spaniards that Romana was at the head of a formidable army; when his
troops were so ♦OPINION OF HIS STRENGTH.♦ broken, a victorious enemy so
close upon him, and his condition so hopeless in all human appearance,
that he himself must have considered his escape from captivity, and
the death to which he would then have been condemned, as manifestly
providential. The Galicians at Lisbon (in which city there were always
some thousands of those industrious men) were at that time embodied for
the purpose of marching to join him; and the Spanish minister wrote to
desire that he would send officers to discipline and take charge of
them. The dispatch found him on the Portugueze frontier: he represented
in reply that his own force consisted chiefly of new volunteers, so
that none of his officers could be spared: he could only send some who
belonged to the provincial regiments of Tuy and Compostella. But of
men there was no want; for even if they had been less willing to take
arms for their country and their cause, mere desperation would have
driven them to it. Had the French been better disposed to observe what
for the last century at least had been the common humanities of war,
it would not have been possible when they were to support themselves
as they could by preying upon the countries which they invaded. Free
licence in one thing led to it in all, and when resistance was provoked
by the most intolerable outrages, it was punished with fire and sword.
The little towns of S. Miguel de Zequelinos and ♦VILLAGES BURNT BY
THE FRENCH.♦ S. Christobal de Mourentan, with their adjacent hamlets,
were burnt by the invaders, and more than 2000 persons, who were thus
reduced to ruin and deprived of shelter, fled into the Portugueze
territory, hoping to find refuge there.
♦INTENDED PLAN OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN ROMANA AND SILVEIRA.♦
The Portugueze General, Francisco da Silveira, had taken the command
upon that frontier; his force consisted of 2800 regular troops, 2500
militia, and only fifty horse. Romana ♦FEB. 24.♦ had an interview with
him at Chaves, while the enemy were preparing for their vain attempt
to pass the Minho; and they had resolved upon attacking the French at
Tuy, when they learnt that Soult was advancing up the river. They then
took up a position for the defence of Chaves, the Spaniards upon the
right bank of the Tamega from Monterrey to that fortress, Silveira from
the bridge of Villaça to Villarelho. The Portugueze were elated by
the failure of the French in their attempt to cross the Minho, which
indeed had in some degree dispirited the invaders; and Romana, though
fully aware of the inefficiency of his own force, had yet an entire
reliance upon the national character and the spirit which had been
raised. The secular clergy as well as the monks were zealously aiding
him; the monks of S. Claudio, of S. Mamed, and of S. Maria de Melon,
and the parochial priest of the latter place, distinguished themselves
especially in this good work. His orders were, that all should take
arms who were capable of using them, and that the remaining part of
the population wherever the French came should abandon their houses,
and carry away all provisions.
♦DIFFERENCE BETWEEN M. SOULT AND M. NEY.♦
These orders were very generally obeyed. The small parties of the
French were harassed or cut off wherever they appeared; and when Soult
approached Ribadavia a brave resistance was made in the village of
Franzelos and before the town. The peasantry were not dispersed till
great carnage had been made among them; and the invaders upon entering
the town found only about a dozen persons remaining there. Detachments
were dispatched against the peasantry on all sides, and the greater
part of the artillery was sent back to Tuy, as much because of the
opposition which was experienced, as owing to the state of the roads.
At Orense ♦OPERATIONS DE M. SOULT, 92–99.♦ part of the people remained,
and the magistrates[5] submitting of necessity, came out to meet the
French. Here Marshal Soult received dispatches from Ney; the contents
were kept secret, but it was reported that Ney advised him not to
pursue his intention of entering Portugal. The report considerably
affected the superior officers, and those especially who, having
belonged to Junot’s army, understood the horrible sort of war in which
they were again to be engaged. The two Marshals were upon ill terms
with each other, and a spirit of dissension was thus introduced into
the army.
♦ROUT OF ROMANA’S ARMY.♦
After remaining more than a week at Orense, endeavouring by force
to suppress the peasants, and by allurements to seduce the higher
classes from their duty, Soult resumed his march for Portugal, by
way of Monterrey and Chaves. In this line he expected to find a
road practicable for artillery, and he thought Romana would be so
effectually crushed, that he should meet with no enemy capable of
molesting him in that quarter. He had sent a trumpet to that general’s
outposts, requesting permission for an officer to pass with a letter
to the Marquis. It was granted. The letter merely contained an offer
of honours and employments in the Intruder’s name, if Romana would
acknowledge him as King, and bring over his troops. Romana having
glanced at the contents, bade the bearer return, and say that the only
answer to be given to such proposals was from the mouth of the cannon:
but the real object of the overture was, that the officer who had been
selected for this service might reconnoitre the position; and this the
Spaniards, unaccustomed as they were to military precautions, gave him
full opportunity of doing. On the following day General Franceschi was
ordered to attack their right, which was posted to the south-east of
Monterrey, on the heights of Orsona. The rout was so complete, that
the actual loss did not amount to more than some 300 slain, and as
many prisoners: the French considered the dispersion of the army which
ensued as its destruction, and believed that Romana had fixed upon so
remote a point as Asturias for the rallying place. While Franceschi
was thus employed on the right, Laborde attacked the vanguard of
the Portugueze at Villaça, who retired[6] at night, after a good
resistance, losing one of their two guns.
♦THE FRENCH REMOVE THEIR SICK TO MONTERREY.♦
The French had left 200 sick and wounded at Ribadavia; they had removed
them to Orense, where nearly 500 were added to the number, and now
the whole were ordered to Monterrey, in so insecure a state did Soult
consider the country which he was leaving. The old works at Monterrey,
he thought, might be so repaired as to render that place tenable,
and make it serve as a base for his line of operations. There and in
the little town of Verin, on the opposite side of the Tamega, which
contained about 2000 inhabitants, scarcely twenty persons had remained;
and the French began to doubt the saying of Buonaparte, that men with
bayonets could want for nothing. The fugitives, however, had left wine
in Verin; and in order to pay some part of his establishment, Soult
raised a few thousand pounds by a loan from the troops, ... part of
the money which had been thrown away in Sir John Moore’s retreat.
General Merle was left to collect his division there, forming the
reserve, and the rest of the army advanced down the Tamega, to enter
Portugal, before any effectual preparations could be made for resisting
them. Marshal Soult was so apprehensive ♦OPERATIONS DE M. SOULT,
107–111, 115.♦ lest the troops should suffer in health, that when they
crossed the river by a ford little more than knee deep, he erected two
temporary bridges there for the infantry.
♦CHAVES.♦
Chaves is the frontier town of Portugal on that side, as Monterrey
is that of Spain; both are on the Tamega, a river which, rising in
the Sierra de S. Mamed, and watering the fertile vales of Monterrey
and Oimbra, enters Portugal at Chaves, turns again into Galicia among
the mountains of Barroso, and re-entering _Tras os Montes_, joins the
Douro at _S. Miguel de Entre ambos os Rios_ with a stronger and larger
volume of waters than is borne to it by any other of its tributary
streams. Chaves is known to have been the _Aquæ Flaviæ_ of the Romans,
so named because of its hot springs, and in honour of its founder
Vespasian. The baths, when flattery in course of nature was out of
date, supplanted the memory of the Emperor; and the place then obtained
the more appropriate name of _Aquæ Calidæ_, which in process of time
was abbreviated and corrupted into Chaves. The springs are said to be
more efficacious than any other in Portugal; but the buildings which
formerly served to accommodate invalids who came to seek relief from
these waters were demolished by the Conde de Mesquitella, toward the
close of the seventeenth century, in order that the guns might command
the approach on that side without impediment: he has been censured for
this as having committed a certain mischief for the sake of a frivolous
precaution. At that time Chaves was considered a place of importance.
The walls were now in many places fallen to decay, and though the
citadel was in better repair, both it and the town were commanded from
several points, and at short distances.
♦SILVEIRA RETIRES FROM CHAVES.♦
Whatever hopes Silveira might have entertained of opposing the French
with the assistance of Romana’s army, he was fully sensible after
the rout of the Spaniards that he could neither stand his ground
in the vale, nor defend the dilapidated works of the town with men
of whom the greater number were half armed and ♦MARCH 7.♦ wholly
undisciplined. On the day therefore when the enemy entered Monterrey
he gave orders for evacuating Chaves, and withdrew to ♦1809. MARCH.♦
the heights of Outeiro Joam, and S. Pedro de Agostem. Small as the
regular force was which he commanded, Portugal, he well knew, could
ill afford to lose it; opportunity for seriously annoying the invaders
was likely to occur, but to expose his men now would be vainly and
wantonly to sacrifice them. Thus he reasoned; ♦SOME MUTINOUS OFFICERS
RESOLVE TO DEFEND IT.♦ but the spirit of insubordination was abroad.
The peasantry, in ignorant but honest zeal, insisted upon defending
the place, and they were supported by certain of his officers, who
were actuated some by mere presumption, others by the intention of
ingratiating themselves with the enemy, whom they thus should serve.
To Chaves therefore these persons returned, and ♦DIARIO OFFICIAL.
CORREIO BRAZILIENSE, T. III. P. 110–11.♦ the vanguard which, having
been stationed at Villarelho to observe the French, he had ordered to
follow him, joined with this party, and prepared to defend the town,
in contempt of his authority. If Silveira’s character had been any
ways doubtful, or if he had been less esteemed and less beloved by
the soldiers, he must at this time have fallen a sacrifice to popular
suspicion.
♦SURRENDER OF CHAVES.♦
Part of the enemy’s advanced guard came in sight of Chaves the next
day. On the following Silveira went into the town, and endeavoured, but
in vain, to convince the refractory officers that it was not possible
to oppose any effectual resistance. Again on the morrow he entered it,
summoned all the superior officers to a council of war, and protested
against the resolution ♦MARCH 10.♦ which had been taken, explaining at
the same time the grounds of his opinion. All the officers agreed with
him except those who by aid of the populace had taken upon themselves
the command. By this time the place was invested on three sides, and
Soult summoned the general to surrender. Silveira returned a verbal
answer, that he had nothing to do with the defence of Chaves, but only
with the army which he commanded; he then retired to the Campo de S.
Barbara. A letter from Marshal Soult followed him, requiring him to
retain the army and govern the province in the Emperor Napoleon’s name,
and spare the effusion of blood which must otherwise follow. Silveira
replied by word of mouth, that one who had the honour to command
Portugueze could give ear to no such proposals; and that he would never
listen to any except that of Marshal Soult’s surrender. Meantime a
fire was kept up from the place with as little effect as judgement,
and the French suffered some loss from the peasantry and from small
parties who were on the alert to seize every occasion. A second summons
was now sent in; by this time the ardour of the refractory troops had
begun to cool, and the self-elected commandant dispatched a messenger
to Silveira, requesting orders. Silveira’s reply was, that he who had
taken upon himself to defend Chaves contrary to his orders must act for
himself. He desired, however, that the officers who were in the place
might be directed to bring off the troops during the night, saying
that he would cover their retreat by bringing down a greater force
upon Outeiro Joam. The movement was made on his part; but he looked in
vain for any ♦DIARIO OFF. COR. BRAZ. 112.♦ attempt on the part of the
garrison, and on the following morning they surrendered prisoners of
war.
♦THE FRENCH ESTABLISH THEIR HOSPITAL THERE.♦
It was now seen what motives had influenced the promoters of this
mock defence, for all the staff-officers offered their services to
the Emperor Napoleon; the troops of the line followed their example,
but with a very different intention, and took the first opportunity
to escape. Marshal Soult could spare no force for marching off his
prisoners, nor for securing them at Chaves; he therefore required an
oath from the militia and peasants that they would never again bear
arms against the French, and dismissed them. This conduct excited
murmurs among those who would rather, after the example of their
Emperor, have made sure work. If Junot had commanded the army, they
said, the place would have been stormed as soon as they appeared before
it. Marshal Soult was not a jot more scrupulous than his predecessor;
but at this time the treasonable disposition which had been manifested
by a few officers led him to suppose that it might be more easy
to conciliate the Portugueze than he had found it to coerce their
neighbours, and under this persuasion he established his hospital at
Chaves; accordingly the sick and wounded were once more removed, and
about 1400 were left there with a small force for their protection
under the _chef de bataillon_ Messager. The Marshal then announced his
appointment as Governor-general ♦OPERATIONS DE M. SOULT, 118–124.♦ of
Portugal, ... the rank which Junot (whom the Portugueze called the Duke
_in partibus_) had held, and proceeded on his march.
♦PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE AT PORTO.♦
His effective force consisted at this time of 21,000 men, the country
through which he had to pass is one of the most defensible in Europe,
nor would it be possible any where to find a peasantry better disposed
to defend their hearths and altars, nor better able, had there been
common prudence to direct their willing strength. But the military
profession had fallen in Portugal to the lowest point of degradation;
and governments which weaken every thing for the miserable purpose
of rendering a corrupt and anile despotism secure, find themselves
powerless and helpless at the first approach of danger. The Portugueze
in these provinces were aware that invasion would be attempted, though
they knew not on what side; and the effect was to produce tumults among
the people, insubordination in the soldiers, apprehension, vacillation,
and confusion among the chief officers and rulers, and a state of
suspicious excitement which predisposed the public mind equally for
impulses of furious cruelty or of unreasonable panic. The Bishop of
Porto applied to the Regency for succours; but Lisbon at that time
was itself as likely to be attacked, nor indeed had the government
any troops upon whom the slightest confidence could be placed. How
capable the Portugueze were of becoming good soldiers, though well
understood by those who knew the people, and indeed not to be doubted
by any who had any knowledge of human nature, had not yet been tried:
with excellent qualities and the best disposition they were perfectly
inefficient now. The Bishop had been offended with Sir Robert Wilson
for having passed into Spain with a body of Portugueze troops. The
consequences of Sir Robert’s movement to Ciudad Rodrigo had been more
important than he himself could have anticipated, and yet in leaving
Porto he lost one of the fairest occasions that was ever presented to
an active and enterprising spirit. Acting as he did there with the full
concurrence of the Bishop, and possessing his confidence, there was
time to have disciplined a force which might have impeded the passage
of Soult’s army through the strong defiles it had to pass, and have
presented a resistance at Porto as successful as that of Acre, and
more fatal to the enemy. The means of defence were in abundance, order
and intelligence for directing them alone were wanting. The population
of the city may be estimated at 80,000, and there were 2000 troops of
the line there, 3000 militia, and 15,000 _ordenanças_; the latter half
armed, and the greater part without discipline. A line of batteries
was erected round the city and suburbs, extending from the Castle of
Queijo on the coast to the village of Freixo on the Douro; the line was
about three miles in extent, and between two and three hundred pieces
of artillery were mounted there in thirty-five batteries. Had it been
well constructed, a large force would have been necessary to defend it:
but there had been as little skill in the formation as in the plan; the
batteries were without parapets, and the houses and trees which might
afford cover to an enemy were not taken down.
♦ADVANCE OF THE FRENCH FROM CHAVES.♦
Soult meantime, as soon as he had entered Chaves, thought to cut off
Silveira; but that general frustrated his intent by retiring first to
the mountains of Oura and Reigaz, and then to Villa Pouca, where he
took a position with the ♦MARCH 13.♦ determination of defending it.
The French, however, did not think this little force of sufficient
consequence to delay their march; and sending out parties in different
directions, in the hope that the report of their entrance spreading on
all sides, might reach the Generals who were to co-operate with them,
but with whom they had no means of communicating, they proceeded by the
Braga road. The resistance which they found evinced the brave spirit
of the people, and the incapacity of those who commanded them. The
villages were abandoned, stragglers were cut off, they were fired upon
by the peasantry from the heights and the cover of crags or trees; any
military attempt to impede them was conducted with so little skill or
order, that it served only to confirm their contempt for the nation
upon whom they had brought and were about to bring such unutterable
miseries; but sometimes a handful of Portugueze stood their ground
with a spirit like that of their ancestors; and sometimes an individual
would rush upon certain death, so he could make sure of one ♦OPERATIONS
DE M. SOULT, 128.♦ Frenchman, knowing that if his countrymen would act
upon the same principle of life for life, the kingdom would soon be
delivered from its unprovoked invaders.
♦TUMULTS AT BRAGA.♦
Bernardim Freire, not knowing whether the enemy would take the way by
Braga or by Villareal, had given orders to secure the positions of
Ponte de Cavez and Salto on the latter road, Ruivaens and Salamonde on
the other: his head-quarters were at Braga, a city which had long been
in a state of strange confusion. The clergy with whimsical indecorum
had embodied themselves to serve as a guard of honour for the Primate
till their services should be needed for the defence of the place;
and part of the exercise of this ecclesiastical corps was with one
♦DIALOGO ENTRE BRAGA E O PORTO, 19–21.♦ hand to take off the hat at
the Ave Maria bell, and present arms with the other. Men lose their
proper influence when they go out of their proper sphere; and the
extraordinary circumstances which justified the clergy in taking arms,
and even increased their authority while they acted individually either
in the ranks or in command, did not save them from ridicule when they
thus exposed themselves to it as a body. At any time this would have
been an evil; it was especially so when the bonds of authority had been
loosened, and envy, cupidity, and hatred were under no restraint.
General Freire had neither the talents nor the character to command
respect; and on his return from inspecting ♦MARCH 15.♦ the positions at
Ruivaens and Salamonde he had been insulted and menaced by the rabble
at S. Gens. On the following day, having received intelligence that the
enemy were on the way to Ruivaens, he went to the heights of Carvalho
d’Este, with the intention of occupying a strong position there, not
indeed in any expectation of defeating the enemy, for having just
military knowledge enough to see all the difficulties of his situation,
he knew himself and the men under his command too well to entertain
any hope; but time he thought might be gained for removing the stores
from Braga, and whatever else could be saved. It was soon understood
that the pass of Ruivaens had been forced, and this intelligence was
presently followed by the fearful tidings that the French had won the
defiles of Salamonde also. His only thought now was of retiring upon
Porto; and having dispatched in the night an order written in pencil to
his adjutant-general for removing the military chest from Braga, and
advising ♦MARCH 17.♦ Parreiras, who commanded at Porto, of the enemy’s
approach, he entered the city in the morning, and found it in a state
of complete anarchy. His dispatches had been seized and opened by the
mob, and some of his messengers murdered. Conceiving that his only
course now was to provide for the defence of Porto, he gave orders
accordingly. The populace were of a different opinion; they thought
the position at Carvalho d’Este ought to be defended, and considered
it either an act of cowardice or of treason to let the French advance
without resistance. Freire, however, left the city without receiving
any injury, and took the high road ♦SENTENÇA SOBRE AS ATROCIDADES,
&C. CORR. BRAZ. IV. 521–531.♦ to Porto. At the village of Carapoa
the peasants detained him as a traitor; he was rescued by the timely
arrival of a commandant of brigade, and proceeded with a guard of
twenty men for his protection; but falling in presently with a party
of _ordenanças_, they seized him, and insisted upon taking him back to
Braga.
♦GENERAL FREIRE MURDERED.♦
Meantime the peasantry from all sides had flocked to that city, some
retreating before the French, some hastening to meet them; some armed
with pikes, those who had fowling-pieces looking for ammunition,
all demanding to be embodied and led out against the enemy. At this
juncture Baron d’Eben arrived on his retreat, in obedience to the
General’s instructions. This Hanoverian nobleman, who was then a major
in the British service, and equerry to the Prince of Wales, commanded
the second battalion of the Lusitanian legion, and after Sir Robert
Wilson’s departure for the frontier had continued to train his men with
a diligence and success which won the confidence of the people. The
populace crowded round him, seized the reins of his horse, exclaimed
that they were determined to defend the city, reviled the General for
not leading them against the invaders, and insisted upon his taking
the command. Baron d’Eben promised to assist their patriotic exertions
in the best manner he could, but said it was necessary that he should
first speak with the General. By thus complying with their wishes
he hoped to obtain an ascendancy which might enable him to prevent
excesses; and for the moment he seemed to have succeeded, for they
allowed him to leave the city for that purpose with an escort of an
hundred _ordenanças_. They had not proceeded far before they met Freire
on foot between two ruffians, who held him by the arms, and followed by
a ferocious mob, who threatened to fire upon D’Eben when he attempted
to interfere. Yielding to a rabble whom he was unable to oppose, he
turned his horse toward Braga; the rabble then cheered him, and when
he reached the house where his quarters were, thither the unfortunate
General was brought. Freire called upon him for protection; but when
the Baron endeavoured to lead him into the house, one of the infuriated
multitude thrust at the General with a sword, and wounded him slightly
under D’Eben’s arm. He got, however, within the door, and D’Eben hoping
to save him by employing the people, went out and ordered the drum to
beat, and the _ordenanças_ to form in line. The mob continued to fire
upon the house where Freire was sheltered; and D’Eben then, as the
only means of saving him, proposed that he should be put in prison.
This was done: and seeing him as he thought safe there, he yielded to
the clamours of the people, who required to be led against the enemy.
Accordingly he formed them in such order as he could, and set out.
Presently a firing was heard in the city, and he was informed that
the rabble had dragged out the General from the prison, and murdered
him with circumstances of atrocious cruelty. Men, like wild beasts,
when once they have tasted blood, acquire an appetite for it. The cry
of treason, while it served as a pretext for old enmities and private
designs, deceived the ignorant and inflamed the furious; and several
persons of rank, as well as many of Freire’s officers, were butchered
in the city and in the neighbouring villages.
♦THE PORTUGUEZE ROUTED BEFORE BRAGA.♦
The command was now a second time forced upon Baron d’Eben by
acclamation, and to him the papers of the murdered General were
brought. He sealed them up, dispatched them to Porto, and prepared as
well as he could to put his tumultuary force in order. The bells from
all the churches were ringing the alarm, and the _ordenanças_ were
coming in at the call: no preparation had been made for supplying them
with food when they were ordered to their stations, nor were there
any cartridges which would fit their pieces. A single mould was at
length found of the just size, lead was taken from the churches, and
bullets were made during the night as fast as this slow process would
allow. Meanwhile the French vanguard under Generals Franceschi and
Laborde, with the brigade of General Foy, arrived before the position
of Carvalho, which a part of this tumultuary force had occupied, about
five miles in front of Braga. During three days frequent attacks
were made, ♦MARCH 20.♦ and the Portugueze kept their ground. By this
time the other divisions of the French had come up, and D’Eben had
collected about 23,000 men; 2000 consisted of regular troops, the
legion and the Braga militia; of the remainder only 5000 were armed
with fire-arms, and most of these had only three rounds of ammunition.
Such a multitude was little able to withstand the well-concerted and
well-sustained attack of a disciplined force nearly equal in numbers.
They were presently routed, and the French having found one of their
fellow-soldiers horribly mutilated by some ferocious persons into whose
♦OPERATIONS DE M. SOULT, 142.♦ hands he had fallen, showed little mercy
in the pursuit. D’Eben and some of his officers attempted in vain to
rally the fugitives, that they might defend the city; the answer to all
his exhortations was, that there was no ammunition. The last act of the
rabble was to murder those remaining objects of their suspicion whom
D’Eben had hoped to save by putting them in prison.
♦THE FRENCH ENTER BRAGA.♦
The French might impose upon the world by representing the dispersion
of this tumultuous assemblage as a splendid victory; but they could
not deceive themselves concerning the temper of the nation, when upon
entering the city they found it deserted by all its inhabitants, and
stripped of every thing which could be carried away. If their light
vanity could be elated with the vaunt that in the course of eleven days
they had won many battles, taken two towns, and forced the passage
of a chain of mountains, there was enough to abate their pleasure,
if not their pride, in the fact that empty houses were all that they
had gained; that they were masters of no more country than their
troops could cover, and only while they covered it; and in the ominous
apprehension excited by knowing how deeply and how deservedly they were
hated by the people whom they had invaded. They consoled themselves
with the thought that the rich merchants of Porto would not abandon
their property as the people of Braga had done their dwellings; and
Marshal Soult was not sparing of professions, that it was with regret
he had been compelled to employ force, when his only object in entering
Portugal was to deliver that fine country from the ruinous yoke of the
English, the eternal enemies of her prosperity. Some of the inhabitants
were induced to return, and one was found timid or traitorous enough
to take upon himself the office of Corregidor by Marshal Soult’s
appointment. The most important business which this wretched instrument
of the enemy was called upon to perform was to provide them with food;
for which purpose he was instructed to assure his countrymen that if
they did not bring in provisions, the French would take them; that in
that case the officers could not control the men; it would therefore
be for their own ♦OPERATIONS, &C. 146–8.♦ interest to act as they were
required to do, and for all which they supplied they should receive
receipts, payable in a manner afterwards to be explained.
♦THEY APPEAR BEFORE PORTO.♦
After resting his army three days, and leaving 700 sick and wounded in
the hospitals, Soult proceeded on his march. One division, which ♦MARCH
24.♦ found the bridge over the Ave at Barca da Trofa broken down, and
the ford guarded too well to be passed without loss and difficulty,
succeeded in winning and repairing the Ponte de S. Justo over the same
river, higher up. The Ponte de Ave also was forced by Colonel Lallemand
in a second attempt; and the officers who defended it were murdered by
their men, who, feeling in themselves no want of courage or of will,
imputed every reverse to treachery in their leaders. Without farther
opposition the enemy advanced upon Porto, and the Marshal sent in a
summons ♦MARCH 28.♦ to the Bishop, the magistrates, and the General, in
the usual French style, protesting that the French came not as enemies
to the Portugueze, but only to drive away the English; and that the
rulers of the city would be responsible before God and man for the
blood that would be shed, and the horrors which must ensue, if they
attempted to oppose an army accustomed to victory. It was not without
danger that the summons could be delivered; and General Foy, who either
being deceived by the gestures of a party of soldiers, or mistaking
them, advanced to receive their submission, was surrounded and carried
into the city. A cry was set up that they had taken Loison; and Foy
would have been torn to pieces, in vengeance for Loison’s ♦OPERATIONS,
&C. 159–168.♦ crimes, if he had not possessed presence of mind enough
to lift up both hands, and thus prove to the people that he was not
their old one-armed enemy.
♦OLIVEIRA MURDERED.♦
The persons in authority had sufficient influence to save his life, and
put him in confinement for security; but they were unable to protect
♦VOL. II. P. 64.♦ Luiz de Oliveira, who having been deservedly thrown
into prison in June, had been left there as if forgotten, with that
iniquitous neglect of justice which had long been usual in Portugal.
He was murdered and dragged through the streets by the rabble; and a
few other victims perished in this last explosion of popular fury. The
Bishop, who appears to have been at that time in the battery of S.
Francisco encouraging the troops, saw now what had been represented
to him vainly, though in time, that the works were too extensive, as
well as too weak. He had been advised to strengthen them by throwing
up works _en flèche_, to place 1500 of the best troops in their rear,
as a reserve for supporting the point which should be attacked,
and to throw up a second line close under the suburb, and have the
houses loop-holed, in preparation for that sort of defence which the
inhabitants were in a temper to have maintained, had there been
spirits to have directed them, as at Zaragoza. None of these things
had been done; and the Bishop, sensible when too late of ♦THE BISHOP
LEAVES THE CITY.♦ the errors which had been committed, and the value
of the time which had been lost, and perceiving also too many proofs
of that confusion which insubordination always produces, crossed to
the left bank of the Douro during the night, leaving the ill-planned
and ill-constructed works to be defended by an inadequate force and
an inefficient general. All night the bells of all the churches were
ringing the alarm; the churches were filled with supplicants, the
streets with a multitude, who wasted in furious demonstrations that
strength which should have been reserved for the defence of their
streets, and houses, and chambers. At midnight a storm of wind and
rain and thunder broke over the city, and while the lightnings flashed
above, a useless discharge of cannon and musketry was kept up by the
Portugueze along the line, at which the enemy gazed as at a spectacle,
for not a shot could reach them. Soult had given orders that the works
should be attacked at six on the ensuing morning, which was Good
Friday. Napoleon and Glory was the word. The storm ceased ♦OPERATIONS,
&C. 168–9.♦ about three, and the attack was postponed till seven, that
the soil might have time to dry, so as not to impede the troops in
their movements.
♦PORTO TAKEN.♦
General Parreiras before the attack was made had lost all hope of
opposing a successful resistance. Yet when the enemy attacked the
Prelada, a _quinta_, or country-seat, about a mile from the city,
where the lines formed an angle, they did not force it without a loss
of 500 men, including two _chefs de bataillon_. Having forced it,
they flanked the greater part of those troops who did their duty.
The right and left were attacked also; a panic soon spread: in less
than an hour after the commencement of the action, the General seeing
that all was lost, had crossed the bridge, and the French were in the
town. A tremendous carnage ensued; the cavalry charging through the
streets, and slaughtering indiscriminately all whom they overtook:
for an officer who accompanied General Foy the preceding day had
been killed, having attempted to defend himself when the General
surrendered, and the circumstance of his death was made a pretext for
this butchery. But the greatest destruction took place in the passage
of the river; the inhabitants rushed to the bridge of boats in such
numbers, that the first pontoon sank under their weight; the crowd
from behind still pressed on, forcing those who were foremost into the
stream, and themselves in like manner precipitated in their turn; the
French meantime keeping up a fire of grape-shot upon the affrighted
and helpless fugitives. From three to four thousand persons are
supposed to have perished thus; and not satisfied with this, the enemy
kept up a fire from the most commanding points upon those who were
endeavouring to cross in boats. Of the numbers who were thus killed a
large proportion consisted of women and children. But in this miserable
day neither sex, age, nor innocence could obtain mercy, nor manly and
heroic courage command respect from the inhuman enemy. The men, and
they were not few, who did their duty, singly or in small parties
where a handful of brave Portugueze had got together, were put to the
sword. About two hundred, whom the French praised in reality when they
intended to depreciate them by calling them the most fanaticised,
collected near the Cathedral, and fought till the last man was cut
down. The scenes which ensued were more odious and more opprobrious
to humanity than even the horrors of this carnage; the men, however,
were not allowed to commit enormities of every kind till they were
glutted, as they had been at ♦COL. JONES’S ACC. OF THE WAR, I. 195.♦
Evora. Marshal Soult exerted himself to check their[7] excesses with an
earnestness which, even if it proceeded from mere motives of policy,
must be recorded to his honour. And he had some officers to second him
with true good will in this good work; for though the miscreants were
with him who had disgraced their country and their profession by the
atrocities which they had perpetrated or permitted at Evora and Leiria,
there were others who abhorred the iniquitous service in which they
were engaged, and who were members of a secret society, the object of
which was to throw off Buonaparte’s yoke, and restore peace to France
and Europe.
♦SOULT REMAINS AT PORTO.♦
Complete as his success had hitherto been, and little as it had cost
him, Marshal Soult did not find it advisable to push on for Lisbon.
He now knew what was the spirit of the nation, and he was without
any intelligence from Lapisse and Victor, whose movements were to be
combined with his. He applied himself therefore to securing what he
had won, and endeavoured to conciliate the Portugueze, and raise a
party among them in favour of the ambitious designs which, like Junot,
he appears now to ♦1809. APRIL.♦ have formed. For this purpose a
newspaper was published at Porto a week only after its capture, and
the first number opened with a panegyric upon the conqueror because he
had not totally destroyed the city. While the streets were yet stained
with the blood of the carnage, and there was mourning in every house,
and bodies were every day cast up by the river and along the sea-beach,
... while it was stated officially in the Madrid Gazette that the whole
garrison had been put to the sword, ... Marshal Soult was panegyrized
for clemency! The dreadful catastrophe which Porto had suffered, said
his writers, might serve as a warning for all who undertook great
enterprises without calculating the means, or looking on to the end.
But amid the horror with which so severe an example affected every
feeling heart, there was abundant matter of consolation for minds
capable of weighing things in the balance of philosophy. Towns carried
by assault had invariably, among the most civilized nations, paid with
their total destruction the penalty of their contumacy. This was the
fate which Porto had had to apprehend; and from this it had been spared
by a hero who always listened to the voice of mercy, and in whose heart
valour and humanity contended for the ascendance!
♦DISPOSITION OF THE INHABITANTS.♦
The Portugueze are not so light a people as to be thus easily deceived.
They had seen the tender mercies of the French too recently to be
duped by their professions, and not more than a sixth part of the
inhabitants remained in Porto under their government. If this proof of
their ♦OPERATIONS, &C. 183.♦ disposition augured ill for the French, it
lessened the difficulty of providing for the city, which was an object
of no small anxiety to the captors. They who had undertaken to supply
the troops went into the country by night to make their bargains with
persons whom they could trust, ♦DO. 206.♦ and the supplies were brought
in darkness at a stated hour to a stated place; for if any person had
been seen engaged in thus administering to the enemy, his life would
have been the penalty of his treason. When the English property was
put up to sale, not a person would bid for it: an individual at last
ventured to offer about a third part of its value for certain goods,
but before four-and-twenty hours had elapsed he absconded, either for
the fear of being marked as one who had dealt with the French, or
unable ♦OPERATIONS, &C. 205.♦ to bear the shame of having been the only
Portugueze in Porto who had thus disgraced himself.
♦MARSHAL SOULT’S VIEWS RESPECTING THE LIBERALS AND THE JEWS.♦
There were, however, in Portugal, as in every country, men who have
no other principle than the determination of promoting their own
interest by any means; and there were some few who entertained that
abject and superstitious faith in Buonaparte’s fortune which his
partizans and flatterers every where endeavoured to promote. Some
also there were who, in their vehement abhorrence for the besotted
despotism and the filthy superstition which degraded their country,
had renounced their national feeling and their Christian faith. The
scheme of Soult’s policy was to make such persons (whom he supposed
more numerous than they were) stand forward as a party, engage them in
the irremissible offence of swearing fidelity to Napoleon and obedience
to his representative, and employ them in corrupting their countrymen,
and in watching and subjugating those whom they could not seduce. For
this purpose he had his emissaries in the capital and in the provinces
to spread disaffection by representing the abuses and evils both of
the civil and ecclesiastical system, ... abuses which it was hardly
possible to exaggerate, and evils which in themselves and in their
consequences were only more tolerable and less pernicious than the iron
tyranny which Buonaparte would have substituted in ♦CAMPAIGN OF 1809
IN THE PENINSULA, 15. DO. APPENDIX A.♦ their place. Marshal Soult had
also conceived the strange intention of making the Jews, whose number
in Portugal he estimated at 200,000, avow their religion under the
protection of France, and hold upon an appointed day a general feast
for the success of the Emperor’s arms. It is probable that he overrated
them as greatly as he mistook their character; but if they had been
mad enough to act in conformity to his wishes, a general massacre
would have been the certain consequence. For the old inhuman prejudice
against this persecuted race, when yielding to wiser laws and the
spirit of the age, had been revived by the manner in which Buonaparte
courted them. It was observed by some of the Spanish journalists, that
when the Turks were the terror of Christendom, they had derived their
information from the Jews, who were their instruments every where; and
the promise of Buonaparte to abolish the Inquisition provoked only from
the Spaniards the remark that this measure must have been suggested by
some Israelite of the Sanhedrim.
♦HIS HOPES OF BECOMING KING OF NORTHERN LUSITANIA.♦
Among the Portugueze who, from the perversion of good feelings, or the
original prevalence of base ones, were open to corruption, persons were
found to forward the design which Soult had now formed of becoming King
of Northern Lusitania. Buonaparte’s formation of new principalities and
kingdoms for his brothers and favourites had made the generals of this
new Alexander suppose that his conquests would be divided among them,
and a petty kingdom under this title had been carved out in the secret
treaty of Fontainebleau. A deputation of twelve principal inhabitants
of Braga, as they were represented to be, waited upon the Marshal, and
published in his gazette an account of their interview with him, and
an address in consequence to the Portugueze people. They assured their
countrymen that Marshal Soult had conversed with them at great length
upon the produce, commerce, and interests of the province between the
rivers, in a manner which formed a striking contrast to the conduct of
their old government. That government, they said, had been indifferent
about all things except the raising of its revenues. The flight of the
Prince Regent amounted to a voluntary abdication of the throne, and a
happy futurity might now be anticipated under a better dynasty. The
House of Braganza, said these traitors, no longer exists. It is the
will of Heaven that our destinies should pass into other hands; and
it has been the peculiar favour of Divine Providence to send us a man
exempt from passions, and devoted to true glory alone, who desires to
employ the force entrusted to him by the great Napoleon only for our
protection and deliverance from the monster of anarchy which threatened
to devour us. Why do we delay to assemble round him, and proclaim him
our father and deliverer? Why do we delay to express our anxiety to
see him at the head of a nation, of whose affections he has made so
rapid a conquest? The sovereign of France will lend a gracious ear to
our supplications, and will rejoice to see that we desire one of his
lieutenants for our King, who, in imitation of his example, knows how
to conquer and to pardon.
Such an address could not have been published in a journal which was
under French superintendence unless it had been in unison with Soult’s
designs. On another occasion, when he gave audience to a second
deputation from Braga, and to the civil, religious, and military
authorities of Porto, the obsequious traitors requested that till the
supreme intentions of the Emperor should be ascertained they might be
allowed to swear fidelity to his most worthy representative, who had so
many claims upon the love, respect, and gratitude of the Portugueze.
The Marshal expatiated as usual in reply upon the felicities which were
about to be showered upon Portugal under a French master: “As to what
concerns myself,” he added, “I feel obliged by the frank expressions
which you have used relating to my person; but it does not depend upon
me to answer them.” He had, however, depended so much upon realizing
this dream of ambition, that proclamations were prepared, announcing
him as King. It was fortunate for the parties concerned that they went
no farther; for one of his staff, who was supposed to be a principal
agent in the scheme, was recalled to Paris, and Buonaparte, addressing
him by name at a grand levee, said to him, “Take care how ♦COL. JONES’S
HIST. OF THE WAR, I. 199, NOTE.♦ you draw up proclamations! My empire
is not yet sufficiently extended for my generals to become independent.
One step farther, and I would have had you shot.”
♦HE VISITS THE CHURCH OF N. SENHOR DE BOUÇAS.♦
Expecting no such impediment to his hopes, the “worthy representative”
of Buonaparte proceeded, as his master had done in Egypt, to show his
attachment to the religion of the people whom he came to govern. There
is a famous crucifix, known by the name of Nosso Senhor de Bouças, in
the little town of Matosinhos, upon the coast, about a league from
Porto. According to tradition it is the oldest image in Portugal, being
the work of Nicodemus; and though the workman neither attempted to
represent muscle nor vein, it is affirmed that there cannot be a more
perfect and excellent crucifix. Antiquaries discovered another merit
in it, for there has been a controversy concerning the number[8] of
nails used in the crucifixion, and in this image four are represented,
agreeing with the opinion of St. Gregory of Tours, and the ♦D. RODRIGO
DA CUNHA, CAT. DOS BISPOS DO PORTO, PP. 393, 4.♦ revelation made to
the Swedish St. Bridget. The sea cast it up, and its miraculous virtue
was soon attested by innumerable proofs. One of the arms was wanting
when it was found; the best sculptors were employed to supply this
deficiency; but in spite of all their skill not one of them could
produce an arm which would fit the place for which it was designed.
One day a poor but pious woman, as she was gathering shell-fish and
drift-wood for fuel, picked up upon the beach a wooden arm, which she,
supposing that it had belonged to some ordinary and profane image,
laid upon the fire. The reader will be at no loss to imagine that it
sprung out of the flames, ... that the neighbours collected at the
vociferations of the woman, ... that the priests were ready to carry
it in procession to the church of N. Senhor; and that the moment it
was applied to the stump whereto it belonged, a miraculous junction
was effected. Our Lord of Bouças became from that time one of the most
famous idols in Portugal; and on ♦COROGRAFIA PORTUGUEZA, T. I. 361.♦
the day of his festival five-and-twenty thousand persons have sometimes
been assembled at his church, coming thither in pilgrimage from all
parts.
To this idol Marshal Soult thought proper to offer his devotions.
He and his staff visited the church, and prostrating themselves
before the altar, paid, says his journal, that tribute of respect
and reverence which religion requires from those who are animated
with the true spirit of Christianity. “There cannot,” continued the
hypocritical traitor who recorded this mummery, ... “there cannot be
a more affecting and interesting spectacle, than to see a Great Man
humbling himself in the presence of the King of kings and Sovereign
Disposer of empires. All the inhabitants of Matosinhos who were present
at this religious solemnity were wrapt in ecstasy!” The French Marshal
testified his great concern at hearing that the plate and jewels and
ornaments of the church had been carried off; and he promised the
rector that he would offer two large silver candlesticks to Nosso
Senhor, and dedicate a silver lamp to him, and assign funds to keep it
burning night and day, and, moreover, that he would double the stipend
of the rector and the sacristan. “Let this fact,” said his penman, “be
contrasted with what we have been told respecting the irreligion of
the French troops and their leaders! It is time to open our eyes, and
to acknowledge the hand of Providence in the events which have befallen
us. How fortunate are we that Heaven has destined us to be governed by
a hero who possesses a heart disposed to be deeply and warmly impressed
with the majesty of our holy religion, and who aspires only to make it
shine forth with new and never-fading splendour! Let the calumniators
be confounded, and the timid be tranquil! Our hopes ought to be
re-animated now that they have obtained a support, which, resting on
religion, and lifting its head above the storms, promises them entire
realization.”
Not a word of restoring the spoils of the church had been said by
Marshal Soult; ... his promise of the lamp and the funds for the oil,
and the increase of salaries, was confirmed by a decree in which
he dedicated the lamp, assigned a revenue of sixteen milreas for
its support, and doubled the incomes; as far as the decree went he
performed his promise ... and no farther. His situation, indeed, was
becoming too perilous to allow him time for the farce of superstition.
On one hand the events in Galicia alarmed him, ... on the other he
learnt that the English, instead of evacuating Lisbon, were expecting
a fresh army there; and that General Beresford was already arrived,
with the title of Field-marshal conferred upon him by the Prince of
Brazil, to take the command of the Portugueze ♦1809. MARCH.♦ army, and
reorganize it. He had experienced the courage and the patriotism of the
Portugueze, and knew that discipline was all they wanted to make them
as formidable in the field as their forefathers. From the centre of
Spain he could expect little assistance, so rapidly had the Spaniards
re-formed their armies; ... and from France itself no reinforcements
were to be looked for, for Buonaparte was even obliged to withdraw
troops from the Peninsula, that he might march against the Austrians.
♦CHAVES RETAKEN BY SILVEIRA.♦
The first ill news which reached him was from Chaves. Bernardim Freire
had directed Silveira, as soon as the enemy should enter Portugal,
to retire by the passes of Salamonde and Ruyvaens, and so join the
main force assembled for the defence of Portugal. The spirit of
insubordination which broke out at Chaves seems to have frustrated this
purpose. Silveira waited till the last in the vicinity of that place,
hoping to bring off the garrison when they should feel that it was
untenable: failing in that hope, he found it necessary to fall back
before the French in a different direction to Villa Pouca. The enemy,
believing that his little army was what they called demoralized, had
contented themselves with making a strong reconnoissance there under
General Lorges, for the double motive of deceiving the Portugueze with
regard to their intended march, and intimidating the country; then
pursued their way, holding the force which they left behind them in
as much contempt as that which they advanced to attack. But no sooner
had Silveira ascertained their movements than he returned to his
position at S. Barbara; and when the last party of the enemy’s cavalry
had withdrawn from observing him to follow the main body, he ♦MARCH
20.♦ entered Chaves, easily overcoming the little resistance which the
garrison were able to make. Messager, the commandant, withdrew into
the fort, where the Portugueze, having no artillery, blockaded him
for four days: on the fifth they prepared to take it by escalade; the
French then proposed to capitulate, on condition of marching out with
arms and baggage to join Marshal Soult. Five minutes were allowed them
to determine whether they would surrender prisoners at war, and they
were glad to secure their lives by submitting to that condition. About
1300 men were thus taken, and 114 Spaniards whom Soult had left there
as prisoners were restored to liberty. Silveira then followed the steps
of the enemy. Hearing that they had entered Braga, his intention was
to cut off their garrison there, as he had done at Chaves; but while
he was arranging measures for this, he learned the fate of Porto, and
marched in consequence toward Villa Real. On the way he was informed
that the enemy intended to enter Tras os Montes by way either of
Canavezes or of a little town known by the awkward name of _Entre ambos
os rios_, from its position near the point where the Tamega falls into
the Douro. Immediately he occupied both places, repulsed the French in
two attempts upon the former, and reaching Amarante himself just as a
party of the enemy, having burnt the villages of Villa Meam, Manhufe,
and Pildre, were advancing ♦DIARIO OFFICIAL. CORR. BRAZ. III. 113,
115.♦ to take possession of it, he made them retire to Penafiel, and
entered that city the next day on their withdrawing from it.
♦PROCEEDINGS AT COIMBRA.♦
Silveira’s activity raised the hopes of the Portugueze: it was said
in Porto that he would soon take his coffee in that city, and this
was repeated to Soult, who desired Silveira might be assured that he
would provide him with sugar for it. The jest is said to have kept
up ♦OPERATIONS, &C. P. 199.♦ the spirits of those Portugueze who had
consented to serve the French interest. But the cup which they had
prepared for themselves was one which, drug it as they might, nothing
could sweeten. Every sacrifice and every success on the part of their
countrymen, every act of heroism and virtue, every manifestation of
the old national spirit, was a reproach to them; and tidings which
would have elated and rejoiced their hearts if they had not fallen
from their duty, brought to them feelings only of fear, and shame,
and self-condemnation. The Portugueze were so persuaded of their own
strength, and the experience even of the preceding year had so little
abated that persuasion, that they had considered it impossible for the
French to enter Porto, or had expected at least that the city would
have made a long and glorious resistance. And yet the tidings of its
capture, with all the shameful and all the dreadful circumstances
that attended it, occasioned no consternation. That miserable event
was known at Coimbra on the following day; it was known also that no
means had been taken for removing the boats and destroying the bridge;
that the part which had been broken by the crowd of fugitives had
speedily been repaired by the enemy, and that their advanced parties
had proceeded as far as Grijo. It was considered certain that they
would lose no time in occupying so important a city as Coimbra and the
intermediate country, one of the finest and most fertile parts of the
kingdom. Colonel Trant, who commanded there, knew how inadequate his
means were to prevent this; but he knew that efficient aid might soon
be expected from England, that much might sometimes be done by mere
display, and by the judicious use of a scanty force, and that if the
evil could be but for a little while delayed, it might ultimately be
averted.
The force at his disposal consisted of the Coimbra militia and a
detachment of volunteers who had enlisted for the army, in all 500
men; but to these an academical corps of 300 was immediately added,
the students offering themselves with that alacrity, and displaying
that promptitude and intelligence, which belong to youth in their
station. The people began to recover confidence when they knew
that one party from this little force took the road to Aveiro and
another that to Sardam, the two directions in which Coimbra might be
approached from Porto. Report magnified the designs of Colonel Trant
and the means which he possessed; and the double good was produced of
encouraging the Portugueze and delaying the progress of the French,
who, if they advanced to Coimbra, would have commanded the resources
of a fertile country, have approached nearer to the armies with which
their operations were to be combined for effecting the conquest of the
kingdom; and moreover, in case of failure, would have had an easier
retreat open through Beira. A most timely supply was obtained from the
magistrates of Aveiro, who having consulted the Camara of Coimbra,
placed the public money which had been collected in their city at
Colonel Trant’s disposal, and also a considerable magazine of maize and
other grain, ... both being thus secured from the enemy, into whose
hands they must otherwise have fallen, if even a slight detachment had
been sent thither. The fugitives from Porto and from that part of the
country which the invaders occupied found in Coimbra all the assistance
that could be afforded, and were thus prevented from carrying the panic
farther; and the soldiers who had escaped the butchery were refitted
and re-embodied as they came in. Colonel Trant offered the command to
Baron d’Eben; but the Baron knew by experience what it was to command
a hasty and tumultuous force, and chose rather to employ himself in
re-collecting his battalion of the Lusitanian Legion. It was offered
also to the Portugueze Brigadier Antonio Marcellino da Victoria; but he
had witnessed the fate of Freire, and desired to accompany Trant as a
simple volunteer. In addition to the force which was thus augmenting,
two squadrons of regular troops unexpectedly arrived in Coimbra, with
their commander, the Visconde de Barbacena: they had been ordered in a
different direction; but being mostly natives of the Campo de Coimbra,
they had insisted upon going to defend their own immediate country, and
the Viscount deemed it better to obey their inclinations than withstand
a spirit of insubordination to which he might too probably have fallen
a sacrifice. Colonel Trant removed them as soon as possible out of the
city, and separating them from the other troops, stationed them in
advance at Mealhada. The Commander-in-chief being duly apprized of what
had occurred, gave orders that these troops should remain under his
command; and the men, whose intentions had been good when their conduct
was most irregular, were thus brought again into the line of duty.
♦COL. TRANT TAKES A POSITION UPON THE VOUGA.♦
With this motley force, a week after the capture of Porto had been
known, Colonel Trant set forth. Taking the students’ corps under his
♦APRIL 6.♦ own command, he advanced toward Aveiro, and effected the
important purpose of securing the boats and provisions in that port.
The right ♦1809. APRIL.♦ column, under Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell
(who had escaped from the carnage at Porto), he sent to the bridge of
Vouga. That river (the Vacca of the ancients) rises in the Serra de
Alcoba, and having received the Portugueze Agueda, which brings an
equal volume of waters, enters the Lake of Aveiro, and forms a harbour
there not less beautiful than singular: it is separated from the sea
by two long wings of sand, and if the entrance were but good, would be
perhaps the most commodious and capacious in Europe. A party of the
enemy had crossed by the bridge of Vouga, and recrossed by that of
Marnel, leaving in all the intermediate places the accustomed marks
of their sacrilegious barbarity. They were part of a considerable
cavalry force, under General Franceschi. For having taken Porto, and
being masters of the Douro, the French, accustomed to consider military
posts and the course of rivers as every thing, and the people as
nothing in the scale, held that the country as far as the Mondego was
already theirs by right of conquest; and Franceschi’s division would
have advanced to occupy Coimbra if he had not thought that the force
opposed to him was respectable both in numbers and quality. Its number,
which the enemy supposed to be from ten to twelve thousand, did not in
reality exceed 2000, even after two companies of grenadiers had joined
them from Guarda. They had been stationed there under Camp-Marshal
Manoel Pinto Bacellar’s command; but choosing to act upon their own
judgement in those days of general insubordination, they compelled
their officers to conduct them to the Vouga, as the place where they
might soonest be enabled to act against the invaders of their country.
With regard to the quality of this little force, the French supposed
that there were English troops with it, and a great proportion of
English officers. A panic seized Campbell’s men; they fled towards
Coimbra; some of the fugitives joined Trant, and added in no slight
degree to the anxieties of his situation by the alarm which they
communicated. The academical corps indeed, under his immediate command,
was one in which he placed just confidence; but the fatal consequence
of exposing the flower of a nobility and gentry like ordinary lives
had been severely felt in England during the great rebellion; and
the Portugueze remembered an example still more ruinous of the same
prodigality, when with their King Sebastian they lost every thing
except their honour. He addressed them therefore on this occasion; told
them they would have to contend against superior numbers, and hinted at
the reproaches which he might bring upon himself if he should lead so
large a portion of the illustrious youth of Portugal to destruction.
The address produced the animating effect for which it was intended,
and they answered him with a general exclamation of _Moriamur pro Rege
nostro_.
♦CRUELTIES OF THE FRENCH.♦
Fortunately the enemy gave him time; they were delayed by the
expectation of Victor’s advance, by Silveira’s movements, and by ill
news from Galicia; and Trant profited by their inactivity to guard
the bridges, remove the boats, and bring over the flocks and herds of
that pastoral country from the northern bank, the owners assisting in
this the more readily when they saw some of their cattle seized by the
French. Whether it were that Marshal Soult despaired of conciliating
the people whom he came to invade and enslave, or if the system of
severity was more congenial to his own temper as well as to that of
the tyrant whom he served, he endeavoured at this time to intimidate
them by measures as atrocious as those which his predecessor Junot
had pursued. Such Portugueze as he suspected of communicating either
with Trant or Silveira were hung from the trees along the road side,
with or without proof, and their bodies left to putrefy there, all
persons being forbidden to bury them. Deep as was the detestation of
such enemies which this conduct excited, there were other actions
at this time which excited, if possible, a stronger feeling of
indignant abhorrence. A party of disbanded militia, with a Portugueze
Lieutenant-Colonel at their head, surprised a _chef d’escadron_ near
the village of Arrifana, and killed him and three dragoons of his
escort. He was one of the Lameth family, so noted in the first stage
of the French revolution; and having been Soult’s aide-de-camp,
had served in the Peninsula with a zeal which could never have been
employed in a worse cause. Having been a favourite with the commander
and his staff, it was determined to take vengeance for his death; it
had taken place in a part of the country of which they had military
possession, and they thought proper therefore to consider it as an ♦SEE
VOL. I. P. 161, AND VOL. II. P. 134. OPERATIONS, &C. P. 196.♦ action
not conformable to the laws of war. General Thomieres, who had been
accustomed to such services, was sent to inflict what the French called
an exemplary and imposing chastisement, ... not upon the individuals
concerned, for they were doing their duty elsewhere in defence of their
country, but upon the people of Arrifana indiscriminately. A French
detachment accordingly entered the village at daybreak, ♦APRIL 17.♦
seized twenty-four of the inhabitants, marched them into a field, and,
having tied them in couples back to back, fired upon them till they
were all killed. The rest of the villagers, ... brethren and sisters,
parents, wives, and children, were compelled to be spectators of this
butchery; the village was then set on fire, and many of the women and
girls carried into an Ermida or chapel, and there[9] violated.
♦POSITIONS OF THE FRENCH AND PORTUGUEZE ON THAT SIDE.♦
Satisfied with keeping the country north of the Vouga in subjection,
and believing that Trant’s corps consisted of ten or twelve thousand
men, the enemy made no attempt to pass that river; Franceschi, who
commanded the cavalry, having his head-quarters at Albergaria Nova, and
Thomieres at Villa de Feira, where, and at Ovar and Oliveira d’Azemeis,
the infantry were stationed. Trant, cautious of exposing his real
weakness, advanced only his scanty cavalry to the Vouga; the foot were
quartered in Sardam and Agueda, flourishing and industrious villages,
which are separated only by the Agueda, a small but navigable stream.
The road from thence toward Porto passes through a pine forest, and
there, profiting by the broken ground, he had fortified a position,
where the enemy could have derived no advantage from their cavalry if
they should pass the Vouga. From hence he communicated with Silveira,
and even with Porto itself, where there were some citizens ready to
expose themselves to any hazard in the hope of serving the national
cause.
♦ROMANA CAPTURES THE GARRISON AT VILLAFRANCA.♦
To gain time in this quarter while a British force was soon and surely
expected, was to gain every thing: and Marshal Soult was not in a
situation to turn his undivided attention in that direction. Tidings
for which he was little prepared, even after what he had experienced of
the Galician spirit, came upon him from Galicia. The news of Romana’s
defeat before Monterrey had been circulated over that province with
such exaggerations as were deemed likely to intimidate the people. The
French affirmed that Romana himself had been taken ♦1809. MARCH.♦
prisoner; they fired salutes and made rejoicings for their victory,
and proceeded even to the mockery of offering thanksgiving in the
churches. Romana meantime collected and rested his harassed troops at
La Puebla de Sanabria: in spite of all the enemy’s artifices his real
situation was soon known to the Spaniards, and deputations from some
town or village came every day to this faithful General, assuring him
that the Galicians were and would continue true to their country. Some
3000 new levies from Castille joined him there, and finding himself
more secure and more hopeful than at any time since he had taken the
command, he resolved upon striking a blow against the enemy upon the
line of posts which they occupied from Astorga to Villafranca. The
walls of the former city, ancient as they were, were not to be won
without artillery; but Villafranca had no other fortress than the old
castle or palace of the Marqueza de Astorga, which the French had
occupied; and there he determined to attack them, moving first upon
Ponferrada, where he made some prisoners, and recovered a good quantity
of corn, several four-pounders, and one dismounted twelve-pounder,
part of his own stores and artillery. Having remounted the larger
gun, Romana dispatched his Camp-marshal D. Gabriel de Mendizabal to
attack the garrison at Villafranca. That officer’s first care was to
get between them and Galicia, while the commander-in-chief intercepted
their retreat towards Astorga: for this purpose he proceeded to
Cacabelos, ♦MARCH 17.♦ and sent one detachment round by the right
to occupy the bridge at the other end of the town, while another
filed round by the left to join it there; every horseman taking up a
foot soldier behind him to ford the Valcarce, and the smaller river
which falls into it. Mendizabal, with the remainder of the troops,
advanced along the road. His advanced parties drove in the French at
all points, till they retired to the castle. The twelve-pounder was
brought up; but the Spaniards found that the French fired securely
from the old fortification while they themselves were exposed; upon
this they entered, and, with fixed bayonets, advanced to storm the
castle. Mendizabal was at their head; a ball passed through his clothes
without wounding him. He summoned the enemy to surrender, and upon
their hesitating what answer to return, repeated the summons with a
threat, that if they refused, every man should be put to the sword.
The white flag was then hoisted, and a negotiation begun, which the
French were conducting with a view to gain time, till the Spanish
commander cut it short, by allowing them a quarter of an hour to
surrender at discretion. Upon this they submitted; Mendizabal then, as
an act of free grace, permitted the officers to keep their horses and
portmanteaus, and the men their knapsacks; and the colonel-commandant
of the French, in returning thanks for this generosity, complimented
him upon his good fortune in having captured the finest regiment in the
Emperor Napoleon’s service. The prisoners were about 800. The Spaniards
lost two officers and thirty men, eighty-two wounded. The result of
the success was, that the Bierzo was cleared of the French, who fell
back from the neighbouring part of Asturias upon Lugo, there to make
a stand, supported by their main force, which was divided between
Santiago, Coruña, and Ferrol.
♦EFFORTS OF THE GALICIANS.♦
Marshal Ney had still a predominant force in Galicia after Soult’s army
was departed; there were garrisons in every town which was sufficiently
important, either for its size or situation, to require one, and the
French had military possession of the province. But they had yet to
subdue the spirit of the people; and the Galicians, who had no longer
an example of panic and disorder before their eyes, carried on the war
in their own way. Captain M’Kinley in the Lively frigate, with the
Plover sloop under his command, arrived off the coast to assist them.
He discovered none of that apathy for their own country, none of that
contented indifference who was to be their master, none of that sullen
and ungrateful dislike of the English, of which the retreating army had
complained so loudly; he heard from them only expressions of gratitude
to the British government and praise of the British nation; he
perceived in them the true feelings of loyalty and patriotism, and saw
in all their actions honest, enthusiastic ardour, regulated by a cool
and determined courage. The invaders attempted, by the most unrelenting
severity, to keep them down. On the 7th of March a party of French
entered the little towns of Carril and Villa Garcia, murdered some old
men and women in the streets, set fire to the houses of those persons
whom they suspected of being hostile to them, and then retreated to
Padron. To lay waste villages with fire, abandon the women to the
soldiery, and put to death every man whom they took in arms, was the
system upon which the French under Marshals Ney and Soult proceeded.
Such a system, if it failed to intimidate, necessarily recoiled
upon their own heads; and the thirst of vengeance gave a character
of desperation to the courage of the Galicians. About an hundred
French were pillaging a convent, when Don Bernardo Gonzalez, with
two-and-thirty Spaniards, fell upon them, and did such execution while
the enemy were in disorder and encumbered with their plunder, that only
sixteen escaped. During three days the French attempted to destroy the
peasants of Deza and Trasdira; the men of Baños and Tabieros came to
aid their countrymen, and the invaders at length retreated with the
loss of 114 ♦MARCH 9.♦ men. A party from Pontevedra entered Marin: here
the Lively and the Plover opened their fire upon them, and as they
fled from the English ships, their officers fell into the hands of the
peasantry. In this kind of perpetual war the French were wasted; a
malignant fever broke out among them, which raged particularly at their
head-quarters in Santiago, and many who had no disease died of the
fatigue which they endured from being incessantly harassed, and kept
night and day on the alarm.
♦BARRIOS SENT INTO GALICIA.♦
D. Manuel Garcia de Barrios, who held the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel,
had arrived in Galicia early in March with credentials from the Central
Junta authorising him to take such measures as he might deem expedient
for its recovery, ... and this was all with which the government could
furnish him. He had, however, two brave and able officers under him, D.
Manuel Acuña and D. Pablo Morillo, then a young man, who had already
distinguished himself ♦VOL. II. P. 460.♦ upon the Tagus. These officers
took the coast and the interior in this military mission, while Barrios
took the southern part of the province; and they communicated with
Romana and Silveira. Barrios was with the latter General when the
French approached Chaves, and, being prevented by an accident from
leaving the town with him, was shut in there during its short siege.
Aware that if the enemy recognised him they would probably put him
to death, or at best compel him to choose between imprisonment and
taking the oaths to the Intruder, he escaped over the walls when they
entered the place, and remained for some days secreted in a cottage,
suffering severely from a fall and from want of food, and having lost
every thing, even his papers. He made his way, however, to the Valle
Real de Lobera, where he thought Romana would have taken some measures
for raising men; and there he found the spirit which he expected. His
report of himself and of his commission was believed, though he had no
credentials to produce: a Junta was formed, volunteers were raised,
and there, in a confined district, where they were half blockaded by
the enemy, plans were laid for the deliverance of Galicia, Barrios
having for his coadjutors the abbots of S. Mamed and Couto. Their
communication with Romana was impeded by the French at Lugo; but they
received tidings of co-operation in another quarter where they had not
looked for it, and prepared with all alacrity to take advantage of the
opportunity that offered.
♦THE PORTUGUEZE AND GALICIANS BLOCKADE TUY.
MARCH 10.♦
While Soult was before Chaves a party of Portugueze, under Alexandre
Alberto de Serpa, crossed the Minho near its mouth, and were joined
at Guardia by the peasantry; in a few days some thousand men had
collected; the Mayorazgo, D. Joaquin Tenreyro, put himself at their
head, and their parish priests acted as officers. The two Abbots, who
had taken the title of Generals, and disputed which should be called
Commander-in-chief of Galicia, compromised their difference by electing
Barrios commandant-general of the province of Tuy and division of the
Minho, and they set out with all the force they could muster to join
one party of these insurgents who blockaded the French in Tuy, while
Morillo and Acuña were directed to join the others, who, officered as
they were, undisciplined and ill equipped, had proceeded to besiege the
enemy’s garrison in Vigo. It had been Soult’s intention, neglecting
all points of less importance, to concentrate in Tuy all the troops
belonging to his army whom he had left in Galicia. But when a column
of about 800 men, under the _chef d’escadron_ Chalot, bringing with it
the heavy baggage of the general officers and the military chest, was
on the way thither from Santiago, General Lamartiniere ordered them to
Vigo, where the resources were greater both for the men and horses.
♦VIGO.♦
The town of Vigo is situated in a bay, which is one of the largest,
deepest, and safest in the whole coast of the peninsula. It is built
upon a rock; but, notwithstanding the severe loss which the Spaniards,
during the War of the Succession, suffered in that port, no care had
been taken to fortify it; it had merely a wall, a fort flanked with
four bastions on the land side, and an old castle, equally dilapidated,
toward the sea. The neighbourhood of Ferrol has made it neglected as a
naval station, and Galicia is too poor a country for foreign commerce.
There was, however, a manufactory of hats there, which were exported
to America; and a fishery was carried on so extensively as to afford
employment for thirty mercantile houses. It derived some importance
also from being the seat of government for the province of Tuy. The
population amounted to 2500. Sir John Moore had at first fixed upon
this port as the place of his embarkation, and ordered the transports
there; and the delay occasioned by waiting till they came round Cape
Finisterre to join him at Coruña gave time for the French to come up,
and for that battle, which, while it redeemed the character of the
army, proved fatal to himself.
♦THE SPANIARDS APPEAR BEFORE VIGO.♦
Captain Crawford, in the Venus frigate, was off the port, and he wrote
to Captain M’Kinley, who was then at Villa Garcia, in the Lively,
telling him how much the presence of his ship would contribute to the
success of the Spaniards. Meantime Morillo arrived to examine the state
of the siege. He learnt that a reinforcement of 1800 French were at
this time in Pontevedra, about four leagues off. They had to cross the
bridge of St. Payo, over a river which discharges itself into the head
of the Bay of Vigo, and Morillo immediately took measures for defending
the passage. From Don Juan Antonio Gago, an inhabitant of Marin, who
was at the head of 500 peasants, he obtained two eight-pounders, and
from the town of Redondella one twenty-four and two eighteen-pounders.
With these means of defence he entrusted this position to Don Juan de
O’Dogherty, a lieutenant in the Spanish navy, who had the command of
three gun-boats. While he was taking these necessary measures, part of
Romana’s army, which Soult boasted of having destroyed a fortnight
before, drove the enemy back from Pontevedra, and took possession of
the town. Morillo joined them; and being of opinion that the reduction
of Vigo was the most important object which could then be undertaken,
they proceeded to that place.
♦RECAPTURE OF THAT PLACE.♦
The French governor Chalot, a _chef d’escadron_, had replied to
every summons which Tenreyro sent him, that he was not authorised
to surrender to peasantry. Captain M’Kinley having now arrived, he
was again summoned to surrender, and negotiations were begun, which
continued till the third day, when Morillo joined the besiegers with
the force from Pontevedra, ♦MARCH 26.♦ consisting of new levies and
retired veterans, 1500 of whom had come forward to assist in the
deliverance of their country; a council of war was held, by which
Morillo was appointed commander-in-chief, and requested to assume
the title of colonel, for the sake of appearing of more consequence
to M. Chalot, whose complaint it was, that he was not summoned by an
officer of sufficient rank. Having been thus ♦MARCH 27.♦ promoted
to accommodate the _chef d’escadron_, he sent him a summons in due
form to surrender within two hours. Chalot replied, that he could not
possibly capitulate till he had heard the opinion of the council of
war, of which he was president; the members were at present dispersed,
and he required twenty-four hours to collect them. Morillo returned a
verbal answer, that he granted him another two hours, and the French,
after ineffectually attempting to prolong the term, delivered in their
proposals of capitulation, which were, that they should march out with
arms, baggage, the whole of their equipage, and with the honours of
war; that they should be conveyed in English vessels to the nearest
French port, on parole not to bear arms against Spain or her allies
till exchanged, or till peace should have taken place; that the money
belonging to the French government, and destined for the payment of
the troops, should remain in the hands of the paymaster, who was
accountable for it; and that the papers relating to the accounts of
the regiments should be preserved; finally, that the troops should
not lay down their arms, nor the town and forts be delivered up, till
the moment of embarking. Morillo, with the three French officers
who brought these proposals, and two Spaniards, went on board the
Lively, to lay them before Captain M’Kinley, and answer them with his
concurrence. The answer was in a spirit becoming England and Spain.
The garrison were required to ground their arms on the glacis, and
surrender themselves prisoners of war, the officers being allowed to
retain their swords and wearing apparel, nothing more. The demand
respecting the money was refused; the place was to be taken possession
of as soon as the French grounded their arms, and if these articles
were not ratified within an hour, hostilities were to recommence.
The officers who were sent to negotiate agreed to these terms, but the
ratification was delayed beyond the hour allotted; and the Spaniards,
who were prepared to execute what they had threatened, began the
assault between eight and nine at night; while those who had muskets
kept up a fire upon the enemy, others began to hew down the gates. An
old man particularly distinguished himself at the gate of Camboa, by
the vigour with which he laid on his strokes, splintering the wood,
and when a ball went through him, by the composure with which he died,
happy to have fallen in the discharge of his duty, and in the hour of
victory. D. Bernardo Gonzalez, the commanding officer of the detachment
from Pontevedra, sprang forward, and taking up the axe of the dead,
continued the same work, notwithstanding he was thrice wounded; till a
fourth wound disabled him, and he was borne away: seven Spaniards fell
at this point. Meantime Morillo was informed that the capitulation was
now ratified, and forcing his way through the ranks amidst the fire,
with great difficulty he made himself heard, and put a stop to the
assault.
On the following morning, when Morillo had made preparations to enter
and occupy the place, information was brought him from the little
town of Porriño, that a reinforcement from Tuy was on the way to the
French. Porriño is about a league to the eastward of the road between
these two places, and equidistant about two leagues from both. News,
therefore, could not be brought so soon but that the troops must
closely follow it. Morillo instantly sent off a part of his force
as secretly as possible to intercept them, and he remained hurrying
the embarkation of the French, by telling them that he could not
restrain the rage of the peasantry. How well they had deserved any
vengeance which the peasantry could inflict the garrison were perfectly
conscious, and were therefore as eager to get on board as Morillo was
to see them there. In this haste, the baggage could not be examined
conformably to the capitulation, for the hurry of both parties was
increased by hearing a firing from the town. The troops from Tuy had
arrived under its walls, and, to their astonishment, a fire was opened
upon them. They were attacked, routed, and pursued with such vigour,
that out of 450, not more than a fifth part escaped; seventy-two were
taken prisoners, and sent on board to join their countrymen; the
rest were either killed or wounded. The military chest, containing
117,000 francs, had been delivered up according to the terms; but an
examination of the baggage was thought necessary; about 20,000 more
were discovered; and the whole of both[10] sums was distributed among
the troops and peasantry. Never had a more motley army been assembled:
... men of all ranks and professions bore arms together at this time
in Galicia; among those who distinguished themselves were soldiers and
sailors; D. Francisco Sanchez Villamarin, the Alferez of a band of
students from Santiago; the Abbot of Valladares, and the first preacher
of the Franciscans, Fr. Andres Villagelvi.
♦BLOCKADE OF TUY.♦
The French had at this time 5000 men at Santiago, where they were
fortifying themselves. Morillo hastened to place Pontevedra in a state
of defence against them, and to secure the bridge of S. Payo, that
they might not be able to form any farther junction; for they were now
calling in all their smaller detachments, and General Lamartiniere had
then collected about 3300 men in Tuy, including some 1200 invalids. A
fire which was opened against that place across the river from Valença
was soon silenced, and the efforts of the disorderly besiegers were
not more effectual. Report magnified their numbers to 20,000; but when
Barrios arrived to recompose the dispute between the General-Abbots, by
taking the command, he found only a fifth part of the estimated force,
and only a fourth of these provided with muskets. Having obtained six
pieces of cannon from Salvatierra and Vigo, and a scanty supply of
ammunition from the same places, from Bayona, and from his Portugueze
neighbours at Valença and Monçam, he carried on the blockade in spite
of all the efforts of the garrison.
♦1809. APRIL.
THE PORTUGUEZE RECROSS THE MINHO.♦
Marshal Soult was under no small anxiety for this place; he had
recommended it to Ney’s especial care; but he had reason to fear that
Ney would have sufficient employment for all his force; and he knew
what effect the fall of a second garrison would produce not upon the
people of the country alone, but also upon his own men; for he was not
ignorant that the better spirits in his army detested the service upon
which they were employed, and that many even of the worst dreaded it.
After entering Braga he dispatched a party of horse in that direction,
for of the many messengers whom he had sent to Tuy since he marched
from thence on his expedition into Portugal, not one had returned.
They learnt at Barcellos that it was blockaded, that it had thrown
shells into Valença, and that the garrison were strong enough to sally
and incommode the besiegers. Soult could take no measures then for
their relief, and he supposed that the news of his success in Portugal
would alone relieve them to a considerable degree, by drawing off the
Portugueze from the blockade: so in fact it proved; they recrossed the
Minho as soon as they heard of his entrance into Braga, and it was
their departure which enabled Lamartiniere to make his unfortunate
attempt for relieving Vigo.
♦THE FRENCH IN TUY RELIEVED AND WITHDRAWN.♦
Having removed his sick and wounded from Braga to Porto, for they
were safe nowhere but under the immediate protection of the army, the
Marshal sent Generals Graindorges and Heudelet to relieve Tuy and
subdue the intermediate country, where the Portugueze General Botelho
had put the Corregidor of Barcellos to death for having welcomed the
French on their former reconnoissance from Braga. They entered ♦APRIL
8.♦ Ponte de Lima after some resistance; the weak and dilapidated
fortress of Valença was surrendered to them, and Barrios, who upon
♦APRIL 10.♦ tidings of their movements had made an unsuccessful attack
upon Tuy, retired during the night to S. Comba. The French boasted
that Lapella and Monçam, Villa Nova and Caminha had opened their
gates to them, and that the fort of Insoa, at the mouth of the Minho,
had capitulated: the names carried as lofty a sound as if the places
were of any strength, or possessed any importance, or could have been
defended against them, or held by them. But in fact the only advantage
expected or derived from the expedition was that of removing with all
speed the garrison and all the moveable effects first from Tuy to
Valença, that they might be on the safer side of the Minho, and then
with the least possible delay to Porto. In that city Marshal Soult
remained, unable to prosecute his plans of conquest, and not more in
hope of co-operation from Lapisse and Victor, than in apprehension that
a British force might anticipate their tardy movements.
CHAPTER XX.
OPERATIONS IN LA MANCHA AND EXTREMADURA. BATTLES OF CIUDAD REAL AND
MEDELLIN.
♦1809. MARCH.♦
Marshal Soult imputed the failure of his expedition to a deviation from
the plan which Buonaparte had prescribed, in not taking possession of
Ciudad Rodrigo. Lapisse had been prevented from doing this when it
might have been done without difficulty, by the unexpected appearance
of Sir Robert Wilson in that quarter; and Victor, who might have
taken the place in spite of any resistance which could then have been
opposed, was employed in operations more likely to gratify the pride
of the French, but of much less importance to the iniquitous cause in
which they were engaged.
♦PLANS OF THE INTRUSIVE GOVERNMENT.♦
Reasons, however, were not wanting for this change of plan. The danger
from the spirit of the people in Galicia and in Portugal had either
not been foreseen, or disregarded; while the French, well knowing in
how short a time men of any nation may be made efficient soldiers by
good discipline, and seeing with what celerity, after so many severe
defeats, the armies of La Carolina and Extremadura had been brought
into the field, deemed it necessary to attack those armies before
they should become formidable, and destroy them, as far as their
destruction could be effected by the most merciless carnage, ... for
such Buonaparte’s generals, to whose pleasure the government of Spain
was in fact entrusted, were determined to make. They had been trained
in the school of the Revolution, and the temper which they had acquired
there fitted them for the service of such a master; and Joseph’s
miserable ministers, who had penned their edicts of extermination in
the hope of intimidating their countrymen, had the misery of knowing
that those edicts were acted upon to the letter. Wrung with compunction
their hearts were, for some of them had begun life with good hearts,
generous feelings, and upright intentions; but having allowed
themselves to be engaged in an evil cause, they were now so far in
blood, that one deadly sin drew on another, in dreadful and necessary
series.
♦EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON THE FRENCH SOLDIERY.♦
By the letters which were intercepted at this time it appeared that
mothers and wives in France congratulated themselves if the objects of
their affection were employed in Spain, rather than in the Austrian
war, so little did they apprehend the real and dreadful character
of such a service. The armies in La Mancha were not better supplied
than those in Galicia; weeks sometimes elapsed in which they received
neither bread for themselves nor barley for their horses, having to
subsist as they could by chance and by plunder. This mode of life had
given them the ferocity and the temper of banditti, and would have
led to the total subversion of discipline among any soldiers less apt
for discipline than the French. The infantry sometimes murmured under
their privations, delivered their opinions freely, and held sometimes
towards their officers a language which might be deemed insolent; but a
jest produced more effect upon them than a reprimand, a good-humoured
reply brought them into good humour; and the prospect of action giving
them a hope of discharging their ill feelings upon the Spaniards,
always animated them, and made them alert in obedience. The cavalry had
better means of providing for themselves, and more opportunities of
plunder; they therefore were always respectful as well as submissive to
their officers, lest they should be dismounted and deprived of these
advantages. The character of the service in which they were incessantly
employed gave both to men and horse a sort of Tartar-like sagacity
which perhaps had never before been seen among the troops of a highly
civilized people. Savages could scarcely have been more quick-sighted
in discovering a pass, detecting an ambush, or descrying a distant
enemy. And the attachment between horse and rider became such, that
if a trooper waking from sleep saw by the condition of his beast that
in a fit of drunkenness he had over-ridden or any ways abused it, he
would in the first emotions of self-reproach abjure wine and shed
tears, with imprecations upon himself, go on foot whenever he could
to spare the horse, and give him the bread which should have been his
own portion. And yet this humanizing feeling did not render them more
humane toward their enemies. Since the religious wars in France no
contest had been carried on with so ferocious a spirit on both sides.
That cruelty which in the middle ages was common to all nations had
been continued among the Spaniards by the effects of the Inquisition,
and by their bull-fights, ... among the French by the inhuman character
of their old laws, and afterwards by the Revolution; on both sides it
was called into full action, retaliation provoking retaliation, and
revenge. Even the cheerfulness of the French, which is their peculiar
and happy characteristic, which if not a virtue itself, is connected
with many virtues, and without which no virtue can have its proper
grace, ... even that quality was corrupted by the dreadful warfare in
which they were engaged. Light minds go beyond the point of fortitude
in that disregard of death which the continual presence of danger
necessarily induces. That which the wise and good regard with silent
composure is to them a theme for bravados and heart-hardening mockery.
It became common ♦ROCCA, 84, 87.♦ for the French, when they recognised
a comrade among the slain, to notice him not by any expression of
natural feeling, but by some coarse and unfeeling jest. The evil here
was to themselves alone; but their oppressions were rendered more
intolerable, and their cruelties more devilish, because they were
exercised mirthfully.
♦TEMPER OF THE SPANISH GENERALS IN LA MANCHA AND EXTREMADURA.♦
The armies under Cartaojal and Cuesta were at this time in such
a state that they deserved to have been better commanded, if the
government had known where to look for better commanders. With all
Cuesta’s good qualities, his popularity among the troops, his sure
integrity, his courage, and the enterprising energy which in spite of
age and infirmities he was capable of exerting, caprice, obstinacy,
and a desperate rashness which no experience could correct, made him
a most unfit man to be trusted with such a stake in such times. All
his desire was to meet the enemy in fair battle, where he could draw
out his men in full display; and if all his men had been as thoroughly
brave as himself, the old man’s system would not have been erroneous.
Cartaojal, on the contrary, was so convinced that discipline was every
thing, and that the best thing which could be done with his troops was
to drill them, that he let slip fair opportunities of exercising them
in successful enterprise. It seems almost as if a fatality overruled
the councils of the Spaniards, both in the cabinet and in the field;
and that if these generals had merely been interchanged, Cartaojal’s
caution might have saved the Extremaduran army, and Cuesta’s enterprise
have seized the advantages which were presented to that of La Carolina.
If severe measures could have restored discipline, they were not
wanting; and they were used with such effect as for a time to stop
desertion. ♦REFORMS IN THE SPANISH ARMY.♦ One essential reform was
introduced. All the infantry officers were till this time mounted, and
this practice occasioned a great consumption of forage when forage
could hardly be obtained for the cavalry; it led also to these farther
inconveniences, that the march of the columns was never conducted
as it ought, for want of the immediate presence and attention of
the officers; and that in case of retreat the mounted officer had a
facility for expediting his escape which might operate as a dangerous
temptation upon such officers in such times. No general could have
ventured upon this needful reformation without drawing upon himself the
ill-will of those whom it affected; the Junta, however, sent orders
that no person in the infantry under the rank of major (except the
adjutant) should be allowed a horse. This was done by British advice;
and if there had been no more jealousy of the British in inferior
agents than existed in the Central Junta, the cordial co-operation of
the two nations would have met with no obstruction.
♦THE DUQUE DE ALBURQUERQUE.♦
The most efficient arm of Cartaojal’s force was the cavalry. It had
been under the Marquez de Palacios, who had the reputation of being the
best cavalry officer in Spain, and was at this time commanded by the
Duque de Alburquerque, D. Jose Maria de la Cueva. This nobleman, then
in his thirty-fifth year, united in his own person many of those names
which are most illustrious in Spanish history, and he had inherited
also in no diminished portion the best and noblest qualities of that
proud ancestry. His education had been neglected, so that his mind was
not stored like Romana’s, neither was it equally under self-government.
But his military talents were such as to impress upon all who knew
him the belief that if experience and opportunity had been afforded,
he would have ranked among the great captains of the age: for he
was ardent without being incautious, capable alike of planning with
clear forethought and executing with celerity, far-sighted, prompt in
decision, and above all endowed with that true and rare nobility of
soul which is essential to true greatness.
♦HE PROPOSES OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.♦
A man of this stamp wins the love of the soldiery as certainly as
he obtains their confidence. Hope became their ruling passion when
Alburquerque was present; and their success in some enterprises, and
the skill with which their commander baffled the movements of the
enemy in others, gave the fairest prospect of success if the system of
enterprise were persevered in. In pursuance of that system, and with
the intention of making a diversion in favour of Cuesta, against whom
there was reason to believe that the French were preparing a serious
attack, the Duke proposed to advance upon Toledo, where they had 4000
foot and 1500 horse, with 12,000 or 15,000 infantry, 4000 horse, and
twenty pieces of horse artillery; and perceiving but too well that
his reputation and popularity were regarded with jealous eyes, he
advised that the expedition should be not under his own command, but
that of a superior officer; and he represented to Cartaojal that the
object of forming and disciplining the raw troops would be carried on
more certainly and securely while that part of the army which was fit
for service occupied the enemy by harassing and keeping them on the
alarm. The plan was too bold for one of Cartaojal’s temper; he saw the
necessity of training the army, and did not consider that enterprise is
the best training, and the only, that can be carried on within reach of
an active enemy. He ordered him, however, to advance with 2000 horse
and four pieces of artillery; and the Duke felt that, as an attempt
made with such a force could only end in a precipitate retreat, the
intention must be to wreck his reputation by exposing him to certain
failure.
♦THEY ARE UNDERTAKEN WHEN TOO LATE.♦
His representations, however, to the Junta were so well seconded, that
instructions came for advancing upon Toledo with all the disposable
force of the army. But when Cartaojal communicated this to the Duke,
he ordered him to deliver up the command of the vanguard to D. Juan
Bernuy, and march himself immediately with Bassecourt’s and Echavarri’s
divisions of 3500 men and 200 cavalry for Guadalupe, to reinforce
Cuesta. It was sufficiently mortifying ♦THE DUKE SENT TO JOIN CUESTA.♦
for the Duke to be removed from the cavalry which had acquired credit
and confidence while he was at their head, and this too at the moment
when the measure which he had so strenuously urged was about to be
undertaken; but it was more painful to know that the attempt had been
delayed till there was no longer any reasonable prospect of success.
With the little body of new-raised infantry which was now placed under
his command he began his march for Extremadura, and the ill-fated army
of La Carolina commenced its operations at a moment when it was thus
deprived of the only General who possessed its confidence.
♦CARTAOJAL ADVANCES AGAINST THE FRENCH.♦
The head-quarters of that army were at Ciudad Real, the cavalry
occupying a line from Manzanares to that city through Damiel, Torralva,
and Carrion, and the infantry in the towns to the left and in the rear
of Valdepenas. Cartaojal thought this a most advantageous position,
having the Sierra Morena behind him as a sure refuge if he were
defeated, whereas the enemy, were they to be repulsed in an attack,
would be exposed in the open plains, and have to cross the Zeucara
and the Guadiana in their flight. Having advanced to Yebenes, and
found the French ready to advance themselves, Cartaojal retreated upon
Consuegra; that place, to his surprise, was occupied by the enemy in
great strength: he fell back, therefore, to his former position, in the
advantage of which he trusted, ... and there, eight and forty hours
after he had commenced this useless and harassing movement, the French
appeared in pursuit, drove in his cavalry, and prepared to attack him
in force on the following morning. They were commanded by General
Sebastiani, who had superseded Marshal Lefebvre. The action which
♦ROUT OF THE CAROLINA ARMY AT CIUDAD REAL.♦ ensued is, even upon their
own accounts, disgraceful to both parties; to the Spaniards, because
♦MARCH 17.♦ they were successively driven from every point where they
attempted to stand, and pursued to the entrance of the Sierra; to the
conquerors, because Sebastiani stated in his official report that the
Spaniards fled on the first charge without resistance, and that he
had sabred more than 3000 of them in their flight. Eighteen pieces
of cannon, and 4000 prisoners, including nearly 200 officers, were,
according to the same report, taken. The fugitives felt a confidence
in the Sierra which they had not done in their General, and collected
in considerable numbers at Despeñaperros, Venta Quemada, and Montizon;
head-quarters were established in the village of S. Elena, two leagues
in advance of Carolina, and the French, without pursuing them into the
mountains, halted at Santa Cruz, awaiting there the success of Victor’s
operations against Cuesta.
♦OPERATIONS OF MARSHAL VICTOR.♦
Marshal Victor’s corps, leaving La Mancha about the middle of the
preceding month, occupied a line upon the Tagus from Talavera to
Almaraz; his head-quarters were at the latter place, where he was
preparing materials for a floating bridge, Cuesta having blown up the
arches of the Puente de Almaraz. A bridge was necessary here, because,
though they could have crossed the river at two other points, there
was no road from either of those points practicable for artillery.
But the bridge could not be constructed while the Spaniards occupied
a post which effectually commanded the passage. Cuesta was aware of
these preparations, and also that there was an intention of passing
over a detachment higher up to attack him on that flank; accordingly he
reinforced it, and removed his head-quarters from Jaraicejo to Puerto
de Miravete, that he might be near the scene of operations.
♦THE FRENCH CROSS THE PUENTE DEL ARZOBISPO.♦
The French detachment, as he had foreseen, effected their passage
at Puente del Arzobispo, or the Archbishop’s Bridge, so called from
its founder, D. Pedro Tenorio. A wooden bridge ♦MARCH 16.♦ which
existed in his days had been swept away by a flood; and as it was
there that pilgrims from the western side of the river passed to pay
their devotions to the famous image of our Lady of Guadalupe, he
built the present edifice of stone, and founded an hospital for their
accommodation, and a town, which he named Villa Franca, but which soon
took its appellation more conveniently from the bridge. It became
a point of considerable importance in the campaigns of this year.
The enemy crossed ♦MARCH 17.♦ with little or no resistance, and the
advanced parties of the Spaniards fell back upon the division which
was stationed at La Mesa de Ibor, and thence, after an unsuccessful
stand, to the village of Campillo, but in good order; their whole
conduct having been such as to satisfy the Commander-in-chief, who
occupied a strong position, and expected that he should well be able to
repel this division of the enemy, while Camp-Marshal Henestrosa, with
the vanguard, would prevent their main body from establishing their
bridge at Almaraz.
♦CUESTA RETREATS FROM THE PUERTO DE MIRAVETE.♦
But the French, who had crossed at Arzobispo, after dislodging the
Spaniards from their positions at Mesa de Ibor and Fresnedoso, divided
into two columns; the one proceeded by the circuitous way of Deleitosa
and Torrecillas, with the intent of getting into Cuesta’s rear, between
Jaraicejo and Miravete, and thus to cut off his communication and
supplies; the other marched by Valduaña toward the bridge of Almaraz,
to dislodge Henestrosa, and thereby free the passage of the river.
Cuesta’s army consisted of about 16,000 men; the French were little
if at all superior in numbers, but he believed that they had 20,000
foot and 3000 cavalry; and learning that Henestrosa, under the belief
that his right was threatened by a superior force, had withdrawn from
his post, and that the enemy had already begun to cross the Tagus,
he determined to retreat toward Truxillo, lest he should be attacked
at the same time both in the front and in the rear. This ♦MARCH 18.♦
brave old man was cautious when he ought to have been bold, and rash
in enterprise when he ought to have been cautious. Had Henestrosa been
supported in time (for there had been time enough to support him),
the ground was so strong, and the Spaniards in such a temper, that
the French could hardly have reached the position at Miravete without
sustaining a loss severe enough to have crippled them. In pursuance of
this unwise resolution, on the night of the 18th he began his retreat,
with the intention of forcing his way through the French corps, which
he expected to fall in with, and of taking up the best position he
could find for his own subsistence, and for covering the frontiers
of Andalusia. But by thus abandoning an excellent position, he left
Extremadura open to a hungry enemy.
♦SKIRMISHES AT TRUXILLO AND MIAJADAS.♦
When the Central Junta were informed of these movements, they imputed
the disastrous measure to Henestrosa’s abandonment of his post, and
ordered Cuesta to proceed against him with all the rigour of the law.
But the old General, though disposed at first to condemn him, was too
generous to do this. He replied that the Camp-Marshal had in all other
cases behaved well, and with a courage amounting to rashness, and that
in this he had acted only under an error of judgement. He met with no
enemies on his night march, and halting in the morning beyond the Rio
Monte, learnt that the detachment which he had expected to encounter
was taking a direction for Truxillo. To Truxillo he proceeded on his
retreat, and, leaving Henestrosa to cover that city, took up a position
at the Puerto de Santa Cruz, forty miles from the stronger pass whence
he had retreated. There it was his intention to wait till it should
be seen whether Alburquerque’s division could effect its junction,
and whether it ♦MARCH 20.♦ would make him equal to the enemy. On the
following morning Henestrosa was attacked, and driven to a little
bridge on the other side of Truxillo: there he repulsed the enemy, and
the skirmishing continued all day, with equal loss on either side,
the Spaniards behaving in such a manner as to increase the General’s
confidence in his troops. Cuesta expected now to be attacked on the
morrow, either in front or on his left toward the village of Abertura,
and had made up his mind to abide an action. But Cuesta’s resolutions
were sometimes changed with as little consideration as they had been
taken, for he was a man who acted more frequently upon the impulse
of the moment than upon reflection. The whole of Victor’s force was
collected at Truxillo; his advanced parties kept the Spaniards upon
the alarm as well as the alert, and Cuesta then began to apprehend
that the Puerto de S. Cruz was not defensible against the superior
force that would be brought against him, especially as the ground was
not favourable for cavalry. In the morning, therefore, he recommenced
his retreat, evidently not knowing whither, and with no determined
purpose, but in good order and in good heart, for, injudicious and
ruinous as all the late movements had been, the men were not yet
dispirited. While he was halting near Miajadas to refresh the troops,
the _chasseurs_ of the enemy’s advanced guard approached near enough to
expose themselves; the advantage was well taken, and the French Colonel
tore his hair in an agony of grief when he saw some hundred and fifty
of his ♦ROCCA, 93.♦ finest men cut down. This success was obtained by
the regiments of Infante and Almanza. It raised the spirits of the men,
a feeling of useful emulation was showing itself, and Cuesta formed the
wise resolution (if he had been steady enough in his purposes to have
kept it) of exercising them in various movements from one position to
another, without exposing them in battle, and thus detaining the enemy
till Cartaojal’s advance upon Toledo should operate as a diversion
in his favour. That same evening, therefore, he retired to Medellin;
and the next day, thinking it probable that if he remained the French
would attack him on the morrow, he marched for Campanario, to join
Alburquerque, who with his little division was coming by way of Aguda
and Garbayuela. He did not, however, remain there till the junction
was effected, but moved to Valle de la Serena, chiefly for the sake of
facilitating his supplies. Some magazines had fallen into the enemy’s
hands at Truxillo, one of the ill consequences arising from his rash
retreat; there was no want of food in that as yet unravaged country,
but he complained to the government of the incapacity and irregularity
of all the persons employed in that department, and protested that
unless this evil was remedied it would be impossible for him to
maintain discipline, or prevent dispersion.
♦JUNCTION WITH ALBURQUERQUE’S DIVISION.♦
The information which Cuesta received at this time, that a train of
heavy artillery had been sent from Madrid toward Extremadura, made
him apprehend the chief object of the enemy was to lay siege to
Badajoz. The possession of that fortress was so important toward the
success of their operations against Portugal, that this design had
been apprehended as soon as they became masters of the field, and the
Governor had been repeatedly charged to omit no means for putting it
in a good state of defence. Forming a new plan in consequence of this,
Cuesta informed the Central Junta that he should annoy the besiegers,
and cut off their communication with Madrid. But he had no sooner
effected his junction with Alburquerque than he determined upon seeking
the enemy, and offering battle in the first favourable situation. It
was not the addition of strength which induced him to this measure,
for he had expected to meet 6000 men, and had found little more than
half that number; ... but long irresolution usually ends in some rash
resolve.
♦CUESTA OFFERS BATTLE AT MEDELLIN.♦
Having forsaken that strong ground, which, if it had been defended
as well as it was wisely chosen, would have covered Extremadura,
it was as much Cuesta’s policy to have avoided an action now as it
had been then to have stood an attack, for he knew that he might
expect a British army to co-operate with him. Sometimes as facile and
vacillating as he was obstinate and impracticable at others, no man was
more unfit to command an army in critical times; and yet the honest
originality of his character, his fearless and buoyant spirit which
nothing could cast down, his energy which neither age nor infirmity
had abated, and the warmth of his heart as well as his temper, had won
for him in no common degree the attachment not of the soldiers alone,
but of those even who perceived and lamented his errors. The enemy at
this time occupied Merida and Medellin: the latter town, memorable as
having been the birth-place of Hernan Cortes, stands on the left bank
of the Guadiana, in a wide and open plain, without tree or cover of
any kind. ♦MARCH 28.♦ On that plain Cuesta formed his whole force in
one line, of about a league in extent, without any reserve, disdaining
all advantage of ground, as if he had desired nothing but a fair field
and mere individual courage were to decide the day. His army consisted
of 20,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry. The vanguard, under Henestrosa,
and the Duque del Parque’s division, formed the left, which Cuesta
took under his own charge, as being placed on the highest ground, from
whence he could overlook the field. The centre was under D. Francisco
de Trias. D. Francisco de Eguia, who was second in command, was with
the right wing, which consisted of the Marques de Portago’s division
and Alburquerque’s, the Duke having with him his own horse. The cavalry
were on the left, that being the point where the French presented the
greatest force.
♦BATTLE OF MEDELLIN.♦
Victor’s army consisted of about 18,000 foot and 2500 horse. He had
collected his whole force there, for the purpose of striking an
efficient blow, and destroying, if that were possible, the Spanish
army, in pursuance of the murderous system upon which he had been
instructed to act. They were formed in an arc between the Guadiana
and a cultivated ravine which extends from Medellin to the village
of Mengabril; Lasalle’s division of light cavalry on the left, the
division of German infantry in the centre, in large close columns; the
dragoons under General Latour-Maubourg on the right, the divisions
of Villate and Ruffin in reserve; their front was covered by six
batteries of four guns each. The action began about eleven o’clock.
These batteries opened on the Spanish infantry, who were ordered
by Cuesta to charge with the bayonet and take them. The order was
bravely obeyed; two regiments of French dragoons charged the foot,
and were repulsed with loss: the German division formed itself into
a square, and resisted with such difficulty the resolute attack of
the Spaniards, that Cuesta was in full hope of a complete victory,
and Victor not without apprehensions of a defeat, till part of his
reserve succeeded in enabling his infantry to keep their ground. The
Spaniards on the left had taken the first battery; a strong body of
horse, protected by a column of infantry, advanced to recover it, and
at that moment the whole of the Spanish cavalry on the ♦Misconduct of
the Spanish cavalry.♦ left took panic, and without facing the foe,
without attempting to make the slightest stand, fled in the greatest
disorder from the field, most of them to the distance of many leagues.
Instances of such scandalous panic were but too frequent in the Spanish
armies during the war, but in no instance was it more fatal or more
unaccountable than in this; for the day was going on well, the infantry
were in good heart, the advantage was on their side; and the regiments
which at that crisis disgraced themselves, and betrayed their country,
had displayed both skill and courage during the retreat from the Tagus,
and had distinguished themselves in the affair near Miajadas.
Cuesta, who was at the other end of the wing when he saw this shameful
abandonment, clapped spurs to his horse in the hope of rallying them;
his staff followed, ... but in vain; the enemy, quick in seizing
opportunity, turned the left, which was thus exposed, and as there
was no second line or reserve, defeat then became ♦CUESTA THROWN, AND
WOUNDED.♦ inevitable. The old General was thrown, and wounded in the
foot, and not without great difficulty rescued and saved from capture
by the exertion of his two nephews and some other brave and faithful
officers. But the day was irrecoverably lost; and the French, having
routed the left wing, turned upon the centre and the right.
♦DISPERSION OF THE SPANISH ARMY.♦
The right wing of the Spaniards, meantime, had made the enemy give
ground, and were following up their success; but Alburquerque, seeing
what had occurred in the other flank, proposed to form in close columns
of battalions, and begin their retreat. Eguia overruled this, saying he
had no instructions to that effect, and not daring even in this evident
emergence to act upon his own responsibility. Indeed it is affirmed,
that not one of Cuesta’s officers knew his intention of giving battle
an hour before the action began. Affairs were every moment growing
worse, and Eguia having left the right of the line, the Duke gave the
necessary command; but it had been delayed too long; the whole force of
the French artillery was concentred upon these columns, who were now
the only troops that remained unbroken; a total dispersion took place;
and the enemy, forming a chain of cavalry all round the routed army,
executed their orders, which were to give no quarter. They had suffered
enough in the action to make them obey this atrocious command with
good will. They had themselves 4000 men killed and wounded, ... nearly
a fifth of their whole force; their official statement of the Spanish
loss made it 7000 killed; other accounts carried it to 12,000. Cuesta
could only state that it was very great, and ascertain that a hundred
and seventy officers of infantry and ten of cavalry were killed,
wounded, or missing.
♦NO QUARTER GIVEN.♦
Weariness, rather than compunction, on the part of the French, at
length put a stop to the carnage, and the account of prisoners is
variously stated from three thousand to seven; but it is certain that
not two ever reached Madrid. A wounded Spanish officer was brought
into the room where Victor was at supper, and the French Marshal said
to him, “If my orders had been obeyed, sir, you would not have been
here.” Those orders had been obeyed too well. The dragoons that night
in the French camp were rubbing their sword arms with soap and spirits,
to recover the muscles from the strains of that day’s slaughter. Their
cruelty was not satiated even with this success. A peasant in one of
the near villages had a son who was in Cuesta’s army, where he had
served for some time. When the army drew near Medellin, this Juan went
to his father’s house, and his conversation induced his two brothers,
Antonio and Carlos, to go with him as volunteers. Juan was never
seen after the battle; but the father upon searching the field found
Antonio’s body, and the other brother, wounded, and weeping over it. He
removed the dead son and the living one to his cottage, that the one
might receive Christian burial, and the other such help as might have
restored him. A party of the French, in their work of pillage, entered
the house, and finding a wounded Spaniard there, deliberately shot him,
before his father’s face.
♦ESCAPE OF ALBURQUERQUE.♦
When the dispersion of his columns took place, the Duke of Alburquerque
found his retreat completely cut off. Four officers were with him; with
these he advanced upon the French cordon of cavalry, and when at the
distance of about an hundred yards, turning to one of his companions,
he said, “You see that officer of chasseurs so gaily caparisoned? I
will have him down in a moment.” He then spurred his horse, and rode
at him full speed: of course his companions followed; ... the French
officer was startled, and moved rapidly on one side, several of the
chasseurs imitated his movement, and Alburquerque with his friends got
through the opening they had thus made. D. Miguel de Alava was one of
those friends; he had behaved with distinguished gallantry that day,
and just before the dispersion of the last battalions, sword in hand,
singly retook a Spanish nine-pounder from two French dragoons who had
taken possession of it. Soon after they had broken through, and were
still hotly pursued, a wounded artilleryman besought Alava to save him
from the general massacre. “Get up behind me,” was the answer, “and I
will carry you off, or we will perish together.” This little party,
happily for Spain, effected their escape. About midnight they arrived
at a lone farm-house, far enough from the field to feel themselves in
safety; and having got some wood upon the fire, and lighted their
cigars, they agreed unanimously that the loss of the battle was of
no[11] importance. Such was the spirit of the Spaniards; a spirit which
no misfortunes could abate, which no defeats could subdue.
♦THE REMAINS OF THE SPANISH ARMY COLLECT.♦
The battle itself, most unfortunate as it was, afforded Cuesta some
vindication for the error which he had committed in risking it. It
had been fought so well by the infantry, that they had obtained, and
that for a considerable time, a decided advantage, till the horse
took fright, and abandoned them. But it was after the defeat that
the strength of the old man’s character appeared with full effect;
and certainly on that memorable occasion both the General and the
government proved themselves worthy of their country and their cause.
The advance of the French was impeded by the weather, a storm of wind
and heavy rain having raged uninterruptedly for three days after the
battle, and swollen the brooks so as to render them like rivers. A
mishap also had befallen them at Almaraz, where their bridge gave way
while some ammunition carts were passing: many lives were lost, and the
operations of the army were delayed in consequence. They collected,
however, in and about Merida, and their advanced parties appeared at
Almendralejo and Villa Franca. This seemed to indicate an intention of
entering Andalusia; and Cuesta was of opinion, that, knowing the total
dispersion of his army, they would not hesitate at dividing their own
force, and execute this design with one part, while they laid siege
with the other to Badajoz, which was not in a state for making a long
military defence. He urged the government to send all the disposable
force in Andalusia to S. Olalla without delay; between that place and
Ronquillo, he said, was the only position where they could resist the
enemy with good probability of success, provided there were troops, and
artillery and subsistence.
♦CUESTA DISGRACES THOSE WHO HAD BEHAVED ILL.♦
He had appointed Llerena as the rallying point for the fugitives. The
infantry came slowly in, but when Cuesta arrived he found that the
cavalry had collected there with little diminution. He thanked the army
in his general orders for their good conduct at Medellin, excepting by
name the horse regiments which had so disgracefully taken flight, and
thereby occasioned that to be a defeat, which, if they had done their
duty like the foot, would have proved a most glorious and important
victory. For this offence he suspended three Colonels from their rank.
It does not appear that any heavier punishment was inflicted: ... the
fault had been too general to fix it upon individuals; ... and if
recourse had been had to lot, it might have fallen upon men who, with
the best heart and will, had not been able in that precipitate ♦1809.
APRIL.♦ movement to check either their companions or their horses. The
privates were disgraced by having one of their pistols taken from them,
till by some good service they should regain the honour which they had
lost.
♦THE JUNTA ACT WISELY AND GENEROUSLY UPON THESE DEFEATS.♦
It was reported that the Central Junta upon the first intelligence
of the defeat had fled from Seville. The danger was considered so
imminent, that they had deliberated concerning their removal; and the
Junta of Seville, who had been consulted, proposed that if such a
measure were adopted, absolute power should be left in their hands. But
the government did nothing precipitately, and on no occasion throughout
the war did it display more magnanimity or so much energy as at this
time of trial. The same day brought them tidings of the defeat at
Ciudad Real and of that at Medellin; the same gazette communicated
both to the people. There was nothing to qualify the disgrace and loss
which Cartaojal had sustained; he was therefore quietly removed from
the command. Whatever errors the Central Junta may have committed, no
other government ever exercised its power with such humanity in such
times, no other government ever made such just and humane allowances
for inexperience and weakness, nor dealt so generously with the
unfortunate. They decreed pensions to the widows and orphans of all who
had fallen at Medellin, in proportion to their rank and circumstances,
and a badge of distinction to those corps which the General should
commend; and they promoted all the officers who had distinguished
themselves. They pronounced that the General and the body of the army
had deserved well of their country. Knowing that Cuesta had been lamed
by his fall, they required him in all his dispatches to report the
state of his own health; and though they appointed D. Francisco de
Venegas to succeed Cartaojal, they placed both armies under Cuesta’s
orders, giving him the rank of Captain-general. In the preamble to
this decree they said that all the details of the battle tended to
console them for its loss, and that the spirit of Hernan Cortes might
have beheld with joy the courage which his countrymen had manifested
upon the scene of his childhood. The example of that day, they said,
might make them hope that with perseverance they might form an infantry
capable of defending the national independence; an infantry that should
be the worthy rival and successor of those famous _Tercios_ which under
the best captains in the world had supported the glory of Spain in
Flanders and in Italy and in Germany.
♦THEIR APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE.♦
The Junta felt it necessary to defend themselves at this time
against the base enemies who charged the late calamities upon their
misconduct, and who were agitating the people of Seville by false
alarms, reporting that the French were within five leagues of that
city, and that the nation was betrayed and sold by its Government. In
reply to these senseless accusations the Junta appealed to the fact,
that in the course of two months it had set on foot two armies for
the defence of the Andalusias, consisting of 50,000 men and nearly
12,000 horse. This they had done beside the assistance which they had
afforded to other provinces; and when was it known that the injuries
which the ship sustains in a storm had been imputed to the pilot? The
Junta had issued an abominable edict, whereby, after denouncing the
punishment of death against all persons who should endeavour to raise
distrust of the existing Government, or to overturn it by exciting
popular commotions, they invited informers to denounce such persons
to ♦TRIBUNAL OF PUBLIC SAFETY.♦ the Tribunal of Public Safety which
they had instituted, holding out the promise of secresy and reward.
When this decree appeared Mr. Frere saw to what an atrocious system
of tyranny it might lead. Judging of the Junta by their individual
characters, he felt assured that they would each have shrunk from
carrying such measures into effect; but he was well aware how little
the personal characters of any men placed in such circumstances are to
be relied on, and apprehended that after some natural hesitation the
majority might either yield to the guidance of one or two members, more
violent and less scrupulous, or abandon themselves to the direction of
this Tribunal of Public Safety; the very name of which, he said, must
remind us of the worst revolutionary horrors. But though the State
Papers of the Junta were on most occasions wiser than their actions,
in this instance their conduct was better than their language; and
it now appeared, most honourably for the national character, that,
notwithstanding this public encouragement to the nefarious practice of
delation, not a single secret information had been laid. If any person,
said the Junta, had complaint to make, or suspicion to allege against
any of the public functionaries, let him lay his proofs before this
Tribunal. But this has not been done, and all the processes which that
Tribunal has instituted have been public prosecutions, not one upon the
accusation of an individual.
♦CORRESPONDENCE ON THE INTRUDER’S PART WITH THE JUNTA.♦
The Intruder and his partizans hoped at this time that the defeat and
dispersion of two armies on two succeeding days would break the spirit
of the Government, if not of the nation, and that the Junta might be
induced to secure themselves and their own possessions by submission.
Accordingly a Spanish traitor, by name Joaquim ♦APRIL 12.♦ Maria
Sotelo, addressed a letter from Merida to the vice-president, saying,
that the greater number of the provinces of Spain had sufficiently
suffered from the effects of war and conquest, and now the rest were
threatened with the same calamities. Filled with consternation, he
said, at the defeats of Cartaojal and Cuesta, the honourable Spaniards
at the court of Madrid, who could not contemplate without the most
poignant grief the desolation of their country, had implored the King
to alleviate the distresses of such provinces as were occupied by the
French troops, and to prevent them in those which were not yet in their
possession. To these prayers the King had attended, had ordered him
to announce his compliance to the Junta, and authorized him to confer
with such deputies as the Junta might appoint, on the best means of
fulfilling his wishes. He could not suppose that they would refuse to
take steps on which the salvation of Andalusia and the happiness of
the whole kingdom depended. And, as the business was most important
and most urgent, Sotelo represented, that it would be improper to
conduct it in writing, but that all the disputes and irregularities and
doubts which it would otherwise cause might be obviated by a personal
conference. On this ground, he hoped that deputies would be named to
confer with him.
The Junta replied, not to this traitor himself, but to Cuesta. “They
had not forgotten,” they said, “the character with which they were
invested, and the oath which they had taken, in unison with the wishes
of the nation. If Sotelo were the bearer of powers sufficiently
extensive to treat for the restitution of their King, and for the
immediate evacuation of the Spanish territory by the French troops,
let him publish them in the usual form, and they would be announced
to the allies of Spain. The Junta had no authority to listen to any
treaty, or terminate any transaction, which was not founded on the
basis of eternal justice. Any other principle of negotiation, without
benefiting the empire, would only tend to degrade the Junta, which
had entered into the most awful engagements to bury itself beneath
the ruins of the monarchy, rather than sanction any proposition which
should diminish the honour and independence of the Spanish people.”
This answer they desired Cuesta to transmit to the Intruder’s agent,
and they published the proposal and the reply. Perceiving, however,
of what importance the safety of the government was to the national
cause, and the danger therefore of associating it in the minds of
the people with any particular place of residence, in times when no
place was secure, they published a decree upon this subject. It began
by an avowal, that in their anxiety to provide immediate remedy for
the calamities which had befallen the armies of La Mancha and ♦APRIL
18.♦ Extremadura, they had imprudently hazarded their own safety by
remaining at Seville. But having provided for the reinforcement and
equipment of the troops, and furnished all the supplies which were
requisite for the defence of Andalusia, they had in cool consideration
reflected, that their security was inseparable from that of the state;
that the preserval of the deposit of the sovereignty entrusted into
their hands was the first of their obligations; and that they could not
again expose it to the danger of being destroyed, without doing wrong
to the nation which had confided it to them. The Speed with which the
tyrant of Europe advanced against Madrid in November, and sent troops
towards Aranjuez, made it apparent that a principal object of his
policy was to strike a blow at the government, and, seizing the body
which administered it, cut all the bonds of political association, and
thus throw the nation into confusion. These were still his objects:
trusting more to his cunning than his force, he still pursued the
government, hoping to get its members in his power, and then renew
the infamous scenes of Bayonne, by compelling them to authorize his
usurpation, or sacrificing them to his rage if they resisted his
seductions and his menaces. Thus to degrade the government in the eyes
of the nation itself would, he thought, be the best means of degrading
the nation also, and reducing it to that servitude, which, in the
insolence of his fortune, this tyrant designed to inflict upon Spain.
To frustrate these aims, they decreed, that, whenever the place of
their residence might be threatened, or when any other reason should
convince them of the utility of so doing, they would transfer the seat
of government elsewhere, where they might preserve the august deposit
of the sovereignty, and watch over the defence, the well-being, and
the prosperity of the nation. And they declared, that, whatever the
accidents of the war might be, the Junta would never abandon the
continent of Spain, while a single spot could be found in it where they
could establish themselves for defending the country against the force
and fraud of its perfidious enemy, as they had solemnly sworn to do.
♦MEASURES FOR SECURING BADAJOZ.♦
When the news of Cuesta’s defeat at Medellin reached Paris, it was
affirmed in the Moniteur, that by this battle Seville was laid open to
the French armies, and that probably by that time Lisbon also was once
more in their possession, ... so confident was the French government
of speedy and complete success. In the same confidence, and with the
hope of subduing the spirit of the Aragoneze, the French Governor of
Zaragoza ordered mass to be celebrated in the Church of the Pillar, for
the capture of Lisbon and Seville, as events which had taken place.
Soult would undoubtedly have advanced upon the Portugueze capital,
if he could have relied upon Victor’s movements; but that General
found that the battle of Medellin had rather raised the hopes of the
Spaniards than depressed them. His views were upon Badajoz. Aware
of this, the Government, with that promptitude which characterised
all their measures at this crisis, supplied the place with money and
arms, and addressed public letters to the Junta of that city and the
Governor, reminding them that Zaragoza had held out two months not
against the enemy alone, but against hunger and pestilence; and that
her defenders would be held in grateful and everlasting remembrance,
while the names of those who had so basely delivered up Coruña would be
handed down for lasting infamy from generation to generation. To the
General, D. Antonio Arce, they said, that true glory was to be gained
by overcoming great dangers, and an opportunity for such glory was now
afforded him. The Extremadurans were not less brave than the Aragoneze,
and Badajoz possessed a defence in her fortifications which had not
existed at Zaragoza. The soldier fought with best hope, and sacrificed
himself with most alacrity, when he saw his commander set the example;
and such an example would not be wanting in one whose ancestors filled
a distinguished place in the annals of their country. At all times
Extremadura had produced heroes. There had the Pizarros, and there had
Cortes been born, to be examples now for their countrymen.
♦A CRUSADE PROCLAIMED THERE AGAINST THE INVADERS.♦
Marshal Victor sent to summon Badajoz, though he was not prepared to
lay siege to it; but the pitiable state of the country rendered it
always possible that a governor might be found weak enough in principle
or in mind to betray his trust. A spirit however such as the time
required prevailed there, and the parties which he sent out in that
direction were attacked at advantage and driven back with loss. The
Junta informed the Government, that, in consideration of the sacrileges
which the enemy committed wherever they went, they were enlisting the
peasantry under the banner of the Crusade with which the misbelievers
in old times had been pursued and conquered. The Government approved
this measure, saying that if their forefathers had proclaimed crusades
for the recovery of the Holy Land, with much more reason now might they
have recourse to the same means for defending their religion in the
bosom of their own country against profanations more impious than had
been heard of in the darkest ages or among the most barbarous people.
And they directed that the persons who should be embodied in these new
corps should be distinguished by wearing a red cross on the breast.
The Central Junta entertained a thought that this might be extended
with good effect; but it did not spread; the feeling and the enthusiasm
denoted by such a badge would not have been partaken by the officers,
and it might have raised a temper in the men unfavourable to any
expected co-operation with their British allies.
♦REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE EJECTED RELIGIONERS.♦
Another measure which the Government adopted at this time was intended
to lessen the ill effect that the dispersion of so many monks and
friars was likely to produce. The same calamities which had set them
loose in every part of the country which the enemy had overrun,
deprived them also of their accustomed means of subsistence; and it was
but too probable that among those who took arms, as was very generally
done by those who were able to bear them, the licence of a military
life might lead to scandals which on every account it was desirable
to prevent. A Junta therefore was formed of persons holding high
stations in the different Religious Orders, the Prior of Zamora, who
was one of the members of the Government, being appointed President.
The business of this Junta was to dispose of those Religioners who,
having been driven from their cloisters (the edict said), were crying
night and day before the throne of a terrible God to revenge the blood
of their innocent brethren, which had so wantonly been shed. They were
to be distributed in towns, hospitals, and armies, as they might be
deemed most qualified; and the Generals were instructed not to receive
any persons of their profession unless they produced credentials or
commissions from this board.
♦PLANS OF THE INTRUSIVE GOVERNMENT.♦
Six thousand men had been detached from La Mancha to reinforce Victor
after the battle ♦APRIL 9.♦ of Medellin. His instructions were to
remain between Merida and Badajoz till he should receive advices of
Soult’s movements, and till Lapisse should join him. The Intrusive
Government persuaded themselves that the struggle would soon be
over, and Joseph waited only to hear from Marshal Ney of the total
destruction of Romana’s army, to give orders for marching against
Valencia. But the tide had now turned in Galicia; there came no
intelligence from Ney but what was disastrous; and Soult could neither
communicate with Victor nor with Lapisse, neither could they at this
time communicate with each other. Soult’s communication was cut off
by Silveira on the Tamega, by Trant on the Vouga, ... and Sir Robert
Wilson, by his position at Ciudad Rodrigo, cut off Lapisse equally
from co-operating with his countrymen in Portugal or in Extremadura.
♦SIR ROBERT WILSON’S CONDUCT AT CIUDAD RODRIGO.♦
Of how great importance that position was likely to become Mr.
Frere had perceived as soon as Sir John Moore’s army began their
dolorous retreat; and he had obtained from the Spanish Government
such reinforcement for the garrison as could be spared at a time when
demands for aid came upon them from all quarters. The command which
they conferred upon Sir Robert Wilson, disposed as the Spaniards were
to act heartily with him, was of more consequence than any succour
which they could then afford. He meantime had spared no exertions for
increasing his little force, and continuing to impose upon the enemy
that useful opinion of its strength which they were known to entertain:
for it was seen by their intercepted letters that they had applied for
reinforcements under the fear of being attacked by him in Salamanca,
where, they said, the inhabitants were as much to be dreaded as the
enemy. Sir Robert circulated addresses inviting the Germans and Poles
and Swiss in the French service to abandon an iniquitous cause into
which they had been forced, and in which they had no concern. There
was no press in the city, but the parochial clergy throughout the line
of country which he occupied multiplied copies by transcription: many
men were brought over by these means, and the enemy suffered not only
from this continual drain, but from the suspicion and inquietude which
was thus produced. Some stragglers from Sir John Moore’s army, and some
prisoners from it who had effected their escape, joined him, having
every where received from the peasantry every possible assistance and
kindness; for that retreat had not lessened in the Spanish people
their sense of gratitude towards Great Britain, nor their respect
for the British character. Some convalescents also from Almeida were
added to his numbers, and he obtained two reinforcements, each of a
more extraordinary kind. A captain of banditti, with five-and-twenty
followers, who had exercised their vocation in the country about
Segovia, repaired to him, as men who preferred risking their lives in
a legal and honourable way, and were desirous of doing good service
in a good cause. The other party told a sadder tale. They were South
Americans from the Plata, who having been made prisoners at Montevideo
in the ill-advised and worse conducted expedition of the English to
that province, had been landed in Spain, there to be neglected and left
destitute by their own government. More than 200 had perished through
want and misery, and the survivors were almost naked and pitiably
emaciated with the privations and sufferings which they had endured.
There were seven officers among them, who were all men of polished
manners; and the soldiers were willing and well disposed, though
deeply sensible of the cruelty and injustice with which they had been
neglected.
♦ATTEMPT TO SURPRISE THAT FORTRESS.♦
Suspecting that the enemy would endeavour to reach Extremadura, get in
Cuesta’s rear, and menace Portugal on that side, Sir Robert occupied
the Puerto de Baños with a small force under Colonel Mayne. This was
effected just in time, Lapisse having marched the greater part of his
force to Alva de Tormes on the way thither, but finding it occupied,
and not knowing in what strength, the French returned. This was a
month before the battle of Medellin, at which time Sir Robert had gone
to confer with General Cuesta, no one except the Governor of Ciudad
Rodrigo being informed of his absence. Immediately after his return the
French, having been reinforced at Salamanca, attempted to ♦MARCH 2.♦
surprise Ciudad Rodrigo. A plan had been concerted with some traitors
in the town, who, from an outwork that might easily be stormed, had
thrown a bridge to the body of the place, so solidly constructed
that Sir Robert had remonstrated against it as promoting their own
destruction in case of an assault. Timely advice, however, came from
the Corregidor of Salamanca; and the enemy, apprehending from the
movements of Sir Robert’s troops that a counterplot had been formed
with the intent of attempting Salamanca, and cutting off their retreat,
fell back hastily, and not without loss. Treachery there had been;
but as there was no proof who had been the traitors, Sir Robert took
measures for removing the suspected persons without discrediting them.
♦THE FRENCH SUMMON IT.♦
After it was known that Cuesta had fallen back from the Tagus to the
Guadiana, and before tidings of his defeat had arrived, Sir Robert, who
had been urging him to form a corps on the Tietar, and thereby preserve
from the enemy a fertile part of the country which had not yet been
overrun, withdrew his troops from the Puerto de Baños to collect them
at Ciudad Rodrigo. Lapisse now brought together the whole remaining
force under his command, which had been reduced to about 7000 men,
advanced against that city, and summoned it. The officer by whom the
summons was sent wished to enter the place with it, but a detachment of
the Lusitanian Legion with four guns, under Lieutenant-Colonel Grant,
had been stationed outside the works, and he was not permitted to
proceed. Before the Governor’s answer could be given, the French, in
disregard of the custom of war, continued advancing toward the gates,
upon which a fire was opened upon them, and continued with effect
till they halted. The Governor’s reply was, that he should not think
of surrendering, even under a greater necessity than then appeared to
exist. Some skirmishing took place, to the advantage of the garrison,
and on the following day the enemy retreated, with some loss both in
men and in reputation.
This movement of the French had been so little serious, that it was
supposed they had expected some co-operation from Soult’s army. Soon
afterwards, however, a second summons came in the name of the Intruder,
holding out ♦MARCH OF LAPISSE TO UNITE WITH VICTOR.♦ threats to the
garrison and inhabitants if they suffered themselves longer to be
misled by a few British officers, and promising them King Joseph’s
favour if they would open their gates. A verbal reply was returned,
stating that the proper answer to such a summons was from the cannon’s
mouth, and there the enemy would receive it if they chose to advance.
At this time the peasantry, encouraged by the example of this brave
garrison, had risen throughout a wide extent of country; and the
situation of Lapisse was becoming critical, when by a movement ♦APRIL
7.♦ which ought not to have been unexpected, he moved rapidly toward
the Puerto de Perales. That pass he could hardly have forced, if it
had been occupied; but Colonel Mayne could not reach it in time after
the intention of the enemy was ascertained, and all that Sir Robert
could do was to dispatch advices into Portugal, and harass their march
by pursuing them with all speed, in the hope that when they arrived at
Alcantara, where they must cross the Tagus, they would find it occupied
by a sufficient force of Portugueze.
♦THE FRENCH ENTER ALCANTARA.♦
The bridge at that point, which was then one of the durable monuments
of Roman magnificence, has given name to a city of some renown, as
the chief seat of one of the military orders famous in old times.
The town is on the left bank, and the inhabitants, aware of danger,
thought to avert it by defending the entrance of the bridge with a
kind of _abbatis_, and breaking up the road to a depth of eighteen
or twenty feet. These rude works not being defended by any regular
force, nor with any skill or military means, were soon forced, and
the town was entered. Lapisse had marked his whole route by the most
wanton cruelties, in return for which every straggler who fell into
the hands of the peasantry was put to death. He remained only during
the night in Alcantara; but that night was employed in plunder, and in
the commission of every crime by which humanity can be disgraced and
outraged. Lieutenant-Colonel Grant and Don Carlos d’España (officers
whose names appear often during the war, and always honourably),
arrived near the town with a small body of cavalry in pursuit during
the night, and entered it in the morning just after the enemy had
left it. They found the houses in flames, and the streets literally
obstructed with mutilated bodies, some lying in heaps, and others
thrown upon piles of furniture and valuable goods, which the ruffians,
having no means of removing, had brought out in front of the houses and
set on fire. Dogs had been murdered like their masters, swine butchered
for the mere pleasure of butchery, and their bodies heaped together in
mockery with those of the human victims. The churches ♦CAMPAIGNS OF
THE LUSITANIAN LEGION, 65–68.♦ had been polluted as well as plundered,
images mutilated, pictures, the value of which was not suspected by
these destroyers, cut to pieces, graves opened in the hope of finding
money or plate concealed there, even the very coffins violated, and the
dead exposed.
♦JUNCTION WITH VICTOR.♦
Victor’s force, after he had been joined by this division, amounted to
23,000 foot and 5800 horse. It was apprehended from some intercepted
letters that he would immediately make for Seville, and Cuesta had
formed his plan of defence accordingly. Portugal, however, was the
object of the French, as a point of more importance at that time; but
they had let the hour go by, and the English were now once more in the
field.
CHAPTER XXI.
PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT RELATING TO THE WAR.
♦1809. JANUARY.♦
♦CONDUCT OF THE OPPOSITION IN ENGLAND.♦
During the first success of the Spaniards, the enemies of Government
either were silent or joined faintly in the expression of national
feeling which was heard from all parts of the united kingdoms. No
sooner had the prospect begun to darken than their real wishes were
disclosed, and, true to their belief in the omnipotence of Buonaparte,
they expatiated upon the folly and insanity of opposing one against
whom it was impossible that any resistance could be successful. They
dwelt upon the consummate wisdom of his cabinet, the unequalled
ability of his generals, the inexhaustible numbers of his armies, and
their irresistible force; but they neither took into this account the
character of the Spanish people, nor the nature of their country,
nor the strength of moral principles and of a righteous cause, being
ignorant alike of all. That faith in English courage, by which the
fields of Cressy, and Poictiers, and Agincourt were won, and which in
our own days we had seen proved, not only upon our own element, our
empire of the seas, at the mouths of the Nile and at Cape Trafalgar,
but before the walls of Acre, and in Egypt, and at Maida, and in
Portugal; ... that faith which should ever be the first article of
an Englishman’s creed, for while it is believed, so long is it true;
... that faith these men had abjured, and substituted in its place a
political heresy, baneful as it was false, that upon land nothing could
withstand the French. The world was made for Buonaparte, and he had
only to march over it, and take possession. When they were reminded of
this Tyrant’s guilt, they thought it a sufficient reply to tell us of
his greatness, and would have had us fall down and worship the Golden
Image at the very time when the Spaniards were walking amid the burning
fiery furnace.
They began by predicting the failure of all our efforts, and the total
ruin of the Spanish cause; laying down as “a proposition too plain
to be disputed, that the spirit of the people, however enthusiastic
and universal, was in its nature more uncertain and short-lived, more
liable to be extinguished by reverses, or to go out of itself amid the
delays of a protracted contest, than the steady, regular, moderate
feeling which calls out disciplined troops, and marshals them under
known leaders, and supplies them by systematic arrangements.” That it
was in the power of England to assist the Spanish people with such
troops, such leaders, and such arrangements, they had neither heart to
feel nor understanding to perceive. They ridiculed the “romantic hopes
of the English nation;” hopes, they said, which had been raised by
“the tricks of a paltry and interested party.” Could any man of sense,
they demanded, any one “above the level of a drivelling courtier, or a
feeble fanatic, look at this contest, without trembling every inch of
him for the result?”
But the baseness of party went beyond this. Not only were ministers
blamed for what they had done in assisting Spain, and counselled to
withdraw their assistance as speedily as possible, but the Spaniards
themselves were calumniated and insulted. They had neither courage,
nor honour, nor patriotism; no love for their country, nor any thing
in their country worth defending. What mattered it to them whether
their King were called Joseph or Ferdinand, a Buonaparte or a Bourbon?
God would dispense sunshine and showers upon the peninsula, whoever
was his vicegerent there; the corn and the olive would ripen, and the
vine and the fig-tree yield their fruits. What folly then to contend
for a feeble and oppressive government, of which the loss was gain!
The Emperor of the French had rid them of this wretched government;
he had abolished the Inquisition, reduced the monastic orders, and
would suppress them and all other remaining grievances as soon as
the obstinacy of the people would allow him leisure. And indeed the
people were sensible of these benefits: ... a few chiefs, the overgrown
aristocracy of the land, had for a while misled them; but those chiefs
had only a little hour to strut and fret; and for the people, whose
detestation of the French government had been carried to a pitch wholly
unauthorized by its proceedings toward them, their eyes were opened
now; they saw that Buonaparte was doing good; while, on the other hand,
they regarded the English as heretics; and nothing could overcome the
antipathy which this feeling occasioned.
The circumstances of Sir John Moore’s retreat, and the return of his
army, were matter of triumph to the journalists of this shameless
faction. “The dismal news,” they said, “was at last arrived! the truth
of the bulletins was established to its utmost latitude! the pledge of
throwing the English into the sea was almost to its literal meaning
fulfilled! The Spanish Junta and their allies, after six months’
trifling, blundering, and vapouring, were now finally defeated! the
spirit of patriotism, both in Spain and Portugal, was extinct! the
majority of the Spaniards had all along been indifferent respecting
the dynasty by which they were to be governed; yea, many were more
attached to the Buonapartes than the Bourbons. The triumphs of France,
the defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies, wherever they were
attacked, the retreat and discomfiture of the British forces, ...
these were the melancholy events which concluded the fatal campaign of
1808, the fifth year of the war, ... this most unjust and unnecessary
war, into which England, in violation of its own treaty with France,
had rushed with equal eagerness and frenzy, and which she was now
carrying on with the professed object of the preservation of the most
corrupt branch of the Romish church!” Such was the language, not of
the revolutionary propagandists alone, but of political faction and
puritanical bigotry; while the condition in which the troops arrived,
and the tale which they related, excited the feelings of the people,
♦RETURN OF THE ARMY FROM CORUÑA.♦ and rendered it easy to mislead them.
Never had such a scene of confusion and distress been witnessed at
Plymouth as on the arrival of this miserable fleet. Above 900 women
were landed, all ignorant whether their husbands were dead or living;
they were searching through the transports, and officers and men in
like manner looking after their wives, children, and friends. Of the
wounded there were some whose wounds had never been dressed: many were
brought on shore dead: some died in the streets, on their way to the
hospitals. They who had escaped from any farther evil, having lost
all their baggage, were, even the officers, covered with filth and
vermin. Letters were written from the Medical Transport Board to all
the surgical lecturers in London, requesting that their pupils would
repair to the ports, and assist during the immediate emergency. The
form of having passed the Hall was dispensed with, and nothing more
required than a certificate from the lecturer whom they had attended.
The people of Plymouth behaved on this occasion with the characteristic
activity and beneficence of the English nation. A committee of
gentlemen was immediately appointed, who sat night and day, providing
food, clothing, and assistance. The ladies of the place attended the
sick and wounded, and assisted in dressing the wounds: thus supplying
the want of a sufficient number of medical men. Many a woman gave her
only second garment to her who had none. A charitable fund was raised,
and 1400 women and children belonging to the expedition received
immediate relief. The inhabitants of Portsmouth had a less mournful
task. That part of the army which landed there had not embarked from
the field of battle; and they who were well enough to partake of
festivity ♦DR. NEALE’S TRAVELS, P. 217.♦ were feasted in the Town-Hall.
The troops brought back with them a pestilential fever, which spread
through the military hospitals, and raged for some months before it
could be subdued.
♦JAN. 19.♦
Parliament met before the issue of Sir John Moore’s campaign was
known, but it was understood that he was hastily retreating toward the
coast with the intention of embarking, and intelligence was hourly
looked for with fearful ♦THE KING’S SPEECH.♦ expectation. The King’s
speech was in a spirit suited to the times. He had given orders, he
said, that the overtures from Erfurth should be laid before both
Houses, and he was persuaded they would participate in the feelings
which he had expressed when it was required that he should consent
to commence the negotiation by abandoning the cause of Spain. So long
as the people of that country remained true to themselves, so long
would he continue to them his most strenuous assistance: and in the
moment of their difficulties and reverses he had renewed to them the
engagements which he had voluntarily contracted at the outset of their
struggle. He had called his Parliament in perfect confidence that
they would cordially support him in the prosecution of a war which
there was no hope of terminating safely and honourably except through
vigorous and persevering exertions. The various grades of opposition
were distinctly marked in the debates ♦LORD SIDMOUTH.♦ which ensued.
Lord Sidmouth said, that there prevailed among the people a feeling of
dissatisfaction which was most honourable to them, because it arose
from their zealous loyalty and generous desires. They were neither
contented with the extent of the exertions which had been made to
support the Spaniards, nor with the manner in which those exertions
had been directed. Something, he trusted, would be done to allay this
laudable discontent, while he avowed his full belief that it behoved
us to prosecute the war with vigour. Such language was consistent with
the constant tenor of Lord Sidmouth’s conduct; a man who never in a
single instance allowed either personal or party feeling to prevail
over his natural integrity. Earl St. ♦EARL ST. VINCENT.♦ Vincent
agreed in the necessity of carrying on determined hostilities against
the common enemy, but he condemned the ministers alike for what had
been done, and what had been left undone. They had brought upon us,
he said, the greatest disgrace which had befallen Great Britain since
the Revolution. It appeared as if they had not even a geographical
knowledge of the Peninsula, insomuch that they ought to go to school
again, to make themselves masters of it. Why had there been that
disgraceful delay before our troops were sent to Spain? Why had not
some of our Princes of the blood been appointed to lead our armies?
all those illustrious persons had been bred to arms, and for what
purpose, if they were not to be employed? Why had not the Portugueze
been called into action? He knew them well; they were as brave a
people as any upon the continent of Europe, and under British officers
would have presented an undaunted front to the enemy. Ministers ought
to have known their value, and if they did not, their ignorance was
inexcusable. If the House of Lords did its duty, they would go to the
foot of the throne, and there tell the Sovereign the bold truth, that
if he did not remove those ministers he would lose the country.
♦LORD GRENVILLE.♦
Lord Grenville said there was but one opinion in the country concerning
the base and treacherous, the atrocious and cruel invasion of the
Spaniards; but one opinion as to the cause wherein they were fighting
against the Tyrant who unjustly and cruelly attacked them; but there
had been no prospect which should have induced reasonable men to send a
British army into the interior of Spain, though fleets with troops on
board, to hover about the coast, and take advantage of every favourable
opportunity, might be of essential service. We had injured our allies
instead of serving them. We had forced the Junta of Seville to abandon
the excellent system of defence which they had arranged, and, by
sending an army into the heart of the country, compelled them to engage
in pitched battles with regular troops. Care must now be taken not to
waste our resources in Quixotic schemes which it was impossible to
accomplish. Our army, brave as it was, well-disciplined, and capable
of doing every thing which men could be expected to perform, would
find employment enough in securing our own defence. If the country
was to be saved, its salvation could alone be effected by maintaining
a force upon a scale commensurate with the increasing dangers of our
situation. But, said he, I have no hesitation in declaring it to be
my most decided opinion, that if the system hitherto acted upon be
farther pursued, and the whole armed force of the country sent into
the interior of Spain, the destruction of this monarchy is inevitable;
and that we shall soon be reduced to the same condition with Prussia
♦EARL OF LIVERPOOL.♦ and the conquered states of the continent. To
these speakers it was replied by the Home Secretary, who had now upon
his father’s death become Earl of Liverpool, that it would ill become
us to be dismayed by those reverses which were from the beginning
to be expected, and to renounce that system of support to which the
nation was solemnly pledged, and in which those very reverses made it
a more sacred duty to persevere. He entreated those who were inclined
to despond that they would call to mind the lessons of history. There
it would be found, that nations, after maintaining struggles for ten
or twenty years, in the course of which they had been almost uniformly
worsted in battle, had eventually succeeded in securing the object for
which they strove. It was difficult to conceive any situation which
would better warrant hopes of ultimate success than that of Spain. The
people were unanimous in their resistance to the invader; and it was
the only instance since the French revolution in which a whole people
had taken up arms in their own defence. The territory of Spain was as
large as that of France within its ancient limits, and the country
possessed many local advantages for defence, ... advantages, the
value of which the Spanish history in former times ought to teach us
duly to appreciate. The cause itself was most interesting to the best
feelings of the human mind: it offered the last chance of salvation to
the continent of Europe; and if it were considered in a selfish and
narrower point of view, our own immediate security was in some degree
involved in its fate. Was there then nothing to be risked in support of
a generous ally? ... nothing for the re-establishment of the general
tranquillity? ... nothing for our own safety and independence?
The opposition in the Lower House betrayed a wish to shake off
the Spaniards and withdraw from the contest in whatever manner we
could. ♦MR. PONSONBY.♦ Never, said Mr. Ponsonby, since Great Britain
attained its present rank, has its public force been directed with
so little skill, so little foresight, or so little success; though,
in the expenditure of public money, he believed none would accuse
his Majesty’s counsellors with ever having been wanting in vigour.
It was their duty now to examine whether they ought to risk an army
in Spain, or confine their assistance to supplies. Elizabeth, under
circumstances sufficiently like the present, took care to possess
cautionary towns, and thereby assured herself of a retreat, and gained
a safe point whither to send reinforcements, as well as a security that
the United Provinces should not abandon her in the contest wherein they
were engaged. He should not indeed think of abandoning the Spaniards
in the hour of misfortune, but he could not admit that the present
obligations were to be considered in the light of a solemn treaty; they
had been entered into in a moment of hurry and precipitation; they had
not been laid before Parliament, and were therefore unauthorized by
it, and Parliament might approve or disapprove, grant or refuse the
supplies ♦MR. WHITBREAD.♦ for carrying them into effect. Mr. Whitbread
declared that if the recent disasters should appear to have proceeded
from the misconduct of ministers, the House ought to demand condign
punishment on their heads. It was now doubtful whether we had not
been proceeding upon false information both with respect to Spain and
Portugal. Were our troops agreeable to the people of Portugal? or were
we not obliged to keep a certain force there for the purpose of keeping
that people quiet, that is, to strike terror into our friends instead
of our enemies? Were our troops, or were they not, welcome to the
people of Spain? He had reason to doubt that fact. He was fearful that
a multitude of Spaniards wished success to Buonaparte rather than to
us. Although we must condemn the injustice of Buonaparte in his attack
upon Spain, yet his measures were extremely judicious. He abolished the
Inquisition, feudal rights, and unequal taxation. This was certainly
holding out some temptation to the people to acquiesce in the changes
which he wished to introduce, and unquestionably it had produced great
effect. The government which England supported was not connected with
any thing like a promise of the reform of any of the evils of the old
system, nor with any thing like a melioration of the condition of the
Spaniards. God forbid that we should abandon their cause while it was
possible to support it with any prospect of success; but he was far
from being sure that the time might not come when we should have to
treat with France after she had totally subdued Spain. Ministers were
justified in refusing to treat on the terms offered at Erfurth; indeed
they must have been the basest of mankind if they had accepted such a
preliminary. But he could not avoid regretting that the country had
lost so many fair opportunities of negotiating a peace, and that it
had at length been reduced to so foul a one that it could not have
been accepted without eternal disgrace. Mr. William Smith said, with a
similar feeling, that though he concurred in the propriety of rejecting
the last offer of negotiation, he by no means meant to declare that the
country ought never to commence another while Spain was in the hands of
the French government.
This first debate made it apparent that the cause of the Spaniards, in
which all Britain had appeared to partake so universal and generous a
sympathy, was now regarded by a party in the state as a party question;
and that because ministers, true to the interest of their country, and
to its honour (of all interests the most important), were resolved to
continue faithful to the alliance which they had formed with Spain,
there were men who felt little concern for what Europe and liberty and
human nature would lose if Buonaparte should succeed in bowing the
Spaniards beneath his yoke, and who looked on with ill-dissembled hope
to the advantage which such a catastrophe might give them over their
parliamentary opponents. Their disposition was more broadly manifested
when the overtures from Erfurth were discussed, and an address moved
approving the answer which had been ♦DEBATES ON THE OVERTURES FROM
ERFURTH. JAN. 26.♦ returned. They admitted that the overtures were
insincere, and could not possibly have led to peace, and yet they took
occasion to carp and cavil at what they could not in common decency
oppose.
♦LORD GRENVILLE.♦
♦LORD AUCKLAND.♦
In the Upper House a feeling of utter hopelessness was expressed with
sincere regret by Lord Grenville and Lord Auckland: the former asserted
that Buonaparte went to Spain with the moral certainty of effecting
its subjugation, the most important object of any that he had yet had
in view; and that in the course of two months he actually had attained
that object. The latter affirmed, that what we called the Spanish cause
was lost, for the present at least, and without any rational hope that
it could be ♦MR. CANNING. JAN. 31.♦ soon revived. To such opinions Mr.
Canning alluded, saying, it was said that whenever Buonaparte declared
he would accomplish any measure, his declaration was to be received
as the fiat of a superior being, whom it was folly to resist! _He_
never pledged himself to any thing but what he could accomplish! _His_
resolves were insurmountable! _His_ career not to be stopped! Such,
said the orator, is not my opinion, nor the opinion of the British
people. Even were the ship in which we are embarked sinking, it would
be our duty still to struggle against the element. But never can I
acknowledge that this is our present state. We are riding proudly
and nobly buoyant upon the waves! To the argument that we ought, as
Buonaparte had done, to have held out a prospect of political reform
to the Spaniards, he replied we had no right to assume any dictatorial
power over a country which we went to assist. We were not to hold cheap
the institutions of other countries because they had not ripened into
that maturity of freedom which we ourselves enjoyed; nor were we to
convert an auxiliary army into a dominating garrison; nor, while openly
professing to aid the Spaniards, covertly endeavour to force upon them
those blessings of which they themselves must be the best judges. If
the Spaniards succeeded, they would certainly be happier and freer than
they had hitherto been; but that happiness and freedom must be of their
own choice, not of our dictation. The Central Junta was not indifferent
to this prospective good, for it called upon all literary men to
contribute their assistance in suggesting such laws as might best be
enacted for the good of the state. If the suggestion of such laws were
to accompany a subsidy, he doubted much whether it would meet with
assent: and sure he was that the Spaniards could not but dislike them,
if dictated at the point of the bayonet. In these enlightened days,
said he, the imposition of a foreign dynasty is not regarded with so
much abhorrence, as it is considered what useful internal regulations
the usurpers may introduce! So detestable a mode of reasoning is
confined to only a few political speculators; the general sense and
feeling of mankind revolt at it. There is an irresistible impulse
which binds men to their native soil; which makes them cherish their
independence; which unites them to their legitimate princes; and which
fires them with enthusiastic indignation against the imposition of a
foreign yoke. No benefit to be received from a conqueror can atone for
the loss of national independence. Let us then do homage to the Spanish
nation for their attachment to their native soil; an attachment which
in its origin is divine; ... and do not let us taunt them with being
a century behind us in civilization or in knowledge, or adhering to
prejudices in religion, in politics, or in arts, which we have happily
surmounted.
♦LORD H. PETTY.♦
The more moderate opposition members, such as Mr. Ponsonby and Lord
Henry Petty, agreed that the government had taken a proper course in
demanding an explanation with regard to Spain before any negotiation
was commenced. ♦MR. WHITBREAD.♦ But Mr. Whitbread said he lamented
that the offer had been so abruptly put an end to. Even in breaking
with France it was better to break with her in a spirit of as little
acrimony as possible, ... for let gentlemen say what they would, we
must ultimately treat with France, ... to this complexion we must come
at last; and it would not be easy to say when we might calculate
upon even as good terms as we had been offered in the late overture.
With respect to Spain, the hopes he once had were nearly gone; and
the various reports from different quarters, from some of the want of
wisdom in the government, from others of want of energy in the people,
were not calculated to revive them. Perhaps before this Portugal was
reconquered. Buonaparte was hastening to fulfil all his prophecies. If
ever we wished for peace, with this man probably we must make it, and
it was always wrong to use insulting language towards him; the least
price of peace would be for us to use something like decorous language
to a power which was perhaps the greatest that had ever existed on the
face of the world. And it was extraordinary indeed that a government
which had committed the attack upon Copenhagen should call the
usurpation of Spain unparalleled! It really carried with it an air of
ridicule. Why should we talk of atrocity? Why should we blasphemously
call on our God ... we, the ravagers of India, ... we who had voted
the solemn thanks of the House to the despoilers of that unhappy,
persecuted country?
Thus did Mr. Whitbread attempt, ... not indeed to justify Buonaparte,
few of his admirers had at that time sufficient effrontery for this,
... but to defend him by the yet viler method of recrimination; to
apologize for his crimes by the false assertion that England had
perpetrated crimes as great; to stand forth as the accuser of his
country; and to disarm it, as far as his ability and his influence
might avail, of its moral strength, and of its hope in God and a good
cause. Six months before he had prayed God to crown the efforts of the
Spaniards with success ♦VOL. I. P. 449.♦ as final as those efforts
were glorious. “Never,” he then said, “were a people engaged in a more
arduous and honourable struggle. Perish the man,” he then exclaimed,
“who would entertain a thought of purchasing peace by abandoning them
to their fate! Perish this country rather than its safety should be
owing to a compromise so horridly iniquitous!” It was now apparent
that the sympathy which had been thus strongly expressed had not been
very deep. He moved as an amendment upon the address, that though we
should have witnessed with regret any inclination to consent to the
abandonment of the cause of Spain, it did not appear that any such
disgraceful concession was required as a preliminary by the other
belligerent powers. The stipulation, therefore, on our part, that the
Spaniards should be admitted as a party, was unwise and impolitic;
an overture made in respectful terms ought to have been answered in
more moderate and conciliatory language, and immediate steps taken for
entering into negotiation on the terms proposed in that overture. The
amendment concluded by requesting that his Majesty would be graciously
pleased to avail himself of any opportunity which might offer of
acceding to, or commencing a negotiation for the restoration of the
blessings of peace, on such terms as the circumstances of the war in
which we were engaged might render compatible with the true interests
of the empire, and the honour of his Majesty’s crown.
♦MR. CROKER.♦
The proposed amendment provoked a severe reply from Mr. Croker. He
exposed the inconsistency of the mover, who in his letter to Lord
Holland, when he had stated his opinion that it became the Government
at that time to negotiate, recommended that “the complete evacuation
of Spain by the French armies, the abstinence from all interference in
her internal arrangements, and the freedom of the Royal Family, should
be the conditions of the negotiation.” Mr. Croker commented also with
just indignation upon the strain of argument which Mr. Whitbread had
pursued. “He has set out,” said he, “by doing Buonaparte the favour
of trying to find a parallel for his attack on Spain; and he boasts
of having found many. But in the registers of British discussion, in
the recollections of British feeling, I defy the honourable gentleman
to find a parallel for his own speech, ... a speech calculated
only to plead the enemy’s cause. I do not mean to represent him
as intentionally their advocate; but I will assert that, whether
intentionally or not, he has taken that course by seeking for examples
which might keep the French government in countenance. But even if he
were not so deeply to blame for ♦1809. FEBRUARY.♦ this, ... supposing
even that this course was necessary to his argument, ... even then he
had been in error: he had produced no parallel instance; the history of
the world did not furnish one; and he had fruitlessly gone out of the
path to weaken the cause of his country.”
♦MR. WHITBREAD’S SPEECH CIRCULATED BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.♦
Mr. Whitbread’s amendment was so little in accord with the feelings
even of his colleagues in opposition, that it was not put to the vote.
But his speech was so favourable to Buonaparte, and so suited to
the furtherance of his purposes, that the French government availed
themselves of it. A very few omissions adapted it to the meridian of
Paris; it was translated, inserted in the provincial papers as well as
those of the capital, and circulated through France and those countries
which were under its dominion or its influence. To deceive the French
and the people of the continent by the official publication of false
intelligence was part of Buonaparte’s system; but no fabrication
could so well have served his purpose as thus to tell them that an
English statesman, one of the most eminent of the Whigs, of the old
advocates of liberty, a leading member of the House of Commons, had
declared in that House that the overtures of peace made by France were
unexceptionable, and had been unwisely, impoliticly, and unnecessarily
answered with insult; that Buonaparte, wielding the greatest power
which had ever existed, was hastening to fulfil all his prophecies;
that England must be reduced to treat with him at last, and therefore
that the King of England ought to be advised by his Parliament
to commence a negotiation as soon as possible upon such terms as
circumstances might permit!
♦DEBATES ON THE PORTUGUEZE CAMPAIGN.♦
The debates upon the campaign in Portugal and the Convention of Cintra
terminated in confirming by the sense of Parliament the opinion which
the Court of Inquiry had pronounced. Events indeed had followed in such
rapid succession, that the Convention having been regarded only as to
immediate interests, not with reference to principles which are of
eternal application, seemed like a subject obsolete and out of date.
Ministers derived another advantage from the manner in which they
were attacked. No man could blame them, except in the mere spirit of
opposition, for having sent an expedition to Portugal; the public sense
of what had been lost by the armistice sufficiently proved the wisdom
of its destination; and that the force had been sufficient for its
object we had the decisive authority of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and the
complete evidence of the victory which he had gained. The discussions
upon the expedition to Spain were more frequent ♦BOTH PARTIES AGREE
IN EXTOLLING SIR J. MOORE.♦ and more angry. Both parties, however,
as soon as the subject was brought forward, agreed in voting the
thanks of Parliament to the army for their services, and a monument
to the General. It had been the intention of Government to make a
provision for the female part of Sir John Moore’s family; but upon an
intimation of their wish that it might be transferred to a male branch,
a pension of a thousand pounds was granted to his elder brother. This
was a becoming act of national generosity; but the opposition eagerly
consecrated, and as it were canonized, the memory of Sir John Moore,
that they might impute the whole misconduct of the campaign, with all
its loss and its disgrace, to Government; and the ministers, always
willing to avert a harassing investigation, were well pleased that
their opponents should thus preclude themselves from pressing it upon
military grounds.
♦INQUIRY INTO THE CAMPAIGN IN SPAIN CALLED FOR.♦
Inquiry, however, was called for, not upon that reasonable ground, but
in the avowed hope that it would prove the ministry guilty of that
utter misconduct for which their enemies so ♦LORD GRENVILLE.♦ loudly
and exultingly arraigned them. Lord Grenville said it was indeed a
sinking country if such mismanagement were suffered to continue in the
midst of our unexampled perils and difficulties. The hand of Providence
appeared to be on us. Within three years we had lost the two great
statesmen in whom the nation reposed its confidence, an admiral who
had carried our navy to a pre-eminence which it never before enjoyed,
and now a great military chieftain, whose talents were of the first
order. “Was it ♦LORD ERSKINE.♦ possible,” Lord Erskine asked, “to
deplore the loss of friends whom we loved, and of men whose lives were
precious to their country, without lamenting in bitterness that they
were literally immolated by the ignorance and folly of those who now
wished to cover their own disgrace by the just and natural feelings
of the public towards men who had died for their native land? But for
their immortal renown, it would have been better for them, certainly
much better for their country, to have shot them upon the parade of St.
James’s Park, than to have sent them, not to suffer the noble risk of
soldiers, in a practicable cause, but to endure insufferable, ignoble,
and useless misery, in a march to the very centre of Spain, where for
them to attack was impracticable, and to retreat only possible, by
unparalleled exertions: and what sort of retreat? ... a retreat leaving
upon the roads and in the mountains of Spain from 8000 to 9000 of our
brave men, dying of fatigue, without one act of courage to sweeten
the death of a soldier. What could, then, be a more disgusting and
humiliating spectacle, than to see the government of this great empire,
in such a fearful season, in the hands of men who seemed not fit to be
a vestry in the smallest parish?”
♦FEB. 24. MR. PONSONBY.♦
Mr. Ponsonby insisted that it was the duty of ministers, before they
engaged in such a contest, to have ascertained the real state of Spain.
It was not sufficient to know that monks could excite some of the
poorer and more ignorant people to insurrection. The disposition and
views of the upper classes, who from their rank and property possess
a natural influence, ought to have been ascertained; and, above all,
the inclination of that middle class which is every where the great
bond and cement of connexion between the higher and lower orders.
Some information too they might have collected from history before
they ventured upon sending an army into Spain: for, as far as history
went, they would not find much to encourage them in relying upon the
character of the Spaniards for cordial or active co-operation in such
a contest. “I am not disposed,” said he, “to speak disrespectfully of
the Spaniards; but history does not represent them as remarkable for
that daring, enthusiastic, high-spirited disposition which prompts and
qualifies men to make a great struggle for freedom and independence.
The most powerful principles to excite mankind have uniformly been
religion and liberty: have either been found materially to operate
upon the recent movements of the Spanish people? These are the only
principles which have ever served to excite the noble daring, the
heroic resolution to conquer or die; and it was necessary therefore
to inquire whether they were actuated by both, or by either, to
calculate upon the probability of their success in the war. If they
were influenced by neither of these motives, how could any reflecting
man look for energy, zeal, or perseverance among them? Let me not
be misinterpreted. I do not desire that they, or any people, should
become wild or mad, and destroy society itself in order to improve
its condition; that in order to remove abuses they should tear away
all their ancient institutions; that in order to reform religion they
should destroy Christianity itself; but I do say, while the Inquisition
existed, that if the Spaniards were not sensible of the multitude of
abuses which pressed upon them, if they felt not a wish to reform
abuses and to restore their rights, and were not willing, for that
reformation and restriction, to encounter all the dangers and endure
all the difficulties inseparable from the species of warfare in which
they were engaged; I say, that if this people were not actuated by the
wish for, and encouraged by the hope of an improved condition, it was
impossible for any statesman, for any man of common sense, to suppose
that they would fight with success. If they were insensible of the
cause of their degradation, and indifferent as to its removal, it was
in vain for England to calculate upon materially exciting the spirit,
or effectually aiding the exertions of such a people.”
Then, after intimating a belief that Sir John Moore had acted against
his own judgment, and in consequence only of Mr. Frere’s repeatedly
urging him to advance, he asked whether the Spaniards had been found
willing and cordial in their assistance to the British army? whether
they had received them as deliverers and guests, or with jealousy and
fear? “Perhaps,” he continued, “ministers may say that the Spaniards
did not discover all that cordiality which was expected. But can it
be permitted that they shall say this after they have involved the
country in such a ruinous, unproductive, and inglorious struggle? For
let us not forget this, that, although we have obtained renown for
our military bravery, England has for ever lost its character as a
military nation. Were you to propose to send your soldiers again, as
an encouragement and aid to other foreign powers, what would be the
answer? It would be, ‘No! Your troops are good; your officers are
skilful and courageous; but there is something in the councils of
England, or in the nature and manner of the application of her force,
that renders it impossible ever to place any reliance upon her military
assistance.’ When you appeared in Holland and Germany as auxiliaries,
you failed; true it is, your force in these cases was comparatively
small, and the question remained undecided. The problem is solved,
however, by what has passed in Spain. You professed to send forth the
largest army that ever went from England, for the purpose of meeting
the force of France; and what has been the result? A shameful retreat
before the armies of France, and a disgraceful desertion of the power
you wished to assist. This campaign, I say, will have an influence upon
the character of England long after all of us shall cease to live. I
ask the House, then, to institute an inquiry. I call upon the country
to seek for one, in order to show how much distress, difficulties,
dangers, and perils unexampled, our soldiers have endured in this
fruitless and inglorious struggle. I call upon you, by the gratitude
you owe to those who were thus shamefully sacrificed at Coruña, ...
by that which you owe to their companions in arms, who are still in
existence, and able and willing to defend their country; I call upon
you, by the interest you take in those who yet remain, to institute
this inquiry, in order that they may not be sacrificed by similar
misconduct upon a future occasion. I call upon you, as you value
the glory of our country, the preservation of our future power and
reputation, as well as our interest, by every thing that can excite the
exertions of brave men, to institute this investigation.”
♦LORD CASTLEREAGH.♦
Lord Castlereagh, in his reply to this speech, observed with sarcastic
truth, there could not be a greater mistake than to suppose they who
called for inquiry meant that they wanted information. It happened,
however, that by pronouncing upon facts of which he was imperfectly
♦MR. TIERNEY.♦ informed, Mr. Tierney was led into a course of argument
most unfavourable to the intentions of himself and those who acted
with him. Why, he demanded, had not the 10,000 men who were embarked
been sent forward with all speed to Sir John Moore’s assistance? On
board the transports they were, and Lord Castlereagh took them out.
Had they been sent, Sir John might have been still alive, and a real
diversion then have been effected; for our army might for some time
have maintained itself in Coruña, and have obliged the enemy to turn
their whole attention to that quarter. The loss which we had sustained
in our retreat, he said, was carefully glossed over, but he understood
that it was at least from 8,000 to 10,000 men. Such a scene of woe,
indeed, had scarcely ever been heard of. Think of blowing up the
ammunition, destroying three or four hundred waggons, staving the
dollar casks, leaving the artillery to be cast away, and the Shrapnell
shells to the French, who would thus discover their composition! He
meant not to ascribe these disasters in the smallest degree to the
General: all might have been avoided, if only 10,000 men had been sent
to his support. Inquiry, therefore, was more than ever necessary; and
by the result of that night’s debate Great Britain would judge of the
character of the House of Commons. That House ought to convince the
army that, though they might be exposed to unavailing exertions, and
useless hardships, by the mismanagement of ignorant councils, they had
protection in Parliament, who would never be slow in attending to their
interest and their comforts. Unless the officers of the army had this
support to look to, all would with them be absolute despair; for, with
the exception of some of the connexions of ministers, there was not an
officer who came home from the expedition who did not vent execrations
against the authors of it ... there was not a man engaged in that
retreat of unparalleled hardship who did not curse those who placed
them in such a situation.
The fact was as Mr. Tierney stated it; ... he was only mistaken in
imputing it to the government. Four regiments and two troops of horse
artillery were actually on board, and had been disembarked. Five more
regiments of cavalry were under orders for Spain, and would have been
dispatched as soon as the transports could return for them. Nor had
Mr. Tierney overstated the advantages which might have been expected
had they arrived at the scene of action. On the contrary, far more
important results than that of maintaining Coruña for a time must have
ensued, if the British army had found these reinforcements there, even
if it could be supposed that the retreat would have been made with such
desperate precipitance, the General knowing he had such support at
hand. He would then have retreated like one who was falling back upon
his reinforcements, not flying to his ships. Broken in strength as the
army was by severe exertion and excessive sufferings, broken in spirit
too and almost in heart by the manner of its retreat, it had beaten
the pursuers in fair battle, and 10,000 fresh troops would have turned
the tide. Galicia would have been delivered from the enemy, Portugal
saved from invasion, and Soult’s army have been cut off, unless they
could have crossed the mountains faster in flight than they had done
in pursuit. Ministers would indeed have deserved the imputation so
confidently cast on them by their opponents, if these advantages had
been lost by their misconduct. Mr. Canning stated in their defence,
that the reinforcements had been countermanded by the Generals, and
empty transports sent out in conformity to their distinct requisition.
“It was an afflicting circumstance,” said he, “to send out empty,
for the purpose of bringing off the army, those ships which had been
filled for the purpose of reinforcing it. Among all the decisions to
which I have been a party, no one has ever in the course of my life
occurred which gave me more pain than this; ... every dictate of the
understanding was tortured, every feeling was wrung by it. But his
Majesty’s ministers had no choice. They felt that it would excite
dissatisfaction in England and dismay in Spain; and yet they had no
alternative.”
♦MR. CANNING.♦
Mr. Canning then proceeded to examine the more general arguments of Mr.
Ponsonby. “It had been argued,” he said, “that before the assistance
of this country had been given to Spain, we ought to have ascertained
whether or not the Spaniards were instigated by the monks; whether
they were encouraged by the higher ranks; whether they were wedded to
their ancient institutions, or disposed to shake off the oppression of
their former government; to abjure the errors of a delusive religion;
and to forswear the Pope and the Grand Inquisitor. The policy of his
Majesty’s government was different. They felt that the Spanish nation
wanted other and more aids than lectures on municipal institutions;
they were content that a British army should act in Spain, though the
Grand Inquisitor might have been at the head of the Spanish armies;
though the people might have been attached to their ancient monarchy,
and with one hand upheld Ferdinand VII., whilst with the other
they worshipped the Lady of the Pillar. God forbid we should be so
intolerant as to make a conformity to our own opinions the price of
our assistance to others, in their efforts for national independence;
to carry the sword in one hand, and what we may choose to call the
Rights of Man in the other! But the enthusiasm of the Spaniards was
not pretended; what they had in their mouths, they felt in their
hearts: they were enthusiastically determined to defend their country
to the last extremity, or to perish under its ruins. The cause was not
desperate; the spirit of the people was unsubdued; the boundaries of
French power were confined within the limits of their military posts;
the throne of Joseph was erected on sand, and would totter with the
first blast; and Buonaparte, even should he succeed, instead of a
yielding and unreproaching ally, would have an impatient, revolting,
and turbulent nation to keep down. The cause was not therefore
desperate, because our army of 30,000 or 40,000 men had been obliged to
withdraw; and it was not just to the country, or to the army, which
he hoped would again prove the stay and bulwark of Europe, to assert
that its honour was in consequence gone for ever. All the energy of
liberty, and all the sacredness of loyalty, still survived; and the
Spanish revolution was, he trusted, destined by Providence to stand
between posterity and French despotism, and to show to the world, that,
amidst the paroxysms of freedom, a monarch might still be loved. If,
therefore, ministers could show that these were the feelings by which
they were influenced, and that they had acted up to these feelings,
their justification would be complete; and he was convinced that the
liberal and disinterested measures of his Majesty’s government towards
Spain were more congenial to British feeling, and more honourable to
the national character, than if they had set out in their career of
assistance by picking up golden apples for ourselves. For himself, as
an humble individual of the government, and having a share in these
transactions, the recollection would be a source of gratification
which he should carry with him to the grave. If we had been obliged to
quit Spain, we had left that country with fresh laurels blooming upon
our brows; and whatever failure there had been upon the whole might
still be repaired. If that was to be brought forward as the ground for
accusation, he stood there for judgement. The object of the motion was
to take the reins of government out of the hands of those who held
them; and upon that ground he desired that the present ministers
might be judged by comparison. Was it the pleasure of the House that
Spain should be abandoned? Was it a principle agreed upon, that the
direction of government should be committed to other hands? Was it then
a settled opinion, that there was something fatal in the will, and
irresistible in the power of Buonaparte? and was the world to submit to
his tyrannous resolves, as to a divine infliction? Whatever might be
the fruits of Buonaparte’s victories in other respects, the spirit of
the Spanish nation was yet unsubdued. His fortune, no doubt, had been
augmented; but still it was fortune, not fate; and therefore not to be
considered unchangeable and fixed. There was something unworthy in the
sentiment that would defer to this fortune, as to the dispensations
of Providence; looking upon it as immutable in its nature, and
irresistible by human means:--
‘Te
Nos facimus Fortuna Deam, cœloque locamus.’”
This was a triumphant reply. The arguments of the opposition had been
so misdirected, that there was no occasion of subterfuge, sophistry,
or the shield of a majority to baffle them: they were refutable by
a plain statement of facts, where they relied on facts, ... by an
appeal to principles and feelings, where they pretended to philosophy.
Mr. Canning spoke from his heart. There was nothing which he was
required to extenuate or to exaggerate; all that was needful was a
manly avowal of what had been done, and of the reasons why it had been
done. He had a good cause to plead, and he pleaded it with a force
and eloquence worthy of the occasion. The same cause was in effect
♦MR. WINDHAM.♦ pleaded by Mr. Windham, though he took his place in
the opposition ranks, and voted for the inquiry as an opposition
question. “Our expedition to Spain,” he said, “had been so managed as
to produce what was much worse than nothing. What we called our best
army had retreated from the field without striking a blow, on the mere
rumour of the enemy’s advance. We had shown them that our best troops
could do nothing, and therefore that there was little chance of their
undisciplined peasantry succeeding better. There were two courses
which might have been pursued, either that of striking a blow upon the
Ebro while the enemy were weak and their attention distracted, ... or,
if this were hopeless, of proceeding at once upon some general plan
with a view to the final deliverance of the Peninsula. The first was
a mere question on which few but those in office could have the means
of judging. But if the force sent to the Ebro had (as it ought to have
been) been chiefly cavalry (which the enemy most wanted, and we could
best spare), such a force, even if it had been found insufficient for
its immediate object, could have retired in safety to that part of
the Peninsula where, at all events, and in every view, the great mass
of our force should be collected ... the neighbourhood of Cadiz and
Gibraltar. These were the only two places from which a large body of
troops, when pressed by a superior army, could hope to get away; and
there was no other part of Spain to which a British army, large enough
to be of any use, could with propriety be trusted.
“There, therefore,” Mr. Windham continued, “I would have collected
the greatest force that this country could by any possibility have
furnished. There was no reason why we might not have had an army of
100,000. An hundred thousand men, with Gibraltar to retreat upon, was a
far less risk to the country than 30,000 in the situation in which the
ministry had placed them; nay, than 30,000 in the very situation spoken
of; because a general must be miserably deficient in knowledge of his
business, who, in such an abundant country, and with such a fortress
behind him, would, with an army of that amount, suffer himself to be
prevented from making good his retreat, by any force which the enemy
could bring against him. For when we talked of Buonaparte’s numbers,
we must recollect where those numbers were to act. To meet in the
south of Spain a British force of 100,000, Buonaparte must bring over
the Pyrenees a force of not less than 200,000; to say nothing of the
demand that would be made upon him by the Spanish army which might be
raised in that part of Spain, to co-operate with the British, and which
the presence of such a British force would help to raise. Buonaparte
would have a whole kingdom, which he must garrison, behind him, if
he would either be sure of his supplies, or make provision against
total destruction, in the event of any reverse. He must fight us at
arm’s-length, while our strength would be exerted within distance, with
an impregnable fortress at hand, furnishing a safe retreat in case of
disaster, and a source of endless supply, by means of its safe and
undisturbable communication with this country. And let it not be said,
that while the army continued in the south, Buonaparte might continue
master of the north. What mastery could he have of any part of Spain,
while such an army could keep on foot in any other? And why, in case
of success, did the security of its retreat require that it should
never advance? There was never any thing so demonstrable, therefore,
as that the only way of carrying on effectually a campaign in Spain,
whatever else you might have done, was to collect your army in the
south. A force raised to the greatest possible amount to which the mind
and means of the country, ... then elevated above itself, and exalted
to something of a preternatural greatness, ... could have carried it,
should have been placed where it would have been safe from the risk
of total loss, and would not have been kept down by the idea that the
deposit was too great for the country to hazard. This should have been
the great foundation, the base line of the plan of the campaign. On
this the country might have given a loose to all its exertions, with
the consolatory reflection, that the greater its exertions, the greater
its security, ... the more it made its preparations effectual to their
purpose, the less was the risk at which it acted.”
Mr. Windham then censured in strong terms the neglect of those
opportunities which our command at sea had offered upon the eastern
coast of Spain; “a coast,” he said, “which was placed as the high road
for the entry of troops from France, which was every where accessible
for our ships, and which was inhabited by the race of men who fought at
Gerona and Zaragoza. Total forgetfulness could alone explain this most
unaccountable neglect. But the great and pregnant source of error in
ministers,” he observed, “besides the fault of not knowing better, was
that which they had in common with many other ministers, and which he
had signally witnessed in some of his own time, ... that of mistaking
bustle for activity, and supposing that they were doing a great deal,
when they were only making a great deal of noise, and spending a great
deal of money. They looked at every measure, not with a view to the
effect which it was to produce abroad, but to the appearance which
it was to make at home.” He then spoke of the campaign in Spain more
fairly than either party had ventured to represent it. “He could not,”
he said, “help perceiving in the conduct of this war, and certainly
in much of the language held about it, a certain mixture of that error
which prevailed in many years of the last, of looking to other powers
for what ought to have been our own work. We did not set our shoulders
to the wheel, as people would who estimated truly what the exertions
of this country could do, when fairly put forth. In this point there
was a want of confidence in ourselves; ... in another there was a want,
not merely of generosity, but of common justice toward our allies.
There could be nothing more fallacious than to estimate the feelings
of a country towards any cause by the feelings excited in that part of
it which should be exposed to the immediate pressure of an army. If
the scene of war lay in England, and we had an army of allies, or even
of our own countrymen, acting for our defence, they would not be very
popular in the places where they were quartered or encamped; and there
would not be wanting complaints among the farmers whose provisions
were consumed, whose hen-roosts were plundered, whose furniture was
stolen, whose ricks were set on fire, and whose wives and daughters
might not always escape insult, that the French themselves could not do
them greater mischief. Now, if this were true, as infallibly it would
be, of English troops upon English ground, might we not suppose that
a good deal more of the same sort would happen when English troops
were on Spanish ground, where every cause of dissatisfaction must be
aggravated a thousand-fold, by difference of habits and manners, and
the want of any common language, by which the parties might understand
one another? It must be confessed, too, he was afraid, that we were
not the nation who accommodated ourselves best to strangers, or knew
best how to conciliate their good will: and when to all this was added,
that we were a retreating army, and an army compelled to retreat with
extraordinary rapidity, and much consequent disorder, it would not
be surprising if neither we appeared to the people, nor they to us,
in the most advantageous form. Nor were the inhabitants of the towns
and villages on the line of our march to be considered as a fair
representation of the feelings and sentiments of the mass of people in
Spain. On many occasions the soldiers, at the end of a long march, had
nothing provided for them to eat, and were obliged to help themselves.
The inhabitants, whether they staid or had fled, had locked up their
houses, and nothing was to be got but by breaking them open; and when
once soldiers, whether from necessity or otherwise, began to break
open houses, farther irregularities must be expected. Galicia was
probably an unfair specimen of what was to be looked for from the rest
of Spain; not so much from the character of the inhabitants, as from
the state of society there, where the gentry were few, and of little
influence; and where there was almost a total want of those classes
which might direct and methodize the exertions of the lower orders.
But to talk of the Spaniards generally, as wanting in zeal, or courage,
or determination to defend their country, was more than any one would
venture, after such examples as Zaragoza. A defence had there been
made, so far exceeding what was to be expected from a regular army,
that a general in this country would have been made a peer for having
surrendered Zaragoza, in circumstances far short of those in which its
inhabitants defended it.”
There was an English spirit in this speech, such as might have been
looked for from Mr. Windham: for if sometimes he seemed to delight in
making with perverse ingenuity the worse appear the better reason,
and treated as a sport for the intellect subjects which deserved
a serious and severe feeling, no political views or enmities ever
betrayed him into an unworthy act, or sentiment inconsistent with his
natural generosity. The motion for inquiry was rejected; but whatever
papers were called for were granted, though Lord Liverpool warned
his opponents, that if they insisted upon making ♦SIR JOHN MOORE’S
DISPATCHES.♦ some of these documents public, they would perceive the
impropriety when it was too late. They found in these papers what they
wanted, ... an assertion broadly made by Sir John Moore, “that the
Spaniards had neither the power nor the inclination to make any efforts
for themselves. To convince the people of England, as well as the
rest of Europe, of this,” he said, “it was necessary to risk his army,
and for that reason he made the march to Sahagun. As a diversion,”
he continued, “it succeeded. I brought the whole disposable force of
the French against this army, and it has been allowed to follow me,
without a single movement being made to favour my retreat. The people
of Galicia, though armed, made no attempt to stop the passage of the
French through the mountains. They abandoned their dwellings at our
approach, drove away their carts, oxen, and every thing that could be
of the smallest aid to the army. The consequence has been, that our
sick have been left behind: and when our horses or mules failed, which,
on such marches, and through such a country, was the case to a great
extent, baggage, ammunition, stores, and even money, were necessarily
destroyed or abandoned.” This was a heavy charge against the Spaniards,
and it was triumphantly repeated by those who, being the opponents
of ministry, became thereby the enemies of the Spanish cause. Yet it
might have occurred to them that it was neither generous nor prudent
to reproach an undisciplined peasantry for not attempting to defend
defiles through which the finest army that had ever left England,
with a man who was supposed to be their best general at its head, was
retreating faster than ever army had retreated before. If these passes
were not defensible, why should the Galicians be condemned for not
defending them? If they were, why did the British army run through,
leaving their baggage, stores, and ammunition, their money, their
horses, their sick, their dying, and their dead, to track the way?
This accusation against our allies the opposition had expected to find;
but they had not looked for a heavier charge against the army itself
from the same authority, ... a charge too which, if any thing more than
the consternation and flight of the British force had been required to
excuse the Galicians, would have supplied it. For the General added
in this unhappy dispatch, “I am sorry to say, that the army whose
conduct I had such reason to extol on its march through Portugal, and
on its arrival in Spain, has totally changed its character since it
began to retreat. I can say nothing in its favour, but that when there
was a prospect of fighting the enemy, the men were then orderly, and
seemed pleased, and determined to do their duty.” “Of what nature,” it
was asked, “was this misconduct with which General Moore so roundly
accused a whole army, almost with his dying breath? Did the officers
behave ill, or the men, or both? Did they refuse to fight, or did they
refuse to fly? What had they done, or what had they omitted to do?”
These questions were asked by the wiser part of the public, and the
narratives of the campaign, which were afterwards published, amply
answered them. It then appeared that the army, from the hour in which
it was turned into a rout, considered themselves like sailors after a
shipwreck, released from all discipline by the common ruin; ... that
they plundered, burnt, and destroyed before them; ... that while many
of the officers murmured against the conduct of the commander, the men
cried out loudly against the disgrace of running away; ... that order,
discipline, temperance, and even humanity, were laid aside by them in
their desperation: but that they had never forgotten the honour of
England; and that whenever a hope of facing the enemy was held out to
them, order was instantaneously restored, they were themselves again,
and, in spite of all their fatigues and sufferings, manifested that
invincible courage which, happily for themselves and for their country,
they were allowed at last to prove upon the French at Coruña.
Such consequences, however, humiliating as they were, were inevitable
in a retreat so conducted. But Sir John Moore’s dispatch contained
a more startling avowal, for it was then first made known that he
had been advised to propose terms to the enemy, that he might be
permitted to embark quietly. It was indeed an unexpected shock to
learn that there were officers, and of such rank as to offer advice to
the General, who were for asking leave of the French to embark, and
purchasing by such dishonour that safety which the army, broken-hearted
as it was, without horse, and almost without artillery, won gloriously
for itself. From this incalculable evil, this inexpiable disgrace,
Sir John Moore had saved us. But who were the men who had so little
confidence in British valour, that they would not have fought the
battle of Coruña? Who were they who, instead of relying upon their
own hearts and hands, would have proposed terms to Marshal Soult, and
set the Spaniards an example to which every traitor or every coward
among them might have appealed as a precedent for any baseness? This
question was not asked in Parliament; nor was any pledge required
from Government, or given, that these men should never on any future
occasion be trusted with command. Not a single remark was made in
either House by either party upon this subject, nor upon any of the
information contained in a dispatch which had been loudly called for as
of such great importance. It furnished no matter of reproach against
the ministry, and therefore it was not the kind of information which
their opponents wanted. And ministers themselves could make no use of
it in their own justification, for, having it in their hands, they
had passed a vote of thanks to the officers and men of whose previous
misconduct they possessed these proofs; and instead of defending their
own measures by arguing that the campaign might probably have turned
out well, and beyond all doubt less disastrously, if the Commander had
acted with more vigour and more discretion, they had asserted that
every thing had been ably executed, as well as wisely planned.
♦MR. FRERE’S CORRESPONDENCE WITH SIR JOHN MOORE.♦
Some matter, however, for accusation the opposition thought they
had found in Mr. Frere’s correspondence with Sir John Moore. They
affirmed that the fatal event of the campaign had been caused by his
interference, he having been the sole cause of the army’s advance. To
have his conduct fairly and impartially considered is what no agent
of the British government expects from a party in opposition to the
government, the just and honourable feelings of private life being
so commonly cast aside in political warfare, that the wonder is when
a trace of them is found remaining. But Mr. Frere was attacked with
peculiar acrimony, as the intimate friend of Mr. Canning; this being
motive enough for virulence when a spirit of faction prevails. He
was charged in the most unqualified terms with folly, ignorance, and
presumption; it was declared that his incapacity had given Buonaparte
the same advantage as that Emperor was accustomed to derive from
corruption and treason; and it was announced that an address would be
moved for his immediate recall. That intention was not pursued when it
was understood that Marquis Wellesley would be appointed to succeed
him in the embassy; and upon every point except that of having desired
that Colonel Charmilly might be examined before a council of war,
his conduct was fully vindicated and ♦1809. APRIL.♦ approved by the
ministers. In so doing they thought he had adopted an improper course;
but they proved from the documents which had supplied the grounds of
the accusation, that Sir John Moore had not been guilty of the gross
fault which his admirers, in their desire of criminating another,
imputed to him: he had not made a forward movement which endangered
the army contrary to his own judgement, and in deference to an opinion
which he disapproved; but upon his own plans, and in consequence of the
information which he obtained from an intercepted dispatch.
♦EARL GREY. APRIL 21.♦
In the course of these debates Earl Grey complained that only 2000
cavalry had been sent to Spain, though we had 27,000, and though
that description of force was peculiarly necessary in that country;
and he contrasted the conduct of the British government with that of
Buonaparte, “the consummate general whose plans they had to oppose.
In rapidity of execution,” said his lordship, “he is only equalled by
his patience in preparing the means. He has all the opposite qualities
of Fabius and Marcellus, whether you consider the country in which he
acts, the people with whom he has to contend, or the means by which
he is to subdue them. He rivals Hannibal in the application of the
means, and is exempt from his only fault, that of not improving by past
experience. The means provided by Buonaparte for the accomplishment of
his purposes are so well combined, and his objects so ably prosecuted,
as generally to give him a moral certainty of success; and whatever
may be thought of his total disregard of the justice of those objects,
it is impossible not to admire the ability and wisdom with which he
combines the means of accomplishing them. In order to maintain against
such an antagonist the ultimate contest which is to decide for ever the
power and independence of this country, the true policy of those who
govern it must be, to pay a strict attention to economy, to be actuated
by a determination to concentrate our means, not to endanger them in
any enterprise or speculation in which the event is doubtful; but
pursuing the economical system of husbanding our resources, by which
alone we could enable ourselves to continue a contest, the cessation of
which does not depend upon us, but upon the injustice of our enemy.”
♦EARL OF LIVERPOOL.♦
The Earl of Liverpool remarked, in reply, how singular it was that
every one who censured the plan which ministers had followed with
regard to Spain had a plan of his own, and that none of those plans
should have a single principle of agreement with each other. This at
least, he said, showed the difficulty which government must have felt
in forming its measures, though it afforded a facility in defending
them. As to the accusation of not sending a sufficient force of
cavalry, he stated that as much tonnage was required for 5000 horse as
for 40,000 foot; and moreover that vessels of a different description
were necessary, of which a very limited number could at any time be
procured. Yet from 8000 to 9000 horse had been sent, and there would
have been not less than 12,000, had not the General countermanded the
reinforcements which were ready. Weak as Earl Grey might be pleased to
deem the ministers, they had not been so foolish as to expect that the
first efforts of the Spaniards would meet with uninterrupted success;
they were not yet guilty of calculating upon impossibilities; they had
not supposed that such a cause as the cause of Spain, to be fought for
with such an enemy as the ruler of France, could be determined in one
campaign. Reverses they had met; but those reverses were not owing to
the indifference or apathy of the Spaniards; they were imputable to
their want of discipline, and to an ill-judged contempt for the French,
a proof in itself of their zeal and ardour. And what would have been
the general sentiment in that country and in this if our army had
retired without attempting any thing? If, when after all her repeated
disasters, the spirit of Spain was unsubdued, and her capital bidding
defiance to an immense army at the very gates; if a British army, so
marshalled and equipped, and after a long march to the aid of their
ally, had in that hour of trial turned their backs upon her danger,
what would have been thought of the sincerity of our co-operation? “I
believe in my conscience,” he continued, “that that movement of Sir
John Moore saved Spain. There are some, perhaps, who may be startled
at the assertion: it is my fixed and decided opinion, and as such I
will avow it. After the destruction of Blake’s army, the defeat of
Castaños, and the dispersion of the army of Extremadura, ... after
the capitulation of Madrid, which promised to emulate the glory of
Zaragoza, and would have done so, had not treachery interposed; if
at that crisis Buonaparte had pursued his conquests, by pushing to
the southern provinces, the Spanish troops would never have had time
to rally there. But that time was given by Sir John Moore’s advance
in their favour. Never was there a more effectual diversion. Sir
John Moore himself said, that as a diversion it had completely and
effectually succeeded. Nor was the moral effect of thus re-animating
the spirit of the nation to be overlooked. Let the final issue of the
contest be what it may, France has not yet succeeded in subduing Spain.
I admit that Buonaparte has 200,000 men in that country; that his
troops are of the bravest, and his generals among the most skilful in
the world; and, above all, that he has been himself at their head: and
yet, with all this, he has not got possession of more territory than
he had last year: he only holds such parts as in every war fell to the
lot of whichever brought the largest army into the field. I am far from
saying, regard being had to the man and the circumstances of the case,
that the Spaniards must ultimately succeed; but, at the same time,
looking at the spirit they have evinced, and the actions that have
happened, particularly the defence of Zaragoza, I cannot feel lukewarm
in my hope that their efforts will be crowned with ultimate success. In
that fatal contest with America we gained every battle; we took every
town we besieged, until the capture of General Burgoyne; and yet the
Americans ultimately succeeded, by perseverance, in the contest. In the
present struggle, do not the extent and nature of the country afford a
hope of success? does not its population forbid despair? We have not
lost the confidence of the Spanish people; we know that every true
Spanish heart beats high for this country; we know that whatever may
happen, they do not accuse us. Submission may be the lot they are fated
to endure in the end; but they do not impute to us the cause of their
misfortunes: they are sensible that neither the thirst after commerce,
nor territory, nor security, is to be imputed to us, in the assistance
we have afforded to them upon this important occasion. Whatever may
be the result, we have done our duty; we have not despaired; we have
persevered, and will do so to the last, while there is any thing left
to contend for with a prospect of success.”
♦MR. CANNING.
MAY 9.♦
Mr. Canning also declared, that considering Sir John Moore’s advance
in a military point, in his poor judgement he could not but think it a
wise measure; but in every view which ennobles ♦1809. MAY.♦ military
objects by exalting military character, he was sure it was so. With all
its consequences and disasters, he preferred it to a retreat at that
time. Of those disasters he would not say a word: the battle of Coruña
covered every thing; but the retreat itself, and the precipitancy of
it, he could never cease to regret. This single expression was the
only hint even of censure as to the conduct of the retreat which was
heard in Parliament. In the course of the debate an extraordinary
confession was made ♦MAY 9.♦ by Mr. Canning. “During the whole time,”
he said, “that these events were passing, government had no means of
arguing from the past: the occasion was without precedent, and such
as it was impossible to lay their hand on any period of history to
parallel, either from its importance with regard to individuals, to
this happy country and to Europe, or the difficulty that arose from
there being so little knowledge to guide their steps in the actual
scene of their operations. Why should government be ashamed to say they
wanted that knowledge of the interior of Spain, which they found no
one possessed? With every other part of the continent we had had more
intercourse: of the situation of Spain we had every thing to learn.”
With what contemptuous satisfaction must Buonaparte and the French
politicians have heard such a confession from the British secretary of
state for foreign affairs! With whatever feelings the government might
make this avowal, it was heard with astonishment by the thoughtful
part of the people, and not without indignation. To them it was a
mournful thing thus to be told that their rulers laid in no stock of
knowledge, but lived, as it were, from hand to mouth, upon what they
happened to meet with! Is there a country or a province in Europe, it
was asked; is there a European possession in any part of the world,
of which the French government does not possess maps, plans, and the
most ample accounts of whatever may guide its politics, and facilitate
its invasion? Even respecting Spanish America, such a confession would
have been disgraceful, because it would have betrayed an inexcusable
negligence in seeking for information; but as regarding Spain itself,
it became almost incredible. Did there not exist faithful and copious
accounts of that kingdom, both by foreign and native writers? Had we
not still living, diplomatists who had resided for years at the Spanish
court; consuls and merchants who had been domesticated, and almost
naturalized in Spain; and travellers who, either for their pleasure, or
on their commercial pursuits, had traversed every province and every
part of the Peninsula? Was not information always to be found, if it
were wisely and[12] perseveringly sought?
The truth was, that though we had means adequate to any emergency,
troops equal to any service, and generals worthy to command them,
Government had the art of war to learn: it had been forgotten in the
cabinet since the days of Marlborough and Godolphin. The minds of men
expand with the sphere in which they act, and that of our statesmen
had long been deplorably contracted. The nation, contented with its
maritime supremacy, hardly considered itself as a military power; and
had well nigh acquiesced in what the French insultingly proclaimed,
and the enemies of the Government sedulously repeated, that we had
ceased to be so. We had been sinking into a feeble, selfish policy,
which would have withered the root of our strength; its avowed
principle being to fix our attention exclusively upon what were called
British objects; in other words, to pursue what was gainful, and
be satisfied with present safety, regardless of honour, and of the
certain ruin which that regardlessness must bring on. The events in
Spain had roused the country from a lethargy which otherwise might
have proved fatal; and ministers, as undoubtedly the better ♦1809.♦
part of their opponents would have done had they been then in office,
heartily participated the national feeling: but when vigorous measures
were required, they found themselves without precedent and without
system. They had entered, however, into the contest generously and
magnanimously, with a spirit which, if it were sustained, would rectify
the errors of inexperience, and work its way through all difficulties.
♦EARL GREY.
APRIL 21.♦
Earl Grey took occasion in one of his speeches to notice an opinion,
that it was of no consequence by which party the administration of
affairs was directed. “How can it,” he asked, “be seriously urged, that
it is the same thing whether the government be entrusted to incapable
persons, or able statesmen? I am really astonished at the absurd
extravagance of the doctrine into which men of general good sense and
good intentions have been recently betrayed upon this subject.” But
no person had ever pretended that it was the same thing whether the
government were administered by weak heads or by wise ones. What had
been maintained was, that the party out of place was in no respect
better than the party in, and in many respects worse: that they did
not possess the slightest superiority in talents; that a comparison
of principles was wholly to their disadvantage; and that the language
respecting the present contest held, even by those among them whose
attachment to the institutions of their country could not be doubted,
was such as left no hope for the honour of England if it were committed
to their hands. The existing ministry acted upon braver and wiser
principles, and, whatever errors they committed in the management of
the war, to the latest ages it will be remembered for their praise,
that in the worst times they never despaired of a good cause, nor
shrunk from any responsibility that the emergency required.
♦EXPEDITION TO THE SCHELDT.♦
An error, and one most grievous in its consequences, they committed
at this time, by dividing their force, and sending a great expedition
against the Isle of Walcheren, as a diversion in aid of Austria,
instead of bringing all their strength to bear upon the Peninsula.
It was a wise saying of Charles V. that counsels are to be approved
or condemned for their causes, not for their consequences. When the
causes which led to this unhappy resolution are considered, it will
appear imputable in part to the conduct of the Spanish government,
still more to that of the opposition in England. By refusing to put
us in possession of Cadiz as a point of retreat and safe depôt, the
Spaniards afforded their enemies in England an argument in support
of their favourite position, that these allies had no confidence in
us. The opposition writers did not fail to urge this as an additional
proof that they were unworthy of our assistance; and the impression
which they laboured to produce was strengthened by persons whose hearts
were with their country, but who thought by heaping obloquy upon the
Spaniards, and making their very misfortunes matter of accusation
against them, to excuse the manner of Sir John Moore’s retreat. To the
effect which had been thus produced on public opinion ministers in some
degree deferred. They deferred still more to the pitiful maxim that the
British government ought to direct its efforts towards the attainment
of what were called purely British objects: now there were ships at
Antwerp and at Flushing, and it was deemed a British object to destroy
the naval resources of the enemy.
Men in England regarded the commencement of the Austrian war with
widely different feelings, each party expecting a result in conformity
to its own system of opinions. Those journalists who taught as the
first political commandment that Buonaparte was Almighty, and that
Europe should have none other Lord but him, as from the commencement of
the troubles in Spain they had represented the cause of the Spaniards
to be hopeless, so they predicted now that that resistless conqueror
was only called a while from his career of conquest in the Peninsula to
win new victories upon the Danube, after which he would return to the
Guadalquivir and the Tagus, and bear down every thing before him there.
Others, who had too sanguinely expected immediate success from the
Spaniards, with equal but less excusable credulity rested their hopes
now upon Austria, ... there, they said, the battle was to be fought,
and the fate of Spain as well as of Germany depended upon the issue.
The wiser few looked for little from the continental governments,
though they knew that much was possible from the people; but from the
beginning of this new contest, it appeared to them important chiefly
because it effected a diversion in favour of the Spaniards; especially
they hoped that England would seize the opportunity, and by meeting
the enemy upon that ground with equal numbers, secure a certain and
decisive victory.
♦TROOPS SENT TO PORTUGAL.♦
Great and unfortunate as the error was of dividing their efforts, the
Government acted with a spirit and vigour which have seldom been seen
in the counsels of a British cabinet. At a time when they expected
that not Spain alone, but Portugal also, would be abandoned by our
troops, they made preparations for sending thither another army with
all speed, under Sir Arthur Wellesley, who consequently resigned his
seat in Parliament, and his office as Chief Secretary in Ireland. Sir
John Craddock, who had then the command in Portugal, being a much older
officer, was appointed Governor of Gibraltar. ♦EARL OF BUCKINGHAMSHIRE.
APRIL 10.♦ The Earl of Buckinghamshire complained of this, as being
an ill reward for those exertions in collecting the scattered British
force, and preparing it for resistance, to which it was owing that the
determination of embarking from Lisbon was abandoned. This complaint
drew from the Earl of Liverpool a just tribute to Sir John Craddock’s
merits, and some remarks not less just upon the impropriety of
bringing such a subject before Parliament, as at once trenching upon
the prerogative, and virtually destroying that responsibility which
ministers possessed.
Lord Buckinghamshire was of opinion that we had acted unwisely in
reinstating the Portugueze Regency; that it became the duty of ♦MAY
1.♦ ministers to form a provisional government in that country till
the subject could be submitted to the Prince of Brazil’s decision;
and that when Marquis Wellesley went out as ambassador to Seville, he
should take with him powers for making those changes in Portugal which
could not be delayed without most serious injury to the common cause
of that kingdom and of Spain, and to the security of Great Britain
and Ireland. To this it was replied, that what had been done was done
because it was presumed to be most in accord with the sentiments of the
government in Brazil, at the same time that due regard was paid to the
feelings and even the prejudices of the people. Lord Buckinghamshire
strongly recommended that we should avail ourselves of the strength
of Portugal as a military position, and of the excellent qualities
of the Portugueze, which, under good discipline, whenever they had
had it, made them among the best soldiers in the world. Such measures
for that great purpose had at that time been taken as the Earl of
Buckinghamshire wished. That nobleman spoke more wisely upon the
affairs of the Peninsula than any other member of the opposition, and
without the slightest taint of party spirit. There were some, of whom
it would be difficult to say whether their speeches displayed less
knowledge of facts, or less regard of them.
CHAPTER XXII.
SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY’S SECOND CAMPAIGN IN PORTUGAL. PASSAGE OF THE
DOURO, AND EXPULSION OF THE FRENCH. DELIVERANCE OF GALICIA.
♦1809.♦
♦FEELINGS OF THE PORTUGUEZE TOWARD THE ENGLISH.♦
There were members who boldly asserted in Parliament that the
Portugueze did not like the English. A more groundless assertion had
seldom been hazarded there. The connexion between England and Portugal
was not an ordinary one, built upon immediate interests, and liable
to change with the chance of circumstances. There were nations with
whom, during the long struggle against Buonaparte, we were in league
one day, and at war the next, the hostility being without anger, and
the alliance without esteem. Our friendship with Portugal was like our
enmity to France, founded upon something deeper. From the day when
Portugal first became a kingdom, with the exception of that unfortunate
period when the Philips usurped its crown, England had been its tried
and faithful friend. When Lisbon was conquered from the Moors, English
crusaders assisted at the siege; ... English archers contributed to
the victory of Aljubarrota, which effected the first deliverance of
Portugal from Castille; ... an Englishwoman, a Plantagenet, was
the mother of that Prince Henry, whose name will for ever remain
conspicuous in the history of the world; ... the Braganzan family, when
it recovered its rights, applied, and not in vain, to its hereditary
ally; ... and when Lisbon was visited by the tremendous earthquake of
1755, money was immediately voted by the English parliament for the
relief of the Portugueze people; and ships laden with provisions were
dispatched to them in a time of scarcity at home[13]. These things
are not forgotten ... if there be a country in the world where the
character of the English is understood, and England is loved as well as
respected, it is Portugal. The face of its rudest mountaineer brightens
when he hears that it is an Englishman who accosts him; and he tells
the traveller that the English and the Portugueze were always ...
always friends.
♦SIR A. WELLESLEY’S INSTRUCTIONS.♦
That old and honourable friendship was now once more to be tried and
approved. An expedition sailed in March for Portugal. The commander’s
instructions were, in case he should find that Lisbon had been
evacuated by the British troops, to proceed to Cadiz, and land the
army there, if the government would admit them into the garrison. Mr.
Canning stated in his advice to Mr. Frere, that the delicacy of this
point was felt and acknowledged, and the former refusal had been
received without the least resentment or surprise. But circumstances
were now materially changed. The security of Cadiz was impaired while
the French possessed Portugal, and it was thought advisable to give the
Junta one more opportunity of reconsidering the question. Permission
would now undoubtedly have been granted had it been required;
fortunately it was not needed.
♦GENERAL BERESFORD APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE PORTUGUEZE ARMY.♦
The Prince of Brazil, perceiving the necessity of forming an efficient
Portugueze army, and the impossibility of remedying the old and
inveterate evils which had ruined the existing establishment, without
the assistance of officers trained in a better school, had appointed
General Beresford commander-in-chief with the rank of Marshal.
Immediately upon taking the command that General published an address
to the army, saying that no person had studied the disposition and
military character of the nation more than himself, and that no one
could be more thoroughly convinced of the good qualities of the
Portugueze soldiers, who were now what they always had been, if not the
best in Europe, equal to the bravest. His care would be to give their
qualities that efficiency which could only be derived from discipline.
They were loyal to their Prince, obedient to the legitimate authorities
who represented him, patient under privations, and they had recently
given proofs of patriotism, energy, and enthusiasm worthy of their
illustrious ancestors. He was proud, therefore, of identifying himself
with such a people: he was now a Portugueze officer, and he pledged
himself that desert should be the only passport to his favour, and that
he would avail himself of every occasion for promoting the comfort,
honour, and advantage both of the officers and men.
♦HE BEGINS TO REFORM THE ARMY.♦
The Portugueze army was indeed in the most deplorable state; but
Marshal Beresford, in appealing to the national pride, did not
exaggerate the good points of the national character; and had it been
as easy in an army which had been so long and so thoroughly debased to
form good officers as good men, his task would not have been difficult.
With the aid of a certain number of British officers, who volunteered
into that service, retaining their rank in their own, he commenced the
task with indefatigable zeal. The capture of Porto excited great alarm
in Lisbon, which was increased when the refugees from that unfortunate
city arrived, and related the horrors that had been committed there.
The spirits of the people, however, were encouraged by the expectation
of British aid, confirmed by a well-timed order of Sir John Craddock’s
for the army to advance, giving proof thereby of a determination to
defend the country, and of confidence in the means for defending it.
The reinforcement which had arrived rendered his force respectable,
and he collected part in front of Santarem, and part upon the road to
Coimbra, to be ready either against Soult or Victor, on ♦APRIL 8.♦
whichever side the attack might be made. Beresford announced the fall
of Porto in his general orders, and took that opportunity of delivering
a wholesome monition to the army. “Porto,” he said, “defended by
four-and-twenty thousand men, and two hundred pieces of artillery, had
fallen an easy conquest, notwithstanding both the people and the troops
were brave and loyal, because the enemy had been able to produce a
general insubordination under the appearance of patriotism.” He warned
them against the French partizans; whatever reports such men propagated
were to be received with distrust, seeing they were undoubtedly paid
by the enemy to promote confusion and distrust. “Let the troops,” he
pursued, “be subordinate to their officers; let them observe strict
discipline, and the country will have nothing to fear. The enemy is
in possession of Porto; so he was of Chaves; but that place he has
lost with more than 1500 men. Recollect, soldiers, that when General
Silveira saw the necessity of retiring from Chaves, where, from the
nature and number of his forces, he was incapable of resisting the
French, there were pretended patriots who raised a cry of treason
against him, and induced a great number of the despisers of discipline
to attempt the defence of that place, which they surrendered without
firing a gun, and the troops with it, who had been deceived by them.
The firmness of the General saved the rest of the army, and placed
it in a situation to acquire greater glory, and merit the thanks of
his country. The Marshal,” he concluded, “cannot sufficiently warn
the people and the troops against those who, while they assume the
appearance of patriotism, are in reality leaders of sedition; nor can
he sufficiently recommend union and confidence, for every thing may
be hoped from the loyalty, valour, and enthusiasm which animate the
Portugueze in defence of their country.” And he assured them that
he should always inform them of the disasters which might occur, as
well as of the successes, being convinced that their zeal would be in
proportion with the services which might be required, and that they
would display a courage equal to the exigency of the times, and worthy
of the Portugueze character.
♦INTERCEPTED LETTER FROM GENERAL KELLERMANN TO SOULT.♦
Marshal Beresford soon had occasion to announce something more
encouraging. Troops were marched from Spain to be employed in the war
against Austria; they knew not whither they were going till they had
left the Peninsula, nor even that a continental war had recommenced,
so completely had the all-pervading despotism of the French government
cut off all private intelligence, as well as withheld all public.
The commanders alone were of necessity made acquainted with the real
state of affairs, and Beresford now published an intercepted letter
from Kellermann to Soult, communicating this news. The war in Germany,
said he, produced by the intrigues and gold of England, renders our
situation extremely critical. Such he represented his own situation
to be, in what he called Upper Spain, where he occupied the plain
country with a considerable cavalry force, watching the Asturian
army and Romana, and doing all he could to keep down the people
between Valladolid and Madrid. He told Soult that he could expect
no reinforcement unless it were from Marshal Ney, of whose ability
to co-operate with him Kellermann could not judge, not having any
communication with him, because the whole of Galicia was in a state of
insurrection. Marshal Soult was at this time spreading a report that
Buonaparte was about to arrive at the head of 80,000 men. Thus it is,
said the Portugueze address, that Marshal Soult, who calls himself
Governor of Portugal, endeavours to conceal their danger from the
unfortunate troops whom he is sacrificing to the ambition of a tyrant.
And when it is thus ascertained that a general publishes falsehoods
in one case, his army and the people will know how to appreciate his
accounts in others.
♦LABORDE SENT TO ATTACK SILVEIRA AT AMARANTE.♦
The French general at this time felt the difficulties of his situation,
though far from apprehending as yet the vigour and ability of the enemy
with whom he was soon to contend. His immediate object was to open a
communication with Lapisse and Victor, and this was not possible while
Trant defended the Vouga, and Silveira the Tamega. The latter enemy,
who was near enough to disquiet him, had broken down all the bridges
over that river except at Amarante. Laborde was sent against him with a
considerable force; he had Loison’s division together with his own, and
was to be joined by Lahoussaye’s. Silveira, in advancing to Penafiel,
had supposed that Soult, instead of tarrying at Porto, would have
marched upon Lisbon without delay; in which case he would have entered
Porto, and, by occupying the Douro, have effectually excluded the enemy
from the province between the rivers. Upon the approach of this force
he withdrew to the ♦STATE OF PENAFIEL WHEN THE FRENCH ENTERED.♦ Campo
de Manhufe. When the enemy entered Penafiel the scene was such as to
make them sensible how deep was the feeling of abhorrence which they
had excited and deserved. The whole city was deserted; all food and
every thing that could have been serviceable to the invaders had been
either carried away or destroyed. Every house had been left open; the
churches alone were closed, that the Portugueze might not seem to have
left them open to pollution. The very silence of the streets was awful,
broken only when the clocks struck; and now and then by the howling of
some of those dogs who, though living, as in other Portugueze towns,
without an owner, felt a sense of desertion when they missed the
accustomed presence of men. The royal arms upon the public buildings
had been covered with black crape, to indicate that in the absence of
the Braganza family Portugal was as a widow. Of the whole population
one old man was the only living soul who remained in the town. Being in
extreme old age, he was either unable to endure the fatigue of flight,
or desirous of ending his days in a manner which he would have regarded
as a religious martyrdom; he placed himself, therefore, on a stone seat
in the market-place; there the French found him in the act of prayer,
while the unsuppressed expression of his strong features and fiery
eye told them in a language not to be misunderstood that part of his
prayer was for God’s vengeance upon the invaders of his ♦NAYLIES, 102.♦
country. This was in the true spirit of his nation: and that spirit was
now in full action. It had reached all ranks and classes. The man of
letters had left his beloved studies, the monk his cloister; even women
forsook that retirement which is every where congenial to the sex, and
belongs there to the habits of the people. But it was not surprising
that in a warfare where women were not spared, they should take part.
Nuns had been seen working at that battery which defeated the French in
their attempt at crossing the Minho; and here a beautiful lady, whose
abode was near Penafiel, had raised some hundred followers; and in the
sure ♦NAYLIES, 107.♦ war of destruction which they were carrying on,
encouraged them, sword in hand, by her exhortations and her example.
♦THE BRIDGE OF AMARANTE.
APRIL 18.♦
After some skirmishing for two days, Silveira, understanding that a
division of the enemy was moving from Guimaraens to take him in the
rear, and place him thus between two fires, gave orders for retiring to
Amarante, and there defending the passage of the bridge. Antiquaries
have maintained that this bridge was the work of Trajan; but a
tradition too long established, and too fondly believed to be shaken by
any historical arguments, has ascribed its foundation to St. Gonçalo de
Amarante, a Saint, who, having taken up his abode there in a hermitage,
and commiserating the numerous accidents which happened in passing the
river, determined to build a bridge. The alms which he obtained would
have fallen short of the necessary charges for feeding his workmen,
if the Saint had had no other resources; he, however, by making a
cross upon the water, drew as many fish to his hand as he pleased to
take, and then supplied his labourers with a fountain of oil from
the rock for the purpose of dressing them, and another of wine, that
their hearts might be gladdened, as well as their countenances made
cheerful. The bridge consists of three arches, the middle one being so
large as to appear very disproportionate; but through this the Saint
is believed to have guided with his staff a huge oak which the flood
was bringing down, and which, if it had struck the pier, must have
demolished it, ... a miracle so necessary, that he rose from his grave
to perform it. Portugal has never been ungrateful to such benefactors:
near as Compostella is, the shrine of St. Gonçalo was preferred by
the Portugueze to that of Santiago; whole parishes went thither in
procession, and not a day passed in which some joyous party of devotees
was not to be met on every road leading to Amarante, travelling with
music, and increasing their noisy mirth by firing off sky-rockets in
the face of the sun. It is the custom for every pilgrim to offer a
small wax taper, and these tapers have amounted to more than twelve
hundred weight on the day of his annual festival, at which sometimes
more than 30,000 persons have assembled from all parts.
♦LIEUTENANT-COLONEL PATRICK KILLED IN DEFENDING IT.♦
The town, which contained about five hundred families, stands on the
right bank, consisting chiefly of one long and narrow street, leading
down a steep descent to the bridge. Hither the Portugueze retreated:
a retrograde movement, in the presence of an active and adventurous
enemy, tries the best troops; to the ill or the undisciplined it is
usually fatal. Silveira’s rear-guard fell back in disorder, ... the
confusion spread, and the enemy, when they entered Amarante pell-mell
with their despised and broken opponents, thought themselves sure
of winning the passage, and destroying a force upon which they were
eager to wreak their vengeance. This expectation might probably have
been fulfilled, if Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick, a British officer who
had come out with Beresford, had not been present. Short as the time
was which he had been with the Portugueze, it had been long enough
for him to become acquainted with their character; and rallying a
handful of men, who required only such a leader to be fit for any
service, he posted himself at the head of the bridge. The example
became as contagious as the previous disorder, and the Portugueze,
who, despairing to maintain the passage, had begun to withdraw toward
Mezam-frio, rallied and re-formed. The enemy persisted in the attack,
knowing the importance of the passage; but the defendants stood their
ground, and actually entrenched themselves in the street with the dead
bodies of their enemies; they occupied the houses also, and the Convent
of St. Gonçalo, one of the finest which the Dominicans possessed in
that kingdom; and from thence they kept up a most destructive fire,
till the enemy were driven out of the town with considerable loss. But
Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick received several wounds, was carried off
exhausted with loss of blood, and died within a few days, after having
performed a service for which it is to be hoped a monument will one day
be erected to his memory on the spot.
♦THE FRENCH ENDEAVOUR TO THROW A BRIDGE OVER THE RIVER.♦
The French set fire to the town before they abandoned it. On the
following day, having been joined by Lahoussaye’s division, they won
the Convent, after a brave resistance: they were now masters of the
town; but the suburb of Villa Real, on the other side the river,
was occupied by the Portugueze, who had barricadoed the bridge, and
planted batteries which commanded the approach to it. They kept up a
fire also from some houses in the suburb upon those who approached
to reconnoitre, and killed, among many others, Loison’s aide-de-camp,
and his chief officer of engineers. The loss was so severe in these
attempts, that Laborde despaired of forcing the passage, and gave
directions for forming a wooden bridge some quarter of a mile from the
town. When the materials were prepared, the best swimmers from the
different regiments were ordered to be upon the spot at midnight, as
soon as the moon had gone down; but they found the water so deep, that
no diver could touch the bottom in the mid stream, and so rapid, that
no one could reach the opposite shore; this project, therefore, was
abandoned.
♦REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO EFFECT THE PASSAGE.♦
Captain Bouchard, of the engineers, who was present at this attempt,
had been sent by Marshal Soult to form an opinion upon the spot
concerning difficulties which both Laborde and Loison represented as
of the most formidable kind. In reconnoitring the Portugueze works
of defence from the church tower, which was close to the bridge, he
discovered a string so placed as to leave no doubt in his mind that
it was fastened to a trigger, which was to fire a mine and blow up
the farther arch in case the entrenchments should be forced: at the
same time he was convinced that there was no other possible means of
effecting the passage than by forcing them. Ten days had been occupied
in vain attempts, which had discouraged not only the men, but their
commanders; more ammunition and artillery had been sent them from
Porto, and another division was placed at Laborde’s disposal, and
positive orders given that the passage must be attempted and won, and
the opposite bank cleared of the enemy. A plan of Bouchard’s was then
tried, against the opinion of the Generals, and the troops were held in
readiness to act in case of its success: this plan was to demolish the
entrenchments on the bridge by four barrels of powder placed against
them under cover of the night.
♦PLAN FOR DEMOLISHING THE PORTUGUEZE ENTRENCHMENTS.♦
To call off the attention of the Portugueze guard, some twenty men were
stationed to keep up a fire upon the entrenchments, so directed as
not to endanger the sappers who had volunteered for the real service
of the hour. It was a service so hopeful and hazardous as to excite
the liveliest solicitude for its success. The barrel was covered with
a gray cloak, that it might neither be heard nor seen, and the man
who undertook to deposit it in its place wore a cloak of the same
colour. The clear moonlight was favourable to the adventure, by the
blackness of the shadow which the parapet on one side produced. In
that line of darkness the sapper crept along at full length, pushing
the barrel before him with his head, and guiding it with his hands.
His instructions were to stop if he heard the slightest movement on
the Portugueze side; and a string was fastened to one of his feet, by
which the French were enabled to know how far he had advanced, and
to communicate with him. Having placed the barrel, ♦1809. MAY.♦ and
uncovered that part where it was to be kindled, he returned with the
same caution. Four barrels, one after the other, were thus arranged
without alarming the Portugueze. The fourth adventurer had not the same
command of himself as his predecessors had evinced. Possessed either
with fear, or with premature exultation, as soon as he had deposited
the barrel in its place, instead of making his way back slowly and
silently along the line of shadow, he rose and ran along the middle of
the bridge in the moonlight. He was seen, fired at, and shot in the
thigh. But the Portugueze did not take the alarm as they ought to have
done; ... they kept up a fire upon the entrance of the bridge, and made
no attempt to discover for what purpose their entrenchments had been
approached so closely.
♦THE FRENCH WIN THE BRIDGE.
MAY 2.♦
Four hours had elapsed before the four barrels were placed: by that
time it was midnight, and in another hour, when the Portugueze had
ceased their fire, a fifth volunteer proceeded in the same manner,
with a saucisson fastened to his body; this he fixed in its place,
and returned safely. By two o’clock this part of the business was
completed, and Laborde was informed that all was ready. Between three
and four a fog rose from the river, and filled the valley, so that the
houses on the opposite shore could scarcely be discerned through it.
This was favourable for the assailants. The saucisson was fired, and
the explosion, as Bouchard had expected, threw down the entrenchments,
and destroyed also the apparatus for communicating with the mine. The
French rushed forward; some threw water into the mine, others cleared
the way; the fog increased the confusion into which the Portugueze were
thrown by being thus surprised; they made so little resistance that
the French ♦OPERATIONS DE M. SOULT, 209–222.♦ lost only nine men; and
Silveira, saving only four pieces of artillery, but preserving order
enough soon to restore the spirits of his countrymen, retired upon
Entre ambos os rios.
♦SITUATION OF THE FRENCH.♦
The advantage which the enemy had gained would have been great, if
it had been earlier; it was too late to profit by it now. Loison had
been ordered to establish himself in Villa Real after the passage
should have been won, ... he only came in sight of it, and returned
to Amarante. On the way the post from Lisbon was intercepted, and in
that mail the intelligence which had been so carefully concealed from
the enemy was found, that hostilities had recommenced in Germany. The
superior officers knew now the whole danger of their situation, and
began to think only of how to[14] secure the booty they had acquired
by such flagitious means. The soldiers partook the spirit of their
leaders; ... they were now in fact a body of freebooters, retaining
still the form, and unhappily the strength of an army, but with the
feelings and the temper of banditti; and it was in vain for Marshal
Soult, after the system of pillage in which all ranks had indulged,
to appeal to any principle of honour, and call upon men to exert
themselves for the good of the service, whose sole care was how to
enrich themselves. Loison’s division had to fight for the resources
which were within their reach, on the left bank of the Tamega; ...
if they got sight of a peasant, a cry was set up as if a beast had
been started, and they hunted him till he was slain. One Portugueze
who was thus brought down among the crags by a shot which broke his
thigh held fast his fowling-piece when he fell, raised himself on the
other knee, and with an unerring aim killed a French officer before he
himself was put to death. Another gray-headed old man, armed with a
musket and bayonet, posted himself to such advantage among the rocks,
that, refusing ♦NAYLIES, 117–8.♦ quarter, he wounded three men and
four horses before he could be cut down. Every day made the French
generals more sensible of the difficulties of their situation. In any
other country, they said, with a fourth part of the means of every kind
which were employed here to obtain intelligence, and without success,
they should have been informed of every design of their enemies, even
the most secret thoughts. All that they could learn now with all their
means amounted only to the certainty that Sir Arthur ♦OPERATIONS, &C.
229.♦ Wellesley had arrived at Lisbon, and that General Beresford had
begun to discipline the Portugueze army.
♦SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY LANDS AT LISBON.♦
Sir Arthur had landed on the 22nd of April. A general rejoicing was
made for his arrival, and every town throughout the kingdom, where
the French were not in possession, was illuminated three successive
nights. The Prince of Brazil had appointed him Marshal-General of the
Portugueze army, thus enabling him to direct its movements, while
Beresford was continued in the command. He would at once have proceeded
into Spain, there in co-operation with Cuesta to have struck a blow
against the French in Extremadura, had it not been that the part of
Portugal which the enemy occupied was fertile in resources, and also
for the importance of the city of Porto. Therefore he ♦HE COMMUNICATES
HIS PLANS TO CUESTA.♦ determined to drive Soult out of the kingdom,
leaving such a force about Abrantes as might secure Lisbon against any
attempt on the part of Victor; and he resolved not to pursue him into
Galicia, because he was not certain that he should, singly, be equal to
the French there, and because the appearance of a British army in that
province would make the French collect their force, and thus suspend
the war of the peasantry, which was at this time carrying on in a way
that harassed and wasted the enemy, and materially impeded their plans:
Galicia, he thought, might be more certainly and permanently relieved
by striking a blow against Victor, than by following Soult. This plan
he communicated to Cuesta, requesting him not to undertake any thing
against Victor till the expedition to Porto should be concluded, when
he would come down upon Elvas, and co-operate with him. Cuesta was not
well pleased with these intended operations. Little or nothing, he
thought, would be gained by driving Soult toward the Minho, for in that
case he would be able to re-enter Galicia and complete its subjugation,
neither the peasantry nor Romana being able to prevent him. “The object
of Sir Arthur,” he said, “ought to be to surround the French in Porto,
or get between them and the Minho, so as to cut off the resources of
Soult and prevent his retreat. But,” he added, “the system of the
British is never to expose their troops; and it was owing to that
system, that instead of ever gaining a decisive action by land, they
sacrificed their men in continual retreats and precautions, as General
Moore had done, for not having attacked the enemy in time.”
In this opinion the brave but ill-judging old man wronged the English,
as much as he underrated the exertions of Romana and the Galicians: and
he recommended a plan which was impossible, unless Soult should remain
quietly at Porto, and allow the enemy to get in his rear. Sir Arthur’s
plans were well formed and vigorously pursued, nor were they altered
in any degree by the intelligence that the passage of the Tamega had
been effected, and that Lapisse had crossed the Tagus at Alcantara
to form his junction with Victor. He stationed two dragoon regiments,
two battalions and a brigade of infantry, with about 7000 Portugueze
under Major-General Mackenzie, to defend the fords of the Tagus between
Santarem and Abrantes, and the mountain passes between that city and
Alcantara. The latter place was occupied by 600 of the Lusitanian
Legion, 1100 Portugueze militia, and a squadron of Portugueze cavalry
under Colonel Mayne. In case Victor, now that the junction had been
effected, should enter Alemtejo, which Sir Arthur thought was not
impossible, he advised that Cuesta should follow him; but his opinion
was, that the French in that quarter would make no movement till they
should hear of Soult.
♦VIEWS OF THE PHILADELPHES IN MARSHAL SOULT’S ARMY.♦
Marshal Soult, in conformity to Buonaparte’s system, had endeavoured
to keep his army ignorant of the continental war. But copies of
Marshal Beresford’s address, which contained the intercepted letter
from Kellermann, were carried to Porto by a brave inhabitant of that
city, Manoel Francisco Camarinho by name, and means were even found of
fastening it upon the walls of Soult’s own quarters. This intelligence
raised the hopes of those officers who, under the appellation of
Philadelphes, had formed a plan for overthrowing the military despotism
under which France, as well as her conquests, was suffering, and
restoring peace to Europe. The restoration of the Bourbons made no
part of the scheme, for the leaders had grown up in those republican
opinions which it is the tendency of youthful studies to promote, and
which are congenial to a generous mind till time and knowledge have
matured it. The end whereat they aimed, as far as they saw the end, was
meritorious; ... the means had a fearful character, such as is common
to all secret societies, but which no circumstances can[15] justify.
The plan had proceeded to a great length in Soult’s army, and some
of the general officers were engaged in it. The more dangerous
part was taken upon himself by the Sieur D’Argenton, who was then
Adjutant-Major, and had formerly been Soult’s aide-de-camp. It is
one of the worst evils of revolution, that in such times good and
honourable men are forced into situations where nothing can enable
them to act innocently and uprightly except that unerring religious
principle which it is the sure tendency and undisguised intent of
modern revolutions to ♦THE SIEUR D’ARGENTON GOES TO SIR ARTHUR
WELLESLEY TO EXPLAIN THEIR VIEWS.♦ destroy. D’Argenton was worthy to
have fallen on better times, for he was a man of kind and generous
affections, at once firm of purpose and gentle of heart. When the
French entered Porto, no individual exerted himself more strenuously
in repressing the excesses of the troops; and many families in those
dreadful days were beholden to him not only for their lives and
properties, but for preservation from evils more dreadful than ruin
and death. This officer undertook to open a communication with the
British army, and finding his way to Colonel Trant’s head-quarters,
was sent by him to Sir Arthur. Several interviews took place; and he
went backward and forward by the French posts with such ease, and so
little apprehension of danger, as naturally to excite a suspicion that
he was acting under Soult’s, instructions, and endeavouring to dupe
the British Commander. There were no means of ascertaining this; but
the manner in which his overtures were received was that which would
have been equally proper whether they were sincere or treacherous. He
was assured by Sir Arthur that no change in the French army, either
in contemplation or actually carried into effect, would induce him
to delay his operations as long as it continued in Portugal; ... he
should march against it with equal activity whether revolutionized
or counter-revolutionized. D’Argenton, however, well knew that if
the army declared unequivocally against Buonaparte, an arrangement
with the British Commander must of necessity follow, and he asked
for passports from the Admiral for the purpose of communicating with
the army in Germany. Sir Arthur warned him of the danger to which he
exposed himself by having such documents in his possession; but he was
particularly solicitous to obtain them, and accordingly they were given
him.
♦ADVANCE OF THE BRITISH ARMY TOWARDS PORTO.♦
The movements of the troops, meantime, were continued without any
reference to the politics or projects in the French army. On the 5th of
May the whole of the British force which was intended to march against
Porto was assembled at Coimbra. On the same day Beresford advanced
from that city toward Viseu, with about 6000 Portugueze, a brigade of
British infantry, and a squadron of British horse, to act upon the
enemy’s left, in the hope that he might so disconcert their plans as to
make them retreat by Chaves into Galicia, rather than by Villa Real in
a direction which would enable them to effect a junction with Victor.
Trant was still on the Vouga, where the students had now the proud
feeling that they formed the advanced post of that army which was
about to deliver their country. He had taken measures for collecting
provisions, whereby one difficulty that might have impeded the advance
was lessened. A strong division under Major-General Hill proceeded
to Aveiro, and there, in boats which Trant had got together for that
service, embarked for Ovar, which is upon the northern creek of that
singular harbour. The main body proceeded by the high road, and began
their march on the 7th. They halted the next day, to allow time for
Beresford’s movements.
♦D’ARGENTON IS ARRESTED.♦
At this time Soult was informed that there existed a conspiracy in his
own army. A general officer, to whom D’Argenton had just opened himself
without being sufficiently sure of his man, gave the information.
D’Argenton was instantly arrested, and all doubt concerning the truth
of the accusation, if any there could have been, was removed by
discovering Admiral Berkeley’s passports among his papers. He was not a
man who held his life cheap, for he had a wife and children in France
whom he loved; but he valued it at no more than it was worth, and had
made up his mind how to act in case of such a discovery. He avowed that
he had been both to Lisbon and to Coimbra, and had communicated with
Generals Wellesley and Beresford, who, he said, would in two days’ time
open the campaign upon the Vouga with 30,000 men. If the French army
of Portugal would declare, what they well knew, that the Peninsular
war in which they were employed was unjust, the British, he said, would
unite with them, march in concert with them toward France, compel
the different corps in Spain to join them, and when they had passed
the Pyrenees, they would find there an expedition of 60,000 English.
Officers would be sent to the armies in Italy and Germany, inviting
them to follow the example, and an English ship would be dispatched to
bring home Moreau from America, and place him at the head of the army
and of the government. The English would supply funds for all this;
and if Marshal Soult refused the splendid invitation to act the part
which became him, the intention was to secure his person, and give the
command to another.
♦SOULT PREPARES TO RETREAT FROM PORTUGAL.♦
The principle upon which D’Argenton acted was that of saying nothing
which could compromise his associates, and any thing that might assist
their purpose. He was sent to prison, and two officers upon whom the
Marshal’s suspicions fell were placed under arrest. But Soult was
alarmed, as well he might, by what he had heard; and though the general
officers whom he convened assured him they knew of no discontent in
the army, it was certain that all those who retained any moral or
religious feeling, any respect for humanity and justice, any sense of
right and wrong, had abundant reason to be discontented with a service
so flagrantly iniquitous as that wherein they were engaged. Not knowing
how far he could depend upon the fidelity of his army, and certain
that such of them as had been present at Roliça and Vimeiro had not
forgotten the lessons which they received there, he thought no longer
of conquering Portugal, but of escaping out of it without delay. He
informed Loison, therefore, who was at Amarante, that he should retreat
by that road, and so by Braganza upon Zamora; and he ordered the
♦OPERATIONS, &C. 239.♦ troops from Viana to march upon Amarante, by way
of Guimaraens, while he remained at Porto to secure their movements.
♦THE FRENCH DRIVEN FROM ALBERGARIA.♦
On the day that this determination was taken, the British attempted
to surprise the advanced guard of the enemy under General Franceschi.
Some troops crossed the Vouga on the preceding evening, others during
the night. They proceeded silently and in darkness, along rocky passes
where there was sometimes room only to march in single file: but the
fidelity of Portugueze guides was not doubted, and they were led safely
to an open heath, where about sunrise they came in sight of the enemy’s
videttes. The French were not taken by surprise, as had been hoped, ...
they were formed in line with a pine wood in their rear; but they were
beaten out of the field, and driven through the wood with the loss of
their cannon; and having then to pass a deep ravine, the artillery came
up in time to play upon their rear-guard. Such of the wounded as they
were not able to bear away, the Portugueze peasantry dispatched, and
miserably mutilated in their vengeance. The French had provoked them
by their barbarous usage of the militia who fell into their hands, ...
for the peasants had found their bodies hanging there, and marks upon
them of the cruelties which they had endured before death. The villages
of Albergaria Velha and Nova, which the enemy had lately occupied,
bore proofs of the atrocious temper in which this war was carried on
by the invaders. They had destroyed in mere wantonness and malignity
every thing that was destructible, ... broken open every house, burnt
the furniture and the thatch, staved all the liquor which they could
not drink, slaughtered the cattle, and pigs, and poultry which they
could not carry off, strewn about their limbs, and trampled them in the
road. And in this manner they acted along the whole of their ♦MILITARY
CHRONICLE, VOL. IV. 193. GENERAL MACKINNON’S JOURNAL, P. 13.♦ retreat
to Porto. The inhabitants, who were thus reduced to ruin, welcomed the
British with tears of joy as their deliverers, and followed them with
prayers that they might overtake and punish these unprovoked invaders,
who had brought such unutterable evils upon Portugal.
♦THEY ARE DRIVEN FROM THEIR POSITION AT GRIJO.♦
The enemy retired first upon Oliveira de Azemeis, then upon Feira. On
the next day their outposts were driven in, and soon afterwards the two
divisions of Franceschi and Mermet were seen strongly posted on the
heights above Grijo, their front covered by woods and broken ground.
Here they were attacked by Brigadier-General R. Stewart; Major-General
Manners, with a brigade of the German Legion, turned their left; they
were dislodged and pursued till night, when the British army halted,
their advance on the heights beyond Carvalhos, and the rear at S.
Antonio da Arrifana, the former about seven miles from the Douro,
the latter about twenty-five. The enemy continued their retreat, and
having crossed the bridge in the night, set fire to it, and completely
destroyed it. At daybreak the British troops were again in motion, in
full expectation and hope of again bringing the enemy to action; but
before they could be reached there was a river to be crossed, more
formidable than ever general had attempted to pass in the presence of a
respectable foe.
♦MEASURES OF MARSHAL SOULT TO PREVENT THE PASSAGE OF THE DOURO.♦
The Douro, which has the longest course of any river in the Peninsula,
and rolls a larger volume of waters than the Tagus to the sea, is
about three hundred yards wide at Porto, its deep and rapid stream
being contracted between high and rocky shores. Soult had prepared
for leaving the city, but he did not dream of being driven out of it.
Having stood upon the quay from midnight till four in the morning, and
seen not only the breaking up of the bridge, but the pontoons consumed
as they floated down, and having previously given orders that all boats
should be brought to the Porto side of the river, and collected at
one place, that they might be the better guarded, he is said to have
supposed that the English would avail themselves of their maritime
means, embark their troops, and attempt a landing near the mouth of the
Douro; and in that belief he went to his head-quarters, which were
between the city and the sea, expecting that he could remain another
day in perfect safety, which would allow time for the movements of
the troops from Viana. Franceschi was instructed to guard the coast
with the rear-guard; Laborde was to support him; Mermet to station one
brigade at Val-longo, and two at Baltar, and to have frequent parties
on his right to observe the river, and destroy all boats that could
be discovered. Orders were also dispatched to Loison, requiring him
to keep his ground at Mezam-frio and at Pezo da Ragoa, to prevent the
enemy from crossing at either of those points. Every thing was prepared
for retreating, biscuit distributed to the troops, the money from the
public treasury delivered over to the paymaster, and a battalion was
stationed on the quay, with the artillery. But the French were so
possessed with the notion ♦OPERATIONS, &C. 241–246.♦ that the English
must make a maritime descent, that this whole battalion was stationed
below the bridge, and not a single post placed above it.
♦PASSAGE OF THAT RIVER.♦
Sir A. Wellesley knew how important it was, with reference to
Beresford’s operations, that he should cross the Douro without delay.
In the morning he sent Major-General Murray up the river, to send
down boats if he could find any, and endeavour to effect a passage
at Avintes, about five miles above the city, where it might be
possible for the troops to ford. The Guards, under Lieutenant-General
Sherbrooke, were to cross at the ferry below the city as soon as boats
could be obtained, and he himself directed the passage of the main body
from the Convent of S. Agostinho da Serra, which stands in the suburb
of Villa Nova upon the most elevated spot on that side. It was certain
that the enemy would have taken all common precautions for securing
the boats, but it was equally certain that the inhabitants would do
every thing in their power to assist their deliverers. Two boats were
brought over by them to the foot of the eminence on which the Convent
stands, and two more were sent down the stream to the same spot. There
was a large unfinished building on the opposite side, designed for the
Bishop’s palace, which afforded a good position for those who should
land first till they could be supported; and some guns were placed in
the Convent garden, where they were masked by fir trees, in a situation
to bear upon the enemy with effect.
Four boats only had been collected when the passage was begun; but
more were presently on the way, for the inhabitants were on the alert
to promote their own deliverance. Lieutenant-General Paget crossed
in one of the first, and took up a position with the Buffs as fast
as they landed and reached the summit. They were attacked in great
force, and stood their ground most gallantly till the 48th and 66th
and a Portugueze battalion arrived successively to support them.
General Paget lost an arm early in the action, and the command devolved
upon Major-General Hill. The most strenuous exertions were made by
the inhabitants for transporting the troops, while this contest was
maintained, in which sure hope and British resolution counterbalanced
the great inequality of numbers. About two hours after the commencement
of the action General Sherbrooke, with the Guards and the 29th,
appeared on the enemy’s right, having crossed at the lower ferry; and
about the same time General Murray was seen coming from the side of
Avintes in the opposite direction. If any thing could be needed to
animate the spirit of Englishmen at such a time, they had it that day.
Hastening up the steep streets of Porto as fast as they could be landed
and formed to support their countrymen, they were welcomed by the
inhabitants with such demonstrations of joy as might have warmed colder
hearts than those to ♦MILITARY CHRONICLE, VOL. IV. P. 28. STOTHERT’S
NARRATIVE, P. 41.♦ which they were addressed. Handkerchiefs were waved
from every balcony, and blessings breathed upon them, and shouts of
triumphant gratulation and convulsive laughter mingled with the tears
and prayers that greeted them.
♦DELIVERANCE OF PORTO.♦
The French had been completely surprised. The very boldness of the
attempt, for history has recorded no passage of the kind so bold, was
its security; till they saw that it was accomplished they did not
believe it would be attempted. A _chef de bataillon_ told one of the
generals that the English were passing, and his report was disregarded.
Soult was assured by the French governor of the city that it was only
some stragglers of their own people who had tarried behind till the
bridge had been destroyed, and that the boatmen had gone to bring
them across, but that he had forbidden the passage of boats on any
pretext to the left bank. The Marshal was satisfied with this; and
the report that the enemy were coming was not believed till General
Foy, going upon the high ground opposite to the Convent, from whence
Sir Arthur ♦OPERATIONS, &C. 245–7.♦ was directing the operations, saw
the troops crossing, and Portugueze upon the walls making signals to
them. In the confusion that ensued among the French General Foy was
wounded, and narrowly escaped being taken, for the enemy thought only
of retreating as fast as possible, when they saw troops on either side
arriving to support General Hill. It was about five in the afternoon
when the action was terminated by their flight. The British were too
much fatigued to follow up their victory that evening, when they
might have completed the destruction of an enemy not less thoroughly
dispirited than discomfited. But in the last four days they had marched
over fourscore miles of difficult country. So complete and signal a
success against an equal enemy was perhaps never before obtained at
so little cost; the loss at Porto consisted only of twenty-three men
killed, ninety-six wounded, and two missing, and in the preceding
affairs at Albergaria and Grijo of 102 in all. That of the enemy was
very considerable; they left behind them five pieces of cannon, eight
ammunition tumbrils, many prisoners, and about a thousand men in the
hospitals.
Porto presented an extraordinary scene that night; every house was
illuminated, while the gutters were still red with blood, and the
streets strewn with dead bodies both of horses and men. There had been
three hours’ fighting in the suburbs, and before night the French
who had fallen were stripped and left naked where they lay; ... they
had their plunder about them for removal, and they had provoked by
the most intolerable wrongs a revengeful people. Sir Arthur the next
morning issued a proclamation, requiring the inhabitants to comport
themselves with humanity toward such of the French as might be made
prisoners; they were entitled to his protection by the laws of war,
he said, it was his duty to afford it, and it would be inconsistent
with the magnanimity of the Portugueze nation to revenge the outrages
which it had suffered upon unfortunate individuals. He prohibited
any person from appearing armed in the city, unless he belonged to a
military corps; and appointed Colonel Trant to be commandant, provided
the nomination should be approved by the Portugueze government.
D’Argenton[16] escaped during the night, as much through the good-will
of those who guarded him, as by the services of his fellow Philadelphes.
♦SOULT AND LOISON EFFECT A JUNCTION ON THEIR RETREAT.♦
On the following morning Sir Arthur commenced the pursuit, the
Hanoverian Legion, under Major-General Murray, moving to Val-longo,
from whence the enemy had commenced their retreat during the night, in
the direction for Amarante. But Beresford had moved with more celerity
than even the British Commander had relied on; driving back the enemy’s
posts at Villa Real and Mezam-frio, he followed up his success, and
drove them from the left bank of the Tamega; and Loison, not venturing
to defend the bridge that had been so gallantly defended against him,
retired from Amarante under cover of the night, in some apprehension
that Silveira or Beresford might have crossed the Douro, and that thus
he might be prevented from rejoining Soult. The intelligence of the
loss of Porto reached him about the same time that Soult was apprised
of his retreat, and that the point which would have opened the surest
way for escape was occupied by the allies. They met, however, within
a few miles of Penafiel, and it was matter of congratulation that
the junction had been effected. Soult’s determination was promptly
taken. There were officers who were heard to say that the English
treated their prisoners well, and that a passage to England in British
transports was no great evil. Loison himself is said to have advised
another convention like that of Cintra; but the Marshal well knew that
the circumstances were widely different, and that nothing remained
for them but flight, with the utmost speed, and by the most difficult
road, abandoning every thing that might encumber them. As the treasure
could not be transported, every one was allowed to take what he could
of it; but there was too much haste and alarm for either officers or
men to profit ♦NAYLIES, 123. OPERATIONS, &C. 249–255.♦ largely by
this licence; some chests which could not readily be forced open were
abandoned by the soldiers, and the greater number were so placed as to
be blown to pieces when the guns were burst.
♦SIR ARTHUR PURSUES THE FRENCH.♦
As soon as Sir Arthur was informed of the rapidity and success of
Beresford’s movements, he directed that General upon Chaves, to
intercept the enemy should they turn to the right. ♦MAY 14.♦ Beresford
had anticipated this order, and had already dispatched Silveira to
occupy the passes of Salamonde and Ruyvaens; but the French were flying
too fast for this to be executed in time. Their flight, however, was
conducted with great presence of mind and judgement. Marshal Soult,
when all his divisions were collected, made a display of them near
Lanhoso, not to the pursuers, but for the sake of his own men, that
they might see their own numbers, and acquire some confidence in
their strength. Dispirited as they were by the abandonment of their
artillery and baggage and the loss of their plunder, this had a good
effect; and the retreat would have been honourable to Marshal Soult if
it had not been disgraced by such cruelties as leave an uneffaceable
stigma upon the commander of any troops by whom they are perpetrated.
Marshal Soult’s soldiers plundered and murdered the peasantry at their
pleasure: many persons, when the English arrived, were found hanging
from the trees by the way-side, who had been put to death for no other
reason than that they were not friendly to their insolent invaders;
and the line of their retreat might ♦SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY’S DISPATCH,
MAY 18.♦ every where be traced by the smoke of the villages which
they burnt. They suffered for this as was to be expected: whatever
stragglers fell into the hands of the peasantry before the advanced
guard could come up to save them were put to death with as little
humanity as they had shown. Some of them were thrown alive amid the
flames of those houses which their comrades had set on fire.
♦SUFFERINGS OF THE ENEMY IN THEIR FLIGHT.♦
On the evening of the 14th Sir Arthur thought it certain, by the
enemy’s movements about Braga, that they intended to retreat either
upon Chaves or Montalegre; and he sent orders to Beresford, in case
they should take the latter direction, to push on for Monterrey, so
as to stop them if they should pass by Villa del Rey. ♦MAY 16.♦ At
Salamonde the pursuers came up with their rear-guard, and drove them
out of the town, which they had destroyed. The pursuers slept on the
ground that night, and dressed their food and dried their clothes by
the fires which the enemy had lighted for their own use. The sufferings
of the French during the retreat were only not so severe as those of
Sir John Moore’s army, because it was in a milder season; ... but it
was made under a fear of the pursuers which the British soldiers had
never felt; the rain was heavy and incessant, and time enough for
necessary rest was not allowed, ... their danger was so imminent. They
who halted at ten at night were on the march again at three in the
morning, and in the few intervening hours the cavalry had to seek both
provisions and forage, and the infantry to provide for themselves as
they could. The greater part of the men had nothing for eight days
except parched maize; very many died of want and exhaustion, and not a
few lay down by the way to take the chance of life or death, as they
might fall into the hands of the British troops or of the peasantry.
Their track was strewn with dead horses and mules, who had either been
driven till they fell, or killed, or more barbarously hamstrung, when
it was not possible by any goading to make them proceed farther.
♦LOSS OF THE FRENCH AT PUENTE DE MISARELLA.♦
A bridge over the Cavado had been occupied by the armed peasantry, but
mistaking some Swiss troops who were clothed in red for British, they
allowed them to pass; but many hurrying over in the darkness, fell into
the torrent and were lost. A greater destruction took place at the
Puente de Misarella, a bridge with a low parapet over a deep ravine,
and so narrow as not to admit two horsemen abreast. The enemy had
driven away the peasants who were attempting to destroy it, but a fire
was kept up upon them by others from the crags of that wild and awful
pass; and upon the report of some cannon fired by the advanced guard of
the pursuers upon their rear, the French were seized with panic; many
threw down their arms and ran; they struggled with each other to cross
the bridge, losing all self-command; and the British advance, when they
arrived at the spot, found the ravine on both sides choked with men and
horses, who had been jostled over in ♦NAYLIES, 126. OPERATIONS, &C.
262.♦ the frantic precipitancy of their flight. Here the papers of the
army, and the little and more precious part of the baggage, which had
hitherto been saved, were lost.
♦THE PURSUIT GIVEN OVER AT MONTALEGRE.♦
Marshal Soult was guided in this retreat by an itinerant Navarrese,
who, in the exercise of one of the vilest callings (that of hangman
alone excepted) in which a human creature can be employed, had acquired
a thorough knowledge of the country. This man conducted him by cross
roads and mountainous paths, where neither artillery nor commissariat
could follow. ♦MAY 18.♦ Sir Arthur continued the pursuit as far as
Montalegre, and then halted, finding that the enemy had gone through
the mountains toward Orense by roads impracticable for carriages, and
where it was impossible either to stop or overtake them. He estimated
that Soult had lost all his artillery and equipments, and not less than
a fourth of his men, since he was attacked upon the Vouga. “If,” said
he, “an army throws away all its cannon, equipments, and baggage, and
every thing that can strengthen it and enable it to act together as a
body, and if it abandons all those who are entitled to its protection,
but add to its weight and impede its progress, it must obviously be
able to march through roads where it cannot be overtaken by an enemy
who has not made the same sacrifices.”
♦MOVEMENT OF TROOPS FROM ARAGON.♦
When the British Commander was commencing his operations from Coimbra,
he received information from the Embassador at Seville that a French
division of 15,000 men had certainly left Aragon, with the intent, it
was believed, of joining either Ney or Soult. It became, therefore, a
grave question for his consideration, whether to return, in pursuance
of his plan of co-operating with Cuesta, when he should have driven the
enemy out of the north of Portugal, ... or push with greater eagerness
for the entire destruction of Soult’s army, instead of leaving him to
retreat, unite with Ney, and become again formidable by the junction
of this force from Aragon. Upon mature deliberation he determined
not to vary from his first purpose, because, though the intelligence
was announced as indubitable, no tidings of this division had been
transmitted from Ciudad Rodrigo, Braganza, or Chaves, quarters where
it might have been expected to be known, and because his instructions
enjoined him to make the protection of Portugal his principal object.
♦REASONS FOR NOT CONTINUING THE PURSUIT.♦ If it were not necessary,
therefore, to remain for that object in the northern provinces, he
conceived that he should act in the best manner both for Portugal
and Spain, by joining Cuesta with all speed, and commencing active
operations against Victor. Thus he had determined before he advanced
from Coimbra, and therefore he now desisted from the pursuit, satisfied
with having done, if not all that he wished, all that was possible, and
more than he had expected. Had the Portugueze at Chaves been active in
obeying their instructions, and occupying the defiles near Salamonde,
the French, who had abandoned their ammunition ♦NAYLIES, 128.♦ and
their guns, must have been irretrievably lost; the very cartridges
which the men carried, and which constituted their whole stock, were
rendered useless by the rain, and they could no otherwise have escaped
the fate they deserved from the hands of the Portugueze than by
surrendering ♦COL. JONES, VOL. I. 204–7.♦ to the British. As it was,
they had lost not less than a fourth of their army since Sir Arthur
attacked them on the Vouga.
♦VICTOR ENTERS PORTUGAL BY WAY OF ALCANTARA, AND SPEEDILY RETREATS.♦
If Sir Arthur had not made this previous determination, and if it
had been possible for the commissariat, imperfect as it then was, to
have kept up with a longer pursuit in a country which could supply
neither food, nor carriages, nor beasts of draught, the tidings which
he now received of Victor’s movements would probably have recalled
him toward the south. That Marshal, having been joined by Lapisse,
had at length made the movement which Soult had so long and anxiously
expected; he had broken up from the Guadiana, and marched for the Tagus
at Alcantara. Colonel Mayne occupied this important point with 600 of
the Lusitanian Legion, 1100 Portugueze militia, and fifty Portugueze
cavalry. With this far inferior force he withstood 10,000 infantry
and 1000 horse for six hours, and then effected his retreat without
losing a single gun, though not without a heavy loss in killed and
wounded, the Legion alone losing 170 men. He had endeavoured to blow
up the bridge; the attempt failed, and the enemy, being thus masters
of the passage, advanced a little way into Portugal in the direction
of Castello Branco. But no sooner had Victor learnt that Sir Arthur
had recrossed the Douro, than he retired by the same course, evacuated
Alcantara, and concentrated his army between the Tagus and the
Guadiana, in the neighbourhood of Caceres.
♦SOULT REACHES ORENSE.♦
When Soult’s army had re-entered Spain, and found that the pursuit was
not continued, their hopes rose, and they rejoiced in the thought of
communicating with the other corps of their countrymen. The red uniform
of the Swiss again led to a serviceable mistake, ... they were ♦MAY
19.♦ taken for British soldiers at Allariz, and the inhabitants, under
that delusion, hastened to bring them provisions and wine, blessing
them as their deliverers. On the following day they reached Orense, and
there learnt that the ♦NAYLIES, 132.♦ French in Lugo were at that time
besieged, and that both Ney and Romana had marched into Asturias.
♦ROMANA ENTERS ASTURIAS, AND DISPLACES THE JUNTA.♦
Romana, after he had succeeded in surprising the enemy at Villa Franca,
had received information that Ney was collecting a considerable force
at Lugo for the purpose of attacking him. Upon this he turned into
Asturias, crossing the mountains at the passes of Cienfuegos, and
descending upon Navia de Suarna; there he left his army under the
command of D. Nicolas Mahy, and went himself to Oviedo, in the hope
of rendering the resources of the principality more efficient than
they had hitherto been found. The Junta of that province had received
larger assistance of every kind from England than any other provincial
government, and were said to have made less use of it in the general
cause. They were accused of looking only to the establishment of
their own indefinite authority, their own interest and that of their
followers, and the destruction of all who were not subservient to
them. Complaints to this tenor had reached Romana in Galicia, and he
found upon inquiry that the greater part of the supplies which they
had received were consumed in the support of idle and ostentatious
offices; and that the corps which were raised, and which he wished
to serve as a nursery for his army, drafting volunteers from them to
fill up his regiments from time to time, were rendered useless by
the want of capacity or conduct in the officers, who either remained
in their houses, or did not support with any firmness the points to
which they were ordered. Abuses of every kind were complained of in
the misapplication of money, the disposal of offices, the contempt of
public orders, the neglect of the laws, and the interception not only
of private correspondence but of official papers. Romana was persuaded
that these accusations were well-founded; and by virtue of the
authority of which he believed himself possessed, as Captain-General
of ♦MAY 2.♦ that province, he dismissed the members of the Junta, as
unworthy of their station, and nominated others in their place, among
whom were the first deputies who had been sent to England, D. Andres
Angel de la Vega, and the Visconde Materosa, now by the death of his
father Conde de Toreno.
♦COMBINED MOVEMENTS OF THE FRENCH AGAINST ROMANA.♦
In consequence of this movement of Romana’s, a combined operation was
concerted between the French generals Ney, Kellermann, and Bonnet,
for the purpose of cutting off him and his army, and subjugating
Asturias. Proclamations in French and Spanish were printed ♦MAY 8.♦ at
Coruña, wherein Ney assured the Asturians that almost all Spain had now
submitted, Zaragoza having surrendered after losing three-fourths of
its inhabitants, Valencia having opened its gates without resistance,
and the Central Junta having taken refuge in Cadiz, which could not
long serve as an asylum. He bade them rely upon his word, that their
persons and their property should be respected, and prayed Heaven to
enlighten them, that he might not be under the necessity of putting
in force against them the terrible rights of war. Having sent abroad
these threats and falsehoods, he, who had collected about 12,000 men
at Lugo, entered Asturias by the Concejo de Ibias, a traitorous priest
guiding him by roads which were unsuspected because they were almost
impassable. Bonnet at the same time advanced along the coast from the
east, and Kellermann with some 6000 men entered by Pajares.
♦ROMANA ESCAPES BY SEA.♦
This was an occasion upon which the Spaniards acted with as much
alertness as their enemies. Mahy was apprised in time of Ney’s
approach, and effectually disappointed one part of his scheme by
returning into Galicia, there to profit by his absence. When the
Marshal reached Navia de Suarnia he found the troops had escaped him;
but deeming the single person of Romana of more importance than his
army, and learning that he was in Oviedo, he hastened toward that city
with such celerity, and by such a route (the priest still guiding him),
that the enemy were in Salas and Cornellana as soon as it was known
in Oviedo that they were on the march. Not an hour was to be lost.
Romana sent the single regiment which was with him to join Ballasteros
at Infiesto, withdrew to Gijon, and there embarked for Galicia with
his staff ♦MAY 19.♦ and the Bishop of St. Andero. Before he had
embarked the French had entered Oviedo; having pillaged that city, they
proceeded to Gijon, but too late for securing the prey of which they
were most desirous.
♦NEY RETURNS INTO GALICIA.♦
But though Romana had been thus nearly surprised, the Asturians, under
Generals Worster and Ballasteros, prevented the enemy from deriving
any benefit from their transient success. Barcena, who commanded a
division of the corps under Worster, by rapid marches upon Teberga and
Grado, prevented the French from uniting their forces, and defeated
them in three partial actions. Worster then collecting his whole army,
advanced toward Oviedo; but Kellermann, perceiving that he could not
maintain possession of the city, evacuated it in time, and retreated
precipitately into Leon. Ballasteros meantime, who was on the eastern
frontier of the principality, finding that Bonnet was between him
and Worster, turned rapidly upon St. Andero, chiefly with a view of
drawing Bonnet out of Asturias. He attacked the French garrison in
that city, killed 800, made 600 prisoners, and won the place. The ill
conduct of part of his army, which he had stationed in the passes near,
deprived him of the fruits of his victory; they suffered themselves
to be surprised by Bonnet’s whole force; the remainder of his men in
consequence had no other alternative than to abandon the city and
disperse, while he himself, like Romana, had just time to escape
by sea. These movements on the part of the two Asturian commanders
compelled Ney to hasten his return to Galicia, where indeed he rightly
judged his presence was necessary. He retreated therefore along the
sea-coast by Castropol, and found in that province intelligence of a
nature which more than counterbalanced the temporary triumph he had
obtained.
♦THE FRENCH IN LUGO RELIEVED BY SOULT.♦
Mahy, when he turned back from Asturias, hastened toward Lugo, where
the greater part of the French then in Galicia had been left. At first
the enemy despised his ill-provided numbers, and relying upon their
artillery and discipline, went out against him; but having been baffled
in two skirmishes, and suffered considerable loss at Puente-nuovo,
where many ♦MAY 19.♦ of the Germans deserted, they were glad to take
shelter within the walls of Lugo, which, old as they were, were an
effectual defence against men who had neither scaling ladders nor
cannon. There, however, he blockaded them; and the French must soon
have been compelled to surrender, if Soult had not arrived to their
relief. That commander, knowing their danger, allowed his troops only
one day’s rest at Orense, and hastened for Lugo, sending a detachment
forward to reconnoitre the besiegers, and assure the garrison of speedy
support. Mahy then, in pursuance of Romana’s system, withdrew; but the
appearance of the French was such, after the sufferings which they had
endured, that the garrison suspected a stratagem, and could not be
persuaded that any French troops could appear in so miserable a state
of clothing and equipments, till some of the officers were personally
recognized.
♦MAHY RETIRES TO MONDOÑEDO.♦
The force with Mahy consisted of about 10,000 men. Knowing that the
troops before whom he retired had been driven from Portugal, he counted
with reason upon the speedy deliverance of the province, and withdrew
toward Mondoñedo, to receive supplies and reinforcements, and be ready
for acting as opportunity might offer, against Coruña or Ferrol. The
remainder of the regular forces then in Galicia consisted of 8000 men
at Vigo under Brigadier D. Martin de la Carrera, to whom Barrios had
♦MAY 21.♦ given up the command. That officer, as soon as he received
advices of Soult’s arrival on the frontier with the intent of joining
Ney, took the field in the hope of intercepting him and preventing
the junction. But finding when he reached Pontevedra that Soult had
hastened on toward Lugo, and was two or three days’ march distant, he
perceived that pursuit must be unavailing; and resolving to profit by
the time, he advanced upon Santiago to strike a blow against the French
in that city, prevent them from joining their countrymen, and distract
the attention of the enemy.
♦THE FRENCH DRIVEN FROM COMPOSTELLO.♦
The garrison consisted of about 1900 men and 200 cavalry. Aware of the
approach of the Spaniards, and despising them as usual, they advanced
to meet them on the Campo de ♦MAY 23.♦ Estrella. The Spanish vanguard,
under D. Ambrosio de la Quadra, withstood them, till Morillo arrived to
charge their right flank; the reserve came to the support of the van;
Carrera advanced against them in front; they were twice driven from the
positions where they attempted to make a stand; and a reinforcement of
800 men arrived in time only to share their defeat. They were driven
into the city, and through it, and pursued more than a league beyond
it, till night came on: the loss of the Spaniards was 130 in killed
and wounded; the French had more than 400 killed, ... they left only
thirty-eight prisoners, of whom the most part were wounded; but very
many wounded were carried to Coruña. The conquerors did not fail to
remark, that this success had been obtained on the day of Santiago’s
apparition, and on the field where his body had been discovered by the
star which rested on his grave.
This was the intelligence which Marshal Ney found when he reached Lugo
on his return from Asturias; and though Lugo itself had been saved by
the unexpected arrival of the army from Portugal, the appearance of
that army, and the recital of its adventures, were alike discouraging.
♦COMBINED OPERATIONS OF MARSHALS NEY AND SOULT IN GALICIA.♦ The two
Marshals had not parted upon good terms, they met upon worse, and the
ill feeling that existed between them extended to their troops. Ney’s
soldiers talked of the Portugueze campaign in terms which provoked
resentment, and quarrels arose, in which the officers ♦NAYLIES, 134.♦
took part. This, however, was no time for reproaches and bickerings;
all fear of pursuit from the English being over, a plan was concerted
for destroying Romana’s army, and recovering what had been lost in
Galicia. For this purpose Ney was to act against Carrera and Morillo,
and having defeated them, and retaken Vigo, to send a column upon
Orense; while Soult was to pursue Romana’s army in the valley of the
Sil, and disperse it, after which he was to march upon the Puebla de
Sanabria, and there observe the Portugueze frontier, threatening to
re-enter it, and keeping up a communication with Ney by Orense, and
with the corps under Mortier by Zamora. In pursuance of this plan Ney
hastened to Coruña; and Soult, having been supplied from that fortress
with field-pieces and stores, commenced a pursuit ♦OPÉRATIONS DE M.
SOULT, 276.♦ little resembling that from which he had so recently
escaped.
♦ROMANA REJOINS HIS ARMY.♦
The day on which Carrera drove the enemy from Santiago Romana[17]
landed at Ribadeo, and joined his army at Mondoñedo. Here he was
informed of Soult’s arrival at Lugo, and apprehending immediately
that an effort would be made by the two Marshals to enclose him, he
marched by the Valle de Neyra to Orense, and there took up a defensive
position, covered by the Minho and the Sil. The Conde de Noroña,
D. Gaspar Maria da Nava, had just at this time arrived in Galicia,
with the appointment of second military and political chief, and
had taken the command at Santiago: him he directed to withdraw from
that city and retire upon Pontevedra, and he applied to Silveira for
assistance; but the Portugueze general could not move without orders
from Marshal Beresford. It was believed by the Galician army, that if
the Portugueze had continued the pursuit two days longer, even without
the British, Soult’s men were in so helpless and miserable a state,
that they would gladly have surrendered, Lugo must have fallen, and the
remainder of the enemy have been shut up in Coruña. If the event was
less advantageous to the common cause, it was more honourable to the
Galicians.
♦PROCEEDINGS OF SOULT.♦
Soult had remained eight days at Lugo, and had sent off for France
1100 men, who were completely broken down by the sufferings of the
campaign. Still his troops were in such a state that when he reached
Monforte it was found necessary to give them some days more of rest.
They were in one of the finest parts of Galicia, and in the most
delightful season of the year; but there was the dreadful feeling for
those whose hearts were not completely hardened, that every inhabitant
of that country was their mortal foe. Into whatever town or village
they entered, not a living soul was to be found, except those who from
infirmity were unable to follow their countrymen. They who had arms
were gone to join the army; the others, with the women and children,
had taken refuge in the wild parts of that wild region, and were on the
watch for every opportunity of weakening their invaders by putting a
straggler to death. During the five days that they halted, the French
suffered considerable loss; and when they attempted to cross the Sil,
they found it not so practicable for them to effect a passage in the
face of an enemy, as it had been for the English at Porto. That sort
of war was kept up which, under the circumstances of Spain, tended
to the sure destruction of the invaders. The Spaniards never exposed
themselves, and never lost an opportunity of harassing the enemy. They
availed themselves of their perfect knowledge of the country to profit
by every spot that afforded cover to their marksmen; and leaving their
fields to be ravaged, their property to be plundered, and their houses
to be destroyed, they applied themselves, with a brave recklessness
of every thing except their duty, to the great object of ridding the
country of its invaders. Wherever the French bivouacked, the scene
was such as might rather have been looked for in a camp of predatory
Tartars than in that of a civilized people. Food, and forage, and
skins of wine, and clothes and church vestments, books and guitars,
and all the bulkier articles of wasteful spoil, were heaped together
in their huts with the planks and doors of the habitations which they
had demolished. Some of the men, retaining amid this brutal service
the characteristic activity and cleverness of their nation, fitted
up their huts with hangings from their last scene of pillage, with a
regard to comfort ♦NAYLIES, 147.♦ hardly to have been expected in their
situation, and a love of gaiety only to be found in Frenchmen. The
idlers were contented with a tub, and if the tub were large enough,
three or four would stow themselves in it.
♦CRUELTIES EXERCISED BY THE FRENCH.♦
The utmost efforts of the French were ineffectual against the spirit
which had now been raised in Galicia. It was in vain that detachments
were sent wherever the Spaniards appeared in a body: accustomed as the
invaders were to the work of destruction, they were baffled by a people
who dispersed before a superior force could reach them, and assembled
again as easily as they had separated. The task of burning villages,
erecting gibbets, and executing, as if in justice, such Spaniards as
fell into his hands, was assigned to Loison, who discharged it to the
utmost of his power with characteristic remorselessness. But it is not
upon Loison, however willing and apt an agent of such wickedness, and
however much of the guilt he may have made his own, that the infamy
of these measures must be charged; it was the system of the French
government, and the French Marshals had consented to act upon it; and
that they were as ready to have acted upon it toward the British army,
if fortune had enabled them, as toward those whom they called the
Spanish insurgents, was evinced by their putting to death ♦SEE VOL. II.
P. 451.♦ a handful of stragglers near Talavera, and by the manner in
which the bulletins announced an act as disgraceful to the army which
permitted it, as it was repugnant to all the laws and usages of war.
♦DEFEAT OF THE FRENCH AT THE BRIDGE OF S. PAYO.♦
While Soult was thus employed in the interior of the province, laying
it waste with fire and sword, always in pursuit, but always baffled,
and harassed always by a people whom his cruelty served only to
exasperate, Ney proceeded to execute his part of their concerted
operations, with a force of 8000 foot and 2500 horse. Upon his
approach the Conde de Noroña retreated from Pontevedra to the Bridge
of S. Payo, where, immediately after the recovery of Vigo, Morillo
had broken down two of the arches, and thrown up works for defending
the passage. In this position, which had thus in ♦1809. JUNE.♦ good
time been strengthened, Noroña resolved to make a stand for covering
Vigo, from whence the Spaniards now received their stores. Boats were
procured from Vigo and Redondela to form a bridge for the passage of
the troops; enough could not be found to construct one in the usual
form, and it was necessary to moor them broadside to the stream, fasten
them together head and stern, and then lay planks along, torn from
the neighbouring houses. The narrowness of this bridge considerably
lengthened the time employed in passing, nevertheless the passage
was effected before the enemy appeared. The troops were formed on
the southern bank; they were now increased to between 6000 and 7000
men, besides 3000 who were without fire-arms; they had 120 horse, and
nine field-pieces, and a battery of two eighteen-pounders planted on
a height above the bridge. Captain M’Kinley, who was still in the
port of Vigo, was informed of this on the evening of the 6th of June.
Very early the following morning he went up in his barge to S. Payo,
and while he was conferring with Carrera, the French appeared on the
opposite bank. The Galician troops had undergone great fatigue, having
been constantly exposed to continued and heavy rain: nothing, however,
could exceed their spirit; it required all the efforts of their
officers to prevent them from pushing across and attacking an enemy
whom they had such cause to hate. Ney posted his troops in the houses
on the right bank and in a wood a little below, and kept up his attack
the whole day. During the night he erected a battery; some of his men
also laid ladders upon the first breach, and got upon the brink of the
second; but when daylight appeared they were soon driven back.
Captain M’Kinley passing safely within gunshot of the enemy’s
field-pieces, returned to Vigo as soon as the action commenced: with
the assistance of Colonel Carol, he provided for the security of that
place, and the Spanish commodore sent up three gun-boats to assist
in the defence. One of these Captain Wynter manned under charge of
Lieutenant Jefferson. A Spanish schooner and a Portugueze one went also
upon this service. At daybreak the French battery opened both upon the
troops and the boats; but the latter, taking advantage of the tide, got
near, and destroyed the battery. When the tide fell, the enemy made two
desperate attempts with horse and foot to cross above the bridge; the
Spaniards steadily resisted, and both times drove them back with great
slaughter. Baffled here, a detachment went up the river, thinking to
cross at the ford of Sotomayor; Morillo was sent to oppose them, and
after they had vainly persevered in their attempt for an hour and half,
compelled them to retire. They made another attack under cover of a
thick fog; this also was as unsuccessful as the former, and Ney being
thus defeated by a new-raised army of inferior numbers, nearly half of
whom were unarmed, retreated during the night, leaving some of his
wounded, and 600 dead.
♦THE SPANIARDS RETALIATE UPON THE FRENCH.♦
Marshal Ney had acted upon the same infamous system of cruelty as
his brother Marshals. The peasantry from the beginning repaid their
inhumanities: and although it was long before the Spanish officers
could resolve upon resorting to the dreadful principle of retaliation,
they also were at length compelled to it. It was not to be supposed
that they could see their countrymen murdered without using those means
of prevention and punishment which were in their hands. At Lourizon
thirty religioners and forty-nine of the principal inhabitants had
been hung by the French, who then set the place on fire: in return for
this barbarity 130 prisoners taken at the Bridge of S. Payo were put
to death. Barrios, while he commanded, had repeatedly remonstrated
with Ney upon the atrocious system of warfare which he pursued; his
representations were treated with contempt, and at length he executed
the threats with which he had vainly endeavoured to enforce them, and
threw at one time 700 Frenchmen into the Minho.
♦MARSHAL SOULT RETREATS FROM GALICIA.♦
These terrible examples were not lost upon the enemy: if they did not
make them abate of their barbarities, they made them eager to get out
of a province where the people were able and determined to take such
vengeance as their invaders had provoked. Marshal Ney indeed would have
endeavoured yet to make a stand, if Soult would have continued to
co-operate with him; but even if there had been no[18] ill will between
them, views of more extensive measures, and necessity also, would have
induced that General to form a different determination. He had received
neither succours of any kind, nor instructions, nor even intelligence
from Madrid for five months, so well had the Spaniards and Portugueze
cut off all communication. There was not a place in Galicia where
he could rest and supply his troops, or leave his sick in security,
except the two great ports; and there he well knew they would be shut
up between the Galician force and the English ships. He therefore
refused to concur in any further movements, and began his retreat from
Val de Orras and Viana by the Portillas de la Cauda and Requejo to the
Puebla de Sanabria. Ney, finding he was thus left to his own resources,
immediately ♦FERROL AND CORUÑA EVACUATED BY THE FRENCH.♦ prepared to
evacuate Coruña and Ferrol. He destroyed the magazines and stores of
every kind, and the defences on the land side, spiked the guns, and
completely disarmed both the place and the people. Ferrol was evacuated
by the last division of the enemy on the 21st, Coruña on the following
day, and Ney retreated through Lugo, Villafranca, and Astorga. He
had formed an encampment between Betanzos and Lugo; and this, before
his final retreat was known, kept the persons whom he had established
in authority in fear or hope of his return, so that no communication
was suffered with the British ships, except by flag of truce. The
batteries and lines on the sea-side having been left uninjured, Captain
Hotham of the Defiance, impatient of this conduct, landed a party of
seamen and marines, and dismounted all the guns which bore upon the
anchorage. When Noroña arrived a few days afterwards, he expressed some
displeasure at this; but the propriety of the measure was so evident
when the circumstances which occasioned it were explained, that this
♦JUNE 26.♦ feeling was only momentary. Captain Hotham having thus
opened a communication with Coruña, sent Captain Parker to Ferrol,
where the joy of the people, at seeing an English officer in their
streets, was manifested by the loudest acclamations, and by every
possible mark of attachment. The Castle of S. Felipe was still held
by a traitor whom Ney had appointed to the command. He had under him
a legion which the French had raised while they were in possession of
the two towns, and over these men he retained his authority as long as
the real state of affairs could be concealed. This traitor gave orders
to fire upon any English ships or boats that might attempt to pass:
Captain Hotham, upon this, stood over to Ferrol in the Defiance, and
landed the marines of that ship and of the Amazon, with a party of
armed seamen under Captain Parker, who proceeded to attack the castle.
But though the men who garrisoned it had been weak enough to suffer
themselves to be enrolled in the Intruder’s service, they refused
to obey their commander, now that it was in their power to deliver
themselves, and joyfully welcomed the English, who entered preceded by
the Spanish colours.
♦MARSHAL SOULT COMPLAINS OF SOME OF HIS OFFICERS.♦
The retreat of the French was conducted in what was now their usual
manner. They are described by Romana as leaving every where marks of
their atrocities, whole villages consumed by fire, victims of both
sexes and all ages butchered, and committing enormities too dreadful to
be recounted. The system had in reality been so wicked, that even some
of the French themselves revolted at the course of crimes into which
they had been led; and Marshal Soult, in a dispatch to the intrusive
government, complained of what he called a moral debility in some of
his generals. “In the kind of war which we carry on,” he said, “and
with the sort of enemy whom we have to contend with, it is of great
importance to the success of our operations that the chiefs who are
at the head of the troops should be not only impassible, but that
they possess a force of mind which places them in all circumstances
above events even the most vexatious.” It was evident from this that
there were officers who were shocked at the atrocities which they
were called upon to order, and to witness, and to execute. The moral
debility which was complained of meant a lingering of humanity, a
return of honourable feeling, an emotion of conscience, a sense of
the opprobrium that they were bringing upon their country, and of the
guilt and infamy they were heaping upon themselves. For such a service
officers were wanted who should be _impassible_, ... not merely unmoved
at any effects, however horrible, of the system in which they were
engaged, but incapable of any feeling whereby they could possibly be
moved.
♦HE RECOMMENDS A PLAN FOR SECURING GALICIA.♦
The dispatch in which this memorable avowal was contained was
intercepted by one of those guerilla parties which now began to show
themselves in different parts of Spain. It was written from Sanabria,
at a time when Soult was not acquainted with Marshal Ney’s intention to
evacuate Galicia. The war in that province, he said, was become very
murderous, and infinitely disagreeable, and its termination was far
distant. The only means of bringing it to a good conclusion would be
to fortify seven or eight important posts, each capable of containing
a garrison of 500 or 600 men, an hospital, and provisions for four
months; by this means the people might be kept in check, the principal
passes closed, and points of support provided for the columns acting
in the province, in whatever direction they moved, where they might
receive assistance and deposit their sick. This, he said, was a very
powerful consideration; for it was not to be concealed that the present
circumstances had a great effect upon the minds of the soldiers,
knowing as they did, that if they were wounded or seized with fever
at a distance from a place of safety, they were liable to perish for
want of assistance, or to be put to death by the peasantry. A million
of French money would suffice to put Galicia in this state of defence,
and no money could be employed to better purpose, especially as a
smaller number of troops would then suffice to occupy it. Lugo should
be fortified, three block-houses erected on the line of Villafranca in
the Bierzo, and the fortifications of Tuy, Monforte, Monterey, Viana,
and the Puebla de Sanabria restored, which might easily be done. A few
other posts might be added if needful.
♦ROMANA SUMMONED TO TAKE HIS PLACE IN THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦
Some of these measures, Marshal Soult said, he had persuaded Marshal
Ney to undertake. But when that dispatch was written Ney was on his
retreat, and so harassed by the Spaniards, that he did not feel himself
safe till he had got beyond Astorga into the plain country. Soult on
his part proceeded to Zamora, and Galicia was thus delivered from its
invaders. That kingdom was left in a state of dreadful exhaustion,
and the anarchy to which all things tended was thereby increased. Men
who had done their part in driving out the enemy, having now no means
of providing for themselves, roamed about in armed parties, and lived
as freebooters, so that the condition of the helpless inhabitants
was little better than when they were under the French yoke. Romana
appointed military governors in every province, and was taking measures
for making its resources available to the general cause, when the Junta
superseded him in the command. The pretext was that they required his
presence among them; for upon the demise of the Principe Pio he had
been chosen to succeed him as one of the deputies for Valencia, his
native province; but the real cause was the complaints which were made
against him by Jovellanos and his colleagues, for his interference in
Asturias. Romana regarded not their accusations, knowing that he had
acted with the best intentions, and believing that he had done what was
best for the country: but he said to his friends that the Junta had
never taken so false a step as in removing him at that time.
♦HE ORDERS A MONUMENT TO BE ERECTED TO SIR JOHN MOORE.♦
Before he left Coruña he erected a[19] temporary monument, in the name
of his country, to the memory of Sir John Moore and the brave ♦HIS
FAREWELL TO THE ARMY.♦ men who had fallen with him. And he published a
farewell address to the remnant of those faithful soldiers whom he had
brought from the Baltic, and who had accompanied him through all his
dangers and privations. “Neither the marches of the Carthaginians in
former times,” said he, “nor of the French in latter, can be compared
with those incessant ones which you have made among the mountains
of Castille, Galicia, and Asturias, during six months of nakedness,
hunger, and misery. You have fought no boasted battles, but you have
annihilated one of the tyrant’s proudest armies; aiding the national
spirit, keeping up its noble excitement, wearying the enemy’s troops,
destroying them in petty actions, and circumscribing their command
to the ground upon which they stood. You have fulfilled the highest
duties of the soldier; and I owe to you the reward, which all my
labours, and cares, and thoughts as a general have aspired to. Your
country was long ignorant of your best services; but the actions of
Villa Franca, Vigo, the fields of Lugo, Santiago, and San Payo, free
you from all reproach for having avoided to engage in fatal battles,
and will make you terrible to those enemies who have been conquered
and driven out, wherever the superiority of their forces was not too
great to be overcome. Brave Spaniards, I acknowledge this day the
want of that composure which I have always felt at your head. I am no
longer your General. The government calls me from you to take a place
in the Supreme Central Junta. Nothing but its irresistible will should
separate me from you, nor make me renounce the right I have to partake
in your future welfare, under your new commander. Take, soldiers, the
last farewell of your General, and reckon always upon the gratitude and
paternal love of your compatriot and companion in arms.”
♦ADDRESS OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA TO THE GALICIANS.♦
The Central Junta, upon the deliverance of Galicia, addressed one
of their animated proclamations to the inhabitants. “People of
Galicia,” they said, “upon seeing you fall into the power of the
enemy without resistance, your naval ports and arsenals occupied by
them, and so powerful and important a province subjected from sea to
sea, indignation and grief made your country break out in cries of
malediction and reproach, like a mother who complains to heaven and
earth of the degradation of a daughter in whom alone she had confided.
At that time reverses followed each other, as successes had done
before. After the battles of Espinosa, and Burgos, and Tudela, came
the passage of the Somosierra, the capture of Madrid, and the rout
at Ucles, and then, to afflict the heart of the country, the ruin of
Zaragoza, the defeat in Catalonia, and at Medellin. In all these
memorable events, though fortune failed, our reputation was not lost,
and Spain, suffering as she did, retained her confidence. But Galicia
... Galicia, entered without resistance, subdued without opposition,
and bearing tranquilly the yoke of servitude, ... Galicia deranged all
calculations of prudence, and was destroying the country by destroying
hope. Who then in that night of misfortunes would have looked to
Galicia for the first day-spring of joy? More glorious in your rise,
than you had seemed weak in your fall, magnanimous Galicians! despair
itself made you feel the strength of which you had not before been
conscious. The cry of independence and vengeance was heard in your
highways, your villages, your towns; the conquerors in their turn began
to fear they should be conquered, and retired into their strong places;
there they were pursued, and assaulted, and taken. Vigo delivered
itself up with its oppressors, and Galicia, sending these prisoners to
the other side of the sea, gave a proof as authentic as it was great,
that the Spaniards had not wholly forgotten the art of subduing and
binding the French. This was the first day of good fortune that rose on
Spain after five months of disasters, ... others followed. In vain did
Soult, hardly escaping from our allies at Porto, come with the relics
of his beaten division to succour the weakened Ney. Harassed in their
marches, decimated in their parties, cut off in their communications,
and baffled in their hope of fighting great actions, these arrogant
Generals despair of conquest, and execrate a war in which their men
are consumed without glory. Weary of struggling against a physical
force which every day strengthened, and a moral resistance which had
made itself invincible, they fled at last from your soil in a state of
miserable exhaustion, giving to Castille a new and great example that
it is not possible to force the yoke upon a people who are unanimous in
resisting it.
“_The Spaniards do not yet know what war is_, said those traitors to
their country, who under the mask of a false prudence concealed their
guilty selfishness. With such disheartening language they endeavoured
to repress the generous impulses of loyalty. Base and pusillanimous
men, we know what war is now! this terrible lesson is written upon our
soil with the finger of desolation, it is engraved in our hearts with
the dagger of vengeance. The execrable criminals whose instruments
you have made yourselves have in their atrocities exceeded all that
your perfidious mind could have foreseen, all that your terrified
imagination could have foreboded. Transport yourselves to Galicia, if
ye dare do it, ye miserable men, and there learn what is the standard
of the true Spanish character! The blood which has there been shed is
still steaming to heaven, the houses which have been burnt are still
smoking, and the frightful silence of depopulation prevails over a
country which was lately covered with villages and hamlets. But ask
those families who, wandering among the mountains, chose rather to live
with wild beasts, than communicate with the assassins to whom you had
sold them: ask them if they repent of their resolution; seek among them
one voice that shall follow you, one vote that shall exculpate you!
“People of Galicia, you are free! and your country, in proclaiming it,
effaces with her tears of admiration and tenderness the mournful words
wherein, in other times, she complained of you. You are free, and you
owe your freedom to your exaltation of mind, to your courage, to your
constancy. You are free, and Spain and all Europe congratulate you the
more joyfully in proportion as your case had appeared desperate. All
good men bless your name; and in holding you up as a model to the other
provinces, we regard the day of your deliverance as a fortunate presage
for the country.”
CHAPTER XXIII.
CATALONIA. BATTLE OF VALLS. DEATH OF REDING. BLAKE APPOINTED TO THE
COMMAND. BATTLE OF ALCANIZ. FLIGHT OF THE SPANIARDS AT BELCHITE.
COMMENCEMENT OF THE GUERILLAS.
♦1809. FEBRUARY.♦
Three circumstances had materially contributed to the success of the
Galicians: the aid and confidence which they derived from the British
ships, whereby they were assisted first in recovering Vigo, and
afterwards at the bridge of S. Payo; the rare virtues of Romana, whose
single thought was how to serve his country, and who for that object,
shrinking neither from responsibility nor obloquy, acted always with
promptitude and decision upon his own judgement; and, lastly, the very
condition, or rather destitution of his army: its name and presence
had a powerful effect in rousing and encouraging the people, while the
troops themselves felt and understood their utter inability for any
other mode of warfare than that which their leader was pursuing, and
thus derived strength from the very knowledge of their weakness. In
Catalonia the people were not less brave and patriotic; there was a
stronger British squadron off the coast; and the army was respectable
for numbers, sufficiently equipped, and in a state of discipline not
to be despised. But the Generals in succession were deficient either in
military skill or natural talent, or that vigour of mind without which
all other qualifications in a commander are of no avail.
♦PROCEEDINGS OF THE FRENCH AFTER THE FALL OF ZARAGOZA.♦
Neither in Aragon nor in Catalonia had the French been able to follow
up their success. They had paid dearly for Zaragoza: even the army of
observation had been so harassed during that ever-memorable siege, that
it was necessary to allow them some repose. Having possessed themselves
of Jaca by the treachery of the governor, and of Monzon, which was
evacuated by the garrison because Lazan had taken no effectual
measures for supplying it with provisions; they were repulsed in three
attempts upon Mequinenza. They summoned Lerida, thinking to intimidate
the inhabitants by the fate of the Zaragozans; but that example had
produced an effect which neither Buonaparte nor his Generals were
capable of anticipating; they estimated every thing by success, and
with them to be unfortunate was to be despised and miserable. Marshal
Lasnes was told in answer to his summons, that Zaragoza, unprotected as
it was, had held out ten months against its besiegers, and that Lerida
was a strong place. The Spaniards were also reminded that the Prince of
Condé had been baffled before that fortress. It was expected by some of
the Spanish officers that St. Cyr, in conjunction with the French from
Aragon, would besiege the city without delay; that he would afterwards
attack Tarragona, and then, marching from conquest to conquest, proceed
against Valencia. Others ♦CABAÑES, C. 14.♦ supposed, that for the more
immediate object of securing the communication between France and
Barcelona, his first measure would be to get possession of Hostalrich.
Orders were indeed sent to St. Cyr to undertake with his corps the
♦ST. CYR, 130.♦ sieges of Gerona, Tarragona, and Tortosa, at the same
time; enterprises so much beyond his means, that the order made him
doubt whether it was an error in the ciphers of the dispatch, or an
act of folly in those who dictated instructions which could not have
been obeyed without exposing the army to some great and inevitable
disaster. That General had as little reason to be satisfied with his
situation, as with the cause in which he was employed. Having exhausted
the resources within reach, he was obliged to quit his position at
Martorell, S. Sadurni, Villa Franca, and Vendrell, and draw nearer to
Tarragona, Reus, and Valls. His great object was to bring on another
action, for the purpose of establishing the superiority of the French
arms in the feelings of his own army, as well as of the Spaniards; for
notwithstanding the splendid successes which he had achieved, that
opinion ♦ST. CYR, 118.♦ was daily losing ground while the Catalans
confined themselves to a system of desultory warfare.
♦STATE OF THE CATALAN ARMY.♦
Upon such a system Reding had resolved to act in conformity to the
opinion of all his best officers. Hope, enterprise, and activity, were
thus excited; and the spirit not of the irregular force alone, but of
the troops, was raised, as every day brought tidings of some partial
and animating success. Meantime he exerted himself in endeavouring to
bring the army into a state of discipline, acting when that was in
question with a decision which he wanted at other times. One regiment
he broke for having refused to obey a Swiss officer in action. His
character stood so high with the Catalans, that this vigorous measure
did not injure his popularity; for he had the full support of public
feeling and of the local authorities. The Junta of Tarragona coined
not only the plate of individuals, but that of the churches also,
for the pay of the troops; and for two months the hospitals received
their whole supplies, and the army the whole of their pay, clothing,
and food, from the inhabitants of that faithful city. It was at this
♦CABAÑES, C. 14.♦ time that one of the best and ablest men whom these
calamitous times forced into action, the Baron de Eroles, D. Joaquin
Ybañez, resigned his place in the Superior Junta, and putting on the
Miquelet uniform, took the command of a body of those troops, believing
that he could serve his country more effectually in the field than in
council. Throughout the whole subsequent course of the war no Spaniard
made himself more conspicuous, nor has any one acquired a higher or
more irreproachable name.
♦NEW LEVIES.♦
A conscription of every fifth man throughout the principality was
called for, without distinction of ranks, in obedience to the decree
of the Central Junta; the men were willing to serve, but an error
was committed in embodying them with the regular troops, because the
Catalans disliked that service, and were proud of the name as well as
attached to the privileges of the Miquelets. Some attempt was made
to bring this irregular but most useful force into a better state of
order and uniformity, for which purpose the camp-marshal, D. Josef
Joaquin Marti, was appointed their commander-in-chief; but this proved
altogether abortive. Even the proper returns of the men who were to
be under his command could not be obtained; and though he had ability
as well as zeal to qualify him for the charge, nothing could be done,
when means of every kind were wanting. The province, however, was in
arms. The people, knowing their own physical strength, and impatient
of seeing their country oppressed by a handful of invaders, began
to murmur at the General’s inactivity: he was assailed by anonymous
writings, accusing him of incapacity or treason; and this General was
as sensitive to such attacks as he was sensible of the difficulties
that surrounded ♦CABAÑES, C. 14.♦ him. Brave, honourable, humane, and
well acquainted with the art of war, he wanted the main qualifications
for it when entrusted with command; having neither fortitude to
persevere against vulgar clamour in the cautious system which he was
sensible was best suited to the time, nor promptitude to act with
vigour and decision when he departed from it.
♦REDING DETERMINES TO ACT ON THE OFFENSIVE.♦
The Central Junta had sent D. Tomas de Veri, one of its members, as its
representative to Catalonia. A like measure had been adopted in the
tumultuous times of the French Revolution; the circumstances in Spain
were altogether different, and these missions appear neither to have
produced good nor evil. On the present occasion Veri was in favour of
active operations; and that opinion, which had necessarily much weight
with Reding, was strengthened by assurances that an insurrection would
be attempted in Barcelona as soon as any movements on his part should
be made to favour it. The Camp-marshal Marti was called upon to form
the plan of a general attack; his own judgement was decidedly opposed
to it, but Reding had determined upon action in deference to the
popular cry. He did not like to hear it remarked that the troops were
more willing to eat their rations than to march against the enemy; and
he wished also to ascertain in the field whether any reliance might be
placed upon the Somatens, and upon that general enthusiasm which he did
not participate, and in which he had no faith. If he entertained any
hope, it was founded upon the promised effort in Barcelona, ... which
of all hopes had the least foundation; ... for the fortresses having
now been well victualled, the time was gone by when it might have been
of advantage to have got possession of the city. But even after his
resolution to act on the offensive was taken, the movements of the army
were delayed by that ominous mood of mind which draws on ill fortune
more surely than it foresees it. And in strange opposition to what
happened in all other parts of the Peninsula, all Reding’s plans were
perfectly well known to the French, while he obtained no information of
their movements or of their numbers on which he could rely. On ♦STAFF.
BEFREIUNGS KRIEG DER KATALONIER, P. 148.♦ the other hand, by a singular
perversion of principle, the Catalans whom the French had in their pay
made it a point of honour and conscience to communicate full and true
intelligence. The task was not difficult; for Reding, in the certainty
that his intentions were betrayed as soon as they were formed, gave up
all hope of secrecy; and every thing was talked of in public, with a
desperate carelessness, as if it were useless to observe even the rules
of common prudence.
♦THE SPANIARDS DRIVEN FROM IGUALADA.♦
The Spaniards occupied a line from Martorell to Tarragona, through
Bruch, Capelladas, S. Magi, and Col de S. Cristina; the head-quarters,
under Camp-marshal D. Juan Bautista de Castro, being at Igualada: this
line covered the whole south of the principality, and touched upon the
north at Valls, where the levy in mass was to be effected. St. Cyr
waited till the Spaniards had weakened themselves to his desire by
extending their line so far as to render it vulnerable in many points:
then leaving Souham’s division at Vendrell to observe the troops at
Col de S. Cristina and near Tarragona, he, with the divisions of Pino,
Chabot, and Chabran, ♦FEB. 17.♦ attacked the Spaniards on their left at
various points, and, though at one time Chabot’s division was in danger
of being routed, succeeded in driving them back upon Igualada, where,
with an imprudence which experience had not corrected, large magazines
had been assembled. They had neglected to occupy the road from Llacuna
in sufficient strength, though it was the key to all their positions on
the way to Barcelona; by this road they found themselves attacked in
the rear, when falling back already dispirited and in confusion; and
it was only by flight that they escaped in the directions of ♦ST. CYR,
103–106. CABAÑES, C. 14.♦ Cervera, Cardona, and Manresa. Castro was
removed from his command, for the want of skill or of zeal which he had
manifested in these operations. His subsequent conduct confirmed the
worst suspicions that could then have been entertained; for he entered
the Intruder’s service, and holding a military command under him,
became, as far as his power extended, the scourge of his countrymen.
♦FAILURE OF THE FRENCH ATTEMPT AGAINST THE ABBEY OF THE CREUS.♦
It was part of St. Cyr’s plan that Souham, when he was apprised of the
success of these operations, either by the ceasing of the fire, or by
any other means, should beat the detachment at Col de S. Cristina, and
join him at Villarradoña, when it was hoped that the Spaniards might
be driven from all their positions, in utter rout, once more within
the walls of Tarragona. To effect this the French commander proceeded
with Pino’s division against a body of Spaniards under Brigadier D.
Miguel de Iranzo, who occupied ♦FEB. 18.♦ the position of S. Magi.
The distance had appeared trifling upon the map: it proved long and
difficult, the road during great part of the way being so narrow that
the troops, foot as well as horse, could only defile man by man: they
did not reach the position till four in the afternoon; the attack
lasted till night closed, and the Spaniards then, unable to maintain
their ground, retreated under cover of the darkness. Here, however, an
unexpected difficulty impeded the conquerors; they were not acquainted
with the country, nor had they been able, with all their exertions upon
the march, to find any person who could serve them as a guide. From
this perplexity they were relieved by a circumstance which would not
have occurred if St. Cyr had not deserved and obtained a reputation,
most unusual among Buonaparte’s generals in Spain, for observing the
humanities of war. A Spanish officer, who had been wounded and taken
prisoner in this last affair, relying upon the French commander’s
character, entreated that he would let him be carried to Tarragona: St.
Cyr not only granted his request, but finding from him that he was able
to direct those who bore him, added, that as there were no peasants
to be found at S. Magi or in the adjoining parts, he would send him
as far as the Convent of the Creus. By this act of compassion the
French were extricated from the difficulty in which they had placed
themselves. The wounded officer gratefully acknowledged this kindness,
little thinking in what manner he was to serve the enemy. On the ♦FEB.
19.♦ morrow accordingly he was sent forward; two or three persons at
convenient distances behind observed his way, and the French by their
direction followed the unconscious guide. During the whole day they did
not fall in with a single person; but in the evening when they drew
near the monastery, instead of finding there, as they had expected,
good quarters and comfortable stores for the troops, who stood in need
of both after four days’ exertions, they discovered that Iranzo had
fallen back to this very point, and occupied it in strength. The French
immediately saw that the post could not be forced without artillery,
and they had none with them; they made, however, a feint of attacking
it, with the intention of attempting an escalade, if the Spaniards
should betray any want of alacrity in the defence. But the walls of
the enclosure, the windows of the buildings, the roof of the church,
and the tower, were presently manned; and a fire was opened upon them
from two _violentos_, ... pieces of small artillery, so named from the
manner in which they are used; they are fired not less than twelve
times in a minute, and the exertion which this requires is so great,
that the strongest and most expert artillerymen ♦ST. CYR, 107–111.♦
cannot continue it more than a quarter of an hour.
The French had learnt at Zaragoza what it was to attack the Spaniards
where there were walls and buildings to be defended; and St. Cyr was
not a man who would throw away the lives of his soldiers. His men,
instead of the good quarters and better fare which they had promised
themselves, were fain to bivouac upon the heights; and in the morning
when the General had determined to cross the Gaya for the purpose of
getting into a more open country, and effecting his junction with
Souham’s division, they were obliged to defile under a sharp and
well-directed fire of musketry from the Convent. When they reached
Villarrodoña, to their great disappointment Souham was not there; the
dispatches which had been sent to him had been all intercepted, and
a day and half were lost in waiting till he arrived from Vendrell.
♦REDING TAKES THE FIELD, AND COLLECTS HIS SCATTERED TROOPS.♦ Reding
meantime, as soon as he heard that his line had been broken, concluded
that nothing now was to be done but to collect as many of the troops as
he could, and withdraw them again under the protection of Tarragona;
and feeling that this service was of too much importance to be
entrusted to any one in whom he had not the most entire confidence,
he set out himself on the morning in which St. Cyr marched from
his unsuccessful attempt upon the Convent. He took with him only a
battalion of Swiss, 300 horse, and six pieces of flying artillery; and
as he marched from Pla saw the enemy on his right, where they were
employed in sacking and burning Villarrodoña and La Puebla. Reding was
not aware that the French Commander-in-chief was with this body of the
invaders, nor did St. Cyr know that the Spanish General was passing
within sight with such a handful of troops. His force, however, was
soon increased with the detachment which had retired from Col de S.
Cristina, and with the 1200 men under Iranzo, whom he now recalled. He
then proceeded to S. Coloma de Queralt, and there effected his junction
with Castro, with the detachment stationed at that place, and with the
force which Castro had collected after his defeat. But here he was
alarmed by learning that the enemy had entered Valls.
♦HE IS ADVISED TO RETREAT.♦
St. Cyr on his part was not without some anxiety concerning Reding’s
intention. The movement which that General had made from his right
upon his centre, led him to apprehend a purpose of re-establishing the
line of communication with his left beyond the Noya, in which case the
French detachment at Igualada would be in danger. That thought had
passed across Reding’s mind. He had supposed that the object of the
French, by occupying Valls, was to cut off his retreat to Tarragona,
and intercept his communications with that fortress; and his first
impulse was to move upon Igualada, and then upon Montbuy, to cut
off the enemy at both places. But it was his fate never to decide
resolutely and act with promptitude: a council of war was held; the
Deputy Veri was for retreating, with the view of covering the plain
of Tarragona. Accordingly they set out from S. Coloma, with the intent
of leaving Valls on the right. That day they reached Montblanch. A
party of French appeared in their rear, reconnoitred them, and then
turned by the Col de Cabra toward Pla and Valls. As it was thus made
certain that the enemy was observing them, a second council was held
on the following morning, at which Marti was present, who had been
summoned from Tarragona, where he had been left with the command. The
force which Reding had with him consisted at this time of 10,000 men,
who were in a better state than any body of troops which the Spaniards
had yet brought into the field in that quarter. The question was
asked, Where the French were posted, and in what numbers? The General
could only answer that they were supposed to be in Valls, and that
he estimated them at from 5000 to 6000, without artillery. Marti’s
opinion was, that as the object was to save the army and protect the
plain of Tarragona, where Reus and the other towns would otherwise
be at the mercy of the enemy, it was not advisable to risk an action
with a foe whom they knew to be superior in cavalry, and who, they
had reason to conclude, had other troops near enough at hand to be
brought together and overpower them if a battle should be ventured. He
advised, therefore, that a few light troops and Miquelets should make
a demonstration by the Col de Lilla against Valls in the morning, and
make their way afterwards as they could, either to join the corps on
the Llobregat, or to Lerida; ♦CABAÑES, C. 15.♦ that their guns should
be sent to that fortress, and that the troops should defile during the
night by Prades and a mountain path impracticable for artillery to
Constanti, where the whole army might be collected safely in a position
that would cover the plain.
General Doyle, who, after the most anxious endeavours to effect
something for the relief of Zaragoza, had joined the Catalan army
that day on its march, was for hope and enterprise. The troops were
in good condition and in good heart, and the opportunity favourable,
when they were within reach of a force inferior in number. Reding,
perplexed by these jarring opinions, and never venturing to decide at
once upon his own responsibility, took a middle course. He thought it
derogatory to steal as it were away through a mountain path like a
guerilla chief; and moreover Marti was one of the persons on whom his
suspicions had fixed. The course on which he determined had neither the
prospect of advantage, nor the certainty of safety. It was to retreat
with his artillery and baggage by the Col de Riba and the banks of the
Francoli; to begin the march that evening; not to seek the enemy, but
not to refuse battle if a favourable opportunity should be offered.
Marti represented that to take this line was not only seeking the
enemy, but putting it in their power to bring on an action upon ground
advantageous to themselves. But Reding certainly had not come to this
determination in the view of bringing on a battle, without incurring
the responsibility of such a measure. He suffered some provision carts
to be cut off by a reconnoitring party almost under his eyes, without
permitting his troops to resent the insult; ... they were tired, he
said, and he would not weaken the main body by sending ♦CABAÑES, C.
15.♦ out any detachments. Nor could Doyle prevail upon him to make his
retreat by day. It was commenced at seven in the evening, in good order
and with all possible silence.
♦BATTLE OF VALLS.♦
St. Cyr, who was at this time with Pino’s division at Pla, had ordered
Souham never to lose sight of Reding’s movements. That General occupied
Valls; he had entered it on a market day, and supplied his hungry
troops with the corn brought thither from Aragon and the plain of
Urgel, as if there had been no enemy to fear! His advanced guard was
to the north of that town, having its left upon the Francoli; his
right was in the direction of Pla, and he had a post at Picamoxons,
the point at which Reding must debouche upon the plain of Valls, if he
went either by the valley of Montblanch or the Col de Lilla. At this
point Souham’s orders were to give him battle; though some apprehension
was entertained that he might pass by the Col de Cabra, with the view
of cutting off the French from Barcelona. No such thought had ever
entered Reding’s mind[20]. The narrowness of the passes and the badness
of the road made the night march slower than had been calculated; at
five in the morning, however, the vanguard under Castro and half the
centre had passed Valls, leaving the enemy’s camp-fires on the left.
They were proceeding ♦FEB. 25.♦ silently and in the best order, and
no advanced post of the enemy had yet been discovered, when, as the
General was passing a little bridge, a volley of musketry opened upon
him within pistol shot. This unexpected attack occasioned a momentary
disorder: measures, however, were immediately taken to prevent the
enemy from cutting off that half of the army which had not yet come
up; the troops took their station with alacrity and precision; the
artillery on both sides began to play: the French descended from the
heights of Valls in several columns; they were met by the Spaniards,
and attacked so vigorously, that notwithstanding the advantage of the
ground, they were driven back.
All the information which Reding had previously obtained concerning the
enemy agreed in affirming that they had no artillery. It was therefore
not without surprise that he had found two batteries open upon him.
They had been silenced, however; the Spaniards had behaved even to his
wish, and a manifest advantage had been gained. But when the French had
been driven to the heights, reinforcements arrived which enabled them
to make a stand, and Reding perceived by their smoke-signals and their
rockets, that they were communicating with a fresh body of troops. It
was now noon; his own men had been marching all night, and having been
several hours in action, they began to feel exhausted. He therefore
concentrated them, sent off the whole of the baggage, and determined to
continue his retreat, as soon as they should have taken food or rest.
The position which he had chosen was a good one, behind the bridge of
Goy, on the right bank of the Francoli, and covered by that river. But
time for rest was not allowed them. Pino’s division had now come up,
and St. Cyr himself had arrived. That General, who was desirous of
gaining such a victory as should give the French the utmost confidence
in what was called their moral superiority, forbade his artillery to
fire; though the opportunity for firing with advantage was such, that
the commandant feigned not to understand the order, and when after a
third discharge it was repeated to him in the most formal manner,
expressed the unwillingness with which he obeyed. That of the Spaniards
was well served; and when, having crossed the river and ascended the
height, the French proceeded with the bayonet to the attack, they
advanced under a fire of musketry which could not have been more
regular at a review. The ♦ST. CYR, 125.♦ right wing of the Spaniards
was threatened, but the main attack was made upon the left, and this
the enemy succeeded in breaking between four and five in the evening,
about an hour after the action had been renewed. The Spaniards then
began to retreat in good order for the next half hour, ... but then
as usual fear and insubordination prevailed as soon as hope was lost.
Reding himself, when it was no longer possible to perform the part of a
general, was distinguished for his personal bravery. A body of French
dragoons surrounded him and some of his staff: two of his aide-de-camps
were killed, and he himself received five sabre wounds from a French
Colonel, with whom he was personally engaged. The cavalry rendered
little service in covering the retreat; but the infantry of the right
and centre, and part of the left, retired ♦CABAÑES, C. 15. ST. CYR,
117, 126.♦ through the vineyards, where the horse could not pursue
them. The other part of the broken wing took to the mountains, and made
their way to Tortosa.
♦THE FRENCH RECEIVED AT REUS.♦
The French estimated their own loss in this action at about a thousand
men, that of the Spaniards at four; ... the Spaniards supposed it to
be about two thousand on either side. In fact the evening was so far
advanced, that they suffered comparatively little in their flight.
Reding reached Tarragona that night; ... that city was only three
leagues from the scene of action, and thither the greater part of the
dispersed troops found their way before morning, some corps in good
order, others in small parties. Some made for Reus, and from thence
to Cambrils and Col de Balaguer. The artillery and baggage fell into
the enemy’s hands. On the following day Souham entered Reus, a rich
commercial city, second only in size and importance to Barcelona.
The inhabitants had not, as had every where till now been done,
forsaken it; on the contrary the municipality went out to receive the
conquerors, and agreed to raise a contribution for the use of the army.
Their wealth may explain a conduct which, in the then state of public
feeling, surprised the French[21] themselves. This supply came at a
time when the paymaster had not a single _sous_ in the chest. Resources
of every kind were also found here, and here were some thousand of sick
or wounded Spaniards in the hospital, whom St. Cyr sent to ♦ARRANGEMENT
CONCERNING THE WOUNDED.♦ Tarragona. This measure led to a negotiation
with Reding, by which it was agreed that in future whatever patients
might be found in the hospitals should not be regarded as prisoners,
♦ST. CYR, 127–8.♦ but allowed to remain where they were, and to rejoin
their respective armies upon their recovery.
♦ALARM AT TORTOSA.♦
The enemy now occupied Villaseca and the port of Salon, and thus cut
off Tarragona from all communication by land with the rest of Spain.
They profited by their success with their wonted alacrity; and yet
they might have improved it farther, and gained a far more important
advantage than the victory itself, had they been aware of the alarm
which prevailed at Tortosa, and of the condition in which that fortress
had been left. The Governor and the Junta sent for General Doyle,
who, as far as personal influence and example could go, possessed in
an extraordinary degree the talent of exciting activity and creating
confidence. He found the fortifications in such a state that they could
not have resisted a coup-de-main; and the city so ill provided, that
if the works could have resisted an enemy, it must presently have been
reduced by famine. Provisions were now collected by requisition from
the neighbourhood, receipts being given for the amount (for the public
money had been constantly ordered to Tarragona), and the citizens
were called out to work upon the ramparts; so that the place was put
in a state for resisting any sudden attack. There were but two roads
by which artillery could be brought against it: one was defended by
the fort at Col de Balaguer; but from that post the troops at this
important crisis were deserting for want of provisions. By General
Doyle’s exertions it was immediately stored, and the other road,
through Falcat, which, there had been no attempt to guard, was occupied
according to his directions by 600 Somatenes. This was a position which
could well be maintained by a small force, and this timely occupation
prevented the advance of a French detachment which had been ordered
thither. The Tortosans were soon encouraged by the arrival of the
Marques de Lazan, who brought his army there when they might better
have kept the field. The want of cordiality between ♦LAZAN SEPARATES
HIS ARMY FROM REDING’S COMMAND.♦ this General and Reding had been
sufficiently manifested to be known even by the enemy; and Lazan now
formally announced, that having previously been appointed second in the
Aragonese army by the Cortes of that kingdom, he had upon the loss of
his brother succeeded to the command in chief; and considering himself
as independent of the commander in Catalonia, should thenceforth look
upon the protection of Aragon as his proper business: but he would do
whatever he could consistently with this object, for covering Catalonia
on that side. Reding represented this to the war-minister as an act by
which Lazan crippled the Catalan army, and exposed his own troops to
certain destruction, without the possibility of effecting any service;
and instructions were accordingly dispatched from Seville that he
should obey Reding’s orders. The same spirit of provincialism was
prevailing in Valencia; a corps of 6000 men ♦1809. MAY.♦ from that
kingdom was stationed at Morela, with orders to remain there, though
neither this place not that part of the country were threatened, but
because that position covers Valencia on the side of Aragon. There
was neither unity in counsel nor in command; ... each of these three
provinces had its own army, acting upon its own views, and of course
all acting without effect.
♦MORTALITY IN TARRAGONA.♦
And yet St. Cyr had mistaken the character of the Spaniards when he
supposed that the battle of Valls would convince them of their moral
inferiority to the conquerors. Far from it; it had even raised the
spirit of the Catalans; and the Central Junta spake of it in their
proclamations as one of those defeats in which ill fortune brought
with it no dishonour, but rather hope and confidence. It proved to the
Spanish army far more disastrous in its consequences than in itself;
they were crowded into Tarragona, and the French commander, by sending
thither several thousand sick and wounded from the hospitals at Reus,
increased or perhaps occasioned an infectious disease which broke
out among them, and was aggravated by the uncleanliness arising from
want of linen, the neglect of those precautions, and the destitution
of all those means without which armies cannot be kept in health. We
reconcile ourselves to the slaughter of a battle or a siege, because
such destruction is the business of war, and the men engaged in it
take their chance bravely for the evils which they are inflicting upon
others; ... ♦1809. MARCH.♦ but there is somewhat at which the heart
revolts in making a league with pestilence or famine, however much the
system of war may require and justify it. St. Cyr knew that disease was
doing his work in Tarragona; officers as well as men were dying in such
numbers, that if he could have kept them thus shut up within the seat
of the contagion, more would perish in a month than he could have hoped
to destroy in four pitched battles. He determined therefore ♦ST. CYR,
133.♦ to remain in the plain of Tarragona as long as his army could be
supplied with a quarter of a ration.
♦ST. CYR REMOVES TO THE PLAIN OF VICQ.♦
But the Spaniards were not idle. The Somatenes were once more in force
and in activity; and the left of the Catalan army, which had not been
engaged in the defeat, harassed the enemy on their right and in the
rear. When Reding had formed his unfortunate plan of operation, 10,000
Miquelets and Somatenes, under Wimpffen, had been sent beyond the
Llobregat to take advantage of any insurrection that might be attempted
in Barcelona. These irregular troops, when they had no longer to
depend upon the combinations of the Commander-in-chief, but were left
to themselves to carry on their own kind of warfare in their own way,
began again to acquire that superiority which such warfare assured
them; Chabran’s division, harassed by repeated assaults, fell back
successively from Igualada upon Llacuna, S. Quinto, and Villa Franca;
and the Spaniards in that quarter, full of hope as ever, resumed the
blockade of Barcelona. For a time they cut off St. Cyr’s communication
with that city, and their position excited no trifling uneasiness in
Duhesme and Lechi, who well knew the disposition of the inhabitants.
But the English squadron, the sight of which always afforded hope to
the Barcelonans, was compelled by a heavy gale to stand out to sea: and
Chabran’s division, recovering the ground and the reputation which it
had lost, once more broke up the irregular blockade. St. Cyr meantime
maintained his position as long as it was possible to feed his army
there; he then determined upon moving it into the little plain of Vicq,
where he expected to find corn, and to remain till the harvest should
be ripe in the environs of Gerona, where he foresaw that in the course
of the siege his army must be established. The battle of Valls had not
given that army the confidence which their General was so desirous they
should possess; there was in fact an impression upon them which they
had never felt in any other service; they knew that they were not the
objects of mere military hostility, in which there is neither enmity
nor ill will between man and man, but that they had the hatred and the
curses of the whole country. Their removal now they looked upon as a
retreat, and they knew what were the dangers of a retrograde movement
in Catalonia. St. Cyr better understood how little able Reding was to
take advantage of such a movement at that time; and for the purpose of
showing his men that he could defy the Spaniards, while at the same
time he was careful not to wound the feelings of a General whom he
respected, he sent an officer to Tarragona with a flag of truce, and
a letter stating that, as circumstances rendered it necessary for him
to draw nearer the French frontier, he should depart from Valls the
following day at noon, and if General Reding would send a detachment
thither at that time, the hospital which had been formed in that town,
and which it was of such consequence for him to preserve, considering
the number of his sick, should be consigned to him as it stood. It
was well furnished from ♦ST. CYR, 134, 145–7.♦ the houses which the
inhabitants of Valls had abandoned on the entrance of the enemy. The
French commander left only a very few wounded men, who were not in a
state to bear removal; because he doubted whether Reding would be able
to make the Spaniards observe the agreement which had been concluded
upon that subject. As far, however, as opportunity was given, it was
properly performed.
This done, after having remained something more than three weeks in
the plain of Tarragona, the French retreated toward the Llobregat.
Chabot’s division occupied at this time Montblanch, for the double
purpose of rendering it more difficult for Reding to communicate with
Wimpffen, and of preventing the latter from holding any communication
with Lerida. A brisk firing in a quarter where no alarm was looked
for, occasioned this General to send out a reconnoissance. It was in
time to save a detachment of 600 horse and foot, with two pieces of
cannon, which Marshal Mortier had sent from Fraga to communicate with
St. Cyr’s army, and bring him back intelligence of the state of things
from Catalonia. A smaller party would have had no chance of succeeding
in this service; and if this had been four-and-twenty hours later, it
would have been cut off. They were fortunate enough to find a division
of their countrymen here, but only half their object was accomplished;
for though the army delayed its ♦ST. CYR, 138.♦ movements two days
in the hope of facilitating their return, and escorted them to some
distance, the attempt was found to be so hopeless, that they were fain
to continue with St. Cyr.
♦VICQ DESERTED BY ITS INHABITANTS.♦
The troops in Tarragona were not in a condition to harass the French
on their retreat; but the retreat was most important to them. They
obtained room to distribute their sick, and the progress of the
contagion was stopped as soon as its main cause was thus removed. Some
affairs took place beyond the Llobregat with Wimpffen’s division, which
dispersed, as it became irregular troops to do, when they were not
acting at advantage. When the enemy reached Vicq, they found that that
city had not been infected by the ill example of Reus; the Bishop,
five or six old men, and the sick who were unable to remove, were the
only inhabitants of that populous city who remained. The others, with
a spirit worthy of their country and their cause, upon the unexpected
approach of the invaders abandoned all that they could not carry with
them in their instant removal, and went to seek shelter where they
could; many of them actually lived among the mountains during the whole
three months that the French continued there, though at the time of
their flight the weather was severe, and the snow daily falling. ♦ST.
CYR, 156.♦ There had been no time to destroy the provisions, much less
to remove them; if St. Cyr had not succeeded in effectually concealing
his intention of quartering the troops there, this would have been
done, and his army could then have derived no advantage from their
change of position. As it was, they found corn enough to last till the
harvest, lard for a month, and wine for a fortnight: but the change of
diet, air, and climate (for they had moved into a higher region), and
the want of wine as soon as the stock was exhausted, produced disease
among the soldiers; and it was well for them that neither Reding nor
his army was in a state to resume offensive operations; so that they
were enabled to rest.
♦ARREST OF THE PERSONS IN OFFICE AT BARCELONA FOR REFUSING THE OATH.♦
St. Cyr himself remained some three weeks in Barcelona. From the
depôts of the Spaniards, which, in the course of this successful
campaign had fallen into his hands, he had supplied the garrison of
that city with grain, pulse, and salt for three months’ consumption:
but there was not enough ammunition for a fortnight’s siege. Of
being formally besieged indeed there was not now even the remotest
danger; but from within there was sufficient cause for inquietude.
The honourable feeling of nationality, for which the Catalans are
eminently distinguished, was in no part of the principality stronger
than in its capital. At this very time Barcelona had two _tercios_
of Miquelets in the field, raised among its inhabitants, and paid
and clothed by them. The individuals of those regiments, having no
uniform by which they could be recognised, used to enter the city
fearlessly whenever it suited them, for the purpose of visiting their
friends, raising recruits, and receiving money or clothing: nor was
it in Duhesme’s power, with all the vigilance, and it may be added,
all the villany of his police, to detect a single person in this
practice; so unanimous were the Barcelonans in their detestation of
the intrusive government, and so well was the secret kept. That police
was continually reporting to Duhesme and Lechi, and these again to
the Commander-in-chief, the existence of conspiracies which they had
discovered; but the members of the police were men of such character,
that St. Cyr suspected these schemes to be suggested by their agents,
if they were not mere fabrications, brought forward for the most
nefarious motives. Now, however, that he was on the spot, he allowed
Duhesme ♦1809. APRIL.♦ to exact an oath of allegiance to the Intruder
from all the public functionaries, and from the Spanish soldiers who
had been disarmed after ♦ST. CYR, 142–4.♦ the treacherous seizure of
the place. Sunday was the day chosen for this act of oppression. They
were summoned to the house of the Royal Audience, which was surrounded
with horse and foot, and 3000 troops were drawn up on the esplanade
and the sea-wall; the display and the actual force being necessary to
keep down the indignation of a generous and most injured people. Every
member of the Audience refused thus to disgrace himself and betray his
country; only one of the _Relatores_ took the oath, and only three of
the numerous persons employed in the inferior departments. The French
were not more successful in tempting the military. Persuasions and
promises availed as little as the threat of immediate imprisonment. The
Contador Asaguerre told Duhesme, that if all Spain were to acknowledge
Joseph, he would expatriate himself. The French executed their threat.
Nine-and-twenty of these honourable Spaniards were sent prisoners,
some to Monjuic, others to the citadel. The people, undeterred by
their strong escort, followed them as in procession, cheering them as
they went, and promising that their families should be well provided
♦PRISONERS SENT TO FRANCE.♦ for during their imprisonment. Many
others were put under arrest in their own houses, and the whole of
the military were, by St. Cyr’s orders, marched with the prisoners of
war, under convoy of Lechi’s division, as far as the Fluvia, where
Reille received and sent them into France: and by Lechi’s return the
commander-in-chief ♦ST. CYR, 151, 158.♦ received the first intelligence
from that country which had reached him since he crossed the Fluvia
himself, ... five months before. His last remaining anxiety was for the
provisionment of Barcelona; and that was removed soon afterward by the
arrival of a squadron from Toulon, which had the rare good fortune to
reach its destined port and return in safety. ♦BARCELONA RELIEVED BY
SEA.♦ The place was thus amply supplied with military stores as well as
provisions, and the siege of Gerona then became the only object of the
French.
♦REDING DIES OF HIS WOUNDS.♦
The dispatch in which Reding informed the Central Junta of his defeat
at Valls, was marked equally by his habitual despondency and his
magnanimity as to every thing which regarded himself. He rendered the
fullest justice both to the policy and humanity of St. Cyr’s conduct
as opposed to that of Duhesme and Lechi, and expressed an apprehension
that it had produced some effect upon the public mind. Some ground
for this had been afforded by what had happened at Igualada and at
Reus; but the evil extended no farther. He had no reliance upon the
Somatenes, he said, nor upon the enthusiasm which they displayed;
order was wanting among them, and where order ended confusion began.
He complained that he could obtain no intelligence of the enemy’s
numbers, whereas they were well informed of every thing that related
to his army; and he gave as a reason for having taken the field, the
opinions of those whom he had consulted, and the popular cry. He made
no mention of his own wounds; and when the government published such
parts of his dispatch as were intended for publication, they noticed,
as it became them, his silence upon this point. The wounds, though
many, were not thought dangerous, and they appeared for a time to be
going on well; but the symptoms changed, and in the course of a month
they proved mortal. He fell in a foreign land, and in the service of a
foreign state; but the cause in which Theodore Reding fell was the same
for which his brother Aloys had fought amid their native mountains; and
it was the cause of his own countrymen as well as of the Spaniards;
the cause of all good men every where. The motives for which ordinary
wars have been undertaken are so mean and transitory, and come so
little to the heart of man, that after a few years have elapsed all
interest concerning them is exhausted; and even nationality does not
prevent us from feeling, that they, whose lives have been expended in
such contests, have died rather in the exercise of their profession
than of their duty. But the struggle of Spain against Buonaparte
is of the same eternal and unfading interest as the wars of Greece
against Xerxes: at whatever distance of time its records shall be
perused, they will excite in every generous mind the same indignant
and ennobling sympathy. Not, therefore, in an ungrateful service did
Reding lay down his life, for with those records his name will be
perpetuated: Switzerland will remember him with pride, as one of the
most honourable, though not most fortunate of her sons, and Spain with
respectful gratitude, as a soldier not unworthy of her service in its
best day, and true to it in its worst.
♦PEASANTS OF THE VALLÉS.♦
Right as this General was in his opinion, that the co-operation of
an irregular force was not to be relied on in a plan of regular
operations, he estimated the effects of a popular resistance below
its real importance, nor did he fairly appreciate the Catalan spirit.
A fine example of it was shown immediately after his death by the
peasants in the Vallés. Their country lies in the line between Vicq and
Barcelona, and the peasants taking arms to impede the communication
occupied the heights near the Church of Canovellas, about a mile from
Granollers, which is the capital of that district. The district is so
strong, that the invaders were desirous of opening the communication by
persuasion rather than by force; and therefore communicated to these
insurgents in due form, that the French commanders ordered their troops
to make war upon soldiers only, not upon peasants; that if they would
lay down their arms, and retire every man to his house, no injury
should be done them; but otherwise there was a division of the enemy
in their front, and another was coming in their rear. A written answer
was returned, in the name of the peasants of the Vallés. “They held it
a great honour,” they said, “to form a part, though but a small one, of
the Spanish nation; and they had seen what their requital had been for
receiving and entertaining the French troops, when their government had
commanded them so to do; their peaceful habitations had been invaded,
their property plundered, their houses burnt, their women violated,
their brethren murdered in cold blood, and above all, the religion of
their fathers outraged and profaned. Nothing remained for them but to
repel force by force; and as they could not by themselves defend their
open villages, they had taken to the mountains as to a strong hold:
from thence they would defend their valleys, and oppose to the enemy
the most obstinate resistance, as long as the government enjoined them
to consider as enemies the subjects of Napoleon. The Spanish general
in Catalonia was the person whose instructions they were to obey. For
themselves, emulating as they did the courage and constancy of all
Spain, they would never depart from those principles which the whole
nation maintained. General St. Cyr and his companions might have the
dreadful glory of seeing nothing but ruins in all that country; ...
they might pass in triumph over the bodies of those whom they had
sacrificed; but neither they nor their masters should ever say that
the people of the Vallés had submitted their necks to a yoke which the
whole nation had justly rejected.” The Spaniards are a nation upon whom
deeper impression would be made by a circumstance of this kind than by
the defeat of one of their armies; and the success with which these
peasants harassed the French, and cut off some of their artillery and
baggage, raised the spirits of the Catalans more than the battle of
Valls had depressed them.
♦BLAKE APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND.♦
Upon Reding’s death the command devolved upon the Marques de Coupigny,
till Blake was nominated as his successor, and with more extensive
powers, being appointed Commander-in-chief in Catalonia, Valencia, and
Aragon. This General, after leaving Romana, had been sent to serve
under Reding, and was in Tortosa at the time of Reding’s decease, where
Lazan, obeying without hesitation the Central Junta’s instructions,
resigned to him the charge of his division, and continued with it, to
serve under him. The Aragonese had not been disheartened by the loss
of their capital; they had regarded the former siege with a happier,
but not with a prouder feeling, for of all examples, that of dignified
suffering makes the deepest impression upon a generous and high-minded
nation. The ♦MOVEMENTS OF THE ARAGONESE.♦ lordship of Molina de
Aragon was surrounded with points which were occupied by the enemy.
Nevertheless, the people, cut off as they were from support, took
arms, trusting in themselves and the strength of their country: for
want of better weapons some of them used slings, as the Somatenes also
had done with good effect; and they made wooden artillery, so light,
that a single man could carry one of these pieces up the heights, and
yet strong enough to bear from fifteen to twenty rounds. The French
endeavoured to surprise them with a detachment of 1800 men, for the
purpose of opening the communication with Madrid, which they had cut
off; but part of this body was itself surprised in Iruecha, and put to
flight with some loss. The Molinese were about to pursue their success
against another party in Alcolea, when they learned that General
Suchet, who had now the command in Aragon, had passed the Puerto de
Daroca, and was entering the lordship on its open side, with some 4000
foot and 600 horse. In the course of two hours the cavalry would reach
Molina. The Junta gave instant orders for removing the ammunition, the
town was deserted by all its inhabitants, and the men in arms retired
with the Junta to the mountains five leagues distant. The efforts of
the French to arrest the Junta or any of its members were in vain;
the proclamations which they issued to intimidate or to delude the
people were of no effect; and after remaining five days in Molina, they
returned with no other advantage from this expedition than that of
carrying away all the flocks and herds they could find.
♦1809. MAY.
MONZON RECOVERED BY THE SPANIARDS.♦
There was no part of Spain in which the French had imagined themselves
to be so secure as in Aragon, after the fall of Zaragoza. During that
siege the army of Aragon had proved completely inefficient, and the
Catalans were too hardly pressed themselves to make any efforts in
behalf of their neighbours. In reliance upon this, some troops had
been withdrawn to march into Germany; and that larger detachment
under Mortier had been called off towards the Douro, which was to
co-operate with Marshal Soult. Advantage was taken of this when Blake’s
appointment to the command had raised the spirits of the soldiers and
of the people, ... both being alike ready to impute their ill success
to any cause except the true one, and to expect better fortune with
every new commander. Blake brought with him a good name, for though
always unfortunate, the Spaniards had never suffered any disgrace under
his guidance; and the Roman government never demeaned itself with more
generosity toward an unsuccessful general than the Central Junta. The
first effect of the impulse which his arrival communicated was on the
side of Lerida. As soon as Mortier had withdrawn from the neighbourhood
of that city, the garrison, in conformity to Blake’s instructions, was
on the alert. A French detachment occupied Barbastro and the places
near, with other points on the right of the Cinca; on the left of that
river they were in possession of Monzon; and from thence, as from a
strong hold, they tyrannized over the country, levying contributions
without mercy. The town of Albalda having refused to answer one of
these oppressive demands, a detachment of 1400 was sent to make
what was called an example of that place for its disobedience. The
governor of Lerida, D. Josef Casimiro de Lavalle, who was apprised
of this movement, stationed 700 of his garrison at Tamarite, under
Colonels Perena and Baget, with some Aragonese and Catalan Somatenes,
who succeeded in routing the enemy; the greater part retreated to
Barbastro, and in consequence of this movement and defeat, about 200
only remained in Monzon. The inhabitants rose against them, though they
had only seven muskets; knives and bludgeons supplied the place of
other weapons; they recovered the Castle, and drove the invaders out.
♦CAPTURE OF A FRENCH DETACHMENT.♦
Monzon, though in these days a place of little strength, was
nevertheless a fortress of importance in that country, and in a war
where every advantage, however trifling, raised the spirits of a people
whom no disasters, however severe, ♦MAY 16.♦ could depress. The French
therefore being determined to retake it, and punish the people, came in
considerable force, horse and foot, down the right bank of the Cinca
to Pomar, where they crossed by the ford and the ferry. Perena, who
had hastened to Monzon upon its recapture, was there to receive them
with his battalion and with a _tercio_ of Miquelets; and they were
repulsed in their attack. They obtained reinforcements, and repeated
it on the morrow, and forced their way into the streets; but Baget with
his detachment came in all speed from Fonz, and arrived opportunely
enough to assist in driving them out a second time, with considerable
loss. They called to their assistance the 2000 men that were left in
Barbastro, but meantime the Cinca had risen so as to be no longer
fordable; and while they were thus cut off from succour, the Spaniards
at Monzon were in communication with Lerida. Perceiving now their
danger, they made for Albalete, hoping to cross at Fraga by the bridge;
their intention had been foreseen, and a detachment from the garrison
of Lerida, weak as it was, was dispatched to secure that point. Thus
anticipated in that direction, and being now not more than 1000 men,
with about forty horse, they fled toward Fonz and Estadilla, to cross
the river in the mountains, above its junction with the Eseva. They
were closely pursued by Perena and Baget; their commander was drowned
in attempting the passage, eight companies were made prisoners, the
whole detachment which had crossed the Cinca was thus cut off, and the
French in consequence withdrew from Barbastro.
♦BLAKE MOVES UPON ALCAÑIZ.♦
The prisoners were marched to Tarragona, where the Catalans, after so
many reverses, were in no slight degree elated by seeing them. More
however from humanity than from a motive of ostentation, proposals for
exchanging them were immediately made to St. Cyr, and accepted by him.
The French suffered another check, less mortifying indeed and less
important, but one which impeded their movements, in the destruction
of their flying bridge upon the Ebro. This, which was large enough to
carry some hundreds at a time, they had removed from the river where
it approaches Caspe, to the part near Alborge, where it was surprised
and burnt by a detachment from Mequinenza. Blake meantime was not less
successful in his own operations. Part of his troops were stationed at
Morelia, to oppose the French division which occupied Alcañiz and its
district, and to cover that part of Catalonia and Valencia which there
borders upon Aragon: others formed a cordon along the Algas, to guard
the difficult country by which they might have threatened Tortosa, or
interrupted the communication between that place and Mequinenza. With
the approbation of the Junta Blake formed a plan for driving the enemy
from this part of the country; for which purpose it was necessary to
collect these troops, and strengthen them with a small detachment from
the garrison of Tortosa. The French division was that which Junot had
commanded at the siege of Zaragoza, and was now under General Laval;
it consisted of from 6000 to 7000 men and 500 horse, having lost
about half its number during the siege. Laval’s head-quarters were at
Alcañiz, where the greater part of the division was stationed; but he
was at this time in the field with 2000 or 3000 men, for the purpose
of driving away the Spaniards, who were observing him too closely, and
continually harassing his posts.
D. Pedro Roca was to conduct the troops from Morella to the place
appointed for their junction, Lazan those from the Algas. Both had
orders to avoid any action with the enemy till the junction should have
been effected. But it so happened that Laval took up his quarters in
the village of Beceyte on the day when Lazan had to arrive there, and
the Spanish general rightly concluded that his instructions were not
intended to prevent him from seizing any decided advantage which might
present itself. He stationed ♦MAY 16.♦ some light troops in points
that commanded the defiles through which the French must pass, and
killed or wounded about an hundred of the enemy, with the loss of only
five or six men on his own part. On the following day the junction was
effected at Monroyo, great difficulty having been overcome in bringing
the artillery through such a country. Having reached the Ermita at
Fornoles, the vanguard ♦MAY 18.♦ under D. Pedro Texada was sent forward
to interpose between Alcañiz and Val de Algorfa, which was the usual
position of the enemy’s van. Two columns, under D. Martin Gonzalez
da Menchaca and D. Joseph Cucalo, had preceded them to occupy the
villages of Castelseras and Torrecilla. The remainder of Blake’s little
army, consisting of three columns of infantry, the cavalry, and the
artillery, began their march by night along the only road from Morella
to Alcañiz, from which place they were five or six hours distant.
♦THE FRENCH WITHDRAW.♦
Upon reaching Val de Algorfa, it was seen that the enemy were protected
by the walls of the inclosures, and by a chapel, where they had formed
a parapet. They were some 500 or 600 in number, and being dislodged
from thence by the artillery, retreated toward Alcañiz; but when they
had advanced about half a league, they came upon Texada’s detachment,
and being thus between two fires, dispersed with as much alacrity as
a body of Spaniards could have done. By this time Menchaca and Cucalo
were approaching the city from the left, and the French, who were
sallying forth against Texada, seeing themselves threatened on that
side also, began to retreat hastily in the direction of Samper. There,
and at La Puebla and Hijar, they collected their troops, withdrawing
them from Caspe and Calanda. The people of Alcañiz, priests, women,
young and old, went out to meet their deliverers, carrying refreshments
for the soldiers, and blessing them with prayers and tears. Blake
himself was affected at the sight, and said, that if the tyrant of the
world, as he called Buonaparte, could have seen the emotions of that
multitude, and heard their shouts for their King, their country, and
their religion, he would perhaps have begun to doubt the possibility of
raising for his brother in Spain a party, not of persons attached to
his cause, but even of those who would be resigned to his usurpation.
♦SUCHET COMES AGAINST HIM.♦
Upon the approach of a Spanish detachment the enemy withdrew from
Samper to the Puebla de Hijar, and being there reinforced from
Zaragoza, ♦MAY 21.♦ advanced towards Alcañiz, to revenge themselves
for their late reverses. They were now 10,000 foot, with 800 horse
and twelve pieces of artillery. Suchet commanded in person. Blake
was informed of their approach, and drew up his army to meet them on
the plain of Alcañiz, before that city. The plain is surrounded with
heights. About two musket shot from the city is a range of hills,
accessible for cavalry, and on all sides sloping gently to the plain.
The road to Zaragoza crosses there. Here he stationed the main body of
his forces, their wings being supported by two batteries, which, with
others in the centre, completely flanked the whole line. The weak side
of this position was on the right, where the plain was lowest, and
there were trees enough to afford cover to the enemy; but the heights
terminated here, and upon their loftiest part, where a chapel commanded
the road from Caspe, he stationed 2000 men, under Camp-marshal D. Juan
Carlos Areizaga. The vanguard, under Texada, was placed on an eminence
in front of the position; some light troops, among the olive-yards
on the left, to prevent the French from turning them on that side;
and the cavalry, under D. Miguel Ibarrola, in front of all, upon the
Zaragoza road.
♦MAY 23. DEFEAT OF THE FRENCH BEFORE ALCAÑIZ.♦
At six in the morning the enemy appeared: the advanced parties retired
before them, and the cavalry and the vanguard fell back before superior
numbers, as they had been instructed; the infantry to the chapel on
the right, the horse, with two pieces of flying artillery, to the
protection of their batteries. The chapel, as Blake had anticipated,
was the main point of attack; the enemy presented themselves in
front of this post and on the right, and occupied all the immediate
heights. After a brisk fire on both sides, a column of about a thousand
grenadiers attempted to take this position with the bayonet: they were
broken presently, and the light troops of the Spaniards in their turn
attacked the French on the heights, who kept their ground. In the hope
of relieving this post, which he saw would be again attempted in force,
Blake directed Menchaca to make an attack upon the enemy’s centre; but
the French were strong enough to attend to this and renew their efforts
against Areizaga. The second effort, however, was not more successful
than the first. The Spanish cavalry had been ordered from the Zaragoza
to the Caspe road, to assist in supporting this point: and as they came
out from the trees, a discharge from the French infantry wounded their
commander Ibarrola; they were attacked with a superior troop of horse,
and fell back to the position. The enemy, now abandoning their first
plan of winning the chapel, turned upon Menchaca, who found himself
suddenly assailed by very superior numbers; he fell back in good order
to the position, but one light battalion found it necessary to retire
upon Areizaga’s post. Encouraged by this, the French made a desperate
attack upon the centre of the Spanish line: it was saved by the
artillery: they approached almost to the cannon’s mouth, but were mown
down by a fire of grape; and those who turned one of the batteries fell
by the fire of the troops. Defeated in this attempt also, they withdrew
to the heights on which they had first been seen, and after an action
of seven hours, both armies remained looking at each other. The rich
plain of Alcañiz was between them; and Blake said in his dispatch that
the sight of it might have warmed the heart of the coldest Spaniard,
and animated him to defend the beautiful country which God had given
him. It would have been rash in him to have attacked the enemy when
they had the advantage of the ground; to have thus decidedly repulsed
them was no inconsiderable advantage in the state of his army, some
corps of which had never before been in action. The French retreated
under cover of the night, and took up a strong position behind the
Huerba near Zaragoza. They left 500 dead on the field, and their total
loss was estimated at[22] 2000; that of the Spaniards did not amount to
400.
Among the officers whom Blake particularly commended for their conduct
Lazan was one, who was at his side during the whole day; Loigorri, the
commandant of the artillery, was also deservedly noticed, and Areizaga,
upon whom the brunt of the action had fallen; to the two latter he
frankly declared that the victory was owing. He returned thanks to his
army; and noticing that a few wretched men had fled from the field,
said their names should be struck off the roll, that the Spanish army
might no longer be disgraced by them. The Central Junta, in consequence
of this success, nominated him Captain General of Aragon, Catalonia,
Valencia, and Murcia, as well as General-in-chief of the united army
of those provinces, and conferred upon him the Encomienda of the Peso
Real in Valencia. The officers whom he recommended were promoted also,
Areizaga to the rank of Lieutenant-General.
♦ANNIVERSARY AT VALENCIA.♦
The day on which the battle of Alcañiz was fought was celebrated at
Valencia as the anniversary of their insurrection against the intrusive
government. The ceremonies were characteristic of the times and of the
people. The festivities, as usual in Catholic countries, began on the
eve of the holiday; the city was illuminated on the preceding night,
the portraits of Ferdinand and his ally the King of Great Britain were
exhibited under the flags of the allied kingdoms; and the Valencians
displayed their national humour in caricatures of Murat, Buonaparte,
and Joseph. In the morning, the civil authorities, the new-raised
levies, and the city volunteers, went in procession to the Plaza of the
Cathedral, where a statue of Ferdinand had been erected upon a Grecian
column. The statue was concealed behind a silk curtain, so disposed as
to fall in tent-hangings and disclose it, when the Captain General,
D. Joseph Caro, asked the people in their own dialect if they wished
to see their King? At the same moment the music struck up, the bells
were rung, the guns fired, and the shouts of the multitude were heard
prevailing over all. They then proceeded to the Cathedral, where the
banners of the volunteers were blessed by the Archbishop at the high
altar, and afterwards delivered to them at the feet of the statue. The
display was in French taste, but it was sanctified by Spanish feeling.
The Valencians were reminded of their defeats as well as of their
triumphs; they were told that many of their countrymen who had assisted
in driving Moncey from their gates had fallen in the field of Tudela,
or lay buried under the ruins of Zaragoza.
♦CELEBRATION OF KING ST. FERDINAND’S DAY.♦
A week after the ceremony Blake reviewed his army at Caspe, on St.
Ferdinand’s day, which of all festivals in the year the Spaniards
then regarded with most feeling. The Romanists, instead of birthdays,
keep the festival of the saint from whom they take their names; this
therefore was especially sacred to a people who, measuring the virtues
of their captive King by their own loyalty, believed him to be all that
they desired, and all that he ought to have been. They were told by
their government that King St. Ferdinand, who had united in himself all
the virtues of a man, all the talents of a hero, and all the qualities
of a monarch, looked down from the heights of Heaven with complacent
eyes upon the defenders and avengers of one who, as he inherited his
throne and name, so also did he imitate and adore his virtues. An
annual service on this day was appointed to be held in all cathedral
and collegiate churches for evermore in remembrance of the sacred
war against the usurper; and the day following was to be kept as a
perpetual anniversary for the souls of all who fell in it. Blake’s army
had now been increased to 14,000 men: their late conduct had filled him
with what might have seemed a well-founded hope; and their appearance
and discipline were now so satisfactory, that as they filed before him,
he said, a few more such days as that of Alcañiz would open for them
the way to France. There were indeed at that time evident marks that
the French were dispirited: they had been weakened by the withdrawal
of Mortier’s division; and having in this last action for the first
time been beaten by a Spanish force, ♦1809. JUNE.♦ not superior to them
in number, and when the advantage of cavalry was on their side, it was
believed that they were preparing to retire from Zaragoza. Blake was
informed that their papers and baggage were already without the city,
ready to be removed; and that they had actually begun their march
toward Navarre, but returned in consequence of receiving dispatches on
the way. The news of Buonaparte’s failure at Essling arrived at this
time; and when Blake communicated it to the troops in general orders,
he observed that it had taken place on the day when they had defeated
another of his armies at Alcañiz.
♦EXECUTIONS IN BARCELONA.♦
While the hopes of the Spaniards in this quarter had thus been raised
by their own success, by the events in Germany, and by the news from
Portugal, circumstances occurred at Barcelona to heighten their
indignation against the oppressors of their country, and exasperate
♦MAY. 16.♦ the desire of vengeance. In conformity to a scheme
concerted with the inhabitants of that city, Coupigny had sent a body
of troops, who were to be admitted in the night, while the attention
of the garrison should be called off by the cannonade of a Spanish
frigate upon one of the batteries. The ship performed its part, and
the troops approached the gates; but no movement was made to favour
them. The French had obtained sufficient intelligence to put them upon
their guard, and render it impracticable, and several persons were
in consequence arrested. One of these, by name Pou, a doctor of laws
in the university of Cervera, being asked upon his trial before the
military tribunal whether he had not distributed fifty muskets, replied
yes, and that he would do so again if he had an opportunity, as they
were for the defence of his religion, his King, and his country. They
told him this could not be, for religion forbade the shedding of blood,
the King desired no such proceedings, and the country abhorred them:
he replied, that as they neither professed the Catholic religion, nor
acknowledged Ferdinand for King of Spain, nor belonged to that country,
it was to be expected that he and they should differ in opinion. They
asked him to whom the muskets had been distributed: his answer was, to
good and loyal Spaniards, whose names he would never disclose. A young
tradesman, who was tried before the same tribunal for endeavouring to
purchase ammunition for the same purpose, threw back the appellation
of traitor upon Duhesme, saying, “Your Excellency is the traitor, who,
under the cloak of friendship, took possession of our fortresses: I
only bought part of what you plundered from us.” This person, with two
others, was hanged, at the same time that Pou and the Prefect of S.
Cayetano were strangled, the Prefect administering the last offices of
religion at the place of execution to his fellow-sufferers.
These executions occasioned a strong feeling among the Catalans, and
it was heightened by a decree of Duhesme’s against the clergy, who
were at the head, he said, of all the conspiracies for assassinating
the French, and who made their churches and convents so many places
of meeting ♦BLAKE ADVANCES TOWARD ZARAGOZA.♦ for the conspirators.
All such buildings therefore were ordered to be closed at six in the
evening, and not opened till half after five in the morning. If any
person were found in a church or belfry between those hours, or in a
convent if he did not belong to it, he was immediately to be delivered
over to a military commission as a conspirator; and a secret agent
of the police was to be appointed, who was to watch every church and
convent, and be paid at its expense. The indignation of the Spaniards
made them more eager in their hopes and expectations of deliverance;
and the Valencians more especially expressed their confidence of fresh
victories, because of the appearance and temper of the troops who
marched from their city to join the army under Blake. That general’s
head-quarters were at Samper de Calanda, part of his troops being
stationed at Hijar and Puebla de Hijar. Having received intelligence
that a French corps, which was estimated at a third part of the force
under Suchet, had been detached to Carineña, and was committing its
usual excesses in the surrounding country, he formed a plan for
cutting off this corps, and then advancing upon Zaragoza, in the hope
of effecting the deliverance of that city, an exploit which, if it
were achieved, would of all possible successes produce the greatest
impression upon the public mind, not in Spain alone, but throughout
Europe. With this view he directed Areizaga to take post with his
division at Botorrita, while he with the rest of the army proceeded to
Villanueva de la Huerva. The artillery was to move behind Longares,
where it was expected that the enemy would pass on their retreat to
Zaragoza as soon as they knew the Spaniards were in motion. When
Areizaga reached Botorrita, he learned that the greater part of the
French had retired to their main body, about 1500 only remaining at
Puebla de Muel, and these moved off so quickly towards the Xalon, that
it was not possible to cut them off, ... only a convoy which they would
have escorted to Zaragoza was taken by the Spanish advance.
♦SUCHET ATTACKS THE SPANIARDS.♦
As this corps had not fallen back upon the main body, which it might
easily have done, but had passed on toward Alagon, Blake was confirmed
in his opinion that the French did not mean to defend Zaragoza if
it should be attacked. Nevertheless, reflecting that the country in
his rear was entirely open, and considering the general situation of
the Spanish armies, the importance of preserving his own, which was
in so promising a state, and the complicated and hazardous movements
of a retreat, in which he knew how little it could be trusted, he
deemed it by no means advisable to bring on a general action, and
therefore did not alter Areizaga’s position, looking upon Botorrita
as a strong post, where, in case of any reserve, the ♦JUNE 14.♦ enemy
might be detained. When he joined Areizaga there, the troops had
begun to skirmish; this had been brought on by that general’s making
a reconnoissance in considerable strength; and Blake was so well
satisfied with the behaviour of his troops, that he endeavoured to
surround the enemy, but they retired in time. Early on the following
morning Suchet drew out his whole force from Zaragoza to attack him.
The firing began at the advanced posts by five in the morning, and went
on increasing till the same hour in the afternoon, when the French
resolved to break the Spanish line, supposing that the men were weary
and the ammunition spent.
♦BLAKE RETREATS TO BELCHITE.♦
Blake’s advanced guard was at Maria, where the road from Zaragoza to
Madrid crosses the cordillera: the ground between him and the city
consisted of hills and vales, ridge behind ridge. His cavalry was
stationed in the high road, the rest of the line was formed by the
infantry and artillery. The Spaniards, fighting and retreating in good
order, fell back successively from one of these heights to another, but
when they reached the fourth, their cavalry had been worsted. Blake
then thought it necessary to fall back on Botorrita, which he did with
as much order as the nature of the ground would permit. A few guns
were spiked and abandoned; not from necessity, but because it was
more advantageous to fire them to the last than bring them off. The
two armies were near, and in sight of each other, when night closed.
Blake ♦JUNE 16.♦ expected to be attacked the next day; but as the enemy
manifested no such intention, he rightly concluded that they were
manœuvring either with a view to surround him, or to threaten his rear.
Accordingly he ascertained that 3000 French were posted at Torrecilla.
About two hours before nightfall a brisk fire was opened upon his left,
with the intent of making him change his position, in which case his
rear would have been exposed to this detachment. But the attack was
repulsed, as was a second which the enemy made upon the centre a little
before midnight. The Spanish general then retreated to Belchite in
perfect order, which he did without being molested. The next day the
enemy came again in sight, and Blake, who had hitherto had no reason
to distrust his troops, took a position in full expectation of being
attacked on the morrow, and in good hope of repelling the enemy as
completely as he had done before Alcañiz.
♦FLIGHT OF THE SPANIARDS.♦
Belchite, once the capital of a petty Moorish sovereignty, stands upon
the slope of some bending hills, which almost surround it: toward
Zaragoza the country is level, covered with gardens and olive-yards.
The position which Blake had taken was singularly advantageous; his
right was completely safe from the enemy’s cavalry, and protected by
a chapel, with a number of outbuildings and two large sheep-folds,
which were all pierced for musketry: to attack the centre, the enemy’s
horse must be exposed to a tremendous cross fire, and the left had
their retreat upon the strong post which was occupied by the other
wing. Blake’s arrangement was so made, that if the enemy, as he
expected, should make a great effort on his left, three columns might
be brought to attack them on that side; and if unsuccessful, they could
have fallen back upon the centre and the right flank, being meantime
assailable only in front, and protected the while by their artillery,
which also had its retreat secure to the same strong ♦JUNE 18.♦ post.
He had harangued his troops, and they made a thousand protestations
that they would do their duty. The attack was made, as he had expected,
on the left; four or five shot were fired on both sides, and the French
threw a few shells, which wounded four or five men. But upon one shell
falling into the middle of a regiment, the men were seized with a
sudden panic and fled; the panic instantly spread, ... a second and a
third regiment ran away without firing a gun, and in a few minutes the
generals were left with none but a few officers in the midst of the
position. With all their efforts they could not rally more than two
hundred men, and nothing was left for them but to make for the nearest
strong place, leaving artillery, baggage, and every thing to the enemy.
The defeat was in all its circumstances so thoroughly disgraceful, ...
so disheartening and hopeless in its consequences, that Blake almost
♦BLAKE OFFERS HIS RESIGNATION, WHICH IS NOT ACCEPTED.♦ sunk under it.
He told the government that he was incapable of entering into details,
but considered it due to the nation that a judicial inquiry should be
instituted into the conduct of a general under whose command an army
of from 13,000 to 14,000 effective men had been utterly routed and
dispersed. “He knew that he had not been culpable,” he said, “but after
so many proofs of his unhappy fortune, he wished not to be employed any
longer in command. As a Spaniard and a soldier he was still ready to
serve his country in an inferior station, and he requested only that
some portion of his present pay might be continued for the support
of his family, or a part of the _Encomienda_ which had recently been
conferred upon him, but which it was not fitting that so useless a
person should retain. The government, however, neither accepted his
proffered resignation, nor instituted any inquiry. The former would
have been unjust towards a brave and honourable officer whose conduct
was unimpeachable, and his character above suspicion; the latter must
have been altogether nugatory. The panic had been instantaneous and
general, and it was impossible to punish a whole army. All that could
be done was to publish the whole details, in no degree attempting to
disguise or palliate the injury and disgrace which had been brought on
the nation: to declare that the commander-in-chief and the generals
had done their duty, and retained the full confidence of the country,
and to brand the fugitives in a body, as men who were the opprobrium of
the Spanish name, and had rendered themselves objects of execration to
their countrymen.
The men who in their panic had thus lost all use of reason, as well
as all sense of honour and of duty, were not likely, when they found
themselves in safety, and recovered their senses, to be affected
by this denunciation. A religion which is contented to accept the
slightest degree of attrition, and keeps short reckonings with
conscience, had taught them to be upon easy terms with themselves;
... moreover the moral disease was so endemic, that it had ceased to
be disgraceful: the greater part of these men had behaved well at
Alcañiz and in the subsequent operations; and no doubt expected to
be more fortunate on a better occasion, for a report was raised that
the French had received so great a reinforcement at the moment of
commencing the action as to render resistance hopeless; and though
this was indignantly contradicted by Blake, the men found an excuse
for themselves in believing it. The disgrace was deeply felt by the
government, and by the general whose hopes were blasted by it in the
blossom; but the Spaniards were in no degree disheartened, not even
those upon whom it brought immediate danger; and when the French, in
the course of a few days, attempted to carry Mequinenza by a _coup de
main_, they were beaten off with considerable loss.
♦COMMENCEMENT OF THE GUERILLAS.♦
At this time also that system of warfare began which soon extended
throughout Spain, and occasioned greater losses to the French than
they suffered in all their pitched battles. The first adventurers who
attracted notice by collecting stragglers from their own dispersed
armies, deserters from the enemy, and men who, made desperate by the
ruin of their private affairs in the general wreck, were ready for
any service in which they could at the same time gratify their just
vengeance and find subsistence, were ♦PORLIER.♦ Juan Diaz Porlier in
Asturias, and Juan Martin Diaz in Old Castille, the latter better
known ♦THE EMPECINADO.♦ by his appellation of the[23] Empecinado.
A lawyer, by name Gil, commenced the same course in the Pyrenean
valleys of Navarre and Aragon. After a short career of some two months
he disappeared, and Egoaguerra, who renewed the attempt, withdrew
from that wilder way of life to engage in Doyle’s battalion. The
third adventurer who at this time raised the spirits of the Pyrenean
provinces, and for a while gave employment to the French in Navarre,
was that D. Mariano de Renovales by whom the Convent of S. Joseph
had been so gallantly defended ♦1809. MAY.♦ at the last siege of
Zaragoza. Having been ♦RENOVALES IN THE VALLEY OF RONCAL.♦ made
prisoner when the city surrendered, he had effected his escape on the
way to France, and collected in the valleys of Roncal and Anso a body
of men and officers, who, like himself, believed that the scandalous
manner in which the terms of capitulation had been violated by the
French released them from any obligation of observing it. They had
probably agreed to rendezvous in these valleys as many of them as could
escape, and his intention was to form them into a body, and rejoin
the army. But when it was known that they were collecting there, and
that the mountaineers, confiding in their presence, refused obedience
to the intrusive government, 600 men were ordered from the garrison
of Pamplona to enter the valleys at six points, and reduce them to
subjection.
♦HE DEFEATS A FRENCH DETACHMENT.
MAY 21.♦
Men who, like Renovales and his officers, had served at Zaragoza,
were neither to be lightly surprised nor easily taken. They were upon
the alert, the mountaineers were ready for their assailants, and
of the column which advanced against the little town of Anso not a
man escaped. The four columns which entered by Navasques, Uztarroz,
Salvatierra, and Fago, effected their junction; but the movements of
the Spaniards were concerted and executed with as much precision; and
after two days’ fighting the French were driven to the foot of a high
rock called Undari, where all that survived, seventy-eight in number,
with their commander, the chef de bataillon, Puisalis, were taken
prisoners: ♦1809. JUNE.♦ the sixth column was not engaged, forty men
having deserted from it before they entered the valleys; the others
thought it imprudent to proceed, and thus they were preserved from
suffering a like fate with their companions. Puisalis, being severely
wounded, was lodged by Renovales in his own quarters, and treated with
the utmost care. The other prisoners were sent with a guard of forty
men to be delivered to General Blake, but the ruffian, Buruchuri by
name, who had charge of the escort, when he had advanced far enough to
be under no control, massacred them all; ... a crime which he appears
to have committed with impunity. Puisalis was more fortunate; as soon
as his wounds were healed, he was sent with five other prisoners to
Blake, and reaching him a little before the rout at Belchite, recovered
his liberty at that time.
♦A SECOND PARTY DEFEATED.♦
This intelligence cheered the Aragonese and the Catalans after that
most disgraceful dispersion, and both Lazan and Blake took measures
for assisting and encouraging the mountaineers. Ammunition was sent
from Lerida; Renovales himself was indefatigable in his exertions: he
collected arms from all the villages within reach, sent for armourers
from Eybar and Placencia, and set up an armoury in Roncal. A second
force was dispatched to crush the growing insurrection. The valley
of Roncal was the part which they attacked; the Spaniards were driven
♦JUNE 15.♦ from the point of Yso, where their advance was stationed;
but Renovales arrived in time with 200 men of the vale, and as many
more from that of Anso; he drove the enemy out, and pursued them as
far as Lumbier, with the loss of more than forty killed; and twice
that number of wounded were removed on the following day to Pamplona.
This second defeat had so weakened the garrison of that city, that the
Spaniards now cut off their communication both with Aragon and with
France; they scoured the roads in all directions; not a day passed in
which some party of the invaders, who hitherto had travelled in safety
in those parts, was not intercepted and cut off, and sometimes the
enemy were pursued to the very gates.
♦PROCLAMATION OF THE DUQUE DE MAHON.♦
The Duque de Mahon, one of those traitors to their country who had
sided with the Intruder, in full confidence that they were taking
the safe part, was at that time Viceroy of Navarre: and he addressed
a proclamation to the inhabitants of Roncal, affecting to believe
that they had taken no share in the insurrection; calling upon them
to unite with the French troops for the purpose of apprehending and
punishing the disturbers of the peace; and assuring them that the
present struggle was excited solely by the personal resentment of
certain individuals, whose interests were opposed to those of the
nation, of the clergy, and of the nobles. If they should be seduced
by these deceivers, the result could only be, the loss, if not of
their lives, yet certainly of their liberty, and of that happiness
which they had hitherto enjoyed. But, on the contrary, if they proved
themselves worthy of the King’s favour, by their obedience to his
government and their cordiality with the allied French troops, it was
his intention and that of the French commandant at Pamplona, General
D’Agoult, to represent their good behaviour to the throne; that when
the arms of the Emperor, now victorious at Vienna and throughout all
Italy, should expel the enemies of public order from Spain, they might
partake in the benefits which were to be expected from so wise and
humane a prince. This proclamation was answered by Renovales with
the bitterest ♦JUNE 28.♦ scorn. He addressed the viceroy as Ex-Duque
de Mahon, telling him, if he disliked that style, that the person
who used it was a Spaniard, and one who respected the orders of his
sovereign; which sovereign, acting through the Supreme Central Junta,
had proscribed him as a traitor, and therefore he had now no title.
He reproached him with ingratitude towards the house of Bourbon, with
disgracing his ancestors, with sacrificing his religion, his king,
his country, and his honour. He told him that the people of Roncal,
like those of Anso, were attached to their own institutions, and true
to their lawful king; that they had fought for him with a spirit
like that of their ancestors; that the magistracy had encouraged the
enthusiasm of the people; and that he, unworthy as he was, had enjoyed
the honour of leading them to victory. They despised his favour, and
they despised his threats; and if he would march out at the head of
a French division, and fix time and place where the question between
them might be put to the decision of the sword, he, Renovales, would
meet him there, a true Spaniard in the cause of a rightful though an
oppressed king, against a false one in the cause of a potentate whom
his followers impiously called almighty; and if the Ex-Duque would
appoint this meeting, that almightiness should be tried.
♦EXECUTIONS AND REPRISALS.♦
Five persons who were charged with having joined the insurgents of
Roncal were put to death at Pamplona upon the Intruder’s law of
extermination against all who should take arms against him. The gallows
was erected without the gate of S. Nicholas, and the sufferers were
executed with their faces toward Roncal, and left hanging there. The
proclamation which announced their punishment, declared, that for
every person, whether soldier or countryman, who should be murdered
by the banditti, a prisoner who had belonged to them should be put to
death. This was answered by an act of retaliation. Renovales seized
five persons who were acting under the intrusive government, beheaded
them, and exposed their bodies on the high road, with an inscription
on their shoulders, saying they were agents of the French robbers,
who had been thus punished by Spanish justice. He declared, that, for
every Spaniard whom the French should put to death, he would behead
two French prisoners; and that if the commandant of Jaca continued to
plunder the people and the churches, and burn the houses, as he had
begun, he would, for every house that should be burnt, set a village on
fire on the French side of the Pyrenees, instead of promoting peace and
friendly intercourse, as he had hitherto done, between the peasants on
the frontier.
♦ATTEMPTS TO WIN OVER RENOVALES.♦
General D’Agoult tried what might be done with Renovales by
conciliatory means. He thanked him for his treatment of Puisalis, and
of those prisoners whom Buruchuri had butchered; a crime of which he
entirely acquitted the Spanish officer. He applied to him now, he
said, by General Suchet’s orders; and joined his own entreaties to
that General’s offers. First he requested him to send back twenty-five
artillerymen who had been captured by his people on the road from
Tafalla, and who he understood were well treated. Renovales, he
observed, owed him this in consideration of the manner in which his
prisoners were used, though more than six and thirty officers had
broken their parole, beginning with the Camp-Marshal Villava. After
experiencing every kindness, he had found means to escape by a bribe
of 4000 livres, and was said to be now in ♦1809 AUGUST.♦ Roncal, having
thus dishonoured himself. If Renovales also had broken his word by
escaping when he was a prisoner of war, there had been something in
his conduct which justified it; and if he would now pacificate Roncal
and the valleys of Aragon, and restore order there, he would entitle
himself to esteem and to the King’s favour. “You are supporting a
chimera,” said the French commander; “your troops are routed on all
sides. You reckon upon the English. I know them better than you do;
and if you desire the good of your country, take the advice of an old
soldier, who went through the Revolution as a royalist, and joined the
present government when he saw that the only man capable of supporting
it had appeared. You are in a like position. The Bourbons exist no
longer upon the throne. The Emperor and his family have superseded
them. Let us be his faithful friends and allies, and render our country
happy, instead of contributing to its ruin.”
Renovales answered, the artillerymen were his prisoners, thought
themselves fortunate in being so, and would have entered among the
troops if he would have allowed them. Villava was not in Roncal, nor
in the district under his command; wherever he was, he would be able
to answer for his own conduct in making his escape. “If I did the
same,” said he, “on the way to Pamplona, it was because the French had
violated a solemn capitulation. I was the first person whom General
Morlot, in contempt both of his word and honour, and in breach of the
terms, plundered of horse and baggage; and if a French general may be
allowed thus to disregard so sacred a right, I know not why a Spanish
prisoner should be withheld from attempting to escape. Wonder not at
seeing me at the head of the Spaniards, since I have seen General Junot
in Zaragoza at the head of the French, after his[24] capitulation in
Portugal.” To all the offers which were held out to him, he replied,
that he was and would continue true to his legitimate King, whose
faithful subjects would freely shed their blood in his cause, and would
yet reverse the scene, and re-establish him upon his rightful throne.
“I know,” said he, “that your Excellency feels the injustice of the
cause which France is supporting; ... that you hear the voice of honour
in your heart, and that you know what is the right path.” General
Plique, commander of the citadel at Zaragoza, endeavoured also to bring
over Renovales to the Intruder’s service, representing to him that the
Austrian army was destroyed, that Russia had given the most public
proofs of its connexion with France, and that the French had obtained
a most decisive victory[25] in S. Domingo. No efforts, no combination
of events could now prevent the complete establishment of King Joseph.
The blow which had ruined Austria had destroyed all the hopes of the
Spaniards. “Insurrection,” said the Frenchman, imitating the style of
his Emperor, “insurrection passes away; madness rages and destroys, and
then becomes calm; the good alone is permanent. Secure for yourself
the glory and the delight of saving a country which ought to be dear
to you; join the cause of a good King, who desires not, by a terrible
and necessary execution, to reign over ruins and carcasses; and I am
authorized to offer you the rank in his armies which you hold among the
insurgents.”
♦TROOPS SENT FROM ZARAGOZA AGAINST THE VALLEYS.♦
The answer was such as became a man who had done his duty at Zaragoza.
“Till the moral strength of the Spaniards and of their government
were destroyed,” he said, “it was in vain to think of ruining their
armies. Neither the supposed victories upon the Danube and in S.
Domingo, nor the adhesion of the Emperor Alexander, nor the immense
forces which were said to be at Napoleon’s command, would break the
spirit of Spain or of England, actuated as those countries were by
principles of justice and high-minded rectitude.” The hope of seducing
Renovales being now no longer entertained, 5000 men were sent against
him from Zaragoza; 2000 of these, being reinforced with 500 more at
Jaca, proceeded against S. Juan de la Peña; and having, after a long
resistance, driven D. Miguel Sarasa from that post, advanced ♦AUG.
21.♦ upon the valley of Anso. Plique, with the other 3000, occupied
the positions of Salvatierra, Castella Nuevo, and Navascues: 800 from
Orbayceta and Pamplona united in the valley of Salazar, and 450 from
Lumbier at Zavalza. Their numbers enabled them to move upon more
points than the Spaniards could ♦AUG. 27.♦ guard; and having entered
Salvatierra, where the advanced parties were driven before them,
they proceeded next day in four columns, two on the right attacking
the heights of Sasi and Virgen de la Peña, the centre by the strait
called La Foz, and the left by the heights of Mayhia, which divide the
jurisdictions of Salvatierra, Navascues, and Burgui. These positions
were attacked by 3000 men, and defended only by 600; they were
maintained from six in the morning till two hours after mid-day; the
French then on the right gained the height at Sasi; and this success
would have enabled them to come upon the rear of the Spaniards at the
other point. Renovales therefore fell back to the bridge and town of
Burgui, from which he was compelled to withdraw as evening began to
close, and the enemy then entered and set fire to it. The town of Anso
was entered the same day by the first division of the French, after a
brave resistance.
♦AUG. 29. RENOVALES CAPITULATES FOR THE VALLEYS.♦
From Burgui, on the following morning, the French in three divisions
attacked the Spaniards, the right and left on the heights of Mendivelza
and Odieta, the centre upon Bochuela. At all these points they were
three times repulsed, some Russian deserters distinguishing themselves
greatly on the Spanish side. The mountaineers thought the day their
own, till, at noon, they were apprised that the French division from
Anso was coming by Garde upon their rear, and already occupied the
heights of Puyeta and Muga de Roncal. Renovales then fell back in good
order upon the town of Roncal, took up a position there, and maintained
it till evening closed. But as the ground there was open enough to give
the enemy room for manœuvring, he fell back to the strong ground about
Urzainqui, the position where he had before determined that in case
of necessity the last stand was to be made. During the night, he was
apprised that 4000 men were marching from Oloron upon those valleys,
and 800 by way of Salazar. Many of his people had dispersed; those who
remained were well nigh exhausted; ... but he was enabled to demand
terms, and capitulate for the valleys, as for a fortified town, in a
manner of which there had been no other example during the war, and to
withdraw with those who chose to follow him, for other opportunities of
serving their country; ... more fortunate their future services might
be; they could not be more honourable.
The French are said to have lost 500 killed and 800 wounded in these
latter actions, and this by their own account. Among the Spanish
officers who distinguished themselves were D. Miguel Sarasa, and D.
Gregorio Cruchaga, names soon connected with that of Mina, which now
first began to be known.
♦XAVIER MINA.♦
Xavier Mina[26], the son of a landholder who cultivated his own estate,
and was deputy for one of the valleys of Navarre, was a student at
Pamplona when the revolution began. He was then in the eighteenth year
of his age, and during the earlier part of the war had been confined
to his father’s house by a severe illness, from which he recovered
just after Renovales had been compelled to withdraw from Roncal. A
French commander, whose corps was encamped in the neighbourhood, sent
a serjeant requiring the father in his capacity as deputy to provide
rations for his[27] men. The serjeant disappeared on the road, and
in consequence the house was surrounded at midnight by a detachment
of infantry, who had orders to arrest the elder Mina, and bring
him to head quarters. The son, however, had time enough to secure
his father’s escape, and then in his name presented himself to the
officer. The French General before whom he was carried threatened him
with death, unless the serjeant were produced; but as every thing in
that quarter was to be arranged by means of money, Mina obtained his
liberty after being detained three days. The party who arrested him had
plundered his father’s house. This usage, the danger he had escaped,
and the injustice of the whole proceeding, roused into full action
those feelings which had only been suspended by disease and languor.
He provided himself with a musket and cartridge-box, and in that trim
presented himself in his own village, and offered to take the command
of as many Spaniards as would engage with him in the good work of
avenging their country upon its invaders. Twelve adventurers joined
him; they took to the near mountains, and there, while they waited an
opportunity of action, maintained themselves on his father’s sheep.
His first adventure was to surprise a party of seven artillerymen, who
were escorting two pieces of cannon and a quantity of ammunition from
Zaragoza to Pamplona. This success procured him twenty volunteers.
He sent off his prisoners to Lerida, retired again to the mountains,
and being informed that a general officer was on the road, travelling
with an escort of thirty-four foot and twelve horsemen, he laid an
ambuscade for them, in so favourable a spot, that a volley was fired
upon the French with sure effect before they had any apprehension
of danger. The general was shot in his carriage, some of the escort
were made prisoners, and some money fell into Mina’s hands. This he
immediately distributed among his men, recommending them to send part
of it to their families, and retain no more than would be necessary
to defray the expenses of their own interment, exposed as they must
now continually be to death. The men were thus raised in their own
esteem and in that of their countrymen where-ever this was told; and
volunteers now presented themselves in abundance, attracted by a
success which was reported every where, with such exaggerations as
such tales gather in their way. He received however none but those who
brought arms, or whom he could supply with the spoils already taken
from the enemy. His party amounted now to about threescore persons,
distinguished by a red riband in their hats, and a red collar to their
jackets.
He proceeded now toward the frontiers of Aragon, where a band of fifty
robbers were adding to the miseries of that afflicted country. These he
succeeded in surprising; the greater number were killed on the spot,
the rest he sent prisoners to Tarragona. Twelve horses were taken from
the party, on which he mounted some of his men, and armed them with
lances; ♦1809. SEPTEMBER.♦ and every day added now to his numbers
and his reputation. Rations were voluntarily provided for his people
wherever they were expected, and given as freely at one time, as they
were paid for at another from the spoils of the enemy. He levied a duty
on the passes, where a considerable trade in colonial produce was then
carried on; the clergy also assisted him from their funds, and with
these resources he paid and equipped his men, and kept in pay also a
sufficient number of intelligencers. It was in vain that the French
made repeated efforts to crush this enterprising enemy; if his troops
dispersed upon the appearance or the attack of a formidable detachment,
it was only to reunite, and by striking a blow in some weak point or
distant quarter, render themselves more formidable than before. General
D’Agoult was accused of secretly favouring this young adventurer, and
sending convoys under weak escort, with the intent that he should
intercept them. Perhaps this suspicion was entertained only because
♦TWO MINAS, P. 16.♦ he had been a royalist, and therefore may have
been supposed to abhor at heart the service wherein he was engaged. An
inquiry into his conduct was instituted, and before it was concluded he
put an end to his life by poison.
♦SIEGE OF GERONA COMMENCED.♦
St. Cyr meantime was informed that Marshal Augereau had been appointed
to supersede him in Catalonia, and that General Verdier, who had been
an old aide-de-camp of Augereau, had already arrived in the Ampurdan to
take the command in place of General Reille, and commence the siege
of Gerona. The rout at Belchite enabled the enemy to make all their
preliminary movements with little other molestation than what the
insufficient garrison of that city could give them; and when Verdier
encamped before the place, St. Cyr removed from Vich, and took up a
position to cover the siege.
END OF VOL. III.
LONDON:
PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.
FOOTNOTES
[1] St. Cyr (p. 50) reproaches the English for this, and says,
‘_Nous n’avions jamais espéré prendre à la vue, et sous le canon de
l’escadre, une garnison forte encore d’environ 3000 hommes. Il aurait
été possible aux Anglais, en plein jour, et sur-tout facile durant
la nuit, d’embarquer la garnison, et de la transporter, en quelques
heures, sur la rive droite de la Fluvia, en laissant seulement un
faible detachement pour remettre la forteresse; comme cela s’était
pratiqué, en Février, 1795, quand une escadre Espagnole occupait la
baie._’ But in that siege the enemy were not masters of the town, and
they had now established a battery in it to cut off the communication
between the citadel and the ships, which was done so effectually, that
five days before the surrender Captain Bennett found it impossible to
land a single messenger there. M. St. Cyr adds, that when the prisoners
defiled along the shore the English ships opened a brisk fire upon
them, and that the Spaniards would never be persuaded that this was
done in mistake. The Marshal was not upon the spot himself; if he had,
this statement would not have appeared in his Journal.
[2] The officers were so aware of their danger, that Cabañes heard
one of the staff say they should certainly have believed it was their
General’s intention to betray them to the enemy, ... if they had
not had the most entire confidence in him. It seems indeed probable
that Buonaparte, not foreseeing what the consequences of a defeat in
Catalonia would be, would have thought the disgrace or destruction of a
general whom he disliked a compensation for the loss of this army.
General Duhesme perished in the flight from Waterloo: the stain of his
blood was pointed out to me on the threshold of the inn at Genap, where
he was cut down by a Brunswicker.
[3] M. Gouvion St. Cyr, who renders justice in other respects to
General Reding, represents him as full of confidence at this time, and
dreaming of a second affair of Baylen. It is upon the most indisputable
authority, confirmed too by his own dispatches, that I have delineated
his state of mind so differently.
[4] Baron Rogniat also in his relation of the siege says, _le Maréchal
exigea que la ville se rendît à discretion_ (p. 44), and omits to say
that terms of capitulation were required and granted. Baron Rogniat
declares that one of his motives for publishing this relation, which
he was not permitted to do during the reign of Buonaparte, was to
celebrate the glory of his comrades. For a man of honour and humanity
to have been in the course of military service involuntarily engaged in
effecting such a conquest, would be the greatest of all misfortunes;
but to look back upon it with complacency, and record it as glorious,
is a crime.
[5] The veracious historian of Marshal Soult asserts that Romana had
compelled the Bishop to withdraw, knowing how much the example of his
submission would influence the Galicians; as if he thought that to
make a man sacrifice any thing to a sense of patriotism and of duty
compulsion was necessary! and as if he were utterly ignorant of the
part which that excellent Prelate sustained throughout these troubles.
See vol. i. p. 409, for the character of the man who is thus traduced.
[6] Marshal Soult’s historian represents this affair as of great
importance, because it removed the impression which their failure
in crossing the Minho had made upon the army. What is more curious,
he finds in it a justification for their invasion of Portugal! _Les
Portugais avaient fait trois lieues sur les terres d’Espagne pour
venir attaquer l’armée Française engagée avec les Espagnols, mouvement
hostile concerté avec la Romana pour faciliter sa retraite, et qui
justifiait l’entrée que nous allions faire en Portugal._--P. 106.
If any thing can be more detestable than the avowed and exultant
profligacy of these men during their season of triumph, it is the
manner in which they have afterwards attempted to gloze over actions
which public opinion (and still more the event) has made them feel are
too nefarious to be openly defended.
[7] Marshal Soult’s historian expresses himself upon this subject in a
manner altogether worthy of such a writer: “_Le Français, si passionné
pour la beauté, sacrifia ses plaisirs à l’honneur de protéger les
femmes qui réclamèrent son appui._”
I believe that no other portion of history was ever so entirely and
audaciously falsified as that of the peninsular war has been by the
French. This writer asserts that few days have been so brilliant for
the French arms as that on which Porto was taken; that they were
astonished at their own success when they saw how many obstacles they
had overcome; for that _des officiers du genie Portugais et Anglais
s’étaient occupés à reunir à l’avantage de la position, tout ce que
l’art a inventé pour la defense d’un camp_; and that these formidable
works were manned by 70,000 men determined to defend them to the last
extremity. Pp. 159–60–77.
There is another statement of this writer’s which deserves notice.
He says that the former campaign in Portugal had been distinguished
by cruelties on the part of the inhabitants (p. 56); and that in the
present “_pour_ _animer le peuple contre les Français, on avait répandu
les bruits les plus absurdes. La haine les peignait aux yeux de la
superstition et de la crédulité, comme des hérétiques qui foulaient
aux pieds tous les principes religieux, commes des barbares qui au
mépris des lois divines et humaines, dévoraient les enfans, livraient
le sexe à tous les outrages, et envoyaient les hommes dans le nord pour
renforcer leurs armées._”--(P. 119.) The charges against which this
contemptuous indignation is affected are true to the very letter, with
the exception of that of eating the children, which, be it remembered,
was never made. They did not _eat_ children; ... they only butchered
them sometimes, and sometimes (as will be shown hereafter) let them die
of hunger before their eyes.
[8] The matter is of more importance than may be immediately perceived
by a protestant. For more than three of these nails are shown as relics
in different churches; and, therefore, if only three, according to the
prevailing opinion, were used, the fourth must be spurious, and thus,
as all cannot be genuine, a doubt would be cast upon the authenticity
of each.
[9] This is the substance of a declaration upon oath by one of the
eye-witnesses.
[10] It is said that there were some articles of very great value in
the baggage, particularly some jewels of which General Lahoussaye had
possessed himself at the Escurial, and which Chalot was supposed to
have secreted.--Campaign of 1809, p. 20.
[11] _Que la perdida de la batalla nada importaba._ The French used to
say that the best General in Spain was the General _no importa_.
[12] When Clarkson wanted evidence respecting the manner in which
slaves were obtained up the rivers Calabar and Bonny, he heard, by
accident, that there was one person who could give it, but he neither
could obtain his name, nor learn the place of his abode: ... all that
was known was, that he belonged to some ship of war in ordinary. That
indefatigable and admirable man immediately set out in search of him:
he went on board every ship in ordinary at Deptford, Woolwich, Chatham,
and Sheerness, ... above an hundred and sixty vessels, ... but in vain.
He boarded above an hundred more at Portsmouth, equally in vain, and
fifty-six at Plymouth, with as little success. In the fifty-seventh he
found his man, after a labour of three weeks; obtained the knowledge
which he wanted; and established by that evidence a point of main
importance to the abolition of the slave trade.
[13] While the Americans carried over ready-built houses for sale; and
the French sent a frigate, by which the _Grand Monarque_ expressed his
condolence for what had happened, and requested to know if he could be
of any use.
[14] M. de Naylies says (p. 120), _J’ai vu compromettre le salut d’une
troupe, pour sauver le fruit des concussions et du pillage_.
[15] It is curious to observe in how many points this secret society
resembled the system of the monastic orders. The person who was
admitted to the higher grades changed his name, and was bound to keep
a journal of all his actions, that the _Censeur_ might at any time
see what his moral conduct had been in all its details. _L’homme
qui y était admis cessait d’être autre chose, au moins quant à ceux
de ses devoirs particuliers qui auraient contrarié les devoirs
de l’institution. Il sortait de la société générale pour devenir
l’instrument aveugle de la société spéciale à laquelle il s’était
dévoué, et cet engagement étendait son obligation bien au-delà de
l’obligation de la vie. On ne crut pas pouvoir isoler le Philadelphe
de ce grade par trop de moyens divers; et le seul de ces moyens que je
puisse écrire fut l’abnégation de nom. Il fallait un nouveau baptême
pour un dévouement de sang. L’influence de ces noms était si puissante,
qu’elle s’étendait visiblement sur la vie privée. Caton, Themistocles,
et Cassius sont morts par le suicide comme leurs patrons._--Hist. des
Sociétés Secrètes de l’Armée, pp. 36–8.
The author of this singular history (who is no common writer) has a
very proper note upon this part of the statement. _Il y a quelque chose
d’effrayante dans cette idée, qui jette un homme hors de toute la
société, et qui le depouille, jusqu’à un certain point, non-seulement
de son existence civile, mais encore de son propre caractère, et de
son identité morale, pour le modeler sur la vie d’un autre. Il ne me
serait pas difficile de donner des exemples très-remarquables de la
singulière influence que cette métamorphose exerçait sur l’esprit
ardent de quelques adeptes, dans lesquels on voyait s’opérer une
véritable métempsycose historique. Mais il est naturel de conclure
aussi, de ces simples aperçus, qu’une institution pareille entraînerait
quelques inconvénients dans l’état ordinaire et naturel de la société.
Tout ce que tend à isoler les citoyens de l’ordre des choses dans
lequel le hasard de leur naissance les a placés, pour les transporter
dans un ordre factice et idéal, ne saurait être évité avec trop de
soin._--Hist. des Soc. Sec. &c., p. 180.
The founder and chief of the Philadelphes was Colonel Jacques Joseph
Oudet, a native of the Jura, ... _homme de vingt-cinq ans, ivre de
jeunesse, fou de plaisir, inconsequent dans ses manières,_ _frivole
dans ses goûts, créature légère, inconstante, mobile, qui paraissait ne
devoir exciter d’autres soupçons que ceux d’un père sage ou d’un mari
defiant, et qui tenait d’une main le fil des intrigues les plus vaines,
et de l’autre celui des conjurations les plus serieuses._--(P. 33.)
The description of this person is so characteristic, that no language
except its own could do justice to it. _La nature, en le formant,
le destinait à tout ce qu’il y a de bon et de beau. Il aurait été à
son choix poète, orateur, tacticien, magistrat: l’armée entière l’a
proclamé brave; personne ne l’a égalé en éloquence; il faudrait l’âme
d’une ange pour se faire une idée de sa bonté, si on ne l’avait pas
connu. Jamais on n’a rassemblé des qualités si contrastées et cependant
si naturelles; il avait la naïveté d’un enfant, et l’aisance d’un homme
du monde; de l’abandon comme une jeune fille sensible, de la fermeté
comme un vieux Romain: de la candeur et de l’héroïsme. C’était le
plus actif, et le plus insouciant des hommes; paresseux avec délices,
infatigable dans ses entreprises, immuable dans ses resolutions;
doux et sévère, folâtre et sérieux, tendre et terrible, Alcibiade et
Marcus_.--(P. 13.) _Oudet aimait les femmes avec fureur, les aimait
toutes, les trompait toutes, et n’en abandonnait aucune de pensée, de
souvenir, d’affection. Son cœur était devenu un abime de tendresse,
où se fondaient les sentimens les plus contradictoires. Il n’y avait
pas un moment de sa vie où l’on ne pût lui tirer des larmes pour la
première femme qu’il avait trahie; pas un où il ne méditât, peut-être
malgré lui, d’en séduire une autre. Il était né Werther, et le monde
l’avait fait Lovelace._--(P. 17.)
The writer more than insinuates that Oudet, who was killed on the
night after the battle of Wagram, fell, not by the Austrians, but by a
premeditated act of Buonaparte. The fact is likely, and the fate not
an unfitting one, ... where life was the stake, and the game Catch who
can. _Ses funerailles resemblerent à celles d’Othon_, for some of his
fellow-soldiers killed themselves.
But the most extraordinary part of the book is its brave assertion that
the army never was the passive instrument of Buonaparte (which indeed
in one sense is true, for it was always an active one); that it always
detested his tyranny, and was the only body which restrained it; that
the love of liberty and of legitimate rights always was cherished in
it; and that the restoration of the Bourbons was owing to it: _Je ne
sortirai pas de cette question sans rappeler que c’est encore à l’armée
que le bienfait de la restauration est dû, puisqu’elle l’a appelée par
ses vœux, secondée par ses efforts, par le concours des supérieurs,
par le bon esprit des soldats, et quelle l’aurait opérée d’elle-même
quelques jours plus tard. Il n’y à pas un officier Français qui en
doute._--(P. 43.)
[16] He was sent to England, and there with commendable humanity
provided for by the Government; but soon venturing over to France
for the purpose of bringing back his wife and children, he was
apprehended, and shot. Nothing could be drawn from him to criminate
any of his confederates, but he affirmed that Marshal Soult was
engaged in the design; and this he had determined to do in case he
should be discovered. It cannot be doubted that the intentions of
this unfortunate officer were good; and that he was a man of good and
generous feelings was proved both by his conduct at Porto, and by the
motive which induced him to venture into his own country, under the
certainty of being put to death if he should be recognized there. And
yet he made a false accusation, and persisted in it at his death. The
best and purest intentions will not preserve a man from guilt, if
he engages in one of those secret societies where he is required to
deliver his conscience out of his own keeping.
[17] The historian of Marshal Soult’s campaigns in 1809 describes
Romana’s _land journey_ from the Asturias (p. 276) with a precision
worthy of notice ... because it shows what credit is due to such a
writer. My statement is taken from Romana’s own letters.
[18] The writer of Marshal Soult’s campaigns loses no opportunity of
displaying this temper. According to him (p. 290) Marshal Ney concealed
the fact of his defeat at S. Payo, and assured Soult that he found the
position of the enemy too strong to think of attempting it. He has so
represented this as to conceal the fact himself, his book not giving
the slightest intimation of an action that effected the deliverance of
Galicia.
[19] What he saw erected was a wooden model of what was afterwards to
be executed in marble, with this inscription:
A LA GLORIA
DEL
EX^{MO}. S^{R}. D. JUAN MOORE, GEN^{L}. DEL EX^{TO}. INGLES,
Y A LA DE SUS VALIENTES COMPATRIOTAS
LA
ESPANA AGRADECIDA.
On the other side:
BATALLA DE CORUÑA A 18 DE ENERO,
ANO 1809.
Marshal Soult also ordered the following inscription to be engraved
upon a rock near the spot where Sir John Moore fell:
HIC CECIDIT JOHANNES MOORE, DUX EXERCITUS,
IN PUGNA JANUARII XVI. 1809,
CONTRA GALLOS A DUCE DALMATIÆ DUCTOS.
[20] M. St. Cyr (p. 118) represents Reding as seeking this action by
General Doyle’s advice; but it is certain that his intention was not
to risk one. The French Commander renders justice to this brave and
unfortunate General in all respects, except that he always imputes
to him a presumptuous confidence, which Reding never felt. The
constitution of his mind disposed him to the very opposite error. This
is not asserted speculatively, but upon his own statements and other
equally incontestable documents. M. St. Cyr says that Reding escaped in
the ensuing action from the hands of a young officer only because that
officer had the generosity not to kill him, as he might easily have
done, when a pistol shot put an end to his own life. The condition in
which Reding escaped does not seem to show that there was much desire
of sparing him.
[21] It is said by M. St. Cyr that they acted by Reding’s advice, and
that by so advising them he saved the city from inevitable destruction.
But this does not accord with Reding’s own language, for in a part of
his dispatch to the Central Junta which was not published, he mentions
this conduct of the Cabildo with indignation.
[22] Marshal St. Cyr speaks of this as _un petit événement heureux_.
(165.) Comparatively small as the numbers were on either side, and
uninfluential as it was upon the issue of the war, it was a well-fought
battle, in which the French, under one of their ablest generals, were
fairly defeated.
[23] Various explanations have been offered of this name. One account
says, that upon finding his family murdered by the French, he smeared
his face with pitch, and made a vow of vengeance. Another, that he was
so called because of his swarthy complexion. But in the account of his
life it is said that all the inhabitants of Castrillo de Duero, where
he was born, have this nickname indiscriminately given them by their
neighbours, in consequence of a black mud, called _pecina_, deposited
by a little stream which runs through the place; and the appellation
became peculiar to him from his celebrity.
[24] Renovales evidently did not know the terms of that capitulation.
[25] There could be no intention of deceiving Renovales, nor was a
victory in S. Domingo likely to have any effect in determining his
conduct. But this mention of one may show how little the French
officers knew of public events; nothing in fact but what their own
government chose to let them know, ... and that government gave them
always as much falsehood as truth.
[26] This account of Xavier Mina differs materially from that which
has been published under the title of The Two Minas and the Spanish
Guerillas, as extracted from the work of a German officer, Captain
H. Von Brandt. The German officer, who collected his information
in the country, acknowledges that the accounts given upon the spot
differ essentially from each other. My statement was derived from Mina
himself during his short abode in England. Certainly I have never
seen any person whom, from his countenance and manners, I should deem
less likely to be given to such company and such courses as in that
publication are imputed to him.
[27] They were to be a pound and a half of bread, ten ounces of meat,
and a bottle of wine per day for every man.
Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant
preference was found in this book. Simple typographical errors were
corrected and some unbalanced quotation marks were remedied. Other
errors of these types were not changed because the corrections were not
obvious to the Transcriber.
Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained; occurrences
of inconsistent hyphenation have been changed only when there was a
predominant preference throughout the book.
The source book used many Sidenotes, printed in italics. Most match
entries in the Table of Contents, but some are either dates or
citations. To preserve proximity with the original text, if they were
printed mid-paragraph, that is where they appear here. Depending on
the format in which you are reading this eBook, Sidenotes may be
distinguished from regular text by being shown in some combination
of italics, boldface, UPPER-CASE, enclosed in ♦DIAMOND SYMBOLS♦,
being offset into the left-margin, or in a rectangular area within
the regular text. Due to limitations of some eReaders, some sidenotes
may appear next to or below each other, depending on the width of the
screen.
The original Table of Contents used “ib.” when the page number was the
same as the one in the previous entry. This eBook uses the actual page
numbers.
Pages 118 and 509: Missing closing quotation mark.
All six volumes of this work are available at no cost at Project
Gutenberg. Some of these volumes reference each other, but some of the
references do not seem to match the text.
Volume I: LibraryBlog eBook number 60386
Volume II: LibraryBlog eBook number 60387
Volume III: LibraryBlog eBook number 60388
Volume IV: LibraryBlog eBook number 60389
Volume V: LibraryBlog eBook number 60390
Volume VI: LibraryBlog eBook number 60391
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