History of Greece, Volume 12 (of 12)

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Title: History of Greece, Volume 12 (of 12)
Author: Grote, George
Language: English
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*** Start of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "History of Greece, Volume 12 (of 12)" ***

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

* Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_.
* Small caps are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS.
* Letter spaced Greek text is enclosed in tildes as in ~καὶ τὰ λοιπά~.
* Footnotes have been renumbered. Each footnote is placed at the end
of the paragraph that includes its anchor.
* Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after
comparison with a later edition of this work. Greek text has also
been corrected after checking with this later edition and with
Perseus, when the reference was found.
* Original spelling, have been kept, but variant spellings were made
consistent when a predominant usage was found.
* Nevetherless, no attempt has been made at normalizing proper names
(i.e. Agrianes and Agriânes, Onchestus and Onchêstus, Megalêpolis
and Megalê-Polis, Mantinea and Mantineia, Crête and Krête,
Phenicians and Phœnicians, etc.). The author established at the
beginning of the first volume of this work some rules of
transcription for proper names, but neither he nor his publisher
follow them consistently.
* In the Table of Contents, some page numbers have been emended so
that they refer to the actual pages where chapters begin and end.

HISTORY OF GREECE.

GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.

VOL. XII.

REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION.

NEW YORK:
HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
329 AND 331 PEARL STREET.
1875.

[Illustration: AFRICAN TERRITORY OF CARTHAGE.]

[Illustration: PLAN to illustrate the BATTLE OF ISSUS.]

CONTENTS.

VOL. XII.

CHAPTER XCI.

FIRST PERIOD OF THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT — SIEGE AND
CAPTURE OF THEBES.

State of Greece at Alexander’s accession — dependence on the
Macedonian kings. — Unwilling subjection of the Greeks —
influence of Grecian intelligence on Macedonia. — Basis of
Alexander’s character — not Hellenic. — Boyhood and Education
of Alexander. — He receives instruction from Aristotle. — Early
political action and maturity of Alexander — his quarrels
with his father. Family discord. — Uncertainty of Alexander’s
position during the last year of Philip. — Impression produced
by the sudden death of Philip. — Accession of Alexander — his
energy and judgment. — Accomplices of Pausanias are slain by
Alexander — Amyntas and others are slain by him also. — Sentiment
at Athens on the death of Philip — language of Demosthenes
— inclination to resist Macedonia, yet without overt act. —
Discontent in Greece — but no positive movement. — March of
Alexander into Greece — submission of Athens. — Alexander is
chosen Imperator of the Greeks in the convention at Corinth —
continued refusal of concurrence by Sparta. — Conditions of the
vote thus passed — privileges granted to the cities. — Authority
claimed by Alexander under the convention — degradation of the
leading Grecian states. — Encroachments and tyranny of the
Macedonian officers in Greece — complaints of the orators at
Athens. — Violations of the convention at sea by Macedonian
officers. — Language of the complaining Athenians — they insist
only on strict observance of the convention. Boldness of their
language. — Encouragements held out by Persia to the Greeks.
— Correspondence of Demosthenes with Persia — justifiable and
politic. — March of Alexander into Thrace. He forces his way
over Mount Hæmus. — His victory over the Triballi. — He crosses
the Danube, defeats the Getæ, and returns back. — Embassy of
Gauls to Alexander. His self-conceit. — Victories of Alexander
over Kleitus and the Illyrians. — The Thebans declare their
independence against Macedonia. — They are encouraged by
Alexander’s long absence in Thrace, and by reports of his death.
— The Theban exiles from Athens get possession of Thebes. —
They besiege the Macedonians in the Kadmeia, and entreat aid
from other Greeks. Favorable sympathies shown towards them,
but no positive aid. — Chances of Thebes and liberation, not
unfavorable. — Rapid march and unexpected arrival of Alexander
with his army before Thebes. His good fortune as to the time of
hearing the news. — Siege of Thebes. Proclamation of Alexander.
Determination of the Thebans to resist. — Capture of Thebes by
assault. Massacre of the population. — Thebes is razed; the
Theban captives sold as slaves; the territory distributed among
the neighboring cities. — The Kadmeia is occupied as a Macedonian
Military post. Retribution upon the Thebans from Orchomenus and
Platæa. — Sentiments of Alexander, at the time and afterwards,
respecting the destruction of Thebes. — Extreme terror spread
throughout Greece. Sympathy of the Athenians towards the
Theban exiles. — Alexander demands the surrender of the chief
anti-Macedonian leaders at Athens. Memorable debate at Athens.
The demand refused. — Embassy of the Athenians to Alexander. He
is persuaded to acquiesce in the refusal, and to be satisfied
with the banishment of Charidemus and Ephialtes. — Influence
of Phokion in obtaining these milder terms — his increased
ascendency at Athens. — Alexander at Corinth — obedience of
the Grecian synod — interview with the philosopher Diogenes. —
Reconstitution of Orchomenus and Platæa. Return of Alexander to
Pella. — Military operations of Parmenio in Asia Minor against
Memnon.
1-49

CHAPTER XCII.

ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER.

During Alexander’s reign, the history of Greece is nearly a
blank. To what extent the Asiatic projects of Alexander belonged
to Grecian history. — Pan-hellenic pretences set up by Alexander.
The real feeling of the Greeks was adverse to his success. —
Analogy of Alexander’s relation to the Greeks — with those
of the Emperor Napoleon to the Confederation of the Rhine. —
Greece an appendage, but a valuable appendage, to Macedonia. —
Extraordinary military endowments and capacity of Alexander.
— Changes in Grecian warfare, antecedent and contributory to
the military organization of Macedonia. — Macedonian military
condition before Philip. Good and firm cavalry: poor infantry.
— Philip re-arms and reorganizes the infantry. Long Macedonian
pike or sarissa. — Macedonian phalanx — how armed and arrayed.
— It was originally destined to contend against the Grecian
hoplites as organized by Epaminondas. — Regiments and divisions
of the phalanx — heavy-armed infantry. — Light infantry of
the line — Hypaspistæ, or Guards. — Light troops generally —
mostly foreigners. — Macedonian cavalry — its excellence — how
regimented. — The select Macedonian Body-guards. The Royal Pages.
— Foreign auxiliaries — Grecian hoplites — Thessalian cavalry —
Pæonians — Illyrians — Thracians, etc. — Magazines, war-office,
and depôt, at Pella. — Macedonian aptitudes — purely military
— military pride stood to them in lieu of national sentiment.
— Measures of Alexander previous to his departure for Asia.
Antipater left as viceroy at Pella. — March of Alexander to
the Hellespont. Passage across to Asia. — Visit of Alexander
to Ilium. — Analogy of Alexander to the Greek heroes. — Review
and total of the Macedonian army in Asia. — Chief Macedonian
officers. — Greeks in Alexander’s service — Eumenes of Kardia.
— Persian forces — Mentor and Memnon the Rhodians. — Succession
of the Persian crown — Ochus — Darius Codomannus. — Preparations
of Darius for defence. — Operations of Memnon before Alexander’s
arrival. — Superiority of the Persians at sea: their imprudence
in letting Alexander cross the Hellespont unopposed. — Persian
force assembled in Phrygia, under Arsites and others. — Advice of
Memnon, to avoid fighting on land, and to employ the fleet for
aggressive warfare in Macedonia and Greece. — Arsites rejects
Memnon’s advice, and determines to fight. — The Persians take
post on the river Granikus. — Alexander reaches the Granikus, and
resolves to force the passage at once, in spite of the dissuasion
of Permenio. — Disposition of the two armies. — Battle of the
Granikus. — Cavalry battle. — Personal danger of Alexander. His
life saved by Kleitus. Complete victory of Alexander. Destruction
of the Grecian infantry on the side of the Persians. — Loss
of the Persians — numbers of their leading men slain. — Small
loss of the Macedonians. — Alexander’s kindness to his wounded
soldiers, and severe treatment of the Grecian prisoners. —
Unskilfulness of the Persian leaders. Immense impression produced
by Alexander’s victory. — Terror and submission of the Asiatics
to Alexander. Surrender of the strong fortress of Sardis. — He
marches from Sardis to the coast. Capture of Ephesus. — He finds
the first resistance at Miletus. — Near approach of the Persian
fleet. Memnon is made commander-in-chief of the Persians. — The
Macedonian fleet occupies the harbor of Miletus, and keeps out
the Persians. Alexander declines naval combat. His debate with
Parmenio. — Alexander besieges Miletus. Capture of the city. —
The Persian fleet retires to Halikarnassus. Alexander disbands
his own fleet. — March of Alexander to Halikarnassus. Ada
queen of Karia joins him. Strong garrison, and good defensive
preparation, at Halikarnassus. — Siege of Halikarnassus. Bravery
of the garrison, under Ephialtes the Athenian. — Desperate sally
of Ephialtes — at first successful, but repulsed — he himself is
slain. — Memnon is forced to abandon Halikarnassus, and withdraw
the garrison by sea, retaining only the citadel. Alexander enters
Halikarnassus. — Winter campaign of Alexander along the southern
coast of Asia Minor. — Alexander concludes his winter campaign at
Gordium. Capture of Kelænæ. — Appendix on the Macedonian Sarissa.
49-104

CHAPTER XCIII.

SECOND AND THIRD ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER — BATTLE OF ISSUS
— SIEGE OF TYRE.

Alexander cuts the Gordian knot. — He refuses the liberation of
the Athenian prisoners. — Progress of Memnon and the Persian
fleet — they acquire Chios and a large part of Lesbos — they
besiege Mitylene. Death of Memnon. Capture of Mitylene. — Hopes
excited in Greece by the Persian fleet, but ruined by the death
of Memnon. — Memnon’s death an irreparable mischief to Darius. —
Change in Darius’s plan caused by this event. He resolves to take
the offensive on land. His immense land-force. — Free speech and
sound judgment of Charidemus. He is put to death by Darius. —
Darius abandoned Memnon’s plans, just at the time when he had the
best defensive position for executing them with effect. — Darius
recalls the Grecian mercenaries from the fleet. — Criticism
of Arrian on Darius’s plan. — March of Alexander from Gordium
through Paphlagonia and Kappadokia. — He arrives at the line of
Mount Taurus — difficulties of the pass. — Conduct of Arsames,
the Persian satrap. Alexander passes Mount Taurus without the
least resistance. He enters Tarsus. — Dangerous illness of
Alexander. His confidence in the physician Philippus, who cures
him. — Operations of Alexander in Kilikia. — March of Alexander
out of Kilikia, through Issus, to Myriandrus. — March of Darius
from the interior to the eastern side of Mount Amanus. Immense
numbers of his army: great wealth and ostentation in it: the
treasure and baggage sent to Damascus. — Position of Darius on
the plain eastward of Mount Amanus. He throws open the mountain
passes, to let Alexander come through and fight a pitched battle.
— Impatience of Darius at the delay of Alexander in Kilikia.
He crosses Mount Amanus to attack Alexander in the defiles of
Kilikia. — He arrives in Alexander’s rear, and captures Issus.
— Return of Alexander from Myriandrus: his address to his army.
— Position of the Macedonian army south of the river Pinarus.
— Position of the Persian army north of the Pinarus. — Battle
of Issus. — Alarm and immediate flight of Darius — defeat of
the Persians. — Vigorous and destructive pursuit by Alexander —
capture of the mother and wife of Darius. — Courteous treatment
of the regal female prisoners by Alexander. — Complete dispersion
of the Persian army — Darius recrosses the Euphrates — escape
of some Perso-Grecian mercenaries. — Prodigious effect produced
by the victory of Issus. — Effects produced in Greece by the
battle of Issus. Anti-Macedonian projects crushed. — Capture
of Damascus by the Macedonians, with the Persian treasure and
prisoners. Capture and treatment of the Athenian Iphikrates.
Altered relative position of Greeks and Macedonians. — Alexander
in Phenicia. Aradus, Byblus, and Sidon open their gates to him.
— Letter of Darius soliciting peace and the restitution of the
regal captives. Haughty reply of Alexander. — Importance of
the voluntary surrender of the Phenician towns to Alexander.
— Alexander appears before Tyre — readiness of the Tyrians to
surrender, yet not without a point reserved — he determines
to besiege the city. — Exorbitant dispositions and conduct
of Alexander. — He prepares to besiege Tyre — situation of
the place. — Chances of the Tyrians — their resolution not
unreasonable. — Alexander constructs a mole across the strait
between Tyre and the mainland. The project is defeated. —
Surrender of the princes of Cyprus to Alexander — He gets hold
of the main Phenician and Cyprian fleet. — He appears before
Tyre with a numerous fleet, and blocks up the place by sea. —
Capture of Tyre by storm — desperate resistance by the citizens.
— Surviving males, 2000 in number, hanged by order of Alexander
— The remaining captives sold. — Duration of the siege for seven
months. Sacrifice of Alexander to Herakles. — Second letter from
Darius to Alexander, who requires unconditional submission. — The
Macedonian fleet overpowers the Persian and becomes master of
the Ægean with the islands. — March of Alexander towards Egypt
— siege of Gaza. — His first assaults fail — he is wounded — he
erects an immense mound round the town. — Gaza is taken by storm,
after a siege of two months. — The garrison are all slain, except
the governor Batis, who becomes prisoner, severely wounded. —
Wrath of Alexander against Batis, whom he causes to be tied to a
chariot, and dragged round the town. — Alexander enters Egypt,
and occupies it without resistance — He determines on founding
Alexandria. — His visit to the temple and oracle of Ammon. The
oracle proclaims him to be the son of Zeus. — Arrangements made
by Alexander at Memphis. — Grecian prisoners brought from the
Ægean. — He proceeds to Phenicia — message from Athens. Splendid
festivals. Reinforcements sent to Antipater. — He marches to
the Euphrates — crosses it without opposition at Thapsakus. —
March across from the Euphrates to the Tigris. Alexander fords
the Tigris above Nineveh, without resistance. — Eclipse of the
moon. Alexander approaches near the army of Darius in position. —
Inaction of Darius since the defeat at Issus. — Paralyzing effect
upon him produced by the captivity of his mother and wife. — Good
treatment of the captive females by Alexander — necessary to keep
up their value as hostages. — Immense army collected by Darius,
in the plains eastward of the Tigris — near Arbela. — He fixes
the spot for encamping and awaiting the attack of Alexander — in
a level plain near Gaugamela. — His equipment and preparation —
better arms — numerous scythed chariots — elephants. — Position
and battle array of Darius. — Preliminary movements of Alexander
— discussions with Parmenio and other officers. His careful
reconnoitring in person. — Dispositions of Alexander for the
attack — array of the troops. — Battle of Arbela. — Cowardice of
Darius — he sets the example of flight — defeat of the Persians.
— Combat on the Persian right between Mazæus and Parmenio.
Flight of the Persian host — energetic pursuit by Alexander. —
Escape of Darius. Capture of the Persian camp, and of Arbela.
— Loss in the battle. Completeness of the victory. Entire and
irreparable dispersion of the Persian army. — Causes of the
defeat — cowardice of Darius. Uselessness of his immense numbers.
— Generalship of Alexander. — Surrender of Babylon and Susa, the
two great capitals of Persia. Alexander enters Babylon. Immense
treasures acquired in both places. — Alexander acts as king of
Persia, and nominates satraps. He marches to Susa. He remodels
the divisions of his army. — Alexander marches into Persis
proper — he conquers the refractory Uxii, in the intermediate
mountains. — Difficult pass called the Susian Gates, on the way
to Persepolis. Ariobarzanes the satrap repulses Alexander, who
finds means to turn the pass, and conquer it. — Alexander enters
Persepolis. Mutilated Grecian captives. — Immense wealth, and
national monuments of every sort, accumulated in Persepolis. —
Alexander appropriates and carries away the regal treasures,
and then gives up Persepolis to be plundered and burnt by the
soldiers. — Alexander rests his troops, and employs himself in
conquering the rest of Persis. — Darius a fugitive in Media.
104-178

CHAPTER XCIV.

MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CONQUESTS OF ALEXANDER, AFTER HIS WINTER
QUARTERS IN PERSIS, DOWN TO HIS DEATH AT BABYLON.

The first four Asiatic campaigns of Alexander — their direct
bearing and importance in reference to Grecian history. — His
last seven years, farther eastward, had no similar bearing upon
Greece. — Darius at Ekbatana — seeks escape towards Baktria,
when he hears of Alexander approaching. — Alexander enters
Ekbatana — establishes there his depôt and base of operations.
— Alexander sends home the Thessalian cavalry — necessity for
him now to pursue a more desultory warfare. — Alexander pursues
Darius to the Caspian Gates, but fails in overtaking him. —
Conspiracy formed against Darius by Bessus and others, who seize
his person. — Prodigious efforts of Alexander to overtake and get
possession of Darius. He surprises the Persian corps, but Bessus
puts Darius to death. — Disappointment of Alexander when he
missed taking Darius alive. Regal funeral bestowed upon Darius.
His fate and conduct. — Repose of Alexander and his army at
Hekatompylus in Parthia. Commencing alteration in his demeanor.
He becomes Asiatized and despotic. — Gradual aggravation of
these new habits, from the present moment. — Alexander conquers
the mountains immediately south of the Caspian. He requires the
Greek mercenaries to surrender at discretion. Envoys from Sparta
and other Greek cities brought to him — how treated. — March of
Alexander farther Eastward — his successes in Asia and Drangiana.
— Proceedings against Philotas, son of Parmenio, in Drangiana.
Military greatness and consideration of the family. — Revelation
of an intended conspiracy made by Kebalinus to Philotas, for
the purpose of being communicated to Alexander. Philotas does
not mention it to Alexander. It is communicated to the latter
through another channel. — Alexander is at first angry with
Philotas, but accepts his explanation, and professes to pass
over the fact. — Ancient grudge against Philotas — advantage
taken of the incident to ruin him. — Kraterus and others are
jealous of Parmenio and Philotas. Alexander is persuaded to put
them both to death. — Arrest of Philotas. Alexander accuses him
before the assembled soldiers. He is condemned. — Philotas is
put to the torture, and forced to confess, both against himself
and Parmenio. — Parmenio is slain at Ekbatana, by order and
contrivance of Alexander. Mutiny of the soldiers when they learn
the assassination of Parmenio — appeased by the production of
Alexander’s order. — Fear and disgust produced by the killing
of Parmenio and Philotas. — Conquest of the Paropamisadæ, etc.
Foundation of Alexandria _ad Caucasum_. — Alexander crosses the
Hindoo-Koosh, and conquers Baktria. Bessus is made prisoner.
— Massacre of the Branchidæ and their families, perpetrated
by Alexander in Sogdiana. — Alexander at Marakanda and on the
Jaxartes. — Foundation of Alexandria _ad Jaxartem_. Limit of
march northward. — Alexander at Zariaspa in Baktria — he causes
Bessus to be mutilated and slain. — Farther subjugation of
Baktria and Sogdiana. Halt at Marakanda. — Banquet at Marakanda.
— Character and position of Kleitus. — Boasts of Alexander and
his flatterers — repugnance of Macedonian officers felt but
not expressed. — Scene at the banquet — vehement remonstrance
of Kleitus. — Furious wrath of Alexander — he murders Kleitus.
— Intense remorse of Alexander, immediately after the deed. —
Active and successful operations of Alexander in Sogdiana. —
Capture of two inexpugnable positions — the Sogdian rock — the
rock of Choriênes. Passion of Alexander for Roxana. — Alexander
at Baktra — marriage with Roxana. His demand for prostration
or worship from all. — Public harangue of Anaxarchus during a
banquet, exhorting every one to render this worship. — Public
reply of Kallisthenes, opposing it. Character and history of
Kallisthenes. — The reply of Kallisthenes is favorably heard by
the guests — the proposition for worship is dropped. — Coldness
and disfavor of Alexander towards Kallisthenes. — Honorable
frankness and courage of Kallisthenes. — Kallisthenes becomes
odious to Alexander. — Conspiracy of the royal pages against
Alexander’s life — it is divulged — they are put to torture, but
implicate no one else; they are put to death. — Kallisthenes is
arrested as an accomplice — antipathy manifested by Alexander
against him and against Aristotle also. — Kallisthenes is
tortured and hanged. — Alexander reduces the country between the
Hindoo-Koosh and the Indus. — Conquest of tribes on the right
bank of the Indus — the rock of Aornos. — Alexander crosses the
Indus — forces the passage of the Hydaspes, defeating Porus —
generous treatment of Porus. — His farther conquests in the
Punjab. Sangala the last of them. — He reaches the Hyphasis
(Sutledge), the farthest of the rivers of the Punjab. His army
refuses to march farther. — Alexander returns to the Hydaspes.
— He constructs a fleet and sails down the Hydaspes and the
Indus. Dangerous wound of Alexander in attacking the Malli. —
New cities and posts to be established on the Indus — Alexander
reaches the ocean — effect of the first sight of tides. — March
of Alexander by land westward through the desert of Gedrosia —
sufferings and losses in the army. — Alexander and the army come
back to Persis. — Conduct of Alexander at Persepolis. Punishment
of the satrap Orsines. — He marches to Susa — junction with
the fleet under Nearchus, after it had sailed round from the
mouth of the Indus. — Alexander at Susa as Great King. Subjects
of uneasiness to him — the satraps — the Macedonian soldiers.
— Past conduct of the satraps — several of them are punished
by Alexander — alarm among them all — flight of Harpalus. —
Discontents of the Macedonian soldiers with the Asiatizing
intermarriages promoted by Alexander. — Their discontent with
the new Asiatic soldiers levied and disciplined by Alexander. —
Interest of Alexander in the fleet, which sails up the Tigris to
Opis. — Notice of partial discharge to the Macedonian soldiers
— they mutiny — wrath of Alexander — he disbands them all. —
Remorse and humiliation of the soldiers — Alexander is appeased
— reconciliation. — Partial disbanding — body of veterans
placed under command of Kraterus to return — New projects of
conquests contemplated by Alexander — measures for enlarging
his fleet. — Visit to Ekbatana — death of Hephæstion — violent
sorrow of Alexander. — Alexander exterminates the Kossæi. —
March of Alexander to Babylon. Numerous embassies which met him
on the way. — Alexander at Babylon — his great preparations
for the circumnavigation and conquest of Arabia. — Alexander
on shipboard, on the Euphrates and in the marshes adjoining.
His plans for improving the navigation and flow of the river.
— Large reinforcements arrive, Grecian and Asiatic. New array
ordered by Alexander, for Macedonians and Persians in the same
files and companies. — Splendid funeral obsequies of Hephæstion.
— General feasting and intemperance in the army. Alexander is
seized with a dangerous fever. Details of his illness. — No hope
of his life. Consternation and grief in the army. Last interview
with his soldiers. His death — Effect produced on the imagination
of contemporaries by the career and death of Alexander. — Had
Alexander lived, he must have achieved things greater still. —
Question raised by Livy, about the chances of Alexander if he
had attacked the Romans. — Unrivalled excellence as a military
man. — Alexander as a ruler, apart from military affairs — not
deserving of esteem. — Alexander would have continued the system
of the Persian empire, with no other improvement except that of
a strong organization. — Absence of nationality in Alexander —
purpose of fusing the different varieties of mankind into one
common type of subjection. — Mistake of supposing Alexander to
be the intentional diffuser of Greek civilization. His ideas
compared with those of Aristotle. — Number of new cities founded
in Asia by Alexander. — It was not Alexander, but the Diadochi
after him, who chiefly hellenized Asia. — How far Asia was ever
really hellenized — the great fact was, that the Greek language
became universally diffused. — Greco-Asiatic cities. — Increase
of the means of communication between various parts of the world.
— Interest of Alexander in science and literature — not great.
178-274

CHAPTER XCV.

GRECIAN AFFAIRS FROM THE LANDING OF ALEXANDER IN ASIA TO THE
CLOSE OF THE LAMIAN WAR.

State of the Grecian world when Alexander crossed the Hellespont.
— Grecian spirit might have been called into action if the
Persians had played their game well. — Hopes raised in Greece,
first by the Persian fleet in the Ægean, next by the two great
Persian armies on land. — Public acts and policy at Athens —
decidedly pacific. — Phokion and Demades were leading ministers
at Athens — they were of macedonizing politics. — Demosthenes
and Lykurgus, though not in the ascendent politically, are
nevertheless still public men of importance. Financial activity
of Lykurgus. — Position of Demosthenes — his prudent conduct
— Anti-Macedonian movement from Sparta — King Agis visits the
Persian admirals in the Ægean. His attempts both in Krete and
in the Peloponnesus. — Agis levies an army in Peloponnesus,
and makes open declaration against Antipater. — Agis, at first
partially successful, is completely defeated by Antipater, and
slain. — Complete submission of all Greece to Antipater — Spartan
envoys sent up to Alexander in Asia. — Untoward result of the
defensive efforts of Greece — want of combination. — Position
of parties at Athens during the struggle of Agis — reaction of
the macedonizing party after his defeat. — Judicial contest
between Æschines and Demosthenes. Preliminary circumstances as
to the proposition of Ktesiphon, and the indictment by Æschines.
— Accusatory harangue of Æschines, nominally against the
proposition of Ktesiphon, really against the political life of
Demosthenes. — Appreciation of Æschines, on independent evidence,
as an accuser of Demosthenes. — Reply of Demosthenes — oration De
Coronâ. — Funeral oration of extinct Grecian freedom. — Verdict
of the Dikasts — triumph of Demosthenes — exile of Æschines. —
Causes of the exile of Æschines — he was the means of procuring
coronation for Demosthenes. — Subsequent accusation against
Demosthenes, in the affair of Harpalus. — Flight of Harpalus
to Athens — his previous conduct and relations with Athens. —
False reports conveyed to Alexander, that the Athenians had
identified themselves with Harpalus. — Circumstances attending
the arrival of Harpalus at Sunium — debate in the Athenian
assembly — promises held out by Harpalus — the Athenians
seem at first favorably disposed towards him. — Phokion and
Demosthenes both agree in dissuading the Athenians from taking
up Harpalus. — Demand by Antipater for the surrender of Harpalus
— the Athenians refuse to comply, but they arrest Harpalus and
sequestrate his treasure for Alexander. — Demosthenes moves the
decree for arrest of Harpalus, who is arrested, but escapes. —
Conduct of Demosthenes in regard to the treasure of Harpalus —
deficiency of the sum counted and realized, as compared with
the sum announced by Harpalus. — Suspicions about this money —
Demosthenes moves that the Areopagus shall investigate the matter
— the Areopagites bring in a report against Demosthenes himself,
with Demades and others, as guilty of corrupt appropriation.
Demosthenes is tried on this charge, condemned, and goes into
exile. — Was Demosthenes guilty of such corrupt appropriation?
Circumstances as known in the case. — Demosthenes could not have
received the money from Harpalus, since he opposed him from first
to last. — Had Demosthenes the means of embezzling, after the
money had passed out of the control of Harpalus? Answer in the
negative. Accusatory speech of Deinarchus — virulent invective
destitute of facts. — Change of mind respecting Demosthenes,
in the Athenean public, in a few months. — Probable reality of
the case, respecting the money of Harpalus, and the sentence of
the Areopagus. — Rescript of Alexander to the Grecian cities,
directing that the exiles should be recalled in each. — Purpose
of the rescript — to provide partisans for Alexander in each of
the cities. Discontents in Greece. — Effect produced in Greece,
by the death of Alexander. The Athenians declare themselves
champions of the liberation of Greece, in spite of Phokion’s
opposition. — The Ætolians and many other Greeks join the
confederacy for liberation — activity of the Athenian Leosthenes
as General. — Athenian envoys sent round to invite co-operation
from the various Greeks. — Assistance lent to the Athenian envoys
by Demosthenes, though in exile. — He is recalled to Athens, and
receives an enthusiastic welcome. — Large Grecian confederacy
against Antipater — nevertheless without Sparta. Bœotia strongly
in the Macedonian interest. Leosthenes with the confederate
army marches into Thessaly. — Battle in Thessaly — victory of
Leosthenes over Antipater, who is compelled to throw himself
into Lamia, and await succors from Asia — Leosthenes forms the
blockade of Lamia: he is slain. — Misfortune of the death of
Leosthenes. Antiphilus is named in his place. Relaxed efforts
of the Grecian army. — Leonnatus, with a Macedonian army from
Asia, arrives in Thessaly. His defeat and death. — Antipater
escapes from Lamia, and takes the command. — War carried on by
sea between the Macedonian and Athenian fleets. — Reluctance
of the Greek contingents to remain on long-continued service.
The army in Thessaly is thinned by many returning home. —
Expected arrival of Kraterus to reinforce Antipater. Relations
between the Macedonian officers. — State of the regal family,
and of the Macedonian generals and soldiery, after the death of
Alexander. — Philip Aridæus is proclaimed king: the satrapies
are distributed among the principal officers. — Perdikkas the
chief representative of central authority, assisted by Eumenes
of Kardia. — List of projects entertained by Alexander at the
time of his death. The generals dismiss them as too vast. —
Plans of Leonnatus and Kleopatra. — Kraterus joins Antipater in
Macedonia with a powerful army. Battle of Krannon in Thessaly.
Antipater gains a victory over the Greeks though not a complete
one. — Antiphilus tries to open negotiations with Antipater, who
refuses to treat except with each city singly. Discouragement
among the Greeks. Each city treats separately. Antipater grants
favorable terms to all, except Athenians and Ætolians. Antipater
and his army in Bœotia — Athens left alone and unable to resist.
Demosthenes and the other anti-Macedonian orators take flight.
Embassy of Phokion, Xenokrates, and others to Antipater. — Severe
terms imposed upon Athens by Antipater. — Disfranchisement and
deportation of the 12,000 poorest Athenian citizens. — Hardship
suffered by the deported poor of Athens — Macedonian garrison
placed in Munychia. — Demosthenes, Hyperides, and others, are
condemned to death in their absence. Antipater sends officers
to track and seize the Grecian exiles. He puts Hyperides to
death. — Demosthenes in sanctuary at Kalauria — Archias with
Thracian soldiers comes to seize him — he takes poison, and
dies. — Miserable condition of Greece — life and character of
Demosthenes. — Dishonorable position of Phokion at Athens under
the Macedonian occupation.
275-331

CHAPTER XCVI.

FROM THE LAMIAN WAR TO THE CLOSE OF THE HISTORY OF FREE HELLAS
AND HELLENISM.

Antipater purges and remodels the Peloponnesian cities. He
attacks the Ætolians, with a view of departing them across to
Asia. His presence becomes necessary in Asia: he concludes a
pacification with the Ætolians. — Plans of Perdikkas — intrigues
with the princesses at Pella. — Antigonus detects the intrigues,
and reveals them to Antipater and Kraterus. — Unpropitious turn
of fortune for the Greeks, in reference to the Lamian war. —
Antipater and Kraterus in Asia — Perdikkas marches to attack
Ptolemy in Egypt, but is killed by a mutiny of his own troops.
Union of Antipater, Ptolemy, Antigonus, etc. New distribution of
the satrapies, made at Triparadeisus. — War between Antigonus and
Eumenes in Asia. Energy and ability of Eumenes. He is worsted
and blocked up in Nora. — Sickness and death of Antipater. The
Athenian orator Demades is put to death in Macedonia — Antipater
sets aside his son Kassander, and names Polysperchon viceroy.
Discontent and opposition of Kassander. — Kassander sets up
for himself, gets possession of Munychia, and forms alliance
with Ptolemy and Antigonus against Polysperchon. Plans of
Polysperchon — alliance with Olympias in Europe, and with Eumenes
in Asia — enfranchisement of the Grecian cities. — Ineffectual
attempts of Eumenes to uphold the imperial dynasty in Asia: his
gallantry and ability: he is betrayed by his own soldiers, and
slain by Antigonus. — Edict issued by Polysperchon at Pella, in
the name of the imperial dynasty — subverting the Antipatrian
oligarchies in the Grecian cities, restoring political exiles,
and granting free constitutions to each. — Letters and measures
of Polysperchon to enforce the edict. State of Athens: exiles
returning: complicated political parties: danger of Phokion.
— Negotiations of the Athenians with Nikanor, governor of
Munychia for Kassander. — Nikanor seizes Peiræus by surprise.
Phokion, though forewarned, takes no precautions against it.
— Mischief to the Athenians, as well as to Polysperchon, from
Nikanor’s occupation of Peiræus; culpable negligence, and
probable collusion, of Phokion. — Arrival of Alexander (son of
Polysperchon): his treacherous policy to the Athenians; Kassander
reaches Peiræus. — Intrigues of Phokion with Alexander — he tries
to secure for himself the protection of Alexander against the
Athenians. — Return of the deported exiles to Athens — public
vote passed in the Athenian assembly against Phokion and his
colleagues. Phokion leaves the city, is protected by Alexander,
and goes to meet Polysperchon, in Phokis. — Agnonides and others
are sent as deputies to Polysperchon, to accuse Phokion and to
claim the benefit of the regal edict. — Agnonides and Phokion
are heard before Polysperchon — Phokion and his colleagues are
delivered up as prisoners to the Athenians. Phokion is conveyed
as prisoner to Athens, and brought for trial before the assembly.
Motion of his friends for exclusion of non-qualified persons.
— Intense exasperation of the returned exiles against Phokion
— grounds for that feeling. — Phokion is condemned to death —
vindictive manifestation against him in the assembly, furious
and unanimous. — Death of Phokion and his four colleagues. —
Alteration of the sentiment of the Athenians towards Phokion, not
long afterwards. Honors shown to his memory. — Explanation of
this alteration. Kassander gets possession of Athens and restores
the oligarchical or Phokionic party. — Life and character of
Phokion. — War between Polysperchon and Kassander, in Attica
and Peloponnesus. Polysperchon is repulsed in the siege of
Megalopolis, and also defeated at sea. — Increased strength of
Kassander in Greece — he gets possession of Athens. — Restoration
of the oligarchical government at Athens, though in a mitigated
form, under the Phalerean Demetrius. — Administration of the
Phalerean Demetrius at Athens, in a moderate spirit. Census taken
of the Athenian population — Kassander in Peloponnesus — many
cities join him — the Spartans surround their city with walls.
— Feud in the Macedonian imperial family — Olympias puts to
death Philip Aridæus and Eurydikê — she reigns in Macedonia: her
bloody revenge against the partisans of Antipater. — Kassander
passes into Macedonia — defeats Olympias, and becomes master
of the country — Olympias is besieged in Pydna, captured, and
put to death. — Great power of Antigonus in Asia. Confederacy
of Kassander, Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleukus against him. —
Kassander founds Kassandreia, and restores Thebes. — Measures of
Antigonus against Kassander — he promises freedom to the Grecian
cities — Ptolemy promises the like. Great power of Kassander in
Greece. — Forces of Antigonus in Greece. Considerable success
against Kassander. — Pacification between the belligerents.
Grecian autonomy guaranteed in name by all. Kassander puts
to death Roxana and her child. — Polysperchon espouses the
pretensions of Herakles, son of Alexander, against Kassander.
He enters into compact with Kassander, assassinates the young
prince, and is recognized as ruler of Southern Greece. —
Assassination of Kleopatra, last surviving relative of Alexander
the Great, by Antigonus. — Ptolemy of Egypt in Greece — after
some successes, he concludes a truce with Kassander. Passiveness
of the Grecian cities. — Sudden arrival of Demetrius Poliorketes
in Peiræus. The Athenians declare in his favor. Demetrius
Phalereus retires to Egypt. Capture of Munychia and Megara. —
Demetrius Poliorketes enters Athens in triumph. He promises
restoration of the democracy. Extravagant votes of flattery
passed by the Athenians towards him. Two new Athenian tribes
created. — Alteration of tone and sentiment in Athens, during
the last thirty years. — Contrast of Athens as proclaimed free
by Demetrius Poliorketes, with Athens after the expulsion of
Hippias. — Opposition made by Demochares, nephew of Demosthenes,
to these obsequious public flatteries. — Demetrius Phalereus
condemned in his absence. Honorable commemoration of the deceased
orator Lykurgus. Restrictive law passed against the philosophers
— they all leave Athens. The law is repealed next year, and
the philosophers return to Athens. — Exploits of Demetrius
Poliorketes. His long siege of Rhodes. Gallant and successful
resistance of the citizens. — His prolonged war, and ultimate
success in Greece, against Kassander. — Return of Demetrius
Poliorketes to Athens — his triumphant reception — memorable
Ithyphallic hymn addressed to him. — Helpless condition of
the Athenians — proclaimed by themselves. — Idolatry shown to
Demetrius at Athens. He is initiate in the Eleusinian mysteries,
out of the regular season. — March of Demetrius into Thessaly —
he passes into Asia and joins Antigonus — great battle of Ipsus,
in which the four confederates completely defeat Antigonus, who
is slain and his Asiatic power broken up and partitioned. —
Restoration of the Kassandrian dominion in Greece. Lachares makes
himself despot at Athens, under Kassander. Demetrius Poliorketes
returns, and expels Lachares. He garrisons Peiræus and Munychia.
— Death of Kassander. Bloody feuds among his family. — Demetrius
acquires the crown of Macedonia. — Antigonus Gonatas (son of
Demetrius) master of Macedonia and Greece. Permanent rule of
the Antigonid dynasty in Macedonia, until the conquest of that
country by the Romans. — Spirit of the Greeks broken — isolation
of the cities from each other by Antigonus. — The Greece of
Polybius cannot form a subject of history by itself, but only as
an appendage to foreign neighbors. — Evidence of the political
nullity of Athens — public decree in honor of Demochares — what
acts are recorded as his titles to public gratitude.
331-393

CHAPTER XCVII.

SICILIAN AND ITALIAN GREEKS — AGATHOKLES.

Constitution established by Timoleon at Syracuse — afterwards
exchanged for an oligarchy. — Italian Greeks — pressed upon
by enemies from the interior — Archidamus king of Sparta
slain in Italy. — Growth of the Molossian kingdom of Epirus,
through Macedonian aid — Alexander the Molossian king brother
of Olympias. — The Molossian Alexander crosses into Italy to
assist the Tarentines. His exploits and death. — Assistance
sent by the Syracusans to Kroton — first rise of Agathokles. —
Agathokles distinguishes himself in the Syracusan expedition —
he is disappointed of honors — becomes discontented and leaves
Syracuse. — He levies a mercenary force — his exploits as
general in Italy and Sicily. — Change of government at Syracuse
— Agathokles is recalled — his exploits against the exiles —
his dangerous character at home. — Farther internal changes at
Syracuse — recall of the exiles — Agathokles readmitted — swears
amnesty and fidelity. — Agathokles, in collusion with Hamilkar,
arms his partisans at Syracuse, and perpetuates a sanguinary
massacre of the citizens. — Agathokles is constituted sole
despot of Syracuse. — His popular manners, military energy,
and conquests. Progress of Agathokles in conquering Sicily.
The Agrigentines take alarm and organize a defensive alliance
against him. — They invite the Spartan Akrotatus to command
— his bad conduct and failure. — Sicily the only place in
which a glorious Hellenic career was open. Peace concluded by
Agathokles with the Agrigentines — his great power in Sicily.
— He is repulsed from Agrigentum — the Carthaginians send an
armament to Sicily against him. — Position of the Carthaginians
between Gela and Agrigentum — their army reinforced from home.
— Operations of Agathokles against them — his massacre of
citizens at Gela. — Battle of the Himera, between Agathokles
and the Carthaginians. — Total defeat of Agathokles by the
Carthaginians. — The Carthaginians recover a large part of
Sicily from Agathokles. His depressed condition at Syracuse. —
He conceives the plan of attacking the Carthaginians in Africa.
— His energy and sagacity in organizing this expedition. His
renewed massacre and spoliation. — He gets out of the harbor, in
spite of the blockading fleet. Eclipse of the sun. He reaches
Africa safely. — He burns his vessels — impressive ceremony
for affecting this, under vow to Demeter. — Agathokles marches
into the Carthaginian territory — captures Tunês — richness and
cultivation of the country. — Consternation at Carthage — the
city force marches out against him — Hanno and Bomilkar named
generals. — Inferior numbers of Agathokles — his artifices to
encourage the soldiers. — Treachery of the Carthaginian general
Bomilkar — victory of Agathokles. — Conquests of Agathokles among
the Carthaginian dependencies on the eastern coast — Religious
terror and distress of the Carthaginians. Human sacrifice. —
Operations of Agathokles on the eastern coast of Carthage —
capture of Neapolis, Adrumetum, Thapsus, etc. — Agathokles
fortifies Aspis — undertakes operations against the interior
country — defeats the Carthaginians again. — Proceedings of
Hamilkar before Syracuse — the city is near surrendering — he
is disappointed, and marches away from it. — Renewed attack of
Hamilkar upon Syracuse — he tries to surprise Euryalus, but is
totally defeated, made prisoner, and slain. — The Agrigentines
stand forward as champions of Sicilian freedom against Agathokles
and the Carthaginians. — Mutiny in the army of Agathokles at
Tunês — his great danger, and address in extricating himself.
— Carthaginian army sent to act in the interior — attacked by
Agathokles with some success — his camp is pillaged by the
Numidians. — Agathokles invites the aid of Ophellas from Kyrênê.
— Antecedent circumstances of Kyrênê. Division of coast between
Kyrênê and Carthage. — Thimbron with the Harpalian mercenaries is
invited over to Kyrênê by exiles. His checkered career, on the
whole victorious, in Libya. — The Kyrenæans solicit aid from the
Egyptian Ptolemy, who sends Ophellas thither. Defeat and death of
Thimbron. Kyrenaica annexed to the dominions of Ptolemy, under
Ophellas as viceroy. — Position and hopes of Ophellas. He accepts
the invitation of Agathokles. He collects colonists from Athens
and other Grecian cities. — March of Ophellas, with his army,
and his colonists, from Kyrênê to the Carthaginian territory
— sufferings endured in the march. — Perfidy of Agathokles —
he kills Ophellas — gets possession of his army — ruin and
dispersion of the colonists. — Terrible sedition at Carthage —
Bomilkar tries to seize the supreme power — he is overthrown and
slain. — Farther successes of Agathokles in Africa — he captures
Utica, Hippo-Zarytus, and Hippagreta. — Agathokles goes to
Sicily, leaving Archagathus to command in Africa. Successes of
Archagathus in the interior country. — Redoubled efforts of the
Carthaginians — they gain two great victories over Archagathus.
— Danger of Archagathus — he is blocked up by the Carthaginians
at Tunis. — Agathokles in Sicily. His career at first prosperous.
Defeat of the Agrigentines. — Activity of Agathokles in Sicily
— Deinokrates in great force against him. — Agrigentine army
under Xenodokus — opposed to the mercenaries of Agathokles —
superiority of the latter. — Defeat of Xenodokus by Leptines
— Agathokles passes over into Africa — bad state of his army
there — he is defeated by the Carthaginians. — Nocturnal panic
and disorder in both camps. — Desperate condition of Agathokles
— he deserts his army and escapes to Sicily. — The deserted
army kill the two sons of Agathokles, and capitulate with the
Carthaginians. — African expedition of Agathokles — boldness of
the first conception — imprudently pushed and persisted in. —
Proceedings of Agathokles in Sicily — his barbarities at Egesta
and Syracuse. — Great mercenary force under Deinokrates in
Sicily — Agathokles solicits peace from him, and is refused —
he concludes peace with Carthage. — Battle of Torgium — victory
of Agathokles over Deinokrates. — Accommodation and compact
between Agathokles and Deinokrates. — Operations of Agathokles in
Liparæ, Italy, and Korkyra — Kleonymus of Sparta. — Last projects
of Agathokles — mutiny of his grandson Archagathus — sickness,
poisoning, and death of Agathokles. — Splendid genius of action
and resource — nefarious dispositions — of Agathokles. — Hellenic
agency in Sicily continues during the life of Agathokles, but
becomes then subordinate to preponderant foreigners.
393-452

CHAPTER XCVIII.

OUTLYING HELLENIC CITIES. — 1. IN GAUL AND SPAIN. — 2. ON THE
COAST OF THE EUXINE.

Massalia—its situation and circumstances.—Colonies planted by
Massalia—Antipolis, Nikæa, Rhoda, Emporiæ—peculiar circumstances
of Emporiæ.—Oligarchical government of Massalia—prudent
political administration.—Hellenizing influence of Massalia
in the West—Pytheas, the navigator and geographer.—Pontic
Greeks—Pentapolis on the south-west coast.—Sinôpê—its envoys
present with Darius in his last days—maintains its independence
for some time against the Mithridatic princes—but become
subject to them ultimately—The Pontic Herakleia—oligarchical
government—the native Mariandyni reduced to serfs.—Political
discord at Herakleia—banishment of Klearchus—partial democracy
established.—Continued political troubles at Herakleia—assistance
invoked from without.—Character and circumstances of Klearchus—he
makes himself despot of Herakleia—his tyranny and cruelty.—He
continues despot for twelve years—he is assassinated at a
festival.—Satyrus becomes despot—his aggravated cruelty—his
military vigor.—Despotism of Timotheus, just and mild—his energy
and ability.—Despotism of Dionysius—his popular and vigorous
government—his prudent dealing with the Macedonians, during the
absence of Alexander in the East.—Return of Alexander to Susa—he
is solicited by the Herakleotic exiles—anger of Dionysius,
averted by the death of Alexander.—Prosperity and prudence of
Dionysius—he marries Amastris—his favor with Antigonus—his
death.—Amastris governs Herakleia—marries Lysimachus—is divorced
from him—Klearchus and Oxathres kill Amastris—are killed by
Lysimachus.—Arsinoê mistress of Herakleia. Defeat and death
of Lysimachus. Power of Seleukus.—Herakleia emancipated from
the despots, and a popular government established—recall of
the exiles—bold bearing of the citizens towards Seleukus—death
of Seleukus.—Situation and management of Herakleia as a free
government—considerable naval power.—Prudent administration of
Herakleia, as a free city, among the powerful princes of Asia
Minor—general condition and influence of the Greek cities on the
coast.—Grecian Pentapolis on the south-west of the Euxine—Ovid
at Tomi.—Olbia—in the days of Herodotus and Ephorus—increased
numbers, and multiplied inroads of the barbaric hordes.—Olbia in
later days—decline of security and production.—Olbia pillaged and
abandoned—afterwards renewed.—Visit of Dion the Rhetor—Hellenic
tastes and manners—ardent interest in Homer.—Bosporus or
Pantikapæum.—Princes of Bosporus—relations between Athens and
Bosporus.—Nymphæum among the tributary cities under the Athenian
empire—how it passed under the Bosporanic princes.—Alliance and
reciprocal good offices between the Bosporanic princes Satyrus,
Leukon, etc. and the Athenians. Immunities of trade granted to
the Athenians.—Political condition of the Greeks of Bosporus—the
princes called themselves archons—their empire over barbaric
tribes.—Family feuds among the Bosporanic princes—war between
Satyrus and Eumelus—death of Satyrus II.—Civil war between
Prytanis and Eumelus—victory of Eumelus—he kills the wives,
children, and friends, of his brother.—His victorious reign and
conquests—his speedy death.—Decline of the Bosporanic dynasty,
until it passed into the hands of Mithridates Eupator.—Monuments
left by the Spartokid princes of Bosporus—sepulchral tumuli near
Kertch (Pantikapæum).—Appendix on the Localities near Issus.
453-495

INDEX 497

[Illustration: MAP SHEWING THE MARCHES OF ALEXANDER.]

HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER XCI.

FIRST PERIOD OF THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT — SIEGE AND CAPTURE
OF THEBES.

My last preceding volume ended with the assassination of Philip of
Macedon, and the accession of his son Alexander the Great, then
twenty years of age.

It demonstrates the altered complexion of Grecian history, that we
are now obliged to seek for marking events in the succession to
the Macedonian crown, or in the ordinances of Macedonian kings. In
fact, the Hellenic world has ceased to be autonomous. In Sicily,
indeed, the free and constitutional march, revived by Timoleon,
is still destined to continue for a few years longer; but all the
Grecian cities south of Mount Olympus have descended into dependents
of Macedonia. Such dependence, established as a fact by the battle
of Chæroneia and by the subsequent victorious march of Philip over
Peloponnesus, was acknowledged in form by the vote of the Grecian
synod at Corinth. While even the Athenians had been compelled to
concur in submission, Sparta alone, braving all consequences,
continued inflexible in her refusal. The adherence of Thebes was not
trusted to the word of the Thebans, but ensured by the Macedonian
garrison established in her citadel, called the Kadmeia. Each
Hellenic city, small and great,—maritime, inland, and insular—(with
the single exception of Sparta), was thus enrolled as a separate unit
in the list of subject-allies attached to the imperial headship of
Philip.

Under these circumstances, the history of conquered Greece loses its
separate course, and becomes merged in that of conquering Macedonia.
Nevertheless, there are particular reasons which constrain the
historian of Greece to carry on the two together for a few years
longer. First, conquered Greece exercised a powerful action on her
conqueror—“Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit”. The Macedonians,
though speaking a language of their own, had neither language for
communicating with others, nor literature, nor philosophy, except
Grecian and derived from Greeks. Philip, while causing himself to be
chosen chief of Hellas, was himself not only partially hellenized,
but an eager candidate for Hellenic admiration. He demanded the
headship under the declared pretence of satisfying the old antipathy
against Persia. Next, the conquests of Alexander, though essentially
Macedonian, operated indirectly as the initiatory step of a series
of events, diffusing Hellenic language (with some tinge of Hellenic
literature) over a large breadth of Asia,—opening that territory to
the better observation, in some degree even to the superintendence,
of intelligent Greeks—and thus producing consequences important in
many ways to the history of mankind. Lastly, the generation of free
Greeks upon whom the battle of Chæroneia fell, were not disposed
to lie quiet if any opportunity occurred for shaking off their
Macedonian masters. The present volume will record the unavailing
efforts made for this purpose, in which Demosthenes and most of the
other leaders perished.

Alexander (born in July 356 B. C.), like his father Philip,
was not a Greek, but a Macedonian and Epirot, partially imbued with
Grecian sentiment and intelligence. It is true that his ancestors,
some centuries before, had been emigrants from Argos; but the kings
of Macedonia had long lost all trace of any such peculiarity as might
originally have distinguished them from their subjects. The basis of
Philip’s character was Macedonian, not Greek: it was the self-will of
a barbarian prince, not the _ingenium civile_, or sense of reciprocal
obligation and right in society with others, which marked more or
less even the most powerful members of a Grecian city, whether
oligarchical or democratical. If this was true of Philip, it was
still more true of Alexander, who inherited the violent temperament
and headstrong will of his furious Epirotic mother Olympias.

A kinsman of Olympias, named Leonidas, and an Akarnanian named
Lysimachus, are mentioned as the chief tutors to whom Alexander’s
childhood was entrusted.[1] Of course the Iliad of Homer was among
the first things which he learnt as a boy. Throughout most of his
life, he retained a passionate interest in this poem, a copy of
which, said to have been corrected by Aristotle, he carried with him
in his military campaigns. We are not told, nor is it probable, that
he felt any similar attachment for the less warlike Odyssey. Even as
a child, he learnt to identify himself in sympathy with Achilles,—his
ancestor by the mother’s side, according to the Æakid pedigree. The
tutor Lysimachus won his heart by calling himself Phœnix—Alexander,
Achilles—and Philip, by the name of Peleus. Of Alexander’s boyish
poetical recitations, one anecdote remains, both curious and of
unquestionable authenticity. He was ten years old, when the Athenian
legation, including both Æschines and Demosthenes, came to Pella to
treat about peace. While Philip entertained them at table, in his
usual agreeable and convivial manner, the boy Alexander recited for
their amusement certain passages of poetry which he had learnt—and
delivered, in response with another boy, a dialogue out of one of the
Grecian dramas.[2]

[1] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 5, 6.

[2] Æschines cont. Timarch. p. 167.

At the age of thirteen, Alexander was placed under the instruction of
Aristotle, whom Philip expressly invited for the purpose, and whose
father Nikomachus had been both friend and physician of Philip’s
father Amyntas. What course of study Alexander was made to go
through, we unfortunately cannot state. He enjoyed the teaching of
Aristotle for at least three years, and we are told that he devoted
himself to it with ardor, contracting a strong attachment to his
preceptor. His powers of addressing an audience, though not so well
attested as those of his father, were always found sufficient for his
purpose: moreover, he retained, even in the midst of his fatiguing
Asiatic campaigns, an interest in Greek literature and poetry.

At what precise moment, during the lifetime of his father, Alexander
first took part in active service, we do not know. It is said that
once, when quite a youth, he received some Persian envoys during the
absence of his father; and that he surprised them by the maturity of
his demeanor, as well as by the political bearing and pertinence of
his questions.[3] Though only sixteen years of age, in 340 B.
C., he was left at home as regent while Philip was engaged in
the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus. He put down a revolt of the
neighboring Thracian tribe called Mædi, took one of their towns, and
founded it anew under the title of Alexandria; the earliest town
which bore that name, afterwards applied to so many other towns
planted by him. In the march of Philip into Greece (338 B.
C.), Alexander took part, commanded one of the wings at the
battle of Chæroneia, and is said to have first gained the advantage
on his side over the Theban sacred band.[4]

[3] Plutarch, Alex. 5.

[4] Plutarch, Alex. 9. Justin says that Alexander was the
companion of his father during part of the war in Thrace (ix. 1).

Yet notwithstanding such marks of confidence and coöperation, other
incidents occurred producing bitter animosity between the father and
the son. By his wife Olympias, Philip had as offspring Alexander
and Kleopatra: by a Thessalian mistress named Philinna, he had a
son named Aridæus (afterwards called Philip Aridæus:) he had also
daughters named Kynna (or Kynanê) and Thessalonikê. Olympias, a
woman of sanguinary and implacable disposition, had rendered herself
so odious to him, that he repudiated her, and married a new wife
named Kleopatra. I have recounted in the preceding volume[5] the
indignation felt by Alexander at this proceeding, and the violent
altercation which occurred during the conviviality of the marriage
banquet; where Philip actually snatched his sword, threatened his
son’s life, and was only prevented from executing the threat by
falling down through intoxication. After this quarrel, Alexander
retired from Macedonia, conducting his mother to her brother
Alexander king of Epirus. A son was born to Philip by Kleopatra.
Her brother or uncle Attalus acquired high favor. Her kinsmen and
partisans generally were also promoted, while Ptolemy, Nearchus, and
other persons attached to Alexander, were banished.[6]

[5] Vol. XI. Ch. xc. p. 513.

[6] Plutarch, Alex. 10. Arrian, iii. 6, 8.

The prospects of Alexander were thus full of uncertainty and peril,
up to the very day of Philip’s assassination. The succession to the
Macedonian crown, though transmitted in the same family, was by no
means assured as to individual members; moreover, in the regal house
of Macedonia[7] (as among the kings called Diadochi, who acquired
dominion after the death of Alexander the Great), violent feuds and
standing mistrust between father, sons, and brethren, were ordinary
phænomena, to which the family of the Antigonids formed an honorable
exception. Between Alexander and Olympias on the one side, and
Kleopatra with her son and Attalus on the other, a murderous contest
was sure to arise. Kleopatra was at this time in the ascendent;
Olympias was violent and mischievous; and Philip was only forty-seven
years of age. Hence the future threatened nothing but aggravated
dissension and difficulties for Alexander. Moreover his strong
will and imperious temper, eminently suitable for supreme command,
disqualified him from playing a subordinate part, even to his own
father. The prudence of Philip, when about to depart on his Asiatic
expedition, induced him to attempt to heal these family dissensions
by giving his daughter Kleopatra in marriage to her uncle Alexander
of Epirus, brother of Olympias. It was during the splendid marriage
festival, then celebrated at Ægæ, that he was assassinated—Olympias,
Kleopatra, and Alexander, being all present, while Attalus was in
Asia, commanding the Macedonian division sent forward in advance,
jointly with Parmenio. Had Philip escaped this catastrophe, he
would doubtless have carried on the war in Asia Minor with quite as
much energy and skill as it was afterwards prosecuted by Alexander:
though we may doubt whether the father would have stretched out to
those ulterior undertakings which, gigantic and far-reaching as
they were, fell short of the insatiable ambition of the son. But
successful as Philip might have been in Asia, he would hardly have
escaped gloomy family feuds; with Alexander as a mutinous son, under
the instigations of Olympias,—and with Kleopatra on the other side,
feeling that her own safety depended upon the removal of regal or
quasi-regal competitors.

[7] See the third chapter of Plutarch’s life of Demetrius
Poliorkêtês; which presents a vivid description of the feelings
prevalent between members of regal families in those ages.
Demetrius, coming home from the chase with his hunting javelins
in his hand, goes up to his father Antigonus, salutes him, and
sits down by his side without disarming. This is extolled as an
unparalleled proof of the confidence and affection subsisting
between the father and the son. In the families of all the other
Diadochi (says Plutarch) murders of sons, mothers, and wives,
were frequent—murders of brothers were even common, assumed to be
precautions necessary for security. Οὕτως ἄρα πάντη δυσκωνοίνητον
ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ μεστὸν ἀπιστίας καὶ δυσνοίας, ὥστε ἀγάλλεσθαι τὸν
μέγιστον τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου διαδόχων καὶ πρεσβύτατον, ὅτι μὴ φοβεῖται
τὸν υἱὸν, ἀλλὰ προσίεται τὴν λόγχην ἔχοντα τοῦ σώματος πλήσιον.
Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ μόνος, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ~ὁ οἶκος οὗτος~ ἐπὶ πλείστας
διαδοχὰς τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν ἐκαθάρευσε, μᾶλλον δὲ ~εἷς μόνος~ τῶν
ἀπ᾽ Ἀντιγόνου Φίλιππος ἀνεῖλεν υἱόν. ~Αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι σχεδὸν ἁπᾶσαι~
διαδοχαὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἔχουσι παίδων, πολλῶν δὲ μητέρων φόνους καὶ
γυναικῶν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδελφοὺς ἀναιρεῖν, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι τὰ
αἰτήματα λαμβάνουσιν, οὕτω ~συνεχωρεῖτο κοινόν τι νομιζόμενον
αἴτημα καὶ βασιλικὸν~ ὑπὲρ ἀσφαλείας.

Compare Tacitus, Histor. v. 8, about the family feuds of the
kings of Judæa; and Xenoph. Hieron. iii. 8.

In noticing the Antigonid family as a favorable exception, we
must confine our assertion to the first century of that family.
The bloody tragedy of Perseus and Demetrius shortly preceded the
ruin of the empire.

From such formidable perils, visible in the distance, if not
immediately impending, the sword of Pausanias guaranteed both
Alexander and the Macedonian kingdom. But at the moment when the blow
was struck, and when the Lynkestian Alexander, one of those privy
to it, ran to forestall resistance and place the crown on the head
of Alexander the Great[8]—no one knew what to expect from the young
prince thus suddenly exalted at the age of twenty years. The sudden
death of Philip in the fulness of glory and ambitious hopes, must
have produced the strongest impression, first upon the festive crowd
assembled,—next throughout Macedonia,—lastly, upon the foreigners
whom he had reduced to dependence, from the Danube to the borders
of Pæonia. All these dependencies were held only by the fear of
Macedonian force. It remained to be proved whether the youthful son
of Philip was capable of putting down opposition and upholding the
powerful organization created by his father. Moreover Perdikkas,
the elder brother and predecessor of Philip, had left a son named
Amyntas, now at least twenty-four years of age, to whom many looked
as the proper successor.[9]

[8] Arrian, i. 25, 2; Justin, xi. 2. See Vol. XI. p. 517.

[9] Arrian, De Rebus post Alexandrum, Fragm. ap. Photium, cod.
92. p. 220; Plutarch, De Fortunâ Alex. Magn. p. 327. πᾶσα δὲ
ὕπουλος ἦν ἡ Μακεδονία (after the death of Philip) πρὸς Ἀμύνταν
ἀποβλέπουσα καὶ τοὺς Ἀερόπου παῖδας.

But Alexander, present and proclaimed at once by his friends, showed
himself both in word and deed, perfectly competent to the emergency.
He mustered, caressed, and conciliated, the divisions of the
Macedonian army and the chief officers. His addresses were judicious
and energetic, engaging that the dignity of the kingdom should be
maintained unimpaired,[10] and that even the Asiatic projects already
proclaimed should be prosecuted with as much vigor as if Philip still
lived.

[10] Diod. xvii. 2.

It was one of the first measures of Alexander to celebrate with
magnificent solemnities the funeral of his deceased father. While
the preparations for it were going on, he instituted researches
to find out and punish the accomplices of Pausanias. Of these
indeed, the most illustrious person mentioned to us—Olympias—was
not only protected by her position from punishment, but retained
great ascendency over her son to the end of his life. Three
other persons are mentioned by name as accomplices—brothers and
persons of good family from the district of Upper Macedonia called
Lynkêstis—Alexander, Heromenes, and Arrhabæus, sons of Aëropus. The
two latter were put to death, but the first of the three was spared,
and even promoted to important charges, as a reward for his useful
forwardness in instantly saluting Alexander king.[11] Others also,
we know not how many, were executed; and Alexander seems to have
imagined that there still remained some undetected.[12] The Persian
king boasted in public letters,[13] with how much truth we cannot
say, that he too had been among the instigators of Pausanias.

[11] Arrian, i. 25, 2; Curtius, vii. 1, 6. Alexander son
of Aëropus was son-in-law of Antipater. The case of this
Alexander—and of Olympias—afforded a certain basis to those who
said (Curtius, vi. 43) that Alexander had dealt favorably with
the accomplices of Pausanias.

[12] Plutarch, Alexand. 10-27; Diodor. xvii. 51; Justin, xi. 11.

[13] Arrian, ii. 14, 10.

Among the persons slain about this time by Alexander, we may number
his first-cousin and brother-in-law Amyntas—son of Perdikkas (the
elder brother of the deceased Philip): Amyntas was a boy when his
father Perdikkas died. Though having a preferable claim to the
succession, according to usage, he had been put aside by his uncle
Philip, on the ground of his age and of the strenuous efforts
required on commencing a new reign. Philip had however given in
marriage to this Amyntas his daughter (by an Illyrian mother) Kynna.
Nevertheless, Alexander now put him to death,[14] on accusation of
conspiracy: under what precise circumstances, does not appear—but
probably Amyntas (who besides being the son of Philip’s elder
brother, was at least twenty-four years of age, while Alexander
was only twenty) conceived himself as having a better right to the
succession, and was so conceived by many others. The infant son of
Kleopatra by Philip is said to have been killed by Alexander, as a
rival in the succession; Kleopatra herself was afterwards put to
death by Olympias during his absence, and to his regret. Attalus,
also, uncle of Kleopatra and joint commander of the Macedonian army
in Asia, was assassinated under the private orders of Alexander, by
Hekatæus and Philotas.[15] Another Amyntas, son of Antiochus (there
seems to have been several Macedonians named Amyntas) fled for safety
into Asia:[16] probably others, who felt themselves to be objects of
suspicion, did the like—since by the Macedonian custom, not merely a
person convicted of high treason, but all his kindred along with him,
were put to death.[17]

[14] Curtius, vi. 9, 17. vi. 10, 24. Arrian mentioned this
Amyntas son of Perdikkas (as well as the fact of his having been
put to death by Alexander before the Asiatic expedition), in
the lost work τὰ μετὰ Ἀλέξανδρον—see Photius Cod. 92. p. 220.
But Arrian, in his account of Alexander’s expedition, _does not
mention_ the fact; which shows that his silence is not to be
assumed as a conclusive reason for discrediting allegations of
others.

Compare Polyænus, v. 60; and Plutarch, Fort. Alex. Magn. p. 327.

It was during this expedition into Thrace and Illyria, about
eight months after his accession, that Alexander promised to
give his sister Kynna in marriage to Langarus prince of the
Agrianes (Arrian, Exp. Al. M. i. 5, 7). Langarus died of sickness
soon after; so that this marriage never took place. But when
the promise was made, Kynna must have been a widow. Her husband
Amyntas must therefore have been put to death during the first
months of Alexander’s reign.

[15] See my last preceding volume, Chap. xc. p. 518; Diod. xvii.
2; Curtius, vii. 1, 6; Justin, ix. 7 xi. 2. xii. 6; Plutarch,
Alexand. 10; Pausanias, viii. 7, 5.

[16] Arrian, i. 17 10; Plutarch, Alex. 20, Curtius, iii. 28, 18.

[17] Curtius, vi. 42, 20. Compare with this custom, a passage in
the Ajax of Sophokles, v. 725.

By unequivocal manifestations of energy and address, and by
despatching rivals or dangerous malcontents, Alexander thus speedily
fortified his position on the throne at home. But from the foreign
dependents of Macedonia—Greeks, Thracians, and Illyrians—the like
acknowledgment was not so easily obtained. Most of them were disposed
to throw off the yoke; yet none dared to take the initiative of
moving, and the suddenness of Philip’s death found them altogether
unprepared for combination. By that event the Greeks were discharged
from all engagement, since the vote of the confederacy had elected
him personally as Imperator. They were now at liberty, in so far
as there was any liberty at all in the proceeding, to elect any
one else, or to abstain from reëlecting at all, and even to let
the confederacy expire. Now it was only under constraint and
intimidation, as was well known both in Greece and Macedonia, that
they had conferred this dignity even on Philip—who had earned it by
splendid exploits, and had proved himself the ablest captain and
politician of the age. They were by no means inclined to transfer
it to a youth like Alexander, until he had shown himself capable
of bringing the like coercion to bear, and extorting the same
submission. The wish to break loose from Macedonia, widely spread
throughout the Grecian cities, found open expression from Demosthenes
and others in the assembly at Athens. That orator (if we are to
believe his rival Æschines), having received private intelligence of
the assassination of Philip, through certain spies of Charidemus,
before it was publicly known to others—pretended to have had it
revealed to him in a dream by the gods. Appearing in the assembly
with his gayest attire, he congratulated his countrymen on the death
of their greatest enemy, and pronounced high encomiums on the brave
tyrannicide of Pausanias, which he would probably compare to that
of Harmodius and Aristogeiton.[18] He depreciated the abilities of
Alexander, calling him Margites (the name of a silly character in
one of the Homeric poems), and intimating that he would be too much
distracted with embarrassments and ceremonial duties at home, to have
leisure for a foreign march.[19] Such, according to Æschines, was
the language of Demosthenes on the first news of Philip’s death. We
cannot doubt that the public of Athens, as well as Demosthenes, felt
great joy at an event which seemed to open to them fresh chances of
freedom, and that the motion for a sacrifice of thanksgiving,[20]
in spite of Phokion’s opposition, was readily adopted. But though
the manifestation of sentiment at Athens was thus anti-Macedonian,
exhibiting aversion to the renewal of that obedience which had been
recently promised to Philip, Demosthenes did not go so far as to
declare any positive hostility.[21] He tried to open communication
with the Persians in Asia Minor, and also, if we may believe
Diodorus, with the Macedonian commander in Asia Minor, Attalus. But
neither of the two missions was successful. Attalus sent his letter
to Alexander; while the Persian king,[22] probably relieved by the
death of Philip from immediate fear of Macedonian power, despatched
a peremptory refusal to Athens, intimating that he would furnish no
more money.[23]

[18] Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. c. 29. p. 469. c. 78 p. 608;
Plutarch, Demosth. 22.

[19] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 547. c. 50.

[20] Plutarch, Phokion, 16.

[21] We gather this from Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 551. c. 52.

[22] Diodorus (xvii. 5) mentions this communication of
Demosthenes to Attalus; which, however, I cannot but think
improbable. Probably Charidemus was the organ of the
communications.

[23] This letter from Darius is distinctly alluded to, and even
a sentence cited from it, by Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 633, 634.
c. 88. We know that Darius wrote in very different language
not long afterwards, near the time when Alexander crossed into
Asia (Arrian, ii. 14, 11). The first letter must have been sent
shortly after Philip’s death, when Darius was publicly boasting
of having procured the deed, and before he had yet learnt to fear
Alexander. Compare Diodor. xvii. 7.

Not merely in Athens, but in other Grecian States also, the death
of Philip excited aspirations for freedom. The Lacedæmonians, who,
though unsupported, had stood out inflexibly against any obedience
to him, were now on the watch for new allies; while the Arcadians,
Argeians, and Eleians, manifested sentiments adverse to Macedonia.
The Ambrakiots expelled the garrison placed by Philip in their city;
the Ætolians passed a vote to assist in restoring those Akarnanian
exiles whom he had banished.[24] On the other hand, the Thessalians
manifested unshaken adherence to Macedonia. But the Macedonian
garrison at Thebes, and the macedonizing Thebans who now governed
that city,[25] were probably the main obstacles to any combined
manifestation in favor of Hellenic autonomy.

[24] Diodor. xvii. 3.

[25] Diodorus (xvii. 3) says that the Thebans passed a vote to
expel the Macedonian garrison in the Kadmeia. But I have little
hesitation in rejecting this statement. We may be sure that
the presence of the Macedonian garrison was connected with the
predominance in the city of a party favorable to Macedonia. In
the ensuing year, when the resistance really occurred, this was
done by the anti-Macedonian party, who then got back from exile.

Apprised of these impulses prevalent throughout the Grecian world,
Alexander felt the necessity of checking them by a demonstration
immediate, as well as intimidating. The energy and rapidity of his
proceedings speedily overawed all those who had speculated on his
youth, or had adopted the epithets applied to him by Demosthenes.
Having surmounted, in a shorter time than was supposed possible,
the difficulties of his newly-acquired position at home, he marched
into Greece at the head of a formidable army, seemingly about two
months after the death of Philip. He was favorably received by the
Thessalians, who passed a vote constituting Alexander head of Greece
in place of his father Philip; which vote was speedily confirmed by
the Amphiktyonic assembly, convoked at Thermopylæ. Alexander next
advanced to Thebes, and from thence over the isthmus of Corinth
into Peloponnesus. The details of his march we do not know; but
his great force, probably not inferior to that which had conquered
at Chæroneia, spread terror everywhere, silencing all except his
partisans. Nowhere was the alarm greater than at Athens. The
Athenians recollecting both the speeches of their orators and the
votes of their assembly,—offensive at least, if not hostile, to the
Macedonians—trembled lest the march of Alexander should be directed
against their city, and accordingly made preparation for standing
a siege. All citizens were enjoined to bring in their families and
properties from the country, insomuch that the space within the walls
was full both of fugitives and of cattle.[26] At the same time, the
assembly adopted, on the motion of Demades, a resolution of apology
and full submission to Alexander: they not only recognized him as
chief of Greece, but conferred upon him divine honors, in terms
even more emphatic than those bestowed on Philip.[27] The mover,
with other legates, carried the resolution to Alexander, whom they
found at Thebes, and who accepted their submission. A young speaker
named Pytheas is said to have opposed the vote in the Athenian
assembly.[28] Whether Demosthenes did the like—or whether, under the
feeling of disappointed anticipations and overwhelming Macedonian
force, he condemned himself to silence,—we cannot say. That he did
not go with Demades on the mission to Alexander, seems a matter of
course, though he is said to have been appointed by public vote to
do so, and to have declined the duty. He accompanied the legation
as far as Mount Kithæron, on the frontier, and then returned to
Athens.[29] We read with astonishment that Æschines and his other
enemies denounced this step as a cowardly desertion. No envoy could
be so odious to Alexander, or so likely to provoke refusal for the
proposition which he carried, as Demosthenes. To employ him in such
a mission would have been absurd; except for the purpose probably
intended by his enemies, that he might be either detained by the
conqueror as an expiatory victim,[30] or sent back as a pardoned and
humiliated prisoner.

[26] Demadis Fragment. ὑπὲρ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, p. 180.

[27] Arrian, i. 1, 4.

[28] Plutarch, Reipub. Ger. Præcept. p. 804.

[29] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 564. c. 50; Deinarchus cont.
Demosth. p. 57; Diodor. xvii. 4; Plutarch, Demosth. c. 23
(Plutarch confounds the proceedings of this year with those of
the succeeding year). Demades, in the fragment of his oration
remaining to us, makes no allusion to this proceeding of
Demosthenes.

The decree, naming Demosthenes among the envoys, is likely enough
to have been passed chiefly by the votes of his enemies. It was
always open to an Athenian citizen to accept or decline such an
appointment.

[30] Several years afterwards, Demades himself was put to death
by Antipater, to whom he had been sent as envoy from Athens
(Diodor. xviii. 48).

After displaying his force in various portions of Peloponnesus,
Alexander returned to Corinth, where he convened deputies from the
Grecian cities generally. The list of those cities which obeyed
the summons is not before us, but probably it included nearly all
the cities of Central Greece. We know only that the Lacedæmonians
continued to stand aloof, refusing all concurrence. Alexander asked
from the assembled deputies the same appointment which the victorious
Philip had required and obtained two years before—the hegemony or
headship of the Greeks collectively for the purpose of prosecuting
war against Persia.[31] To the request of a prince at the head of an
irresistible army, one answer only was admissible. He was nominated
Imperator with full powers, by land and sea. Overawed by the presence
and sentiment of Macedonian force, all acquiesced in this vote except
the Lacedæmonians.

[31] Arrian, i. 1, 2. αἰτεῖν παρ᾽ αὐτῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς ἐπὶ
τοὺς Πέρσας στρατείας, ἥντινα Φιλίππῳ ἤδη ἔδοσαν· καὶ αἰτήσαντα
λαβεῖν παρὰ πάντων, πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων, etc.

Arrian speaks as if this request had been addressed only to the
Greeks _within_ Peloponnesus; moreover he mentions no assembly
at Corinth, which is noticed (though with some confusion) by
Diodorus, Justin, and Plutarch. Cities out of Peloponnesus,
as well as within it, must have been included; unless we
suppose that the resolution of the Amphiktyonic assembly, which
had been previously passed, was held to comprehend all the
extra-Peloponnesian cities, which seems not probable.

The convention sanctioned by Alexander was probably the same as that
settled by and with his father Philip. Its grand and significant
feature was, that it recognized Hellas as a confederacy under the
Macedonian prince as imperator, president, or executive head and
arm. It crowned him with a legal sanction as keeper of the peace
within Greece, and conqueror abroad in the name of Greece. Of its
other conditions, some are made known to us by subsequent complaints;
such conditions as, being equitable and tutelary towards the members
generally, the Macedonian chief found it inconvenient to observe,
and speedily began to violate. Each Hellenic city was pronounced,
by the first article of the convention, to be free and autonomous.
In each, the existing political constitution was recognized as it
stood; all other cities were forbidden to interfere with it, or to
second any attack by its hostile exiles.[32] No new despot was to
be established; no dispossessed despot was to be restored.[33] Each
city became bound to discourage in every other, as far as possible,
all illegal violence—such as political executions, confiscation,
spoliation, redivision of land or abolition of debts, factious
manumission of slaves, etc.[34] To each was guaranteed freedom of
navigation; maritime capture was prohibited, on pain of enmity from
all.[35] Each was forbidden to send armed vessels into the harbor of
any other, or to build vessels or engage seamen there.[36] By each,
an oath was taken to observe these conditions, to declare war against
all who violated them, and to keep them inscribed on a commemorative
column. Provision seems to have been made for admitting any
additional city[37] on its subsequent application, though it might
not have been a party to the original contract. Moreover, it appears
that a standing military force, under Macedonian orders, was provided
to enforce observance of the convention; and that the synod of
deputies was contemplated as likely to meet periodically.[38]

[32] Demosthenes (or Pseudo-Demosthenes), Orat. xvii. De
Fœdere Alexandrino, p. 213, 214. ἐπιτάττει ἡ συνθήκη εὐθὺς ἐν
ἀρχῇ, ἐλευθέρους εἶναι καὶ αὐτονόμους τοὺς Ἕλληνας.—Ἐστὶ γὰρ
γεγραμμένον, ἐάν τινες τὰς πολιτείας τὰς παρ᾽ ἑκάστοις οὔσας, ὅτε
τοὺς ὅρκους τοὺς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης ὤμνυσαν, καταλύσωσι, πολεμίους
εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς τῆς εἰρήνης μετέχουσιν....

[33] Demosthen. Orat. de Fœdere Alex. p. 213.

[34] Demosth. ib. p 215.

[35] Demosth. ib. p. 217. ἔστι γὰρ δήπου ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις, τὴν
θάλατταν πλεῖν τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς εἰρήνης, καὶ μηδένα κωλύειν
αὐτοὺς μηδὲ κατάγειν πλοῖον μηδενὸς τούτων· ἐὰν δέ τις παρὰ ταῦτα
ποιῇ, πολέμιον εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς τῆς εἰρήνης μετέχουσιν....

[36] Demosth. ib. p. 218, 219. Böhnecke, in his instructive
comments on this convention (Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der
Attischen Redner, p. 623), has treated the prohibition here
mentioned as if it were one specially binding the Macedonians
not to sail with armed ships into the Peiræus. This undoubtedly
is the particular case on which the orator insists; but I
conceive it to have been only a particular case under a general
prohibitory rule.

[37] Arrian, ii. 1, 7; ii. 2, 4. Demosth. de Fœd. Alex, p. 213.
Tenedos, Mitylênê, Antissa, and Eresus, can hardly have been
members of the convention when first sworn.

[38] Demosth. Orat. de Fœd. Alex. p. 215. ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς
συνθήκαις ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ~τοὺς συνεδρεύοντας καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῇ
κοινῇ φυλακῇ τεταγμένους~, ὅπως ἐν ταῖς κοινωνούσαις πόλεσι μὴ
γίγνωνται θάνατοι μηδὲ φυγαὶ παρὰ τοὺς κειμένους ταῖς πόλεσι
νόμους.... Οἱ δὲ τοσοῦτον δέουσι τούτων τι κωλύειν, ὥστε καὶ
συγκατασκευάζουσιν, etc. (p. 216).

The persons designated by οἱ δὲ, and denounced throughout this
oration generally, are, Alexander or the Macedonian officers and
soldiers.

A passage in Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 14, leads to the
supposition, that a standing Macedonian force was kept at
Corinth, occupying the Isthmus. The Thebans, however, declared
against Macedonia (in August or September 335 B. C.),
and proceeding to besiege the Macedonian garrison in the Kadmeia,
sent envoys to entreat aid from the Arcadians. “These envoys
(says Deinarchus) got with difficulty by sea to the Arcadians”—οἳ
κατὰ θάλασσαν ~μόλις~ ἀφίκοντο πρὸς ἐκείνους. Whence should this
difficulty arise, except from a Macedonian occupation of Corinth?

Such was the convention, in so far as we know its terms, agreed
to by the Grecian deputies at Corinth with Alexander; but with
Alexander at the head of an irresistible army. He proclaimed it as
the “public statute of the Greeks”,[39] constituting a paramount
obligation, of which he was the enforcer, binding on all, and
authorizing him to treat all transgressors as rebels. It was set
forth as counterpart of, and substitute for, the convention of
Antalkidas, which we shall presently see the officers of Darius
trying to revive against him—the headship of Persia against that of
Macedonia. Such is the melancholy degradation of the Grecian World,
that its cities have no alternative except to choose between these
two foreign potentates—or to invite the help of Darius, the most
distant and least dangerous, whose headship could hardly be more than
nominal, against a neighbor sure to be domineering and compressive,
and likely enough to be tyrannical. Of the once powerful Hellenic
chiefs and competitors—Sparta, Athens, Thebes—under each of whom the
Grecian world had been upheld as an independent and self-determining
aggregate, admitting the free play of native sentiment and character,
under circumstances more or less advantageous—the two last are now
confounded as common units (one even held under garrison) among the
subject allies of Alexander; while Sparta preserves only the dignity
of an isolated independence.

[39] Arrian, i. 16, 10. παρὰ τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα τοῖς Ἕλλησιν.
After the death of Darius, Alexander pronounced that the Grecian
mercenaries who had been serving with that prince, were highly
criminal for having contravened the general vote of the Greeks
(παρὰ τὰ δόγματα τὰ Ἑλλήνων), except such as had taken service
before that vote was passed, and except the Sinopeans, whom
Alexander considered as subjects of Persia and not partakers τοῦ
κοινοῦ τῶν Ἑλλήνων (Arrian, iii. 23, 15; iii. 24, 8, 9).

It appears that during the nine months which succeeded the swearing
of the convention, Alexander and his officers (after his return to
Macedonia) were active, both by armed force and by mission of envoys,
in procuring new adhesions and in re-modelling the governments of
various cities suitably to their own views. Complaints of such
aggressions were raised in the public assembly of Athens, the only
place in Greece where any liberty of discussion still survived.
An oration, pronounced by Demosthenes, Hyperides, or one of the
contemporary, anti-Macedonian politicians (about the spring or early
summer of 335 B. C.),[40] imparts to us some idea both of
the Macedonian interventions steadily going on, and of the unavailing
remonstrances raised against them by individual Athenian citizens. At
the time of this oration, such remonstrances had already been often
repeated. They were always met by the macedonizing Athenians with
peremptory declarations that the convention must be observed. But
in reply, the remonstrants urged, that it was unfair to call upon
Athens for strict observance of the convention, while the Macedonians
and their partisans in the various cities were perpetually violating
it for their own profit. Alexander and his officers (affirms this
orator) had never once laid down their arms since the convention was
settled. They had been perpetually tampering with the governments
of the various cities, to promote their own partisans to power.[41]
In Messênê, Sikyon, and Pellênê, they had subverted the popular
constitutions, banished many citizens, and established friends of
their own as despots. The Macedonian force, destined as a public
guarantee to enforce the observance of the convention, had been
employed only to overrule its best conditions, and to arm the
hands of factious partisans.[42] Thus Alexander in his capacity of
Imperator, disregarding all the restraints of the convention, acted
as chief despot for the maintenance of subordinate despots in the
separate cities.[43] Even at Athens, this imperial authority had
rescinded sentences of the dikastery, and compelled the adoption of
measures contrary to the laws and constitution.[44]

[40] This is the oration περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συνθηκῶν
already more than once alluded to above. Though standing among
the Demosthenic works, it is supposed by Libanius as well as by
most modern critics not to be the production of Demosthenes—upon
internal grounds of style, which are certainly forcible. Libanius
says that it bears much resemblance to the style of Hyperides.
At any rate, there seems no reason to doubt that it is a genuine
oration of one of the contemporary orators. I agree with
Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 629) in thinking that it must have
been delivered a few months after the convention with Alexander,
before the taking of Thebes.

[41] Demosthenes (or Pseudo-Demosth.), Orat. De Fœdere Alex. p.
216. Οὕτω μὲν τοίνυν ῥᾳδίως τὰ ὅπλα ἐπήνεγκε ὁ Μακεδὼν, ὥστε οὐδὲ
κατέθετο πώποτε, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιέρχεται καθ᾽ ὅσον δύναται,
etc.

[42] Demosth. ib. p. 214, 215.

[43] Demosth. (or Pseudo-Demosth.) Orat. De Fœdere Alex. p.
212, 214, 215, 220, where the orator speaks of Alexander as the
τύραννος of Greece.

The orator argues (p. 213) that the Macedonians had recognized
despotism as contrary to the convention, in so far as to expel
the despots from the towns of Antissa and Eresus in Lesbos. But
probably these despots were in correspondence with the Persians
on the opposite mainland, or with Memnon.

[44] Demosth. ib. p. 215. τοὺς δ᾽ ἰδίους ὑμᾶς νόμους ἀναγκάζουσι
λύειν, τοὺς μὲν κεκριμένους ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἀφιέντες, ἕτερα
δὲ παμπλήθη τοιαῦτα βιαζόμενοι παρανομεῖν....

At sea, the wrongful aggressions of Alexander or his officers had
been not less manifest than on land. The convention, guaranteeing
to all cities the right of free navigation, distinctly forbade each
to take or detain vessels belonging to any other. Nevertheless the
Macedonians had seized, in the Hellespont, all the merchantmen coming
out with cargoes from the Euxine, and carried them into Tenedos,
where they were detained, under various fraudulent pretences, in
spite of remonstrances from the proprietors and cities whose supply
of corn was thus intercepted. Among these sufferers, Athens stood
conspicuous; since consumers of imported corn, ship-owners, and
merchants, were more numerous there than elsewhere. The Athenians,
addressing complaints and remonstrances without effect, became at
length so incensed, and perhaps uneasy about their provisions,
that they passed a decree to equip and despatch 100 triremes,
appointing Menestheus (son of Iphikrates) admiral. By this strenuous
manifestation, the Macedonians were induced to release the detained
vessels. Had the detention been prolonged, the Athenian fleet would
have sailed to extort redress by force; so that, as Athens was more
than a match for Macedon on sea, the maritime empire of the latter
would have been overthrown, while even on land much encouragement
would have been given to malcontents against it.[45] Another incident
had occurred, less grave than this, yet still dwelt upon by the
orator as an infringement of the convention, and as an insult to
Athenians. Though an express article of the convention prohibited
armed ships of one city from entering the harbor of another, still
a Macedonian trireme had been sent into Pieræus to ask permission
that smaller vessels might be built there for Macedonian account.
This was offensive to a large proportion of Athenians, not only as
violating the convention, but as a manifest step towards employing
the nautical equipments and seamen of Athens for the augmentation of
the Macedonian navy.[46]

[45] Demosth. (or Pseudo-Demosth.) Orat. De Fœdere Alex. p. 217.
εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπεροψίας ἦλθον, ὥστε εἰς Τένεδον ἅπαντα τὰ ἐκ τοῦ
Πόντου πλοῖα κατήγαγον, καὶ σκευωρούμενοι περὶ αὐτὰ οὐ πρότερον
ἀφεῖσαν, πρὶν ὑμεῖς ἐψηφίσασθε τριήρεις ἕκατον πληροῦν καὶ
καθέλκειν εὐθὺς τότε—ὃ παρ᾽ ἐλάχιστον ἐποίησεν αὐτοὺς ἀφαιρεθῆναι
δικαίως τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἡγεμονίαν.... p. 218. Ἕως γὰρ ἂν ἐξῇ
τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν καὶ μόνοις ἀναμφισβητήτως εἶναι κυρίοις (the
Athenians), τοῖς γε κατὰ γῆν πρὸς τῇ ὑπαρχούσῃ δυνάμει ἐστὶ
προβολὰς ἑτέρας ἰσχυροτέρας εὑρέσθαι, etc.

We know that Alexander caused a squadron of ships to sail round
to and up the Danube from Byzantium (Arrian, i. 3, 3), to meet
him after his march by land from the southern coast of Thrace.
It is not improbable that the Athenian vessels detained may have
come loaded with a supply of corn, and that the detention of the
corn-ships may have been intended to facilitate this operation.

[46] Demosth. (or Pseudo-Demosth.) Orat. De Fœdere Alex. p. 219.

“Let those speakers who are perpetually admonishing us to observe
the convention (the orator contends), prevail on the imperial chief
to set the example of observing it on his part. I too impress upon
you the like observance. To a democracy nothing is more essential
than scrupulous regard to equity and justice.[47] But the convention
itself enjoins all its members to make war against transgressors; and
pursuant to this article, you ought to make war against Macedon.[48]
Be assured that all Greeks will see that the war is neither directed
against them nor brought on by your fault.[49] At this juncture, such
a step for the maintenance of your own freedom as well as Hellenic
freedom generally, will be not less opportune and advantageous than
it is just.[50] The time is come for shaking off your disgraceful
submission to others, and your oblivion of our own past dignity.[51]
If you encourage me, I am prepared to make a formal motion—To declare
war against the violators of the convention, as the convention itself
directs.”[52]

[47] Demosth. ib. p. 211. οἶμαι γὰρ οὐδὲν οὕτω τοῖς
δημοκρατουμένοις πρέπειν, ὡς περὶ τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον
σπουδάζειν.

I give here the main sense, without binding myself to the exact
phrases.

[48] Demosth. ib. p. 213. καὶ γὰρ ἔτι προσγέγραπται ἐν ταῖς
συνθήκαις, πολέμιον εἶναι, τὸν ἐκεῖνα ἅπερ Ἀλέξανδρος ποιοῦντα,
ἁπᾶσι τοῖς τῆς εἰρήνης κοινωνοῦσι, καὶ τὴν χώραν αὐτοῦ, καὶ
στρατεύεσθαι ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν ἅπαντας. Compare p. 214 init.

[49] Demosth. ib. p. 217. οὐδεὶς ὑμῖν ἐγκαλέσει ποτε τῶν Ἑλλήνων
ὡς ἄρα παρέβητέ τι τῶν κοινῇ ὁμολογηθέντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ χάριν
ἕξουσιν ὅτι μόνοι ἐξηλέγξατε τοὺς ταῦτα ποιοῦντας, etc.

[50] Demosth. ib. p. 214. νυνὶ δ᾽, ὅτ᾽ εἰς ταὐτὸ δίκαιον ἅμα καὶ
ὁ καιρὸς καὶ τὸ σύμφερον συνδεδράμηκεν, ἄλλον ἄρα τινὰ χρόνον
ἀναμενεῖτε τῆς ἰδίας ἐλευθερίας ἅμα καὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων
ἀντιλαβέσθαι;

[51] Demosth. ib. p. 220. εἰ ἄρα ποτὲ δεῖ παύσασθαι αἰσχρῶς
ἑτέροις ἀκολουθοῦντας, ἀλλὰ μηδ᾽ ἀναμνησθῆναι μηδεμιᾶς φιλοτιμίας
τῶν ἐξ ἀρχαιοτάτου καὶ πλείστου καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἡμῖν
ὑπαρχουσῶν.

[52] Demosth. (or Pseudo-Demosth.) Orat. De Fœdere Alex. ἐὰν οὖν
κελεύητε, γράψω, καθάπερ αἱ συνθῆκαι κελεύουσι, πολεμεῖν τοῖς
παραβεβηκόσιν.

A formal motion for declaring war would have brought upon the
mover a prosecution under the Graphê Paranomôn. Accordingly, though
intimating clearly that he thought the actual juncture (what it was,
we do not know) suitable, he declined to incur such responsibility
without seeing beforehand a manifestation of public sentiment
sufficient to give him hopes of a favorable verdict from the
Dikastery. The motion was probably not made. But a speech so bold,
even though not followed up by a motion, is in itself significant
of the state of feeling in Greece during the months immediately
following the Alexandrine convention. This harangue is only one among
many delivered in the Athenian assembly, complaining of Macedonian
supremacy as exercised under the convention. It is plain that the
acts of Macedonian officers were such as to furnish ample ground for
complaint; and the detention of all the trading ships coming out of
the Euxine, shows us that even the subsistence of Athens and the
islands had become more or less endangered. Though the Athenians
resorted to no armed interference, their assembly at least afforded
a theatre where public protest could be raised and public sympathy
manifested.

It is probable too that at this time Demosthenes and the other
anti-Macedonian speakers were encouraged by assurances and subsidies
from Persia. Though the death of Philip, and the accession of an
untried youth of twenty, had led Darius to believe for the moment
that all danger of Asiatic invasion was past, yet his apprehensions
were now revived by Alexander’s manifested energy, and by the renewal
of the Grecian league under his supremacy.[53] It was apparently
during the spring of 335 B. C., that Darius sent money to sustain
the anti-Macedonian party at Athens and elsewhere. Æschines affirms,
and Deinarchus afterwards repeats (both of them orators hostile
to Demosthenes)—That about this time, Darius sent to Athens 300
talents, which the Athenian people refused, but which Demosthenes
took, reserving however 70 talents out of the sum for his own
private purse: That public inquiry was afterwards instituted on the
subject. Yet nothing is alleged as having been made out;[54] at
least Demosthenes was neither condemned, nor even brought (as far
as appears) to any formal trial. Out of such data we can elicit no
specific fact. But they warrant the general conclusion, that Darius,
or the satraps in Asia Minor, sent money to Athens in the spring of
335 B. C., and letters or emissaries to excite hostilities against
Alexander.

[53] Diodorus, xvii. 7.

[54] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 634; Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s.
11-19, p. 9-14. It is Æschines who states that the 300 talents
were sent to the Athenian people, and refused by them.

Three years later, after the battle of Issus, Alexander in his
letter to Darius accuses that prince of having sent both letters
and money into Greece, for the purpose of exciting war against
him. Alexander states that the Lacedæmonians accepted the money,
but that all the other Grecian cities refused it (Arrian, ii. 14,
9). There is no reason to doubt these facts; but I find nothing
identifying the precise point of time to which Alexander alludes.

That Demosthenes, and probably other leading orators, received such
remittances from Persia, is no evidence of that personal corruption
which is imputed to them by their enemies. It is no way proved
that Demosthenes applied the money to his own private purposes. To
receive and expend it in trying to organize combinations for the
enfranchisement of Greece, was a proceeding which he would avow as
not only legitimate but patriotic. It was aid obtained from one
foreign prince to enable Hellas to throw off the worse dominion of
another. At this moment, the political interests of Persia coincided
with that of all Greeks who aspired to freedom. Darius had no chance
of becoming master of Greece; but his own security prescribed to
him to protect her from being made an appendage of the Macedonian
kingdom, and his means of doing so were at this moment ample, had
they been efficaciously put forth. Now the purpose of a Greek patriot
would be to preserve the integrity and autonomy of the Hellenic world
against all foreign interference. To invoke the aid of Persia against
Hellenic enemies,—as Sparta had done both in the Peloponnesian war
and at the peace of Antalkidas, and as Thebes and Athens had followed
her example in doing afterwards—was an unwarrantable proceeding: but
to invoke the same aid against the dominion of another foreigner, at
once nearer and more formidable, was open to no blame on the score
either of patriotism or policy. Demosthenes had vainly urged his
countrymen to act with energy against Philip, at a time when they
might by their own efforts have upheld the existing autonomy both for
Athens and for Greece generally. He now seconded or invited Darius,
at a time when Greece single-handed had become incompetent to the
struggle against Alexander, the common enemy both of Grecian liberty
and of the Persian empire. Unfortunately for Athens as well as for
himself, Darius, with full means of resistance in his hands, played
his game against Alexander even with more stupidity and improvidence
than Athens had played hers against Philip.

While such were the aggressions of Macedonian officers in the
exercise of their new imperial authority, throughout Greece and the
islands—and such the growing manifestations of repugnance to it at
Athens—Alexander had returned home to push the preparations for his
Persian campaign. He did not however think it prudent to transport
his main force into Asia, until he had made his power and personal
ascendency felt by the Macedonian dependencies, westward, northward,
and north-eastward of Pella—Illyrians, Pæonians, and Thracians.
Under these general names were comprised a number[55] of distinct
tribes, or nations, warlike and for the most part predatory. Having
remained unconquered until the victories of Philip, they were not
kept in subjection even by him without difficulty: nor were they at
all likely to obey his youthful successor, until they had seen some
sensible evidence of his personal energy.

[55] Strabo speaks of the Thracian ἔθνη as twenty-two in number,
capable of sending out 200,000 foot, and 15,000 horses (Strabo,
vii. Fragm. Vatic. 48).

Accordingly, in the spring, Alexander put himself at the head of a
large force, and marched in an easterly direction from Amphipolis,
through the narrow Sapæan pass between Philippi and the sea.[56] In
ten days’ march he reached the difficult mountain path over which
alone he could cross Mount Hæmus (Balkan.) Here he found a body of
the free Thracians and of armed merchants of the country, assembled
to oppose his progress; posted on the high ground with waggons
in their front, which it was their purpose to roll down the steep
declivity against the advancing ranks of the Macedonians. Alexander
eluded this danger by ordering his soldiers either to open their
ranks, so as to let the waggons go through freely—or where there was
no room for such loose array, to throw themselves on the ground with
their shields closely packed together and slanting over their bodies;
so that the waggons, dashing down the steep and coming against the
shields, were carried off the ground, and made to bound over the
bodies of the men to the space below. All the waggons rolled down
without killing a single man. The Thracians, badly armed, were then
easily dispersed by the Macedonian attack, with the loss of 1500 men
killed, and all their women and children made prisoners.[57] The
captives and plunder were sent back under an escort to be sold at the
seaports.

[56] Strabo, vii. p. 331 (Fragm.); Arrian, i. 1, 6; Appian, Bell.
Civil. iv. 87, 105, 106. Appian gives (iv. 103) a good general
description of the almost impassable and trackless country to the
north and north-east of Philippi.

[57] Arrian, i. 1, 12, 17. The precise locality of that steep
road whereby Alexander crossed the Balkan, cannot be determined.
Baron von Moltke, in his account of the Russian campaign in
Bulgaria (1828-1829), gives an enumeration of four roads,
passable by an army, crossing this chain from north to south (see
chap. i. of that work). But whether Alexander passed by any one
of these four, or by some other road still more to the west, we
cannot tell.

Having thus forced the mountain road, Alexander led his army over the
chain of Mount Hæmus, and marched against the Triballi: a powerful
Thracian tribe,—extending (as far as can be determined) from the
plain of Kossovo in modern Servia northward towards the Danube,—whom
Philip had conquered, yet not without considerable resistance and
even occasional defeat. Their prince Syrmus had already retired with
the women and children of the tribe into an island of the Danube
called Peukê, where many other Thracians had also sought shelter. The
main force of the Triballi took post in woody ground on the banks of
the rivet Zyginus, about three days’ march from the Danube. Being
tempted however, by an annoyance from the Macedonian light-armed, to
emerge from their covered position into the open plain, they were
here attacked by Alexander with his cavalry and infantry, in close
combat, and completely defeated. Three thousand of them were slain,
but the rest mostly eluded pursuit by means of the wood, so that
they lost few prisoners. The loss of the Macedonians was only eleven
horsemen and forty foot slain; according to the statement of Ptolemy,
son of Lagus, then one of Alexander’s confidential officers, and
afterwards founder of the dynasty of Greco-Egyptian kings.[58]

[58] Arrian, i. 2.

Three days’ march, from the scene of action, brought Alexander to the
Danube, where he found some armed ships which had been previously
ordered to sail (probably with stores of provision) from Byzantium
round by the Euxine and up the river. He first employed these ships
in trying to land a body of troops on the island of Peukê; but his
attempt was frustrated by the steep banks, the rapid stream, and
the resolute front of the defenders on shore. To compensate for
this disappointment, Alexander resolved to make a display of his
strength by crossing the Danube and attacking the Getæ; tribes,
chiefly horsemen armed with bows,[59] analogous to the Thracians
in habits and language. They occupied the left bank of the river,
from which their town was about four miles distant. The terror of
the Macedonian successes had brought together a body of 4000 Getæ,
visible from the opposite shore, to resist any crossing. Accordingly
Alexander got together a quantity of the rude boats (hollowed out of
a single trunk) employed for transport on the river, and caused the
tent-skins of the army to be stuffed with hay in order to support
rafts. He then put himself on shipboard during the night, and
contrived to carry across the river a body of 4000 infantry, and 1500
cavalry; landing on a part of the bank where there was high standing
wheat and no enemy’s post. The Getæ, intimidated not less by this
successful passage than by the excellent array of Alexander’s army,
hardly stayed to sustain a charge of cavalry, but hastened to abandon
their poorly fortified town and retire father away from the river.
Entering the town without resistance, he destroyed it, carried away
such movables as he found, and then returned to the river without
delay. Before he quitted the northern bank, he offered sacrifice to
Zeus the Preserver—to Hêraklês—and to the god Ister (Danube) himself,
whom he thanked for having shown himself not impassable.[60] On the
very same day, he recrossed the river to his camp; after an empty
demonstration of force, intended to prove that he could do what
neither his father nor any Grecian army had ever yet done, and what
every one deemed impossible—crossing the greatest of all known rivers
without a bridge and in the face of an enemy.[61]

[59] Strabo, vii. p. 303.

[60] Arrian, i. 4, 2-7.

[61] Neither the point where Alexander crossed the Danube,—nor
the situation of the island called Peukê,—nor the identity of the
river Lyginus—nor the part of Mount Hæmus which Alexander forced
his way over—can be determined. The data given by Arrian are too
brief and too meagre to make out with assurance any part of his
march after he crossed the Nestus. The facts reported by the
historian represent only a small portion of what Alexander really
did in this expedition.

It seems clear, however, that the main purpose of Alexander
was to attack and humble the Triballi. Their locality is known
generally as the region where the modern Servia joins Bulgaria.
They reached eastward (in the times of Thucydides, ii. 96) as
far as the river Oskius or Isker, which crosses the chain of
Hæmus from south to north, passes by the modern city of Sophia,
and falls into the Danube. Now Alexander, in order to conduct
his army from the eastern bank of the river Nestus, near its
mouth, to the country of the Triballi, would naturally pass
through Philippopolis, which city appears to have been founded
by his father Philip, and therefore probably had a regular road
of communication to the maritime regions. (See Stephanus Byz.
v. Φιλιππόπολις.) Alexander would cross Mount Hæmus, then,
somewhere north-west of Philippopolis. We read in the year 376
B. C. (Diodor. xv. 36) of an invasion of Abdêra by the
Triballi; which shows that there was a road, not unfit for an
army, from their territory to the eastern side of the mouth of
the river Nestus, where Abdêra was situated. This was the road
which Alexander is likely to have followed. But he must probably
have made a considerable circuit to the eastward; for the route
which Paul Lucas describes himself as having taken direct from
Philippopolis to Drama, can hardly have been fit for an army.

The river Lyginus may perhaps be the modern Isker, but this is
not certain. The Island called Peukê is still more perplexing.
Strabo speaks of it as if it were near the mouth of the Danube
(vii. p. 301-305). But it seems impossible that either the range
of the Triballi, or the march of Alexander, can have extended so
far eastward. Since Strabo (as well as Arrian) copied Alexander’s
march from Ptolemy, whose authority is very good, we are
compelled to suppose that there was a second island called Peukê
higher up the river.

The Geography of Thrace is so little known, that we cannot wonder
at our inability to identify these places. We are acquainted, and
that but imperfectly, with the two high roads, both starting from
Byzantium or Constantinople. 1. The one (called the King’s Road,
from having been in part the march of Xerxes in his invasion
of Greece, Livy, xxxix. 27; Herodot. vii. 115) crossing the
Hebrus and the Nestus, touching the northern coast of the Ægean
Sea at Neapolis, a little south of Philippi, then crossing the
Strymon at Amphipolis, and stretching through Pella across Inner
Macedonia and Illyria to Dyrrachium (the Via Egnatia). 2. The
other, taking a more northerly course, passing along the upper
valley of the Hebrus from Adrianople to Philippopolis, then
through Sardicia (Sophia) and Naissus (Nisch), to the Danube near
Belgrade; being the high road now followed from Constantinople to
Belgrade.

But apart from these two roads, scarcely anything whatever is
known of the country. Especially the mountainous region of
Rhodopê, bounded on the west by the Strymon, on the north and
east by the Hebrus, and on the south by the Ægean, is a Terra
Incognita, except the few Grecian colonies on the coast. Very few
travellers have passed along, or described the southern or King’s
Road, while the region in the interior, apart from the high
road, was absolutely unexplored until the visit of M. Viquesnel
in 1847, under scientific mission from the French government.
The brief, but interesting account, composed by M. Viquesnel,
of this rugged and impracticable district, is contained in the
“Archives des Missions Scientifiques et Litteraires”, for 1850,
published at Paris. Unfortunately, the map intended to accompany
that account has not yet been prepared; but the published data,
as far as they go, have been employed by Kiepert in constructing
his recent map of Turkey in Europe; the best map of these regions
now existing, though still very imperfect. The Illustrations
(Erläuterungen) annexed by Kiepert to his map of Turkey, show
the defective data on which the chartography of this country is
founded. Until the survey of M. Viquesnel, the higher part of the
course of the Strymon, and nearly all the course of the Nestus,
may be said to have been wholly unknown.

The terror spread by Alexander’s military operations was so great,
that not only the Triballi, but the other autonomous Thracians
around, sent envoys tendering presents or tribute, and soliciting
peace. Alexander granted their request. His mind being bent upon war
with Asia, he was satisfied with having intimidated these tribes so
as to deter them from rising during his absence. What conditions he
imposed, we do not know, but he accepted the presents.[62]

[62] Arrian, i. 4, 5; Strabo, vii. p. 301.

While these applications from the Thracians were under debate, envoys
arrived from a tribe of Gauls occupying a distant mountainous region
westward towards the Ionic Gulf. Though strangers to Alexander,
they had heard so much of the recent exploits, that they came with
demands to be admitted to his friendship. They were distinguished
both for tall stature and for boastful language. Alexander readily
exchanged with them assurances of alliance. Entertaining them at a
feast, he asked, in the course of conversation, what it was that they
were most afraid of, among human contingencies? They replied, that
they feared no man, nor any danger, except only, lest the heaven
should fall upon them. Their answer disappointed Alexander, who had
expected that they would name him, as the person of whom they were
most afraid; so prodigious was his conceit of his own exploits. He
observed to his friends that these Gauls were swaggerers. Yet if we
attend to the sentiment rather than the language, we shall see that
such an epithet applies with equal or greater propriety to Alexander
himself. The anecdote is chiefly interesting as it proves at how
early an age the exorbitant self-esteem, which we shall hereafter
find him manifesting, began. That after the battle of Issus he should
fancy himself superhuman, we can hardly be astonished; but he was as
yet only in the first year of his reign, and had accomplished nothing
beyond his march into Thrace and his victory over the Triballi.

After arranging these matters, he marched in a south-westerly
direction into the territory of the Agriânes and the other Pæonians,
between the rivers Strymon and Axius in the highest portion of their
course. Here he was met by a body of Agriânes under their prince
Langarus, who had already contracted a personal friendship for him
at Pella before Philip’s death. News came that the Illyrian Kleitus,
son of Bardylis, who had been subdued by Philip, had revolted at
Pelion (a strong post south of lake Lychnidus, on the west side of
the chain of Skardus and Pindus, near the place where that chain is
broken by the cleft called the Klissura of Tzangon or Devol[63])—and
that the western Illyrians, called Taulantii, under their prince
Glaukias, were on the march to assist him. Accordingly Alexander
proceeded thither forthwith, leaving Langarus to deal with the
Illyrian tribe Autariatæ, who had threatened to oppose his progress.
He marched along the bank and up the course of the Erigon, from a
point near where it joins the Axius.[64] On approaching Pelion, he
found the Illyrians posted in front of the town and on the heights
around, awaiting the arrival of Glaukias their promised ally. While
Alexander was making his dispositions for attack, they offered their
sacrifices to the gods: the victims being three boys, three girls,
and three black rams. At first they stepped boldly forward to meet
him, but before coming to close quarters, they turned and fled into
the town with such haste that the slain victims were left lying
on the spot.[65] Having thus driven in the defenders, Alexander
was preparing to draw a wall of circumvallation round the Pelion,
when he was interrupted by the arrival of Glaukias with so large a
force as to compel him to abandon the project. A body of cavalry,
sent out from the Macedonian camp under Philotas to forage, were in
danger of being cut off by Glaukias, and were only rescued by the
arrival of Alexander himself with a reinforcement. In the face of
this superior force, it was necessary to bring off the Macedonian
army, through a narrow line of road along the river Eordaikus, where
in some places there was only room for four abreast, with hill or
marsh everywhere around. By a series of bold and skilful manœuvres,
and by effective employment of his battering-train or projectile
machines to protect the rear-guard, Alexander completely baffled
the enemy, and brought off his army without loss.[66] Moreover these
Illyrians, who had not known how to make use of such advantages of
position, abandoned themselves to disorder as soon as their enemy had
retreated, neglecting all precautions for the safety of their camp.
Apprised of this carelessness, Alexander made a forced night-march
back, at the head of his Agrianian division and light troops
supported by the remaining army. He surprised the Illyrians in their
camp before daylight. The success of this attack against a sleeping
and unguarded army was so complete, that the Illyrians fled at once
without resistance. Many were slain or taken prisoners; the rest,
throwing away their arms, hurried away homeward, pursued by Alexander
for a considerable distance. The Illyrian prince Kleitus was forced
to evacuate Pelion, which place he burned, and then retired into the
territory of Glaukias.[67]

[63] For the situation of Pelion, compare Livy, xxxi. 33, 34, and
the remarks of Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol.
iii. ch. 28. p. 310-324.

[64] Assuming Alexander to have been in the Territory of the
Triballi, the modern Servia, he would in this march follow mainly
the road which is now frequented between Belgrade and Bitolia;
through the plain of Kossovo, Pristina, Katschanik (rounding
on the north-eastern side the Ljubatrin, the north-eastern
promontory terminating the chain of Skardus), Uschkub, Kuprili,
along the higher course of the Axius or Vardar, until the point
where the Erigon or Tscherna joins that river below Kuprili. Here
he would be among the Pæonians and Agrianes, on the east—and the
Dardani and Autariatæ, seemingly on the north and west. If he
then followed the course of the Erigon, he would pass through
the portions of Macedonia then called Deuripia and Pelagonia:
he would go between the ridges of the mountains, through which
the Erigon breaks, called Nidje on the south, and Babuna on the
north. He would pass afterwards to Florina, and not to Bitolia.

See Kiepert’s map of these regions—a portion of his recent map of
Turkey in Europe—and Griesbach’s description of the general track.

[65] Arrian, i. 5, 12.

[66] Arrian, i. 6, 3-18.

[67] Arrian, i. 6, 19-22.

Just as Alexander had completed this victory over Kleitus and the
Taulantian auxiliaries, and before he had returned home, news reached
him of a menacing character. The Thebans had declared themselves
independent of him, and were besieging his garrison in the Kadmeia.

Of this event, alike important and disastrous to those who stood
forward, the immediate antecedents are very imperfectly known to
us. It has already been remarked that the vote of submission on the
part of the Greeks to Alexander as Imperator, during the preceding
autumn, had been passed only under the intimidation of a present
Macedonian force. Though the Spartans alone had courage to proclaim
their dissent, the Athenians, Arcadians, Ætolians, and others, were
well known even to Alexander himself, as ready to do the like on
any serious reverse to the Macedonian arms.[68] Moreover the energy
and ability displayed by Alexander had taught the Persian king that
all danger to himself was not removed by the death of Philip, and
induced him either to send, or to promise, pecuniary aid to the
anti-Macedonian Greeks. We have already noticed the manifestation
of anti-Macedonian sentiment at Athens—proclaimed by several of
the most eminent orators—Demosthenes, Lykurgus, Hyperides, and
others; as well as by active military men like Charidemus and
Ephialtes,[69] who probably spoke out more boldly when Alexander was
absent on the Danube. In other cities, the same sentiment doubtless
found advocates, though less distinguished; but at Thebes, where
it could not be openly proclaimed, it prevailed with the greatest
force.[70] The Thebans suffered an oppression from which most of
the other cities were free—the presence of a Macedonian garrison
in their citadel; just as they had endured, fifty years before,
the curb of a Spartan garrison after the fraud of Phœbidas and
Leontiades. In this case, as in the former, the effect was to arm the
macedonizing leaders with absolute power over their fellow-citizens,
and to inflict upon the latter not merely the public mischief of
extinguishing all free speech, but also multiplied individual insults
and injuries, prompted by the lust and rapacity of rulers, foreign
as well as domestic.[71] A number of Theban citizens, among them
the freest and boldest spirits, were in exile at Athens, receiving
from the public indeed nothing beyond a safe home, but secretly
encouraged to hope for better things by Demosthenes and the other
anti-Macedonian leaders.[72] In like manner, fifty years before,
it was at Athens, and from private Athenian citizens, that the
Thebans Pelopidas and Mellon had found that sympathy which enabled
them to organize their daring conspiracy for rescuing Thebes from
the Spartans. That enterprise, admired throughout Greece as alike
adventurous, skilful, and heroic, was the model present to the
imagination of the Theban exiles, to be copied if any tolerable
opportunity occurred.

[68] Arrian, i. 7, 5.

[69] Ælian, V. H. xii. 57.

[70] Demades, ὑπὲρ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, s. 14. Θηβαῖοι δὲ μέγιστον
εἶχον δεσμὸν τὴν τῶν Μακεδόνων φρουρὰν, ὑφ᾽ ἧς οὐ μόνον τὰς
χεῖρας συνεδέθησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν παῤῥησίαν ἀφῄρηντο....

[71] The Thebans, in setting forth their complaints to the
Arcadians, stated—ὅτι οὐ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας φιλίαν Θηβαῖοι
διαλῦσαι βουλόμενοι, τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπανέστησαν, οὐδ᾽ ἐναντίον
τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὐδὲν πράξοντες, ~ἀλλὰ τὰ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν
Μακεδόνων ἐν τῇ πόλει γινόμενα φέρειν οὐκέτι δυνάμενοι, οὐδὲ τὴν
δούλειαν ὑπομένειν, οὐδὲ τὰς ὕβρεις ὁρᾷν τὰς εἰς τὰ ἐλεύθερα
σώματα γινομένας~.

See Demades περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, s. 13, the speech of Cleadas,
Justin, xi. 4; and (Deinarchus cont. Demosth. s. 20) compare
Livy, xxxix. 27—about the working of the Macedonian garrison at
Maroncia, in the time of Philip son of Demetrius.

[72] Demades περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, Fragm. ad fin.

Such was the feeling in Greece, during the long absence of Alexander
on his march into Thrace and Illyria; a period of four or five
months, ending at August 335 B. C. Not only was Alexander
thus long absent, but he sent home no reports of his proceedings.
Couriers were likely enough to be intercepted among the mountains and
robbers of Thrace; and even if they reached Pella, their despatches
were not publicly read, as such communications would have been read
to the Athenian assembly. Accordingly we are not surprised to hear
that rumors arose of his having been defeated and slain. Among these
reports, both multiplied and confident, one was even certified by a
liar who pretended to have just arrived from Thrace, to have been
an eye-witness of the fact, and to have been himself wounded in
the action against the Triballi, where Alexander had perished.[73]
This welcome news, not fabricated, but too hastily credited, by
Demosthenes and Lykurgus,[74] was announced to the Athenian assembly.
In spite of doubts expressed by Demades and Phokion, it was believed
not only by the Athenians and the Theban exiles there present, but
also by the Arcadians, Eleians, Ætolians and other Greeks. For a
considerable time, through the absence of Alexander, it remained
uncontradicted, which increased the confidence in its truth.

[73] Arrian, i. 7, 3. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ πολὺς ὁ λόγος (of the death of
Alexander) καὶ παρὰ πολλῶν ἐφοίτα, ὅτι τε χρόνον ἀπῆν οὐκ ὀλίγον
καὶ ὅτι οὐδεμία ἀγγελία παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἀφῖκτο, etc.

[74] Demades περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, ad fin. ἡνίκα Δημοσθένης
καὶ Λυκοῦργος τῷ μὲν λόγῳ παραταττόμενοι τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἐνίκων
ἐν Τριβάλλοις, μόνον δ᾽ οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος νεκρὸν τὸν
Ἀλέξανδρον προέθηκαν ... ἐμὲ δὲ στυγνὸν καὶ περίλυπον ἔφασκον
εἶναι μὴ συνευδοκοῦντα, etc.

Justin, xi. 2. “Demosthenem oratorem, qui Macedonum deletas omnes
cum rege copias à Triballis affirmaverit, producto in concionem
auctore, qui in eo praelio, in quo rex ceciderit, se quoque
vulneratum diceret.”

Compare Tacitus, Histor. i. 34. “Vix dum egresso Pisone, occisum
in castris Othonem, vagus primum et incertus rumor, mox, ut _in
magnis mendaciis, interfuisse se quidam, et vidisse affirmabant_,
credulà famâ inter gaudentes et incuriosos.... Obvius in
palatio Julius Atticus, speculator, cruentum gladium ostentans,
occisum _à se_ Othonem exclamavit.”

It is stated that Alexander was really wounded in the head by a
stone, in the action with the Illyrians (Plutarch, Fortun. Alex.
p. 327).

It was upon the full belief in this rumor, of Alexander’s defeat and
death, that the Grecian cities proceeded. The event severed by itself
their connection with Macedonia. There was neither son nor adult
brother to succeed to the throne: so that not merely the foreign
ascendency, but even the intestine unity, of Macedonia, was likely
to be broken up. In regard to Athens, Arcadia, Elis, Ætolia, etc.,
the anti-Macedonian sentiment was doubtless vehemently manifested,
but no special action was called for. It was otherwise in regard
to Thebes. Phœnix, Prochytes, and other Theban exiles at Athens,
immediately laid their plan for liberating their city and expelling
the Macedonian garrison from the Kadmeia. Assisted with arms and
money by Demosthenes and other Athenian citizens, and invited by
their partisans at Thebes, they suddenly entered that city in arms.
Though unable to carry the Kadmeia by surprise, they seized in the
city, and put to death, Amyntas, a principal Macedonian officer, with
Timolaus, one of the leading macedonizing Thebans.[75] They then
immediately convoked a general assembly of the Thebans, to whom they
earnestly appealed for a vigorous effort to expel the Macedonians,
and reconquer the ancient freedom of the city. Expatiating upon the
misdeeds of the garrison and upon the oppressions of those Thebans
who governed by means of the garrison, they proclaimed that the happy
moment of liberation had now arrived, through the recent death of
Alexander. They doubtless recalled the memory of Pelopidas, and the
glorious enterprise, cherished by all Theban patriots, whereby he had
rescued the city from Spartan occupation, forty-six years before. To
this appeal the Thebans cordially responded. The assembly passed a
vote, declaring severance from Macedonia, and autonomy of Thebes—and
naming as Bœotarchs some of the returned exiles, with others of
the same party, for the purpose of energetic measures against the
garrison in the Kadmeia.[76]

[75] Arrian, i. 7, 1: compare Deinarchus cont. Demosthenes, s.
75. p. 53.

[76] Arrian, i. 7, 3-17.

Unfortunately for Thebes, none of these new Bœotarchs were men of
the stamp of Epaminondas, probably not even of Pelopidas. Yet
their scheme, though from its melancholy result it is generally
denounced as insane, really promised better at first than that of
the anti-Spartan conspirators in 380 B. C. The Kadmeia was instantly
summoned; hopes being perhaps indulged, that the Macedonian commander
would surrender it with as little resistance as the Spartan harmost
had done. But such hopes were not realized. Philip had probably
caused the citadel to be both strengthened and provisioned. The
garrison defied the Theban leaders, who did not feel themselves
strong enough to give orders for an assault, as Pelopidas in his
time was prepared to do, if surrender had been denied.[77] They
contented themselves with drawing and guarding a double line of
circumvallation round the Kadmeia, so as to prevent both sallies
from within and supplies from without.[78] They then sent envoys in
the melancholy equipment of suppliants, to the Arcadians and others,
representing that their recent movement was directed, not against
Hellenic union, but against Macedonian oppression and outrage,
which pressed upon them with intolerable bitterness. As Greeks and
freemen, they entreated aid to rescue them from such a calamity.
They obtained much favorable sympathy, with some promise and even
half-performance. Many of the leading orators at Athens—Demosthenes,
Lykurgus, Hyperides, and others—together with the military men
Charidemus and Ephialtes—strongly urged their countrymen to declare
in favor of Thebes and send aid against the Kadmeia. But the citizens
generally, following Demades and Phokion, waited to be better assured
both of Alexander’s death and of its consequences, before they
would incur the hazard of open hostility against Macedonia, though
they seem to have declared sympathy with the Theban revolution.[79]
Demosthenes farther went as envoy into Peloponnesus, while the
Macedonian Antipater also sent round urgent applications to the
Peloponnesian cities, requiring their contingents, as members of the
confederacy under Alexander, to act against Thebes. The eloquence of
Demosthenes, backed by his money, or by Persian money administered
through him, prevailed on the Peloponnesians to refuse compliance
with Antipater and to send no contingents against Thebes.[80] The
Eleians and Ætolians held out general assurances favorable to the
revolution at Thebes, while the Arcadians even went so far as to send
out some troops to second it, though they did not advance beyond the
isthmus.[81]

[77] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 4, 11. See Volume X. Ch. lxxvii. p. 81 of
this History.

[78] Arrian, i. 7, 14.

[79] Diodor. xvii. 8.

[80] Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 14. s. 19. καὶ Ἀρκάδων ἡκόντων
εἰς εσθμὸν, καὶ τὴν μὲν παρὰ Ἀντιπάτρου πρεσβείαν ἄπρακτον
ἀποστειλάντων, etc.

In the vote passed by the people of Athens some years afterwards,
awarding a statue and other honors to Demosthenes, these
proceedings in Peloponnesus are enumerated among his titles
to public gratitude—καὶ ὡς ἐκώλυσε Πελοποννησίους ἐπὶ Θήβας
Ἀλεξάνδρῳ βοηθῆσαι, χρήματα δοὺς καὶ αὐτὸς πρεσβεύσας, etc.
(Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator. p. 850).

[81] Arrian, i. 10, 2; Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. p. 634.

Here was a crisis in Grecian affairs, opening new possibilities
for the recovery of freedom. Had the Arcadians and other Greeks
lent decisive aid to Thebes—had Athens acted even with as much
energy as she did twelve years afterwards during the Lamian war,
occupying Thermopylæ with an army and a fleet—the gates of Greece
might well have been barred against a new Macedonian force, even
with Alexander alive and at its head. That the struggle of Thebes
was not regarded at the time, even by macedonizing Greeks, as
hopeless, is shown by the subsequent observations both of Æschines
and Deinarchus at Athens. Æschines (delivering five years afterwards
his oration against Ktesiphon) accuses Demosthenes of having by his
perverse backwardness brought about the ruin of Thebes. The foreign
mercenaries forming part of the garrison of the Kadmeia were ready
(Æschines affirms) to deliver up that fortress, on receiving five
talents: the Arcadian generals would have brought up their troops
to the aid of Thebes, if nine or ten talents had been paid to
them—having repudiated the solicitations of Antipater. Demosthenes
(say these two orators) having in his possession 300 talents from the
Persian king, to instigate anti-Macedonian movements in Greece, was
supplicated by the Theban envoys to furnish money for these purposes,
but refused the request, kept the money for himself, and thus
prevented both the surrender of the Kadmeia and the onward march
of the Arcadians.[82] The charge here advanced against Demosthenes
appears utterly incredible. To suppose that anti-Macedonian movements
counted for so little in his eyes, is an hypothesis belied by his
whole history. But the fact that such allegations were made by
Æschines only five years afterwards, proves the reports and the
feelings of the time—that the chances of successful resistance to
Macedonia on the part of the Thebans were not deemed unfavorable. And
when the Athenians, following the counsels of Demades and Phokion,
refused to aid Thebes or occupy Thermopylæ—they perhaps consulted the
safety of Athens separately, but they receded from the generous and
Pan-hellenic patriotism which had animated their ancestors against
Xerxes and Mardonius.[83]

[82] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 634; Deinarch. adv. Demosth. p.
15, 16. s. 19-22.

[83] See Herod. viii. 143. Demosthenes in his orations frequently
insists on the different rank and position of Athens, as compared
with those of the smaller Grecian states—and of the higher and
more arduous obligations consequent thereupon. This is one grand
point of distinction between his policy and that of Phokion. See
a striking passage in the speech De Coronâ, p. 245. s. 77; and
Orat. De Republ. Ordinand. p. 176. s. 37.

Isokrates holds the same language touching the obligations of
Sparta,—in the speech which he puts into the mouth of Archidamus.
“No one will quarrel with Epidaurians and Phliasians, for looking
only how they can get through and keep themselves in being. But
for Lacedæmonians, it is impossible to aim simply at preservation
and nothing beyond—by any means, whatever they may be. If we
cannot preserve ourselves with honor, we ought to prefer a
glorious death.” (Isokrates, Orat. vi. Archid. s. 106.)

The backward and narrow policy, which Isokrates here proclaims
as fit for Epidaurus and Phlius, but not for Sparta—is precisely
what Phokion always recommended for Athens, even while Philip’s
power was yet nascent and unsettled.

The Thebans, though left in this ungenerous isolation, pressed
the blockade of the Kadmeia, and would presently have reduced the
Macedonian garrison, had they not been surprised by the awe-striking
event—Alexander arriving in person at Onchêstus in Bœotia, at the
head of his victorious army. The first news of his being alive was
furnished by his arrival at Onchêstus. No one could at first believe
the fact. The Theban leaders contended that it was another Alexander,
the son of Aëropus, at the head of a Macedonian army of relief.[84]

[84] Arrian, i. 7, 9.

In this incident we may note two features, which characterized
Alexander to the end of his life; matchless celerity of movement,
and no less remarkable favor of fortune. Had news of the Theban
rising first reached him while on the Danube or among the distant
Triballi,—or even when embarrassed in the difficult region round
Pelion,—he could hardly by any effort have arrived in time to save
the Kadmeia. But he learnt it just when he had vanquished Kleitus and
Glaukias, so that his hands were perfectly free—and also when he was
in a position peculiarly near and convenient for a straight march
into Greece without going back to Pella. From the pass of Tschangon
(or of the river Devol), near which Alexander’s last victories were
gained, his road lay southward, following downwards in part the
higher course of the river Haliakmon, through Upper Macedonia or the
regions called Eordæa and Elymeia which lay on his left, while the
heights of Pindus and the upper course of the river Aous, occupied
by the Epirots called Tymphæi and Parauæi, were on the right. On the
seventh day of march, crossing the lower ridges of the Cambunian
mountains (which separate Olympus from Pindus and Upper Macedonia
from Thessaly), Alexander reached the Thessalian town of Pelinna. Six
days more brought him to the Bœotian Onchestus.[85] He was already
within Thermopylæ, before any Greeks were aware that he was in march,
or even that he was alive. The question about occupying Thermopylæ by
a Grecian force was thus set aside. The difficulty of forcing that
pass, and the necessity of forestalling Athens in it by stratagem or
celerity, was present to the mind of Alexander, as it had been to
that of Philip in his expedition of 346 B. C., against the
Phokians.

[85] Arrian, i. 7. 6. See, respecting this region, Colonel
Leake’s Travels in Northern Greece, ch. vi. p. 300-304; ch.
xxviii. p. 303-305, etc.; and for Alexander’s line of march, the
map at the end of the volume.

His arrival, in itself a most formidable event, told with double
force on the Greeks from its extreme suddenness. We can hardly doubt
that both Athenians and Thebans had communications at Pella—that
they looked upon any Macedonian invasion as likely to come from
thence—and that they expected Alexander himself (assuming him to
be still living, contrary to their belief) back in his capital
before he began any new enterprise. Upon this hypothesis—in itself
probable, and such as would have been realized if Alexander had not
already advanced so far southward at the moment when he received the
news[86]—they would at least have known beforehand of his approach,
and would have had the option of a defensive combination open. As it
happened, his unexpected appearance in the heart of Greece precluded
all combinations, and checked all idea of resistance.

[86] Diodorus (xvii. 9) incorrectly says that Alexander came back
unexpectedly from _Thrace_. Had this been the fact, he would have
come by Pella.

Two days after his arrival in Bœotia, he marched his army round
Thebes, so as to encamp on the south side of the city; whereby he
both intercepted the communication of the Thebans with Athens, and
exhibited his force more visibly to the garrison in the Kadmeia.
The Thebans, though alone and without hope of succor, maintained
their courage unshaken. Alexander deferred the attack for a day or
two, in hopes that they would submit; he wished to avoid an assault
which might cost the lives of many of his soldiers, whom he required
for his Asiatic schemes. He even made public proclamation,[87]
demanding the surrender of the anti-Macedonian leaders Phœnix and
Prochytes, but offering to any other Theban who chose to quit the
city, permission to come and join him on the terms of the convention
sworn in the preceding autumn. A general assembly being convened,
the macedonizing Thebans enforced the prudence of submission to
an irresistible force. But the leaders recently returned from
exile, who had headed the rising, warmly opposed this proposition,
contending for resistance to the death. In them, such resolution
may not be wonderful, since (as Arrian[88] remarks) they had gone
too far to hope for lenity. As it appears however that the mass of
citizens deliberately adopted the same resolution, in spite of
strong persuasion to the contrary,[89] we see plainly that they had
already felt the bitterness of Macedonian dominion, and that sooner
than endure a renewal of it, sure to be yet worse, coupled with
the dishonor of surrendering their leaders—they had made up their
minds to perish with the freedom of their city. At a time when the
sentiment of Hellas as an autonomous system was passing away, and
when Grecian courage was degenerating into a mere instrument for the
aggrandizement of Macedonian chiefs, these countrymen of Epaminondas
and Pelopidas set an example of devoted self-sacrifice in the cause
of Grecian liberty, not less honorable than that of Leonidas at
Thermopylæ, and only less esteemed because it proved infructuous.

[87] Diodor. xvii. 9; Plutarch. Alexand. 11.

[88] Arrian, i. 7, 16.

[89] Diodor. xvii. 9.

In reply to the proclamation of Alexander, the Thebans made from
their walls a counter-proclamation, demanding the surrender of his
officers Antipater and Philotas, and inviting every one to join
them, who desired, in concert with the Persian king and the Thebans,
to liberate the Greeks and put down the despot of Hellas.[90] Such
a haughty defiance and retort incensed Alexander to the quick.
He brought up his battering engines and prepared everything for
storming the town. Of the murderous assault which followed, we find
different accounts, not agreeing with each other, yet not wholly
irreconcilable. It appears that the Thebans had erected, probably
in connection with their operations against the Kadmeia, an outwork
defended by a double palisade. Their walls were guarded by the least
effective soldiers, metics and liberated slaves; while their best
troops were bold enough to go forth in front of the gates and give
battle. Alexander divided his army into three divisions; one under
Perdikkas and Amyntas, against the outwork—a second, destined to
combat the Thebans who sallied out—and a third, held in reserve.
Between the second of these three divisions, and the Thebans in front
of the gates, the battle was so obstinately contested, that success
at one time seemed doubtful, and Alexander was forced to order up his
reserve. The first Macedonian success was gained by Perdikkas,[91]
who, aided by the division of Amyntas and also by the Agrianian
regiment and the bowmen carried the first of the two outworks, as
well as a postern gate which had been left unguarded. His troops
also stormed the second outwork, though he himself was severely
wounded and borne away to the camp. Here the Theban defenders fled
back into the city, along the hollow way which led to the temple of
Herakles, pursued by the light troops, in advance of the rest. Upon
these men, however, the Thebans presently turned, repelling them
with the loss of Eurybotas their commanding officer and seventy men
slain. In pursuing these bowmen, the ranks of the Thebans became
somewhat disordered, so that they were unable to resist the steady
charge of the Macedonian guards and heavy infantry coming up in
support. They were broken, and pushed back into the city; their rout
being rendered still more complete by a sally of the Macedonian
garrison out of the Kadmeia. The assailants being victorious on this
side, the Thebans who were maintaining the combat without the gates
were compelled to retreat, and the advancing Macedonians forced
their way into the town along with them. Within the town, however,
the fighting still continued; the Thebans resisting in organized
bodies as long as they could; and when broken, still resisting even
single-handed. None of the military population sued for mercy; most
of them were slain in the streets; but a few cavalry and infantry cut
their way out into the plain and escaped. The fight now degenerated
into a carnage. The Macedonians with their Pæonian contingents were
incensed with the obstinate resistance; while various Greeks serving
as auxiliaries—Phokians, Orchomenians, Thespians, Platæans,—had
to avenge ancient and grievous injuries endured from Thebes. Such
furious feelings were satiated by an indiscriminate massacre of
all who came in their way, without distinction of age or sex—old
men, women, and children, in houses and even in temples. This
wholesale slaughter was accompanied of course by all the plunder and
manifold outrage with which victorious assailants usually reward
themselves.[92]

[90] Diodor. xvii. 9.

[91] The attack of Perdikkas was represented by Ptolemy, from
whom Arrian copies (i. 8, 1), not only as being the first
and only attack made by the Macedonian army on Thebes, but
also as made by Perdikkas _without orders from Alexander_,
who was forced to support it in order to preserve Perdikkas
from being overwhelmed by the Thebans. According to Ptolemy
and Arrian, therefore, the storming of Thebes took place both
without the orders, and against the wishes, of Alexander; the
capture moreover was effected rapidly with little trouble to
the besieging army (ἡ ἅλωσις δι᾽ ὀλίγου τε καὶ ~οὐ ξὺν πόνῳ τῶν
ἑλόντων~ ξυνενεχθεῖσα, Arr. i. 9, 9): the bloodshed and pillage
was committed by the vindictive sentiment of the Bœotian allies.

Diodorus had before him a very different account. He affirms that
Alexander both combined and ordered the assault—that the Thebans
behaved like bold and desperate men, resisting obstinately and
for a long time—that the slaughter afterwards was committed by
the general body of the assailants; the Bœotian allies being
doubtless conspicuous among them. Diodorus gives this account at
some length, and with his customary rhetorical amplifications.
Plutarch and Justin are more brief; but coincide in the same
general view, and not in that of Arrian. Polyænus again (iv. 3
12) gives something different from all.

To me it appears that the narrative of Diodorus is (in its
basis, and striking off rhetorical amplifications) more credible
than that of Arrian. Admitting the attack made by Perdikkas,
I conceive it to have been a portion of the general plan of
Alexander. I cannot think it probable that Perdikkas attacked
without orders, or that Thebes was captured with little
resistance. It was captured by _one_ assault (Æschines adv.
Ktesiph. p. 524), but by an assault well-combined and stoutly
contested—not by one begun without preparation or order, and
successful after hardly any resistance. Alexander, after having
offered what he thought liberal terms, was not the man to shrink
from carrying his point by force; nor would the Thebans have
refused those terms, unless their minds had been made up for
strenuous and desperate defence, without hope of ultimate success.

What authority Diodorus followed, we do not know. He may have
followed Kleitarchus, a contemporary and an Æolian, who must have
had good means of information respecting such an event as the
capture of Thebes (see Geier, Alexandri M. Historiarum Scriptores
ætate suppares, Leips. 1844, p. 6-152; and Vossius, De Historicis
Græcis. i. x. p. 90, ed. Westermann). I have due respect for the
authority of Ptolemy, but I cannot go along with Geier and other
critics who set aside all other witnesses, even contemporary,
respecting Alexander, as worthy of little credit, unless where
such witnesses are confirmed by Ptolemy or Aristobulus. We must
remember that Ptolemy did not compose his book until after he
became king of Egypt, in 306 B. C.; nor indeed until
after the battle of Ipsus in 301, according to Geier (p. 1);
at least twenty-nine years after the sack of Thebes. Moreover,
Ptolemy was not ashamed of what Geier calls (p. 11) the “pious
fraud” of announcing, that two speaking serpents conducted the
army of Alexander to the holy precinct of Zeus Ammon (Arrian,
iii. 3). Lastly, it will be found that the depositions which are
found in other historians, but not in Ptolemy and Aristobulus,
relate principally to matters discreditable to Alexander. That
Ptolemy and Aristobulus _omitted_, is in my judgment far more
probable, than that other historians _invented_. Admiring
biographers would easily excuse themselves for refusing to
proclaim to the world such acts as the massacre of the Branchidæ,
or the dragging of the wounded Batiz at Gaza.

[92] Arrian, i. 8; Diodor. xvii. 12, 13.

More than five hundred Macedonians are asserted to have been
slain, and six thousand Thebans. Thirty thousand captives were
collected.[93] The final destiny of these captives, and of Thebes
itself, was submitted by Alexander to the Orchomenians, Platæans,
Phokians, and other Grecian auxiliaries in the assault. He must
have known well beforehand what the sentence of such judges would
be. They pronounced, that the city of Thebes should be razed to the
ground: that the Kadmeia alone should be maintained, as a military
post with Macedonian garrison: that the Theban territory should be
distributed among the allies themselves: that Orchomenus and Platæa
should be rebuilt and fortified: that all the captive Thebans,
men, women, and children, should be sold as slaves—excepting only
priests and priestesses, and such as were connected by recognized
ties of hospitality with Philip or Alexander, or such as had been
_proxeni_ of the Macedonians; that the Thebans who had escaped should
be proclaimed outlaws, liable to arrest and death, wherever they
were found; and that every Grecian city should be interdicted from
harboring them.[94]

[93] Diodorus (xvii. 14) and Plutarch (Alexand. 11) agree in
giving the totals of 6000 and 30,000.

[94] Arrian, i. 9; Diodor. xvii. 14.

This overwhelming sentence, in spite of an appeal for lenity by a
Theban[95] named Kleadas, was passed by the Grecian auxiliaries
of Alexander, and executed by Alexander himself, who made but one
addition to the excepting clauses. He left the house of Pindar
standing, and spared the descendants of the poet. With these
reserves, Thebes was effaced from the earth. The Theban territory was
partitioned among the reconstituted cities of Orchomenus and Platæa.
Nothing, except the Macedonian military post at the Kadmeia, remained
to mark the place where the chief of the Bœotian confederacy had
once stood. The captives were all sold, and are said to have yielded
440 talents; large prices being offered by bidders from feelings of
hostility towards the city.[96] Diodorus tells us that this sentence
was passed by the general synod of Greeks. But we are not called upon
to believe that this synod, subservient though it was sure to be when
called upon to deliberate under the armed force of Alexander, could
be brought to sanction such a ruin upon one of the first and most
ancient Hellenic cities. For we learn from Arrian that the question
was discussed and settled only by the Grecian auxiliaries who had
taken part with Alexander;[97] and that the sentence therefore
represents the bitter antipathies of the Orchomenians, Platæans, etc.
Without doubt, these cities had sustained harsh and cruel treatment
from Thebes. In so far as they were concerned, the retribution upon
the Thebans was merited. Those persons, however, who (as Arrian tells
us) pronounced the catastrophe to be a divine judgment upon Thebes
for having joined Xerxes against Greece[98] a century and a half
before,—must have forgotten that not only the Orchomenians, but even
Alexander of Macedon, the namesake and predecessor of the destroying
conqueror, had served in the army of Xerxes along with the Thebans.

[95] Justin, xi. 4.

[96] Diodor. xvii. 14; Justin, xi. 4: “pretium non ex ementium
commodo, sed ex inimicorum odio extenditur.”

[97] Arrian, i. 9, 13. Τοῖς δὲ μετασχοῦσι τοῦ ἔργου ξυμμάχοις,
οἷς δὴ καὶ ἐπέτρεψεν Ἀλέξανδρος τὰ κατὰ τὰς Θήβας διαθεῖναι,
ἔδοξε, etc.

[98] Arrian, i. 9, 10. He informs us (i. 9, 12) that there were
many previous portents which foreshadowed this ruin: Diodorus
(xvii. 10) on the contrary, enumerates many previous signs, all
tending to encourage the Thebans.

Arrian vainly endeavors to transfer from Alexander to the minor
Bœotian towns the odium of this cruel destruction—unparalleled in
Grecian history (as he himself says), when we look to the magnitude
of the city; yet surpassed in the aggregate by the subversion, under
the arms of Philip, of no less than thirty-two free Chalkidic cities,
thirteen years before. The known antipathy of these Bœotians was
invoked by Alexander to color an infliction which satisfied at once
his sentiment, by destroying an enemy who defied him—and his policy,
by serving as a terrific example to keep down other Greeks.[99] But
though such were the views which governed him at the moment, he came
afterwards to look back upon the proceeding with shame and sorrow.
The shock to Hellenic feeling, when a city was subverted, arose not
merely from the violent extinction of life, property, liberty, and
social or political institutions—but also from the obliteration of
legends and the suppression of religious observances, thus wronging
and provoking the local gods and heroes. We shall presently find
Alexander himself sacrificing at Ilium,[100] in order to appease the
wrath of Priam, still subsisting and efficacious, against himself and
his race, as being descended from Neoptolemus the slayer of Priam.
By his harsh treatment of Thebes, he incurred the displeasure of
Dionysus, the god of wine, said to have been born in that city, and
one of the principal figures in Theban legend. It was to inspirations
of the offended Dionysus that Alexander believed himself to owe
that ungovernable drunken passion under which he afterwards killed
Kleitus, as well as the refusal of his Macedonian soldiers to follow
him farther into India.[101] If Alexander in after days thus
repented of his own act, we may be sure that the like repugnance
was felt still more strongly by others; and we can understand the
sentiment under which, a few years after his decease, the Macedonian
Kassander, son of Antipater, restored the destroyed city.

[99] Plutarch, Alex. 11. ἡ μὲν πόλις ἥλω καὶ διαρπασθεῖσα
κατεσκάφη, τὸ μὲν ὅλον προσδοκήσαντος αὐτοῦ τοὺς Ἕλληνας πάθει
τηλικούτῳ ἐκπλαγέντας καὶ πτήξαντας ἀτρεμήσειν, ἄλλως δὲ καὶ
καλλωπισαμένου χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς τῶν συμμάχων ἐγκλήμασιν.

[100] Arrian, i. 11, 13. To illustrate farther the feeling of
the Greeks, respecting the wrath of the gods arising from the
discontinuance of worship where it had been long continued—I
transcribe a passage from Colonel Sleeman’s work respecting the
Hindoos, whose religious feelings are on so many points analogous
to those of the Hellênes:—

“Human sacrifices were certainly offered in the city of Saugor
during the whole Mahratta government, up to the year 1800—when
they were put a stop to by the local governor, Assa Sahib, a very
humane man. I once heard a learned Brahmin priest say, that he
thought the decline of his (Assa Sahib’s) family and government
arose from this innovation. ‘There is (said he) no sin in not
offering human sacrifices to the gods, where none have been
offered; _but where the gods have been accustomed to them, they
are very naturally annoyed when the rite is abolished, and visit
the place and the people with all kinds of calamity_.’ The priest
did not seem to think that there was anything singular in this
mode of reasoning: perhaps three Brahmin priests out of four
would have reasoned in the same manner.” (Sleeman, Rambles and
Recollections of an Indian Official, vol. i. ch. xv. p. 130).

[101] Plutarch, Alex. 13: compare Justin, xi. 4; and Isokrates ad
Philipp. (Or. v. s. 35), where he recommends Thebes to Philip on
the ground of pre-eminent worship towards Herakles.

It deserves notice, that while Alexander himself repented of
the destruction of Thebes, the macedonizing orator at Athens
describes it as a just, though deplorable penalty, brought by the
Thebans upon themselves by reckless insanity of conduct (Æschines
adv. Ktesiph. p. 524).

At the time, however, the effect produced by the destruction of
Thebes was one of unmitigated terror throughout the Grecian cities.
All of them sought to make their peace with the conqueror. The
Arcadian contingent not only returned home from the Isthmus, but even
condemned their leaders to death. The Eleians recalled their chief
macedonizing citizens out of exile into ascendency at home. Each
tribe of Ætolians sent envoys to Alexander, entreating forgiveness
for the manifestations against him. At Athens, we read with surprise
that on the very day when Thebes was assaulted and taken, the great
festival of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr, with its multitudinous procession
of votaries from Athens to Eleusis, was actually taking place,
at a distance of two days’ march from the besieged city. Most
Theban fugitives who contrived to escape, fled to Attica as the
nearest place of refuge, communicating to the Athenians their own
distress and terror. The festival was forthwith suspended. Every
one hurried within the walls of Athens,[102] carrying with him his
movable property into a state of security. Under the general alarm
prevalent, that the conqueror would march directly into Attica,
and under the hurry of preparation for defence,—the persons both
most alarmed and most in real danger were, of course, Demosthenes,
Lykurgus, Charidemus, and those others who had been loudest in speech
against Macedonia, and had tried to prevail on the Athenians to
espouse openly the cause of Thebes. Yet notwithstanding such terror
of consequences to themselves, the Athenians afforded shelter and
sympathy to the miserable Theban fugitives. They continued to do this
even when they must have known that they were contravening the edict
of proscription just sanctioned by Alexander.

[102] Arrian, i. 10, 4.

Shortly afterwards, envoys arrived from that monarch with a menacing
letter, formally demanding the surrender of eight or ten leading
citizens of Athens—Demosthenes, Lykurgus, Hyperides, Polyeuktus,
Mœroklês, Diotimus,[103] Ephialtes, and Charidemus. Of these the
first four were eminent orators, the last two military men; all
strenuous advocates of an anti-Macedonian policy. Alexander in his
letter denounced the ten as the causes of the battle of Chæroneia,
of the offensive resolutions which had been adopted at Athens after
the death of Philip, and even of the recent hostile proceedings
of the Thebans.[104] This momentous summons, involving the right
of free speech and public debate at Athens, was submitted to the
assembly. A similar demand had just been made upon the Thebans, and
the consequences of refusal were to be read no less plainly in the
destruction of their city than in the threats of the conqueror. That
even under such trying circumstances, neither orators nor people
failed in courage—we know as a general fact; though we have not the
advantage (as Livy had in his time) of reading the speeches made in
the debate.[105] Demosthenes, insisting that the fate of the citizens
generally could not be severed from that of the specific victims, is
said to have recounted in the course of his speech, the old fable—of
the wolf requiring the sheep to make over to him their protecting
dogs, as a condition of peace—and then, devouring the unprotected
sheep forthwith. He, and those demanded along with him, claimed the
protection of the people, in whose cause alone they had incurred
the wrath of the conqueror. Phokion on the other hand—silent at
first, and rising only under constraint by special calls from the
popular voice—contended that there was not force enough to resist
Alexander, and that the persons in question must be given up. He
even made appeal to themselves individually, reminding them of the
self-devotion of the daughters of Erechtheus, memorable in Attic
legend—and calling on them to surrender themselves voluntarily for
the purpose of perverting public calamity He added, that he (Phokion)
would rejoice to offer up either himself, or his best friend, if
by such sacrifice he could save the city.[106] Lykurgus, one of
the orators whose extradition was required, answered this speech
of Phokion with vehemence and bitterness; and the public sentiment
went along with him, indignantly repudiating Phokion’s advice. By a
resolute patriotism highly honorable at this trying juncture, it was
decreed that the persons demanded should not be surrendered.[107]

[103] The name of Diotimus is mentioned by Arrian (i. 10, 6),
but not by Plutarch; who names Demon instead of him (Plutarch,
Demosth. c. 23) and Kallisthenes instead of Hyperides. We know
nothing about Diotimus, except that Demosthenes (De Coronâ, p.
264) alludes to him along with Charidemus, as having received
an expression of gratitude from the people, in requital for a
present of shields which he had made. He is mentioned also, along
with Charidemus and others, in the third of the Demosthenic
epistles, p. 1482.

[104] Arrian, i. 10, 6; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 847. ἐξῄτει
αὐτὸν (Demosthenes) ἀπειλὼν εἰ μὴ δοίησαν. Diodor. xvii. 15;
Plutarch, Demosth. 23.

[105] Livy; ix. 18. “(Alexander), adversus quem Athenis, in
civitate fractâ Macedonum armis, cernente tum maxime prope
fumantes Thebarum ruinas, concionari libere ausi sint homines,—id
quod ex monumentis orationum patet”, etc.

[106] Plutarch, Phokion, 9-17; Diodor. xvii. 15.

[107] Diodor. xvii. 15. Ὁ δὲ δῆμος τοῦτον μὲν (Phokion) τοῖς
θορύβοις ἐξέβαλε, προσάντως ἀκούων τοὺς λόγους.

On the motion of Demades, an embassy was sent to Alexander,
deprecating his wrath against the ten, and engaging to punish them
by judicial sentence, if any crime could be proved against them.
Demades, who is said to have received from Demosthenes a bribe of
five talents, undertook this mission. But Alexander was at first
inexorable; refusing even to hear the envoys, and persisting in his
requisition. It was only by the intervention of a second embassy,
headed by Phokion, that a remission of terms was obtained. Alexander
was persuaded to withdraw his requisition, and to be satisfied with
the banishment of Charidemus and Ephialtes, the two anti-Macedonian
military leaders. Both of them accordingly, and seemingly other
Athenians with them, passed into Asia, where they took service under
Darius.[108]

[108] Arrian, i. 10, 8; Diodor. xvii. 15; Plutarch, Phokion, 17;
Justin, xi. 4; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 26.

Arrian states that the visit of Demades with nine other Athenian
envoys to Alexander, occurred _prior_ to the demand of Alexander
for the extradition of the ten citizens. He (Arrian) affirms
that immediately on hearing the capture of Thebes, the Athenians
passed a vote, on the motion of Demades, to send ten envoys,
for the purpose of expressing satisfaction that Alexander had
come home safely from the Illyrians, and that he had punished
the Thebans for their revolt. Alexander (according to Arrian)
received this mission courteously, but replied by sending a
letter to the Athenian people, insisting on the surrender of the
ten citizens.

Now both Diodorus and Plutarch represent the mission of Demades
as _posterior_ to the demand made by Alexander for the ten
citizens; and that it was intended to meet and deprecate that
demand.

In my judgment, Arrian’s tale is the less credible of the two.
I think it highly improbable that the Athenians would by public
vote express satisfaction that Alexander had punished the Thebans
for their revolt. If the macedonizing party at Athens was strong
enough to carry so ignominious a vote, they would also have been
strong enough to carry the subsequent proposition of Phokion—that
the ten citizens demanded should be surrendered. The fact, that
the Athenians afforded willing shelter to the Theban fugitives,
is a farther reason for disbelieving this alleged vote.

It was indeed no part of Alexander’s plan to undertake a siege of
Athens, which might prove long and difficult, since the Athenians had
a superior naval force, with the sea open to them, and the chance
of effective support from Persia. When therefore he saw, that his
demand for the ten orators would be firmly resisted, considerations
of policy gradually overcame his wrath, and induced him to relax.

Phokion returned to Athens as the bearer of Alexander’s concessions,
thus relieving the Athenians from extreme anxiety and peril. His
influence—already great and of long standing, since for years past
he had been perpetually re-elected general—became greater than ever,
while that of Demosthenes and the other anti-Macedonian orators must
have been lowered. It was no mean advantage to Alexander, victorious
as he was, to secure the incorruptible Phokion as leader of the
macedonizing party at Athens. His projects against Persia were mainly
exposed to failure from the possibility of opposition being raised
against him in Greece by the agency of Persian money and ships.
To keep Athens out of such combinations, he had to rely upon the
personal influence and party of Phokion, whom he knew to have always
dissuaded her from resistance to the ever-growing aggrandizement
of his father Philip. In his conversation with Phokion on the
intended Asiatic expedition, Alexander took some pains to flatter
the pride of Athens by describing her as second only to himself,
and as entitled to the headship of Greece, in case any thing should
happen to him.[109] Such compliments were suitable to be repeated in
the Athenian assembly: indeed the Macedonian prince might naturally
prefer the idea of Athenian headship to that of Spartan, seeing that
Sparta stood aloof from him, an open recusant.

[109] Plutarch, Phokion, 17; Plutarch, Alexand. 13.

The animosity of Alexander being appeased, Athens resumed her
position as a member of the confederacy under his imperial authority.
Without visiting Attica, he now marched to the Isthmus of Corinth,
where he probably received from various Grecian cities deputations
deprecating his displeasure, and proclaiming their submission to
his imperial authority. He also probably presided at a meeting of
the Grecian synod, where he would dictate the contingents required
for his intended Asiatic expedition in the ensuing spring. To the
universal deference and submission which greeted him, one exception
was found—the Cynic philosopher Diogenes, who resided at Corinth,
satisfied with a tub for shelter, and with the coarsest and most
self-denying existence. Alexander approached him with a numerous
suite, and asked him if he wished for anything; upon which Diogenes
is said to have replied,—“Nothing, except that you would stand a
little out of my sunshine.” Both the philosopher and his reply
provoked laughter from the bystanders, but Alexander himself was
so impressed with the independent and self-sufficing character
manifested, that he exclaimed,—“If I were not Alexander, I would be
Diogenes.”[110]

[110] Plutarch, Alex. 14.

Having visited the oracle of Delphi, and received or extorted
from the priestess[111] an answer bearing favorable promise for
his Asiatic schemes, he returned to Macedonia before the winter.
The most important permanent effect of his stay in Greece was the
reconstitution of Bœotia; that is, the destruction of Thebes, and
the reconstitution of Orchomenus, Thespiæ, and Platæa, dividing
between them the Theban territory; all guarded and controlled by a
Macedonian garrison in the Kadmeia. It would have been interesting
to learn some details about this process of destruction and
restitution of the Bœotian towns; a process not only calling forth
strong manifestations of sentiment, but also involving important and
difficult questions to settle. But unfortunately we are not permitted
to know anything beyond the general fact.

[111] Plutarch, Alex. 14.

Alexander left Greece for Pella in the autumn of 335 B. C.,
and never saw it again.

It appears, that during this summer, while he was occupied in
his Illyrian and Theban operations, the Macedonian force under
Parmenio in Asia had had to contend against a Persian army, or Greek
mercenaries, commanded by Memnon the Rhodian. Parmenio, marching into
Æolis, besieged and took Grynium; after which he attacked Pitanê,
but was compelled by Memnon to raise the siege. Memnon even gained
a victory over the Macedonian force under Kallas in the Troad,
compelling them to retire to Rhœteum. But he failed in an attempt to
surprise Kyzikus, and was obliged to content himself with plundering
the adjoining territory.[112] It is affirmed that Darius was engaged
this summer in making large preparations, naval as well as military,
to resist the intended expedition of Alexander. Yet all that we hear
of what was actually done implies nothing beyond a moderate force.

[112] Diodor. xvi. 7.

CHAPTER XCII.

ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER.

A year and some months had sufficed for Alexander to make a first
display of his energy and military skill, destined for achievements
yet greater; and to crush the growing aspirations for freedom
among Greeks on the south, as well as among Thracians on the north,
of Macedonia. The ensuing winter was employed in completing his
preparations; so that early in the spring of 334 B. C., his army
destined for the conquest of Asia was mustered between Pella and
Amphipolis, while his fleet was at hand to lend support.

The whole of Alexander’s remaining life—from his crossing the
Hellespont in March or April 334 B. C., to his death at Babylon in
June 323 B. C., eleven years and two or three months—was passed in
Asia, amidst unceasing military operations, and ever-multiplied
conquests. He never lived to revisit Macedonia; but his achievements
were on so transcendent a scale, his acquisitions of territory so
unmeasured, and his thirst for farther aggrandizement still so
insatiate, that Macedonia sinks into insignificance in the list
of his possessions. Much more do the Grecian cities dwindle into
outlying appendages of a newly-grown Oriental empire. During all
these eleven years, the history of Greece is almost a blank, except
here and there a few scattered events. It is only at the death of
Alexander that the Grecian cities again awaken into active movement.

The Asiatic conquests of Alexander do not belong directly and
literally to the province of an historian of Greece. They were
achieved by armies of which the general, the principal officers,
and most part of the soldiers, were Macedonian. The Greeks who
served with him were only auxiliaries, along with the Thracians
and Pæonians. Though more numerous than all the other auxiliaries,
they did not constitute, like the Ten Thousand Greeks in the army
of the younger Cyrus, the force on which he mainly relied for
victory. His chief-secretary, Eumenes of Kardia, was a Greek, and
probably most of the civil and intellectual functions connected
with the service were also performed by Greeks. Many Greeks also
served in the army of Persia against him, and composed indeed a
larger proportion of the real force (disregarding mere numbers) in
the army of Darius than in that of Alexander. Hence the expedition
becomes indirectly incorporated with the stream of Grecian history
by the powerful auxiliary agency of Greeks on both sides—and still
more, by its connection with previous projects, dreams, and legends,
long antecedent to the aggrandizement of Macedon—as well as by the
character which Alexander thought fit to assume. To take revenge on
Persia for the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and to liberate the
Asiatic Greeks, had been the scheme of the Spartan Agesilaus, and of
the Pheræan Jason; with hopes grounded on the memorable expedition
and safe return of the Ten Thousand. It had been recommended by the
rhetor Isokrates, first to the combined force of Greece, while yet
Grecian cities were free, under the joint headship of Athens and
Sparta—next, to Philip of Macedon as the chief of united Greece, when
his victorious arms had extorted a recognition of headship, setting
aside both Athens and Sparta. The enterprising ambition of Philip was
well pleased to be nominated chief of Greece for the execution of
this project. From him it passed to his yet more ambitious son.

Though really a scheme of Macedonian appetite and for Macedonian
aggrandizement, the expedition against Asia thus becomes thrust
into the series of Grecian events, under the Pan-hellenic pretence
of retaliation for the long past insults of Xerxes. I call it a
_pretence_, because it had ceased to be a real Hellenic feeling, and
served now two different purposes; first, to ennoble the undertaking
in the eyes of Alexander himself, whose mind was very accessible
to religious and legendary sentiment, and who willingly identified
himself with Agamemnon or Achilles, immortalized as executors of the
collective vengeance of Greece for Asiatic insult—next, to assist in
keeping the Greeks quiet during his absence. He was himself aware
that the real sympathies of the Greeks were rather adverse than
favorable to his success.

Apart from this body of extinct sentiment, ostentatiously rekindled
for Alexander’s purposes, the position of the Greeks in reference to
his Asiatic conquests was very much the same as that of the German
contingents, especially those of the Confederation of the Rhine, who
served in the grand army with which the Emperor Napoleon invaded
Russia in 1812. They had no public interest in the victory of the
invader, which could end only by reducing them to still greater
prostration. They were likely to adhere to their leader as long as
his power continued unimpaired, but no longer. Yet Napoleon thought
himself entitled to reckon upon them as if they had been Frenchmen,
and to denounce the Germans in the service of Russia as traitors
who had forfeited the allegiance which they owed to him. We find him
drawing the same pointed distinction between the Russian and the
German prisoners taken, as Alexander made between Asiatic and Grecian
prisoners. These Grecian prisoners the Macedonian prince reproached
as guilty of treason against the proclaimed statute of collective
Hellas, whereby he had been declared general, and the Persian king a
public enemy.[113]

[113] Arrian, i. 16, 10; i. 29, 9, about the Grecian prisoners
taken at the victory of the Granikus—ὅσους δὲ αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους
ἔλαβε, τούτους δὲ δήσας ἐν πέδαις, εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἀπέπεμψεν
ἐργάζεσθαι, ὅτι παρὰ τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, Ἕλληνες
ὄντες, ἐναντία τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὲρ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐμάχοντο. Also iii.
23, 15, about the Grecian soldiers serving with the Persians, and
made prisoners in Hyrkania—Ἀδικεῖν γὰρ μεγάλα (said Alexander)
τοὺς στρατευομένους ἐναντία τῇ Ἑλλάδι παρὰ τοῖς βαρβάροις παρὰ τὰ
δόγματα τῶν Ἑλλήνων.

Toward the end of October 1812, near Moscow, General
Winzingerode, a German officer in the Russian service,—with his
aide-de-camp a native Russian, Narishkin,—became prisoner of the
French. He was brought to Napoleon—“At the sight of that German
general, all the secret resentments of Napoleon took fire. ‘Who
are you (he exclaimed)? a man without a country! When I was at
war with the Austrians, I found you in their ranks. Austria has
become my ally, and you have entered into the Russian service.
You have been one of the warmest instigators of the present
war. Nevertheless, you are a native of the Confederation of the
Rhine: _you are my subject_. You are not an ordinary enemy:
you are a rebel: I have a right to bring you to trial. _Gens
d’armes_, seize this man!’ Then addressing the aide-de-camp of
Winzingerode, Napoleon said, ‘As for you, Count Narishkin, I have
nothing to reproach you with: you are a Russian, you are doing
your duty.’” (Ségur’s account of the Campaign in Russia, book ix.
ch. vi. p. 132.)

Napoleon did not realize these threats against Winzingerode;
but his language expresses just the same sentiment as that of
Alexander towards the captive Greeks.

Hellas, as a political aggregate, has now ceased to exist, except
in so far as Alexander employs the name for his own purposes.
Its component members are annexed as appendages, doubtless of
considerable value, to the Macedonian kingdom. Fourteen years
before Alexander’s accession, Demosthenes, while instigating the
Athenians to uphold Olynthus against Philip, had told them[114]—“The
Macedonian power, considered as an appendage, is of no mean value;
but by itself, it is weak and full of embarrassments.” Inverting the
position of the parties, these words represent exactly what Greece
herself had become, in reference to Macedonia and Persia, at the time
of Alexander’s accession. Had the Persians played their game with
tolerable prudence and vigor, his success would have been measured by
the degree to which he could appropriate Grecian force to himself,
and withhold it from his enemy.

[114] Demosth. Olynth. ii. p. 14 Ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἡ Μακεδονικὴ
δύναμις καὶ ἀρχὴ ~ἐν μὲν προσθήκῃ μερίς~ ἐστὶ τις οὐ σμικρὰ, οἷον
ὑπῆρξέ ποθ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐπὶ Τιμοθέου πρὸς Ὀλυνθίους ... αὐτὴ δὲ καθ᾽
αὑτὴν ἀσθενὴς καὶ πολλῶν κακῶν ἐστὶ μεστὴ.

Alexander’s memorable and illustrious manifestations, on which we
are now entering, are those, not of the ruler or politician, but
of the general and the soldier. In this character his appearance
forms a sort of historical epoch. It is not merely in soldier-like
qualities—in the most forward and even adventurous bravery—in
indefatigable personal activity, and in endurance as to hardship
and fatigue,—that he stands pre-eminent; though these qualities
alone, when found in a king, act so powerfully on those under his
command, that they suffice to produce great achievements, even
when combined with generalship not surpassing the average of his
age. But in generalship, Alexander was yet more above the level of
his contemporaries. His strategic combinations, his employment of
different descriptions of force conspiring towards one end, his
long-sighted plans for the prosecution of campaigns, his constant
foresight and resource against new difficulties, together with
rapidity of movement even in the worst country—all on a scale of
prodigious magnitude—are without parallel in ancient history. They
carry the art of systematic and scientific welfare to a degree of
efficiency, such as even successors trained in his school were unable
to keep up unimpaired.

We must recollect however that Alexander found the Macedonian
military system built up by Philip, and had only to apply and enlarge
it. As transmitted to him, it embodied the accumulated result and
matured fruit of a series of successive improvements, applied by
Grecian tacticians to the primitive Hellenic arrangements. During
the sixty years before the accession of Alexander, the art of war
had been conspicuously progressive—to the sad detriment of Grecian
political freedom. “Everything around us (says Demosthenes addressing
the people of Athens in 342 B. C.), has been in advance for
some years past—nothing is like what it was formerly—but nowhere is
the alteration and enlargement more conspicuous than in the affairs
of war. Formerly, the Lacedæmonians as well as other Greeks did
nothing more than invade each other’s territory, during the four or
five summer months, with their native force of citizen hoplites: in
winter they stayed at home. But now we see Philip in constant action,
winter as well as summer, attacking all around him, not merely with
Macedonian hoplites, but with cavalry, light infantry, bowmen,
foreigners of all descriptions, and siege-batteries.”[115]

[115] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 123, 124: compare Olynth. ii. p.
22. I give here the substance of what is said by the orator, not
strictly adhering to his words.

I have in my last two volumes dwelt upon this progressive change in
the character of Grecian soldiership. At Athens, and in most other
parts of Greece, the burghers had become averse to hard and active
military service. The use of arms had passed mainly to professional
soldiers, who, without any feeling of citizenship, served wherever
good pay was offered, and became immensely multiplied, to the
detriment and danger of Grecian society.[116] Many of these
mercenaries were lightly armed—peltasts served in combination
with the hoplites.[117] Iphikrates greatly improved and partly
re-armed the peltasts; whom he employed conjointly with hoplites so
effectively as to astonish his contemporaries.[118] His innovation
was farther developed by the great military genius of Epaminondas;
who not only made infantry and cavalry, light-armed and heavy-armed,
conspire to one scheme of operations, but also completely altered
the received principles of battle-manœuvring, by concentrating an
irresistible force of attack on one point of the enemy’s line, and
keeping the rest of his own line more on the defensive. Besides these
important improvements, realized by generals in actual practice,
intelligent officers like Xenophon embodied the results of their
military experience in valuable published criticisms.[119] Such were
the lessons which the Macedonian Philip learnt and applied to the
enslavement of those Greeks, especially of the Thebans, from whom
they were derived. In his youth, as a hostage at Thebes, he had
probably conversed with Epaminondas, and must certainly have become
familiar with the Theban military arrangements. He had every motive,
not merely from ambition, of conquest, but even from the necessities
of defence, to turn them to account: and he brought to the task
military genius and aptitude of the highest order. In arms, in
evolutions, in engines, in regimenting, in war-office arrangements,
he introduced important novelties; bequeathing to his successors the
Macedonian military system, which, with improvements by his son,
lasted until the conquest of the country by Rome, near two centuries
afterwards.

[116] Isokrates, in several of his discourses, notes the gradual
increase of these mercenaries—men without regular means of
subsistence, or fixed residence, or civic obligations. Or. iv.
(Panegyr.) s. 195; Or. v. (Philippus), s. 112-142; Or. viii. (De
Pace), s. 31-56.

[117] Xenoph. Magist. Equit. ix. 4. Οἶδα δ᾽ ἐγὼ καὶ
Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ ἱππικὸν ἀρξάμενον εὐδοκιμεῖν, ἐπεὶ ξένους
ἱππέας προσέλαβον· καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι πανταχοῦ τὰ ξενικὰ
ὁρῶ εὐδοκιμοῦντα.

Compare Demosth. Philippic. i. p. 46; Xenoph. Hellenic. iv. 4,
14; Isokrates, Orat. vii. (Areopagit.), s. 93.

[118] For an explanation of the improved arming of peltasts
introduced by Iphikrates, see Vol. IX. Ch. lxxv. p. 335 of this
History. Respecting these improvements, the statements both
of Diodorus (xv. 44) and of Nepos are obscure. MM. Rüstow and
Köchly (in their valuable work, Geschichte des Griechischen
Kriegswesens, Aarau, 1852, B. ii. p. 164) have interpreted the
statements in a sense to which I cannot subscribe. They think
that Iphikrates altered not only the arming of peltasts, but also
that of hoplites; a supposition, which I see nothing to justify.

[119] Besides the many scattered remarks in the Anabasis, the
Cyropædia is full of discussion and criticism on military
phænomena. It is remarkable to what an extent Xenophon had
present to his mind all the exigencies of war, and the different
ways of meeting them. See as an example, Cyropæd. vi. 2; ii. 1.

The work on sieges, by Æneas (Poliorketica), is certainly
anterior to the military improvements of Philip of Macedon:
probably about the beginning of his reign. See the preface
to it by Rüstow and Köchly, p. 8, in their edition of Die
Griechischen Kriegs-schriftsteller, Leips. 1853. In this work,
allusion is made to several others, now lost, by the same
author—Παρασκευαστικὴ βίβλος, Ποριστικὴ Βίβλος, Στρατοπεδευτικὴ,
etc.

The military force of Macedonia, in the times anterior to Philip,
appears to have consisted, like that of Thessaly, in a well-armed
and well-mounted cavalry, formed from the substantial proprietors
of the country—and in a numerous assemblage of peltasts or light
infantry (somewhat analogous to the Thessalian Penestæ): these latter
were the rural population, shepherds or cultivators, who tended
sheep and cattle, or tilled the earth, among the spacious mountains
and valleys of Upper Macedonia. The Grecian towns near the coast,
and the few Macedonian towns in the interior, had citizen-hoplites
better armed; but foot-service was not in honor among the natives,
and the Macedonian infantry in their general character were hardly
more than a rabble. At the period of Philip’s accession, they were
armed with nothing better than rusty swords and wicker shields, noway
sufficient to make head against the inroads of their Thracian and
Illyrian neighbors; before whom they were constantly compelled to
flee for refuge up into the mountains.[120] Their condition was that
of a poor herdsman, half-naked or covered only with hides, and eating
from wooden platters: not much different from that of the population
of Upper Macedonia three centuries before, when first visited by
Perdikkas the ancestor of the Macedonian kings, and when the wife
of the native prince baked bread with her own hands.[121] On the
other hand, though the Macedonian infantry was thus indifferent, the
cavalry of the country was excellent, both in the Peloponnesian war,
and in the war carried on by Sparta against Olynthus more than twenty
years afterwards.[122] These horsemen, like the Thessalians, charged
in compact order, carrying as their principal weapon of offence, not
javelins to be hurled, but the short thrusting-pike for close combat.

[120] See the striking speech addressed by Alexander to the
discontented Macedonian soldiers, a few months before his death,
at Opis or Susa (Arrian, vii).

... Φίλιππος γὰρ παραλαβὼν ὑμᾶς πλανήτας καὶ ἀπόρους, ἐν
διφθέραις τοὺς πολλοὺς νέμοντας ἀνὰ τὰ ὄρη πρόβατα κατὰ ὄλιγα,
καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτων κακῶς μαχομένους Ἰλλυριοῖς τε καὶ Τριβαλλοῖς καὶ
τοῖς ὁμόροις Θρᾳξὶ, χλαμύδας μὲν ὑμῖν ἀντὶ τῶν διφθερῶν φορεῖν
ἔδωκε, κατήγαγε δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὀρῶν ἐς τὰ πεδία, ἀξιομάχους καταστήσας
τοῖς προσχώροις τῶν βαρβάρων, ὡς μὴ χωρίων ἔτι ὀχυρότητι
πιστεύοντας μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἀρετῇ σώζεσθαι....

In the version of the same speech given by Curtius (x. 10,
23), we find, “Modo sub Philippo seminudis, amicula ex purpurâ
sordent, aurum et argentum oculi ferre non possunt: lignea enim
vasa desiderant, et ex cratibus scuta rubiginemque gladiorum”,
etc.

Compare the description given by Thucydides, iv. 124, of the
army of Brasidas and Perdikkas, where the Macedonian foot are
described as ἄλλος ὅμιλος τῶν βαρβάρων πολύς.

[121] Herodot. viii. 137.

[122] Thucyd. ii. 100; Xenoph. Hellen. v. 2, 40-42.

Thus defective was the military organization which Philip found.
Under his auspices it was cast altogether anew. The poor and hardy
Landwehr of Macedonia, constantly on the defensive against predatory
neighbors, formed an excellent material for soldiers, and proved
not intractable to the innovations of a warlike prince. They were
placed under constant training in the regular rank and file of heavy
infantry: they were moreover brought to adopt a new description
of arm, not only in itself very difficult to manage, but also
comparatively useless to the soldier when fighting single-handed,
and only available by a body of men in close order, trained to
move or stand together. The new weapon, of which we first hear the
name in the army of Philip, was the sarissa—the Macedonian pike or
lance. The sarissa was used both by the infantry of his phalanx,
and by particular regiments of his cavalry; in both cases it was
long, though that of the phalanx was much the longer of the two.
The regiments of cavalry called Sarissophori or Lancers were a sort
of light-horse, carrying a long lance, and distinguished from the
heavier cavalry intended for the shock of hand combat, who carried
the xyston or short pike. The sarissa of this cavalry may have been
fourteen feet in length, as long as the Cossack pike now is; that of
the infantry in phalanx was not less than twenty-one feet long. This
dimension is so prodigious and so unwieldy, that we should hardly
believe it, if it did not come attested by the distinct assertion of
an historian like Polybius.

The extraordinary reach of the sarissa or pike constituted the
prominent attribute and force of the Macedonian phalanx. The
phalangites were drawn up in files generally sixteen deep, each
called a Lochus; with an interval of three feet between each two
soldiers from front to rear. In front stood the lochage, a man of
superior strength, and of tried military experience. The second and
third men in the file, as well as the rearmost man who brought up the
whole, were also picked soldiers, receiving larger pay than the rest.
Now the sarissa, when in horizontal position, was held with both
hands (distinguished in this respect from the pike of the Grecian
hoplite, which occupied only one hand, the other being required
for the shield), and so held that it projected fifteen feet before
the body of the pikeman; while the hinder portion of six feet so
weighted as to make the pressure convenient in such division. Hence,
the sarissa of the man standing second in the file, projected twelve
feet beyond the front rank; that of the third man, nine feet; these
of the fourth and fifth ranks, respectively six feet and three feet.
There was thus presented a quintuple series of pikes by each file,
to meet an advancing enemy. Of these five, the three first would be
decidedly of greater projection, and even the fourth of not less
projection, than the pikes of Grecian hoplites coming up as enemies
to the charge. The ranks behind the fifth, while serving to sustain
and press onward the front, did not carry the sarissa in a horizontal
position, but slanted it over the shoulders of those before them, so
as to break the force of any darts or arrows which might be shot over
head from the rear ranks of the enemy.[123]

[123] Respecting the length of the pike of the Macedonian
phalanx, see Appendix to this Chapter.

The phalangite (soldier of the phalanx) was farther provided
with a short sword, a circular shield of rather more than two
feet in diameter, a breast-piece, leggings, and a kausia or
broad-brimmed-hat—the head-covering common in the Macedonian army.
But the long pikes were in truth the main weapons of defence as well
as of offence. They were destined to contend against the charge
of Grecian hoplites with the one-handed pike and heavy shield;
especially against the most formidable manifestation of that force,
the deep Theban column organized by Epaminondas. This was what Philip
had to deal with, at his accession, as the irresistible infantry
of Greece, bearing down everything before it by thrust of pike and
propulsion of shield. He provided the means of vanquishing it, by
training his poor Macedonian infantry to the systematic use of the
long two-handed pike. The Theban column, charging a phalanx so
armed, found themselves unable to break into the array of protended
pikes, or to come to push of shield. We are told that at the battle
of Chæroneia, the front rank Theban soldiers, the chosen men of the
city, all perished on the ground; and this is not wonderful, when
we conceive them as rushing, by their own courage as well as by the
pressure upon them from behind, upon a wall of Pikes double the
length of their own. We must look at Philip’s phalanx with reference
to the enemies before him, not with reference to the later Roman
organization, which Polybius brings into comparison. It answered
perfectly the purposes of Philip, who wanted mainly to stand the
shock in front, thus overpowering Grecian hoplites in their own mode
of attack. Now Polybius informs us, that the phalanx was never once
beaten, in front and on ground suitable for it; and wherever the
ground was fit for hoplites, it was also fit for the phalanx. The
inconveniences of Philip’s array, and of the long pikes, arose from
the incapacity of the phalanx to change its front or keep its order
on unequal ground; but such inconveniences were hardly less felt by
Grecian hoplites.[124]

[124] The impression of admiration, and even terror, with which
the Roman general Paulus Emilius was seized, on first seeing the
Macedonian phalanx in battle array at Pydna—has been recorded by
Polybius (Polybius, Fragm. xxix. 6, 11; Livy, xliv. 40).

The Macedonian phalanx, denominated the Pezetæri[125] or Foot
Companions of the King, comprised the general body of native
infantry, as distinguished from special _corps d’armée_. The largest
division of it which we find mentioned under Alexander, and which
appears under the command of a general of division, is called a
Taxis. How many of these Taxeis there were in all, we do not know;
the original Asiatic army of Alexander (apart from what he left at
home) included six of them, coinciding apparently with the provincial
allotments of the country: Orestæ, Lynkestæ, Elimiotæ, Tymphæi,
etc.[126] The writers on tactics give us a systematic scale of
distribution (ascending from the lowest unit, the Lochus of sixteen
men, by successive multiples of two, up to the quadruple phalanx of
16,384 men) as pervading the Macedonian army. Among these divisions,
that which stands out as most fundamental and constant, is the
Syntagma, which contained sixteen Lochi. Forming thus a square of
sixteen men in front and depth, or 256 men, it was at the same time
a distinct aggregate or permanent battalion, having attached to it
five supernumeraries, an ensign, a rear-man, a trumpeter, a herald,
and an attendant or orderly.[127] Two of these Syntagmas composed
a body of 512 men, called a Pentakosiarchy, which in Philip’s time
is said to have been the ordinary regiment, acting together under a
separate command; but several of these were doubled by Alexander when
he reorganized his army at Susa,[128] so as to form regiments of 1024
men, each under its Chiliarch, and each comprising four Syntagmas.
All this systematic distribution of the Macedonian military force
when at home, appears to have been arranged by the genius of Philip.
On actual foreign service, no numerical precision could be observed;
a regiment or a division could not always contain the same fixed
number of men. But as to the array, a depth of sixteen, for the
files of the phalangites, appears to have been regarded as important
and characteristic,[129] perhaps essential to impart a feeling of
confidence to the troops. It was a depth much greater than was common
with Grecian hoplites, and never surpassed by any Greeks except the
Thebans.

[125] Harpokration and Photius, v. Πεζέταιροι, Demosth. Olynth.
ii. p. 23; Arrian, iv. 23, 1. τῶν πεζεταίρων καλουμένων τὰς
Τάξεις, and ii. 23, 2, etc.

Since we know from Demosthenes that the pezetæri date from the
time of Philip, it is probable that the passage of Anaximenes
(as cited by Harpokration and Photius) which refers them to
Alexander, has ascribed to the son what really belongs to the
father. The term ἑταῖροι, in reference to the kings of Macedonia,
first appears in Plutarch, Pelopidas, 27, in reference to
Ptolemy, before the time of Philip; see Otto Abel, Makedonien
vor König Philip, p. 129 (the passage of Ælian referred to by
him seems of little moment). The term Companions or Comrades had
under Philip a meaning purely military, designating foreigners as
well as Macedonians serving in his army: see Theopompus, Frag.
249. The term, originally applied only to a select few, was by
degrees extended to the corps generally.

[126] Arrian, i. 14, 3; iii. 16, 19; Diodor. xvii. 57. Compare
the note of Schmieder on the above passage of Arrian; also
Droysen, Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen, p. 95, 96, and the
elaborate note of Mützel on Curtius, v. 2, 3. p. 400.

The passage of Arrian (his description of Alexander’s army
arrayed at the Granikus) is confused, and seems erroneous in some
words of the text; yet it may be held to justify the supposition
of six Taxeis of pezetæri in Alexander’s phalanx on that day.
There seem also to be six Taxeis at Arbêla (iii. 11, 16).

[127] Arrian. Tactic. c. 10; Ælian. Tactic. c. 9.

[128] Curtius, v. 2, 3.

[129] This is to be seen in the arrangement made by Alexander
a short time before his death, when he incorporated Macedonian
and Persian soldiers in the same lochus; the normal depth of
sixteen was retained; all the front ranks or privileged men being
Macedonians. The Macedonians were much hurt at seeing their
native regimental array shared with Asiatics (Arrian, vii. 11, 5;
vii. 23, 4-8).

But the phalanx, though an essential item, was yet only one among
many, in the varied military organization introduced by Philip.
It was neither intended, nor fit, to act alone; being clumsy in
changing front to protect itself either in flank or rear, and unable
to adapt itself to uneven ground. There was another description of
infantry organized by Philip called the Hypaspists—shield-bearers
or Guards;[130] originally few in number, and employed for personal
defence of the prince—but afterwards enlarged into several distinct
_corps d’armée_. These Hypaspists or Guards were light infantry
of the line;[131] they were hoplites, keeping regular array and
intended for close combat, but more lightly armed, and more fit for
diversities of circumstance and position, than the phalanx. They seem
to have fought with the one-handed pike and shield, like the Greeks;
and not to have carried the two-handed phalangite pike or sarissa.
They occupied a sort of intermediate place between the heavy infantry
of the phalanx properly so called—and the peltasts and light troops
generally. Alexander in his later campaigns had them distributed into
Chiliarchies (how the distribution stood earlier, we have no distinct
information), at least three in number, and probably more.[132] We
find them employed by him in forward and aggressive movements; first
his light troops and cavalry begin the attack; next, the hypaspists
come to follow it up; lastly, the phalanx is brought up to support
them. The hypaspists are used also for assault of walled places, and
for rapid night marches.[133] What was the total number of them, we
do not know.[134]

[130] The proper meaning of ὑπασπισταὶ, as guards or personal
attendants on the prince, appears in Arrian, i. 5, 3; vii. 8, 6.

Neoptolemus, as ἀρχιυπασπιστὴς to Alexander, carried the shield
and lance of the latter, on formal occasions (Plutarch, Eumenes,
1).

[131] Arrian, ii. 4, 3, 4; ii. 20, 5.

[132] Arrian, iv. 30, 11; v. 23, 11.

[133] Arrian, ii. 20, 5; ii. 23, 6; iii. 18, 8.

[134] Droysen and Schmieder give the number of hypaspists in
Alexander’s army at Issus, as 6000. That this opinion rests on no
sufficient evidence, has been shown by Mützel (ad Curtium, v. 2,
3. p. 399). But that the number of hypaspists left by Philip at
his death was 6000 seems not improbable.

Besides the phalanx, and the hypaspists or Guards, the Macedonian
army as employed by Philip and Alexander included a numerous
assemblage of desultory or irregular troops, partly native
Macedonians, partly foreigners, Thracians, Pæonians, etc. They were
of different descriptions; peltasts, darters, and bowmen. The best
of them appear to have been the Agriânes, a Pæonian tribe expert in
the use of the javelin. All of them were kept in vigorous movement
by Alexander, on the flanks and in front of his heavy infantry, or
intermingled with his cavalry,—as well as for pursuit after the enemy
was defeated.

Lastly, the cavalry in Alexander’s army was also admirable—at
least equal, and seemingly even superior in efficiency, to his
best infantry.[135] I have already mentioned that cavalry was the
choice native force of Macedonia, long before the reign of Philip;
by whom it had been extended and improved.[136] The heavy cavalry,
wholly or chiefly composed of native Macedonians, was known by the
denomination of the Companions. There was besides a new and lighter
variety of cavalry, apparently introduced by Philip, and called the
Sarissophori, or Lancers, used like Cossacks for advanced posts or
scouring the country. The sarissa which they carried was probably
much shorter than that of the phalanx; but it was long, if compared
with the xyston or thrusting pike used by the heavy cavalry for the
shock of close combat. Arrian, in describing the army of Alexander at
Arbêla, enumerates eight distinct squadrons of this heavy cavalry—or
cavalry of the Companions; but the total number included in the
Macedonian army at Alexander’s accession, is not known. Among the
squadrons, several at least (if not all) were named after particular
towns or districts of the country—Bottiæa, Amphipolis, Apollonia,
Anthemus, etc.;[137] there was one or more, distinguished as the
Royal Squadron—the Agêma or leading body of cavalry—at the head of
which Alexander generally charged, himself among the foremost of the
actual combatants.[138]

[135] See Arrian, v. 14, 1; v. 16, 4; Curtius, vi. 9, 22.
“Equitatui, optimæ exercitûs parti”, etc.

[136] We are told that Philip, after his expedition against the
Scythians about three years before his death, exacted and sent
into Macedonia 20,000 chosen mares, in order to improve the breed
of Macedonian horses. The regal haras were in the neighborhood of
Pella (Justin, ix. 2; Strabo, xvi. p. 752, in which passage of
Strabo, _the details_ apply to the _haras_ of Seleukus Nikator at
Apameia, not to that of Philip at Pella).

[137] Arrian, i. 2, 8, 9 (where we also find mentioned τοὺς ἐκ
τῆς ἄνωθεν Μακεδονίας ἱππέας), i. 12, 12; ii. 9, 6; iii. 11, 12.

About the ἱππεῖς σαρισσόφοροι, see i. 13, 1.

It is possible that there may have been sixteen squadrons of
heavy cavalry, and eight squadrons of the Sarissophori,—each
squadron from 180 to 250 men—as Rüstow and Köchly conceive (p.
243). But there is no sufficient evidence to prove it; nor can I
think it safe to assume, as they do, that Alexander carried over
with him to Asia _just half_ of the Macedonian entire force.

[138] Arrian, iii. 11, 11; iii. 13, 1; iii. 18, 8. In the first
of these passages, we have ἴλαι βασιλικαὶ in the plural (iii. 11,
12). It seems too that the different ἴλαι alternated with each
other in the foremost position, or ἡγεμονία for particular days
(Arrian, i. 14, 9).

The distribution of the cavalry into squadrons was that which
Alexander found at his accession; but he altered it, when he
remodelled the arrangements of his army (in 330 B. C.), at Susa, so
as to subdivide the squadron into two Lochi, and to establish the
Lochus for the elementary division of cavalry, as it had always been
of infantry.[139] His reforms went thus to cut down the primary body
of cavalry from the squadron to the half-squadron or Lochus, while
they tended to bring the infantry together into larger bodies—from
cohorts of 500 each to cohorts of 1000 men each.

[139] Arrian, iii. 16, 19.

Among the Hypaspists or Guards, also, we find an Agêma or chosen
cohort, which was called upon oftener than the rest to begin the
fight. A still more select corps were, the Body-Guards; a small
company of tried and confidential men, individually known to
Alexander, always attached to his person, and acting as adjutants
or as commanders for special service. These Body-Guards appear
to have been chosen persons promoted out of the Royal Youths or
Pages; an institution first established by Philip, and evincing the
pains taken by him to bring the leading Macedonians into military
organization as well as into dependence on his own person. The Royal
Youths, sons of the chief persons throughout Macedonia, were taken by
Philip into service, and kept in permanent residence around him for
purposes of domestic attendance and companionship. They maintained
perpetual guard of his palace, alternating among themselves the
hours of daily and nightly watch; they received his horse from the
grooms, assisted him to mount, and accompanied him if he went to
the chase: they introduced persons who came to solicit interviews,
and admitted his mistresses by night through a special door. They
enjoyed the privilege of sitting down to dinner with him, as well
as that of never being flogged except by his special order.[140]
The precise number of the company we do not know; but it must have
been not small, since fifty of these youths were brought out from
Macedonia at once by Amyntas to join Alexander and to be added to the
company at Babylon.[141] At the same time the mortality among them
was probably considerable; since, in accompanying Alexander, they
endured even more than the prodigious fatigues which he imposed upon
himself.[142] The training in this corps was a preparation first for
becoming Body-guards of Alexander,—next, for appointment to the great
and important military commands. Accordingly, it had been the first
stage of advancement to most of the Diadochi, or great officers of
Alexander, who after his death carved kingdoms for themselves out of
his conquests.

[140] Arrian, iv. 13, 1. Ἐκ Φιλίππου ἦν ἤδη καθεστηκὸς, τῶν ἐν
τέλει Μακεδόνων τοὺς παῖδας, ὅσοι ἐς ἡλικίαν ἐμειρακίσαντο,
καταλέγεσθαι ἐς θεραπείαν τοῦ βασιλέως. Τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην
δίαιταν τοῦ σώματος διακονεῖσθαι βασιλεῖ, καὶ κοιμώμενον
φυλάσσειν, τούτοις ἐπετέτραπτο· καὶ ὁπότε ἐξελαύνοι βασιλεὺς,
τοὺς ἵππους παρὰ τῶν ἱπποκόμων δεχόμενοι ἐκεῖνοι προσῆγον, καὶ
ἀνέβαλον οὗτοι βασιλέα τὸν Περσικὸν τρόπον, καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ θήρᾳ
φιλοτιμίας βασιλεῖ κοινωνοὶ ἦσαν, etc.

Curtius, viii. 6. 1. “Mos erat principibus Macedonum adultos
liberos regibus tradere, ad munia haud multum servilibus
ministeriis abhorrentia. Excubabant servatis noctium vicibus
proximi foribus ejus ædis, in quâ rex aquiescebat. Per hos
pellices introducebantur, alio aditu quam quem armati obsidebant.
Iidem acceptos ab agasonibus equos, quum rex ascensurus esset,
admovebant; comitabanturque et venantem, et in præliis,
omnibus artibus studiorum liberalium exculti. Præcipuus honor
habebatur, quod licebat sedentibus vesci cum rege. Castigandi eos
verberibus nullius potestas præter ipsum erat. Hæc cohors velut
seminarium ducum præfectorumque apud Macedonas fuit: hinc habuere
posteri reges, quorum stirpibus post multas ætates Romani opes
ademerunt.” Compare Curtius, v. 6, 42; and Ælian, V. H. xiv. 49.

This information is interesting, as an illustration of Macedonian
manners and customs, which are very little known to us. In the
last hours of the Macedonian monarchy, after the defeat at Pydna
(168 B. C.), the _pueri regii_ followed the defeated
king Perseus to the sanctuary at Samothrace, and never quitted
him until the moment when he surrendered himself to the Romans
(Livy, xlv. 5).

As an illustration of the scourging, applied as a punishment to
these young Macedonians of rank, see the case of Dekamnichus,
handed over by king Archelaus to Euripides, to be flogged
(Aristotle, Polit. v. 8, 13).

[141] Curtius, v. 6, 42; Diodor. xvii. 65.

[142] We read this about the youthful Philippus, brother of
Lysimachus (Curtius, viii. 2, 36).

It was thus that the native Macedonian force was enlarged and
diversified by Philip, including at his death—1. The phalanx,
Foot-companions, or general mass of heavy infantry, drilled to
the use of the long two-handed pike or sarissa—2. The Hypaspists,
or lighter-armed corps of foot-guards—3. The Companions, or heavy
cavalry, the ancient indigenous force consisting of the more opulent
or substantial Macedonians—4. The lighter cavalry, lancers, or
Sarissophori.—With these were joined foreign auxiliaries of great
value. The Thessalians, whom Philip had partly subjugated and partly
gained over, furnished him with a body of heavy cavalry not inferior
to the native Macedonian. From various parts of Greece he derived
hoplites, volunteers taken into his pay, armed with the full-sized
shield and one-handed pike. From the warlike tribes of Thracians,
Pæonians, Illyrians, etc., whom he had subdued around him, he levied
contingents of light troops of various descriptions, peltasts,
bowmen, darters, etc., all excellent in their way, and eminently
serviceable to his combinations, in conjunction with the heavier
masses. Lastly, Philip had completed his military arrangements by
organizing what may be called an effective siege-train for sieges as
well as for battles; a stock of projectile and battering machines,
superior to anything at that time extant. We find this artillery used
by Alexander in the very first year of his reign, in his campaign
against the Illyrians.[143] Even in his most distant Indian marches,
he either carried it with him, or had the means of constructing new
engines for the occasion. There was no part of his military equipment
more essential to his conquests. The victorious sieges of Alexander
are among his most memorable exploits.

[143] Arrian, i. 6, 17.

To all this large, multifarious, and systematized array of actual
force, are to be added the civil establishments, the depôts,
magazines of arms, provision for remounts, drill officers and
adjutants, etc., indispensable for maintaining it in constant
training and efficiency. At the time of Philip’s accession, Pella
was an unimportant place;[144] at his death, it was not only strong
as a fortification and place of deposit for regal treasure, but
also the permanent centre, war-office, and training quarters, of
the greatest military force then known. The military registers as
well as the traditions of Macedonian discipline were preserved there
until the fall of the monarchy.[145] Philip had employed his life in
organizing this powerful instrument of dominion. His revenues, large
as they were, both from mines and from tributary conquests, had been
exhausted in the work, so that he had left at his decease a debt of
500 talents. But his son Alexander found the instrument ready made,
with excellent officers, and trained veterans for the front ranks of
his phalanx.[146]

[144] Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 247.

[145] Livy. xlii. 51; xliv. 46, also the comparison in Strabo,
xvi. p. 752, between the military establishments of Seleukus
Nikator at Apameia in Syria, and those of Philip at Pella in
Macedonia.

[146] Justin, xi. 6. About the debt of 500 talents left by
Philip, see the words of Alexander, Arrian, vii. 9, 10. Diodorus
affirms (xvi. 8) that Philip’s annual return from the gold mines
was 1000 talents; a total not much to be trusted.

This scientific organization of military force, on a large scale and
with all the varieties of arming and equipment made to co-operate
for one end, is the great fact of Macedonian history. Nothing of the
same kind and magnitude had ever before been seen. The Macedonians,
like Epirots and Ætolians, had no other aptitude or marking quality
except those of soldiership. Their rude and scattered tribes manifest
no definite political institutions and little sentiment of national
brotherhood; their union was mainly that of occasional fellowship
in arms under the king as chief. Philip the son of Amyntas was the
first to organize this military union into a system permanently and
efficaciously operative, achieving by means of it conquests such as
to create in the Macedonians a common pride of superiority in arms,
which served as substitute for political institutions or nationality.
Such pride was still farther exalted by the really superhuman career
of Alexander. The Macedonian kingdom was nothing but a well-combined
military machine, illustrating the irresistible superiority of the
rudest men, trained in arms and conducted by an able general, not
merely over undisciplined multitudes, but also over free, courageous,
and disciplined, citizenship with highly gifted intelligence.

During the winter of 335-334 B. C., after the destruction of
Thebes and the return of Alexander from Greece to Pella, his final
preparations were made for the Asiatic expedition. The Macedonian
army with the auxiliary contingents destined for this enterprise were
brought together early in the spring. Antipater, one of the oldest
and ablest officers of Philip, was appointed to act as viceroy of
Macedonia during the king’s absence. A military force, stated at
12,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry,[147] was left with him to keep
down the cities of Greece, to resist aggressions from the Persian
fleet, and to repress discontents at home. Such discontents were
likely to be instigated by leading Macedonians or pretenders to the
throne, especially as Alexander had no direct heir: and we are told
that Antipater and Parmenio advised postponement of the expedition
until the young king could leave behind him an heir of his own
lineage.[148] Alexander overruled these representations; yet he did
not disdain to lessen the perils at home by putting to death such men
as he principally feared or mistrusted, especially the kinsmen of
Philip’s last wife Kleopatra.[149] Of the dependent tribes around,
the most energetic chiefs accompanied his army into Asia, either by
their own preference or at his requisition. After these precautions,
the tranquillity of Macedonia was entrusted to the prudence and
fidelity of Antipater, which were still farther ensured by the fact
that three of his sons accompanied the king’s army and person.[150]
Though unpopular in his deportment,[151] Antipater discharged the
duties of his very responsible position with zeal and ability;
notwithstanding the dangerous enmity of Olympias, against whom he
sent many complaints to Alexander when in Asia, whilst she on her
side wrote frequent but unavailing letters with a view to ruin him in
the esteem of her son. After a long period of unabated confidence,
Alexander began during the last years of his life to dislike and
mistrust Antipater. He always treated Olympias with the greatest
respect; trying however to restrain her from meddling with political
affairs, and complaining sometimes of her imperious exigencies and
violence.[152]

[147] Diodor. xvii. 17.

[148] Diodor. xvii. 16.

[149] Justin, xi. 5. “Proficiscens ad Persicum bellum, omnes
novercæ suæ cognatos, quos Philippus in excelsiorem dignitatis
locum provehens imperiis præfecerat, interfecit. Sed nec suis,
qui apti regno videbantur, pepercit; ne qua materia seditionis
procul se agente in Macedoniâ remaneret.” Compare also xii. 6,
where the Pausanias mentioned as having been put to death by
Alexander is not the assassin of Philip. Pausanias was a common
Macedonian name (see Diodor. xvi. 93).

I see no reason for distrusting the general fact here asserted by
Justin. We know from Arrian (who mentioned the fact incidentally
in his work τὰ μετὰ Ἀλέξανδρον, though he says nothing about it
in his account of the expedition of Alexander—see Photius, Cod.
92. p. 220) that Alexander put to death, in the early period of
his reign, his first cousin and brother-in-law Amyntas. Much less
would he scruple to kill the friends or relatives of Kleopatra.
Neither Alexander nor Antipater would account such proceeding
anything else than a reasonable measure of prudential policy.
By the Macedonian common law, when a man was found guilty of
treason, all his relatives were condemned to die along with him
(Curtius, vi. 11, 20).

Plutarch (De Fortunâ Alex. Magn. p. 342) has a general allusion
to these precautionary executions ordered by Alexander. Fortune
(he says) imposed upon Alexander δεινὴν πρὸς ἄνδρας ὁμοφύλους
καὶ συγγενεῖς διὰ φόνου καὶ σιδήρου καὶ πυρὸς ἀνάγκην ἀμύνης,
ἀτερπέστατον τέλος ἔχουσαν.

[150] Kassander commanded a corps of Thracians and Pæonians:
Iollas and Philippus were attached to the king’s person (Arrian,
vii. 27, 2; Justin, xii. 14; Diodor. xvii. 17).

[151] Justin, xvi. 1, 14. “Antipatrum—amariorem semper ministrum
regni, quam ipsos reges, fuisse”, etc.

[152] Plutarch, Alexand. 25-39; Arrian, vii. 12, 12. He was wont
to say, that his mother exacted from him a heavy house-rent for
his domicile of ten months.

Kleopatra also (sister of Alexander and daughter of Olympias)
exercised considerable influence in the government. Dionysius,
despot of the Pontic Herakleia, maintained himself against
opposition in his government, during Alexander’s life, mainly by
paying assiduous court to her (Memnon. Heracl. c. 4. ap. Photium,
Cod. 224).

The army intended for Asia, having been assembled at Pella, was
conducted by Alexander himself first to Amphipolis, where it crossed
the Strymon; next along the road near the coast to the river Nestus
and to the towns of Abdêra and Maroneia; then through Thrace
across the rivers Hebrus and Melas; lastly, through the Thracian
Chersonese to Sestos. Here it was met by his fleet, consisting of 160
triremes, with a number of trading vessels besides;[153] made up in
large proportions from contingents furnished by Athens and Grecian
cities.[154] The passage of the whole army, infantry, cavalry, and
machines, on ships, across the strait from Sestos in Europe to Abydos
in Asia,—was superintended by Parmenio, and accomplished without
either difficulty or resistance. But Alexander himself, separating
from the army at Sestos, went down to Elæus at the southern extremity
of the Chersonese. Here stood the chapel and sacred precinct of the
hero Protesilaus, who was slain by Hektor; having been the first
Greek (according to the legend of the Trojan war) who touched the
shore of Troy. Alexander, whose imagination was then full of Homeric
reminiscences, offered sacrifice to the hero, praying that his own
disembarkation might terminate more auspiciously.

[153] Arrian, i. 11, 9.

[154] The Athenians furnished twenty ships of war. Diodor. xvii.
22.

He then sailed across in the admiral’s trireme, steering with his
own hand, to the landing place near Ilium called the Harbor of the
Achæans. At mid-channel of the strait, he sacrificed a bull, with
libations out of a golden goblet, to Poseidon and the Nereids.
Himself too in full armor, he was the first (like Protesilaus)
to tread the Asiatic shore; but he found no enemy like Hektor to
meet him. From hence, mounting the hill on which Ilium was placed,
he sacrificed to the patron-goddess Athênê; and deposited in her
temple his own panoply, taking in exchange some of the arms said
to have been worn by the heroes in the Trojan war, which he caused
to be carried by guards along with him in his subsequent battles.
Among other real or supposed monuments of this interesting legend,
the Ilians showed to him the residence of Priam with its altar of
Zeus Herkeios, where that unhappy old king was alleged to have been
slain by Neoptolemus. Numbering Neoptolemus among his ancestors,
Alexander felt himself to be the object of Priam’s yet unappeased
wrath; and accordingly offered sacrifice to him at the same altar,
for the purpose of expiation and reconciliation. On the tomb and
monumental column of Achilles, father of Neoptolemus, he not only
placed a decorative garland, but also went through the customary
ceremony of anointing himself with oil and running naked round it:
exclaiming how much he envied the lot of Achilles, who had been blest
during life with a faithful friend, and after death, with a great
poet to celebrate his exploits. Lastly, to commemorate his crossing,
Alexander erected permanent altars, in honor of Zeus, Athênê, and
Hêraklês; both on the point of Europe which his army had quitted, and
on that of Asia where it had landed.[155]

[155] Arrian, i. 11; Plutarch, Alexand. 15; Justin, xi. 5. The
ceremony of running round the column of Achilles still subsisted
in the time of Plutarch—ἀλειψάμενος λίπα καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἑταίρων
συναναδραμὼν γυμνὸς, ~ὥσπερ ἔθος ἔστιν~, etc. Philostratus,
five centuries after Alexander, conveys a vivid picture of the
numerous legendary and religious associations connected with the
plain of Troy and with the tomb of Protesilaus at Elæus, and of
the many rites and ceremonies performed there even in his time
(Philostrat. Heroica, xix. 14, 15. p. 742, ed. Olearius—δρόμοις
δ᾽ ἐῤῥυθμισμένοις συνηλάλαζον, ἀνακαλοῦντες τὸν Ἀχιλλέα, etc.,
and the pages preceding and following).

Dikæarchus (Fragm. 19, ed. Didot. ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 603)
had treated in a special work about the sacrifices offered to
Athênê at Ilium (Περὶ τῆς ἐν Ἰλίῳ θυσίας) by Alexander, and
by many others before him; by Xerxes (Herodot. vii. 43), who
offered up 1000 oxen—by Mindarus (Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 4), etc.
In describing the proceedings of Alexander at Ilium, Dikæarchus
appears he have dwelt much on the warm sympathy which that prince
exhibited for the affection between Achilles and Patroklus: which
sympathy Dikæarchus illustrated by characterizing Alexander as
φιλόπαις ἐκμανῶς, and by recounting his public admiration for the
eunuch Bagôas: compare Curtius, x. i. 25—about Bagôas.

The proceedings of Alexander, on the ever-memorable site of Ilium,
are interesting as they reveal one side of his imposing character—the
vein of legendary sympathy and religious sentiment wherein alone
consisted his analogy with the Greeks. The young Macedonian prince
had nothing of that sense of correlative right and obligation,
which characterized the free Greeks of the city-community. But he
was in many points a reproduction of the heroic Greeks,[156] his
warlike ancestors in legend, Achilles and Neoptolemus, and others
of that Æakid race, unparalleled in the attributes of force—a man
of violent impulse in all directions, sometimes generous, often
vindictive—ardent in his individual affections both of love and
hatred, but devoured especially by an inextinguishable pugnacity,
appetite for conquest, and thirst for establishing at all cost his
superiority of force over others—“Jura negat sibi nata, nihil non
arrogat armis”—taking pride, not simply in victorious generalship
and direction of the arms of soldiers, but also in the personal
forwardness of an Homeric chief, the foremost to encounter both
danger and hardship. To dispositions resembling those of Achilles,
Alexander indeed added one attribute of a far higher order. As a
general, he surpassed his age in provident and even long-sighted
combinations. With all his exuberant courage and sanguine temper,
nothing was ever omitted in the way of systematic military
precaution. Thus much be borrowed, though with many improvements of
his own, from Grecian intelligence as applied to soldiership. But the
character and dispositions, which he took with him to Asia, had the
features, both striking and repulsive, of Achilles, rather than those
of Agesilaus or Epaminondas.

[156] Plutarch, Fort. Al. M. ii. p. 334. Βριθὺς ὁπλιτοπάλας,
δαΐος ἀντιπάλοις—ταύτην ἔχων τέχνην προγονικὴν ἀπ᾽ Αἰακιδῶν, etc.

Ἄλκην μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκεν Ὀλύμπιος Αἰακίδησι,
Νοῦν δ᾽ Ἀμυθαονίδαις, πλοῦτον δ᾽ ἔπορ᾽ Ἀτρεΐδῃσιν.

(Hesiod. Fragment. 223, ed. Marktscheffel.)

Like Achilles, Alexander was distinguished for swiftness of foot
(Plutarch, Fort. Al. M. i. p. 331).

The army, when reviewed on the Asiatic shore after its crossing,
presented a total of 30,000 infantry, and 4500 cavalry, thus
distributed:—

INFANTRY.

Macedonian phalanx and hypaspists 12,000
Allies 7,000
Mercenaries 5,000
------
Under the command of Parmenio 24,000
Odryssians, Triballi (both Thracians), and Illyrians 5,000
Agriânes and archers 1,000
------
Total Infantry 30,000

CAVALRY.

Macedonian heavy—under Philotas son of Parmenio 1,500
Thessalian (also heavy)—under Kallas 1,500
Miscellaneous Grecian—under Erigyius 600
Thracian and Pæonian (light)—under Kassander 900
------
Total Cavalry 4,500

Such seems the most trustworthy enumeration of Alexander’s first
invading army. There were however other accounts, the highest of
which stated as much as 43,000 infantry with 4000 cavalry.[157]
Besides these troops, also, there must have been an effective train
of projectile machines and engines, for battles and sieges, which
we shall soon find in operation. As to money, the military chest of
Alexander, exhausted in part by profuse donatives to his Macedonian
officers,[158] was as poorly furnished as that of Napoleon Buonaparte
on first entering Italy for his brilliant campaign of 1796. According
to Aristobulus, he had with him only seventy talents; according to
another authority, no more than the means of maintaining his army
for thirty days. Nor had he even been able to bring together his
auxiliaries, or complete the outfit of his army, without incurring a
debt of 800 talents, in addition to that of 500 talents contracted by
his father Philip.[159] Though Plutarch[160] wonders at the smallness
of the force with which Alexander contemplated the execution of such
great projects, yet the fact is, that in infantry he was far above
any force which the Persians had to oppose him;[161] not to speak
of comparative discipline and organization, surpassing even that of
the Grecian mercenaries, who formed the only good infantry in the
Persian service; while his cavalry, though inferior as to number, was
superior in quality and in the shock of close combat.

[157] Diodor. xvii. 17. Plutarch (Alexand. 15) says that the
highest numbers which he had read of, were,—43,000 infantry with
5000 cavalry: the lowest numbers, 30,000 infantry with 4000
cavalry (assuming the correction of Sintenis, τετρακισχιλίους
in place of πεντακισχιλίους, to be well founded, as it probably
is—compare Plutarch, Fort. Alex. M. i. p. 327).

According to Plutarch (Fort. Al. M. p. 327), both Ptolemy and
Aristobulus stated the number of infantry to be 30,000; but
Ptolemy gave the cavalry as 5000, Aristobulus, as only 4000.
Nevertheless, Arrian—who professes to follow mainly Ptolemy and
Aristobulus, whenever they agree—states the number of infantry
as “not much more than 30,000; the cavalry as more than 5000”
(Exp. Al. i. 11, 4). Anaximenes alleged 43,000 infantry, with
5500 cavalry. Kallisthenes (ap. Polybium. xii. 19) stated
40,000 infantry, with 4500 cavalry. Justin (xi. 6) gives 32,000
infantry, with 4500 cavalry.

My statement in the text follows Diodorus, who stands
distinguished, by recounting not merely the total, but the
component items besides. In regard to the total of infantry, he
agrees with Ptolemy and Aristobulus: as to cavalry, his statement
is a mean between the two.

[158] Plutarch, Alexand. 15.

[159] Arrian, vii. 9, 10—the speech which he puts in the mouth of
Alexander himself—and Curtius, x. 2, 24.

Onesikritus stated that Alexander owed at this time a debt of 200
talents (Plutarch, Alex. 15).

[160] Plutarch, Fort. Alex. M. i. p. 327; Justin, xi. 6.

[161] Arrian, i. 13, 4.

Most of the officers exercising important command in Alexander’s army
were native Macedonians. His intimate personal friend Hephæstion,
as well as his body-guards Leonnatus and Lysimachus, were natives
of Pella: Ptolemy the son of Lagus, and Pithon, were Eordians from
Upper Macedonia; Kraterus and Perdikkas, from the district of Upper
Macedonia called Orestis;[162] Antipater with his son Kassander,
Kleitus son of Drôpides, Parmenio with his two sons Philôtas and
Nikanor, Seleukus, Kœnus, Amyntas, Philippus (these two last names
were borne by more than one person), Antigonus, Neoptolemus,[163]
Meleager, Peukestes, etc., all these seem to have been native
Macedonians. All or most of them had been trained to war under
Philip, in whose service Parmenio and Antipater, especially, had
occupied a high rank.

[162] Arrian, vi. 28, 6; Arrian, Indica, 18; Justin, xv. 3-4.
Porphyry (Fragm. ap. Syncellum, Frag. Histor. Græc. vol. iii. p.
695-698) speaks of Lysimachus as a Thessalian from Kranon; but
this must be a mistake: compare Justin, xv. 3.

[163] Neoptolemus belonged, like Alexander himself, to the Æakid
gens (Arrian, ii. 27, 9).

Of the many Greeks in Alexander’s service, we hear of few in
important station. Medius, a Thessalian from Larissa, was among his
familiar companions; but the ablest and most distinguished of all
was Eumenes, a native of Kardia in the Thracian Chersonese. Eumenes,
combining an excellent Grecian education with bodily activity and
enterprise, had attracted when a young man the notice of Philip
and had been appointed as his secretary. After discharging these
duties for seven years until the death of Philip, he was continued
by Alexander in the post of chief secretary during the whole of that
king’s life.[164] He conducted most of Alexander’s correspondence,
and the daily record of his proceedings, which was kept under the
name of the Royal Ephemerides. But though his special duties were
thus of a civil character, he was not less eminent as an officer in
the field. Occasionally entrusted with high military command, he
received from Alexander signal recompenses and tokens of esteem. In
spite of these great qualities—or perhaps in consequence of them—he
was the object of marked jealousy and dislike[165] on the part of the
Macedonians,—from Hephæstion the friend, and Neoptolemus the chief
armor-bearer, of Alexander, down to the principal soldiers of the
phalanx. Neoptolemus despised Eumenes as an unwarlike penman. The
contemptuous pride with which Macedonians had now come to look down
on Greeks, is a notable characteristic of the victorious army of
Alexander, as well as a new feature in history; retorting the ancient
Hellenic sentiment in which Demosthenes, a few years before, had
indulged towards the Macedonians.[166]

[164] Plutarch, Eumenes, c. 1; Cornelius Nepos, Eumen. c. 1.

[165] Arrian, vii. 13, 1; Plutarch, Eum. 2, 3, 8, 10.

[166] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 19, respecting Philip—οὐ μόνον
οὐχ Ἕλληνος ὄντος, οὐδὲ προσήκοντος οὐδὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ
βαρβάρου ἐντεῦθεν ὅθεν καλὸν εἰπεῖν, ~ἀλλ᾽ ὀλέθρου Μακεδόνος~,
ὅθεν οὐδ᾽ ἀνδράποδον σπουδαῖον οὐδὲν ἦν πρότερον πρίασθαι.

Compare this with the exclamations of the Macedonian soldiers
(called Argyraspides) against their distinguished chief Eumenes,
calling him Χεῤῥονησίτης ὄλεθρος (Plutarch, Eumenes, 18).

Though Alexander has been allowed to land in Asia unopposed, an army
was already assembled under the Persian satraps within a few days’
march of Abydos. Since the reconquest of Egypt and Phenicia, about
eight or nine years before, by the Persian king Ochus, the power of
that empire had been restored to a point equal to any anterior epoch
since the repulse of Xerxes from Greece. The Persian successes in
Egypt had been achieved mainly by the arms of Greek mercenaries,
under the conduct and through the craft of the Rhodian general
Mentor; who, being seconded by the preponderant influence of the
eunuch Bagôas, confidential minister of Ochus, obtained not only
ample presents, but also the appointment of military commander on the
Hellespont and the Asiatic seaboard.[167] He procured the recall of
his brother Memnon, who with his brother-in-law Artabazus had been
obliged to leave Asia from unsuccessful revolt against the Persians,
and had found shelter with Philip.[168] He farther subdued, by force
or by fraud, various Greek and Asiatic chieftains on the Asiatic
coast; among them, the distinguished Hermeias, friend of Aristotle,
and master of the strong post of Atarneus.[169] These successes of
Mentor seem to have occurred about 343 B. C. He, and his brother
Memnon after him, upheld vigorously the authority of the Persian king
in the regions near the Hellespont. It was probably by them that
troops were sent across the strait both to rescue the besieged town
of Perinthus from Philip, and to act against that prince in other
parts of Thrace;[170] that an Asiatic chief, who was intriguing
to facilitate Philip’s intended invasion of Asia, was seized and
sent prisoner to the Persian court; and that envoys from Athens,
soliciting aid against Philip, were forwarded to the same place.[171]

[167] See, in reference to these incidents, my last preceding
volume, Vol. XI. Ch. xc. p. 441 _seq._

[168] Diodor. xvi. 52; Curtius, vi. 4, 25; vi. 5, 2. Curtius
mentions also Manapis, another Persian exile, who had fled from
Ochus to Philip.

[169] Diodor. xvi. 52. About the strength of the fortress of
Athens, see Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 2, 11; Diodor. xiii. 64. It had
been held in defiance of the Persians, even before the time of
Hermeias—Isokrates. Compare also Isokrates, Or. iv. (Panegyr.) s.
167.

[170] Letter of Alexander, addressed to Darius after the battle
of Issus, apud Arrian, ii. 14, 7. Other troops sent by the
Persians into Thrace (besides those despatched to the relief of
Perinthus), are here alluded to.

[171] Demosthenes, Philippic. iv. p. 139, 140; Epistola Philippi
apud Demosthen. p. 160.

Ochus, though successful in regaining the full extent of Persian
dominion, was a sanguinary tyrant, who shed by wholesale the blood
of his family and courtiers. About the year 338 B. C., he
died, poisoned by the eunuch Bagôas, who placed upon the throne
Arses, one of the king’s sons, killing all the rest. After two
years, however, Bagôas conceived mistrust of Arses, and put him to
death also, together with all his children; thus leaving no direct
descendant of the regal family alive. He then exalted to the throne
one of his friends named Darius Codomannus (descended from one of the
brothers of Artaxerxes Memnon), who had acquired glory, in a recent
war against the Kadusians, by killing in single combat a formidable
champion of the enemy’s army. Presently, however, Bagôas attempted to
poison Darius also; but the latter, detecting the snare, forced him
to drink the deadly draught himself.[172] In spite of such murders
and change in the line of succession, which Alexander afterwards
reproached to Darius[173]—the authority of Darius seems to have been
recognized, without any material opposition, throughout all the
Persian empire.

[172] Diodor. xvii. 5; Justin, x. 3; Curtius, x. 5, 22.

[173] Arrian, ii. 14, 10.

Succeeding to the throne in the early part of B. C. 336,
when Philip was organizing the projected invasion of Persia, and when
the first Macedonian division under Parmenio and Attalus was already
making war in Asia—Darius prepared measures of defence at home,
and tried to encourage anti-Macedonian movements in Greece.[174]
On the assassination of Philip by Pausanias, the Persian king
publicly proclaimed himself (probably untruly) as having instigated
the deed, and alluded in contemptuous terms to the youthful
Alexander.[175] Conceiving the danger from Macedonia to be past, he
imprudently slackened his efforts and withheld his supplies during
the first months of Alexander’s reign, when the latter might have
been seriously embarrassed in Greece and in Europe by the effective
employment of Persian ships and money. But the recent successes of
Alexander in Thrace, Illyria, and Bœotia, satisfied Darius that
the danger was not past, so that he resumed his preparations for
defence. The Phenician fleet was ordered to be equipped: the satraps
in Phrygia and Lydia got together a considerable force, consisting
in part of Grecian mercenaries; while Memnon, on the seaboard, was
furnished with the means of taking 5000 of these mercenaries under
his separate command.[176]

[174] Diodor. xvii. 7.

[175] Arrian, ii. 14, 11.

[176] Diodor. xvii. 7.

We cannot trace with any exactness the course of these events,
during the nineteen months between Alexander’s accession and his
landing in Asia (August 336 B. C., to March or April 334 B. C.) We
learn generally that Memnon was active and even aggressive on the
north-eastern coast of the Ægean. Marching northward from his own
territory (the region of Assus or Atarneus skirting the Gulf of
Adramyttium[177]) across the range of Mount Ida, he came suddenly
upon the town of Kyzikus on the Propontis. He failed, however, though
only by a little, in his attempt to surprise it, and was forced to
content himself with a rich booty from the district around.[178]
The Macedonian generals Parmenio and Kallas had crossed into Asia
with bodies of troops. Parmenio, acting in Æolis, took Grynium, but
was compelled by Memnon to raise the siege of Pitanê; while Kallas,
in the Troad, was attacked, defeated, and compelled to retire to
Rhœteium.[179]

[177] Diodor. xvii. 7: compare Arrian, i. 17, 9. ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν
τὴν Μέμνονος ἔπεμψεν—which doubtless means this region, conquered
by Mentor from Hermeias of Atarneus.

[178] Diodor. xvii. 7; Polyænus, v. 34, 5.

[179] Diodor. xvii. 7. We read also of military operations near
Magnesia between Parmenio and Memnon (Polyænus, v. 34, 4).

We thus see that during the season preceding the landing of
Alexander, the Persians were in considerable force, and Memnon both
active and successful even against the Macedonian generals, on the
region north-east of the Ægean. This may help to explain that fatal
imprudence, whereby the Persians permitted Alexander to carry over
without opposition his grand army into Asia, in the spring of 334
B. C. They possessed ample means of guarding the Hellespont,
had they chosen to bring up their fleet, which, comprising as it
did the force of the Phenician towns, was decidedly superior to
any naval armament at the disposal of Alexander. The Persian fleet
actually came into the Ægean a few weeks afterwards. Now Alexander’s
designs, preparations, and even intended time of march, must have
been well known not merely to Memnon, but to the Persian satraps in
Asia Minor, who had got together troops to oppose him. These satraps
unfortunately supposed themselves to be a match for him in the field,
disregarding the pronounced opinion of Memnon to the contrary, and
even overruling his prudent advice by mistrustful and calumnious
imputations.

At the time of Alexander’s landing, a powerful Persian force was
already assembled near Zeleia in the Hellespontine Phrygia, under
command of Arsites the Phrygian satrap, supported by several
other leading Persians—Spithridates (satrap of Lydia and Ionia),
Pharnakes, Atizyes, Mithridates, Rhomithres, Niphates, Petines,
etc. Forty of these men were of high rank (denominated kinsmen of
Darius), and distinguished for personal valor. The greater number
of the army consisted of cavalry, including Medes, Baktrians,
Hyrkanians, Kappadokians, Paphlagonians, etc.[180] In cavalry they
greatly outnumbered Alexander; but their infantry was much inferior
in number,[181] composed however, in large proportion, of Grecian
mercenaries. The Persian total is given by Arrian as 20,000 cavalry,
and nearly 20,000 mercenary foot; by Diodorus as 10,000 cavalry, and
100,000 infantry; by Justin even at 600,000. The numbers of Arrian
are the more credible; in those of Diodorus, the total of infantry is
certainly much above the truth—that of cavalry probably below it.

[180] Diodor. xvii. 18, 19; Arrian, i. 12, 14; i. 16, 5.

[181] Arrian, i. 12, 16; i. 13, 4.

Memnon, who was present with his sons and with his own division,
earnestly dissuaded the Persian leaders from hazarding a battle.
Reminding them that the Macedonians were not only much superior in
infantry, but also encouraged by the leadership of Alexander—he
enforced the necessity of employing their numerous cavalry to destroy
the forage and provisions, and if necessary, even towns themselves—in
order to render any considerable advance of the invading force
impracticable. While keeping strictly on the defensive in Asia, he
recommended that aggressive war should be carried into Macedonia;
that the fleet should be brought up, a powerful land-force put
aboard, and strenuous efforts made, not only to attack the vulnerable
points of Alexander at home, but also to encourage active hostility
against him from the Greeks and other neighbors.[182]

[182] Compare the policy recommended by Memnon, as set forth in
Arrian (i. 12, 16), and in Diodorus (xvii. 18). The superiority
of Diodorus is here incontestable. He proclaims distinctly
both the defensive and the offensive side of Memnon’s policy;
which, when taken together, form a scheme of operations no less
effective than prudent. But Arrian omits all notice of the
offensive policy, and mentions only the defensive—the retreat and
destruction of the country; which, if adopted alone, could hardly
have been reckoned upon for success, in starving out Alexander,
and might reasonably be called in question by the Persian
generals. Moreover, we should form but a poor idea of Memnon’s
ability, if in this emergency he neglected to avail himself of
the irresistible Persian fleet.

I notice the rather this point of superiority of Diodorus,
because recent critics have manifested a tendency to place too
exclusive a confidence in Arrian, and to discredit almost all
allegations respecting Alexander except such as Arrian either
certifies or countenances. Arrian is a very valuable historian;
he has the merit of giving us plain narrative without rhetoric,
which contrasts favorably both with Diodorus and with Curtius;
but he must not be set up as the only trustworthy witness.

Had this plan been energetically executed by Persian arms and money,
we can hardly doubt that Antipater in Macedonia would speedily have
found himself pressed by serious dangers and embarrassments, and that
Alexander would have been forced to come back and protect his own
dominions; perhaps prevented by the Persian fleet from bringing back
his whole army. At any rate, his schemes of Asiatic invasion must for
the time have been suspended. But he was rescued from this dilemma
by the ignorance, pride, and pecuniary interests of the Persian
leaders. Unable to appreciate Alexander’s military superiority,
and conscious at the same time of their own personal bravery, they
repudiated the proposition of retreat as dishonorable, insinuating
that Memnon desired to prolong the war in order to exalt his own
importance in the eyes of Darius. This sentiment of military dignity
was farther strengthened by the fact, that the Persian military
leaders, deriving all their revenues from the land, would have been
impoverished by destroying the landed produce. Arsites, in whose
territory the army stood, and upon whom the scheme would first take
effect, haughtily announced that he would not permit a single house
in it to be burnt.[183] Occupying the same satrapy as Pharnabazus had
possessed sixty years before, he felt that he would be reduced to
the same straits as Pharnabazus under the pressure of Agesilaus—“of
not being able to procure a dinner in his own country”.[184] The
proposition of Memnon was rejected, and it was resolved to await the
arrival of Alexander on the banks of the river Granikus.

[183] Arrian, i. 12, 18.

[184] Xenophon, Hellenic. iv. 1, 33.

This unimportant stream, commemorated in the Iliad, and immortalized
by its association with the name of Alexander, takes its rise
from one of the heights of Mount Ida near Skêpsis,[185] and flows
northward into the Propontis, which it reaches at a point somewhat
east of the Greek town of Parium. It is of no great depth: near the
point where the Persians encamped, it seems to have been fordable in
many places; but its right bank was somewhat high and steep, thus
offering obstruction to an enemy’s attack. The Persians, marching
forward from Zeleia, took up a position near the eastern side of
the Granikus, where the last declivities of Mount Ida descend into
the plain of Adrasteia, a Greek city situated between Priapus and
Parium.[186]

[185] Strabo, xiii. p. 602. The rivers Skamander, Æsepus, and
Granikus, all rise from the same height, called Kotylus. This
comes from Demetrius, a native of Skepsis.

[186] Diodor. xvii. 18, 19. Οἱ βάρβαροι, τὴν ὑπώρειαν
κατειλημμένοι, etc. “prima congressio in campis Adrastiis fuit.”
Justin, xi. 6: compare Strabo, xiii. p. 587, 588.

Meanwhile Alexander marched onward towards this position, from Arisbê
(where he had reviewed his army)—on the first day to Perkôtê, on the
second to the river Praktius, on the third to Hermôtus; receiving
on his way the spontaneous surrender of the town of Priapus. Aware
that the enemy was not far distant, he threw out in advance a body of
scouts under Amyntas, consisting of four squadrons of light cavalry
and one of the heavy Macedonian (Companion) cavalry. From Hermôtus
(the fourth day from Arisbê) he marched direct towards the Granikus,
in careful order, with his main phalanx in double files, his cavalry
on each wing, and the baggage in the rear. On approaching the river,
he made his dispositions for immediate attack, though Parmenio
advised waiting until the next morning. Knowing well, like Memnon on
the other side, that the chances of a pitched battle were all against
the Persians, he resolved to leave them no opportunity of decamping
during the night.

In Alexander’s array, the phalanx or heavy infantry formed the
central body. The six Taxeis or divisions, of which it consisted,
were commanded (reckoning from right to left) by Perdikkas, Kœnus,
Amyntas son of Andromenes, Philippus, Meleager, and Kraterus.[187]
Immediately on the right of the phalanx, were the hypaspistæ,
or light infantry, under Nikanor son of Parmenio—then the light
horse or lancers, the Pæonians, and the Apolloniate squadron of
Companion-cavalry commanded by the Ilarch Sokrates, all under
Amyntas son of Arrhibæus—lastly the full body of Companion-cavalry,
the bowmen, and the Agrianian darters, all under Philôtas (son of
Parmenio), whose division formed the extreme right.[188] The left
flank of the phalanx was in like manner protected by three distinct
divisions of cavalry or lighter troops—first, by the Thracians,
under Agathon—next, by the cavalry of the allies, under Philippus,
son of Menelaus—lastly, by the Thessalian cavalry, under Kallas,
whose division formed the extreme left. Alexander himself took the
command of the right, giving that of the left to Parmenio; by right
and left are meant the two halves of the army, each of them including
three Taxeis or divisions of the phalanx with the cavalry on its
flank—for there was no recognized centre under a distinct command. On
the other side of the Granikus, the Persian cavalry lined the bank.
The Medes and Baktrians were on their right, under Rheomithres—the
Paphlagonians and Hyrkanians in the centre, under Arsites and
Spithridates—on the left were Memnon and Arsamenes, with their
divisions.[189] The Persian infantry, both Asiatic and Grecian, were
kept back in reserve; the cavalry alone being relied upon to dispute
the passage of the river.

[187] Arrian, i. 14, 3. The text of Arrian is not clear. The name
of Kraterus occurs twice. Various explanations are proposed.
The words ἔστε ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς ξυμπάσης τάξεως seem to prove
that there were three τάξεις of the phalanx (Kraterus, Meleager,
and Philippus) included in the left half of the army—and three
others (Perdikkas, Kœnus, and Amyntas) in the right half; while
the words ἐπὶ δὲ, ἡ Κρατέρου τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου appear wrongly
inserted. There is no good reason for admitting two distinguished
officers, each named Kraterus. The name of Philippus and his
τάξις is repeated twice; once in counting from the right of the
τάξεις,—once again in counting from the left.

[188] Plutarch states that Alexander struck into the river with
thirteen squadrons (ἴλαι) of cavalry. Whether this total includes
all then present in the field, or only the Companion-cavalry—we
cannot determine (Plutarch, Alex. 16).

[189] Diodor. xvii. 19.

In this array, both parties remained for some time, watching each
other in anxious silence.[190] There being no firing or smoke, as
with modern armies, all the details on each side were clearly visible
to the other; so that the Persians easily recognized Alexander
himself on the Macedonian right from the splendor of his armor and
military costume, as well as from the respectful demeanor of those
around him. Their principal leaders accordingly thronged to their
own left, which they reinforced with the main strength of their
cavalry, in order to oppose him personally. Presently he addressed
a few words of encouragement to the troops, and gave the order for
advance. He directed the first attack to be made by the squadron of
Companion-cavalry whose turn it was on that day to take the lead—(the
squadron of Apollonia, of which Sokrates was captain—commanded on
this day by Ptolemæus son of Philippus) supported by the light horse
or Lancers, the Pæonian darters (infantry), and one division of
regularly armed infantry, seemingly hypaspistæ.[191] He then himself
entered the river, at the head of the right half of the army, cavalry
and infantry, which advanced under sound of trumpets and with the
usual war-shouts. As the occasional depths of water prevented a
straightforward march with one uniform line, the Macedonians slanted
their course suitably to the fordable spaces; keeping their front
extended so as to approach the opposite bank as much as possible in
line, and not in separate columns with flanks exposed to the Persian
cavalry.[192] Not merely the right under Alexander, but also the left
under Parmenio, advanced and crossed in the same movement and under
the like precautions.

[190] Arrian, i. 14, 8. Χρόνον μὲν δὴ ἀμφότερα τὰ στρατεύματα,
ἐπ᾽ ἀκροῦ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐφεστῶτες, ὑπὸ τοῦ τὸ μέλλον ὀκνεῖν ἡσυχίαν
ἦγον· καὶ σιγὴ ἦν πολλὴ ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρων.

[191] Arrian, i. 14, 9. τοὺς προδρόμους ἱππέας mean the same
cavalry as those who are called (in 14, 2) σαρισσοφόρους ἱππέας,
under Amyntas son of Arrhibæus.

[192] Arrian, i. 14, 10. Αὐτὸς δὲ (Alexander) ἄγων τὸ δέξιον
κέρας ... ἐμβαίνει ἐς τὸν πόρον, λοξὴν ἀεὶ παρατείνων τὴν τάξιν,
ᾗ παρεῖλκε τὸ ῥεῦμα, ἵνα δὴ μὴ ἐκβαίνοντι αὐτῷ οἱ Πέρσαι κατὰ
κέρας προσπίπτοιεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς, ὡς ἀνυστὸν, τῇ φάλαγγι
προσμίξῃ αὐτοῖς.

Apparently, this passage λοξὴν ἀεὶ παρατείνων τὴν τάξιν, ᾗ
παρεῖλκε τὸ ῥεῦμα is to be interpreted by the phrase which
follows describing the purpose to be accomplished.

I cannot think that the words imply a movement _in échelon_,
as Rüstow and Köchly contend (Geschichte des Griechischen
Kriegswesens, p. 271)—nor a crossing of the river against the
stream, to break the force of the current, as is the opinion of
others.

The foremost detachment under Ptolemy and Amyntas, on reaching the
opposite bank, encountered a strenuous resistance, concentrated as it
was here upon one point. They found Memnon and his sons with the best
of the Persian cavalry immediately in their front; some on the summit
of the bank, from whence they hurled down their javelins—others
down at the water’s-edge, so as to come to closer quarters. The
Macedonians tried every effort to make good their landing, and push
their way by main force through the Persian horse, but in vain.
Having both lower ground and insecure footing, they could make no
impression, but were thrust back with some loss, and retired upon the
main body which Alexander was now bringing across. On his approaching
the shore, the same struggle was renewed around his person with
increased fervor on both sides. He was himself among the foremost,
and all near him were animated by his example. The horsemen on both
sides became jammed together, and the contest was one of physical
force and pressure by man and horse; but the Macedonians had a great
advantage in being accustomed to the use of the strong close-fighting
pike, while the Persian weapon was the missile javelin. At length
the resistance was surmounted, and Alexander with those around him,
gradually thrusting back the defenders, made good their way up the
high bank to the level ground. At other points the resistance was not
equally vigorous. The left and centre of the Macedonians, crossing
at the same time on all practicable spaces along the whole line,
overpowered the Persians stationed on the slope, and got up to the
level ground with comparative facility.[193] Indeed no cavalry could
possibly stand on the bank to offer opposition to the phalanx with
its array of long pikes, wherever this could reach the ascent in
any continuous front. The easy crossing of the Macedonians at other
points helped to constrain those Persians, who were contending with
Alexander himself on the slope, to recede to the level ground above.

[193] Arrian, i. 15, 5. Καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν (Alexander himself)
ξυνειστήκει μάχη καρτερὰ, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἄλλαι ἐπ᾽ ἄλλαις τῶν
τάξεων τοῖς Μακεδόσι διέβαινον οὐ χαλεπῶς ἤδη.

These words deserve attention, because they show how incomplete
Arrian’s description of the battle had before been. Dwelling
almost exclusively upon the personal presence and achievements
of Alexander, he had said little even about the right half of
the army, and nothing at all about the left half of it under
Parmenio. We discover from these words that _all_ the τάξεις of
the phalanx (not only the three in Alexander’s half, but also the
three in Parmenio’s half) passed the river nearly at the same
time, and for the most part, with little or no resistance.

Here again, as at the water’s edge, Alexander was foremost in
personal conflict. His pike having been broken, he turned to a
soldier near him—Aretis, one of the horseguards who generally aided
him in mounting his horse—and asked for another. But this man, having
broken his pike also, showed the fragment to Alexander, requesting
him to ask some one else; upon which the Corinthian Demaratus,
one of the Companion-cavalry close at hand, gave him his weapon
instead. Thus armed anew, Alexander spurred his horse forward against
Mithridates (son-in-law of Darius), who was bringing up a column
of cavalry to attack him, but was himself considerably in advance
of it. Alexander thrust his pike into the face of Mithridates, and
laid him prostrate on the ground: he then turned to another of the
Persian leaders, Rhœsakes, who struck him a blow on the head with
his scymetar, knocked off a portion of his helmet, but did not
penetrate beyond. Alexander avenged this blow by thrusting Rhœsakes
through the body with his pike.[194] Meanwhile a third Persian
leader, Spithridates, was actually close behind Alexander, with hand
and scymetar uplifted to cut him down. At this critical moment,
Kleitus son of Dropides—one of the ancient officers of Philip, high
in the Macedonian service—struck with full force at the uplifted
arm of Spithridates and severed it from the body, thus preserving
Alexander’s life. Other leading Persians, kinsmen of Spithridates,
rushed desperately on Alexander, who received many blows on his
armor, and was in much danger. But the efforts of his companions
near were redoubled, both to defend his person and to second his
adventurous daring. It was on that point that the Persian cavalry
was first broken. On the left of the Macedonian line, the Thessalian
cavalry also fought with vigor and success;[195] and the light-armed
foot, intermingled with Alexander’s cavalry generally, did great
damage to the enemy. The rout of the Persian cavalry, once begun,
speedily became general. They fled in all directions, pursued by the
Macedonians.

[194] Arrian, i. 15, 6-12; Diodor. xvi. 20; Plutarch, Alex. 16.
These authors differ in the details. I follow Arrian.

[195] Diodor. xvii. 21.

But Alexander and his officers soon checked this ardor of pursuit,
calling back their cavalry to complete his victory. The Persian
infantry, Asiatics as well as Greeks, had remained without movement
or orders, looking on the cavalry battle which had just disastrously
terminated. To them Alexander immediately turned his attention.[196]
He brought up his phalanx and hypaspistæ to attack them in front,
while his cavalry assailed on all sides their unprotected flanks and
rear; he himself charged with the cavalry, and had a horse killed
under him. His infantry alone was more numerous than they, so that
against such odds the result could hardly be doubtful. The greater
part of these mercenaries, after a valiant resistance, were cut to
pieces on the field. We are told that none escaped, except 2000 made
prisoners, and some who remained concealed in the field among the
dead bodies.[197]

[196] Arrian, i. 16, 1. Plutarch says that the infantry, on
seeing the cavalry routed, demanded to capitulate on terms with
Alexander; but this seems hardly probable.

[197] Arrian, i. 16, 4; Diodor. xvii. 21. Diodorus says that on
the part of the Persians more than 10,000 foot were killed, with
2000 cavalry; and that more than 20,000 men were made prisoners.

In this complete and signal defeat, the loss of the Persian cavalry
was not very serious in mere number—for only 1000 of them were slain.
But the slaughter of the leading Persians, who had exposed themselves
with extreme bravery in the personal conflict against Alexander,
was terrible. There were slain not only Mithridates, Rhœsakes,
and Spithridates, whose names have been already mentioned,—but
also Pharnakes, brother-in-law of Darius, Mithrobarzanes satrap of
Kappadokia, Atizyes, Niphates, Petines, and others; all Persians
of rank and consequence. Arsites, the satrap of Phrygia, whose
rashness had mainly caused the rejection of Memnon’s advice, escaped
from the field, but died shortly afterwards by his own hand, from
anguish and humiliation.[198] The Persian or Perso-Grecian infantry,
though probably more of them individually escaped than is implied in
Arrian’s account, was as a body irretrievably ruined. No force was
either left in the field, or could be afterwards reassembled in Asia
Minor.

[198] Arrian, i. 16, 5, 6.

The loss on the side of Alexander is said to have been very small.
Twenty-five of the Companion-cavalry, belonging to the division under
Ptolemy and Amyntas, were slain in the first unsuccessful attempt
to pass the river. Of the other cavalry, sixty in all were slain;
of the infantry, thirty. This is given to us as the entire loss on
the side of Alexander.[199] It is only the number of killed; that
of the wounded is not stated; but assuming it to be ten times the
number of killed, the total of both together will be 1265.[200] If
this be correct, the resistance of the Persian cavalry, except near
that point where Alexander himself and the Persian chiefs came into
conflict, cannot have been either serious or long protracted. But
when we add farther the contest with the infantry, the smallness of
the total assigned for Macedonian killed and wounded will appear
still more surprising. The total of the Persian infantry is stated
at nearly 20,000, most part of them Greek mercenaries. Of these only
2000 were made prisoners; nearly all the rest (according to Arrian)
were slain. Now the Greek mercenaries were well armed, and not likely
to let themselves be slain with impunity; moreover Plutarch expressly
affirms that they resisted with desperate valor, and that most of the
Macedonian loss was incurred in the conflict against them. It is not
easy therefore to comprehend how the total number of slain can be
brought within the statement of Arrian.[201]

[199] Arrian, i. 16, 7, 8.

[200] Arrian, in describing another battle, considers that the
proportion of twelve to one, between wounded and killed, is above
what could have been expected (v. 24, 8). Rüstow and Köchly (p.
273) state that in modern battles, the ordinary proportion of
wounded to killed is from 8:1 to 10:1.

[201] Arrian, i. 16, 8; Plutarch, Alexand. 16. Aristobulus
(apud Plutarch. _l. c._) said that there were slain, among the
companions of Alexander (τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον) thirty-four
persons, of whom nine were infantry. This coincides with Arrian’s
statement about the twenty-five companions of the cavalry, slain.

After the victory, Alexander manifested the greatest solicitude for
his wounded soldiers, whom he visited and consoled in person. Of the
twenty-five Companions slain, he caused brazen statues, by Lysippus,
to be erected at Dium in Macedonia, where they were still standing
in the time of Arrian. To the surviving relatives of all the slain
he also granted immunity from taxation and from personal service.
The dead bodies were honorably buried, those of the enemy as well as
of his own soldiers. The two thousand Greeks in the Persian service
who had become his prisoners, were put in chains, and transported
to Macedonia, there to work as slaves; to which treatment Alexander
condemned them on the ground that they had taken arms on behalf
of the foreigner against Greece, in contravention of the general
vote passed by the synod at Corinth. At the same time, he sent
to Athens three hundred panoplies selected from the spoil, to be
dedicated to Athênê in the acropolis with this inscription—“Alexander
son of Philip, and the Greeks, except the Lacedæmonians (_present
these offerings_), out of the spoils of the foreigners inhabiting
Asia.”[202] Though the vote to which Alexander appealed represented
no existing Grecian aspiration, and granted only a sanction which
could not be safely refused, yet he found satisfaction in clothing
his own self-aggrandizing impulse under the name of a supposed
Pan-hellenic purpose: which was at the same time useful, as
strengthening his hold upon the Greeks, who were the only persons
competent, either as officers or soldiers, to uphold the Persian
empire against him. His conquests were the extinction of genuine
Hellenism, though they diffused an exterior varnish of it, and
especially the Greek language, over much of the Oriental world. True
Grecian interests lay more on the side of Darius than of Alexander.

[202] Arrian, i. 16, 10, 11.

The battle of the Granikus, brought on by Arsites and the other
satraps contrary to the advice of Memnon, was moreover so unskilfully
fought by them, that the gallantry of their infantry, the most
formidable corps of Greeks that had ever been in the Persian service,
was rendered of little use. The battle, properly speaking, was
fought only by the Persian cavalry;[203] the infantry was left to be
surrounded and destroyed afterwards.

[203] Arrian usually calls the battle of the Granikus an
ἱππομαχία (i. 17, 10 and elsewhere).

The battle was fought in the Attic month Thargelion: probably the
beginning of May (Plutarch, Camillus, 19).

No victory could be more decisive or terror-striking than that of
Alexander. There remained no force in the field to oppose him. The
impression made by so great a public catastrophe was enhanced by two
accompanying circumstances; first, by the number of Persian grandees
who perished, realizing almost the wailings of Atossa, Xerxes, and
the Chorus, in the Persæ of Æschylus,[204] after the battle of
Salamis—next, by the chivalrous and successful prowess of Alexander
himself, who, emulating the Homeric Achilles, not only rushed
foremost into the _mélée_, but killed two of these grandees with his
own hand. Such exploits, impressive even when we read of them now,
must at the moment when they occurred have acted most powerfully upon
the imagination of contemporaries.

[204] Æschylus, Pers. 950 _seqq._

Several of the neighboring Mysian mountaineers, though mutinous
subjects towards Persia, came down to make submission to him, and
were permitted to occupy their lands under the same tribute as they
had paid before. The inhabitants of the neighboring Grecian city
of Zeleia, whose troops had served with the Persians, surrendered
and obtained their pardon; Alexander admitting the plea that
they had served only under constraint. He then sent Parmenio
to attack Daskylium, the stronghold and chief residence of the
satrap of Phrygia. Even this place was evacuated by the garrison
and surrendered, doubtless with a considerable treasure therein.
The whole satrapy of Phrygia thus fell into Alexander’s power,
and was appointed to be administered by Kallas for his behalf,
levying the same amount of tribute as had been paid before.[205] He
himself then marched, with his main force, in a southerly direction
towards Sardis—the chief town of Lydia, and the main station of the
Persians in Asia Minor. The citadel of Sardis—situated on a lofty
and steep rock projecting from Mount Tmolus, fortified by a triple
wall with an adequate garrison—was accounted impregnable, and at
any rate could hardly have been taken by anything less than a long
blockade,[206] which would have allowed time for the arrival of the
fleet and the operations of Memnon. Yet such was the terror which now
accompanied the Macedonian conqueror, that when he arrived within
eight miles of Sardis, he met not only a deputation of the chief
citizens, but also the Persian governor of the citadel, Mithrines.
The town, citadel, garrison, and treasure Were delivered up to him
without a blow. Fortunately for Alexander, there were not in Asia
any Persian governors of courage and fidelity such as had been
displayed by Maskames and Boges after the repulse of Xerxes from
Greece.[207] Alexander treated Mithrines with courtesy and honor,
granted freedom to the Sardians and to the other Lydians generally,
with the use of their own Lydian laws. The betrayal of Sardis by
Mithrines was a signal good fortune to Alexander. On going up to
the citadel, he contemplated with astonishment its prodigious
strength; congratulating himself on so easy an acquisition, and
giving directions to build there a temple of Olympian Zeus, on the
spot where the old palace of the kings of Lydia had been situated.
He named Pausanias governor of the citadel, with a garrison of
Peloponnesians from Argos; Asander, satrap of the country; and
Nikias, collector of tribute.[208] The freedom granted to the
Lydians, whatever it may have amounted to, did not exonerate them
from paying the usual tribute.

[205] Arrian, i. 17, 1, 2.

[206] About the almost impregnable fortifications and position
of Sardis, see Polybius, vii. 15-18; Herod. i. 84. It held out
for nearly two years against Antiochus III. (B. C. 216),
and was taken at last only by the extreme carelessness of the
defenders; even then, the citadel was still held.

[207] Herodot. vii. 106, 107.

[208] Arrian, i. 17, 5-9; Diodor. xvii. 21.

From Sardis, he ordered Kallas, the new satrap of Hellespontine
Phrygia—and Alexander son of Aëropus, who had been promoted in place
of Kallas to the command of the Thessalian cavalry—to attack Atarneus
and the district belonging to Memnon, on the Asiatic coast opposite
Lesbos. Meanwhile he himself directed his march to Ephesus, which he
reached on the fourth day. Both at Ephesus and at Miletus—the two
principal strongholds of the Persians on the coast, as Sardis was
in the interior—the sudden catastrophe at the Granikus had struck
unspeakable terror. Hegesistratus, governor of the Persian garrison
(Greek mercenaries) at Miletus, sent letters to Alexander offering to
surrender the town on his approach; while the garrison at Ephesus,
with the Macedonian exile Amyntas, got on board two triremes in the
harbor, and fled. It appears that there had been recently a political
revolution in the town, conducted by Syrphax and other leaders, who
had established an oligarchical government. These men, banishing
their political opponents, had committed depredations on the temple
of Artemis, overthrown the statue of Philip of Macedon dedicated
therein, and destroyed the sepulchre of Heropythus the liberator
in the agora.[209] Some of the party, though abandoned by their
garrison, were still trying to invoke aid from Memnon, who however
was yet at a distance. Alexander entered the town without resistance,
restored the exiles, established a democratical constitution, and
directed that the tribute heretofore paid to the Persians should now
be paid to the Ephesian Artemis. Syrphax and his family sought refuge
in the temple, from whence they were dragged by the people and stoned
to death. More of the same party would have been despatched, had not
the popular vengeance been restrained by Alexander; who displayed an
honorable and prudent moderation.[210]

[209] Arrian, i. 17, 12. Respecting these commotions at Ephesus,
which had preceded the expedition of Alexander, we have no
information: nor are we told who Heropythus was or under what
circumstances he had liberated Ephesus. It would have been
interesting to know these facts, as illustrating the condition of
the Asiatic Greeks previous to Alexander’s invasion.

[210] Arrian, i. 17, 10-13.

Thus master of Ephesus, Alexander found himself in communication with
his fleet, under the command of Nikanor; and received propositions
of surrender from the two neighboring inland cities, Magnesia and
Tralleis. To occupy these cities, he despatched Parmenio with 5000
foot (half of them Macedonians) and 200 of the Companion-cavalry;
while he at the same time sent Antimachus with an equal force in a
northerly direction, to liberate the various cities of Æolic and
Ionic Greeks. This officer was instructed to put down in each of
them the ruling oligarchy, which acted with a mercenary garrison
as an instrument of Persian supremacy—to place the government in
the hands of the citizens—and to abolish all payment of tribute.
He himself—after taking part in a solemn festival and procession
to the temple of Ephesian Artemis, with his whole army in battle
array—marched southward towards Miletus; his fleet under Nikanor
proceeding thither by sea.[211] He expected probably to enter
Miletus with as little resistance as Ephesus. But his hopes were
disappointed: Hegesistratus, commander of the garrison in that town,
though under the immediate terror of the defeat at the Granikus
he had written to offer submission, had now altered his tone, and
determined to hold out. The formidable Persian fleet,[212] four
hundred sail of Phenician and Cyprian ships of war with well-trained
seamen, was approaching.

[211] Arrian, i. 18, 5, 6.

[212] Arrian, i. 18, 10-13.

This naval force, which a few weeks earlier would have prevented
Alexander from crossing into Asia, now afforded the only hope of
arresting the rapidity and ease of his conquests. What steps had been
taken by the Persian officers since the defeat at the Granikus, we do
not hear. Many of them had fled, along with Memnon, to Miletus;[213]
and they were probably disposed, under the present desperate
circumstances, to accept the command of Memnon as their only hope
of safety, though they had despised his counsel on the day of the
battle. Whether the towns in Memnon’s principality of Atarneus had
attempted any resistance against the Macedonians, we do not know. His
interests however were so closely identified with those of Persia,
that he had sent up his wife and children as hostages, to induce
Darius to entrust him with the supreme conduct of the war. Orders
to this effect were presently sent down by that prince;[214] but at
the first arrival of the fleet, it seems not to have been under the
command of Memnon, who was however probably on board.

[213] Diodor. xvii. 22.

[214] Diodor. xvii. 23.

It came too late to aid in the defence of Miletus. Three days before
its arrival, Nikanor the Macedonian admiral, with his fleet of one
hundred and sixty ships, had occupied the island of Ladê, which
commanded the harbor of that city. Alexander found the outer portion
of Miletus evacuated, and took it without resistance. He was making
preparations to besiege the inner city, and had already transported
4000 troops across to the island of Ladê, when the powerful Persian
fleet came in sight, but found itself excluded from Miletus, and
obliged to take moorings under the neighboring promontory of Mykalê.
Unwilling to abandon without a battle the command of the sea,
Parmenio advised Alexander to fight this fleet, offering himself to
share the hazard aboard. But Alexander disapproved the proposition,
affirming that his fleet was inferior not less in skill than in
numbers; that the high training of the Macedonians would tell for
nothing on shipboard; and that a naval defeat would be the signal for
insurrection in Greece. Besides debating such prudential reasons,
Alexander and Parmenio also differed about the religious promise of
the case. On the sea-shore, near the stern of the Macedonian ships,
Parmenio had seen an eagle, which filled him with confidence that
the ships would prove victorious. But Alexander contended that this
interpretation was incorrect. Though the eagle doubtless promised to
him victory, yet it had been seen on land—and therefore his victories
would be on land: hence the result signified was, that he would
overcome the Persian fleet, by means of land-operations.[215] This
part of the debate, between two practical military men of ability,
is not the least interesting of the whole; illustrating as it does,
not only the religious susceptibilities of the age, but also the
pliancy of the interpretative process, lending itself equally well
to inferences totally opposite. The difference between a sagacious
and a dull-witted prophet, accommodating ambiguous omens to useful or
mischievous conclusions, was one of very material importance in the
ancient world.

[215] Arrian, i. 18, 9-15; i. 20, 2.

Alexander now prepared vigorously to assault Miletus, repudiating
with disdain an offer brought to him by a Milesian citizen named
Glaukippus—that the city should be neutral and open to him as well as
to the Persians. His fleet under Nikanor occupied the harbor, blocked
up its narrow mouth against the Persians, and made threatening
demonstrations from the water’s edge; while he himself brought up
his battering-engines against the walls, shook or overthrew them
in several places, and then stormed the city. The Milesians, with
the Grecian mercenary garrison, made a brave defence, but were
overpowered by the impetuosity of the assault. A large number of
them were slain, and there was no way of escape except by jumping
into little boats, or swimming off upon the hollow of the shield.
Even of these fugitives, most part were killed by the seamen of the
Macedonian triremes; but a division of 300 Grecian mercenaries got on
to an isolated rock near the mouth of the harbor, and there prepared
to sell their lives dearly. Alexander, as soon as his soldiers were
thoroughly masters of the city, went himself on shipboard to attack
the mercenaries on the rock, taking with him ladders in order to
effect a landing upon it. But when he saw that they were resolved
on a desperate defence, he preferred admitting them to terms of
capitulation, and received them into his own service.[216] To the
surviving Milesian citizens he granted the condition of a free city,
while he caused all the remaining prisoners to be sold as slaves.

[216] Arrian, i. 19; Diodor. xvii. 22.

The powerful Persian fleet, from the neighboring promontory of
Mykalê, was compelled to witness, without being able to prevent, the
capture of Miletus, and was presently withdrawn to Halikarnassus.
At the same time Alexander came to the resolution of disbanding his
own fleet; which, while costing more than he could then afford, was
nevertheless unfit to cope with the enemy in open sea. He calculated
that by concentrating all his efforts on land-operations, especially
against the cities on the coast, he should exclude the Persian fleet
from all effective hold on Asia Minor, and ensure that country to
himself. He therefore paid off all the ships, retaining only a
moderate squadron for the purposes of transport.[217]

[217] Arrian, i. 20, 1-4; Diodor. xvii. 22. At the same time,
the statement of Diodorus can hardly be correct (xvii. 24),
that Alexander sent his battering engines from Miletus to
Halikarnassus by sea. This would only have exposed them to be
captured by the Persian fleet. We shall see that Alexander
reorganized his entire fleet during the ensuing year.

Before this time, probably, the whole Asiatic coast northward of
Miletus—including the Ionic and Æolic cities and the principality of
Memnon—had either accepted willingly the dominion of Alexander, or
had been reduced by his detachments. Accordingly he now directed his
march southward from Miletus, towards Karia, and especially towards
Halikarnassus, the principal city of that territory. On entering
Karia, he was met by Ada, a member of the Karian princely family,
who tendered to him her town of Alinda and her other possessions,
adopting him as her son, and entreating his protection. Not many
years earlier, under Mausôlus and Artemisia, the powerful princes
of this family had been formidable to all the Grecian islands. It
was the custom of Karia that brothers and sisters of the reigning
family intermarried with each other: Mausôlus and his wife Artemisia
were succeeded by Idrieus and his wife Ada, all four being brothers
and sisters, sons and daughters of Hekatomnus. On the death of
Idrieus, his widow Ada, was expelled from Halikarnassus and other
parts of Karia by her surviving brother Pixodarus; though she still
preserved some strong towns, which proved a welcome addition to the
conquests of Alexander. Pixodarus, on the contrary, who had given his
daughter in marriage to a leading Persian named Orontobates, warmly
espoused the Persian cause, and made Halikarnassus a capital point of
resistance against the invader.[218]

[218] Arrian, i. 23, 11, 12; Diodor. xvii. 24; Strabo, xiv. p.
657.

But it was not by him alone that this city was defended. The Persian
fleet had repaired thither from Miletus; Memnon, now invested by
Darius with supreme command on the Asiatic coast and the Ægean, was
there in person. There was not only Orontobates with many other
Asiatics, but also a large garrison of mercenary Greeks, commanded by
Ephialtes, a brave Athenian exile. The city, strong both by nature
and by art, with a surrounding ditch forty-five feet broad and
twenty-two feet deep,[219] had been still farther strengthened under
the prolonged superintendence of Memnon;[220] lastly, there were two
citadels, a fortified harbor, with its entrance fronting the south,
abundant magazines of arms, and good provision of defensive engines.
The siege of Halikarnassus was the most arduous enterprise which
Alexander had yet undertaken. Instead of attacking it by land and sea
at once, as at Miletus, he could make his approaches only from the
land, while the defenders were powerfully aided from seaward by the
Persian ships with their numerous crews.

[219] Arrian, i. 20, 13.

[220] Arrian, i. 20, 5. ξύμπαντα ταῦτα Μέμνων τε αὐτὸς παρὼν ἐκ
πολλοῦ παρεσκευάκει, etc.

His first efforts, directed against the gate on the north or
north-east of the city, which led towards Mylasa, were interrupted
by frequent sallies and discharges from the engines on the walls.
After a few days thus spent without much avail, he passed with a
large section of his army to the western side of the town, towards
the outlying portion of the projecting tongue of land, on which
Halikarnassus and Myndus (the latter farther westward) were situated.
While making demonstrations on this side of Halikarnassus, he at
the same time attempted a night-attack on Myndus, but was obliged
to retire after some hours of fruitless effort. He then confined
himself to the siege of Halikarnassus. His soldiers, protected from
missiles by movable penthouses (called Tortoises), gradually filled
up the wide and deep ditch round the town, so as to open a level road
for his engines (rolling towers of wood) to come up close to the
walls. The engines being brought up close, the work of demolition
was successfully prosecuted; notwithstanding vigorous sallies from
the garrison, repulsed; though not without loss and difficulty,
by the Macedonians. Presently the shock of the battering-engines
had overthrown two towers of the city-wall, together with two
intermediate breadths of wall; and a third tower was beginning to
totter. The besieged were employed in erecting an inner wall of
brick to cover the open space, and a wooden tower of the great
height of 150 feet for the purpose of casting projectiles.[221] It
appears that Alexander waited for the full demolition of the third
tower, before he thought the breach wide enough to be stormed; but
an assault was prematurely brought on by two adventurous soldiers
from the division of Perdikkas.[222] These men, elate with wine,
rushed up single-handed to attack the Mylasean gate, and slew
the foremost of the defenders who came out to oppose them, until
at length, reinforcements arriving successively on both sides, a
general combat took place at a short distance from the wall. In the
end, the Macedonians were victorious, and drove the besieged back
into the city. Such was the confusion, that the city might then
have been assaulted and taken, had measures been prepared for it
beforehand. The third tower was speedily overthrown; nevertheless,
before this could be accomplished, the besieged had already completed
their half-moon within, against which accordingly, on the next day,
Alexander pushed forward his engines. In this advanced position,
however, being as it were within the circle of the city-wall, the
Macedonians were exposed to discharges not only from engines in their
front, but also from the towers yet standing on each side of them.
Moreover, at night, a fresh sally was made with so much impetuosity,
that some of the covering wicker-work of the engines, and even
the main wood-work of one of them, was burnt. It was not without
difficulty that Philôtas and Hellanikus, the officers on guard,
preserved the remainder; nor were the besieged finally driven in,
until Alexander himself appeared with reinforcements.[223] Though his
troops had been victors in these successive combats, yet he could not
carry off his dead, who lay close to the walls, without soliciting
a truce for burial. Such request usually counted as a confession of
defeat: nevertheless Alexander solicited the truce, which was granted
by Memnon, in spite of the contrary opinion of Ephialtes.[224]

[221] Compare Arrian, i. 21, 7, 8; Diodor. xvii. 25, 26.

[222] Both Arrian, (i. 21, 5) and Diodorus (xvii. 25) mention
this proceeding of the two soldiers of Perdikkas, though Diodorus
says that it occurred at night, which cannot well be true.

[223] Arrian, i. 21, 7-12.

[224] Diodor. xvii. 25.

After a few days of interval, for burying his dead and repairing the
engines, Alexander recommenced attack upon the half-moon, under his
own personal superintendence. Among the leaders within, a conviction
gained ground that the place could not long hold out. Ephialtes
especially, resolved not to survive the capture, and seeing that the
only chance of preservation consisted in destroying the besieging
engines, obtained permission from Memnon to put himself at the head
of a last desperate sally.[225] He took immediately near him 2000
chosen troops, half to encounter the enemy, half with torches to
burn the engines. At daybreak, all the gates being suddenly and
simultaneously thrown open, sallying parties rushed out from each
against the besiegers; the engines from within supporting them by
multiplied discharges of missiles. Ephialtes with his division,
marching straight against the Macedonians on guard at the main
point of attack, assailed them impetuously, while his torch-bearers
tried to set the engines on fire. Himself distinguished no less for
personal strength than for valor, he occupied the front rank, and
was so well seconded by the courage and good array of his soldiers
charging in deep column, that for a time he gained advantage. Some of
the engines were successfully fired, and the advanced guard of the
Macedonian troops, consisting of young troops, gave way and fled.
They were rallied partly by the efforts of Alexander, but still
more by the older Macedonian soldiers, companions in all Philip’s
campaigns; who, standing exempt from night-watches, were encamped
more in the rear. These veterans, among whom one Atharrias was the
most conspicuous, upbraiding the cowardice of their comrades,[226]
cast themselves into their accustomed phalanx-array, and thus both
withstood and repulsed the charge of the victorious enemy. Ephialtes,
foremost among the combatants, was slain, the rest were driven back
to the city, and the burning engines were saved with some damage.
During this same time, an obstinate conflict had also taken place at
the gate called Tripylon, where the besieged had made another sally,
over a narrow bridge thrown across the ditch. Here the Macedonians
were under the command of Ptolemy (not the son of Lagus), one of the
king’s body-guards. He, with two or three other conspicuous officers,
perished in the severe struggle which ensued, but the sallying party
were at length repulsed and driven into the city.[227] The loss of
the besieged was severe, in trying to get again within the walls,
under vigorous pursuit from the Macedonians.

[225] The last desperate struggle of the besieged, is what stands
described in i. 22 of Arrian, and in xvii. 26, 27 of Diodorus;
though the two descriptions are very different. Arrian does
not name Ephialtes at Halikarnassus. He follows the Macedonian
authors, Ptolemy and Aristobulus; who probably dwelt only on
Memnon and the Persians as their real enemies, treating the
Greeks in general as a portion of the hostile force. On the other
hand, Diodorus and Curtius appear to have followed, in great
part, Grecian authors; in whose view eminent Athenian exiles,
like Ephialtes and Charidemus, counted for much more.

The fact here mentioned by Diodorus, that Ephialtes drove back
the young Macedonian guard, and that the battle was restored only
by the extraordinary efforts of the old guard—is one of much
interest, which I see no reason for mistrusting, though Arrian
says nothing about it. Curtius (v. 2; viii. 1) makes allusion to
it on a subsequent occasion, naming Atharrias: the part of his
work in which it ought to have been narrated, is lost. On this,
as on other occasions, Arrian slurs over the partial reverses,
obstructions, and losses, of Alexander’s career. His authorities
probably did so before him.

[226] Diodor. xvi. 27; Curtius, v. 1. viii. 2. ... οἱ γὰρ
πρεσβύτατοι τῶν Μακεδόνων, διὰ μὲν τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀπολελυμένοι
τῶν κινδύνων, συνεστρατευμένοι δὲ Φιλίππῳ ... τοῖς μὲν
φυγομαχοῦσι νεωτέροις πικρῶς ὠνείδισαν τὴν ἀνανδρίαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ
συναθροισθέντες καὶ συνασπίσαντες, ὑπέστησαν τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἤδη
νενικηκέναι....

[227] Arrian, i. 22, 5.

By this last unsuccessful effort, the defensive force of
Halikarnassus was broken. Memnon and Orontobates, satisfied that
no longer defence of the town was practicable, took advantage
of the night to set fire to their wooden projectile engines and
towers, as well as to their magazines of arms, with the houses near
the exterior wall, while they carried away the troops, stores,
and inhabitants, partly to the citadel called Salmakis—partly to
the neighboring islet called Arkonnesus—partly to the island of
Kos.[228] Though thus evacuating the town, however, they still kept
good garrisons well-provisioned in the two citadels belonging to it.
The conflagration, stimulated by a strong wind, spread widely. It
was only extinguished by the orders of Alexander, when he entered
the town, and put to death all those whom he found with firebrands.
He directed that the Halikarnassians found in the houses should be
spared, but that the city itself should be demolished. He assigned
the whole of Karia to Ada, as a principality, doubtless under
condition of tribute. As the citadels still occupied by the enemy
were strong enough to require a long siege, he did not think it
necessary to remain in person for the purpose of reducing them; but
surrounding them with a wall of blockade, he left Ptolemy and 3000
men to guard it.[229]

[228] Arrian, i. 23, 3, 4; Diodor. xvii. 27.

[229] Arrian, i. 23, 11; Diodor. xvii. 7; Strabo, xiv. p. 657.

Having concluded the siege of Halikarnassus, Alexander sent back his
artillery to Tralles, ordering Parmenio, with a large portion of the
cavalry, the allied infantry, and the baggage waggons, to Sardis.

The ensuing winter months he employed in the conquest of Lykia,
Pamphylia, and Pisidia. All this southern coast of Asia Minor is
mountainous; the range of Mount Taurus descending nearly to the sea,
so as to leave little or no intervening breadth of plain. In spite
of great strength of situation, such was the terror of Alexander’s
arms, that all the Lykian towns—Hyparna, Telmissus, Pinara, Xanthus,
Patara, and thirty others—submitted to him without a blow.[230] One
alone among them, called Marmareis, resisted to desperation.[231]
On reaching the territory called Milyas, the Phrygian frontier of
Lykia, Alexander received the surrender of the Greek maritime city,
Phasêlis. He assisted the Phaselites in destroying a mountain fort
erected and garrisoned against them by the neighboring Pisidian
mountaineers, and paid a public compliment to the sepulchre of their
deceased townsman, the rhetorician Theodektes.[232]

[230] Arrian, i. 24, 6-9.

[231] Diodor. xvii. 28.

[232] Arrian, i. 24, 11; Plutarch, Alexand. 17.

After this brief halt at Phasêlis, Alexander directed his course to
Pergê in Pamphylia. The ordinary mountain road, by which he sent
most of his army, was so difficult as to require some leveling by
Thracian light troops sent in advance for the purpose. But the king
himself, with a select detachment, took a road more difficult still,
under the mountains by the brink of the sea, called Klimax. When the
wind blew from the south, this road was covered by such a depth of
water as to be impracticable; for some time before he reached the
spot, the wind had blown strong from the south—but as he came near,
the special providence of the gods (so he and his friends conceived
it) brought on a change to the north, so that the sea receded and
left an available passage, though his soldiers had the water up to
their waists.[233] From Pergê he marched on to Sidê, receiving on his
way envoys from Aspendus, who offered to surrender their city, but
deprecated the entrance of a garrison; which they were allowed to
buy off promising fifty talents in money, together with the horses
which they were bringing up as tribute for the Persian king. Having
left a garrison at Sidê, he advanced onward to a strong place called
Syllium, defended by brave natives with a body of mercenaries to
aid them. These men held out, and even repulsed a first assault;
which Alexander could not stay to repeat, being apprised that the
Aspendians had refused to execute the conditions imposed, and had put
their city in a state of defence. Returning rapidly, he constrained
them to submission, and then marched back to Pergê; from whence he
directed his course towards the greater Phrygia,[234] through the
difficult mountains, and almost indomitable population, of Pisidia.

[233] Arrian, i. 26, 4. οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ θείου, ὡς αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ
ἀμφ᾽ αὐτὸν ἐξηγοῦντο, etc. Strabo, xiv. p. 666; Curtius, v. 3, 22.

Plutarch’s words (Alexand. 17) must be taken to mean that
Alexander did not boast so much of this special favor from the
gods, as some of his panegyrists boasted for him.

[234] Arrian, i. 27, 1-8

After remaining in the Pisidian mountains long enough to reduce
several towns or strong posts, Alexander proceeded northward
into Phrygia, passing by the salt lake called Askanius to the
steep and impregnable fortress of Kelænæ, garrisoned by 1000
Karians, and 100 mercenary Greeks. These men, having no hope of
relief from the Persians, offered to deliver up the fortress,
unless such relief should arrive before the sixtieth day.[235]
Alexander accepted the propositions, remained ten days at Kelænæ,
and left there Antigonus (afterwards the most powerful among his
successors) as satrap of Phrygia, with 1500 men. He then marched
northward to Gordium on the river Sangarius, where Parmenio
was directed to meet him, and where his winter-campaign was
concluded.[236]

[235] Curtius. iii. 1, 8.

[236] Arrian, i. 29, 1-5.

APPENDIX.

ON THE LENGTH OF THE MACEDONIAN SARISSA OR PIKE.

The statements here given about the length of the sarissa carried
by the phalangite, are taken from Polybius, whose description is on
all points both clear and consistent with itself. “The sarissa (he
says) is sixteen cubits long, according to the original theory; and
fourteen cubits as adapted to actual practice”—τὸ δὲ τῶν σαρισσῶν
μέγεθός ἐστι, κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπόθεσιν, ἑκκαίδεκα πηχῶν, κατὰ
δὲ τὴν ἁρμογὴν τὴν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, δεκατεσσάρων. Τούτων δὲ τοὺς
τέσσαρας ἀφαιρεῖ τὸ μεταξὺ ταῖν χεροῖν διάστημα, καὶ τὸ κατόπιν
σήκωμα τῆς προβολῆς (xviii. 12).

The difference here indicated by Polybius between the length in
theory, and that in practice, may probably be understood to mean,
that the phalangites, when in exercise, used pikes of the greater
length; when on service, of the smaller: just as the Roman soldiers
were trained in their exercises to use arms heavier than they
employed against an enemy.

Of the later tactic writers, Leo (Tact. vi. 39) and Constantine
Porphyrogenitus, repeat the double measurement of the sarissa as
given by Polybius. Arrian (Tact. c. 12) and Polyænus (ii. 29, 2)
state its length at sixteen cubits—Ælian (Tact. c. 14) gives fourteen
cubits. All these authors follow either Polybius, or some other
authority concurrent with him. None of them contradict him, though
none state the case so clearly as he does.

Messrs. Rüstow and Köchly (Gesch. des Griech. Kriegswesens, p. 238),
authors of the best work that I know respecting ancient military
matters, reject the authority of Polybius as it here stands. They
maintain that the passage must be corrupt, and that Polybius must
have meant to say that the sarissa was sixteen _feet_ in length—not
sixteen _cubits_. I cannot subscribe to their opinion, nor do I think
that their criticism on Polybius is a just one.

First, they reason as if Polybius had said that the sarissa of actual
service was _sixteen_ cubits long. Computing the weight of such a
weapon from the thickness required in the shaft, they pronounce that
it would be unmanageable. But Polybius gives the actual length as
only _fourteen_ cubits: a very material difference. If we accept the
hypothesis of these authors—that corruption of the text has made us
read _cubits_ where we ought to have read _feet_,—it will follow that
the length of the sarissa, as given by Polybius, would be _fourteen
feet_, not _sixteen feet_. Now this length is not sufficient to
justify various passages in which its prodigious length is set forth.

Next, they impute to Polybius a contradiction in saying that the
Roman soldier occupied a space of three feet, equal to that occupied
by a Macedonian soldier—and yet that in the fight, he had two
Macedonian soldiers and ten pikes opposed to him (xviii. 13). But
there is here no contradiction at all: for Polybius expressly says
that the Roman, though occupying three feet when the legion was drawn
up in order, required, when fighting, an expansion of the ranks and
an increased interval to the extent of three feet behind him and
on each side of him (χάλασμα καὶ διάστασιν ἀλλήλων ἔχειν δεήσει
τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐλάχιστον τρεῖς πόδας κατ᾽ ἐπιστάτην καὶ παραστάτην) in
order to allow full play for his sword and shield. It is therefore
perfectly true that each Roman soldier, when actually marching up to
attack the phalanx, occupied as much ground as two phalangites, and
had ten pikes to deal with.

Farther, it is impossible to suppose that Polybius, in speaking of
_cubits_, really meant _feet_; because (cap. 12) he speaks of _three
feet_ as the interval between each rank in the file, and these _three
feet_ are clearly made equal to _two cubits_. His computation will
not come right, if in place of _cubits_ you substitute _feet_.

We must therefore take the assertion of Polybius as we find it: that
the pike of the phalangite was fourteen cubits or twenty-one feet in
length. Now Polybius had every means of being well informed on such
a point. He was above thirty years of age at the time of the last war
of the Romans against the Macedonian king Perseus, in which war he
himself served. He was intimately acquainted with Scipio, the son of
Paulus Emilius, who gained the battle of Pydna. Lastly, he had paid
great attention to tactics, and had even written an express work on
the subject.

It might indeed be imagined, that the statement of Polybius, though
true as to his own time, was not true as to the time of Philip and
Alexander. But there is nothing to countenance such a suspicion—which
moreover is expressly disclaimed by Rüstow and Köchly.

Doubtless twenty-one feet is a prodigious length, unmanageable,
except by men properly trained, and inconvenient for all evolutions.
But these are just the terms under which the pike of the phalangite
is always spoken of. So Livy, xxxi. 39, “Erant pleraque silvestria
circa, incommoda phalangi maximè Macedonum: quæ, nisi ubi _prælongis
hastis_ velut vallum ante clypeos objecit (quod ut fiat, libero campo
opus est) nullius admodum usus est.” Compare also Livy, xliv. 40, 41,
where, among other intimations of the immense length of the pike, we
find, “Si carptim aggrediendo, circumagere _immobilem longitudine et
gravitate hastam_ cogas, confusâ strue implicatur:” also xxxiii. 8, 9.

Xenophon tells us that the Ten Thousand Greeks in their retreat had
to fight their way across the territory of the Chalybes, who carried
a pike _fifteen cubits_ long, together with a short sword; he does
not mention a shield, but they wore greaves and helmets (Anab. iv.
7, 15). This is a length greater than what Polybius ascribes to
the pike of the Macedonian phalangite. The Mosynœki defended their
citadel “with pikes so long and thick that a man could hardly carry
them” (Anabas. v. 4, 25). In the Iliad, when the Trojans are pressing
hard upon the Greek ships, and seeking to set them on fire, Ajax is
described as planting himself upon the poop, and keeping off the
assailants with a thrusting-pike of twenty-two cubits or thirty-three
feet in length (ξυστὸν ναύμαχον ἐν παλάμῃσιν—δυωκαιεικοσίπηχυ, Iliad,
xv. 678). The spear of Hektor is ten cubits, or eleven cubits, in
length—intended to be hurled (Iliad vi. 319; viii. 494)—the reading
is not settled whether ἔγχος ἔχ᾽ ἑνδεκάπηχυ, or ἔγχος ἔχεν δεκάπηχυ.

The Swiss infantry, and the German Landsknechte, in the sixteenth
century, were in many respects a reproduction of the Macedonian
phalanx: close ranks, deep files, long pikes, and the three or
four first ranks, composed of the strongest and bravest men in the
regiment—either officers, or picked soldiers receiving double pay.
The length and impenetrable array of their pikes enabled them to
resist the charge of the heavy cavalry or men at arms: they were
irresistible in front, unless an enemy could find means to break in
among the pikes, which was sometimes, though rarely, done. Their
great confidence was in the length of the pike—Macciavelli says of
them (Ritratti dell’ Alamagna, Opere t. iv. p. 159; and Dell’ Arte
della Guerra, p. 232-236), “Dicono tenere tale ordine, che non é
possibile entrare tra loro, né accostarseli, quanto é la picca lunga.
Sono ottime genti in campagna, à far giornata: ma per espugnare terra
non vagliono, e poco nel difenderlo: ed universalmente, dove non
possano tenere l’ ordine loro della milizia, non vagliono.”

CHAPTER XCIII.

SECOND AND THIRD ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER — BATTLE OF ISSUS —
SIEGE OF TYRE.

It was about February or March 333 B. C., when Alexander
reached Gordium; where he appears to have halted for some time,
giving to the troops who had been with him in Pisidia a repose
doubtless needful. While at Gordium, he performed the memorable
exploit familiarly known as the cutting of the Gordian knot. There
was preserved in the citadel an ancient waggon of rude structure,
said by the legend to have once belonged to the peasant Gordius and
his son Midas—the primitive rustic kings of Phrygia, designated as
such by the gods, and chosen by the people. The cord (composed of
fibres from the bark of the cornel tree), attaching the yoke of
this waggon to the pole, was so twisted and entangled as to form
a knot of singular complexity, which no one had ever been able to
untie. An oracle had pronounced, that to the person who should untie
it the empire of Asia was destined. When Alexander went up to see
this ancient relic, the surrounding multitude, Phrygian as well
as Macedonian, were full of expectation that the conqueror of the
Granikus and of Halikarnassus would overcome the difficulties of the
knot, and acquire the promised empire. But Alexander, on inspecting
the knot, was as much perplexed as others had been before him, until
at length, in a fit of impatience, he drew his sword and severed the
cord in two. By every one this was accepted as a solution of the
problem, thus making good his title to the empire of Asia; a belief
which the gods ratified by a storm of thunder and lightning during
the ensuing night.[237]

[237] Arrian, ii. 3; Curtius, iii. 2, 17; Plutarch, Alex. 18;
Justin, xi. 7.

At Gordium, Alexander was visited by envoys from Athens, entreating
the liberation of the Athenian prisoners taken at the Granikus, who
were now at work chained in the Macedonian mines. But he refused this
prayer until a more convenient season. Aware that the Greeks were
held attached to him only by their fears, and that, if opportunity
occurred, a large fraction of them would take part with the Persians,
he did not think it prudent to relax his hold upon their conduct.[238]

[238] Arrian, i. 29, 8.

Such opportunity seemed now not unlikely to occur. Memnon, excluded
from efficacious action on the continent since the loss of
Halikarnassus, was employed among the islands of the Ægean (during
the first half of 333 B. C.), with the purpose of carrying war into
Greece and Macedonia. Invested with the most ample command, he had a
large Phenician fleet and a considerable body of Grecian mercenaries,
together with his nephew Pharnabazus and the Persian Autophradates.
Having acquired the important island of Chios, through the
co-operation of a part of its inhabitants, he next landed on Lesbos,
where four out of the five cities, either from fear or preference,
declared in his favor; while Mitylênê, the greatest of the five,
already occupied by a Macedonian garrison, stood out against him.
Memnon accordingly disembarked his troops and commenced the blockade
of the city both by sea and land, surrounding it with a double
palisade wall from sea to sea. In the midst of this operation he died
of sickness; but his nephew Pharnabazus, to whom he had consigned
the command provisionally, until the pleasure of Darius could be
known, prosecuted his measures vigorously, and brought the city to
a capitulation. It was stipulated that the garrison introduced by
Alexander should be dismissed; that the column, recording alliance
with him, should be demolished; that the Mityleneans should become
allies of Darius, upon the terms of the old convention called by the
name of Antalkidas; and that the citizens in banishment should be
recalled, with restitution of half their property. But Pharnabazus,
as soon as admitted, violated the capitulation at once. He not only
extorted contributions, but introduced a garrison under Lykomêdes,
and established a returned exile named Diogenes as despot.[239] Such
breach of faith was ill calculated to assist the farther extension of
Persian influence in Greece.

[239] Arrian, ii. 1, 4-9.

Had the Persian fleet been equally active a year earlier, Alexander’s
army could never have landed in Asia. Nevertheless, the acquisitions
of Chios and Lesbos, late as they were in coming, were highly
important as promising future progress. Several of the Cyclades
islands sent to tender their adhesion to the Persian cause; the fleet
was expected in Eubœa, and the Spartans began to count upon aid for
an anti-Macedonian movement.[240] But all these hopes were destroyed
by the unexpected decease of Memnon.

[240] Diodor. xvii. 29.

It was not merely the superior ability of Memnon, but also his
established reputation both with Greeks and Persians, which rendered
his death a fatal blow to the interests of Darius. The Persians had
with them other Greek officers—brave and able—probably some not
unfit to execute the full Memnonian schemes. But none of them had
gone through the same experience in the art of exercising command
among Orientals—none of them had acquired the confidence of Darius
to the same extent, so as to be invested with the real guidance of
operations, and upheld against court-calumnies. Though Alexander had
now become master of Asia Minor, yet the Persians had ample means,
if effectively used, of defending all that yet remained, and even of
seriously disturbing him at home. But with Memnon vanished the last
chance of employing these means with wisdom or energy. The full value
of his loss was better appreciated by the intelligent enemy whom
he opposed, than by the feeble master whom he served. The death of
Memnon lessening the efficiency of the Persians at sea, allowed full
leisure to reorganize the Macedonian fleet,[241] and to employ the
undivided land-force for farther inland conquest.[242]

[241] Arrian, ii. 2, 6; Curtius, iii. 3, 19; iii. 4, 8. “Nondum
enim Memnonem vitâ excessisse cognoverat (Alexander)—satis
gnarus, cuncta in expedito fore, si nihil ab eo moveretur.”

[242] Diodor. xvi. 31.

If Alexander was a gainer in respect to his own operations by the
death of this eminent Rhodian, he was yet more a gainer by the change
of policy which that event induced Darius to adopt. The Persian
king resolved to renounce the defensive schemes of Memnon, and to
take the offensive against the Macedonians on land. His troops,
already summoned from the various parts of the empire, had partially
arrived, and were still coming in.[243] Their numbers became greater
and greater, amounting at length to a vast and multitudinous host,
the total of which is given by some as 600,000 men; by others, as
400,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry. The spectacle of this showy
and imposing mass, in every variety of arms, costume, and language,
filled the mind of Darius with confidence; especially as there were
among them between 20,000 and 30,000 Grecian mercenaries. The Persian
courtiers, themselves elate and sanguine, stimulated and exaggerated
the same feeling in the king himself, who became confirmed in his
persuasion that his enemies could never resist him. From Sogdiana,
Baktria, and India, the contingents had not yet had time to arrive;
but most of those between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian sea had
come in—Persians, Medes, Armenians, Derbikes, Barkanians, Hyrkanians,
Katdakes, etc.; all of whom, mustered in the plains of Mesopotamia,
are said to have been counted, like the troops of Xerxes in the
plain of Doriskus, by paling off a space capable of containing
exactly 10,000 men, and passing all the soldiers through it in
succession.[244] Neither Darius himself, nor any of those around him,
had ever before seen so overwhelming a manifestation of the Persian
imperial force. To an Oriental eye, incapable of appreciating the
real conditions of military preponderance,—accustomed only to the
gross and visible computation of numbers and physical strength,—the
king who marched forth at the head of such an army appeared like a
god on earth, certain to trample down all before him—just as most
Greeks had conceived respecting Xerxes,[245] and by stronger reason
Xerxes respecting himself, a century and a half before. Because all
this turned out a ruinous mistake, the description of the feeling,
given in Curtius and Diodorus, is often mistrusted as baseless
rhetoric. Yet it is in reality the self-suggested illusion of
untaught men, as opposed to trained and scientific judgment.

[243] Diodor. xvii. 30, 31. Diodorus represents the Persian king
as having begun to issue letters of convocation for the troops,
_after_ he heard the death of Memnon; which cannot be true. The
letters must have been sent out before.

[244] Curtius, iii. 2.

[245] Herodot. vii. 56—and the colloquy between Xerxes and
Demaratus, vii. 103, 104—where the language put by Herodotus into
the mouth of Xerxes is natural and instructive. On the other
hand, the superior penetration of Cyrus the younger expresses
supreme contempt for the military inefficiency of an Asiatic
multitude—Xenophon, Anabas. i. 7, 4. Compare the blunt language
of the Arcadian Antiochus—Xen. Hellen. vii. i. 38; and Cyropæd.
viii. 8, 20.

But though such was the persuasion of Orientals, it found no response
in the bosom of an intelligent Athenian. Among the Greeks now near
Darius, was the Athenian exile Charidemus, who having incurred the
implacable enmity of Alexander, had been forced to quit Athens
after the Macedonian capture of Thebes, and had fled together
with Ephialtes to the Persians. Darius, elate with the apparent
omnipotence of his army under review, and hearing but one voice of
devoted concurrence from the courtiers around him, asked the opinion
of Charidemus, in full expectation of receiving an affirmative
reply. So completely were the hopes of Charidemus bound up with
the success of Darius, that he would not suppress his convictions,
however unpalatable, at a moment when there was yet a possibility
that they might prove useful. He replied (with the same frankness as
Demaratus had once employed towards Xerxes), that the vast multitude
now before him were unfit to cope with the comparatively small number
of the invaders. He advised Darius to place no reliance on Asiatics,
but to employ his immense treasures in subsidizing an increased
army of Grecian mercenaries. He tendered his own hearty services
either to assist or to command. To Darius, what he said was alike
surprising and offensive; in the Persian courtiers, it provoked
intolerable wrath. Intoxicated as they all were with the spectacle
of their present muster, it seemed to them a combination of insult
with absurdity, to pronounce Asiatics worthless as compared with
Macedonians, and to teach the king that his empire could be defended
by none but Greeks. They denounced Charidemus as a traitor who
wished to acquire the king’s confidence in order to betray him to
Alexander. Darius, himself stung with the reply, and still farther
exasperated by the clamors of his courtiers, seized with his own
hands the girdle of Charidemus, and consigned him to the guards for
execution. “You will discover too late (exclaimed the Athenian), the
truth of what I have said. My avenger will soon be upon you.”[246]

[246] Curtius, iii. 2, 10-20; Diodor. xvii. 30.

Filled as he now was with certain anticipations of success and glory,
Darius resolved to assume in person the command of his army, and
march down to overwhelm Alexander. From this moment, his land-army
became the really important and aggressive force, with which he
himself was to act. Herein we note his distinct abandonment of the
plans of Memnon—the turning-point of his future fortune. He abandoned
them, too, at the precise moment when they might have been most
safely and completely executed. For at the time of the battle of the
Granikus, when Memnon’s counsel was originally given, the defensive
part of it was not easy to act upon; since the Persians had no very
strong or commanding position. But now, in the spring of 333 B.
C., they had a line of defence as good as they could possibly
desire; advantages, indeed, scarcely to be paralleled elsewhere.
In the first place, there was the line of Mount Taurus, barring
the entrance of Alexander into Kilikia; a line of defence (as will
presently appear) nearly inexpugnable. Next, even if Alexander had
succeeded in forcing this line and mastering Kilikia, there would yet
remain the narrow road between Mount Amanus and the sea, called the
Amanian Gates, and the Gates of Kilikia and Assyria—and after that,
the passes over Mount Amanus itself— all indispensable for Alexander
to pass through, and capable of being held, with proper precautions,
against the strongest force of attack. A better opportunity, for
executing the defensive part of Memnon’s scheme, could not present
itself; and he himself must doubtless have reckoned that such
advantages would not be thrown away.

The momentous change of policy, on the part of the Persian king, was
manifested by the order which he sent to the fleet after receiving
intelligence of the death of Memnon. Confirming the appointment of
Pharnabazus (made provisionally by the dying Memnon) as admiral, he
at the same time despatched Thymôdes (son of Mentor and nephew of
Memnon) to bring away from the fleet the Grecian mercenaries who
served aboard, to be incorporated with the main Persian army.[247]
Here was a clear proof that the main stress of offensive operations
was henceforward to be transferred from the sea to the land.

[247] Arrian, ii. 2, 1; ii. 13, 3. Curtius, iii. 3, 1.

It is the more important to note such desertion of policy, on the
part of Darius, as the critical turning-point in the Greco-Persian
drama—because Arrian and the other historians leave it out of sight,
and set before us little except the secondary points in the case.
Thus, for example, they condemn the imprudence of Darius, for coming
to fight Alexander within the narrow space near Issus, instead of
waiting for him on the spacious plains beyond Mount Amanus. Now,
unquestionably, granting that a general battle was inevitable, this
step augmented the chances in favor of the Macedonians. But it was a
step upon which no material consequences turned; for the Persian army
under Darius was hardly less unfit for a pitched battle in the open
plain; as was afterwards proved at Arbela. The real imprudence—the
neglect of the Memnonian warning—consisted in fighting the battle at
all. Mountains and defiles were the real strength of the Persians,
to be held as posts of defence against the invader. If Darius erred,
it was not so much in relinquishing the open plain of Sochi, as in
originally preferring that plain with a pitched battle, to the strong
lines of defence offered by Taurus and Amanus.

The narrative of Arrian, exact perhaps in what it affirms, is not
only brief and incomplete, but even omits on various occasions to put
in relief the really important and determining points.

While halting at Gordium, Alexander was joined by those newly-married
Macedonians whom he had sent home to winter, and who now came back
with reinforcements to the number of 3000 infantry and 300 cavalry,
together with 200 Thessalian cavalry, and 150 Eleians.[248] As soon
as his troops had been sufficiently rested, he marched (probably
about the latter half of May) towards Paphlagonia and Kappadokia.
At Ankyra he was met by a deputation from the Paphlagonians, who
submitted themselves to his discretion, only entreating that he
would not conduct his army into their country. Accepting these
terms, he placed them under the government of Kallas, his satrap of
Hellespontine Phrygia. Advancing farther, he subdued the whole of
Kappadokia, even to a considerable extent beyond the Halys, leaving
therein Sabiktas as satrap.[249]

[248] Arrian, i. 29. 6.

[249] Arrian, ii. 4, 2; Curtius, iii. 1, 22; Plutarch, Alex. 18.

Having established security in his rear, Alexander marched southward
towards Mount Taurus. He reached a post called the Camp of Cyrus,
at the northern foot of that mountain, near the pass Tauri-pylæ,
or Kilikian Gates, which forms the regular communication, between
Kappadokia on the north side, and Kilikia on the south, of this great
chain. The long road ascending and descending was generally narrow,
winding, and rugged, sometimes between two steep and high banks; and
it included, near its southern termination, one spot particularly
obstructed and difficult. From ancient times, down to the present,
the main road from Asia Minor into Kilikia and Syria has run through
this pass. During the Roman empire, it must doubtless have received
many improvements, so as to render the traffic comparatively easier.
Yet the description given of it by modern travellers represents
it to be as difficult as any road ever traversed by an army.[250]
Seventy years before Alexander, it had been traversed by the younger
Cyrus with the 10,000 Greeks, in his march up to attack his brother
Artaxerxes; and Xenophon,[251] who then went through it, pronounces
it absolutely impracticable for an army, if opposed by any occupying
force. So thoroughly persuaded was Cyrus himself of this fact,
that he had prepared a fleet, in case he found the pass occupied,
to land troops by sea in Kilikia in the rear of the defenders; and
great indeed was his astonishment, to discover that the habitual
recklessness of Persian management had left the defile unguarded. The
narrowest part, while hardly sufficient to contain four armed men
abreast, was shut in by precipitous rock on each side.[252] Here, if
anywhere, was the spot in which the defensive policy of Memnon might
have been made sure. To Alexander, inferior as he was by sea, the
resource employed by the younger Cyrus was not open.

[250] Respecting this pass, see Vol. IX. Ch. lxix. p. 20 of the
present History. There are now two passes over Taurus, from
Erekli on the north side of the mountain—one, the easternmost
descending upon Adana in Kilikia—the other, the westernmost, upon
Tarsus. In the war (1832) between the Turks and Ibrahim Pacha,
the Turkish commander left the westernmost pass undefended,
so that Ibrahim Pacha passed from Tarsus along it without
opposition. The Turkish troops occupied the easternmost pass, but
defended themselves badly, so that the passage was forced by the
Egyptians (Histoire de la Guerre de Mehemed Ali, par Cadalvène et
Barrault, p. 243).

Alexander crossed Taurus by the easternmost of the two passes.

[251] Xenoph. Anabas. i. 2. 21; Diodor. xiv. 20.

[252] Curtius, iii. 4, 11.

Yet Arsames, the Persian satrap commanding at Tarsus in Kilikia,
having received seemingly from his master no instructions, or worse
than none, acted as if ignorant of the existence of his enterprising
enemy north of Mount Taurus. On the first approach of Alexander,
the few Persian soldiers occupying the pass fled without striking
a blow, being seemingly unprepared for any enemy more formidable
than mountain-robbers. Alexander thus became master of this almost
insuperable barrier, without the loss of a man.[253] On the ensuing
day, he marched his whole army over it into Kilikia, and arriving
in a few hours at Tarsus, found the town already evacuated by
Arsames.[254]

[253] Curtius, iii. 4, 11. “Contemplatus locorum situm
(Alexander), non alias dicitur magis admiratus esse felicitatem
suam”, etc.

See Plutarch, Demetrius, 47, where Agathokles (son of Lysimachus)
holds the line of Taurus against Demetrius Poliorkêtes.

[254] Arrian, ii. 4, 3-8; Curtius, iii. 4. Curtius ascribes to
Arsames the intention of executing what had been recommended by
Memnon before the battle of Granikus—to desolate the country in
order to check Alexander’s advance. But this can hardly be the
right interpretation of the proceeding. Arrian’s account seems
more reasonable.

At Tarsus Alexander made a long halt; much longer than he intended.
Either from excessive fatigue—or from bathing while hot in the
chilly water of the river Kydnus—he was seized with a violent fever,
which presently increased to so dangerous a pitch that his life was
despaired of. Amidst the grief and alarm with which this misfortune
filled the army, none of the physicians would venture to administer
remedies, for fear of being held responsible for what threatened
to be a fatal result.[255] One alone among them, an Akarnanian
named Philippus, long known and trusted by Alexander, engaged to
cure him by a violent purgative draught. Alexander directed him to
prepare it; but before the time for taking it arrived, he received
a confidential letter from Parmenio, entreating him to beware of
Philippus, who had been bribed by Darius to poison him. After reading
the letter, he put it under his pillow. Presently came Philippus with
the medicine, which Alexander accepted and swallowed without remark,
at the same time giving Philippus the letter to read, and watching
the expression of his countenance. The look, words, and gestures of
the physician were such as completely to reassure him. Philippus,
indignantly repudiating the calumny, repeated his full confidence
in the medicine, and pledged himself to abide the result. At first
it operated so violently as to make Alexander seemingly worse, and
even to bring him to death’s door; but after a certain interval, its
healing effects became manifest. The fever was subdued, and Alexander
was pronounced out of danger, to the delight of the whole army.[256]
A reasonable time sufficed, to restore him to his former health and
vigor.

[255] When Hephæstion died of fever at Ekbatana, nine years
afterwards, Alexander caused the physician who had attended him
to be crucified (Plutarch, Alexand. 72; Arrian, vii. 14).

[256] This interesting anecdote is recounted, with more or less
of rhetoric and amplification, in all the historians—Arrian, ii.
4; Diodor. xvii. 31; Plutarch, Alexand. 19; Curtius, iii. 5;
Justin, xi. 8.

It is one mark of the difference produced in the character of
Alexander, by superhuman successes continued for four years—to
contrast the generous confidence which he displayed towards
Philippus, with his cruel prejudgment and torture of Philôtas
four years afterwards.

It was his first operation, after recovery, to send forward Parmenio,
at the head of the Greeks, Thessalians, and Thracians, in his army,
for the purpose of clearing the forward route and of securing the
pass called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria.[257] This narrow road,
bounded by the range of Mount Amanus on the east and by the sea on
the west, had been once barred by a double cross-wall with gates for
passage, marking the original boundaries of Kilikia and Syria. The
Gates, about six days’ march beyond Tarsus,[258] were found guarded,
but the guard fled with little resistance. At the same time Alexander
himself, conducting the Macedonian troops in a south-westerly
direction from Tarsus, employed some time in mastering and
regulating the towns of Anchialus and Soli, as well as the Kilikian
mountaineers. Then, returning to Tarsus, and recommencing his forward
march, he advanced with the infantry and with his chosen squadron of
cavalry, first to Magarsus near the mouth of the river Pyramus, next
to Mallus; the general body of cavalry, under Philôtus, being sent by
a more direct route across the Alëian plain. Mallus, sacred to the
prophet Amphilocus as a patron-hero, was said to be a colony from
Argos; on both these grounds Alexander was disposed to treat it with
peculiar respect. He offered solemn sacrifice to Amphilocus, exempted
Mallus from tribute, and appeased some troublesome discord among the
citizens.[259]

[257] Arrian, ii. 5, 1; Diodor. xvii. 32; Curtius, iii. 7, 6.

[258] Cyrus the younger was five days in marching from Tarsus to
Issus, and one day more from Issus to the gates of Kilikia and
Syria.—Xenoph. Anab. i. 4, 1; Vol. IX. Chap. lxix. p. 27 of this
history.

[259] Arrian, ii, 5, 11.

It was at Mallus that he received his first distinct communication
respecting Darius and the main Persian army; which was said to be
encamped at Sochi in Syria, on the eastern side of Mount Amanus,
about two days’ march from the mountain pass now called Beylan.
That pass, traversing the Amanian range, forms the continuance of
the main road from Asia Minor into Syria, after having passed first
over Taurus, and next through the difficult point of ground above
specified (called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria), between Mount
Amanus and the sea. Assembling his principal officers, Alexander
communicated to them the position of Darius, now encamped in a
spacious plain with prodigious superiority of numbers, especially
of cavalry. Though the locality was thus rather favorable to the
enemy, yet the Macedonians, full of hopes and courage, called upon
Alexander to lead them forthwith against him. Accordingly Alexander,
well pleased with their alacrity, began his forward march on the
following morning. He passed through Issus, where he left some sick
and wounded under a moderate guard—then through the Gates of Kilikia
and Syria. At the second day’s march from those Gates, he reached the
seaport of Myriandrus, the first town of Syria or Phenicia.[260]

[260] Arrian, ii. 6.

Here, having been detained in his camp one day by a dreadful storm,
he received intelligence which altogether changed his plans. The
Persian army had been marched away from Sochi, and was now in
Kilikia, following in his rear. It had already got possession of
Issus.

Darius had marched out of the interior his vast and miscellaneous
host, stated at 600,000 men. His mother, his wife, his harem, his
children, his personal attendants of every description, accompanied
him, to witness what was anticipated as a certain triumph. All the
apparatus of ostentation and luxury was provided in abundance, for
the king and for his Persian grandees. The baggage was enormous: of
gold and silver alone, we are told, that there was enough to furnish
load for 600 mules and 300 camels.[261] A temporary bridge being
thrown over the Euphrates, five days were required to enable the
whole army to cross.[262] Much of the treasure and baggage, however,
was not allowed to follow the army to the vicinity of Mount Amanus,
but was sent under a guard to Damascus in Syria.

[261] Curtius, iii. 3, 24.

[262] Curtius, iii. 7, 1.

At the head of such an overwhelming host, Darius was eager to bring
on at once a general battle. It was not sufficient for him simply
to keep back an enemy, whom, when once in presence, he calculated
on crushing altogether. Accordingly, he had given no orders (as we
have just seen) to defend the line of the Taurus; he had admitted
Alexander unopposed into Kilikia, and he intended to let him enter in
like manner through the remaining strong passes—first, the Gates of
Kilikia and Syria, between Mount Amanus and the sea—next, the pass,
now called Beylan, across Amanus itself. He both expected and wished
that his enemy should come into the plain to fight, there to be
trodden down by the countless horsemen of Persia.

But such anticipation was not at once realized. The movements of
Alexander, hitherto so rapid and unremitting, seemed suspended.
We have already noticed the dangerous fever which threatened his
life, occasioning not only a long halt, but much uneasiness among
the Macedonian army. All was doubtless reported to the Persians,
with abundant exaggerations: and when Alexander, immediately after
recovery, instead of marching forward towards them, turned away
from them to subdue the western portion of Kilikia, this again was
construed by Darius as an evidence of hesitation and fear. It is even
asserted that Parmenio wished to await the attack of the Persians in
Kilikia, and that Alexander at first consented to do so.[263] At any
rate, Darius, after a certain interval, contracted the persuasion,
and was assured by his Asiatic councillors and courtiers, that
the Macedonians, though audacious and triumphant against frontier
satraps, now hung back intimidated by the approaching majesty
and full muster of the empire, and that they would not stand to
resist his attack. Under this impression Darius resolved upon an
advance into Kilikia with all his army. Thymôdes indeed, and other
intelligent Grecian advisers—together with the Macedonian exile
Amyntas—deprecated his new resolution, entreating him to persevere in
his original purpose. They pledged themselves that Alexander would
come forth to attack him wherever he was, and that too, speedily.
They dwelt on the imprudence of fighting in the narrow defiles of
Kilikia, where his numbers, and especially his vast cavalry, would be
useless. Their advice, however, was not only disregarded by Darius,
but denounced by the Persian councillors as traitorous.[264] Even
some of the Greeks in the camp shared, and transmitted in their
letters to Athens, the blind confidence of the monarch. The order
was forthwith given for the whole army to quit the plains of Syria
and march across Mount Amanus into Kilikia.[265] To cross, by any
pass, over such a range as that of Mount Amanus, with a numerous
army, heavy baggage, and ostentatious train (including all the
suite necessary for the regal family), must have been a work of no
inconsiderable time; and the only two passes over this mountain were,
both of them, narrow and easily defensible.[266] Darius followed the
northernmost of the two, which brought him into the rear of his enemy.

[263] Curtius, iii. 7, 8.

[264] From Æschines (cont. Ktesiphont. p. 552) it seems that
Demosthenes, and the anti-Macedonian statesmen at Athens,
received letters at this moment written in high spirits,
intimating that Alexander was “caught and pinned up” in Kilikia.
Demosthenes (if we may believe Æschines) went about showing
these letters, and boasting of the good news which was at
hand. Josephus (Ant. Jud. xi. 8, 3) also reports the confident
anticipations of Persian success, entertained by Sanballat at
Samaria, as well as by all the Asiatics around.

[265] Arrian, ii. 6; Curtius, iii. 8, 2; Diodor. xvii. 32.

[266] Cicero, Epist. ad Famil. xv. 4. See the instructive
commentary of Mützel ad Curtium, iii. 8, p. 103, 104. I have
given in an Appendix to this Volume, some explanatory comments on
the ground near Issus.

Thus at the same time that the Macedonians were marching southward
to cross Mount Amanus by the southern pass, and attack Darius in
the plain—Darius was coming over into Kilikia by the northern pass
to drive them before him back into Macedonia.[267] Reaching Issus,
seemingly about two days after they had left it, he became master of
their sick and wounded left in the town. With odious brutality, his
grandees impelled him to inflict upon these poor men either death or
amputation of hands and arms.[268] He then marched forward—along the
same road by the shore of the Gulf which had already been followed by
Alexander—and encamped on the banks of the river Pinarus.

[267] Plutarch (Alexand. 20) states this general fact correctly;
but he is mistaken in saying that the two armies missed one
another in the night, etc.

[268] Arrian, ii. 7, 2; Curtius, iii. 8, 14. I have mentioned,
a few pages back, that about a fortnight before, Alexander
had sent Parmenio forward from Tarsus to secure the Gates of
Kilikia and Syria, while he himself marched backward to Soli
and Anchilaus. He and Parmenio must have been separated at this
time by a distance, not less than eight days of ordinary march.
If during this interval, Darius had arrived at Issus, he would
have been just between them, and would have cut them off one
from the other. It was Alexander’s good luck that so grave an
embarrassment did not occur.

The fugitives from Issus hastened to inform Alexander, whom they
overtook at Myriandrus. So astonished was he, that he refused to
believe the news, until it had been confirmed by some officers whom
he sent northward along the coast of the Gulf in a small galley,
and to whom the vast Persian multitude on the shore was distinctly
visible. Then, assembling the chief officers, he communicated to
them the near approach of the enemy, expatiating on the favorable
auspices under which a battle would now take place.[269] His address
was hailed with acclamation by his hearers, who demanded only to be
led against the enemy.[270]

[269] Arrian, ii. 7, 8.

[270] Arrian, ii. 7; Curtius, iii. 10; Diodor. xvii. 33.

His distance from the Persian position may have been about eighteen
miles.[271] By an evening march, after supper, he reached at midnight
the narrow defile (between Mount Amanus and the sea) called the Gates
of Kilikia and Syria, through which he had marched two days before.
Again master of that important position, he rested there the last
portion of the night, and advanced forward at daybreak northward
towards Darius. At first the breadth of practicable road was so
confined, as to admit only a narrow column of march, with the cavalry
following the infantry; presently it widened, enabling Alexander
to enlarge his front by bringing up successively the divisions of
the phalanx. On approaching near to the river Pinarus (which flowed
across the pass), he adopted his order of battle. on the extreme
right he placed the hypaspists, or light division of hoplites; next
(reckoning from right to left), five Taxeis or divisions of the
phalanx, under Kœnus, Perdikkas, Meleager, Ptolemy, and Amyntas. Of
these three last or left divisions, Kraterus had the general command;
himself subject to the orders of Parmenio, who commanded the entire
left half of the army. The breadth of plain between the mountains on
the right, and the sea on the left, is said to have been not more
than fourteen stadia, or about one English mile and a half.[272] From
fear of being outflanked by the superior numbers of the Persians,
he gave strict orders to Parmenio to keep close to the sea. His
Macedonian cavalry, the Companions, together with the Thessalians,
were placed on his right flank; as were also the Agrianes, and the
principal portion of the light infantry. The Peloponnesian and allied
cavalry, with the Thracian and Kretan light infantry, were sent on
the left flank to Parmenio.[273]

[271] Kallisthenes called the distance 100 stadia (ap. Polyb.
xii. 19). This seems likely to be under the truth.

Polybius criticises severely the description given by
Kallisthenes of the march of Alexander. Not having before us the
words of Kallisthenes himself, we are hardly in a condition to
appreciate the goodness of the criticism; which in some points is
certainly overstrained.

[272] Kallisthenes ap. Polybium, xii. 17.

[273] Arrian, ii. 8, 4-13.

Darius, informed that Alexander was approaching, resolved to fight
where he was encamped, behind the river Pinarus. He, however, threw
across the river a force of 30,000 cavalry, and 20,000 infantry,
to ensure the undisturbed formation of his main force behind the
river.[274] He composed his phalanx or main line of battle, of 90,000
hoplites; 30,000 Greek hoplites in the centre, and 30,000 Asiatics
armed as hoplites (called Kardakes), on each side of these Greeks.
These men—not distributed into separate divisions, but grouped in one
body or multitude[275]—filled the breadth between the mountains and
the sea. On the mountains to his left, he placed a body of 20,000
men, intended to act against the right flank and rear of Alexander.
But for the great numerical mass of his vast host, he could find no
room to act; accordingly they remained useless in the rear of his
Greek and Asiatic hoplites, yet not formed into any body of reserve,
or kept disposable for assisting in case of need. When his line was
thoroughly formed, he recalled to the left bank of the Pinarus the
30,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry which he had sent across as a
protecting force. A part of this cavalry were sent to his extreme
left wing, but the mountain ground was found unsuitable for them
to act, so that they were forced to cross the right wing, where
accordingly the great mass of the Persian cavalry became assembled.
Darius himself in his chariot was in the centre of the line, behind
the Grecian hoplites. In the front of his whole line ran the river or
rivulet Pinarus; the banks of which, in many parts naturally steep,
he obstructed in some places by embankments.[276]

[274] Compare Kallisthenes ap. Polyb. xii. 17.; and Arrian, ii.
8, 8. Considering how narrow the space was, such numerous bodies
as these 30,000 horse and 20,000 foot must have found little
facility in moving. Kallisthenes did not notice them, as far as
we can collect from Polybius.

[275] Arrian, ii. 8, 9. Τοσούτους γὰρ ~ἐπὶ φάλαγγος ἁπλῆς~
ἐδέχετο τὸ χωρίον, ἵνα ἐτάσσοντο.

The depth of this single phalanx is not given, nor do we know the
exact width of the ground which it occupied. Assuming a depth of
sixteen, and one pace in breadth to each soldier, 4000 men would
stand in the breadth of a stadium of 250 paces; and therefore
80,000 men in a breadth of twenty stadia (see the calculation of
Rüstow and Köchly, p. 280, about the Macedonian line). Assuming
a depth of twenty-six, 6500 men would stand in the stadium, and
therefore 90,000 in a total breadth of 14 stadia, which is that
given by Kallisthenes. But there must have been intervals left,
greater or less, we know not how many; the covering detachments,
which had been thrown out before the river Pinarus, must have
found some means of passing through to the rear, when recalled.

Mr. Kinneir states that the breadth between Mount Amanus and the
sea varies between one mile and a half (English) and three miles.
The fourteen stadia of Kallisthenes are equivalent to nearly one
English mile and three-quarters.

Neither in ancient nor in modern times have Oriental armies ever
been trained, by native officers, to regularity of march or
array—see Malcolm, Hist. of Persia, ch. xxiii. vol. ii. p. 498;
Volney, Travels in Egypt and Syria, vol. i. p. 124.

[276] Arrian, ii. 10, 2. Kallisthenes appears to have reckoned
the mercenaries composing the Persian phalanx at 30,000—and the
cavalry at 30,000. He does not seem to have taken account of the
Kardakes. Yet Polybius in his criticism tries to make out that
there was not room for an array of even 60,000; while Arrian
enumerates 90,000 hoplites, not including cavalry (Polyb. xii.
18).

As soon as Alexander, by the retirement of the Persian covering
detachment, was enabled to perceive the final dispositions of Darius,
he made some alteration in his own, transferring his Thessalian
cavalry by a rear movement from his right to his left wing, and
bringing forward the lancer-cavalry or sarissophori, as well as the
light infantry, Pæonians, and archers, to the front of his right. The
Agrianians, together with some cavalry and another body of archers,
were detached from the general line to form an oblique front against
the 20,000 Persians posted on the hill to outflank him. As these
20,000 men came near enough to threaten his flank, Alexander directed
the Agrianians to attack them, and to drive them farther away on the
hills. They manifested so little firmness, and gave way so easily,
that he felt no dread of any serious aggressive movement from them.
He therefore contented himself with holding back in reserve against
them a body of 300 heavy cavalry; while he placed the Agrianians and
the rest on the right of his main line, in order to make his front
equal to that of his enemies.[277]

[277] Arrian, ii. 9; Kallisthenes ap. Polyb. xii. 17. The
slackness of this Persian corps on the flank, and the ease with
which Alexander drove them back—a material point in reference to
the battle—are noticed by Curtius, iii. 9, 11.

Having thus formed his array, after giving the troops a certain
halt after their march, he advanced at a very slow pace, anxious
to maintain his own front even, and anticipating that the enemy
might cross the Pinarus to meet him. But as they did not move, he
continued his advance, preserving the uniformity of the front,
until he arrived within bowshot, when he himself, at the head of
his cavalry, hypaspists, and divisions of the phalanx on the right,
accelerated his pace, crossed the river at a quick step, and fell
upon the Kardakes or Asiatic hoplites on the Persian left. Unprepared
for the suddenness and vehemence of this attack, these Kardakes
scarcely resisted a moment, but gave way as soon as they came to
close quarters, and fled, vigorously pressed by the Macedonian right.
Darius, who was in his chariot in the centre, perceived that this
untoward desertion exposed his person from the left flank. Seized
with panic, he caused his chariot to be turned round, and fled with
all speed among the foremost fugitives.[278] He kept to his chariot
as long as the ground permitted, but quitted it on reaching some
rugged ravines, and mounted on horseback to make sure of escape; in
such terror, that he cast away his bow, his shield, and his regal
mantle. He does not seem to have given a single order, nor to have
made the smallest effort to repair a first misfortune. The flight
of the king was the signal for all who observed it to flee also; so
that the vast host in the rear were quickly to be seen trampling one
another down, in their efforts to get through the difficult ground
out of the reach of the enemy. Darius was himself not merely the
centre of union for all the miscellaneous contingents composing the
army, but also the sole commander; so that after his flight there was
no one left to give any general order.

[278] Arrian, ii. 11, 6. εὐθὺς, ὡς εἶχεν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἅρματος, ξὺν
τοῖς πρώτοις ἔφευγε, etc.

This simple statement of Arrian is far more credible than the
highly wrought details given by Diodorus (xvii. 34) and Curtius
(iii. 11, 9) about a direct charge of Alexander upon the chariot
of Darius, and a murderous combat immediately round that chariot,
in which the horses became wounded and unmanageable, so as to
be on the point of overturning it. Chares even went so far
as to affirm that Alexander had come into personal conflict
with Darius, from whom he had received his wound in the thigh
(Plutarch, Alex. 20). Plutarch had seen the letter addressed by
Alexander to Antipater, simply intimating that he had received a
slight wound in the thigh.

In respect to this point, as to so many others, Diodorus and
Curtius have copied the same authority.

Kallisthenes (ap. Polyb. xii. 22) stated that Alexander had
laid his plan of attack with a view to bear upon the person of
Darius, which is not improbable (compare Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 22),
and was in fact realized, since the first successful charge of
the Macedonians came so near to Darius as to alarm him for the
safety of his own person. To the question put by Polybius—How
did Alexander know in what part of the army Darius was?—we may
reply, that the chariot and person of Darius would doubtless be
conspicuous: moreover the Persian kings were habitually in the
centre—and Cyrus the younger, at the battle of Kunaxa, directed
the attack to be made exactly against the person of his brother
Artaxerxes.

After the battle of Kunaxa, Artaxerxes assumed to himself the
honor of having slain Cyrus with his own hand, and put to death
those who had really done the deed, because they boasted of it
(Plutarch, Artax. 16).

This great battle—we ought rather to say, that which ought to have
been a great battle—was thus lost,—through the giving way of the
Asiatic hoplites on the Persian left, and the immediate flight of
Darius,—within a few minutes after its commencement. But the centre
and right of the Persians, not yet apprised of these misfortunes,
behaved with gallantry. When Alexander made his rapid dash forward
with the right, under his own immediate command, the phalanx in his
left centre (which was under Kraterus and Parmenio) either did not
receive the same accelerating order, or found itself both retarded
and disordered by greater steepness in the banks of the Pinarus.
Here it was charged by the Grecian mercenaries, the best troops in
the Persian service. The combat which took place was obstinate, and
the Macedonian loss not inconsiderable; the general of division,
Ptolemy son of Seleukus, with 120 of the front rank men or choice
phalangites, being slain. But presently Alexander, having completed
the rout on the enemies’ left, brought back his victorious troops
from the pursuit, attacked the Grecian mercenaries in flank, and gave
decisive superiority to their enemies. These Grecian mercenaries
were beaten and forced to retire. On finding that Darius himself
had fled, they got away from the field as well as they could, yet
seemingly in good order. There is even reason to suppose that a part
of them forced their way up the mountains or through the Macedonian
line, and made their escape southward.[279]

[279] This is the supposition of Mr. Williams, and it appears
to me probable though Mr. Ainsworth calls it in question, in
consequence of the difficulties of the ground southward of
Myriandrus towards the sea. [See Mr. Ainsworth’s Essay on the
Cilician and Syrian Gates, Journal of the Geograph. Society,
1838, p. 194]. These Greeks, being merely fugitives with arms in
their hands—with neither cavalry nor baggage—could make their way
over very difficult ground.

Meanwhile on the Persian right, towards the sea, the heavy-armed
Persian cavalry had shown much bravery. They were bold enough to
cross the Pinarus[280] and vigorously to charge the Thessalians; with
whom they maintained a close contest, until the news spread that
Darius had disappeared, and that the left of the army was routed.
They then turned their backs and fled, sustaining terrible damage
from their enemies in the retreat. Of the Kardakes on the _right_
flank of the Grecian hoplites in the Persian line, we hear nothing,
nor of the Macedonian infantry opposed to them. Perhaps these
Kardakes came little into action, since the cavalry on their part of
the field were so severely engaged. At any rate they took part in the
general flight of the Persians, as soon as Darius was known to have
left the field.[281]

[280] Arrian, ii. 11, 3; Curtius, iii. 11, 13. Kallisthenes
stated the same thing as Arrian—that this Persian cavalry had
crossed the Pinarus, and charged the Thessalians with bravery.
Polybius censures him for it, as if he had affirmed something
false and absurd (xii. 18). This shows that the criticisms of
Polybius are not to be accepted without reserve. He reasons as if
the Macedonian phalanx _could_ not cross the Pinarus—converting a
difficulty into an impossibility (xii. 22).

[281] Arrian, ii. 11; Curtius, iii. 11.

The rout of the Persians being completed, Alexander began a
vigorous pursuit. The destruction and slaughter of the fugitives
was prodigious. Amidst so small a breadth of practicable ground,
narrowed sometimes into a defile and broken by frequent watercourses,
their vast numbers found no room, and trod one another down. As many
perished in this way as by the sword of the conquerors; insomuch
that Ptolemy (afterwards king of Egypt, the companion and historian
of Alexander) recounts that he himself in the pursuit came to a
ravine choked up with dead bodies, of which he made a bridge to pass
over it.[282] The pursuit was continued as long as the light of a
November day allowed; but the battle had not begun till a late hour.
The camp of Darius was taken together with his mother, his wife, his
sister, his infant son, and two daughters. His chariot, his shield,
and his bow also fell into the power of the conquerors; and a sum
of 3000 talents in money was found, though much of the treasure
had been sent to Damascus. The total loss of the Persians is said
to have amounted to 10,000 horse and 100,000 foot; among the slain
moreover were several eminent Persian grandees,—Arsames, Rheomithres,
and Atizyes, who had commanded at the Granikus—Sabakes, satrap of
Egypt. Of the Macedonians we are told that 300 foot and 150 horse
were killed. Alexander himself was slightly wounded in the thigh by a
sword.[283]

[282] Arrian, i. 11, 11; Kallisthenes ap. Polyb. xii 20.

[283] Arrian, ii. 11; Diodor. xvii. Curtius (ii. 11, 27) says
that the Macedonians lost thirty-two foot and one hundred and
fifty horse, killed; with 504 men wounded;—Justin states, 130
foot, and 150 horse (xi. 9).

The mother, wife, and family of Darius, who became captives, were
treated by Alexander’s order with the utmost consideration and
respect. When Alexander returned at night from the pursuit, he found
the regal tent reserved and prepared for him. In an inner compartment
of it he heard the tears and wailings of women. He was informed that
the mourners were the mother and wife of Darius, who had learnt that
the bow and shield of Darius had been taken, and were giving loose
to their grief under the belief that Darius himself was killed.
Alexander immediately sent Leonnatus to assure them that Darius was
still living, and to promise further that they should be allowed
to preserve the regal title and state—his war against Darius being
undertaken not from any feelings of hatred, but as a fair contest
for the empire of Asia.[284] Besides this anecdote, which depends on
good authority, many others, uncertified or untrue, were recounted
about his kind behavior to these princesses; and Alexander himself,
shortly after the battle, seems to have heard fictions about it,
which he thought himself obliged to contradict in a letter. It is
certain, (from the extract now remaining of this letter) that he
never saw, nor ever entertained the idea of seeing, the captive wife
of Darius, said to be the most beautiful woman in Asia; moreover he
even declined to hear encomiums upon her beauty.[285]

[284] Arrian, ii. 12, 8—from Ptolemy and Aristobulus. Compare
Diodor. xvii. 36; Curtius, iii. 11, 24; iii. 12, 17.

[285] Plutarch, Alex. 22. ἐγὼ γὰρ (Alexander) οὐχ ὅτι ἑωρακὼς ἂν
εὑρεθείην τὴν Δαρείου γυναῖκα ἢ βεβουλευμένος ἰδεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ
τῶν λεγόντων περὶ τῆς εὐμορφίας αὐτῆς προσδεδεγμένος τὸν λόγον.

How this vast host of fugitives got out of the narrow limits of
Kilikia, or how many of them quitted that country by the same pass
over Mount Amanus as that by which they had entered it—we cannot make
out. It is probable that many, and Darius himself among the number,
made their escape across the mountain by various subordinate roads
and by-paths; which, though unfit for a regular army with baggage,
would be found a welcome resource by scattered companies. Darius
managed to get together 4000 of the fugitives, with whom he hastened
to Thapsakus, and there recrossed the Euphrates. The only remnant of
force, still in a position of defence after the battle, consisted of
8000 of the Grecian mercenaries under Amyntas and Thymôdes. These
men, fighting their way out of Kilikia (seemingly towards the south,
by or near Myriandrus), marched to Tripolis on the coast of Phenicia,
where they still found the same vessels in which they had themselves
been brought from the armament of Lesbos. Seizing sufficient means
of transport, and destroying the rest to prevent pursuit, they
immediately crossed over to Cyprus, and from thence to Egypt.[286]
With this single exception, the enormous Persian host disappears
with the battle of Issus. We hear of no attempt to rally or reform,
nor of any fresh Persian force afoot until two years afterwards. The
booty acquired by the victors was immense, not merely in gold and
silver, but also in captives for the slave-merchant. On the morrow of
the battle, Alexander offered a solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving,
with three altars erected on the banks of the Pinarus; while he at
the same time buried the dead, consoled the wounded, and rewarded or
complimented all who had distinguished themselves.[287]

[286] Arrian, ii. 13, 2, 3; Diodor. xvii. 48. Curtius says
that these Greeks got away by by-paths across the mountains
(Amanus)—which may be true (Curtius, iii. 11, 19).

[287] Arrian, ii. 12, 1; Curtius, iii. 12, 27; Diodor. xvii. 40.
The “Aræ Alexandri, in radicibus Amani”, are mentioned by Cicero
(ad Famil. xv. 4) When commanding in Kilikia he encamped there
with his army four days.

No victory recorded in history was ever more complete in itself, or
more far-stretching in its consequences, than that of Issus. Not
only was the Persian force destroyed or dispersed, but the efforts
of Darius for recovery were paralyzed by the capture of his family.
Portions of the dissipated army of Issus may be traced, re-appearing
in different places for operations of detail; but we shall find no
farther resistance to Alexander and his main force, except from the
brave freemen of two fortified cities. Everywhere an overwhelming
sentiment of admiration and terror was spread abroad, towards the
force, skill, or good fortune of Alexander, by whichever name it
might be called—together with contempt for the real value of a
Persian army, in spite of so much imposing pomp and numerical show; a
contempt, not new to intelligent Greeks, but now communicated even to
vulgar minds by the recent unparalleled catastrophe. Both as general
and as soldier, indeed, the consummate excellence of Alexander stood
conspicuous, not less than the signal deficiency of Darius. The fault
in the latter, upon which most remark is usually made, was, that of
fighting the battle, not in an open plain, but in a narrow valley,
whereby his superiority of number was rendered unprofitable. But this
(as I have already observed) was only one among many mistakes, and
by no means the most serious. The result would have been the same,
had the battle been fought in the plains to the eastward of Mount
Amanus. Superior numbers are of little avail on any ground unless
there be a general who knows how to make use of them; unless they be
distributed into separate divisions ready to combine for offensive
action on many points at once, or at any rate to lend support to each
other in defence, so that a defeat of one fraction is not a defeat
of the whole. The faith of Darius in simple multitude was altogether
blind and childish;[288] nay, that faith, though overweening
beforehand, disappeared at once when he found his enemies did not run
away, but faced him boldly—as was seen by his attitude on the banks
of the Pinarus, where he stood to be attacked instead of executing
his threat of treading down the handful opposed to him.[289] But it
was not merely as a general, that Darius acted in such a manner as
to render the loss of the battle certain. Had his dispositions been
ever so skilful, his personal cowardice, in quitting the field and
thinking only of his own safety, would have sufficed to nullify their
effect.[290] Though the Persian grandees are generally conspicuous
for personal courage, yet we shall find Darius hereafter again
exhibiting the like melancholy timidity, and the like incompetence
for using numbers with effect, at the battle of Arbela, though fought
in a spacious plain chosen by himself.

[288] See this faith put forward in the speech of Xerxes—Herodot.
vii. 48; compare the speech of Achæmenes, vii. 236.

[289] Arrian, ii. 10, 2. καὶ ταύτῃ ὡς δῆλος ἐγένετο (Darius) τοῖς
ἀμφ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρον τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένος (a remarkable expression
borrowed from Thucydides, iv. 34). Compare Arrian, ii. 6, 7.

[290] Immediately before the battle of Kunaxa, Cyrus the younger
was asked by some of the Grecian Officers, whether he thought
that his brother Artaxerxes (who had as yet made no resistance)
would fight—“To be sure he will (was the reply) if he is the son
of Darius and Parysatis, and my brother, I shall not obtain the
crown without fighting!” Personal cowardice, in a king of Persia
at the head of his army, seemed inconceivable (Xenoph. Anab. i.
7, 9)

Happy was it for Memnon, that he did not live to see the renunciation
of his schemes, and the ruin consequent upon it! The fleet in the
Ægean, which had been transferred at his death to Pharnabazus, though
weakened by the loss of those mercenaries whom Darius had recalled
to Issus, and disheartened by a serious defeat which the Persian
Orontobates had received from the Macedonians in Karia,[291] was
nevertheless not inactive in trying to organize an anti-Macedonian
manifestation in Greece. While Pharnabazus was at the island of
Siphnos with his 100 triremes, he was visited by the Lacedæmonian
king Agis, who pressed him to embark for Peloponnesus as large a
force as he could spare, to second a movement projected by the
Spartans. But such aggressive plans were at once crushed by the
terror-striking news of the battle of Issus. Apprehending a revolt
in the island of Chios as the result of this news, Pharnabazus
immediately sailed thither with a large detachment. Agis, obtaining
nothing more than a subsidy of thirty talents and a squadron of ten
triremes, was obliged to renounce his projects in Peloponnesus, and
to content himself with directing some operations in Krete, to be
conducted by his brother Agesilaus; while he himself remained among
the islands, and ultimately accompanied the Persian Autophradates
to Halikarnassus.[292] It appears, however, that he afterwards went
to conduct the operations in Krete, and that he had considerable
success in that island, bringing several Kretan towns to join the
Persians.[293] On the whole, however, the victory of Issus overawed
all free spirit throughout Greece, and formed a guarantee to
Alexander for at least a temporary quiescence. The philo-Macedonian
synod, assembled at Corinth during the Isthmian festival, manifested
their joy by sending to him an embassy of congratulation and a wreath
of gold.[294]

[291] Arrian, ii. 5, 8.

[292] Arrian, ii. 13, 4-8.

[293] Diodor. xvii. 48.

[294] Diodor. xvii. 48; Curtius, iv. 5, 11. Curtius seems to
mention this vote later, but it must evidently have been passed
at the first Isthmian festival after the battle of Issus.

With little delay after his victory, Alexander marched through
Kœle-Syria to the Phenician coast, detaching Parmenio in his way
to attack Damascus, whither Darius, before the battle, had sent
most part of his treasure with many confidential officers, Persian
women of rank, and envoys. Though the place might have held out a
considerable siege, it was surrendered without resistance by the
treason or cowardice of the governor; who made a feint of trying to
convey away the treasure, but took care that it should fall into the
hands of the enemy.[295] There was captured a large treasure—with a
prodigious number and variety of attendants and ministers of luxury,
belonging to the court and the grandees.[296] Moreover the prisoners
made were so numerous, that most of the great Persian families had
to deplore the loss of some relative, male or female. There were
among them the widow and daughters of king Ochus, the predecessor
of Darius—the daughter of Darius’s brother Oxathres—the wives of
Artabazus, and of Pharnabazus—the three daughters of Mentor, and
Barsinê, widow of the deceased Memnon with her child, sent up by
Memnon to serve as an hostage for his fidelity. There were also
several eminent Grecian exiles, Theban, Lacedæmonian and Athenian,
who had fled to Darius, and whom he had thought fit to send to
Damascus, instead of allowing them to use their pikes with the army
at Issus. The Theban and Athenian exiles were at once released by
Alexander; the Lacedæmonians were for the time put under arrest, but
not detained long. Among the Athenian exiles was a person of noble
name and parentage—Iphikrates, son of the great Athenian officer of
that name.[297] The captive Iphikrates not only received his liberty,
but was induced by courteous and honorable treatment to remain with
Alexander. He died however shortly afterwards from sickness, and his
ashes were then collected, by order of Alexander, to be sent to his
family at Athens.

[295] Arrian, ii. 11, 13; Curtius, iii. 13. The words of Arrian
(ii. 15, 1)—ὀπίσω κομίσαντα ἐς Δαμασκὸν—confirm the statement of
Curtius, that this treasure was captured by Parmenio, not in the
town, but in the hands of fugitives who were conveying it away
from the town.

[296] A fragment of the letter from Parmenio to Alexander is
preserved, giving a detailed list of the articles of booty
(Athenæus, xiii. p. 607).

[297] Arrian, ii. 15, 5; Curtius, iii. 13, 13-16. There is some
discrepancy between the two (compare Arrian, iii. 24, 7) as to
the names of the Lacedæmonian envoys.

I have already stated in a former volume[298] that the elder
Iphikrates had been adopted by Alexander’s grandfather into the regal
family of Macedonia, as the savior of their throne: probably this was
the circumstance which determined the superior favor shown to the
son, rather than any sentiment either towards Athens or towards the
military genius of the father. The difference of position, between
Iphikrates the father and Iphikrates the son, is one among the
painful evidences of the downward march of Hellenism; the father, a
distinguished officer moving amidst a circle of freemen, sustaining
by arms the security and dignity of his own fellow-citizens, and
even interfering for the rescue of the Macedonian regal family;
the son, condemned to witness the degradation of his native city
by Macedonian arms, and deprived of all other means of reviving or
rescuing her, except such as could be found in the service of an
Oriental prince, whose stupidity and cowardice threw away at once his
own security and the freedom of Greece.

[298] See above, in the History, Vol. X. Ch. lxxvii. p. 108; Vol.
X. Ch. lxxix. p. 251; and Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 263. c. 13.

Alexander himself had consented to be adopted by Ada princess of
Karia as her son (Arrian, i. 23, 12).

Master of Damascus and of Kœle-Syria, Alexander advanced onward to
Phenicia. The first Phenician town which he approached was Marathus,
on the mainland opposite the islet of Aradus, forming, along with
that islet and some other neighboring towns, the domain of the
Aradian prince Gerostratus. That prince was himself now serving with
his naval contingent among the Persian fleet in the Ægean; but his
son Strata, acting as viceroy at home, despatched to Alexander his
homage with a golden wreath, and made over to him at once Aradus with
the neighboring towns included in its domain. The example of Strato
was followed, first by the inhabitants of Byblus, the next Phenician
city in a southerly direction; next, by the great city of Sidon, the
queen and parent of all Phenician prosperity. The Sidonians even sent
envoys to meet him and invite his approach.[299] Their sentiments
were unfavorable to the Persians, from remembrance of the bloody
and perfidious proceedings which (about eighteen years before) had
marked the recapture of their city by the armies of Ochus.[300]
Nevertheless, the naval contingents both of Byblus and of Sidon (as
well as that of Aradus), were at this moment sailing in the Ægean
with the Persian admiral Autophradates, and formed a large proportion
of his entire fleet.[301]

[299] Arrian, ii. 14, 11; ii. 15, 8.

[300] Diodor. xvi. 45.

[301] Arrian, ii. 15, 8; ii. 20, 1. Curtius, iv. 1, 6-16.

While Alexander was still at Marathus, however, previous to his
onward march, he received both envoys and a letter from Darius,
asking for the restitution of his mother, wife, and children—and
tendering friendship and alliance, as from one king to another.
Darius farther attempted to show, that the Macedonian Philip had
begun the wrong against Persia,—that Alexander had continued it—and
that he himself (Darius) had acted merely in self-defence. In reply,
Alexander wrote a letter, wherein he set forth his own case against
Darius, proclaiming himself the appointed leader of the Greeks, to
avenge the ancient invasion of Greece by Xerxes. He then alleged
various complaints against Darius, whom he accused of having
instigated the assassination of Philip, as well as the hostilities
of the anti-Macedonian cities in Greece. “Now (continued he), by the
grace of the gods, I have been victorious, first over your satraps,
next over yourself. I have taken care of all who submit to me, and
made them satisfied with their lot. Come yourself to me also, as to
the master of all Asia. Come without fear of suffering harm; ask me,
and you shall receive back your mother and wife, and anything else
which you please. When next you write to me, however, address me not
as an equal, but as lord of Asia and of all that belongs to you;
otherwise I shall deal with you as a wrong-doer. If you intend to
contest the kingdom with me, stand and fight for it, and do not run
away. I shall march forward against you, wherever you may be.”[302]

[302] Arrian, ii. 14; Curtius, iv. i. 10; Diodor. xvii. 39. I
give the substance of this correspondence from Arrian. Both
Curtius and Diodorus represent Darius as offering great sums
of money and large cessions of territory, in exchange for the
restitution of the captives. Arrian says nothing of the kind.

This memorable correspondence, which led to no result, is of
importance only as it marks the character of Alexander, with whom
fighting and conquering were both the business and the luxury of
life, and to whom all assumption of equality and independence with
himself, even on the part of other kings—every thing short of
submission and obedience—appeared in the light of wrong and insult to
be avenged. The recital of comparative injuries, on each side, was
mere unmeaning pretence. The real and only question was (as Alexander
himself had put it in his message to the captive Sisygambis[303])
which of the two should be master of Asia.

[303] Arrian, ii. 12, 9.

The decision of this question, already sufficiently advanced on the
morrow after the battle of Issus, was placed almost beyond doubt
by the rapid and unopposed successes of Alexander among most of
the Phenician cities. The last hopes of Persia now turned chiefly
upon the sentiments of these Phenicians. The greater part of the
Persian fleet in the Ægean was composed of Phenician triremes, partly
from the coast of Syria, partly from the island of Cyprus. If the
Phenician towns made submission to Alexander, it was certain that
their ships and seamen would either return home spontaneously or be
recalled; thus depriving the Persian quiver of its best remaining
arrow. But if the Phenician towns held out resolutely against him,
one and all, so as to put him under the necessity of besieging them
in succession—each lending aid to the rest by sea, with superiority
of naval force, and more than one of them being situated upon
islets—the obstacles to be overcome would have been so multiplied,
that even Alexander’s energy and ability might hardly have proved
sufficient for them: at any rate, he would have had hard work before
him for perhaps two years, opening the door to many new accidents and
efforts. It was therefore a signal good fortune to Alexander when
the prince of the islet of Aradus spontaneously surrendered to him
that difficult city, and when the example was followed by the still
greater city of Sidon. The Phenicians, taking them generally, had
no positive tie to the Persians; neither had they much confederate
attachment one towards the other, although as separate communities
they were brave and enterprising. Among the Sidonians, there was
even a prevalent feeling of aversion to the Persians, from the cause
above mentioned. Hence the prince of Aradus, upon whom Alexander’s
march first came, had little certainty of aid from his neighbors,
if he resolved to hold out; and still less disposition to hold
out single-handed, after the battle of Issus had proclaimed the
irresistible force of Alexander not less than the impotence of
Persia. One after another, all these important Phenician seaports,
except Tyre, fell into the hands of Alexander without striking a
blow. At Sidon, the reigning prince Strato, reputed as philo-Persian,
was deposed, and a person named Abdalonymus—of the reigning family,
yet poor in circumstances—was appointed in his room.[304]

[304] Curtius, iv. 1, 20-25; Justin, xi. 10. Diodorus (xvii. 47)
tells the story as if it had occurred at Tyre, and not at Sidon;
which is highly improbable.

With his usual rapidity, Alexander marched onward towards Tyre; the
most powerful among the Phenician cities, though apparently less
ancient than Sidon. Even on the march, he was met by a deputation
from Tyre, composed of the most eminent men in the city, and headed
by the son of the Tyrian prince Azemilchus, who was himself absent
commanding the Tyrian contingent in the Persian fleet. These men
brought large presents and supplies for the Macedonian army, together
with a golden wreath of honor; announcing formally that the Tyrians
were prepared to do whatever Alexander commanded.[305] In reply,
he commended the dispositions of the city, accepted the presents,
and desired the deputation to communicate at home, that he wished
to enter Tyre and offer sacrifice to Herakles. The Phenician god
Melkart was supposed identical with the Grecian Herakles, and was
thus ancestor of the Macedonian kings. His temple at Tyre was of
the most venerable antiquity; moreover the injunction, to sacrifice
there, is said to have been conveyed to Alexander in an oracle.[306]
The Tyrians at home, after deliberating on this message, sent out an
answer declining to comply, and intimating that they would not admit
within their walls either Macedonians or Persians; but that as to all
other points, they would obey Alexander’s orders.[307] They added
that his wish to sacrifice to Herakles might be accomplished without
entering their city, since there was in Palætyrus (on the mainland
over against the islet of Tyre, separated from it only by the narrow
strait) a temple of that god yet more ancient and venerable than
their own.[308] Incensed at this qualified adhesion, in which he took
note only of the point refused,—Alexander dismissed the envoys with
angry menaces, and immediately resolved on taking Tyre by force.[309]

[305] Arrian. iii 15, 9. ὡς ἐγνωκότων Τυρίων πράσσειν, ὅ,τι ἂν
ἐπαγγέλλῃ Ἀλέξανδρος. Compare Curtius, iv. 2, 3.

[306] Curtius (_ut suprà_) adds these motives: Arrian asserts
nothing beyond the simple request. The statement of Curtius
represents what is likely to have been the real fact and real
feeling of Alexander.

It is certainly true that Curtius overloads his narrative with
rhetorical and dramatic amplification; but it is not less true
that Arrian falls into the opposite extreme—squeezing out _his_
narrative until little is left beyond the dry skeleton.

[307] Arrian, ii. 16, 11.

[308] Curtius, iv. 2, 4; Justin, xi. 10. This item, both prudent
and probable, in the reply of the Tyrians, is not noticed by
Arrian.

[309] Arrian, ii. 16, 11. τοὺς μὲν πρέσβεις πρὸς ὀργὴν ὀπίσω
ἀπέπεμψεν, etc. Curtius, iv. 2, 5. “Non tenuit iram, cujus
alioqui potens non erat”, etc.

Those who (like Diodorus) treat such refusal on the part of the
Tyrians as foolish wilfulness,[310] have not fully considered how
much the demand included. When Alexander made a solemn sacrifice to
Artemis at Ephesus, he marched to her temple with his whole force
armed and in battle army.[311] We cannot doubt that his sacrifice at
Tyre to Herakles—his ancestral Hero, whose especial attribute was
force—would have been celebrated with an array equally formidable, as
in fact it was, after the town had been taken.[312] The Tyrians were
thus required to admit within their walls an irresistible military
force; which might indeed be withdrawn after the sacrifice was
completed, but which might also remain, either wholly or in part, as
permanent garrison of an almost impregnable position. They had not
endured such treatment from Persia, nor were they disposed to endure
it from a new master. It was in fact hazarding their all; submitting
at once to a fate which might be as bad as could befall them after a
successful siege. On the other hand, when we reflect that the Tyrians
promised everything short of submission to military occupation, we
see that Alexander, had he been so inclined, could have obtained
from them all that was really essential to his purpose, without the
necessity of besieging the town. The great value of Phenician cities
consisted in their fleet, which now acted with the Persians, and
gave to them the command of the sea.[313] Had Alexander required
that this fleet should be withdrawn from the Persians and placed in
his service, there can be no doubt that he would have obtained it
readily. The Tyrians had no motive to devote themselves for Persia,
nor did they probably (as Arrian supposes) attempt to trim between
the two belligerents, as if the contest were still undecided.[314]
Yet rather than hand over their city to the chances of a Macedonian
soldiery, they resolved to brave the hazards of a siege. The pride of
Alexander, impatient of opposition even to his most extreme demands,
prompted him to take a step politically unprofitable, in order to
make display of his power, by degrading and crushing, with or without
a siege, one of the most ancient, spirited, wealthy and intelligent
communities of the ancient world.

[310] Diodorus, xvii. 40. Οἱ δὲ Τύριοι, βουλομένου τοῦ βασιλέως
τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ τῷ Τυρίῳ θῦσαι, προπετέστερον διεκώλυσαν αὐτὸν τῆς εἰς
τὴν πόλιν εἰσόδου.

[311] Arrian, i. 18, 4.

[312] Arrian, ii. 24, 10.

[313] This is the view expressed by Alexander himself, in his
address to the army, inviting them to undertake the siege of Tyre
(Arrian, ii. 17, 3-8).

[314] Arrian, ii. 16, 12. Curtius says (iv. 2, 2), “Tyros
facilius _societatem_ Alexandri acceptura videbatur, quam
_imperium_.” This is representing the pretensions of the Tyrians
as greater than the fact warrants. They did not refuse the
_imperium_ of Alexander, though they declined compliance with one
extreme demand.

Ptolemy I. (son of Lagus) afterwards made himself master of
Jerusalem, by entering the town on the Sabbath, under pretence of
offering sacrifice (Josephus, Antiq. Jud. xii. 1).

Tyre was situated on an islet nearly half a mile from the
mainland;[315] the channel between the two being shallow towards the
land, but reaching a depth of eighteen feet in the part adjoining
the city. The islet was completely surrounded by prodigious walls,
the loftiest portion of which, on the side fronting the mainland,
reached a height not less than 150 feet, with corresponding solidity
and base.[316] Besides these external fortifications, there was a
brave and numerous population within, aided by a good stock of arms,
machines, ships, provisions, and other things essential to defence.

[315] Curtius, iv. 2, 7, 8. The site of Tyre at the present day
presents nothing in the least conformable to the description of
Alexander’s time.

[316] Arrian, ii. 18, 3; ii. 21, 4; ii. 22, 8.

It was not without reason, therefore, that the Tyrians, when driven
to their last resource, entertained hopes of holding out even against
the formidable arm of Alexander; and against Alexander as he then
stood, they might have held out successfully; for he had as yet no
fleet, and they could defy any attack made simply from land. The
question turned upon the Phenician and Cyprian ships, which were for
the most part (the Tyrian among them) in the Ægean under the Persian
admiral. Alexander—master as he was of Aradus, Byblus, Sidon, and all
the Phenician cities except Tyre—calculated that the seamen belonging
to these cities would follow their countrymen at home and bring away
their ships to join him. He hoped also, as the victorious potentate,
to draw to himself the willing adhesion of the Cyprian cities. This
could hardly have failed to happen if he had treated the Tyrians with
decent consideration; but it was no longer certain, now that he had
made them his enemies.

What passed among the Persian fleet under Autophradates in the Ægean,
when they were informed, first that Alexander was master of the other
Phenician cities; next, that he was commencing the siege of Tyre—we
know very imperfectly. The Tyrian prince Azemilchus brought home his
ships for the defence of his own city;[317] the Sidonian and Aradian
ships also went home, no longer serving against a power to whom their
own cities had submitted; but the Cyprians hesitated longer before
they declared themselves. If Darius, or even Autophradates without
Darius, instead of abandoning Tyre altogether (as they actually did),
had energetically aided the resistance which it offered to Alexander,
as the interests of Persia dictated—the Cypriot ships might not
improbably have been retained on that side in the struggle. Lastly,
the Tyrians might indulge a hope, that their Phenician brethren, if
ready to serve Alexander against Persia, would be nowise hearty as
his instruments for crushing a kindred city. These contingencies,
though ultimately they all turned out in favor of Alexander, were
in the beginning sufficiently promising to justify the intrepid
resolution of the Tyrians; who were farther encouraged by promises
of aid from the powerful fleets of their colony Carthage. To that
city, whose deputies were then within their walls for some religious
solemnities, they sent many of their wives and children.[318]

[317] Azemilchus was with Autophradates when Alexander declared
hostility against Tyre (Arrian, ii. 15, 10); he was in Tyre when
it was captured (Arrian, ii. 24, 8).

[318] Curtius, iv. 2, 10; Arrian, ii. 24, 8; Diodor. xvli. 40,
41. Curtius (iv. 2, 15) says that Alexander sent envoys to the
Tyrians to invite them to peace; that the Tyrians not only
refused the propositions, but put the deputies to death, contrary
to the law of nations. Arrian mentions nothing about this sending
of deputies, which he would hardly have omitted to do had he
found it stated in his authorities, since it tends to justify
the proceedings of Alexander. Moreover it is not conformable to
Alexander’s temperament, after what had passed between him and
the Tyrians.

Alexander began the siege of Tyre without any fleet; the Sidonian
and Aradian ships not having yet come. It was his first task to
construct a solid mole two hundred feet broad, reaching across the
half mile channel between the mainland and the islet. He pressed into
his service laboring hands by thousands from the neighborhood; he
had stones in abundance from Palætyrus, and wood from the forests in
Lebanon. But the work, though prosecuted with ardor and perseverance,
under pressing instigations from Alexander, was tedious and toilsome,
even near the mainland, where the Tyrians could do little to impede
it; and became far more tedious as it advanced into the sea, so as
to be exposed to their obstruction, as well as to damage from winds
and waves. The Tyrian triremes and small boats perpetually annoyed
the workmen, and destroyed parts of the work, in spite of all the
protection devised by the Macedonians, who planted two towers in
front of their advancing mole, and discharged projectiles from
engines provided for the purpose. At length, by unremitting efforts,
the mole was pushed forward until it came nearly across the channel
to the city wall; when suddenly, on a day of strong wind, the Tyrians
sent forth a fireship loaded with combustibles, which they drove
against the front of the mole and set fire to the two towers. At
the same time, the full naval force of the city, ships and little
boats, was sent forth to land men at once on all parts of the mole.
So successful was this attack, that all the Macedonian engines were
burnt,—the outer wood-work which kept the mole together was torn up
in many places,—and a large part of the structure came to pieces.[319]

[319] Arrian, ii. 18, 19; Diodor. xvii. 42; Curtius, iv. 3, 6, 7.

Alexander had thus not only to construct fresh engines, but also to
begin the mole nearly anew. He resolved to give it greater breadth
and strength, for the purpose of carrying more towers abreast in
front, and for better defence against lateral attacks. But it had
now become plain to him, that while the Tyrians were masters of the
sea, no efforts by land alone would enable him to take the town.
Leaving Perdikkas and Kraterus to reconstruct the mole and build new
engines, he himself repaired to Sidon, for the purpose of assembling
as large a fleet as he could. He got together triremes from various
quarters—two from Rhodes, ten from the seaports in Lykia, three from
Soli and Mallus. But his principal force was obtained by putting in
requisition the ships of the Phenician towns, Sidon, Byblus, and
Aradus, now subject to him. These ships, eighty in number, had left
the Persian admiral and come to Sidon, there awaiting his orders;
while not long afterwards, the princes of Cyprus came thither also,
tendering to him their powerful fleet of 120 ships of war.[320] He
was now master of a fleet of 200 sail, comprising the most part
and the best part, of the Persian navy. This was the consummation
of Macedonian triumph—the last real and effective weapon wrested
from the grasp of Persia. The prognostic afforded by the eagle near
the ships at Miletus, as interpreted by Alexander, had now been
fulfilled; since by successful operations on land, he had conquered
and brought into his power a superior Persian fleet.[321]

[320] Arrian. ii. 20, 1-4; Curtius, iv. 2, 14. It evinces how
strongly Arrian looks at everything from Alexander’s point of
view, when we find him telling us, that that monarch _forgave_
the Phenicians and Cyprians for their adherence and past service
in the Persian fleet, considering that they had acted under
compulsion.

[321] Arrian, i. 18, 15. In the siege of Tyre (four centuries
earlier) by the Assyrian monarch Salmaneser, Sidon and other
Phenician towns had lent their ships to the besieger (Menander
apud Joseph. Antiq. Jud. ix. 14, 2).

Having directed these ships to complete their equipments and
training, with Macedonians as soldiers on board, Alexander put
himself at the head of some light troops for an expedition of
eleven days against the Arabian mountaineers on Libanus, whom he
dispersed or put down, though not without some personal exposure and
hazard.[322] On returning to Sidon, he found Kleander arrived with
a reinforcement of 4000 Grecian hoplites, welcome auxiliaries for
prosecuting the siege. Then, going aboard his fleet in the harbor
of Sidon, he sailed with it in good battle order to Tyre, hoping
that the Tyrians would come out and fight. But they kept within,
struck with surprise and consternation; having not before known that
their fellow-Phenicians were now among the besiegers. Alexander,
having ascertained that the Tyrians would not accept a sea-fight,
immediately caused their two harbors to be blocked up and watched;
that on the north, towards Sidon, by the Cyprians—that on the south,
towards Egypt, by the Phenicians.[323]

[322] Arrian, ii. 20, 5; Plutarch, Alexander, 24.

[323] Arrian, ii. 20, 9-16; Curtius, iv. 3, 11.

From this time forward, the doom of Tyre was certain. The Tyrians
could no longer offer obstruction to the mole, which was completed
across the channel and brought up to the town. Engines were planted
upon it to batter the walls: movable towers were rolled up to take
them by assault; attack was also made from seaward. Yet though
reduced altogether to the defensive, the Tyrians still displayed
obstinate bravery, and exhausted all the resources of ingenuity in
repelling the besiegers. So gigantic was the strength of the wall
fronting the mole, and even that of the northern side fronting Sidon,
that none of Alexander’s engines could make any breach in it; but
on the south side towards Egypt he was more successful. A large
breach having been made in this south-wall, he assaulted it with two
ships manned by the hypaspists and the soldiers of his phalanx: he
himself commanded in one and Admêtus in the other. At the same time
he caused the town to be menaced all round, at every approachable
point, for the purpose of distracting the attention of the defenders.
Himself and his two ships having been rowed close up to the breach
in the south wall, boarding bridges were thrown out from each deck,
upon which he and Admêtus rushed forward with their respective
storming-parties. Admêtus got upon the wall, but was there slain;
Alexander also was among the first to mount, and the two parties got
such a footing on the wall as to overpower all resistance. At the
same time, his ships also forced their way into the two harbors, so
that Tyre came on all sides into his power.[324]

[324] Arrian, ii. 23, 24; Curtius, iv. 4, 11; Diodor. xvii. 46.

Though the walls were now lost, and resistance had become desperate,
the gallant defenders did not lose their courage. They barricaded
the streets, and concentrated their strength especially at a
defensible post called the Agenorion, or chapel of Agenor. Here the
battle again raged furiously until they were overpowered by the
Macedonians, incensed with the long toils of the previous siege,
as well as by the slaughter of some of their prisoners, whom the
Tyrians had killed publicly on the battlements. All who took shelter
in the temple of Hêraklês were spared by Alexander from respect to
the sanctuary: among the number were the prince Azemilchus, a few
leading Tyrians, the Carthaginian envoys, and some children of both
sexes. The Sidonians also, displaying a tardy sentiment of kindred,
and making partial amends for the share which they had taken in the
capture, preserved some lives from the sword of the conqueror.[325]
But the greater number of the adult freemen perished with arms in
their hands; while 2000 of them who survived, either from disabling
wounds, or from the fatigue of the slaughterers, were hanged on the
sea-shore by order of Alexander.[326] The females, the children, and
the slaves, were sold to the slave-merchant. The number sold is said
to have been about 30,000: a total rather small, as we must assume
slaves to be included; but we are told that many had been previously
sent away to Carthage.[327]

[325] Curtius, iv. 4, 15.

[326] This is mentioned both by Curtius (iv. 4, 17) and by
Diodorus (xvii. 46). It is not mentioned by Arrian, and perhaps
may not have found a place in Ptolemy or Aristobulus; but I see
no ground for disbelieving it.

[327] Arrian, iv. 24, 9; Diodorus, xvii. 46.

Thus master of Tyre, Alexander marched into the city and consummated
his much-desired sacrifice to Herakles. His whole force, land and
naval, fully armed and arrayed, took part in the procession. A more
costly hecatomb had never been offered to that god, when we consider
that it had been purchased by all the toils of an unnecessary siege,
and by the extirpation of these free and high-spirited citizens, his
former worshippers. What the loss of the Macedonians had been, we
cannot say. The number of their slain is stated by Arrian at 400,
which must be greatly beneath the truth; for the courage and skill
of the besieged had prolonged the siege to the prodigious period
of seven months, though Alexander had left no means untried to
accomplish it sooner.[328]

[328] The resuscitating force of commercial industry is seen by
the fact, that in spite of this total destruction, Tyre again
rose to be a wealthy and flourishing city (Strabo, xvi. p. 757).

Towards the close of the siege of Tyre, Alexander received and
rejected a second proposition from Darius, offering 10,000 talents,
with the cession of all the territory westward of the Euphrates, as
ransom for his mother and wife, and proposing that Alexander should
become his son-in-law as well as his ally. “If I were Alexander (said
Parmenio) I should accept such terms, instead of plunging into
farther peril.”—“So would I (replied Alexander) if I were Parmenio;
but since I am Alexander, I must return a different answer.” His
answer to Darius was to this effect—“I want neither your money nor
your cession. All your money and territory are already mine, and
you are tendering to me a part in place of the whole. If I choose
to marry your daughter, I _shall_ marry her—whether you give her
to me or not. Come hither to me, if you wish to obtain from me any
act of friendship.”[329] Alexander might spare the submissive and
the prostrate; but he could not brook an equal or a competitor, and
his language towards them was that of brutal insolence. Of course
this was the last message sent by Darius, who now saw, if he had not
before seen, that he had no chance open except by the renewal of war.

[329] Arrian, ii. 25, 5; Curtius, iv. 5. The answer is more
insolent in the naked simplicity of Arrian, than in the pomp
of Curtius. Plutarch (Alexand. 29) both abridges and softens
it. Diodorus also gives the answer differently (xvii. 54)—and
represents the embassy as coming somewhat later in time, after
Alexander’s return from Egypt.

Being thus entire master of Syria, Phenicia, and Palestine, and
having accepted the voluntary submission of the Jews, Alexander
marched forward to conquer Egypt. He had determined, before he
undertook any farther expedition into the interior of the Persian
empire, to make himself master of all the coast-lands which kept open
the communications of the Persians with Greece, so as to secure his
rear against any serious hostility. His great fear was, of Grecian
soldiers or cities raised against him by Persian gold;[330] and
Egypt was the last remaining possession of the Persians, which gave
them the means of acting upon Greece. Those means were indeed now
prodigiously curtailed by the feeble condition of the Persian fleet
in the Ægean, unable to contend with the increasing fleet of the
Macedonian admirals Hegelochus and Amphoterus, now numbering 160
sail.[331] During the summer of 332 B. C., while Alexander
was prosecuting the siege of Tyre, these admirals recovered all the
important acquisitions—Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos—which had been made
by Memnon for the Persian interests. The inhabitants of Tenedos
invited them and ensured their success; those of Chios attempted
to do the same, but were coerced by Pharnabazus, who retained the
city by means of his insular partisans, Apollonides and others, with
a military force. The Macedonian admirals laid siege to the town,
and were presently enabled to carry it by their friends within.
Pharnabazus was here captured with his entire force; twelve triremes
thoroughly armed and manned, thirty store-ships, several privateers,
and 3000 Grecian mercenaries. Aristonikus, philo-Persian despot of
Methymna—arriving at Chios shortly afterwards, but ignorant of the
capture—was entrapped into the harbor, and made prisoner. There
remained only Mitylênê, which was held for the Persians by the
Athenian Chares, with a garrison of 2000 men; who, however, seeing no
hope of holding out against the Macedonians, consented to evacuate
the city on condition of a free departure. The Persians were thus
expelled from the sea, from all footing among the Grecian islands,
and from the vicinity of Greece and Macedonia.[332]

[330] Arrian, ii. 17, 4.

[331] Curtius, iv. 5, 14.

[332] Curtius, iv. 5, 14-22; Arrian, iii. 2, 4-8.

These successes were in full progress, when Alexander himself
directed his march from Tyre to Egypt, stopping in his way to besiege
Gaza. This considerable town, the last before entering on the desert
track between Syria and Egypt, was situated between one and two
miles from the sea. It was built upon a lofty artificial mound, and
encircled with a high wall; but its main defence was derived from
the deep sands immediately around it, as well as from the mud and
quicksand on its coast. It was defended by a brave man, the eunuch
Batis, with a strong garrison of Arabs, and abundant provision of
every kind. Confiding in the strength of the place, Batis refused
to admit Alexander. Moreover his judgment was confirmed by the
Macedonian engineers themselves, who, when Alexander first surveyed
the walls, pronounced it to be impregnable, chiefly from the height
of its supporting mound. But Alexander could not endure the thought
of tacitly confessing his inability to take Gaza. The more difficult
the enterprise, the greater was the charm for him, and the greater
would be the astonishment produced all around when he should be seen
to have triumphed.[333]

[333] Arrian, ii. 26, 5. Οἱ δὲ μηχανοποιοὶ γνώμην ἀπεδείκνυντο,
ἄπορον εἶναι βίᾳ ἑλεῖν τὸ τεῖχος, διὰ ὕψος τοῦ χώματος· ἀλλ᾽
Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐδόκει αἱρετέον εἶναι, ὅσῳ ἀπορώτερον· ἐκπλήξειν γὰρ
τοὺς πολεμίους τὸ ἔργον τῷ παραλόγῳ ἐπὶ μέγα, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἑλεῖν
αἰσχρὸν εἶναί οἱ, λεγόμενον ἔς τε τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ Δαρεῖον.

About the fidelity, and obstinate defensive courage, shown more
than once by the inhabitants of Gaza—see Polybius, xvi. 40.

He began by erecting a mound south of the city, close by the wall,
for the purpose of bringing up his battering engines. This external
mound was completed, and the engines had begun to batter the wall,
when a well-planned sally by the garrison overthrew the assailants
and destroyed the engines. The timely aid of Alexander himself with
his hypaspists, protected their retreat; but he himself, after
escaping a snare from a pretended Arabian deserter, received a severe
wound through the shield and the breastplate into the shoulder, by
a dart discharged from a catapult; as the prophet Aristander had
predicted—giving assurance at the same time, that Gaza would fall
into his hands.[334] During the treatment of his wound, he ordered
the engines employed at Tyre to be brought up by sea; and caused his
mound to be carried around the whole circumference of the town, so
as to render it approachable from every point. This Herculean work,
the description of which we read with astonishment, was 250 feet
high all round, and two stadia (1240 feet) broad[335]; the loose
sand around could hardly have been suitable, so that materials must
have been brought up from a distance. The undertaking was at length
completed; in what length of time we do not know, but it must have
been considerable—though doubtless thousands of laborers would be
pressed in from the circumjacent country.[336]

[334] Arrian, ii. 26, 27; Curtius, iv. 6, 12-18; Plutarch,
Alexand. 25.

[335] Arrian, ii. 27, 5. ~χῶμα~ χωννύναι ~ἐν κύκλῳ παντόθεν~
τῆς πόλεως. It is certainly possible, as Droysen remarks
(Gesch. Alex. des Grossen, p. 199), that παντόθεν is not to be
interpreted with literal strictness, but only as meaning in _many
different portions_ of the walled circuit.

Yet if this had been intended, Arrian would surely have said
χώματα in the plural, not χῶμα.

[336] Diodorus (xvii. 48) states the whole duration of the siege
as two months. This seems rather under than over the probable
truth.

Gaza was now attacked at all points by battering-rams, by mines, and
by projectile engines with various missiles. Presently the Walls were
breached in several places, though the defenders were unremitting
in their efforts to repair the damaged parts. Alexander attempted
three distinct general assaults; but in all three he was repulsed by
the bravery of the Gazæans. At length, after still farther breaching
the wall, he renewed for the fourth time his attempt to storm. The
entire Macedonian phalanx being brought up to attack at different
points, the greatest emulation reigned among the officers. The Æakid
Neoptolemus was first to mount the wall; but the other divisions
manifested hardly less ardor, and the town was at length taken. Its
gallant defenders resisted, with unabated spirit, to the last; and
all fell in their posts, the incensed soldiery being no way disposed
to give quarter.

One prisoner alone was reserved for special treatment—the prince
or governor himself, the eunuch Batis; who, having manifested the
greatest energy and valor, was taken severely wounded, yet still
alive. In this condition he was brought by Leonatus and Philôtas into
the presence of Alexander, who cast upon him looks of vengeance and
fury. The Macedonian prince had undertaken the siege mainly in order
to prove to the world that he could overcome difficulties insuperable
to others. But he had incurred so much loss, spent so much time and
labor, and undergone so many repulses before he succeeded,—that the
palm of honor belonged rather to the minority vanquished than to
the multitude of victors. To such disappointment, which would sting
Alexander in the tenderest point, is to be added the fact, that
he had himself incurred great personal risk and received a severe
wound. Here was ample ground for violent anger; which was moreover
still farther exasperated by the appearance of Batis—an eunuch—a
black man—tall and robust, but at the same time fat and lumpish—and
doubtless at the moment covered with blood and dirt. Such visible
circumstances, repulsive to eyes familiar with Grecian gymnastics,
contributed to kindle the wrath of Alexander to its highest pitch.
After the siege of Tyre, his indignation had been satiated by the
hanging of the 2000 surviving combatants; here, to discharge the
pressure of a still stronger feeling, there remained only the single
captive, upon whom therefore he resolved to inflict a punishment as
novel as it was cruel. He directed the feet of Batis to be bored, and
brazen rings to be passed through them; after which the naked body of
this brave man, yet surviving, was tied with cords to the tail of a
chariot driven by Alexander himself, and dragged at full speed amidst
the triumphant jeers and shouts of the army.[337] Herein Alexander,
emulous even from childhood of the exploits of his legendary ancestor
Achilles, copied the ignominious treatment described in the Iliad as
inflicted on the dead body of Hektor.[338]

[337] Curtius, iv. 6, 25-30; Dionys. Hal. De Comp. Verbor. p.
123-125—with the citation there given from Hegesias of Magnesia.
Diodorus (xvii. 48, 49) simply mentions Gaza in two sentences,
but gives no details of any kind.

Arrian says nothing about the treatment of Batis, nor did he
probably find anything about it in Ptolemy or Aristobulus. There
are assignable reasons why they should pass it over in silence,
as disgraceful to Alexander. But Arrian, at the same time, says
nothing inconsistent with or contradicting the statement of
Curtius; while he himself recognizes how emulous Alexander was of
the proceedings of Achilles (vii. 14, 7).

The passage describing this scene, cited from the lost author
Hegesias by Dionysius of Halikarnassus, as an example of bad
rhythm and taste, has the merit of bringing out the details
respecting the person of Batis, which were well calculated to
disgust and aggravate the wrath of Alexander. The bad taste of
Hegesias as a writer does not diminish his credibility as a
witness.

[338] Arrian. vii. 14, 7.

This proceeding of Alexander, the product of Homeric reminiscences
operating upon an infuriated and vindictive temperament, stands
out in respect of barbarity from all that we read respecting the
treatment of conquered towns in antiquity. His remaining measures
were conformable to received usage. The wives and children of the
Gazæans were sold into slavery. New inhabitants were admitted from
the neighborhood, and a garrison was placed there to hold the town
for the Macedonians.[339]

[339] Arrian, ii. 27. 11. About the circumstances and siege of
Gaza see the work of Stark, Gaza and die Philistäische Küste, p.
242, Leip. 1852.

The two sieges of Tyre and Gaza, which occupied both together nine
mouths,[340] were the hardest fighting that Alexander had ever
encountered, or in fact ever did encounter throughout his life. After
such toils, the march to Egypt, which he now commenced (October
332 B. C.), was an affair of holiday and triumph. Mazakes,
the satrap of Egypt, having few Persian troops and a disaffected
native population, was noway disposed to resist the approaching
conqueror. Seven days’ march brought Alexander and his army from
Gaza to Pelusium, the frontier fortress of Egypt, commanding the
eastern branch of the Nile, whither his fleet, under the command of
Hephæstion, had come also. Here he found not only open gates and
a submissive governor, but also crowds of Egyptians assembled to
welcome him.[341] He placed a garrison in Pelusium, sent his fleet
up the river to Memphis, and marched himself to the same place by
land. The satrap Mazakes surrendered himself, with all the treasure
in the city, 800 talents in amount, and much precious furniture. Here
Alexander reposed some time, offering splendid sacrifices to the
gods generally, and especially to the Egyptian god Apis; to which he
added gymnastic and musical matches, sending to Greece for the most
distinguished artists.

[340] Diodor. xvii. 48; Josephus, Antiq. xi. 4.

[341] Arrian, iii. 1, 3; Curtius iv. 7, 1, 2; Diodor. xvii. 49.

From Memphis, he descended the westernmost branch of the Nile to
Kanôpus at its mouth, from whence he sailed westerly along the
shore to look at the island of Pharos, celebrated in Homer, and the
lake Mareôtis. Reckoning Egypt now as a portion of his empire, and
considering that the business of keeping down an unquiet population,
as well as of collecting a large revenue, would have to be performed
by his extraneous land and sea force, he saw the necessity of
withdrawing the seat of government from Memphis, where both the
Persians and the natives had maintained it, and of founding a new
city of his own on the seaboard, convenient for communication with
Greece and Macedonia. His imagination, susceptible to all Homeric
impressions and influenced by a dream, first fixed upon the isle of
Pharos as a suitable place for his intended city.[342] Perceiving
soon, however, that this little isle was inadequate by itself, he
included it as part of a larger city to be founded on the adjacent
mainland. The gods were consulted, and encouraging responses were
obtained; upon which Alexander himself marked out the circuit of
the walls, the direction of the principal streets, and the sites
of numerous temples to Grecian gods as well as Egyptian.[343] It
was thus that the first stone was laid of the mighty, populous, and
busy Alexandria; which however the founder himself never lived to
see, and wherein he was only destined to repose as a corpse. The
site of the place, between the sea and the Lake Mareôtis, was found
airy and healthy, as well as convenient for shipping and commerce.
The protecting island of Pharos gave the means of forming two good
harbors for ships coming by sea, on a coast harborless elsewhere;
while the Lake Mareôtis, communicating by various canals with the
river Nile, received with facility the exportable produce from the
interior.[344] As soon as houses were ready, commencement was made by
transporting to them in mass the population of the neighboring town
of Kanôpus, and probably of other towns besides, by the intendant
Kleomenes.[345]

[342] Curtius, iv. 8, 1-4; Plutarch, Alexand. 26.

[343] Arrian, iii. 1, 8; Curtius, iv. 8, 2-6; Diodor. xvii. 52.

[344] Strabo, xvii. p. 793. Other authors however speak of the
salubrity of Alexandria less favorably than Strabo: see St.
Croix, Examen des Hist. d’ Alexandre, p. 287.

[345] Pseudo-Aristotle, Œconomic. ii. 32.

Alexandria became afterwards the capital of the Ptolemaic princes.
It acquired immense grandeur and population during their rule of two
centuries and a half, when their enormous revenues were spent greatly
in its improvement and decoration. But we cannot reasonably ascribe
to Alexander himself any prescience of such an imposing future.
He intended it as a place from which he could conveniently rule
Egypt, considered as a portion of his extensive empire all round the
Ægean; and had Egypt remained thus a fraction, instead of becoming a
substantive imperial whole, Alexandria would probably not have risen
beyond mediocrity.[346]

[346] Arrian, iii. 5, 4-9. Tacitus (Annal. i. 11) says about
Egypt under the Romans—“provinciam aditu difficilem, annonæ
fecundam, superstitione et lasciviâ discordem et mobilem, insciam
legum, ignaram magistratuum”, etc. Compare Polybius ap. Strabon.
xvii. p. 797.

The other most notable incident, which distinguished the four or five
months’ stay of Alexander in Egypt, was his march through the sandy
desert to the temple of Zeus Ammon. This is chiefly memorable as it
marks his increasing self-adoration and inflation above the limits
of humanity. His achievements during the last three years had so
transcended the expectations of every one, himself included—the gods
had given to him such incessant good fortune, and so paralyzed or
put down his enemies—that the hypothesis of a superhuman personality
seemed the natural explanation of such a superhuman career.[347]
He had to look back to the heroic legends, and to his ancestors
Perseus and Herakles, to find a worthy prototype.[348] Conceiving
himself to be (like them) the son of Zeus, with only a nominal human
parentage, he resolved to go and ascertain the fact by questioning
the infallible oracle of Zeus Ammon. His march of several days,
through a sandy desert—always fatiguing, sometimes perilous, was
distinguished by manifest evidences of the favor of the gods.
Unexpected rain fell just when the thirsty soldiers required water.
When the guides lost their track, from shifting of the sand, on a
sudden two speaking serpents, or two ravens, appeared preceding the
march and indicating the right direction. Such were the statements
made by Ptolemy, Aristobulus, and Kallisthenes, companions and
contemporaries; while Arrian, four centuries afterwards, announces
his positive conviction that there was a divine intervention on
behalf of Alexander, though he cannot satisfy himself about the
details.[349] The priest of Zeus Ammon addressed Alexander, as being
the son of the god, and farther assured him that his career would
be one of uninterrupted victory, until he was taken away to the
gods; while his friends also, who consulted the oracle for their own
satisfaction, received for answer that the rendering of divine honors
to him would be acceptable to Zeus. After profuse sacrifices and
presents, Alexander quitted the oracle, with a full and sincere faith
that he really was the son of Zeus Ammon; which faith was farther
confirmed by declarations transmitted to him from other oracles—that
of Erythræ in Ionia, and of Branchidæ near Miletus.[350] Though he
did not directly order himself to be addressed as the son of Zeus,
he was pleased with those who volunteered such a recognition, and
angry with sceptics or scoffers, who disbelieved the oracle of Ammon.
Plutarch thinks that this was a mere political manœuvre of Alexander,
for the purpose of overawing the non-Hellenic population over whom
he was enlarging his empire.[351] But it seems rather to have been a
genuine faith,—a simple exaggeration of that exorbitant vanity which
from the beginning reigned so largely in his bosom. He was indeed
aware that it was repugnant to the leading Macedonians in many ways,
but especially as a deliberate insult to the memory of Philip. This
is the theme always touched upon in moments of dissatisfaction. To
Parmenio, to Philôtas, to Kleitus, and other principal officers, the
insolence of the king in disclaiming Philip and putting himself above
the level of humanity, appeared highly offensive. Discontents on this
subject among the Macedonian officers, though condemned to silence by
fear and admiration of Alexander, became serious, and will be found
re-appearing hereafter.[352]

[347] Diodor. xvii. 51. τεκμήρια δ᾽ ἔσεσθαι τῆς ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ
γενέσεως τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι κατορθωμάτων (answer of
the priest of Ammon to Alexander).

[348] Arrian, iii. 3, 2.

[349] Arrian, iii. 3, 12. Καὶ ὅτι μὲν θεῖόν τι ξυνεπέλαβεν αὐτῷ,
~ἔχω ἰσχυρίσασθαι~, ὅτι καὶ τὸ εἰκὸς ταύτῃ ἔχει· τὸ δ᾽ ἀτρεκὲς
τοῦ λόγου ἀφείλοντο οἱ ἄλλῃ καὶ ἄλλῃ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ἐξηγησάμενοι.

Compare Curtius, iv. 7, 12-15; Diodor. xvii. 49-51; Plutarch,
Alex. 27; Kallisthenes ap. Strabon. xvii. p. 814.

[350] Kallisthenes, Fragm. xvi. ap. Alexand. Magn. Histor.
Scriptor. ed. Geier. p. 257; Strabo, xvii. p. 814.

[351] Plutarch, Alexand. 28. Arrian, hints at the same
explanation (vii. 29, 6).

[352] Curtius, iv. 10, 3—“fastidio esse patriam, abdicari
Philippum patrem cœlum vanis cogitationibus petere.” Arrian, iii.
26, 1; Curtius, vi. 9, 18; vi. 11, 23.

The last month of Alexander’s stay in Egypt was passed at Memphis.
While nominating various officers for the permanent administration
of the country, he also received a visit of Hegelochus his admiral,
who brought as prisoners Aristonikus of Methymna, and other despots
of the various insular Grecian cities. Alexander ordered them to
be handed over to their respective cities, to be dealt with as the
citizens pleased; all except the Chian Apollonides, who was sent
to Elephantinê in the south of Egypt for detention. In most of the
cities, the despots had incurred such violent hatred, that when
delivered up, they were tortured and put to death.[353] Pharnabazus
also had been among the prisoners, but had found means to escape
from his guards when the fleet touched at Kos.[354]

[353] Curtius, iv. 8, 11.

[354] Arrian, iii. 2, 8, 9.

In the early spring, after receiving reinforcements of Greeks and
Thracians, Alexander marched into Phenicia. It was there that he
regulated the affairs of Phenicia, Syria, and Greece, prior to his
intended expedition into the interior against Darius. He punished
the inhabitants of Samaria, who had revolted and burnt alive the
Macedonian prefect Andromachus.[355] In addition to all the business
transacted, Alexander made costly presents to the Tyrian Herakles,
and offered splendid sacrifices to other gods. Choice festivals with
tragedy were also celebrated, analogous to the Dionysia at Athens,
with the best actors and chorists contending for the prize. The
princes of Cyprus vied with each other in doing honor to the son of
Zeus Ammon; each undertaking the duty of chorêgus, getting up at his
own cost a drama with distinguished chorus and actors, and striving
to obtain the prize from pre-appointed judges—as was practised among
the ten tribes at Athens.[356]

[355] Curtius, iv. 8, 10.

[356] Plutarch, Alexand. 29; Arrian, _l. c._

In the midst of these religious and festive exhibitions, Alexander
was collecting magazines for his march into the interior.[357] He had
already sent forward a detachment to Thapsacus, the usual ford of the
Euphrates, to throw bridges over the river. The Persian Mazæus was on
guard on the other side, with a small force of 3000 men, 2000 of them
Greeks; not sufficient to hinder the bridges from being built, but
only to hinder them from being carried completely over to the left
bank. After eleven days of march from Phenicia, Alexander and his
whole army reached Thapsakus. Mazæus, on the other side, as soon as
he saw the main army arrive, withdrew his small force without delay,
and retreated to the Tigris; so that the two bridges were completed,
and Alexander crossed forthwith.[358]

[357] Arrian, iii. 6, 12.

[358] Arrian, iii. 7, 1-6; Curtius, iv. 9, 12—“undecimis castris
pervenit ad Euphraten.”

Once over the Euphrates, Alexander had the option of marching down
the left bank of that river to Babylon, the chief city of the
Persian empire, and the natural place to find Darius.[359] But this
march (as we know from Xenophon, who made it with the Ten Thousand
Greeks) would be one of extreme suffering and through a desert
country where no provisions were to be got. Moreover, Mazæus in
retreating had taken a north-easterly direction towards the upper
part of the Tigris; and some prisoners reported that Darius with his
main army was behind the Tigris, intending to defend the passage
of that river against Alexander. The Tigris appears not to be
fordable below Nineveh (Mosul). Accordingly he directed his march,
first nearly northward, having the Euphrates on his left hand; next
eastward across Northern Mesopotamia, having the Armenian mountains
on his left hand. On reaching the ford of the Tigris, he found it
absolutely undefended. Not a single enemy being in sight, he forded
the river as soon as possible, with all his infantry, cavalry, and
baggage. The difficulties and perils of crossing were extreme, from
the depth of the water, above their breasts, the rapidity of the
current, and the slippery footing.[360] A resolute and vigilant enemy
might have rendered the passage almost impossible. But the good
fortune of Alexander was not less conspicuous in what his enemies
left undone, than in what they actually did.[361]

[359] So Alexander considers Babylon (Arrian, ii. 17,
3-10)—προχωρησάντων ξὺν τῇ δυνάμει ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνά τε καὶ Δαρεῖον
... τόν τε ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνος στόλον ποιησόμεθα, etc. This is the
explanation of Arrian’s remark, iii. 7, 6—where he assigns the
reason why Alexander, after passing the Euphrates at Thapsakus,
did not take the straight road towards Babylon. Cyrus the younger
marched directly to Babylon to attack Artaxerxes. Susa, Ekbatana,
and Persepolis were more distant, and less exposed to an enemy
from the west.

[360] Arrian, iii. 7, 8; Diodor. xvii. 55; Curtius. iv. 9, 17-24.
“Magna munimenta regni Tigris atque Euphrates erant”, is a part
of the speech put into the mouth of Darius before the battle of
Arbela, by Curtius, (iv. 14, 10). Both these great defences were
abandoned.

[361] Curtius, iv. 9, 23; Plutarch, Alexand. 39.

After this fatiguing passage, Alexander rested for two days. During
the night an eclipse of the moon occurred, nearly total; which
spread consternation among the army, combined with complaints
against his overweening insolence, and mistrust as to the unknown
regions on which they were entering. Alexander, while offering
solemn sacrifices to Sun, Moon, and Earth, combated the prevailing
depression by declarations from his own prophet Aristander and from
Egyptian astrologers, who proclaimed that Helios favored the Greeks,
and Selênê the Persians; hence the eclipse of the moon portended
victory to the Macedonians—and victory too (so Aristander promised),
before the next new moon. Having thus reassured the soldiers,
Alexander marched for four days in a south-easterly direction through
the territory called Aturia, with the Tigris on his right hand, and
the Gordyene or Kurd mountains on his left. Encountering a small
advanced guard of the Persians, he here learnt from prisoners that
Darius with his main host was not far off.[362]

[362] Arrian, iii. 7, 12; iii. 8, 3. Curtius, iv. 10, 11-18.

Nearly two years had elapsed since the ruinous defeat of Issus. What
Darius had been doing during this long interval, and especially
during the first half of it, we are unable to say. We hear only
of one proceeding on his part—his missions, twice repeated, to
Alexander, tendering or entreating peace, with the especial view of
recovering his captive family. Nothing else does he appear to have
done, either to retrieve the losses of the past, or to avert the
perils of the future; nothing, to save his fleet from passing into
the hands of the conqueror; nothing, to relieve either Tyre or Gaza,
the sieges of which collectively occupied Alexander for near ten
months. The disgraceful flight of Darius at Issus had already lost
him the confidence of several of his most valuable servants. The
Macedonian exile Amyntas, a brave and energetic man, with the best
of the Grecian mercenaries, gave up the Persian cause as lost,[363]
and tried to set up for himself, in which attempt he failed and
perished in Egypt. The satrap of Egypt, penetrated with contempt for
the timidity of his master, was induced, by that reason as well as by
others, to throw open the country to Alexander.[364] Having incurred
so deplorable a loss, as well in reputation as in territory, Darius
had the strongest motives to redeem it by augmented vigor.

[363] Arrian, ii. 13; Curtius, iv. 1, 27-30—“cum in illo statu
rerum id quemque, quod occupasset, habiturum arbitraretur”
(Amyntas).

[364] Arrian, iii. 1, 3. τήν τε ἐν Ἰσσῷ μάχην ὅπως συνέβη
πεπυσμένος (the satrap of Egypt) καὶ Δαρεῖον ὅτι αἰσχρᾷ φυγῇ
ἔφυγε, etc.

But he was paralyzed by the fact, that his mother, his wife, and
several of his children, had fallen into the hands of the conqueror.
Among the countless advantages growing out of the victory of Issus,
this acquisition was not the least. It placed Darius in the condition
of one who had given hostages for good behavior to his enemy. The
Persian kings were often in the habit of exacting from satraps or
generals the deposit of their wives and families, as a pledge for
fidelity; and Darius himself had received this guarantee from Memnon,
as a condition of entrusting him with the Persian fleet.[365] Bound
by the like chains himself, towards one who had now become his
superior, Darius was afraid to act with energy, lest success should
bring down evil upon his captive family. By allowing Alexander to
subdue unopposed all the territory west of the Euphrates, he hoped
to be allowed to retain his empire eastward, and to ransom back
his family at an enormous price. Such propositions did satisfy
Parmenio, and would probably have satisfied even Philip, had Philip
been the victor. The insatiate nature of Alexander had not yet been
fully proved. It was only when the latter contemptuously rejected
everything short of surrender at discretion, that Darius began to
take measures east of the Euphrates for defending what yet remained.

[365] Diodor. xvii. 23. Compare Xenophon, Anabasis, i. 4, 9;
Herodotus, vii. 10.

The conduct of Alexander towards the regal hostages, honorable as it
was to his sentiment, evinced at the same time that he knew their
value as a subject of political negotiation.[366] It was essential
that he should treat them with the full deference due to their rank,
if he desired to keep up their price as hostages in the eyes of
Darius as well as of his own army. He carried them along with his
army, from the coast of Syria, over the bridge of the Euphrates, and
even through the waters of the Tigris. To them, this must have proved
a severe toil; and in fact, the queen Statira became so worn out
that she died shortly after crossing the Tigris;[367] to him also,
it must have been an onerous obligation, since he not only sought to
ensure to them all their accustomed pomp, but must have assigned a
considerable guard to watch them, at a moment when he was marching
into an unknown country, and required all his military resources to
be disposable. Simply for safe detention, the hostages would have
been better guarded and might have been treated with still greater
ceremony, in a city or a fortress. But Alexander probably wished to
have them near him, in case of the possible contingency of serious
reverses to his army on the eastern side of the Tigris. Assuming such
a misfortune to happen, the surrender of them might ensure a safe
retreat under circumstances otherwise fatal to its accomplishment.

[366] The praise bestowed upon the continence of Alexander, for
refusing to visit Statira the wife of Darius, is exaggerated even
to absurdity.

In regard to women, Alexander was by temperament cold, the
opposite of his father Philip. During his youth, his development
was so tardy, that there was even a surmise of some physical
disability (Hieronymus ap. Athenæ. x. p. 435). As to the most
beautiful persons, of both sexes, he had only to refuse the
numerous tenders made to him by those who sought to gain his
favor (Plutarch, Alex. 22). Moreover, after the capture of
Damascus, he did select for himself, from among the female
captives, Barsinê, the widow of his illustrious rival Memnon;
daughter of Artabazus, a beautiful woman of engaging manners, and
above all, distinguished, by having received Hellenic education,
from the simply Oriental harem of Darius (Plutarch, Alex. 21).
In adopting the widow of Memnon as his mistress, Alexander may
probably have had present to his imagination the example of his
legendary ancestor Neoptolemus, whose tender relations with
Andromache, widow of his enemy Hektor, would not be forgotten by
any reader of Euripides. Alexander had by Barsinê a son called
Herakles.

Lastly, Alexander was so absorbed by ambition,—so overcharged
with the duties and difficulties of command, which he always
performed himself—and so continually engaged in fatiguing bodily
effort,—that he had little leisure left for indulgences; such
leisure as he had, he preferred devoting to wine-parties with the
society and conversation of his officers.

[367] Curtius, iv. 10, 19. “Itineris continui labore animique
ægritudine fatigata”, etc.

Curtius and Justin mention a third embassy sent by Darius
(immediately after having heard of the death and honorable
obsequies of Statira) to Alexander, asking for peace. The other
authors allude only to two tentatives of this kind; and the third
seems by no means probable.

Being at length convinced that Alexander would not be satisfied with
any prize short of the entire Persian empire, Darius summoned all
his forces to defend what he still retained. He brought together a
host said to be superior in number to that which had been defeated
at Issus.[368] Contingents arrived from the farthest extremities of
the vast Persian territory—from the Caspian sea, the rivers Oxus and
Indus, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea. The plains eastward of
the Tigris, about the latitude of the modern town of Mosul, between
that river and the Gordyene mountains (Zagros), were fixed upon for
the muster of this prodigious multitude; partly conducted by Darius
himself from Babylon, partly arriving there by different routes from
the north, east, and south. Arbêla—a considerable town about twenty
miles east of the Great Zab river, still known under the name of
Erbil, as a caravan station on the ordinary road between Erzeroum and
Bagdad—was fixed on as the muster-place or head-quarters, where the
chief magazines were collected and the heavy baggage lodged, and near
which the troops were first assembled and exercised.[369]

[368] Arrian, iii. 7, 7.

[369] Diodorus, xvii. 53; Curtius, iv. 9, 9.

But the spot predetermined for a pitched battle was, the neighborhood
of Gaugamela near the river Bumôdus, about thirty miles west of
Arbêla, towards the Tigris, and about as much south-east of Mosul—a
spacious and level plain, with nothing more than a few undulating
slopes, and without any trees. It was by nature well adapted for
drawing up a numerous army, especially for the free manœuvres of
cavalry, and the rush of scythed chariots; moreover, the Persian
officers had been careful beforehand to level artificially such of
the slopes as they thought inconvenient.[370] There seemed every
thing in the ground to favor the operation both of the vast total,
and the special forces, of Darius; who fancied that his defeat
at Issus had been occasioned altogether by his having adventured
himself in the narrow defiles of Kilikia—and that on open and level
ground his superior numbers must be triumphant. He was even anxious
that Alexander should come and attack him on the plain. Hence the
undefended passage of the Tigris.

[370] Arrian, iii. 8, 12. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὅσα ἀνώμαλα αὐτοῦ ἐς
ἱππασίαν, ταῦτά τε ~ἐκ πολλοῦ~ οἱ Πέρσαι τοῖς τε ἅρμασιν
ἐπελαύνειν εὐπετῆ πεποιήκεσαν καὶ τῇ ἵππῳ ἱππάσιμα.

For those who looked only to numbers, the host assembled at Arbêla
might well inspire confidence; for it is said to have consisted of
1,000,000 of infantry[371]—40,000 cavalry—200 scythed chariots—and
fifteen elephants; of which animals we now read for the first time
in a field of battle. But besides the numbers, Darius had provided
for his troops more effective arms; instead of mere javelins, strong
swords and short thrusting pikes, such as the Macedonian cavalry
wielded so admirably in close combat—together with shields for the
infantry and breastplates for the horsemen.[372] He counted much
also on the terrific charge of the chariots, each of which had a
pole projecting before the horses and terminating in a sharp point,
together with three sword-blades stretching from the yoke on each
side, and scythes also laterally from the naves of the wheels.[373]

[371] This is the total given by Arrian as what he found set
forth (ἐλέγετο), probably the best information which Ptolemy and
Aristobulus could procure (Arrian, iii. 8, 8).

Diodorus (xvii. 53) says 800,000 foot, 200,000 horse, and 200
scythed chariots. Justin (xi. 12) gives 400,000 foot and 100,000
horse. Plutarch (Alex. 31) talks generally of a million of men.
Curtius states the army to have been almost twice as large as
that which had fought in Kilikia (iv. 9, 3); he gives the total
as 200,000 foot, and 45,000 horse (iv. 12, 13).

[372] Diodor. xvii. 53; Curtius, iv. 9, 2.

[373] Curtius, iv. 9, 3; Diodor. xvii. 53. Notwithstanding the
instructive note of Mützel upon this passage of Curtius, the mode
in which these chariots were armed is not clear on all points.

Informed of the approach of Alexander, about the time when the
Macedonian army first reached the Tigris, Darius moved from Arbêla,
where his baggage and treasure were left—crossed by bridges the river
Lykus or Great Zab, an operation which occupied five days—and marched
to take post on the prepared ground near Gaugamela. His battle array
was formed—of the Baktrians on the extreme left, under command of
Bessus the satrap of Baktria; next, the Dahæ and Arachôti, under
command of Barsäentes, satrap of Arachosia; then the native Persians,
horse and foot alternating—the Susians, under Oxathres,—and the
Kadusians. On the extreme right were the contingents of Syria both
east and west of the Euphrates, under Mazæus; then the Medes, under
Atropates; next, the Parthians, Sakæ, Tapyrians, and Hyrkanians, all
cavalry, under Phrataphernes; then the Albanians and the Sakesinæ.
Darius himself was in the centre, with the choice troops of the
army near and around him—the Persian select Horse-guards, called
the king’s kinsmen—the Persian foot-guards, carrying pikes with a
golden apple at the butt-end—a regiment of Karians, or descendants
of Karians, who had been abstracted from their homes and planted as
colonists in the interior of the empire—the contingent of Mardi, good
archers—and lastly, the mercenary Greeks, of number unknown, in whom
Darius placed his greatest confidence.

Such was the first or main line of the Persians. In the rear of it
stood deep masses of Babylonians,—inhabitants of Sittakê down to the
Persian Gulf—Uxians, from the territory adjoining Susiana to the
east—and others in unknown multitude. In front of it were posted the
scythed chariots, with small advanced bodies of cavalry—Scythians
and Baktrians on the left, with one hundred chariots—Armenians and
Kappadokians on the right, with fifty more—and the remaining fifty
chariots in front of the centre.[374]

[374] The Persian battle order here given by Arrian (iii. 11),
is taken from Aristobulus, who affirmed that it was so set down
in the official scheme of the battle, drawn up by the Persian
officers, and afterwards captured with the baggage of Darius.
Though thus authentic as far as it goes, it is not complete,
even as to names—while it says nothing about numbers or depth or
extent of front. Several names, of various contingents stated to
have been present in the field, are not placed in the official
return—thus the Sogdiani, the Arians, and the Indian mountaineers
are mentioned by Arrian as having joined Darius (iii. 8); the
Kossæans, by Diodorus (xvii. 59); the Sogdiani, Massagetæ,
Belitæ, Kossæans, Gortyæ, Phrygians, and Kataonians, by Curtius
(iv. 12).

Alexander had advanced within about seven miles of the Persian army,
and four days’ march since his crossing the Tigris—when he first
learnt from Persian prisoners how near his enemies were. He at once
halted, established on the spot a camp with ditch and stockade;
and remained there for four days, in order that the soldiers might
repose. On the night of the fourth day, he moved forward, yet
leaving under guard in the camp the baggage, the prisoners, and the
ineffectives. He began his march, over a range of low elevations
which divided him from the enemy, hoping to approach and attack
them at daybreak. But his progress was so retarded, that day broke,
and the two armies first came in sight, when he was still on the
descending slope of the ground, more than three miles distant. On
seeing the enemy, he halted, and called together his principal
officers, to consult whether he should not prosecute his march and
commence the attack forthwith.[375] Though most of them pronounced
for the affirmative, yet Parmenio contended that this course would be
rash; that the ground before them, with all its difficulties, natural
or artificial, was unknown, and that the enemy’s position, which
they now saw for the first time, ought to be carefully reconnoitred.
Adopting this latter view, Alexander halted for the day; yet still
retaining his battle order, and forming a new entrenched camp,
to which the baggage and the prisoners were now brought forward
from the preceding day’s encampment.[376] He himself spent the
day, with an escort of cavalry and light troops, in reconnoitring
both the intermediate ground and the enemy, who did not interrupt
him, in spite of their immense superiority in cavalry. Parmenio,
with Polysperchon and others, advised him to attack the enemy in
the night; which promised some advantages, since Persian armies
were notoriously unmanageable by night,[377] and since their camp
had no defence. But on the other hand, the plan involved so many
disadvantages and perils, that Alexander rejected it; declaring—with
an emphasis intentionally enhanced, since he spoke in the hearing of
many others—that he disdained the meanness of stealing a victory;
that he both would conquer, and could conquer, Darius fairly and in
open daylight.[378] Having then addressed to his officers a few brief
encouragements, which met with enthusiastic response, he dismissed
them to their evening meal and repose.

[375] Arrian, iii. 9, 5-7.

[376] Arrian, iii. 9, 2-8. It is not expressly mentioned by
Arrian that the baggage, etc. was brought forward from the first
camp to the second. But we see that such must have been the
fact, from what happened during the battle. Alexander’s baggage,
which was plundered by a body of Persian cavalry, cannot have
been so far in the rear of the army as the distance of the first
camp would require. This coincides also with Curtius, iv. 13,
35. The words ἔγνω ἀπολείπειν (Arrian, iii. 9, 2), indicate the
contemplation of a purpose which was not accomplished—ὡς ἅμ᾽
ἡμέρᾳ προσμῖξαι τοῖς πολεμίοις (iii. 9, 3). Instead of “coming
into conflict” with the enemy at break of day—Alexander only
arrived within sight of them at break of day; he then halted the
whole day and night within sight of their position; and naturally
brought up his baggage, having no motive to leave it so far in
the rear.

[377] Xenoph. Anabas. iii. 4, 35.

[378] Arrian, iii. 10, 3; Curtius, iv. 13, 4-10.

On the next morning, he marshalled his army, consisting of
40,000 foot, and 7000 horse, in two lines.[379] The first or
main line was composed, on the right, of the eight squadrons of
Companion-cavalry, each with its separate captain, but all under
the command of Philôtas, son of Parmenio. Next (proceeding from
right to left) came the Agêma or chosen band of the Hypaspistæ—then
the remaining Hypaspistæ, under Nikanor—then the phalanx properly
so called, distributed into six divisions, under the command of
Kœnus, Perdikkas, Meleager, Polysperchon, Simmias, and Kraterus,
respectively.[380] Next on the left of the phalanx, were ranged the
allied Grecian cavalry, Lokrian and Phokian, Phthiot, Malians, and
Peloponnesians; after whom, at the extreme left, came the Thessalians
under Philippus—among the best cavalry in the army, hardly inferior
to the Macedonian Companions. As in the two former battles, Alexander
himself took the command of the right half of the army, confiding the
left to Parmenio.

[379] Arrian, iii. 12, 1-9.

[380] Arrian, ii. 11; Diodor. xvii. 57; Curtius, iv. 13, 26-30.

Behind this main line, was placed a second or body of reserve,
intended to guard against attacks in the flanks and rear, which the
superior numbers of the Persians rendered probable. For this purpose,
Alexander reserved,—on the right, the light cavalry or Lancers—the
Pæonians, under Aretes and Aristo—half the Agrianes, under
Attalus—the Macedonian archers, under Brisson—and the mercenaries
of old service, under Kleander; on the left, various bodies of
Thracian and allied cavalry, under their separate officers. All these
different regiments were held ready to repel attack either in flank
or rear. In front of the main line were some advanced squadrons
of cavalry and light troops—Grecian cavalry, under Menidas on the
right, and under Andromachus on the left—a brigade of darters under
Balakrus, together with Agrianian darters, and some bowmen. Lastly,
the Thracian infantry were left to guard the camp and baggage.[381]

[381] Arrian, iii. 12, 2-6; Curtius, iv. 13, 30-32; Diodor. xvii.
57.

Forewarned by a deserter, Alexander avoided the places where iron
spikes had been planted to damage the Macedonian cavalry.[382] He
himself, at the head of the Royal Squadron, on the extreme right, led
the march obliquely in that direction, keeping his right somewhat
in advance. As he neared the enemy, he saw Darius himself with the
Persian left centre immediately opposed to him—Persian guards,
Indians, Albanians, and Karians. Alexander went on inclining to the
right, and Darius stretching his front towards the left to counteract
this movement, but still greatly outflanking the Macedonians to the
left. Alexander had now got so far to his right, that he was almost
beyond the ground levelled by Darius for the operations of his
chariots in front. To check any farther movement in this direction,
the Baktrian 1000 horse and the Scythians in front of the Persian
left, were ordered to make a circuit and attack the Macedonian right
flank. Alexander detached against them his regiment of cavalry under
Menidas, and the action thus began.[383]

[382] Curtius, iv. 13, 36; Polyænus, iv. 3, 17.

[383] Arrian, iii. 13, 1-5.

The Baktrian horse, perceiving the advance of Menidas, turned from
their circuitous movement to attack him, and at first drove him back
until he was supported by the other advanced detachments—Pæonians
and Grecian cavalry. The Baktrians, defeated in their turn, were
supported by the satrap Bessus with the main body of Baktrians and
Scythians in the left portion of Darius’s line. The action was here
for some time warmly contested, with some loss to the Greeks; who
at length however, by a more compact order against enemies whose
fighting was broken and desultory, succeeded in pushing them out of
their place in the line, and thus making a partial opening in it.[384]

[384] Arrian, iii. 13, 9.

While this conflict was still going on, Darius had ordered his
scythed chariots to charge, and his main line to follow them,
calculating on the disorder which he expected that they would
occasion. But the chariots were found of little service. The horses
were terrified, checked, or wounded, by the Macedonian archers and
darters in front; who even found means to seize the reins, pull down
the drivers, and kill the horses. Of the hundred chariots in Darius’s
front, intended to beat down the Macedonian ranks by simultaneous
pressure along their whole line, many were altogether stopped or
disabled; some turned right round, the horses refusing to face the
protended pikes, or being scared with the noise of pike and shield
struck together; some which reached the Macedonian line, were let
through without mischief by the soldiers opening their ranks; a few
only inflicted wounds or damage.[385]

[385] About the chariots. Arrian, iii. 13, 11; Curtius, iv. 15,
14; Diodor. xvii. 57, 58.

Arrian mentions distinctly only those chariots which were
launched on Darius’s left, immediately opposite to Alexander. But
it is plain that the chariots along the whole line must have been
let off at one and the same signal—which we may understand as
implied in the words of Curtius—“Ipse (Darius) ante se falcatos
currus habebat, quos signo dato universos in hostem effudit” (iv.
14, 3).

The scythed chariots of Artaxerxes, at the battle of Kunaxa,
did no mischief (Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 10-20). At the battle of
Magnesia, gained by the Romans (B. C. 190) over the
Syrian king Antiochus, his chariots were not only driven back,
but spread disorder among their own troops (Appian, Reb. Syriac.
33).

As soon as the chariots were thus disposed of, and the Persian main
force laid open as advancing behind them, Alexander gave orders
to the troops of his main line, who had hitherto been perfectly
silent,[386] to raise the war-shout and charge at a quick pace;
at the same time directing Aretes with the Pæonians to repel the
assailants on his right flank. He himself, discontinuing his slanting
movement to the right, turned towards the Persian line, and dashed,
at the head of all the Companion-cavalry, into that partial opening
in it, which had been made by the flank movement of the Baktrians.
Having by this opening got partly within the line, he pushed straight
towards the person of Darius; his cavalry engaging in the closest
hand-combat, and thrusting with their short pikes at the faces of the
Persians. Here, as at the Granikus, the latter were discomposed by
this mode of fighting—accustomed as they were to rely on the use of
missiles, with rapid wheeling of the horse for renewed attack.[387]
They were unable to prevent Alexander and his cavalry from gaining
ground and approaching nearer to Darius; while at the same time,
the Macedonian phalanx in front, with its compact order and long
protended pikes, pressed upon the Persian line opposed to it. For
a short interval, the combat here was close and obstinate; and it
might have been much prolonged—since the best troops of Darius’s
army—Greeks, Karians, Persian guards, regal kinsmen, etc., were here
posted,—had the king’s courage been equal to that of his soldiers.
But here, even worse than at Issus, the flight of the army began with
Darius himself. It had been the recommendation of Cyrus the younger,
in attacking the army of his brother Artaxerxes at Kunaxa, to aim
the main blow at the spot where his brother was in person—since he
well knew that victory there was victory everywhere. Having already
once followed this scheme successfully at Issus, Alexander repeated
it with still more signal success at Arbêla. Darius, who had long
been in fear, from the time when he first beheld his formidable enemy
on the neighboring hills, became still more alarmed when he saw the
scythed chariots prove a failure, and when the Macedonians, suddenly
breaking out from absolute silence into an universal war-cry, came
to close quarters with his troops, pressing towards and menacing
the conspicuous chariot on which he stood.[388] The sight and
hearing of this terrific _mêlée_, combined with the prestige already
attaching to Alexander’s name, completely overthrew the courage and
self-possession of Darius. He caused his chariot to be turned round,
and himself set the example of flight.[389]

[386] See the remarkable passage in the address of Alexander
to his soldiers previous to the battle, about the necessity of
absolute silence until the moment came for the terrific war-shout
(Arrian, iii. 9, 14): compare Thucyd. ii. 89—a similar direction
from Phormio to the Athenians.

[387] Arrian, iii. 15, 4. οὔτε ἀκοντισμῷ ἔτι, οὔτε ἐξελιγμοῖς τῶν
ἵππων, ἥπερ ἱππομαχίας δίκη, ἐχρῶντο—about the Persian cavalry
when driven to despair.

[388] Arrian, iii. 14, 2. ἦγε δρόμῳ τε καὶ ἀλαλαγμῷ ὡς ἐπὶ αὐτὸν
Δαρεῖον—Diodor. xvii. 60. Alexander μετὰ τῆς βασιλικῆς ἴλης καὶ
τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων ἱππέων ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν ἤλαυνε τὸν Δαρεῖον.

[389] Arrian, iii. 14, 3. Καὶ χρόνον μέν τινα ὀλίγον ἐν χερσὶν
ἡ μάχη ἐγένετο. Ὣς δὲ οἵ τε ἱππεῖς οἱ ἀμφ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ
αὐτὸς Ἀλέξανδρος εὐρώστως ἐνέκειντο, ὠθισμοῖς τε χρώμενοι, καὶ
τοῖς ξυστοῖς τὰ πρόσωπα τῶν Περσῶν κόπτοντες, ἥ τε φάλαγξ ἡ
Μακεδονικὴ, πυκνὴ καὶ ταῖς σαρίσσαις πεφρικυῖα, ἐμβέβληκεν ἤδη
αὐτοῖς, ~καὶ πάντα ὁμοῦ τὰ δεινὰ καὶ πάλαι ἤδη φοβερῷ ὄντι Δαρείῳ
ἐφαίνετο, πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἐπιστρέψας ἔφευγεν~. At Issus, Arrian
states that “Darius fled along with the first” (ii. 11, 6); at
Arbela here, he states that “Darius was the first to turn and
flee;” an expression yet stronger and more distinct. Curtius
and Diodorus, who seem here as elsewhere to follow generally
the same authorities, give details, respecting the conduct of
Darius, which are not to be reconciled with Arrian, and which are
decidedly less credible than Arrian’s narrative. The fact that
the two kings were here (as at Issus) near, and probably visible,
to each other, has served as a basis for much embroidery. The
statement that Darius, standing on his chariot, hurled his spear
against the advancing Macedonians—and that Alexander also hurled
his spear at Darius, but missing him, killed the charioteer—is
picturesque and Homeric, but has no air of reality. Curtius and
Diodorus tell us that this fall of the charioteer was mistaken
for the fall of the king, and struck the Persian army with
consternation, causing them forthwith to take flight, and thus
ultimately forcing Darius to flee also (Diodor. xvii. 60; Curt.
iv. 15, 26-32). But this is noway probable; since the real fight
then going on was close, and with hand-weapons.

From this moment, the battle, though it had lasted so short a
time, was irreparably lost. The king’s flight, followed of course
immediately by that of the numerous attendants around him, spread
dismay among all his troops, leaving them neither centre of command,
nor chief to fight for. The best soldiers in his army, being those
immediately around him, were under these circumstances the first to
give way. The fierce onset of Alexander with the Companion-cavalry,
and the unremitting pressure of the phalanx in front was obstructed
by little else than a mass of disordered fugitives. During the same
time, Aretes with his Pæonians had defeated the Baktrians on the
right flank,[390] so that Alexander was free to pursue the routed
main body,—which he did most energetically. The cloud of dust raised
by the dense multitude is said to have been so thick, that nothing
could be clearly seen, nor could the pursuers distinguish the track
taken by Darius himself. Amidst this darkness, the cries and noises
from all sides were only the more impressive; especially the sound
from the whips of the charioteers, pushing their horses to full
speed.[391] It was the dust alone which saved Darius himself from
being overtaken by the pursuing cavalry.

[390] Arrian, iii. 14, 4.

[391] Diodor. xvii. 60; Curtius, iv. 15, 32, 33. The cloud of
dust, and the noise of the whips, are specified both by Diodorus
and Curtius.

While Alexander was thus fully successful on his right and centre,
the scene on his left under Parmenio was different. Mazæus, who
commanded the Persian right, after launching his scythed chariots
(which may possibly have done more damage than those launched on
the Persian left, though we have no direct information about them),
followed it up by vigorously charging the Grecian and Thessalian
horse in his front, and also by sending round a detachment of
cavalry to attack them on their left flank.[392] Here the battle was
obstinately contested, and success for some time doubtful. Even after
the flight of Darius, Parmenio found himself so much pressed, that he
sent a message to Alexander. Alexander, though full of mortification
at relinquishing the pursuit, checked his troops, and brought them
back to the assistance of his left, by the shortest course across the
field of battle. The two left divisions of the phalanx, under Simmias
and Kraterus, had already stopped short in the pursuit, on receiving
the like message from Parmenio; leaving the other four divisions to
follow the advanced movement of Alexander.[393] Hence there arose a
gap in the midst of the phalanx, between the four right divisions,
and the two left; into which gap a brigade of Indian and Persian
cavalry darted, galloping through the midst of the Macedonian line to
get into the rear and attack the baggage.[394] At first this movement
was successful, the guard was found unprepared, and the Persian
prisoners rose at once to set themselves free; though Sisygambis,
whom these prisoners were above measure anxious to liberate, refused
to accept their aid, either from mistrust of their force, or
gratitude for the good treatment received from Alexander.[395] But
while these assailants were engaged in plundering the baggage, they
were attacked in the rear by the troops forming the second Macedonian
line, who though at first taken by surprise, had now had time to
face about and reach the camp. Many of the Persian brigade were thus
slain, the rest got off as they could.[396]

[392] Curtius, iv. 16, 1; Diodorus, xvii. 59, 60; Arrian, iii.
14, 11. The two first authors are here superior to Arrian, who
scarcely mentions at all this vigorous charge of Mazæus, though
he alludes to the effects produced by it.

[393] Arrian, iii. 14, 6. He speaks directly here only of the
τάξις under the command of Simmias; but it is plain that what he
says must be understood of the τάξις commanded by Kraterus also.
Of the six τάξεις or divisions of the phalanx, that of Kraterus
stood at the extreme left—that of Simmias (who commanded on this
day the τάξις of Amyntas son of Andromenes) next to it (iii.
11, 16). If therefore the τάξις of Simmias was kept back from
pursuit, on account of the pressure upon the general Macedonian
left (iii. 14, 6)—_à fortiori_, the τάξις of Kraterus must have
been kept back in like manner.

[394] Arrian, iii. 14, 7.

[395] Curtius. iv. 15, 9-11; Diodor. xvii. 59. Curtius and
Diodorus represent the brigade of cavalry who plundered the camp
and rescued the prisoners, to have been sent round by Mazæus
from the Persian right; while Arrian states, more probably, that
they got through the break accidentally left in the phalanx, and
traversed the Macedonian lines.

[396] Arrian, iii. 14, 10. Curtius represents this brigade as
having been driven off by Aretes and a detachment sent expressly
by Alexander himself. Diodorus describes it as if it had not been
defeated at all, but had ridden back to Mazæus after plundering
the baggage. Neither of these accounts is so probable as that of
Arrian.

Mazæus maintained for a certain time fair equality, on his own
side of the battle, even after the flight of Darius. But when, to
the paralyzing effect of that fact in itself, there was added the
spectacle of its disastrous effects on the left half of the Persian
army, neither he nor his soldiers could persevere with unabated vigor
in a useless combat. The Thessalian and Grecian horse, on the other
hand, animated by the turn of fortune in their favor, pressed their
enemies with redoubled energy and at length drove them to flight; so
that Parmenio was victor, on his own side and with his own forces,
before the succors from Alexander reached him.[397]

[397] Diodor. xvii. 60. Ὁ Παρμενίων ... μόλις ἐτρέψατο τοὺς
βαρβάρους, μάλιστα καταπλαγέντας τῇ κατὰ τὸν Δαρεῖον φυγῇ.
Curtius, iv. 16, 4-7. “Interim ad Mazæum fama superati regis
pervenerat. Itaque, quanquam validior erat, tamen fortunâ partium
territus, perculsis languidius instabat.” Arrian, iv. 14, 11; iv.
15, 8.

In conducting those succors, on his way back from the pursuit,
Alexander traversed the whole field of battle, and thus met face
to face some of the best Persian and Parthian cavalry, who were
among the last to retire. The battle was already lost, and they
were seeking only to escape. As they could not turn back, and had
no chance for their lives except by forcing their way through his
Companion-cavalry, the combat here was desperate and murderous; all
at close quarters, cut and thrust with hand weapons on both sides
contrary to the Persian custom. Sixty of the Macedonian cavalry were
slain; and a still greater number, including Hephæstion, Kœnus,
and Menidas, were wounded, and Alexander himself encountered great
personal danger. He is said to have been victorious; yet probably
most of these brave men forced their way through and escaped, though
leaving many of their number on the field.[398]

[398] Arrian, iii. 15, 6. Curtius also alludes to this combat;
but with many particulars very different from Arrian (iv. 16,
19-25).

Having rejoined his left, and ascertained that it was not only out
of danger, but victorious, Alexander resumed his pursuit of the
flying Persians, in which Parmenio now took part.[399] The host of
Darius was only a multitude of disorderly fugitives, horse and foot
mingled together. The greater part of them had taken no share in
the battle. Here, as at Issus, they remained crowded in stationary
and unprofitable masses, ready to catch the contagion of terror
and to swell the number of runaways, so soon as the comparatively
small proportion of real combatants in the front had been beaten.
On recommencing the pursuit, Alexander pushed forward with such
celerity, that numbers of the fugitives were slain or taken,
especially at the passage of the river Lykus;[400] where he was
obliged to halt for a while, since his men as well as their horses
were exhausted. At midnight, he again pushed forward, with such
cavalry as could follow him, to Arbêla, in hopes of capturing the
person of Darius. In this he was disappointed, though he reached
Arbêla the next day. Darius had merely passed through it, leaving an
undefended town, with his bow, shield, chariot, a large treasure,
and rich equipage, as prey to the victor. Parmenio had also occupied
without resistance the Persian camp near the field of battle,
capturing the baggage, the camels, and the elephants.[401]

[399] Arrian, iii. 15, 9.

[400] Arrian, iii. 15, 10. Curtius (iv. 16, 12-18) gives
aggravated details about the sufferings of the fugitives in
passing the river Lykus—which are probably founded on fact. But
he makes the mistake of supposing that Alexander had got as far
as this river in his first pursuit, from which he was called back
to assist Parmenio.

[401] Arrian, iii. 15, 14; Curtius, v. 1, 10.

To state anything like positive numbers of slain or prisoners, is
impossible. According to Arrian, 300,000 Persians were slain, and
many more taken prisoners. Diodorus puts the slain at 90,000, Curtius
at 40,000. The Macedonian killed were, according to Arrian, not more
than 100—according to Curtius, 300: Diodorus states the slain at
500, besides a great number of wounded.[402] The estimate of Arrian
is obviously too great on one side, and too small on the other;
but whatever may be the numerical truth, it is certain that the
prodigious army of Darius was all either killed, taken, or dispersed,
at the battle of Arbêla. No attempt to form a subsequent army ever
succeeded; we read of nothing stronger than divisions or detachments.
The miscellaneous contingents of this once mighty empire, such at
least among them as survived, dispersed to their respective homes and
could never be again mustered in mass.

[402] Arrian, iii. 15, 16; Curtius, iv. 16, 27, Diodor. xvii. 61.

The defeat of Arbêla was in fact the death blow of the Persian
empire. It converted Alexander into the Great King, and Darius into
nothing better than a fugitive pretender. Among all the causes of
the defeat—here as at Issus—the most prominent and indisputable was
the cowardice of Darius himself. Under a king deficient not merely
in the virtues of a general, but even in those of a private soldier,
and who nevertheless insisted on commanding in person—nothing
short of ruin could ensue. To those brave Persians whom he dragged
into ruin along with him and who knew the real facts, he must have
appeared as the betrayer of the empire. We shall have to recall
this state of sentiment, when we describe hereafter the conspiracy
formed by the Baktrian satrap Bessus. Nevertheless, even if Darius
had behaved with unimpeachable courage, there is little reason to
believe, that the defeat of Arbêla, much less that of Issus, could
have been converted into a victory. Mere immensity of number, even
with immensity of space, was of no efficacy without skill as well
as bravery in the commander. Three-fourths of the Persian army were
mere spectators, who did nothing, and produced absolutely no effect.
The flank movement against Alexander’s right, instead of being made
by some unemployed division, was so carried into effect, as to
distract the Baktrian troops from their place in the front line, and
thus to create a fatal break, of which Alexander availed himself
for his own formidable charge in front. In spite of amplitude of
space—the condition wanting at Issus,—the attacks of the Persians on
Alexander’s flanks and rear were feeble and inefficient. After all,
Darius relied mainly upon his front line of battle, strengthened by
the scythed chariots; these latter being found unprofitable, there
remained only the direct conflict, wherein the strong point of the
Macedonians resided.

On the other hand, in so far as we can follow the dispositions of
Alexander, they appear the most signal example recorded in antiquity,
of military genius and sagacious combination. He had really as great
an available force as his enemies, because every company in his army
was turned to account, either in actual combat, or in reserve against
definite and reasonable contingences. All his successes, and this
most of all, were fairly earned by his own genius and indefatigable
effort, combined with the admirable organization of his army. But
his good fortune was no less conspicuous in the unceasing faults
committed by his enemies. Except during the short period of Memnon’s
command, the Persian king exhibited nothing but ignorant rashness
alternating with disgraceful apathy; turning to no account his vast
real power of resistance in detail—keeping back his treasures to
become the booty of the victor—suffering the cities which stoutly
held out to perish unassisted—and committing the whole fate of
the empire on two successive occasions, to that very hazard which
Alexander most desired.

The decisive character of the victory was manifested at once by the
surrender of the two great capitals of the Persian empire—Babylon
and Susa. To Babylon, Alexander marched in person; to Susa, he sent
Philoxenus. As he approached Babylon, the satrap Mazæus met him
with the keys of the city; Bagophanes, collector of the revenue,
decorated the road of march with altars, sacrifices, and scattered
flowers; while the general Babylonian population and their Chaldæan
priests poured forth in crowds with acclamations and presents. Susa
was yielded to Philoxenus with the same readiness, as Babylon to
Alexander.[403] The sum of treasure acquired at Babylon was great:
sufficient to furnish a large donative to the troops—600 drachms
per man to the Macedonian cavalry, 500 to the foreign cavalry,
200 to the Macedonian infantry, and something less to the foreign
infantry.[404] But the treasure found and appropriated at Susa was
yet greater. It is stated at 50,000 talents[405] (= about £11,500,000
sterling), a sum which we might have deemed incredible, if we did
not find it greatly exceeded by what is subsequently reported about
the treasures in Persepolis. Of this Susian treasure four-fifths
are said to have been in uncoined gold and silver, the remainder in
golden Darics[406]; the untouched accumulations of several preceding
kings, who had husbanded them against a season of unforeseen urgency.
A moderate portion of this immense wealth, employed by Darius three
years earlier to push the operations of his fleet, subsidize able
Grecian Officers, and organize anti-Macedonian resistance—would have
preserved both his life and his crown.

[403] Arrian, iii. 16, 5-11; Diodor. xvii. 64; Curtius, v. 1,
17-20.

[404] Curtius, v. 1, 45; Diodor. xvii. 64.

[405] Arrian states this total of 50,000 talents (iii. 16. 12).

I have taken them as Attic talents; if they were Æginæan talents,
the value of them would be greater in the proportion of five to
three.

[406] Curtius, v. 2, 11; Diodor. xvii. 66.

Alexander rested his troops for more than thirty days amidst the
luxurious indulgences of Babylon. He gratified the feelings of the
population and the Chaldæan priests by solemn sacrifices to Belus,
as well as by directing that the temple of that god, and the other
temples destroyed in the preceding century by Xerxes, should be
rebuilt.[407] Treating the Persian empire now as an established
conquest, he nominated the various satraps. He confirmed the Persian
Mazæus in the satrapy of Babylon, but put along with them two Greeks
as assistants and guarantees—Apollodorus of Amphipolis, as commander
of the military force—Asklepiodorus as collector of the revenue.
He rewarded the Persian traitor Mithrines, who had surrendered at
his approach the strong citadel of Sardis, with the satrapy of
Armenia. To that of Syria and Phenicia, he appointed Menes, who took
with him 3000 talents, to be remitted to Antipater for levying new
troops against the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus.[408] The march of
Alexander from Babylon to Susa occupied twenty days; an easy route
through a country abundantly supplied. At Susa he was joined by
Amyntas son of Andromenes, with a large reinforcement of about 15,000
men—Macedonians, Greeks, and Thracians. There were both cavalry and
infantry—and what is not the least remarkable, fifty Macedonian
youths of noble family, soliciting admission into Alexander’s corps
of pages.[409] The incorporation of these new-comers into the army
afforded him the opportunity for remodelling on several points the
organization of his different divisions, the smaller as well as the
larger.[410]

[407] Arrian, iii. 16, 6-9: compare Strabo, xvi. p. 738.

[408] Arrian, iii. 16, 16; Curtius, v. 1, 44; Diodor. xvii. 64.
Curtius and Diodorus do not exactly coincide with Arrian; but the
discrepancy here is not very important.

[409] Curtius, v. 1, 42: compare Diodor. xvii. 65; Arrian, iii,
16, 18.

[410] Arrian, iii. 16, 20; Curtius, v. 2, 6; Diodor. xvii. 65.
Respecting this reorganization, begun now at Susa and carried
farther during the next year at Ekbatana, see Rüstow and Köchly,
Griechisches Kriegswesen, p. 252 _seq._

One among the changes now made was, that the divisions
of cavalry—which, having hitherto coincided with various
local districts or towns in Macedonia, had been officered
accordingly—were re-distributed and mingled together (Curtius, v.
2, 6).

After some delay at Susa—and after confirming the Persian Abulites,
who had surrendered the city, in his satrapy, yet not without two
Grecian officers as guarantees, one commanding the military force,
the other governor of the citadel—Alexander crossed the river Eulæus
or Pasitigris, and directed his march to the south-east towards
Persis proper, the ancient hearth or primitive seat from whence
the original Persian conquerors had issued.[411] Between Susa and
Persis lay a mountainous region occupied by the Uxii—rude but warlike
shepherds, to whom the Great King himself had always been obliged
to pay a tribute whenever he went from Susa to Persepolis, being
unable with his inefficient military organization to overcome the
difficulties of such a pass held by an enemy. The Uxii now demanded
the like tribute from Alexander, who replied by inviting them to
meet him at their pass and receive it. Meanwhile a new and little
frequented mountain track had been made known to him, over which he
conducted in person a detachment of troops so rapidly and secretly
as to surprise the mountaineers in their own villages. He thus not
only opened the usual mountain pass for the transit of his main army,
but so cut to pieces and humiliated the Uxii, that they were forced
to sue for pardon. Alexander was at first disposed to extirpate or
expel them; but at length, at the request of the captive Sisygambis,
permitted them to remain as subjects of the satrap of Susa, imposing
a tribute of sheep, horses, and cattle, the only payment which their
poverty allowed.[412]

[411] Arrian, iii. 17, 1. Ἄρας δὲ ἐκ Σούσων, καὶ διαβὰς τὸν
Πασιτίγρην ποταμὸν, ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὴν Οὐξίων γῆν.

The Persian Susa was situated between two rivers; the Choaspes
(now Kherkha) on the west; the Eulæus or Pasitigris, now Karun,
on the east; both rivers distinguished for excellent water. The
Eulæus appears to have been called Pasitigris in the lower part
of its course—Pliny, H. N. xxxi. 21. “Parthorum reges ex Choaspe
et Eulæo tantum bibunt.”

Ritter has given an elaborate exposition respecting these two
rivers and the site of the Persian Susa (Erdkunde, part ix. book
iii. West-Asien, p. 291-320).

[412] Arrian, iii. 17; Curtius. v. 3, 5-12; Diodor. xvii.
67; Strabo, xv. p. 729. It would seem that the road taken by
Alexander in this march, was that described by Kinneir, through
Bebahan and Kala-Sefid to Schiraz (Geographical Memoir of the
Persian Empire, p. 72). Nothing can exceed the difficulties of
the territory for military operation.

No certainty is attainable, however, respecting the ancient
geography of these regions. Mr. Long’s Map of Ancient Persia
shows how little can be made out.

But bad as the Uxian pass had been, there remained another still
worse—called the Susian or Persian gates,[413] in the mountains
which surrounded the plain of Persepolis, the centre of Persis
proper. Ariobarzanes, satrap of the province, held this pass; a
narrow defile walled across, with mountain positions on both sides,
from whence the defenders, while out of reach themselves, could
shower down missiles upon an approaching enemy. After four days of
march, Alexander reached on the fifth day the Susian Gates; which,
inexpugnable as they seemed, he attacked on the ensuing morning. In
spite of all the courage of his soldiers, however, he sustained loss
without damaging his enemy, and was obliged to return to his camp. He
was informed that there was no other track by which this difficult
pass could be turned; but there was a long circuitous march of many
days whereby it might be evaded, and another entrance found into the
plain of Persepolis. To recede from any enterprise as impracticable,
was a humiliation which Alexander had never yet endured. On farther
inquiry, a Lykian captive, who had been for many years tending sheep
as a slave on the mountains, acquainted him with the existence of a
track known only to himself, whereby he might come on the flank of
Ariobarzanes. Leaving Kraterus in command of the camp, with orders
to attack the pass in front, when he should hear the trumpet give
signal—Alexander marched forth at night at the head of a light
detachment, under the guidance of the Lykian. He had to surmount
incredible hardship and difficulty—the more so as it was mid-winter,
and the mountain was covered with snow; yet such were the efforts of
his soldiers and the rapidity of his movements, that he surprised
all the Persian outposts, and came upon Ariobarzanes altogether
unprepared. Attacked as they were at the same time by Kraterus also,
the troops of the satrap were forced to abandon the Gates, and were
for the most part cut to pieces. Many perished in their flight among
the rocks and precipices; the satrap himself being one of a few that
escaped.[414]

[413] See the instructive notes of Mützel—on Quintus Curtius, v.
10, 3; and v. 12, 17, discussing the topography of this region,
in so far as it is known from modern travellers. He supposes the
Susian Gates to have been near Kala-Sefid, west of the plain
of Merdasht or Persepolis. Herein he dissents from Ritter,
apparently on good grounds, as far as an opinion can be formed.

[414] Arrian, iii. 18, 1-14; Curtius, v. 4, 10-20; Diodor. xvii.
68.

Though the citadel of Persepolis is described as one of the strongest
of fortresses,[415] yet after this unexpected conquest of a pass
hitherto deemed inexpugnable, few had courage to think of holding it
against Alexander. Nevertheless Ariobarzanes, hastening thither from
the conquered pass, still strove to organize a defence, and at least
to carry off the regal treasure, which some in the town were already
preparing to pillage. But Tiridates, commander of the garrison,
fearing the wrath of the conqueror, resisted this, and despatched
a message entreating Alexander to hasten his march. Accordingly
Alexander, at the head of his cavalry, set forth with the utmost
speed, and arrived in time to detain and appropriate the whole.
Ariobarzanes, in a vain attempt to resist, was slain with all his
companions. Persepolis and Pasargadæ—the two peculiar capitals of the
Persian race, the latter memorable as containing the sepulchre of
Cyrus the Great—both fell into the hands of the conqueror.[416]

[415] Diodor. xvii. 71.

[416] Arrian, iii. 18, 16; Curtius, v. 4, 5; Diodor. xvii. 69.

On approaching Persepolis, the compassion of the army was powerfully
moved by the sight of about 800 Grecian captives, all of them
mutilated in some frightful and distressing way, by loss of legs,
arms, eyes, ears, or some other bodily members. Mutilation was a
punishment commonly inflicted in that age by Oriental governors, even
by such as were not accounted cruel. Thus Xenophon, in eulogizing
the rigid justice of Cyrus the younger, remarks that in the public
roads of his satrapy, men were often seen who had been deprived of
their arms or legs, or otherwise mutilated, by penal authority.[417]
Many of these maimed captives at Persepolis were old, and had lived
for years in their unfortunate condition. They had been brought up
from various Greek cities by order of some of the preceding Persian
kings; but on what pretences they had been thus cruelly dealt with,
we are not informed. Alexander, moved to tears at such a spectacle,
offered to restore them to their respective homes, with a comfortable
provision for the future. But most of them felt so ashamed of
returning to their homes, that they entreated to be allowed to
remain all together in Persis, with lands assigned to them, and with
dependent cultivators to raise produce for them. Alexander granted
their request in the fullest measure, conferring besides upon each an
ample donation of money, clothing, and cattle.[418]

[417] Xenoph. Anabas. i. 9, 13. Similar habits have always
prevailed among Orientals. “The most atrocious part of the
Mohammedan system of punishment, is, that which regards theft and
robbery. Mutilation, by cutting off the hand or the foot, is the
prescribed remedy for all higher degrees of the offence” (Mill,
History of British India, book iii. ch. 5. p. 447).

“Tippoo Saib used to cut off the right hands and noses of the
British camp-followers that fell into his hands” (Elphinstone,
Hist. of India, vol. i. p. 380. ch. xi.).

A recent traveller notices the many mutilated persons, female as
well as male, who are to be seen in the northern part of Scinde
(Burton, Scenes in Scinde, vol. ii. p. 281).

[418] Diodor. xvii. 69; Curtius, v. 5; Justin, xi. 14. Arrian
does not mention these mutilated captives; but I see no reason
to mistrust the deposition of the three authors by whom it is
certified. Curtius talks of 4000 captives; the other two mention
800. Diodorus calls them —Ἕλληνες ὑπὸ τῶν πρότερον βασιλέων
ἀνάστατοι γεγονότες, ὀκτακόσιοι μὲν σχεδὸν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντες,
ταῖς δ᾽ ἡλικίαις οἱ πλεῖστοι μὲν γεγηρακότες, ἠκρωτηριασμένοι δὲ
πάντες, etc. Some ἀνάρπαστοι πρὸς βασιλέα διὰ σοφίαν are noticed
in Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 33; compare Herodot. iii. 93; iv. 204. I
have already mentioned the mutilation of the Macedonian invalids,
taken at Issus by Darius.

Probably these Greek captives were mingled with a number of
other captives, Asiatics and others, who had been treated in the
same manner. None but the Greek captives would be likely to show
themselves to Alexander and his army, because none but they would
calculate on obtaining sympathy from an army of Macedonians and
Greeks. It would have been interesting to know who these captives
were, or how they came to be thus cruelly used. The two persons
among them, named by Curtius as spokesmen in the interview with
Alexander, are—Euktemon, a Kymæan—and Theætêtus, an Athenian.

The sight of these mutilated Greeks was well calculated to excite
not merely sympathy for them, but rage against the Persians, in
the bosoms of all spectators. Alexander seized this opportunity,
as well for satiating the anger and cupidity of his soldiers, as
for manifesting himself in his self-assumed character of avenger of
Greece against the Persians, to punish the wrongs done by Xerxes a
century and a half before. He was now amidst the native tribes and
seats of the Persians, the descendants of those rude warriors who,
under the first Cyrus, had overspread Western Asia from the Indus
to the Ægean. In this their home the Persian kings had accumulated
their national edifices, their regal sepulchres, the inscriptions
commemorative of their religious or legendary sentiment, with many
trophies and acquisitions arising out of their conquests. For the
purposes of the Great King’s empire, Babylon, or Susa, or Ekbatana,
were more central and convenient residences; but Persepolis was
still regarded as the heart of Persian nationality. It was the chief
magazine, though not the only one, of those annual accumulations
from the imperial revenue, which each king successively increased,
and which none seems to have ever diminished. Moreover, the Persian
grandees and officers, who held the lucrative satrapies and posts
of the empire, were continually sending wealth home to Persis, for
themselves or their relatives. We may therefore reasonably believe
what we find asserted, that Persepolis possessed at this time more
wealth, public and private, than any place within the range of
Grecian or Macedonian knowledge.[419]

[419] Diodor. xvii. 70. πλουσιωτάτης οὔσης τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν ἥλιον,
etc. Curtius, v. 6, 2, 3.

Convening his principal officers, Alexander denounced Persepolis as
the most hostile of all Asiatic cities,—the home of those impious
invaders of Greece, whom he had come to attack. He proclaimed his
intention of abandoning it to be plundered, as well as of burning
the citadel. In this resolution he persisted, notwithstanding the
remonstrance of Parmenio, who reminded him that the act would
be a mere injury to himself by ruining his own property, and
that the Asiatics would construe it as evidence of an intention
to retire speedily, without founding any permanent dominion in
the country.[420] After appropriating the regal treasure—to the
alleged amount of 120,000 talents in gold and silver = £27,600,000
sterling[421]—Alexander set fire to the citadel. A host of mules,
with 5000 camels, were sent for from Mesopotamia and elsewhere, to
carry off this prodigious treasure; the whole of which was conveyed
out of Persis proper, partly to be taken along with Alexander
himself in his ulterior marches, partly to be lodged in Susa and
Ekbatana. Six thousand talents more, found in Pasargadæ, were added
to the spoil.[422] The persons and property of the inhabitants were
abandoned to the license of the soldiers, who obtained an immense
booty, not merely in gold and silver, but also in rich clothing,
furniture, and ostentatious ornaments of every kind. The male
inhabitants were slain,[423] the females dragged into servitude;
except such as obtained safety by flight, or burned themselves with
their property in their own houses. Among the soldiers themselves,
much angry scrambling took place for the possession of precious
articles, not without occasional bloodshed.[424] As soon as their
ferocity and cupidity had been satiated, Alexander arrested the
massacre. His encouragement and sanction of it was not a burst of
transient fury, provoked by unexpected length of resistance, such
as the hanging of the 2000 Tyrians and the dragging of Batis at
Gaza—but a deliberate proceeding, intended partly as a recompense
and gratification to the soldiery, but still more as an imposing
manifestation of retributive vengeance against the descendants of
the ancient Persian invaders. In his own letters seen by Plutarch,
Alexander described the massacre of the native Persians as having
been ordered by him on grounds of state policy.[425]

[420] Arrian, iii. 18, 18; Diodor. xvii. 70; Curtius, v. 6, 1;
Strabo, xv. p. 731.

[421] This amount is given both by Diodorus (xvii. 71) and by
Curtius (v. 6, 9). We see however from Strabo that there were
different statements as to the amount. Such overwhelming figures
deserve no confidence upon any evidence short of an official
return. At the same time, we ought to expect a very great sum,
considering the long series of years that had been spent in
amassing it. Alexander’s own letters (Plutarch, Alex. 37) stated
that enough was carried away to load 10,000 mule carts and 5000
camels.

To explain the fact, of a large accumulated treasure in the
Persian capitals, it must be remarked, that what we are
accustomed to consider as expenses of government, were not
defrayed out of the regal treasure. The military force, speaking
generally, was not paid by the Great King, but summoned
by requisition from the provinces, upon which the cost of
maintaining the soldiers fell, over and above the ordinary
tribute. The king’s numerous servants and attendants received no
pay in money, but in kind; provisions for maintaining the court
with its retinue were furnished by the provinces, over and above
the tribute. See Herodot. i. 192; and iii. 91—and a good passage
of Heeren, setting forth the small public disbursement out of
the regal treasure, in his account of the internal constitution
of the ancient Persian Empire (Ideen über die Politik and den
Verkehr der Völker der alten Welt, part i. Abth. 1. p. 511-519).

Respecting modern Persia, Jaubert remarks (Voyage en Arménie
et en Perse, Paris, 1821, p. 272, ch. 30)—“Si les sommes que
l’on verse dans le trésor du Shah ne sont pas exorbitantes,
comparativement à l’étendue et à la population de la Perse, elles
n’en sortent pas non plus que pour des dépenses indispensables
qui n’en absorbent pas la moitié. Le reste est converti en
lingots, en pierreries, et en divers objets d’une grande valeur
et d’un transport facile en cas d’évènement: ce qui doit suffire
pour empêcher qu’on ne trouve exagérés les rapports que tous les
voyageurs ont faits de la magnificence de la cour de Perse. Les
Perses sont assez clairvoyans pour pénétrer les motifs réels qui
portent Futteh Ali Shah à thésauriser.”

When Nadir-Shah conquered the Mogul Emperor Mohammed, and
entered Delhi in 1739,—the imperial treasure and effects which
fell into his hands is said to have amounted to £32,000,000
sterling, besides heavy contributions levied on the inhabitants
(Mill, History of British India, vol. ii, B. iii, ch. 4, p.
403).—Runjeet Sing left at his death (1839) a treasure of
£8,000,000 sterling: with jewels and other effects to several
millions more. [The Punjaub, by Col. Steinbach, p. 16. London,
1845].

Mr. Mill remarks in another place, that “in Hindostan, gold,
silver, and gems are most commonly hoarded, and not devoted to
production” (vol. i, p. 254, B. ii. ch. 5).

Herodotus (iii. 96) tells us that the gold and silver brought
to the Persian regal treasure was poured in a melted state
into earthern vessels; when it cooled, the earthern vessel was
withdrawn, and the solid metallic mass left standing; a portion
of it was cut off when occasion required for disbursements. This
practice warrants the supposition that a large portion of it was
habitually accumulated, and not expended.

[422] Arrian, iii. 18, 17. He does not give the amount which I
transcribe from Curtius, v. 6, 10.

[423] Diodor. xvii. 70. Οἱ Μακεδόνες ἐπῄεσαν, τοὺς μὲν ἄνδρας
πάντας φονεύοντες, τὰς δὲ κτήσεις διαρπάζοντες, etc. Curtius, v.
6, 6.

[424] Diodor. xvii. 70, 71; Curtius, v. 6, 3-7. These two authors
concur in the main features of the massacre and plunder in
Persepolis, permitted to the soldiers of Alexander. Arrian does
not mention it; he mentions only the deliberate resolution of
Alexander to burn the palace or citadel, out of revenge on the
Persian name. And such feeling, assuming it to exist, would also
naturally dictate the general license to plunder and massacre.
Himself entertaining such vindictive feeling, and regarding it
as legitimate, Alexander would either presume it to exist, or
love to kindle it, in his soldiers; by whom indeed the license
to plunder would be sufficiently welcomed, with or without any
antecedent sentiment of vengeance.

The story (told by Diodorus, Curtius, and Plutarch, Alex. 38)
that Alexander, in the drunkenness of a banquet, was first
instigated by the courtesan Thais to set fire to the palace of
Persepolis, and accompanied her to begin the conflagration with
his own hand—may perhaps be so far true, that he really showed
himself in the scene and helped in the burning. But that his
resolution to burn was deliberately taken, and even maintained
against the opposition of esteemed officers, is established on
the authority of Arrian.

[425] Plutarch, Alexand. 37. Φόνον μὲν οὖν ἐνταῦθα πολὺν τῶν
ἁλισκομένων γενέσθαι συνέπεσε· ~γράφει γὰρ αὐτὸς, ὡς νομίζων
αὐτῷ τοῦτο λυσιτελεῖν ἐκέλευεν ἀποσφάττεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους~·
νομίσματος δὲ εὑρεῖν πλῆθος ὅσον ἐν Σούσοις, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην
κατασκευὴν καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐκκομισθῆναί φησι μυρίοις ὀρικοῖς
ζεύγεσι, καὶ πεντακισχιλίαις καμήλοις. That ἐνταῦθα means
Persepolis, is shown by the immediately following comparison with
the treasure found at Susa.

As it was now winter or very early spring, he suffered his main
army to enjoy a month or more of repose at or near Persepolis. But
he himself, at the head of a rapidly moving division, traversed the
interior of Persia proper; conquering or receiving into submission
the various towns and villages.[426] The greatest resistance which
he experienced was offered by the rude and warlike tribe called
the Mardi; but worse than any enemy was the severity of the season
and the rugged destitution of a frozen country. Neither physical
difficulties, however, nor human enemies, could arrest the march
of Alexander. He returned from his expedition, complete master of
Persis; and in the spring, quitted that province with his whole
army, to follow Darius into Media. He left only a garrison of
3000 Macedonians at Persepolis, preserving to Tiridates, who had
surrendered to him the place, the title of satrap.[427]

[426] Diod. xvii. 73; Curtius, v. 6, 12-20.

[427] Curtius, v. 6, 11.

Darius was now a fugitive, with the mere title of king, and with a
simple body-guard rather than an army. On leaving Arbêla after the
defeat, he had struck in an easterly direction across the mountains
into Media; having only a few attendants round him, and thinking
himself too happy to preserve his own life from an indefatigable
pursuer.[428] He calculated that, once across these mountains,
Alexander would leave him for a time unmolested, in haste to march
southward for the purpose of appropriating the great and real prizes
of the campaign—Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis. The last struggles of
this ill-starred prince will be recounted in another chapter.

[428] Arrian, iii. 16, 1-4.

CHAPTER XCIV.

MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CONQUESTS OF ALEXANDER, AFTER HIS
WINTER-QUARTERS IN PERSIS, DOWN TO HIS DEATH AT BABYLON.

From this time forward to the close of Alexander’s life—a period of
about seven years—his time was spent in conquering the eastern half
of the Persian empire, together with various independent tribes lying
beyond its extreme boundary. But neither Greece, nor Asia Minor, nor
any of his previous western acquisitions, was he ever destined to see
again.

Now, in regard to the history of Greece—the subject of these
volumes—the first portion of Alexander’s Asiatic campaigns (from
his crossing the Hellespont to the conquest of Persis, a period of
four years, March 334 B. C., to March 330 B. C.), though not of
direct bearing, is yet of material importance. Having in his first
year completed the subjugation of the Hellenic world, he had by
these subsequent campaigns absorbed it as a small fraction into the
vast Persian empire, renovated under his imperial sceptre. He had
accomplished a result substantially the same as would have been
brought about if the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, destined, a
century and a half before, to incorporate Greece with the Persian
monarchy, had succeeded instead of failing.[429] Towards the kings of
Macedonia alone, the subjugation of Greece would never have become
complete, so long as she could receive help from the native Persian
kings, who were perfectly adequate as a countervailing and tutelary
force, had they known how to play their game. But all hope for Greece
from without was extinguished, when Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis
became subject to the same ruler as Pella and Amphipolis—and that
ruler too, the ablest general, and most insatiate aggressor, of
his age; to whose name was attached the prestige of success almost
superhuman. Still, against even this overwhelming power, some of the
bravest of the Greeks at home tried to achieve their liberation with
the sword: we shall see presently how sadly the attempt miscarried.

[429] Compare the language addressed by Alexander to his weary
soldiers, on the banks of the Hyphasis (Arrian, v. 26), with that
which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Xerxes, when announcing
his intended expedition against Greece (Herodot. vii. 8).

But though the first four years of Alexander’s Asiatic expedition,
in which he conquered the Western half of the Persian empire, had
thus an important effect on the condition and destinies of the
Grecian cities—his last seven years, on which we are now about to
enter, employed chiefly in conquering the Eastern half, scarcely
touched these cities in any way. The stupendous marches to the rivers
Jaxartes, Indus, and Hyphasis, which carried his victorious arms
over so wide a space of Central Asia, not only added nothing to his
power over the Greeks, but even withdrew him from all dealings with
them, and placed him almost beyond their cognizance. To the historian
of Greece, therefore, these latter campaigns can hardly be regarded
as included within the range of his subject. They deserve to be
told, as examples of military skill and energy, and as illustrating
the character of the most illustrious general of antiquity—one who,
though not a Greek, had become the master of all Greeks. But I shall
not think it necessary to recount them in any detail, like the
battles of Issus and Arbêla.

About six or seven months had elapsed from the battle of Arbêla
to the time when Alexander prepared to quit his most recent
conquest—Persis proper. During all this time, Darius had remained
at Ekbatana,[430] the chief city of Media, clinging to the hope,
that Alexander, when possessed of the three southern capitals and
the best part of the Persian empire, might have reached the point of
satiation, and might leave him unmolested in the more barren East. As
soon as he learnt that Alexander was in movement towards him, he sent
forward his harem and his baggage to Hyrkania, on the south-eastern
border of the Caspian sea. Himself, with the small force around him,
followed in the same direction, carrying off the treasure in the city
(7000 talents= £1,610,000 in amount), and passed through the Caspian
Grates into the territory of Parthyênê. His only chance was to escape
to Baktria at the eastern extremity of the empire, ruining the
country in his way for the purpose of retarding pursuers. But this
chance diminished every day, from desertion among his few followers,
and angry disgust among many who remained.[431]

[430] I see no reason for doubting that the Ekbatana here meant
is the modern Hamadan. See a valuable Appendix added by Dr.
Thirlwall to the sixth volume of his History of Greece, in which
this question is argued against Mr. Williams.

Sir John Malcolm observes—“There can hardly be said to be any
roads in Persia; nor are they much required, for the use of wheel
carriages has not yet been introduced into that kingdom. Nothing
can be more rugged and difficult than the paths which have been
cut over the mountains by which it is bounded and intersected”
(ch. xxiv. vol. ii. p. 525).

In this respect, indeed, as in others, the modern state of Persia
must be inferior to the ancient; witness the description given by
Herodotus of the road between Sardis and Susa.

[431] Arrian, iii. 19, 2-9; iii. 20, 3.

Eight days after Darius had quitted Ekbatana, Alexander entered it.
How many days had been occupied in his march from Persepolis, we
cannot say: in itself a long march, it had been farther prolonged,
partly by the necessity of subduing the intervening mountaineers
called Parætakeni,[432] partly by rumors exaggerating the Persian
force at Ekbatana, and inducing him to advance with precaution and
regular array. Possessed of Ekbatana—the last capital stronghold of
the Persian kings, and their ordinary residence during the summer
months—he halted to rest his troops, and establish a new base of
operations for his future proceedings eastward. He made Ekbatana
his principal depôt; depositing in the citadel, under the care of
Harpalus as treasurer, with a garrison of 6000 or 7000 Macedonians,
the accumulated treasures of his past conquests, out of Susa and
Persepolis; amounting, we are told, to the enormous sum of 180,000
talents = £41,400,000 sterling.[433] Parmenio was invested with the
chief command of this important post, and of the military force
left in Media; of which territory Oxodates, a Persian who had been
imprisoned at Susa by Darius, was named satrap.[434]

[432] Arrian, iii. 19, 5.

[433] Arrian, iii. 19, 14; Diodor. xvii. 80. Diodorus had before
stated (xvii. 66, 71) the treasure in Susa as being 49,000
talents, and that in Persepolis as 120,000. Arrian announces the
treasure in Susa as 50,000 talents—Curtius gives the uncoined
gold and silver alone as 50,000 talents (v. 8, 11). The treasure
of both places was transported to Ekbatana.

[434] Arrian, iii. 20, 4.

At Ekbatana Alexander was joined by a fresh force of 6000 Grecian
mercenaries,[435] who had marched from Kilikia into the interior,
probably crossing the Euphrates and Tigris at the same points as
Alexander himself had crossed. Hence he was enabled the better to
dismiss his Thessalian cavalry, with other Greeks who had been
serving during his four years of Asiatic war, and who now wished to
go home.[436] He distributed among them the sum of 2000 talents in
addition to their full pay, and gave them the price of their horses,
which they sold before departure. The operations which he was now
about to commence against the eastern territories of Persia were
not against regular armies, but against flying corps and distinct
native tribes, relying for defence chiefly on the difficulties which
mountains, deserts, privation, or mere distance, would throw in the
way of an assailant. For these purposes he required an increased
number of light troops, and was obliged to impose even upon his
heavy-armed cavalry the most rapid and fatiguing marches, such
as none but his Macedonian Companions would have been contented
to execute; moreover he was called upon to act less with large
masses, and more with small and broken divisions. He now therefore
for the first time established a regular Taxis, or division of
horse-bowmen.[437]

[435] Curtius, v. 23, 12.

[436] Arrian, iii. 19, 10: compare v. 27, 7.

[437] Arrian, iii. 24, 1. ἤδη γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ἱππακοντισταὶ ἦσαν
τάξις.

See the remarks of Rüstow and Köchly upon the change made by
Alexander in his military organization about this period, as soon
as he found that there was no farther chance of a large collected
Persian force, able to meet him in the field (Geschichte des
Griech. Kriegswesens, p. 252 _seq._).

The change which they point out was real,—but I think they
exaggerate it in degree.

Remaining at Ekbatana no longer than was sufficient for these new
arrangements, Alexander recommenced his pursuit of Darius. He hoped
to get before Darius to the Caspian Gates, at the north-eastern
extremity of Media; by which Gates[438] was understood a
mountain-pass, or rather a road of many hours’ march, including
several difficult passes stretching eastward along the southern
side of the great range of Taurus towards Parthia. He marched with
his Companion-cavalry, the light-horse, the Agrianians, and the
bowmen—the greater part of the phalanx keeping up as well as it
could—to Rhagæ, about fifty miles north of the Caspian Gates; which
town he reached in eleven days, by exertions so severe that many men
as well as horses were disabled on the road. But in spite of all
speed, he learnt that Darius had already passed through the Caspian
Gates. After five days of halt at Rhagæ, indispensable for his army,
Alexander passed them also. A day’s march on the other side of them,
he was joined by two eminent Persians, Bagistanes and Antibêlus, who
informed him that Darius was already dethroned and in imminent danger
of losing his life.[439]

[438] The passes called the Caspian Gates appear to be those
described by Morier, Fraser, and other modern travellers, as the
series of narrow valleys and defiles called Ser-Desch, Sirdari,
or Serdara Kahn,—on the southernmost of the two roads which
lead eastward from Teheran towards Damaghan, and thence farther
eastward towards Mesched and Herat. See the note of Mützel in his
edition of Curtius, v. 35, 2, p. 489; also Morier, Second Journey
through Persia, p. 363; Fraser’s Narrative of a Journey into
Khorasan, p. 291.

The long range of mountains, called by the ancients Taurus,
extends from Lesser Media and Armenia in an easterly direction
along the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. Its northern
declivity, covered by prodigious forests with valleys and
plains of no great breadth reaching to the Caspian, comprehends
the moist and fertile territories now denominated Ghilan and
Mazanderan. The eastern portion of Mazanderan was known in
ancient times as Hyrkania, then productive and populous; while
the mountain range itself was occupied by various rude and
warlike tribes—Kadusii, Mardi, Tapyri, etc. The mountain range,
now called Elburz, includes among other lofty eminences the very
high peak of Demavend.

The road from Ekbatana to Baktra, along which both the flight of
Darius and the pursuit of Alexander lay, passed along the broken
ground skirting the southern flank of the mountain range Elburz.
Of this broken ground the Caspian Gates formed the worst and most
difficult portion.

[439] Arrian, iii. 20, 21.

The conspirators by whom this had been done, were Bessus, satrap
of Baktria—Barsaentes, satrap of Drangiana and Arachosia—and
Nabarzanes, general of the regal guards. The small force of Darius
having been thinned by daily desertion, most of those who remained
were the contingents of the still unconquered territories, Baktria,
Arachosia, and Drangiana, under the orders of their respective
satraps. The Grecian mercenaries, 1500 in number, and Artabazus,
with a band under his special command, adhered inflexibly to Darius,
but the soldiers of Eastern Asia followed their own satraps. Bessus
and his colleagues intended to make their peace with Alexander by
surrendering Darius, should Alexander pursue so vigorously as to
leave them no hope of escape; but if they could obtain time to
reach Baktria and Sogdiana, they resolved to organize an energetic
resistance, under their own joint command, for the defence of those
eastern provinces—the most warlike population of the empire.[440]
Under the desperate circumstances of the case, this plan was perhaps
the least unpromising that could be proposed. The chance of resisting
Alexander, small as it was at the best, became absolutely nothing
under the command of Darius, who had twice set the example of flight
from the field of battle, betraying both his friends and his empire,
even when surrounded by the full force of Persia. For brave and
energetic Persians, unless they were prepared at once to submit to
the invader, there was no choice but to set aside Darius; nor does
it appear that the conspirators intended at first anything worse.
At a village called Thara in Parthia, they bound him in chains of
gold—placed him in a covered chariot surrounded by the Baktrian
troops,—and thus carried him onward, retreating as fast as they
could; Bessus assuming the command. Artabazus, with the Grecian
mercenaries, too feeble to prevent the proceeding, quitted the army
in disgust, and sought refuge among the mountains of the Tapuri
bordering on Hyrkania towards the Caspian Sea.[441]

[440] Masistes, after the shocking outrage upon his wife by Queen
Amestris, was going to Baktria to organize a revolt: see Herodot.
ix. 113—about the importance of that satrapy.

[441] Arrian, iii. 21-23. Justin (xi. 15) specifies the name
of the place—Thara. Both he and Curtius mention the _golden
chain_ (Curtius, 34, 20). Probably the conspirators made use
of some chains which had formed a part of the ornaments of
the royal wardrobe. Among the presents given by Darius son
of Hystaspes to the surgeon Demokedes, there were two pairs
of golden chains—Δωρέεται δή μιν Δαρεῖος πεδέων χρυσέων δύο
ζεύγεσιν—Herodot. iii. 130: compare iii. 15. The Persian king and
grandees habitually wore golden chains round neck and arms.

On hearing this intelligence, Alexander strained every nerve to
overtake the fugitives and get possession of the person of Darius.
At the head of his Companion-cavalry, his light-horse, and a body of
infantry picked out for their strength and activity, he put himself
in instant march, with nothing but arms and two days’ provisions
for each man; leaving Kraterus to bring on the main body by easier
journeys. A forced march of two nights and one day, interrupted only
by a short midday repose (it was now the month of July), brought him
at daybreak to the Persian camp which his informant Bagistanes had
quitted. But Bessus and his troops were already beyond it, having
made considerable advance in their flight; upon which Alexander,
notwithstanding the exhaustion both of men and horses, pushed on
with increased speed through all the night to the ensuing day at
noon. He there found himself in the village where Bessus had encamped
on the preceding day. Yet learning from deserters that his enemies
had resolved to hasten their retreat by night marches, he despaired
of overtaking them, unless he could find some shorter road. He
was informed that there was another shorter, but leading through
a waterless desert. Setting out by this road late in the day with
his cavalry, he got over no less than forty-five miles during the
night, so as to come on Bessus by complete surprise on the following
morning. The Persians, marching in disorder without arms, and having
no expectation of an enemy, were so panic-struck at the sudden
appearance of their indefatigable conqueror, that they dispersed and
fled without any attempt to resist. In this critical moment, Bessus
and Barsaentes urged Darius to leave his chariot, mount his horse,
and accompany them in their flight. But he refused to comply. They
were determined however that he should not fall alive into the hands
of Alexander, whereby his name would have been employed against them,
and would have materially lessened their chance of defending the
eastern provinces; they were moreover incensed by his refusal, and
had contracted a feeling of hatred and contempt to which they were
glad to give effect. Casting their javelins at him, they left him
mortally wounded, and then pursued their flight.[442] His chariot,
not distinguished by any visible mark, nor known even to the Persian
soldiers themselves, was for some time not detected by the pursuers.
At length a Macedonian soldier named Polystratus found him expiring,
and is said to have received his last words; wherein he expressed
thanks to Alexander for the kind treatment of his captive female
relatives, and satisfaction that the Persian throne, lost to himself,
was about to pass to so generous a conqueror. It is at least certain
that he never lived to see Alexander himself.[443]

[442]

“Rarus apud Medos regum cruor; unaque cuncto
Pœna manet generi; quamvis crudelibus æque
Paretur dominis.” (Claudian. in Eutrop. ii. p. 478.)

Court conspiracies and assassinations of the prince, however were
not unknown either among the Achæmenidæ or the Arsakidæ.

[443] This account of the remarkable incidents immediately
preceding the death of Darius, is taken mainly from Arrian (iii.
21), and seems one of the most authentic chapters of his work.
He is very sparing in telling what passed in the Persian camp;
he mentions indeed only the communications made by the Persian
deserters to Alexander.

Curtius (v. 27-34) gives the narrative far more vaguely and
loosely than Arrian, but with ample details of what was going on
in the Persian camp. We should have been glad to know from whom
these details were borrowed. In the main they do not contradict
the narrative of Arrian, but rather amplify and dilute it.

Diodorus (xvii. 73), Plutarch (Alexand. 42, 43), and Justin (xi.
15) give no new information.

Alexander had made the prodigious and indefatigable marches of the
last four days, not without destruction to many men and horses, for
the express purpose of taking Darius alive. It would have been a
gratification to his vanity to exhibit the Great King as a helpless
captive, rescued from his own servants by the sword of his enemy, and
spared to occupy some subordinate command as a token of ostentatious
indulgence. Moreover, apart from such feelings, it would have been a
point of real advantage to seize the person of Darius, by means of
whose name Alexander would have been enabled to stifle all farther
resistance in the extensive and imperfectly known regions eastward of
the Caspian Gates. The satraps of these regions had now gone thither
with their hands free, to kindle as much Asiatic sentiment and levy
as large a force as they could, against the Macedonian conqueror; who
was obliged to follow them, if he wished to complete the subjugation
of the empire. We can understand therefore that Alexander was deeply
mortified in deriving no result from this ruinously fatiguing march,
and can the better explain that savage wrath which we shall hereafter
find him manifesting against the satrap Bessus.

Alexander caused the body of Darius to be buried with full pomp
and ceremonial, in the regal sepulchres of Persis. The last days
of this unfortunate prince have been described with almost tragic
pathos by historians; and there are few subjects in history better
calculated to excite such a feeling, if we regard simply the
magnitude of his fall, from the highest pitch of power and splendor
to defeat, degradation, and assassination. But an impartial review
will not allow us to forget that the main cause of such ruin was
his own blindness—his long apathy after the battle of Issus, and
abandonment of Tyre and Gaza, in the fond hope of repurchasing queens
whom he had himself exposed to captivity—lastly, what is still less
pardonable, his personal cowardice in both the two decisive battles
deliberately brought about by himself. If we follow his conduct
throughout the struggle, we shall find little of that which renders
a defeated prince either respectable or interesting. Those who had
the greatest reason to denounce and despise him were his friends
and his countrymen, whom he possessed ample means of defending, yet
threw those means away. On the other hand, no one had better grounds
for indulgence towards him than his conqueror; for whom he had kept
unused the countless treasures of the three capitals, and for whom he
had lightened in every way the difficulties of a conquest, in itself
hardly less than impracticable.[444]

[444] Arrian (iii. 22) gives an indulgent criticism on Darius,
dwelling chiefly upon his misfortunes, but calling him ἀνδρὶ τὰ
μὲν πολέμια, εἴπερ τινὶ ἄλλῳ, μαλθακῷ τε καὶ οὐ φρενήρει, etc.

The recent forced march, undertaken by Alexander for the purpose of
securing Darius as a captive, had been distressing in the extreme
to his soldiers, who required a certain period of repose and
compensation. This was granted to them at the town of Hekatompylus
in Parthia, where the whole army was again united. Besides abundant
supplies from the neighboring region, the soldiers here received
a donative derived from the large booty taken in the camp of
Darius.[445] In the enjoyment and revelry universal throughout the
army, Alexander himself partook. His indulgences in the banquet
and in wine-drinking, to which he was always addicted when leisure
allowed were now unusually multiplied and prolonged. Public
solemnities were celebrated, together with theatrical exhibitions
by artists who joined the army from Greece. But the change of most
importance in Alexander’s conduct was, that he now began to feel
and act manifestly as successor of Darius on the Persian throne;
to disdain the comparative simplicity of Macedonian habits, and to
assume the pomp, the ostentatious apparatus of luxuries, and even the
dress, of a Persian king.

[445] Curtius, vi. 5, 10; vi. 6, 15. Diodor. xvii. 74.
Hekatompylus was an important position, where several roads
joined (Polyb. x. 28). It was situated on one of the roads
running eastward from the Caspian Gates, on the southern flank
of Mount Taurus (Elburz). Its locality cannot be fixed with
certainty: Ritter (Erdkunde, part viii. 465, 467) with others
conceives it to have been near Damaghan; Forbiger (Handbuch der
Alten Geographie, vol. ii. p. 549) places it further eastward,
near Jai-Jerm. Mr. Long notes it on his map, as _site unknown_.

To many of Alexander’s soldiers, the conquest of Persia appeared
to be consummated and the war finished, by the death of Darius.
They were reluctant to exchange the repose and enjoyments of
Hekatompylus for fresh fatigues; but Alexander, assembling the
select regiments, addressed to them an emphatic appeal which revived
the ardor of all.[446] His first march was, across one of the
passes from the south to the north of Mount Elburz, into Hyrkania,
the region bordering the south-eastern corner of the Caspian Sea.
Here he found no resistance; the Hyrkanian satrap Phrataphernes,
together with Nabarzanes, Artabazus, and other eminent Persians,
surrendered themselves to him, and were favorably received. The Greek
mercenaries, 1500 in number, who had served with Darius, but had
retired when that monarch was placed under arrest by Bessus, sent
envoys requesting to be allowed to surrender on capitulation. But
Alexander—reproaching them with guilt for having taken service with
the Persians, in contravention of the vote passed by the Hellenic
synod—required them to surrender at discretion; which they expressed
their readiness to do, praying that an officer might be despatched
to conduct them to him in safety.[447] The Macedonian Andronikus
was sent for this purpose, while Alexander undertook an expedition
into the mountains of the Mardi; a name seemingly borne by several
distinct tribes in parts remote from each other, but all poor and
brave mountaineers. These Mardi occupied parts of the northern
slope of the range of Mount Elburz a few miles from the Caspian Sea
(Mazanderan and Ghilan). Alexander pursued them into all their
retreats,—overcame them, when they stood on their defence, with great
slaughter,—and reduced the remnant of the half-destroyed tribes to
sue for peace.[448]

[446] This was attested by his own letters to Antipater, which
Plutarch had seen (Plutarch, Alexand. 47). Curtius composes a
long speech for Alexander (vi. 7, 9).

[447] Arrian, iii. 23, 15.

[448] Arrian, iii. 24, 4. In reference to the mountain
tribes called Mardi, who are mentioned in several different
localities—on the parts of Mount Taurus south of the Caspian,
in Armenia, on Mount Zagros, and in Persis proper (see Strabo,
xi. p. 508-523; Herodot. i. 125), we may note, that the Nomadic
tribes, who constitute a considerable fraction of the population
of the modern Persian Empire, are at this day found under the
same name in spots widely distant: see Jaubert, Voyage en Arménie
et en Perse, p. 254.

From this march, which had carried him in a westerly direction,
he returned to Hyrkania. At the first halt he was met by the
Grecian mercenaries who came to surrender themselves, as well as by
various Grecian envoys from Sparta, Chalkedon, and Sinôpe, who had
accompanied Darius in his flight. Alexander put the Lacedæmonians
under arrest, but liberated the other envoys, considering Chalkedon
and Sinôpe to have been subjects of Darius, not members of the
Hellenic synod. As to the mercenaries, he made a distinction between
those who had enlisted in the Persian service before the recognition
of Philip as leader of Greece—and those whose enlistment had been of
later date. The former he liberated at once; the latter he required
to remain in his service under the command of Andronikus, on the
same pay as they had hitherto received.[449] Such was the untoward
conclusion of Grecian mercenary service with Persia; a system whereby
the Persian monarchs, had they known how to employ it with tolerable
ability, might well have maintained their empire even against such an
enemy as Alexander.[450]

[449] Arrian, iii. 24, 8; Curtius, vi. 5, 9. An Athenian officer
named Demokrates slew himself in despair, disdaining to surrender.

[450] See a curious passage on this subject, at the end of the
Cyropædia of Xenophon.

After fifteen days of repose and festivity at Zeudracarta, the chief
town of Hyrkania, Alexander marched eastward with his united army
through Parthia into Aria—the region adjoining the modern Herat with
its river now known as Herirood. Satibarzanes, the satrap of Aria,
came to him near the border, to a town named Susia,[451] submitted,
and was allowed to retain his satrapy; while Alexander, merely
skirting the northern border of Aria, marched in a direction nearly
east towards Baktria against the satrap Bessus, who was reported as
having proclaimed himself King of Persia. But it was discovered,
after three or four days, that Satibarzanes was in league with
Bessus; upon which Alexander suspended for the present his plans
against Baktria, and turned by forced marches to Artakoana, the
chief city of Aria.[452] His return was so unexpectedly rapid, that
the Arians were overawed, and Satibarzanes was obliged to escape. A
few days enabled him to crush the disaffected Arians and to await
the arrival of his rear division under Kraterus. He then marched
southward into the territory of the Drangi, or Drangiana (the modern
Seiestan), where he found no resistance—the satrap Barsaentes having
sought safety among some of the Indians.[453]

[451] Arrian, iii. 25, 3-8. Droysen and Dr. Thirlwall identify
Susia with the town now called Tûs or Toos, a few miles
north-west of Mesched. Professor Wilson (Ariana Antiqua, p.
177) thinks that this is too much to the west, and too far from
Herat: he conceives Susia to be Zuzan, on the desert side of the
mountains west of Herat. Mr. Prinsep (notes on the historical
results deducible from discoveries in Afghanistan, p. 14)
places it at Subzawar, south of Herat, and within the region of
fertility.

Tûs seems to lie in the line of Alexander’s march, more than
the other two places indicated; Subzawar is too far to the
south. Alexander appears to have first directed his march from
Parthia to Baktria (in the line from Asterabad to Baikh through
Margiana), merely touching the borders of Aria in his route.

[452] Artakoana, as well as the subsequent city of Alexandria in
Ariis, are both supposed by Wilson to coincide with the locality
of Herat (Wilson, Ariana Antiqua, p. 152-177).

There are two routes from Herat to Asterabad, at the south-east
corner of the Caspian; one by Schahrood which is 533 English
miles; the other by Mesched, which is 688 English miles (Wilson,
p. 149).

[453] Arrian, iii. 25; Curtius, vi. 24, 36. The territory of the
Drangi, or Zarangi, southward from Aria, coincides generally with
the modern Seistan, adjoining the lake now called Zareh, which
receives the waters of the river Hilmend.

In the chief town of Drangiana occurred the revolting tragedy, of
which Philotas was the first victim, and his father Parmenio the
second. Parmenio, now seventy years of age, and therefore little
qualified for the fatigue inseparable from the invasion of the
eastern satrapies, had been left in the important post of commanding
the great depôt and treasure at Ekbatana. His long military
experience, and confidential position even under Philip, rendered him
the second person in the Macedonian army, next to Alexander himself.
His three sons were all soldiers. The youngest of them, Hektor,
had been accidentally drowned in the Nile, while in the suite of
Alexander in Egypt; the second, Nikanor, had commanded the hypaspists
or light infantry, but had died of illness, fortunately for himself,
a short time before;[454] the eldest, Philotas, occupied the high
rank of general of the Companion-cavalry, in daily communication with
Alexander, from whom he received personal orders.

[454] Arrian, iii. 25, 6; Curtius, iv. 8, 7; vi. 6, 19.

A revelation came to Philotas, from Kebalinus, brother of a youth
named Nikomachus, that a soldier, named Dimnus of Chalastra, had
made boast to Nikomachus, his intimate friend or beloved person,
under vows of secrecy, of an intended conspiracy against Alexander,
inviting him to become an accomplice.[455] Nikomachus, at first
struck with abhorrence, at length simulated compliance, asked
who were the accomplices of Dimnus, and received intimation of a
few names; all of which he presently communicated to his brother
Kebalinus, for the purpose of being divulged. Kebalinus told the
facts to Philotas, entreating him to mention them to Alexander. But
Philotas, though every day in communication with the king, neglected
to do this for two days; upon which Kebalinus began to suspect him of
connivance, and caused the revelation to be made to Alexander through
one of the pages named Metron. Dimnus was immediately arrested, but
ran himself through with his sword, and expired without making any
declaration.[456]

[455] Curtius, vi. 7, 2. “Dimnus, modicæ apud regem auctoritates
et gratiæ, exoleti, cui Nicomacho erat nomen, amore flagrabat,
obsequio uni sibi dediti corporis vinctus.” Plutarch, Alex. 49;
Diodor. xvii. 79.

[456] Curt. vi. 7, 29; Plutarch, Alex. 49. The latter says that
Dimnus resisted the officer sent to arrest him, and was killed by
him in the combat.

Of this conspiracy, real or pretended, every thing rested on the
testimony of Nikomachus. Alexander indignantly sent for Philotas,
demanding why he had omitted for two days to communicate what he had
heard. Philotas replied, that the source from which it came was too
contemptible to deserve notice—that it would have been ridiculous
to attach importance to the simple declarations of such a youth as
Nikomachus, recounting the foolish boasts addressed to him by a
lover. Alexander received, or affected to receive, the explanation,
gave his hand to Philotas, invited him to supper, and talked to him
with his usual familiarity.[457]

[457] Curtius, vi. 7, 33. “Philotas respondit, Cebalinum quidem
scorti sermonem ad se detulisse, sed ipsum tam levi auctori nihil
credidisse—veritum, ne jurgium inter amatorem et exoletum non
sine risu aliorum detulisset.”

But it soon appeared that advantage was to be taken of this incident
for the disgrace and ruin of Philotas, whose free-spoken criticisms
on the pretended divine paternity,—-coupled with boasts, that he
and his father Parmenio had been chief agents in the conquest of
Asia,—had neither been forgotten nor forgiven. These, and other
self-praises, disparaging to the glory of Alexander, had been
divulged by a mistress to whom Philotas was attached; a beautiful
Macedonian woman of Pydna, named Antigonê, who, having first
been made a prize in visiting Samothrace by the Persian admiral
Autophradates, was afterwards taken amidst the spoils of Damascus
by the Macedonians victorious at Issus. The reports of Antigonê,
respecting some unguarded language held by Philotas to her, had
come to the knowledge of Kraterus, who brought her to Alexander,
and caused her to repeat them to him. Alexander desired her to take
secret note of the confidential expressions of Philotas, and report
them from time to time to himself.[458]

[458] Plutarch, Alexand. 48.

It thus turned out that Alexander, though continuing to Philotas
his high military rank, and talking to him constantly with seeming
confidence, had for at least eighteen months, ever since his
conquest of Egypt and perhaps even earlier, disliked and suspected
him, keeping him under perpetual watch through the suborned and
secret communications of a treacherous mistress.[459] Some of the
generals around Alexander—especially Kraterus, the first suborner
of Antigonê—fomented these suspicions, from jealousy of the great
ascendency of Parmenio and his family. Moreover, Philotas himself
was ostentatious and overbearing in his demeanor, so as to have made
many enemies among the soldiers.[460] But whatever may have been
his defects on this head—defects which he shared with the other
Macedonian generals, all gorged with plunder and presents[461]—his
fidelity as well as his military merits stand attested by the fact
that Alexander had continued to employ him in the highest and most
confidential command throughout all the long subsequent interval;
and that Parmenio was now general at Ekbatana, the most important
military appointment which the king had to confer. Even granting
the deposition of Nikomachus to be trustworthy, there was nothing
to implicate Philotas, whose name had not been included among the
accomplices said to have been enumerated by Dimnus. There was not a
tittle of evidence against him, except the fact that the deposition
had been made known to him, and that he had seen Alexander twice
without communicating it. Upon this single fact, however, Kraterus,
and the other enemies of Philotas, worked so effectually as to
inflame the suspicions and the pre-existing ill-will of Alexander
into fierce rancor. He resolved on the disgrace, torture, and death
of Philotas,—and on the death of Parmenio besides.[462]

[459] Plutarch, Alexand. 48, 49. Πρὸς δὲ αὐτὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ~ἐκ
πάνυ πολλῶν χρόνων~ ἐτύγχανε διαβεβλημένος (Philotas).... Ὁ μὲν
οὖν Φιλώτας ἐπιβουλευόμενος οὕτως ἠγνόει, καὶ συνῆν τῇ Ἀντιγόνῃ
πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς ὀργὴν καὶ μεγαλαυχίαν ῥήματα καὶ λόγους κατὰ τοῦ
βασιλέως ἀνεπιτηδείους προϊέμενος.

Both Ptolemy and Aristobulus recognized these previous
communications made to Alexander against Philotas in Egypt, but
stated that he did not believe them (Arrian, iii. 26, 1).

[460] Plutarch, Alexand. 40-48; Curtius, vi. 11, 3.

[461] Phylarchus, Fragment. 41. ed. Didot, ap. Athenæum, xii. p.
539; Plutarch, Alexand. 39, 40. Even Eumenes enriched himself
much; though being only secretary, and a Greek, he could not
take the same liberties as the great native Macedonian generals
(Plutarch, Eumenes, 2).

[462] Plutarch, Alexand. 49; Curtius, vi. 8.

To accomplish this, however, against the two highest officers in
the Macedonian service, one of them enjoying a separate and distant
command—required management. Alexander was obliged to carry the
feelings of the soldiers along with him, and to obtain a condemnation
from the army; according to an ancient Macedonian custom, in regard
to capital crimes, though (as it seems) not uniformly practised.
Alexander not only kept the resolution secret, but is even said to
have invited Philotas to supper with the other officers, conversing
with him just as usual.[463] In the middle of the night, Philotas
was arrested while asleep in his bed,—put in chains,—and clothed
in an ignoble garb. A military assembly was convened at daybreak,
before which Alexander appeared with the chief officers in his
confidence. Addressing the soldiers in a vehement tone of mingled
sorrow and anger, he proclaimed to them that his life had just
been providentially rescued from a dangerous conspiracy organized
by two men hitherto trusted as his best friends—Philotas and
Parmenio—through the intended agency of a soldier named Dimnus,
who had slain himself when arrested. The dead body of Dimnus was
then exhibited to the meeting, while Nikomachus and Kebalinus were
brought forward to tell their story. A letter from Parmenio to his
sons Philotas and Nikanor, found among the papers seized on the
arrest, was read to the meeting. Its terms were altogether vague and
unmeaning; but Alexander chose to construe them as it suited his
purpose.[464]

[463] Curtius, vi. 8, 16. “Invitatus est etiam Philotas
ad ultimas sibi epulas et rex non cœnare modo, sed etiam
familiariter colloqui, cum eo quam damnaverat, sustinuit.”

[464] Arrian, iii. 26, 2. Λέγει δὲ Πτολεμαῖος εἰσαχθῆναι εἰς
Μακεδόνας Φιλώταν, καὶ κατηγορῆσαι αὐτοῦ ἰσχυρῶς Ἀλέξανδρον, etc.
Curtius, vi. 9, 13; Diodorus, xvii, 80.

We may easily conceive the impression produced upon these assembled
soldiers by such denunciations from Alexander himself—revelations of
his own personal danger, and reproaches against treacherous friends.
Amyntas, and even Kœnus, the brother-in-law of Philotas, were yet
more unmeasured in their invectives against the accused.[465]
They, as well as the other officers with whom the arrest had been
concerted, set the example of violent manifestation against him,
and ardent sympathy with the king’s danger. Philotas was heard in
his defence, which though strenuously denying the charge, is said
to have been feeble. It was indeed sure to be so, coming from one
seized thus suddenly, and overwhelmed with disadvantages; while a
degree of courage, absolutely heroic, would have been required
for any one else to rise and presume to criticise the proofs. A
soldier named Bolon harangued his comrades on the insupportable
insolence of Philotas, who always (he said) treated the soldiers with
contempt, turning them out of their quarters to make room for his
countless retinue of slaves. Though this allegation (probably enough
well-founded) was no way connected with the charge of treason against
the king, it harmonized fully with the temper of the assembly, and
wound them up to the last pitch of fury. The royal pages began the
cry, echoed by all around, that they would with their own hands tear
the parricide in pieces.[466]

[465] Curtius, vi. 9, 30.

[466] Curtius, vi. 11, 8. “Tum vero universa concio accensa
est, et a corporis custodibus initium factum, clamantibus,
discerpendum esse parricidam manibus eorum. Id quidam Philotas,
qui graviora supplicia metueret, haud sane iniquo animo audiebat.”

It would have been fortunate for Philotas if their wrath had been
sufficiently ungovernable to instigate the execution of such a
sentence on the spot. But this did not suit the purpose of his
enemies. Aware that he had been condemned upon the regal word, with
nothing better than the faintest negative ground of suspicion,
they determined to extort from him a confession such as would
justify their own purposes, not only against him, but against
his father Parmenio—whom there was as yet nothing to implicate.
Accordingly, during the ensuing night, Philotas was put to the
torture. Hephæstion, Kraterus, and Kœnus—the last of the three
being brother-in-law of Philotas[467]—themselves superintended the
ministers of physical suffering. Alexander himself too was at hand,
but concealed by a curtain. It is said that Philotas manifested
little firmness under torture, and that Alexander, an unseen witness,
indulged in sneers against the cowardice of one who had fought by
his side in so many battles.[468] All who stood by were enemies,
and likely to describe the conduct of Philotas in such manner as to
justify their own hatred. The tortures inflicted,[469] cruel in the
extreme and long-continued, wrung from him at last a confession,
implicating his father along with himself. He was put to death;
and at the same time, all those whose names had been indicated by
Nikomachus, were slain also—apparently by being stoned, without
preliminary torture. Philotas had serving in the army a numerous
kindred, all of whom were struck with consternation at the news
of his being tortured. It was the Macedonian law that all kinsmen
of a man guilty of treason were doomed to death along with him.
Accordingly, some of these men slew themselves, others fled from
the camp, seeking refuge wherever they could. Such was the terror
and tumult in the camp, that Alexander was obliged to proclaim a
suspension of this sanguinary law for the occasion.[470]

[467] Curtius, vi. 9, 30; vi. 11, 11.

[468] Plutarch, Alexand. 49.

[469] Curtius, vi. 11, 15, “Per ultimos deinde cruciatus, utpote
et damnatus et inimicis in gratiam regis torquentibus, laceratur.
Ac primo quidam, quanquam hinc ignis, illinc verbera, jam non ad
quæstionem, sed ad pœnam, ingerebantur, non vocem modo, sed etiam
gemitus habuit in potestate; sed postquam intumescens corpus
ulceribus flagellorum ictus nudis ossibus incussos ferre non
poterat”, etc.

[470] Curtius, vi. 11, 20.

It now remained to kill Parmenio, who could not be safely left
alive after the atrocities used towards Philotas; and to kill him,
moreover, before he could have time to hear of them, since he was
not only the oldest, most respected, and most influential of all
Macedonian officers, but also in separate command of the great depôt
at Ekbatana. Alexander summoned to his presence one of the Companions
named Polydamas; a particular friend, comrade, or _aide de camp_, of
Parmenio. Every friend of Philotas felt at this moment that his life
hung by a thread; so that Polydamas entered the king’s presence in
extreme terror, the rather as he was ordered to bring with him his
two younger brothers. Alexander addressed him, denouncing Parmenio as
a traitor, and intimating that Polydamas would be required to carry a
swift and confidential message to Ekbatana, ordering his execution.
Polydamas was selected as the attached friend of Parmenio, and
therefore as best calculated to deceive him. Two letters were placed
in his hands, addressed to Parmenio; one from Alexander himself,
conveying ostensibly military communications and orders; the other,
signed with the seal-ring of the deceased Philotas, and purporting to
be addressed by the son to the father. Together with these, Polydamas
received the real and important despatch, addressed by Alexander
to Kleander and Menidas, the officers immediately subordinate to
Parmenio at Ekbatana; proclaiming Parmenio guilty of high treason,
and directing them to kill him at once. Large rewards were offered to
Polydamas if he performed this commission with success, while his two
brothers were retained as hostages against scruples or compunction.
He promised even more than was demanded—too happy to purchase this
reprieve from what had seemed impending death. Furnished with native
guides and with swift dromedaries, he struck by the straightest
road across the desert of Khorasan, and arrived at Ekbatana on the
eleventh day—a distance usually requiring more than thirty days to
traverse.[471] Entering the camp by night, without the knowledge
of Parmenio, he delivered his despatch to Kleander, with whom he
concerted measures. On the morrow he was admitted to Parmenio, while
walking in his garden with Kleander and the other officers marked
out by Alexander’s order as his executioners. Polydamas ran to
embrace his old friend, and was heartily welcomed by the unsuspecting
veteran, to whom he presented the letters professedly coming from
Alexander and Philotas. While Parmenio was absorbed in the perusal,
he was suddenly assailed by a mortal stab from the hand and sword
of Kleander. Other wounds were heaped upon him as he fell, by the
remaining officers,—the last even after life had departed.[472]

[471] Strabo, xv. p. 724; Diodor. xvii. 80; Curtius, vii. 2,
11-18.

[472] Curtius, vii. 2, 27. The proceedings respecting Philotas
and Parmenio are recounted in the greatest detail by Curtius; but
his details are in general harmony with the brief heads given by
Arrian from Ptolemy and Aristobulus—except as to one material
point. Plutarch (Alex. 49), Diodorus (xvii. 79, 80), and Justin
(xii. 5), also state the fact in the same manner.

Ptolemy and Aristobulus, according to the narrative of Arrian,
appear to have considered that Philotas was really implicated in
a conspiracy against Alexander’s life. But when we analyze what
they are reported to have said, their opinion will not be found
entitled to much weight. In the first place, they state (Arrian,
iii. 26, 1) that the _conspiracy of Philotas had been before made
known to Alexander while he was in Egypt_, but that he did not
then believe it. Now eighteen months had elapsed since the stay
in Egypt; and the idea of a conspiracy going on for eighteen
months is preposterous. That Philotas was in a mood in which he
might be supposed likely to conspire, is one proposition; that
he actually did conspire is another; Arrian and his authorities
run the two together as if they were one. As to the evidence
purporting to prove that Philotas did conspire, Arrian tells us
that “the informers came forward before the assembled soldiers
and convicted Philotas with the rest by other _indicia_ not
obscure, _but chiefly by this_—that Philotas confessed to
have heard of a conspiracy going on, without mentioning it
to Alexander, though twice a day in his presence”—καὶ τοὺς
μηνυτὰς τοῦ ἔργου παρελθόντας ἐξελέγξαι Φιλώταν τε καὶ τοὺς
ἀμφ᾽ αὐτὸν ~ἄλλοις τε ἐλέγχοις οὐκ ἀφανέσι, καὶ μάλιστα δὴ~
ὅτι αὐτὸς Φιλώτας πεπύσθαι μὲν—συνέφη, etc. What these other
_indicia_ were, we are not told; but we may see how slender was
their value, when we learn that the non-revelation admitted by
Philotas was stronger than any of them. The non-revelation,
when we recollect that Nikomachus was the _only_ informant
(Arrian loosely talks of μηνυτὰς, as if there were more), proves
absolutely nothing as to the complicity of Philotas, though
it may prove something as to his indiscretion. Even on this
minor charge, Curtius puts into his mouth a very sufficient
exculpation. But if Alexander had taken a different view, and
dismissed or even confined him for it, there would have been
little room for remark.

The point upon which Arrian is at variance with Curtius, is,
that he states “Philotas with the rest to have been shot to
death by the Macedonians”—thus, seemingly contradicting, at
least by implication, the fact of his having been tortured.
Now Plutarch, Diodorus, and Justin, all concur with Curtius in
affirming that he was tortured. On such a matter, I prefer their
united authority to that of Ptolemy and Aristobulus. These two
last-mentioned authors were probably quite content to believe
in the complicity of Philotas upon the authority of Alexander
himself; without troubling themselves to criticise the proofs.
They tell us that Alexander vehemently denounced (κατηγορῆσαι
ἰσχυρῶς) Philotas before the assembled soldiers. After this, any
mere shadow or pretence of proof would be sufficient. Moreover,
let us recollect that Ptolemy obtained his promotion, to be one
of the confidential _body guards_ (σωματοφύλακες), out of this
very conspiracy, real or fictitious; he was promoted to the post
of the condemned Demetrius (Arrian, iii. 27. 11).

How little Ptolemy and Aristobulus cared to do justice to any one
whom Alexander hated, may be seen by what they say afterwards
about the philosopher Kallisthenes. Both of them affirmed
that the pages, condemned for conspiracy against Alexander,
deposed against Kallisthenes as having instigated them to the
deed (Arrian, iv. 14, 1). Now we know, from the authority of
Alexander himself, whose letters Plutarch quotes (Alexand. 55),
that the pages denied the privity of any one else—maintaining
the project to have been altogether their own. To their great
honor, the pages persisted in this deposition, even under extreme
tortures—though they knew that a deposition against Kallisthenes
was desired from them.

My belief is, that Diodorus, Plutarch, Curtius, and Justin,
are correct in stating that Philotas was tortured. Ptolemy and
Aristobulus have thought themselves warranted in omitting this
fact, which they probably had little satisfaction in reflecting
upon. If Philotas was not tortured, there could have been no
evidence at all against Parmenio—for the only evidence against
the latter was the extorted confession of Philotas.

The soldiers in Ekbatana, on hearing of this bloody deed, burst
into furious mutiny, surrounded the garden wall, and threatened to
break in for the purpose of avenging their general, unless Polydamas
and the other murderers should be delivered to them. But Kleander,
admitting a few of the ringleaders, exhibited to them Alexander’s
written orders, to which the soldiers yielded, not without murmurs
of reluctance and indignation. Most of them dispersed, yet a few
remained, entreating permission to bury Parmenio’s body. Even this
was long refused by Kleander, from dread of the king’s displeasure.
At last, however, thinking it prudent to comply in part, he cut off
the head, delivering to them the trunk alone for burial. The head was
sent to Alexander.[473]

[473] Curtius, vii. 2, 32, 33.

Among the many tragical deeds recounted throughout the course of
this history, there is none more revolting than the fate of these
two generals. Alexander, violent in all his impulses, displayed
on this occasion a personal rancor worthy of his ferocious mother
Olympias, exasperated rather than softened by the magnitude of past
services.[474] When we see the greatest officers of the Macedonian
army directing in person, and under the eye of Alexander, the
laceration and burning of the naked body of their colleague Philotas,
and assassinating with their own hands the veteran Parmenio,—we feel
how much we have passed out of the region of Greek civic feeling into
that of the more savage Illyrian warrior, partially orientalized. It
is not surprising to read, that Antipater, viceroy of Macedonia, who
had shared with Parmenio the favor and confidence of Philip as well
as of Alexander, should tremble when informed of such proceedings,
and cast about for a refuge against the like possibilities to
himself. Many other officers were alike alarmed and disgusted with
the transactions.[475] Hence Alexander, opening and examining the
letters sent home from his army to Macedonia, detected such strong
expressions of indignation, that he thought it prudent to transfer
many pronounced malcontents into a division by themselves, parting
them off from the remaining army.[476] Instead of appointing any
substitute for Philotas in the command of the Companion-cavalry,
he cast that body into two divisions, nominating Hephæstion to the
command of one and Kleitus to that of the other.[477]

[474] Contrast the conduct of Alexander towards Philotas and
Parmenio, with that of Cyrus the younger towards the conspirator
Orontes, as described in Xenophon, Anabas. i. 6.

[475] Plutarch, Alexand. 49.

[476] Curtius, vii. 2, 36; Diodor. xvii. 80; Justin, xii. 5.

[477] Arrian, iii. 27, 8.

The autumn and winter were spent by Alexander in reducing Drangiana,
Gedrosia, Arachosia, and the Paropamisadæ; the modern Seiestan,
Afghanistan, and the Western part of Kabul, lying between Ghazna on
the north, Kandahar or Kelat on the south, and Furrah in the west.
He experienced no combined resistance, but his troops suffered
severely from cold and privation.[478] Near the southern termination
of one of the passes of the Hindoo-Koosh (apparently north-east
of the town of Kabul) he founded a new city, called Alexandria ad
Caucasum, where he planted 7000 old soldiers, Macedonians, and others
as colonists.[479] Towards the close of Winter he crossed over the
mighty range of the Hindoo-Koosh; a march of fifteen days through
regions of snow, and fraught with hardship to his army. On reaching
the north side of these mountains, he found himself in Baktria.

[478] Arrian, iii. 28, 2. About the geography, compare Wilson’s
Ariana Antiqua, p. 173-178. “By perambulator, the distance from
Herat to Kandahar is 371 miles; from Kandahar to Kabul, 309:
total 688 miles (English).” The principal city in Drangiana
(Seiestan) mentioned by the subsequent Greek geographers is,
Prophthasia; existing seemingly before Alexander’s arrival. See
the fragments of his _mensores_, ap. Didot, Fragm. Hist. Alex.
Magn. p. 135; Pliny, H. N. vi. 21. The quantity of remains
of ancient cities, still to be found in this territory, is
remarkable. Wilson observes this (p. 154).

[479] Arrian, iii. 28, 6; Curtius, vii. 3, 23; Diodor. xvii. 83.
Alexandria in Ariis is probably Herat; Alexandria in Arachosia
is probably Kandahar. But neither the one nor the other is
mentioned as having been founded by _Alexander_, either in
Arrian or Curtius, or Diodorus. The name Alexandria does not
prove that they were founded by him; for several of the Diadochi
called their own foundations by his name (Strabo, xiii. p.
593). Considering how very short a time Alexander spent in
these regions, the wonder is, that he could have found time to
establish those foundations which are expressly ascribed to him
by Arrian and his other historians. The authority of Pliny and
Steph. Byzant. is hardly sufficient to warrant us in ascribing
to him more. The exact site of Alexandria ad Caucasum cannot be
determined, for want of sufficient topographical data. There
seems much probability that it was at the place called Beghram,
twenty-five miles north-east of Kabul—in the way between Kabul
on the south side of the Hindoo-Koosh, and Anderhab on the north
side. The prodigious number of coins and relics, Greek as well as
Mohammedan, discovered by Mr. Masson at Beghram, supply better
evidence for identifying the site with that of Alexandria ad
Caucasum, than can be pleaded on behalf of any other locality.
See Masson’s Narrative of Journeys in Afghanistan, etc., vol.
iii. ch. 7. p 148 _seqq._

In crossing the Hindoo-Koosh from south to north Alexander
probably marched by the pass of Bamian, which seems the only one
among the four passes open to an army in the winter. See Wood’s
Journey to the Oxus, p 195.

The Baktrian leader Bessus, who had assumed the title of king,
could muster no more than a small force, with which he laid waste
the country, and then retired across the river Oxus into Sogdiana,
destroying all the boats. Alexander overran Baktria with scarce
any resistance; the chief places, Baktra (Balkh) and Aornos
surrendering to him on the first demonstration of attack. Having
named Artabazus satrap of Baktria, and placed Archelaus with a
garrison in Aornos,[480] he marched northward towards the river
Oxus, the boundary between Baktria and Sogdiana. It was a march of
extreme hardship; reaching for two or three days across a sandy
desert destitute of water, and under very hot weather, The Oxus, six
furlongs in breadth, deep, and rapid, was the most formidable river
that the Macedonians had yet seen.[481] Alexander transported his
army across it on the tent-skins inflated and stuffed with straw. It
seems surprising that Bessus did not avail himself of this favorable
opportunity for resisting a passage in itself so difficult; he had
however been abandoned by his Baktrian cavalry at the moment when
he quitted their territory. Some of his companions, Spitamenes and
others, terrified at the news that Alexander had crossed the Oxus,
were anxious to make their own peace by betraying their leader.[482]
They sent a proposition to this effect; upon which Ptolemy with a
light division was sent forward by Alexander, and was enabled, by
extreme celerity of movements, to surprise and seize Bessus in a
village. Alexander ordered that he should be held in chains, naked
and with a collar round his neck, at the side of the road along which
the army were marching. On reaching the spot, Alexander stopped his
chariot, and sternly demanded from Bessus, on what pretence he had
first arrested, and afterwards slain, his king and benefactor Darius.
Bessus replied, that he had not done this single-handed; others were
concerned in it along with him, to procure for themselves lenient
treatment from Alexander. The king said no more, but ordered Bessus
to be scourged, and then sent back as prisoner to Baktra[483]—where
we shall again hear of him.

[480] Arrian, iii. 29, 3; Curtius, vii. 5, 1.

[481] Arrian, iii. 29, 4; Strabo, xi. p. 509. Evidently Ptolemy
and Aristobulus were much more awe-struck with the Oxus, than
with either the Tigris or the Euphrates. Arrian (iv. 6, 13) takes
his standard of comparison, in regard to rivers, from the river
Peneius in Thessaly.

[482] Curtius, vii. 5, 19. The exactness of Quintus Curtius,
in describing the general features of Baktria and Sogdiana, is
attested in the strongest language by modern travellers. See
Burnes’s Travels into Bokhara, vol. ii. ch. 8. p. 211, 2nd edit.;
also Morier, Second Journey in Persia, p. 282.

But in the geographical details of the country, we are at fault.
We have not sufficient data to identify more than one or two
of the localities mentioned, in the narrative of Alexander’s
proceedings, either by Curtius or Arrian. That Marakanda is the
modern Samarkand—the river Polytimetus, the modern Kohik—and
Baktra or Zariaspa the modern Balkh—appears certain; but the
attempts made by commentators to assign the site of other places
are not such as to carry conviction.

In fact, these countries, at the present moment, are known
only superficially as to their general scenery; for purposes
of measurement and geography, they are almost unknown; as may
be seen by any one who reads the Introduction to Erskine’s
translation of the Memoirs of Sultan Baber.

[483] Arrian. iii. 30, 5-10. These details are peculiarly
authentic, as coming from Ptolemy, the person chiefly concerned.

Aristobulus agreed in the description of the guise in which
Bessus was exhibited, but stated that he was brought up in this
way by Spitamenes and Dataphernes. Curtius (vii. 24, 36) follows
this version. Diodorus also gives an account very like it,
mentioning nothing about Ptolemy (xvii. 83).

In his onward march, Alexander approached a small town, inhabited
by the Branchidæ; descendants of those Branchidæ near Miletus on
the coast of Ionia, who had administered the great temple and oracle
of Apollo on Cape Poseidion, and who had yielded up the treasures
of that temple to the Persian king Xerxes, 150 years before. This
surrender had brought upon them so much odium, that when the dominion
of Xerxes was overthrown on the coast, they retired with him into the
interior of Asia. He assigned to them lands in the distant region of
Sogdiana, where their descendants had ever since remained; bilingual
and partially dis-hellenized, yet still attached to their traditions
and origin. Delighted to find themselves once more in commerce with
Greeks, they poured forth to meet and welcome the army, tendering
all that they possessed. Alexander, when he heard who they were
and what was their parentage, desired the Milesians in his army to
determine how they should be treated. But as these Milesians were
neither decided nor unanimous, Alexander announced that he would
determine for himself. Having first occupied the city in person
with a select detachment, he posted his army all round the walls,
and then gave orders not only to plunder it, but to massacre the
entire population—men, women, and children. They were slain without
arms or attempt at resistance, resorting to nothing but prayers and
suppliant manifestations. Alexander next commanded the walls to be
levelled, and the sacred groves cut down, so that no habitable site
might remain, nor any thing except solitude and sterility.[484]
Such was the revenge taken upon these unhappy victims for the
deeds of their ancestors in the fourth or fifth generation before.
Alexander doubtless considered himself to be executing the wrath
of Apollo against an accursed race who had robbed the temple of
the god.[485] The Macedonian expedition had been proclaimed to
be undertaken originally for the purpose of revenging upon the
contemporary Persians the ancient wrongs done to Greece by Xerxes;
so that Alexander would follow out the same sentiment in revenging
upon the contemporary Branchidæ the acts of their ancestors—yet more
guilty than Xerxes, in his belief. The massacre of this unfortunate
population was in fact an example of human sacrifice on the largest
scale, offered to the gods by the religious impulses of Alexander,
and worthy to be compared to that of the Carthaginian general
Hannibal, when he sacrificed 3000 Grecian prisoners on the field of
Himera, where his grandfather Hamilkar had been slain seventy years
before.[486]

[484] Curtius, vii. 23; Plutarch de Serâ Numinis Vindictâ, p.
557 B; Strabo xi. p. 518: compare also xiv. p. 634, and xvii. p.
814. This last-mentioned passage of Strabo helps us to understand
the peculiarly strong pious fervor with which Alexander regarded
the temple and oracle of Branchidæ. At the time when Alexander
went up to the oracle of Ammon in Egypt, for the purpose of
affiliating himself to Zeus Ammon, there came to him envoys from
Miletus, announcing that the oracle at Branchidæ, which had been
silent ever since the time of Xerxes, had just begun to give
prophecy, and had certified the fact that Alexander was the son
of Zeus, besides many other encouraging predictions.

The massacre of the Branchidæ by Alexander was described by
Diodorus, but was contained in that part of the seventeenth book
which is lost; there is a great lacuna in the MSS. after cap.
83. The fact is distinctly indicated in the table of contents
prefixed to Book xvii.

Arrian makes no mention of these descendants of the Branchidæ in
Sogdiana, nor of the destruction of the town and its inhabitants
by Alexander. Perhaps neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus, said
anything about it. Their silence is not at all difficult to
explain, nor does it, in my judgment, impeach the credibility
of the narrative. They do not feel under obligation to give
publicity to the worst acts of their hero.

[485] The Delphian oracle pronounced, in explaining the
subjugation and ruin of Krœsus king of Lydia, that he had thereby
expiated the sin of his ancestor in the fifth generation before
(Herodot. i. 91: compare vi. 86). Immediately before the breaking
out of the Peloponnesian war, the Lacedæmonians called upon the
Athenians to expel the descendants of those who had taken part
in the Kylonian sacrilege, 180 years before; they addressed this
injunction with a view to procure the banishment of Perikles, yet
still τοῖς θεοῖς πρῶτον τιμωροῦντες (Thucyd. i. 125-127).

The idea that the sins of fathers were visited upon their
descendants, even to the third and fourth generation, had great
currency in the ancient world.

[486] Diodor. xiii. 62. See Vol. X. Ch. lxxxi. p 413 of this
History.

Alexander then continued his onward progress, first to Marakanda
(Samarcand), the chief town of Sogdiana—next, to the river Jaxartes,
which he and his companions, in their imperfect geographical
notions, believed to be the Tanais, the boundary between Asia, and
Europe.[487] In his march, he left garrisons in various towns,[488]
but experienced no resistance, though detached bodies of the natives
hovered on his flanks. Some of these bodies, having cut off a few of
his foragers, took refuge afterwards on a steep and rugged mountain,
conceived to be unassailable. Thither however Alexander pursued them,
at the head of his lightest and most active troops. Though at first
repulsed, he succeeded in scaling and capturing the place. Of its
defenders, thirty thousand in number, three fourths were either put
to the sword, or perished in jumping down the precipices. Several
of his soldiers were wounded with arrows, and he himself received a
shot from one of them through his leg.[489] But here, as elsewhere,
we perceive that nearly all the Orientals whom Alexander subdued were
men little suited for close combat hand to hand,—fighting only with
missiles.

[487] Pliny, H. N. vi. 16. In the Meteorologica of Aristotle (i.
13, 15-18) we read that the rivers Bahtrus, Choaspes, and Araxes
flowed from the lofty mountain Parnasus (Paropamisus?) in Asia;
and that the Araxes bifurcated, one branch forming the Tanais,
which fell into the Palus Mæotis. For this fact he refers to
the γῆς περιόδοι current in his time. It seems plain that by
the Araxes Aristotle must mean the Jaxartes. We see, therefore,
that Alexander and his companions, in identifying the Jaxartes
with the Tanais, only followed the geographical descriptions and
ideas current in their time. Humboldt remarks several cases in
which the Greek geographers were fond of supposing bifurcation of
rivers (Asie Centrale, vol. ii. p. 291).

[488] Arrian, iv. 1, 5.

[489] Arrian, iii. 30, 17.

Here, on the river Jaxartes, Alexander projected the foundation of a
new city to bear his name; intended partly as a protection against
incursions from the Scythian Nomads on the other side of the river,
partly as a facility for himself to cross over and subdue them, which
he intended to do as soon as he could find opportunity.[490] He was
however called off for the time by the news of a wide-spread revolt
among the newly-conquered inhabitants both of Sogdiana and Baktria.
He suppressed the revolt with his habitual vigor and celerity,
distributing his troops so as to capture five townships in two days,
and Kyropolis or Kyra, the largest of the neighboring Sogdian towns
(founded by the Persian Cyrus), immediately afterwards. He put all
the defenders and inhabitants to the sword. Returning then to the
Jaxartes, he completed in twenty days the fortifications of his new
town of Alexandria (perhaps at or near Khodjend), with suitable
sacrifices and festivities to the gods. He planted in it some
Macedonian veterans and Grecian mercenaries, together with volunteer
settlers from the natives around.[491] An army of Scythian Nomads,
showing themselves on the other side of the river, piqued his vanity
to cross over and attack them. Carrying over a division of his army
on inflated skins, he defeated them with little difficulty, pursuing
them briskly into the desert. But the weather was intensely hot, and
the army suffered much from thirst; while the little water to be
found was so bad, that it brought upon Alexander a diarrhœa which
endangered his life.[492] This chase, of a few miles on the right
bank of the Jaxartes (seemingly in the present Khanat of Kokand),
marked the utmost limit of Alexander’s progress northward.

[490] Arrian, iv. 1, 3

[491] Arrian, iv. 3, 17; Curtius, vii. 6, 25.

[492] Arrian. iv. 5, 6; Curtius, vii. 9.

Shortly afterwards, a Macedonian detachment, unskilfully conducted,
was destroyed in Sogdiana by Spitamenes and the Scythians: a rare
misfortune, which Alexander avenged by overrunning the region[493]
near the river Polytimêtus (the Kohik), and putting to the sword
the inhabitants of all the towns which he took. He then recrossed
the Oxus, to rest during the extreme season of winter at Zariaspa
in Baktria, from whence his communications with the West and
with Macedonia were more easy, and where he received various
reinforcements of Greek troops.[494] Bessus, who had been here
retained as a prisoner, was now brought forward amidst a public
assembly; wherein Alexander, having first reproached him for his
treason to Darius, caused his nose and ears to be cut off—and sent
him in this condition to Ekbatana, to be finally slain by the Medes
and Persians.[495] Mutilation was a practice altogether Oriental
and non-Hellenic: even Arrian, admiring and indulgent as he is
towards his hero, censures this savage order, as one among many
proofs how much Alexander had taken on Oriental dispositions. We may
remark that his extreme wrath on this occasion was founded partly on
disappointment that Bessus had frustrated his toilsome efforts for
taking Darius alive—partly on the fact that the satrap had committed
treason against the king’s person, which it was the policy as well
as the feeling of Alexander to surround with a circle of Deity.[496]
For as to traitors against Persia, as a cause and country, Alexander
had never discouraged, and had sometimes signally recompensed them.
Mithrines, the governor of Sardis, who opened to him the gates of
that almost impregnable fortress immediately after the battle of
the Granikus—the traitor who perhaps, next to Darius himself, had
done most harm to the Persian cause—obtained from him high favor and
promotion.[497]

[493] Arrian, iv. 6, 11; Curtius, vii. 9, 22. The river, called
by the Macedonians Polytimetus (Strabo, xi. p. 518), now bears
the name of Kohik or Zurufshan. It rises in the mountains east of
Samarkand, and flowing westward on the north of that city and of
Bokhara. It does not reach so far as the Oxus; during the full
time of the year, it falls into a lake called Karakul; during the
dry months, it is lost in the sands, as Arrian states (Burnes’s
Travels, vol. ii. ch. xi. p. 299. ed. 2nd.).

[494] Arrian, iv. 7, 1; Curtius, vii. 10, 12.

[495] Arrian, iv. 7, 5.

[496] After describing the scene at Rome, when the Emperor
Galba was deposed and assassinated in the forum, Tacitus
observes—“Plures quam centum et viginti libellos præmia
exposcentium, ob aliquam notabilem illà die operam, Vitellius
posteà invenit, omnesque conquiri et interfici jussit: _non
honore Galbæ, sed tradito principibus more, munimentum ad
præsens, in posterum ultionem_” (Tacitus, Hist. i. 44).

[497] Arrian, i. 17, 3; iii. 16, 8. Curtius, iii. 12, 6; v. 1, 44.

The rude but spirited tribes of Baktria and Sogdiana were as yet but
imperfectly subdued, seconded as their resistance was by wide spaces
of sandy desert, by the neighborhood of the Scythian Nomads, and
by the presence of Spitamenes as a leader. Alexander, distributing
his army into five divisions, traversed the country and put down
all resistance, while he also took measures for establishing
several military posts, or new towns in convenient places.[498]
After some time the whole army was reunited at the chief place of
Sogdiana—Marakanda—where some halt and repose was given.[499]

[498] Curtius (vii. 10, 15) mentions six cities (oppida) founded
by Alexander in these regions; apparently somewhere north of the
Oxus, but the sites cannot be made out. Justin (xii. 5) alludes
to twelve foundations in Baktria and Sogdiana.

[499] Arrian, iv. 16, 4; Curtius, vii. 10, 1. “Sogdiana regio
magnâ ex parte deserta est; octingenta ferè stadia in latitudinem
vastæ solitudines tenent.”

Respecting the same country (Sogdiana and Baktria), Mr. Erskine
observes (Introduction to the Memoirs of Sultan Baber, p.
xliii.):—“The face of the country is extremely broken, and
divided by lofty hills; even the plains are diversified by great
varieties of soil,—some extensive districts along the Kohik
river, nearly the whole of Ferghana (along the Jaxartes), the
greater part of Kwarizm along the branches of the Oxus, with
the large portions of Balkh, Badakshan, Kesh, and Hissar, being
of uncommon fertility; while the greater part of the rest is a
barren waste, and in some places a sandy desert. Indeed the whole
country north of the Oxus has a decided tendency to degenerate
into desert, and many of its most fruitful spaces are nearly
surrounded by barren sands; so that the population of all these
districts still, as in the time of Baber, consists of the fixed
inhabitants of the cities and fertile lands, and of the unsettled
and roving wanderers of the desert, who dwell in tents of felt,
and live on the produce of their flocks.”

During this halt at Marakanda (Samarcand) the memorable banquet
occurred wherein Alexander murdered Kleitus. It has been already
related that Kleitus had saved his life at the battle of the
Granikus, by cutting off the sword arm of the Persian Spithridates
when already uplifted to strike him from behind. Since the death of
Philotas, the important function of general of the Companion-cavalry
had been divided between Hephæstion and Kleitus. Moreover, the family
of Kleitus had been attached to Philip, by ties so ancient, that his
sister, Lanikê, had been selected as the nurse of Alexander himself
when a child. Two of her sons had already perished in the Asiatic
battles. If, therefore, there were any man who stood high in the
service, or was privileged to speak his mind freely to Alexander, it
was Kleitus.

In this banquet at Marakanda, when wine, according to the Macedonian
habit, had been abundantly drunk, and when Alexander, Kleitus, and
most of the other guests were already nearly intoxicated, enthusiasts
or flatterers heaped immoderate eulogies upon the king’s past
achievements.[500] They exalted him above all the most venerated
legendary heroes; they proclaimed that his superhuman deeds proved
his divine paternity, and that he had earned an apotheosis like
Herakles, which nothing but envy could withhold from him during his
life. Alexander himself joined in these boasts, and even took credit
for the later victories of the reign of his father, whose abilities
and glory he depreciated. To the old Macedonian officers, such an
insult cast on the memory of Philip was deeply offensive. But among
them all, none had been more indignant than Kleitus, with the growing
insolence of Alexander—his assumed filiation from Zeus Ammon, which
put aside Philip as unworthy—his preference for Persian attendants,
who granted or refused admittance to his person—his extending to
Macedonian soldiers the contemptuous treatment habitually endured
by Asiatics, and even allowing them to be scourged by Persian
hands and Persian rods.[501] The pride of a Macedonian general in
the stupendous successes of the last five years, was effaced by
his mortification when he saw that they tended only to merge his
countrymen amidst a crowd of servile Asiatics, and to inflame the
prince with high-flown aspirations transmitted from Xerxes or Ochus.
But whatever might be the internal thoughts of Macedonian officers,
they held their peace before Alexander, whose formidable character
and exorbitant self-estimation would tolerate no criticism.

[500] Arrian, iv. 8, 7.

[501] Plutarch, Alexand. 51. Nothing can be more touching than
the words put by Plutarch into the mouth of Kleitus—Ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ
νῦν χαίρομεν, Ἀλέξανδρε, τοιαῦτα τέλη τῶν πόνων κομιζόμενοι,
μακαρίζομεν δὲ τοὺς ἤδη τεθνηκότας πρὶν ἐπιδεῖν Μηδικαῖς ῥάβδοις
ξαινομένους Μακεδόνας, καὶ Περσῶν δεομένους ἵνα τῷ βασιλεῖ
προσέλθωμεν.

At the banquet of Marakanda, this long suppressed repugnance found
an issue, accidental indeed and unpremeditated, but for that very
reason all the more violent and unmeasured. The wine, which made
Alexander more boastful and his flatterers fulsome to excess,
overpowered altogether the reserve of Kleitus. He rebuked the impiety
of those who degraded the ancient heroes in order to make a pedestal
for Alexander. He protested against the injustice of disparaging
the exalted and legitimate fame of Philip; whose achievements he
loudly extolled, pronouncing them to be equal, and even superior
to those of his son. For the exploits of Alexander, splendid as
they were, had been accomplished, not by himself alone, but by that
unconquerable Macedonian force which he had found ready made to his
hands;[502] whereas those of Philip had been his own—since he had
found Macedonia prostrate and disorganized, and had had to create for
himself both soldiers, and a military system. The great instruments
of Alexander’s victories had been Philip’s old soldiers, whom he now
despised—and among them Parmenio, whom he had put to death.

[502] Arrian, iv. 8, 8. οὔκουν μόνον γε (Ἀλέξανδρον) καταπρᾶξαι
αὐτὰ, ἀλλὰ τὸ γὰρ πολὺ μέρος Μακεδόνων εἶναι τὰ ἔργα, etc.

Remarks such as these, poured forth in the coarse language of a
half-intoxicated Macedonian veteran, provoked loud contradiction from
many, and gave poignant offence to Alexander; who now for the first
time heard the open outburst of disapprobation, before concealed
and known to him only by surmise. But wrath and contradiction, both
from him and from others, only made Kleitus more reckless in the
outpouring of his own feelings, now discharged with delight after
having been so long pent up. He passed from the old Macedonian
soldiers to himself individually. Stretching forth his right hand
towards Alexander, he exclaimed—“Recollect that you owe your life
to me; this hand preserved you at the Granikus. Listen to the
outspoken language of truth, or else abstain from asking freemen to
supper, and confine yourself to the society of barbaric slaves.” All
these reproaches stung Alexander to the quick. But nothing was so
intolerable to him as the respectful sympathy for Parmenio, which
brought to his memory one of the blackest deeds of his life—and the
reminiscence of his preservation at the Granikus, which lowered
him into the position of a debtor towards the very censor under
whose reproof he was now smarting. At length wrath and intoxication
together drove him into uncontrollable fury. He started from his
couch, and felt for his dagger to spring at Kleitus; but the dagger
had been put out of reach by one of his attendants. In a loud voice
and with the Macedonian word of command, he summoned the body guards
and ordered the trumpeter to sound an alarm. But no one obeyed so
grave an order, given in his condition of drunkenness. His principal
officers, Ptolemy, Perdikkas and others, clung round him, held his
arms and body, and besought him to abstain from violence; others at
the same time tried to silence Kleitus and hurry him out of the hall,
which had now become a scene of tumult and consternation. But Kleitus
was not in a humor to confess himself in the wrong by retiring; while
Alexander, furious at the opposition now, for the first time, offered
to his will, exclaimed, that his officers held him in chains as
Bessus had held Darius, and left him nothing but the name of a king.
Though anxious to restrain his movements, they doubtless did not dare
to employ much physical force; so that his great personal strength,
and continued efforts, presently set him free. He then snatched a
pike from one of the soldiers, rushed upon Kleitus, and thrust him
through on the spot, exclaiming, “Go now to Philip and Parmenio”.[503]

[503] Arrian, iv. 8; Curtius, viii. 1; Plutarch, Alexand. 50, 51;
Justin, xii. 6.

The description given by Diodorus was contained in the lost
part of his seventeenth book; the table of contents, prefixed
thereunto, notes the incident briefly.

All the authors describe in the same general way the
commencement, progress, and result, of this impressive scene in
the banqueting hall of Marakanda; but they differ materially
in the details. In giving what seems to me the most probable
account, I have borrowed partly from all, yet following mostly
the account given by Arrian from Ptolemy, himself present. For
Arrian’s narrative down to sect. 14 of c. 8 (before the words
Ἀριστόβουλος δὲ) may fairly be presumed to be derived from
Ptolemy.

Both Plutarch and Curtius describe the scene in a manner more
dishonorable to Alexander than Arrian; and at the same time
(in my judgment) less probable. Plutarch says that the brawl
took its rise from a poet named Pierion singing a song which
turned into derision those Macedonians who had been recently
defeated in Sogdiana; that Alexander and those around him greatly
applauded this satire; that Kleitus protested against such an
insult to soldiers, who, though unfortunate, had behaved with
unimpeachable bravery; that Alexander then turned upon Kleitus
saying, that he was seeking an excuse for himself by extenuating
cowardice in others; that Kleitus retorted by reminding him of
the preservation of his life at the Granikus. Alexander is thus
made to provoke the quarrel by aspersing the courage of Kleitus,
which I think noway probable; nor would he be likely to encourage
a song of that tenor.

Curtius agrees with Arrian in ascribing the origin of the
mischief to the extravagant boasts of Alexander and his
flatterers, and to their depreciation of Philip. He then tells
us that Kleitus, on hearing their unseemly talk, turned round
and whispered to his neighbor some lines out of the Andromachê
of Euripides (which lines Plutarch also ascribes to him, though
at a later moment); that Alexander, not hearing the words,
asked what had been said, but no one would tell him; at length
Kleitus himself repeated the sentiment in language of his own.
This would suit a literary Greek; but an old Macedonian officer
half intoxicated, when animated by a vehement sentiment, would
hardly express it by whispering a Greek poetical quotation to his
neighbor. He would either hold his tongue, or speak what he felt
broadly and directly. Nevertheless Curtius has stated two points
very material to the case, which do not appear in Arrian. 1. It
was Alexander himself, not his flatterers, who vilipended Philip;
at least the flatterers only did so after him, and following his
example. The topic would be dangerous for them to originate, and
might easily be carried too far. 2. Among all the topics touched
upon by Kleitus, none was so intolerable as the open expression
of sympathy, friendship, and regret for Parmenio. This stung
Alexander in the sorest point of his conscience; he must have
known that there were many present who sympathized with it; and
it was probably the main cause which worked him up to phrenzy.
Moreover we may be pretty sure that Kleitus, while expatiating
upon Philip, would not forget Philip’s general in chief and his
own old friend, Parmenio.

I cannot believe the statement of Aristobulus, that Kleitus was
forced by his friends out of the hall, and afterward returned
to it of his own accord, to defy Alexander once more. It seems
plain from Arrian that Ptolemy said no such thing. The murderous
impulse of Alexander was gratified on the spot, and without
delay, as soon as he got clear from the gentle restraint of his
surrounding friends.

No sooner was the deed perpetrated, than the feelings of Alexander
underwent an entire revolution. The spectacle of Kleitus, a bleeding
corpse on the floor,—the marks of stupefaction and horror evident
in all the spectators, and the reaction from a furious impulse
instantaneously satiated—plunged him at once into the opposite
extreme of remorse and self-condemnation. Hastening out of the
hall, and retiring to bed, he passed three days in an agony of
distress, without food or drink. He burst into tears and multiplied
exclamations on his own mad act; he dwelt upon the name of Kleitus
and Lanikê with the debt of gratitude which he owed to each, and
denounced himself as unworthy to live after having requited such
services with a foul murder.[504] His friends at length prevailed
on him to take food, and return to activity. All joined in trying
to restore his self-satisfaction. The Macedonian army passed a
public vote that Kleitus had been justly slain, and that his body
should remain unburied; which afforded opportunity to Alexander to
reverse the vote, and to direct that it should be buried by his own
order.[505] The prophets comforted him by the assurance that his
murderous impulse had arisen, not from his own natural mind, but
from a maddening perversion intentionally brought on by the god
Dionysus, to avenge the omission of a sacrifice due to him on the
day of the banquet, but withheld.[506] Lastly, the Greek sophist
or philosopher, Anaxarchus of Abdera, revived Alexander’s spirits
by well-timed flattery, treating his sensibility as nothing better
than generous weakness; reminding him that in his exalted position
of conqueror and Great King, he was entitled to prescribe what was
right and just, instead of submitting himself to laws dictated from
without.[507] Kallisthenes the philosopher was also summoned, along
with Anaxarchus, to the king’s presence, for the same purpose of
offering consolatory reflections. But he is said to have adopted a
tone of discourse altogether different, and to have given offence
rather than satisfaction to Alexander.

[504] Arrian, iv. 9, 4; Curtius, viii. 2, 2.

[505] Curtius, viii. 2, 12. “Quoque minus cædis puderet, jure
interfectum Clitum Macedones decernunt; sepulturâ quoque
prohibituri, ni rex humari jussisset.”

In explanation of this monstrous verdict of the soldiers, we must
recollect that the safety of the whole army (now at Samarcand,
almost beyond the boundary of inhabited regions, ἔξω τῆς
οἰκουμένης) was felt to depend on the life of Alexander. Compare
Justin, xii. 6, 15.

[506] Arrian, iv. 9, 6. Alexander imagined himself to have
incurred the displeasure of Dionysus by having sacked and
destroyed the city of Thebes, the supposed birth-place and
favorite locality of that god (Plutarch, Alex. 13).

The maddening delusion brought upon men by the wrath of Dionysus
is awfully depicted in the Bacchæ of Euripides. Under the
influence of that delusion, Agavê, mother of Pentheus, tears her
son in pieces and bears away his head in triumph, not knowing
what is in her hands. Compare also Eurip. Hippolyt. 440-1412.

[507] Arrian, iv. 9, 10; Plutarch. Alex. 52.

To such remedial influences, and probably still more to the absolute
necessity for action, Alexander’s remorse at length yielded. Like the
other emotions of his fiery soul, it was violent and overpowering
while it lasted. But it cannot be shown to have left any durable
trace on his character, nor any effects justifying the unbounded
admiration of Arrian; who has little but blame to bestow on the
murdered Kleitus, while he expresses the strongest sympathy for the
mental suffering of the murderer.

After ten days,[508] Alexander again put his army in motion, to
complete the subjugation of Sogdiana. He found no enemy capable of
meeting him in pitched battle; yet Spitamenes, with the Sogdians and
some Scythian allies, raised much hostility of detail, which it cost
another year to put down. Alexander underwent the greatest fatigue
and hardships in his marches through the mountainous parts of this
wide, rugged, and poorly supplied country, with rocky positions,
strong by nature, which his enemies sought to defend. One of these
fastnesses, held by a native chief named Sisymithres, seemed almost
unattackable, and was indeed taken rather by intimidation than by
actual force.[509] The Scythians, after a partial success over a
small Macedonian detachment, were at length so thoroughly beaten
and overawed, that they slew Spitamenes and sent his head to the
conqueror as a propitiatory offering.[510]

[508] Curtius, viii. 2, 13—“decem diebus ad confirmandum pudorem
apud Maracanda consumptis”, etc.

[509] Curtius, viii. 2, 20-30.

[510] Arrian, iv. 17, 11. Curtius (viii. 3) gives a different
narrative of the death of Spitamenes.

After a short rest at Naütaka during the extreme winter, Alexander
resumed operations, by attacking a strong post called the Sogdian
Rock, whither a large number of fugitives had assembled, with
an ample supply of provision. It was a precipice supposed to be
inexpugnable; and would seemingly have proved so, in spite of the
energy and abilities of Alexander, had not the occupants altogether
neglected their guard, and yielded at the mere sight of a handful of
Macedonians who had scrambled up the precipice. Among the captives,
taken by Alexander on this rock, were the wife and family of the
Baktrian chief Oxyartes; one of whose daughters, named Roxana, so
captivated Alexander by her beauty that he resolved to make her
his wife.[511] He then passed out of Sogdiana into the neighboring
territory Parætakênê, where there was another inexpugnable site
called the Rock of Choriênes, which he was also fortunate enough to
reduce.[512]

[511] Arrian, iv. 18, 19.

[512] Arrian, iv. 21. Our geographical knowledge does not enable
us to verify these localities, or to follow Alexander in his
marches of detail.

From hence Alexander went to Baktra. Sending Kraterus with a
division to put the last hand to the reduction of Parætakênê, he
himself remained at Baktra, preparing for his expedition across
the Hindoo-Koosh to the conquest of India. As a security for the
tranquillity of Baktria and Sogdiana during his absence, he levied
30,000 young soldiers from those countries to accompany him.[513]

[513] Curtius, viii. 5, 1; Arrian, iv. 22, 2.

It was at Baktra that Alexander celebrated his marriage with
the captive Roxana. Amidst the repose and festivities connected
with that event, the Oriental temper which he was now acquiring
displayed itself more forcibly than ever. He could no longer be
satisfied without obtaining prostration, or worship, from Greeks
and Macedonians as well as from Persians; a public and unanimous
recognition of his divine origin and superhuman dignity. Some Greeks
and Macedonians had already rendered to him this homage. Nevertheless
to the greater number, in spite of their extreme deference and
admiration for him, it was repugnant and degrading. Even the
imperious Alexander shrank from issuing public and formal orders on
such a subject; but a manœuvre was concerted, with his privity, by
the Persians and certain compliant Greek sophists or philosophers,
for the purpose of carrying the point by surprise.

During a banquet at Baktra, the philosopher Anaxarchus, addressing
the assembly in a prepared harangue, extolled Alexander’s exploits as
greatly surpassing those of Dionysus and Herakles. He proclaimed that
Alexander had already done more than enough to establish a title to
divine honors from the Macedonians; who, (he said) would assuredly
worship Alexander after his death, and ought in justice to worship
him during his life, forthwith.[514]

[514] Arrian, iv. 10, 7-9. Curtius (viii. 5, 9-13) represents
the speech proposing divine honors to have been delivered, not
by Anaxarchus, but by another lettered Greek, a Sicilian named
Kleon. The tenor of the speech is substantially the same, as
given by both authors.

This harangue was applauded, and similar sentiments were enforced,
by others favorable to the plan; who proceeded to set the example
of immediate compliance, and were themselves the first to tender
worship. Most of the Macedonian officers sat unmoved, disgusted at
the speech. But though disgusted they said nothing. To reply to a
speech doubtless well-turned and flowing, required some powers of
oratory; moreover, it was well known that whoever dared to reply
stood marked out for the antipathy of Alexander. The fate of
Kleitus, who had arraigned the same sentiments in the banqueting
hall of Marakanda, was fresh in the recollection of every one. The
repugnance which many felt, but none ventured to express, at length
found an organ in Kallisthenes of Olynthus.

This philosopher, whose melancholy fate imparts a peculiar interest
to his name, was nephew of Aristotle, and had enjoyed through his
uncle an early acquaintance with Alexander during the boyhood of
the latter. At the recommendation of Aristotle, Kallisthenes had
accompanied Alexander in his Asiatic expedition. He was a man of
much literary and rhetorical talent, which he turned towards the
composition of history—and to the history of recent times.[515]
Alexander, full of ardor for conquest, was at the same time anxious
that his achievements should be commemorated by poets and men
of letters;[516] there were seasons also when he enjoyed their
conversation. On both these grounds, he invited several of them
to accompany the army. The more prudent among them declined, but
Kallisthenes obeyed, partly in hopes of procuring the reconstitution
of his native city Olynthus, as Aristotle had obtained the like
favor for Stageira.[517] Kallisthenes had composed a narrative (not
preserved) of Alexander’s exploits, which certainly reached to
the battle of Arbela, and may perhaps have gone down farther. The
few fragments of this narrative remaining seem to betoken extreme
admiration, not merely of the bravery and ability, but also of the
transcendent and unbroken good fortune, of Alexander—marking him
out as the chosen favorite of the gods. This feeling was perfectly
natural under the grandeur of the events. Insofar as we can judge
from one or two specimens, Kallisthenes was full of complimentary
tribute to the hero of his history. But the character of Alexander
himself had undergone a material change during the six years between
his first landing in Asia and his campaign in Sogdiana. All his worst
qualities had been developed by unparalleled success and by Asiatic
example. He required larger doses of flattery, and had now come to
thirst, not merely for the reputation of divine paternity, but for
the actual manifestations of worship as towards a god.

[515] Kallisthenes had composed three historical works—1.
Hellenica—from the year 387-357 B. C. 2. History of the
sacred war—from 357-346 B. C. 3. Τὰ κατ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρον.
His style is said by Cicero to have been rhetorical; but the
Alexandrine critics included him in their Canon of Historians.
See Didot, Fragm. Hist. Alex. Magn. p. 6-9.

[516] See the observation ascribed to him expressing envy towards
Achilles for having been immortalized by Homer (Arrian, i. 12, 2).

[517] It is said that Ephorus, Xenokrates, and Menedemus, all
declined the invitation of Alexander (Plutarch, De Stoicorum
Repugnantiis, p. 1043). Respecting Menedemus, the fact can hardly
be so: he must have been then too young to be invited.

To the literary Greeks who accompanied Alexander, this change in
his temper must have been especially palpable and full of serious
consequence; since it was chiefly manifested, not at periods of
active military duty, but at his hours of leisure, when he recreated
himself by their conversation and discourses. Several of these
Greeks—Anaxarchus, Kleon, the poet Agis of Argos—accommodated
themselves to the change, and wound up their flatteries to the
pitch required. Kallisthenes could not do so. He was a man of
sedate character, of simple, severe, and almost unsocial habits—to
whose sobriety the long Macedonian potations were distasteful.
Aristotle said of him, that he was a great and powerful speaker,
but that he had no judgment; according to other reports, he was a
vain and arrogant man, who boasted that Alexander’s reputation and
immortality were dependent on the composition and tone of _his_
history.[518] Of personal vanity,—a common quality among literary
Greeks,—Kallisthenes probably had his full share. But there is no
ground for believing that _his_ character had altered. Whatever his
vanity may have been, it had given no offence to Alexander during the
earlier years, nor would it have given offence now, had not Alexander
himself become a different man.

[518] Arrian, iv. 10, 2; Plutarch, Alex. 53, 54. It is
remarkable that Timmæus denounced Kallisthenes as having in
his historical work flattered Alexander to excess (Polybius,
xii. 12). Kallisthenes seems to have recognized various special
interpositions of the gods, to aid Alexander’s successes—see
Fragments 25 and 36 of the Fragmenta Callisthenis in the edition
of Didot.

In reading the censure which Arrian passes on the arrogant
pretensions of Kallisthenes, we ought at the same time to
read the pretensions raised by Arrian on his own behalf as an
historian (i. 12, 7-9)—καὶ ἐπὶ τῷδε οὐκ ἀπαξιῶ ἐμαυτὸν τῶν
πρώτων ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῇ Ἑλλάδι, εἴπερ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος τῶν ἐν τοῖς
ὅπλοις, etc. I doubt much whether Kallisthenes pitched his
self-estimation so high. In this chapter, Arrian recounts, that
Alexander envied Achilles for having been fortunate enough to
obtain such a poet as Homer for panegyrist; and Arrian laments
that Alexander had not, as yet, found an historian equal to his
deserts. This, in point of fact, is a reassertion of the same
truth which Kallisthenes stands condemned for asserting—that the
fame even of the greatest warrior depends upon his commemorators.
The boastfulness of a poet is at least pardonable, when he
exclaims, like Theokritus, Idyll. xvi. 73—

Ἔσσεται οὗτος ἀνὴρ, ὃς ἐμεῦ κεχρήσετ᾽ ἀοιδοῦ,
Ῥέξας ἢ Ἀχιλεὺς ὅσσον μέγας, ἢ βαρὺς Αἴας
Ἐν πεδίῳ Σιμόεντος, ὅθι Φρυγὸς ἠρίον ῎Ιλου.

On occasion of the demonstration led up by Anaxarchus at the banquet,
Kallisthenes had been invited by Hephæstion to join in the worship
intended to be proposed towards Alexander; and Hephæstion afterwards
alleged, that he had promised to comply.[519] But his actual conduct
affords reasonable ground for believing that he made no such promise;
for he not only thought it his duty to refuse the act of worship,
but also to state publicly his reasons for disapproving it; the more
so, as he perceived that most of the Macedonians present felt like
himself. He contended that the distinction between gods and men
was one which could not be confounded without impiety and wrong.
Alexander had amply earned,—as a man, a general, and a king,—the
highest honors compatible with humanity; but to exalt him into a
god would be both an injury to him, and an offence to the gods.
Anaxarchus (he said) was the last person from whom such a proposition
ought to come, because he was one of those whose only title to
Alexander’s society was founded upon his capacity to give instructive
and wholesome counsel.[520]

[519] Plutarch, Alex. 55.

[520] Arrian, iv. 11. ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ τε καὶ παιδεύσει Ἀλεξάνδρῳ
συνόντα.

Kallisthenes here spoke out, what numbers of his hearers felt.
The speech was not only approved, but so warmly applauded by the
Macedonians present, especially the older officers,—that Alexander
thought it prudent to forbid all farther discussion upon this
delicate subject. Presently the Persians present, according to
Asiatic custom, approached him and performed their prostration; after
which Alexander pledged, in successive goblets of wine, those Greeks
and Macedonians with whom he had held previous concert. To each of
them the goblet was handed, and each, after drinking to answer the
pledge, approached the king, made his prostration, and then received
a salute. Lastly, Alexander sent the pledge to Kallisthenes, who,
after drinking like the rest, approached him, for the purpose of
receiving the salute, but without any prostration. Of this omission
Alexander was expressly informed by one of the Companions; upon which
he declined to admit Kallisthenes to a salute. The latter retired,
observing, “Then I shall go away, worse off than others as far as the
salute goes.”[521]

[521] Arrian, iv. 12, 7. φιλήματι ἔλαττον ἔχων ἄπειμι.

Kallisthenes was imprudent, and even blamable, in making this last
observation, which without any necessity or advantage, aggravated
the offence already given to Alexander. He was more imprudent
still, if we look simply to his own personal safety in standing
forward publicly to protest against the suggestion for rendering
divine honors to that prince, and in thus creating the main offence
which even in itself was inexpiable. But here the occasion was one
serious and important, so as to convert the imprudence into an act
of genuine moral courage. The question was, not about obeying an
order given by Alexander, for no order had been given—but about
accepting or rejecting a motion made by Anaxarchus; which Alexander,
by a shabby, preconcerted manœuvre, affected to leave to the free
decision of the assembly, in full confidence that no one would be
found intrepid enough to oppose it. If one Greek sophist made a
proposition, in itself servile and disgraceful, another sophist could
do himself nothing but honor by entering public protest against it;
more especially since this was done (as we may see by the report in
Arrian) in terms no way insulting, but full of respectful admiration,
towards Alexander personally. The perfect success of the speech
is in itself a proof of the propriety of its tone;[522] for the
Macedonian officers would feel indifference, if not contempt towards
a rhetor like Kallisthenes, while towards Alexander they had the
greatest deference short of actual worship. There are few occasions
on which the free spirit of Greek letters and Greek citizenship, in
their protest against exorbitant individual insolence, appears more
conspicuous and estimable than in the speech of Kallisthenes.[523]
Arrian disapproves the purpose of Alexander, and strongly blames
the motion of Anaxarchus; nevertheless, such is his anxiety to find
some excuse for Alexander, that he also blames Kallisthenes for
unseasonable frankness, folly, and insolence, in offering opposition.
He might have said with some truth, that Kallisthenes would have done
well to withdraw earlier (if indeed he could have withdrawn without
offence) from the camp of Alexander, in which no lettered Greek could
now associate without abnegating his freedom of speech and sentiment,
and emulating the servility of Anaxarchus. But being present, as
Kallisthenes was, in the hall at Baktra when the proposition of
Anaxarchus was made, and when silence would have been assent—his
protest against it was both seasonable and dignified; and all the
more dignified for being fraught with danger to himself.

[522] Arrian, iv. 12, 1. ἀνιᾶσαι μὲν μεγαλωστὶ Ἀλέξανδρον,
Μακεδόσι δὲ πρὸς θυμοῦ εἰπεῖν....

Curtius, viii. 5, 20. “Æquis auribus Callisthenes velut vindex
publicæ libertatis audiebatur. Expresserat non assensionem modo,
sed etiam vocem, seniorum præcipuè quibus gravis erat inveterati
moris externa mutatio.”

[523] There was no sentiment more deeply rooted in the free
Grecian mind, prior to Alexander’s conquests, than the repugnance
to arrogant aspirations on the part of the fortunate man,
swelling himself above the limits of humanity—and the belief
that such aspirations were followed by the Nemesis of the gods.
In the dying speech which Xenophon puts into the mouth of Cyrus
the Great, we find—“Ye gods, I thank you much, that I have
been sensible of your care for me, and that I have never in my
successes raised my thoughts above the measure of man” (Cyropæd.
viii. 7, 3). Among the most striking illustrations of this
sentiment is, the story of Solon and Crœsus (Herodot. i. 32-34).

I shall recount in the next chapter examples of monstrous
flattery on the part of the Athenians, proving how this sentiment
expired with their freedom.

Kallisthenes knew that danger well, and was quickly enabled to
recognize it in the altered demeanor of Alexander towards him. He
was, from that day, a marked man in two senses: first, to Alexander
himself, as well as to the rival sophists and all promoters of
the intended deification,—for hatred, and for getting up some
accusatory pretence such as might serve to ruin him; next, to the
more free-spirited Macedonians, indignant witnesses of Alexander’s
increased insolence, and admirers of the courageous Greek who had
protested against the motion of Anaxarchus. By such men he was
doubtless much extolled; which praises aggravated his danger, as they
were sure to be reported to Alexander. The pretext for his ruin was
not long wanting.

Among those who admired and sought the conversation of Kallisthenes,
was Hermolaus, one of the royal pages—the band, selected from noble
Macedonian families, who did duty about the person of the king. It
had happened that this young man, one of Alexander’s companions in
the chase, on seeing a wild boar rushing up to attack the king,
darted his javelin, and slew the animal. Alexander, angry to be
anticipated in killing the boar, ordered Hermolaus to be scourged
before all the other pages, and deprived him of his horse.[524] Thus
humiliated and outraged—for an act not merely innocent, but the
omission of which, if Alexander had sustained any injury from the
boar, might have been held punishable—Hermolaus became resolutely
bent on revenge.[525] He enlisted in the project his intimate friend
Sostratus, with several others among the pages, and it was agreed
among them to kill Alexander in his chamber, on the first night when
they were all on guard together. The appointed night arrived, without
any divulgation of their secret; yet the scheme was frustrated
by the accident, that Alexander continued till daybreak drinking
with his officers, and never retired to bed. On the morrow, one
of the conspirators, becoming alarmed or repentant, divulged the
scheme to his friend Charikles, with the names of those concerned.
Eurylochus, brother to Charikles, apprised by him of what he had
heard, immediately informed Ptolemy, through whom it was conveyed to
Alexander. By Alexander’s order, the persons indicated were arrested
and put to the torture;[526] under which they confessed that they had
themselves conspired to kill him, but named no other accomplices,
and even denied that any one else was privy to the scheme. In this
denial they persisted, though extreme suffering was applied to extort
the revelation of new names. They were then brought up and arraigned
as conspirators before the assembled Macedonian soldiers. There
their confession was repeated. It is even said that Hermolaus, in
repeating it, boasted of the enterprise as legitimate and glorious;
denouncing the tyranny and cruelty of Alexander us having become
insupportable to a freeman. Whether such boast was actually made or
not, the persons brought up were pronounced guilty, and stoned to
death forthwith by the soldiers.[527]

[524] Plutarch, Alexand. 54. He refers to Hermippus, who mentions
what was told to Aristotle by Strœbus, the reader attendant on
Kallisthenes.

[525] Arrian, iv. 13; Curtius, viii. 6, 7.

[526] Arrian, iv. 13, 13.

[527] Arrian, iv, 14, 4. Curtius expands this scene into great
detail; composing a long speech for Hermolaus, and another for
Alexander (viii. 6, 7, 8).

He says that the soldiers who executed these pages, tortured them
first, in order to manifest zeal for Alexander (viii. 8, 20).

The pages thus executed were young men of good Macedonian families,
for whose condemnation accordingly, Alexander had thought it
necessary to invoke—what he was sure of obtaining against any
one—the sentence of the soldiers. To satisfy his hatred against
Kallisthenes—not a Macedonian, but only a Greek citizen, one of
the surviving remnants of the subverted city of Olynthus—no such
formality was required.[528] As yet, there was not a shadow of proof
to implicate this philosopher; for obnoxious as his name was known
to be, Hermolaus and his companions had, with exemplary fortitude,
declined to purchase the chance of respite from extreme torture by
pronouncing it. Their confessions,—all extorted by suffering, unless
confirmed by other evidence, of which we do not know whether any
was taken—were hardly of the least value, even against themselves;
but against Kallisthenes, they had no bearing whatever; nay, they
tended indirectly, not to convict, but to absolve him. In his case,
therefore, as in that of Philotas before, it was necessary to pick
up matter of suspicious tendency from his reported remarks and
conversations. He was alleged[529] to have addressed dangerous and
inflammatory language to the pages, holding up Alexander to odium,
instigating them to conspiracy, and pointing out Athens as a place of
refuge; he was moreover well known to have been often in conversation
with Hermolaus. For a man of the violent temper and omnipotent
authority of Alexander, such indications were quite sufficient as
grounds of action against one whom he hated.

[528] “Quem, si Macedo esset (Callisthenem), tecum introduxissem,
dignissimum te discipulo magistrum: nunc Olynthio non idem
juris est” (Curtius. viii. 8, 19—speech of Alexander before the
soldiers addressing Hermolaus especially).

[529] Plutarch, Alexand. 55; Arrian, iv. 10, 4.

On this occasion, we have the state of Alexander’s mind disclosed
by himself, in one of the references to his letters given by
Plutarch. Writing to Kraterus and to others immediately afterwards,
Alexander distinctly stated that the pages throughout all their
torture had deposed against no one but themselves. Nevertheless, in
another letter, addressed to Antipater in Macedonia, he used these
expressions—“The pages were stoned to death by the Macedonians; but
I myself shall punish the sophist, as well as those who sent him
out here, and those who harbor in their cities conspirators against
me.”[530] The sophist Kallisthenes had been sent out by Aristotle,
who is here designated; and probably the Athenians after him.
Fortunately for Aristotle, he was not at Baktra, but at Athens. That
he could have had any concern in the conspiracy of the pages, was
impossible. In this savage outburst of menace against his absent
preceptor, Alexander discloses the real state of feeling which
prompted him to the destruction of Kallisthenes; hatred towards that
spirit of citizenship and free speech, which Kallisthenes not only
cherished, in common with Aristotle and most other literary Greeks,
but had courageously manifested in his protest against the motion for
worshipping a mortal.

[530] Plutarch, Alex. 55. Καίτοι τῶν περὶ Ἑρμόλαον οὐδεὶς
οὐδὲ διὰ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνάγκης Καλλισθένους κατεῖπεν. Ἀλλὰ καὶ
Ἀλέξανδρος ~αὐτὸς εὐθὺς γράφων~ Κρατερῷ καὶ Ἀττάλῳ καὶ Ἀλκέτᾳ
φησὶ τοὺς παῖδας βασανιζομένους ὁμολογεῖν, ὡς αὐτοὶ ταῦτα
πράξειαν, ~ἄλλος δὲ οὐδεὶς συνειδείη~. Ὕστερον δὲ γράφων πρὸς
Ἀντίπατρον, καὶ τὸν Καλλισθένην συνεπαιτιασάμενος, Οἱ μὲν παῖδές,
φησιν, ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων κατελεύσθησαν, ~τὸν δὲ σοφιστὴν ἐγὼ
κολάσω~, καὶ ~τοὺς ἐκπέμψαντας αὐτὸν~, καὶ τοὺς ὑποδεχομένους
ταῖς πόλεσι τοὺς ἐμοὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντας ... ἄντικρυς ἔν γε τούτοις
ἀποκαλυπτόμενος πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην, etc.

About the hostile dispositions of Alexander towards Aristotle,
see Dio Chrysostom, Orat. 64. de Fortunâ, p. 598.

Kraterus was at this time absent in Sogdiana, engaged in
finishing the suppression of the resistance (Arrian, iv. 22, 1).
To him, therefore, Alexander would naturally write.

This statement, from the pen of Alexander himself, distinctly
contradicts and refutes (as I have before observed) the
affirmation of Ptolemy and Aristobulus as given by Arrian (iv.
14, 1)—that the pages deposed against Kallisthenes.

Kallisthenes was first put to the torture and then hanged.[531]
His tragical fate excited a profound sentiment of sympathy and
indignation among the philosophers of antiquity.[532]

[531] Arrian, iv. 14, 5. Curtius also says—“Callisthenes quoque
tortus interiit, initi consilii in caput regis innoxius, sed
haudquaquam aulæ et assentantium accommodatus ingenio (viii. 8,
21).” Compare Plutarch, Alex. 55.

This is the statement of Ptolemy; who was himself concerned in
the transactions, and was the officer through whom the conspiracy
of the pages had been revealed. His partiality might permit him
to omit or soften what was discreditable to Alexander, but he may
be fully trusted when he records an act of cruelty. Aristobulus
and others affirmed that Kallisthenes was put in chains and
carried about in this condition for some time; after which he
died of disease and a wretched state of body. But the witnesses
here are persons whose means of information we do not know to
be so good as those of Ptolemy; besides that, the statement is
intrinsically less probable.

[532] See the language of Seneca, Nat. Quæst. vi. 23; Plutarch,
De Adulator. et Amici Discrimine, p. 65; Theophrast. ap. Ciceron.
Tusc. Disp. iii. 10.

Curtius says that this treatment of Kallisthenes was followed by
a late repentance on the part of Alexander (viii. 8, 23). On this
point there is no other evidence—nor can I think the statement
probable.

The halts of Alexander were formidable to friends and companions;
his marches, to the unconquered natives whom he chose to treat as
enemies. On the return of Kraterus from Sogdiana, Alexander began his
march from Baktra (Balkh) southward to the mountain range Paropamisus
or Caucasus (Hindoo-Koosh); leaving however at Baktra Amyntas, with a
large force of 10,000 foot and 3500 horse, to keep these intractable
territories in subjugation.[533] His march over the mountains
occupied ten days; he then visited his newly-founded city Alexandria
in the Paropamisadæ. At or near the river Kophen (Kabool river),
he was joined by Taxiles, a powerful Indian prince, who brought
as a present twenty-five elephants, and whose alliance was very
valuable to him. He then divided his army, sending one division under
Hephæstion and Perdikkas, towards the territory called Peukelaôtis
(apparently that immediately north of the confluence of the Kabool
river with the Indus); and conducting the remainder himself in
an easterly direction, over the mountainous regions between the
Hindoo-Koosh and the right bank of the Indus. Hephæstion was ordered,
after subduing all enemies in his way, to prepare a bridge ready for
passing the Indus by the time when Alexander should arrive. Astes,
prince of Peukelaôtis, was taken and slain in the city where he had
shut himself up; but the reduction of it cost Hephæstion a siege of
thirty days.[534]

[533] Arrian, iv. 22, 4.

[534] Arrian, iv. 22, 8-12.

Alexander, with his own half of the army, undertook the reduction
of the Aspasii, the Guræi, and the Assakeni, tribes occupying
mountainous and difficult localities along the southern slopes
of the Hindoo-Koosh; but neither they nor their various towns
mentioned—Arigæon, Massaga, Bazira, Ora, Dyrta, etc., except perhaps
the remarkable rock of Aornos,[535] near the Indus—can be more
exactly identified. These tribes were generally brave, and seconded
by towns of strong position as well as by a rugged country, in many
parts utterly without roads.[536] But their defence was conducted
with little union, no military skill, and miserable weapons; so that
they were no way qualified to oppose the excellent combination and
rapid movements of Alexander, together with the confident attack and
very superior arms, offensive, as well as defensive, of his soldiers.
All those who attempted resistance were successively attacked,
overpowered and slain. Even those who did not resist, but fled to the
mountains, were pursued, and either slaughtered or sold for slaves.
The only way of escaping the sword was to remain, submit, and await
the fiat of the invader. Such a series of uninterrupted successes,
all achieved with little loss, it is rare in military history to
read. The capture of the rock of Aornos was peculiarly gratifying
to Alexander, because it enjoyed the legendary reputation of having
been assailed in vain by Herakles—and indeed he himself had deemed
it, at first sight, unassailable. After having thus subdued the upper
regions (above Attock or the confluence of the Kabul river) on the
right bank of the Indus, he availed himself of some forests alongside
to fell timber and build boats. These boats were sent down the
stream, to the point where Hephæstion and Perdikkas were preparing
the bridge.[537]

[535] Respecting the rock called Aornos, a valuable and elaborate
article, entitled “Gradus ad Aornon” has been published by Major
Abbott in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, No. iv.
1854. This article gives much information, collected mainly by
inquiries on the spot, and accompanied by a map, about the very
little known country west of the Indus, between the Kabool river
on the south, and the Hindoo-Koosh on the north.

Major Abbott attempts to follow the march and operations of
Alexander, from Alexandria ad Caucasum to the rock of Aornos (p.
311 _seq._). He shows highly probable reason for believing that
the Aornos described by Arrian is the Mount Mahabunn, near the
right bank of the Indus (lat. 34° 20´), about sixty miles above
its confluence with the Kabool river. “The whole account of
Arrian of the rock Aornos is a faithful picture of the Mahabunn.
It was the most remarkable feature of the country. It was the
refuge of all the neighboring tribes. It was covered with forest.
It had good soil sufficient for a thousand ploughs, and pure
springs of water everywhere abounded. It was 4125 feet above the
plain, and fourteen miles in circuit. The summit was a plain
where cavalry could act. It would be difficult to offer a more
faithful description of the Mahabunn. The side on which Alexander
scaled the main summit had certainly the character of a rock. But
the whole description of Arrian indicates a table mountain” (p.
341). The Mahabunn “is a mountain table, scarped on the east by
tremendous precipices, from which descends one large spur down
upon the Indus between Sitana and Umb” (p. 340).

To this similarity in so many local features, is to be added the
remarkable coincidence of name, between the town Embolima, where
Arrian states that Alexander established his camp for the purpose
of attacking Aornos—and the modern names Umb and Balimah (between
the Mahabunn and the Indus)—“the one in the river valley, the
other on the mountain immediately above it” (p. 344). Mount
Mahabunn is the natural refuge for the people of the neighborhood
from a conqueror, and was among the places taken by Nadir Shah
(p. 338).

A strong case of identity is thus made out between this mountain
and the Aornos _described by Arrian_. But undoubtedly it does not
coincide with the Aornos _described by Curtius_, who compares
Aornos to a Meta (the conical goal of the stadium), and says that
the Indus washed its base,—that at the first assault several
Macedonian soldiers were hurled down into the river. This close
juxtaposition of the Indus has been the principal feature looked
for by travellers who have sought for Aornos; but no place has
yet been found answering the conditions required. We have here
to make our election between Arrian and Curtius. Now there is
a general presumption in Arrian’s favor, in the description of
military operations, where he makes a positive statement; but in
this case, the presumption is peculiarly strong, because Ptolemy
was in the most conspicuous and difficult command for the capture
of Aornos, and was therefore likely to be particular in the
description of a scene where he had reaped much glory.

[536] Arrian, iv. 30, 13. ἡ στρατιὰ αὐτῷ ὡδοποίει τὸ πρόσω ἰοῦσα,
ἄπορα ἄλλως ὄντα τὰ ταύτῃ χωρία, etc.

The countries here traversed by Alexander include parts of
Kafiristan, Swart, Bajore, Chitral, the neighborhood of the
Kameh and other affluents of the river Kabul before it falls
into the Indus near Attock. Most of this is Terra Incognita
even at present; especially Kafiristan, a territory inhabited
by a population said to be rude and barbarous, but which has
never been conquered—nor indeed ever visited by strangers. It is
remarkable, that among the inhabitants of Kafiristan,—as well
as among those of Badakshan, on the other or northern side of
the Hindoo-Koosh—there exist traditions respecting Alexander,
together with a sort of belief that they themselves are descended
from his soldiers. See Ritter’s Erdkunde, part vii. book iii. p.
200 _seq._; Burnes’s Travels, vol. iii. ch. 4. p. 186, 2nd ed.;
Wilson, Ariana Antiqua, p. 194 _seq._

[537] Arrian, iv. 30, 16; v. 7, 2.

Such fatiguing operations of Alexander, accomplished amidst all
the hardships of winter, were followed by a halt of thirty days,
to refresh the soldiers before he crossed the Indus, in the early
spring of 326 B. C.[538] It is presumed, probably enough,
that he crossed at or near Attock, the passage now frequented. He
first marched to Taxila, where the prince Taxilus at once submitted,
and reinforced the army with a strong contingent of Indian soldiers.
His alliance and information was found extremely valuable. The whole
neighboring territory submitted, and was placed under Philippus
as satrap, with a garrison and depôt at Taxila. He experienced no
resistance until he reached the river Hydaspes (Jelum), on the other
side of which the Indian prince Porus stood prepared to dispute
the passage; a brave man, with a formidable force, better armed
than Indians generally were, and with many trained elephants; which
animals the Macedonians had never yet encountered in battle. By
a series of admirable military combinations, Alexander eluded the
vigilance of Porus, stole the passage of the river at a point a
few miles above, and completely defeated the Indian army. In spite
of their elephants, which were skilfully managed, the Indians
could not long withstand the shock of close combat, against such
cavalry and infantry as the Macedonian. Porus, a prince of gigantic
stature, mounted on an elephant, fought with the utmost gallantry,
rallying his broken troops and keeping them together until the last.
Having seen two of his sons slain, himself wounded and perishing
with thirst, he was only preserved by the special directions of
Alexander. When Porus was brought before him, Alexander was struck
with admiration at his stature, beauty, and undaunted bearing.[539]
Addressing him first, he asked, what Porus wished to be done for
him. “That you should treat me as a king,” was the reply of Porus.
Alexander, delighted with these words, behaved towards Porus with
the utmost courtesy and generosity; not only ensuring to him his
actual kingdom, but enlarging it by new additions. He found in
Porus a faithful and efficient ally. This was the greatest day of
Alexander’s life; if we take together the splendor and difficulty of
the military achievement, and the generous treatment of his conquered
opponent.[540]

[538] The halt of thirty days is mentioned by Diodorus, xvii. 86.
For the proof that these operations took place in winter, see the
valuable citation from Aristobulus given in Strabo (xv. p. 691).

[539] Arrian. v. 19, 1. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ὡς προσάγοντα ἐπύθετο,
προσιππεύσας πρὸ τῆς τάξεως σὺν ὀλίγοις τῶν ἑταίρων ἀπαντᾷ τῷ
Πώρῳ, καὶ ἐπιστήσας τὸν ἵππον, τό τε μέγεθος ἐθαύμαζεν ὑπὲρ πέντε
πήχεις μάλιστα ξυμβαῖνον, ~καὶ τὸ κάλλος τοῦ Πώρου~, καὶ ὅτι οὐ
δεδουλωμένος τῇ γνώμῃ ἐφαίνετο, etc.

We see here how Alexander was struck with the stature and
personal beauty of Porus, and how much these visual impressions
contributed to determine, or at least to strengthen, his
favorable sympathies towards the captive prince. This illustrates
what I have observed in the last chapter, in recounting his
treatment of the eunuch Batis after the capture of Gaza; that
the repulsive appearance of Batis greatly heightened Alexander’s
indignation. With a man of such violent impulses as Alexander,
these external impressions were of no inconsiderable moment.

[540] These operations are described in Arrian, v. 9. v. 19 (we
may remark that Ptolemy and Aristobulus, though both present,
differed on many points, v. 14); Curtius, viii. 13, 14; Diodor.
xvii. 87, 88. According to Plutarch (Alex. 60), Alexander dwelt
much upon the battle in his own letters.

There are two principal points—Jelum and Julalpoor—where high
roads from the Indus now cross the Hydaspes. Each of these
points have been assigned by different writers, as the probable
scene of the crossing of the river by Alexander. Of the two
Jelum (rather higher up the river than Julalpoor) seems the more
probable. Burnes points out that near Jelum the river is divided
into five or six channels with islands (Travels, vol. ii. ch. 2.
p. 50, 2nd ed.). Captain Abbott (in the Journal of the Asiatic
Society, Calcutta, Dec. 1848) has given an interesting memoir on
the features and course of the Hydaspes a little above Jelum,
comparing them with the particulars stated by Arrian, and showing
highly plausible reasons in support of this hypothesis—that the
crossing took place near Jelum.

Diodorus mentions a halt of thirty days, after the victory (xvii.
89), which seems not probable. Both he and Curtius allude to
numerous serpents, by which the army was annoyed between the
Akesines and the Hydraotes (Curtius, ix. 1, 11).

Alexander celebrated his victory by sacrifices to the gods, and
festivities on the banks of the Hydaspes; where he also gave
directions for the foundation of two cities—Nikæa, on the eastern
bank; and Bukephalia, on the western, so named in commemoration of
his favorite horse, who died here of age and fatigue.[541] Leaving
Kraterus to lay out and erect these new establishments, as well
as to keep up communication, he conducted his army onward in an
easterly direction towards the river Akesines (Chenab).[542] His
recent victory had spread terror around; the Glaukæ, a powerful
Indian tribe, with thirty-seven towns and many populous villages,
submitted, and were placed under the dominion of Porus; while
embassies of submission were also received from two considerable
princes—Abisares, and a second Porus, hitherto at enmity with his
namesake. The passage of the great river Akesines, now full and
impetuous in its current, was accomplished by boats and by inflated
hides, yet not without difficulty and danger. From thence he
proceeded onward in the same direction, across the Punjab—finding
no enemies, but leaving detachments at suitable posts to keep up
his communications and ensure his supplies—to the river Hydraotes
or Ravee; which, though not less broad and full than the Akesines,
was comparatively tranquil, so as to be crossed with facility.[543]
Here some free Indian tribes, Kathæans and others, had the courage
to resist. They first attempted to maintain themselves in Sangala by
surrounding their town with a triple entrenchment of waggons. These
being attacked and carried, they were driven within the walls, which
they now began to despair of defending, and resolved to evacuate by
night. But the project was divulged to Alexander by deserters, and
frustrated by his vigilance. On the next day, he took the town by
storm, putting to the sword 17,000 Indians, and taking (according to
Arrian) 70,000 captives. His own loss before the town was less than
100 killed, and 1200 wounded. Two neighboring towns, in alliance with
Sangala, were evacuated by their terrified inhabitants. Alexander
pursued, but could not overtake them, except 500 sick or weakly
persons, whom his soldiers put to death. Demolishing the town of
Sangala, he added the territory to the dominion of Porus, then
present, with a contingent of 5000 Indians.[544]

[541] Arrian states (v. 19, 5) that the victory over Porus
was gained in the month Munychion of the archon Hegemon at
Athens—that is, about the end of April, 326 B. C. This
date is not to be reconciled with another passage, v. 9, 6—where
he says that the summer solstice had already passed, and that all
the rivers of the Punjab were full of water, turbid and violent.

This swelling of the rivers begins about June; they do not attain
their full height until August. Moreover, the description of the
battle, as given both by Arrian and by Curtius, implies that it
took place after the rainy season had begun (Arrian, v. 9, 7; v.
12, 5. Curtius, viii. 14, 4).

Some critics have proposed to read _Metageitnion_ (July-August)
as the month, instead of _Munychion_; an alteration approved by
Mr. Clinton and received into the text by Schmieder. But if this
alteration be admitted, the name of the Athenian archon must be
altered also; for Metageitnion of the archon Hegemon would be
eight months earlier (July-August, 327 B. C.); and at
this date Alexander had not as yet crossed the Indus, as the
passage of Aristobulus (ap. Strabo. xv. p. 691) plainly shows—and
as Droysen and Mützel remark. Alexander did not cross the Indus
before the spring of 326 B. C. If, in place of the
archon Hegemon, we substitute the next following archon Chremês
(and it is remarkable that Diodorus assigns the battle to this
later archonship, xvii. 87), this would be July-August 326 B. C.;
which would be a more admissible date for the battle than the
preceding month of Munychion. At the same time, the substitution
of Metageitnion _is_ mere conjecture; and seems to leave hardly
time enough for the subsequent events. As far as an opinion can
be formed, it would seem that the battle was fought about the end
of June or beginning of July 326 B. C. after the rainy season had
commenced; towards the close of the archonship of Hegemon, and
the beginning of that of Chremes.

[542] Arrian, v. 20; Diodor. xvii. 95. Lieut. Wood (Journey to
the source of the Oxus, p. 11-39) remarks that the large rivers
of the Punjab change their course so often and so considerably,
that monuments and indications of Alexander’s march in that
territory cannot be expected to remain, especially in ground near
rivers.

[543] Arrian, v. 20.

[544] Arrian, v, 23, 24; Curtius, ix. 1, 15.

Sangala was the easternmost of all Alexander’s conquests. Presently
his march brought him to the river Hyphasis (Sutledge), the last of
the rivers in the Punjab—seemingly at a point below its confluence
with the Beas. Beyond this river, broad and rapid, Alexander was
informed that there lay a desert of eleven days’ march, extending
to a still greater river called the Ganges; beyond which dwelt the
Gandaridæ, the most powerful, warlike, and populous, of all the
Indian tribes, distinguished for the number and training of their
elephants.[545] The prospect of a difficult march, and of an enemy
esteemed invincible, only instigated his ardor. He gave orders for
the crossing. But here for the first time his army, officers as
well as soldiers, manifested symptoms of uncontrollable weariness;
murmuring aloud at these endless toils, and marches they knew not
whither. They had already over-passed the limits where Dionysus
and Herakles were said to have stopped: they were travelling into
regions hitherto unvisited either by Greeks or by Persians, merely
for the purpose of provoking and conquering new enemies. Of victories
they were sated; of their plunder, abundant as it was, they had
no enjoyment;[546] the hardships of a perpetual onward march,
often excessively accelerated, had exhausted both men and horses;
moreover, their advance from the Hydaspes had been accomplished in
the wet season, under rains more violent and continued than they had
ever before experienced.[547] Informed of the reigning discontent,
Alexander assembled his officers and harangued them, endeavoring
to revive in them that forward spirit and promptitude which he had
hitherto found not inadequate to his own.[548] But he entirely
failed. No one indeed dared openly to contradict him. Kœnus alone
hazarded some words of timid dissuasion; the rest manifested a
passive and sullen repugnance, even when he proclaimed that those
who desired might return, with the shame of having deserted their
king, while he would march forward with the volunteers only. After a
suspense of two days, passed in solitary and silent mortification—he
still apparently persisted in his determination, and offered the
sacrifice usual previous to the passage of a river. The victims were
inauspicious; he bowed to the will of the gods; and gave orders for
return, to the unanimous and unbounded delight of his army.[549]

[545] Curtius, ix. 2, 3; Diodor. xvii. 93; Plutarch, Alex. 62.

[546] Curtius, ix. 3, 11 (speech of Kœnus). “Quoto cuique lorica
est? Quis equum habet? Jube quæri, quam multos servi ipsorum
persecuti sint, quid cuique supersit ex prædâ. Omnium victores,
omnium inopes sumus.”

[547] Aristobulus ap. Strabo. xv. p. 691-697. ὕεσθαι συνεχῶς.
Arrian, v, 29, 8; Diodor. xvii. 93. χειμῶνες ἄγριοι κατεῤῥάγησαν
ἐφ᾽ ἡμέρας ἑβδομήκοντα, καὶ βρονταὶ συνεχεῖς καὶ κεραυνοὶ
κατέσκηπτον, etc.

[548] In the speech which Arrian (v. 25, 26) puts into the mouth
of Alexander, the most curious point is, the geographical views
which he promulgates. “We have not much farther now to march (he
was standing on the western bank of the Sutledge) to the river
Ganges, and the great Eastern Sea which surrounds the whole
earth. The Hyrkanian (Caspian) Sea joins on to this great sea on
one side, the Persian Gulf on the other; after we have subdued
all those nations which lie before us eastward towards the Great
Sea, and northward towards the Hyrkanian Sea, we shall then sail
by water first to the Persian Gulf, next round Libya to the
pillars of Herakles; from thence we shall march back all through
Libya, and add it to all Asia as parts of our empire.” (I here
abridge rather than translate).

It is remarkable, that while Alexander made so prodigious an
error in narrowing the eastern limits of Asia, the Ptolemaic
geography, recognized in the time of Columbus, made an error not
less in the opposite direction, stretching it too far to the
East. It was upon the faith of this last mistake, that Columbus
projected his voyage of circumnavigation from Western Europe,
expecting to come to the eastern coast of Asia from the West,
after no great length of voyage.

[549] Arrian, v. 28, 7. The fact that Alexander, under all
this insuperable repugnance of his soldiers, still offered the
sacrifice preliminary to crossing—is curious as an illustration
of his character, and was specially attested by Ptolemy.

To mark the last extremity of his eastward progress, he erected
twelve altars of extraordinary height and dimension on the western
bank of the Hyphasis, offering sacrifices of thanks to the gods,
with the usual festivities, and matches of agility and force. Then,
having committed all the territory west of the Hyphasis to the
government of Porus, he marched back, repassed the Hydraotes and
Akesines, and returned to the Hydaspes near the point where he had
first crossed it. The two new cities—Bukephalia and Nikæa—which he
had left orders for commencing on that river, had suffered much from
the rains and inundations during his forward march to the Hyphasis,
and now required the aid of the army to repair the damage.[550] The
heavy rains continued throughout most of his return march to the
Hydaspes.[551]

[550] Arrian, v. 29, 8; Diodor. xvii. 95.

[551] Aristobulus ap. Strab. xv. p. 691—until the rising of
Arkturus. Diodorus says, 70 days (xvii. 73), which seems more
probable.

On coming back to this river, Alexander received a large
reinforcement both of cavalry and infantry, sent to him from Europe,
together with 25,000 new panoplies, and a considerable stock of
medicines.[552] Had these reinforcements reached him on the Hyphasis,
it seems not impossible that he might have prevailed on his army to
accompany him in his farther advance to the Ganges and the regions
beyond. He now employed himself, assisted by Porus and Taxilus, in
collecting and constructing a fleet for sailing down the Hydaspes and
thence down to the mouth of the Indus. By the early part of November,
a fleet of nearly 2000 boats or vessels of various sizes having
been prepared, he began his voyage.[553] Kraterus marched with one
division of the army, along the right bank of the Hydaspes—Hephæstion
on the left bank with the remainder, including 200 elephants;
Nearchus had the command of the fleet in the river, on board of
which was Alexander himself. He pursued his voyage slowly down the
river, to the confluence of the Hydaspes with the Akesines—with the
Hydraotes—and with the Hyphasis—all pouring, in one united stream,
into the Indus. He sailed down the Indus to its junction with the
Indian Ocean. Altogether this voyage occupied nine months,[554]
from November 326 B. C. to August 325 B. C. But it was a voyage full
of active military operations on both sides of the river. Alexander
perpetually disembarked to attack, subdue, and slaughter all such
nations near the banks as did not voluntarily submit. Among them were
the Malli and Oxydrakæ, free and brave tribes, who resolved to defend
their liberty, but, unfortunately for themselves, were habitually
at variance, and could not now accomplish any hearty co-operation
against the common invader.[555] Alexander first assailed the Malli
with his usual celerity and vigor, beat them with slaughter in the
field, and took several of their towns.[556] There remained only
their last and strongest town, from which the defenders were already
driven out and forced to retire to the citadel.[557] Thither they
were pursued by the Macedonians, Alexander being among the foremost,
with only a few guards near him. Impatient because the troops with
their scaling-ladders did not come up more rapidly, he mounted upon
a ladder that happened to be at hand, attended only by Peukestes and
one or two others, with an adventurous courage even transcending what
he was wont to display. Having cleared the wall by killing several
of its defenders, he jumped down into the interior of the citadel,
and made head for some time, nearly alone, against all within. He
received however a bad wound from an arrow in the breast, and was
on the point of fainting, when his soldiers burst in, rescued him,
and took the place. Every person within, man, woman, and child, was
slain.[558]

[552] Diodor. xvii. 95; Curtius, ix. 3, 21.

[553] The voyage was commenced a few days before the setting of
the Pleiades (Aristobulus, ap. Strab. xv. p. 692).

For the number of the ships, see Ptolemy ap. Arrian, vi. 2, 8.

On seeing crocodiles in the Indus, Alexander was at first led
to suppose that it was the same river as the Nile, and that he
had discovered the higher course of the Nile, from whence it
flowed into Egypt. This is curious, as an illustration of the
geographical knowledge of the time (Arrian, vi. 1, 3).

[554] Aristobulus ap. Strab. xv. p. 692. Aristobulus said that
the downward voyage occupied ten months; this seems longer than
the exact reality. Moreover Aristobulus said that they had no
rain during all the voyage down, through all the summer months:
Nearchus stated the contrary (Strabo, _l. c._).

[555] Curtius, ix. 4, 15; Diodor. xvii 98.

[556] Arrian, vi. 7, 8.

[557] This last stronghold of the Malli is supposed, by Mr.
Cunningham and others, to have been the modern city of Multan.
The river Ravee or Hydraotes is said to have formerly run past
the city of Multan into the Chenab or Akesines.

[558] Arrian, vi. 9, 10, 11. He notices the great discrepancy
in the various accounts given of this achievement and dangerous
wound of Alexander.

Compare Diodor. xvii. 98, 99; Curtius, ix. 4, 5; Plutarch, Alex.
63.

The wound of Alexander was so severe, that he was at first reported
to be dead to the great consternation and distress of the army.
However, he became soon sufficiently recovered to show himself, and
to receive their ardent congratulations, in the camp established at
the point of junction between the Hydraotes (Ravee) and Akesines
(Chenab).[559] His voyage down the river, though delayed by the care
of his wound, was soon resumed and prosecuted, with the same active
operations by his land-force on both sides to subjugate all the
Indian tribes and cities within accessible distance. At the junction
of the river Akesines (Punjnud) with the Indus, Alexander directed
the foundation of a new city, with adequate docks and conveniences
for ship-building, whereby he expected to command the internal
navigation.[560] Having no farther occasion now for so large a
land-force, he sent a large portion of it, under Kraterus, westward
(seemingly through the pass now called Bolan) into Karmania.[561] He
established another military and naval post at Pattala, where the
Delta of the Indus divided; and he then sailed, with a portion of his
fleet, down the right arm of the river to have the first sight of the
Indian Ocean. The view of ebbing and flowing tide, of which none had
had experience on the scale there exhibited, occasioned to all much
astonishment and alarm.[562]

[559] Arrian, xi. 13.

[560] Arrian, xi. 15, 5.

[561] Arrian, xi. 17, 6; Strabo, xv. p. 721.

[562] Arrian, xi. 18, 19; Curtius, ix. 9. He reached Pattala
towards the middle or end of July, περὶ κυνὸς ἐπιτολήν (Strabo,
xv. p. 692).

The site of Pattala has been usually looked for near the modern
Tatta. But Dr. Kennedy, in his recent ‘Narrative of the Campaign
of the Army of the Indus in Scinde and Kabool’ (ch. v. p.
104), shows some reasons for thinking that it must have been
considerably higher up the river than Tatta; somewhere near
Sehwan. “The delta commencing about 130 miles above the sea, its
northern apex would be somewhere midway between Hyderabad and
Sehwan; where local traditions still speak of ancient cities
destroyed, and of greater changes having occurred than in any
other part of the course of the Indus.”

The constant changes in the course of the Indus, however (compare
p. 73 of his work), noticed by all observers, render every
attempt at such identification conjectural—see Wood’s Journey to
the Oxus, p. 12.

The fleet was now left to be conducted by the admiral Nearchus,
from the mouth of the Indus round by the Persian Gulf to that of
the Tigris: a memorable nautical enterprise in Grecian antiquity.
Alexander himself (about the month of August) began his march by land
westward through the territories of the Arabitæ and the Oritæ, and
afterwards through the deserts of Gedrosia. Pura, the principal town
of the Gedrosians, was sixty days’ march from the boundary of the
Oritæ.[563]

[563] Arrian, vi. 24, 2; Strabo, xv. p. 723.

Here his army, though without any formidable opposing enemy,
underwent the most severe and deplorable sufferings; their march
being through a sandy and trackless desert, with short supplies of
food and still shorter supplies of water, under a burning sun. The
loss in men, horses, and baggage-cattle from thirst, fatigue, and
disease was prodigious; and it required all the unconquerable energy
of Alexander to bring through even the diminished number.[564] At
Pura the army obtained repose and refreshment, and was enabled to
march forward into Karmania, where Kraterus joined them with his
division from the Indus, and Kleander with the division which had
been left at Ekbatana. Kleander, accused of heinous crimes in his
late command, was put to death or imprisoned: several of his comrades
were executed. To recompense the soldiers for their recent distress
in Gedrosia, the king conducted them for seven days in drunken
bacchanalian procession through Karmania, himself and all his friends
taking part in the revelry; an imitation of the jovial festivity
and triumph with which the god Dionysus had marched back from the
conquest of India.[565]

[564] Arrian, vi. 25, 26; Curtius. ix. 10; Plutarch, Alex. 66.

[565] Curtius, ix. 10; Diodor. xvii. 106; Plutarch, Alex. 67.
Arrian (vi. 28) found this festal progress mentioned in some
authorities, but not in others. Neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus
mentioned it. Accordingly Arrian refuses to believe it. There
may have been exaggerations or falsities as to the details of
the march; but as a general fact, I see no sufficient ground for
disbelieving it. A season of excessive license to the soldiers,
after their extreme suffering in Gedrosia, was by no means
unnatural to grant. Moreover, it corresponds to the general
conception of the returning march of Dionysus in antiquity,
while the imitation of that god was quite in conformity with
Alexander’s turn of sentiment.

I have already remarked, that the silence of Ptolemy and
Aristobulus is too strongly insisted on, both by Arrian and by
others, as a reason for disbelieving affirmations respecting
Alexander.

Arrian and Curtius (x. 1) differ in their statements about the
treatment of Kleander. According to Arrian, he was put to death;
according to Curtius, he was spared from death, and simply put
in prison, in consequence of the important service which he had
rendered by killing Parmenio with his own hand; while 600 of his
accomplices and agents were put to death.

During the halt in Karmania Alexander had the satisfaction of seeing
his admiral Nearchus,[566] who had brought the fleet round from the
mouth of the Indus to the harbor called Harmozeia (Ormuz), not far
from the entrance of the Persian Gulf; a voyage of much hardship
and distress, along the barren coasts of the Oritæ, the Gedrosians,
and the Ichthyophagi.[567] Nearchus, highly commended and honored,
was presently sent back to complete his voyage as far as the mouth
of the Euphrates; while Hephæstion also was directed to conduct the
larger portion of the army, with the elephants and heavy baggage,
by the road near the coast from Karmania into Persis. This road,
though circuitous, was the most convenient, as it was now the winter
season;[568] but Alexander himself, with the lighter divisions of his
army, took the more direct mountain road from Karmania to Pasargadæ
and Persepolis. Visiting the tomb of Cyrus the Great, founder of the
Persian empire, he was incensed to find it violated and pillaged.
He caused it to be carefully restored, put to death a Macedonian
named Polymachus as the offender, and tortured the Magian guardians
of it for the purpose of discovering accomplices, but in vain.[569]
Orsines, satrap of Persis, was however accused of connivance in
the deed, as well as of various acts of murder and spoliation:
according to Curtius, he was not only innocent, but had manifested
both good faith and devotion to Alexander;[570] in spite of which
he became a victim of the hostility of the favorite eunuch Bagoas,
who both poisoned the king’s mind with calumnies of his own, and
suborned other accusers with false testimony. Whatever may be the
truth of the story, Alexander caused Orsines to be hanged; naming as
satrap Peukestes, whose favor was now high, partly as comrade and
preserver of the king in his imminent danger at the citadel of the
Malli,—partly from his having adopted the Persian dress, manners, and
language more completely than any other Macedonian.[571]

[566] Nearchus had begun his voyage about the end of September,
or beginning of October (Arrian, Indic. 21; Strabo, xv. p. 721).

[567] Arrian, vi. 28, 7; Arrian, Indica, c. 33-37.

[568] Arrian, vi. 28, 12-29, 1.

[569] Plutarch, Alex. 69; Arrian, vi. 29, 17; Strabo, xv. p. 730.

[570] Arrian, vi. 30, 2; Curtius, x. 1, 23-38. “Hic fuit exitus
nobilissimi Persarum, nec insontis modo, sed eximiæ quoque
benignitatis in regem.” The great favor which the beautiful
eunuch Bagoas (though Arrian does not mention him) enjoyed
with Alexander, and the exalted position which he occupied,
are attested by good contemporary evidence, especially the
philosopher Dikæarchus—see Athenæ. xiii. p. 603; Dikæarch. Fragm.
19. ap. Hist. Græc. Fragm. Didot, vol. ii. p. 241. Compare the
Fragments of Eumenes and Diodotus (Ælian, V. H. iii. 23) in
Didot, Fragm. Scriptor. Hist. Alex. Magni, p. 121; Plutarch De
Adul. et Amic. Discrim. p. 65.

[571] Arrian, vi. 30; Curtius, x. 1, 22-30.

It was about February, in 324 B. C.,[572] that Alexander
marched out of Persis to Susa. During this progress, at the point
where he crossed the Pasitigris, he was again joined by Nearchus, who
having completed his circumnavigation from the mouth of the Indus
to that of the Euphrates, had sailed back with the fleet from the
latter river and come up the Pasitigris.[573] It is probable that
the division of Hephæstion also rejoined him at Susa, and that the
whole army was there for the first time brought together, after the
separation in Karmania.

[572] Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. B. C. 325, also Append. p.
232) places the arrival of Alexander in Susiana, on his return
march, in the month of February B. C. 325; a year too early, in
my opinion. I have before remarked on the views of Mr. Clinton
respecting the date of Alexander’s victory over Porus on the
Hydaspes, where he alters the name of the month as it stands
in the text of Arrian (following Schmieder’s conjecture), and
supposes that battle to have occurred in August B. C. 327 instead
of April B. C. 326. Mr. Clinton antedates by one year all the
proceedings of Alexander subsequent to his quitting Baktria
for the last time in the summer of B. C. 327. Dr. Vincent’s
remark—“that the supposition of _two winters_ occurring after
Alexander’s return to Susa is not borne out by the historians”
(see Clinton. p. 232), is a perfectly just one; and Mitford has
not replied to it in a satisfactory manner. In my judgment,
there was only an interval of sixteen months (not an interval of
twenty-eight months, as Mr. Clinton supposes) between the return
of Alexander to Susa and his death at Babylon (Feb. 324 B. C. to
June 323 B. C.).

[573] Arrian, vii. 5. 9; Arrian, Indica, c. 42. The voluntary
death of Kalanus the Indian Gymnosophist must have taken place
at Susa (where Diodorus places it—xvii. 107), and not in Persis;
for Nearchus was seemingly present at the memorable scene of the
funeral pile (Arrian, vii. 3, 9)—and he was not with Alexander in
Persis.

In Susa and Susiana Alexander spent some months. For the first time
since his accession to the throne, he had now no military operations
in hand or in immediate prospect. No enemy was before him, until it
pleased him to go in quest of a new one;—nor indeed could any new
one be found, except at a prodigious distance. He had emerged from
the perils of the untrodden East, and had returned into the ordinary
localities and conditions of Persian rule, occupying that capital
city from whence the great Achæmenid kings had been accustomed to
govern the Western as well as the Eastern portions of their vast
empire. To their post, and to their irritable love of servility,
Alexander had succeeded; but bringing with him a restless energy such
as none of them except the first founder Cyrus had manifested—and a
splendid military genius, such as was unknown alike to Cyrus and to
his successors.

In the new position of Alexander, his principal subjects of
uneasiness were, the satraps and the Macedonian soldiers. During
the long interval (more than five years) which had elapsed since he
marched eastward from Hyrkania in pursuit of Bessus, the satraps had
necessarily been left much to themselves. Some had imagined that
he would never return; an anticipation noway unreasonable, since
his own impulse towards forward march was so insatiate that he was
only constrained to return by the resolute opposition of his own
soldiers; moreover his dangerous wound among the Malli, and his
calamitous march through Gedrôsia, had given rise to reports of
his death, credited for some time even by Olympias and Kleopatra
in Macedonia.[574] Under these uncertainties, some satraps stood
accused of having pillaged rich temples, and committed acts of
violence towards individuals. Apart from all criminality, real
or alleged, several of them, also, had taken into pay bodies of
mercenary troops, partly as a necessary means of authority in their
respective districts, partly as a protection to themselves in the
event of Alexander’s decease. Respecting the conduct of the satraps
and their officers, many denunciations and complaints were sent in;
to which Alexander listened readily and even eagerly, punishing the
accused with indiscriminate rigor, and resenting especially the
suspicion that they had calculated upon his death.[575] Among those
executed, were Abulites, satrap of Susiana, with his son Oxathres;
the latter was even slain by the hands of Alexander himself, with a
sarissa[576]—the dispensation of punishment becoming in his hands
an outburst of exasperated temper. He also despatched peremptory
orders to all the satraps, enjoining them to dismiss their mercenary
troops without delay.[577] This measure produced considerable
effect on the condition of Greece—about which I shall speak in a
subsequent chapter. Harpalus, satrap of Babylon (about whom also
more, presently), having squandered large sums out of the revenues of
the post upon ostentatious luxury, became terrified when Alexander
was approaching Susiana, and fled to Greece with a large treasure
and a small body of soldiers.[578] Serious alarm was felt among all
the satraps and officers, innocent as well as guilty. That the most
guilty were not those who fared worst, we may see by the case of
Kleomenes in Egypt, who remained unmolested in his government, though
his iniquities were no secret.[579]

[574] Plutarch, Alexand. 68.

[575] Arrian, vii. 4, 2-5; Diodor. xvii. 108; Curtius, x. 1,
7. “Cœperat esse præceps ad repræsentanda supplicia, item ad
deteriora credenda” (Curtius, x. 1, 39).

[576] Plutarch, Alex. 68.

[577] Diodor. xvii. 106-111.

[578] Among the accusations which reached Alexander against this
satrap, we are surprised to find a letter addressed to him (ἐν
τῇ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον ἐπιστολῇ) by the Greek historian Theopompus;
who set forth with indignation the extravagant gifts and honors
heaped by Harpalus upon his two successive mistresses—Pythionikê
and Glykera; celebrated Hetæræ from Athens. These proceedings
Theopompus describes as insults to Alexander (Theopompus ap.
Athenæ. xiii. p. 586-595; Fragment. 277, 278 ed. Didot).

The satyric drama called Ἀγὴν, represented before Alexander at
a period subsequent to the flight of Harpalus, cannot have been
represented (as Athenæus states it to have been) on the banks
of _the Hydaspes_, because Harpalus did not make his escape
until he was frightened by the approach of Alexander _returning_
from India. At the Hydaspes, Alexander was still on his outward
progress; very far off, and without any idea of returning.
It appears to me that the words of Athenæus respecting this
drama—ἐδίδαξε Διονυσίων ὄντων ἐπὶ τοῦ ~Ὑδάσπου~ τοῦ ποταμοῦ
(xiii, p. 595)—involve a mistake or misreading; and that it
ought to stand ἐπὶ τοῦ ~Χοάσπου~ τοῦ ποταμοῦ. I may remark that
the words _Medus Hydaspes_ in Virgil, Georg. iv. 211, probably
involve the same confusion. The Choaspes was the river, near
Susa; and this drama was performed before Alexander at Susa
during the Dionysia of the year 324 B. C., after
Harpalus had fled. The Dionysia were in the month Elaphebolion;
now Alexander did not fight Porus on the Hydaspes until the
succeeding month Munychion at the earliest—and probably later.
And even if we suppose (which is not probable) that he reached
the Hydaspes in Elaphebolion, he would have no leisure to
celebrate dramas and a Dionysiac festival, while the army of
Porus was waiting for him on the opposite bank. Moreover it is no
way probable that, on the remote Hydaspes, he had any actors or
chorus, or means of celebrating dramas at all.

[579] Arrian, vii. 18, 2; vii. 23, 9-13.

Among the Macedonian soldiers, discontent had been perpetually
growing, from the numerous proofs which they witnessed that Alexander
had made his election for an Asiatic character, and abnegated his own
country. Besides his habitual adoption of the Persian costume and
ceremonial, he now celebrated a sort of national Asiatic marriage at
Susa. He had already married the captive Roxana, in Baktria; he next
took two additional wives—Statira, daughter of Darius—and Parysatis,
daughter of the preceding king Ochus. He at the same time caused
eighty of his principal friends and officers, some very reluctantly,
to marry (according to Persian rites) wives selected from the
noblest Persian families, providing dowries for all of them.[580] He
made presents besides, to all those Macedonians who gave in their
names as having married Persian women. Splendid festivities[581]
accompanied these nuptials, with honorary rewards distributed to
favorites and meritorious officers. Macedonians and Persians, the
two imperial races, one in Europe, the other in Asia, were thus
intended to be amalgamated. To soften the aversion of the soldiers
generally towards these Asiatising marriages,[582] Alexander issued
proclamation that he would himself discharge their debts, inviting
all who owed money to give in their names with an intimation of the
sums due. It was known that the debtors were numerous; yet few came
to enter their names. The soldiers suspected the proclamation as
a stratagem, intended for the purpose of detecting such as were
spendthrifts, and obtaining a pretext for punishment: a remarkable
evidence how little confidence or affection Alexander now inspired,
and how completely the sentiment entertained towards him was that
of fear mingled with admiration. He himself was much hurt at their
mistrust, and openly complained of it; at the same time proclaiming
that paymasters and tables should be planted openly in the camp,
and that any soldier might come and ask for money enough to pay
his debts, without being bound to give in his name. Assured of
secrecy, they now made application in such numbers that the total
distributed was prodigiously great; reaching, according to some, to
10,000 talents—according to Arrian, not less than 20,000 talents or
£4,600,000 sterling.[583]

[580] Arrian, vii. 4, 6-9. By these two marriages, Alexander thus
engrafted himself upon the two lines of antecedent Persian Kings.
Ochus was of the Achæmenid family, but Darius Codomannus, father
of Statira, was not of that family; he began a new lineage. About
the overweening regal state of Alexander, outdoing even the
previous Persian kings, see Phylarchus ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 539.

[581] Chares ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 538.

[582] Arrian, vii. 6, 3. καὶ τοὺς γάμους ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῷ Περσικῷ
ποιηθέντας οὐ πρὸς θυμοῦ γενέσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς αὐτῶν, οὐδὲ τῶν
γημάντων ἐστὶν οἷς, etc.

[583] Arrian, vii. 5; Plutarch, Alexand. 70; Curtius, x. 2, 9;
Diodor. xvii. 109.

Large as this donative was, it probably gave but partial
satisfaction, since the most steady and well-conducted soldiers could
have received no benefit, except in so far as they might choose to
come forward with fictitious debts. A new modification moreover was
in store for the soldiers generally. There arrived from the various
satrapies—even from those most distant, Sogdiana, Baktria, Aria,
Drangiana, Arachosia, etc.—contingents of young and fresh native
troops, amounting in total to 30,000 men; all armed and drilled
in the Macedonian manner. From the time when the Macedonians had
refused to cross the river Hyphasis and march forward into India,
Alexander saw, that for his large aggressive schemes it was necessary
to disband the old soldiers, and to organize an army at once more
fresh and more submissive. He accordingly despatched orders to the
satraps to raise and discipline new Asiatic levies, of vigorous
native youths; and the fruit of these orders was now seen.[584]
Alexander reviewed the new levies, whom he called the Epigoni, with
great satisfaction. He moreover incorporated many native Persians,
both officers and soldiers, into the Companion-cavalry, the most
honorable service in the army; making the important change of arming
them with the short Macedonian thrusting-pike in place of the missile
Persian javelin. They were found such apt soldiers, and the genius of
Alexander for military organization was so consummate, that he saw
himself soon released from his dependence on the Macedonian veterans;
a change evident enough to them as well as to him.[585]

[584] Diodor. xvii. 108. It must have taken some time to get
together and discipline these young troops; Alexander must
therefore have sent the orders from India.

[585] Arrian, vii. 6.

The novelty and success of Nearchus in his exploring voyage had
excited in Alexander an eager appetite for naval operations. Going on
board his fleet in the Pasitigris (the Karun, the river on the east
side of Susa), he sailed in person down to the Persian Gulf, surveyed
the coast as far as the mouth of the Tigris, and then sailed up the
latter river as far as Opis. Hephæstion meanwhile, commanding the
army, marched by land in concert with this voyage, and came back to
Opis, where Alexander disembarked.[586]

[586] Arrian, vii. 7.

Sufficient experiment had now been made with the Asiatic levies, to
enable Alexander to dispense with many of his Macedonian veterans.
Calling together the army, he intimated his intention of sending
home those who were unfit for service either from age or wounds, but
of allotting to them presents at departure sufficient to place them
in an enviable condition, and attract fresh Macedonian substitutes.
On hearing this intimation, all the long-standing discontent of the
soldiers at once broke out. They felt themselves set aside as worn
out and useless,—and set aside, not to make room for younger men of
their own country, but in favor of those Asiatics into whose arms
their king had now passed. They demanded with a loud voice that he
should dismiss them all—advising him by way of taunt to make his
future conquests along with his father Ammon. These manifestations so
incensed Alexander, that he leaped down from the elevated platform on
which he had stood to speak, rushed with a few of his guards among
the crowd of soldiers, and seized or caused to be seized thirteen
of those apparently most forward, ordering them immediately to be
put to death. The multitude were thoroughly overawed and reduced to
silence, upon which Alexander remounted the platform and addressed
them in a speech of considerable length. He boasted of the great
exploits of Philip, and of his own still greater: he affirmed that
all the benefit of his conquests had gone to the Macedonians, and
that he himself had derived from them nothing but a double share of
the common labors, hardships, wounds, and perils. Reproaching them
as base deserters from a king who had gained for them all these
unparalleled acquisitions, he concluded by giving discharge to
all—commanding them forthwith to depart.[587]

[587] Arrian, vii. 9, 10; Plutarch, Alex. 71; Curtius, x. 2;
Justin, xii. 11.

After this speech—teeming (as we read it in Arrian) with that
exorbitant self-exaltation which formed the leading feature in
his character—Alexander hurried away into the palace, where he
remained shut up for two days without admitting any one except his
immediate attendants. His guards departed along with him, leaving
the discontented soldiers stupefied and motionless. Receiving no
farther orders, nor any of the accustomed military indications,[588]
they were left in the helpless condition of soldiers constrained to
resolve for themselves, and at the same time altogether dependent
upon Alexander whom they had offended. On the third day, they learnt
that he had convened the Persian officers, and had invested them with
the chief military commands, distributing the newly arrived Epigoni
into divisions of infantry and cavalry, all with Macedonian military
titles, and passing over the Macedonians themselves as if they did
not exist. At this news, the soldiers were overwhelmed with shame and
remorse. They rushed to the gates of the palace, threw down their
arms, and supplicated with tears and groans for Alexander’s pardon.
Presently he came out, and was himself moved to tears by seeing their
prostrate deportment. After testifying his full reconciliation,
he caused a solemn sacrifice to be celebrated, coupled with a
multitudinous banquet of mixed Macedonians and Persians. The Grecian
prophets, the Persian magi and all the guests present, united in
prayer and libation for fusion, harmony, and community of empire,
between the two nations.[589]

[588] See the description given by Tacitus (Hist. ii. 29) of
the bringing round of the Vitellian army,—which had mutinied
against the general Fabius Valens:—“Tum Alphenus Varus,
præfectus castrorum, deflagrante paulatim seditione, addit
consilium—vetitis obire vigilias centurionibus, omisso tubæ
sono, quo miles ad belli munia cietur. Igitur torpere cuncti,
circumspectare inter se attoniti, _et id ipsum, quod nemo
regeret, paventes_; silentio, patientiâ, postremo precibus et
lacrymis veniam quærebant. Ut vero deformis et fiens, et præter
spem incolumis, Valens processit, gaudium, miseratio, favor;
versi in lætitiam (ut est vulgus utroque immodicum) laudantes
gratantesque, circumdatum aquilis signisque, in tribunal ferunt.”

Compare also the narrative in Xenophon (Anab. i. 3) of the
embarrassment of the Ten Thousand Greeks at Tarsus, when they at
first refused to obey Klearchus and march against the Great King.

[589] Arrian, vii. 11.

This complete victory over his own soldiers was probably as
gratifying to Alexander as any one gained during his past life;
carrying as it did a consoling retribution for the memorable stoppage
on the banks of the Hyphasis, which he had neither forgotten nor
forgiven. He selected 10,000 of the oldest and most exhausted among
the soldiers to be sent home under Kraterus, giving to each full pay
until the time of arrival in Macedonia, with a donation of one talent
besides. He intended that Kraterus, who was in bad health, should
remain in Europe as viceroy of Macedonia, and that Antipater should
come out to Asia with a reinforcement of troops.[590] Pursuant to
this resolution, the 10,000 soldiers were now singled out for return,
and separated from the main army. Yet it does not appear that they
actually did return, during the ten months of Alexander’s remaining
life.

[590] Arrian, vii. 12, 1-7; Justin, xii. 12. Kraterus was
especially popular with the Macedonian soldiers, because he had
always opposed, as much as he dared, the Oriental transformation
of Alexander (Plutarch, Eumenes, 6).

Of the important edict issued this summer by Alexander to the
Grecian cities, and read at the Olympic festival in July—directing
each city to recall its exiled citizens—I shall speak in a future
chapter. He had now accomplished his object of organizing a land
force, half Macedonian, half Asiatic. But since the expedition of
Nearchus, he had become bent upon a large extension of his naval
force also; which was indeed an indispensable condition towards
his immediate projects of conquering Arabia, and of pushing both
nautical exploration and aggrandizement from the Persian Gulf round
the Arabian coast. He despatched orders to the Phenician ports,
directing that a numerous fleet should be built; and that the ships
should then be taken to pieces, and conveyed across to Thapsakus
on the Euphrates, from whence they would sail down to Babylon. At
that place, he directed the construction of other ships from the
numerous cypress trees around—as well as the formation of an enormous
harbor in the river at Babylon, adequate to the accommodation of
1000 ships of war. Mikkalus, a Greek of Klazomenæ, was sent to
Phenicia with 500 talents, to enlist, or to purchase, seamen for the
crews. It was calculated that these preparations (probably under the
superintendence of Nearchus) would be completed by the spring, for
which period contingents were summoned to Babylon for the expedition
against Arabia.[591]

[591] Arrian, vii. 19. He also sent an officer named Herakleides
to the shores of the Caspian sea, with orders to construct ships
and make a survey of that sea (vii. 16).

In the mean time, Alexander himself paid a visit to Ekbatana, the
ordinary summer residence of the Persian kings. He conducted his army
by leisurely marches, reviewing by the way the ancient regal parks
of the celebrated breed called Nisæan horses now greatly reduced in
number.[592] On the march, a violent altercation occurred between his
personal favorite Hephæstion,—and his secretary Eumenes, the most
able, dexterous, and long-sighted man in his service. Eumenes, as a
Greek of Kardia, had been always regarded with slight and jealousy by
the Macedonian officers, especially by Hephæstion; Alexander now took
pains to reconcile the two, experiencing no difficulty with Eumenes,
but much with Hephæstion.[593] During his stay at Ekbatana, he
celebrated magnificent sacrifices and festivities, with gymnastic and
musical exhibitions, which were farther enlivened, according to the
Macedonian habits, by banquets and excessive wine-drinking. Amidst
these proceedings, Hephæstion was seized with a fever. The vigor of
his constitution emboldened him to neglect all care or regimen, so
that in a few days the disease carried him off. The final crisis came
on suddenly, and Alexander was warned of it while sitting in the
theatre; but though he instantly hurried to the bedside, he found
Hephæstion already dead. His sorrow for this loss was unbounded,
manifesting itself in excesses suitable to the general violence of
his impulses, whether of affection or of antipathy. Like Achilles
mourning for Patroklus, he cast himself on the ground near the dead
body, and remained there wailing for several hours; he refused
all care, and even food, for two days; he cut his hair close, and
commanded that all the horses and mules in the camp should have their
manes cut close also; he not only suspended the festivities, but
interdicted all music and every sign of joy in the camp; he directed
that the battlements of the walls belonging to the neighboring cities
should be struck off; he hung, or crucified, the physician Glaukias,
who had prescribed for Hephæstion; he ordered that a vast funeral
pile should be erected at Babylon, at a cost given to us as 10,000
talents (£2,300,000), to celebrate the obsequies; he sent messengers
to the oracle of Ammon, to inquire whether it was permitted to
worship Hephæstion as a god. Many of those around him, accommodating
themselves to this passionate impulse of the ruler, began at once
to show a sort of worship towards the deceased, by devoting to
him themselves and their arms; of which Eumenes set the example,
conscious of his own personal danger, if Alexander should suspect
him of being pleased at the death of his recent rival. Perdikkas was
instructed to convey the body in solemn procession to Babylon, there
to be burnt in state when preparations should be completed.[594]

[592] Arrian, vii. 13, 2; Diodor. xvii. 110. How leisurely the
march was may be seen in Diodorus.

The direction of Alexander’s march from Susa to Ekbatana, along
a frequented and good road which Diodorus in another place
calls a royal road (xix. 19), is traced by Ritter, deriving
his information chiefly from the recent researches of Major
Rawlinson. The larger portion of the way lay along the western
side of the chain of Mount Zagros, and on the right bank of the
river Kerkha (Ritter, Erdkunde, part ix. b. 3. p. 329, West Asia).

[593] Arrian, vii. 13, 1; Plutarch, Eumenes, 2.

[594] Arrian, vii. 14; Plutarch, Alexand. 72; Diodor. xvii. 110.
It will not do to follow the canon of evidence tacitly assumed
by Arrian, who thinks himself authorized to discredit all the
details of Alexander’s conduct on this occasion, which transgress
the limits of a dignified, though vehement sorrow.

When Masistius was slain, in the Persian army commanded by
Mardonius in Bœotia, the manes of the horses were cut, as token
of mourning: compare also Plutarch, Pelopidas, 33; and Euripid.
Alkestis, 442.

Alexander stayed at Ekbatana until winter was at hand, seeking
distraction from his grief in exaggerated splendor of festivals
and ostentation of life. His temper became so much more irascible
and furious, that no one approached him without fear, and he was
propitiated by the most extravagant flatteries.[595] At length he
roused himself and found his true consolation, in gratifying the
primary passions of his nature—fighting and man-hunting.[596] Between
Media and Persis, dwelt the tribes called Kossæi, amidst a region
of lofty, trackless, inaccessible mountains. Brave and predatory,
they had defied the attacks of the Persian kings. Alexander now
conducted against them a powerful force, and in spite of increased
difficulties arising from the wintry season, pushed them from point
to point, following them into the loftiest and most impenetrable
recesses of their mountains. These efforts were continued for forty
days, under himself and Ptolemy, until the entire male population
was slain; which passed for an acceptable offering to the manes of
Hephæstion.[597]

[595] See the curious extracts from Ephippus the
Chalkidian,—seemingly a contemporary, if not an eye-witness (ap.
Athenæ. xii. p. 537, 538)—εὐφημία δὲ καὶ σιγὴ κατεῖχε πάντας ὑπὸ
δέους τοὺς παρόντας· ἀφόρητος γὰρ ἦν (Alexander) καὶ φονικός·
ἐδόκει γὰρ εἶναι μελαγχολικὸς, etc.

[596] I translate here, literally, Plutarch’s expression—Τοῦ
δὲ πένθους παρηγορίᾳ τῷ πολέμῳ χρώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ θήραν καὶ
~κυνηγέσιον ἀνθρώπων~ ἐξῆλθε, καὶ τὸ Κοσσαίων ἔθνος κατεστρέψατο,
~πάντας ἡβηδὸν ἀποσφάττων~. Τοῦτο δὲ Ἡφαιστίωνος ἐναγισμὸς
ἐκαλεῖτο (Plutarch, Alexand. 72: compare Polyænus, iv. 3, 31).

[597] Arrian, vii. 15; Plutarch, Alex. 72; Diodor. xvii. 111.
This general slaughter, however, can only be true of portions of
the Kossæan name; for Kossæans occur in after years (Diodor. xix.
19.).

Not long afterwards, Alexander commenced his progress to Babylon;
but in slow marches, farther retarded by various foreign embassies
which met him on the road. So widely had the terror of his name
and achievements been spread, that several of these envoys came
from the most distant regions. There were some from the various
tribes of Lybia—from Carthage—from Sicily and Sardinia—from
the Illyrians and Thracians—from the Lucanians, Bruttians, and
Tuscans, in Italy—nay, even (some affirmed) from the Romans, as
yet a people of moderate power.[598] But there were other names
yet more surprising—Æthiopians, from the extreme south, beyond
Egypt—Scythians from the north, beyond the Danube—Iberians and Gauls,
from the far west, beyond the Mediterranean Sea. Legates also arrived
from various Grecian cities, partly to tender congratulations and
compliments upon his matchless successes, partly to remonstrate
against his sweeping mandate for the general restoration of the
Grecian exiles.[599] It was remarked that these Grecian legates
approached him with wreaths on their heads, tendering golden wreaths
to him,—as if they were coming into the presence of a god.[600] The
proofs which Alexander received even from distant tribes with names
and costumes unknown to him, of fear for his enmity and anxiety
for his favor, were such as had never been shown to any historical
person, and such as entirely to explain his superhuman arrogance.

[598] Pliny, H. N. iii. 9. The story in Strabo, v. p. 232, can
hardly apply to Alexander the Great. Livy (ix. 18) conceives that
the Romans knew nothing of Alexander even by report, but this
appears to me not credible.

On the whole, though the point is doubtful, I incline to believe
the assertion of a Roman embassy to Alexander. Nevertheless,
there were various false statements which afterwards became
current about it—one of which may be seen in Memnon’s history
of the Pontic Herakleia ap. Photium, Cod. 224; Orelli Fragment.
Memnon, p. 36. Kleitarchus (contemporary of Alexander), whom
Pliny quotes, can have had no motive to insert falsely the name
of Romans, which in his time was nowise important.

[599] Arrian, vii. 15; Justin, xii. 13; Diodor. xvii. 113. The
story mentioned by Justin in another place (xxi. 6) is probably
referable to this season of Alexander’s career. A Carthaginian
named Hamilkar Rhodanus, was sent by his city to Alexander;
really as an emissary to acquaint himself with the king’s real
designs, which occasioned to the Carthaginians serious alarm—but
under color of being an exile tendering his services. Justin says
that Parmenio introduced Hamilkar—which must, I think, be an
error.

[600] Arrian, vii. 19, 1; vii. 23, 3.

In the midst of this exuberant pride and good fortune, however, dark
omens and prophecies crowded upon him as he approached Babylon. Of
these the most remarkable was, the warning of the Chaldean priests,
who apprised him, soon after he crossed the Tigris, that it would
be dangerous for him to enter that city, and exhorted him to remain
outside of the gates. At first he was inclined to obey; but his
scruples were overruled, either by arguments from the Greek sophist
Anaxarchus, or by the shame of shutting himself out from the most
memorable city of the empire, where his great naval preparations
were now going on. He found Nearchus with his fleet, who had come
up from the mouth of the river,—and also the ships directed to be
built in Phenicia, which had come down the river from Thapsakus,
together with large numbers of seafaring men to serve aboard.[601]
The ships of cypress-wood, and the large docks, which he had ordered
to be constructed at Babylon, were likewise in full progress. He lost
no time in concerting with Nearchus the details of an expedition
into Arabia and the Persian Gulf, by his land-force and naval
force coöperating. From various naval officers, who had been sent
to survey the Persian Gulf and now made their reports, he learned
that though there were no serious difficulties within it or along
its southern coast, yet to double the eastern cape which terminated
that coast—to circumnavigate the unknown peninsula of Arabia—and
thus to reach the Red Sea—was an enterprise perilous at least, if
not impracticable.[602] But to achieve that which other men thought
impracticable, was the leading passion of Alexander. He resolved to
circumnavigate Arabia as well as to conquer the Arabians, from whom
it was sufficient offence that they had sent no envoys to him. He
also contemplated the foundation of a great maritime city in the
interior of the Persian Gulf, to rival in wealth and commerce the
cities of Phenicia.[603]

[601] Arrian, vii. 19, 5-12; Diodor. xvii. 112.

[602] Arrian, vii. 20, 15; Arrian, Indica, 43. To undertake this
circumnavigation, Alexander had despatched a ship-master of Soli
in Cyprus, named Hiero; who becoming alarmed at the distance
to which he was advancing, and at the apparently interminable
stretch of Arabia towards the south, returned without
accomplishing the object.

Even in the time of Arrian, in the second century after the
Christian era, Arabia had never been circumnavigated, from the
Persian Gulf to the Red Sea—at least so far as his knowledge
extended.

[603] Arrian, vii. 19, 11.

Amidst preparations for this expedition—and while the immense funeral
pile destined for Hephæstion was being built—Alexander sailed down
the Euphrates to the great dyke called Pallakopas, about ninety miles
below Babylon; a sluice constructed by the ancient Assyrian kings,
for the purpose of being opened when the river was too full, so as
to let off the water into the interminable marshes stretching out
near the western bank. The sluice being reported not to work well,
he projected the construction of a new one somewhat farther down. He
then sailed through the Pallakopas in order to survey the marshes,
together with the tombs of the ancient Assyrian kings which had been
erected among them. Himself steering his vessel, with the kausia on
his head, and the regal diadem above it,[604] he passed some time
among these lakes and swamps, which were so extensive that his fleet
lost the way among them. He stayed long enough also to direct, and
even commence, the foundation of a new city, in what seemed to him a
convenient spot.[605]

[604] Arrian, vii. 22, 2, 3; Strabo, xvi. p. 741.

[605] Arrian, vii. 21, 11. πόλιν ἐξῳκοδόμησέ τε καὶ ἐτείχισε.

On returning to Babylon, Alexander found large reinforcements arrived
there—partly under Philoxenus, Menander, and Menidas, from Lydia and
Karia—partly 20,000 Persians, under Peukestes the satrap. He caused
these Persians to be incorporated in the files of the Macedonian
phalanx. According to the standing custom, each of these files
was sixteen deep, and each soldier was armed with the long pike
or sarissa wielded by two hands; the lochage, or front-rank man,
being always an officer receiving double pay, of great strength and
attested valor—and those second and third in the file, as well as the
rearmost man of all, being likewise strong and good men, receiving
larger pay than the rest. Alexander, in his new arrangement, retained
the three first ranks and the rear rank unchanged, as well as the
same depth of file; but he substituted twelve Persians in place
of the twelve Macedonians who followed after the third-rank man;
so that the file was composed first of the lochage and two other
chosen Macedonians, each armed with the sarissa—then of twelve
Persians armed in their own manner with bow or javelin—lastly, of a
Macedonian with his sarissa bringing up the the rear.[606] In this
Macedonico-Persian file, the front would have only three projecting
pikes, instead of five, as the ordinary Macedonian phalanx presented;
but then, in compensation, the Persian soldiers would be able to
hurl their javelins at an advancing enemy, over the heads of their
three front-rank men. The supervening death of Alexander prevented
the actual execution of this reform, interesting as being his last
project for amalgamating Persians and Macedonians into one military
force.

[606] Arrian, vii. 23, 5. Even when performing the purely
military operation of passing these soldiers in review,
inspecting their exercise, and determining their array,—Alexander
sat upon the regal throne, surrounded by Asiatic eunuchs; his
principal officers sat upon couches with silver feet, near to him
(Arrian, vii. 24, 4). This is among the evidences of his altered
manners.

Besides thus modifying the phalanx, Alexander also passed in review
his fleet, which was now fully equipped. The order was actually
given for departing, so soon as the obsequies of Hephæstion should
be celebrated. This was the last act which remained for him to
fulfil. The splendid funeral pile stood ready—two hundred feet
high, occupying a square area, of which the side was nearly one
furlong, loaded with mostly decorations from the zeal, real and
simulated, of the Macedonian officers. The invention of artists was
exhausted, in long discussions with the king himself, to produce
at all cost an exhibition of magnificence singular and stupendous.
The outlay (probably with addition of the festivals immediately
following) is stated at 12,000 talents, or £2,760,000 sterling.[607]
Alexander awaited the order from the oracle of Ammon, having sent
thither messengers to inquire what measure of reverential honor he
might properly and piously show to his departed friend.[608] The
answer was now brought back, intimating that Hephæstion was to be
worshipped as a Hero—the secondary form of worship, not on a level
with that paid to the gods. Delighted with this divine testimony
to Hephæstion, Alexander caused the pile to be lighted, and the
obsequies celebrated, in a manner suitable to the injunctions of the
oracle.[609] He farther directed that magnificent chapels or sacred
edifices should be erected for the worship and honor of Hephæstion,
at Alexandria in Egypt,—at Pella in Macedonia,—and probably in other
cities also.[610]

[607] Diodorus, xvii. 115; Plutarch, Alex. 72.

[608] Arrian, vii. 23, 8.

[609] Diodor. xvii. 114, 115: compare Arrian, vii. 14, 16;
Plutarch, Alexand. 75.

[610] Arrian, vii. 23, 10-13; Diod. xviii. 4. Diodorus speaks
indeed, in this passage, of the πυρὰ or funeral pile in honor
of Hephæstion, as if it were among the vast expenses included
among the memoranda left by Alexander (after his decease) of
prospective schemes. But the funeral pile had already been
erected at Babylon, as Diodorus himself had informed us.

What Alexander left unexecuted at his decease, but intended to
execute if he had lived, was the splendid edifices and chapels in
Hephæstion’s honor—as we see by Arrian, vii. 23, 10. And Diodorus
must be supposed to allude to these intended sacred buildings,
though he has inadvertently spoken of the funeral pile. Kraterus,
who was under orders to return to Macedonia, was to have built
one at Pella.

The Olynthian Ephippus had composed a book περὶ τῆς Ἡφαιστίωνος
καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ταφῆς, of which there appear four or five
citations in Athenæus. He dwelt especially on the luxurious
habits of Alexander, and on his unmeasured potations—common to
him with other Macedonians.

Respecting the honors intended for Hephæstion at Alexandria, he
addressed to Kleomenes, the satrap of Egypt, a despatch which becomes
in part known to us. I have already stated that Kleomenes was among
the worst of the satraps; having committed multiplied public crimes,
of which Alexander was not uninformed. The regal despatch enjoined
him to erect in commemoration of Hephæstion a chapel on the terra
firma of Alexandria, with a splendid turret on the islet of Pharos;
and to provide besides that all mercantile written contracts, as
a condition of validity, should be inscribed with the name of
Hephæstion. Alexander concluded thus: “If on coming I find the
Egyptian temples and the chapels of Hephæstion completed in the best
manner, I will forgive you for all your past crimes; and in future,
whatever magnitude of crime you may commit, you shall suffer no bad
treatment from me.”[611] This despatch strikingly illustrates how
much the wrong doings of satraps were secondary considerations in
his view, compared with splendid manifestations towards the gods and
personal attachments towards friends.

[611] Arrian, vii. 23, 9-14. Καὶ Κλεομένει ἀνδρὶ κακῷ, καὶ πολλὰ
ἀδικήματα ἀδικήσαντι ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, ἐπιστέλλει ἐπιστολήν.... Ἢν γὰρ
καταλάβω ἐγὼ (ἔλεγε τὰ γράμματα) τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καλῶς
κατεσκευασμένα καὶ τὰ ἡρῷα τὰ Ἡφαιστίωνος, εἴτε τι πρότερον
ἡμάρτηκας, ἀφήσω σε τούτων, καὶ τολοιπόν, ὁπήλικον ἂν ἁμάρτῃς,
οὐδὲν πείσῃ ἐξ ἐμοῦ ἄχαρι.—In the oration of Demosthenes against
Dionysodoras (p. 1285), Kleomenes appears as enriching himself by
the monopoly of corn exported from Egypt: compare Pseudo-Aristot.
Œconom. c. 33. Kleomenes was afterwards put to death by the first
Ptolemy, who became king of Egypt (Pausanias, i. 6, 3).

The intense sorrow felt by Alexander for the death of Hephæstion—not
merely an attached friend, but of the same age and exuberant vigor
as himself—laid his mind open to gloomy forebodings from numerous
omens, as well as to jealous mistrust even of his oldest officers.
Antipater especially, no longer protected against the calumnies of
Olympias by the support of Hephæstion,[612] fell more and more into
discredit; whilst his son Kassander, who had recently come into Asia
with a Macedonian reinforcement, underwent from Alexander during
irascible moments much insulting violence. In spite of the dissuasive
warning of the Chaldean priests,[613] Alexander had been persuaded to
distrust their sincerity, and had entered Babylon, though not without
hesitation and uneasiness. However, when, after having entered the
town, he went out of it again safely on his expedition for the survey
of the lower Euphrates, he conceived himself to have exposed them
as deceitful alarmists, and returned to the city with increased
confidence, for the obsequies of his deceased friend.[614]

[612] Plutarch, Alex. 74; Diodor. xvii. 114.

[613] Arrian, vii. 16, 9; vii. 17, 6. Plutarch, Alex. 73. Diodor.
xvii. 112.

[614] Arrian, vii. 22, 1. Αὐτὸς δὲ ~ὡς ἐξελέγξας δὴ~ τῶν Χαλδαίων
μαντείαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν πεπονθὼς εἴη ἐν Βαβυλῶνι ἄχαρι (ἀλλ᾽ ἔφθη γὰρ
ἐλάσας ἔξω Βαβυλῶνος πρίν τι παθεῖν) ἀνέπλει αὖθις κατὰ τὰ ἕλη
~θαῤῥῶν~, etc.

The uneasiness here caused by these prophecies and omens, in the
mind of the most fearless man of his age, is worthy of notice as
a psychological fact, and is perfectly attested by the authority
of Aristobulus and Nearchus. It appears that Anaxarchus and
other Grecian philosophers encouraged him by their reasonings
to despise all prophecy, but especially that of the Chaldæan
priests; who (they alleged) wished to keep Alexander out of
Babylon in order that they might continue to possess the large
revenues of the temple of Belus, which they had wrongfully
appropriated; Alexander being disposed to rebuild that ruined
temple, and to re-establish the suspended sacrifices to which its
revenues had been originally devoted (Arrian, vii. 17; Diodor.
xvii. 112). Not many days afterwards, Alexander greatly repented
of having given way to these dangerous reasoners, who by their
sophistical cavils set aside the power and the warnings of
destiny (Diodor. xvii. 116).

The sacrifices connected with these obsequies were on the most
prodigious scale. Victims enough were offered to furnish a feast for
the army, who also received ample distributions of wine. Alexander
himself presided at the feast, and abandoned himself to conviviality
like the rest. Already full of wine, he was persuaded by his friend
Medius to sup with him, and to pass the whole night in yet farther
drinking, with the boisterous indulgence called by the Greeks Kômus
or Revelry. Having slept off his intoxication during the next day,
he in the evening again supped with Medius, and spent a second night
in the like unmeasured indulgence.[615] It appears that he already
had the seeds of fever upon him, which was so fatally aggravated by
this intemperance that he was too ill to return to his palace. He
took the bath, and slept in the house of Medius; on the next morning,
he was unable to rise. After having been carried out on a couch to
celebrate sacrifice (which was his daily habit), he was obliged to
lie in bed all day. Nevertheless he summoned the generals to his
presence, prescribing all the details of the impending expedition,
and ordering that the land-force should begin its march on the
fourth day following, while the fleet, with himself aboard, would
sail on the fifth day. In the evening, he was carried on a couch
across the Euphrates into a garden on the other side, where he
bathed and rested for the night. The fever still continued, so that
in the morning, after bathing and being carried out to perform the
sacrifices, he remained on his couch all day, talking and playing at
dice with Medius; in the evening, he bathed, sacrificed again, and
ate a light supper, but endured a bad night with increased fever. The
next two days passed in the same manner, the fever becoming worse
and worse; nevertheless Alexander still summoned Nearchus to his
bedside, discussed with him many points about his maritime projects,
and repeated his order that the fleet should be ready by the third
day. On the ensuing morning the fever was violent; Alexander reposed
all day in a bathing-house in the garden, yet still calling in the
generals to direct the filling up of vacancies among the officers,
and ordering that the armament should be ready to move. Throughout
the two next days, his malady became hourly more aggravated. On the
last day of the two, Alexander could with difficulty support the
being lifted out of bed to perform the sacrifice; even then, however,
he continued to give orders to the generals about the expedition.
On the morrow, though desperately ill, he still made the effort
requisite for performing the sacrifice; he was then carried across
from the garden-house to the palace, giving orders that the generals
and officers should remain in permanent attendance in and near the
hall. He caused some of them to be called to his bedside; but though
he knew them perfectly, he had by this time become incapable of
utterance. One of his last words spoken is said to have been, on
being asked to whom he bequeathed his kingdom, “_To the strongest_;”
one of his last acts was, to take the signet ring from his finger,
and hand it to Perdikkas.[616]

[615] Arrian, vii. 24, 25. Diodorus states (xvii. 117) that
Alexander, on this convivial night, swallowed the contents of a
large goblet called the cup of Herakles, and felt very ill after
it; a statement repeated by various other writers of antiquity,
and which I see no reason for discrediting, though some modern
critics treat it with contempt. The royal Ephemerides, or Court
Journal, attested only the general fact of his long potations and
the long sleep which followed them: see Athenæus, x. p. 434.

To drink to intoxication at a funeral, was required as a token of
respectful sympathy towards the deceased—see the last words of
the Indian Kalanus before he ascended the funeral pile—Plutarch,
Alexander, 69.

[616] These last two facts are mentioned by Arrian (vii. 26, 5)
and Diodorus (xvii. 117), and Justin (xii. 15): but they found
no place in the Court Journal. Curtius (x. v. 4) gives them with
some enlargement.

For two nights and a day he continued in this state, without either
amendment or repose. Meanwhile, the news of his malady had spread
through the army, filling them with grief and consternation. Many of
the soldiers, eager to see him once more, forced their way into the
palace, and were admitted unarmed. They passed along by the bedside,
with all the demonstrations of affliction and sympathy: Alexander
knew them, and made show of friendly recognition as well as he could;
but was unable to say a word. Several of the generals slept in the
temple of Serapis, hoping to be informed by the god in a dream
whether they ought to bring Alexander into it, as a suppliant to
experience the divine healing power. The god informed them in their
dream, that Alexander ought not to be brought into the temple—that it
would be better for him to be left where he was. In the afternoon he
expired—June 323 B. C.—after a life of thirty-two years and
eight months—and a reign of twelve years and eight months.[617]

[617] The details, respecting the last illness of Alexander,
are peculiarly authentic, being extracted both by Arrian and by
Plutarch, from the Ephemerides Regiæ, or short Court Journal;
which was habitually kept by his secretary Eumenes, and another
Greek named Diodotus (Athenæ. x. p. 434): see Arrian, vii. 25,
26; Plutarch, Alex. 76.

It is surprising that throughout all the course of this malady
no mention is made of any physician as having been consulted. No
advice was asked; if we except the application to the temple of
Serapis, during the last day of Alexander’s life. A few months
before, Alexander had hanged or crucified the physician who
attended Hephæstion in his last illness. Hence it seems probable
that he either despised or mistrusted medical advice, and would
not permit any to be invoked. His views must have been much
altered since his dangerous fever at Tarsus, and the successful
treatment of it by the Akarnanian physician Philippus.

Though the fever (see some remarks from Littré attached to
Didot’s Fragm. Script. Alex. Magn. p. 124) which caused
Alexander’s death is here a plain fact satisfactorily made out,
yet a different story was circulated some time afterwards, and
gained partial credit (Plutarch De Invidiâ, p. 538), that he
had been poisoned. The poison was said to have been provided
by Aristotle,—sent over to Asia by Antipater through his son
Kassander,—and administered by Iollas (another son of Antipater),
Alexander’s cupbearer (Arrian, vii. 27, 2; Curtius, x. 10, 17;
Diodor. xvii. 118; Justin, xii. 13). It is quite natural that
fever and intemperance (which latter moreover was frequent with
Alexander) should not be regarded as causes sufficiently marked
and impressive to explain a decease at once so unexpected and so
momentous. There seems ground for supposing, however, that the
report was intentionally fomented, if not originally broached,
by the party-enemies of Antipater and Kassander—especially by
the rancorous Olympias. The violent enmity afterwards displayed
by Kassander against Olympias, and all the family of Alexander
helped to encourage the report. In the life of Hyperides in
Plutarch, (Vit. X. Oratt. p. 849) it is stated, that he proposed
at Athens public honors to Iollas for having given the poison to
Alexander. If there is any truth in this, it might be a stratagem
for casting discredit on Antipater (father of Iollas), against
whom the Athenians entered into the Lamian war, immediately after
the death of Alexander.

The death of Alexander, thus suddenly cut off by a fever in the
plenitude of health, vigor, and aspirations, was an event impressive
as well as important, in the highest possible degree, to his
contemporaries far and near. When the first report of it was brought
to Athens, the orator Demades exclaimed:—“It cannot be true: if
Alexander were dead, the whole habitable world would have smelt of
his carcass.”[618] This coarse but emphatic comparison illustrates
the immediate, powerful, and wide-reaching impression produced by
the sudden extinction of the great conqueror. It was felt by each
of the many remote envoys who had so recently come to propitiate
this far-shooting Apollo—by every man among the nations who had sent
these envoys—throughout Europe, Asia, and Africa, as then known,—to
affect either his actual condition or his probable future.[619] The
first growth and development of Macedonia, during the twenty-two
years preceding the battle of Chæroneia, from an embarrassed
secondary State into the first of all known powers, had excited
the astonishment of contemporaries, and admiration for Philip’s
organizing genius. But the achievements of Alexander, during his
twelve years of reign, throwing Philip into the shade, had been on a
scale so much grander and vaster, and so completely without serious
reverse or even interruption, as to transcend the measure, not only
of human expectation, but almost of human belief. The Great King (as
the king of Persia was called by excellence) was, and had long been,
the type of worldly power and felicity, even down to the time when
Alexander crossed the Hellespont. Within four years and three months
from this event, by one stupendous defeat after another, Darius had
lost all his Western Empire, and had become a fugitive eastward of
the Caspian Gates, escaping captivity at the hands of Alexander only
to perish by those of the satrap Bessus. All antecedent historical
parallels—the ruin and captivity of the Lydian Crœsus, the expulsion
and mean life of the Syracusan Dionysius, both of them impressive
examples of the mutability of human condition,—sank into trifles
compared with the overthrow of this towering Persian colossus.
The orator Æschines expressed the genuine sentiment of a Grecian
spectator, when he exclaimed (in a speech delivered at Athens shortly
before the death of Darius):—“What is there among the list of strange
and unexpected events, that has not occurred in our time? Our lives
have transcended the limits of humanity; we are born to serve as a
theme for incredible tales to posterity. Is not the Persian king—who
dug through Athos and bridged the Hellespont,—who demanded earth
and water from the Greeks,—who dared to proclaim himself, in public
epistles, master of all mankind from the rising to the setting sun—is
not _he_ now struggling to the last, not for dominion over others,
but for the safety of his own person?”[620]

[618] Plutarch, Phokion, 22; Demetrius Phaler. De Elocution.
s. 300. Οὐ τέθνηκεν Ἀλέξανδρος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι—ὦζε γὰρ ἂν ἡ
οἰκουμένη τοῦ νεκροῦ.

[619] Dionysius, despot of the Pontic Herakleia, fainted away
with joy when he heard of Alexander’s death, and erected a statue
of Εὐθυμία or Comfort (Memn. Heracl. Fragm. ap. Photium, Cod.
224. c. 4).

[620] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 524. c. 43. Τοιγάρτοι τί τῶν
ἀνελπίστων καὶ ἀπροσδοκήτων ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν οὐ γέγονεν! οὐ γὰρ βίον
γ᾽ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπινον βεβιώκαμεν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς παραδοξολογίαν τοῖς
ἐσομένοις μεθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἔφυμεν. Οὐχ ὁ μὲν τῶν Περσῶν βασιλεὺς, ὁ τὸν
Ἄθων διορύξας καὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ζεύξας, ὁ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ τοὺς
Ἕλληνας αἰτῶν, ὁ τολμῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς γράφειν ὅτι δεσπότης
ἐστὶν ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀφ᾽ ἡλίου ἀνιόντος μέχρι δυομένου, νῦν οὐ
περὶ τοῦ κύριος ἑτέρων εἶναι διαγωνίζεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη περὶ τῆς τοῦ
σώματος σωτηρίας;

Compare the striking fragment, of a like tenor, out of the lost
work of the Phalerean Demetrius—Περὶ τῆς τύχης—Fragment. Histor.
Græcor. vol. ii. p. 368.

Such were the sentiments excited by Alexander’s career even in the
middle of 330 B. C., more than seven years before his death.
During the following seven years, his additional achievements had
carried astonishment yet farther. He had mastered, in defiance of
fatigue, hardship, and combat, not merely all the eastern half of the
Persian empire, but unknown Indian regions beyond its easternmost
limits. Besides Macedonia, Greece, and Thrace, he possessed all that
immense treasure and military force which had once rendered the Great
King so formidable. By no contemporary man had any such power ever
been known or conceived. With the turn of imagination then prevalent,
many were doubtless disposed to take him for a god on earth, as
Grecian spectators had once supposed with regard to Xerxes, when they
beheld the innumerable Persian host crossing the Hellespont.[621]

[621] Herodot. vii. 56.

Exalted to this prodigious grandeur, Alexander was at the time of
his death little more than thirty-two years old—the age at which a
citizen of Athens was growing into important commands; ten years
less than the age for a consul at Rome;[622] two years younger
than the age at which Timour first acquired the crown, and began
his foreign conquests.[623] His extraordinary bodily powers were
unabated; he had acquired a large stock of military experience; and
what was still more important, his appetite for farther conquest
was as voracious, and his readiness to purchase it at the largest
cost of toil or danger, as complete, as it had been when he first
crossed the Hellespont. Great as his past career had been, his
future achievements, with such increased means and experience, were
likely to be yet greater. His ambition would have been satisfied
with nothing less than the conquest of the whole habitable world
as then known;[624] and if his life had been prolonged, he would
probably have accomplished it. Nowhere (so far as our knowledge
reaches) did there reside any military power capable of making head
against him; nor were his soldiers, when he commanded them, daunted
or baffled by any extremity of cold, heat, or fatigue. The patriotic
feelings of Livy dispose him to maintain[625] that Alexander,
had he invaded Italy and assailed Romans or Samnites, would have
failed and perished like his relative Alexander of Epirus. But this
conclusion cannot be accepted. If we grant the courage and discipline
of the Roman infantry to have been equal to the best infantry of
Alexander’s army, the same cannot be said of the Roman cavalry as
compared with the Macedonian Companions. Still less is it likely
that a Roman consul, annually changed, would have been found a match
for Alexander in military genius and combinations; nor, even if
personally equal, would he have possessed the same variety of troops
and arms, each effective in its separate way, and all conspiring
to one common purpose—nor the same unbounded influence over their
minds in stimulating them to full effort. I do not think that even
the Romans could have successfully resisted Alexander the Great;
though it is certain that he never throughout all his long marches
encountered such enemies as they, nor even such as Samnites and
Lucanians—combining courage, patriotism, discipline, with effective
arms both for defence and for close combat.[626]

[622] Cicero, Philippic. v. 17, 48.

[623] See Histoire de Timour-Bec, par Cherefeddin Ali, translated
by Petit de la Croix, vol. i. p. 203.

[624] This is the remark of his great admirer Arrian, vii. 1, 6.

[625] Livy, ix. 17-19. A discussion of Alexander’s chances
against the Romans—extremely interesting and beautiful, though
the case appears to me very partially set forth. I agree with
Niebuhr in dissenting from Livy’s result; and with Plutarch in
considering it as one of the boons of fortune to the Romans, that
Alexander did not live long enough to attack them (Plutarch de
Fortunâ Romanor. p. 326).

Livy however had great reason for complaining of those Greek
authors (he calls them “levissimi ex Græcis”) who said that
the Romans would have quailed before the terrible reputation
of Alexander, and submitted without resistance. Assuredly his
victory over them would have been dearly bought.

[626] Alexander of Epirus is said to have remarked, that he, in
his expeditions into Italy, had fallen upon the ἀνδρωνῖτις or
chamber of the men; while his nephew (Alexander the Great), in
invading Asia, had fallen upon the γυναικωνῖτις or chamber of the
women (Aulus Gellius, xvii. 21; Curtius, viii. 1, 37).

Among all the qualities which go to constitute the highest military
excellence, either as a general or as a soldier, none was wanting
in the character of Alexander. Together with his own chivalrous
courage—sometimes indeed both excessive and unseasonable, so as to
form the only military defect which can be fairly imputed to him—we
trace in all his operations the most careful dispositions taken
beforehand, vigilant precaution in guarding against possible reverse,
and abundant resource in adapting himself to new contingences.
Amidst constant success, these precautionary combinations were never
discontinued. His achievements are the earliest recorded evidence
of scientific military organization on a large scale, and of its
overwhelming effects. Alexander overawes the imagination more than
any other personage of antiquity, by the matchless development of
all that constitutes effective force—as an individual warrior,
and as organizer and leader of armed masses; not merely the blind
impetuosity ascribed by Homer to Ares, but also the intelligent,
methodized, and all-subduing compression which he personifies in
Athênê. But all his great qualities were fit for use only against
enemies; in which category indeed were numbered all mankind, known
and unknown, except those who chose to submit to him. In his Indian
campaigns, amidst tribes of utter strangers, we perceive that not
only those who stand on their defence, but also those who abandon
their property and flee to the mountains, are alike pursued and
slaughtered.

Apart from the transcendent merits of Alexander as a soldier and a
general, some authors give him credit for grand and beneficent views
on the subject of imperial government, and for intentions highly
favorable to the improvement of mankind. I see no ground for adopting
this opinion. As far as we can venture to anticipate what would have
been Alexander’s future, we see nothing in prospect except years of
ever-repeated aggression and conquest, not to be concluded until he
had traversed and subjugated all the inhabited globe. The acquisition
of universal dominion—conceived not metaphorically, but literally,
and conceived with greater facility in consequence of the imperfect
geographical knowledge of the time—was the master-passion of his
soul. At the moment of his death, he was commencing fresh aggression
in the south against the Arabians, to an indefinite extent;[627]
while his vast projects against the western tribes in Africa and
Europe, as far as the pillars of Herakles, were consigned in the
orders and memoranda confidentially communicated to Kraterus.[628]
Italy, Gaul, and Spain, would have been successively attacked and
conquered; the enterprises proposed to him when in Baktria by the
Chorasmian prince Pharasmanes, but postponed then until a more
convenient season, would have been next taken up, and he would
have marched from the Danube northward round the Euxine and Palus
Mæotis against the Scythians and the tribes of Caucasus.[629] There
remained moreover the Asiatic regions east of the Hyphasis, which
his soldiers had refused to enter upon, but which he certainly would
have invaded at a future opportunity, were it only to efface the
poignant humiliation of having been compelled to relinquish his
proclaimed purpose. Though this sounds like romance and hyperbole, it
was nothing more than the real insatiate aspiration of Alexander, who
looked upon every new acquisition mainly as a capital for acquiring
more.[630] “You are a man like all of us, Alexander—except that
you abandon your home (said the naked Indian to him[631]) like a
meddlesome destroyer, to invade the most distant regions; enduring
hardship yourself, and inflicting hardship upon others.” Now, how
an empire thus boundless and heterogeneous, such as no prince has
ever yet realized, could have been administered with any superior
advantages to subjects—it would be difficult to show. The mere task
of acquiring and maintaining—of keeping satraps and tribute-gatherers
in authority as well as in subordination—of suppressing resistances
ever liable to recur in regions distant by months of march[632]—would
occupy the whole life of a world-conqueror, without leaving any
leisure for the improvements suited to peace and stability, if we
give him credit for such purposes in theory.

[627] Arrian, vii. 28, 5.

[628] Diodor. xviii. 4.

[629] Arrian, iv. 15, 11.

[630] Arrian, vii. 19, 12. Τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖ,
ἄπληστος ἦν τοῦ κτᾶσθαί τι ἀεὶ Ἀλέξανδρος. Compare vii. 1, 3-7;
vii. 15, 6, and the speech made by Alexander to his soldiers on
the banks of the Hyphasis, when he was trying to persuade them
to march forward, v. 26 _seq._ We must remember that Arrian
had before him the work of Ptolemy, who would give, in all
probability, the substance of this memorable speech from his own
hearing.

[631] Arrian, vii. 1, 8. σὺ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὢν, παραπλήσιος τοῖς
ἄλλοις, πλήν γε δὴ, ὅτι πολυπράγμων καὶ ἀτάσθαλος, ἀπὸ τῆς
οἰκείας τοσαύτην γῆν ἐπεξέρχῃ, πράγματα ἔχων τε καὶ παρέχων
ἄλλοις.

[632] Arrian, vii. 4, 4, 5.

But even this last is more than can be granted. Alexander’s
acts indicate that he desired nothing better than to take up
the traditions of the Persian empire; a tribute-levying and
army-levying system, under Macedonians, in large proportion, as
his instruments; yet partly also under the very same Persians who
had administered before, provided they submitted to him. It has
indeed been extolled among his merits that he was thus willing to
re-appoint Persian grandees (putting their armed force however
under the command of a Macedonian officer)—and to continue native
princes in their dominions, if they did willing homage to him, as
tributary subordinates. But all this had been done before him by the
Persian kings, whose system it was to leave the conquered princes
undisturbed, subject only to the payment of tribute, and to the
obligation of furnishing a military contingent when required.[633] In
like manner Alexander’s Asiatic empire would thus have been composed
of an aggregate of satrapies and dependent principalities, furnishing
money and soldiers; in other respects, left to the discretion of
local rule, with occasional extreme inflictions of punishment, but
no systematic examination or control.[634] Upon this, the condition
of Asiatic empire in all ages, Alexander would have grafted one
special improvement: the military organization of the empire, feeble
under the Achæmenid princes, would have been greatly strengthened by
his genius, and by the able officers formed in his school, both for
foreign aggression and for home control.[635]

[633] Herodot. iii. 15. Alexander offered to Phokion (Plutarch,
Phok. 18) his choice between four Asiatic cities, of which (that
is, of any one of them) he was to enjoy the revenues; just
as Artaxerxes Longimanus had acted towards Themistokles, in
recompense for his treason. Phokion refused the offer.

[634] See the punishment of Sisamnes by Kambyses (Herodot. v. 25).

[635] The rhetor Aristeides, in his Encomium on Rome, has some
good remarks on the character and ascendancy of Alexander,
exercised by will and personal authority, as contrasted with the
systematic and legal working of the Roman empire (Orat. xiv. p.
332-360, vol. i. ed. Dindorf).

The Persian empire was a miscellaneous aggregate, with no strong
feeling of nationality. The Macedonian conqueror who seized its
throne was still more indifferent to national sentiment. He was
neither Macedonian nor Greek. Though the absence of this prejudice
has sometimes been mounted to him as a virtue, it only made room,
in my opinion, for prejudices yet worse. The substitute for it was
an exorbitant personality and self-estimation, manifested even in
his earliest years, and inflamed by extraordinary success into the
belief in divine parentage; which, while setting him above the
idea of communion with any special nationality, made him conceive
all mankind as subjects under one common sceptre to be wielded by
himself. To this universal empire the Persian king made the nearest
approach,[636] according to the opinions then prevalent. Accordingly
Alexander, when victorious, accepted the position and pretensions of
the overthrown Persian court as approaching most nearly to his full
due. He became more Persian than either Macedonian or Greek. While
himself adopting, as far as he could safely venture, the personal
habits of the Persian court, he took studied pains to transform his
Macedonian officers into Persian grandees, encouraging and even
forcing intermarriages with Persian women according to Persian rites.
At the time of Alexander’s death, there was comprised, in his written
orders given to Kraterus, a plan for the wholesale transportation
of inhabitants, both out of Europe into Asia, and out of Asia into
Europe, in order to fuse these populations into one by multiplying
intermarriages and intercourse.[637] Such reciprocal translation of
peoples would have been felt as eminently odious, and could not have
been accomplished without coercive authority.[638] It is rash to
speculate upon unexecuted purposes; but, as far as we can judge, such
compulsory mingling of the different races promises nothing favorable
to the happiness of any of them, though it might serve as an imposing
novelty and memento of imperial omnipotence.

[636] Xenoph. Cyropæd. viii. 6, 21; Anabas. i. 7, 6; Herodot.
vii. 8, 13: compare Arrian, v. 26, 4-10.

[637] Diodor. xviii. 4. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πόλεων συνοικισμοὺς
καὶ σωμάτων μεταγωγὰς ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην, καὶ κατὰ
τοὐναντίον ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν, ὅπως τὰς μεγίστας
ἠπείρους ταῖς ἐπιγαμίαις καὶ ταῖς οἰκειώσεσιν εἰς κοινὴν ὁμόνοιαν
καὶ συγγενικὴν καταστήσῃ.

[638] See the effect produced upon the Ionians by the false
statement of Histiæus (Herodot. vi. 3) with Wesseling’s note—and
the eagerness of the Pæonians to return (Herod. v. 98; also
Justin, viii. 5).

Antipater afterwards intended to transport the Ætolians in
mass from their own country into Asia, if he had succeeded in
conquering them (Diodor. xviii. 25). Compare Pausanias (i.
9, 8-10) about the forcible measures used by Lysimachus, in
transporting new inhabitants, at Ephesus and Lysimacheia.

In respect of intelligence and combining genius, Alexander was
Hellenic to the full; in respect of disposition and purpose, no one
could be less Hellenic. The acts attesting his Oriental violence of
impulse, unmeasured self-will,[639] and exaction of reverence above
the limits of humanity—have been already recounted. To describe him
as a son of Hellas, imbued with the political maxims of Aristotle,
and bent on the systematic diffusion of Hellenic culture for the
improvement of mankind[640]—is, in my judgment, an estimate of
his character contrary to the evidence. Alexander is indeed said
to have invited suggestions from Aristotle as to the best mode of
colonizing; but his temper altered so much, after a few years of
Asiatic conquest, that he came not only to lose all deference for
Aristotle’s advice, but even to hate him bitterly.[641] Moreover,
though the philosopher’s full suggestions have not been preserved,
yet we are told generally that he recommended Alexander to behave
to the Greeks as a leader or president, or limited chief—and to
the Barbarians (non-Hellenes) as a master;[642] a distinction
substantially coinciding with that pointed out by Burke in his
speeches at the beginning of the American war, between the principles
of government proper to be followed by England in the American
colonies, and in British India. No Greek thinker believed the
Asiatics to be capable of that free civil polity[643] upon which
the march of every Grecian community was based. Aristotle did not
wish to degrade the Asiatics below the level to which they had been
accustomed, but rather to preserve the Greeks from being degraded
to the same level. Now Alexander recognized no such distinction as
that drawn by his preceptor. He treated Greeks and Asiatics alike,
not by elevating the latter, but by degrading the former. Though he
employed all indiscriminately as instruments, yet he presently found
the free speech of Greeks, and even of Macedonians, so distasteful
and offensive, that his preferences turned more and more in favor of
the servile Asiatic sentiment and customs. Instead of hellenizing
Asia, he was tending to asiatize Macedonia and Hellas. His temper
and character, as modified by a few years of conquest, rendered him
quite unfit to follow the course recommended by Aristotle towards the
Greeks—quite as unfit as any of the Persian kings, or as the French
Emperor Napoleon, to endure that partial frustration, compromise, and
smart from free criticism, which is inseparable from the position of
a limited chief. Among a multitude of subjects more diverse-colored
than even the army of Xerxes, it is quite possible that he might have
turned his power towards the improvement of the rudest portions.
We are told (though the fact is difficult to credit, from his want
of time) that he abolished various barbarisms of the Hyrkanians,
Arachosians, and Sogdians.[644] But Macedonians as well as Greeks
would have been pure losers by being absorbed into an immense Asiatic
aggregate.

[639] Livy, ix. 18. “Referre in tanto rege piget superbam
mutationem vistis, et desideratas humi jacentium adulationes,
etiam victis Macedonibus graves, nedum victoribus: en fœda
supplicia, et inter vinum et epulas cædes amicorum, et vanitatem
ementiendæ stirpis. Quid si vini amor in dies fieret acrior? quid
si trux et præfervida ira? (_nec quidquam dubium inter scriptores
refero_) nullane hæc damna imperatoriis virtutibus ducimus?”

The appeal here made by Livy to the full attestation of these
points in Alexander’s character deserves notice. He had doubtless
more authorities before him than we possess.

[640] Among other eulogists of Alexander, it is sufficient
to name Droysen—in his two works, both of great historical
research—Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen—and Geschichte des
Hellenismus oder der Bildung des Hellenischen Staaten Systemes
(Hamburg, 1843). See especially the last and most recent work, p.
27 _seqq._, p. 651 _seqq._—and elsewhere _passim_.

[641] Plutarch, Alex. 55-74.

[642] Plutarch, Fortun. Alex. M. p. 329. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τὸ
ἔργον παρέσχεν· οὐ γὰρ, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης συνεβούλευεν αὐτῷ, τοῖς
μὲν Ἕλλησιν ἡγεμονικῶς, τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις δεσποτικῶς χρώμενον
... ἀλλὰ κοινὸς ἥκειν θεόθεν ἁρμοστὴς καὶ διαλλακτὴς τῶν ὅλων
νομίζων, οὓς τῷ λόγῳ μὴ συνῆγε, τοῖς ὅπλοις βιαζόμενος, εἰς τὸ
αὐτὸ συνενεγκὼν τὰ παντάχοθεν, etc.

Strabo (or Eratosthenes, see Strabo, i. p. 66) and Plutarch
understand the expression of Aristotle erroneously—as if that
philosopher had meant to recommend harsh and cruel treatment of
the non-Hellenes, and kind treatment only towards Greeks. That
Aristotle could have meant no such thing, is evident from the
whole tenor of his treatise on Politics. The distinction really
intended is between a greater and a less measure of extra-popular
authority—not between kind and unkind purposes in the exercise
of authority. Compare Tacitus, Annal. xii. 11—the advice of the
Emperor Claudius to the Parthian prince Meherdates.

[643] Aristot. Politic. i. 1, 5; vii. 6, 1. See the memorable
comparison drawn by Aristotle (Polit. vii. 6) between the
Europeans and Asiatics generally. He pronounces the former to be
courageous and energetic, but wanting in intelligence or powers
of political combination; the latter to be intelligent and clever
in contrivance, but destitute of courage. Neither of them have
more than a “one-legged aptitude” (φύσιν μονόκωλον); the Greek
alone possesses both the courage and intelligence united. The
Asiatics are condemned to perpetual subjection; the Greeks might
govern the world could they but combine in one political society.

[644] Plutarch, Fortun. Alex. M. p. 328. The stay of Alexander
in these countries was however so short, that even with the best
will he could not have enforced the suppression of any inveterate
customs.

Plutarch states that Alexander founded more than seventy new cities
in Asia.[645] So large a number of them is neither verifiable nor
probable, unless we either reckon up simple military posts, or borrow
from the list of foundations really established by his successors.
Except Alexandria in Egypt, none of the cities founded by Alexander
himself can be shown to have attained any great development. Nearly
all were planted among the remote, warlike, and turbulent peoples
eastward of the Caspian Gates. Such establishments were really
fortified posts to hold the country in subjection: Alexander lodged
in them detachments from his army; but none of these detachments
can well have been large, since he could not afford materially to
weaken his army, while active military operations were still going
on and while farther advance was in contemplation. More of these
settlements were founded in Sogdiana than elsewhere; but respecting
the Sogdian foundations, we know that the Greeks whom he established
there, chained to the spot only by fear of his power, broke away
in mutiny immediately on the news of his death.[646] Some Greek
soldiers in Alexander’s army on the Jaxartes or the Hydaspes, sick
and weary of his interminable marches, might prefer being enrolled
among the colonists of a new city on one of these unknown rivers, to
the ever-repeated routine of exhausting duty.[647] But it is certain
that no volunteer emigrants would go forth to settle at distances
such as their imaginations could hardly conceive. The absorbing
appetite of Alexander was conquest, to the East, West, South, and
North; the cities which he planted were established, for the most
part, as garrisons to maintain his most distant and most precarious
acquisitions. The purpose of colonization was altogether subordinate;
and that of hellenizing Asia, so far as we can see, was not even
contemplated, much less realized.

[645] Plutarch, Fortun. Al. M. p. 328. Plutarch mentions, a few
lines afterwards, Seleukeia in Mesopotamia, as if he thought that
it was among the cities established by Alexander himself. This
shows that he has not been exact in distinguishing foundations
made by Alexander, from those originated by Seleukus and the
other Diadochi.

The elaborate article of Droysen (in the Appendix to his
Geschichte des Hellenismus, p. 588-651), ascribes to Alexander
the largest plans of colonization in Asia, and enumerates a
great number of cities alleged to have been founded by him. But
in regard to the majority of these foundations, the evidence
upon which Droysen grounds his belief that Alexander was the
founder, appears to me altogether slender and unsatisfactory. If
Alexander founded so many cities as Droysen imagines, how does it
happen that Arrian mentions only so comparatively small a number?
The argument derived from Arrian’s silence, for rejecting what
is affirmed by other ancients respecting Alexander, is indeed
employed by modern authors (and by Droysen himself among them),
far oftener than I think warrantable. But if there be any one
proceeding of Alexander more than another, in respect of which
the silence of Arrian ought to make us suspicious—it is the
foundation of a new colony; a solemn act, requiring delay and
multiplied regulations, intended for perpetuity, and redounding
to the honor of the founder. I do not believe in any colonies
founded by Alexander, beyond those comparatively few which Arrian
mentions, except such as rest upon some other express and good
testimony. Whoever will read through Droysen’s list, will see
that most of the names in it will not stand this test. The short
life, and rapid movements, of Alexander, are of themselves the
strongest presumption against his having founded so large a
number of colonies.

[646] Diodor. xvii. 99; xviii. 7. Curtius, ix. 7, 1. Curtius
observes (vii. 10, 15) respecting Alexander’s colonies in
Sogdiana—that they were founded “velut fræni domitarum gentium;
nunc originis suæ oblita serviunt, quibus imperaverunt.”

[647] See the plain-spoken outburst of the Thurian Antileon, one
of the soldiers in Xenophon’s Ten Thousand Greeks, when the army
reached Trapezus (Xenoph. Anabas. v. 1, 2).

This process of hellenizing Asia—in so far as Asia was ever
hellenized—which has often been ascribed to Alexander, was in
reality the work of the Diadochi who came after him; though his
conquests doubtless opened the door and established the military
ascendency which rendered such a work practicable. The position, the
aspirations, and the interests of these Diadochi—Antigonus, Ptolemy,
Seleukus, Lysimachus, etc.—were materially different from those of
Alexander. They had neither appetite nor means for new and remote
conquest; their great rivalry was with each other; each sought to
strengthen himself near home against the rest. It became a matter
of fashion and pride with them, not less than of interest, to found
new cities immortalizing their family names. These foundations
were chiefly made in the regions of Asia near and known to Greeks,
where Alexander had planted none. Thus the great and numerous
foundations of Seleukus Nikator and his successors covered Syria,
Mesopotamia, and parts of Asia Minor. All these regions were known
to Greeks, and more or less tempting to new Grecian immigrants—not
out of reach or hearing of the Olympic and other festivals, as the
Jaxartes and the Indus were. In this way a considerable influx of new
hellenic blood was poured into Asia during the century succeeding
Alexander,—probably in great measure from Italy and Sicily, where the
condition of the Greek cities became still more calamitous—besides
the numerous Greeks who took service as individuals under these
Asiatic kings. Greeks, and Macedonians speaking Greek, became
predominant, if not in numbers, at least in importance, throughout
most of the cities in Western Asia. In particular, the Macedonian
military organization, discipline, and administration, was maintained
systematically among these Asiatic kings. In the account of the
battle of Magnesia, fought by the Seleukid king Atiochus the Great
against the Romans in 190 B. C., the Macedonian phalanx,
constituting the main force of his Asiatic army, appears in all its
completeness, just as it stood under Philip and Perseus in Macedonia
itself.[648]

[648] Appian, Syriac. 32.

When it is said however that Asia became hellenized under Alexander’s
successors, the phrase requires explanation. Hellenism, properly
so called—the aggregate of habits, sentiments, energies, and
intelligence, manifested by the Greeks during their epoch of
autonomy[649]—never passed over into Asia; neither the highest
qualities of the Greek mind, not even the entire character of
ordinary Greeks. This genuine Hellenism could not subsist under
the overruling compression of Alexander, nor even under the less
irresistible pressure of his successors. Its living force, productive
genius, self-organizing power, and active spirit of political
communion, were stifled, and gradually died out. All that passed
into Asia was a faint and partial resemblance of it, carrying
the superficial marks of the original. The administration of the
Greco-Asiatic kings was not hellenic (as it has been sometimes
called), but completely despotic, as that of the Persians had been
before. Whoever follows their history, until the period of Roman
dominion, will see that it turned upon the tastes, temper, and
ability of the prince, and on the circumstances of the regal family.
Viewing their government as a system, its prominent difference
as compared with their Persian predecessors, consisted in their
retaining the military traditions and organization of Philip and
Alexander, an elaborate scheme of discipline and manœuvring, which
would not be kept up without permanent official grades and a higher
measure of intelligence than had ever been displayed under the
Achæmenid kings, who had no military school or training whatever.
Hence a great number of individual Greeks found employment in the
military as well as in the civil service of these Greco-Asiatic
kings. The intelligent Greek, instead of a citizen of Hellas, became
the instrument of a foreign prince; the details of government were
managed to a great degree by Greek officials, and always in the Greek
language.

[649] This is the sense in which I have always used the word
Hellenism, throughout the present Work.

With Droysen, the word _Hellenismus_—_Das Hellenistische
Staatensystem_—is applied to the state of things which followed
upon Alexander’s death; to the aggregate of kingdoms into which
Alexander’s conquests become distributed, having for their
point of similarity the common use of Greek speech, a certain
proportion of Greeks both as inhabitants and as officers, and a
partial streak of Hellenic culture.

I cannot but think that such an employment of the word is
misleading. At any rate, its sense must be constantly kept in
mind, in order that it may not be confounded with _hellenism_ in
the stricter meaning.

Moreover, besides this, there was the still more important fact of
the many new cities founded in Asia by the Seleukidæ and the other
contemporary kings. Each of these cities had a considerable infusion
of Greek and Macedonian citizens, among the native Orientals located
there, often brought by compulsion from neighboring villages. In
what numerical ratio these two elements of the civic population
stood to each other, we cannot say. But the Greeks and Macedonians
were the leading and active portion, who exercised the greatest
assimilating force, gave imposing effect to the public manifestations
of religion, had wider views and sympathies, dealt with the central
government, and carried on that contracted measure of municipal
autonomy which the city was permitted to retain. In these cities the
Greek inhabitants, though debarred from political freedom, enjoyed
a range of social activity suited to their tastes. In each, Greek
was the language of public business and dealing; each formed a
centre of attraction and commerce for an extensive neighborhood; all
together, they were the main hellenic or quasi-hellenic element in
Asia under the Greco-Asiatic kings, as contrasted with the rustic
villages, where native manners, and probably native speech, still
continued with little modification. But the Greeks of Antioch, or
Alexandria, or Seleukeia, were not like citizens of Athens or Thebes,
nor even like men of Tarentum or Ephesus. While they communicated
their language to Orientals, they became themselves substantially
orientalized. Their feelings, judgments, and habits of action, ceased
to be hellenic. Polybius, when he visited Alexandria, looked with
surprise and aversion on the Greeks there resident, though they
were superior to the non-hellenic population, whom he considered
worthless.[650] Greek social habits, festivals, and legends, passed
with the hellenic settlers into Asia; all becoming amalgamated and
transformed so as to suit a new Asiatic abode. Important social and
political consequences turned upon the diffusion of the language,
and upon the establishment of such a common medium of communication
throughout Western Asia. But after all, the hellenized Asiatic was
not so much a Greek as a foreigner with Grecian speech, exterior
varnish, and superficial manifestations; distinguished fundamentally
from those Greek citizens with whom the present history has been
concerned. So he would have been considered by Sophokles, by
Thucydides, by Sokrates.

[650] Strabo, xvii. p. 797, ὁ γοῦν Πολύβιος, γεγονὼς ἐν τῇ πόλει
(Alexandria), βδελύττεται τὴν ταύτῃ κατάστασιν, etc.

The Museum of Alexandria (with its library) must be carefully
distinguished from the city and the people. It was an artificial
institution, which took its rise altogether from the personal
taste and munificence of the earlier Ptolemies, especially the
second. It was one of the noblest and most useful institutions
recorded in history, and forms the most honorable monument of
what Droysen calls the _hellenistic_ period, between the death
of Alexander and the extension of the Roman empire into Asia.
But this Museum, though situated at Alexandria, had no peculiar
connection with the city or its population; it was a College of
literary Fellows (if we may employ a modern word) congregated
out of various Grecian towns. Eratosthenes, Kallimuchus,
Aristophanes, Aristarchus, were not natives of Alexandria.

Thus much is necessary in order to understand the bearing of
Alexander’s conquests, not only upon the hellenic population, but
upon hellenic attributes and peculiarities. While crushing the Greeks
as communities at home, these conquests opened a wider range to the
Greeks as individuals abroad; and produced—perhaps the best of all
their effects—a great increase of intercommunication, multiplication
of roads, extension of commercial dealing, and enlarged facilities
for the acquisition of geographical knowledge. There already
existed in the Persian empire an easy and convenient royal road
(established by Darius son of Hystaspes and described as well as
admired by Herodotus) for the three months’ journey between Sardis
and Susa; and there must have been another regular road from Susa
and Ekbatana to Baktria, Sogdiana, and India. Alexander, had he
lived, would doubtless have multiplied on a still larger scale the
communications both by sea and land between the various parts of his
world-empire. We read that among the gigantic projects which he was
contemplating when surprised by death, one was, the construction of
a road all along the northern coast of Africa, as far as the Pillars
of Herakles.[651] He had intended to found a new maritime city on
the Persian Gulf, at the mouth of the Euphrates, and to incur much
outlay for regulating the flow of water in its lower course. The
river would probably have been thus made again to afford the same
conveniences, both for navigation and irrigation, as it appears to
have furnished in earlier times under the ancient Babylonian kings.
Orders had been also given for constructing a fleet to explore the
Caspian Sea. Alexander believed that sea to be connected with the
Eastern Ocean,[652] and intended to make it his point of departure
for circumnavigating the eastern limits of Asia, which country
yet remained for him to conquer. The voyage already performed by
Nearchus, from the mouth of the Indus to that of the Euphrates, was
in those days a splendid maritime achievement; to which another
still greater was on the point of being added—the circumnavigation
of Arabia from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea; though here we must
remark, that this same voyage (from the mouth of the Indus round
Arabia into the Red Sea) had been performed in thirty months, a
century and a half before, by Skylax of Karyanda, under the orders
of Darius son of Hystaspes;[653] yet, though recorded by Herodotus,
forgotten (as it would appear) by Alexander and his contemporaries.
This enlarged and systematic exploration of the earth, combined with
increased means of communication among its inhabitants, is the main
feature in Alexander’s career which presents itself as promising real
consequences beneficial to humanity.

[651] Diodor. xviii. 4. Pausanias (ii. 1. 5) observes that
Alexander wished to cut through Mount Mimas (in Asia. Minor), but
that this was the only one, among all his undertakings, which
did not succeed. “So difficult is it (he goes on) to put force
upon the divine arrangements”, τὰ θεῖα βιάσασθαι. He wished to
cut through the isthmus between Teos and Klazomenæ, so as to
avoid the navigation round the cliffs of Mimas (σκόπελον νιφόεντα
Μίμαντος—Aristophan. Nub. 274) between Chios and Erythræ.
Probably this was among the projects suggested to Alexander, in
the last year of his life. We have no other information about it.

[652] Arrian, v. 26, 2.

[653] Herodot. iv. 44: compare iii. 102. That Arrian had not
present to his memory this narrative of Herodotus, is plain
from the last chapter of his Indica; though in his history of
Alexander he alludes several times to Herodotus. Some authors
have concluded from Arrian’s silence that he disbelieved the
fact: if he had disbelieved it, I think that he would have
mentioned the statement of Herodotus nevertheless, with an
intimation that he did not think it worthy of credit. Moreover,
Arrian’s disbelief (even granting that such was the state of his
mind) is not to be held as a conclusive disproof of the story.
I confess that I see no sufficient reason for discrediting the
narrative of Herodotus—though some eminent modern writers are of
an opposite opinion.

We read that Alexander felt so much interest in the extension
of science, that he gave to Aristotle the immense sum of 800
talents in money, placing under his directions several thousand
men, for the purpose of prosecuting zoological researches.[654]
These exaggerations are probably the work of those enemies of the
philosopher who decried him as a pensioner of the Macedonian court;
but it is probable enough that Philip, and Alexander in the early
part of his reign, may have helped Aristotle in the difficult process
of getting together facts and specimens for observation—from esteem
towards him personally, rather than from interest in his discoveries.
The intellectual turn of Alexander was towards literature, poetry,
and history. He was fond of the Iliad especially, as well as of the
Attic tragedians; so that Harpalus, being directed to send some books
to him in Upper Asia, selected as the most acceptable packet various
tragedies of Æschylus, Sophokles, and Euripides, with the dithyrambic
poems of Telestes and the histories of Phlistus.[655]

[654] Pliny, H. N. viii. 17; Athenæus, ix. p. 398. See
Schneider’s Preface to his edition of Aristotle’s Historiæ De
Animalibus, p. xxxix. _seq._

[655] Plutarch, Alexand. 8.

CHAPTER XCV.

GRECIAN AFFAIRS FROM THE LANDING OF ALEXANDER IN ASIA TO THE CLOSE OF
THE LAMIAN WAR.

Even in 334 B. C., when Alexander first entered upon his
Asiatic campaigns, the Grecian cities, great as well as small, had
been robbed of all their free agency, and existed only as appendages
of the kingdom of Macedonia. Several of them were occupied by
Macedonian garrisons, or governed by local despots who leaned upon
such armed force for support. There existed among them no common
idea or public sentiment, formally proclaimed and acted on, except
such as it suited Alexander’s purpose to encourage. The miso-Persian
sentiment—once a genuine expression of Hellenic patriotism, to the
recollection of which Demosthenes was wont to appeal, in animating
the Athenians to action against Macedonia, but now extinct and
supplanted by nearer apprehensions—had been converted by Alexander
to his own purposes, as a pretext for headship, and a help for
ensuring submission during his absence in Asia. Greece had become a
province of Macedonia; the affairs of the Greeks (observes Aristotle
in illustrating a philosophical discussion) are “in the hands of the
king.”[656] A public synod of the Greeks sat from time to time at
Corinth; but it represented only philo-Macedonian sentiment; all that
we know of its proceedings consisted in congratulations to Alexander
on his victories. There is no Grecian history of public or political
import; there are no facts except the local and municipal details
of each city—“the streets and fountains which we are repairing
and the battlements which we are whitening”, to use a phrase of
Demosthenes[657]—the good management of the Athenian finances by the
orator Lykurgus, and the contentions of orators respecting private
disputes or politics of the past.

[656] Aristot. Physic. iv. 3. p. 210 a. 21. ἔτι ~ὡς ἐν βασιλεῖ τὰ
τῶν Ἑλλήνων~, καὶ ὅλως ~ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ κινητικῷ~.

[657] Demosthen. Olynthiac. iii. p. 36.

But though Grecian history is thus stagnant and suspended during the
first years of Alexander’s Asiatic campaigns, it might at any moment
have become animated with an active spirit of self-emancipation, if
he had experienced reverses, or if the Persians had administered
their own affairs with skill and vigor. I have already stated, that
during the first two years of the war, the Persian fleet (we ought
rather to say, the Phenician fleet in the Persian service) had a
decided superiority at sea. Darius possessed untold treasures which
might have indefinitely increased that superiority and multiplied
his means of transmarine action, had he chosen to follow the advice
of Memnon, by acting vigorously from the sea and strictly on the
defensive by land. The movement or quiescence of the Greeks therefore
depended on the turn of affairs in Asia; as Alexander himself was
well aware.

During the winter of 334-333 B. C., Memnon with the Persian fleet
appeared to be making progress among the islands in the Ægean,[658]
and the anti-Macedonian Greeks were expecting him farther westward in
Eubœa and Peloponnesus. Their hopes being dashed by his unexpected
death, and still more by Darius’s abandonment of the Memnonian plans,
they had next to wait for the chance of what might be achieved by the
immense Persian land-force. Even down to the eve of the battle of
Issus, Demosthenes[659] and others (as has already been mentioned)
were encouraged by their correspondents in Asia to anticipate success
for Darius even in pitched battle. But after the great disaster at
Issus, during a year and a half (from November 333 B. C. to March
or April 331 B. C.), no hope was possible. The Persian force seemed
extinct, and Darius was so paralyzed by the captivity of his family,
that he suffered even the citizens of Tyre and Gaza to perish in
their gallant efforts of defence, without the least effort to save
them. At length, in the spring of 331 B. C., the prospects again
appeared to improve. A second Persian army, countless like the first,
was assembling eastward of the Tigris; Alexander advanced into the
interior, many weeks’ march from the shores of the Mediterranean, to
attack them; and the Persians doubtless transmitted encouragements
with money to enterprising men in Greece, in hopes of provoking
auxiliary movements. Presently (October 331 B. C.) came the
catastrophe at Arbela; after which no demonstration against Alexander
could have been attempted with any reasonable hope of success.

[658] Arrian, ii. 1.

[659] Æschines cont. Ktesiph. p. 552.

Such was the varying point of view under which the contest in Asia
presented itself to Grecian spectators, during the three years and
a half between the landing of Alexander in Asia and the battle of
Arbela. As to the leading states in Greece, we have to look at Athens
and Sparta only; for Thebes had been destroyed and demolished as
a city; and what had been once the citadel of the Kadmeia was now
a Macedonian garrison.[660] Moreover, besides that garrison, the
Bœotian cities, Orchomenus, Platæa, etc., were themselves strongholds
of Macedonian dependence; being hostile to Thebes of old, and having
received among themselves assignments of all the Theban lands.[661]
In case of any movement in Greece, therefore, Antipater, the viceroy
of Macedonia, might fairly count on finding in Greece interested
allies, serving as no mean check upon Attica.

[660] Vita Demosthenis ap. Westermann, Scriptt. Biograph. p.
301. φρουρὰν καταστήσαντος Ἀλέξανδρου ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις μετὰ τὸ
κατασκάψαι τοὺς Θηβαίους, etc.

[661] Pausanias, i. 25, 4.

At Athens, the reigning sentiment was decidedly pacific. Few
were disposed to brave the prince who had just given so fearful
an evidence of his force by the destruction of Thebes and the
enslavement of the Thebans. Ephialtes and Charidemus, the military
citizens at Athens most anti-Macedonian in sentiment, had been
demanded as prisoners by Alexander, and had withdrawn to Asia, there
to take service with Darius. Other Athenians, men of energy and
action, had followed their example, and had fought against Alexander
at the Granikus, where they became his prisoners, and were sent
to Macedonia to work in fetters at the mines. Ephialtes perished
at the siege of Halikarnassus, while defending the place with the
utmost gallantry; Charidemus suffered a more unworthy death from the
shameful sentence of Darius. The anti-Macedonian leaders who remained
at Athens, such as Demosthenes and Lykurgus, were not generals or
men of action, but statesmen and orators. They were fully aware that
submission to Alexander was a painful necessity, though they watched
not the less anxiously for any reverse which might happen to him,
such as to make it possible for Athens to head a new struggle on
behalf of Grecian freedom.

But it was not Demosthenes nor Lykurgus who now guided the general
policy of Athens.[662] For the twelve years between the destruction
of Thebes and the death of Alexander, Phokion and Demades were
her ministers for foreign affairs; two men of totally opposite
characters, but coinciding in pacific views, and in looking to the
favor of Alexander and Antipater as the principal end to be attained.
Twenty Athenian triremes were sent to act with the Macedonian
fleet, during Alexander’s first campaign in Asia; these, together
with the Athenian prisoners taken at the Granikus, served to him
farther as a guarantee for the continued submission of the Athenians
generally.[663] There can be no doubt that the pacific policy of
Phokion was now prudent and essential to Athens, though the same
cannot be said (as I have remarked in the proper place) for his
advocacy of the like policy twenty years before, when Philip’s power
was growing and might have been arrested by vigorous opposition. It
suited the purpose of Antipater to ensure his hold upon Athens by
frequent presents to Demades, a man of luxurious and extravagant
habits. But Phokion, incorruptible as well as poor to the end,
declined all similar offers, though often made to him, not only by
Antipater, but even by Alexander.[664]

[662] “Since Macedonian dominion became paramount (observes
Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 331), Æschines and men of his stamp
are in full ascendency and affluence—I am impotent: there is
no place at Athens for free citizens and counsellors, but only
for men who do what they are ordered, and flatter the ruling
potentate.”

[663] Arrian, i. 29, 8.

[664] Plutarch, Phokion, 30.

It deserves particular notice, that though the macedonizing policy
was now decidedly in the ascendent—accepted, even by dissentients,
as the only course admissible under the circumstances, and confirmed
the more by each successive victory of Alexander—yet statesmen, like
Lykurgus and Demosthenes, of notorious anti-Macedonian sentiment,
still held a conspicuous and influential position, though of course
restricted to matters of internal administration. Thus Lykurgus
continued to be the real acting minister of finance, for three
successive Panathenaic intervals of four years each, or for an
uninterrupted period of twelve years. He superintended not merely
the entire collection, but also the entire disbursement of the
public revenue; rendering strict periodical account, yet with a
financial authority greater than had belonged to any statesman since
Perikles. He improved the gymnasia and stadia of the city—multiplied
the donatives and sacred furniture in the temples—enlarged, or
constructed anew, docks and arsenals,—provided a considerable
stock of arms and equipments, military as well as naval—and
maintained four hundred triremes in a seaworthy condition, for the
protection of Athenian commerce. In these extensive functions he
was never superseded, though Alexander at one time sent to require
the surrender of his person, which was refused by the Athenian
people.[665] The main cause of his firm hold upon the public mind,
was, his known and indisputable pecuniary probity, wherein he was the
parallel of Phokion.

[665] See the remarkable decree in honor of Lykurgus, passed by
the Athenian people seventeen or eighteen years after his death,
in the archonship of Anaxikrates, B. C. 307 (Plutarch,
Vit. X. Oratt. p. 852). The reciting portion of this decree,
constituting four-fifths of the whole, goes over the public
conduct of Lykurgus, and is very valuable.

It seems that the twelve years of financial administration
exercised by Lykurgus, are to be taken probably, either from
342-330 B. C.—or four years later, from 338-326 B.
C. Boeckh leaves the point undetermined between the two.
Droysen and Meier prefer the earlier period—O. Müller the later.
(Boeckh, Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen, also the second
edition of his Staatshaushaltung der Athener, vol. ii. p.
114-118).

The total of public money, recorded by the Inscription as having
passed through the hands of Lykurgus in the twelve years, was
18,900 talents = £4,340,000, or thereabouts. He is said to have
held, besides, in deposit, a great deal of money entrusted to him
by private individuals. His official duties as treasurer were
discharged, for the first four years, in his own name: during the
last eight years, in the names of two different friends.

As to Demosthenes, he did not hold any such commanding public
appointments as Lykurgus; but he enjoyed great esteem and sympathy
from the people generally, for his marked line of public counsel
during the past. The proof of this is to be found in one very
significant fact. The indictment, against Ktesiphon’s motion for
crowning Demosthenes, was instituted by Æschines, and official entry
made of it, before the death of Philip—which event occurred in
August 336 B. C. Yet Æschines did not venture to bring it
on for trial until August 330 B. C., after Antipater had
subdued the ill-fated rising of the Lacedæmonian king Agis; and even
at that advantageous moment, when the macedonizers seemed in full
triumph, he signally failed. We thus perceive, that though Phokion
and Demades were now the leaders of Athenian affairs, as representing
a policy which every one felt to be unavoidable—yet the preponderant
sentiment of the people went with Demosthenes and Lykurgus. In
fact, we shall see that after the Lamian war, Antipater thought it
requisite to subdue or punish this sentiment by disfranchising or
deporting two-thirds of the citizens.[666] It seems however that the
anti-Macedonian statesmen were very cautious of giving offence to
Alexander, between 334 and 330 B. C. Ktesiphon accepted a
mission of condolence to Kleopatra, sister of Alexander, on the death
of her husband Alexander of Epirus; and Demosthenes stands accused of
having sent humble and crouching letters to Alexander (the Great) in
Phenicia, during the spring of 331 B. C. This assertion of
Æschines, though not to be trusted as correct, indicates the general
prudence of Demosthenes as to his known and formidable enemy.[667]

[666] Plutarch, Phokion, 28.

[667] Æschines (adv. Ktesiph. p. 635) mentions this mission of
Ktesiphon to Kleopatra. He also (in the same oration, p. 550)
charges Demosthenes with having sent letters to Alexander,
soliciting pardon and favor. He states that a young man named
Aristion, a friend of Demosthenes, was much about the person of
Alexander, and that through him the letters were sent. He cites
as his authority the seamen of the public Athenian vessel called
_Paralus_, and the Athenian envoys who went to Alexander in
Phenicia in the spring or summer of 331 B. C. (compare
Arrian, iii. 6, 3). Hyperides also seems to have advanced the
like allegation against Demosthenes—see Harpokration, v. Ἀριστίων.

The fragments of the oration of Hyperides in defence of
Euxenippus (recently published by Mr. Churchill Babington),
delivered at some period during the reign of Alexander, give
general evidence of the wide-spread feeling of jealous aversion
to the existing Macedonian ascendancy. Euxenippus had been
accused of devotion to Macedonia; Hyperides strenuously denies
it, saying that Euxenippus had never been in Macedonia, nor ever
conversed with any Macedonian who came to Athens. Even boys at
school (says Hyperides) know the names of the corrupt orators, or
servile flatterers, who serve Macedonia—Euxenippus is not among
them (p 11, 12).

It was not from Athens, but from Sparta, that anti-Macedonian
movements now took rise.

In the decisive battle unsuccessfully fought by Athens and Thebes
at Chæroneia against Philip, the Spartans had not been concerned.
Their king Archidamus,—who had been active conjointly with Athens
in the Sacred War, trying to uphold the Phokians against Philip
and the Thebans,—had afterwards withdrawn himself from Central
Greece to assist the Tarentines in Italy, and had been slain in a
battle against the Messapians.[668] He was succeeded by his son
Agis, a brave and enterprising man, under whom the Spartans, though
abstaining from hostilities against Philip, resolutely declined to
take part in the synod at Corinth, whereby the Macedonian prince
was nominated Leader of the Greeks; and even persisted in the same
denial on Alexander’s nomination also. When Alexander sent to Athens
three hundred panoplies after his victory at the Granikus, to be
dedicated in the temple of Athênê, he expressly proclaimed in the
inscription, that they were dedicated “by Alexander and the Greeks,
_excepting the Lacedæmonians_.”[669] Agis took the lead in trying to
procure Persian aid for anti-Macedonian operations in Greece. Towards
the close of summer 333 B. C., a little before the battle
of Issus, he visited the Persian admirals at Chios, to solicit men
and money for intended action in Peloponnesus.[670] At that moment,
they were not zealous in the direction of Greece, anticipating (as
most Asiatics then did) the complete destruction of Alexander in
Kilikia. As soon, however, as the disaster of Issus became known,
they placed at the disposal of Agis thirty talents and ten triremes;
which he employed, under his brother Agesilaus, in making himself
master of Krete—feeling that no movement in Greece could be expected
at such a discouraging crisis. Agis himself soon afterwards went
to that island, having strengthened himself by a division of the
Greek mercenaries who had fought under Darius at Issus. In Krete,
he appears to have had considerable temporary success; and even in
Peloponnesus, he organized some demonstrations, which Alexander sent
Amphoterus with a large naval force to repress, in the spring of 331
B. C.[671] At that time, Phenicia, Egypt, and all the naval
mastery of the Ægean, had passed into the hands of the conqueror, so
that the Persians had no direct means of acting upon Greece. Probably
Amphoterus recovered Krete, but he had no land-force to attack Agis
in Peloponnesus.

[668] Plutarch, Camill. 19; Diodor. xvi. 88; Plutarch, Agis, 3.

[669] Arrian, i. 16, 11: compare Pausan. vii. 10, 1.

[670] Arrian, ii. 13, 4.

[671] Arrian, iii. 6, 4; Diodor. xvii. 48; Curtius, iv. 1, 39. It
is to this war in Krete, between Agis and the Macedonian party
and troops, that Aristotle probably alludes (in the few words
contained, Politica, ii. 7, 8), as having exposed the weakness of
the Kretan institutions—see Schneider’s note on the passage. At
least we do not know of any other event, suitable to the words.

In October 331 B. C., Darius was beaten at Arbela and became a
fugitive in Media, leaving Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis, with the
bulk of his immense treasures, as a prey to the conqueror during the
coming winter. After such prodigious accessions to Alexander’s force,
it would seem that any anti-Macedonian movement, during the spring
of 330 B. C., must have been obviously hopeless and even insane. Yet
it was just then that King Agis found means to enlarge his scale
of operations in Peloponnesus, and prevailed on a considerable
body of new allies to join him. As to himself personally, he and
the Lacedæmonians had been previously in a state of proclaimed
war with Macedonia,[672] and therefore incurred little additional
risk; moreover, it was one of the effects of the Asiatic disasters
to cast back upon Greece small hands of soldiers who had hitherto
found service in the Persian armies. These men willingly came to
Cape Tænarus to enlist under a warlike king of Sparta; so that Agis
found himself at the head of a force which appeared considerable
to Peloponnesians, familiar only with the narrow scale of Grecian
war-muster, though insignificant as against Alexander or his viceroy
in Macedonia.[673] An unexpected ray of hope broke out from the
revolt of Memnon, the Macedonian governor of Thrace. Antipater was
thus compelled to withdraw some of his forces to a considerable
distance from Greece; while Alexander, victorious as he was, being
in Persis or Media, east of Mount Zagros, appeared in the eyes of a
Greek to have reached the utmost limits of the habitable world.[674]
Of this partial encouragement Agis took advantage, to march out of
Lakonia with all the troops, mercenary and native, that he could
muster. He called on the Peloponnesians for a last effort against
Macedonian dominion, while Darius still retained all the eastern half
of his empire, and while support from him in men and money might yet
be anticipated.[675]

[672] Alexander, as soon as he got possession of the Persian
treasures at Susa (about December 331 B. C.), sent a
large remittance of 3000 talents to Antipater, as means for
carrying on the war against the Lacedæmonians (Arrian, iii. 16.
17). The manifestations of Agis in Peloponnesus had begun in
the spring of 331 B. C. (Arrian, iii. 6, 4); but his
aggressive movements in Peloponnesus did not assume formidable
proportions until the spring of 330 B. C. At the date
of the speech of Æschines against Ktesiphon (August 330 B.
C.), the decisive battle by which Antipater crushed the
forces of Agis had only recently occurred; for the Lacedæmonian
prisoners were only _about to be sent_ to Alexander to learn
their fate (Æsch. adv. Kt. p. 524). Curtius (vii. 1, 21) is
certainly mistaken in saying that the contest was terminated
before the battle of Arbela. Moreover, there were Lacedæmonian
envoys, present with Darius until a few days before his death
(July 330 B. C.), who afterwards fell into the hands
of Alexander (Arrian iii. 24, 7); these men could hardly have
known of the prostration of their country at home. I suppose the
victory of Antipater to have taken place about June 330 B.
C.—and the Peloponnesian armament of Agis to have been got
together about three months before (March 330 B. C.).

Mr. Clinton (Fast. H. App. c. 4. p. 234) discusses the chronology
of this event, but in a manner which I cannot think satisfactory.
He seems inclined to put it some months earlier. I see no
necessity for construing the dictum ascribed to Alexander
(Plutarch, Agesilaus, 15) as proving close coincidence of time
between the battle of Arbela and the final defeat of Agis.

[673] Alexander in Media, when informed of the whole affair after
the death of Agis, spoke of it with contempt as a battle of frogs
and mice, if we are to believe the dictum of Plutarch, Agesilaus,
15.

[674] Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. p. 553. ὁ δ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρος ἔξω τῆς
ἄρκτου καὶ τῆς οἰκουμένης ὀλίγου δεῖν πάσης μεθειστήκει, etc.

[675] Diodor. xvii. 62; Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. s. 35.

Respecting this war, we know very few details. At first, a flush
of success appeared in attend Agis. The Eleians, the Achæans
(except Pellênê), the Arcadians (except Megalopolis) and some
other Peloponnesians, joined his standard; so that he was enabled
to collect an army stated at 20,000 foot and 2000 horse. Defeating
the first Macedonian forces sent against him, he proceeded to
lay siege to Megalopolis; which city, now as previously, was the
stronghold of Macedonian influence in the peninsula, and was probably
occupied by a Macedonian garrison. An impulse manifested itself
at Athens in favor of active sympathy, and equipment of a fleet
to aid this anti-Macedonian effort. It was resisted by Phokion
and Demades, doubtless upon all views of prudence, but especially
upon one financial ground, taken by the latter, that the people
would be compelled to forego the Theoric distribution.[676] Even
Demosthenes himself, under circumstances so obviously discouraging,
could not recommend the formidable step of declaring against
Alexander—though he seems to have indulged in the expression of
general anti-Macedonian sympathies, and to have complained of
the helplessness into which Athens had been brought by past bad
policy.[677] Antipater, closing the war in Thrace on the best terms
that he could, hastened into Greece with his full forces, and reached
Peloponnesus in time to relieve Megalopolis, which had begun to be in
danger. One decisive battle, which took place in Arcadia, sufficed to
terminate the war. Agis and his army, the Lacedæmonians especially,
fought with gallantry and desperation, but were completely defeated.
Five thousand of their men were slain, including Agis himself; who,
though covered with wounds, disdained to leave the field, and fell
resisting to the last. The victors, according to one account, lost
3500 men; according to another, 1000 slain, together with a great
many wounded. This was a greater loss than Alexander had sustained
either at Issus or at Arbela; a plain proof that Agis and his
companions, however unfortunate in the result, had manifested courage
worthy of the best days of Sparta.

[676] Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. p. 818.

[677] This is what we make out, as to the conduct of Demosthenes,
from Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 553.

It is however difficult to believe, what Æschines insinuates,
that Demosthenes boasted of having himself got up the
Lacedæmonian movement—and yet that he made no proposition or
suggestion for countenancing it. Demosthenes can hardly have
lent any positive aid to the proceeding, though of course his
anti-Macedonian feelings would be counted upon, in case things
took a favorable turn.

Deinarchus (_ut suprà_) also accuses Demosthenes of having
remained inactive at this critical moment.

The allied forces were now so completely crushed, that all submitted
to Antipater. After consulting the philo-Macedonian synod at
Corinth, he condemned the Achæans and Eleians to pay 120 talents to
Megalopolis, and exacted from the Tegeans the punishment of those
among their leading men who had advised the war.[678] But he would
not take upon him to determine the treatment of the Lacedæmonians,
without special reference to Alexander. Requiring from them fifty
hostages, he sent up to Alexander in Asia some Lacedæmonian envoys
or prisoners, to throw themselves on his mercy.[679] We are told
that they did not reach the king until a long time afterwards, at
Baktra;[680] what he decided about Sparta generally, we do not know.

[678] Curtius, vi. 1, 15-20; Diodor. xvii. 63-73. After the
defeat, a suspensive decree was passed by the Spartans, releasing
from ἀτιμία those who had escaped from the battle—as had been
done after Leuktra (Diodor. xix. 70).

[679] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 524.

[680] Curtius, vii. 4, 32.

The rising of the Thebans, not many months after Alexander’s
accession, had been the first attempt of the Greeks to emancipate
themselves from Macedonian dominion; this enterprise of Agis was the
second. Both unfortunately had been partial, without the possibility
of any extensive or organized combination beforehand; both ended
miserably, riveting the chains of Greece more powerfully than ever.
Thus was the self-defensive force of Greece extinguished piecemeal.
The scheme of Agis was in fact desperate from the very outset, as
against the gigantic power of Alexander; and would perhaps never have
been undertaken, had not Agis himself been already compromised in
hostility against Macedonia, before the destruction of the Persian
force at Issus. This unfortunate prince, without any superior ability
(so far as we know), manifested a devoted courage and patriotism
worthy of his predecessor Leonidas at Thermopylæ; whose renown
stands higher, only because the cause in which he fell ultimately
triumphed. The Athenians and Ætolians, neither of whom took part
with Agis, were now left, without Thebes and Sparta, as the two great
military powers of Greece which will appear presently, when we come
to the last struggle for Grecian independence—the Lamian war; better
combined and more promising, yet not less disastrous in its result.

Though the strongest considerations of prudence kept Athens quiet
during this anti-Macedonian movement in Peloponnesus, a powerful
sympathy must have been raised among her citizens while the struggle
was going on. Had Agis gained the victory over Antipater, the
Athenians might probably have declared in his favor; and although no
independent position could have been permanently maintained against
so overwhelming an enemy as Alexander, yet considering that he was
thoroughly occupied and far in the interior of Asia, Greece might
have held out against Antipater for an interval not inconsiderable.
In the face of such eventualities, the fears of the macedonizing
statesmen now in power at Athens, the hopes of their opponents,
and the reciprocal antipathies of both, must have become unusually
manifest; so that the reaction afterwards, when the Macedonian power
became more irresistible than ever, was considered by the enemies
of Demosthenes to offer a favorable opportunity for ruining and
dishonoring him.

To the political peculiarity of this juncture we owe the judicial
contest between the two great Athenian orators; the memorable
accusation of Æschines against Ktesiphon, for having proposed a crown
to Demosthenes—and the still more memorable defence of Demosthenes,
on behalf of his friend as well as of himself. It was in the autumn
or winter of 337-336 B. C., that Ktesiphon had proposed this vote
of public honor in favor of Demosthenes, and had obtained the
probouleuma or preliminary acquiescence of the senate; it was in the
same Attic year, and not long afterwards, that Æschines attacked the
proposition under the Graphê Paranomôn, as illegal, unconstitutional,
mischievous, and founded on false allegations.[681] More than six
years had thus elapsed since the formal entry of the accusation;
yet Æschines had not chosen to bring it to actual trial; which
indeed could not be done without some risk to himself, before the
numerous and popular judicature of Athens. Twice or thrice before
his accusation was entered, other persons had moved to confer the
same honor upon Demosthenes,[682] and had been indicted under the
Graphê Paranomôn; but with such signal ill-success, that their
accusers did not obtain so much as one-fifth of the suffrages of the
Dikasts, and therefore incurred (under the standing regulation of
the Attic law) a penalty of 1000 drachmæ. The like danger awaited
Æschines; and although, in reference to the illegality of Ktesiphon’s
motion (which was the direct and ostensible purpose aimed at under
the Graphê Paranomôn), his indictment was grounded on special
circumstances such as the previous accusers may not have been able
to show, still it was not his real object to confine himself within
this narrow and technical argument. He intended to enlarge the range
of accusation, so as to include the whole character and policy of
Demosthenes; who would thus, if the verdict went against him, stand
publicly dishonored both as citizen and as politician. Unless this
latter purpose were accomplished, indeed, Æschines gained nothing
by bringing the indictment into court; for the mere entry of the
indictment would have already produced the effect of preventing the
probouleuma from passing into a decree, and the crown from being
actually conferred. Doubtless Ktesiphon and Demosthenes might have
forced Æschines to the alternative of either dropping his indictment
or bringing it into the Dikastery. But this was a forward challenge,
which, in reference to a purely honorary vote, they had not felt bold
enough to send; especially after the capture of Thebes in 335 B. C.
when the victorious Alexander demanded the surrender of Demosthenes
with several other citizens.

[681] Among the various documents, real or pretended, inserted in
the oration of Demosthenes De Coronâ, there appears one (p. 266)
purporting to be the very decree moved by Ktesiphon; and another
(p. 243) purporting to be the accusation preferred by Æschines. I
have already stated that I agree with Droysen in mistrusting all
the documents annexed to this oration; all of them bear the name
of wrong archons, most of them names of unknown archons; some of
them do not fit the place in which they appear. See my preceding
Vol. XI. Ch. lxxxix. p. 424; Ch. xc. p. 456-486.

We know from the statement of Æschines himself that the motion
of Ktesiphon was made after the appointment of Demosthenes to
be one of the inspectors of the fortifications of the city; and
that this appointment took place in the last month of the archon
Chærondas (June 337 B. C.—see Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p.
421-426). We also know that the accusation of Æschines against
Ktesiphon was preferred before the assassination of Philip,
which took place in August 336 B. C. (Æschin. ib. p.
612, 613). It thus appears that the motion of Ktesiphon (with
the probouleuma which followed upon it) must have occurred some
time during the autumn or winter of 337-336 B. C.—that
the accusation of Æschines must have been handed in shortly
after it—and that this accusation cannot have been handed in
at the date borne by the pseudo-document, p. 243—the month
Elaphebolion of the archon Chærondas, which would be anterior to
the appointment of Demosthenes. Moreover, whoever compares the
so-called motion of Ktesiphon, as it stands inserted Demosth. De
Coronâ, p. 266, with the words in which Æschines himself (Adv.
Ktesiph. p. 631. ὅθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ψηφίσματος ἐποιήσω, see also
p. 439) describes the exordium of that motion, will see that it
cannot be genuine.

[682] Demosthenes De Coronâ, p. 253, 302, 303, 310. He says (p.
267-313) that he had been crowned _often_ (πολλάκις) by the
Athenians and other Greek cities. The crown which he received on
the motion of Aristonikus (after the successes against Philip at
Byzantium and the Chersonesus, etc. in 340 B. C.) was
the _second_ crown (p. 253)—Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 848.

In this state of abeyance and compromise—Demosthenes enjoying the
inchoate honor of a complimentary vote from the senate, Æschines
intercepting it from being matured into a vote of the people—both
the vote and the indictment had remained for rather more than six
years. But the accuser now felt encouraged to push his indictment to
trial, under the reactionary party feeling, following on abortive
anti-Macedonian hopes, which succeeded to the complete victory of
Antipater over Agis, and which brought about the accusation of
anti-Macedonian citizens in Naxos, Thasos, and other Grecian cities
also.[683] Amidst the fears prevalent that the victor would carry
his resentment still farther, Æschines could now urge that Athens
was disgraced by having adopted or even approved the policy of
Demosthenes,[684] and that an emphatic condemnation of him was the
only way of clearing her from the charge of privity with those who
had raised the standard against Macedonian supremacy. In an able and
bitter harangue, Æschines first shows that the motion of Ktesiphon
was illegal, in consequence of the public official appointments held
by Demosthenes at the moment when it was proposed—next he enters at
large into the whole life and character of Demosthenes, to prove him
unworthy of such an honor, even if there had been no formal grounds
of objection. He distributes the entire life of Demosthenes into four
periods, the first ending at the peace of 346 B. C., between
Philip and the Athenians—the second, ending with the breaking out
of the next ensuing war in 341-340 B. C.—the third, ending
with the disaster at Chæroneia—the fourth, comprising all the time
following.[685] Throughout all the four periods, he denounces the
conduct of Demosthenes as having been corrupt, treacherous, cowardly,
and ruinous to the city. What is more surprising still—he expressly
charges him with gross subservience both to Philip and to Alexander,
at the very time when he was taking credit for a patriotic and
intrepid opposition to them.[686]

[683] Demosthenes De Coronâ, p. 294.

[684] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 645. διαβέβληται δ᾽ ἡμῶν ἡ
πόλις ἐκ τῶν Δημοσθένους πολιτευμάτων ~περὶ τοὺς νῦν καιρούς~·
δόξετε δ᾽ ἐὰν μὲν τοῦτον στεφανώσητε, ~ὁμογνώμονες εἶναι τοῖς
παραβαίνουσι τὴν κοινὴν εἰρήνην~· ἐὰν δὲ τοὐναντίον τούτου
πράξητε, ἀπολύσετε τὸν δῆμον τῶν αἰτιῶν.—Compare with this, the
last sentence of the oration of Demosthenes in reply, where he
puts up a prayer to the gods—ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς λοιποῖς τὴν ταχίστην
ἀπαλλαγὴν ~τῶν ἐπηρτημένων φόβων~ δότε καὶ σωτηρίαν ἀσφαλῆ.

The mention by Æschines (immediately before) of the Pythian
games, as about to be celebrated in a few days, marks the date of
this judicial trial—August, 330 B. C.

[685] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 443.

[686] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. pp. 449, 456, 467, 551.

That Athens had undergone sad defeat and humiliation, having been
driven from her independent and even presidential position into the
degraded character of a subject Macedonian city, since the time
when Demosthenes first began political life—was a fact but too
indisputable. Æschines even makes this a part of his case; arraigning
the traitorous mismanagement of Demosthenes as the cause of so
melancholy a revolution, and denouncing him as candidate for public
compliment or no better plea than a series of public calamities.[687]
Having thus animadverted on the conduct of Demosthenes prior to the
battle of Chæroneia, Æschines proceeds to the more recent past, and
contends that Demosthenes cannot be sincere in his pretended enmity
to Alexander, because he has let slip three successive occasions, all
highly favorable, for instigating Athens to hostility against the
Macedonians. Of these three occasions, the first was, when Alexander
first crossed into Asia; the second, immediately before the battle
of Issus; the third, during the flush of success obtained by Agis
in Peloponnesus.[688] On neither of these occasions did Demosthenes
call for any public action against Macedonia; a proof (according to
Æschines) that his anti-Macedonian professions were insincere.

[687] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. pp. 526, 538, 541.

[688] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 551-553.

I have more than once remarked, that considering the bitter enmity
between the two orators, it is rarely safe to trust the unsupported
allegation of either against the other. But in regard to the
last-mentioned charges advanced by Æschines, there is enough of known
fact, and we have independent evidence, such as is not often before
us, to appreciate him as an accuser of Demosthenes. The victorious
career of Alexander, set forth in the preceding chapters, proves
amply that not one of the three periods, here indicated by Æschines,
presented even decent encouragement for a reasonable Athenian
patriot, to involve his country in warfare against so formidable
an enemy. Nothing can be more frivolous than these charges against
Demosthenes, of having omitted promising seasons for anti-Macedonian
operations. Partly for this reason, probably, Demosthenes does not
notice them in his reply; still more, perhaps, on another ground,
that it was not safe to speak out what he thought and felt about
Alexander. His reply dwells altogether upon the period before the
death of Philip. Of the boundless empire subsequently acquired,
by the son of Philip, he speaks only to mourn it as a wretched
visitation of fortune, which has desolated alike the Hellenic and
the barbaric world—in which Athens has been engulfed along with
others—and from which even those faithless and trimming Greeks, who
helped to aggrandize Philip, have not escaped better than Athens, nor
indeed so well.[689]

[689] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 311-316.

I shall not here touch upon the Demosthenic speech De Coronâ in
a rhetorical point of view, nor add anything to those encomiums
which have been pronounced upon it with one voice, both in ancient
and in modern times, as the unapproachable masterpiece of Grecian
oratory. To this work it belongs as a portion of Grecian history;
a retrospect of the efforts made by a patriot and a statesman to
uphold the dignity of Athens and the autonomy of the Grecian world,
against a dangerous aggressor from without. How these efforts were
directed, and how they lamentably failed, has been recounted in
my last preceding volume. Demosthenes here passes them in review,
replying to the criminations against his public conduct during the
interval of ten years, between the peace of 346 B. C., (or
the period immediately preceding it) and the death of Philip. It is
remarkable, that though professing to enter upon a defence of his
whole public life,[690] he nevertheless can afford to leave unnoticed
that portion of it which is perhaps the most honorable to him—the
early period of his first Philippics and Olynthiacs—when, though a
politician as yet immature and of no established footing, he was the
first to descry in the distance the perils threatened by Philip’s
aggrandizement, and the loudest in calling for timely and energetic
precautions against it; in spite of apathy and murmurs from older
politicians as well as from the general public. Beginning with the
peace of 346 B. C., Demosthenes vindicates his own share in
the antecedents of that event against the charges of Æschines, whom
he denounces as the cause of all the mischief; a controversy which
I have already tried to elucidate, in my last volume. Passing next
to the period after that peace—to the four years first of hostile
diplomacy, then of hostile action, against Philip, which ended with
the disaster of Chæroneia—Demosthenes is not satisfied with simple
vindication. He re-asserts this policy as matter of pride and honor,
in spite of its results. He congratulates his countrymen on having
manifested a Pan-hellenic patriotism worthy of their forefathers, and
takes to himself only the credit of having been forward to proclaim
and carry out this glorious sentiment common to all. Fortune has been
adverse; yet the vigorous anti-Macedonian policy was no mistake;
Demosthenes swears it by the combatants of Marathon, Platæa and
Salamis.[691] To have had a foreign dominion obtruded upon Greece, is
an overwhelming calamity; but to have had this accomplished without
strenuous resistance on the part of Athens, would have been calamity
aggravated by dishonor.

[690] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 227. μέλλων τοῦ τε ἰδίου βίου
~παντός~, ὡς ἔοικε, λόγον διδόναι τήμερον καὶ τῶν κοινῇ
πεπολιτευμένων, etc.

[691] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 297. ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐκ
ἔστιν ὅπως ἡμάρτετε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἁπάντων
ἐλευθερίας καὶ σωτηρίας κίνδυνον ἀράμενοι—οὐ μὰ τοὺς Μαραθῶνι
προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων καὶ τοὺς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς
παραταξαμένους καὶ τοὺς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχήσαντας, etc., the oath
so often cited and admired.

Conceived in this sublime strain, the reply of Demosthenes to his
rival has an historical value, as a funeral oration of extinct
Athenian and Grecian freedom. Six years before, the orator had been
appointed by his countrymen to deliver the usual public oration over
the warriors slain at Chæroneia. That speech is now lost, but it
probably touched upon the same topics. Though the sphere of action,
of every Greek city as well as of every Greek citizen, was now
cramped and confined by irresistible Macedonian force; there still
remained the sentiment of full political freedom and dignity enjoyed
during the past—the admiration of ancestors who had once defended it
successfully—and the sympathy with leaders who had recently stood
forward to uphold it, however unsuccessfully. It is among the most
memorable facts in Grecian history, that in spite of the victory of
Philip at Chæroneia—in spite of the subsequent conquest of Thebes by
Alexander, and the danger of Athens after it—in spite of the Asiatic
conquests which had since thrown all Persian force into the hands
of the Macedonian king—the Athenian people could never be persuaded
either to repudiate Demosthenes, or to disclaim sympathy with his
political policy. How much art and ability was employed, to induce
them to do so, by his numerous enemies, the speech of Æschines is
enough to teach us. And when we consider how easily the public sicken
of schemes which end in misfortune—how great a mental relief is
usually obtained by throwing blame on unsuccessful leaders—it would
have been no matter of surprise, if, in one of the many prosecutions
wherein the fame of Demosthenes was involved, the Dikasts had given
a verdict unfavorable to him. That he always came off acquitted, and
even honorably acquitted, is a proof of rare fidelity and steadiness
of mind in the Athenians. It is a proof that those noble, patriotic,
and Pan-hellenic sentiments, which we constantly find inculcated in
his orations, throughout a period of twenty years, had sunk into the
minds of his hearers; and that amidst the many general allegations of
corruption against him, loudly proclaimed by his enemies, there was
no one well-ascertained fact which they could substantiate before the
Dikastery.

The indictment now preferred by Æschines against Ktesiphon only
procured for Demosthenes a new triumph. When the suffrages of the
Dikasts were counted, Æschines did not obtain so much as one fifth.
He became therefore liable to the customary fine of 1000 drachmæ. It
appears that he quitted Athens immediately, without paying the fine,
and retired into Asia, from whence he never returned. He is said to
have opened a rhetorical school at Rhodes, and to have gone into the
interior of Asia during the last year of Alexander’s life (at the
time when that monarch was ordaining on the Grecian cities compulsory
restoration of all their exiles), in order to procure assistance for
returning to Athens. This project was disappointed by Alexander’s
death.[692]

[692] See the various lives of Æschines—in Westermann, Scriptores
Biographici, pp. 268, 269.

We cannot suppose that Æschines was unable to pay the fine of 1000
drachmæ, or to find friends who would pay it for him. It was not
therefore legal compulsion, but the extreme disappointment and
humiliation of so signal a defeat, which made him leave Athens.
We must remember that this was a gratuitous challenge sent by
himself; that the celebrity of the two rivals had brought together
auditors, not merely from Athens, but from various other Grecian
cities; and that the effect of the speech of Demosthenes in his
own defence,—delivered with all his perfection of voice and
action, and not only electrifying hearers by the sublimity of its
public sentiment, but also full of admirably managed self-praise,
and contemptuous bitterness towards his rival—must have been
inexpressibly powerful and commanding. Probably the friends of
Æschines became themselves angry with him for having brought the
indictment forward. For the effect of his defeat must have been
that the vote of the Senate which he indicted, was brought forward
and passed in the public assembly; and that Demosthenes must have
received a public coronation.[693] In no other way, under the
existing circumstances of Athens, could Demosthenes have obtained so
emphatic a compliment. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that such
a mortification was insupportable to Æschines. He became disgusted
with his native city. We read that afterwards, in his rhetorical
school at Rhodes, he one day declaimed, as a lesson to his pupils,
the successful oration of his rival, De Coronâ. Of course it excited
a burst of admiration. “What, if you had heard the beast himself
speak it!”—exclaimed Æschines.

[693] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 315. ἀλλὰ νυνὶ τήμερον ἐγὼ μὲν
ὑπὲρ τοῦ στεφανωθῆναι δοκιμάζομαι, τὸ δὲ μήδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ἀδικεῖν
ἀνωμολόγημαι—σοὶ δὲ συκοφάντῃ μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖν ὑπάρχει,
κινδυνεύεις δὲ εἴτε δεῖ σε ἔτι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, εἴτ᾽ ἤδη πεπαῦσθαι
μὴ μεταλαβόντα τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων, etc.

Yet Æschines had become opulent, according to Demosthenes, p. 329.

From this memorable triumph of the illustrious orator and defendant,
we have to pass to another trial—a direct accusation brought against
him, from which he did not escape so successfully. We are compelled
here to jump over five years and a half (August 330 B. C.,
to January 324 B. C.), during which we have no information
about Grecian history; the interval between Alexander’s march into
Baktria and his return to Persis and Susiana. Displeased with the
conduct of the satraps during his absence, Alexander put to death
or punished several, and directed the rest to disband without delay
the mercenary soldiers whom they had taken into pay. This peremptory
order filled both Asia and Europe with roving detachments of
unprovided soldiers, some of whom sought subsistence in the Grecian
islands and on the Lacedæmonian southern coast, at Cape Tænarus in
Laconia.

It was about this period (the beginning of 324 B. C.),
that Harpalus the satrap of Babylonia and Syria, becoming alarmed
at the prospect of being punished by Alexander for his ostentatious
prodigalities, fled from Asia into Greece, with a considerable
treasure and a body of 5000 soldiers.[694] While satrap, he had
invited into Asia, in succession, two Athenian women as mistresses,
Pythionikê and Glykera, to each of whom he was much attached, and
whom he entertained with lavish expense and pomp. On the death of
the first, he testified his sorrow by two costly funereal monuments
to her memory; one at Babylon, the other in Attica, between Athens
and Eleusis. With Glykera he is said to have resided at Tarsus in
Kilikia,—to have ordered that men should prostrate themselves before
her, and address her as queen—and to have erected her statue along
with his own at Rhossus, a seaport on the confines of Kilikia and
Syria.[695] To please these mistresses, or perhaps to ensure a
retreat for himself in case of need, he had sent to Athens profuse
gifts of wheat for distribution among the people, for which he had
received votes of thanks with the grant of Athenian citizenship.[696]
Moreover he had consigned to Charikles, son-in-law of Phokion, the
task of erecting the monument in Attica to the honor of Pythionikê;
with a large remittance of money for the purpose.[697] The profit or
embezzlement arising out of this expenditure secured to him the good
will of Charikles—a man very different from his father-in-law, the
honest and austere Phokion. Other Athenians were probably conciliated
by various presents, so that when Harpalus found it convenient to
quit Asia, about the beginning of 324 B. C., he had already
acquired some hold both on the public of Athens and on some of her
leading men. He sailed with his treasure and his armament straight
to Cape Sunium in Attica, from whence he sent to ask shelter and
protection in that city.[698]

[694] Diodor. xvii. 108. He states the treasure brought out of
Asia by Harpalus as 5000 talents.

[695] See the fragments of the letter or pamphlet of Theopompus
addressed to Alexander, while Harpalus was still at Tarsus, and
before his flight to Athens—Theopomp. Fragm. 277, 278, ed. Didot,
ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 586-595. Theopompus speaks in the present
tense—~καὶ ὁρᾷ~ (Harpalus) ὑπὸ τοῦ λάου προσκυνουμένην (Glykera),
etc. Kleitarchus stated these facts, as well as Theopompus
(Athenæ. ibid.).

[696] Athenæus, xiii. p. 596—the extract from the satirical
drama called Agên, represented before Alexander at Susa, in the
Dionysiac festival or early months of 324 B. C.

[697] Plutarch, Phokion, 22; Pausanias, i. 37, 4; Dikæarchi
Fragment. 72. ed. Didot.

Plutarch’s narrative is misleading, inasmuch as it seems to imply
that Harpalus gave this money to Charikles _after_ his arrival at
Athens. We know from Theopompus (Fr. 277) that the monument had
been finished some time before Harpalus quitted Asia. Plutarch
treats it as a mean structure, unworthy of the sum expended on
it; but both Dikæarchus and Pausanias describe it as stately and
magnificent.

[698] Curtius, x. 2, 1.

The first reports transmitted to Asia appear to have proclaimed that
the Athenians had welcomed Harpalus as a friend and ally, thrown off
the Macedonian yoke, and prepared for a war to re-establish Hellenic
freedom. Such is the color of the case, as presented in the satiric
drama called Agên, exhibited before Alexander in the Dionysiac
festival at Susa, in February or March 324 B. C. Such news,
connecting itself in Alexander’s mind with the recent defeat of
Zopyrion in Thrace and other disorders of the disbanded mercenaries,
incensed him so much, that he at first ordered a fleet to be
equipped, determining to cross over and attack Athens in person.[699]
But he was presently calmed by more correct intelligence, certifying
that the Athenians had positively refused to espouse the cause of
Harpalus.[700]

[699] Curtius, x. 2, 1. “Igitur triginta navibus Sunium
transmittunt” (Harpalus and his company), “unde portum urbis
petere decreverunt. His cognitis, rex Harpalo Atheniensibusque
juxta infestus, classem parari jubet, Athenas protinus
petiturus.” Compare Justin, xiii. 5, 7—who mentions this hostile
intention in Alexander’s mind, but gives a different account of
the cause of it.

The extract from the drama _Agên_ (given in Athenæus, xiii.
p. 596) represents the reports which excited this anger of
Alexander. It was said that Athens had repudiated her slavery,
with the abundance which she had before enjoyed under it,—to
enter upon a struggle for freedom, with the certainty of present
privations and future ruin:—

A. ὅτε μὲν ἔφασκον (the Athenians) δοῦλον ἐκτῆσθαι βίον,
ἱκανὸν ἐδείπνουν· ~νῦν δὲ~, τὸν χέδροπα μόνον
καὶ τὸν μάραθον ~ἔσθουσι~, πυροὺς δ᾽ οὐ μάλα.

B. καὶ μὴν ἀκούω μυριάδας τὸν Ἅρπαλον
αὐτοῖσι τῶν Ἀγῆνος οὐκ ἐλάττονας
σίτου παραπέμψαι, καὶ πολίτην γεγονέναι.

A. Γλυκέρας ὁ σῖτος οὗτος ἦν· ἔσται δ᾽ ἴσως
αὐτοῖσιν ~ὀλέθρου~ κοὐκ ἑταίρας ἀῤῥαβών.

I conceive this drama Agên to have been represented on the banks
of the _Choaspes_ (not the _Hydaspes_—see my note in the Chapter
immediately preceding, p. 240), that is, at Susa, in the Dionysia
of 324 B. C. It is interesting as a record of the
feelings of the time.

[700] Nevertheless the impression, that Alexander was intending
to besiege Athens, must have prevailed in the army for several
months longer, during the autumn of 324 B. C. when
he was at Ekbatana. Ephippus the historian, in recounting the
flatteries addressed to Alexander at Ekbatana, mentions the
rhodomontade of a soldier named Gorgus—Γόργος ὁ ὁπλοφύλαξ
Ἀλέξανδρον Ἄμμωνος υἱὸν στεφανοῖ χρυσοῖς τρισχιλίοις, ~καὶ ὅταν
Ἀθήνας πολιορκῇ~, μυρίαις πανοπλίαις καὶ ταῖς ἴσαις καταπέλταις
καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις βέλεσιν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἱκανοῖς (Ephippus
ap. Athenæum, xii. p. 538. Fragment. 3. ed. Didot).

The fact of such final rejection by the Athenians is quite
indisputable. But it seems, as far as we can make out from imperfect
evidence, that this step was not taken without debate, nor without
symptoms of a contrary disposition, sufficient to explain the
rumors first sent to Alexander. The first arrival of Harpalus
with his armament at Sunium, indeed, excited alarm, as if he were
coming to take possession of Peiræus; and the admiral Philokles was
instructed to adopt precautions for defence of the harbor.[701]
But Harpalus, sending away his armament to Krete or to Tænarus,
solicited and obtained permission to come to Athens, with a single
ship and his own personal attendants. What was of still greater
moment, he brought with him a large sum of money, amounting, we
are told to upwards of 700 talents, or more than £160,000. We must
recollect that he was already favorably known to the people by large
presents of corn, which had procured for him a vote of citizenship.
He now threw himself upon their gratitude as a suppliant seeking
protection against the wrath of Alexander; and while entreating
from the Athenians an interference so hazardous to themselves, he
did not omit to encourage them by exaggerating the means at his own
disposal. He expatiated on the universal hatred and discontent felt
against Alexander, and held out assurance of being joined by powerful
allies, foreign as well as Greek, if once a city like Athens would
raise the standard of liberation.[702] To many Athenian patriots,
more ardent than long-sighted, such appeals inspired both sympathy
and confidence. Moreover Harpalus would of course purchase every
influential partisan who would accept a bribe; in addition to men
like Charikles, who were already in his interest. His cause was
espoused by Hyperides,[703] an earnest anti-Macedonian citizen, and
an orator second only to Demosthenes. There seems good reason for
believing that at first, a strong feeling was excited in favor of
taking part with the exile; the people not being daunted even by the
idea of war with Alexander.[704]

[701] Deinarchus adv. Philokl. s. 1. φάσκων κωλύσειν Ἅρπαλον εἰς
τὸν Πειραῖα καταπλεῦσαι, στατηγὸς ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τὰ νεώρια καὶ τὴν
Μουνυχίαν κεχειροτονημένος, etc. Deinarchus adv. Aristogeiton,
s. 4. ὃς παρ᾽ Ἁρπάλου λαβεῖν χρήματα ἐτόλμησεν, ὃν ᾔσθεθ᾽ ἥκειν
καταληψόμενον τὴν πόλιν ὑμῶν, etc.

[702] See the new and interesting, though unfortunately scanty,
fragments of the oration of Hyperides against Demosthenes,
published and elucidated by Mr. Churchill Babington from a
recently discovered Egyptian papyrus (Cambridge, 1850). From
Fragm. 14 (p. 38 of Mr. Babington’s edition) we may see that
the promises mentioned in the text were actually held out by
Harpalus—indeed we might almost have presumed it without positive
evidence. Hyperides addresses Demosthenes—ταύτας ὑπ...ις τῷ
ψηφίσματι, συλλαβὼν τὸν Ἅρπαλον· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἅπαντας
πρεσβεύεσθαι πεποίηκας ὡς Ἀλέξανδρον, οὐκ ἔχοντας ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν
ἀποστροφήν· ~τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους~, οἳ αὐτοὶ ἂν ἧκον φέροντες εἰς
ταὐτὸ τὴν δύναμιν, ἔχοντες τὰ χρήματα καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ὅσους
ἕκαστος αὐτῶν εἶχε, ~τούτους σύμπαντας~ οὐ μόνον ~κεκώλυκας
ἀποστῆναι ἐκείνου~ τῇ συλλήψει τοῦ Ἁρπάλου, ἀλλὰ καὶ....

From the language thus used by Hyperides in his accusation, we
are made to perceive what prospects he (and of course Harpalus,
upon whose authority he must have spoken) had held out to the
people when the case was first under discussion.

The fragment here cited is complete as to the main sense, not
requiring very great help from conjecture. In some of the other
fragments, the conjectural restorations of Mr. Babington, though
highly probable and judicious, form too large a proportion of the
whole to admit of our citing them with confidence as testimony.

[703] Pollux, x. 159.

[704] Plutarch, De Vitioso Pudore, p. 531. τῶν γὰρ Ἀθηναίων
ὡρμημένων Ἁρπάλῳ βοηθεῖν, καὶ κορυσσόντων ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον,
ἐξαίφνης ἐπεφάνη Φιλόξενος, ὁ τῶν ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ πραγμάτων
Ἀλεξάνδρου στρατηγός· ἐκπλαγέντος δὲ τοῦ δήμου, καὶ σιωπῶντος
διὰ τὸν φόβον, ὁ Δημοσθένης—Τί ποιήσουσιν, ἔφη, πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον
ἰδόντες, οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι πρὸς τὸν λύχνον ἀντιβλέπειν;

Phokion, whom Harpalus vainly endeavored to corrupt, resisted of
course the proposition of espousing his cause. And Demosthenes
also resisted it, not less decidedly, from the very outset.[705]
Notwithstanding all his hatred of Macedonian supremacy, he could not
be blind to the insanity of declaring war against Alexander. Indeed
those who study his orations throughout, will find his counsels
quite as much distinguished for prudence as for vigorous patriotism.
His prudence, on this occasion, however, proved injurious to his
political position; for while it incensed Hyperides and the more
sanguine anti-Macedonians, it probably did not gain for himself
anything beyond a temporary truce from his old macedonizing opponents.

[705] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 21; Plutarch, Demosthen. 25.

The joint opposition of politicians so discordant as Demosthenes
and Phokion, prevailed over the impulse which the partisans of
Harpalus had created. No decree could be obtained in his favor.
Presently however the case was complicated by the coming of envoys
from Antipater and Olympias in Macedonia, requiring that he should
be surrendered.[706] The like requisition was also addressed by the
Macedonian admiral Philoxenus, who arrived with a small squadron
from Asia. These demands were refused, at the instance of Phokion no
less than of Demosthenes. Nevertheless the prospects of Macedonian
vengeance were now brought in such fearful proximity before the
people, that all disposition to support Harpalus gave way to the
necessity of propitiating Alexander. A decree was passed to arrest
Harpalus, and to place all his money under sequestration in the
acropolis, until special directions could be received from Alexander;
to whom, apparently, envoys were sent, carrying with them the slaves
of Harpalus to be interrogated by him, and instructed to solicit
a lenient sentence at his hands.[707] Now it was Demosthenes who
moved these decrees for personal arrest and for sequestration of
the money;[708] whereby he incurred still warmer resentment from
Hyperides and the other Harpalian partisans, who denounced him
as a subservient creature of the all-powerful monarch. Harpalus
was confined, but presently made his escape; probably much to the
satisfaction of Phokion, Demosthenes, and every one else; for even
those who were most anxious to get rid of him would recoil from the
odium and dishonor of surrendering him, even under constraint, to a
certain death. He fled to Krete, where he was soon after slain by one
of his own companions.[709]

[706] Diodor. xvii. 108.

[707] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 69. ἐὰν τοὺς παῖδας καταπέμψῃ
(Alexander) πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς νῦν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνακεκομισμένους, καὶ
τούτων ἀξιοῖ τὴν ἀληθείαν πυθέσθαι, etc.

[708] See the fragment cited in a preceding note from the oration
of Hyperides against Demosthenes. That it was _Demosthenes_ who
moved the decree for depositing the money in the acropolis,
we learn also from one of his other accusers—the citizen who
delivered the speech composed by Deinarchus (adv. Demosthen.
sect. 68, 71, 89)—~ἔγραψεν αὐτὸς, ἐν τῷ δήμῳ Δημοσθένης~, ὡς
δηλονότι δικαίου τοῦ πράγματος ὄντος, φυλάττειν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τὰ εἰς
τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἀφικόμενα μετὰ Ἁρπάλου χρήματα.

Deinarchus (adv. Demosth. s. 97-106) accuses Demosthenes of base
flattery to Alexander. Hyperides also makes the same charge—see
the Fragments in Mr. Babington’s edition, sect. 2. Fr. 11. p. 12;
sect. 3. Fr. 5. p. 34.

[709] Pausan. ii. 33, 4; Diodor. xvii. 108.

At the time when the decrees for arrest and sequestration were
passed, Demosthenes requested a citizen near him to ask Harpalus
publicly in the assembly, what was the amount of his money, which
the people had just resolved to impound.[710] Harpalus answered,
720 talents; and Demosthenes proclaimed this sum to the people, on
the authority of Harpalus, dwelling with some emphasis upon its
magnitude. But when the money came to be counted in the acropolis, it
was discovered that there was in reality no more than 350 talents.
Now it is said that Demosthenes did not at once communicate to the
people this prodigious deficiency in the real sum as compared with
the announcement of Harpalus, repeated in the public assembly by
himself. The impression prevailed, for how long a time we do not
know, that 720 Harpalian talents had actually been lodged in the
acropolis; and when the truth became at length known, great surprise
and outcry were excited.[711] It was assumed that the missing half
of the sum set forth must have been employed in corruption; and
suspicions prevailed against almost all the orators, Demosthenes and
Hyperides both included.

[710] This material fact, of the question publicly put to
Harpalus in the assembly by some one at the request of
Demosthenes, appears in the Fragments of Hyperides, p. 5, 7,
9, ed. Babington—καθήμενος κάτω ὑπὸ τῇ κατατομῇ, ἐκέλευσε ...
τὸν χορευτὴν ἐρωτῆσαι τὸν Ἅρπαλον ὁπόσα εἴη τὰ χρήματα τὰ
ἀνοισθησόμενα εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν· ~ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο~ ὅτι ἑπτακόσια,
etc.

The term κατατομὴ (see Mr. Babington’s note) “designates a
broad passage occurring at intervals between the concentrically
arranged benches of seats in a theatre, and running parallel with
them.”

[711] Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 846. In the life of Demosthenes
given by Photius (Cod. 265, p. 494) it is stated that only 308
talents were found.

In this state of doubt, Demosthenes moved that the Senate of
Areopagus should investigate the matter and report who were the
presumed delinquents[712] fit to be indicted before the Dikastery;
he declared in the speech accompanying his motion that the real
delinquents, whoever they might be, deserved to be capitally
punished. The Areopagites delayed their report for six months, though
Demosthenes is said to have called for it with some impatience.
Search was made in the houses of the leading orators, excepting
only one who was recently married.[713] At length the report
appeared, enumerating several names of citizens chargeable with
the appropriation of this money, and specifying how much had been
taken by each. Among these names were Demosthenes himself, charged
with 20 talents—Demades charged with 6000 golden staters—and other
citizens, with different sums attached to their names.[714] Upon
this report, ten[715] public accusers were appointed to prosecute
the indictment against the persons specified, before the Dikastery.
Among the accusers was Hyperides, whose name had not been comprised
in the Areopagitic report. Demosthenes was brought to trial, first
of all the persons accused, before a numerous Dikastery of 1500
citizens,[716] who confirmed the report of the Areopagites, found
him guilty, and condemned him to pay fifty talents to the state.
Not being able to discharge this large fine, he was put in prison;
but after some days he found means to escape, and fled to Trœzen
in Peloponnesus, where he passed some months as a dispirited and
sorrowing exile, until the death of Alexander.[717] What was done
with the other citizens included in the Areopagitic report, we do not
know. It appears that Demades[718]—who was among those comprised, and
who is especially attacked, along with Demosthenes, by both Hyperides
and Deinarchus—did not appear to take his trial, and therefore
must have been driven into exile; yet if so, he must have speedily
returned, since he seems to have been at Athens when Alexander died.
Philokles and Aristogeiton were also brought to trial as being
included by the Areopagus in the list of delinquents; but how their
trial ended, does not appear.[719]

[712] That this motion was made by Demosthenes himself, is a
point strongly pressed by his accuser Deinarchus—adv. Demosth. s.
5. 62, 84, etc.: compare also the Fragm. of Hyperides, p. 59, ed.
Babington.

Deinarchus, in his loose rhetoric, tries to put the case as
if Demosthenes had proposed to recognize the sentence of the
Areopagus as final and peremptory, and stood therefore condemned
upon the authority invoked by himself. But this is refuted
sufficiently by the mere fact that the trial was instituted
afterwards; besides that, it is repugnant to the judicial
practice of Athens.

[713] Plutarch, Demosth. 26. We learn from Deinarchus (adv.
Demosth. s. 46) that the report of the Areopagites was not
delivered until after an interval of six months. About their
delay and the impatience of Demosthenes see Fragm. Hyperides, pp.
12-33, ed. Babington.

[714] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 92. See the Fragm. of Hyperides
in Mr. Babington, p. 18.

[715] Deinarchus adv. Aristogeiton, s. 6. Stratokles was one of
the accusers.

[716] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 108, 109.

[717] Plutarch, Demosth. 26.

[718] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 104.

[719] See the two orations composed by Deinarchus, against
Philokles and Aristogeiton.

In the second and third Epistles ascribed to Demosthenes (p.
1470, 1483, 1485), he is made to state, that he alone had
been condemned by the Dykastery, because his trial had come
on first—that Aristogeiton and all the others tried were
acquitted, though the charge against all was the same, and the
evidence against all was the same also—viz. nothing more than
the simple report of the Areopagus. As I agree with those who
hold these epistles to be probably spurious, I cannot believe,
on such authority alone, that all the other persons tried were
acquitted—a fact highly improbable in itself.

This condemnation and banishment of Demosthenes—unquestionably the
greatest orator, and one of the greatest citizens, in Athenian
antiquity,—is the most painful result of the debates respecting
the exile Harpalus. Demosthenes himself denied the charge; but
unfortunately we possess neither his defence, nor the facts alleged
in evidence against him; so that our means of forming a positive
conclusion are imperfect. At the same time, judging from the
circumstances as far as we know them—there are several which go to
show his innocence, and none which tend to prove him guilty. If we
are called upon to believe that he received money from Harpalus, we
must know for what service the payment was made. Did Demosthenes
take part with Harpalus, and advise the Athenians to espouse his
cause? Did he even keep silence, and abstain from advising them to
reject the propositions? Quite the reverse. Demosthenes was from
the beginning a declared opponent of Harpalus, and of all measures
for supporting his cause. Plutarch indeed tells an anecdote—that
Demosthenes began by opposing Harpalus, but that presently he
was fascinated by the beauty of a golden cup among the Harpalian
treasures. Harpalus, perceiving his admiration, sent to him on
the ensuing night the golden cup, together with twenty talents,
which Demosthenes accepted. A few days afterwards, when the cause
of Harpalus was again debated in the public assembly, the orator
appeared with his throat enveloped in woollen wrappers, and affected
to have lost his voice; upon which the people, detecting this
simulated inability as dictated by the bribe which had been given,
expressed their displeasure partly by sarcastic taunts, partly by
indignant murmuring.[720] So stands the anecdote in Plutarch. But
we have proof that it is untrue. Demosthenes may indeed have been
disabled by sore throat from speaking at some particular assembly;
so far the story may be accurate; but that he desisted from opposing
Harpalus (the real point of the allegation against him) is certainly
not true; for we know from his accusers Deinarchus and Hyperides,
that it was he who made the final motion for imprisoning Harpalus
and sequestrating the Harpalian treasure in trust for Alexander.
In fact, Hyperides himself denounces Demosthenes, as having from
subservience to Alexander, closed the door against Harpalus and his
prospects.[721] Such direct and continued opposition is a conclusive
proof that Demosthenes was neither paid nor bought by Harpalus.
The only service which he rendered to the exile was, by refusing
to deliver him to Antipater, and by not preventing his escape
from imprisonment. Now in this refusal even Phokion concurred;
and probably the best Athenians, of all parties, were desirous of
favoring the escape of an exile whom it would have been odious to
hand over to a Macedonian executioner. Insofar as it was a crime not
to have prevented the escape of Harpalus, the crime was committed
as much by Phokion as by Demosthenes; and indeed more, seeing that
Phokion was one of the generals, exercising the most important
administrative duties—while Demosthenes was only an orator and mover
in the assembly. Moreover, Harpalus had no means of requiting the
persons, whoever they were, to whom he owed his escape; for the same
motion which decreed his arrest, decreed also the sequestration of
his money, and thus removed it from his own control.[722]

[720] Plutarch, Demosth. 25: compare also Plutarch, Vit. X.
Oratt. p. 846; and Photius, Life of Demosth. Cod. 265, p. 494.

[721] See the fragment of Hyperides in Mr. Babington’s edition,
pp. 37, 38 (a fragment already cited in a preceding note),
insisting upon the prodigious mischief which Demosthenes had done
by his decree for arresting (σύλληψις) Harpalus.

[722] In the Life of Demosthenes apud Photium (Cod. 265), the
service alleged to have been rendered by him to Harpalus, and for
which he was charged with having received 1000 Darics, is put as
I have stated it in the text—Demosthenes first spoke publicly
against receiving Harpalus, but presently Δαρεικοὺς χιλίους
(~ὥς φασι~) λαβὼν πρὸς τοὺς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ λέγοντας μετετάξατο
(then follow the particular acts whereby this alleged change of
sentiment was manifested, which particular acts are described
as follows)—καὶ βουλομένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων Ἀντιπάτρῳ προδοῦναι τὸν
ἄνθρωπον ἀντεῖπεν, τά τε Ἁρπάλεια χρήματα εἰς ἀκρόπολιν ἔγραψεν
ἀποθέσθαι, μηδὲ τῷ δήμῳ τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν ἀποσημηνάμενος.

That Demosthenes should first oppose the reception of
Harpalus—and then afterwards oppose the surrender of Harpalus
to Antipater’s requisition—is here represented as a change of
politics requiring the hypothesis of a bribe to explain it.
But it is in reality no change at all. The two proceedings are
perfectly consistent with each other, and both of them defensible.

The charge therefore made against Demosthenes by his two
accusers,—that he received money _from_ Harpalus,—is one which all
the facts known to us tend to refute. But this is not quite the whole
case. Had Demosthenes the means of embezzling the money, after it
had passed out of the control of Harpalus? To this question also we
may reply in the negative, so far as Athenian practice enables us to
judge. Demosthenes had moved, and the people had voted, that these
treasures should be lodged in trust for Alexander, in the acropolis;
a place where all the Athenian public money was habitually kept—in
the back chamber of the Parthenon. When placed in that chamber, these
new treasures would come under the custody of the officers of the
Athenian exchequer; and would be just as much out of the reach of
Demosthenes as the rest of the public money. What more could Phokion
himself have done to preserve the Harpalian fund intact, than to put
it in the recognized place of surety? Then, as to the intermediate
process, of taking the money from Harpalus up to the acropolis, there
is no proof,—and in my judgment no probability,—that Demosthenes was
at all concerned in it. Even to count, verify, and weigh, a sum of
above £80,000—not in bank notes or bills of exchange, but subdivided
in numerous and heavy coins (staters, darics, tetradrachms), likely
to be not even Attic, but Asiatic—must have been a tedious duty
requiring to be performed by competent reckoners, and foreign to
the habits of Demosthenes. The officers of the Athenian treasury
must have gone through this labor, providing the slaves or mules
requisite for carrying so heavy a burthen up to the acropolis.
Now we have ample evidence from the remaining Inscriptions, that
the details of transfering and verifying the public property, at
Athens, were performed habitually with laborious accuracy. Least
of all would such accuracy be found wanting in the case of the
large Harpalian treasure, where the very passing of the decree
implied great fear of Alexander. If Harpalus, on being publicly
questioned in the assembly—What was the sum to be carried up into the
acropolis,—answered by stating the amount which he had originally
brought and not that which he had remaining—Demosthenes might surely
repeat that statement immediately after him, without being understood
thereby to bind himself down as guarantee for its accuracy. An
adverse pleader, like Hyperides, might indeed turn a point in his
speech[723]—“_You_ told the assembly that there were 700 talents,
and now _you_ produce no more than half”—but the imputation wrapped
up in these words against the probity of Demosthenes, is utterly
groundless. Lastly, when the true amount was ascertained, to make
report thereof was the duty of the officers of the treasury.
Demosthenes could only learn it from them; and it might certainly
be proper in him, though in no sense an imperative duty, to inform
himself on the point, seeing that he had unconsciously helped to give
publicity to a false statement. The true statement was given; but we
neither know by whom, nor how soon.[724]

[723] Fragm. Hyperides, p. 7, ed. Babington—ἐν τῷ δήμῳ ἑπτακόσια
~φήσας~ εἶναι τάλαντα, ~νῦν τὰ ἡμίση ἀναφέρεις~;

In p. 26 of the same Fragments, we find Hyperides reproaching
Demosthenes for not having kept effective custody over the
person of Harpalus; for not having proposed any decree providing
a special custody; for not having made known beforehand, or
prosecuted afterwards, the negligence of the ordinary jailers.
This is to make Demosthenes responsible for the performance of
_all_ the administrative duties of the city; for the good conduct
of the treasurers and the jailers.

We must recollect that Hyperides had been the loudest advocate
of Harpalus, and had done all he could to induce the Athenians
to adopt the cause of that exile against Alexander. One of the
charges (already cited from his speech) against Demosthenes, is,
that Demosthenes prevented this from being accomplished. Yet
here is another charge from the same speaker, to the effect that
Demosthenes did not keep Harpalus under effective custody for the
sword of the Macedonian executioner!

The line of accusation taken by Hyperides is full of shameful
inconsistencies.

[724] In the Life of Demosthenes (Plutarch, Vit. X Oratt. p.
846), the charge of corruption against him is made to rest
chiefly on the fact, that he did not make this communication to
the people—καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μήτε τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνακομισθέντων
μεμηνυκὼς μήτε τῶν φυλασσόντων ἀμελείαν, etc. The biography apud
Photium seems to state it as if Demosthenes did not communicate
the amount, _at the time_ when he proposed the decree of
sequestration. This last statement we are enabled to contradict,
from the testimony of Hyperides.

Reviewing the facts known to us, therefore, we find them all tending
to refute the charge against Demosthenes. This conclusion will
certainly be strengthened by reading the accusatory speech composed
by Deinarchus; which is mere virulent invective, barren of facts and
evidentiary matter, and running over all the life of Demosthenes for
the preceding twenty years. That the speech of Hyperides also was of
the like desultory character, the remaining fragments indicate. Even
the report made by the Areopagus contained no recital of facts—no
justificatory matter—nothing except a specification of names with the
sums for which each of them is chargeable.[725] It appears to have
been made _ex-parte_, as far as we can judge—that is, made without
hearing these persons in their own defence, unless they happened to
be themselves Areopagites. Yet this report is held forth both by
Hyperides and Deinarchus as being in itself conclusive proof which
the Dikasts could not reject. When Demosthenes demanded, as every
defendant naturally would, that the charge against him should be
proved by some positive evidence, Hyperides sets aside the demand as
nothing better than cavil and special pleading.[726]

[725] Hyperid. Fragm. p. 18, ed. Babington. τὰς γὰρ ἀποφάσεις
πάσας τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν χρημάτων Ἁρπάλου, πάσας ὁμοίως ἡ βουλὴ
πεποίηται, καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς κατὰ πάντων· καὶ ~οὐδεμιᾷ προσγέγραφε,
δι᾽ ὅτι ἕκαστον ἀποφαίνει~· ἀλλ᾽ ~ἐπικεφάλαιον~ γράψασα, ὁπόσον
ἕκαστος εἴληφε χρυσίον, τοῦτ᾽ οὖν ὀφειλέτω....

[726] Hyperid. Frag. p. 20, ed. Babingt. ἐγὼ δ᾽ ὅτι μὲν ἔλαβες
τὸ χρυσίον, ~ἱκανὸν οἶμαι εἶναι σημεῖον τοῖς δικασταῖς, τὸ τὴν
βουλὴν σοῦ καταγνῶναι~ (see Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 46, and
the beginning of the second Demosthenic epistle).

Hyperid. p. 16, ed Babingt. Καὶ ~συκοφαντεῖς τὴν βουλὴν~,
προκλήσεις προτιθεὶς, καὶ ~ἐρωτῶν ἐν ταῖς προκλήσεσιν, πόθεν
ἔλαβες τὸ χρυσίον, καὶ τίς ἦν σοὶ ὁ δοὺς, καὶ πῶς; τελευταῖον δ᾽
ἴσως ἐρωτήσεις, καὶ εἰ ἐχρήσω τῷ χρυσίῳ, ὥσπερ τραπεζιτικὸν λόγον
παρὰ τῆς βουλῆς ἀπαιτῶν~.

This monstrous sentence creates a strong presumption in favor
of the defendant,—and a still stronger presumption against the
accuser. Compare Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 6, 7.

The biographer apud Photium states that Hyperides and four other
orators procured (κατεσκεύασαν) the condemnation of Demosthenes
by the Areopagus.

One farther consideration remains to be noticed. Only nine months
after the verdict of the Dikastery against Demosthenes, Alexander
died. Presently the Athenians and other Greeks rose against Antipater
in the struggle called the Lamian war. Demosthenes was then recalled;
received from his countrymen an enthusiastic welcome, such as
had never been accorded to any returning exile since the days of
Alkibiades; took a leading part in the management of the war; and
perished, on its disastrous termination, along with his accuser
Hyperides.

Such speedy revolution of opinion about Demosthenes, countenances the
conclusion which seems to me suggested by the other circumstances
of the case—that the verdict against him was not judicial, but
political; growing out of the embarrassing necessities of the time.

There can be no doubt that Harpalus, to whom a declaration of active
support from the Athenians was matter of life and death, distributed
various bribes to all consenting recipients, who could promote his
views,—and probably even to some who simply refrained from opposing
them; to all, in short, except pronounced opponents. If we were to
judge from probabilities alone, we should say that Hyperides himself,
as one of the chief supporters, would also be among the largest
recipients.[727] Here was abundant bribery—notorious in the mass,
though perhaps untraceable in the detail—all consummated during the
flush of promise which marked the early discussions of the Harpalian
case. When the tide of sentiment turned—when fear of Macedonian force
became the overwhelming sentiment—when Harpalus and his treasures
were impounded in trust for Alexander—all these numerous receivers
of bribes were already compromised and alarmed. They themselves
probably, in order to divert suspicion, were among the loudest in
demanding investigation and punishment against delinquents. Moreover,
the city was responsible for 700 talents to Alexander, while no
more than 350 were forthcoming.[728] It was indispensable that some
definite individuals should be pronounced guilty and punished, partly
in order to put down the reciprocal criminations circulating through
the city, partly in order to appease the displeasure of Alexander
about the pecuniary deficiency. But how to find out who were the
guilty? There was no official Prosecutor-general; the number of
persons suspected would place the matter beyond the reach of private
accusations; perhaps the course recommended by Demosthenes himself
was the best, to consign this preliminary investigation to the
Areopagites.

[727] The biographer of Hyperides (Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt.
p. 48) tells us that he was the only orator who kept himself
unbribed; the comic writer Timokles names Hyperides along with
Demosthenes and others as recipients (ap. Athenæ. viii. p. 342).

[728] See this point urged by Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 69, 70.

Six months elapsed before these Areopagites made their report. Now
it is impossible to suppose that all this time could have been spent
in the investigation of facts—and if it had been, the report when
published would have contained some trace of these facts, instead
of embodying a mere list of names and sums. The probability is,
that their time was passed quite as much in party-discussions as in
investigating facts; that dissentient parties were long in coming
to an agreement whom they should sacrifice; and that when they did
agree, it was a political rather than a judicial sentence, singling
out Demosthenes as a victim highly acceptable to Alexander, and
embodying Demades also, by way of compromise, in the same list of
delinquents—two opposite politicians, both at the moment obnoxious.
I have already observed that Demosthenes was at that time unpopular
with both the reigning parties: with the philo-Macedonians, from long
date, and not without sufficient reason; with the anti-Macedonians,
because he had stood prominent in opposing Harpalus. His accusers
count upon the hatred of the former against him, as a matter of
course; they recommend him to the hatred of the latter, as a base
creature of Alexander. The Dikasts doubtless included men of both
parties; and as a collective body, they might probably feel, that
to ratify the list presented by the Areopagus was the only way of
finally closing a subject replete with danger and discord.

Such seems the probable history of the Harpalian transactions. It
leaves Demosthenes innocent of corrupt profit, not less than Phokion;
but to the Athenian politicians generally, it is noway creditable;
while it exhibits the judicial conscience of Athens as under pressure
of dangers from without, worked upon by party-intrigues within.[729]

[729] We read in Pausanias (ii. 33, 4) that the Macedonian
admiral Philoxenus, having afterwards seized one of the slaves
of Harpalus, learnt from him the names of those Athenians whom
his master had corrupted; and that Demosthenes was _not_ among
them. As far as this statement goes, it serves to exculpate
Demosthenes. Yet I cannot assign so much importance to it as
Bishop Thirlwall seems to do. His narrative of the Harpalian
transactions is able and discriminating (Hist. vol. vii. ch. 56.
p. 170 _seqq._).

During the half-year and more which elapsed between the arrival of
Harpalus at Athens, and the trial of Demosthenes, one event at least
of considerable moment occurred in Greece. Alexander sent Nicanor
to the great Olympic festival held in this year, with a formal
letter or rescript, directing every Grecian city to recall all its
citizens that were in exile, except such as were under the taint
of impiety. The rescript, which was publicly read at the festival
by the herald who had gained the prize for loudness of voice, was
heard with the utmost enthusiasm by 20,000 exiles, who had mustered
there from intimations that such a step was intended. It ran thus:
“King Alexander to the exiles out of the Grecian cities—We have not
been authors of your banishment, but we will be authors of your
restoration to your native cities. We have written to Antipater about
this matter, directing him to apply force to such cities as will not
recall you of their own accord.”[730]

[730] Diodor. xix. 8.

It is plain that many exiles had been pouring out their complaints
and accusations before Alexander, and had found him a willing
auditor. But we do not know by what representations this rescript
had been procured. It would seem that Antipater had orders farther,
to restrain or modify the confederacies of the Achæan and Arcadian
cities;[731] and to enforce not merely recall of the exiles, but
restitution of their properties.[732]

[731] See the Fragments of Hyperides, p. 36, ed. Babington.

[732] Curtius, x. 2, 6.

That the imperial rescript was dictated by mistrust of the tone of
sentiment in the Grecian cities generally, and intended to fill each
city with devoted partisans of Alexander—we cannot doubt. It was on
his part a high-handed and sweeping exercise of sovereignty—setting
aside the conditions under which he had been named leader of
Greece—disdaining even to inquire into particular cases, and to
attempt a distinction between just and unjust sentences—overruling
in the mass the political and judicial authorities in every city. It
proclaimed with bitter emphasis the servitude of the hellenic world.
Exiles restored under the coercive order of Alexander, were sure to
look to Macedonia for support, to despise their own home authorities,
and to fill their respective cities with enfeebling discord. Most of
the cities, not daring to resist, appear to have yielded a reluctant
obedience; but both the Athenians and Ætolians are said to have
refused to execute the order.[733] It is one evidence of the disgust
raised by the rescript at Athens, that Demosthenes is severely
reproached by Deinarchus, because, as chief of the Athenian Theôry or
sacred legation to the Olympic festival, he was seen there publicly
consorting and in familiar converse with Nikanor.[734]

[733] Curtius, x. 2, 6. The statement of Diodorus (xviii. 8)—that
the rescript was popular and acceptable to all Greeks, except
the Athenians and Ætolians—cannot be credited. It was popular,
doubtless, with the exiles themselves, and their immediate
friends.

[734] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 81; compare Hyperid. Fragm. p.
36, ed. Babington.

In the winter or early spring of 323 B. C. several Grecian
cities sent envoys into Asia to remonstrate with Alexander against
the measure; we may presume that the Athenians were among them; but
we do not know whether the remonstrance produced any effect.[735]
There appears to have been considerable discontent in Greece during
this winter and spring (323 B. C.). The disbanded soldiers
out of Asia still maintained a camp at Tænarus; where Leosthenes,
an energetic Athenian of anti-Macedonian sentiments, accepted the
command of them, and even attracted fresh mercenary soldiers from
Asia, under concert with various confederates at Athens, and with
the Ætolians.[736] Of the money, said to be 5000 talents, brought by
Harpalus out of Asia, the greater part had not been taken by Harpalus
to Athens, but apparently left with his officers for the maintenance
of the troops who had accompanied him over.

[735] Diodor. xvii. 113.

[736] Diodor. xvii. 111: compare xviii. 21. Pausanias (i. 25, 5;
viii. 52, 2) affirms that Leosthenes brought over 50,000 of these
mercenaries from Asia into Peloponnesus, during the lifetime of
Alexander, and against Alexander’s will. The number here given
seems incredible; but it is probable enough that he induced some
to come across.—Justin (xiii. 5) mentions that armed resistance
was prepared by the Athenians and Ætolians against Alexander
himself during the latter months of his life, in reference to the
mandate enjoining recall of the exiles. He seems to overstate the
magnitude of their doings, before the death of Alexander.

Such was the general position of affairs, when Alexander died at
Babylon in June 323 B. C. This astounding news, for which no
one could have been prepared, must have become diffused throughout
Greece during the month of July. It opened the most favorable
prospects to all lovers of freedom and sufferers by Macedonian
dominion. The imperial military force resembled the gigantic
Polyphemus after his eye had been blinded by Odysseus:[737] Alexander
had left no competent heir, nor did any one imagine that his vast
empire could be kept together in effective unity by other hands.
Antipater in Macedonia was threatened with the defection of various
subject neighbors.[738]

[737] A striking comparison made by the orator Demades (Plutarch,
Apophthegm. p. 181).

[738] See Frontinus, Stratagem, ii. 11, 4.

No sooner was the death of Alexander indisputably certified, than the
anti-Macedonian leaders in Athens vehemently instigated the people
to declare themselves first champions of Hellenic freedom, and to
organize a confederacy throughout Greece for that object. Demosthenes
was then in exile; but Leosthenes, Hyperides and other orators of the
same party, found themselves able to kindle in their countrymen a
strenuous feeling and determination, in spite of decided opposition
on the part of Phokion and his partisans.[739] The rich men for the
most part took the side of Phokion, but the mass of the citizens were
fired by the animating recollection of their ancestors and by the
hopes of reconquering Grecian freedom. A vote was passed, publicly
proclaiming their resolution to that effect. It was decreed that 200
quadriremes, and 40 triremes should be equipped; that all Athenians
under 40 years of age should be in military requisition; and that
envoys should be sent round to the various Grecian cities, earnestly
invoking their alliance in the work of self-emancipation.[740]
Phokion, though a pronounced opponent of such warlike projects,
still remained at Athens, and still, apparently, continued in his
functions as one of the generals.[741] But Pytheas, Kallimedon, and
others of his friends, fled to Antipater, whom they strenuously
assisted in trying to check the intended movement throughout Greece.

[739] Plutarch, Phokion, 23. In the Fragments of Dexippus, there
appear short extracts of two speeches, seemingly composed by
that author in his history of these transactions; one which he
ascribes to Hyperides instigating the war, the other to Phokion,
against it (Fragm. Hist. Græc. vol. iii. p. 668).

[740] Diodor. xviii. 10. Diodorus states that the Athenians sent
the Harpalian treasures to the aid of Leosthenes. He seems to
fancy that Harpalus had brought to Athens all the 5000 talents
which he had carried away from Asia; but it is certain, that no
more than 700 or 720 talents were declared by Harpalus in the
Athenian assembly—and of these only half were really forthcoming.
Moreover, Diodorus is not consistent with himself, when he says
afterwards (xviii. 19) that Thimbron, who killed Harpalus in
Krete, got possession of the Harpalian treasures and mercenaries,
and carried them over to Kyrênê in Africa.

[741] It is to this season, apparently, that the anecdote (if
true) must be referred—The Athenians were eager to invade Bœotia
unseasonably; Phokion, as general of eighty years old, kept
them back, by calling out the citizens of sixty years old and
upwards for service, and offering to march himself at their head
(Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præcept. p. 818).

Leosthenes, aided by some money and arms from Athens, put himself
at the head of the mercenaries assembled at Tænarus, and passed
across the Gulf into Ætolia. Here he was joined by the Ætolians and
Akarnanians, who eagerly entered into the league with Athens for
expelling the Macedonians from Greece. Proceeding onward towards
Thermopylæ and Thessaly, he met with favor and encouragement almost
everywhere. The cause of Grecian freedom was espoused by the
Phokians, Lokrians, Dorians, Ænianes, Athamantes, and Dolopes; by
most of the Malians, Œtæans, Thessalians, and Achæans of Phthiôtis;
by the inhabitants of Leukas, and by some of the Molossians. Promises
were also held out of co-operation from various Illyrian and Thracian
tribes. In Peloponnesus, the Argeians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians,
Trœzenians, Eleians, and Messenians, enrolled themselves in the
league, as well as the Karystians in Eubœa.[742] These adhesions were
partly procured by Hyperides and other Athenian envoys, who visited
the several cities; while Pytheas and other envoys were going round
in like matter to advocate the cause of Antipater. The two sides
were thus publicly argued by able pleaders before different public
assemblies. In these debates, the advantage was generally on the
side of the Athenian orators, whose efforts moreover were powerfully
seconded by the voluntary aid of Demosthenes, then living as an exile
in Peloponnesus.

[742] Diodor. xviii. 11; Pausanias, i. 25, 4.

To Demosthenes the death of Alexander, and the new prospect of
organizing an anti-Macedonian confederacy with some tolerable chance
of success, came more welcome than to any one else. He gladly
embraced the opportunity of joining and assisting the Athenian
envoys, who felt the full value of his energetic eloquence, in the
various Peloponnesian towns. So effective was the service which he
thus rendered to his country, that the Athenians not only passed
a vote to enable him to return, but sent a trireme to fetch him
to Peiræus. Great was the joy and enthusiasm on his arrival. The
archons, the priests, and the entire body of citizens, came down to
the harbor to welcome his landing, and escorted him to the city. Full
of impassioned emotion, Demosthenes poured forth his gratitude for
having been allowed to see such a day, and to enjoy a triumph greater
even than that which had been conferred on Alkibiades on returning
from exile; since it had been granted spontaneously, and not extorted
by force. His fine could not be remitted, consistently with Athenian
custom; but the people passed a vote granting to him fifty talents
as superintendent of the periodical sacrifice to Zeus Soter; and his
execution of this duty was held equivalent to a liquidation of the
fine.[743]

[743] Plutarch, Demosth. 27.

What part Demosthenes took in the plans or details of the war, we
are not permitted to know. Vigorous operations were now carried on,
under the military command of Leosthenes. The confederacy against
Antipater included a larger assemblage of Hellenic states than that
which had resisted Xerxes in 480 B. C. Nevertheless, the
name of Sparta does not appear in the list. It was a melancholy
drawback to the chances of Greece, in this her last struggle for
emancipation, that the force of Sparta had been altogether crushed in
the gallant but ill-concerted effort of Agis against Antipater seven
years before, and had not since recovered. The great stronghold of
Macedonian interest, in the interior of Greece, was Bœotia. Platæa,
Orchomenus, and the other ancient enemies of Thebes, having received
from Alexander the domain once belonging to Thebes herself, were well
aware that this arrangement could only be upheld by the continued
pressure of Macedonian supremacy in Greece. It seems probable also
that there were Macedonian garrisons in the Kadmeia—in Corinth—and
in Megalopolis; moreover, that the Arcadian and Achæan cities had
been macedonized by the measures taken against them under Alexander’s
orders in the preceding summer;[744] for we find no mention made
of these cities in the coming contest. The Athenians equipped a
considerable land-force to join Leosthenes at Thermopylæ; a citizen
force of 5000 infantry and 500 cavalry, with 2000 mercenaries
besides. But the resolute opposition of the Bœotian cities hindered
them from advancing beyond Mount Kithæron, until Leosthenes
himself, marching from Thermopylæ to join them with a part of his
army, attacked the Bœotian troops, gained a complete victory, and
opened the passage. He now proceeded with the full Hellenic muster,
including Ætolians and Athenians, into Thessaly to meet Antipater,
who was advancing from Macedonia into Greece at the head of the force
immediately at his disposal—13,000 infantry, and 600 cavalry—and with
a fleet of 110 ships of war co-operating on the coast.[745]

[744] See the Fragments of Hyperides, p. 36, ed. Babington. καὶ
περὶ τοῦ τοὺς κοινοὺς συλλόγους Ἀχαιῶν τε καὶ Ἀρκάδων ... we do
not know what was done to these district confederacies, but it
seems that some considerable change was made in them, at the time
when Alexander’s decree for restoring the exiles was promulgated.

[745] Diodor. xviii. 13.

Antipater was probably not prepared for this rapid and imposing
assemblage of the combined Greeks at Thermopylæ, nor for the
energetic movements of Leosthenes. Still less was he prepared for
the defection of the Thessalian cavalry, who, having always formed
an important element in the Macedonian army, now lent their strength
to the Greeks. He despatched urgent messages to the Macedonian
commanders in Asia—Kraterus, Leonnatus, Philotas, etc., soliciting
reinforcements; but in the mean time, though inferior in numbers,
he thought it expedient to accept the challenge of Leosthenes. In
the battle which ensued, however, he was completely defeated, and
even cut off from the possibility of retreating into Macedonia;
so that no resource was left to him except the fortified town of
Lamia (near to the river Spercheius, beyond the southern border of
Thessaly), where he calculated on holding out until relief came
from Asia. Leosthenes immediately commenced the siege of Lamia,
and pressed it with the utmost energy, making several attempts to
storm the town; but its fortifications were strong, with a garrison
ample and efficient—so that he was repulsed with considerable loss.
Unfortunately he possessed no battering train nor engineers, such as
had formed so powerful an element in the military successes of Philip
and Alexander. He therefore found himself compelled to turn the siege
into a blockade, and to adopt systematic measures for intercepting
the supply of provisions. In this he had every chance of succeeding,
and of capturing the person of Antipater. Hellenic prospects looked
bright and encouraging; nothing was heard in Athens and the other
cities except congratulations and thanksgivings.[746] Phokion, on
hearing the confident language of those around him remarked—“The
stadium (or short course) has been done brilliantly, but I fear
we shall not have strength to hold out for the long course.”[747]
At this critical moment, Leosthenes, in inspecting the blockading
trenches, was wounded on the head by a large stone, projected from
one of the catapults on the city-walls, and expired in two days.[748]
A funeral oration in his honor, as well as in that of the other
combatants against Antipater, was pronounced at Athens by Hyperides,
on whom the people devolved that duty in preference to Demosthenes.

[746] Plutarch, Phokion, 23, 24.

[747] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 23; Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præcept. p.
803.

[748] Diodor. xviii. 12, 13.

The death of this eminent general, in the full tide of success, was a
hard blow struck by fortune at the cause of Grecian freedom. For the
last generation, Athens had produced several excellent orators, and
one who combined splendid oratory with wise and patriotic counsels.
But during all that time, none of her citizens, before Leosthenes had
displayed military genius and ardor along with Panhellenic purposes.
His death appears to have saved Antipater from defeat and captivity.
The difficulty was very great, of keeping together a miscellaneous
army of Greeks, who after the battle, easily persuaded themselves
that the war was finished, and desired to go home—perhaps under
promise of returning. Even during the lifetime of Leosthenes, the
Ætolians, the most powerful contingent of the army, had obtained
leave to go home, from some domestic urgency, real or pretended.[749]
When he was slain, there was no second in command; nor, even if there
had been, could the personal influence of one officer be transferred
to another. Reference was made to Athens, where, after some debate,
Antiphilus was chosen commander, after the proposition to name
Phokion had been made and rejected.[750] But during this interval
there was no authority to direct military operations, or even to
keep the army together; so that the precious moments for rendering
the blockade really stringent, were lost, and Antipater was enabled
to maintain himself until the arrival of Leonnatus from Asia to his
aid. How dangerous the position of Antipater was, we may judge from
the fact, that he solicited peace, but was required by the besiegers
to surrender at discretion[751]—with which condition he refused to
comply.

[749] Diodor. xviii. 13-15.

[750] Plutarch, Phokion, 24.

[751] Diodor. xviii. 11; Plutarch, Phokion, 26.

Antiphilus appears to have been a brave and competent officer. But
before he could reduce Lamia, Leonnatus with a Macedonian army had
crossed the Hellespont from Asia, and arrived at the frontiers of
Thessaly. So many of the Grecian contingents had left the camp, that
Antiphilus was not strong enough at once to continue the blockade and
to combat the relieving army. Accordingly, he raised the blockade,
and moved off by rapid marches to attack Leonnatus apart from
Antipater. He accomplished this operation with vigor and success.
Through the superior efficiency of the Thessalian cavalry under
Menon, he gained an important advantage in a cavalry battle over
Leonnatus, who was himself slain;[752] and the Macedonian phalanx
having its flanks and rear thus exposed, retired from the plain to
more difficult ground, leaving the Greeks masters of the field with
the dead bodies. On the very next day, Antipater came up with the
troops from Lamia, and took command of the defeated army. He did not
however think it expedient to renew the combat, but withdrew his army
from Thessaly into Macedonia, keeping in his march the high ground,
out of the reach of cavalry.[753]

[752] Plutarch, Phokion, 25; Diodor. xviii. 14, 15: compare
Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 1.

[753] Diodor. xviii. 15.

During the same time generally as these operations in Thessaly,
it appears that war was carried on actively by sea. We hear of
a descent by Mikion with a Macedonian fleet at Rhamnus on the
eastern coast of Attica, repulsed by Phokion; also of a Macedonian
fleet, of 240 sail, under Kleitus, engaging in two battles with the
Athenian fleet under Eetion, near the islands called Echinades,
at the mouth of the Achelous, on the western Ætolian coast. The
Athenians were defeated in both actions, and great efforts were
made at Athens to build new vessels for the purpose of filling up
the losses sustained.[754] Our information is not sufficient to
reveal the purposes or details of these proceedings. But it seems
probable that the Macedonian fleet were attacking Ætolia through
Œniadæ, the citizens of which town had recently been expelled by the
Ætolians;[755] and perhaps this may have been the reason why the
Ætolian contingent was withdrawn from Thessaly.

[754] Diodor. xviii. 15.

[755] Diodor. xviii. 8.

In spite of such untoward events at sea, the cause of Panhellenic
liberty seemed on the whole prosperous. Though the capital
opportunity had been missed, of taking Antipater captive in Lamia,
still he had been expelled from Greece, and was unable, by means
of his own forces in Macedonia, to regain his footing. The Grecian
contingents had behaved with bravery and unanimity in prosecution
of the common purpose; and what had been already achieved was
quite sufficient to justify the rising, as a fair risk, promising
reasonable hopes of success. Nevertheless Greek citizens were not
like trained Macedonian soldiers. After a term of service not much
prolonged, they wanted to go back to their families and properties,
hardly less after a victory than after a defeat. Hence the army
of Antiphilus in Thessaly became much thinned,[756] though still
remaining large enough to keep back the Macedonian forces of
Antipater, even augmented as they had been by Leonnatus—and to compel
him to await the still more powerful reinforcement destined to follow
under Kraterus.

[756] Diodor. xviii. 17.

In explaining the relations between these three Macedonian
commanders—Antipater, Leonnatus, and Kraterus—it is necessary to go
back to June 323 B. C., the period of Alexander’s death, and
to review the condition into which his vast and mighty empire had
fallen. I shall do this briefly, and only so far as it bears on the
last struggles and final subjugation of the Grecian world.

On the unexpected death of Alexander, the camp at Babylon with its
large force became a scene of discord. He left no offspring, except
a child named Herakles, by his mistress Barsinê. Roxana, one of
his wives, was indeed pregnant; and amidst the uncertainties of
the moment, the first disposition of many was to await the birth
of her child. She herself, anxious to shut out rivalry, caused
Statira, the queen whom Alexander had last married to be entrapped
and assassinated along with her sister.[757] There was, however,
at Babylon, a brother of Alexander, named Aridæus (son of Philip
by a Thessalian mistress), already of full age though feeble in
intelligence, towards whom a still larger party leaned. In Macedonia,
there were Olympias, Alexander’s mother—Kleopatra, his sister, widow
of the Epirotic Alexander—and Kynanê,[758] another sister, widow of
Amyntas (cousin of Alexander the Great, and put to death by him);
all of them disposed to take advantage of their relationship to the
deceased conqueror, in the scramble now opened for power.

[757] Plutarch, Alexand. 77.

[758] Arrian, De Rebus post Alexandrum, vi. ap. Photium, Cod. 92.

After a violent dispute between the cavalry and the infantry at
Babylon, Aridæus was proclaimed king under the name of Philip
Aridæus. Perdikkas was named as his guardian and chief minister;
among the other chief officers, the various satrapies and fractions
of the empire were distributed. Egypt and Libya were assigned to
Ptolemy; Syria to Laomedon; Kilikia to Philôtas; Pamphylia, Lykia,
and the greater Phrygia, to Antigonus; Karia, to Asander; Lydia, to
Menander; the Hellespontine Phrygia, to Leonnatus; Kappadokia and
Paphlagonia, to the Kardian Eumenes; Media, to Pithon. The eastern
satrapies were left in the hands of the actual holders.

In Europe, the distributors gave Thrace with the Chersonese to
Lysimachus; the countries west of Thrace, including (along with
Illyrians, Triballi, Agrianes, and Epirots) Macedonia and Greece, to
Antipater and Kraterus.[759] We thus find the Grecian cities handed
over to new masters, as fragments of the vast intestate estate left
by Alexander. The empty form of convening and consulting a synod of
deputies at Corinth, was no longer thought necessary.

[759] Arrian, De Rebus post Alexand. _ut supra_; Diodor. xviii.
3, 4; Curtius, x. 10; Dexippus, Fragmenta ap. Photium, Cod. 82,
ap. Fragm. Hist. Græc. vol. iii. p. 667, ed. Didot (De Rebus post
Alexandrum).

All the above-named officers were considered as local lieutenants,
administering portions of an empire one and indivisible, under
Aridæus. The principal officers who enjoyed central authority,
bearing on the entire empire, were, Perdikkas, chiliarch of the
horse (the post occupied by Hephæstion until his death), a sort of
vizir,[760] and Seleukus, commander of the Horse Guards. No one at
this moment talked of dividing the empire. But it soon appeared that
Perdikkas, profiting by the weakness of Aridæus, had determined to
leave to him nothing more than the imperial name, and to engross for
himself the real authority. Still, however, in his disputes with the
other chiefs, he represented the imperial family, and the integrity
of the empire, contending against severality and local independence.
In this task (besides his brother Alketas), his ablest and most
effective auxiliary was Eumenes of Kardia, secretary of Alexander for
several years until his death. It was one of the earliest proceedings
of Perdikkas to wrest Kappadokia from the local chief Ariarathes (who
had contrived to hold it all through the reign of Alexander), and to
transfer it to Eumenes, to whom it had been allotted in the general
scheme of division.[761]

[760] Arrian and Dexippus—De Reb. post Alex. _ut supra_: compare
Diodor. xviii. 48.

[761] Diodor. xviii. 16.

At the moment of Alexander’s death, Kraterus was in Kilikia, at
the head of an army of veteran Macedonian soldiers. He had been
directed to conduct them home into Macedonia, with orders to remain
there himself in place of Antipater, who was to come over to
Asia with fresh reinforcements. Kraterus had with him a paper of
written instructions from Alexander, embodying projects on the most
gigantic scale; for western conquest—transportation of inhabitants
by wholesale from Europe into Asia and Asia into Europe—erection
of magnificent religious edifices in various parts of Greece and
Macedonia, etc. This list was submitted by Perdikkas to the officers
and soldiers around him, who dismissed the projects as too vast for
any one but Alexander to think of.[762] Kraterus and Antipater had
each a concurrent claim to Greece and Macedonia, and the distributors
of the empire had allotted these countries to them jointly, not
venturing to exclude either. Amidst the conflicting pretensions of
these great Macedonian officers, Leonnatus also cherished hopes of
the same prize. He was satrap of the Asiatic territory bordering
upon the Hellespont, and had received propositions from Kleopatra
at Pella, inviting him to marry her and assume the government of
Macedonia. About the same time, urgent messages were also sent to him
(through Hekatæus despot of Kardia) from Antipater, immediately after
the defeat preceding the siege of Lamia, entreating his co-operation
against the Greeks. Leonnatus accordingly came, intending to assist
Antipater against the Greeks, but also to dispossess him of the
government of Macedonia and marry Kleopatra.[763] This scheme
remained unexecuted, because (as has been already related) Leonnatus
was slain in his first encounter with the Greeks. To them, his death
was a grave misfortune; to Antipater, it was an advantage which more
than countervailed the defeat, since it relieved him from a dangerous
rival.

[762] Diodor. xviii. 4.

[763] Plutarch, Eumenes, 3.

It was not till the ensuing summer that Kraterus found leisure to
conduct his army into Macedonia. By this junction, Antipater to
whom he ceded the command, found himself at the head of a powerful
army—40,000 heavy infantry, 5000 cavalry, and 3000 archers and
slingers. He again marched into Thessaly against the Greeks under
Antiphilus; and the two armies came in sight on the Thessalian plains
near Krannon. The Grecian army consisted of 25,000 infantry, and 3500
cavalry—the latter, Thessalians under Menon, of admirable efficiency.
The soldiers in general were brave, but insubordinate; while the
contingents of many cities had gone home without returning, in spite
of urgent remonstrances from the commander. Hoping to be rejoined
by these absentees, Antiphilus and Menon tried at first to defer
fighting; but Antipater forced them to a battle. Though Menon with
his Thessalian cavalry defeated and dispersed the Macedonian cavalry,
the Grecian infantry were unable to resist the superior number of
Antipater’s infantry, and the heavy pressure of the phalanx. They
were beaten back and gave way, yet retiring in tolerable order, the
Macedonian phalanx being incompetent for pursuit, to some difficult
neighboring ground, where they were soon joined by their victorious
cavalry. The loss of the Greeks is said to have been 500 men; that of
the Macedonians, 120.[764]

[764] Diodor. xviii. 17; Plutarch, Phokion, 26.

The defeat of Krannon (August 322 B. C.) was no way
decisive or ruinous, nor would it probably have crushed the spirit
of Leosthenes, had he been alive and in command. The coming up of
the absentee contingents might still have enabled the Greeks to make
head. But Antiphilus and Menon, after holding counsel, declined to
await and accelerate that junction. They thought themselves under the
necessity of sending to open negotiations for peace with Antipater;
who however returned for answer, that he would not recognize or
treat with any Grecian confederacy, and that he would receive no
propositions except from each city severally. Upon this the Grecian
commanders at once resolved to continue the war, and to invoke
reinforcements from their countrymen. But their own manifestation
of timidity had destroyed the chance that remained of such
reinforcements arriving. While Antipater commenced a vigorous and
successful course of action against the Thessalian cities separately,
the Greeks became more and more dispirited and alarmed. City after
city sent its envoys to entreat peace from Antipater, who granted
lenient terms to each, reserving only the Athenians and Ætolians. In
a few days, the combined Grecian army was dispersed; Antiphilus with
the Athenians returned into Attica; Antipater followed them southward
as far as Bœotia, taking up his quarters at the Macedonian post on
the Kadmeia, once the Hellenic Thebes—within two days’ march of
Athens.[765]

[765] Diodor. xviii. 17; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 26.

Against the overwhelming force thus on the frontiers of Attica, the
Athenians had no means of defence. The principal anti-Macedonian
orators, especially Demosthenes and Hyperides, retired from the city
at once, seeking sanctuary in the temples of Kalauria and Ægina.
Phokion and Demades, as the envoys most acceptable to Antipater,
were sent to Kadmeia as bearers of the submission of the city, and
petitioners for lenient terms. Demades is said to have been at this
time disfranchised and disqualified from public speaking—having been
indicted and found guilty thrice (some say seven times) under the
Graphê Paranomon; but the Athenians passed a special vote of relief,
to enable him to resume his functions of citizen. Neither Phokion
nor Demades, however, could prevail upon Antipater to acquiesce in
anything short of the surrender of Athens at discretion; the same
terms as Leosthenes had required from Antipater himself at Lamia.
Kraterus was even bent upon marching forward into Attica, to dictate
terms under the walls of Athens; and it was not without difficulty
that Phokion obtained the abandonment of this intention; after which
he returned to Athens with the answer. The people had no choice
except to throw themselves on the mercy of Antipater;[766] and
Phokion and Demades came back to Thebes to learn his determination.
This time they were accompanied by the philosopher Xenokrates—the
successor of Plato and Speusippus, as presiding teacher in the school
of the Academy. Though not a citizen of Athens, Xenokrates had long
resided there; and it was supposed that his dignified character and
intellectual eminence might be efficacious in mitigating the wrath
of the conqueror. Aristotle had quitted Athens for Chalkis before
this time; otherwise he, the personal friend of Antipater, would have
been probably selected for this painful mission. In point of fact,
Xenokrates did no good, being harshly received, and almost put to
silence by Antipater. One reason of this may be, that he had been to
a certain extent the rival of Aristotle; and it must be added to his
honor, that he maintained a higher and more independent tone than
either of the other envoys.[767]

[766] Demochares, the nephew of Demosthenes, who had held a bold
language and taken active part against Antipater throughout
the Lamian war, is said to have delivered a public harangue
recommending resistance even at this last moment. At least such
was the story connected with his statue, erected a few years
afterwards at Athens, representing him in the costume of an
orator, but with a sword in hand—Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 847:
compare Polybius, xii. 13.

[767] Plutarch, Phokion, 27; Diodor. xviii. 18.

According to the terms dictated by Antipater, the Athenians
were required to pay a sum equal to the whole cost of the war;
to surrender Demosthenes, Hyperides, and seemingly at least two
other anti-Macedonian orators; to receive a Macedonian garrison in
Munychia; to abandon their democratical constitution and disfranchise
all their poorer citizens. Most of these poor men were to be
transported from their homes, and to receive new lands on a foreign
shore. The Athenian colonists in Samos were to be dipossessed and the
island retransferred to the Samian exiles and natives.

It is said that Phokion and Demades heard these terms with
satisfaction, as lenient and reasonable. Xenokrates entered against
them the strongest protest which the occasion admitted, when he
said[768]—“If Antipater looks upon us as slaves, the terms are
moderate; if as freemen, they are severe.” To Phokion’s entreaty,
that the introduction of the garrison might be dispensed with,
Antipater replied in the negative, intimating that the garrison would
be not less serviceable to Phokion himself than to the Macedonians;
while Kallimedon also, an Athenian exile there present, repelled the
proposition with scorn. Respecting the island of Samos, Antipater was
prevailed upon to allow a special reference to the imperial authority.

[768] Plutarch, Phokion, 27. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι πρέσβεις ἠγάπησαν
ὡς φιλανθρώπους τὰς διαλύσεις, πλὴν τοῦ Ξενοκράτους, etc.
Pausanias even states (vii. 10, 1) that Antipater was disposed
to grant more lenient terms, but was dissuaded from doing so by
Demades.

If Phokion thought these terms lenient, we must imagine that he
expected a sentence of destruction against Athens, such as Alexander
had pronounced and executed against Thebes. Under no other comparison
can they appear lenient. Out of 21,000 qualified citizens of Athens,
all those who did not possess property to the amount of 2000 drachmæ
were condemned to disfranchisement and deportation. The number
below this prescribed qualification, who came under the penalty,
was 12,000, or three-fifths of the whole. They were set aside as
turbulent, noisy democrats; the 9000 richest citizens, the “party
of order”, were left in exclusive possession, not only of the
citizenship, but of the city. The condemned 12,000 were deported out
of Attica, some to Thrace, some to the Illyrian or Italian coast,
some to Libya or the Kyrenaic territory. Besides the multitude
banished simply on the score of comparative poverty, the marked
anti-Macedonian politicians were banished also, including Agnonides,
the friend of Demosthenes, and one of his earnest advocates when
accused respecting the Harpalian treasures.[769] At the request
of Phokion, Antipater consented to render the deportation less
sweeping than he had originally intended, so far as to permit some
exiles, Agnonides among the rest, to remain within the limits of
Peloponnesus.[770] We shall see him presently contemplating a still
more wholesale deportation of the Ætolian people.

[769] See Fragments of Hyperides adv. Demosth. p. 61-65, ed.
Babington.

[770] Diodor. xviii. 18. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες πλείους τῶν μυρίων
(instead of δισμυρίων, which seems a mistake) καὶ δισχιλίων
μετεστάθησαν ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος· οἱ δὲ τὴν ὡρισμένην τίμησιν ἔχοντες
περὶ ἐννακισχιλίους, ἀπεδείχθησαν κύριοι τῆς τε πόλεως καὶ τῆς
χώρας, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς Σόλωνος νόμους ἐπολιτεύοντο. Plutarch states
the disfranchised as above 12,000.

Plutarch, Phokion, 28, 29. Ὅμως δ᾽ οὖν ὁ Φωκίων καὶ φυγῆς
ἀπήλλαξε πολλοὺς δεηθεὶς τοῦ Ἀντιπάτρου· καὶ φεύγουσι διεπράξατο,
μὴ καθάπερ οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν μεθισταμένων ὑπὲρ τὰ Κεραύνια ὄρη καὶ
τὸν Ταίναρον ἐκπεσεῖν τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ κατοικεῖν,
ὧν ἦν καὶ Ἁγνωνίδης ὁ συκοφάντης.

Diodorus and Plutarch (c. 29) mention that Antipater assigned
residences in Thrace for the expatriated. Those who went beyond
the Keraunian mountains must have gone either to the Illyrian
coast, Apollonia or Epidamnus—or to the Gulf of Tarentum. Those
who went beyond Tænarus would probably be sent to Libya: see
Thucydides, vii. 19, 10; vii. 50, 2.

It is deeply to be lamented that this important revolution, not
only cutting down Athens to less than one-half of her citizen
population, but involving a deportation fraught with individual
hardship and suffering, is communicated to us only in two or three
sentences of Plutarch and Diodorus, without any details from
contemporary observers. It is called by Diodorus a return to the
Solonian constitution; but the comparison disgraces the name of
that admirable lawgiver, whose changes, taken as a whole, were
prodigiously liberal and enfranchising, compared with what he found
established. The deportation ordained by Antipater must indeed have
brought upon the poor citizens of Athens a state of suffering in
foreign lands analogous to that which Solon describes as having
preceded his Seisachtheia, or measure for the relief of debtors.[771]
What rules the nine thousand remaining citizens adopted for their
new constitution, we do not know. Whatever they did, must now have
been subject to the consent of Antipater and the Macedonian garrison,
which entered Munychia, under the command of Menyllus, on the
twentieth day of the month Boedromion (September), rather more than
a month after the battle of Krannon. The day of its entry presented
a sorrowful contrast. It was the day on which, during the annual
ceremony of the mysteries of Eleusinian Demeter, the multitudinous
festal procession of citizens escorted the god Iacchus from Athens to
Eleusis.[772]

[771] Plutarch, Phokion, 28. ἐκπεπολιορκημένοις ἐῴκεσαν: compare
Solon, Fragment 28, ed. Gaisford.

[772] Plutarch, Phokion, 28.

One of the earliest measures of the nine thousand was, to condemn to
death, at the motion of Demades, the distinguished anti-Macedonian
orators who had already fled—Demosthenes, Hyperides, Aristonikus, and
Himeræus, brother of the citizen afterwards celebrated as Demetrius
the Phalerean. The three last having taken refuge in Ægina, and
Demosthenes in Kalauria, all of them were out of the reach of an
Athenian sentence, but not beyond that of the Macedonian sword.
At this miserable season, Greece was full of similar exiles, the
anti-Macedonian leaders out of all the cities which had taken part in
the Lamian war. The officers of Antipater, called in the language of
the time the Exile-Hunters,[773] were everywhere on the look-out to
seize these proscribed men; many of the orators, from other cities as
well as from Athens, were slain; and there was no refuge except the
mountains of Ætolia for any of them.[774] One of these officers, a
Thurian named Archias, who had once been a tragic actor, passed over
with a company of Thracian soldiers to Ægina, where he seized the
three Athenian orators—Hyperides, Aristonikus, and Himeræus—dragging
them out of the sanctuary of the Æakeion or chapel of Æakus. They
were all sent as prisoners to Antipater, who had by this time marched
forward with his army to Corinth and Kleonæ in Peloponnesus. All were
there put to death, by his order. It is even said, and on respectable
authority, that the tongue of Hyperides was cut out before he was
slain; according to another statement, he himself bit it out—being
put to the torture, and resolving to make revelation of secrets
impossible. Respecting the details of his death, there were several
different stories.[775]

[773] Plutarch, Demosth. 28. Ἀρχίας ὁ κληθεὶς Φυγαδοθήρας.
Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 846.

[774] Polybius, ix. 29, 30. This is stated, as matter of
traditional pride, by an Ætolian speaker more than a century
afterwards. In the speech of his Akarnanian opponent, there is
nothing to contradict it—while the fact is in itself highly
probable.

See Westermann, Geschichte der Beredtsamkeit in Griechenland, ch.
71, note 4.

[775] Plutarch, Demosth. 28; Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 849;
Photius, p. 496.

Having conducted these prisoners to Antipater, Archias proceeded
with his Thracians to Kalauria in search of Demosthenes. The temple
of Poseidon there situated, in which the orator had taken sanctuary,
was held in such high veneration, that Archias, hesitating to drag
him out by force, tried to persuade him to come forth voluntarily,
under promise that he should suffer no harm. But Demosthenes, well
aware of the fate which awaited him, swallowed poison in the temple,
and when the dose was beginning to take effect, came out of the
sacred ground, expiring immediately after he had passed the boundary.
The accompanying circumstances were recounted in several different
ways.[776] Eratosthenes (to whose authority I lean) affirmed that
Demosthenes carried the poison in a ring round his arm; others said
that it was suspended in a linen bag round his neck; according to
a third story, it was contained in a writing-quill, which he was
seen to bite and suck, while composing a last letter to Antipater.
Amidst these contradictory details, we can only affirm as certain,
that the poison which he had provided beforehand preserved him from
the sword of Antipater, and perhaps from having his tongue cut out.
The most remarkable assertion was that of Demochares, nephew of
Demosthenes, made in his harangues at Athens a few years afterwards.
Demochares asserted that his uncle had not taken poison, but had
been softly withdrawn from the world by a special providence of the
gods, just at the moment essential to rescue him from the cruelty
of the Macedonians. It is not less to be noted, as an illustration
of the vein of sentiment afterwards prevalent, that Archias the
Exile-Hunter was affirmed to have perished in the utmost dishonor and
wretchedness.[777]

[776] Plutarch, Demosth. 30. τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων, ὅσοι γεγράφασί τι
περὶ αὐτοῦ, ~παμπολλοὶ δ᾽ εἰσὶ~, τὰς διαφορὰς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον
ἐπεξελθεῖν, etc.

The taunts on Archias’s profession, as an actor, and as an
indifferent actor, which Plutarch puts into the mouth of
Demosthenes (c. 29), appear to me not worthy either of the
man or of the occasion; nor are they sufficiently avouched to
induce me to transcribe them. Whatever bitterness of spirit
Demosthenes might choose to manifest, at such a moment, would
surely be vented on the chief enemy, Antipater; not upon the mere
instrument.

[777] Plutarch, Demosth. 30; Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 846;
Photius, p. 494; Arrian, De Rebus post Alexand. vi. ap. Photium,
Cod. 92.

The violent deaths of these illustrious orators, the disfranchisement
and deportation of the Athenian Demos, the suppression of the public
Dikasteries, the occupation of Athens by a Macedonian garrison, and
of Greece generally by Macedonian Exile-Hunters—are events belonging
to one and the same calamitous tragedy, and marking the extinction
of the autonomous hellenic world. Of Hyperides as a citizen we know
only the general fact, that he maintained from first to last, and
with oratorical ability inferior only to Demosthenes, a strenuous
opposition to Macedonian dominion over Greece; though his prosecution
of Demosthenes respecting the Harpalian treasure appears (as far as
it comes before us) discreditable. Of Demosthenes we know more—enough
to form a judgment of him both as citizen and statesman. At the time
of his death he was about sixty-two years of age, and we have before
us his first Philippic, delivered thirty years before (352-351 B.
C.). We are thus sure, that even at that early day, he took
a sagacious and provident measure of the danger which threatened
Grecian liberty from the energy and encroachments of Philip. He
impressed upon his countrymen this coming danger, at a time when the
older and more influential politicians either could not or would not
see it; he called aloud upon his fellow-citizens for personal service
and pecuniary contributions, enforcing the call by all the artifices
of consummate oratory, when such distasteful propositions only
entailed unpopularity upon himself. At the period when Demosthenes
first addressed these earnest appeals to his countrymen, long before
the fall of Olynthus, the power of Philip, though formidable,
might have been kept perfectly well within the limits of Macedonia
and Thrace; and would probably have been so kept, had Demosthenes
possessed in 351 B. C. as much public influence as he had
acquired ten years afterwards, in 341 B. C.

Throughout the whole career of Demosthenes as a public adviser, down
to the battle of Chæroneia, we trace the same combination of earnest
patriotism with wise and long-sighted policy. During the three years’
war which ended with the battle of Chæroneia, the Athenians in the
main followed his counsel; and disastrous as were the ultimate
military results of that war, for which Demosthenes could not be
responsible—its earlier periods were creditable and successful,
its general scheme was the best that the case admitted, and its
diplomatic management universally triumphant. But what invests the
purposes and policy of Demosthenes with peculiar grandeur, is, that
they were not simply Athenian, but in an eminent degree Panhellenic
also. It was not Athens only that he sought to defend against Philip,
but the whole hellenic world. In this he towers above the greatest
of his predecessors for half a century before his birth—Perikles,
Archidamus, Agesilaus, Epaminondas; whose policy was Athenian,
Spartan, Theban, rather than hellenic. He carries us back to the time
of the invasion of Xerxes and the generation immediately succeeding
it, when the struggles and sufferings of the Athenians against Persia
were consecrated by complete identity of interest with collective
Greece. The sentiments to which Demosthenes appeals throughout his
numerous orations, are those of the noblest and largest patriotism;
trying to inflame the ancient Grecian sentiment, of an autonomous
hellenic world, as the indispensable condition of a dignified and
desirable existence[778]—but inculcating at the same time that these
blessings could only be preserved by toil, self-sacrifice, devotion
of fortune, and willingness to brave hard and steady personal service.

[778] Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 324. οὗτοι—τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὸ
μηδένα ἔχειν δεσπότην αὑτῶν, ἃ τοῖς προτέροις Ἕλλησιν ὅροι τῶν
ἀγαθῶν ἦσαν καὶ κανόνες, ἀνατετραφότες, etc.

From the destruction of Thebes by Alexander in 335 B. C.,
to the Lamian war after his death, the policy of Athens neither was
nor could be conducted by Demosthenes. But, condemned as he was to
comparative inefficacy, he yet rendered material service to Athens,
in the Harpalian affair of 324 B. C. If, instead of opposing
the alliance of the city with Harpalus, he had supported it as warmly
as Hyperides—the exaggerated promises of the exile might probably
have prevailed, and war would have been declared against Alexander.
In respect to the charge of having been corrupted by Harpalus, I
have already shown reasons for believing him innocent. The Lamian
war, the closing scene of his activity, was not of his original
suggestion, since he was in exile at its commencement. But he threw
himself into it with unreserved ardor, and was greatly instrumental
in procuring the large number of adhesions which it obtained from
so many Grecian states. In spite of its disastrous result, it was,
like the battle of Chæroneia, a glorious effort for the recovery of
Grecian liberty, undertaken under circumstances which promised a fair
chance of success. There was no excessive rashness in calculating
on distractions in the empire left by Alexander—on mutual hostility
among the principal officers—and on the probability of having only
to make head against Antipater and Macedonia, with little or no
reinforcement from Asia. Disastrous as the enterprise ultimately
proved, yet the risk was one fairly worth incurring, with so noble
an object at stake; and could the war have been protracted another
year, its termination would probably have been very different. We
shall see this presently when we come to follow Asiatic events. After
a catastrophe so ruinous, extinguishing free speech in Greece, and
dispersing the Athenian Demos to distant lands, Demosthenes himself
could hardly have desired, at the age of sixty-two, to prolong his
existence as a fugitive beyond sea.

Of the speeches which he composed for private litigants, occasionally
also for himself, before the Dikastery—and of the numerous
stimulating and admonitory harangues on the public affairs of the
moment, which he had addressed to his assembled countrymen, a few
remain for the admiration of posterity. These harangues serve to us,
not only as evidence of his unrivalled excellence as an orator, but
as one of the chief sources from which we are enabled to appreciate
the last phase of free Grecian life, as an acting and working reality.

CHAPTER XCVI.

FROM THE LAMIAN WAR TO THE CLOSE OF THE HISTORY OF FREE HELLAS AND
HELLENISM.

The death of Demosthenes, with its tragical circumstances recounted
in my last chapter, is on the whole less melancholy than the
prolonged life of Phokion, as agent of Macedonian supremacy in a city
half-depopulated, where he had been born a free citizen, and which he
had so long helped to administer as a free community. The dishonor
of Phokion’s position must have been aggravated by the distress in
Athens, arising both out of the violent deportation of one-half of
its free citizens, and out of the compulsory return of the Athenian
settlers from Samos; which island was now taken from Athens, after
she had occupied it forty-three years, and restored to the Samian
people and to their recalled exiles, by a rescript of Perdikkas in
the name of Aridæus.[779] Occupying this obnoxious elevation, Phokion
exercised authority with his usual probity and mildness. Exerting
himself to guard the citizens from being annoyed by disorders on the
part of the garrison of Munychia, he kept up friendly intercourse
with its commander Menyllus, though refusing all presents both
from him and from Antipater. He was anxious to bestow the gift of
citizenship upon the philosopher Xenokrates, who was only a metic, or
resident non-freeman; but Xenokrates declined the offer, remarking,
that he would accept no place in a constitution against which he had
protested as envoy.[780] This mark of courageous independence, not a
little remarkable while the Macedonians were masters of the city, was
a tacit reproach to the pliant submission of Phokion.

[779] Diodor. xviii. 18; Diogen. Laert. x. 1, 1. I have
endeavored to show, in the Tenth Volume of this History (Ch.
lxxix. p. 297, note), that Diodorus is correct in giving
forty-three years, as the duration of the Athenian Kleruchies
in Samos; although both Wesseling and Mr. Clinton impugn his
statement. The Athenian occupation of Samos _began_ immediately
after the conquest of the island by Timotheus, in 366-365 B.
C.; but additional batches of colonists were sent thither in
later years.

[780] Plutarch, Phokion, 29, 30.

Throughout Peloponnesus, Antipater purged and remodelled the cities,
Argos, Megalopolis, and others, as he had done at Athens; installing
in each an oligarchy of his own partisans—sometimes with a Macedonian
garrison—and putting to death, deporting, or expelling, hostile, or
intractable, or democratical citizens.[781] Having completed the
subjugation of Peloponnesus, he passed across the Corinthian Gulf
to attack the Ætolians, now the only Greeks remaining unsubdued. It
was the purpose of Antipater, not merely to conquer this warlike and
rude people, but to transport them in mass across into Asia, and
march them up to the interior deserts of the empire.[782] His army
was too powerful to be resisted on even ground, so that all the more
accessible towns and villages fell into his hands. But the Ætolians
defended themselves bravely, withdrew their families into the high
towns and mountain tops of their very rugged country, and caused
serious loss to the Macedonian invaders. Nevertheless, Kraterus,
who had carried on war of the same kind with Alexander in Sogdiana,
manifested so much skill in seizing the points of communication,
that he intercepted all their supplies and reduced them to extreme
distress, amidst the winter which had now supervened. The Ætolians,
in spite of bravery and endurance, must soon have been compelled to
surrender from cold and hunger, had not the unexpected arrival of
Antigonus from Asia communicated such news to Antipater and Kraterus,
as induced them to prepare for marching back to Macedonia, with a
view to the crossing of the Hellespont and operating in Asia. They
concluded a pacification with the Ætolians—postponing till a future
period their design of deporting that people,—and withdrew into
Macedonia; where Antipater cemented his alliance with Kraterus by
giving to him his daughter Phila in marriage.[783]

[781] Diodor. xviii. 55, 56, 57, 68, 69. φανεροῦ δ᾽ ὄντος, ὅτι
Κάσανδρος τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πόλεων ἀνθέξεται, διὰ τὸ τὰς μὲν
αὐτῶν πατρικαῖς φρουραῖς φυλάττεσθαι, τὰς δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ὀλιγαρχιῶν
διοικεῖσθαι, κυριευομένας ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀντιπάτρου φίλων καὶ ξένων.

That citizens were not only banished, but deported, by Antipater
from various other cities besides Athens, we may see from the
edict issued by Polysperchon shortly after the death of Antipater
(Diod. xviii. 56)—καὶ τοὺς ~μεταστάντας ἢ φυγόντας~ ὑπὸ τῶν
ἡμετέρων στρατηγῶν (_i. e._ Antipater and Kraterus), ἀφ᾽ ὧν
χρόνων Ἀλέξανδρος εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν διέβη, κατάγομεν, etc.

[782] Diodor. xviii. 25. διεγνωκότες ὕστερον αὐτοὺς
καταπολεμῆσαι, καὶ ~μεταστῆσαι πανοικίους ἅπαντας~ εἰς τὴν
ἐρημίαν καὶ ποῤῥωτάτω τῆς Ἀσίας κειμένην χώραν.

[783] Diodor. xviii. 18-25.

Another daughter of Antipater, named Nikæa, had been sent over to
Asia not long before, to become the wife of Perdikkas. That general,
acting as guardian or prime minister to the kings of Alexander’s
family (who are now spoken of in the plural number, since Roxana had
given birth to a posthumous son, called Alexander, and made king
jointly with Philip Aridæus), had at first sought close combination
with Antipater, demanding his daughter in marriage. But new views
were presently opened to him by the intrigues of the princesses at
Pella (Olympias, with her daughter Kleopatra, widow of the Molossian
Alexander)—who had always been at variance with Antipater, even
throughout the life of Alexander—and Kynanê (daughter of Philip by
an Illyrian mother, and widow of Amyntas, first cousin of Alexander,
but slain by Alexander’s order) with her daughter Eurydikê. It has
been already mentioned that Kleopatra had offered herself in marriage
to Leonnatus, inviting him to come over and occupy the throne of
Macedonia: he had obeyed the call, but had been slain in his first
battle against the Greeks, thus relieving Antipater from a dangerous
rival. The first project of Olympias being thus frustrated, she
had sent to Perdikkas proposing to him a marriage with Kleopatra.
Perdikkas had already pledged himself to the daughter of Antipater;
nevertheless he now debated whether his ambition would not be better
served by breaking his pledge, and accepting the new proposition.
To this step he was advised by Eumenes, his ablest friend and
coadjutor, steadily attached to the interest of the regal family,
and withal personally hated by Antipater. But Alketas, brother of
Perdikkas, represented that it would be hazardous to provoke openly
and immediately the wrath of Antipater. Accordingly Perdikkas
resolved to accept Nikæa for the moment, but to send her away after
no long time, and take Kleopatra; to whom secret assurances from him
were conveyed by Eumenes. Kynanê also (daughter of Philip and widow
of his nephew Amyntas) a warlike and ambitious woman, had brought
into Asia her daughter Eurydikê for the purpose of espousing the
king Philip Aridæus. Being averse to this marriage, and probably
instigated by Olympias also, Perdikkas and Alketas put Kynanê to
death. But the indignation excited among the soldiers by this deed
was so furious as to menace their safety, and they were forced to
permit the marriage of the king with Eurydikê.[784]

[784] Diodor. xviii. 23; Arrian, De Rebus post Alex. vi. ap.
Phot. Cod. 92. Diodorus alludes to the murder of Kynanê or Kynna,
in another place (xix. 52).

Compare Polyænus, viii. 60—who mentions the murder of Kynanê
by Alketas, but gives a somewhat different explanation of her
purpose in passing into Asia.

About Kynanê, see Duris, Fragm. 24, in Fragment. Hist. Græc. vol.
ii. p. 475; Athenæ. xiii. p. 560.

All these intrigues were going on through the summer of 322 B.
C., while the Lamian war was still effectively prosecuted
by the Greeks. About the autumn of the year, Antigonus (called
Monophthalmus), the satrap of Phrygia, detected these secret
intrigues of Perdikkas; who, for that and other reasons, began to
look on him as an enemy, and to plot against his life. Apprised
of his danger, Antigonus made his escape from Asia into Europe
to acquaint Antipater and Kraterus with the hostile manœuvres of
Perdikkas; upon which news, the two generals, immediately abandoning
the Ætolian war, withdrew their army from Greece for the more
important object of counteracting Perdikkas in Asia.

To us, these contests of the Macedonian officers belong only so far
as they affect the Greeks. And we see, by the events just noticed,
how unpropitious to the Greeks were the turns of Fortune, throughout
the Lamian war: the grave of Grecian liberty, not for the actual
combatants only, but for their posterity also.[785] Until the battle
of Krannon and the surrender of Athens, everything fell out so as
to relieve Antipater from embarrassment, and impart to him double
force. The intrigues of the princesses at Pella, who were well known
to hate him, first raised up Leonnatus, next Perdikkas, against him.
Had Leonnatus lived, the arm of Antipater would have been at least
weakened, if not paralyzed; had Perdikkas declared himself earlier,
the forces of Antipater must have been withdrawn to oppose him, and
the battle of Krannon would probably have had a different issue. As
soon as Perdikkas became hostile to Antipater, it was his policy
to sustain and seek alliance with the Greeks, as we shall find him
presently doing with the Ætolians.[786] Through causes thus purely
accidental, Antipater obtained an interval of a few months, during
which his hands were not only free, but armed with new and unexpected
strength from Leonnatus and Kraterus, to close the Lamian war. The
disastrous issue of that war was therefore in great part the effect
of casualties, among which we must include the death of Leosthenes
himself. Such issue is not to be regarded as proving that the project
was desperate or ill-conceived on the part of its promoters, who had
full right to reckon, among the probabilities of their case, the
effects of discord between the Macedonian chiefs.

[785] The fine lines of Lucan (Phars. vii. 640) on the effects of
the battle of Pharsalia, may be cited here:—

“Majus ab hac acie, quam quod sua sæcula ferrent,
Vulnus habent populi: plus est quam vita salusque
Quod perit: in totum mundi prosternimur ævum.
Vincitur his gladiis omnis, quæ serviet, ætas.
Proxima quid soboles, aut quid meruere nepotes,
In regnum nasci?” etc.

[786] Diodor. xviii. 38. Ἀντιπάτρου δ᾽ εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν
διαβεβηκότος, Αἰτωλοὶ ~κατὰ τὰς πρὸς Περδίκκαν συνθήκας~
ἐστράτευσαν εἰς τὴν Θετταλίαν, etc.

In the spring of 321 B. C., Antipater and Kraterus, having
concerted operations with Ptolemy governor of Egypt, crossed into
Asia, and began their conflict with Perdikkas; who himself, having
the kings along with him, marched against Egypt to attack Ptolemy;
leaving his brother Alketas, in conjunction with Eumenes as general,
to maintain his cause in Kappadokia and Asia Minor. Alketas,
discouraged by the adverse feeling of the Macedonians generally,
threw up the enterprise as hopeless. But Eumenes, though embarrassed
and menaced in every way by the treacherous jealousy of his own
Macedonian officers, and by the discontent of the soldiers against
him as a Greek—and though compelled to conceal from these soldiers
the fact that Kraterus, who was popular among them, commanded on the
opposite side,—displayed nevertheless so much ability that he gained
an important victory,[787] in which both Neoptolemus and Kraterus
perished. Neoptolemus was killed by Eumenes with his own hand, after
a personal conflict desperate in the extreme and long doubtful, and
at the cost of a severe wound to himself.[788] After the victory, he
found Kraterus still alive, though expiring from his wound. Deeply
afflicted at the sight, he did his utmost to restore the dying man;
and when this proved to be impossible, caused his dead body to be
honorably shrouded and transmitted into Macedonia for burial.

[787] Plutarch, Eumenes, 7; Cornel. Nepos, Eumenes, c. 4. Eumenes
had trained a body of Asiatic and Thracian cavalry to fight in
close combat with the short pike and sword of the Macedonian
Companions—relinquishing the javelin, the missiles, and the
alternation of charging and retiring usual to Asiatics.

Diodorus (xviii. 30, 31, 32) gives an account at some length of
this battle. He as well as Plutarch may probably have borrowed
from Hieronymus of Kardia.

[788] Arrian ap. Photium, Cod. 92; Justin, xiii. 8; Diodor.
xviii. 33.

This new proof of the military ability and vigor of Eumenes, together
with the death of two such important officers as Kraterus and
Neoptolemus—proved ruinous to the victor himself, without serving
the cause in which he fought. Perdikkas his chief did not live to
hear of it. That general was so overbearing and tyrannical in his
demeanor towards the other officers—and withal so unsuccessful in
his first operations against Ptolemy on the Pelusiac branch of the
Nile—that his own army mutinied and slew him.[789] His troops joined
Ptolemy, whose conciliatory behavior gained their goodwill. Only
two days after this revolution, a messenger from Eumenes reached
the camp, announcing his victory and the death of Kraterus. Had
this intelligence been received by Perdikkas himself at the head of
his army, the course of subsequent events might have been sensibly
altered. Eumenes would have occupied the most commanding position
in Asia, as general of the kings of the Alexandrine family, to whom
both his interests and his feelings attached him. But the news,
arriving at the moment when it did, caused throughout the army only
the most violent exasperation against him; not simply as ally of the
odious Perdikkas, but as cause of death to the esteemed Kraterus. He,
together with Alketas and fifty officers, was voted by the soldiers
a public enemy. No measures were kept with him henceforward by
Macedonian officers or soldiers. At the same time several officers
attached to Perdikkas in the camp, and also Atalanta his sister, were
slain.[790]

[789] Diodor. xviii. 36.

[790] Plutarch, Eumenes, 8; Cornel. Nepos, Eumenes, 4; Diodor.
xviii. 36, 37.

By the death of Perdikkas, and the defection of his soldiers,
complete preponderance was thrown into the hands of Antipater,
Ptolemy, and Antigonus. Antipater was invited to join the army,
now consisting of the forces both of Ptolemy and Perdikkas united.
He was there invested with the guardianship of the persons of the
kings, and with the sort of ministerial supremacy previously held by
Perdikkas. He was however exposed to much difficulty, and even to
great personal danger, from the intrigues of the princess Eurydikê,
who displayed a masculine boldness in publicly haranguing the
soldiers—and from the discontents of the army, who claimed presents,
formerly promised to them by Alexander, which there were no funds
to liquidate at the moment. At Triparadisus in Syria, Antipater
made a second distribution of the satrapies of the empire; somewhat
modified, yet coinciding in the main with that which had been drawn
up shortly after the death of Alexander. To Ptolemy was assured Egypt
and Libya,—to Antigonus, the Greater Phrygia, Lykia, and Pamphylia—as
each had had before.[791]

[791] Diodor. xviii. 39. Arrian, ap. Photium.

Antigonus was placed in command of the principal Macedonian army in
Asia, to crush Eumenes and the other chief adherents of Perdikkas;
most of whom had been condemned to death by a vote of the Macedonian
army. After a certain interval, Antipater himself, accompanied by the
kings, returned to Macedonia, having eluded by artifice a renewed
demand on the part of his soldiers for the promised presents. The
war of Antigonus, first against Eumenes in Kappadokia, next against
Alketas and the other partisans of Perdikkas in Pisidia, lasted
for many months, but was at length successfully finished.[792]
Eumenes, beset by the constant treachery and insubordination of the
Macedonians, was defeated and driven out of the field. He took refuge
with a handful of men in the impregnable and well-stored fortress of
Nora in Kappadokia, where he held out a long blockade, apparently
more than a year, against Antigonus.[793]

[792] Arrian, De Rebus post Alexandr. lib. ix. 10. ap. Photium,
Cod. 92; Diodor. xviii. 39, 40, 46; Plutarch, Eumenes, 3, 4.

[793] Plutarch, Eumenes, 10, 11; Cornel. Nepos, Eumenes, c. 5;
Diodor. xviii. 41.

Before the prolonged blockade of Nora had been brought to a close,
Antipater, being of very advanced age, fell into sickness, and
presently died. One of his latest acts was, to put to death the
Athenian orator Demades, who had been sent to Macedonia as envoy to
solicit the removal of the Macedonian garrison at Munychia. Antipater
had promised, or given hopes, that if the oligarchy which he had
constituted at Athens maintained unshaken adherence to Macedonia, he
would withdraw the garrison. The Athenians endeavored to prevail on
Phokion to go to Macedonia as solicitor for the fulfilment of this
promise; but he steadily refused. Demades, who willingly undertook
the mission, reached Macedonia at a moment very untoward for himself.
The papers of the deceased Perdikkas had come into possession of his
opponents; and among them had been found a letter written to him
by Demades, inviting him to cross over and rescue Greece from her
dependence “on an old and rotten warp”—meaning Antipater. This letter
gave great offence to Antipater—the rather, as Demades is said to
have been his habitual pensioner—and still greater offence to his son
Kassander; who caused Demades with his son to be seized—first killed
the son in the immediate presence and even embrace of the father—and
then slew the father himself, with bitter invective against his
ingratitude.[794] All the accounts which we read depict Demades, in
general terms, as a prodigal spendthrift and a venal and corrupt
politician. We have no ground for questioning this statement: at the
same time, we have no specific facts to prove it.

[794] Plutarch, Phokion, 30; Diodor. xviii. 48; Plutarch,
Demosth. 31; Arrian, De Reb. post Alex. vi. ap. Photium, Cod. 92.

In the life of Phokion, Plutarch has written inadvertently
_Antigonus_ instead of _Perdikkas_.

It is not easy to see, however, how Deinarchus can have been the
accuser of Demades on such a matter—as Arrian and Plutarch state.
Arrian seems to put the death of Demades too early, from his
anxiety to bring it into immediate juxtaposition with the death
of Demosthenes, whose condemnation Demades had proposed in the
Athenian assembly.

Antipater by his last directions appointed Polysperchon, one of
Alexander’s veteran officers, to be chief administrator, with full
powers on behalf of the imperial dynasty; while he assigned to his
own son Kassander only the second place, as Chiliarch, or general of
the body-guard.[795] He thought that this disposition of power would
be more generally acceptable throughout the empire, as Polysperchon
was older and of longer military service than any other among
Alexander’s generals. Moreover, Antipater was especially afraid of
letting dominion fall into the hands of the princesses;[796] all of
whom—Olympias, Kleopatra, and Eurydikê—were energetic characters; and
the first of the three (who had retired to Epirus from enmity towards
Antipater) furious and implacable.

[795] Diod. xviii. 48.

[796] Diod. xix. 11.

But the views of Antipater were disappointed from the beginning,
because Kassander would not submit to the second place, nor tolerate
Polysperchon as his superior. Immediately after the death of
Antipater, but before it became publicly known, Kassander despatched
Nikanor with pretended orders from Antipater to supersede Menyllus
in the government of Munychia. To this order Menyllus yielded. But
when after a few days the Athenian public came to learn the real
truth, they were displeased with Phokion for having permitted the
change to be made—assuming that he knew the real state of the facts,
and might have kept out the new commander.[797] Kassander, while
securing this important post in the hands of a confirmed partisan,
affected to acquiesce in the authority of Polysperchon, and to
occupy himself with a hunting-party in the country. He at the same
time sent confidential adherents to the Hellespont and other places
in furtherance of his schemes; and especially to contract alliance
with Antigonus in Asia and with Ptolemy in Egypt. His envoys being
generally well received, he himself soon quitted Macedonia suddenly,
and went to concert measures with Antigonus in Asia.[798] It suited
the policy of Ptolemy, and still more that of Antigonus, to aid
him against Polysperchon and the imperial dynasty. On the death of
Antipater, Antigonus had resolved to make himself the real sovereign
of the Asiatic Alexandrine empire, possessing as he did the most
powerful military force within it.

[797] Plutarch, Phokion, 31. Diodorus (xviii. 64) says also that
Nikanor was nominated by Kassander.

[798] Diodor. xviii. 54.

Even before this time the imperial dynasty had been a name rather
than a reality; yet still a respected name. But now, the preference
shown to Polysperchon by the deceased Antipater, and the secession
of Kassander, placed all the real great powers in active hostility
against the dynasty. Polysperchon and his friends were not blind
to the difficulties of their position. The principal officers in
Macedonia having been convened to deliberate, it was resolved to
invite Olympias out of Epirus, that she might assume the tutelage of
her grandson Alexander (son of Roxana)—to place the Asiatic interests
of the dynasty in the hands of Eumenes, appointing him to the
supreme command[799]—and to combat Kassander in Europe, by assuring
to themselves the general goodwill and support of the Greeks. This
last object was to be obtained by granting to the Greeks general
enfranchisement, and by subverting the Antipatrian oligarchies and
military governments now paramount throughout the cities.

[799] Diodor. xviii. 49-58.

The last hope of maintaining the unity of Alexander’s empire in Asia,
against the counter-interests of the great Macedonian officers, who
were steadily tending to divide and appropriate it—now lay in the
fidelity and military skill of Eumenes. At his disposal Polysperchon
placed the imperial treasures and soldiers in Asia; especially
the brave, but faithless and disorderly, Argyraspides. Olympias
also addressed to him a pathetic letter, asking his counsel as the
only friend and savior to whom the imperial family could now look.
Eumenes replied by assuring them of his devoted adherence to their
cause. But he at the same time advised Olympias not to come out of
Epirus into Macedonia; or if she did come, at all events to abstain
from vindictive and cruel proceedings. Both these recommendations,
honorable as well to his prudence as to his humanity, were
disregarded by the old queen. She came into Macedonia to take the
management of affairs; and although her imposing title, of mother
to the great conqueror, raised a strong favorable feeling, yet her
multiplied executions of the Antipatrian partisans excited fatal
enmity against a dynasty already tottering. Nevertheless Eumenes,
though his advice had been disregarded, devoted himself in Asia with
unshaken fidelity to the Alexandrine family, resisting the most
tempting invitations to take part with Antigonus against them.[800]
His example contributed much to keep alive the same active sentiment
in those around him; indeed, without him, the imperial family would
have had no sincere or commanding representative in Asia. His gallant
struggles, first in Kilikia and Phenicia, next (when driven from the
coast), in Susiana, Persis, Media, and Parætakênê—continued for two
years against the greatly preponderant forces of Ptolemy, Antigonus,
and Seleukus, and against the never-ceasing treachery of his own
officers and troops[801]—do not belong to Grecian history. They
are however among the most memorable exploits of antiquity. While
even in a military point of view, they are hardly inferior to the
combinations of Alexander himself—they evince, besides, a flexibility
and aptitude such as Alexander neither possessed nor required, for
overcoming the thousand difficulties raised by traitors and mutineers
around him. To the last, Eumenes remained unsubdued; he was betrayed
to Antigonus by the base and venal treachery of his own soldiers, the
Macedonian Argyraspides.[802]

[800] Plutarch, Eumenes, 11, 12; Cornelius Nepos, Eumenes, c. 6;
Diodor. xviii. 58-62.

Diodor. xviii, 58. ἧκε δὲ καὶ παρ᾽ Ὀλυμπιάδος αὐτῷ γράμματα,
δεομένης καὶ λιπαρούσης βοηθεῖν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι καὶ ἑαυτῇ· μόνον
γὰρ ἐκεῖνον πιστότατον ἀπολελεῖφθαι τῶν φίλων, καὶ δυνάμενον
διορθώσασθαι τὴν ἐρημίαν τῆς βασιλικῆς οἰκίας.

Cornelius Nepos, Eumenes, 6. “Ad hunc (Eumenem) Olympias,
quum literas et nuntios misisset in Asiam, consultum, utrum
repetitum Macedoniam veniret (nam tum in Epiro habitabat) et
eas res occuparet—huic ille primum suasit ne se moveret, et
expectaret quoad Alexandri filius regnum adipisceretur. Sin
aliquâ cupiditate raperetur in Macedoniam, omnium injuriarum
oblivisceretur, et in neminem acerbiore uteretur imperio. Horum
illa nihil fecit. Nam et in Macedoniam profecta est, et ibi
crudelissime se gessit.” Compare Justin, xiv. 6; Diodor. xix. 11.

The details respecting Eumenes may be considered probably as
depending on unusually good authority. His friend Hieronymus of
Kardia had written a copious history of his own time; which,
though now lost, was accessible both to Diodorus and Plutarch.
Hieronymus was serving with Eumenes, and was taken prisoner along
with him by Antigonus; who spared him and treated him well, while
Eumenes was put to death (Diodor. xix. 44). Plutarch had also
read letters of Eumenes (Plut. Eum. 11).

[801] Diodor. xviii. 63-72; xix. 11, 17, 32, 44.

[802] Plutarch (Eumenes, 16-18), Cornelius Nepos (10-13), and
Justin (xiv. 3, 4) describe in considerable detail the touching
circumstances attending the tradition and capture of Eumenes. On
this point Diodorus is more brief; but he recounts at much length
the preceding military operations between Eumenes and Antigonus
(xix. 17, 32, 44).

The original source of these particulars must probably be, the
history of Hieronymus of Kardia, himself present, and copied,
more or less accurately, by others.

For the interests of the imperial dynasty (the extinction of which
we shall presently follow), it is perhaps to be regretted that
they did not abandon Asia at once, at the death of Antipater, and
concentrate their attention on Macedonia alone, summoning over
Eumenes to aid them. To keep together in unity the vast aggregate of
Asia was manifestly impracticable, even with his consummate ability.
Indeed, we read that Olympias wished for his presence in Europe, not
trusting any one but him as protector of the child Alexander.[803]
In Macedonia, apart from Asia, Eumenes, if the violent temper of
Olympias had permitted him, might have upheld the dynasty; which,
having at that time a decided interest in conciliating the Greeks,
might probably have sanctioned his sympathies in favor of free
Hellenic community.[804]

[803] Plutarch, Eumenes, 13; Diodor. xviii. 58.

[804] Plutarch, Eumenes, 3.

On learning the death of Antipater, most of the Greek cities had
sent envoys to Pella.[805] To all the governments of these cities,
composed as they were of his creatures, it was a matter of the utmost
moment to know what course the new Macedonian authority would adopt.
Polysperchon, persuaded that they would all adhere to Kassander, and
that his only chance of combating that rival was by enlisting popular
sympathy and interests in Greece, or at least by subverting these
Antipatrian oligarchies—drew up in conjunction with his counsellors a
proclamation which he issued in the name of the dynasty.

[805] Diodor. xviii. 55. εὐθὺς οὖν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων παρόντας
πρεσβευτὰς προσκαλεσάμενοι, etc.

After reciting the steady goodwill of Philip and Alexander towards
Greece, he affirmed that this feeling had been interrupted by the
untoward Lamian war, originating with some ill-judged Greeks, and
ending in the infliction of many severe calamities upon the various
cities. But all these severities (he continued) had proceeded from
the generals (Antipater and Kraterus): the kings had now determined
to redress them. It was accordingly proclaimed that the political
constitution of each city should be restored, as it had stood in
the times of Philip and Alexander; that before the thirtieth of the
month Xanthikus, all those who had been condemned to banishment, or
deported, by the generals, should be recalled and received back; that
their properties should be restored, and past sentences against them
rescinded; that they should live in amnesty as to the past, and good
feeling as to the future, with the remaining citizens. From this act
of recall were excluded, the exiles of Amphissa, Trikka, Pharkadon,
and Herakleia, together with a certain number of Megalopolitans,
implicated in one particular conspiracy. In the particular case of
those cities, the governments of which had been denounced as hostile
by Philip or Alexander, special reference and consultation was opened
with Pella, for some modification to meet the circumstances. As to
Athens, it was decreed that Samos should be restored to her, but not
Orôpus; in all other respects, she was placed on the same footing as
in the days of Philip and Alexander. “All the Greeks (concluded this
proclamation) shall pass decrees, forbidding every one either to bear
arms or otherwise act in hostility against us—on pain of exile and
confiscation of goods, for himself and his family. On this and on all
other matters, we have ordered Polysperchon to take proper measures.
Obey him—as we have before written you to do; for we shall not omit
to notice those who on any point disregard our proclamation.”[806]

[806] Diodor. xviii. 56. In this chapter the proclamation is
given _verbatim_. For the exceptions made in respect to Amphissa,
Trikka, Herakleia, etc., we do not know the grounds.

Reference is made to prior edicts of the kings—ὑμεῖς οὖν, καθάπερ
ὑμῖν καὶ πρότερον ἐγράψαμεν, ἀκούετε τούτου (Πολυσπέρχοντος).
These words must allude to written answers given to particular
cities, in reply to special applications. No general
proclamation, earlier than this, can have been issued since the
death of Antipater.

Such was the new edict issued by the kings, or rather by Polysperchon
in their names. It directed the removal of all the garrisons, and the
subversion of all the oligarchies, established by Antipater after
the Lamian war. It ordered the recall of the host of exiles then
expelled. It revived the state of things prevalent before the death
of Alexander—which indeed itself had been, for the most part, an
aggregate of macedonizing oligarchies interspersed with Macedonian
garrisons. To the existing Antipatrian oligarchies, however, it was
a deathblow; and so it must have been understood by the Grecian
envoys—including probably deputations from the exiles, as well as
envoys from the civic governments—to whom Polysperchon delivered it
at Pella. Not content with the general edict, Polysperchon addressed
special letters to Argos and various other cities, commanding that
the Antipatrian leading men should be banished with confiscation
of property, and in some cases put to death;[807] the names being
probably furnished to him by the exiles. Lastly, as it was clear that
such stringent measures could not be executed without force,—the
rather as these oligarchies would be upheld by Kassander from
without—Polysperchon resolved to conduct a large military force into
Greece; sending thither first, however, a considerable detachment,
for immediate operations, under his son Alexander.

[807] Diodor. xviii. 57.

To Athens, as well as to other cities, Polysperchon addressed
special letters, promising restoration of the democracy and recall
of the exiles. At Athens, such change was a greater revolution than
elsewhere, because the multitude of exiles and persons deported had
been the greatest. To the existing nine thousand Athenian citizens,
it was doubtless odious and alarming; while to Phokion with the other
leading Antipatrians, it threatened not only loss of power, but
probably nothing less than the alternative of flight or death.[808]
The state of interests at Athens, however, was now singularly novel
and complicated. There were the Antipatrians and the nine thousand
qualified citizens. There were the exiles, who, under the new edict,
speedily began re-entering the city, and reclaiming their citizenship
as well as their properties. Polysperchon and his son were known to
be soon coming with a powerful force. Lastly, there was Nikanor, who
held Munychia with a garrison, neither for Polysperchon, nor for the
Athenians, but for Kassander; the latter being himself also expected
with a force from Asia. Here then were several parties; each distinct
in views and interests from the rest—some decidedly hostile to each
other.

[808] Plutarch, Phokion, 32. The opinion of Plutarch, however,
that Polysperchon intended this measure as a mere trick to ruin
Phokion, is only correct so far—that Polysperchon wished to put
down the Antipatrian oligarchies everywhere, and that Phokion was
the leading person of that oligarchy at Athens.

The first contest arose between the Athenians and Nikanor respecting
Munychia; which they required him to evacuate, pursuant to the
recent proclamation. Nikanor on his side returned an evasive answer,
promising compliance as soon as circumstances permitted, but in the
mean time entreating the Athenians to continue in alliance with
Kassander, as they had been with his father Antipater.[809] He
seems to have indulged hopes of prevailing on them to declare in
his favor—and not without plausible grounds, since the Antipatrian
leaders and a proportion of the nine thousand citizens could not but
dread the execution of Polysperchon’s edict. And he had also what
was of still greater moment—the secret connivance and support of
Phokion: who put himself in intimate relation with Nikanor, as he had
before done with Menyllus[810]—and who had greater reason than any
one else to dread the edict of Polysperchon. At a public assembly
held in Peiræus to discuss the subject, Nikanor even ventured to
present himself in person, in the company and under the introduction
of Phokion, who was anxious that the Athenians should entertain the
proposition of alliance with Kassander. But with the people, the
prominent wish was to get rid altogether of the foreign garrison,
and to procure the evacuation of Munychia—for which object, of
course, the returned exiles would be even more anxious than the nine
thousand. Accordingly, the assembly refused to hear any propositions
from Nikanor; while Derkyllus with others even proposed to seize his
person. It was Phokion who ensured to him the means of escaping;
even in spite of serious wrath from his fellow-citizens, to whom he
pleaded, that he had made himself guarantee for Nikanor’s personal
safety.[811]

[809] Diodor. xviii. 64.

[810] Plutarch, Phokion, 31.

[811] Plutarch, Phokion, 32.

Foreseeing the gravity of the impending contest, Nikanor had been
secretly introducing fresh soldiers into Munychia. And when he found
that he could not obtain any declared support from the Athenians,
he laid a scheme for surprising and occupying the town and harbor
of Peiræus, of which Munychia formed the adjoining eminence and
harbor, on the southern side of the little peninsula. Notwithstanding
all his precautions, it became known to various Athenians that he
was tampering with persons in Peiræus, and collecting troops in
the neighboring isle of Salamis. So much anxiety was expressed in
the Athenian assembly for the safety of Peiræus, that a decree
was passed, enjoining all citizens to hold themselves in arms for
its protection, under Phokion as general. Nevertheless Phokion,
disregarding such a decree, took no precautions, affirming that he
would himself be answerable for Nikanor. Presently that officer,
making an unexpected attack from Munychia and Salamis, took Peiræus
by surprise, placed both the town and harbor under military
occupation, and cut off its communication with Athens by a ditch and
palisade. On this palpable aggression, the Athenians rushed to arms.
But Phokion as general damped their ardor, and even declined to head
them in an attack for the recovery of Peiræus before Nikanor should
have had time to strengthen himself in it. He went however, with
Konon (son of Timotheus), to remonstrate with Nikanor, and to renew
the demand that he should evacuate, under the recent proclamation,
all the posts which he held in garrison. But Nikanor would give no
other answer, except that he held his commission from Kassander, to
whom they must address their application.[812] He thus again tried to
bring Athens into communication with Kassander.

[812] Diodor. xviii. 64; Plutarch, Phokion, 32; Cornelius Nepos,
Phokion, 2.

The occupation of Peiræus in addition to Munychia was a serious
calamity to the Athenians, making them worse off than they had
been even under Antipater. Peiræus, rich, active, and commercial,
containing the Athenian arsenal, docks, and muniments of war, was
in many respects more valuable than Athens itself; for all purposes
of war, far more valuable. Kassander had now an excellent place of
arms and base, which Munychia alone would not have afforded, for his
operations in Greece against Polysperchon; upon whom therefore the
loss fell hardly less severely than upon the Athenians. Now Phokion,
in his function as general, had been forewarned of the danger, might
have guarded against it, and ought to have done so. This was a grave
dereliction of duty, and admits of hardly any other explanation
except that of treasonable connivance. It seems that Phokion,
foreseeing his own ruin and that of his friends in the triumph of
Polysperchon and the return of the exiles, was desirous of favoring
the seizure of Peiræus by Nikanor, as a means of constraining Athens
to adopt the alliance with Kassander; which alliance indeed would
probably have been brought about, had Kassander reached Peiræus by
sea sooner than the first troops of Polysperchon by land. Phokion was
here guilty, at the very least, of culpable neglect, and probably of
still more culpable treason, on an occasion seriously injuring both
Polysperchon and the Athenians; a fact which we must not forget, when
we come to read presently the bitter animosity exhibited against
him.[813]

[813] Cornelius Nepos, Phokion, 2. “Concidit autem maxime uno
crimine: quod cum apud eum summum esset imperium populi, et
Nicanorem, Cassandri præfectum, insidiari Piræo Atheniensium,
a Dercyllo moneretur: idemque postularet, ut provideret, ne
commeatibus civitas privaretur—huic, audiente populo, Phocion
negavit esse periculam, seque ejus rei obsidem fore pollicitus
est. Neque ita multo post Nicanor Piræo est potitus. Ad quem
recuperandum cum populus armatus concurrisset, ille non modo
neminem ad arma vocavit, sed ne armatis quidem præsse voluit,
sine qua Athenæ omnino esse non possunt.”

The news, that Nikanor had possessed himself of Peiræus, produced
a strong sensation. Presently arrived a letter addressed to him
by Olympias herself, commanding him to surrender the place to the
Athenians, upon whom she wished to confer entire autonomy. But
Nikanor declined obedience to her order, still waiting for support
from Kassander. The arrival of Alexander (Polysperchon’s son) with a
body of troops, encouraged the Athenians to believe that he was come
to assist in carrying Peiræus by force, for the purpose of restoring
it to them. Their hopes, however, were again disappointed. Though
encamped near Peiræus, Alexander made no demand for the Athenian
forces to co-operate with him in attacking it; but entered into
open parley with Nikanor, whom he endeavored to persuade or corrupt
into surrendering the place.[814] When this negotiation failed, he
resolved to wait for the arrival of his father, who was already on
his march towards Attica with the main army. His own force unassisted
was probably not sufficient to attack Peiræus; nor did he choose to
invoke assistance from the Athenians, to whom he would then have been
compelled to make over the place when taken, which they so ardently
desired. The Athenians were thus as far from their object as ever;
moreover, by this delay the opportunity of attacking the place was
altogether thrown away; for Kassander with his armament reached it
before Polysperchon.

[814] Diodor. xviii. 65; Plutarch, Phokion, 33.

It was Phokion and his immediate colleagues who induced Alexander
to adopt this insidious policy; to decline reconquering Peiræus for
the Athenians, and to appropriate it for himself. To Phokion, the
reconstitution of autonomous Athens, with its democracy and restored
exiles, and without any foreign controlling force—was an assured
sentence of banishment, if not of death. Not having been able to
obtain protection from the foreign force of Nikanor and Kassander,
he and his friends resolved to throw themselves upon that of
Alexander and Polysperchon. They went to meet Alexander as he entered
Attica—represented the impolicy of his relinquishing so important a
military position as Peiræus, while the war was yet unfinished,—and
offered to co-operate with him for this purpose, by proper management
of the Athenian public. Alexander was pleased with these suggestions,
accepted Phokion with the others as his leading adherents at Athens,
and looked upon Peiræus as a capture to be secured for himself.[815]
Numerous returning Athenian exiles accompanied Alexander’s army.
It seems that Phokion was desirous of admitting the troops, along
with the exiles, as friends and allies into the walls of Athens,
so as to make Alexander master of the city—but that this project
was impracticable in consequence of the mistrust created among the
Athenians by the parleys of Alexander with Nikanor.[816]

[815] Diodor. xviii. 65. Τῶν γὰρ Ἀντιπάτρῳ γεγονότων φίλων τινὲς
(ὑπῆρχον) καὶ ~οἱ περὶ Φωκίωνα φοβούμενοι τὰς ἐκ τῶν νόμων
τιμωρίας~, ὑπήντησαν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, καὶ διδάξαντες τὸ συμφέρον,
ἔπεισαν αὐτὸν ἰδίᾳ κατέχειν τὰ φρούρια, καὶ μὴ παραδιδόναι τοῖς
Ἀθηναίοις, μέχρις ἂν ὁ Κάσσανδρος καταπολεμήθῃ.

[816] Plutarch, Phokion, 33; Diod. xviii. 65. 66. This seems
to me the probable sequence of facts, combining Plutarch with
Diodorus. Plutarch takes no notice of the negotiation opened
by Phokion with Alexander, and the understanding established
between them; which is stated in the clearest manner by
Diodorus, and appears to me a material circumstance. On the
other hand, Plutarch mentions (though Diodorus does not) that
Alexander was anxious to seize Athens itself, and was very near
succeeding. Plutarch seems to conceive that it was the exiles
who were disposed to let him in; but if that had been the case,
he probably would have been let in when the exiles became
preponderant. It was Phokion, I conceive, who was desirous, for
his own personal safety, of admitting the foreign troops.

The strategic function of Phokion, however, so often conferred
and re-conferred upon him—and his power of doing either good or
evil—now approached its close. As soon as the returning exiles
found themselves in sufficient numbers, they called for a revision
of the list of state-officers, and for the re-establishment of
the democratical forms. They passed a vote to depose those who
had held office under the Antipatrian oligarchy and who still
continued to hold it down to the actual moment. Among these Phokion
stood first: along with him were his son-in-law Charikles, the
Phalerean Demetrius, Kallimedon, Nikokles, Thudippus, Hegemon, and
Philokles. These persons were not only deposed, but condemned,
some to death, some to banishment and confiscation of property.
Demetrius, Charikles, and Kallimedon sought safety by leaving
Attica; but Phokion and the rest merely went to Alexander’s camp,
throwing themselves upon his protection on the faith of the recent
understanding.[817] Alexander not only received them courteously,
but gave them letters to his father Polysperchon, requesting safety
and protection for them, as men who had embraced his cause, and who
were still eager to do all in their power to support him.[818] Armed
with these letters, Phokion and his companions went through Bœotia
and Phokis to meet Polysperchon on his march southward. They were
accompanied by Deinarchus and by a Platæan named Solon, both of them
passing for friends of Polysperchon.[819]

[817] Diodor. xviii. 65; Plutarch, Phokion, 35.

[818] Diodor. xviii. 66. Προσδεχθέντες δὲ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ (Alexander)
φιλοφρόνως, γράμματα ἔλαβον πρὸς τὸν πατέρα Πολυσπέρχοντα, ὅπως
μηδὲν πάθωσιν οἱ περὶ Φωκίωνα ~τἀκείνου πεφρονηκότες, καὶ νῦν
ἐπαγγελλόμενοι πάντα συμπράξειν~.

This application of Phokion to Alexander, and the letters
obtained to Polysperchon, are not mentioned by Plutarch, though
they are important circumstances in following the last days of
Phokion’s life.

[819] Plutarch, Phokion, 33.

The Athenian democracy, just reconstituted, which had passed the
recent condemnatory votes, was disquieted at the news that Alexander
had espoused the cause of Phokion and had recommended the like policy
to his father. It was possible that Polysperchon might seek, with
his powerful army, both to occupy Athens and to capture Peiræus,
and might avail himself of Phokion (like Antipater after the Lamian
war) as a convenient instrument of government. It seems plain that
this was the project of Alexander, and that he counted on Phokion
as a ready auxiliary in both. Now the restored democrats, though
owing their restoration to Polysperchon, were much less compliant
towards him than Phokion had been. Not only they would not admit
him into the city, but they would not even acquiesce in his separate
occupation of Munychia and Peiræus. On the proposition of Agnonides
and Archestratus, they sent a deputation to Polysperchon accusing
Phokion and his comrades of high treason; yet at the same time
claiming for Athens the full and undiminished benefit of the late
regal proclamation—autonomy and democracy, with restoration of
Peiræus and Munychia free and ungarrisoned.[820]

[820] Diodor. xviii. 66.

The deputation reached Polysperchon at Pharyges in Phokis, as early
as Phokion’s company, which had been detained for some days at
Elateia by the sickness of Deinarchus. That delay was unfortunate
for Phokion. Had he seen Polysperchon, and presented the letter of
Alexander, before the Athenian accusers arrived, he might probably
have obtained a more favorable reception. But as the arrival of
the two parties was nearly simultaneous, Polysperchon heard both
of them at the same audience, before King Philip Aridæus in his
throne with the gilt ceiling above it. When Agnonides,—chief of the
Athenian deputation, and formerly friend and advocate of Demosthenes
in the Harpalian cause—found himself face to face with Phokion and
his friends, their reciprocal invectives at first produced nothing
but confusion; until Agnonides himself exclaimed—“Pack us all into
one cage and send us back to Athens to receive judgment from the
Athenians.” The king laughed at this observation, but the bystanders
around insisted upon more orderly proceedings, and Agnonides then set
forth the two demands of the Athenians—condemnation of Phokion and
his friends, partly as accomplices of Antipater, partly as having
betrayed Peiræus to Nikanor—and the full benefit of the late regal
proclamation to Athens.[821] Now, on the last of these two heads,
Polysperchon was noway disposed to yield—nor to hand over Peiræus
to the Athenians as soon as he should take it. On this matter,
accordingly, he replied by refusal or evasion. But he was all the
more disposed to satisfy the Athenians on the other matter—the
surrender of Phokion; especially as the sentiment now prevalent at
Athens evinced clearly that Phokion could not be again useful to him
as an instrument. Thus disposed to sacrifice Phokion, Polysperchon
heard his defence with impatience, interrupted him several times, and
so disgusted him, that he at length struck the ground with his stick,
and held his peace. Hegemon, another of the accused, was yet more
harshly treated. When he appealed to Polysperchon himself, as having
been personally cognizant of his (the speaker’s) good dispositions
towards the Athenian people (he had probably been sent to Pella, as
envoy for redress of grievances under the Antipatrian oligarchy),
Polysperchon exclaimed—“Do not utter falsehoods against me before the
king.” Moreover, king Philip himself was so incensed, as to start
from his throne and snatch his spear; with which he would have run
Hegemon through,—imitating the worst impulses of his illustrious
brother—had he not been held back by Polysperchon. The sentence could
not be doubtful. Phokion and his companions were delivered over as
prisoners to the Athenian deputation, together with a letter from the
king, intimating that in his conviction they were traitors, but that
he left them to be judged by the Athenians, now restored to freedom
and autonomy.[822]

[821] Plutarch, Phokion, 33; Cornel. Nepos. Phokion, 3.
“Hic (Phocion), ab Agnonide accusatus, quod Piræum Nicanori
prodidisset, ex consilii sententiâ, in custodiam conjectus,
Athenas deductus est, ut ibi de eo legibus fieret judicium.”

Plutarch says that Polysperchon, before he gave this hearing
to both parties, ordered _the Corinthian Deinarchus_ to be
tortured and to be put to death. Now the person so named cannot
be Deinarchus, the logographer—of whom we have some specimens
remaining, and who was alive even as late as 292 B.
C.—though he too was a Corinthian. Either, therefore, there
were two Corinthians, both bearing this same name (as Westermann
supposes—Gesch. der Beredtsamkeit, sect. 72), or the statement
of Plutarch must allude to an order given but not carried into
effect—which latter seems to me most probable.

[822] Plutarch, Phokion, 33, 34; Diodor. xviii. 66.

The Macedonian Kleitus was instructed to convey them to Athens as
prisoners under a guard. Mournful was the spectacle as they entered
the city; being carried along the Kerameikus in carts, through
sympathizing friends and an embittered multitude, until they reached
the theatre, wherein the assembly was to be convened. That assembly
was composed of every one who chose to enter, and is said to have
contained many foreigners and slaves. But it would have been
fortunate for Phokion had such really been the case; for foreigners
and slaves had no cause of antipathy towards him. The assembly was
mainly composed of Phokion’s keenest enemies, the citizens just
returned from exile or deportation; among whom may doubtless have
been intermixed more or less of non-qualified persons, since the
lists had probably not yet been verified. When the assembly was about
to be opened, the friends of Phokion moved, that on occasion of so
important a trial, foreigners and slaves should be sent away. This
was in every sense an impolitic proceeding; for the restored exiles,
chiefly poor men, took it as an insult to themselves, and became only
the more embittered, exclaiming against the oligarchs who were trying
to exclude them.

It is not easy to conceive stronger grounds of exasperation than
those which inflamed the bosoms of these returned exiles. We must
recollect that at the close of the Lamian war, the Athenian democracy
had been forcibly subverted. Demosthenes and its principal leaders
had been slain, some of them with antecedent cruelties; the poorer
multitude, in number more than half of the qualified citizens,
had been banished or deported into distant regions. To all the
public shame and calamity, there was thus superadded a vast mass
of individual suffering and impoverishment, the mischiefs of which
were very imperfectly healed, even by that unexpected contingency
which had again thrown open to them their native city. Accordingly,
when these men returned from different regions, each hearing from
the rest new tales of past hardship, they felt the bitterest hatred
against the authors of the Antipatrian revolution; and among these
authors Phokion stood distinctly marked. For although he had neither
originated nor advised these severities, yet he and his friends,
as administering the Antipatrian government at Athens, must have
been agents in carrying them out, and had rendered themselves
distinctly liable to the fearful penalties pronounced by the psephism
of Demophantus,[823] consecrated by an oath taken by Athenians
generally, against any one who should hold an official post after the
government was subverted.

[823] Andokides de Mysteriis, sect. 96, 97; Lycurgus adv.
Leokrat. s. 127.

When these restored citizens thus saw Phokion brought before
them, for the first time after their return, the common feeling
of antipathy against him burst out into furious manifestations.
Agnonides the principal accuser, supported by Epikurus[824] and
Demophilus, found their denunciations welcomed and even anticipated,
when they arraigned Phokion as a criminal who had lent his hand to
the subversion of the constitution,—to the sufferings of his deported
fellow-citizens,—and to the holding of Athens in subjection under
a foreign potentate; in addition to which, the betrayal of Peiræus
to Nikanor[825] constituted a new crime; fastening on the people
the yoke of Kassander, when autonomy had been promised to them by
the recent imperial edict. After the accusation was concluded,
Phokion was called on for his defence; but he found it impossible
to obtain a hearing. Attempting several times to speak, he was as
often interrupted by angry shouts; several of his friends were cried
down in like manner; until at length he gave up the case in despair,
and exclaimed, “For myself, Athenians, I plead guilty; I pronounce
against myself the sentence of death for my political conduct; but
why are you to sentence these men near me, who are not guilty?”
“Because they are your friends, Phokion”—was the exclamation of those
around. Phokion then said no more; while Agnonides proposed a decree,
to the effect, that the assembled people should decide by show of
hands, whether the persons now arraigned were guilty or not; and that
if declared guilty, they should be put to death. Some persons present
cried out, that the penalty of torture ought to precede death; but
this savage proposition, utterly at variance with Athenian law in
respect to citizens, was repudiated not less by Agnonides than by the
Macedonian officer Kleitus. The decree was then passed; after which
the show of hands was called for. Nearly every hand in the assembly
was held up in condemnation; each man even rose from his seat to make
the effect more imposing; and some went so far as to put on wreaths
in token of triumph. To many of them doubtless, the gratification
of this intense and unanimous vindictive impulse,—in their view not
merely legitimate, but patriotic,—must have been among the happiest
moments of life.[826]

[824] _Not_ the eminent philosopher so named.

[825] Cornel. Nepos, Phoc. 4. “Plurimi vero ita exacuerentur
propter proditionis suspicionem Piræi, maximeque quod adversus
populi commoda in senectute steterat.”

[826] Diodor. xviii. 66, 67; Plutarch, Phokion, 34, 35; Cornelius
Nepos, Phokion, 2, 3.

After sentence, the five condemned persons, Phokion, Nikokles,
Thudippus, Hegemon, and Pythokles, were consigned to the supreme
magistrates of Police, called The Eleven, and led to prison for the
purpose of having the customary dose of poison administered. Hostile
bystanders ran alongside, taunting and reviling them. It is even said
that one man planted himself in the front, and spat upon Phokion; who
turned to the public officers and exclaimed—“Will no one check this
indecent fellow?” This was the only emotion which he manifested; in
other respects, his tranquillity and self-possession were resolutely
maintained, during this soul-subduing march from the theatre to the
prison, amidst the wailings of his friends, the broken spirit of his
four comrades, and the fiercest demonstrations of antipathy from his
fellow-citizens generally. One ray of comfort presented itself as he
entered the prison. It was the nineteenth of the month Munychion,
the day on which the Athenian Horsemen or Knights (the richest class
in the city, men for the most part of oligarchical sentiments)
celebrated their festal procession with wreaths on their heads in
honor of Zeus. Several of these horsemen halted in passing, took off
their wreaths, and wept as they looked through the gratings of the
prison.

Being asked whether he had anything to tell his son Phokus, Phokion
replied—“I tell him emphatically, not to hold evil memory of the
Athenians.” The draught of hemlock was then administered to all
five—to Phokion last. Having been condemned for treason, they were
not buried in Attica; nor were Phokion’s friends allowed to light
a funeral pile for the burning of his body; which was carried out
of Attica into the Megarid, by a hired agent named Konopion, and
there burnt by fire obtained at Megara. The wife of Phokion, with
her maids, poured libations and marked the spot by a small mound of
earth; she also collected the bones and brought them back to Athens
in her bosom, during the secrecy of night. She buried them near her
own domestic hearth, with this address—“Beloved Hestia, I confide
to thee these relics of a good man. Restore them to his own family
vault, as soon as the Athenians shall come to their senses.”[827]

[827] Plutarch, Phokion, 36, 37. Two other anecdotes are
recounted by Plutarch, which seem to be of doubtful authenticity.
Nikokles entreated that he might be allowed to swallow his potion
before Phokion; upon which the latter replied—“Your request,
Nikokles, is sad and mournful; but as I have never yet refused
you anything throughout my life, I grant this also.”

After the four first had drunk, all except Phokion, no more
hemlock was left; upon which the jailer said that he would
not prepare any more, unless twelve drachmæ of money were
given to him to buy the material. Some hesitation took place,
until Phokion asked one of his friends to supply the money,
sarcastically remarking, that it was hard if a man could not even
die _gratis_ at Athens.

As to the first of these anecdotes—if we read, in Plato’s Phædon
(152-155), the details of the death of Sokrates,—we shall see
that death by hemlock was not caused instantaneously, but in a
gradual and painless manner; the person who had swallowed the
potion being desired to walk about for some time, until his legs
grew heavy, and then to lie down in bed, after which he gradually
chilled and became insensible, first in the extremities, next in
the vital centres. Under these circumstances, the question—which
of the persons condemned should swallow the first of the five
potions—could be of very little moment.

Then, as to the alleged niggardly stock of hemlock in the
Athenian prison—what would have been the alternative, if
Phokion’s friend had not furnished the twelve drachmæ? Would
he have remained in confinement, without being put to death?
Certainly not; for he was under capital sentence. Would he
have been put to death by the sword or some other unexpensive
instrument? This is at variance with the analogy of Athenian
practice. If there be any truth in the story, we must suppose
that the Eleven had allotted to this jailer a stock of hemlock
(or the price thereof) really adequate to five potions, but that
he by accident or awkwardness had wasted a part of it, so that
it would have been necessary for him to supply the deficiency
out of his own pocket. From this embarrassment he was rescued
by Phokion and his friend; and Phokion’s sarcasm touches upon
the strangeness of a man being called upon to pay for his own
execution.

After a short time (we are told by Plutarch) the Athenians did
thus come to their senses. They discovered that Phokion had been a
faithful and excellent public servant, repented of their severity
towards him, celebrated his funeral obsequies at the public expense,
erected a statue in his honor, and put to death Agnonides by public
judicial sentence; while Epikurus and Demophilus fled from the city
and were slain by Phokion’s son.[828]

[828] Plutarch, Phokion, 38

These facts are ostensibly correct; but Plutarch omits to notice
the real explanation of them. Within two or three months after
the death of Phokion, Kassander, already in possession of Peiræus
and Munychia, became also master of Athens; the oligarchical
or Phokionic party again acquired predominance; Demetrius the
Phalerean was recalled from exile, and placed to administer
the city under Kassander, as Phokion had administered it under
Antipater.

No wonder, that under such circumstances, the memory of Phokion
should be honored. But this is a very different thing from
spontaneous change of popular opinion respecting him. I see no
reason why such change of opinion should have occurred, nor do
I believe that it did occur. The Demos of Athens, banished and
deported in mass, had the best ground for hating Phokion, and
were not likely to become ashamed of the feeling. Though he
was personally mild and incorruptible, they derived no benefit
from these virtues. To them it was of little moment that he
should steadily refuse all presents from Antipater, when he did
Antipater’s work gratuitously. Considered as a judicial trial,
the last scene of Phokion before the people in the theatre
is nothing better than a cruel imposture; considered as a
manifestation of public opinion already settled, it is one for
which the facts of the past supplied ample warrant.

We cannot indeed read without painful sympathy the narrative of
an old man above eighty,—personally brave, mild, and superior to
all pecuniary temptation, so far as his positive administration
was concerned,—perishing under an intense and crushing storm
of popular execration. But when we look at the whole case—when
we survey, not merely the details of Phokion’s administration,
but the grand public objects which those details subserved, and
towards which he conducted his fellow-citizens—we shall see that
this judgment is fully merited. In Phokion’s patriotism—for so
doubtless he himself sincerely conceived it—no account was taken
of Athenian independence; of the autonomy or self-management of
the Hellenic world; of the conditions, in reference to foreign
kings, under which alone such autonomy could exist. He had
neither the Panhellenic sentiment of Aristeides, Kallikratidas,
and Demosthenes—nor the narrower Athenian sentiment, like the
devotion of Agesilaus to Sparta, and of Epaminondas to Thebes.
To Phokion it was indifferent whether Greece was an aggregate
of autonomous cities, with Athens as first or second among
them—or one of the satrapies under the Macedonian kings. Now
this was among the most fatal defects of a Grecian public man.
The sentiment in which Phokion was wanting, lay at the bottom
of all those splendid achievements which have given to Greece a
substantive and pre-eminent place in the history of the world.
Had Themistokles, Arsiteides, and Leonidas resembled him, Greece
would have passed quietly under the dominion of Persia, and the
brilliant, though checkered, century and more of independent
politics which succeeded the repulse of Xerxes would never have
occurred. It was precisely during the fifty years of Phokion’s
political and military influence, that the Greeks were degraded
from a state of freedom, and Athens from ascendency as well as
freedom, into absolute servitude. Insofar as this great public
misfortune can be imputed to any one man—to no one was it more
ascribable than to Phokion. He was stratêgus during most of
the long series of years when Philip’s power was growing; it
was his duty to look ahead for the safety of his countrymen,
and to combat the yet immature giant. He heard the warnings of
Demosthenes, and he possessed exactly those qualities which were
wanting to Demosthenes—military energy and aptitude. Had he lent
his influence to inform the short-sightedness, to stimulate the
inertia, to direct the armed efforts, of his countrymen, the
kings of Macedon might have been kept within their own limits,
and the future history of Greece might have been altogether
different. Unfortunately, he took the opposite side. He acted
with Æschines and the Philippizers; without receiving money
from Philip, he did gratuitously all that Philip desired— by
nullifying and sneering down the efforts of Demosthenes and the
other active politicians. After the battle of Chæroneia, Phokion
received from Philip first, and from Alexander afterwards, marks
of esteem not shown towards any other Athenian. This was both the
fruit and the proof of his past political action—anti-Hellenic
as well as anti-Athenian. Having done much, in the earlier
part of his life, to promote the subjugation of Greece under
the Macedonian kings, he contributed somewhat, during the
latter half, to lighten the severity of their dominion; and it
is the most honorable point in his character that he always
refrained from abusing their marked favor towards himself, for
purposes either of personal gain or of oppression over his
fellow-citizens. Alexander not only wrote letters to him, even
during the plenitude of imperial power, in terms of respectful
friendship, but tendered to him the largest presents—at one time
the sum of 100 talents, at another time the choice of four towns
on the coast of Asia Minor, as Xerxes gave to Themistokles. He
even expressed his displeasure when Phokion, refusing everything,
consented only to request the liberation of three Grecian
prisoners confined at Sardis.[829]

[829] Plutarch, Phokion, 18; Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 188.

The Lamian war and its consequences, were Phokion’s ruin. He
continued at Athens, throughout that war, freely declaring his
opinion against it; for it is to be remarked, that in spite of his
known macedonizing politics, the people neither banished nor degraded
him, but contented themselves with following the counsels of others.
On the disastrous termination of the war, Phokion undertook the
thankless and dishonorable function of satrap under Antipater at
Athens, with the Macedonian garrison at Munychia to back him. He
became the subordinate agent of a conqueror who not only slaughtered
the chief Athenian orators, but disfranchised and deported the Demos
in mass. Having accepted partnership and responsibility in these
proceedings, Phokion was no longer safe except under the protection
of a foreign prince. After the liberal proclamation issued in the
name of the Macedonian kings, permitting the return of the banished
Demos, he sought safety for himself, first by that treasonable
connivance which enabled Nikanor to seize the Peiræus, next by
courting Polysperchon the enemy of Nikanor. A voluntary expatriation
(along with his friend the Phalerean Demetrius) would have been less
dangerous, and less discreditable, than these manœuvres, which still
farther darkened the close of his life, without averting from him,
after all, the necessity of facing the restored Demos. The intense
and unanimous wrath of the people against him is an instructive,
though a distressing spectacle. It was directed, not against the
man or the administrator—for in both characters Phokion had been
blameless, except as to the last collusion with Nikanor in the
seizure of the Peiræus—but against his public policy. It was the last
protest of extinct Grecian freedom, speaking as it were from the
tomb in a voice of thunder, against that fatal system of mistrust,
inertia, self-seeking, and corruption, which had betrayed the once
autonomous Athens to a foreign conqueror.

I have already mentioned that Polysperchon with his army was in
Phokis when Phokion was brought before him, on his march towards
Peloponnesus. Perhaps he may have been detained by negotiation with
the Ætolians, who embraced his alliance.[830] At any rate he was
tardy in his march, for before he reached Attica, Kassander arrived
at Peiræus to join Nikanor with a fleet of thirty-five ships and 4000
soldiers obtained from Antigonus. On learning this fact, Polysperchon
hastened his march also, and presented himself under the walls of
Athens and Peiræus with a large force of 20,000 Macedonians, 4000
Greek allies, 1000 cavalry, and sixty-five elephants; animals which
were now seen for the first time in European Greece. He at first
besieged Kassander in Peiræus, but finding it difficult to procure
subsistence in Attica for so numerous an army, he marched with
the larger portion into Peloponnesus, leaving his son Alexander
with a division to make head against Kassander. Either approaching
in person the various Peloponnesian towns—or addressing them by
means of envoys—he enjoined the subversion of the Antipatrian
oligarchies, and the restoration of liberty and free speech to the
mass of the citizens.[831] In most of the towns, this revolution
was accomplished; but in Megalopolis, the oligarchy held out; not
only forcing Polysperchon to besiege the city, but even defending
it against him successfully. He made two or three attempts to storm
it, by movable towers, by undermining the walls, and even by the aid
of elephants; but he was repulsed in all of them,[832] and obliged
to relinquish the siege with considerable loss of reputation. His
admiral Kleitus was soon afterwards defeated in the Propontis, with
the loss of his whole fleet, by Nikanor (whom Kassander had sent from
Peiræus) and Antigonus.[833]

[830] Diodor. xix. 35.

[831] Diodor. xviii. 69.

[832] Diodor. xxiii. 70, 71.

[833] Diodor. xviii. 72.

After these two defeats, Polysperchon seems to have evacuated
Peloponnesus, and to have carried his forces across the Corinthian
Gulf into Epirus, to join Olympias. His party was greatly weakened
all over Greece, and that of Kassander proportionally strengthened.
The first effect of this was, the surrender of Athens. The Athenians
in the city, including all or many of the restored exiles, could
no longer endure that complete severance from the sea, to which
the occupation of Peiræus and Munychia by Kassander had reduced
them. Athens without a port was hardly tenable; in fact, Peiræus
was considered by its great constructor, Themistokles, as more
indispensable to the Athenians than Athens itself.[834] The
subsistence of the people was derived in large proportion from
imported corn, received through Peiræus; where also the trade and
industrial operations were carried on, most of the revenue collected,
and the arsenals, docks, ships, etc. of the state kept up. It became
evident that Nikanor, by seizing on the Peiræus, had rendered Athens
disarmed and helpless; so that the irreparable mischief done by
Phokion, in conniving at that seizure, was felt more and more every
day. Hence the Athenians, unable to capture the port themselves, and
hopeless of obtaining it through Polysperchon, felt constrained to
listen to the partisans of Kassander, who proposed that terms should
be made with him. It was agreed that they should become friends and
allies of Kassander; that they should have full enjoyment of their
city, with the port Peiræus, their ships and revenues; that the
exiles and deported citizens should be readmitted; that the political
franchise should for the future be enjoyed by all citizens who
possessed 1000 drachmæ of property and upwards; that Kassander should
hold Munychia with a governor and garrison, until the war against
Polysperchon was brought to a close; and that he should also name
some one Athenian citizen, in whose hands the supreme government of
the city should be vested. Kassander named Demetrius the Phalerean
(_i. e._ an Athenian of the Deme Phalerum), one of the colleagues
of Phokion; who had gone into voluntary exile since the death of
Antipater, but had recently returned.[835]

[834] Thucyd. i. 93.

[835] Diodor. xviii. 74.

This convention restored substantially at Athens the Antipatrian
government; yet without the severities which had marked its original
establishment—and with some modifications in various ways. It made
Kassander virtually master of the city (as Antipater had been before
him), by means of his governing nominee, upheld by the garrison, and
by the fortification of Munychia; which had now been greatly enlarged
and strengthened,[836] holding a practical command over Peiræus,
though that port was nominally relinquished to the Athenians.
But there was no slaughter of orators, no expulsion of citizens:
moreover, even the minimum of 1000 drachmæ, fixed for the political
franchise, though excluding the multitude, must have been felt as an
improvement compared with the higher limit of 2000 drachmæ prescribed
by Antipater. Kassander was not, like his father, at the head of an
overwhelming force, master of Greece. He had Polysperchon in the
field against him with a rival army and an established ascendency in
many of the Grecian cities; it was therefore his interest to abstain
from measures of obvious harshness towards the Athenian people.

[836] See the notice of Munychia, as it stood ten years
afterwards (Diodor. xx. 45).

Towards this end his choice of the Phalerean Demetrius appears
to have been judicious. That citizen continued to administer
Athens, as satrap or despot under Kassander, for ten years. He
was an accomplished literary man, friend both of the philosopher
Theophrastus, who had succeeded to the school of Aristotle—and of
the rhetor Deinarchus. He is described also as a person of expensive
and luxurious habits; towards which he devoted the most of the
Athenian public revenue, 1200 talents in amount, if Duris is to
be believed. His administration is said to have been discreet and
moderate. We know little of its details, but we are told that he made
sumptuary laws, especially restricting the cost and ostentation of
funerals.[837] He himself extolled his own decennial period as one
of abundance and flourishing commerce at Athens.[838] But we learn
from others, and the fact is highly probable, that it was a period
of distress and humiliation, both at Athens and in other Grecian
towns; and that Athenians, as well as others, welcomed new projects
of colonization (such as that of Ophellas from Kyrênê) not simply
from prospects of advantage, but also as an escape from existing
evils.[839]

[837] Cicero, De Legg. ii. 26, 66; Strabo, ix. p. 398; Pausanias,
i. 25, 5. τύραννόν τε Ἀθηναίοις ἔπραξε γενέσθαι Δημήτριον, etc.
Duris ap. Athenæum, xii. 542. Fragm. 27. vol. iii. p. 477. Frag.
Hist. Græc.

The Phalerean Demetrius composed, among numerous historical,
philosophical, and literary works, a narrative of his own
decennial administration (Diogenes Laert. v. 5, 9; Strabo,
ib.)—περὶ τῆς δεκαετίας.

The statement of 1200 talents, as the annual revenue handled by
Demetrius, deserves little credit.

[838] See the Fragment of Demochares, 2. Fragment. Historic.
Græc. ed. Didot, vol. ii. p. 448, ap. Polyb. xii. 13. Demochares,
nephew of the orator Demosthenes, was the political opponent of
Demetrius Phalereus, whom he reproached with these boasts about
commercial prosperity, when the liberty and dignity of the city
were overthrown. To such boasts of Demetrius Phalereus probably
belongs the statement cited from him by Strabo (iii. p. 147)
about the laborious works in the Attic mines at Laureium.

[839] Diodor. xx. 40. ὥσθ᾽ ὑπελάμβανον μὴ μόνον ἐγκρατεῖς ἔσεσθαι
πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι.

What forms of nominal democracy were kept up during this interval,
we cannot discover. The popular judicature must have been continued
for private suits and accusations, since Deinarchus is said to have
been in large practice as a logographer, or composer of discourses
for others.[840] But the fact that three hundred and sixty statues
were erected in honor of Demetrius while his administration was
still going on, demonstrates the gross flattery of his partisans,
the subjection of the people, and the practical abolition of all
free-spoken censure or pronounced opposition. We learn that, in
some one of the ten years of his administration, a census was taken
of the inhabitants of Attica; and that there were numbered, 21,000
citizens, 10,000 metics, and 400,000 slaves.[841] Of this important
enumeration we know the bare fact, without its special purpose or
even its precise date. Perhaps some of those citizens, who had
been banished or deported at the close of the Lamian war, may have
returned and continued to reside at Athens. But there still seems
to have remained, during all the continuance of the Kassandrian
Oligarchy, a body of adverse Athenian exiles, watching for an
opportunity of overthrowing it, and seeking aid for that purpose from
the Ætolians and others.[842]

[840] Dionys. Halic. Judicium de Dinarcho, p. 633, 634; Plutarch,
Demetrius, 10. λόγῳ μὲν ὀλιγαρχικῆς, ἔργῳ δὲ μοναρχικῆς,
καταστάσεως γενομένης διὰ τὴν τοῦ Φαληρέως δύναμιν, etc.

[841] Ktesikles ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 272. Mr. Fynes Clinton
(following Wesseling), supplies the defect in the text of
Athenæus, so as to assign the census to the 115th Olympiad.
This conjecture _may_ be right, yet the reasons for it are not
conclusive. The census may have been either in the 116th, or
in the 117th Olympiad; we have no means of determining which.
The administration of Phalerean Demetrius covers the ten years
between 317 and 307 B. C. (Fast. Hell. Append. p. 388).

Mr. Clinton (ad ann. 317 B. C. Fast. Hell.) observes
respecting the census—“The 21,000 Athenians express those who
had votes in the public assembly, or all the males above the age
of twenty years; the 10,000 μέτοικοι described also the males of
full age. When the women and children are computed, the total
free population will be about 127,660; and 400,000 slaves, added
to this total, will give about 527,660 for the total population
of Attica.” See also the Appendix to F. H. p. 390 _seq._

This census is a very interesting fact; but our information
respecting it is miserably scanty, and Mr. Clinton’s
interpretation of the different numbers is open to some remark.
He cannot be right, I think, in saying—“The 21,000 Athenians
express those who had votes in the assembly, _or_ all the males
above the age of twenty years.” For we are expressly told, that
under the administration of Demetrius Phalereus, all persons who
did not possess 1000 drachmæ were excluded from the political
franchise; and therefore a large number of males above the age of
twenty years would have no vote in the assembly. Since the two
categories are not coincident, then, to which shall we apply the
number 21,000? To those who had votes? Or to the total number of
free citizens, voting or not voting, above the age of twenty?
The public assembly, during the administration of Demetrius
Phalereus, appears to have been of little moment or efficacy; so
that a distinct record, of the number of persons entitled to vote
in it, is not likely to have been sought.

Then again, Mr. Clinton interprets the three numbers given, upon
two principles totally distinct. The two first numbers (citizens
and metics), he considers to designate only males of full age;
the third number, of οἰκέται, he considers to include both sexes
and all ages.

This is a conjecture which I think very doubtful, in the absence
of farther knowledge. It implies that the enumerators take
account of the _slave_ women and children—but that they take no
account of the _free_ women and children, wives and families
of the citizens and metics. The number of the free women and
children are wholly unrecorded, on Mr. Clinton’s supposition. Now
if, for the purposes of the census, it was necessary to enumerate
the _slave_ women and children—it surely would be not less
necessary to enumerate the _free_ women and children.

The word οἰκέται sometimes means, not slaves only, but the
inmates of a family generally—free as well as slave. If such be
its meaning here (which however there is not evidence enough to
affirm), we eliminate the difficulty of supposing the slave women
and children to be enumerated—and the free women and children
_not_ to be enumerated.

We should be able to reason more confidently, if we knew the
purpose for which the census had been taken—whether with a view
to military or political measures—to finance and taxation—or to
the question of subsistence and importation of foreign corn (see
Mr. Clinton’s Fast. H. ad ann. 444 B. C., about another
census taken in reference to imported corn).

[842] See Dionys. Halic. Judic. de Dinarcho, p. 658 Reisk.

The acquisition of Athens by Kassander, followed up by his capture
of Panaktum and Salamis, and seconded by his moderation towards the
Athenians, procured for him considerable support in Peloponnesus,
whither he proceeded with his army.[843] Many of the cities,
intimidated or persuaded, joined him and deserted Polysperchon;
while the Spartans, now feeling for the first time their defenceless
condition, thought it prudent to surround their city with walls.[844]
This fact, among many others contemporaneous, testifies emphatically,
how the characteristic sentiments of the Hellenic autonomous world
were now dying out everywhere. The maintenance of Sparta as an
unwalled city, was one of the deepest and most cherished of the
Lykurgean traditions; a standing proof of the fearless bearing and
self-confidence of the Spartans against dangers from without. The
erection of the walls showed their own conviction, but too well borne
out by the real circumstances around them, that the pressure of the
foreigner had become so overwhelming as hardly to leave them even
safety at home.

[843] Diodor. xviii. 75.

[844] Justin, xiv. 5; Diodor. xviii. 75; Pausan. vii. 8, 3;
Pausanias, i. 25, 5.

The warfare between Kassander and Polysperchon became now embittered
by a feud among the members of the Macedonian imperial family. King
Philip Aridæus and his wife Eurydikê, alarmed and indignant at the
restoration of Olympias which Polysperchon was projecting, solicited
aid from Kassander, and tried to place the force of Macedonia at
his disposal. In this however they failed. Olympias, assisted not
only by Polysperchon, but by the Epirotic prince Æakides, made her
entry into Macedonia out of Epirus, apparently in the autumn of 317
B. C. She brought with her Roxana and her child—the widow
and son of Alexander the Great. The Macedonian soldiers, assembled by
Philip Aridæus and Eurydikê to resist her, were so overawed by her
name and the recollection of Alexander, that they refused to fight,
and thus ensured to her an easy victory. Philip and Eurydikê became
her prisoners; the former she caused to be slain; to the latter she
offered only an option between the sword, the halter, and poison. The
old queen next proceeded to satiate her revenge against the family
of Antipater. One hundred leading Macedonians, friends of Kassander,
were put to death, together with his brother Nikanor;[845] while the
sepulchre of his deceased brother Iollas, accused of having poisoned
Alexander the Great, was broken up.

[845] Diodor. xix. 11; Justin, x. 14, 4; Pausanias, i. 11, 4.

During the winter, Olympias remained thus completely predominant in
Macedonia; where her position seemed strong, since her allies the
Ætolians were masters of the pass at Thermopylæ, while Kassander
was kept employed in Peloponnesus by the force under Alexander,
son of Polysperchon. But Kassander, disengaging himself from these
embarrassments, and eluding Thermopylæ by a maritime transit to
Thessaly, seized the Perrhæbian passes before they had been put
under guard, and entered Macedonia without resistance. Olympias,
having no army competent to meet him in the field, was forced to shut
herself up in the maritime fortress of Pydna, with Roxana, the child
Alexander, and Thessalonikê daughter of her late husband Philip son
of Amyntas.[846] Here Kassander blocked her up for several months by
sea, as well as by land, and succeeded in defeating all the efforts
of Polysperchon and Æakides to relieve her. In the spring of the
ensuing year (316 B. C.), she was forced by intolerable famine
to surrender. Kassander promised her nothing more than personal
safety, requiring from her the surrender of the two great fortresses,
Pella and Amphipolis, which made him master of Macedonia. Presently
however, the relatives of those numerous victims, who had perished by
order of Olympias, were encouraged by Kassander to demand her life in
retribution. They found little difficulty in obtaining a verdict of
condemnation against her from what was called a Macedonian assembly.
Nevertheless, such was the sentiment of awe and reverence connected
with her name, that no one except these injured men themselves could
be found to execute the sentence. She died with a courage worthy of
her rank and domineering character. Kassander took Thessalonikê to
wife—confined Roxana with the child Alexander in the fortress of
Amphipolis—where (after a certain interval) he caused both of them to
be slain.[847]

[846] Diodor. xix. 36.

[847] Diodor. xix. 50, 51; Justin, xiv. 5; Pausan. i. 25, 5; ix.
7, 1.

While Kassander was thus master of Macedonia—and while the imperial
family were disappearing from the scene in that country—the defeat
and death of Eumenes (which happened nearly at the same time as the
capture of Olympias[848]) removed the last faithful partisan of
that family in Asia. But at the same time, it left in the hands of
Antigonus such overwhelming preponderance throughout Asia, that he
aspired to become vicar and master of the entire Alexandrine empire,
as well as to avenge upon Kassander the extirpation of the regal
family. His power appeared indeed so formidable, that Kassander of
Macedonia, Lysimachus of Thrace, Ptolemy of Egypt, and Seleukus of
Babylonia, entered into a convention, which gradually ripened into an
active alliance, against him.

[848] Even immediately before the death of Olympias, Aristonous,
governor of Amphipolis in her interest, considered Eumenes to be
still alive (Diodor. xix. 50).

During the struggles between these powerful princes, Greece appears
simply as a group of subject cities, held, garrisoned, grasped at,
or coveted, by all of them. Polysperchon, abandoning all hopes in
Macedonia after the death of Olympias, had been forced to take
refuge among the Ætolians, leaving his son Alexander to make the
best struggle that he could in Peloponnesus; so that Kassander was
now decidedly preponderant throughout the Hellenic regions. After
fixing himself on the throne of Macedonia, he perpetuated his own
name by founding, on the isthmus of the peninsula of Pallênê and
near the site where Potidæa had stood, the new city of Kassandreia;
into which he congregated a large number of inhabitants from the
neighborhood, and especially the remnant of the citizens of Olynthus
and Potidæa,—towns taken and destroyed by Philip more than thirty
years before.[849] He next marched into Peloponnesus with his army
against Alexander son of Polysperchon. Passing through Bœotia,
he undertook the task of restoring the city of Thebes, which had
been destroyed twenty years previously by Alexander the Great,
and had ever since existed only as a military post on the ancient
citadel called Kadmeia. The other Bœotian towns, to whom the old
Theban territory had been assigned, were persuaded or constrained
to relinquish it; and Kassander invited from all parts of Greece
the Theban exiles or their descendants. From sympathy with these
exiles, and also with the ancient celebrity of the city, many Greeks,
even from Italy and Sicily, contributed to the restoration. The
Athenians, now administered by Demetrius Phalereus under Kassander’s
supremacy, were particularly forward in the work; the Messenians
and Megalopolitans, whose ancestors had owed so much to the Theban
Epaminondas, lent strenuous aid. Thebes was re-established in the
original area which it had occupied before Alexander’s siege; and
was held by a Kassandrian garrison in the Kadmeia, destined for the
mastery of Bœotia and Greece.[850]

[849] Diodor. xix. 52; Pausanias, v. 23, 2.

[850] Diodor. xix. 52, 54, 78; Pausan. ix. 7, 2-5. This seems an
explanation of Kassander’s proceeding, more probable than that
given by Pausanias; who tells us that Kassander hated the memory
of Alexander the Great, and wished to undo the consequences of
his acts. That he did so hate Alexander, is however extremely
credible: see Plutarch, Alexand. 74.

After some stay at Thebes, Kassander advanced toward Peloponnesus.
Alexander (son of Polysperchon) having fortified the Isthmus, he was
forced to embark his troops with his elephants at Megara, and cross
over the Saronic Gulf to Epidaurus. He dispossessed Alexander of
Argos, of Messenia, and even of his position on the Isthmus, where
he left a powerful detachment, and then returned to Macedonia.[851]
His increasing power raised both apprehension and hatred in the
bosom of Antigonus, who endeavored to come to terms with him, but in
vain.[852] Kassander preferred the alliance with Ptolemy, Seleukus,
and Lysimachus—against Antigonus, who was now master of nearly
the whole of Asia, inspiring common dread to all of them.[853]
Accordingly, from Asia to Peloponnesus, with arms and money Antigonus
despatched the Milesian Aristodemus to strengthen Alexander against
Kassander; whom he further denounced as an enemy of the Macedonian
name, because he had slain Olympias, imprisoned the other members of
the regal family, and re-established the Olynthian exiles. He caused
the absent Kassander to be condemned by what was called a Macedonian
assembly, upon these and other charges.

[851] Diodor. xix. 54.

[852] Diodor. xix. 56.

[853] Diodor. xix. 57.

Antigonus farther proclaimed, by the voice of this assembly, that all
the Greeks should be free, self-governing, and exempt from garrisons
or military occupation.[854] It was expected that these brilliant
promises would enlist partisans in Greece against Kassander;
accordingly Ptolemy ruler of Egypt, one of the enemies of Antigonus,
thought fit to issue similar proclamations a few months afterwards,
tendering to the Greeks the same boon from himself.[855] These
promises, neither executed, not intended to be executed, by either
of the kings, appear to have produced little or no effect upon the
Greeks.

[854] Diodor. xix. 61.

[855] Diodor. xix. 62.

The arrival of Aristodemus in Peloponnesus had re-animated the party
of Alexander, (son of Polysperchon), against whom Kassander was again
obliged to bring his full forces from Macedonia. Though successful
against Alexander at Argos, Orchomenus, and other places, Kassander
was not able to crush him, and presently thought it prudent to gain
him over. He offered to him the separate government of Peloponnesus,
though in subordination to himself: Alexander accepted the offer,
becoming Kassander’s ally[856]—and carried on war, jointly with him,
against Aristodemus, with varying success, until he was presently
assassinated by some private enemies. Nevertheless his widow
Kratesipolis, a woman of courage and energy, still maintained herself
in considerable force at Sikyon.[857] Kassander’s most obstinate
enemies were the Ætolians, of whom we now first hear formal mention
as a substantive confederacy.[858] These Ætolians became the allies
of Antigonus as they had been before of Polysperchon, extending
their predatory ravages even as far as Attica. Protected against
foreign garrisons, partly by their rude and fierce habits, partly by
their mountainous territory, they were almost the only Greeks who
could still be called free. Kassander tried to keep them in check
through their neighbors the Akarnanians, whom he induced to adopt a
more concentrated habit of residence, consolidating their numerous
petty townships into a few considerable towns,—Stratus, Sauria, and
Agrinium—convenient posts for Macedonian garrisons. He also made
himself master of Leukas, Apollonia, and Epidamnus, defeating the
Illyrian king Glaukias, so that his dominion now extended across from
the Thermaic to the Adriatic Gulf.[859] His general Philippus gained
two important victories over the Ætolians and Epirots, forcing the
former to relinquish some of their most accessible towns.[860]

[856] Diodor. xix. 63, 64.

[857] Diodor. xix. 62, 67.

[858] Diodor. xix. 66. Ἀριστόδημος, ~ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν~
δικαιολογησάμενος, προετρέψατο τὰ πλήθη βοηθεῖν τοῖς Ἀντιγόνου
πράγμασιν, etc.

[859] Diodor. xix. 67, 68; Justin, xv. 2. See Brandstäter,
Geschichte des Ætolischen Volkes und Bundes, p. 178 (Berlin,
1844).

[860] Diodor. xix. 74.

The power of Antigonus in Asia underwent a material diminution,
by the successful and permanent establishment which Seleukus now
acquired in Babylonia; from which event the era of the succeeding
Seleukidæ takes its origin. In Greece, however, Antigonus gained
ground on Kassander. He sent thither his nephew Ptolemy with a
large force to liberate the Greeks, or in other words, to expel
the Kassandrian garrisons; while he at the same time distracted
Kassander’s attention by threatening to cross the Hellespont and
invade Macedonia. This Ptolemy (not the Egyptian) expelled the
soldiers of Kassander from Eubœa, Bœotia, and Phokis. Chalkis in
Eubœa was at this time the chief military station of Kassander;
Thebes (which he had recently re-established) was in alliance with
him; but the remaining Bœotian towns were hostile to him. Ptolemy,
having taken Chalkis—the citizens of which he conciliated by
leaving them without any garrison—together with Oropus, Eretria,
and Karystus—entered Attica and presented himself before Athens. So
much disposition to treat with him was manifested in the city, that
Demetrius the Phalerean was obliged to gain time by pretending to
open negotiations with Antigonus, while Ptolemy withdrew from Attica.
Nearly at the same epoch, Apollonia, Epidamnus, and Leukas, found
means, assisted by an armament from Korkyra, to drive out Kassander’s
garrisons, and to escape from his dominion.[861] The affairs of
Antigonus were now prospering in Greece, but they were much thrown
back by the discontent and treachery of his admiral Telesphorus,
who seized Elis and even plundered the sacred treasures of Olympia.
Ptolemy presently put him down, and restored these treasures to the
god.[862]

[861] Diodor. xix. 77, 78, 89.

[862] Diodor. xix. 87.

In the ensuing year, a convention was concluded between Antigonus,
on one side—and Kassander, Ptolemy (the Egyptian) and Lysimachus, on
the other, whereby the supreme command in Macedonia was guaranteed
to Kassander, until the maturity of Alexander son of Roxana; Thrace
being at the same time assured to Lysimachus, Egypt to Ptolemy, and
the whole of Asia to Antigonus. It was at the same time covenanted
by all, that the Hellenic cities should be free.[863] Towards the
execution of this last clause, however, nothing was actually done.
Nor does it appear that the treaty had any other effect, except to
inspire Kassander with increased jealousy about Roxana and her child;
both of whom (as has been already stated) he caused to be secretly
assassinated soon afterwards, by the governor Glaukias, in the
fortress of Amphipolis, where they had been confined.[864] The forces
of Antigonus, under his general Ptolemy, still remained in Greece.
But this general presently (310 B. C.) revolted from Antigonus, and
placed them in co-operation with Kassander; while Ptolemy of Egypt,
accusing Antigonus of having contravened the treaty by garrisoning
various Grecian cities, renewed the war and the triple alliance
against him.[865]

[863] Diodor. xix. 105.

[864] Diodor. xix. 105.

[865] Diodor. xx. 19.

Polysperchon,—who had hitherto maintained a local dominion over
various parts of Peloponnesus, with a military force distributed
in Messênê and other towns[866]—was now encouraged by Antigonus to
espouse the cause of Herakles (son of Alexander by Barsinê), and to
place him on the throne of Macedonia in opposition to Kassander.
This young prince Herakles, now seventeen years of age, was sent
to Greece from Pergamus in Asia, and his pretensions to the throne
were assisted not only by a considerable party in Macedonia itself,
but also by the Ætolians. Polysperchon invaded Macedonia, with
favorable prospects of establishing the young prince; yet he thought
it advantageous to accept treacherous propositions from Kassander,
who offered to him partnership in the sovereignty of Macedonia, with
an independent army and dominion in Peloponnesus. Polysperchon,
tempted by these offers, assassinated the young prince Herakles,
and withdrew his army towards Peloponnesus. But he found such
unexpected opposition, in his march through Bœotia, from Bœotians and
Peloponnesians, that he was forced to take up his winter quarters
in Lokris[867] (309 B. C.). From this time forward, as far
as we can make out, he commanded in Southern Greece as subordinate
ally or partner of Kassander;[868] whose Macedonian dominion, thus
confirmed, seems to have included Akarnania and Amphilochia on the
Ambrakian Gulf, together with the town of Ambrakia itself, and a
supremacy over many of the Epirots.

[866] Messênê was garrisoned by Polysperchon (Diodor. xix. 64).

[867] Diodor. xx. 28; Trogus Pompeius—Proleg. ad Justin. xv.
Justin. xv. 2.

[868] Diodor. xx. 100-103; Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 6. King Pyrrhus
was of προγόνων ἀεὶ δεδουλευκότων Μακεδόσι—at least this was the
reproach of Lysimachus (Plutarch, Phyrrhus, 12).

The assassination of Herakles was speedily followed by that of
Kleopatra, sister of Alexander the Great, and daughter of Philip
and Olympias. She had been for some time at Sardis, nominally at
liberty, yet under watch by the governor, who received his orders
from Antigonus; she was now preparing to quit that place, for the
purpose of joining Ptolemy in Egypt, and of becoming his wife. She
had been invoked as auxiliary, or courted in marriage, by several
of the great Macedonian chiefs, without any result. Now, however,
Antigonus, afraid of the influence which her name might throw into
the scale of his rival Ptolemy, caused her to be secretly murdered
as she was preparing for her departure; throwing the blame of the
deed on some of her women, whom he punished with death.[869] All
the relatives of Alexander the Great (except Thessalonikê wife
of Kassander, daughter of Philip by a Thessalian mistress) thus
successively perished, and all by the orders of one or other among
his principal officers. The imperial family, with the prestige of its
name, thus came to an end.

[869] Diodor. xx. 37 compare Justin, xiii. 6; xiv. 1.

Ptolemy of Egypt now set sail for Greece with a powerful armament. He
acquired possession of the important cities—Sikyon and Corinth—which
were handed over to him by Kratesipolis, widow of Alexander son of
Polysperchon. He then made known by proclamation his purpose as a
liberator, inviting aid from the Peloponnesian cities themselves
against the garrisons of Kassander. From some he received encouraging
answers and promises; but none of them made any movement, or seconded
him by armed demonstrations. He thought it prudent therefore to
conclude a truce with Kassander and retire from Greece, leaving
however secure garrisons in Sikyon and Corinth.[870] The Grecian
cities had now become tame and passive. Feeling their own incapacity
of self-defence, and averse to auxiliary efforts, which brought upon
them enmity without any prospect of advantage—they awaited only the
turns of foreign interference and the behests of the potentates
around them.

[870] Diodor. xx. 37.

The Grecian ascendency of Kassander, however, was in the following
year exposed to a graver shock than it had ever yet encountered—by
the sudden invasion of Demetrius called Poliorketes, son of
Antigonus. This young prince, sailing from Ephesus with a formidable
armament, contrived to conceal his purposes so closely, that he
actually entered the harbor of Peiræus (on the 26th of the month
Thargelion—May) without expectation, or resistance from any one;
his fleet being mistaken for the fleet of the Egyptian Ptolemy. The
Phalerean Demetrius, taken unawares, and attempting too late to guard
the harbor, found himself compelled to leave it in possession of the
enemy, and to retire within the walls of Athens; while Dionysius,
the Kassandrian governor, maintained himself with his garrison
in Munychia, yet without any army competent to meet the invaders
in the field. This accomplished Phalerean, who had administered
for ten years as the viceroy and with the force of Kassander, now
felt his position and influence at Athens overthrown, and even his
personal safety endangered. He with other Athenians went as envoys
on the ensuing day to ascertain what terms would be granted. The
young prince ostentatiously proclaimed, that it was the intention
of his father Antigonus and himself to restore and guarantee to the
Athenians unqualified freedom and autonomy. Hence the Phalerean
Demetrius foresaw that his internal opponents, condemned as they
had been to compulsory silence during the last ten years, would now
proclaim themselves with irresistible violence, so that there was no
safety for him except in retreat. He accordingly asked and obtained
permission from the invader to retire to Thebes, from whence he
passed over soon after to Ptolemy in Egypt. The Athenians in the city
declared in favor of Demetrius Poliorketes; who however refused to
enter the walls until he should have besieged and captured Munychia,
as well as Megara, with their Kassandrian garrisons. In a short
time he accomplished both these objects. Indeed energy, skill, and
effective use of engines, in besieging fortified places, were among
the most conspicuous features in his character; procuring for him the
surname whereby he is known to history. He proclaimed the Megarians
free, levelling to the ground the fortifications of Munychia, as an
earnest to the Athenians that they should be relieved for the future
from all foreign garrison.[871]

[871] Philochor. Fragm. 144, ed. Didot; Diodor. xx. 45, 46;
Plutarch, Demetrius, 8, 9. The occupation of Peiræus by Demetrius
Poliorketes is related somewhat differently by Polyænus, iv. 7,
6.

After these successes, Demetrius Poliorketes made his triumphant
entry into Athens. He announced to the people, in formal assembly,
that they were now again a free democracy, liberated from all
dominion either of soldiers from abroad or oligarchs at home. He
also promised them a farther boon from his father Antigonus and
himself—150,000 medimni of corn for distribution, and ship-timber
in quantity sufficient for constructing 100 triremes. Both these
announcements were received with grateful exultation. The feelings
of the people were testified not merely in votes of thanks and
admiration towards the young conqueror, but in effusions of
unmeasured and exorbitant flattery. Stratokles (who has already been
before us as one of the accusers of Demosthenes in the Harpalian
affair) with others exhausted their invention in devising new
varieties of compliment and adulation. Antigonus and Demetrius
were proclaimed to be not only kings, but gods and saviors: a high
priest of these saviors was to be annually chosen, after whom each
successive year was to be named (instead of being named after the
first of the nine Archons, as had hitherto been the custom), and the
dates of decrees and contracts commemorated; the month Munychion was
re-named as Demetrion—two new tribes, to be called Antigonis and
Demetrias, were constituted in addition to the preceding ten:—the
annual senate was appointed to consist of 600 members instead of
500; the portraits and exploits of Antigonus and Demetrius were to
be woven, along with those of Zeus and Athênê, into the splendid and
voluminous robe periodically carried in procession, as an offering
at the Panathenaic festival; the spot of ground where Demetrius had
alighted from his chariot, was consecrated with an altar erected in
honor of Demetrius Katæbates or the Descender. Several other similar
votes were passed, recognizing, and worshipping as gods, the saviors
Antigonus and Demetrius. Nay, we are told that temples or altars
were voted to Phila-Aphroditê, in honor of Phila wife of Demetrius;
and a like compliment was paid to his two mistresses, Leæna and
Lamia. Altars are said to have been also dedicated to Adeimantus and
others, his convivial companions or flatterers.[872] At the same
time the numerous statues which had been erected in honor of the
Phalerean Demetrius during his decennial government, were overthrown,
and some of them even turned to ignoble purposes, in order to cast
greater scorn upon the past ruler.[873] The demonstrations of
servile flattery at Athens, towards Demetrius Poliorketes, were in
fact so extravagantly overdone, that he himself is said to have
been disgusted with them, and to have expressed contempt for these
degenerate Athenians of his own time.[874]

[872] Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 47; Demochares ap.
Athenæum, vi. p. 253.

[873] Diogen. Laert. v, 77. Among the numerous literary works
(all lost) of the Phalerean Demetrius, one was entitled Ἀθηναίων
καταδρομή (ib. v. 82).

[874] Demochares ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 253.

In reviewing such degrading proceedings, we must recollect that
thirty-one years had now elapsed since the battle of Chæroneia,
and that during all this time the Athenians had been under the
practical ascendancy, and constantly augmenting pressure, of foreign
potentates. The sentiment of this dependence on Macedonia had been
continually strengthened by all the subsequent events—by the capture
and destruction of Thebes, and the subsequent overwhelming conquests
of Alexander—by the deplorable conclusion of the Lamian war, the
slaughter of the free-spoken orators, the death of the energetic
military leaders, and the deportation of Athenian citizens—lastly,
by the continued presence of a Macedonian garrison in Peiræus or
Munychia. By Phokion, Demetrius Phalereus, and the other leading
statesmen of this long period, submission to Macedonia had been
inculcated as a virtue, while the recollection of the dignity and
grandeur of old autonomous Athens had been effaced or denounced as
a mischievous dream. The fifteen years between the close of the
Lamian war and the arrival of Demetrius Poliorketes (322-307 B.
C.), had witnessed no free play, nor public discussion and
expression, of conflicting opinions; the short period during which
Phokion was condemned must be excepted, but that lasted only long
enough to give room for the outburst of a preconceived but suppressed
antipathy.

During this thirty years, of which the last half had been an
aggravation of the first, a new generation of Athenians had grown
up, accustomed to an altered phase of political existence. How
few of those who received Demetrius Poliorketes, had taken part in
the battle of Chæroneia, or listened to the stirring exhortations
of Demosthenes in the war which preceded that disaster![875] Of
the citizens who yet retained courage and patriotism to struggle
again for their freedom after the death of Alexander, how many must
have perished with Leosthenes in the Lamian war! The Athenians of
307 B. C. had come to conceive their own city, and Hellas
generally, as dependent first on Kassander, next on the possible
intervention of his equally overweening rivals, Ptolemy, Antigonus,
Lysimachus, etc. If they shook off the yoke of one potentate, it
could only be by the protectorate of another. The sentiment of
political self-reliance and autonomy had fled; the conception of a
citizen military force, furnished by confederate and co-operating
cities, had been superseded by the spectacle of vast standing armies,
organized by the heirs of Alexander and of his traditions.

[875] Tacitus, Annal. i. 3. “Juniores post Actiacam victoriam,
seniores plerique inter bella civium nati: quotusquisque
reliquus, qui rempublicam vidisset?”

Two centuries before (510 B. C.), when the Lacedæmonians
expelled the despot Hippias and his mercenaries from Athens, there
sprang up at once among the Athenian people a forward and devoted
patriotism, which made them willing to brave, and competent to avert,
all dangers in defence of their newly-acquired liberty.[876] At that
time, the enemies by whom they were threatened were Lacedæmonians,
Thebans, Æginetans, Chalkidians, and the like (for the Persian force
did not present itself until after some interval, and attacked not
Athens alone, but Greece collectively). These hostile forces, though
superior in number and apparent value to those of Athens, were yet
not so disproportionate as to engender hopelessness and despair.
Very different were the facts in 307 B. C., when Demetrius
Poliorketes removed the Kassandrian mercenaries with their fortress
Munychia, and proclaimed Athens free. To maintain that freedom by
their own strength—in opposition to the evident superiority of
organized force residing in the potentates around, one or more
of whom had nearly all Greece under military occupation,—was an
enterprise too hopeless to have been attempted even by men such as
the combatants of Marathon or the contemporaries of Perikles. “Who
would be free, themselves must strike the blow!” but the Athenians
had not force enough to strike it; and the liberty proclaimed by
Demetrius Poliorketes was a boon dependent upon him for its extent
and even for its continuance. The Athenian assembly of that day was
held under his army as masters of Attica, as it had been held a few
months before under the controlling force of the Phalerean Demetrius
together with the Kassandrian governor of Munychia; and the most
fulsome votes of adulation proposed in honor of Demetrius Poliorketes
by his partisans, though perhaps disapproved by many, would hardly
find a single pronounced opponent.

[876] Herodotus, v. 78.

One man, however, there was, who ventured to oppose several of
the votes—the nephew of Demosthenes—Demochares; who deserves to
be commemorated as the last known spokesman of free Athenian
citizenship. We know only that such were his general politics, and
that his opposition to the obsequious rhetor Stratokles ended in
banishment, four years afterwards.[877] He appears to have discharged
the functions of general during this period—to have been active
in strengthening the fortifications and military equipment of the
city—and to have been employed in occasional missions.[878]

[877] Plutarch, Demetr. 24.

[878] Polybius, xii. 13; Decretum apud Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt.
p. 851.

The altered politics of Athens were manifested by impeachment
against Demetrius Phalereus and other leading partisans of the
late Kassandrian government. He and many others had already gone
into voluntary exile; when their trials came on, they were not
forthcoming, and all were condemned to death. But all those who
remained, and presented themselves for trial, were acquitted;[879]
so little was there of reactionary violence on this occasion.
Stratokles also proposed a decree, commemorating the orator Lykurgus
(who had been dead about seventeen years) by a statue, an honorary
inscription, and a grant of maintenance in the Prytaneum to his
eldest surviving descendant.[880] Among those who accompanied
the Phalerean Demetrius into exile was the rhetor or logographer
Deinarchus.

[879] Philochori Fragm. 144, ed. Didot, ap. Dionys. Hal. p. 636.

[880] Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 842-852. Lykurgus at his death
(about 324 B. C.) left three sons, who are said, shortly
after his death, to have been prosecuted by Menesæchmus, and
put in prison (“handed over to the Eleven”). But Thrasykles,
supported by Demokles, stood forward on their behalf; and
Demosthenes, then in banishment at Trœzen, wrote emphatic
remonstrances to the Athenians against such unworthy treatment of
the sons of a distinguished patriot. Accordingly the Athenians
soon repented and released them.

This is what we find stated in Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 842.
The third of the so-called Demosthenic Epistles purports to be
the letter written on this subject by Demosthenes.

The harsh treatment of the sons of Lykurgus (whatever it may have
amounted to, and whatever may have been its ground) certainly did
not last long; for in the next page of the very same Plutarchian
life (p. 843), an account is given of the family of Lykurgus,
which was ancient and sacerdotal; and it is there stated that his
sons after his death fully sustained the dignified position of
the family.

On what ground they were accused, we cannot make out. According
to the Demosthenic epistle (which epistles I have before stated
that I do not believe to be authentic), it was upon some
allegation, which, if valid at all, ought to have been urged
against Lykurgus himself during his life (p. 1477, 1478); but
Lykurgus had been always honorably acquitted, and always held
thoroughly estimable, up to the day of his death (p. 1475).

The friendship of this obnoxious Phalerean, and of Kassander also,
towards the philosopher Theophrastus, seems to have been one main
cause which occasioned the enactment of a restrictive law against
the liberty of philosophizing. It was decreed, on the proposition of
a citizen named Sophokles, that no philosopher should be allowed to
open a school or teach, except under special sanction obtained from a
vote of the Senate and people. Such was the disgust and apprehension
occasioned by the new restriction, that all the philosophers with
one accord left Athens. This spirited protest, against authoritative
restriction on the liberty of philosophy and teaching, found
responsive sympathy among the Athenians. The celebrity of the schools
and professors was in fact the only characteristic mark of dignity
still remaining to them—when their power had become extinct, and
when even their independence and free constitution had degenerated
into a mere name. It was moreover the great temptation for young
men, coming from all parts of Greece, to visit Athens. Accordingly,
a year had hardly passed, when Philon, impeaching Sophokles the
author of the law, under the Graphê Paranomôn, prevailed on the
Dikastery to find him guilty, and condemn him to a fine of five
talents. The restrictive law being thus repealed, the philosophers
returned.[881] It is remarkable that Demochares stood forward as one
of its advocates; defending Sophokles against the accuser Philon.
From scanty notices remaining of the speech of Demochares, we gather
that, while censuring the opinions no less than the characters of
Plato and Aristotle, he denounced yet more bitterly their pupils, as
being for the most part ambitious, violent, and treacherous men. He
cited by name several among them, who had subverted the freedom of
their respective cities, and committed gross outrages against their
fellow-citizens.[882]

[881] Diogen. Laert. v. 38. It is probably to this return of the
philosophers that the φυγάδων κάθοδος mentioned by Philochorus,
as foreshadowed by the omen in the Acropolis, alludes
(Philochorus, Frag. 145, ed. Didot, ap Dionys. Hal. p. 637).

[882] See the few fragments of Demochares collected in Fragmenta
Historicorum Græcorum, ed. Didot, vol. ii. p. 445, with the notes
of Carl Müller.

See likewise Athenæus, xiii. 610, with the fragment from the
comic writer Alexis. It is there stated that Lysimachus also,
king of Thrace, had banished the philosophers from his dominions.

Demochares might find (besides the persons named in Athenæ. v.
21, xi. 508) other authentic examples of pupils of Plato and
Isokrates who had been atrocious and sanguinary tyrants in their
native cities—see the case of Klearchus of Herakleia, Memnon ap.
Photium, Cod. 224. cap. 1. Chion and Leonides, the two young
citizens who slew Klearchus, and who perished in endeavoring to
liberate their country—were also pupils of Plato (Justin, xvi.
5). In fact, aspiring youths, of all varieties of purpose, were
likely to seek this mode of improvement. (Alexander the Great,
too, the very impersonation of subduing force, had been the pupil
of Aristotle).

Athenian envoys were despatched to Antigonus in Asia, to testify the
gratitude of the people, and communicate the recent complimentary
votes. Antigonus not only received them graciously, but sent to
Athens, according to the promise made by his son, a large present of
150,000 medimni of wheat, with timber sufficient for 100 ships. He
at the same time directed Demetrius to convene at Athens a synod of
deputies from the allied Grecian cities, where resolutions might be
taken for the common interests of Greece.[883] It was his interest
at this moment to raise up a temporary self-sustaining authority
in Greece, for the purpose of upholding the alliance with himself,
during the absence of Demetrius; whom he was compelled to summon into
Asia with his army—requiring his services for the war against Ptolemy
in Syria and Cyprus.

[883] Diodor. xx. 46.

The following three years were spent by Demetrius—1. In victorious
operations near Cyprus, defeating Ptolemy and making himself master
of that island; after which Antigonus and Demetrius assumed the
title of kings, and the example was followed by Ptolemy, in Egypt—by
Lysimachus, in Thrace—and by Seleukus in Babylonia, Mesopotamia,
and Syria[884]—thus abolishing even the titular remembrance of
Alexander’s family. 2. In an unsuccessful invasion of Egypt by land
and sea, repulsed with great loss. 3. In the siege of Rhodes. The
brave and intelligent citizens of this island resisted for more
than a year the most strenuous attacks and the most formidable
siege-equipments of Demetrius Poliorketes. All their efforts
however would have been vain had they not been assisted by large
reinforcements and supplies from Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Kassander.
Such are the conditions under which alone even the most resolute
and intelligent Greeks can now retain their circumscribed sphere of
autonomy. The siege was at length terminated by a compromise; the
Rhodians submitted to enrol themselves as allies of Demetrius, yet
under proviso not to act against Ptolemy.[885] Towards the latter
they carried their grateful devotion so far, as to erect a temple to
him, called the Ptolemæum, and to worship him (under the sanction
of the oracle of Ammon) as a god.[886] Amidst the rocks and shoals
through which Grecian cities were now condemned to steer, menaced on
every side by kings more powerful than themselves, and afterwards by
the giant-republic of Rome—the Rhodians conducted their political
affairs with greater prudence and dignity than any other Grecian city.

[884] Diodor. xx. 53; Plutarch, Demetr. 18.

[885] Diodor. xx. 99. Probably this proviso extended also to
Lysimachus and Kassander (both of whom had assisted Rhodes) as
well as to Ptolemy—though Diodorus does not expressly say so.

[886] Diodor. xx. 100.

Shortly after the departure of Demetrius from Greece to Cyprus,
Kassander and Polysperchon renewed the war in Peloponnesus and its
neighborhood.[887] We make out no particulars respecting this war.
The Ætolians were in hostility with Athens, and committed annoying
depredations.[888] The fleet of Athens, repaired or increased by
the timber received from Antigonus, was made to furnish thirty
quadriremes to assist Demetrius in Cyprus, and was employed in
certain operations near the island of Amorgos, wherein it suffered
defeat.[889] But we can discover little respecting the course of the
war, except that Kassander gained ground upon the Athenians, and
that about the beginning of 303 B. C., he was blockading
or threatening to blockade, Athens. The Athenians invoked the
aid of Demetrius Poliorketes, who, having recently concluded an
accommodation with the Rhodians, came again across from Asia, with
a powerful fleet and army, to Aulis in Bœotia.[890] He was received
at Athens with demonstrations of honor equal or superior to those
which had marked his previous visit. He seems to have passed a year
and a half, partly at Athens, partly in military operations carried
successfully over many parts of Greece. He compelled the Bœotians
to evacuate the Eubœan city of Chalkis, and to relinquish their
alliance with Kassander. He drove that prince out of Attica—expelled
his garrisons from the two frontier fortresses of Attica,—Phylê
and Panaktum—and pursued him as far as Thermopylæ. He captured, or
obtained by bribing the garrisons, the important towns of Corinth,
Argos, and Sikyon; mastering also Ægium, Bura, all the Arcadian towns
(except Mantineia), and various other towns in Peloponnesus.[891] He
celebrated, as president, the great festival of the Heræa at Argos;
on which occasion he married Deidameia, sister of Pyrrhus, the young
king of Epirus. He prevailed on the Sikyonians to transfer to a
short distance the site of their city, conferring upon the new city
the name of Demetrias.[892] At a Grecian synod, convened in Corinth
under his own letters of invitation, he received by acclamation
the appointment of leader or Emperor of the Greeks, as it had been
conferred on Philip and Alexander. He even extended his attacks
as far as Leukas and Korkyra. The greater part of Greece seems to
have been either occupied by his garrisons, or enlisted among his
subordinates.

[887] Diodor. xx. 100.

[888] That the Ætolians were just now most vexatious enemies to
Athens, may be seen by the Ithyphallic ode addressed to Demetrius
Poliorketes (Athenæus, vi. p. 253).

[889] Diodor. xx. 50; Plutarch, Demetr. 11. In reference to this
defeat near Amorgos, Stratokles (the complaisant orator who
moved the votes of flattery towards Demetrius and Antigonus) is
said to have announced it first as a victory, to the great joy
of the people. Presently evidences of the defeat arrived, and
the people were angry with Stratokles. “What harm has happened
to you? (replied he)—have you not had two days of pleasure and
satisfaction?” This is at any rate a very good story.

[890] Diodor. xx. 100; Plutarch, Demetr. 23.

[891] Diodor. xx. 102, 103; Plutarch, Demetr. 23-25.

[892] Diodor. xx. 102; Plutarch, Demetr. 25; Pausanias, ii. 7, 1.
The city was withdrawn partially from the sea, and approximated
closely to the acropolis. The new city remained permanently: but
the new name Demetrias gave place to the old name Sikyon.

So much was Kassander intimidated by these successes, that he sent
envoys to Asia, soliciting peace from Antigonus; who, however,
elate and full of arrogance, refused to listen to any terms short
of surrender at discretion. Kassander, thus driven to despair,
renewed his applications to Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleukus. All
these princes felt equally menaced by the power and dispositions of
Antigonus—and all resolved upon an energetic combination to put him
down.[893]

[893] Diodor. xx. 106

After uninterrupted prosperity in Greece, throughout the summer
of 302 B. C., Demetrius returned from Leukas to Athens,
about the month of September, near the time of the Eleusinian
mysteries.[894] He was welcomed by festive processions,
hymns, pæans, choric dances, and bacchanalian odes of joyous
congratulation. One of these hymns is preserved, sung by a
chorus of Ithyphalli—masked revellers, with their heads and arms
encircled by wreaths,—clothed in white tunics, and in feminine
garments reaching almost to the feet.[895]

[894] That he returned from Leukas about the time of these
mysteries, is attested both by Demochares and by the Ithyphallic
ode in Athenæus, vi. p. 253. See also Duris ap. Athenæ, xii. p.
535.

[895] Semus ap. Athenæum, xiv. p. 622.

This song is curious, as indicating the hopes and fears prevalent
among Athenians of that day, and as affording a measure of their
self-appreciation. It is moreover among the latest Grecian documents
that we possess, bearing on actual and present reality. The poet,
addressing Demetrius as a god, boasts that two of the greatest
and best-beloved of all divine beings are visiting Attica at the
same moment—Demeter (coming for the season of her mysteries), and
Demetrius, son of Poseidon and Aphroditê. “To thee we pray (the hymn
proceeds); for other gods are either afar off—or have no ears—or do
not exist—or care nothing about us; but _thee_ we see before us,
not in wood or marble, but in real presence. First of all things,
establish peace; for thou hast the power—and chastise that Sphinx who
domineers, not merely over Thebes, but over all Greece—the Ætolian,
who, (like the old Sphinx) rushes from his station on the rock to
snatch and carry away our persons, and against whom we cannot fight.
At all times, the Ætolians robbed their neighbors; but now, they rob
far as well as near.[896]”

[896] Athenæus, vi. p. 253.

Ἄλλοι μὲν ἢ μακρὰν γὰρ ἀπέχουσιν θεοὶ,
ἢ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὦτα,
ἢ οὐκ εἰσὶν, ἢ οὐ προσέχουσιν ἡμῖν οὐδὲ ἕν·
σὲ δὲ παρόνθ᾽ ὁρῶμεν,
οὐ ξύλινον, οὐδὲ λίθινον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀληθινόν.
Εὐχόμεσθα δὴ σοί·
πρῶτον μὲν εἰρήνην ποιῆσον, φίλτατε,
κύριος γὰρ εἶ σύ.
Τὴν δ᾽ οὐχὶ Θηβῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος,
Σφίγγα περικρατοῦσαν,
Αἰτωλὸς ὅστις ἐπὶ πέτρας καθήμενος,
ὥσπερ ἡ παλαιὰ,
τὰ σώμαθ᾽ ἡμῶν πάντ᾽ ἀναρπάσας φέρει,
~κοὐκ ἔχω μάχεσθαι~·
Αἰτωλικὸν γὰρ ἁρπάσαι τὰ τῶν πέλας,
νυνὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ πόῤῥω—
μάλιστα μὲν δὴ κόλασον αὐτὸς· εἰ δὲ μὴ,
Οἰδίπουν τιν᾽ εὗρε,
τὴν Σφίγγα ταύτην ὅστις ἢ κατακρημνιεῖ,
ἢ σπίνον ποιήσει.

Effusions such as these, while displaying unmeasured idolatry and
subservience towards Demetrius, are yet more remarkable, as betraying
a loss of force, a senility, and a consciousness of defenceless
and degraded position, such as we are astonished to find publicly
proclaimed at Athens. It is not only against the foreign potentates
that the Athenians avow themselves incapable of self-defence, but
even against the incursions of the Ætolians.—Greeks like themselves,
though warlike, rude, and restless.[897] When such were the feelings
of a people, once the most daring, confident, and organizing—and
still the most intelligent—in Greece, we may see that the history of
the Greeks as a separate nation or race is reaching its close—and
that from henceforward they must become merged in one or other of the
stronger currents that surround them.

[897] Compare Pausanias, vii. 7, 4.

After his past successes, Demetrius passed some months in enjoyment
and luxury at Athens. He was lodged in the Parthenon, being
considered as the guest of the goddess Athênê. But his dissolute
habits provoked the louder comments, from being indulged in such a
domicile; while the violences which he offered to beautiful youths
of good family led to various scenes truly tragical. The subservient
manifestations of the Athenians towards him, however, continued
unabated. It is even affirmed, that, in order to compensate for
something which he had taken amiss, they passed a formal decree,
on the proposition of Stratokles, declaring that every thing which
Demetrius might command was holy in regard to the gods, and just in
regard to men.[898] The banishment of Demochares is said to have
been brought on by his sarcastic comments upon this decree.[899]
In the month Munychion (April) Demetrius mustered his forces and
his Grecian allies for a march into Thessaly against Kassander;
but before his departure, he was anxious to be initiated in the
Eleusinian mysteries. It was however not the regular time for
this ceremony; the Lesser Mysteries being celebrated in February,
the Greater in September. The Athenians overruled the difficulty
by passing a special vote, enabling him to be initiated at once,
and to receive in immediate succession, the preparatory and the
final initiation, between which ceremonies a year of interval was
habitually required. Accordingly, he placed himself disarmed in the
hands of the priests, and received both first and second initiation
in the month of April, immediately before his departure from
Athens.[900]

[898] Plutarch, Demetr. 24.

[899] Such is the statement of Plutarch (Demetr. 24); but it
seems not in harmony with the recital of the honorary decree,
passed in 272 B. C., after the death of Demochares,
commemorating his merits by a statue, etc. (Plutarch, Vit. X.
Oratt. p. 850). It is there recited that Demochares rendered
services to Athens (fortifying and arming the city, concluding
peace and alliance with the Bœotians, etc.) ἐπὶ τοῦ τετραετοῦς
πολέμου, ἀνθ᾽ ὧν ἐξέπεσεν ὑπὸ τῶν καταλυσάντων τὸν δῆμον. Οἱ
καταλύσαντες τὸν δῆμον cannot mean either Demetrius Poliorketes,
or Stratokles. Moreover, we cannot determine when the “four
years’ war”, or the alliance with the Bœotians, occurred. Neither
the discussion of Mr. Clinton (Fast. H. 302 B. C., and
Append. p. 380), nor the different hypothesis of Droysen, are
satisfactory on this point—see Carl Müller’s discussion on the
fragments of Demochares, Fragm. Hist. Gr. v. ii. p. 446.

[900] Diodor. xx. 110. παραδοὺς οὖν αὑτὸν ἄνοπλον τοῖς ἱερεῦσι,
καὶ πρὸ τῆς ὡρισμένης ἡμέρας μυηθεὶς, ἀνέζευξεν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν.

The account of this transaction in the text is taken from
Diodorus, and is a simple one; a vote was passed granting special
license to Demetrius, to receive the mysteries at once, though it
was not the appointed season.

Plutarch (Demetr. 26) superadds other circumstances, several of
which have the appearance of jest rather than reality. Pythodôrus
the Daduch or Torch-bearer of the Mysteries stood alone in his
protest against any celebration of the ceremony out of time:
this is doubtless very credible. Then (according to Plutarch)
the Athenians passed decrees, on the proposition of Stratokles,
that the month Munychion should be called Anthesterion. This
having been done, the Lesser Mysteries were celebrated, in which
Demetrius was initiated. Next, the Athenians passed another
decree, to the effect, that the month Munychion should be called
Boêdromion—after which, the Greater Mysteries (which belonged to
the latter month) were forthwith celebrated. The comic writer
Philippides said of Stratokles, that he had compressed the whole
year into a single month.

This statement of Plutarch has very much the air of a caricature,
by Philippides or some other witty man, of the simple decree
mentioned by Diodorus—a special license to Demetrius to be
initiated out of season. Compare another passage of Philippides
against Stratokles (Plutarch, Demetr. 12).

Demetrius conducted into Thessaly an army of 56,000 men; of whom
25,000 were Grecian allies—so extensive was his sway at this moment
over the Grecian cities.[901] But after two or three months of
hostilities, partially successful, against Kassander, he was summoned
into Asia by Antigonus to assist in meeting the formidable army
of the allies—Ptolemy, Seleukus, Lysimachus, and Kassander. Before
retiring from Greece, Demetrius concluded a truce with Kassander,
whereby it was stipulated that the Grecian cities, both in Europe
and Asia, should be permanently autonomous and free from garrison or
control. This stipulation served only as an honorable pretext for
leaving Greece; Demetrius had little expectation that it would be
observed.[902] In the ensuing spring was fought the decisive battle
of Ipsus in Phrygia (B. C. 300), by Antigonus and Demetrius,
against Ptolemy, Seleukus, and Lysimachus; with a large army and
many elephants on both sides. Antigonus was completely defeated and
slain, at the age of more than eighty years. His Asiatic dominion was
broken up, chiefly to the profit of Seleukus, whose dynasty became
from henceforward ascendent, from the coast of Syria eastward to the
Caspian Gates and Parthia; sometimes, though imperfectly, farther
eastward, nearly to the Indus.[903]

[901] Diodor. xx. 110.

[902] Diodor. xx. 111. It must have been probably during this
campaign that Demetrius began or projected the foundation of
the important city of Demetrias on the Gulf of Magnesia, which
afterwards became one of the great strongholds of the Macedonian
ascendency in Greece (Strabo, ix. p. 436-443, in which latter
passage, the reference to Hieronymus of Kardia seems to prove
that that historian gave a full description of Demetrias and its
foundation). See about Demetrias, Mannert, Geogr. v. Griech. vii.
p. 591.

[903] Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hell. B. C. 301) places
the battle of Ipsus in August 301 B. C.; which appears
to me some months earlier than the reality. It is clear from
Diodorus, (and indeed from Mr. Clinton’s own admission) that
winter-quarters in Asia intervened between the departure of
Demetrius from Athens in or soon after April 301 B. C.,
and the battle of Ipsus. Moreover Demetrius, immediately after
leaving Athens, carried on many operations against Kassander in
Thessaly, before crossing over to Asia to join Antigonus (Diodor.
xx. 110, 111).

The effects of the battle of Ipsus were speedily felt in Greece.
The Athenians passed a decree proclaiming themselves neutral, and
excluding both the belligerent parties from Attica. Demetrius,
retiring with the remnant of his defeated army, and embarking at
Ephesus to sail to Athens, was met on the voyage by Athenian envoys,
who respectfully acquainted him that he would not be admitted. At
the same time, his wife Deidameia, whom he had left at Athens, was
sent away by the Athenians under an honorable escort to Megara, while
some ships of war which he had left in the Peiræus were also restored
to him. Demetrius, indignant at this unexpected defection of a city
which had recently heaped upon him such fulsome adulation, was still
farther mortified by the loss of most of his other possessions in
Greece.[904] His garrisons were for the most part expelled, and the
cities passed into Kassandrian keeping or dominion. His fortunes
were indeed partially restored by concluding a peace with Seleukus,
who married his daughter. This alliance withdrew Demetrius to
Syria, while Greece appears to have fallen more and more under the
Kassandrian parties. It was one of these partisans, Lachares, who,
seconded by Kassander’s soldiers, acquired a despotism at Athens
such as had been possessed by the Phalerean Demetrius, but employed
in a manner far more cruel and oppressive. Various exiles driven out
by his tyranny invited Demetrius Poliorketes, who passed over again
from Asia into Greece, recovered portions of Peloponnesus, and laid
siege to Athens. He blocked up the city by sea and land, so that the
pressure of famine presently became intolerable. Lachares having
made his escape, the people opened their gates to Demetrius, not
without great fear of the treatment awaiting them. But he behaved
with forbearance, and even with generosity. He spared them all,
supplied them with a large donation of corn, and contented himself
with taking military occupation of the city, naming his own friends
as magistrates. He put garrisons, however, not only into Peiræus and
Munychia, but also into the hill called Museum, a part of the walled
circle of Athens itself[905] (B. C. 298).

[904] Plutarch, Demetr. 31.

[905] Plutarch, Demetr. 34, 35; Pausan. i. 25, 5. Pausanias
states (i. 26, 2) that a gallant Athenian named Olympiodorus (we
do not know when) encouraged his fellow-citizens to attack the
Museum, Munychia, and Peiræus; and expelled the Macedonians from
all of them. If this be correct, Munychia and Peiræus must have
been afterwards reconquered by the Macedonians: for they were
garrisoned (as well as Salamis and Sunium) by Antigonus Gonatas
(Pausanias, ii. 8, 5; Plutarch, Aratus, 34).

While Demetrius was thus strengthening himself in Greece, he lost
all his footing both in Cyprus, Syria, and Kilikia, which passed
into the hands of Ptolemy and Seleukus. New prospects however
were opened to him in Macedonia by the death of Kassander (his
brother-in-law, brother of his wife Phila) and the family feuds
supervening thereupon. Philippus, eldest son of Kassander, succeeded
his father, but died of sickness after something more than a year.
Between the two remaining sons, Antipater and Alexander, a sanguinary
hostility broke out. Antipater slew his mother Thessalonikê, and
threatened the life of his brother, who in his turn invited aid
both from Demetrius, and from the Epirotic king Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus
being ready first, marched into Macedonia, and expelled Antipater;
receiving as his recompense the territory called Tymphæa (between
Epirus and Macedonia), together with Akarnania, Amphilochia,
and the town of Ambrakia, which became henceforward his chief
city and residence.[906] Antipater sought shelter in Thrace with
his father-in-law Lysimachus; by whose order, however, he was
presently slain. Demetrius, occupied with other matters, was more
tardy in obeying the summons; but, on entering into Macedonia,
he found himself strong enough to dispossess and kill Alexander
(who had indeed invited him, but is said to have laid a train for
assassinating him), and seized the Macedonian crown; not without the
assent of a considerable party, to whom the name and the deeds of
Kassander and his sons were alike odious.[907]

[906] Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 6.

[907] Plutarch, Demetr. 36; Dexippus ap. Syncell. p. 264 _seq._;
Pausan. 7, 3; Justin, xvi. 1, 2.

Demetrius became thus master of Macedonia, together with the greater
part of Greece, including Athens, Megara, and much of Peloponnesus.
He undertook an expedition into Bœotia, for the purpose of conquering
Thebes; in which attempt he succeeded, not without a double siege of
that city, which made an obstinate resistance. He left as viceroy in
Bœotia the historian, Hieronymus of Kardia,[908] once the attached
friend and fellow-citizen of Eumenes. But Greece as a whole was
managed by Antigonus (afterwards called Antigonus Gonatas) son of
Demetrius, who maintained his supremacy unshaken during all his
father’s lifetime; even though Demetrius was deprived of Macedonia
by the temporary combination of Lysimachus with Pyrrhus, and
afterwards remained (until his death in 283 B. C.) a captive in the
hands of Seleukus. After a brief possession of the crown of Macedonia
successively by Seleukus, Ptolemy, Keraunus, Meleager, Antipater, and
Sosthenes—Antigonus Gonatas regained it in 277 B. C. His descendants
the Antigonid kings maintained it until the battle of Pydna in 168 B.
C.; when Perseus, the last of them, was overthrown, and his kingdom
incorporated with the Roman conquests.[909]

[908] Plutarch, Demetr. 39.

[909] See Mr. Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, Append. 4. p. 236-239.

Of Greece during this period we can give no account, except that the
greater number of its cities were in dependence upon Demetrius and
his son Antigonus; either under occupation by Macedonian garrisons,
or ruled by local despots who leaned on foreign mercenaries and
Macedonian support. The spirit of the Greeks was broken, and their
habits of combined sentiment and action had disappeared. The invasion
of the Gauls indeed awakened them into a temporary union for the
defence of Thermopylæ in 279 B. C. So intolerable was the
cruelty and spoliation of those barbarian invaders, that the cities
as well as Antigonus were driven by fear to the efforts necessary
for repelling them.[910] A gallant army of Hellenic confederates
was mustered. In the mountains of Ætolia and in the neighborhood of
Delphi, most of the Gallic horde with their king Brennus perished.
But this burst of spirit did not interrupt the continuance of the
Macedonian dominion in Greece, which Antigonus Gonatas continued
to hold throughout most of a long reign. He greatly extended the
system begun by his predecessors, of isolating each Grecian city from
alliances with other cities in its neighborhood—planting in most of
them local despots—and compressing the most important by means of
garrisons.[911] Among all Greeks, the Spartans and the Ætolians
stood most free from foreign occupation, and were the least crippled
in their power of self-action. The Achæan league too developed itself
afterwards as a renovated sprout from the ruined tree of Grecian
liberty,[912] though never attaining to anything better than a feeble
and puny life, nor capable of sustaining itself without foreign
aid.[913]

[910] Pausanias, i. 4, 1; x. 20, 1. Τοῖς δέ γε Ἕλλησι
κατεπεπτώκει μὲν ἐς ἅπαν τὰ φρονήματα, τὸ δὲ ἰσχυρὸν τοῦ δείματος
προῆγεν ἐς ἀνάγκην τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀμύνειν· ἑώρων δὲ τόν τε ἐν τῷ
παρόντι ἀγῶνα, οὐκ ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας γενησόμενον, καθὰ ἐπὶ τοῦ
Μήδου πότε ... ὡς οὖν ἀπολωλέναι δέον ἢ ἐπικρατεστέρους εἶναι,
κατ᾽ ἄνδρα τε ἰδίᾳ καὶ αἱ πόλεις διέκειντο ἐν κοινῷ. (On the
approach of the invading Gauls.)

[911] Polyb. ii. 40, 41. πλείστους γὰρ δὴ μονάρχους οὗτος
(Antigonus Gonatas) ἐμφυτεῦσαι δοκεῖ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. Justin, xxvi.
1.

[912] Pausanias, vii. 17, 1. Ἅτε ἐκ δένδρου λελωβημένου,
ἀνεβλάστησεν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὸ Ἀχαϊκόν.

[913] Plutarch, Aratus, 47. ἐθισθέντες γὰρ ἀλλοτρίαις σώζεσθαι
χερσὶν, καὶ τοῖς Μακεδόνων ὅπλοις αὑτοὺς ὑπεσταλκότες (the
Achæans), etc. Compare also c. 12, 13, 15, in reference to the
earlier applications to Ptolemy king of Egypt.

With this after-growth, or half-revival, I shall not meddle. It
forms the Greece of Polybius, which that author treats, in my
opinion justly, as having no history of its own,[914] but as an
appendage attached to some foreign centre and principal among its
neighbors—Macedonia, Egypt, Syria, Rome. Each of these neighbors
acted upon the destinies of Greece more powerfully than the Greeks
themselves. The Greeks to whom these volumes have been devoted—those
of Homer, Archilochus, Solon, Æschylus, Herodotus, Thucydides,
Xenophon, and Demosthenes—present as their most marked characteristic
a loose aggregation of autonomous tribes or communities, acting and
reacting freely among themselves, with little or no pressure from
foreigners. The main interest of the narrative has consisted in the
spontaneous grouping of the different Hellenic fractions—in the
self-prompted cooperations and conflicts—the abortive attempts to
bring about something like an effective federal organization, or to
maintain two permanent rival confederacies—the energetic ambition,
and heroic endurance, of men to whom Hellas was the entire political
world. The freedom of Hellas, the life and soul of this history from
its commencement, disappeared completely during the first years of
Alexander’s reign. After following to their tombs the generation of
Greeks contemporary with him, men like Demosthenes and Phokion, born
in a state of freedom—I have pursued the history into that gulf of
Grecian nullity which marks the succeeding century; exhibiting sad
evidence of the degrading servility, and suppliant king-worship,
into which the countrymen of Aristeides and Perikles had been driven,
by their own conscious weakness under overwhelming pressure from
without.

[914] Polybius, i. 3, 4; ii. 37.

I cannot better complete that picture than by showing what the
leading democratical citizen became, under the altered atmosphere
which now bedimmed his city. Demochares, the nephew of Demosthenes,
has been mentioned as one of the few distinguished Athenians in
this last generation. He was more than once chosen to the highest
public offices;[915] he was conspicuous for his free speech, both
as an orator and as an historian, in the face of powerful enemies;
he remained throughout a long life faithfully attached to the
democratical constitution, and was banished for a time by its
opponents. In the year 280 B. C., he prevailed on the Athenians
to erect a public monument, with a commemorative inscription, to
his uncle Demosthenes. Seven or eight years afterwards, Demochares
himself died, aged nearly eighty. His son Laches proposed and
obtained a public decree, that a statue should be erected, with an
annexed inscription, to his honor. We read in the decree a recital of
the distinguished public services, whereby Demochares merited this
compliment from his countrymen. All that the proposer of the decree,
his son and fellow-citizen, can find to recite, as ennobling the last
half of the father’s public life (since his return from exile), is as
follows:—1. He contracted the public expenses, and introduced a more
frugal management. 2. He undertook an embassy to King Lysimachus,
from whom he obtained two presents for the people, one of thirty
talents, the other of one hundred talents. 3. He proposed the vote
for sending envoys to King Ptolemy in Egypt, from whom fifty talents
were obtained for the people. 4. He went as envoy to Antipater,
received from him twenty talents, and delivered them to the people at
the Eleusinian festival.[916]

[915] Polybius, xii. 13.

[916] See the decree in Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 850. The
Antipater here mentioned is the son of Kassander, not the father.
There is no necessity for admitting the conjecture of Mr. Clinton
(Fast. Hell. App. p. 380) that the name ought to be _Antigonus_,
and not _Antipater_; although it may perhaps be true that
Demochares was on favorable terms with Antigonus Gonatas (Diog.
Laert. vii, 14).

Compare Carl Müller ad Democharis Fragm. apud Fragm. Hist. Græc.
vol. ii. p. 446, ed. Didot.

When such begging missions are the deeds, for which Athens both
employed and recompensed her most eminent citizens, an historian
accustomed to the Grecian world as described by Herodotus,
Thucydides, and Xenophon, feels that the life has departed from his
subject, and with sadness and humiliation brings his narrative to a
close.

CHAPTER XCVII.

SICILIAN AND ITALIAN GREEKS. — AGATHOKLES.

It has been convenient, throughout all this work, to keep the history
of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks distinct from that of the Central
and Asiatic. We parted last from the Sicilian Greeks,[917] at the
death of their champion the Corinthian Timoleon (337 B. C.),
by whose energetic exploits, and generous political policy, they
had been almost regenerated—rescued from foreign enemies, protected
against intestine discord, and invigorated by a large reinforcement
of new colonists. For the twenty years next succeeding the death of
Timoleon, the history of Syracuse and Sicily is an absolute blank;
which is deeply to be regretted, since the position of these cities
included so much novelty—so many subjects for debate, for peremptory
settlement, or for amicable compromise—that the annals of their
proceedings must have been peculiarly interesting. Twenty years after
the death of Timoleon, we find the government of Syracuse described
as an oligarchy; implying that the constitution established by
Timoleon must have been changed either by violence or by consent.
The oligarchy is stated as consisting of 600 chief men, among whom
Sosistratus and Herakleides appear as leaders.[918] We hear generally
that the Syracusans had been engaged in wars, and that Sosistratus
either first originated, or first firmly established, his oligarchy,
after an expedition undertaken to the coast of Italy, to assist the
citizens of Kroton against their interior neighbors and assailants
the Bruttians.

[917] See my last preceding Vol. XI. Ch. lxxxv. p. 196.

[918] Diodor. xix. 3. It appears that Diodorus had recounted
in his eighteenth Book the previous circumstances of these two
leaders; but this part of his narrative is lost: see Wesseling’s
note.

Not merely Kroton, but other Grecian cities also on the coast of
Italy, appear to have been exposed to causes of danger and decline,
similar to those which were operating upon so many other portions
of the Hellenic world. Their non-Hellenic neighbors in the interior
were growing too powerful and too aggressive to leave them in peace
or security. The Messapians, the Lucanians, the Bruttians, and other
native Italian tribes, were acquiring that increased strength which
became ultimately all concentrated under the mighty republic of Rome.
I have in my preceding volume recounted the acts of the two Syracusan
despots, the elder and younger Dionysius, on this Italian coast.[919]
Though the elder gained some advantage over the Lucanians, yet the
interference of both contributed only to enfeeble and humiliate the
Italiot Greeks. Not long before the battle of Chæroneia (340-338
B. C.), the Tarentines found themselves so hard pressed by the
Messapians, that they sent to Sparta, their mother-city, to entreat
assistance. The Spartan king Archidamus son of Agesilaus, perhaps
ashamed of the nullity of his country since the close of the Sacred
War, complied with their prayer, and sailed at the head of a
mercenary force to Italy. How long his operations there lasted, we do
not know; but they ended by his being defeated and killed, near the
time of the battle of Chæroneia[920] (338 B. C.).

[919] See Vol. XI. Ch. lxxxiii. p. 22; Ch. lxxxv. p. 133.

[920] Diodor. xvi. 88; Plutarch, Camill. 19; Pausan. iii. 10,
5. Plutarch even says that the two battles occurred on the same
_day_.

About six years after this event, the Tarentines, being still pressed
by the same formidable neighbors, invoked the aid of the Epirotic
Alexander, king of the Molossians, and brother of Olympias. These
Epirots now, during the general decline of Grecian force, rise into
an importance which they had never before enjoyed[921]. Philip of
Macedon, having married Olympias, not only secured his brother-in-law
on the Molossian throne, but strengthened his authority over subjects
not habitually obedient. It was through Macedonian interference that
the Molossian Alexander first obtained (though subject to Macedonian
ascendency) the important city of Ambrakia; which thus passed out
of a free Hellenic community into the capital and seaport of the
Epirotic kings. Alexander farther cemented his union with Macedonia
by marrying his own niece Kleopatra, daughter of Philip and Olympias.
In fact, during the lives of Philip and Alexander the Great, the
Epirotic kingdom appears a sort of adjunct to the Macedonian;
governed by Olympias either jointly with her brother the Molossian
Alexander—or as regent after his death.[922]

[921] The Molossian King Neoptolemus was father both of Alexander
(the Epirotic) and of Olympias. But as to the genealogy of the
preceding kings, nothing certain can be made out: see Merleker,
Darstellung des Landes und der Bewohner von Epeiros, Königsberg,
1844, p. 2-6.

[922] A curious proof how fully Olympias was queen of Epirus is
preserved in the fragments (recently published by Mr. Babington)
of the oration of Hyperides in defence of Euxenippus, p. 12. The
Athenians, in obedience to an oracular mandate from the Dodonæan
Zeus, had sent to Dodona a solemn embassy for sacrifice, and had
dressed and adorned the statue of Diônê there situated. Olympias
addressed a despatch to the Athenians, reproving them for this as
a trespass upon her dominions—ὑπὲρ τούτων ὑμῖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἦλθε
παρ᾽ Ὀλυμπιάδος ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς, ὡς ~ἡ χώρα εἴη ἡ Μολοσσία
αὐτῆς~, ἐν ᾗ τὸ ἱερόν ἐστιν· οὔκουν προσῆκεν ἡμᾶς τῶν ἐκεῖ οὐδὲ
ἓν κινεῖν. Olympias took a high and insolent tone in this letter
(τὰς ~τραγῳδίας~ αὐτῆς καὶ τὰς κατηγορίας, etc.)

The date of this oration is at some period during the life of
Alexander the Great—but cannot be more precisely ascertained.
After the death of Alexander, Olympias passed much time in
Epirus, where she thought herself more secure from the enmity of
Antipater (Diodor. xviii. 49).

Dodona had been one of the most ancient places of pilgrimage
for the Hellenic race—especially for the Athenians. The order
here addressed to them,—that they should abstain from religious
manifestations at this sanctuary—is a remarkable proof of the
growing encroachments on free Hellenism; the more so, as Olympias
sent offerings to temples at Athens when she chose and without
asking permission—we learn this from the same fragment of
Hyperides.

It was about the year after the battle of Issus that the Molossian
Alexander undertook his expedition into Italy;[923] doubtless
instigated in part by emulation of the Asiatic glories of his
nephew and namesake. Though he found enemies more formidable than
the Persians at Issus, yet his success was at first considerable.
He gained victories over the Messapians, the Lucanians, and the
Samnites; he conquered the Lucanian town of Consentia, and the
Bruttian town of Tereina; he established an alliance with the
Pœdiculi, and exchanged friendly messages with the Romans. As far
as we can make out from scanty data, he seems to have calculated on
establishing a comprehensive dominion in the south of Italy, over
all its population—over Greek cities, Lucanians, and Bruttians.
He demanded and obtained three hundred of the chief Lucanian and
Messapian families, whom he sent over as hostages to Epirus.
Several exiles of these nations joined him as partisans. He farther
endeavored to transfer the congress of the Greco-Italian cities,
which had been usually held at the Tarentine colony of Herakleia, to
Thurii; intending probably to procure for himself a compliant synod
like that serving the purpose of his Macedonian nephew at Corinth.
But the tide of his fortune at length turned. The Tarentines became
disgusted and alarmed; his Lucanian partisans proved faithless; the
stormy weather in the Calabrian Apennines broke up the communication
between his different detachments, and exposed them to be cut off
in detail. He himself perished, by the hands of a Lucanian exile,
in crossing the river Acheron, and near the town of Pandosia. This
was held to be a memorable attestation of the prophetic veracity of
the oracle; since he had received advice from Dodona to beware of
Pandosia and Acheron; two names which he well knew, and therefore
avoided, in Epirus—but which he had not before known to exist in
Italy.[924]

[923] Livy (viii. 3-24) places the date of this expedition of the
Molossian Alexander eight years earlier; but it is universally
recognized that this is a mistake.

[924] Livy, viii. 17-24; Justin, xii. 2; Strabo, vi. p. 280.

The Greco-Italian cities had thus dwindled down into a prize to be
contended for between the Epirotic kings and the native Italian
powers—as they again became, still more conspicuously, fifty years
afterwards, during the war between Pyrrhus and the Romans. They
were now left to seek foreign aid, where they could obtain it, and
to become the prey of adventurers. It is in this capacity that we
hear of them as receiving assistance from Syracuse, and that the
formidable name of Agathokles first comes before us—seemingly about
320 B. C.[925] The Syracusan force, sent to Italy to assist
the Krotoniates against their enemies the Bruttians, was commanded by
a general named Antander, whose brother Agathokles served with him in
a subordinate command.

[925] Diodor. xix. 3.

To pass over the birth and childhood of Agathokles—respecting which,
romantic anecdotes are told, as about most eminent men,—it appears
that his father, a Rhegine exile named Karkinus, came from Therma (in
the Carthaginian portion of Sicily) to settle at Syracuse, at the
time when Timoleon invited and received new Grecian settlers to the
citizenship of the latter city. Karkinus was in comparative poverty,
following the trade of a potter; which his son Agathokles learnt
also, being about eighteen years of age when domiciliated with his
father at Syracuse.[926] Though starting from this humble beginning,
and even notorious for the profligacy and rapacity of his youthful
habits, Agathokles soon attained a conspicuous position, partly
from his own superior personal qualities, partly from the favor of
a wealthy Syracusan named Damas. The young potter was handsome,
tall, and of gigantic strength; he performed with distinction the
military service required from him as a citizen, wearing a panoply
so heavy, that no other soldier could fight with it; he was moreover
ready, audacious, and emphatic in public harangue. Damas became much
attached to him, and not only supplied him profusely with money,
but also, when placed in command of a Syracusan army against the
Agrigentines, nominated him one of the subordinate officers. In this
capacity Agathokles acquired great reputation, for courage in battle,
ability in command, and fluency of speech. Presently Damas died of
sickness, leaving a widow without children. Agathokles married the
widow, and thus raised himself to a high fortune and position in
Syracuse.[927]

[926] Timæus apud Polybium, xii. 15; Diodor. xix. 2.

[927] Diodor. xix. 3; Justin, xxii. 1. Justin states the earliest
military exploits of Agathokles to have been against the Ætuæans,
not against the Agrigentines.

Of the oligarchy which now prevailed at Syracuse, we have no
particulars, nor do we know how it had come to be substituted
for the more popular forms established by Timoleon. We hear only
generally that the oligarchical leaders, Sosistratus and Herakleides,
were unprincipled and sanguinary men.[928] By this government an
expedition was despatched from Syracuse to the Italian coast, to
assist the inhabitants of Kroton against their aggressive neighbors
the Bruttians. Antander, brother of Agathokles, was one of the
generals commanding this armament, and Agathokles himself served in
it as a subordinate officer. We neither know the date, the duration,
nor the issue, of this expedition.

[928] Diodor. xix. 3, 4. Diodorus had written more about this
oligarchy in a part of his eighteenth book; which part is not
preserved: see Wesseling’s note.

But it afforded a fresh opportunity to Agathokles to display his
adventurous bravery and military genius, which procured for him
high encomium. He was supposed by some, on his return to Syracuse,
to be entitled to the first prize for valor; but Sosistratus and
the other oligarchical leaders withheld it from him and preferred
another. So deeply was Agathokles incensed by this refusal, that he
publicly inveighed against them among the people, as men aspiring to
despotism. His opposition being unsuccessful, and drawing upon him
the enmity of the government, he retired to the coast of Italy.

Here he levied a military band of Grecian exiles and Campanian
mercenaries, which he maintained by various enterprises for or
against the Grecian cities. He attacked Kroton, but was repulsed
with loss; he took service with the Tarentines, fought for some time
against their enemies, but at length became suspected and dismissed;
he then joined himself with the inhabitants of Rhegium, assisting
in the defence of the town against a Syracusan aggression. He even
made two attempts to obtain admission by force into Syracuse, and
to seize the government.[929] Though repulsed in both of them, he
nevertheless contrived to maintain a footing in Sicily, was appointed
general at the town of Morgantium, and captured Leontini, within a
short distance north of Syracuse. Some time afterwards, a revolution
took place at Syracuse, whereby Sosistratus and the oligarchy were
dispossessed and exiled with many of their partisans.

[929] Diodor. xix. 4; Justin, xxii. 1. “Bis occupare imperium
Syracusarum voluit; bis in exilium actus est.”

In the same manner, the Syracusan exile Hermokrates had attempted
to extort by force his return, at the head of 3000 men, and by
means of partisans within; he failed and was slain—B. C.
408 (Diodor. xiii. 75).

Under the new government, Agathokles obtained his recall, and soon
gained increased ascendency. The dispossessed exiles contrived to
raise forces, and to carry on a formidable war against Syracuse
from without; they even obtained assistance from the Carthaginians,
so as to establish themselves at Gela, on the southern confines of
the Syracusan territory. In the military operations thus rendered
necessary, Agathokles took a forward part, distinguishing himself
among the ablest and most enterprising officers. He tried, with 1000
soldiers, to surprise Gela by night; but finding the enemy on their
guard, he was repulsed with loss and severely wounded; yet by an able
manœuvre he brought off all his remaining detachment. Though thus
energetic against the public enemy, however, he at the same time
inspired both hatred and alarm for his dangerous designs, to the
Syracusans within. The Corinthian Akestorides, who had been named
general of the city—probably from recollection of the distinguished
services formerly rendered by the Corinthian Timoleon—becoming
persuaded that the presence of Agathokles was full of peril to the
city, ordered him to depart, and provided men to assassinate him on
the road during the night. But Agathokles, suspecting their design,
disguised himself in the garb of a beggar, appointing another man to
travel in the manner which would be naturally expected from himself.
This substitute was slain in the dark by the assassins, while
Agathokles escaped by favor of his disguise. He and his partisans
appear to have found shelter with the Carthaginians in Sicily.[930]

[930] Diodor. xix. 5, 6. A similar stratagem is recounted of the
Karian Datames (Cornelius Nepos, Datames, 9).

That Agathokles, on leaving Syracuse, went to the Carthaginians,
appears to be implied in the words of Diodorus, c. 6—τοὺς αὐτῷ
πρότερον συμπορευθέντας ~πρὸς~ Καρχηδονίους (see Wesseling’s
note on the translation of ~πρὸς~). This fact is noticed merely
incidentally, in the confused narrative of Diodorus; but it
brings him to a certain extent into harmony with Justin (xxii.
2), who insists much on the combination between Agathokles and
the Carthaginians, as one of the main helps whereby he was
enabled to seize the supreme power.

Not long afterwards, another change took place in the government
of Syracuse, whereby the oligarchical exiles were recalled, and
peace made with the Carthaginians. It appears that a senate of
600 was again installed as the chief political body; probably not
the same men as before, and with some democratical modifications.
At the same time, negotiations were opened, through the mediation
of the Carthaginian commander Hamilkar, between the Syracusans
and Agathokles. The mischiefs of intestine conflict, amidst the
numerous discordant parties in the city, pressed hard upon every one,
and hopes were entertained that all might be brought to agree in
terminating them. Agathokles affected to enter cordially into these
projects of amnesty and reconciliation. The Carthaginian general
Hamilkar, who had so recently aided Sosistratus and the Syracusan
oligarchy, now did his best to promote the recall of Agathokles,
and even made himself responsible for the good and pacific behavior
of that exile. Agathokles, and the other exiles along with him were
accordingly restored. A public assembly was convened in the temple of
Demeter, in the presence of Hamilkar; where Agathokles swore by the
most awful oaths, with his hands touching the altar and statue of the
goddess, that he would behave as a good citizen of Syracuse, uphold
faithfully the existing government, and carry out the engagements
of the Carthaginian mediators—abstaining from encroachments on
the rights and possessions of Carthage in Sicily. His oaths and
promises were delivered with so much apparent sincerity, accompanied
by emphatic harangues, that the people were persuaded to name him
general and guardian of the peace, for the purpose of realizing the
general aspirations towards harmony. Such appointment was recommended
(it seems) by Hamilkar.[931]

[931] The account here given is the best which I can make out
from Diodorus (xix. 5), Justin (xxii. 2),—Polyænus (v. 3, 8). The
first two allude to the solemn oath taken by Agathokles—παραχθεὶς
εἰς τὸ τῆς Δήμητρος ἱερὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν, ὤμοσε μηδὲν
ἐναντιωθήσεσθαι τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ—“Tunc Hamilcari expositis ignibus
Cereris tactisque in obsequia Pœnorum jurat.” “Jurare in obsequia
Pœnorum” can hardly be taken to mean that Syracuse was to become
subject to Carthage; there was nothing antecedent to justify
such a proceeding, nor does anything follow in the sequel which
implies it.

Compare also the speech which Justin puts into the
mouth of Bomilkar when executed for treason by the
Carthaginians—“objectans illis (Carthaginiensibus) in Hamilcarem
patruum suum tacita suffragia, quod Agathoclem _sociam illis
facere, quam hostem, maluerit_” (xxii. 7). This points to
previous collusion between Hamilkar and Agathokles.

All this train of artifice had been concerted by Agathokles with
Hamilkar, for the purpose of enabling the former to seize the
supreme power. As general of the city, Agathokles had the direction
of the military force. Under the pretence of marching against some
refractory exiles at Erbita in the interior, he got together 3000
soldiers strenuously devoted to him—mercenaries and citizens of
desperate character—to which Hamilkar added a reinforcement of
Africans. As if about to march forth, he mustered his troops at
daybreak in the Timoleonteon (chapel or precinct consecrated to
Timoleon), while Peisarchus and Dekles, two chiefs of the senate
already assembled, were invited with forty others to transact with
him some closing business. Having these men in his power, Agathokles
suddenly turned upon them, and denounced them to the soldiers as
guilty of conspiring his death. Then, receiving from the soldiers a
response full of ardor, he ordered them immediately to proceed to a
general massacre of the senate and their leading partisans, with full
permission of licentious plunder in the houses of these victims, the
richest men in Syracuse. The soldiers rushed into the street with
ferocious joy to execute this order. They slew not only the senators,
but many others also, unarmed and unprepared; each man selecting
victims personally obnoxious to him. They broke open the doors of the
rich, or climbed over the roofs, massacred the proprietors within,
and ravished the females. They chased the unsuspecting fugitives
through the streets, not sparing even those who took refuge in the
temples. Many of these unfortunate sufferers rushed for safety to
the gates, but found them closed and guarded by special order of
Agathokles; so that they were obliged to let themselves down from the
walls, in which many perished miserably. For two days Syracuse was
thus a prey to the sanguinary, rapacious, and lustful impulses of the
soldiery; four thousand citizens had been already slain, and many
more were seized as prisoners. The political purposes of Agathokles,
as well as the passions of the soldiers, being then sated, he
arrested the massacre. He concluded this bloody feat by killing such
of his prisoners as were most obnoxious to him, and banishing the
rest. The total number of expelled or fugitive Syracusans is stated
at 6000; who found a hospitable shelter and home at Agrigentum. One
act of lenity is mentioned, and ought not to be omitted amidst this
scene of horror. Deinokrates, one among the prisoners, was liberated
by Agathokles from motives of former friendship: he too, probably,
went into voluntary exile.[932]

[932] Diodor. xix. 8, 9; Justin, xxii. 2.

After a massacre thus perpetrated in the midst of profound peace,
and in the full confidence of a solemn act of mutual reconciliation
immediately preceding—surpassing the worst deeds of the elder
Dionysius, and indeed (we might almost say) of all other Grecian
despots—Agathokles convened what he called an assembly of the people.
Such of the citizens as were either oligarchical, or wealthy, or
in any way unfriendly to him, had been already either slain or
expelled; so that the assembly probably included few besides his own
soldiers: Agathokles, addressing them in terms of congratulation on
the recent glorious exploit, whereby they had purged the city of
its oligarchical tyrants—proclaimed that the Syracusan people had
now reconquered their full liberty. He affected to be weary of the
toils of command, and anxious only for a life of quiet equality as
one among the many; in token of which he threw off his general’s
cloak and put on a common civil garment. But those whom he addressed,
fresh from the recent massacre and plunder, felt that their whole
security depended upon the maintenance of his supremacy, and loudly
protested that they would not accept his resignation. Agathokles,
with pretended reluctance, told them, that if they insisted, he would
comply, but upon the peremptory condition of enjoying a single-handed
authority, without any colleagues or counsellors for whose misdeeds
he was to be responsible. The assembly replied by conferring upon
him, with unanimous acclamations, the post of general with unlimited
power, or despot.[933]

[933] Diodor. xix. 9.

Thus was constituted a new despot of Syracuse about fifty years
after the decease of the elder Dionysius, and twenty-two years after
Timoleon had rooted out the Dionysian dynasty, establishing on its
ruins a free polity. On accepting the post, Agathokles took pains
to proclaim that he would tolerate no farther massacre or plunder,
and that his government would for the future be mild and beneficent.
He particularly studied to conciliate the poorer citizens, to whom
he promised abolition of debts and a new distribution of lands. How
far he carried out this project systematically, we do not know; but
he conferred positive donations on many of the poor—which he had
abundant means of doing, out of the properties of the numerous exiles
recently expelled. He was full of promises to every one, displaying
courteous and popular manners, and abstaining from all ostentation
of guards, or ceremonial attendants, or a diadem. He at the same
time applied himself vigorously to strengthen his military and
naval force, his magazines of arms and stores, and his revenues. He
speedily extended his authority over all the territorial domain of
Syracuse, with her subject towns, and carried his arms successfully
over many other parts of Sicily.[934]

[934] Diodor. xix. 9.; Justin, xxii. 2.

The Carthaginian general Hamilkar, whose complicity or connivance
had helped Agathokles to this blood-stained elevation, appears to
have permitted him without opposition to extend his dominion over a
large portion of Sicily, and even to plunder the towns in alliance
with Carthage itself. Complaints having been made to Carthage, this
officer was superseded, and another general (also named Hamilkar) was
sent in his place. We are unable to trace in detail the proceedings
of Agathokles during the first years of his despotism; but he went on
enlarging his sway over the neighboring cities, while the Syracusan
exiles, whom he had expelled, found a home partly at Agrigentum
(under Deinokrates), partly at Messênê. About the year 314 B.
C., we hear that he made an attempt on Messênê, which he was on
the point of seizing, had he not been stopped by the interference of
the Carthaginians (perhaps the newly-appointed Hamilkar), who now
at length protested against his violation of the convention; meaning
(as we must presume, for we know of no other convention) the oath
which had been sworn by Agathokles at Syracuse under the guarantee
of the Carthaginians.[935] Though thus disappointed at Messênê,
Agathokles seized Abakænum—where he slew the leading citizens opposed
to him,—and carried on his aggressions elsewhere so effectively,
that the leaders at Agrigentum, instigated by the Syracusan exiles
there harbored, became convinced of the danger of leaving such
encroachments unresisted.[936] The people of Agrigentum came to the
resolution of taking up arms on behalf of the liberties of Sicily,
and allied themselves with Gela and Messênê for the purpose.

[935] Diodor. xix. 65. καθ᾽ ὃν δὴ χρόνον ἧκον ἐκ Καρχηδόνος
πρέσβεις, οἳ τῷ μὲν Ἀγαθοκλεῖ περὶ τῶν πραχθέντων ἐπετίμησαν,
ὡς παραβαίνοντι τὰς συνθήκας· τοῖς δὲ Μεσσηνίοις εἰρήνην
παρεσκεύασαν, καὶ τὸ φρούριον ἀναγκάσαντες ἀποκαταστῆσαι τὸν
τύραννον, ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς τὴν Λιβύην.

I do not know what συνθῆκαι can be here meant, except that oath
described by Justin under the words “in obsequia Pœnorum jurat”
(xxii. 2).

[936] Diodor. xix. 70. μὴ περιορᾷν Ἀγαθοκλέα συσκευαζόμενον τὰς
πόλεις.

But the fearful example of Agathokles himself rendered them so
apprehensive of the dangers from any military leader, at once
native and energetic, that they resolved to invite a foreigner.
Some Syracusan exiles were sent to Sparta, to choose and invoke
some Spartan of eminence and ability, as Archidamus had recently
been called to Tarentum—and even more, as Timoleon had been brought
from Corinth, with results so signally beneficent. The old Spartan
king Kleomenes (of the Eurysthenid race) had a son Akrotatus, then
unpopular at home,[937] and well disposed towards foreign warfare.
This prince, without even consulting the Ephors, listened at once to
the envoys, and left Peloponnesus with a small squadron, intending to
cross by Korkyra and the coast of Italy to Agrigentum. Unfavorable
winds drove him as far north as Apollonia, and delayed his arrival
at Tarentum; in which city, originally a Spartan colony, he met with
a cordial reception, and obtained a vote of twenty vessels to assist
his enterprise of liberating Syracuse from Agathokles. He reached
Agrigentum with favorable hopes, was received with all the honors
due to a Spartan prince, and undertook the command. Bitterly did he
disappoint his party. He was incompetent as a general; he dissipated
in presents or luxuries the money intended for the campaign,
emulating Asiatic despots; his conduct was arrogant, tyrannical,
and even sanguinary. The disgust which he inspired was brought to
a height, when he caused Sosistratus, the leader of the Syracusan
exiles, to be assassinated at a banquet. Immediately the exiles rose
in a body to avenge this murder; while Akrotatus, deposed by the
Agrigentines, only found safety in flight.[938]

[937] Diodor. xix. 70. After the defeat of Agis by Antipater,
the severe Lacedæmonian laws against those who fled from battle
had been suspended for the occasion; as had been done before,
after the defeat of Leuktra. Akrotatus had been the _only_ person
(μόνος) who opposed this suspension; whereby he incurred the most
violent odium generally, but most especially from the citizens
who profited by the suspension. These men carried their hatred
so far, that they even attacked, beat him and conspired against
his life (οὗτοι γὰρ συστραφέντες πληγάς τε ἐνεφόρησαν αὐτῷ καὶ
διετέλουν ἐπιβουλεύοντες).

This is a curious indication of Spartan manners.

[938] Diodor. xix. 71.

To this young Spartan prince, had he possessed a noble heart and
energetic qualities, there was here presented a career of equal
grandeur with that of Timoleon—against an enemy able indeed and
formidable, yet not so superior in force as to render success
impossible. It is melancholy to see Akrotatus, from simple
worthlessness of character, throwing away such an opportunity; at
a time when Sicily was the only soil on which a glorious Hellenic
career was still open—when no similar exploits were practicable
by any Hellenic leader in Central Greece, from the overwhelming
superiority of force possessed by the surrounding kings.

The misconduct of Akrotatus broke up all hopes of active operations
against Agathokles. Peace was presently concluded with the latter
by the Agrigentines and their allies, under the mediation of the
Carthaginian general Hamilkar. By the terms of this convention,
all the Greek cities in Sicily were declared autonomous, yet under
the hegemony of Agathokles; excepting only Himera, Selinus, and
Herakleia, which were actually, and were declared still to continue,
under Carthage. Messênê was the only Grecian city standing aloof
from this convention; as such, therefore still remaining open to the
Syracusan exiles. The terms were so favorable to Agathokles, that
they were much disapproved at Carthage.[939] Agathokles, recognized
as chief and having no enemy in the field, employed himself actively
in strengthening his hold on the other cities, and in enlarging his
military means at home. He sent a force against Messênê, to require
the expulsion of the Syracusan exiles from that city, and to procure
at the same time the recall of the Messenian exiles, partisans of
his own, and companions of his army. His generals extorted these two
points from the Messenians. Agathokles, having thus broken the force
of Messênê, secured to himself the town still more completely, by
sending for those Messenian citizens who had chiefly opposed him,
and putting them all to death, as well as his leading opponents
at Tauromenium. The number thus massacred was not less than six
hundred.[940]

[939] Diodor. xix. 71, 72, 102. When the convention specifies
Herakleia, Selinus, and Himera, as being under the Carthaginians,
this is to be understood as in addition to the primitive
Carthaginian settlements of Solus, Panormus, Lilybæum, etc.,
about which no question could arise.

[940] Diodor. xix. 72: compare a different narrative—Polyænus, v.
15.

It only remained for Agathokles to seize Agrigentum. Thither he
accordingly marched. But Deinokrates and the Syracusan exiles,
expelled from Messênê, had made themselves heard at Carthage,
insisting on the perils to that city from the encroachments of
Agathokles. The Carthaginians alarmed sent a fleet of sixty sail,
whereby alone Agrigentum, already under siege by Agathokles, was
preserved. The recent convention was now broken on all sides,
and Agathokles kept no farther measures with the Carthaginians.
He ravaged all their Sicilian territory, and destroyed some of
their forts; while the Carthaginians on their side made a sudden
descent with their fleet on the harbor of Syracuse. They could
achieve nothing more, however, than the capture of one Athenian
merchant-vessel, out of two there riding. They disgraced their
acquisition by the cruel act (not uncommon in Carthaginian warfare)
of cutting of the hands of the captive crew; for which, in a few
days, retaliation was exercised upon the crews of some of their own
ships, taken by the cruisers of Agathokles.[941]

[941] Diodor. xix. 103. It must be noticed, however, that even
Julius Cæsar, in his wars in Gaul, sometimes cut off the hands of
his Gallic prisoners taken in arms, whom he called rebels (Bell.
Gall. viii. 44).

The defence of Agrigentum now rested principally on the Carthaginians
in Sicily, who took up a position on the hill called Eknomus—in
the territory of Gela, a little to the west of the Agrigentine
border. Here Agathokles approached to offer them battle—having been
emboldened by two important successes obtained over Deinokrates and
the Syracusan exiles, near Kentoripa and Gallaria.[942] So superior
was his force, however, that the Carthaginians thought it prudent to
remain in their camp; and Agathokles returned in triumph to Syracuse,
where he adorned the temples with his recently acquired spoils. The
balance of force was soon altered by the despatch of a large armament
from Carthage under Hamilkar, consisting of 130 ships of war, with
numerous other transport ships, carrying many soldiers—2000 native
Carthaginians, partly men of rank—10,000 Africans—1000 Campanian
heavy-armed and 1000 Balearic slingers. The fleet underwent in its
passage so terrific a storm, that many of the vessels sunk with all
on board, and it arrived with very diminished numbers in Sicily.
The loss fell upon the native Carthaginian soldiers with peculiar
severity; insomuch that when the news reached Carthage, a public
mourning was proclaimed, and the city walls were hung with black
serge.

[942] Diodor. xix. 103, 104.

Those who reached Sicily, however, were quite sufficient to place
Hamilkar in an imposing superiority of number as compared with
Agathokles. He encamped on or near Eknomus, summoned all the
reinforcements that his Sicilian allies could furnish, and collected
additional mercenaries; so that he was soon at the head of 40,000
infantry and 5000 cavalry.[943] At the same time, a Carthaginian
armed squadron, detached to the strait of Messênê, fell in with
twenty armed ships belonging to Agathokles, and captured them all
with their crews. The Sicilian cities were held to Agathokles
principally by terror, and were likely to turn against him, if the
Carthaginians exhibited sufficient strength to protect them. This the
despot knew and dreaded; especially respecting Gela, which was not
far from the Carthaginian camp. Had he announced himself openly as
intending to place a garrison in Gela, he feared that the citizens
might forestall him by calling in Hamilkar. Accordingly he detached
thither, on various pretences, several small parties of soldiers, who
presently found themselves united in a number sufficient to seize
the town. Agathokles then marched into Gela with his main force.
Distrusting the adherence of the citizens, he let loose his soldiers
upon them, massacred four thousand persons, and compelled the
remainder, as a condition of sparing their lives, to bring in to him
all their money and valuables. Having by this atrocity both struck
universal terror and enriched himself, he advanced onward towards
the Carthaginian camp, and occupied a hill called Phalarion opposite
to it.[944] The two camps were separated by a level plain or valley
nearly five miles broad, through which ran the river Himera.[945]

[943] Diodor. xix. 106.

[944] Diodor. xix. 107, 108.

[945] Diodor. xix. 108, 109.

For some days of the hottest season (the dog-days), both armies
remained stationary, neither of them choosing to make the attack. At
length Agathokles gained what he thought a favorable opportunity.
A detachment from the Carthaginian camp sallied forth in pursuit
of some Grecian plunderers; Agathokles posted some men in ambush,
who fell upon this detachment unawares, threw it into disorder, and
pursued it back to the camp. Following up this partial success,
Agathokles brought forward his whole force, crossed the river Himera,
and began a general attack. This advance not being expected, the
Grecian assailants seemed at first on the point of succeeding.
They filled up a portion of the ditch, tore up the Stockade, and
were forcing their way into the camp. They were however repulsed
by redoubled efforts, and new troops coming up, on the part of the
defenders; mainly, too, by the very effective action of the 1000
Balearic slingers in Hamilkar’s army, who hurled stones weighing
a pound each, against which the Grecian armor was an inadequate
defence. Still Agathokles, noway discouraged, caused the attack to be
renewed on several points at once and with apparent success, when
a reinforcement landed from Carthage—the expectation of which may
perhaps have induced Hamilkar to refrain from any general attack.
These new troops joined in the battle, coming upon the rear of the
Greeks; who were intimidated and disordered by such unforeseen
assailants, while the Carthaginians in their front, animated to more
energetic effort, first repulsed them from the camp, and then pressed
them vigorously back. After holding their ground for some time
against their double enemy, the Greeks at length fled in disorder
back to their own camp, recrossing the river Himera. The interval
was between four and five miles of nearly level ground, over which
they were actively pursued and severely handled by the Carthaginian
cavalry, 5000 in number. Moreover, in crossing the river, many
of them drank eagerly, from thirst, fatigue, and the heat of the
weather; the saltness of the water proved so destructive to them,
that numerous dead bodies are said to have been found unwounded on
the banks.[946] At length they obtained shelter in their own camp,
after a loss of 7000 men; while the loss of the victors is estimated
at 500.

[946] Diodor. xix. 109.

Agathokles, after this great disaster, did not attempt to maintain
his camp, but set it on fire, and returned to Gela; which was well
fortified and provisioned, capable of a long defence. Here he
intended to maintain himself against Hamilkar, at least until the
Syracusan harvest (probably already begun) should be completed. But
Hamilkar, having ascertained the strength of Gela, thought it prudent
to refrain from a siege, and employed himself in operations for the
purpose of strengthening his party in Sicily. His great victory
at the Himera had produced the strongest effect upon many of the
Sicilian cities, who were held to Agathokles by no other bonds except
those of fear. Hamilkar issued conciliatory proclamations, inviting
them all to become his allies, and marching his troops towards
the most convenient points. Presently Kamarina, Leontini, Katana,
Tauromenium, Messênê, Abakænum, with several other smaller towns
and forts, sent to tender themselves as allies; and the conduct of
Hamilkar towards all was so mild and equitable, as to give universal
satisfaction. Agathokles appears to have been thus dispossessed of
most part of the island, retaining little besides Gela and Syracuse.
Even the harbor of Syracuse was watched by a Carthaginian fleet,
placed to intercept foreign supplies. Returning to Syracuse after
Hamilkar had renounced all attempts on Gela, Agathokles collected
the corn from the neighborhood, and put the fortifications in the
best state of defence. He had every reason to feel assured that the
Carthaginians, encouraged by their recent success, and reinforced by
allies from the whole island, would soon press the siege of Syracuse
with all their energy; while for himself, hated by all, there was
no hope of extraneous support, and little hope of a successful
defence.[947]

[947] Diodor. xix. 110.

In this apparently desperate situation, he conceived the idea of a
novelty alike daring, ingenious, and effective; surrounded indeed
with difficulties in the execution, but promising, if successfully
executed, to change altogether the prospects of the war.

He resolved to carry a force across from Syracuse to Africa, and
attack the Carthaginians on their own soil. No Greek, so far as we
know, had ever conceived the like scheme before; no one certainly
had ever executed it. In the memory of man, the African territory of
Carthage had never been visited by hostile foot. It was known that
the Carthaginians would be not only unprepared to meet an attack at
home, but unable even to imagine it as practicable. It was known
that their territory was rich, and their African subjects harshly
treated, discontented, and likely to seize the first opportunity
for revolting. The landing of any hostile force near Carthage
would strike such a blow, as at least to cause the recall of the
Carthaginian armament in Sicily, and thus relieve Syracuse; perhaps
the consequences of it might be yet greater.

How to execute the scheme was the grand difficulty—for the
Carthaginians were superior not merely on land, but also at sea.
Agathokles had no chance except by keeping his purpose secret, and
even unsuspected. He fitted out an armament, announced as about to
sail forth from Syracuse on a secret expedition, against some unknown
town on the Sicilian coast. He selected for this purpose his best
troops, especially his horsemen, few of whom had been slain at the
battle of the Himera; he could not transport horses, but he put
the horsemen aboard with their saddles and bridles, entertaining
full assurance that he could procure horses in Africa. In selecting
soldiers for his expedition, he was careful to take one member from
many different families, to serve as hostage for the fidelity of
those left behind. He liberated, and enrolled among his soldiers,
many of the strongest and most resolute slaves. To provide the
requisite funds, his expedients were manifold; he borrowed from
merchants, seized the money belonging to orphans, stripped the
women of their precious ornaments, and even plundered the richest
temples. By all these proceedings, the hatred as well as fear towards
him was aggravated, especially among the more opulent families.
Agathokles publicly proclaimed, that the siege of Syracuse, which the
Carthaginians were now commencing, would be long and terrible—that
he and his soldiers were accustomed to hardships and could endure
them, but that those, who felt themselves unequal to the effort,
might retire with their properties while it was yet time. Many of
the wealthier families—to a number stated as 1600 persons—profited
by this permission; but as they were leaving the city, Agathokles
set his mercenaries upon them, slew them all, and appropriated their
possessions to himself.[948] By such tricks and enormities, he
provided funds enough for an armament of sixty ships, well filled
with soldiers. Not one of these soldiers knew where they were
going; there was a general talk about the madness of Agathokles;
nevertheless such was their confidence in his bravery and military
resource, that they obeyed his orders without asking questions. To
act as viceroy of Syracuse during his own absence, Agathokles named
Antander his brother, aided by an Ætolian officer named Erymnon.[949]

[948] Diodor. xx. 4, 5; Justin, xxii. 4. Compare Polyænus, 3-5.

[949] Diodor. xx. 4-16.

The armament was equipped and ready, without any suspicion on the
part of the Carthaginian fleet blockading the harbor. It happened
one day that the approach of some corn-ships seduced this fleet
into a pursuit; the mouth of the harbor being thus left unguarded,
Agathokles took the opportunity of striking with his armament into
the open sea. As soon as the Carthaginian fleet saw him sailing
forth, they neglected the corn-ships, and prepared for battle,
which they presumed that he was come to offer. To their surprise,
he stood out to sea as fast as he could; they then pushed out in
pursuit of him, but he had already got a considerable advance and
strove to keep it. Towards nightfall however they neared him so much,
that he was only saved by the darkness. During the night he made
considerable way; but on the next day there occurred an eclipse of
the sun so nearly total, that it became perfectly dark, and the stars
were visible. The mariners were so terrified at this phenomenon,
that all the artifice and ascendency of Agathokles were required to
inspire them with new courage. At length, after six days and nights,
they approached the coast of Africa. The Carthaginian ships had
pursued them at a venture, in the direction towards Africa; and they
appeared in sight, just as Agathokles was nearing the land. Strenuous
efforts were employed by the mariners on both sides to touch land
first; Agathokles secured that advantage, and was enabled to put
himself into such a posture of defence that he repulsed the attack
of the Carthaginian ships, and secured the disembarcation of his own
soldiers, at a point called the Latomiæ or Stone quarries.[950]

[950] Diodor. xx. 6. Procopius, Bell. Vand. i. 15. It is here
stated, that for nine days’ march eastward from Carthage, as far
as Juka, the land is παντελῶς ἀλίμενος.

After establishing his position ashore, and refreshing his soldiers,
the first proceeding of Agathokles was to burn his vessels; a
proceeding which seemed to carry an air of desperate boldness. Yet
in truth the ships were now useless—for, if he was unsuccessful on
land, they were not enough to enable him to return in the face of
the Carthaginian fleet; they were even worse than useless, since, if
he retained them, it was requisite that he should leave a portion of
his army to guard them, and thus enfeeble his means of action for
the really important achievements on land. Convening his soldiers
in assembly near the ships, he first offered a sacrifice to Demeter
and Persephonê—the patron goddesses of Sicily, and of Syracuse in
particular. He then apprised his soldiers, that during the recent
crossing and danger from the Carthaginian pursuers, he had addressed
a vow to these goddesses—engaging to make a burnt-offering of his
ships in their honor, if they would preserve him safe across to
Africa. The goddesses had granted this boon; they had farther, by
favorably responding to the sacrifice just offered, promised full
success to his African projects: it became therefore incumbent on
him to fulfil his vow with exactness. Torches being new brought,
Agathokles took one in his hand, and mounted on the stern of the
admiral’s ship, directing each of the trierarchs to do the like on
his own ship. All were set on fire simultaneously, amidst the sound
of trumpets, and the mingled prayers and shouts of the soldiers.[951]

[951] This striking scene is described by Diodorus, xx. 7
(compare Justin, xxii. 6), probably enough copied from Kallias,
the companion and panegyrist of Agathokles: see Diodor. xxi.
Fragm. p. 281.

Though Agathokles had succeeded in animating his soldiers with a
factitious excitement, for the accomplishment of this purpose, yet
so soon as they saw the conflagration decided and irrevocable, thus
cutting off all their communication with home—their spirits fell,
and they began to despair of their prospects. Without allowing
them time to dwell upon the novelty of the situation, Agathokles
conducted them at once against the nearest Carthaginian town, called
Megalê-Polis.[952] His march lay for the most part through a rich
territory in the highest cultivation. The passing glance which we
thus obtain into the condition of the territory near Carthage is
of peculiar interest; more especially when contrasted with the
desolation of the same coast, now and for centuries past. The
corn-land, the plantations both of vines and olives, the extensive
and well-stocked gardens, the size and equipment of the farm
buildings, the large outlay for artificial irrigation, the agreeable
country-houses belonging to wealthy Carthaginians, etc., all excited
the astonishment, and stimulated the cupidity, of Agathokles and his
soldiers. Moreover, the towns were not only very numerous, but all
open and unfortified, except Carthage itself and a few others on the
coast.[953]

[952] Megalê-Polis is nowhere else mentioned—nor is it noticed
by Forbiger in his list of towns in the Carthaginian territory
(Handbuch der Alten Geographie, sect. 109).

Dr. Barth (Wanderungen auf den Küsten Ländern des Mittelmeeres,
vol. i. p. 131-133) supposes that Agathokles landed at an
indentation of the coast on the western face of that projecting
tongue of land which terminates in Cape Bon (Promontorium
Mercurii), forming the eastern boundary of the Gulf of Carthage.
There are stone quarries here, of the greatest extent as well as
antiquity. Dr. Barth places Megalê-Polis not far off from this
spot, on the same western face of the projecting land, and near
the spot afterwards called Misua.

[953] Justin, xxii. 5. “Huc accedere, quod urbes castellaque
Africæ non muris cinctæ, non in montibus positæ sint: sed in
planis campis sine ullis munimentis jaceant: quas omnes metu
excidii facile ad belli societatem perlici posse.”

The Carthaginians, besides having little fear of invasion by sea,
were disposed to mistrust their subject cities, which they ruled
habitually with harshness and oppression.[954] The Liby-Phenicians
appear to have been unused to arms—a race of timid cultivators and
traffickers, accustomed to subjection and practised in the deceit
necessary for lightening it.[955] Agathokles, having marched through
this land of abundance, assaulted Megalêpolis without delay. The
inhabitants, unprepared for attack, distracted with surprise and
terror, made little resistance. Agathokles easily took the town,
abandoning both the persons of the inhabitants and all the rich
property within, to his soldiers; who enriched themselves with a
prodigious booty both from town and country—furniture, cattle, and
slaves. From hence he advanced farther southward to the town called
Tunês (the modern Tunis, at the distance of only fourteen miles
south-west of Carthage itself), which he took by storm in like
manner. He fortified Tunês as a permanent position; but he kept his
main force united in camp, knowing well that he should presently have
an imposing army against him in the field, and severe battles to
fight.[956]

[954] Seven centuries and more after these events, we read that
the Vandal king Genseric conquered Africa from the Romans—and
that he demolished the fortifications of all the other towns
except Carthage alone—from the like feeling of mistrust. This
demolition materially facilitated the conquest of the Vandal
kingdom by Belisarius, two generations afterwards (Procopius,
Bell. Vandal. i. 5; i. 15).

[955] Livy (xxix. 25), in recounting the landing of Scipio in
the Carthaginian territory in the latter years of the second
Punic war, says, “Emporia ut peterent, gubernatoribus edixit.
Fertilissimus ager, eoque abundans omnium copiâ rerum est regio,
et imbelles (quod plerumque in uberi agro evenit) barbari sunt:
priusque quam Carthagine subveniretur, opprimi videbantur posse.”

About the harshness of the Carthaginian rule over their African
subjects, see Diodor. xv. 77; Polyb. i. 72. In reference to
the above passage of Polybius, however, we ought to keep in
mind—That in describing this harshness, he speaks with _express
and exclusive reference_ to the conduct of the Carthaginians
towards their subjects during the first Punic war (against Rome),
when the Carthaginians themselves were hard pressed by the
Romans and required everything that they could lay hands upon
for self-defence. This passage of Polybius has been sometimes
cited as if it attested the _ordinary_ character and measure of
Carthaginian dominion; which is contrary to the intention of the
author.

[956] Diodor. xx. 8. Compare Polybius, i. 29, where he describes
the first invasion of the Carthaginian territory by the Roman
consul Regulus. Tunês was 120 stadia or about fourteen miles
south-east of Carthage (Polyb. i. 67). The Tab. Peuting. reckons
it only ten miles. It was made the central place for hostile
operations against Carthage both by Regulus in the first Punic
war (Polyb. i. 30),—by Matho and Spendius, in the rebellion of
the mercenary soldiers and native Africans against Carthage,
which followed on the close of the first Punic war (Polyb. i.
73)—and by the revolted Libyans in 396 B. C. (Diodor.
xiv. 77).

Diodorus places Tunês at the distance of 2000 stadia from
Carthage, which must undoubtedly be a mistake. He calls it _White
Tunês_; an epithet drawn from the chalk cliffs adjoining.

The Carthaginian fleet had pursued Agathokles during his crossing
from Syracuse, in perfect ignorance of his plans. When he landed
in Africa, on their own territory, and even burnt his fleet, they
at first flattered themselves with the belief that they held him
prisoner. But as soon as they saw him commence his march in military
array against Megalêpolis, they divined his real purposes, and were
filled with apprehension. Carrying off the brazen prow-ornaments of
his burnt and abandoned ships, they made sail for Carthage, sending
forward a swift vessel to communicate first what had occurred.
Before this vessel arrived, however, the landing of Agathokles had
been already made known at Carthage, where it excited the utmost
surprise and consternation; since no one supposed that he could have
accomplished such an adventure without having previously destroyed
the Carthaginian army and fleet in Sicily. From this extreme dismay
they were presently relieved by the arrival of the messengers from
their fleet; whereby they learnt the real state of affairs in
Sicily. They now made the best preparations in their power to resist
Agathokles. Hanno and Bomilkar, two men of leading families, were
named generals conjointly. They were bitter political rivals,—but
this very rivalry was by some construed as an advantage, since each
would serve as a check upon the other and as a guarantee to the
state; or, what is more probable, each had a party sufficiently
strong to prevent the separate election of the other.[957] These two
generals, unable to wait for distant succors, led out the native
forces of the city, stated at 40,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry, derived
altogether from citizens and residents—with 2000 war-chariots. They
took post on an eminence (somewhere between Tunis and Carthage) not
far from Agathokles; Bomilkar commanding on the left, where the
ground was so difficult that he was unable to extend his front, and
was obliged to admit an unusual depth of files; while Hanno was on
the right, having in his front rank the Sacred Band of Carthage, a
corps of 2500 distinguished citizens, better armed and braver than
the rest. So much did the Carthaginians outnumber the invaders—and
so confident were they of victory—that they carried with them 20,000
pairs of handcuffs for their anticipated prisoners.[958]

[957] Diodor. xx. 10.

[958] Diodor. xx. 10-13. See, respecting the Sacred Band of
Carthage (which was nearly cut to pieces by Timoleon at the
battle of the Krimesus), Diodor. xvi. 80, 81; also Vol. XI. of
this History, Chap. lxxxv. p. 171-177.

The amount of native or citizen-force given here by Diodorus
(40,000 foot and 1000 horse) seems very great. Our data for
appreciating it however are lamentably scanty; and we ought to
expect a large total. The population of Carthage is said to have
been 700,000 souls; even when it was besieged by the Romans in
the third Punic war, and when its power was prodigiously lessened
(Strabo, xvii. p. 833). Its military magazines, even in that
reduced condition, were enormous,—as they stood immediately
previous to their being given up to the Romans, under the
treacherous delusions held out by Rome.

Agathokles placed himself on the left, with 1000 chosen hoplites
round him, to combat the Sacred Band; the command of his right he
gave to his son Archagathus. His troops—Syracusans, miscellaneous
mercenary Greeks, Campanians or Samnites, Tuscans, and Gauls—scarcely
equalled in numbers one-half of the enemy. Some of the ships’ crews
were even without arms,—a deficiency, which Agathokles could only
supply in appearance, by giving to them the leather cases or wrappers
of shields, stretched out upon sticks. The outstretched wrappers thus
exhibited looked from a distance like shields; so that these men,
stationed in the rear, had the appearance of a reserve of hoplites.
As the soldiers however were still discouraged, Agathokles tried to
hearten them up by another device yet more singular, for which indeed
he must have made deliberate provision beforehand. In various parts
of the camp, he let fly a number of owls, which perched upon the
shields and helmets of the soldiers. These birds, the favorite of
Athênê, were supposed and generally asserted to promise victory; the
minds of the soldiers are reported to have been much reassured by the
sight.

The Carthaginian war-chariots and cavalry, which charged first, made
little or no impression; but the infantry of their right pressed the
Greeks seriously. Especially Hanno, with the Sacred Band around him,
behaved with the utmost bravery and forwardness, and seemed to be
gaining advantage, when he was unfortunately slain. His death not
only discouraged his own troops, but became fatal to the army, by
giving opportunity for treason to his colleague Bomilkar. This man
had long secretly meditated the project of rendering himself despot
of Carthage. As a means of attaining that end, he deliberately sought
to bring reverses upon her; and no sooner had he heard of Hanno’s
death, than he gave orders for his own wing to retreat. The Sacred
Band, though fighting with unshaken valor, were left unsupported,
attacked in rear as well as front, and compelled to give way along
with the rest. The whole Carthaginian army was defeated and driven
back to Carthage. Their camp fell into the hands of Agathokles, who
found among their baggage the very handcuffs which they had brought
for fettering their expected captives.[959]

[959] Diodor. xx. 12. The loss of the Carthaginians was
differently given—some authors stated it at 1000 men—others at
6000. The loss in the army of Agathokles was stated at 200 men.

This victory made Agathokles for the time master of the open country.
He transmitted the news to Sicily, by a boat of thirty oars,
constructed expressly for the purpose—since he had no ships of his
own remaining. Having fortified Tunês and established it as his
central position, he commenced operations along the eastern coast
(Zeugitana and Byzakium, as the northern and southern portions of
it were afterwards denominated by the Romans) against the towns
dependent on Carthage.[960]

[960] Diodor. xx. 17.

In that city, meanwhile, all was terror and despondency in
consequence of the recent defeat. It was well known that the African
subjects generally entertained nothing but fear and hatred towards
the reigning city. Neither the native Libyans or Africans,—nor the
mixed race called Liby-Phœnicians, who inhabited the towns[961]—could
be depended on if their services were really needed. The distress of
the Carthaginians took the form of religious fears and repentance.
They looked back with remorse on the impiety of their past lives, and
on their omissions of duty towards the gods. To the Tyrian Herakles,
they had been slack in transmitting the dues and presents required
by their religion; a backwardness which they now endeavored to make
up by sending envoys to Tyre, with prayers and supplications, with
rich presents, and especially with models in gold and silver of
their sacred temples and shrines. Towards Kronus, or Moloch, they
also felt that they had conducted themselves sinfully. The worship
acceptable to that god required the sacrifice of young children,
born of free and opulent parents, and even the choice child of the
family. But it was now found out, on investigation, that many parents
had recently put a fraud upon the god, by surreptitiously buying
poor children, feeding them well, and then sacrificing them as their
own. This discovery seemed at once to explain why Kronus had become
offended, and what had brought upon them the recent defeat. They
made an emphatic atonement, by selecting 200 children from the most
illustrious families in Carthage, and offering them up to Kronus
at a great public sacrifice; besides which, 300 parents, finding
themselves denounced for similar omissions in the past, displayed
their repentance by voluntarily immolating their own children for
the public safety. The statue of Kronus,—placed with outstretched
hands to receive the victim tendered to him, with fire immediately
underneath—was fed on that solemnity certainly with 200, and probably
with 500, living children.[962] By this monstrous holocaust the full
religious duty being discharged, and forgiveness obtained from the
god, the mental distress of the Carthaginians was healed.

[961] Diodor. xx. 55.

[962] Diodor. xx. 14. ᾐτιῶντο δὲ καὶ τὸν Κρόνον αὑτοῖς
ἐναντιοῦσθαι, καθόσον ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις θύοντες τούτῳ
τῷ θεῷ τῶν υἱῶν τοὺς κρατίστους, ὕστερον ὠνούμενοι λάθρα παῖδας
καὶ θρέψαντες ἔπεμπον ἐπὶ τὴν θυσίαν· καὶ ζητήσεως γενομένης,
εὑρέθησάν τινες τῶν καθιερουργημένων ὑποβολιμαῖοι γεγονότες·
τούτων δὲ λαβόντες ἔννοιαν, καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους πρὸς τοῖς τείχεσιν
ὁρῶντες στρατοπεδεύοντας, ἐδεισιδαιμόνουν ὡς καταλελυκότες τὰς
πατρίους τῶν θεῶν τιμάς· διορθώσασθαι δὲ τὰς ἀγνοίας σπεύδοντες,
διακοσίους μὲν τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων παίδων προκρίναντες ἔθυσαν
δημοσίᾳ· ἄλλοι δ᾽ ἐν διαβολαῖς ὄντες, ἑκουσίως ἑαυτοὺς ἔδοσαν,
οὐκ ἐλάττους ὄντες τριακοσίων· ἦν δὲ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἀνδριὰς Κρόνου
χαλκοῦς, ἐκτετακὼς τὰς χεῖρας ὑπτίας ἐγκεκλιμένας ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν,
ὥστε τὸν ἐπιτεθέντα τῶν παίδων ἀποκυλίεσθαι καὶ πίπτειν εἴς τι
χάσμα πλῆρες πυρός. Compare Festus ap. Lactantium, Inst. Div. i.
21; Justin, xviii. 6, 12.

In this remarkable passage (the more remarkable because so little
information concerning Carthaginian antiquity has reached us),
one clause is not perfectly clear, respecting the three hundred
who are said to have voluntarily _given themselves up_. Diodorus
means (I apprehend) as Eusebius understood it, that these were
fathers who gave up _their children_ (not themselves) to be
sacrificed. The victims here mentioned as sacrificed to Kronus
were children, not adults (compare Diodor. xiii. 86): nothing
is here said about adult victims. Wesseling in his note adheres
to the literal meaning of the words, dissenting from Eusebius:
but I think that the literal meaning is less in harmony with the
general tenor of the paragraph. Instances of self-devotion, by
persons torn with remorse, are indeed mentioned: see the case of
Imilkon, Diodor. xiv. 76; Justin, xix. 3.

We read in the Fragment of Ennius—“Pœni sunt soliti suos
sacrificare puellos:” see the chapter iv. of Münter’s work,
Religion der Karthager, on this subject.

Having thus relieved their consciences on the score of religious
obligation, the Carthaginians despatched envoys to Hamilkar in
Sicily, acquainting him with the recent calamity, desiring him
to send a reinforcement, and transmitting to him the brazen prow
ornaments taken from the ships of Agathokles. They at the same time
equipped a fresh army, with which they marched forth to attack
Tunês. Agathokles had fortified that town, and established a strong
camp before it; but he had withdrawn his main force to prosecute
operations against the maritime towns on the eastern coast of the
territory of Carthage. Among these towns, he first attacked Neapolis
with success, granting to the inhabitants favorable terms. He then
advanced farther southwards towards Adrumetum, of which he commenced
the siege, with the assistance of a neighboring Libyan prince named
Elymas, who now joined him. While Agathokles was engaged in the siege
of Adrumetum, the Carthaginians attacked his position at Tunês, drove
his soldiers out of the fortified camp into the town, and began to
batter the defences of the town itself. Apprised of this danger
while besieging Adrumetum, but nevertheless reluctant to raise the
siege,—Agathokles left his main army before it, stole away with
only a few soldiers and some camp-followers, and conducting them to
an elevated spot—halfway between Adrumetum and Tunês, yet visible
from both—he caused them to kindle at night upon this eminence a
prodigious number of fires.[963] The effect, of these fires, seen
from Adrumetum on one side and from Tunês on the other, was, to
produce the utmost terror at both places. The Carthaginians besieging
Tunês fancied that Agathokles with his whole army was coming to
attack them, and forthwith abandoned the siege in disorder, leaving
their engines behind. The defenders of Adrumetum, interpreting these
fires as evidence of a large reinforcement on its way to join the
besieging army, were so discouraged that they surrendered the town on
capitulation.[964]

[963] Diodor. xx. 17. λάθρα προσῆλθεν ἐπί τινα τόπον ὀρεινὸν,
ὅθεν ~ὁρᾶσθαι δυνατὸν ἦν αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀδρυμητινῶν καὶ τῶν
Καρχηδονίων τῶν Τύνητα πολιορκούντων~· νυκτὸς δὲ συντάξας τοῖς
στρατιώταις ἐπὶ πολὺν τόπον πυρὰ καίειν, δόξαν ἐν εποίησε,
τοῖς μὲν Καρχηδονίοις, ὡς μετὰ μεγάλης δυνάμεως ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς
πορευόμενος, τοῖς δὲ πολιορκουμένοις, ὡς ἄλλης δυνάμεως ἁδρᾶς
τοῖς πολεμίοις εἰς συμμαχίαν παραγεγενημένης.

[964] Diodor. xx. 17. The incident here recounted by Diodorus
is curious, but quite distinct and intelligible. He had good
authorities before him in his history of Agathokles. If true,
it affords an evidence for determining, within some limits, the
site of the ancient Adrumetum, which Mannert and Shaw place at
Herkla— while Forbiger and Dr. Barth put it near the site of the
modern port called Susa, still more to the southward, and at a
prodigious distance from Tunis. Other anthem have placed it at
Hamamat, more to the northward than Herkla, and nearer to Tunis.

Of these three sites, Hamamat is the only one which will consist
with the narrative of Diodorus. Both the others are too distant.
Hamamat is about forty-eight English miles from Tunis (see Barth,
p. 184, with his note). This is as great a distance (if not too
great) as can possibly be admitted; both Herkla and Susa are very
much more distant, and therefore out of the question.

Nevertheless, the other evidence known to us tends apparently
to place Adrumetum at Susa, and not at Hamamat (see Barth, p.
142-154; Forbiger, Handb. Geog. p. 845). It is therefore probable
that the narrative of Diodorus is not true, or must apply to some
other place on the coast (possibly Neapolis, the modern Nabel)
taken by Agathokles, and not to Adrumetum.

By this same stratagem—if the narrative can be trusted—Agathokles
both relieved Tunês, and acquired possession of Adrumetum. Pushing
his conquests yet farther south, he besieged and took Thapsus,
with several other towns on the coast to a considerable distance
southward.[965] He also occupied and fortified the important position
called Aspis, on the south-east of the headland Cape Bon, and not far
distant from it; a point convenient for maritime communication with
Sicily.[966]

[965] Diodor. xx. 17.

[966] Strabo, xvii. p. 834. Solinus (c. 30) talks of Aspis as
founded by the _Siculi_. Aspis (called by the Romans Clypea),
being on the eastern side of Cape Bon, was more convenient for
communication with Sicily than either Carthage, or Tunis, or
any part of the Gulf of Carthage, which was on the western side
of Cape Bon. To get round that headland is, even at the present
day, a difficult and uncertain enterprise for navigators: see
the remarks of Dr. Barth, founded partly on his own personal
experience (Wanderungen auf den Küstenländern des Mittelmeeres,
i. p. 196). A ship coming from Sicily to Aspis was not under the
necessity of getting round the headland.

In the case of Agathokles, there was a further reason for
establishing his maritime position at Aspis. The Carthaginian
fleet was superior to him at sea; accordingly they could easily
interrupt his maritime communication from Sicily with Tunis, or
with any point in the Gulf of Carthage. But it was not so easy
for them to watch the coast at Aspis; for in order to do this,
they must get from the Gulf round to Cape Bon.

By a series of such acquisitions, comprising in all not less than
200 dependencies of Carthage, Agathokles became master along the
eastern coast.[967] He next endeavored to subdue the towns in the
interior, into which he advanced as far as several days’ march. But
he was recalled by intelligence from his soldiers at Tunês, that the
Carthaginians had marched out again to attack them, and had already
retaken some of his conquests. Returning suddenly by forced marches,
he came upon them by surprise, and drove in their advanced parties
with considerable loss; while he also gained an important victory
over the Libyan prince Elymas, who had rejoined the Carthaginians,
but was now defeated and slain.[968] The Carthaginians, however,
though thus again humbled and discouraged, still maintained the
field, strongly entrenched, between Carthage and Tunês.

[967] Diodor. xx. 17. The Roman consul Regulus, when he invaded
Africa during the first Punic war, is said to have acquired,
either by capture or voluntary adhesion, two hundred dependent
cities of Carthage (Appian, Punica, c. 3). Respecting the
prodigious number of towns in Northern Africa, see the very
learned and instructive work of Mövers, Die Phönikier, vol.
ii. p. 454 _seqq._ Even at the commencement of the third Punic
war, when Carthage was so much reduced in power, she had still
three hundred cities in Libya (Strabo, xvii. p. 833). It must be
confessed that the name cities or towns (πόλεις) was used by some
authors very vaguely. Thus Posidonius ridiculed the affirmation
of Polybius (Strabo, iii. p. 162), that Tiberius Gracchus had
destroyed three hundred πόλεις of the Celtiberians; Strabo
censures others who spoke of one thousand πόλεις of the Iberians.
Such a number could only be made good by including large κῶμαι.

[968] Diodor. xx. 17, 18.

Meanwhile the affairs of Agathokles at Syracuse had taken a turn
unexpectedly favorable. He had left that city blocked up partially
by sea and with a victorious enemy encamped near it; so that
supplies found admission with difficulty. In this condition,
Hamilkar, commander of the Carthaginian army, received from
Carthage the messengers announcing their recent defeat in Africa;
yet also bringing the brazen prow ornaments taken from the ships
of Agathokles. He ordered the envoys to conceal the real truth,
and to spread abroad news that Agathokles had been destroyed with
his armament; in proof of which he produced the prow ornaments,—an
undoubted evidence that the ships had really been destroyed. Sending
envoys with these evidences into Syracuse, to be exhibited to
Antander, and the ether authorities, Hamilkar demanded from them
the surrender of the city, under promise of safety and favorable
terms; at the same time marching his army close up to it, with
the view of making an attack. Antander with others, believing the
information and despairing of successful resistance, were disposed
to comply; but Erymnon the Ætolian insisted on holding out until
they had fuller certainty. This resolution Antander adopted. At the
same time, mistrusting those citizens of Syracuse who were relatives
or friends of the exiles without, he ordered them all to leave the
city immediately, with their wives and families. No less than 8000
persons were expelled under this mandate. They were consigned to the
mercy of Hamilkar, and his army without; who not only suffered them
to pass, but treated them with kindness. Syracuse was now a scene
of aggravated wretchedness and despondency; not less from this late
calamitous expulsion, than from the grief of those who believed that
their relatives in Africa had perished with Agathokles. Hamilkar had
brought up his battering-engines, and was preparing to assault the
town, when Nearchus, the messenger from Agathokles, arrived from
Africa after a voyage of five days, having under favor of darkness
escaped, though only just escaped, the blockading squadron. From him
the Syracusan government learnt the real truth, and the victorious
position of Agathokles. There was no farther talk of capitulation;
Hamilkar—having tried a partial assault, which was vigorously
repulsed,—withdrew his army, and detached from it a reinforcement of
5000 men to the aid of his countrymen in Africa.[969]

[969] Diodor. xx. 15, 16.

During some months, he seems to have employed himself in partial
operations for extending the Carthaginian dominion throughout
Sicily. But at length he concerted measures with the Syracusan exile
Deinokrates, who was at the head of a numerous body of his exiled
countrymen, for a renewed attack upon Syracuse. His fleet already
blockaded the harbor, and he now with his army, stated as 120,000
men, destroyed the neighboring lands, hoping to starve out the
inhabitants. Approaching close to the walls of the city, he occupied
the Olympieion, or temple of Zeus Olympius, near the river Anapus and
the interior coast of the Great Harbor. From hence—probably under the
conduct of Deinokrates and the other exiles, well-acquainted with
the ground—he undertook by a night-march to ascend the circuitous
and difficult mountain track, for the purpose of surprising the
fort called Euryalus, at the highest point of Epipolæ, and the
western apex of the Syracusan lines of fortification. This was
the same enterprise, at the same hour, and with the same main
purpose, as that of Demosthenes during the Athenian siege, after
he had brought the second armament from Athens to the relief of
Nikias.[970] Even Demosthenes, though conducting his march with
greater precaution than Hamilkar, and successful in surprising the
fort of Euryalus, had been driven down again with disastrous loss.
Moreover, since his time, this fort Euryalus, instead of being left
detached, had been embodied by the elder Dionysius as an integral
portion of the fortifications of the city. It formed the apex or
point of junction for the two converging walls—one skirting the
northern cliff, the other the southern cliff, of Epipolæ.[971]
The surprise intended by Hamilkar—difficult in the extreme, if at
all practicable—seems to have been unskilfully conducted. It was
attempted with a confused multitude, incapable of that steady order
requisite for night-movements. His troops, losing their way in the
darkness, straggled, and even mistook each other for enemies; while
the Syracusan guards from Euryalus, alarmed by the noise, attacked
them vigorously and put them to the rout. Their loss, in trying
to escape down the steep declivity, was prodigious; and Hamilkar
himself, making brave efforts to rally them, became prisoner to the
Syracusans. What lent peculiar interest to this incident, in the
eyes of a pious Greek, was that it served to illustrate and confirm
the truth of prophecy. Hamilkar had been assured by a prophet that
he would sup that night in Syracuse; and this assurance had in part
emboldened him to the attack, since he naturally calculated on
entering the city as a conqueror.[972] He did indeed take his evening
meal in Syracuse, literally fulfilling the augury. Immediately after
it, he was handed over to the relatives of the slain, who first
paraded him through the city in chains, then inflicted on him the
worst tortures, and lastly killed him. His head was cut off and sent
to Africa.[973]

[970] See Vol. VII. Ch. lx. p. 304 of this History.

[971] For a description of the fortifications added to Syracuse
by the elder Dionysius, see Vol. X. Ch. lxxxii. p. 499 of this
History.

[972] Diodor. xx. 29, 30. Cicero (Divinat. i. 24) notices this
prophecy and its manner of fulfilment; but he gives a somewhat
different version of the events preceding the capture of Hamilkar.

[973] Diodor. xx. 30. τὸν δ᾽ οὖν Ἁμίλκαν οἱ τῶν ἀπολωλότων
συγγενεῖς δεδεμένον ἀγαγόντες διὰ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ δειναῖς αἰκίαις
κατ᾽ αὐτοῦ χρησάμενοι, μετὰ τῆς ἐσχάτης ὕβρεως ἀνεῖλον.

The loss and humiliation sustained in this repulse—together with the
death of Hamilkar, and the discord ensuing between the exiles under
Deinokrates and the Carthaginian soldiers—completely broke up the
besieging army. At the same time, the Agrigentines, profiting by the
depression both of Carthaginians and exiles, stood forward publicly,
proclaiming themselves as champions of the cause of autonomous city
government throughout Sicily, under their own presidency, against
both the Carthaginians on one side, and the despot Agathokles on
the other. They chose for their general a citizen named Xenodokus,
who set himself with vigor to the task of expelling everywhere the
mercenary garrisons which held the cities in subjection. He began
first with Gela, the city immediately adjoining Agrigentum, found
a party of the citizens disposed to aid him, and in conjunction
with them, overthrew the Agathoklean garrison. The Geloans, thus
liberated, seconded cordially his efforts to extend the like benefits
to others. The popular banner proclaimed by Agrigentum proved so
welcome, that many cities eagerly invited her aid to shake off the
yoke of the soldiery in their respective citadels, and regain their
free governments.[974] Enna, Erbessus, Echetla,[975] Leontini, and
Kamarina, were all thus relieved from the dominion of Agathokles;
while other cities were in like manner emancipated from the sway
of the Carthaginians; and joined the Agrigentine confederacy.
The Agathoklean government at Syracuse was not strong enough to
resist such spirited manifestations. Syracuse still continued to be
blocked up by the Carthaginian fleet; though the blockade was less
efficacious, and supplies were now introduced more abundantly than
before.[976]

[974] Diodor. xx. 31. διαβοηθείσης δὲ τῆς τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων
ἐπιβολῆς κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν νῆσον, ἐνέπεσεν ὁρμὴ ταῖς πόλεσι πρὸς τὴν
ἐλευθερίαν.

[975] Enna is nearly in the centre of Sicily; Erbessus is not far
to the north-east of Agrigentum; Echetla is placed by Polybius
(i. 15) midway between the domain of Syracuse and that of
Carthage.

[976] Diodor. xx. 32.

The ascendency of Agathokles was thus rather on the wane in Sicily:
but in Africa, he had become more powerful than ever—not without
perilous hazards which brought him occasionally to the brink of ruin.
On receiving from Syracuse the head of the captive Hamilkar, he rode
forth close to the camp of the Carthaginians, and held it up to their
view in triumph; they made respectful prostration before it, but the
sight was astounding and mournful to them.[977] While they were thus
in despondency, however, a strange vicissitude was on the point of
putting their enemy into their hands. A violent mutiny broke out in
the camp of Agathokles at Tunês, arising out of a drunken altercation
between his son Archagathus and an Ætolian officer named Lykiskus;
which ended in the murder of the latter by the former. The comrades
of Lykiskus rose in arms with fury to avenge him, calling for the
head of Archagathus. They found sympathy with the whole army; who
seized the opportunity of demanding their arrears of outstanding
pay, chose new generals, and took regular possession of Tunês with
its defensive works. The Carthaginians, informed of this outbreak,
immediately sent envoys to treat with the mutineers, offering to them
large presents and double pay in the service of Carthage. Their offer
was at first so favorably entertained, that the envoys returned with
confident hopes of success; when Agathokles, as a last resource,
clothed himself in mean garb, and threw himself on the mercy of the
soldiers. He addressed them in a pathetic appeal, imploring them not
to desert him, and even drew his sword to kill himself before their
faces. With such art did he manage this scene, that the feelings of
the soldiers underwent a sudden and complete revolution. They not
only became reconciled to him, but even greeted him with enthusiasm,
calling on him to resume the dress and functions of general, and
promising unabated obedience for the future.[978] Agathokles gladly
obeyed the call, and took advantage of their renewed ardor to attack
forthwith the Carthaginians; who, expecting nothing less, were
defeated with considerable loss.[979]

[977] Diodor. xx. 33. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, περιαλγεῖς γενόμενοι,
καὶ βαρβαρικῶς προσκυνήσαντες, etc.

[978] Compare the description in Tacitus, Hist. ii. 29, of the
mutiny in the Vitellian army commanded by Fabius Valens, at
Ticinum.

“Postquam immissis lictoribus, Valens coercere seditionem
cœptabat, ipsum invadunt (milites), saxa jaciunt, fugientem
sequuntur.—Valens, servili veste, apud decurionem equitum
tegebatur.” (Presently the feeling changes, by the adroit
management of Alphenus Varus, prefect of the camp)—then,
“silentio, patientia, postremo precibus et lacrymis, veniam
quærebant. Ut vero deformis et flens, et præter spem incolumis
Valens processit, gaudium, miseratio, favor: versi in lætitiam
(ut est vulgus utroque immodicum) laudantes gratantesque
circumdatum aquilis signisque, in tribunal ferunt.”

[979] Diodor. xx. 34.

In spite of this check, the Carthaginians presently sent a
considerable force into the interior, for the purpose of reconquering
or regaining the disaffected Numidian tribes. They met with good
success in this enterprise; but the Numidians were in the main
faithless and indifferent to both the belligerents, seeking only
to turn the war to their own profit. Agathokles, leaving his son
in command at Tunês, followed the Carthaginians into the interior
with a large portion of his army. The Carthaginian generals were
cautious, and kept themselves in strong position. Nevertheless
Agathokles felt confident enough to assail them in their camp; and
after great effort, with severe loss on his own side, he gained an
indecisive victory. This advantage however was countervailed by the
fact, that during the action the Numidians assailed his camp, slew
all the defenders, and carried off nearly all the slaves and baggage.
The loss on the Carthaginian side fell most severely upon the Greek
soldiers in their pay; most of them exiles under Klinon, and some
Syracusan exiles. These men behaved with signal gallantry, and were
nearly all slain, either during the battle or after the battle, by
Agathokles.[980]

[980] Diodor. xx. 39.

It had now become manifest, however, to this daring invader that
the force of resistance possessed by Carthage was more than he
could overcome—that though humbling and impoverishing her for the
moment, he could not bring the war to a triumphant close; since
the city itself, occupying the isthmus of a peninsula from sea to
sea, and surrounded with the strongest fortifications, could not
be besieged except by means far superior to his.[981] We have
already seen, that though he had gained victories and seized rich
plunder, he had not been able to provide even regular pay for his
soldiers, whose fidelity was consequently precarious. Nor could he
expect reinforcements from Sicily; where his power was on the whole
declining, though Syracuse itself was in less danger than before.
He therefore resolved to invoke aid from Ophellas at Kyrênê and
despatched Orthon as envoy for that purpose.[982]

[981] Diodor. xx. 59. Ὁ δὲ τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἦν κίνδυνος, ἀπροσίτου
τῆς πόλεως οὔσης διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν τειχῶν καὶ τῆς θαλάττης
ὀχυρότητα.

[982] Diodor. xx. 40.

To Kyrênê and what was afterwards called its Pentapolis (i. e. the
five neighboring Grecian towns, Kyrênê, its port Apollonia, Barka,
Teucheira, and Hesperides), an earlier chapter of this history has
already been devoted.[983] Unfortunately information respecting
them, for a century and more anterior to Alexander the Great, is
almost wholly wanting. Established among a Libyan population, many
of whom were domiciliated with the Greeks as fellow-residents, these
Kyreneans had imbibed many Libyan habits in war, in peace, and in
religion; of which their fine breed of horses, employed both for
the festival chariot-matches and in battle, was one example. The
Libyan tribes, useful as neighbors, servants, and customers,[984]
were frequently also troublesome as enemies. In 413 B. C.
we hear accidentally that Hesperides was besieged by Libyan tribes,
and rescued by some Peloponnesian hoplites on their way to Syracuse
during the Athenian siege.[985] About 401 B. C. (shortly
after the close of the Peloponnesian war), the same city was again
so hard pressed by the same enemies, that she threw open her
citizenship to any Greek new-comer who would aid in repelling them.
This invitation was accepted by several of the Messenians, just then
expelled from Peloponnesus, and proscribed by the Spartans; they
went to Africa, but, becoming involved in intestine warfare among
the citizens of Kyrênê, a large proportion of them perished.[986]
Except these scanty notices, we hear nothing about the Greco-Libyan
Pentapolis in relation to Grecian affairs, before the time of
Alexander. It would appear that the trade with the native African
tribes, between the Gulfs called the Greater and Lesser Syrtis,
was divided between Kyrênê (meaning the Kyrenaic Pentapolis) and
Carthage—at a boundary point called the Altars of the Philæni,
ennobled by a commemorative legend; immediately east of these Altars
was Automala, the westernmost factory of Kyrênê.[987] We cannot doubt
that the relations, commercial and otherwise, between Kyrênê and
Carthage, the two great emporia on the coast of Africa, were constant
and often lucrative—though not always friendly.

[983] See Vol. IV. Ch. xxvii. p. 29-49.

[984] See Isokrates, Or. iv. (Philipp.) s. 6, where he speaks of
Kyrênê as a spot judiciously chosen for colonization; the natives
near it being not dangerous, but suited for obedient neighbors
and slaves.

[985] Thucyd. vii. 50.

[986] Pausan. iv. 26; Diodor. xiv. 34.

[987] Strabo, xvii. p. 836; Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. p. 126.

In the year 331 B. C., when the victorious Alexander overran Egypt,
the inhabitants of Kyrênê sent to tender presents and submission
to him, and became enrolled among his subjects.[988] We hear
nothing more about them until the last year of Alexander’s life
(324 B. C. to 323 B. C.). About that time, the exiles from Kyrênê
and Barka, probably enough emboldened by the rescript of Alexander
(proclaimed at the Olympic festival of 324 B. C., and directing
that all Grecian exiles, except those guilty of sacrilege, should
be recalled forthwith), determined to accomplish their return by
force. To this end they invited from Krete an officer named Thimbron;
who, having slain Harpalus after his flight from Athens (recounted
in a previous chapter), had quartered himself in Krete, with the
treasure, the ships, and the 6000 mercenaries, brought over from
Asia by that satrap.[989] Thimbron willingly carried over his army
to their assistance, intending to conquer for himself a principality
in Libya. He landed near Kyrênê, defeated the Kyrenean forces with
great slaughter, and made himself master of Apollonia, the fortified
port of that city, distant from it nearly ten miles. The towns of
Barka and Hesperides sided with him; so that he was strong enough to
force the Kyreneans to a disadvantageous treaty. They covenanted to
pay 500 talents,—to surrender to him half of their war-chariots for
his ulterior projects—and to leave him in possession of Apollonia.
While he plundered the merchants in the harbor, he proclaimed
his intention of subjugating the independent Libyan tribes, and
probably of stretching his conquests to Carthage.[990] His schemes
were however frustrated by one of his own officers, a Kretan named
Mnasikles; who deserted to the Kyreneans, and encouraged them to set
aside the recent convention. Thimbron, after seizing such citizens of
Kyrênê as happened to be at Apollonia, attacked Kyrênê itself, but
was repulsed; and the Kyreneans were then bold enough to invade the
territory of Barka and Hesperides. To aid them, Thimbron moved his
quarters from Apollonia; but during his absence, Mnasikles contrived
to surprise that valuable port; thus mastering at once his base of
operations, the station for his fleet, and all the baggage of his
soldiers. Thimbron’s fleet could not be long maintained without a
harbor. The seamen, landing here and there for victuals and water,
were cut off by the native Libyans, while the vessels were dispersed
by storms.[991]

[988] Arrian, vii. 9, 12; Curtius, iv. 7, 9; Diodor. xvii. 49.
It is said that the inhabitants of Kyrênê (exact date unknown)
applied to Plato to make laws for them, but that he declined. See
Thrige, Histor. Cyrênês, p. 191. We should be glad to have this
statement better avouched.

[989] Diodor. xvii. 108, xviii. 19; Arrian, De Rebus; post
Alexandr. vi. apud Photium, Cod. 92; Strabo, xvii. p. 837.

[990] Diodor. xviii. 19.

[991] Diodor. xvii. 20.

The Kyreneans, now full of hope, encountered Thimbron in the field,
and defeated him. Yet though reduced to distress, he contrived
to obtain possession of Teucheira; to which port he invoked as
auxiliaries 2500 fresh soldiers, out of the loose mercenary bands
dispersed near Cape Tænarus in Peloponnesus. This reinforcement
again put him in a condition for battle. The Kyreneans on their
side also thought it necessary to obtain succor, partly from the
neighboring Libyans, partly from Carthage. They got together a force
stated as 30,000 men, with which they met him in the field. But, on
this occasion they were totally routed, with the loss of all their
generals and much of their army. Thimbron was now in the full tide of
success; he pressed both Kyrênê and the harbor so vigorously, that
famine began to prevail, and sedition broke out among the citizens.
The oligarchical men, expelled by the more popular party, sought
shelter, some in the camp of Thimbron; some at the court of Ptolemy
in Egypt.[992]

[992] Diodor. xviii. 21.

I have already mentioned, that in the partition after the decease
of Alexander, Egypt had been assigned to Ptolemy. Seizing with
eagerness the opportunity of annexing to it so valuable a possession
as the Kyrenaic Pentapolis, this chief sent an adequate force under
Ophellas to put down Thimbron and restore the exiles. His success was
complete. All the cities in the Pentapolis were reduced; Thimbron,
worsted and pursued as a fugitive, was seized in his flight by
some Libyans, and brought prisoner to Teucheira; the citizens of
which place (by permission of the Olynthian Epikydes, governor for
Ptolemy), first tortured him, and then conveyed him to Apollonia to
be hanged. A final visit from Ptolemy himself regulated the affairs
of the Pentapolis, which were incorporated with his dominions and
placed under the government of Ophellas.[993]

[993] Arrian, De Rebus post Alex. vi. ap. Phot. Cod. 92; Diodor.
xviii. 21; Justin, xiii. 6, 20.

It was thus that the rich and flourishing Kyrênê, an interesting
portion of the once autonomous Hellenic world, passed like the rest
under one of the Macedonian Diadochi. As the proof and guarantee of
this new sovereignty, we find erected within the walls of the city,
a strong and completely detached citadel, occupied by a Macedonian
or Egyptian garrison (like Munychia at Athens), and forming the
stronghold of the viceroy. Ten years afterwards (B. C. 312)
the Kyreneans made an attempt to emancipate themselves, and besieged
this citadel; but being again put down by an army and fleet which
Ptolemy despatched under Agis from Egypt,[994] Kyrênê passed once
more under the vice-royalty of Ophellas.[995]

[994] Diodor. xix. 79. Οἱ Κυρηναῖοι ... τὴν ἄκραν
περιεστρατοπέδευσαν, ὡς αὔτικα μάλα τὴν φρουρὰν ἐκβαλοῦντες, etc.

[995] Justin (xxii. 7, 4) calls Ophellas “rex Cyrenarum;” but it
is noway probable that he had become independent of Ptolemy—as
Thrige (Hist. Cyrênês, p. 214) supposes. The expression in
Plutarch (Demetrius, 14), Ὀφέλλᾳ τῷ ἄρξαντι Κυρήνης, does not
necessarily imply an independent authority.

To this viceroy Agathokles now sent envoys, invoking his aid against
Carthage. Ophellas was an officer of consideration and experience.
He had served under Alexander, and had married an Athenian wife,
Euthydikê,—a lineal descendant from Miltiades the victor of
Marathon, and belonging to a family still distinguished at Athens.
In inviting Ophellas to undertake jointly the conquest of Carthage,
the envoys proposed that he should himself hold it when conquered.
Agathokles (they said) wished only to overthrow the Carthaginian
dominion in Sicily, being well aware that he could not hold that
island in conjunction with an African dominion. To Ophellas,[996]
such an invitation proved extremely seducing. He was already on
the look out for aggrandizement towards the west, and had sent an
exploring nautical expedition along the northern coast of Africa,
even to some distance round and beyond the Strait of Gibraltar.[997]
Moreover, to all military adventurers, both on sea and on land, the
season was one of boundless speculative promise. They had before
them not only the prodigious career of Alexander himself, but the
successful encroachments of the great officers his successors. In
the second distribution, made at Triparadeisus, of the Alexandrine
empire, Antipater had assigned to Ptolemy not merely Egypt and
Libya, but also an undefined amount of territory west of Libya, to
be afterwards acquired;[998] the conquest of which was known to
have been among the projects of Alexander, had he lived longer.
To this conquest Ophellas was now specially called, either as the
viceroy or the independent equal of Ptolemy, by the invitation
of Agathokles. Having learnt in the service of Alexander not to
fear long marches, he embraced the proposition with eagerness. He
undertook an expedition from Kyrênê on the largest scale. Through
his wife’s relatives, he was enabled to make known his projects at
Athens, where, as well as in other parts of Greece, they found much
favor. At this season, the Kassandrian oligarchies were paramount
not only at Athens, but generally throughout Greece. Under the
prevalent degradation and suffering, there was ample ground for
discontent, and no liberty of expressing it; many persons therefore
were found disposed either to accept army-service with Ophellas,
or to enrol themselves in a foreign colony under his auspices. To
set out under the military protection of this powerful chief—to
colonize the mighty Carthage, supposed to be already enfeebled by the
victories of Agathokles—to appropriate the wealth, the fertile landed
possessions, and the maritime position, of her citizens—was a prize
well calculated to seduce men dissatisfied with their homes, and not
well informed of the intervening difficulties.[999]

[996] Diodor. xx. 40.

[997] From an incidental allusion in Strabo (xvii. p. 826), we
learn this fact—that Ophellas had surveyed the whole coast of
Northern Africa, to the straits of Gibraltar, and round the old
Phenician settlements on the western coast of modern Morocco.
Some eminent critics (Grosskurd among them) reject the reading in
Strabo—ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀφέλα (or Ὀφέλλα) περιπλοῦ, which is sustained by
a very great preponderance of MSS. But I do not feel the force of
their reasons; and the reading which they would substitute has
nothing to recommend it. In my judgment, Ophellas, ruling in the
Kyrenaica and indulging aspirations towards conquest westward,
was a man both likely to order, and competent to bring about, an
examination of the North African coast. The knowledge of this
fact may have induced Agathokles to apply to him.

[998] Arrian, De Rebus post Alex. ap. Photium, Cod. 92. Αἴγυπτον
μὲν γὰρ καὶ Λιβύην, καὶ τὴν ἐπέκεινα ταύτης τὴν πολλὴν, καὶ ὅ,τι
περ ἂν πρὸς τούτοις δ᾽ ὅριον ἐπικτήσηται πρὸς δυομένου ἡλίου,
Πτολεμαίου εἶναι.

[999] Diodor. xx. 40. πολλοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων προθύμως ὑπήκουσαν εἰς
τὴν στρατείαν· οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων, ἔσπευδον
κοινωνῆσαι τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, ἐλπίζοντες τήν τε κρατίστην τῆς Λιβύης
κατακληρουχήσειν, καὶ τὸν ἐν Καρχηδόνι διαρπάσειν πλοῦτον.

As to the great encouragement held out to settlers, when a new
colony was about to be founded by a powerful state, see Thucyd.
iii. 93, about Herakleia Trachinia—πᾶς γάρ τίς, Λακεδαιμονίων
οἰκιζόντων, θαρσαλέως ᾔει, βέβαιαν νομίζων τὴν πόλιν.

Under such hopes, many Grecian colonists joined Ophellas at Kyrênê,
some even with wives and children. The total number is stated at
10,000. Ophellas conducted them forth at the head of a well appointed
army of 10,000 infantry, 600 cavalry, and 100 war-chariots; each
chariot carrying the driver and two fighting men. Marching with this
miscellaneous body of soldiers and colonists, he reached in eighteen
days the post of Automalæ—the westernmost factory of Kyrênê.[1000]
From thence he proceeded westward along the shore between the two
Syrtes, in many parts a sandy, trackless desert, without wood and
almost without water (with the exception of particular points of
fertility), and infested by serpents many and venomous. At one time,
all his provisions were exhausted; he passed through the territory
of the natives called Lotophagi, near the lesser Syrtis; where the
army had nothing to eat except the fruit of the lotus, which there
abounded.[1001] Ophellas met with no enemies; but the sufferings
of every kind endured by his soldiers—still more of course by the
less hardy colonists and their families—were most distressing. After
miseries endured for more than two months, he joined Agathokles in
the Carthaginian territory; With what abatement of number, we do not
know, but his loss must have been considerable.[1002]

[1000] Diodor. xx. 41.

[1001] Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. iv. 3. p. 127, ed. Schneider.

The philosopher would hear this fact from some of the Athenians
concerned in the expedition.

[1002] Diodor. xx. 42. See the striking description of the
miseries of this same march, made by Cato and his Roman troops
after the death of Pompey, in Lucan, Pharsalia, ix. 382-940:—

“Vadimus in campos steriles, exustaque mundi.
Quà nimius Titan, et raræ in fontibus undæ,
Siccaque letiferis squalent serpentibus arva,
Durum iter.”

The entire march of Ophellas must (I think) have lasted longer
than two months; probably Diodorus speaks only of the more
distressing or middle portion of it when he says—κατὰ τὴν
ὁδοιπορίαν πλεῖον ἢ δύο μῆνας κακοπαθήσαντες, etc. (xx. 42).

Ophellas little knew the man whose invitation and alliance he
had accepted. Agathokles at first received him with the warmest
protestations of attachment, welcoming the new-comers with profuse
hospitality, and supplying to them full means of refreshment and
renovation after their past sufferings. Having thus gained the
confidence and favorable sympathies of all, he proceeded to turn it
to his own purposes. Convening suddenly the most devoted among his
own soldiers, he denounced Ophellas as guilty of plotting against
his life. They listened to him with the same feelings of credulous
rage as the Macedonian soldiers exhibited when Alexander denounced
Philotas before them. Agathokles then at once called them to arms,
set upon Ophellas unawares, and slew him with his more immediate
defenders. Among the soldiers of Ophellas, this act excited horror
and indignation, no less than surprise; but Agathokles at length
succeeded in bringing them to terms, partly by deceitful pretexts,
partly by intimidation: for this unfortunate army, left without any
commander of fixed purpose, had no resource except to enter into
his service.[1003] He thus found himself (like Antipater after the
death of Leonnatus) master of a double army, and relieved from a
troublesome rival. The colonists of Ophellas—more unfortunate still,
since they could be of no service to Agathokles—were put by him on
board some merchant vessels, which he was sending to Syracuse with
spoil. The weather becoming stormy, many of these vessels foundered
at sea,—some were driven off and wrecked on the coast of Italy—and a
few only reached Syracuse.[1004] Thus miserably perished the Kyrenean
expedition of Ophellas; one of the most commanding and powerful
schemes, for joint conquest and colonization, that ever set out from
any Grecian city.

[1003] Diodor. xx. 42; Justin. xxii. 7.

[1004] Diodor. xx. 44.

It would have fared ill with Agathokles, had the Carthaginians
been at hand, and ready to attack him in the confusion immediately
succeeding the death of Ophellas. It would also have fared yet
worse with Carthage, had Agathokles been in a position to attack
her during the terrible sedition excited, nearly at the same time,
within her walls by the general Bomilkar.[1005] This traitor (as
has been already stated) had long cherished the design to render
himself despot, and had been watching for a favorable opportunity.
Having purposely caused the loss of the first battle—fought in
conjunction with his brave colleague Hanno, against Agathokles—he
had since carried on the war with a view to his own project (which
explains in part the continued reverses of the Carthaginians); he
now thought that the time was come for openly raising his standard.
Availing himself of a military muster in the quarter of the city
called Neapolis, he first dismissed the general body of the soldiers,
retaining near him only a trusty band of 500 citizens, and 4000
mercenaries. At the head of these, he then fell upon the unsuspecting
city: dividing them into five detachments, and slaughtering
indiscriminately the unarmed citizens in the streets, as well as in
the great market-place. At first the Carthaginians were astounded
and paralyzed. Gradually however they took courage, stood upon their
defence against the assailants, combatted them in the streets and
poured upon them missiles from the house-tops. After a prolonged
conflict, the partisans of Bomilkar found themselves worsted, and
were glad to avail themselves of the mediation of some elder
citizens. They laid down their arms on promise of pardon. The promise
was faithfully kept by the victors, except in regard to Bomilkar
himself; who was hanged in the market-place, having first undergone
severe tortures.[1006]

[1005] Diodor. xx. 43.

[1006] Diodor. xx. 44; Justin, xxii. 7. Compare the description
given by Appian (Punic. 128), of the desperate defence made by
the Carthaginians in the last siege of the city, against the
assault of the Romans, from the house-tops and in the streets.

Though the Carthaginians had thus escaped from an extreme peril, yet
the effects of so formidable a conspiracy weakened them for some time
against their enemy without; while Agathokles on the other hand,
reinforced by the army from Kyrênê, was stronger than ever. So elate
did he feel, that he assumed the title of King;[1007] following
herein the example of the great Macedonian officers, Antigonus,
Ptolemy, Seleukus, Lysimachus, and Kassander; the memory of Alexander
being now discarded, as his heirs had been already put to death.
Agathokles, already master of nearly all the dependent towns east and
south-east of Carthage, proceeded to carry his arms to the north-west
of the city. He attacked Utica,—the second city next to Carthage
in importance, and older indeed than Carthage itself—situated
on the western or opposite shore of the Carthaginian Gulf, and
visible from Carthage, though distant from it twenty-seven miles
around the Gulf on land.[1008] The Uticans had hitherto remained
faithful to Carthage, in spite of her reverses, and of defection
elsewhere.[1009] Agathokles marched into their territory with such
unexpected rapidity (he had hitherto been on the south-east of
Carthage, and he now suddenly moved to the north-west of that city),
that he seized the persons of three hundred leading citizens, who
had not yet taken the precaution of retiring within the city. Having
vainly tried to prevail on the Uticans to surrender, he assailed
their walls, attaching in front of his battering engines the three
hundred Utican prisoners; so that the citizens, in hurling missiles
of defence, were constrained to inflict death on their own comrades
and relatives. They nevertheless resisted the assault with unshaken
resolution; but Agathokles found means to force an entrance through a
weak part of the walls, and thus became master of the city. He made
it a scene of indiscriminate slaughter, massacring the inhabitants,
armed and unarmed, and hanging up the prisoners. He further captured
the town of Hippu-Akra, about thirty miles north-west of Utica,
which had also remained faithful to Carthage—and which now, after a
brave defence, experienced the like pitiless treatment.[1010] The
Carthaginians, seemingly not yet recovered from their recent shock,
did not interfere, even to rescue these two important places; so that
Agathokles, firmly established in Tunês as a centre of operations,
extended his African dominion more widely than ever all round
Carthage, both on the coast and in the interior; while he interrupted
the supplies of Carthage itself, and reduced the inhabitants to great
privations.[1011] He even occupied and fortified strongly a place
called Hippagreta, between Utica and Carthage; thus pushing his posts
within a short distance both east and west of her gates.[1012]

[1007] There are yet remaining coins—Ἀγαθοκλέος Βασιλέως—the
earliest Sicilian coins that bear the name of a prince
(Humphreys, Ancient Coins and Medals, p. 50).

[1008] Strabo, xvii. p. 832; Polyb. i. 73.

[1009] Polybius (i. 82) expressly states that the inhabitants
of Utica and of Hippu-Akra (a little further to the west than
Utica), remained faithful to Carthage throughout the hostilities
carried on by Agathokles. This enables us to correct the passage
wherein Diodorus describes the attack of Agathokles upon Utica
(xx. 54)—ἐπὶ μὲν Ἰτυκαίους ἐστράτευσεν ~ἀφεστηκότας~, ἄφνω δὲ
αὐτῶν τῇ πόλει προσπεσών, etc. The word ~ἀφεστηκότας~ here is
perplexing. It must mean that the Uticans had revolted _from
Agathokles_; yet Diodorus has not before said a word about the
Uticans, nor reported that they had either joined Agathokles,
or been conquered by him. Everything that Diodorus has reported
hitherto about Agathokles, relates to operations among the towns
east or south-east of Carthage.

It appears to me that the passage ought to stand—ἐπὶ μὲν
Ἰτυκαίους ἐστράτευσεν ~οὐκ ἀφεστηκότας~, _i. e._ from Carthage;
which introduces consistency into the narrative of Diodorus
himself, while it brings him into harmony with Polybius.

[1010] Diodor. xx. 54, 55. In attacking Hippu-Akra (otherwise
called Hippo-Zarytus, near the Promontorium Pulchrum, the
northernmost point of Africa), Agathokles is said to have got the
better in a naval battle—ναυμαχία περιγενόμενος. This implies
that he must have got a fleet superior to the Carthaginians even
in their own gulf; perhaps ships seized at Utica.

[1011] Diodor. xx. 59.

[1012] Appian distinctly mentions this place _Hippagreta_ as
having been fortified by Agathokles—and distinctly describes
it as being between Utica and Carthage (Punic. 110). It cannot
therefore be the same place as Hippu-Akra (or Hippo-Zarytus);
which was considerably further from Carthage than Utica was.

In this prosperous condition of his African affairs, he thought the
opportunity favorable for retrieving his diminished ascendency in
Sicily; to which island he accordingly crossed over, with 2000 men,
leaving the command in Africa to his son Archagathus. That young
man was at first successful, and seemed even in course of enlarging
his father’s conquests. His general Eumachus overran a wide range
of interior Numidia, capturing Tokæ, Phellinê, Meschelæ, Akris, and
another town bearing the same name of Hippu-Akra—and enriching his
soldiers with a considerable plunder. But in a second expedition,
endeavoring to carry his arms yet farther into the interior, he
was worsted in an attack upon a town called Miltinê, and compelled
to retreat. We read that he marched through one mountainous region
abounding in wild cats—and another, in which there were a great
number of apes, who lived in the most tame and familiar manner in
the houses with men—being greatly caressed, and even worshipped as
gods.[1013]

[1013] Diodor. xx. 57, 58. It is vain to attempt to identify
the places mentioned as visited and conquered by Eumachus. Our
topographical knowledge is altogether insufficient. This second
Hippu-Akra is supposed to be the same as Hippo-Regius; Tokæ may
be Tucca Terebinthina, in the south-eastern region or Byzakium.

The Carthaginians however had now regained internal harmony and
power of action. Their senate and their generals were emulous, both
in vigor and in provident combinations, against the common enemy.
They sent forth 30,000 men, a larger force than they had yet had in
the field; forming three distinct camps, under Hanno, Imilkon, and
Adherbal, partly in the interior, partly on the coast. Archagathus,
leaving a sufficient guard at Tunês, marched to meet them,
distributing his army in three divisions also; two, under himself
and Æschrion, besides the corps under Eumachus in the mountainous
region. He was however unsuccessful at all points. Hanno, contriving
to surprise the division of Æschrion, gained a complete victory,
wherein Æschrion himself with more than 4000 men were slain. Imilkon
was yet more fortunate in his operations against Eumachus, whom he
entrapped by simulated flight into an ambuscade, and attacked at such
advantage, that the Grecian army was routed and cut off from all
retreat. A remnant of them defended themselves for some time on a
neighboring hill, but being without water, nearly all soon perished,
from thirst, fatigue, and the sword of the conqueror.[1014]

[1014] Diodor. xx. 59, 60.

By such reverses, destroying two-thirds of the Agathoklean army,
Archagathus was placed in serious peril. He was obliged to
concentrate his force in Tunês, calling in nearly all his outlying
detachments. At the same time, those Liby-Phenician cities, and
rural Libyan tribes, who had before joined Agathokles, now detached
themselves from him when his power was evidently declining, and made
their peace with Carthage. The victorious Carthaginian generals
established fortified camps round Tunês, so as to restrain the
excursions of Archagathus; while with their fleet they blocked up
his harbor. Presently provisions became short, and much despondency
prevailed among the Grecian army. Archagathus transmitted this
discouraging news to his father in Sicily, with urgent entreaties
that he would come to the rescue.[1015]

[1015] Diodor. xx. 61.

The career of Agathokles in Sicily, since his departure from Africa,
had been checkered, and on the whole unproductive. Just before his
arrival in the island,[1016] his generals Leptines and Demophilus had
gained an important victory over the Agrigentine forces commanded by
Xenodokus, who were disabled from keeping the field. This disaster
was a fatal discouragement both to the Agrigentines, and to the
cause which they had espoused as champions—free and autonomous
city-government with equal confederacy for self-defence, under the
presidency of Agrigentum.[1017] The outlying cities confederate with
Agrigentum were left without military protection, and exposed to the
attacks of Leptines, animated and fortified by the recent arrival
of his master Agathokles. That despot landed at Selinus—subdued
Herakleia, Therma, and Kephaloidion, on or near the northern coast of
Sicily—then crossed the interior of the island to Syracuse. In his
march he assaulted Kentoripa, having some partisans within, but was
repulsed with loss. At Apollonia,[1018] he was also unsuccessful in
his first attempt; but being stung with mortification, he resumed the
assault next day, and at length, by great efforts, carried the town.
To avenge his loss, which had been severe, he massacred most of the
citizens, and abandoned the town to plunder.[1019]

[1016] Diodor. xx. 56. Ἀγαθοκλῆς δὲ, τῆς ~μάχης ἄρτι~
γεγενημένης, καταπλεύσας τῆς Σικελίας εἰς Σελινοῦντα, etc.

[1017] Diodor. xx. 56. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀκραγαντῖνοι ταύτῃ τῇ συμφορᾷ
περιπεσόντες, διέλυσαν ἑαυτῶν μὲν τὴν καλλίστην ἐπιβολὴν, τῶν δὲ
συμμάχων τὰς τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐλπίδας.

[1018] Apollonia was a town in the interior of the island,
somewhat to the north-east of Enna (Cicero, Verr. iii. 43).

[1019] Diodor. xx. 56.

From hence he proceeded to Syracuse, which he now revisited after
an absence of (apparently) more than two years in Africa. During
all this interval, the Syracusan harbor had been watched by a
Carthaginian fleet, obstructing the entry of provisions, and causing
partial scarcity.[1020] But there was no blockading army on land;
nor had the dominion of Agathokles, upheld as it was by his brother
Antander and his mercenary force, been at all shaken. His arrival
inspired his partisans and soldiers with new courage, while it
spread terror throughout most parts of Sicily. To contend with the
Carthaginian blockading squadron, he made efforts to procure maritime
aid from the Tyrrhenian ports in Italy;[1021] while on land, his
forces were now preponderant—owing to the recent defeat, and broken
spirit, of the Agrigentines. But his prospects were suddenly checked
by the enterprising move of his old enemy—the Syracusan exile
Deinokrates; who made profession of taking up that generous policy
which the Agrigentines had tacitly let fall—announcing himself as
the champion of autonomous city-government, and equal confederacy,
throughout Sicily. Deinokrates received ready adhesion from most of
the cities belonging to the Agrigentine confederacy—all of them who
were alarmed by finding that the weakness or fears of their presiding
city had left them unprotected against Agathokles. He was soon at
the head of a powerful army—20,000 foot, and 1500 horse. Moreover a
large proportion of his army were not citizen militia, but practised
soldiers; for the most part exiles, driven from their homes by
the distractions and violences of the Agathoklean æra.[1022] For
military purposes, both he and his soldiers were far more strenuous
and effective than the Agrigentines under Xenodokus had been. He not
only kept the field against Agathokles, but several times offered him
battle, which the despot did not feel confidence enough to accept.
Agathokles could do no more than maintain himself in Syracuse, while
the Sicilian cities generally were put in security against his
aggressions.

[1020] Diodor. xx. 62.

[1021] Diodor. xx. 61.

[1022] Diodor. xx. 57. καὶ πάντων τούτων ἐν φυγαῖς καὶ μελέταις
τοῦ πονεῖν συνεχῶς γεγονότων, etc.

Amidst this unprosperous course of affairs in Sicily, Agathokles
received messengers from his son, reporting the defeats in Africa.
Preparing immediately to revisit that country, he was fortunate
enough to obtain a reinforcement of Tyrrhenian ships of war, which
enabled him to overcome the Carthaginian blockading squadron at
the mouth of the Syracusan harbor. A clear passage to Africa was
thus secured for himself, together with ample supplies of imported
provisions for the Syracusans.[1023] Though still unable to combat
Deinokrates in the field, Agathokles was emboldened by his recent
naval victory to send forth Leptines with a force to invade the
Agrigentines—the jealous rivals, rather than the allies, of
Deinokrates. The Agrigentine army—under the general Xenodokus, whom
Leptines had before defeated—consisted of citizen militia mustered
on the occasion; while the Agathoklean mercenaries, conducted by
Leptines, had made arms a profession, and were used to fighting
as well as to hardships.[1024] Here as elsewhere in Greece, we
find the civic and patriotic energy trampled down by professional
soldiership, and reduced to operate only as an obsequious instrument
for administrative details.

[1023] Diodor. xx. 61, 62.

[1024] Diodor. xx. 62.

Xenodokus, conscious of the inferiority of his Agrigentine force,
was reluctant to hazard a battle. Driven to this imprudence by the
taunts of his soldiers, he was defeated a second time by Leptines,
and became so apprehensive of the wrath of the Agrigentines, that he
thought it expedient to retire to Gela. After a period of rejoicing,
for his recent victories by land as well as by sea, Agathokles passed
over to Africa, where he found his son, with the army at Tunês in
great despondency and privation, and almost mutiny for want of
pay. They still amounted to 6000 Grecian mercenaries, 6000 Gauls,
Samnites, and Tyrrhenians—1500 cavalry—and no less than 6000 (if the
number be correct) Libyan war-chariots. There were also a numerous
body of Libyan allies; faithless time-servers, watching for the
turn of fortune. The Carthaginians, occupying strong camps in the
vicinity of Tunês, and abundantly supplied, awaited patiently the
destroying effects of privation and suffering on their enemies. So
desperate was the position of Agathokles, that he was compelled to go
forth and fight. Having tried in vain to draw the Carthaginians down
into the plain, he at length attacked them in the full strength of
their entrenchments. But in spite of the most strenuous efforts, his
troops were repulsed with great slaughter, and driven back to their
camp.[1025]

[1025] Diodor. xx. 64; Justin, xxii. 8.

The night succeeding this battle was a scene of disorder and panic in
both camps; even in that of the victorious Carthaginians. The latter,
according to the ordinances of their religion, eager to return their
heartfelt thanks to the gods for this great victory, sacrificed to
them as a choice offering the handsomest prisoners captured.[1026]
During this process, the tent or tabernacle consecrated to the gods,
close to the altar as well as to the general’s tent, accidentally
took fire. The tents being formed by mere wooden posts, connected
by a thatch of hay or straw both on roof and sides,—the fire spread
rapidly, and the entire camp was burnt, together with many soldiers
who tried to arrest the conflagration. So distracting was the terror
occasioned by this catastrophe, that the whole Carthaginian army for
the time dispersed; and Agathokles, had he been prepared, might have
destroyed them. But it happened that at the same hour, his own camp
was thrown into utter confusion by a different accident, rendering
his soldiers incapable of being brought into action.[1027]

[1026] Diodor. xx. 65. See an incident somewhat similar (Herod.
vii. 180)—the Persians, in the invasion of Greece by Xerxes,
sacrificed the handsomest Grecian prisoner whom they captured on
board the first prize-ship that fell into their hands.

[1027] Diodor. xx. 66, 67.

His position at Tunês had now become desperate. His Libyan allies had
all declared against him, after the recent defeat. He could neither
continue to hold Tunês, nor carry away his troops to Sicily; for
he had but few vessels, and the Carthaginians were masters at sea.
Seeing no resource, he resolved to embark secretly with his younger
son Herakleides; abandoning Archagathus and the army to their fate.
But Archagathus and the other officers, suspecting his purpose,
were thoroughly resolved that the man who had brought them into
destruction should not thus slip away and betray them. As Agathokles
was on the point of going aboard at night, he found himself watched,
arrested, and held prisoner, by the indignant soldiery. The whole
town now became a scene of disorder and tumult, aggravated by the
rumor that the enemy were marching up to attack them. Amidst the
general alarm, the guards who had been set over Agathokles, thinking
his services indispensable for defence, brought him out with his
fetters still on. When the soldiers saw him in this condition,
their sentiment towards him again reverted to pity and admiration,
notwithstanding his projected desertion; moreover they hoped for his
guidance to resist the impending attack. With one voice they called
upon the guards to strike off his chains and set him free. Agathokles
was again at liberty. But insensible to everything except his own
personal safety, he presently stole away, leaped unperceived into a
skiff, with a few attendants, but without either of his sons,—and was
lucky enough to arrive, in spite of stormy November weather, on the
coast of Sicily.[1028]

[1028] Diodor. xx. 69; Justin, xxii. 8. ... τὸ δὲ πλῆθος, ὡς
εἶδεν, εἰς ἔλεον ἐτράπη, καὶ πάντες ἐπεβόων ἀφεῖναι· ὁ δὲ λυθεὶς
καὶ μετ᾽ ὀλίγων ἐμβὰς εἰς τὸ πορθμεῖον, ἔλαθεν ἐκπλεύσας κατὰ τὴν
δύσιν τῆς Πλειάδος, χειμῶνος ὄντος.

So terrible was the fury of the soldiers, on discovering that
Agathokles had accomplished his desertion, that they slew both his
sons, Archagathus and Herakleides. No resource was left but to elect
new generals, and make the best terms they could with Carthage. They
were still a formidable body, retaining in their hands various other
towns besides Tunês; so that the Carthaginians, relieved from all
fear of Agathokles, thought it prudent to grant an easy capitulation.
It was agreed that all the towns should be restored to the
Carthaginians, on payment of 300 talents; that such soldiers as chose
to enter into the African service of Carthage, should be received on
full pay; but that such as preferred returning to Sicily should be
transported thither, with permission to reside in the Carthaginian
town of Solus (or Soluntum). On these terms the convention was
concluded, and the army finally broken up. Some indeed among the
Grecian garrisons, quartered in the outlying posts, being rash enough
to dissent and hold out, were besieged and taken by the Carthaginian
force. Their commanders were crucified, and the soldiers condemned to
rural work as fettered slaves.[1029]

[1029] Diodor. xx. 69.

Thus miserably terminated the expedition of Agathokles to Africa,
after an interval of four years from the time of his landing. By
the _vana mirantes_,[1030] who looked out for curious coincidences
(probably Timæus), it was remarked, that his ultimate flight, with
the slaughter of his two sons, occurred exactly on the same day of
the year following his assassination of Ophellas.[1031] Ancient
writers extol, with good reason, the bold and striking conception
of transferring the war to Africa, at the very moment when he was
himself besieged in Syracuse by a superior Carthaginian force.
But while admitting the military resource, skill, and energy, of
Agathokles, we must not forget that his success in Africa was
materially furthered by the treasonable conduct of the Carthaginian
general Bomilkar—an accidental coincidence in point of time. Nor
is it to be overlooked, that Agathokles missed the opportunity
of turning his first success to account, at a moment when the
Carthaginians would probably have purchased his evacuation of Africa
by making large concessions to him in Sicily.[1032] He imprudently
persisted in the war, though the complete conquest of Carthage was
beyond his strength—and though it was still more beyond his strength
to prosecute effective war, simultaneously and for a long time, in
Sicily and in Africa. The African subjects of Carthage were not
attached to her; but neither were they attached to him;—nor, on the
long run, did they do him any serious good. Agathokles is a man of
force and fraud—consummate in the use of both. His whole life is a
series of successful adventures, and strokes of bold ingenuity to
extricate himself from difficulties; but there is wanting in him all
predetermined general plan, or measured range of ambition, to which
these single exploits might be made subservient.

[1030] Tacit. Annal. i. 9. “Multus hinc ipso de Augusto sermo,
plerisque _vana mirantibus_—quod idem dies accepti quondam
imperii princeps, et vitæ supremus—quod Nolæ in domo et cubiculo,
in quo pater ejus Octavius, vitam finivisset”, etc.

[1031] Diodor. xx. 70.

[1032] This is what Agathokles might have done, but did not
do. Nevertheless, Valerius Maximus (vii. 4, 1) represents him
as having actually done it, and praises his sagacity on that
ground. Here is an example how little careful these collectors of
anecdotes sometimes are about their facts.

After his passage from Africa, Agathokles landed on the western
corner of Sicily near the town of Egesta, which was then in alliance
with him. He sent to Syracuse for a reinforcement. But he was hard
pressed for money; he suspected, or pretended to suspect, the
Egestæans of disaffection; accordingly, on receiving his new force,
he employed it to commit revolting massacre and plunder in Egesta.
The town is reported to have contained 10,000 citizens. Of these
Agathokles caused the poorer men to be for the most part murdered;
the richer were cruelly tortured, and even their wives tortured and
mutilated, to compel revelations of concealed wealth; the children
of both sexes were transported to Italy, and there sold as slaves to
the Bruttians. The original population being thus nearly extirpated,
Agathokles changed the name of the town to Dikæopolis, assigning
it as a residence to such deserters as might join him.[1033] This
atrocity, more suitable to Africa[1034] than Greece (where the
mutilation of women is almost unheard of), was probably the way in
which his savage pride obtained some kind of retaliatory satisfaction
for the recent calamity and humiliation in Africa. Under the like
sentiment, he perpetrated another deed of blood at Syracuse. Having
learnt that the soldiers, whom he had deserted at Tunês, had after
his departure put to death his two sons, he gave orders to Antander
his brother (viceroy of Syracuse), to massacre all the relatives
of those Syracusans who had served him in the African expedition.
This order was fulfilled by Antander (we are assured) accurately
and to the letter. Neither age or sex—grandsire or infant—wife or
mother—were spared by the Agathoklean executioners. We may be sure
that their properties were plundered at the same time; we hear of no
mutilations.[1035]

[1033] Diodor. xx. 71. We do not know what happened afterwards
with this town under its new population. But the old name Egesta
was afterwards resumed.

[1034] Compare the proceedings of the Greco-Libyan princess
Pheretimê (of the Battiad family) at Barka (Herodot. iv. 202).

[1035] Diodor. xx. 72. Hippokrates and Epikydes—those Syracusans
who, about a century afterwards, induced Hieronymus of Syracuse
to prefer the Carthaginian alliance to the Roman—had resided
at Carthage for some time, and served in the army of Hannibal,
because their grandfather had been banished from Syracuse as one
concerned in killing Archagathus (Polyb. vii. 2).

Still Agathokles tried to maintain his hold on the Sicilian towns
which remained to him; but his cruelties as well as his reverses
had produced a strong sentiment against him, and even his general
Pasiphilus revolted to join Deinokrates. That exile was now at the
head of an army stated at 20,000 men, the most formidable military
force in Sicily; so that Agathokles, feeling the inadequacy of his
own means, sent to solicit peace, and to offer tempting conditions.
He announced his readiness to evacuate Syracuse altogether, and
to be content, if two maritime towns on the northern coast of the
island—Therma and Kephaloidion—were assigned to his mercenaries and
himself. Under this proposition, Deinokrates, and the other Syracusan
exiles, had the opportunity of entering Syracuse, and reconstituting
the free city-government. Had Deinokrates been another Timoleon, the
city might now have acquired and enjoyed another temporary sunshine
of autonomy and prosperity; but his ambition was thoroughly selfish.
As commander of this large army, he enjoyed a station of power and
license such as he was not likely to obtain under the reconstituted
city-government of Syracuse. He therefore evaded the propositions of
Agathokles, requiring still larger concessions; until at length the
Syracusan exiles in his own army (partly instigated by emissaries
from Agathokles himself) began to suspect his selfish projects,
and to waver in their fidelity to him. Meanwhile Agathokles, being
repudiated by Deinokrates, addressed himself to the Carthaginians,
and concluded a treaty with them, restoring or guaranteeing to them
all the possessions that they had ever enjoyed in Sicily. In return
for this concession, he received from them a sum of money, and a
large supply of corn.[1036]

[1036] Diodor. xx. 78, 79. Some said that the sum of money paid
by the Carthaginians was 300 talents. Timæus stated it at 150
talents.

Relieved from Carthaginian hostility, Agathokles presently ventured
to march against the army of Deinokrates. The latter was indeed
greatly superior in strength, but many of his soldiers were now
lukewarm or disaffected, and Agathokles had established among them
correspondences upon which he could rely. At a great battle fought
near Torgium, many of them went over on the field to Agathokles,
giving to him a complete victory. The army of Deinokrates was
completely dispersed. Shortly afterwards a considerable body among
them (4000 men, or 7000 men, according to different statements)
surrendered to the victor on terms. As soon as they had delivered up
their arms, Agathokles, regardless of his covenant, caused them to be
surrounded by his own army, and massacred.[1037]

[1037] Diodor. xx. 89.

It appears as if the recent victory had been the result of a secret
and treacherous compact between Agathokles and Deinokrates; and as if
the prisoners massacred by Agathokles were those of whom Deinokrates
wished to rid himself as malcontents; for immediately after the
battle, a reconciliation took place between the two. Agathokles
admitted the other as a sort of partner in his despotism; while
Deinokrates not only brought into the partnership all the military
means and strong posts which he had been two years in acquiring, but
also betrayed to Agathokles the revolted general Pasiphilus with the
town of Gela occupied by the latter. It is noticed as singular, that
Agathokles, generally faithless and unscrupulous towards both friends
and enemies, kept up the best understanding and confidence with
Deinokrates to the end of his life.[1038]

[1038] Diodor. xx. 90.

The despot had now regained full power at Syracuse, together with
a great extent of dominion in Sicily. The remainder of his restless
existence was spent in operations of hostility or plunder against
more northerly enemies—the Liparæan isles[1039]—the Italian cities
and the Bruttians—the island of Korkyra. We are unable to follow
his proceedings in detail. He was threatened with a formidable
attack[1040] by the Spartan prince Kleonymus, who was invited by
the Tarentines to aid them against the Lucanians and Romans. But
Kleonymus found enough to occupy him elsewhere, without visiting
Sicily. He collected a considerable force on the coast of Italy,
undertook operations with success against the Lucanians, and even
captured the town of Thurii. But the Romans, now pushing their
intervention even to the Tarentine Gulf, drove him off and retook the
town; moreover his own behavior was so tyrannical and profligate, as
to draw upon him universal hatred. Returning from Italy to Korkyra,
Kleonymus made himself master of that important island, intending to
employ it as a base of operations both against Greece and against
Italy.[1041] He failed however in various expeditions both in the
Tarentine Gulf and the Adriatic. Demetrius Poliorketes and Kassander
alike tried to conclude an alliance with him; but in vain.[1042]
At a subsequent period, Korkyra was besieged by Kassander with a
large naval and military force; Kleonymus then retired (or perhaps
had previously retired) to Sparta. Kassander, having reduced the
island to great straits, was on the point of taking it, when it was
relieved by Agathokles with a powerful armament. That despot was
engaged in operations on the coast of Italy against the Bruttians
when his aid to Korkyra was solicited; he destroyed most part of the
Macedonian fleet, and then seized the island for himself.[1043] On
returning from this victorious expedition to the Italian coast, where
he had left a detachment of his Ligurian and Tuscan mercenaries,
he was informed that these mercenaries had been turbulent during
his absence, in demanding the pay due to them from his grandson
Archagathus. He caused them all to be slain, to the number of
2000.[1044]

[1039] Diodor. xx. 101. This expedition of Agathokles against
the Lyparæan isles seems to have been described in detail by his
contemporary historian, the Syracusan Kallias: see the Fragments
of that author, in Didot’s Fragment. Hist. Græc. vol. ii. p. 383.
Fragm. 4.

[1040] Diodor. xx. 104.

[1041] Diodor. xx. 104; Livy, x. 2. A curious anecdote appears in
the Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mirabilibus (78) respecting two native
Italians, Aulus and Caius, who tried to poison Kleonymus at
Tarentum, but were detected and put to death by the Tarentines.

That Agathokles, in his operations on the coast of southern
Italy, found himself in conflict with the Romans, and that their
importance was now strongly felt—we may judge by the fact, that
the Syracusan Kallias (contemporary and historian of Agathokles)
appears to have given details respecting the origin and history
of Rome. See the Fragments of Kallias, ap. Didot, Hist. Græc.
Frag. vol. ii. p. 383; Fragm. 5—and Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. i. 72.

[1042] Diodor. xx. 105.

[1043] Diodor. xxi. Fragm. 2. p. 265.

[1044] Diodor. xxi. Fragm. 3. p. 266.

As far as we can trace the events of the last years of Agathokles,
we find him seizing the towns of Kroton and Hipponia in Italy,
establishing an alliance with Demetrius Poliorketes,[1045] and giving
his daughter Lanassa in marriage to the youthful Pyrrhus king of
Epirus. At the age of seventy-two, still in the plenitude of vigor
as well as of power, he was projecting a fresh expedition against
the Carthaginians in Africa, with two hundred of the largest ships
of war, when his career was brought to a close by sickness and by
domestic enemies.

[1045] Diodor. xxi. Fragm. 4, 8, 11. p. 266-273.

He proclaimed as future successor to his dominion, his son, named
Agathokles; but Archagathus his grandson (son of Archagathus who had
perished in Africa), a young prince of more conspicuous qualities,
had already been singled out for the most important command, and
was now at the head of the army near Ætna. The old Agathokles,
wishing to strengthen the hands of his intended successor, sent his
favored son Agathokles to Ætna, with written orders directing that
Archagathus should yield up to him the command. Archagathus, noway
disposed to obey, invited his uncle Agathokles to a banquet, and
killed him; after which he contrived the poisoning of his grandfather
the old despot himself. The instrument of his purpose was Mænon; a
citizen of Egesta, enslaved at the time when Agathokles massacred
most of the Egestæan population. The beauty of his person procured
him much favor with Agathokles; but he had never forgotten, and
had always been anxious to avenge, the bloody outrage on his
fellow-citizens. To accomplish this purpose, the opportunity was
now opened to him, together with a promise of protection, through
Archagathus. He accordingly poisoned Agathokles, as we are told, by
means of a medicated quill, handed to him for cleaning his teeth
after dinner.[1046] Combining together the various accounts, it seems
probable that Agathokles was at the time sick—that this sickness may
have been the reason why he was so anxious to strengthen the position
of his intended successor—and that his death was as much the effect
of his malady as of the poison. Archagathus, after murdering his
uncle, seems by means of his army to have made himself real master of
the Syracusan power; while the old despot, defenceless on a sick bed,
could do no more than provide for the safety of his Egyptian wife
Theoxena and his two young children, by despatching them on shipboard
with all his rich movable treasures to Alexandria. Having secured
this object, amidst extreme grief on the part of those around, he
expired.[1047]

[1046] Diodor. xxi. Fragm. 12. p. 276-278. Neither Justin (xxiii.
2) nor Trogus before him, (as it seems from the Prologue) alludes
to poison. He represents Agathokles as having died by a violent
distemper. He notices however the bloody family feud, and the
murder of the uncle by the nephew.

[1047] Justin (xxiii. 2) dwells pathetically on this last parting
between Agathokles and Theoxena. It is difficult to reconcile
Justin’s narrative with that of Diodorus; but on this point, as
far as we can judge, I think him more credible than Diodorus.

The great lines in the character of Agathokles are well marked.
He was of the stamp of Gelon and the elder Dionysius—a soldier of
fortune, who raised himself from the meanest beginnings to the summit
of political power—and who, in the acquisition as well as maintenance
of that power, displayed an extent of energy, perseverance, and
military resource, not surpassed by any one, even of the generals
formed in Alexander’s school. He was an adept in that art at which
all aspiring men of his age aimed—the handling of mercenary soldiers
for the extinction of political liberty and security at home, and
for predatory aggrandizement abroad. I have already noticed the
opinion delivered by Scipio Africanus—that the elder Dionysius and
Agathokles were the most daring, sagacious, and capable men of
action within his knowledge.[1048] Apart from this enterprising
genius, employed in the service of unmeasured personal ambition,
we know nothing of Agathokles except his sanguinary, faithless,
and nefarious dispositions; in which attributes also he stands
pre-eminent, above all his known contemporaries, and above nearly
all predecessors.[1049] Notwithstanding his often-proved perfidy, he
seems to have had a joviality and apparent simplicity of manner (the
same is recounted of Cæsar Borgia) which amused men and put them off
their guard, throwing them perpetually into his trap.[1050]

[1048] Polyb. xv. 35. See above in this History, Vol. XI. Ch.
lxxxiii. p. 46.

[1049] Polybius (ix. 23) says that Agathokles, though cruel
in the extreme at the beginning of his career, and in the
establishment of his power, yet became the mildest of men after
his power was once established. The latter half of this statement
is contradicted by all the particular facts which we know
respecting Agathokles.

As to Timæus the historian, indeed (who had been banished from
Sicily by Agathokles, and who wrote the history of the latter
in five books), Polybius had good reason to censure him, as
being unmeasured in his abuse of Agathokles. For Timæus not only
recounted of Agathokles numerous acts of nefarious cruelty—acts
of course essentially public, and therefore capable of being
known—but also told much scandal about his private habits, and
represented him (which is still more absurd) as a man vulgar and
despicable in point of ability. See the Fragments of Timæus ap.
Histor. Græc. ed. Didot. Frag. 144-150.

All, or nearly all, the acts of Agathokles, as described in the
preceding pages, have been copied from Diodorus; who had as good
authorities before him as Polybius possessed. Diodorus does not
copy the history of Agathokles from Timæus; on the contrary,
he censures Timæus for his exaggerated acrimony and injustice
towards Agathokles, in terms not less forcibly than those which
Polybius employs (xxi. Fragm. p. 279). Diodorus cites Timæus by
name, occasionally and in particular instances: but he evidently
did not borrow from that author the main stream of his narrative.
He seems to have had before him other authorities—among them
some highly favorable to Agathokles—the Syracusan Kallias—and
Antander, brother of Agathokles (xxi. p. 278-282).

[1050] Diodor. xx. 63.

Agathokles, however, though among the worst of Greeks, was yet
a Greek. During his government of thirty-two years, the course
of events in Sicily continued under Hellenic agency, without the
preponderant intervention of any foreign power. The power of
Agathokles indeed rested mainly on foreign mercenaries; but so had
that of Dionysius and Gelon before him; and he as well as they,
kept up vigorously the old conflict against the Carthaginian power
in the island. Grecian history in Sicily thus continues down to the
death of Agathokles; but it continues no longer. After his death,
Hellenic power and interests become incapable of self-support,
and sink into a secondary and subservient position, overridden or
contended for by foreigners. Syracuse and the other cities passed
from one despot to another, and were torn with discord arising out
of the crowds of foreign mercenaries who had obtained footing among
them. At the same time, the Carthaginians made increased efforts to
push their conquests in the island, without finding any sufficient
internal resistance; so that they would have taken Syracuse, and made
Sicily their own, had not Pyrrhus king of Epirus (the son-in-law
of Agathokles) interposed to arrest their progress. From this
time forward, the Greeks of Sicily become a prize to be contended
for—first between the Carthaginians and Pyrrhus—next, between the
Carthaginians and Romans[1051]—until at length they dwindle into
subjects of Rome; corn-growers for the Roman plebs, clients under the
patronage of the Roman Marcelli, victims of the rapacity of Verres,
and suppliants for the tutelary eloquence of Cicero. The historian of
self-acting Hellas loses sight of them at the death of Agathokles.

[1051] The poet Theokritus (xvi. 75-80) expatiates on the bravery
of the Syracusan Hiero II., and on the great warlike power
of the Syracusans under him (B. C. 260-240), which
he represents as making the Carthaginians tremble for their
possessions in Sicily. Personally, Hiero seems to have deserved
this praise—and to have deserved yet more praise for his mild and
prudent internal administration of Syracuse. But his military
force was altogether secondary in the great struggle between Rome
and Carthage for the mastery of Sicily.

CHAPTER XCVIII.

OUTLYING HELLENIC CITIES.

1 IN GAUL AND SPAIN.
2 ON THE COAST OF THE EUXINE.

To complete the picture of the Hellenic world while yet in its
period of full life, in freedom and self-action, or even during its
decline into the half-life of a dependent condition—we must say a few
words respecting some of its members lying apart from the general
history, yet of not inconsiderable importance. The Greeks of Massalia
formed its western wing; the Pontic Greeks (those on the shores of
the Euxine), its eastern; both of them the outermost radiations of
Hellenism, where it was always militant against foreign elements, and
often adulterated by them. It is indeed little that we have the means
of saying; but that little must not be left unsaid.

In my third volume (ch. xxii. p. 397), I briefly noticed the
foundation and first proceedings of Massalia (the modern Marseilles),
on the Mediterranean coast of Gaul or Liguria. This Ionic city,
founded by the enterprising Phokæans of Asia Minor, a little before
their own seaboard was subjugated by the Persians, had a life and
career of its own, apart from those political events which determined
the condition of its Hellenic sisters in Asia, Peloponnesus,
Italy, or Sicily. The Massaliots maintained their own relations of
commerce, friendship or hostility with their barbaric neighbors, the
Ligurians, Gauls, and Iberians, without becoming involved in the
larger political confederacies of the Hellenic world. They carried
out from their mother-city established habits of adventurous coast
navigation and commercial activity. Their situation, distant from
other Greeks and sustained by a force hardly sufficient even for
defence, imposed upon them the necessity both of political harmony
at home, and of prudence and persuasive agency in their mode of
dealing with neighbors. That they were found equal to this necessity,
appears sufficiently attested by the few general statements
transmitted in respect to them; though their history in its details
is unknown. Their city was strong by position, situated upon a
promontory washed on three sides by the sea, well-fortified, and
possessing a convenient harbor securely closed against enemies.[1052]
The domain around it however appears not to have been large, nor
did their population extend itself much into the interior. The land
around was less adapted for corn than for the vine and the olive;
wine was supplied by the Massaliots throughout Gaul.[1053] It was
on shipboard that their courage and skill was chiefly displayed; it
was by maritime enterprise that their power, their wealth, and their
colonial expansion was obtained. In an age when piracy was common,
the Massaliot ships and seamen were effective in attack and defence
not less than in transport and commercial interchange; while their
numerous maritime successes were attested by many trophies adorning
the temples.[1054] The city contained docks and arsenals admirably
provided with provisions, stores, arms, and all the various muniments
of naval war.[1055] Except the Phenicians and Carthaginians, these
Massaliots were the only enterprising mariners in the Western
Mediterranean; from the year 500 B. C. downward, after the
energy of the Ionic Greeks had been crushed by inland potentates. The
Iberian and Gallic tribes were essentially landsmen, not occupying
permanent stations on the coast, nor having any vocation for the
sea; but the Ligurians, though chiefly mountaineers, were annoying
neighbors to Massalia as well by their piracies at sea as from
their depredations by land.[1056] To all these landsmen, however,
depredators as they were, the visit of the trader soon made itself
felt as a want, both for import and export; and to this want the
Massaliots, with their colonies, were the only ministers, along the
Gulfs of Genoa and Lyons, from Luna (the frontier of Tuscany) to
the Dianium (Cape della Nao) in Spain.[1057] It was not until the
first century before the Christian era that they were outstripped in
this career by Narbon, and a few other neighbors, exalted into Roman
colonies.

[1052] Cæsar, Bell. Gall. ii. 1; Strabo, iv. p. 179.

[1053] See Poseidonius ap. Athenæum, iv. p. 152.

[1054] Strabo, iv. p. 180.

[1055] Strabo (xii. p. 575) places Massalia in the same rank as
Kyzikus, Rhodes and Carthage; types of maritime cities highly and
effectively organized.

[1056] Livy, xl. 18; Polybius, xxx. 4.

[1057] The oration composed by Demosthenes πρὸς Ζηνόδεμιν,
relates to an affair wherein a ship, captain, and mate, all from
Massalia, are found engaged in the carrying trade between Athens
and Syracuse (Demosth. p. 382 _seq._).

Along the coast on both sides of their own city, the Massaliots
planted colonies, each commended to the protection, and consecrated
by the statue and peculiar rites, of their own patron goddess, the
Ephesian Artemis.[1058] Towards the east were Tauroentium, Olbia,
Antipolis, Nikæa, and the Portus Monœki; towards the west, on the
coast of Spain, were Rhoda, Emporiæ, Alônê, Hemeroskopium, and
Artemisium or Dianium. These colonies were established chiefly on
outlying capes or sometimes islets, at once near and safe; they were
intended more as shelter and accommodation for maritime traffic,
and as depots for trade with the interior,—than for the purpose of
spreading inland, and including a numerous outlying population round
the walls. The circumstances of Emporiæ were the most remarkable.
That town was built originally on a little uninhabited islet off the
coast of Iberia; after a certain interval, it became extended to the
adjoining mainland, and a body of native Iberians were admitted to
joint residence within the new-walled circuit there established. This
new circuit however was divided in half by an intervening wall, on
one side of which dwelt the Iberians, on the other side the Greeks.
One gate alone was permitted, for intercommunication, guarded night
and day by appointed magistrates, one of whom was perpetually on
the spot. Every night, one third of the Greek citizens kept guard
on the walls, or at least held themselves prepared to do so. How
long these strict and fatiguing precautions were found necessary,
we do not know; but after a certain time they were relaxed, and the
intervening wall disappeared, so that Greeks and Iberians freely
coalesced into one community.[1059] It is not often that we are
allowed to see so much in detail the early difficulties and dangers
of a Grecian colony. Massalia itself was situated under nearly
similar circumstances among the rude Ligurian Salyes; we hear of
these Ligurians hiring themselves as laborers to dig on the fields
of Massaliot proprietors.[1060] The various tribes of Ligurians,
Gauls, and Iberians extended down to the coast, so that there was no
safe road along it, nor any communication except by sea, until the
conquests of the Romans in the second and first century before the
Christian era.[1061]

[1058] Brückner, Histor. Massiliensium, c. 7 (Göttingen).

[1059] Livy, xxxiv. 8; Strabo. iii. p. 160. At Massalia, it is
said that no armed stranger was ever allowed to enter the city,
without depositing his arms at the gate (Justin, xliii. 4).

This precaution seems to have been adopted in other cities also:
see Æneas, Poliorket. c. 30.

[1060] Strabo, iii. p. 165. A fact told to Poseidonius by a
Massaliot proprietor who was his personal friend.

In the siege of Massalia by Cæsar, a detachment of
Albici,—mountaineers not far from the town, and old allies or
dependents—were brought in to help in the defence (Cæsar, Bell.
G. i. 34).

[1061] Strabo, iv. p. 180.

The government of Massalia was oligarchical, carried on chiefly
by a Senate or Great Council of Six Hundred (called Timuchi),
elected for life—and by a small council of fifteen, chosen among
this larger body to take turn in executive duties.[1062] The public
habits of the administrators are said to have been extremely
vigilant and circumspect; the private habits of the citizens,
frugal and temperate—a maximum being fixed by law for dowries and
marriage-ceremonies.[1063] They were careful in their dealings
with the native tribes, with whom they appear to have maintained
relations generally friendly. The historian Ephorus (whose history
closed about 340 B. C.) represented the Gauls as especially
phil-hellenic;[1064] an impression which he could hardly have derived
from any but Massaliot informants. The Massaliots (who in the first
century before Christ were _trilingues_, speaking Greek, Latin, and
Gallic[1065]) contributed to engraft upon these unlettered men a
certain refinement and variety of wants, and to lay the foundation
of that taste for letters which afterwards became largely diffused
throughout the Roman Province of Gaul. At sea, and in traffic, the
Phenicians and Carthaginians were their formidable rivals. This was
among the causes which threw them betimes into alliance and active
co-operation with Rome, under whose rule they obtained favorable
treatment, when the blessing of freedom was no longer within their
reach.

[1062] Strabo, iv. p. 181; Cicero, De Republ. xxvii. Fragm.
Vacancies in the senate seem to have been filled up from
meritorious citizens generally—as far as we can judge by a brief
allusion in Aristotle (Polit. vi. 7).

From another passage in the same work, it seems that the narrow
basis of the oligarchy must have given rise to dissensions (v.
6). Aristotle had included the Μασσαλιωτῶν πολιτεία in his lost
work Περὶ Πολιτειῶν.

[1063] Strabo, _l. c._ However, one author from whom Athenæus
borrowed (xii. p. 523), described the Massaliots as luxurious in
their habits.

[1064] Strabo, iv. p. 199. Ἔφορος δὲ ὑπερβάλλουσαν τῷ μεγέθει
λέγει τὴν Κελτικὴν, ὥστε ἧσπερ νῦν Ἰβηρίας καλοῦμεν ἐκείνοις τὰ
πλεῖστα προσνέμειν μέχρι Γαδείρων, ~φιλέλληνάς τε ἀποφαίνει τοὺς
ἀνθρώπους~, καὶ πολλὰ ἰδίως λέγει περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐοικότα τοῖς
νῦν. Compare p. 181.

It is to be remembered that Ephorus was a native of the Asiatic
Kymê the immediate neighbor of Phokæa, which was the metropolis
of Massalia. The Massaliots never forgot or broke off their
connection with Phokæa: see the statement of their intercession
with the Romans on behalf of Phokæa (Justin, xxxvii. 1). Ephorus
therefore had good means of learning whatever Massaliot citizens
were disposed to communicate.

[1065] Varro, Antiq. Fragm. p. 350, ed. Bipont.

Enough is known about Massalia to show that the city was a genuine
specimen of Hellenism and Hellenic influences—acting not by force
or constraint, but simply by superior intelligence and activity—by
power of ministering to wants which must otherwise have remained
unsupplied—and by the assimilating effect of a lettered civilization
upon ruder neighbors. This is the more to be noticed as it contrasts
strikingly with the Macedonian influences which have occupied so
much of the present volume; force admirably organized and wielded
by Alexander, yet still nothing but force. The loss of all details
respecting the history of Massalia is greatly to be lamented;
and hardly less, that of the writings of Pytheas, an intelligent
Massaliotic navigator, who, at this early age (330-320 B.
C.),[1066] with an adventurous boldness even more than Phokæan,
sailed through the Pillars of Herakles and from thence northward
along the coast of Spain, Gaul, Britain, Germany—perhaps yet farther.
Probably no Greek except a Massaliot could have accomplished such a
voyage; which in his case deserves the greater sympathy, as there
was no other reward for the difficulties and dangers braved, except
the gratification of an intelligent curiosity. It seems plain that
the publication of his “Survey of the Earth”—much consulted by
Eratosthenes, though the criticisms which have reached us through
Polybius and Strabo dwell chiefly upon its mistakes, real or
supposed—made an epoch in ancient geographical knowledge.

[1066] See the Fragmenta Pytheæ collected by Arfwedson, Upsal,
1824. He wrote two works—1. Γῆς Περιόδος. 2. Περὶ Ὠκεανοῦ.
His statements were greatly esteemed, and often followed, by
Eratosthenes; partially followed by Hipparchus; harshly judged
by Polybius, whom Strabo in the main follows. Even by those who
judge him most severely, Pytheas is admitted to have been a good
mathematician and astronomer (Strabo, iv. p. 201)—and to have
travelled extensively in person. Like Herodotus, he must have
been forced to report a great deal on hearsay; and all that
he could do was to report the best hearsay information which
reached him. It is evident that his writings made an epoch in
geographical inquiries; though they doubtless contained numerous
inaccuracies. See a fair estimate of Pytheas in Mannert, Geog.
der Gr. und Römer, Introd. i. p. 73-86.

The Massaliotic Codex of Homer, possessed and consulted among
others by the Alexandrine critics, affords presumption that
the celebrity of Massalia as a place of Grecian literature and
study (in which character it competed with Athens towards the
commencement of the Roman empire) had its foundations laid at
least in the third century before the Christian era.

From the western wing of the Hellenic world, we pass to the
eastern—the Euxine Sea. Of the Pentapolis on its western coast
south of the Danube (Apollonia, Mesembria, Kallatis, Odessus,
and probably Istrus)—and of Tyras near the mouth of the river so
called (now Dniester)—we have little to record, though Istrus
and Apollonia were among the towns whose political constitutions
Aristotle thought worthy of his examination.[1067] But Herakleia on
the south coast, and Pantikapæum or Bosporus between the Euxine and
the Palus Mæotis (now Sea of Azof), are not thus unknown to history;
nor can Sinôpê (on the south coast) and Olbia (on the north-west)
be altogether passed over. Though lying apart from the political
headship of Athens or Sparta, all these cities were legitimate
members of the Hellenic brotherhood. All supplied spectators and
competitors for the Pan-hellenic festivals—pupils to the rhetors and
philosophers—purchasers, and sometimes even rivals, to the artists.
All too were (like Massalia and Kyrênê) adulterated partially—Olbia
and Bosporus considerably—by admixture of a non-hellenic element.

[1067] Aristotle, Politic. v. 2, 11; v. 5, 2.

Of Sinôpê, and its three dependent colonies Kotyôra, Kerasus,
and Trapezus, I have already said something,[1068] in describing
the retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks. Like Massalia with its
dependencies Antipolis, Nikæa, and others—Sinôpê enjoyed not merely
practical independence, but considerable prosperity and local
dignity, at the time when Xenophon and his companions marched through
those regions. The citizens were on terms of equal alliance, mutually
advantageous, with Korylas prince of Paphlagonia, on the borders of
whose territory they dwelt. It is probable that they figured on the
tribute list of the Persian king as a portion of Paphlagonia, and
paid an annual sum; but here ended their subjection. Their behavior
towards the Ten Thousand Greeks, pronounced enemies of the Persian
king, was that of an independent city. Neither they, nor even the
inland Paphlagonians, warlike and turbulent, were molested with
Persian governors or military occupation.[1069] Alexander however
numbered them among the subjects of Persia; and it is a remarkable
fact, that envoys from Sinôpê were found remaining with Darius almost
to his last hour, after he had become a conquered fugitive, and had
lost his armies, his capitals, and his treasures. These Sinopian
envoys fell into the hands of Alexander; who set them at liberty
with the remark, that since they were not members of the Hellenic
confederacy, but subjects of Persia—their presence as envoys near
Darius was very excusable.[1070] The position of Sinôpê placed her
out of the direct range of the hostilities carried on by Alexander’s
successors against each other; and the ancient Kappadokian princes
of the Mithridatic family (professedly descendants of the Persian
Achæmenidæ),[1071] who ultimately ripened into the king of Pontus,
had not become sufficiently powerful to swallow up her independence
until the reign of Pharnakes, in the second century before Christ.
Sinôpê then passed under his dominion; exchanging (like others)
the condition of a free Grecian city for that of a subject of the
barbaric kings of Pontus, with a citadel and mercenary garrison
to keep her citizens in obedience. We know nothing however of the
intermediate events.

[1068] See Vol. IX. Ch. lxxi. p. 129 _seqq._

[1069] See the remarkable life of the Karian Datames, by
Cornelius Nepos, which gives some idea of the situation of
Paphlagonia about 360-350 B. C. (cap. 7, 8). Compare
Xenoph. Hellenic. iv. 1, 4.

[1070] Arrian, iii. 24, 8; Curtius, vi. 5, 6.

[1071] Polybius, v. 43.

Respecting the Pontic Herakleia, our ignorance is not so complete.
That city—much nearer than Sinôpê to the mouth of the Thracian
Bosporus, and distant by sea from Byzantium only one long day’s
voyage of a rowboat—was established by Megarians and Bœotians on the
coast of the Mariandyni. These natives were subdued, and reduced to
a kind of serfdom; whereby they became slaves, yet with a proviso
that they should never be sold out of the territory. Adjoining, on
the westward, between Herakleia and Byzantium, were the Bithynian
Thracians—villagers not merely independent, but warlike and fierce
wreckers, who cruelly maltreated any Greeks stranded on their
coast.[1072] We are told in general terms that the government of
Herakleia was oligarchical;[1073] perhaps in the hands of the
descendants of the principal original colonists, who partitioned
among themselves the territory with its Mariandynian serfs, and who
formed a small but rich minority among the total population. We hear
of them as powerful at sea, and as being able to man, through their
numerous serfs, a considerable fleet, with which they invaded the
territory of Leukon prince of the Kimmerian Bosporus.[1074] They
were also engaged in land-war with Mithridates, a prince of the
ancient Persian family established as district rulers in Northern
Kappadokia.[1075]

[1072] Xenoph. Anab. vi. 6, 2.

[1073] Aristot. Polit. v. 5, 2; v. 5, 5. Another passage in
the same work, however (v. 4, 2), says, that in Herakleia, the
democracy was subverted immediately after the foundation of the
colony, through the popular leaders; who committed injustice
against the rich. These rich men were banished, but collected
strength enough to return and subvert the democracy by force.

If this passage alludes to the same Herakleia (there were many
towns of that name), the government must have been originally
democratical. But the serfdom of the natives seems to imply an
oligarchy.

[1074] Aristot. Polit. vii. 5, 7; Polyæn. vi. 9, 3, 4; compare
Pseudo-Aristotle Œconomic. ii. 9.

The reign of Leukon lasted from about 392-352 B. C. The
event alluded to by Polyænus must have occurred at some time
during this interval.

[1075] Justin, xvi. 4.

Towards 380-370 B. C., the Herakleots became disturbed by
violent party-contentions within the city. As far as we can divine
from a few obscure hints, these contentions began among the oligarchy
themselves;[1076] some of whom opposed, and partially threw open,
a close political monopoly—yet not without a struggle, in the
course of which an energetic citizen named Klearchus was banished.
Presently however the contest assumed larger dimensions; the plebs
sought admission into the constitution, and are even said to have
required abolition of debts with a redivision of the lands.[1077]
A democratical constitution was established; but it was speedily
menaced by conspiracies of the rich, to guard against which, the
classification of the citizens was altered. Instead of three tribes,
and four centuries, all were distributed anew into sixty-four
centuries; the tribes being discontinued. It would appear that in the
original four centuries, the rich men had been so enrolled as to form
separate military divisions (probably their rustic serfs being armed
along with them)—-while the three tribes had contained all the rest
of the people; so that the effect of thus multiplying the centuries
was, to divest the rich of their separate military enrolment, and to
disseminate them in many different regiments along with a greater
number of poor.[1078]

[1076] Aristot. v. 5, 2; 5, 10.

[1077] Justin, xvi. 4.

[1078] Æneas, Poliorket. c. 11. I have given what seems the most
probable explanation of a very obscure passage.

It is to be noted that the distribution of citizens into
centuries (ἑκατοστύες) prevailed also at Byzantium; see Inscript.
No. 2060 ap. Boeck. Corp. Inscr. Græc. p. 130. A citizen of
Olbia, upon whom the citizenship of Byzantium is conferred, is
allowed to enroll himself in any one of the ἑκατοστύες, that he
prefers.

Still however the demands of the people were not fully granted, and
dissension continued. Not merely the poorer citizens, but also the
population of serfs—homogeneous, speaking the same language, and
sympathizing with each other, like Helots or Penestæ—when once
agitated by the hope of liberty, were with difficulty appeased.
The government, though greatly democratized, found itself unable
to maintain tranquillity, and invoked assistance from without.
Application was made first, to the Athenian Timotheus—next, to the
Theban Epaminondas; but neither of them would interfere—nor was
there, indeed, any motive to tempt them. At length application was
made to the exiled citizen Klearchus.

This exile, now about forty years of age, intelligent, audacious and
unprincipled, had passed four years at Athens partly in hearing the
lessons of Plato and Isokrates—and had watched with emulous curiosity
the brilliant fortune of the despot Dionysius at Syracuse, in whom
both these philosophers took interest.[1079] During his banishment,
moreover, he had done what was common with Grecian exiles; he had
taken service with the enemy of his native city, the neighboring
prince Mithridates,[1080] and probably enough against the city
itself. As an officer, he distinguished himself much; acquiring
renown with the prince and influence over the minds of soldiers.
Hence his friends, and a party in Herakleia, became anxious to
recall him, as moderator and protector under the grievous political
discords prevailing. It was the oligarchical party who invited him
to come back, at the head of a body of troops, as their auxiliary
in keeping down the plebs. Klearchus accepted their invitation; but
with the full purpose of making himself the Dionysius of Herakleia.
Obtaining from Mithridates a powerful body of mercenaries, under
secret promise to hold the city only as his prefect, he marched
thither with the proclaimed purpose of maintaining order, and
upholding the government. As his mercenary soldiers were soon found
troublesome companions, he obtained permission to construct a
separate stronghold in the city, under color of keeping them apart
in the stricter discipline of a barrack.[1081] Having thus secured
a strong position, he invited Mithridates into the city, to receive
the promised possession; but instead of performing this engagement,
he detained the prince as prisoner, and only released him on payment
of a considerable ransom. He next cheated, still more grossly, the
oligarchy who had recalled him; denouncing their past misrule,
declaring himself their mortal enemy, and espousing the pretensions
as well as the antipathies of the plebs. The latter willingly
seconded him in his measures—even extreme measures of cruelty and
spoliation—against their political enemies. A large number of the
rich were killed, imprisoned, or impoverished and banished; their
slaves or serfs, too, were not only manumitted by order of the new
despot, but also married to the wives and daughters of the exiles.
The most tragical scenes arose out of these forced marriages; many
of the women even killed themselves, some after having first killed
their new husbands. Among the exiles, a party, driven to despair,
procured assistance from without, and tried to obtain by force
readmittance into the city; but they were totally defeated by
Klearchus, who after this victory became more brutal and unrelenting
than ever.[1082]

[1079] Diodor. xv. 81. ἐζήλωσε μὲν τὴν Διονυσίου τοῦ Συρακοσίου
διαγωγὴν, etc. Memnon, Fragm. c. 1; Isokrates, Epist. vii.

It is here that the fragments of Memnon, as abstracted by Photius
(Cod. 224), begin. Photius had seen only eight books of Memnon’s
History of Herakleia (Books ix.-xvi. inclusive); neither the
first eight books (see the end of his Excerpta from Memnon),
nor those after the sixteenth, had come under his view. This
is greatly to be regretted, as we are thus shut out from the
knowledge of Heraklean affairs anterior to Klearchus.

It happens, not unfrequently, with Photius, that he does not
possess an entire work, but only parts of it; this is a curious
fact, in reference to the libraries of the ninth century A.
D.

The fragments of Memnon are collected out of Photius, together
with those of Nymphis and other Herakleotic historians, and
illustrated with useful notes and citations, in the edition of
Orelli; as well as by K. Müller, in Didot’s Fragm. Hist. Græc.
tom. iii. p. 525. Memnon carried his history down to the time
of Julius Cæsar, and appears to have lived shortly after the
Christian era. Nymphis (whom he probably copied) was much older;
having lived seemingly from about 300-230 B. C. (see the
few Fragmenta remaining from him, in the same work, iii. p. 12).
The work of the Herakleotic author Herodôrus seems to have been
altogether upon legendary matter (see Fragm. in the same work,
ii. p. 27). He was half a century earlier than Nymphis.

[1080] Suidas v. Κλέαρχος.

[1081] Polyænus, ii. 30, 1; Justin, xvi. 4. “A quibus revocatus
in patriam, per quos in arce collocatus fuerat”, etc.

Æneas (Poliorket. c. 12) cites this proceeding as an example of
the mistake made by a political party, in calling in a greater
number of mercenary auxiliaries than they could manage or keep in
order.

[1082] Justin, xvi. 4, 5; Theopompus ap. Athenæ. iii. p. 85.
Fragm. 200, ed. Didot.

He was now in irresistible power; despot of the whole city, plebs as
well as oligarchy. Such he continued to be for twelve years; during
which he displayed great warlike energy against exterior enemies,
together with unabated cruelty towards the citizens. He farther
indulged in the most overweening insolence of personal demeanor,
adopting an Oriental costume and ornaments, and proclaiming himself
the son of Zeus—as Alexander the Great did after him. Amidst all
these enormities, however, his literary tastes did not forsake him;
he collected a library, at that time a very rare possession.[1083]
Many were the conspiracies attempted by suffering citizens against
this tyrant; but his vigilance baffled and punished all. At length
two young men, Chion and Leonidas (they too having been among the
hearers of Plato), found an opportunity to stab him at a Dionysiac
festival. They, with those who seconded them, were slain by his
guards, after a gallant resistance; but Klearchus himself died of the
wound, in torture and mental remorse.[1084]

[1083] Memnon, c. 1. The seventh Epistle of Isokrates, addressed
to Timotheus son of Klearchus, recognizes generally this
character of the latter with whose memory Isokrates disclaims all
sympathy.

[1084] Memnon, c. 1; Justin, xvi. 5; Diodor. xvi 36.

His death unfortunately brought no relief to the Herakleots. The two
sons whom he left, Timotheus and Dionysius, were both minors; but his
brother Satyrus, administering in their name, grasped the sceptre
and continued the despotism, with cruelty not merely undiminished,
but even aggravated and sharpened by the past assassination. Not
inferior to his predecessor in energy and vigilance, Satyrus was in
this respect different, that he was altogether rude and unlettered.
Moreover he was rigidly scrupulous in preserving the crown for his
brother’s children, as soon as they should be of age. To ensure to
them an undisturbed succession, he took every precaution to avoid
begetting children of his own by his wife.[1085] After a rule of
seven years, Satyrus died of a lingering and painful distemper.

[1085] Memnon, c. 2. ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ φιλαδελφίᾳ τὸ πρῶτον ἠνέγκατο·
τὴν γὰρ ἀρχὴν τοῖς τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ παισὶν ἀνεπηρέαστον συντηρῶν,
ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τῆς αὐτῶν κηδεμονίας λόγον ἐτίθετο, ὡς καὶ γυναικὶ
συνὼν, καὶ τότε λίαν στεργομένῃ, μὴ ἀνασχέσθαι παιδοποιῆσαι,
ἀλλὰ μηχανῇ πάσῃ γονῆς στέρησιν ἑαυτῷ δικάσαι, ὡς ἂν μήδ᾽ ὅλως
ὑπολίποι τινὰ ἐφεδρεύοντα τοῖς τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ παισίν.

In the Antigonid dynasty of Macedonia, we read that Demetrius,
son of Antigonus Gonatas, died leaving his son Philip a boy.
Antigonus called Doson, younger brother of Demetrius, assumed the
regency on behalf of Philip; he married the widow of Demetrius,
and had children by her; but he was so anxious to guard Philip’s
succession against all chance of being disturbed, that he
refused to bring up his own children—Ὁ δὲ παιδῶν γενομένων ἐκ
τῆς Χρυσηΐδος, οὐκ ἀνεθρέψατο, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῷ Φιλιππῷ περισώζων
(Porphyry, Fragm. ap. Didot, Fragm. Histor. Græc. vol. iii. p.
701).

In the Greek and Roman world, the father was generally considered
to have the right of determining whether he would or would not
bring up a new-born child. The obligation was only supposed to
commence when he accepted or sanctioned it, by taking up the
child.

The government of Herakleia now devolved on Timotheus, who exhibited
a contrast, alike marked and beneficent, with his father and uncle.
Renouncing all their cruelty and constraint, he set at liberty
every man whom he found in prison. He was strict in dispensing
justice, but mild and even liberal in all his dealings towards the
citizens. At the same time, he was a man of adventurous courage,
carrying on successful war against foreign enemies, and making his
power respected all round. With his younger brother Dionysius, he
maintained perfect harmony, treating him as an equal and partner.
Though thus using his power generously towards the Herakleots, he
was, however, still a despot, and retained the characteristic marks
of despotism—the strong citadel, fortified separately from the town,
with a commanding mercenary force. After a reign of about nine years,
he died, deeply mourned by every one.[1086]

[1086] Memnon, c. 3. The Epistle of Isokrates (vii.) addressed to
Timotheus in recommendation of a friend, is in harmony with this
general character, but gives no new information.

Diodorus reckons Timotheus as immediately succeeding Klearchus
his father—considering Satyrus simply as regent (xvi. 36).

Dionysius, who succeeded him, fell upon unsettled times, full both
of hope and fear; opening chances of aggrandizement, yet with many
new dangers and uncertainties. The sovereignty which he inherited
doubtless included, not simply the city of Herakleia, but also
foreign dependencies and possessions in its neighborhood; for
his three predecessors[1087] had been all enterprising chiefs,
commanding a considerable aggressive force. At the commencement of
his reign, indeed, the ascendency of Memnon and the Persian force
in the north-western part of Asia Minor was at a higher pitch than
ordinary; it appears too that Klearchus—and probably his successors
also—had always taken care to keep on the best terms with the Persian
court.[1088] But presently came the invasion of Alexander (334 B.
C.), with the battle of the Granikus, which totally extinguished
the Persian power in Asia Minor, and was followed, after no long
interval, by the entire conquest of the Persian empire. The Persian
control being now removed from Asia Minor—while Alexander with the
great Macedonian force merely passed through it to the east, leaving
viceroys behind him—new hopes of independence or aggrandizement
began to arise among the native princes in Bithynia, Paphlagonia,
and Kappadokia. The Bithynian prince even contended successfully
in the field against Kalas, who had been appointed by Alexander as
satrap in Phrygia.[1089] The Herakleot Dionysius, on the other hand,
enemy by position of these Bithynians, courted the new Macedonian
potentates, playing his political game with much skill in every way.
He kept his forces well in hand, and his dominions carefully guarded;
he ruled in a mild and popular manner, so as to preserve among the
Herakleots the same feelings of attachment which had been inspired
by his predecessor. While the citizens of the neighboring Sinôpê (as
has been already related) sent their envoys to Darius, Dionysius kept
his eyes upon Alexander; taking care to establish a footing at Pella,
and being peculiarly assiduous in attentions to Alexander’s sister,
the princess Kleopatra.[1090] He was the better qualified for this
courtly service, as he was a man of elegant and ostentatious tastes,
and had purchased from his namesake, the fallen Syracusan Dionysius,
all the rich furniture of the Dionysian family, highly available for
presents.[1091]

[1087] We hear of Klearchus as having besieged Astakus
(afterwards Nikomedia)—at the interior extremity of the
north-eastern indentation of the Propontis, called the Gulf of
Astakus (Polyænus, ii. 30, 3).

[1088] Memnon, c. 1.

[1089] Memnon, c. 20.

[1090] Memnon, c. 3.

[1091] Memnon, c. 3. See in this History, Vol. XI. Ch. lxxxv. p.
154.

By the favor of Antipater and the regency at Pella, the Herakleotic
despot was enabled both to maintain and extend his dominions, until
the return of Alexander to Susa and Babylon in 324 B. C.
All other authority was now superseded by the personal will of the
omnipotent conqueror; who, mistrusting all his delegates—Antipater,
the princesses, and the satraps—listened readily to complainants from
all quarters, and took particular pride in espousing the pretensions
of Grecian exiles. I have already recounted how in June 324 B.
C., Alexander promulgated at the Olympic festival a sweeping
edict, directing that in every Grecian city the exiles should be
restored—by force, if force was required. Among the various Grecian
exiles, those from Herakleia were not backward in soliciting his
support, to obtain their own restoration, as well as the expulsion of
the despot. As they were entitled, along with others, to the benefit
of the recent edict, the position of Dionysius became one of extreme
danger. He now reaped the full benefit of his antecedent prudence,
in having maintained both his popularity with the Herakleots at
home, and his influence with Antipater, to whom the enforcement of
the edict was entrusted. He was thus enabled to ward off the danger
for a time; and his good fortune rescued him from it altogether, by
the death of Alexander in June 323 B. C. That event, coming
as it did unexpectedly upon every one, filled Dionysius with such
extravagant joy, that he fell into a swoon: and he commemorated it
by erecting a statue in honor of Euthymia, or the tranquillizing
goddess. His position however seemed again precarious, when the
Herakleotic exiles renewed their solicitations to Perdikkas: who
favored their cause, and might probably have restored them, if he had
chosen to direct his march towards the Hellespont against Antipater
and Kraterus, instead of undertaking the ill-advised expedition
against Egypt, wherein he perished.[1092]

[1092] Memnon, c. 4.

The tide of fortune now turned more than ever in favor of Dionysius.
With Antipater and Kraterus, the preponderant potentates in his
neighborhood, he was on the best terms; and it happened at this
juncture to suit the political views of Kraterus to dismiss his
Persian wife Amastris (niece of the late Persian king Darius,
and conferred upon Kraterus by Alexander when he himself married
Statira), for the purpose of espousing Phila daughter of Antipater.
Amastris was given in marriage to Dionysius; for him, a splendid
exaltation—attesting the personal influence which he had previously
acquired. His new wife, herself a woman of ability and energy,
brought to him a large sum from the regal treasure, as well as
the means of greatly extending his dominion round Herakleia.
Noway corrupted by this good fortune, he still persevered both in
his conciliating rule at home, and his prudent alliances abroad,
making himself especially useful to Antigonus. That great chief,
preponderant throughout most parts of Asia Minor, was establishing
his ascendency in Bithynia and the neighborhood of the Propontis,
by founding the city of Antigonia in the rich plain adjoining the
Askanian Lake.[1093] Dionysius lent effective maritime aid to
Antigonus, in that war which ended by his conquest of Cyprus from the
Egyptian Ptolemy (307 B. C.) To the other Ptolemy, nephew
and general of Antigonus, Dionysius gave his daughter in marriage;
and even felt himself powerful enough to assume the title of king,
after Antigonus, Lysimachus, and the Egyptian Ptolemy had done the
like.[1094] He died, after reigning thirty years with consummate
political skill and uninterrupted prosperity—except that during the
last few years he lost his health from excessive corpulence.[1095]

[1093] Strabo, xii. p. 565.

[1094] Memnon, c. 4: compare Diodor. xx. 53.

[1095] Nymphis, Fragm. 16. ap. Athenæum, xii. p. 549; Ælian, V.
H. ix. 13.

Dionysius left three children under age—Klearchus, Oxathres and
a daughter—by his wife Amastris; whom he constituted regent, and
who, partly through the cordial support of Antigonus, maintained
the Herakleotic dominion unimpaired. Presently Lysimachus, king
of Thrace and of the Thracian Chersonese (on the isthmus of
which he had founded the city of Lysimacheia), coveted this as a
valuable alliance, paid his court to Amastris, and married her. The
Herakleotic queen thus enjoyed double protection, and was enabled
to avoid taking a part in the formidable conflict of Ipsus (300
B. C.); wherein the allies Lysimachus, Kassander, Ptolemy,
and Seleukus were victorious over Antigonus. The latter being
slain, and his Asiatic power crushed, Lysimachus got possession
of Antigonia, the recent foundation of his rival in Bithynia, and
changed its name to Nikæa.[1096] After a certain time, however,
Lysimachus became desirous of marrying Arsinoê, daughter of the
Egyptian Ptolemy; accordingly, Amastris divorced herself from him,
and set up for herself separately as regent of Herakleia. Her two
sons being now nearly of age, she founded and fortified, for her
own residence, the neighboring city of Amastris, about sixty miles
eastward of Herakleia on the coast of the Euxine.[1097] These young
men, Klearchus and Oxathres, assumed the government of Herakleia, and
entered upon various warlike enterprises; of which we know only, that
Klearchus accompanied Lysimachus in his expedition against the Getæ,
sharing the fate of that prince, who was defeated and taken prisoner.
Both afterwards obtained their release, and Klearchus returned to
Herakleia; where he ruled in a cruel and oppressive manner, and even
committed the enormity (in conjunction with his brother Oxathres) of
killing his mother Amastris. This crime was avenged by her former
husband Lysimachus; who, coming to Herakleia under professions of
friendship (B. C. 286), caused Klearchus and Oxathres to be
put to death, seized their treasure, and keeping separate possession
of the citadel only, allowed the Herakleots to establish a popular
government.[1098]

[1096] Strabo, xii. p. 565. So also Antioch, on the Orontes in
Syria, the great foundation of Seleukus Nikator, was established
on or near the site of another Antigonia, also previously founded
by Antigonus Monophthalmus (Strabo, xv. p. 750).

[1097] Strabo, xii. p. 544.

[1098] Memnon, c. 6.

Lysimachus, however, was soon persuaded by his wife Arsinoê to make
over Herakleia to her, as it had been formerly possessed by Amastris;
and Arsinoê sent thither a Kymæan officer named Herakleides, who
carried with him force sufficient to re-establish the former
despotism, with its oppressions and cruelties. For other purposes
too, not less mischievous, the influence of Arsinoê was all-powerful.
She prevailed upon Lysimachus to kill his eldest son (by a former
marriage) Agathokles, a young prince of the most estimable and
eminent qualities. Such an atrocity, exciting universal abhorrence
among the subjects of Lysimachus, enabled his rival Seleukus to
attack him with success. In a great battle fought between these two
princes, Lysimachus was defeated and slain—by the hand and javelin of
a citizen of Herakleia, named Malakon.[1099]

[1099] Memnon, c. 7, 8.

This victory transferred the dominions of the vanquished prince to
Seleukus. At Herakleia too, its effect was so powerful, that the
citizens were enabled to shake off their despotism. They at first
tried to make terms with the governor Herakleides, offering him money
as an inducement to withdraw. From him they obtained only an angry
refusal; yet his subordinate officers of mercenaries, and commanders
of detached posts in the Herakleotic territory, mistrusting their
own power of holding out, accepted an amicable compromise with the
citizens, who tendered to them full liquidation of arrears of pay,
together with the citizenship. The Herakleots were this enabled
to discard Herakleides, and regain their popular government. They
signalized their revolution by the impressive ceremony of demolishing
their Bastile—the detached fort or stronghold within the city, which
had served for eighty-four years as the characteristic symbol, and
indispensable engine, of the antecedent despotism.[1100] The city,
now again a free commonwealth, was farther reinforced by the junction
of Nymphis (the historian) and other Herakleotic citizens, who
had hitherto been in exile. These men were restored, and welcomed
by their fellow-citizens in full friendship and harmony; yet with
express proviso, that no demand should be made for the restitution
of their properties, long since confiscated.[1101] To the victor
Seleukus, however, and his officer Aphrodisius, the bold bearing
of the newly-emancipated Herakleots proved offensive. They would
probably have incurred great danger from him, had not his mind been
first set upon the conquest of Macedonia in the accomplishment of
which he was murdered by Ptolemy Keraunus.

[1100] Memnon, c. 9; Strabo, xii. p. 542.

[1101] Memnon, c. 11.

The Herakleots thus became again a commonwealth of free citizens,
without any detached citadel or mercenary garrison; yet they lost,
seemingly through the growing force and aggressions of some inland
dynasts, several of their outlying dependencies—Kierus, Tium,
and Amastris. The two former they recovered some time afterwards
by purchase, and they wished also to purchase back Amastris; but
Eumenes, who held it, hated them so much, that he repudiated their
money, and handed over the place gratuitously to the Kappadokian
chief Ariobarzanes.[1102] That their maritime power was at this time
very great, we may see by the astonishing account given of their
immense ships,—numerously manned, and furnished with many brave
combatants on the deck—which fought with eminent distinction in the
naval battle between Ptolemy Keraunus (murderer and successor of
Seleukus) and Antigonus Gonatas.[1103]

[1102] Memnon, c. 16. The inhabitants of Byzantium also purchased
for a considerable sum the important position called the Ἱερὸν,
at the entrance of the Euxine on the Asiatic side (Polybius, iv.
50).

These are rare examples, in ancient history, of cities acquiring
territory or dependencies _by purchase_. Acquisitions were often
made in this manner by the free German, Swiss, and Italian cities
of mediæval Europe; but as to the Hellenic cities, I have not had
occasion to record many such transactions in the course of this
history.

[1103] Memnon, c. 13: compare Polyb. xviii. 34.

It is not my purpose to follow lower down the destinies of Herakleia.
It maintained its internal autonomy, with considerable maritime
power, a dignified and prudent administration, and a partial, though
sadly circumscribed, liberty of foreign action—until the successful
war of the Romans against Mithridates (B. C. 69). In Asia Minor, the
Hellenic cities on the coast were partly enabled to postpone the
epoch of their subjugation, by the great division of power which
prevailed in the interior; for the potentates, of Bithynia, Pergamus,
Kappadokia, Pontus, Syria, were in almost perpetual discord—while
all of them were menaced by the intrusion of the warlike and
predatory Gauls, who extorted for themselves settlements in Galatia
(B. C. 276). The kings, the enemies of civic freedom, were kept
partially in check by these new and formidable neighbors,[1104]
who were themselves however hardly less formidable to the Grecian
cities on the coast.[1105] Sinôpê, Herakleia, Byzantium,—and even
Rhodes, in spite of the advantage of an insular position,—isolated
relics of what had once been an Hellenic aggregate, become from
henceforward cribbed and confined by inland neighbors almost at their
gates[1106]—dependent on the barbaric potentates, between whom they
were compelled to trim, making themselves useful in turn to all. It
was however frequent with these barbaric princes to derive their
wives, mistresses, ministers, negotiators, officers, engineers,
literati, artists, actors, and intermediate agents both for ornament
and recreation—from some Greek city. Among them all, more or less
of Hellenic influence became thus insinuated; along with the Greek
language which spread its roots everywhere—even among the Gauls or
Galatians, the rudest and latest of the foreign immigrants.

[1104] This is a remarkable observation made by Memnon, c. 19.

[1105] See the statement of Polybius, xxii. 24.

[1106] Contrast the independent and commanding position occupied
by Byzantium in 399 B. C., acknowledging no superior
except Sparta (Xenoph. Anab. vii. 1)—with its condition in the
third century B. C.—harassed and pillaged almost to
the gates of the town by the neighboring Thracians and Gauls,
and only purchased immunity by continued money payments: see
Polybius, iv. 45.

Of the Grecian maritime towns in the Euxine south of the
Danube—Apollonia, Mesembria, Odêssus, Kallatis, Tomi, and Istrus—five
(seemingly without Tomi) formed a confederate Pentapolis.[1107] About
the year 312 B. C., we hear of them as under the power of
Lysimachus king of Thrace, who kept a garrison in Kallatis—probably
in the rest also. They made a struggle to shake off his yoke,
obtaining assistance from some of the neighboring Thracians and
Scythians, as well as from Antigonus. But Lysimachus, after a contest
which seems to have lasted three or four years, overpowered both
their allies and them, reducing them again into subjection.[1108]
Kallatis sustained a long siege, dismissing some of its ineffective
residents; who were received and sheltered by Eumelus prince of
Bosporus. It was in pushing his conquests yet farther northward, in
the steppe between the rivers Danube and Dniester, that Lysimachus
came into conflict with the powerful prince of the Getæ—Dromichætes;
by whom he was defeated and captured, but generously released.[1109]
I have already mentioned that the empire of Lysimachus ended with
his last defeat and death by Seleukus—(281 B. C.). By his
death, the cities of the Pontic Pentapolis regained a temporary
independence. But their barbaric neighbors became more and more
formidable, being reinforced seemingly by immigration of fresh
hordes from Asia; thus the Sarmatians, who in Herodotus’s time were
on the east of the Tanais, appear, three centuries afterwards, even
south of the Danube. By these tribes—Thracians, Getæ, Scythians, and
Sarmatians—the Greek cities of this Pentapolis were successively
pillaged. Though renewed indeed afterwards, from the necessity
of some place of traffic, even for the pillagers themselves—they
were but poorly renewed, with a large infusion of barbaric
residents.[1110] Such was the condition in which the exile Ovid found
Tomi, near the beginning of the Christian era. The Tomitans were more
than half barbaric, and their Greek not easily intelligible. The
Sarmatian or Getic horse-bowmen, with their poisoned arrows, ever
hovered near, galloped even up to the gates, and carried off the
unwary cultivators into slavery. Even within a furlong of the town,
there was no security either for person or property. The residents
were clothed in skins, or leather; while the women, ignorant both of
spinning and weaving, were employed either in grinding corn or in
carrying on their heads the pitchers of water.[1111]

[1107] Strabo, vii. p. 319. Philip of Macedon defeated the
Scythian prince Atheas or Ateas (about 340 B. C.)
somewhere between Mount Hæmus and the Danube (Justin, ix. 2). But
the relations of Ateas with the towns of Istrus and Apollonia,
which are said to have brought Philip into the country, are very
difficult to understand. It is most probable that these cities
invited Philip as their defender.

In Inscription No. 2056 c. (in Boeckh’s Corp. Inscript. Græc.
part xi. p. 79), the five cities constituting the Pentapolis
are not clearly named. Boeckh supposes them to be Apollonia,
Mesembria, Odêssus, Kallatis, and Tomi; but Istrus seems more
probable than Tomi. Odêssus was on the site of the modern Varna
where the Inscription was found; greatly south of the modern town
of Odessa, which is on the site of another town _Ordêsus_.

An Inscription (2056) immediately preceding the above, also found
at Odêssus, contains a vote of thanks and honors to a certain
citizen of Antioch, who resided with ... (name imperfect), king
of the Scythians and rendered great service to the Greeks by his
influence.

[1108] Diodor. xix. 73; xx. 25.

[1109] Strabo, vii. p. 302-305; Pausanias, i. 9, 5.

[1110] Dion Chrysost. Orat. xxxvi. (Borysthenitica) p. 75, Reisk.
εἶλον δὲ καὶ ταύτην (Olbia) Γέται, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς ἐν τοῖς
ἀριστέροις τοῦ Πόντου πόλεις, μέχρι Ἀπολλωνίας· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ σφόδρα
ταπεινὰ τὰ πράγματα κατέστη τῶν ταύτῃ Ἑλλήνων· τῶν μὲν οὐκέτι
συνοικισθεισῶν πόλεων, τῶν δὲ φαυλῶς, καὶ τῶν πλείστων βαρβάρων
εἰς αὐτὰς συῤῥεόντων.

[1111] The picture drawn by Ovid, of his situation as an exile
at Tomi, can never fail to interest, from the mere beauty and
felicity of his expression; but it is not less interesting, as
a real description of Hellenism in its last phase, degraded and
overborne by adverse fates. The truth of Ovid’s picture is fully
borne out by the analogy of Olbia, presently to be mentioned. His
complaints run through the five books of the Tristia, and the
four books of Epistolæ ex Ponto (Trist. v. 10, 15).

“Innumeræ circa gentes fera bella minantur,
Quæ sibi non rapto vivere turpe putant.
Nil extra tutum est: tumulus defenditur ægre
Mœnibus exiguis ingenioque soli.
Cum minime credas, ut avis, densissimus hostis
Advolat, et prædam vix bene visus agit.
Sæpe intra muros clausis venientia portis
Per medias legimus noxia tela vias.
Est igitur rarus, qui colere audeat, isque
Hac arat infelix, hac tenet arma manu.
Vix ope castelli defendimur: et tamen intus
Mista facit Græcis barbara turba metum.
Quippe simul nobis habitat discrimine nullo
Barbarus, et tecti plus quoque parte tenet.
Quos ut non timeas, possis odisse, videndo
Pellibus et longâ corpora tecta comâ.
Hos quoque, qui geniti Graiâ creduntur ab urbe,
Pro patrio cultu Persica bracca tegit,” etc.

This is a specimen out of many others: compare Trist. iii. 10,
53; iv. 1, 67; Epist. Pont. iii. 1.

Ovid dwells especially upon the fact that there was more of
barbaric than of Hellenic speech at Tomi—“Graiaque quod Getico
victa loquela sono est” (Trist. v. 2, 68). Woollen clothing, and
the practice of spinning and weaving by the free women of the
family, were among the most familiar circumstances of Grecian
life; the absence of these feminine arts, and the use of skins or
leather for clothing, were notable departures from Grecian habits
(Ex Ponto, iii. 8):—

“Vellera dura ferunt pecudes; et Palladis uti
Arte Tomitanæ non didicere nurus.
Femina pro lanâ Cerealia munera frangit,
Suppositoque gravem vertice portat aquam.”

By these same barbarians, Olbia also (on the right bank of the
Hypanis or Bug near its mouth) became robbed of that comfort and
prosperity which it had enjoyed when visited by Herodotus. In his
day, the Olbians lived on good terms with the Scythian tribes in
their neighborhood. They paid a stipulated tribute, giving presents
besides to the prince and his immediate favorites; and on these
conditions, their persons and properties were respected. The Scythian
prince Skylês (son of an Hellenic mother from Istrus, who had
familiarized him with Greek speech and letters) had built a fine
house in the town, and spent in it a month, from attachment to Greek
manners and religion, while his Scythian army lay near the gates
without molesting any one.[1112] It is true, that this proceeding
cost Skylês his life; for the Scythians would not tolerate their own
prince in the practice of foreign religious rites, though they did
not quarrel with the same rites when observed by the Greeks.[1113]
To their own customs the Scythians adhered tenaciously, and those
customs were often sanguinary, ferocious, and brutish. Still they
were warriors, rather than robbers—they abstained from habitual
pillage, and maintained with the Greeks a reputation for honesty and
fair dealing, which became proverbial with the early poets. Such were
the Scythians as seen by Herodotus (probably about 440 to 430 B. C.);
and the picture drawn by Ephorus a century afterwards (about 340 B.
C.), appears to have been not materially different.[1114] But after
that time it gradually altered. New tribes seem to have come in—the
Sarmatians out of the East—the Gauls out of the West; from Thrace
northward to the Tanais and the Palus Mæotis, the most different
tribes became intermingled—Gauls, Thracians, Getæ, Scythians,
Sarmatians, etc.[1115] Olbia was in an open plain, with no defence
except its walls and the adjoining river Hypanis, frozen over in the
winter. The hybrid Helleno-Scythian race, formed by intermarriages of
Greeks with Scythians—and the various Scythian tribes who had become
partially sedentary cultivators of corn for exportation—had probably
also acquired habits less warlike than the tribes of primitive
barbaric type. At any rate, even if capable of defending themselves,
they could not continue their production and commerce under repeated
hostile incursions.

[1112] Herodot. iv. 16-18. The town was called _Olbia_ by its
inhabitants, but _Borysthenes_ usually by foreigners; though it
was not on the Borysthenes river (Dnieper), but on the right bank
of the Hypanis (Bug).

[1113] Herodot. iv. 76-80.

[1114] Strabo, vii. p. 302: Skymnus Chius, v. 112, who usually
follows Ephorus.

The rhetor Dion tells us (Orat. xxxvi. init.) that he went to
Olbia in order that he might _go through the Scythians to the
Getæ_. This shows that in his time (about A. D. 100)
the Scythians must have been between the Bug and Dniester—the
Getæ nearer to the Danube—just as they had been four centuries
earlier. But many new hordes were mingled with them.

[1115] Strabo, vii. p. 296-304.

A valuable inscription remaining enables us to compare the Olbia (or
Borysthenes) seen by Herodotus, with the same town in the second
century B. C.[1116] At this latter period, the city was diminished
in population, impoverished in finances, exposed to constantly
increasing exactions and menace from the passing barbaric hordes,
and scarcely able to defend against them even the security of its
walls. Sometimes there approached the barbaric chief Saitapharnes
with his personal suite, sometimes his whole tribe or horde in mass,
called Saii. Whenever they came, they required to be appeased by
presents, greater than the treasury could supply, and borrowed only
from the voluntary help of rich citizens; while even these presents
did not always avert ill treatment or pillage. Already the citizens
of Olbia had repelled various attacks, partly by taking into pay
a semi-Hellenic population in their neighborhood (Mix-Hellenes,
like the Liby-Phenicians in Africa); but the inroads became more
alarming, and their means of defence less, through the uncertain
fidelity of these Mix-Hellenes, as well as of their own slaves—the
latter probably barbaric natives purchased from the interior.[1117]
In the midst of public poverty, it was necessary to enlarge and
strengthen the fortifications; for they were threatened with the
advent of the Gauls—who inspired such terror that the Scythians and
other barbarians were likely to seek their own safety by extorting
admission within the walls of Olbia. Moreover even corn was scarce,
and extravagantly dear. There had been repeated failures in the
produce of the lands around, famine was apprehended, and efforts were
needed, greater than the treasury could sustain, to lay in a stock at
the public expense. Among the many points of contrast with Herodotus,
this is perhaps the most striking; for in his time, corn was the
great produce and the principal export from Olbia; the growth had now
been suspended, or was at least perpetually cut off, by increased
devastation and insecurity.

[1116] This Inscription—No. 2058—in Boeckh’s Inscr. Græc. part
xi. p. 121 _seq._—is among the most interesting in that noble
collection. It records a vote of public gratitude and honor to
a citizen of Olbia named Protogenes, and recites the valuable
services which he as well as his father had rendered to the
city. It thus describes the numerous situations of difficulty
and danger from which he had contributed to extricate them. A
vivid picture is presented to us of the distress of the city.
The introduction prefixed by Boeckh (p. 86-89) is also very
instructive.

Olbia is often spoken of by the name of _Borysthenes_, which
name was given to it by foreigners, but not recognized by the
citizens. Nor was it even situated on the Borysthenes river; but
on the right or western bank of the Hypanis (Bug) river; not far
from the modern Oczakoff.

The date of the above Inscription is not specified, and has been
differently determined by various critics. Niebuhr assigns it
(Untersuchungen über die Skythen, etc. in his Kleine Schriften,
p. 387) to a time near the close of the second Punic war. Boeckh
also believes that it is not much after that epoch. The terror
inspired by the Gauls, even to other barbarians, appears to suit
the second century B. C. better than it suits a later
period.

The Inscription No. 2059 attests the great number of strangers
resident at Olbia; strangers from eighteen different cities, of
which the most remote is Miletus, the mother-city of Olbia.

[1117] On one occasion, we know not when, the citizens of Olbia
are said to have been attacked by one Zopyrion, and to have
succeeded in resisting him only by emancipating their slaves, and
granting the citizenship to foreigners (Macrobius, Saturnal. i.
11).

After perpetual attacks, and even several captures, by barbaric
neighbors—this unfortunate city, about fifty years before the
Christian era, was at length so miserably sacked by the Getæ, as to
become for a time abandoned.[1118] Presently, however, the fugitives
partially returned, to re-establish themselves on a reduced scale.
For the very same barbarians who had persecuted and plundered them,
still required an emporium with a certain amount of import and
export, such as none but Greek settlers could provide; moreover it
was from the coast near Olbia, and from care of its inhabitants, that
many of the neighboring tribes derived their supply of salt.[1119]
Hence arose a puny after-growth of Olbia—preserving the name,
traditions, and part of the locality, of the deserted city—by the
return of a portion of the colonists with an infusion of Scythian or
Sarmatian residents; an infusion indeed so large, as seriously to
dishellenize both the speech and the personal names in the town.[1120]

[1118] Dion Chrys. (Or. xxxvi. p. 75), ἀεὶ μὲν πολεμεῖται,
πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἑάλωκε, etc.

[1119] Dion Chrysost. Orat. xxxvi. (Borysthenit.) p. 75, 76,
Reisk.

[1120] See Boeckh’s Commentary on the language and personal names
of the Olbian Inscriptions, part xi. p. 108-116.

To this second edition of Olbia, the rhetor Dion Chrysostom paid a
summer visit (about a century after the Christian era), of which
he has left a brief but interesting account. Within the wide area
once filled by the original Olbia—the former circumference of which
was marked by crumbling walls and towers—the second town occupied
a narrow corner; with poor houses, low walls, and temples having
no other ornament except the ancient statues mutilated by the
plunderers. The citizens dwelt in perpetual insecurity, constantly
under arms or on guard; for the barbaric horsemen, in spite of
sentinels posted to announce their approach, often carried off
prisoners, cattle, or property, from the immediate neighborhood
of the gates. The picture drawn of Olbia by Dion confirms in a
remarkable way that given of Tomi by Ovid. And what imparts to it
a touching interest is, that the Greeks whom Dion saw contending
with the difficulties, privations, and dangers of this inhospitable
outpost, still retained the activity, the elegance, and the
intellectual aspirations of their Ionic breed; in this respect much
superior to the Tomitans of Ovid. In particular, they were passionate
admirers of Homer; a considerable proportion of the Greeks of Olbia
could repeat the Iliad from memory.[1121] Achilles (localized under
the surname of Pontarches, on numerous islands and capes in the
Euxine) was among the chief divine or heroic persons to whom they
addressed their prayers.[1122] Amidst Grecian life, thus degraded
and verging towards its extinction, and stripped even of the purity
of living speech—the thread of imaginative and traditional sentiment
thus continues without suspension or abatement.

[1121] Dion, Orat. xxxvi. (Borysthenit.), p. 78, Reiske. ... καὶ
τἄλλα μὲν οὐκέτι σαφῶς ἑλληνίζοντες, διὰ τὸ ἐν μέσοις οἰκεῖν τοῖς
βαρβάροις, ὅμως τήν γε Ἰλιάδα ὀλίγου πάντες ἴσασιν ἀπὸ στόματος.
I translate the words ὀλίγου πάντες with some allowance for
rhetoric.

The representation given by Dion of the youthful citizen of
Olbia—Kallistratus—with whom he conversed, is curious as a
picture of Greek manners in this remote land; a youth of eighteen
years of age, with genuine Ionic features, and conspicuous for
his beauty (εἶχε πολλοὺς ἐραστάς) a zealot for literature and
philosophy, but especially for Homer; clothed in the costume of
the place, suited for riding—the long leather trowsers, and short
black cloak; constantly on horseback for defence of the town, and
celebrated as a warrior even at that early age, having already
killed or made prisoners several Sarmatians (p. 77).

[1122] See Inscriptions, Nos. 2076, 2077, ap. Boeckh; and
Arrian’s Periplus of the Euxine, ap. Geogr. Minor. p. 21, ed.
Hudson.

Respecting Bosporus or Pantikapæum (for both names denote the same
city, though the former name often comprehends the whole annexed
dominion), founded by Milesian settlers[1123] on the European side
of the Kimmerian Bosporus (near Kertsch), we first hear, about
the period when Xerxes was repulsed from Greece (480-479 B.
C.). It was the centre of a dominion including Phanagoria,
Kepi, Hermonassa, and other Greek cities on the Asiatic side of the
strait; and is said to have been governed by what seems to have been
an oligarchy—called the Archæanaktidæ, for forty-two years[1124]
(480-438 B. C.).

[1123] Strabo, vii. p. 310.

[1124] Diodor. xii. 31.

After them we have a series of princes standing out individually by
name, and succeeding each other in the same family. Spartokus I. was
succeeded by Seleukus; next comes Spartokus II.; then Satyrus I.
(407-393 B. C.); Leukon (393-353 B. C.); Spartokus III. (353-348 B.
C.); Parisades I. (348-310 B. C.); Satyrus II., Prytanis, Eumelus
(310-304 B. C.); Spartokus IV. (304-284 B. C.); Parisades II.[1125]
During the reigns of these princes, a connection of some intimacy
subsisted between Athens and Bosporus; a connection not political,
since the Bosporanic princes had little interest in the contentions
about Hellenic hegemony—but of private intercourse, commercial
interchange, and reciprocal good offices. The eastern corner of
the Tauric Chersonesus, between Pantikapæum and Theodosia, was
well-suited for the production of corn; while plenty of fish, as well
as salt, was to be had in or near the Palus Mæotis. Corn, salted
fish and meat, hides, and barbaric slaves in considerable numbers,
were in demand among all the Greeks round the Ægean, and not least
at Athens, where Scythian slaves were numerous;[1126] while oil and
wine, with other products of more southern regions, were acceptable
in Bosporus and the other Pontic ports. This important traffic seems
to have been mainly carried on in ships and by capital belonging to
Athens and other Ægean maritime towns; and must have been greatly
under the protection and regulation of the Athenians, so long as
their maritime empire subsisted. Enterprising citizens of Athens went
to Bosporus (as to Thrace and the Thracian Chersonesus), to push
their fortunes; merchants from other cities found it advantageous to
settle as resident strangers or metics at Athens, where they were
more in contact with the protecting authority, and obtained readier
access to the judicial tribunals. It was probably during the period
preceding the great disaster at Syracuse in 413 B. C., that Athens
first acquired her position as a mercantile centre for the trade with
the Euxine; which we afterwards find her retaining, even with reduced
power, in the time of Demosthenes.

[1125] See Mr. Clinton’s Appendix on the Kings of Bosporus—Fast.
Hellen. App. c. 13. p. 280. etc.; and Boeckh’s Commentary on the
same subject, Inscript. Græc. part xi. p. 91 _seq._

[1126] Polybius (iv. 38) enumerates the principal articles of
this Pontic trade; among the exports τά τε δέρματα καὶ τὸ τῶν εἰς
τὰς δουλείας ἀγομένων σωμάτων πλῆθος, etc., where Schweighäuser
has altered ~δέρματα~ to ~θρέμματα~ seemingly on the authority
of one MS. only. I doubt the propriety of this change, as well
as the facts of any large exportation of live cattle from the
Pontus; whereas the exportation of hides was considerable: see
Strabo, xi. p. 493.

The Scythian public slaves or policemen of Athens are well known.
Σκύθαινα also is the name of a female slave (Aristoph. Lysistr.
184). Σκύθης, for the name of a slave, occurs as early as
Theognis, v. 826.

Some of the salted preparations from the Pontus were
extravagantly dear; Cato complained of a κεράμιον Ποντικῶν
ταρίχον as sold for 300 drachmæ (Polyb. xxxi. 24).

How strong was the position enjoyed by Athens in Bosporus, during
her unimpaired empire, we may judge from the fact, that Nymphæum
(south of Pantikapæum, between that town and Theodosia) was among
her tributary towns, and paid a talent annually.[1127] Not until
the misfortunes of Athens in the closing years of the Peloponnesian
war, did Nymphæum pass into the hands of the Bosporanic princes;
betrayed (according to Æschines) by the maternal grandfather of
Demosthenes, the Athenian Gylon; who however probably did nothing
more than obey a necessity rendered unavoidable by the fallen
condition of Athens.[1128] We thus see that Nymphæum, in the midst
of the Bosporanic dominion, was not only a member of the Athenian
empire, but also contained influential Athenian citizens, engaged
in the corn-trade. Gylon was rewarded by a large grant of land at
Kepi—probably other Athenians of Nymphæum were rewarded also—by
the Bosporanic prince; who did not grudge a good price for such an
acquisition. We find also other instances,—both of Athenian citizens
sent out to reside with the prince Satyrus,—and of Pontic Greeks who,
already in correspondence and friendship with various individual
Athenians, consign their sons to be initiated in the commerce,
society, and refinements of Athens.[1129] Such facts attest the
correspondence and intercourse of that city, during her imperial
greatness, with Bosporus.

[1127] Harpokration and Photius, v. Νυμφαῖον—from the ψηφίσματα
collected by Kraterus. Compare Boeckh, in the second edition of
his Staatshaushaltung der Athener, vol. ii. p. 658.

[1128] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 78. c. 57. See my last preceding
Vol. XI. Ch. lxxxvii. p. 263.

[1129] Lysias, pro Mantitheo, Or. xvi. s. 4; Isokrates
(Trapezitic.), Or. xvii. s. 5. The young man, whose case
Isokrates sets forth, was sent to Athens by his father Sopæus,
a rich Pontic Greek (s. 52) much in the confidence of Satyrus.
Sopæus furnished his son with two ship-loads of corn, and with
money besides—and then despatched him to Athens ἅμα κατ᾽ ἐμπορίαν
καὶ κατὰ θεωρίαν.

The Bosporanic prince Satyrus was in the best relations with Athens,
and even seems to have had authorized representatives there to
enforce his requests, which met with very great attention.[1130]
He treated the Athenian merchants at Bosporus with equity and
even favor, granting to them a preference in the export of corn
when there was not enough for all.[1131] His son Leukon not only
continued the preference to Athenian exporting ships, but also
granted to them remission of the export duty (of one-thirtieth
part), which he exacted from all other traders. Such an exemption
is reckoned as equivalent to an annual present of 13,000 medimni of
corn (the medimnus being about 1⅓ bushel); the total quantity of
corn brought from Bosporus to Athens in a full year being 400,000
medimni.[1132] It is easy to see moreover that such a premium must
have thrown nearly the whole exporting trade into the hands of
Athenian merchants. The Athenians requited this favor by public votes
of gratitude and honor, conferring upon Leukon the citizenship,
together with immunity from all the regular burthens attaching to
property at Athens. There was lying in that city money belonging
to Leukon;[1133] who was therefore open (under the proposition of
Leptines) to that conditional summons for exchange of properties,
technically termed Antidosis. In his time, moreover, the corn-trade
of Bosporus appears to have been farther extended; for we learn that
he established an export from Theodosia as well as from Pantikapæum.
His successor Parisades I. continuing to Athenian exporters of corn
the same privilege of immunity from export duty, obtained from Athens
still higher honors than Leukon; for we learn that his statue,
together with those of two relatives, was erected in the agora, on
the motion of Demosthenes.[1134] The connection of Bosporus with
Athens was durable as well as intimate; its corn-trade being of high
importance to the subsistence of the people. Every Athenian exporter
was bound by law to bring his cargo in the first instance to Athens.
The freighting and navigating of ships for that purpose, together
with the advance of money by rich capitalists (citizens and metics)
upon interest and conditions enforced by the Athenian judicature,
was a standing and profitable business. And we may appreciate the
value of equitable treatment, not to say favor, from the kings of
Bosporus—when we contrast it with the fraudulent and extortionate
behavior of Kleomenes, satrap of Egypt, in reference to the export of
Egyptian corn.[1135]

[1130] Isokrates, Trapez. s. 5, 6. Sopæus, father of this
pleader, had incurred the suspicions of Satyrus in the Pontus,
and had been arrested; upon which Satyrus sends to Athens
to seize the property of the son, to order him home,—and if
he refused, then to require the Athenians to deliver him
up—ἐπιστέλλει δὲ τοῖς ἐνθάδε ἐπιδημοῦσιν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου τά τε
χρήματα παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ κομίσασθαι, etc.

[1131] Isokrates, Trapezit. s. 71. Demosthenes also recognizes
favors from Satyrus—καὶ αὐτὸς (Leukon) καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι, etc.
(adv. Leptin. p. 467).

[1132] Demosth. adv. Leptin., p. 467.

[1133] Demosth. adv. Leptin., p. 469.

[1134] Demosth. adv. Phormion., p. 917; Deinarchus adv. Demosth.,
p. 34. The name stands Berisades as printed in the oration; but
it is plain that Parisades is the person designated. See Boeckh,
Introd. ad Inscr. No. 2056, p. 92.

Deinarchus avers, that Demosthenes received an annual present of
1000 modii of corn from Bosporus.

[1135] Demosthen. adv. Dionysodor. p. 1285.

The political condition of the Greeks at Bosporus was somewhat
peculiar. The hereditary princes (above enumerated), who ruled them
substantially as despots, assumed no other title (in respect to
the Greeks) than that of Archon. They paid tribute to the powerful
Scythian tribes who bounded them on the European side, and even
thought it necessary to carry a ditch across the narrow isthmus,
from some point near Theodosia northward to the Palus Mæotis, as a
protection against incursions.[1136] Their dominion did not extend
farther west than Theodosia; this ditch was their extreme western
boundary; and even for the land within it, they paid tribute. But
on the Asiatic side of the strait, they were lords paramount for a
considerable distance, over the feebler and less warlike tribes who
pass under the common name of Mæotæ or Mæêtae—the Sindi, Toreti,
Dandarii, Thatês, etc. Inscriptions, yet remaining, of Parisades I.
record him as King of these various barbaric tribes, but as Archon of
Bosporus and Theodosia.[1137] His dominion on the Asiatic side of the
Kimmerian Bosporus, sustained by Grecian and Thracian mercenaries,
was of considerable (though to us unknown) extent, reaching to
somewhere near the borders of Caucasus.[1138]

[1136] Strabo, vii. p. 310, 311.

[1137] See Inscript. Nos. 2117, 2118, 2119, in Boeckh’s
Collection, p. 156.

In the Memorabilia of Xenophon (ii. 1, 10). Sokrates cites the
Scythians as an example of ruling people, and the Mæotæ as an
example of subjects. Probably this refers to the position of the
Bosporanic Greeks, who paid tribute to the Scythians, but ruled
over the Mæotæ. The name _Mæotæ_ seems confined to tribes on the
Asiatic side of the Palus Mæotis; while the Scythians were on the
European side of that sea. Sokrates and the Athenians had good
means of being informed about the situation of the Bosporani and
their neighbors on both sides. See K. Neumann, die Hellenen im
Skythenlande, b. ii. p. 216.

[1138] This boundary is attested in another Inscription No.
2104, of the same collection. Inscription No. 2103, seems to
indicate Arcadian mercenaries in the service of Leukon: about the
mercenaries, see Diodor. xx. 22.

Parisades I. is said to have been worshipped as a god, after his
death (Strabo, vii. p. 310).

Parisades I. on his death left three sons—Satyrus, Prytanis, and
Eumelus. Satyrus, as the eldest, succeeded; but Eumelus claimed the
crown, sought aid without, and prevailed on various neighbors—among
them a powerful Thracian king named Ariopharnes—to espouse his
cause. At the head of an army said to consist of 20,000 horse and
22,000 foot, the two allies marched to attack the territories of
Satyrus, who advanced to meet them, with 2000 Grecian mercenaries,
and 2000 Thracians of his own, reinforced by a numerous body of
Scythian allies—20,000 foot, and 10,000 horse, and carrying with him
a plentiful supply of provisions in waggons. He gained a complete
victory, compelling Eumelus and Ariopharnes to retreat and seek
refuge in the regal residence of the latter, near the river Thapsis;
a fortress built of timber, and surrounded with forest, river, marsh,
and rock, so as to be very difficult of approach. Satyrus, having
first plundered the country around, which supplied a rich booty of
prisoners and cattle, proceeded to assail his enemies in their almost
impracticable position. But though he, and Meniskus his general of
mercenaries, made the most strenuous efforts, and even carried some
of the outworks, they were repulsed from the fortress itself; and
Satyrus, exposing himself forwardly to extricate Meniskus, received
a wound of which he shortly died—after a reign of nine months.
Meniskus, raising the siege, withdrew the army to Gargaza; from
whence he conveyed back the regal corpse to Pantikapæum.[1139]

[1139] Diodor. xx. 24 The scene of these military operations
(as far as we can pretend to make it out from the brief and
superficial narrative of Diodorus), seems to have been on the
European side of Bosporus; somewhere between the Borysthenes
river and the Isthmus of Perekop, in the territory called by
Herodotus _Hylæa_. This is Niebuhr’s opinion, which I think more
probable than that of Boeckh, who supposes the operations to have
occurred on the Asiatic territory of Bosporus. So far I concur
with Niebuhr; but his reasons for placing Dromichætes king of the
Getæ (the victor over Lysimachus), east of the Borysthenes, are
noway satisfactory.

Compare Niebuhr’s Untersuchungen über die Skythen, etc. (in
his Kleine Schriften, p. 380). with Boeckh’s Commentary on the
Sarmatian Inscriptions, Corp. Ins. Græc. part xi. p. 83-103.

The mention by Diodorus of a wooden fortress, surrounded by
morass and forest, is curious, and may be illustrated by the
description in Herodotus (iv. 108) of the city of the Budini.
This habit of building towns and fortifications of wood,
prevailed among the Slavonic population in Russia and Poland
until far down in the middle ages. See Paul Joseph Schaffarik,
Slavische Alterhümer, in the German translation of Wuttke, vol.
i. ch. 10 p. 192; also K. Neumann, Die Hellenen im Skythenlande,
p. 91.

Prytanis, the next brother, rejecting an offer of partition tendered
by Eumelus, assumed the sceptre, and marched forth to continue the
struggle. But the tide of fortune now turned in favor of Eumelus;
who took Gargaza with several other places, worsted his brother
in battle, and so blocked him up in the isthmus near the Palus
Mæotis, that he was forced to capitulate and resign his pretensions.
Eumelus entered Pantikapæum as conqueror. Nevertheless, the defeated
Prytanis, in spite of his recent covenant, made a renewed attempt
upon the crown; wherein he was again baffled, forced to escape to
Kêpi, and there slain. To assure himself of the throne, Eumelus put
to death the wives and children of both his two brothers, Satyrus
and Prytanis—together with all their principal friends. One youth
alone—Parisades, son of Satyrus—escaped and found protection with the
Scythian prince Agarus.

Eumelus had now put down all rivals; yet his recent cruelties had
occasioned wrath and disgust among the Bosporanic citizens. He
convoked them in assembly, to excuse his past conduct, and promised
good government for the future; at the same time guaranteeing to them
their full civic constitution, with such privileges and immunities
as they had before enjoyed, and freedom from direct taxation.[1140]
Such assurances, combined probably with an imposing mercenary force,
appeased or at least silenced the prevailing disaffection. Eumelus
kept his promises so far as to govern in a mild and popular spirit.
While thus rendering himself acceptable at home, he maintained an
energetic foreign policy, and made several conquests among the
surrounding tribes. He constituted himself a sort of protector
of the Euxine, repressing the piracies of the Heniochi and Achæi
(among the Caucasian mountains to the east) as well as of the
Tauri in the Chersonesus (Crimea); much to the satisfaction of
the Byzantines, Sinopians, and other Pontic Greeks. He received a
portion of the fugitives from Kallatis, when besieged by Lysimachus,
and provided for them a settlement in his dominions. Having thus
acquired great reputation, Eumelus was in the full career of conquest
and aggrandizement, when an accident terminated his life, after a
reign of rather more than five years. In returning from Scythia to
Pantikapæum, in a four-wheeled carriage (or waggon) and four with a
tent upon it, his horses took fright and ran away. Perceiving that
they were carrying him towards a precipice, he tried to jump out;
but his sword becoming entangled in the wheel, he was killed on the
spot.[1141] He was succeeded by his son Spartokus IV., who reigned
twenty years (304-284 B. C.); afterwards came the son of
Spartokus, Parisades II.; with whose name our information breaks
off.[1142]

[1140] Diodor. xx. 24.

[1141] Diodor. xx. 25.

[1142] Diodor. xx. 100. Spartokus IV.—son of Eumelus—is
recognized in one Attic Inscription (No. 107), and various
Bosporanic (No. 2105, 2106, 2120) in Boeckh’s Collection.
Parisades II.—son of Spartokus—is recognized in another
Bosporanic Inscription, No. 2107—seemingly also in No. 2120 _b._

This dynasty, the Spartokidæ, though they ruled the Greeks of
Bosporus as despots by means of a foreign mercenary force—yet seem to
have exercised power with equity and moderation.[1143] Had Eumelus
lived, he might probably have established an extensive empire over
the barbaric tribes on all sides of him. But empire over such
subjects was seldom permanent; nor did his successors long maintain
even as much as he left. We have no means of following their fortunes
in detail; but we know that about a century B. C., the then
reigning prince, Parisades IV., found himself so pressed and squeezed
by the Scythians,[1144] that he was forced (like Olbia and the
Pentapolis) to forego his independence; and to call in, as auxiliary
or master, the formidable Mithridates Eupator of Pontus; from whom a
new dynasty of Bosporanic kings began—subject however after no long
interval, to the dominion and interference of Rome.

[1143] Strabo, vii. p. 310. Deinarchus however calls Parisades,
Satyrus, and Gorgippus, τοὺς ἐχθίστους τύραννους (adv. Demosth.
s. 44).

[1144] Strabo, vii. p. 310. οὐχ οἷός τε ὢν ἀντέχειν πρὸς τοὺς
βαρβάρους, φόρον πραττομένους μείζω τοῦ πρότερον, etc.

These Mithridatic princes lie beyond our period; but the cities of
Bosporus under the Spartokid princes, in the fourth century B.
C., deserve to be ranked among the conspicuous features of the
living Hellenic world. They were not indeed purely Hellenic, but
presented a considerable admixture of Scythian or Oriental manners;
analogous to the mixture of the Hellenic and Libyan elements at
Kyrênê with its Battiad princes. Among the facts attesting the
wealth and power of these Spartokid princes, and of the Bosporanic
community, we may number the imposing groups of mighty sepulchral
tumuli near Kertch (Pantikapæum); some of which have been recently
examined, while the greater part still remain unopened. These
spacious chambers of stone—enclosed in vast hillocks (Kurgans),
cyclopian works piled up with prodigious labor and cost—have been
found to contain not only a profusion of ornaments of the precious
metals (gold, silver, and electron, or a mixture of four parts of
gold to one of silver), but also numerous vases, implements, and
works of art, illustrating the life and ideas of the Bosporanic
population. “The contents of the tumuli already opened are so
multifarious, that from the sepulchres of Pantikapæum alone, we might
become acquainted with everything which served the Greeks either
for necessary use, or for the decoration of domestic life.”[1145]
Statues, reliefs and frescoes on the walls, have been found, on
varied subjects both of war and peace, and often of very fine
execution; besides these, numerous carvings in wood, and vessels
of bronze or terra cotta; with necklaces, armlets, bracelets,
rings, drinking cups, etc. of precious metal—several with colored
beads attached.[1146] The costumes, equipment, and physiognomy
represented, are indeed a mixture of Hellenic and barbaric; moreover,
even the profusion of gold chains and other precious ornaments,
indicates a tone of sentiment partially orientalized, in those for
whom they were destined.

[1145] Neumann, Die Hellenen im Skythenlande, p. 503.

[1146] An account of the recent discoveries near Kertch or
Pantikapæum, will be found in Dubois de Montpéreux, Voyage
dans le Caucase, vol. v. p. 135 _seqq._; and in Neumann, Die
Hellenen im Skythenlande, pp. 483-533. The last-mentioned work
is peculiarly copious and instructive; relating what has been
done since Dubois’s travels, and containing abundant information
derived from the recent memoirs of the St. Petersburg Literary
Societies.

The local and special type, which shows itself so much on these
works of art, justifies the inference that they were not brought
from other Grecian cities, but executed by Grecian artists
resident at Pantikapæum (p. 507). Two marble statues, a man and
a woman, both larger than life, exhumed in 1850, are spoken of
with peculiar admiration (p. 491). Coins of the third and fourth
century B. C. have been found in several (p. 494, 495).
A great number of the so-called Etruscan vases have also been
discovered, probably fabricated from a species of clay still
existing in the neighborhood: the figures on these vases are
often excellent, with designs and scenes of every description,
religious, festal, warlike, domestic (p. 522). Many of the
sarcophagi are richly ornamented with carvings, in wood, ivory,
etc; some admirably executed (p. 521).

Unfortunately, the belief prevails, and has long prevailed,
among the neighboring population, that these tumuli contain
hidden treasures. One of the most striking among them—called the
Kul-Obo—was opened in 1830 by the Russian authorities. After
great pains and trouble, the means of entrance were discovered,
and the interior chamber was reached. It was the richest that
had ever been opened; being found to contain some splendid
golden ornaments, as well as many other relics. The Russian
officers placed a guard to prevent any one from entering it;
but the cupidity of the population of Kertch was so inflamed
by the report of the expected treasure being discovered, that
they forced the guard, broke into the interior, and pillaged
most of the contents (p. 509). The Russian authorities have been
generally anxious for the preservation and gradual excavation of
these monuments, but have had to contend against repugnance and
even rapacity on the part of the people near.

Dubois de Montpéreux gives an interesting description of the
opening of these tumuli near Kertch—especially of the Kul-Obo,
the richest of all, which he conceives to have belonged to one
of the Spartokid kings, and the decorations of which were the
product of Hellenic art:—

“Si l’on a enterré (he observes) un roi entouré d’un luxe
Scythique, ce sont des Græcs et des artistes de cette nation
qui ont travaillé à ses funerailles” (Voyage autour du Caucase,
pp. 195, 213, 227). Pantikapæum and Phanagoria (he says) “se
reconnoissent de loin à la foule de leurs tumulus” (p. 137).

But the design as well as the execution comes clearly out of the
Hellenic workshop; and there is good ground for believing, that in
the fourth century B. C., Pantikapæum was the seat, not
only of enterprising and wealthy citizens, but also of strenuous
and well-directed artistic genius. Such manifestations of the
refinements of Hellenism, in this remote and little-noticed city,
form an important addition to the picture of Hellas as a whole,—prior
to its days of subjection,—which it has been the purpose of this
history to present.

* * * * *

I have now brought down the history of Greece to the point of
time marked out in the Preface to my First Volume—the close of
the generation contemporary with Alexander—the epoch, from whence
dates not only the extinction of Grecian political freedom and
self-action, but also the decay of productive genius, and the
debasement of that consummate literary and rhetorical excellence
which the fourth century B. C. had seen exhibited in Plato
and Demosthenes.[1147] The contents of this last Volume indicate but
too clearly that Greece as a separate subject of history no longer
exists; for one full half of it is employed in depicting Alexander
and his conquests—ἄγριον αἰχμητὴν, κρατερὸν μήστωρα φόβοιο[1148]—that
Non-Hellenic conqueror into whose vast possessions the Greeks are
absorbed, with their intellectual brightness bedimmed, their spirit
broken, and half their virtue taken away by Zeus—the melancholy
emasculation inflicted (according to Homer) upon victims overtaken by
the day of slavery.[1149]

[1147] How marked that degradation was, may be seen attested by
Dionysius of Halikarnassus, De Antiquis Oratoribus, pp. 445, 446,
Reiske—ἐν γὰρ δὴ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν χρόνοις ἡ μὲν ἀρχαία καὶ φιλόσοφος
ῥητορικὴ προπηλακιζομένη καὶ δεινὰς ὕβρεις ὑπομένουσα κατελύετο,
ἀρξαμένη μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Μακεδόνος τελευτῆς ἐκπνεῖν
καὶ μαραίνεσθαι κατ᾽ ὀλίγον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἡλικίας μικροῦ
δεήσασα εἰς τέλος ἠφανίσθαι. Compare Dionys. De Composit. Verbor.
p. 29, 30, Reisk.; and Westermann, Geschichte der Griechischen
Beredtsamkeit, s. 75-77.

[1148] Hom. Iliad, vi. 97.

[1149] Hom. Odyss. xvii. 322.—

ἥμισυ γάρ τ᾽ ἀρετῆς ἀποαίνυται εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς
ἀνέρος, εὖτ᾽ ἄν μιν κατὰ δούλιον ἦμαρ ἕλῃσιν.

One branch of intellectual energy there was, and one alone, which
continued to flourish, comparatively little impaired, under the
preponderance of the Macedonian sword—the spirit of speculation and
philosophy. During the century which we have just gone through, this
spirit was embodied in several eminent persons, whose names have been
scarcely adverted to in this history. Among these names, indeed,
there are two, of peculiar grandeur, whom I have brought partially
before the reader, because both of them belong to general history
as well as to philosophy; Plato, as citizen of Athens, companion
of Sokrates at his trial, and counsellor of Dionysius in his
glory—Aristotle, as the teacher of Alexander. I had at one time hoped
to include in my present work a record of them as philosophers also,
and an estimate of their speculative characteristics; but I find
the subject far too vast to be compressed into such a space as this
volume would afford. The exposition of the tenets of distinguished
thinkers is not now numbered by historians, either ancient or modern,
among the duties incumbent upon them, nor yet among the natural
expectations of their readers; but is reserved for the special
historian of philosophy. Accordingly, I have brought my history of
Greece to a close, without attempting to do justice either to Plato
or to Aristotle. I hope to contribute something towards supplying
this defect, the magnitude of which I fully appreciate, in a separate
work, devoted specially to an account of Greek speculative philosophy
in the fourth century B. C.

APPENDIX.

ON ISSUS AND ITS NEIGHBORHOOD, AS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR.

The exact battle-field of Issus cannot be certainly assigned, upon
the evidence accessible to us. But it may be determined, within a few
miles north or south; and what is even more important—the general
features of the locality, as well as the preliminary movements of the
contending armies, admit of being clearly conceived and represented.

That the battle was fought in some portion of the narrow space
intervening between the eastern coast of the Gulf of Issus and the
western flank of Mount Amanus—that Alexander’s left and Darius’s
right, rested on the sea, and their right and left respectively on
the mountain—that Darius came upon Alexander unexpectedly from the
rear, thus causing him to return back a day’s march from Myriandrus,
and to reoccupy a pass which he had already passed through and
quitted—these points are clearly given, and appear to me not open to
question. We know that the river Pinarus, on which the battle was
fought, was at a certain distance _south_ of Issus, the last town of
Kilikia before entering Syria (Arrian, ii. 7. 2)—ἐς δὲ τὴν ὑστεραίαν
προὐχώρει (Darius from Issus) ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν Πίναρον—Ritter
erroneously states that Issus was _upon_ the river Pinarus, which
he even calls _the Issus river_ (Erdkunde, Theil iv. Abth. 2. p.
1797-1806). We know also that this river was at some distance _north_
of the maritime pass called the Gates of Kilikia and Assyria, through
which Alexander passed and repassed.

But when we proceed, beyond these data (the last of them only vague
and relative), to fix the exact battle-field, we are reduced to
conjecture. Dr. Thirlwall, in an appendix to the sixth volume of his
history, has collected and discussed very ably the different opinions
of various geographers.

To those whom he has cited, may be added—Mr. Ainsworth’s Essay on the
Cilician and Syrian Gates (in the Transactions of the Geographical
Society for 1837)—Mützel’s Topographical Notes on the third book of
Quintus Curtius—and the last volume of Ritter’s Erdkunde, published
only this year (1855), ch. xxvii. p. 1778 _seqq._

We know from Xenophon that Issus was a considerable town close to
the sea—two days’ march from the river Pyramus, and one day’s march
northward of the maritime pass called the Gates of Kilikia and
Syria. That it was near the north-eastern corner of the Gulf, may
also be collected from Strabo, who reckons the shortest line across
Asia Minor, as stretching from Sinôpê or Amisus _to Issus_—and who
also lays down the Egyptian sea as having its northern termination
_at Issus_ (Strabo, xiv. p. 677; xvi. p. 749). The probable site of
Issus has been differently determined by different authors; Rennell
(Illustrations of the Geography of the Anabasis, p. 42-48) places
it near Oseler or Yusler; as far as I can judge, this seems too far
distant from the head of the Gulf, towards the south.

In respect to the maritime pass, called the Gates of Kilikia and
Syria, there is much discrepancy between Xenophon and Arrian. It
is evident that, in Xenophon’s time, this pass and the road of
march through it lay between the mountains and the sea,—and that
the obstructions (walls blocking up the passage), which he calls
insurmountable by force, were mainly of artificial creation. But when
Alexander passed, no walls existed. The artificial obstructions had
disappeared during the seventy years between Xenophon and Alexander;
and we can assign a probable reason why. In Xenophon’s time, Kilikia
was occupied by the native prince Syennesis, who, though tributary,
maintained a certain degree of independence even in regard to the
Great King, and therefore kept a wall guarded by his own soldiers
on his boundary towards Syria. But in Alexander’s time, Kilikia
was occupied, like Syria, by a Persian satrap. Artificial boundary
walls, between two conterminous satrapies under the same master, were
unnecessary; and must even have been found inconvenient, during the
great collective military operations of the Persian satraps against
the revolted Evagoras of Cyprus (principally carried on from Kilikia
as a base, about 380 B. C., Diodor. xv. 2)—as well as in the
subsequent operations against the Phenician towns (Diodor. xvi. 42).
Hence we may discern a reason why all artificial obstructions may
have been swept away before the time of Alexander; leaving only the
natural difficulties of the neighboring ground, upon which Xenophon
has not touched.

The spot still retained its old name—“The Gates of Kilikia and
Syria”—even after walls and gates had been dispensed with. But that
name, in Arrian’s description, designates a difficult and narrow
point of the road _over hills and rocks_; a point which Major Rennell
(Illustrations, p. 54) supposes to have been about a mile south of
the river and walls described by Xenophon. However this may be, the
precise spot designated by Xenophon seems probably to be sought
about seven miles north of Scanderoon, near the ruins now known as
Jonas’s Pillars (or Sakal Tutan), and the Castle of Merkes, where a
river called _Merkes_, _Mahersy_, or _Kara-su_, flows across from the
mountain to the sea. That this river is the same with the Kersus of
Xenophon, is the opinion of Rennell, Ainsworth, and Mützel; as well
as of Colonel Callier, who surveyed the country when accompanying
the army of Ibrahim Pacha as engineer (cited by Ritter, Erdk. p.
1792). At the spot here mentioned, the gulf indents eastward, while
the western flank of Amanus approaches very close to it, and drops
with unusual steepness towards it. Hence the road now followed does
not pass between the mountain and the sea, but ascends over a portion
of the mountain, and descends again afterwards to the low ground
skirting the sea. Northward of Merkes, the space between the mountain
and the sea gradually widens, towards Bayas. At some distance to the
north of Bayas occurs the river now called Delle Tschai, which is
considered I think with probability, to be the Pinarus, where the
battle between Alexander and Darius was fought. This opinion however
is not unanimous; Kinneir identifies the _Merkes_ with the Pinarus.
Moreover, there are several different streams which cross the space
between Mount Amanus and the sea. Des Monceaux notices six streams
as having been crossed between the Castle of Merkes and Bayas; and
five more streams between Bayas and Ayas (Mützel ad Curtium, p. 105).
Which among these is the Pinarus, cannot be settled without more or
less of doubt.

Besides the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, noted by Xenophon and Arrian
in the above passages, there are also other Gates called _the
Amanian Gates_, which are spoken of in a perplexing manner. Dr.
Thirlwall insists with propriety on the necessity of distinguishing
the _maritime_ passes, between Mount Amanus and the sea—from the
_inland_ passes, which crossed over the ridge of Mount Amanus
itself. But this distinction seems not uniformly observed by ancient
authors, when we compare Strabo, Arrian, and Kallisthenes. Strabo
uses the phrase, _Amanian Gates_, twice (xiv. p. 676; xvi. p. 751);
in both cases designating a _maritime pass_, and not a pass _over_
the mountain,—yet designating one maritime pass in the page first
referred to, and another in the second. In xiv. p. 676—he means by
αἱ Ἀμανίδες πύλαι, the spot called by modern travellers Demir Kapu,
between Ægæ and Issus, or between Mopsuestia and Issus; while in xvi.
751—he means by the same words that which I have been explaining as
the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, on the eastern side of the Gulf of
Issus. In fact, Strabo seems to conceive as a whole the strip of
land between Mount Amanus and the Gulf, beginning at Demir Kapu,
and ending at the Gates of Kilikia and Syria—and to call both the
beginning and the end of it by the same name—the Amanian Gates.
But he does not use this last phrase to designate the passage over
or across Mount Amanus; neither does Arrian; who in describing the
march of Darius from Sochi into Kilikia, says (ii. 7, 1)—ὑπερβαλὼν
δὴ τὸ ὄρος Δαρεῖος τὸ κατὰ τὰς πύλας τὰς Ἀμανικὰς καλουμένας, ὡς ἐπὶ
Ἴσσον προῆγε, καὶ ἐγένετο κατόπιν Ἀλεξάνδρου λαθών. Here, let it be
observed, we do not read ὑπερβαλὼν τὰς πύλας—nor can I think that the
words mean, as the translator gives them—“transiit Amanum, _eundo per
Pylas Amanicas_.” The words rather signify, that Darius “crossed
over the mountain where it adjoined the Amanian Gates”—_i. e._ where
it adjoined the strip of land skirting the Gulf, and lying between
those two extreme points which Strabo denominates _Amanian Gates_.
Arrian employs this last phrase more loosely than Strabo, yet still
with reference to the maritime strip, and not to a _col_ over the
mountain ridge.

On the other hand, Kallisthenes (if he is rightly represented by
Polybius, who recites his statement, not his words, xii. 17) uses the
words _Amanian Gates_ to signify the passage by which Darius entered
Kilikia—that is, the passage _over_ the mountain. That which Xenophon
and Arrian call the _Gates of Kilikia and Syria_—and which Strabo
calls _Amanian Gates_—is described by Polybius as τὰ στενὰ, καὶ τὰς
λεγομένας ἐν τῇ Κιλικίᾳ πύλας.

It seems pretty certain that this must have been Darius’s line of
march, because he came down immediately upon Issus, and then marched
forward to the river Pinarus. Had he entered Kilikia by the pass of
Beylan, he must have passed the Pinarus _before_ he reached Issus.
The positive grounds for admitting a practicable pass near the 37th
parallel, are indeed called in question by Mützel (ad Curtium, p.
102, 103), and are not in themselves conclusive; still I hold them
sufficient, when taken in conjunction with the probabilities of the
case. This pass was, however, we may suppose, less frequented than
the maritime line of road through the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, and
the pass of Beylan; which, as the more usual, was preferred both by
the Cyreians and by Alexander.

Respecting the march of Alexander, Dr. Thirlwall here starts a
question, substantially to this effect: “Since Alexander intended
to march through the pass of Beylan for the purpose of attacking
the Persian camp at Sochi, what could have caused him to go to
Myriandrus, which was more south than Beylan, and out of his road?”
Dr. Thirlwall feels this difficulty so forcibly, that in order
to eliminate it, he is inclined to accept the hypothesis of Mr.
Williams, which places Myriandrus at Bayas, and the Kiliko-Syrian
Gates at Demir-Kapu; an hypothesis which appears to me inadmissible
on various grounds, and against which Mr. Ainsworth (in his Essay on
the Cilician and Syrian Gates) has produced several very forcible
objections.

I confess that I do not feel the difficulty on which Dr. Thirlwall
insists. When we see that Cyrus and the Ten Thousand went to
Myriandrus, in their way to the pass of Beylan, we may reasonably
infer that, whether that town was in the direct line or not, it was
at least in the _usual_ road of march—which does not always coincide
with the direct line. But to waive this supposition, however—let us
assume that there existed another shorter road leading to Beylan
without passing by Myriandrus—there would still be reason enough to
induce Alexander to go somewhat out of his way, in order to visit
Myriandrus. For it was an important object with him to secure the
sea ports in his rear, in case of a possible reverse. Suppose him
repulsed and forced to retreat—it would be a material assistance to
his retreat, to have assured himself beforehand of Myriandrus as well
as the other seaports. In the approaching months, we shall find him
just as careful to make sure of the Phenician cities on the coast,
before he marches into the interior to attack Darius at Arbela.

Farther, Alexander, marching to attack Darius, had nothing to gain by
haste, and nothing to lose by coming up to Sochi three days later. He
knew that the enormous Persian host would not try to escape; it would
either await him at Sochi, or else advance into Kilikia to attack him
there. The longer he tarried, the more likely they were to do the
latter, which was what he desired. He had nothing to lose therefore
in any way, and some chance of gain, by prolonging his march to Sochi
for as long a time as was necessary to secure Myriandrus. There is no
more difficulty, I think, in understanding why he went to Myriandrus,
than why he went westward from Tarsus (still more out of his line of
advance) to Soli and Anchialus.

It seems probable (as Rennell, p. 56, and others think), that the
site of Myriandrus is now some distance inland; that there has been
an accretion of new land and morass on the coast.

The modern town of Scanderoon occupies the site of Ἀλεξανδρεία
κατ᾽ Ἴσσον, founded (probably by order of Alexander himself) in
commemoration of the victory of Issus. According to Ritter (p. 1791),
“Alexander had the great idea of establishing there an emporium for
the traffic of the East with Europe, as at the other Alexandria for
the trade of the East with Egypt.” The importance of the site of
Scanderoon, in antiquity, is here greatly exaggerated. I know no
proof that Alexander had the idea which Ritter ascribes to him; and
it is certain that his successors had no such idea; because they
founded the great cities of Antioch and Seleukeia (in Pieria), both
of them carrying the course of trade up the Orontes, and therefore
diverting it away from Scanderoon. This latter town is only of
importance as being the harbor of Aleppo; a city (Berœa) of little
consequence in antiquity, while Antioch became the first city in the
East, and Seleukeia among the first: see Ritter, p. 1152.

END.

INDEX

_Abantes_, iii. 165.

_Abdêra_, the army of Xerxes at, v. 42.

_Abrokomas_, ix. 27, 31.

_Abydos_, march of Xerxes to, v. 28;
revolt of, from Athens, viii. 94;
Athenian victory at, over the Peloponnesians, viii. 110;
Athenian victory over Pharnabazus at, viii. 121;
Derkyllidas at, ix. 310 _seq._;
Anaxibius and Iphikrates at, ix. 369 _seq._

_Achæan_ origin affected by Spartan kings, ii. 11;
league, xii. 391.

_Achæans_, various accounts of, i. 104, 105;
effect of the Dorian occupation of Peloponnesus on, ii. 12;
Homeric view of, ii. 12;
of Phthiôtis and Peloponnesus, ii. 275;
of Peloponnesus, ii. 284, 303.

_Achæmenes_, v. 96.

_Achæus_, i. 101, 199.

_Achaia_, ii. 269;
towns and territory of, ii. 465 _seq._;
Epaminondas in, B. C. 367, x. 266;
proceedings of the Thebans in B. C. 367, x. 268;
alliance of, with Sparta and Elis, B. C. 365, x. 313.

_Acharnæ_, Archidamus at, vi. 131 _seq._

_Achelôus_, i. 282.

_Achillêis_, the basis of the Iliad, ii. 175 _seq._

_Achillês_, i. 291 _seq._, 297 _seq._

_Achradina_, capture of, by Neon, xi. 157.

_Acropolis at Athens_, flight to, on Xerxes’s approach, v. 114;
capture of by Xerxes, v. 117 _seq._;
visit of the Peisistratids to, after its capture by Xerxes, v. 118;
inviolable reserve fund in, vi. 138 _seq._

_Ada_, queen of Karia, xii. 94, 99.

_Adeimantus_, of Corinth, and Themistoklês, at Salamis, v. 122, 124.

_Admêtus_ and Alkêstis, i. 113 _seq._

_Admêtus_ and Themisoklês, v. 283.

_Adranum_, Timoleon at, xi. 148, 156.

_Adrastus_, i. 256, _seq._, 268; iii. 34.

_Adrastus_, the Phrygian exile, iii. 152.

_Adrumetum_, captured by Agathokles, xii. 419.

_Æa_, i. 250 _seq._

_Æakid_ genealogy, i. 184 _seq._, 189.

_Æakus_, i. 184 _seq._

_Æêtês_, i. 115;
and the Argonauts, i. 231 _seq._;
and Circê, i. 251.

_Ægæ_, iii. 190.

_Ægean_, islands in, ii. 214;
the Macedonian fleet master of, xii. 141.

_Ægean_ islands, effect of the battle of Chæroneia on, xi. 504.

_Ægeids_ at Sparta, ii. 361.

_Ægeus_, i. 205; death of, i. 221.

_Ægialeus_, i. 82.

_Ægina_, i. 184;
war of, against Athens, at the instigation of the Thebans, iv. 171,
173, 315;
submission of, to Darius, iv. 315;
appeal of Athenians to Sparta against the Medism of, iv. 318;
attempted revolution at, by Nikodromus, v. 47 _seq._;
from B. C. 488 to 481, v. 47, 48 _seq._, 53;
and Athens, settlement of the feud between, v. 58;
removal of Athenians to, on Xerxes’s approach, v. 108;
Greek fleet at, in the spring of B. C. 479, v. 147;
war of Athens against, B. C. 459, v. 321;
subdued by Athens, v. 331;
expulsion of the Æginetans from, by the Athenians, vi. 136;
and Athens, B. C. 389, ix. 371 _seq._;
Gorgôpas in, ix. 373 _seq._;
Teleutias in, ix. 373, 376.

_Æginæan_ scale, ii. 319 _seq._, 325; iii. 171.

_Æqinetans_, and Thebans, i. 184;
and the hostages taken from them by Kleomenês and Leotychidês,
v. 46 _seq._;
pre-eminence of, at Salamis, v. 145;
at Thyrea, capture and death of, B. C. 424, vi. 366.

_Ægistheus_, i. 162 _seq._

_Ægospotami_, battle of, viii. 217 _seq._;
condition of Athens and her dependencies after the battle of,
viii. 223, 225, 227 _seq._

_Ægyptos_, i. 87.

_Æimnestus_ and Dionysius, x. 468.

_Æneadæ_ at Skêpsis, i. 316.

_Æneas_, i. 293, 315 _seq._

_Ænianes_, ii. 286.

_Æolic_ Greeks in the Trôad, i. 335;
emigration under the Pelopids, ii. 19;
Kymê, custom at, in cases of murder, ii. 94 _n._;
and Doric dialects, ii. 335;
cities in Asia, iii. 190 _seq._;
emigration, iii. 191, 193;
establishments near Mount Ida, iii. 195.

_Æolid line_, the first, i. 107 _seq._;
the second, i. 112 _seq._;
the third, i. 119 _seq._;
the fourth, i. 123 _seq._

_Æolis_, iii. 195;
the subsatrapy of, and Pharnabazus, ix. 206 _seq._

_Æolus_, i. 95 _seq._, 103.

_Æpytus_, i. 176.

_Æschinês_, at the battle of Tamynæ, xi. 342;
proceedings of, against Philip, after his capture of Olynthus,
xi. 366;
early history of, xi. 366;
as envoy of Athens in Arcadia, xi. 367;
desire of, for peace, B. C. 347, xi. 368;
and the embassies from Athens to Philip, xi. 381 _seq._, 406, 410,
413 _seq._, 422;
and the motion of Philokrates for peace and alliance with Philip,
xi. 391 _seq._;
fabrications of, about Philip, xi. 398, 408, 409, 412 _seq._;
visit of, to Philip in Phokis, xi. 422;
justifies Philip after his conquest of Thermopylæ, xi. 425;
corruption of, xi. 430 _seq._;
at the Amphiktyonic assembly at Delphi, B. C. 359, xi. 470 _seq._;
on the special Amphiktyonic meeting at Thermopylæ, xi. 479;
conduct of, after the battle of Chæroneia, xi. 506;
accusation against Ktesiphon by, xii. 286 _seq._;
exile of, xii. 293 _seq._

_Æschylus_, Promêtheus of, i. 78, 381 _n._;
his treatment of mythes, i. 379 _seq._;
Sophoklês, and Euripidês, viii. 317 _seq._

_Æsculapius_, i. 178 _seq._

_Æsôn_, death of, i. 114.

_Æsymnête_, iii. 19.

_Æthiopis_ of Arktinus, ii. 156.

_Æêthlius_, i. 99.

_Ætna_, foundation of the city of, v. 229;
second city of, v. 236;
reconquered by Duketius, vii. 123;
conquest of, by Dionysius, x. 468;
Campanians of, x. 497.

_Ætolia_, legendary settlement of, i. 137;
expedition of Demosthenes against, vi. 296 _seq._

_Ætolian_ genealogy, i. 138.

_Ætolians_, ii. 290;
rude condition of, ii. 292;
emigration of, into Peloponnesus, ii. 325 _seq._;
and Akarnanians, iii. 411;
and Peloponnesians under Eurylochus attack Naupaktus, xi. 291;
contest and pacification of, with Antipater, xii. 332;
Kassander’s attempt to check, xii. 370.

_Ætolo-Eleians_ and the Olympic games, ii. 317.

_Ætôlus_, i. 102, 103;
and Oxylus, i. 153.

_Africa_, circumnavigation of, by the Phenicians, iii. 283 _seq._;
expedition of Agathokles to, against Carthage, xii. 410 _seq._, 444.

_Agamêdês_ and Trophonius, i. 129.

_Agamemnôn_, pre-eminence of, i. 154 _seq._, 161 _seq._, 163;
and Orestes transferred to Sparta, i. 165;
and the Trojan expedition, i. 289, 293.

_Agaristê_ and Megaklês, iii. 38.

_Agasias_, ix. 145, 147 _seq._

_Agathokles_, first rise of, xii. 397;
distinction of, in the Syracusan expedition to Kroton, xii. 398;
retires from Syracuse to Italy, xii. 398;
exploits of, in Italy and Sicily, about B. C. 320, xii. 285;
first ascendency of, at Syracuse, xii. 399;
his readmission to Syracuse, xii. 400;
massacres the Syracusans, xii. 401 _seq._;
constituted despot of Syracuse, xii. 402;
his popular manners, and military success, xii. 404 _seq._;
and the Agrigentines, xii. 404, 406, 407;
and Deinokrates, xii. 407, 440, 446 _seq._;
massacre at Gela by, xii. 408;
defeat of, at the Himera, xii. 409;
expedition of, to Africa, xii. 410 _seq._, 444;
capture of Megalêpolis and Tunês by, xii. 414;
victory of, over Hanno and Bomilkar, xii. 416 _seq._;
operations of, on the eastern coast of Carthage, xii. 419 _seq._;
mutiny in the army of, at Tunês, xii. 426;
in Numidia, xii. 427;
and Ophellas, xii. 427, 431 _seq._;
capture of Utica by, xii. 436;
goes from Africa to Sicily, B. C. 306-305, xii. 438, 439;
in Sicily, B. C. 306-305, xii. 439 _seq._;
returns from Sicily to Africa, where he is defeated by the
Carthaginians, xii. 441;
deserts his army at Tunês, and they capitulate, xii. 443, 444;
barbarities of, at Egesta and Syracuse, after his African
expedition, xii. 445;
operations of, in Liparæ, Italy, and Korkyra, xii. 448;
last projects and death of, xii. 449 _seq._;
genius and character of, xii. 450 _seq._

_Agavê_ and Pentheus, i. 261 _seq._

_Agêma_, Macedonian, xii. 63.

_Agên_, the satiric drama, xii. 296 and _n._ 2.

_Agenôr_ and his offspring, i. 257.

_Agesandridas_, viii. 71, 74 _seq._

_Agesilaus_, character of, ix. 242, 246, 280;
nomination of, as king, ix. 244 _seq._;
popular conduct and partisanship of, ix. 246;
expedition of, to Asia, B. C. 397, ix. 257 _seq._;
humiliation of Lysander by, ix. 260 _seq._;
Tissaphernes breaks the truce with, ix. 261;
attacks of, on the satrapy of Pharnabazus, ix. 261, 273 _seq._;
his enrichment of his friends, ix. 262;
humanity of, ix. 263;
naked exposure of Asiatic prisoners by, ix. 265 _seq._;
at Ephesus, ix. 266;
victory of, near Sardis, ix. 267;
negotiations of, with Tithraustes, ix. 269;
appointed to command at sea and on land, ix. 269, 271;
efforts of, to augment his fleet, ix. 273;
and Spithridates, ix. 274;
and Pharnabazus, conference between, ix. 277 _seq._;
large preparations and recall of, from Asia, ix. 280, 286,
308 _seq._;
relations of Sparta with her neighbors and allies after the
accession of, ix. 284;
on the northern frontier of Bœotia, ix. 312;
victory of, at Koroneia, ix. 313 _seq._;
and Teleutias, capture of the Long Walls at Corinth, and of Lechæum
by, ix. 339 _seq._;
capture of Peiræum and Œnoê by, ix. 344, 345 _seq._;
and the Isthmian festival, ix. 344;
and the envoys from Thebes, ix. 346, 352;
and the destruction of the Lacedæmonian _mora_ by Iphikrates,
ix. 348, 352;
expedition of, against Akarnania, ix. 354;
and the peace of Antalkidas, ix. 385 _seq._;
miso-Theban sentiment of, x. 28, 34;
his defence of Phœbidas, x. 62;
subjugation of Phlius by, x. 70 _seq._;
and the trial of Sphodrias, x. 100;
expeditions of, against Thebes, x. 127 _seq._;
and Epaminondas, at the congress at Sparta, B. C. 371, x. 170;
and the re-establishment of Mantinea, x. 205 _seq._;
feeling against, at Sparta, B. C. 371, x. 207;
march of, against Mantinea, x. 211 _seq._;
vigilant defence of Sparta by, against Epaminondas, x. 221, 330;
in Asia, B. C. 366, x. 294, 296;
in Egypt, x. 362 _seq._, and the independence of Mêssêne, x. 360;
death and character of, x. 363 _seq._

_Agesipolis_, ix. 356 _seq._; x. 35 _seq._, 67, 70.

_Agêtus_ and Aristo, iv. 326.

_Agis II._, invasion of Attica by, B. C. 425, vi. 313;
advance of, to Leuktra, B. C. 419, vii. 64;
invasion of Argos by, vii. 71 _seq._;
retirement of, from Argos, vii. 74 _seq._;
at the battle of Mantinea, B. C. 418, vii. 81 _seq._;
invasion of Attica by, vii. 288, 353;
movements of, after the Athenian disaster in Sicily, vii. 364;
applications from Eubœa and Lesbos to, B. C. 413, vii. 365;
overtures of peace from the Four Hundred to, viii. 44;
repulse of, by Thrasyllus, viii. 128;
fruitless attempt of, to surprise Athens, viii. 156;
invasions of Elis by, ix. 225 _seq._;
death of, ix. 241.

_Agis III._, ii. 387 _seq._, 127, 281 _seq._

_Aglaurion_, v. 117 _n._

_Agnonides_, xii. 351.

_Agones_ and festivals in honor of gods, i. 51.

_Agora_, Homeric, ii. 67 _seq._; and Boulê, ii. 75.

_Agoratus_, viii. 235, 240.

_Agrigentine_ generals, accusation and death of, x. 427.

_Agrigentines_, and Agathokles, xii. 404, 406, 425;
defeat of, by Leptines and Demophilus, xii. 440;
defeat of, by Leptines, xii. 441.

_Agrigentum_, iii. 366;
Phalaris of, iv. 378, v. 204;
and Syracuse, before B. C. 500, v. 205;
prisoners sent to, after the battle of Himera, v. 225;
and Syracuse, B. C. 446, vii. 126;
after the Theronian dynasty, vii. 127;
and Hannibal’s capture of Selinus, x. 408;
defensive preparations at, against Hannibal and Imilkon, x. 422;
strength, wealth, and population of, B. C. 406, x. 423 _seq._;
blockade and capture of, by the Carthaginians, x. 425 _seq._;
complaints against the Syracusan generals at, x. 427, 431,
433 _seq._;
declaration of, against Dionysius, xi. 6;
Timoleon and the fresh colonization of, xi. 187;
siege of, by Agathokles, xii. 406.

_Agylla_, plunder of the temple at, xi. 25.

_Agyrium_, Dionysius and Magon at, ix. 7.

_Agyrrhius_, ix. 368.

_Ajax_, son of Telamôn, i. 187, 299.

_Ajax_, son of Oïleus, i. 189, 305, 310.

_Akanthus_, iv. 25;
march of Xerxes to, v. 43;
induced by Brasidas to revolt from Athens, vi. 406 _seq._;
speech of Brasidas at, ix. 193 _seq._;
opposition of, to the Olynthian confederacy, x. 52 _seq._, 57.

_Akarnan_ and Amphoterus, i. 282.

_Akarnania_, Demosthenês in, B. C. 426, vi. 296;
expedition of Agesilaus against, ix. 354.

_Akarnanians_, ii. 292 _seq._, iii. 407 _seq._;
and Athens, alliance between, vi. 120;
under Demosthenês save Naupaktus, vi. 303;
and Amphilochians, pacific treaty of, with the Ambrakiots, vi. 311.

_Akastus_, wife of, and Pêleus, i. 114.

_Akesines_, crossed by Alexander, xii. 230.

_Akræ_ in Sicily, iii. 366.

_Akragas_, iii. 366.

_Akrisois_, Danaê and Perseus, i. 89 _seq._

_Akrotatus_, xii. 404.

_Aktæôn_, i. 260.

_Aktê_, Brasidas in, vi. 421.

_Akusilaus_, his treatment of mythes, i. 390.

_Alæsa_, foundation of, x. 469.

_Alalia_, Phokæan colony at, iv. 205.

_Alazônes_, iii. 239.

_Alcyone_ and Kêyx, i. 135.

_Alêtês_, ii. 9.

_Aleus_, i. 176.

_Alexander of Macedon_, and Greeks at Tempê, on Xerxes’s invasion,
v. 69;
embassy of, to Athens, v. 150 _seq._;
and the Athenians before the battle of Platæa, v. 151.

_Alexander the Great_, his visit to Ilium, i. 326, xii. 69;
successors of, and Ilium, i. 326;
comparison between the invasion of, and that of Xerxes, v. 240;
birth of, xi. 241;
at the battle of Chæroneia, xi. 500;
quarrels of, with his father, xi. 513, xii. 3;
accession of, xi. 517, xii. 1, 7;
character, education, and early political action of, xii. 2 _seq._;
uncertain position of, during the last year of Philip, xii. 5;
Amyntas put to death by, xii. 8;
march of, into Greece, B. C. 336, xii. 11;
chosen Imperator of the Greeks, xii. 13;
convention at Corinth under, B. C. 336, xii. 13;
authority claimed by, under the convention at Corinth, xii. 15;
violations of the convention at Corinth by, xii. 16 _seq._;
expedition of, into Thrace, xii. 22 _seq._, 25, _n._;
embassy of Gauls to, xii. 26;
victories of, over Kleitus and the Illyrians, xii. 27 _seq._;
revolt of Thebes against, xii. 29 _seq._;
march of, from Thrace to Thebes, xii. 36;
capture and destruction of Thebes by, xii. 37 _seq._;
demands the surrender of anti-Macedonian leaders at Athens, xii. 45;
at Corinth, B. C. 335, xii. 48;
and Diogenes, xii. 48;
reconstitution of Bœotia by, xii. 48;
Grecian history a blank in the reign of, xii. 50;
connection of his Asiatic conquests with Grecian history, xii. 50,
179 _seq._;
Pan-Hellenic pretences of, xii. 51;
analogy of his relation to the Greeks with those of Napoleon to the
Confederation of the Rhine, xii. 51, 52 _n._;
military endowments of, xii. 52;
military changes in Greece during the sixty years before the
accession of, xii. 53 _seq._;
measures of, before going to Asia, xii. 67;
his march to the Hellespont and passage to Asia, xii. 69, 78;
analogy of, to the Greek heroes, xii. 71;
review of his army in Asia, xii. 72;
Macedonian officers of his army in Asia, xii. 73;
Greeks in his service in Asia, xii. 74;
defensive preparation of Darius against, xii. 76;
victory of, at the Granikus, xii. 81 _seq._;
submission of the Asiatics to, after the battle of the Granikus,
xii. 89;
and Mithrines, xii. 90, 207;
capture of Ephesus by, xii. 90;
capture of Miletus by, xii. 92 _seq._;
debate of, with Parmenio at Miletus, xii. 92;
disbands his fleet, xii. 94;
capture of Halikarnassus by, xii. 94 _seq._;
conquest of Lykia, Pamphylia, and Pisidia by, xii. 99;
at Kelænæ, xii. 101;
cuts the Gordian knot, xii. 104;
refuses to liberate the Athenians captured at the Granikus,
xii. 105;
subjugation of Paphlagonia and Kappadokia by, xii. 111;
passes Mount Taurus and enters Tarsus, xii. 111 _seq._;
operations of, in Kilikia, xii. 113;
march of, from Kilikia to Myriandrus, xii. 114;
return of, from Myriandrus, xii. 117;
victory of, at Issus, xii. 118 _seq._;
his courteous treatment of Darius’s mother, wife and family,
xii. 124, 153;
his treatment of Greeks taken at Damascus, xii. 129;
in Phœnicia, xii. 130 _seq._, 150;
his correspondence with Darius, xii. 130, 140;
siege and capture of Tyre by, xii. 132 _seq._;
surrender of the princes of Cyprus to, xii. 138;
his march towards Egypt, xii. 141, 142, 145;
siege and capture of Gaza by, xii. 142 _seq._;
his cruelty to Batis, xii. 145;
in Egypt, xii. 146 _seq._;
crosses the Euphrates at Thapsakus, xii. 150;
fords the Tigris, xii. 151;
continence of, xii. 158 _n._ 2;
victory of, at Arbela, xii. 155 _seq._;
surrender of Susa and Babylon to, xii. 168;
his march from Susa to Persepolis, xii. 171;
at Persepolis, xii. 172 _seq._;
subjugation of Persis by, xii. 177;
at Ekbatana, xii. 181, 246 _seq._;
sends home the Thessalian cavalry, xii. 181;
pursues Darius into Parthia, xii. 181 _seq._;
disappointment of, in not taking Darius alive, xii. 186;
Asiatizing tendencies of, xii. 188, 215, 267;
at Hekatompylus, xii. 187;
in Hyrkania, xii. 188;
his treatment of the Grecian mercenaries and envoys with Darius,
xii. 188, 189;
in Aria and Drangiana, xii. 189 _seq._, 200;
Parmenio and Philotas put to death by, xii. 190 _seq._;
in Gedrosia, xii. 200, 236;
foundation of Alexandria ad Caucasum by, xii. 200;
in Baktria and Sogdiana, xii. 201 _seq._;
and Bessus, 12, 202, 208;
massacre of the Branchidæ by, xii. 203 _seq._;
at Marakanda, xii. 204, 207 _seq._;
and the Scythians, xii. 206, 213;
Kleitus killed by, xii. 208 _seq._, 213, 216 _seq._, 222 _seq._;
capture of the Sogdian rock and the rock of Choriênes by, xii. 214;
and Roxana, xii. 214, 215;
and Kallisthenes, conspiracy of royal pages against, xii. 221;
reduces the country between Hindoo Koosh and the Indus,
xii. 225 _seq._;
crosses the Indus and the Hydaspes, and defeats Porus,
xii. 227 _seq._, 228 _n._ 2, and _n._ 1 page 229;
conquests of, in the Punjab, xii. 227 _seq._;
refusal of his army to march farther, xii. 231;
voyage of, down the Hydaspes and the Indus, xii. 234;
wounded in attacking the Malli, xii. 234;
posts on the Indus established by, xii. 235;
his bacchanalian procession thro’ Karmania, xii. 236;
and the tomb of Cyrus the Great, xii. 237;
satraps of, xii. 239 _seq._;
discontents and mutiny of his Macedonian soldiers, xii. 241 _seq._;
Asiatic levies of, xii. 243;
sails down the Pasitigris and up the Tigris to Opis, xii. 243;
partial disbanding of his Macedonian soldiers by, xii. 245;
preparations of, for the conquest and circumnavigation of Asia,
xii. 245, 250;
his grief for the death of Hephæstion, xii. 247, 253;
extermination of the Kossæi by, xii. 248;
his last visit to Babylon, xii. 248 _seq._;
numerous embassies to, B. C. 323, xii. 248;
his sail on the Euphrates, xii. 250;
his incorporation of Persians in the Macedonian phalanx, xii. 251;
his despatch to Kleomenes, xii. 253;
forebodings and suspicion of, at Babylon, xii. 253, 254 _n._ 3;
illness and death of, xii. 254 _seq._;
rumored poisoning of, xii. 256 _n._ 2;
sentiments excited by the career and death of, xii. 258 _seq._;
probable achievements of, if he had lived longer, xii. 259 _seq._;
character of, as a ruler, xii. 261 _seq._;
absence of nationality in, xii. 264;
Livy’s opinion as to his chances, if he had attacked the Romans,
xii. 260;
unrivalled excellence of, as a military man, xii. 261;
not the intentional diffuser of Hellenic culture, xii. 265 _seq._;
cities founded in Asia by, xii. 267;
Asia not Hellenized by, xii. 269;
increased intercommunication produced by the conquests of,
xii. 272 _seq._;
his interest in science and literature, xii. 274;
state of the Grecian world when he crossed the Hellespont, xii. 275;
possibility of emancipating Greece during his earlier Asiatic
campaigns, xii. 276;
his rescript directing the recall of Grecian exiles,
xii. 310 _seq._;
his family and generals, after his death, xii. 319 _seq._;
partition of the empire of, xii. 319, 337;
list of projects entertained by, at the time of his death, xii. 320.

_Alexander_, son of Alexander the Great, xii. 333, 340, 342, 366, 367,
371.

_Alexander_, son of Polysperchon, xii. 366, 368, 369.

_Alexander_, son of Kassander, xii. 389.

_Alexander_, king of the Molossians, xii. 396 _seq._

_Alexander_, son of Amyntas, x. 248, 249.

_Alexander of Epirus_, marriage of, xi. 515.

_Alexander_, the Lynkestian, xi. 517 _seq._

_Alexander of Pheræ_, x. 248;
expeditions of Pelopidas against, x. 248, 263, 303, 307 _seq._,
309 _n._ 3;
seizure of Pelopidas and Ismenias by, x. 282 _seq._;
release of Pelopidas and Ismenias by, x. 285;
subdued by the Thebans, x. 309 _seq._;
naval hostilities of, against Athens, x. 370;
cruelties and assassination of, xi. 203 _seq._

_Alexandreia Trôas_, i. 326.

_Alexandria_ in Egypt, xii. 146;
ad Caucasum, xii. 200;
in Ariis, and in Arachosia, xii. 200 _n._ 4;
ad Jaxartem, xii. 205, 206.

_Alexandrine_ chronology from the return of the Herakleids to the
first Olympiad, ii. 304.

_Alexiklês_, viii. 64, 67, 68.

_Alkæus_, Herodotus’s mistake about, iii. 155 _n._;
his flight from battle, iii. 199;
opposition of, to Pittakus, iii. 199, iv., 90 _seq._;
collected works of, iv. 90 _n._ 4;
subjective character of his poetry, i. 363.

_Alkamenês_, son of Têleklus, ii. 420.

_Alkamenês_, appointment of, to go to Lesbos, vii. 365;
defeat and death of, vii. 369.

_Alkestis_ and Admêtus, i. 113 _seq._

_Alketas_, x. 139, 147 _n._, 153, xi. 54.

_Alkibiades_, reputed oration of Androkidês against, iv. 151, _n._ 3,
vi. 7, _n._ 2;
alleged duplication of the tribute-money of Athenian allies by,
vi. 7, _n._ 2;
at the battle of Delium, v. 397;
education and character of, vii. 30 _seq._;
and Sokratês, vii. 35 _seq._;
conflicting sentiments entertained towards, vii. 40;
attempts of, to revive his family tie with Sparta, vii. 42;
early politics of, vii. 42;
adoption of anti-Laconian politics by, vii. 43;
attempt of, to ally Argos with Athens, B. C. 420, vii. 43;
trick of, upon the Lacedæmonian envoys, vii. 46 _seq._;
display of, at the Olympic festival, vii. 53 _seq._, 59 _n._;
intra-Peloponnesian policy of, B. C. 419, vii. 62 _seq._;
expedition of, into the interior of Peloponnesus, B. C. 419,
vii. 63;
at Argos, B. C. 418, vii. 75, and B. C. 416, vii. 98;
and Nikias, projected contention of ostracism between,
vii. 104 _seq._;
his support of the Egestæan envoys at Athens, B. C. 416, vii. 146;
and the Sicilian expedition, vii. 148, 152 _seq._, 160 _seq._;
attack upon, in connection with the mutilation of the Hermæ,
vii. 175, 207 _seq._;
the Eleusinian mysteries and, vii. 175 _seq._, 211 _seq._;
viii. 150;
plan of action in Sicily proposed by, vii. 191;
at Messênê in Sicily, vii. 193;
at Katana, vii. 193;
recall of, to take his trial, vii. 195, 211 _seq._;
escape and condemnation of, vii. 211 _seq._, 235 _n._ 2;
at Sparta, vii. 235 _seq._;
Lacedæmonians persuaded by, to send aid to Chios, vii. 367;
expedition of, to Chios, vii. 370 _seq._;
revolt of Milêtus from Athens, caused by, vii. 375;
order from Sparta to kill, viii. 2;
escape of, to Tissaphernês, viii. 3;
advice of, to Tissaphernês, viii. 3;
acts as interpreter between Tissaphernês and the Greeks,
viii. 5 _seq._;
oligarchical conspiracy of, with the Athenian officers at Samos,
viii. 6 _seq._;
counter manœuvres of, against Phrynichus, viii. 12;
proposed restoration of, to Athens, viii. 12, 13;
negotiations of, with Peisander, viii. 15, 20 _seq._;
and the Athenian democracy at Samos, viii. 49 _seq._, 51, 52 _seq._;
at Aspendus, viii. 100;
return of, from Aspendus to Samos, viii. 116;
arrival of, at the Hellespont, from Samos, viii. 117;
arrest of Tissaphernês by, viii. 120;
escape of, from Sardis, viii. 120;
and the Athenian fleet, at the Bosphorus, viii. 126;
attack upon Chalkêdon by, viii. 126;
occupation of Chrysopolis by, viii. 127;
and Thrasyllus, at the Hellespont, viii. 130;
capture of Chalkêdon by, viii. 132;
and Pharnabazus, viii. 133;
proceedings of, in Thrace and Asia, B. C. 407, viii. 144;
return of, to Athens, B. C. 407, viii. 145 _seq._;
expedition of, to Asia, B. C. 407, viii. 150 _seq._;
dissatisfaction of the armament at Samos with, viii. 153;
accusations against, at Athens, B. C. 407, viii. 153;
alteration of sentiment towards, at Athens, B. C. 407,
viii. 156 _seq._;
and Nikias, different behavior of the Athenians towards, viii. 158;
dismissal of, from his command, B. C. 407, viii. 158;
at Ægospotami, viii. 217;
position and views of, in Asia, after the battle of Ægospotami,
viii. 313 _seq._;
assassination of, viii. 314 _seq._;
character of, viii. 316 _seq._

_Alkidas_, vi. 237, 239 _seq._, 266 _seq._

_Alkmæôn_, i. 278 _seq._

_Alkmæônids_, curse, trial, and condemnation of, iii. 82;
proceedings of, against Hippias, iv. 120;
rebuilding of Delphian temple by, iv. 121;
false imputation of treachery on at the battle of Marathon, iv. 356;
demand of Sparta for the expulsion of, vi. 97.

_Alkman_, iv. 77, 82, 85 _seq._

_Alkmênê_, i. 91.

_Allegorical_ interpretation of mythes, i. 418 _seq._, 425, 436.

_Allegory_ rarely admissible in the interpretation of mythes, i. 2.

_Alôids_, the, i. 136.

_Alos_, sanguinary rites at, i. 125.

_Althæa_ and the burning brand, i. 144.

_Althæmenês_, founder of Rhodes, ii. 30.

_Althæmenês_ and Katreus, i. 224.

_Alyattês_ and Kyaxarês, iii. 230;
war of, with Milêtus, iii. 255 _seq._;
sacrilege committed by, iii. 256;
long reign, death and sepulchre of, iii. 257.

_Amaltheia_, the horn of, i. 150.

_Amanus_, Mount, march of Darius to, xii. 115.

_Amasis_, iii. 328 _seq._;
death of, iv. 229.

_Amasis_ and Polykratês, iv. 241.

_Amastris_, xii. 467 _seq._

_Amazons_, legend of, i. 209 _seq._

_Ambrakia_, iii. 404, 405.

_Ambrakiots_, attack of, upon Amphilokian Argos, vi. 180;
attack of upon Akarnania, vi. 192 _seq._;
projected attack of, on Amphilochian Argos, vi. 302;
defeat of, at Olpæ, vi. 304;
Menedæus’s desertion of, vi. 305 _seq._;
Demosthenês’s victory over, vi. 307 _seq._;
pacific convention of, with the Akarnanians and Amphilochians,
vi. 311.

_Ambrysus_, re-fortification of, xi. 494.

_Ammon_, Alexander’s visit to the oracle of, xii. 147.

_Amnesty_ decreed by Solon, iii. 98;
proposed by Patrokleidês, viii. 225;
at Athens, B. C. 403, viii. 293, 299 _seq._

_Amompharetus_, v. 174 _seq._

_Amorgês_, vii. 375;
capture of, vii. 388.

_Amphiaraus_, i. 272, 275.

_Amphiktyon_, i. 98, 99, 103.

_Amphiktyonic assembly_, i. 100, ii. 243 _seq._, xi. 241;
condemnation of Sparta by, x. 202 _seq._;
accusation of Thebes against Sparta before, xi. 242;
accusation of Thebes against Phokis before, xi. 243;
resistance of Phokis to, xi. 244 _seq._;
sentence of, against the Phokians, and honors conferred upon Philip
by, xi. 425, 429;
at Delphi, B. C. 339, xi. 470 _seq._

_Amphiktyonies_, or exclusive religious partnerships, ii. 243 _seq._,
248.

_Amphiktyons_, punishment of the Kirrhæans by, iv. 61;
establishment of the Pythian games by, iv. 63;
violent measures of, against the Amphissians, xi. 474 _seq._

_Amphiktyony_ at Kalauria, i. 133.

_Amphilochian Argos_, Eurylochus’s projected attack upon, vi. 302.

_Amphilochians_ and Akarnanians, pacific treaty of, with the
Ambrakiots, vi. 211.

_Amphilochus_, i. 278;
wanderings of, i. 313.

_Amphiôn and Zethus_, i. 263 _seq._;
Homeric legend of, i. 257.

_Amphipolis_, foundation of, vi. 11 _seq._;
acquisition of, by Brasidas, vi. 406 _seq._;
proceedings of Brasidas in, vi. 420;
policy of Kleon and Nikias for the recovery of, vi. 457 _seq._;
Kleon’s expedition against, vi. 462 _seq._;
topography of, vi. 464 _seq._;
battle of, vi. 471 _seq._;
negotiations for peace after the battle of, vi. 489;
not restored to Athens, on the peace of, Nikias, vii. 4;
neglect of, by the Athenians, vii. 104, xi. 215;
claim of Athens to, x. 245 _seq._, 294;
Iphikrates at, x. 251, 299;
failure of Timotheus at, x. 301;
nine defeats of the Athenians at, x. 302 _n._ 2;
Kallisthenes at, x. 370;
Philip renounces his claim to, xi. 212;
siege and capture of, by Philip, xi. 232 _seq._;
Philip’s dealings with the Athenians respecting, xi. 235.

_Amphissa_, capture of, by Philip, xi. 497.

_Amphissians_, accusation of, against Athens, xi. 470 _seq._;
violent proceedings of the Amphiktyons against, xi. 473 _seq._

_Amphitryôn_, i. 91.

_Amphoterus_ and Akarnan, i. 283.

_Amyklæ_, ii. 327;
conquest of, ii. 419.

_Amykus_, i. 169.

_Amyntas_, and the Peisistratids, iv. 19.

_Amyntas, father of Philip_, x. 48 _seq._, 243 _seq._;
and the Olynthian confederacy, x. 50, 56, 58, 65;
and Iphikrates, x. 108;
and Athens, x. 243, 245;
death of, x. 243;
assistance of Iphikrates to the family of, x. 250.

_Amyntas_, son of Antiochus, xii. 9, 116, 125.

_Amyntas_, son of Perdikkas, xii. 8.

_Anaktorium_, iii. 402 _seq._, vi. 360.

_Anaphê_, i. 240.

_Anapus_, crossing of, by Dion, xi. 91.

_Anaxagoras_, vi. 101.

_Anaxandrides_, bigamy of, ii. 386.

_Anaxarchus_ of Abdera, xii. 213, 215, 217.

_Anaxibius_, ix. 150 _seq._, 156 _seq._;
in the Hellespont, ix. 369;
death of, ix. 371 _seq._

_Anaxikratês_, v. 335.

_Anaxilaus_, v. 211, 230.

_Anaximander_, iv. 381 _seq._

_Anaximenês_ of Lampsakus, i. 409.

_Andokidês_, reputed oration of, against Alkibiadês, iv. 151 _n._ 1,
vi. 6 _n._ 1;
de Mysteriis, iv. 123 _n._ 3;
and the mutilation of, the Hermæ, vii. 196, 200 _seq._

_Androgeos_, death of, i. 211.

_Androklus_, iii. 175.

_Andromachê_ and Helenus, i. 305.

_Andromachus_, xi. 146.

_Andrôn_, story of, respecting Krête, ii. 29.

_Andros_, siege of, by Themistoklês, v. 141;
siege of, by Alkibiadês and Konon, viii. 151.

_Animals_, worship of, in Egypt, iii. 319.

_Ankæus_, i. 177.

_Antalkidas_, embassy of, to Tiribazus, ix. 374 _seq._;
embassies of, to Persia, ix. 383, x. 157;
in the Hellespont, ix. 384;
the peace of, ix. 385 _seq._, x. 1 _seq._

_Antandrus_, expulsion of Arsakes from, viii. 114;
the Syracusans at, x. 386.

_Ante-Hellenic_ inhabitants of Greece, ii. 261;
colonies from Phœnicia and Egypt not probable, ii. 267.

_Antênôr_, i. 304, 315.

_Antigonê_, i. 276.

_Antigonus_ and Perdikkas, xii. 334;
and Eumenes, xii. 338;
great power of, xii. 367;
alliance of Kassander, Lysimachus and Ptolemy against, xii. 367,
372, 383, 387;
measures of, against Kassander, xii. 369, 370;
pacification of, with Kassander, Lysimachus, and Ptolemy, xii. 371;
Roxana and her son Alexander put to death by, xii. 371;
murders Kleopatra, sister of Alexander, xii. 372;
Athenian envoys sent to, xii. 380; death of, xii. 387.

_Antigonus_ Gonatas, xii. 390.

_Antilochus_, death of, i. 298.

_Antimachus_ of Kolophon, i. 268.

_Antiochus_ at Samos and Notium, viii. 152, 153.

_Antiochus_, the Arcadian, x. 280.

_Antiopê_, i. 257 _seq._

_Antipater_, embassy of, from Philip to Athens, xi. 386, 387, 390,
397, 401;
made viceroy of Macedonia, xii. 67, 68;
and Olympias, xii. 68, 254;
defeat of Agis by, xii. 284;
submission of all Greece to, xii. 285;
Grecian hostilities against, after Alexander’s death,
xii. 313 _seq._;
and Kraterus, xii. 321 _seq._, 335;
victory of, at Krannon, xii. 321, 322;
terms imposed upon Athens by, xii. 324 _seq._;
remodels the Peloponnesian cities, xii. 332;
contest and pacification of, with the Ætolians, xii. 332;
made guardian of Alexander’s family, xii. 337;
death of, xii. 338;
last directions of, xii. 339.

_Antipater_, son of Kassander, xii. 389.

_Antiphilus_, xii. 319, 321.

_Antiphon_, viii. 18, 30 _seq._, 57 _seq._, 78 _seq._

_Antiquity_, Grecian, a religious conception, i. 445;
stripped of its religious character by chronology, i. 446.

_Antisthenês_, at Kaunus, vii. 397.

_Antistrophê_, introduction of, iv. 89.

_Anytus_, viii. 130, 242.

_Aornos_, rock of, xii. 225 _n._ 2, 227.

_Apatê_, i. 7.

_Apaturia_, excitement at the, after the battle of Arginusæ,
viii. 193 _seq._

_Aphareus_, i. 168, 169.

_Apheidas_, i. 176.

_Aphepsion_, and Mantitheus, vii. 200.

_Aphetæ_, Persian fleet at, v. 97, 98, 101.

_Aphroditê_, i. 5, 52.

_Apis_, i. 83.

_Apodektæ_, iv. 137.

_Apollo_, i. 10;
legends of, i. 45 _seq._, 50;
worship and functions of, i. 49 _seq._, iii. 168;
and Laomedon, i. 57, 285;
and Hermês, i. 59;
types of, i. 61;
and Admêtus, i. 113;
and Korônis, i. 176;
Sminthius, i. 337;
evidence of the Homeric Hymn to, as to early Ionic life, iii. 168;
temple of at Klarus, iii. 184;
reply of Delphian to the remonstrance of Crœsus, iv. 189.

_Apollodôrus_, his genealogy of Hellên, i. 106 _seq._

_Apollodôrus_ and the Theôric fund, xi. 348.

_Apollokratês_, xi. 105, 107, 117.

_Apollonia_, iii. 402 _seq._;
and the Illyrians, iv. 6 _seq._;
and the Olynthian confederacy, x. 52.

_Apollonides_, xii. 142, 149.

_Apriês_, reign and death of, iii. 323 _seq._

_Apsyrtus_, i. 238.

_Arabia_, Alexander’s projects with regard to, xii. 245, 250.

_Arachosia_, Alexander in, xii. 200.

_Aradus_, surrender of, to Alexander xii. 130.

_Arbela_, battle of, xii. 155 _seq._

_Arbitration_ at Athens, v. 354.

_Arcadia_, ii. 299;
state of, B. C. 560, ii. 441 _seq._;
and Sparta, ii. 444 _seq._, v. 315;
proceedings in, after the battle of Leuktra, x. 204 _seq._;
invasions of, by Archidamus, x. 265, 310 _seq._;
mission of Epaminondas to, x. 288;
dissensions in, x. 322 _seq._;
embassy of Æschines to, xi. 368.

_Arcadians_, ii. 301, 433 seq;
sympathy of, with Messenians, ii. 427;
impulse of towards a Pan-Arcadian union, x. 208;
application of, to Athens and Thebes, for aid against Sparta,
x. 213;
Epaminondas and the consolidation of, x. 215;
energetic action and insolence of, x. 259 _seq._;
envoy to Persia from, x. 278, 280;
protest of, against the headship of Thebes, x. 281;
alliance of Athens with, x. 287;
and Eleians, x. 314 _seq._, 323;
occupation and plunder of Olympia by, x. 314, 320 _seq._;
celebration of the Olympic games by, x. 318 _seq._;
seizure of, at Tegea, by the Theban harmost, x. 324 _seq._

_Archagathus_, xii. 438, 439, 443.

_Archêgelês_, Apollo, i. 50.

_Archelaus_, x. 46 _seq._;
siege of Pydna by, viii. 118.

_Archeptolemus_, viii. 84 _seq._

_Archias_, œkist of Syracuse, iii. 363.

_Archias_, the Theban, x. 82, 85.

_Archias_, the Exile-Hunter, xii. 326 _seq._

_Archidamus II._, speech of, against war with Athens, vi. 80 _seq._;
invasions of Attica by, vii. 126 _seq._, 152, 221;
his expedition to Platæa, vi. 185 _seq._

_Archidamus III._, invasions of Arcadia by, x. 265, 316 _seq._;
and the independence of Messênê, x. 291, 360;
and Philomelus, xi. 254;
expedition of, against Megalopolis, xi. 306;
aid to the Phokians at Thermopylæ under, xi. 419, 421; xii. 281,
394.

_Archilochus_, i. 362; iv. 26, 73, 76 _seq._

_Archinus_, decrees of, viii. 299, 308.

_Architects_ at Athens, under Periklês, vi. 20.

_Architecture_, Grecian, between B. C. 600-550, iv. 98.

_Archonides_, x. 469.

_Archons_ after Kodrus, iii. 49;
the nine, iii. 75;
judges without appeal till after Kleisthenês, iii. 129;
effect of Kleisthenês’s revolution on, iv. 137 _seq._, 142 _seq._;
limited functions of, after the Persian war, v. 276;
limitation of the functions of, by Periklês, v. 355, 358, 365.

_Ardys_, iii. 223.

_Areopagus, senate of_, iii. 73;
and the Ephetæ, iii. 79;
and the Eumenides of Æschylus, iii. 80 _n._;
powers of, enlarged by Solon, iii. 122;
under the Solonian and Kleisthenean constitutions, iv. 141;
in early Athens, v. 352 _seq._;
oligarchical tendencies of, v. 354;
venerable character and large powers of, v. 359;
at variance with the growing democratic sentiment, B. C. 480-460,
v. 361;
a centre of action for the oligarchical party, v. 361;
power of, abridged by Periklês and Ephialtês, v. 366 _seq._

_Arês_, i. 10.

_Aretê_, xi. 55, 56, 82, 129.

_Argadeis_, iii. 50.

_Argæus_ and Philip, xi. 212.

_Arganthonius_ and the Phokæans, iv. 199.

_Argeian_ Demos, proceedings of, vii. 99.

_Argeian_ genealogies, i. 81.

_Argeians_, attempts of, to recover Thyrea, ii. 447;
defeat and destruction of, by Kleomenês, iv. 321;
trick of, with their callendar, vii. 65;
Epidaurus, vii. 69, 70, 88;
at the battle within the Long Walls of Corinth, ix. 333;
manœuvres of, respecting the holy truce, ix. 344;
and the peace of Antalkidas, ix. 387;
and Mardonius, v. 157.

_Argês_, i. 5.

_Argilus_, acquisition of, by Brasidas, vi. 406 _seq._

_Arginusæ_, battle of, viii. 173 _seq._;
recall, impeachment, defence, and condemnation of the generals at
the battle of, viii. 181, 210;
inaction of the Athenian fleet after the battle of, viii. 215.

_Argô_, the, i. 231.

_Argonautic expedition_, i. 231 _seq._;
monuments of, i. 241 _seq._;
how and when attached to Kolchis, i. 251;
attempts to reconcile the, with geographical knowledge,
i. 254 _seq._;
continued faith in, i. 255;
Dr. Warton and M. Ginguené on the, i. 481 _n._

_Argos_, rise of, coincident with the decline of Mykênæ, i. 165;
occupation of, by the Dorians, ii. 6;
and neighboring Dorians greater than Sparta, in 776 B. C., ii. 307;
Dorian settlements in, ii. 308, 309, 311;
early ascendency of, ii. 312, 320;
subsequent decline of, ii. 321;
acquisitions of Sparta from, ii. 448 _seq._;
military classification at, ii. 460;
struggles of, to recover the headship of Greece, ii. 463 _seq._;
and Kleônæ, ii. 464;
victorious war of Sparta against, B. C. 496-5, iv. 221 _seq._;
prostration of, B. C. 496-5, iv. 324;
assistance of, to Ægina, v. 49;
neutrality of, on the invasion of Xerxes, v. 64 _seq._;
position of, on its alliance with Athens about B. C. 461,
v. 319 _seq._;
uncertain relations between Sparta and, B. C. 421, vii. 3;
position of, on the peace of Nikias, vii. 11 _seq._;
the Thousand-regiment at, vii. 11;
induced by the Corinthians to head a new Peloponnesian alliance,
B. C. 421, vii. 13;
joined by Matinea, vii. 14;
joined by the Corinthians, vii. 17, 19;
joined by Elis, vii. 19;
refusal of Tegea to join, vii. 20;
and Sparta, projected alliance between, vii. 24;
and Bœotia, projected alliance between, vii. 24 _seq._;
conclusion of a fifty years’ peace between Sparta and,
vii. 28 _seq._;
and Athens, alliance between, vii. 44, 51 _seq._;
embassy from, for alliance with Corinth, vii. 61;
attack of, upon Epidaurus, vii. 65, 69;
invasion of, by the Lacedæmonians and their allies, B. C. 418,
vii. 71 _seq._;
Alkibiadês at, B. C. 418, vii. 75;
political change at, through the battle of Mantinea, B. C. 418,
vii. 89 _seq._;
treaty of peace between Sparta and, B. C. 418, vii. 92 _seq._;
alliance between Sparta and, B. C. 418, vii. 94;
renounces alliance with Athens, Elis and Mantinea, vii. 94;
oligarchical revolution at, vii, 96, 97;
restoration of democracy at, vii. 100;
renewed alliance of, with Athens, vii. 101;
Alkibiadês at, B. C. 416, vii. 101;
Lacedæmonian intervention in behalf of the oligarchy at, vii. 101,
102;
envoys from, to the Athenian Demos at Samos, viii. 53;
alliance of, with Thebes, Athens, and Corinth, against Sparta,
ix. 284;
consolidation of Corinth with, ix. 332;
expedition of Agesipolis against, ix. 355 _seq._;
violent intestine feud at, x. 199 _seq._

_Argos, Amphilochian_, capture of, by Phormio, vi. 121;
attack of Ambrakiots on, vi. 180;
Eurylochus’s projected attack upon, vi. 302.

_Argus_, destruction of Argeians in the grove of, iv. 321.

_Aria_, Alexander in, xii. 189.

_Ariadnê_, i. 220 _seq._

_Ariæus_, flight of, after the battle of Kunaxa, ix. 47;
and Klearchus, ix. 52, 54;
and the Greeks after the battle of Kunaxa, ix. 54, 56, 62, 78.

_Aridæus_, Philip, xii. 319, 320, 334.

_Ariobarzanes_, intervention of, in Greece, x. 261;
revolt of, x. 294 _seq._;
at the Susian Gates, xii. 171;
death of, xii. 172.

_Arion_, iv. 78 _seq._

_Aristagoras_ and Megabatês, iv. 284;
revolt of, iv. 285 _seq._, 292;
application of, to Sparta, iv. 286 _seq._;
application of, to Athens, iv. 289;
march of, to Sardis, iv. 290;
desertion of the Ionic revolt by, iv. 296 _seq._

_Aristarchus_, the Athenian, viii. 82.

_Aristarchus_, the Lacedæmonian, ix. 164 _seq._

_Aristeidês_, constitutional change introduced by, iv. 145;
character of, iv. 338 _seq._;
elected general, iv. 341;
banishment of, by ostracism, v. 50;
and Themistoklês, rivalry between, v. 50, 273;
restoration of, from banishment, v. 110;
joins the Greek fleet at Salamis, v. 130;
slaughters the Persians at Psyttaleia, v. 136;
equitable assessment of, upon the allied Greeks, v. 264 _seq._;
popularity of, after the Persian war, v. 278;
death and poverty of, v. 289.

_Aristeus_, vi. 70, 73 _seq._ 182.

_Aristo_ and Agêtus, iv. 326.

_Aristocrats_, Grecian, bad morality of, vi. 287.

_Aristodêmus_, ii. 2 _seq._

_Aristodêmus_, king of Messenia, ii. 476.

_Aristodêmus Malakus_, iii. 359.

_Aristodêmus_, “the coward”, v. 94, 188.

_Aristodêmus_, the actor, xi. 373.

_Aristodikus_, iv. 201.

_Aristogeitôn_ and Harmodius, iv. 111 _seq._

_Aristoklês_ and Hipponoidas, vii. 85, 89.

_Aristokratês_, king of Orchomenus, ii. 428, 437.

_Aristokratês_, the Athenian, vii. 368.

_Aristomachê_, x. 480.

_Aristomenês_, ii. 421, 428 _seq._

_Aristonikus_ of Methymna, xii. 142, 149.

_Aristophanês_, viii. 327;
his reason for showing up Sokratês, viii. 408;
his attack upon the alleged impiety of Sokratês, i. 400 _n._;
and Kleon, vi. 482 _seq._, 488.

_Aristoteles_ the Spartan, xi. 2.

_Aristotle_ on Spartan women, ii. 387;
on the Spartan laws of property, ii. 408;
meaning of the word Sophist in, viii. 354;
formal logic of, viii. 429;
novelties ascribed to Sokratês by, viii. 424;
and Hermeias, xi. 441, 441 _n._;
instruction of Alexander by, xii. 3;
and Alexander, political views of, compared, xii. 265 _seq._

_Aristoxenus_, of Tarentum, xi. 154.

_Aristus_ and Nikoteles, x. 466.

_Arkas_ and Kallisto, i. 175.

_Arkesilaus_ the Second, iv. 40;
the Third, iv. 45 _seq._

_Arktinus_, Æthiopis of, ii. 156.

_Armenia_, the Ten Thousand Greeks in, ix. 95 _seq._

_Armenus_, i. 242.

_Arnold_, his edition of Thucydides, viii. 106 _n._

_Arrhibæus_, vi. 400, 440, 443 _seq._

_Arrian_ on the Amazons, i. 216 _seq._;
conjecture of, respecting Geryôn, i. 249;
on Darius’s plan against Alexander, xii. 110.

_Arsakes_ at Antandrus, viii. 114.

_Arsames_, xii. 112.

_Arsinoê_, xii. 469 _seq._

_Arsites_, xii. 78, 80.

_Art_, Grecian. iv. 98 _seq._

_Artabanus_, v. 8 _seq._

_Artabazus, Xerxes’s general_, siege of Potidæa and Olynthus by,
v. 142;
jealousy of, against Mardonius, v. 160;
conduct of, at and after the battle of Platæa, v. 180, 182;
and Pausanias, v. 254, 268.

_Artabazus, satrap of Daskylium_, xi. 230, 257, 300.

_Artabazus, Darius’s general_, xii. 183, 184, 188.

_Artaphernês, satrap of Sardis_, Hippias’s application to, iv. 277;
and Histiæus, iv. 298, 309;
proceedings of, after the conquest of Ionia, iv. 311;
and Datis, Persian armament under, iv. 329;
return of, to Asia, after the battle of Marathon, iv. 362.

_Artaphernês, the Persian envoy_, vi. 360 _seq._

_Artaxerxes Longimanus_, v. 285 _seq._, vi. 361 _seq._

_Artaxerxes Mnemon_, accession of, ix. 7;
and Cyrus the Younger, viii. 312; ix. 7, 42 _seq._;
at Kunaxa, ix. 42 _seq._, 48, 52;
death of, x. 366.

_Artayktês_, v. 198 _seq._

_Artemis_, i. 10;
worship of, in Asia, iii. 170.

_Artemis_ Limnatis, temple of, ii. 424.

_Artemisia_, v. 119, 133, 139.

_Artemisium_, resolution of Greeks to oppose Xerxes at, v. 71;
Greek fleet at, v. 79, 80, 97 _seq._;
sea-fight off, v. 99, 101;
retreat of the Greek fleet from, to Salamis, v. 102.

_Arthur_, romances of, i. 476.

_Artisans_, at Athens, iii. 136 _seq._

_Arts_, rudimentary state of, in Homeric and Hesiodic Greece, ii. 116.

_Aryandes_, Persian satrap of Egypt, iv. 47.

_Asia_, twelve Ionic cities in, iii. 172 _seq._;
Æolic cities in, iii. 190 _seq._;
collective civilization in, without individual freedom or
development, iii. 303;
state of, before the Persian monarchy, iv. 182;
conquests of Cyrus the Great in, iv. 209;
expedition of Greek fleet against, B. C. 478, v. 253;
Alkibiadês in, viii. 144, 153 _seq._, 311 _seq._;
expedition of Timotheus to, x. 252, 294 _seq._;
Agesilaus in, x. 294, 296;
measures of Alexander before going to, xii. 67;
passage of Alexander to, xii. 69;
review of Alexander’s army in, xii. 72;
cities founded by Alexander in, xii. 267;
Hellenized by the Diadochi, not by Alexander, xii. 269;
how far really Hellenized, xii. 270.

_Asia Minor_, Greeks in, ii. 235;
non-Hellenic people of, iii. 203, 205 _seq._;
features of the country of, iii. 205;
Phrygian music and worship among Greeks in, iii. 212;
predominance of female influence in the legends of, iii. 222;
Cimmerian invasion of, iii. 245 _seq._;
conquest of, by the Persians, iv. 201;
arrival of Cyrus the Younger in, viii. 135, 137.

_Asia, Upper_, Scythian invasion of, iii. 253.

_Asiatic_ customs and religion blended with Hellenic in the Trôad,
i. 338.

_Asiatic Dorians_, iii. 201, 202.

_Asiatic_ frenzy grafted on the joviality of the Grecian Dionysia,
i. 35.

_Asiatic Greece_, deposition of despots of, by Aristagoras, iv. 245.

_Asiatic Greeks_, conquest of, by Crœsus, iii. 259 _seq._;
state of, after Cyrus’s conquest of Lydia, iv. 198;
application of, to Sparta, B. C. 546, iv. 199;
alliance with, against Persia, abandoned by the Athenians, iv. 291;
successes of Persians against, iv. 294;
reconquest of, after the fall of Milêtus, iv. 306;
first step to the ascendency of Athens over, v. 198;
not tributary to Persia between B. C. 477 and 412, v. 339 _n._;
surrender of, to Persia, by Sparta, ix. 205;
and Tissaphernes, x. 206; ix. 207;
application of to Sparta for aid against Tissaphernes, ix. 207;
after the peace of Antalkidas, x. 26 _seq._;
Spartan project for the rescue of, x. 44.

_Asidates_, ix. 172.

_Askalaphus_ and Ialmenus, i. 130.

_Asklepiadês_ of Myrlea, legendary discoveries of, i. 247 _n._ 4.

_Asklêpiads_, i. 181.

_Asklêpius_, i. 178 _seq._

_Asopius_, son of Phormio, vi. 231.

_Asopus_, Greeks and Persians at, before the battle of Platæa,
v. 158 _seq._

_Aspasia_, vi. 98 _seq._

_Aspendus_, Phenician fleet at, B. C. 411, viii. 99, 100, 114;
Alkibiadês at, viii. 99;
Alkibiadês, return from, to Samos, viii. 116;
Alexander at, xii. 100.

_Aspis_, xii. 421.

_Assembly_, Spartan popular, ii. 345, 356;
Athenian judicial, iv. 137, 140 _seq._;
Athenian political, iv. 139.

_Assyria_, relations of, with Egypt, iii. 324.

_Assyrian_ kings, their command of human labor, iii. 302.

_Assyrians_ and Medes, iii. 224 _seq._, 290 _seq._;
contrasted with Phenicians, Greeks, and Egyptians, iii. 303;
and Phenicians, effect of, on the Greek mind, iii. 343 _seq._

_Astakus_, vi. 135, 141.

_Asteria_, i. 6.

_Asterius_, i. 220.

_Astræus_, i. 6; and Eôs, children of, i. 6.

_Astronomy_, physical, thought impious by ancient Greeks, i. 346 _n._;
and physics, knowledge of, among the early Greeks, ii. 114.

_Astyages_, story of, iv. 182 _seq._

_Astyanax_, death of, i. 305.

_Astyochus_, expedition of, to Ionia, vii. 383;
at Lesbos, vii. 384;
at Chios and the opposite coast, vii. 391;
accidental escape of, vii. 392;
and Pedaritus, vii. 393, 394;
and Tissaphernês, treaty between, vii. 395 _seq._;
mission of Lichas and others respecting, vii. 397;
victory of, over Charmînus, and junction with Antisthenês, vii. 397;
at Rhodes, viii. 94;
at Milêtus, viii. 97;
recall of, viii. 98.

_Atalanta_, i. 56, 145 _seq._

_Atarneus_, captured and garrisoned by Derkyllidas, ix. 219;
Hermeias of, xi. 441, and _n._ 3.

_Atê_, i. 7.

_Athamas_, i. 123 _seq._

_Athenagoras_, vii. 184 _seq._

_Athênê_, birth of, i. 10;
various representations of, i. 54;
her dispute with Poseidon, i. 56, 191;
Chalkiœkus, temple of, and Pausanias, v. 272;
Polias, reported prodigy in the temple of, on Xerxes’s approach,
v. 109.

_Athenian_, victims for the Minôtaur, i. 221;
ceremonies commemorative of the destruction of the Minôtaur, i. 223;
democracy, Kleisthenês, the real author of, iv. 139;
people, judicial attributes of, iv. 140;
nobles, early violence of, iv. 152;
energy, development of, after Kleisthenês’s revolution, iv. 176;
seamen, contrasted with the Ionians at Ladê, iv. 300;
dikasts, temper of, in estimating past services, iv. 372;
democracy, origin of the apparent fickleness of, iv. 375 _seq._;
envoy, speech of, to Gelo, v. 219;
parties and politics, effect of the Persian war upon, v. 274 _seq._;
empire, v. 290 _seq._, 304 _n._ 2, 346, vi. 398 _seq._, 44 _n._, 48;
viii. 281-290;
power, increase of, after the formation of the Delian confederacy,
v. 313;
auxiliaries to Sparta against the Helots, v. 317 _seq._;
democracy, consummation of, v. 380;
armament against Samos, under Periklês, Sophoklês, etc.,
vi. 26 _seq._;
private citizens, redress of the allies against, vi. 38;
assembly, speeches of the Korkyræan and Corinthian envoys to,
vi. 58 _seq._;
navel attack, vi. 63;
envoy, reply of, to the Corinthian envoy, at the Spartan assembly,
vi. 85 _seq._;
expedition to ravage Peloponnesus, B. C. 431, vi. 134;
armament to Potidæa and Chalkidic Thrace, B. C. 429, vi. 191;
assembly, debates in, respecting Mitylênê. vi. 244, 248 _seq._;
assembly, about the Lacedæmonian prisoners in Sphakteria,
vi. 328 _seq._;
assembly, on Demosthenes’ application for reinforcements to attack
Sphakteria, vi. 334 _seq._;
hoplites, at the battle of Amphipolis, vi. 477;
fleet, operations of, near Messênê and Rhegium, B. C. 425, vii. 133;
assembly and the expedition to Sicily, vii. 145, 147 _seq._, 279;
treasury, abundance in, B. C. 415, vii. 164;
fleet in the harbor of Syracuse, vii. 302, 303 _seq._, 315 _seq._,
325 _seq._;
prisoners at Syracuse, vii. 344 _seq._;
fleet at Samos, B. C. 412, vii. 394;
democracy, securities in, against corruption, vii. 402;
assembly, vote of, in favor of oligarchical change, viii. 14;
assembly, at Kolônus, viii. 35;
democracy, reconstitution of, at Samos, viii. 46;
squadron, escape of from Sestos to Elæus, viii. 105;
fleet at Kynossêma, viii. 109 _seq._;
fleet at Abydos, viii. 117 _seq._;
fleet, concentration of, at Kardia, viii. 120;
fleet, at the Bosphorus, B. C. 410, viii. 127;
fleet at Arginusæ, viii. 170 _seq._;
assembly, debate in, on the generals at Arginusæ, viii. 178-186,
190-194;
fleet, inaction of, after the battle of Arginusæ, viii. 211;
fleet, removal of, from Samos to Ægospotami, viii. 215;
fleet, capture of, at Ægospotami, viii. 216 _seq._;
kleruchs and allies after the battle of Ægospotami, viii. 223;
tragedy, growth of, viii. 317, 319;
mind, influence of comedy on, viii. 331 _seq._;
character not corrupted between B. C. 480 and 405, viii. 374 _seq._;
confederacy, new, B. C. 378, x. 192 _seq._;
and Theban cavalry, battle of, near Mantinea, B. C. 362,
x. 333 _seq._;
marine, reform in the administration of, by Demosthenês,
xi. 462 _seq._

_Athenians_ and the Hêrakleids, i. 94;
and Sigeium, i. 339;
and Samians, contrast between, iv. 247;
active patriotism of, between B. C. 500-400, iv. 178;
diminished active sentiment of, after the Thirty Tyrants, iv. 180;
alliance with Asiatic Greeks abandoned by, iv. 291;
Darius’s revenge against, iv. 297;
terror and sympathy of, on the capture of Milêtus, iv. 309;
appeal of, to Sparta, against the Medism of Ægina, iv. 318;
condition and character of, B. C. 490, iv. 334;
application of, to Sparta, before the battle of Marathon, iv. 341;
victory of, at Marathon, iv. 348 _seq._, 358;
alleged fickleness and ingratitude of, towards Miltiadês,
iv. 370 _seq._;
answers of the Delphian oracle to, on the eve of Xerxes’s invasion,
v. 59;
Pan-Hellenic patriotism of, on Xerxes’s invasion, v. 63 _seq._;
hopeless situation of, after the battle of Thermopylæ, v. 106;
conduct of, on the approach of Xerxes, v. 107, _seq._;
victory of, at Salamis, v. 115, 132 _seq._;
honor awarded to, after the battle of Salamis, v. 146;
under Pausanias in Bœotia, v. 164;
and Alexander of Macedon, before the battle of Platæa, v. 170;
and Spartans at Platæa, v. 171, 174;
victory of, at Platæa, v. 179 _seq._;
and continental Ionians, after the battle of Mykalê, v. 199;
attack the Chersonese, B. C. 479, v. 200;
the leaders of Grecian progress after the battle of Salamis, v. 242;
rebuild their city after the battle of Platæa, v. 243;
effect of the opposition to the fortification of Athens upon,
v. 246;
induced by Themistoklês to build twenty new triremes annually,
v. 252;
activity of, in the first ten years of their hegemony,
v. 294 _seq._, 303;
renounce the alliance of Sparta, and join Argos and Thessaly,
v. 319 _seq._;
proceedings of, in Cyprus, Phœnicia, Egypt, and Megara, B. C. 460,
v. 321;
defeat the Æginetans, B. C. 459, v. 323;
defeat of at Tanagra, v. 328;
victory of, at Œnophyta, v. 331;
sail round Peloponnesus under Tolmidês, v. 331;
march against Thessaly, v. 334;
defeat and losses of, in Egypt, B. C. 460-455, v. 383;
victories of, at Cyprus, under Anaxikratês, v. 337;
defeat of, at Korôneia, v. 348;
personal activity of, after the reforms of Periklês and Ephialtês,
vi. 1;
settlements of, in the Ægean, during the Thirty years’ truce,
vi. 11;
pride of, in the empire of Athens, vi. 9;
decision of, respecting Corinth and Korkyra, vi. 62;
victory of near Potidæa, vi. 73;
blockade of Potidæa by, vi. 74;
counter-demand of, upon Sparta, for expiation of sacrilege, vi. 105;
final answer of, to the Spartans before the Peloponnesian war,
vi. 110;
expel the Æginetans from Ægina, B. C. 431, vi. 186;
ravage of the Megarid by, in the Peloponnesian war, vi. 137;
irritation of, at their losses from the plague and the
Peloponnesians, vi. 164;
energetic demonstration of, B. C. 428, vi. 226;
their feeling and conduct towards the revolted Mitylenæans,
vi. 249 _seq._, 255 _seq._;
and Lacedæmonians at Pylus, armistice between, vi. 324;
demands of, in return for the release of the Lacedæmonians in
Sphakteria, vi. 329;
and Bœotians, debate between, after the battle of Delium, B. C. 424,
vi. 393 _seq._;
discontent of, with Sparta, on the non-fulfilment of the peace of
Nikias, vii. 10;
recapture of Skiônê by, vii. 22;
and Amphipolis, vii. 104, xi. 215, 233 _seq._;
siege and capture of Mêlos by, vii. 109 _seq._;
treatment of Alkibiadês by, for his alleged profanation of the
mysteries, vii. 211 _seq._;
victory of, near the Olympieion at Syracuse, vii. 221 _seq._;
forbearance of, towards Nikias, vii. 227 _seq._;
not responsible for the failure of the Sicilian expedition,
B. C. 415, vii. 227 _n._;
defeat of, at Epipolæ, B. C. 414, vii. 277;
conduct of, on receiving Nikias’s despatch, B. C. 414, vii. 279,
280 _seq._;
victory of, in the harbor of Syracuse, B. C. 413, vii. 316;
and Syracusans, conflicts between, in the Great Harbor, vii. 291,
294 _seq._, 317 _seq._, 323 _seq._;
postponement of their retreat from Syracuse by an eclipse of the
moon, vii. 315;
blockade of, in the harbor of Syracuse, vii. 319 _seq._, 329 _seq._;
and Corinthians near Naupaktus, vii. 358 _seq._;
resolutions of, after the disaster at Syracuse, vii. 362 _seq._;
suspicions of, about Chios, vii. 368;
defeat Alkamenês and the Peloponnesian fleet, vii. 369;
effect of the Chian revolt on, vii. 372;
harassing operations of, against Chios, B. C. 412, vii. 345 _seq._,
391, 393;
victory of, near Milêtus, B. C. 412, vii. 385, 387;
retirement of, from Milêtus, B. C. 412, vii. 388;
naval defeat of, near Eretria, B. C. 411, viii. 72 _seq._;
moderation of, on the deposition of the Thirty and the Four Hundred,
viii. 88 _seq._, 300 _seq._;
victory of, at Kyzikus, viii. 121;
convention of, with Pharnabazus, about Chalkêdon, viii. 132;
capture of Byzantium by, viii. 134;
different behavior of, towards Alkibiadês and Nikias, viii. 158;
victory of, at Arginusæ, viii. 173 _seq._;
remorse of, after the death of the generals at Arginusæ, viii. 205;
first proposals of, to Sparta after the battle of Ægospotami,
viii. 227;
repayment of the Lacedæmonians by, after the restoration of the
democracy, B. C. 403, viii. 305;
their treatment of Dorieus, ix. 272 _seq._;
restoration of the Long Walls at Corinth by, ix. 338;
and Evagoras of Cyprus, ix. 365, 375;
successes of Antalkidas against, ix. 344;
their alleged envy of distinguished generals, x. 108 _n._ 2;
and Alexander of Pheræ, x. 283;
project of, to seize Corinth, B. C. 366, x. 289;
and Charidemus in the Chersonese, B. C. 360-358, x. 377 _seq._;
the alliance of Olynthus rejected by, B. C. 358, xi. 236;
their remissness in assisting Methônê, xi. 260;
change in the character of, between B. C. 431 and 360, xi. 279;
prompt resistance of, to Philip at Thermopylæ, xi. 296;
expedition of, to Olynthus, B. C. 349, xi. 346;
capture of, at Olynthus, xi. 365, 372;
letters of Philip to, xi. 411, 416, 417;
and the Phokians at Thermopylæ, B. C. 374-346, xi. 418 _seq._;
letter of Philip to, declaring war, B. C. 340, xi. 456 _seq._;
refusal of, to take part in the Amphiktyonic proceedings against
Amphissa, xi. 478;
Philip asks the Thebans to assist in attacking, xi. 483 _seq._;
and Thebans, war of, against Philip in Phokis, xi. 493, 495 _seq._;
and Philip, peace of Demades between, xi. 507 _seq._;
their recognition of Philip as head of Greece, xi. 507, 511 _seq._;
captured at the Granikus, xii. 105;
champions of the liberation of Greece, B. C. 323, xii. 312;
helpless condition of, B. C. 302-301, xii. 385.

_Athens_, historical, impersonal authority of law in, ii. 81;
treatment of homicide in, ii. 92 _seq._;
military classification at, ii. 460;
meagre history of, before Drako, iii. 48;
tribunals for homicide at, iii. 77;
local superstitions at, about trial of homicide, iii. 79;
pestilence and suffering at, after the Kylonian massacre, iii. 82;
and Megara, war between, about Salamis, iii. 90 _seq._;
acquisition of Salamis by, iii. 91 _seq._;
state of, immediately before the legislation of Solon,
iii. 93 _seq._;
rights of property sacred at, iii. 105, 112 _seq._;
rate of interest free at, iii. 108;
political rights of Solon’s four classes at, iii. 120 _seq._;
democracy at, begins with Kleisthenês, iii. 127;
distinction between the democracy at, and Solon’s constitution,
iii. 131;
Solon’s departure from, iii. 147;
Solon’s return to, iii. 153;
connection of, with Thracian Chersonesus, under Peisistratus,
iv. 117 _seq._;
after the expulsion of Hippias, iv. 126;
introduction of universal admissibility to office at, iv. 145;
necessity for creating a constitutional morality at, in the time of
Kleisthenês, iv. 153;
application of, for alliance with Persia, iv. 165;
and Platæa, first connection between, iv. 166;
successes of, against Bœotians and Chalkidians, iv. 170;
war of Ægina against, iv. 173, 316;
application of Aristagoras to, iv. 289;
treatment of Darius’s herald at, iv. 316;
traitors at, B. C. 490, iv. 356, 358;
penal procedure at, iv. 368 _n._;
and Ægina war between, from B. C. 488 to 481, v. 47, 49 _seq._, 50,
53, 323;
first growth of the naval force of, v. 51;
fleet of, the salvation of Greece, v. 53;
and Sparta, no heralds sent from Xerxes to, v. 57;
Pan-Hellenic congress convened by, at the Isthmus of Corinth,
v. 58 _seq._;
and Ægina, occupation of, Xerxes, v. 109, 112 _seq._;
Mardonius at, v. 154 _seq._;
first step to the separate ascendancy of, over Asiatic Greeks,
v. 200;
conduct of, in the repulse of the Persians, v. 242;
Long Walls at, v. 244 _seq._, 322 _seq._, ix. 325 _seq._;
plans of Themistoklês for the naval aggrandizement of,
v. 249 _seq._;
increase of metics and commerce at, after the enlargement of Piræus,
v. 251;
headship of the allied Greeks transferred from Sparta to,
v. 256 _seq._;
and Sparta, first open separation between, v. 258 _seq._, 290;
proceedings of, on being made leader of the allied Greeks,
v. 263 _seq._;
stimulus to democracy at, from the Persian war, v. 275;
changes in the Kleisthenean constitution at, after the Persian war,
v. 275 _seq._;
long-sighted ambition imputed to, v. 293;
enforcing sanction of the confederacy of Delos exercised by, v. 298;
increasing power and unpopularity of among the allied Greeks,
v. 299 _seq._;
as guardian of the Ægean against piracy, between B. C. 476-466,
v. 304;
bones of Theseus conveyed to, v. 304, 305;
quarrel of, with Thasos, B. C. 465, v. 309, 311;
first attempt of, to found a city at Ennea Hodoi on the Strymon,
v. 310;
alliance of, with Megara, B. C. 461, v. 321;
growing hatred of Corinth and neighboring states to, B. C. 461,
v. 321;
war of, with Corinth, Ægina, etc., B. C. 459, v. 322 _seq._;
reconciliation between leaders and parties at, after the battle of
Tanagra, v. 329;
acquisition of Bœotia, Phokis, and Lokris by, v. 331;
and the Peloponnesians, five years’ truce between, v. 334;
and Persia, treaty between, B. C. 450, v. 335 _seq._;
fund of the confederacy transferred from Delos to, v. 343;
position and prospects of, about B. C. 448, v. 344 _seq._;
commencement of the decline of, v. 346 _seq._;
and Delphi, B. C. 452-447, v. 346;
loss of Bœotia by, v. 347 _seq._;
despondency at, after the defeat at Korôneia, v. 350;
and Sparta, thirty years’ truce between, v. 350;
and Megara, feud between, v. 351;
magistrates and Areopagus in early, v. 352;
increase of democratical sentiment at, between the time of
Aristeidês and of Periklês, v. 355;
choice of magistrates by lot at, v. 355;
oligarchical party at, v. 361;
maritime empire of, vi. 2 _seq._, viii. 281-293, ix. 199 _seq._;
maritime revenue of, vi. 5 _seq._, 6, _n._ 1, 36;
commercial relations of, in the Thirty years’ truce, vi. 11;
political condition of, between B. C. 445-431, vi. 15 _seq._;
improvements in the city of, under Periklês, vi. 20 _seq._,
23 _seq._;
Periklês’s attempt to convene a Grecian congress at, vi. 25;
application of the Samians to Sparta for aid against, vi. 29;
funeral ceremony of slain warriors at, vi. 31;
and her subject-allies, vi. 33 _seq._, 48;
and Sparta, confederacies of, vi. 49;
reinforcement from, to Korkyra against Corinth, vi. 57 _seq._, 67;
and Corinth, after the second naval battle between Corinth and
Korkyra, vi., 69 _seq._;
and Perdikkas, vi. 71 _seq._, 449, _seq._, vii. 96;
non-aggressive, between B. C. 445-431, vi. 76;
Megara prohibited from trading with, vi. 76;
hostility of the Corinthians to, after their defeat near Potidæa,
vi. 77;
discussion and decision of the Spartan assembly upon war with,
B. C. 431, vi. 79 _seq._;
position and prospects of, on commencing the Peloponnesian war,
vi. 94 _seq._, 113 _seq._, 121 _seq._;
requisitions addressed to, by Sparta, B. C. 431, vi. 97 _seq._,
106 _seq._;
assembly at, on war with Sparta, B. C. 431, vi. 108 _seq._;
conduct of, on the Theban night-surprise of Platæa, vi. 119 _seq._;
and the Akarnanians, alliance between, vi. 121;
crowding of population into, on Archidamus’s invasion of Attica,
vi. 129;
and Sicily, relations of, altered by the quarrel between Corinth and
Korkyra, vi. 130;
clamor at, on Archidamus’s ravage of Acharnæ, vi. 131;
measures for the permanent defence of, B. C. 431, vi. 138 _seq._;
alliance of Stitalkês with, vi. 141, 215 _seq._;
freedom of individual thought and action at, vi. 149 _seq._;
position of, at the time of Periklês’s funeral oration, vi. 152;
the plague at, vi. 154 _seq._, 293;
proceedings of, on learning the revolt of Mitylênê, vi. 223;
exhausted treasury of, B. C. 428, vi. 232;
new politicians at, after Periklês, vi. 245 _seq._;
revolutions at, contrasted with those at Korkyra, vi. 283;
political clubs at, vi. 290;
and the prisoners in Sphakteria vi. 325 _seq._, 353 _seq._,
vii. 6 _seq._;
fluctuation of feeling at, as to the Peloponnesian war, vi. 355;
and her Thracian subject-allies, vi. 405 _seq._;
and Brasidas’s conquests in Thrace, vi. 413;
and Sparta, one year’s truce between, B. C. 423, vi. 432 _seq._;
and Sparta, relations between, B. C. 423-422, vi. 449, 452 _seq._;
necessity for voluntary accusers at, vi. 486;
and Sparta, alliance between, B. C. 421, vii. 5;
application of Corinthians to, B. C. 421, vii. 20;
Lacedæmonian envoys at, about Panaktum and Pylus, B. C. 420,
vii. 29;
and Argos, alliance between, B. C. 420, vii. 43 _seq._;
convention of, with Argos, Mantineia, and Elis, B. C. 420,
vii. 49 _seq._;
policy of, attempted by Alkibiades, B. C. 419, vii. 62 _seq._;
attack of, upon Epidaurus, B. C. 419, vii. 64, 66;
and Sparta, relations between, B. C. 419, vii. 69;
and Argos, renewed alliance between, B. C. 417, vii. 101;
and Sparta, relations between, B. C. 416, vii. 103;
Sicilian expedition, vii. 132, 142, 144 _seq._, 163 _seq._,
364 _seq._;
mutilation of the Hermæ at, vii. 167 _seq._, 197 _seq._;
injurious effects of Alkibiadês’s banishment upon, B. C. 415,
vii. 216;
Nikias’s despatch to, for reinforcements, B. C. 414,
vii. 274 _seq._;
and Sparta, violation of the peace between, B. C. 414, vii. 286;
effects of the Lacedæmonian occupation of Dekeleia on,
vii. 354 _seq._;
dismissal of Thracian mercenaries from, 357 _seq._;
revolt of Chios, Erythræ, and Klazomenæ from, B. C. 412, vii. 371;
appropriation of the reserve fund at, vii. 373;
loss of Teos by, B. C. 412, vii. 374;
revolt of Lebedos and Eræ from, B. C. 412, vii. 375;
loss and recovery of Lesbos by, B. C. 412, vii. 384 _seq._;
recovery of Klazomenæ by, B. C. 412, vii. 384;
rally of, during the year after the disaster at Syracuse, viii. 1;
conspiracy of the Four Hundred at, viii. 1, 7 _seq._, 31 _seq._;
loss of Orôpus by, viii. 25;
arrival of the Paralus at, from Samos, viii. 30;
constitutional morality of, viii. 25;
restoration of democracy at, B. C. 411, viii. 69 _seq._, 77 _seq._,
81 _seq._, 89;
contrast between oligarchy at, and democracy at Samos, B. C. 411,
viii. 91 _seq._;
revolt of Byzantium from, B. C. 411, viii. 97;
revolt of Abydos and Lampsakus from, viii. 94;
revolt of Kyzikus from, viii. 112;
zeal of Pharnabazus against, viii. 113;
proposals of peace from Sparta to, B. C. 410, viii. 122 _seq._;
return of Alkibiadês to, B. C. 407, viii. 145 _seq._;
fruitless attempt of Agis to surprise, B. C. 407, viii. 150;
complaints at, against Alkibiadês, B. C. 407, viii. 152 _seq._;
conflicting sentiments at, caused by the battle of Arginusæ,
viii. 175;
alleged proposals of peace from Sparta to, after the battle of
Arginusæ, viii. 210;
condition of her dependencies, after the battle of Ægospotami,
viii. 213 _seq._;
oath of mutual harmony at, after the battle of Ægospotami,
viii. 225;
surrender of, to Lysander, viii. 226 _seq._;
return of oligarchical exiles to, B. C. 404, viii. 234;
oligarchical party at, B. C. 404, viii. 235;
imprisonment of Strombichidês and other democrats at, B. C. 404,
viii. 236;
the Thirty tyrants at, viii. 237, 240 _seq._, ix. 182 _seq._,
186 _seq._, 198;
Lacedæmonian garrison at, under Kallibius, viii. 242;
alteration of feeling in Greece after the capture of, by Lysander,
viii. 259, 264, 275;
restoration of Thrasybulus and the exiles to, viii. 279;
restoration of the democracy at, B. C. 403, viii. 280, 294, 295,
295 _seq._, 308 _seq._;
condition of, B. C. 405-403, viii. 293;
abolition of Hellenotamiæ and restriction of citizenship at
B. C. 403, viii. 310 _seq._;
development of dramatic genius at, between the time of Kleisthenês
and of Eukleidês, viii. 318 _seq._, 327 _seq._;
accessibility of the theatre at, viii. 321;
growth of rhetoric and philosophy at, viii. 338 _seq._;
literary and philosophical antipathy at, viii. 348;
enlargement of the field of education at, viii. 349;
sophists at, viii. 350 _seq._, 399;
banishment of Xenophon from, ix. 175;
Theban application to, for aid against Sparta, B. C. 395,
ix. 291 _seq._;
alliance of Thebes, Corinth, Argos and, against Sparta, ix. 301;
contrast between political conflicts at, and at Corinth,
ix. 330 _n._ 3;
alarm at, on the Lacedæmonian capture of the Long Walls at Corinth,
ix. 340;
and Ægina, B. C. 389, ix. 372 _seq._;
financial condition of, from B. C. 403 to 387, ix. 378 _seq._;
creation of the Theôric Board at, ix. 379;
property-taxes at, ix. 380 _n._;
and the peace of Antalkidas, x. 2, 12;
applications of, to Persia, B. C. 413, x. 7, 8;
and Evagoras, x. 18 _seq._;
naval competition of, with Sparta, after the peace of Antalkidas,
x. 42 _seq._;
and Macedonia, contrast between, x. 47;
Theban exiles at, after the seizure of the Kadmeia by Phœbidas,
x. 61, 80 _seq._;
condemnation of the generals at, who had favored the enterprise of
Pelopidas, x. 96;
contrast between judicial procedure at, and at Sparta, x. 102;
hostility of, to Sparta, and alliance with Thebes, B. C. 378,
x. 102 _seq._;
exertions of, to form a new maritime confederacy, B. C. 378,
x. 103 _seq._;
absence of Athenian generals from, x. 108 _n._ 2;
synod of new confederates at, B. C. 378, x. 112;
nature and duration of the Solonian census at, x. 113 _seq._;
new census at, in the archonship of Nausinikus, x. 115 _seq._;
symmories at, x. 117 _seq._;
financial difficulties of, B. C. 374, x. 133;
displeasure of, against Thebes, B. C. 374, x. 133, 159;
separate peace of, with the Lacedæmonians, B. C. 374, x. 137, 141;
disposition of, towards peace with Sparta, B. C. 372, x. 158, 164;
and the dealings of Thebes with Platæa and Thespiæ, B. C. 372,
x. 162 _seq._;
and the peace of, B. C. 371, x. 167, 172;
and Sparta, difference between in passive endurance and active
energy, x. 187;
the Theban victory at Leuktra not well received at, x. 189;
at the head of a new Peloponnesian land confederacy, B. C. 371,
x. 201;
application of Arcadians to, for aid against Sparta, B. C. 370,
x. 213;
application of Sparta, Corinth, and Phlius to, for aid against
Thebes, B. C. 369, x. 234 _seq._;
ambitious views of, after the battle of Leuktra, x. 244 _seq._;
and Sparta, alliance between, B. C. 369, x. 253;
embassies from, to Persia, x. 278, 280, 293;
loss of Orôpus by, B. C. 366, x. 286;
alliance of, with Arcadia, B. C. 366, x. 288;
partial readmission of, to the Chersonese, B. C. 365, x. 295 _seq._;
and Kotys, x. 298 _seq._, 372, 373;
Theban naval operations against, under Epaminondas, x. 303 _seq._;
naval operations of Alexander of Pheræ against, x. 370;
and Miltokythes, x. 372;
restoration of the Chersonese to, B. C. 358, x. 379;
transmarine empire of, B. C. 358, x. 381;
condition of, B. C. 360-359, xi. 199;
proceedings of Philip towards, on his accession, xi. 212;
and Eubœa, xi. 217 _seq._, 340 _seq._;
surrender of the Chersonese to, B. C. 358, xi. 219;
revolt of Chios, Kos, Rhodes, and Byzantium from, B. C. 358,
xi. 220 _seq._, 231;
armaments and operations of, in the Hellespont, B. C. 357, xi. 224;
loss of power to, from the Social War, xi. 232;
Philip’s hostilities against, B. C. 358-356, xi. 237;
recovery of Sestos by, B. C. 353, xi. 257;
intrigues of Kersobleptes and Philip against, B. C. 353, xi. 258;
countenance of the Phokians by, B. C. 353, xi. 262;
applications of Sparta and Megalopolis to, B. C. 353, xi. 263, 290;
alarm about Persia at, B. C. 354, xi. 285;
Philip’s naval operations against, B. C. 351, xi. 304 _seq._;
and Olynthus, xi. 326, 331, 334, 345 _seq._, 365, 372;
and Philip overtures for peace between, B. C. 348 xi. 368 _seq._;
application of the Phokians to, for aid against Philip at
Thermopylæ, xi. 376 _seq._;
embassies to Philip from, xi. 379 _seq._; 401 _seq._, 422,
430 _seq._;
resolution of the synod of allies at, respecting Philip, xi. 388;
assemblies at, in the presence of the Macedonian envoys,
xi. 390 _seq._;
envoys from Philip to, xi. 386, 387, 390, 398, 401;
motion of Philokrates for peace and alliance between Philip and,
xi. 390 _seq._;
ratification of peace and alliance between Philip and,
xi. 398 _seq._, 429 _seq._;
alarm and displeasure at, on the surrender of Thermopylæ to Philip,
xi. 423;
professions of Philip to, after his conquest of Thermopylæ, xi. 425;
and the honors conferred upon Philip by the Amphiktyons, xi. 429;
and Philip, formal peace between, from B. C. 346 to 340, xi. 442;
mission of Python from Philip to, xi. 446;
and Philip, proposed amendments in the peace of, B. C. 346, between,
xi. 446 _seq._;
and Philip, disputes between, about the Bosporus and Hellespont,
xi. 450;
increased influence of Demosthenes at, B. C. 341-338, xi. 452;
services of Kalias the Chalkidian to, B. C. 341, xi. 452;
and Philip, declaration of war between, B. C. 340, xi. 455 _seq._;
votes of thanks from Byzantium and the Chersonese to, xi. 461;
accusation of the Amphissians against, at the Amphiktyonic assembly,
B. C. 339, xi. 470 _seq._;
and Thebes, unfriendly relations between, B. C. 339, xi. 484;
proceedings at, on Philip’s fortification of Elateia and application
to Thebes for aid, xi. 484 _seq._ 491;
and Thebes, alliance of, against Philip, B. C. 339, xi. 490;
Demosthenes crowned at, xi. 493, 495;
proceedings at, on the defeat at Chæroneia, xi. 502 _seq._;
lenity of Philip towards, after the battle of Chæroneia, xi. 505;
means of resistance at, after the battle of, Chæroneia, xi. 508;
honorary votes at, in favor of Philip, xi. 509;
sentiment at, on the death of Philip, xii. 10;
submission of, to Alexander, xii. 12;
conduct of, on Alexander’s violation of the convention at Corinth,
xii. 17 _seq._;
proceedings at, on the destruction of Thebes by Alexander, xii. 44;
Alexander demands the surrender of anti-Macedonian leaders at,
xii. 45;
pacific policy of, in Alexander’s time, xii. 277 _seq._;
position of parties at, during and after the anti-Macedonian
struggle of Agis, xii. 286;
submission of, to Antipater, xii. 322 _seq._;
state of parties at, on the proclamation of Polysperchon, xii. 345;
Kassander gets possession of, xii. 361; under Demetrius Phalereus,
xii. 362 _seq._;
census at, under Demetrius Phalereus, xii. 363;
Demetrius Poliorketes at, xii. 373 _seq._, 382, 384 _seq._, 388;
alteration of sentiment at, between B. C. 338 and 307, xii. 376;
in B. C. 501 and 307, contrast between, xii. 377;
restrictive law against philosophers at, B. C. 307, xii. 379;
embassy to Antigonus from, xii. 380;
political nullity of, in the generation after Demosthenes, xii. 392;
connection of, with Bosporus or Pantikapæum, xii. 480 _seq._

_Athos_, iv. 23;
colonies in, iv. 25;
Mardonius’s fleet destroyed near, iv. 314;
Xerxes’s canal through, v. 21 _seq._

_Atlas_, i. 6, 8, 9.

_Atossa_, iv. 252.

_Atreids_, i. 157.

_Atreus_, i. 155 _seq._

_Atropos_, i. 7.

_Attalus, the Macedonian_, xi. 513;
and Pausanias, xi. 515;
death of, xi. 518.

_Attalus, uncle of Kleopatra_, death of, xi. 8.

_Attic_ legends, i. 191 _seq._;
chronology. commencement of, iii. 49;
gentes, iii. 54 _seq._;
demes, iii. 63, 66, 68, iv. 133 _n._;
law of debtor and creditor, iii. 99, 109 _n._;
scale, ratio of, to the Æginæan and Euboic, iii. 171;
Dionysia, iv. 69.

_Attica_ original distribution of, i. 193;
division of, by Kekrops, i. 195;
obscurity of the civil condition of, before Solon, iii. 49;
alleged duodecimal division of, in early times, iii. 50;
four Ionic tribes in, iii. 50 _seq._;
original separation and subsequent consolidation of communities in,
iii. 69;
long continuance of the cantonal feeling in, iii. 70;
state of, after Solon’s legislation, iii. 154;
Spartan expeditions to, against Hippias, iv. 122;
Xerxes in, v. 111 _seq._;
Lacedæmonian invasion of, under Pleistoanax, v. 349;
Archidamus’s invasions of, vi. 129 _seq._, 154, 221;
Lacedæmonian invasion of, B. C. 427, vi. 239;
invasion of, by Agis, B. C. 413, vii. 288;
king Pausanias’s expedition to, viii. 275 _seq._

_Augê_, i. 177.

_Augeas_, i. 139.

_Aulis_, Greek forces assembled at, against Troy, i. 293 _seq._;
Agesilaus at, ix. 258.

_Ausonians_, iii. 355.

_Autoklês_ at the congress at Sparta, B. C. 371, x. 165;
in the Hellespont, x. 371 _seq._

_Autolykus_, i. 119.

_Azan_, i. 176.

_Babylon_, iii. 291 _seq._;
Cyrus’s capture of, iv. 213 _seq._;
revolt, and reconquest of, by Darius, iv. 231 _seq._;
Alexander at, xii. 168 _seq._, 248 _seq._;
Harpalus satrap of, xii. 240.

_Babylonian_ scale, ii. 319;
kings, their command of human labor, iii. 302.

_Babylonians_, industry of, iii. 300;
deserts and predatory tribes surrounding, iii. 304.

_Bacchæ_ of Euripides, i. 262 _n._

_Bacchiads_, ii. 307, iii. 2.

_Bacchic_ rites, i. 33, 34, 38.

_Bacchus_, birth of, i. 260;
rites of, i. 261.

_Bacon_ and Sokratês, viii. 450 _n._ 1;
on the Greek philosophers, viii. 454 _n._ 3.

_Bad_, meaning of, in early Greek writers, ii. 64;
double sense of the Greek and Latin equivalents of, iii. 45 _n._ 4.

_Bagæus_ and Orœtês, iv. 230.

_Bagoas_, xi. 439, 441, xii. 76, 237.

_Baktria_, Alexander in, xii. 201, 206, 215 _seq._

_Barbarian_, meaning of, ii. 276;
and Grecian military feeling, contrast between, vi. 446.

_Bards_, ancient Grecian, ii. 136, 143.

_Bardylis_, defeat of, by Philip, xi. 215.

_Barka_, modern observations of, iv. 32 _n._ 2, 36 _n._ 3, 37 _n._;
foundation of, iv. 42;
Persian expedition from Egypt against, iv. 48;
capture of, iv. 48;
submission of, to Kambysês, iv. 220.

_Basilids_, iii. 162 _n._ 4, 188.

_Batis_, governor of Gaza, xii. 144.

_Battus_, founder of Kyrênê, iv. 30 _seq._;
dynasty of, iv. 40 _seq._;
the Third, iv. 43.

_Bebrykians_, iii. 207, 208.

_Bellerophôn_, i. 121 _seq._

_Bêlus_, temple of, iii. 297.

_Bequest_, Solon’s law of, iii. 139.

_Berœa_, Athenian attack upon, vi. 76 _n._ 2.

_Bessus_, xii. 183 _seq._, 202, 206.

_Bias_, i. 91, 109 _seq._

_Bisaltæ_, the king of, iv. 21, v. 43.

_Bithynia_, Derkyllidas in, ix. 216.

_Bithynians_, iii. 207.

_Boar_, the Kalydônian, i. 147, 148 _seq._

_Bœotia_, affinities of, with Thessaly, ii. 18;
transition from mythical to historical, ii. 19;
cities and confederation of, ii. 295;
Mardonius in, v. 153, 161;
Pausanias’s march to, v. 168;
supremacy of Thebes in, restored by Sparta, v. 319, 326;
expedition of the Lacedæmonians into, B. C. 458, v. 326 _seq._;
acquisition of, by Athens, v. 331;
loss of, by Athens, v. 347 _seq._, 351 _n._;
scheme of Demosthenês and Hippokratês for invading, B. C. 424,
vi. 379;
and Argos, projected alliance between, B. C. 421, vii. 24 _seq._;
and Sparta, alliance between, B. C. 420, vii. 26;
and Eubœa, bridge connecting, viii. 112, 118;
Agesilaus on the northern frontier of, ix. 315;
expeditions of Kleombrotus to, x. 94 _seq._, 129;
expulsion of the Lacedæmonians from, by the Thebans, B. C. 374,
x. 135;
proceedings in, after the battle of Leuktra, x. 188;
retirement of the Spartans from, after the battle of Leuktra,
x. 190;
extinction of free cities in, by Thebes, xi. 201;
successes of Onomarchus in, xi. 293;
reconstitution of, by Alexander, xii. 48.

_Bœotian_ war, ix. 295 _seq._;
cities after the peace of Antalkidas, x. 29, 33.

_Bœotians_, ii. 14 _seq._ 293 _seq._;
and Chalkidians, successes of Athens against, iv. 171;
and Athenians, debate between, after the battle of Delium,
vi. 403 _seq._;
at peace during the One year’s truce between Athens and Sparta,
vi. 457;
repudiate the peace of Nikias, vi. 493, vii. 3;
refuse to join Argos, B. C. 421, vii. 16.

_Bœôtus_, genealogy of, i. 256 _n._ 2, ii. 18 _n._ 3.

_Bogês_, v. 295.

_Bomilkar_, xii. 416 _seq._, 435.

_Boreas_, i. 6, 199, 200.

_Bosporus_, Alkibiades and the Athenian fleet at the, viii. 125;
Autokles in the, x. 372;
disputes between Philip and Athens about, xi. 450.

_Bosporus_ or Pantikapæum, xii. 479 _seq._

_Bottiæans_, iv. 14, 19 _n._

_Boulê_, Homeric, ii. 65;
and Agora, ii. 74.

_Branchidæ_ and Alexander, xii. 202 _seq._

_Brasidas_, first exploit of, vi. 135;
and Knêmus, attempt of, upon Peiræus, vi. 211;
at Pylus, vi. 324;
sent with Helot and other Peloponnesian hoplites to Thrace, vi. 370;
at Megara, vi. 376 _seq._;
march of, through Thessaly to Thrace, vi. 399 _seq._;
and Perdikkas, relations between, vi. 400, 450, 443 _seq._;
prevails upon Akanthus to revolt from Athens, vi. 402 _seq._;
proceedings of, at Argilus, vi. 408, 409;
at Amphipolis, vi. 408 _seq._, 476 _seq._;
repelled from Eion, vi. 411;
capture of Lêkythus by, vi. 424;
revolt of Skiônê to, vi. 435 _seq._;
and Perdikkas, proceedings of, towards Arrhibæus, vi. 400, 440,
443 _seq._;
personal ascendency of, vi. 412, 425;
operations of, after his acquisition of Amphipolis, vi. 420;
surprises and takes Toronê, vi. 422;
acquisition of Mendê by, vi. 439;
retreat of, before the Illyrians, vi. 447 _seq._;
Lacedæmonian reinforcement to, vi. 449;
attempt of, upon Potidæa, vi. 450;
opposition of, to peace on the expiration of the One year’s truce,
vi. 455;
death and character of, vi. 473, 474, 479 _seq._;
speech of, at Akanthus, ix. 193 _seq._;
language of, contrasted with the acts of Lysander, ix. 194.

_Brazen_ race, the, i. 65.

_Brennus_, invasion of Greece by, xii. 390.

_Briarcus_, i. 5.

_Bribery_, judicial, in Grecian cities, v. 188.

_Brisêis_, i. 294.

_Bromias_, xi. 298.

_Brontês_, i. 5.

_Brundusium_, iii. 391.

_Brute_, the Trojan, i. 482 _seq._

_Bruttians_, xi. 10, 133.

_Bryant_, hypothesis on the Trojan war, i. 330 _n._ 1;
on Palæphatus, i. 418 _n._

_Bryas_, vii. 99.

_Budini_, iii. 244.

_Bukephalia_, xii. 229, 233.

_Bull_, Phalaris’s brazen, v. 205 _n._

_Bura_, destruction of, x. 157.

_Butadæ_, i. 197.

_Byblus_, surrender of, to Alexander, xii. 130.

_Byzantium_, iv. 27;
extension of the Ionic revolt to, iv. 291;
Pausanias at, v. 268, 280;
revolt of, from Athens, B. C. 411, viii. 97;
Klearchus, the Lacedæmonian, sent to, viii. 128;
capture of, by the Athenians, viii. 134;
mission of Cheirisophus to, ix. 125;
return of Cheirisophus from, ix. 144;
the Ten Thousand Greeks at, ix. 154 _seq._;
revolt of, from Athens, B. C. 358, xi. 220 _seq._, 231;
mission of Demosthenes to, xi. 453;
siege of, by Philip, xi. 459;
vote of thanks from, to Athens, xi. 461;
Philip concludes peace with, xi. 461.

_Calabrian_ peninsula, Dionysius’s projected wall across, xi. 43.

_Calycê_, i. 137.

_Campanians_, xi. 9;
of Ætna, x. 407.

_Canacê_, i. 136 _n._

_Carthage_, iii. 273;
foundation and dominion of, iii. 345 _seq._;
and Tyre, amicable relations of, iii. 348;
projected expedition of Kambysês against, iv. 220;
empire, power, and population of, x. 391 _seq._;
and her colonies, x. 394;
military force of, x. 396 _seq._;
political constitution of, x. 397 _seq._;
oligarchical system and sentiment at, x. 398 _seq._;
powerful families at, x. 400;
intervention of, in Sicily, B. C. 410, x. 401 _seq._;
and Dionysius, x. 469, 473, 481, 483;
distressat, on the failure of Imilkon’s expedition against Syracuse,
x. 511;
danger of, from her revolted Libyan subjects, B. C. 394, x. 511;
Dionysius renews the war with, xi. 41 _seq._;
Dionysius concludes an unfavorable peace with, xi. 42;
new war of Dionysius with, xi. 44;
danger from, to Syracuse, B. C. 344, xi. 134;
operations of Agathokles on the eastern coast of, xii. 419 _seq._;
sedition of Bomilkar at, xii. 435.

_Carthaginian_ invasion of Sicily, B. C. 480, v. 221 _seq._;
fleet, entrance of, into the Great Harbor of Syracuse, x. 498.

_Carthaginians_, and Phenicians, difference between the aims of,
iii. 275;
and Greeks, first known collision between, iii. 348;
peace of, with Gelo, after the battle of the Himera, v. 225;
and Egestæans, victory of, over the Selinuntines, x. 404;
blockade and capture of Agrigentum by, x. 405 _seq._;
plunder of Syracuse by, x. 482;
in Sicily, expedition of Dionysius against, x. 483 _seq._;
naval victory of, off Katana, x. 495;
before Syracuse, x. 499 _seq._, 506 _seq._;
defeat of, in the Great Harbor of Syracuse, x. 501;
in Sicily, frequency of pestilence among, xi. 1;
purchase the robe of the Lakinian Hêrê, xi. 23;
and Hipponium, xi. 43;
invade Sicily, B. C. 340, xi. 170, 171;
Timoleon’s victory over, at the Krimêsus, xi. 174 _seq._;
peace of Timoleon with, xi. 182;
their defence of Agrigentum against Agathokles, xii. 406 _seq._;
victory of, over Agathokles at the Himera, xii. 408 _seq._;
recover great part of Sicily from Agathokles, xii. 409;
expedition of Agathokles to Africa against, xii. 410 _seq._;
religious terror of after the defeat of Hanno and Bomilkar,
xii. 418;
success of, against Agathokles in Numidia, xii. 427;
victories of, over Archagathus, xii. 439;
Archagathus blocked up at Tunês by, xii. 439, 441;
victory of, over Agathokles near Tunês, xii. 442;
nocturnal panic in the camp of, near Tunês, xii. 442;
the army of Agathokles capitulate with, after his desertion,
xii. 443.

_Caspian_ Gates, xii. 182 _n._ 2.

_Castes_, Egyptian, iii. 314 _seq._

_Catalogue_ in the Iliad, i. 290 _seq._, ii. 157.

_Cato_ the elder, and Kleon, vi. 485 _n._, 486 _n._

_Census_, nature and duration of the Solonian, x. 113 _seq._;
in the archonship of Nausinikus, x. 114 _seq._

_Centaur_ Nessus, i. 151.

_Centimanes_, i. 8.

_Ceremonies_, religious, a source of mythes, i. 62, 63.

_Cestus_, iv. 57 _n._ 2.

_Chabrias_, defeat of Gorgôpas by, ix. 375;
proceedings of between B. C. 387-378, x. 105;
at Thebes, x. 127;
victory of, near Naxos, x. 130 _seq._;
at Corinth, x. 258;
in Egypt, x. 361, 362;
and Charidemus, x. 379;
death of, xi. 223.

_Chæreas_, viii. 30, 46.

_Chæroneia_, victory of the Thebans over Onomarchus at, xi. 257;
battle of, B. C. 338, xi. 498 _seq._

_Chaldæan_ priests and Alexander, xii. 249, 254.

_Chaldæans_, iii. 290 _seq._

_Chalkêdon_ and Alkibiadês, viii. 126, 132.

_Chalkideus_, expedition of, to Chios, vii. 370, 371 _seq._;
and Tissaphernes, treaty between, vii. 376;
defeat and death of, vii. 385.

_Chalkidians_, Thracian, iv. 22 _seq._, vi. 183, 396;
of Eubœa, successes of Athens against, iv. 170.

_Chalkidikê_, success of Timotheus in, x. 294;
three expeditions from Athens to, B. C. 349-348, xi. 334 _n._, 349;
success of Philip in, xi. 350 _seq._, 364.

_Chalkis_, iii. 164 _seq._; retirement of the Greek fleet to, on the
loss of three triremes, v. 80.

_Chalybes_, iii. 252, ix. 106 _seq._, 110.

_Champions_, select, change in Grecian opinions respecting, ii. 451.

_Chaonians_, iii. 413 _seq._

_Chaos_, i. 4;
and her offspring, i. 4.

_Chares_, assistance of, to Phlius, x. 272;
recall of, from Corinth, x. 287;
unsuccessful attempt of, to seize Corinth, x. 289;
in the Chersonese, B. C. 358, x. 379;
at Chios, xi. 374;
in the Hellespont, xi. 224;
accusation of Iphikrates and Timotheus by, xi. 226 _seq._;
and Artabazus, xi. 230;
conquest of Sestos by, xi. 258;
expedition of, to Olynthus, xi. 349;
at the battle of Chæroneia, xi. 502;
capitulation of, at Mitylênê, xii. 142.

_Charidemus_, x. 251;
and Iphikrates, x. 299;
and Timotheus, x. 300, 301;
and Kephisodotus, x. 374, 377;
and Kersobleptes, x. 376, 377;
and the Athenians in the Chersonese, B. C. 360-358, x. 377 _seq._;
and Miltokythes, x. 378;
his popularity and expedition to Thrace, xi. 307;
expedition of, to Chalkidikê, xi. 349;
put to death by Darius, xii. 108.

_Charidemus_ and Ephialtes, banishment of, xii. 46.

_Chariklês_, expedition of, to Peloponnesus, B. C. 413, vii. 288;
and Peisander, vii. 198.

_Charilaus_ and Lykurgus, ii. 344;
the Samian, iv. 249.

_Charites_, the, i. 10.

_Charitesia_, festival of, i. 128.

_Charlemagne_, legends of, i. 475.

_Charmandê_, dispute among the Cyreian forces near, ix. 35.

_Charmînus_, victory of Astyochus over, vii. 397.

_Charon_ the Theban, x. 81 _seq._

_Charondas_, iv. 417.

_Charopinus_, iv. 290.

_Cheirisophus_, ix. 80;
and Xenophon, ix. 92, 95, 106 _seq._;
at the Kentritês, ix. 99;
mission of, to Byzantium, ix. 125;
return of, from Byzantium, ix. 144;
elected sole general of the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 145;
death of, ix. 148.

_Chersonese_, Thracian, iv. 27;
connection of, with Athens under Peisistratus, iv. 117 _seq._;
attacked by the Athenians, B. C. 479, v. 201;
operations of Periklês in, vi. 10;
retirement of Alkibiadês to, B. C. 407, viii. 159;
fortification of, by Derkyllidas, ix. 218;
partial readmission of Athenians to, B. C. 365, x. 296 _seq._;
Epaminondas near, x. 301, 306;
Timotheus at, x. 302, 306, 368;
Ergophilus in the, x. 369 _seq._;
Kotys in the, x. 373;
Kephisodotus in the, x. 374;
Charidemus and the Athenians in the, x. 377 _seq._;
restoration of, to Athens, B. C. 358, x. 379, xi. 219;
Kersobleptes cedes part of, to Athens, xi. 258;
speech of Demosthenes on, xi. 451;
mission of Demosthenes to, xi. 453;
votes of thanks from, to Athens, xi. 461.

_Chians_ at Ladê, iv. 304;
activity of, in promoting revolt among the Athenian allies,
vii. 374;
expedition of, against Lesbos, vii. 382 _seq._;
improved condition of, B. C. 411, viii. 94.

_Chimæra_, the, i. 7.

_Chios_, foundation of, iii. 147;
Histiæus at, iv. 299;
an autonomous ally of Athens, vi. 2;
proceeding of Athenians at, B. C. 425, vi. 360;
application from, to Sparta, B. C. 413, vii. 365;
the Lacedæmonians persuaded by Alkibiadês to send aid to, vii. 367;
suspicions of the Athenians about, B. C. 412, vii. 368;
expedition of Chalkideus and Alkibiadês to, vii. 369 _seq._;
revolt of, from Athens, B. C. 412, vii. 371 _seq._;
expedition of Strombichidês to, vii. 374;
harassing operations of the Athenians against, B. C. 412,
vii. 385 _seq._, 391, 393;
prosperity of, between B. C. 480-412. vii. 387;
defeat of Pedaritus at, viii. 20;
removal of Mindarus from Milêtus to, viii. 101;
voyage of Mindarus from, to the Hellespont, viii. 102, 102 _n._;
revolution at, furthered by Kratesippidas, viii. 140;
escape of Eteonikus from Mitylenê to, viii. 175, 189;
Eteonikus at, viii. 211;
revolt of, from Athens, B. C. 358, xi. 220 _seq._, 231;
repulse of the Athenians at, B. C. 358, xi. 223;
acquisition of, by Memnon, xii. 105;
capture of, by Macedonian admirals, xii. 141.

_Chivalry_, romances of, i. 475 _seq._

_Chlidon_, x. 84.

_Chœrilus_, Näke’s comments on, ii. 137 _n._;
poem of, on the expedition of Xerxes into Greece, v. 39 _n._

_Choric_ training at Sparta and Krête, iv. 84 _seq._

_Choriênes_, Alexander’s capture of the rock of, xii. 214.

_Chorus_, the Greek, iv. 83;
improvements in, by Stesichorus, iv. 87.

_Chronicle_ of Turpin, the, i. 475.

_Chronological_ calculation destroys the religious character of
mythical genealogies, i. 446;
table from Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, ii. 36 _seq._;
computations, the value of, dependent on the trustworthiness of the
genealogies, ii. 41;
evidence of early poets, ii. 45.

_Chronologists_, modern, ii. 37.

_Chronologizing_ attempts indicative of mental progress, ii. 56.

_Chronology_ of mythical events, various schemes of, ii. 34 _seq._;
Alexandrine, from the return of the Herakleids to the first
Olympiad, ii. 304;
of Egyptian kings from Psammetichus to Amasis, iii. 330 _n._ 2;
Egyptian, iii. 339 _seq._;
Grecian, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, v. 304 _n._ 2;
of the period between Philip’s fortification of Elateia and the
battle of Chæroneia, xi. 494 _n._ 2.

_Chrysaor_, i. 1, 7.

_Chryseis_, i. 294.

_Chrysippus_, i. 160.

_Chrysopolis_, occupation of, by the Athenians, viii. 127.

_Cimmerian_ invasion of Asia Minor, iii. 249 _seq._

_Cimmerians_, iii. 234;
driven out of their country by the Scythians, iii. 247 _seq._

_Circê_ and Æêtês, i. 252.

_Clinton’s_ Fasti Hellenici, chronological table from, ii. 36 _seq._;
opinion on the computations of the date of the Trojan war, ii. 39;
vindication of the genealogies, ii. 42 _seq._

_Coined_ money, first introduction of, into Greece, ii. 318.

_Comedy_, growth, development, and influence of, at Athens,
viii. 325 _seq._

_Comic_ poets, before Aristophanês, viii. 327;
writers, mistaken estimate of, as witnesses and critics,
viii. 332 _seq._

_Commemorative_ influence of Grecian rites, i. 454 _seq._

_Congress_ at Corinth, B. C. 421, vii. 13-15;
at Sparta, B. C. 421, vii. 24;
at Mantinea, B. C. 419, vii. 67 _seq._

_Conón_ on the legend of Kadmus, i. 258.

_Constitutional_ forms, attachment of the Athenians to, viii. 41;
morality, necessity for creating, in the time of Kleisthenês,
iv. 159.

_Corinth_, origin of, i. 119 _seq._;
Dorians, at, ii. 9;
early distinction of, ii. 113;
isthmus of, ii. 216;
Herakleid kings of, ii. 306;
Dorian settlers at, ii. 309;
despots at, iii. 39 _seq._;
great power of, under Periander, iii. 43;
Sikyôn and Megara, analogy of, iii. 47;
voyage from, to Gadês in the seventh and sixth centuries B. C.,
iii. 277;
relations of Korkyra with, iii. 404 _seq._;
and Korkyra, joint settlements of, iii. 405 _seq._;
relations between the colonies of, iii. 407;
decision of, respecting the dispute between Thebes and Platæa,
iv. 166;
protest of, at the first convocation at Sparta, iv. 175;
Pan-Hellenic congress at the Isthmus of, v. 57 _seq._;
rush of Peloponnesians to the Isthmus of, after the battle of
Thermopylæ, v. 106;
growing hatred of, to Athens, B. C. 461, v. 320;
operations of the Athenians in the Gulf of, B. C. 455, v. 332;
and Korkyra, war between, vi. 51 _seq._;
and Athens, after the naval battle between Corinth and Korkyra,
vi. 69 _seq._;
congress at, B. C. 421, vii. 13, 15 _seq._;
and Syracuse, embassy from, to Sparta, vii. 235;
synod at, B. C. 412, vii. 368;
altered feeling of, after the capture of Athens by Lysander,
viii. 259, 264, 275;
alliance of, with Thebes, Athens, and Argos, against Sparta,
ix. 301;
anti-Spartan allies at, ix. 302;
battle of, ix. 307 _seq._, 317;
Pharnabazus and the anti-Spartan allies at, ix. 320;
philo-Laconian party at, B. C. 392, ix. 328 _seq._;
_coup d’état_ of the government at, ix. 329;
contrast between political conflicts at, and at Athens,
ix. 330 _n._ 3;
and Argos, consolidation of, B. C. 392, ix. 332;
victor of the Lacedæmonians within the Long Walls at ix. 333 _seq._;
the Long Walls of, partly pulled down by the Lacedæmonians, ix. 335;
the Long Walls of, restored by the Athenians, and taken by Agesilaus
and Teleutias, ix. 345 _seq._;
and the peace of Antalkidas, ix. 387, x. 12;
application of, to Athens, for aid against Thebes, x. 234 _seq._;
Iphikrates at, x. 237;
and the Persian rescript in favor of Thebes, x. 282;
project of the Athenians to seize, B. C. 366, x. 289;
peace of, with Thebes, B. C. 366, x. 290 _seq._;
application from Syracuse to, B. C. 344, xi. 134;
message from Hiketas to, xi. 143;
Dionysius the Younger at, xi. 151 _seq._;
reinforcement from, to Timoleon, xi. 152, 155, 157;
efforts of, to restore Syracuse, xi. 167, 168;
Philip chosen chief of the Greeks at the congress at, xi. 511;
convention at, under Alexander, B. C. 336, xii. 13 _seq._;
violations of the convention at, by Alexander, xii. 16 _seq._;
Alexander at, B. C. 335, xii. 48.

_Corinthian envoys_, speech of, to the Athenian assembly, in reply to
the Korkyræans, vi. 59;
speech of, to the Spartan assembly, against Athens, vi. 82 _seq._;
speech of, at the congress of allies at Sparta, vi. 93 _seq._

_Corinthian_ genealogy of Eumelus, i. 119 _seq._;

_Corinthian_ Gulf, naval conflicts of Corinthians and Lacedæmonians
in, ix. 326;
territory, Nikias’s expedition against, vi. 355 _seq._;
war, commencement of, ix. 301.

_Corinthians_, early commerce and enterprise of, iii. 1;
behavior of, at Salamis, v. 145;
defeated by Myronides, v. 324;
procure the refusal of the Samians’ application to Sparta for aid
against Athens, vi. 30, 50;
instigate Potidæa, the Chalkidians and Bottiæans to revolt from
Athens, vi. 65 _seq._;
defeat of, near Potidæa, vi. 73;
strive to excite war against Athens after their defeat near Potidæa,
vi. 78;
repudiate the peace of Nikias, vi. 493, vii. 2;
induce Argos to head a new Peloponnesian alliance, vii. 12;
hesitate to join Argos, vii. 16, 62;
join Argos, vii. 18;
application of, to the Bœotians and Athenians, B. C. 421, vii. 20;
and Karneia, vii. 308 _n._ 1;
and Athenians, naval battle between, near Naupaktus,
vii. 358 _seq._;
and Lacedæmonians, naval and land conflicts between, B. C. 393,
ix. 333 _seq._

_Courts_ of Requests, their analogy to Athenian dikasteries,
v. 399 _n._ 1.

_Creditor_ and debtor, law of, at Athens before Solon, iii. 95;
Roman law of, iii. 159.

_Criticisms_ on the first two volumes of this history, reply to,
i. 408 _n._

_Crœsus_ and Solon, alleged interview between, iii. 149 _seq._;
moral of Herodotus’s story about, iii. 153;
reign and conquests of, iii. 258 _seq._;
power and alliances of, iv. 182;
and Cyrus, war between, iv. 188 _seq._;
and the oracles, iv. 189, 190, 193;
solicits the alliance of Sparta, iv. 190;
fate of, impressive to the Greek mind, iv. 195.

_Cumæ_ in Campania, iii. 357 _seq._

_Cyclades_, ii. 214, iii. 163;
Themistoklês levies fines on, v. 141.

_Cycle_, epic, ii. 122 _seq._

_Cyclic_ poets, ii. 122 _seq._

_Cyclôpes_, i. 4, 5.

_Cyprus_, influence of Aphroditê upon, i. 5;
Solon’s visit to, iii. 148;
Phenicians and Greeks in, iii. 277;
extension of the Ionic revolt to, iv. 291;
subjugation of, by Phenicians and Persians, iv. 293;
conquest of, by the Turks in 1570, iv. 293 _n._;
expedition to, under Kimon, v. 335;
before and under Evagoras, x. 14 _seq._;
subjugation of, to the Persian king Ochus, xi. 437;
surrender of the princes of, to Alexander, xii. 137.

_Cyrenaica_, iv. 36 _n._ 3, 37 _n._

_Cyropædia_, Xenophon’s, iv. 183.

_Cyrus the Great_, early history and rise of, iv. 183 _seq._;
and Crœsus, war between, iv. 188 _seq._;
and the Lacedæmonians, iv. 199;
conquests of, in Asia, iv. 209;
capture of Babylon by, iv. 211 _seq._;
exploits and death of, iv. 215;
effects of his conquests upon the Persians, iv. 216 _seq._;
the tomb of, xii. 237.

_Cyrus the Younger_, arrival of, in Asia Minor, B. C. 408, viii. 135,
137;
Lysander’s visits to, at Sardis, viii. 140 _seq._, 214;
pay of the Peloponnesian fleet by, viii. 143;
and Kallikratidas, viii. 162;
entrusts his satrapy and revenues to Lysander, viii. 214;
and Artaxerxes Mnemon, viii. 312, ix. 8 _seq._;
youth and education of, ix. 5;
his esteem for the Greeks and hopes of the crown, ix. 6;
charge of Tissaphernes against, ix. 7;
strict administration and prudent behavior of, ix. 9;
forces of, collected at Sardis, ix. 11;
march of, from Sardis to Kunaxa, ix. 14 _seq._;
assistance of Epyaxa to, ix. 18;
review of his troops at Tyriæum, ix. 19;
and Syennesis, ix. 20;
at Tarsus, ix. 21 _seq._;
desertion of Xenias and Pasion from, ix. 28;
at Thapsakus, ix. 29 _seq._;
in Babylonia, ix. 35 _seq._;
speech of, to his Greek forces in Babylonia, ix. 36;
his conception of Grecian superiority, ix. 37;
his present to the prophet Silanus, ix. 40;
passes the undefended trench, ix. 41;
at Kunaxa, ix. 42 _seq._;
character of, ix. 49;
probable conduct of, towards Greece, if victorious at Kunaxa, ix. 51;
and the Asiatic Greeks, ix. 207.

_Dædalus_, i. 225, 228 _seq._

_Dæmon_ of Sokratês, viii. 408 _seq._

_Dæmons_, i. 65, 67, 70 _seq._;
and gods, distinction between, i. 425 _seq._;
admission of, as partially evil beings, i. 427.

_Damascus_, capture of, by the Macedonians, xii. 128.

_Damasithymus_ of Kalyndus, v. 135.

_Danaê_, legend of, i. 90.

_Danaos_ and the Danaides, i. 88.

_Dancing_, Greek, iv. 85.

_Daphnæus_, at Agrigentum, x. 426 _seq._;
death of, x. 444.

_Dardanus_, son of Zeus, i. 285.

_Daric_, the golden, iv. 239 _n._ 2.

_Darius Hystaspes_, accession of, iv. 224 _seq._;
discontents of the satraps under, iv. 226 _seq._;
revolt of the Medes against, iv. 227 _n._;
revolt of Babylon against, iv. 230;
organization of the Persian empire by, iv. 233 _seq._;
twenty satrapies of, iv. 235 _seq._;
organizing tendency, coinage, roads, and posts of, iv. 238 _seq._;
and Sylosôn, iv. 240;
conquering dispositions of, iv. 252;
probable consequences of an expedition by, against Greece before
going against Scythia, iv. 260 _seq._;
invasion of Scythia by, iv. 262 _seq._;
his orders to the Ionians at the bridge over the Danube, iv. 269;
return of, to Susa from Scythia, iv. 280;
revenge of, against the Athenians, iv. 297;
preparations of, for invading Greece, iv. 314;
submission of Greeks to, before the battle of Marathon, iv. 315;
heralds of, at Athens and Sparta, iv. 316;
instructions of, to Datis and Artaphernês, iv. 329;
resolution of, to invade Greece a second time, v. 1;
death of, v. 2.

_Darius_, son of Artaxerxes Mnemon, x. 367.

_Darius Codomannus_, encouragement of anti-Macedonians in Greece by,
xii. 20;
his accession and preparations for defence against Alexander,
xii. 76;
irreparable mischief of Memnon’s death to, xii. 106;
change in the plan of, after Memnon’s death, xii. 107, 109;
puts Charidemus to death, xii. 108;
Arrian’s criticism on the plan of, against Alexander, xii. 110;
at Mount Amanus, xii. 115 _seq._;
advances into Kilikia, xii. 117;
at Issus before the battle, xii. 117;
defeat of, at Issus, xii. 118 _seq._;
capture of his mother, wife, and family by Alexander, xii. 124, 153;
his correspondence with Alexander, xii. 130, 140;
inaction of, after the battle of Issus, xii. 152;
defeat of, at Arbela, xii. 155 _seq._;
a fugitive in Media, xii. 178, 180;
pursued by Alexander into Parthia, xii. 182 _seq._;
conspiracy against, by Bessus and others, xii. 183 _seq._;
death of, xii. 185;
Alexander’s disappointment in not taking him alive, xii. 186;
funeral, fate, and conduct of, xii. 186.

_Darius Nothus_, ix. 2 _seq._;
death of, ix. 6.

_Daskon_, attack of Dionysius on the Carthaginian naval station at,
x. 508.

_Datames_, x. 360.

_Datis_, siege and capture of Eretria by, iv. 330 _seq._;
conquest of Karystus by, iv. 331;
Persian armament at Samos under, iv. 329;
conquest of Naxos and other Cyclades by, iv. 330 _seq._;
forbearance of, towards Delos, iv. 330;
at Marathon, iv. 333, 345 _seq._;
return of, to Asia, after the battle of Marathon, iv. 362.

_Debtor and creditor_, law of, at Athens before Solon, iii. 95;
Roman law of, iii. 159 _seq._

_Debtors_, Solon’s relief of, iii. 99;
treatment of, according to Gallic and Teutonic codes, iii. 110 _n._

_Debts_, the obligation of, inviolable at Athens, iii. 105, 113;
distinction between the principal and interest of, in an early
society, iii. 107.

_Defence_, means of, superior to those of attack in ancient Greece,
ii. 111.

_Deianeira_, i. 151.

_Deinokrates_, xii. 406, 407, 440, 446 _seq._

_Dêïokes_, iii. 227 _seq._

_Deities_ not included in the twelve great ones, i. 10;
of guilds or trades, i. 344.

_Dekamnichus_, x. 47.

_Dekarchies_ established by Lysander, ix. 184 _seq._, 194, 197.

_Dekeleia_, legend of, 159;
fortification of, by the Lacedæmonians, vii. 286, 288, 364;
Agis at, vii. 365, viii. 150.

_Delian Apollo_, i. 45.

_Delian festival_, iii. 167 _seq._;
early splendor and subsequent decline of, iv. 54;
revival of, B. C. 426, vi. 312.

_Delium_, Hippokratês’s march to, and fortification of, B. C. 424,
vi. 382 _seq._;
battle of, B. C. 424, vi. 389 _seq._;
siege and capture of, by the Bœotians, B. C. 424, vi. 396;
Sokratês and Alkibiadês at the battle of, vi. 397.

_Dêlos_, Ionic festival at, iii. 167, _seq._, iv. 54;
forbearance of Datis towards, iv. 330;
the confederacy of, v. 263 _seq._, 290 _seq._;
the synod of, v. 301, 302;
first breach of union in the confederacy of, v. 312;
revolt of Thasos from the confederacy of, v. 315;
transfer of the fund of the confederacy from, to Athens, v. 343;
transition of the confederacy of, into an Athenian empire, v. 343;
purification of, by the Athenians, vi. 312;
restoration of the native population to, B. C. 421, vii. 23.

_Delphi_, temple and oracle of, i. 48 _seq._, ii. 253;
oracle of, and the Battiad dynasty, iv. 41;
early state and site of, iv. 59;
growth of, iv. 62;
conflagration and rebuilding of the temple at, iv. 120 _seq._;
the oracle at, worked by Kleisthenês, iv. 122;
oracle of, and Xerxes’s invasion, v. 59 _seq._;
Xerxes’s detachment against, v. 417;
proceedings of Sparta and Athens at, B. C. 452-447, v. 346;
answer of the oracle of, to the Spartans on war with Athens,
B. C. 432, vi. 92;
reply of the oracle at, about Sokratês, viii. 412 _seq._;
Agesipolis and the oracle at, ix. 357;
claim of the Phokians to the presidency of the temple at,
xi. 245 _seq._;
Philomelus seizes and fortifies the temple at, xi. 247;
Philomelus takes part of the treasures in the temple at, xi. 252;
employment of the treasures in the temple at, by Onomarchus,
xi. 255;
Phayllus despoils the temple at, xi. 297;
peculation of the treasures at, xi. 375;
miserable death of all concerned in the spoliation of the temple at,
xi. 434;
relations of the Lokrians of Amphissa with, xi. 469;
Amphiktyonic meeting at, B. C. 339, xi. 470 _seq._

_Delphian Apollo_, reply of, to the remonstrance of Crœsus, iv. 189.

_Delphians_ and Amphiktyons, attack of, upon Kirrha, xi. 474.

_Delphinium_ at Athens, iii. 78 _n._

_Deluge_ of Deukaliôn, i. 96 _seq._

_Demades_, reproof of Philip by, xi. 505;
peace of, xi. 506 _seq._;
remark of, on hearing of Alexander’s death, xii. 257;
Macedonizing policy of, xii. 278;
and Phokion, embassy of, to Antipater, xii. 322;
death of, xii. 338.

_Demagogues_, iii. 18, 21, viii. 39 _seq._

_Demaratus_ and Kleomenês, iv. 325 _seq._;
conversations of, with Xerxes, v. 40, 86, 96;
advice of, to Xerxes after the death of Leonidas, v. 96.

_Demes, Attic_, iii. 63, 66, 68; iv. 132 _seq._

_Dêmêtêr_, i. 6, 7, 10;
foreign influence on the worship of, i. 24, 25;
how represented in Homer and Hesiod, i. 37;
Homeric hymn to, i. 38 _seq._;
legends of, differing from the Homeric hymn, i. 44;
Hellenic importance of, i. 44.

_Dêmêtrius_ of Skêpsis, on Ilium, i. 328.

_Demetrius Phalereus_, administration of, at Athens, xii. 362 _seq._;
retires to Egypt, xii. 374;
condemnation of, xii. 378.

_Demetrius Poliorketes_, at Athens, xii. 373 _seq._, 382, 383 _seq._,
388;
exploits of, B. C. 307-304, xii. 381;
his successes in Greece against Kassander, xii. 382;
march of, through Thessaly into Asia, xii. 386;
return of, from Asia to Greece, xii. 388;
acquires the crown of Macedonia, xii. 389;
Greece under, xii. 389;
captivity and death of, xii. 390.

_Demiurgi_, iii. 72.

_Demochares_, xii. 378, 380, 385, 392.

_Democracies_, Grecian, securities against corruption in, vii. 402.

_Democracy_, Athenian, iii. 128, 140; v. 380;
effect of the idea of, upon the minds of the Athenians,
iv. 179 _seq._;
at Athens, stimulus to, from the Persian war, v. 275;
reconstitution of, at Samos, viii. 46 _seq._;
restoration of, at Athens, B. C. 411, viii. 75 _seq._, 80 _seq._,
and B. C. 403, viii. 288, 300;
moderation of Athenian, viii. 92, 304 _seq._;
at Samos, contrasted with the oligarchy of the Four Hundred,
viii. 93 _seq._

_Democratical_ leaders at Athens, and the Thirty, viii. 240,
245 _seq._;
sentiment, increase of, at Athens, between B. C. 479-459, v. 355.

_Dêmokêdês_, romantic history of, iv. 253 _seq._

_Demônax_, reform of Kyrênê by, iv. 44;
constitution of, not durable, iv. 49.

_Demophantus_, psephism of, viii. 80.

_Demos_ at Syracuse, v. 206.

_Demosthenês the general_, in Akarnania, vi. 296;
expedition of, against Ætolia, vi. 296 _seq._;
saves Naupaktus, vi. 301;
goes to protect Amphilochian Argos, vi. 302;
his victory over Eurylochus at Olpæ, vi. 304 _seq._;
his triumphant return from Akarnania to Athens, vi. 312;
fortifies and defends Pylus, vi. 317 _seq._;
application of, for reinforcements from Athens, to attack
Sphakteria, vi. 334 _seq._;
victory of, in Sphakteria, vi. 341 _seq._;
attempt of, to surprise Megara and Nisæ, vi. 372 _seq._;
scheme of, for invading Bœotia, B. C. 424, vi. 379;
unsuccessful descent upon Bœotia by, vi. 380;
his evacuation of the fort at Epidaurus, vii. 97;
expedition of, to Sicily, vii. 289, 298, 303;
arrival of, at Syracuse, vii. 302, 304;
plans of, on arriving at Syracuse, vii. 306;
night attack of, upon Epipolæ, vii. 306 _seq._;
his proposals for removing from Syracuse, vii. 308 _seq._;
and Nikias, resolution of, after the final defeat in the harbor of
Syracuse, vii. 338;
capture and subsequent treatment of, vii. 341 _seq._, 347;
respect for the memory of, vii. 348;
death of, vii. 347.

_Demosthenes_, father of the orator, xi. 265.

_Demosthenes the orator_, first appearance of, as public adviser in
the Athenian assembly, xi. 263;
parentage and early youth of, xi. 263 _seq._;
and his guardians, xi. 265;
early rhetorical tendencies of, xi. 266;
training and instructors of, xi. 268 _seq._;
action and matter of, xi. 271;
first known as a composer of speeches for others, xi. 272;
speech of, against Leptines, xi. 272;
speech of, on the Symmories, xi. 285 _seq._;
exhortations of, to personal effort and sacrifice, xi. 289, 357;
recommendations of, on Sparta and Megalopolis, xi. 291;
first Philippic of, xi. 309 _seq._;
opponents of, at Athens, B. C. 351, xi. 318;
earliest Olynthiac of, xi. 327 _seq._;
practical effect of his speeches, xi. 329;
second Olynthiac of, xi. 331 _seq._;
allusions of, to the Theôric fund, xi. 334, 338;
third Olynthiac of, xi. 335 _seq._, 336;
insulted by Meidias, xi. 343;
reproached for his absence from the battle of Tamynæ, xi. 344;
serves as hoplite in Eubœa, and is chosen senator for,
B. C. 349-348, xi. 345;
order of the Olynthiacs of, xi. 358 _seq._;
and Æschines, on the negotiations with Philip, B. C. 347-346,
xi. 371 _n._, 378 _n._;
speaks in favor of peace, B. C. 347, xi. 372;
and the first embassy from Athens to Philip, xi. 380 _seq._, 386;
failure of, in his speech before Philip, xi. 382;
and the confederate synod at Athens respecting Philip, xi. 389 _n._,
390, 392 _n._ 3;
and the motion of Philokratês for peace and alliance with Philip,
xi. 391 _seq._;
and the exclusion of the Phokians from the peace and alliance
between Athens and Philip, xi. 400 _seq._;
and the second embassy from Athens to Philip, xi. 403, 405 _seq._,
412, 415;
and the third embassy from Athens to Philip, xi. 422;
charges of, against Æschines, xi. 431;
and the peace and alliance of Athens with Philip, B. C. 346,
xi. 432;
recommends acquiescence in the Amphiktyonic dignity of Philip,
xi. 435;
vigilance and warnings of, against Philip, after B. C. 246, xi. 444;
speech on the Chersonese and third Philippic of, xi. 451;
increased influence of, at Athens, B. C. 341-338, xi. 452;
mission of, to the Chersonese and, Byzantium, xi. 453;
vote of thanks to, at Athens, xi. 461;
reform in the administration of the Athenian marine by,
xi. 462 _seq._, 464 _n._;
his opposition to the proceedings of Æschines at the Amphiktyonic
meeting, B. C. 339, xi. 478;
on the special Amphiktyonic meeting at Thermopylæ, xi. 479;
advice of, on hearing of the fortification of Elateia by Philip,
xi. 486;
mission of, to Thebes, B. C. 339, xi. 488 _seq._;
crowned at Athens, xi. 493, 496;
at the battle of Chæroneia, xi. 498 _seq._, 501;
confidence shown to, after the battle of Chæroneia, xi. 503, 509;
conduct of, on the death of Philip, xii. 10;
correspondence of, with Persia, xii. 20 _seq._;
accusation against, respecting the revolt of Thebes against
Alexander, xii. 34;
position and policy of, in Alexander’s time, xii. 278 _seq._;
and Æschines, judicial contest between, xii. 286 _seq._;
accusation against, in the affair of Harpalus, xii. 294 _seq._;
recall of, from exile, xii. 314;
flight of, to Kalauria, xii. 322;
condemnation and death of, xii. 326 _seq._;
life and character of, xii. 328 _seq._

_Derdas_ at Olynthus, x. 65.

_Derkyllidas_, in Asia, ix. 209 _seq._, 219 _seq._, 255;
at Abydos and Sestos, ix. 320;
superseded by Anaxibius at Abydos, ix. 368.

_Despots_, in Greece, iii. 4, 18 _seq._;
at Sikyôn, iii. _seq._, 39;
at Corinth, iii. 41 _seq._;
of Asiatic Greece, deposition of, by Aristagoras, iv. 285;
Sicilian, v. 206, 233.

_Deukaliôn_, i. 96 _seq._

_Dexippus_, ix. 126, 149 _seq._; x. 423, 429, 444.

_Diadochi_, Asia Hellenized by, xii. 269.

_Diagoras_, prosecution of, vii. 208.

_Dialectics_, Grecian, iv. 87; viii. 338, 345 _seq._, 454 _seq._

_Dictators_ in Greece, iii. 19.

_Dido_, legend of, iii. 347.

_Digamma_ and the Homeric poems, ii. 147.

_Diitrephês_, vii. 356 _seq._

_Dikæus_, vision of, v. 118.

_Dikasteries_, not established by Solon, iii. 125;
Athenian, iv. 140 _seq._, v. 378 _seq._, 385, 393;
constitution of, by Periklês, v. 355 _seq._, 366;
working of, at Athens, v. 381 _seq._;
at Rhodes and other Grecian cities, v. 384 _n._ 2;
jurisdiction of, over the subject-allies of Athens, vi. 39 _seq._,
42, 43, 45.

_Dikasts_, oath of, at Athens, iii. 105, viii. 298;
Athenian iv. 141, 372;
under Periklês, v. 357, 366, 376 _seq._, 388.

_Dikon_ of Kaulonia, xi. 28.

_Dimnus_, xii. 191, 194.

_Diodôrus_, his historical versions of mythes, i. 413;
statement of, respecting the generals at Arginusæ, viii. 184.

_Diodotus_, speech of, vi. 254 _seq._

_Diogenes_ and Alexander, xii. 48.

_Diokleidês_, vii. 198, 204.

_Dioklês the Corinthian_, ii. 297.

_Dioklês the Syracusan_, the laws of, x. 389 _seq._;
aid to Himera under, x. 410, 412;
banishment of, x. 417.

_Dio Chrysostom’s_ attempt to historicise the legend of Troy, i. 321.

_Dio Chrysostom_ at Olbia, xii. 477 _seq._

_Diomêdês_, return of, from Troy, i. 316.

_Diomedon_, pursuit of Chians by, vii. 375;
at Teos and Lesbos, vii. 383;
at Milêtus and Chios, vii. 385 _seq._;
at Samos, viii. 28;
defeat of, by Kallikratidas, viii. 169.

_Dion_, his Dionysian connection, and character, xi. 58;
Plato, and the Pythagoreans, xi. 56 _seq._;
political views of, xi. 58 _seq._;
maintains the confidence of Dionysius the Elder to the last, xi. 61;
his visits to Peloponnesus and Athens, xi. 61;
conduct of, on the accession of Dionysius the Younger,
xi. 64 _seq._;
efforts of, to improve Dionysius the Younger, xi. 64 _seq._;
entreats Plato to visit Dionysius the Younger, xi. 69;
and Plato urge Dionysius the Younger to reform himself, xi. 73;
and Plato, intrigues of Philistus against, xi. 76;
alienation of Dionysius the Younger from, xi. 77;
banishment of, xi. 78;
property of, confiscated by Dionysius the Younger, xi. 82;
resolution of, to avenge himself on Dionysius the Younger, and free
Syracuse, xi. 82 _seq._, 85;
forces of, at Zakynthus, xi. 84, 87;
expedition of, against Dionysius the Younger, xi. 85 _seq._;
entry of, into Syracuse, B. C. 357, xi. 92 _seq._;
chosen general by the Syracusans, xi. 94;
captures Epipolæ and Euryalus, xi. 95;
blockade of Ortygia by, xi. 95, 98, 114;
negotiations of Dionysius the Younger with, xi. 97, 104;
victory of, over Dionysius the Younger, xi. 97 _seq._;
intrigues of Dionysius the Younger against, xi. 103;
suspicions of the Syracusans against, xi. 100, 193, 118;
and Herakleides, xi. 101, 103, 112, 115 _seq._, 121, 122;
deposition and retreat of, from Syracuse, xi. 105;
at Leontini, xi. 106, 108, 109;
repulse of Nepsius and rescue of Syracuse by, xi. 108 _seq._;
entry of, into Syracuse, B. C. 356, xi. 110;
entry of, into Ortygia, xi. 117;
conduct of, on his final triumph, xi. 118 _seq._;
his omission to grant freedom to Syracuse, xi. 119 _seq._;
opposition to, as dictator, xi. 121 _seq._;
tyranny, unpopularity and disquietude of, xi. 122 _seq._;
death and character of, xi. 123 _seq._;
and Timoleon, contrast between, xi. 195 _seq._

_Dionysia_, Attic, i. 31, iv. 69.

_Dionysiac_ festival at Athens, B. C. 349, xi. 343.

_Dionysius, Phôkæan_, iv. 305 _seq._, 309.

_Dionysius the Elder_, and Konon, ix. 325;
demonstration against, at Olympia, B. C. 384, x. 73 _seq._,
xi. 27 _seq._;
triremes of, captured by Iphikrates, x. 151;
first appearance of, at Syracuse, x. 420;
movement of the Hermokratean party to elevate, x. 432;
harangue of, against the Syracusan generals at Agrigentum,
x. 433 _seq._;
one of the generals of Syracuse, x. 434 _seq._;
first expedition of, to Gela, x. 438;
accusations of, against his colleagues, x. 439;
election of, as sole general, x. 440;
stratagem of, to obtain a body-guard, x. 441 _seq._;
establishes himself as despot at Syracuse, x. 444 _seq._, 454;
second expedition of, to Gela, x. 447 _seq._;
charges of treachery against, x. 451, 456;
mutiny of the Syracusan horsemen against, x. 451 _seq._;
and Imilkon, peace between, x. 455 _seq._;
sympathy of Sparta with, x. 457;
strong position of, after his peace with Imilkon, x. 457;
fortification and occupation of Ortygia by, x. 458 _seq._;
re-distribution of property by, x. 459 _seq._;
exorbitant exactions of, x. 461;
mutiny of the Syracusan soldiers against, x. 462 _seq._;
besieged in Ortygia, x. 462 _seq._;
strengthens his despotism, x. 466 _seq._;
conquers Ætna, Naxus, Katana, and Leontini, x. 467;
at Enna, x. 468;
resolution of, to make war upon Carthage, B. C. 400, x. 469;
additional fortifications at Syracuse by, x. 471 _seq._;
preparations of, for war with Carthage, B. C. 399-397, x. 473,
477 _seq._;
improved behavior of, to the Syracusans, B. C. 399, x. 473;
conciliatory policy of, towards the Greek cities, near the Strait
of Messênê, B. C. 399, x. 474 _seq._;
marriage of, with Doris and Aristomachê, x. 476, 480;
exhorts the Syracusan assembly to war against Carthage, x. 481;
permits the plunder of the Carthaginians at Syracuse, x. 482;
declares war against Carthage, B. C. 397, x. 483;
marches against the Carthaginians in Sicily, B. C. 397,
x. 483 _seq._;
siege and capture of Motyê by, x. 485 _seq._;
revolt of the Sikels from, x. 494;
provisions of, for the defence of Syracuse against the Carthaginians
B. C. 396, x. 494;
naval defeat of, near Katana, x. 495;
retreat of, from Katana to Syracuse, B. C. 395, x. 497;
Syracusan naval victory over the Carthaginians in the absence of,
x. 501;
speech of Theôdorus against, x. 501 _seq._;
discontent of the Syracusans with, B. C. 395, x. 501 _seq._;
and Pharakidas, x. 504;
attacks the Carthaginian camp before Syracuse and sacrifices his
mercenaries, x. 507;
success of, by sea and land against the Carthaginians before
Syracuse, x. 508;
secret treaty of, with Imilkon before Syracuse, x. 510;
and the Iberians, x. 510;
capture of Libyans by, x. 510;
difficulties of, from his mercenaries, xi. 2;
re-establishment of Messênê by, xi. 3;
conquests of, in the interior of Sicily, B. C., 394, xi. 4;
at Tauromenium, xi. 5, 8;
and the Sikels, B. C. 394-393, xi. 5, 6;
declaration of Agrigentum against, B. C. 393, xi. 6;
victory of, near Abakæna, xi. 6;
expedition of, against Rhegium, B. C. 393, xi. 7;
repulses Magon at Agyrium, xi. 7;
plans of against the Greek cities in southern Italy, xi. 8;
alliance of, with the Lucanians against the Italiot Greeks, xi. 11;
attack of, upon Rhegium, B. C. 390, xi. 11;
expedition of, against the Italian Greeks, B. C. 389, xi. 14 _seq._;
his capture and generous treatment of Italiot Greeks, xi. 15;
besieges and grants peace to Rhegium, xi. 16;
capture of Kaulonia and Hipponium by, xi. 7;
capture of Rhegium by, xi. 7, 18, 21;
cruelty of, to Phyton, xi. 19;
and Sparta, ascendancy of, B. C. 387, xi. 22;
capture of Kroton, by xi. 23;
schemes of for conquests in Epirus and Illyria, xi. 23;
plunders Latium, Etruria, and the temple of Agylla, xi. 25;
poetical compositions of, xi. 26;
dislike and dread of, in Greece, xi. 25, 30;
harshness of, to Plato, xi. 39;
new constructions and improvements by, at Syracuse, B. C. 387-383,
xi. 39;
renews the war wish Carthage, B. C. 383, xi. 41 _seq._;
disadvantageous peace of, with Carthage, B. C. 383, xi. 42;
projected wall of, across the Calabrian peninsula, xi. 43;
relations of, with Central Greece, B. C. 382-369, xi. 44;
war of, with Carthage, B. C. 368, xi. 44;
gains the tragedy prize at the Lenæan festival at Athens, xi. 46;
death and character of, xi. 46 _seq._, 62;
family left by, xi. 54, 62;
the good opinion of, enjoyed by Dion to the last, xi. 61;
drunken habits of his descendants, xi. 132.

_Dionysius the Younger_, age of, at his father’s death, xi. 55 _n._ 1;
accession and character of, xi. 63;
Dion’s efforts to improve, xi. 67 _seq._;
Plato’s visits to, xi. 69 _seq._, 80 _seq._;
Plato’s injudicious treatment of, xi. 73 _seq._;
his hatred and injuries to Dion, xi. 77, 78, 81 _seq._;
detention of Plato by, xi. 79;
Dion’s expedition against, xi. 85 _seq._;
weakness and drunken habits of, xi. 87;
absence of, from Syracuse, B. C. 357, xi. 89;
negotiations of, with Dion and the Syracusans, xi. 96, 104;
defeat of, by Dion, xi. 97 _seq._;
blockaded in Ortygia by Dion, xi. 98;
intrigues of, against Dion, xi. 101, 103;
his flight in Lokri, xi. 104;
return of, to Syracuse, xi. 133;
at Lokri, xi. 133;
his surrender of Ortygia to Timoleon, xi. 150;
at Corinth, xi. 151 _seq._

_Dionysius_ of the Pontic Herakleia, xii. 465 _seq._

_Dionysus_, worship of, i. 23, 24, 30, 33;
legend of, in the Homeric hymn to, i. 34;
alteration of the primitive Grecian idea of, i. 36 _seq._

_Diopeithes_, xi. 450.

_Dioskuri_, i. 172.

_Diphilus_ at Naupaktus, B. C. 413, vii. 358.

_Diphridas_, in Asia, ix. 363.

_Dirkê_, i. 263.

_Discussion_, growth of, among the Greeks, iv. 96.

_Dithyramb_, iv. 88.

_Dôdôna_, i. 396.

_Doloneia_, ii. 178, 189.

_Dolonkians_ and Miltiadês the first, iv. 117.

_Dorian cities_ in Peloponnesus about 450 B. C., ii. 298;
islands in the Ægean and the Dorians in Argolis, ii. 323;
immigration to Peloponnesus, ii. 303;
settlers at Argos and Corinth, ii. 308 _seq._, 311;
settlement in Sparta, ii. 328;
allotment of land at Sparta, ii. 416;
mode, the, ii. 433, iii. 212;
states, inhabitants of, iii. 31;
tribes at Sikyôn, names of, iii. 32, 35.

_Dorians_, early accounts of, 103 _seq._; ii. 2;
mythical title of, to the Peloponnesus, ii. 6;
their occupation of Argos, Sparta, Messenia, and Corinth, ii. 8, 9;
early Krêtan, ii. 310;
in Argolis and the Dorian islands in the Ægean, ii. 323;
of Sparta and Stenyklêrus, ii. 326 _seq._;
divided into three tribes, ii. 361;
Messenian, ii. 438;
Asiatic, iii. 201, 202;
of Ægina, iv. 172.

_Doric_ dialect, ii. 337 _seq._, iv. 87;
emigrations, ii. 25 _seq._

_Dorieus the Spartan Prince_, aid of, to Kinyps, iv. 39;
and the Krotoniates, iv. 415, 416;
Sicily, v. 207.

_Dorieus the Rhodian_, vii. 394, viii. 116, 117;
capture and liberation of, viii. 159;
treatment of, by the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, ix. 273 _seq._;
and Hermokrates in the Ægean, x. 385.

_Doris_, i. 102, ii. 289.

_Doris_, wife of Dionysius, x. 476, 480.

_Doriskus_, Xerxes at, v. 31 _seq._

_Dorkis_, v. 256, 257.

_Dôrus_, i. 99 _seq._

_Drako_ and his laws, iii. 73 _seq._

_Dramatic_ genius, development of, at Athens, viii. 317 _seq._

_Drangiana_, Alexander in, xii. 190 _seq._, 191.

_Drepanê_, i. 239.

_Dryopians_, settlements of, formed by sea, ii. 310.

_Dryopis_, ii. 289.

_Duketius_, the Sikel prince, iii. 374, vii. 122 _seq._

_Dymanes_, Hylleis, and Pamphyli, ii. 360.

_Dyrrachium_, iii. 407 _seq._

_Earliest Greeks_, residences of, ii. 108 _seq._

_Early poets_, historical value of, ii. 45.

_Echemus_, i. 95, 177.

_Echidna_, i. 7.

_Eclipse_ of the sun in a battle between Medes and Lydians, iii. 231;
of the moon, B. C. 413, vii. 315;
of the moon, B. C. 333, xii. 151.

_Edda_, the, i. 479.

_Edessa_, the dynasty of, iv. 13, 17.

_Eetioneia_, fort at, viii. 57, 63; viii. 67.

_Egesta_, application of, to Athens, vii. 145 _seq._;
application of, to Carthage, x. 401 _seq._;
Syracusan attack upon, x. 489;
barbarities of Agathokles at, xii. 445.

_Egypt_, influence of, upon the religion of Greece, i. 24, 29, 31;
the opening of, to Grecian commerce, i. 365;
ante-Hellenic colonies from, to Greece not probable, ii. 267;
Solon’s visit to, iii. 148;
Herodotus’s account of, iii. 308 _seq._;
antiquity of, iii. 311;
peculiar physical and moral features of, iii. 311;
large town-population in, iii. 319;
profound submission of the people in, iii. 320, 321;
worship of animals in, iii. 322;
relations of, with Assyria, iii. 324;
archæology and chronology of, iii. 339 _seq._;
and Kyrênê, iv. 42;
Persian expedition from, against Barka, iv. 49;
Kambyses’s invasion and conquest of, iv. 219;
revolt and reconquest of, under Xerxes, v. 3;
defeat and losses of the Athenians in, v. 333;
unavailing efforts of Persia to reconquer, x. 13;
Agesilaus and Chabrias in, x. 362 _seq._;
reconquest of, by Ochus, xi. 439;
march of Alexander towards, xii. 141, 142, 145;
Alexander in, xii. 146 _seq._

_Egyptians_, ethnography of, iii. 264;
contrasted with Greeks, Phenicians, and Assyrians, iii. 304;
and Ethiopians, iii. 313;
effect of, on the Greek mind, iii. 343.

_Eileithyia_, i. 10.

_Eion_, capture of, by Kimon, v. 295 _seq._;
defended by Thucydidês against Brasidas, vi. 411;
Kleon at, vi. 471.

_Ekbatana_, foundation of, iii. 228;
Darius at, xii. 180;
Alexander at, xii. 181 _seq._, 246 _seq._;
Parmenio at, xii. 181, 196 _seq._

_Ekdikus_, expedition of, to Rhodes, ix. 363.

_Ekklesia_, Athenian, iv. 139.

_Elæa_, iii. 191.

_Elæus_, escape of the Athenian squadron from Sestos to, viii. 106;
Mindarus and Thrasyllus at, viii. 109, 113.

_Elateia_, re-fortification of, by Philip, xi. 483.

_Elatus_, i. 178.

_Elea_, Phôkæan colony at, iv. 206; vii. 127.

_Eleatic_ school, viii. 343 _seq._, 369.

_Elegiac_ verse of Kallinus, Tyrtæus, and Mimnermus, iv. 78.

_Eleian_ genealogy, i. 138, 141.

_Eleians_ excluded from the Isthmian games, i. 140;
and the Olympic games, ii. 10, 321;
and Pisatans, ii. 434, 439;
their exclusion of the Lacedæmonians from the Olympic festival,
vii. 57 _seq._;
desert the Argeian allies, vii. 76;
and Arcadians, X. 314 _seq._, 324;
exclusion of, from the Olympic festival, B. C. 364, x. 318 _seq._

_Elektra_ and Thaumas, progeny of, i. 7.

_Elektryôn_, death of, i. 92.

_Eleusinian_ mysteries, i. 38, 41, 43;
alleged profanation of, by Alkibiadês and others, vii. 175 _seq._,
211 _seq._;
celebration of, protected by Alkibiades, viii. 150.

_Eleusinians_, seizure and execution of by the Thirty at Athens,
viii. 267.

_Eleusis_, temple of, i. 40;
importance of mysteries to, i. 43;
early independence of, iii. 71;
retirement of the Thirty to, viii. 266;
capture of, viii. 274.

_Eleutheria_, institution of, at Platæa, v. 189.

_Elis_, genealogy of, i. 137, 139;
Oxylus and the Ætolians at, ii. 9;
Pisa, Triphylia, and Lepreum, ii. 39, 440;
formation of the city of, v. 315;
revolt of, from Sparta to Argos, vii. 18 _seq._;
and Lepreum, vii. 18;
and Sparta, war between, ix. 224 _seq._;
claim of, to Triphylia and the Pisatid, x. 260 _seq._, 313;
alienation of, from the Arcadians, x. 260;
alliance of, with Sparta and Achaia, x. 313.

_Elymi_, iii. 349.

_Emigrants_ to Iônia, the, ii. 21 _seq._

_Emigration_, early, from Greece, iii. 349.

_Emigrations_ consequent on the Dorian occupation of the Peloponnesus,
ii. 12;
Æolic, Ionic, and Doric, ii. 19 _seq._

_Empedoklês_, i. 424 _seq._, vii. 127, viii. 340.

_Emporiæ_, xii. 455.

_Endius_, viii. 122 _seq._

_Endymiôn_, stories of, i. 137.

_Eneti_, the, i. 319.

_England_, her government of her dependencies compared with the
Athenian empire, vi. 48 _n._

_Eniênes_, ii. 286.

_Enna_, Dionysius at, x. 468.

_Ennea Hodoi_, v. 310, vi. 12.

_Enômoties_, ii. 456 _seq._

_Entella_, Syracusan attack upon, x. 490, 497.

_Eos_, i. 6.

_Epaminondas_, and the conspiracy against the philo-Laconian oligarchy
at Thebes, x. 81, 87, 124 _seq._;
training and character of, x. 121 _seq._;
and Pelopidas, x. 121;
and Kallistratus, x. 164, 288;
and Agesilaus at the congress at Sparta, x. 167 _seq._, 173;
at Leuktra, x. 179;
and Orchomenus, x. 194;
proceedings and views of, after the battle of Leuktra,
x. 213 _seq._;
expeditions of, into Peloponnesus, x. 215 _seq._, x. 254 _seq._,
266 _seq._, 343 _seq._;
foundation of Megalopolis and Messênê by, x. 224 _seq._;
his retirement from Peloponnesus, x. 233;
his trial of accountability, x. 239 _seq._;
mildness of, x. 259;
and the Theban expedition to Thessaly, to rescue Pelopidas, x. 283,
285;
mission of, to Arcadia, x. 288;
Theban fleet and naval expedition under, x. 303 _seq._;
and Menekleidas, x. 268, 304 _seq._;
and the destruction of Orchomenus, x. 312;
and the arrest of Arcadians by the Theban harmost at Tegea,
x. 326 _seq._;
attempted surprise of Mantinea by the cavalry of, x. 332 _seq._;
at the battle of Mantinea, x. 335 _seq._;
death of, x. 346 _seq._, character of, x. 351 _seq._

_Epeians_, i. 138, 141 _seq._, ii. 12.

_Epeius_ of Panopeus, i. 302, 312.

_Epeunaktæ_, iii. 387.

_Ephesus_, iii. 180 _seq._;
capture of, by Crœsus, iii. 260;
defeat of Thrasyllus at, viii. 129;
Lysander at, viii. 152, 215;
capture of, by Alexander, xii. 90.

_Ephetæ_, iii. 77, 79 _seq._

_Ephialtês, the Alôid_, i. 136.

_Ephialtês, the general_, xii. 46, 95, 97.

_Ephialtês, the statesman_, v. 366, 372;
and Periklês, constitution of dikasteries by, v. 357 _seq._;
judicial reform of, v. 368.

_Ephors_, Spartan, ii. 350, 352 _seq._, 358, vii. 24;
appointment of, at Athens, viii. 236.

_Ephorus_, i. 409, ii. 369.

_Epic cycle_, ii. 122 _seq._

_Epic poems_, lost, ii. 121;
recited in public, not read in private, ii. 135;
variations in the mode of reciting, ii. 141 _seq._;
long, besides the Iliad and Odyssey, ii. 156.

_Epic poetry_ in early Greece, ii. 118 _seq._

_Epic poets_ and their dates, ii. 122.

_Epic_ of the middle ages, i. 481.

_Epical_ localities, transposition of, i. 245;
age preceding the lyrical, iv. 74.

_Epicharmus_, i. 376 _n._

_Epidamnus_, iii. 407 _seq._;
and the Illyrians, iv. 6 _seq._;
foundation of, vi. 51;
application of the democracy at, to Korkyra and Corinth, vi. 52;
attacked by the Korkyræans, vi. 53;
expeditions from Corinth to, vi. 53.

_Epidaurus_, attack of Argos and Athens upon, vii. 64, 68;
ravaged by the Argeians, vii. 69;
Lacedæmonian movements in support of, vii. 69;
attempts of the Argeians to storm, vii. 70;
operations of the Argeian allies near, vii. 90;
evacuation of the fort at, vii. 97.

_Epigoni_, the, i. 278, ii. 130 _n._ 2.

_Epimenides_, visit of, to Athens, i. 28.

_Epimenides of Krete_, iii. 87 _seq._

_Epimêtheus_, i. 6, 74.

_Epipolæ_, vii. 245;
intended occupation of, by the Syracusans, vii. 247;
occupation of, by the Athenians, vii. 247;
defeat of the Athenians at, vii. 272;
Demosthenês’s night-attack upon, vii. 305 _seq._;
capture of by Dion, xi. 95;
capture of, by Timoleon, xi. 160.

_Epirots_, ii. 233, iii. 351, 413 _seq._;
attack of, upon Akarnania, vi. 193 _seq._

_Epirus_, discouraging to Grecian colonization, iii. 417;
Dionysius’s schemes of conquest in, xi. 23;
government of Olympias in, xii. 394, 395 _n._ 2.

_Epistatês_, iv. 138.

_Epitadas_, vi. 334, 345 _seq._, 342.

_Epitadeus_, the Ephor, ii. 406.

_Epôdus_, introduction of, iv. 89.

_Epyaxa_, and Cyrus the Younger, ix. 18.

_Eræ_, revolt of, from Athens, vii. 375.

_Erasinides_, trial and imprisonment of, viii. 180.

_Eratosthenês_, viii. 248, 272, 292.

_Erechtheion_, restoration of, vi. 21.

_Erechtheus_, i. 191 _seq._, 198, 204.

_Eresus_, Thrasyllus at, viii. 101.

_Eretria_, iii. 164 _seq._, 170 _seq._;
assistance of, to the Milesians, iv. 290;
siege and capture of, by Datis, iv. 331 _seq._;
fate of captives taken by Datis at, iv. 362;
naval defeat of the Athenians near viii. 71 _seq._;
Phokion at, xi. 339 _seq._;
Philippizing faction at, xi. 449;
liberation of, xi. 452.

_Ergoklês_, ix. 368 _n._ 1.

_Ergophilus_, x. 369 _seq._

_Erichthonius_, i. 192, 196, 285.

_Eriphylê_, i. 272 _seq._

_Erôs_, i. 4;
and Aphrodite, function of, i. 5.

_Erytheia_, i. 249.

_Erythræ_, iii. 187, vii. 371.

_Eryx_, defeat of Dionysius at, xi. 46.

_Eryxô_ and Learchus, iv. 43.

_Eteokles_, i. 128, 267, 280.

_Eteonikus_, expulsion of, from Thasos, viii. 127;
at Mitylênê, viii. 170;
escape of, from Mitylênê to Chios, viii. 174, 190;
at Chios, viii. 211;
removal of, from Chios to Ephesus, viii. 213;
in Ægina, ix. 372, 375.

_Ethiopians_ and Egyptians, iii. 313.

_Etruria_, plunder of, by Dionysius, xi. 25.

_Euæphnus_ and Polycharês, ii. 426.

_Eubœa_, iii. 163 _seq._;
resolution of Greeks to oppose Xerxes at the strait on the north of,
v. 71;
advance of the Persian fleet to, v. 102;
revolt and reconquest of, by Periklês, v. 349;
application from, to Agis, vii. 364;
revolt of, from Athens, B. C. 411, viii. 73;
Peloponnesian fleet summoned from, by Mindarus, viii. 111;
bridge joining Bœotia and, viii. 112, 118;
rescued from Thebes by Athens, B. C. 358, xi. 216 _seq._;
revolt of, from Athens, B. C. 350-349, xi. 339 _seq._;
intrigues of Philip in, xi. 339;
expedition of Phokion to, B. C. 342, xi. 340 _seq._;
hostilities in, B. C. 349-348, xi. 345;
Philippizing factions in, B. C. 342, xi. 449;
expedition of Phokion to, B. C. 341, xi. 452.

_Eubœa in Sicily_, v. 215.

_Euboic scale_, ii. 319, 324, iii. 171.

_Euboic synod_, xi. 453.

_Eubulus_, xi. 277, 308, 366, 368, 394.

_Eudamidas_, x. 58, 65.

_Euemerus’s_ treatment of mythes, i. 411.

_Euenus_, i. 112.

_Eukleides_, archonship of, viii. 280, 309.

_Eukles_, vi. 407, 409, 413 _seq._

_Eumachus_, xii. 438, 439.

_Eumelus of Bosporus_, xii. 481 _seq._

_Eumelus the poet_, i. 120 _seq._

_Eumenes_, xii. 74;
and Hephæstion, xii. 246;
and Perdikkas, xii. 320;
victory of, over Kraterus and Neoptolemus, xii. 336 _seq._;
attempts of, to uphold Alexander’s dynasty in Asia, xii. 340 _seq._;
and Antigonus, xii. 337.

_Eumenides_, Æschylus’s, and the Areopagus, iii. 80 _n._

_Eumolpus_, i. 202 _seq._

_Eunomus_, ix. 374.

_Eupatridæ_, iii. 72 _seq._

_Euphaes_, ii. 426.

_Euphemus_, speech of, at Kamarina, vii. 231.

_Euphiletus_ and Melêtus, vii. 204.

_Euphræus_, xi. 206, 448.

_Euphrates_, Cyrus the Younger at, ix. 31;
the Ten Thousand Greeks at, ix. 103;
Alexander at, xii. 150, 250.

_Euphron_, x. 269 _seq._

_Euripides_, faults imputed to, i. 389 _seq._;
story about the dramas of, and the Athenian prisoners in Sicily,
vii. 346;
number of tragedies by, viii. 319 _n._;
Æschylus and Sophokles, viii. 322 _seq._;
and Dekamnichus, x. 47.

_Euripides_, financial proposal of, ix. 380 _n._

_Euripus_, bridge across, viii. 112, 118.

_Eurôpa_, i. 218 _seq._, 527.

_Eurotas_, crossed by Epaminondas, x. 218.

_Euryalus_, Hamilkar’s attempt on, xii. 423.

_Eurybatês_, v. 49.

_Eurybiades_, v. 75, 120 _seq._

_Eurydike_, widow of Amyntas, x. 250.

_Eurydike_, granddaughter of Philip, xii. 333, 334, 337.

_Euryleon_, v. 207.

_Eurylochus_, vi. 301, 302, 304, 305.

_Eurymedon_, victories of the, v. 308.

_Eurymedon_ at Korkyra, vi. 274 _seq._;
and Sophokles, expedition of, to Korkyra and Sicily, vi. 316 _seq._,
360 _seq._;
at Pylus, vi. 322 _seq._, 333;
expeditions of, to Sicily, vii. 133, 136, 287;
return of, from Sicily to Athens, vii. 139.

_Eurynomê_ and Zeus, offspring of, i. 10.

_Euryptolemus_, viii. 177 _n._, 184, 197, 200 _seq._

_Eurypylus_, i. 301.

_Eurystheus_, i. 91, 92, 93, 94.

_Eurytos_, i. 139, 151.

_Eurytus_, v. 94.

_Eutæa_, Agesilaus at, B. C. 370, x. 211.

_Euthydemus_, Plato’s, viii. 392 _n._

_Euthykrates_ and Lasthenes, xi. 351, 352.

_Euxine_, Greek settlements on, iii. 236; iv. 27, ix. 121;
first sight of, by the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 111;
indigenous tribes on, ix. 122;
the Greeks on, and the Ten Thousand, ix. 123 _seq._;
Xenophon’s idea of founding a new city on the, ix. 132 _seq._

_Evadnê_, i. 278.

_Evagoras_, ix. 364, 374, x. 14 _seq._

_Family_ tie, in legendary Greece, ii. 83;
rites in Greece, iii. 51.

_Fates_, i. 7;
and Crœsus, iv. 195 _seq._

_Ferdousi_, Persian epic of, i. 641.

_Festivals_, Grecian, i. 51, ii. 228, iv. 53, 67 _seq._, 71 _seq._;
at Athens, viii. 324.

_Fiction_, plausible, i. 435; ii. 51.

_Fictitious_ matter in Greek tradition, i. 433.

_Financial changes_, Kleisthenean, iv. 137.

_Five Thousand_, the, at Athens, viii. 31, 54 _n._, 61, 75 _n._ 1,
78 _seq._

_Flaying alive_ by Persians and Turks, iv. 293 _n._ 2.

_Fleece, Golden_, legend of, i. 123.

_Flute_, use of, in Sparta, iv. 87.

_Fortification_ of towns in early Greece, ii. 108 _seq._;
of the Grecian camp in the Iliad, ii. 186.

_Four Hundred_, the oligarchy of, viii. 30 _seq._

_Frenzy_, religious, of women, i. 30 _seq._

_Funeral_ ceremony at Athens over slain warriors, vi. 31;
orations, besides that of Periklês, vi. 142 _n._;
obsequies of Hephæstion, xii. 252, 254.

_Funerals_, Solon’s regulations about iii. 140.

_Gadês_, iii. 271 _seq._;
voyage from Corinth to, in the seventh and sixth centuries B. C.,
iii. 277.

_Gæa_, i. 4, 6, 9.

_Gæsylus_, xi. 116.

_Games_, Olympic, i. 100, ii. 241 _seq._, 317 _seq._, iv. 55 _seq._;
Isthmian, i. 124, ii. 306 _n._ 1, iv. 65;
the four great Grecian, ii. 240, iv. 67, 80 _seq._;
Solon’s rewards to victors at, iii. 141;
Pythian, iv. 58, 64 _seq._;
Nemean, iv. 65.

_Gamori_, iii. 30;
at Syracuse, v. 206.

_Gargaphia_, fountain of, v. 165 _n._ 3.

_Gaugamela_, battle of, xii. 155 _seq._

_Gauls_, embassy of, to Alexander, xii. 28;
invasion of Greece by, xii. 390.

_Gaza_, capture of, by Alexander, xii. 142 _seq._

_Gedrosia_, Alexander in, xii. 200, 236.

_Gela_, v. 208; and Syracuse, before B. C. 500, v. 204;
Kleander of, v. 208;
Gelo, despot of, v. 213 _seq._;
congress of Sicilian cities at, vii. 137;
and Hannibal’s capture of Selinus, x. 408;
expeditions of Dionysius to, x. 438, 439, 447 _seq._;
capture of, by Imilkon, x. 447 _seq._;
Timoleon and the fresh colonization of, xi. 187;
Agathokles at, xii. 408.

_Geleontes_, iii. 51.

_Gelo_, v. 67, 204-239.

_Gelôni_, iii. 244.

_Gelonian_ dynasty, fall of, v. 233;
citizens of Syracuse, v. 234 _seq._

_Genealogies_, Grecian, i. 80 _seq._, 448;
Argeian, i. 81, mythical, i. 191, 445 _seq._;
Egyptian, i. 448;
Clinton’s vindication of, ii. 37 _seq._

_Genealogy_, Corinthian, of Eumelus, i. 120 _seq._;
of Orchomenos, i. 127 _seq._;
Eleian, i. 139;
Ætolian, i. 143;
Laconian, i. 168;
Messênian i. 171;
Arcadian, i. 173.

_Generals_, Kleisthenean, iv. 136.

_Gentes_, Attic, iii. 53 _seq._, 66 _seq._;
analogy between those of Greece and other nations, iii. 58 _seq._;
Grecian, patronymic names of, iii. 63;
difference between Grecian and Roman, iii. 65;
non-members of, under Solon, iii. 133.

_Geographical_ knowledge, Hesiodic and Homeric, ii. 114;
views of Alexander, xii. 232 _n._ 1.

_Geography_, fabulous, i. 245 _seq._;
Homeric, iii. 204;
of the retreat of the Ten Thousand, ix. 115 _seq._

_Geological_ features of Greece, ii. 215.

_Geomori_, iii. 30, 72.

_Gergis_, iii. 197;
Derkyllidas at, ix. 212.

_Gergithes_, iii. 197.

_German_ progress brought about by violent external influences,
i. 463;
mythes, i. 464.

_Gerontes_, ii. 66.

_Geronthræ_, conquest of, ii. 419.

_Geryôn_, i. 7, 249.

_Getæ_, Alexander’s defeat of, xii. 24.

_Gigantes_, birth of, i. 5, 9 _n._

_Gillus_, iv. 258.

_Giskon_, x. 401, 403 _n._, xi. 180.

_Glaukæ_, xii. 230.

_Glauke_, i. 117.

_Glaukon_, discourse of, in Plato’s Republic, viii. 391.

_Glaukus_, i. 224.

_Gnomic_, Greek poets, iv. 90 _seq._

_Gnomon_, whence obtained by the Greeks, iii. 345.

_Goddesses_, and gods, twelve great, i. 10.

_Gods_, Grecian, how conceived by the Greeks, i. 3 _seq._, 347 _seq._;
and dæmons, i. 425 _seq._;
and men, i. 449.

_Golden Fleece_, legend of, i. 123.

_Golden race_, the, i. 65.

_Gongylus_, the Corinthian, vii. 265, 271.

_Good_, etc., meaning of, in early Greek writers, ii. 64;
double sense of the Greek and Latin equivalents of, iii. 45 _n._ 4.

_Gordian knot_, Alexander cuts the, xii. 104.

_Gordium_, Alexander’s march from, xii. 111.

_Gordius_, legend of, iii. 217.

_Gorgias_ of Leontini, vii. 128, 132, viii. 369, 382.

_Gorgons_, i. 90.

_Gorgôpas_ at Ægina, ix. 373 _seq._

_Government_ of historical and legendary Greece, ii. 60 _seq._;
heroic, ii. 75;
earliest changes of, in Greece, iii. 4 _seq._;
kingly, iii. 5 _seq._;
change from monarchical to oligarchical in Greece, iii. 15 _seq._

_Governments_, Grecian, weakness of, iv. 152.

_Graces_, the, i. 10.

_Grææ_, i. 7.

_Græci_, ii. 269.

_Græcia_ Magna, iii. 399.

_Græco-Asiatic_ cities, xii. 271.

_Granikus_, battle of the, xii. 80 _seq._;
Athenians captured at the, xii. 105.

_Graphê Paranomôn_, v. 375 _seq._;
abolition of, B. C. 411, viii. 36.

_Grecian_ mythes, i. 51, 426 _seq._;
genealogies, i. 80 _seq._;
mythology, sources of our information on, i. 106;
intellect, expansive force of, i. 362;
progress between B. C. 700 and 500, i. 365 _seq._;
antiquity, i. 445, 448; genealogies, i. 447;
townsman, intellectual acquisitions of a, i. 458;
poetry, matchless, i. 463;
progress self-operated, i. 463;
mythology, how it would have been affected by the introduction of
Christianity, B. C. 500, i. 467;
mythes, proper treatment of, i. 487 _seq._;
computation of time, ii. 115 _n._ 2;
festivals, intellectual influence of, ii. 228;
history, first and second periods of, ii. 270 _seq._, iv. 52;
opinion, change in, on the decision of disputes by champions,
ii. 451;
states, growing communion of, between B. C. 600 and 547, ii. 461;
“faith”, iii. 115;
settlements on the Euxine, iii. 236;
marine and commerce, growth of, iii. 336;
colonies in Southern Italy, iii. 374 _seq._;
world about 560 B. C., iii. 398;
history, want of unity in, iv. 51, 52;
games, influence of, upon the Greek mind, iv. 70 _seq._;
art, beginnings and importance of, iv. 98 _seq._;
architecture, iv. 99;
governments, weakness of, iv. 152;
world, in the Thirty years’ truce, vi. 47;
and barbarian military feeling, contrast between, vi. 446;
youth, society and conversation of, vii. 33 _n._;
states, complicated relations among, B. C. 420, vii. 52, and
B. C. 366, x. 292;
philosophy, negative side of, viii. 345;
dialectics, their many-sided handling of subjects, viii. 454 _seq._;
states embassies from, at Pella, B. C. 346, xi. 404 _seq._;
captives, mutilated, at Persepolis, xii. 173;
history, bearing of Alexander’s Asiatic campaigns on,
xii. 179 _seq._;
mercenaries under Darius, xii. 183, 184, 188, 189;
envoys with Darius, xii. 189;
world, state of, B. C. 334, xii. 275;
exiles, Alexander’s rescript directing the recall of,
xii. 310 _seq._

_Greece_, legends of, originally isolated, afterwards thrown into
series, i. 105;
legendary and historical, state of society and manners in,
ii. 57-118;
subterranean course of rivers in, ii. 218;
difficulty of land communication in, ii. 220;
accessibility of, by sea, ii. 222;
islands and colonies of, ii. 224;
difference between the land-states and sea-states in, ii. 225;
effects of the configuration of, ii. 226 _seq._;
mineral and other productions of, ii. 229 _seq._;
climate of, ii. 232;
difference between the inhabitants of different parts of, ii. 233;
ante-Hellenic inhabitants of, ii. 261;;
discontinuance of kingship in, iii. 7;
anti-monarchical sentiment of, iii. 11 _seq._, iv. 176;
the voyage from, to Italy or Sicily, iii. 361;
seven wise men of, iv. 94 _seq._;
first advance of, towards systematic conjunction, iv. 174;
probable consequences of a Persian expedition against, before that
against Scythia, iv. 261 _seq._;
on the eve of Xerxes’s invasion, v. 57, 60;
first separation of, into two distinct parties, v. 262 _seq._, 290;
proceedings in central, between B. C. 470-464, v. 312;
state of feeling in, between B. C. 445-431, vi. 76;
bad morality of the rich and great in, vi. 284;
atmospherical disturbances in, B. C. 427, vi. 293;
warlike preparations in, during the winter of B. C. 414-413,
vii. 287;
alteration of feeling in, after the capture of Athens by Lysander,
viii. 259, 264, 275;
disgust in, at the Thirty at Athens, viii. 262;
degradation of, by the peace of Antalkidas, x. 2 _seq._, 10;
effect of the battle of Leuktra on, x. 184, 185, 193;
relations of Dionysius with, B. C. 382-369, xi. 44;
state of, B. C. 360-359, xi. 197;
decline of citizen-soldiership and increase of mercenaries in, after
the Peloponnesian war, xi. 280 _seq._;
effect of the peace and alliance between Philip and Athens upon,
xi. 430;
movements and intrigues of Philip throughout, after B. C. 346,
xi. 443 _seq._;
state of, on Alexander’s accession, xii. 1, 9 _seq._;
march of Alexander into, B. C. 336, xii. 11;
Macedonian interventions in, B. C. 336-335, xii. 16 _seq._;
terror in, on the destruction of Thebes by Alexander, xii. 43;
connection of Alexander with, history of, xii. 50 _seq._,
179 _seq._;
an appendage to Macedonia under Alexander, xii. 52;
military changes in, during the sixty years before Alexander’s
accession, xii. 53 _seq._;
possibility of emancipating, during Alexander’s earlier Asiatic
campaigns, xii. 276;
hopes raised in, by the Persian fleet and armies, B. C. 334-331,
xii. 276;
submission of, to Antipater, xii. 285;
effect of Alexander’s death on, xii. 311;
confederacy for liberating, after Alexander’s death,
xii. 311 _seq._;
Ptolemy of Egypt in, xii. 373;
success of Demetrius Poliorketes in, against Kassander, xii. 382;
under Demetrius Poliorketes and Antigonus Gonatas, xii. 390;
invasion of, by the Gauls, xii. 390;
of Polybius, xii. 391.

_Greece, Proper_, geography of, ii. 211 _seq._

_Greek_ forces against Troy, i. 289 _seq._;
language and the mythes, i. 351;
tradition, matter of, uncertified, i. 433;
language, various dialects of, ii. 238;
alphabet, origin of, iii. 344 _n._;
Latin and Oscan languages, iii. 354;
settlements, east of the Strymôn in Thrace, iv. 20;
settlements on the Euxine south of the Danube, iv. 27;
settlements in Libya, and the nomads, iv. 38;
cities, local festivals in, iv. 51, 67 _seq._;
lyric poetry, iv. 73, 90;
poetry about the middle of the seventh century B. C., iv. 74;
music, about the middle of the seventh century B. C., iv. 75;
poetry, after Terpander, iv. 77;
hexameter, new metres superadded to, iv. 79;
chorus, iv. 83, 87;
dancing, iv. 85;
mind, positive tendencies of, in the time of Herodotus,
iv. 105 _n._;
philosophy, in the sixth century B. C., 380 _seq._;
fleet at Artemisium, v. 79 _seq._, 83 _seq._;
fleet at Salamis, v. 111;
fleet at Mykalê, v. 193 _seq._;
fleet after the battle of Mykalê, v. 200 _seq._;
fleet, expedition of, against Asia, B. C. 478, v. 253;
generals and captains, slaughter of Cyreian, ix. 72 _seq._;
heroes, analogy of Alexander to the, xii. 71.

_Greeks_, return of, from Troy, i. 309 _seq._;
their love of antiquities, i. 353;
their distaste for a real history of the past, i. 359;
Homeric, ii. 92, 114;
in Asia Minor, ii. 235, iii. 212;
extra-Peloponnesian north of Attica in the first two centuries,
ii. 273 _seq._;
advance of, in government in the seventh and sixth centuries B. C.,
iii. 20;
musical modes of, iii. 212;
and Phenicians in Sicily and Cyprus, iii. 276;
contrasted with Egyptians, Assyrians, and Phenicians, iii. 304;
influence of Phenicians, Assyrians, and Egyptians on,
iii. 343 _seq._;
and Carthaginians, first known collision between, iii. 348;
Sicilian and Italian, monetary and statical scale of, iii. 369;
in Sicily, prosperity of, between B. C. 735-485, iii. 368 _seq._;
in Sicily and in Greece Proper, difference between, iii. 372;
Italian, between B. C. 700-500, iii. 392, 394, 398;
their talent for command over barbarians, iv. 17;
first voyage of, to Libya, iv. 29;
and Libyans at Kyrene, iv. 39;
political isolation of, iv. 51;
tendencies to political union among, after B. C. 560, iv. 52;
growth of union among, between B. C. 776-560, iv. 53;
rise of philosophy and dialectic among, iv. 96;
writing among, iv. 97;
Asiatic, after Cyrus’s conquest of Lydia, iv. 198;
Asiatic, application of, to Sparta, 546 B. C., iv. 199;
and Darius, before the battle of Marathon, iv. 315;
eminent, liable to be corrupted by success, iv. 375 _seq._;
and Persians, religious conception of history common to, v. 11;
northern, and Xerxes, v. 64, 69;
confederate, engagement of, against such as joined Xerxes, v. 70;
effect of the battle of Thermopylæ on, v. 105 _seq._;
and the battle of Salamis, v. 121 _seq._;
Medising, and Mardonius, v. 148;
Medising, at Platæa, v. 161;
at Platæa, v. 163 _seq._;
at Mykalê, v. 194 _seq._;
Asiatic, first step to the ascendancy of Athens over, v. 200;
Sicilian, early governments of, v. 206;
Sicilian, progress of, between the battle of Salamis and Alexander,
v. 241;
allied, oppose the fortification of Athens, v. 243 _seq._, 246;
allied, transfer the headship from Sparta to Athens, B. C. 477,
v. 260 _seq._;
allied, Aristeides assessment of, v. 263;
allied, under Athens, substitute money-payment for personal service,
v. 298 _seq._;
effect of the Athenian disaster in Sicily upon, vii. 363;
and Tissaphernes, Alkibiades acts as interpreter between,
viii. 4 _seq._;
Asiatic, surrender of, by Sparta to Persia, ix. 205;
Asiatic, and Cyrus the Younger, ix. 206;
Asiatic, and Tissaphernes, ix. 207;
the Ten Thousand, their position and circumstances, ix. 11;
Ten Thousand, at Kunaxa, ix. 42 _seq._;
Ten Thousand, after the battle of Kunaxa, ix. 52 _seq._;
Ten Thousand, retreat of, ix. 56-121, 181 _seq._;
Ten Thousand, after their return to Trapezus, ix. 121-180;
Asiatic, their application to Sparta for aid against Tissaphernes,
ix. 207;
in the service of Alexander in Asia, xii. 74;
unpropitious circumstances for, in the Lamian war, xii. 334;
Italian, pressed upon by enemies from the interior, xii. 394.

_Gurylls_, death of, x. 335.

_Guilds_, Grecian deities of, i. 344;
German and early English, iii. 60 _n._ 2;
compared with ancient political associations, viii. 16 _n._ 2.

_Gyges_, i. 5, iii. 219 _seq._

_Gylippus_, expedition of, to Syracuse, vii. 242, 265 _seq._,
275 _seq._, 298 _seq._, 323, 330 _seq._

_Gylon_, father of Kleobulê, the mother of Demosthenes,
xi. 261 _n._ 1.

_Gymnêsii_, iii. 35.

_Gyndês_, distribution of, into channels by Cyrus, iv. 212.

_Hadês_, i. 6 _seq._, 7, 9.

_Hæmôn_ and Antigonê, i. 276.

_Haliartus_, Lysander at, ix. 294.

_Halikarnassus_, ii. 31, iii. 201;
capture of, by Alexander, xii. 94 _seq._

_Halonnesus_, dispute between Philip and the Athenians about,
xi. 449 _seq._

_Halys_, the, 207.

_Hamilkar_, defeat and death of, at Himera, v. 222 _seq._

_Hamilkar_, collusion of, with Agathokles, xii. 401;
superseded in Sicily by another general of the same name, xii. 403.

_Hamilkar_, victory of, at the Himera, xii. 408 _seq._;
attempt of, upon Syracuse, xii. 422;
defeat and death of, xii. 424.

_Hannibal_, expeditions of, to Sicily, x. 402-415, 421 _seq._

_Hanno_, silly fabrication of, xi. 158.

_Harmodius_ and Aristogeitôn, iv. 111 _seq._

_Harmosts_, Spartan, ix. 189 _seq._, 197, 201.

_Harpagus_, iv. 202, 207.

_Harpalus_, xii. 240, 294 _seq._

_Harpies_, the, i. 1, 266.

_Hêbê_, i. 10.

_Hectôr_, i. 286, 297.

_Hegemony_, Athenian, v. 291 _seq._

_Hegesippus_, xi. 446.

_Hegesistratus_, iv. 118, v. 191, xii. 90, 91.

_Hekabê_, i. 286.

_Hekatæus_ on Geryôn, i. 249;
on the Argonauts, i. 253;
and the mythes, i. 391;
and the Ionic revolt, iv. 284, 296.

_Hekatompylus_, Alexander at, xii. 188.

_Hekatoncheires_, the, i. 4, 5.

_Hekatonymus_ and the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 129 _seq._

_Helen_, i. 161, 168, 169;
necklace of, i. 282;
and Paris, i. 287;
and Achilles, i. 294;
various legends of, i. 305 _seq._

_Helenus_ and Andromachê, i. 305.

_Heliæa_, iii. 128 _n._, iv. 137, 141 _seq._

_Heliasts_, iv. 141.

_Helikê_, destruction of, x. 157.

_Helios_, i. 6, 344.

_Helixus_, viii. 133.

_Hellanikus_, his treatment of mythes, i. 390;
contrasted with Saxo Grammaticus and Snorro Sturleson, i. 468.

_Hellas_, division of, i. 100;
proper, ii. 212;
mountain systems of, ii. 212 _seq._;
islands and colonies of, ii. 224;
most ancient, ii. 268;
first historical manifestation of, as an aggregate body, iv. 318.

_Hellê_ and Phryxus, i. 123.

_Hellên_ and his sons, i. 99 _seq._

_Hellênes_, i. 99, ii. 236 _seq._, 255 _seq._

_Hellenic_ religion and customs in the Trôad, i. 337;
cities, ii. 257.

_Hellênion_ at Naukratis, iii. 336.

_Hellenism_, definition of, xii. 270.

_Hellenotamiæ_, v. 265, viii. 310.

_Hellespont_, bridges of Xerxes over, v. 15 _seq._, 19 _n._;
crossed by Xerxes, v. 31;
retreating march of Xerxes to, v. 144 _seq._;
Grecian fleet at, B. C. 479, v. 200;
Strombichidês at, viii. 96;
Peloponnesian reinforcement to, B. C. 411, viii. 97;
Mindarus and Thrasyllus at, viii. 102, 109, 117;
Athenians and Peloponnesians at, after the battle of Kynossêma,
viii. 117;
Thrasyllus and Alkibiadês at, viii. 131;
Thrasybulus at, ix. 366;
Iphikrates at, ix. 369 _seq._;
Antalkidas at, ix. 384;
Epaminondas at, x. 301, 306;
Timotheus at, x. 301, 306, 368;
Autoklês at, x. 371 _seq._;
operations of the Athenians at, B. C. 357, xi. 224;
disputes between Athens and Philip about, xi. 450;
imprudence of the Persians in letting Alexander cross the, xii. 78.

_Helôris_, unsuccessful expedition of, xi. 5, 7, 15.

_Helots_, ii. 373 _seq._;
Pausanias and, v. 270;
revolt of, v. 315 _seq._;
at Ithômê, capitulation of, v. 333;
assassination of, vi. 368 _seq._;
Brasidean, vii. 21;
brought back to Pylus, vii. 71;
and the invasion of, Laconia by Epaminondas, x. 219;
establishment of, with the Messenians, x. 229 _seq._

_Helus_, conquered by Alkamenês, ii. 420.

_Hephæstion_, xii. 246, 247, 252, 254.

_Hephæstos_, i. 10, 58.

_Hêræon_ near Mykênæ, i. 165.

_Hêræon Teichos_, siege of, by Philip, xi. 307.

_Hêrakleia Pontica_, i. 241; xii. 460 _seq._;
the Ten Thousand Greeks at, ix. 146.

_Hêrakleia in Italy_, iii. 384, vi. 14.

_Hêrakleia in Sicily_, v. 207;
Dion at, xi. 89, 90 _seq._

_Hêrakleia Trachinea_, vi. 90 _seq._; vii. 60, ix. 284, 302,
xi. 90 _seq._

_Hêrakleid_ kings of Corinth, ii. 307.

_Hêrakleides the Syracusan_, exile of, xi. 86;
victory of, over Philistus, xi. 100;
and Dion, xi. 101, 105, 110, 112 _seq._, 121;
victory of, over Nypsius, xi. 107;
death of, xi. 122.

_Hêrakleides_, governor of the Pontic Herakleia, xii. 469, 470.

_Hêrakleids_, i. 94, 95, ii. 1 _seq._;
Lydian dynasty of, iii. 222.

_Hêraklês_, i. 92 _seq._;
attack of, on Pylos, i. 110;
and Alkêstis, i. 113;
overthrows Orchomenos, i. 133;
death of, i. 151;
and Hylas, i. 234;
and Laomedôn, i. 286;
Tyrian temple of, iii. 269.

_Hêraklês_, son of Alexander, xii. 372.

_Hêrê_, i. 6, 7, 10, 58;
and Mykênæ, i. 165;
temple of, near Argos, burnt, vi. 451;
Lakinian, robe of, xi. 52.

_Herippidas_, ix. 285, 326, 339.

_Hermæ_, mutilation of, at Athens, vii. 167 _seq._, 199 _seq._

_Hermeias_ of Atarneus, xi. 441.

_Hermes_, i. 10, 58 _seq._

_Hermionê_, i. 163.

_Hermokratês_, at the congress at Gela, vii. 137;
and the Athenian armament, vii. 182;
recommendations of, after the battle near Olympieion, vii. 227;
speech of at Kamarina, vii. 229;
urges the Syracusans to attack the Athenians at sea, vii. 290;
postpones the Athenians’ retreat from Syracuse, vii. 330;
and Tissaphernês, vii. 390; viii. 98;
in the Ægean, x. 385 _seq._;
banishment of, x. 387 _seq._;
his return to Sicily, and death, x. 415 _seq._

_Hermokratean_ party, x. 432;
exiles, x. 438.

_Hermolaus_, xii. 221.

_Hermotybii_ and Kalasiries, iii. 316.

_Herodotus_, on Minôs, i. 228, 229;
on Helen and the Trojans, i. 308;
treatment of mythes by, i. 393 _seq._;
his view of Lykurgus, ii. 343;
his story of Solon and Crœsus, iii. 151 _seq._;
chronological mistakes of, iii. 154 _n._, 198 _n._ 3;
chronological discrepancies of, respecting Kyaxarês, iii. 232 _n._;
his description of Scythia, iii. 236 _seq._;
his account of Babylon, iii. 295 _seq._, 297 _n._ 2;
distinction between what he professes to have seen and heard,
iii. 309;
on the effects of despotism and democracy upon the Athenians,
iv. 178;
and Ktêsias, on Cyrus, iv. 185;
chronology of his life and authorship, iv. 277 _n._, v. 49 _n._;
his narrative of Darius’s march into Scythia, iv. 265 _seq._;
does not mention Pythagoras in connection with the war between
Sybaris and Kroton, iv. 416;
historical manner and conception of, v. 5, 11, _n._ 3;
his estimate of the number of Xerxes’s army, v. 36 _seq._;
doubts about the motives ascribed to Xerxes at Thermopylæ by, v. 87;
a proof of the accuracy of, v. 89 _n._;
on the movements of the Persian fleet before the battle of Salamis,
v. 132 _nn._

_Heroes_ appear with gods and men on mythes, i. 64;
Greek, at Aulis, i. 293 _seq._, 289;
Greek, analogy of Alexander to, xii. 70.

_Heroic_ race, i. 66, legends, i. 424.

_Hesiod_, theogony of, i. 3, 16, 20, 74;
family affairs of, i. 72;
Iapetids in, i. 73;
complaints of, against kings, ii. 73;
dark picture of Greece by, ii. 91.

_Hesiodic_ mythes traceable to Krête and Delphi, i. 15;
“Works and Days”, i. 66 _seq._;
philosophy, i. 367;
Greeks, ii. 114 _seq._;
epic, ii. 119.

_Hesionê_, i. 286.

_Hesperides_, dragon of, i. 7.

_Hesperides_, town of, iv. 32 _n._ 2, 42.

_Hestia_, i. 6, 7, 58.

_Hestiæa_ on Ilium, i. 329.

_Hetæræ_, vi. 100.

_Hetæries_, at Athens, vi. 290, viii. 15.

_Hexameter_, the ancient, i. 73;
new metres superadded to, iv. 75.

_Hierax_, ix. 373.

_Hiero of Syracuse_, v. 227 _seq._

_Hieromnêmôn_, ii. 246.

_Hiketas_, xi. 128;
and the Syracusans, xi. 134;
message of, to Corinth and to Timoleon, xi. 143, 144;
defeat of, at Adranum, xi. 148;
and Magon, xi. 156 _seq._, 159;
flight of, from Syracuse to Leontini, xi. 161;
capitulation of, with Timoleon, xi. 170;
invites the Carthaginians to invade Sicily, xi. 171;
defeat, surrender, and death of, xi. 181, 182.

_Himera_, iii. 367;
battle of, v. 221 _seq._;
treatment of, by Thêro, v. 228;
capture of, by Hannibal, x. 410 _seq._;
defeat of Agathokles at the, xii. 408 _seq._

_Hindoos_, rivers personified by, i. 342 _n._ 2;
their belief with regard to the small pox, i. 360 _n._;
belief of, in fabulous stories, i. 430 _n._;
expensiveness of marriage among, iii. 141 _n._ 2;
sentiment of, with regard to the discontinuance of sacrifices,
xii. 43 _n._ 1.

_Hindoo Koosh_, Alexander at, xii. 200;
Alexander reduces the country between the Indus and, xii. 224 _seq._

_Hindostan_, hoarding in, xii. 175 _n._ 3.

_Hipparchus_, ii. 153 _n._, iv. 111 _seq._

_Hipparinus_, son of Dionysius, xi. 130.

_Hippeis_, Solonian, iii. 118.

_Hippias_, of Elis, viii. 380 _seq._

_Hippias, Peisistratid_, iv. 111 _seq._, 120 _seq._, 281, 356 _n._ 2.

_Hippo_, iv. 385.

_Hippodameia_, i. 159.

_Hippodamus_, vi. 20.

_Hippokleidês_, iii. 39.

_Hippokratês the physician_, i. 373; viii. 426 _n._ 2.

_Hippokratês of Gela_, v. 213 _seq._

_Hippokratês, the Athenian general_, vi. 370 _seq._, 379, 382 _seq._,
388.

_Hippon_, xi. 184.

_Hipponikus_, iii. 102.

_Hipponium_, capture of, xi. 17;
re-establishment of, xi. 43.

_Hipponoidas_, vii. 85, 89.

_Histiæus_ and the bridge over the Danube, iv. 272;
and Myrkinus, iv. 273, 277;
detention of, at Susa, iv. 277;
and the Ionic revolt, iv. 284, 299 _seq._, 309.

_Historians_, treatment of mythes by, i. 391 _seq._

_Historical_ proof, positive evidence indispensable to, i. 430;
sense of modern times not to be applied to an unrecording age,
i. 432;
evidence, the standard of, raised with regard to England, but not
with regard to Greece, i. 485;
and legendary Greece compared, ii. 60 _seq._

_Historicizing_ innovations in the tale of Troy, i. 333;
of ancient mythes, i. 409 _seq._;
applicable to all mythes, or none, i. 422.

_History_, uninteresting to early Greeks, i. 359;
of England, how conceived down to the seventeenth century,
i. 482 _seq._;
and legend, Grecian, blank between, ii. 33 _seq._;
Grecian first period of, from B. C. 776 to 560, ii. 270, 273;
Grecian, second period of, from B. C. 560 to 300, ii. 270 _seq._;
religious conception of, common to Greeks and Persians, v. 10.

_Homer_ and Hesiod, mythology of, i. 12;
personality and poems of, ii. 127 _seq._

_Homeric Zeus_, i. 12;
hymns, i. 34, 37 _seq._, 45, 59, 60, iii. 168 _seq._;
legend of the birth of Hêraklês, i. 93 _seq._;
Pelops, i. 159;
gods, types of, i. 350;
age, mythical faith of, i. 359;
philosophy, i. 368;
account of the inhabitants of Peloponnesus, ii. 12;
Boulê and Agora, ii. 65 _seq._;
Greeks, social condition of, ii. 97 _seq._, 107;
Greeks, unity, idea of, partially revived, ii. 162 _seq._;
epoch, right conception of, ii. 174;
mode of fighting, ii. 457;
geography, iii. 204.

_Homêrids_, the poetical gens of, ii. 132.

_Homicide_, purification for, i. 25, 26;
mode of dealing with, in legendary and historical Greece,
ii. 93 _seq._;
tribunals for, at Athens, iii. 77;
Drake’s laws of, retained by Solon, iii. 134;
trial for and the senate of Areopagus, v. 368 _n._

_Homoioi_, Spartan, ii. 363, 418.

_Hoplêtes_, iii. 51.

_Hôræ_, the, i. 10.

_Horkos_, i. 7, 8.

_Horse_, the wooden, of Troy, i. 302, 309.

_Horsemen_ at Athens, after the restoration of the democracy,
B. C. 403, viii. 305.

_Hospitality_ in legendary Greece, ii. 84.

_Human_ sacrifices in Greece, i. 126 _seq._

_Hyakinthia_ and the Lacedæmonians, v. 153.

_Hyakinthus_, i. 168.

_Hyblæan Megara_, iii. 365.

_Hydarnês_, v. 88.

_Hydaspes_, Alexander at the, xii. 227 _seq._;
Alexander sails down the, xii. 333.

_Hydra_, the Lernæan, i. 7.

_Hydra_, sailors of, v. 51 _n._ 2.

_Hykkara_, capture of, vii. 216.

_Hylas_ and Hêraklês, i. 234.

_Hylleis_, ii. 360.

_Hyllus_, i. 94, 177.

_Hymns_, Homeric, i. 34, 37 _seq._, 45, 59, 60, iii. 168 _seq._;
at festival in honor of gods, i. 49.

_Hypaspistæ_, xii. 61.

_Hyperbolus_, iv. 151, vii. 108 _seq._, viii. 27.

_Hyperides_, xi. 509, xii. 298 _n._ 1, 305 _n._, 326, 327.

_Hyperiôn_, i. 5, 6.

_Hypermênes_, x. 146.

_Hypermnêstra_, i. 88.

_Hyphasis_, Alexander at, xii. 231.

_Hypomeiones_, Spartan, ii. 363, 418.

_Hyrkania_, Alexander in, xii. 166.

_Ialmenos_ and Askalaphos, i. 130.

_Iapetids_ in Hesiod, i. 74.

_Iapetos_, i. 5, 6.

_Iapygians_, iii. 392.

_Iasus_, capture of, vii. 389.

_Iberia_ in Spain, iii. 275.

_Iberians_ and Dionysius, x. 510.

_Ida_ in Asia, iii. 195, 197.

_Ida_ in Crête, Zeus at, i. 6.

_Idanthyrsus_, iv. 267.

_Idas_, i. 169, 171.

_Idomenê_, Demosthenês at, vi. 306 _seq._

_Idrieus_, xi. 437.

_Ikarus_, i. 225.

_Iliad_ and the Trojan war, i. 297;
and Odyssey, date, structure, and authorship of, ii. 118-209.

_Ilium_, i. 286, 334 _seq._

_Illyria_, Dionysius’s schemes of conquest in, xi. 24.

_Illyrians_, different tribes of, iv. 1 _seq._;
retreat of Perdikkas and Brasidas before, vi. 447 _seq._;
victory of Philip over, xi. 214 _seq._;
defeat of, by Alexander, xii. 28 _seq._

_Ilus_, i. 285, 286.

_Imbros_, iv. 28, 278 _seq._

_Imilkon_ and Hannibal, invasion of Sicily by, x. 421 _seq._;
at Agrigentum, x. 425 _seq._;
at Gela, x. 447 _seq._;
and Dionysius, x. 454 _seq._;
at Motyê, x. 479, 490;
capture of Messênê by, 491 _seq._;
and the Campanians of Ætna, x. 497;
before Syracuse, x. 498 _seq._;
flight of, from Syracuse, x. 510;
miserable end of, x. 511.

_Inachus_, i. 82.

_Indus_, Alexander at, xii. 225 _seq._, 233 _seq._;
voyage of Nearchus from the mouth of, to that of the Tigris,
xii. 235, 237.

_Industry_, manufacturing, at Athens, iii. 136 _seq._

_Infantry_ and oligarchy, iii. 31.

_Inland_ and maritime cities contrasted, ii. 225.

_Inô_, i. 123 _seq._

_Inscriptions_, ii. 41.

_Interest_ on loans, iii. 107 _seq._, 159.

_Interpreters_, Egyptian, iii. 327.

_Io_, legend of, i. 84 _seq._

_Iôn_, i. 198, 204.

_Iônia_, emigrants to, ii. 24 _seq._;
conquest of, by Harpagus, iv. 202;
Mardonius’s deposition of despots in, iv. 312;
expedition of Astyochus to, vii. 382;
expedition of Thrasyllus to, viii. 129.

_Ionian_, the name a reproach, iii. 169.

_Ionians_, ii. 12, 13;
and Darius’s bridge over the Danube, iv. 271 _seq._;
abandonment of, by the Athenians, iv. 297;
at Ladê, iv. 301 _seq._;
at Mykalê, v. 192 _seq._, 197;
after the battle of Mykalê, v. 199.

_Ionic_ emigration, ii. 21, 24 _seq._, iii. 172;
tribes in Attica, iii. 50, 52 _seq._;
cities in Asia, iii. 172 _seq._, 260;
and Italic Greeks, iii. 398;
revolt, iv. 285 _seq._, 306 _n._ 2;
philosophers, iv. 378;
Sicilians and Athens, vii. 132;
alphabet and the Athenian laws, viii. 308.

_Iphigeneia_, i. 293.

_Iphiklos_, i. 110.

_Iphikrates_, destruction of a Lacedæmonian _mora_ by, ix. 327 _n._,
341 _n._, 348 _seq._;
military improvements and successes of, ix. 335 _seq._, 353;
defeat of Anaxibius by, ix. 370 _seq._;
proceedings of, between B. C. 387-378, x. 105 _seq._;
and Kotys, x. 106, 299, 369, 374;
expedition of, to Korkyra, x. 149 _seq._, 154 _n._;
and Timotheus, x. 149, 299, xi. 231 _seq._;
expedition of, to aid Sparta against Thebes, x. 237 _seq._;
in Thrace and Macedonia, x. 250 _seq._, 299;
in the Hellespont, xi. 224;
and Chares, xi. 224 _seq._

_Iphikrates the Younger_, xii. 129.

_Ipsus_, battle of, xii. 387.

_Iran_, territory of, iv. 184.

_Irasa_, iv. 31.

_Iris_, i. 7.

_Iron race_, the, i. 66.

_Isagoras_, iv. 126, 164 _seq._

_Ischagoras_, vi. 449.

_Ischolaus_, x. 217.

_Ischys_, i. 178.

_Isidas_, x. 332.

_Islands_ in the Ægean, ii. 234.

_Ismenias_ in the north of Bœotia, ix. 301;
and Leontiades, x. 59;
trial and execution of, x. 63.

_Ismenias_ and Pelopidas, x. 277 _seq._, 283, 285.

_Isokratês_, his treatment of mythes, i. 407 _n._ 2;
on the origin of Periœki, ii. 367;
panegyrical oration of, x. 44, 77;
the Plataic oration of, x. 163;
the Archidamus of, x. 228 _n._ 2, 229 _n._ 1, 291 _n._ 2;
his letter to Philip, xi. 282, 436.

_Issêdones_, iii. 245.

_Issus_, Alexander at, before the battle, xii. 114;
Darius at, before the battle, xii. 117;
battle of, xii. 118 _seq._;
inaction of Darius after the battle of, xii. 152;
and its neighborhood, as connected with the battle, xii. 491 _seq._

_Isthmian games_, i. 124, ii. 242, iv. 65 _seq._;
Eleians excluded from, i. 140, ii. 306 _n._;
B. C. 412, vii. 368;
and Agesilaus, ix. 344.

_Istônê_, Korkyræan fugitives at, vi. 278, 313, 357 _seq._

_Italia_, iii. 350.

_Italian_ Greeks, iii. 369, 392, 394 _seq._, xi. 7 _seq._, 133,
xii. 394.

_Italians_, iii. 369.

_Italy and Sicily_, early languages and history of, iii. 354 _n._

_Italy_, the voyage from Greece to, iii. 361;
Grecian colonies in, iii. 354, 360, 374 _seq._;
decline of Greek power in, after the fall of Sybaris, iv. 415;
Southern, affairs of, B. C. 382-369, xi. 43.

_Ithômê_, ii. 422, v. 316.

_Jason_, i. 114 _seq._, 237 _seq._

_Jason of Pheræ_, x. 137 _seq._, 147 _n._, 153, 189 _seq._, 195 _seq._

_Jaxartes_, Alexander at the, xii. 204 _seq._

_Jocasta_, i. 266 _seq._

_Jurkæ_, iii. 245.

_Jury-trial_, characteristics of, exhibited in the Athenian
dikasteries, v. 385 _seq._

_Kabala_, victory of Dionysius at, xi. 41.

_Kabeirichus_, x. 85.

_Kadmeia_, at Thebes, seizure of, by Phœbidas, x. 58 _seq._;
surrender of, by the Lacedæmonians, x. 88 _seq._

_Kadmus_, i. 257 _seq._

_Kalais_ and Zêtês, i. 199.

_Kalasiries_ and Hermotybii, iii. 316.

_Kalauria_, i. 56;
Amphiktyony at, i. 133;
the Athenian allied armament at, x. 148;
death of Demosthenes at, xii. 327 _seq._

_Kalchas_, wanderings and death of, i. 313.

_Kalê Aktê_, foundation of, vii. 125.

_Kallias_, treaty of, v. 336 _seq._

_Kallias, son of Kalliades_, vi. 70, 72.

_Kallias_ at the congress at Sparta, B. C. 371, x. 165.

_Kallias of Chalkis_, xi. 341 _seq._, 452.

_Kallibius, the Lacedæmonian_, viii. 242; ix. 188.

_Kallibius_ of Tegea, x. 209.

_Kalliklês_, in Plato, viii. 382 _seq._

_Kallikratidas_, viii. 160 _seq._, 263.

_Kallimachus_, the polemarch, iv. 341, 348.

_Kallinus_, iv. 73, 77.

_Kallipidæ_, iii. 239.

_Kallippus_, xi. 123 _seq._, 128 _seq._

_Kallirrhoe_, i. 7, 282.

_Kallisthenês, the historian_, i. 410.

_Kallisthenes, the general_, failure and condemnation of, x. 370,
xi. 423.

_Kallisthenes of Olynthus_, xii. 213, 216 _seq._, 222 _seq._

_Kallistô_, i. 175.

_Kallistratus_, x. 110, 164, _seq._, 172, 288, xi. 266.

_Kallixenus_, viii. 194 _seq._, 203, 205.

_Kalpê_, the Ten Thousand Greeks at, ix. 148 _seq._

_Kalydônian_ boar, i. 143, 146 _seq._

_Kamarina_, iii. 366;
restoration of, to independence, v. 237;
and the Athenians, vii. 194;
Athenian and Syracusan envoys at, vii. 229 _seq._;
neutral policy of, B. C. 415, vii. 233;
evacuation of, x. 450;
and Timoleon, xi. 187.

_Kambyses_, iv. 47, 218 _seq._

_Kandaulês_, iii. 220.

_Kannônus_, psephism of, viii. 197 _n._

_Kanôpic branch of the Nile_., opening of, to Greek traffic, iii. 327.

_Kapaneus_. i. 273, 278.

_Kappadokia_ subdued by Alexander, xii. 111.

_Kardia_, Athenian fleet at, viii. 120;
alliance of, with Philip, xi. 451;
Eumenes of, xii. 74.

_Karduchians_, and the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 95 _seq._

_Karia_, resistance of, to Daurisês, iv. 294.

_Karmania_, Alexander’s bacchanalian procession through, xii. 237.

_Karneian_ festival, ii. 306 _n._, v. 78.

_Karneius_ Apollo, i. 49.

_Karnus_, ii. 3.

_Karpathus_, ii. 31.

_Karystus_, iv. 331, v. 303.

_Kassander_, Alexander’s treatment of, xii. 254;
schemes of, on Antipater’s death, xii. 339;
and Polysperchon, war between, xii. 360;
gets possession of Athens, xii. 361;
in Peloponnesus, xii. 365;
defeat of Olympias by, xii. 366;
confederacy of, with Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleukus against
Antigonus, xii. 367, 372, 382, 387;
founds Kassandreia and restores Thebes, xii. 368;
and Alexander, son of Polysperchon, xii. 368, 369;
and the Ætolians, xii. 370;
measures of Antigonus against, xii. 369, 370;
great power of, in Greece, xii. 371;
Ptolemy, and Lysimachus, pacification of, with Antigonus, xii. 371;
compact of Polysperchon with, xii. 372, 381;
Ptolemy makes a truce with, xii. 373;
success of Demetrius Poliorketes in Greece against, xii. 382;
truce of, with Demetrius Poliorketes, xii. 387;
death of, xii. 389.

_Kassandra_. i. 287.

_Kastôr_ and Pollux, i. 169 _seq._

_Katabothra_, ii. 218.

_Katana_, iii. 364;
and Ætna, v. 236;
Alkibiadês at, vii. 194;
Nikias at, vii. 234;
conquest of, by Dionysius, x. 468;
Carthaginian naval victory near, x. 495;
Hiketas and Magon at, xi. 156.

_Katônakophori_, iii. 35.

_Katreus_ and Althæmenês, i. 224.

_Kaulonia_, iii. 384, xi. 14, 17;
Dikon of, xi. 28.

_Kaunus_, Antisthenês at, vii. 397.

_Käystru-Pedion_, march of Cyrus from Keramôn-Agora to, ix. 17 _n._ 2.

_Kebalinus_, xii. 191, 194.

_Kekrops_, i. 195 _seq._;
the second, i. 204.

_Kelænæ_, Alexander at, xii. 101.

_Keleos_, i. 38 _seq._, 196.

_Keleustes_, vi. 200 _n._

_Kenchreæ_, Peloponnesian fleet at, vii. 382.

_Kentrites_, the Ten Thousand Greeks at the, ix. 99 _seq._

_Kephallênia_, iii. 410, vi. 135, 141.

_Kephalus_, i. 195 _n._ 4, 198;
and Dionysius at Syracuse, xi. 167.

_Kephisodotus_, x. 374, 377.

_Kerasus_, the Ten Thousand Greeks at, ix. 127.

_Kersobleptes_, x. 366;
and Charidemus, x. 366, 378, 379;
intrigue of, against Athens, xi. 258;
and the peace and alliance between Athens and Philip,
xi. 396 _seq._;
defeat of, by Philip, xi. 443.

_Kertch_, tumuli near, xii. 487 _seq._

_Ketô_, i. 7.

_Keyx_ and Alcyone, i. 135.

_Kilikia_, Alexander in, xii. 113, 114;
Darius in, xii. 116.

_Kimon_ and Themistoklês, v. 278, 280;
capture of Skyros by, v. 304, 304 _n._ 2.;
victories of, at the Eurymedon, v. 308;
trial and acquittal of, v. 312, 365;
and the Spartan application for aid against the Helots, v. 318, 365;
recall of, from ostracism, v. 329;
death of, v. 335, 340;
political party of, v. 361;
and Periklês, v. 329, 362 _seq._, 371;
character of, v. 364;
ostracism of, v. 366.

_Kimonian_ treaty, the so-called, v. 337 _seq._

_Kinadon_, conspiracy and character of, ix. 251 _seq._

_King_, the, in legendary Greece, ii. 61 _seq._, 74 _seq._;
the, in historical Greece, ii. 76;
English theory of a, iii. 13.

_Kings_, Egyptian, iii. 321, 330 _n._ 2.

_Kingship_, discontinuance of, in Greece generally, ii. 76, iii. 8;
in mediæval and modern Europe, iii. 8 _seq._

_Kinyps_ and Dorieus, iv. 36.

_Kirrha_, iv. 60 _n._, 61 _seq._, xi. 468 _seq._, 474.

_Kirrhæans_, punishment of, iv. 62 _seq._

_Kissidas_, x. 265.

_Klarus_, temple of Apollo at, iii. 185.

_Klazomenæ_, iii. 188, vii. 372, 384, 391.

_Kleander_ of Gela, v. 207.

_Kleander the Lacedæmonian_, ix. 149 _seq._, 152, 154, 165, xii. 197.

_Kleandridas_, vi. 14.

_Kleandridês_, v. 349.

_Klearchus the Lacedæmonian_, at the Hellespont, viii. 96;
at Byzantium, viii. 128;
and Cyrus the Younger, ix. 8, 22 _seq._;
and Menon’s soldiers, ix. 35;
and Ariæus, ix. 52;
and Tissaphernes, ix. 63, 70 _seq._

_Klearchus of the Pontic Herakleia_, xii. 461 _seq._

_Klearidas_, vi. 450, 470, 472, vii. 3.

_Kleinas_, iii. 102.

_Kleisthenês of Sikyôn_, i. 279, ii. 129, iii. 32 _seq._

_Kleisthenês the Athenian_, revolution in Attic tribes by,
iii. 63, 67;
and the oracle at Delphi, iv. 121;
retirement and recall of, iv. 164, 165;
development of Athenian energy after, iv. 176;
changes in the constitution of, after the Persian war, v. 275.

_Kleïppidês_, vi. 224 _seq._

_Kleitarchus_, xi. 450, 452.

_Kleitus the Illyrian_, xii. 28 _seq._

_Kleitus, Alexander’s general_, xii. 85, 208 _seq._

_Kleobulê_, mother of Demosthenes, xi. 263.

_Kleobûlus_ and Xenarês, vii. 24 _seq._

_Kleokritus_, viii. 270.

_Kleombrotus_, x. 94 _seq._, 129, 136, 176 _seq._, 180 _seq._

_Kleomenês I._, his expeditions to Athens, iv. 122, 164 _seq._;
and Aristagoras, iv. 287;
defeat of Argeians by, iv. 320 _seq._;
return of, without attacking Argos, iv. 321;
trial of, iv. 323;
and the Æginetans, iv. 325, 328;
and Demaratus, iv. 325 _seq._;
violent proceedings and death of, v. 45.

_Kleomenês III._, ii. 349, 350.

_Kleomenês, Alexander’s satrap_, xii. 241, 253, 253 _n._ 1.

_Kleon the Athenian_, first mention of, by Thucydidês, vi. 244;
policy and character of, vi. 246, 480 _seq._;
and Mitylênê, vi. 249 _seq._;
political function of, vi. 290, 292;
and the prisoners in Sphakteria, vi. 329 _seq._;
expedition of, to Pylus, vi. 336 _seq._;
warlike influence of, vi. 355, 457 _seq._;
at Amphipolis, vi. 462 _seq._, 467 _seq._;
capture of Torônê by, vi. 463;
at Eion, vi. 463;
Thucydidês’s treatment of, vi. 479, 483 _seq._;
and Aristophanês, vi. 481 _seq._, 485.

_Kleon, of Halikarnassus_, ix. 237, 300.

_Kleônæ_ and Argos, ii. 464, iv. 65 _n._ 2.

_Kleonikê_ and Pausanias, v. 255.

_Kleonymus_, xii. 448, 449.

_Kleopatra, wife of Philip_, xi. 513 _seq._, 518 _n._ 2,
xii. 4 _seq._, 8.

_Kleopatra, daughter of Philip_, xi. 514, xii. 321, 372.

_Kleophon_, viii. 123.

_Kleopus_, iii. 228.

_Kleruchies, Athenian_, revival of B. C. 365, vi. 31 _n._,
x. 296 _seq._

_Kleruchs, Athenian_, in Chalkis, iv. 170;
in Lesbos, vi. 257;
after the battle of Ægospotami, viii. 223.

_Klonas_, musical improvements of, iv. 75.

_Klothô_, i. 7.

_Klymenê_, i. 6.

_Klytæmnêstra_, i. 162, 168.

_Knêmus_, vi. 193 _seq._, 202, 213.

_Knidus_, settlement of, ii. 31;
maritime contests near, B. C. 412 vii. 394;
Antisthenês and Astyochus at, vii. 397;
the battle of, ix. 283;
and Agesilaus, ix. 312;
reverses of Sparta after the battle of, 317.

_Knights at Athens_, viii. 305, ix. 183.

_Knôpus_, iii. 187.

_Kodrids_, i. 112.

_Kodrus_, ii. 24;
archons after, iii. 48.

_Kœnus_, xii. 194, 195, 232.

_Kœos_, i. 5, 7.

_Kœratadus_, viii. 134, iv. 160, 163.

_Kôês_, iv. 270, 273, 285.

_Kokalus_, i. 225 _seq._

_Kôlæus_, his voyage to Tartêssus, iii. 279.

_Kôlakretæ_, iv. 137.

_Kolchians_ and the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 112, 126.

_Kolchis_, and the Argonautic expedition, i. 241, 255.

_Kolônus_, Athenian assembly at, viii. 35.

_Kolophôn_, iii. 184 _seq._

_Konipodes_, iii. 35.

_Konon_ at Naupaktus, vii. 358;
at Andros, viii. 151;
appointment of, to succeed Alkibiadês, viii. 159;
at Samos, 160;
at Mitylênê, viii. 166 _seq._;
escape of, from Ægospotami, viii. 219;
renewed activity of, ix. 255, 269;
at Rhodes, ix. 270;
visit of, to the Persian court, ix. 280 _seq._;
and Pharnabazus, ix. 281, 318, 321 _seq._;
rebuilds the Long Walls of Athens, ix. 322;
large plans of, ix. 325;
sent as envoy to Tiribazus, ix. 359;
arrest of, ix. 361;
long absence of, from Athens, x. 108 _n._ 2.

_Kopaïs_, lake of, i. 132.

_Korkyra_ and the Argonauts, i. 243;
early inhabitants of, iii. 402;
relations of, with Corinth, iii. 403 _seq._;
relations of, with Epirus, iii. 405;
and Corinth, joint settlements of, iii. 405 _seq._;
commerce of, iii. 409;
and Corinth, disputes between, vi. 51 _seq._;
application of the Epidamnian democracy to, vi. 52;
and Corinth, hostilities between, vi. 55, 63 _seq._;
and Corinth, decision of the Athenians between, vi. 62;
oligarchical violence at, vi. 270 _seq._;
vengeance of the victorious Demos at, B. C. 427, vi. 275 _seq._;
Nikostratus and Alkidas at, vi. 282;
revolutions at, contrasted with those at Athens, vi. 283;
distress at, B. C. 425, vi. 313;
expedition of Eurymedon and Sophoklês to, vi. 313 _seq._,
357 _seq._;
muster of the Athenian armament at, vii. 180;
Demosthenês’s voyage from, to Sicily, vii. 301;
renewed troubles at, viii. 118;
Lacedæmonian expedition against, x. 142 _seq._;
expedition of Iphikrates to, x. 149 _seq._;
Kleonymus and Agathokles in, xii. 449.

_Korkyræan_ envoys, speech of, to the Athenian assembly,
vi. 58 _seq._;
captives return home from Corinth, vi. 266 _seq._;
oligarchical fugitives at Istônê, vi. 278, 313, 357.

_Korkyræans_, and Xerxes’s invasion, v. 66;
attack Epidamnus, vi. 53;
remonstrate with the Corinthians and Peloponnesians, vi. 54;
seek the alliance of Athens, vi. 56 _seq._

_Korôbius_ and the foundation of Kyrênê, iv. 30.

_Korôneia_, Athenian defeat at, v. 348;
Theban victory at, ix. 312 _seq._, 317.

_Korônis_ and Asklêpius, i. 178.

_Korynephori_, iii. 35.

_Kôs_, settlement of, ii. 30;
capture of, by Astyochus, vii. 397;
revolt of, from Athens, xi. 220 _seq._, 231.

_Kossæi_, xii. 248.

_Kottas_, i. 5.

_Kottyphus_, xi. 475, 479, 480.

_Kotyôra_, the Ten Thousand Greeks at, ix. 126 _seq._

_Kotys_ and Iphikrates, x. 106, 299, 369, 373;
and Athens, x. 228 _seq._, 372, 373;
and Timotheus, x. 301, 368;
and Miltokythes, x. 372;
capture of Sestos by, x. 373;
assassination of, x. 375.

_Kranaus_, i. 196.

_Krannon_, battle of, xii. 321.

_Kraterus_ and Philôtas, xii. 192 _seq._;
and Antipater, xii. 320 _seq._, 335;
death of, xii. 336.

_Kratês_, comedy of, viii. 328.

_Kratesippidas_, viii. 128, 138.

_Kratinus_, viii. 327, 332 _n._

_Kreôn, king of Thêbes_, i. 117, 276.

_Kreôn, archon at Athens_, iii. 48.

_Kresphontês_, ii. 2 _seq._, 331 _n._

_Krêtan_ settlements on the Gulf of Tarentum, i. 330;
and Phrygian worship, iii. 215.

_Krêtans_ and Minôs, i. 229;
in the time of Homer, ii. 102;
and Xerxes, v. 66.

_Krête_, migrations of Dorians to, ii. 30;
early Dorians in, ii. 310;
Periœki in, ii. 364 _n._ 3;
Phalækus in, xi. 433.

_Krêthêis_ and Pêleus, i. 114.

_Krêtheus_, descendants of, i. 113.

_Kreüsa_, i. 198, 204.

_Krimêsus_, Timoleon’s victory over the Carthaginians at the,
xi. 174 _seq._

_Krios_, i. 5, 6.

_Krissa_, iv. 59 _seq._

_Kritias_ and Sokratês, vii. 36 _seq._;
return of, to Athens, viii. 233 _seq._;
and Theramenês, viii. 237 _seq._, 245 _seq._;
death of, viii. 290.

_Krius_, iv. 325, 328.

_Krommyon_, capture of, ix. 335;
recovery of, ix. 353.

_Kromnus_, capture of Lacedæmonians at, x. 316 _seq._

_Kronium_, Dionysius at, xi. 41.

_Kronos_, i. 5 _seq._, 8.

_Krotôn_, foundation, territory, and colonies of, iii. 376 _seq._;
fall of, iii. 392;
maximum power of, iii. 394;
citizens and government of, iii. 399;
and Pythagoras, iv. 401 _seq._;
and Sybaris, iv. 413 _seq._;
capture of, by Dionysius, xi. 22;
expedition from Syracuse to, xii. 397.

_Krypteia_, ii. 378.

_Kteatos_ and Eurytos, i. 141.

_Ktêsias_ and Herodotus on Cyrus, iv. 185;
on Darius, iv. 264.

_Ktesiphon_, xi. 371, xii. 286 _seq._

_Kunaxa_, battle of, ix. 42 _seq._

_Kurêtes_, ceremonies of, i. 31.

_Kyaxarês_, iii. 231, 254.

_Kydonta_, vi. 203.

_Kyknus_, i. 294.

_Kylôn the Athenian_, attempted usurpation of, iii. 81 _seq._

_Kylôn of Krotôn_, iv. 409.

_Kyllyrii_ at Syracuse, v. 206.

_Kymæans_ and Pactyas, iv. 201.

_Kymê_, iii. 190;
Alkibiadês at, viii. 153.

_Kynegeirus_, iv. 350.

_Kynossêma_, battle of, viii. 109 _seq._

_Kynurians_, ii. 303;
in Argolis, ii. 451.

_Kypselus_, iii. 40;
fall of the dynasty of, iii. 43.

_Kyrênê_, foundation of, iv. 29 _seq._;
situation, fertility and prosperity of, iv. 31 _seq._;
and the Libyans, iv. 35 _seq._, 42 _seq._;
second migration of Greeks to, iv. 41;
and Egypt, iv. 42;
reform of, by Demônax, iv. 43;
Periœki at, iv. 45;
third immigration to, iv. 46;
submission of, to Kambysês, iv. 220;
history of, from about B. C. 450 to 306, xii. 428 _seq._;
Ophellas, viceroy of, xii. 431 _seq._

_Kythera_, capture of, by the Athenians, vi. 365 _seq._

_Kytinium_, occupation of, by Philip, xi. 498.

_Kyzikus_ and the Argonauts, i. 234;
revolt of, from Athens, viii. 112;
siege of, by Mindarus, viii. 120;
battle of, viii. 121.

_Labdalum_, vii. 248, 269.

_Lacedæmonian_ envoys to Persia, B. C. 430, vi. 181;
embassy to Athens about the prisoners in Sphakteria, vi. 325 _seq._;
reinforcement to Brasidas in Chalkidikê, vi. 449;
envoys at the congress at Corinth, B. C. 421, vii. 15;
envoys at Athens, about Panaktum and Pylus, vii. 29;
embassy to Athens, against the alliance of Athens with Argos,
vii. 44 _seq._;
army, vii. 79, 81 _n._ 2;
assembly, speech of Alkibiadês in, vii. 237 _seq._;
fleet under Agesandridas, viii. 66, 71;
fleet victory of, near Eretria, viii. 72 _seq._;
_mora_, destruction of a, by Iphikrates, ix. 350 _seq._;
auxiliaries to the Phokians at Thermopylæ, xi. 419, 421.

_Lacedæmonians_ and Cyrus the Great, iv. 199;
attack of, upon Polykratês, iv. 243;
and Themistoklês, v. 149, 278, 280;
and Mardonius’s offer of peace to the Athenians, v. 151 _seq._;
invoke the aid of their allies against the Helots, v. 316;
dismiss their Athenian auxiliaries against the Helots,
v. 317 _seq._;
expedition of, into Bœotia, B. C. 458, v. 327 _seq._;
victory of, at Tanagra, v. 328;
proceedings of, on Phormio’s victory over the Peloponnesian fleet
near Rhium, vi. 202;
proceedings of, for the recovery of Pylus, vi. 319, 320 _seq._;
occupation of Sphakteria by, vi. 320, 347;
blockade of, in Sphakteria, vi. 324 _seq._, 333 _seq._, 342 _seq._;
offers of peace from, after the capture of Sphakteria, vi. 353;
assassination of Helots by, vi. 368 _seq._;
and the Peace of Nikias, vii. 3;
liberate the Arcadian subjects of Mantinea, and plant Helots at
Lepreum, vii. 21;
exclusion of, from the Olympic festival, vii. 57 _seq._;
detachment of, to reinforce Epidaurus, B. C. 419, vii. 70;
and their allies, invasions of Argos by, vii. 71 _seq._, 102;
Gylippus sent to Syracuse by, vii. 242;
fortification of Dekeleia by, vii. 288, 354;
and the Four Hundred, viii. 65;
recapture of Pylus by, viii. 131;
defeat of, at Arginusæ, viii. 173 _seq._;
repayment of, by the Athenians, after the restoration of the
democracy, B. C. 403, viii. 305;
assassination of Alkibiadês demanded by, viii. 313;
the Cyreians under, ix. 170, 174, 208, 217, 318;
and Dorieus, ix. 271 _seq._;
and Corinthians, conflicts between, B. C. 393, ix. 326 _seq._;
victory of, within the Long Walls of Corinth, ix. 333 _seq._;
and the Olynthian confederacy, x. 56;
seizure of the Kadmeia at Thebes by, x. 60 _seq._;
trial and execution of Ismenias by, x. 64;
their surrender of the Kadmeia at Thebes, x. 88 _seq._;
defeat of, at Tegyra, x. 134;
expulsion of, from Bœotia, B. C. 374, x. 135;
at Kromnus, x. 316 _seq._;
at Mantinea, B. C. 362, x. 329, 335, 338, 340 _seq._;
and Alexander, xii. 13.

_Lachês_, expedition to Sicily under, vii. 132.

_Lachesis_, i. 7.

_Laconia_, genealogy of, i. 168;
population of, ii. 362;
gradual conquest of, ii. 417;
modern, ii. 418 _n._ 3, 454 _n._;
invasions of, by Epaminondas, x. 215 _seq._, 330 _seq._;
western, abstraction of, from Sparta, x. 226 _seq._

_Ladê_, combined Ionic fleet at, iv. 300 _seq._;
victory of Persian fleet at, iv. 304.

_Laius_ and Œdipus, i. 265.

_Lakes_ and marshes of Greece, ii. 219.

_Lamachus_, vii. 148, 190 _seq._, 256.

_Lamia_, Antipater at, xii. 315 _seq._

_Lamian_ war, xii. 315 _seq._, 334.

_Lampsakus_, revolt of, viii. 94;
recovery of, by Strombichidês, viii. 96.

_Language_, Greek, dialects of, ii. 239.

_Lanikê_, xii. 208.

_Laocoôn_, i. 303.

_Laomedôn_, i. 57, 285.

_Laphystios_, Zeus, i. 127.

_Laphystius_ and Timoleon, xi. 192.

_Larissa_, Asiatic, iii. 191 _n._ 1, 192.

_Lash_, use of, by Xerxes, v. 24, 31.

_Lasthenes_ and Euthykrates, xi. 351, 352.

_Latin_, Oscan, and Greek languages, iii. 354.

_Latium_, emigration from Arcadia to, iii. 351 _n._ 3;
plunder of, by Dionysius, xi. 25.

_Latins_, Œnotrians and Epirots, relationship of, iii. 351.

_Latona_ and Zeus, offspring of, i. 10.

_Laurium_, mines of, v. 55 _seq._

_Laws_, authority of, in historical Athens, ii. 81;
of Solon, iii. 131 _seq._;
of Zaleukus, iii. 382;
and psephisms, distinction between, v. 373;
enactment and repeal of, at Athens, v. 373 _seq._

_Layard’s_ “Nineveh and its Remains”, iii. 305.

_Learchus_ and Eryxô, iv. 43.

_Lebedos_, revolt of, from Athens, vii. 383.

_Lechæum_, capture of, by the Lacedæmonians, ix. 345 _n._ 1, 348.

_Leda_, and Tyndareus, i. 168 _seq._

_Legend_ of Dêmêtêr, i. 39 _seq._;
of the Delphian oracle, i. 45;
of Pandôra, i. 75 _n._ 4, 76;
of Io, i. 84 _seq._;
of Hêraklês, i. 93 _seq._;
Argonatic, i. 234 _n._ 3, 245 _seq._, 255 _seq._;
of Troy, i. 289 _seq._;
of the Minyæ from Lemnos, ii. 27;
and history, Grecian, blank between, ii. 31 _seq._

_Legendary_ Greece, social state of, ii. 57-118;
poems of Greece, value of, ii. 55 _seq._

_Legends_, mystic, i. 32 _seq._;
of Apollo, i. 45 _seq._;
of Greece, originally isolated, afterwards thrown into series,
i. 105;
of Mêdea and Jasôn, i. 118 _n._;
change of feeling with regard to, i. 186;
Attic, i. 191;
ancient, deeply rooted in the faith of the Greeks, i. 217, 348;
of Thebes, i. 256 _seq._;
divine, allegorized, heroic historicized, i. 424;
of saints, i. 469 _seq._;
of Asia Minor, iii. 227.

_Lekythus_, capture of, by Brasidas, vi. 425.

_Leleges_, ii. 264.

_Lelex_, i. 172.

_Lemnos_ and the Argonauts, i. 233;
early condition of, iv. 28;
conquest of, by Otanês, iv. 278;
Miltiadês at, iv. 279 _seq._

_Lending_ houses, iii. 162.

_Leokrates_, xi. 504.

_Leon_ and Diomedon, vii. 385 _seq._; viii. 28.

_Leon the Spartan_, viii. 20, 94.

_Leon_, mission of, to Persia, x. 278, 280.

_Leonidas_ at Thermopylæ, v. 76 _seq._, 89 _seq._

_Leonnatus_, xii. 317, 321.

_Leontiades_, the oligarchy under, x. 29 _n._;
conspiracy of, x. 58 _seq._;
at Sparta, x. 62;
Thebes under, x. 79, 80;
conspiracy against, x. 81 _seq._;
death of, x. 86.

_Leontini_, iii. 364;
intestine dissention at, vii. 140;
Demos at, apply to Athens, vii. 142, 143;
Dionysius at, B. C. 396, x. 442, 468, 492;
the mercenaries of Dionysius at, xi. 2;
Philistus at, xi. 99;
Dion at, xi. 106, 108, 109;
Hiketas at, xi. 160, 170;
surrender of, to Timoleon, xi. 182.

_Leosthenes the admiral_, x. 370.

_Leosthenes the general_, xii. 311, 313 _seq._

_Leotychides the Prokleid_, ii. 430;
chosen king of Sparta, iv. 326;
and Æginetan hostages, iv. 328, v. 46;
at Mykalê, v. 193;
banishment of, v. 259.

_Leotychides, son of Agis II._, ix. 242, 244.

_Lepreum_ and Elis, ii. 440, vii. 18;
Brasidean Helots at, vii. 21.

_Leptines, brother of Dionysius_, x. 489, 491, 495, xi. 13, 33, 42.

_Leptines the Athenian_, xi. 272.

_Leptines, general of Agathokles_, xii. 434, 441.

_Lesbians_, their application to Sparta, vi. 76.

_Lesbos_, early history of, iii. 193 _seq._;
autonomous ally of Athens, vi. 2;
Athenian kleruchs in, vi. 257;
application from, to Agis, vii. 365;
expedition of the Chians against, vii. 382 _seq._;
Thrasyllus at, viii. 102;
Kallikratidas in, viii. 166;
Thrasybulus in, ix. 166;
Memnon in, xii. 105;
recovery of, by Macedonian admirals, xii. 141.

_Lethe_, i. 7.

_Letô_, i. 6, 10.

_Leukas_, iii. 404 _seq._

_Leukon_ of Bosporus, xii. 481.

_Leukothea_, the temple of, i. 242.

_Leuktra_, the battle of, x. 176 _seq._;
treatment of Spartans defeated at, x. 192 _seq._;
extension of Theban power after the battle of, x. 193;
proceedings in Peloponnesus after the battle of, x. 198, 242;
position of Sparta after the battle of, x. 201;
proceedings in Arcadia after the battle of, x. 204 _seq._;
proceedings and views of Epaminondas after the battle of,
x. 213 _seq._

_Libya_, first voyages of Greeks to, iv. 29;
nomads of, iv. 38 _seq._;
expedition of Kambyses against, iv. 220.

_Libyans_ and Greeks at Kyrênê, iv. 39 _seq._;
and Dionysius, x. 510.

_Liby-Phœnicians_, x. 332.

_Lichas_ and bones of Orestes, ii. 447;
and the Olympic festival, iv. 72 _n._ 2, vii. 53 _n._, 59;
mission of to Milêtus, vii. 397, 398, viii. 98.

_Lilybæum_, defeat of Dionysius near, xi. 45.

_Limos_, i. 7, 10, _n._ 6.

_Lion_, the Nemean, i. 7.

_Lissus_, foundation of, xi. 24.

_Livy_, his opinion as to the chances of Alexander, if he had attacked
the Romans, xii. 260;
on the character of Alexander, xii. 265 _n._ 3.

_Lixus_ and Tingis, iii. 273 _n._ 1.

_Loans_ on interest, iii. 109, 159.

_Localities_, epical, i. 245.

_Lochages_, Spartan, ii. 459.

_Lochus_, Spartan, ii. 458 _seq._;
Macedonian, xii. 60.

_Logographers_ and ancient mythes, i. 377, 390 _seq._

_Lokri, Epizephrian_, early history of, iii. 379 _seq._;
and Dionysius, x. 476, xi. 17, 21, 23;
Dionysius the Younger at, xi. 105, 132 _seq._

_Lokrian_ coast opposite Eubœa, Athenian ravage of, vi. 136.

_Lokrians_, ii. 287;
Ozolian, ii. 290;
Italian, iii. 380 _seq._, iv. 172 _n._;
of Opus and Leonidas, v. 76;
and Phokians, xi. 251, 253;
of Amphissa, xi. 469.

_Lokris_ and Athens, v. 331.

_Long Walls_ at Megara, v. 324;
at Athens, v. 325 _seq._, 327, 331, vi. 20, viii. 231,
ix. 328 _seq._;
at Corinth, ix. 340 _seq._

_Lucanians_, xi. 9 _seq._, 132.

_Lucretius_ and ancient mythes, i. 430 _n._

_Lydia_, early history of, iii. 220 _seq._

_Lydian_ music and instruments, iii. 212, 219;
monarchy, iii. 262, iv. 191 _seq._

_Lydians_, iii. 215 _seq._, 219, iv. 198.

_Lykæus_, Zeus, i. 174.

_Lykambes_ and Archilochus, iv. 81.

_Lykaôn_ and his fifty sons, i. 173 _seq._

_Lykia_, conquest of, by Alexander, xii. 99.

_Lykidas_, the Athenian senator, v. 155.

_Lykomedes_, x. 259 _seq._, 281, 288.

_Lykophrôn, son of Periander_, iii. 42.

_Lykophrôn, despot of Pheræ_, xi. 261, 292, 294.

_Lykurgus the Spartan_, laws and discipline of, ii. 337-349, 381-421.

_Lykurgus the Athenian_, xii. 278, 378.

_Lykus_, i. 204; and Dirkê, i. 263.

_Lynkeus_ and Idas, i. 172.

_Lyre_, Hermes the inventor of, i. 59.

_Lyric poetry_, Greek, ii. 136, iv. 73, 93.

_Lysander_, appointments of, as admiral, viii. 138 _n._, 212;
character and influence of, viii. 139, ix. 309;
and Cyrus the Younger, viii. 140 _seq._, 214, 215;
factions organized by, in the Asiatic cities, viii. 143;
at Ephesus, viii. 152, 212;
victory of, at Notium, viii. 153;
superseded by Kallikratidas, viii. 162;
revolution at Milêtus by the partisans of, viii. 213;
operations of, after the battle of Arginusæ, viii. 215 _seq._;
victory of, at Ægospotami, viii. 217 _seq._;
proceedings of, after the battle of Ægospotami, viii. 222;
at Athens, viii. 226 _seq._, 237;
conquest of Samos by, viii. 238;
triumphant return of, to Sparta, viii. 238;
ascendency and arrogance of, after the capture of Athens, viii. 261,
ix. 204, 236 _seq._;
opposition to, at Sparta, viii. 262, ix. 204;
contrasted with Kallikratidas, viii. 263;
expedition of, against Thrasybulus, viii. 274;
dekarchies established by, ix. 184 _seq._, 197;
contrasted with Brasidas, ix. 195;
recall and temporary expatriation of, ix. 205;
introduction of gold and silver to Sparta by, ix. 230 _seq._;
intrigues of, to make himself king, ix. 237, 239 _seq._, 300;
and Agesilaus, ix. 242 _seq._, 257, 260 _seq._;
and the Bœotian war, ix. 292, 295;
death of, ix. 296.

_Lysias_, seizure of, by the Thirty at Athens, viii. 248;
speech of, against Phormisius’s disfranchising proposition,
viii. 294;
proposed citizenship of, viii. 309;
oration of, against Ergoklês, ix. 367;
oration of, at Olympia, B. C. 384, x. 73 _seq._;
panegyrical oration of, xi. 29 _seq._, 35 _n._

_Lysikles_, vi. 232.

_Lysikles, general at Chæoroneia_, xi. 502.

_Lysimachus_, confederacy of, with Kassander, Ptolemy, and Seleukus,
against Antigonus, xii. 367, 372, 383;
Kassander, Ptolemy, and Seleukus, pacification of, with Antigonus,
xii. 371;
and Amastris, xii. 468;
and Arsinoê, xii. 469 _seq._;
death of, xii. 470;
and the Pentapolis on the south-west coast of the Euxine, xii. 472.

_Macedonia_, Mardonius in, iv. 313;
Perdikkas and Brasidas in, vi. 449, 453 _seq._;
increasing power of, from B. C. 414, x. 44;
and Athens, contrasted, x. 47;
kings of, after Archelaus, x. 48;
state of, B. C. 370, x. 248, 249;
Iphikrates in, x. 250 _seq._;
Timotheus in, x. 300;
government of, xi. 210 _seq._;
military condition of, under Philip, xi. 282 _seq._, xii. 55 _seq._;
and conquered Greece, xii. 1, 52;
and the Greeks, on Alexander’s accession, xii. 9;
Antipater, viceroy of, xii. 67, 68;
and Sparta, war between, xii. 281 _seq._;
Grecian confederacy against, after Alexander’s death,
xii. 313 _seq._;
Kassander in, xii. 366;
Demetrius Poliorketes acquires the crown of, xii. 389.

_Macedonian_ dynasty, iv. 12, 13;
envoys at Athens, xi. 387, 390, 398;
phalanx, xi. 501, xii. 59 _seq._, 251;
interventions in Greece, B. C. 336-335, xii. 16 _seq._;
pike, xii. 57, 101 _seq._;
troops, xii. 61 _seq._;
officers of Alexander’s army in Asia, xii. 72;
fleet, master of the Ægean, xii. 141;
soldiers of Alexander, mutiny of, xii. 242 _seq._

_Macedonians_, ii. 233, iv. 1 _n._, 8 _seq._;
conquered by Megabazus, iv. 276;
poverty and rudeness of, xi. 283;
military aptitude of, xii. 67;
small loss of, at the battle of the Granikus, xii. 86.

_Machaôn_ and Podaleirius, i. 180.

_Mæandrius_, iv. 245 _seq._

_Mæonians_ and Lydians, iii. 219.

_Magians_, massacre of, after the assassination of Smerdis, iv. 225.

_Magistrates_ of early Athens, v. 352 _seq._;
Athenian, from the time of Periklês, v. 355, 357, 366 _seq._

_Magna Græcia_, iii. 399.

_Magnesia_, iii. 179, 192; Xerxes’s fleet near, v. 84 _seq._;
on the Pagasæan Gulf, xi. 304 _n._ 3.

_Magnetes_, Thessalian and Asiatic, ii. 285.

_Magon_, off Katana, x. 495;
near Abakæna, xi. 6;
at Agyrium, xi. 7;
death of, xi. 41.

_Magon_ and Hiketas, xi. 156 _seq._;
death of, xi. 171.

_Maia_ and Zeus, offspring of, i. 10.

_Makrônes_ and the Ten Thousand, ix. 112.

_Malians_, ii. 282.

_Malli_, xii. 234.

_Mallus_, Alexander at, xii. 114.

_Mamerkus_ and Timoleon, xi. 180 _seq._

_Manetho_ and the Sothiac period, iii. 339 _seq._

_Mania_, sub-satrap of Æolis, ix. 214 _seq._

_Mantinea_ and Tegea, ii. 442 _seq._, vi. 452, vii. 14;
and Sparta, ii. 444, vii. 20, 94, x. 35 _seq._;
and Argos, vii. 19;
congress at, vii. 81 _seq._;
battle of, B. C. 418, vii. 81 _seq._;
expedition of Agesipolis to, x. 36 _seq._;
and the river Ophis, x. 36 _n._ 2;
re-establishment of, x. 205 _seq._;
march of Agesilaus against, x. 211 _seq._;
muster of Peloponnesian enemies to Thebes at, x. 329;
attempted surprise of, by the cavalry of Epaminondas, x. 332 _seq._;
battle of, B. C. 362, x. 335 _seq._, 357;
peace concluded after the battle of, x. 350.

_Mantineans_ and the Pan-Arcadian union, x. 322 _seq._;
opposition of to Theban intervention, x. 326.

_Mantinico-Tegeatic_ plain, x. 338.

_Mantitheus_ and Aphepsion, vii. 200 _seq._

_Mantô_, iii. 184.

_Marakanda_, Alexander at, xii. 204, 207 _seq._

_Marathon_, battle of, iv. 342-360.

_Marathus_ surrenders to Alexander, xii. 130.

_Mardi_ and Alexander, xii. 178, 188.

_Mardonius_, in Ionia, iv. 313;
in Thrace and Macedonia, iv. 315;
fleet of, destroyed near Mount Athos, iv. 314;
urges Xerxes to invade Greece, v. 3 _seq._, 7;
advice of, to Xerxes after the battle of Salamis, v. 138;
forces left with, in Thessaly, v. 141;
and Medizing Greeks, after Xerxes’s retreat, v. 148;
in Bœotia, v. 149, 158 _seq._;
offers of peace to Athens by, v. 150 _seq._, 154;
at Athens, v. 154;
and his Phokiôn contingent, v. 161;
on the Asôpus, v. 167;
at Platæa, v. 169 _seq._

_Marine_, military, unfavorable to oligarchy, iii. 31.

_Maritime_ and inland cities contrasted, ii. 225.

_Marpessa_ and Idas, i. 172.

_Marriage_ in legendary Greece, ii. 83;
among the Spartans, ii. 386;
among the Hindoos, iii. 141 _n._ 2.

_Marshes_ and lakes of Greece, ii. 219.

_Marsyas_, iii. 213, 213 _n._ 1.

_Masistes_, v. 199.

_Masistius_, v. 164.

_Maskames_, v. 295.

_Massagetæ_, iii. 245.

_Massalia_, iii. 280, 348, 400 _seq._, xii. 453 _seq._

_Mausôlus_ and the Social War, xi. 222.

_Mazæus_ at Thapsakus, xii. 150;
at the battle of Arbela, xii. 164, 165;
surrender of Babylon by, xii. 168;
appointed satrap of Babylon by Alexander, xii. 169.

_Mazares_, iv. 200 _seq._

_Medea_ and the Argonauts, i. 237 _seq._

_Medes_, early history of, iii. 224 _seq._;
and Persians, iv. 183, 224 _seq._

_Media_, the wall of, iii. 304 _n._ 2, ix. 63, 65 _n._;
Darius a fugitive in, xii. 178, 180.

_Medius_, xii. 254.

_Medus_, i. 205 _n._ 4, 242.

_Medusa_, i. 7, 90.

_Megabates_, iv. 283, 284.

_Megabazus_, iv. 275, 276.

_Megabyzus_, v. 333.

_Megaklês_, iii. 37 _n._, 38, 82.

_Megalêpolis_, capture of, by Agathokles, xii. 414.

_Megalopolis_, foundation of, ii. 448, x. 224 _seq._, 233 _n._ 6;
the centre of the Pan-Arcadian confederacy, x. 232;
disputes at, x. 358;
and Sparta, xi. 198, 263, 290, 300 _seq._

_Megapenthes_ and Perseus, i. 90.

_Megara_, early history of, iii. 2, 44 _seq._;
Corinth and Sikyôn, analogy of, iii. 47;
and Athens, iii. 90 _seq._, v. 321, 348, 351 _n._, 352, vi. 76,
370 _seq._;
Long Walls at, v. 322;
Brasidas at, vi. 375 _seq._;
revolution at, vi. 378 _seq._;
Philippizing faction at, xi. 449.

_Megara in Sicily_, iii. 365, v. 215.

_Megarian Sicily_, iii. 365.

_Megarians_ under Pausanias, and Persian cavalry under Masistius,
v. 164;
repudiate the peace of Nikias, vi. 493, vii. 2;
refuse to join Argos, vii. 16;
recovery of Nisea by, viii. 131.

_Megarid_, Athenian ravage of, in the Peloponnesian war, vi. 137.

_Meidias of Skepsis_, ix. 213 _seq._

_Meidias the Athenian_, xi. 343, 343 _n._ 2.

_Meilaniôn_ and Atalanta, i. 149.

_Meilichios_, meaning of, ix. 171 _n._

_Melampus_, i. 33, 109, 398, v. 89.

_Melannippus_ and Tydeus, i. 274, 279.

_Melanthus_, ii. 23.

_Meleager_, legend of, i. 143 _seq._

_Meleagrides_, i. 145.

_Melesippus_, vi. 126.

_Melian_ nymphs, i. 5.

_Melissus_, vi. 28, viii. 341, 343.

_Melkarth_, temple of, iii. 269.

_Melon_, x. 81 _seq._, 88.

_Melos_, settlement of, ii. 28;
expedition against, under Nikias, vi. 295;
capture of, vii. 109 _seq._;
Antisthenês at, vii. 396.

_Memnôn, son of Tithônus_, i. 298.

_Memnôn the Rhodian_, operations of, between Alexander’s accession and
landing in Asia, xii. 49, 77;
and Mentor, xii., 75;
advice of, on Alexander’s landing in Asia, xii. 78;
made commander-in-chief of the Persians, xii. 92;
at Halikarnassus, xii. 95 _seq._;
his progress with the Persian fleet, and death, xii. 105 _seq._;
change in the plan of Darius after his death, xii. 107, 109.

_Memphis_, Alexander at, xii. 146.

_Men_, races of, in “Works and Days”, i. 64 _seq._

_Mende_, and Athens, vi. 441 _seq._

_Menedæus_, and the Ambrakiots, vi. 305 _seq._

_Menekleidas_ and Epaminondas, x. 268, 305 _seq._

_Menekles_, viii. 203.

_Menelaus_, i. 162 _seq._, iii. 269 _n._ 4.

_Menestheus_, i. 312, ii. 22.

_Menœkeus_, i. 274.

_Menœtius_, i. 6, 8.

_Menon the Thessalian_, ix. 30, 71.

_Menon the Athenian_, x. 373.

_Mentor the Rhodian_, xi. 439 _seq._, xii. 75.

_Mercenary_ soldiers, multiplication of, in Greece after the
Peloponnesian war, xi. 281 _seq._

_Mermnads_, Lydian dynasty of, iii. 221.

_Meroe_, connection of, with Egyptian institutions, iii. 313.

_Messapians_, iii. 391;
and Tarentines, xii. 394.

_Messene_, foundation of, ii. 422, iii. 366;
foundation of, by Epaminondas, x. 225, 233 _n._ 6, 261;
and Sparta, x. 290, 350, xi. 198, 263, 290.

_Messene, in Sicily_, chorus sent to Rhegium from, iv. 53 _n._;
re-colonization of, by Anaxilaus, v. 213;
Laches at, vii. 134;
Athenian fleet near, vii. 136;
Alkibiades at, vii. 193;
Nikias at, vii. 223;
and Dionysius, x. 474 _seq._, xi. 3;
Imilkon at, x. 492 _seq._;
and Timoleon, xi. 158.

_Messenia_, Dorian settlements in, ii. 8, 311.

_Messenian_ genealogy, i. 172; wars, ii. 421-438;
victor proclaimed at Olympia, B. C. 368, x. 262.

_Messenians_ and Spartans, early proceedings of, ii. 328;
expelled by Sparta, ix. 229, xi. 3;
plan of Epaminondas for the restoration of, x. 214.

_Messenians in Sicily_, defeated by Naxians and Sikels, vii. 135.

_Metaneira_, i. 38.

_Metapontium_, iii. 386.

_Methana_, Athenian Garrion at, vi. 451.

_Methône_, iv. 23;
Philip at, xi. 260.

_Methône in Peloponnesus_, Athenian assault upon, vi. 134.

_Methymna_, vi. 222, 225;
Kallikratidas at, viii. 164.

_Metics_, and the Thirty at Athens, viii. 247.

_Metis_ and Zeus, daughter of, i. 9.

_Metrodorus_, i. 419, 444 _n._

_Metropolis_, relation of a Grecian, to its colonies, vi. 60 _n._

_Midas_, iii. 209, 217.

_Middle ages_, monarchy in, iii. 8 _seq._

_Mikythus_, v. 230, 231, 238.

_Milesian_ colonies in the Troad, i. 339.

_Milesians_ and Lichas, viii. 98;
and Kallikratidas, viii. 164.

_Miletus_, early history of, iii. 176 _seq._;
and Alyattês, iii. 255 _seq._;
and Crœsus, iii. 258;
sieges of, by the Persians, iv. 290, 305;
Histiæus of, iv. 273 _seq._, 277, 280, 284, 298 _seq._;
Phrynichus’s tragedy on the capture of, iv. 309;
exiles from, at Zanklê, v. 211 _seq._;
and Samos, dispute between, vi. 26;
revolt of, from Athens, vii. 375, 385, 387 _seq._;
Tissaphernes at, vii. 376, 399;
Lichas at, vii. 399;
Peloponnesian fleet at, viii. 25, 94, 95 _seq._, 99;
revolution at, by the partisans of Lysander, viii. 213;
capture of, by Alexander, xii. 92 _seq._

_Military_ array of legendary and historical Greece, ii. 106 _seq._;
divisions not distinct from civil in any Grecian cities but Sparta,
ii. 456;
force of early oligarchies, iii. 31;
order, Egyptian, iii. 316;
arrangements, Kleisthenean, iv. 136.

_Miltas_, xi. 88.

_Miltiades the First_, iv. 117.

_Miltiades the Second_, iv. 119;
and the bridge over the Danube, iv. 271, 274 _n._ 2;
his retirement from the Chersonese, iv. 274;
capture of Lemnos and Imbros by, iv. 278;
escape of, from Persian pursuit, iv. 307;
adventures and character of, iv. 334 _seq._;
elected general, 490 B. C., iv. 341;
and the battle of Marathon, iv. 343 _seq._;
expedition of, against Paros, iv. 363;
disgrace, punishment, and death of, iv. 365 _seq._

_Milto_, ix. 47.

_Miltokythes_, x. 372, 378.

_Milton_ on the early series of British kings, i. 484;
his treatment of British fabulous history, i. 487.

_Mimnermus_, iv. 82.

_Mindarus_, supersedes Astyochus, viii. 98;
deceived by Tissaphernês, viii. 99;
removal of, from Milêtus to Chios, viii. 181;
eludes Thrasyllus and reaches the Hellespont, viii. 102, 103 _n._;
at the Hellespont, viii. 109;
Peloponnesian fleet summoned from Eubœa by, viii. 111;
siege of Kyzikus by, viii. 121;
death of, viii. 121.

_Mineral_ productions of Greece, ii. 229.

_Minôa_, capture of, by Nikias, vi. 285.

_Minôs_, i. 219 _seq._

_Minôtaur_, the, i. 220 _seq._

_Minyæ_, i. 130, ii. 26 _seq._

_Minyas_, i. 128 _seq._

_Miraculous_ legends, varied interpretation of, i. 472 _n._ 2.

_Mistake_ of ascribing to an unrecording age the historical sense of
modern times, i. 432.

_Mitford_, his view of the anti-monarchical sentiment of Greece,
iii. 12 _seq._

_Mithridates the Persian_, ix. 87 _seq._

_Mithridates of Pontus_, xii. 463.

_Mithrines_, xii. 90, 207.

_Mitylenæan_ envoys, speech of, to the Peloponnesians at Olympia,
vi. 226 _seq._;
prisoners sent to Athens by Pachês, vi. 243, 255.

_Mityleneans_ at Sigeium, i. 339.

_Mitylênê_, iii. 193; political dissensions and poets of, iii. 198;
revolt of, from Athens, vi. 221 _seq._;
blockade of, by Pachês, vi. 237 _seq._;
and the Athenian assembly, vi. 244, 246 _seq._;
loss and recovery of, by Athens, B. C. 412, vii. 383, 384;
Kallikratidas at, viii. 167 _seq._;
removal of Kallikratidas from, viii. 170;
Eteonikus at, viii. 170, 174, 189;
blockade of, by Memnon, xii. 105;
surrender of, by Chares, xii. 142.

_Mnassippus_, expedition of, to Korkyra, x. 142 _seq._

_Mnêmosynê_, i. 5, 10.

_Mnesiphilus_, v. 122.

_Mœræ_, and Crœsus, iv. 194 _seq._

_Mœris_, lake of, iii. 322 _n._ 1.

_Molionids_, the, i. 140.

_Molossian_ kingdom of Epirus, xii. 395.

_Molossians_, iii. 413 _seq._

_Molossus_, i. 189.

_Mômus_, i. 7.

_Monarchy_, in mediæval and modern Europe, iii. 8 _seq._;
aversion to, in Greece, after the expulsion of Hippias, iv. 176.

_Money_, coined, not known to Homeric or Hesiodic Greeks, ii. 116;
coined, first introduction of, into Greece, ii. 320.

_Money-lending_ at Florence in the middle ages, iii. 109 _n._;
and the Jewish law, iii. 111 _n._;
and ancient philosophers, iii. 113.

_Money-standard_, Solon’s debasement of, iii. 100;
honestly maintained at Athens after Solon, iii. 114.

_Monsters_, offspring of the gods, i. 11.

_Monstrous_ natures associated with the gods, i. 1.

_Monts de Piété_, iii. 162.

_Monuments_ of the Argonautic expedition, i. 241 _seq._

_Moon_, eclipse of, B. C. 413, vii. 315;
eclipse of, B. C. 331, xii. 151.

_Mopsus_, iii. 184.

_Mora_, Spartan, ii. 458 _seq._;
destruction of a Spartan, by Iphikrates, ix. 351 _seq._

_Moral_ and social feeling in legendary Greece, ii. 79.

_Moralizing_ Greek poets, iv. 91 _seq._

_Mosynæki_, and the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 128.

_Mothakes_, ii. 418.

_Motyê_, capture of, by Dionysius, x. 485 _seq._;
recapture of, by Imilkon, x. 490.

_Motyum_, Duketius at, vii. 123.

_Mountainous_ systems of Greece, ii. 212 _seq._

_Müller_ on Sparta as the Dorian type, ii. 342.

_Multitude_, sentiment of a, compared with that of individuals,
ix. 279.

_Munychia_ and Peiræus, Themistoklês’ wall round, v. 249;
Menyllus in, xii. 326, 339;
Nikanor in, xii. 339, 345.

_Muse_, inspiration and authority of the, i. 355.

_Muses_, the, i. 10.

_Music_, ethical effect of old Grecian, ii. 433;
Greek, improvements in, about the middle of the seventh century
B. C., iv. 77;
comprehensive meaning of, among the ancient Greeks, viii. 349.

_Musical_ modes of the Greeks, iii. 212.

_Musicians_, Greek, in the seventh century B. C., iv. 76 _n._

Μῦθος, i. 356, 432 _n._, 458.

_Mutilated_ Grecian captives at Persepolis, xii. 173.

_Mutilation_ of dead bodies in legendary and historical Greece,
ii. 92;
of Bessus, xii. 206.

_Mutiny_ at Athens immediately before Solon’s legislation, iii. 93.

_Mygdonia_, iii. 210.

_Mykalê_, Pan-Ionic festival at, iii. 177;
the battle of, v. 191 _seq._

_Mykalêssus_, massacre at, vii. 357 _seq._

_Myknæ_, i. 90 _seq._

_Myriandrus_, Alexander’s march from Kilikia to, xii. 114;
Alexander’s return from, xii. 117.

_Myrkinus_, iv. 273, 296.

_Myrmidons_, origin of, i. 184.

_Myrôn_, iii. 32.

_Myrônidês_, v. 323, 331.

_Myrtilus_, i. 159.

_Mysia_, the Ten Thousand Greeks in, ix. 172 _seq._

_Mysians_, iii. 196, 205 _seq._, 209.

_Mysteries_, principal Pan-Hellenic, i. 28, 38, 41, 43, v. 209 _n._;
and mythes, i. 496.

_Mystic_ legends, connection of, with Egypt, i. 32;
legends, contrast of, with Homeric hymns, i. 34;
brotherhoods, iii. 87.

_Mythe_ of Pandôra and Prometheus, now used in “Works and Days”,
i. 71;
meaning of the word, i. 356.

_Mythes_, how to be told, i. 2;
Hesiodic, traceable to Krête and Delphi, i. 15;
Grecian, origin of, i. 4, 52, 61 _seq._, 340 _seq._;
of the gods, discrepancies in, i. 53 _n._, 54;
contain gods, heroes and men, i. 64;
formed the entire mental stock of the early Greeks, i. 340, 359;
difficulty of regarding them in the same light as the ancients did,
i. 341;
Grecian, adapted to the personifying and patriotic tendencies of the
Greeks, i. 344 _seq._;
Grecian, beauty of, i. 351;
Grecian, how to understand properly, i. 351 _seq._;
how regarded by superior men in the age of Thucydides, i. 375;
accommodated to a more advanced age, i. 376 _seq._;
treatment of, by poets and logographers, i. 377 _seq._;
treatment of, by historians, i. 391 _seq._;
historicised, i. 409 _seq._;
treatment of, by philosophers, i. 418 _seq._;
allegorized, i. 419 _seq._;
semi-historical interpretation of, i. 433;
allegorical theory of, i. 436;
connection of, with mysteries, i, 436;
supposed ancient meaning of, i. 438;
Plato on, i. 441 _seq._, 420;
recapitulation of remarks on, i. 450 _seq._;
familiarity of the Greeks with, i. 456 _seq._;
bearing of, on Grecian art, i. 459 _seq._;
German, i. 363;
Grecian, proper treatment of, i. 487 _seq._;
Asiatic, iii. 221.

_Mythical_ world, opening of, i. 1;
sentiment in “Works and Days”, i. 68 _seq._;
geography, i. 246 _seq._;
faith in the Homeric age, i. 357;
genealogies, i. 445 _seq._;
age, gods and men undistinguishable in, i. 449;
events, relics of, i. 457;
account of the alliance between the Hêrakleids and Dorians, ii. 2;
races of Greece, ii. 19.

_Mythology_, Grecian, sources of our information on, i. 106;
German, Celtic, and Grecian, i. 462, 463;
Grecian, how it would have been affected by the introduction of
Christianity, B. C. 500, i. 467.

_Mythopæic_ faculty, stimulus to, i. 351;
age, the, i. 361;
tendencies, by what causes enfeebled, i. 361 _seq._;
tendencies in modern Europe, i. 469 _seq._

_Myûs_, iii. 172.

_Napoleon_, analogy between his relation to the confederation of the
Rhine, and that of Alexander to the Greeks, xii. 51.

_Nature_, first regarded as impersonal, i. 368.

_Naukraries_, iii. 52, 65.

_Naukratis_, iii. 327, 335 _seq._

_Naupaktus_, origin of the name, ii. 3;
Pharmio’s victory near, vi. 206 _seq._;
Eurylochus’s attack upon, vi. 301;
Demosthenês at, vi. 301;
naval battle at, B. C. 413, vii. 358 _seq._

_Nausinikus_, census in the archonship of, x. 115 _seq._

_Naval_ attack, Athenian, vi. 63.

_Naxians_ and Sikels, defeat of Messenians by, vii. 135.

_Naxos_, early power of, iii. 165;
expedition of Aristagoras against, iv. 282 _seq._;
Datis at, iv. 330;
revolt and reconquest of, v. 307.

_Naxos in Sicily_, iii. 363, vii. 193, x. 468.

_Nearchus_, voyages of, xii. 233, 235, 237, 238.

_Nebuchadnezzar_, iii. 333.

_Necklaces_ of Eriphylê and Helen, i. 287 _seq._

_Nectanebus_, xi. 440.

_Negative_ side of Grecian philosophy, viii. 345.

_Neileus_, or _Nêleus_, i. 109, ii. 24, iii. 173.

_Nekôs_, iii. 329 _seq._

_Nektanebis_, x. 362, 366.

_Nêleids_ down to Kodrus, i. 111.

_Nêleus_ and Pelias, i. 107 _seq._

_Nemean_ lion, the, i. 7;
games, ii. 461, iv. 65 _seq._

_Nemesis_, i. 7.

_Neobulê_ and Archilochus, iv. 81.

_Neon the Cyreian_, ix. 136 _seq._, 147.

_Neon the Corinthian_, xi. 156 _seq._

_Neoptolemus, son of Achilles_, i. 188, 300, 305.

_Neoptolemus the actor_, xi. 373.

_Nephelê_, i. 123 _seq._

_Nereas_, i. 7.

_Nereids_, i. 7.

_Nessus_, the centaur, i. 150.

_Nestor_, i. 110.

_Niebelungen_ Lied, i. 479.

_Nikæa_ on the Hydaspes, xii. 229, 233.

_Nikanor_, xii. 339, 354 _seq._

_Nikias_, at Minôa, vi. 285;
position and character of, vi. 285 _seq._;
and Kleon, vi. 287 _seq._, 457 _seq._;
at Mêlos, vi. 295;
in the Corinthian territory, vi. 355 _seq._;
at Mendê and Skiônê, vi. 441 _seq._;
peace of, vi. 490 _seq._ vii. 1 _seq._;
and the Spartans taken at Sphakteria, vii. 6 _seq._;
embassy of, to Sparta, vii. 44;
and Alkibiadês, vii. 104 _seq._, viii. 158;
appointed commander of the Sicilian expedition, B. C. 415, vii. 148;
speeches and influence of, on the Sicilian expedition, B. C. 415,
vii. 148 _seq._, 155, 159;
his plan of action in Sicily, vii. 191;
dilatory proceedings of, in Sicily, vii. 219, 225, 258 _seq._;
stratagem of, for approaching Syracuse, vii. 221;
at the battle near the Olympeion at Syracuse, vii. 220;
measures of, after his victory near the Olympeion at Syracuse,
vii. 223;
at Messênê in Sicily, vii. 223;
forbearance of the Athenians towards, vii. 225 _seq._;
at Katana, vii. 234;
in Sicily in the spring of B. C. 414, vii. 243;
his neglect in not preventing Gylippus’s approach to Sicily and
Syracuse, vii. 263 _seq._, 266 _seq._;
fortification of Cape Plenimyrium by, vii. 270;
at Epipolæ, vii. 272;
despatch of, to Athens for reinforcements, vii. 275 _seq._,
281 _seq._;
opposition of, to Demosthenês’s proposals for leaving Syracuse,
vii. 308 _seq._;
consent of, to retreat from Syracuse, vii. 313;
exhortations of, before the final defeat of the Athenians in the
harbor of Syracuse, vii. 321 _seq._;
and Demosthenês, resolution of, after the final defeat in the harbor
of Syracuse, vii. 330;
exhortations of, to the Athenians on their retreat from Syracuse,
vii. 333 _seq._;
and his division, surrender of, to Gylippus, vii. 343 _seq._,
347 _n._ 2;
and Demosthenês, treatment of, by their Syracusan conquerors,
vii. 346;
disgrace of, at Athens after his death, vii. 348;
opinion of Thucydidês about, vii. 349;
opinion and mistake of the Athenians about, vii. 351 _seq._

_Nikodromus_, v. 47.

_Nikoklês_, x. 26.

_Nikomachus the Athenian_, viii. 307 _seq._

_Nikomachus the Macedonian_, xii. 191, 194.

_Nikostratus_, vi. 271 _seq._, 440 _seq._

_Nikoteles_, x. 466.

_Nile_, the, iii. 309.

_Nineveh_, or _Ninus_, siege of, iii. 233;
capture of, iii. 255;
and Babylon, iii. 290;
site of, iii. 294 _n._ 2;
and its remains, iii. 305.

_Nine Ways_, nine defeats of the Athenians at the, x. 302 _n._ 1.

_Ninon_ and Kylon, iv. 409.

_Niobê_, i. 158.

_Nisæa_, alleged capture of, by Peisistratus, iii. 154 _n._;
connected with Megara by “Long Walls”, v. 324;
surrender of, to the Athenians, vi. 375 _seq._;
recovery of, by the Megarians, viii. 131.

_Nisus_, i. 205, 221.

_Nobles_, Athenian, early violence of, iv. 152.

_Nomads_, Libyan, iv. 35 _seq._

_Nomios_ Apollo, i. 61.

_Nomophylakes_, v. 371.

_Nomothetæ_, iii. 123, 125, v. 372, viii. 296.

_Non-Amphiktyonic_ races, ii. 270.

_Non-Hellenic_ practices, ii. 256.

_Non-Olympiads_, ii. 435.

_Notium_, iii. 183;
Pachês at, vi. 242;
recolonized from Athens, vi. 243;
battle of, viii. 153.

_Notus_, i. 6.

_Numidia_, Agathokles and the Carthaginians in, xii. 427.

_Nymphæum_, xi. 264, _n._ 1, xii. 480.

_Nymphs_, i. 5, 7.

_Nypsius_, xi. 107, 109, 111.

_Nyx_, i. 4, 6.

_Oarus_, fortresses near, iv. 266.

_Oath_ of mutual harmony at Athens, after the battle of Ægospotami,
viii. 225.

_Obæ_ ar Obês, ii. 361.

_Ocean_, ancient belief about, iii. 286 _n._

_Oceanic_ nymphs, i. 6.

_Oceanus_, i. 5, 6, 8.

_Ochus_, x. 367, xi. 437 _seq._, xii. 75 _seq._

_Odeon_, building of, vi. 31.

_Odes_ at festivals in honor of gods, i. 52.

_Odin_ and other gods degraded into men, i. 466.

_Odrysian_ kings, vi. 215 _seq._

_Odysseus_, i. 290;
and Palamêdês, i. 294;
and Ajax, i. 299;
steals away the Palladium, i. 302;
return of, from Troy, i. 309;
final adventures and death of, i. 314 _seq._;
at the agora in the second book of the Iliad, ii. 70 _seq._

_Odyssey_ and Iliad, date, structure, authorship and character of,
ii. 118-209.

_Œchalia_, capture of, i. 151.

_Œdipus_, i. 265 _seq._

_Œneus_ and his offspring, i. 143 _seq._

_Œnoê_, vi. 127, viii. 83, ix. 353.

_Œnomaus_ and Pelops, i. 158.

_Œnônê_, i. 301 _n._ 3.

_Œnophyta_, Athenian victory at, v. 331.

_Œnotria_, iii. 350 _seq._

_Œnotrians_, iii. 351, 375, 393.

_Œta_, path over Mount, v. 78.

_Œtæi_, ii. 213.

_Office_, admissibility of Athenians citizens to, iv. 113.

_Ogygês_, i. 194.

_Okypetê_, i. 7.

_Olbia_, xii. 474 _seq._

_Oligarchical_ government, change from monarchical to, in Greece,
iii. 15 _seq._;
party at Athens, v. 365, viii. 235 _seq._, 300 _seq._;
Greeks, corruption of, vii. 401;
conspiracy at Samos, viii. 6 _seq._, 26 _seq._;
conspiracy at Athens, viii. 15, 31 _seq._;
exiles, return of, to Athens, viii. 232.

_Oligarchies_ in Greece, iii. 17, 29, 30, 31.

_Oligarchy_, conflict of, with despotism, iii. 28;
vote of the Athenian assembly in favor of, viii. 14;
establishment of, in Athenian allied cities, viii. 34;
of the Four Hundred, viii. 36 _seq._, 45 _seq._, viii. 75, 88 _seq._

_Olive trees_, sacred, near Athens, iii. 135 _n._ 2, vi. 267 _n._ 3.

_Olpæ_, Demosthenes’s victory at, vi. 303 _seq._

_Olympia_, Agesipolis, and the oracle at, ix. 356;
Lysias at, x. 73 _seq._;
panegyrical oration of Isokrates at, x. 77;
occupation of, by the Arcadians, x. 315, 322;
topography of, x. 319 _n._ 2;
plunder of, by the Arcadians, x. 322 _seq._

_Olympias_, xi. 262, 512, 516, 519;
and Antipater, xii. 68, 254, 256 _n._ 2;
intrigues of, after Alexander’s death, xii. 333;
return of, from Epirus to Macedonia, xii. 340 _seq._, 366;
death of, xii. 366;
Epirus governed by, xii. 395 _n._ 2.

_Olympic_ games, and Aëthlius, i. 100;
origin of, i. 140;
presidency of, ii. 10, 317 _seq._;
nature and importance of, ii. 241, 242;
the early point of union between Spartans, Messenians, and Eleians,
ii. 334;
and the Delian festival, iv. 54;
celebrity, history and duration of, iv. 55 _seq._;
interference of, with the defence of Thermopylæ, v. 77;
and the Karneia, v. 77 _n._;
conversation of Xerxes on, v. 113;
of the 90th Olympiad, vii. 52 _seq._;
celebration of, by the Arcadians and Pisatans, x. 318 _seq._;
legation of Dionysius to, xi. 28 _seq._

_Olympieion_ near Syracuse, battle of, vii. 219 _seq._

_Olympus_, ii. 211.

_Olympus, the Phrygian_, iii. 213 _n._, iv. 75.

_Olynthiac_, the earliest, of Demosthenês, xi. 327 _seq._;
the second, of Demosthenês, xi. 331 _seq._;
the third, of Demosthenês, xi. 335 _seq._

_Olynthiacs_ of Demosthenês, order of, xi. 358 _seq._

_Olynthian_ confederacy, x. 50 _seq._, 68, 381, xi. 324;
war, xi. 325-363.

_Olynthus_, iv. 24;
capture and re-population of, by Artabazus, v. 149;
increase of, by Perdikkas, vi. 69;
expedition of Eudamidas against, x. 58;
Teleutias at, x. 65 _seq._;
Agesipolis at, x. 67;
submission of, to Sparta, x. 68;
alliance of, rejected by the Athenians, xi. 236;
alliance of, with Philip, xi. 236 _seq._;
secedes from the alliance of Philip, and makes peace with Athens,
xi. 319;
hostility of Philip to, xi. 320;
Philip’s half-brothers flee to, xi. 321;
intrigues of Philip in, xi. 321;
attack of Philip upon, xi. 325, 381;
alliance of, with Athens, xi. 326;
renewed application of, to Athens, against Philip, xi. 331;
assistance from Athens to, B. C. 350, xi. 334;
three expeditions from Athens to, B. C. 349-348, xi. 334 _n._, 349;
expedition of Athenians to, B. C. 349, xi. 346, 347;
capture of, by Philip, xi. 350 _seq._, 364, 365, 372.

_Oneirus_, i. 7, ii. 185.

_Oneium_, Mount, Epaminondas at, x. 254.

_Onesilus_, iv. 292 _seq._

_Onomakles_, viii. 84 _seq._

_Onamakritus_, v. 3.

_Onomarchus_, and the treasures in the temple at Delphi, xi. 255;
successes of, 256, 293;
at Chæroneia, xi. 257;
power of the Phokians under, xi. 261;
aid to Lykophron by, xi. 293;
death of, xi. 294.

_Ophellas_, xii. 428, 431 _seq._

_Ophis_, the, x. 36.

_Opici_, iii. 353.

_Opis_, Alexander’s voyage to, xii. 243.

_Oracle at Delphi_, legend of, i. 41;
and the Krêtans, i. 226 _n._ 2;
and the Battiad dynasty, iv. 43;
answers of, on Xerxes’s invasion, v. 60 _seq._

_Oracles_, consultation and authority of, among the Greeks, ii. 255;
in Bœotia consulted by Mardonius, v. 149.

_Orations_, funeral, of Periklês, vi. 31, 144 _seq._

_Orchomenians_, i. 313.

_Orchomenus_, ante-historical, i. 130 _seq._;
and Thêbes, i. 135, v. 159 _n._ 4, x. 194.

_Orchomenus_, early historical, ii. 273;
capitulation of, B. C. 418, vii. 75;
revolt of, from Thebes to Sparta, ix. 293;
and the Pan-Arcadian union, x. 209, 210;
destruction of, x. 311.

_Oreithyia_, i. 199.

_Orestês_, i. 163 _seq._;
and Agamemnôn transferred to Sparta, i. 165.

_Orestês_, bones of, ii. 447.

_Oreus_, xi. 449, 452.

_Orgies_, post-Homeric, i. 27.

_Orœtês_, iv. 226, 245.

_Orontês the Persian nobleman_, ix. 36, 40 _n._ 2.

_Orontês_, the Persian satrap, x. 22, 24.

_Orôpus_, vi. 383 _n._ 2, viii. 25, x. 286.

_Orphans_ in legendary and historical Greece, ii. 91.

_Orpheotelestæ_, iii. 87.

_Orpheus_, i. 21, 22.

_Orphic_ Theogony, i. 16 _seq._;
egg, i. 18;
life, the, i. 23;
brotherhood, i. 34.

_Orsines_, xii. 237.

_Orthagoridæ_, iii. 33 _seq._

_Orthros_, i. 7.

_Ortygês_, iii. 187.

_Ortygia_, iii. 363;
fortification and occupation of, by Dionysius, x. 458 _seq._;
Dionysius besieged in, x. 462 _seq._;
blockade of, by Dion, xi. 95, 98, 114;
sallies of Nypsius from, xi. 107, 109, 111;
Dion’s entry into, xi. 117;
surrender of, to Timoleon, xi. 150 _seq._;
advantage of, to Timoleon, xi. 155;
siege of, by Hiketas and Magon, xi. 156 _seq._;
Timoleon’s demolition of the Dionysian works in, xi. 165;
Timoleon erects courts of justice in, xi. 165.

_Oscan_, Latin and Greek languages, iii. 354.

_Oscans_, iii. 353.

_Ossa_ and Pelion, ii. 214.

_Ostracism_, similarity of, to Solon’s condemnation of neutrality in
sedition, iii. 145, 147 _seq._, vii. 108 _seq._;
of Hyperbolus, iv. 151, vii. 101 _seq._;
of Kimon, v. 366;
of Thucydidês, son of Melêsias, vi. 19;
projected contention of, between Nikias and Alkibiadês,
vii. 106 _seq._;
at Syracuse, vii. 122.

_Otanês_, iv. 223, 249 _seq._, 277.

_Othryadês_, ii. 449.

_Othrys_, ii. 213 _seq._

_Otos_ and Ephialtês, i. 136.

_Ovid_ at Tomi, xii. 474 _n._

_Oxus_ crossed by Alexander, xii. 201.

_Oxylus_, i. 153, ii. 4, 9.

_Oxythemis Korônæus_, ii. 332 _n._ 2.

_Pachês_, at Mitylênê, vi. 226, 237 _seq._;
at Notium, vi. 242;
pursues the fleet of Alkidas to Patmos, vi. 241;
sends Mitylenæan prisoners to Athens, vi. 243;
crimes and death of, vi. 258.

_Pæonians_, iv. 15;
conquest of, by Megabazus, iv. 276;
victory of Philip over, xi. 214.

_Pagasæ_, conquest of, by Philip, xi. 295;
importance of the Gulf of, to Philip, xi. 303.

_Pagondas_, vi. 384 _seq._

_Paktyas, the Lydian_, iv. 200 _seq._

_Palæmon_ and Inô, i. 124.

_Palæphatus_, his treatment of mythes, i. 415 _seq._

_Palamêdês_, i. 294.

_Palikê_, foundation of, vii. 123.

_Palladium_, capture of, i. 302.

_Pallakopas_, xii. 250.

_Pallas_, i. 6, 8.

_Pallas, son of Pandiôn_, i. 205.

_Pallênê_, i. 318, iv. 24.

_Palus Mæotis_, tribes east of, iii. 242.

_Pammenes_, expedition of, to Megalopolis, x. 359, xi. 257, 299.

_Pamphyli_, Hylleis, and Dymanes, ii. 360.

_Pamphylia_, conquest of, by Alexander, xii. 99.

_Panaktum_, vii. 24, 29.

_Pan-Arcadian Ten Thousand_, x. 232, 322.

_Pan-Arcadian union_, x. 208 _seq._, 321 _seq._

_Pandiôn_, i. 196.

_Pandiôn, son of Phineus_, i. 199.

_Pandiôn II._, i. 204.

_Pandôra_, i. 71, 76 _seq._

_Pan-Hellenic_ proceeding, the earliest approach to, iv. 50;
feeling, growth of, between B. C. 776-560, iv. 51;
character of the four great games, iv. 67;
congress at the Isthmus of Corinth, v. 57 _seq._;
patriotism of the Athenians on Xerxes’s invasion, v. 62;
union under Sparta after the repulse of Xerxes, v. 260;
schemes and sentiment of Periklês, vi. 18;
pretences of Alexander, xii. 51.

_Pan-Ionic_ festival and Amphiktyony in Asia, iii. 177.

_Panoptês_, Argos, i. 84.

_Pantaleôn_, ii. 434.

_Pantikapæum_, xii. 479 _seq._, 487.

_Pantitês_, story of, v. 94 _n._ 1.

_Paphlagonia_, submission of, to Alexander, xii. 111.

_Paphlagonians_, and the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 144.

_Paragraphê_, viii. 299.

_Parali_, at Samos, viii. 29.

_Paralus_, arrival of, at Athens from Samos, viii. 30.

_Paranomôn_, Graphê, v. 375 _seq._, viii. 36.

_Parasang_, length of, ix. 14 _n._ 3.

_Paris_, i. 286 _seq._, 301.

_Parisades I._, xii. 482.

_Parmenidês_, viii. 343, 344 _n._

_Parmenio_, embassy of, from Philip to Athens, xi. 386, 388, 389, 398,
401;
operations of, in Asia Minor against Memnon, xii. 49;
debate of, with Alexander at Milêtus, xii. 92;
captures Damascus, xii. 128;
at the battle of Arbela, xii. 158, 159, 164, 165;
invested with the chief command at Ekbatana, xii. 181;
family of, xii. 190;
alleged conspiracy and assassination of, xii. 196 _seq._

_Paropamisadæ_, subjugation of, by Alexander, xii. 200.

_Paros_, Theramenês at, viii. 118.

_Partheniæ_, iii. 387.

_Parthenon_, vi. 21, 22;
records of offerings in, xi. 249 _n._, 252 _n._ 3.

_Parthia_, Darius pursued by Alexander into, xii. 182 _seq._

_Partition of lands_ ascribed to Lykurgus, ii. 380, 393 _seq._,
401 _seq._;
proposed by Agis, iii. 399, 401.

_Parysatis, wife of Darius Nothus_, ix. 61, 72.

_Parysatis, daughter of Darius Nothus_, xii. 241.

_Pasimêlus_, ix. 331 _seq._

_Pasion_, and Xenias, ix. 28.

_Pasiphaë_ and the Minôtaur, i. 220.

_Pasippidas_, banishment of, viii. 128.

_Patizeithês_, conspiracy of, iv. 223.

_Patrokleidês_, amnesty proposed by, viii. 224.

_Patroklus_, treatment of, in the Iliad, ii. 177.

_Patronymic_ names of demes, iii. 63 _n._ 2.

_Patrôus_ Apollo, i. 50.

_Pattala_, xii. 235 _n._ 4.

_Pausanias, the historian_, on the Achæans, i. 104;
his view of mythes, i. 414;
his history of the Bœotians between the siege of Troy and the Return
of the Hêrakleids, ii. 16;
his account of the Messenian wars, ii. 425 _seq._, 428 _seq._;
on Iphikrates at Corinth, B. C. 369, x. 238 _n._

_Pausanias, the Spartan regent_, at the Isthmus of Corinth, v. 165;
at Platæa, v. 168 _seq._, 177 _seq._;
misconduct of, after the battle of Platæa, v. 178 _seq._, 181;
conduct of, after losing the command of the Greeks, v. 269;
detection and death of, v. 272 _seq._;
and Themistoklês, v. 273, 282.

_Pausanias the Spartan king_, and Lysander, viii. 262;
his expedition to Attica, viii. 275 _seq._;
his attack upon Peiræus, viii. 276;
his pacification between the Ten at Athens and the exiles at
Peiræus, viii. 277 _seq._;
in Bœotia, ix. 295 _seq._;
condemnation of, ix. 297 _seq._;
and the democratical leaders of Mantinea, x. 37.

_Pausanias the Macedonian_, x. 249, xi. 515 _seq._

_Pedaritus_, vii. 399, 391, viii. 19.

_Pedieis_, iii. 93.

_Pedigrees_, mythical, connect _gentes_, i. 193.

_Pegasus_, i. 4, 122.

_Peiræum_, Athenian victory near, vii. 369;
defeat of the Athenian fleet near, vii. 381;
capture of, by Agesilaus, ix. 343, 345 _seq._;
recovery of, by Iphikrates, ix. 353.

_Peiræus_, fortification of, by Themistoklês, v. 249 _seq._;
and Athens, Long Walls between, v. 324 _seq._, viii. 229,
ix. 333 _seq._;
improvements at, under Periklês, vi. 20;
departure of the armament for Sicily from, vii. 181;
walls built at, by the Four Hundred, viii. 63;
approach of the Lacedæmonian fleet under Agesandridas to,
viii. 66, 71;
Thrasybulus at, viii. 272 _seq._;
king Pausanias’s attack upon, viii. 276;
attack of Teleutias on, ix. 377 _seq._;
attempt of Sphodrias to surprise, x. 98 _seq._;
seizure of, by Nikanor, xii. 346.

_Peisander_, and the mutilation of the Hermæ, vii. 200;
and the conspiracy of the Four Hundred, viii. 8, 12, 13 _seq._, 21,
26, 33 _seq._;
statements respecting, viii. 32 _n._;
punishment of, viii. 88.

_Peisander, the Lacedæmonian admiral_, ix. 274, 283.

_Peisistratids_, and Thucydidês iv. 112 _n._ 2;
fall of the dynasty of, iv. 122;
with Xerxes in Athens, v. 115 _seq._

_Peisistratus_, iii. 153 _seq._, iv. 102 _seq._, 117.

_Peithias, the Korkyræan_, vi. 268 _seq._

_Pelasgi_, ii. 261 _seq._;
in Italy, iii. 351;
of Lemnos and Imbros, iv. 277.

_Pelasgikon_, oracle about the, vi. 129 _n._ 2.

_Pelasgus_, i. 173.

_Pêleus_, i. 114, 187 _seq._

_Pelias_, i. 108 _seq._, 114 _seq._

_Pelion_ and Ossa, ii. 214.

_Pella_, embassies from Grecian states at, B. C. 346, xi. 404 _seq._;
under Philip, xii. 66.

_Pellênê_, i. 318;
and Phlius, x. 271.

_Pelopidas_, escape of, to Athens, x. 61;
conspiracy of, against the philo-Laconian rulers at Thebes,
x. 81 _seq._;
slaughter of Leontiades by, x. 86;
and Epaminondas, x. 121;
victory of, at Tegyra, x. 134;
in Thessaly, x. 249, 263, 283 _seq._, 303, 307 _seq._;
and Philip, x. 249 _n._ 2, 264;
and Alexander of Pheræ, x. 282 _seq._;
death of, x. 308.

_Pelopidas_, i. 153 _seq._, 160.

_Peloponnesian_ war, its injurious effects upon the Athenian empire,
vi. 46;
war, commencement of, vi. 103-153;
fleet, Phormio’s victories over, vi. 196 _seq._, 203 _seq._;
war, agreement of the Peloponnesian confederacy at the commencement
of, vii. 19 _n._;
allies, synod of, at Corinth, B. C. 412, vii. 368;
fleet of under Theramenês, vii. 387 _seq._;
fleet at Rhodes, vii. 400 _seq._, viii. 94;
fleet, return of, from Rhodes to Milêtus, viii. 25;
fleet discontent in, Milêtus, viii. 95, 97 _seq._;
fleet, capture of, at Kyzikus, viii. 121;
fleet, pay of, by Cyrus, viii. 143;
confederacy, assembly of, at Sparta, B. C. 404, viii. 228;
confederacy, Athens at the head of, B. C. 371, x. 201;
allies of Sparta after the Peloponnesian war, xi. 280.

_Peloponnesians_, immigrant, ii. 303;
conduct of, after the battle of Thermopylæ, v. 106;
and Mardonius’s approach, v. 154 _seq._;
and the fortification of Athens, v. 243 _seq._, 247;
five years’ truce of, with Athens, v. 334;
position and views of, in commencing the Peloponnesian war,
vi. 94 _seq._, 113, 124 _seq._;
invasions of Attica, by, under Archidamus, vi. 126 _seq._, 154;
slaughter of neutral prisoners by, vi. 182;
and Ambrakiots attack Akarnania, vi. 194 _seq._;
application of revolted Mitylenæans to, vi. 226 _seq._;
and Ætolians attack Naupaktus, vi. 301;
and Tissaphernês, vii. 387, 395 _seq._, viii. 4, 21 _seq._, 113 _seq._;
defeat of, at Kynossêma, viii. 109 _seq._;
at Abydos, viii. 117;
aid of Pharnabazus to, viii. 126;
letters of Philip to, xi. 492.

_Peloponnesus_, eponym of, i. 154;
invasion and division of, by the Hêrakleids, ii. 4;
mythical tide of the Dorians to, ii. 6;
extension of Pindus through, ii. 212;
distribution of, about B. C. 450, ii. 299 _seq._;
difference between the distribution, B. C. 450 and 776, ii. 302;
population of, which was believed to be indigenous, ii. 303;
southern inhabitants of, before the Dorian invasion, ii. 337;
events in, during the first twenty years of the Athenian hegemony,
v. 315 _seq._;
voyage of Tolmidês round, v. 331;
ravages of, by the Athenians, vi. 135, 164;
political relations in, B. C. 421, vii. 23;
expedition of Alkibiadês into the interior of, vii. 63;
expedition of Konon and Pharnabazus to, ix. 322;
circumnavigation of, by Timotheus, x. 132;
proceedings in, after the battle of Leuktra, x. 198, 242;
expedition of Epaminondas to, x. 215 _seq._, 254 _seq._, 266 _seq._,
328 _seq._;
state of, B. C. 362, x. 313 _seq._;
visits of Dion to, xi. 61;
disunion of, B. C. 360-359, xi. 199;
affairs of, B. C. 354-352, xi. 290 _seq._;
war in, B. C. 352-351, xi. 299;
intervention of Philip in, after B. C. 346, xi. 443;
expedition of Philip to, xi. 511;
Kassander and Polysperchon in, xii. 360, 365;
Kassander and Alexander, son of Polysperchon, in, xii. 368, 369.

_Pelops_, i. 154 _seq._

_Pelusium_, Alexander at, xii. 146.

_Penal_ procedure at Athens, iv. 366 _n._

_Penestæ_, Thessalian, ii. 279 _seq._

_Pentakosiomedimni_, iii. 117.

_Pentapolis_ on the south-west coast of the Euxine, xii. 458, 472.

_Pentekontêrs_, Spartan, ii. 459.

_Pentekostys_, i. 458.

_Penthesileia_, ii. 209, 298.

_Pentheus_ and Agavê, i. 262 _seq._

_Perdikkas I._, iv. 17.

_Perdikkas II._, relations and proceedings of, towards Athens,
vi. 67 _seq._, 71, 141, 370, 448 _seq._, vii. 96, 104;
and Sitalkês, xi. 217, 220;
application of, to Sparta, vi. 398;
and Brasidas, relations between, vi. 369, 448, 450 _seq._;
joins Sparta and Argos, vii. 96;
death of, x. 46.

_Perdikkas, brother of Philip_, x. 300, 301, 370, 382, xi. 205 _seq._

_Perdikkas, Alexander’s general_, xii. 256, 319, 333 _seq._, 337.

_Pergamum_, i. 286 _n._ 5, 324.

_Pergamus_, custom in the temple of Asklêpius at, i. 301 _n._ 4.

_Pergamus in Mysia_, the Ten Thousand Greeks at, ix. 172 _seq._

_Periander, the Corinthian despot_, power and character of,
iii. 41 _seq._

_Perikles_, difference between the democracy after, and the
constitution of Kleisthenês, iv. 148;
effect of, on constitutional morality, iv. 163;
at the battle of Tanagra, v. 328;
expeditions of, to Sikyon and Akarnania, v. 332;
policy of, B. C. 450, v. 342;
reconquest of Eubœa by, v. 349;
and Ephialtês, constitution of dikasteries by, v. 355 _seq._;
and Kimon, v. 362 _seq._;
public life and character of, v. 362 _seq._;
and Ephialtês, judicial reform of, v. 355 _seq._, 366 _seq._;
real nature of the constitutional changes effected by,
v. 367 _seq._;
commencement of the ascendancy of, v. 370;
and Kimon, compromise between, v. 329, 371;
his conception of the relation between Athens and her allies, vi. 4;
and Athenian kleruchs by, vi. 10;
and Thucydidês, son of Melêsias, vi. 15 _seq._;
Pan-Hellenic schemes and sentiment of, vi. 18;
city-improvements at Athens under, vi. 20 _seq._, 23 _seq._;
sculpture at Athens under, vi. 22;
attempt of, to convene a Grecian congress at Athens, vi. 25;
Sophoklês, etc., Athenian armament under, vi. 27 _seq._;
funeral orations of, vi. 31, 143 _seq._;
demand of the Spartans for his banishment, vi. 97, 105;
indirect attacks of his political opponents upon, vi. 98 _seq._;
his family relations, and connection with Aspasia, vi. 101, 102;
charge of peculation against, vi. 103 _seq._;
stories of his having caused the Peloponnesian war, vi. 104 _n._;
speech of, before the Peloponnesian war, vi. 107 _seq._;
and the ravages of Attica by Archidamus, vi. 128 _seq._;
last speech of, xii. 165 _seq._;
accusation and punishment of, vi. 168 _seq._;
old age and death of, vi. 170 _seq._;
life and character of, vi. 172 _seq._;
new class of politicians at Athens after, vi. 171 _seq._;
and Nikias compared, vi. 287.

_Perriklymenos_, i. 112 _seq._

_Perinthus_, iv. 27;
and Athens, viii. 126, xi. 461;
siege of, by Philip, xi. 454, 458.

_Periœki_, ii. 364 _seq._, 369, 371 _n._ 2;
Libyan, iv. 40, 42, 45.

_Pêrô_, Bias and Melampus, i. 110 _seq._

_Perseid_ dynasty, i. 91.

_Persephonê_, i. 10;
mysteries of, v. 208 _n._ 2.

_Persepolis_, Alexander’s march from Susa to, xii. 170 _seq._;
Alexander at, xii. 172 _seq._, 237;
Alexander’s return from India to, xii. 237.

_Persês_, i. 6.

_Perseus_, exploits of, i. 89 _seq._

_Persia_, application of Athens for alliance with, iv. 165;
state of, on the formation of the confederacy of Delos, v. 267;
treatment of Themistoklês in, v. 284 _seq._;
operations of Athens and the Delian confederacy against,
v. 303 _seq._;
and Athens, treaty between, B. C. 450, v. 335 _seq._;
Asiatic Greeks not tributary to, between B. C. 477-412,
v. 337 _n._ 2;
surrender of the Asiatic Greeks by Sparta to, ix. 205;
and the peace of Antalkidas, ix. 385 _seq._, x. 2 _seq._, 158;
applications of Sparta and Athens to, x. 5 _seq._;
hostility of, to Sparta after the battle of Ægospotami, x. 8;
unavailing efforts of, to reconquer Egypt, x. 13;
and Evagoras, x. 20 _seq._;
Spartan project against, for the rescue of the Asiatic Greeks,
x. 44;
application of Thebes to, x. 277 _seq._;
embassy from Athens to, B. C. 366, x. 293;
state of, B. C. 362, x. 360, 366;
alarm at Athens about, B. C. 354, xi. 285;
projected invasion of, by Philip, xi. 511 _seq._;
correspondence of Demosthenes with, xii. 20 _seq._;
accumulation of royal treasures in, xii. 175 _n._ 3;
roads in, xii. 180 _n._

_Persian_ version of the legend of Io, i. 86;
noblemen, conspiracy of, against the false Smerdis, iv. 223 _seq._;
empire, organization of, by Darius Hystaspês, iv. 233 _seq._;
envoys to Macedonia, iv. 276;
armament against Cyprus, iv. 292;
force against Milêtus, iv. 299;
fleet at Ladê, iv. 304;
fleet and Asiatic Greeks, iv. 307;
armament under Datis, iv. 329 _seq._, 345;
fleet before the battle of Salamis, v. 85 _seq._, 99 _seq._, 113,
119, 125, 127 _nn._;
army, march of, from Thermopylæ to Attica, v. 114 _seq._;
fleet at Salamis, v. 130 _seq._;
fleet after the battle of Salamis, v. 137, 147;
army under Mardonius, v. 154 _seq._;
fleet at Mykalê, v. 191;
army at Mykalê, v. 193;
army, after the defeat at Mykalê, v. 198;
war effect of, upon Athenian political sentiment, v. 274;
kings, from Xerxes to Artaxerxes Mnemon, vi. 362 _seq._;
cavalry, and the retreating Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 89 _seq._;
empire, distribution of, into satrapies and subsatrapies, ix. 209;
preparations for maritime war against Sparta, B. C. 397, ix. 255,
268;
king, Thebans obtain money from, xi. 302;
forces in Phrygia on Alexander’s landing, xii. 75, 78;
Gates, Alexander at, xii. 171;
fleet and armies, hopes raised in Greece by, B. C. 334-331,
xii. 276.

_Persians_, condition of, at the rise of Cyrus the Great, iv. 187;
conquests of, under Cyrus the Great, iv. 209, 216 _seq._;
the first who visited Greece, iv. 257 _seq._;
conquest of Thrace by, under Darius Hystaspês, iv. 273;
successes of, against the revolted coast of Asia Minor, iv. 289;
attempts of, to disunite the Ionians at Ladê, iv. 300;
narrow escape of Miltiadês from, iv. 307;
cruelties of, at Milêtus, iv. 308;
attempted revolt of Thasos from, iv. 314;
at Marathon, iv. 333, 345 _seq._;
after the battle of Marathon, iv. 351, 352;
change of Grecian feeling towards, after the battle of Marathon,
iv. 355;
their religious conception of history, v. 10;
at Thermopylæ, v. 83, 85 _seq._;
in Psyttaleia, v. 128, 136;
at Salamis, v. 131 _seq._;
at Platæa, v. 163 _seq._;
at Mykalê, v. 197;
between Xerxes and Darius Codomannus, v. 241;
necessity of Grecian activity against, after the battles of Platæa
and Mykalê, v. 296;
mutilation inflicted by, ix. 9;
heralds from, to the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 52;
impotence and timidity of, ix. 75;
imprudence of, in letting Alexander cross the Hellespont, xii. 78;
defeat of, at the Granikus, xii. 80 _seq._;
defeat of, at Issus, xii. 118 _seq._;
incorporation of, in the Macedonian phalanx, xii. 251.

_Persis_, subjugation of, by Alexander, xii. 177;
Alexander’s return from India to, xii. 237.

_Personages_, quasi-human, in Grecian mythology, i. 342 _seq._

_Personal_ ascendency of the king in legendary Greece, ii. 61;
feeling towards the gods, the king, or individuals in legendary
Greece, ii. 80 _seq._;
sympathies the earliest form of social existence, ii. 84.

_Personalities_, great predominance of, in Grecian legend, ii. 74.

_Personality_ of divine agents in mythes, i. 2.

_Personification_, tendency of the ancient Greeks to, i. 342 _seq._;
of the heavenly bodies by Boiocalus, the German chief, i. 345 _n._

_Pestilence_ and suffering at Athens after the Kylonian massacre,
iii. 84.

_Petalism_ at Syracuse, iv. 163, vii. 122.

_Peuke_, xii. 23, 25 _n._ 2.

_Peukestes_, xii. 234, 238.

_Pezetæri_, xii. 59.

_Phæax_, expedition of, to Sicily, vii. 143.

_Phalækus_ succeeds to the command of the Phokians, xi. 301;
decline of the Phokians under, xi. 374, 418;
opposition to, in Phokis, xi. 375;
opposition of, to aid from Athens to Thermopylæ, xi. 376;
position of, at Thermopylæ, xi. 375, 418 _seq._;
death of, xi. 434.

_Phalanthus_, œkist of Tarentum, iii. 387 _seq._

_Phalanx_, Macedonian, xi. 501, xii. 57 _seq._, 251.

_Phalaris_, iv. 378, v. 204.

_Phalerium_, Xerxes at, v. 118.

_Phalinus_, ix. 52.

_Phanes_, and Zeus, i. 18.

_Phanosthenes_, viii. 159.

_Pharakidas_, x. 504 _seq._

_Pharax_, ix. 270, 271 _n._ 3.

_Pharax the officer of Dionysius_, xi. 115, 116, 133.

_Pharis_, conquest of, ii. 420.

_Pharnabazus_ and Tissaphernês, embassy from, to Sparta, vii. 366;
and Derkyllidas, viii. 94;
and Athens, viii. 114, 125;
Athenian victory over, viii. 130;
convention of, about Chalkêdon, viii. 132;
and Alkibiades, viii. 133, 311 _seq._;
and Greek envoys, viii. 135, 137;
after the battle of Ægospotami, viii. 311;
and Anaxibius, ix. 154, 166;
and Lysander, ix. 204;
and the subsatrapy of Æolis, ix. 210 _seq._;
and Agesilaus, ix. 269, 279 _seq._;
and Konon, ix. 283, 322, 325 _seq._;
and Abydos, ix. 324;
and the anti-Spartan allies at Corinth, ix. 327;
and the Syracusans, x. 386;
anti-Macedonian efforts of, xii. 127;
capture of, with his force, at Chios, xii. 142.

_Pharsalus_, Polydamas of, x. 137 _seq._;
and Halus, xi. 411.

_Phaselis_, Alexander at, xii. 100.

_Phayllus_, xi. 293, 297 _seq._, 301.

_Pheidias_, vi. 23, 102.

_Pheidôn the Temenid_, ii. 314;
claims and projects of, as representative of Hêraklês, ii. 316;
and the Olympic games, ii. 316 _seq._;
coinage and scale of, ii. 318 _seq._, 323 _seq._;
various descriptions of, ii. 320.

_Pheidôn, one of the Thirty_, viii. 271, 293.

_Phenicia_, ante-Hellenic colonies from, to Greece not probable,
ii. 262 _seq._;
situation and cities of, iii. 267;
reconquest of, by Darius Nothus, xi. 438, 440 _n._ 3;
Alexander in, xii. 130 _seq._, 150.

_Phenician_ version of the legend of Io, i. 86;
colonies, iii. 271 _seq._;
fleet at Aspendus, viii. 99, 100, 114;
towns, surrender of, to Alexander, xii. 130, 132.

_Phenicians_ in Homeric times, ii. 103 _seq._;
historical, iii. 204, 289, 303, 308, 342 _seq._;
and Persians, subjugation of Cyprus by, iv. 293;
and Persians at Milêtus, iv. 300 _seq._;
and Persians, reconquest of Asiatic Greeks by, iv. 307;
and the cutting through Athos, v. 24;
and Greeks in Sicily, v. 207;
in Cyprus, x. 14 _seq._

_Pheræ, Jason of_, x. 138 _seq._, x. 147 _n._, 153, 189 _seq._,
195 _seq._

_Pheræ, Alexander of_, x. 248, xi. 202 _seq._;
despots of, xi. 202 _seq._;
Philip and the despots of, xi. 261, 292, 294 _seq._;
Philip takes the oath of alliance with Athens at, xi. 417;
Alexander of, and Pelopidas, 256, 277 _seq._, 297, 301 _seq._;
Alexander of, subdued by the Thebans, x. 309 _seq._;
hostilities of Alexander of, against Athens, x. 369.

_Pherekydes_, i. 390, iv. 390.

_Phretime_, iv. 45 _seq._

_Philæus_, eponym of an Attic dême, i. 189.

_Philaidæ_, origin of, i. 189.

_Philip of Macedon_, detained as a hostage at Thebes, x. 249 _n._ 1,
263, xi. 207 _seq._;
accession of, x. 382, xi. 212 _seq._;
as subordinate governor in Macedonia, xi. 207, 208;
position of, on the death of Perdikkas, xi. 209;
capture of Amphipolis by, xi. 232 _seq._;
his alliance with Olynthus and hostilities against Athens,
xi. 236 _seq._;
capture of Pydna and Potidæa by, xi. 237 _seq._;
increased power of, B. C. 358-356, xi. 239;
marriage of, with Olympias, xi. 240;
intrigue of, with Kersobleptes against Athens, xi. 158;
his activity, and conquest of Methônê, xi. 259 _seq._;
and the despots of Pheræ, xi. 261, 292 _seq._;
development of Macedonian military force under, xi. 282 _seq._;
and Onomarchus, xi. 293;
conquest of Pheræ and Pagasæ by, xi. 295;
checked at Thermopylæ by the Athenians, xi. 296;
power and attitude of, B. C. 352-351, xi. 322;
naval power and operations of, B. C. 351, xi. 297 _seq._;
in Thrace, B. C. 351, xi. 301;
hostility of, to Olynthus, B. C. 351-350, xi. 320;
flight of his half-brothers to Olynthus, xi. 321;
intrigues of, in Olynthus, xi. 322;
destruction of the Olynthian confederacy by, xi. 324, 325, 331,
350 _seq._, 364;
Athenian expedition to Olynthus against, xi. 334;
intrigues of, in Eubœa, xi. 339;
and Athens, overtures for peace between, B. C. 348, xi. 369 _seq._;
Thebans invoke the aid of, against the Phokians, xi. 375;
and Thermopylæ, xi. 377, 407, 410, 416, 421, 424;
embassies from Athens to, xi. 375 _seq._, 401 _seq._, 422;
envoys to Athens from, xi. 386, 387, 390, 398, 401;
synod of allies at Athens about, xi. 388;
peace and alliance between Athens, and, xi. 390 _seq._, 409,
429 _seq._, 442, 446 _seq._;
fabrications of Æschines and Philokrates about, xi. 398, 408, 409,
412 _seq._;
in Thrace, xi. 402, 404, 450 _seq._;
letter of, taken by Æschines to Athens, xi. 410, 416;
surrender of Phokis to, xi. 421;
declared sympathy of, with the Thebans, B. C. 346, xi. 421;
visit of Æschines to, in Phokis, xi. 423;
admitted into the Amphiktyonic assembly, xi. 425;
ascendancy of, B. C. 346, xi. 428 _seq._;
named president of the Pythian festival, xi. 428;
position of, after the Sacred War, xi. 434;
letter of Isokrates to, xi. 436;
movements of, after B. C. 346, xi. 443 _seq._;
warnings of Demosthenês against, after B. C. 346, xi. 444;
mission of Python from, to Athens, xi. 446;
and Athens, dispute between about Halonnesus, xi. 448 _seq._;
and Kardia, xi. 450;
and Athens, disputes between, about the Bosporus and Hellespont,
xi. 450;
at Perinthus and the Chersonese, xi. 454, 458 _seq._;
and Athens, declaration of war between, xi. 454 _seq._;
makes peace with Byzantium, Chios, and other islands, attacks the
Scythians, and is defeated by the Triballi, xi. 461;
and the Amphissians, xi. 480 _seq._, 497;
re-fortification of Elateia by, xi. 482, 484 _seq._;
application of, to Thebes for aid in attacking the Athenians,
xi. 483 _seq._, 489;
alliance of Athens and Thebes against, xi. 490 _seq._, 593 _seq._;
letters of, to the Peloponnesians for aid, xi. 492;
victory of, at Chæroneia, xi. 497 _seq._, 505;
military organization of, xi. 501, xii. 56 _seq._;
and the Athenians, peace of Demades between, xi. 507 _seq._;
honorary votes at Athens in favor of, xi. 509;
expedition of, into Peloponnesus, xi. 510;
at the congress at Corinth, xi. 511;
preparations of, for the invasion of Persia, xi. 512;
repudiates Olympias, and marries Kleopatra, xi. 512;
and Alexander, dissensions between, xi. 513;
assassination of, xi. 514 _seq._, xii. 6 _seq._;
character of, xi. 519 _seq._;
discord in the family of, xii. 4;
military condition of Macedonia before, xii. 55.

_Philip Aridæus_, xii. 319, 334.

_Philippi_, foundation of, xi. 241.

_Philippics_ of Demosthenes, xi. 309 _seq._, 445, 451.

_Philippizing_ factions in Megara and Eubœa, xi. 448.

_Philippus, the Theban polemarch_, x. 82, 85.

_Philippus, Alexander’s physician_, xii. 113.

_Philiskus_, x. 261.

_Philistides_, xi. 449, 452.

_Philistus_, his treatment of mythes, i. 410;
banishment of, xi. 33;
recall of, xi. 67;
intrigues of, against Plato and Dion, xi. 76;
tries to intercept Dion in the Gulf of Tarentum, xi. 89;
at Leontini, xi. 99;
defeat and death of, xi. 100.

_Philokrates_, motion of, to allow Philip to send envoys to Athens,
xi. 371;
motion of, to send envoys to Philip, xi. 379;
motion of, for peace and alliance with Philip, xi. 390 _seq._, 416;
fabrications of, about Philip, xi. 398, 408, 409, 412;
impeachment and condemnation of, xi. 433.

_Philoktetes_, i. 301, 310.

_Philolaus_ and Dioklês, ii. 297.

_Philomela_, i. 196 _seq._

_Philomelus_, xi. 245;
seizes the temple at Delphi, xi. 248;
and Archidamus, xi. 247;
and the Pythia at Delphi, xi. 250;
successful battles of, with the Lokrians, xi. 251;
defeat and death of, xi. 255;
takes part of the treasures in the temple at Delphi, xi. 252.

_Philonomus_ and the Spartan Dorians, ii. 327.

_Philosophers_, mythes allegorized by, i. 418 _seq._

_Philosophy_, Homeric and Hesiodic, i. 368;
Ionic, i. 372 _n._ 2;
ethical and social among the Greeks, iv. 76.

_Philotas_, alleged conspiracy, and execution of, xii. 190 _seq._,
197 _n._ 2.

_Philoxenus_ and Dionysius, xi. 26.

_Phineus_, i. 199, 235.

_Phlegyæ_, the, i. 128.

_Phlius_, return of philo-Laconian exiles to, x. 42;
intervention of Sparta with, x. 70;
surrender of, to Agesilaus, x. 70 _seq._;
application of, to Athens, x. 234 _seq._;
fidelity of, to Sparta, x. 257, 270;
invasion of, by Euphron, x. 270;
and Pellênê, x. 271;
assistance of Chares to, x. 272;
and Thebes, x. 290 _seq._

_Phœbe_, i. 5, 6.

_Phœbidas_, at Thebes, x. 58 _seq._, 62, 63, 128.

_Phœnissæ_ of Phrynichus, v. 138 _n._ 1.

_Phœnix_, i. 257.

_Phôkæa_, foundation of, iii. 188;
surrender of, to Harpagus, iv. 203;
Alkibiadês at, viii. 152.

_Phôkæan_ colonies at Atalia and Elea, iv. 206.

_Phôkæans_, exploring voyages of, iii. 281;
effects of their exploring voyages upon Grecian knowledge and fancy,
iii. 282;
emigration of, iv. 205 _seq._

_Phokian_ defensive wall at Thermopylæ, ii. 283;
townships, ravage of, by Xerxes’s army, v. 114.

_Phokians_, ii. 288;
application of Leonidas to, v. 76;
at Leuktra, x. 181, 182;
and the presidency of the temple at Delphi, xi. 245 _seq._;
Thebans strive to form a confederacy against, xi. 251;
take the treasures of the temple at Delphi, xi. 252, 255, 297, 374;
war of, with the Lokrians, Thebans, and Thessalians, xi. 254;
under Onomarchus, xi. 261, 293;
under Phayllus, xi. 297 _seq._;
under Phalækus, xi. 374, 418;
Thebans invoke the aid of Philip against, xi. 375;
application of, to Athens, xi. 376;
exclusion of, from the peace and alliance between Philip and Athens,
xi. 396 _seq._, 411;
envoys from, to Philip, xi. 404, 406;
motion of Philokrates about, xi. 416;
at Thermopylæ, xi. 418 _seq._;
treatment of, after their surrender to Philip, xi. 425 _seq._;
restoration of, by the Thebans and Athenians, xi. 493.

_Phokion_, first exploits of, x. 131;
character and policy of, xi. 273 _seq._, 308, xii. 278, 311,
357 _seq._;
in Eubœa, xi. 340 _seq._, 452;
at Megara, xi. 449;
in the Propontis, xi. 460;
and Alexander’s demand that the anti-Macedonian leaders at Athens
should be surrendered, xii. 46, 47;
and Demades, embassy of, to Antipater, xii. 322;
at Athens under Antipater, xii. 324;
and Nikanor, xii. 339, 346 _seq._;
and Alexander, son of Polysperchon, xii. 348;
condemnation and death of, xii. 349 _seq._;
altered sentiment of the Athenians towards, after his death,
xii. 357.

_Phokis_, acquisition of, by Athens, v. 331;
loss of, by Athens, v. 348;
invasion of, by the Thebans, B. C. 374, x. 136;
accusation of Thebes against, before the Amphiktyonic assembly,
xi. 243;
resistance of, to the Amphiktyonic assembly, xi. 246 _seq._;
Philip in, xi. 421, 482, 492 _seq._

_Phôkus_, i. 185.

_Phokylidês_, iv. 92.

_Phorkys_ and Kêtô, progeny of, i. 7.

_Phormio_ at Potidæa, vi. 74;
at Amphilochian Argos, vi. 121;
at Naupaktus, vi. 180;
his victories over the Peloponnesian fleet, vi. 199 _seq._,
206 _seq._;
in Akarnania, vi. 213;
his later history, vi. 277 _n._

_Phormisius_, disfranchising proposition of, viii. 294.

_Phorôneus_, i. 82, 83.

_Phraortês_, iii. 228.

_Phratries_, iii. 52 _seq._, 63;
and gentes, non-members of, iii. 133.

_Phrikônis_, iii. 192.

_Phrygia_, Persian forces in, on Alexander’s landing, xii. 75, 78;
submission of, to Alexander, xii. 89.

_Phrygian_ influence on the religion of the Greeks, i. 26, 28;
music and worship, iii. 213 _seq._

_Phrygians_ and Trojans, i. 335;
and Thracians, iii. 210, 213;
ethnical affinities and early distribution of, iii. 209 _seq._

_Phrynichus the tragedian_, his capture of Milêtus, iv. 309;
his Phœnissæ, v. 138, _n._ 1.

_Phrynichus the commander_, at Milêtus, vii. 388;
and Amorgês, vii. 389 _n._ 1;
and Alkibiadês, viii. 10 _seq._;
deposition of, viii. 15;
and the Four Hundred, viii. 11, 58 _seq._;
assassination of, viii. 66, 85, _n._;
decree respecting the memory of, viii. 85.

_Phrynon_, xi. 370.

_Phryxus_ and Hellê, i. 123 _seq._

_Phthiôtis_ and Deukalion, i. 96.

Φύσις, first use of, in the sense of _nature_, i. 368.

_Phyê-Athênê_, iv. 104.

_Phylarch_, Athenian, ii. 461.

_Phylê_, occupation of, by Thrasybulus, viii. 265.

_Phyllidas_ and the conspiracy against the philo-Laconian oligarchy at
Thebes, x. 81 _seq._

_Physical_ astronomy thought impious by ancient Greeks, i. 346 _n._;
science, commencement of, among the Greeks, i. 368.

_Phytalids_, their tale of Dêmêtêr, i. 44.

_Phyton_, xi. 18 _seq._

_Pierians_, original seat of, iv. 14.

_Piété, Monts de_, iii. 162.

Πῖλοι of the Lacedæmonians in Sphakteria, vi. 344 _n._

_Pinarus_, Alexander and Darius on the, xii. 118 _seq._

_Pindar_, his treatment of mythes, i. 378 _seq._

_Pindus_, ii. 211 _seq._

_Piracy_ in early Greece, ii. 90, 113.

_Pisa_ and Ellis, relations of, ii. 439.

_Pisatans_ and the Olympic games, ii. 318, 434, ix. 228,
x. 318 _seq._;
and Eloians, ii. 434, 439.

_Pisatic_ sovereignty of Pelops, i. 157.

_Pisidia_, conquest of, by Alexander, xii. 99.

_Pissuthnes_, vi. 26, 28, ix. 8.

_Pitane_, iii. 190.

_Pittakus_, power and merit of, iii. 198 _seq._

_Plague at Athens_, vi. 154 _seq._;
revival of, vi. 293.

_Platæa_, and Thebes, disputes between, iv. 166;
and Athens, first connection of, iv. 165;
battle of, v. 164 _seq._;
revelation of the victory of, at Mykalê the same day, v. 194;
night-surprise of, by the Thebans, vi. 114 _seq._;
siege of, by Archidamus, vi. 188 _seq._;
surrender of, to the Lacedæmonians, vi. 264 _seq._;
restoration of, by Sparta, x. 30 _seq._;
capture of, by the Thebans, x. 159 _seq._

_Platæans_ at Marathon, iv. 248.

_Plato_, his treatment of mythes, i. 441;
on the return of the Hêrakleids, ii. 6;
on homicide, ii. 96 _n._;
his Republic and the Lykurgean institutions, ii. 390;
and the Sophists, viii. 345-399;
and Xenophon, evidence of, about Sokratês, viii. 403 _seq._,
444 _n._, 450 _n._;
his extension and improvement of the formal logic founded by
Sokratês, viii. 429;
purpose of his dialogues, viii. 453;
incorrect assertions in the Menexenus of, ix. 360 _n._;
the letters of, x. 435 _n._ 1;
and Dionysius the Elder, xi. 38, 60;
and Dion, xi. 39, 57 _seq._, 69, 84;
and Dionysius the Younger, xi. 52, 69-80;
Dion, and the Pythagoreans, xi. 56 _seq._;
statements and advice of, on the condition of Syracuse,
xi. 130 _seq._;
and the kings of Macedonia, xi. 206.

_Plausible fiction_, i. 435, ii. 51.

_Pleistoanax_, v. 349, 429 _seq._

_Plemmyrium_, vii. 270, 290 _seq._

_Plutarch_ and Lykurgus, ii. 337, 343, 403 _seq._;
on the ephor Epitadeus, ii. 405;
and Herodotus, iv. 202 _n._, v. 6 _n._ 2;
on Periklês, vi. 172.

_Plutarch of Eretria_, xi. 340 _seq._

_Plyntêria_, viii. 144.

_Podaleirus_ and Machaôn, i. 180.

_Podarkês_, birth of, i. 110.

_Poems_, lost epic, ii. 120;
epic, recited in public, not read in private, ii. 135.

_Poetry_, Greek, transition of, from the mythical past to the positive
present, i. 349;
epic, ii. 117 _seq._;
epic, Homeric and Hesiodic, ii. 118;
didactic and mystic hexameter, ii. 119;
lyric and choric, intended for the ear, ii. 137;
Greek, advances of, within a century and a half after Terpander,
iv. 77.

_Poets_ inspired by the Muse, i. 355;
iambic, elegiac, and lyric, predominance of the present in, i. 363;
and logographers, their treatment of mythes, i. 377 _seq._;
early, chronological evidence of, ii. 45 _seq._;
epic, and their probable dates, ii. 122;
cyclic, ii. 123 _seq._;
gnomic or moralizing, iv. 91 _seq._

_Polemarch_, Athenian, iii. 74.

_Polemarchs_, Spartan, ii. 459.

_Polemarchus_, viii. 248.

_Political clubs_ at Athens, viii. 15.

_Politicians_, new class of, at Athens, after Periklês, vi. 245 _seq._

_Pollis_, defeat of, by Chabrias, x. 130.

_Pollux_ and Castor, i. 171 _seq._

_Polyarchus_, xi. 154.

_Polybiades_, x. 68.

_Polybius_, his transformation of mythes to history, i. 412;
perplexing statement of, respecting the war between Sybaris and
Kroton, iv. 416;
the Greece of, xii. 318.

_Polychares_, and Euæphnus, ii. 426.

_Polydamas of Pharsalus_, x. 137 _seq._

_Polydamas the Macedonian_, xii. 197.

_Polydamidas_, at Mendê, vi. 440 _seq._

_Polykrates of Samos_, iv. 241 _seq._

_Polykrates the Sophist_, harangue of, on the accusation against
Sokratês, viii. 478 _n._

_Polynikes_, i. 267, 269 _seq._, 273, 280.

_Polyphron_, x. 248.

_Polysperchon_, appointed by Antipater as his successor, xii. 339;
plans of, xii. 340;
edict of, at Pella, xii. 343 _seq._;
Phokion and Agnonides heard before, xii. 351 _seq._;
and Kassander, xii. 360, 372, 382;
flight of, Ætalia, xii. 367.

_Polystratus_, one of the Four Hundred, viii. 68 _n._ 1, 69 _n._, 78,
88.

_Polyxena_, death of, i. 305.

_Polyzelus_ and Hiero, v. 228.

_Pompey_ in Colchis, i. 243.

_Pontic Greeks_, xii. 458 _seq._

_Pontic Herakleia_, xii. 460-471.

_Pontus_ and Gæa, children of, i. 7.

_Popular belief_ in ancient mythes, i. 424, 427.

_Porus_, xii. 227 _seq._

_Poseidôn_, i. 6, 9, 56;
prominence of, in Æolid legends, i. 110;
Erechtheus, i. 192, 193;
and Athênê, i. 195;
and Laomedôn, i. 285.

_Positive_ evidence indispensable to historical proof, i. 429.

_Positive_ tendencies of the Greek mind in the time of Herodotus,
iv. 105 _n._

_Post-Homeric_ poems on the Trojan war, i. 297.

_Potidæa_ and Artabazus, v. 149;
relations of, with Corinth and Athens, vi. 67;
designs of Perdikkas and the Corinthians upon, vi. 68;
revolt of, from Athens, vi. 69 _seq._;
Athenian victory near, vi. 73;
blockade of, by the Athenians, vi. 74, 140, 164, 182;
Brasidas’s attempt upon, vi. 150;
capture of, by Philip and the Olynthians, xi. 238.

_Prasiæ_, expedition of Pythodôrus to, vii. 285.

_Praxitas_, ix. 327 _n._ 1, 333 _seq._

_Priam_, i. 285, 292 _n._ 5, 304.

_Priene_, iii. 172, 178, vi. 26.

_Priests_, Egyptian, iii. 314.

_Primitive_ and historical Greece, ii. 57-118.

_Private property_, rights of, at Athens, viii. 304.

_Probability_ alone not sufficient for historical proof, i. 429.

_Pro-Bouleutic Senate_, Solon’s, iii. 121.

_Probûli_, board of, vii. 362.

_Prodikus_, viii. 370, 380 _seq._

_Prœtos_ and his daughters, i. 88 _seq._

_Proknê_, i. 197 _seq._

_Prokris_, i. 198.

_Promêtheus_, i. 6;
and Zeus, i. 63, 76, 79 _seq._;
and Pandora, i. 75;
and Epimêtheus, i. 75;
Æschylus’s, i. 382 _n._ 3.

_Property_, rights of, at Athens, iii. 106, 114 _seq._

_Prophecies_, Sibylline, i. 338.

_Propontis_, Phokion in, xi. 460.

_Propylæa_, building of, vi. 21, 23 _n._ 4.

_Prose writing_ among the Greeks, iv. 97.

_Protagoras_, viii. 376, 379 _seq._, 389 _seq._, 392 _n._

_Protesilaus_, i. 290, v. 201.

_Prothoüs_, x. 176.

_Proxenus of Tegea_, x. 209.

_Prytaneium_, Solon’s regulations about, iii. 143.

_Prytanes_, iv. 138.

_Prytanies_, iv. 138.

_Prytanis_, xii. 485.

_Psammenitus_, iv. 219.

_Psammetichus I._, iii. 325 _seq._

_Psammetichus_ and Tamos, x. 13.

_Psammis_, iii. 333.

_Psephism_, Demophantus’s democratical, viii. 81.

_Psephisms_ and laws, distinction between, v. 373.

_Psyttaleia_, Persian troops in, v. 128, 136.

_Ptolemy of Alôrus_, x. 249, 250;
and Pelopidas, x. 263;
assassination of, x. 300.

_Ptolemy of Egypt_, attack of Perdikkas on, xii. 335;
alliance of, with Kassander, Lysimachus and Seleukus against
Antigonus, xii. 367, 372, 383, 387;
proclamations of, to the Greeks, xii. 369;
Lysimachus and Kassander, pacification of, with Antigonus, xii. 371;
in Greece, xii. 373.

_Ptolemy, nephew of Antigonus_, xii. 370.

_Public speaking_, its early origin and intellectual effects,
ii. 77 _seq._

_Punjab_, Alexander’s conquests in the, xii. 227 _seq._

_Purification_ for homicide, i. 25, 26.

_Pydna_, siege of, by Archestratus, vi. 70;
siege of, by Archelaus, viii. 118;
and Philip, xi. 236, 237.

_Pylæ_, in Babylonia, ix. 36 _n._ 2., 43 _n._

_Pylagoræ_, ii. 247.

_Pylians_, ii. 12, 335.

_Pylus_, attack of Hêraklês on, i. 110;
long independence of, ii. 331 _n._ 2;
occupation and fortification of, by the Athenians, vi. 317 _seq._;
armistice concluded at, vi. 324, 332;
Kleon’s expedition to, vi. 365 _seq._;
cession of, demanded by the Lacedæmonians, vii. 29;
helots brought back to, by the Athenians, vii. 70;
recapture of, by the Lacedæmonians, viii. 131.

_Pyramids_, Egyptian, iii. 321.

_Pyrrha_ and Deukaliôn, i. 96.

_Pyrrho_ and Sokratês, viii. 489 _n._

_Pyrrhus, son of Achilles_, i. 188.

_Pyrrhus, king of Epirus_, and Antipater, son of Kassander, xii. 389.

_Pythagoras, the philosopher_, i. 367 _seq._, iv. 390-411, 416.

_Pythagoras, the Ephesian despot_, iii. 182.

_Pythagorean order_, iv. 395, 403 _seq._, 416.

_Pythagoreans_, logical distinction of genera and species unknown to,
viii. 427 _n._ 2;
Plato, and Dion, xi. 57 _seq._

_Pytheas_, xii. 457.

_Pythia_, the, at Delphi, and Philomelus, xi. 250.

_Pythian Apollo_, i. 47.

_Pythian games_, ii. 240, 243, iv. 58, 63 _seq._, iv. 65,
x. 137 _n._ 1, 195, xi. 428.

_Pythius, the Phrygian_, v. 27.

_Pythodôrus_, vii. 133, 139, 285.

_Python_, mission of, to Athens, xi. 446.

_Pythonikus_, vii. 175, 197.

_Quadriremes_, x. 479.

_Quinqueremes_, v. 47 _n._ 2, x. 479.

_Races_ of men in “Works and Days”, i. 64 _seq._

_Religious_ ceremonies a source of mythes, i. 62, 63, 451 _seq._;
views paramount in the Homeric age, i. 357;
views, opposition of, to scientific, among the Greeks, i. 358,
370 _seq._;
festivals, Grecian, iv. 53, 67 _seq._, xi. 353;
associations, effect of, on early Grecian art, iv. 99.

_Reply_ to criticisms on the first two volumes of this history,
i. 408 _n._

_Rhadamanthus_ and Minôs, i. 219.

_Rhapsodes_, ii. 129, 137 _seq._

_Rhea_, i. 5, 6.

_Rhegians_ and Tarentines, expedition of, against the Iapygians,
v. 238.

_Rhegium_, iii. 383;
the chorus sent from Messênê to, iv. 53 _n._ 1;
and Athens, vii. 128 _n._ 3;
the Athenian fleet near, B. C. 425, vii. 134;
progress of the Athenian armament for Sicily to, vii. 181;
discouragement of the Athenians at, vii. 190;
relations of, with Dionysius, B. C. 399, x. 474 _seq._;
and Dionysius, xi. 5, 71, 11, 16 _seq._;
and Dionysius the Younger, xi. 133;
Timoleon at, xi. 144 _seq._

_Rhetoric_, v. 402, viii. 335, 339, 346 _seq._

_Rhetors_ and sophists, v. 402 _seq._

_Rhetra_, the primitive constitutional, ii. 344 _n._ 2, 345 _n._ 2.

_Rhetræ_, the Three Lykurgean, ii. 355 _n._ 3.

_Rhienus_ and the second Messenian war, ii. 430.

_Rhium_, Phormio in the Gulf at, vi. 196 _seq._

_Rhodes_, founder of, ii. 30;
dikasteries at, v. 384 _n._ 2;
and the Olympic games, vii. 52 _n._ 4;
the Peloponnesian fleet at, vii. 399, 400 _seq._, viii. 94, ix. 368,
373;
Dorieus at, viii. 116;
revolt of, from Sparta, ix. 271;
revolt of, from Athens, xi. 220 _seq._;
siege of, by Demetrius Poliorketes, xii. 381.

_Rhodians_ and the battle of Chæroneia, xi. 504.

_Rhodôpis_, iii. 337 _n._ 2.

_Rhœkus_ of Samos, iv. 100.

_Rhœsakes_, xii. 84.

_Rites_, post-Homeric, i. 27, 28;
ecstatic, i. 30 _seq._

_Rivers_, mythical personages identified with, i. 342 _n._ 2;
of Greece, ii. 217.

_Robbery_, violent, how regarded in Greece and Europe, ii. 111 _n._ 2.

_Romances_ of chivalry, i. 475, ii. 156 _n._ 2.

_Roman kings_, authority of, ii. 68 _n._ 3.

_Roman law_ of debtor and creditor, iii. 159 _seq._

_Romans_, respect of, for Illium, i. 327;
belief of, with regard to earthquakesi. 400 _n._;
dislike of, to paijudicial pleading, viii. 361 _n._ 2;
embassy from, to Alexander, xii. 248 _n._ 2;
Livy’s opinion as to the chances of Alexander, if he had attacked
the, xii. 260.

_Rome_, reduction of the rate of interest at, iii. 112 _n._ 1;
debasement of coin at, iii. 114;
new tables at, iii. 115 _n._ 2;
law of debtor and creditor at, iii. 159 _seq._;
political associations at, viii, 16 _n._ 2;
and Carthage, treaties between, x. 392 _n._

_Roxana_, xii. 214, 215, 319, 333, 367, 371.

_Sacred games_, Solon’s rewards to victors at, iii. 141;
objects, Greek view of material connection with, iii. 84 _n._ 1.,
260.

_Sacred War_, the first, iv. 63 _seq._, v. 346;
the second, xi. 241 _seq._, 374, 421 _seq._;
position of Philip after the second, xi. 434;
the third, xi. 467.

_Sacrifices_, i. 62;
human, in Greece, i. 126 _seq._

_Sacrilege_, French legislation upon, vii. 212 _n._

_Sadyattês_, iii. 253.

_Saga_, the, Ampère on, i. 357 _n._

_Sage_, a universal manifestation of the human mind, i. 461.

_Sagen-poesie_, applied as a standard to the Iliad and Odyssey,
ii. 162.

_Sagra_, date of the battle at, iv. 411 _n._ 2.

_Saints_, legends of, i. 469 _seq._

_Sakadas_, iv. 89.

_Salæthus_, vi. 237 _seq._

_Salamis_, the serpent of, i. 186;
war between Athens and Megara about, iii. 98 _seq._;
retreat of the Greek fleet from Artemisium to, v. 102, 107;
the battle of, v. 104-147;
Persian and Greek fleets after the battle of, v. 147;
migration of Athenians to, on Mardonius’s approach, v. 154;
seizure of prisoners at, by the Thirty Tyrants at Athens, viii. 267.

_Salamis in Cyprus_, i. 189, x. 14 _seq._

_Salmoneus_, i. 108.

_Samian exiles_, application of, to Sparta, iv. 242;
attack of, on Siphnos, iv. 244;
at Zanklê, v. 211.

_Samians_ and Athenians, contrast between, iv. 247;
slaughter of, by Otanês, iv. 249;
at Ladê, iv. 304;
migration of, to Sicily, iv. 305;
transfer of the fund of the confederacy from Delos to Athens
proposed by, v. 343;
application of, to Sparta for aid against Athens, vi. 29.

_Samnites_, xi. 8.

_Samos_, foundation of, iii. 173;
condition of, on the accession of Darius Hystaspês, iv. 240;
Lacedæmonians and Polykratês at, iv. 243;
Persian armament under Datis at, iv. 329;
Persian fleet at, after the battle of Salamis, v. 147, 192;
Greek fleet moves to the rescue of, from the Persians, v. 192;
an autonomous ally of Athens, vi. 2;
revolt of, from the Athenians, vi. 25 _seq._, 29;
and Milêtus, dispute between, about Priênê, vi. 26;
Athenian armament against, under Periklês, Sophoklês, etc.,
vi. 27 _seq._;
blockaded, vi. 28;
government of, after its capture by Periklês, vi. 30;
democratical revolution at, vii. 377 _seq._;
powerful Athenian fleet at, B. C. 412, vii. 386;
oligarchical conspiracy at, viii. 7 _seq._, 25 _seq._;
embassy from the Four Hundred to, viii. 44, 52 _seq._, 55;
Athenian democracy reconstituted at, viii. 46 _seq._;
the Athenian democracy at, and Alkibiadês, viii. 49 _seq._;
eagerness of the Athenian democracy at, to sail to Peiræus,
viii. 52, 54;
envoys from Argosto the Athenian Demos at, viii. 57;
Athenian democracy at, contrasted with the oligarchy of the Four
Hundred, viii. 92 _seq._;
Strombichidês’s arrival at, from the Hellespont, viii. 96;
Alkibiadês’s return from Aspendus to, viii. 115;
Alkibiadês sails from, to the Hellespont, viii. 116;
Alkibiadês at, B. C. 407, viii. 155;
Alkibiadês leaves Antiochus in command at, viii. 153;
dissatisfaction of the armament at, with Alkibiadês, viii. 154;
Konon at, viii. 160;
Lysander at, viii. 223, 237;
conquest of, by Timotheus, x. 294, 297 _n._ 2.

_Samothracians_, exploit of, at Salamis, v. 135.

_Sangala_, capture of, by Alexander, xii. 231.

_Sapphô_, i. 363, iv. 90 _seq._

_Sardinia_, proposition of Bias for a Pan-Ionic emigration to, iv. 207.

_Sardis_, iii. 220;
capture of, by Cyrus, iv. 192;
march of Aristagoras to, and burning of, iv. 290;
march of Xerxes to, and collection of his forces at, v. 14;
march of Xerxes from, v. 27;
retirement of the Persian army to, after their defeat at Mykalê,
v. 198
Alkibiadês’s imprisonment at, and escape from, viii. 119, 120;
forces of Cyrus the Younger collected at, ix. 8;
march of Cyrus the Younger from, to Kunaxa, ix. 11 _seq._;
victory of Agesilaus near, ix. 267;
surrender of, to Alexander, xii. 89.

_Sarissa_, xii. 57, 101 _seq._

_Sarmatians_, iii. 243.

_Sarpêdôn_, i. 219.

_Sataspes_, iii. 285, 288 _n._

_Satrapies_ of Darius Hystaspes, iv. 235 _seq._

_Satraps_ under Darius Hystaspes, discontents of, iv. 226 _seq._;
of Alexander, xii. 239 _seq._

_Satyrus of Herakleia_, xii. 564.

_Satyrus I._ of Bosporus, xi. 264 _n._ 1, xii. 481.

_Satyrus the actor_, xi. 270, 364.

_Satyrus II._ of Bosporus, xii. 484.

_Saxo Grammaticus_ and Snorro Sturleson contrasted with Pherekydes and
Hellanikus, i. 468.

_Scales_ Æginæan and Euboic, ii. 319 _seq._, 325;
Æginæan, Euboic and Attic, iii. 171.

_Scandinavian_ mythical genealogies, i. 465 _n._ 3;
and Teutonic epic, i. 479 _seq._

_Scardus_, ii. 212.

_Science_, physical, commencement of, among the Greeks, i. 367.

_Scientific_ views, opposition of, to religions, among the Greeks,
i. 359-370 _seq._

_Scission_ between the superior men and the multitude among the Greeks,
i. 375.

_Sculpture_ at Athens, under Periklês, vi. 22.

_Scurrility_ at festivals, iv. 80 _n._ 2.

_Scylla_, i. 1, 221.

_Scythia_, iii. 235;
Darius’s invasion of, iv. 263 _seq._

_Scythians_, iii. 233 _seq._, xii. 475;
invasion of Asia Minor and Upper Asia by, iii. 245 _seq._;
strong impression produced by, upon Herodotus’s imagination, iv. 268;
attack of Philip on, xi. 462;
and Alexander, xii. 206, 214.

_Secession_ of the mythical races of Greece, ii. 19.

_Seisachtheia_, or debtors’ relief-law of Solon, iii. 99 _seq._

_Selene_, i. 6, 346 _n._

_Seleukus_, alliance of, with Kassander, Lysimachus, and Ptolemy
against Antigonus, xii. 367, 372, 383, 387;
Kassander, Lysimachus, and Ptolemy, pacification of, with Antigonus,
xii. 371;
and the Pontic Hêrakleia, xii. 470;
death of, xii. 470.

_Selinuntines_, defeat of, by the Egestæans and Carthaginians, x. 404.

_Selinus_, iii. 367;
and Egesta, vii. 145, x. 401, 404;
application of, to Syracuse, x. 404;
capture of, by Hannibal, x. 405 _seq._;
abandonment of, by the rest of Sicily, x. 408;
Hermokrates at, x. 417.

_Selli_, ii. 268.

_Selymbria_, viii. 126, 133, xi. 455 _n._ 3.

_Selymbris_, iv. 27.

_Semele_, i. 259.

_Semi-historical_ interpretation of ancient mythes, i. 433.

_Senate_ and Agora subordinate in legendary, paramount in historical
Greece, ii. 76;
Spartan, ii. 345, 357;
of Areopagus, iii. 73;
powers of, enlarged by Solon, iii. 122;
of Four Hundred, Solon’s, iii. 121;
of Five Hundred, iv. 137;
at Athens, expulsion of, by the Four Hundred, viii. 39.

_Senators_, addition to the oath of Athenian, viii. 298.

_Sentiment_, mingled ethical and mythical, in “Works and Days”,
i. 69 _seq._

_Sepias Akte_, Xerxes’s fleet at, v. 83 _seq._

_Servitude_, temporary, of the gods, i. 57, 113 _n._ 2.

_Sestos_, capture of, B. C. 479, v. 202 _seq._;
escape of the Athenian squadron from, to Elæus, viii. 105;
Derkyllidas at, ix. 320;
capture of, by Kotys, x. 373;
surrender of, to Athens, B. C. 358, x. 379 _n._;
conquest of, by Chares, xi. 257.

_Seuthes_, and the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 154, 169 _seq._

_Seven chiefs_ against Thebes, the, i. 274.

_Seven wise men_ of Greece, iv. 95 _seq._

_Sibyl_, the Erythræan, i. 28.

_Sibylline_ prophecies, i. 28, 338.

_Sicilian_ Greeks, prosperity of, between B. C. 735 and 485,
iii. 367 _seq._;
Greeks, peculiarity of their monetary and statical scale, iii. 369;
comedy, iii. 373;
Greeks, early governments of, v. 206;
Greeks, and Phenicians, v. 207;
cities, B. C. 431, vii. 127, 131;
and Italian Dorians, aid expected from, by Sparta, vii. 129;
cities, general peace between, B. C. 424, vii. 138;
aid to Syracuse, B. C. 413, vii. 295.

_Sicily_, Phenicians and Greeks in, iii. 276;
ante-Hellenic population of, iii. 350, 361, 372;
and Italy, early languages and history of, iii. 354 _n._;
and Italy, date of earliest Grecian colony in, iii. 356;
rapid multiplication of Grecian colonies in, after B. C. 735,
iii. 360;
the voyage from Greece to, iii. 361;
spot where the Greeks first landed in, iii. 361;
Megarian, iii. 365;
subcolonies from, iii. 366;
Sikel or Sikan caverns in, iii. 368 _n._;
mixed population of, iii. 369;
difference between Greeks in, and those in Greece Proper,
iii. 372;
despots in, about B. C. 500, v. 204;
Carthaginian invasion of, B. C. 480, v. 220;
expulsion of despots from, B. C. 465, v. 233;
after the expulsion of the despots, B. C. 465, v. 234, 236 _seq._,
vii. 118;
return of Duketius to, vii. 122;
intellectual movement in, between B. C. 461-416, vii. 127;
relations of, to Athens and Sparta, altered by the quarrel between
Corinth and Korkyra, vii. 129;
Dorians attack the Ionians in, about B. C. 427, vii. 131;
Ionic cities in, solicit aid from Athens, against the Dorians,
B. C. 427, vii. 132;
Athenian expedition to, B. C. 427, vii. 133;
Athenian expedition to, B. C. 425, vii. 133;
Athenian expedition to, B. C. 422, vii. 142;
Athenian expedition to, B. C. 415, vii. 148-162, 179-191, 217-278;
Athenian expedition to, B. C. 413, vii. 279-287, 288-353;
effect of the Athenian disaster in, upon all Greeks, vii. 363;
intervention of Carthage in, B. C. 410, x. 401 _seq._;
invasion of, by Hannibal, B. C. 409, x. 405 _seq._;
abandonment of Selinus by the Hellenic cities of, B. C. 409, x. 408;
Hannibal’s return from, B. C. 409, x. 415;
return of Hermokrates to, x. 415;
invasion of, by Hannibal and Imilkon, x. 422 _seq._;
southern, depressed condition of, B. C. 405, x. 457;
expedition of Dionysius against the Carthaginians in, x. 483 _seq._;
frequency of pestilence among the Carthaginians in, xi. 1;
Dionysius’s conquests in the interior of, B. C. 394, xi. 4;
condition of, B. C. 353-344, xi. 130;
voyage of Timoleon to, xi. 143 _seq._;
invasion of, by the Carthaginians, B. C. 340, xi. 170;
Timoleon in, xi. 170-195;
expedition to, under Giskon, xi. 180;
Agathokles in, xii. 439 _seq._;
ceases to be under Hellenic agency after Agathokles, xii. 451.

_Sidon_, iii. 265;
conquest of, by Darius Nothus, xi. 438;
surrender of, to Alexander, xii. 130.

_Sidus_, capture of, by the Lacedæmonians, ix. 335;
recovery of, by Iphikrates, ix. 353.

_Siege of Troy_, i. 284-306.

_Sigeium_, Mitylenæan at, i. 339;
and Peisistratus, iv. 117.

_Sikans_, iii. 349, 351 _n._ 3, 369.

_Sikel_ prince, Duketius, iii. 374.

_Sikels_, iii. 349;
in Italy, iii. 351, 375;
migration of, from Italy to Sicily, iii. 353 _n._ 2;
in Sicily, iii. 367, x. 494, xi. 5, 6.

_Sikinnus_, v. 126, 140, 313 _n._ 2.

_Sikyôn_, origin of, i. 120 _seq._;
early condition of, iii. 4;
despots at, iii. 32 _seq._, 38;
classes of people at, iii. 35;
names of Dorion and non-Dorion tribes at, iii. 34, 37;
Corinth, and Megara, analogy of, iii. 47;
Athenian attacks upon, v. 332;
Spartan and Argeian expedition against, vii. 97;
desertion of, from Sparta to Thebes, x. 257;
intestine dissensions at, B. C. 367-366, x. 269 _seq._;
Euphron at, x. 269 _seq._, 272, 273.

_Silanus the prophet_, ix. 40, 133 _seq._

_Silphium_, iv. 33.

_Silver race_, the, i. 65.

_Simon_, i. 304.

_Simonidês of Keôs_, epigram of, on the battle of Thermopylæ, v. 104;
mediation of, between Hiero and Thero, v. 227.

_Simonidês of Amorgus_, poetry of, i. 463, iv. 73, 82.

_Sinôpe_ and the Amazons, i. 212 _n._ 3;
date of the foundation of, iii. 249 _n._ 3;
Perikles’s expedition to, vi. 10;
and the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 129 _seq._, 144;
long independence of, xii. 459;
envoys from with Darius, xii. 459.

_Siphnus_, iii. 166;
attack of Samian exiles on, iv. 244.

_Sirens_, the, i. 1.

_Siris_, or Herakleia, iii. 384.

_Sisygambis_, xii. 124, 164, 171.

_Sisyphus_, i. 118 _seq._

_Sitalkes_, vi. 141, 215 _seq._

_Sithonia_, iv. 24, 25.

_Sittake_, the Ten Thousand Greeks at, ix. 65.

_Skalds_, Icelandic, songs of, ii. 150 _n._ 2, ii. 157 _n._

_Skedasus_, x. 178.

_Skepsis_, Derkyllidas at, ix. 213.

_Skillus_, Xenophon at, ix. 176 _seq._

_Skiône_, revolt of, from Athens to Brasidas, vi. 435 _seq._;
dispute about, after the One year’s truce between Athens and Sparta,
vi. 437;
blockade of, by the Athenians, B. C. 423, vi. 442;
capture of, by the Athenians, B. C. 421, vii. 22.

_Skiritæ_, vii. 80, 84, x. 233.

_Skylax_, iv. 237, 283, x. 227 _n._ 6.

_Skyllêtium_, iii. 384.

_Skyros_, conquest of, by Kimon, v. 303.

_Skytalism_ at Argos, x. 200 _seq._

_Skythês_ of Zanklê, v. 211 _seq._

_Skythini_, and the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 110.

_Slavery_ of debtors in Attica before Solon, iii. 94.

_Slaves_ in legendary Greece, ii. 97 _seq._

_Smerdis_, iv. 221 _seq._

_Sminthian Apollo_, i. 50, 337.

_Smyrna_, iii. 182, 189.

_Social War_, xi. 220, 231.

_Socratic philosophers_, their unjust condemnation of rhapsodes,
ii. 139.

_Socratici viri_, viii. 403 _n._

_Sogdian rock_, capture of, by Alexander, xii. 214.

_Sogdiana_, Alexander in, xii. 202 _seq._, 207.

_Sôkratês_, his treatment of the discrepancy between scientific and
religious views, i. 370;
treatment of, by the Athenians, i. 374 _seq._;
alleged impiety of, attacked by Aristophanês, i. 401 _n._;
and the sophists, v. 404, vii. 35 _n._ 2; viii. 387 _n._, 400,
441 _n._;
at the battle of Delium, vi. 396;
and Alkibiadês, vii. 35 _seq._;
and Kritias, vii. 35 _seq._;
at the Athenian assembly, on the generals at Arginusæ, vii. 200;
and the Thirty, viii. 244, 257;
and Parmenidês, viii. 346 _n._;
dislike of, to teaching for pay, viii. 342;
life, character, philosophy, teaching, and death of, viii. 400-496.

_Solemnities_ and games, i. 106.

_Soli_ in Cyprus, iii. 148.

_Sollium_, Athenian capture of, vi. 135.

_Soloeis_, Cape, iii. 272 _n._ 2.

_Solon_ and the Iliad, ii. 152 _n._ 2;
civil condition of Attica before, iii. 48;
life, character, laws, and constitution of, iii. 88-159.

_Sophokles_, his Œdipus, i. 270;
his treatment of mythes, i. 379 _seq._, 385;
Periklês, etc., Athenian armament under, against Samos,
vi. 27 _seq._;
number of tragedies by, viii. 319 _n._;
Æschylus and Euripidês, viii. 332;
and Herodotus, viii. 323 _n._ 2.

_Sophokles_ and Eurymedon, expeditions of, to Sicily and Korkyra,
vi. 313 _seq._, 357 _seq._, vii. 133, 136, 139.

_Sôsis_, xi. 104.

_Sosistratus_, xii. 394, 388, 405.

_Sothiac period_ and Manetho, iii. 340 _seq._

_Sparta_ and Mykênæ, i. 165 _seq._;
occupation of, by the Dorians, ii. 311, 326 _seq._, 360;
and the disunion of Greek towns, ii. 259;
not strictly a city, ii. 261;
inferior to Argos and neighboring Dorians, B. C. 776, ii. 307, 312;
first historical view of, ii. 323;
not the perfect Dorian type, ii. 341;
pair of kings at, ii. 349;
classification of the population at, ii. 348 _seq._;
syssitia and public training at, ii. 380 _seq._;
partition of lands at, ascribed to Lykurgus, ii. 393-415;
progressive increase of, ii. 417;
and Lepreum, ii. 440;
Argos, and Arcadia, relations of, ii. 443 _n._ 2;
and Mantinea, ii. 444;
and Arcadia, ii. 445 _seq._;
and Tegea, ii. 446 _seq._;
bones of Orestês taken to, ii. 447;
acquisitions of, towards Argos, ii. 450 _seq._;
extensive possessions and power of by, B. C. 540, ii. 453 _seq._;
military institutions of, ii. 456 _seq._;
recognized superiority of, ii. 461, iv. 242, 318;
peculiar government of, iii. 6;
alleged intervention of, with the Nemean and Isthmian games,
iv. 66 _n._;
exclusive character of her festivals, iv. 69;
musical and poetical tendencies at, iv. 83 _seq._, 86 _n._ 1;
choric training at, iv. 84 _seq._;
first appearance of, as head of Peloponnesian allies, iv. 169,
174 _seq._;
preparations at, for attacking Athens, after the failure of
Kleomenês, iv. 173 _seq._;
and Crœsus, iv. 190;
and Asiatic Greeks, iv. 199, iv. 207, 208;
and Samian exiles, iv. 242;
and Aristagoras, iv. 287 _seq._;
treatment of Darius’s herald at, iv. 317;
appeal of Athenians to, against the Medism of Ægina, iv. 318;
war of, against Argos, B. C. 496-5, iv. 320 _seq._;
no heralds sent from Xerxes to, v. 57;
Pan-Hellenic congress convened by, at the Isthmus of Corinth,
v. 57 _seq._;
leaves Athens undefended against Mardonius, v. 153 _seq._;
headship of the allied Greeks transferred from, to Athens,
v. 261 _seq._;
and Athens, first open separation between, v. 263, 265 _seq._, 290;
secret promise of, to the Thasians, to invade Attica, v. 312;
restores the supremacy of Thebes in Bœotia, v. 313, 331;
and the rest of Peloponnesus, between B. C. 477-457, v. 314;
earthquake and revolt of Helots at, B. C. 464, v. 315 _seq._;
Athenian auxiliaries to, against the Helots, v. 316 _seq._;
Athenians renounce the alliance of, B. C. 464, v. 319;
and Athens, five years’ truce between, v. 334;
and Delphi, B. C. 452-447, v. 346;
and Athens, thirty years’ truce between, v. 350;
application of Samians to, vi. 29;
imperial, compared with imperial Athens, vi. 39, ix. 187 _seq._;
and her subject-allies, vi. 41;
and Athens, confederacies of, vi. 46;
promise of, to the Potidæans, to invade Attica, vi. 69;
application of the Lesbians to, vi. 76;
assembly at, before the Peloponnesian war, vi. 78 _seq._;
relations of, with her allies, vi. 79;
congress of allies at, B. C. 432, vi. 92 _seq._;
requisitions addressed to Athens by, B. C. 431, vi. 97 _seq._,
105 _seq._;
efforts of, to raise a naval force on commencing the Peloponnesian
war, vi. 125;
and the Mitylenæans, vi. 226 _seq._;
despatches from Artaxerxes to, vi. 360 _seq._;
and Athens one year’s truce between, B. C. 423, vi. 437 _seq._, 453,
457 _seq._;
and the Peace of Nikias, vii. 2, 9;
and Argos, uncertain relations between, B. C. 421, vii. 3;
and Athens, alliance between, B. C. 421, vii. 5;
revolt of Elis from, vii. 17 _seq._;
congress at, B. C. 421, vii. 24;
and Bœotia, alliance between, B. C. 420, vii. 26;
and Argos, fifty years’ peace between, vii. 28 _seq._;
embassy of Nikias to, vii. 44;
and Athens, relations between, B. C. 419, vii. 70;
and the battle of Mantinea, B. C. 418, vii. 86;
and Argos, peace and alliance between, B. C. 418, vii. 92 _seq._;
submission of Mantinea to, vii. 95;
and Athens, relations between, B. C. 416, vii. 103;
and Sicily, relations of, altered by the quarrel between Corinth and
Korkyra, vii. 129;
aid expected from the Sicilian Dorians by, B. C. 431, vii. 130;
embassy from Syracuse and Corinth to, B. C. 415, vii. 235 _seq._;
Alkibiadês at, vii. 236 _seq._, viii. 2;
and Athens, violation of the peace between, B. C. 414, vii. 285;
resolution of, to fortify Dekeleia and send a force to Syracuse,
B. C. 414, vii. 286;
application from Chios to, vii. 365;
embassy from Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus to, vii. 366;
embassy from the Four Hundred to, viii. 63, 84;
proposals of peace from, to Athens, B. C. 410, viii. 122 _seq._;
alleged proposals of peace from, to Athens, after the battle of
Argenusæ, viii. 210;
first proposals of Athens to, after the battle of Ægospotami,
viii. 226;
embassies of Theramenês to, viii. 227, 228;
assembly of the Peloponnesian confederacy at, B. C. 404, viii. 228;
terms of peace granted to Athens by, B. C. 404, viii. 229;
triumphant return of Lysander to, viii. 238;
and her allies, after the capture of Athens by Lysander, viii. 259;
oppressive dominion of after the capture of Athens by Lysander,
viii. 260;
opposition to Lysander at, viii. 262;
pacification by, between the Ten at Athens and the exiles at Peiræus,
viii. 278;
empire of, contrasted with her promises of liberty, ix. 191 _seq._;
change in the language and plans of, towards the close of the
Peloponnesian war, ix. 194;
and the Thirty at Athens, ix. 197;
opportunity lost by, for organizing a stable confederacy throughout
Greece, ix. 199 _seq._;
alienation of the allies of, after the battle of Ægospotami,
ix. 223 _seq._;
and Elis, war between, ix. 225 _seq._;
refuses to restore the Olympic presidency to the Pisatans, ix. 229;
expels the Messenians from Peloponnesus, ix. 229;
introduction of gold and silver to, by Lysander, ix. 230 _seq._;
in B. C. 432 and after B. C. 404, contrast between, ix. 232;
position of kings at, ix. 238 _seq._;
conspiracy of Kinadon at, ix. 247 _seq._;
Persian preparations for maritime war against, B. C. 397, ix. 255,
270;
revolt of Rhodes from, ix. 271;
relations of, with her neighbors and allies, after the accession of
Agesilaus, ix. 284;
and Hêrakleia Trachynia, ix. 285, 302;
and Timokrates, ix. 286 _seq._;
and Thebes, war between, B. C. 395, ix. 289 _seq._;
alliance of Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos against, ix. 301;
proceedings of, against Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos, ix. 303,
305 _seq._;
consequences of the battles of Corinth, Knidus, and Korôneia to,
ix. 317 _seq._;
hostility of, to partial land confederacies in Greece, ix. 361;
congress at, on the peace of Antalkidas, ix. 386;
and the peace of Antalkidas, x. 2 _seq._, 9 _seq._, 28;
applications of, for Persian aid, x. 5 _seq._;
and Persia after the battle of Ægospotami, x. 8;
and Grecian autonomy, x. 11 _seq._, 28;
miso-Theban proceedings of, after the peace of Antalkidas,
x. 28 _seq._;
restores Platæa, x. 30 _seq._;
oppressive conduct of towards Mantinea, B. C. 386, x. 35 _seq._;
mischievous influence of, after the peace of Antalkidas,
x. 40 _seq._;
naval competition of Athens with, after the peace of Antalkidas,
x. 42 _seq._;
and the Olynthian confederacy, x. 52 _seq._, 57, 65 _seq._;
and the surprise of Thebes by Phœbidas, x. 61 _seq._;
and Phlius, x. 70;
ascendency and unpopularity of, B. C. 379, x. 72 _seq._;
Xenophon on the conduct of, between B. C. 387-379, x. 77;
effect of the revolution at Thebes, B. C. 379, on, x. 93;
trial of Sphodrias at, x. 100 _seq._;
war declared by Athens against, B. C. 378, x. 102;
separate peace of Athens with, B. C. 374, x. 137, 141;
and Polydamas, x. 137 _seq._;
decline of the power of, between B. C. 382-374, x. 140;
discouragement of, by her defeat at Korkyra and by earthquakes,
B. C. 372, x. 157;
disposition of Athens to peace with, B. C. 372, x. 158, 165;
general peace settled at, B. C. 371, x. 165 _seq._, 174, 198;
effect of the news of the defeat at Leuktra on, x. 186;
and Athens, difference between in passive endurance and active
energy, x. 188;
reinforcements from, after the battle of Leuktra, x. 188;
treatment of defeated citizens on their return from Leuktra,
x. 192 _seq._;
and Thebes, alleged arbitration of the Achæans between, after the
battle of Leuktra, x. 199 _n._;
position of, after the battle of Leuktra, x. 201;
and the Amphiktyonic assembly, x. 202 _seq._, xi. 242;
feeling against Agesilaus at, B. C. 371, x. 207;
hostile approaches of Epaminondas to, x. 218 _seq._, 330 _seq._;
abstraction of Western Laconia from, x. 226 _seq._;
application of, to Athens for aid against Thebes, B. C. 369,
x. 234 _seq._;
and Athens, alliance between, B. C. 369, x. 253;
reinforcement from Syracuse in aid of, x. 258;
peace of her allies with Thebes, x. 290 _seq._;
alliance of Elis and Achaia with, B. C. 365, x. 313;
and Dionysius, x. 457, 505, xi. 22;
degradation of, B. C. 360-359, xi. 197 _seq._;
countenance of the Phokians by, B. C. 353, xi. 262;
plans of, against Megalopolis and Messênê, B. C. 353, ix. 263, 290;
decline in military readiness among the Peloponnesian allies of,
after the Peloponnesian war, xi. 280;
ineffectual campaign of, against Megalopolis, xi. 299 _seq._;
envoys from, to Philip, xi. 405, 409;
envoys from, with Darius, xii. 189;
anti-Macedonian policy of, after Alexander’s death, xii. 281 _seq._

_Spartan_ kings, ii. 11, 76, 353 _seq._;
senate, assembly, and ephors, ii. 349 _seq._;
popular assembly, ii. 357;
constitution, ii. 359 _seq._;
government, secrecy of, ii. 378;
discipline, ii. 381 _seq._;
women, ii. 383 _seq._;
law and practice of succession, erroneous suppositions about,
ii. 409 _seq._;
arbitration of the dispute between Athens and Megan about Salamis,
iii. 92;
expeditions against Hippias, iv. 122;
empire, commencement of, ix. 181, 184 _seq._, 188 _seq._;
empire, Theopompus on, ix. 195 _n._;
allies at the battle of Leuktra, x. 182.

_Spartans_, and Pheidôn, ii. 318;
and Messenians, early proceedings of, ii. 329;
local distinctions among, ii. 361;
the class of, ii. 361 _seq._;
and Helots, ii. 373 _seq._;
marriage among, ii. 385; their ignorance of letters, ii. 390 _n._ 3;
musical susceptibilities of, ii. 433;
and the second Messenian war, ii. 434, 437;
careful training of, when other states had none, ii. 455;
and the battle of Marathon, iv. 342, 358;
unwillingness of, to postpone or neglect festivals, v. 77;
at Platæa, v. 157, 166 _seq._;
and the continental Ionians after the battle of Mykalê, v. 193;
and the fortification of Athens, v. 243 _seq._;
favorable answer of the oracle at Delphi to, on war with Athens,
B. C. 432, vi. 91;
final answer of the Athenians to, before the Peloponnesian war,
vi. 106;
their desire for peace, to regain the captives from Sphakteria,
vi. 428 _seq._;
and Thebans, at the battle of Korôneia, ix. 317;
project of, for the rescue of the Asiatic Greeks, x. 44;
miso-Theban impulse of, B. C. 371, x. 175;
confidence and defeat of, at Leuktra, x. 179 _seq._;
retirement of, from Bœotia after the battle of Leuktra, x. 190;
refusal of, to acknowledge the independence of Messênê, x. 290, 350;
and Dion, xi. 61.

_Sparti_, i. 259, 261.

_Spartokidæ_, xii. 479 _seq._

_Speaking_, public, its early origin and intellectual effects,
ii. 77 _seq._

_Sperthiês_ and Bulis, vi. 182 _n._

_Speusippus_, indictment of, by Leogoras, vii. 206 _n._ 3.

_Sphakteria_, locality of, vi. 314;
occupation of, by the Lacedæmonians, vi. 320, 346;
blockade of Lacedæmonians in, vi. 324, 332 _seq._;
Lacedæmonian embassy to Athens for the release of the prisoners in,
vi. 324 _seq._;
Demosthenês’s application for reinforcements to attack,
vi. 334 _seq._;
condition of, on the attack by Demosthenês and Kleon, vi. 340;
victory of Demosthenês and Kleon over Lacedæmonians in,
vi. 341 _seq._;
surrender of Lacedæmonians in, vi. 345 _seq._;
arrival of prisoners from, at Athens, vi. 351;
restoration of prisoners taken at, vii. 6 _seq._;
disfranchisement of restored prisoners from, vii. 22.

_Sphendaleis_, Attic deme of, v. 158 _n._ 2.

_Sphinx_, the, i. 7, 266.

_Spodrias_, attempt of, to surprise Peiræus, x. 98 _seq._

_Spitamenes_, xii. 207, 213, 214.

_Spithridates_, and the Lacedæmonians, ix. 260, 274 _seq._

_Stables_, the Augean, i. 139.

_Stageira_, iv. 25.

_Standard_ of historical evidence raised with regard to England, but
not with regard to Greece, i. 484.

_Stasippus_, x. 209.

_Statira_, xii. 124, 154, 241.

_Statues_, Greek, identified with the beings they represented, i. 460.

_Stenyklêrus_, Dorians of, ii. 328.

_Steropês_, i. 5.

_Stesichorus, the lyric poet_, and Helen, i. 307 _seq._;
dialect of, iv. 78 _seq._

_Stesiklês_, x. 144, 147 _n._

_Sthenelaïdas_, the ephor, vi. 90 _seq._

_Story_ of striking off the overtopping ears of corn, iii. 24 _n._

_Strabo_ on the Amazons, i. 214;
his version of the Argonautic expedition, i. 255;
on Old and New Ilium, i. 329 _seq._;
his transformation of mythes to history, i. 413.

_Strangers_, supplication of, ii. 79 _n._;
reception of, in legendary Greece, ii. 85.

_Stratêgi_, Kleisthenean, iv. 136;
enlarged functions of Athenian, after the Persian war, v. 276.

_Stratolas_, x. 320.

_Stratus_, attack of Peloponnesians, Ambrakiots and Epirots upon,
B. C. 429, vi. 194.

_Strelitzes_, suppression of the revolt of, by Peter the Great,
iv. 232 _n._ 3.

_Strombichidês_, pursuit of Chalkideus and Alkibiadês by, vii. 371;
expedition of, to Chios, vii. 374, 390, 392;
removal of, from Chios to the Hellespont, viii. 94;
arrival of, at Samos, from the Hellespont, viii. 95;
and other Athenian democrats, imprisonment of, viii. 236;
trial and execution of, viii. 240 _seq._

_Strophê_, introduction of, iv. 89.

_Struthas_, victory of, over Thimbron, ix. 362.

_Strymôn_, Greek settlements east of, in Thrace, iv. 25;
Xerxes’s bridges across the, v. 25.

_Styx_, i. 7, 8.

_Styx_, rocks near, ii. 301 _n._

_Subterranean_, course of rivers in Greece, ii. 219.

_Succession_, Solon’s laws of, iii. 139.

_Suli_, iii. 418.

_Suppliants_, reception of, in legendary Greece, ii. 85.

_Supplication_ of strangers, ii. 79 _n._

_Susa_, sum found in by Alexander the Great, iv. 236 _n._;
Pharnabazus conveys Greek escorts towards, viii. 135;
Alexander at, xii. 168, 238;
Alexander’s march from, to Persepolis, xii. 246 _seq._

_Susia_, xii. 189.

_Susian Gates_, Alexander at, xii. 171.

_Syagrus_, reply of, to Gelôn, i. 167.

_Sybaris_, foundation, territory and colonies of, iii. 376 _seq._;
fall of, iii. 392, 399, iv. 413 _seq._;
maximum power of, iii. 394 _seq._;
and Krotôn, war between, iv. 412.

_Sybarites_, character of, iii. 394 _seq._;
defeat of, by the Krotoniates, iv. 413;
descendants of, at Thurii, vi. 13.

_“Sybaritic tales”_, iii. 394.

_Syennesis of Kilikia_, and Cyrus the Younger, ix. 18.

_Sylosôn_, iv. 248 _seq._

_Symmories_ at Athens, x. 117 _seq._;
speech of Demosthenês on the, xi. 285 _seq._

_Symplêgades_, the, i. 235.

_Syntagma_, Macedonian, xii. 60.

_Syracusan_ assembly, on the approaching Athenian expedition,
B. C. 415, vii. 183 _seq._;
ships, improvements in, to suit the narrow harbor, vii. 297;
squadron under Hermokrates against Athens in the Ægean,
x. 385 _seq._;
generals at Agrigentum, complaints against, x. 427, 431;
generals at Agrigentum, speech of Dionysius against, x. 433 _seq._;
horsemen, mutiny of, against Dionysius, x. 451 _seq._;
soldiers mutiny of, against Dionysius, x. 462 _seq._

_Syracusans_, confidence and proceedings of, after the capture of
Plemmyrium, B. C. 413, vii. 293 _seq._;
and Athenians, conflicts between, in the Great Harbor, vii. 294,
299 _seq._, 316 _seq._, 324 _seq._;
defeat of the Athenian night attack upon Epipolæ by, vii. 305 _seq._;
their blockade of the Athenians in the harbor, vii. 318;
captured by Thrasyllus, viii. 129;
delay of, in aiding Selinus, B. C. 409, x. 404, 408;
improvement in Dionysius’s behavior towards, B. C. 399, x. 473;
victory of, over the Carthaginians in the great Harbor, x. 501;
negotiations of Dionysius the Younger with Dion and the, xi. 96;
defeat of Dionysius the Younger, by Dion and the, xi. 97 _seq._;
application from, to Dion at Leontini, xi. 108;
gratitude of, to Dion, xi. 112;
opposition of, to Dion as dictator, xi. 121 _seq._;
application of, to Hiketas and Corinth, B. C. 344, x. 134 _seq._;
and Timoleon, application of, to Corinth, xi. 167.

_Syracuse_, foundation of, iii. 363;
petalism or ostracism at, iv. 162;
inferior to Agrigentum and Gela, before B. C. 500, v. 204;
in B. C. 500, v. 205;
increased population and power of, under Gelo, v. 214 _seq._;
prisoners awarded to, after the battle of Himera, v. 225;
topography of, B. C. 465, v. 235 _n._;
fall of the Gelonian dynasty at, v. 235 _seq._;
Gelonian citizens of, v. 237 _seq._;
reaction against despotism at, after the fall of the Gelonian
dynasty, v. 240;
political dissensions and failure of ostracism at, vii. 122;
foreign exploits of, B. C. 452, vii. 123;
Duketius at, vii. 124;
and Agrigentum, hostilities between, B. C. 446, vii. 125;
conquests and ambitious schemes of, B. C. 440, vii. 126;
incredulity and contempt at, as to the Athenian armament for Sicily,
B. C. 415, vii. 182;
quiescence of the democracy at, vii. 183 _n._;
preparations at, on the approach of the Athenian armament at,
B. C. 415, vii. 190;
empty display of the Athenian armament at, B. C. 415, vii. 194;
increased confidence at, through Nikias’s inaction, B. C. 415,
vii. 218;
landing of Nikias and his forces in the Great Harbor of, B. C. 415,
vii. 219;
defensive measures of, after the battle near the Olympieion,
vii. 228;
embassy from, to Corinth and Sparta, B. C. 415, vii. 235;
local condition and fortifications of, in the spring of B. C. 414,
vii. 244;
localities outside the walls of, vii. 245;
possibilities of the siege of, B. C. 415 and 414, vii. 245;
siege of, B. C. 414, vii. 248 _seq._;
battle near, B. C. 414, vii. 255 _seq._;
entrance of the Athenian fleet into the Great Harbor at, B. C. 414,
vii. 256;
approach of Gylippus to, vii. 262 _seq._;
arrival of Gylippus and Gongylus at, vii. 265;
expedition to, under Demosthenês B. C. 413, vii. 289;
Athenian victory in the harbor of, B. C. 413, vii. 291;
defeat of a Sicilian reinforcement to, B. C. 413, vii. 295;
disadvantages of the Athenian fleet in the harbor of, vii. 296;
arrival of Demosthenês at, vii. 301, 303;
philo-Athenians at, during the siege, vii. 311 _n._;
increase of force and confidence in, after the night attack upon
Epipolæ, vii. 314;
postponement of the Athenians’ retreat from, by an eclipse of the
moon, vii. 315;
number and variety of forces engaged at, vii. 318;
postponement of the Athenians’ retreat from, by Hermokratês,
vii. 330;
retreat of the Athenians from, vii. 331 _seq._;
number and treatment of Athenian prisoners at, vii. 344 _seq._;
topography of, and the operations during the Athenian siege,
vii. 401 _seq._;
rally of Athens during the year after the disaster at, viii. 1;
reinforcement from, in aid of Sparta, B. C. 368, x. 258;
after the destruction of the Athenian armament, x. 383, 389 _seq._;
and the quarrel between Selinus and Egesta, B. C. 410, x. 403 _seq._;
embassy from, to Hannibal, at Selinus, x. 409;
aid from, to Himera, against Hannibal, x. 410, 411;
attempts of Hermokrates to enter, x. 416 _seq._;
first appearance of Dionysius at, x. 420;
discord at, B. C. 407, x. 421;
reinforcement from, to Agrigentum, x. 426;
movement of the Hermokratean party at, to raise Dionysius to power,
x. 432;
Dionysius one of the generals at, 434 _seq._;
return of the Hermokratean exiles to, x. 436;
return of Dionysius from Gela, to, B. C. 405, x. 429;
establishment of Dionysius as despot at, x. 444 _seq._, 454;
re-distribution of property at, by Dionysius, x. 459 _seq._;
locality of, x. 470;
additional fortifications at, by Dionysius, x. 471 _seq._;
plunder of Carthaginians at, by permission of Dionysius, x. 482;
provisions of Dionysius for the defence of, against the
Carthaginians, B. C. 396, x. 494;
retreat of Dionysius from, to Katana, B. C. 395, x. 497;
siege of, by Imilkon, x. 498 _seq._;
Carthaginians before, x. 498 _seq._, 506 _seq._;
exultation at, over the burning of the Carthaginian fleet at Daskon,
x. 509;
new constructions and improvements by Dionysius at, xi. 39;
feeling at, towards Dionysius the Younger and Dion, B. C. 357,
xi. 86;
Dion’s march from Herakleia to, xi. 90;
Timokrates, governor of, xi. 92 _seq._;
Dion’s entries into, B. C. 357 and B. C. 356, xi. 92 _seq._, 110;
flight of Dionysius the Younger from, to Lokri, xi. 104;
rescue of, by Dion, xi. 108 _seq._;
condition of, B. C. 353-344, xi. 129 _seq._;
return of Dionysius the Younger to, xi. 132;
first arrival of Timoleon at, xi. 149;
return of Timoleon from Adranum to, xi. 158;
flight of Magon from, xi. 159 _seq._;
Timoleon’s temptations and conduct on becoming master of,
xi. 163 _seq._;
Timoleon’s recall of exiles to, xi. 166;
desolate condition of, on coming into the hands of Timoleon,
xi. 166, 167;
efforts of Corinth to reconstitute, xi. 167, 168;
influx of colonists to, on the invitation of Corinth and Timoleon,
xi. 169;
Timoleon marches from, against the Carthaginians, xi. 172 _seq._;
Timoleon lays down his power at, xi. 185;
great influence of Timoleon at, after his resignation, xi. 186, 193;
residence of Timoleon at, xi. 190;
Timoleon in the public assembly of, xi. 190 _seq._;
the constitution established by Timoleon at, exchanged for a
democracy, xii. 393;
expedition from, to Krotôn, about B. C. 320, xii. 397;
revolutions at, about B. C. 320, xii. 399, 400;
massacre at, by Agathokles in collusion with Hamilkar,
xii. 401 _seq._;
Agathokles constituted despot of, xii. 402;
Hamilkar’s unsuccessful attempt to take, xii. 422 _seq._;
barbarities of Agathokles at, after his African expedition, xii. 446.

_Syrians_, not distinguished from Assyrians in Greek authors,
iii. 290 _n._

_Syrphax_, xii. 90.

_Syssitia_, or public mess at Sparta, ii. 381.

_Tachos_, x. 361 _seq._

_Tagus_, Thessalian, ii. 281.

_Talôs_, i. 240.

_Tamos_, x. 13.

_Tamynæ_, Phokion’s victory at, xi. 341;
Demosthenes reproached for his absence from the battle of, xi. 344.

_Tanagra_, battle of, v. 328;
reconciliation of leaders and parties at Athens, after the battle
of, v. 329.

_Tantalus_, i. 157.

_Taochi_, and the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 109 _seq._

_Taphians_ in Homer’s time, ii. 102.

_Taranto_, fishery at, iii. 389 _n._ 2.

_Tarentines_ and Rhegians, expedition of, against the Iapygians,
v. 238;
and Mesapians, xii. 394.

_Tarentum_, foundation of cities in the Gulf of, i. 230;
Greek settlements on the Gulf of, iii. 384;
foundation and position of, iii. 387 _seq._

_Tarsus_, origin of, i. 85 _n._, iii. 277;
Cyrus the Younger at, ix. 20 _seq._;
Alexander at, xii. 112.

_Tartarus_, i. 4, 8, 9.

_Tartessus_, iii. 274;
not visited by Greeks before B. C. 630, iii. 277;
Kôlæus’s voyage to, iii. 278.

_Tauri_ in the Crimea, iii. 245.

_Tauromenium_, iii. 362;
commencement of, x. 493;
repulse of Dionysius at, xi. 5;
capture of, by Dionysius, xi. 8;
Timoleon at, xi. 146.

_Taurus_, xii. 182 _n._ 2.

_Taurus, Mount_, Alexander at, xii. 111.

_Taxiarch_, ii. 460.

_Taxila_, Alexander at, xii. 227.

_Tearless Battle_, the, x. 265 _seq._

_Tegea_ and Mantinea, ii. 443 _seq._, vi. 452, vii. 13;
and Sparta, ii. 447 _seq._;
bones of Orestês taken from, ii. 448;
refusal of, to join Argos, B. C. 421, vii. 19;
plans of the Argeian allies against, B. C. 418, vii. 76;
march of Agis to the relief of, B. C. 418, vii. 77;
revolution at, B. C. 370, x. 209;
seizure of Arcadians at, by the Theban harmost, x. 324 _seq._;
Epaminondas at, B. C. 362, x. 329, 330, 333, 335 _seq._;
march of Epaminondas from, B. C. 362, x. 333 _seq._

_Tegyra_, victory of Pelopidas at, x. 134.

_Teian_ inscriptions, iii. 186 _n._

_Telamôn_, i. 189 _seq._

_Telegonus_, i. 315.

_Têlekus_, conquests of, ii. 421;
death of, ii. 425.

_Teleontes_, iii. 51.

_Têlephus_, i. 177, 292.

_Teleutius_ and Agesilaus, capture of the Long Walls at Corinth, and of
Lechæum by, ix. 339 _seq._;
expedition of, to Rhodes, ix. 364, 368;
at Ægina, ix. 373, 376;
attack of, on the Peiræus, ix. 377 _seq._;
at Olynthus, x. 65 _seq._

_Têlinês_, iv. 106 _n._, v. 208 _seq._

_Telys, of Sybaris_, iv. 412 _seq._

_Temenion_ and Solygeius, ii. 309.

_Temenus_, Kresphontês, and Aristodêmus, ii. 2 _seq._;
and Kresphontês, family of, lowest in the series of subjects for
heroic drama, ii. 10.

_Temnos_, situation of, iii. 191 _n._ 1.

_Tempe_, remarks of Herodotus on the legend of, i. 400;
Delphian procession to, ii. 275 _n._ 2;
Grecian army sent to defend, against Xerxes, v. 68;
abandonment of the defence of, against Xerxes, v. 69 _seq._

_Temple of Eleusis_ built by order of Dêmêtêr, i. 40.

_Tenedos_, continental settlements of, iii. 195;
recovery of, by Macedonian admiralty, xii. 141.

_Ten_, appointment of the, at Athens, viii. 271;
measures of the, at Athens, viii. 272;
peace between the, at Athens, and Thrasybulus, viii. 279 _seq._;
treatment of the, at Athens, B. C. 403, viii. 293.

_Ten generals_ appointed to succeed Alkibiadês, viii. 159.

_Tennes_, the Sidonian prince, xi. 438.

_Ten Thousand Greeks_, position and circumstances of, ix. 11;
commencement of their retreat, ix. 52;
Persian heralds to, on commencing their retreat, ix. 52;
negotiations and convention of Tissaphernes with, ix. 59 _seq._;
quarrel of, with Ariæus, ix. 63;
retreating march of, under Tissaphernes, ix. 63 _seq._;
at the Tigris, ix. 65 _seq._;
at the Greater Zab, ix. 69;
summoned by Ariæus to surrender, ix. 76;
distress of, after the seizure of the generals, ix. 76;
new generals appointed by, ix. 80;
great ascendency of Xenophon over, ix. 83 _seq._;
crossing of the Great Zab by, ix. 88;
harassing attacks of the Persian cavalry on, ix. 88 _seq._;
retreat of, along the Tigris, ix. 90 _seq._;
and the Karduchians, ix. 96 _seq._;
at the Kentritês, ix. 100 _seq._;
in Armenia, ix. 102 _seq._;
and the Chalybes, ix. 107 _seq._;
and the Taochi, ix. 107 _seq._;
and the Skythine, ix. 110;
first sight of the Euxine by, ix. 111;
and the Makrônes, ix. 112;
and the Kolchians, ix. 112, 127;
at Trapezus, ix. 113, 124 _seq._;
geography of the retreat of, ix. 115 _seq._;
feelings of the Greeks on the Euxine towards, ix. 123 _seq._;
leave Trapezus, ix. 127;
at Kerasus, ix. 127;
march of, to Kotyôra, ix. 128;
at Kotyôra, ix. 129 _seq._;
and the Paphlagonians, ix. 144;
sail to Sinopê, ix. 144;
at Herakleia, ix. 146;
at Kalpê, ix. 147;
and Kleander, ix. 149 _seq._, 164;
and Anaxibius, ix. 154 _seq._, 163;
and Seuthes, ix. 154, 165 _seq._;
after leaving Byzantium, ix. 163 _seq._;
and Aristarchus, ix. 164 _seq._;
under the Lacedæmonians, ix. 168, 173, 206, 214;
in Mysia, ix. 172 _seq._;
Xenophon’s farewell of, ix. 175;
effects of their retreat on the Greek mind, ix. 179 _seq._

_Ten Thousand_, the Pan-Arcadian, x. 232.

_Teôs_, foundation of, iii. 185;
inscriptions of, iii. 186 _n._;
emigration from, on the conquest of Harpagus, iv. 203;
loss of, to Athens, B. C. 412, vii. 383;
capture of, by the Lacedæmonians, viii. 154.

_Tereus_, i. 196.

_Terpander_, ii. 141;
musical improvements of, iv. 75.

_Tethys_, i. 5, 6.

_Teukrians_, the, i. 335;
and Mysians, ethnical affinities and migrations of, iii. 208 _seq._

_Teukrus_, i. 189.

_Teukrus, the metic_, vii. 195, 197, 205 _n._ 1.

_Teuthrania_ mistaken by the Greeks for Troy, i. 292.

_Teutonic and Scandinavian epic_, its analogy with the Grecian,
i. 479 _seq._;
points of distinction between the Grecian and, i. 481.

_Thais_ and the burning of the palace of Persepolis, xii. 176 _n._ 3.

_Thales_, Xenophanês, and Pythagoras, i. 367 _seq._;
predictions ascribed to, ii. 116;
alleged prediction of an eclipse of the sun by, iii. 231 _n._ 3;
suggestion of, respecting the twelve Ionic cities in Asia, iii. 259;
philosophy and celebrity of, iv. 381 _seq._

_Thaletas_, iv. 83, 86.

_Thamyris_, analogy between the story of, and that of Marsyas,
iii. 214.

_Thanatos_, i. 7.

_Thapsakus_, Cyrus the Younger end his forces at, ix. 29 _seq._;
Alexander crosses the Euphrates at, xii. 150.

_Thasos_, island of, iv. 25;
attempted revolt of, from the Persians, iv. 313;
contribution levied by Xerxes on, v. 42;
revolt of, from the confederacy of Delos, v. 310;
blockade and conquest of, B. C. 464-463, v. 312;
application of, to Sparta, for aid against Athens, v. 312;
expulsion of the Lacedæmonians from, viii. 127;
reduction of, by Thrasyllus, viii. 144;
slaughter at, by Lysander, viii. 222.

_Thaumas_, i. 7.

_Theagenes of Rhegium_, the first to allegorize mythical narratives,
v. i. 418.

_Theagenes, despot of Megara_, iii. 44.

_Theagenes of Thasus_, statue of, 17, v. _n._ 2.

_Theatre_, Athenian, accessibility of, to the poorest citizens,
viii. 320.

_Thebaïd_ of Antimachus, i. 268.

_Thebaïs_, the Cyclic, i. 268;
ascribed to Homer, ii. 129.

_Theban_ contingent of Leonidas, doubts about, v. 91, 95;
leaders put to death after the battle of Platæa, v. 187;
prisoners in the night-surprise at Platæa, slaughter of,
vi. 118 _seq._;
military column, depth of, vi. 386, 390;
band of Three Hundred, vi. 387;
exiles at Athens, x. 61, 80 _seq._

_Thebans_ and Æginetans, i. 184;
against the seven chiefs, i. 273;
application of, to Ægina, for assistance against Athens, iv. 172;
and Xerxes’s invasion, v. 76;
defeated by the Athenians at Platæa, v. 179;
night-surprise of Platæa by, B. C. 431, vi. 114 _seq._;
capture of, in the night-surprise of Platæa, vi. 116 _seq._;
captured in the night-surprise of Platæa, slaughter of,
vi. 118 _seq._;
opposition of, to peace with Athens, B. C. 404, viii. 229 _n._;
humiliation of Agesilaus by, ix. 256;
application of, to Athens for aid against Sparta, B. C. 395,
ix. 291 _seq._;
at the battle of Corinth, ix. 306 _n._;
and Spartans at the battle of Korôneia, ix. 315;
and the peace of Antalkidas, ix. 386;
expulsion of the Lacedæmonians from Bœotia by, B. C. 374, x. 135;
invasion of Phokis by, B. C. 374, x. 136;
discouragement and victory of, at Leuktra, x. 177 _seq._;
and allies, invasion of Laconia by, B. C. 370, x. 215 _seq._;
displeasure of, with Epaminondas, B. C. 367, x. 268;
expeditions of, to Thessaly, to rescue Pelopidas, x. 283, 303 _seq._;
destruction of Orchomenus by, x. 311;
under Pammenes, expedition of, to Megalopolis, x. 359;
extinction of free cities in Bœotia by, xi. 201;
exertions of, to raise a confederacy against the Phokians, B. C. 356,
ix. 251;
Lokrians and Thessalians, war of, against the Phokians, B. C. 355,
xi. 254;
assistance under Pammenes sent by, to Artabazus, xi. 257, 299;
assistance of, to Megalopolis against Sparta, B. C. 352-351,
xi. 299 _seq._;
obtain money from the Persian king, B. C. 350-349, xi. 302;
invoke the aid of Philip to put down the Phokians, xi. 375;
Philip declares his sympathy with, B. C. 346, xi. 421;
invited by Philip to assist in an attack upon Attica, B. C. 339,
xi. 483 _seq._;
and Athenians, war of, against Philip in Phokis, xi. 493, 494 _seq._;
revolt of, against Alexander, xii. 29 _seq._

_Thêbê_, xi. 204 _seq._

_Thebes_ and Orchomenos, i. 135;
legends of, i. 256 _seq._;
how founded by Kadmus, i. 258;
five principal families at, i. 259;
foundation of, by Amphiôn, i. 263;
poems on the sieges of, i. 266;
sieges of, i. 269 _seq._;
the seven chiefs against, i. 273 _seq._;
repulse of the seven chiefs against, i. 274 _seq._;
the seven chiefs against death of all but Adrastus, i. 276;
the seven chiefs against, burial of the fallen, i. 277;
second siege of, i. 279, 280;
early legislation of, ii. 297;
and Platæa, disputes between, iv. 166;
summoned to give up its leaders after the battle of Platæa, v. 186;
discredit of, for its _Medism_, v. 314;
supremacy of, in Bœotia restored by Sparta, v. 314, 327;
mastery of Athens over, B. C. 456, v. 331;
reinforcements from, in support of the night-surprise at Platæa,
vi. 114 _seq._;
hard treatment of Thespiæ by, B. C. 423, vi. 452;
altered feeling of, after the capture of Athens by Lysander,
viii. 259, 264, 275;
and Sparta, war between, B. C. 395, ix. 289 _seq._;
revolt of Orchomenos from, to Sparta, ix. 293;
alliance of, with Athens, Corinth, and Argos, against Sparta,
ix. 301;
increased importance of, B. C. 395, ix. 301;
alarm at, and proposals of peace from, on the Lacedæmonian capture of
the Long Walls at Corinth, ix. 341;
envoys from, to Agesilaus, ix. 347, 352;
and the peace of Antalkidas, x. 12;
proceedings of Sparta against, after the peace of Antalkidas,
x. 28 _seq._;
seizure of the Kadmeia at, by Phœbidas, x. 58 _seq._;
government of, B. C. 382, x. 59 _n._ 1;
under Leontiades and other philo-Laconian oligarchs, x. 79 _seq._;
conspiracy against the philo-Laconian oligarchy at, x. 81 _seq._;
alliance of, with Athens, B. C. 378, x. 102;
state of, after the revolution of, B. C. 379, x. 119;
the Sacred Band at, x. 120;
expeditions of Agesilaus against, B. C. 378 and 377, x. 127 _seq._;
displeasure of Athens against, B. C. 474, x. 134, 158;
dealings of, with Platæa and Thespiæ, B. C. 372, x. 159 _seq._;
exclusion of, from the peace of B. C. 371, x. 167 _seq._;
increased power of, after the battle of Leuktra, x. 193;
and Sparta, alleged arbitration of the Achæans between, after the
battle of Leuktra, x. 199 _n._;
influence of, in Thessaly, B. C. 369, x. 248;
alienation of the Arcadians from, B. C. 368, x. 259 _seq._;
assassination of Euphron at, x. 273 _seq._;
application of, to Persia, B. C. 367, x. 277 _seq._;
Persian rescript in favor of, x. 278 _seq._;
protest of the Arcadians against the headship of, x. 281;
peace of Corinth, Epidaurus an Phlius with, B. C. 366, x. 290 _seq._;
opposition of the Mantineans and other Arcadians to, B. C. 362,
x. 326;
power of, B. C. 360-359, xi. 200 _seq._;
Philip at, xi. 207 _seq._;
Eubœa rescued from, by Athens, B. C. 358, xi. 217 _seq._;
accusation of, against Sparta before the Amphiktyonic assembly,
xi. 243;
accusation of, against Phokis before the Amphiktyonic assembly,
xi. 243;
the Phokians countenanced by Athens and Sparta as rivals of, xi. 262;
envoys to Philip from, B. C. 346, xi. 405, 408;
and Athens, unfriendly relations between, B. C. 339, xi. 484;
mission of Demosthenês to, B. C. 339, xi. 486 _seq._;
and Athens, alliance of, against Philip, B. C. 339, xi. 490;
severity of Philip towards, after the battle of Chæroneia, xi. 505;
march of Alexander from Thrace to, xii. 36;
capture and destruction of, by Alexander, xii. 37 _seq._;
restored by Kassander, xii. 441.

_Thebes in Egypt_, iii. 312.

_Theft_, laws of, at Athens, iii. 142.

_Theia_, i. 5.

_Themis_, i. 5, 10.

_Themistoklês_, character of, iv. 337 _seq._;
and Aristeidês, rivalry between, v. 50, 273;
change of Athens from a land-power to a sea-power proposed by, v. 52;
long-sighted views of, in creating a navy at Athens, v. 53,
293 _n._ 2;
and the Laurian mines, v. 54;
his explanation of the answer of the Delphian oracle on Xerxes’s
invasion, v. 61;
prevails upon the Greeks to stay and fight at Artemisium,
v. 97 _seq._;
inscribed invitations of, to the Ionians under Xerxes, v. 102;
activity and resource of, on Xerxes’s approach, v. 110;
opposes the removal of the Greek fleet from Salamis to the isthmus
of Corinth, v. 121 _seq._;
and Eurybiadês at Salamis, v. 123 _n._;
and Adeimantus of Corinth, at Salamis, v. 122, 125;
his message to Xerxes before the battle of Salamis, v. 126;
his message to Xerxes after the battle of Salamis, v. 139;
levies fines on the Cyclades, v. 141;
honors rendered to, after the battle of Salamis, v. 146;
alleged proposal of, to burn all the Grecian ships except the
Athenian, v. 203 _n._ 2;
stratagem of, respecting the fortification of Athens, v. 244 _seq._;
plans of, for the naval aggrandizement of Athens, v. 248 _seq._;
persuades the Athenians to build twenty new triremes annually,
v. 252;
and Pausanias, v. 273, 282;
opponents and corruption of, after the Persian war, v. 278 _seq._;
and Timokreon, v. 278;
first accusation of treason against, v. 280;
two accusations of treason against, v. 280 _n._ 1;
ostracism of, v. 281, 282 _n._ 1;
second accusation of treason against, v. 382;
flight and adventures of, on charge of _Medism_, v. 283 _seq._;
and Admêtus, v. 283;
and Artaxerxes Longimanus, v. 285 _seq._;
in Persia, v. 285 _seq._;
rewards and death of, v. 287 _seq._

_Theodôrus of Samos_, iv. 98 _n._

_Theodôrus the Syracusan_, speech of, against Dionysius, x. 501 _seq._

_Theognis_, iii. 44, iv. 92.

_Theogony_ of the Greeks not a cosmogony, i. 2;
of Hesiod, i. 3;
Orphic, i. 17 _seq._;
Hesiodic and Orphic, compared, i. 20 _seq._;
Hesiodic legend of Pandôra in, i. 75.

_Theoklês_, the founder of Naxos, in Sicily, iii. 361;
expels the Sikels from Leontini and Katana, iii. 363.

_Theology_, triple, of the pagan world, i. 439.

_Theophrastus_, the phytologist, i. 360 _n._;
his treatment of mythes, i. 412.

_Theopompus, the Spartan king_, ii. 424 _nn._

_Theopompus, the historian_, on the Spartan empire, ix. 195 _n._

_Theôric Board_ at Athens, creation of, ix. 379.

_Theôric Fund_, allusions of Demosthenês to, xi. 334, 338;
motion of Apollodorus about, xi. 348;
not appropriated to war purposes till just before the battle of
Chæroneia, xi. 353;
true character of, xi. 353 _seq._;
attempt of the Athenian property-classes to evade direct taxation by
recourse to, xi. 357;
application of, to military purposes, xi. 492.

_Theôrikon_, viii. 321.

_Theôrs_, ii. 243.

_Thêra_, ii. 27;
foundation of Kyrênê from, iv. 29 _seq._

_Theramenês_, Peloponnesian fleet under, vii. 388;
statement of, respecting the Four Hundred, viii. 13 _n._ 2;
expedition of, to the Hellespont, viii. 118;
accusation of the generals at Arginusæ by, viii. 181 _seq._;
probable conduct of, at Arginusæ, viii. 185 _seq._, 187 _n._;
first embassy of, to Sparta, viii. 227;
second embassy of, to Sparta, viii. 228;
and the executions by the Thirty, viii. 241, 242, 245;
and Kritias, dissentient views of, viii. 241 _seq._, 249;
exasperation of the majority of the Thirty against, viii. 249;
denunciation of, by Kritias in the senate, viii. 249;
reply of, to Kritins’s denunciation in the senate, viii. 251;
condemnation and death of, vii. 253 _seq._

_Theramenês_ the Athenian, viii. 19;
his opposition to the Four Hundred, viii. 58 _seq._;
his impeachment of the embassy of the Four Hundred to Sparta,
viii. 84 _seq._

_Therimachus_, ix. 366.

_Therma_, Xerxes’s movements from, to Thermopylæ, v. 83;
capture of, by Archestratus, vi. 70.

_Thermaic Gulf_, original occupants on, iv. 13.

_Thermopylæ_, Greeks north of, in the first two centuries, ii. 274;
Phokian defensive wall at, ii. 283;
resolution of Greeks to defend against Xerxes, v. 71;
the pass of, v. 73 _seq._;
path over Mount Œta avoiding, v. 73;
movements of Xerxes from Therma to, v. 83;
impressions of Xerxes about the defenders at, v. 86;
repeated Persian attacks upon, repulsed, v. 87;
debate among the defenders of, when the Persians approached their
rear, v. 89;
manœuvres ascribed to Xerxes respecting the dead at, v. 103;
numbers slain at, on both sides, v. 103;
inscriptions commemorative of the battle at, v. 104;
effect of the battle of, on the Greeks and Xerxes, v. 105 _seq._;
conduct of the Peloponnesians after the battle of, v. 106;
hopeless situation of the Athenians after the battle of, v. 106;
Onomarchus at, xi. 256;
Philip checked at, by the Athenians, xi. 296;
position of Phalækus at, B. C. 347-346, xi. 374, 418;
application of the Phokians to Athens for aid against Philip at,
B. C. 347, xi. 376;
importance of, to Philip and Athens, B. C. 347, xi. 378;
march of Philip to, B. C. 346, xi. 407 _seq._;
plans of Philip against, B. C. 346, xi. 410;
letters of Philip inviting the Athenians to join him at, xi. 417;
Phokians at, B. C. 347-346, xi. 418 _seq._;
surrender of, to Philip, xi. 421;
professions of Philip after his conquest of, xi. 424;
special meeting of the Amphiktyous at, B. C. 339, xi. 479.

_Thermus_, ii. 291.

_Thêro of Agrigentum_ and Gelo, v. 220 _seq._;
and Hiero, v. 228;
severe treatment of Himeræans by, v. 228;
death of, v. 230.

_Thersander_, the Orchomenian, at the Theban banquet to Mardonius,
v. 160.

_Thersitês_, i. 298, ii. 70 _seq._

_Therseium_ at Athens, v. 306.

_Thêseus_, i. 169, 207 _seq._;
and the Minôtaur, i. 223;
obtains burial for the fallen chiefs against Thêbes, i. 277;
the political reforms of, ii. 21;
and Menestheus, ii. 22;
restoration of the sons of, to his kingdom, ii. 23;
consolidation of Attica by, iii. 69;
bones of, conveyed to Athens, v. 304.

_Thesmoi_, iii. 76.

_Thesmophoria_, festival of, i. 44.

_Thesmothetæ_, iii. 74.

_Thespiæ_, hard treatment of, by Thebes, B. C. 423, vi. 452;
severity of Thebes towards, B. C. 372, x. 162.

_Thespian_ contingent of Leonidas, v. 91.

_Thespians_, distress of, caused by Xerxes’s invasion, v. 91 _n._ 1;
at the battle of Leuktra, x. 180;
expulsion of, from Bœotia, after the buds of Leuktra, x. 195.

_Thespis_ and Solon, story of, iii. 146.

_Thesprotians_, iii. 414 _seq._

_Thessalian_ cities, disorderly confederacy of, ii. 282;
and Athenian cavalry, skirmishes of, with Archidamus, vi. 134;
cavalry sent home by Alexander, xii. 181.

_Thessalians_, migration of, from Thesprôtis to Thessaly, ii. 14;
non-Hellenic character of, ii. 15;
and their dependants in the first two centuries, ii. 274 _seq._;
character and condition of, ii. 276 _seq._;
and Xerxes’s invasion, v. 67, 69;
alliance of, with Athens and Argos, about B. C. 461, v. 320;
Thebans, and Lokrians, war of, with the Phokians, B. C. 355, xi. 254.

_Thessalus_, son of Kimon, impeachment of Alkibiadês by, vii. 210.

_Thessaly_, affinities of, with Bœotia, ii. 17;
quadruple division of, ii. 281;
power of, when united, ii. 283;
Athenian march against, B. C. 454, v. 382;
Brasidas’s march through, to Thrace, vi. 399 _seq._;
Lacedæmonian reinforcements to Brasidas prevented from passing
through, vi. 449;
state of, B. C. 370, x. 248;
influence of Thebes in, B. C. 369, x. 248;
expedition of Pelopidas to, B. C. 369, x. 248;
expedition of Pelopidas to, B. C. 368, x. 263;
expeditions of Pelopidas to, x. 264 _n._ 2;
mission of Pelopidas to, B. C. 366, x. 282;
expedition of Pelopidas to, B. C. 363, x. 303, 307 _seq._;
despots of, xi. 202 _seq._;
first expedition of Philip into, against the despots of Pheræ,
xi. 261, 292, 295 _n._ 2;
second expedition of Philip into, against the despots of Pheræ,
xi. 292;
victory of Leosthenes over Antipater in, xii. 315.

_Thêtes_ in legendary Greece, ii. 100;
in Attica immediately before Solon’s legislation, iii. 94 _seq._;
mutiny of, iii. 97.

_Thetis_ and Pêleus, i. 187.

_Thimbron_, expedition of, to Asia, ix. 208;
defeat and death of, ix. 362, xii. 429 _seq._

_Thirlwall’s_ opinion on the partition of land ascribed to Lykurgus,
ii. 401 _seq._, 404, 407 _seq._

_Thirty at Athens_, nomination of, viii. 236;
proceedings of, viii. 239 _seq._;
executions by, viii. 240 _seq._, 243 _seq._, 247 _seq._;
discord among, viii. 243;
three thousand hoplites nominated by, viii. 246;
disarming of hoplites by, viii. 247;
murders and spoliations by, viii. 247, 256;
tyranny of, after the death of Theramenês, viii. 256;
intellectual teaching forbidden by, viii. 257;
and Sokratês, viii. 258;
growing insecurity of, viii. 259;
disgust in Greece at the enormities of, viii. 262;
repulse and defeat of, by Thrasybulus at Phylê, viii. 265;
seizure and execution of prisoners at Eleusis and Salamis by,
viii. 267;
defeat of, by Thrasybulus at Peiræus, viii. 269 _seq._;
deposition of, viii. 271;
reaction against, on the arrival of king Pausanias, viii. 275;
flight of the survivors of the, viii. 280;
treatment of, B. C. 403, viii. 292;
oppression and suffering of Athens under the, ix. 185;
Athens rescued from the, ix. 185;
the knights or horsemen supporters of the, ix. 186;
Athens under the, a specimen of the Spartan empire, ix. 187;
compared with the Lysandrian Dekarchies, ix. 188;
and Kallibius, ix. 188;
put down by the Athenians themselves, ix. 198.

_Thorax_ and Xenophon, ix. 134 _seq._

_Thrace_, Chalkidic colonies in, iv. 22 _seq._;
Greek settlements east of the Strymôn in, iv. 25;
conquest of, by the Persians under Darius, iv. 273;
and Macedonia, march of Mardonius into, iv. 373;
contributions levied by Xerxes on towns in, v. 41;
Brasidas’s expedition to, vi. 370, 397 _seq._;
war continued in, the one year’s truce between Athens and Sparta,
vi. 438;
Alkibiadês and Thrasybulus in, B. C. 407, viii. 144;
Iphikrates in, between B. C. 387-378, x. 106 _seq._;
Iphikrates in, B. C. 368-365, x. 250 _seq._;
Philip in, B. C. 351, xi. 306, and B. C. 346, xi. 402, 404, and
B. C. 342-341, xi. 450 _seq._;
Alexander’s expedition into, xii. 22 _seq._;
march of Alexander from, to Thebes, xii. 36.

_Thracian_ influence upon Greece, i. 31;
race in the north of Asia Minor, iii. 207;
Chersonesus, iv. 27;
subject-allies of Athens not oppressed by her, vi. 404 _seq._;
mercenaries under Diitrephês, vii. 356 _seq._

_Thracians_ in the time of Herodotus and Thucydides, ii. 88;
and Phrygians, affinities between, iii. 208 _seq._, 212;
affinities and migrations of, iii. 208 _seq._;
numbers and abode of, iv. 15;
general character of, iv. 15 _seq._;
Asiatic characteristics of, iv. 17;
venality of, vi. 217 _n._ 2.

_Thrasius_, xi. 173, 180.

_Thrasybulus of Syracuse_, v. 232 _seq._

_Thrasybulus, the Athenian_, speech of, at Samos, viii. 47;
efforts of, at Samoa, in favor of Alkibiadês, viii. 50;
in Thrace, viii. 144;
accusation of the generals at Arginusæ by, viii. 182 _seq._;
flight of, from Attica, viii. 242;
occupation of Phylê, and repulse and defeat of the Thirty by,
viii. 265;
occupation of Peiræus by, viii. 268;
victory of, over the Thirty at Peiræus, viii. 269 _seq._;
increasing strength of, at Peiræus, vii. 273;
straitened condition of, in Peiræus, viii. 274;
at Peiræus, king Pausanias’s attack upon, viii. 276;
and the Ten at Athens, peace between, viii. 277;
and the exiles, restoration of, to Athens, viii. 279;
assistance of, to Evander and others, viii. 306 _n._ 2;
honorary reward to, viii. 309;
aid to the Thebans by, ix. 295;
acquisitions of, in the Hellespont and Bosporus, ix. 366;
victory of, in Lesbos, ix. 367;
death and character of, ix. 367.

_Thrasydæus_, v. 226;
cruel government, defeat, and death of, v. 228, ix. 223, 226.

_Thrasyklês_ and Strombichidês, expedition of, to Chios, vii. 374.

_Thrasyllus_, vii. 73, 74;
at Samos, B. C. 411, viii. 46, 48;
at Lesbos, viii. 101;
eluded by Mindarus, viii. 102;
at Elæus, viii. 109;
repulse of Agis by, viii. 128;
expedition of, to Ionia, viii. 129;
and Alkibiadês, at the Hellespont, viii. 130.

_Thrasylochus_ and Demosthenês, xi. 268 _n._ 2.

_Thrasymachus_, rhetorical precepts of, viii. 370;
doctrine of, in Plato’s Republic, viii. 390 _seq._

_Three thousand_, nominated the Thirty at Athens, viii. 246.

_Thucydidês_, altered intellectual and ethical standard in the age of,
i. 366;
his treatment of ancient mythes, i. 391, 405 _seq._;
his version of the Trojan war, i. 405 _seq._;
on the dwellings of the earliest Greeks, ii. 109;
his date for the return of the Herakleids, ii. 13;
silence of, on the treaty between Athens and Persia, v. 336;
descent of, vi. 12 _n._ 2;
various persons named, vi. 28 _n._ 2;
his division of the year, vi. 114 _n._ 2;
his judgment respecting Periklês, vi. 173, 176;
first mention of Kleon by, vi. 244;
reflections of, on the Korkyræan massacre, B. C. 427, vi. 278 _seq._;
structure of his history, vi. 309 _n._;
judgment of, on Kleon’s success at Pylus, vi. 347 _seq._;
on Kythêra, vi. 364 _n._;
and the capitulation of Amphipolis to Brasidas, vi. 409, 410,
412 _seq._;
banishment of, vi. 413 _seq._;
on Kleon’s views and motives in desiring war, B. C. 422,
vi. 456 _seq._, 459;
passages of, on the battle of Amphipolis, vi. 405 _nn._, 466 _n._,
468 _n._;
feelings of, towards Brasidas and Kleon, vi. 474;
treatment of Kleon by, vi. 474, 477 _seq._;
dialogue set forth by, between the Athenian envoys and Executive
Council of Mêlos, vii. 109 _seq._, 115 _seq._;
his favorable judgment of the Athenians at the restoration of the
democracy, B. C. 411, viii. 90 _seq._;
study of, by Demosthenes, xi. 269.

_Thucydides, son of Melesias_, v. 342;
rivalry of, with Periklês, vi. 15 _seq._;
ostracised, vi. 19;
history of, after his ostracism, vi. 28 _n._ 2.

_Thurians_, defeat of, by the Lucanians, xi. 13.

_Thurii_, foundation of, vi. 13 _seq._;
few Athenian settlers at, vi. 15;
revolution at, B. C. 413, x. 384.

_Thyania_, surprise of, by the Phliasians and Chares, x. 272.

_Thyestean banquet_, the, i. 162.

_Thyestes_, i. 161 _seq._

_Thymochares_, defeat of, near Eretria, viii. 72 _seq._

_Thymodes_, xii. 116, 125.

_Thynians_, iii. 207.

_Thyrea_, conquest of, ii. 449;
capture of, by Nikias, B. C. 424, vi. 366;
stipulation about, between Sparta and Argos, B. C. 420, vii. 27.

_Thyssagetæ_, iii. 244.

_Tigris_, the Ten Thousand Greeks at the, ix. 64 _seq._;
retreat of the Ten Thousand along the, ix. 88 _seq._;
forded by Alexander, xii. 151;
voyage of Nearchus from the mouth of the Indus to that of the,
xii. 235, 236;
Alexander’s voyage up the, to Opis, xii. 243.

_Tilphusios Apollo_, origin of the name, i. 48.

_Timæus’s_ treatment of mythes, i. 410.

_Timagoras_, his mission to Persia, and execution, x. 278, 280,
280 _n._ 1.

_Timandra_, i. 168.

_Timarchus_, decree of, xi. 368, 369 _n._

_Timasion_, and Xenophon, ix. 134 _seq._

_Time_, Grecian computation of, ii. 115 _n._ 2.

_Timegenidas_, death of, v. 187.

_Timocracy_ of Solon, iii. 120 _seq._

_Timokrates, the Rhodian_, ix. 286 _seq._

_Timokrates, of Syracuse_, xi. 92 _seq._

_Timokreon_ and Themistoklês, v. 279.

_Timolaus_, speech of, ix. 304.

_Timoleon_, appointment of, to aid Syracuse, xi. 136, 142;
life and character of, before B. C. 344, xi. 136 _seq._;
and Timophanes, xi. 136 _seq._;
preparations of, for his expedition to Syracuse, xi. 143;
voyage of, from Corinth to Sicily, xi. 143 _seq._;
message from Hiketas to, xi. 144;
at Rhegium, xi. 144 _seq._;
at Tauromenium, xi. 146;
at Adranum, xi. 148, 156;
first arrival of, at Syracuse, xi. 149;
surrender of Ortygia to, xi. 150 _seq._;
reinforcement from Corinth to, xi. 152, 155, 157;
admiration excited by the successes of, xi. 152, 162;
advantage of Ortygia to, xi. 155;
return of, from Adranum to Syracuse, xi. 158;
Messênê declares in favor of, xi. 158;
capture of Epipolæ by, xi. 160;
favor of the gods towards, xi. 161, 179, 181;
ascribes his successes to the gods, xi. 163;
temptations and conduct of, on becoming master of Syracuse,
xi. 163 _seq._;
demolition of the Dionysian stronghold in Ortygia by, xi. 165;
erection of courts of justice at Syracuse by, xi. 166;
recall of exiles to Syracuse, by, xi. 166;
capitulation of Hiketas with, at Leontini, xi. 170;
puts down the despots in Sicily, xi. 170, 180 _seq._;
march of, from Syracuse against the Carthaginians, xi. 172 _seq._;
and Thrasius, xi. 172, 180;
victory of, over the Carthaginians at the Krimêsus, xi. 174 _seq._;
and Mamerkus, xi. 180 _seq._;
partial defeats of his troops, xi. 180;
victory of, over Hiketas at the Damurias, xi. 181;
surrender of Leontini and Hiketas to, xi. 182;
peace of, with the Carthaginians, xi. 182;
capture of Messênê and Hippon by, xi. 184;
lays down his power at Syracuse, xi. 185;
great influence of, after his resignation at Syracuse, xi. 186, 193;
and the immigration of new Greek settlers into Sicily,
xi. 188 _seq._;
residence of, at Syracuse, xi. 190;
in the public assembly at Syracuse, xi. 190 _seq._;
uncorrupted moderation and public spirit of, xi. 192;
freedom and prosperity in Sicily, introduced by, xi. 193;
death and obsequies of, xi. 194;
and Dion, contrast between, xi. 196 _seq._;
the constitution established at Syracuse by, exchanged for an
oligarchy, xii. 393.

_Timomachus_ in the Hellespont, x. 373.

_Timophanes_ and Timoleon, xi. 136 _seq._

_Timotheus, son of Konon_, x. 110;
circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by, x. 132;
at Zakynthus, x. 141;
appointment of, to aid Korkyra, B. C. 373, x. 144;
delay of, in aiding Korkyra, x. 146 _seq._, 147 _n._;
and Iphikrates, x. 149, 288, 299 _n._ 2;
trial and acquittal of, x. 153 _seq._, 154 _n._;
expedition of, to Asia Minor, B. C. 366, x. 252, 294 _seq._;
and Charidemus, x. 299, 300;
successes of, in Macedonia and Chalkidikê, B. C. 365-364, x. 300;
failure of, at Amphipolis, B. C. 364, x. 301;
and Kotys, x. 302;
in the Chersonese, B. C. 363, x. 302, 306, 368;
in the Hellespont, B. C. 357, xi. 224;
accusation of, by Chares, xi. 226 _seq._, 228 _n._ 4;
arrogance and unpopularity of, xi. 227;
exile and death of, xi. 229.

_Timotheus, of the Pontic Herakleia_, xii. 465.

_Tiribazus_ and The Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 99, 102;
embassy of Antalkidas, Konon, and others to, ix. 359 _seq._;
and Antalkidas at, Susa, ix. 383;
and the peace of Antalkidas, ix. 385;
and Orontes, x. 22, 23.

_Tisamenus, son of Orestes_, ii. 4, 7, 8 _n._ 1.

_Tisamenus, the Athenian_, decree of, viii. 295.

_Tisiphonus_, despot at Pheræ, xi. 205.

_Tissaphernes_ and Pharnabazus, embassy from, to Sparta, B. C. 413,
vii. 366;
and Chalkideus, treaty between, vii. 376;
first treaty of, with the Peloponnesians, vii. 376;
payment of the Peloponnesian fleet by, vii. 389;
and Astyochus, treaty between, vii. 395 _seq._;
second treaty of, with the Peloponnesians, vii. 395 _seq._;
and Lichas, at Milêtus, vii. 398;
double-dealing and intrigues of, with the Peloponnesian fleet,
vii. 398, 400 _seq._;
escape and advice of Alkibiades, to, viii. 3 _seq._;
and the Greeks, Alkibiadês acts as interpreter between, viii. 5;
reduction of pay to the Peloponnesian fleet by, viii. 5;
third treaty of, with the Peloponnesians, viii. 23 _seq._;
envoy from, to Sparta, B. C. 411, viii. 98;
false promises of, to Mindarus, viii. 99;
and the Phenician fleet at Aspendus, viii. 99, 100, 111;
and the Peloponnesians at the Hellespont, viii. 110 _seq._;
Alkibiadês arrested by, viii. 120;
charge of, against Cyrus the Younger, ix. 7;
negotiations and convention of, with the Ten Thousand Greeks,
ix. 59 _seq._;
retreating march of the Ten Thousand under, ix. 63 _seq._;
treachery of, towards Klearchus and other Greeks, ix. 70 _seq._;
plan of, against the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 75;
attack of, on the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 90;
and the Asiatic Greeks, ix. 206;
and Derkyllidas, ix. 209, 219 _seq._;
and Agesilaus, ix. 261, 267;
death of, ix. 268.

_Titanides_, the, i. 4.

_Titans_, the, i. 4, 5, 8;
the Orphic, i. 17.

Τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα, meaning of, vi. 114 _n._ 3, 356 _n._ 2, 373 _n._,
385 _n._ 2, 387 _n._ 2.

_Tithraustes_ supersedes Tissaphernes, and opens negotiations with
Agesilaus, ix. 268;
sends an envoy to Greece against Sparta, ix. 286 _seq._;
victory of Chares and Artabazus over, xi. 231.

_Tolmidês_, voyage of, round Peloponnesus, v. 333;
defeat and death of, v. 348.

_Tomi_, legendary origin of the name, i. 238 _n._ 3, xii. 473.

_Topographical_ impossibilities in the legend of Troy no obstacles to
its reception, i. 332;
criticisms inapplicable to the legend of Troy, i. 333.

_Torgium_, victory of Agathokles over Deinokrates at, xii. 447.

_Torônê_, surprise and capture of, by Brasidas, vi. 422;
capture of, by Kleon, vi. 462.

_Torrhêbia_, iii. 223.

_Torture_, use of, to elicit truth, vii. 201 _n._

_Town-occupations_, encouragement to, at Athens, iii. 136.

_Towns_, fortification of, in early Greece, ii. 108 _seq._

_Trades_, Grecian deities of, i. 342.

_Tradition, Greek_, matter of, uncertified, i. 433;
fictitious matter in, does not imply fraud, i. 434.

_Træzen_, removal of Athenians to, on Xerxes’s approach, v. 108.

_Tragedies_, lost, of Promêtheus, i. 78 _n._ 2.

_Tragedy_, Athenian, growth of, viii. 318;
Athenian, abundant production of, viii. 319;
Athenians, effect of, on the public mind, viii. 321;
Grecian, ethical sentiment in, viii. 336.

_Trapezus_, legendary origin of, i. 175;
date of the foundation of, iii. 252 _n._ 2;
the Ten Thousand at, xi. 111, 120 _seq._;
departure of the Ten Thousand from, ix. 127.

_Trench_ of Artaxerxes from the Euphrates to the wall of Media, ix. 40,
42 _n._ 1.

_Triballi_, defeat of Philip by, xi. 462;
victory of Alexander over, xii. 23.

_Tribes_ and demes of Kleisthenês, iv. 132 _seq._

_Tribute_ of the subject-allies of Athens, vi. 5 _n._ 1, 6 _n._ 1.

_Trierarchic_ reform of Demosthenês, xi. 462 _seq._

_Trinakria_, town of, vii. 125.

_Triphylia_, Minyæ in, ii. 27;
and Elis, ii. 442, x. 260, 313.

_Triphylians_, ii. 303.

_Triple_ theology of the pagan world, i. 439;
partition of past time by Varro, i. 488.

_Tripolis_, iii. 268.

_Trireme_, equipment of a, vi. 200 _n._

_Tritantæchmês_, exclamation of, on the Greeks and the Olympic games,
v. 113.

_Tritôn_ and the Argonauts, i. 239.

_Tritônis_, Lake, iv. 35 _n._ 1;
prophecies about, iv. 39.

_Trittyes_, iii. 52, 67 _n._

_Trôad_, the, i. 334.

_Trôas Alexandreia_, i. 328.

_Trôas historical_, and the Teukrians, i. 334.

_Trojan war_, Thucydidês’s version of, i. 405 _seq._;
the date of, ii. 38, 54.

_Trojans_, allies of, i. 293;
new allies of, i. 298;
and Phrygians, i. 335.

_Trophonius_ and Agamêdês, i. 130.

_Trôs_, i. 285.

_Troy_, legend of, i. 284-340.

_Tunês_, capture of, by Agathokles, xii. 414;
mutiny in the army of Agathokles at, xii. 426;
Archagathus blocked up by the Carthaginians at, xii. 439, 442;
the Carthaginians over Agathokles near, xii. 442;
nocturnal panic in the Carthaginian camp near, xii. 442;
Agathokles deserts his army at, and they capitulate, xii. 443, 444.

_Turpin_, chronicle of, i. 475.

_Tychê_, near Syracuse, vii. 245.

_Tydeus_, i. 152, 271.

_Tyndareus_, and Lêda, i. 168 _seq._

_Tyndarion_, vii. 121.

_Tyndaris_, foundation of, xi. 4.

_Types_, manifold, of the Homeric gods, i. 349.

_Typhaôn_ and Echidna, offspring of, i. 7.

_Typhôeus_, i. 9.

_Tyre_, iii. 266 _seq._;
siege and subjugation of, by Nebuchadnezzar, iii. 332;
and Carthage, amicable relations between, iii. 348;
siege and capture of, by Alexander, xii. 132 _seq._

_Tyrô_, different accounts of, i. 107.

_Tyrrhenians_, O. Müller’s view of the origin of, iii. 180.

_Tyrtæus_ and the first Messenian war, ii. 422, 424, 427;
efficiency of, in the second Messenian war, ii. 431 _seq._;
poetry of, iv. 82;
age and metres of, iv. 78.

_Uranos_, i. 4, 5.

_Usury_ and the Jewish law, iii. 111 _n._

_Utica_, iii. 271;
capture of, by Agathokles, xii. 437.

_Uxii_, conquest of, by Alexander, xii. 170.

_Varro’s_ triple division of pagan theology, i. 439;
his triple partition of past time, i. 488.

_Veneti_, the, i. 319.

_Villagers_ regarded as inferiors by Hellens, ii. 259, 263.

_Villages_ numerous in early Greece, ii. 261.

_Volsunga Saga_, i. 479.

_War_, the first sacred, iv. 62 _seq._, v. 346;
the social, xi. 220, 231;
the second sacred, xi. 241 _seq._, 374, 421 _seq._;
the third sacred. xi. 468.

_Wise men_ of Greece, seven, iv. 94 _seq._

_Wolf’s_ Prolegomena to Homer, ii. 142;
his theory on the composition of the Iliad and Odyssey,
ii. 150 _seq._

_Women_, Solon’s laws respecting, iii. 140.

_Wooden horse_ of Troy, the, i. 303, 309.

_“Works and Days”_, races of men in, i. 64 _seq._;
differs from the Theogony and Homer, i. 66;
mingled ethical and mythical sentiment in, i. 67 _seq._;
the earliest didactic poem, i. 69;
personal feeling pervading, i. 71;
probable age of, i. 72;
legend of Pandôra in, i. 76;
general feeling of the poet in, i. 77;
on women, i. 77.

_Writing_, unknown to Homeric and Hesiodic Greeks, ii. 116;
few traces of, long after the Homeric age, ii. 142;
among the Greeks, iv. 97.

_Xanthippus_ and Miltiadês, iv. 357, 365.

_Xanthippus son of Periklês_, vi. 100.

_Xenarês_ and Kleobulus, the anti-Athenian ephors, vii. 24 _seq._

_Xenias_ and Pasion, desertion of Cyrus by, ix. 28.

_Xenodokus_, xii. 425, 439, 441.

_Xenokrates_, embassy of, to Antipater, xii. 323, 324, 332.

_Xenophanes_, his condemnation of ancient legends, i. 397;
Thalês, and Pythagoras, i. 367 _seq._;
his treatment of ancient mythes, i. 418;
philosophy and school of, iv. 387 _seq._

_Xenophôn_, his treatment of ancient mythes, i. 410;
on Spartan women, ii. 388, 389 _n._ 1;
his Cyropædia, iii. 229 _n._ 2; iv. 183;
his version of Cyrus’s capture of Babylon, iv. 213 _n._;
on the dikasteries, vi. 42, 46 _n._ 2;
and Plato, evidence of, about Sokratês, viii. 409 _seq._, 448 _n._ 3;
the preceptorial and positive exhortation of Sokrates exhibited by,
viii. 450;
remarks of, on the accusation against Sokrates, viii. 473;
on the condemnation of Sokrates, viii. 482;
and his joining of the Cyreian army, ix. 12;
length of the parasang in, ix. 14 _n._ 3;
dream of, after the seizure of the generals, ix. 77;
address of, to the captains of the Ten Thousand, after the seizure of
the generals, ix. 78;
chosen a general of the Ten Thousand, ix. 80;
first speech of, to the Ten Thousand, after being chosen a general,
ix. 81 _seq._;
great ascendancy acquired by, over the Ten Thousand, ix. 83 _seq._;
and Cheirisophus, ix. 92, 96, 106, 107;
prowess of, against the Persians, ix. 92 _seq._;
in the mountains of the Karduchians, ix. 95 _seq._;
at the Kentritês, ix. 100 _seq._;
propositions of, to the Ten Thousand at Trapezus, ix. 125;
his idea of founding a new city on the Euxine, ix. 132 _seq._;
charges against, and speeches of, at Kotyôra, ix. 139 _seq._;
offered the sole command of the Ten Thousand, ix. 195;
at Herakleia and Kalpê, ix. 146 _seq._;
and Kleander, ix. 153, 155;
at Byzantium, ix. 154;
and Anaxibius, ix. 164, 165 _seq._;
takes leave of the Ten Thousand, ix. 164;
rejoins the Ten Thousand, ix. 165;
and Aristarchus, ix. 166;
and Seuthes, ix. 154, 167 _seq._;
his poverty and sacrifice to Zeus Meilichios, ix. 171 _seq._;
at Pergamus in Mysia, ix. 172 _seq._;
takes his second farewell of the Ten Thousand, ix. 174;
and the Cyreian army under the Lacedæmonians, ix. 174, 208, 314, 317;
banishment of, by the Athenians, ix. 174, 175 _n._ 3;
at Skillus, ix. 176 _seq._;
later life of, ix. 177;
and Deinarchus, ix. 178 _n._ 3;
on the conduct of Sparta between B. C. 387-379, x. 77;
partiality of, to Sparta in his Hellenica, x. 230 _n._;
on the results of the battle of Mantinea, x. 350.

_Xerxes_, chosen as successor to Darius, v. 2;
instigated to the invasion of Greece, v. 3;
resolves to invade Greece, v. 4;
deliberation and dreams of, respecting the invasion of Greece,
v. 6 _seq._;
vast preparations of, for the invasion of Greece, v. 13 _seq._;
march of, to Sardis, and collection of his forces there, v. 14;
throws two bridges across the Hellespont, v. 15;
wrath of, on the destruction of his bridges across the Hellespont,
v. 16;
punishment of the Hellespont by, v. 16 _seq._;
second bridges of, over the Hellespont, v. 18 _seq._;
ship-canal of, across the isthmus of Mount Athos, v. 22 _seq._;
bridges of, across the Strymôn, v. 25;
demands of, sent to Greece before his invasion, v. 25, 56;
and the mare which brought forth a hare, v. 25 _n._;
march of, from Sardis, v. 25;
and Pythius, the Phrygian, v. 27;
march of, to Abydos, v. 28;
respect shown to Ilium by, v. 29;
crossing of the Hellespont by, v. 29 _seq._;
march of, to Doriskus, v. 31;
review and muster of the forces of, at Doriskus, v. 31, 40;
numbering of the army of, at Doriskus, v. 33;
number of the army of, v. 33 _seq._;
conversations of, with Demaratus, v. 40, 86, 96;
march of, from Doriskus along Thrace, v. 41 _seq._;
crosses the Strymôn and marches to Akanthus, v. 43;
march of, to Therma, v. 44;
favorable prospects of, on reaching the boundary of Hellas, v. 44;
preparations of, known beforehand in Greece, v. 56;
heralds of, obtain submission from many Grecian cities, v. 57;
alarm and mistrust in Greece on the invasion of, v. 59;
unwillingness or inability of northern Greeks to resist, v. 64;
inability of Gelon to join in resisting the invasion of, v. 67;
the Thessalians and the invasion of, v. 67;
Grecian army sent to defend Tempê against, v. 68;
abandonment of the defence of Tempê against, v. 69 _seq._;
submission of northern Greeks to, after the retreat from Tempê,
v. 69;
engagement of confederate Greeks against, such as joined, v. 70;
first encounter of the fleet of, with that of the Greeks, v. 79;
movements of, from Therma to Thermopylæ, v. 82;
movements of the fleet of, from Therma to Thermopylæ, v. 82 _n._ 3;
destruction of the fleet of, by storm at Magnesia, v. 84 _seq._;
delay of, with his land force near Trachis, v. 86 _seq._;
impressions of, about the defenders at Thermopylæ, v. 87;
at Thermopylæ, doubts about the motives ascribed by Herodotus to,
v. 87;
the mountain-path avoiding Thermopylæ revealed to, v. 88;
impressions of, after the combat with Leonidas, v. 95;
Demaratus’s advice to, after the death of Leonidas, v. 96;
manœuvres ascribed to, respecting the dead at Thermopylæ, v. 103;
losses of, repaired after the battle of Thermopylæ, v. 105;
abandonment of Attica on the approach of, v. 107 _seq._;
occupation of Attica and Athens by, v. 111;
conversation of, with Arcadians, on the Olympic games, v. 113;
detachment of, against Delphi, v. 114;
capture of the Acropolis at Athens by, v. 116 _seq._;
number of the fleet of, at Salamis, v. 118 _n._ 3;
reviews his fleet at Phalêrum, and calls a council of war, v. 119;
resolution of, to fight at Salamis, v. 119;
Themistoklês’s message to, before the battle of Salamis, v. 127;
surrounds the Greeks at Salamis, v. 128 _seq._;
and the fleets at Salamis, position of, v. 131;
story of three nephews of, at Salamis, v. 132 _n._;
fears of, after the battle of Salamis, v. 138;
resolves to go back to Asia after the battle of Salamis,
v. 139 _seq._;
sends his fleet to Asia after the battle of Salamis, v. 139;
Mardonius’s proposal to, after the battle of Salamis, v. 140;
Themistoklês’s message to, after the battle of Salamis, v. 141;
retreating march of, to the Hellespont, v. 142 _seq._;
and Artayktês, v. 202;
causes of the repulse of, from Greece, v. 240;
comparison between the invasion of, and that of Alexander, v. 241;
death of, ix. 2.

_Xuthus_, i. 99 _seq._, 103;
and Kreüsa, i. 204.

_Zab, the Great_, the Ten Thousand Greeks at, ix. 69 _seq._;
crossed by the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 88.

_Zagreus_, i. 18, 19 _n._

_Zakynthus_, iii. 410;
Timotheus at, x. 141;
forces of Dion mustered at, xi. 84, 87;
Dion’s voyage from, to Herakleia, xi. 88.

_Zaleukus_, iii. 382.

_Zalmoxis_, i. 448.

_Zanklê_, iii. 365;
fate of, v. 211 _seq._

_Zariaspa_, Alexander at, xii. 206.

_Zêlos_, i. 8.

_Zeno of Elea_, viii. 341, 344, 345.

_Zephyrus_, i. 6.

_Zêtês_ and Kalais, i. 199.

_Zethus_ and Amphiôn, Homeric legend of, i. 257, 263 _seq._

_Zeugitæ_, iii. 118;
Boeckh’s opinion on the pecuniary qualification of, iii. 119 _n._

_Zeus_, i. 3, 7, 8 _seq._, 12;
Homeric, i. 13;
account of, in the Orphic Theogony, i. 18;
mythical character, names, and functions, i. 61 _seq._;
origin of the numerous mythes of, i. 62;
and Promêtheus, i. 63, 75;
and Danaê, i. 90;
and Alkmênê, i. 93;
and Ægina, i. 184;
and Eurôpa, i. 257;
and Ganymêdês, i. 285;
in the fourth book of the Iliad different from Zeus in the first and
eighth, ii. 190;
fluctuation of Greek opinion on the supremacy of, iv. 196 _n._

_Zeus Ammon_, Alexander’s visit to the oracle of, xii. 147.

_Zeus Laphystios_, i. 127.

_Zeus Lykæus_, i. 174.

_Zeus Meilichios_, Xenophon’s sacrifice to, ix. 171 _seq._

_Zopyrus_, iv. 231.

*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "History of Greece, Volume 12 (of 12)" ***

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