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Title: From the Black Mountain to Waziristan - Being an Account of the Border Countries and the More - Turbulent of the Tribes Controlled by the North-west - Frontier Province, and of Our Military Relations With Them - in the Past
Author: Wylly, Harold Carmichael
Language: English
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*** Start of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "From the Black Mountain to Waziristan - Being an Account of the Border Countries and the More - Turbulent of the Tribes Controlled by the North-west - Frontier Province, and of Our Military Relations With Them - in the Past" ***
Military Text-Books
FROM THE BLACK MOUNTAIN TO WAZIRISTAN
[Illustration]
MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA
MELBOURNE
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
NEW YORK · BOSTON · CHICAGO
DALLAS · SAN FRANCISCO
THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD.
TORONTO
FROM
THE BLACK MOUNTAIN TO WAZIRISTAN
BEING AN ACCOUNT OF THE BORDER COUNTRIES AND THE MORE TURBULENT OF THE
TRIBES CONTROLLED BY THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE, AND OF OUR
MILITARY RELATIONS WITH THEM IN THE PAST
BY
COLONEL H. C. WYLLY, C.B.
AUTHOR OF ‘THE CAMPAIGN OF MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO,’ ‘THE MILITARY MEMOIRS
OF LIEUT.-GEN. SIR JOSEPH THACKWELL, G.C.B., K.H.’
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
LIEUT.-GEN, SIR HORACE L. SMITH DORRIEN
K.C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C. GEN.
MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
ST. MARTIN’S STREET, LONDON
1912
_COPYRIGHT_
TO
E. M. W.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PREFACE
This book is the outcome of my own experience of the want of something
of the kind in the early autumn of 1897, when the Second Battalion of my
old Corps, the Sherwood Foresters, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire
Regiment, then serving at Bareilly, was ordered to join the Tirah
Expeditionary Force. The Battalion had then been in India for nearly
fifteen years, but only one or two of the officers, and none of the
other ranks, had ever been west of the Indus, and few of us therefore
knew anything of the wild men against whom we were to fight, or of the
equally wild country in which the operations were to be conducted.
The fault for such ignorance cannot fairly be said to have been ours.
There was at that time no single book, generally procurable and of an
up-to-date character, describing the country immediately beyond the
North-West border, the men who inhabited it, and the campaigns which,
since the decline of the Sikh power, have there become our natural and
our troublous inheritance. Paget and Mason’s monumental work,
_Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes_, published in 1885,
was wholly admirable, but much of it was ancient history; it was an
enormous volume; it had for long been “confidential,” and had never been
placed on general sale. Mr. Oliver’s most fascinating book, _Across the
Border, or Pathan and Biluch_, had been published in 1890, but it
contained little more than a general mention of certain campaigns. It
was therefore almost inevitable that British officers—and especially
those serving in India in British regiments—had no idea where, in regard
to the Frontier, they could draw their knowledge or inspiration.
Even in the present day matters have not greatly improved. The cream has
been drawn from Paget and Mason’s book, it has been brought up-to-date,
and re-christened _Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India_; but
the material is now contained in several large volumes, of which seven
have already appeared, and it does not seem to be intended that these
should be generally available, since each is labelled “For Official Use
only.”
It seemed then to me that there was room for a single volume, compiled
from official and other sources, describing the more turbulent of the
tribes beyond our Border, the countries they inhabit, and the campaigns
which the Indian Government has undertaken against them during the last
sixty-five years; and up to the time of completing the chapters which
follow, I believe this to have been the first attempt which has been
made to put such a record before the Army in one handy volume.
I wish to express my thanks to my old comrade, Sir Horace, for so kindly
acceding to my request to write an introduction to my book; to my
brother, Major Wylly, Librarian at the Royal United Service Institution,
for much help in research; and to Mr. J. H. Harper, of the staff of the
same Institution, for preparing nearly all the maps.
The appearance of this book has been delayed some four and a half months
by the request of the Government of India that it should be submitted to
Simla for scrutiny prior to publication; the delay is to be regretted,
but it has admitted of advantage being taken of certain suggestions
offered by the Indian authorities for adding to the instructional value
of the work.
H. C. W.
_March, 1912._
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION p. xix
CHAPTER I
THE BORDERLAND
The country of the Pathans; their traditionary descent;
their bad and good qualities; their loyalty as soldiers;
blood-feuds; tribal divisions; leaders, religious and
secular. Sunnis and Shiahs. Gar and Samil. Defence of the
border. Moveable columns, their sphere of action.
Punishment of offences. Pathans serving in Indian Army,
Militia, Police and Levies. The North-West Frontier
Province. Frontier communications. General frontier
policy pp. 1–23
CHAPTER II
BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES
The country surrounding the Black Mountain: _Allai_,
_Nandihar_, _Deshi_, _Tikari_—all Swatis; _Tanawal_; the
Yusafzai clans of the Mountain. Description of the range.
Routes. _Hassanzais_; _Akazais_; _Chagarzais_. Interior
communications. _Pariari Saiyids._ Expedition of 1852–3
against the Hassanzais. Expedition of 1868 against the
Black Mountain Tribes. Expedition of 1888. Expedition of
1891 against the Hassanzais and Akazais. Expedition of
1892 against the Hassanzais and Mada Khels pp. 24–53
CHAPTER III
YUSAFZAIS AND GADUNS
_Yusafzais_, descent; arrival in Peshawar valley; division
into two branches; occupation; character; sub-divisions
of the two main branches; the holdings of the
sub-divisions. Cis-border Yusafzais. Trans-border
Yusafzais; _Bunerwals_; _Gaduns_; their origin; probably
of Rajput descent; arrival in their present country;
description; tribal divisions. _Hindustani Fanatics._
Saiyid Ahmad of Bareilly pp. 54–70
CHAPTER IV
YUSAFZAIS AND GADUNS: OPERATIONS
Expedition of 1853 against the _Hindustani Fanatics_; the
mutineers of the 55th Native Infantry. Operations in 1857
against Narinji. Expedition of 1858 against the _Khudu
Khels_. Hindustanis expelled from Sitana. Ambela
Expedition of 1863. Expedition of 1898 against the
_Bunerwals_. Operations against the _Gaduns_. The
_Hindustani Fanatics_ pp. 71–106
CHAPTER V
AKOZAIS (SWAT)
District of Swat proper; Swat Kohistan; climate;
description of the country; character of the people;
early history of the valley; government of Swat. “The
Border Pope”; his life and rule. Divisions of the
_Akozais_; their sub-divisions. Other clans; _Dusha
Khels_; _Torwals_; _Garhwis_. Operations of 1847 against
the _Baizais_. Expedition of 1849 against the _Sam
Baizais_. Expedition of 1852 against the _Ranizais_. Umra
Khan. Attacks on the Malakand and Chakdara, 1897.
Operations of the Malakand Field Force pp. 107–142
CHAPTER VI
UTMAN KHELS
Their country and neighbours; origin; main tribal
divisions; Ismailzai. Communications. Operations.
Expedition of 1852. Expedition of 1878. Expedition of
1897 pp. 143–154
CHAPTER VII
CLANS OF BAJAUR AND DIR
Both Yusafzais; distinction. _Bajaur_, the country and
people; three main divisions; the valleys of Bajaur. Khan
of Nawagai. _Dir_, the country and people; ranges and
passes; divisions. Operations. Umra Khan. Chitral Relief
Expedition, 1895. Operations of the Malakand Field Force
in Dir and Bajaur, 1897 pp. 155–182
CHAPTER VIII
CHITRALIS
Description of the country; internal communications;
position on the frontier; of political rather than
strategic importance; origin of the people;
characteristics; government and rulers. British Missions.
Claimants to the Mehtarship. Umra Khan. Commencement of
hostilities. Events on the Chitral-Gilgit line. Advance
of the Gilgit Column. Siege of Chitral Fort. Raising of
the Siege pp. 183–210
CHAPTER IX
MOHMANDS
Main branches; origin; position of their country. The
Durand partition of the Mohmand territory. Kunar River
and Valley. Asmar. Communications from the east. Gandab
Valley; the people. Cis-frontier clans; clans of the
independent Mohmands. Vassal clans pp. 211–226
CHAPTER X
MOHMANDS: OPERATIONS
First dealings with British. Operations in 1851–52; Matta
threatened. Operations in 1854 against the Michni
Mohmands. Operations near Shabkadar. Affair at Kam Dakka
in 1879. Action on the Gara Heights. Attack on Shabkadar
in 1897. Operations in the Mohmand country. Renewed raids
by tribesmen. Matta fired into. Concentration of troops.
Expedition of 1908. Part of Mohmand Field Force
transferred to Lundi Kotal. Attack by Afghan _lashkar_ on
Michni Kandao. Gen. Willcocks defeats enemy who disperse.
Operations of the Mohmand Field Force resumed and
concluded. Loi Shilman Railway pp. 227–260
CHAPTER XI
AFRIDIS
Their country; origin; appearance; characteristics;
armament and fighting value; methods of punishment and
coercion; moral character; internal feuds; divided into
eight clans. _Khyber Afridis_; area of country; main
rivers. _Zakha Khels._ Tribal limits in Khyber Pass.
First contact with British Government. Arrangements for
keeping open Khyber Pass during both Afghan campaigns.
Description of Pass. _Adam Khels_ and Kohat Pass pp. 261–280
CHAPTER XII
AFRIDIS: OPERATIONS
_Adam Khels_; first trouble in 1850. Expedition against the
Kohat Pass Afridis in 1850. Continual difficulties about
safeguarding the Pass. Expedition against the _Jowaki_
Afridis, 1853. A second expedition in 1877. A third in
1877–78. Operations of a column from Peshawar. _Aka
Khels_; operations in 1855 pp. 281–300
CHAPTER XIII
KHYBER PASS AFRIDIS: OPERATIONS
Commenced giving trouble in 1857; continued up to year of
Afghan War. Expedition into Bazar Valley in 1878; second
expedition in 1879. Engagements made for keeping Pass
open held to for sixteen years. Sudden outbreak; some of
the reputed causes; action (or inaction) of Peshawar
authorities; precautionary measures; distribution of
Khyber Rifles on outbreak; attacks on the Khyber forts
and posts. Tirah expedition of 1897–98; composition and
distribution of force; actions of Dargai; capture of
Sampagha and Arhanga Passes; operations in Maidan and
Mastura; operations against _Chamkannis_ and westerly
_Orakzais_; evacuation of Afridi Tirah; re-occupation of
the Khyber; expedition to the Bazar Valley; action at
Shinkamar Pass. Expedition of 1908 to the Bazar Valley.
Note pp. 301–345
CHAPTER XIV
ORAKZAIS
Their country; origin; early struggles with the _Bangash_;
description of the people; appearance; character; their
rivers and valleys; their clans; holdings and
settlements. _Hamsaya_ clans. Certain divisions petition
to be taken under British administration; British
Government refuses request; reasons for same pp. 346–362
CHAPTER XV
ORAKZAIS: OPERATIONS
Outrages in 1855 in the Miranzai Valley. Attacks on the
_Bangash_. Expedition against the _Rabia Khel_ in 1855.
Operations against the _Bizotis_ in 1868. Raid across the
Ublan Pass by Col. Keyes in 1869. First Miranzai
Expedition in 1891. Second. Commencement of the troubles
in 1897; operations near Hangu, Sadda, and the Ublan
Pass; _Orakzais_ and _Afridis_ attack Samana forts;
relief of Fort Lockhart; and Gulistan pp. 363–388
CHAPTER XVI
BANGASH: ZAIMUKHTS: CHAMKANNIS: TURIS
Miranzai under Sikh rule. Attempted occupation by Kabul
Government. Description of Miranzai Valley. Kurram,
originally Afghan territory; description of Upper and
Lower Kurram. Importance of these valley routes.
_Bangash_; origin; characteristics; main clans.
_Zaimukhts_; origin; country; clans; operations;
expedition of 1879. _Chamkannis_; origin; country;
peculiarities; clans; operations in 1897. _Turis_;
obscurity of their origin; possession of the Kurram
Valley; characteristics; friendship for Englishmen;
curious family divisions; no tribal combination pp. 389–417
CHAPTER XVII
WAZIRISTAN AND ITS TRIBES
Description of the country; inhabitants; origin of Wazirs.
Tochi and Gomal Valleys. Wana. Horse-breeding. Wazirs
generally disliked by other Pathans. _Darwesh Khel_;
their country. _Mahsuds_; their country; chief towns;
their raiding propensities; priest-ridden. _Batannis_;
origin; country; clans; expedition of 1880. _Dawaris_;
dubious descent; former home; character; clans;
operations in 1872 pp. 418–434
CHAPTER XVIII
WAZIRS: OPERATIONS
Expedition against _Umarzai Wazirs_, 1852; against _Kabul
Khel Wazirs_, 1859–60. Raids near Thal. Expedition
against the _Malik Shahi Wazirs_, 1880. Attempt on Tank
by _Mahsuds_ in 1860. Expedition of same year; occupation
of Kaniguram. Attack on Tank by _Mahsuds_ in 1879.
Expedition against _Mahsuds_ in 1881. _Ahmadzai division
of Darwesh Khel_ ask to be allowed to become British
subjects. Waziristan delimitation operations. Wana.
Operations of Waziristan Field Force, 1894. Maizar
affair. Operations of the Tochi Field Force, 1897–98.
Operations against the _Mahsuds_, 1900–1901. Expedition
against the _Kabul Khels_, 1901–2 pp. 435–474
APPENDICES
A. The Arms Trade and the Tribesmen pp. 475–484
B. Table of Expeditions against the Frontier Tribes
mentioned in the preceding chapters pp. 485–488
C. Table showing by whom these Tribes are controlled p. 489
INDEX p. 490
LIST OF MAPS
I. GENERAL MAP OF THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE.
II. MAP SHOWING TRIBAL LIMITS.
III. THE BLACK MOUNTAIN.
IV. SWAT, BUNER AND BAJAUR.
V. DIR AND CHITRAL.
VI. UTMAN KHEL AND MOHMAND COUNTRIES.
VII. AFRIDI AND ORAKZAI COUNTRIES, MIRANZAI AND KURRAM.
VIII. TOCHI AND WAZIRISTAN.
INTRODUCTION
To do justice to an introduction to a book such as this, one requires to
have first-hand knowledge of all the tribes on the Indian Frontier; but
although I have served a good many years in India, and some six years
altogether in peace and war on the Frontier itself, I cannot even
pretend to possess the requisite knowledge to criticise this careful and
complete work.
Colonel Wylly has done me the honour of asking me to godfather his book,
I am sure more on account of our having been friends for some thirty-six
years, than by reason of the outside chance of my being regarded as an
authority on Indian Frontier inhabitants; added to which he is aware
that I hold the view that no army should undertake a war without doing
all in its power in peace time to become efficient up to the last
button, and that one of the most important buttons is an accurate
knowledge of the country and the people against whom a war may occur.
Let us suppose that our North-West Frontier were not, as it is,
bristling with fine fighting races, but were merely an open coast-line
with nothing beyond it but sea, and I ask in that case should we keep up
an army in India of its present size? and I think all will agree with me
that we certainly should not. The fair deduction then is that a very
important _raison d’être_ for the army in India is the possibility of
having to suppress recalcitrant tribes on the North-West Frontier. It is
therefore most important that our soldiers should study their habits,
countries, armed forces, etc.
Now all that Colonel Wylly says in his preface about the absence of
conveniently small books which will provide this information is
perfectly true, and the custom has been, when war against a tribe has
been imminent, for the Intelligence Department to circulate in the army
a _brochure_ dealing with the country and the people. This was very
useful, but the fact that it was most necessary suggests that
opportunities were lacking for studying the question thoroughly in the
piping times of peace.
This book, _From the Black Mountain to Waziristan_, seems to provide the
very want.
It is extremely well put together, the story of each tribe being
complete in itself, and with excellent maps, and written in the easy,
attractive style common to all Colonel Wylly’s books, is bound to appeal
to all who take an interest in this most important subject, and I
recommend it especially to the Army in India.
H. L. SMITH-DORRIEN,
_Lt. General._
HARNHAM CLIFF, SALISBURY,
_7th March, 1912_.
CHAPTER I.
THE BORDERLAND.
The whole of the country lying immediately to the west of the Punjab,
and between it and the kingdom of Afghanistan, is held by the two great
nations of Pathan and Baluch, the former lying to the north and the
latter to the south of a line drawn from the western face of the
Suleiman Mountains opposite Dera Ghazi Khan, almost due west to Quetta.
The land, then, of the Pathans may be said to comprise the regions of
the Sufed Koh and the Suleiman and adjacent mountains with their
numerous offshoots; and their territory may be considered roughly to be
enclosed by the River Indus on the east, by Afghanistan on the west,
Baluchistan on the south, and on the north by Kashmir and the Kunar
River—a veritable _tangle_ of brown hills.
“It is a long strip of unutterably rugged country; stony barren heights,
deep abrupt valleys seamed by occasional torrents; the farms represented
by a patch of corn on a hillside or a scrap of cultivation on a narrow
strip of alluvial soil alongside a mountain stream. No highways, save
those made by us; the village roads—mere tracks straggling over hills
and among the roughest ravines—always difficult and often dangerous. The
dwelling places, fortified towers or caves among the hills.” The Pathan
territories occupy many thousand square miles of mountainous country
through which flow the Gomal, the Kurram, the Zhob, the Kabul and other
smaller rivers with their tributaries, the principal tributaries of the
Kabul River being the Chitral, the Bara, the Swat and the Kalpani. The
rainfall in this region is scanty and uncertain, and agriculture can
only properly be carried on in those tracts watered by these rivers.
The language of the Pathan is called Pushtu or Pukhtu, according as it
is the softer Kandahari dialect or the hard guttural speech of the
Peshawar Valley, the line which separates the two being the northern
boundary of the Khattak tract in Kohat and the south-east corner of the
Peshawar District. It is only since the fourteenth century that Pushtu
has attained the dignity of a written language. And what of the men who
speak it? What is a Pathan?
[Sidenote: Pathan Descent]
In India all Pushtu-speaking people come under this designation—a
corruption of the word “Pukhtun”—the term being frequently used to
denote equally the Pathan proper, the Afghan, the Tajik, the Hazara and
the Ghilzai; but, strictly speaking, the title is not really applicable
to any of the four last, who, though related to the true Pathan by
historical, geographical and ethnological association, are none the less
distinct peoples. There is great conflict of opinion as to the original
stock from which the Pathans have sprung—the traditions of the people
themselves are conflicting, vague and misleading, but the Pathans
believe that they are descended from Saul, the first King of the Jews.
They speak of themselves as “Beni Israel,” the children of Israel, and
the greybeards of the Pathan tribes are fond of tracing their story back
to Ibrahim, Isak and Yakub. However far-fetched and mainly traditionary
the connection may be, there is, as discussed by Bellew, a savour of
Israelitish custom and an often remarkable similarity of name still
surviving—Amazites, Moabites and Hittites live again in Amazai, Muhibwal
and Hotiwal, to be found on Mount Morah, the hill Pehor, and the plain
of Galilee (Jalala); there is the valley of Sudum; the observance of the
“Passover,” offering sin and thank offerings, or driving off the
scapegoat laden with the sins of the people—with many other religious
and social observances which are Jewish rather than Islamic in their
origin. It would seem that the Pathan race is closely allied to the
Afghan on the one side, and, though perhaps not so closely, to certain
tribes of Aryan Indians on the other. (The language is a mixture of
partly Persian, partly Indian—Prakrit—origin.) The Pathan may be indeed
described as an Indian Afghan, and the probabilities are that he
represents an earlier eastern emigration of certain sections of the same
tribes as have given birth to the Afghan; and from this point of view
the Pathan and the Afghan are by origin one and the same. Whatever view
is correct, there can be no doubt that the Pathan differs from the
Afghan in the possession of certain Indian affinities not present in the
other. Whether these are due to an admixture of Indian blood, or whether
they are merely the result of close and prolonged political and social
contact with India, is a matter of no very particular importance.
Ibbetson favours the theory that the Pathans are in the main a race of
Indian extraction, that is, that the Pathan stock is decidedly Indian
despite the admixture of foreign blood. According to him, the true
Pathans are the modern representatives of an Aryan Indian race called by
Herodotus the Pactiyae, which gave birth to many of the tribes
represented to-day in and on the borders of the Peshawar Valley.
According to this view the Pathans proper are those Pathan tribes which
have a decidedly Pactiyan stock, in which the preponderating racial
element is Indian; while the mixed Pactiyan and foreign tribes in which
the stock is not Indian, but Afghan, Turk or Scythian, as the case may
be, are Pathan by virtue of their Pactiyan blood, as well as by their
geographical location, association, customs and language. But that the
stock is in the main Afghan rather than Indian, seems borne out by the
fact that from the earliest times of which historical records exist, we
find the Pathan ever arrayed against and despising the Indian—evincing
an antagonism which is not merely practical and political, but one of
ideals and sentiment. On the other hand, although the Pathan tribes have
had constant and bloody feuds with the Afghans, in their brief periods
of peace they display a marked similarity of sentiment, ideals and aims,
while the mental characteristics of the Pathan also approximate much
more closely to the Afghan than to those of any purely Indian tribe.
Of the other races and tribes to which the term Pathan is loosely
applied, the _Ghilzais_ are a race of mixed Turkish and Persian descent,
which has now become assimilated with the Afghans by sentiment and
association. The _Tajiks_, another to which the term Pathan is applied,
are of pure Persian origin, and are believed to be the remnants of
certain Persian tribes who once inhabited Afghanistan before the advent
of the Afghans by whom they were subdued. The Tajiks still retain their
Persian speech. The _Hazaras_ are Persian-speaking Tartars who have long
settled among the Afghans, but who hold among them a subordinate and
dependent position.
[Sidenote: Character]
The character of the Pathan is a favourite theme of disparagement
amongst the frontier officials of the last half-century and more. In
1855, Mr. Temple, then Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of the
Punjab, wrote thus of them: “Now these tribes are savages—noble savages
perhaps—and not without some tincture of virtue and generosity, but
still absolutely barbarians nevertheless.... They have nominally a
religion, but Muhammadanism, as understood by them, is no better, or
perhaps is actually worse, than the creeds of the wildest race on earth.
In their eyes the one great commandment is blood for blood, and fire and
sword for all infidels.... They are superstitious and priest-ridden. But
the priests are as ignorant as they are bigoted, and use their influence
simply for preaching crusades against unbelievers, and inculcate the
doctrine of rapine and bloodshed against the defenceless people of the
plain.... They are a sensual race. They are very avaricious; for gold
they will do almost anything, except betray a guest. They are thievish
and predatory to the last degree. The Pathan mother offers prayers that
her son may be a successful robber. They are utterly faithless to public
engagements; it would never even occur to their minds that an oath on
the Koran was binding, if against their own interests.... They are
fierce and bloodthirsty ... they are perpetually at war with each other.
Every tribe and section of a tribe has its internecine wars, every
family its hereditary blood-feuds, and every individual his personal
foes. There is hardly a man whose hands are unstained. Every person
counts up his murders. Each tribe has a debtor and creditor account with
its neighbours, life for life.... They consider retaliation and revenge
to be the strongest of all obligations. They possess gallantry and
courage themselves, and admire such qualities in others.... To their
minds hospitality is the first of virtues. Any person who can make his
way into their dwellings will not only be safe, but will be kindly
received. But as soon as he has left the roof of his entertainer he may
be robbed and killed.”
[Sidenote: Code of Honour]
Mr. Ibbetson wrote of the Pathan in 1881: “The true Pathan is perhaps
the most barbaric of all the races with which we are brought into
contact in the Punjab.... He is bloodthirsty, cruel and vindictive in
the highest degree; he does not know what truth or faith is, insomuch
that the saying _Afghan be iman_ (_i.e._ an Afghan is without
conscience) has passed into a proverb among his neighbours; and though
he is not without courage of a sort, and is often curiously reckless of
his life, he would scorn to face an enemy whom he could stab from
behind, or to meet him on equal terms if it were possible to take
advantage of him, however meanly. It is easy to convict him out of his
own mouth; here are some of his proverbs: ‘a Pathan’s enmity smoulders
like a dung fire’; ‘a cousin’s tooth breaks upon a cousin’;[1] ‘keep a
cousin poor but use him’; ‘when he is little play with him; when he is
grown up he is a cousin, fight him’; ‘speak good words to an enemy very
softly; gradually destroy him root and branch.’ At the same time he has
a code of honour which he strictly observes, and which he quotes with
pride under the name of _Pukhtunwali_. It imposes on him three chief
obligations—_Nanawatai_, or the right of asylum, which compels him to
shelter and protect even an enemy who comes as a suppliant; _Badal_, or
the necessity for revenge by retaliation; and _Mailmastai_, or
openhanded hospitality to all who may demand it. And of these three
perhaps the last is the greatest. And there is a charm about him,
especially about the leading men, which almost makes one forget his
treacherous nature. As the proverb says—‘the Pathan is one moment a
saint, and the next a devil.’ For centuries he has been, on our frontier
at least, subject to no man. He leads a wild, free, active life in the
rugged fastnesses of his mountains; and there is an air of masculine
independence about him which is refreshing in a country like India. He
is a bigot of the most fanatical type, exceedingly proud and
extraordinarily superstitious.” Holdich says of the Pathan that “he will
shoot his own relations just as soon as the relations of his
enemy—possibly sooner—and he will shoot them from behind. Yet the
individual Pathan may be trusted to be true to his salt and to his
engagements.”
Of one Pathan tribe Macgregor said that “there is no doubt, like other
Pathans, they would not shrink from any falsehood, however atrocious, to
gain an end. Money could buy their services for the foulest deed;
cruelty of the most revolting kind would mark their actions to a wounded
or helpless foe, as much as cowardice would stamp them against
determined resistance.” While Mr. Elsmie has spoken as follows of his
five years’ experience as a Commissioner and Judge among the Pathans of
the Peshawar border: “Crime of the worst conceivable kind is a matter of
almost daily occurrence; murder in all its phases, unblushing
assassination in broad daylight before a crowd of witnesses; the
carefully planned secret murder of the sleeping victim at dead of night,
murder by robbers, by rioters, by poisoners, by boys, and by women sword
in hand. Blood always crying for blood, revenge looked upon as a virtue,
the heritage of retribution passed on as a solemn duty from father to
son. It would seem that the spirit of murder is latent in the heart of
nearly every man in the valley.” But, on the other hand, Oliver tells us
in _Across the Border_, that the Pathan has sometimes been condemned in
what appear too sweeping terms, and that “there is a sort of charm about
the better sort that inclines many people to forget his treacherous
nature, and even his ‘vice is sometimes by action dignified.’”
[Sidenote: A Juster Judgment]
Probably what Lieut. Enriquez says about these tribesmen in his _Pathan
Borderland_ describes them with, on the whole, more justice, if less
vehemence, than have some of those other writers from whom quotations
have here been made. “The Pathan,” he says, “is not so black as he is
painted. It should not be overlooked that most of the tribes have only
been established three hundred years in their present territories, and
that their habits are not really much worse than were those of the
various English tribes during the first few centuries after their final
settlement. The conditions of a feudal system, under which each baron
lived in his own castle, and waged constant war with his neighbours over
disputes relating to land and women, are simply being repeated again
across our border. For stories of gross treachery, or cold-blooded
murder and inter-family strife, we have only to turn back the pages of
our own history book. In fact, it seems quite unfair to judge the Pathan
according to twentieth century standards. For him it is still the tenth
century. Moreover, it is ungenerous to assert that there are not many
noble exceptions amongst them.... When you meet a Pathan, you meet a man
like yourself.... He will never allow you to abuse him, but makes up for
it amply by never making you wish to do so. There is perhaps no native
of India who is less irritating to our nerves, and his ideas of tact
seem to run on quite the same lines as our own.... He takes his
independence for granted, and very seldom parades it in the garb of
rudeness.”
Take him for all in all, there is in the Pathan much to like, a good
deal to respect and much to detest. He is very susceptible to the
personal influence of Englishmen who are strong, resolute and
fearless—men of the type of Nicholson, Abbott, Cavagnari, Battye and
many others. In our service he has usually been a loyal and devoted
sepoy, and no better instance of the loyalty of the Pathan soldier can
be given than is furnished by that of the small body of Khyber Rifles in
1897, who, as Holdich has told us, “maintained British honour in the
Khyber, while 9,500 British troops about the Peshawar frontier looked
on.”
[Sidenote: Blood-feuds]
The Pathan enlists freely into our service—there are at the present
moment something like eleven thousand Pathans in the Indian Army, and
probably the recruiting among the tribesmen was never brisker than
during the few months immediately following the close of the operations
in Tirah of 1897–98—and he will march anywhere and fight anyone against
whom he may be led. Over and over again have Pathans fought in our ranks
against their fellow-tribesmen and their own homes. Not only against
fathers and brothers, but even against the still more potent religious
appeals from the local Ghazis. One thing, however, the Pathan recruit
does not give up, “but brings with him to his regiment, keeps through
his service, must have leave to look after, will resign promotion to
gratify, and looks forward to retiring to thoroughly enjoy—and that
is—his cherished feud.” If he has not got one when he joins, he may
inherit one which may become just as binding, though it concerns people
he has not seen for years, and hardly knew when he left home. In India
the white man wants leave to get married, he is sick, he needs a change,
or to avoid a bad station—for the Pathan soldier there is only one class
of “urgent private affairs,” but for this he must have leave. Everyone
knows for what purpose he goes; it is the only reason when the refusal
of leave would justify desertion. In many of the Punjab regiments which
recruit Pathans there are cases of trans-frontier soldiers who will
serve together in all amity for years, but between whom is so bitter a
feud that they must take their furlough at different times, since, if
they went together, not all would come back.
As to the personal appearance of “the raw material,” here is a picture
drawn from life by Oliver: “The style of the Tribesman is a little after
the manner of Rob Roy—‘my foot is on my native heath,’ and ‘am I not a
Pathan’? Even when he leaves his native heath behind, he takes his
manners with him. He will come down, a stalwart, manly-looking ruffian,
with frank and open manners, rather Jewish features, long hair
plentifully oiled under a high turban, with a loose tunic, blue for
choice—the better to hide the dirt—worn very long, baggy drawers, a
_lungi_ or sash across his shoulders, grass sandals, a sheepskin coat
with the hair inside, thickly populated, a long heavy knife, and a
rifle, if he is allowed to carry either. He is certain to be filthy and
he may be ragged, but he will saunter into a Viceregal _durbar_ as proud
as Lucifer, and with an air of unconcern a diplomatist might envy.”
[Sidenote: Leaders]
The Pathan tribes are partly agriculturists and partly nomads, but their
migrations are on a small and restricted scale, being no more than
annual moves within their own limits from one grazing ground to another,
or from their homes among the hills to the warmer and lower valleys.
Beyond and upon our frontier the Pathans live in fortified villages, to
which are attached stone towers in commanding positions serving as watch
towers and places of refuge for the inhabitants. A large number of the
men of each tribe obtain their livelihood as petty merchants or traders,
carrying goods in caravans between India, Afghanistan and Central Asia.
These wandering traders are called _Powindahs_, a term derived from the
Persian word _Parwindah_, which signifies a bale of goods. The villages
are divided into several distinct allotments of sub-divisions called
_Kandis_, according to the number of the sub-divisions of the tribe
residing in it. Thus in each village each group of families which goes
to form a _Khel_, or clan, has its own Kandi, at the head of which is a
_Malik_, who acts as its judge, manager or administrator. In each Kandi,
again, there is a _Jumaat_, or mosque, under a _Mullah_, or priest, and
an assembly room, called _hujra_, where the residents meet to discuss
their affairs, and where visitors and travellers are sheltered. At the
head of each clan is a chief styled _Khan_, to whom the _Maliks_ are
subordinate, but the tribesmen being intensely independent and impatient
of control, it is not surprising that neither Maliks nor Khans enjoy any
real power. They may be said indeed to possess influence rather than
power. All matters of general tribal interest are settled by the
decision of a _jirgah_ or council of Maliks and in this the real
controlling authority resides, the Khan, or tribal chief, merely acting
as president of the tribal jirgah, as their leader in time of war, and
during peace as their accredited agent for inter-tribal communication.
But among the Pathans there can be very little like ordered government,
and as a matter of fact the several clans decide their disputes
independently of any central controlling authority. The office of Malik
and Khan is usually hereditary, but by no means always.
It is not very uncommon for families of one tribe or clan to quarrel
with their brethren, and leaving their own tribe, to claim the
protection of a neighbouring one. They then become _hamsayas_, or
“dwellers beneath the shade,” and secure protection in return for
obedience. With the Pathans the action of this custom is chiefly
confined to traders, menials and other dependents of foreign extraction,
who are protected by, but not received into, the tribe.
The great majority of the Pathan tribes are Sunni[2] Muhammadans of a
bigoted sort, the exception being the Turis and some of the Bangash and
Orakzai clansmen, who are Shiahs. Of the different dignitaries of the
Pathan Church there is no occasion here to speak further than to remark
that the Mullah, to whom allusion has already been made, is the
ordinary, hard working parish priest, whose duties are to attend to the
services of the Church, teach the creed, and look after the schools. He
is the most important factor in Pathan life and his influence is
enormous, despite the fact, as Dr. Pennell points out, “that there is no
priesthood in Islam,” and that according to its tenets, there is no act
of worship and no religious rite which may not, in the absence of a
Mullah, be equally well performed by any pious layman. Since, however,
“knowledge has been almost limited to the priestly class, it is only
natural that in a village, where the Mullahs are almost the only men who
can lay claim to anything more than the most rudimentary learning, they
should have the people of the village entirely in their own control.”
The general security in which the Mullah lives is the best possible
evidence of the deference accorded to his office. “He is almost the only
man,” says Oliver, “whose life is sacred from the casual bullet or the
hasty knife, for whose blood the Pathan tariff does not provide a rate.”
His flock is generally ignorant of everything connected with the
Muhammadan religion beyond its most elementary doctrines. In matters of
faith the Pathans confine themselves to the belief that there is a God,
a prophet, a resurrection, and a day of judgment. They know there is a
Koran, but are probably wholly ignorant of its contents. Their practice
is un-Islamic. Though they repeat every day that there is one God only
who is worthy of worship, they almost invariably prefer to worship some
saint or tomb. Indeed, superstition is a more appropriate term for the
ordinary belief of the people than the name of religion.
[Sidenote: Gar and Samil]
Since mention has above been made of the religious divisions of the
tribesmen, I may perhaps briefly allude to their political factions,
since reports from beyond the border make frequent mention of the feuds
of Gar and Samil. In the fourteenth century a chief of the Bangash
tribe, Ismail by name, had two sons, Gar and Samil, whose quarrels led
to the tribe being split up into the two great factions which still
exist under these names. Bangash or Bankash means “root-destroyer,” and
this was adopted or bestowed as the tribal name by reason of the enmity
aroused between the rival factions. The distinction then established
still remains, and affects almost all the surrounding tribes; and since
some Sunnis by religion are Samil in politics, and some Shiahs are Gar,
while sometimes both cases are reversed, it may easily be realised how
prolific are the causes for private quarrels and tribal feuds beyond the
Bloody Border.
Of so turbulent a race what Temple said about them in 1855 might with
almost equal truth have been repeated of them annually up to the present
time: “They have kept up old quarrels, or picked new ones with our
subjects in the plains and valleys near the frontier; they have
descended from the hills and fought these battles out in our territory;
they have plundered and burnt our villages and slain our subjects; they
have committed minor robberies and isolated murders without number; they
have often levied blackmail from our villages; they have intrigued with
the disaffected everywhere and tempted our loyal subjects to rebel; and
they have for ages regarded the plain as their preserve and its
inhabitants as their game. When inclined for cruel sport they sally
forth to rob and murder, and occasionally to take prisoners into
captivity for ransom. They have fired upon our own troops, and even
killed our officers in our own territories. They have given an asylum to
every malcontent or proclaimed criminal who can escape from British
justice. They traverse at will our territories, enter our villages,
trade in our markets; but few British subjects, and no servant of the
British Government, would dare to enter their country on any account
whatever.”
Since the 400 miles of our borderland, comprised in the stretch from
Buner on the right to Waziristan on the left, is, as computed by the
Commander-in-Chief in India in 1897, inhabited by 200,000 first-rate
fighting men, of the quarrelsome character above described—every man at
all times ready and eager for blood-letting—it would be as well now to
recount the measures which the Government of India adopts for their
restraint; to state the composition and general distribution of the
instruments by means of which the peace of the frontier is more or less
preserved; and to note the manner in which offences committed by
independent tribes beyond the border are punished.
[Sidenote: Defence of the Frontier]
For the defence of the border, and to prevent the incursion of armed
robbers, the system generally followed—with some recent
modifications—has been the maintenance of a line of fortified posts
along the frontier, garrisoned by regulars and militia. In the year 1884
there were fifty-four such posts situated in the Hazara, Yusafzai,
Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan and Rajanpur districts,
and of these sixteen were held by the Punjab Frontier Force, twenty-six
by militia, and the remainder by combined parties of both militia and
regulars. In those days the Punjab Frontier Force was generally
responsible—a responsibility which endured until 1903—for the military
defence of the frontier, with the exception of the Peshawar district.
The force was approximately 15,000 strong, and consisted of four
regiments of cavalry, the Guides (cavalry and infantry), four mountain
batteries, one garrison battery, and eleven infantry battalions, the
whole commanded by a Brigadier-General. At that time it was immediately
under the orders of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, but it was a
few years later placed under the Commander-in-Chief in India. With the
gradual extension of the frontier, and the general forward movement made
within recent years, it became apparent that the Punjab Frontier Force
could no longer remain a local and also a border force, and that in any
comprehensive scheme of frontier defence other regiments of the Indian
army must take their share. In 1903, then, the Punjab Frontier Force was
abolished.
Under Lord Curzon’s rule in India a change was inaugurated in the system
of frontier defence. Regular troops have been gradually withdrawn, as
far as possible, from advanced trans-frontier positions, and have been
concentrated in large centres within easy reach. Their places on the
border have been taken by various corps of militia, military police, and
levies raised locally; communications have been improved; strategic
railways have crept further forward; another bridge has been thrown
across the Indus; and the frontier is now defended by the Peshawar and
Quetta divisions and the Kohat, Derajat and Bannu brigades, moveable
columns being held always ready to move out at a moment’s notice from
Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. The general sphere of
action prescribed for each of these columns is as under:
Peshawar Column, The Khyber and the Malakand.
Kohat Column, The Kurram.
Bannu Column, The Tochi.
Dera Ismail Khan Column, Waziristan.
It remains to note the manner in which offences committed by independent
tribes across the border are punished. The most simple way of dealing
with a refractory tribe, and in many cases the most effectual, is to
inflict a fine and demand compensation for plundered property or for
lives lost. When the tribe is dependent upon trade with British
territory, or when a portion resides within British limits, or is easily
accessible from the plains to an attack by a military force, the demand
for payment of fine or compensation is generally acceded to, and, being
paid, the tribe is again received into favour. Should the demand be
refused, hostages are demanded, or members of the tribe and their
property found within British territory are seized, until such time as
the compensation and fine are paid. Against some tribes, as in the case
of the Afridis of the Kohat Pass in 1876–77, a blockade is an effective
measure of punishment. It can, however, only be employed against such
tribes as trade with British territory, and, while it lasts, any member
of the offending tribe found within our border is at once seized and
detained. This means of punishment has often been found effectual, and
if effectual, it is preferable to a military expedition, which often
leaves behind it bitter memories in the destruction of property and loss
of life. Last as a measure of punishment comes the military expedition,
which is only resorted to in exceptional circumstances, and when every
other means of coercing a hostile tribe has failed.
[Sidenote: Coercive Measures]
The necessity, in certain circumstances, for military expeditions has
been admitted by the civil authorities of the Punjab in the following
statement made in 1864 by Mr. Davies, Secretary to the Punjab
Government: “The despatch of an expedition into the hills is always in
the nature of a judicial act. It is the delivery of a sentence, and the
infliction of a punishment for international offences. It is, as a rule,
not in assertion of any disputed right, or in ultimate arbitration of
any contested claim of its own, that the British Government resolves on
such measures, but simply as the only means by which retribution can be
obtained for acknowledged crimes by its neighbours, and by which justice
can be satisfied or future outrages prevented. In the extreme cases in
which expeditions are unavoidable, they are analogous to legal penalties
for civil crime—evils in themselves inevitable from deficiencies of
preventive police, but redeemed by their deterrent effects.
Considerations of expense, of military risk, of possible losses, of
incurring antagonism and combination against us on the part of the
tribes, all weigh heavily against expeditions; and to set them aside,
there must be irresistible obligation to protect and to vindicate the
outraged rights of subjects whom we debar from the revenge and
retaliation they formerly practised.”
At the present moment rather over 9000 Pathans are serving in our
militias, border military police and levies, while considerably more
than 10,000 are in the ranks of the regular regiments of the Indian
army; a certain number, too, are serving in the forces maintained by
native chiefs. Considering the readiness with which the Pathan accepts
military service, it cannot be said that these numbers are high, but the
fact would seem to be that while some tribes are supplying us with more
recruits than they can well afford, others have scarcely been drawn upon
at all, and many races along the Pathan borderland remain still
altogether unexploited.
[Sidenote: The N.W.F. Province]
[3]The North-West Frontier Province is, with the exception of Behar,
Chota Nagpur and Orissa, the youngest of the provinces into which
British India is divided, while in respect of population and extent of
territory administered according to British law, it is also the
smallest. It lies between the 31st and 36th degrees of latitude and the
69th and 74th degrees of longitude; its total length, as the crow flies,
is over 400 miles, its average breadth is from 100 to 150 miles, the
total area comprised within its limits being roughly 38,000 square
miles. Only 13,000 square miles, however, are under full British law and
administration, and 25,000 square miles are occupied by tribes who are
under British political control, but who maintain their internal or
municipal independence. The British territory part of the province is
divided into the five districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and
Dera Ismail Khan, whose western boundary, known as the administrative
border, is a sinuous line extending for some 600 miles. On the other
side of this administrative or inner provincial border dwell the
municipally independent tribes who are under the political control of
the Chief Commissioner, a control which he exercises with the aid of the
officers in charge of the political agencies, viz. Swat, Dir and
Chitral, the Khyber, the Kurram, and Northern and Southern Waziristan.
These agencies have been described as the tentacles of civilised order,
stretching into a mass of barbarism and savagery; and the remainder of
the space beyond the administrative border and as far as the “Durand
line” or “the outer provincial border,” separating the British and
Afghan spheres of influence, is occupied by the independent tribes. The
length of this outer border cannot be less than 800 miles.
The population of the five British districts is about 2,200,000, and of
the outer portion of the province probably a million and a half.
After the border war of 1897 a narrow-gauge line was laid from Nowshera,
on the Kabul River, to the foot of the Malakand; constructed in the
first instance for military reasons, it rapidly developed into an
important artery of commerce, justifying its conversion from a narrow to
a broad gauge. Another railway which, in 1897, stopped on the left bank
of the Indus at Kushalgarh, now crosses the Indus by a bridge, and has
been extended via Kohat and Hangu to Thal, at the southern end of the
Kurram Valley. A third line to the base of the hills is under
construction; it will be taken over the Indus at Kalabagh and carried to
Bannu. When the Thal railway has been extended to the head of the Kurram
Valley; when a short line has been constructed in the Hazara district;
and when a lateral branch has been provided from Bannu to Tank and Dera
Ismail Khan, the province will be fairly well equipped with railways of
a distinct commercial and strategic value.
[Sidenote: Frontier Policy]
A perusal of the chapters which follow will probably make it apparent
that the general policy of the Government of India in regard to the
frontier tribes is, and has been—as well described by a former Chief
Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province—“a forward one only
when necessity compels, and stationary where circumstances permit.”
CHAPTER II.
BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES.[4]
Before describing the Black Mountain itself and the various tribes which
inhabit its slopes, it may be as well to say something about the country
which encompasses it on three sides and about the men who occupy it.
Allai is a valley bounded by Kohistan on the north and east, by the
Bhogarmang Valley, Nandihar and Deshi on the south, and by the Indus on
the west. The valley of Allai is divided from Kohistan on the north by a
range of mountains rising to over 15,000 feet, and from Nandihar and
Deshi by another range running from the British boundary to the Indus
above Thakot. The average breadth of the Allai Valley is about twelve
miles, and the total area about 200 square miles. Wheat, barley, Indian
corn and rice are grown, and the mountain slopes at the eastern end are
covered with forest.
The men of Allai are ever engaged in internal quarrels; blood-feuds are
rife, and often embroil the whole tribe. They are but little dependent
on British territory; number some 9000 fighting men, indifferently
armed; they have at times, although not of late years, given us some
trouble, but have usually been coerced by means of a blockade, although
a really effective one is not easy to enforce.
[Sidenote: Surrounding Country]
Nandihar is a valley lying to the south of Allai, and adjoining the
British valleys of Bhogarmang and Konsh on the east. It is divided by a
spur of the hills into two long narrow glens; the area of the valley is
about ninety square miles, and its elevation is from four to five
thousand feet. There are about a thousand fighting men; the people are
perpetually at feud; the country is very easily accessible from British
territory.
Tikari is a valley lying to the south of Nandihar, and between it and
Agror in British territory. It is about eight miles long, four broad,
and lies at an elevation of about 4500 feet. There are only some 400
fighting men. Supplies in Tikari are plentiful, with the exception of
fuel, and water is abundant. The men of Tikari have not been troublesome
neighbours.
Deshi is the name given to the country to the north of Agror, and lying
to the west of Nandihar. It comprises a portion of the eastern slopes of
the Black Mountain—a succession of bold, wooded spurs with intervening
watercourses, on the banks of which are the villages. The fighting men
number just over 700, indifferently armed. They are a united tribe,
equally among themselves and when external danger threatens, but are
easily accessible and exposed to attack, although not immediately on our
border. They gave us some trouble in 1868, but have been quiet since.
All the above-mentioned tribes are Swatis; none of them, except the men
of Deshi, have a very high reputation for courage; they are all Sunni
Muhammadans and very bigoted.
Tanawal, an independent State, is, roughly speaking, a square block of
territory in the north-west corner of the Hazara district, south of the
Black Mountain and Agror. It consists of 200 square miles of hilly
country, held as a _jaghir_ by the Nawab of Amb, a fort and village on
the right bank of the Indus. Little is known of the origin of the
Tanawalis.
We now come to the Yusafzai tribes inhabiting the slopes of the Black
Mountain lying to the east of the Indus, and occupying the southern
corner of the angle formed by that river and the British boundary. The
total length of this mountain is about twenty-five to thirty miles, and
its average height about 8000 feet above sea-level. It ascends from the
Indus basin at its southern end near the village of Kiara, and so up to
its watershed by Baradar; thence it runs north-east by north to the
point on the crest known as Chitabat. From here the range runs due
north, finally descending to the Indus by two large spurs, at the foot
of the easternmost of which lies Thakot. The Indus, after passing
Thakot, runs westward along the northern foot of the mountain till it
washes the western of the two spurs above mentioned, when it takes a
sharp bend to the south, and runs below and parallel to the western foot
of the range.
[Sidenote: The Mountain Itself]
The Black Mountain may be described as a long, narrow ridge with higher
peaks at intervals, and occasional deep passes; the general outline of
the crest is more rounded than sharp. From the sides numerous large
spurs project, which are often precipitous and rocky, with deep, narrow
glens or gorges lying between them, in which are some of the smaller
villages of the tribes, the larger ones being, as a rule, situated on
the banks of the Indus. The whole of the upper portion of the mountain
is thickly wooded, with pine, oak, sycamore, horse-chestnut and wild
cherry. The crest of the mountain is crossed by several passes. The
mountain is bounded on the south by Tanawal; on the east by Agror,
Pariari, and the Swati tribes of Tikari, Nandihar and Deshi; on the
northern extremity lies the Indus and Thakot; and on the west, between
the crest and the River Indus, the slopes are occupied by Yusafzai
Pathans. These slopes fall steeply from the crest for some 2000 feet;
then follows a zone of gentle, well-cultivated slopes; and then from
4000–5000 feet altitude the hill drops precipitously to the Indus. The
actual Indus Valley here varies in width from a few hundred yards to
nearly two miles, being narrowest at Kotkai and at its broadest at
Palosi. It is crossed at about eleven different points by ferries, the
boats holding from twenty to thirty passengers, but the inhabitants pass
over the river almost everywhere on inflated skins.
There are many routes by which the mountain can be ascended, and most of
these have been used by our troops in different expeditions: from
British territory all of them start from either Tanawal or Agror.
The western face of the Black Mountain is inhabited by three clans:
1. The Hassanzais.
2. The Akazais.
3. The Chagarzais.
On the eastern face are the Saiyids of Pariari, besides the men of Deshi
who have already been described.
The Hassanzais are a division of the Isazai clan of Yusafzai Pathans,
and live on either side of the Indus; those cis-Indus occupy the most
southern portion of the western slopes of the Black Mountain, while
those trans-Indus live immediately opposite to them. The former are
bounded on the north and east by the Akazais, on the west by the Indus,
and on the south the Hassanzai border adjoins the territory of the Nawab
of Amb. The Hassanzais are divided into ten sub-divisions with a total
fighting strength of something under 2000 men, who are not, however,
specially noted for their bravery. In the event of attack the Hassanzais
could probably depend for assistance upon two other divisions of Isazai
Yusafzais, the Akazais and the Mada Khels, of whom the last named live
on the right bank of the Indus. Of the ten sub-divisions of the
Hassanzais that known as the Khan Khel is the most troublesome, so far
as we are concerned, but the whole clan is constantly engaged in
internal feud.
During the days of the Sikh rule, the famous Sikh general, Hari Singh,
with two regiments, made an expedition into the Hassanzai country via
Darband and Baradar and burnt some of the villages.
[Sidenote: Akazais]
The Akazais, like the Hassanzais, are the descendants of Isa, and are
also a division of the Isazai clan of Yusafzais, inhabiting a portion of
the crest and western slopes of the Black Mountain to the north of the
Hassanzais, having on the east a part of Agror and the Pariari Saiyids,
to the north the Chagarzais, and on the west the Indus. They have no
territory trans-Indus, with the exception of part of one village which
they share with the Hassanzais. Their chief villages are Kand, Bimbal
and Biliani, the two first being nearest to the crest of the Black
Mountain, and situated on flat, open ground, with difficult approaches.
The Akazais are divided into four sub-divisions, and can probably put
some 1100 men in the field. Neither this clan nor the Hassanzais are
dependent on British territory, but so far as the Akazais are concerned
we possess the power to attack them, while we know all about the rich
and accessible rice and wheat crops which they cultivate round the
villages which they own, or in which they hold shares, in the Tikari
Valley. During the Sikh rule, and up to 1868, the Akazais held the
village of Shatut in the Agror Valley. It is only within the last
twenty-five years or so that this clan has begun to give trouble.
The Chagarzais are a division of the Malizai clan of the Yusafzai
Pathans, claiming to be descended from Chagar, the son of Mali, who was
one of the sons of Yusaf. They occupy the country on either side of the
river, those cis-Indus being located on the western slopes of the Black
Mountain, to the north of the Akazais. They are divided into three
sub-divisions, and could probably call together from both sides of the
river some 4600 armed men—the larger body from across the Indus.
The southern boundary of the cis-Indus Chagarzais is contiguous with
that of the Akazais, and follows the spur of the Black Mountain running
from the Machai peak to the Indus bank—the southern face of the spur
belonging to the Akazais and the northern to the Chagarzais. On the west
and north the Indus forms the boundary, while on the east the Chagarzais
are bounded by the country of the Deshiwals and of the Pariari Saiyids.
The Chagarzais are considered braver than the Hassanzais and Akazais,
who would, however, probably unite with them if attacked, as would also
contingents from Swat and Buner.
Little is definitely known about the communications in the interior of
the country. The crest of the mountain and the Machai peak may be gained
by advancing up the Kungali spur to Chitabat; but owing to the steep and
rugged nature of the country, and the thick forest clothing the whole of
the upper portion of the hill, an active enemy, well acquainted with the
ground, would have every facility for annoying the troops and opposing
the advance. About three miles north of Machai is the high peak of
Ganthar, and the pass leading from Pariari to Pakban—one of the
principal villages—lies on the crest between these two points. Here the
ground is broken and precipitous, flanked by thick pine forests, and in
all probability forms a strong position from which the advance of a
force moving from Machai upon Ganthar could be disputed. From this
point, which lies in a deep hollow on the crest, the ascent to Ganthar,
though steep in places and everywhere flanked by forest, is not of any
great difficulty. Beyond Ganthar the advance along the crest would be
easier.
[Sidenote: Chagarzais and Saiyids]
The Chagarzais also are not in any way dependent upon British territory.
It is only since 1863 that they have given us any trouble, and on the
few occasions when they have opposed us, their operations have not been
long protracted nor of a very serious character.
Colonies of Saiyids, religious adventurers—theoretically those who are
the direct descendants of Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet—occupy
several of the glens on the mountain itself, and have caused much of the
bloodshed and trouble which have stained and disturbed these parts. In
two of these glens on the eastern slope of the Black Mountain are the
Pariari Saiyids. On the western face, among the Hassanzais, are the
Saiyids of Tilli; one or two more such colonies are scattered through
the Chagarzai country; while a rather formidable religious body, the
Akhund Khels, holds the glens and spurs on the extreme north-west corner
down to the Indus. Numerically all are more or less insignificant, but
they exercise considerable influence.
Neither the extent nor the population of this Black Mountain country
warrant its being ranked as of any exceptional importance. As Oliver
reminds us, “the tribes are not numerous, nor particularly warlike, and
most of them are miserably poor, but they, and the nests of fanatical
hornets they shelter, have for long proved capable of inflicting an
altogether disproportionate amount of annoyance.”
OPERATIONS.
The first time the Hassanzai clan came into notice was on the occasion
of the murder by them of two officers of the Indian Customs Department.
Shortly after the annexation of the Punjab a preventive line was
established along the left bank of the Indus, so far as British
jurisdiction extended, to prevent trans-Indus salt being smuggled into
the Punjab. In 1851 this line was extended five miles beyond Torbela to
a point on the Indus where the cis-Indus territory of the Nawab of Amb
commenced. In November of that year two of our customs officials,
visiting this portion of the border, were murdered by a band of armed
Hassanzais, when actually within the bounds of the Nawab of Amb. The
Nawab was at once called to account, and delivered up such Hassanzais as
happened to be within his territory, for which act the Hassanzais made
war upon him, laid waste his border villages, and seized two of his
forts: upon this, British interference became necessary, and orders were
issued for the assembly of a punitive force.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1852–53]
_Expedition against the Black Mountain Hassanzais, 1852–53._—In December
1852 the troops, as enumerated below, were concentrated at Shergarh on
the north-western border of the Hazara district under the command of
Lieut.-Col. Mackeson,[5] C.B., Commissioner of Peshawar.
Four guns, 5th Troop, 1st Brigade, H.A.
Six guns, Mountain Train Battery.
16th Irregular Cavalry.[6]
7th Company Sappers and Miners.
3rd Native Infantry.[7]
Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment.[8]
Four Companies Corps of Guides.
1st Sikh Infantry.[9]
176 men Rawal Pindi Police.
Two Regiments Kashmir Dogras.
Levies (1760 men).
The force was divided into three columns with a reserve, occupying
respectively Chatta, Shingli, Shoshni and Shergarh. The fort at Shingli,
which was one of the two that had been captured by the Hassanzais from
the Nawab of Amb, was recovered without loss, and while our troops were
engaged in making it defensible, the Hassanzais and Akazais occupied the
crest of the Black Mountain, and advanced their picquets close up to
Chatta. The authorities had forbidden the employment of the regular
troops with the force on the top of the mountain at so late a season of
the year, so that they were thereby restricted to the duties of a
reserve at Shergarh—where, confined in a narrow valley and incumbered
with all kinds of _impedimenta_, they were of little or no assistance to
a force engaged in mountain warfare. Col. Mackeson consequently decided
to move the reserve of regular troops round to the banks of the Indus,
behind the Black Mountain, and thus to turn the position on the heights;
and to let each column of attack trust to a small reserve of its own,
and to the fort at Shergarh in the rear, if all were beaten back.
The regular troops accordingly marched on the 24th and 25th December
from Shergarh to Darband, behind the screen formed by the irregular
portion of the force at Chatta, Shingli and Shoshni. On the 27th, as the
result of a reconnaissance, Col. Mackeson decided to alter his plans,
and to place the main part of the regular troops at Baradar, with four
companies in Chamberi, to make demonstrations on the heights in front of
the last-named place—for to move them to the rear of the enemy’s
position would have involved them in difficult ground.
On the 29th, these dispositions having been completed, orders were
issued for the advance of the remaining three columns, Panj Gali being
named as their ultimate objective; in the event of a repulse they were
to fall back either upon Chamberi or Baradar.
The right column, under Lieut.-Col. R. Napier, arrived, after a
considerable amount of opposition, near the summit of the mountain at a
point where a broad spur, forming the top of the range occupied by the
Akazais, branched off at an elevation of some 9000 feet. By this ridge
the enemy retired, and no further defence of the hill was made. Shortly
before sunset the Guides, under Lieut. Hodson, arrived at the shoulder
of the mountain above Panj Gali, which was still occupied by the
tribesmen, but on the appearance of our troops they rapidly retreated,
and the right column bivouacked here for the night.
The centre column, under Major J. Abbott, had ascended about halfway to
Panj Gali when the troops suddenly came upon the main body of the
Hassanzais, consisting of about 600 matchlock men, strongly posted upon
a steep eminence in the centre of the main ravine. This position having
been turned, the enemy fell back upon another equally strong at the head
of the pass, but even after being joined by the left column under
Captain Davidson, Lieut.-Col. Mackeson did not feel himself strong
enough to attack, so awaited the appearance of Col. Napier’s force in
rear of the position, when the Hassanzais retreated, as already stated.
[Sidenote: Mackeson’s Operations]
The left column was accompanied by Col. Mackeson, and marching by Agror
and Pabal, was fired at from a hill overlooking Tilli, but the enemy
were immediately dislodged and the column effected its junction with the
centre one, as described, close to Panj Gali.
On the 30th the Hassanzai villages about here were destroyed, and the
force moving on the next day to the Tilli plateau burnt all the villages
between that place and Abu, while those along the Indus between Kotkai
and Baradar were destroyed by the Nawab of Amb’s men.
On the 2nd January the whole force retired to Baradar, being followed up
by the enemy and their allies, and the expedition was at an end. The
Hassanzais had made no submission, but it was considered that they had
been sufficiently punished for the murder of the two British officers by
the destruction of their villages and grain, and for some time after
this lesson the Hassanzais remained fairly quiet, and the raids made by
them in 1863 were directed chiefly against the Nawab of Amb’s territory,
and no doubt partook of the nature of reprisals for the assistance the
Nawab had afforded us ten years earlier.
Our casualties in the 1853 expedition were about fifteen killed and
wounded.
In November, 1867, it was determined to establish a body of police in
the Agror Valley, and this was temporarily located in the village of
Oghi until a fortified police post could be built. At daylight on the
morning of the 30th July, 1868, this body of twenty-two policemen was
attacked by some 500 men belonging to almost all the tribes, including
the Pariari Saiyids, mentioned in this chapter. The enemy were driven
off, but troops being called for from Abbottabad, a force composed of
the Peshawar Mountain Battery and 350 of the 5th Gurkhas, under
Lieut.-Col. Rothney, reached Oghi before midnight on the 31st, having
marched forty-two miles in twenty-five hours, and here this force was
joined on the 2nd August by the levies of the Nawab of Amb. It appearing
that the attack had been instigated by the Khan of Agror, that chief was
promptly arrested and sent in to Abbottabad.
During the next few days there were signs of serious unrest in the Agror
Valley; the tribesmen refused to meet the Deputy-Commissioner, many
villages were burnt by them, and on the 7th a general advance of the
enemy took place, when all the neighbouring tribesmen joined them, while
our own levies deserted in numbers to their homes. On the 12th, Col.
Rothney, who had been reinforced, moved out from Oghi, and drove the
enemy out of the Agror Valley. By this engagement, by the arrival of
troops at Abbottabad, of further reinforcements at Oghi, and the
presence of some Kashmir regiments in the Pakli Valley, the safety of
the Hazara district was now secured, and Brig.-Gen. Wilde—who was now in
command—only waited for more troops to carry out any punitive operations
which might be ordered.
Up to this date twenty-one British villages had been burnt by the
tribesmen, who had also caused us sixty-four casualties.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1868]
_Expedition against the Black Mountain Tribes, 1868._—An expedition was
now sanctioned, but in view of the generally disturbed state of this
portion of the frontier, it was decided to draw the required troops from
cantonments further down country, leaving the garrisons of Peshawar and
of other border posts as far as possible intact. Considering that some
regiments had come from as far south as Cawnpore, the concentration by
the 24th September of the following force at Agror, Darband and
Abbottabad, may be considered a very satisfactory piece of work:
At Agror:
D. F. Royal Horse Artillery.
E. 19th Royal Artillery.
2. 24th Royal Artillery.
Peshawar Mountain Battery.
Hazara Mountain Battery.
1st Battalion 6th Foot.
1st Battalion 19th Foot.
Guides Cavalry.
16th Bengal Cavalry.[10]
Det. Telegraph Sappers.
1st Gurkhas.
2nd Gurkhas.
3rd Sikhs.[11]
2nd Punjab Infantry.[12]
4th Gurkhas.
20th Punjab Native Infantry.[13]
24th Punjab Native Infantry.[14]
5th Gurkhas.
At Abbottabad:
2nd and 7th Companies Sappers and Miners.
At Darband, in support of the Nawab of Amb:
38th Foot.
9th Bengal Cavalry.[15]
31st Punjab Native Infantry.[16]
[Sidenote: Composition of Force]
This force was divided into two brigades, under Colonels Bright and
Vaughan, the whole under command of Brigadier-General Wilde, C.B.,
C.S.I., and numbered some 9500 of all ranks. In addition, a contingent
of 1200 troops was furnished by the Maharaja of Kashmir, but these,
though present on the border, did not take any active part in the
operations.
The overawing effect of the assembly of so large a force was immediately
apparent in the petitions to be permitted to treat which now began to
come in from the Swatis, the Hassanzais and the men of Tikari and
Nandihar, and these were granted in the case of those clans which had
not been specially hostile, or which it was considered particularly
desirable to detach from the general coalition. The force which had been
concentrated in Hazara had still, however, a sufficiently formidable
task before it, having to deal with the Chagarzai and Akazai clans, with
the Swatis of Deshi and Thakot, with the Pariari Saiyids, and not
improbably with the Hindustani fanatics (of whom more will be said
hereafter), and large bodies of trans-Indus Pathans.
On the 3rd October the force moved out from the camp at Oghi;
Brigadier-General Vaughan, with the Second Brigade, advancing by
Bagrian, occupied with but insignificant opposition the Kiarkot
Mountain, and closed up his brigade to Kilagai. Brigadier-General Bright
at the same time advanced on Kungali and thence on Mana-ka-Dana, which
he occupied after some little fighting, and which was found to form an
excellent temporary base for operations against the Chitabat and Machai
peaks. The Second Brigade was now ordered to support the further advance
of the First, leaving the levies to move up the Barchar spur. On the
next day—the 4th—the Chitabat position was carried with small loss—the
road having, however, been found to be almost impracticable—and was put
in a state of defence. The Second Brigade closed up this evening to
Mana-ka-Dana. On the following day the First Brigade advanced against
the enemy holding the Machai peak. This was naturally a very strong
defensible position, the ascent being steep and rugged in the extreme,
only to be climbed on a narrow front, as the ground on the left was
precipitous, and on the right thickly wooded. The accurate and effective
covering fire of the mountain batteries enabled the troops to capture
the position with only eight casualties, the enemy not holding out to
the last, but flying down the spurs into the Indus Valley.
Major-General Wilde was now in possession of the most commanding plateau
of the range, he had ample supplies, his communications were secure, and
he was able to inflict considerable damage on the mountain villages of
the neighbouring Pathan tribes. Jirgahs of the clans now began to come
in and make formal submission, and by the 12th the Machai peak was
evacuated, the force finally reaching Oghi, via Tikari and Nandihar, on
the 22nd October, with the objects of the expedition satisfactorily
attained.
Our casualties totalled five killed and twenty-nine wounded.
[Sidenote: Raids and Outrages]
Raids did not, however, entirely and immediately cease, and in the
autumn of 1869 a force of some 700 men had to be moved out from
Abbottabad to assist in the establishment of a blockade against the
Hassanzais, Akazais and others who had raided into Agror. In April of
the following year a party of Akazais attacked Barchar, and burnt
Sambalbat and Bholu, despite the presence in the Agror valley of a small
British garrison.
During the years 1871–75 offences continued to be committed on the Agror
border by the tribesmen, and another expedition seemed inevitable, when,
in September 1875, a settlement was arrived at, all the Black Mountain
tribes agreeing in submitting to the British Government, and for some
few years this part of the frontier was free from any serious trouble.
Up to 1884 there was no real cause for complaint; it had been found
necessary in this year to blockade the Chagarzais, Akazais and Pariari
Saiyids, and the same punishment was extended later to the Hassanzais;
but it was not until June 1888 that a serious outrage occurring on the
Agror frontier necessitated the despatch of another expedition to the
Black Mountain. On the 18th of this month an attack was made upon a
small party of British troops within British territory by Akazais,
Hassanzais and Pariari Saiyids, and two British officers and four men
were killed. Immediately upon this, large bodies of these tribesmen
assembled with the intention of attacking Agror, but dispersed again
without taking any further offensive action; the Indian Government now
once more took into consideration the question of punitive measures
against the Black Mountain tribes, and on the 29th August an expedition
was decided upon.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1888]
_Expedition against the Black Mountain Tribes, 1888._—The force was
formed on the 7th September, 1888, and consisted of three mountain
batteries, one company sappers and miners, four battalions of British,
nine of Native infantry, with two battalions of Kashmir infantry and the
Khyber Rifles, and was placed under command of Brigadier-General
(temporary Major-General) J. McQueen, C.B., A.D.C. The total strength
was 9416 of all ranks, and the force was organised in two brigades under
Brigadier-Generals Channer and Galbraith, each brigade being sub-divided
into two columns. There was further a reserve composed of a regiment of
cavalry and two battalions of infantry. Headquarters and the first,
second and third columns were directed to concentrate at Oghi in the
Agror valley by the 1st October, and the fourth column at Darband on the
Indus on the same date; and the object of the expedition was stated to
be the coercion into submission of the Akazais and the Khan Khel
division of the Hassanzais, with the punishment of any clans or
divisions which might assist these tribesmen in their opposition to our
troops.
The following were the orders issued for the advance of the four
columns:
No. 1 Column to move on the 4th to Mana-ka-Dana, and the following day
to Chitabat, leaving a sufficient force at Mana-ka-Dana to protect
its line of communications.
No. 2 Column to advance up the Barchar spur on the 4th, occupying
Barchar; thence moving on the 5th to the crest of the ridge, one
regiment being at once detached to the left to meet No. 3 Column.
No. 3 Column to advance up the Sambalbat spur to the village of the
same name, which was to be occupied on the 4th. The advance to be
continued to the crest on the 5th. The 24th Punjab Infantry and
two guns Derajat Mountain Battery to move up the Chatta Spur,
meeting the remainder of No. 3 Column on the morning of the 5th at
the junction of the Sambalbat and Chatta spurs. The Khyber Rifles
to advance up the Chajri spur between Nos. 2 and 3 Columns on the
5th.
No. 4 Column to advance on the 4th to the neighbourhood of Kotkai on
the Indus.
The first three columns carried out their orders on the 4th and 5th, the
2nd and 3rd Columns practically unmolested, the 1st with but slight
opposition, which chiefly took the form of firing into the bivouacs
after nightfall; but the opposition experienced by the 4th, and more
isolated, Column was of a considerably more serious character.
This column, under Colonel Crookshank, and accompanied by the Brigadier,
crossed the frontier on the morning of the 4th and advanced to Bela on
the Indus by a road which had been made practicable the previous day.
The river bank was reached at 8 a.m., and a halt was made to allow the
column to close up. On the advance being resumed, the village of Shingri
was carried with but trifling opposition, but about a mile beyond large
numbers of the enemy were found in occupation of a strong position about
the villages of Towara and Kotkai, with both flanks held by skirmishers
and even defended by guns. The flanks were turned by the 34th Pioneers
and 4th Punjab Infantry,[17] but the advance was necessarily very slow,
and the line was suddenly charged by a body of _ghazis_ who had been
concealed in a nullah on the left flank of the Royal Irish Regiment;
they were, however, nearly all shot down before they arrived at close
quarters. The enemy now began to break, and by 3.30 p.m. were in full
retreat towards Kanar, when Kotkai was occupied.
On the 6th the other three columns were engaged in collecting forage,
improving their water supply, and in safeguarding their communications,
and during the 7th they remained respectively at Chitabat, Nimal and
Kain Gali.
[Sidenote: Work of the Columns]
From the 5th to the 10th October the 4th Column was engaged in
reconnaissances to Kanar, Tilli, Kunari, Garhi and Ghazi Kot, and on the
13th the settlements and forts at Maidan, on the further bank of the
Indus, of the Hindustani fanatics—many of whom had opposed us at
Kotkai—were destroyed. These operations were nearly always opposed, but
with the destruction of Maidan the active services of this column came
to an end. Later on in the month a Hassanzai village on the right bank
of the Indus was burnt, as were also Garhi, Bakrai and Kotkai, after
which this clan sent in their jirgah, made submission and paid up their
fine.
During this period the Agror Columns remained on the crest of the Black
Mountain above the lands of the Hassanzais and Akazais, exploring the
surrounding country and destroying villages of offending clans. These
measures were successful; by the 19th the Akazai jirgah had come in and
had unconditionally accepted our terms. The Hassanzais too, although
they did not actually make submission until the 30th, had ceased to be
actively hostile, and General McQueen was therefore now able to devote
his attention to the coercing of the Pariari Saiyids and the Tikariwals.
On the evening of the 20th October the Divisional Headquarters and No. 1
Column were at Mana-ka-Dana, No. 2 Column was in occupation of Chitabat,
No. 3 was distributed between Karun, Akhund Baba, Nimal and Tilli, and
No. 4 was at Ledh, Kanar, Kotkai, Shingri and Darband.
On a small force moving forward from Dilbori towards Chirmang, the
Tikariwals at once came in and hurriedly paid up their fines, leaving
now only the Pariari Saiyids to be dealt with; and on the 24th troops
were sent into their country, Garhi was destroyed, Thakot was then
entered, via Chanjal and Karg, without opposition, and preparations were
now made for visiting Allai, the Khan of which had begged that his
country should not be visited, but who had made no signs of submission.
Allai was entered, via the Ghorapher Pass, by a force of six guns and
some 2400 rifles under Brigadier-General Channer, divided into two
columns. The ascent was found to be very difficult and precipitous, and
the crest held in some force, but the enemy made no serious stand, and
our casualties in the capture of the position were only one killed and
one wounded. The crest of the Chaila Mountain was held during that night
and the 2nd, and on the 3rd November the force marched to Pokal, the
Khan’s headquarters, destroyed it and returned to camp, having
experienced some opposition in the advance and being persistently
followed up in the retirement. Late this evening the Allai jirgah came
in, followed on the next day by that of the Pariari Saiyids, and by the
13th the whole of the force had been withdrawn to British territory. The
British casualties during the operations amounted to twenty-five killed
and fifty-seven wounded.
The objects for which the expedition had been undertaken had been
attained; the offending clans had met with severe punishment, and had
made their submission; hostages had been given for future good
behaviour; and some roads had been made, while a large extent of
hitherto unknown country had been surveyed and mapped. For a year
affairs on this border remained quiet, but the Government of India
considered it necessary to take measures to secure its control over the
clans and to make roads into their territories. To the construction of
roads, however, the Hassanzais, Akazais and Pariari Saiyids made
objections, and on Major-General Sir John McQueen moving a small force
along the Border to prove our rights under the treaty which had been
made, a considerable amount of opposition was shown by the clans
immediately concerned, and the General withdrew his troops in accordance
with his instructions, and to make way for a larger expedition now
projected.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1891]
_Expedition against the Hassanzais and Akazais, 1891._—The objects of
these operations were to assert our right to move along the crest of the
Black Mountain; to inflict punishment upon the clans which had recently
shown hostility to the force under Sir John McQueen; and to occupy the
country until complete submission had been made. In consequence of the
experience gained in 1888 it was decided that Oghi, Tilli and Pabal Gali
should be occupied, but that the advance should be made only by the
Indus line, whence the Hassanzai and Akazai villages and lands could
most easily be reached, and where the conditions of warfare would be
more favourable to the British troops.
The force detailed was placed under command of Major-General W. K.
Elles, C.B., and was directed to advance from Darband in two columns,
one via Baradar and Pailam to Tilli, the other by the river via Kotkai
and Kanar. The concentration was to be effected by the 1st March, 1891,
as detailed below.
Left or River Column, at Darband:
Three guns No. 1 M.B.R.A.
Three guns Derajat Mountain Battery.
2nd Battalion Seaforth Highlanders.
Headquarters Wing 32nd Pioneers.
37th Dogras.
Guides Infantry.
4th Sikhs.[18]
Right or Tilli Column, at Darband:
No. 9 M.B.R.A.
1st Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
11th Bengal Infantry.[19]
Wing 32nd Pioneers.
2nd Battalion 5th Gurkhas.
Khyber Rifles.
Divisional Troops at Darband:
One squadron 11th Bengal Lancers and No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers
and Miners.
At Oghi:
One squadron 11th Bengal Lancers.
Three guns Derajat Mountain Battery.
28th Bengal Infantry.[20]
In Reserve at Rawal Pindi:
One squadron 11th Bengal Lancers.
1st Battalion King’s Royal Rifle Corps.
19th Bengal Infantry.[21]
27th Bengal Infantry.[22]
[Sidenote: Advance of the Force]
The weather was bad for some days after the concentration was effected,
but good roads had been made to the frontier and to Bela, and both
Phaldan and Bela had been occupied by our troops. General Elles proposed
first to establish posts in Kanar and Tilli, and then with the Left or
River Column to occupy the lower Hassanzai country on both banks and the
Diliarai peninsula of the Akazais, while the Right Column, moving by Ril
and Kungar, occupied the Khan Khel territory, and thus by degrees
complete the occupation of the lands of both clans.
The advance commenced on the morning of the 12th, and Pailam and Kotkai
were occupied by either column without any more opposition than was
occasioned by some desultory firing at the River Column from across the
Indus. On the next day the Right Column moved on to and halted at Tilli,
while the River Column visited the Palosi plain and also Nadrai on the
right bank, experiencing some opposition, but reconnoitring the road
between Kotkai and Kanar. By the 15th it was reported that while the
Hassanzais and Akazais were anxious to submit, other clans were
gathering against us—mostly in the trans-Indus Chagarzai country.
About 3 a.m. on the 19th a weak company of the 4th Sikhs, providing an
outpost at the small village of Ghazi Kot, on the left bank of the
Indus, was heavily attacked by a large body of Hindustani fanatics.
Reinforcements, however, furnished by the 4th Sikhs and 32nd Pioneers,
were quickly on the scene, and the enemy were driven off with
considerable loss. The following night there was a good deal of firing
at Kanar; on the 21st the River Column had reached Palosi via Pirzada
Bela; and the Right Column occupied Ril the same day, destroyed Seri on
the next, and then returned to Tilli.
On the 23rd the establishment of a bridge at Bakrai was covered by a
party of the 4th Sikhs, who were opposed by a large gathering of the
enemy on the Diliarai Hill, overlooking Bakrai and about one mile to the
north-west of that place. The enemy were driven off the hill, but on the
Sikhs and Guides withdrawing to a position lower down, they were
followed up so determinedly that Lieut.-Colonel Gaselee of the 4th Sikhs
again advanced, and cleared and reoccupied the hill for the night. The
fighting had been hand-to-hand, and the enemy—chiefly Chagarzais and
Hindustanis—suffered rather heavily.
On the 24th Brigadier-General Hammond took a small force from Tilli to
Palosi, and thence next day advanced up the Shal Nala against Darbanai—a
village on a knoll jutting out from the main spur into the Indus Valley.
The enemy were driven off this commanding position, and on the 27th
General Hammond moved into lower Surmal and burnt some of the Chagarzai
villages.
[Sidenote: Gathering of the Clans]
The gatherings of the tribesmen had now increased. There were a number
of Bunerwals at Baio and in this neighbourhood, and in the Chagarzai
country to the north there appeared to be a coalition of all the clans
from Thakot to the Peshawar border—from Buner, Chamla, and from the
Amazai and Gadun country. In consequence of these concentrations of
clans, a regiment of cavalry and a battalion of infantry were ordered up
from Nowshera to Mardan, and, with the troops already in garrison at the
last-named place, were held in readiness for service against the
Bunerwals; and the reserve brigade from Rawal Pindi was concentrated at
Darband. At the same time representations were made to the Buner jirgah
that we had no intention of invading either their country or that of the
Chagarzais, but that they would be attacked if their forces did not
disperse. These warnings had the desired effect, and the Bunerwals
returned to their homes, while the lower Hassanzais had already made
their submission. Towards the end of April the whole of the country of
the Akazais, who still remained recalcitrant, was visited, and shortly
after Darband was evacuated and the base transferred to Oghi; but it was
not until a month later that the Akazai jirgah at last came in and
tendered the unconditional submission of the tribe. The three Isazai
divisions, with the Saiyids and Chagarzais of Pariari, consented to the
perpetual banishment from their territories of a notorious disturber of
the peace, one Hashim Ali, and promised generally to be of good
behaviour and to exclude the Hindustani fanatics from their country.
Early in June the bulk of the troops composing the force returned to
India, but some remained until the end of November in occupation of Seri
and Oghi and of the crest of the Black Mountain.
In these operations—which cost us nine killed and thirty-nine wounded—we
had a larger coalition against us than in any other expedition, with the
exception of the Ambela outbreak of 1863 and the Pathan revolt of 1897.
In March 1892 the Hassanzais and Mada Khels broke the engagement into
which they had entered with the British Government, by permitting Hashim
Ali to return to their country and settle at Baio; and accordingly in
October a force of 6250 men and two guns, organised in two brigades,
advanced from Darband under Major-General Sir William Lockhart. The
Indus was crossed at Marer, and on the 6th October the two brigades
advanced on Baio—the First Brigade from Wale and the Second Brigade from
Manjakot. Baio was found deserted, and was destroyed, as was also Doba,
a Mada Khel village. Demolitions were also carried out in Manja Kot,
Karor, Garhi and Nawekili, and the force was back on the 11th October at
Darband, where it was broken up. None of the tribesmen offered any
resistance, and there were no casualties, but the troops suffered a good
deal from fever and also from cholera.
[Sidenote: End of the Operations]
Since this expedition the Black Mountain clans and their neighbours have
given no serious trouble.
CHAPTER III.
YUSAFZAIS AND GADUNS.[23]
The clansmen occupying the British border from the Black Mountain to the
Utman Khel territory belong, with the exception of the Gaduns, to the
important tribe of Yusafzai Pathans, of which the Hassanzais, Akazais
and Chagarzais, already described, are also branches.
[Sidenote: Arrival in Peshawar Valley]
The Yusafzais inhabit the division of that name in the Peshawar
district, as well as independent territory beyond the border. They are
the descendants of the original Gandhari, who in ancient days occupied
the Peshawar Valley, emigrating thence to the Helmand in the fifth
century, and becoming fused with the Afghans of Ghor. In the fifteenth
century, owing to pressure, the Yusafzais migrated with other tribes
northwards to Kabul, and from thence in the sixteenth century into the
Peshawar Valley, where they acquired the plain country north of the
Kabul River and west of Mardan. Meanwhile, the Mohmands of the Ghoria
Khel had followed the Yusafzais, and they in turn defeated the
Dilazaks—whom the Yusafzais had already dispossessed of their lands—and
forced them into the present Yusafzai plain, in the north-east corner of
the Peshawar Valley. The Yusafzais then, with the help of other tribes,
drove the Dilazaks across the Indus into Hazara. The Yusafzais, with the
Utman Khel and Tarkanris, now settled themselves in the Yusafzai plain,
and during the next few years these three tribes made themselves masters
of all the hill country along that border, from the Indus to the range
separating the Bajaur and Kunar Valleys. In a later division of the
country the Tarkanris took Bajaur; the Utman Khel the Swat Valley up to
the junction of that river with the Panjkhora; while the Yusafzais
occupied all the hills to the east as far as the Indus, including Lower
Swat, Buner, Chamla and the Peshawar Valley east of Hastnagar and north
of the Kabul River. At the present time the Yusafzais inhabit the
north-east of the Peshawar district, or the Yusafzai plain, Swat, Buner,
Panjkhora, and several strips of independent territory north and east of
the Peshawar Valley. They have also considerable settlements to the east
of the Indus as we have seen.
At the time of the final division of the country with the Tarkanris and
the Utman Khels, the Yusafzais were divided into two great branches, the
Mandanr and the Yusafzais, the whole race tracing its origin to Mandai,
who had two sons, Yusaf and Umar. From Yusaf sprang the Yusafzais, and
from a son of Umar called Mandan, the Mandanr took their name. On the
occupation of this tract of country, an equal division of both plain and
hill country was made between the Mandanr and the Yusafzais, but
quarrels arising, the Yusafzais gradually became owners of the hill
country, while the Mandanr were driven into the plains; it is thus
actually the Mandanr who now occupy the so-called Yusafzai plain in the
north-east of the Peshawar Valley, and who are generally known as
Yusafzais, while the real Yusafzais, who dwell in the hill country, are
usually called after the name of the territory they severally inhabit.
The Yusafzai is an agriculturist, generally a fine, well-limbed man, of
good physique and appearance, with a great deal of race-pride,
well-dressed and cheery, while his hospitality is proverbial. They have
an established and recognised gentry, and all blue-blooded Yusafzais
have a hereditary share in the land, their names appearing in the book
of hereditary land-owners kept by the village _patwari_. The Yusafzai
plain is very flat, and the soil, where properly irrigated, is very
fertile, but the chief interest of this district lies in the numerous
ruins of ancient Buddhist and Hindu cities, temples and inscriptions,
scattered broadcast about the plain and the adjoining hills.
The Yusafzais may conveniently be divided into Cis- and Trans-frontier
Yusafzais: under the former category come the
(1) Mandanr,
(2) Sam Baizais,
while the following are the clans of trans-frontier Yusafzais:
(1) Akozais,
(2) Amazais,
(3) Bunerwals,
(4) Chagarzais,
(5) Chamlawals,
(6) Isazais,
(7) Khudu Khel,
(8) Nasozais,
(9) Utmanzais.
[Sidenote: Geographical Position]
First in order of the independent tribes on the British border between
the Black Mountain and the Utman Khel territory, come the Mada Khel
division of the Isazais and the Amazais, adjoining the lands of our
feudatory the Nawab of Amb; to the south of the Amazais lie the
Utmanzais, to their west the Gaduns, and beyond them the Khudu Khel. To
the north of the Khudu Khel territory is the Chamla Valley, inhabited by
members of different clans, and separated from Buner by the Guru range
of mountains. Next come the Nurizai and Salarzai divisions of Buner,
which march with our border. Between Buner and the Utman Khel limits is
the district of Swat peopled by the Akozais, with the portion adjoining
British territory inhabited by the Baizai and Ranizai tribesmen of Swat.
Something can here fittingly be mentioned with regard to the position of
the Nawab of Amb on this border. His territory may be roughly described
as a square block in the north-west corner of the Hazara district,
separated on the west from the independent Pathan country by the Indus,
and having the Black Mountain and Agror to the north. The Tanawal chief
has also two or three villages beyond the Indus, and the largest of
these is Amb. The Nawab holds his cis-Indus territory as a perpetual
_jaghir_ from the British Government, while his trans-Indus villages are
independent. The existence of this little principality is, from its
situation, in many ways convenient.
_Cis-border Yusafzais. Mandanr._—These occupy the greater portion of the
Yusafzai plain in the north-eastern part of the Peshawar Valley, bounded
on the south by the Khattaks and the Kabul River, on the west by
Hastnagar and the Muhammadzais, and on the east and north by the Indus
River, and by the Gaduns and the independent Yusafzai tribes. The
district is divided into two sub-divisions (_tehsils_), Swabi and
Mardan. The Mandanr are divided into three divisions—the Usmanzai,
Utmanzai and Razar—of which the first named has its holdings in the
Mardan and the two latter in the Swabi tehsil. The family in each of the
three divisions, in which the Khan-ship is hereditary, is known as the
Khan Khel, and these families have a higher social standing than the
others.
A number of other Pathans live among the Mandanr, as do also many
persons of Indian race, some of them immigrants from the Punjab and
Kashmir, and some descendants of the original inhabitants of the
country. All these, however, speak Pushtu and greatly resemble Pathans
in appearance.
_Sam Baizai._—These are a portion of the Baizai division of the Akozai
Yusafzais, who formerly occupied the whole of the northern portion of
the Yusafzai plain to the foot of the hills below the Morah Pass. During
the sixteenth century they called in the Khattaks and Utman Khels to
assist them against the inroads of the Ranizais, and in return gave
their allies land in their country as tenants. In course of time the new
comers have practically ousted the Baizais, who now possess but few
villages of their own. In regard to numbers they are an insignificant
division.
_Trans-border Yusafzais. Akozais._—These, which form the largest clan of
trans-frontier Yusafzais, inhabit the whole of Swat proper, and will be
found described in greater detail in Chapter V.
[Sidenote: Amazais]
_Amazais._—This people forms one of the two sub-divisions of the
Usmanzai division of Mandanr Yusafzais, and is sub-divided into the
Daulatzais and Ismailzais. The Amazai country is situated between that
of the Chamlawals and Hassanzais on the north and west, the Mada Khel
and Tinaolis on the east, and the Utmanzais, Gaduns, and Khudu Khel on
the south. Within British territory the Daulatzai occupy the Sudum
Valley, while the Ismailzai inhabit a strip of country in the Yusafzai
sub-division of the Peshawar district, south of the Karamar range and
east of the road from Mardan. The trans-frontier Amazais are divided
into the Saiyid Khel and Mobarak Khel, two sub-divisions which are
constantly at feud with one another. The Amazai country is divided into
two by a northern spur from the Mahaban Mountain; the villages lying to
the east of this spur, and between it and the Indus, belong to the
Saiyid Khel, and those to the west to both sub-divisions. The country is
narrow, rough, well watered and wooded. The strength of the
trans-frontier Amazais in fighting men is about 1500, and they have a
high reputation for courage, but while a number of the cis-frontier men
are enlisted, few come in for service from across the border.
The only occasion upon which we have come into direct conflict with the
Amazais was in the Ambela campaign of 1863.
_Bunerwals._—This clan inhabits the Buner Valley—an irregular oval—which
is bounded on the north-west by Swat, on the north-east by the Puran
Valley, on the south-east by the Mada Khel and Amazai territory, on the
south by the Chamla Valley, and on the south-west by Yusafzai. It is a
small mountain valley, and the Morah Hills and Ilam Range divide it from
Swat, the Sinawar Range from Yusafzai, the Guru Mountain from the Chamla
Valley, and the Duma Range from the Puran Valley. The Buner Valley is
drained by the Barandu, a perennial stream which joins the Indus above
Mahabara; the valley is about thirty miles in length. The term Bunerwals
includes the Iliaszai division, occupying the north-western portion of
the country, and the Malizais, who inhabit the south-eastern portion:
these two divisions are divided into seven sub-divisions. The hereditary
chiefs of the tribe are the Khans of Dagar and Bagra, but their
influence is nominal, and the different clans are entirely democratic.
Moreover, the Khan of Dagar does not belong to any of the Buner clans,
but his family is recognised as the leading or Khan Khel family. The
clan is neither so well armed nor so adept at hill fighting as other
trans-frontier tribes, but can turn out some 6800 fighting men. The few
who enlist with us—according to Enriquez just over 200—are well spoken
of. Their land is very fertile, and the Bunerwals are purely
agriculturists, the men of good physique, dark and swarthy, and
distinguishable by the dark blue clothes and pugarees which they wear.
[Sidenote: Bunerwals]
Although the Bunerwals have never been specially friendly with us, they
have proved themselves on the whole most satisfactory neighbours. Though
poor, they are not given to thieving; they discourage raiding into our
territory; and though they will give an asylum to outlaws from our side
of the border, they will not join with them in the commission of
outrages. Oliver says of them that “there are in many ways few finer
specimens of Pathans than the Bunerwals. Simple and temperate, they are
content with the plain wholesome food, the produce of their own cattle
and lands; courteous and hospitable to all who claim shelter, treachery
to a stranger seeking refuge among them being considered the deepest
reproach that could fall upon the clansmen, and such a case is almost
unknown. Upright in their dealings, with enemies as well as with
strangers, they have always been adverse to us, and though probably not
anxious to begin the war, they were among our most determined enemies
during the Ambela campaign.... Patriotic they certainly are, and in
their way, which is a pastoral and agricultural one, industrious, though
they hold all trade in the very lowest estimation; anything that savours
of the shop or of trading is anathema to a Bunerwal. Therefore they are
poor, but, for poor Pathans, have an exceptional regard for the law of
_meum_ and _tuum_. Their word, once given through the council of the
tribe, may, according to Warburton, be depended on with almost
certainty. Lastly, they are ‘distinguished for their ignorance,’ and
ignorance being the ‘mother of devotion,’ they are deeply religious;
greatly under the influence of the most bigoted of mullahs, saiyids, and
pirs, and the many varieties of the priestly class, which is probably
the most powerful and prosperous section of the community; while if
there is any section whose heritage ought to be one of woe it is this,
for it is from the priests most of the offences come throughout the
whole of Yusafzai.”
The winter climate in Buner is said to be very severe, snow falling
thickly on the hills and lying in the valleys, while malaria makes the
country unhealthy during the hot season.
Of the seven divisions into which the clan is divided, it will probably
be sufficient briefly to notice the two which are nearest to British
territory; these are the Salarzais and the Nurizais. The former are a
powerful community, and could bring nearly 2000 men into the field; they
have more intercourse with our subjects than any other section of the
Bunerwals. The Nurizais are also a strong division, and of the two
sub-divisions they contain, one is as favourably disposed towards the
British as the other is inimical and troublesome. The Nurizais adjoin
British territory to the south-east of the Salarzais, and are separated
from the Chamla Valley by the Guru Range.
From Swat three passes lead into Buner, the Kalel, the Jowarai and the
Karakar, and of these the last only is practicable for mule transport.
On the east, the Indus being crossed at Mahabara, it is possible to
enter Buner by the Barandu defile. From our territory two passes, both
practicable for pack animals, lead into Buner—the Malandri Pass and the
Ambela.
[Sidenote: Chagarzais and Chamlawals]
_Chagarzais._—These have already been dealt with in Chapter II. under
the Black Mountain tribes. They are divided into three divisions, and
one only is located in Buner, living on the western slopes of the Duma
Mountains. This division can turn out about one thousand fighting men.
_Chamlawals._—These are the inhabitants of the small valley of Chamla,
which lies to the south-east of Buner, and they are Mandanr Yusafzais.
When the Yusaf and Mandan clans, after they had subjugated the country,
began fighting among themselves, the Mandanr located their families in
the Chamla Valley, and retained it at the conclusion of the struggle.
The valley runs east and west, and is about seventeen miles long by two
and a half broad. It is bounded on the north by Buner, south by the
Khudu Khel country, east by the Amazai, and west by the British district
of Rustam, in Yusafzai. The Chamlawals number about 1400 fighting men,
but do not enjoy as such a very high reputation. They are divided into
three divisions. The valley can be approached from the north from Buner
by several passes, of which the easiest is said to be the Buner Pass,
leading from Barkilai to Ambela; it leads through the Guru range, and is
believed to be practicable for camels. From British territory it is
entered by the Ambela, Sherdara and Narinji passes, and it is also
approachable from the east and through the Khudu Khel country. Any
trouble which the Chamlawals may have given us in the past has usually
been the result of tribal pressure.
_Mada Khels._—This is a division of Isazai Yusafzais, of which the other
two, the Akazais and Hassanzais, have already been described among the
dwellers on the Black Mountain. The Mada Khel country is on the northern
slopes of the Mahaban Mountain down to the right bank of the Indus, and
is bounded on the north by the Hassanzais, on the east by the Indus, and
on the south and west by the Tinaolis and Amazais. Settled in the
country are a number of Dilazaks—the former occupiers of the Yusafzai
country and now settled in Hazara—and Gujars, the descendants of the
original Hindu population of the country. The Mada Khel have three
sub-divisions, and are considered more enlightened than the other Isazai
tribesmen. They can muster some 1500 men, very badly armed, and their
young bloods do not readily enlist in the native army. Most of the
villages are on the Mahaban Mountain, only two being on the banks of the
Indus. The easiest approaches to Mada Khel territory pass through the
Hassanzai country.
_Khudu Khels._—These are a sub-division of the Saddozai division of the
Utmanzai clan of the Mandanr Yusafzais. Their territory is bounded on
the north by Chamla, on the west by Yusafzai, on the south by Utmanama,
and on the east by the territory of the Gaduns and Amazai. Their country
is about twenty-two miles long and about fifteen wide. The Khudu Khel
contains two sections, is very much divided among its members, and could
probably, if united, furnish some 1600 fighting men, of no particular
value. Their country is very open to attack from British territory and
to blockade, and for this reason the Khudu Khels have not given us any
real trouble since 1847 and 1849, when a British force marched into
their country and surprised their villages.
The Khudu Khel have settlements also in British territory in the Mardan
district.
[Sidenote: Nasozais and Utmanzais]
_Nasozais._—This sub-division of the Iliaszai Yusafzais, though not
included among the Bunerwals proper, is practically identical with them.
It is located north-east of Buner in the Puran Valley on the eastern
slopes of the Lilban Mountains, and is divided into two sections. The
Nasozais can muster some 800 fighting men.
_Utmanzais._—These are a clan of Mandanr Yusafzais. They inhabit both
banks of the Indus, those on the right bank being independent and
occupying a narrow strip of land between the river and the Gadun
country, bounded on the north by the Tinaolis and on the south by the
British. The Utmanzais on the left bank inhabit the Torbela-Khalsa
tracts in British territory in the Hazara district. They contain four
divisions and do not number more than 400 fighting men of good quality.
About two-thirds of the original Utmanzai territory is now occupied by
the Gaduns, who in old days were invited to cross the Indus as
mercenaries, and were given in requital the lands they now hold on the
western and southern slopes of the Mahaban Mountain.
This clan is more or less dependent upon us, and their territory can be
reached by several routes.
[Sidenote: Gaduns and Hindustanis]
_Gaduns._—The origin of the tribe of Gaduns or Jaduns is not very clear,
but they certainly have no connection with the Yusafzais among whom they
dwell. They claim descent from the family of Ghurghusht, but are more
probably of Rajput origin. Many of the descendants of Jadu, the founder
of a Rajput dynasty, emigrated from Gujrat, some eleven hundred years
before Christ, to the hills of Kabul and Kandahar. When they moved to
the Mahaban range, the southern slopes of which some of them now occupy,
is uncertain, but in the sixteenth century a portion of the tribe
crossed the Indus into Hazara, where, about Sultanpur, Mansehra and
Abbottabad, their descendants are still to be found. These have,
however, lost all connection with their trans-frontier tribesmen, have
even forgotten Pushtu, and are to all intents and purposes Punjabis.
“From opposite Torbela on the Indus, and from the boundary of our border
on the right bank,” says Oliver, “the Gadun country extends right up to
the crest of the Mahaban Mountain, or rather that cluster of peaks and
ranges which, rising 7000 feet from the Indus, extend back as a great
spur of the Morah or Ilum. A thoroughly classic ground; ‘the Great
Forest’ of the early Aryans; the ‘Sinai’ of Sanskrit, where Arjuna
wrestled with God, and, like the Jewish Jacob, though defeated, still
won his irresistible weapon, ground that, if not identical with
Alexander’s Aornos, is probably not very distant, that was famous for
its numerous monasteries (Mahawana) when Hwen Tsang visited it in 630
A.D., and is studded with ruins to this day.”
The tribe has three clans—the Salar, Mansur and Hassazai—of which the
last is unrepresented among the trans-frontier Gaduns, while the other
two are continually at feud. The trans-frontier clans contain about 2000
fighting men; they do not enlist freely nor are they much in request,
being considered to be of smaller fighting value than other Pathans. The
trans-Indus Gaduns are bounded on the east by the Utmanzais, on the
north by the Amazais, on the west by the Khudu Khels, and on the south
by British territory. The tribesmen are all cultivators or
cattle-owners. They can be coerced by blockade or by means of an
expedition, and their country could be overrun without other tribes
being molested or too closely approached.
_The Hindustani Fanatics._[24]—Something has already been mentioned
about the colonies of religious adventurers which are found among the
hills and valleys of this part of the border; and a more detailed
description must now be given of the particular colony or colonies of
Hindustani fanatics, who have been responsible for, and have taken so
prominent a part in, most of the operations in which British troops have
here been engaged.
It was in the year 1823 that one Saiyid Ahmad Shah, of Bareilly, a
religious adventurer, made his appearance on the Yusafzai frontier. He
had been at one time a friend of the notorious Amir Khan Pindari—himself
a Pathan born in Buner, who had fled before James Skinner and his
“Yellow Boys” from Bhurtpore to the Himalayas. Saiyid Ahmad studied
Arabic at Delhi, and made a pilgrimage to Mecca via Calcutta, and it was
at this time that his doctrines gave him an influence over Bengali
Muhammadans, which led them thenceforth to supply with recruits the
colony which he founded. His doctrines at that time, whatever they may
have become thereafter, were those of the Wahabi sect, and inculcated
the original tenets of Islam, repudiating commentaries on the Koran and
the adoration of relics. In 1823 then he appeared upon the Yusafzai
border of the Peshawar district with some forty Hindustani followers,
having arrived there by way of Kandahar and Kabul.
At this time the Pathans of the frontier were generally depressed by the
crushing defeat which they and the Peshawar Sirdars had sustained at the
hands of Ranjit Singh at the battle of Nowshera, so that when the Saiyid
began to preach a _jehad_ many people flocked to his standard, the
number of his Hindustani followers grew to 900, and the Peshawar Sirdars
also joined him. In the spring of 1827 Saiyid Ahmad proceeded to
Nowshera with the intention of laying siege to Attock, but Ranjit Singh
was ready for him. The great Sikh general, Hari Singh, with one army,
awaited him on the Indus, while Budh Singh, crossing the river with
another, marched to and entrenched himself at Saidu. Here Saiyid Ahmad
surrounded his force, and in time reduced it to great straits, until
Budh Singh, resolving to fight, warned the Peshawar Sirdars of the
approach of another Sikh army under Ranjit Singh, and then joined
battle. The Sirdars fled, and the Musalmans were routed with great
slaughter. Saiyid Ahmad escaped with a handful of followers via
Lundkhwar to Swat and thence to Buner, where the Saiyid was able to
persuade the Pathans that treachery alone had been responsible for his
defeat, and he was soon again joined by thousands. He then went to
Panjtar, where he was cordially received by Fateh Khan, the chief of the
Khudu Khels, and his position thereby greatly strengthened. Eventually
he succeeded in getting the whole of Yusafzai and Peshawar under his
control; he subdued the chiefs of Hund and Hoti; levied tithes; defeated
a Barakzai force which had marched against him; took possession of Amb;
and finally, in 1829, he occupied Peshawar.
[Sidenote: Gaduns and Hindustanis]
He had now come to the end of his tether; his exactions had made him
unpopular with his Pathan following, and there was a general revolt
against his authority. The Sikhs organised expeditions against him and
his men, which, as Oliver says, “were exterminative rather than
punitive. The villagers turned out and hunted back the fugitives into
the mountains, destroying them like wild beasts. The history of the time
is a record of the bitterest hatred. The traditions tell of massacre
without mercy. Hunter quotes one instance in which the very land tenure
was a tenure by blood, certain village lands being held by the Hindu
borderer on payment to the Sikh grantees of an annual hundred heads of
the Hassan Khel. The decline of Saiyid Ahmad’s fame as an apostle came
after his ill-advised effort to reform the Pathan marriage customs,
which was really an attempt to provide wives for his own Hindustanis.
Something like the Sicilian Vespers was repeated, the fiery cross was
passed round the hills as the signal for the massacre of his agents, and
in one hour—the hour of evening prayer—they were murdered by the
tribesmen almost to a man.”
With the men who were left, Saiyid Ahmad crossed the Indus and proceeded
to Balakot, where the believers again rallied to him, and he gave battle
once more to a Sikh army under Sher Singh. He was, however, signally
defeated, he himself being slain, and, out of the 1600 Hindustanis who
had taken the field with him, only 300 escaping to Sitana. This was a
refuge for outlaws and for offenders of all kinds from Yusafzai and
Hazara, and belonged to one Saiyid Akbar, who had been Ahmad’s
counsellor and treasurer. Here the Hindustanis established a colony and
built a fort which they called Mandi.
CHAPTER IV.
YUSAFZAIS AND GADUNS: OPERATIONS.[25]
None of the dwellers in the territories described in the last chapter
gave us any trouble during the first few years which followed upon the
taking over of the frontier by the British. In 1853, however, it became
necessary to punish the Hindustani fanatics, who had afforded some
assistance to the Hassanzais during the expedition which the British
Government undertook against them in the previous year, and who had
seized the fort at Kotla on the right bank of the Indus, belonging to
the Nawab of Amb. Early in January 1853, Lieutenant-Colonel Mackeson,
C.B., moved the following force down to the Indus opposite Kotla:
Two guns, Mountain Train Battery.
1st Sikh Infantry.
3rd Sikh Infantry.
Two Dogra regiments of the Kashmir Army.
Six Wallpieces.
Six Zamburaks.
On the 6th the force was ferried across from Kirpilian in two large
boats, and the Sikh regiments and mountain guns advanced, when the
Hindustanis evacuated the fort and fled, being pursued and having
considerable loss inflicted upon them by the Nawab of Amb’s men. There
was no more trouble in the Peshawar district until the year of the
Mutiny, and it was then almost entirely due to the presence on the
Yusafzai frontier of the Hindustani fanatics, who were supported by
contributions of men and money from traitorous princes and private
individuals in India.
[Sidenote: The Mutineers of the 55th]
The Yusafzai country was then controlled by the fort at Mardan, usually
garrisoned by the Corps of Guides; in the middle of May, however, this
regiment had started upon its famous march to Delhi, and its place at
Mardan had been taken by part of the 55th Native Infantry. On the night
of the 21st May news reached General Cotton at Peshawar that some
companies of the 55th, stationed at Nowshera, had mutinied, and that
some of these had joined their comrades at Mardan. On the night of the
23rd a small force, accompanied by John Nicholson as political officer,
quitted Peshawar for the purpose of disarming the 55th Native Infantry
at Mardan. At sunrise on the 25th the disaffected regiment saw the
column approaching Mardan; “and then all but a hundred and twenty, who
were restrained by the threats and persuasions of the officers, broke
tumultuously from the fort, and fled. The column pressed on in pursuit;
but the mutineers were far ahead; the ground was so heavy that the
artillery could not get within range; and the chase was all in vain
until Nicholson, taking with him a few of the police sowars, dashed to
the front and rode into the fugitive masses. Breaking before his charge,
they scattered themselves over the country in sections and companies;
but all day long he pursued them, hunted them out of the villages in
which they sought for refuge, drove them over ridges, cut down their
stragglers in ravines, and never rested till, having ridden over seventy
miles, slain a hundred and twenty, and wounded between three and four
hundred of the traitors, taken a hundred and fifty prisoners, and
recovered two hundred and fifty stand of arms and the regimental
Colours, he was forced by the approach of night to draw rein, while
those who had escaped him fled across the border into the hills of
Swat.”[26]
The virtual ruler of Swat at that time was one whom Oliver has called “A
Border Pope”—an aged priest, known as the Akhund, and he decided that
these fugitives should not be accorded an asylum. They were accordingly
guided to the Indus and put across the stream, whence they intended to
endeavour to make their way to Kashmir. The majority of them succumbed,
however, to the perils of the journey by way of Hazara or Kohistan, but
a few took refuge in the country of the Khudu Khels, whose Khan was
hostile to us, and in whose territory a settlement of Hindustanis had
been established at a place called Mangal Thana, as a branch of the
parent colony at Sitana. The presence of the Hindustanis was the cause
of some trouble in July 1857 at Shekh Jana, and a fortnight later the
fanatics, under the leadership of one Maulvi Inayat Ali Khan, crossed
the border and raised the standard of religious war at a border village
called Narinji, where some 650 desperadoes had collected. A small force
was moved out from Mardan and Nowshera, and, marching at first in
another direction so as to conceal the object of the expedition, arrived
unexpectedly before Narinji. The position of the village was very
strong, and in the days of Sikh rule it had more than once been
unsuccessfully attacked, but under cover of the fire of the mountain
guns, it was now speedily taken and destroyed. The enemy had lost very
severely, and the retirement, which now took place, was quite unopposed.
Our casualties had been five killed and twenty-one wounded.
The chief object of the operations—the capture of the Maulvi—had not,
however, been attained; cattle were raided from British territory; and
the enemy were being daily reinforced by men from Buner, Chamla and
Swat. Major J. L. Vaughan, who had charge of the operations, now
received additional troops from Peshawar, and early on the 1st August he
left his camp at Shewa with the following force:
2 24–pounder Howitzers.
4 guns, Peshawar Mountain Train Battery.
50 bayonets, 27th Foot.
50 bayonets, 70th Foot.
50 bayonets, 87th Foot.
150 sabres, 2nd Punjab Cavalry.[27]
50 bayonets, 21st Native Infantry.[28]
400 bayonets, 5th Punjab Infantry.[29]
200 bayonets, 6th Punjab Infantry.[30]
150 bayonets, 16th Punjab Infantry.[31]
225 Mounted Levies and Police.
100 Foot Levies and Police.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1857]
Three hundred and fifty rifles were detached to take Narinji in flank
and rear, and reached their position about half an hour after the main
body had appeared in front of the village. The flanking party was
vigorously opposed, but the frontal attack had a comparatively easy
task, many of the defenders withdrawing early—among them being the
Maulvi. The retreat was to some extent cut off, and many were killed,
among the slain being several of the mutineers of the 55th Native
Infantry. Our losses were only one killed and eight wounded.
The village was then completely destroyed and the troops retired.
The spirit of the people was not, however, by any means broken, for less
than three months later the Assistant-Commissioner of Yusafzai, while
encamped at Shekh Jana with a small escort, was attacked by the
Hindustanis and Khudu Khels, assisted by the men of Shekh Jana and
Narinji. The Assistant-Commissioner escaped with his life, but five of
his party were killed, and the whole of his baggage was looted.
_Expedition against the Hindustanis and Khudu Khels, 1858._—On the 22nd
April, 1858, a force was assembled, for the punishment of this outrage,
on the left bank of the Kabul River opposite Nowshera. It numbered 4877
of all ranks, was commanded by Major-General Sir Sydney Cotton, K.C.B.,
and was divided into two brigades, respectively under Lieutenant-Colonel
Renny and Major Alban, both of the 81st Foot, but before crossing the
frontier, was divided into three columns as under:
FIRST COLUMN.
4 guns, Peshawar Light Field Battery.[32]
2 guns, Peshawar Mountain Train Battery.[33]
260 bayonets, 98th Foot.
100 sabres, 7th Irregular Cavalry.[34]
200 sabres, Guides Cavalry.
30 sabres, Peshawar Light Horse.[35]
100 bayonets, Sappers and Miners.
300 bayonets, 21st Native Infantry.[36]
300 bayonets, Guides Infantry.
400 bayonets, 9th Punjab Infantry.[37]
400 bayonets, 18th Punjab Infantry.[38]
SECOND COLUMN.
200 bayonets, 81st Foot.
100 sabres, 18th Irregular Cavalry.[39]
47 bayonets, Sappers and Miners.
200 bayonets, Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment.
450 bayonets, 8th Punjab Infantry.[40]
THIRD COLUMN.
105 bayonets, 81st Foot.
10 bayonets, 98th Foot.
25 sabres, 7th Irregular Cavalry.
25 sabres, 18th Irregular Cavalry.[39]
60 sabres, Guides Cavalry.
254 bayonets, Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment.
155 bayonets, 21st Native Infantry.
76 bayonets, Guides Infantry.
54 bayonets, 8th Punjab Infantry.[40]
137 bayonets, 9th Punjab Infantry.
185 bayonets, 18th Punjab Infantry.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1858]
The force assembled at the frontier village of Salim Khan, which was
made the base of operations, and on the 25th April the people of
Totalai, who had long been oppressed by the chief of the Khudu Khels,
now, encouraged by the proximity of the troops, made a rush upon
Panjtar, intending to seize the chief, Mukarrab Khan, but he escaped to
Chinglai, when his village was burnt before the troops arrived upon the
scene. The first object of the expedition was thus unexpectedly and
easily attained.
The following arrangements were now made: the First Column, under the
Major-General commanding, marching by Chinglai, was to enter Khudu Khel
territory by the Darhan Pass; the Second Column was to move directly on
Panjtar; while the Third remained in charge of the camp at Salim Khan.
The Darhan Pass was found to be a very narrow defile, about two miles in
length, the passage of which might easily have been disputed; no
opposition was, however, encountered, and the troops reached Chinglai,
which was destroyed under a slight and ineffectual fire from the enemy
holding the heights. The column returned on the 27th to Salim Khan via
Panjtar and the Jehangirra Darra. This route was found to form a very
much more difficult approach to Chinglai than the Darhan Pass route, the
track being chiefly through broken country, at one point passing through
a rocky defile called Taralai—a very formidable obstacle if disputed.
Although some of Mukarrab Khan’s men, mounted and on foot, were seen, no
attack was made upon the column. The Second Column had meanwhile
thoroughly destroyed Panjtar and returned to Salim Khan.
The General now determined to attack a stronghold of the Khan’s, called
Mangal Thana, situated on one of the main spurs of the Mahaban Mountain.
This place had also been the resort of Maulvi Inayat Ali Khan, who had
so perseveringly endeavoured, at Narinji and other places, to raise
Yusafzai in rebellion in 1857.
The force was again divided into three columns, which were now, however,
somewhat differently constituted—the First to act against Mangal Thana,
the Second to proceed as a support to Panjtar, the Third remaining in
reserve at Salim Khan. On the 28th April the First Column left camp
while it was moonlight; the ascent of the hills was found to be very
difficult, and it was necessary to leave half the column at Dukarai. No
opposition was, however, met with, and Mangal Thana was found to be
abandoned.
Mangal Thana consisted of two villages, one above the other, the upper
containing the citadel of the leader of the fanatics with enclosures for
his followers, and the whole surrounded by strong fortifications of
stones and timber. The position was about 5000 feet above sea-level, and
the neighbourhood was densely wooded. The troops bivouacked here for the
night, blew up the fort next day, and returned on the 30th to camp at
Salim Khan.
[Sidenote: Operations against the Fanatics]
The colony of fanatics at Sitana had now to be dealt with, and
accordingly, on the 2nd May, the force marched to Khabal, about four
miles from Sitana. Between Amb, on the right bank of the Indus, and our
frontier village of Topi, is a narrow strip of land forming part of the
Utmanzai territory. It contains, in addition to the two or three small
hamlets of Topi, the villages of Upper and Lower Khabal (exactly
opposite Torbela), Upper and Lower Kai, and Lower Sitana, Mandi and
Upper Sitana. The Utmanzais of this strip had, previous to this date,
had feuds with the Saiyids and Hindustanis of Sitana, and consequently
welcomed our troops as allies against a common foe.
Early on the 4th May a force of five guns and 1050 rifles was sent to
the left bank of the Indus, and advanced against the villages from the
east; the main column moved against them from the south; while the men
of our ally, the Nawab of Amb, occupied the hills to the north. On
approaching Lower Sitana, two regiments were detached to move up the
mountain in rear, the position was attacked in front, and the enemy were
driven with considerable loss to their second position. Here they were
met by one of the regiments coming up in their rear, and driven back on
the bayonets of the troops in front. Hand-to-hand fighting now ensued
until every Hindustani in the position was either killed or captured.
Some Gadun allies of the fanatics made no stand, retiring precipitately.
The enemy’s position having been carried at all points and their
villages destroyed, the force retired, being closely followed up. This
was the first time the Enfield rifle had been used against the
tribesmen, and the effectiveness of its fire made a great impression.
Our losses had been six killed and twenty-nine wounded.
That night the force encamped on the Sitana Plain by the Indus bank,
whence it proceeded next day to Khabal.
The Hindustanis, expelled from Sitana by the Utmanzais, had taken refuge
with the Upper Gaduns, and to prevent the Utmanzais being compelled, on
our retirement, to readmit them, the Gadun villages immediately on the
Yusafzai border were surrounded by our troops, and coercive measures
were threatened. This had an immediate effect, the Upper and Lower
Gaduns sending in their representatives and binding themselves, equally
with the Utmanzais, to expel and keep out the Saiyids and Hindustanis,
and to resist any other tribe which should try to readmit them.
The force then marched back to Nowshera, where it was broken up.
[Sidenote: The Gaduns Troublesome]
The Hindustani fanatics, now ejected from Sitana, settled at Malka, on
the north side of the Mahaban Mountain, but in 1861 they came down to a
place called Siri, close to their old haunts, and began abducting Hindu
traders from across the Hazara border. The only way whereby it seemed
possible to check these crimes was to punish the tribes which allowed
these robbers passage through their territories. The Utmanzais and
Gaduns were accordingly placed under blockade, and towards the end of
1861 these came in, made submission, and again agreed to exclude the
Hindustanis. For a brief period the kidnapping ceased; then in the
spring of 1863 came reports of two murders, followed in the summer by
the news that the Hindustanis had suddenly reoccupied Sitana. Not only
had the tribes above mentioned done nothing to prevent this, according
to agreement, but some of the tribesmen had actually invited this
occupation. A blockade of the Gaduns and Utmanzais was therefore
reimposed, and a large number of troops and levies were disposed on
either bank of the Indus, while the 101st Fusiliers were ordered up to
Hazara.
The Hindustanis were now showing a very bitter spirit against the
British Government, their leaders were preaching something of a _jehad_,
and attacks on our posts and villages were now projected or undertaken.
On the night of the 3rd September a party of Hindustanis attempted to
attack the camp of the Guides engaged on blockade duty at Topi, but were
driven off in panic; the Hassanzais, instigated by the Maulvi of Sitana,
made an unprovoked attack upon and destroyed several outlying villages
in Amb territory; later the same clan threatened Chamberi, and attacked
and killed several of the Amb levies on the Black Mountain. By this time
it seemed clear that most of the Hazara tribes had now thrown in their
lot against the British, and an expedition against them appeared
inevitable; it was therefore decided that the force employed should be a
large one, and that Brigadier-General Sir Neville Chamberlain should
command it.
Two columns were to be employed, the one operating from the Peshawar
Valley, the other from Hazara, and the movements proposed for each were
as under: the Peshawar Column was to assemble at Nawa Kala and Swabi,
with the apparent intention of moving on Mangal Thana, but when ready to
move was to march through the Ambela Pass, occupy Koga in the Chamla
Valley, and thence march on Sitana by Chirori; the Hazara Column
remaining stationary at Darband to overawe the riverain tribes and
protect the Hazara border. Additional troops were detailed to hold the
line of the Indus, Hazara and Yusafzai at Darband, Torbela, Topi,
Abbottabad, Rustam Bazar and Mardan. Hostilities were not anticipated
from the Bunerwals, with whom we had no quarrel, and who were known to
have no sympathy with the Hindustanis; but it was unfortunate that the
absolute necessity for keeping the line of operations secret prevented
the Bunerwals being informed that their frontier would be approached by
our troops. Consequently they not unnaturally believed that an invasion
of their country was intended, and eventually joined the coalition
against us.
[Sidenote: Ambela Expedition]
_Ambela Expedition, 1863._—The preliminary arrangements for the
expedition appear to have suffered to no inconsiderable extent from the
fact that, in order not to alarm the frontier tribes, General
Chamberlain had been asked not to join his command until the last
moment. On the 19th October he wrote to his brother: “I never before had
such trouble or things in so unsatisfactory a state. Carriage, supplies,
grain-bags, all deficient. Some of our guns and the five and a half inch
mortars have to be sent back as useless, after having taken the pick of
men and animals to equip a half-inch battery of R.A. Our 1st L.F.
batteries have to be stripped to make the Half Battery R.A.
efficient.”[41]
General Chamberlain reached Swabi on the 13th October, and marched on
the 18th to the mouth of the Darhan Pass with the following troops:
Peshawar Mountain Train Battery.
Hazara Mountain Train Battery.[42]
1st Punjab Infantry.[43]
5th Gurkhas.
The other troops of the expeditionary force closed up at the same time
to Nawa Kala from their camps in rear, and a proclamation was now issued
to all the tribes concerned, stating the object of the operations and
the reason for following this particular route. Then on the night of the
19th the following troops marched from Nawa Kala and joined at Parmalao
the advanced column:
100 sabres, Guides Cavalry.
100 sabres, 11th Bengal Cavalry.[44]
Guides Infantry.
5th Punjab Infantry.
27th Punjab Native Infantry.[45]
The junction effected, the whole moved on, under Colonel Wilde, to the
mouth of the Ambela Pass, which was reached at sunrise on the 20th.
On the 20th the pass was entered and traversed, the head of the pass
being held by some 250 Bunerwals, who were, however, dislodged without
any great difficulty, and Colonel Wilde’s column encamped on and beyond
the pass on tolerably open and level ground; he posted picquets to hold
the most important points, but was not strong enough to do more. The
main column had left Nawa Kala at 1 a.m. on the 20th October, and, after
a short halt at Rustam, closed up to the rear of the advanced troops
late in the afternoon. Both parties had found the road extraordinarily
difficult; the track was tolerably good up to the village of Surkhabi,
in our own territory, but thereafter deteriorated, in the pass often
lying in the bed of a stream, and in other places being overgrown with
jungle. In most parts it was possible to move only in single file; the
rear guard did not get beyond Surkhabi; and though the ammunition mules
managed, with difficulty, to keep up with their units, not a single
baggage animal reached camp during the night of the 20th–21st, and only
few had arrived there twenty-four hours later. It had been intended that
Colonel Wilde should push forward the few cavalry with him, supported by
the other arms, to reconnoitre the road down the further side of the
pass and the head of the Chamla Valley, but in view of the difficulties
of the road, it was deemed best to postpone any forward movement.
[Sidenote: The Advance Commences]
While halted on the pass, representatives came in from the people of
Chamla and Buner expressing feelings of friendship, and no opposition
seems therefore to have been anticipated from these tribes when the
force again moved forward on the morning of the 22nd. To prevent any
misunderstanding, a full explanation of our intentions was sent to the
Buner maliks, and careful instructions were given to our reconnoitring
party of cavalry and infantry, now sent on, to follow a road avoiding
Buner territory as far as possible. The descent from the top of the
Kotal was found to be tolerably good going, and the rest of the pass was
unoccupied by any of the tribesmen.
From the foot of the range on the northern side, two roads passed
through the Chamla Valley; one skirted the village of Ambela and lay
under the hills dividing Chamla from Buner on the north side of the
valley, while the other went by Koga on the south; and as Ambela, though
actually in Chamla, was regarded by the Bunerwals as one of their own
villages, the advance guard was ordered to proceed by the Koga road so
as to avoid all possibility of offence or misunderstanding.
Passing the kotal leading into Buner it was seen to be crowded by
Bunerwals, but they did not come down into the valley, which appeared to
be quite unoccupied. The reconnoitring party pushed on through Koga to
Kuria and then returned towards the Ambela; by this time it was seen
that numbers of Bunerwals had come down from the hills with the evident
intention of cutting off the retreat of the party. The tribesmen were
charged by the cavalry and driven back, and the infantry—the 20th Punjab
Infantry[46] under Major Brownlow—then formed the rearguard. Daylight
had now gone, the enemy came on again and pressed the 20th very closely,
rushing in among them sword in hand. As the retiring troops drew near
camp, the picquets became engaged, and there was a general attack upon
them in the front and on the flanks of the camp, which was kept up until
midnight.
[Sidenote: Hostility of the Bunerwals]
That the Bunerwals should thus have taken a decidedly hostile part
against us was very serious, and our position now required to be
strengthened and the plan of operations to be changed. The line of
communications was secured by calling up additional infantry and levies,
but it was evident that the Hindustani settlements on the Mahaban
Mountain could not now be reached by the Chamla Valley, with a powerful
and hostile tribe on the left flank of the line of march.
On the 24th all sick, superfluous baggage and spare transport were
passed down the pass to the rear, and the troops—on this date about 6000
in number—were employed in improving the communications. The Bunerwals
remained quiet, but it was noticed that they were joined by large bodies
of the Hassanzais, Chagarzais, Mada Khels and Hindustanis.
Shortly after daylight next morning the enemy were observed on a ridge
opposite and close to the advanced picquets of the right defence, and
Major Keyes, who was there in command, advanced and dislodged them. He
took up a position on a ridge commanding the plain over which the enemy
had retired, and found he was then himself commanded, at a range of 700
yards, from a conical hill on which the tribesmen were collecting. He
sent into camp for reinforcements, but these did not reach him until 2
p.m., when the hill was attacked and captured. It afterwards transpired
that the enemy had intended to attack both sides of the camp, but one
force did not come on.
The attention of the General commanding was now drawn to the left side
of the camp, where was the Guru Mountain separating the Ambela Pass from
Buner. The enemy had collected here in large bodies, and it was
necessary to meet any attack from that quarter, and to provide for the
security of a sick convoy which it was proposed to send to the rear. On
the morning of the 26th, therefore, the left picquets, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan, were reinforced with the following:
Hazara Mountain Battery.
30 marksmen, 71st and 101st Regiments.
200 rifles, 71st Regiment.
5th Punjab Infantry.
6th Punjab Infantry.
[Sidenote: The “Eagle’s Nest”]
These troops proceeded to the vicinity of the “Eagle’s Nest” picquet,
situated a full mile from the camp, and occupying the top of a very
steep, rocky knoll rising out of the southern face of the mountain, and
forming the apex of that portion overlooking the left side of the camp.
This picquet had hitherto only been held during the day. Colonel Vaughan
now placed the thirty marksmen with eighty men of the 20th Punjab
Infantry in the “Eagle’s Nest”—as many as it was capable of holding—and
stationed another 120 men of the 3rd[47] and 20th Punjab Infantry among
some large rocks at the base of the knoll. The rest of the force with
Colonel Vaughan was disposed about a small underfeature, 400 yards west
of the picquet.
On the crest of the hill opposite to and distant 500 yards from our
picquet, was a breastwork occupied by about 2000 of the enemy, and
shortly after noon these made two fierce assaults upon the “Eagle’s
Nest,” and also attacked the rest of the troops immediately under
Colonel Vaughan. All these attacks were gallantly repulsed, but our
casualties were heavy, amounting to twenty-nine killed and ninety-two
wounded; the enemy also lost seriously, and though no further attack was
made, a heavy fire was kept up during the rest of the day. The picquet
was not, as usual, withdrawn at sunset, and Colonel Vaughan’s party
maintained its positions all night; next day it was determined to hold
permanently the “Eagle’s Nest” with forty British and 300 Native
soldiers, and another post on an adjoining height, called “Vaughan’s
Picquet,” with the Hazara Mountain Battery, fifty British and 300 Native
soldiers. Of the enemy’s killed and wounded many were Hindustanis, and
some were apparently ex-soldiers of the late 55th Native Infantry.
News was now received that the Akhund of Swat, the Border Pope, had
thrown in his lot with the Bunerwals, and had summoned also the people
of Bajaur and Dir; Chamla sent its quota; the Utman Khels, Afridis from
Lundkhwar, also took the field; and it was evident that there was now a
general combination against us of almost all the tribes from the Indus
to the boundary of Afghanistan. Old feuds seemed to be forgotten, for
tribes and chiefs, usually bitter enemies, were now ready to fight side
by side against us; and it was clear how greatly the situation had
changed for the worse since the force had first entered the Ambela Pass.
Then the troops had merely to deal with the tribes on the Mahaban
Mountain, to expel the Hindustanis from that tract, and march to its
borders through a friendly, or at least a not actively hostile, country.
General Chamberlain recognised that it would be inadvisable to make any
advance, such as had been contemplated, with his present force against
so large a combination. He therefore decided to remain on the defensive
in the position he now occupied, which was secure, where at any rate his
communications were safeguarded, and where supplies and reinforcements
could easily reach him, trusting that the discouragement of repeated
unsuccessful attacks would gradually weaken the enemy’s numbers and
break up the coalition.
Between the 27th and 29th the force was strengthened by the arrival of
two guns of the 3rd Punjab Light Field Battery,[48] the 14th Sikhs, and
the 4th Gurkhas, but it was known that the tribesmen too had received
reinforcements, and that an attack was shortly to be made upon the camp
defences.
[Sidenote: The “Crag Picquet”]
On the night of the 29th–30th the advanced picquets of the right defence
were furnished by the 1st Punjab Infantry and a company of the Guides,
under Major Keyes. Above the main picquets and commanding them was “the
Crag”—a high rock, the ascent to which was most precipitous, and the
summit of which was incapable of containing more than a very few men.
Shortly before daybreak this position was heavily attacked, and it soon
became apparent that its garrison was hard pressed. Reinforcements were
at once sent forward from the lower picquets, but, before “the Crag”
could be reached, the small garrison was overpowered and driven off the
rock, though the men held the ground lower down. Major Keyes decided to
hold his ground until daylight among the rocks immediately below the
summit and sent for help. As day broke the picquets were here reinforced
by the 20th Punjab Infantry under Major Brownlow, and this officer
advanced by a ridge which ran to the right of “the Crag” and threatened
the enemy in rear, while Major Keyes attacked in front. The assault thus
carried out and supported was entirely successful; a hand-to-hand fight
ensued when the summit of the rock was reached, but the enemy were
driven out at the point of the bayonet and the position was recovered.
No sooner had “the Crag” been recaptured than the right attack fell to
pieces and the tribesmen fled in panic. Lieutenants Fosbery, 104th
Fusiliers, and Pitcher, 1st Punjab Infantry, were awarded the Victoria
Cross for gallantry on this occasion.
While this attack on the right was in progress, another by men from Swat
was delivered on the front of the camp, but this was easily repulsed; a
demonstration was also made against the upper left flank picquets. Our
losses on this day amounted to fifty-five killed and wounded, but those
of the enemy had been so heavy, and the effect of the defeat so great,
that many of the tribesmen returned to their homes.
The General commanding now decided to arrange for a new line of
communications which should not be exposed to attack from the direction
of the Guru Mountain. A line of road was therefore selected between the
villages of Khanpur and Sherdara, and the base of operations was changed
from Rustam to Parmalao. On the 28th October and 5th November the 7th
Fusiliers, 93rd Highlanders, 23rd[49] and 24th[50] Punjab Native
Infantry were ordered up to this frontier; a body of 275 police, horse
and foot, was sent up to Nawa Kala to assist in the protection of the
rearward communications; and later on 4200 camels and 2100 mules were
collected at Nowshera, in view of the demand for pack transport which
might have to be met when the force eventually moved forward. Working
parties were also employed in making a road, to facilitate the forward
march on Ambela, along the western slopes of the right ridge, and thus
covered from any fire from the Guru Mountain. On the 6th November the
operations on this road caused us considerable loss. The working parties
had been sent forward as usual, covered by picquets beyond and above
them, and all had gone well until the time came to withdraw. The working
parties were successfully retired, but the forward covering parties seem
to have, for some unknown reason, remained too long on their ground, and
were surrounded by the enemy, who moved up in large numbers. The light
was failing, and the enemy seem to have broken in between some of the
picquets: many of the covering party fought their way back to camp, but
our losses this day amounted to seventy-eight of all ranks killed and
wounded; the bodies of some of the former had temporarily to be left
behind, but were recovered next day.
On the 8th the new road to the rear was taken into use, and a
commencement was made in removing supplies, etc., to the south side of
the pass, where it was proposed to form a new camp, thereby saving much
picquet duty and affording an actually stronger position.
[Sidenote: “Crag Picquet” Attacked]
On the 11th the enemy ascended the hills about Lalu, on our right front,
in large numbers, evidently with the intention of attacking the picquets
on that side of the camp. These were accordingly reinforced and their
defences strengthened. “The Crag” had recently been much enlarged and
improved, and was now capable of accommodating a garrison of 160 men,
while it was supported by the mountain guns of the Peshawar Battery from
the main picquet. At 4 p.m. on the 11th Major Brownlow assumed command
of “the Crag,” having under him fifteen of the 101st Fusiliers, thirty
of the 14th Sikhs, and 115 of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry. Two of
the four mountain guns commanded the left shoulder of “the Crag” hill
and the front of the “Centre” picquet below. The enemy occupied a
position about half a mile in length on a ridge facing and within 250
yards of “the Crag” picquet. Between the two positions was a hollow
intersected by a ravine. The right and rear of “the Crag” were
precipitous and practically unassailable; the left face was the weak
point, there being cover for an attacker to within a few yards of the
position. Anticipating an attack, every effort was this day made to
improve the defences. About 10 p.m. the enemy moved down in large
numbers to the hollow in front of the picquet, and shortly after made
repeated desperate attacks until daybreak upon the front and left of the
picquet, but were beaten back with loss, although at one time they
nearly penetrated the position at its left front angle; the situation
was saved by the gallantry and devotion of Major Brownlow and five men
of his regiment. By morning but very few of the enemy were anywhere
visible, and as Major Brownlow’s men had been for forty-eight hours on
duty, they were relieved at 8 a.m. on the 30th by ninety men of the 1st
Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant Davidson.
This officer soon after asked Major Keyes for reinforcements, as he did
not consider his ninety men sufficient garrison for the position, and
thirty additional men were sent him, all that could at the moment be
spared, as serious attacks were anticipated upon other portions of the
defence. These reinforcements had only just reached “the Crag,” when the
men of the picquet were seen to be vacating it and rushing down the hill
in confusion. Major Keyes at once proceeded to and occupied a breastwork
on the road between “the Crag” and the main picquet, and there rallied
the retreating men and checked the advance of the enemy. Feeling the
urgent need of the moral effect of a counter attack and the necessity
for giving time for the arrival of support, he ordered an assault upon
“the Crag.” This, though bravely led and executed, was unsuccessful,
owing to the paucity of men available, and the detachments fell back.
The enemy occupying “the Crag” were now pouring a heavy fire into the
camp, and its continued possession by them would render the lower
picquets untenable. Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, commanding the right
defences, now asked for the 101st Regiment, and taking also three
companies of the Guides, made for the advanced picquets, where the state
of affairs was as follows: Major Ross, with some of the 14th Sikhs and
men of other corps, was holding on halfway up “the Crag” hill, but
unable to advance any further; parties of the enemy, attacking the lower
picquets, were only kept back by the well-directed fire of the mountain
guns; while the 1st, 20th, and two companies of the Guides with Major
Keyes still held the breastwork, but could not hope to do so for long.
[Sidenote: Re-Capture of the “Crag”]
The 101st now at once advanced direct upon “the Crag,” and never halted
or broke until they had gallantly stormed the heights and secured the
picquet, driving the enemy over the hills beyond, while the three
companies of Guides swept the enemy from the right of the position. All
opposition now ceased along the whole line, the enemy having lost very
heavily, their casualties being 89 killed and 140 wounded. The defenders
of “the Crag” seem to have been seized with an unaccountable panic,
owing to the enemy concentrating a large force, unobserved, upon a weak
picquet: Lieutenant Davidson was killed at his post.
During the next four or five days no attacks of a serious character were
made by the enemy. Early on the morning of the 18th, the new camp being
ready for occupation, the whole of the troops occupying the Guru
Mountain were withdrawn, and the entire camp and troops transferred to
the heights on the south of the pass, while steps were also taken to
extend the position so as more effectually to command the water supply.
Imagining from the evacuation of the Guru position that the force was
retreating, the new left front of the camp was this day fiercely
attacked, but the enemy were repulsed with heavy losses on both sides.
[Sidenote: “Crag” Lost and Re-Captured]
On the 20th November “the Crag” picquet was garrisoned by 100 bayonets
from the 101st Fusiliers and an equal number from the 20th Punjab Native
Infantry; the “Water” picquet, within 450 yards of it, by 100 bayonets
of the 71st Foot and 100 men of the 3rd Punjab Infantry. About 9 a.m.
the enemy began to collect in large numbers near these picquets,
principally threatening “the Crag,” but were to some extent checked by
the fire of the Peshawar mountain battery. Up to late in the afternoon
the tribesmen had made no impression, though they had succeeded in
establishing themselves within a few yards of the breastworks. About 3
p.m., however, the unaccountable conduct of an officer on the left of
the picquet, who suddenly ordered the troops immediately under his
command to retire, gave the enemy possession of the post—though not
without a desperate resistance from the remainder of the garrison. On
the fall of “the Crag” being reported, General Chamberlain ordered up
the 71st Foot and the 5th Gurkhas to retake it; the 71st stormed the
position in front, the Gurkhas and 5th Punjab Infantry attacking the
lower portion in flank, and the work was retaken without much loss on
our side. Among the wounded, however, was the General commanding, who
had accompanied the storming party. Thus for the third time was “the
Crag” lost and won—a spot which, from the heavy casualties there
sustained on either side, had become known in the country side as the
_katlgar_, or place of slaughter.
This action, despite the temporary success gained, seemed to have a
depressing effect on the enemy; their numbers dwindled down, and from
this date until the 15th December they made no further attack in any
force. Sir Nevill Chamberlain’s wound proving more serious than was at
first expected, he asked to be relieved of the command, and on the 30th
November his place was taken by Major-General Garvock.
Meanwhile the political officers had had some success in their attempts
to detach certain clans from the coalition. Two divisions of the
Bunerwals had thus seceded; 2000 Swatis had been induced to return to
their homes; one or two influential chiefs had drawn off their
followers; while amongst the men who remained in the field a general
mistrust prevailed. The gathering, in fact, seemed to be only now held
together by the influence of the Akhund of Swat and of the Maulvi. Still
reinforcements reached the tribesmen from Kunar and Bajaur, while our
force was strengthened by the arrival of the 7th Fusiliers, the 93rd
Highlanders, the 3rd Sikhs and 23rd Punjab Native Infantry.
It was becoming increasingly evident that the Buner and Chamla tribes
were weary of the war, and were beginning to realise that we had never
harboured any idea of invading their country; and on the 10th December
they sent a deputation into our camp and agreed to accompany a force
sent to destroy the Hindustani settlement at Malka, and to expel the
Hindustanis from their country. On the 14th, however, they found
themselves obliged to admit that they had promised more than they could
perform; that their proposals had been over-ruled; and they advised us
that an attack would be made on the camp on the 16th, and promised that,
in the event of our taking the initiative, they, the Bunerwals, would
not actively oppose us.
[Sidenote: The Force Moves Forward]
General Garvock accordingly determined to attack the village of Lalu,
where there was a force of about 4000 of the enemy, and for this purpose
he moved out on the 15th with some 4800 men, unencumbered by tents or
baggage, formed into two columns. The first column assembled at the base
of “the Crag” picquet and drove the enemy before it to the “Conical”
hill. The second column now emerged from the camp, and deploying in
prolongation of the line formed by the other column, both prepared to
assault the “Conical” hill—a most formidable position, extraordinarily
precipitous, rocky, and scarped by nature. Covered by the mountain guns,
both columns descended the hill, crossed the valley, drove the enemy
from the heights, and captured the position. Colonel Wilde secured the
line of hills overlooking the Chamla Valley, while the rest of the
force, pushing on after the enemy, captured the villages of Banda and
Lalu. The enemy made a vigorous assault upon Colonel Wilde’s position,
but were driven off with great slaughter, and a desultory attack was
also made upon the front and left of the camp, now held by some 3000 men
under Colonel Vaughan. That night the first column occupied the ground
it had gained about Lalu; Colonel Wilde that between the camp and
“Conical” hill. Not a shot was fired that night. Early next morning the
cavalry—some 400 sabres under Lieutenant-Colonel Probyn—were brought
from camp, and the advance of the two columns was resumed, Colonel Wilde
leading. Advancing across the valley towards the Buner Pass, as the
column debouched into the open country the enemy appeared in great force
on the hills covering the approach to Ambela—a well-chosen position, of
great strength, and peculiarly capable of defence; but fearing that
their left would be turned by the cavalry and the other column, the
tribesmen abandoned the position and retreated slowly towards the pass
leading to Buner. The force pressed on, captured and burnt the village
of Ambela, and the first column endeavoured to cut off the enemy’s
retreat from the pass towards which they were retiring. Here the
tribesmen stood, and made a furious onset on the left of the line,
entangled in broken and wooded ground. But the attackers were destroyed
almost to a man, and the force pushed forward into the pass, driving the
enemy before it. It was now getting late, there was no wish to invade
Buner, and the enemy further was in great strength. General Garvock
therefore withdrew his troops, and bivouacked that night in the vicinity
of Ambela. During these two days the tribesmen present in the field were
estimated at 15,000, chiefly Hindustanis, Bajauris, and men from Dir and
Swat—none of the Bunerwals had taken any prominent part in the fighting.
That night the men of Bajaur and Dir fled to their homes, and the Swatis
alone remained in the field; on the morning of the 17th the Buner jirgah
came once more into camp, actually _asking for orders_. It was wisely
decided to require the Bunerwals themselves to destroy Malka without any
aid from our troops, and to this the Buner jirgah unanimously consented.
Accordingly, on the 19th, a party of six British officers, escorted by
the Guides and accompanied by part of the Buner jirgah, left Ambela, and
marched through Chamla and Amazai territory—by Kuria and Nagrai—to
Malka, which was reached on the 21st. On the following day the
settlement was burnt to the ground by the Bunerwals and Amazais, and the
party rejoined the force on the 23rd in the Ambela Pass. During these
four days matters once or twice looked uncertain, and indeed
threatening, but throughout the Bunerwals maintained their reputation
for keeping their engagements, while the sight of so powerful a clan
carrying out our orders upon their own allies, afforded a salutary
lesson to the surrounding tribesmen.
[Sidenote: End of Ambela Expedition]
General Garvock’s force now began to withdraw to the plains, and the
whole had reached Nawa Kala by Christmas Day. Our casualties during the
whole of these operations had been 238 killed and 670 wounded, while the
estimated total loss of the enemy was 3000.
During the next few years the behaviour of the Bunerwals may, in
comparison with that of many other frontier tribes, be described as
“good.” Raids were committed upon our border villages in 1868 and 1877,
and in 1878 and 1879 there was a certain amount of unrest in Buner, due
to the inflammatory preachings of certain mullahs. In 1884 renewed
outrages had to be punished by a blockade of the Salarzai Bunerwals; and
in 1887 a small column composed of cavalry and infantry was sent to
destroy the village of Surai Malandri in punishment for the incursions
of raiding parties across the Malandri Pass, but at the end of the year,
the Bunerwals submitting, the long-continued blockade was removed.
During the Black Mountain expedition of 1888 the Bunerwals evinced a
disposition to take part against us, but refrained from doing so; while
in 1895 they sent a contingent to help hold the passes against General
Low’s force, but arriving too late for the Malakand fighting, this party
returned home again. In 1897, however, the Bunerwals were well to the
fore in much of the fighting at the Malakand and in Upper Swat, but when
called to account at the end of 1897 they merely sent defiant answers to
the ultimatum of the political officers, and it therefore became
necessary to despatch an expedition into their country.
_Expedition against the Bunerwals and Chamlawals, January 1898._—The
Buner Field Force was placed under the command of Major-General Sir
Bindon Blood, and the greater part of it concentrated at Sanghao: it was
composed as under:
FIRST BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G.
1st Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment.
16th Bengal Infantry.[51]
20th Punjab Infantry.
31st Punjab Infantry.
SECOND BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General Jeffreys, C.B.
1st Battalion The Buffs.
21st Punjab Infantry.[52]
Guides Infantry.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.
10th Field Battery R.A.
No. 7 Mountain Battery R.A.
No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery R.A.[53]
1 Squadron 10th Bengal Lancers.[54]
Guides Cavalry.
2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry.
6 Companies 3rd Bombay Light Infantry.[55]
No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
No. 5 Company Madras Sappers and Miners.
[Sidenote: Buner Expedition of 1898]
Sir Bindon Blood, with the bulk of his troops at Sanghao, intended to
force the Tanga Pass, about a mile to the northward, while a small
column composed of the 31st Punjab Infantry, the Guides Infantry and a
section of No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners, was to capture the
Pirsai Pass, when the cavalry, moving from Rustam, was to cross over the
Pirsai Pass and cut the enemy’s line of retreat from the Tanga. This
last-named pass was known to be held by about a thousand of the enemy,
as were the Ambela and Malandri, but only forty or fifty men had
collected for the defence of the Pirsai. The 2nd Brigade advanced on the
morning of the 7th January and found the position defended by at least
2000 men, and from a parallel ridge facing the pass the Buffs and
mountain guns opened fire at 1500 yards, under cover of which the rest
of the troops pushed forward through the ravine, while the 20th Punjab
Infantry had ascended a steep spur to the east, leading to a high peak
overlooking the position. When the 20th were seen to be approaching
their objective, the frontal attack commenced. The enemy, however,
demoralised by the heavy gun and rifle fire, made no real stand, and,
pressed by the 20th on their right, early began to abandon their
position, and finally fled down the valley towards Kingargali and the
hills beyond. Three battalions of the 1st Brigade pushed on to
Kingargali, which was found deserted. Meanwhile the cavalry and infantry
from Rustam and Pirsai had captured the Pirsai Pass without meeting with
but slight resistance, and the cavalry pushed on up the narrow valley as
far as Kuhai, returning to Chorbanda, two miles north of the pass, where
the night was spent. On the 10th this column joined the 1st Brigade at
Bampokha.
Two divisions of Bunerwals now at once came in and tendered their
submission, but it was decided to visit the territory of every division,
and General Meiklejohn’s column accordingly marched to Jawar Bai,
Hildai, Rega, where the house of the Mad Fakir (of whom more will be
heard later) was destroyed, and Barkeli. The 2nd Brigade, which had
returned to Sanghao after the capture of the Tanga Pass, entered Buner
by the Ambela Pass and occupied Koga and Nawagai, the cavalry
reconnoitring the Chamla Valley. These measures led to the prompt and
complete submission of all divisions of the Bunerwals and of the men of
Chamla, and the force was withdrawn by the Ambela Pass, and reached
Mardan on the 20th January.
[Sidenote: Operations against the Gaduns]
During the Ambela expedition of 1863 the behaviour of the Gadun tribe
had not been uniformly satisfactory, and consequently on the break up of
the force Colonel Wilde took a strong brigade into their country,
visited Meni, and also Khabal in the territory of the Utmanzais, whose
conduct had been of an equally hostile character. No opposition was
experienced, but it was decided to require the two tribes to perform a
similar service to that demanded of the Bunerwals, viz. to destroy a
Hindustani fort and settlement called Mandi adjacent to Sitana. This was
carried out and the force was then broken up; the effect of these
measures was immediately apparent, for within the next few weeks the
Mada Khels, the Amazais and the remaining sections of the Hassanzais all
sent deputations to our political officers and made their submission.
For some years, however, the Gaduns continued to give trouble,
committing outrages of all kinds and raiding on the border. They were
blockaded, coerced and fined, but continued to be troublesome; in 1897,
too, they were implicated in the attacks on the Malakand and Chakdara
posts, but in the end of that year they finally made submission and paid
up the fines demanded of them.
This chapter commenced with some account of our dealings with the
Hindustani fanatics, and may fittingly end with a few final words about
them. Expelled in 1864 from Malka, they retreated into the Chagarzai
country north of the Barandu River, but were not very comfortable there,
their hosts frequently threatening them with expulsion. In 1868 they
appear to have moved from their settlements in the Chagarzai territory
to Bajkatta in Buner, and here in April they were joined by Feroz Shah,
the son of the last king of Delhi. The presence of the Hindustanis in
Buner was abhorrent to the Akhund, who induced his co-religionists to
decide to expel them. In consequence of this resolve, the fanatics, now
some 700 strong, hurriedly retreated to Malka, where they commenced
re-building their houses. Some of them eventually got permission to
return to Buner, but, intriguing against the Akhund, the order of
expulsion was again put in force, and they were hunted out of the
country, suffering heavy losses, and took refuge, first with the
Chagarzais, then at Palosi—moving again to Thakot, and eventually back
again to the country of the Hassanzais who rented them some land at
Maidan near Palosi, where they remained until 1888. After their dramatic
appearance at Kotkai in the Black Mountain operations of 1888, they
resought an asylum among the Chagarzais, but are now, to the number of
700, living among the Amazais, neither occupying themselves greatly with
local feuds nor being seriously implicated in other disturbances. But of
late years there have not been wanting signs—faint, perhaps, but
discernible—of a slight revival of their former activity.
CHAPTER V.
AKOZAIS. (SWAT.)[56]
The district of Swat proper—as distinct from the tracts of country south
of the Malakand and Morah Mountains, and inhabited by the same
clans—comprises the valley of the Swat River, from its junction with the
Panjkora northwards to the village of Ain, above which the country is
known as Swat Kohistan. From Ain to the Landakai spur, five miles above
Chakdara, the valley is called Bar, or Upper Swat, while Kuz, or Lower
Swat, is the name given to the portion from Landakai downwards to the
village of Kalangai. The valley is about seventy miles long and some
twelve miles wide from crest to crest of its watersheds. The river, fed
by glaciers and snow, begins to rise in the middle of April, and rapidly
becomes unfordable, falling again in the middle of September, and being
passable almost anywhere by midwinter. The climate is much the same as
that of Buner, and the valley is unhealthy and malarious in summer.
Of the country of Swat, Oliver, in _Across the Border_, writes: “Its
hill tops are clothed with rich forests, giving place to a variety of
excellent fruit trees in its well-watered valleys. Its climate is
temperate even in summer, and its capabilities great. Many parts of it
are known to be rich in ancient remains; the frequent ruins in Swat and
Bajaur indicate the former presence of Greek, Buddhist and Hindu, and
innumerable inscribed tablets in Greek and Pali—probably becoming fewer
and less valuable every year—only await scientific investigation to
throw much light on the ancient history of this part of the world....
The river from which the district takes its name, probably the Suastos
of Arrian, debouches on British territory near the fort of Abazai,
whence, up to its junction with the Panjkora—the ancient Gauraios—it is
a swift, deep torrent, rushing between precipitous banks; the
surrounding hills impracticable for any except foot passengers, and not
easy for them, being in the hands of the Utman Khels.... The whole
valley is highly cultivated and densely populated, each glen or gorge
has its village or hamlet, and the total population has been estimated
at not far short of 100,000 souls. The fields are in terraces one above
another, extensively irrigated by channels diverted from the river or
the torrents flowing into it. The course of the river itself, working
from side to side of the valley, is marked by more numerous villages,
groves of trees, and almost unbroken cultivation. The very
burying-grounds, usually especially sacred to Pathans, are regularly
ploughed up, and the dead buried in the fallow lands; hardly a single
yard of tillable ground is neglected. Wheat and most grains, sugar-cane,
lucerne, tobacco, and vegetables are extensively grown, and Upper Swat
yields excellent fruits. In the hot weather, when a great portion of the
valley can be irrigated, the lands everywhere near the river are a sheet
of luxuriant rice, the steamy exhalations from which no doubt contribute
largely to the unhealthiness of the valley. Picturesque it is in the
extreme; the upper slopes of the mountains are well clothed with forests
of pine and deodar; below lies a beautiful velvet-like turf, and again
stretches of cultivation, dotted with houses—wretched hovels enough, but
artistically half-hidden among rich clusters of plane or poplar; and
bright clear streams everywhere rushing down to the brisk noisy Swat,
dashing over its boulder-strewn bed, like a Scotch salmon river. All the
same, the notorious insalubrity of the valley is a very serious drawback
to all this beauty.... The men especially are weak, thin and feeble,
hardly resembling Pathans in form or feature, and more like the Gujars
of the Lower Punjab. The women, on the other hand, seem curiously much
less affected, for they are described as stout and buxom, and though by
no means good-looking, retain far more of the Pathan appearance. They
have, moreover, entirely reversed the position of the sexes prevailing
in ordinary Pathan communities. Not only do they go unveiled, and enjoy
more liberty, but rule the men to a greater extent than is known among
Pathans elsewhere. The men of the Swat Valley, are, in fact, credited
with living to a great extent under petticoat government.”
[Sidenote: The Swat Valley]
In character the people appear to differ but little from other Pathans.
They possess all the vices common to that race, and are not behind them
in pride, cupidity, revengefulness or treachery. In the last-named vice,
indeed, they may indisputably be given the first place among Pathan
tribes. At one time their courage was not held in very high esteem, but
the fighting in 1895 and 1897 seems to prove that in this respect they
have been by us and others curiously misjudged. Beyond a few
individuals, however, none of the Swat tribes are represented in the
Indian regular army, although some 400 are serving in the Dir and Swat
levies; this service is popular with them, as it is close to their
homes, and as they are generally prosperous, they prefer not to wander
far afield in search of military service.
The Swat Valley, and those to the west and south-west of it, form
classic ground, for it was through them that Alexander himself marched
on his way to the invasion of India. It was in the winter of 327 B.C.
that he left the city he had founded to the north of Kabul, and
somewhere west of Jagdallak he divided his force into two parts.
Hephæstion, with the heavy troops forming the main body, followed the
direct route through the Khyber, marching on an ancient city, the
capital of Gandhara, and to the north-east of Peshawar. Alexander, with
the light troops, entered the Kunar Valley and crossed the Kunar
watershed by the Spinasuka Pass, which leads direct from Pashat, the
present capital of Kunar, into Bajaur, and there found himself close to
Nawagai, the present chief town of Bajaur. Thence he passed over the
Gauraios or Panjkora River some few miles below its junction with the
Swat, and so came to the siege and capture of Massaga, identified as
Matkanai, near the Malakand Pass, by which Alexander must have crossed
from the Swat Valley to the plain country bordering the Indus.
The language spoken in Swat is Pushtu, except in Swat Kohistan, where
Torwali and Garhwi are used.
The best road into Swat from the south is over the Malakand Pass; the
Shakot, further to the east, is shorter, but the ascent is steeper,
while the Morah Pass entrance is still more difficult.
[Sidenote: The Government of Swat]
The Government of Swat, like that of all Pathan tribes, is an almost
complete democracy. The country is split up into nearly as many factions
as there are villages. Each sub-division of each division of each clan
has its separate quarrels, and supports its own chief, who is generally
at mortal feud with either his own relations or his neighbours, and who
is seldom obeyed one instant longer than is convenient; so that nothing
short of pressing danger to the whole community from without could ever
bring together all the divisions into which Swat is separated. But that
which could not be effected by ordinary means has, in a measure, been
brought about by the influence of one individual, working on the
religious feelings of a mass of grossly ignorant and proportionately
bigoted people, such as are the inhabitants of Swat; this man was the
late Akhund of Swat. The Akhund exerted such a powerful influence, as
already seen in the Ambela campaign, not only over the district of Swat,
but over the whole of the Yusafzai border, that an account of him
somewhat in detail may not be out of place.
Abdul Ghafur, as was his original name, was born of poor and obscure
parents, probably Gujars, at the village of Jabrai, in Upper Swat, and
passed his early boyhood tending sheep and cattle. He was even then
distinguished for his religious proclivities, and at the age of eighteen
he decided to adopt the life of an ascetic, and proceeded to Barangola
to learn to read and write, and master the rudiments of his religion.
Thence, after a time, he set out as an “inquirer after wisdom,” and at
first took up his abode in or near a mosque about three miles from
Mardan; but moving on again after a stay of a few months, he became, at
Tordhair, the disciple of a fakir who enjoyed in those parts a
reputation for peculiar sanctity. Here the Akhund resolved to exchange
the mosque for the hermitage, and became a recluse.
About the year 1816 he accordingly settled down, as a young man of
barely twenty, to a life of the greatest austerity, at a lonely spot on
the banks of the Indus, below the village of Beka, ten miles above
Attock, where for twelve years he followed the _Nakshbandia_ form of
religious devotion—sitting silent and motionless, his head bowed on his
chest, and his eyes fixed on the ground. His food was an inferior kind
of millet moistened with water, and throughout his life—he died at the
age of eightythree—his diet was equally simple, milk being, however,
subsequently substituted for water. His fame as a saint dates from his
sojourn at Beka, and even to this day, in the most distant parts of
Persia, he is still remembered as “the Hermit of Beka.”
[Sidenote: A Militant Priest]
In an evil moment he unwisely allowed himself to be drawn into a quarrel
between the Khan of Hund and Saiyid Ahmad of Bareilly, and found himself
obliged to abandon his retreat at Beka, and wander forth unknown and of
no account; but after some years he settled down in a ziarat at
Ghulaman, in British Yusafzai, and recovering his old reputation for
sanctity and piety, his advice and prayers were again in great request.
Thence in time he removed to the village of Salim Khan, in the
south-east of British Yusafzai and on the border of the Khudu Khels,
and, being generally regarded as a saint, was given the title of Akhund
by the learned Moslem doctors of the day.
On two occasions was the Akhund beguiled—possibly from some dread of
loss of ascendancy among his co-religionists should he refuse—into
taking up arms for “the Faith.” In the year 1835, Dost Muhammad Khan,
Amir of Kabul, invited him to join his force near Peshawar, with as
large a body of his disciples as he could persuade to accompany him, and
attack the camp of the Sikhs. This the Akhund did, and he and his
following had some trifling success against the soldiers of the Khalsa.
But the arrival of Ranjit Singh to command the Sikh armies in person was
enough to send the Amir flying precipitately through the Khyber, and to
scatter the Akhund’s fanatical rabble in all directions. The Akhund
himself made for Buner with a few followers, who quickly deserted him,
and then, returning to his ascetic and secluded life, he settled for a
time in Ranizai territory. From here he moved a few years later to the
village of Saidu Mandz, in the Baizai district of Swat, where he lived
surrounded by numerous disciples and visited by crowds of devotees. The
Akhund gained such an ascendancy over the minds of his co-religionists
that they believed all kinds of stories about him; that he was supplied
by supernatural means with the necessities of life, and that every
morning a sum of money, sufficient for his own needs and for the
entertainment of the pilgrims who flocked to consult him, was found
under his praying carpet. But most wonderful of all—he was never known
to accept any present offered to him.
“His ascendancy over the Muhammadans of the Border and Eastern
Afghanistan,” says Oliver, “was as great as that of Loyola in Rome or
Luther in Saxony; his edicts regarding religious customs and secular
observances were as unquestioned as the Papal Bulls in Spain. When the
chiefs of Swat recognised the possibility of British military operations
extending to their valley and the necessity for federation, it was to
the Akhund they turned to select them a king. His selection was a Saiyid
of Sitana, who for some years carried on an organised government under
the patronage of the Border Pope. Putting aside the incredulous stories
about him as priest, his life seems to have been one of devotion,
humility, abstinence and chastity; the doctrines he taught were as
tolerant and liberal as those of his Wahabi opponents were intolerant
and puritanical. Judged by the standard applied to other religious
leaders, he used his influence, according to his lights, for good,
supporting peace and morality, discouraging feuds, restraining the
people from raiding and offences against their neighbours, and enforcing
the precepts of Muhammadan law as far as ineradicable Pathan custom
would permit him.”
[Sidenote: His Ascendancy]
For many years after settling at Saidu Mandz, he held himself aloof from
secular affairs, preached peace towards all men, and counselled the
tribesmen to cultivate friendly relations with the British Government.
In 1847 he did his best to prevent the Swatis from assisting the
Baizais, whom we were engaged in punishing. When the mutineers of the
55th Native Infantry, flying from Mardan before Nicholson, crossed the
boundary into Swat, he caused them to be deported beyond the Indus; and
he supported our government so far as lay in his power during the
anxious days of the Mutiny. He had always opposed the colonies of
Hindustani fanatics, so that his conduct in 1863, when during the Ambela
expedition he sided with them, seems difficult to explain. Colonel
Reynell Taylor believed, and his belief was shared by those at the time
best able to judge, that the Akhund had taken the line he did in fear
that if he did not show sympathy with Buner on this occasion, his
influence might pass to some more compliant leader. The pressure brought
to bear on him was practically irresistible; the adjurations of the
Buner chiefs and people had been most passionate, all the mullahs of the
country, with many of the women, having been deputed to beseech him to
adopt their cause.
The expedition having come to an end, he went back to his former life,
and never again took the field. He was then already seventy years of
age, and thenceforth until his death in January, 1877, he did his best
to hold in check the wild spirits of the border.
During his residence in Saidu Mandz the Akhund married a woman of a
neighbouring village; she bore him two sons and a daughter. The elder of
the sons was Abdul Manan, alias Mian Gul, who, after the death of the
Akhund, became involved in a struggle for supremacy in Swat with the
Khan of Dir, and in 1883, aided by the chief of Bajaur and the name of
his father, he established himself for a brief period before his death.
The younger son, Abdul Khalik, was, as his father before him, an ascetic
and a hermit, but he had no influence whatever, and was unknown beyond
the boundaries of his own valley.
“No Border Pontiff has yet arisen,” writes the author of _Across the
Border_, “who can successfully fill the chair of his eminence Abdul
Ghafur, the Akhund of Swat.”
The Akozais, the inhabitants of Swat, are separated into five divisions:
1. Baizai.
2. Ranizai.
3. Khadakzai.
4. Abazai.
5. Khwazozai.
[Sidenote: Divisions of the Akozais]
The Baizais inhabit the country on the left bank of the Swat River from
the borders of Kohistan as far as and including Thana; the division
contains three sub-divisions, and of these certain sections live beyond
the limits of the Swat Valley, in the Ghurban, Kana, Puran and Chakesar
Valleys, the drainage of which finds its way into the Indus. In addition
to the Baizai there are also the Sam, or lowland, Baizai, who occupy the
land from our border to the foot of the hills below the Morah Pass. The
villages in this territory formerly belonged to the Baizai maliks, and
were occupied by their tenants and servants, but have now become
independent.
The Ranizais occupy the left bank of the Swat River from the district of
the most southerly sub-division of the Baizais at Thana to the Utman
Khel boundary, which is about three miles above the junction of the Swat
with the Panjkora. To the north their territory extends to the river,
and includes the islands between the different channels, while the
southern boundary is formed by the watershed of the hills on that side.
The importance of the division lies mainly in their possession of the
Malakand and Shakot Passes; the Digar Pass, which is further to the
west, also leads into the Ranizai country, but the pass itself is partly
in the hands of the Utman Khels.
Formerly the whole of the country from the hills to the British border,
now held by the Sam Ranizais, belonged to the Ranizai division, as the
people known as Sam Ranizais, and who are now independent, were
originally servants and tenants of the Ranizais.
The Ranizais contain five sub-divisions, and their principal village is
Aladand, at the mouth of the Shakot Pass.
The Khadakzais are on the right bank of the Swat River, extending from
Abazai territory to the country of the Dusha Khel; the principal village
is Barangola.
The Abazais inhabit a small valley on the right bank of the Swat River
immediately below the Adinzai sub-division of the Khwazozais. Both the
Abazais and the Khadakzais are insignificant divisions of the Akozai
tribe, numbering between them no more than 750 fighting men, and within
recent years these divisions and the Adinzai sub-division of the
Khwazozai, which is stronger than the two combined, have been handed
over to the Khan of Dir. The importance of the Adinzai sub-division
consists in their possession of the village of Chakdara, where the river
is bridged, and which is on the main route from India to Bajaur and
Chitral. The Swat River runs here in six channels, covering about
three-quarters of a mile of ground; the village is on a bank 60 feet
high, and some 600 yards from the nearest branch of the river. An iron
girder bridge crosses the river three-quarters of a mile below the
village, and there is a fort on the right bank.
The Khwazozais are, next to the Baizais, the strongest division of the
Swat clan; they are separated into five sub-divisions, and occupy the
valley on the right bank of the river from Kohistan to Chakdara.
Besides the above five divisions of the Akozai clan, mention must be
made of some others who inhabit territory adjacent to the country of
Swat. The Dusha Khels are Yusafzais, whose territory lies south of the
Talash Valley and east of the Panjkora, running down in a narrow wedge
between that river and the Khadakzai country to the banks of the Swat
River. Their country is very mountainous, they themselves are very
independent in character, and bear a reputation for thieving. They have
been handed over to the Khan of Dir.
North of Swat proper, in Swat Kohistan, live the _Torwals_ and the
_Garhwis_, and in the Panjkora Kohistan are the _Bashkaris_. Little is
known of these tribes, but they are not Pathans, and are probably the
descendants of the races occupying Dir and Swat prior to the arrival
upon the scene of the Pathans. The _Roganis_, _Katnis_ and _Gurohs_, who
are supposed to be of Kafir descent, are also located in Dir.
OPERATIONS.
Up to the year 1895 the only Akozais of Swat with whom the British had
had any dealings were the Baizais and Ranizais, who inhabited the
country south of the Morah Mountain.
[Sidenote: Operations in 1847]
_Operations against the Baizais, 1847._—The first time we came in
contact with these people was in October 1847, when Major George
Lawrence, then holding the Peshawar Valley for the Sikhs, was fired on
by the men of the Baizai village of Babuzai, and, obtaining no
satisfaction for the outrage, he determined to attack the village. This
was awkwardly placed; a direct attack was inadvisable, for Babuzai was
situated at the further extremity of a _cul-de-sac_, 500 yards long and
300 yards broad, formed by two short, steep and rugged spurs from the
lofty ridge of hills dividing Lundkhwar from Sudum. Only the year
previously the village had repulsed a superior force under the Sikh
Sirdar, Sher Singh. The force under Major Lawrence was composed of a
brigade of all arms belonging to the Sikh Durbar, aided by the
newly-raised Corps of Guides. It was discovered that the heights above
the village could be gained, and Major Lawrence accordingly sent some
levies of the Sudum chief, with thirty bayonets of the Guides, to ascend
the heights by night and co-operate at daybreak with the main frontal
attack. Early on the 11th Major Lawrence advanced, but one of his
columns was at first driven back; the rear attack being now seen
descending on the village, a general assault was ordered, and Babuzai
was carried and burnt. It being ascertained that men from Palai, in Sam
Baizai, had assisted in the defence of Babuzai, Major Lawrence moved
thither on the 14th, inflicted some loss on the enemy, destroyed the
village and retired.
Our casualties had been only one killed and thirteen wounded, and the
moral effect of these operations was such that a few days after ten
villages made their submission, several of which had never before
tendered allegiance either to the Durani or to the Sikh rulers.
Two years after these events the Peshawar Valley was annexed, and then
and thereafter the Swatis proved themselves bad neighbours. Plunderers
and marauders, mounted and on foot, issued from Swat, passed through
Ranizai, and raided into our territory. They kidnapped almost all
classes except Pathans; and Swat became an Alsatia where evilly-disposed
persons, criminals of all shades, and people hostile to the British
Government were readily granted help, asylum and countenance.
In October 1849 it was reported that the whole of the Utman Khel
villages of Sam Baizai had refused to pay revenue or to receive the
native revenue collector, and that the people were all preparing for
war. The Deputy-Commissioner of Peshawar urged that a military force
should be sent into the country, pointing out that, whereas the Sikhs
collected their annual revenue under the cover of a considerable
military force, none of our troops had ever been seen near this part of
our border, and the hill tribes therefore imagined we had either no
force to employ, or were afraid to entangle it in those fastnesses.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1849]
_Expedition against the Sam Baizais, 1849._—An expedition was sanctioned
and a force as below detailed, and, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel
Bradshaw, C.B., 60th Rifles, left Peshawar on the 3rd December, 1849:
2nd Troop, 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery.
200 bayonets, 60th Rifles.
300 bayonets, 61st Foot.
13th Irregular Cavalry.[57]
A Company Bombay Sappers and Miners.
3rd Bombay Native Infantry,
strengthened later by the Corps of Guides and 100 bayonets, 1st Punjab
Infantry.
On the 11th December Colonel Bradshaw moved with his whole force against
the village of Sanghao. This was situated in a very strong position,
but, attacked in front and on both flanks, it was soon carried, the
enemy effecting their retirement by a path up the height in rear of the
village, which had not been noticed. The enemy were here very numerous,
having been largely reinforced from Buner. Their loss was considerable;
our casualties amounted to four killed and eighteen wounded.
On the 13th December the force marched to a position at the mouth of the
Bazdara Valley, near the villages of Palai, and of Zormandai and Sher
Khana in Sam Baizai. The enemy were here in great force; 5000 of them
occupied a hill to the right of and commanding Palai, while hills to the
right and rear of the other villages were held by large bodies. They
were also in strength in the valley in front of Palai, their right and
left resting on the hills which enclosed it. The hill to the right of
Palai was first stormed and captured, when the left was also turned, and
the force swept up the valley, carrying and destroying the villages and
driving off the enemy. Colonel Bradshaw then withdrew unmolested from
the valley. Our losses were three killed and twenty-two wounded. The
enemy had been in great strength—the local fighting men having been
assisted by people from Swat proper numbering 5000 to 6000—and it was
afterwards known that reinforcements of 15,000 were hastening to the
scene when news of the defeat reaching them caused them to turn back.
[Sidenote: Trouble and Outrage]
This expedition did not have the effect of causing outrage and trouble
to cease; raids continued by the tribesmen either upon one another or
upon our subjects; in 1855 and 1857 disputes were constant, while during
the Ambela expedition the inhabitants of British Baizai flocked in
numbers to assist the Bunerwals, and gave a good deal of trouble by
cutting up stragglers between the British position and the rear. The
suggestion that a punitive force should be sent against them was made,
but was negatived. After the close of the campaign, however, the tribal
maliks were sent for and a fine of Rs. 2500 was imposed upon them.
The effect of this measure was, temporarily at any rate, to check
outrage in our territory, while it seems to have led to disagreement,
feud and fighting among the tribesmen themselves. Serious fights took
place between the men of different villages, the aid of villages within
and without our border was invited and accorded, and a regular warfare,
disturbing the whole of that portion of the frontier, went on for some
time. Heavy fines inflicted in 1865 did something to remedy the
disturbed state of affairs, but in the following year quarrels broke out
afresh, and it became evident that this lawlessness must be suppressed
lest other districts should be affected. It was therefore determined to
move out a force, the object of whose employment was merely to destroy
certain refractory and aggressive villages, but which at the same time
had to be strong enough to resist any combination of tribes which might
be brought against it. On the 15th January, 1866, then, a force of 4000
men with twelve guns was assembled at Nowshera, under the command of
Brigadier-General Dunsford, C.B., and moved out to Mardan. Here it was
found that the approach of a punitive force had of itself been
sufficient to cause some of the villages to come to terms; the troops
then marched on, destroyed the villages of Sanghao, Mian Khan and
Barmul, and the inhabitants of these were forced to rebuild upon other
and less inaccessible sites. After this there was an occasional
recrudescence of trouble, but finally the people of Baizai, realising
how easily they could be reached and punished, made overtures to the
Assistant-Commissioner of Yusafzai, concluded satisfactory arrangements
for the settlement of all outstanding claims, and for some years they
gave us small cause of complaint.
Colonel Bradshaw’s operations in 1849 against the Sam Baizais had opened
the eyes of the Swat chiefs to the possibility of their own valley being
one day visited by us, and they became alarmed. It was agreed to combine
for defensive purposes under some one responsible chief, and to nominate
a king of Swat. There were naturally many claimants for the appointment,
and the selection seemed likely to lead to so serious a broil as
actually to defeat the union which it was proposed to establish. Finally
the Akhund of Swat suggested the election of Saiyid Akbar of Sitana, a
former follower and functionary of the famous Hindustani fanatic, Saiyid
Ahmad of Bareilly, and he was accordingly installed. He appears to have
marked his accession by the creation of a standing army, and eventually
managed to collect a force of 800 mounted men, 3000 footmen and five or
six guns. Towards the end of 1861 the Swatis began to move large bodies
of armed men to the foot of the Morah Mountain and into Sam Ranizai for
the purpose of creating disaffection on our border; and on the 6th
March, 1862, a party of 180 horsemen, under Mukaram Khan, formerly of
the Peshawar police, made a sudden attack by night upon thirty sabres of
the Guides cavalry escorting a Survey Party, and who were stationed at
the British village of Gujar Garhi. The Guides, under Ressaldar Fateh
Khan, repelled the attack with great gallantry, inflicting a loss at
least equal to that they themselves experienced.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1852]
_Expedition against the Ranizais, 1852._—It being evident that this
party had passed through and had probably been harboured in the Sam
Ranizai territory, it was determined to punish them as a tribe. A force
was accordingly got together under the command of Brigadier Sir Colin
Campbell, K.C.B., and marched on the 11th March, 1852, from Peshawar
towards Tangi. It was composed as follows:
1st Troop 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery.
600 bayonets, 32nd Foot.
15th Irregular Cavalry.[58]
Wing, 29th Native Infantry.[59]
66th Gurkha Regiment.[60]
The force had reached Turangzai when, on the 14th, the Sam Ranizais sent
in offering to submit to any terms imposed, but this was evidently no
more than a _ruse_ to gain time, for the maliks shortly after declared
they would oppose us and were expecting assistance from Swat. The delay,
however, had also favoured the British, since it enabled two heavy
howitzers with elephant draught to join Sir Colin from Peshawar. The
force now marched on, and arrived on the 21st at our frontier village of
Sherghar, about eight miles from Shakot.
The maliks now and again on the 22nd, while the force was marching to
Shakot, made offers of submission; they were told that the advance would
continue into the Ranizai valley, but that if all our terms were
accepted no damage would be done to either villages or crops.
Eventually, after much shilly-shallying, the Ranizai maliks tendered
full submission, and conducted the force as far as Dargai, close to the
foot of the Malakand Pass. The general encamped that night at Sherghar,
returning Peshawarwards on the 23rd.
In the following month some Ranizais were implicated in an attack by the
Utman Khels on the village of Charsada, in Hastnagar,[61] and while the
fine imposed upon the tribe in March had not yet been liquidated, they
now refused payment and repudiated the hostages who had been taken for
its settlement. Further coercion now, therefore, became necessary, and
on the 15th May, a force, as detailed below and numbering 3270 of all
arms, was assembled at Sherghar under Sir Colin Campbell:
Six guns, 1st Troop 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery.
Two guns, No. 19 Light Field Battery.
32nd Foot.
2nd Irregular Cavalry.[62]
Guides Cavalry.
1st Punjab Cavalry.[63]
2nd Company Sappers and Miners.
28th Native Infantry.[64]
66th Gurkha Regiment.
1st Punjab Infantry.
From reports received it was evident that considerable numbers were
flocking from Swat and other parts to Shakot to defend the Ranizai
Valley, and that many ghazis had come over the passes to fight against
us.
[Sidenote: Action at Shakot]
On the 18th the force moved on to Shakot, situated between a very deep
and narrow nullah on the east and some hills on the west, and here it
was seen that the enemy were in strength, holding a position about a
mile and a half long on the edge of the nullah. The Horse Artillery guns
shelled the centre of the position with great accuracy, but the enemy
stood firmly, availing themselves of the broken ground for cover. The
Guides and Gurkhas now stormed the nullah, covered by the guns and
supported by the 1st Punjab Infantry and the Light Company of the 32nd.
A heavy fire and stern resistance were encountered, the tribesmen
charging into the midst of the Gurkhas and fighting hand-to-hand. The
guns were advanced closer, and the enemy at last broke, some ascending
the hills in rear of Shakot and others making for the Malakand Pass. In
their retreat the enemy lost heavily, both from the fire of the guns and
the sabres of the cavalry. Our casualties only amounted to eleven killed
and twenty-nine wounded.
In addition to the armed villagers, about 4000 infantry and 500 mounted
men, all from Swat, had opposed us, while the King and the Akhund had
watched the fight from the crest of the Malakand Pass.
Shakot and Dargai were now completely destroyed, and the troops returned
to Sherghar on the following day. On the 20th the whole of the Ranizai
Valley was traversed, and eight villages and much grain were destroyed,
no opposition being met with. On the 22nd a strong force of all arms
visited and burnt the village of Hiro Shah, nine miles distant, being
followed, on retirement, by a matchlock fire until quite clear of the
hills and ravines, but no casualties were sustained. The force then
marched back through Lundkhwar to Gujar Garhi, where it was broken up,
and before the end of the next month the Ranizais had tendered
unconditional submission.
[Sidenote: Heirs of the Akhund]
It was very evident that Swat was the fountainhead of all this
offending, and there were at this time some thoughts of despatching an
expedition thither via the Malakand Pass. The idea was, however,
eventually abandoned, and the necessity for an expedition did not again
arise, for the Swatis seemed to realise how heavy had been the
punishment inflicted on the Ranizais, and dreaded similar operations in
their own valley. They abstained, therefore, from annoyance, and for
some time at least the Peshawar districts enjoyed immunity from
marauding, either instigated or perpetrated by men from Swat. Strangely
enough, the troubles of the Mutiny year were not taken advantage of by
the leaders in Swat. The King died on the very day that the first news
of the outbreak at Meerut reached Peshawar, and the Akhund took no
action inimical to British authority—on the contrary, as has been
already stated, he deported the mutineers of the 55th Native Infantry
who sought an asylum in Swat. In 1863, however, he adopted a different
line; but thereafter he invariably advised his people to behave as good
neighbours, to meet our just demands, and comply with our terms. When he
died he left two rival factions in his country; one was headed by
Sherdil Khan, chief of the Ranizais; the other by Abdul Manan, _alias_
Mian Gul, the eldest son of the Akhund.
With the death of the Akhund in 1877 the Ranizais again began to give
trouble on our border, and the villagers of Shakot acquired a bad name
for harbouring outlaws and disregarding the orders of our frontier
officials. This state of things could not be permitted to continue, and
on the 13th March, 1878, Colonel R. Campbell left Mardan to punish the
men of Shakot, accompanied by the Hazara Mountain Battery, 249 sabres
and 428 bayonets of the Corps of Guides, arriving unsuspected, within
two miles of Shakot, at 2 a.m. on the 14th. Two companies of infantry
were sent to seize a small detached hill commanding the village on the
north-west, and when, at daybreak, the remainder of the force advanced,
the headmen of Shakot, seeing the hopelessness of resistance, came
forward and made an unconditional surrender, no shot having been fired
on either side. All our demands were at once agreed to without demur,
thirty-three hostages were selected, and no attempt to assist Shakot was
made by any of the neighbouring villages, whose headmen now arrived to
pay their respects. The troops remained in occupation of the village
until 10 a.m., when the retirement commenced, and Mardan was reached the
same evening, the men having marched nearly fifty miles in twenty-four
hours.
In this same year the two sons of the late Akhund endeavoured to preach
a _jehad_, but the movement was an utter failure. In 1880 Sherdil Khan
died, and the chief political power in Swat passed to Rahmatulla Khan,
the chief of Dir, who remained passive when, during the Afghan War, the
Mohmand mullahs tried to stir up the tribes of Dir and Swat to attack
our communications near Jalalabad. In 1883 a desultory contest was
carried on between Mian Gul and the Khan of Dir for supremacy in Swat,
but in March 1884 these two came to terms. During the next six years,
however, the Swat Valley was greatly disturbed, and its people divided
into factions, by the ambitions of Umra Khan of Jandol, of whom more
will be said later. Abdul Manan, otherwise Mian Gul, the Akhund’s eldest
son, died in 1887, and was succeeded by his brother, Abdul Khalik, and
the political trouble was increased by the fact that Mian Gul had left
two young sons, who had also supporters. In all these questions the
Indian Government did not meddle, but since the easiest way to our
outposts in Chitral led by Swat, it was impossible to permit any other
Power to acquire an influence over these countries, and by the Durand
Mission our claims to include Swat, Dir and Bajaur within our sphere of
influence were pressed, and in some degree admitted.
[Sidenote: Appearance of Umra Khan]
In 1890 Umra Khan expelled and dispossessed the Khan of Dir, and in 1893
he attacked the Dusha Khel and drove out the Khan of Aladand, putting in
a nominee of his own. In the same year the last surviving son of the
Akhund died, and the succession, though temporarily in abeyance, was
recognised in a son, Saiyid Badshah, of the elder Mian Gul. Then, for
the next two years, there was continual internal fighting in Swat, but,
so far as the Indian Government was concerned, it appeared that while
the Khans were anxious to be loyal, the priesthood was persistently
preaching against us.
Prior to the year 1895 no British troops had ever entered the Swat
Valley, and the events which led to this forward policy, with the
operations which resulted, will be found described in Chapter VII.
The Swatis opposed us in that year on the Malakand, but quiet and
friendly feelings were soon restored, and on the withdrawal of our force
they seemed to acquiesce in the establishment of our posts on the
Malakand at the entrance to their valley, and at Chakdara where their
river was bridged. When Umra Khan fled from Swat, the Khan of Dir
returned, reassumed possession of his original territory, and became
heir to that of his immediate predecessor; but his rule was not
altogether acceptable or popular. There was a good deal of friction and
constant faction fights; the Khan interfered perhaps rather more than
was wise, and his subjects made constant appeals to the British
Political Agent at the Malakand. So far as our presence in the country
was concerned, no resentment was shown, and the annual reliefs of the
Chitral garrison were carried out in 1896 and 1897 without a shot being
fired in Swat.
Early in 1897 the Swatis, like all Pathans along the border, had been
influenced and disquieted by the preachings of the Hadda Mullah and
others in Dir and Swat, but no serious trouble was anticipated until,
about July, there appeared in Lower Swat a Buner Mullah, afterwards
known as “the Mad Fakir.” Regarded everywhere at first as an
irresponsible lunatic, his preachings soon attracted earnest attention
and large audiences, but no actual disturbance was expected to result.
_Attacks on the Malakand and Chakdara, July 1897._—Late on the 26th
July, however, disquieting rumours as to the success of the Mad Fakir’s
teaching reached the Political Agent; later still it was reported that
this pestilent priest had reached Aladand with a large gathering, and it
was arranged to send out a column to seize the Amandara Pass, about a
third of the way to Chakdara, while the Guides at Mardan were asked by
telegram to reinforce the Malakand garrison as soon as possible. Two
reports now came in from the Swat Valley close upon one another. The
first was from Chakdara, stating that the Fakir with his following had
already passed Khar village on his way to the Malakand; the second was
brought in person by a Jemadar of Levies, who announced that the Fakir
was now close at hand with a gathering of armed men swelled by every
village through which he had come.
[Sidenote: Attack on the Malakand]
The troops of the Malakand Brigade were under the command of Colonel
Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., and occupied a rather extended position. To
the south-west of the Kotal and, in a direct line some 500 yards from
it, was a fort garrisoned by 200 men of the 24th Punjab Infantry. North
of the Kotal, in a hollow known as “the Crater,” were located six
companies each of the 24th Punjab Infantry and 45th Sikhs, and No. 5
Company Madras Sappers and Miners, with the Engineer Park and
Commissariat Stores. On the high ground on either side of “the Crater”
were picquets, and to the front, closing in the camping grounds, was an
isolated conical hill, called “Gibraltar,” also held by a picquet. On
either flank of “Gibraltar” a road wound down to the valley; that to the
west led to a second camp—North Camp—situated on flat open ground within
a breastwork, while the eastern road led down to the valley, and,
passing through the Amandara defile, ran on to Chakdara and Chitral.
North Camp was held by one squadron 11th Bengal Lancers (less twenty
sabres at Chakdara), No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, and six companies,
31st Punjab Infantry; Chakdara, at the bridge-head of the Swat River
crossing, had a garrison of twenty sabres of the 11th Bengal Lancers,
and 180 men of the 45th Sikhs; while at Dargai, at the southern foot of
the Malakand Pass, were 200 rifles of the 31st Punjab Infantry.
[Sidenote: Arrival of Reinforcements]
At 10 p.m., on receipt of the news brought by the Levy Jemadar, the
“alarm” was sounded, and the troops had barely reached their posts when
the attack opened. A party of the 45th Sikhs seized the gorge, through
which the old Buddhist road descends from the Kotal, just in time to
check a rush of tribesmen; but the enemy succeeding in occupying the
high ground on either side of the gorge, the Sikhs fell back to a more
commanding position in rear, where they withstood all attacks until 2
a.m., at which hour the enemy here beat a retreat. Meanwhile large
numbers had advanced along the main road, drove in the picquets, rushed
the _serai_ held by levies, attacked the bazar, and some forced their
way into the Commissariat enclosure. They twice charged the position in
the centre of the camp held by the Sappers and Miners, and passed the
abatis enclosing it, capturing a quantity of ammunition. A reinforcement
of 100 men was sent for to the fort to reinforce the defenders of “the
Crater” Camp, who were hard pressed, but at 4.30 a.m. on the 27th the
enemy drew off. Our casualties during the night had been one officer and
twenty-two men killed, five officers (two of whom died) and thirty-one
men wounded.
The troops in the North Camp had not been seriously attacked, and were
ordered to move out in pursuit, but, having arrived near Khar village,
were recalled, as a large hostile force was seen on the hills and in the
valley beyond. The squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers, however, pushing
on, reached Chakdara with two men and some horses wounded. This day
North Camp was evacuated, and the troops concentrated in the Malakand
position; the withdrawal, which was effected before dark, was rather
harassed by the enemy. Colonel Meiklejohn had received a further welcome
reinforcement before night in the arrival of the Guides from Mardan, the
magnificent infantry of this corps covering the thirty-two miles in
seventeen and a half hours. The reinforcement numbered 160 sabres and
300 rifles, of which latter fifty had remained at Dargai to strengthen
that post.
Again on this night was an attack made, commencing at 8.30 and
continuing until daylight, the centre and right being most closely
pressed. The enemy were, however, everywhere repulsed with loss, while
our casualties numbered eleven killed and forty-six wounded. Throughout
the 28th the enemy maintained a fire on the camp, and attacked again at
night with great energy, but the troops had been employed during
daylight in improving the defences, and the attack was more easily
repulsed and without incurring so many casualties—two killed and sixteen
wounded during this night. On the 29th the position was further
improved, the front cleared, and arrangements made for lighting up the
ground over which the tribesmen must advance.
Chakdara signalled that it was successfully holding out, and the
reinforcements ordered by the military authorities were beginning to
arrive. A squadron 11th Bengal Lancers came in escorting ammunition, and
in the evening the 35th Sikhs and 38th Dogras reached Dargai, the
first-named regiment having lost twenty-one men from heat apoplexy on
its march from Nowshera.
Again, on the night of the 29th–30th, was the attack renewed, chiefly
against the flanks, but was everywhere repulsed with great loss, and the
same may be said of the following night, when the attack, though
repeated, seemed to have lost something of its energy and fire. On these
two nights our losses were one man killed and nineteen wounded. On the
31st reinforcements, amounting to over 700, reached the Malakand
position, and that night the usual attack was not delivered.
[Sidenote: Relief of Chakdara]
On the 1st August Colonel Meiklejohn made an attempt at the relief of
Chakdara, but the start was rather delayed, and the enemy showed
themselves in such strength that the orders had to be cancelled. On this
date Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, having been appointed to command a
newly organised Malakand Field Force, arrived in the position, and
approved of a strong force moving out at daybreak on the 2nd to effect
the relief of Chakdara. The relieving force, under Colonel Meiklejohn,
was stoutly opposed all the way, but the determination of the enemy only
made their losses the heavier, the cavalry getting among them with their
lances and the Sikhs with the bayonet. As the force drew near, the enemy
surrounding the fort began to withdraw, their retirement being hastened
by a vigorous _sortie_ by the garrison. The relieving column had five
men killed and twenty-eight wounded, while the casualties of the
Chakdara garrison only amounted to three killed and nine wounded during
their six days’ close investment, standing continually to their posts by
day and night.
That day the villages of Aladand and Thana were visited, no opposition
being met with, and Colonel Meiklejohn’s column marched to and remained
in camp at Amandara in preparation for the reconstitution of the field
force.
_Operations of the Malakand Field Force, 1897._—To punish all the
attacks above described, the Government of India sanctioned the despatch
of a force, to be known as the Malakand Field Force, to concentrate, the
First Brigade at Amandara, the Second at Khar and Malakand, the Reserve
at Rawal Pindi and Mardan.
FIRST BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G.
1st Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment.
24th Punjab Infantry.
31st Punjab Infantry.
45th Sikhs.
SECOND BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General P. D. Jeffreys, C.B.
1st Battalion the Buffs.
35th Sikhs.
38th Dogras.
Guides Infantry.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.
One squadron 10th Bengal Lancers.
11th Bengal Lancers.
Guides Cavalry.
No. 1 M.B.R.A.
No. 7 M.B.R.A.
No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery.
22nd Punjab Infantry.
Two companies 21st Punjab Infantry.
No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
No. 5 Company Madras Sappers and Miners.
THIRD (RESERVE) BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General J. H. Wodehouse, C.B., C.M.G.
1st Battalion Royal West Surrey Regiment.
2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry.
6 companies 21st Punjab Infantry.
39th Garhwal Rifles.
No. 10 F.B.R.A.
No. 3 Company Bombay Sappers and Miners.
[Sidenote: Extent of the Rising]
By this time some idea could be formed of the extent of the rising and
how far the neighbouring tribes were infected by the spirit of unrest
which had been aroused. It was known that a division of the Bunerwals,
the Utman Khels, the inhabitants of Lower Swat, and certain numbers of
Upper Swatis had taken part in the attacks upon the Malakand position;
not to mention the Dusha Khels, certain divisions of the Khwazozais, and
other sub-divisions, whose names would only be worth repeating as
showing how general was the rising among the local clans. But the tribes
further north did not seem to have been infected with any excitement or
restlessness; communication between Gilgit and Chitral was still open.
The Indus-Kohistan, the Mohmand country, the Khyber, Kohat and Kurram,
all then appeared to be undisturbed; the Nawab of Dir reported that the
Bajauris had remained tranquil, as had also the tribes on the Peshawar
border. The only disquieting frontier news to hand at this time was to
the effect that a number of mullahs, with a following of fanatical
tribesmen, had left Ningrahar and the neighbourhood of Jalalabad to join
either the Hadda Mullah or the Mad Fakir. The bulk of the attacking
force had been furnished by the men of Lower Swat, hitherto, and with
some reason, despised as fighting men. Thus the Khan of Aladand, whose
conduct had been exemplary since the Chitral Campaign, whose people were
largely employed as levies, and who himself drew a subsidy from
Government, was among those killed in one of the attacks. Thana lost
nearly all its young men, and men of other villages, who for the last
two years had regularly furnished supplies, turned out for this “Holy
War” in obedience to the exhortations of the Mad Fakir.
The concentration of the troops composing the Malakand Field Force was
completed on the 8th August; and already on the next day and on the 12th
certain Ranizai and Khwazozai jirgahs came in to sue for peace, their
submission being accepted on payment of heavy fines, surrender of arms,
and promise of future good behaviour and non-molestation of the troops.
[Sidenote: Action at Landakai]
On the 16th Sir Bindon Blood, leaving his Reserve Brigade at Mardan and
Rustam to observe the Buner passes, advanced by the left bank of the
river towards Upper Swat, bivouacking at Thana, and sending forward to
Landakai his cavalry, who reported that the enemy were holding the hills
above the village in strength. The position at Landakai was naturally a
very strong one, and was occupied by some 3000 tribesmen behind
_sangars_ on a steep rocky spur running down to the water’s edge from
the mountains on the south. This spur commanded the approach by a gorge,
the road through which only permitted of an advance in single file; but
further to the west another ridge came down from a height overlooking
the Landakai spur and ended at the village of Jalala. The few tribesmen
holding Jalala were early dispossessed, and the ridge being then seized
by the West Kent Regiment, it was occupied as an artillery position by a
field and mountain battery, and a heavy fire was opened from here upon
the Landakai spur.
The rest of the infantry, with another mountain battery, moved to the
right along the rear of this position, and occupied a spur commanding
the enemy’s left flank. The tribesmen, prevented from reinforcing this
flank by the heavy infantry and gun fire from the Jalala spur, began to
waver and then to fall back. Many escaped by the Morah Pass, and those
who held on to the position were driven from their sangars by the
advance of the whole of the infantry, who pursued them to Kota, the
cavalry following as far up the valley as Abuwa, on the Barikot road,
and doing considerable execution. Our losses this day were light—two
killed and nine wounded. On the two following days the force moved on by
Ghalegai to Mingaora, encountering no opposition, and finding the
inhabitants ready enough to tender their submission and furnish
supplies. From Mingaora, where the force remained some days,
reconnaissances were sent out in all directions, the country was as far
as possible disarmed, and the terms of submission were enforced. By the
22nd August jirgahs, representing all the Upper Swat clans, had agreed
to unconditional surrender, and the force then commenced to withdraw,
reaching Khar and the Malakand on the 27th.
While the Headquarters and the First Brigade had been operating in Upper
Swat, the Second Brigade had remained at Khar to overawe the people of
Lower Swat, pushing reconnaissances in all directions, the inhabitants
remaining perfectly submissive. There had been some idea of employing
this Brigade for the punishment of the Bunerwals and Utman Khels,
implicated in the recent rising, but by this time the frontier generally
was in a blaze, and it was decided that two of Sir Bindon’s brigades
should be sent through Dir and Bajaur in order to co-operate with the
Mohmand Field Force from Nawagai: these operations, in which the Second
and Reserve (Third) Brigade were employed—the First Brigade remaining in
occupation of Swat—will be found described in Chapter VII.
Since this year there has been no further outbreak of fanaticism and no
other trouble in Swat, and the prosperity of the country has made very
real progress.
CHAPTER VI
UTMAN KHELS.[65]
The trans-frontier portion of this tribe occupies the country between
the Rud River on the north, the Panjkora and Swat Rivers on the east and
south-east, and the Ambahar River on the south and south-west: their
neighbours being the Bajauris on the north, the Akozai Yusafzais or
Swatis on the east, and the Mohmands on the west; while the Peshawar
district is the southern boundary. The country is a network of low hills
and nullahs, and is generally unfertile and unproductive. The
cis-frontier people of the tribe own certain lands in the northern
portion of the Yusafzai Plain, originally bestowed upon them by the
Baizais, when these, some time in the sixteenth century, were being
pressed by the Ranizais. In the course of time the Baizais have
practically been pushed from their own country by the Utman Khels. The
Utman Khels hold the villages situated on the spur running down from the
Pajja and Morah Ranges, and also the villages of Shamozai and Matta, on
the north-west slopes of the Ganga Ghar Mountain.
The Utman Khel are said to be Sarbani Pathans of the Kodai Karlanri
branch, who moved eastwards with the Yusafzais when these migrated from
their earlier homes north-west of the Suleiman range, occupying their
present territory simultaneously with the Yusafzai conquest of Swat.
They are a hardy set of mountaineers, of good physique, hardworking,
many of them eking out a scanty livelihood as labourers about Peshawar;
“often,” so Oliver tells us, “naked from the waist up—a custom opposed
to Pathan ideas—but not very civilised. They live in small groups of
houses, rather than villages, stuck on the mountain side, secure in
their inaccessibility.” There are no chiefs of any importance among
them, and they are a very democratic people. They are estimated to
number some 9,000 fighting men, poorly armed. The trans-frontier Utman
Khels have always held themselves rather aloof, and few of them enlist
with us; but the cis-frontier men have lately taken more freely to
service in the levies, and even in the Indian army, and are said to make
excellent soldiers.
Their country lies on both banks of the Swat River until the limits of
the Mohmand territory are reached, and here the river bends to the south
and forms the boundary between the two tribes. The country is throughout
very difficult, there are few roads passable by any but a pedestrian,
and the only means of crossing the Swat—here rushing a deep swift
torrent between steep cliff-like banks—is afforded by a few rope
bridges. To the north of the river are a number of valleys between spurs
running out from the Koh-i-Mohr. To the south and south-east of this
mountain are the important divisions of Barang and Ambahar; to the
north-east lies Arang; and south of the Swat River, and between it and
British territory, is the narrow hilly tract of Laman or Daman,
traversed by the Sulala Range.
[Sidenote: Utman Khel Clans]
The tribe is divided into eight main clans as under:
1. Ismailzai.
2. Mandal.
3. Alizai.
4. Matakai.
5. Gurai.
6. Peghozai.
7. Bimarai.
8. Sinazai.
The Ismailzai is by far the largest and most important clan, and
occupies the right bank of the Swat River and the northern slopes of the
Koh-i-Mohr. The three last-named clans of the tribe live in Totai on the
left bank of the Swat below its junction with the Panjkora, within Sam
Ranizai limits, and separated from the Laman by the Jhindai Valley. The
Laman accommodates a number of other tribes besides the Utman Khel.
The roads leading from our territory into the Utman Khel country are all
difficult, but there is a good road from Matta, on the Mohmand border,
through Pandiali to Ambahar. The dwellers in Laman can be easily
coerced, but in their time, and particularly during the first years of
British occupation of the frontier country, they have given a great deal
of trouble, raiding the border and sheltering outlaws.
The Utman Khels are quite a distinct people, being unconnected with any
of the Pathan races which surround them—whether Mohmands, Bajauris, or
Yusafzais; they have more than once waged war with the Mohmands, but
consider themselves to be on specially friendly terms with the
Shinwaris.
OPERATIONS.
In the middle of the last century the favourite raiding ground of the
restless spirits of the Utman Khels was the Hastnagar division. Early in
1852, they permitted one Ajun Khan, a notoriously disaffected man, to
take up his residence in Utman Khel villages to the north of the
district, and here he gathered together a band of adventurers like
himself to raid upon our border. Finally in April, Ajun Khan collected
some 200 mounted men, attacked Charsada, the headquarters of the
division, plundered the treasury and slew some of our officials. On the
following day he occupied Abazai, and then visited Pranghar and
Nawedand, where he took up his quarters. Within a week, however, Sir
Colin Campbell was moving troops out against him from Peshawar.
_Expedition against the Independent Utman Khels, 1852._—Sir Colin
Campbell established his headquarters at Abazai and there concentrated
the following force:
First Troop, 1st Brigade Horse Artillery.
Two 8–inch howitzers, 4th Battalion Artillery.
300 bayonets, 32nd Foot.
One squadron 2nd Irregular Cavalry.
One squadron Guides Cavalry.
2nd Company Sappers and Miners.
300 bayonets, 28th Native Infantry.
300 bayonets, 66th Gurkhas.
Guides Infantry.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1852]
On the 11th May the force moved out and destroyed Nawedand, experiencing
some slight opposition, and while the operations were in progress Sir
Colin was joined by the 1st Punjab Infantry under Captain Coke, and by
two squadrons of the 1st Punjab Cavalry under Lieutenant Hughes. These
regiments had left Kohat at 2 a.m. on the 8th and reached Peshawar,
forty miles distant, the same day; there was a delay in crossing the
Kabul River owing to the bridge of boats having been swept away, but by
the evening of the 10th Coke’s party was across, arriving at Abazai at
daybreak with a two hours’ halt _en route_. Finding at Abazai that Sir
Colin had left to attack Nawedand, Coke again pushed on, took part in
the attack, and returned with the force to Abazai, having thus covered
another forty miles, or a total of eighty since 2 a.m. on the 8th.
On the 12th General Campbell moved about seven miles to Gandera, and on
the 13th he attacked, carried and destroyed Pranghar, the stronghold of
the Utman Khels, who were in considerable strength and held out
gallantly against the fire of our ten guns. The force then withdrew.
At the end of this year the fort of Abazai was erected for the better
security of this part of the border.
After this expedition, the conduct of the Independent Utman Khels—as
distinguished from the Utman Khels of Sam Baizai—was uniformly good, and
for more than twenty years the Indian Government had no grounds for any
complaint against them. On the 9th December, 1876, however, an offence
of the very gravest description was committed by this tribe, chiefly by
men from Ambahar and the Laman; a number of them, instigated by persons
of influence in British territory, attacking a body of unarmed coolies
engaged in the preliminary operations connected with the canal about to
be taken from the Swat River near Abazai. It appears that the party,
consisting of a hundred men, surrounded the tents in which the coolies
were sleeping about 2 a.m.; then, at a given signal, having cut through
the ropes of the tents, threw them down and butchered the helpless,
struggling inmates through the tent-cloth. The camp was then robbed of
almost everything it contained, some of the dead and wounded being
stripped of the very clothes on their backs. Of the sixty-five coolies,
six were killed and twenty-seven wounded, some dangerously. Having
plundered the camp, the raiders effected their escape to the hills
before any assistance could reach the spot from Fort Abazai; but all the
neighbouring headmen, suspected of complicity, were apprehended and sent
into Peshawar.
It seems probable that this raid would never have taken place if proper
steps had been taken for the protection of the men employed on the canal
works—a project, and the taking up land for which, known to have aroused
suspicion and dislike; and it cannot be denied that sufficient
precautions were not taken by the responsible officers to prevent an
attack of this kind, when the work was being carried on so near the
border. It could not, however, have well been anticipated that a
Muhammadan tribe would, without provocation and with no quarrel with the
British Government, attack and kill an unarmed body of their
co-religionists—a dastardly outrage, which brought down upon the
perpetrators the virtual excommunication of the aged Akhund of Swat.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1878]
_Operations against the Independent Utman Khels, 1878._—In consequence
of this affair, the Utman Khels were, as a tribe, excluded from British
territory, but at the time it was not possible to take more active
measures against them. At the beginning of 1878, however, it was
proposed to Government that an attempt should be made to surprise the
village of Sapri, where dwelt the man who had been the leader of the
party concerned in the attack on the coolie camp; for it was felt that
while he was at large and unpunished, any really satisfactory settlement
with the tribe would be practically impossible; his village, moreover,
was close to our border. The proposal was sanctioned, and at 7 p.m. on
the 14th February, 1878, Captain Wigram Battye,[66] accompanied by
Captain Cavagnari,[67] marched from Mardan with 264 sabres and twelve
bayonets of the Guides, the infantry mounted on mules.
The party moved by the main Tangi-Abazai road for some distance, but on
arrival near Tangi, the column turned off to the north, crossed the line
of the Swat Canal, and arriving within two miles of Abazai, left the
horses there under a small escort. The troops had marched thirty-two
miles, making a long detour so as to avoid villages whence news of the
movement might have been conveyed across the border. Moving on, the Swat
River was struck, and its left bank ascended for about four miles to
Mada Baba Ziarat, where a mountain torrent joins the river; and climbing
a rough path by the side of this torrent, the kotal leading to the
village of Sapri was soon reached. It was still dark, but from here
Captain Battye sent a small party on to a spur commanding the village,
and especially the towers of the man particularly wanted for the outrage
near Abazai. With daylight the village was rushed, the tribesmen being
taken completely by surprise, and Mian Rakan-ud-din, the leader, was
shot down. Some of his immediate attendants surrendered, and others
bolted to the hills above the village, whence they kept up a desultory
fire on the troops. But Captain Battye was able to withdraw his party to
Fort Abazai without further molestation. Our casualties were eight
wounded.
As a result of this measure some of the Utman Khel villages showed
themselves most anxious to effect a satisfactory settlement with
Government; others, however—those of Zirak and Pakhai—remained recusant,
and consequently, while the submission of the repentant villages was
accepted, it was decided to coerce the remainder. On the 20th March,
therefore, Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins left Mardan for the Utman Khel
border with a force composed of four guns of the Hazara Mountain
Battery, 245 sabres and 453 bayonets of the Guides. The Zirak villages
were first dealt with. The force entered the hills as day was breaking,
and experienced no opposition at the first village, Tarakai, but moving
on from here entered a valley formed by the Sulala range of hills and
divided into two parts by the Tor Tam hill; on the near side of this
hill were the remaining Zirak villages, and on the other were those of
Pakhai. The first village was found to be deserted, but our troops were
fired on from the others; the enemy were, however, easily dispersed and
the remaining Zirak villages cleared. Leaving now the Guides cavalry in
occupation, Colonel Jenkins secured possession of the Tor Tam hill with
the infantry and guns without any serious opposition, and thence had the
Pakhai villages at his mercy. The Zirak and Pakhai headmen were now
called upon to submit, which they did after the usual hesitation, and
agreed to pay the fines demanded of them. The force then withdrew from
the valley unmolested, and bivouacked that night at the Jhinda outpost
of the Swat canal works, having marched over forty miles since noon of
the previous day. Mardan was again reached on the 22nd.
[Sidenote: Punitive Measures]
During 1882 there was a slight revival of trouble in connection with the
canal works, but thenceforward the Utman Khels gave us no cause for
complaint until 1895, when some divisions opposed General Low’s
advance[68] at the passage of the Swat River; they also shared in other
attacks upon us during the operations of that spring, but no punitive
measures were taken against them for these signs of hostility. In 1897
again large numbers of Utman Khels took part in the attacks on the
Malakand; some assisted their old enemies the Mohmands in the fighting
about Shabkadar; and others again of the divisions which live on the
further bank of the Swat River helped in the assaults on Chakdara, and
later tried to seize the bridge over the Panjkora, but were forestalled
by General Meiklejohn.
The trans-frontier Utman Khels thereafter only broke out once, joining
the Mamunds in the attack on General Jeffreys’ camp described in Chapter
VII., but, on the whole, they remained quiet while our troops were in
Bajaur, and even helped to keep open the lines of communications where
these passed near their border.
_Expedition against the Utman Khels, 1897._—As stated in Chapter V.,
General Blood had intended sending a brigade from Lower Swat into the
Utman Khel country, but at the moment the services of the troops were
required elsewhere, and operations against the Utman Khels had to be
postponed. For the time, therefore, Government contented itself with
imposing terms upon such clans as had shown themselves hostile, and
demanding the submission of the whole tribe. By the close of the year,
however, the Utman Khel generally had evinced no inclination to comply
with our terms, and on the 22nd November, therefore, a small force was
collected to compel submission. It was concentrated near Dargai, at the
southern foot of the Malakand Pass, and was placed under the command of
Colonel A. J. F. Reid; it was composed as under:
One squadron, 10th Bengal Lancers.
No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery.
No. 5 Company Madras Sappers and Miners.
1st Battalion The Buffs.
21st Punjab Infantry.
35th Sikhs.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1897]
In addition to the above, the 16th Bengal Infantry was sent to Abazai to
protect the head of the Swat River canal, and to help the local
political officers in dealing with the Utman Khels of the Laman. The
initial destination of the force was the Totai Valley, and on the 23rd
Colonel Reid marched to Hariankot at the foot of the pass leading to
Kot, which was reached next day. The road over the pass, although it had
been improved by working parties, was found very difficult for laden
camels. On the west side of the pass the valley widens considerably, and
is highly cultivated. The villagers of Lower Totai showed every sign of
wishing to be friendly, and many jirgahs came in asking for terms. All
the clans accepted our terms without hesitation, except the Agra jirgah,
and the force accordingly arranged to march into that valley. Two routes
were reconnoitred from Kot, but that via Silai Patai was eventually
adopted, although it required much work to make it passable. The
villagers along the route proved very submissive, bringing in supplies,
and the Agra jirgah met Colonel Reid on their boundary to tender
submission. On the 27th the troops marched to Bargholai along a very
difficult track through a narrow gorge. The Agra Valley was thoroughly
explored, reconnaissances were pushed forward to the passes, and much
useful survey work was done. All the representatives of the Utman Khel
had now submitted except the Kanauri Ismailzai, so a small column was
detailed to visit the Kanauri villages, which lay high up in the hills
above Kot, to the west of Colonel Reid’s camp. The road was very bad and
steep, but halfway there the jirgah was met hurrying down to submit.
By the 4th December all the clans had complied with our terms, and the
troops were withdrawn to Hariankot and the column broken up.
Since that date this tribe has given no serious trouble to the British
Government.
CHAPTER VII.
THE CLANS OF BAJAUR AND DIR.[69]
The inhabitants of both these countries are mainly Yusafzais—Tarkanri or
Tarklanri Yusafzais in Bajaur, and Akozai Yusafzais in Dir.
Bajaur is bounded on the north by Dir, and on the east by Dir and Swat,
on the south-east and south by the Utman Khel country, on the south
again for a short distance by the Mohmands, and on the west by
Afghanistan. It is an extremely mountainous country, watered by the Rud
River, and including within its area the valleys of the Rud, of
Babukarra, Watelai and Chaharmung.
The Bajauris or Tarkanris are Sarbani Pathans of the Khakhai Khel branch
and representatives of the ancient Gandhari, with whom they returned
from Kabul in the fifteenth century to the Peshawar Valley, and a
hundred years later subjugated and dispossessed the Gujars, then in
occupation of Bajaur. “In 1504,” we are reminded by Oliver, “the Emperor
Baber acquired the sovereignty of Kabul and Ghazni, and in the following
year made an extensive frontier tour, coming by the Khyber Pass to
Peshawar, going along the whole border, and returning by the Sakhi
Sarwar Pass and the Bori Valley to Ghazni. At this period the Pathan
settlers are described as pretty well established in Laghman, Peshawar,
Swat and Bajaur; though some of the original occupants still struggled
for independence under their hereditary chiefs. During the next
twenty-five years the Mogul Baber undertook many forays—for most of them
could not be called anything else—to punish the hill Pathans, or to
protect his own subjects, dispersing the men, carrying off the women and
cattle; but, as a rule, the tribes were even then fully able to hold
their own. Guided by the Dilazaks, he marched against Bajaur, carried
the fortress of the original Sultan by escalade, using the new
matchlocks, which greatly astonished the enemy, the net result being to
extend the power of the Tarklanris.”
The Tarkanris have three main divisions:
1. Ismailzai.
2. Isozai.
3. Mamunds,
and of the different valleys into which Bajaur is split up, the Maidan
Valley is occupied by the Ismailzai, the Baraul and Jandol Valleys by
the Isozai, and the valleys of Babukarra, Chaharmung and Watelai by the
Mamunds, who also own a good deal of land across the border in
Afghanistan. Some six or seven alien tribes also live among the
Bajauris—chiefly in the Jandol and Maidan Valleys. Originally Jandol
belonged to Bajaur, but it has within recent years come under the
political control of Dir, whose ruler, however, has little or no
authority over the people of the Jandol Valley.
[Sidenote: The Valleys of Bajaur]
The Maidan Valley is about ten miles long, rich and fertile and well
cultivated, watered by the Maidan or Kunai River. The Jandol Valley,
whose northern and southern boundaries are the Janbatai Range and the
Rud River, has a total area of some 144 square miles, being about
fourteen miles long, with a breadth ranging from six to ten miles, and
is also rich and well cultivated. The Baraul Valley is divided into an
upper and a lower, the upper including the Janbatai district, and good
crops are raised here, and iron of excellent quality is exported. The
Babukarra Valley is about fifteen miles long, with an average width of
five or six miles; the range of the Hindu Raj divides it from Asmar on
the north, on the east the Takwara spur separates it from Jandol, on the
west is the Mamund or Watelai Valley, while to the south, on the right
bank of the Bajaur River, is the country of the Utman Khel. The
Chaharmung Valley lies between the Mamund country on the north-east and
the Kamangara Valley on the south-west. The Watelai Valley, occupied by
the Mamunds, the most important section of the Tarkanris or Bajauris,
lies between the valleys of Chaharmung and Babukarra; it is about
thirteen miles in length, with a maximum breadth of ten miles, and is
well cultivated, but has no main river of any importance running through
it, and the bed of the valley is much cut up by deep nullahs. The
Mamunds are probably the most warlike of the Tarkanris, and can put
12,000 men in the field, all well armed as frontier tribesmen go.
The position of the Khan of Nawagai requires some explanation. He is the
hereditary chief of a branch of the Salarzai sub-division of the
Mamunds, and also of all the Tarkanris, but his authority has of late
years very greatly diminished, although he is still by no means without
influence, even far beyond the borders of his own Khanate. His actual
territory is an irregular tract of country on the left bank of the Rud
River, together with the district of Surkamar; part of his country was
encroached upon some years ago by the Mohmands, and he has never been
sufficiently powerful to regain permanent possession of it.
The country known as Dir comprises roughly the whole area drained by the
Panjkora River and its affluents, as far south as its junction with the
Rud River of Bajaur. The Upper Panjkora Valley is known as the Panjkora
Kohistan, and is divided into two parts called Bashkar and Sheringal.
The principal subsidiary valleys of Dir are the Kashkar or Dir, the
Baraul and the Maidan on the west, and the Ushiri and Talash Valleys on
the east. The northern limit of Dir is the crest of the mountain range
which divides it from Chitral and Yasin; the Durand line is the boundary
on the west; on the east it is bounded by Kohistan, and on the south by
the valley of Upper Swat and by Bajaur. From the mass of mountains to
the north three giant spurs or ranges run down towards the south. The
easternmost of these, forming the watershed between the Swat and the
Indus Rivers, runs first due south and then west to the Malakand. The
central forms the watershed between the Panjkora and Swat. The
westernmost range is a continuation of the Hindu Raj, runs
south-westerly, and forms the watershed between the Panjkora and Rud
Rivers on the one side and the Kunar on the other. The most important
pass which crosses it is the Lowari or Laorai (10,250 feet), open for
convoys from April to November; it carries the main road from India to
Chitral.
[Sidenote: Description of Dir]
The four sections of the Malizai sub-division of the Khwazozai-Akozais
resident in Dir are:
1. Painda Khel.
2. Sultan Khel.
3. Nusrudin Khel.
4. Ausa Khel.
On the Panjkora River, commencing from the north, in the Kashkar Valley,
in which the village of Dir is situated, is the Akhund Khel sub-section
of the Painda Khel Malizais, to which the Khan of Dir belongs. Below
these again, on the left bank of the river, are more of the Painda Khel,
and on the right bank the Sultan Khel; and, still further down, the
Sultan Khel, Nusrudin Khel and Ausa Khel on both banks of the river.
The route to Chitral from the Swat Valley leads through this country.
Leaving the Swat River at Chakdara, the road turns abruptly to the west
and enters the Uch Valley, passing by the Katgola Pass (3000 feet) into
the Talash Valley, where, as Bellew tells us and as later travellers
have confirmed, there are extensive ruins of massive fortifications on
the south side of the valley and nine or ten miles from the Panjkora,
covering the hills for a distance of several miles. From here the ascent
is very steep to the summit of the Kamrani Pass, to the north-east of
which, in a valley, lies Mundah, the stronghold of Mian Gul Jan, the
quarrelsome younger brother of the Khan of Dir. The descent from the
kotal to Sado or Khungai is very steep. Turning to the right from Sado,
the road passes up the Panjkora Valley, the river being crossed on the
fourth march from Sado at Chutiatun, whence, a few miles further along
the right bank of the Dir stream, Dir itself is reached. “Here,” writes
Enriquez, “situated on a low hill is the stronghold of the Khan. The
fort has three towers, each surmounted with a loop-holed fighting
top.... The vale of Dir is well cultivated and numbers of chenars are
scattered about it, so that its greenness is refreshing after the
wearying aridity of the Panjkora. The little town of Dir occupies a
steep khud abreast of the fort. Its crazy huts are built one above the
other, so that the roof of one forms the promenade or front garden of
the one above.” Then on up the Dir Valley, via Mirga, to the Lowari Pass
and Chitral. An alternative route, branching off from Sado, runs
westward for some way and then, turning northward again, ascends the bed
of the Jandol River to the Janbatai Pass (7212 feet); after crossing
this the road leads along the Baraul Valley to Chutiatun and Dir, where
it joins the first mentioned road.
The people of Dir and Bajaur are all Sunni Muhammadans, intensely
bigoted, but superstitious rather than religious. Their country is very
much priest-ridden, and the people are unusually susceptible to the
influence of the mullahs, who are able to excite them to fanaticism more
easily and to a greater degree than among other Pathans. The fighting
men in Dir and Bajaur number probably not less than 80,000; they, and
more particularly the men of Dir, have a very strong sense of
discipline; and in the event of a general fanatical rising the
combination of tribes which could be formed would be by no means one to
be despised, since they would probably receive material assistance, if
not indeed open and active help, from Swat, from the Utman Khels, and
very possibly from the men of Buner.
OPERATIONS.
[Sidenote: Umra Khan of Jandol]
It will be convenient here to give some account of Umra Khan of Jandol,
whose usurpations were responsible for the formation of the Chitral
Relief Expedition, the operations of which, in the countries of Dir and
Bajaur, are about to be described.
Umra Khan was a younger son of the Khan of Jandol, and a grandson of the
Chief of Bajaur who took up arms against us during the Ambela campaign.
He quarrelled with his father and was expelled from the country; but
returning in 1878 he killed his elder brother, and later, as the result
of a year’s successful fighting, he made himself master of Jandol, and
eventually brought under his control a tract of country extending from
the Dir-Chitral border in the north to the Swat River in the south, and
including the whole of Dir, the greater part of Bajaur and a portion of
Swat. In 1891 and 1892 the Kabul Government undertook certain
operations, which were not particularly successful, to check Umra Khan’s
aggressions, and up to the latter year he seems to have been friendly
inclined towards the British. In 1892, however, when he was being
somewhat pressed, both by the Afghans from without and by rebels within
his kingdom, an appeal which he made to the Government of India for
assistance in the form of arms and ammunition was refused; and in 1893,
as a result of the Durand Mission to Kabul, the territory of Asmar,
which he had coveted and seized, and whence he had been driven, was
handed over to Afghanistan. All this gave great offence to Umra Khan,
and it was shortly after these events that he mixed himself in Chitral
affairs—described in their proper place—leading to the despatch of the
Chitral Relief Force in 1895 and the resultant operations in Dir and
Bajaur.
[Sidenote: Detail of the Force]
_Chitral Relief Expedition, 1895._—It had been intended to mobilise the
First Division as being nearest to the scene of operations; but some of
the units of which it was composed were then on service in Waziristan,
while the nature of the country to be operated in precluded the
employment of others. The force was ultimately composed as hereunder
detailed, was placed under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir R. Low,
K.C.B., and its base was fixed at Nowshera.
FIRST BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General Kinloch, C.B.
1st Battalion Bedfordshire Regiment.
1st Battalion King’s Royal Rifles.
15th Sikhs.
37th Dogras.
SECOND BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General Waterfield.
2nd Battalion K.O.S. Borderers.
1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders.
4th Sikhs.
Guides Infantry.
THIRD BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General Gatacre, D.S.O.
1st Battalion The Buffs.
2nd Battalion Seaforth Highlanders.
25th Punjab Infantry.[70]
2nd Battalion 4th Gurkhas.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.
11th Bengal Lancers.
Guides Cavalry.
13th Bengal Infantry.[71]
23rd Pioneers.
15th Field Battery R.A.
No. 8 M.B. Royal Artillery.
4 guns, No. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery.
No. 1 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
No. 6 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
RESERVE BRIGADE.
Major-General Channer, V.C., C.B.
No. 7 Bengal Mountain Battery.[72]
3rd Battalion Rifle Brigade.
26th Punjab Infantry.[73]
2nd Battalion 1st Gurkhas.
2nd Battalion 3rd Gurkhas.
LINES OF COMMUNICATION TROOPS.
1st Battalion East Lancashire Regiment.
29th Punjab Infantry.[74]
30th Punjab Infantry.[75]
No. 4 Hazara Mountain Battery.
MOVEABLE COLUMN (ABBOTTABAD).
No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery.
2nd Battalion 2nd Gurkhas.
2nd Battalion 5th Gurkhas.
Railway concentration commenced on the 26th March, and in seven days the
force was concentrated at Hoti Mardan and Nowshera. A proclamation was
published to the tribes through whose territory it would be necessary
for the force to pass, announcing that the quarrel of the British
Government was only with Umra Khan of Jandol, and stating that there was
no intention of permanently occupying the tribal country, or of
interfering with the independence of its inhabitants. In reply, the Sam
Ranizais consented to our passage through their territory, while some of
the headmen in Lower Swat tried to adopt an attitude of armed
neutrality, and the Upper Swatis failed to combine against us. The Khan
of Nawagai promised to do his best to keep Bajaur quiet, and the maliks
among the Bunerwals, Utman Khels and Mohmands seemed anxious to keep
their people out of the quarrel.
[Sidenote: The Malakand Pass]
On the 1st April the First Brigade moved to Lundkwar, the Second and
Third to Jalala, the General intending to advance into Swat by the
Shakot and Malakand Passes. During this day, however, the report of the
friendly or neutral intentions of the border tribes was seriously
discounted by the receipt of information that large bodies of tribesmen
were holding not only these two passes, but also the Morah, which, by
reason of its propinquity to Buner, there had been no intention of
using. It appearing that of the three the Malakand was the least
strongly occupied, Sir Robert Low decided to force the Malakand, making
a feint with his cavalry towards the Shakot. He therefore concentrated
all three brigades at Dargai, at the southern foot of the Malakand,
early on the morning of the 2nd April.
Leaving Dargai, the track took for some way a north-easterly direction
up the gradually narrowing valley; it then turned north-west and,
leaving the bed of the valley, zigzagged up to the crest, whence two
paths led into the Swat Valley. The kotal itself is some 2850 feet above
sea-level, but on the left of the position precipitous hills rise to a
height of over 400 feet, while on the right the crest of the range
slopes steeply up to three tall peaks. The whole of the ridge, with the
heights on either flank, formed a position not less than two miles long
and was held in strength.
The Second Brigade was sent forward early on the 3rd to force the pass,
it being the intention of the general commanding that the position once
taken, the First Brigade, which alone was entirely supplied with mule
transport, should then be pushed on to the Swat River. Of the Second
Brigade, the 4th Sikhs and Guides Infantry ascended parallel spurs on
the west of the valley, intending to turn the position from this flank;
while the remaining battalions, covered by the fire of three mountain
batteries, advanced directly upon the Pass. The infantry on the flank
were, however, very stubbornly opposed, while the actual ascent was most
difficult, and the general commanding the Second Brigade, seeing that
the advance would be greatly delayed, sent forward his remaining
battalions to the frontal attack, which the First Brigade was now called
upon to support. The infantry, during their advance, captured sangar
after sangar, and moving forward very steadily, the position was finally
carried, after some five hours’ fighting, at the point of the bayonet,
the 4th Sikhs and Guides running in on the enemy’s right at the same
time. Two regiments of the First Brigade pressed the pursuit of the
retreating enemy as far as Khar, where they bivouacked; the 4th Sikhs
occupied the vicinity of the crest; and the remainder of the Second
Brigade withdrew to Dargai.
It was estimated that we had been opposed by about 12,000 men, of whom
probably a third possessed firearms; their losses, mainly by reason of
their holding the position to the last, were heavy; our casualties were
11 killed and 51 wounded.
During the advance, our troops fortunately came upon the remains of an
old disused Buddhist road, well built and skilfully aligned, and which
two days’ work rendered fit for camel transport, thus greatly
facilitating the passage of supplies.
[Sidenote: Advance into Swat]
Early on the afternoon of the 4th, the First Brigade advanced into the
Swat Valley, the Second Brigade taking its place on the Malakand, and
the Third remaining at Dargai. The leading brigade was opposed, and even
attacked, with great boldness, by large numbers of tribesmen falling
back from the Shakot and Morah Passes, but these lost severely from the
fire of our infantry and the sabres of the Guides Cavalry, who made a
fine charge over bad ground.
The First Brigade halted at Khar, where that of General Waterfield
joined it, and whence reconnaissances moved up the Swat Valley.
Opportunity was further taken of the halt to open communications with
the headmen of many of the neighbouring villages, and also with the
former Khan of Dir, whom Umra Khan had dispossessed of his country; and
by these measures our troops were assured an unopposed passage through
the Baraul and Dir Valleys, and of the neutrality of some of the more
powerful of the clans of Upper Swat and Bajaur.
On the 6th, it being reported that a large body of Umra Khan’s personal
followers, under command of his brother, had occupied Chakdara and the
fort and village of Ramora, about two miles further up the Swat River,
five squadrons of cavalry, supported by other arms from the Second
Brigade, were ordered to cross the Swat River early next morning and
reconnoitre towards Uch, opportunity being at the same time taken to
destroy the fort at Ramora. These parties, and another sent out to
search for a suitable site for a bridge over the Swat River, were
opposed by some 4500 men who lost very severely, especially at the hands
of the cavalry, who pursued as far as the Katgola Pass, about 7½ miles
distant. Chakdara was then occupied and a bridge constructed.
It was now determined that the First Brigade should remain in occupation
of the Swat Valley, and it accordingly handed over all its mule
transport to the two other brigades—the Second taking up the lead and
crossing the Swat River, while the Third advanced to Khar; and on the
same day, the 8th, the cavalry reconnoitred the Talash Valley as far as
Shamshikhan, and the Adinzai Valley up to the foot of the Laram Pass,
which was reported impracticable for transport. On the 9th the cavalry
reconnoitred up to Sado on the Panjkora River, which can be approached
by two roads, that to the west by the Shigu Kas being just passable,
while that by the Kamrani Pass (3300 feet) was unfit for transport. Next
day the advanced troops reached Sado, and the cavalry reconnoitred for
some distance up the Rud River, being fired on near Kotkai by a small
body of the enemy; the Second Brigade marched to Gumbat and part of the
Third closed up to Uch.
At this period, in view of the possibility of trouble in the Buner and
Mohmand countries, the Reserve Brigade was moved up to Mardan from Rawal
Pindi, and a second reserve brigade was mobilised, but the units
composing it were not required to leave their garrisons; they were No. 1
Mountain Battery R.A., 2nd Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry, 28th
Punjab Infantry, and 39th Garhwal Rifles.
[Sidenote: Bridging the Panjkora]
The Panjkora River had been rising every day, and by the 11th April had
become quite unfordable, and, while bridging materials were being
collected, the Second Brigade was closed up to Sado and Khungai, the
Third being distributed between Gumbat and Chakdara. By the night of the
12th the bridge was ready for foot traffic, the river showed no signs of
further rising, and six companies of the Guides crossed to the right
bank, where they formed an entrenched position to serve as a
bridge-head, commanded at short range from the high ground of the left
bank. Here the Guides were conveniently placed to carry out the orders
they were to execute on the following morning, viz. to march down the
right bank of the river and destroy certain villages whence the convoys
had been persistently annoyed. It had been intended to support the
Guides by passing over other troops, and another company of the Guides
was later able to cross; but during the night of the 12th–13th the river
suddenly rose, bringing down large masses of timber and practically
breaking up the newly-completed bridge.
At 6 a.m. Lieutenant-Colonel Battye took five companies up the Rud
River, leaving two companies to hold the bridge-head, and marched up the
left bank to Subhan Killa, whence parties were detached to the east to
burn three villages. Re-concentrating then at Subhan Killa, the Rud or
Jandol River was crossed and the heights on the right bank of the
Panjkora were ascended, from whence other villages were destroyed. About
noon large parties of the enemy appeared to be advancing, and on Colonel
Battye signalling this information to Headquarters at Sado, he was
directed to fall back on the bridge-head, where the high bank was lined
by troops of the Second Brigade to cover the retirement. As usual on the
frontier, the retirement had no sooner commenced than it was hotly
pressed, and it was perhaps not begun quite so soon as it might have
been, or as was under the circumstances advisable, owing to the fact
that it was impossible for the commander with the main body of the
Guides infantry to be certain whether the detached parties had, or had
not, complied with the order to fall back. The conduct of the
retirement, made practically under the eyes of the whole of the Second
Brigade, was, as recorded by General Low and as endorsed by all who saw
it, “a splendid performance.” Very deliberately the different companies
retired, fiercely assailed on all sides, yet coolly firing by word of
command, and relinquishing quietly and almost imperceptibly one position
only to take up another a few yards back. Twice did the Guides fix
bayonets to meet the onrush, expected but never actually made. Shortly
before recrossing the Jandol River near its junction with the Panjkora,
Colonel Battye fell mortally wounded, the command devolving on Captain
Campbell.
[Sidenote: Across the River]
The bridge-head was reached just before dark, and the enemy kept up a
fire till nearly 11 a.m. The Guides were reinforced by two Maxims and a
company of the 4th Sikhs sent across the river on rafts, while support
was also afforded by five companies of infantry on the left bank and a
mountain battery, whose firing of star shell probably prevented any
attempt to rush the post. By early morning of the 14th the tribal
gathering—chiefly Utman Khels and men from Mundah—had dispersed, having
experienced very heavy losses. On this day the Third Brigade moved up to
Sado, and six more companies of the 4th Sikhs were sent over on rafts to
the Guides entrenchment; but the continued rapid rise of the river made
bridge construction at this spot impossible, and eventually a suspension
bridge was thrown across a gorge two miles lower down the river, being
completed by the evening of the 16th.
On this date the rain, which had been falling heavily for some days,
ceased, and the river began to subside. The Third Brigade was now
ordered to lead, and crossed to the right bank on the 17th, the Second
Brigade moving over next day. General Gatacre advanced up the Jandol
Valley, experiencing some opposition about Manugai, and finally
bivouacked at Ghobani, where early next morning the Second Brigade
joined him. An hour later the combined force advanced on Mundah and
Miankilai, which were found deserted, and the cavalry pushed a
reconnaissance to the foot of the Janbatai Pass, finding the people
generally friendly.
From here it was decided to despatch a small flying column to Chitral,
and a mountain battery, with two infantry battalions and half a company
of Sappers from the Third Brigade, marched on that afternoon to Barwa
and on the 19th to the Janbatai Pass.
Bandai was reached by General Gatacre’s advance column on the 20th, and
here he received news that the Chitral garrison was in great straits,
and therefore he proposed to General Low that he should be permitted to
push on with 500 men; this suggestion was approved, and, pressing
forward, General Gatacre was in Dir on the 22nd.
In the meantime the situation had undergone some change. Umra Khan had
fled to the Asmar border, and thence to Kabul, leaving the resettlement
of his territory to the British; the left flank of our line of advance
was in a measure menaced by the presence of the Utman Khel, Nawagai and
Mamund tribesmen; while intelligence, received on the 21st, that the
siege of Chitral had been abandoned, obviated the need for any forced
march to its relief such as had been arranged.
From Dir to Ashreth in Chitral territory via the Lowari Pass was
twenty-three miles, and the whole of General Gatacre’s column, in spite
of the extraordinary difficulties of the road, was concentrated at
Ashreth by the 30th April, and was ordered to halt there for the
present. On the 10th May the 1st Battalion the Buffs, the Derajat
Mountain Battery, and the 4th Company Bengal Sappers and Miners were led
by General Gatacre to Chitral, where the Gilgit Column had arrived on
the 20th April, and with this the object of the expedition may be said
to have been accomplished; Umra Khan, who had actually originated all
the trouble, had fled the country, while on the 27th April Sher Afzul,
the late claimant to the Mehtarship of Chitral, had been brought into
our camp at Dir, having been captured in Bashkar by some of the Khan of
Dir’s levies.
[Sidenote: Withdrawal of the Force]
On the 10th May the troops hitherto serving on the lines of
communication were formed into a Fourth Brigade of the Chitral Relief
Force, under Brigadier-General Hammond, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., and
it was not until the middle of August that some of the troops—mostly of
the Fourth Brigade—commenced their return march to India. On the 4th
September the Third Brigade ceased to exist; on the 28th General Low’s
Headquarters demobilised at Nowshera; and about the same date
Brigadier-General Waterfield assumed command of the Malakand Brigade and
of all troops remaining beyond the frontier.
On the final withdrawal of the force it was found that while regular
troops must continue to be maintained on the Malakand Pass, at Chakdara,
and in Chitral territory, it would be possible to keep open the
Nowshera-Chitral road by peaceful means, its security from the Swat
River to the borders of Chitral territory being maintained by levies,
and the route adopted being via Panjkora and Dir.
During this expedition the troops under Lieutenant-General Sir Robert
Low had sustained a loss in action of twenty-one killed and 101 wounded;
but in addition, and in consequence of fanatical attacks, further
casualties were experienced, altogether two soldiers and forty-nine
followers having been killed, and three soldiers and forty-seven
followers wounded, between the middle of April and the date of the final
withdrawal of the force.
After our troops had returned to India the condition of affairs in
Bajaur and Dir was generally satisfactory, and the arrangements for the
maintenance of the road promised to work well. There was a certain
amount of local unrest, as was only perhaps to be expected; but both in
1896 and 1897 the Chitral reliefs marched by the Malakand-Chitral road
without experiencing any interference whatever on the part of the
tribesmen. At various times both the Khan of Dir and the Khan of Nawagai
attempted to extend their influence by force of arms, the one in Jandol,
the other in the Babukarra Valley, but both showed themselves ready to
yield to the pacificatory influence of the political agent for Dir and
Swat. There were rumours also that Umra Khan contemplated revisiting
this part of the frontier, but he ultimately decided to return to Kabul.
The whole country had been so recently pacified that it was hardly to be
hoped that it would remain quiescent during the disturbances of the year
1897. The Mullahs, always opposed to the establishment of any civilising
influence tending to weaken or destroy their supremacy over their
peoples, had been busy preaching against the British, and it was known
that they were doing their utmost to form a hostile combination of the
clans against us; while other outside influences, which need not here be
particularly specified, were also known to be in action. The Khans of
Dir and Nawagai behaved very well under difficult circumstances, and
seem to have done their best to check and stifle sedition, but proved in
the end unable altogether to restrain the fanaticism of their followers.
When the “Mad Mullah” actually arrived in Swat from Buner in July, 1897,
the Khan of Dir was away in Kohistan, but even had he been present it
seems improbable that he would have had sufficient influence or power to
stem the outbreak, culminating in the attacks upon the Malakand and
Chakdara positions described in Chapter V. But on his return to Swat,
and when the tide had turned in our favour, both he and the Khan of
Nawagai did what in them lay to assist the British Government, by
reopening communications and by holding the important river crossings on
the Chitral road.
[Sidenote: Operations of 1897]
_Operations of the Malakand Field Force in Dir and Bajaur in 1897._—The
attacks on the Malakand and on the Chakdara post, with the composition
and early operations of the Malakand Field Force, under Major-General
Sir Bindon Blood, have already been described in Chapter V. These
operations commenced with the subjection and punishment of the people of
Lower and Upper Swat. It had been proposed to deal next with the Utman
Khels, but more important events then transpiring, obliged the
postponement of the coercion of this tribe; and the news that the forces
of the Hadda Mullah, signally defeated on the 9th August by the troops
from Peshawar, were advancing into Dir, caused the recall of General
Blood’s Second Brigade from Utman Khel territory, and the move of his
Third Brigade to Uch in the Adinzai Valley. The Mullah’s gathering now
dispersed, and General Blood was directed to co-operate with General
Elles in the punishment of the Mohmands, by moving with two brigades
through Bajaur via Sado and Nawagai. At Nawagai our troops would be in
rear of the Mohmands, who had never before been attacked from the north,
and from this place a caravan route leads due south to the Peshawar
border, passing Lokerai in the Bohai Valley, where are many Mohmand
villages.
On the 4th and 5th September General Wodehouse moved his brigade—now
somewhat reconstructed—hurriedly from Uch to Sado, and was only just in
time to prevent the seizure of the Panjkora Bridge by the Bajauris and
Utman Khels, who had now made up their minds to oppose us. The First
Brigade (Meiklejohn) was now left to hold the Swat Valley and our
communications up to Sado; the Second (Jeffreys) marched from Chakdara,
via Sarai, the Panjkora and Kotkai to Ghosam, where it arrived on the
9th; while by the 11th the Third Brigade (Wodehouse) was concentrated at
Shakrata, equidistant from Mundah and Barwa, cavalry reconnaissances
being pushed forward to the Batai and Shinai passes. On the 12th the
Second Brigade was at Khar,[76] and the Third at Shamshak in the Watelai
Valley, where the camp was fired into during the night.
Sir Bindon Blood had now intended to co-operate with General Elles, and
for this purpose he himself moved on the 14th with the Third Brigade to
Nawagai, while General Jeffreys seized the Rambat Pass, bivouacking on
the Chaharmung stream near Inayat Kila, an Utman Khel village. Here a
determined attack was made upon the Second Brigade camp at night by
Mamunds and Utman Khels, who were unusually well armed and, creeping
along the broken ground, were able to gain positions near the camp from
which they maintained a very galling fire for nearly six hours, almost
without intermission. Our casualties were seven killed (three British
officers) and ten wounded, and the losses among the transport were
serious, amounting to nearly a hundred. When daylight appeared the
cavalry were sent after the retreating enemy and accounted for many of
them.
[Sidenote: The Mamund Country]
The idea of joining the Third Brigade at Nawagai had now to be given up
in favour of punitive operations in the Mamund country, and co-operation
with General Elles was for the present impossible; the First Brigade was
therefore ordered to move up to the Panjkora, the Third remaining
entrenched at Nawagai. Here, on the night of the 19th and 20th
determined attacks were made upon the camp, chiefly by the Hadda
Mullah’s men from the Bedmanai Pass; they were beaten off without much
difficulty, but some of them were shot down within ten yards of the
entrenchment; we had one man killed and thirty-one wounded, among the
latter being General Wodehouse. On the 22nd Sir Bindon Blood proceeded
to the Mamund Valley to rejoin General Jeffreys; the Third Brigade on
the same date being attached to the force under General Elles for
completion of the operations against the Mohmands.
[Sidenote: In the Watelai Valley]
In the meantime the Second Brigade under General Jeffreys had been
engaged in further fighting. On the 16th the troops marched up the
Watelai Valley in three small columns, directed respectively on Badalai,
Badan and Agra, and experienced in the operations which resulted the
heaviest loss which British troops have suffered in frontier warfare, in
a single day’s fighting, since the Ambela campaign. The right column
destroyed some villages and then, finding a considerable force of the
enemy occupying a strong position from which it seemed impossible to
dislodge them without guns, returned to camp. The remaining two columns
moved up the valley, the enemy retiring before them; when, however, it
became necessary for the troops to halt to await the return of a party
which had been detached, the enemy began to press forward in
considerable numbers, inflicting some loss upon two companies of the
35th Sikhs, which were falling back upon their supports. The pressure
was, however, temporarily relieved by an opportune charge of a squadron
of the 11th Bengal Lancers under Captain Cole. The two columns commenced
their withdrawal to camp at Inayat Kila about 3 p.m. A flanking party of
two companies of the 35th Sikhs had not received the order to retire,
but when the party commenced to do so, it withdrew in a direction rather
diverging from the general line of retreat. These companies were
assailed by the enemy on all sides, and did not extricate themselves,
assisted finally by the Guides, until they had suffered over forty
casualties. As the whole force continued its retirement darkness came
on, accompanied by a heavy thunderstorm, and the General, considering it
would be difficult to reach camp that night and anxious about his
flanking parties, decided to occupy some villages till morning. The
orders failed, however, to reach all the units; some pushed on to camp;
but about dusk General Jeffreys found himself with no troops at his
immediate disposal, except four guns of No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, a
small party of Sappers, and a few men of the Buffs and 35th Sikhs, who
had become separated from their companies in the dark. With these the
General decided to occupy a hamlet called Bilot, about 3½ miles from
camp. Part of this village was burning and half was in possession of the
enemy, who had been following up closely, and the party with the General
was only able to occupy and entrench one angle of the hamlet. Fighting
was kept up at the closest possible quarters, and with heavy losses on
both sides, until the arrival, about midnight, of four companies of the
35th Sikhs, with whose assistance the enemy were easily driven off, the
rest of the night passing quietly.
The casualties during this day’s fighting amounted to 38 killed and 116
wounded, including three followers.
During the next few days the Second Brigade was busily employed in
destroying villages and removing grain stores—always under fire, while
the retirement to camp was invariably closely pressed. On the 23rd the
Mamunds professed to be disheartened at their losses and anxious to make
terms; but it seems probable that all they wished was to gain breathing
time, for the negotiations came to nothing, and operations were
accordingly resumed on the 29th September when many towers were
demolished. The wounded were sent down to the Panjkora, and the heavy
casualties in transport animals were made good.
On the 30th September the brigade attacked the villages of Agra and Gat,
and severe fighting ensued, the enemy in great numbers occupying a
position of considerable strength. More than once the Mamunds had to be
driven from their sangars at the point of the bayonet, and, although the
object of the operations was effected and the retirement was
satisfactorily carried out, the want of more troops—for the brigade was
by now greatly weakened—was much felt; on this day the casualties
numbered twelve killed and forty-nine wounded, while throughout the
losses in officers had been out of all proportion. Sir Bindon Blood now
reinforced the troops in the Mamund country by bringing up another
squadron of the Guides Cavalry, the 10th Field Battery, No. 8 Bengal
Mountain Battery, the 2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry, four
companies of the 24th Punjab Infantry, and No. 5 Company Madras Sappers
and Miners.
[Sidenote: Close of the Operations]
On the 3rd October the Second Brigade, with two mountain batteries,
attacked and destroyed the village of Badalai, experiencing small
opposition until the retirement commenced, when the enemy came on with
great boldness, and to the number of between two and three thousand.
There was now a very large body of troops at Inayat Kila, and the
Mamunds began clearly to recognise the hopelessness of prolonging the
resistance. They accordingly opened negotiations through the Khan of
Nawagai, their jirgah finally coming in on the 11th October and agreeing
to all our terms. The operations against the Mamunds, who had shown
fighting qualities of a high order, now came to an end, and the troops
were withdrawn from the Watelai Valley. During the period from the 14th
September to the 11th October, our casualties totalled 61 killed and 218
wounded.
On his way back to the Malakand, Sir Bindon Blood halted in the Salarzai
Valley and easily forced that section of the Tarkanris to submit, while
the Babukarra Valley was thoroughly explored. The last of the troops
crossed the Panjkora on the 23rd, and four days later the whole force
returned to the Swat Valley.
Since the conclusion of the operations just described, the clans of Dir
and Bajaur have given no trouble to the British Government; but the
efforts which the ambitions of the local khans cause them to make in
order to add to their territories, and the constant intrigues of
pretenders and other claimants, combine with the natural pugnacity of
the Pathan to cause some occasional anxiety as to the continued security
of our communications with Chitral.
CHAPTER VIII.
CHITRALIS.[77]
Chitral is the largest and the most important state on the northern part
of the north-western frontier. It lies immediately to the west of
Gilgit, while on the other side it is divided by the Hindu Kush from the
province of Kafiristan—transferred to the dominions of Afghanistan
during the latter part of the reign of the late Amir Abdurrahman Khan.
South of Gilgit the Shandur spur and the watershed between the Chitral
and Panjkora Rivers divide the country from Yasin, Kohistan and Dir; it
is bordered on the north by the Hindu Kush; while to the south the
watershed of the Arnawai Stream forms the boundary between Chitral and
the districts of Dir and Asmar. It is an especially mountainous country,
“composed partly of gigantic snowy peaks, mostly of barren rocky
mountains, and, in a very small degree, of cultivated land. The valleys
are narrow and confined, the main ones in their inhabited portions
running from 5000 to 8000 feet above sea-level. It is only in them that
any cultivation at all is found, and even then it is not carried on very
extensively.... But the whole food production is small, and barely
suffices for the people of the country, leaving little to spare for
outsiders. The climate varies according to the height of the valley. In
the lower parts, at about 5000 feet above sea-level, it ranges from 12°
or 15° in winter to 100° in summer, and higher up, at 8000 feet, it
would vary from 5° or so below zero to about 90° in summer.”[78]
Sir George Robertson, in his _Chitral_, says that “food is so scarce
that a fat man has never yet been seen in the country; even the upper
classes look underfed, and the most effective of bribes is a full meal.
The hill tracks, which form the main lines of communication, are seldom
easy; they are often difficult, sometimes dangerous.”
The country is watered by the river which goes in its northern course
indifferently by the names of the Yarkhun, the Mastuj or the Chitral
River, and which, flowing from a glacier of the Hindu Kush, runs
south-westerly to Asmar, where it becomes known as the Kunar River, and
falls into the Kabul River near Jalalabad. During its course it receives
the drainage of numerous valleys on either side, and is spanned by many
rope bridges, by several untrustworthy native-built bridges, usually
constructed on a rough cantilever principle, and by good suspension
bridges at important crossings, such as Chitral, Mastuj, Drosh and other
places. “Even when the rivers are moderately placid and shallow, the
fords,” Sir George Robertson tells us, “are always bad, because of the
boulders and stones in their beds; they are frequently devious also;
and, consequently, always require a guide. It is dangerous to miss the
proper line, for then one is liable to be carried into deep, heavy
water, or to find oneself in a quicksand.”[79]
[Sidenote: The Roads to Chitral]
There are two main routes from Chitral to India: that which has been
followed in the preceding chapter, from Chitral over the Lowari Pass,
through Dir and Swat, and across the Malakand to railhead at Dargai; and
another from Chitral across the Shandur Pass to the Gilgit road, and
thence through Kashmir and the Jhelum Valley to the rail at Rawal Pindi.
Those passes leading to the north or to the west are for the most part
very difficult; some are impracticable for pack animals, some are only
passable at all during certain brief seasons of the year; others again
could only be crossed by a lightly equipped force of selected troops
under unusually favourable circumstances. The Baroghil Pass (12,460
feet), which leads out of the Yarkhun Valley into Wakhan, is practicable
for laden animals during eight months of the year, and climbs over what
Holdich calls “the comparatively easy slopes of the flat-backed Hindu
Kush.” Many passes, but all more or less difficult, lead from Chitral
into Kafiristan, while that leading from Chitral to Upper Badakshan—the
Dorah Pass (14,800 feet)—is much trodden, and is used by laden animals
as a commercial link between the Kunar Valley and Badakshan. It is open
from July to September, and has been crossed as late as early in
November.
Chitral is an important state by reason of its situation at the
extremity of the country over which the Government of India exerts its
influence. Sir Francis Younghusband has described this state as “one of
the chinks in the wall of defence. Not a very large one, but certainly
capable of being made into a considerable one if we do not look after
it, and in time; for not only is there a chink just here, but the wall
is thinner too. Practicable roads across the mountains, especially those
by the Baroghil and Dorah passes, lead into Chitral; while the width of
the mountains from the plains on the south to the plains on the north,
as the crow flies, is 400 miles by the Pamirs and Gilgit, but through
Chitral only 200. So Chitral is a place to be looked after and
efficiently guarded.”
[Sidenote: Importance of Chitral]
Gilgit and Chitral seemed to the Government of India to afford good
watch-towers whence the country south of the Hindu Kush might be guarded
and controlled, since the northern passes provide a difficult but by no
means impracticable route for the incursion of a hostile force large
enough to cause trouble, or at least excitement, upon this portion of
the Border. But our occupation of Chitral is not universally approved.
Sir Thomas Holdich[80] has said that “the retention of Chitral may well
be regarded as a doubtful advantage.... As an outpost to keep watch and
ward for an advance from the north, Chitral is useless, for no serious
menace is possible from the north. As a safeguard otherwise, it is hard
to say from what it will protect us. It is in short the outcome of
political, not of military, strategy. As a political centre it must be
remembered that it possesses an outlook westwards over the hills and
valleys through which the Amir’s great commercial roads have been
projected, as well as northwards to the Hindu Kush passes. But it is at
best an expensive and burdensome outpost, and is, on the whole, the
least satisfactory of all the forward positions that we have recently
occupied.”
Elsewhere,[81] however, Sir Thomas Holdich seems in some degree to
qualify these opinions. Writing of these northern mountain approaches to
India, he says, “We cannot altogether leave them alone. They have to be
watched by the official guardians of our frontier, and all the gathered
threads of them converging on Leh or Gilgit must be held by hands that
are alert and strong. It is just as dangerous an error to regard such
approaches to India as negligible quantities in the military and
political field of Indian defence, as to take a serious view of their
practicability for purposes of invasion.... The Dorah Pass ... is the
one gateway which is normally open from year to year, and its existence
renders necessary an advanced watchtower at Chitral.”
The country is divided into the nine districts of Laspur, Mastuj,
Torikho, Mulrikho, Kosht, Owir, Khuzara, Chitral and Drosh. The
population totals something over seventy thousand, and the fighting
strength is estimated at six thousand men, armed for the most part with
matchlocks of local manufacture or imported from Badakshan. There are
also in the country under a thousand Sniders and muzzle-loading Enfield
rifles, presented at different times to the Mehtar or ruler by the
Indian Government.
The Chitralis are the only non-Pathan tribe described in this book and
are a mixed race of Aryan type, of whose origin little is known: the
language of the country is Chitrali, and Persian is also spoken by some
of the upper classes. The people are all Muhammadans, mostly Sunnis, but
by no means of a particularly strict or fanatical type; and while the
priests have a certain amount of influence, they are unable to work
their flocks up into any high degree of religious frenzy as is possible
with certain Pathans. The people of Chitral are splendid mountaineers
with great powers of endurance, and have fought well on occasion. Sir
George Robertson has thus described their characteristics:[82] “There
are few more treacherous people than the Chitralis, and they have a
wonderful capacity for cold-blooded cruelty; yet none are kinder to
little children, or have stronger affection for blood or
foster-relations when cupidity or jealousy do not intervene. All have
pleasant manners and engaging light-heartedness, free from all trace of
boisterous behaviour, a great fondness for music, dancing and singing, a
passion for simple-minded ostentation, and an instinctive yearning for
softness and luxury, which is the mainspring of their intense cupidity
and avarice. No race is more untruthful, or has greater power of keeping
a collective secret. Their vanity is easily injured, they are revengeful
and venal, but they are charmingly picturesque and admirable companions.
Perhaps the most convenient trait they possess, as far as we are
concerned, is a complete absence of religious fanaticism.... Sensuality
of the grossest kind, murder, abominable cruelty, treachery or violent
death, are never long absent from the thoughts of a people than whom
none in the world are of simpler, gentler appearance.”
[Sidenote: Early History]
The early history of Chitral is a record of intrigue, civil war and
assassination—“a monotonous tale of murder and perfidy—the slaying of
brother by brother, of son by father,” and each successive Mehtar
appears to have waded to the throne through seas of blood. The founder
of the Chitral Royal Family was Shah Katur, whose descendants, dividing
into two branches, parcelled the mountainous country from Kafiristan to
Gilgit between them—the Khushwakt branch ruling the eastern portion,
while the Katur branch governed in the west, or Lower Chitral. At the
time of the British occupation of the Punjab, one Gauhar Aman reigned in
the Khushwakt district, while Shah Afzul II. ruled in Lower Chitral.
About 1854 the Kashmir State, having long suffered from the
encroachments of the ruler of Upper Chitral, appealed to Shah Afzul for
assistance, and he, induced thereto far more by hatred of his kinsman
than by any wish to oblige the Kashmir authorities, seized, in 1855,
Mastuj, then the headquarters of the Khushwaktia chief. Possession was,
however, regained in the year following, but the place was again
captured by the Chitralis in 1857.
In this year Shah Afzul II. died quietly in his bed—the demise of a
ruler from natural causes was almost unprecedented in this country—and
was succeeded by his second son, Aman-ul-Mulk, known as “the great
Mehtar.” In 1860 the eastern chief also died, being succeeded in the
Mehtarship of Khushwaktia by Mir Wali, who was deposed and slain by his
own brother; while in 1880 Aman-ul-Mulk invaded and possessed himself of
the eastern portion of Chitral, uniting the whole country under his
sovereignty. Not long after this, during the viceroyalty of Lord Lytton,
it was decided that the policy of the Government of India should be so
extended as to control the external affairs of Chitral in a direction
friendly to our interests; so as to secure an effective guardianship
over the northern passes, and to keep watch over what goes on beyond
them. To initiate and carry out this policy, Major Biddulph was sent to
Gilgit in 1877 and spent some years there, succeeding in entering into
relations with Aman-ul-Mulk, then Mehtar of Chitral. No very definite
arrangement was come to at this time, the position was considered rather
too isolated, and Major Biddulph was withdrawn. Then in 1885 Lord
Dufferin despatched the late General Sir William Lockhart at the head of
an important mission, to enter into more definite and closer relations
with the Mehtar of Chitral, and to report upon the defences of the
country. Colonel Lockhart, as he then was, spent more than a year in
Chitral; he wintered at Gilgit, traversed the State of Hunza, crossed
the Hindu Kush, passed through Wakhan down the southernmost branch of
the Oxus, and travelled over Chitral territory from one end of the
country to the other. Similar visits were paid to Chitral by Colonel
Durand in 1888 and 1889, and in this latter year the Agency at Gilgit,
withdrawn in 1881, was re-established, and certain allowances, doubled
in 1891, were granted to the Mehtar, Aman-ul-Mulk.
[Sidenote: Beginning of Trouble]
In the following year the thirty-two years’ reign of “the great Mehtar”
came to an end, he dying suddenly of heart failure while in _durbar_.
His eldest son, Nizam-ul-Mulk, was away in Yasin at the time, and the
second brother, Afzul-ul-Mulk, seized the fort at Chitral with its
arsenal and treasure, and sent off urgent demands to the Agent at Gilgit
that he might at once be recognized as Mehtar. Nothing was to be feared
from Nizam, who was no fighter and fled to Gilgit, leaving Afzul to
return triumphant to Chitral. Afzul had, however, apparently overlooked
or disregarded the fact that there was another candidate for the
Mehtarship in one Sher Afzul, fourth son of Shah Afzul II., and
consequently a younger brother of Aman-ul-Mulk and uncle to
Afzul-ul-Mulk. Sher Afzul seems to have left Kabul, where he had been
living, directly he heard of his brother’s death, crossed the Dorah Pass
from Badakshan at the head of a handful of followers, and, marching
rapidly, surprised the fort at Chitral, Afzul-ul-Mulk being shot down in
the ensuing _mêlée_.
Sher Afzul, who seemed to have many adherents in the country, was now
proclaimed Mehtar, but his reign was a very short one. Nizam-ul-Mulk,
plucking up courage, determined to proceed to Chitral and turn out the
new pretender. He was joined by a Hunza chief of considerable military
capacity and force of character, while his advance appears to have been
preceded by extravagant rumours that his candidature was supported by
the British authorities; and Sher Afzul then, losing heart, fled back to
Kabul by way of the Kunar Valley.
Nizam-ul-Mulk was now formally recognised as Mehtar by the British
Government, and two of the political officers of the Gilgit Agency
visited the new ruler in Chitral and promised him that, under certain
conditions, the same allowances and support would be given to him as had
been afforded to his father, Aman-ul-Mulk. So far as could be seen, it
appeared that the new ruler was in the way to be fairly well established
on the throne.
It is now necessary to revert to Umra Khan of Jandol, of whom some
mention has already been made in the last chapter, and whose actions and
aggressions were largely responsible for the troubles which now arose
upon this part of the frontier.
At the end of 1894 the situation here was as follows: Umra Khan had at
last made friends with his old enemy, the Khan of Nawagai; he had
established his authority over a considerable portion of Swat, the
greater part of Bajaur, and the whole of Dir; while he had possessed
himself of the strip of country known as Narsat, hitherto claimed alike
by Chitral, Dir and Asmar. He had attacked some villages in the Bashgul
Valley, claimed by Chitral; had commenced to build forts at Arnawai and
Birkot, in the Kunar Valley; and had encroached upon Chitral territory,
and demanded the payment of tribute from Chitral villages. The ex-Khan
of Dir was at this time a refugee in Upper Swat. Nizam-ul-Mulk was
proving himself a fairly efficient and popular, though not a strong,
ruler; Sher Afzul was believed to be safely interned at Kabul; and
Nizam’s younger brother, Amir-ul-Mulk, who had at first fled from
Chitral, had now returned there and been well received by the new
Mehtar.
[Sidenote: Murder of Nizam]
On the 1st January, 1895, Nizam-ul-Mulk was shot dead while out hawking
by one of the servants, and at the instigation, of Amir-ul-Mulk, who at
once caused himself to be proclaimed Mehtar, but his recognition was
delayed for reference to Simla. There can be little doubt that this
fresh murder was the outcome of a conspiracy between Amir-ul-Mulk, Sher
Afzul and Umra Khan, and that the object was to remove Nizam and cause
him to be temporarily succeeded by Amir, who was then to resign in
favour of Sher Afzul. Umra Khan was to be called in merely to help the
furtherance of the schemes of the other two: but Umra Khan had his own
personal interests to consult, and on hearing news of the murder he at
once crossed the Lowari Pass with between 3000 and 4000 men, and
occupied the southern Chitral Valley. He sent on letters stating that he
had come to wage a holy war against the Kafirs of the Bashgul Valley,
that he had no hostile designs against Chitral, and that if Amir-ul-Mulk
did not join and help him he must take the consequences. Umra Khan now
advanced on Kila Drosh, twenty-five miles below Chitral fort.
At this date there were rather over 3000 troops garrisoning posts in the
Upper Indus, Gilgit and Chitral Valleys, and of these roughly one-third
were regular troops of the Indian Army, the remainder belonging to
regiments of the Kashmir Durbar. When the murder of Nizam took place,
Lieutenant Gurdon was in political charge at Chitral, accompanied by no
more than eight men of the 14th Sikhs, drawn from a detachment of 103
posted at Mastuj under Lieutenant Harley. There were no other troops of
any kind in Chitral, and the nearest garrison was at Gupis, far on the
eastern side of the Shandur Pass. The nearest regular troops were
ninety-nine men of the 14th Sikhs at Gilgit, while the 32nd Pioneers,
rather over 800 strong, were employed on the Bunji-Chilas road. Gurdon
at once drew upon Mastuj for fifty Sikhs of its garrison, and these
reached him unhindered and unmolested on the 7th January. In
anticipation of possible trouble, the following moves then took place:
Mastuj was reinforced by 100 men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles from Gupis,
200 men of the same regiment moved up to Ghizr, while Gupis was
strengthened by 150 men of the 6th Kashmir Light Infantry from Gilgit.
Shortly before this Surgeon-Major Robertson—now Sir George Robertson—had
relieved Colonel Bruce in charge of the Gilgit Agency, and he now at
once left for Chitral, taking with him some of the 4th Kashmir Rifles
under Captain Townsend, Central India Horse, and the remainder of the
14th Sikhs from Mastuj—100 in all. Before he reached there, however, the
Chitralis, who had at first evinced some intention of opposing Umra
Khan, had been driven from a position they had taken up in front of Kila
Drosh; while a fortnight later—on the 9th February—the fort of Drosh was
surrendered, without any pretence of resistance, to Umra Khan, with all
its rifles and stores. About the 18th the situation, already
sufficiently complicated, was rendered even more so by the news that
Sher Afzul, probably the most generally popular of all the claimants to
the throne, had arrived at Drosh. He was at once joined by some of the
lower class Chitralis, and by the end of February nearly all the
Adamzadas (members of clans descended from the founder of the ruling
family) had also gone over to him. On the 1st March the British Agent
withdrew his escort—now numbering 100 of the 14th Sikhs and 320 of the
4th Kashmir Rifles—into the fort at Chitral; and on the following day in
_durbar_, it being patent that Amir-ul-Mulk, listening to the promptings
of ill-advisers, had been intriguing with Umra Khan, Amir was placed
under surveillance, and his young brother, Shuja-ul-Mulk, was formally
recognised as Mehtar, subject to the approval of the Government of
India.
[Sidenote: The New Mehtar]
The number of followers with which Umra Khan had entered Chitral
territory had been gradually increasing, as his star appeared to be in
the ascendant, and his total strength was now estimated at between 5000
and 8000 men. On the afternoon of the 3rd March Sher Afzul reached the
neighbourhood of Chitral at the head of an armed force, and took up a
position in some villages about two miles to the south-west of the fort.
At 4.15 two hundred men of the Kashmir Rifles were sent out, under
Captains Campbell, Townsend and Baird, to check the enemy’s advance.
Captain Campbell proposed to attack the position in front, while fifty
men under Captain Baird made a flank attack along some high ground to
the west. The enemy were found to be well armed and strongly posted; the
Kashmir troops were met with a very heavy fire, and the attempts to
carry the position by assault failed. It was rapidly getting dark, and
Captain Campbell commenced to retire, being followed up closely by the
enemy. The main body sustained heavy losses, but gained the fort under
cover of the fire of a party of the 14th Sikhs; Captain Baird’s
detachment became, however, isolated, Baird himself was mortally
wounded, being carried back by Surgeon Captain Whitchurch, and this
party only made its way back to the fort after desperate fighting, in
which several were killed and many wounded. On this day, out of 150 men
actually engaged, twenty-five were killed and thirty wounded. Captain
Campbell was severely wounded, and the command of the troops in Chitral
fort now devolved upon Captain Townsend. On this day the siege of
Chitral fort may be said to have commenced, and for many weeks no news
of the garrison reached the outer world.
[Sidenote: The Chitral-Gilgit Line]
_Events on the Chitral-Gilgit Line._—We may now conveniently describe
the events which took place on the line of communications between
Chitral and Mastuj, and all that befell the small bodies of reinforcing
troops and the convoys, which were struggling westward through a very
difficult and actively hostile country.
On the 26th February the following instructions had issued from the
British Agent: “Lieutenant Edwardes, commanding at Ghizr, to hand over
that garrison to Lieutenant Gough, and to come on to Chitral, there to
take command of the Puniali levies which had been ordered up from
Gilgit; Lieutenant Moberley, commanding at Mastuj, was directed to order
Lieutenant Fowler, R.E. (expected shortly to reach Mastuj with a party
of Bengal Sappers and Miners), to continue his march to Chitral; and to
send on a supply of Snider ammunition to Chitral by a suitable escort
making ordinary marches.” These two last-mentioned orders were received
at Mastuj on the 28th February, and on the following day the ammunition
was sent off to Chitral under escort of forty of the Kashmir Rifles. On
the 2nd March, however, disquieting news reaching Mastuj as to the state
of affairs on the road, Lieutenant Moberley was in doubt as to whether
he should not recall the ammunition escort, but it was ultimately
permitted to proceed. On this date Captain Ross was expected at Laspur
with 100 of the 14th Sikhs, and Lieutenant Moberley wrote asking him to
come straight through to Mastuj in a single stage; this Captain Ross
did, reaching Mastuj on the 3rd.
He marched on again the following day to support the ammunition escort,
which had been obliged to halt at Buni owing to the onward road having
been broken down; and on the 5th the force at Buni was further
strengthened by the arrival there of twenty men of the Bengal Sappers
and Miners, accompanied by Lieutenants Fowler and Edwardes.
The possibility of the road being designedly broken had been foreseen by
the British Agent, who had caused certain orders to be issued to meet
such an eventuality; but as these never reached Lieutenant Moberley, to
whom they had been addressed at Mastuj, it seems unnecessary here to
recapitulate them.
[Sidenote: The Fighting at Reshun]
On the 5th March Captain Ross returned with his Sikhs to Mastuj, while
on the next day the combined detachment—two British officers, twenty
Bengal Sappers and forty of the 4th Kashmir Rifles—marched on to Reshun,
a large, straggling village situated on a sloping plain on the left bank
of the Chitral River. Here news came in of fighting at Chitral, but the
night passed quietly, and at noon on the 7th the two officers, with the
twenty sappers, ten rifles and a number of coolies, moved off to repair
a break reported about three miles distant. Reaching a narrow defile
near Parpish, sangars were noticed on the high cliffs; these were at
once occupied by the tribesmen, firing became general, four of the
little party were hit, one being killed, and a retirement on Reshun was
now ordered.
Eight more men were hit during this retirement. On arrival at an
entrenchment which had been thrown up by the rest of the party near the
village, the position was found too exposed, and a cluster of
houses—affording better cover—was seized, and the work of improving the
defences was at once proceeded with.
A fierce but unsuccessful attack was made just before dawn, and firing
was kept up during the 8th from a large number of Martini and Snider
rifles; at the end of the day the total losses of the defence—including
the casualties near Parpish—amounted to seven killed or died of wounds
and sixteen wounded. For the next five days the little garrison defended
its post with conspicuous gallantry against heavy odds and repeated
attacks from the enemy, who had succeeded in establishing themselves
under cover close up to the walls. Lieutenant Fowler specially
distinguished himself in making several successful sorties to obtain
water. On the 13th the enemy opened negotiations, stating that all
fighting at Chitral had ceased, and that Sher Afzul was engaged in
friendly correspondence with the British Government. By the 15th, it
seeming that matters were in course of arrangement, the two officers
were persuaded to leave their defences, and were then treacherously
seized, while the Chitralis succeeded in rushing the defences.
Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler were now taken in charge by some of Umra
Khan’s men, and proceeding by Chitral and Drosh to Jandol, were
eventually released and sent in to Sir Robert Low’s camp at Sado in
April.
When, on the 6th March, Lieutenant Edwardes heard of the gathering below
Reshun, he had at once sent back news to Mastuj, where it arrived the
same evening, and Captain Ross thereupon started next morning with his
party—two British officers, one native officer and ninety-three of other
ranks—to bring Lieutenant Edwardes’ detachment back to Buni. Reaching
Buni late on the night of the 7th, he there left his native officer with
thirty-three rank and file, and pushed on next morning for Reshun with
the remainder of his party. At 1 p.m. the Koragh Defile was reached; as
described by Robertson, “the defile is the result of the river cutting
its winding course through terrible cliffs. A goat, scuttling along the
high ridges, might start a thunderous avalanche of boulders down the
unstable slopes. At the lower end of this frightful gorge the pathway
begins to ascend from the river above some caves, and then zigzags
upwards. There the ‘point’ of the advance guard was fired upon, and
hundreds of men disclosed themselves and set the very hillsides rolling
down.” The small party were in a trap. Several men were at once hit, and
Captain Ross then decided to occupy some caves in the river bank. He
made several attempts to scale the cliffs and to force his way back to
Buni, but was everywhere met by a heavy fire from both banks of the
river, and by a deadly hail of rocks from the cliffs above. Captain Ross
was killed, and eventually his subaltern, Lieutenant Jones, with only
fourteen men, ten of the party being wounded, reached Buni on the
evening of the 10th. Here he occupied a house and held it until the
17th, when Lieutenant Moberley marched out from Mastuj with 150 men of
the Kashmir troops, and relieved and brought in the remnants of Captain
Ross’ party.
From the 22nd March until the 9th April Mastuj was invested by the
enemy, but on this latter date they began to retire owing to the advance
of the Gilgit column under Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly. The Mastuj garrison
had only one man wounded.
[Sidenote: The Gilgit Column]
_Advance of the Gilgit Column._—During the first week in March reports
of the serious state of affairs in the Chitral Valley began to reach
Gilgit, whence a few days later the Assistant British Agent sent down a
request to Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly to bring to Gilgit a wing of the
32nd Pioneers, then engaged in road-making between Bunji and Chilas. In
peace time this officer commanded no more than his own regiment, but on
hostilities occurring he automatically became the military head of the
whole district, and all military responsibility rested on him alone. The
message reached Colonel Kelly on the 14th, and by the 22nd the wing
(strength 403) had arrived at Gilgit; on the same day Colonel Kelly was
informed by telegraph from the Adjutant General that he was in military
command in the Gilgit Agency, and was also Chief Political Officer so
long as communications with Chitral were interrupted; in regard to
operations he was to use his own judgment but was to run no unnecessary
risks. He was also informed of the advance of a relief force via Swat
about the 1st April. Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly now issued the following
orders: 200 men to start early on the 23rd for Chitral, followed on the
next day by the remainder of the wing, accompanied by two guns of No. 1
Kashmir Mountain Battery. Of the other half battalion 200 were called up
to Gilgit from the Indus Valley, while the remainder of the regiment
(242) was to proceed to Chilas.
At this time the various happenings on the Gilgit-Chitral road were
known, except that no tidings had come in of the disaster to the party
under Lieutenant Edwardes. Colonel Kelly’s command now extended from
Astor to Chitral, and contained, exclusive of the troops in the Mastuj
and Chitral districts, four mountain guns, 845 of the 32nd Pioneers,
about 1250 Rifles of the Kashmir Infantry, and 160 Kashmir Sappers. But
in deciding upon the numbers of which the Relief Column was to be
composed, with which he intended to force his way to Chitral, it was
necessary also to provide for the safety of Gilgit and for keeping open
the line of communications. There was nothing to be feared from the
people of Hunza and Nagar, whose chiefs at once furnished 1000 men for
employment as levies; but the people of Chilas required watching, though
apparently submissive, while those of Yasin were sure to be in sympathy
with their near neighbours of Chitral. From Gilgit to Chitral was 220
miles, and between the two posts was the Shandur Pass (12,250 feet), at
this season deep in snow. As far as Gupis there was a made mule road,
but thence forward the road was a mere track; while throughout its
length there were many places where it might be easily blocked, and
where an enemy might take up an almost impregnable position. The supply
question was further one of great anxiety, especially should the country
prove hostile, but it was known that reserve supplies were stored at
Gupis, Ghizr and Mastuj. Bearing all these points in mind,
Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly decided to limit the strength of the Relief
Column to 400 men of the 32nd Pioneers, two guns of the Kashmir Mountain
Battery, 40 Kashmir Sappers and 100 of the Hunza and Nagar levies. The
column started in two parties. As far as Gupis, which was reached on the
26th and 27th, mule transport was used, but this was here exchanged for
coolies and ponies; owing, however, to desertions among the coolies the
loads had to be reduced—there were no tents and each man had an
allowance of 15 lbs. of baggage—while only six days’ supplies could be
taken with the column.
[Sidenote: Crossing the Shandur]
Ghizr was reached on the 30th and 31st March, and the march to the
Shandur Pass was commenced. The snow was now so deep that the battery
mules and the ponies could not proceed; Colonel Kelly therefore withdrew
200 of his men under Captain Borradaile to Teru and returned himself
with the rest of the column to Ghizr where the supply question did not
present such difficulties. Borradaile was next day to attempt to cross
the Shandur Pass, reach and entrench himself at Laspur, return the
transport, and try and open communications with Mastuj.
Snow fell heavily during the next twenty-four hours and no start could
be made until 11 a.m. on the 3rd, by which time the guns and a
detachment of the Kashmir Rifles had joined Borradaile. The pass was
crossed under extraordinary difficulties, the infantry reaching Laspur
on the night of the 4th, and the guns and Kashmir Infantry the following
afternoon. A reconnaissance on the 6th revealed the presence in the
neighbourhood of the enemy, who were reported also to be entrenched near
the Chakalwat defile some thirteen miles further on. On this day Colonel
Kelly arrived with fifty Nagar levies, and next day fifty Puniali levies
also came in. Some idea of the severity of the climate may be gathered
from the fact that among the troops there were sixty-three cases of snow
blindness and forty-three of frost-bite.
The second part of the column, delayed at Ghizr, was unable to reach
Laspur until the 9th, but Colonel Kelly, considering it inadvisable to
wait, pushed on to Gasht with the remainder of his party, and after
reconnoitring the enemy’s position, determined to attack. The enemy’s
position was naturally very strong and the sangars well placed; these
blocked the valley on either side of the river and were continued up to
the snow line, while the right of the position was further protected by
a mass of fallen snow descending into the water. On the 9th Colonel
Kelly advanced towards the enemy’s position at Chakalwat; the Hunza
levies were sent up the heights on one side to get above and fire into
the sangars; while the Puniali men ascended on the other flank to drive
the enemy from their stone shoots on the slopes above the river.
The force deployed on a gentle slope facing the right-hand sangars, and
the two guns opened fire at 800 yards range. This shell-fire and the
volleys of the infantry cleared the enemy out of the right sangar, while
the Hunza levies had already driven them from those higher up. The next
line of sangars was attacked in the same manner, and the enemy now began
to give way and were soon in full flight, having lost between fifty and
sixty killed. Our casualties were only four men wounded.
[Sidenote: Forcing the Nisa Gol]
Colonel Kelly now moved on to Mastuj, where the rest of his column
closed up on the 11th, and the three days spent here were occupied in
the collection of transport and supplies and in pushing out
reconnaissances. These disclosed the presence of the enemy in a strong
and well-fortified position, where the Chitral River Valley is cleft by
a deep ravine known as the Nisa Gol, 200 or 300 feet deep, with
precipitous sides. The defence was prepared on much the same lines as at
Chakalwat, but the sangars were of better construction, being provided
with head cover, while their front was covered by the precipices of the
Nisa Gol.
It was decided to attack on the 13th and to try and turn the enemy’s
left. Colonel Kelly pursued the same tactics as in the earlier action,
bringing his artillery fire to bear on the sangars while keeping up a
heavy rifle fire, his levies climbing the precipitous hillsides and
turning the flank. The guns silenced sangar after sangar, gradually
moving in closer; a place was discovered where the ravine could be
crossed, and a party reached the opposite side just as the levies had
turned the position. The enemy now evacuated their defences and fled,
fired on by the guns and the infantry. Our loss was seven killed and
thirteen wounded.
There was no further opposition to the advance of the Gilgit column,
beyond such as was experienced from broken bridges and roads, and on the
20th April Colonel Kelly’s force marched into Chitral and joined the
garrison.
[Sidenote: Siege of Chitral Fort]
_The Siege of Chitral Fort._—This commenced, as has been said, on the
3rd March, after the action of that date wherein the British troops had
suffered many casualties; and when, in consequence of Captain Campbell
having been severely wounded, the command of the troops devolved upon
Captain Townsend. The garrison of the fort consisted of six British
officers, of whom five only were fit for duty, ninety-nine men of the
14th Sikhs, and 301 of all ranks of the 4th Kashmir Rifles. There were
in addition fifty-two Chitralis—men whose loyalty was at best
dubious—and eighty-five followers. The supplies, on half-rations, could
be made to last two and a half months, while of ammunition there were
300 rounds per Martini-Henri rifle of the Sikhs and 280 rounds per
Snider of the Kashmir troops. The fort was about seventy yards square
with a tower at each corner, and a fifth guarded the path to the river;
the walls of the fort were some twenty-five feet in height and from
eight to ten feet thick; it was practically commanded on all sides, and
surrounded on three by houses, walls, and all kinds of cover. The number
of British officers was so small and the Kashmir troops, who composed
three-fourths of the fort-garrison, were so shaken by their losses on
the 3rd, that Captain Townsend resolved to remain as far as possible on
the defensive. He confined his energies, therefore, to devising measures
of defence, to the provision of cover within and the demolition of cover
without the walls, to arranging a system for quickly extinguishing
fires, and to providing as far as possible for proper sanitation.
The garrison was therefore engaged in real fighting on two occasions
only during the forty-eight days that the siege lasted, and the losses
incurred in the passive defence of the fort were not heavy; there was,
however, much sickness, and at the end of the first week only eighty
Sikhs and 240 of the Kashmir Rifles remained fit for duty. From the 16th
to the 23rd there was a truce, during which Sher Afzul did his best to
persuade the British Agent to agree to withdraw the garrison to Mastuj,
or to India by way of Jandol. During the suspension of hostilities
Captain Townsend effected many improvements in the defences. The guard
duties were very heavy, half the effectives being on duty at a time, and
the defenders were harassed day and night by a desultory rifle fire.
On the 7th, under cover of a heavy rifle fire, a party of the enemy
crept up to the tower at the south-eastern corner and managed to set it
on fire. A strong wind was blowing, and for some time matters looked
very serious, as the tower, being largely composed of wood, burned
fiercely. No sooner did the fire seem to be mastered than it blazed up
again; the enemy, occupying the high ground, were able to fire upon men
going in and out of the tower with water and earth; the British Agent
and a Sikh soldier were here wounded, while a sentry of the Kashmir
Rifles was killed. On the 10th an attack was made on the waterway, and
on the morning of the 17th the enemy could distinctly be heard at work
upon a mine, leading to the same tower as that attacked on the 7th. It
was clear that the entrance of the mine was in a summer-house about a
hundred and fifty feet from the tower, and which there had been no time
to demolish; while from the distinctness with which the sound of digging
could be heard, the mine had evidently reached within a few feet of the
base of the tower. It was decided to make a sortie, carry the
summer-house where it was thought the mine shaft would be found, and
destroy the mine, since matters had gone too far to counter-mine.
[Sidenote: Harley’s Sortie]
For this duty forty men of the 14th Sikhs, with their _jemadar_, and
sixty of the Kashmir Rifles, with a native officer, were placed under
command of Lieutenant H. K. Harley, 14th Sikhs, with orders to leave the
fort at 4 p.m. by the east gate, rush the summer-house, and hold it on
the enemy’s side, while the rest of the party destroyed or blew in the
mine gallery. The summer-house was taken with a loss of two men killed,
the defenders—some thirty Pathans—bolting to the cover of a wall and
opening fire from thence upon Harley’s party. Leaving some men to keep
these in check, Harley led the remainder to the mine shaft, just outside
the summer-house. Thirty-five Chitralis, armed with swords, came out and
were at once bayoneted. Harley now cleared the mine, arranged powder and
fuse, but it was untamped and the charge exploded prematurely; none the
less the effect was excellent, the mine being burst open right up to the
foot of the tower, and lying exposed like a trench. Two prisoners were
brought in, two of the enemy were killed in the mine by the explosion,
two Pathans were shot in the summer-house, and many of the enemy were
shot down by the covering fire from the walls of the fort. Harley’s
party had eight men killed and thirteen wounded.
The enemy now seemed to have made their last effort; they had learnt
that the defenders were still able to assume a vigorous offensive, and
they knew that help was drawing nearer from the direction of Gilgit. On
the night of the 18th–19th the investing force quietly withdrew and
abandoned the siege; Sher Afzul and the Jandol chiefs fled that night to
Bashkar and Asmar, and on the afternoon of the 20th the Gilgit force
marched in.
During the siege the loss of the garrison of Chitral fort amounted,
exclusive of the casualties on the 3rd March, to seventeen killed and
thirty-two wounded.
CHAPTER IX.
MOHMANDS.[83]
The Mohmands are divided into two main branches, the trans-frontier or
Bar (hill) Mohmands and the cis-frontier or Kuz (plain) Mohmands, and
both belong to the Ghoria Khel branch of the Afghans, who, when driven
from their holdings on the head waters of the Tarnak and Arghastan
Rivers by the Tarin Afghans, emigrated eastwards, at the commencement of
the fifteenth century, by way of Ghazni, Kabul and Ningrahar. The Bar
Mohmands separated from those of the Kuz branch at Dakka, the latter
going to the Peshawar Valley, while the former made for the original
Gandhar and took possession of the hills which they still occupy. Thus
separated, the two branches have long since lost touch with each other.
Speaking generally, the country of the trans-frontier Mohmands extends
from a little south of the Kabul River, on the line Girdi Kats to Fort
Michni on the south, to Bajaur on the north. On the east it is
coterminous with the Peshawar district from Gandi, three miles north of
Jamrud, to Fort Abazai, and along the right bank of the Swat River about
twelve miles above Abazai. On the west it is bounded by the Kabul
Tsappar Range and by the Kunar River, which constitute the dividing line
between the Mohmands under British and Afghan spheres of influence, for
by the Durand Agreement of 1893 the Mohmand country, which from the days
of Ahmad Shah had been more or less subject to the Kabul rulers, was
divided between the British and the Afghan Governments. The settlements
of the cis-frontier Mohmands lie immediately south of Peshawar, and are
bounded on the north by the Bara River, on the west and south by the Aka
Khel and Adam Khel Afridis, and on the east by the Khattaks, their
country being some twenty miles long by twelve miles broad. The greater
portion of this is irrigated by the Bara River, is very productive, and
its inhabitants for the most part fairly well to do.
In regard to the circumstances attending the partition of the Mohmand
country, the author of _Afghanistan_ wrote as follows in the _United
Service Magazine_ of April, 1908: “At the period of the Durand Mission
the Government of India laid claim to the entire region—Bulund Khel,
Mohmandstan, Asmar and Yaghistan, the latter embracing Chitral, Bajaur,
Swat, Buner, Dir, Chilas and Waziristan. The Amir put forward a demand
for Chageh in Baluchistan and the Asmar Valley, which he had previously
occupied, and objected to the British pretensions. In point of fact, the
rights of the Government of India had been already established by
conquest and by moral superiority, since this zone, the home of border
ruffians, had always required the watchful initiative of a strong
Government.... Ultimately, after long discussion, the negotiations
concluded, when it was revealed that at needless sacrifice the Asmar
Valley, commanding the approach to the Pamir-Chitral region and
south-eastern Afghanistan, and of great importance to strategic
considerations on the Indian frontier, had been surrendered to the Amir,
the Birmal tract separated from Waziristan, and an ethnic absurdity
perpetrated where the Mohmands’ country had been divided by the
watershed of the Kunar and Panjkora Rivers.”
[Sidenote: The Mohmand Boundary]
On the 12th June, 1894, Mr. Udny, the Commissioner of Peshawar, who had
been nominated as chief of the Mohmand Boundary Delimitation Commission,
issued a proclamation to “all Bajauri, Mohmand and other tribes
inhabiting the country towards the Indian Empire from the Kabul River to
the southern limit of Chitral,” giving what he called “a brief sketch of
the boundary.” He stated that “whereas the kingdom of Great Britain has
agreed that his Highness the Amir should retain in his possession the
country of Asmar on the north of Chanak, situated on the Kunar River, or
the River of Kashkar, the boundary demarcation will commence from Chanak
in a south-westerly direction up to Kunar, and at a distance of a few
English miles from the bank of the Kunar River towards Bajaur. From
Kunar the boundary line goes southwards, and, taking a bend, ascends the
hills close to Satala Sar, which hills divide the watershed between the
Kunar and Panjkora rivers. From Satala Sar the boundary passes over the
crest of the hill, on one side of which the waters flowing from the Dag
Hills fall into the Panjkora River, whilst the waters on the other side
passing through the Satala Valley, fall into the Kabul River. And in the
centre of this hill lies the kotal of Satala. The extreme end of the
boundary touches the Kabul River, in the vicinity of Palosi. From a
review of the above details, you will understand that, in addition to
the countries watered by the Kunar River which lie towards the limits of
the Indian dominions, his Highness the Amir has agreed not to interfere
in all that country, the eastern waters of which fall into the Panjkora
River, nor to interfere or stretch his hand in that quarter of the
Mohmand country, the waters of which fall into the Kabul River below
Palosi.”
When, however, Mr. Udny met in August at Jalalabad the Sipah Salar,
Ghulam Haidar, the Amir’s representative, it seemed that the Amir
intended to repudiate the Durand Agreement, so far as it concerned the
Mohmand and Bajaur country; the proposed partition of Mohmand spheres of
influence was rejected, it appearing that the Sipah Salar, on behalf of
his master, claimed to exercise jurisdiction over the Mohmands right
down to the Peshawar Valley. A solution of the difficulty was, however,
found, and Colonel Sir T. Holdich has something to tell us about it in
his _Indian Borderland_, where he writes: “It was impossible to give any
effect to the agreement of 1893 without clearly ascertaining whether the
geographical conditions of the country admitted of a direct
interpretation. For the most part they did not. The boundary of the
agreement was partly a geographical impossibility, but for a great part
there was no obstruction in the way of carrying out its intention,
except a new and varied interpretation which the Amir put upon the text
of it.... A boundary was found between Afghanistan and the independent
tribes to the east, from the Hindu Kush to a point in the Kunar Valley
from whence it diverged to Lundi Kotal; and although at that point it
had to be temporarily abandoned, and has remained undemarcated, enough
was secured to lead up to a better geographical knowledge of the whole
position, on the basis of which it was possible to effect a subsequent
agreement which has rendered actual demarcation through the Mohmand
country unnecessary,” in spite of the fact that no part of the boundary
defined south of the Hindu Kush was the actual boundary of the
agreement.
[Sidenote: The Kunar Valley]
Of the Kunar River and Valley Holdich has a good deal to say, both in
_The Gates of India_ and in _The Indian Borderland_. In the former book
he writes that it was in the Kunar Valley that Alexander the Great
“found and defeated the chief of the Aspasians. The Kunar River is by
far the most important of the northern tributaries of the Kabul. It
rises under the Pamirs, and is otherwise known as the Chitral River. The
Kunar Valley is amongst the most lovely of the many lovely valleys of
Afghanistan. Flanked by the snowy-capped mountains of Kashmund on the
west, and the long level water-parting which divides it from Bajaur and
the Panjkora drainage on the east, it appears, as one enters it from
Jalalabad, to be hemmed in and constricted. The gates of it are indeed
somewhat narrow, but it widens out northward, where the ridges of the
lofty Kashmund tail off into low altitudes of sweeping foothills a few
miles above the entrance, and here offer opportunity for an easy pass
across the divide from the west into the valley. This is a link in the
oldest and probably the best-trodden route from Kabul to the Punjab, and
it has no part with the Khyber. It links together these northern valleys
of Laghman, Kundar and Lundai (_i.e._ the Panjkora and Swat united) by a
road north of the Kabul, finally passing southwards into the plains
chequered by the river network above Peshawar. The lower Kunar Valley in
the early autumn is passing beautiful. Down the tawny plain and backed
by purple hills the river winds its way, reflecting the azure sky with
pure turquoise colour—the opaque blue of silted water—blinking and
winking with tiny sun shafts, and running emerald green at the edges....
The clustering villages are thick in some parts—so thick that they
jostle each other continuously.... Higher up the river the valley closes
until, long before Chitral is reached, it narrows exceedingly. Here, in
the north, the northern winds rage down the funnel with bitter fury and
make life burdensome. The villages take to the hill slopes or cluster in
patches on the terraces at their feet.”
In _The Indian Borderland_ we are told that “the Kunar River rises in a
blue lake called Gaz Kul, or Karumbar, under the southern slopes of the
Hindu Kush. This, at least, is one of its sources. Many a mighty glacier
standing about the head of the Yarkhun River offers its contributions.
The Yarkhun flows past the foot of the Baroghil Pass, over pebble and
boulder-covered flats, and through terrific gorges, with here and there
the snout of a glacier protruding (or even temporarily blocking the
valley) till it reaches Mastuj. From this point you may call it the
Chitral River, or Kashkar, for it now flows past Chitral, and through
the district known to hill people as Kashkar. It does not become the
Kunar till it reaches the neighbourhood of the ancient kingdom of Kunar,
which occupies the last fifty miles of its course before it joins the
Kabul River.... The Kunar Valley and the Valley of the Bashgul, or
Arnawai, together lead up to the Mandal and Dorah passes, either one of
which is the gateway to the rich valleys of eastern Badakshan, and opens
up a direct line to Jalalabad from the Oxus, which does not touch Kabul
at all. These passes are high (14,000 feet to 15,000 feet), difficult,
and very much more buried under snow than those further west; but a
well-constructed road across them would still be a passable trade route
for many months in the year; and would offer a far more direct
connection between the Oxus regions and India than any which now exist.”
[Sidenote: Asmar]
“Asmar is the most unattractive corner of the Kunar district. A narrow,
three-cornered patch of dusty valley, over which the wind comes dancing
and sweeping from all sides at once, with the river running deep in a
rocky gorge below; steep pine-clad hills to the west, and more
reasonable slopes to the east, amongst which there winds up one of the
chief routes into Bajaur ... such is the general view of Asmar.”
The aspect of the Mohmand hills is exceedingly dreary, and the eye is
everywhere met by dry ravines between long rows of rocky hills and
crags, scantily clothed with coarse grass, scrub and the dwarf palm. In
summer the want of water is greatly felt, and the desert tracts radiate
an intolerable heat; this, coupled with the unhealthiness of the river
lowlands, probably accounts for the inferior physique of the Mohmands as
compared with their Afridi and Shinwari neighbours. The want of water is
especially felt in the Gandab district, which with the Shilman and
Pandiali are the largest valleys in the Mohmand country, and the
entrances to which are covered by the respective forts of Shabkadar,
Michni, and Abazai. The villages, or rather fort clusters, are scattered
along the valleys wherever a spring, or proximity of water to the
surface, encourages cultivation, but in some cases the drinking water
has to be brought from great distances, and is either obtained from
springs whose supply is uncertain or from small tanks made to retain the
rain water. The women are employed in the laborious task of bringing the
water from these places for the use of the village.
[Sidenote: The Mohmand Country]
The crops in the Mohmand hills are almost entirely dependent on the
winter and autumn rains, and should these fail there is considerable
distress. Even in ordinary times the country cannot support the surplus
population, which has for years past been steadily emigrating to the
Peshawar district. The products of the Mohmand country are few and rude;
a little grain, firewood, grass, charcoal, ropes and mats, honey and
cattle from the Baizai hills—these are the chief exports. But through
the Mohmand country come India-wards the wood rafts from Chitral, Kunar
and Laghman on the Kabul River, and from Dir and Swat; wax, hides, ghi
and rice from Kunar; and the iron of Bajaur in lumps and bars. The
imports are salt, cloth, paper, soap, tea, indigo, sugar, grain,
tobacco, needles, scissors and other manufactures of civilisation,
purchased by the Mohmands for themselves and their northern neighbours.
The through trade, therefore, is considerable, and it is with transit
dues levied on trade, and the profits earned as carriers of goods to and
from the trade centres of Peshawar, Jalalabad, Pesh-Bolak, Lalpura and
Shabkadar, that the Mohmands supplement the scanty returns of their
barren soil. In the hot weather trade is brisk on the Kabul River, upon
which wood rafts, or merchandise carried on inflated skins, are floated
down to British territory.
There are numerous roads through the Mohmand country, as the hills,
though rugged and rocky, are nowhere impassable. The most important
perhaps of these are the roads from Peshawar to Dakka, one from Shahgai
via Tartara in the Mullagori country and the Shilman Valley, and the
other from Fort Michni across the Kabul River by the Shanilo ferry into
the Shilman Valley; in old days these were important trade routes. The
other roads of importance from British territory are one from Shabkadar
to the Gandab Valley, and another from Matta, a few miles north of
Shabkadar, over the Inzarai Pass into the Pandiali Valley; this is
comparatively easy and is known as the Alikandi route.
Of the Gandab Valley, Lieutenant Enriquez says that “it is certainly a
hopeless wilderness. Mile after mile the scenery offers nothing but
dreary boulder-strewn mountains. The streams in summer disappear under
ground and only rise to the surface at intervals. The purity of the
water is not above suspicion.[84] In the deeper pools there are
quantities of little fish which can be caught in a sheet, and which make
a very tolerable substitute for white-bait. Smalls eels are also quite
common and can be hooked. The hardy pink oleander thrives in the
ravines, and lends the only touch of colour to the desolate landscape.
In June the climate of the Gandab Valley is detestable. The excessive
heat is intensified by radiation. The narrow glen acts as a funnel for
the scorching wind, which blows hard for days on end. No tent can stand
against the storm, and I have seen half a camp collapse when struck by a
sudden blast. Dust and even small pebbles are blown about with great
violence.”
[Sidenote: The Mohmand People]
Oliver says of the Mohmands that “in physique, though there are among
them fine men, they are as a rule inferior to many of the surrounding
Pathans; and though they have on occasions fought well against us, their
courage is decidedly open to suspicion. They have plenty of pride and
haughtiness, sufficient reputation for cruelty and treachery, and like
other Pathans a good deal to say about their honour; the value of which
may, perhaps, be best judged by the frontier proverb concerning them, to
the effect that ‘you have only to put a rupee in your eye, and you may
look at any Mohmand, man or woman.’ They are on fairly good terms with
their neighbours of Bajaur and Kunar, have usually avoided collisions
with the Afridis, though between them and the Shinwaris a guerilla war
has lasted for centuries; the belt of desert from Lundi Kotal to
Pesh-Bolak bearing witness to the destruction caused by raid and
counter-raid. Private blood-feuds are common, and the tariff for
injuries runs rather low. In many other social and domestic
customs,”—and in dress and language, it might also be added—“they
resemble the Yusafzais; but they have no _hujras_—an institution which
to the Pathan ‘young blood,’ corresponds to the English notion of a
club—the want of which, in a Pathan’s opinion, is to stamp a tribe as
little better than savages. They differ, moreover, conspicuously in
having a more aristocratic tribal constitution, in that they have
hereditary chiefs or Khans,[85] drawn from the old families, who from
ancient times have supplied leaders—the most important being the Khan of
Lalpura in the east, and the Baizai Khan of Goshta in the west.”
The cis-frontier or Kuz Mohmands are divided into five main clans:
1. Kayakzai.
2. Musazai.
3. Dawezai.
4. Matanni.
5. Sirgani.
These are represented by some 500 men in the regular army and levies,
and of these branches of the Mohmand family, who settled in the
south-west corner of the Peshawar Valley when their progenitors finally
ousted the Dilazaks, it may be said that they have been for so long
separated from their cousins of the hills as to have become practically
an altogether separate tribe.
Of the independent, Bar or hill, Mohmands there are four main clans:
1. Tarakzai.
2. Halimzai.
3. Baizai.
4. Khwaezai.
The _Tarakzais_ inhabit the hills north and west of Michni adjoining the
British border—the Burhan Khel and Isa Khel divisions of the clan living
in Pandiali, and the Morcha Khel divisions having settlements on either
bank of the Kabul River round Lalpura and Dakka. A small proportion of
the Tarakzais live in Loi Shilman, and some are also settled in British
territory in the _Doaba_, the triangular piece of country between the
junction of the Kabul and Swat Rivers. The chiefs of the Tarakzais are
the Khans of Lalpura and Pandiali.
The _Halimzais_ were originally considered to be a branch of the
Tarakzais, but they have so grown in numbers and importance as to be now
looked upon as a separate clan. They live in the Gandab Valley and in
Kamali, and have also a colony in Loi Shilman.
[Sidenote: Baizai and Khwaezai]
The _Baizais_ are the most powerful clan of the Mohmands, and inhabit
the more westerly portion of the tribal country. They are bounded on the
north and west by the Kunar River, south by the Kabul River, south-east
by the Khwaezais, and east by the Safis and the territory of the Khan of
Nawagai. They also extend into Afghanistan. The chief of the Baizai clan
is the Khan of Goshta.
The _Khwaezai_ settlements stretch from the west, from the north of the
Kabul River near Lalpura, across the Bohai Dag as far as the Kamali
limits of the Halimzais to the east.
Of the independent Mohmands very few enlist in the Indian Army, but
there are a good many in the regiments of the Amir of Afghanistan and in
the contingents of the local Khans. The physique of the tribe is
generally good, and a rough estimate of the fighting strength of the Bar
Mohmands places it at 19,000 men, of whom the Baizais supply almost
half. They have gained for themselves of more recent years a reputation
as brave fighters as well as troublesome raiders, but are thoroughly
mistrusted and detested by their neighbours, who accuse them of the
grossest treachery. The Mohmands, moreover, are very vindictive,
frequently exhuming and burning the bodies of enemies, even of their own
faith; they often, too, refuse permission to relatives to remove their
dead for proper burial after a war. At one time the Mohmand fighting men
did not possess many modern rifles, but latterly it is said that they
have received several large consignments of arms from the Persian Gulf
via Kabul, and have also purchased numbers of rifles from the Adam Khel
factories in the Kohat Pass.
To be considered in connection with the independent Mohmands are three
affiliated clans living on the northern outskirts of the Mohmand
country, and also three vassal clans.
The three first mentioned are the _Dawezais_, of whom some live
permanently in the Upper Ambahar Valley and others leave their families
in the winter in Ningrahar, migrating during the summer to the
neighbourhood of the Unai Pass and the Upper Helmand River; the
_Utmanzais_, who live in Bar and Kuz Yakhdand; and the _Kukkozais_,
whose settlements are in Ningrahar.
The three vassal clans are the _Mullagoris_, the _Safis_, and the
_Shilmanis_.
The _Mullagoris_ are a people of doubtful origin, it being open to
conjecture whether they are of Dilazak, Durani or Ghilzai stock. They
are not acknowledged as being connected with any of the neighbouring
tribes. The bulk of the clan is situated to the north of the Khyber
Pass, extending from the Dabbar Pass on the west to the Peshawar
district on the east, the Kabul River being their northern boundary.
Their neighbours on the west are the Shilmanis, on the north the
Tarakzai Mohmands, and on the south the Kuki Khel Afridis, with whom, as
well as with other Afridis, they are at feud. They have other
settlements at Sapri in the Mohmand Hills, in the Sisobi Glen, on the
western slopes of the Pandperi Range, and along the banks of the Kunar
River. Those of the clan who are settled about the Khyber go in the
summer to Kambela, which lies below Mutlani Sar to the west. The Khyber
Mullagoris are very united, have a good reputation for courage, and
enlist freely in the Khyber Rifles.
[Sidenote: Safis or Kandaharis]
The _Safis_ or _Kandaharis_ are supposed to be descendants of the
original Gandhari of the country included between the Indus and Kunar
Rivers, and which is bounded on the north by the Koh-i-Mor Range, and on
the south by the Kabul River. Of these a great number emigrated in the
fifth and sixth centuries to the valley of the Helmand, being driven out
by Jat and other Scythic tribes from across the Hindu Kush. “In
appearance often florid,” says Oliver, “with light eyes and hair,
speaking a language only distantly related to the Pushtu of the
Mohmands, whose dialect has much in common with that spoken in Kabul,
both they and the Dehgans of the Laghman Valley are either directly
descended from, or largely admixed with, the Kafirs, and are
comparatively recent converts to Islamism. In Baber’s time they were
still called Kafirs; in Nadir’s—Safis, a name which Masson suggests they
may have acquired by becoming ‘pure’ in comparison to the adjoining
‘impure’ idolaters.” They are very bigoted and are fanatical, but make
good soldiers. The main portion of them live in a wide valley, called
Sur Kamar, which divides the Baizai country from that of the Dawezai and
Utmanzai Mohmands. It is bounded on the north and east by the Sarlarra
Range and Utmanzai country, on the south by the Darwazgai Range, and on
the west by the Amrohi Range. They hold their valley by favour of the
Mohmands, but are really dependents of the Khan of Nawagai.
The _Shilmanis_ look upon the trans-frontier Mohmands as their parent
stock, but their origin is rather doubtful—it has been stated to be Turk
or Indian, and the latter seems the more probable. Their ancient home
appears to have been in Shilman on the banks of the Kurram River, whence
they migrated to the Tartara Mountain north of the Khyber, and to
Hastnagar during the fifteenth century. At the end of the same century
the Yusafzais drove the Hastnagar section into Swat, since which time
they have sought the protection of the Mohmands, who had also taken
possession of the country north of the Kabul River, and thus have become
affiliated with them. The tract of country occupied by the Shilmanis is
to the north of the Loargai plain and between it and the Kabul River,
being bounded on the east by the Dabbar Hill, and on the west by the
Shilman Gakhe. It is divided into four portions: 1, the Kam Shilman
Valley; 2, the Prang Darra Glen; 3, the Loi Shilman Valley; and 4, from
Shinpokh to the mouth of the Kam Shilman Glen along the right bank of
the Kabul River. The tribes bordering this tract of country are the
Mullagoris on the east, the Shinwaris on the south, and the Mohmands on
the west and north.
About one-tenth of the Shilmani fighting men take service in the Khyber
Rifles.
CHAPTER X.
MOHMANDS: OPERATIONS.[86]
The British Government first came into contact with the Mohmands during
the Afghan War of 1838–42, at which time one Saadat Khan was Chief of
Lalpura. On the news of the approach of the British army, Turabaz Khan,
his cousin and enemy, immediately started off to meet the army of the
Indus at Jhelum. Saadat Khan thereupon espoused the cause of the
Barakzais, and Turabaz Khan was installed as Khan of Lalpura by Colonel
Wade, and seems to have done loyal service for Mackeson while we held
Afghanistan. After the disasters at Kabul the whole country rose, and
Turabaz Khan, at risk to himself, saved an English lady and her child
from the Pesh-Bolak garrison, and took them down the river on a raft to
Peshawar. The officers of the _Jazailchis_ stationed at Pesh-Bolak
escaped over the Tartara hills, and Turabaz Khan himself took refuge in
British territory. He returned with General Pollock’s force, but was
ousted by Saadat Khan on the withdrawal of our troops. He subsequently
made his peace with the Amir and received a _jaghir_, or grant of land,
in Kama.
During the early years of British rule in the Peshawar Valley, the
Mohmands gave more trouble than almost any other tribe.
The Michni Mohmands, after annexation, were allowed to hold a fief from
the British Government in the Doaba, of which they collected the
revenue. A portion of the lands they cultivated themselves, farming out
the remainder to other tribes of the plains as tenants. Many of their
clansmen dwelt in the plains of Michni, and some in the neighbouring
hills, and they traded largely in the Peshawar Valley. The Halimzai
Mohmands also held Panjpao in British Doaba as a fief, chiefly
cultivated by tenants. A few of their men lived in the plains, but the
majority in the hills, and these also traded in the valley. The Pandiali
Mohmands at a former period had held a similar jaghir in the Doaba, but
not since British rule. They had few relations either with the
Government or the people of the Peshawar Valley, and inhabited a very
strong locality in the hills. These fiefs had originally been granted to
the Mohmands by former governments, as blackmail to buy off
depredations.
The first inroad of the Mohmands occurred in December, 1850, in an
unprovoked attack on the village of Shabkadar, organised by Fateh Khan,
a son of Saadat Khan, who at that time was still the chief of Lalpura,
and who was naturally not well disposed towards us, and was doing his
best to incite the tribe to hostilities. In the following year a number
of outrages were committed: two attacks were made upon Matta in March
and April by the chief of Pandiali; other minor depredations succeeded
in July, headed by a leading man from Panjpao; and in October the Michni
Mohmands made so serious an attack upon British villages, that later in
the month the Supreme Government directed that the Mohmand fiefs in the
Doaba should be confiscated, our border posts strengthened, and that
punitive operations should be undertaken against the offenders.
[Sidenote: Operations in 1851–52]
_Operations against the Mohmands in 1851–52._—Accordingly on the 25th
October of this year, a force numbering 1593 of all ranks marched out
from Peshawar towards the Mohmand frontier. It was under the command of
Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., and was composed as under:
Det. 3rd Company 1st Battalion Artillery.[87]
No. 17 Light Field Battery.[87]
Two companies 61st Foot.
Two companies 98th Foot.
2nd Irregular Cavalry.
2nd Company Sappers and Miners.
66th Gurkha Regiment.
Wing 71st Native Infantry.[88]
The force moved, unopposed, to the village of Dab, via Mian Khel, and
here the hamlets were destroyed, Shabkadar and Matta were reinforced,
and a position was taken up to cover the erection of a fort at Michni.
In the meantime several outrages had been committed in Peshawar,
instigated by Saadat Khan, then at the head of a small armed force in
the Tartara Hills; and it seeming likely that he meditated an attack
upon some of our frontier villages, measures were taken by Sir Colin for
their protection, and for that of the bridge of boats over the Kabul
River forming his communications with Peshawar.
Saadat Khan continued very active; he busied himself in endeavouring to
unite the Mohmands; on the 26th he had moved to Gandab, twenty miles
north-west of Shabkadar, and here on the 30th he was joined by the Chief
of Bajaur with a large following. On the 28th and 29th the Mohmands
attacked two of our villages, burnt another, and finally, on the 7th
December, Saadat Khan suddenly moved out of a gorge in the hills to the
right front of camp, and took up a position with 4000 footmen and a
small body of horse. At the same time the hills to the westward, near
Dab, had been strongly occupied by the enemy, while a party of 200 came
down to the left bank of the Kabul River immediately in rear of the
camp. Seeing the force thus displayed, the Brigadier directed that a
troop of Horse Artillery and six companies of the 53rd Regiment should
at once move out from Peshawar to the bridge of boats on the Kabul
River.
On the 8th December the Mohmands, to the number of 3000 or 4000, under
Saadat Khan, advanced upon Matta, but were driven off, and all this day
the tribesmen were reported to be collecting in great strength in
Pandiali, under the Chief of Bajaur, and Sir Colin accordingly sent in
to Peshawar for reinforcements; and their arrival, after a forced march,
the 53rd having covered forty-two miles in thirty hours, undoubtedly
prevented an attack upon the camp near Dab. The British force was now
far too strong for the Mohmands, whose gathering broke up, Saadat Khan
returning to Lalpura. Desultory operations continued for some few more
weeks, but finally the force was recalled to Peshawar on the 14th
February.
[Sidenote: Action near Shabkadar]
On the 30th March news was received at Fort Shabkadar that the Mohmands
were collecting in the high ground in front to the number of between 400
and 500, and troops were moved out from the post, causing the enemy’s
retreat to the hills. It was known that Saadat Khan was making great
efforts to unite the various clans in view of again attempting the
recovery of the lands we had annexed; and finally, on the 15th April,
the Mohmands debouched from the hills, in numbers not less than 6000
matchlock men with some eighty horsemen, and moved along the foot of the
hills in front of Shabkadar, taking the direction of Matta. Sir Colin
Campbell had himself gone out to Shabkadar, where he had gathered some
600 troops, and he speedily issued from the fort with two Horse
Artillery guns and 266 sabres of the 7th Light Cavalry[89] and 15th
Irregular Cavalry,[89] and dispersed the enemy, causing them
considerable loss.
In the month of July following this affair, the Michni and Panjpao
Mohmands, exiled from house and lands and cut off from trade, tendered
their submission and prayed for the restoration of their fiefs, which
were handed back on payment of a nominal annual tribute. The Panjpao or
Halimzai Mohmands gave no further cause for dissatisfaction, but the men
of Michni fell into arrears in the payment of their tribute, and their
Chief, when invited into Peshawar to make an explanation, fled instead
to the hills. It was therefore necessary to attach the property of the
tribesmen to the extent of the amount of tribute and, further, to
inflict and recover a fine. To assist the civil authorities in enforcing
these measures a small force of all arms proceeded to Michni, a company
of infantry was sent to Mian Khel, and patrols so arranged as to seize
all cattle moving off to the hills. It was proposed to transfer the
Michni jaghir to some of our own subjects, but it was obvious that these
could not hold the lands and be responsible for the revenue, unless they
were secured from all chance of raids from the independent border
villages beyond Michni. It was therefore resolved to destroy the three
villages particularly concerned, and to prevent their being ever
reoccupied; for such measures it was necessary to obtain the assistance
of a military force strong enough to meet any resistance the Mohmands of
that part of the border might make.
_Operations against the Michni Mohmands in 1854._—For this purpose,
while the garrisons of the forts and posts at Abazai, Shabkadar, Mian
Khel and Michni were strengthened, a force as below enumerated was
concentrated at Michni, under command of Colonel Cotton, 22nd Foot:
Two guns 1st Troop 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery.
2nd Company 2nd Battalion Artillery with Mountain Train Battery
(4 howitzers and 4 guns).
Two companies 22nd Foot.
2nd Company Sappers and Miners.
One squadron 10th Light Cavalry.[90]
One squadron 1st Irregular Cavalry.[91]
Three companies 1st Native Infantry.[92]
9th Native Infantry.[93]
1st Sikh Infantry.
[Sidenote: Operations in 1854]
The advance commenced on the 31st August along the left bank of the
Kabul River in the direction of Shahmansur Khel, which was captured
after some opposition. While the destruction of the village and the
removal of grain stores was in progress, the heights above had to be
seized and held, and the troops engaged on this duty were exposed to an
unceasing and galling fire, and suffered several casualties, but the
subsequent retirement to camp was practically unmolested. On the 2nd
September Colonel Cotton again moved out, and destroyed the villages of
Dab and Sadin, when the troops returned to Peshawar, and the
well-affected among the Michni Mohmands paid up their share of the
tribute due.
After this the Mohmands continued to commit outrages, issuing in large
bodies from the hills and harrying the border, and between March, 1855,
and July, 1857, no fewer than thirty-six serious raids, having plunder
and murder for their objects, were committed by the Mohmands of
Pandiali. The Commissioner, Colonel Edwardes, had been supported by the
Chief Commissioner, Sir John Lawrence, in recommending punitive
operations in the Pandiali Valley, but the Government were unwilling to
undertake them at the time, and when the Mutiny broke out in 1857 our
attention was at once more pressingly directed to other quarters.
During this period the Mohmands failed, by any concerted action, to
avail themselves of an unusually favourable opportunity of increasing
their annoyance, but raids and outrages did not cease, while there were
no troops available on the frontier to move out against them. From the
beginning of September 1857 to March 1860, thirty-nine serious outrages
were committed by members of this tribe. Within five years eighty-five
raids had been conducted by parties of an average strength of
seventy-five men, in which fourteen British subjects had been killed,
twenty-seven wounded, and fifty-five carried off, while over 1200 head
of cattle had been plundered. This was exclusive of forty minor raids in
which thirty-five British subjects had been killed or wounded and 267
head of cattle driven away, but though an expedition was urged by the
local authorities, the Government still refused to sanction one. At
last, about the end of March 1860, Nauroz Khan, an adopted son of Saadat
Khan of Lalpura, sent in seeking for peace, and finally it was agreed
that bygones should be bygones, that the Chief of Lalpura should be
responsible for the future peace of the frontier, that there should be
something of a general amnesty, and that the blockade of the country
should be raised.
[Sidenote: Unrest in 1863]
Soon after this the Khans of Lalpura and Pandiali came into Peshawar in
person and made their submission to the Commissioner. For three years
there was peace on the border, the Mohmands desisting from troubling
until the Ambela expedition in 1863, described in Chapter IV., when the
emissaries of the Akhund of Swat were sent all over the hills bordering
the Peshawar Valley, but were successful in exciting disturbances among
the Mohmands only. Sultan Muhammad Khan, another son of Saadat Khan,
Chief of Lalpura, owned the Akhund’s religious supremacy, and was,
moreover, ill-disposed towards the British. Collecting a body of
Mohmands, joined by a miscellaneous rabble of Safis, Bajauris and the
like, he came down to our frontier on the 5th December, 1863, at the
head of some 500 men. The officer commanding Fort Shabkadar at once
turned out with fifty-five sabres and ninety-six bayonets, and drove the
enemy back beyond our frontier, inflicting some loss. The Shabkadar
garrison was reinforced from Peshawar, and the Mohmands again advancing
on the 7th from the shelter of the hills, were again forced to retire.
Nauroz Khan now, however, joined his brother, and, supported by the
priesthood, the two managed, by the beginning of the new year, to
collect a miscellaneous assemblage of close upon 6000 armed men—mostly
Mohmands and mainly represented by men from the Halimzai and Khwaezai
clans—and with these it was now proposed to meet the British troops
stationed at Shabkadar.
This force had recently been very considerably strengthened, and now
numbered some 1800 of all ranks, with three Horse Artillery guns, under
Colonel Macdonnell, C.B.
On the morning of the 2nd January, 1864, the enemy made their
appearance, debouching from a gorge north-west of Shabkadar, and formed
up in something of the appearance of a crescent. The action which
resulted was on our side almost entirely confined to the cavalry and
guns. The British commander succeeded to some extent in drawing the
enemy into the plain, where they were repeatedly charged by the cavalry
and finally driven beyond the border, having sustained about eighty
casualties.
The effects of this check were felt throughout the Mohmand country, at
least 1000 men departing next morning to their homes, while in a few
days the gathering completely dispersed.
The Amir Sher Ali Khan now took the Mohmands in hand, ejecting and
imprisoning Saadat Khan and his son, Nauroz Khan, and replacing the
former in the chieftainship by a son of his ancient rival, Turabaz Khan.
Eventually, however, Nauroz Khan came to his own again, returning from
Afghanistan in 1870 and assuming the Khan-ship.
During the years immediately following the operations near Shabkadar in
1864, the Mohmand border was not disturbed by anything more than
isolated outrages—sufficiently serious though these were; and it was not
until the invasion of Afghanistan in 1878 that the independent Mohmands
began again to be really troublesome. At this time a grandson of Saadat
Khan was Chief of Lalpura, and he sent a Mohmand contingent to
co-operate with the Amir’s troops at Ali Musjid. These, however, fled
without firing a shot, and the Khan then came in and tendered his
submission to Sir S. Browne at Dakka. The Khan of Goshta refused to come
in, and it was believed to be at his instigation that a raid was made by
hill Mohmands on the village of Sarai, on the left bank of the Kabul
River, in the Kama district. A small column was sent out from Jalalabad,
and some of the ringleaders were captured.
On the 6th February a mixed force of 12,000 Mohmands and Bajauris made
an attack upon the village of a friendly chief, one Azim Khan, who had
been placed by us in charge of the two districts of Goshta and Chardeh.
On the next day General Macpherson, V.C., C.B., took out a small force
of some 900 cavalry and infantry from Jalalabad, intending to act in
combination with another body moving from Basawal by Chardeh upon
Goshta, and which was to intercept the Mohmands in their retirement; but
the enemy having received notice of the proposed operations, retreated
hurriedly to the hills, and the two columns returned to their respective
stations.
[Sidenote: Affair at Kam Dakka]
_Affair at Kam Dakka in 1879._—After this some of the Tarakzais and
Halimzais were implicated in an attack upon a surveyor’s party near
Michni, for which the divisions concerned were fined; and then in April
of this year there was a more serious gathering of Mohmands brought
together by a notorious mullah, for the purpose of raiding into British
territory or making attacks on our posts in the Khyber. On the night of
the 20th April between 200 and 300 Khwaezai and Halimzai Mohmands began
to cross the Kabul River from Palosi to Shinpokh—from the left to the
right bank. The Khan of Lalpura sent the news in to Dakka that a large
body of Mohmands was within three miles of that place and had already
engaged his outposts. He asked for help, as he expected a night attack.
Arrangements were made for rendering such assistance as could be
afforded, but no attack was delivered. The officer commanding at Dakka
moved out on the 21st with a small mixed force, found the Kam Dakka Pass
clear, and also that the village of that name, on the right bank of the
Kabul River and seven miles east of Dakka, was unoccupied by the enemy.
It was reported here that the Mohmands were in great strength in the
vicinity of the north bank, and the villagers appeared alarmed and
seemed unwilling that Major Barnes’ force should be withdrawn. The
troops, however, returned the same day, unopposed, to Dakka, but on
arrival here it was decided to send infantry to Kam Dakka, and 130
rifles of the Mhairwara Battalion[94] started thither at 5 p.m.,
reaching the village at 11.15 p.m. This detachment, commanded by Captain
O’Moore Creagh, was to protect Kam Dakka from an attack from the north
bank of the river, and was to hold the village for three days.
The villagers, however, appeared unwilling to be compromised by
harbouring British troops, said they were quite capable of taking care
of themselves, objected to the troops entering their village, and
seemed, in fact, anything but friendly.
[Sidenote: Relief of Detachment]
Early next morning Captain O’Moore Creagh took up a position partially
covering the village, and then, finding crowds of Mohmands crossing the
river and threatening his flank, he withdrew to a better position near a
graveyard and on the river bank, where he hastily threw up an
entrenchment. He had by this time been reinforced by thirty-six rifles
of his regiment from Dakka. Scarcely had this entrenchment been
completed, about 9 a.m., and followers and baggage animals been brought
under cover, water stored, etc., when the enemy came down from the hills
and completely surrounded the detachment. They persistently attacked
from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m., frequently getting to the closest quarters, and
having to be repulsed with the bayonet. The ammunition now began to run
low, the enemy had closed in all round to within sixty to a hundred
yards, and the situation became most critical, when it was relieved by
the opportune approach of reinforcements.
These had been sent off from Dakka and Lundi Kotal so soon as the
situation at Kam Dakka had become known at divisional headquarters.
Under cover of the fire of the reinforcing troops, and some dashing
charges by a troop of the 10th Bengal Cavalry, the Mhairwara detachment
was withdrawn from the entrenchment, and the retirement on Dakka was
commenced. This was reached about 8.30 p.m., the enemy pressing the
rearguard closely, but being unable, owing to the darkness, to cause
more than a very few casualties. A strong force of all arms moved out on
the next day to Kam Dakka, but few of the enemy were met with.
In April, 1879, the same month as the Kam Dakka affair above related,
Muhammad Sadik Khan, the eldest son of Nauroz Khan, who was with the
British force at Gandamak, fled from the camp and joined the Amir Yakub
Khan—whose mother was a sister of Nauroz Khan—and, as soon as our troops
left Dakka in June, 1879, he was appointed Khan of Lalpura in the place
of the Khan installed in 1875. When the second invasion of Afghanistan
took place, the Khan of Lalpura hesitated for some days as to what
action he should take, but at length appeared at Dakka, and for two
months all went well at Lalpura and also at Goshta.
_Action on the Gara Heights, January 1880._—The journey of the Amir
Yakub Khan to India gave the first shock to the Mohmands, and further
agitation was produced by the news of the fighting at Kabul. The mullahs
began to arouse the fanaticism of the tribesmen, and the Khans of
Lalpura and Goshta placed themselves at the head of the movement and
collected large numbers of men at Palosi and Rena. On the 11th January
the Mohmands began to pass the river, and three days later about 5400
men under the Khan of Lalpura had crossed and taken up a strong position
on the Gara Heights, about two miles from Fort Dakka and between that
place and Kam Dakka. Fortunately, this move had been anticipated, and
nearly all the officers at Fort Dakka had made themselves thoroughly
familiar with the features of the position. Arrangements were now made
to attack the enemy on the Gara Heights in front from Dakka, while
another column from Lundi Kotal attacked them in flank and rear, so
that, beset on three sides and with the unfordable Kabul River on the
other, escape would be impossible and destruction almost certain.
[Sidenote: The Gara Heights]
On the 15th the Dakka Column moved out and was drawn up in position
facing the Gara Heights by 11 a.m. It was commanded by Colonel
Boisragon, 30th Punjab Native Infantry, and was composed as under:
Four guns I Bty. C. Bde. Royal Horse Artillery.
94 sabres 6th Dragoon Guards.
50 sabres 17th Bengal Cavalry.[95]
110 bayonets 1st Battalion 25th Foot.
100 bayonets 8th Native Infantry.[96]
500 bayonets 30th Punjab Native Infantry.
It had been arranged that the force from Lundi Kotal should start six
hours previously, and it was hoped that by this time it was in a
position to enable it to cut off the enemy’s retreat. The Dakka force
advanced to the attack covered by the fire of the four guns, and the
heights were taken without any very serious opposition, the enemy
evacuating one position after another, until, utterly routed, they fled
down the reverse slopes towards Kam Dakka. As soon as the guns of the
Lundi Kotal column were heard, about 5 p.m., Colonel Boisragon pressed
on and joined hands with Brigadier-General Doran, commanding the troops
from Lundi Kotal, in Kam Dakka. In the meantime the enemy had made good
their escape, either towards Rena or across the river.
Brigadier-General Doran had left Lundi Kotal at 4.30 a.m. with the
undermentioned troops:
Two guns 11–9th Royal Artillery.
20 sabres 17th Bengal Cavalry.
200 bayonets 5th Fusiliers.
200 bayonets 25th Foot.
30 bayonets Madras Sappers and Miners.
300 bayonets 1st Madras Native Infantry.[97]
200 bayonets 4th Madras Native Infantry.[98]
300 bayonets 31st Punjab Native Infantry.
Progress, via the Inzari Kandao, was very slow, the troops could move
only in single file, the battery mules could hardly be got along, some
baggage animals fell over the precipices and were lost, and the
rearguard was sixty-seven hours in covering seventeen miles. The gorge
of the Shilman Gakhe was forced after but a feeble resistance, and
eventually Brigadier-General Doran was able to join Colonel Boisragon as
already related; but all the baggage of the Lundi Kotal column, owing to
the extraordinary difficulties of the road, did not reach the bivouac
until the morning of the 18th. Meanwhile, on the 16th January, 500 men
had been passed over the river on rafts and destroyed the village of
Rena, whereafter the columns returned unmolested to Dakka and Lundi
Kotal.
The operations, though a failure in regard to combination, had not been
without effect; the tribesmen had suffered a severe defeat and had
sustained many casualties; and nearly all the clans having been
represented in the force opposed to us, the moral effect of the defeat
was felt throughout the tribe, and for some months the Mohmands remained
quiet. The success of Ayub Khan at Kandahar excited a rising which
collapsed on the news of his subsequent defeat, and during the next
sixteen years or more there was no recrudescence of large-scale trouble
among the Mohmands on our border.
[Sidenote: Partition of their Country]
The difficulty of restraining and punishing the Mohmands had for
years been intensified by the doubts which existed as to the
respective spheres of influence of the British and Kabul
Governments; it had been hoped that the Durand Agreement of 1893 had
helped to smooth these difficulties away; but the Agreement,
although apparently concurred in by the Amir, did not commend itself
to his judgment on reconsideration, so far at least as the partition
of control over the Mohmands was concerned. At last in 1896 the
Government of India, with a view of terminating a state of
indecision which had become intolerable, resolved to make an attempt
to bring certain of the Mohmand clans more immediately under British
control. The efforts made in this direction were so far successful
that, despite certain hostile influences—religious and political—the
Halimzais, Tarakzais, Utmanzais, Dawezais, and also the Pandiali
sections, were held to be henceforth in British territory, and
seemed themselves cordially to concur when the new arrangement was
announced to them.
When the frontier disturbances commenced in 1897 the above-named clans
evinced no disposition to take part, although the Hadda Mullah, an
especially notorious agitator, himself lived in the Mohmand country and
had acquired a commanding influence over the clans, with some of whom he
was said to have helped to defend the Malakand in 1895; and when in July
the rising occurred among the men of Swat, some of the leading Mohmands
among our new subjects offered their assistance to the representatives
of the British Government.
Eventually the Hadda Mullah succeeded in stirring up the tribesmen, who,
while unwilling to assist their co-religionists in Swat, had no
objection to raid in the vicinity of their own border; and accordingly
by the 7th August information had reached the authorities at Peshawar
that some 3000 Mohmands were marching from Gandab to attack Shabkadar.
The General Officer commanding at Peshawar proposed reinforcing Fort
Shabkadar with regular troops, but this proposal was negatived by the
Commissioner, who was in hopes that the Halimzais, who had so recently
accepted our protection, would be able and willing to prevent the
advance of the raiders.
It was, however, speedily apparent that measures so heroic were quite
beyond the power of the Halimzais; they temporised, they gave
information of the hostile movement, but they did not oppose the forces
of the Hadda Mullah; and eventually, as was almost to be expected, many
of the Halimzai fighting men enlisted under his banners.
On the afternoon of the 7th August the attack was delivered, both the
fort of Shabkadar and the neighbouring village of Shankargarh being the
objects of the assaults of the tribesmen, who, to the number of nearly
5000, now descended from the hills. The village was burned, but the
attack on the fort was easily beaten off, and by next morning many of
the enemy had retired whence they came. The news of the projected attack
had reached Peshawar on the night of the 7th, and about midnight a force
as under started for Shabkadar under Lieutenant-Colonel Woon, 20th
Punjab Infantry:
Four guns 51st Field Artillery.
Two squadrons 13th Bengal Lancers.
Two companies Somerset Light Infantry.
20th Punjab Infantry.
[Sidenote: Action at Shabkadar]
The cavalry went on in advance and reached Shabkadar early on the
morning of the 8th, but the guns and infantry were much delayed in
crossing the Kabul River, then in flood, by the ferry at Hajizai, and
did not reach the scene of action until some hours later. With the
troops available, Lieutenant-Colonel Woon moved out against the enemy,
but finding them in considerable strength and occupying a favourable
position, he decided against attacking, and withdrew to the fort. Early
on the 9th the Shabkadar troops again advanced to the attack; the enemy,
who had been reinforced during the night, had now taken up a line about
two miles in length, occupied by some 6000 men, whose right rested on
the higher hills; their centre extended across the low hills; while the
left stretched into the cultivated ground in the plain itself. Colonel
Woon began his attack in front with the infantry, intending to turn the
enemy’s left with the cavalry and artillery, but he could effect little
or no impression on the Mohmand position, and the enemy now making a
determined attempt to turn our left, Colonel Woon began to withdraw
towards the fort to avoid being completely enveloped.
At this moment Brigadier-General Elles arrived upon the scene from
Peshawar, and finding that most of the enemy had hurried down from the
high ground and were engaged with our infantry in the open, he directed
the two squadrons of the 13th Bengal Lancers to charge from right to
left along the whole line of tribesmen. Charging down upon the left
rear, the squadrons rode down the whole line, clearing the front; the
infantry then again advanced, the Mohmands were driven back and pursued
to the high ground, and in a short time not a man of them was to be
seen.
Our loss was nine killed and sixty-five wounded, while among the enemy
more than 200 were killed and many wounded.
The gathering seems to have been representative of almost every tribe
living north of the Kabul River and between our border and that of
Afghanistan, from the banks of the Swat, Panjkora and Kunar Rivers, with
perhaps the single exception of the Tarakzais.
A cavalry reconnaissance was made next day, the 10th, some miles up the
Gandab Valley without seeing anything of the enemy; but as the
gathering, so far from having dispersed, was reported as intending to
return to the attack after replenishment of ammunition and supplies, the
troops at Shabkadar were made up to 2500 men, a bridge of boats was
substituted for the ferry at Hajizai, telegraphic communication was
established between Peshawar and Shabkadar, and fresh troops were sent
up to fill the gaps in the Peshawar garrison.
While the necessity for the early chastisement of the Mohmands was
recognised by the Indian Government, it was considered that, in view of
the generally disturbed state of the north-west frontier, the moment was
not propitious for such action, and consequently it was decided merely
to concentrate two strong moveable columns, the one at Peshawar and the
other at Shabkadar, ready for eventualities.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1897]
_Expedition against the Mohmands, 1897._—Signs of restlessness were now
being daily reported from the Afridi and Orakzai country, and finally,
on the 23rd and 24th August, the smouldering embers of fanaticism in
this direction burst suddenly into flames, and the Khyber forts were
attacked as described in Chapter XIII. The Hadda Mullah was once again
rumoured to have taken the field with 4000 Baizai Mohmands, intending
another attack upon Shabkadar; his other plan of attacking Dir, in
retaliation for the friendly attitude towards us of the Khan of that
country, having come to naught by reason of operations which have been
elsewhere described. In consequence of these reports the Government now,
during the first week in September, sanctioned extensive punitive
operations against the various tribes on the Peshawar border, and
decided that the Mohmands should be the first tribe to be taken in hand.
Everything pointed to the operations being short and decisive, as two
powerful bodies were about to move into the Mohmand country from
opposite directions. Sir Bindon Blood was to act from the north and
east, while Brigadier-General Elles (with the rank of Major-General),
with two brigades under Brigadier-Generals Westmacott and Macgregor,
would move from Shabkadar.
1ST (WESTMACOTT’S) BRIGADE.
1st Battalion Somerset Light Infantry.
20th Punjab Infantry.
2nd Battalion 1st Gurkhas.
2ND (MACGREGOR’S) BRIGADE.
2nd Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
9th Gurkhas.
37th Dogras.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.
13th Bengal Lancers.
No. 3 Mountain Battery R.A.
No. 5 Mountain Battery R.A.
28th Bombay Pioneers.[99]
Patiala Regiment, Imperial Service Troops.
Nabha Regiment, Imperial Service Troops.
Two Maxim guns, Devonshire Regiment.
[Sidenote: Combined Operations]
Marching out of Shabkadar on the 15th September, General Elles reached
Ghalanai next day with the 1st Brigade, the 2nd Brigade getting no
further than Dand, as the road, especially over the Kharappa Pass,
required much work on it to make it practicable for baggage animals. On
the 17th a small force under General Westmacott moved on to Katsai, two
and a half miles south of the Nahaki Pass, which was reconnoitred and
reported very difficult. On this day communication was established with
Sir Bindon Blood, and measures were concerted for the attack on the
Bedmanai Pass which the Hadda Mullah was said to be holding with a large
force; the Gandab Halimzais came in at Nahaki and agreed to comply with
our terms. On the 19th Westmacott’s Brigade was concentrated at Nahaki,
and that of General Macgregor began to close up from Dand to Ghalanai.
On the 21st September General Elles with the 1st Brigade arrived at
Lakarai, where General Blood was met; and on the day following General
Elles moved his force on to Khazina, where he was joined by the 3rd
Brigade of the Malakand Field Force, placed at his disposal by General
Blood, to enable him to deal with the gathering at the Bedmanai Pass and
to clear the Mitai and Suran Valleys. The Nahaki Pass, dominating the
whole of this part of the Mohmand country, was now held by troops of
Macgregor’s brigade.
The Bedmanai Pass lies some five miles west-south-west of Khazina. The
track leading thence to the pass runs along the bed of a broad dry
nullah, and about a mile and a half further on, a narrow gap, between
the Gharibai Hill and the northern end of a spur jutting out from the
Yari Sar Mountain, gives entrance to a broad valley. Crossing this, four
small villages are passed, and the path winds upwards along the nullah
through a narrow gorge, until the summit of the pass, commanded from the
highest point of Yari Sar, is reached.
On the morning of the 23rd the troops moved forward and, after some
opposition, carried the Bedmanai Pass, the capture of which, contrary to
expectation, proved tolerably easy of accomplishment, as not more than
700 or 800 Mohmands, chiefly Baizais, were present. As to the actual
assault, the 20th Punjab Infantry led and were opposed on every ridge,
and the men of this regiment particularly distinguished themselves in
clearing the heights, well supported by the fire of the guns and Maxims.
The attached brigade meanwhile moved in support of General Westmacott up
the centre and guarding the right flank, and was only slightly engaged,
our casualties totalling no more than four. This easy victory was
attributable to the heavy losses which the men led by the Hadda Mullah,
had already experienced in their attack upon General Blood before
described. That, their real effort, had failed, and they had very little
heart for further fighting; also General Elles had previously so
disposed his cavalry as to prevent any help reaching the defenders of
the Bedmanai Pass from the Mitai and Suran Valleys.
During the two following days these valleys were visited and towers were
destroyed. The attached brigade now left to join the Tirah Expeditionary
Force, marching via Nahaki and Gandab to Peshawar; and General Elles
prepared to move on Jarobi, where, in the most rugged and inaccessible
part of the Baizai Mohmand country, a glen at the head of the Shindarra
Valley, was the home of the Hadda Mullah. The road thither was found to
be very difficult, but the opposition was not formidable, only some
nineteen casualties being experienced.
[Sidenote: The Clans give in]
During the next few days the troops were employed in marching through
the Bohai Dag and adjacent valleys, demolishing the defences of the
Baizai Mohmands and exacting submission. The opposition here was rather
more formidable but was easily broken down. The clans now began to give
in: the Khwaezai, Halimzai, Utmanzai, Dawezai jirgahs arrived asking for
terms, the acceptance of which was expedited by the troops continuing to
visit the uttermost parts of the country; and by the 3rd October all our
claims had been met and the force returned to Peshawar, where, on the
7th, it was broken up.
The objects of the expedition had been accomplished. All concerned in
the raid on Shabkadar had been punished; the Hadda Mullah had been
discredited, his dwelling destroyed and he himself driven into Afghan
territory; and the Mohmand country had been traversed from end to end.
That these operations did not, however, immediately initiate a period of
absolute quiet on the Border, goes without saying. There were outbreaks
and raids upon villages close to our frontier and within the territories
of tribes which had come under our protection; and it was very apparent
that the Indian Government could exercise but little more than a nominal
authority over any of the clans of the Mohmand tribe. Still, some
advance had been made, and when in 1906 an extension of the railway was
commenced from Peshawar to the Afghan frontier through Shilman, the
Mohmands did not offer any really serious opposition to the
undertaking.[100]
In March, 1908, three rather serious raids were carried out in our
territory by Mohmand tribesmen—at the village of Marozai, six miles
north-east of Shankargarh (Shabkadar); at Mirzadhar, two miles from
Marozai; and at Chikkar, nine miles south-east of Shankargarh.
All three raids were believed to be the work of men of the Mohmand
gathering which collected at the end of the Zakha Khel expedition, as
mentioned in Chapter XIII.; in consequence of these outrages the posts
at Abazai and Shabkadar were strengthened. Early in April, however, the
mullahs began to preach against the British in Ningrahar, and within a
few days had succeeded in collecting a large following of Mohmands with
the reported object of attacking Shabkadar. The movement spread,
villagers in masses joined the force, and by the 17th it was computed
that some 5000 men, including 2000 Afghans, were gathered together under
Hazrat Mullah in Kamali, to the north-west of Halimzai territory. It is
not surprising under the circumstances that the Chief Commissioner,
North-West Frontier Province, detected danger of a fanatical outbreak.
[Sidenote: Fresh Trouble]
Within four days the numbers of the Mohmand _lashkar_ had increased to
10,000 men, our post at Matta was fired into, and on the 21st General
Anderson, with two guns and 1000 bayonets, moved out from Peshawar, to
which place troops were sent forward from Nowshera. At Matta and
Shabkadar, and towards the Mohmands generally, General Willcocks,
commanding at Peshawar, occupied, according to instructions, a purely
defensive advanced position, the object being to prevent any collision
and to offer no possible ground for Mohmand attack. It was, however,
abundantly clear that the fanatical feeling against us was spreading,
that _ghaza_ was being preached, and that men were flocking to the
standards of the mullahs from Bajaur, Utman Khel territory, Asmar,
Kohistan and Kunar, while grain, ammunition and money were being sent
down to the Mohmands from Ningrahar.
On the 23rd considerable bodies of the enemy occupied the foothills just
across our border opposite Abazai, and General Willcocks accordingly,
considering that the Mohmands probably intended assuming the offensive,
ordered up additional troops from Peshawar to Shabkadar, and with their
arrival he had, on the line Abazai-Shabkadar-Michni, 2700 infantry, 520
sabres and twelve guns.
_Expedition against the Mohmands, 1908._—The authorities at home and at
Simla now concurred in thinking that no good purpose was likely to be
served by the maintenance of the mere defensive, and that it would
probably be a safer policy to advance and disperse the gathering before
it became larger and led to a big fanatical outbreak. The immediate
mobilisation of two brigades with divisional troops and a reserve was
ordered. General Willcocks was placed in command, and directed to cross
the border and assume the offensive. The force was thus composed:
FIRST BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General Anderson.
1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers.
53rd Sikhs.
57th Wilde’s Rifles.
59th Scinde Rifles.
SECOND BRIGADE.
Major-General Barrett.
1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders.
Guides Infantry.
28th Punjabis.
55th Coke’s Rifles.
RESERVE BRIGADE.
Major-General Ramsay.
1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers.
21st Punjabis.
22nd Punjabis.
40th Pathans.
This brigade to proceed to Peshawar.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.
21st Cavalry.
No. 8. M.B.R.G.A.
23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery.
28th Mountain Battery.
No. 6 Company Sappers and Miners.
No. 1 Company Sappers and Miners.
34th Sikh Pioneers.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1908]
The troops being for the most part all on the spot, in consequence of
the conclusion, then just arrived at, of the Zakha Khel expedition, no
time was lost, and on the 24th April an advance was made with all troops
available at Shabkadar and Matta, when the enemy’s positions to the west
of these posts were attacked and captured. A heavy blow was inflicted on
the Mohmands, and a reconnaissance, carried out on the following day,
found no signs of them about their former positions or in the Gandab
Valley. It was, however, very clear that the rising was not crushed; the
mullahs were doing their best to enlist recruits in Dir and Swat, and an
attempt was also being made to induce the Zakha Khels to join, so far,
however, without success; but there seemed small doubt that all branches
of the Mohmands were represented in the recent actions with our columns
from Matta and Shabkadar. For some few days after the dispersal of the
gathering in front of Shabkadar, the British troops remained inactive,
in order to see whether the assembly of the tribal jirgah, which had
been arranged for, would enable General Willcocks to arrive at
reasonable terms.
It had been hoped that the disinclination shown by the tribes of Dir,
Swat, Bajaur and the Bazar Valley to make common cause with the
Mohmands, and the difficulty of keeping the lashkar in the field, would
have led to the gradual dispersal of the whole gathering, especially in
view of the projected meeting of the jirgah on the 4th May.
On the 2nd May, however, the Viceroy telegraphed to the India Office
explaining that the centre of unrest had now shifted to the Khyber,
where for some time past at Pesh-Bolak one Sufi Sahib, a noted
firebrand, had been collecting a force of Afghans. This army, whose
numbers were estimated at anything between 13,000 and 20,000 men, had
already passed Lundi Khana, and was believed to intend an attack on the
fortified serai at Lundi Kotal that evening, and possibly also on Ali
Musjid and the fort at Chora belonging to the Malikdin Khel chief, who
had often proved himself our friend.
[Sidenote: The Khyber Danger]
In consequence of the threatening aspect of affairs troops were
despatched to Jamrud with a view to rendering assistance, and the
Mohmand Field Force was directed to remain strictly on the defensive.
The General Officer left in command was further instructed, when the
jirgah assembled, to observe a temporising policy, encouraging
attendance and requiring an explanation of past conduct, but neither
announcing terms nor making any definite communication. Recognising also
that the greater danger was now threatening from the Khyber, the larger
part of the force present under General Willcocks at Shabkadar and
Peshawar was drawn to the pass.
The Reserve Brigade, under General Ramsay, reached Lundi Kotal on the
3rd May, while that under General Barrett marched to Ali Musjid; General
Anderson remained at Shabkadar with his brigade in observation of the
Mohmands.
On the night of the 2nd May repeated efforts had been made by the Khyber
gathering (which appeared to be entirely composed of Afghans, no Afridis
having joined it), to capture our post of Michni Kandao, which was ably
defended by Subadar Tor Khan of the Khyber Rifles. Lundi Kotal was also
fired into, and several attempts made to burn the serai, but these were
all beaten off, although firing took place daily. On the 4th General
Willcocks felt himself strong enough to attack, and moved out from Lundi
Kotal in two columns against the enemy, who occupied the Shinwari
villages about 4000 yards to the west. One column consisted of Ramsay’s
infantry brigade, with the 80th Battery R.F.A. and the 28th Mountain
Battery, while the other was under Colonel Roos-Keppel, and was composed
of fifty dismounted men 19th Lancers, two companies 21st Punjabis, and
500 of the Khyber Rifles. The enemy were driven from their sangars and
the shelter of the villages, and, having suffered severely, disappeared
over the Afghan boundary. It being apparent that nothing further was to
be apprehended on this part of the frontier, the troops left Lundi Kotal
on the 7th, and were back in Peshawar on the 8th and 9th, having left
behind two mountain guns at Lundi Kotal and the 54th Sikhs at Jamrud.
During the absence of the force all had remained quiet on the
Mohmand-Peshawar border from Michni to Abazai, but there were signs of a
general disinclination to send tribal representatives to a jirgah; and
finally, on the 9th May—by which date the limit of time allowed had
expired—news arrived of the refusal of some maliks to come in, and of
the receipt of insulting messages from others. It was therefore decided,
on the 10th May, to send troops into the Mohmand country, and the
advance commenced accordingly on the 13th.
In the meantime cases of cholera had occurred among the troops, and
certain changes became inevitable in the composition of the Mohmand
Field Force. In the 1st Brigade the 22nd Punjabis replaced the 1st
Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers; in the 2nd Brigade the 54th Sikhs
replaced the Guides Infantry, relegated, with the 21st Punjabis, to the
lines of communication beyond Shabkadar; while in the 3rd Brigade the
1st Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment and the 19th Punjabis replaced the
Munster Fusiliers and the 22nd Punjabis.
[Sidenote: The Troops Advance]
Nahaki was occupied on the 14th by part of the 1st Brigade without
opposition, but a reconnaissance made to the Khapakh Pass was fired on,
and it was found to be held in strength. Both brigades closed up on the
16th at Nahaki, and while here the camp of the 1st Brigade was attacked
in a most determined manner on the nights of the 16th and 18th. The
enemy lost heavily on both occasions, but inflicted considerable loss
upon our troops. On the 17th all the force was engaged in destroying the
towers of villages belonging to Kandahari Safis and Halimzais; and on
the next day the 2nd Brigade proceeded up the Bohai Dag to destroy the
headquarters of the Hazrat Mullah, and met with strong opposition from
the Khwaezais, Baizais and others near Zarawar China, the hills on both
sides of the valley being held. The enemy were dislodged, with heavy
loss, by the 28th and 55th. This brigade returned to Nahaki on the 20th,
and the 1st moved north towards Lakarai, and found the enemy holding in
considerable strength the village of Umra Kilai, with a deep and very
intricate nullah behind and hills beyond. They were driven off after a
stubborn resistance, during which their leaders repeatedly led charges
with swords. The Mohmand losses were consequently very heavy, but none
the less they made some half-hearted attacks on the bivouac during the
night. Our casualties were five killed and seventeen wounded.
During the next day several towers between Nahaki and Lakarai were
destroyed, a measure which resulted in some of the clans beginning to
come in and submit.
On the 23rd the 1st Brigade moved from Lakarai to Shato Khel with only
slight opposition, and on the day following to Kargha; the enemy had
prepared and held a strong position at the entrance to Ambahar, but on
their left flank being turned they fled, pursued by the cavalry, and
heavily punished by the fire of the infantry. On the 27th General
Willcocks returned, via Mulla Kilai, to Nahaki, and by this day the
recalcitrant Utmanzai, Dawezai and Khwaezai had sent in jirgahs and
submitted. There only remained the Khuda Khel Baizais, and their country
was visited by the 2nd Brigade from Nahaki on the 28th, and this
division was severely punished.
The force began its retirement to India on this date, and on the 1st
June the last troops of the Mohmand Field Force had recrossed the
border. Our casualties had been rather heavy for so short a campaign—38
killed or died of wounds and 184 wounded; 51 succumbed to disease.
There does not appear to be any reason to believe that the continuation
of the work on the Loi-Shilman railway had any connection with the
Mohmand rising of 1908. The Tarakzai Mohmands are the only clan whose
country abuts on the proposed line, and these do not seem to have taken
any part in the fighting of that year.
CHAPTER XI.
AFRIDIS.[101]
The Afridis are a large tribe, inhabiting the lower and easternmost
spurs of the Safed Koh Range, to the west and south of the Peshawar
district, including the Bazar and Bara Valleys. On the east they are
bounded by British territory; on their north they have the Mohmands;
west, the Shinwaris; and south, the Orakzais and Bangash.
Their origin is very obscure; Bellew identifies them with one of the
peoples referred to by Herodotus; their traditions, however, says James,
would lead us to believe that, in common with other Pathan tribes, they
are the descendants of Khalid-ibn-Walid, a Jew, who embraced Islamism,
and whose descendants had possession of great tracts in the western
portion of Afghanistan during the tenth century. At this time, upon the
convulsions in the country owing to the advance of Mahmud of Ghazni, a
chief named Afrid was obliged, owing to his enormities and feuds, to fly
from his country and seek refuge with a kindred spirit, by name Wazir,
in the wilds of Shir-i-Talla. Here he seems to have settled and to have
remained with his family for a considerable time. Turner gives something
of the same story, viz. that Afrid, an individual of unknown country and
parentage, came to Ghor, and there had an intrigue with a woman of the
Karerai tribe, the eventual result of which was the tribe of Afridis.
Cavagnari says of their origin that they are supposed to have been
descended from a woman named Maimana, who had two sons, Afrid and Adam.
But it is probably sufficient to surmise that they are a tribe of
Pactiyan stock, who have been established in their present country for
many centuries—far longer than the majority of Pathan tribes—and that
living as they do on the high road from Central Asia to India, it is
likely that they have a large admixture of Turkish and Scythian blood.
The Afridi country being bleak and sterile, and the rainfall but small,
agriculture is only scantily pursued, although they raise a coarse kind
of rice in the Bara Valley, a considerable amount of which finds its way
to the Peshawar market. Some of the tribe also gain a precarious living
by cutting and selling timber for firewood, but many of the clans
possess great stock in cattle, cows, sheep and goats, and go in for
breeding mules and donkeys, which are much thought of locally. Their
chief manufactures are coarse mats and cloth, while in Maidan, at
Ilmgudar near Fort Bara, and in the Kohat Pass there are factories which
annually turn out a certain number of rifles.
[Sidenote: As Soldiers]
The Afridi in appearance is generally a fine, tall, athletic highlander,
whose springy step at once denotes his mountain origin. They are lean
but muscular men, with long, gaunt faces, high noses and cheekbones, and
rather fair complexions. Brave and hardy, they make good soldiers, but
are apt to be somewhat homesick in the hot weather, and they have gained
a greater reputation for fidelity as soldiers than in any other way. The
Afridi has uniformly shown himself ready to enlist in our army, and at
the present moment there are probably 4000 of this tribe serving in the
ranks of the Indian army or in the Khyber Rifles. But since the Pathan
is notoriously restless and dislikes expatriation, the average length of
service is shorter than in the case of our other Indian soldiers; the
result being that a greater number of trained soldiers from Pathan
squadrons and companies annually pass back to their homes, than is the
case with a proportionately larger establishment of any other race.
While, therefore, their loyalty, while actually in our service and even
during frontier expeditions against their own kinsmen, has been all that
could be wished, it is not perhaps saying much—considering their normal
family relations—that they should cheerfully fight for us against them.
But, on the other hand, it can hardly be expected that men who have
become again merged in their tribe, and who, according to their own
ideas, are no longer bound to us by any obligation, should maintain an
attitude of complete aloofness from any tribal movement prompted by
racial feeling, or by that fanaticism which, on the border, has been
defined as “a sentiment of religious intolerance excited into reckless
action.” During the Tirah Campaign the number of pensioners and
reservists who fought against our troops is believed to have been very
large. As long ago as 1884 it was stated of the Afridis that “almost
every fighting man possesses a gun or pistol, besides other arms; many
of the firearms are rifled, and some have percussion locks.” To-day the
armament of these tribesmen is far more complete and up-to-date,[102]
and there can be no doubt that the fighting powers of the Afridis have
increased during recent years to a very formidable extent. At the same
time our powers of effectively dealing with them have increased in a
still greater ratio. Our soldiers are more suitably trained for the
particular warfare waged in these border hills; they are infinitely
better armed; the services of transport and supply are more efficiently
organised; the country of the independent tribesmen is more thoroughly
known; the moral effect of uniformly successful expeditions—are all
factors which more than counterbalance any accession of strength which
the last twenty-five years have brought to the Afridis.
As to the measures to be taken effectually to coerce them, Oliver,
writing twenty-two years ago, said that “strong as are the natural
positions they hold among the spurs and defiles of the Safed Koh and the
bare, rugged, inhospitable ranges of the Khyber; difficult of approach
the passes which might have to be forced, and unanimous as the clans may
be to defend them at the signal of a common danger, the people are so
dependent on the plains, their position—secure though it may sound—is
really their weakest point, and makes it easy to shut them up in their
own hills. Peshawar, the great field for their plundering operations, is
also the market for their produce and the source of supply for their
many domestic wants. Exclusion from Peshawar is to many clans a severe
form of punishment; and an effectual blockade that will cut them off
from the outer world, would probably bring them to terms sooner than an
expedition.” But Holdich again reminds us that “across those wild
break-neck passes over the Safed Koh into Ningrahar ... the hard-pressed
Afridi can constantly find refuge for his family, and sanctuary for
himself, amongst the Durani tribes who dwell on the northern slopes of
the Safed Koh.” That there is always that back door, “the keys of which
are in their own pockets,” and that “at the worst they could shift
across the hills into Afghanistan, and there was the prospect ... that
something more than mere shelter would be accorded by the ruler of
Kabul.”
[Sidenote: Their Character]
Of the moral attributes of the Afridis few people have found much to say
in praise. Mackeson wrote of them: “The Afridis are a most avaricious
race, desperately fond of money. Their fidelity is measured by the
length of the purse of the seducer, and they transfer their obedience
and support from one party to another of their own clansmen, according
to the comparative liberality of the donation.” Elphinstone, generally
ready enough to record anything good of Afghans, said of the Afridis:
“On the whole they are the greatest robbers among the Afghans, and, I
imagine, have no faith or sense of honour; for I never heard of anybody
hiring an escort of Khaiberis to secure his passage through their
country—a step which always ensures a traveller’s safety in the lands of
any other tribe.” MacGregor considers this estimate harsh, but that
furnished by the same authority is hardly more flattering: “A ruthless,
cowardly robber—a cold-blooded treacherous murderer; brought up from his
earliest childhood amid scenes of appalling treachery and merciless
revenge, nothing has changed him; as he has lived—a shameless, cruel
savage—so he dies. And it would seem that, notwithstanding his long
intercourse with us, and the fact that large numbers have been and are
in our service, and must have learnt in some way what faith, justice and
mercy mean, yet the Afridi is no better than in the days of his father.”
Against these adverse testimonies, however, there is the opinion of Sir
Robert Warburton, who spent eighteen years in their midst and who wrote
of them: “The Afridi lad from his earliest childhood is taught by the
circumstances of his existence and life to distrust all mankind, and
very often his near relations, heirs to his small plot of land by
inheritance, are his deadliest enemies. Distrust of all mankind, and
readiness to strike the first blow for the safety of his own life, have
therefore become the maxims of the Afridi. If you can overcome this
mistrust, and be kind in words to him, he will repay you by great
devotion, and he will put up with any punishment you like to give him
except abuse. It took me years to get through this thick crust of
mistrust, but what was the after-result? For upwards of fifteen years I
went about unarmed amongst these people. My camp, wherever it happened
to be pitched, was always guarded and protected by them. The deadliest
enemies of the Khyber range, with a long record of blood-feuds, dropped
those feuds for the time being when in my camp. Property was always
safe.... Time after time have the Afridi elders and jirgahs supported me
even against their own Maliks.”
[Sidenote: Warburton’s Opinion]
Notwithstanding all that has been said against the Afridi he is, on the
whole, one of the finest of the Pathan races on our border. His
appearance is greatly in his favour, and he is really braver, more open,
and not more treacherous than many other Pathans. This much is certain,
that he has the power of prejudicing Englishmen in his favour, and there
are few brought into contact with him who do not at least begin with an
enthusiastic admiration for his manliness. Again, with a tight hand over
him, many of his faults remain dormant, and he soon develops into a
valuable soldier.
Though eternally at feud among themselves, they seldom quarrel with
neighbouring tribes; that is, the Afridis do not care to waste their
energies in fighting with their neighbours, but reserve the luxury for
home consumption—a feud to an Afridi is the salt of life, the one
pleasure that makes existence tolerable. On occasion, in the face of
common danger, they are capable of concerted action, as was shown in the
Tirah Campaign of 1897, but even then one clan held entirely aloof.
Though nominally under the control of their Maliks, the Afridis have
very little respect for their authority and are thoroughly democratic.
They are all of the Sunni persuasion of the Muhammadan faith.
The following are the eight clans into which the Afridi tribe is
divided, and of these the first six are known collectively as the
“Khyber Afridis”:
1. Kuki Khel.
2. Malikdin Khel.
3. Kambar Khel.
4. Kamrai or Kamar Khel.
5. Zakha Khel.
6. Sipah.
7. Aka Khel.
8. Adam Khel.
The _Aka Khels_ have no connection with the Khyber and are located to
the south of the Bara River. The _Adam Khels_ inhabit the hills between
the districts of Kohat and Peshawar, and cannot be regarded, except
ethnologically, as a part of the Afridi tribe; for whether they are
viewed with reference to their position, their interests or their
habits, they are a distinct community.
The area of the country inhabited by the Afridis is about nine hundred
square miles. The principal streams draining their hills are the
northern branch of the Bara River, or Bara proper, the Bazar or Chora
River, and the Khyber stream, all flowing into the Peshawar Valley. The
valleys lying near the sources of the Bara River are included in the
general name of Tirah, which comprises an area of 600 to 700 square
miles. The greater part of Tirah is inhabited by different clans of the
Orakzai tribe, but the valleys known as Rajgal and Maidan are occupied
by the Afridis. The Rajgal Valley is drained by one main stream, into
which fall some lesser streams from the surrounding hills. Its length is
about ten miles, and the breadth of the open country about four to five
miles. The elevation is over 5000. Maidan lies to the south of Rajgal,
and is a circular valley about ten miles across, watered by several
large watercourses. The streams from Rajgal and Maidan unite and form
the Bara River, flowing down the valley of the same name to the Kajurai
Plain, shortly before entering which the Bara is joined by the Mastura
River.
[Sidenote: The Clans]
The _Kuki Khel_ number some 5600 fighting men, and occupy the Rajgal
valley and the eastern end of the Khyber Pass, as far as the Rohtas
Hill, which overhangs the fort at Ali Musjid, and also the Bezai Spur—a
long underfeature which flanks, but at a considerable distance, the
latter part of the railway and road from Peshawar to Fort Jumrud. This
clan has a bitter feud with the Zakha Khel, and is Gar in politics.
The _Malikdin Khel_ is the Khan Khel or head clan of the Afridis, and is
closely connected with the Kambar Khel, their settlements in Maidan,
Chora and Kajurai lying together. In Maidan they occupy the central and
northern portion of the valley—Bagh, the recognised meeting place of the
Afridi Jirgahs, “where the Khyber raid and Afridi rebellion of 1897–98
were planned, and where fanaticism, intrigue and sedition have always
been hot-bedded and nourished,” being in their country. The Malikdin
Khels number some 6000 fighting men, and are Samil in politics.
The _Kambar Khel_ is numerically the most powerful of all the Afridi
clans, being able on emergency to put 10,000 armed men in the field;
they belong to the Gar political faction. This clan is very migratory,
occupying in the hot weather the Kahu Darra and the valley of the
Shalobar River, which joins the Bara River at Dwatoi, and moving in the
winter to the Kajurai Plain and to other minor settlements. This clan is
very strongly represented in the Indian Army and Border Militia.
The _Kamrai_ or _Kumar Khel_ form but a small clan, Samil in politics,
having its settlements in the extreme west of the Bara Valley, and also
moving down to the Kajurai Valley to the west of Peshawar in the winter
months. Their fighting men number no more than about 800.
[Sidenote: Their Holy Places]
The _Zakha Khel_ owe their undoubted importance to their geographical
position in Afridi-land, rather than to the number of armed men they can
turn out—probably not less than 6000. Their holdings stretch diagonally
across the Afridi country from the south-east corner of Maidan to the
Khyber Pass; they are the wildest and most turbulent amongst their
tribe, and their land being unproductive they depend a good deal upon
raiding and blackmail for their livelihood, are “the wolves of the
community,” and since—at any rate up to recent times—“they lent no
soldiers to the ranks of the British army and had no pensions to lose,”
the Zakha Khels have always been more ready to give trouble than the
rest of their fellow-tribesmen. They hold, moreover, some five miles of
the country lying on either side of the road in what Warburton calls
“the real Khyber proper,” from the Shrine of Gurgurra (the
sloe-tree)—where a small post is held by the Khyber Rifles—to Loargai in
the Shinwari country. Of this shrine Warburton tells the following story
of the manner in which the Zakha Khels managed to remove the reproach
which had been levelled against them, _i.e._ that their country
possessed none of the ziarats, or sacred shrines, to the memory of
saints or martyrs. “The Zakha Khel Afridis,” writes Warburton, “bear a
most unenviable name as being the greatest thieves, housebreakers,
robbers and raiders amongst all the Khyber clans, their word or promise
never being believed or trusted by their Afridi brethren without a
substantial security being taken for its fulfilment. Naturally a race so
little trusted were not fortunate enough to possess a holy man whose
tomb would have served as a sanctuary to swear by, and thus save the
necessity of the substantial security. One day, however, a Kaka Khel Mia
came into their limits with the object of seeking safe conduct through
their territory to the next tribe. They received him with all
politeness, but finding in the course of conversation that he was of
saintly character—a holy Kaka Khel Mia—they came to the conclusion that
he was just the individual wanted to put their character for
truthfulness on a better footing. They therefore killed him and buried
him, making his tomb a shrine for all true believers to reverence, and a
security for themselves to swear by.”
Oliver caps this story with another of the same character: “A Mullah was
caught copying the Koran. ‘You tell us these books come from God, and
here you are making them yourself. It is not good for a Mullah to tell
lies’; so the indignant Afridis made another ziarat for him.”
It is only quite within recent years that the Zakha Khels have taken to
military service, and even now the number enlisted in the regular Indian
army is relatively small, the majority preferring service near their
homes and joining the Khyber Rifles. In politics the Zakha Khels are
Samil.
The _Sipah_ is only a small clan, Samil in politics, and cherishing a
standing feud with the Aka Khels. Their main settlements are in the
upper portion of the Bara Valley, with the Zakha Khel bordering them on
one side and the Kambar Khel on the other, while they also have
settlements in the Kajurai plain, where is their notorious rifle factory
at Ilmgudar.
Ranken defines the tribal limits in the Khyber Pass as follows: “The
Kuki Khels from Jumrud to where the Mackeson road begins; the Sipah
Afridis from the beginning of the Mackeson road to Shagai; the Kambar
Khel from Sultan Tarra to the white mosque of Ali Musjid; the Malikdin
Khel from the mosque to Gurgurra; the Zakha Khel from Gurgurra to the
Kandar ravine near Garhi Lalabeg; and the Shinwaris westward of
Torkhan.”
[Sidenote: The Khyber Pass Afridis]
The above-mentioned six clans are known collectively, as already
mentioned, as the “Khyber Pass Afridis.” British connection with them
commenced as far back as 1839, when a Sikh force under Colonel Wade, and
Shah Shuja’s contingent with British officers, forced the Khyber—of
which the actual defile may be said to be in the hands of these
half-dozen clans. “In our earlier Afghan campaigns they fully maintained
their ancient fame,” writes Oliver, “as bold and faithless robbers, but
from the time the Punjab was annexed, up to the second Afghan War, their
behaviour was, for Afridis, fairly good. In 1878 some of the clans took
sides with us, and some with the Amir, necessitating a couple of
expeditions into the Bazar Valley,” and during the two phases of the
campaign not less than 15,000 fighting men were required to keep open
our communications with India by the Khyber route, despite the
arrangement which had been come to with the clans bordering on the
Khyber, and which will now be described.
When, in 1878, the Government of India called upon the
Commander-in-Chief to put forward proposals for the conduct of a
campaign in Afghanistan, Sir Frederick Haines offered the suggestion,
_inter alia_, that “a demonstration should be made early in the
operations of an advance by the Khyber, by encamping out a certain
proportion of the Peshawar troops, making arrangements with the Khyberis
for their passage through the pass.”[103] In consequence of the above,
Major Cavagnari was instructed to come to a friendly understanding with
the Khyber Pass Afridis, and to arrange for the passage of troops
through the defiles at certain rates. Major Cavagnari based his estimate
of the money payments to be made to the headmen of the clans, on the
sums paid by Colonel Mackeson for the same purpose during the latter
period of the first Afghan War; and he finally compounded with the six
clans of Khyber Afridis for a payment of Rs. 5950 per mensem, which sum
was willingly accepted. When, in September 1880, northern Afghanistan
was finally evacuated by our troops, the Indian Government, recognising
the undesirability of maintaining any regular force in the Khyber,
expressed a wish to hand the pass over entirely to the independent
charge of the neighbouring clans, provided some wholly satisfactory
arrangement could be come to for keeping the road open, and for
safeguarding the caravans passing to and fro between Afghanistan and
India. Early in 1881 a complete jirgah of all the Khyber clans assembled
in Peshawar, and an agreement was arrived at whereby the independence of
the Afridis was recognised, and they engaged, in consideration of
certain allowances, to maintain order throughout the Khyber; the
Government of India reserved the right of re-occupation of the pass, and
was to take all tolls; the Afridis providing a force of Jazailchis paid
for by the Indian Government, and were to deal by a general jirgah with
all offences committed on the road. The allowances were fixed at Rs.
85,860 per annum for the six clans immediately concerned with the
policing of the pass, and for the Shinwaris of Loargai; and a further
sum of approximately the same amount was guaranteed by the Government of
India for the upkeep of the Jazailchis—since improved into the Khyber
Rifles—a body about 550 strong. As a set-off against these money grants
the tolls on caravans amounted to some 60,000 rupees per annum. The
allowances then granted are to-day substantially the same; the pass is
again in charge of the Khyber Afridis, and is again guarded, from Jumrud
to Lundi Kotal, by the Khyber Rifles, who have, however, been completely
reorganised, and are now a body 1700 strong, with six British officers.
[Sidenote: The Khyber]
Of that portion of the Khyber which is under our own control the
following description is given by Warburton: “The main road from
Peshawar to Kabul passes through Jumrud, going almost due east to west.
After leaving Jumrud it passes through an easy country, having low hills
on the left hand side, and about the third mile it enters the hills at
an opening called Shadi Bagiar. A ridge from the lofty Ghund-ghar on the
left runs down to the road, and faces a similar ridge coming down from a
prolongation of the Rhotas Range. The highway runs for a short distance
through the bed of a ravine, and then joins the road made by Colonel
Mackeson in 1839–42, until it ascends to the Shagai Plateau on the left
hand side, and here Ali Musjid is seen for the first time. Still going
westward the road turns to the right, and by an easy zigzag descends to
the stream and runs along its side, and below Ali Musjid goes up the
waterway. The new road along the cliff was made by us in 1879–80, and
here is the narrowest part of the Khyber, not more than fifteen feet
broad with the Rhotas hill on the right hand fully 2000 feet overhead.
Still progressing, at about 400 yards from Ali Musjid, on the left hand
side, three or four large springs issuing from the rock give the whole
water supply to this quarter. Between two and three miles comes the
Malikdin Khel hamlet of Katta Kushtia; soon after Gurgurra is reached,
and then we are in Zakha Khel limits in the real Khyber proper, until we
come to the Shinwaris of Lundi Kotal, or more properly Loargai. The
valley now widens out, and on either side lie the hamlets and some sixty
forts of the Zakha Khel Afridis. Here, there is no stream, and the
residents have to depend on rainwater collected in tanks. The Loargai
Shinwari Plateau is some seven miles in length, and there is its widest
part. Just here above Lundi Khana, the old road was a very nasty bit....
From Shadi Bagiar to Lundi Khana the pass cannot be more than twenty
miles in a direct line. When the first detachment of our troops returned
from Kabul,[104] they marched from Ali Musjid along the bed of the
stream, by Lala China, Jabagai, Gagri, Kaddam, ‘the real gate,’ and Jam,
villages of the Kuki Khel Afridis, to Jumrud; but Colonel Mackeson,
finding this way extremely difficult and unsuitable for guns and wheeled
traffic, made an excellent road from Ali Musjid to Fort Jumrud through
the hills, the same that we now use.”
[Sidenote: The Trans-Frontier Khyber]
The trans-frontier portion of the Khyber route to Kabul is described by
Oliver as follows: “Over the Lundi Khana Pass, called the Kotal,[105]
the road rises by a steep ascent between steep cliffs less than 150 feet
apart, and down again till the Valley of the Kabul River is reached at
Dakka.... At Jalalabad—ninety miles from Peshawar—the cross ranges of
hills are, for a change, replaced by a well-watered fertile stretch of
country, a score of miles long by a dozen wide, dotted with towers,
villages and trees; and where the Kabul River—that has all along had to
struggle through mere cracks—becomes a broad clear stream 100 yards
wide. Thence the route lies through a thoroughly unattractive country
again, over long stony ridges, across rocky river beds, varied with an
occasional fine valley like Fathabad, or an oasis like Nimlah, to
Gandamak, which, by way of comparison with what is beyond again, is a
land flowing with milk and honey; for on by Jagdalak and the Lataband
Pass, or Tezin and the Khurd Kabul, is a wild waste of bare hills,
surrounded by still more lofty and forbidding mountains. The teeth
become more closely set together; the road narrower; the stony ridges
change to bleak heights from 7000 to 8000 feet high, the river beds,
deep valleys, or narrow defiles, like the fatal Jagdalak, almost devoid
of verdure, and into whose gloomy ravines the winter sun can hardly
penetrate—these are the outworks that have to be negotiated before the
gardens and orchards, the bazaars and forts of Kabul, can be
approached.”
The _Aka Khel_ clan occupies the hills to the south-west of Peshawar
between the Bara River and the country of the Adam Khels, also the Bara
and the Waran Valleys. It was in the Waran Valley and in the house of
that firebrand among the border clergy, Saiyid Akbar, that there was
found, during the course of the Tirah expedition, the whole of the
inflammatory correspondence which had passed between the Afridi maliks
and mullahs prior to and during the Pathan revolt of 1897. This clan is
Samil in politics and can put 4000 armed men in the field.
[Sidenote: The Adam Khels]
The _Adam Khel_ clan is located in the hills between Peshawar and Kohat,
being bounded on the north and east by the Khattaks, on the south by the
Bangash, and on the west by the Aka Khels (their deadly enemies), and by
the Orakzais. They are one of the most powerful and numerous of the
Afridi clans, have a great reputation for bravery, and can bring into
the field 6500 fighting men, who, moreover, are unusually well armed,
with rifles stolen from our cantonments and with those they manufacture
themselves at their factories in the Kohat Pass. They are to a small
extent cultivators, but their chief occupation is carrying salt from the
mines; while the allowance they receive from the Indian Government for
keeping open the Kohat-Peshawar road is an assistance to their revenues,
an allowance which has been paid them since the days of the Sikh
governors of Peshawar. The Adam Khels do not belong to either of the two
great political factions. From the situation of the Adam Khel country,
and owing to the fact that their very existence is dependent upon their
trade with British territory, this particular clan is very susceptible
to a blockade and can consequently be easily brought to terms. Nearly
all the trouble we have had with the Adam Khels in the past has been due
to disputes about the salt tax, or about the maintenance of a
practicable road through the Kohat Pass. This short cut from Peshawar to
Kohat has a certain strategic value; by this road the two frontier
garrisons are no more than thirty-seven miles apart, and only ten of
these are in independent territory, while round by railway, via
Khushalgarh on the Indus, the distance is 200 miles. Two divisions of
the Adam Khels are the actual keepers of the pass, and though we pay,
and have paid for years, a considerable subsidy, until comparatively
lately we were not allowed to make a road, or even to remove the
boulders that obstructed the path. From about 1865 onwards the question
of the construction of a road practicable for wheeled traffic was
continually raised, and was as often dropped in face of tribal
opposition. It was one of the main objects of the expedition of 1877,
but was given up by Lord Lytton to avoid “breaking the spirit of the
clan,” who evinced their gratitude the year following—that of the Afghan
War—by threatening to close the road to us. This threat came, however,
to nothing, and the pass formed, throughout the campaign, an unmolested
and important means of communication between Peshawar and Kohat. Water
is very scarce in the pass, the supply being dependent mainly upon
tanks.
During the risings of 1897–98 the Adam Khels remained perfectly quiet,
and troops constantly used the pass, through which at last, in 1901, a
metalled cart road was made.
CHAPTER XII.
AFRIDIS: OPERATIONS.[106]
ADAM KHELS.
As has been already mentioned, British connection with the Afridis as a
tribe commenced in 1839, when Colonel Wade, with a contingent of Sikh
troops, forced the Khyber Pass. The first occasion, however, after the
annexation of the Peshawar Valley, upon which we came into actual
conflict with any of the clan, was in 1850. In the previous year,
following the example of former governors of Peshawar, the British
entered into an agreement with the Adam Khel, or Kohat Pass Afridis, to
pay them Rs. 5700 per annum, in consideration of which they were to
protect and keep open the road through the pass connecting Peshawar and
Kohat. The agreement had not, however, been in force a year, when a
party of our Sappers, road-making in British territory on the Kohat side
of the pass, were surprised by a body of 1000 tribesmen, and sustained
eighteen casualties before they were able even to take to their arms. It
was found that the assailants belonged to the Galai and Hassan Khel
divisions of the Adam Khel Afridis; and while the reputed reason for
their act of aggression was the raising of the rates at which salt had
hitherto been sold at the Kohat Mines, the chief cause was undoubtedly
the construction of the Kohat road, now recognised as increasing the
accessibility of the hill fastnesses of the neighbouring clans.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1850]
_Expedition against the Kohat Pass Afridis, February 1850._—Sir Charles
Napier, then Commander-in-Chief in India, happened at this time to be
visiting Peshawar, and within a week of the outrage orders had been
issued for the advance of a force through the Kohat Pass. The column,
which was accompanied by the Commander-in-Chief, was under Brigadier Sir
Colin Campbell, K.C.B., and consisted of one troop Horse Artillery with
elephant transport (25½-inch mortars carried on one elephant), two
companies each of the 60th Rifles, 61st and 98th Foot, the 15th
Irregular and 1st Punjab Cavalry, the 23rd and 31st Native Infantry, and
the 1st Punjab Infantry. The object was to escort the 1st Punjab Cavalry
and 1st Punjab Infantry to Kohat, and to punish the offenders of the
Adam Khel Afridis. The advance commenced on the 9th February, 1850, and
the troops were back in Peshawar by the 14th, but in the interval they
had fought their way through the Kohat Pass and back again. Strong
opposition was offered at Akhor, at the northern entrance to the pass,
which was taken and destroyed, and the tribesmen had then to be driven
from positions they had occupied on the heights above the village of
Zargun Khel, which was also burnt. Here the column camped for the night,
but sniping was carried on from the surrounding hills, and several
casualties occurred in the force. When next day the advance was resumed,
the village of Khui had in like manner to be attacked, while the
rearguard was throughout the day’s march exposed to considerable
annoyance from large bodies of the enemy who pressed heavily on rear and
flanks, occupying each height as it was vacated by our troops. The force
encamped for the night of the 11th at the foot of the Kohat Kotal, and
the regiments intended to garrison Kohat were passed on. During the
night the picquets in front of the camp were attacked by the enemy, who
were driven off without difficulty. Early the next morning, however, as
some of the picquets furnished by the 23rd and 31st were withdrawing
from their positions, they were suddenly and heavily attacked by the
Afridis, and sustained several casualties before the enemy was
dispersed. During this day the village of Bosti Khel, to the west of the
pass, was destroyed, and early on the 13th Brigadier Campbell’s force
started on its return march to Peshawar; but from Sharaki to Akhor,
nearly the whole length of the defile, the Afridis contested the ground,
opposing the force in front and hanging on its flanks and rear with even
greater perseverance than they had manifested during the advance. No
transport animals or baggage, however, were lost throughout these
operations, but our casualties amounted to nineteen killed, seventy-four
wounded and one missing.
Within a fortnight of the return of the troops from this expedition
hostilities broke out afresh. On the 28th February a jirgah of the
neighbouring clans agreed to attack the police post in the tower on the
summit of the pass, and next day the Pass Afridis, assisted by Bizoti
and Utman Khel Orakzais, surrounded the tower, held the road, and drove
back a police reinforcement arriving upon the scene. The defenders of
the tower were nearly out of ammunition when Captain Coke reached the
Kotal from Kohat, with a squadron of cavalry, two guns, and 450
bayonets, and found himself opposed to a force of from 1500 to 2000
Afridis and Orakzais. He attacked at once, drove off the enemy, and
placed reinforcements, supplies and ammunition in the post. Of his party
eleven were killed and fourteen wounded.
On the night of the 2nd–3rd March the tower was again attacked by a
mixed band of Kohat Pass and Khyber Afridis and Orakzais, to the number
of 2000, who cut off the water supply and erected breastworks close up
to the post, which was defended with great spirit by a subadar of the
1st Punjab Infantry. Coke moved out from Kohat again with 450 of his
regiment and some Bangash levies, and withdrew the garrison of the
tower, which was thereupon destroyed by the enemy, who now dispersed to
their homes.
For some months individual outrages continued, and it appeared that,
while certain maliks were willing to submit to our terms, the body of
the clan was still recalcitrant. A blockade of the offending divisions
was therefore established, and men belonging to them who happened to be
in British territory were seized. The reply of the tribesmen to these
measures was an incursion into our border and the raiding of one of our
villages in July.
[Sidenote: Trouble in the Pass]
For some time after this negotiations were carried on with the Afridis
in regard to safeguarding the pass, and temporary arrangements were made
whereby, up to 1853, the pass remained generally open—occasional
robberies only being committed. These arrangements thereafter broke
down, and towards the end of this year the Bangash were asked if they
would undertake to hold the pass against other tribesmen. They agreed,
but they had hardly occupied the position on the Kotal and commenced the
reconstruction of its defences, when they were attacked by the Afridis
in force. There was a general panic among the Bangash, who hurriedly
evacuated their position and retired, covered by a small force under
Captain Coke.
Subsequently an arrangement was come to by which the defence of the
Kotal was entrusted, on payment, to divisions of the Orakzais, Afridis
and Bangash; and the Galai and Hassan Khel divisions of the Adam Khel
Afridis having offered their submission, the blockade was removed and
the pass might now again be said to be open.
The total allowances at this time paid to all the Pass tribesmen
amounted to an annual payment of Rs. 14,600.
While the shortest and easiest route between Peshawar and Kohat
traverses the Kohat Pass, there is an alternative, though tortuous,
connection between these two outposts by way of the Jamu and Bori[107]
Passes through the country of the Jawaki division of the Adam Khel
Afridis; and when the early disturbances which have been above described
made communication difficult and hazardous by way of the Kohat Pass, the
Jawaki Afridis offered to carry the mails by their route, which for a
short time was in actual use. But the misbehaviour of the Jawakis was
soon found to be at least equal to that of their fellow-tribesmen, and
during 1851–53 they committed serious raids in the Kohat, Khushalgarh
and Peshawar districts, the Bori villages especially becoming the refuge
for every robber and murderer of that part of the Border. The amount of
plunder taken by the men of Bori in 1852–53 was said to have surpassed
that of any former period, and Captain Coke reported that there were
half a dozen stolen cattle in every house. Every effort was made to
persuade the Jawaki Afridis to see the error of their ways, to avoid the
committal of crimes in British territory, to refuse passage through
their lands to outlaws and criminals, and to come to terms with the
Punjab Government, but they rejected all propositions and nothing
therefore remained but to send a military force against them.
[Sidenote: Jawaki Expedition of 1853]
_Expedition against the Jawaki Afridis, November 1853._—The Bori Valley
is about twelve miles long and has an entrance at each extremity; but as
they are both very narrow and very defensible defiles, it was determined
to cross the outer range at the most favourable point, and the Sarghasha
Pass, crossing the outer range between Kandao and Taruni and believed to
be the most practicable road, was chosen. The force—a squadron 7th
Irregular Cavalry, a mountain battery, two nine pounders, 22nd Foot,
Corps of Guides, 20th Native Infantry,[108] 66th Gurkhas, and a company
of Sappers and Miners—under Colonel Boileau, advanced very early on the
29th November from Bazid Khel where it had been covering the
construction of Fort Mackeson. The Sarghasha Pass was found to be steep,
winding, narrow and long, but fortunately it was not held, and the Bori
villages were not occupied in any strength, the Afridis inhabiting them
having taken to the spurs commanding them. From these they had to be
dislodged by the Guides and Gurkhas, led by Lieutenant W. S. R. Hodson
of the former regiment, who had a hot struggle with the enemy in holding
the heights, while the villages were being destroyed, and in withdrawing
when the retirement commenced. The valley was left by the Taruni exit,
up to which point the rearguard was as usual hotly pressed. Camp at
Bazid Khel was regained at 8 p.m., the force having suffered a loss of
eight killed and twenty-nine wounded. The effect of the expedition was
apparent—not in the losses of the tribesmen, which were actually rather
fewer than our own—but in the fact that within a few days the men of
Bori made overtures of submission, and, after somewhat protracted
negotiations, they agreed to our terms and gave hostages for their
future good behaviour.
After the settlement of 1853 with the Kohat Pass Afridis, the Pass
remained open until 1866, when the Basl Khel and Hassan Khel divisions
seemed inclined to give trouble, endeavouring to interfere with the Pass
arrangements, plundering the mail, kidnapping our subjects and firing on
our posts. The assembly, however, of a punitive force soon changed the
aspect of affairs, the tribesmen at once submitted to our terms, gave
hostages, and for another ten years free passage through the pass was
assured.
In 1876 the question of the construction of a cart road through the pass
was reopened; the majority of the Pass Afridis appeared to raise no
objection, but the Sharaki men absolutely refused to listen to the
proposal, and by placing obstructions on the road, ill-using travellers,
and insulting the Government messenger sent to summon them to a meeting,
they necessitated the closing of the pass to Afridi trade. Reprisals
immediately commenced; raids were made in British territory, cattle were
carried off, and the towers on the crest of the pass and which were in
charge of the levies were burnt. In these outrages the Galai Khel alone
were at first implicated, but ere long the Hassan Khel and Ashu Khel
divisions were included in the blockade which had been established. By
March 1877, however, all the offenders had submitted and the pass was
again opened.
In this year a consideration of the re-allotment of the pass allowances
was rendered necessary, as it was found that in some cases these were
paid to divisions which rendered no appreciable service, while others
received more than their dues. The Jawakis had hitherto been paid a sum
of Rs. 2000 per annum, despite the fact that their settlements did not
abut on the pass, and that they had in the past proved themselves
incapable of assisting in the safeguarding of the road. It was proposed
by Government to withdraw this Kohat Pass allowance from the Jawakis,
but to give them an equivalent sum for guarding the Khushalgarh road and
telegraph line, which, running close to the hills of independent tribes,
were always liable to attack. Without, however, awaiting the decision of
the Government, the Jawakis began, in July 1877, to give trouble; on the
15th they cut the Kohat-Khushalgarh telegraph line in several places; on
the 24th they attacked a police escort on the Kohat road and rescued a
couple of Afridi prisoners; on the 17th August they carried off a number
of Government mules from near Khushalgarh; on the 19th they attacked and
burnt a village; on two other occasions bodies of Jawaki Afridis
attacked small armed parties moving along the road; villages in our
territory were constantly raided; and finally, on the 27th August, a
bridge on the Khushalgarh road was burnt. At the end of August it was
decided to make a sudden dash into the Jawaki country with the object of
quickly effecting as much damage as possible, and so bring them to
terms, the season of the year being unfavourable for protracted
operations.
[Sidenote: Trouble with the Jawakis]
_Expedition against the Jawaki Afridis in August
1877._—Brigadier-General C. P. Keyes, C.B., commanding the Punjab
Frontier Force, was to have had charge of the proposed operations, but
in his absence through illness the command devolved upon Colonel
Mocatta, commanding the 3rd Sikhs. The force employed was divided into
three small columns, of which the first, consisting of a mountain
battery, 45 sabres, and 625 bayonets, was to enter the Jawaki country by
the Tortang defile, thence pushing forward, as rapidly as possible,
until arrival at a central point at the northern end of the Gandiali
ravine, so as to cut off the retreat in that direction of the enemy’s
main body, which, it was anticipated, would be opposed to No. 2 Column
in the Gandiali defile. The second column—621 bayonets—was to advance up
the Gandiali Pass at daylight, and keep the enemy in play until the
first column should be in position. The third column—201 bayonets of the
Guides—advancing from Shadipur on the Indus, via Sheikh Aladad Ziarat,
was to cut off the enemy’s retreat along the Tambal Hills, thereafter
effecting a junction with the other two columns, the whole force
retiring to British territory by the Gandiali Pass.
The operations were carried out as arranged, the junction with No. 3
Column being effected at the village of Lashkari Banda; but, owing to
the difficulties of the road and the pressure of the enemy on the rear
guard, the original intention of retiring by the Gandiali Pass had to be
abandoned, and the whole force was withdrawn by the Kuka China Pass to
the border village of Talanj, and thence to Gumbat on the
Kohat-Khushalgarh road. The men had been under arms in a burning sun for
twenty hours, had marched nearly thirty miles, and had sustained eleven
casualties—one killed and ten wounded.
These operations did not have the quieting effect which had been
anticipated, chiefly because the loss of the Jawakis in killed and
wounded had been but trifling, while the actual destruction of property
had fallen upon one small section of the division alone. Their hostile
attitude consequently remained unchanged, and aggressions upon British
territory did not cease. Outrages of all kinds continued throughout
September and October, and another expedition into the Jawaki country
became imperative.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1877–78]
_Expedition against the Jawaki Afridis, November 1877 to January
1878._—The arrangements made followed the procedure adopted earlier in
the year—that is to say, three columns were formed which entered the
Jawaki country at the same points as had the columns under command of
Colonel Mocatta, but the strength of each had been slightly increased.
Brig.-Gen. Keyes was in command.
No. 1 COLUMN.
Colonel Mocatta.
No. 1 Mountain Battery.[109]
25 sabres, 2nd Punjab Cavalry.
380 bayonets, Corps of Guides.
225 bayonets, 1st Sikh Infantry.
225 bayonets, 3rd Sikh Infantry.
No. 2 COLUMN.
Major Williams.
25 sabres, 2nd Punjab Cavalry.
350 bayonets, 4th Punjab Infantry.
300 bayonets, 6th Punjab Infantry.
No. 3 COLUMN.
Colonel Gardiner.
2 guns, No. 2 Mountain Battery.[110]
280 bayonets, 5th Punjab Infantry.
280 bayonets, 5th Gurkhas.
The first and second columns, advancing on the 9th November from Kohat
and Gumbat and by Tortang and Gandiali respectively, met at Turki, and
moved in combination upon Paia, which was occupied after but
insignificant opposition. Meanwhile, the third column had pushed forward
from Shadipur through the Namung Pass, finding the enemy holding the
ridges on the right of the exit from the defile; these were quickly
driven off, and the column moved on to Kakhto and there entrenched. On
the 12th the third column was again engaged, and the 13th and 15th were
occupied in the destruction of towers about Zal-Beg and in the Paia
Valley, the main body then moving to Shindih and Turki. There was very
heavy rain between the 16th and 25th, but a good deal of reconnaissance
and survey work was carried out. No further military operations were,
however, possible until the 1st December, when an advance on Jamu had
been decided upon. As it appeared that heavy loss must accompany any
retirement from Jamu after its capture, Brigadier-General Keyes
suggested that his operations should be assisted by the advance of a
force from Peshawar upon Bori: this was agreed to.
[Sidenote: Combined Operations]
On the 1st December the force under General Keyes, divided into three
columns, left camp at 4 a.m. The right column moved to the plateau to
the north-east of the camp in the direction of Paia; the centre column
advanced towards Bagh and Saparai; while the third, or left, moved by a
high ridge to a point to the north-west of the camp. The general advance
commenced at 6.30 a.m.; the enemy were completely surprised and,
although they had constructed breastworks, did not in any place attempt
to make a stand. They were driven into and beyond the two villages of
Shahi Khel, close to the Nara Khula defile, where the Jamu Valley is
very narrow, and these villages were then occupied by our troops and
finally burnt. The force then fell back and bivouacked at Saparai and
Bagh. On the 2nd and 3rd the Jamu Valley was surveyed and the Bazid Khel
Kotal reconnoitred, and on the 4th the village of Bagh was burnt, the
whole force now bivouacking in its vicinity.
Meanwhile, the operations from the Peshawar side had been delayed and
hampered by the weather. Heavy rain caused a flood on the Indus, the
bridge of boats at Attock was destroyed and communications with Rawal
Pindi were interrupted, so that it was not until the 3rd December that
the Peshawar column was concentrated and ready to move forward into the
Jawaki country. This force was under Brigadier-General C. C. G. Ross,
C.B., and was composed as under:
FIRST BRIGADE.
Colonel J. Doran, C.B.
Three guns, I/C R.H.A.
51st Regiment.
Two Companies Sappers and Miners.
22nd Punjab Native Infantry.
27th Punjab Native Infantry.
SECOND BRIGADE.
Colonel H. Buchanan.
Three guns, I/C R.H.A.
13/ 9th R.A. (40–pounders).
9th Regiment.
4th Battalion Rifle Brigade.
14th Native Infantry.[111]
20th Punjab Native Infantry.
The Bori Valley is separated from the plain to the south of the
Mackeson-Sham Shatu road by a rocky range of hills, as already described
in the account of the operations against the Bori villages in 1853. This
range is crossed by a comparatively low pass at Kandao, and by a second,
more direct pass, known as the Sarghasha, over a higher part of the
ridge. The plan of operations was to occupy the crest of the ridge with
artillery and infantry, and from this position—completely commanding the
Bori Valley—to take such measures as should be found most suitable for
attacking the villages and destroying their towers and other defences.
The first brigade advanced via Kandao with orders to proceed to the top
of the ridge, turning the Sarghasha Pass, while the other brigade made a
direct attack upon it. By these arrangements the crest of the pass
became untenable, and the enemy abandoned the position and retired
firing, partly towards the Bori Valley and partly along the ridge
towards Khui. The whole force bivouacked on the ridge. For the next few
days the troops were employed in destroying the towers and villages in
the Bori Valley under a brisk but ineffective fire from the tribesmen.
While these operations were in progress, the force under command of
Brigadier-General Keyes had advanced upon and destroyed the towers of
the village of Ghariba, a place which had long been considered the
Alsatia of Jawaki thieves, and, from the difficult nature of its
approaches, secure from attack. This operation was effected by a rapid
and combined movement of two columns of attack, without any casualties
on our side.
[Sidenote: The Country Traversed]
Although the chief places of the Jawakis had now been occupied and
destroyed, and the blockade satisfactorily maintained by our forces, yet
the enemy showed no signs of surrender. A further advance, therefore, by
both forces in combination, into the Pustawani Valley was decided upon.
The strategic value of this valley to any force operating against the
Adam Khel Afridis had long been recognised, and it was known that this
part of the country was considered impregnable by the Jawakis, while its
careful survey was very desirable. On the Peshawar side, the road from
the Bori Valley to Pustawani leads through the Bori China Pass, which a
reconnaissance, conducted on the 25th December, proved to be just
practicable for mules. The actual advance to Pustawani was to have been
made on the 27th, but heavy rain, with the probable consequent floods in
the pass, delayed forward movement until the 31st, and it was hoped that
the troops of both the Peshawar and Kohat columns would arrive on the
same day in the Pustawani Valley.
Both forces effected their purposes successfully and with but small
loss. Brigadier-General Ross moved almost entirely unopposed through the
Bori China Pass to Pustawani, and thence to Walai, where he met
Brigadier-General Keyes. The Peshawar force bivouacked unmolested in or
about Pustawani, which was destroyed on the 2nd January, when General
Ross retraced his steps, and, meeting with but very slight opposition,
regained the Bori Valley early that afternoon, and reached the Sarghasha
camp without any casualties.
Early on the 31st December Brigadier-General Keyes left his camp in
front of Bagh, debouched on the Paia Plain, and having reached Ghariba,
moved to the left up the spur of the Dargai Sar, and sent troops through
the Dargai Pass. Thence the General rode on to Walai, where he met
General Ross, and it was agreed that nothing was to be gained by further
operations or a prolonged occupation of the Pustawani Valley. On the
next day the whole force commenced its retirement, the rear guard being
followed up by the enemy, who had collected in some strength. The
retirement was, however, admirably covered by the Pathan company of the
5th Punjab Infantry, and from Paia the troops marched back unmolested to
camp.
The remaining operations carried out by the troops under Generals Keyes
and Ross were mainly of topographical importance. On the morning of the
15th January both columns occupied the positions they had held on the
31st December, and thence they moved towards Jamu for the purpose of
exploring the Nara Khula defile and the valley to the west of it, now
the only remaining strongholds of the Jawakis. Despite a certain amount
of opposition, this country was traversed by our troops, and by the 23rd
January the bulk of the force employed had been withdrawn to Peshawar
and Kohat, a small body of the three arms only remaining temporarily on
the Sarghasha ridge as a force of observation. During the whole
operations, from November 1877 to January 1878, our casualties had
amounted to eleven killed and fifty-one wounded.
[Sidenote: Submission of the Jawakis]
Almost immediately upon the withdrawal of our troops the Jawakis had
begun to show signs of submission, and after negotiations, protracted
until March, a settlement was effected, the tribesmen agreeing to make
complete submission in full durbar at Peshawar, to pay a fine of Rs.
5000, to expel certain ringleaders of recent raids, to surrender a
number of English rifles and native matchlocks, and to give hostages for
future good conduct.
After the conclusion of the Jawaki expedition, the Adam Khel Afridis
continued to behave well as a clan. During the Afghan War it was
rumoured that they intended to close the Peshawar-Kohat road, and that
they had offered help to the Amir of Kabul; but not only was the pass
never closed for a single hour during the campaign, but it was freely
used by us for the passage of troops and convoys, while the Adam Khels
hired themselves and their camels out to us for transport purposes.
There have been disagreements since then—notably in 1883—and chiefly
connected with the salt duties, but these differences, like “the
quarrels of lovers, are the renewal of love”—the pass has remained open,
the Adam Khels continue in the undisturbed enjoyment of their pass
allowances, few important offences have of late years been committed,
and—most significant of all—the Adam Khels remained quiescent throughout
the troubles of 1897, in spite of many endeavours made by the other
clans to induce them to join in the risings of that year.
_Aka Khels._—The first occasion upon which, after our arrival in the
Peshawar Valley, we came in collision with the Aka Khel Afridis was in
1854. The Aka Khel settlements lie, some of them, to the west of the
country of the Adam Khels; and in 1854 the Basi Khel section of the Aka
Khel, not finding themselves admitted to any share in the Kohat Pass
allowances, began to give trouble on the Peshawar border, murdering
British subjects, threatening the village of Matanni close to Peshawar,
and attacking the camp of the Assistant Civil Engineer.
[Sidenote: Coercion of the Aka Khels]
The operations which, during 1855, were carried out against the Aka
Khels can hardly, even collectively, be dignified by the name of an
“expedition,” and consisted for the most part in a blockade of the clan,
and in the carrying out of sudden raids into their winter settlements,
the surprise of their border villages, and the seizure of their cattle
from their grazing grounds. Since during the hot weather the Aka Khel
migrate to their summer settlements in Tirah, any blockade to be
effective must be long sustained, and the Commissioner of Peshawar,
Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Edwardes, obtained sanction to keep up the
blockade until the clan surrendered at discretion. When, therefore, the
Aka Khels returned in the winter to the low country, not a man of them
could venture into Peshawar, their wood trade fell into other hands, and
finally—after a determined but fruitless attempt to induce the other
tribesmen to make common cause and take the field with them—the Aka Khel
gave in about the middle of December, and agreed to the terms imposed
upon them. They estimated their losses during the blockade at more than
seventy-seven thousand rupees.
“Thus,” said Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes, “ended the struggle of the Aka
Khel Afridis with a settled government. Instead of haughtily exacting
blackmail from the British for the safety of the Kohat road, they paid a
judicial fine for a highway robbery.”
Since then the Aka Khels as an individual clan have given little or no
trouble on our border.
CHAPTER XIII.
AFRIDIS: OPERATIONS CONTINUED.[112]
KHYBER PASS AFRIDIS.
From the year 1857 onwards the Khyber Pass Afridis have given the Punjab
Government a good deal of trouble, and it has been necessary to carry
out many raids and expeditions against one or other of the clans, and,
at times, against all of them. Just before the outbreak of the Mutiny,
when the Amir Dost Muhammad was encamped at Jamrud after his interview
with Sir John Lawrence, a party of Kuki Khels fired upon some British
officers near the mouth of the Khyber, and mortally wounded one of them.
The blockade then established was maintained throughout that troublous
year, and was so injurious to the interests of the clan that they paid
up a fine and agreed to other terms proposed by us. The Zakha Khels were
at the same time under blockade for innumerable highway robberies, but
they also early made their submission.
They broke out again in 1861, and raided British territory in the
neighbourhood of Kajurai—a tract of country occupied during the winter
by the remainder of the clans of the Khyber Pass Afridis, and it was
found necessary to put the usual pressure on these to induce them for
the future to refuse passage through their lands at Kajurai to Zakha
Khel and other robbers.
The Zakha Khel and Kuki Khel continued to give trouble, and maintained
their reputation as the most inveterate and audacious of robbers, whose
depredations up to the very walls of Peshawar, and even within the city
and cantonments, have been notorious since the days of Sikh rule. In
those days, moreover, the Sikh governors cultivated methods of
repression and punishment such as we have never practised. In General
Thackwell’s diary, dated Peshawar, 23rd November, 1839, he writes,
“Called on General Avitabili to take leave. They say Avitabili is a
tiger in this government, he has been known to flay criminals alive and
to break the bones of poor wretches on the wheel previous to hanging
them in chains, and at our conference to-day very gravely wondered we
did not put poison in sugar to send in traffic among the Khyberees.”
In December 1874, the bandmaster[113] of the 72nd Highlanders, stationed
at Peshawar, was carried off by some Zakha Khel raiders and taken to the
Khyber, being subsequently released uninjured; and during the operations
against the Jawakis in 1877–78 the Zakha Khels sent to their aid a
contingent of from 300–400 men, who fired on some British troops in the
Kohat Pass and then turned back.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1878]
_Expedition against the Zakha Khels of the Bazar Valley, December
1878._—From the very commencement of the second Afghan war in 1878, the
Afridis of the Khyber Pass began to give trouble. At the end of November
a signalling party on the Shagai Heights, east of Ali Musjid in the
Khyber, was attacked by some Kuki Khels from the village of Kadam, two
men being killed and one wounded, but for this outrage punishment was
inflicted by the tribal jirgah. Annoyance did not, however, cease; our
communications in the Khyber were continually harassed, and the camp at
Ali Musjid was fired into regularly every night, the culprits belonging
chiefly to the Zakha Khel clan. One or two small raids upon tribal
villages proving ineffectual, a punitive expedition into the Bazar
Valley was decided upon, the troops composing it being drawn from the
2nd Division of the Peshawar Valley Field Force, the headquarters of
which were then at Jamrud, and from the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division
then at Dakka. The following composed the two columns:
JAMRUD COLUMN.
3 guns, D/A. R.H.A.
300 bayonets, 1/5th Fusiliers.
200 bayonets, 51st Foot.
1 troop, 11th Bengal Lancers.
1 troop, 13th Bengal Lancers.
500 bayonets, 2nd Gurkhas.
400 bayonets, Mhairwara Battalion.
DAKKA COLUMN.
2 guns, 11/9th R.A.
300 bayonets, 1/17th Foot.
41 bayonets, 8th Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
263 bayonets, 27th Punjab Native Infantry.
114 bayonets, 45th Sikhs.
The Jamrud column, starting at 5 p.m. on the 19th December, and moving
by Chora, a village inhabited by friendly Malikdin Khels, reached Walai
in the Bazar Valley by midday on the 20th, and from here communication
was established with the Dakka column, which had then reached the Sisobi
Pass[114]—about three miles to the east—and expected to effect a
junction with the Jamrud Column next day.
On the 21st the Jamrud Column marched to China, and visited every
village of any importance in the valley, destroying all the towers,
returning that night to Walai, and withdrawing thence unopposed to Ali
Musjid on the 22nd.
The Dakka troops destroyed the towers in the vicinity of their bivouac,
marching later to Nikai, which was also burnt. It being then too late to
arrive at the Sisobi Pass on the return march before nightfall, the
General (Tytler) halted, owing to difficulties as to water, in the
Thabai Pass, with the intention of retiring on Dakka by this route.
During the night the tribesmen assembled in strength about the camp, and
when the march was resumed at daybreak it was seen that the enemy meant
disputing every foot of it. The Afridis notoriously attack the baggage
guard in preference to any other part of a force, and it was therefore
determined to change the usual order of march. Orders were consequently
issued for each corps to take its own baggage with it; the artillery and
sappers, being most encumbered with mules, followed close to the
advanced guard; while a very strong rearguard was left behind, which,
being wholly relieved from the charge of baggage, was able to resist the
pressure from the rear.
The road was winding, steep, and very difficult for mules, and from the
moment the force started a lively but ineffective fusillade was opened
on the column. The heights were taken and held by flanking parties; the
rearguard was hotly engaged; the enemy seized the positions of the
rearguard and of the flanking parties as soon as they were abandoned;
and Dakka was not reached by the whole column until 11.30 p.m., when the
force had marched 22 miles, and had lost two men killed and twenty
wounded.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1879]
_Second Expedition against the Zakha Khels of the Bazar Valley, January
1879._—After the expedition of December 1878, the Khyber Pass Afridis
continuing to give trouble, every effort was made to break up the tribal
combination, and the Kuki Khels and Kambar Khels came in and tendered
their submission. The attitude of the Zakha Khels was, however, so
unsatisfactory that the political officer, Major Cavagnari, recommended
a temporary occupation of the Bazar Valley, coupled with visits to all
the recusant villages in that and the Bara Valley. In consequence,
Lieutenant-General Maude, commanding the 2nd Division, Peshawar Valley
Field Force, applied on the 16th January for sanction for the proposed
operations, in concert with a force furnished from the 1st Division.
Sanction was accorded by the Commander-in-Chief, but a time-limit of ten
days was laid down within which the operations were to be concluded. The
following troops were placed at the disposal of Lieutenant-General
Maude:
JAMRUD COLUMN.
2 guns, D/A Royal Horse Artillery.
2 guns, 11/9th Royal Field Artillery.
315 bayonets, 5th Fusiliers.
316 bayonets, 25th Foot.
145 sabres, 13th Bengal Lancers.
55 bayonets, Madras Sappers and Miners.
356 bayonets, 24th Punjab Native Infantry.
BASAWAL COLUMN.
2 guns, 11/9th Royal Artillery.
361 bayonets, 1/17th Foot.
210 bayonets, 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade.
32 sabres, Guides Cavalry.
43 bayonets, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
201 bayonets, 4th Gurkhas.
ALI MUSJID COLUMN.
2 guns, 11/9th Royal Artillery.
213 bayonets, 51st Foot.
31 bayonets, Madras Sappers and Miners.
312 bayonets, 2nd Gurkhas.
320 bayonets, Mhairwara Battalion.
311 bayonets, 6th Native Infantry.[115]
DAKKA COLUMN.
52 bayonets, 1/17th Foot.
104 bayonets, 27th Punjab Native Infantry.
257 bayonets, 45th Sikhs.
[Sidenote: The different Columns]
Leaving Jamrud on the 24th January, the Jamrud Column marched by way of
the Khyber Stream and the Chora Pass to Berar Kats, arriving there late
on the following afternoon. There was some firing at the baggage escort
_en route_ and at the camp after dark, but it soon ceased.
The Ali Musjid Column started on the 25th, and, moving by Alachi,
reached Karamna the same afternoon, being there joined by the 6th Native
Infantry, which had marched thither from Lundi Kotal by way of the Bori
Pass, the southern foot of which is in the north-west corner of the
Karamna Valley. On this day the towers of the Karamna villages were
destroyed, as were those of Barg, to which place the column marched on
the 27th.
The Basawal Column reached China on the afternoon of the 25th January,
and was here joined by the Dakka force, the united columns moving on to
Kasaba and Sisobi on the 26th; the Sisobi Pass was occupied on the 27th,
and made practicable. Here a junction was effected with the Jamrud
force, and on the afternoon of this day all the columns were united in
the Bazar Valley under Lieutenant-General Maude, who early that morning
had secured possession of the China hill.
During all these movements the Zakha Khel had shown great hostility; the
force had been fired on night and day from the moment of entry into the
country, while the inhabitants had deserted their villages and had, in
many instances, themselves set fire to them. In a reconnaissance on the
28th of the Bukar Pass leading to the Bara Valley a good deal of
opposition was experienced, and in the destruction on the 29th of the
towers of Halwai the enemy disclosed their presence in large numbers. It
was now clear that any invasion of the Bara Valley would bring on an
Afridi war, and it subsequently transpired that other tribes, as well as
other clans of Afridis, were assembling to oppose our further
advance—detachments from the Shinwaris and Orakzais, as well as from the
Kuki Khel, Aka Khel, Kambar Khel, Malikdin Khel, and Sipah Afridis,
gathering together and holding the passes over the Bara hills.
The responsibility of Lieutenant-General Maude as to further operations
was not lightened by the receipt on the 29th January of a circular
letter from Army Headquarters, reminding column commanders in
Afghanistan that the operations then in progress were directed against
the Amir and his troops alone, and that unnecessary collisions with the
tribes were to be as far as possible avoided. Lieutenant-General Maude
therefore telegraphed for more explicit instructions, especially as to
whether he should force an entrance to the Bara Valley.
[Sidenote: Close of the Operations]
Before any reply could be expected, an urgent demand was received from
the General Officer commanding First Division, Peshawar Valley Field
Force, for the immediate return of his troops, in view of an expected
attack upon Jalalabad and Dakka by Mohmands and Bajauris; but the
awkwardness of such a request in the middle of operations was smoothed
by the Afridis of the Bazar Valley now evincing a disposition to open
negotiations, while a deputation from all divisions of the Bara Valley
Zakha Khels actually arrived in camp. On the 2nd February the Political
Officer reported that he had made satisfactory terms with the jirgah;
and although the same evening General Maude was informed that the words
of the circular above referred to did not preclude his carrying out an
expedition into the Bara Valley should he consider such to be necessary,
he decided that the whole force under his command should commence its
withdrawal on the 3rd; and on that date accordingly the different
columns left the Bazar Valley, the Dakka force by the Sisobi Pass and
the troops of the Second Division via Chora for Jamrud and Ali Musjid.
There was no molestation by the Afridis during the retirement of any of
the columns, which, during the operations described, had sustained a
loss of five killed and thirteen wounded.
The effect of this expedition did not last more than a few weeks, for by
the end of March the Zakha Khels had again begun to give trouble,
continuing to do so until the termination in May of the first phase of
the second Afghan war. On the withdrawal from Afghanistan in June, the
Khyber Afridis made only one insignificant attempt to molest our troops;
and, fortunately for us, the trials of what has been called “the Death
March”[116] were not aggravated by the attacks of fanatical tribesmen,
during the retirement India-wards through the Khyber of the Peshawar
Valley Field Force.
After the close of the first phase of the campaign in Afghanistan,
arrangements, which worked generally satisfactorily, were made with the
Afridis for the safety of the Khyber; while the agreement come to in
1881, and honourably kept on both sides for sixteen years, will be found
in Chapter XI.
It has been said that the Afridis of the Khyber kept faithfully to their
treaty engagements during the sixteen years which followed the events
which have been just described, but in 1892 there was one comparatively
minor case of misconduct, when a Kuki Khel malik, smarting under a
grievance connected with the deprivation for misbehaviour of a portion
of his allowances, collected a body of 500 or 600 men and attacked three
of the Khyber posts. The Tirah mullahs made an unsuccessful attempt to
persuade other Afridi clans to join, and the prompt despatch of troops
to Jamrud was sufficient to cause the dispersal of the lashkar.
[Sidenote: The Outbreak of 1897]
Five years afterwards there was a sudden, unaccountable, and widespread
display of hostility towards the government, in which almost all the
border tribes from the Malakand to the Tochi were concerned; and it
seems necessary to make something of the nature of a statement of the
causes which have been put forward, at various times and by different
persons, for an outbreak so serious and so wholly unexpected. It must,
however, from the outset be borne in mind that, when we made our
agreement for the safeguarding of the pass with and by the Khyber
Afridis, they put the recognition upon record of the independence of
their responsibility for the security of the road from any government
aid in the matter of troops; while it was further by them admitted that
“it lies with the Indian Government to retain its troops within the pass
or withdraw them and to re-occupy it at pleasure.” In face of this
admission it is not easy to see how the Afridis can justify their
complaint (made to the Amir of Afghanistan), that our hold on the Khyber
was an infringement of treaty rights.
It may be admitted that a strong case is presented by those who hold
that the real cause of the general Pathan revolt of 1897 is traceable to
the policy which dictated the Afghan Boundary agreement of 1893. It is
indisputable that one of the results of this measure—imperatively
demanded by the difficulty, always present and ever increasing, of
controlling the tribes immediately beyond our border—aroused a sense of
distrust and uneasiness among the Pathans of the frontier. ‘They watched
in impotent wrath the erection of the long line of demarcation pillars;
they were told that henceforth all to the east of that line practically
belonged to the British, and that the allegiance of all who dwelt within
it must be to us; they saw their country mapped and measured; they
witnessed the establishment of military posts, not merely on their
borders, but in their very midst, as at Wana; and they came to a
conclusion, not unnatural to an ignorant people ever hostile to any form
of settled and civilised government, that their country was annexed and
their independence menaced.’ The tribesmen themselves put forward many
pretexts for their action—after the event; but religious fanaticism
undoubtedly furnished the actual incentive, while there are not wanting
indications that the discomfiture of the infidel (the Greek) at the
hands of the followers of Islam (the Turk), furnished the spur which
incited the tribesmen to try and throw off the yoke of the unbeliever.
Then, again, there seems no doubt that the men of the border believed
that they might safely rely upon the support, moral and material, of the
Amir of Afghanistan. It was known that the Durand Boundary Agreement was
not particularly palatable to the Ruler of the Unruly; he had lately
written a book on _Jehad_; he had recently assumed a title[117] which
seemed to include all Muhammadans under his sovereignty; for years he
had been a personal friend of the Hadda Mullah, one of the chief
apostles of insurrection. As a matter of fact, however, subsequent
revelations proved that the Amir’s attitude towards his ally had been
perfectly correct, throughout a situation which for him was both
difficult and dangerous; he issued proclamations enjoining neutrality;
he caused Afghan reinforcements moving eastward to be stopped and
dispersed; the Afridis themselves admitted that “His Highness advised us
not to fight with the British Government;” but the Amir was not able
effectively to control the active sympathies with the insurrectionary
movement of some of his people in general, and of Ghulam Haidar, his
Commander-in-Chief, in particular.
[Sidenote: Amir and Afridis]
The initial outbreaks, preceding that of the Afridis, occurred on the
10th June, 1897, in the Tochi Valley, on the 26th July at the Malakand,
and on the 7th August at Shabkadar in the Peshawar Valley; and shortly
after this latter date the possibility of the rising, already
sufficiently formidable, spreading to the Afridis and Orakzais, caused
the concentration at Rawal Pindi of two brigades, in addition to those
which had already been formed for service against other tribes on the
frontier. At the same time a movable column, composed of the three arms,
was formed at Peshawar, intended for the protection of the frontier
immediately adjacent to that cantonment, but not intended to carry on
operations in the Khyber; the garrison of Jamrud was doubled, and
regular troops occupied the frontier forts at Michni and Abazai. For
some reason, not readily apparent, the authorities on the spot, military
and civil, do not seem to have felt any real apprehension for the safety
of the Khyber; and, as has been said elsewhere, reports sent from Kohat,
emphasising the serious and widespread character of the rising, and
pointing out the extent to which Afridis and Orakzais seemed to be
implicated, appear to have been discredited or were considered to be
exaggerated.
On the 17th August, definite information reached Peshawar from the
Khyber that an Afridi force, reported 10,000 strong, had left Bagh in
Tirah on the 16th, with the intention of attacking the Khyber posts on
the 18th. Both the General Officer commanding and the Commissioner of
Peshawar decided against any occupation of the Khyber forts by regular
troops, for the reason that such a course would imply distrust of the
tribesmen holding to their treaty obligations. This decision, and the
resultant abandonment of the Khyber, and the failure to support the
Khyber Rifles holding its different posts, have been widely criticised
and greatly condemned. Holdich says: “But, alas! whilst the Afridi
fought for us, we failed to fight for ourselves; 9500 troops about the
Peshawar frontier looked on, whilst 500 Afridis maintained British
honour in the Khyber.” And those who were present at a lecture given at
Simla in 1898, on “the Campaign in Tirah,” will not have forgotten the
general chorus of approval which there greeted the remarks of a
prominent Punjab civilian, that “the 23rd of August was a day of pain
and humiliation for every Englishman in India. We had 12,000 troops at
the mouth of the Pass or within easy reach of Ali Musjid, marking time
as it were, or held in leash, and we allowed these forts to fall one
after the other.”
But whatever opinion may be held in regard to the reasons of policy
which held back the troops of the regular army, there seems no question
that at the time any forward movement on anything like a large scale was
practically out of the question; pack transport especially was very
scarce, all immediately and locally available having already been
requisitioned for military operations elsewhere in progress. At the same
time, it cannot be denied that the military authorities in Peshawar had
been in receipt of at least a fortnight’s definite notice of what might
be expected, while, for any operations in the Khyber Pass itself,
wheeled transport, contrary to ordinary frontier experience, could have
been utilised practically throughout.
[Sidenote: Precautionary Measures]
The following precautionary measures were taken: Ali Musjid and Fort
Maude were reinforced by 100 tribesmen each; the Zakha Khel and Shinwari
maliks were reminded of their obligations; additional troops were sent
to Fort Bara, and a column of all arms to Jamrud; while—a step which
aroused, perhaps, more adverse comment than any other—the British
commandant of the Khyber Rifles was recalled from Lundi Kotal to
Peshawar, the Commissioner considering that his presence at the former
place might hamper the action of the Indian Government.
On the 23rd August, when the storm finally broke over the Khyber, the
distribution of the Khyber Rifles was as under:
Jamrud, 271.
Bagiar, 13.
Jehangira, 7.
Fort Maude, 42 + 100 tribesmen.
Ali Musjid, 80 + 100 tribesmen
(of whom only 40 were present on the
23rd).
Katta Kushtia, 7.
Gurgurra, 10.
Lundi Kotal, 374.
Fort Tytler, 20.
Fort Maude was attacked at 10 in the morning, but in the afternoon
Brigadier-General Westmacott, commanding at Jamrud, moved out to the
entrance to the Khyber, and thence shelled the enemy about Fort Maude.
[Sidenote: Attack on Lundi Kotal]
The attackers thereupon dispersed, and, on General Westmacott
withdrawing again to Jamrud, Fort Maude, Bagiar and Jehangira were
evacuated by their garrisons and then destroyed by the enemy. The Afridi
lashkar then attacked Ali Musjid, and by evening the garrison, short of
ammunition and hearing of the fall of the three posts above mentioned,
escaped to Jamrud, having lost three of their number killed and wounded.
From Ali Musjid the tribesmen marched on the morning of the 24th for
Lundi Kotal, their numbers being swelled _en route_, and being
unmolested in their passage, since the garrisons of Katta Kushtia and
Gurgurra early abandoned their posts and took to the hills. The attack
on the fortified serai at Lundi Kotal began at 8 a.m., and during the
whole of that day and the night that followed, the defence was
resolutely maintained under Subadar Mursil Khan, who had two sons in the
attacking force and one with him in the Khyber Rifles. The garrison
consisted of five native officers, and 369 men of the Khyber Rifles. Of
these, 120 belonged to miscellaneous clans—Shilmani Mohmands,
Peshawaris, and Kohat Pass Afridis; of the remaining 249, 70 were
Loargai Shinwaris, 50 were Mullagoris, the remainder being Zakha Khel
and Malikdin Khel Afridis. During the 24th the fire from the walls kept
the attack at a distance; but on the morning of the 25th, a Shinwari
jemadar being wounded, his men seemed to think they had done enough for
honour, scaled the north wall, and deserted to their homes—the Afridis
of the garrison, it is said, sending a volley after them. It is not
clear exactly what proportion of the besieged gave friendly admittance
to the besiegers and what proportion remained true to their salt; but
negotiations were opened, Mursil Khan was killed, and about 11 a.m. the
gate was opened from inside by treacherous hands and the tribesmen
swarmed in. The Mullagori and Shilmani sepoys fought their way out and
escaped—the Native Officer of the Mullagori company eventually bringing
his little command back to Jamrud without the loss of a rifle. It was
estimated that in the attacks on the Khyber posts the enemy had
sustained some 250 casualties, and immediately after the fall of Lundi
Kotal they dispersed to their homes, promising to reassemble on the 15th
September.
One of the most serious results of the capture of the Lundi Kotal serai
was that fifty thousand rounds of ammunition fell into the hands of the
enemy.
_The Tirah Expedition of 1897–98 against the Khyber Pass and Aka Khel
Afridis._—On the 3rd September the necessary orders were issued for the
formation and concentration of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, the actual
date for the expedition to start being fixed as the 12th October. By
this date it was hoped that the operations, then in progress in other
parts of the frontier and elsewhere described, would have ceased, and
that both troops and transport there in use would be available for the
larger expedition now projected. These anticipations, however, were not
altogether justified by events, only one brigade with its accompanying
transport being set free for employment under Sir William Lockhart, who
was recalled from leave in England to command the Tirah Field Force,
consisting of some 44,000 men. (For composition of the force see note at
end of chapter.)
Kohat was made the base of operations, with an advanced base at
Shinawari, thirty miles from Maidan. This route was on the whole
considered an easier and shorter one into Tirah than those from Peshawar
by the Bara and Mastura valleys, or from Kohat via the Khanki, despite,
too, the fact that the nearest railway terminus was at Khushalgarh on
the left bank of the Indus, and thirty miles to the east of Kohat.
The troops were divided into a main column of two divisions, each of two
brigades of infantry with divisional troops; two subsidiary columns;
line of communication troops; and a reserve mixed brigade at Rawal
Pindi.
[Sidenote: Transport Requirements]
The main column, operating from Kohat and Shinawari, was to move on
Tirah via the Chagru Kotal, Sampagha and Arhanga Passes; while of the
two subsidiary columns one was to operate from Peshawar, and the other
from the Miranzai and Kurram Valleys, as circumstances might require.
From railhead at Khushalgarh to Shinawari, the advanced base, the road
was practicable for carts, thence onwards the troops could only be
served by pack animals, and of these some 60,000 were required for the
use of the Tirah Expeditionary Force alone, not counting those already
engaged with other frontier expeditions still in progress.[118] The
collection of so vast an amount of transport naturally caused delay, and
it was not until the 20th October that any forward movement could take
place.
With the arrival of troops at Shinawari a commencement had been made at
improving the road from thence over the Chagru Kotal to Kharappa, and by
the 15th October it was fit for transport animals as far as the top of
the pass. In order, however, to work on the north side of the kotal, and
so complete the road construction in readiness for the advance on the
20th, it was necessary to drive the enemy from the vicinity so as to
prevent them from disturbing our working parties.
On the 18th, then, Lieutenant-General Sir A. P. Palmer, temporarily
commanding at Shinawari, moved out with troops of the 2nd Division,
distributed in two columns. The main column was composed of
Brigadier-General Kempster’s 1st Brigade of the 2nd Division:
1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders.
1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment.
1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas.
15th Sikhs.
To which were added
No. 4 Company Madras Sappers and Miners.
No. 8 Mountain Battery.
Machine Gun Detachment, 16th Lancers.
Scouts, 5th Gurkhas.
The second column was under Brigadier-General Westmacott, who had either
with him, or was joined by on reaching the Chagru Kotal, three of the
battalions of his own, the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Division, viz.:
2nd Battalion King’s Own Scottish Borderers.
1st Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment.
1st Battalion 3rd Gurkhas,
supplemented for this day by
No. 5 Mountain Battery.
No. 9 Mountain Battery.
Rocket Detachment Royal Artillery.
[Sidenote: First Action at Dargai]
The two columns left camp at Shinawari, the one at 4.30 a.m., the other
half an hour later. The main column moved along the foothills to the
north-west of camp and, then, making a wide circle to the east, was to
operate against the right flank and right rear of the enemy occupying
the cliffs about Dargai. The second column was to make a frontal attack
upon Dargai from the Chagru Kotal; and on its arrival here about 8.30,
and seeing few of the enemy on the Dargai position, it was decided to at
once attack without awaiting the turning movement of the main column.
Some description of the famous position must now be given. [119] “The
Chagru Kotal is at the top of the hill, 5525 feet high, between the
plain on the southern or Shinawari side of the Samana Range and the
Khanki Valley, but at the lowest point of the gap between the Samana
Sukh, or western extremity of that part of the Samana Range on which
stand Forts Gulistan, Saraghari and Lockhart, and the heights above
Dargai. These heights, continued to the north beyond the village of
Dargai, form what is called the Narikh Sukh, from which a rough track
drops down into the Narikh Darra a short distance above its junction
with the Chagru defile, which again meets the Khanki River almost at
right angles some two miles further on. The road from Shinawari to the
Khanki Valley runs very nearly due north. At the Chagru Kotal it is
overlooked on the east by the Samana Sukh, a steep cliff rising
precipitously to a height of some 700 feet above it, at a distance of
from 700 to 800 yards. Opposite and nearly parallel to this on the
western side of the kotal, but 1000 yards from it, are the Dargai
heights, which attain an elevation of slightly over 6600 feet, 1100 feet
above the Chagru Kotal. Although the range from the kotal to the enemy’s
sangars on the top of the heights was only 1800 yards, the distance to
be traversed on foot was about a couple of miles. For the first mile or
more the track followed a more or less level course, until, passing
through the village of Mamu Khan, it took a sharp turn to the right and
began to zigzag up a very steep watercourse, which became gradually
narrower as it neared the top of a small wooded, rocky ridge running
roughly parallel to the enemy’s position and connected with it by a
narrow col or saddle. This ridge was 400 feet lower than the crest of
the position, and some 350 yards from the foot of it. The angle of
descent from the position to the top of the ridge, or rather to the
narrow gap at which alone it was possible to cross the ridge—which
elsewhere was precipitous on the side nearest the position—was less
steep than the slope from the gap downwards—or rearwards. Consequently,
except at a point not far beyond the village of Mamu Khan, which was too
distant from the position to be of any importance, the attacking force
was not exposed to the enemy’s fire until it reached the gap. The
approach to the gap was, as has been already stated, up a watercourse
which narrowed at the top until it formed a sort of funnel, not wide
enough to admit of the passage of more than two or three men abreast,
who, as they issued from it, found themselves at the edge of a narrow
ledge, 350 yards long to the foot of the position, exposed every inch of
the way to a fire from half a mile of sangared crest.”
The cliffs of Dargai are everywhere almost sheer, the final ascent being
made by a rough track, which climbs up at a point where the cliff is
rather more broken and shelving than elsewhere.
[Sidenote: The Dargai Position]
The advance commenced about 9 a.m., the 3rd Gurkhas leading, followed by
the King’s Own Scottish Borderers and Northamptons; and just before
midday the position had been taken, the enemy, chiefly Orakzai Ali
Khels, at the last only offering a comparatively feeble resistance, as
they were beginning to feel the pressure of the main column. These fled
towards the Khanki Valley, leaving twenty dead behind them. The
attacking force had sustained but fifteen casualties—two killed and
thirteen wounded. The advance of the main column had been greatly
delayed by the impracticable character of the ground, which had
necessitated the return of the mountain battery and all other pack
animals; and it was after 3 p.m. before the junction of the two columns
was effected at Dargai, by which time parties of the enemy had commenced
to harass the rear of the main column, and some 4000 Afridis appeared to
be advancing from the direction of the Khanki Valley, with the intention
of attempting a re-occupation of the position.
No operation of this campaign has been more criticised, either by those
who took part in it or by historians, than the evacuation on the 18th
October of the Dargai position and its recapture thereby necessitated
only two days later. The matter is barely touched upon in Sir William
Lockhart’s despatch, appearing in the _Gazette of India_ of January
22nd, 1898, beyond a remark that “the track to the water supply was
afterwards found to be about three miles in length, so commanded from
the adjacent heights that water could not have been obtained in the
presence of an enemy unless these heights as well as Dargai itself had
been held.” The inference is that, to hold the position won on the 18th,
and safeguard the water supply, a far larger force would have been
required than could at the time be spared. “Colonel (now
Lieutenant-General) Hutchinson in his book, the _Campaign in Tirah_,
states[120] as the principal excuse for the failure to hold the Dargai
heights when they had once been captured, that ‘the water supply of
Dargai was at a place called Khand Talao, nearly three miles away to the
west, and the road to it was commanded throughout by adjacent heights,
so that, in the presence of an enemy, water could not have been obtained
for the troops, unless these heights, as well as the village of Dargai,
had been held in force.’ This statement is all the more remarkable in
view of the fact that, on the excellent map of the position which he
gives three pages before, are clearly marked both the small Talao (or
tank), 100 yards below the village, containing muddy but not undrinkable
water, which we used at first on the morning of the 21st, but also the
larger tank some 500 yards further to the east.... The summit of the
Narikh Sukh completely dominates the village of Dargai and the reverse
slope of the enemy’s position, and commands an extensive view of the
country for miles round. It is strewn with large rocks, very much like a
Dartmoor Tor, and abounds in natural cover. A battalion left there on
the 18th could have set at defiance any number of tribesmen, and,
supported by another battalion on the kotal to connect it with the base
and furnish it with supplies, could with little difficulty, in
conjunction with the troops already in possession of the Samana across
the valley, have effectually prevented any attempt of the Afridis to
come up to meet us from the Khanki Valley.”
[Sidenote: Retirement from Dargai]
Immediately the junction of the two columns had been effected the
retirement to camp commenced; a mountain battery was posted at the
Chagru Kotal, and another, with a battalion, on the Samana Sukh, to
cover the withdrawal—a difficult operation and attended with
considerable loss, for the path was very steep and broken, and the enemy
pressed the rearguard closely. They do not, however, appear to have
pursued beyond the heights, and the further retirement of Sir Power
Palmer’s force to Shinawari via the Chagru Kotal was unmolested. Our
total casualties this day amounted to one officer and seven men killed,
five officers and twenty-nine men wounded.
The reports which he had received, as to the relation of the Dargai
position in occupation by the enemy to the use of the road over the
Chagru Kotal, seem to have convinced General Yeatman-Biggs, now again
commanding his division, that passage could not safely be attempted
unless the tribesmen were dislodged from the heights on the left flank.
He, therefore, proposed to Sir William Lockhart on the 19th, that the
advance be made by way of Gulistan, the Samana Sukh, and the Talai
Spur;[121] but this suggestion was negatived, and the previous
arrangement for the advance to Kharappa over the Chagru Kotal was to
stand, Sir William considering that the well-known anxiety of the enemy
as to their flanks, would cause them to evacuate the Dargai position on
our troops arriving at the junction of the Narikh and Chagru ravines; at
the same time the G.O.C.-in-Chief admitted that “it would be necessary
to clear the Dargai heights overlooking the road to the west.” It seems,
then, that what Sir William Lockhart suggested was a frontal attack on
the Dargai position, combined with a threatening of the flanks by
continuing the advance towards Kharappa.
The force placed at the disposal of General Yeatman-Biggs on the 20th,
was composed of the troops of his own division, which had already taken
the Dargai position on the 18th, _less_ the 36th Sikhs, but strengthened
by the inclusion of the 21st Madras Pioneers (divisional troops) and by
the loan of two infantry battalions (2nd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment
and 3rd Sikhs) from the 1st Division. The whole force left camp at
Shinawari at 4.30 a.m. on the 20th by the direct road to the Chagru
Kotal: no flank attack was attempted as on the previous occasion, but,
fortunately, the expectation of such a movement kept a large contingent
of the enemy from the actual point of attack during the whole day. As
might have been expected with the passage by a single narrow road of so
large a body of troops and transport, the block, inevitable under
ordinary conditions, was accentuated by the opposition experienced; and,
while some of the baggage was unable even to leave the Shinawari camp
that day, late on the 21st the Shinawari-Chagru Kotal road was for quite
half its length still absolutely choked with transport of all kinds—many
of the animals had been standing loaded up for upwards of thirty-six
hours.
[Sidenote: Second Action at Dargai]
The Dargai position, which on the 18th had been held by a limited number
of Orakzais, was now occupied by a gathering of tribesmen estimated to
number 12,000, partly Orakzais, but more than half consisting of Afridis
from the Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Kamar Khel, Zakha Khel, Kuki Khel,
and Sipah clans.
The advanced troops, under Brigadier-General Kempster, reached the kotal
about 8 a.m., and, on being joined there by Major-General Yeatman-Biggs,
were at once ordered to take the position; the remainder of the force
being halted on the summit or the south side of the pass, and no attempt
being made to threaten the enemy’s flanks by continuing the advance. The
assault on Dargai was led by the Gurkha Scouts and 1st Battalion 2nd
Gurkhas, with the Dorsets in support and the Derbyshire Regiment in
reserve, covered by the long-range fire of the Gordons and Maxim gun
from a ridge immediately west of the kotal, of three mountain batteries
on the pass, and of another on the Samana Sukh. The whole of the
infantry of the attack was able to mass, without loss and under cover,
within less than 500 yards of the position, and from here the Gurkhas
dashed out, and, with something over fifty casualties, succeeded in
establishing themselves in shelter in the broken and dead ground
immediately under the cliffs. The enemy now concentrated a rapid,
accurate, and well-sustained fire upon the narrow col or saddle
described on page 322. The remainder of the Gurkhas were unable to get
across, and attempts made, first by the Dorsets and then by the
Derbyshires, to rush forward in driblets (necessitated both by the
narrow exit from the “funnel” and the congested state of the ground
whereon these regiments were massed) were beaten back with considerable
loss. About 2.30 p.m. the colonel of the Dorsets, the senior officer on
the spot, signalled for reinforcements. The Gordon Highlanders and 3rd
Sikhs were then sent up, and, under a rapid concentrated fire from all
the batteries, the Gordons led a dash, which was joined by all the other
troops in the position, and the enemy, not waiting for the final
assault, fled towards the Khanki Valley.
[Sidenote: Second Capture of Position]
By this time it was too late to continue the advance; consequently,
while the bulk of the force bivouacked about the Chagru Kotal, the
Narikh Sukh was held by the Derbyshires, the position at Dargai by the
Gurkhas and Dorsets, with the Gordon Highlanders lower down the hill.
The total casualties sustained in this, the second assault on Dargai,
amounted to four officers and thirty-four men killed, fourteen officers
and 147 men wounded. It may here be mentioned that the troops now
holding these heights remained wholly unmolested, even when, after the
23rd, the position was occupied by no more than one battalion—the 30th
Punjab Infantry.
On the 21st the Second Division resumed its march; on the 24th the First
Division began to move from Shinawari; and by the evening of the 27th
the whole of the main force under Sir William Lockhart’s command, was,
with its supplies and transport, concentrated at Kharappa ready for a
further advance. During this time the Sampagha Pass to the north was
reconnoitred, foraging parties were sent out, camps were strengthened
and communications improved; the enemy was always active, following up
reconnoitring and foraging parties, and “sniping” nightly into camp,
whereby several casualties were sustained.
By the 28th a force of some 17,600 fighting men, nearly as many
followers, and 24,000 animals, was concentrated in camp, and marched out
this day to Ghandaki, a short four miles from Kharappa, proceeding by
two roads; and in the afternoon a reconnaissance by the 1st Brigade of
the First Division was pushed to the foot of the Sampagha Pass. On the
following day the same brigade moved out while it was still dark; the
Devons seized a village and some spurs on the right of the road to the
pass, the Derbyshire Regiment occupied a mass of small brown hills in
the centre—afterwards the first artillery position, and the 1st Gurkhas
moved against the Kandi Mishti villages on the left. The Sampagha was
captured by direct attack, the opposition not being very serious, and by
11.30 a.m. was in our hands, at a cost of two killed and thirty wounded.
Three brigades were that same day pushed forward into the Mastura
Valley, where up to this date no European had ever penetrated, the 1st
Brigade remaining on the south of the Sampagha to help forward the
transport, and eventually joining the main body on the night of the
30th.
On the 31st the force moved against the Arhanga Pass leading into Afridi
Tirah, but the general expectation that the tribesmen would here make a
real stand proved unfounded. The pass was captured practically by a
single brigade—General Westmacott’s—at the expense of only three
casualties, and the 2nd Brigade, First Division, with the whole of the
Second Division, hurried on to Maidan, leaving the 1st Brigade of the
First Division in the Mastura Valley.
Arrived in Maidan, expeditions were now made into the settlements of the
different tribesmen in arms against us. As a preliminary, Bagh was
visited on the 1st November. This was about three miles to the west of
the Maidan camp, is the political centre of Tirah, and the meeting place
of the Afridi jirgahs. On the 9th, a reconnaissance was made of Saran
Sar, a pass into the Bara Valley, a number of defensive villages of the
Zakha Khel were destroyed, and grain and forage supplies were removed;
we sustained a considerable number of casualties in the retirement, the
Northampton Regiment especially losing heavily. On the 13th, a force
under General Kempster visited the Waran Valley to overawe and punish
the Aka Khels, and the house of the notorious mullah, Saiyid Akbar, was
destroyed. In the retirement our rearguard was again heavily handled,
over 70 casualties being sustained at the hands of the Aka Khel, Zakha
Khel, Kamar Khel and Sipah Afridis who took part in the action.
[Sidenote: In Afridi Tirah]
On the 18th November, the main force moved from Maidan to Bagh, which
was considered a better political and strategical centre; and on the
22nd, Sir William Lockhart accompanied thence a force which, under
General Westmacott, started on a three days’ reconnaissance to Dwa Toi
to explore the approaches to the Bara Valley and to punish the Kuki
Khels. In all these expeditions our losses were not light, the rearguard
being invariably followed up and harassed; the clans in general, and the
Zakha Khel in particular, appeared irreconcilably hostile; and
skirmishes and attacks on convoys were of almost daily occurrence.
Foraging parties from Mastura camp were also attacked by the Orakzais,
but it was evident that the back of the resistance of this tribe had
been broken at Dargai, and, indeed, by the 20th November they had
accepted our terms and paid their fines in full, both in rifles and in
money. The greater part of Afridi Tirah had now been traversed and
surveyed; the Chamkannis and westerly Orakzais were visited and punished
as mentioned in Chapter XVI., and Sir William Lockhart now resolved to
evacuate Tirah and attack the Afridis in their winter settlements near
Peshawar.
Heavy baggage was now sent back from Bagh and Mastura to Shinawari, the
base was changed from Khushalgarh to Peshawar, and on the 7th December
the Maidan and Mastura Valleys were evacuated, the 2nd Brigade of the
First Division rejoining its division detailed to march down the Mastura
Valley. The Second Division withdrew by the Bara Valley, and experienced
some of the heaviest rearguard fighting ever encountered in an Indian
frontier campaign.
The march of the First Division was but little opposed throughout. On
the 9th the 1st Brigade marched from Haidar Khel into the Waran Valley,
destroyed a large number of fortified houses, and also the house of
Saiyid Akbar, which had been partially repaired since destroyed by
General Kempster’s brigade. In its retirement the Aka Khel and Zakha
Khel pressed upon our rearguard, but the losses were not heavy. The
remainder of the march down the valley was practically unmolested, and
the division was concentrated at Ilmgudar near Peshawar on the 17th
November.
[Sidenote: In the Bara Valley]
General Westmacott’s brigade of the Second Division marched from Bagh on
the 7th, through the Shaloba Pass to Dwa Toi, where it was joined on the
9th by General Kempster’s troops, whose march had been delayed, at the
outset, by the necessity for destroying the defences of the Kambar Khel
and Malikdin Khel, and, during its execution, by the state of the road
rendered slippery by rain and congested by the baggage of the advanced
brigade. On the 10th, the march of the two brigades was unopposed, but
on the 11th, movement and communication were rendered difficult by a
thick mist, touch was lost between the two brigades, and the Afridis
following up closely, favoured by the mist and abundant cover, inflicted
great loss among the transport and followers. Part of the rearguard did
not get into camp at all that night, and, seizing some houses, the
commander defended his rearguard and a large amount of transport against
the attacks of the tribesmen, who kept up a fire all night. On the 12th
the Second Division closed up and remained halted. On the 13th the march
was resumed, and the tribesmen attacking with great boldness as soon as
the rearguard of the rear brigade (General Westmacott’s) left camp, the
fighting was continuous throughout the day. The enemy suffered heavily
in his attacks on the baggage column and rearguard, but, nothing
daunted, came on again and again, making most determined rushes. Firing
was incessant throughout the night into the bivouac of Westmacott’s
brigade, which encamped where darkness found it, and the brigade was
again attacked at daybreak, but the enemy did not on this day follow the
column very far or for very long. On the 17th December the two brigades
of the Second Division had reached respectively Bara and Mamanai; here
they remained for the present guarding the Bara Valley line, while the
Peshawar Column and First Division advanced into the Khyber Pass and
Bazar Valley.
On the 18th December the Peshawar Column reconnoitred the Khyber Pass as
far as Fort Maude; on the 23rd Ali Musjid was occupied; and on the 26th
the column marched to Lundi Kotal, finding villages deserted, barracks
destroyed, and everywhere damage done to Government property. The
Shinwaris living about Lundi Kotal, who had assisted in the early
attacks on the Khyber posts, had by now paid up their fines and
submitted, and proved their repentance by assisting in picqueting the
hills and keeping off Zakha Khel raiders, and even restored some of the
property taken away when the serai at Lundi Kotal was looted.
The Bazar Valley, which is one of a series of parallel valleys running
almost due east and west, is only about twenty miles long, with an
average breadth of between eight and twelve miles from watershed to
watershed, and lies at an elevation of 3000 feet. On the north the
Alachi Mountains separate it from the Khyber, and on the south the Sur
Ghar Range divides it from the Bara Valley. Through the valley the Bazar
stream runs almost due east till it joins the Khyber stream at Jabagai.
The east end of the valley is narrow, and just before its final
debouchure into the Peshawar Plain it contracts into an almost
impassable defile. The west end, on the other hand, is comparatively
wide and open, and climbs gradually up to the snow-capped range of the
Safed Koh, the lower ridges of which form the boundary of the Bazar
Valley. The Zakha Khel own this upper portion of the valley. It consists
of two main branches, each about two miles broad, enclosing between them
an irregular spur. This spur, running out from the main watershed in a
series of relatively small hills, ends in an abrupt peak just above
China. About two and a half miles east of China the two branch valleys
unite, and in the apex of their junction, closing the mouth of the China
plain, is an isolated hill known as Khar Ghundai.
Through the circle of mountains to the south-west and west go four main
passes—Mangal Bagh and Bukar leading into the Bara Valley, and the
Thabai and Sisobi, or Tsatsobi, into Afghanistan. The former give
communication to neighbours, the latter form back-doors or “bolt-holes”
into Afghanistan, and the existence of these back-doors constitutes the
real difficulty of dealing effectively with the Zakha Khels. The
“front-door” is over the Alachi Range, crossed by the Chora, Alachi,
Bori, and Bazar Passes, and of these the first named is the easiest, but
it leads, as has been already stated, through Malikdin Khel territory.
[Sidenote: The Bazar Valley]
On the 25th the First Division entered the Bazar Valley in two columns
from the immediate vicinity of Ali Musjid, where it had concentrated the
day previous. The 1st Brigade moved by the Alachi Pass to Karamna, and
the 2nd by way of the Chora Pass to Chora; neither was seriously
opposed, but the roads were found to be very difficult. On the 26th the
1st Brigade was only able to march as far as Barg, no more than two and
a half miles, but a road presenting extraordinary difficulties to the
progress of troops and almost impassable to transport. The same day the
2nd Brigade was advancing to China, with its rearguard harassed all the
way; it returned next day to Chora, followed up on both flanks, and
reached the Khyber on the 28th and Jamrud on the 29th. The 1st Brigade
supported, on the 27th, the retirement of the 2nd Brigade from China,
moved back to Karamna on the 28th, and on the next day returned to the
Khyber, the rearguard, furnished by the Derbyshire Regiment, being
persistently followed up nearly to Lala China in the Khyber.
During the latter part of December and beginning of January 1898, the
Peshawar column was frequently engaged with the Zakha Khels about Lundi
Kotal, and on all sides punitive measures, accompanied by desultory and
indecisive fighting, continued as before. Many of the Afridi clans—the
Malikdin Khels, Kambar Khels, Sipah and Kamar Khels—had sent in asking
for peace, while bewailing the severity of our terms; but the Aka Khels
were obdurate, and the Zakha Khels as defiant as at the very
commencement of the campaign, their two most recalcitrant maliks, Khwas
Khan and Wali Muhammad Khan, from the secure haven of Afghanistan,
exhorting them to stand firm and to continue to resist.
[Sidenote: End of Tirah Campaign]
The last action of the campaign took place at the Shinkamar Pass on the
29th January, when all the four brigades combined to endeavour to
surround the Kajurai plain, where the Afridis were reported to be again
grazing their cattle. Few of the columns employed experienced any
opposition, but one operating from Mamanai, and belonging to General
Westmacott’s brigade, when about to retire was hotly engaged by the
enemy, and sustained some seventy casualties; these were chiefly among
the Yorkshire Light Infantry and the 36th Sikhs, the last-named regiment
losing a splendid frontier soldier in their commanding officer, Colonel
John Haughton.
Before the end of February nearly all the Afridi clans had submitted or
were making advances towards a settlement; the Khyber Pass had been
reopened to kafilas, but the Zakha Khels evinced no real intention of
giving in. On the 17th March, therefore, preparations were made for a
spring campaign; Sir William Lockhart returned to Jamrud, fresh
transport was distributed among the troops, and one of the brigades of
the Second Division made a short advance towards the Bara Valley. The
effect upon the Zakha Khels was immediate. By the 3rd April all the
clans had definitely submitted and given hostages for fines still due;
hostilities then ceased and demobilisation commenced, but for some
months regular troops were retained in occupation of the Khyber posts.
By November 1898 the arrangements for the government of the Khyber
previously in force were practically re-established.
The total casualties during the campaign amounted to 287 killed, 853
wounded and ten missing.
It was hoped that the settlement effected, coupled with the knowledge
the Afridis now possessed that no part of their country was inaccessible
to British troops, would have proved satisfactory to both sides; and it
was noticed as a favourable sign that the enlistment of Pathans, and
especially of Afridis, into the regiments of the Indian Army, had never
been brisker than during the months immediately succeeding the close of
hostilities. It was hardly to be expected that individual raids and
outrages would cease, and had any such expectations been cherished they
would have speedily been disappointed; but at any rate for a brief term
of years it was not considered necessary to undertake military
operations against any of the Afridis. But among these tribesmen the
mullahs appear to be specially inimical to the British Government—as
they probably would be to any civilised administration—while there is
also always present in Afghanistan a faction opposed to British
interests, and from this faction disaffected tribesmen can safely reckon
upon a large measure of support. In 1904 a number of Afridis visited
Kabul—whether by invitation or not is not certain—were accorded a very
friendly reception, and seem to have returned determined—especially the
Zakha Khel members of the deputation—upon a policy of opposition to the
British authorities. During the next four years raids, ever increasing
in audacity, were committed on and within our border by the Zakha Khels,
culminating on the 28th January, 1908, in a raid carried out by some
seventy or eighty men upon the city of Peshawar, whence property valued
at a lakh of rupees was carried off, the raiders getting clear away.
Tribal allowances were stopped in the endeavour to force the more
well-behaved tribesmen to undertake the coercion of the Zakha Khel, but
they declared their inability to restrain the clan—and their impotence
was recognised—while suggesting to the British authorities the
occupation of the Bazar Valley, as the only means of dealing effectively
with a situation which was rapidly becoming intolerable, since security
of life and property on the Kohat and Peshawar borders was seriously
menaced.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1908]
By the beginning of 1908 the Government of India saw that military
operations must inevitably be undertaken, and proposed that three
brigades (one in reserve) should be mobilised in view of an expedition
into the Bazar Valley; and on the 13th February Major-General Sir J.
Willcocks, who had been appointed to command, moved out from Peshawar.
The three brigades were thus constituted:
FIRST BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General Anderson.
1st Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
53rd Sikhs.
59th Scinde Rifles.
2nd Battalion 5th Gurkhas.
SECOND BRIGADE.
Major-General Barrett.
1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders.
28th Punjabis.
45th Sikhs.
54th Sikhs.
THIRD (RESERVE) BRIGADE.
Major-General Watkis.
1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers.
1st Battalion 5th Gurkhas.
1st Battalion 6th Gurkhas.
55th Coke’s Rifles.
No. 9 Company 2nd Sappers and Miners.
23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.
Two Squadrons 19th Lancers.
Two Squadrons 37th Lancers.
23rd Sikh Pioneers.
25th Punjabis.
No. 3 Mountain Battery.
Four Guns, 22nd Derajat Mountain Battery.
No. 6 Company 1st Sappers and Miners.
800 Khyber Rifles.
The main force, under General Willcocks, left Peshawar on the 13th
February, and on the 15th, marching by the Chora Pass, entered the Bazar
Valley. The Second Brigade, with some divisional troops, pushed on
rapidly through Malikdin Khel country, accompanied by little or no
transport and all ranks carrying three days rations on the person, and
bivouacked that night near Walai. The latter part of the march was
opposed. The First Brigade followed more leisurely, escorting the
baggage and supply columns of both brigades, and halted for the night at
Chora, sending forward next day the Second Brigade baggage and supplies.
On the same day a small column under Colonel Roos-Keppel, political
adviser with the force, and composed of a wing of the 2nd Battalion 5th
Gurkhas and the Khyber Rifles, left Lundi Kotal, and, marching by the
Bazar Pass, arrived that evening at China. There was no opposition en
route, but the camps, both here and at Walai, were subjected to the
usual “sniping” after nightfall.
The Walai camp was particularly well chosen; it was well covered, was
surrounded by a circle of hills admitting of effective picqueting, had a
secure line of communication with Chora, and, commanding as it did the
whole valley, was especially well placed for carrying out punitive
operations among the Zakha Khels.
[Sidenote: In the Bazar Valley]
From the 17th to the 24th the troops were engaged in destroying towers
and defensive enclosures, and in collecting wood and fodder; the columns
were always followed up by the enemy, who, however, usually suffered
heavily; the whole of the Bazar Valley was visited and important surveys
were completed; sniping occurred on most nights; but already by the 23rd
the resistance offered was no more than half-hearted, and that afternoon
a tolerably representative jirgah came in professing anxiety to effect a
settlement. An agreement was rendered difficult by the presence about
the Thabai Pass of a gathering of Shinwaris and Mohmands, who had come
to offer their services to the Zakha Khels, but these were prevailed
upon to withdraw; and after protracted negotiations, lasting from the
25th to the 27th, a satisfactory settlement was arrived at. On the 29th
the force withdrew wholly unmolested to the Khyber and Peshawar, the
Afridi jirgah having undertaken the punishment of raiders,
responsibility for future good behaviour, and restitution, as far as
possible, of stolen property.
The casualties in this short and successful campaign amounted to three
killed and thirty-seven wounded.
NOTE.
_COMPOSITION OF THE TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE._
THE MAIN COLUMN.
FIRST DIVISION.
COMMANDING—BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. P. SYMONS, C.B.
FIRST BRIGADE.
COMMANDING—BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. C. HART, V.C., C.B.
1st Battalion, the Devonshire Regiment.
2nd Battalion, the Derbyshire Regiment.
2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
30th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
SECOND BRIGADE.
COMMANDING—BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. GASELEE, A.D.C., C.B.
1st Battalion, Royal West Surrey Regiment.
2nd Battalion, the Yorkshire Regiment.
2nd Battalion, 4th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
3rd Regiment of Sikh Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.
No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery.
No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery.
Two Squadrons, 18th Regiment of Bengal Lancers.
28th Regiment of Bombay Infantry (Pioneers).[122]
No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
No. 4 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
The Nabha Regiment of Imperial Service Infantry.
The Maler Kotla Imperial Service Sappers.
SECOND DIVISION.
COMMANDING—MAJOR-GENERAL A. G. YEATMAN-BIGGS, C.B.
THIRD BRIGADE.
COMMANDING—COLONEL F. J. KEMPSTER, A.D.C., D.S.O.
1st Battalion, the Dorsetshire Regiment.
1st Battalion, the Gordon Highlanders.
1st Battalion, 2nd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
15th (the Ludhiana Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
FOURTH BRIGADE.
COMMANDING—BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. WESTMACOTT, C.B., D.S.O.
2nd Battalion, the King’s Own Scottish Borderers.
1st Battalion, the Northamptonshire Regiment.
1st Battalion, 3rd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
36th (Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.
No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery.
Machine Gun Detachment, 16th Lancers.
Two Squadrons, 18th Regiment of Bengal Lancers.
21st Regiment of Madras Infantry (Pioneers).
No. 4 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners.
The Jhind Regiment of Imperial Service Infantry.
The Sirmur Imperial Service Sappers.
LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS.
COMMANDING—LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR A. P. PALMER, K.C.B.
3rd Regiment of Bengal Cavalry.
18th Regiment of Bengal Lancers.
No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery.
22nd (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
2nd Battalion, 2nd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
39th Garhwal (Rifle) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
2nd Regiment Punjab Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force.
No. 1 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
The Jeypore Imperial Service Transport Corps.
The Gwalior Imperial Service Transport Corps.
[Sidenote: Composition of Force]
THE PESHAWAR COLUMN.
COMMANDING—BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. G. HAMMOND, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C.
57th Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
2nd Battalion, the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
2nd Battalion, the Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
9th Regiment of Bengal Lancers.
No. 5 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
9th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
34th Pioneers.
45th (Rattray’s Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
THE KURRAM MOVABLE COLUMN.
COMMANDING—COLONEL W. HILL.
3rd Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
6th Regiment of Bengal Cavalry.
2nd Regiment of Central India Horse.[123]
12th (Khelat-i-Ghilzie) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
1st Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles.
The Kapurthala Regiment of Imperial Service Infantry.
THE RAWAL PINDI RESERVE BRIGADE.
COMMANDING—BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. R. MACGREGOR, D.S.O.
1st Battalion, the Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry.
2nd Battalion, the King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.
27th Regiment (1st Baluch Battalion) of Bombay (Light)
Infantry.[124]
2nd Regiment of Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent.[125]
Jodhpur Imperial Service Lancers.
CHAPTER XIV.
ORAKZAIS.[126]
The tract of country inhabited by this tribe is some sixty miles long by
about twenty broad. It is bounded on the north by the Shinwaris and
Afridis, on the east by the Bangash and Afridis, on the south by the
Bangash and the Zaimukhts, and on the west by the Kharmana River and by
the country of the Chamkannis. The Orakzais also possess some
settlements in British territory in the Kohat district. The Orakzai
country proper is generally termed Orakzai Tirah, and it contains four
principal valleys—the Khanki, the Mastura, the Kharmana and the Bara;
but Holdich lays due stress upon the peculiarities of its position, when
he says that “the Orakzai geographical position differs from that of the
Afridis in some essential particulars.... It is through their country
that the way to the heart of the Afridi mountains lies. They keep the
front door to Maidan (which is near the Dargai Pass across the Samana),
whilst the back door is open to Afghanistan, but they possess no back
door themselves, so that once their valleys (Khanki and Mastura) are
held, they are in the power of the enemy and they must submit.”
[Sidenote: Origin of the Tribe]
The origin of the tribe is rather obscure, and local traditions vary
greatly. One version is that three brothers—Pridi, Wazir, and Warak—came
from Afghanistan to the Orakzai Hills, where they quarrelled over some
trifle—as their descendants have continued to do down to present
times—and Pridi then went north, Wazir to the south, while Warak
remained where he was. Another tradition is that they are descended from
a Persian prince who was exiled (“Wrukzai” in Pushtu) and who settled in
the Kohat district, marrying a daughter of the King of Kohat. Others,
again, say that the original home of the Orakzais was on the slopes of
the Suleiman Mountains; that they and the Bangash settled in the
Zaimukht country during the invasions of Sabuktagin and Timur, and were
driven thence into the Kurram, and from there, again, into the Miranzai
Valley. The occupation of the Kurram by the Turis, and their gradual
encroachment into the lower part of that valley, then held by the
Bangash, forced these in their turn to press the Orakzais. The struggle
came to an end with a great battle at Muhammadzai, near Kohat, towards
the end of the sixteenth century. The story goes that after three days’
fighting the victory remained with the Bangash, the actual issue being
materially assisted by the intervention of a supernatural figure garbed
in spotless white raiment, which appeared between the contending forces,
crying out—“the plains for the Bangash and the hills for the Orakzai.”
The Orakzais thereupon retired to their present holdings, while the
Bangash have ever since occupied the Miranzai Valley. Historically,
however, it is more than probable that the Orakzais are of an ancient
Indian stock, and that in process of time successive emigrations from
the west have brought to them an infusion of Turkish blood.
These tribesmen are wiry-looking mountaineers, but they are not such
fine men physically, their reputation for courage does not stand so
high, nor are they as formidable as their northern neighbours, the
Afridis, while they are prone to be influenced by fanaticism to a far
greater extent. Their mountains are barren, and they themselves are
often ragged, poverty-stricken and underfed in appearance,
distinguishable from their neighbours—and, incidentally, wholly
_indistinguishable_ when skirmishing on their hillsides—by reason of the
peculiar pearl-grey tint of their dress, dyed from an earth found in the
Tirah hills. Their chief source of wealth lies in their flocks and
herds, and they do a considerable trade with Peshawar, especially in the
_mazarai_, or dwarf palm, which is cut during August and September, and
which has a certain commercial value for the manufacture of ropes, grass
sandals, bed-strings, nets, matting, baskets and grain-bins. Many of the
Orakzais are weavers by trade.
Of their moral character the usual contradictory evidence is
forthcoming. It was against the Orakzais that Macgregor brought the
indictment already quoted, that “there is no doubt that, like other
Pathans, they would not shrink from any falsehood, however atrocious, to
gain an end. Money would buy their services for the foulest deed;
cruelty of the most revolting kind would mark their actions to a wounded
or helpless foe, as much as cowardice would stamp them against
determined resistance.” And Oliver, after saying that, if not better,
they are probably not much worse than their neighbours in the Pathan
qualities of deceit, avarice and cruelty, reminds us that “it must not
be forgotten that they have been embittered by centuries of bitter
religious feuds and the influence of fanatical teachers; they have never
had a government of any decent sort, its place being supplied by
superstition; and they do not understand our theory of tolerance or
non-interference.” On the other hand, it is said that as soldiers they
are, in general, quiet, well-behaved and intelligent, responding easily
to discipline. At home they are given, even more than other Pathans, to
internecine feuds, due to the fact that part of the tribe are Samil and
Sunnis, and part Gar and Shiahs. Their fighting men number, all told,
some 24,000, all tolerably well armed.
[Sidenote: Their Moral Character]
Of two out of their four main valleys the following descriptions are
given by Holdich: “The Khanki Valley offers no special attractions in
the matter of scenery. The flanking mountains are rugged and rough, and
unbroken by the craggy peaks and fantastic outlines which generally give
a weird sort of charm to frontier hills. The long slopes of the mountain
spurs gradually shape themselves downwards into terraced flats, bounded
by steep-sided ravines, along which meander a few insignificant streams,
and the whole scene, under the waning sun of late October, is a dreary
expanse of misty dust colour, unrelieved by the brilliant patchwork
which enlivens the landscape elsewhere. On a terraced slope between the
Khanki and the Kandi Mishti ravines, under the Pass of Sampagha, stands
a mud-built village with an enclosure of trees, called Ghandaki; and it
is through this village that the road to Sampagha runs after crossing
the Kandi Mishti declivities, ere it winds its devious course up a long
spur to the pass.... Beyond the Sampagha lay the elevated Valley of
Mastura (some 1500 feet higher than the Khanki, itself 4300 feet above
sea-level), and 700 feet below, the pass. The difference in elevation
was at once apparent in the general appearance of the landscape. Six
thousand feet of altitude lifts Mastura above the dust-begrimed and
heat-riddled atmosphere of Khanki or Miranzai, and gives it all the
clear, soft beauty of an Alpine climate. Mastura is one of the prettiest
valleys of the frontier. In spite of the lateness of the season, apricot
and mulberry trees had not yet parted with scarlet and yellow of the
waning year. Each little hamlet clinging to the grey cliffs, or perched
on the flat spaces of the bordering plateau below, was set in its own
surrounding of autumn’s gold-tinted jewellery; and in the blue haze born
of the first breath of clear October frost, the crowded villages and the
graceful watch-towers keeping ward over them were mistily visible across
the breadth of the valleys, tier above tier, on the far slopes of the
mountains, till lost in the vagueness of the shadows of the hills.”
[Sidenote: Kharmana and Bara Valleys]
The Kharmana Valley has been described as dotted with hamlets and
towers, well-wooded and cultivated, and abundantly watered. It is
entered from the south by the Kharmana defile, some seven miles in
length, the hills on either side being very steep and covered with scrub
jungle; and from the east over the Durbi Khel Kotal, a rough and
difficult pass, and by way of the Lozaka defile, a narrow ravine with
precipitous hills on either side.
Of such part of the Bara Valley as is occupied by the Orakzai, it may be
said to be that portion between the right bank of the Bara River and the
Mastura—formerly known as the Orakzai Bara—and enclosed between Bar And
Khel, where the Mastura makes a sharp bend to the south, and Mamanai,
where it joins the Bara on its entry into the Kajurai plain. From this
part of the Bara Valley the upper reaches of the Mastura are arrived at
by a very narrow, rocky gorge to Sapri and Kwaja Khidda, thence over the
Sapri Pass—an ascent of some 2000 feet—and thence by the stream bed or
over the Sangra Pass to Mishti Bazar and the upper Mastura.
The Orakzais are now usually considered to be divided into six clans,
since, of the original seven, one is practically extinct; these six
clans are again sub-divided into many divisions; the six clans are as
under:
1. Ismailzai.
2. Lashkarzai.
3. Massuzai.
4. Daulatzai.
5. Muhammad Khel.
6. Sturi Khel or Alizai.
In addition, however, to the Orakzai clans, there are four hamsaya
clans:
1. Ali Khel.
2. Malla Khel.
3. Mishtis.
4. Sheikhans.
The _Ismailzai_ are divided into six divisions; all of them are Sunnis
by faith, and the majority are Samil in politics. The clan is very
disunited, but can turn out some 1800 fighting men, chiefly from two of
the divisions, which are rather increasing in power and numbers at the
expense of the remaining four. One of these divisions, the Rabia Khel,
is remarkable for the fair hair, fair complexions and blue eyes of those
belonging to it. The Ismailzai, residing as they do rather nearer to our
territory than the rest of the Orakzais, have hitherto given us
considerably more than their share of tribal trouble.
Commencing from the east, the settlements of the Ismailzai extend along
the right bank of the Khanki River to near Shahu Khel, and include the
northern slopes of the Samana Range. This tract belongs to the Rabia
Khel and Akhel divisions, and they also own a small strip of ground on
the left bank of the river, while both have also settlements in the
British portion of the Miranzai Valley. Another division, the Mamazai,
live in the Daradar Glen, which drains into the Khanki on the left bank,
and here is the village of Arkhi, of more than local reputation for the
manufacture of rifles. The remaining three divisions of this clan are
scattered about in small settlements on the left bank of the Khanki
River, the Khadizais at Sadarai and Tutgarhi, the Sadakhel at Ghandaki,
at the foot of the Sampagha Pass leading to the Mastura Valley, and the
Isa Khel in hamlets on either side of the pass itself. The Isa Khel are
considered inviolable and are hamsayas of the Rabia Khel, Ali Khel and
Mishtis—the two last themselves hamsaya clans—while the curse of an Isa
Khel is said to possess particular potency, and is in consequence
dreaded by the neighbouring tribesmen.
[Sidenote: The Lashkarzai]
The _Lashkarzai_ consist of two divisions only, Alisherzais and
Mamuzais, the former Gar and the latter Samil, both being of the Sunni
sect, and each being at feud with the other. The clan can muster some
5800 fighting men, of which number the Alisherzais contribute the larger
half—all are fairly well armed. The country of the Alisherzai is
divided—like the seats at a Spanish bull-fight—into the “sunny” and the
“shady”—the former title applying to the country lying on the southern
slopes of the Tor Ghar, towards the Kurram Valley, and the latter to
that on the northern slopes at the head of the Khanki Valley. The
Alisherzais have a great reputation for bravery, and it is said that at
one time in their military history they employed mounted men in battle;
but if this was ever the case their taste for cavalry service would
appear to have weakened, since barely a dozen Orakzais all told are at
the present moment to be found serving in our regular regiments of the
Indian cavalry. In this division the Khan-ship is hereditary, being
vested in a family living at Tatang; in the year 1897 the then holder of
the office was greatly implicated in the risings on the Samana. The
Mamuzais live at the head of the Khanki Valley, to the north of the
Minjan Darra, in a tract called Sama, Khanki Bazar, a rich trading
centre, being the tribal headquarters. There is, perhaps, no other clan
between the Kabul and the Kurram Rivers, so much under the influence of
their mullahs and so fanatical as are these people; they also rather
take the lead among the Orakzais.
The _Massuzais_ are contained in three divisions, of which one is Gar
and the other two are Samil, while all three are Sunnis. They can put
2000 men in the field, but have not a great reputation for courage.
Their holdings are in the Kharmana Valley—the Kharmana River flows into
the Kurram near our frontier post at Sadda—and they have a number of
Afridi hamsayas settled amongst them.
The _Daulatzai_ clan consists of the Firoz Khel, the Bizotis, and the
Utman Khel,[127] all Sunnis and all Samil, but the Firoz Khel hold aloof
from the other two, who are leagued together against them. The three
divisions can turn out 1600 men between them, the Firoz Khel being the
most powerful, and the Bizotis the worst armed. The Bizotis and the
Utman Khel have given us a good deal of trouble since our first
occupation of the Miranzai Valley, while the Firoz Khel on the other
hand have been generally well-behaved, the reason no doubt being that
living further from our territory they have had less temptation to
transgress. The Firoz Khel, from which division the reigning family of
Bhopal is said to be descended, inhabit the Upper Mastura Valley and the
north-eastern slopes of the Mola Ghar as far west as the Sapri Pass; the
Utman Khel live in portions of the Upper and Lower Mastura Valley, as
far as the junction of that river with the Bara; while the Bizotis are
intermixed with them in the Upper Mastura, living in the lower reaches
of the river between the Ublan Pass and the Asman Darra.
[Sidenote: Muhammad and Sturi Khel]
The _Muhammad Khel_ comprise four divisions, all of which are Gar in
politics, and being of the Shiah sect, set in the midst of Sunni
neighbours, they are inclined to separate themselves to some extent from
the rest of the Orakzais and to turn to the British; they have always
been well-behaved and favourably disposed towards us. They number 2500
well-armed fighting men, and are accounted among the bravest of the
Orakzais. Their country is in the centre of the Mastura Valley, of which
it commands either end and turns the greater part of the Khanki Valley;
it is also easy of access from Kohat, and would furnish a convenient
advanced base for operations against the Afridi country directed from
the south. It was the Khan of one of the sections of the Muhammad Khel
who led the Orakzai lashkar which, in 1587, defeated, in a battle at the
Sampagha Pass, a Mogul army under Ghairat Khan which had attempted to
penetrate into Tirah.
The _Sturi Khel_ or _Alizai_ are divided into Tirah and Bara Sturi Khel,
who are at mortal feud with one another, half being Shiahs and half
Sunnis. The clan is only a small one, its fighting men numbering no more
than 500 all told, and but indifferently armed. The Tirah division
occupies both sides of the Mastura River from Shiraz Garhi to the Gudar
Tangi, while the Bara Sturi Khel inhabit the lower Bara Valley from
Galli Khel to Mamanai, thus commanding the approach to the Mastura
Valley by the way of the Sapri, or Walnut Tree, Pass.
_Hamsaya: Ali Khel._—This is by far the most important of these alien
clans, is very united, with a high reputation for courage, and mustering
from 2800–3000 fighting men. They are said to be descended from Yusafzai
emigrants, and being thus of the same origin as the Mishtis they form a
coalition with them, despite the fact that they belong to different
political factions, the Ali Khel being Gar while the Mishtis are Samil.
In religion the Ali Khel are partly Shiahs and partly Sunnis. Their
country extends from the Tor Ghar Range on the north, to the Khanki
River on the south, with summer settlements near the source of the
Mastura River and on either bank. This clan thus occupies in the Orakzai
country much the same position of command as do the Zakha Khels in
Afridi-land. They are consequently, by right of position, very
troublesome neighbours, both to their fellow tribesmen and to the Indian
Government.
_Hamsaya: Malla Khel._—A clan of Ghilzai origin, Sunni by persuasion and
Samil in politics. They occupy a strip of country in the Mastura Valley
between the Sampagha and Arhanga Passes. In the cold weather they
migrate to Darband in the Miranzai Valley, which they hold as a
perpetual gift from the Khan of Hangu—a family formerly possessing great
local influence—for having aided him in the eighteenth century against
the Khan of Kohat. They hold also, on a lease, the village of Turki in
British territory. The Malla Khel have a considerable reputation for
bravery, and their fighting men number 800, but the clan is much divided
against itself, and, as a clan, is to a great extent swayed by the
counsels of the Mishtis, who command the routes to and from the summer
quarters of the Malla Khel.
[Sidenote: Mishtis and Sheikhans]
_Hamsaya: Mishtis._—These are, as already stated, of Yusafzai descent,
Samil in politics, and of the Sunni sect. They are rather a scattered
clan, living in the Upper Mastura south of the Waran Valley, in the
Upper Khanki south of the Sampagha Range, and also in the Lower Khanki
Valley, while in the winter months many of them migrate to the Miranzai
Valley. The Mishtis rather take the lead among the Samil faction of the
Orakzai; they have 3000 warriors, are well off, and engage a good deal
in trade with British territory. One division of this clan is known
among the remainder as “the Dirty Ones”—their want of cleanliness must
consequently be something quite abnormal to render them thus conspicuous
among Pathans.
_Hamsaya: Sheikhan._—These are believed to have been originally Wazirs;
they are Sunnis and Samil in politics. Their possessions form a compact
tract, extending from the Mastura River on the north to the Khanki on
the south, and from Khangabur on the west to Talai on the border of the
Kohat district on the east. They trade but little, and come down to the
neighbourhood of Kohat to pasture their flocks in the winter. They can
muster from 2750–3000 fighting men of no great repute for courage, but
are a clan of some importance and not easy to control, though
susceptible to blockade.
As regards the question of the southern boundaries of the Orakzai
territory, it may be mentioned that as far back as 1865, the Rabia Khel
division of the Ismailzai clan formally acknowledged that the crest of
the Samana Range was the northern boundary of British territory; but the
strip of country in question does not then appear to have been marked on
our maps as British, although it was assessed as such, and was always
acknowledged by the clans as being within our borders. It was not,
however, until 1889 that the Government of India agreed to the proposals
of the Punjab Government that “the country up to the _foot_ of the
Samana Range should be declared to be British territory and dealt with
accordingly,” and not until two years later that posts were established
upon the Samana Range itself.
This chapter may fittingly be closed by a brief account of the
circumstances under which certain Orakzai clans and divisions petitioned
to be taken under British administration, and of the decision which was
then come to on the matter.
As has already been mentioned, the Orakzai tribe is partly Sunni and
partly Shiah by persuasion, the Sunnis predominating, and between these
two religious communities there exists a long-standing and bitter
animosity. In the summer of 1894 the Bar Muhammad Khel division of the
Muhammad Khel clan of Orakzais made a request through the Assistant
Political Officer, Kohat, that they might be allowed to come under
British rule, on the grounds that they could not much longer defend
themselves against their Sunni fellow-tribesmen, as they found
themselves cut off from local supplies of arms and ammunition by the
influence of Sunni mullahs. To some of the frontier officials the idea
of such voluntary annexation had a good deal to recommend it, but the
Government of India declined to meet the desire of the division
concerned that they or their country should be put under the control or
the protection of the British Government.
[Sidenote: Shiah and Sunni Animosity]
In the following year the Shiahs of the Ali Khel (hamsaya) clan of
Orakzais preferred a similar petition, but the annexation of their
country did not present advantages equal to that which had accompanied
the request put forward in the preceding year. The tract of country
offered us by the Bar Muhammad Khel was an undivided stretch of hills
with no inhabitants save Shiahs; while in the case of the Ali Khel,
although some of the villages concerned were large and powerful, yet
they were so mixed up with Sunni communities that annexation would have
been impracticable, even if desirable. The request of the Ali Khel was
consequently also refused, the Governments of the Punjab and of India
being very strongly against any extension of our responsibilities in the
tribal tracts beyond the Kohat district. So matters remained until the
frontier disturbances of 1897–98, during which these Shiah clans
maintained a uniformly friendly attitude towards us, as they had also
during the Miranzai expeditions, when they gave us material assistance.
In January 1898 the then Secretary of State for India laid down certain
principles for the conduct of frontier policy, whereby his successors
seem in the main to have since been guided. These were: (1) That no
fresh responsibility should be accepted unless absolutely required by
actual strategic necessities and for the protection of the British
border; (2) that interference with the tribes must when possible be
avoided; (3) that no countenance should be given to the idea that
Government intended to administer or enclose the tribal country; and,
finally, (4) that in view of the suspicion which the Durand demarcation
had aroused, one of the primary objects of our future actions should be
gradually to allay such doubts and misgivings.
[Sidenote: Shiah Friendship for British]
In 1904, however, an even more extended offer of annexation was made to
the Government of India, under circumstances differing from those of
1895. In the summer of 1903 a fakir from Ghazni created disturbances in
the Orakzai country, preached a jehad, and made an organised attack
against the Shiahs. The fakir’s Sunni forces were, however, twice
defeated, the fakir left the country, and hostilities came to an end.
But even while the fighting was still in progress, the Chappar Mishtis,
a Sunni division, applied to be taken over by the British Government,
but were informed that we could not interfere in a purely religious war,
and that no petition from them could be entertained until peace was
restored. When the war had come to an end, all the four Shiah divisions
of the Muhammad Khel clan—the Mani Khel, Bar Muhammad Khel, Sipaia and
Abdul Aziz Khel—with the Ibrahimzai and the Chappar Mishtis, at once
made overtures to be taken over, expressing their desire to come under
Government control somewhat on the same lines as the Kurram clans. The
fighting strength of these tribes represented approximately 2710 men,
the tract occupied by them containing some seventy villages, and being
about thirty miles in length with a maximum breadth of some fourteen
miles. The territory formed a complete block, bounded on the north by
the Mastura river, running down on the south to the broken and
undulating country within the limits of Kachai and Marai in British
territory; on the east it extended to within four miles of Kohat; while
on the west the boundary stopped just short of the point where the road,
made during the expedition of 1897, crosses the Sampagha Pass. The
strategical advantages conferred by the possession of this tract of
country are especially great in the event of the Afridi tribe being ever
again arrayed against us. These Shiah clans command one of the shortest
routes from the Kohat side to the centre of Tirah by the Landuki Pass;
there is access to the Bara Valley by the Maturi or the Uchpal Pass, and
by Waran to the Khyber Afridi settlements in Rajgal and Maidan. They
also overlook the territory of three of the hamsaya clans, and are in
rear of the country of some of the Ismailzai divisions.
On the 28th October, 1904, the Secretary of State for India expressed
himself as unwilling to take any steps which he was of opinion might add
appreciably to our frontier responsibilities, and therefore declined to
authorise any serious departure from the general policy laid down by his
predecessor in January 1898, or to incur the risk attaching to the
suggested extension of the tribal area under our control.
CHAPTER XV.
ORAKZAIS: OPERATIONS.[128]
Up to the year 1855 the Orakzais, though occasionally committing petty
depredations on the border, and known to be capable of mischief if so
inclined, gave no positive trouble to the British authorities; but in
the spring of that year many of the tribe were concerned in the
demonstrations and attacks upon posts and parties in the Miranzai
Valley, mention of which will be found in Chapter XVI. Divisions of the
Ismailzai clan had been especially aggressive; the Akhel division had
attacked a village (Baliamin) in British territory and carried off 156
head of cattle; and on the 30th April of that year the Orakzais, made up
by Afridis and Zaimukhts to a strength of between 1500 and 2000 men,
attacked our camp, but were driven off with heavy loss.
After the withdrawal of the troops, the Orakzais continued to commit
depredations upon the Bangash living in the Kohat district, making no
fewer than fifteen raids, carrying off many hundred head of cattle and
killing several British subjects. In these affairs the tribesmen of the
two hamsaya clans, the Sheikhan and the Mishti, were concerned, but the
Rabia Khel division of the Ismailzai was also conspicuous; and finally,
a feud having commenced between the Orakzais and the people of Hangu, a
village in the neighbourhood was raided and 660 head of cattle were
carried off. At this Major J. Coke, commanding the 1st Punjab Infantry,
and also Deputy-Commissioner of Kohat, reinforced Hangu with two guns
and 300 bayonets, and, the raids continuing, reported that he proposed
to attack the Rabia Khel village of Nasin,[129] assisted by Bangash and
other levies. Coke’s proposals were, however, vetoed both by the
Brigadier-General commanding the Punjab Frontier Force, and by Mr. John
Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner—chiefly on the ground of the difficulty
and danger of moving troops at that season of the year—July—and
defensive measures only were for the present sanctioned. During the next
few weeks the tribesmen became more unsettled; the Rabia Khel, Mamazai
and Ali Khel held a jirgah, at which it was agreed that, provided the
Ali Khel and Akhel would join, the combined four divisions should make
an attack upon British territory somewhere about the date of the Eed
(the 25th August). There was, moreover, no doubt that the rest of the
hill clans were in a most excited state, and were trying to foment a
jehad. Brigadier Chamberlain, commanding the Frontier Force, had by this
time arrived at Kohat, reinforcements were called up, the border
villages were put in a state of defence, communications were improved,
supplies collected, and friendly chiefs were called upon to collect
armed levies.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1855]
_Expedition against the Rabia Khel (Ismailzai), 1855._—By the 25th
August a force of nine guns, one regiment of cavalry, and three
battalions of Punjab Infantry had been assembled at Hangu, and on the
1st September arrangements were made to attack early the following
morning the villages of Nasin and Sangar, the one on the summit, the
other on the slopes of the Samana Range, and that of Katsa on the
northern side of the Samana and on the left bank of the Khanki River.
The two first-named villages were so situated, both in regard to
position and approach, that any attack, during daylight and with the
tribesmen prepared to meet our troops, would have entailed serious loss
of life. Success depended almost entirely upon the simultaneous surprise
of both Nasin and Sangar; and since any preliminary approach would have
excited suspicion, it was necessary to start from Hangu, thus involving
a march of fourteen miles before the commencement of the ascent of the
Samana; while even if the range were ascended opposite camp, the same
distance would have to be marched along the ridge before reaching
Sangar. It was determined to attack the villages both from above and
below, and the following dispositions were made. The 1st Punjab Infantry
and three companies of the 2nd Punjab Infantry were detailed, under
Major Coke, to attack the village of Sangar, leaving camp at 10 p.m.,
climbing the range near Hangu, and, moving along the crest, to reach and
rush Sangar before daybreak.
The second column, composed of three companies of the 3rd Punjab
Infantry, was to move at 9 p.m. on Nasin, taking up such a position
above and near the village as to command it. If in difficulties, this
column was to be reinforced by Major Coke, who was further, after
capturing and destroying Sangar, to move the whole of his party down the
hill to aid in the attack on Nasin. Katsa, with its rice crops and
mills, and which was reported to be almost undefended, was to be
attacked and destroyed by a party of levies, who were to move in rear of
Major Coke’s column. The remainder of the force, under the Brigadier,
was to leave camp shortly after 10 p.m. and, climbing the same spur as
the second party, was to move on Nasin in readiness to support any one
of the three columns. A reserve, with field guns, came behind the main
body, timed to reach the foot of the spur by dawn, so as to cover the
retirement.
The troops were warned only one hour before starting.
Each of the three columns effected its purpose without loss, the enemy
being completely surprised and making no stand; a large number of sheep
and cattle was seized, the towers of the villages were blown up and the
crops destroyed; but, on the retirement commencing, the enemy followed
up with great determination, and, as the skirmishers of the 2nd Punjab
Infantry evacuated a commanding position, they were attacked and driven
back by a sudden rush of swordsmen, when a native doctor and seven men
were hacked to pieces. The enemy did not leave the hill in pursuit, and
the whole force reached the camp, one mile south-west of Hangu, by
sunset, having suffered a loss of eleven men killed and four wounded.
The enemy sustained casualties to the number of twenty-four killed and
wounded, among the former being four maliks. The troops had been under
arms for over seventeen hours, had marched some twenty-eight miles, and
had ascended and descended a rugged mountain nearly 4000 feet in height.
[Sidenote: Trouble in 1865–8]
Within a few days of the close of these operations the Mishtis came to
terms and gave hostages; the Rabia Khel then came in and submitted,
bringing back many of the plundered cattle and promising payment for
those not forthcoming; the Sheikhans also made submission, and the force
was back in Kohat by the 7th October, when it was broken up.
After this the Orakzais did not again trouble our border until 1868,
when complications arose with the Bizoti division of the Daulatzais.
This being a small and insignificant branch with its chief settlements
in Tirah, its members had hitherto been able to avoid punishment for any
misdeeds of which they had been guilty. From the commencement of British
rule beyond the Indus, the Bizotis were constantly engaged in
cattle-lifting on our border, and had attacked and robbed travellers and
others at every opportunity. In 1865–67 they continued to give trouble,
plundered cattle, and made demonstrations against our police posts in
the Ublan Pass, about six miles from Kohat. The representatives of the
offending divisions—Bizotis, Utman Khels and Sipaias (the last of the
Muhammad Khel clan) were summoned to Kohat, were informed that they were
debarred from trade with British territory, and the Bizotis were further
deprived of certain allowances which had been granted them some years
previously. Finally, in March 1868, it was reported that the Bizotis
intended attacking the village of Muhammadzai, at the southern foot of
the Ublan Pass, and accordingly, during the night of the 10th and early
morning of the 11th, Lieutenant Cavagnari, Deputy-Commissioner, occupied
the hills on the left of the gorge with police and levies.
_Operations against the Bizotis (Daulatzai), 1868._—There appearing to
be no doubt that a raid was intended, 100 bayonets were sent out from
Kohat to reinforce the levies at Muhammadzai, and about 11.30 a.m. the
enemy collected to the number of some 200 about the Ublan Kotal, beating
drums, and occupying the right of the Pass. Major Jones, 3rd Punjab
Cavalry, commanding at Kohat, now ordered out two guns, eighty sabres,
and 480 infantry, and the enemy were at once driven from the positions
they had first taken up, and fell back upon a high peak where they had
erected a breastwork. Three attempts to take this position were
defeated, and as it was then 4.30 p.m., it was decided to retire,
covered by the guns. Our retirement was in no way pressed, from which it
may be assumed that the enemy had suffered considerably, but our own
casualties were not slight—eleven killed (one British officer), and
forty-four wounded.
[Sidenote: “A Pathan Surprise”]
After this affair the blockade against the Bizotis and other offending
divisions was made more stringent, but this measure was comparatively
ineffective, as these tribesmen soon departed to their summer quarters
in Tirah. As the time again approached when they would return to their
winter settlements, it was determined to put pressure on the Orakzais
generally by extending the blockade so as to include the whole clan;
there seemed some prospect of this measure resulting in the submission
of the Daulatzais, when, on the 13th February, 1869, a raiding party of
the Utman Khel surprised our police post at the foot of the Kohat Kotal,
killed one policeman and carried off three others. As it seemed certain
that the well-disposed divisions did not possess the power necessary to
coerce the offending parties, it was determined by Lieutenant-Colonel
Keyes, then commanding at Kohat, and by Lieutenant Cavagnari,
Deputy-Commissioner, to make a counter-raid into the territory of the
Bizotis and Utman Khels. This raid is admirably described in Chapter
XIX., “A Pathan Surprise,” in Oliver’s _Across the Border_, and appears,
in all the preliminary arrangements and the actual conduct of the
operations, to be a model of how a petty border expedition of this kind
should be projected and carried out.
The plan was to cross the Ublan Pass, and if not opposed at the village
of Gara to pass on to and destroy that of Dana Khula; if, however,
opposed at Gara, then no further advance was to be made, as the delay
would preclude the surprise of Dana Khula, where the enemy would be able
to make preparations, while to reach it the troops would have to fight
their way for two miles. The jirgah of the Kohat Pass Afridis happened
then to be in Kohat, and to prevent any information leaking out through
them to the Daulatzais, the jirgah was detained in Kohat on some pretext
while the troops were absent. It was clear that the complete success of
the whole operation depended upon the sudden and surprise seizure of the
Ublan Kotal, and, consequently, not even commanding officers were
informed of what was in view until a few hours prior to a start being
made. At midnight on the 24th February, the 4th Punjab Cavalry[130]
moved out and formed a complete cordon round the town of Kohat, so as to
prevent anybody from entering, and, still more, from leaving it; police
picquets were posted also at all places where a footman might seek to
enter the hills. At the same hour the mountain guns were got ready for
service, half an hour later the native gunners were warned, and the 1st
and 4th Punjab Infantry were turned out; at 1 a.m. the 2nd Punjab
Infantry was paraded, and at that hour two guns and two infantry
battalions left Kohat; all without bugle sound.
The Kotal was found undefended, but the enemy made some stand at Gara,
which was taken with a loss on our side of one killed and nineteen
wounded, and the surprise of Dana Khula was consequently impracticable.
Gara, however, was completely destroyed, cattle and other live stock
were driven off, and the retirement commenced. The descent was steep and
difficult, and the retreat, harassed by the enemy, was necessarily slow,
but the troops were withdrawn from the hill with great coolness and
steadiness, incurring, however, a further loss of two killed and
fourteen wounded.
[Sidenote: Continued Trouble]
While these operations were being carried on from Kohat, a strong column
had moved out from Peshawar, and had materially assisted the movements
of Colonel Keyes’ force by distracting the attention of the Utman Khel
Orakzais and a division of the Aka Khel Afridis.
The Bizotis and their neighbours had learnt a lesson, and early in April
the jirgahs of the Bizotis, Utman Khels and Sipaia (Muhammad Khel)
divisions came into Kohat, made submission, paid a fine of Rs. 1200, and
gave up nine of their principal headmen as hostages for their future
good behaviour; the long-standing blockade was then removed.
For the next three years this part of our border remained tolerably
quiet, but thereafter there was a constant succession of petty raids and
disturbances—not individually, perhaps, of much account, but forming, in
the aggregate, sufficient reason for undertaking at no distant date
punitive measures against the Orakzais as a whole. In 1873 the Sipaia
division of the Muhammad Khel gave trouble on the Kohat border. In 1878
the Massuzai and Lashkarzai evinced hostility towards us, both in Upper
Miranzai and in the Kurram; during the Afghan War emissaries from the
Amir, aided by the preachings of the mullahs, disquieted all the Sunni
Orakzai clans; and although there was no concerted action undertaken by
these tribesmen, the Ali Khels, and the Alisherzai and Mamuzai divisions
of the Lashkarzai, committed many outrages and raids between Hangu and
Thal, attacking posts, carrying off cattle, cutting up unarmed parties
and coolies, and increasing generally the difficulties of our
communications between India and Afghanistan. Despite, too, the fact
that only two clans of Orakzais were actively engaged in these raids,
the men appeared to have been accorded free passage through the country
of the Ismailzai and Malla Khel, both in proceeding to the scenes of
their outrages, and when returning home with the plunder obtained. Fines
had been imposed by Government, whose hands were at the time too full
for embarking upon the military expedition necessary for their
collection, and already by the end of 1880 the indebtedness of the
Orakzais in fines amounted to upwards of Rs. 15,000.
From 1884 until the end of 1890 increased and increasing trouble was
given by parties belonging to divisions of almost every clan of Orakzais
whose settlements are nearest to our frontier—Ismailzai, Sturi Khel,
Mishtis and Malla Khel—fines remained unpaid, and new scores, though
marked up, were ignored. The necessity for strong measures was urged by
the Deputy-Commissioner again and again; one division committed
forty-eight fresh offences in one year; the Sturi Khel made a partial
payment of fines for past misconduct, and then commenced a fresh
indebtedness by new outrages; the Samana boundary line, acknowledged and
acquiesced in since 1865, was repudiated in 1888. A new frontier post
was established at Shinawari, at the southern exit of the Chagru defile,
and was promptly attacked by a mixed band of Malla Khel and Rabia Khel;
and on the main road between Kai and Hangu, a police guard was attacked
in open day, prisoners were rescued, and arms carried off. This lawless
condition of the border abated somewhat at the beginning of 1890, when a
punitive expedition appeared to the tribe to be imminent, and a portion
of the outstanding fines was paid up; but the Rabia Khel continued to be
aggressive, and in December of this year sent an insolent message to the
Deputy-Commissioner, that they had no intention whatever of paying up
any of the heavy arrears of fines due from them—an example which was
promptly followed by the Sturi Khel.
[Sidenote: First Miranzai Expedition]
_First Miranzai Expedition, 1891._—The patience of the
Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and of the Government of India was now
exhausted, and an expedition was decided upon, having for its special
object the punishment of the Rabia Khel (Ismailzai), Mamuzai
(Lashkarzai), Sheikhan and Mishti divisions and clans, and also of the
Sturi Khel, should these not submit on the occupation by our troops of
the Khanki Valley.
The expeditionary force, under command of Brigadier-General Sir William
Lockhart, K.C.B., C.S.I., was assembled at Kohat by the 12th January,
the advance being arranged for the 19th, and on the former date a
proclamation was issued to the four Samil clans, whose punishment was
about to be undertaken, warning them not to resist, and to the remainder
of the Orakzais informing them that they would be in no way interfered
with provided they did not oppose us. The force was composed of—
Two Squadrons of Cavalry.
Two Mountain Batteries.
One Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
Seven Infantry Battalions, each of a strength of 600.
No British troops formed part of the force, which was divided into three
columns, rendezvousing respectively at Shahu Khel, Togh and Hangu. The
start was delayed by heavy rain and snow, and the troops were not in
position until the 21st January. On the advance commencing practically
no opposition was experienced; the country of each one of the offending
clans was visited by the different columns; and within a very short
space of time each division had made its submission—the Rabia Khel
standing out to the last. The Khanki Valley was traversed as far west as
Ghuzghor; a reconnaissance was pushed up the Daradar Valley through Star
Khel to the Kharai Kotal overlooking the Sheikhan country; Dran was
visited; and a column marched from Shahu Khel and reached the Zera Pass
via Bar Marai, sending reconnaissances through the Gudar defile to
Sultanzai and Shirazgarhi on the Lower Mastura. The casualties were nil,
but the troops suffered severely from the extreme cold. The following
terms imposed were agreed upon: the establishment of three posts on the
Samana connected by mule road with each other, and with Baliamin,
Darband and Hangu; payment of outstanding fines; undesirables and
outlaws not to be harboured by the tribes. The tribes had not agreed to
the construction of the Samana forts—at Gulistan on the west, near
Sangar, and on the east at Lakka—with an especially good grace, but
their submission had been so complete that no further immediate trouble
was anticipated.
[Sidenote: Trouble on the Samana]
The field force had barely broken up when it was rumoured that the clans
concerned, egged on by the taunts of those tribesmen who had not been
proceeded against, were trying to form a combination to prevent the
construction of the Samana posts, and that the Rabia Khel were
particularly truculent. Kohat was, as a precautionary measure,
reinforced by a battery and a battalion, but nothing of the nature of an
actual outbreak occurred until the 4th April. On this date an attack was
made upon our working parties on the Samana by men of the Rabia Khel,
who, having been taken on as labourers on the road, suddenly turned upon
the covering party, and were then at once reinforced by large numbers of
tribesmen who had been awaiting events on the north side of the Samana.
Our troops were obliged to abandon the crest of the range and to fall
back upon Baliamin, having suffered a loss of fourteen killed and seven
wounded.
From subsequent enquiry it was elicited that the Rabia Khel had been
joined in this outbreak by the Mamuzai, Sheikhans and Mishtis, and the
temporary success of the movement at once swelled the numbers of the
enemy, until it was computed that many thousand men were under arms;
these included not only all the Orakzais of the Khanki Valley, but a
certain number of Afridis under one Mir Bashar, a Malikdin Khel, who,
during the Afghan War, had assumed the title of “King of Tirah,” and had
received a pension from the Amir. Mir Bashar was reported to be
preaching a jehad, aided by Aka Khel and Mamuzai mullahs. It seemed
evident that the work commenced on the Samana posts, and on the roads
connecting them, had aroused the suspicions of all the Orakzais, and
enlisted the sympathies of many of the more fanatical of the Afridis.
Both from the Kohat and the Khyber side proclamations were issued,
assuring the tribesmen that we had no designs on their independence, and
that the posts on the Samana were being erected purely as a defensive
measure against the Rabia Khel; but in view of the threatening state of
affairs in the district troops were at once pushed up to Kohat, Darband
and Baliamin. The tribesmen now forthwith commenced hostilities; on the
8th April they attacked a small party of the 1st Punjab Infantry at
Hangu, and two days later a lashkar of about 1000 men attacked our camp
at Darband, but was beaten off without loss to us. On this date a reply
was received to the proclamation above mentioned, demanding our
abandonment of the Samana and the release of certain notoriously
troublesome characters then in our custody.
[Sidenote: Second Miranzai Expedition]
_Second Miranzai Expedition, 1891._—The troops detailed for this, the
second, Miranzai Expedition, consisted of six squadrons of cavalry,
fifteen mountain and three heavy guns, one company of Bengal Sappers,
and ten and a half battalions of infantry (one and a half British), and
were divided into three columns, concentrating the one at Hangu, the
other two at Darband. The whole numbered something under 8000 men, and
Sir William Lockhart was again in command.
The enemy—Mishtis, Sheikhans, Mamuzais, and Rabia Khel—were reported to
be on the Samana to the number of about a thousand men, while several
thousand others were in support in the Khanki Valley.
The advance was made on the 17th April, No. 1 Column moving up on to the
Samana, reaching Lakka without opposition, and assaulting and carrying
Tsalai, Gogra and Sangar in succession, and with only trifling loss.
Meanwhile Nos. 2 and 3 Columns left Darband, No. 2 advancing to the
Darband Kotal, and thence, with some opposition, to Gwada, and No. 3
from Darband to Sangar, where it joined No. 1 Column. On the 18th No. 2
remained halted, while Nos. 1 and 3 attacked Sartop, and cleared and
held the plateau between it and Gulistan—at the western end of the
range—leaving No. 3 Column there in position. Next day No. 2 moved up to
Sangar, joining there the first column; and throughout the whole of this
day and the greater part of the 20th, No. 3 Column was fired upon from
three sides. Having been reinforced after midday on the 20th, No. 3
Column moved out, attacked and captured Saragarhi and Gustang, whence
most of the fire was proceeding, burnt these villages and drove the
Orakzais off the mountain down into the Khanki Valley. On the 22nd No. 2
Column advanced to the extreme western end of the Samana, overlooking
the Chagru Valley, where a large assemblage of armed men was visible. On
these moving forward in a threatening manner they were attacked and
driven back, as was also another body some 1500 strong, advancing from
the Khanki Valley, and the British force retired to camp practically
unmolested, although our picquets were threatened later on in the
evening. On the same day another column had attacked and destroyed
several villages of the Rabia Khel, experiencing but slight opposition.
Tribesmen again collecting in large numbers on the 23rd, No. 2 Column
moved out in full strength, dispersed them and then burnt the village of
Tsalai, where they appeared to have rendezvoused. From the 24th to 29th
jirgahs began to come in with offers of submission; and while
negotiations were in progress, the General Officer commanding took the
opportunity of visiting the Sheikhans and of levelling their towers.
By the beginning of May most of the opposing divisions had come in and
had submitted, but were told that all stolen government property must be
restored before negotiations could really be opened. With the Rabia
Khel, Akhel and Sheikhan, matters were speedily settled, but it was felt
that a special punishment must be meted out to the Mishtis, who had been
equally troublesome with the others, but whose villages, lying at a
considerable distance from our frontier, had not suffered to anything
like the same extent as those of other tribesmen, who had taken a no
more prominent part in the recent disturbances. It was, therefore,
decided to destroy the towers of the large villages about Kandi Mishti,
in the Khanki Valley, and lying at the foot of the Sampagha Pass. Sir
William Lockhart, then, taking No. 2 Column, marched from Gulistan on
the Samana by the Tsalai Spur and the Chagru Kotal to Kharappa, blew up
three of the Kandi Mishti towers in the presence of the jirgahs, and
from Kharappa marched through the country of some of the more westerly
clans, sections of which had been concerned in the risings, and who had
hitherto imagined that their position rendered them inaccessible. The
Khanki Valley was, therefore, traversed from end to end, and the
Kharmana Valley was overlooked and overawed.
[Sidenote: Occupation of the Samana]
The result of these operations was that all the clans concerned agreed
to our occupation of the Samana; adequate punishment had been dealt out
to offenders; practically the whole of the Orakzai country had now been
traversed by our troops; and for the next six years this part of the
border was at peace.
Our casualties in this expedition amounted to twenty-eight killed and
seventy-three wounded.
From the date of the conclusion of these operations up to the general
“Pathan Revolt” of 1897, the behaviour of the Orakzais as a tribe may
almost be described as irreproachable—although, of course, isolated
cases of misbehaviour were not uncommon. It was known, too, that our
actual presence in occupation of posts on the Samana Range rankled in
the minds of the tribesmen. Although the crest of the Samana had for
more than thirty years been acknowledged as our boundary, and had been
assessed as such, the outward and visible sign of our occupation
appeared to be a source of continual offence, and early in 1892 a
deputation of the Orakzais asked the assistance of the Amir of
Afghanistan in inducing us to abandon the range. The Amir, however, very
properly replied that he did not see his way to take any action in the
matter.
In May 1897 the Orakzais appear, in conjunction with the Afridis, to
have again solicited the intervention of the Amir, and it was felt that
the situation on the frontier generally, and particularly on this
section of it, was becoming serious. The actual causes which may be said
to have led to the outbreak along four hundred miles of border have been
given at more length in Chapter XIII., and it is not proposed here to
recapitulate them; it is sufficient to state that the first definite
news of unrest amongst the Afridis and Orakzais was contained in a
telegram from the Deputy-Commissioner of Kohat, stating that the Mullah
Saiyid Akbar, Aka Khel, had succeeded in persuading the Orakzais to
unite against the British Government, and was in Tirah trying to
persuade the Afridis to do the same. This information appears, however,
to have been discredited by the Commissioner of Peshawar (Sir Richard
Udny), even when followed by another telegram from Kohat announcing the
actual assembly of hostile tribesmen; and all that was done—so far as
precautionary measures against the Orakzais were concerned—was the
reinforcement of Kohat on 20th August by a force of the three arms—the
9th Field Battery, 18th Bengal Lancers, and 15th Sikhs.
[Sidenote: Beginning of Trouble]
Information was now received that the tribal jirgahs had decided that,
of the Orakzais, the Massuzais, assisted by the Chamkannis, should move
against the Kurram, the Daulatzais against Kohat, and the remainder of
the tribe against the forts on the Samana; whereupon the following
measures were taken for the security of the district generally by
Major-General Yeatman-Biggs, who had now, on the 21st August, assumed
command of the troops on the Kohat-Kurram border.
A flying column—four mountain guns, six squadrons cavalry, and one
battalion infantry, under Colonel Richardson—was formed for action in
the Kurram, and moved out to Hangu; Kohat was reinforced by the 3rd
Gurkhas and four companies Royal Scots Fusiliers, while rifles were
issued to friendly villagers on the border. On the 25th Colonel
Richardson was able to put supplies and ammunition, bringing up the
number of rounds per rifle to 400, into the Samana posts; and that this
was accomplished none too soon was made clear by the news which now came
in, that 12,000 tribesmen were concentrating at Kharappa in the Khanki
Valley—chiefly Ali Khels, Malla Khels, and the Alisherzai and Mamuzai
divisions of the Lashkarzai. So far it was reported that neither Mishtis
nor Akhels (Ismailzai) had joined the gathering, but at the same time
their headmen sent in to say that public opinion and tribal pressure
would oblige them, sooner or later, to take the field also. A force,
composed of fighting men from all three divisions of the Daulatzai, had
occupied the Ublan Pass, whence they sent into Kohat a statement of the
terms upon which they would be willing to vacate it and disperse; and in
the Kurram Valley, too, matters looked threatening, and anxiety was felt
in regard to the posts at Sadda and Parachinar, which could not be
relieved from Hangu until some, at least, of the Orakzai lashkars had
been driven off.
The Orakzais now themselves began to take the offensive. The Daulatzais
descended from the Ublan Pass and attacked and captured the old police
post, held by twenty-five border police, at Muhammadzai. Against them
the Major-General moved out on the 27th August with a field battery, a
squadron, two companies Royal Scots Fusiliers, and 487 rifles of the 2nd
Punjab Infantry, drove the enemy from the pass and towards the Bara
Valley. Our casualties were only two killed and nine wounded, but the
heat was intense, twenty British soldiers were prostrated with
sunstroke, of whom one died, and eighty-six of the Fusiliers had to be
carried back to Kohat in ambulance tongas.
On the same day the Orakzais had been active all along the Samana Range.
The levy-posts at Lakka and Saifaldara, further west, had been
surrounded and attacked, but Colonel Richardson sent out a force under
Lieutenant-Colonel Abbott (two mountain guns, half a squadron of
cavalry, one and a half battalions), and the garrisons were successfully
relieved and withdrawn, the posts being burnt by the enemy the same
evening. The eastern end of the Samana about Gulistan was threatened by
large gatherings; the border police post at Shinawari was attacked three
nights running, and finally captured and destroyed on the night of the
28th August; and on the night following the tribesmen, intoxicated with
their success, raided down into the valley south of Shinawari, plundered
Mariab and Kai, and fired into the camp at Hangu.
[Sidenote: Orakzai Raids]
By this time, however, troops had been pushed up to Kohat from Rawal
Pindi, and from Peshawar through the Kohat Pass, and the advanced force
at Hangu had now been strengthened. Lieutenant-Colonel Abbott was sent
on from Hangu to Doaba, twenty-two miles further west, with two mountain
guns, a squadron of cavalry, the 15th Sikhs, and half a company Bombay
Sappers; and on the 31st Major-General Yeatman-Biggs left Kohat for
Hangu, and formed the troops there into two brigades. One of these, now
commanded by Colonel Richardson, was ordered to proceed at once to the
relief of the posts at Sadda and Parachinar—distant seventy and
ninety-two miles respectively—which expected to be attacked in force on
the 3rd September. The rapid advance of this brigade—Sadda was reached
on the night of the 3rd—staved off actual attack; but Thal had been
fired into, Torawari post had been burnt, while Balish Khel, a post on
the border three miles from Sadda, had been fiercely attacked, and its
defence by twenty men of the Kurram Militia, under an Afridi havildar,
was particularly fine. Its relief was effected by the arrival of some
fifty armed Turi villagers from Sadda, and 200 militia from Hasan Ali.
With the appearance in the neighbourhood of Colonel Richardson’s
brigade, matters quieted down for a time, but on the 16th a determined
attack was made upon the camp about 10.30 p.m. by 2000 of the Massuzais,
who were not finally beaten off until 1 a.m.
While these operations were in progress in the Kurram desperate fighting
had taken place on the Samana.
The posts of Lakka and Saifaldara, at the western end of the range, had,
as we have seen, been abandoned, and thereupon destroyed, and in
addition two other small police posts, Gogra and Tsalai, had been
evacuated and burnt. There remained on the hill two large posts—Fort
Lockhart, on the centre of the range, and Gulistan (Fort Cavagnari), at
the western end overlooking the Chagru Kotal—and several smaller
ones—Saraghari, the Crag Picquet, the Sangar Picquet, Sartop and Dhar.
Each of the two larger posts was capable of accommodating two companies,
though at Gulistan one company had to be placed in a small hornwork to
the west, while the smaller posts could hold from twenty-five to fifty
rifles. Of these small posts, Saraghari was by reason of its situation
the most important, being on high ground and in signalling communication
with the different posts on the range.
On the nights of the 3rd and 4th September Gulistan was attacked in
force, and the enemy came on so determinedly that they succeeded in
setting fire to the abatis outside the hornwork, but the fire was
extinguished by volunteers rushing out from the fort. In these attacks
the Orakzais lost so heavily that they withdrew entirely from the Samana
for some days, and indeed made up their minds to leave the posts alone
unless the Afridis should come to their assistance. Raids continued,
however, but as the Tirah Expeditionary Force was now being assembled,
Government refused to permit of any reprisals against the Orakzais on a
large scale; but the Mishtis, who were easily accessible in the Lower
Khanki Valley, were proceeded against, several of their fortified
villages being destroyed by a small column sent out from Hangu.
[Sidenote: The Samana Forts]
Between the 7th and 12th September Major-General Yeatman-Biggs was able
to throw a month’s supplies into the Samana forts, and on the last-named
date his column came in contact with the combined force of the enemy,
estimated at a total of 10,000 men, for the Afridis had now thrown in
their lot with the Orakzais. As the column was, however, short both of
water and supplies, it was unable to remain on the hill, and was forced
to descend to Hangu, when the whole strength of the tribesmen was pitted
against the Samana forts, held by the 36th Sikhs, distributed as
follows:
Fort Lockhart (Headquarters), 168, and 2 British officers.
Crag Picquet, 22.
Sartop, 21.
Sangar, 44.
Dhar, 38.
Saraghari, 21.
Gulistan, 175, and 4 British officers.
On the night of the 11–12th September the post of Sangar was first
attacked, but being well situated and with no cover in the vicinity, the
enemy were repulsed without serious difficulty. They then, on the
morning of the 12th, vigorously assailed Saraghari, one of the smallest
posts in regard to garrison, and being further weakly constructed and
badly placed for prolonged resistance to overwhelming numbers. The whole
course of the attack could be seen from both Fort Lockhart and Gulistan,
whence no effective assistance could be rendered, for these garrisons
were themselves small, the villages between Fort Lockhart and Saraghari
were full of the enemy, and Gulistan was itself being vigorously
attacked. None the less two attempts were made from Fort Lockhart to
effect relief, but they were unsuccessful. During one of the rushes upon
the post, some men established themselves under the wall where there was
a dead angle, and managed there to effect a breach, when the enemy
rushed in in overwhelming numbers, and the garrison, fighting manfully
to the last, were killed to a man. The twenty-one heroes had, however,
inflicted heavy loss upon the enemy, who owned to a death-roll of 180;
the last of the Sikhs killed twenty men before he was overpowered. Truly
of these twenty-one men of the 36th Sikhs may be said, as was recorded
of the Guides at Kabul: “By their deeds they have conferred undying
honour, not only on the regiment to which they belong, but on the whole
British Army.”
Gulistan had been closely invested since noon, all was over at Saraghari
by 4 p.m., and the tribesmen now put out their whole strength against
the first-named post. The attack was pressed throughout the whole of the
night, a hot fire being maintained upon the post from the closest
quarters. When the morning of the 13th dawned the enemy were found to be
entrenched within twenty yards of the walls, but the Sikhs under Major
Des Vœux, not only maintained their ground throughout the day and the
night that followed, but carried out two most successful sorties,
capturing three standards and striking terror into the tribesmen as much
as they heartened themselves.
[Sidenote: Relief of Gulistan]
At midnight on the 13th General Yeatman-Biggs had moved out from Hangu
with a relieving force.[131] Advancing up the Samana via Lakka, the
column met and drove off a body of the enemy, estimated at 4000, holding
Gogra hill and the ruined Tsalai post; and, continuing its progress, put
to a hurried flight into the Khanki Valley a second force, numbering
several thousand, entrenched on the Saraghari ridge. Continuing
westward, Gulistan was seen to be surrounded by swarms of tribesmen,
but, declining attack, these also drew off hurriedly into the Khanki
Valley, and by 1 p.m. Gulistan was relieved. Our losses were: Saraghari,
twenty-one killed; Gulistan, two killed, thirty-nine wounded; relieving
force, one killed, six wounded; while the total losses of the enemy on
the Samana were found later to have amounted to about 400 killed and 600
seriously wounded.
The subsequent operations of this year, wherein the Orakzais were
concerned, will be found described in Chapter XIII., “Afridis:
operations,” and in Chapter XVI., “Chamkannis,” but the moral effect of
the heavy losses incurred in the attacks on the Samana forts was
undoubtedly responsible for the feeble character of the resistance
thereafter offered to us by the Orakzais, and for the readiness they
evinced in coming to terms, and making a complete and unconditional
submission.
Since 1897 the Orakzais, as a tribe, have given us no trouble.
CHAPTER XVI.
BANGASH—ZAIMUKHTS—CHAMKANNIS—TURIS.[132]
Since the territories of the above-mentioned tribes are either situated
in, or are most easily approached from, the Miranzai and Kurram, the
account of these peoples had better be prefaced by some description of
those valleys.
During the days of Sikh rule on the frontier, Miranzai remained under
the Governor of Kohat, but not much interference was attempted. On the
annexation of the Punjab by the Government of India, Miranzai, being an
outlying territory, was overlooked when possession was taken of the rest
of Kohat; the Kabul Government, accordingly, made arrangements to occupy
Miranzai, the Amir’s son, Sirdar Muhammad Azim, who was then Governor of
Kurram, sending in 1851 some cavalry to hold the villages of Bilandkhel,
Thal and Torawari. The people of Miranzai, thereupon, appealed to the
Indian Government, and petitioned that their country might be included
in British territory, offering to pay a yearly revenue of Rs. 7500.
Their request was acceded to, and in August 1861, a proclamation was
issued declaring Miranzai to be a portion of the Kohat district.
This country has been thus described by Oliver in his book _Across the
Border_: “The Miranzai Valley, perhaps the pleasantest part of the Kohat
district, has been arbitrarily divided into an Upper and a Lower, though
the river which runs east, down the latter, is a feeder of the Kohat
_toi_, or stream, and goes thence to the Indus, while the Ishkali, which
runs west along the Upper, is a branch of the Kurram. Both Upper and
Lower Miranzai, equally with the Kurram, lie along the base of the great
Safed Koh Range, the white peaks of which tower over everything else, a
gigantic barrier between this and the still more famous Khyber route to
Kabul.... It is a land of mountains, small and great, of rocks and of
stones. The rivers that rush down the steep slopes are at one time
dangerous torrents, at others yielding with difficulty a little water
from the holes dug in their beds, with small and circumscribed, but
well-cultivated valleys, where grain and fruit flourish abundantly,
varied with raviney wastes, growing little beyond the dwarf palm which
affords materials for one of the few staple industries the country
possesses. These, again, are interspersed by grassy tracts, on which are
pastured abnormally small cattle and exceptionally fat-tailed sheep.”
The Miranzai Valley is about forty miles in length, and its width varies
from three to seven miles; it extends from Thal to Raisan—where the
Khanki River breaks through the hills into the valley—and from the
Zaimukht and Orakzai hills to those of the Khattaks.
[Sidenote: The Kurram Valley]
Up to the time of the second Afghan war the Kurram Valley was ruled by
the Afghans, but it came under our influence during the campaign, and
was finally occupied by us in the autumn of 1893. The country is now
administered by the Indian Government, and is ruled by a political
officer, the valley being to all intents and purposes British territory.
“Once past Thal,” says Oliver, “and the banks of the Kurram River
reached—more or less all along are cornfields and fruit gardens,
mulberry groves and fertile glades, passing up to ridges crested by oak
and olive, yew trees and pines; the range behind again culminating in
the snow-capped peak of Sika Ram, which rises over 15,000 feet high.
Some parts of the valley have the reputation of being unhealthy, for the
same reason as Bannu, but there are few more fertile spots along the
Afghan Border than the Kurram.” The valley is about sixty miles long and
in some parts not more than ten miles broad; it is bounded on the west
by Afghanistan, on the east by the country of the Chamkannis, Zaimukhts
and Orakzais, on the south by Waziristan, while on the north Kurram is
separated from the country of the Shinwaris by the Safed Koh Range.
“Dark pine forests cover the lower ranges, and naked cliffs and snowy
peaks rise high above them. The chain is so situated that the rays of
the setting sun fall full upon it, and the effect on a chill winter
evening, when the pale snows flush scarlet and crimson, while darkness
is already gathering in the valley below, is very fine.”
Enriquez, from whose work, _The Pathan Borderland_, quotation has
already been made, tells us that “Lower Kurram,[133] that is as far as
Alizai, differs very essentially from the Upper Kurram and in appearance
resembles the Miranzai. The villages are built of rough and irregular
blocks of stone interspersed with layers of brushwood. Towers and
defensive walls are the exception, and the inhabitants are but poorly
armed. The fodder is collected in ricks inside the hamlets, and great
stacks of hay and ‘johwar’ are also grouped together in large numbers on
rising ground near by. The valley is narrow, and there is little room
for cultivation. The trees are few and stunted, and the general
appearance of the country is of low hills and broken nullahs, where the
usual ‘palosa,’ bera, seneta and mazarai form a thin scrub jungle. Upper
Kurram, on the other hand, is wider, and the mountains containing it are
more imposing. There is a good deal of cultivation; the villages are
larger and far more prosperous looking, and are built chiefly of mud.
The more important ones have from eight to ten fortified towers, and are
besides protected by high loop-holed walls. A very successful attempt is
made to decorate these forts by means of patterns in the brickwork and
of crenelations along the upper parapets. They are, moreover, neatly
built and kept in good repair. Chenar trees abound and grow to as fine a
size as they do in Kashmir. To judge by their girth, many of them must
be very old. There are willows, mulberries and ‘palosa’ in the valley
and the walnuts of Kurram rival those of Tirah.” The valley is said,
with pride, to produce four remarkable and marketable commodities—the
stone of Malana, the rice of Karman, the wood of Peiwar, and the women
of Shalozan—the last a village from which ladies have always been
supplied for the Royal zenana in Kabul. The grandmother of the late
Amir, Abdur Rahman Khan, was a daughter of the Turi Malik of Shalozan in
Kurram.
[Sidenote: Value of the Kurram]
The Miranzai and Kurram Valleys are of importance as providing an
alternative route, practically wholly through friendly territory, from
our frontiers to the borders of Afghanistan. A narrow-gauge railway runs
from Kohat to Thal, and is eventually, it is stated, to be extended to
Parachinar—fifty-six miles further up the Kurram Valley. The Peiwar
Kotal is only fifteen miles further west from Parachinar, and is of an
elevation of 9200 feet, the onward road then crossing the Shutargardan,
or Camel’s Neck Pass, at a height of 11,900 feet, into the Logar Valley
leading to Kabul. The route affords a subsidiary line for part of the
year, but its closing by snow, and the great altitudes at which the
several passes have to be crossed, forbid its being classed as a
principal line of communication. During the second Afghan war it was
used as a line of advance mainly because Lord Lytton firmly believed in
the value of Kurram, being influenced in this, as in many other matters,
by his Military Secretary, Colonel, afterwards Sir George, Colley, who
wrote: “Personally my hobby is the Kurram—I had long ago come to the
conclusion that the possession of the Peiwar held the most commanding
military position, short of Kabul, in Afghanistan.... The Kurram Valley
is mainly fairly open and inhabited by a peaceful agricultural
population, so that our communications there will never be troublesome
or uncertain.”
Lord Roberts, however, has on the other hand described the Kurram route
as no more than a “byroad”; and on its final evacuation at the close of
the last phase of the second Afghan war, Sir Frederick Haines, who was
then Commander-in-Chief in India, wrote that: “As a line of military
communication experience has condemned it, and I abandon it as such
without the slightest regret.”
_The Bangash._—Of this tribe something has already been said—of their
battle near Kohat with the Orakzais, and of the final issue resulting in
their holding to the plain country, while the Orakzais remained in the
hills. Tradition has it that the Bangash are of Arab origin, and that,
pressed by the Ghilzais, they moved eastward about the end of the
fourteenth century. Settling then in the Kurram Valley, and expanding
further eastward, they drove the Orakzais into the mountains. Dr.
Bellew, however, is inclined to think that they are in the main of
Scythian origin, and that they came into India with the Central Asian
hordes which followed Sabuktagin and Timur. But at the present day it
will probably be enough to describe them as a tribe of Pathans who
inhabit the Kurram and Miranzai Valleys down to Kohat. Bangash families
are also settled in Persia and in some parts of India, notably in
Farakhabad, the Nawab of which place, who was banished from India for
his conduct during the Mutiny, being descended from a Bangash family.
They are Gar in politics and partly Shiah and partly Sunni. They enlist
readily in the Indian Army and Border Militia, and are thought well of,
being quieter than most Pathans.
[Sidenote: The Bangash Tribe]
“The Kohat, Miranzai and southern part of the Kurram Valley,” Oliver
tells us, “are mainly Bangash; those towards Kohat mostly Sunnis, the
bulk of the remainder Shiahs. The Westerns wear their beards long, with
a few short Jewish ringlets on either side of the face, shaving the rest
of the head; the Easterns clip them short; otherwise there is not much
difference. Physically they are quite up to the average Pathans, though
they are not generally credited with great fighting qualities. A few
deal in salt, but they are eminently an agricultural rather than a
pastoral people. Reported hospitable, many of them are undoubtedly
treacherous and cruel, not specially disposed to wanton violence, but
much addicted to thieving. They are rather the victims of raids by their
neighbours than raiders themselves”—the Orakzais, in their barren
mountains, regretting their old-time homes and occasionally indulging in
a foray into Miranzai—“and have generally behaved well from an
administrative point of view. Their situation is such, they have had the
good sense to see that in this lay their best chance of security.”
The three main clans of the tribe, now recognised, are as under:
1. Miranzai.
2. Samilzai.
3. Baizai.
The first-named live for the most part in Upper Miranzai—that is to say,
west of Kai, but some of them inhabit villages nearer to Kohat, and a
few, again, live in the Kurram. The Samilzai are to be found some in the
Kurram and some in Lower Miranzai; while the Baizai live chiefly in the
Kohat Valley proper. The Baizai claim that in the days of the Mogul
emperors they received an allowance for holding the crest of the Kotal
of the Kohat Pass; and as a solution of the difficulties about the pass
in 1853, to which allusion is made elsewhere, they petitioned to be
allowed to resume their ancient responsibilities. Their request was
granted, but they proved unable to hold the position against Afridi
attack, and an arrangement was come to under which four different clans,
the Baizai Bangash included, received grants for keeping open the pass.
These they still retain, and up to 1882, when the management of the pass
was transferred to the Deputy-Commissioner, the chief of the Baizai was
in charge of the Kohat Pass arrangements. The Bangash have themselves
given us little or no trouble, but have suffered much by being unusually
exposed to the raids of neighbouring tribes.
_The Zaimukhts._—This tribe are also known as Zwaimukht and Zaimusht;
they are of Afghan stock and live on the southern slopes of the Zawa
Ghar Range, having for their neighbours, on the north-west the Turis, on
the north and east the Orakzais, and on the south and south-west the
Bangash. With every one of these the Zaimukhts are at feud. Their
country is very fertile, and they own, too, a number of villages in the
Kurram and Miranzai valleys in British territory. They are strong,
well-built men with pleasing features, and can muster some 2300 armed
men, who appear to possess good fighting qualities, but so far none of
the tribesmen have taken service either in the Indian Army or in the
local militia. They are all Sunni in religion and Samil in politics.
[Sidenote: The Zaimukht Tribe]
The country of the Zaimukhts may be described as a triangle, with the
Zawa Ghar Range as its base, and the village of Thal as the apex; this
includes a tract of country on its western side, occupied by the
Alisherzai Orakzais. The northern range rises to a height of over 9000
feet above the village of Zawo, and from 7000 to 8000 feet elsewhere.
The crest is in some parts covered with pine forests, in others it is
bare of trees. From this main range several streams run southward
between precipitous and rocky spurs whose sides are quite inaccessible;
from the crests, here and there, rise steep, craggy peaks, which render
the ridges also very difficult, if not impracticable. Among these glens
lie many hamlets of small size, the village of Zawo being composed of
several hamlets. This village was considered the chief stronghold of the
Zaimukhts, and, from its position, impregnable, nestling close under the
mountain range, and from the south only approachable up a ravine several
miles in length, hemmed in by precipitous spurs rising to 8000 feet in
elevation. The spurs of the Zawa Ghar Range are steep and rugged for
about six to seven miles; as they run southward they fall away, and form
a succession of small plateaux, intersected by ravines, 4000 to 5000
feet in elevation. Across these runs the route from Torawari, in Upper
Miranzai, to Balish Khel, near the junction of the Kharmana River with
the Kurram—a route formerly used by kafilas. The drainage divides into
three parts—one running westward into the Kharmana and Kurram, near
Balish Khel and Sadda; a second, collecting below Chinarak, forms the
Sangroba, which falls into the Kurram near Thal; while the remainder
runs eastward into the Ishkali which drains into the Kurram River.
Dividing these are two passes at the villages of Manatu (5200 feet) and
Urmegi (4300 feet), which also form the connecting links between the
Zawa Ghar hill, and a second series of hills, that rise abruptly from
4000 feet to 8000 feet in two groups—one round the peak of Dingsar west
of the Sangroba, the other round Dondo Ghar, east of that stream. The
crests and spurs of these two groups are rugged, rocky and almost
treeless. Amongst them lie several secluded glens, in which are other
hamlets of the Zaimukhts, very difficult of access. The country is, as a
rule, devoid of timber trees; water is plentiful; the soil is fertile
and there are large numbers of cattle, sheep, goats and poultry.
The tribe is divided into two main branches, each at bitter feud with
the other:
1. The Mamuzai or Western Zaimukhts.
2. The Khoidad Khel or Eastern Zaimukhts.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1879]
In the early days of the annexation of Miranzai the Zaimukhts gave
little trouble to the Indian Government, but in the year 1855 they
assumed a hostile attitude, and, among other acts of hostility, they
took part in the affair near Darsamand (see Turis). From 1856 to 1878
the Zaimukhts kept quiet. The outbreak of the second Afghan war, and the
long British line of communications through Miranzai and Kurram,
provided an opportunity of raiding which the Zaimukhts found it
impossible to resist. From December 1878, to August of the year
following, the Zaimukhts, chiefly of the Khoidad Khel clan of the tribe,
committed a number of offences, cutting off grazing pack animals,
kidnapping British subjects, raiding the post, culminating in the murder
of two British officers passing along the road. Besides these, there
were also a number of petty thefts and such offences as cutting the
telegraph wire; and in October 1879, the bill for damages against the
tribe amounting to Rs. 25,000, a force under Brigadier-General Tytler,
V.C., C.B., was ordered into the Zaimukht country. The objects of the
expedition were:
1. To punish the tribe.
2. To punish, if convenient and desirable, the Lashkarzai Orakzais,
who had equally been guilty of misbehaviour.
3. To secure a right-of-way through the Zaimukht country, between
Torawari and Balish Khel.
4. To secure the safety of communications on the Thal-Kurram road.
The expedition was delayed owing to the renewal of active operations in
Afghanistan, consequent upon the murder at Kabul of Sir Louis Cavagnari
and the members of his Mission, and it was not until the end of November
that General Tytler was able to commence operations. In the interval,
however, the tribesmen had continued their raids upon a larger scale
than before, 3000 of the Lashkarzai Orakzais having concentrated for
that purpose at Balish Khel, and a mixed force of Zaimukhts and
Orakzais, in numbers about 1000, having assembled close to the post at
Chupri in the Kurram Valley. Both these hostile concentrations were
dispersed by small British columns collected on the spot, and which
suffered but small loss.
While General Tytler was pushing on his preparations, several
reconnaissances were made into Zaimukht country from Balish Khel, where
the headquarters of the expedition was established on the 28th November.
A party, numbering 500 infantry and two mountain guns, under Colonel J.
J. H. Gordon, C.B., 29th Punjab Infantry, ascended the Drabzai Mountain,
7300 feet high, seven miles from Balish Khel, and commanding the whole
southern Alisherzai (Lashkarzai Orakzai) Valley, with the passes leading
to the northern Alisherzai and Massuzai country.
Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Low, 13th Bengal Lancers, taking with him 400
infantry, 100 cavalry and two mountain guns, passed round the foot of
the Drabzai Mountain, through Tindoh, as far as the entrance to the
Krumb defile.
400 infantry, 50 cavalry and two mountain guns under Lieutenant-Colonel
R. G. Rogers, C.B., 20th Punjab Infantry, explored the Tatang defile and
the Abasikor Pass, the latter about thirteen miles from camp and 7700
feet in height. A mile beyond Tatang village, the road enters the Tatang
defile, narrow, about forty or fifty yards long, and with precipitous,
rocky sides overhanging the roadway. The road was rough and difficult
for any but lightly laden baggage animals. From the crest of the pass a
good view was obtained of the Massuzai (Orakzai) Valley.
A small party of the 13th Bengal Lancers, under Major C. R. Pennington,
reconnoitred the country in the direction of the old Kafila road from
Durani to Gawakki, which was found to be fairly good, and was
consequently selected as that by which the main force should advance.
The party under Colonel Rogers was the only one of the four which
experienced any, and that but an altogether insignificant, opposition.
[Sidenote: General Tytler’s Operations]
On the 8th December, Brigadier-General Tytler moved to Gawakki, in the
Zaimukht country, with the undermentioned force:
Total strength.
1–8th Royal Artillery, four guns (screw), 195
No. 1 Kohat Mountain Battery, two guns, 78
2nd Battalion 8th Regiment, 41
85th Regiment, 733
1st Bengal Cavalry, 57
13th Bengal Cavalry, 155
18th Bengal Cavalry, 55
8th Company Sappers and Miners, 57
13th Native Infantry, 323
4th Punjab Infantry, 557
20th Punjab Native Infantry, 399
29th Punjab Native Infantry, 568
During the next ten days the country was thoroughly explored, and every
village of any importance was visited. On the 9th, Manatu was reached
without opposition, and from here three columns were despatched into the
Wattizai Valley, the inhabitants of which had been largely implicated in
the offences on the Thal-Kurram road, and there, in spite of some
opposition, the villages of Kandali and Katokomela were burnt to the
ground; at the same time some other villages in this valley were
attacked from Kurram by a party of Turi levies and were also destroyed.
The Wattizai Valley is about six miles long, well cultivated and
watered. On the 12th the column marched five miles to Chinarak, distant
about eight miles from the stronghold of Zawo, the objective of the
expedition. Chinarak is situated on a fairly open and level plateau,
surrounded by terraced fields, through which ran numerous water
channels, and was almost at the foot of the defile leading to Zawo. At
Chinarak the three main routes into the Zaimukht country converge, viz.
from Balish Khel, from Torawari, and from Thal by the Sangroba defile,
and it may therefore be looked upon as the most important strategical
point of the whole valley.
[Sidenote: Advance on Zawo]
On the 13th, the force, less a small party remaining to guard the camp
at Chinarak, moved out to attack Zawo; to this fastness there are three
approaches—one by a difficult ravine about seven miles long and ten feet
wide, one to the left over a steep spur on the west of the ravine, one
to the right over high hills west of the valley of Surmai. The plan
adopted was to hold the commanding ground on the right, while the main
advance was made by the ravine. There was a certain amount of
opposition—the enemy at one place fighting hand-to-hand with the
29th—the advance was much delayed by the ground, and the bed of the
defile was found to be excessively difficult; so that when by 4 p.m. the
Brigadier-General found himself in possession of the village of Bagh,
three and a half miles from Chinarak and four and a half from Zawo, he
decided to postpone any further advance till the following day and
bivouac at Bagh for the night. Early on the 14th, while Colonel Gordon,
with three companies of the 85th, three companies of his own regiment,
and two guns, occupied the high ground to the north, flanking the
approach to Zawo from Bagh, the main force under General Tytler advanced
up the gorge, over increasing difficulties for about a mile, and gained,
under a heavy fire, the summit of the pass overlooking the village, or
cluster of eight or ten villages, of Zawo, situated amongst terraced
fields in a horse-shoe shaped valley. The villages were destroyed, and
the force returned that night to Bagh, and thence on the 15th to
Chinarak, the retirement having been entirely unmolested.
In these operations the loss of the enemy was estimated at over forty
killed and one hundred wounded, the British casualties being one officer
and one sepoy killed, one native officer and one noncommissioned officer
wounded. The result of the Zawo expedition was the complete destruction
of the settlements of the Khudu Khel sub-division. The Zaimukhts had for
this occasion been aided by from 2000 to 3000 of the Lashkarzai
Orakzais, and so confident were they of the natural strength of the
position and of their capability to defend it with the numbers at their
disposal, that they hardly commenced to desert the village until the
ridge above Zawo had been taken by our troops. Their losses in
retirement were consequently unusually heavy, and may account for the
unmolested withdrawal of Brigadier-General Tytler’s force.
The subsequent operations were of the nature of a military promenade,
portions of the force visiting Nawakila and Sparkhwait; the latter place
is a small open valley at the foot of the Mandatti Pass, the mouth of
which is in Zaimukht country, but which leads into the settlements of
the Alisherzais (Lashkarzai Orakzais). Yasta was also visited, as was
the village of Sangroba, through the difficult and narrow defile of the
same name. Sangroba is at the head of a valley containing three other
villages.
The operations were happily concluded, and all the offending tribesmen
brought to terms, just as orders were received that all movements
against the Zaimukhts were to cease, with a view of releasing General
Tytler’s column for a demonstration in the direction of the
Shutargardan, so as to assist Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts,
reported hard pressed at Kabul. Fortunately, no news from Afghanistan
had reached the enemy, and it was possible at once to bring the
expedition to a satisfactory conclusion. All the four objects mentioned
on p. 399 had been fulfilled; the Zaimukhts had been severely punished,
their country traversed from end to end, and their strong places had
been captured. They paid up their fines in full, surrendered 500
matchlocks and an equal number of swords, and gave hostages for the
fulfilment of these terms. The Lashkarzai Orakzais had also made their
submission and paid their fines. The construction of the Torawari-Balish
Khel road was assured, should such be necessary, but it was found that
the line of country it would traverse was extremely difficult, the
saving in actual length was only seven miles, while it would be much
exposed to raiders. The last object of the expedition was fully
obtained, and the Thal-Kurram road henceforth enjoyed an immunity from
outrages which it had not previously known since the commencement of the
operations in Afghanistan.
[Sidenote: Submission of Zaimukhts]
Since 1879 the Zaimukhts have given no trouble on our border.
_The Chamkannis._—This tribe—known also as Chakmannis—is traditionally
supposed to belong to the Ghoria Khel section of the Sarbani Pathans—one
of the two divisions of the Gandhari section of the Pactiyan nation,
said by Herodotus to have been in existence when Alexander invaded India
in B.C. 327.
Other authorities assign them a Persian origin. By their Sarbani descent
they are related to the Mohmands, Daudzais and Khalils; the major
portion of the tribe appears to have joined forces with the Khattaks,
who were settled on our western border in the fourteenth century; and
when these moved into the Kohat district, the Chamkannis remained in
Waziristan, going later into the Kharmana Valley to the north-east of
the Kurram Valley. The tribe is at present located in the Thabai and Awi
Darras, in the Kharmana Valley, and in the Karman Darra on the northern
slopes of the Sika Ram Range. Their neighbours are the Afridis on the
east, the Orakzais on the east and south-east, the Turis on the west and
south-west, while the Safed Koh Range is the boundary on the north,
beyond which lies the country of the Shinwaris.
With few exceptions the Chamkannis are all Sunnis; the tribe is poor,
but fairly united, can turn out rather over 3000 fighting men, and is at
feud with the Turis, and with the Massuzai clan of Orakzais who border
them on the east.
Dr. Bellew describes the Chamkannis as originating in a heretical sect
of Persian Islamites, who were driven out of their own country by
constant persecution on account of their peculiar religious ceremonies
and immoral proceedings. “One of the stories against them is not
altogether without a savour of the ‘Love Feast’ of more modern sects in
England,” says Oliver, “and consisted in putting out the lights at a
stage of the religious performances, in which both sexes joined
indiscriminately, and which was the signal for possible improprieties.
The Persians called it ‘_Chiragh-kush_ or lamp-extinguisher,’ and the
Pathans ‘_Or-mur_ or fire-extinguisher’; the Chamkannis, however, have
turned over a new leaf and become orthodox Muhammadans.”
[Sidenote: Chamkanni Clans]
The tribe is divided into four main clans—exclusive of a small band
called also Chamkannis, who, however, claim to be Ghilzais, and who live
at the head of the Kurram Valley above Karlachi:
1. Bada Khel.
2. Haji or Para Khel.
3. Khwajak Khel.
4. Khani Khel.
Up to 1897 the Chamkannis had never been conspicuously troublesome, or
what seems more probable is that while they may on occasion have leagued
with their more powerful neighbours against us, their own comparative
insignificance has helped to preserve them against the consequences.
When, however, in 1897 the long line of north-west frontier broke into
flames, and the several tribes evinced a quality of cohesion which had
not been expected of them, and the several points of our border had been
portioned out for attack, the general jirgah held on the 20th August had
arranged that the Chamkannis and their neighbours, the Massuzai
Orakzais, should move against the Kurram.
The Chamkannis remained, however, tolerably quiescent until the 16th
September, when a proportion of their fighting men are believed to have
been concerned in a sudden and hotly-pressed attack by night upon
Colonel Richardson’s camp at Sadda, at the junction of the Kharmana and
Kurram Rivers. To Sir William Lockhart’s proclamation of the 6th October
they returned insolent and defiant replies, offering peace upon their
own terms; they built a barrier right across the Kharmana Darra; and it
was probably only the presence in the neighbourhood of the Kurram
Moveable Column under Colonel Hill, which kept from other open acts of
hostility the large concentration of tribesmen known to be in this
neighbourhood. But even then it did not appear certain that the
Chamkannis _as a tribe_ had thrown in their lot with the remaining
firebrands of the frontier; and their complete and final implication was
probably due to the unfortunate result of a reconnaissance undertaken by
our troops on the 7th November. On that date the Commander of the Kurram
Moveable Column, taking advantage of a temporary suspension of
hostilities in the neighbourhood of Sadda, moved out into the Kharmana
defile. The resulting reconnaissance, successful enough in itself, was
marred by a heavy loss of life. The defile is seven miles long, and the
river bed is throughout commanded from both sides within short rifle
range, but the enemy was evidently taken by surprise by our advance,
which was undisputed, even the barrier erected across the defile not
being held. The villages of Hissar and Janikot were reached, and
although the final retirement to Sadda was followed up as usual, our
casualties were but few, while the enemy suffered heavy losses. It was
not until some time after arrival in camp, that a havildar and
thirty-five men of the Kapurthala Infantry were found to be missing.
Subsequent inquiries revealed the fact that this body had, during
retirement from a position, taken the wrong road, and being surrounded
in a ravine with further retreat cut off by a jungle fire, had there
been shot down by the Chamkannis. This comparative success of the
tribesmen naturally inflamed afresh the spirit of revolt on the northern
side of the Kurram Valley, the Chamkannis and Orakzais being reinforced
by other tribesmen who had hitherto held more or less aloof, and the
strength of the concentration near the village of Hissar, which Colonel
Hill had destroyed, being continually augmented.
[Sidenote: Coercion of Chamkannis]
As a punishment for their complicity in this resistance the Chamkannis
were ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 1000, to surrender thirty
breech-loading rifles, and to restore all Government property; but as
these demands were treated with contempt, it became necessary to march
through their country and inflict other punishment.
On the 26th November, therefore, the Kurram Moveable Column took part in
the operations alluded to on p. 388, entering the Khani Khel country of
the Chamkannis in two bodies, destroying Thabai and other villages, and
inflicting heavy loss upon them. In these operations another of the
famous family of the Battyes was killed; hardly a single frontier
expedition has closed but that a Battye has died for his country, and
has always fallen foremost in the fight.
Unlike the rest of the tribes in 1898, the Chamkannis failed to make
formal submission, and thus encouraged, they broke out again in 1899,
raiding two villages in the Kurram Valley, killing and wounding several
villagers, and carrying off a large number of cattle. A counter-raid,
however, quickly organised by Captain Roos-Keppel, and directed against
Chamkanni villages in the Kurram Darra, soon brought these tribesmen to
terms. Over a hundred prisoners were taken, several villages burned, and
large numbers of cattle and firearms were seized. Upon this the
Chamkannis at once paid up their fines, and since then have remained
tolerably quiet.
[Sidenote: Turis or Torizais]
_The Turis._—The Turis, or Torizais as they are sometimes called, are a
tribe of whose origin little definite is known, but all authorities are
agreed that if Afghans at all they are not Afghans of pure descent.
Muhammad Hyat Khan says they are Karlanrai Afghans; Lumsden says they
are of Mogul extraction; Ibbetson regards them as being probably Tartar
tribes which accompanied Chengis Khan and Timur in their Indian raids;
Bonarjee calls them a tribe of mixed blood—Indian stock with a Tartar
admixture; while Edwardes and others say that they are a Hindki race,
some sixty families of whom, about four or five hundred years ago,
because of drought, migrated from their native country in the Punjab
(opposite Nilab on the Indus in the Kohat district) to the Kurram
Valley, or, as it was then called, the Bangash Valley, and became
hamsayas of its inhabitants. They themselves support this last
tradition, but say that the ancestor who originally settled at Nilab was
one Torghani Turk, who came from Persia. In his diary of the year 1506
the Emperor Baber mentions the presence of Turis in the Kurram Valley.
About the year 1700, owing to a quarrel arising out of insults offered
to Turi women, the Turis and Jajis, who were then united, attacked the
Bangash, and the Turis gradually made themselves masters of the Kurram
Valley, the Bangash remaining on in their turn as hamsayas. The Turis
were in the course of time conquered by the Afghans, though the exact
date is not known; but there was no actual attempt at occupation of
their country until 1850, the Afghans satisfying themselves with
periodical expeditions every five or six years to collect the revenue,
the soldiers living on the people. About 1850, however, the districts
both of Khost and Kurram, were occupied, and an Afghan governor was
appointed, a fort being built at Ahmadzai and a strong garrison
maintained in the valley. Until the outbreak of the second Afghan war in
1879, the Kurram Valley was ruled by a succession of Afghan governors,
and the Turis were so heavily oppressed at times that they rose in
rebellion, and on one occasion attacked the Afghan camp and slew 500
men.
Of the Turis, Oliver writes: “They are not very big nor very
good-looking, and have somewhat of the look of the savage about them,
but they are strong, hardy and compact, and are essentially horsemen, as
the Wazirs, in spite of their well-known breed of horses, are
essentially footmen. The Turi is a model moss-trooper. Profusely armed,
he has probably a couple of brass-bound carbines at his back, two or
three pistols in front, knives of many sizes and sorts in his
waist-belt, and a sword by his side. His mount, often a small, sorry
jade, is necessarily wiry and active; for, in addition to the Turi and
his armoury, it has to carry his entire wardrobe packed under the
saddle, certain wallets containing food for man and beast, some spare
shoes, nails and a hammer, an iron peg and a picket rope, all the
requisites to enable this distinguished highwayman to carry on distant
and daring raids, which is the Turi road to distinction. The local Dick
Turpin is honoured with the title of _Khlak_, a hard man, the Turi
equivalent for the hero of the hour. The newly-born Turi is introduced
to ordinary life by a number of shots fired over his head, to accustom
him to the sound and prevent him shrinking when his turn comes to be
shot at. Nor does he usually have to wait long for this, for he is at
feud with pretty well all his neighbours, Wazirs, Zaimukhts and Mangals,
and most bitterly with the Jajis; even a Bangash has to attach to
himself a Turi _badraga_, or safe-conduct—an excellent word for a most
ragged but faithful little ruffian, who protects him from all other
Turis.
“And to violate a safe-conduct once given, whatever form it takes, is as
exceptional on the Pathan border, as in the Scotch Highlands; no greater
insult could be put on the Khan or the clan giving it. Plowden tells of
a Turi Malik who gave his cap as a badraga to an Afridi Kafila, which
was plundered, and fell himself in avenging it. He is hospitable, this
moss-trooper, even to allowing the women of the house to wait upon
strangers, and in a way he is religious. He divides mankind into
straight and crooked. The Shiahs—and all Turis are Shiahs—are straight,
the rest are crooked. To a stranger the question takes a masonic form;
the Turi salute is a finger placed perpendicularly on the forehead for a
straight man, and a contorted one for a crooked man. If the stranger is
well-advised, he will give the countersign with a perpendicular finger.”
[Sidenote: Friendship for Englishmen]
Enriquez says, “The Turis are on the most friendly terms with the
Englishmen who live among them; and the heartiness of their salutation
when they meet a Sahib is quite refreshing to listen to. The Turis look
upon the British Government as their deliverer from the oppression of
their rapacious Sunni neighbours, and even consider that their Shiah
religion resembles, to a certain extent, Christianity. They are not
forgetful that Christians fought and died for them in their wars against
the Sunnis, and are even in a few cases buried in the most sacred Shiah
shrines.... Their dress is very distinctive.... The sleeves of their
shirts have blue cuffs, and there is a thin red piping, or an ornamental
border round the neck. In the cold weather they wear a coat made out of
a cloth called ‘sharai,’ which is woven from sheep’s wool.”
On their eastern border the Turis have the Chamkannis, Orakzais and
Zaimukhts; on the south the Wazirs, and on the west Afghanistan, or the
tribes within the sphere of influence of the Amir of that country. The
total male population of the Turi country is about 6000. Every Turi
considers himself to be the spiritual disciple (murid) of some Saiyid
(pir), and from this practice of pir-muridi four great families of
Saiyids have arisen. Of these one family composes one faction, the Mian
Murid, while the remaining three compose the Drewandi faction. The
first, while the weaker, is the most united, the other the more
patriotic, but since besides these there are also two political
factions, it results that there is no tribal combination, each Turi
being an absolute democrat who thinks himself as good as his neighbour,
and cannot bear to see anybody in authority over him.
In the middle of the last century the Kurram, and especially the
Miranzai Valley, was to the Deputy-Commissioner of Kohat a source of
endless trouble. Wazirs, Turis, Zaimukhts and Orakzais were constantly
assembling, either as tribal parties or in combination, to raid the
well-disposed villages on the Hangu and Khattak frontiers, and, yet,
whenever trouble threatened them from without, the people of Miranzai
were loud in their calls for aid. Small punitive expeditions were sent
into the valley in 1851, 1855 and 1856 to deal with these raiders, and
especially with the Turis, who, since the first annexation of the Kohat
district, had given much trouble—leaguing with other tribesmen to raid
the Miranzai Valley, harbouring fugitives, encouraging all to resist,
and frequently attacking Bangash and Khattak villages. In 1855 Darsamand
was thus raided. In 1856 the Kurram Valley was traversed right up to the
Peiwar Kotal, and the Turis, who had intended to refuse compliance with
our demands, thinking they could prevail on the surrounding tribes to
make common cause with them, very soon changed their language and
policy, and came to terms. Since those days the Turis have not merely
given no trouble, but have helped us on several occasions.
[Sidenote: We Occupy the Kurram]
The universal detestation of Afghan rule has, no doubt, greatly assisted
us to gain the confidence of the Turis. Our advance into the Kurram
Valley was hailed with delight. “There can be no doubt,” wrote Major
Collett, “that the people in the Kurram Valley were glad to see us, and
that, smarting, as they then were, under Sher Ali’s late exactions, they
regarded General Roberts’ troops as deliverers from an oppressive
Government.” During the operations in the valley the Turis furnished
transport and supplies, and a levy was raised among them of from 350 to
400 men under their own Maliks. Prior to our withdrawal in 1880 the
tribe made a formal petition to the Indian Government that they should
for the future be independent of Kabul. This request was granted, but
the experiment then instituted of managing, unaided, their own affairs
did not prove a success. Faction fighting broke out, and for a long
period complete anarchy prevailed, and, finally, in 1893 we occupied the
Kurram Valley. In the Turis we now possess a true and loyal race
occupying a country of great strategical advantages.
The Turis helped our troops against the Zaimukhts in 1879, and against
the Chamkannis, twenty years later. They stood by us, too, in the
troublous year of 1897, and their eagerness for the fray when
hostilities first broke out, is thus described in an Indian newspaper of
that date: “The road into Sadda, on the 3rd and 4th September, presented
a most extraordinary sight. On the 3rd, before the news of the advance
of reinforcements had been confirmed by letter, bands upon bands of
friendly Turis, horse and foot, could be seen making their way from
Upper Kurram to Sadda, and other points likely to be attacked in Lower
Kurram. The big attack was expected on the night of the 3rd September;
all these men were going down to help to beat off the common enemy; they
all gladly responded to the call of the Political Officer, and every
village sent a contingent, just as they would have done in the old days
before we took over the safe custody of the valley. Many an old raider’s
heart must have beat quicker as he thought of the past, when he had
ridden forth in just the same way on some foray far across the border.
Breech-loaders were very scarce, but two-thirds of the men had jazails,
and all of them had the long Pathan knife stuck through their
kummerbunds, while here and there was a revolver or pistol, the latter
generally of native workmanship. To look at their merry faces, one would
have imagined they were off to a wedding or other tamasha, and not going
to fight against odds for hearth and home. The Turi cavalry, especially,
took things with evident lightness of heart. Here and there a grass
_chupli_ would be stuck up in the middle of the road, and the next
minute it was to be seen at the end of a lance, high in the air.... The
following day they were to be seen returning to their homes; the arrival
of reinforcements in the very nick of time had made their presence no
longer necessary in Lower Kurram.”
[Sidenote: Loyalty of the Turis]
There are, at this date, some nine hundred Turis in the Kurram Militia.
So assured is their loyalty that a systematic effort is now being made
to arm them better. Their weapons are all registered, and means are
available on the spot for arming the Turi lashkar on emergency.
CHAPTER XVII.
WAZIRISTAN AND ITS TRIBES.[134]
On the annexation of the Punjab in 1849 by the Indian Government, and
our consequent occupation of Kohat, the inhabitants of Waziristan became
our neighbours for one hundred and forty miles along the boundary
line—from the north-west corner of the Kohat district to the Gomal Pass
west of Dera Ismail Khan. Waziristan, the frontier Switzerland, is in
shape a rough parallelogram, averaging one hundred miles in length from
north to south, with a general breadth of sixty miles from east to west;
at the north-west corner a wedge of hilly country juts into the Kohat
and Bannu districts. It is bounded on the west and north-west by
Afghanistan; on the north-east and east by the British districts of
Kurram, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan; and on the south by
Baluchistan.
The chief inhabitants of Waziristan are:
1. The Darwesh Khels.
2. The Mahsuds.
3. The Batannis.
4. The Dawaris.
The two first named are the only Wazirs proper, and all four have but
little in common with each other, and for many generations have been in
a perpetual state of feud.
[Sidenote: Origin of the Wazirs]
Bellew and Ibbetson are inclined to think that the Wazirs are a tribe of
Rajput origin, and it is probable that ethnologically they are an Indian
race with a large admixture of Scythian or Tartar blood. Their own
traditions, however, represent them to be the descendants of Wazir, who
was the son of Suleiman, who was the son of Kakai, himself the son of
Karlan and grandson of Ghurghusht, so that they are usually described as
being a tribe of Karlanri or Ghurghusht Pathans. From this common origin
come the Wazirs, a title which properly includes both Darwesh Khel and
Mahsuds, but the name Wazir has now been practically appropriated by the
former. The ancient home of the Wazirs appears to have been in Birmal,
in Afghanistan, whence they began to move eastward at the close of the
fourteenth century, ousting the Khattaks from Shawal and the Kohat
border north of the Tochi. In process of time they took possession of
the mountainous region about Shuidar, and the whole country as far as
the Gomal River, south of which but few of their settlements are to be
found. The Darwesh Khel and Mahsuds differ greatly in habits and
characteristics, and are practically separate tribes; but despite the
enmity existing between them, their villages are much mixed up, and many
of the leading men of each are connected by marriage.
Waziristan has been described by Oliver as “a land of high and difficult
hills, deep and rugged defiles, brave and hardy people, in their way as
independent and patriotic, and, in the presence of the common enemy,
hardly less united, than the famous compatriots of Tell. Geographically
and politically the two have several points in common; and as regards
the mass of hills that lie between the Gomal and the Tochi, or Dawar
Valley, of which Kaniguram is about the centre, this is more especially
true. The east front is protected by the bare hills, held by the
Batannis; beyond which are ravines, flanked by precipitous cliffs, which
occasionally widen out to enclose small valleys fairly fertile, from one
hundred to one thousand yards wide, but narrowing again as they ascend.
Not unfrequently the mouth is a mere gorge or tangi (waist), where the
water forces its way through a range crossing it at right angles and
forming a colossal natural barrier. In these valleys, and the small
strips of alluvial land which border the base of the higher mountains,
locally called _Kaches_—which are quite a distinctive feature of the
whole range—there is often a good deal of cultivation, the whole
carefully terraced, and irrigated by means of channels cut out of the
hill sides, a great deal of ingenuity and skill being expended in
leading the water from field to field.”
The principal rivers in Waziristan are the Kurram, Kaitu, Tochi and
Gomal; the valley of the last-named is particularly barren, there being
hardly any cultivation to be seen between Murtaza and Khajuri Kach, and
no villages along the river itself. The tributaries of the Gomal in
southern Waziristan flow through the wide and open, but stony and barren
plains of Wana, Spin and Zarmelan. Indeed, Waziristan answers to the
description Pathans give of their country when they tell us, that “when
God made the world there were a lot of stones and rocks and lumber left
over, which were all dumped down on this frontier, and that this
accounts for its unattractive appearance.”
[Sidenote: Their Country]
“Waziristan,” writes Holdich, “the land of the Waziris or Wazirs,
constitutes a little independent mountain state, geographically apart
from the larger mountain systems to the north and south. No roads
through Waziristan lead to Afghanistan—at least no roads that are better
than mere mountain footpaths. Of these there is no lack at any part of
the frontier. North of Waziristan the Tochi Valley affords a through
route about which we know little; and south of it the Gomal Valley leads
to Ghazni; but at the back of Waziristan, between it and the plateau or
high-land of Afghanistan, there is a band of rough hills packed in more
or less parallel lines across the path from India, which shuts off the
head of the Tochi from the Ghazni plains, and forms the barrier through
which the Gomal breaks ere it reaches the open stony plain of Wana. Wana
lies to the south-west of Waziristan. From the Gomal River southward
commences the true Suleimani mountain system, presenting a band of
rugged, serrated ridges, facing the Indus, and preserving the attitude
of an impenetrable barrier (an attitude which is, after all, only a
magnificent assumption) between the plains of the Indus and
Afghanistan.... Waziristan is sufficiently far north to partake rather
of the characteristics of the mountains of the Kurram and Safed Koh than
of the Suleiman Hills to the south. There are pine trees and grand
deodars on the far slopes of Waziristan to the west; there are
magnificent ilex (oak) trees, which throw broad square spaces of solid
shade. The young ilex sprouts all over the lower slopes of the hills,
imitating holly in its early stages. The spreading poplar is the glory
of many a village, and the ubiquitous bher, or jujube, is in every
low-lying nullah. And Waziristan possesses a glorious group of
mountains, culminating in two giant peaks—Shuidar, or Sheikh Haidar, to
the north, Pirghal to the south—each of them rising 11,000 feet above
the plains of the Indus, and standing like twin sentinels, guardians of
the western passes of the country. From Shuidar, looking northward, one
may see the flat, white back of the Safed Koh, which divides the Khyber
from the Kurram, culminating in Sika Ram (16,000 feet), and from
Pirghal, the craggy outline of Kaisarghar, the highest peak of the
mountain called the Takht-i-Suleiman, bars further view to the south.
From both peaks westward there stretches a boundless vista of ridge and
hazy plain, a diapason of tender distances fainting to lighter tints of
blue, till it is only against the yellowing evening sky that the pale
silhouette of the hills that stand about Ghazni can be detected.... The
wide cultivated ramp formed by the valley of the Tochi to the north of
Waziristan, as well as the more restricted valley of the Gomal to the
south, are both of them highroads to Ghazni. They figure in history,
though no modern force has ever made use of them. Tradition points to
the former as the route sometimes selected by that arch-raider of the
Indian frontier, Mahmud of Ghazni, early in the eleventh century, who is
said to have swept down with hordes of irregular cavalry through the
band of hills which heads the Tochi Valley with a rapidity that seems
incredible in these days, and to have laid waste the Indus Valley from
Bannu to Multan.... The Tochi,[135] moreover, dominates much of the
northern hills of Waziristan. We have not yet shut off Waziristan from
Afghanistan, and the Wazirs will be as ripe for mischief in the future
as in the past. But Waziristan is now dovetailed in between the Gomal
and the Tochi, and the influence of our military pressure north and
south, as well as east, cannot fail to make for peace and good order....
If there is so much to be said for the occupation of the Tochi (a more
or less isolated valley) surely there is yet more to be said for the
occupation of the Gomal. The Tochi Valley leads nowhere, so far as we
are concerned at present.... The Gomal is the most important pass
between the Khyber and the Bolan. It gives access to the very centre of
Afghanistan from India. It is the regular highway for thousands of
trading and fighting people who bring their Kafilas yearly to India....
From Wana we not only dominate the southern Waziri valleys, but we round
off the line of frontier outposts which hold all the wild people of the
Suleiman mountains in check from Quetta to Waziristan. It secures the
end of the chain, and can itself be supported and fed either from India
by the Gomal Pass, or from Quetta by the Zhob Valley.”
[Sidenote: The Tochi and the Gomal]
Some explanation of this last sentence is necessary; at Khajuri
Kach—“the plain of palms,” trees which, by the way, are here said to be
conspicuous by their absence—the Zhob River flows into the Gomal, and
here the road bifurcates, that along the Zhob Valley leading to Quetta,
the other continuing north-west along the Gomal to Ghazni. Further on
again, at Domandi, the Gomal is joined by a river called the Kundar, the
valley route of which leads directly to Kandahar.
Of the approach to Ghazni by the Tochi we know that it is easy enough,
for we have made it so, as far as Sheranni, and thence onward to the
Katanni Kotal very difficult, steep and broken; but we know practically
nothing of the road between the head of the Katanni Pass and Ghazni. Of
the Gomal route, so far as Domandi and Wana is familiar enough, but we
would give much to know more than we do of the country beyond.
Physically the Wazirs are tall and muscular, and they are also
courageous, while, though poor, they are hospitable. They raise a good
breed of horses, said to have Arab blood in them, derived from horses
left behind him by Nadir Shah, but they are themselves bad riders for
the most part, and are essentially footmen. They are a pastoral rather
than an agricultural race, and possess herds of small black cattle and
sheep in abundance. Unlike most other independent border tribes, the
Wazirs have had the good sense to avoid, to a large extent, internal
feuds, and their unity as a tribe is proverbial. Their blood-feuds are
consequently not so indiscriminate as those of some of their neighbours,
it being ruled that the slaying of the actual murderer is sufficient.
They are satisfied also with what they call “make-up money,” the price
of a male adult being Rs. 1300; a woman is only half-price, while the
tariff for sword-cuts is on a graduated scale—some twelve rupees for the
first half inch!
The Wazirs are Muhammadans of the Sunni sect, but, like any other Pathan
tribe, they are not particularly strict in the performance of their
religious duties. The mullahs have influence only so far as the
observances of religion go, and are powerless in political matters, but
the Wazirs are an especially democratic and independent people, and even
their own Maliks have little real control over them.
[Sidenote: General Unpopularity]
Of the Wazirs, Enriquez tells us that they “are held in abomination by
all their Pathan neighbours, who have a common saying to the effect that
‘a Wazir will murder you for the sake of your pugaree.’ ... To the poor
of their own community they are said to be charitable, and they do not
offer violence to the wives and children of their personal foes. Their
barbarity to all strangers, however, is such that every Pathan sepoy in
the Indian Army longs for nothing so keenly as a Wazir war.”
“Of the Wazir,” said Edwardes, “it is literally true that his hand is
against every man, and every man’s hand against him.”
The _Darwesh Khel_ are divided into two main clans:
1. The Utmanzais.
2. The Ahmadzais.
The Utmanzais live in the Tochi Valley, in Shawal, and on the Khaisora,
Kaitu and Kurram Rivers.
The Ahmadzais live for the most part round Wana, in Shakai, and in the
western part of the Bannu district along the border.
Thus the Darwesh Khel occupy by far the larger portion of Waziristan—the
southern, western and northern part of the country. The approximate
fighting strength of the Darwesh Khel Wazirs is rather over 25,000;
there are barely one hundred of them serving in the regular Indian Army,
but probably not far short of 800 are at the present moment in the
Border Militia.
The _Mahsuds_ are equally Wazirs with the Darwesh Khel, but are only so
described by strangers to their country; they pronounce their name
“Mahsit.”
They inhabit the very centre of Waziristan, being hemmed in on three
sides by the Darwesh Khel, and being shut off by the Batannis on the
east from the Derajat and Bannu districts. Chamberlain says of the
Mahsuds that it was their boast that, while kingdoms and dynasties had
passed away, they alone, of all the Afghan tribes, had remained free;
that the armies of kings had never penetrated their strongholds; that in
their intercourse with the rest of mankind they knew no law nor will but
their own; and, lastly, that from generation to generation the plain
country, within a night’s run to the hills, had been their hunting
ground from which to enrich themselves.
Under the Sikh rule this state of things was even worse, for, through
misgovernment, the chief of Tank became a refugee in the mountains of
Waziristan, and his country was farmed out to Multani or Tiwana
mercenaries, according as either class was for the time being in favour
at the Lahore court. The chief being expelled from his territory, his
course was naturally to ally himself with the Mahsuds (which he did by
marriage), and to keep the country in so distracted a state that it
became almost uninhabited; the town of Tank at last contained nothing
but its garrison and a few bunnias. On one occasion it was attacked and
plundered by the Mahsuds, who retained possession of it for three days.
After the first Sikh war the rightful owner was restored, and matters
returned to pretty much their usual state, the Mahsuds not causing
uneasiness as a tribe, but raids being of constant occurrence.
[Sidenote: Principal Villages]
The principal villages of the Mahsuds are Makin and Kaniguram, the
majority of the population being pastoral and living in tents, but caves
are also used as habitations. During the winter the Mahsuds move down to
the lower valleys. Kaniguram is inhabited principally by a people called
_Urmar_, whose origin is not thoroughly known, but who are believed to
be of Indian descent. They have a language of their own, muster about
1000 fighting men, and identify themselves with the Mahsuds in all their
quarrels. The Mahsuds are said to be even more superstitious and under
the influence of mullahs than are the Darwesh Khel. They are also more
democratic, and any man who distinguishes himself in bravery or wisdom
may rise to the position of malik. Their physique and stamina are good,
and judged from the limited extent to which they have hitherto enlisted
with us, some rate their soldierly qualities even higher than those of
the Afridis.
The Mahsuds are divided into three clans, all very much mixed as to
locality; they number some 11,400 fighting men:
1. The Alizai.
2. The Bahlolzai.
3. The Shaman Khel.
The _Batannis_ claim descent from Baitan, the third son of Kais, who was
the founder of the Pathan race. They live in the hill country on the
borders of Tank and Bannu, from the Gabar Mountain on the north to the
Gomal Valley on the south. They are the hereditary enemies of the
Mahsuds, but have on occasion aided and abetted them in their attacks
upon and raids into British territory; usually, however, on these
occasions they have played the part of jackal to their more powerful
neighbours. Though an insignificant tribe, numbering only 6000 fighting
men, they have always been troublesome. They resemble the Mahsuds in
physique and appearance, but are cleaner and more civilised, and within
comparatively recent years have practically identified themselves as a
tribe with British interests; they are now responsible for the control
of the passes through their country whereby alone the Mahsuds can reach
the plains.
[Sidenote: Batannis and Dawaris]
The Batannis comprise three clans:
1. Tatta, living at Jandola and Siraghar and in the Dera Ismail Khan
district.
2. Dhana, on the Gabar Mountain and the Bannu border.
3. Uraspan, living in the Dera Ismail Khan district and in the valleys
between the first and second ranges of hills.
The Batannis have only once been accorded an expedition to themselves—in
1880, when it was necessary to punish them for permitting the Mahsuds
passage through their country when proceeding to raid our border.
The _Dawaris_ or _Daurs_ are Ghurghusht Pathans of the Kakai Karlanri
branch, descendants of Shitak, and thus closely allied to the Bannuchis.
Traditionally, however, they are not classed as true Pathans, being
supposed to be descended from one Shah Husain, who reigned in Ghor at
the commencement of the eighth century, by a mirasi wife. The original
home of the Dawaris appears to have been in Shawal, whence they, in
company with the Bannuchis, were driven to their present holdings by the
Wazirs in the fourteenth century. These holdings comprise the open
valleys—watered by the Tochi River—called Upper and Lower Dawar, which
are surrounded on all sides by the Darwesh Khel, who also divide Upper
from Lower Dawar, one section of that tribe having villages in the
Taghrai Tangi, a narrow pass some three miles in length.
They are a fanatical, priest-ridden race, numbering about 8000 fighting
men, but with a very poor reputation for courage, and are not now
enlisted in the local militia.
They still appear to suffer from the evil reputation they bore for many
years. “The very name Dawari,” says Oliver, “is a byword of reproach....
An object of supreme contempt to his warlike neighbours, the Wazirs, he
is even looked upon as a bad character by a Bannuchi. Worse, probably,
could not be said of him. To call him dirty would be almost a
compliment; his clothes, usually black cotton to start with, are worn
till they would be considered malodorous by a Ghilzai.... His complexion
naturally inclines to yellow. He is essentially a non-fighting man and
an unenterprising man; he is ready for any robbery and to back up any
villainy, but he has not energy or pluck enough to venture out of his
valley to attempt it.... The fringe of warlike tribes by which the
valley is surrounded has, however, really been its protection from
annexation over and over again. It seems to have been included in the
Mogul Empire during the time of Aurangzebe, whose son, Bahadur Shah, is
said to have levied in person some heavy arrears from the wealthy
inhabitants. The Durani lieutenants occasionally used their armies from
Khost to extort revenue; and there are stories of a shadowy Sikh
jurisdiction, but which really relate to mere forays. Though Dawar has
at different times been nominally subject to the Kabul authorities,
practically it has been perfectly independent. In 1855 the Government of
India renounced any rights in favour of the Amir, Dost Muhammad, though
neither he nor his successors were ever strong enough to enter into
possession, and the sovereign rights of Kabul remained just as imaginary
as before.”
The Dawar country is entered from British territory by the valleys of
the Tochi, Baran and Khaisora Rivers.
The tribe has the following clans:
1. The Tappizad.
2. The Idak.
3. The Mallizad.
[Sidenote: Trouble with the Dawaris]
After the annexation of the Punjab, the first occasion on which we came
into collision with the Dawaris was in 1851, when they attacked a police
guard in charge of camels belonging to the Latammar post. They were
quiet for twenty years, and then in 1870 they gave shelter and
assistance to the Muhammad Khel Wazirs, then in open rebellion against
the British Government; and subsequent inquiry revealed the fact that,
while outwardly aiding the local civil authorities, they were advising
the Wazirs to oppose us. There was a general settlement in September
1871, when all those tribes who had assisted the Muhammad Khels were
fined. The men of Upper Dawar paid their share of the tribal fine, but
the men of Lower Dawar declined to do so, and insulted and assaulted our
messengers. Subsequently they sent a specially insulting letter to the
district officer.
Such conduct from a petty tribe could not, of course, be tolerated, and
Brigadier-General C. P. Keyes, C.B., commanding the Punjab Frontier
Force, was directed to march to the Tochi Pass on the 6th March, 1872,
taking with him all the troops available in garrison at Bannu. The
operations were not to be protracted over twenty-four hours. On the 6th,
then, General Keyes moved out towards the Tochi Pass with a force of two
guns, 149 sabres and 1412 bayonets, having previously sent on 1000
friendly levies to seize and hold the Shinkai Kotal at the western end
of the pass. These levies were, however, but indifferently armed, and
being attacked by the hostile tribesmen, they abandoned the position
before General Keyes could send them any support. It was now expected
that the Dawaris would hold the pass against us, and the alternative of
advancing by the longer route through the Khaisora Pass was considered;
but fortunately it was resolved to keep to the original plan, for, when
the advance was resumed, the crest of the pass was found to be
unoccupied, and the Shinkai Kotal was gained on the morning of the 7th
without opposition.
The guns were with difficulty dragged up the ascent, and then the
General, pushing on with the cavalry, found himself, at the end of an
hour’s ride up the rocky bed of the stream, at the edge of a broad
plateau with the three refractory Dawari villages—Haidar Khel, Hassu
Khel and Aipi—in front. Some of the Hassu Khel maliks came forward to
beg for terms, the nature of which was communicated to them; they agreed
to our demands but asked for time; but while the amount of the fines was
being collected, the men of Haidar Khel became very defiant in their
demeanour and were evidently preparing for an attack upon the advanced
troops. The infantry and guns now arrived and assurances of submission
were repeated, but on the force advancing to destroy some of the
towers—the destruction of which was part of our conditions of peace—the
enemy suddenly opened fire on the troops from behind walls and houses.
The 1st Sikhs at once stormed the closed gates of the village of Haidar
Khel, the 4th Sikhs and 1st Punjab Infantry took the defenders on either
flank, while the cavalry, moving round in rear, sabred the men who were
now evacuating the village. The rest then surrendered, and all three
villages yielded unconditionally to our demands, when the force retired,
no opposition of any kind being encountered during the return march.
[Sidenote: Alarms and Excursions]
After this punishment the conduct of the Dawaris was satisfactory up to
1876, when several serious offences were committed, and the Dawaris
evading surrender of the offenders, a blockade of Lower Dawar was
instituted, and was kept up until the tribe submitted in June 1878.
During the Afghan war, the men of both Upper and Lower Dawar were
concerned in raids on the Thal-Bannu and Thal-Kurram roads. In April
1880 Dawaris joined with the Wazirs in an attack upon the Baran militia
post, and on the Chapri post in the following month; and it was
suggested that opportunity should be taken of the operations of 1881
against the Mahsud Wazirs, to visit the Dawar Valley and inflict
punishment on its inhabitants. Eventually these measures were not
sanctioned by the Government of India; the mere threat of coercion,
however, appears to have been sufficient, and the conduct of the Dawaris
at once improved and has since remained very fairly satisfactory.
CHAPTER XVIII.
WAZIRS: OPERATIONS.[136]
_Darwesh Khels._—Immediately after the annexation of the Punjab, the
Umarzai sub-division of the Ahmadzai Wazirs began and continued to give
trouble on our border. A dispute which commenced with a disagreement
with a Bannuchi chief, responsible for the collection of the revenue
from Wazir villages in our territory, gradually developed into a
grievance against the local British authority, and finally, early in
1850, men from several divisions of the Ahmadzai, to the number of 1500,
attacked our post at Gumatti, immediately north of Bannu, but were
repulsed. Later in the same year the Umarzais, joined by the Mahsud
Wazirs, collected a force of several thousand men, intending to make an
attack upon Bannu itself, but finding it too strongly defended, they
dispersed. During the next two years the outposts of Bannu were
constantly engaged in skirmishes with the Wazirs, who came down almost
daily, occupying the foothills and firing at long range into Gumatti.
Attempts were made to effect a settlement with them, but they resisted
all overtures, and operations were then decided upon against them.
Before, however, these could be undertaken, the southern Umarzais,
living between the Tochi River and the Gabar Mountain, made a raid
towards the Kurram, but were headed off by Major John Nicholson, then
Deputy-Commissioner of Bannu, who at once made arrangements for the
punishment of this particular section.
_Expedition against the Umarzai Wazirs, 1852._—The punitive force was
divided into three columns. One column, composed of the 2nd Punjab
Infantry, was to leave Bannu at 10 p.m. on the 20th December, and march
through the Gumatti Pass upon Derabina and Garang, distant respectively
fourteen and seventeen miles, attacking both places simultaneously at
daybreak. Garang was at the foot of a narrow precipitous chasm in the
Kafirkot Range, through which ran the road to Sappari, near the summit
of the ridge. The Gumatti Pass was entered at midnight, the valley and a
low range of hills were crossed, and Derabina was reached and destroyed.
The hills above the Garang ravine were occupied just as the head of the
second column was seen emerging from the village of Garang.
This force—two companies 1st Punjab Infantry and 350 men 4th Punjab
Infantry, and accompanied by Major Nicholson—had moved from Latammar on
Sappari by the Barganatu Pass, which was entered at midnight, the crest
of the Kafirkot Range being reached about daybreak. Sappari was taken by
surprise and destroyed, as were other encampments of the Umarzais in the
Garang Pass. The surprise had been complete and but small resistance was
made, but none the less the force suffered a loss of twenty-three men
killed and wounded.
The third column—forty sabres, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, fifty Mounted Police,
and 400 of the 6th Punjab Police Battalion—moved on the Umarzai
settlements at the north of the Khaisora and Sein Passes, and these were
destroyed and the cattle captured, the whole force returning to Bannu on
the 22nd by the Kurram Pass. The Umarzais now appeared thoroughly
humbled, and made complete submission.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1859–60]
_Expedition against the Kabul Khel Wazirs, 1859–1860._—The Ahmadzai were
not the only clan of the Darwesh Khel Wazirs which gave trouble in those
early days, for in 1850 the Kabul Khel sub-division of the Utmanzai clan
made an audacious attack—in conjunction with some of the Khattaks—upon
Bahadur Khel and the salt mines. Our troops being quickly brought up
they dispersed, but they did not fail to collect again for the
harassment of the working parties engaged in building a fort at Bahadur
Khel. They joined the Umarzais in 1851 in their various raids against
our posts, and gave some annoyance to our troops during Captain Coke’s
Miranzai expedition of 1851. During the next two years they were
particularly aggressive, committing nineteen raids and carrying off
cattle, but on Captain Coke commencing reprisals they made terms, and
for a time were more careful in their behaviour. They, however, cut up
some of our cavalry grasscutters near Thal during the Miranzai
expedition of 1855–6, and in 1859 some of the Hathi Khel sub-division of
the Ahmadzais, having murdered a British officer near Latammar, took
refuge with the Kabul Khels. As was only to be expected, these refused
to hand over the murderers, and a force of nearly 4000 men was assembled
in December of this year at Kohat and marched to Thal, where, on the
19th, it was joined by Bangash and Khattak levies, raising the strength
of the force to some 5400 men: the whole was under the command of
Brigadier-General N. B. Chamberlain, C.B. On the 20th December the force
crossed the Kurram River and encamped at Biland Khel, then in Afghan
territory, the ruler of which had sanctioned our movements; and it was
found that the main body of the Kabul Khels had taken their stand on a
high range of hills called Maidani, whither they had removed their
belongings, and where they had stored grain, and raised defences.
Maidani is about eight miles south-west of Biland Khel, near Zakha
Narai, and consists of two parallel ranges contiguous to each other,
terminating at either end in a gorge and enclosing a long, narrow
valley; the inward slopes of both mountains are tolerably easy, and
covered with grass and bushes, but the outward sides or faces are rugged
and precipitous. The two gorges, forming the water channels, were the
entrances to the valley—the one facing east being called Gandiob, the
one to the south Zakha. The enemy were believed to be from 2000–3000
strong.
It was resolved to attack before other clans could join the enemy, or
before the tribesmen should be led to evacuate the position by seeing
the preparations made to assault it.
[Sidenote: Operations about Gandiob]
At 6 a.m. on the 22nd the following marched upon Gandiob:
Four guns, Peshawar Mountain Battery.
Three guns, Hazara Mountain Battery.
Guides Infantry.
4th Sikh Infantry.
1st Punjab Infantry.
3rd Punjab Infantry.
4th Punjab Infantry.
The enemy had evidently expected the advance upon Maidani by the Zakha
gorge, where most of the defenders had taken post, and the defences at
Gandiob were incomplete, consequently the resistance was comparatively
feeble; the heights were taken with but small loss, and after destroying
the defences, the force returned unmolested to its camp at Gandiob. Next
day the advantage gained was followed up; the bulk of the force returned
to Maidani, marched down the valley near to the Zakha exit, and crossed
over the range into the Durnani Valley, where the night was passed; a
large amount of Kabul Khel stock was captured, and on the return to
Shiwa, whither the camp had been moved from Gandiob, representatives of
the clans came in asking for terms. The Utmanzais were directed to give
up two of the murderers or the actual leader of the gang. On the 29th
the main body moved to Spinwam, whence the tribesmen could more easily
be coerced, while the remainder marched up the river nearer to Biland
Khel. The tribesmen now brought in a man who had harboured the
murderers, and on the 2nd January the troops moved back to Karera in the
Kurram, having now satisfactorily settled with the Wazirs on the left
bank of that river.
On the 4th January, while two battalions and a mountain battery remained
on the right bank of the Kurram to keep open communications, the
Brigadier-General marched to Sappari with the Hazara Mountain Battery, a
detachment of Sappers and Miners, the 3rd and 6th Punjab Infantry, and
one company 24th Punjab Infantry. There was no opposition, the Ahmadzai
maliks were told they must assist in the capture of the murderers, and
the force was then broken up. As might, however, have been expected, the
dispersal of the troops did not facilitate the attainment of the object
for which the expedition had mainly been undertaken; but eventually,
through the personal influence of Lieutenant-Colonel Reynell Taylor, the
Commissioner, the tribesmen were induced themselves to assemble a force,
and capture and bring in one of the murderers, who was ultimately hanged
on the very spot where he had committed the crime.
[Sidenote: Trouble in 1869]
The next occasion when we came in contact with the Darwesh Khels was in
1869, when in retaliation for an attack made upon a party of them by the
Turis, they came down upon the village of Thal, and carried off about
7000 head of cattle. They refused restitution, but on Lieutenant-Colonel
Keyes, commanding the Kohat district, collecting and moving a strong
force out to Thal in April, the chief men of the division implicated
tendered their submission and paid up the fines demanded. In the year
following, the Muhammad Khel section of the Ahmadzai, hitherto a
well-behaved community, began to give a good deal of trouble. Beginning
with a grievance about a fine, and a judgment against them in regard to
water-rights—Oliver tells us that across the border more than half the
trouble arises about women, money, land or water—it culminated in
ambuscading and shooting down seven sepoys of a party marching from
Bannu for the relief of the Kurram outpost, by a raiding party of 140
Muhammad Khels. The section concerned was at once outlawed; all members
found in British territory were arrested, and their lands in the Bannu
district were sequestered until the whole clan submitted, and gave up
the men who had committed this last outrage. This they refused to do,
and for some fifteen months they lived among other clans, who
sympathised with, and befriended them in their exile. They committed
several further raids, but eventually expressed their anxiety to come to
terms and surrendered unconditionally. Their six headmen were sentenced
to various terms of imprisonment, and the fines inflicted on the section
had to be paid up before they were permitted to return to their holdings
in British territory. Nor did the lesson taught end here; every division
which had harboured or befriended the Muhammad Khels was called to
account, and punishments suitable to the degree of their offences were
inflicted.
For some years after this the Darwesh Khel Wazirs gave but little
trouble, but this unusual abstinence was not due to any consideration
for the British Government, but was necessitated by the tedious war they
were engaged in against the Mahsuds, and which endured—to the general
disadvantage of the Darwesh Khels—until September 1878, when the feud
was patched up.
On the outbreak of the war in Afghanistan a convoy route was opened
between Thal and Bannu, and which, following for the most part the line
of the Kurram River, passed through the independent territory of the
Utmanzais and Ahmadzais; it had been traversed during the Kabul Khel
expedition of 1859, but had not since been used by us. Many detachments
and contingents of all arms marched by this route during the winter of
1878–79, and Wazir camels were extensively used in the carriage of
supplies for the Kurram Valley Field Force. For assisting in these
arrangements, allowances amounting to Rs. 1000 per mensem were made to
the more important Utmanzai and Ahmadzai chiefs, and the route remained
open until the latter part of March 1880, when, in view of a fanatical
excitement fanned by the Mullah Adkar, the road was closed.
During the time the Thal-Bannu route was in use, the number of offences
or raids committed was particularly small, considering the number of
valuable convoys passed through; but almost immediately the road was
closed, a serious raid was committed on a Turi caravan near Thal by a
mixed band of Darwesh Khels, Mahsuds and Dawaris, and on a Khattak
labour camp on the Thal-Kurram road. A few weeks later—on the night of
the 1st–2nd May—a determined attack was made on the military post at
Chupri, eight miles to the north-west of Thal, garrisoned by fifty
bayonets and thirty sabres. The raiders were some 200 men of the Darwesh
Khels, Mahsuds and Dawaris; and forty of these, having by some means
gained access to the enclosure of the post, inflicted upon our troops a
loss of eleven killed (including a British officer), and sixteen wounded
before they were beaten off. No reparation for this outrage ever appears
to have been exacted.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1880]
_Expedition against the Malik Shahi Wazirs, October 1880._—By October
1880, the fines due from the Kabul Khel and Malik Shahi Wazirs had
amounted to a considerable sum, chiefly on account of thefts committed
by them in the Kurram and near Thal during the Afghan war; and there
appearing to be some difficulty in collecting the amount, a force, under
Brigadier-General J. J. H. Gordon, C.B., entered the Kabul Khel Hills on
the evening of the 27th October. The force was composed of:
Two guns, 1/8th Royal Artillery.
250, 85th King’s Own Light Infantry.
250, 18th Bengal Cavalry.
250, 20th Punjab Infantry.
The object of the expedition was to seize men and cattle of the Malik
Shahi section as security for their share of the fine. These people are
almost entirely nomadic, spending the summer on the slopes of the Siah
Koh Mountains, and wintering on both banks of the Kurram River between
the ninth and sixteenth milestones on the Thal-Bannu road. In order to
reach them it was necessary to traverse the whole of the Kabul Khel
settlements; and the difficulty, therefore, of the enterprise lay in
moving through Kabul Khel country without warning reaching the Malik
Shahi section, and so giving them time to escape from the comparatively
open country watered by the Kurram River, into the more intricate hill
country to the west in the direction of the Siah Koh.
The force left Thal at 9.30 p.m.; the advance party surrounded the Malik
Shahi encampment at the south-west of the valley, another party,
detached to the left, surrounded other settlements on the Charkhanai
plateau; while a third small party went to the right to try and capture
some noted Wazir thieves; the supports remained at Drozanda on the
Thal-Bannu road. The surprise was complete, 2000 head of cattle and 109
prisoners were taken, and the force returned to Thal on the 28th, where,
two days later, the jirgahs came in, and within a few weeks the whole of
the fines due had been realised from the Malik Shahi and Kabul Khels;
their conduct did not, however, materially improve, despite the
punishment they had received and the knowledge they had acquired of our
ability to exact reparation from them whenever it should suit us to do
so.
Our later dealings with the Darwesh Khel Wazirs will be described
further on in this chapter.
[Sidenote: The Mahsud Wazirs]
_Mahsud Wazirs._—The reputation of the Mahsuds has never been good; they
have from the earliest days been notorious robbers, and their raids upon
British territory have been frequent and serious. The Powindah caravans
of the warrior traders, mostly Ghilzais, which pass to and fro by the
Gomal Pass between Afghanistan and India, bringing Central Asian
merchandise as far as the markets of Benares and Patna, have ever been
the objects of constant attack and harassment by the Mahsuds, whose
country commands the Gomal; and both in 1855 and 1857 John Lawrence, the
Chief Commissioner, urged the Government to undertake retributive
measures against them. Again, in 1859 and 1860, Brigadier-General
Chamberlain, Commanding the Punjab Frontier Force, made similar appeals,
but Lord Canning, to whom the matter was then referred, decided against
an expedition as not being actually urgent at the moment.
In March 1860, however, the Mahsuds committed a most serious and
unprovoked act of aggression. This was nothing less than the arrival
before Tank of some 3000 Wazirs, under one Jangi Khan, with the
intention of sacking the town, which stands on the plains some five
miles from the foot of the hills. Warning of the intended attack had,
however, been received, and Ressaldar Saadat Khan, of the 5th Punjab
Cavalry, commanding the post, had taken the necessary steps to oppose
the tribesmen. He had called in mounted men from other posts in the
neighbourhood, and had collected levies and horsemen in the service of
the Nawab of Tank, and on the 13th March he moved out towards the hills
at the head of 158 sabres of his regiment and thirty-seven mounted
levies. He found the Wazir lashkar drawn up near the mouth of the Tank
Pass, and, feigning retreat, he drew the enemy after him into the
plains. The cavalry then turned and, having cut off the enemy’s retreat,
Saadat Khan charged in the most dashing manner. The Wazirs were cut
down, ridden over and put to flight, leaving 300 dead on the ground,
including six leading maliks, and having many more wounded. The
Ressaldar’s force had only one man killed and sixteen wounded.[137]
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1860]
_Expedition against the Mahsud Wazirs, 1860._—It was now felt that
operations must be undertaken against the Mahsuds, and Brigadier-General
Chamberlain was accordingly ordered to take a force into their hills.
The general decided to advance by way of Tank; this line was better
known than that via Bannu, and it led more directly to the country of
the tribesmen concerned in the recent outrage; he intended, moreover,
should the Mahsuds not early come to terms, to advance to their chief
places, Kaniguram and Makin, returning to British territory by the
Khaisora defile debouching near Bannu. It was expected that the Mahsuds
would probably make a stand, either at an advanced position at Hinis
Tangi or at the more retired Shingi Kot, protecting the actual entrance
to their country. As a matter of fact, however, they did not seriously
defend either position, and as this was the first occasion upon which
operations in the Mahsud country had been undertaken, there was no
precedent to guide the commander and troops as to the amount of
resistance which was to be expected, or where it would most probably be
met.
A large number of levies—about 1600,—chiefly drawn from the hereditary
enemies of the Mahsuds, were called up to take part in the expedition,
while the regular portion of the force, assembled on the 16th April at
Tank, was composed as under:
Three guns, No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery.[138]
Three guns, No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery.[139]
Four guns, Peshawar Mountain Battery.
Three guns, Hazara Mountain Battery.
108 sabres, Guides Cavalry.
131 sabres, 3rd Punjab Cavalry.
100 sabres, Multani Cavalry.[140]
60 bayonets, 1st Company Sappers and Miners.
407 bayonets, Guides Infantry.
427 bayonets, 4th Sikh Infantry.
397 bayonets, 1st Punjab Infantry.
684 bayonets, 2nd Punjab Infantry.
373 bayonets, 3rd Punjab Infantry.
381 bayonets, 4th Punjab Infantry.
400 bayonets, 6th Punjab Infantry.
207 bayonets, 14th Punjab Infantry.[141]
418 bayonets, 24th Punjab Infantry (Pioneers).[142]
464 bayonets, Hazara Gurkha Battalion.[143]
394 bayonets, 6th Police Battalion.
The force started on the 17th, and arrived unopposed at Palosin Kach
next day, a party being detached to destroy Shingi Kot. A halt was made
during the 20th to give the Mahsuds an opportunity for submission; but
nothing resulting, the Headquarters and main column moved on the 20th to
Haidari Kach, so as to survey the country and punish certain especially
troublesome sections, leaving a small force at Palosin and at Jandola
(the latter a Batanni village) to keep open communications with the
plains. From Haidari Kach the Brigadier advanced as far as Barwand,
meeting with no opposition and seeing few of the enemy; and on the
morning of the 24th returned to Palosin, where in the meantime the camp
under Colonel Lumsden, with six guns, some 200 sabres and about
1400–1500 bayonets, had been very seriously attacked.
The camp had been placed on the Kach[144] land, on the left bank of the
Tank stream, with its right resting on an old tower (distant some 800
yards) overlooking the stream; the left was protected by a picquet on an
abrupt peak to the south-east, having the scarped bank of the river in
its front and the edge of the high table-land immediately in the rear.
On the night of the 22nd, the outlying picquets were at their posts on
the ridge behind the camp; a complete company occupied the tower, three
other parties, each of a havildar and eight sepoys, were posted along
the rear, while one of thirty men was on the high peak above mentioned.
Each picquet had a support of equal strength close in rear.
[Sidenote: A Night Attack]
No information as to any tribal gathering had been received, and the
night had passed quietly enough, when just at _reveille_ the rear
picquet fired a volley, and a rush of 3000 Wazirs overpowered and nearly
destroyed the picquets holding the high bank. Fortunately the whole body
did not come on; some 500 swordsmen stormed into the camp, while the
remainder kept up a heavy fire from the ridge. For some little time
confusion reigned in the camp, but then discipline prevailed, and the
Guides, 4th Sikhs and Gurkhas drove out the enemy at the point of the
bayonet, pursuing them for three miles and punishing them heavily. Our
losses had been serious—63 killed and 166 wounded—but those of the enemy
were even more so. The attack had been a complete surprise, and was
carried out with great gallantry and determination: we shall see another
instance of such an attack further on in this chapter.
It had been intended to commence the march on Kaniguram on the 2nd May,
forcing _en route_ the position at the Ahnai Tangi, which the Wazirs
were said to have occupied; but on the 1st some Mahsud maliks arrived in
camp, purporting to represent the whole tribe, and expressing their
anxiety to make terms. They were offered the option of a heavy fine,
with security for its payment and hostages for good behaviour, or the
unopposed passage of the force to their capital, Kaniguram. Neither
alternative recommended itself to the maliks, who asked for a day to
consider the matter, and the General decided to move the camp on to
Shingi Kot for greater convenience of supply, and here the maliks were
to bring their decision on the 2nd. Nothing, however, was heard from
them this day, and on the 3rd the onward march was resumed, the Ahnai
gorge being found abandoned, and the force encamped at Zeriwam, where
another, and an unsuccessful, attempt was made to effect a peaceful
settlement with the Mahsuds. Next day the troops moved on, the defile
becoming narrower and the Barari gorge turning out to be the most
difficult of any that had been yet seen, being a narrow cleft cut by the
Tank stream through a chain of mountains crossing its course at right
angles. Both sides of the passage are perpendicular cliffs of forty or
fifty feet in height, from which the mountains slope upwards at a
considerable incline, while the actual mouth of the pass was hidden by a
thick grove of trees.
It was soon abundantly evident that here the enemy had made every
preparation for defence, while the position itself was one of great
natural strength. Both sides of the pass-mouth were very steep, while
everywhere sangars had been placed in terraces, and there was a safe
line of retreat, but the ground to the north seemed just practicable for
infantry and mules. There was, however, a ravine which joined the Tank
stream at the mouth of the pass on this side, and there was no means of
knowing whether, after the northern heights had been seized, the actual
position might not still be inaccessible owing to the presence of this
ravine.
[Sidenote: General Chamberlain’s Operations]
General Chamberlain decided to attack on both sides, and formed two
columns for this purpose, the left under Colonel Lumsden, the right or
northern under Colonel Green. On the right the attack was at first
conducted without loss, but thereafter the advance became difficult, the
ground was much cut up by ravines, the fire was very heavy, and the men
attacking became a good deal exposed and dispersed. There was something
of a check, and the Wazirs, leaping out of their sangars, charged down
upon the 3rd Punjab Infantry sword in hand. These gave way and fell back
upon the support, which also retired, and the Mahsuds prepared to charge
the guns and the reserve. The 1st Punjab Infantry, under Captain Keyes,
now stemmed the tide; the enemy, met by these men and by the fire of the
guns, fell back in their turn hotly pursued. The 1st Punjab Infantry
followed them into the breastworks, the other troops rallied, and the
right of the position was now taken.
Colonel Lumsden’s party had an easier task; disheartened at seeing the
northern part of their position in our hands, and fired on by Colonel
Green’s guns, the Mahsuds on this flank offered but a feeble resistance,
and the force marched through the gorge and camped three miles beyond
it. Our losses in this affair were thirty killed and eighty-six wounded.
On the 5th the force arrived, unopposed, at Kaniguram, remaining there
until the 8th, and receiving the expression of a desire for peace from
the Mahsud maliks, but nothing satisfactory was arranged. On the 9th a
move was then made to Makin, which was reached with but little
opposition on the following day. Next to Kaniguram, Makin is the most
important and best built town in the Mahsud country, the seat of their
iron trade; it is situated at the point where the mountains of Shuidar
and Pirghal close in upon each other, a spur from each forming its
northern and southern face. As the Mahsuds still failed to come to
terms, towers were destroyed and villages burnt; but the state of the
supplies rendering it impossible for the force to remain longer in the
country, the General directed the return march on Bannu to commence on
the 12th. Moving by Razmak, Razani and Saroba, on the 20th Bannu was
reached, and the force was broken up.
Although the operations had been successful, they had not resulted in
the submission of the Mahsud Wazirs; the tribe was therefore put under
blockade, thus inflicting increased financial loss on them, and at last
in June 1862 they gave in, agreed to the principle of sectional
responsibility for outrages committed, and gave hostages, but they had
hardly concluded this treaty before they broke it.
The next sixteen years form a continuous record of raids on the Bannu
and Dera Ismail Khan borders; attacks on posts, cattle-lifting, highway
robbery, abduction, murder and wounding. The offenders were punished
when they could be met with, and the divisions and sections to which
they belonged were made to suffer for their misdeeds; blockades were
imposed, additional posts were built for the overawing of the Mahsud
Wazirs, service was offered to them in the frontier militia, and at
last, in 1878, it was reported that the Tank border had never before
been in so settled a condition, or life and property so secure. Within a
year, however, the peace of this part of the frontier was rudely broken
by a raid on a large scale and of a particularly audacious character.
[Sidenote: Descent upon Tank]
About Christmas 1878 rumours of an intended attack upon Tank reached the
local authorities, and precautions were accordingly taken. All the posts
on this border were doubled, and in some of the more important the
strength of the garrison had been trebled, so that when, on New Year’s
Day 1879, the attack, instigated by emissaries of the Amir Sher Ali,
actually commenced, nearly half the available force in the district was
concentrated in the Tank Valley. All the villages had also been warned.
On the 1st January, however, the Mahsuds descended from their hills to
the number of between 2000 and 3000, brushed aside the opposition met
with from the post at the mouth of the pass, and, descending upon Tank,
burnt the bazaar and many houses, and finally regained the hills before
they could be intercepted, carrying off a considerable amount of
property with them.
The Mahsuds engaged in this affair belonged chiefly to the Alizai clan;
but men from all the country round, within and without our border,
joined the marauders, being unable to resist so unusually favourable an
opportunity for fomenting disorder and obtaining plunder, and lawless
and predatory bands destroyed and robbed several border villages.
The news of the outrage did not reach Dera Ismail Khan until the morning
of the 2nd, when a force of cavalry and infantry at once moved out to
Tank, came up with some clansmen about four miles from that place, took
a number of prisoners, recovered a certain amount of plunder, and
reached Tank the following night, having marched nearly fifty miles.
During the next fortnight minor operations were carried out from Tank
and from the border posts with the comparatively small force available,
and the enemy were everywhere driven from the positions they took up and
suffered considerable loss, order being eventually restored on this
border. All the local tribesmen implicated in the recent attacks had now
been punished, with the exception of the Mahsuds, and these were offered
certain terms for acceptance, failing which a punitive expedition was to
be sent into their country so soon as a favourable opportunity should
occur. Meanwhile a strict blockade was enforced.
In March 1880 the Mahsuds, stirred up by the preachings of a fanatical
mullah, commenced hostilities against the British Government, and
collected up the Tank stream within ten miles of our border. A force was
at once—on 5th April—moved out from Dera Ismail Khan (3 guns, 50 sabres,
300 bayonets) and marched to Tank. The Mahsuds could not make up their
minds where their blow should fall, and many consequently returned to
their homes, while the remainder, moving south, attacked the town of
Gomal, but, being driven off, dispersed. As it was apparent that the
Batannis of Jandola had given passage to this raiding party, the Dera
Ismail Khan force advanced on Jandola from Kot Khirgi on the morning of
the 12th, forced the Hinis Tangi and, having destroyed Jandola, returned
unopposed to Tank.
[Sidenote: Renewed Outrages]
During 1880 the Mahsuds, associated with the Darwesh Khels and Dawaris,
committed several serious outrages on our border, and, with the
termination of the operations in Afghanistan, the Government now found
itself able to send the long contemplated expedition into the Mahsud
country. Accordingly, early in 1881 arrangements were put in hand for
coercing that tribe. While the force was in process of assembly, the
Mahsuds, who had been offered a final opportunity of peaceful
submission, sent in certain headmen to make terms and thus avoid
punishment; but these belonged almost exclusively to clans living
immediately without our borders, while those sections among the more
inaccessible hills, and which had for long been opposed to peace with
the British Government, were still entirely unrepresented among those
suing for peace.
During the third week in April, after a great council at Kaniguram, our
terms were to some extent complied with, but the submission of the tribe
generally was still incomplete. Several important sub-divisions, notably
the Nana Khel division of the Bahlolzais, were still defiant, and it was
decided that this division must be coerced. The force assembled at Tank,
composed entirely of troops of the Punjab Frontier Force with some
additions, was placed under command of Brigadier-General T. G. Kennedy,
C.B., and consisted of twelve guns, 290 sabres and 3662 bayonets; while
a reserve brigade—eight guns, 326 sabres and 3380 bayonets—under
Brigadier-General J. J. H. Gordon, C.B., was formed at Bannu.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1881]
_Expedition against the Mahsud Wazirs, 1881._—The main force moved from
Tank by Kot Khirgi to Jandola, which was reached on the 23rd April, when
the pass leading to the Shahur Valley was reconnoitred without
opposition. The column then moved on by Haidari Kach and Turam China to
Barwand, and so far, although the rearguard was always fired on, there
had been no casualties and nothing in the way of serious opposition had
been experienced, while some of the headmen had already submitted. The
force now moved on towards the Khaisora Valley, and on arrival in this
neighbourhood the Alizais made terms, but the troops were now in the
country of the Nana Khels, who showed a good deal of hostility. On the
5th May General Kennedy arrived at Kaniguram via Kundiwan, having had a
sharp affair with some 500 Bahlolzais holding the densely wooded slopes
about Shah Alum. Makin was reached on the 10th, by which date the Bannu
column was encamped at Razmak, only seven miles distant.
On the 16th April this brigade had moved from Bannu and had taken up a
position on the right bank of the Tochi River near Miriam, commanding
the entrances of the Khaisora, Tochi and Shakto valleys. General Gordon,
in compliance with instructions received from General Kennedy, marched
up the Khaisora Valley to Razmak via Saroba and Razani practically
unopposed, being accompanied by representatives of the sections
inhabiting the valley. A convoy of supplies was passed from here to
Makin, and on the 12th May the Bannu column began to retire, visiting
the Shakto Valley _en route_ and having only one casualty in the force.
On the next day General Kennedy marched from Makin via Janjal to
Jandola, and arrived on the 18th unmolested at Tank, where the column
was broken up. The total British casualties during these operations only
amounted to thirty-two killed and wounded.
The Mahsuds seemed now ready and eager to make peace, but still our
terms remained uncomplied with, and the blockade consequently was
reimposed; and it was not until September of this year, and after
several fruitless attempts to play off the Amir against the British
Government, that the Mahsuds finally gave in. They surrendered the
remaining ones among the proscribed ringleaders in the 1879 outrages,
but since the aggregate of the fines accumulated against them now
appeared quite beyond their powers of payment, it was agreed that the
amount should gradually be liquidated by a tax imposed on all Mahsud
goods imported into our territory, and for a breathing space at least
quiet reigned on this portion of the border.
_Mahsud and Darwesh Khels._—The behaviour of all the Wazirs, Mahsuds and
Darwesh Khels, may be said to have been uniformly good for a further
period of ten years, dating from the conclusion of the expedition of
1881. In 1883 the Mahsuds gave facilities for the survey of the country
about Khajuri Kach; in 1889 the Zhob Valley was traversed by us; the
Gomal Pass was opened up, and our protectorate extended over the Zhob
Valley and the country between the Gomal and Pishin; a railway survey
was carried out in the Gomal; and our influence was strengthened among
the Mahsuds and the Wazirs of Wana by the granting of new or increased
allowances. There had, of course, been periods of disquiet, occasioned
and accentuated by the fact that at this time there was no definite
boundary line demarcating British and Afghan spheres of influence. The
difficulty of restraining the tribesmen within limits and of inflicting
punishment for outrages was increased, and a delicate situation thereby
created, owing to the fact that it was often impossible to determine
whether offenders were subjects of the Amir of Afghanistan, or came
within the pale of British influence. It was then, in October 1893,
that, after long negotiations, Sir Mortimer Durand went to Kabul and
returned with an agreement signed by the Amir. By this settlement the
respective spheres of influence of the British Government and of the
ruler of Afghanistan were carefully defined. The Amir agreed to retire
from Chageh in Baluchistan, and withdrew his objections to the extension
of the railway to New Chaman, west of the Kwaja Amran Range, and to the
establishment of a British cantonment at that place; the Bajauris,
Afridis and Wazirs were left outside the limits of his influence, but
Asmar, and the Kunar valley above it as far as Chanak, and the tract of
Birmal, bordering on the Wazir country, were included within his
territory; on the other hand, a somewhat clumsy arrangement, and one
almost certain to be fruitful of future trouble, had been come to,
whereby the country of the Mohmands had been arbitrarily divided by the
watershed of the Kunar and Panjkhora rivers.
[Sidenote: Delimitation Commission]
Early in 1894 the Government of India began to make preparations for the
demarcation, in co-operation with the Commissioners appointed by the
Amir, of the western boundaries of Waziristan; and the attitude of the
Wazirs being, as ever, uncertain, it was decided to maintain a
considerable force on the frontier. Work was to commence at Domandi on
the 15th October, and some weeks prior to this a proclamation was issued
to the tribesmen, fully explaining the objects and limitations of the
expedition; the news seemed to be generally received in Waziristan in a
friendly spirit.
The following troops under Brigadier-General Turner were detailed to
form the escort:
129 sabres, 1st Punjab Cavalry.
6 guns, No. 3 Punjab Mountain Battery.
189 bayonets, No. 2 Company Sappers and Miners.
748 bayonets, 1st Battalion 1st Gurkhas.
744 bayonets, 3rd Sikh Infantry.
741 bayonets, 20th Punjab Infantry,
while, in addition, the following units were held in readiness at Multan
and Dera Ismail Khan to form a reserve brigade, viz.:
2nd Battalion Border Regiment.
One squadron 1st Punjab Cavalry.
No. 8 Mountain Battery.
4th Punjab Infantry.
38th Dogras.
On the 1st October the escort was concentrated at Dera Ismail Khan, and
within ten days the Ahmadzai clan of the Darwesh Khels from Wana had
sent in their jirgah, _unanimously repeating a previous invitation to
the British Government to take over their country and permit them to
become British subjects_.
_Operations of the Waziristan Field Force, 1894._—The escort finally
left Dera Ismail Khan on the 13th October, concentrating again at
Khajuri Kach and reaching Wana—via Spin and Karab Kot—on the 25th. A
jirgah of the Wana Ahmadzai came in here and expressed pleasure at the
arrival of the troops, but none the less the camp was fired into two
nights in succession, and it was reported that the mullahs were
endeavouring to stir up strife and to prevent a really representative
jirgah from coming in.
[Sidenote: The Camp at Wana]
The plain of Wana is about 13 miles long, 11 broad, and very stony; the
camp was placed at the eastern end of it, the ground in the vicinity
being much cut up by ravines. The position, moreover, which had been
chosen for the camp of the British Joint Commissioner, was a source of
weakness and of anxiety to the General in command of the escort, having
been pitched some 210 yards from the south-east corner of the military
camp, so as to afford the jirgahs free access to the Political Officers.
Up to the end of October there was no reason to anticipate an attack
upon the escort by any large body of Mahsuds; but on the 1st November it
became known that the Mullah Powindah, a noted firebrand, was in the
neighbourhood with not less than 1000 followers, and that he had
expressed his intention of attacking the Wana camp. Picquets were
accordingly doubled, the defences were strengthened, and the troops
ordered to be under arms at 4 a.m. every day.
The camp was surrounded by some thirteen picquets, furnished by the 3rd
Sikhs, 20th Punjab Infantry and 1st Gurkhas, in addition to an old
Darwesh Khel fort held by 100 rifles of the last-named regiment; but,
contrary to the procedure usually followed in frontier warfare, the
majority of these picquets were no more than observation posts, and were
not intended to hold their own in any serious attack, but were to fall
back, in some cases on their supports, in others on their regiments in
camp.
At 5.30 a.m. on the 2nd November, while it was still dark, the camp was
suddenly aroused by three shots, and a desperate rush of some 500
fanatics, supported by fire from the left front, was made on the left
flank and left rear of the camp, held by the 1st Gurkhas. It appears
that the enemy—consisting for the most part of Mahsuds, with a few
Darwesh Khels—had crept up two large ravines on the west, overwhelmed
the picquets there posted, from one of which the three warning shots had
issued, and came on so rapidly that the leading assailants had climbed
the camp defences and penetrated into the middle of the camp, before the
defenders had turned out of their tents. Another party, swinging round
to the right, made their way into the camp by the rear or south, did
much damage among the transport animals, and cut loose some of the
cavalry horses.
By this time the troops had turned out and got to work. The Gurkhas
stopped the main rush down the centre of the camp; reinforced then by
two companies of the 20th and one of the 3rd Sikhs, the men swept
through the camp, clearing it with the bayonet; and though two further
but less determined attacks were made, no second rush followed the
first, and soon after 6 a.m. the enemy were in full retreat. They were
followed by a small column for six miles, and were charged into again
and again by the cavalry, who inflicted serious loss upon them. Our
casualties were forty-five killed and seventy-five wounded, while the
enemy carried off many rifles and much loot, but left some 350 killed
behind them in camp or on the line of their retreat, out of 3000 who
were present, but not all of whom joined in the actual attack on the
camp.
On the 18th a jirgah came into camp but nothing resulted, and on the
27th a large tribal meeting, attended by the Mullah and some 2000 or
3000 men, took place in Shakai, where the Government terms were
fruitlessly discussed. The maliks then returned to our camp at Wana,
stating they could not carry our terms out at once, but that if given
until the 12th December all demands would be met. The extension was
sanctioned, but the headmen were informed that on that date our troops
would move forward unless all claims had been satisfied. All
preparations were also made for the prosecution of further operations.
[Sidenote: The Punitive Force]
On the 2nd December the formation was ordered of a punitive force, under
the command of Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B.,
consisting of three brigades, the first being composed of the original
escort, strengthened by the inclusion of the 2nd Battalion Border
Regiment, and later by the arrival of the 1st Battalion 4th Gurkhas.
The composition of the Second Brigade, under Brigadier-General W. P.
Symons, was as under:
No. 8 Mountain Battery.
One Squadron 1st Punjab Cavalry.
One Squadron 2nd Punjab Cavalry.
33rd Punjab Infantry.[145]
38th Dogras.
4th Punjab Infantry.
1st Battalion 5th Gurkhas.
No. 5 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
One Maxim Gun.
This brigade concentrated at Tank for Jandola.
The Third Brigade was under the command of Colonel C. C. Egerton, C.B.,
and assembled at Miriam, near Bannu; it was made up as follows:
No. 1 Kohat Mountain Battery.
3rd Punjab Cavalry.[146]
1st Sikh Infantry.
2nd Punjab Infantry.
6th Punjab Infantry.
In the meantime the Mahsuds had added to their already long list of
offences, and finally, on the 12th December, the jirgah came in and
admitted that there appeared no hope of the tribe complying with our
terms. Consequently, on the 16th, Sir William Lockhart was ordered to
advance, when the following instructions were issued by him: The First
Brigade to move from Wana by the Tiarza Pass and the Sharawangi Kotal on
Kaniguram; the Second Brigade to advance on Makin from Jandola by the
Tank stream; the Third to proceed by the Khaisora Valley, in Darwesh
Khel limits, to Razmak. Each column to arrive at its destination on the
21st December.
Before leaving Wana the Officer commanding First Brigade established
there a military post in a fortified village, occupying it with two
guns, twenty sabres and a battalion of infantry. Moving then by the
Tiarza Pass, the column arrived at Kaniguram on the 21st, encountering
only slight opposition _en route_, but the road was found to be very
bad, and the rearguard never reached camp before midnight. Meanwhile the
Second Brigade, accompanied by Sir William Lockhart, marched from
Jandola via Marghaband, Shilmanzai Kach and Janjal, and reached Makin on
the 21st, having _en route_ destroyed the Mullah’s village at Marobi.
The camp was fired into every night, but no really active opposition was
met with, and the mullah was reported to have fled to the Darra Valley,
north of Pirghal.
[Sidenote: Kaniguram and Makin]
The Third Brigade, marching on the 17th, was at Razmak on the 23rd—the
rearguard having been fired at from one village only—and arrived on the
following day at Makin. The force was now split up into a number of
smaller columns, and all parts of the country were visited—the Baddar,
Shakto, Sheranna, Shinkai, Nargao, Tangai and Janjara Valleys—and only
in the first of these was opposition experienced. Cattle were driven in,
forage collected, and towers destroyed; nearly all the divisions
implicated in the attack on Wana camp had been punished, our terms had
to some extent been complied with, and by the last week in January the
delimitation party was able to commence work. On the 4th March the last
of the Mahsud hostages required were surrendered, and the force was then
gradually reduced, troops remaining in occupation of Jandola, Barwand,
Wana, and in the Tochi Valley—this last offering the means for
maintaining a hold over the Darwesh Khels. By the end of the operations
all concerned in the attack on Wana had been punished, our terms had
been fully complied with, and the boundary from Domandi to Laram had
been demarcated.
In 1895 there were several murderous attacks upon individuals, chiefly
in the Tochi Valley, and it was evident that the establishment of
military posts, and the permanent military occupation of the Tochi
Valley, had done little to counteract the natural lawlessness of the
inhabitants.
In the summer of 1896 a British subject had been murdered at Sheranni in
the Tochi, and the Madda Khel, who inhabit Maizar in the lower part of
the Shawal Valley, considered they had been unfairly treated in the
apportionment of the blood money, levied according to tribal custom for
the murdered man. The matter was still unsettled in June of the
following year, when the Political Officer gave notice that he would
visit Maizar to discuss the case, and further to select a site for a new
levy post, the construction of which had been decided upon. On the 10th
June, then, Mr. Gee, the Political Officer, left Datta Khel, which since
the autumn of the year previous had been the civil and military
headquarters of the district, with an escort of two mountain guns,
twelve sabres, and 300 rifles under Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny, 1st Sikhs.
On arrival at Maizar the maliks evinced every sign of friendship,
pointing out a halting place, and, with an excess of treachery unusual
even among Pathans, provided food for the Muhammadan soldiers of the
escort. The halting place chosen was close to a Madda Khel village and
commanded by other villages from 100 to 400 yards distant, but, so far
as the position admitted, all possible precautions were taken. The meal
promised was produced and partaken of, and then, while the pipers of the
1st Sikhs were playing for the benefit of the villagers, a hubbub
suddenly arose in the village, from the top of a tower in which a man
was seen to wave a sword. The villagers quickly drew off, and firing at
once commenced on the escort from the houses on three sides.
[Sidenote: The Maizar Outrage]
Colonel Bunny and three officers were hit almost immediately, and the
baggage animals, carrying most of the reserve ammunition, stampeded; but
the guns at once came into action, driving back into the village the men
who seemed upon the point of charging, and giving time for preparations
for the retirement of the escort, now inevitable. The circumstances were
trying in the extreme for the troops, and their staunchness is worthy of
the highest praise. By this time every one of the British officers had
been hit, two of them mortally, but the native officers of the 1st
Punjab Infantry and 1st Sikhs nobly filled their places. Getting
together a party of men, a most determined stand was made by a garden
wall, whereby the first withdrawal was covered, the wounded were helped
away, and the guns were able to retire to a fresh position, whence they
fired “blank” to check the enemy, the small number of service rounds
brought out having now been exhausted. The retirement was continued, the
enemy coming on and enveloping the flanks, until the Sheranni plain was
reached; and about 5.30 p.m., reinforcements coming out from Datta Khel,
the enemy were at last beaten off, and the further withdrawal to camp
was unmolested.
_Operations of the Tochi Field Force, 1897–98._—The decision to send a
punitive expedition into the Tochi was arrived at on the 17th June, and
by the 8th July the concentration at Bannu was completed. The force was
placed under command of Major-General Corrie-Bird, C.B., and comprised
two brigades.
FIRST BRIGADE.
Colonel C. C. Egerton, C.B.
2nd Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
1st Sikh Infantry.
1st Punjab Infantry.
33rd Punjab Infantry.
One squadron 1st Punjab Cavalry.
No. 3 Peshawar Mountain Battery.
No. 2 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
SECOND BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General W. P. Symons, C.B.
3rd Battalion Rifle Brigade.
14th Sikhs.
6th Jats.
25th Punjab Infantry.
One squadron 1st Punjab Cavalry.
Four guns No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery.
[Sidenote: Punitive Operations]
The field force concentrated at Datta Khel on the 19th July, and on the
next day the First Brigade marched to Sheranni, finding that place and
Maizar deserted, the Madda Khel being reported to have fled to the hills
preliminary to seeking a refuge in Afghanistan. All the defences in the
neighbourhood were destroyed, and a proclamation embodying our terms was
issued, but to these the Maizar and Sheranni maliks on the 3rd September
definitely refused to agree. The Kazha, Shawal and Khina Valleys were
visited by columns, and strong places were destroyed, but with the
exception of some sniping into camp there was no sign of opposition. It
was not, however, until the 31st October that the head of the Madda Khel
gave himself up, and a fortnight later the whole tribe formally
submitted, paid up a first instalment of all fines, including the
overdue blood money which had occasioned the outrage, and early in 1898
the field force began to be gradually broken up.
The total casualties at Maizar and in the subsequent operations amounted
to twenty-nine killed and forty wounded; but during this expedition the
troops suffered to an altogether unusual extent from sickness, chiefly
diarrhoea and dysentery. The climate of the Tochi Valley is always
trying, while the forced march in the hot weather from Khushalgarh to
Bannu had no doubt affected the men’s constitutions.
_Operations against the Mahsuds in 1900–1901._—No sooner were operations
concluded in the Tochi Valley than the Mahsuds began again to be
troublesome. During 1898 and 1899 raids were of frequent occurrence, and
in the year following a levy post at Zam and a police post near Tank
were attacked. The maliks seemed quite unable to restrain, still less to
coerce, the tribesmen. The fines for past offences now amounted to no
less a sum than Rs. 100,000, and, no portion of it being forthcoming, a
blockade was declared, which came into operation on the 1st December,
1900. To ensure its effectiveness movable columns were mobilised from
Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, and by their means cordons were drawn on the
east and south of the Mahsud country. These measures were so far
effectual that the Mahsuds made a commencement with the payment of their
fine, but in January 1901, fresh offences were committed, raids
continued, and more serious attacks were not infrequent.
A new procedure was now introduced into the ordinary measures of a
purely passive blockade. Hitherto the tribesmen had invariably received
notice prior to the commencement of active operations—they had always
been afforded an opportunity of coming belatedly to terms—but it was now
decided that, while the blockade should continue, it should be varied
and accompanied by sharp attacks, carried on during three or four days
by small mobile columns acting simultaneously and by surprise. The first
series of such operations, for which preparations had been made in
secret, commenced on the 23rd November, and was directed against the
Mahsuds of the Khaisora and Shahur Valleys, combined with demonstrations
from Jandola into the Takhi Zam, and from Datta Khel against the
north-west portion of the Mahsud country; the general object being to
demolish all defences, capture prisoners and cattle, and destroy grain
and fodder. Four columns, each consisting almost exclusively of
infantry, and varying in strength from 900 to 1250 men, started from
Datta Khel, Jandola, Sarwekai and Wana; all were opposed, and each
suffered some loss, but the combined operations were very successful.
Moreover, no sooner were these at an end than a further series was
projected. On the 4th December Brigadier-General Dening left Jandola
with 2500 rifles and four guns and moved to Shingi Kot, where he divided
his force into two columns. Marching north-west up the Tazar Tang, Dwe
Shinkai and Guri Khel were visited, and the force returned by way of
Marghaband to Jandola. The enemy fought fiercely, following up the
columns and driving home their attacks with great determination; their
losses were consequently very severe.
[Sidenote: Mobile Columns]
The third series of operations began on the 19th December, and was
undertaken by two columns starting from Jandola and Sarwekai converging
on Dwe Shinkai, where, as well as in the Spli Toi Algad, there were now
known to be many Mahsud settlements. The Jandola column under General
Dening (four guns, thirteen sabres, and 2052 rifles, exclusive of the
South Waziristan Militia), marched via Shingi Kot and Umar Ragzha to
Paridai up the Tre Algad, destroyed all defences, and joined the other
columns at Dwe Shinkai on the 21st. The Sarwekai column under Colonel
Hogge (two guns and three battalions) had marched to Dwe Shinkai by way
of the Shahur Nala, Badshah Khan, Nanu Narai and the Spli Toi Algad. On
the 22nd the whole combined force, told off into three columns, raided
up the Dwe Shinkai, and, after destroying a number of fortified towers
and other defences, returned on the 24th to Jandola.
The Mahsuds still, however, evinced no inclination to submit, and a
fourth series of operations was consequently planned against them, the
object of these being the punishment of the sections living in the
Shakto, Sheranna and Shuza Algads. For this three columns were formed,
based respectively on Jandola, Jani Khel and Datta Khel, and varying in
strength from 2500 to 1400 men, and their operations were uniformly
successful, resulting in the capture of a large number of cattle and the
destruction of many fortified places. Standing camps were now formed at
Zam, Miramshah and Baran, whence it was intended that punitive measures
should be resumed so soon as the troops had enjoyed a much needed rest.
The Mahsuds had by this, however, lost heavily in men and cattle, and
had throughly realised that the innermost parts of their country could
be reached and traversed by our troops. They consequently opened
negotiations for peace and for the removal of the blockade, and after
the usual delays they paid up their fines in full, restored all the
rifles they had captured, and gave hostages for the return of all
plundered cattle.
Our casualties during these operations had amounted to thirty-two killed
and 114 wounded.
The punishment inflicted on the Mahsuds did not, however, appear to have
had any particular effect upon all Wazirs, and before the end of 1901
another expedition became necessary against the Kabul Khel sub-division
of the Utmanzai Darwesh Khels, who inhabit the wedge of hilly country
lying between the Kohat and Bannu districts and east of the Kurram
River.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1901–02]
_Expedition against the Kabul Khels (Darwesh Khels) in
1901–1902._—During the years between 1896 to 1899 many outrages were
committed upon our border by men living at the village of Gumatti, some
eight miles north of Bannu. In February of the latter year this village
was surrounded by our troops and the surrender of all outlaws demanded.
This was refused, and some of the men “wanted” shut themselves up in two
strong towers, from which, owing to the short time available, it was not
found possible to dislodge them. The force had consequently to withdraw
with its object only partially accomplished, and its retirement was
harassed by the tribesmen all the way back to Bannu. Crimes of all kinds
continued to be committed on this part of the border, and it was finally
decided to send an expedition into the district. Four small columns
directed by Major-General Egerton were accordingly formed, comprising
all three arms, and varying from 600 to 1000 men in numbers. These
concentrated at Thal, Idak, Barganatu and Bannu, and started, the Idak
column on the 17th November and the others on the next day. By these
forces the Kabul Khel country was traversed in all directions, many of
the outlaws were killed or captured, over 5000 head of cattle were
carried off by us, and a large number of fortified towers were
destroyed. Since the close of this expedition the Darwesh Khels have
given us but little trouble, the Mahsuds continuing, however, to be
almost as turbulent as ever.
APPENDIX A.
THE ARMS TRADE AND THE TRIBESMEN.
No book dealing with the military relations, now and in the past, of the
Indian Government and the frontier tribes, can be said to be complete,
which does not contain some allusion to the armament of these men. In
the matter of small arms we have not invariably possessed the
conspicuous superiority which might have been expected of a
highly-civilised nation warring against a semi-savage people. Readers of
Kaye’s _History of the War in Afghanistan_ will not need to be reminded
how frequently both the Afghans, and the tribes which followed our
columns, proved that their firearms were better in range and in
man-killing power than were the weapons with which in those days, and
even for some years after, our soldiers were armed. We read of our
muskets: “Little could they do against the far-reaching Afghan
matchlocks.... The muskets of our infantry could not reach the
assailants.... The two forces were at a distance from each other, which
gave all the advantage to the enemy, who shot down our men with ease,
and laughed at the musket balls, which never reached their position....
But, again, the British muskets were found no match for the Afghan
jazails ... the Afghan marksmen mowed down our men like grass.”[147]
At the time of the second Afghan war we had completely re-established
the superiority of our armament; but since then arms factories have been
set up in many places within and without our border, and by this means
and by a well-organised, large-scale system of rifle-stealing—not only
from regiments in our frontier garrisons, but from others far down
country—the tribesmen, who could pay the prices asked, gradually became
well equipped with modern rifles and the necessary ammunition. At the
time of the Tirah Expedition of 1897–98 the old-fashioned, home-made
jazail had practically been everywhere replaced by the breech-loader,
many of which, if not actually made at Enfield, had probably been
manufactured in the Kohat Pass with all the Government “marks” carefully
reproduced. Such confidence had their improved armament inspired in the
men of the border, that the feeling found expression in an offer made
from more than one clansman at the close of the Tirah campaign: “if we
would only leave our artillery behind, they would fight us all over
again.”
[Sidenote: Bushire and Muscat]
But the improvement noticed in 1897 in the armament of the tribes,
seemed to point to the existence of other and more open markets for the
supply of modern rifles, than those known to exist to the west of our
border; and the Government of India now set inquiries on foot relative
to statements, of late years often repeated and as persistently
disregarded, of the existence of a well-established and flourishing
trade in arms carried on in the Persian Gulf. There can be no doubt that
the arms traffic both at Bushire and at Muscat was originally begun and
maintained by British subjects; but the demand for modern rifles in
Southern Persia, in Afghanistan, and on the north-west frontier was now
so great, that other nations quickly went into the business, and it has
been computed that in 1906 four European nations between them imported
£278,000 worth of rifles into Muscat alone. The traffic at Bushire does
not appear to have exercised any perceptible influence on the arming of
the north-west frontier tribes; but that which originated at Muscat in
the early nineties soon grew and flourished exceedingly, “parcels” of
rifles and ammunition being shipped in native craft from Muscat to the
Mekran coast, where they were met by the caravans of the Afghan traders,
and being taken thence along the Perso-Baluch frontier into Southern
Afghanistan, were distributed among the tribes on our border. This trade
was permitted to flourish for fully ten years before any adequate steps
were taken to stop it.
In the reports of the Baluchistan Agency during the last five years, so
far as these have appeared up to the time of writing, it is possible in
some degree to trace the growth of the traffic, and to note the steps
belatedly taken for its suppression. Thus, in the Report for 1906–07 we
read: “During the months of October to December over a thousand rifles
imported from Muscat are reported to have been landed and distributed
throughout Persian Baluchistan.”
Report for 1907–08: “Not so satisfactory to record is the enormous
increase in the arms trade between the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan. A
very large number of rifles and a vast amount of ammunition are reported
to have been landed on the Persian coast during the year under report.
Arrangements were being made at the close of the year under report to
reinforce the military garrison at Robat, with a view to preventing
these arms being taken through British territory. The Afghan arms
traders have since successfully brought all their large consignments of
arms into Afghanistan through Persian territory.”
Report for 1908–09: “In the year under review very large numbers of
rifles, with great quantities of ammunition, were again imported into
Afghanistan and into Persian Baluchistan from the Persian Gulf. A force
of 500 infantry, with two machine guns, was sent to Robat in April to
reinforce the military detachment already there, and to assist in
intercepting any caravans which might attempt to reach Afghanistan
through the Chagai District. This additional force returned in August at
the close of the arms-running season. Though no captures were made, the
traffic by this route was effectively checked. In the absence of any
effective measures on the Persian side, however, this was of little
advantage, and the trade through Persia, being practically completely
unchecked, increased considerably in volume.”
[Sidenote: Naval Operations in 1909]
In 1909 the Admiral of the East Indian station took the matter seriously
in hand, and the result of the efforts of the Navy is recorded in the
Report of the Baluchistan Agency for 1909–10. After making some
complaint of the increase in the number of raids from across the border,
and stating that “owing to the possession of modern rifles and abundant
ammunition these outlaws have been more daring and difficult to deal
with,” the Report goes on to say: “Throughout the year under review
reports continued to be received regarding the landing of arms and
ammunition on the Persian Gulf coast. It is estimated that over 16,500
rifles, 352 revolvers and pistols, 1,079,000 rounds, as well as 137
boxes of ammunition, were landed between the 31st March, 1909, and 1st
April, 1910. Owing to the frequency of these reports regarding the
landing of arms, the Government of India, in September 1909, decided to
resume naval operations on the Persian Gulf coast. It is satisfactory to
note that these operations proved far more successful than previous
ones, some 6307 rifles and 619,700 rounds of ammunition being captured
between July 1909 and April 1910, and 4260 rifles with 520,000 rounds
being accounted for after the close of the year. As a result of a
conference held at Simla in July 1909, Mr. Gregson, Superintendent of
Police, North-West Frontier Police, was placed on special duty in
November, with a view of preventing Ghilzais and other trans-frontier
tribesmen from getting to the Gulf through India. This measure resulted
in some 152 Afghans with about Rs. 73,000 in their possession being
detained, and it has been proved that another Rs. 26,000 was returned
from Muscat.
“Half a battalion of Native Infantry, with a maxim gun section, left
Quetta for Robat on the 3rd January, 1910, with a view to protecting the
trade-route and closing the road leading through British territory to
arms-runners. No attempts were made by the Afghans to make use of these
routes, but as the Persian authorities made no attempt to close the
routes leading through Persian Baluchistan, the Afghans experienced no
difficulty in entering Afghanistan by skirting Robat and travelling a
few miles to the west of that place. It is, however, satisfactory to
note that several of the caravans are reported to have had to return
empty owing to the naval operations referred to above.... One attempt
was made during the year to land arms on the coast on the British side
of the Persian boundary. A consignment, estimated at from 9500–15,000
rifles, was landed at Pishukan, near Gwadar, which is a Muscat
possession within British territory. It is, however, satisfactory to
note that the fate of this consignment should act as a warning to
arms-runners not to make the attempt again; for 850 of these rifles were
captured by a party landed by H.M.S. _Perseus_.... But for the active
steps taken to check the arms traffic, the trade during the year would
have attained abnormal proportions. Very large numbers of Afghans went
down to the coast, and with them large numbers of Afridis and men of the
north-west border tribes. Very great discouragement was caused to them
by the failure of their ventures, and how far the success of our
operations will diminish the number of those who will make similar
ventures next year remains to be seen.”
[Sidenote: Combined Operations in 1910]
The Report of the Baluchistan Agency for 1910–11 hardly does sufficient
justice to the success met with by the naval operations of the twelve
months under review. “The combined naval and military operations in the
Persian Gulf,” we read, “were continued during the year. Several large
consignments of arms and ammunition were captured by His Majesty’s
ships, and the landing of arms on the Mekran coast was rendered more
difficult than ever. Notwithstanding the difficulties experienced by
arms-runners last season, large numbers of Afghans and tribesmen again
proceeded to the Gulf for the purpose of obtaining arms, but it is
satisfactory to note that a large proportion of these are said to have
returned either with unladen camels or with ordinary merchandise. Those
that managed to procure arms are reported to have purchased them mostly
from the local Baluch, with the result that prices have risen and very
few arms are now obtainable even at the high prices offered by the
arms-runners. Half a battalion of Native Infantry, with a maxim gun
detachment, was maintained at Robat throughout the year, and prevented
any attempts being made to use the routes leading through British
territory. The routes followed by the Afghans, both when proceeding to
and returning from the coast, were those to the west of Robat, which the
Persian Government is incapable of closing. Reports from all sides show
that the active measures again taken to stop the arms traffic are keenly
felt both in Afghanistan and among the gun-running community generally.
The trade is now looked upon as an extremely difficult and hazardous
undertaking.”
It was, of course, hardly to be expected that so independent a people as
these border folk would take “lying down” this interference with their
supply of arms and ammunition—the less that the business appears to have
been conducted on the “payment-in-advance” principle, and, the money
being already in the hands of the traders for the rifles seized by
British ships, whole communities were not merely disappointed but
ruined. Much ill-feeling and disaffection was aroused on the frontier;
and the Kohat Pass Afridis actually put in a claim against the Indian
Government for compensation—a demand which was not entertained.
Thanks to the energy of the naval authorities, the Muscat gun-trade
would appear to have been scotched, but it is very far from being
killed, while the operations in the Gulf have cost something like
£100,000 each season. How, too, can any preventive service, however well
organised, deal with cases such as that reported in August 1911 in the
Indian papers—of a steamer of the Hansa Line which arrived in Bombay,
having among its cargo a number of cases labelled “Loaf Sugar”—shipped
at Hamburg, through Antwerp, for Koweit via Bombay? Unfortunately for
the consignees, one of these cases was damaged in trans-shipment, when
the “loaf sugar” was found to be magazine rifles, fifty in number, of
·203 bore, and with a quantity of ammunition to match.
Mr. Lovat Fraser has told us that when he was on the north-west frontier
in 1909, he tried to ascertain what proportion of the tribesmen were
then armed with modern rifles. The lowest estimate was 80,000, and many
frontier officers seemed of the opinion that there were probably 150,000
good rifles in possession of men of the border. “Not only,” says Mr.
Lovat Fraser, “does this great influx of arms affect the character of
our relations with the tribesmen, by giving them greater confidence in
their offensive capacity, but it may also have very grave results should
it ever be necessary for us to advance again into Afghanistan.”[148]
[Sidenote: The Sultan of Oman]
But coincident with the departure from Indian waters of Rear-Admiral Sir
Edward Slade, whose vigorous measures have done so much during the last
three years for the suppression of the arms traffic between Muscat and
Mekran, comes the opportune announcement that the Sultan of Oman has
happily decided to control the trade himself—hitherto protected by a
treaty, dating back to the Second Empire, between the Sultan and the
Government of the French Republic. The Sultan of Oman has come to the
decision to store all arms and ammunition imported into his dominions in
a bonded warehouse, from which they are not to be released except upon
production of certificates of destination, while no such certificates
are to be issued for the Mekran coast. If the supervision of the bonded
warehouse is thorough, the traffic in arms should be effectively
controlled, and a considerable relaxation of British naval activities
should be possible; unfortunately, however, the continued existence of
the trade benefits many others besides the men of the “Bloody
Border”—Oriental officials and European manufacturers and exporters—and
it is possible that, though the traffic is to all appearance dead, it
may ere long be surreptitiously revived.
APPENDIX B.
TABLE OF EXPEDITIONS AGAINST THE FRONTIER TRIBES MENTIONED IN THE
PRECEDING CHAPTERS.
[Sidenote: Expeditions 1847–1908]
───────┬────────────┬────────────────┬──────────────┬───────────────
YEAR. │ TRIBE. │ COMMANDER. │ NUMBERS │ CASUALTIES.
│ │ │EMPLOYED.[149]│
───────┼────────────┼────────────────┼──────────────┼───────┬───────
│ │ │ │ K. │ W.
───────┼────────────┼────────────────┼──────────────┼───────┼───────
│ │Lt.-Col. │ │ │
1847 │Baizais, │ Bradshaw, │ Mixed Brigade│ 1│ 13
│ │ C.B., │ │ │
1849 │Do., │Do., │ 2300│ 7│ 40
│Afridis, │Brig. Sir C. │ │ │
1850 │ Kohat │ Campbell, │ 3200│ 19│ 74
│ Pass, │ K.C.B., │ │ │
│Miranzai │ │ 2050,│ │
1851 │ Tribes, │Capt. J. Coke, │ including│ 2│ 3
│ │ │ levies│ │
│ │Brig. Sir C. │ │ │
1851–2 │Mohmands, │ Campbell, │ 1597│ 4│ 5
│ │ K.C.B., │ │ │
1852 │Do., │Do., │ 600│ 2│ 8
〃 │Ranizais, │Do., │ 3270│ 11│ 29
〃 │Utman Khels,│Do., │ 2200│ 3│ 15
│Wazirs, │Major J. │ │ │
〃 │ Darwesh │ Nicholson, │ 1500│ 24│ 7
│ Khel, │ │ │ │
│ │Lt.-Col. │ 3800,│ │
1852–3 │Hassanzais, │ Mackeson, │ including│ 5│ 10
│ │ C.B., │ levies, etc.│ │
1853 │Hindustani │Do., │ 2000│ Nil
│ Fanatics, │ │ │
〃 │Afridis, │Col. Boileau, │ 1740│ 8│ 29
│ Adam Khel,│ │ │ │
1854 │Mohmands, │Col. Cotton, │ 1782│ 1│ 16
1855 │Afridis, Aka│Lt.-Col. │ 1500│ 9│ 25
│ Khel, │ Craigie, C.B.,│ │ │
1855 │Miranzai │Brig. │ 3766│ —│ 14
│ Tribes, │ Chamberlain, │ │ │
│Orakzais, │ │ │ │
〃 │ Rabia │Do., │ 2457│ 11│ 4
│ Khel, │ │ │ │
│ │ │ 4896,│ │
1856 │Turis, │Do., │ including│ 5│ 3
│ │ │ levies│ │
1857 │Yusafzais, │Major Vaughan, │ 400│ 2│ 3
│ │ │ 990│ 5│ 21
│ │ │ 1625,│ │
│ │ │ including│ 1│ 8
│ │ │ levies│ │
│Khudu Khels,│M.-Gen. Sir S. │ │ │
1858 │ etc., │ Cotton, │ 4877│ 6│ 29
│ │ K.C.B., │ │ │
│Wazirs, │Brig.-Gen. │ 5372,│ │
1859–60│ Darwesh │ Chamberlain, │ including│ 1│ 19
│ Khel, │ C.B., │ levies│ │
│Wazirs, │ │ 6796,│ │
1860 │ Mahsuds, │Do., │ including│ 100│ 261
│ │ │ levies│ │
1863 │Ambela │Do., │ 9000│ 238│ 670
│ Expedition│ │ │ │
│(Hindustani │(later M.-Gen. │ │ │
│ Fanatics, │ Garvock), │ │ │
│ etc.), │ │ │ │
1864 │Mohmands, │Col. Macdonell, │ 1801│ 2│ 17
│ │ C.B., │ │ │
1868 │Orakzais, │Major Jones, │970, including│ 11│ 44
│ │ │ levies, etc.│ │
│Black │M.-Gen. Wilde, │ │ │
〃 │ Mountain │ C.B., C.S.I., │ 12,544│ 5│ 29
│ Tribes, │ │ │ │
│ │Lt.-Col. Keyes, │ 2080,│ │
1869 │Orakzais, │ C.B., │ including│ 3│ 33
│ │ │ levies│ │
1872 │Dawaris, │Brig.-Gen. │ 1826│ —│ 6
│ │ Keyes, C.B., │ │ │
1877 │Afridis, │Col. Mocatta, │ 1750│ 1│ 10
│ Jowaki, │ │ │ │
│ │Brig.-Gens. │ │ │
1877–8 │Do., │ Keyes and │ 7400│ 11│ 51
│ │ Ross, │ │ │
1878 │Utman Khels,│Capt. Battye, │ 280│ —│ 8
1878 │Ranizais, │Major Campbell, │ 860│ Nil
〃 │Utman Khels,│Lt.-Col. │ 875│ —│ 1
│ │ Jenkins, │ │ │
│Afridis, │Lt.-Gen. Maude, │ │ │
〃 │ Zakha │ V.C., C.B., │ 2500│ 2│ 9
│ Khel, │ │ │ │
1879 │Do., │Do., │ 3750│ 5│ 13
〃 │Mohmands, │Capt. Creagh and│ 600│ 6│ 18
│ │ Major Dyce, │ │ │
│ │Brig.-Gen. │ │ │
〃 │Zaimukhts, │ Tytler, V.C., │ 3226│ 2│ 2
│ │ C.B., │ │ │
1880 │Mohmands, │Brig.-Gen. │ 2300│ 2│ 3
│ │ Doran, C.B., │ │ │
〃 │Batannis, │Lt.-Col. Rynd, │ 721│ —│ 5
│Wazirs, │Brig.-Gen. │ │
〃 │ Darwesh │ Gordon, C.B., │ 800│ Nil
│ Khel, │ │ │
│Wazirs, │Brig.-Gens. │ │ │
1881 │ Mahsuds, │ Gordon and │ 8531│ 8│ 24
│ │ Kennedy, │ │ │
1887 │Bunerwals, │Col. Broome, │ 460│ 3│ 2
│Black │B.-Gen. J. │ │ │
1888 │ Mountain │ McQueen, C.B.,│ 9416│ 25│ 57
│ Tribes, │ A.D.C., │ │ │
1891 │Do., │M.-Gen. W. K. │ 7289│ 9│ 39
│ │ Elles, C.B., │ │ │
│ │B.-Gen. Sir W. │ │
〃 │Orakzais, │ Lockhart, │ 4600│ Nil
│ │ K.C.B., │ │
〃 │Do., │Do., │ 8000│ 28│ 73
│ │Brig.-Gen. │ │ │
1894 │Wazirs, │ Turner and │ 11,150│ 45│ 75
│ │ Lt.-Gen. │ │ │
│ │Sir W. Lockhart,│ │ │
│ │ K.C.B., │ │ │
1895 │Chitralis, │M.-Gen. Sir R. │ 15,249│ 21│ 101
│ │ Low, K.C.B., │ │ │
1895 │Chitralis, │Col. Kelly, │ 1400[150]│ 165│ 88
│Wazirs, │M.-Gen. │ │ │
1897 │ Darwesh │ Corrie-Bird, │ 8000│ 29│ 61
│ Khel, │ C.B., │ │ │
│Akozais │Col. Meiklejohn,│ │ │
〃 │ (Swat), │ C.B., C.M.G., │ 12,650│ 97│ 386
│ │ and │ │ │
│ │M.-Gen. Sir B. │ │ │
│ │ Blood, K.C.B.,│ │ │
〃 │Mohmands, │Brig.-Gen. E. │ 8500│ 12│ 96
│ │ Elles, C.B., │ │ │
〃 │Akozais and │M.-Gen. Sir B. │ 12,200│ 61│ 218
│ Tarkanris │ Blood, K.C.B.,│ │ │
│(Dir and │ │ │ │
│ Bajaur) │ │ │ │
〃 │Utman Khels,│Colonel A. Reid,│ 2900│ Nil
│ │ C.B., │ │
│ │M.-Gen. │ │ │
〃 │Orakzais, │ Yeatman-Biggs,│ 9500│ 26│ 54
│ │ C.B., │ │ │
│ │Lt.-Gen. Sir W. │ │ │
〃 │Afridis, │ Lockhart, │ 34,550│ 287│ 853
│ │ K.C.B., │ │ │
│ │Brig.-Gen. │ │ │
〃 │Chamkannis, │ Gaselee, C.B.,│ 9700│ 46│ 35
│ │ and │ │ │
│ │Col. Hill, C.B.,│ │ │
1898 │Bunerwals, │M.-Gen. Sir B. │ 8800│ —│ 1
│ │ Blood, K.C.B.,│ │ │
│ │Capt. │ 1200,│ │
1899 │Chamkannis, │ Roos-Keppel, │ including│ —│ 1
│ │ │ levies│ │
1900–01│Wazirs, │Brig.-Gen. │ Small│ 32│ 114
│ Mahsud, │ Dening, │ Columns[151]│ │
│Wazirs, │M.-Gen. Egerton,│ │ │
1901–02│ Darwesh │ C.B., │ Do.,[151]│ 4│ 15
│ Khel, │ │ │ │
│Afridis, │M.-Gen. Sir J. │ │ │
1908 │ Zakha │ Willcocks, │ 14,000│ 3│ 37
│ Khel, │ K.C.M.G., │ │ │
〃 │Mohmands, │Do., │ 12,000│ 38│ 184
───────┴────────────┴────────────────┴──────────────┴───────┴───────
APPENDIX C.
TABLE SHOWING BY WHOM THE TRIBES ARE CONTROLLED.
[Sidenote: Tribal Control]
───────────────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────
Dep.-Commissioner, Hazara. │Cis-Indus Swatis—Allai, Tikari,
│ Deshi, Nandihar and Thakot.
│Yusafzais—Trans-Indus Utmanzai,
│ Mada Khel, Amazai, Hassanzai,
│ Akazai and Cis-Indus Chagarzai.
│
Political Agent, Dir, Swat and │Yusafzais—Trans-frontier Akozai.
Chitral. │
│Sam Ranizais.
│Bajauris.
│Chitralis.
│
Dep.-Commissioner, Peshawar. │Yusafzais—Trans-Indus Chagarzai,
│ Khudu Khel, Chamlawals, Sam
│ Baizai and Cis-Indus Utmanzai.
│Utman Khel.
│Mohmands.
│Gaduns.
│Bunerwals.
│Afridis—Adam Khel of Janakor and
│ Kandar.
│
Political Agent, Khyber. │Afridis—except Adam Khel.
│Mullagoris.
│Mohmands—Shilmani.
│Shinwaris.
│
Dep.-Commissioner, Kohat. │Orakzais—except Massuzai.
│Afridis—Adam Khel.
│Bangash.
│
Political Agent, Kurram. │Zaimukhts.
│Turis.
│Orakzais—Massuzai.
│Chamkannis.
│
Dep.-Commissioner, Bannu. │Bannuchis.
│
Political Agent, Tochi. │Dawaris.
│Wazirs—Darwesh Khel.
│
Political Agent, Wana. │Wazirs—Mahsuds.
│
Dep.-Commissioner, Dera Ismail │Batannis.
Khan. │
───────────────────────────────────┴───────────────────────────────────
INDEX.
A
Abazai, fort, 108, 146–9, 153, 211, 218, 232, 252, 254, 258, 314.
Abazais, 118.
Abbott, Colonel, 10, 35.
Abbottabad, 37, 38, 41, 66, 83.
Abdul Khalik, 116, 131.
Abdul Manan, 116, 129, 130, 131.
Abdur Rahman Khan, 183.
Abu, 36.
Abuwa, 141.
Adam Khel, Afridis, 212, 224, 268, 278–281 _et seq._
Adinzai, 168, 176.
Afghan, 1, 2.
Afridis, 19, 89, 218, 247, 261 _et seq._, 346, 376.
Afzul-ul-Mulk, 191.
Agra, 153, 154, 178, 180.
Agror, 25, 29, 35–38, 41, 42, 45, 57.
Ahmad Shah of Bareilly, 67 _et seq._, 113.
Ahmadzai, Wazirs, 426, 435, 437, 438, 440, 441, 460.
Ain, 107.
Ajun Khan, 146.
Aka Khel, Afridis, 212, 268, 278, 298–300, 308, 318, 331, 336, 371,
376.
Akazais, 28–30, 34, 35, 39, 41–43, 45, 47, 49.
Akhel, Orakzais, 352, 363, 378, 382.
Akhor, 282, 283.
Akhund Baba, 46.
Akhund Khels, 32.
Akhund of Swat, 73, 89, 98, 106, 112 _et seq._, 124, 235.
Akozais, 56, 58, 107 _et seq._, 116 _et seq._
Alachi Pass, 335.
Aladand, 118, 131, 137, 139.
Alexander the Great, 110, 215, 406.
Alikandi, 220.
Ali Khel, Orakzais, 323, 352, 356, 359, 364, 372, 382.
Ali Musjid, 237, 256, 257, 269, 272, 275, 276, 303, 304, 307, 315 _et
seq._, 334, 335.
Alisherzai, Orakzais, 353, 372, 382, 397, 400, 404.
Alizai, Wazirs, 428, 454, 457.
Alizai, Utman Khels, 145.
Allai, 24, 46.
Amandara, 133, 137.
Aman-ul-Mulk, 190–192.
Amazai, 3, 56, 59, 60, 64, 67, 105, 106.
Amb, 26, 28, 32, 33, 36, 57, 69, 71, 72, 79, 82.
Ambahar, 143, 145, 148, 224, 260.
Ambela, 52, 59, 61, 63, 82 _et seq._, 123, 178.
Amir Ayub Khan, 243.
Amir Khan, 68.
Amir Sher Ali, 236, 415, 453.
Amir-ul-Mulk, 193, 195.
Amir Yakub Khan, 240.
Anderson, General, 253, 254, 257, 339.
Aornos, 66.
Arhanga Pass, 319, 330.
Arnawai, 183, 193, 217.
Asmar, 157, 162, 172, 183, 193, 209, 212, 217, 253.
Astor, 202.
Attock, 68, 112, 293.
Avitabili, General, 302.
B
Babukarra, 155–157, 174, 181.
Babuzai, 119, 120.
Bada Khel, Chamkannis, 407.
Badakshan, 185, 188, 191, 217.
Badal, 7.
Badan, 178.
Badelai, 178, 181.
Bagh, Tirah, 269, 330–333.
Bagrian, 40.
Bahlolzai, Wazirs, 428, 456, 457.
Baio, 51, 52.
Baird, Captain, 196.
Baizai, Bangash, 396.
Baizai, Mohmands, 219, 221, 223, 225, 250, 259.
Baizai, Yusafzais, 57, 58, 117, 119 _et seq._
Bajaur, 55, 89, 110, 155 _et seq._, 182, 192, 211, 253.
Bajkatta, 105.
Bakrai, 45, 50.
Balakot, 70.
Baliamin, 363, 375, 376.
Balish Khel, 398, 400, 402.
Baluchistan, 1.
Bampokha, 104.
Banda, 99.
Bangash, 14, 15, 261, 278, 284, 285, 346, 394 _et seq._
Bannu, 17, 18, 21–23, 391, 418, 426, 428, 429, 432, 433, 435, 446, 452,
464, 468, 469, 473.
Bara Fort, 334.
Bara River and Valley, 2, 261, 268, 270, 309, 318, 332, 334, 346, 351,
382.
Baradar, 26, 29, 34–36, 48.
Baran, 433.
Barandu River, 60, 62, 105.
Barangola, 112, 118.
Baraul, 156, 157, 160, 167.
Barchar, 40, 41, 43.
Barg, 307, 336.
Barkeli, 104.
Barkilai, 63.
Baroghil Pass, 185, 186, 217.
Barrett, General, 254, 257, 340.
Barwa, 172, 176.
Barwand, 448, 456, 465.
Basawal, 237, 306, 307.
Bashgul Valley, 193, 194, 217.
Bashkar, 119, 173, 209.
Basi Khel, Afridis, 298.
Batai Pass, 176.
Batannis, 418, 420, 428–429, 455.
Battye, Colonel, 10, 169, 170, 171.
Battye, Captain W., 149, 150.
Battye, Lieut., 409.
Bazar Pass, 335.
Bazar Valley, 261, 268, 273, 304 _et seq._, 334 _et seq._
Bazdara Valley, 122.
Bedmanai Pass, 178, 249–251.
Beka, 112, 113.
Bela, 44, 49.
Bellew, Dr., 3, 159, 261, 394, 406, 419.
Berar Kats, 307.
Bhogarmang, 24, 25.
Bholu, 41.
Biddulph, Major, 190.
Biland Khel, 387, 438, 440.
Biliani, 29.
Bilot, 179.
Bimarai, 145.
Bimbal, 29.
Birkot, 193.
Bizotis, Orakzais, 284, 354, 355, 367–369.
Black Mountain, 24 _et seq._
Blood, Major-General Sir B., 102, 137 _et seq._, 152, 175 _et seq._,
248, 249.
Bohai Dag, 223, 259.
Bohai Valley or Darra, 176.
Boisragon, Colonel, 241–242.
Bori Pass, 335.
Borradaile, Captain, 203, 204.
Bradshaw, Colonel, 121, 122, 124.
Bright, Colonel, 39, 40.
Browne, General Sir S., 237.
Brownlow, Major, 86, 91, 93, 94.
Bruce, Colonel, 195.
Buchanan, Colonel, 294.
Budh Sing, 68.
Bukar Pass, 308, 335.
Buner, 16, 30.
Buner Pass, 63, 99.
Bunerwals, 56, 60 _et seq._, 83 _et seq._, 139, 165.
Buni, 198, 200, 201.
Bunji, 194.
Bunny, Colonel, 466, 467.
C
Campbell, General Sir C., 125, 146, 229–231, 282.
Campbell, Colonel R., 130.
Campbell, Captain F., 171.
Campbell, Captain, 196, 206.
Cavagnari, Sir L., 10, 149, 262, 274, 306, 368–9, 400.
Cawnpore, 38.
Chagarzais, 28, 30, 39, 41, 56, 63, 87, 105, 106.
Chagru Kotal, 319 _et seq._, 373, 378, 384.
Chaharmung, 155–157, 177.
Chaila Mountain, 46.
Chajri, 43.
Chakalwat, 205.
Chakdara, 105, 107, 118, 132, 133, 136, 137, 152, 159, 167, 169, 173.
Chakesar, 117.
Chamberi, 34, 35, 82.
Chamberlain, General Sir N., 82 _et seq._, 97, 364, 426, 438, 445, 446,
451.
Chamkannis, 332, 346, 381, 389 _et seq._, 405 _et seq._
Chamla, 55, 57, 82, 85, 89, 99, 104.
Chamlawals, 56, 63, 64.
Chanjal, 46.
Channer, General, 42, 46, 164.
Charsada, 126, 146.
Chatta, 33, 34, 43.
Chilas, 194, 201, 202.
China, 307, 335, 336.
Chinglai, 77, 78.
Chirmang, 46.
Chirori, 82.
Chitabat, 26, 30, 40, 43, 45, 46.
Chitral, 2, 22, 118, 160, 162, 172, 182 _et seq._
Chora, 256, 269, 304, 307, 309, 335, 336, 340, 341.
Chorbanda, 104.
Chutiatun, 160.
Coke, Captain J., 147, 284–286, 364–366, 437.
Cole, Captain H., 179.
Corrie-Bird, General, 468.
Cotton, General Sir S., 72, 76.
Cotton, Colonel, 232, 233.
“Crag Picquet,” Ambela, 90 _et seq._
“Crag Picquet,” Samana, 384, 386.
Creagh, Captain O’M., 238–9.
Crookshank, Colonel, 44.
D
Dab, 229–233.
Dabbar Pass, 224, 226.
Dakka, 211, 219, 237–43, 277, 304, 307, 309.
Dand, 249.
Daradar Valley, 352, 374.
Darbanai, 51.
Darband, Black Mountain, 29, 34, 38, 42, 46, 48, 51, 52, 82, 83.
Darband, Miranzai, 375–377.
Dargai, Swat, 128, 135, 153, 165, 166, 185.
Dargai, Tirah, 321 _et seq._, 346.
Darhan Pass, 78, 83.
Darsamand, 399, 415.
Darwesh Khels, 418, 419, 426 _et seq._
Datta Khel, 466, 468–472.
Daulatzai, Orakzais, 351, 354, 355, 370, 381, 382.
Daulatzai, Yusafzais, 59.
Davidson, Captain, 35.
Davidson, Lieut., 94, 96.
Dawaris, 418, 429 _et seq._, 455.
Dawezai, Mohmands, 222, 224, 225, 244, 251, 260.
Delhi, 72, 105.
Dening, General, 471.
Dera Ghazi Khan, 17.
Dera Ismail Khan, 17–22, 418, 429, 453–455, 460, 470.
Deshi, 24–28, 39.
Des Vœux, Major, 387.
Dhana, Batannis, 429.
Dhar, 384, 386.
Digar Pass, 117.
Dilazaks, 54, 64, 156, 222, 224.
Dilbori, 46.
Diliarai, 49, 50.
Dir, 22, 89, 118, 155 _et seq._, 182, 192.
Doha, 52.
Domandi, 424, 459, 466.
Dorah Pass, 185–187, 191, 217.
Doran, General, 242, 294.
Dost Muhammad Khan, 113, 301, 431.
Dufferin, Lord, 190.
Dukarai, 79.
Dunsford, General, 124.
Durand, Colonel, 191.
Durand Mission, 131, 162, 212, 214, 243, 459.
Dusha Khel, 118, 119, 131, 139.
Dwa Toi, 331, 333.
E
“Eagle’s Nest” Picquet, 88, 89.
Edwardes, Colonel, 234, 299, 426.
Edwardes, Lieut., 197, 200.
Egerton, General, 464, 468, 473.
Elles, General E., 177, 178, 246, 248 _et seq._
Elles, General W., 48, 49.
Elsmie, Mr., 8.
Enriquez, Lieut., 9, 60, 160, 220, 392, 413, 425.
F
Fateh Khan, 69.
Feroz Shah, 105.
Firoz Khel, 354.
Fosbery, Lieut., 91.
Fowler, Lieut., 197–199.
G
Gaduns, 54 _et seq._, 57–59, 64–67, 104.
Galai, Afridis, 281, 285.
Galbraith, General, 42.
Gandab Valley, 220, 222, 230, 244, 247, 251, 255.
Gandamak, 277.
Gandera, 147.
Gandhara, 110.
Gandhari, 54, 211.
Gandiali Pass, 290, 292.
Gandiob, 438, 439.
Ganthar, 31.
Gar, 15.
Gara Heights, 240, 241.
Gardiner, Colonel, 292.
Garhi, 45, 46, 52.
Garhwis, 119.
Garvock, General, 97, 98, 100, 101.
Gaselee, Colonel, 50;
General, 343.
Gasht, 204.
Gat, 180.
Gatacre, General, 163, 171–173.
Gauraios, 108.
Gawakki, 401.
Ghalanai, 249.
Ghalegai, 141.
Ghandaki, 329, 352.
Ghariba, 295, 296.
Ghazi Kot, 45, 50.
Ghazis, 11.
Ghazni, 155, 211, 421, 423.
Ghilzai, 2, 5, 224.
Ghizr, 194, 197, 203.
Ghor, 54.
Ghorapher Pass, 46.
Ghoria Khel, 211.
Ghosam, 176.
Ghulam Haidar, 214.
Ghurban Valley, 117.
Ghurghusht, 66.
Gilgit, 183, 190–192, 197, 201, 202.
Gomal River and Valley, 2, 418, 419, 421, 428, 445, 458.
Gordon, Colonel, 400, 443, 456.
Goshta, 221, 223, 237, 240.
Gough, Lieut., 197.
Green, Colonel, 451, 452.
Gujar Garhi, 125, 128.
Gujars, 64, 109, 112.
Gulistan Fort, 321, 326, 377, 383–388.
Gumatti, 435, 436, 473.
Gumbat, Miranzai, 290, 292.
Gumbat, Swat, 168, 169.
Gupis, 194, 203.
Gurai, Utman Khel, 145.
Gurdon, Lieut., 194.
Gurgurra, 271, 272, 276, 316.
Gurohs, 119.
Guru Mountain, 60, 92, 96.
H
Hadda Mullah, 132, 139, 176, 178, 244, 245, 247, 249–251.
Haines, General Sir F., 273, 394.
Haji Khel, Chamkannis, 407.
Hajizai Ferry, 245, 247.
Halimzai, Mohmands, 222, 223, 232, 235, 237, 238, 244, 245, 249, 251,
253, 259.
Hammond, General, 50, 51, 173, 345.
Hamsayas, 13.
Hangu, 22, 357, 364, 367, 372, 375–377, 381, 385–387.
Hariankot, 153, 154.
Hari Singh, 29, 68.
Harley, Lieut., 194, 209.
Hart, General, 343.
Hashim Ali, 52.
Hassan Khel, Afridis, 281, 285, 288.
Hassanzais, Black Mountain, 28 _et seq._, 39, 41, 42, 45, 47, 49, 64,
87, 105.
Hassazai, Gaduns, 67.
Hastnagar, 55, 58, 126, 146, 226.
Haughton, Colonel, 337.
Hazara, 17, 21, 23, 26, 37, 39, 55, 65, 73, 81, 82.
Hazaras, 2, 5.
Hephæstion, 110.
Hildai, 104.
Hill, Colonel, 345, 408, 409.
Hindu Kush, 183, 185, 187, 191, 215, 217, 225.
Hindustani Fanatics, 39, 45, 67 _et seq._, 87, 105, 106, 115.
Hiro Shah, 128.
Hodson, Lieut. W., 35, 287.
Holdich, Colonel Sir T., 8, 10, 186, 187, 214, 215, 265, 314, 346, 349,
421.
Hoti, 69.
Hotiwal, 3.
Hughes, Lieut., 147.
Hujra, 13.
Hund, 69, 113.
Hunza, 191, 192, 202, 205.
Hutchinson, Colonel, 324.
Hwen Tsang, 67.
I
Ibbetson, Mr., 4, 6, 410, 419.
Idak, Dawaris, 431, 473.
Iliaszai, Bunerwals, 60.
Ilmgudar, 262, 272, 332.
Inayat Ali Khan, 74, 78, 98.
Inayat Kila, 177, 179, 181.
Indus River, 1, 22, 24, 26, 27, 34, 36, 40, 42, 43, 47, 52, 65, 112,
318.
Inzarai Pass, 220.
Isazai, Black Mountain, 28, 52, 56, 64.
Ismailzai, Bajaur, 156.
Ismailzai, Orakzais, 351 _et seq._, 362–363, 372.
Ismailzai, Utman Khel, 145.
Ismailzai, Yusafzai, 59.
J
Jabagai, 334.
Jabrai, 112.
Jagdallak, 110, 277.
Jalala, 3, 140, 141, 165.
Jalalabad, 130, 139, 184, 214, 217, 237, 277, 309.
Jamrud, 211, 256, 258, 269, 272, 275, 276, 301, 303, 307, 313 _et
seq._, 336.
Jamu, 292–293, 297.
Janbatai Pass, 160, 172.
Jandol Valley, 156, 160, 200, 207, 209.
Jandola, 429, 448, 455–457, 464, 465, 470–472.
Jangi Khan, 445, 446.
Jarobi, 251.
Jawaki, Afridis, 286 _et seq._
Jawar Bai, 104.
Jeffreys, General, 102, 138 _et seq._, 152, 176 _et seq._
Jehangirra, 78.
Jenkins, Colonel, 151.
Jhelum, 227.
Jhindai Valley, 145.
Jirgah, 13.
Jones, Lieut., 201.
Jowarai Pass, 62.
K
Kabul, 110, 191, 192, 211.
Kabul Khel, Wazirs, 437, 443, 444, 473, 474.
Kabul River, 2, 76, 147, 216, 219, 224–226, 230, 237, 238, 241, 245.
Kafiristan, 185, 189.
Kai, Yusafzai, 79.
Kai, Miranzai, 373, 396.
Kain Gali, 45.
Kaitu River, 420, 426.
Kajurai, 269, 272, 301, 337.
Kalangai, 107.
Kalel Pass, 62.
Kalpani, 2.
Kama, 227, 237.
Kamali, 223, 253.
Kamar Khel, Afridis, 268, 270, 327, 331, 336.
Kambar Khel, Afridis, 268, 270, 272, 306, 308, 327, 333, 336.
Kambela, 225.
Kam Dakka, 237–243.
Kamrani Pass, 160, 168.
Kam Shilman, 226.
Kana Valley, 117.
Kanar, 44–46, 48–50.
Kanauri, 154.
Kand, 29.
Kandahar, 243.
Kandi Mishti, 330, 350, 379.
Kandis, 12.
Kaniguram, 420, 427, 447, 450, 452, 456, 457, 464, 465.
Karakar Pass, 62.
Karamna, 307, 336.
Karg, 46.
Karor, 52.
Karun, 46.
Kashkar Valley, 159, 217.
Katgola Pass, 159, 168.
Katnis, 119.
Katsai, 249.
Katur, 189.
Kayakzai, Mohmands, 222.
Kelly, Colonel, 201–206.
Kempster, General, 320, 327, 331, 344.
Kennedy, General, 456, 457.
Keyes, Colonel, 87, 94, 290–297, 369, 371, 432, 440.
Khabal, 79, 80, 104.
Khadakzais, Swat, 118.
Khaisora, River, 426, 432, 437, 447, 456, 457, 464, 470.
Khajuri Kach, 420, 424, 458.
Khan, 13.
Khan Khel, Hassanzais, 28, 43, 49.
Khani Khel, Chamkannis, 407, 409.
Khanki Bazar, 354.
Khanki River and Valley, 318, 321, 323, 328, 346, 349, 353, 365, 374
_et seq._, 379, 385–388.
Khanpur, 92.
Khar, Mohmand, 177.
Khar, Swat, 133, 135, 137, 141, 142, 166–168.
Kharappa, 319, 326, 329, 379.
Kharappa Pass, 249.
Kharmana River and Valley, 346, 351, 354, 379, 398, 406, 408.
Khattaks, 2, 58, 212, 278, 437.
Khazina, 249.
Khoidad Khel, Zaimukhts, 399.
Khudu Khel, Yusafzais, 56, 57, 59, 63–69, 73, 75 _et seq._, 113.
Khushalgarh, 22, 279, 286, 289, 318, 319, 332, 469.
Khushwakt, 189.
Khuzara, 187.
Khwaezai, Mohmands, 222, 223, 235, 238, 251, 259, 260.
Khwajak Khel, Chamkannis, 407.
Khwazozais, Swat, 118, 139, 140.
Khyber, 18, 22, 110, 114, 155, 216, 224, 264, 270, 281, 301, 336, 337.
Khyber Afridis, 268, 273, 301 _et seq._, 318.
Kiara, 26.
Kiarkot Mountains, 40.
Kila Drosh, 184, 187, 194, 195, 200.
Kilagai, 40.
Kingargali, 104.
Kinloch, General, 163.
Kirpilian, 71.
Koga, 82, 86, 104.
Kohat, 2, 17, 18, 21, 22, 147, 268, 281, 286 _et seq._, 318, 367, 368,
373, 418.
Kohat Pass, 19, 262, 278 _et seq._, 396.
Kohistan, 73, 158, 253.
Konsh, 25.
Koragh Defile, 200.
Kosht, 187.
Kot, 153, 154.
Kotkai, Black Mountain, 27, 36, 43–46, 49, 50, 106.
Kotkai, Swat, 168, 176.
Kotla, 71.
Kuhai, 104.
Kuki Khel, Afridis, 224, 268, 269, 272, 301, 303, 308, 327, 331.
Kukkozai, Mohmands, 224.
Kunar, 98, 212 _et seq._
Kunar River, 1, 55, 110, 184, 192, 193, 225, 253, 459.
Kunari, 45.
Kungali, 30, 40.
Kungar, 49.
Kuria, 86, 100.
Kurram River and Valley, 2, 18, 22, 226, 319, 347, 353, 371, 381, 389
_et seq._, 406, 410, 418, 420, 426, 440.
L
Laghman, 156, 216, 219, 225.
Lakarai, 249, 259, 260.
Lakka, 377, 383, 384, 387.
Lala China, 276.
Lalpura, 219, 221, 223, 227, 228, 231, 234, 235, 237, 238, 240.
Lalu, 93, 98, 99.
Laman, 145, 148, 153.
Landakai, 107, 140, 141.
Laram, 466.
Lashkarzai, Orakzais, 351, 353 _et seq._, 371–373, 399, 404.
Laspur, 187, 198, 204.
Latammar, 431, 436, 438.
Lawrence, Sir John, 234, 301, 364, 445.
Lawrence, Major G., 119, 120.
Ledh, 46.
Leh, 187.
Lilban Mountain, 65.
Loargai, 226, 271, 275, 276.
Lockhart, Fort, 321, 384, 386.
Lockhart, General Sir W., 190, 191, 318 _et seq._, 373, 377, 408, 463,
464, 465.
Loi Shilman, 226, 260.
Lokerai, 176.
Low, General Sir R., 101, 152, 162 _et seq._, 200.
Lowari Pass, 159, 160, 172, 185, 193.
Lumsden, Colonel, 448, 451.
Lundi Khana, 256, 276, 277.
Lundi Kotal, 215, 221, 239, 241, 243, 256, 258, 275–277, 307, 315–318,
334, 336, 341.
Lundkhwar, 69, 89, 120, 128, 165.
Lytton, Lord, 190.
M
Macdonnell, Colonel, 236.
Macgregor, Sir C., 8, 266, 348.
Macgregor, General, 248, 345.
Machai Peak, 30, 31, 40, 41.
Mackeson, Colonel, 33–35, 71, 227, 265, 272, 274, 276.
McQueen, General, 42, 45, 47.
Mada Khel, Yusafzais, 28, 57, 59, 60, 64, 87, 105.
Madda Khel, Wazirs, 466–469.
Mad Fakir, 132, 133, 139, 140, 175.
Mahaban Mountain, 59, 64, 65, 81, 87, 90.
Mahabara, 60, 62.
Mahmud of Ghazni, 261, 423.
Mahsuds, 418, 419, 426 _et seq._
Maidan, Black Mountain, 45, 106.
Maidan, Tirah, 262, 269, 270, 318, 330, 332, 346, 361.
Maidan Valley, Bajaur, 156.
Mailmastai, 7.
Maizar, 466, 469.
Makin, 427, 447, 452, 457, 464, 465.
Malakand, 18, 22, 101, 102, 105, 107, 111, 117, 126, 128, 129, 132 _et
seq._, 152, 165 _et seq._, 181, 185, 244, 313.
Malandri Pass, 101, 103.
Malik, 13.
Malikdin Khel, Afridis, 256, 268, 269, 272, 304, 308, 317, 327, 336.
Malik Shahi, Wazirs, 443, 444.
Malizai, 30, 60.
Malka, 81, 98, 100, 105, 106.
Malla Khel, Orakzais, 352, 356, 357, 372, 382.
Mallizad, Dawaris, 431.
Mamanai, 334, 337, 351, 356.
Mamazai, Orakzais, 352, 364.
Mamunds, 152, 156, 172, 177, 180.
Mamuzai, Orakzais, 353, 354, 372, 373, 376, 377, 382.
Mamuzai, Zaimukhts, 399.
Mana-ka-Dana, 40, 43, 45.
Mandal, 145.
Mandanr Yusafzais, 55 _et seq._
Mandi, 70, 79, 105.
Mangal Thana, 73, 78, 79, 82.
Manjakot, 52.
Mansehra, 66.
Mansur, Gaduns, 67.
Manugai, 171.
Mardan, 58, 72, 83, 104, 112, 115, 124, 130, 137, 149, 164.
Marer, 52.
Massaga, 111.
Massuzai, Orakzais, 351, 354, 381, 384, 400, 406.
Mastuj, 184, 187, 189, 194, 197, 200, 201, 203, 205.
Mastura River and Valley, 269, 318, 330, 332, 346, 350, 361, 374.
Matakai, 145.
Matanni, Kohat, 299.
Matanni, Mohmand, 222.
Matkanai, 111.
Matta, 143, 145, 220, 228–231, 253, 255, 256.
Maude, General, 306 _et seq._
Mazarai, 348.
Meiklejohn, General, 102, 104, 133 _et seq._, 152, 176.
Meni, 104.
Merk, Mr., 21.
Mian Khan, 124.
Miankilai, 171.
Michni, 211, 218, 219, 228, 229, 231, 232, 237, 254, 313.
Mingaora, 141.
Miramshah, 472.
Miranzai, 319, 347 _et seq._, 371, 389 _et seq._, 437.
Miranzai, Bangash, 396.
Miriam, 457, 464.
Mishti Bazar, 351.
Mishtis, Orakzais, 352, 357, 364, 367, 372, 373, 376–378, 382, 385.
Mobarak Khel, 59.
Moberley, Lieut., 197, 198, 201.
Mohmands, 54, 158, 165, 176, 211 _et seq._, 309, 342.
Morah Mountain, 3, 58, 107, 119, 125, 143.
Morah Pass, 111, 117, 141, 167.
Muhammad Khel, Orakzais, 351, 355, 359, 361, 368, 371.
Muhammad Khel, Wazirs, 431, 441.
Muhammadzai, 347, 368, 382.
Muhibwal, 3.
Mukaram Khan, 125.
Mukarrab Khan, 77–79.
Mulrikho, 187.
Mundah, 160, 171, 176.
Musazai, Mohmands, 222.
N
Nadrai, 49.
Nagar, 202.
Nagrai, 100.
Nahaki Pass, 249, 251, 259, 260.
Nakshbandia, 112.
Nanawatai, 7.
Nandihar, 24, 25, 27, 39, 41.
Napier, Sir C., 282.
Napier, Colonel R., 35.
Narikh Sukh, 321, 325.
Narinji, 63, 74, 75, 78.
Narsat, 193.
Nasozai, Yusafzais, 56, 65.
Nauroz Khan, 234–236, 240.
Nawagai, Bajaur, 110, 142, 158, 165, 172, 176, 181, 192, 226.
Nawagai, Buner, 104.
Nawa Kala, 82, 84, 92, 101.
Nawedand, 146, 147.
Nawekili, 52.
Nicholson, Colonel, 10, 72, 115, 436.
Nimal, 45, 46.
Ningrahar, 139, 211, 252, 253, 265.
Nisa Gol, 205.
Nizam-ul-Mulk, 191–193.
North-West Frontier Province, 21, 23.
Nurizai, 57, 62.
Nusrudin Khel, 159.
O
Oghi, 36, 37, 40–42, 47, 51, 52.
Oliver, Mr., 9, 11, 14, 32, 61, 66, 69, 73, 107, 220, 225, 264, 272,
273, 277, 369, 390, 395, 407, 411, 419, 420.
Orakzais, 14, 247, 261, 269, 278, 308, 331, 332, 346 _et seq._
Owir, 187.
Oxus River, 217.
P
Pabal, 35, 47.
Paia, 292, 293.
Pailam, 48, 49.
Painda Khel, 159.
Panj Gali, 34–36.
Pakban, 31.
Pakhai, 150, 151.
Pakli Valley, 37.
Palai, 120, 122.
Palmer, General Sir A. P., 320, 325, 344.
Palosi, Black Mountain, 27, 49, 50, 106.
Palosi, Kabul River, 214, 238, 240.
Palosin, 448.
Pamirs, 186.
Pandiali, 145, 218, 220, 222, 229, 230, 234, 235, 244.
Panjkhora River, 55, 108, 117, 143, 152, 177, 181, 213, 459.
Panjpao, 228, 229, 231, 232.
Panjtar, 69, 77–79.
Parachinar, 382, 383.
Pariari, 27, 31.
Parmalao, 84, 92.
Parpish, 198.
Pashat, 110.
Peghozai, 145.
Pennell, Dr., 14.
Peshawar, 2, 17, 18, 21, 38, 69, 72, 74, 82, 110, 113, 120, 147, 155,
219, 228, 269, 278, 297, 332.
sea-level, 219, 221, 227, 256.
Phaldan, 49.
Pirsai Pass, 103, 104.
Pirzada Bela, 50.
Pitcher, Lieut., 91.
Pokal, 46.
Pollock, General, 227.
Powindahs, 12.
Pranghar, 146, 147.
Probyn, Colonel, 99.
Pukhtunwali, 7.
Punial, 204, 205.
Punjab Frontier Force, 17, 18.
Puran Valley, 60, 65, 117.
Pustawani, Valley, 295–297.
R
Rabia Khel, Orakzais, 352, 358, 364 _et seq._, 375, 378.
Rahmatulla Khan, 130.
Rajanpur, 17.
Rajgal, 269, 361.
Rambat Pass, 177.
Ramora, 168.
Ramsay, General, 255, 257.
Ranizai, 57, 117, 140, 164.
Ranjit Singh, 68, 69, 113.
Ranken, Captain, 272.
Rawal Pindi, 137, 169, 185, 293, 383.
Razani, 452.
Razar, 58.
Razmak, 452, 464, 465.
Rega, 104.
Regiments and Corps—
_British Cavalry._
6th Dragoon Guards, 241.
16th Lancers, 320, 344.
_British Artillery._
D/A. Royal Horse Artillery, 303, 306.
I/C. Royal Horse Artillery, 241.
D/F. Royal Horse Artillery, 38.
9th Field Battery, Royal Artillery, 381.
10th Field Battery, Royal Artillery, 102, 181.
1/8 Royal Artillery, 401, 443.
11/9 Royal Artillery, 242, 304, 306, 307.
E/19 Royal Artillery, 38.
57th Field Battery, R.A., 345.
80th Battery, R.F.A., 257.
No. 1 Mountain Battery, R.A., 48, 138, 169, 343.
No. 3 Mountain Battery, R.A., 248, 340, 345.
No. 5 Mountain Battery, R.A., 248, 320.
No. 7 Mountain Battery, R.A., 102, 138.
No. 8 Mountain Battery, R.A., 320, 344, 460.
No. 9 Mountain Battery, R.A., 48, 320, 344.
_British Infantry._
Queen’s, Royal West Surrey Regt., 138, 343.
Buffs, East Kent Regt., 102, 103, 138, 153, 163, 173, 179.
5th—Northumberland Fusiliers, 242, 254, 258, 303, 306.
6th—Warwickshire Regt., 38, 339.
7th—Royal Fusiliers, 92, 98.
8th—King’s Liverpool Regt., 401.
9th—Norfolk Regt., 294.
Devonshire Regt., 249, 330, 343.
Somerset L.I., 245, 248.
West Yorkshire Regt., 258.
Bedfordshire Regt., 163.
17th—Leicestershire Regt., 304, 306, 307.
Royal Irish Regt., 44, 387.
19th—Yorkshire Regt., 38, 343.
Royal Scots Fusiliers, 381, 382.
22nd Foot, 232, 233, 287.
Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 48.
25th—King’s Own Scottish Borderers, 163, 241, 242, 306, 320, 323,
344.
27th—Inniskilling Fusiliers, 74, 345.
East Lancashire Regt., 164.
32nd—Duke of Cornwall’s L.I., 125, 127, 128, 146, 345.
Border Regt., 460, 463.
38th Foot, 39.
Dorsetshire Regt., 320, 328, 329, 344.
Oxford L.I., 169, 248, 345.
Derbyshire Regt., 327–330, 336, 343.
Northamptonshire Regt., 320, 323, 331, 344.
Royal West Kent Regt., 102, 138, 141.
51st—King’s Own Yorkshire L.I., 294, 303, 307, 337, 345.
53rd Foot, 230, 231.
60th—King’s Royal Rifles, 49, 121, 163, 282.
61st Foot, 121, 229, 282.
70th Foot, 74.
71st—Highland L.I., 88, 96, 97, 103, 138, 181.
Gordon Highlanders, 320, 328, 329, 344.
Seaforth Highlanders, 48, 163, 254, 340.
81st Foot, 77.
85th Foot, 402, 403, 443.
87th Foot, 74.
93rd—Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 92, 98, 468.
98th Foot, 76, 229, 282.
101st—Royal Munster Fusiliers, 82, 88, 93, 95, 96, 255, 259, 340.
Rifle Brigade, 164, 294, 306, 468.
_Indian Cavalry._
1st B.C., 402.
2nd Lancers, 127, 146.
3rd B.C., 345.
6th B.C., 345.
9th B.L., 39, 345.
10th Lancers, 102, 138, 153, 239.
11th B.L., 48, 49, 84, 134, 135, 138, 163, 179, 303.
13th B.L., 245, 248, 303, 306, 401, 402.
15th Cavalry, 447.
16th B.C., 38.
17th B.C., 241, 242.
18th B.L., 343, 345, 381, 402, 443.
19th Lancers, 258, 340.
1st P.C.—21st Cavalry, 127, 147, 255, 282, 460, 463, 468.
2nd P.C., 74, 291, 292, 437, 463.
3rd P.C., 368, 447, 464.
4th P.C., 370.
5th P.C., 445.
37th Lancers, 340.
2nd Central India Horse, 345.
10th Light Cavalry, 233.
1st Irregular Cavalry, 233.
7th Irregular Cavalry, 76, 77, 287.
13th Irregular Cavalry, 121.
15th Irregular Cavalry, 125, 282.
16th Irregular Cavalry, 33.
18th Irregular Cavalry, 77.
_Indian Artillery._
1st Troop, 1st Bde., Horse Artillery, 125, 127, 146.
5th Troop, 1st Bde., Horse Artillery, 33.
2nd Troop, 2nd Bde., Horse Artillery, 121.
No. 19 Light Field Battery, 127.
21st Kohat Mountain Battery, 291, 343, 401, 447, 464.
Derajat Mountain Battery, 43, 48, 49, 90, 163, 173, 340, 343, 447.
Mountain Train Battery, 33.
Peshawar Mountain Battery, 37, 38, 76, 93, 96, 255, 340, 439, 447,
460, 468.
Hazara Mountain Battery, 38, 84, 88, 89, 130, 151, 164, 439, 440,
447.
No. 7 Bengal Mountain Battery, 164.
No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, 102, 134, 138, 153, 164, 179, 460.
28th Mountain Battery, 255, 257.
No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery, 344.
No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery, 468.
Sappers and Miners, 33, 48, 76, 77, 103, 127, 133, 138, 146, 153,
163, 198, 229, 242, 255, 294, 304, 306, 307, 320, 340, 343, 345,
464, 468.
_Indian Infantry._
Corps of Guides, 17, 33, 35, 38, 50, 72, 76, 84, 90, 95, 102, 103,
120, 122, 127, 128, 130, 133, 135, 149, 151, 163, 166, 167, 169,
170, 179, 181, 258, 290, 306, 387, 439, 447.
1st N.I., 233.
3rd N.I., 33.
6th N.I.—6th Jats, 307, 468.
8th N.I., 241.
9th N.I., 233.
11th B.I., 48.
Kelat-i-Gilzie Regt., 33, 77, 345.
13th Rajputs, 163, 402.
14th Sikhs, 90, 93, 95, 194–196, 206–209, 294, 468.
15th Sikhs, 163, 320, 344, 381, 383.
16th B.I., 102, 153.
16th P.I., 75.
18th P.I., 76, 77.
19th B.I., 49, 259.
20th P.I., 38, 86, 88, 91, 93, 95, 96, 102, 103, 245, 248–250, 294,
402, 443, 460–462.
20th N.I., 287.
21st P.N.I., 76, 102, 138, 153, 255, 258.
21st N.I., 74.
22nd P.I., 138, 255, 258, 259, 294, 344.
23rd P.I., 92, 98, 163, 340.
24th P.I., 38, 43, 92, 133, 138, 181, 306, 448.
25th P.I., 163, 340.
26th P.I., 164.
27th B.I., 49.
27th P.N.I., 84, 294, 304, 307.
28th N.I., 127, 147.
28th B.I., 49, 169, 254, 259, 340.
29th N.I., 126.
29th P.I., 164, 400, 402.
30th P.I., 164, 241, 329, 343.
31st P.N.I., 39, 102, 103, 134, 138, 242.
32nd Pioneers, 48, 50, 194, 201–206, 448.
33rd P.I., 463, 468.
34th Pioneers, 44, 255, 345.
35th Sikhs, 136, 138, 153, 178, 179.
36th Sikhs, 326, 344, 386–388.
37th Dogras, 48, 163, 248.
38th Dogras, 136, 138, 460, 464.
39th Garhwal Rifles, 139, 169, 344.
40th Pathans, 255.
44th Merwara Infantry, 238, 303, 307.
45th Sikhs, 133, 134, 138, 304, 307, 340, 345.
55th N.I., 72, 73, 75, 115, 129.
1st Sikhs, 33, 71, 233, 291, 433, 464, 466, 468.
3rd Sikhs—53rd Sikhs, 38, 71, 98, 254, 290, 291, 327, 328, 339, 343,
460–462.
4th Sikhs—54th Sikhs, 48, 50, 163, 166, 171, 258, 340, 433, 439, 447,
449.
1st P.I.—55th Rifles, 84, 90, 94, 95, 122, 127, 128, 147, 254, 259,
282, 284, 340, 365, 370, 376, 433, 436, 439, 448, 451, 467.
2nd P.I., 38, 345, 365, 366, 370, 382, 387, 436, 448, 464.
3rd P.I., 88, 96, 366, 439, 440, 448, 451.
4th P.I.—57th Rifles, 44, 254, 292, 370, 402, 436, 439, 448, 460,
464.
5th P.I., 75, 84, 88, 97, 292, 297.
6th P.I.—59th Rifles, 75, 88, 254, 292, 339, 440, 464.
8th P.I., 77.
9th P.I., 76, 77.
71st N.I., 229.
1st Madras N.I., 242.
4th Madras N.I., 242.
2nd Hyderabad Infantry, 345.
21st Madras Pioneers, 326, 344.
103rd Mahrattas, 103, 122.
27th Bombay L.I., 345.
28th Bombay Infantry, 249, 343.
1st Gurkhas, 38, 126–128, 147, 164, 229, 248, 287, 330, 343, 460,
461.
2nd Gurkhas, 38, 164, 303, 307, 320, 328, 329, 344, 387.
3rd Gurkhas, 164, 320, 323, 344, 381, 387.
4th Gurkhas, 38, 90, 163, 306, 343.
5th Gurkhas, 37, 38, 48, 84, 97, 164, 292, 320, 339–341, 345, 448,
464.
9th Gurkhas, 248, 345.
_Local and Imperial Service Troops._
Gwalior Transport Corps, 345.
Jeypore Transport Corps, 345.
Jhind Regt., 344.
Jodhpur Lancers, 345.
Kapurtala Infantry, 345, 409.
No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery, 202, 203, 344.
4th Kashmir Rifles, 194–198, 206.
6th Kashmir Light Infantry, 194.
Kashmir Sappers, 202, 203.
Khyber Rifles, 10, 42, 43, 48, 225, 226, 257, 263, 272, 275, 315,
316, 340, 341.
Maler Kotla Sappers, 344.
Nabha Regt., 249, 344.
Patiala Regt., 249.
Sirmur Sappers, 344.
Reid, Colonel, 153, 154.
Rena, 240, 242, 243.
Renny, Colonel, 76.
Reshun, 198–200.
Richardson, Colonel, 381, 384, 408.
Ril, 49.
Roberts, Earl, 394, 405, 415.
Robertson, Sir G., 184, 188, 194, 195, 200.
Roganis, 119.
Roos-Keppel, Colonel, 258, 341, 410.
Ross, General, 294, 296.
Ross, Major, 95.
Ross, Captain, 197, 198, 200, 201.
Rothney, Colonel, 37.
Rud River, 155.
Rustam, 63, 83, 85, 92, 103, 104, 140.
S
Saadat Khan of Lalpura, 227–229, 234–237.
Saadat Khan, Ressaldar, 445, 446.
Sabuktagin, 347, 394.
Sadda, 354, 382–384, 392, 398, 408, 416.
Saddozai, 64.
Sadin, 233.
Sado, 160, 168, 169, 171, 176, 200.
Safed Koh, 261, 264, 265, 335, 390, 391, 406, 422.
Safis, 224–226, 235, 259.
Saidu Mandz, 114–116.
Saifaldara, 383, 384.
Saiyid Khel, 59.
Saiyids of Pariari, 28, 29, 31, 36, 39, 41, 42, 45, 46.
Salar, Gaduns, 67.
Salarzai, 57, 62, 101.
Salim Khan, 77–79, 113.
Samana, 321, 325, 346, 352, 358, 365, 373, 375 _et seq._
Samana Sukh, 321, 325, 326, 328.
Sambalbat, 41, 43.
Samil, 15.
Samilzai, Bangash, 396.
Sampagha Pass, 319, 329, 330, 350, 353, 355.
Sangar Picquet, 384, 386.
Sanghao, 102–104, 122, 124.
Saparai, 293.
Sapri, Bara Valley, 351, 356.
Sapri, Mohmand, 224.
Sapri, Utman Khel, 149, 150.
Saraghari, 321, 378, 384–387.
Sarghasha Pass, 287, 294–296.
Saroba, 452.
Sartop, 384, 386.
Satala, 214.
Shabkadar, 152, 218–220, 228, 231, 235, 236, 244, 248, 249, 251, 253
_et seq._
Shadipur, 290, 292.
Shah Afzul, 189, 190.
Shahgai, 219.
Shah Katur, 189.
Shahmansur Khel, 233.
Shakot, 126, 130.
Shakot Pass, 111, 117, 118, 165, 167.
Shakrata, 176.
Shakto Valley, 457, 465, 472.
Shal Nala, 51.
Shaman Khel, Mahsuds, 428.
Shamozai, 143.
Shamshak, 177.
Shamshikan, 168.
Shandur Pass, 183, 185, 194, 203.
Shanilo Ferry, 220.
Shankagarh, 245.
Sharaki, 283, 288.
Shatut, 29.
Shawal, 426, 429, 466, 469.
Sheikhans, Orakzais, 352, 357, 358, 364, 373, 376, 378.
Shekh Jana, 73, 75.
Sher Afzul, 173, 191, 193, 195, 196, 199, 207, 209.
Sheranni, 424, 466, 468, 469.
Sherdara Pass and Village, 63, 92.
Sherdil Khan, Ranizai, 129, 130.
Shergarh, Black Mountain, 33, 34.
Shergarh, Ranizai, 126–128.
Sheringal, 158.
Sher Khana, 122.
Sher Singh, 70, 120.
Shewa, 74.
Shiah, 14.
Shilman, 218–220, 222, 224, 226, 252, 317.
Shilman Gakhe, 226.
Shinawari, 318, 319, 321, 325, 327, 332, 383.
Shindih, 292.
Shingi Kot, 447, 450, 471.
Shingli, 33, 34.
Shingri, 44, 46.
Shinkamar Pass, 337.
Shinpokh, 226, 238.
Shinwaris, 218, 221, 226, 261, 271, 272, 275, 276, 308, 315, 317, 334,
342, 391, 406.
Shoshni, 33, 34.
Shuja-ul-Mulk, 195.
Sika Ram, 391, 406, 422.
Sinazai, 145.
Sipah, Afridis, 268, 272, 308, 327, 331, 336.
Sirgani, Mohmands, 222.
Siri, 81.
Sisobi, 224, 304, 308, 309, 335.
Sitana, 70, 73, 79, 81, 105.
Skinner, Colonel J., 68.
Slessor, Capt., 321, 324.
Spin, 421, 460.
Spinasuka Pass, 110.
Sturi Khel, Orakzais, 351, 355, 356, 372, 373.
Suastos, 108.
Sudum, 3, 59, 120.
Sulala Hills, 145, 151.
Suleiman Mountains, 1, 347.
Sultan Khel, 159.
Sultanpur, 66.
Sunni, 14.
Surai Malandri, 101.
Suran Valley, 249, 251.
Surkhabi, 85.
Surmal, 51.
Swabi, 58, 82, 83.
Swat River and Valley, 2, 22, 30, 73, 107 _et seq._, 117, 143, 159,
192, 202, 212.
Swatis, 26, 39, 97.
Symons, General W. P., 343, 463, 468.
T
Tajik, 2, 5.
Talai, 326, 358.
Talash Valley, 119, 158, 159, 168.
Tanawal, 26–28.
Tanga Pass, 103, 104.
Tangi, 125, 149, 150.
Tank, 23, 428, 445, 448, 450, 453, 455, 464, 470.
Tappizad, Dawaris, 431.
Tarakzai, Mohmands, 222, 224, 237, 244, 260.
Taralai, 78.
Tarkanris, Yusafzais, 55, 155 _et seq._
Tarnak River, 211.
Tartara, 219, 226, 227, 229, 304.
Tatta, Batannis, 429.
Taylor, Colonel R., 115.
Temple, Sir R., 5, 15.
Teru, 203.
Thabai, 335, 342.
Thackwell, General, 302.
Thakot, 24, 26, 27, 39, 46, 51.
Thal, 22, 372, 384, 389, 390–393, 397, 400, 402, 403, 433, 438, 440,
441, 444, 473.
Thana, 117, 137, 140.
Tikari, 25, 27, 29, 39, 41, 45, 46.
Tilli, 35, 36, 45, 46, 49, 50.
Tilli, Saiyids of, 31.
Timur, 347, 394.
Tinaolis, 65.
Tirah, 10, 263, 268, 318 _et seq._
Tochi, 18, 313, 419–421, 426, 429, 432, 436, 457, 466, 468, 469.
Topi, 79, 82, 83.
Torawari, 384, 389, 398, 400, 402, 403.
Torbela, 32, 65, 66, 79, 83.
Tordhair, 112.
Torikho, 187.
Torwals, 119.
Totai, 145, 153.
Totalai, 77.
Townsend, Captain C. V., 195, 196, 206, 207.
Turabaz Khan, 227, 236.
Turangzai, 126.
Turis, 14, 384, 397, 410 _et seq._, 440.
Turki, 292.
Turner, General, 460.
Tytler, General, 305 _et seq._, 399–405.
U
Ublan Pass, 355, 368, 370, 382.
Uch, 168, 176.
Uch Valley, 159.
Udny, Sir R., 214, 381.
Umar, 55.
Umarzai, Wazirs, 435–437.
Umra Khan of Jandol, 131, 132, 161 _et seq._, 173, 192, 193, 195.
Uraspan, Batannis, 429.
Urmar, 427.
Ushiri Valley, 158.
Usmanzai, 58, 59.
Utman Khel, 54–58, 108, 117, 126, 139, 142 _et seq._, 165, 171, 175,
177, 253.
Utman Khel, Orakzais, 284, 354, 355, 368, 369, 371.
Utmanzai, Darwesh Khel, 426, 437, 439, 473.
Utmanzai, Mohmands, 224, 226, 244, 251, 260.
Utmanzai, Yusafzais, 56, 58, 59, 65, 67, 79, 80, 104.
V
Vaughan, Colonel, 39, 40, 74, 88, 89, 99.
W
Wade, Colonel, 227, 273, 281.
Wahabis, 68, 115.
Wakhan, 185, 191.
Walai, Bazar Valley, 341.
Walai, Kohat, 296.
Wale, 52.
Wana, 421, 423, 424, 426, 458, 460, 462, 464, 465, 471.
Waran Valley, 278, 331, 332, 361.
Warburton, Colonel, 61, 266, 271, 275.
Watelai, 155–157, 177, 178, 181.
Waterfield, General, 163, 167, 173.
Watkis, General, 340.
Waziristan, 16, 18, 22, 162, 212, 391, 418 _et seq._
Westmacott, General, 248, 250, 316, 320, 330, 332, 333, 337, 344.
Whitchurch, Captain, 196.
Wilde, General, 37, 39, 40, 84 _et seq._, 95, 99.
Willcocks, General Sir J., 253 _et seq._, 339 _et seq._
Williams, Major, 292.
Wodehouse, General, 138 _et seq._, 176, 178.
Woon, Colonel, 245, 246.
Y
Yarkhun River, 184, 217.
Yasin, 158, 183, 191, 202.
Yeatman-Biggs, General, 326, 327, 344, 381, 383, 385–388.
Younghusband, Sir F., 186.
Yusaf, 55.
Yusafzais, 17, 26–28, 54 _et seq._, 71 _et seq._, 221.
Z
Zaimukhts, 346, 391, 396 _et seq._
Zakha Khel, 252, 255, 268, 270–272, 276, 301 _et seq._
Zarmelan, 421.
Zawa Ghar Range, 397, 398.
Zawo, 397, 402-404.
Zhob River, 2.
Zirak, 150, 151.
Zormandai, 122.
GLASGOW: PRINTED AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS BY ROBERT MACLEHOSE AND CO.
LTD.
[Click anywhere on map for high resolution image.]
[Illustration:
No. I.
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE.
_Stanford’s Geog^l. Estab^t, London_
London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd.
]
[Illustration:
No. II.
GENERAL TRIBAL MAP.
London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd.
]
[Illustration:
No. III.
THE BLACK MOUNTAIN.
London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd
]
[Illustration:
No. IV.
SWAT, BUNER AND BAJAUR.
London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd
]
[Illustration:
No. V.
DIR AND CHITRAL.
London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd
]
[Illustration:
No. VI.
UTMAN KHEL AND MOHMAND COUNTRIES.
London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd
]
[Illustration:
No. VII.
AFRIDI AND ORAKZAI COUNTRIES MIRANZAI AND KURRAM.
London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd
]
[Illustration:
No. VIII.
TOCHI AND WAZIRISTAN.
London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd
]
-----
Footnote 1:
It is significant that the Pushtu word _tarbur_ means both cousin and
enemy.
Footnote 2:
The Sunnis represent the orthodox church of Islam, recognise no divine
right of succession to the Caliphate, and claim for the “faithful”
free choice in the selection of their spiritual leader; the Shiahs, or
sectarians, claim that the right of succession to Muhammad rests with
his cousin Ali and Ali’s descendants.
Footnote 3:
For what follows I am indebted to a paper read by Mr. W. R. H. Merk,
C.S.I., LL.D., at the Royal Society of Arts, and published in the
Journal for June, 1911, on “the North-West Frontier Province of
India.” The North-West Frontier Province was formed on the 9th
November, 1901.
Footnote 4:
See Map III.
Footnote 5:
It is to be regretted that no “life” of this remarkable frontier
official has ever appeared.
Footnote 6:
Disbanded in 1861.
Footnote 7:
Mutinied at Phillour in 1857.
Footnote 8:
Now the 12th Pioneers.
Footnote 9:
Now the 51st Sikhs.
Footnote 10:
Now the 16th Cavalry.
Footnote 11:
Now the 53rd Sikhs.
Footnote 12:
Now the 56th Punjabi Rifles.
Footnote 13:
Now the 20th Punjabis.
Footnote 14:
Now the 24th Punjabis.
Footnote 15:
Now the 9th Hodson’s Horse.
Footnote 16:
Now the 31st Punjabis.
Footnote 17:
Now the 57th Wilde’s Rifles.
Footnote 18:
Now the 54th Sikhs.
Footnote 19:
Now the 11th Rajputs.
Footnote 20:
Now 28th Punjabis.
Footnote 21:
Now 19th Punjabis.
Footnote 22:
Now 27th Punjabis.
Footnote 23:
See Map IV.
Footnote 24:
For what follows, I am indebted to an article by Col. A. H. Mason in
the Journal of the _United Service Institution of India_ for 1890.
Footnote 25:
See Map IV.
Footnote 26:
From _A History of the Indian Mutiny_, by T. Rice Holmes.
Footnote 27:
Now the 22nd Cavalry.
Footnote 28:
Now the 1st Brahmans.
Footnote 29:
Now the 58th Vaughan’s Rifles.
Footnote 30:
Now the 59th Scinde Rifles.
Footnote 31:
Now the 24th Punjabis.
Footnote 32:
The Peshawar Light Field Battery was raised during the Mutiny from the
Bengal Foot Artillery, horsed from the horses taken from the disbanded
5th Light Cavalry.
Footnote 33:
Now the 23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery.
Footnote 34:
Now the 5th Cavalry.
Footnote 35:
Raised during the Mutiny from men of the 27th, 70th and 87th Foot: had
a strength of ninety of all ranks, and was commanded by Captain Fane,
87th.
Footnote 36:
Now the 1st Brahmans.
Footnote 37:
Now the 21st Punjabis.
Footnote 38:
Now the 26th Punjabis.
Footnote 39:
Now the 8th Cavalry.
Footnote 40:
Now the 20th Punjabis.
Footnote 41:
_Life of Field Marshal Sir Neville Chamberlain_, by G. W. Forrest.
Footnote 42:
Now the 24th Hazara Mountain Battery.
Footnote 43:
Now the 55th Coke’s Rifles.
Footnote 44:
Now the 11th Lancers.
Footnote 45:
Now the 27th Punjabis.
Footnote 46:
Now the 20th Brownlow’s Punjabis.
Footnote 47:
Disbanded in 1882.
Footnote 48:
Now the 22nd Derajat Mountain Battery.
Footnote 49:
Now the 23rd Sikh Pioneers.
Footnote 50:
Now the 24th Punjabis.
Footnote 51:
Now the 16th Rajputs.
Footnote 52:
Now the 21st Punjabis.
Footnote 53:
Now the 28th Mountain Battery.
Footnote 54:
Now the 10th Lancers (Hodson’s Horse).
Footnote 55:
Now the 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.
Footnote 56:
See Map IV.
Footnote 57:
Mutinied in 1857.
Footnote 58:
Disbanded in 1861 as the 16th.
Footnote 59:
Mutinied in 1857.
Footnote 60:
Now the 1st Gurkha Rifles.
Footnote 61:
For particulars see Chapter VI.
Footnote 62:
Now the 2nd Lancers (Gardner’s Horse).
Footnote 63:
Now the 21st Cavalry (Daly’s Horse).
Footnote 64:
Mutinied at Shahjahanpur in 1857.
Footnote 65:
See Maps V. and VI.
Footnote 66:
Afterwards killed at Fatehabad during the Afghan War.
Footnote 67:
Afterwards killed in the attack on the British Residency at Kabul.
Footnote 68:
See Chapter VII.
Footnote 69:
See Maps IV. and V.
Footnote 70:
Now the 25th Punjabis.
Footnote 71:
Now the 13th Rajputs.
Footnote 72:
Now the 27th Mountain Battery.
Footnote 73:
Now the 26th Punjabis.
Footnote 74:
Now the 29th Punjabis.
Footnote 75:
Now the 30th Punjabis.
Footnote 76:
Not to be confused with the village of the same name in Lower Swat.
Footnote 77:
See Map V.
Footnote 78:
Sir Francis Younghusband in the _Journal of the Society of Arts_,
April 1895.
Footnote 79:
_Chitral, the Story of a Minor Siege._
Footnote 80:
_The Indian Borderland._
Footnote 81:
_The Gates of India._
Footnote 82:
_Chitral, the Story of a Minor Siege._
Footnote 83:
See Map VI.
Footnote 84:
The word “Gandab” signifies bad water.
Footnote 85:
Usually termed “Arbaba.”
Footnote 86:
See Map VI.
Footnote 87:
Ceased to exist after the Mutiny.
Footnote 88:
Mutinied at Lucknow in 1857.
Footnote 89:
Mutinied in 1857.
Footnote 90:
Mutinied in 1857.
Footnote 91:
Now the 1st Lancers (Skinner’s Horse).
Footnote 92:
Mutinied in 1857.
Footnote 93:
Mutinied in 1857.
Footnote 94:
Now the 44th Merwara Infantry.
Footnote 95:
Now the 17th Cavalry.
Footnote 96:
Now the 8th Rajputs.
Footnote 97:
Now the 61st Pioneers.
Footnote 98:
Now the 64th Pioneers.
Footnote 99:
Now the 128th Pioneers.
Footnote 100:
The permanent way and girders of this Loi-Shilman extension of the
N.W. Railway were removed in the winter of 1911-12.
Footnote 101:
See Map VII.
Footnote 102:
Particulars of the sources of supply of rifles will be found in
Appendix A.
Footnote 103:
_The Second Afghan War, abridged official account._
Footnote 104:
During the first Afghan War.
Footnote 105:
On the frontier, the word “Kandao” is frequently used for Pass.
Footnote 106:
See Map VII.
Footnote 107:
Not to be confused with a pass of the same name between the Khyber and
the Bazar Valley.
Footnote 108:
Mutinied in 1857.
Footnote 109:
Now the 21st Kohat Mountain Battery.
Footnote 110:
Now the 22nd Derajat Mountain Battery.
Footnote 111:
Now the 14th Ferozepore Sikhs.
Footnote 112:
See Map VII.
Footnote 113:
For further details of this abduction see Warburton’s _Eighteen Years
in the Khyber_.
Footnote 114:
The villages in the Sisobi Glen are inhabited by Mullagoris, a
comparatively insignificant tribe of doubtful origin, and therefore
rather despised by their neighbours. They number about 900 fighting
men, and the bulk of the tribe live north of the Kabul river and to
the west of the Peshawar border, owning the Tartara mountain, 7000
feet high, valuable as a sanatorium and as a position of considerable
strategic importance. For further information about the Mullagoris see
Chapter IX.
Footnote 115:
Now the 6th Jat Light Infantry.
Footnote 116:
For details of this march, see the narrative of Surgeon-General
Ker-Innes.
Footnote 117:
King of Islam.
Footnote 118:
The requirements of expeditionary carriage always weigh with especial
hardship on the Punjab; during the summer of 1897 the Deputy
Commissioners in that Province impressed about 100,000 animals and
25,000 owners, and of these numbers not one in five was actually
required and sent to the front.
Footnote 119:
For much of the following I am indebted to Captain A. K. Slessor’s
_Tirah Campaign_—being No. 5 of the “Derbyshire Campaign Series,”
printed for regimental circulation.
Footnote 120:
Quotation is here again made from Captain Slessor’s book.
Footnote 121:
This was afterwards found to be a mere goat-track, quite unsuited to
the movement of any large force—still less for its transport.
“Talai” is sometimes called “Tsalai.”
Footnote 122:
Now the 128th Pioneers.
Footnote 123:
Now the 39th King George’s Own Central India Horse.
Footnote 124:
Now the 127th L.I.
Footnote 125:
Now the 95th Russell’s Infantry.
Footnote 126:
See Map VII.
Footnote 127:
Not to be confused with a tribe of the same name in the Yusafzai
country.
Footnote 128:
See Map VII.
Footnote 129:
No longer in existence.
Footnote 130:
Disbanded in 1882.
Footnote 131:
4 mountain guns, 300 rifles Royal Irish Regiment, 500 1st Battalion
2nd Gurkhas, 500 1st Battalion 3rd Gurkhas, 500 2nd Punjab Infantry,
half a company Bombay Sappers and Miners, and departmental details.
Footnote 132:
See Map VII.
Footnote 133:
Above Sadda is Upper Kurram, between Sadda and Thal is Lower Kurram.
Footnote 134:
See Map VIII.
Footnote 135:
The Tochi Valley is sixty-three miles in length.
Footnote 136:
See Map VIII.
Footnote 137:
“The family history of Badshah Khan shows the extraordinary conditions
which obtain across the frontier, and how seldom men of any note die
in their beds. His grandfather, Jangi Khan, was a well-known raider,
and he met his death in 1860 at the hands of the 5th Punjab Cavalry
when leading a force of Mahsuds to attack Tank. His father, Umar Khan,
sacked Tank in 1879, but was killed in a blood-feud in the following
year. Badshah Khan was always a prominent figure in the Mahsud jirgahs
which came in to discuss matters with our political officers, and he
occasionally exerted his authority to keep the more lawless spirits of
the tribe in check, but he had to join in the general resistance when
punitive expeditions entered the country. His eldest son, Jehan Khan,
was killed during the blockade of 1901. He has left two other sons,
and these will doubtless maintain the reputation of the
family.”—_Pioneer Mail_, August 11th, 1911.
Footnote 138:
Now the 21st Kohat Mountain Battery.
Footnote 139:
Now the 22nd Derajat Mountain Battery.
Footnote 140:
Now the 15th Cavalry, at that time attached to the Punjab Frontier
Force.
Footnote 141:
Afterwards disbanded.
Footnote 142:
Now the 32nd Pioneers.
Footnote 143:
Now 5th Gurkhas.
Footnote 144:
_Kach_, a stretch of alluvial land subject to inundation, in a valley
or in the broad bed of a nullah.
Footnote 145:
Now the 33rd Punjabis.
Footnote 146:
Now the 23rd Cavalry.
Footnote 147:
Vol. III., pp. 86 and 89, 1851 edition.
Footnote 148:
_Proceedings of the Central Asian Society_, May 1911.
Footnote 149:
These figures are in many cases only approximate.
Footnote 150:
Includes garrisons of Chitral Fort and Mastuj, and parties under Capt.
Ross and Lieut. Edwardes.
Footnote 151:
Four to six small columns employed, strength averaging 1000.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
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1. Silently corrected typographical errors and variations in spelling.
2. Anachronistic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings retained as
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3. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.
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