History of Greece, Volume 05 (of 12)

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Title: History of Greece, Volume 05 (of 12)
Author: Grote, George
Language: English
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TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

* Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_.
* Small caps are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS.
* Letter spaced Greek text is enclosed in tildes as in ~καὶ τὰ
λοιπά~.
* Footnotes have been renumbered. Each footnote is placed at the
end of the paragraph that includes its anchor.
* Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after
comparison with a later edition of this work. Greek text has
also been corrected after checking with this later edition and
with Perseus, when the reference was found.
* Original spelling, hyphenation and punctuation have been kept,
but variant spellings were made consistent when a predominant
usage was found.
* Nevetherless, no attempt has been made at normalizing proper
names (i.e. Ægæan and Ægean, Æschines and Æschinês, Alkibiades and
Alkibiadês, Andokides and Andokidês, Aristeides and Aristeidês,
Boedromion and Boëdromion, Chalkiœkos and Chalkiœkus, Deinomenes
and Deinomenês, Deïphonus and Dêiphonus, Demosthenes and
Demosthenês, Inaros and Inarôs, Isokrates and Isokratês,
Kephallenia and Kephallênia, Miltiades and Miltiadês, Mykenæ and
Mykênæ, Pegæ and Pêgæ, Sestus and Sestos, Thucydides and
Thucydidês, Xenophon and Xenophôn, etc.). The author established
at the beginning of the first volume of this work some rules of
transcription for proper names, but neither he nor his publisher
follow them consistently.

HISTORY OF GREECE.

GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.

VOL. V.

REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION.

NEW YORK:
HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS
329 AND 331 PEARL STREET.
1857.

PREFACE TO VOL. V.

VOLUMES V AND VI.

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE PEACE OF NIKIAS.

B. C. 490-421.

I had reckoned upon carrying my readers in these two volumes down to
the commencement of the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse.

But the narration of events, now that we are under the positive
guidance of Thucydidês,—coupled with the exposition of some points on
which I differ from the views generally taken by my predecessors,—
have occupied greater space than I had foreseen: and I have been
obliged to enlarge my Sixth Volume beyond the usual size, in order to
arrive even at the Peace of Nikias.

The interval of disturbance and partial hostility, which ensued
between that peace and the Athenian expedition, will therefore be
reserved for the beginning of my Seventh Volume, the publication of
which will not be long delayed.

G. G.

Dec. 1848.

CONTENTS.

VOL. V.

PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE MARCH OF XERXES AGAINST GREECE.

Resolutions of Darius to invade Greece a second time. His death.
— Succeeded by his son Xerxes. — Revolt and reconquest of Egypt
by the Persians. — Indifference of Xerxes to the invasion of
Greece — persons who advised and instigated him — persuasions
which they employed — prophecies produced by Onomakritus. —
Xerxes resolves to invade Greece. — Historical manner and
conception of Herodotus. — Xerxes announces his project to an
assembly of Persian counsellors — Mardonius and Artabanus,
the evil and good genius. — Xerxes is induced by Artabanus to
renounce his project — his repeated dreams — divine command to
invade Greece. — Religious conception of the sequences of history
— common both to Persians and Greeks. — Vast preparations of
Xerxes — March of Xerxes from the interior of Asia — collection
of the invading army at Sardis — his numerous fleet and large
magazines of provision beforehand. — He throws a bridge of boats
across the Hellespont. — The bridge is destroyed by a storm —
Wrath of Xerxes — he puts to death the engineers and punishes the
Hellespont. — Remarks on this story of the punishment inflicted
on the Hellespont: there is no sufficient reason for disbelieving
its reality. — Reconstruction of the bridge — description of it
in detail. — Xerxes cuts a ship-canal across the isthmus of Mount
Athos. — Superior intelligence of the Phenicians. — Employment
of the lash over the workmen engaged on the canal — impression
made thereby on the Greeks. — Bridge of boats thrown across the
Strymon. — March of Xerxes from Sardis — disposition of his army.
— Story of the rich Kappadokian Pythius — his son put to death
by order of Xerxes. — March to Abydos — respect shown to Ilium
by Xerxes. — Xerxes and his army cross over the Hellespontine
bridges. — March to Doriskus in Thrace, near the mouth of the
Hebrus — his fleet joins him here. — Review and muster on the
plain of Doriskus — immense variety of the nations brought
together. — Numbering of the army — method employed. — Immense
and incredible totals brought out by Herodotus. — Comments upon
the evidence of Herodotus and upon himself as witness and judge.
— Other testimonies about the number of the Persians. — Xerxes
passes in review the land-force and the fleet at Doriskus — his
conversation with the Spartan king Demaratus. — March of Xerxes
from Doriskus westward along Thrace. — Contributions levied on
the Grecian towns on the coast of Thrace — particularly Thasus
and Abdêra. — Xerxes crosses the Strymon — marches to Akanthus —
zeal of the Akanthians in regard to the canal of Athos. — March
of Xerxes to Therma — his fleet join him in the Thermaic Gulf.
— Favorable prospects of the invasion — zeal of the Macedonian
prince to assist Xerxes.
1-44

CHAPTER XXXIX.

PROCEEDINGS IN GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE TIME OF
THE BATTLE OF THERMOPYLÆ.

Violent proceedings and death of Kleomenês king of Sparta. —
Complaint of the Æginetans at Sparta against Kleomenês and
Leotychidês, on the subject of the hostages which those two
kings had taken from Ægina. — The Spartans deliver Leotychidês
to the Æginetans, who require him to go with them to Athens,
to get back the hostages. — Refusal of the Athenians to give
up the hostages — reprisals of the Æginetans. — The Æginetan
Nikodromus lays a scheme for a democratical revolution in Ægina,
in concert with Athens — the movement fails. — Treatment of the
defeated conspirators — sacrilege. — The Athenians land a force
in Ægina — war which ensues. — Effect of this war in inducing the
Athenians to enlarge their military force. — Themistoklês and
Aristeidês, the chief men at Athens — intense rivalry between
them. — Banishment of the latter by ostracism. — Conversion
of Athens from a land power into a naval power proposed and
urged by Themistoklês. — Views and long-sighted calculations of
Themistoklês — he was at this time more essential to his country
than Aristeidês. — Fleet of Athens — the salvation of Greece
as well as of herself. — Valuable fund new first available to
Athens from the silver mines of Laurium in Attica. — Themistoklês
prevails upon the Athenian people to forego the distribution
of this fund, and employ it in building an increased number of
ships. — Preparations of Xerxes — known beforehand in Greece. —
Heralds from Persia to demand earth and water from the Grecian
cities — many of them comply and submit. — Pan-Hellenic congress
convened jointly by Athens and Sparta at the Isthmus of Corinth.
— Important effect on Grecian mind. — Effects of the congress in
healing feuds among the different Greeks — especially between
Athens and Ægina. — Alarm and mistrust prevalent throughout
Greece. — Terror conveyed in the reply of the Delphian oracle
to the Athenian envoys. — Sentence of the oracle frightful, yet
obscure: efforts of the Athenians to interpret it: ingenuity
and success of Themistoklês. — Great and genuine Pan-Hellenic
patriotism of the Athenians — strongly attested by Herodotus, as
his own judgment. — Unwillingness, or inability, on the part of a
large proportion of Greeks, to resist the Persians. — Ambiguous
neutrality of Argos. — Different stories current in Greece about
Argos — opinion of Herodotus. — Refusal or equivocation of the
Kretans and Korkyræans. — Mission to Gelon at Syracuse — his
reply. — Grecian army sent into Thessaly, to defend the defile
of Tempê against Xerxes. — On arriving, they find that it cannot
be successfully held against him, and retire. — Consequences of
this retreat — the Thessalians, and nearly all Hellas north of
Kithæron, either submit to Xerxes or waver.
45-70

CHAPTER XL.

BATTLES OF THERMOPYLÆ AND ARTEMISIUM.

Engagement taken by the Confederate Greeks against such Greeks
as joined the Persians. — Resolution taken to defend Thermopylæ
as well as the adjoining strait of Eubœa. — Pass of Thermopylæ
and its neighborhood. — The Greeks take post at Thermopylæ —
Leonidas, king of Sparta, conducts the force thither — the
combined fleet under Eurybiadês occupy the Eubœan strait. —
Numbers and composition of the force of Leonidas. — Phocians
and Lokrians. — Olympian and Karneian festivals — the Greeks
could not bring themselves to postpone these, even under such
imminent danger. — Path over Mount Œta by which Thermopylæ might
be evaded — Leonidas first informed of it on reaching the spot —
the Phocians engage to defend it. — Numbers and composition of
the Greek fleet at Artemisium. — Three triremes of the Grecian
fleet sent forward as scouts — their first encounter with the
Persian fleet. — Capture of these three triremes — panic of
the general Grecian fleet, who abandon Artemisium, and retire
to Chalkis. — Imminent danger of the Greek scheme of defence —
they are rescued by a terrific storm. — Movements of Xerxes from
Therma. — He arrives with his army in the Malian territory, close
upon the pass of Thermopylæ. — Advance of the Persian fleet — it
is overtaken by a destructive storm and hurricane on the coast
of Magnesia. — Immense damage inflicted upon it by the storm. —
Encouragement occasioned to the Greek fleet — they return from
Chalkis to Artemisium. — Delay of Xerxes with his land-force
near Trachis. — Impressions of Xerxes about the defenders at
Thermopylæ — conversation with Demaratus, whom he will not
believe. — Doubts about the motives ascribed by Herodotus to
Xerxes. — First attack upon Thermopylæ — made by the Median
troops — repulsed. — Repeated attacks, by the best troops in the
Persian army, all repulsed with slaughter. — Embarrassment of
Xerxes — he is relieved from it by hearing of the path over the
mountain. — A Persian detachment under Hydarnês march over the
mountain-path, driving away the Phocian guard. — They arrive in
the rear of Leonidas. — Debate among the defenders of Thermopylæ,
when it became known that the Persians were approaching their
rear. — Resolution of Leonidas to stay and die in the pass. — The
three hundred Spartans, together with the Thespians, remain with
Leonidas: the rest of the detachment retire. — Doubts about the
Theban contingent. — Last exploits and death of Leonidas and his
band. — Individuals among them distinguished — scorn exhibited
towards Aristodêmus who did not fight. — Fate of the Theban
contingent. — Impressions of Xerxes after the combat — advice
given to him by Demaratus — he rejects it. — Proceedings of the
two fleets, at Artemisium and Aphetæ — alarm among the Grecian
fleet — Themistoklês determines them to stay and fight, at the
urgent instance of the Eubœans. — Important service thus rendered
by Themistoklês. — Confident hopes of the Persian fleet — they
detach a squadron to sail round Eubœa, and take the Greeks in
the rear. — Sea-fight of Artemisium — advantage gained by the
Greeks. — Second storm — increased damage to the Persian fleet,
and ruin to the detachment sent round Eubœa. — Renewed sea-fight
off Artemisium — indecisive — but the Greek fleet resolves to
retreat. — They retreat immediately on hearing of the disaster
at Thermopylæ — they go to Salamis. — Advance of the Persian
fleet to Eubœa — manœuvres ascribed to Xerxes in respect of the
dead bodies at Thermopylæ — Numbers of dead on both sides. —
Subsequent commemorating inscriptions. — Impressive epigram of
Simonides.
70-104

CHAPTER XLI.

BATTLE OF SALAMIS. — RETREAT OF XERXES.

Surprise and terror of the Greeks immediately after the battle
of Thermopylæ. — No ulterior plan of defence formed — no
new position to be found, capable of defending Attica — the
Peloponnesians crowd to fortify the Isthmus of Corinth. —
Hopeless situation of the Athenians — no measures yet taken
to remove their families from Attica. — The Athenians abandon
Attica, removing their families and property to Salamis, Ægina,
Trœzen, etc. — Unavoidable hurry and sufferings of the emigrants.
— Energy of the Athenians, and unanimity of the leaders —
Themistoklês proposes the restoration of Aristeidês from exile. —
Numbers and composition of the combined Greek fleet at Salamis.
— Xerxes occupies Athens and Attica — the Persian fleet enters
the road of Phalêrum. — The Persian army ravage the Phocian
townships in their march from Thermopylæ to Attica — pillage
of the temple at Abæ. — Persian division detached against the
temple of Delphi. — Failure, flight, and ruin of the detachment.
— Xerxes with the Peisistratids in Athens — the acropolis holds
out — is taken and sacked. — Atoning visit of the Peisistratids
to the ruined acropolis. — Xerxes reviews his fleet at Phalêrum —
debate about the policy of fighting a naval battle at Salamis —
prudent counsel of Queen Artemisia. — Resolution taken by Xerxes
to fight at Salamis. — Dissensions among the Greeks in the fleet
at Salamis. Resolution taken to remove the fleet to the Isthmus.
— Ruinous consequences, if that resolution had been executed. —
Themistoklês opposes the resolution, persuades Eurybiadês, and
prevails upon him to reopen the debate. — Synod of Grecian chiefs
again convened — Themistoklês tries to get the former resolution
rescinded — the Peloponnesians adhere to it — angry words. —
Menace of Themistoklês to retire with the Athenian squadron,
unless a battle were to be fought at Salamis — Eurybiadês takes
upon him to adopt this measure. — The Peloponnesian chiefs,
silenced for the moment, afterwards refuse obedience. Third
synod convened — renewed disputes; the majority opposed to
Themistoklês and determined on retreating to the Isthmus. —
Desperate stratagem of Themistoklês — he sends a private message
across to Xerxes, persuading him to surround the Greek fleet in
the night, and thus render retirement impossible. — Impatient
haste of Xerxes to prevent any of the Greeks from escaping — his
fleet incloses the Greeks during the night. — Aristeidês comes in
the night to the Greek fleet from Ægina — informs the chiefs that
they are inclosed by the Persians, and that escape has become
impossible. — Position of Xerxes — order of the fleets, and plan
of attack. — Battle of Salamis — confusion and complete defeat
of the Persians. — Distinguished gallantry of Queen Artemisia.
— Expectations of the Greeks that the conflict would be renewed
— fears of Xerxes for his own personal safety — he sends his
fleet away to Asia. — Xerxes resolves to go back himself to Asia
— advice and recommendation of Mardonius, who is left behind,
as general, to finish the conquest of Greece. — The Greeks
pursue the Persian fleet as far as Andros — second stratagem of
Themistoklês by secret message to Xerxes. — Themistoklês with the
fleet — levying money in the Cyclades. — Xerxes evacuates Attica
and returns home by land, with the larger portion of his army. —
Retreating march of Xerxes to the Hellespont — sufferings of his
troops. He finds the bridge broken, and crosses the strait on
shipboard into Asia. — Joy of the Greeks — distribution of honors
and prizes. — Honors rendered to Themistoklês.
104-147

CHAPTER XLII.

BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALE. — FINAL REPULSE OF THE PERSIANS.

The Persian fleet, after retiring from Greece, winters at Kymê,
and collects in the spring at Samos. — The Greek fleet assembles
in the spring at Ægina. — General adherence of the _medizing_
Greeks to Mardonius — revolt of Potidæa — which is besieged in
vain by Artabazus. — Mardonius, after wintering in Thessaly,
resumes operations in the spring in Bœotia. He consults the
Bœotian oracles. — Mardonius sends Alexander of Macedon to
Athens, to offer the most honorable terms of peace. — Temptation
to Athens to accept this offer — fear of the Lacedæmonians that
she would accept it — Lacedæmonian envoys sent to Athens to
prevent it. — Resolute reply of the Athenians, and determination
to carry on the war, in spite of great present suffering. —
Selfish indifference displayed by Sparta and the Peloponnesians
towards Athens. — The Spartans, having fortified the Isthmus,
leave Attica undefended: Mardonius occupies Athens a second
time. — Second migration of the Athenians to Salamis — their
bitter disappointment and anger against Sparta for deserting
them. — Second offer of Mardonius to the Athenians — again
refused — intense resolution which they display. — Remonstrance
sent by the Athenians to Sparta — ungenerous slackness of the
Spartans. — Large Spartan force collected under Pausanias at
the Isthmus. — Mardonius, after ravaging Attica, retires into
Bœotia. — Discouragement in the army of Mardonius generally:
Thersander of Orchomenus at the banquet: jealousies between
Mardonius and Artabazus, the second in command — zeal and
eagerness of the Thebans. — Numbers of the Greeks collected under
Pausanias. — March of Pausanias over Kithæron into Bœotia. — He
is attacked by the Persian cavalry under Masistius, and much
harassed — superior efficiency of the Athenians against cavalry
— Masistius is slain. — The Greeks quit the protection of the
mountain-grounds and take up a position nearer to Platæa, along
the Asôpus. — Mardonius alters his position, and posts himself
nearly opposite to the Greeks on the other side of the Asôpus. —
Unwillingness of both armies to begin the attack — the prophets
on both sides discourage first aggression. — Mardonius annoys
the Greeks with his cavalry, and cuts off their supplies in the
rear. — Impatience of Mardonius — in spite of the reluctance
of Artabazus and other officers he determines on a general
attack: he tries to show that the prophecies are favorable to
him. — His intention communicated to the Athenians in the night
by Alexander of Macedon. — Pausanias changes places in the line
between the Spartans and Athenians. — Mardonius again attacks
them with his cavalry. — In consequence of the annoyance of the
Persian cavalry, Pausanias determines to move in the night into
the Island. — Confusion of the Grecian army in executing this
night-movement. — Refusal of the Spartan lochage Amompharetus
to obey the order for the night-march. — Mistrust of Pausanias
and the Spartans, exhibited by the Athenians. — Pausanias moves
without Amompharetus, who speedily follows him. — Astonishment of
Mardonius on discovering that the Greeks had retreated during the
night — he pursues and attacks them with disorderly impatience.
— Battle of Platæa. — Great personal bravery of the Persians —
they are totally defeated, and Mardonius slain. — The Athenians
on the left wing defeat the Thebans. — Artabazus, with a large
Persian corps, abandons the contest and retires out of Greece
— the rest of the Persian army take up their position in the
fortified camp. — Small proportion of the armies on each side
which really fought. — The Greeks attack and carry the fortified
camp. — Loss on both sides. — Funeral obsequies by the Greeks —
monuments — dead body of Mardonius — distribution of booty. —
Pausanias summons Thebes, requiring the surrender of the leaders
— these men give themselves up, and are put to death. — Honors
and distinctions among the Greek warriors. — Reverential tribute
to Platæa, as the scene of the victory, and to the Platæans:
solemnities decreed to be periodically celebrated by the latter,
in honor of the slain. — Permanent Grecian confederacy decreed
by the victors, to hold meetings at Platæa. — Proceedings of the
Grecian fleet: it moves to the rescue of Samos from the Persians.
— The Persian fleet abandons Samos and retires to Mykalê in
Ionia. — Mistrust of the fidelity of the Ionians entertained by
the Persian generals. — The Greeks land to attack the Persians
ashore — revelation of the victory of Platæa, gained by their
countrymen on the same morning, springs up in their minds before
the battle. — Battle of Mykalê — revolt of the Ionians in the
Persian camp — complete defeat of the Persians. — Retirement
of the defeated Persian army to Sardis. — Reluctance of the
Spartans to adopt the continental Ionians into their alliance
— proposition to transport them across the Ægean into Western
Greece — rejected by the Athenians. — The Grecian fleet sails
to the Hellespont: the Spartans return home, but the Athenians
remain to attack the Chersonese. — Siege of Sestos — antipathy
of the Chersonesites against Artayktês. — Capture of Sestos —
crucifixion of Artayktês. — Return of the fleet to Athens.
147-203

CHAPTER XLIII.

EVENTS IN SICILY DOWN TO THE EXPULSION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE
ISLAND.

Agrigentum and Gela superior to Syracuse before 500 B. C.
— Phalaris despot of Agrigentum. — Syracuse in 500 B. C.
— oligarchical government under the Gamori, or privileged
descendants of the original proprietary colonists — the Demos
— the Kyllyrii, or Serfs. — Early governments of the Greek
cities in Sicily — original oligarchies subverted in many places
by despots — attempted colony of the Spartan prince Dorieus. —
Kleander despot of Gela, B. C. about 500. — First rise of Gelo
and Ænesidêmus in his service. Têlinês, the first marked ancestor
of Gelo. — Gelo — in high command among the mercenaries of
Hippokratês despot of Gela. — Fate of the Ionic town of Zanklê,
afterwards Messina — it is seized by the Samians — conduct of
Hippokratês. — Hippokratês is victorious over the Syracusans —
takes Kamarina — dies. — Gelo becomes in his place despot of
Gela. — Greatness of Gelo — he gets possession of Syracuse, and
transfers the seat of his power from Gela to Syracuse. — Conquest
of various Sicilian towns by Gelo — he transports the oligarchy
to Syracuse and sells the Demos for slaves. — Increased power
and population of Syracuse under Gelo — it becomes the first
city in Sicily. — Power of Gelo when the envoys from Sparta and
Athens came to entreat his aid, B. C. 481. — Plans of Gelo for
strengthening Sicilian Hellenism against the barbaric interests
in the islands. — Spartan and Athenian envoys apply to Gelo —
his answer. — Carthaginian invasion of Sicily, simultaneous with
the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. — The Carthaginian army under
Hamilkar besiege Himera — battle of Himera — complete victory
gained over them by Gelo. — Supremacy of Gelo in Sicily — he
grants peace to the Carthaginians. — Conduct of Gelo towards the
confederate Greeks who were contending against Xerxes. — Number
of prisoners taken at the battle of Himera and distributed among
the Carthaginian cities — their prosperity, especially that
of Agrigentum. — Death and obsequies of Gelo. — Number of new
citizens whom Gelo had introduced at Syracuse. — Hiero, brother
and successor of Gelo at Syracuse — jealous of his brother
Polyzêlus — harsh as a ruler — quarrel between Hiero of Syracuse
and Thêro of Agrigentum — appeased by the poet Simonides. —
Severe treatment of the inhabitants of Himera by Thêro. — Power
and exploits of Hiero — against the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians
— against Anaxilaus — he founds the city of Ætna — new wholesale
transplantation of inhabitants — compliments of Pindar. — Death
of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, and of Thêro of Agrigentum. Thrasydæus,
son of Thêro, rules Agrigentum and Himera. His cruel government
— he is defeated by Hiero and expelled. — Great power of Hiero,
after the defeat of Thrasydæus — his death. — Thrasybulus,
brother and successor of Hiero — disputes among the members of
the Gelonian family. — Cruelties and unpopularity of Thrasybulus
— mutiny against him at Syracuse. — Expulsion of Thrasybulus,
and extinction of the Gelonian dynasty. — Popular governments
established in all the Sicilian cities — confusion and disputes
arising out of the number of new citizens and mercenaries
domiciliated by the Gelonian princes. — Internal dissensions
and combat in Syracuse. — Defeat of the Gelonians — Syracuse
made into one popular government, one city, one fortification.
— Disorders in other Sicilian cities, arising from the return
of exiles who had been dispossessed under the Gelonian dynasty.
Katana and Ætna. — General congress and compromise — the exiles
are provided for — Kamarina again restored as a separate
autonomous city. — Reactionary feelings against the previous
despotism, and in favor of popular government, at Syracuse and in
the other cities. — Italiot Greeks — destructive defeat of the
inhabitants of Tarentum and of Rhegium.
204-239

CHAPTER XLIV.

FROM THE BATTLE OF PLATÆA AND MYKALE DOWN TO THE DEATHS OF
THEMISTOKLES AND ARISTEIDES.

Causes of the disgraceful repulse of Xerxes from Greece — his own
defects — inferior quality and slackness of most of his army. —
Tendency to exaggerate the heroism of the Greeks. — Comparison
of the invasion of Greece by Xerxes with the invasion of Persia
afterwards by Alexander the Great. — No improvement in warfare
among the Persians during that interval of one hundred and fifty
years — great improvement among the Greeks. — Progressive spirit
in Greece — operating through Athenian initiative. — Conduct of
Athens in the repulse of the Persians — her position, temper,
and influence, after that event. — Proceedings of the Athenians
to restore their city — jealous obstructions caused by the
Peloponnesians. — Stratagem of Themistoklês to procure for the
Athenians the opportunity of fortifying their city. — Athens
fortified — confusion of the Spartans — disappointment of the
allies. — Effect of this intended, but baffled, intervention
upon Athenian feelings. — Enlargement of the walls of Athens.
— Large plans of Themistoklês for the naval aggrandizement of
the city — fortified town and harbor provided at Peiræus — vast
height and thickness projected for the walls. — Advantages of
the enlarged and fortified harbor — increase of metics and of
commerce at Athens. — Resolution to build twenty new triremes
annually. — Expedition of the united Greek fleet against
Asia, under the Spartan Pausanias — capture of Byzantium. —
Misconduct of Pausanias — refusal of the allies to obey him —
his treasonable correspondence with Xerxes. — Pausanias, having
assurances of aid from Xerxes, becomes more intolerable in his
behavior. He is recalled to Sparta. — The allies transfer the
headship from Sparta to Athens. — Importance of this change in
the relations of the Grecian states. — Tendency of the Spartan
kings to become corrupted on foreign service — Leotychidês. —
Momentary Pan-Hellenic union under Sparta, immediately after the
repulse of Xerxes — now broken up and passing into a schism,
with two distinct parties and chiefs, Sparta and Athens. —
Proceedings of Athens in her capacity of leader — good conduct
of Aristeidês. — Formation of the confederacy of Delos, under
Athens as president — general meetings of allies held in that
island. — Assessment of the confederacy and all its members, made
by Aristeidês — definite obligation in ships and money — money
total — Hellênotamiæ. — Rapid growth, early magnitude, of the
confederacy of Delos: willing adhesion of the members. — State
and power of Persia at the time when the confederacy of Delos
was first formed. — Conduct of Pausanias after being removed
from the command — he prosecutes his treasonable designs in
conjunction with Persia. — He is recalled to Sparta — imprisoned
— put on his trial — tries to provoke the Helots to revolt. — He
is detected by the revelation of a slave — incredulity or fear of
the Ephors. — His arrest and death — atonement made for offended
sanctuary. — Themistoklês is compromised in the detected treason
of Pausanias. — Position of Themistoklês at Athens — tendency
of Athenian parties and politics. — Effect of the events of the
Persian war upon Athenian political sentiment — stimulus to
democracy. — Alteration of the Kleisthenean constitution — all
citizens without exception are rendered politically admissible to
office: first, universal eligibility and election of magistrates
— next, sortition, or drawing by lot. — Increase of the power
of the Stratêgi — alteration in the functions and diminution
of the importance of the archons. — Administration of Athens
enlarged — new functionaries appointed — distribution between
Athens and Peiræus. — Political career and precarious tenor of
Themistoklês — bitter rivals against him — Kimon, Alkmæon, etc.
— His liability to charges of corruption. — Themistoklês is
charged with accepting bribes from Persia — acquitted at Athens.
— Increased bitterness of feud between him and his political
rivals, after this acquittal. He is ostracized. — While in
banishment under ostracism, the Lacedæmonians prefer a charge of
treason against him. — Flight and adventures of Themistoklês. —
Themistoklês gets over to Asia, and seeks refuge with the Persian
king. — Stories about the relations between the Persian king
and Themistoklês. — Real treatment of Themistoklês in Persia. —
Influence which he acquires with the Persian king. — Large reward
which he receives — His death at Magnesia. — Death of Aristeidês
— his poverty.
239-289

CHAPTER XLV.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENS AS HEAD. — FIRST
FORMATION AND RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

Consequence of the formation of the confederacy of Delos. —
Bifurcation of Grecian politics between Sparta and Athens.
— Distinction between the confederacy of Delos, with Athens
as president — and the Athenian empire which grew out of it.
— Tendency to confuse these two, and to impute to Athens
long-sighted plans of ambition. — The early years, after the
formation of the confederacy of Delos, were years of active
exertion on the part of Athens. — Our imperfect knowledge of
them. — Necessity of continued action against the Persians, even
after the battles of Platæa and Mykalê. This necessity was the
cause, both of the willing organization of the confederacy of
Delos and of the maritime improvement of Athens. — Confederacy of
Delos — sworn to by all the members — perpetual and peremptory
— not allowing retirement nor evasion. — Enforcing sanction of
Athens, strictly exercised, in harmony with the general synod. —
Gradual alteration in the relations of the allies — substitution
of money-payment for personal service, demanded by the allies
themselves, suitable to the interests and feelings of Athens. —
Change in the position as well as in the feelings of Athens. —
Growing unpopularity of Athens throughout Greece — causes of it.
— Synod of Delos — gradually declines in importance and vanishes.
— Superior qualities and merit of the Athenians as compared with
the confederates of Delos generally. — Tribute first raised by
the synod of Delos — assessment of Aristeidês. — Events between
B. C. 476-466. — Eion — Skyros — Karystus. — Athens as guardian
of the Ægean sea against piracy. — The Hero Theseus. — First
revolt among the members of the confederacy of Delos — Naxos
revolts and is reconquered. — Operations of Athens and the
confederacy against Persia. — Defeat of the Persians by Kimon at
the river Eurymedon. — Revolt of Thasos from the confederacy of
Delos. — Siege of Thasos by the Athenians under Kimon. — Mines in
Thrace. — First attempt of Athens to found a city at Ennea Hodoi
on the Strymon above Eion. The attempt fails and the settlers
are slain. — Reduction of Thasos after a blockade of two years —
it is disarmed and dismantled. — Application of the Thasians to
Sparta for aid — granted, but not carried into effect — glimpse
of hostilities between Sparta and Athens. — Trial and acquittal
of Kimon at Athens. — Great increase of the Athenian power. —
Proceedings in Central Greece between 470-464 B. C. Thebes and
the Bœotian towns. Discredit of Thebes. — Sparta restores and
upholds the supremacy of Thebes over the lesser Bœotian towns.
— Events in Peloponnesus — Arcadia — Elis, etc. — Terrible
earthquake at Sparta, 464 B. C. — Revolt of the Helots. — The
Lacedæmonians invoke the aid of their allies against the revolted
Helots. — March of the Athenians under Kimon into Laconia, to
aid them. — Mistrust conceived by the Lacedæmonians of their
Athenian auxiliaries, who are dismissed from Laconia. Displeasure
and change of policy at Athens. — The Athenians renounce the
alliance of Sparta, and contract alliance with Argos. Position
of Argos — her conquest of Mykênæ and other towns. — Megara
becomes allied with Athens. Growing hatred of Corinth and the
neighboring Peloponnesian states towards Athens. — Energetic
simultaneous action of the Athenians — in Cyprus, Phenicia,
Egypt, and Greece — they build the first “Long Wall” from
Megara to Nisæa. — War of Athens against Corinth, Ægina, etc.
Total defeat of the Æginetans at sea. — The Athenians besiege
Ægina — the Corinthians, Epidaurians, etc. are defeated by the
Athenians under Myrônidês. — The Long Walls between Athens and
Peiræus are projected — espoused by Periklês, opposed by Kimon —
political contentions at Athens — importance of the Long Wall. —
Expedition of the Lacedæmonians into Bœotia — they restore the
ascendancy of Thebes. — Intention of the Spartan army in Bœotia
to threaten Athens and sustain the Athenian oligarchical party
opposed to the Long Walls. — Battle of Tanagra — defeat of the
Athenians. — Effects of the battle — generous behavior of Kimon
— he is recalled from ostracism. — Compromise and reconciliation
between the rival leaders and parties at Athens. — Victory of
Œnophyta gained by the Athenians — they acquire ascendency over
all Bœotia, Phocis, and Lokris. — Completion of the Long Walls.
— Conquest of Ægina, which is disarmed, dismantled, and rendered
tributary. — The Athenians first sail round Peloponnesus — their
operations in the gulf of Corinth. — Defeat and losses of the
Athenians in Egypt. — The revolted Helots in Laconia capitulate
and leave the country. — Truce for five years concluded between
Athens and Lacedæmonians, through the influence of Kimon. —
Fresh expeditions of Kimon against Persia. — Death of Kimon at
Cyprus — victories of the Athenian fleet — it returns home. — No
farther expeditions of the Athenians against Persia — convention
concluded between them. — Mistakes and exaggerations respecting
this convention — doubts raised as to its historical reality.
Discussion of those doubts — confirmatory hints of Thucydidês. —
Thucydidês, son of Melêsias, succeeds Kimon as leading opponent
of Periklês. — Transfer of the common fund of the confederacy
from Delos to Athens. — Gradual passage of the confederacy into
an Athenian empire. — Transfer of the fund was proposed by the
Samians. — Position of Athens with a numerous alliance both
of inland and maritime states. — Commencement of reverses and
decline of power to Athens. — Revolt of Bœotia from Athens —
defeat of the Athenians at Korôneia — they evacuate Bœotia. —
Revolt of Phocis, Lokris, Eubœa, and Megara: invasion of Attica
by the Peloponnesians under the Lacedæmonian king Pleistoanax. —
Eubœa reconquered by Periklês. — Humiliation and despondency of
Athens. — Conclusion of the Thirty years’ truce. — Diminution of
Athenian power. — Feud between Athens and Megara.
290-352

CHAPTER XLVI.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKLES.

First establishment of the democratical judicial system
at Athens. — Union, in the same hands, of functions both
administrative and judicial in early Athens — great powers of the
magistrates, as well as of the senate of Areopagus. — Magistrates
generally wealthy men — oligarchical tendencies of the senate of
Areopagus — increase of democratical sentiment among the bulk
of the citizens. — Political parties in Athens. — Periklês and
Ephialtês democratical: Kimon, oligarchical or conservative. —
Democratical Dikasteries, or Jury-courts, constituted by Periklês
and Ephialtês. — How these dikasteries were arranged. — Pay
to the dikasts introduced and made regular. — The magistrates
are deprived of their judicial and confined to administrative
functions. — Senate of Areopagus — its antiquity — semi-religious
character — large and undefined controlling power. — Large powers
of the senate of Areopagus, in part abused, became inconsistent
with the feelings of the people after the Persian invasion. —
New interests and tendencies then growing up at Athens. — Senate
of Areopagus — a centre of action for the conservative party and
Kimon. — Opposition between Kimon and Periklês — inherited from
their fathers. — Character and working of Periklês. — Reserved,
philosophical, and business-like habits of Periklês — his little
pains to court popularity — less of the demagogue than Kimon. —
Ephialtês belonging to the democratical party, and originally
equal to Periklês in influence. — Efforts of Ephialtês against
magisterial abuse. — Kimon and his party, more powerful than
Ephialtês and Periklês, until the time when the Athenian troops
were dismissed from Laconia. — Ostracism of Kimon. — Measures
carried by Ephialtês and Periklês to abridge the power of the
senate of Areopagus as well as of individual magistrates. —
Institution of the paid dikasteries. — Separation of judicial
from administrative functions. — Assassination of Ephialtês by
the conservative party. — Commencement of the great ascendency of
Periklês, after the death of Ephialtês. Compromise between him
and Kimon. — Brilliant success of Athens, and era of the maximum
of her power. — Other constitutional changes. — The Nomophylakes.
— The Nomothetæ — distinction between laws and psephisms,
or special decrees — process by which laws were enacted and
repealed. — Procedure in making or repealing of laws assimilated
to the procedure in judicial trials. — Graphê Paranomôn —
indictment against the mover of illegal or unconstitutional
propositions. — Working of the Graphê Paranomôn. — Conservative
spirit in which it is framed. — Restraint upon new propositions,
and upon the unlimited initiative belonging to every citizen.
— Abusive extension of the Graphê Paranomôn afterwards. — It
was often used as a simple way of procuring the repeal of an
existing law — without personal aim against the author of the
law. — Numbers and pay of the dikasts, as provided by Periklês.
— The Athenian democracy, as constituted by Periklês, remained
substantially unaltered afterwards down to the loss of Athenian
independence — excepting the temporary interruptions of the Four
Hundred and the Thirty. — Working of the numerous dikasteries
— their large numbers essential to exclude corruption or
intimidation — liability of individual magistrates to corruption.
— The Athenian dikasteries are jury-trial applied on the broadest
scale — exhibiting both its excellences and its defects in
an exaggerated form. — The encomiums usually pronounced upon
the theory of jury-trial would apply yet more strongly to the
Athenian dikasteries. — Imperfections of jury-trial — exaggerated
in the procedure of the dikasteries. — Powerful effects of the
dikasteries in exercising and stimulating the intellect and
feelings of individual citizens. — Necessity of learning to speak
— growth of professional teachers of rhetoric — professional
composers of speeches for others. — Rhetors and Sophists. —
Polemics of Sokratês, himself a sophist, against the sophists
generally. — Sophists and rhetors were the natural product of
the age and of the democracy. — The dikasteries were composed,
not exclusively of poor men, but of middling and poorer citizens
indiscriminately.
352-407

HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE MARCH OF XERXES AGAINST GREECE.

In the last chapter but one of the preceding volume, I described the
Athenian victory at Marathon, the repulse of the Persian general
Datis, and the return of his armament across the Ægean to the
Asiatic coast. He had been directed to conquer both Eretria and
Athens: an order which he had indeed executed in part with success,
as the string of Eretrian prisoners brought to Susa attested,—but
which remained still unfulfilled in regard to the city principally
obnoxious to Darius. Far from satiating his revenge upon Athens, the
Persian monarch was compelled to listen to the tale of an ignominious
defeat. His wrath against the Athenians rose to a higher pitch
than ever, and he commenced vigorous preparations for a renewed
attack upon them, as well as upon Greece generally. Resolved upon
assembling the entire force of his empire, he directed the various
satraps and sub-governors throughout all Asia to provide troops,
horses, and ships, both of war and burden. For no less than three
years the empire was agitated by this immense levy, which Darius
determined to conduct in person against Greece.[1] Nor was his
determination abated by a revolt of the Egyptians, which broke out
about the time when his preparations were completed. He was on the
point of undertaking simultaneously the two enterprises,—the conquest
of Greece and the reconquest of Egypt,—when he was surprised by
death, after a reign of thirty-six years. As a precaution previous
to this intended march, he had nominated as successor Xerxes, his
son by Atossa; for the ascendency of that queen insured to Xerxes
the preference over his elder brother Artabazanes, son of Darius by
a former wife, and born before the latter became king. The choice
of the reigning monarch passed unquestioned, and Xerxes succeeded
without opposition.[2] It deserves to be remarked, that though we
shall meet with several acts of cruelty and atrocity perpetrated
in the Persian regal family, there is nothing like that systematic
fratricide which has been considered necessary to guarantee
succession in Turkey and other Oriental empires.

[1] Herodot. vii, 3, 4.

[2] Herodot. vii, 1-4. He mentions—simply as a report, and
seemingly without believing it himself—that Demaratus the exiled
king of Sparta was at Susa at the moment when Darius was about
to choose a successor among his sons (this cannot consist with
Ktesias, Persic. c. 23): and that he suggested to Xerxes a
convincing argument by which to determine the mind of his father,
urging the analogy of the law of regal succession at Sparta,
whereby the son of a king, born after his father became king, was
preferred to an elder son born before that event. The existence
of such a custom at Sparta may well be doubted.

Some other anecdotes, not less difficult of belief than this, and
alike calculated to bestow a factitious importance on Demaratus,
will be noticed in the subsequent pages. The latter received from
the Persian king the grant of Pergamus and Teuthrania, with their
land-revenues, which his descendants long afterwards continued to
occupy (Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 1-6): and perhaps these descendants
may have been among the persons from whom Herodotus derived his
information respecting the expedition of Xerxes. See vii, 239.

Plutarch (De Fraterno Amore, p. 488) gives an account in many
respects different concerning the circumstances which determined
the succession of Xerxes to the throne, in preference to his
elder brother.

The intense wrath against Athens, which had become the predominant
sentiment in the mind of Darius, was yet unappeased at the time of
his death, and it was fortunate for the Athenians that his crown
now passed to a prince less obstinately hostile as well as in every
respect inferior. Xerxes, personally the handsomest[3] and most
stately man amid the immense crowd which he led against Greece, was
in character timid and faint-hearted, over and above those defects of
vanity, childish self-conceit, and blindness of appreciation, which
he shared more or less with all the Persian kings. Yet we shall see
that, even under his conduct, the invasion of Greece was very near
proving successful: and it well might have succeeded altogether, had
he been either endued with the courageous temperament, or inflamed
with the fierce animosity, of his father.

[3] Herod. vii, 187. The like personal beauty is ascribed to
Darius Codomannus, the last of the Persian kings (Plutarch,
Alexand. c. 21).

On succeeding to the throne, Xerxes found the forces of the empire in
active preparation, pursuant to the orders of Darius; except Egypt,
which was in a state of revolt. His first necessity was to reconquer
this country; a purpose for which the great military power now in
readiness was found amply sufficient. Egypt was subdued and reduced
to a state of much harder dependence than before: we may presume that
the tribute was increased, as well as the numbers of the Persian
occupying force maintained, by contributions levied on the natives.
Achæmenes, brother of Xerxes, was installed there as satrap.

But Xerxes was not at first equally willing to prosecute the schemes
of his deceased father against Greece. At least such is the statement
of Herodotus; who represents Mardonius as the grand instigator of the
invasion, partly through thirst for warlike enterprise, partly from a
desire to obtain the intended conquest as a satrapy for himself. Nor
were there wanting Grecian counsellors to enforce his recommendation,
both by the promise of help and by the color of religion. The great
family of the Aleuadæ, belonging to Larissa, and perhaps to other
towns in Thessaly, were so eager in the cause, that their principal
members came to Susa to offer an easy occupation of that frontier
territory of Hellas: while the exiled Peisistratids from Athens still
persevered in striving to procure their own restoration at the tail
of a Persian army. On the present occasion, they brought with them
to Susa a new instrument, the holy mystic Onomakritus,—a man who
had acquired much reputation, not by prophesying himself, but by
collecting, arranging, interpreting, and delivering out, prophetic
verses passing under the name of the ancient seer or poet Musæus.
Thirty years before, in the flourishing days of the Peisistratids,
he had lived at Athens, enjoying the confidence of Hipparchus, and
consulted by him as the expositor of these venerated documents. But
having been detected by the poet Lasus of Hermione, in the very act
of interpolating them with new matter of his own, Hipparchus banished
him with indignation. The Peisistratids, however, now in banishment
themselves, forgot or forgave this offence, and carried Onomakritus
with his prophecies to Susa, announcing him as a person of oracular
authority, to assist in working on the mind of Xerxes. To this
purpose his interpolations, or his omissions, were now directed:
for when introduced to the Persian monarch, he recited emphatically
various encouraging predictions wherein the bridging of the
Hellespont and the triumphant march of a barbaric host into Greece,
appeared as predestined; while he carefully kept back all those of a
contrary tenor, which portended calamity and disgrace. So at least
Herodotus,[4] strenuous in upholding the credit of Bakis, Musæus, and
other Grecian prophets whose verses were in circulation, expressly
assures us. The religious encouragements of Onomakritus, and the
political cooperation proffered by the Aleuadæ, enabled Mardonius
effectually to overcome the reluctance of his master. Nor indeed was
it difficult to show, according to the feelings then prevalent, that
a new king of Persia was in honor obliged to enlarge the boundaries
of the empire.[5] The conquering impulse springing from the first
founder was as yet unexhausted; the insults offered by the Athenians
remained still unavenged: and in addition to this double stimulus
to action, Mardonius drew a captivating picture of Europe as an
acquisition;—“it was the finest land in the world, produced every
variety of fruit-bearing trees, and was too good a possession for
any mortal man except the Persian kings.”[6] Fifteen years before,
the Milesian Aristagoras,[7] when entreating the Spartans to assist
the Ionic revolt, had exaggerated the wealth and productiveness of
Asia in contrast with the poverty of Greece,—a contrast less widely
removed from the truth, at that time, than the picture presented by
Mardonius.

[4] Herodot. vii, 6; viii, 20, 96, 77. Ὀνομάκριτος—κατέλεγε τῶν
χρησμῶν· εἰ μέν τι ἐνέοι σφάλμα φέρον τῷ Πέρσῃ, τῶν μὲν ἔλεγε
οὐδέν· ὁ δὲ τὰ εὐτυχέστατα ἐκλεγόμενος, ἔλεγε τόν τε Ἑλλήσποντον
ὡς ζευχθῆναι χρέον εἴη ὑπ’ ἀνδρὸς Πέρσεω, τήν τε ἔλασιν
ἐξηγεόμενος, etc.

An intimation somewhat curious respecting this collection
of prophecies; it was of an extremely varied character, and
contained promises or threats to meet any emergency which might
arise.

[5] Æschylus, Pers. 761.

[6] Herodot. vii, 5. ὡς ἡ Εὐρώπη περικαλλὴς χώρη, καὶ
δένδρεα παντοῖα φέρει τὰ ἥμερα, βασιλέϊ τε μούνῳ θνητῶν ἀξίη
ἐκτῆσθαι—χώρην παμφορωτέρην (vii, 8).

[7] Herodot. v, 49.

Having thus been persuaded to alter his original views, Xerxes
convoked a meeting of the principal Persian counsellors, and
announced to them his resolution to invade Greece, setting forth the
mingled motives of revenge and aggrandizement which impelled him, and
representing the conquest of Greece as carrying with it that of all
Europe, so that the Persian empire would become coextensive with the
æther of Zeus and the limits of the sun’s course. On the occasion
of this invasion, now announced and about to take place, we must
notice especially the historical manner and conception of our capital
informant,—Herodotus. The invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and the final
repulse of his forces, constitute the entire theme of his three
last books, and the principal object of his whole history, towards
which the previous matter is intended to conduct. Amidst those prior
circumstances, there are doubtless many which have a substantive
importance and interest of their own, recounted at so much length
that they appear coördinate and principal, so that the thread of
the history is for a time put out of sight. Yet we shall find, if
we bring together the larger divisions of his history, omitting the
occasional prolixities of detail, that such thread is never lost in
the historian’s own mind: it may be traced by an attentive reader,
from his preface and the statement immediately following it—of
Crœsus, as the first barbaric conqueror of the Ionian Greeks—down
to the full expansion of his theme, “Græcia Barbariæ lento collisa
duello,” in the expedition of Xerxes. That expedition, as forming
the consummation of his historical scheme, is not only related more
copiously and continuously than any events preceding it, but is
also ushered in with an unusual solemnity of religious and poetical
accompaniment, so that the seventh book of Herodotus reminds us
in many points of the second book of the Iliad: probably too, if
the lost Grecian epics had reached us, we should trace many other
cases in which the imagination of the historian has unconsciously
assimilated itself to them. The dream sent by the gods to frighten
Xerxes, when about to recede from his project,—as well as the ample
catalogue of nations and eminent individuals embodied in the Persian
host,—have both of them marked parallels in the Iliad: and Herodotus
seems to delight in representing to himself the enterprise against
Greece as an antithesis to that of the Atreidæ against Troy. He
enters into the internal feelings of Xerxes with as much familiarity
as Homer into those of Agamemnon, and introduces “the counsel of
Zeus” as not less direct, special, and overruling, than it appears in
the Iliad and Odyssey:[8] though the godhead in Herodotus, compared
with Homer, tends to become neuter instead of masculine or feminine,
and retains only the jealous instincts of a ruler, apart from the
appetites, lusts, and caprices of a man: acting, moreover, chiefly as
a centralized, or at least as a homogeneous, force, in place of the
discordant severalty of agents conspicuous in the Homeric theology.
The religious idea, so often presented elsewhere in Herodotus,—that
the godhead was jealous and hostile to excessive good fortune or
immoderate desires in man,—is worked into his history of Xerxes as
the ever-present moral and as the main cause of its disgraceful
termination: for we shall discover as we proceed, that the historian,
with that honorable frankness which Plutarch calls his “malignity,”
neither ascribes to his countrymen credit greater than they deserve
for personal valor, nor seeks to veil the many chances of defeat
which their mismanagement laid open.[9]

[8] Homer, Iliad, i, 3. Διὸς δ’ ἐτελείετο βουλή. Herodotus is
characterized as Ὁμήρου ζηλωτὴς—Ὁμηρικώτατος (Dionys. Halic. ad
Cn. Pompeium, p. 772, Reiske; Longinus De Sublim. p. 86, ed.
Pearce).

[9] While Plutarch—if indeed the treatise De Herodoti Malignitate
be the work of Plutarch—treats Herodotus as uncandid,
malicious, corrupt, the calumniator of great men and glorious
deeds,—Dionysius of Halikarnassus, on the contrary, with more
reason, treats him as a pattern of excellent dispositions in
an historian, contrasting him in this respect with Thucydides,
to whom he imputes an unfriendly spirit in criticizing Athens,
arising from his long banishment: Ἡ μὲν Ἡροδότου διάθεσις ἐν
ἅπασιν ἐπιεικὴς, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς συνηδομένη, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς
συναλγοῦσα· ἡ δὲ Θουκυδίδου διάθεσις αὐθέκαστός τις καὶ πικρὰ,
καὶ τῇ πατρίδι τῆς φυγῆς μνησικακοῦσα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἁμαρτήματα
ἐπεξέρχεται καὶ μάλα ἀκριβῶς, τῶν δὲ κατὰ νοῦν κεχωρηκότων
καθάπαξ οὐ μέμνηται ἢ ὥσπερ ἠναγκασμένος. (Dionys. Hal. ad. Cn.
Pompeium de Præcip. Historicis Judic. p. 774, Reisk.)

Precisely the same fault which Dionysius here imputes to
Thucydides (though in other places he acquits him, ἀπὸ παντὸς
φθόνου καὶ πάσης κολακείας, p. 824), Plutarch and Dio cast far
more harshly upon Herodotus. In neither case is the reproach
deserved.

Both the moralists and the rhetoricians of ancient times were
very apt to treat history, not as a series of true matters
of fact, exemplifying the laws of human nature and society,
and enlarging our knowledge of them for purposes of future
inference,—but as if it were a branch of fiction, so to be
handled as to please our taste or improve our morality.
Dionysius, blaming Thucydides for the choice of his subject, goes
so far as to say that the Peloponnesian war, a period of ruinous
discord in Greece, ought to have been left in oblivion and never
to have passed into history (σιωπῇ καὶ λήθῃ παραδοθεὶς, ὑπο τῶν
ἐπιγιγνομένων ἠγνοῆσθαι, ibid. p. 768),—and that especially
Thucydides ought never to have thrown the blame of it upon his
own city, since there were many other causes to which it might
have been imputed (ἑτέραις ἔχοντα πολλαῖς ἀφορμαῖς περιάψαι τὰς
αἰτίας, p. 770).

I have already mentioned that Xerxes is described as having
originally been averse to the enterprise, and only stimulated thereto
by the persuasions of Mardonius: this was probably the genuine
Persian belief, for the blame of so great a disaster would naturally
be transferred from the monarch to some evil counsellor.[10] As soon
as Xerxes, yielding to persuasion, has announced to the Persian
chief men whom he had convoked his resolution to bridge over the
Hellespont and march to the conquest of Greece and Europe, Mardonius
is represented as expressing his warm concurrence in the project,
extolling the immense force[11] of Persia and depreciating the
Ionians in Europe—so he denominated them—as so poor and disunited
that success was not only certain but easy. Against the rashness of
this general—the evil genius of Xerxes—we find opposed the prudence
and long experience of Artabanus, brother of the deceased Darius,
and therefore uncle to the monarch. The age and relationship of
this Persian Nestor emboldens him to undertake the dangerous task
of questioning the determination which Xerxes, though professing to
invite the opinions of others, had proclaimed as already settled
in his own mind. The speech which Herodotus puts into the mouth of
Artabanus is that of a thoughtful and religious Greek: it opens with
the Grecian conception of the necessity of hearing and comparing
opposite views, prior to any final decision,—reproves Mardonius
for falsely depreciating the Greeks and seducing his master into
personal danger,—sets forth the probability that the Greeks, if
victorious at sea, would come and destroy the bridge by which Xerxes
had crossed the Hellespont,—reminds the latter of the imminent
hazard which Darius and his army had undergone in Scythia, from
the destruction—averted only by Histiæus and his influence—of the
bridge over the Danube: such prudential suggestions being further
strengthened by adverting to the jealous aversion of the godhead
towards overgrown human power.[12]

[10] Herodot. viii, 99. Μαρδόνιον ἐν αἰτίῃ τιθέντες: compare c.
100.

[11] Herodot. vii, 9.

[12] Herodot. vii, 10.

The impatient monarch silences his uncle in a tone of insult and
menace: nevertheless, in spite of himself, the dissuasions work
upon him so powerfully, that before night they gradually alter
his resolution, and decide him to renounce the scheme. In this
latter disposition he falls asleep, when a dream appears: a tall,
stately man stands over him, denounces his change of opinion, and
peremptorily commands him to persist in the enterprise as announced.
In spite of this dream, Xerxes still adheres to his altered purpose,
assembles his council the next morning, and after apologizing for his
angry language towards Artabanus, acquaints them to their great joy
that he adopts the recommendations of the latter, and abandons his
project against Greece. But in the following night, no sooner has
Xerxes fallen asleep, than the same dream and the same figure again
appear to him, repeating the previous command in language of terrific
menace. The monarch, in a state of great alarm, springs from his
bed and sends for Artabanus, whom he informs of the twice-repeated
vision and divine mandate interdicting his change of resolution.
“If (says he) it be the absolute will of God that this expedition
against Greece should be executed, the same vision will appear to
thee also, provided thou puttest on my attire, sittest in my throne,
and sleepest in my bed.”[13] Not without reluctance, Artabanus obeys
this order (for it was high treason in any Persian to sit upon the
regal throne[14]), but he at length complies, expecting to be able to
prove to Xerxes that the dream deserved no attention. “Many dreams
(he says) are not of divine origin, nor anything better than mere
wandering objects such as we have been thinking upon during the day:
this dream, of whatever nature it may be, will not be foolish enough
to mistake me for the king, even if I be in the royal attire and bed;
but if it shall still continue to appear to thee, I shall myself
confess it to be divine.”[15] Accordingly, Artabanus is placed in the
regal throne and bed, and, as soon as he falls asleep, the very same
figure shows itself to him also, saying, “Art thou he who dissuadest
Xerxes, on the plea of solicitude for his safety, from marching
against Greece? Xerxes has already been forewarned of that which he
will suffer if he disobeys, and thou too shalt not escape, either now
or in future, for seeking to avert that which must and shall be.”
With these words the vision assumes a threatening attitude, as though
preparing to burn out the eyes of Artabanus with hot irons, when the
sleeper awakes in terror, and runs to communicate with Xerxes. “I
have hitherto, O king, recommended to thee to rest contented with
that vast actual empire on account of which all mankind think thee
happy; but since the divine impulsion is now apparent, and since
destruction from on high is prepared for the Greeks, I too alter my
opinion, and advise thee to command the Persians as God directs; so
that nothing may be found wanting on thy part for that which God puts
into thy hands.”[16]

[13] Herodot. vii, 15. Εἰ ὦν θεός ἐστι ὁ ἐπιπέμπων καὶ οἱ πάντως
ἐν ἡδονῇ ἐστι γενέσθαι στρατηλασίην ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἐπιπτήσεται
καὶ σοὶ τὠυτὸ τοῦτο ὄνειρον, ὁμοίως καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐντελλόμενον.
Εὑρίσκω δὲ ὧδε ἂν γινόμενα ταῦτα, εἰ λάβοις τὴν ἐμὴν σκευὴν
πᾶσαν, καὶ ἐνδὺς, μετὰ τοῦτο ἵζοιο ἐς τὸν ἐμὸν θρόνον, καὶ ἔπειτα
ἐν κοίτῃ τῇ ἐμῇ κατυπνώσειας. Compare vii, 8. θεὸς τε οὕτω ἄγει,
etc.

[14] See Brissonius, De Regno Persarum, lib. i, p. 27.

[15] Herodot. vii, 16. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐς τοσοῦτό γε εὐηθείης ἀνήκει
τοῦτο, ὅτι δή κοτέ ἐστι τὸ ἐπιφαινόμενόν τοι ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ, ὥστε
δόξει ἐμὲ ὁρῶν σὲ ὁρᾷν, τῇ σῇ ἐσθῆτι τεκμαιρόμενον. ... εἰ γὰρ δὴ
ἐπιφοιτήσειέ γε συνεχέως, φαίην ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς θεῖον εἶναι.

[16] Herodot. vii, 18. Ἐπεὶ δὲ δαιμονίη τις γίγνεται ὁρμὴ, καὶ
Ἕλληνας, ὡς ἔοικε, φθορὴ τις καταλαμβάνει θεήλατος, ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ
αὐτὸς τράπομαι, καὶ τὴν γνώμην μετατίθεμαι. ... Ποίεε δὲ οὕτω
ὅκως, τοῦ θεοῦ παραδίδοντος, τῶν σῶν ἐνδεήσεται μηδέν.

The expression τοῦ θεοῦ παραδίδοντος in this place denotes what
is expressed by τὸ χρέον γίγνεσθαι, c. 17. The dream threatens
Artabanus and Xerxes for trying to turn aside the current of
destiny,—or in other words, to contravene the predetermined will
of the gods.

It is thus that Herodotus represents the great expedition of Xerxes
to have originated: partly in the rashness of Mardonius, who reaps
his bitter reward on the field of battle at Platæa,—but still more in
the influence of “mischievous Oneiros,” who is sent by the gods—as
in the second book of the Iliad—to put a cheat upon Xerxes, and even
to overrule by terror both his scruples and those of Artabanus. The
gods having determined—as in the instances of Astyagês, Polykratês,
and others—that the Persian empire shall undergo signal humiliation
and repulse at the hands of the Greeks, constrain the Persian
monarch into a ruinous enterprise against his own better judgment.
Such religious imagination is not to be regarded as peculiar to
Herodotus, but as common to him with his contemporaries generally,
Greeks as well as Persians, though peculiarly stimulated among the
Greeks by the abundance of their epic or quasi-historical poetry:
modified more or less in each individual narrator, it is made to
supply connecting links as well as initiating causes for the great
events of history. As a cause for this expedition, incomparably the
greatest fact and the most fertile in consequences, throughout the
political career both of Greeks and Persians, nothing less than a
special interposition of the gods would have satisfied the feelings
either of one nation or the other. The story of the dream has its
rise, as Herodotus tells us,[17] in Persian fancy, and is in some
sort a consolation for the national vanity; but it is turned and
colored by the Grecian historian, who mentions also a third dream,
which appeared to Xerxes after his resolution to march was finally
taken, and which the mistake of the Magian interpreters falsely
construed[18] into an encouragement, though it really threatened
ruin. How much this religious conception of the sequence of events
belongs to the age, appears by the fact, that it not only appears in
Pindar and the Attic tragedians generally, but pervades especially
the Persæ of Æschylus, exhibited seven years after the battle of
Salamis,—in which we find the premonitory dreams as well as the
jealous enmity of the gods towards vast power and overweening
aspirations in man,[19] though without any of that inclination, which
Herodotus seems to have derived from Persian informants, to exculpate
Xerxes by representing him as disposed himself to sober counsels,
but driven in a contrary direction by the irresistible fiat of the
gods.[20]

[17] Herodot. vii, 12. Καὶ δή κου ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ εἶδε ὄψιν τοιήνδε,
ὡς λέγεται ὑπὸ Περσέων.

Herodotus seems to use ὄνειρον in the neuter gender, not ὄνειρος
in the masculine: for the alteration of Bähr (ad vii, 16) of
ἐῶντα in place of ἐῶντος, is not at all called for. The masculine
gender ὄνειρος is commonly used in Homer; but there are cases of
the neuter ὄνειρον.

Respecting the influence of dreams in determining the enterprises
of the early Turkish Sultans, see Von Hammer, Geschichte des
Osmanischen Reiches, book ii, vol. i, p. 49.

[18] Compare the dream of Darius Codomannus. Plutarch, Alexander,
c. 18. Concerning the punishment inflicted by Astyagês on the
Magians for misinterpreting his dreams, see Herodot. i, 128.

Philochorus, skilled in divination, affirmed that Nikias put
a totally wrong interpretation upon that fatal eclipse of the
moon which induced him to delay his retreat, and proved his ruin
(Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23).

[19] Æschylus, Pers. 96, 104, 181, 220, 368, 745, 825: compare
Sophocl. Ajax, 129, 744, 775, and the end of the Œdipus Tyrannus;
Euripid. Hecub. 58; Pindar, Olymp. viii. 86; Isthm. vi, 39;
Pausanias, ii, 33, 3. Compare the sense of the word δεισιδαίμων
in Xenophon, Agesilaus, c. 11, sect. 8,—“the man who in the midst
of success fears the envious gods,”—opposed to the person who
confides in its continuance; and Klausen, Theologumena Æschyli,
p. 18.

[20] The manner in which Herodotus groups together the facts
of his history, in obedience to certain religious and moral
sentiments in his own mind, is well set forth in Hoffmeister,
Sittlich—religiöse Lebensansicht des Herodotos, Essen, 1832,
especially sects. 21, 22, pp. 112, _seqq._ Hoffmeister traces
the veins of sentiment running through, and often overlaying,
or transforming, the matters of fact through a considerable
portion of the nine books. He does not, perhaps, sufficiently
advert to the circumstance, that the informants from whom
Herodotus collected his facts were for the most part imbued with
sentiments similar to himself; so that the religious and moral
vein pervaded more or less his original materials, and did not
need to be added by himself. There can be little doubt that
the priests, the ministers of temples and oracles, the exegetæ
or interpreting guides around these holy places were among his
chief sources for instructing himself: a stranger, visiting so
many different cities must have been constantly in a situation
to have no other person whom he could consult. The temples were
interesting both in themselves and in the trophies and offerings
which they exhibited, while the persons belonging to them were,
as a general rule, accessible and communicative to strangers,
as we may see both from Pausanias and Plutarch,—both of whom,
however, had books before them also to consult, which Herodotus
hardly had at all. It was not only the priests and ministers of
temples in Egypt, of Hêraklês at Tyre, and of Bêlus at Babylon,
that Herodotus questioned (i, 181; ii, 3, 44, 143), but also
those of Delphi (Δελφῶν οἶδα ἐγὼ οὕτως ἀκούσας γενέσθαι, i, 20:
compare i, 91, 92, 51); Dôdôna (ii, 52); of the Ismenian Apollo
at Thebes (v, 59); of Athênê Alea at Tegea (i, 66); of Dêmêtêr
at Paros (vi, 134—if not the priests, at least persons full of
temple inspirations); of Halus in Achaia Phthiôtis (vii, 197);
of the Kabeiri in Thrace (ii, 51); of persons connected with the
Herôon of Protesilaus in the Chersonese (ix, 116, 120). The facts
which these persons communicated to him were always presented
along with associations referring to their own functions or
religious sentiments, nor did Herodotus introduce anything new
when he incorporated them as such in his history. The treatise of
Plutarch—“Cur Pythia nunc non reddat Oracula Carmine”—affords an
instructive description of the ample and multifarious narratives
given by the expositors at Delphi, respecting the eminent persons
and events of Grecian history, so well fitted to satisfy the
visitors who came full of curiosity—φιλοθεάμονες, φιλόλογοι,
and φιλομαθεῖς (Plutarch, ib. p. 394)—such as Herodotus was
in a high degree. Compare pp. 396, 397, 400, 407, of the same
treatise: also Plutarch, De Defectu Oraculorum, p. 417—οἱ Δελφῶν
θεολόγοι, etc. Plutarch remarks that in his time political life
was extinguished in Greece, and that the questions put to the
Pythian priestess related altogether to private and individual
affairs; whereas, in earlier times, almost all political events
came somehow or other under her cognizance, either by questions
to be answered, or by commemorative public offerings (p. 407).
In the time of Herodotus, the great temples, especially those
of Delphi and Olympia, were interwoven with the whole web of
Grecian political history. See the Dissertation of Preller,
annexed to his edition of Polemonis Fragmenta, c. 3, pp. 157-162;
De Historiâ atque Arte Periegetarum; also K. F. Hermann,
Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen, part 1, ch. 12, p. 52.

The religious interpretation of historical phenomena is not
peculiar to Herodotus, but belongs to him in common with his
informants and his age generally, as indeed Hoffmeister remarks
(pp. 31-136): though it is remarkable to notice the frankness
with which he (as well as the contemporary poets: see the
references in Monk ad Euripid. Alcestis, 1154) predicates envy
and jealousy of the gods, in cases where the conduct, which he
supposes them to pursue, is really such as would deserve that
name in a man,—and such as he himself ascribes to the despot
(iii, 80): he does not think himself obliged to _call_ the gods
just and merciful while he is attributing to them acts of envy
and jealousy in their dealing with mankind. But the religious
interpretation does not reign alone throughout the narrative of
Herodotus: it is found side by side with careful sifting of fact
and specification of positive, definite, appreciable causes:
and this latter vein is what really distinguishes the historian
from his age,—forming the preparation for Thucydides, in whom
it appears predominant and almost exclusive. See this point
illustrated in Creuzer, Historische Kunst der Griechen, Abschnitt
iii, pp. 150-159.

Jäger (Disputationes Herodoteæ, p. 16. Göttingen, 1828) professes
to detect evidences of old age (senile ingenium) in the
moralizing color which overspreads the history of Herodotus, but
which I believe to have belonged to his middle and mature age not
less than to his latter years,—if indeed he lived to be very old,
which is noway proved, except upon reasons which I have already
disputed in my preceding volume. See Bähr, Commentatio de Vitâ et
Scriptis Herodoti, in the fourth volume of his edition, c. 6, p.
388.

While we take due notice of those religious conceptions with which
both the poet and the historian surround this vast conflict of Greeks
and barbarians, we need look no farther than ambition and revenge
for the real motives of the invasion: considering that it had been
a proclaimed project in the mind of Darius for three years previous
to his death, there was no probability that his son and successor
would gratuitously renounce it. Shortly after the reconquest of
Egypt, he began to make his preparations, the magnitude of which
attested the strength of his resolve as well as the extent of his
designs. The satraps and subordinate officers, throughout the whole
range of his empire, received orders to furnish the amplest quota
of troops and munitions of war,—horse and foot, ships of war,
horse-transports, provisions, or supplies of various kinds, according
to the circumstances of the territory; while rewards were held out to
those who should execute the orders most efficiently. For four entire
years these preparations were carried on, and as we are told that
similar preparations had been going forward during the three years
preceding the death of Darius, though not brought to any ultimate
result, we cannot doubt that the maximum of force, which the empire
could possibly be made to furnish,[21] was now brought to execute
the schemes of Xerxes. The Persian empire was at this moment more
extensive than ever it will appear at any subsequent period; for it
comprised maritime Thrace and Macedonia as far as the borders of
Thessaly, and nearly all the islands of the Ægean north of Krete and
east of Eubœa, including even the Cyclades. There existed Persian
forts and garrisons at Doriskus, Eion, and other places on the
coast of Thrace, while Abdêra, with the other Grecian settlements
on that coast were numbered among the tributaries of Susa.[22] It
is necessary to bear in mind these boundaries of the empire, at the
time when Xerxes mounted the throne, as compared with its reduced
limits at the later time of the Peloponnesian war,—partly that we
may understand the apparent chances of success to his expedition, as
they presented themselves both to the Persians and to the _medizing_
Greeks,—partly that we may appreciate the after-circumstances
connected with the formation of the Athenian maritime empire.

[21] Herodot. vii, 19. χῶρον πάντα ἐρευνῶν τῆς ἠπείρου.

[22] Herodot. vii, 106. Κατέστασαν γὰρ ἔτι πρότερον ταύτης τῆς
ἐξελάσιος (_i. e._ the invasion by Xerxes) ὕπαρχοι ἐν τῇ Θρηΐκῃ
καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου πανταχῇ. vii, 108. ἐδεδούλωτο γὰρ, ὡς καὶ
πρότερόν μοι δεδήλωται, ἡ μέχρι Θεσσαλίης πᾶσα, καὶ ἦν ὑπὸ
βασιλῆα δασμοφόρος, Μεγαβάζου τε καταστρεψαμένου καὶ ὕστερον
Μαρδονίου; also vii, 59, and Xenophon, Memorab. iii, 5, 11.
Compare Æschylus Pers. 871-896, and the vision ascribed to Cyrus
in reference to his successor Darius, covering with his wings
both Europe and Asia (Herodot. i, 209).

In the autumn of the year 481 B. C., the vast army thus raised by
Xerxes arrived, from all quarters of the empire, at or near to
Sardis; a large portion of it having been directed to assemble at
Kritala in Kappadokia, on the eastern side of the Halys, where
it was joined by Xerxes himself on the road from Susa.[23] From
thence he crossed the Halys, and marched through Phrygia and Lydia,
passing through the Phrygian towns of Kelænæ, Anaua, and Kolossæ,
and the Lydian town of Kallatêbus, until he reached Sardis, where
winter-quarters were prepared for him. But this land force, vast as
it was (respecting its numbers, I shall speak farther presently),
was not all that the empire had been required to furnish. Xerxes had
determined to attack Greece, not by traversing the Ægean, as Datis
had passed to Eretria and Marathon, but by a land force and fleet
at once: the former crossing the Hellespont, and marching through
Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly; while the latter was intended
to accompany and coöperate. A fleet of one thousand two hundred
and seven ships of war, besides numerous vessels of service and
burden, had been assembled on the Hellespont and on the coasts of
Thrace and Ionia; moreover, Xerxes, with a degree of forethought
much exceeding that which his father Darius had displayed in the
Scythian expedition, had directed the formation of large magazines
of provisions at suitable maritime stations along the line of march,
from the Hellespont to the Strymonic gulf. During the four years of
military preparation, there had been time to bring together great
quantities of flour and other essential articles from Asia and
Egypt.[24]

[23] Herodot. vii, 26-31.

[24] Herodot. vii. 23-25.

If the whole contemporary world were overawed by the vast assemblage
of men and muniments of war which Xerxes thus brought together,
so much transcending all past, we might even say all subsequent,
experience,—they were no less astounded by two enterprises which
entered into his scheme,—the bridging of the Hellespont, and the
cutting of a ship-canal through the isthmus of Mount Athos. For the
first of the two there had indeed been a precedent, since Darius
about thirty-five years before had caused a bridge to be thrown over
the Thracian Bosphorus, and crossed it in his march to Scythia;
but this bridge, though constructed by the Ionians and by a Samian
Greek, having had reference only to distant regions, seems to have
been little known or little thought of among the Greeks generally,
as we may infer from the fact, that the poet Æschylus[25] speaks as
if he had never heard of it, while the bridge of Xerxes was ever
remembered, both by Persians and by Greeks, as a most imposing
display of Asiatic omnipotence. The bridge of boats—or rather, the
two separate bridges not far removed from each other—which Xerxes
caused to be thrown across the Hellespont, stretched from the
neighborhood of Abydos, on the Asiatic side to the coast between
Sestos and Madytus on the European, where the strait is about an
English mile in breadth. The execution of the work was at first
intrusted, not to Greeks, but to Phenicians and Egyptians, who had
received orders long beforehand to prepare cables of extraordinary
strength and size expressly for the purpose; the material used by the
Phenicians was flax, that employed by the Egyptians was the fibre of
the papyrus. Already had the work been completed and announced to
Xerxes as available for transit, when a storm arose, so violent as
altogether to ruin it. The wrath of the monarch, when apprized of
this catastrophe, burst all bounds; it was directed partly against
the chief-engineers, whose heads he caused to be struck off,[26]
but partly also against the Hellespont itself. He commanded that
the strait should be scourged with three hundred lashes, and that a
set of fetters should be let down into it as a farther punishment:
moreover Herodotus had heard, but does not believe, that he even sent
irons for the purpose of branding it. “Thou bitter water (exclaimed
the scourgers while inflicting this punishment), this is the penalty
which our master inflicts upon thee, because thou hast wronged him
though he hath never wronged thee. King Xerxes _will_ cross thee,
whether thou wilt or not; but thou deservest not sacrifice from
any man, because thou art a treacherous river of (useless) salt
water.”[27]

[25] Æschylus, Pers. 731, 754, 873.

[26] Plutarch (De Tranquillitate Animi, p. 470), speaks of them
as having had their noses and ears cut off.

[27] Herodot. vii, 34, 35. ἐνετέλλετο δὴ ὦν ῥαπίζοντας, λέγειν
βάρβαρά τε καὶ ἀτάσθαλα, Ὦ πικρὸν ὕδωρ, δεσπότης τοι δίκην
ἐπιτιθεῖ τήνδε, ὅτι μιν ἠδίκησας, οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐκείνου ἄδικον
παθόν. Καὶ βασιλεὺς μὲν Ξέρξης διαβήσεταί σε, ἤν τε σύ γε βούλῃ,
ἤν τε καὶ μή· σοὶ δὲ κατὰ δίκην ἄρα οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων θύει, ὡς
ἐόντι καὶ δολερῷ καὶ ἁλμυρῷ ποταμῷ.

The assertion—that no one was in the habit of sacrificing to
the Hellespont—appears strange, when we look to the subsequent
conduct of Xerxes himself (vii, 53): compare vii, 113, and vi,
76. The epithet _salt_ employed as a reproach, seems to allude to
the undrinkable character of the water.

Such were the insulting terms heaped by order of Xerxes on the
rebellious Hellespont,—Herodotus calls them “non-Hellenic and
blasphemous terms,” which, together with their brevity, leads us to
believe that he gives them as he heard them, and that they are not
of his own invention, like so many other speeches in his work, where
he dramatizes, as it were, a given position. It has been common,
however, to set aside in this case not merely the words, but even
the main incident of punishment inflicted on the Hellespont,[28] as
a mere Greek fable rather than a real fact: the extreme childishness
and absurdity of the proceeding giving to it the air of an enemy’s
calumny. But this reason will not appear sufficient, if we transport
ourselves back to the time and to the party concerned. To transfer to
inanimate objects the sensitive as well as the willing and designing
attributes of human beings, is among the early and wide-spread
instincts of mankind, and one of the primitive forms of religion:
and although the enlargement of reason and experience gradually
displaces this elementary Fetichism, and banishes it from the regions
of reality into those of conventional fictions, yet the force of
momentary passion will often suffice to supersede the acquired
habit, and even an intelligent man[29] may be impelled in a moment
of agonizing pain to kick or beat the lifeless object from which he
has suffered. By the old procedure, never formally abolished, though
gradually disused, at Athens,—an inanimate object which had caused
the death of a man was solemnly tried and cast out of the border: and
the Arcadian youths, when they returned hungry from an unsuccessful
day’s hunting,[30] scourged and pricked the god Pan or his statue
by way of revenge. Much more may we suppose a young Persian monarch,
corrupted by universal subservience around him, to be capable of thus
venting an insane wrath: and the vengeance ascribed by Herodotus to
Cyrus towards the river Gyndês (which he caused to be divided into
three hundred and sixty streamlets, because one of his sacred horses
had been drowned in it), affords a fair parallel to the scourging
of the Hellespont by Xerxes. To offer sacrifice to rivers, and to
testify in this manner gratitude for service rendered by rivers,
was a familiar rite in the ancient religion. While the grounds for
distrusting the narrative are thus materially weakened, the positive
evidence will be found very forcible. The expedition of Xerxes
took place when Herodotus was about four years old, so that he
afterwards enjoyed ample opportunity of conversing with persons who
had witnessed and taken part in it: and the whole of his narrative
shows that he availed himself largely of such access to information.
Besides, the building of the bridge across the Hellespont, and all
the incidents connected with it, were acts essentially public in
their nature,—known to many witnesses, and therefore the more easily
verified,—the decapitation of the unfortunate engineers was an act
fearfully impressive, and even the scourging of the Hellespont,
while essentially public, appears to Herodotus[31] (as well as to
Arrian, afterwards), not childish but impious. The more attentively
we balance, in the case before us, the positive testimony against the
intrinsic negative probabilities, the more shall we be disposed to
admit without diffidence the statement of our original historian.

[28] See Stanley and Blomfield ad Æschyl. Pers. 731, and K.
O. Müller (in his Review of Benjamin Constant’s work Sur la
Religion), Kleine Schriften, vol. ii, p. 59.

[29] See Auguste Comte, Traité de Philosophie Positive, vol. v,
leçon 52, pp. 40, 46.

[30] See vol. ii, part 2, c. i, p. 297 of the present work; and
compare Wachsmuth, Hellenisch. Alterthümer, 2, i, p. 320, and K.
F. Hermann, Griech. Staatsalterthümer, sect. 104.

For the manner in which Cyrus dealt with the river Gyndês,
see Herodot. i, 202. The Persian satrap Pharnuchês was thrown
from his horse at Sardis, and received an injury of which he
afterwards died: he directed his attendants to lead the horse to
the place where the accident had happened, to cut off all his
legs, and leave him to perish there (Herodot. vii, 88). The kings
of Macedonia offered sacrifice even during the time of Herodotus,
to the river which had been the means of preserving the life of
their ancestor Perdikkas; after he had crossed it, the stream
swelled and arrested his pursuers (Herodot. viii, 138): see an
analogous story about the inhabitants of Apollonia and the river
Aöus, Valerius Maxim. i, 5, 2.

After the death of the great boxer, wrestler, etc., Theagenês
of Thasus, a statue was erected to his honor. A personal enemy,
perhaps one of the fourteen hundred defeated competitors, came
every night to gratify his wrath and revenge by flogging the
statue. One night the statue fell down upon this scourger and
killed him; upon which his relatives indicted the statue for
murder: it was found guilty by the Thasians, and thrown into the
sea. The gods, however, were much displeased with the proceeding,
and visited the Thasians with continued famine, until at length a
fisherman by accident fished up the statue, and it was restored
to its place (Pausan. vi, 11. 2). Compare the story of the statue
of Hermês in Babrius, Fabul. 119, edition of Mr. Lewis.

[31] Herodot. vii, 35-54: compare viii, 109. Arrian, Exp. Alex.
vii, 14. 9.

New engineers—perhaps Greek along with, or in place of, Phenicians
and Egyptians—were immediately directed to recommence the work, which
Herodotus now describes in detail, and which was doubtless executed
with increased care and solidity. To form the two bridges, two lines
of ships—triremes and pentekonters blended together—were moored
across the strait breastwise, with their sterns towards the Euxine,
and their heads towards the Ægean, the stream flowing always rapidly
towards the latter.[32] They were moored by anchors head and stern,
and by very long cables. The number of ships placed to carry the
bridge nearest to the Euxine was three hundred and sixty: the number
in the other, three hundred and fourteen. Over or through each of
the two lines of ships, across from shore to shore, were stretched
six vast cables, which discharged the double function of holding the
ships together, and of supporting the bridge-way to be laid upon
them. They were tightened by means of capstans on each shore: in
three different places along that line, a gap was left between the
ships for the purpose of enabling trading vessels, in voyage to or
from the Euxine, to pass and repass beneath the cables.

[32] Herodot. vii, 36. The language in which Herodotus describes
the position of these ships which formed the two bridges, seems
to me to have been erroneously or imperfectly apprehended by most
of the commentators: see the notes of Bähr, Kruse, Wesseling,
Rennell, and especially Larcher: Schweighäuser is the most
satisfactory—τοῦ μὲν Πόντου ἐπικαρσίας, τοῦ δὲ Ἑλλησπόντου κατὰ
ῥόον. The explanation given by Tzetzes of ἐπικαρσίας by the
word πλαγίας seems to me hardly exact: it means, not _oblique_,
but _at right angles with_. The course of the Bosphorus and
Hellespont, flowing out of the Euxine sea, is conceived by the
historian as meeting that sea at right angles; and the ships,
which were moored near together along the current of the strait,
taking the line of each from head to stern, were therefore also
at right angles with the Euxine sea. Moreover, Herodotus does not
mean to distinguish the two bridges hereby, and to say that the
ships of the one bridge were τοῦ Πόντου ἐπικαρσίας, and those of
the other bridge τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου κατὰ ῥόον, as Bähr and other
commentators suppose: _both_ the predicates apply alike to _both_
the bridges,—as indeed it stands to reason that the arrangement
of ships best for one bridge must also have been best for the
other. Respecting the meaning of ἐπικάρσιος in Herodotus, see iv,
101; i, 180. In the Odyssey (ix, 70: compare Eustath. ad loc.)
ἐπικάρσιαι does not mean oblique, but headlong before the wind:
compare ἐπίκαρ, Iliad, xviii, 392. The circumstance stated by
Herodotus—that in the bridge higher up the stream, or nearest to
the Euxine, there were in all three hundred and sixty vessels,
while in the other bridge there were no more than three hundred
and fourteen—has perplexed the commentators, and induced them to
resort to inconvenient explanations,—as that of saying, that in
the higher bridge the vessels were moored not in a direct line
across, but in a line slanting, so that the extreme vessel on the
European side was lower down the stream than the extreme vessel
on the Asiatic side. This is one of the false explanations given
of ἐπικαρσίας (_slanting_, _schräg_): while the idea of Gronovius
and Larcher, that the vessels in the higher bridge presented
_their broadside_ to the current, is still more inadmissible. But
the difference in the number of ships employed in the one bridge
compared with the other seems to admit of an easier explanation.
We need not suppose, nor does Herodotus say, that the two bridges
were quite close together: considering the multitude which had to
cross them, it would be convenient that they should be placed at
a certain distance from each other. If they were a mile or two
apart, we may well suppose that the breadth of the strait was not
exactly the same in the two places chosen, and that it may have
been broader at the point of the upper bridge,—which, moreover,
might require to be made more secure, as having to meet the first
force of the current. The greater number of vessels in the upper
bridge will thus be accounted for in a simple and satisfactory
manner.

In some of the words used by Herodotus there appears an
obscurity: they run thus,—ἐζεύγνυσαν δὲ ὧδε· Πεντηκοντέρους καὶ
τριήρεας συνθέντες, ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν (these words are misprinted
in Bähr’s edition) πρὸς τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου ἐξήκοντά τε καὶ
τριηκοσίας, ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἑτέρην τέσσερες καὶ δέκα καὶ τριηκοσὶας
(τοῦ μὲν Πόντου, ἐπικαρσίας, τοῦ δὲ Ἑλλησπόντου κατὰ ῥόον), ἵνα
ἀνακωχεύῃ τὸν τόνον τῶν ὅπλων· συνθέντες δὲ, ἀγκύρας κατῆκαν
περιμήκεας, etc.

There is a difficulty respecting the words ἵνα ἀνακωχεύῃ τὸν
τόνον τῶν ὅπλων,—what is the nominative case to this verb? Bähr
says in his note, _sc._ ὁ ῥόος, and he construes τῶν ὅπλων to
mean the cables whereby the anchors were held fast. But if
we read farther on, we shall see that τὰ ὅπλα mean, not the
anchor-cables, but the cables which were stretched across from
shore to shore to form the bridge; the very same words τῶν
ὅπλων τοῦ τόνου, applied to these latter cables, occur a few
lines afterwards. I think that the nominative case belonging
to ἀνακωχεύῃ is ἡ γεφύρα (not ὁ ῥόος), and that the words from
τοῦ μὲν Πόντου down to ῥόον are to be read parenthetically,
as I have printed them above: the express object for which
the ships were moored was, “that the bridge might hold up, or
sustain, the tension of its cables stretched across from shore
to shore.” I admit that we should naturally expect ἀνακωχεύωσι
and not ἀνακωχεύῃ, since the proposition would be true of _both_
bridges; but though this makes an awkward construction, it is not
inadmissible, since each bridge had been previously described in
the singular number.

Bredow and others accuse Herodotus of ignorance and incorrectness
in this description of the bridges, but there seems nothing to
bear out this charge.

Herodotus (iv, 85), Strabo (xiii, p. 591), and Pliny (H. N. iv,
12; vi, 1) give seven stadia as the breadth of the Hellespont in
its narrowest part. Dr. Pococke also assigns the same breadth:
Tournefort allows but a mile (vol. ii, lett. 4). Some modern
French measurements give the distance as something considerably
greater,—eleven hundred and thirty or eleven hundred and fifty
toises (see Miot’s note on his translation of Herodotus). The
Duke of Ragusa states it at seven hundred toises (Voyage en
Turquie, vol. ii, p. 164). If we suppose the breadth to be
one mile, or five thousand two hundred and eighty feet, three
hundred and sixty vessels at an average breadth of fourteen and
two thirds feet would exactly fill the space. Rennell says,
“Eleven feet is the breadth of a barge: vessels of the size of
the smallest coasting-craft were adequate to the purpose of the
bridge.” (On the Geography of Herodotus, p. 127.)

The recent measurements or estimates stated by Miot go much
beyond Herodotus: that of the Duke of Ragusa nearly coincides
with him. But we need not suppose that the vessels filled up
entirely the whole breadth, without leaving any gaps between: we
only know, that there were no gaps left large enough for a vessel
in voyage to sail through, except in three specified places.

Out of the six cables assigned to each bridge, two were of flax and
four of papyrus, combined for the sake of increased strength; for it
seems that in the bridges first made, which proved too weak to resist
the winds, the Phenicians had employed cables of flax for one bridge,
the Egyptians those of papyrus for the other.[33] Over these again
were laid planks of wood, sawn to the appropriate width, secured by
ropes to keep them in their places: and lastly, upon this foundation
the causeway itself was formed, out of earth and wood, with a
palisade on each side high enough to prevent the cattle which passed
over from seeing the water.

[33] For the long celebrity of these cables, see the epigram of
Archimêlus, composed two centuries and a half afterwards, in the
time of Hiero the Second, of Syracuse, ap. Athenæum, v, 209.

Herodotus states that in thickness and compact make (παχυτὴς
καὶ καλλονὴ) the cables of flax were equal to those of papyrus;
but that in weight the former were superior; for each cubit in
length of the flaxen cable weighed a talent: we can hardly reason
upon this, because we do not know whether he means an Attic, an
Euboic, or an Æginæan talent: nor, if he means an Attic talent,
whether it be an Attic talent of commerce, or of the monetary
standard.

The cables contained in the Athenian dockyard are distinguished
as σχοίνια ὀκτωδάκτυλα, ἐξδάκτυλα,—in which expressions, however,
M. Boeckh cannot certainly determine whether circumference or
diameter be meant: he thinks probably the former. See his learned
book, Das Seewesen der Athener, ch. x, p. 165.

The other great work which Xerxes caused to be performed, for
facilitating his march, was, the cutting through of the isthmus
which connects the stormy promontory of Mount Athos with the main
land.[34] That isthmus, near the point where it joins the main land,
was about twelve stadia or furlongs across, from the Strymonic to
the Toronaic gulf: and the canal dug by order of Xerxes was broad
and deep enough for two triremes to sail abreast. In this work too,
as well as in the bridge across the Hellespont, the Phenicians
were found the ablest and most efficient among all the subjects
of the Persian monarch; but the other tributaries, especially the
Greeks from the neighboring town of Akanthus, and indeed the entire
maritime forces of the empire,[35] were brought together to assist.
The head-quarters of the fleet were first at Kymê and Phokæa, next
at Elæus in the southern extremity of the Thracian Chersonese,
from which point it could protect and second at once the two
enterprises going forward at the Hellespont and at Mount Athos. The
canal-cutting at the latter was placed under the general directions
of two noble Persians,—Bubarês and Artachæus, and distributed under
their measurement as task-work among the contingents of the various
nations; an ample supply of flour and other provisions being brought
for sale in the neighboring plain from various parts of Asia and
Egypt.

[34] For a specimen of the destructive storms near the promontory
of Athos, see Ephorus, Fragment. 121, ed. Didot; Diodor. xiii, 41.

[35] Herodot. vii, 22, 23, 116; Diodor. xi. 2.

Three circumstances in the narrative of Herodotus, respecting this
work, deserve special notice. First, the superior intelligence of
the Phenicians, who, within sight of that lofty island of Thasos
which had been occupied three centuries before by their free
ancestors, were now laboring as instruments to the ambition of a
foreign conqueror. Amidst all the people engaged, they alone took
the precaution of beginning the excavation at a breadth far greater
than the canal was finally destined to occupy, so as gradually to
narrow it, and leave a convenient slope for the sides: the others
dug straight down, so that the time as well as the toil of their
work was doubled by the continual falling in of the sides,—a
remarkable illustration of the degree of practical intelligence
then prevalent, since the nations assembled were many and diverse.
Secondly, Herodotus remarks that Xerxes must have performed this
laborious work from motives of mere ostentation: “for it would have
cost no trouble at all,” he observes,[36] “to drag all the ships in
the fleet across the isthmus; so that the canal was nowise needed.”
So familiar a process was it, in the mind of a Greek of the fifth
century B. C., to transport ships by mechanical force across an
isthmus; a special groove, or slip, being seemingly prepared for
them: such was the case at the Diolkus across the isthmus of Corinth.
Thirdly, it is to be noted, that the men who excavated the canal at
Mount Athos worked under the lash; and these, be it borne in mind,
were not bought slaves, but freemen, except in so far as they were
tributaries of the Persian monarch; and that the father of Herodotus,
a native of Halikarnassus, and a subject of the brave queen
Artemisia, may perhaps have been among them. We shall find other
examples as we proceed, of this indiscriminate use of the whip, and
full conviction of its indispensable necessity, on the part of the
Persians,[37]—even to drive the troops of their subject-contingents
on to the charge in battle. To employ the scourge in this way
towards freemen, and especially towards freemen engaged in military
service, was altogether repugnant both to Hellenic practice and to
Hellenic feeling: the Asiatic and insular Greeks were relieved from
it, as from various other hardships, when they passed out of Persian
dominion to become, first allies, afterwards subjects, of Athens: and
we shall be called upon hereafter to take note of this fact, when we
appreciate the complaints preferred against the hegemony of Athens.

[36] Herodot. vii, 24: ὡς μὲν ἐμὲ συμβαλλεόμενον εὑρίσκειν,
μεγαλοφροσύνης εἵνεκα αὐτὸ Ξέρξης ὀρύσσειν ἐκέλευε, ἐθέλων τε
δύναμιν ἀποδείκνυσθαι, καὶ μνημόσυνα λιπέσθαι· παρεὸν γὰρ,
~μηδένα πόνον λαβόντας~, τὸν ἰσθμὸν τὰς νέας διειρύσαι, ὀρύσσειν
ἐκέλευε διώρυχα τῇ θαλάσσῃ, εὖρος ὡς δύο τριήρεας πλέειν ὁμοῦ
ἐλαστρευμένας.

According to the manner in which Herodotus represents this
excavation to have been performed, the earth dug out was handed
up from man to man from the bottom of the canal to the top—the
whole performed by hand, without any aid of cranes or barrows.

The pretended work of turning the course of the river Halys,
which Grecian report ascribed to Crœsus on the advice of Thales,
was a far greater work than the cutting at Athos (Herodot. i, 75).

As this ship-canal across the isthmus of Athos has been treated
often as a fable both by ancients (Juvenal, Sat. x) and by
moderns (Cousinéry, Voyage en Macédoine), I transcribe the
observations of Colonel Leake. That excellent observer points
out evident traces of its past existence: but in my judgment,
even if no such traces now remained, the testimony of Herodotus
and Thucydides (iv, 109) would alone be sufficient to prove
that it _had_ existed really. The observations of Colonel Leake
illustrate at the same time the motives in which the canal
originated: “The canal (he says) seems to have been not more
than sixty feet wide. As history does not mention that it was
ever kept in repair after the time of Xerxes, the waters from
the heights around have naturally filled it in part with soil,
in the course of ages. It might, however, without much labor, be
renewed: and there can be no doubt that it would be useful to
the navigation of the Ægean: for such is the fear entertained by
the Greek boatmen, of the strength and uncertain direction of
the currents around Mount Athos, and of the gales and high seas
to which the vicinity of the mountain is subject during half the
year, and which are rendered more formidable by the deficiency
of harbors in the gulf of Orfaná, that I could not, as long as I
was on the peninsula, and though offering a high price, prevail
upon any boat to carry me from the eastern side of the peninsula
to the western. Xerxes, therefore, was perfectly justified in
cutting this canal, as well from the security which it afforded
to his fleet, as from the facility of the work and the advantages
of the ground, which seems made expressly to tempt such an
undertaking. The experience of the losses which the former
expedition under Mardonius had suffered suggested the idea. The
circumnavigation of the capes Ampelus and Canastræum was much
less dangerous, as the gulfs afford some good harbors, and it
was the object of Xerxes to collect forces from the Greek cities
in those gulfs as he passed. If there be any difficulty arising
from the narrative of Herodotus, it is in comprehending how the
operation should have required so long a time as three years,
when the king of Persia had such multitudes at his disposal, and
among them Egyptians and Babylonians, accustomed to the making of
canals.” (Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii, ch. 24, p.
145.)

These remarks upon the enterprise are more judicious than those
of Major Rennell (Geogr. of Herodot. p. 116). I may remark that
Herodotus does not affirm that the actual cutting of the canal
occupied three years,—he assigns that time to the cutting with
all its preliminary arrangements included,—προετοιμάζετο ἐκ τρίων
ἐτέων κου μάλιστα τὰ ἐς τὸν Ἄθων (vii, 22).

[37] Herodot. vii, 22: ὤρυσσον ὑπὸ μαστίγων παντοδαποὶ τῆς
στρατιῆς· διάδοχοι δ’ ἐφοίτων.—vii, 56: Ξέρξης δὲ, ἐπεί
τε διέβη ἐς τὴν Εὐρώπην, ἐθηεῖτο τὸν στρατὸν ὑπὸ μαστίγων
διαβαίνοντα:—compare vii, 103, and Xenophon, Anabasis, iii, 4-25.

The essential necessity, and plentiful use, of the whip, towards
subject-tributaries, as conceived by the ancient Persians, finds
its parallel in the modern Turks. See the Mémoires du Baron de
Tott, vol. i, p. 256, _seqq._, and his dialogue on this subject
with his Turkish conductor Ali-Aga.

At the same time that the subject-contingents of Xerxes excavated
this canal, which was fortified against the sea at its two
extremities by compact earthen walls, or embankments, they also
threw bridges of boats over the river Strymon: and these two works,
together with the renovated double bridge across the Hellespont,
were both announced to Xerxes as completed and ready for passage,
on his arrival at Sardis at the beginning of winter, 481-480 B. C.
Whether the whole of his vast army arrived at Sardis at the same time
as himself, and wintered there, may reasonably be doubted; but the
whole was united at Sardis and ready to march against Greece, at the
beginning of spring, 480 B. C.

While wintering at Sardis, the Persian monarch despatched heralds
to all the cities of Greece, except Sparta and Athens, to demand
the received tokens of submission, earth and water: for news of
his prodigious armament was well calculated to spread terror even
among the most resolute of them. And he at the same time sent
orders to the maritime cities in Thrace and Macedonia to prepare
“dinner” for himself and his vast suite as he passed on his march.
That march was commenced at the first beginning of spring, and
continued in spite of several threatening portents during the course
of it,—one of which Xerxes was blind enough not to comprehend,
though, according to Herodotus, nothing could be more obvious than
its signification,[38]—while another was misinterpreted into a
favorable omen by the compliant answer of the Magian priests. On
quitting Sardis, the vast host was divided into two nearly equal
columns: a spacious interval being left between the two for the king
himself, with his guards and select Persians. First of all[39] came
the baggage, carried by beasts of burden, immediately followed by
one half of the entire body of infantry, without any distinction
of nations: next, the select troops, one thousand Persian cavalry,
with one thousand Persian spearmen, the latter being distinguished
by carrying their spears with the point downwards, as well as by
the spear itself, which had a golden pomegranate at its other
extremity, in place of the ordinary spike or point whereby the
weapon was planted in the ground when the soldier was not on duty.
Behind these troops walked ten sacred horses, of vast power and
splendidly caparisoned, bred on the Nisæan plains in Media: next,
the sacred chariot of Zeus, drawn by eight white horses,—wherein no
man was ever allowed to mount, not even the charioteer, who walked
on foot behind with the reins in his hand. Next after the sacred
chariot came that of Xerxes himself, drawn by Nisæan horses; the
charioteer, a noble Persian, named Patiramphês, being seated in it
by the side of the monarch,—who was often accustomed to alight from
the chariot and to enter a litter. Immediately about his person were
a chosen body of one thousand horse-guards, the best troops and of
the highest breed among the Persians, having golden apples at the
reverse extremity of their spears, and followed by other detachments
of one thousand horse, ten thousand foot, and ten thousand horse,
all native Persians. Of these ten thousand Persian infantry, called
the Immortals, because their number was always exactly maintained,
nine thousand carried spears with pomegranates of silver at the
reverse extremity, while the remaining one thousand distributed in
front, rear, and on each side of this detachment, were marked by
pomegranates of gold on their spears. With them ended what we may
call the household troops: after whom, with an interval of two
furlongs, the remaining host followed pell-mell.[40] Respecting its
numbers and constituent portions I shall speak presently, on occasion
of the great review at Doriskus.

[38] Herodot. vii, 57. Τέρας σφι ἐφάνη μέγα, τὸ Ξέρξης ἐν οὐδενὶ
λόγῳ ἐποιήσατο, καίπερ εὐσύμβλητον ἐόν· ἵππος γὰρ ἔτεκε λαγόν.
Εὐσύμβλητον ὦν τῇδε ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἔμελλε μὲν ἐλᾶν στρατιὴν ἐπὶ
τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ξέρξης ἀγαυρότατα καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατα, ὀπίσω δὲ περὶ
ἑωϋτοῦ τρέχων ἥξειν ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν χῶρον.

The prodigy was, that a mare brought forth a hare, which
signified that Xerxes would set forth on his expedition to Greece
with strength and splendor, but that he would come back in timid
and disgraceful flight.

The implicit faith of Herodotus, first in the reality of the
fact,—next, in the certainty of his interpretation,—deserves
notice, as illustrating his canon of belief, and that of his
age. The interpretation is doubtless here the generating cause
of the story interpreted: an ingenious man, after the expedition
has terminated, imagines an appropriate simile for its proud
commencement and inglorious termination (Parturiunt montes,
nascetur ridiculus mus), and the simile is recounted, either
by himself or by some hearer who is struck with it, as if it
had been a real antecedent fact. The aptness of this supposed
antecedent fact to foreshadow the great Persian invasion (τὸ
εὐσύμβλητον of Herodotus) serves as presumptive evidence to
bear out the witness asserting it; while departure from the
established analogies of nature affords no motive for disbelief
to a man who admits that the gods occasionally send special signs
and warnings.

[39] Compare the description of the processional march of Cyrus,
as given in the Cyropædia of Xenophon, viii, 2, 1-20.

[40] Herodot. vii, 41. Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἵππον διελέλειπτο καὶ δύο
σταδίους, καὶ ἔπειτα ὁ λοιπὸς ὅμιλος ἤϊε ἀναμίξ.

On each side of the army, as it marched out of Sardis, was seen
suspended one half of the body of a slaughtered man, placed there
expressly for the purpose of impressing a lesson on the subjects of
Persia. It was the body of the eldest son of the wealthy Pythius,
a Phrygian old man resident at Kelænæ, who had entertained Xerxes
in the course of his march from Kappadokia to Sardis, and who had
previously recommended himself by rich gifts to the preceding king
Darius. So abundant was his hospitality to Xerxes, and so pressing
his offers of pecuniary contribution for the Grecian expedition, that
the monarch asked him what was the amount of his wealth. “I possess
(replied Pythius) besides lands and slaves, two thousand talents of
silver, and three million nine hundred and ninety-three thousand of
golden darics, wanting only seven thousand of being four million.
All this gold and silver do I present to thee, retaining only my
lands and slaves, which will be quite enough.” Xerxes replied by the
strongest expressions of praise and gratitude for his liberality;
at the same time refusing his offer, and even giving to Pythius out
of his own treasure the sum of seven thousand darics, which was
wanting to make up the exact sum of four million. The latter was
so elated with this mark of favor, that when the army was about to
depart from Sardis, he ventured, under the influence of terror from
the various menacing portents, to prefer a prayer to the Persian
monarch. His five sons were all about to serve in the invading army
against Greece: his prayer to Xerxes was, that the eldest of them
might be left behind, as a stay to his own declining years, and that
the service of the remaining four with the army might be considered
as sufficient. But the unhappy father knew not what he asked.
“Wretch! (replied Xerxes) dost thou dare to talk to me about _thy_
son, when I am myself on the march against Greece, with my sons,
brothers, relatives, and friends? thou who art my slave, and whose
duty it is to follow me, with thy wife and thy entire family? Know
that the sensitive soul of man dwells in his ears: on hearing good
things, it fills the body with delight, but boils with wrath when it
hears the contrary. As, when thou didst good deeds and madest good
offers to me, thou canst not boast of having surpassed the king in
generosity,—so now, when thou hast turned round and become impudent,
the punishment inflicted on thee shall not be the full measure of thy
deserts, but something less. For thyself and for thy four sons, the
hospitality which I received from thee shall serve as protection; but
for that one son whom thou especially wishest to keep in safety, the
forfeit of his life shall be thy penalty.” He forthwith directed that
the son of Pythius should be put to death, and his body severed in
twain: of which one half was to be fixed on the right-hand, the other
on the left-hand, of the road along which the army was to pass.[41]

[41] The incident respecting Pythius is in Herodot. vii, 27, 28,
38, 39. I place no confidence in the estimate of the wealth of
Pythius; but in other respects, the story seems well entitled to
credit.

A tale essentially similar, yet rather less revolting, has been
already recounted respecting Darius, when undertaking his expedition
against Scythia. Both tales illustrate the intense force of sentiment
with which the Persian kings regarded the obligation of universal
personal service, when they were themselves in the field. They seem
to have measured their strength by the number of men whom they
collected around them, with little or no reference to quality: and
the very mention of exemption—the idea that a subject and a slave
should seek to withdraw himself from a risk which the monarch was
about to encounter—was an offence not to be pardoned. In this as in
the other acts of Oriental kings, whether grateful, munificent, or
ferocious, we trace nothing but the despotic force of personal will,
translating itself into act without any thought of consequences, and
treating subjects with less consideration than an ordinary Greek
master would have shown towards his slaves.

From Sardis, the host of Xerxes directed its march to Abydos, first
across Mysia and the river Kaïkus,—then through Atarneus, Karinê,
and the plain of Thêbê: they passed Adramyttium and Antandrus, and
crossed the range of Ida, most part of which was on their left hand,
not without some loss from stormy weather and thunder.[42] From hence
they reached Ilium and the river Skamander, the stream of which was
drunk up, or probably in part trampled and rendered undrinkable, by
the vast host of men and animals: in spite of the immortal interest
which the Skamander derives from the Homeric poems, its magnitude is
not such as to make this fact surprising. To the poems themselves,
even Xerxes did not disdain to pay tribute: he ascended the holy
hill of Ilium,—reviewed the Pergamus where Priam was said to have
lived and reigned,—sacrificed one thousand oxen to the patron
goddess Athênê,—and caused the Magian priests to make libations
in honor of the heroes who had fallen on that venerated spot. He
even condescended to inquire into the local details,[43] abundantly
supplied to visitors by the inhabitants of Ilium, of that great real
or mythical war to which Grecian chronologers had hardly yet learned
to assign a precise date: and doubtless when he contemplated the
narrow area of that Troy which all the Greeks confederated under
Agamemnon had been unable for ten years to overcome, he could not
but fancy that these same Greeks would fall an easy prey before his
innumerable host. Another day’s march between Rhœteium, Ophryneium,
and Dardanus on the left-hand, and the Teukrians of Gergis on the
right-hand, brought him to Abydos, where his two newly-constructed
bridges over the Hellespont awaited him.

[42] Herodot. vii, 42.

[43] Herodot. vii, 43. θεησάμενος δὲ, καὶ πυθόμενος κείνων
ἕκαστα, etc.

On this transit from Asia into Europe Herodotus dwells with peculiar
emphasis,—and well he might do so, since when we consider the
bridges, the invading number, the unmeasured hopes succeeded by
no less unmeasured calamity,—it will appear not only to have been
the most imposing event of his century, but to rank among the most
imposing events of all history. He surrounds it with much dramatic
circumstance, not only mentioning the marble throne erected for
Xerxes on a hill near Abydos, from whence he surveyed both his masses
of land-force covering the shore, and his ships sailing and racing
in the strait (a race in which the Phenicians of Sidon surpassed
the Greeks and all the other contingents), but also superadding to
this real fact a dialogue with Artabanus, intended to set forth
the internal mind of Xerxes. He farther quotes certain supposed
exclamations of the Abydenes at the sight of his superhuman power.
“Why (said one of these terror-stricken spectators[44]), why dost
thou, O Zeus, under the shape of a Persian man and the name of
Xerxes, thus bring together the whole human race for the ruin of
Greece? It would have been easy for thee to accomplish _that_ without
so much ado.” Such emphatic ejaculations exhibit the strong feeling
which Herodotus or his informants throw into the scene, though we
cannot venture to apply to them the scrutiny of historical criticism.

[44] Herodot. vii, 45, 53, 56. Ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δὴ ἀνδρὶ εἰδόμενος
Πέρσῃ, καὶ οὔνομα ἀντὶ Διὸς Ξέρξην θέμενος, ἀνάστατον τὴν Ἑλλάδα
ἐθέλεις ποιῆσαι, ἄγων πάντας ἀνθρώπους; καὶ γὰρ ἄνευ τουτέων ἐξῆν
τοι ποιέειν ταῦτα.

At the first moment of sunrise, so sacred in the mind of
Orientals,[45] the passage was ordered to begin: the bridges being
perfumed with frankincense and strewed with myrtle boughs, while
Xerxes himself made libations into the sea with a golden censer, and
offered up prayers to Helios, that he might effect without hindrance
his design of conquering Europe even to its farthest extremity.
Along with his libation he cast into the Hellespont the censer
itself, with a golden bowl and a Persian scimitar;—“I do not exactly
know[46] (adds the historian) whether he threw them in as a gift to
Helios, or as a mark of repentance and atonement to the Hellespont
for the stripes which he had inflicted upon it.” Of the two bridges,
that nearest to the Euxine was devoted to the military force,—the
other, to the attendants, the baggage, and the beasts of burden.
The ten thousand Persians, called Immortals, all wearing garlands
on their heads, were the first to pass over, and Xerxes himself,
with the remaining army, followed next, though in an order somewhat
different from that which had been observed in quitting Sardis: the
monarch having reached the European shore, saw his troops crossing
the bridges after him “under the lash.” But in spite of the use of
this sharp stimulus to accelerate progress, so vast were the numbers
of his host, that they occupied no less than seven days and seven
nights, without a moment of intermission, in the business of crossing
over,—a fact to be borne in mind presently, when we come to discuss
the totals computed by Herodotus.[47]

[45] Tacitus, Histor. iii, 24. “Undique clamor, et orientem
solem, ita in Syriâ mos est, consalutavêre,”—in his striking
description of the night battle near Cremona, between the Roman
troops of Vitellius and Vespasian, and the rise of the sun while
the combat was yet unfinished: compare also Quintus Curtius (iii,
3, 8, p. 41, ed. Mützel).

[46] Herodot. vii, 54. ταῦτα οὐκ ἔχω ἀτρεκέως διακρῖναι, οὔτε εἰ
τῷ Ἡλίῳ ἀνατιθεὶς κατῆκε ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, οὔτε εἰ μετεμέλησέ οἱ τὸν
Ἑλλήσποντον μαστιγώσαντι, καὶ ἀντὶ τούτων τὴν θάλασσαν ἐδωρέετο.

[47] Herodot. vii, 55, 56. Διέβη δὲ ὁ στρατὸς αὐτοῦ ἐν ἑπτὰ
ἡμέρῃσι καὶ ἐν ἑπτὰ εὐφρόνῃσι, ἐλινύσας οὐδένα χρόνον.

Having thus cleared the strait, Xerxes directed his march along the
Thracian Chersonese, to the isthmus whereby it is joined with Thrace,
between the town of Kardia on his left hand and the tomb of Hellê on
his right,—the eponymous heroine of the strait. After passing this
isthmus, he turned westward along the coast of the gulf of Melas and
the Ægean sea,—crossing the river from which that gulf derived its
name, and even drinking its waters up—according to Herodotus—with
the men and animals of his army. Having passed by the Æolic city of
Ænus and the harbor called Stentoris, he reached the sea-coast and
plain called Doriskus, covering the rich delta near the mouth of the
Hebrus: a fort had been built there and garrisoned by Darius. The
spacious plain called by this same name reached far along the shore
to Cape Serreium, and comprised in it the towns of Salê and Zonê,
possessions of the Samothracian Greeks planted on the territory
once possessed by the Thracian Kikones on the mainland. Having been
here joined by his fleet, which had doubled[48] the southernmost
promontory of the Thracian Chersonese, he thought the situation
convenient for a general review and enumeration both of his land and
his naval force.

[48] Herodot. vii, 58-59; Pliny, H. N. iv, 11. See some valuable
remarks on the topography of Doriskus and the neighborhood of
the town still called Enos, in Grisebach, Reise durch Rumelien
und nach Brussa, ch. vi, vol. i, pp. 157-159 (Göttingen, 1841).
He shows reason for believing that the indentation of the coast,
marked on the map as the gulf of Ænos, did not exist in ancient
times, any more than it exists now.

Never probably in the history of mankind has there been brought
together a body of men from regions so remote and so widely diverse,
for one purpose and under one command, as those which were now
assembled in Thrace near the mouth of the Hebrus. About the numerical
total we cannot pretend to form any definite idea; about the variety
of contingents there is no room for doubt. “What Asiatic nation was
there (asks Herodotus,[49] whose conceptions of this expedition
seem to outstrip his powers of language) that Xerxes did not bring
against Greece?” Nor was it Asiatic nations alone, comprised within
the Oxus, the Indus, the Persian gulf, the Red Sea, the Levant, the
Ægean and the Euxine: we must add to these also the Egyptians, the
Ethiopians on the Nile south of Egypt, and the Libyans from the
desert near Kyrênê. Not all the expeditions, fabulous or historical,
of which Herodotus had ever heard, appeared to him comparable to this
of Xerxes, even for total number; much more in respect of variety
of component elements. Forty-six different nations,[50] each with
its distinct national costume, mode of arming, and local leaders,
formed the vast land-force; eight other nations furnished the fleet,
on board of which Persians, Medes, and Sakæ served as armed soldiers
or marines; and the real leaders, both of the entire army and of
all its various divisions, were native Persians of noble blood,
who distributed the various native contingents into companies of
thousands, hundreds, and tens. The forty-six nations composing the
land-force were as follows: Persians, Medes, Kissians, Hyrkanians,
Assyrians, Baktrians, Sakæ, Indians, Arians, Parthians, Chorasmians,
Sogdians, Gandarians, Dadikæ, Kaspians, Sarangæ, Paktyes, Utii, Myki,
Parikanii, Arabians, Ethiopians in Asia and Ethiopians south of
Egypt, Libyans, Paphlagonians, Ligyes, Matieni, Mariandyni, Syrians,
Phrygians, Armenians, Lydians, Mysians, Thracians, Kabêlians, Mares,
Kolchians, Alarodians, Saspeires, Sagartii. The eight nations who
furnished the fleet were: Phenicians, three hundred ships of war;
Egyptians, two hundred; Cypriots, one hundred and fifty; Kilikians,
one hundred; Pamphylians, thirty; Lykians, fifty; Karians, seventy;
Ionic Greeks, one hundred; Doric Greeks, thirty; Æolic Greeks, sixty;
Hellespontic Greeks, one hundred; Greeks from the islands in the
Ægean, seventeen; in all one thousand two hundred and seven triremes,
or ships of war, with three banks of oars. The descriptions of
costume and arms which we find in Herodotus are curious and varied;
but it is important to mention that no nation except the Lydians,
Pamphylians, Cypriots and Karians (partially also the Egyptian
marines on shipboard) bore arms analogous to those of the Greeks
(_i. e._ arms fit for steady conflict and sustained charge,[51]—for
hand combat in line as well as for defence of the person,—but
inconveniently heavy either in pursuit or in flight); while the other
nations were armed with missile weapons,—light shields of wicker or
leather, or no shields at all,—turbans or leather caps instead of
helmets,—swords, and scythes. They were not properly equipped either
for fighting in regular order or for resisting the line of spears and
shields which the Grecian hoplites brought to bear upon them; their
persons too were much less protected against wounds than those of the
latter; some of them indeed, as the Mysians and Libyans, did not even
carry spears, but only staves with the end hardened in the fire.[52]
A nomadic tribe of Persians, called Sagartii, to the number of eight
thousand horsemen, came armed only with a dagger and with the rope
known in South America as the lasso, which they cast in the fight to
entangle an antagonist. The Æthiopians from the Upper Nile had their
bodies painted half red and half white, wore the skins of lions and
panthers, and carried, besides the javelin, a long bow with arrows of
reed, tipped with a point of sharp stone.

[49] Herodot. vii, 20-21.

[50] See the enumeration in Herodotus, vii, 61-96. In chapter 76,
one name has dropped out of the text (see the note of Wesseling
and Schweighäuser), which, in addition to those specified under
the head of the land-force, makes up exactly forty-six. It is
from this source that Herodotus derives the boast which he puts
into the mouth of the Athenians (ix, 27) respecting the battle
of Marathon, in which they pretend to have vanquished forty-six
nations,—ἐνικήσαμεν ἔθνεα ἓξ καὶ τεσσαράκοντα: though there is no
reason for believing that so great a number of contingents were
engaged with Datis at Marathon.

Compare the boasts of Antiochus king of Syria. (B. C. 192) about
his immense Asiatic host brought across into Greece, as well as
the contemptuous comments of the Roman consul Quinctius (Livy,
xxxv, 48-49). “Varia enim genera armorum, et multa nomina gentium
inauditarum, Dahas, et Medos, et Cadusios, et Elymæos—Syros omnes
esse: haud paulo mancipiorum melius, propter servilia ingenia,
quam militum genus:” and the sharp remark of the Arcadian envoy
Antiochus (Xenophon, Hellen. vii, 1, 33). Quintus Curtius also
has some rhetorical turns about the number of nations, whose
names even were hardly known, tributary to the Persian empire
(iii, 4, 29; iv, 45, 9), “ignota etiam ipsi Dario gentium
nomina,” etc.

[51] Herodot. vii, 89-93.

[52] Herodot. vii, 61-81.

It was at Doriskus that the fighting men of the entire land-army
were first numbered; for Herodotus expressly informs us that the
various contingents had never been numbered separately, and avows
his own ignorance of the amount of each. The means employed for
numeration were remarkable. Ten thousand men were counted,[53] and
packed together as closely as possible: a line was drawn, and a
wall of inclosure built around the space which they had occupied,
into which all the army was directed to enter successively, so that
the aggregate number of divisions, comprising ten thousand each,
was thus ascertained. One hundred and seventy of these divisions
were affirmed by the informants of Herodotus to have been thus
numbered, constituting a total of one million seven hundred thousand
foot, besides eighty thousand horse, many war-chariots from Libya
and camels from Arabia, with a presumed total of twenty thousand
additional men.[54] Such was the vast land-force of the Persian
monarch: his naval equipments were of corresponding magnitude,
comprising not only the twelve hundred and seven triremes,[55] or
war-ships, of three banks of oars, but also three thousand smaller
vessels of war and transports. The crew of each trireme comprised two
hundred rowers, and thirty fighting-men, Persians or Sakæ; that of
each of the accompanying vessels included eighty men, according to an
average which Herodotus supposes not far from the truth. If we sum
up these items, the total numbers brought by Xerxes from Asia to the
plain and to the coast of Doriskus would reach the astounding figure
of two million three hundred and seventeen thousand men. Nor is this
all. In the farther march from Doriskus to Thermopylæ, Xerxes pressed
into his service men and ships from all the people whose territory
he traversed: deriving from hence a reinforcement of one hundred and
twenty triremes with aggregate crews of twenty-four thousand men, and
of three hundred thousand new land troops, so that the aggregate of
his force when he appeared at Thermopylæ was two million six hundred
and forty thousand men. To this we are to add, according to the
conjecture of Herodotus, a number not at all inferior, as attendants,
slaves, sutlers, crews of the provision-craft and ships of burden,
etc., so that the male persons accompanying the Persian king when
he reached his first point of Grecian resistance amounted to five
million two hundred and eighty-three thousand two hundred and twenty!
So stands the prodigious estimate of this army, the whole strength
of the Eastern world, in clear and express figures of Herodotus,[56]
who himself evidently supposes the number to have been even greater;
for he conceives the number of “camp followers” as not only equal to,
but considerably larger than, that of fighting-men. We are to reckon,
besides, the eunuchs, concubines, and female cooks, at whose number
Herodotus does not pretend to guess: together with cattle, beasts
of burden, and Indian dogs, in indefinite multitude, increasing the
consumption of the regular army.

[53] The army which Darius had conducted against Scythia is said
to have been counted by divisions of ten thousand each, but the
process is not described in detail (Herodot. iv, 87).

[54] Herodot. vii, 60, 87, 184. This same rude mode of
enumeration was employed by Darius Codomannus a century and a
half afterwards, before he marched his army to the field of Issus
(Quintus Curtius, iii, 2, 3, p. 24, Mutzel).

[55] Herodot. vii, 89-97.

[56] Herodot. vii, 185-186. ἐπάγων πάντα τὸν ἠῷον στρατὸν ἐκ τῆς
Ἀσίης (vii, 157). “Vires Orientis et ultima secum Bactra ferens,”
to use the language of Virgil about Antony at Actium.

To admit this overwhelming total, or anything near to it, is
obviously impossible: yet the disparaging remarks which it has
drawn down upon Herodotus are noway merited.[57] He takes pains
to distinguish that which informants told him, from that which he
merely guessed. His description of the review at Doriskus is so
detailed, that he had evidently conversed with persons who were
present at it, and had learned the separate totals promulgated by the
enumerators,—infantry, cavalry, and ships of war, great and small. As
to the number of triremes, his statement seems beneath the truth, as
we may judge from the contemporary authority of Æschylus, who in the
“Persæ” gives the exact number of twelve hundred and seven Persian
ships as having fought at Salamis: but between Doriskus and Salamis,
Herodotus[58] has himself enumerated six hundred and forty-seven
ships as lost or destroyed, and only one hundred and twenty as added.
No exaggeration, therefore, can well be suspected in this statement,
which would imply about two hundred and seventy-six thousand as the
number of the crews, though there is here a confusion or omission in
the narrative which we cannot clear up. But the aggregate of three
thousand smaller ships, and still more, that of one million seven
hundred thousand infantry, are far less trustworthy. There would
be little or no motive for the enumerators to be exact, and every
motive for them to exaggerate,—an immense nominal total would be no
less pleasing to the army than to the monarch himself,—so that the
military total of land-force and ships’ crews, which Herodotus gives
as two million six hundred and forty-one thousand on the arrival
at Thermopylæ, may be dismissed as unwarranted and incredible. And
the computation whereby he determines the amount of non-military
persons present, as equal or more than equal to the military, is
founded upon suppositions noway admissible; for though in a Grecian
well-appointed army it was customary to reckon one light-armed
soldier, or attendant, for every hoplite, no such estimate can be
applied to the Persian host. A few grandees and leaders might be
richly provided with attendants of various kinds, but the great
mass of the army would have none at all. Indeed, it appears that
the only way in which we can render the military total, which must
at all events have been very great, consistent with the conditions
of possible subsistence, is by supposing a comparative absence of
attendants, and by adverting to the fact of the small consumption,
and habitual patience as to hardship of Orientals in all ages. An
Asiatic soldier will at this day make his campaign upon scanty fare,
and under privations which would be intolerable to an European.[59]
And while we thus diminish the probable consumption, we have to
consider that never in any case of ancient history had so much
previous pains been taken to accumulate supplies on the line of
march: in addition to which the cities in Thrace were required to
furnish such an amount of provisions, when the army passed by, as
almost brought them to ruin. Herodotus himself expresses his surprise
how provisions could have been provided for so vast a multitude; and
were we to admit his estimate literally, the difficulty would be
magnified into an impossibility. Weighing the circumstances of the
case well, and considering that this army was the result of a maximum
of effort throughout the vast empire, that a great numerical total
was the thing chiefly demanded, and that prayers for exemption were
regarded by the Great King as a capital offence, and that provisions
had been collected for three years before along the line of march,—we
may well believe that the numbers of Xerxes were greater than were
ever assembled in ancient times, or perhaps at any known epoch of
history. But it would be rash to pretend to guess at any positive
number, in the entire absence of ascertained data: and when we learn
from Thucydides that he found it impossible to find out the exact
numbers of the small armies of Greeks who fought at Mantineia,[60]
we shall not be ashamed to avow our inability to count the Asiatic
multitudes at Doriskus. We may remark, however, that, in spite
of the reinforcements received afterwards in Thrace, Macedonia,
and Thessaly, it may be doubted whether the aggregate total ever
afterwards increased; for Herodotus takes no account of desertions,
which yet must have been very numerous, in a host disorderly,
heterogeneous, without any interest in the enterprise, and wherein
the numbers of each separate contingent were unknown.

[57] Even Dahlmann, who has many good remarks in defence of
Herodotus, hardly does him justice (Herodot, Aus seinem Buche
sein Leben, ch. xxxiv, p. 176).

[58] Only one hundred and twenty ships of war are mentioned
by Herodotus (vii, 185) as having joined afterwards from the
seaports in Thrace. But four hundred were destroyed, if not more,
in the terrible storm on the coast of Magnesia (vii, 190); and
the squadron of two hundred sail, detached by the Persians round
Eubœa, were also all lost (viii, 7); besides forty-five taken or
destroyed in the various sea-fights near Artemisium (vii, 194;
viii, 11). Other losses are also indicated (viii, 14-16).

As the statement of Æschylus for the number of the Persian
triremes at Salamis appears well-entitled to credit, we must
suppose either that the number of Doriskus was greater than
Herodotus has mentioned, or that a number greater than that which
he has stated joined afterwards.

See a good note of Amersfoordt, ad Demosthen. Orat. de Symmoriis,
p. 88 (Leyden, 1821).

[59] See on this point Volney, Travels in Egypt and Syria, ch.
xxiv, vol. ii, pp. 70, 71; ch. xxxii, p. 367; and ch. xxxix, p.
435, (Engl. transl.).

Kinneir, Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire, pp. 22-23.
Bernier, who followed the march of Aurungzebe from Delhi, in
1665, says that some estimated the number of persons in the camp
at three hundred thousand, others at different totals, but that
no one knew, nor had they ever been counted. He says: “You are,
no doubt, at a loss to conceive how so vast a number both of men
and animals can be maintained in the field. The best solution of
the difficulty will be found in the temperance and simple diet of
the Indians.” (Bernier, Travels in the Mogul Empire, translated
by Brock, vol. ii, App. p. 118).

So also Petit de la Croix says, about the enormous host of
Genghis-Khan: “Les hommes sont si sobres, qu’ils s’accommodent de
toutes sortes d’alimens.”

That author seems to estimate the largest army of Genghis at
seven hundred thousand men (Histoire de Genghis, liv. ii, ch. vi,
p. 193).

[60] Thucydid. v, 68. Xenophon calls the host of Xerxes
_innumerable_,—ἀναρίθμητον στρατιάν (Anabas. iii, 2, 13).

It seems not to be considered necessary for a Turkish minister
to know the numbers of an assembled Turkish army. In the war
between the Russians and Turks in 1770, when the Turkish army was
encamped at Babadag near the Balkan, Baron de Tott tells us: “Le
Visir me demanda un jour fort sérieusement si l’armée Ottomane
étoit nombreuse. C’est à vous que je m’adresserois, lui dis-je,
si j’étais curieux de le savoir. Je l’ignore, me repondit-il. Si
vous l’ignorez, comment pourrois-je en être instruit? _En lisant
la Gazette de Vienna_, me répliqua-t-il. Je restai confondu.”

The Duke of Ragusa (in his voyage en Hongrie, Turquie, etc.),
after mentioning the prodigiously exaggerated statements
current about the numbers slain in the suppressed insurrection
of the Janissaries at Constantinople in 1826, observes: “On
a dit et répété, que leur nombre s’étoit élévé a huit ou
dix mille, et cette opinion s’est accréditée (it was really
about five hundred). Mais les Orientaux en général, et les
Turcs en particulier, n’ont aucune idée des nombres: ils les
emploient sans exactitude, et ils sont par caractère portés à
l’exagération. D’un autre coté, le gouvernement a dû favoriser
cette opinion populaire, pour frapper l’imagination et inspirer
une plus grande terreur.” (Vol. ii, p. 37.)

Ktesias gives the total of the host at eight hundred thousand men,
and one thousand triremes, independent of the war-chariots: if
he counts the crews of the triremes apart from the eight hundred
thousand men, as seems probable, the total will then be considerably
above a million. Ælian assigns an aggregate of seven hundred
thousand men: Diodorus[61] appears to follow partly Herodotus, partly
other authorities. None of these witnesses enable us to correct
Herodotus, in a case where we are obliged to disbelieve him. He
is, in some sort, an original witness, having evidently conversed
with persons actually present at the muster of Doriskus, giving us
both their belief as to the numbers, together with the computation,
true or false, circulated among them by authority. Moreover, the
contemporary Æschylus, while agreeing with him exactly as to the
number of triremes, gives no specific figure as to the land-force,
but conveys to us, in his Persæ, a general sentiment of vast number,
which may seem in keeping with the largest statement of Herodotus:
the Persian empire is drained of men,—the women of Susa are left
without husbands and brothers,—the Baktrian territory has not been
allowed to retain even its old men.[62] The terror-striking effect
of this crowd was probably quite as great as if its numbers had
really corresponded to the ideas of Herodotus.

[61] Ktesias, Persica, c. 22, 23; Ælian, V. H. xiii, 3; Diodorus,
xi, 2-11.

Respecting the various numerical statements in this case, see the
note of Bos ad Cornel. Nepot. Themistocl. c. 2, pp. 75, 76.

The Samian poet Chœrilus, a few years younger than Herodotus,
and contemporary with Thucydides, composed an epic poem on the
expedition of Xerxes against Greece. Two or three short fragments
of it are all that is preserved: he enumerated all the separate
nations who furnished contingents to Xerxes, and we find not
only the Sakæ, but also the Solymi (apparently the Jews, and so
construed by Josephus) among them. See Fragments, iii and iv, in
Næke’s edition of Chœrilus, pp. 121-134. Josephus cont. Apion. p.
454, ed. Havercamp.

[62] Æschylus, Pers. 14-124, 722-737. Heeren (in his learned
work on the commerce of the ancient world, Über den Verkehr der
alten Welt, part 1, sect. 1, pp. 162, 558, 3d edition) thinks
that Herodotus had seen the actual muster-roll, made by Persian
authority, of the army at Doriskus. I cannot think this at all
probable: it is much more reasonable to believe that all his
information was derived from Greeks who had accompanied the
expedition. He must have seen and conversed with many such. The
Persian royal scribes, or secretaries, accompanied the king,
and took note of any particular fact or person who might happen
to strike his attention (Herodot. vii, 100; viii, 90), or to
exhibit remarkable courage. They seem to have been specially
attached to the person of the king as ministers to his curiosity
and amusement, rather than keepers of authentic and continuous
records.

Heeren is disposed to accept the numerical totals, given by
Herodotus as to the army of Xerxes, much too easily, in my
judgment: nor is he correct in supposing that the contingents
of the Persian army marched with their wives and families (pp.
557-559).

After the numeration had taken place, Xerxes passed in his chariot
by each of the several contingents, observed their equipment, and
put questions to which the royal scribes noted down the answers: he
then embarked on board a Sidonian trireme, which had been already
fitted up with a gilt tent, and sailed along the prows of his immense
fleet, moored in line about four hundred feet from the shore, and
every vessel completely manned for action. Such a spectacle was well
calculated to rouse emotions of arrogant confidence, and it was in
this spirit that he sent forthwith for Demaratus, the exiled king
of Sparta, who was among his auxiliaries,—to ask whether resistance
on the part of the Greeks to such a force was even conceivable.
The conversation between them, dramatically given by Herodotus,
is one of the most impressive manifestations of sentiment in the
Greek language.[63] Demaratus assures him that the Spartans most
certainly, and the Dorians of Peloponnesus probably, will resist
him to the death, be the difference of numbers what it may. Xerxes
receives the statement with derision, but exhibits no feeling of
displeasure: an honorable contrast to the treatment of Charidemus a
century and a half afterwards, by the last monarch of Persia.[64]

[63] When Herodotus specifies his informants—it is much to be
regretted that he does not specify them oftener—they seem to be
frequently Greeks, such as Dikæus the Athenian exile, Thersander
of Orchomenus in Bœotia, Archias of Sparta, etc. (iii, 55; viii,
65; ix, 16.) He mentions the Spartan king Demaratus often,
and usually under circumstances both of dignity and dramatic
interest: it is highly probable that he may have conversed with
that prince himself, or with his descendants, who remained
settled for a long time in Teuthrania, near the Æolic coast of
Asia Minor (Xenoph. Hellenica, iii, 1, 6), and he may thus have
heard of representations offered by the exiled Spartan king to
Xerxes. Nevertheless, the remarks made by Hoffmeister, on the
speeches ascribed to Demaratus by Herodotus, are well deserving
of attention (Sittlich-religiöse Lebensansicht des Herodotos, p.
118).

“Herodotus always brings into connection with insolent kings some
man or other through whom he gives utterance to his own lessons
of wisdom. To Crœsus, at the summit of his glory, comes the wise
Solon: Crœsus himself, reformed by his captivity, performs the
same part towards Cyrus and Kambyses: Darius, as a prudent and
honest man, does not require any such counsellor; but Xerxes
in his pride has the sententious Artabanus and the sagacious
Demaratus attached to him; while Amasis king of Egypt is employed
to transmit judicious counsel to Polykratês, the despot of
Samos. Since all these men speak one and the same language, it
appears certain that they are introduced by Herodotus merely as
spokesmen for his own criticisms on the behavior and character
of the various monarchs,—criticisms which are nothing more than
general maxims, moral and religious, brought out by Solon,
Crœsus, or Artabanus, on occasion of particular events. The
speeches interwoven by Herodotus have, in the main, not the same
purpose as those of Tacitus,—to make the reader more intimately
acquainted with the existing posture of affairs, or with the
character of the agents,—but a different purpose quite foreign
to history: they embody in the narrative his own personal
convictions respecting human life and the divine government.”

This last opinion of Hoffmeister is to a great degree true, but
is rather too absolutely delivered.

[64] Herodot. vii, 101-104. How inferior is the scene between
Darius and Charidemus, in Quintus Curtius! (iii, 2, 9-19, p. 20,
ed. Mutzel.)

Herodotus takes up substantially the same vein of sentiment and
the same antithesis as that which runs through the Persæ of
Æschylus; but he handles it like a social philosopher, with a
strong perception of the real causes of Grecian superiority.

It is not improbable that the skeleton of the conversation
between Xerxes and Demaratus was a reality, heard by Herodotus
from Demaratus himself or from his sons; for the extreme
specialty with which the Lacedæmonian exile confines his praise
to the Spartans and Dorians, not including the other Greeks,
hardly represents the feeling of Herodotus himself.

The minuteness of the narrative which Herodotus gives respecting
the deposition and family circumstances of Demaratus (vi, 63,
_seq._), and his view of the death of Kleomenês as an atonement
to that prince for injury done, may seem derived from family
information (vi, 84).

After the completion of the review, Xerxes with the army pursued
his march westward, in three divisions and along three different
lines of road, through the territories of seven distinct tribes of
Thracians, interspersed with Grecian maritime colonies: all was
still within his own empire, and he took reinforcements from each
as he passed: the Thracian Satræ were preserved from this levy by
their unassailable seats amidst the woods and snows of Rhodopê. The
islands of Samothrace and Thasus, with their subject towns on the
mainland, and the Grecian colonies Dikæa,[65] Maroneia, and Abdêra,
were successively laid under contribution for contingents of ships or
men; and, what was still more ruinous, they were further constrained
to provide a day’s meal for the immense host as it passed: for the
day of his passage the Great King was their guest. Orders had been
transmitted for this purpose long beforehand, and for many months
the citizens had been assiduously employed in collecting food for
the army, as well as delicacies for the monarch,—grinding flour of
wheat and barley, fattening cattle, keeping up birds and fowls;
together with a decent display of gold and silver plate for the
regal dinner. A superb tent was erected for Xerxes and his immediate
companions, while the army received their rations in the open region
around: on commencing the march next morning, the tent with all its
rich contents was plundered, and nothing restored to those who had
furnished it. Of course, so prodigious a host, which had occupied
seven days and seven nights in crossing the double Hellespontine
bridge, must also have been for many days on its march through the
territory, and therefore at the charge, of each one among the cities,
so that the cost brought them to the brink of ruin, and even in some
cases drove them to abandon house and home. The cost incurred by the
city of Thasus, on account of their possessions of the mainland,
for this purpose, was no less than four hundred talents[66] (equal
to ninety-two thousand eight hundred pounds): while at Abdêra,
the witty Megakreon recommended to his countrymen to go in a body
to the temples and thank the gods, because Xerxes was pleased to
be satisfied with one meal in the day. Had the monarch required
breakfast as well as dinner, the Abderites must have been reduced to
the alternative either of exile or of utter destitution.[67] A stream
called Lissus, which seems to have been of no great importance, is
said to have been drunk up by the army, together with a lake of some
magnitude near Pistyrus.[68]

[65] Herodot. vii, 109, 111, 118.

[66] This sum of four hundred talents was equivalent to the
entire annual tribute charged in the Persian king’s rent-roll,
upon the satrapy comprising the western and southern coast of
Asia Minor, wherein were included all the Ionic and Æolic Greeks,
besides Lykians, Pamphylians, etc. (Herodot. iii, 90.)

[67] Herodot. vii, 118-120. He gives (vii, 187) the computation
of the quantity of corn which would have been required for daily
consumption, assuming the immense numbers as he conjectures
them, and reckoning one chœnix of wheat for each man’s daily
consumption, equal to one eighth of a medimnus. It is unnecessary
to examine a computation founded on such inadmissible data.

[68] Herodot. vii, 108, 109.

Through the territory of the Edonian Thracians and the Pierians,
between Pangæus and the sea, Xerxes and his army reached the river
Strymon at the important station called Ennea Hodoi, or Nine-Roads,
afterwards memorable by the foundation of Amphipolis. Bridges had
been already thrown over the river, to which the Magian priests
rendered solemn honors by sacrificing white horses and throwing them
into the stream. Nor were his religious feelings satisfied without
the more precious sacrifices often resorted to by the Persians: he
here buried alive nine native youths and nine maidens, in compliment
to Nine-Roads, the name of the Spot:[69] moreover, he also left,
under the care of the Pæonians of Siris, the sacred chariot of Zeus,
which had been brought from the seat of empire, but which doubtless
was found inconvenient on the line of march. From the Strymon he
marched forward along the Strymonic gulf, passing through the
territory of the Bisaltæ, near the Greek colonies of Argilus and
Stageirus, until he came to the Greek town of Akanthus, hard by the
isthmus of Athos, which had been recently cut through. The fierce
king of the Bisaltæ[70] refused submission to Xerxes, fled to Rhodopê
for safety, and forbade his six sons to join the Persian host.
Unhappily for themselves, they nevertheless did so, and when they
came back he caused all of them to be blinded.

[69] Herodot. vii, 114. He pronounces this savage practice to
be specially Persian. The old and cruel Persian queen Amestris,
wife of Xerxes, sought to prolong her own life by burying alive
fourteen victims, children of illustrious men, as offerings to
the subterranean god.

[70] Herodot. viii, 116.

All the Greek cities, which Xerxes had passed by, obeyed his orders
with sufficient readiness, and probably few doubted the ultimate
success of so prodigious an armament. But the inhabitants of Akanthus
had been eminent for their zeal and exertions in the cutting of
the canal, and had probably made considerable profits during the
operation; Xerxes now repaid their zeal by contracting with them
the tie of hospitality, accompanied with praise and presents;
though he does not seem to have exempted them from the charge of
maintaining the army while in their territory. He here separated
himself from his fleet, which was directed to sail through the canal
of Athos, to double the two southwestern capes of the Chalkidic
peninsula, to enter the Thermaic gulf, and to await his arrival at
Therma. The fleet in its course gathered additional troops from
the Greek towns in the two peninsulas of Sithonia and Pallênê, as
well as on the eastern side of the Thermaic gulf, in the region
called Krusis, or Krossæa, on the continental side of the isthmus of
Pallênê. These Greek towns were numerous, but of little individual
importance. Near Therma (Salonichi) in Mygdonia, in the interior of
the gulf and eastward of the mouth of the Axius, the fleet awaited
the arrival of Xerxes by land from Akanthus. He seems to have had
a difficult march, and to have taken a route considerably inland,
through Pæonia and Krestônia,—a wild, woody, and untrodden country,
where his baggage-camels were set upon by lions, and where there
were also wild bulls, of prodigious size and fierceness: at length
he rejoined his fleet at Therma, and stretched his army throughout
Mygdonia, the ancient Pieria, and Bottiæis, as far as the mouth of
the Haliakmôn.[71]

[71] Herodot. vii, 122-127.

Respecting the name Pieria, and the geography of these regions,
see the previous volume, vol. iv, ch. xxv. p. 14.

Xerxes had now arrived within sight of Mount Olympus, the northern
boundary of what was properly called Hellas; after a march through
nothing but subject territory, with magazines laid up beforehand
for the subsistence of his army, with additional contingents levied
in his course, and probably with Thracian volunteers joining him in
the hopes of plunder. The road along which he had marched was still
shown with solemn reverence by the Thracians, and protected both
from intruders and from tillage, even in the days of Herodotus.[72]
The Macedonian princes, the last of his western tributaries, in
whose territory he now found himself,—together with the Thessalian
Aleuadæ,—undertook to conduct him farther. Nor did the task as yet
appear difficult: what steps the Greeks were taking to oppose him,
shall be related in the coming chapter.

[72] Herodot. vii, 116.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

PROCEEDINGS IN GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE TIME OF THE
BATTLE OF THERMOPYLÆ.

Our information respecting the affairs of Greece immediately after
the repulse of the Persians from Marathon, is very scanty.

Kleomenês and Leotychidês, the two kings of Sparta (the former
belonging to the elder, or Eurystheneïd, the latter to the younger,
or the Prokleïd, race), had conspired for the purpose of dethroning
the former Prokleïd king Demaratus: and Kleomenês had even gone so
far as to tamper with the Delphian priestess for this purpose. His
manœuvre being betrayed shortly afterwards, he was so alarmed at the
displeasure of the Spartans, that he retired into Thessaly, and from
thence into Arcadia, where he employed the powerful influence of his
regal character and heroic lineage to arm the Arcadian people against
his country. The Spartans, alarmed in their turn, voluntarily invited
him back with a promise of amnesty. But his renewed lease did not
last long: his habitual violence of character became aggravated into
decided insanity, insomuch that he struck with his stick whomsoever
he met; and his relatives were forced to confine him in chains under
a Helot sentinel. By severe menaces, he one day constrained this man
to give him his sword, with which he mangled himself dreadfully and
perished. So shocking a death was certain to receive a religious
interpretation, but which among the misdeeds of his life had drawn
down upon him the divine wrath, was a point difficult to determine.
Most of the Greeks imputed it to the sin of his having corrupted
the Pythian priestess:[73] but the Athenians and Argeians were each
disposed to an hypothesis of their own,—the former believed that
the gods had thus punished the Spartan king for having cut timber
in the sacred grove of Eleusis,—the latter recognized the avenging
hand of the hero Argus, whose grove Kleomenês had burnt, along
with so many suppliant warriors who had taken sanctuary in it.
Without pronouncing between these different suppositions, Herodotus
contents himself with expressing his opinion that the miserable
death of Kleomenês was an atonement for his conduct to Demaratus.
But what surprises us most is, to hear that the Spartans, usually
more disposed than other Greeks to refer every striking phenomenon
to divine agency, recognized on this occasion nothing but a vulgar
physical cause: Kleomenês had gone mad, they affirmed, through habits
of intoxication, learned from some Scythian envoys who had come to
Sparta.[74]

[73] Herodot. vi, 74, 75.

[74] Herodot. vi, 84.

The death of Kleomenês, and the discredit thrown on his character,
emboldened the Æginetans to prefer a complaint at Sparta respecting
their ten hostages whom Kleomenês and Leotychidês had taken away from
the island, a little before the invasion of Attica by the Persians
under Datis, and deposited at Athens as guarantee to the Athenians
against aggression from Ægina at that critical moment. Leotychidês
was the surviving auxiliary of Kleomenês in the requisition of these
hostages, and against him the Æginetans complained. Though the
proceeding was one unquestionably beneficial to the general cause of
Greece,[75] yet such was the actual displeasure of the Lacedæmonians
against the deceased king and his acts, that the survivor Leotychidês
was brought to a public trial, and condemned to be delivered up as
prisoner in atonement to the Æginetans. The latter were about to
carry away their prisoner, when a dignified Spartan named Theasidês,
pointed out to them the danger which they were incurring by such
an indignity against the regal person,—the Spartans, he observed,
had passed sentence under feelings of temporary wrath, which would
probably be exchanged for sympathy if they saw the sentence realized.

[75] Herodot. vi, 61. Κλεομένεα, ἐόντα ἐν τῇ Αἰγίνῃ, καὶ κοινὰ τῇ
Ἑλλάδι ἀγαθὰ προεργαζόμενον, etc.

Accordingly the Æginetans, instead of executing the sentence,
contented themselves with stipulating that Leotychidês should
accompany them to Athens and redemand their hostages detained
there. The Athenians refused to give up the hostages, in spite of
the emphatic terms in which the Spartan king set forth the sacred
obligation of restoring a deposit:[76] they justified the refusal
in part by saying that the deposit had been lodged by the two kings
jointly, and could not be surrendered to one of them alone: but they
probably recollected that the hostages were placed less as a deposit
than as a security against Æginetan hostility,—which security they
were not disposed to forego.

[76] Herodot. vi, 85: compare vi, 49-73, and the preceding volume
of this history, c. xxxvi, pp. 437-441.

Leotychidês having been obliged to retire without success, the
Æginetans resolved to adopt measures of retaliation for themselves:
they waited for the period of a solemn festival celebrated every
fifth year at Sunium, on which occasion a ship peculiarly equipped
and carrying some of the leading Athenians as Theôrs, or sacred
envoys, sailed thither from Athens. This ship they found means to
capture, and carried all on board prisoners to Ægina. Whether an
exchange took place, or whether the prisoners and hostages on both
sides were put to death, we do not know; but the consequence of
their proceeding was an active and decided war between Athens and
Ægina,[77] beginning seemingly about 488 or 487 B. C., and lasting
until 481 B. C., the year preceding the invasion of Xerxes.

[77] Herodot. vi, 87, 88.

Instead of ἦν γὰρ δὴ τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι ~πεντήρης~ ἐπὶ Σουνίῳ (vi,
87), I follow the reading proposed by Schömann and sanctioned by
Boëckh—~πεντετηρίς~. It is hardly conceivable that the Athenians
at that time should have had any ships with five banks of oars
(πεντήρης): moreover, apart from this objection, the word
πεντήρης makes considerable embarrassment in the sentence; see
Boëckh, Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen, chap. vii, pp. 75,
76.

The elder Dionysius of Syracuse is said to have been the first
Greek who constructed πεντήρεις or quinquereme ships (Diodor.
xiv, 40, 41).

There were many distinct pentaëterides, or solemnities celebrated
every fifth year, included among the religious customs of Athens:
see Aristoteles, Πολιτ. Fragm. xxvii, ed. Neumann; Pollux, viii,
107.

An Æginetan citizen named Nikodromus took advantage of this war
to further a plot against the government of the island: having
been before, as he thought, unjustly banished, he now organized
a revolt of the people against the ruling oligarchy, concerting
with the Athenians a simultaneous invasion in support of his plan.
Accordingly, on the appointed day he rose with his partisans in
arms and took possession of the Old Town,—a strong post which
had been superseded in course of time by the more modern city on
the sea-shore, less protected though more convenient.[78] But no
Athenians appeared, and without them he was unable to maintain his
footing: he was obliged to make his escape from the island after
witnessing the complete defeat of his partisans,—a large body of
whom, seven hundred in number, fell into the hands of the government,
and were led out for execution. One man alone among these prisoners
burst his chains, fled to the sanctuary of Dêmêtêr Thesmophorus,
and was fortunate enough to seize the handle of the door before
he was overtaken. In spite of every effort to drag him away by
force, he clung to it with convulsive grasp: his pursuers did not
venture to put him to death in such a position, but they severed
the hands from the body and then executed him, leaving the hands
still hanging to and grasping[79] the door-handle, where they seem
to have long remained without being taken off. Destruction of the
seven hundred prisoners does not seem to have drawn down upon the
Æginetan oligarchy either vengeance from the gods or censure from
their contemporaries; but the violation of sanctuary, in the case of
that one unfortunate man whose hands were cut off, was a crime which
the goddess Dêmêtêr never forgave. More than fifty years afterwards,
in the first year of the Peloponnesian war, the Æginetans, having
been previously conquered by Athens, were finally expelled from
their island: such expulsion was the divine judgment upon them for
this ancient impiety, which half a century of continued expiatory
sacrifice had not been sufficient to wipe out.[80]

[78] See Thucyd. i, 8.

The acropolis at Athens, having been the primitive city
inhabited, bore the name of _The City_ even in the time of
Thucydides (ii, 15), at a time when Athens and Peiræus covered so
large a region around and near it.

[79] Herodot. vi, 91. χεῖρες δὲ κεῖναι ἐμπεφυκυῖαι ἦσαν τοῖσι
ἐπισπαστῆρσι. The word κεῖναι for ἐκεῖναι, “those hands,” appears
so little suitable in this phrase, that I rather imagine the real
reading to have been κειναὶ (the Ionic dialect for κεναὶ), “the
hands with nothing attached to them:” compare a phrase not very
unlike, Homer, Iliad, iii, 376, κεινὴ δὲ τρυφάλεια ἅμ’ ἕσπετο,
etc.

Compare the narrative of the arrest of the Spartan king
Pausanias, and of the manner in which he was treated when in
sanctuary at the temple of Athênê Chalkiœkos (Thucyd. i, 134).

[80] Herodot. vi, 91. Ἀπὸ τούτου δὲ καὶ ἄγος σφι ἐγένετο, τὸ
ἐκθύσασθαι οὐκ οἶοί τε ἐγένοντο ἐπιμηχανώμενοι, ἀλλ’ ἔφθησαν
ἐκπεσόντες πρότερον ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἤ σφι ἵλεον γενέσθαι τὴν θεόν.

Compare Thucyd. ii, 27 about the final expulsion from Ægina. The
Lacedæmonians assigned to these expelled Æginetans a new abode in
the territory of Thyrea, on the eastern coast of Peloponnesus,
where they were attacked, taken prisoners, and put to death by
the Athenians, in the eighth year of the war (Thucyd. iv, 57).
Now Herodotus, while he mentions the expulsion, does not allude
to their subsequent and still more calamitous fate. Had he
known the fact, he could hardly have failed to notice it, as a
farther consummation of the divine judgment. We may reasonably
presume ignorance in this case, which would tend to support the
opinion thrown out in my preceding volume (chap. xxxiii, p. 225,
note) respecting the date of composition of his history,—in the
earliest years of the Peloponnesian war.

The Athenians who were to have assisted Nikodromus arrived at Ægina
one day too late. Their proceedings had been delayed by the necessity
of borrowing twenty triremes from the Corinthians, in addition
to fifty of their own: with these seventy sail they defeated the
Æginetans, who met them with a fleet of equal number, and then landed
on the island. The Æginetans solicited aid from Argos, but that city
was either too much displeased with them, or too much exhausted
by the defeat sustained from the Spartan Kleomenês, to grant it.
Nevertheless, one thousand Argeian volunteers, under a distinguished
champion of the pentathlon named Eurybatês, came to their assistance,
and a vigorous war was carried on, with varying success, against the
Athenian armament.

At sea, the Athenians sustained a defeat, being attacked at a
moment when their fleet was in disorder, so that they lost four
ships with their crews: on land they were more successful, and few
of the Argeian volunteers survived to return home. The general of
the latter, Eurybatês, confiding in his great personal strength and
skill, challenged the best of the Athenian warriors to single combat:
he slew three of them in succession, but the arm of the fourth,
Sôphanês of Dekeleia, was victorious, and proved fatal to him.[81]
At length the invaders were obliged to leave the island without
any decisive result, and the war seems to have been prosecuted by
frequent descents and privateering on both sides,—in which Nikodromus
and the Æginetan exiles, planted by Athens on the coast of Attica
near Sunium, took an active part;[82] the advantage on the whole
being on the side of Athens.

[81] Herodot. ix, 75.

[82] Herodot. vi, 90-93. Thucyd. i, 41. About Sôphanês, comp. ix,
75.

How much damage was done by such a privateering war, between
countries so near as Ægina and Attica, may be seen by the more
detailed description of a later war of the same kind in 388 B. C.
(Xenophon, Hellenic. v. 1.)

The general course of this war, and especially the failure of the
enterprise concerned with Nikodromus in consequence of delay in
borrowing ships from Corinth, were well calculated to impress upon
the Athenians the necessity of enlarging their naval force. And it is
from the present time that we trace among them the first growth of
that decided tendency towards maritime activity, which coincided so
happily with the expansion of their democracy, and opened a new phase
in Grecian history, as well as a new career for themselves.

The exciting effect produced upon them by the repulse of the Persians
at Marathon has been dwelt upon in my preceding volume. Miltiades,
the victor in that field, having been removed from the scene under
circumstances already described, Aristeidês and Themistoklês became
the chief men at Athens: and the former was chosen archon during the
succeeding year. His exemplary uprightness in magisterial functions
insured to him lofty esteem from the general public, not without
a certain proportion of active enemies, some of them sufferers by
his justice. These enemies naturally became partisans of his rival,
Themistoklês, who had all the talents necessary for bringing them
into coöperation: and the rivalry between the two chiefs became so
bitter and menacing, that even Aristeidês himself is reported to have
said, “If the Athenians were wise, they would cast both of us into
the barathrum.” Under such circumstances, it is not too much to say
that the peace of the country was preserved mainly by the institution
called Ostracism, of which so much has been said in the preceding
volume. After three or four years of continued political rivalry,
the two chiefs appealed to a vote of ostracism, and Aristeidês was
banished.

Of the particular points on which their rivalry turned, we are
unfortunately little informed. But it is highly probable that one
of them was, the important change of policy above alluded to,—the
conversion of Athens from a land-power into a sea-power,—the
development of this new and stirring element in the minds of the
people. By all authorities, this change of policy is ascribed
principally and specially to Themistoklês:[83] on that account, if
for no other reason, Aristeidês would probably be found opposed
to it,—but it was, moreover, a change not in harmony with that
old-fashioned Hellenism, undisturbed uniformity of life and narrow
range of active duty and experience, which Aristeidês seems to have
approved in common with the subsequent philosophers. The seaman was
naturally more of a wanderer and cosmopolite than the heavy-armed
soldier: the modern Greek seaman even at this moment is so to a
remarkable degree, distinguished for the variety of his ideas and the
quickness of his intelligence:[84] the land-service was a type of
steadiness and inflexible ranks, the sea-service that of mutability
and adventure. Such was the idea strongly entertained by Plato and
other philosophers:[85] though we may remark that they do not render
justice to the Athenian seaman, whose training was far more perfect
and laborious, and his habits of obedience far more complete,[86]
than that of the Athenian hoplite, or horseman: a training beginning
with Themistoklês, and reaching its full perfection about the
commencement of the Peloponnesian war.

[83] Plutarch, Themist. c. 19.

[84] See Mr. Galt’s interesting account of the Hydriot sailors,
Voyages and Travels in the Mediterranean, pp. 376-378 (London,
1802).

“The city of Hydra originated in a small colony of boatmen
belonging to the Morea, who took refuge in the island from the
tyranny of the Turks. About forty years ago they had multiplied
to a considerable number, their little village began to assume
the appearance of a town, and they had cargoes that went as
far as Constantinople. In their mercantile transactions, the
Hydriots acquired the reputation of greater integrity than the
other Greeks, as well as of being the most intrepid navigators
in the Archipelago; and they were of course regularly preferred.
Their industry and honesty obtained its reward. The islands of
Spezzia, Paros, Myconi, and Ipsara, resemble Hydra in their
institutions, and possess the same character for commercial
activity. In paying their sailors, Hydra and its sister islands
have a peculiar custom. The whole amount of the freight is
considered as a common stock, from which the charges of
victualing the ship are deducted. The remainder is then divided
into two equal parts: one is allotted to the crew, and equally
shared among them without reference to age or rank; the other
part is appropriated to the ship and captain. The capital of the
cargo is a trust given to the captain and crew on certain fixed
conditions. The character and manners of the Hydriot sailors,
from the moral effect of these customs, are much superior in
regularity to the ideas that we are apt to entertain of sailors.
They are sedate, well-dressed, well-bred, shrewd, informed,
and speculative. They seem to form a class, in the orders of
mankind, which has no existence among us. By their voyages,
they acquire a liberality of notion which we expect only among
gentlemen, while in their domestic circumstances their conduct
is suitable to their condition. The Greeks are all traditionary
historians, and possess much of that kind of knowledge to which
the term _learning_ is usually applied. This, mingled with the
other information of the Hydriots, gives them that advantageous
character of mind which I think they possess.”

[85] Plato, Legg. iv, pp. 705, 706. Plutarch, Themistoklês, c.
19. Isokratês, Panathenaic, c. 43.

Plutarch, Philopœmen. c. 14. Πλὴν Ἐπαμεινώνδαν μὲν ἔνιοι λέγουσιν
ὀκνοῦντα γεῦσαι τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν ὠφελειῶν τοὺς πολίτας, ὅπως
αὐτῷ μὴ λάθωσιν ἀντὶ μονίμων ὁπλιτῶν, κατὰ Πλάτωνα, ναῦται
γενόμενοι καὶ διαφθαρέντες, ἄπρακτον ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ τῶν νήσων
ἀπελθεῖν ἑκουσίως: compare vii, p. 301.

[86] See the remarkable passage in Xenophon (Memorab. iii, 5,
19), attesting that the Hoplites and the Hippeis, the persons
first in rank in the city were also the most disobedient on
military service.

In recommending extraordinary efforts to create a navy as well
as to acquire nautical practice, Themistoklês displayed all that
sagacious appreciation of the circumstances and dangers of the time
for which Thucydides gives him credit: and there can be no doubt
that Aristeidês, though the honester politician of the two, was at
this particular crisis the less essential to his country. Not only
was there the struggle with Ægina, a maritime power equal or more
than equal, and within sight of the Athenian harbor,—but there was
also in the distance a still more formidable contingency to guard
against. The Persian armament had been driven with disgrace from
Attica back to Asia; but the Persian monarch still remained with
undiminished means of aggression and increased thirst for revenge;
and Themistoklês knew well that the danger from that quarter would
recur greater than ever. He believed that it would recur again in
the same way, by an expedition across the Ægean like that of Datis
to Marathon;[87] against which the best defence would be found in a
numerous and well-trained fleet. Nor could the large preparations of
Darius for renewing the attack remain unknown to a vigilant observer,
extending as they did over so many Greeks subject to the Persian
empire. Such positive warning was more than enough to stimulate the
active genius of Themistoklês, who now prevailed upon his countrymen
to begin with energy the work of maritime preparation, as well
against Ægina as against Persia.[88] Not only were two hundred new
ships built, and citizens trained as seamen,—but the important work
was commenced, during the year when Themistoklês was either archon
or general, of forming and fortifying a new harbor for Athens at
Peiræus, instead of the ancient open bay of Phalêrum. The latter
was indeed somewhat nearer to the city, but Peiræus, with its three
separate natural ports,[89] admitting of being closed and fortified,
was incomparably superior in safety as well as in convenience. It
is not too much to say, with Herodotus,—that the Æginetan “war was
the salvation of Greece, by constraining the Athenians to make
themselves a maritime power.”[90] The whole efficiency of the
resistance subsequently made to Xerxes turned upon this new movement
in the organization of Athens, allowed as it was to attain tolerable
completeness through a fortunate concurrence of accidents; for the
important delay of ten years, between the defeat of Marathon and the
fresh invasion by which it was to be avenged, was in truth the result
of accident. First, the revolt of Egypt; next, the death of Darius;
thirdly, the indifference of Xerxes, at his first accession, towards
Hellenic matters,—postponed until 480 B. C., an invasion which would
naturally have been undertaken in 487 or 486 B. C., and which would
have found Athens at that time without her wooden walls,—the great
engine of her subsequent salvation.

[87] Thucyd. i, 93. ἰδὼν (Themistoklês) τῆς βασιλέως στρατιᾶς τὴν
κατὰ θάλασσαν ἔφοδον εὐπορωτέραν τῆς κατὰ γῆν οὖσαν.

[88] Thucyd. i, 14. Herodot. vii, 144.

[89] Thucyd. i, 93.

[90] Herodot. vii, 144. Οὗτος γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος συστὰς ἔσωσε τότε τὴν
Ἑλλάδα, ἀναγκάσας θαλασσίους γενέσθαι Ἀθηναίους.

Thucyd. i, 18. ναυτικοὶ ἐγένοντο.

Another accidental help, without which the new fleet could not
have been built,—a considerable amount of public money,—was also
by good fortune now available to the Athenians. It is first in an
emphatic passage of the poet Æschylus, and next from Herodotus on the
present occasion, that we hear of the silver mines of Laurium[91]
in Attica, and the valuable produce which they rendered to the
state. They were situated in the southern portion of the territory,
not very far from the promontory of Sunium,[92] amidst a district
of low hills which extended across much of the space between the
eastern sea at Thorikus, and the western at Anaphlystus. At what
time they first began to be worked, we have no information; but
it seems hardly possible that they could have been worked with
any spirit or profitable result until after the expulsion of
Hippias and the establishment of the democratical constitution of
Kleisthenês. Neither the strong local factions, by which different
portions of Attica were set against each other before the time of
Peisistratus, nor the rule of that despot succeeded by his two sons,
were likely to afford confidence and encouragement. But when the
democracy of Kleisthenês first brought Attica into one systematic
and comprehensive whole, with equal rights to all the parts, and a
common centre at Athens,—the power of that central government over
the mineral wealth of the country, and its means of binding the whole
people to respect agreements concluded with individual undertakers,
would give a new stimulus to private speculation in the district of
Laurium. It was the practice of the Athenian government either to
sell, or to let for a long term of years, particular districts of
this productive region to individuals or companies,—on consideration
partly of a sum or fine paid down, partly of a reserved rent equal to
one-twenty-fourth part of the gross produce.

[91] Æschylus, Persæ, 235.

[92] The mountain region of Laurium has been occasionally visited
by modern travellers, but never carefully surveyed until 1836,
when Dr. Fiedler examined it mineralogically by order of the
present Greek government. See his Reisen durch Griechenland, vol.
i, pp. 39, 73. The region is now little better than a desert,
but Fiedler especially notices the great natural fertility of
the plain near Thorikus, together with the good harbor at that
place,—both circumstances of great value at the time when the
mines were in work. Many remains are seen of shafts sunk in
ancient times,—and sunk in so workmanlike a manner as to satisfy
the eye of a miner of the present day.—p. 76.

We are told by Herodotus that there was in the Athenian treasury, at
the time when Themistoklês made his proposition to enlarge the naval
force, a great sum[93] arising from the Laurian mines, out of which a
distribution was on the point of being made among the citizens,—ten
drachms to each man. This great amount in hand must probably have
been the produce of the purchase-money or fines received from
recent sales, since the small annual reserved rent can hardly have
been accumulated during many successive years: new and enlarged
enterprises in mines must be supposed to have been recently begun by
individuals under contract with the government, in order to produce
at the moment so overflowing an exchequer and to furnish means for
the special distribution contemplated. Themistoklês availed himself
of this precious opportunity,—set forth the necessities of the war
with Ægina and the still more formidable menace from the great
enemy in Asia,—and prevailed upon the people to forego the promised
distribution for the purpose of obtaining an efficient navy.[94]
One cannot doubt that there must have been many speakers who would
try to make themselves popular by opposing this proposition and
supporting the distribution, insomuch that the power of the people
generally to feel the force of a distant motive as predominant over
a present gain deserves notice as an earnest of their approaching
greatness.

[93] Herodot. vii, 144. Ὅτε Ἀθηναίοισι γενομένων χρημάτων μεγάλων
ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τὰ ἐκ τῶν μετάλλων σφι προσῆλθε τῶν ἀπὸ Λαυρείου,
ἔμελλον λάξεσθαι ὀρχηδὸν ἕκαστος δέκα δραχμάς.

[94] All the information—unfortunately it is very scanty—which
we possess respecting the ancient mines of Laurium, is brought
together in the valuable Dissertation of M. Boëckh, translated
and appended to the English translation of his Public Economy
of Athens. He discusses the fact stated in this chapter of
Herodotus, in sect. 8 of that Dissertation: but there are many of
his remarks in which I cannot concur.

After multiplying ten drachmæ by the assumed number of twenty
thousand Athenian citizens, making a sum total distributed
of thirty-three and one-third talents, he goes on: “That the
distribution was made annually might have been presumed from the
principles of the Athenian administration, without the testimony
of Cornelius Nepos. We are not, therefore, to suppose that the
savings of several years are meant, nor merely a surplus; but
that all the public money arising from the mines, as it was not
required for any other object, was divided among the members of
the community,” (p. 632).

We are hardly authorized to conclude from the passage of
Herodotus that _all_ the sum received from the mines was about to
be distributed: the treasury was very rich, and a distribution
was about to be made,—but it does not follow that nothing was
to be left in the treasury after the distribution. Accordingly,
all calculations of the total produce of the mines, based upon
this passage of Herodotus, are uncertain. Nor is it clear
that there was any regular annual distribution, unless we are
to take the passage of Cornelius Nepos as proving it: but he
talks rather about the magistrates employing this money for
jobbing purposes,—not about a regular distribution: “Nam cum
pecunia publica quæ ex metallis redibat, largitione magistratuum
quotannis periret.” Corn. Nep. Themist. c. 2. A story is told by
Polyænus, from whomsoever he copied it,—of a sum of one hundred
talents in the treasury, which Themistoklês persuaded the people
to hand over to one hundred rich men, for the purpose of being
expended as the latter might direct, with an obligation to
reimburse the money in case the people were not satisfied with
the expenditure: these rich men employed each the sum awarded
to him in building a new ship, much to the satisfaction of the
people (Polyæn. i, 30). This story differs materially from that
of Herodotus, and we cannot venture either to blend the two
together or to rely upon Polyænus separately.

I imagine that the sum of thirty three talents, or fifty talents,
necessary for the distribution, formed part of a larger sum lying
in the treasury, arising from the mines. Themistoklês persuaded
the people to employ the _whole_ sum in ship-building, which of
course implied that the distribution was to be renounced. Whether
there had been distributions of a similar kind in former years,
as M. Boëckh affirms, is a matter on which we have no evidence.
M. Boëckh seems to me not to have kept in view the fact, which
he himself states just before, that there were two sources of
receipt into the treasury,—original purchase-money paid down, and
reserved annual rent. It is from the former source that I imagine
the large sum lying in the treasury to have been derived: the
small reserved rent probably went among the annual items of the
state-budget.

Immense, indeed, was the recompense reaped for this self-denial,
not merely by Athens but by Greece generally, when the preparations
of Xerxes came to be matured, and his armament was understood to
be approaching. The orders for equipment of ships and laying in of
provisions, issued by the Great King to his subject Greeks in Asia,
the Ægean, and Thrace, would of course become known throughout Greece
Proper,—especially the vast labor bestowed on the canal of Mount
Athos, which would be the theme of wondering talk with every Thasian
or Akanthian citizen who visited the festival games in Peloponnesus.
All these premonitory evidences were public enough, without any need
of that elaborate stratagem whereby the exiled Demaratus is alleged
to have secretly transmitted, from Susa to Sparta, intelligence
of the approaching expedition.[95] The formal announcements of
Xerxes all designated Athens as the special object of his wrath and
vengeance;[96] and other Grecian cities might thus hope to escape
without mischief: so that the prospect of the great invasion did not
at first provoke among them any unanimous dispositions to resist.
Accordingly, when the first heralds despatched by Xerxes from
Sardis in the autumn of 481 B. C., a little before his march to the
Hellespont, addressed themselves to the different cities with demand
of earth and water, many were disposed to comply. Neither to Athens,
nor to Sparta, were any heralds sent; and these two cities were thus
from the beginning identified in interest and in the necessity of
defence. Both of them sent, in this trying moment, to consult the
Delphian oracle: while both at the same time joined to convene a
Pan-Hellenic congress at the Isthmus of Corinth, for the purpose of
organizing resistance against the expected invader.

[95] Herodot. vii, 239.

[96] Herodot. vii, 8-138.

I have in the preceding volume pointed out the various steps whereby
the separate states of Greece were gradually brought, even against
their own natural instincts, into something approaching more nearly
to political union. The present congress, assembled under the
influence of common fear from Persia, has more of a Pan-Hellenic
character than any political event which has yet occurred in Grecian
history. It extends far beyond the range of those Peloponnesian
states who constitute the immediate allies of Sparta: it comprehends
Athens, and is even summoned in part by her strenuous instigation: it
seeks to combine, moreover, every city of Hellenic race and language,
however distant, which can be induced to take part in it,—even the
Kretans, Korkyræans, and Sicilians. It is true that all these states
do not actually come, but earnest efforts are made to induce them to
come: the dispersed brethren of the Hellenic family are intreated
to marshal themselves in the same ranks for a joint political
purpose,[97]—the defence of the common hearth and metropolis of the
race. This is a new fact in Grecian history, opening scenes and ideas
unlike to anything which has gone before,—enlarging, prodigiously,
the functions and duties connected with that headship of Greece
which had hitherto been in the hands of Sparta, but which is about
to become too comprehensive for her to manage,—and thus introducing
increased habits of coöperation among the subordinate states, as well
as rival hopes of aggrandizement among the leaders. The congress at
the isthmus of Corinth marks such further advance in the centralizing
tendencies of Greece, and seems at first to promise an onward march
in the same direction: but the promise will not be found realized.

[97] Herodot. vii, 145. Φρονήσαντες εἴ κως ἕν τε γένοιτο τὸ
Ἑλληνικὸν, καὶ εἰ συγκύψαντες τωὐτὸ πρήσσοιεν πάντες, ὡς δεινῶν
ἐπιόντων ὁμοίως πᾶσι Ἕλλησι.

Its first step was, indeed, one of inestimable value. While most of
the deputies present came prepared, in the name of their respective
cities, to swear reciprocal fidelity and brotherhood, they also
addressed all their efforts to appease the feuds and dissensions
which reigned among the particular members of their own meeting. Of
these the most prominent, as well as the most dangerous, was the war
still subsisting between Athens and Ægina. The latter was not exempt,
even now, from suspicions of _medizing_,[98] _i. e._, embracing the
cause of the Persians, which had been raised by her giving earth
and water ten years before to Darius: but her present conduct gave
no countenance to such suspicions: she took earnest part in the
congress as well as in the joint measures of defence, and willingly
consented to accommodate her difference with Athens.[99] In this
work of reconciling feuds, so essential to the safety of Greece, the
Athenian Themistoklês took a prominent part, as well as Cheileos of
Tegea in Arcadia.[100] The congress proceeded to send envoys and
solicit coöperation from such cities as were yet either equivocal or
indifferent, especially Argos, Korkyra, and the Kretan and Sicilian
Greeks,—and at the same time to despatch spies across to Sardis, for
the purpose of learning the state and prospects of the assembled army.

[98] Herodot. viii, 92.

[99] Herodot. vii, 145.

[100] Plutarch, Themistokl. c. 10. About Cheileos, Herodot. ix, 9.

These spies presently returned, having been detected and condemned
to death by the Persian generals, but released by express order of
Xerxes, who directed that the full strength of his assembled armament
should be shown to them, in order that the terror of the Greeks might
be thus magnified. The step was well calculated for such a purpose:
but the discouragement throughout Greece was already extreme, at this
critical period when the storm was about to burst upon them. Even to
intelligent and well-meaning Greeks, much more to the careless, the
timid, or the treacherous,—Xerxes with his countless host appeared
irresistible, and indeed something more than human:[101] of course,
such an impression would be encouraged by the large number of Greeks
already his tributaries: and we may even trace a manifestation of a
wish to get rid of the Athenians altogether, as the chief objects of
Persian vengeance and chief hindrance to tranquil submission. This
despair of the very continuance of Hellenic life and autonomy breaks
forth even from the sanctuary of Hellenic religion, the Delphian
temple; when the Athenians, in their distress and uncertainty, sent
to consult the oracle. Hardly had their two envoys performed the
customary sacrifices, and sat down in the inner chamber near the
priestess Aristonikê, when she at once exclaimed: “Wretched men, why
sit ye there? Quit your land and city, and flee afar! Head, body,
feet, and hands are alike rotten: fire and sword, in the train of the
Syrian chariot, shall overwhelm you: nor only your city, but other
cities also, as well as many even of the temples of the gods,—which
are now sweating and trembling with fear, and foreshadow, by drops of
blood on their roofs, the hard calamities impending. Get ye away from
the sanctuary, with your souls steeped in sorrow.”[102]

[101] Herodot. vii, 203. οὐ γὰρ θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἐπιόντα ἐπὶ τὴν
Ἑλλάδα, ἀλλ’ ἄνθρωπον, etc.: compare also vii, 56.

[102] Herodot. vii, 140.

Ἀλλ’ ἴτον ἐξ ἀδύτοιο, κακοῖς δ’ ἐπικίδνατε θυμόν.

The general sense and scope of the oracle appears to me clear,
in this case. It is a sentence of nothing but desolation and
sadness; though Bähr and Schweighäuser, with other commentators,
try to infuse into it some thing of encouragement by construing
θυμόν, _fortitude_. The translation of Valla and Schultz is
nearer to the truth. But even when the general sense of an oracle
is plain (which it hardly ever is), the particular phrases are
always wild and vague.

So terrific a reply had rarely escaped from the lips of the
priestess. The envoys were struck to the earth by it, and durst not
carry it back to Athens. In their sorrow they were encouraged yet
to hope by an influential Delphian citizen named Timon (we trace
here, as elsewhere, the underhand working of these leading Delphians
on the priestess), who advised them to provide themselves with the
characteristic marks of supplication, and to approach the oracle a
second time in that imploring guise: “O lord, we pray thee (they
said), have compassion on these boughs of supplication, and deliver
to us something more comfortable concerning our country; else we
quit not thy sanctuary, but remain here until death.” Upon which the
priestess replied: “Athênê with all her prayers and all her sagacity
cannot propitiate Olympian Zeus.[103] But this assurance I will give
you, firm as adamant: when everything else in the land of Kekrops
shall be taken, Zeus grants to Athênê that the wooden wall alone
shall remain unconquered, to defend you and your children. Stand not
to await the assailing horse and foot from the continent, but turn
your backs and retire: you shall yet live to fight another day. O
divine Salamis, thou too shalt destroy the children of women, either
at the seed-time or at the harvest.”[104]

[103] Herodot. vii, 141.

Οὐ δύναται Παλλὰς Δί’ Ὀλύμπιον ἐξιλάσασθαι
Λισσομένη πολλοῖσι λόγοις καὶ μήτιδι πυκνῇ.

Compare with this the declaration of Apollo to Crœsus of Lydia
(i, 91).

[104]

... Τεῖχος Τριτογενεῖ ξύλινον διδοῖ εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς
Μοῦνον ἀπόρθητον τελέθειν, τὸ σὲ τέκνα τ’ ὀνήσει.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ὦ θείη Σαλαμὶς, ἀπολεῖς δὲ σὺ τέκνα γυναικῶν, etc.

(Herodot. vii, 141).

This second answer was a sensible mitigation of the first: it left
open some hope of escape, though faint, dark, and unintelligible,—and
the envoys wrote it down to carry back to Athens, not concealing,
probably, the terrific sentence which had preceded it. When read to
the people, the obscurity of the meaning provoked many different
interpretations. What was meant by “the wooden wall?” Some supposed
that the acropolis itself, which had originally been surrounded
with a wooden palisade, was the refuge pointed out: but the greater
number, and among them most of those who were by profession
expositors of prophecy, maintained that the wooden wall indicated
the fleet. But these professional expositors, while declaring that
the god bade them go on shipboard, deprecated all idea of a naval
battle, and insisted on the necessity of abandoning Attica forever:
the last lines of the oracle, wherein it was said that Salamis would
destroy the children of women, appeared to them to portend nothing
but disaster in the event of a naval combat. Such was the opinion
of those who passed for the best expositors of the divine will: it
harmonized completely with the despairing temper then prevalent,
heightened by the terrible sentence pronounced in the first oracle;
and emigration to some foreign land presented itself as the only hope
of safety even for their persons. The fate of Athens,—and of Greece
generally, which would have been helpless without Athens,—now hung
upon a thread, when Themistoklês, the great originator of the fleet,
interposed with equal steadfastness of heart and ingenuity, to insure
the proper use of it. He contended that if the god had intended to
designate Salamis as the scene of a naval disaster to the Greeks,
that island would have been called in the oracle by some such epithet
as “wretched Salamis:” but the fact that it was termed “divine
Salamis,” indicated that the parties, destined to perish there, were
the enemies of Greece, not the Greeks themselves. He encouraged his
countrymen, therefore, to abandon their city and country, and to
trust themselves to the fleet as the wooden wall recommended by the
god, but with full determination to fight and conquer on board.[105]
Great, indeed, were the consequences which turned upon this bold
stretch of exegetical conjecture. Unless the Athenians had been
persuaded, by some plausible show of interpretation, that the sense
of the oracle encouraged instead of forbidding a naval combat, they
would in their existing depression have abandoned all thought of
resistance.

[105] Herodot. vii, 143. Ταύτῃ Θεμιστοκλέους ἀποφαινομένου,
Ἀθηναῖοι ταῦτά σφι ἔγνωσαν αἱρετώτερα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ τῶν
χρησμολόγων, οἳ οὐκ εἴων ναυμαχίην ἀρτέεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἐκλιπόντας
χώρην τὴν Ἀττικὴν, ἄλλην τινὰ οἰκίζειν.

There is every reason to accept the statement of Herodotus as
true, respecting these oracles delivered to the Athenians, and
the debated interpretation of them. They must have been discussed
publicly in the Athenian assembly, and Herodotus may well have
conversed with persons who had heard the discussion. Respecting
the other oracle which he states to have been delivered to the
Spartans,—intimating that either Sparta must be conquered or a
king of Sparta must perish,—we may well doubt whether it was in
existence before the battle of Thermopylæ (Herodot. vii, 220).

The later writers, Justin (ii, 12), Cornelius Nepos (c. 2),
and Polyænus (i, 30), give an account of the proceeding of
Themistoklês, inferior to Herodotus in vivacity as well as in
accuracy.

Even with the help of an encouraging interpretation, however, nothing
less than the most unconquerable resolution and patriotism could have
enabled the Athenians to bear up against such terrific denunciations
from the Delphian god, and persist in resistance in place of seeking
safety by emigration. Herodotus emphatically impresses this truth
upon his readers:[106] nay, he even steps out of his way to do so,
proclaiming Athens as the real saviour of Greece. Writing as he did
about the beginning of the Peloponnesian war,—at a time when Athens,
having attained the maximum of her empire, was alike feared, hated,
and admired, by most of the Grecian states,—he knows that the opinion
which he is giving will be unpopular with his hearers generally, and
he apologizes for it as something wrung from him against his will by
the force of the evidence.[107] Nor was it only that the Athenians
dared to stay and fight against immense odds: they, and they alone,
threw into the cause that energy and forwardness whereby it was
enabled to succeed,[108] as will appear farther in the sequel. But
there was also a third way, not less deserving of notice, in which
they contributed to the result. As soon as the congress of deputies
met at the isthmus of Corinth, it became essential to recognize
some one commanding state, and with regard to the land-force no one
dreamed of contesting the preëminence of Sparta. But in respect to
the fleet, her pretensions were more disputable, since she furnished
at most only sixteen ships, and little or no nautical skill; while
Athens brought two-thirds of the entire naval force, with the best
ships and seamen. Upon these grounds the idea was at first started,
that Athens should command at sea. and Sparta on land: but the
majority of the allies manifested a decided repugnance, announcing
that they would follow no one but a Spartan. To the honor of the
Athenians, they at once waived their pretensions, as soon as they saw
that the unity of the confederate force, at this moment of peril,
would be compromised.[109] To appreciate this generous abnegation of
a claim in itself so reasonable, we must recollect that the love of
preëminence was among the most prominent attributes of the Hellenic
character: a prolific source of their greatness and excellence,
but producing also no small amount both of their follies and their
crimes. To renounce at the call of public obligation a claim to
personal honor and glory, is perhaps the rarest of all virtues in a
son of Hellen.

[106] Herodot. vii, 139. οὐδὲ σφέας χρηστήρια φοβερὰ, ἐλθόντα ἐκ
Δελφῶν, καὶ ἐς δεῖμα βαλόντα, ἔπεισε ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν Ἑλλάδα, etc.

For the abundance of oracles and prophecies, from many different
sources, which would be current at such a moment of anxiety, we
may compare the analogy of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war,
described by the contemporary historian (Thucyd. ii, 8).

[107] Herodot. vii, 139. Ἐνθαῦτα ~ἀναγκαίῃ~ ἐξέργομαι γνώμην
ἀποδέξασθαι, ~ἐπίφθονον μὲν πρὸς τῶν πλεόνων ἀνθρώπων~· ὅμως
δὲ, τῇ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἀληθὲς, οὐκ ἐπισχήσω. Εἰ Ἀθηναῖοι,
καταῤῥωδήσαντες τὸν ἐπιόντα κίνδυνον, ἐξέλιπον τὴν σφετέρην, etc.
... Νῦν δὲ, Ἀθηναίους ἄν τις λέγων σωτῆρας γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος,
οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοι τὸ ἀληθές, etc.

The whole chapter deserves peculiar attention, as it brings
before us the feelings of those contemporaries to whom his
history is addressed, and the mode of judging with which they
looked back on the Persian war. One is apt unconsciously to fancy
that an ancient historian writes for men in the abstract, and not
for men of given sentiments, prejudices, and belief. The persons
whom Herodotus addressed are those who were so full of admiration
for Sparta, as to ascribe to her chiefly the honor of having
beaten back the Persians; and to maintain that, even without
the aid of Athens, the Spartans and Peloponnesians both could
have defended, and would have defended, the isthmus of Corinth,
fortified as it was by a wall built expressly. The Peloponnesian
allies of that day forgot that they were open to attack by sea as
well as by land.

[108] Herodot. vii, 139. ἑλόμενοι δὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιεῖναι
ἐλευθέρην, τοῦτο τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν πᾶν τὸ λοιπὸν, ὅσον μὴ ἐμήδισε,
αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ἦσαν οἱ ἐπεγείραντες, καὶ βασιλέα μετά γε θεοὺς
ἀνωσάμενοι.

[109] Herodot. viii, 2, 3: compare vii, 161.

We find thus the Athenians nerved up to the pitch of
resistance,—prepared to see their country wasted, and to
live as well as to fight on shipboard, when the necessity
should arrive,—furnishing two thirds of the whole fleet, and
yet prosecuting the building of fresh ships until the last
moment,[110]—sending forth the ablest and most forward leader in the
common cause, while content themselves to serve like other states
under the leadership of Sparta. During the winter preceding the
march of Xerxes from Sardis, the congress at the Isthmus was trying,
with little success, to bring the Grecian cities into united action.
Among the cities north of Attica and Peloponnesus, the greater number
were either inclined to submit, like Thebes and the greater part
of Bœotia, or at least lukewarm in the cause of independence,—so
rare at this trying moment (to use the language of the unfortunate
Platæans fifty-three years afterwards), was the exertion of resolute
Hellenic patriotism against the invader.[111] Even in the interior of
Peloponnesus, the powerful Argos maintained an ambiguous neutrality.
It was one of the first steps of the congress to send special envoys
to Argos, to set forth the common danger and solicit coöperation; the
result is certain, that no coöperation was obtained,—the Argeians did
nothing throughout the struggle; but as to their real position, or
the grounds of their refusal, contradictory statements had reached
the ears of Herodotus. They themselves affirmed that they were ready
to have joined the Hellenic cause, in spite of dissuasion from the
Delphian oracle,—exacting only as conditions, that the Spartans
should conclude a truce with them for thirty years, and should
equally divide the honors of headship with Argos. To the proposed
truce there would probably have been no objection, nor was there
any as to the principle of dividing the headship: but the Spartans
added, that they had two kings, while the Argeians had only one; and
inasmuch as neither of the two Spartan kings could be deprived of
his vote, the Argeian king could only be admitted to a third vote
conjointly with them. This proposition appeared to the Argeians, who
considered that even the undivided headship was no more than their
ancient right, as nothing better than insolent encroachment. and
incensed them so much that they desired the envoys to quit their
territory before sunset,—preferring even a tributary existence under
Persia to a formal degradation as compared with Sparta.[112]

[110] Herodot. vii, 144.

[111] Thucyd. iii, 56. ἐν καιροῖς οἷς σπάνιον ἦν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τινὰ
ἀρετὴν τῇ Ξέρξου δυνάμει ἀντιτάξασθαι.

This view of the case is much more conformable to history than
the boasts of later orators respecting wide-spread patriotism in
these times. See Demosthen. Philipp. iii, 37, p. 120.

[112] Herodot. vii, 147-150.

Such was the story told by the Argeians themselves, but seemingly
not credited either by any other Greeks or by Herodotus himself. The
prevalent opinion was, that the Argeians had a secret understanding
with Xerxes, and some even affirmed that they had been the parties
who invited him into Greece, as a means both of protection and
of vengeance to themselves against Sparta after their defeat by
Kleomenês. And Herodotus himself evidently believed that they
_medized_, though he is half afraid to say so, and disguises his
opinion in a cloud of words which betray the angry polemics going on
about the matter, even fifty years afterwards.[113] It is certain
that in act the Argeians were neutral, and one of their reasons for
neutrality was, that they did not choose to join any Pan-Hellenic
levy except in the capacity of chiefs; but probably the more powerful
reason was, that they shared the impression then so widely diffused
throughout Greece as to the irresistible force of the approaching
host, and chose to hold themselves prepared for the event. They kept
up secret negotiations even with Persian agents, yet not compromising
themselves while matters were still pending; nor is it improbable,
in their vexation against Sparta, that they would have been better
pleased if the Persians had succeeded,—all which may reasonably be
termed, _medizing_.

[113] The opinion of Herodotus is delivered in a remarkable way,
without mentioning the name of the Argeians, and with evident
reluctance. After enumerating all the Grecian contingents
assembled for the defence of the Isthmus, and the different
inhabitants of Peloponnesus, ethnically classified, he proceeds
to say: Τούτων ὦν τῶν ἑπτὰ ἐθνέων αἱ λοιπαὶ πόλις, πάρεξ τῶν
κατέλεξα, ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ἐκατέατο· ~εἰ δὲ ἐλευθέρως ἔξεστι εἰπεῖν,
ἐκ τοῦ μέσου κατήμενοι ἐμήδιζον~ (viii, 73). This assertion
includes the Argeians without naming them.

Where he speaks respecting the Argeians by name, he is by no
means so free and categorical; compare vii, 152,—he will give no
opinion of his own, differing from the allegation of the Argeians
themselves,—he mentions other stories, incompatible with that
allegation, but without guaranteeing their accuracy,— he delivers
a general admonition that those who think they have great reason
to complain of the conduct of others would generally find, on an
impartial scrutiny, that others have as much reason to complain
of them,—“and thus the conduct of Argos has not been _so much
worse than that of others_,”—οὕτω δὴ ~οὐκ Ἀργείοισι αἴσχιστα
πεποίηται~.

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when the history
of Herodotus was probably composed, the Argeians were in a
peculiarly favorable position. They took part neither with
Athens nor Lacedæmon, each of whom was afraid of offending them.
An historian who openly countenanced a grave charge of treason
against them in the memorable foregone combat against Xerxes, was
thus likely to incur odium from both parties in Greece.

The comments of Plutarch on Herodotus in respect to this matter
are of little value (De Herodoti Malignit. c. 28, p. 863), and
are indeed unfair, since he represents the Argeian version of the
facts as being universally believed (ἅπαντες ἴσασιν), which it
evidently was not.

The absence of Hellenic fidelity in Argos was borne out by the
parallel examples of Krete and Korkyra, to which places envoys from
the Isthmus proceeded at the same time. The Kretans declined to
take any part, on the ground of prohibitory injunctions from the
oracle;[114] the Korkyræans promised without performing, and even
without any intention to perform. Their neutrality was a serious
loss to the Greeks, since they could fit out a naval force of
sixty triremes, second only to that of Athens. With this important
contingent they engaged to join the Grecian fleet, and actually
set sail from Korkyra; but they took care not to sail round cape
Malea, or to reach the scene of action. Their fleet remained on
the southern or western coast of Peloponnesus, under pretence of
being weatherbound, until the decisive result of the battle of
Salamis was known. Their impression was that the Persian monarch
would be victorious, in which case they would have made a merit
of not having arrived in time; but they were also prepared with
the plausible excuse of detention from foul winds, when the result
turned out otherwise, and when they were reproached by the Greeks
for their absence.[115] Such duplicity is not very astonishing, when
we recollect that it was the habitual policy of Korkyra to isolate
herself from Hellenic confederacies.[116]

[114] Herodot. vii, 169.

[115] Herodot. vii, 168.

[116] Thucyd. i, 32-37. It is perhaps singular that the
Corinthian envoys in Thucydides do not make any allusion to the
duplicity of the Korkyræans in regard to the Persian invasion,
in the strong invective which they deliver against Korkyra
before the Athenian assembly (Thucydid. i, 37-42). The conduct
of Corinth herself, however, on the same occasion, was not
altogether without reproach.

The envoys who visited Korkyra proceeded onward on their mission
to Gelon, the despot of Syracuse. Of that potentate, regarded by
Herodotus as more powerful than any state in Greece, I shall speak
more fully in a subsequent chapter: it is sufficient to mention now,
that he rendered no aid against Xerxes. Nor was it in his power to
do so, whatever might have been his inclinations; for the same year
which brought the Persian monarch against Greece, was also selected
by the Carthaginians for a formidable invasion of Sicily, which kept
the Sicilian Greeks to the defence of their own island. It seems even
probable that this simultaneous invasion had been concerted between
the Persians and Carthaginians.[117]

[117] Herodot. vii, 158-167. Diodor. xi, 22.

The endeavors of the deputies of Greeks at the Isthmus had thus
produced no other reinforcement to their cause except some fair
words from the Korkyræans. It was near the time when Xerxes was
about to pass the Hellespont, in the beginning of 480 B. C., that
the first actual step for resistance was taken, at the instigation
of the Thessalians. Though the great Thessalian family of the
Aleuadæ were among the companions of Xerxes, and the most forward
in inviting him into Greece, with every promise of ready submission
from their countrymen, it seems that these promises were in reality
unwarranted: the Aleuadæ were at the head only of a minority, and
perhaps were even in exile, like the Peisistratidæ:[118] while most
of the Thessalians were disposed to resist Xerxes, for which purpose
they now sent envoys to the Isthmus,[119] intimating the necessity
of guarding the passes of Olympus, the northernmost entrance of
Greece. They offered their own cordial aid in this defence, adding
that they should be under the necessity of making their own separate
submission, if this demand were not complied with. Accordingly,
a body of ten thousand Grecian heavy-armed infantry, under the
command of the Spartan Euænetus and the Athenian Themistoklês, were
despatched by sea to Halus in Achæa Phthiôtis, where they disembarked
and marched by land across Achæa and Thessaly.[120] Being joined by
the Thessalian horse, they occupied the defile of Tempê, through
which the river Peneius makes its way to the sea, by a cleft between
the mountains Olympus and Ossa.

[118] See Schol. ad Aristeid., Anathenaic. p. 138.

[119] Herodot. vii, 172: compare c. 130.

[120] Herodot. vii, 173.

The long, narrow, and winding defile of Tempê, formed then, and forms
still, the single entrance, open throughout winter as well as summer,
from lower or maritime Macedonia into Thessaly: the lofty mountain
precipices approach so closely as to leave hardly room enough in
some places for a road: it is thus eminently defensible, and a few
resolute men would be sufficient to arrest in it the progress of the
most numerous host.[121] But the Greeks soon discovered that the
position was such as they could not hold,—first, because the powerful
fleet of Xerxes would be able to land troops in their rear; secondly,
because there was also a second entrance passable in summer, from
upper Macedonia into Thessaly, by the mountain-passes over the
range of Olympus; an entrance which traversed the country of the
Perrhæbians and came into Thessaly near Gonnus, about the spot where
the defile of Tempê begins to narrow. It was in fact by this second
pass, evading the insurmountable difficulties of Tempê, that the
advancing march of the Persians was destined to be made, under the
auspices of Alexander, king of Macedon, tributary to them, and active
in their service; who sent a communication of this fact to the Greeks
at Tempê, admonishing them that they would be trodden under foot by
the countless host approaching, and urging them to renounce their
hopeless position.[122] This Macedonian prince passed for a friend,
and probably believed himself to be acting as such in dissuading the
Greeks from unavailing resistance to Persia: but he was in reality
a very dangerous mediator; and as such the Spartans had good reason
to dread him, in a second intervention of which we shall hear more
hereafter.[123] On the present occasion, the Grecian commanders were
quite ignorant of the existence of any other entrance into Thessaly,
besides Tempê, until their arrival in that region. Perhaps it might
have been possible to defend both entrances at once, and considering
the immense importance of arresting the march of the Persians at
the frontiers of Hellas, the attempt would have been worth some
risk. So great was the alarm, however, produced by the unexpected
discovery, justifying, or seeming to justify, the friendly advice of
Alexander, that they remained only a few days at Tempê, then at once
retired back to their ships, and returned by sea to the isthmus of
Corinth,—about the time when Xerxes was crossing the Hellespont.[124]

[121] Herodot. vii, 172. τὴν ἐσβολὴν τὴν Ὀλυμπικήν. See the
description and plan of Tempê in Dr. Clarke’s Travels, vol. iv,
ch. ix, p. 280; and the Dissertation of Kriegk, in which all the
facts about this interesting defile are collected and compared
(Das Thessalische Tempe. Frankfort, 1834).

The description of Tempê in Livy (xliii, 18; xliv, 6) seems more
accurate than that in Pliny (H. N. iv, 8). We may remark that
both the one and the other belong to times subsequent to the
formation and organization of the Macedonian empire, when it came
to hold Greece in a species of dependence. The Macedonian princes
after Alexander the Great, while they added to the natural
difficulties of Tempê by fortifications, at the same time made
the road more convenient as a military communication. In the time
of Xerxes, these natural difficulties had never been approached
by the hand of art, and were doubtless much greater.

The present road through the pass is about thirteen feet broad
in its narrowest part, and between fifteen and twenty feet
broad elsewhere,—the pass is about five English miles in length
(Kriegk, pp. 21-33).

[122] Herodot. vii, 173.

[123] Herodot. viii, 140-143.

[124] Herodot. vii, 173, 174.

This precipitate retreat produced consequences highly disastrous and
discouraging. It appeared to leave all Hellas north of mount Kithæron
and of the Megarid territory without defence, and it served either
as reason or pretext for the majority of the Grecian states north
of that boundary to make their submission to Xerxes, which some of
them had already begun to do before.[125] When Xerxes in the course
of his march reached the Thermaic gulf, within sight of Olympus
and Ossa, the heralds whom he had sent from Sardis brought him
tokens of submission from a third portion of the Hellenic name,—the
Thessalians, Dolopes, Ænianes, Perrhæbians, Magnêtes, Lokrians,
Dorians, Melians, Phthiôtid Achæans, and Bœotians,—among the latter
is included Thebes, but not Thespiæ or Platæa. The Thessalians,
especially, not only submitted, but manifested active zeal and
rendered much service in the cause of Xerxes, under the stimulus of
the Aleuadæ, whose party now became predominant: they were probably
indignant at the hasty retreat of those who had come to defend
them.[126]

[125] Diodor. xi, 3. ἔτι παρούσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς Τέμπεσι φυλακῆς,
etc.

[126] Herodot. vii, 131, 132, 174.

Had the Greeks been able to maintain the passes of Olympus and
Ossa, all this northern fraction might probably have been induced
to partake in the resistance instead of becoming auxiliaries to the
invader. During the six weeks or two months which elapsed between
the retreat of the Greeks from Tempê and the arrival of Xerxes at
Therma, no new plan of defence appears to have been formed; for it
was not until that arrival became known at the Isthmus that the Greek
army and fleet made its forward movement to occupy Thermopylæ and
Artemisium.[127]

[127] Herodot. vii, 177

CHAPTER XL.

BATTLES OF THERMOPYLÆ AND ARTEMISIUM.

It was while the northerly states of Greece were thus successively
falling off from the common cause, that the deputies assembled at
the Isthmus took among themselves the solemn engagement, in the
event of success, to inflict upon these recusant brethren condign
punishment,—to tithe them in property, and perhaps to consecrate a
tenth of their persons, for the profit of the Delphian god. Exception
was to be made in favor of those states which had been driven to
yield by irresistible necessity.[128] Such a vow seemed at that
moment little likely to be executed it was the manifestation of
a determined feeling binding together the states which took the
pledge, but it cannot have contributed much to intimidate the rest.

[128] Herodot. vii, 132; Diodor. xi, 3.

To display their own force, was the only effective way of keeping
together doubtful allies; and the pass of Thermopylæ was now fixed
upon as the most convenient point of defence, next to that of
Tempê,—leaving out indeed, and abandoning to the enemy, Thessalians,
Perrhæbians, Magnêtes, Phthiôtid Achæans, Dolopes, Ænianes, Malians,
etc., who would all have been included if the latter line had been
adhered to; but comprising the largest range consistent with safety.
The position of Thermopylæ presented another advantage which was not
to be found at Tempê; the mainland was here separated from the island
of Eubœa only by a narrow strait, about two English miles and a half
in its smallest breadth, between mount Knêmis and cape Kênæum. On
the northern portion of Eubœa, immediately facing Magnesia and Achæa
Phthiôtis, was situated the line of coast called Artemisium: a name
derived from the temple of Artemis, which was its most conspicuous
feature, belonging to the town of Histiæa. It was arranged that
the Grecian fleet should be mustered there, in order to coöperate
with the land-force, and to oppose the progress of the Persians on
both elements at once. To fight in a narrow space[129] was supposed
favorable to the Greeks on sea not less than on land, inasmuch as
their ships were both fewer in number and heavier in sailing than
those in the Persian service. From the position of Artemisium, it was
calculated that they might be able to prevent the Persian fleet from
advancing into the narrow strait which severs Eubœa, to the north
and west, from the mainland, and which, between Chalkis and Bœotia,
becomes not too wide for a bridge. It was at this latter point
that the Greek seamen would have preferred to place their defence:
but the occupation of the northern part of the Eubœan strait was
indispensable to prevent the Persian fleet from landing troops in the
rear of the defenders of Thermopylæ.

[129] Herodot. viii, 15-60. Compare Isokratês, Panegyric, Or. iv,
p. 59.

I shall have occasion presently to remark the revolution which
took place in Athenian feeling on this point between the Persian
and Peloponnesian wars.

Of this Eubœan strait, the western limit is formed by what was
then called the Maliac gulf, into which the river Spercheius poured
itself,—after a course from west to east between the line of Mount
Othrys to the north, and Mount Œta to the south,—near the town of
Antikyra. The lower portion of this spacious and fertile valley of
the Spercheius was occupied by the various tribes of the Malians,
bordering to the north and east on Achæa Phthiôtis: the southernmost
Malians, with their town of Trachis, occupied a plain—in some places
considerable, in others very narrow—inclosed between mount Œta and
the sea. From Trachis the range of Œta stretched eastward, bordering
close on the southern shore of the Maliac gulf: between the two lay
the memorable pass of Thermopylæ.[130] On the road from Trachis to
Thermopylæ, immediately outside of the latter and at the mouth of
the little streams called the Phenix and the Asôpus, was placed the
town of Anthêla, celebrated for its temples of Amphiktyon and of the
Amphiktyonic Dêmêtêr, as well as for the autumnal assemblies of the
Amphiktyonic council, for whom seats were provided in the temple.

[130] The word _Pass_ commonly conveys the idea of a path
inclosed between mountains. In this instance it is employed to
designate a narrow passage, having mountains on one side only,
and water (or marsh ground) on the other.

Immediately near to Anthêla, the northern slope of the mighty and
prolonged ridge of Œta approached so close to the gulf, or at least
to an inaccessible morass which formed the edge of the gulf, as
to leave no more than one single wheel track between. This narrow
entrance formed the western gate of Thermopylæ. At some little
distance, seemingly about a mile, to the eastward, the same close
conjunction between the mountain and the sea was repeated,—thus
forming the eastern gate of Thermopylæ, not far from the first
town of the Lokrians, called Alpêni. The space between these two
gates was wider and more open, but it was distinguished, and is
still distinguished, by its abundant flow of thermal springs, salt
and sulphureous. Some cells were here prepared for bathers, which
procured for the place the appellation of Chytri, or the Pans: but
the copious supply of mineral water spread its mud and deposited
its crust over all the adjacent ground; and the Phocians, some time
before, had designedly endeavored so to conduct the water as to
render the pass utterly impracticable, at the same time building a
wall across it near to the western gate. They had done this in order
to keep off the attacks of the Thessalians, who had been trying to
extend their conquests southward and eastward. The warm springs,
here as in other parts of Greece, were consecrated to Hêraklês,[131]
whose legendary exploits and sufferings ennobled all the surrounding
region,—mount Œta, Trachis, cape Kenæum, Lichades islands, the river
Dyras: some fragments of these legends have been transmitted and
adorned by the genius of Sophoklês, in his drama of the Trachinian
maidens.

[131] According to one of the numerous hypotheses for refining
religious legend into matter of historical and physical fact,
Hêraklês was supposed to have been an engineer, or water-finder,
in very early times,—δεινὸς περὶ ζήτησιν ὑδάτων καὶ συναγωγήν.
See Plutarch, Cum principibus viris philosopho esse disserendum,
c. i, p. 776.

Such was the general scene—two narrow openings with an intermediate
mile of enlarged road and hot springs between them—which passed in
ancient times by the significant name of Thermopylæ, the Hot Gates;
or sometimes, more briefly, Pylæ—The Gates. At a point also near
Trachis, between the mountains and the sea, about two miles outside
or westward of Thermopylæ, the road was hardly less narrow, but it
might be turned by marching to the westward, since the adjacent
mountains were lower, and presented less difficulty of transit; while
at Thermopylæ itself, the overhanging projection of mount Œta was
steep, woody, and impracticable, leaving access, from Thessaly into
Lokris and the territories southeast of Œta, only through the strait
gate;[132] save and except an unfrequented as well as circuitous
mountain-path, which will be presently spoken of. The wall originally
built across the pass by the Phocians was now half-ruined by age and
neglect: but the Greeks easily reëstablished it, determined to await
in this narrow pass, in that age narrower even than the defile of
Tempê, the approach of the invading host. The edge of the sea line
appears to have been for the most part marsh, fit neither for walking
nor for sailing: but there were points at which boats could land,
so that constant communication could be maintained with the fleet
at Artemisium, while Alpêni was immediately in their rear to supply
provisions.

[132] About Thermopylæ, see Herodot. vii, 175, 176, 199, 200.

Ἡ δὲ αὖ διὰ Τρηχῖνος ἔσοδος ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἔστι, τῇ στεινότατον,
ἡμίπλεθρον· οὐ μέντοι κατὰ τοῦτό γ’ ἔστι τὸ στεινότατον τῆς χώρης
τῆς ἄλλης, ἀλλ’ ἔμπροσθέ τε Θερμοπυλέων καὶ ὄπισθε· κατά τε
Ἀλπηνοὺς, ὄπισθε ἐόντας, ἐοῦσα ἁμαξιτὸς μούνη· καὶ ἔμπροσθε κατὰ
Φοίνικα ποταμὸν, ἁμαξιτὸς ἄλλη μούνη.

Compare Pausanias, vii, 15, 2. τὸ στένον τὸ Ἡρακλείας τε μεταξὺ
καὶ Θερμοπυλέων; Strabo, ix, p. 429; and Livy, xxxvi, 12.

Herodotus says about Thermopylæ—στεινοτέρη γὰρ ἐφαίνετο ἐοῦσα τῆς
εἰς Θεσσαλίην, _i. e._ than the defile of Tempê.

If we did not possess the clear topographical indications given
by Herodotus, it would be almost impossible to comprehend
the memorable event here before us; for the configuration of
the coast, the course of the rivers, and the general local
phenomena, have now so entirely changed, that modern travellers
rather mislead than assist. In the interior of the Maliac
gulf, three or four miles of new land have been formed by the
gradual accumulation of river deposit, so that the gulf itself
is of much less extent, and the mountain bordering the gate of
Thermopylæ is not now near to the sea. The river Spercheius has
materially altered its course; instead of flowing into the sea
in an easterly direction considerably north of Thermopylæ, as
it did in the time of Herodotus, it has been diverted southward
in the lower part of its course, with many windings, so as to
reach the sea much south of the pass: while the rivers Dyras,
Melas, and Asôpus, which in the time of Herodotus all reached the
sea separately between the mouth of Spercheius and Thermopylæ,
now do not reach the sea at all, but fall into the Spercheius.
Moreover, the perpetual flow of the thermal springs has tended to
accumulate deposit and to raise the level of the soil generally
throughout the pass. Herodotus seems to consider the road between
the two gates of Thermopylæ as bearing north and south, whereas
it would bear more nearly east and west. He knows nothing of the
appellation of Callidromus, applied by Livy and Strabo to an
undefined portion of the eastern ridge of Œta.

Respecting the past and present features of Thermopylæ, see the
valuable observations of Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern
Greece, vol. ii, ch. x, pp. 7-40; Gell, Itinerary of Greece, p.
239; Kruse, Hellas, vol. iii, ch. x, p. 129. Dr. Clarke observes:
“The hot springs issue principally from two mouths at the foot of
the limestone precipices of Œta, upon the left of the causeway,
which here passes close under the mountain, and on this part
of it scarcely admits two horsemen abreast of each other, the
morass on the right, between the causeway and the sea, being so
dangerous, that we were very near being buried, with our horses,
by our imprudence in venturing a few paces into it from the paved
road.” (Clarke’s Travels, vol. iv, ch. viii, p. 247.)

Though the resolution of the Greek deputies assembled at the Isthmus,
to defend conjointly Thermopylæ and the Eubœan strait, had been
taken, seemingly, not long after the retreat from Tempê, their troops
and their fleet did not actually occupy these positions until Xerxes
was known to have reached the Thermaic gulf. Both were then put in
motion; the land-force under the Spartan king Leonidas, the naval
force under the Spartan commander Eurybiadês, apparently about the
latter part of the month of June. Leonidas was the younger brother,
the successor, and the son-in-law, of the former Eurystheneid king
Kleomenês, whose only daughter Gorgo he had married. Another brother
of the same family—Dorieus, older than Leonidas—had perished, even
before the death of Kleomenês, in an unsuccessful attempt to plant
a colony in Sicily; and room had been thus made for the unexpected
succession of the youngest brother. Leonidas now conducted from the
Isthmus to Thermopylæ a select band of three hundred Spartans,—all
being citizens of mature age, and persons who left at home sons
to supply their places.[133] Along with them were five hundred
hoplites from Tegea, five hundred from Mantineia, one hundred and
twenty from the Arcadian Orchomenus, one thousand from the rest of
Arcadia, four hundred from Corinth, two hundred from Phlius, and
eighty from Mykenæ. There were also, doubtless, Helots and other
light troops, in undefined number, and probably a certain number of
Lacedæmonian hoplites, not Spartans. In their march through Bœotia
they were joined by seven hundred hoplites of Thespiæ, hearty in
the cause, and by four hundred Thebans, of more equivocal fidelity,
under Leontiadês. It appears, indeed, that the leading men of Thebes,
at that time under a very narrow oligarchy, decidedly _medized_,
or espoused the Persian interest, as much as they dared before the
Persians were actually in the country: and Leonidas, when he made
the requisition for a certain number of their troops to assist
in the defence of Thermopylæ, was doubtful whether they would not
refuse compliance, and openly declare against the Greek cause. The
Theban chiefs thought it prudent to comply, though against their real
inclinations, and furnished a contingent of four hundred men,[134]
chosen from citizens of a sentiment opposed to their own. Indeed the
Theban people, and the Bœotians generally, with the exception of
Thespiæ and Platæa, seem to have had little sentiment on either side,
and to have followed passively the inspirations of their leaders.

[133] Herodot. vii, 177, 205. ἐπιλεξάμενος ἄνδρας τε τοὺς
κατεστεῶτας τριηκοσίους, καὶ τοῖσι ἐτύγχανον παῖδες ἐόντες.

In selecting men for a dangerous service, the Spartans took by
preference those who already had families: if such a man was
slain, he left behind him a son to discharge his duties to the
state, and to maintain the continuity of the family sacred rites,
the extinction of which was considered as a great misfortune. In
our ideas, the life of the father of a family in mature age would
be considered as of more value, and his death a greater loss,
than that of a younger and unmarried man.

[134] Herodot. vii, 205; Thucyd. iii, 62; Diodor. xi, 4;
Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 18.

The passage of Thucydides is very important here, as confirming,
to a great degree, the statement of Herodotus, and enabling us
to appreciate the criticisms of Plutarch, on this particular
point very plausible (De Herodoti Malign. pp. 865, 866). The
latter seems to have copied from a lost Bœotian author named
Aristophanes, who tried to make out a more honorable case for his
countrymen in respect to their conduct in the Persian war.

The statement of Diodorus,—Θηβαίων ἀπὸ τῆς ἑτέρας μέριδος ὡς
τετρακόσιοι,—is illustrated by a proceeding of the Korkyræan
government (Thucyd. iii, 75), when they enlisted their enemies in
order to send them away: also that of the Italian Cumæ (Dionys.
Hal. vii, 5).

With these troops Leonidas reached Thermopylæ, whence he sent
envoys to invite the junction of the Phocians and the Lokrians of
Opus. The latter had been among those who had sent earth and water
to Xerxes, of which they are said to have repented: the step was
taken, probably, only from fear, which at this particular moment
prescribed acquiescence in the summons of Leonidas, justified by
the plea of necessity in case the Persians should prove ultimately
victorious:[135] while the Phocians, if originally disposed to
_medize_, were now precluded from doing so by the fact that their
bitter enemies, the Thessalians, were active in the cause of Xerxes,
and influential in guiding his movements.[136] The Greek envoys added
strength to their summons by all the encouragement in their power.
“The troops now at Thermopylæ, they said, were a mere advanced body,
preceding the main strength of Greece, which was expected to arrive
every day: on the side of the sea, a sufficient fleet was already
on guard: nor was there any cause for fear, since the invader was,
after all, not a god, but a man, exposed to those reverses of fortune
which came inevitably on all men, and most of all, upon those in
preëminent condition.”[137] Such arguments prove but too evidently
the melancholy state of terror which then pervaded the Greek mind:
whether reassured by them or not, the great body of the Opuntian
Lokrians, and one thousand Phocians, joined Leonidas at Thermopylæ.

[135] Diodor. xi, 4.

[136] Herodot. viii, 30.

[137] Herodot. vii, 203. λέγοντες δι’ ἀγγέλων, ὡς αὐτοὶ μὲν
ἥκοιεν πρόδρομοι τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ τῶν συμμάχων προσδόκιμοι
πᾶσάν εἰσι ἡμέρην· ... καί σφι εἴη δεινὸν οὐδέν· οὐ γὰρ θεὸν
εἶναι τὸν ἐπίοντα ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἀλλ’ ἄνθρωπον· εἶναι δὲ θνητὸν
οὐδένα, οὐδὲ ἔσεσθαι, τῷ κακὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γινομένῳ οὐ συνεμίχθη,
τοῖσι δὲ μεγίστοισι αὐτέων, μέγιστα· ὀφείλειν ὦν καὶ τὸν
ἐπελαύνοντα, ὡς ἐόντα θνητὸν, ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης πεσέειν ἄν.

That this terror was both genuine and serious, there cannot be any
doubt: and the question naturally suggests itself, why the Greeks
did not at once send their full force instead of a mere advanced
guard? The answer is to be found in another attribute of the
Greek character,—it was the time of celebrating both the Olympic
festival-games on the banks of the Alpheius, and the Karneian
festival at Sparta and most of the other Dorian states.[138] Even
at a moment when their whole freedom and existence were at stake,
the Greeks could not bring themselves to postpone these venerated
solemnities: especially the Peloponnesian Greeks, among whom this
force of religious routine appears to have been the strongest. At
a period more than a century later, in the time of Demosthenes,
when the energy of the Athenians had materially declined, we shall
find them, too, postponing the military necessities of the state to
the complete and splendid fulfilment of their religious festival
obligations,—starving all their measures of foreign policy in order
that the Theôric exhibitions might be imposing to the people and
satisfactory to the gods. At present, we find little disposition in
the Athenians to make this sacrifice,—certainly much less than in the
Peloponnesians. The latter, remaining at home to celebrate their
festivals while an invader of superhuman might was at their gates,
remind us of the Jews in the latter days of their independence, who
suffered the operations of the besieging Roman army round their
city to be carried on without interruption during the Sabbath.[139]
The Spartans and their confederates reckoned that Leonidas with his
detachment would be strong enough to hold the pass of Thermopylæ
until the Olympic and Karneian festivals should be past, after which
period they were prepared to march to his aid with their whole
military force:[140] and they engaged to assemble in Bœotia for the
purpose of defending Attica against attack on the land-side, while
the great mass of the Athenian force was serving on shipboard.

[138] Herodot. vii, 206. It was only the Dorian states
(Lacedæmon, Argos, Sikyon, etc.) which were under obligation of
abstinence from aggressive military operations during the month
of the Karneian festival: other states (even in Peloponnesus),
Elis, Mantineia, etc., and of course Athens, were not under
similar restraint (Thucyd. v, 54, 75).

[139] Josephus, Bell. Judaic. i, 7, 3; ii, 16, 4; ibid. Antiqq.
Judaic. xiv, 4, 2. If their bodies were attacked on the Sabbath,
the Jews defended themselves; but they would not break through
the religious obligations of the day in order to impede any
military operations of the besiegers. See Reimar. ad Dion. Cass.
lxvi, 7.

[140] Herodot. vii, 206; viii, 40.

At the time when this plan was laid, they believed that the narrow
pass of Thermopylæ was the only means of possible access for an
invading army. But Leonidas, on reaching the spot, discovered for
the first time that there was also a mountain-path starting from the
neighborhood of Trachis, ascending the gorge of the river Asôpus and
the hill called Anopæa, then crossing the crest of Œta and descending
in the rear of Thermopylæ near the Lokrian town of Alpêni. This
path-then hardly used, though its ascending half now serves as
the regular track from Zeitun, the ancient Lamia, to Salona on the
Corinthian gulf, the ancient Amphissa-was revealed to him by its
first discoverers, the inhabitants of Trachis, who in former days
had conducted the Thessalians over it to attack Phocis, after the
Phocians had blocked up the pass of Thermopylæ. It was therefore
not unknown to the Phocians: it conducted from Trachis into their
country, and they volunteered to Leonidas that they would occupy and
defend it.[141] But the Greeks thus found themselves at Thermopylæ
under the same necessity of providing a double line of defence,
for the mountain-path as well as for the defile, as that which had
induced their former army to abandon Tempê: and so insufficient did
their numbers seem, when the vast host of Xerxes was at length
understood to be approaching, that a panic terror seized them; and
the Peloponnesian troops especially, anxious only for their own
separate line of defence at the isthmus of Corinth, wished to retreat
thither forthwith. The indignant remonstrances of the Phocians
and Lokrians, who would thus have been left to the mercy of the
invader, induced Leonidas to forbid this retrograde movement: but he
thought it necessary to send envoys to the various cities, insisting
on the insufficiency of his numbers, and requesting immediate
reinforcements.[142] So painfully were the consequences now felt, of
having kept back the main force until after the religious festivals
in Peloponnesus.

[141] Herodot. vii, 212, 216, 218.

[142] Herodot. vii, 207.

Nor was the feeling of confidence stronger at this moment in their
naval armament, though it had mustered in far superior numbers
at Artemisium on the northern coast of Eubœa, under the Spartan
Eurybiadês. It was composed as follows: one hundred Athenian
triremes, manned in part by the citizens of Platæa, in spite of
their total want of practice on shipboard; forty Corinthian, twenty
Megarian, twenty Athenian, manned by the inhabitants of Chalkis, and
lent to them by Athens; eighteen Æginetan, twelve Sikyonian, ten
Lacedæmonian, eight Epidaurian, seven Eretrian, five Trœzenian, two
from Styrus in Eubœa, and two from the island of Keos. There were
thus in all two hundred and seventy-one triremes; together with nine
pentekonters, furnished partly by Keos and partly by the Lokrians of
Opus. Themistoklês was at the head of the Athenian contingent, and
Adeimantus of the Corinthian; of other officers we hear nothing.[143]
Three cruising vessels, an Athenian, an Æginetan, and a Trœzenian,
were pushed forward along the coast of Thessaly, beyond the island of
Skiathos, to watch the advancing movements of the Persian fleet from
Therma.

[143] Herodot. viii, 1, 2, 3. Diodorus (xi, 12) makes the
Athenian number stronger by twenty triremes.

It was here that the first blood was shed in this memorable contest.
Ten of the best ships in the Persian fleet, sent forward in the
direction of Skiathos, fell in with these three Grecian triremes,
who probably supposing them to be the precursors of the entire
fleet sought safety in flight. The Athenian trireme escaped to the
mouth of the Peneius, where the crew abandoned her, and repaired
by land to Athens, leaving the vessel to the enemy: the other two
ships were overtaken and captured afloat,—not without a vigorous
resistance on the part of the Æginetan, one of whose hoplites,
Pythês, fought with desperate bravery, and fell covered with wounds.
So much did the Persian warriors admire him, that they took infinite
pains to preserve his life, and treated him with the most signal
manifestations both of kindness and respect, while they dealt with
his comrades as slaves.

On board the Trœzenian vessel, which was the first to be captured,
they found a soldier named Leon, of imposing stature: this man was
immediately taken to the ship’s head and slain, as a presaging omen
in the approaching contest: perhaps, observes the historian, his name
may have contributed to determine his fate.[144] The ten Persian
ships advanced no farther than the dangerous rock Myrmêx, between
Skiathos and the mainland, which had been made known to them by a
Greek navigator of Skyros, and on which they erected a pillar to
serve as warning for the coming fleet. Still, so intense was the
alarm which their presence—communicated by fire-signals[145] from
Skiathos, and strengthened by the capture of the three look-out
ships—inspired to the fleet at Artemisium, that they actually
abandoned their station, believing that the entire fleet of the enemy
was at hand.[146] They sailed up the Eubœan strait to Chalkis, as the
narrowest and most defensible passage; leaving scouts on the high
lands to watch the enemy’s advance.

[144] Herodot. vii, 180. τάχα δ’ ἄν τι καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπαύροιτο.

Respecting the influence of a name and its etymology, in this
case unhappy for the possessor, compare Herodot. ix, 91; and
Tacit. Hist. iv, 53.

[145] For the employment of fire-signals, compare Livy, xxviii,
5; and the opening of the Agamemnon of Æschylus, and the same
play, v. 270, 300; also Thucydides, iii, 22-80.

[146] Herodot. vii, 181, 182, 183.

Probably this sudden retreat was forced upon the generals by the
panic of their troops, similar to that which king Leonidas, more
powerful than Eurybiadês and Themistoklês, had found means to arrest
at Thermopylæ. It ruined for the time the whole scheme of defence,
by laying open the rear of the army at Thermopylæ to the operations
of the Persian fleet. But that which the Greeks did not do for
themselves was more than compensated by the beneficent intervention
of their gods, who opposed to the invader the more terrible arms of
storm and hurricane. He was allowed to bring his overwhelming host,
land-force as well as naval, to the brink of Thermopylæ and to the
coast of Thessaly, without hindrance or damage; but the time had
now arrived when the gods appeared determined to humble him, and
especially to strike a series of blows at his fleet which should
reduce it to a number not beyond what the Greeks could contend
with.[147] Amidst the general terror which pervaded Greece, the
Delphians were the first to earn the gratitude of their countrymen by
announcing that divine succor was at hand.[148] On entreating advice
from their own oracle, they were directed to pray to the Winds, who
would render powerful aid to Greece. Moreover, the Athenian seamen,
in their retreat at Chalkis, recollecting that Boreas was the husband
of the Attic princess or heroine Oreithyia, daughter of their ancient
king Erechtheus, addressed fervent prayers to their son-in-law for
his help in need. Never was help more effective, or more opportune,
than the destructive storm, presently to be recounted, on the coast
of Magnesia, for which grateful thanks and annual solemnities were
still rendered even in the time of Herodotus, at Athens as well as at
Delphi.[149]

[147] Herodot. vii, 184. μέχρι μὲν δὴ τούτου τοῦ χώρου καὶ τῶν
Θερμοπυλέων, ἀπαθής τε κακῶν ἔην ὁ στρατὸς, καὶ πλῆθος ἔην
τηνικαῦτα ἔτι τόσον, etc.—viii, 13. ἐποιέετο δὲ πᾶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ,
ὅκως ἂν ἐξισωθείη τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ τὸ Περσικὸν, μηδὲ πολλῷ πλέον εἴη.
Compare viii, 109; and Diodor. xi, 13.

[148] Herodot. vii, 178. Δελφοὶ δὲ δεξάμενοι τὸ μαντήϊον, πρῶτα
μὲν, Ἑλλήνων τοῖσι βουλομένοισι εἶναι ἐλευθέροισι ἐξήγγειλαν τὰ
χρησθέντα αὐτοῖσι· καί σφι δεινῶς καταῤῥωδέουσι τὸν βάρβαρον
ἐξαγγείλαντες, χάριν ἀθάνατον κατέθεντο.

[149] Herodot. vii, 189. The language of the historian in this
chapter is remarkable: his incredulous reason rather gets the
better of religious acquiescence.

Clemens Alexandrinus, reciting this incident together, with some
other miracles of Ækus, Aristæus, Empedoklês, etc., reproves his
pagan opponents for their inconsistency, while believing these,
in rejecting the miracles of Moses and the prophets (Stromat. vi,
pp. 629, 630).

Xerxes had halted on the Thermaic gulf for several days, employing
a large portion of his numerous army in cutting down the woods and
clearing the roads, on the pass over Olympus from upper Macedonia
into Perrhæbia, which was recommended by his Macedonian allies as
preferable to the defile of Tempê.[150] Not intending to march
through the latter, he is said to have gone by sea to view it; and
remarks are ascribed to him on the facility of blocking it up so
as to convert all Thessaly into one vast lake.[151] His march from
Therma through Macedonia, Perrhæbia, Thessaly, and Achæa Phthiôtis,
into the territory of the Malians and the neighborhood of Thermopylæ,
occupied eleven or twelve days:[152] the people through whose towns
he passed had already made their submission, and the Thessalians
especially were zealous in seconding his efforts. His numerous host
was still farther swelled by the presence of these newly-submitted
people, and by the Macedonian troops under Alexander; so that
the river Onochônus in Thessaly, and even the Apidanus in Achæa
Phthiôtis, would hardly suffice to supply it, but were drunk up,
according to the information given to Herodotus. At Alus in Achæa, he
condescended to listen to the gloomy legend connected with the temple
of Zeus Laphysteus and the sacred grove of the Athamantid family:
he respected and protected these sacred places,—an incident which
shows that the sacrilege and destruction of temples imputed to him
by the Greeks, though true in regard to Athens, Abæ, Milêtus, etc.,
was by no means universally exhibited, and is even found qualified
by occasional instances of great respect for Grecian religious
feeling.[153] Along the shore of the Malian gulf he at length came
into the Trachinian territory near Thermopylæ, where he encamped,
seemingly awaiting the arrival of the fleet, so as to combine
his farther movements in advance,[154] now that the enemy were
immediately in his front.

[150] The pass over which Xerxes passed was that by Petra,
Pythium, and Oloosson,—“saltum ad Petram,”—“Perrhæbiæ
saltum,”—(Livy, xlv, 21; xliv, 27.) Petra was near the point
where the road passed from Pieria, or lower Macedonia, into upper
Macedonia (see Livy, xxxix, 26).

Compare respecting this pass, and the general features of the
neighboring country, Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece,
vol. iii, ch. xviii, pp. 337-343, and ch. xxx, p. 430; also Boué,
La Turquie en Europe, vol. i, pp. 198-202.

The Thracian king Sitalkês, like Xerxes on this occasion, was
obliged to cause the forests to be cut, to make a road for his
army, in the early part of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. ii, 98).

[151] Herodot. vii, 130, 131. That Xerxes, struck by the view of
Olympus and Ossa, went to see the narrow defile between them, is
probable enough; but the remarks put into his mouth are probably
the fancy of some ingenious contemporary Greeks, suggested by the
juxtaposition of such a landscape and such a monarch. To suppose
this narrow defile walled up, was easy for the imagination of any
spectator: to suppose that _he_ could order it to be done, was
in character with a monarch who disposed of an indefinite amount
of manual labor, and who had just finished the cutting of Athos.
Such dramatic fitness was quite sufficient to convert that which
_might have been_ said into that which _was_ said, and to procure
for it a place among the historical anecdotes communicated to
Herodotus.

[152] The Persian fleet did not leave Therma until eleven days
after Xerxes and his land-force (Herodot. vii, 183); it arrived
in one day on the Sêpias Aktê, or southeastern coast of Magnesia
(ibid.), was then assailed and distressed for three days by the
hurricane (vii, 191), and proceeded immediately afterwards to
Aphetæ (vii, 193). When it arrived at the latter places, Xerxes
himself had been _three days_ in the Malian territory (vii, 196).

[153] This point is set forth by Hoffmeister, Sittlich-religiöse
Lebensansicht des Herodotos, Essen, 1832, sect. 19, p. 93.

[154] Herodot. vii, 196, 197, 201.

But his fleet was not destined to reach the point of communication
with the same ease as he had arrived before Thermopylæ. After having
ascertained by the ten ships already mentioned, which captured
the three Grecian guardships, that the channel between Skiathos
and the mainland was safe, the Persian admiral Megabates sailed
with his whole fleet from Therma, or from Pydna,[155] his station
in the Thermaic gulf, eleven days after the monarch had begun his
land-march; and reached in one long day’s sail the eastern coast
of Magnesia, not far from its southernmost promontory. The greater
part of this line of coast, formed by the declivities of Ossa and
Pelion, is thoroughly rocky and inhospitable: but south of the town
called Kasthanæa there was a short extent of open beach, where the
fleet rested for the night before coming to the line of coast called
the Sêpias Aktê.[156] The first line of ships were moored to the
land, but the larger number of this immense fleet swung at anchor in
a depth of eight lines. In this condition they were overtaken the
next morning by a sudden and desperate hurricane,—a wind called by
the people of the country Hellespontias, which blew right upon the
shore. The most active among the mariners found means to forestall
the danger by beaching and hauling their vessels ashore; but a large
number, unable to take such a precaution, were carried before the
wind and dashed to pieces near Melibœa, Kasthanæa, and other points
of this unfriendly region. Four hundred ships of war, according to
the lowest estimate, together with a countless heap of transports
and provision craft, were destroyed: and the loss of life as well as
property was immense. For three entire days did the terrors of the
storm last, during which time the crews ashore, left almost without
defence, and apprehensive that the inhabitants of the country might
assail or plunder them, were forced to break up the ships driven
ashore in order to make a palisade out of the timbers.[157] Though
the Magian priests who accompanied the armament were fervent in
prayer and sacrifice,—not merely to the Winds, but also to Thetis
and the Nereids, the tutelary divinities of Sêpias Aktê,—they could
obtain no mitigation until the fourth day:[158] thus long did the
prayers of Delphi and Athens, and the jealousy of the gods against
superhuman arrogance, protract the terrible visitation. At length,
on the fourth day, calm weather returned, when all those ships which
were in condition to proceed, put to sea and sailed along the land,
round the southern promontory of Magnesia, to Aphetæ, at the entrance
of the gulf of Pagasæ. Little, indeed, had Xerxes gained by the
laborious cutting through mount Athos, in hopes to escape the unseen
atmospheric enemies which howl around that formidable promontory: the
work of destruction to his fleet was only transferred to the opposite
side of the intervening Thracian sea.

[155] Diodor. xi, 12.

[156] Diodorus (xi, 12), Plutarch (Themistoklês, 8), and Mannert
(Geogr. der Gr. und Römer, vol. vii, p. 596), seem to treat
Sêpias as a _cape_, the southeastern corner of Magnesia: this
is different from Herodotus, who mentions it as a line of some
extent (ἅπασα ἡ ἀκτὴ ἡ Σηπιὰς, vii, 191), and notices separately
τὴν ἄκρην τῆς Μαγνησίης, vii, 193.

The geography of Apollonius Rhodius (i, 560-580) seems sadly
inaccurate.

[157] Herodot. vii, 189-191.

[158] Herodot. vii, 191. On this occasion, as in regard to the
prayers addressed by the Athenians to Boreas, Herodotus suffers
a faint indication of skepticism to escape him: ἡμέρας γὰρ δὴ
ἐχείμαζε τρεῖς· τέλος δὲ, ἔντομά τε ποιεῦντες καὶ καταείδοντες
γόοισι τῷ ἀνέμῳ οἱ Μάγοι, πρός τε τούτοισι, καὶ Θέτι καὶ τῇσι
Νηρηΐσι θύοντες, ἔπαυσαν τετάρτῃ ἡμέρῃ· ~ἢ ἄλλως κως αὐτὸς ἐθέλων
ἐκόπασε~.

Had the Persian fleet reached Aphetæ without misfortune, they
would have found the Eubœan strait evacuated by the Greek fleet
and undefended, so that they would have come immediately into
communication with the land army, and would have acted upon the rear
of Leonidas and his division. But the storm completely altered this
prospect, and revived the spirits of the Greek fleet at Chalkis. It
was communicated to them by their scouts on the high lands of Eubœa,
who even sent them word that the entire Persian fleet was destroyed:
upon which, having returned thanks and offered libations to Poseidon
the Saviour, the Greeks returned back as speedily as they could to
Artemisium. To their surprise, however, they saw the Persian fleet,
though reduced in number, still exhibiting a formidable total and
appearance at the opposite station of Aphetæ. The last fifteen
ships of that fleet, having been so greatly crippled by the storm
as to linger behind the rest, mistook the Greek ships for their
own comrades, fell into the midst of them, and were all captured.
Sandôkês, sub-satrap of the Æolic Kymê,—Aridôlis, despot of Alabanda
in Karia,—and Penthylus, despot of Paphos in Cyprus,—the leaders of
this squadron, were sent prisoners to the isthmus of Corinth, after
having been questioned respecting the enemy: the latter of these
three had brought to Xerxes a contingent of twelve ships, out of
which eleven had foundered in the storm, while the last was now taken
with himself aboard.[159]

[159] Herodot. vii, 194.

Meanwhile Xerxes, encamped within sight of Thermopylæ, suffered
four days to pass without making any attack: a probable reason may
be found in the extreme peril of his fleet, reported to have been
utterly destroyed by the storm: but Herodotus assigns a different
cause. Xerxes could not believe, according to him, that the Greeks
at Thermopylæ, few as they were in number, had any serious intention
to resist: he had heard in his march that a handful of Spartans and
other Greeks, under an Herakleid leader, had taken post there,
but he treated the news with scorn: and when a horseman,—whom he
sent to reconnoitre them, and who approached near enough to survey
their position, without exciting any attention among them by his
presence,—brought back to him a description of the pass, the wall of
defence, and the apparent number of the division, he was yet more
astonished and puzzled. It happened too, that at the moment when this
horseman rode up, the Spartans were in the advanced guard, outside of
the wall: some were engaged in gymnastic exercises, others in combing
their long hair, and none of them heeded the approach of the hostile
spy. Xerxes next sent for the Spartan king, Demaratus, to ask what
he was to think of such madness; upon which the latter reminded him
of their former conversation at Doriskus, again assuring him that
the Spartans in the pass would resist to the death, in spite of the
smallness of their number; and adding, that it was their custom, in
moments of special danger, to comb their hair with peculiar care.
In spite of this assurance from Demaratus, and of the pass not only
occupied, but in itself so narrow and impracticable, before his eyes,
Xerxes still persisted in believing that the Greeks did not intend
to resist, and that they would disperse of their own accord. He
delayed the attack for four days: on the fifth he became wroth at the
impudence and recklessness of the petty garrison before him, and sent
against them the Median and Kissian divisions, with orders to seize
them and bring them as prisoners into his presence.[160]

[160] Herod. vii, 208, 210. πέμπει ἐς αὐτοὺς Μήδους τε καὶ
Κισσίους θυμωθεὶς, ἐντειλάμενός σφεας ζωγρήσαντας ἄγειν ἐς ὄψιν
τὴν ἑωϋτοῦ.

Though we read thus in Herodotus, it is hardly possible to believe
that we are reading historical reality: we rather find laid out
before us a picture of human self-conceit in its most exaggerated
form, ripe for the stroke of the jealous gods, and destined, like the
interview between Crœsus and Solon, to point and enforce that moral
which was ever present to the mind of the historian; whose religious
and poetical imagination, even unconsciously to himself, surrounds
the naked facts of history with accompaniments of speech and motive
which neither Homer nor Æschylus would have deemed unsuitable. The
whole proceedings of Xerxes, and the immensity of host which he
summoned, show that he calculated on an energetic resistance; and
though the numbers of Leonidas, compared with the Persians, were
insignificant, they could hardly have looked insignificant in the
position which they then occupied,—an entrance little wider than a
single carriage-road, with a cross wall, a prolonged space somewhat
widened, and then another equally narrow exit, behind it. We are
informed by Diodorus[161] that the Lokrians, when they first sent
earth and water to the Persian monarch, engaged at the same time to
seize the pass of Thermopylæ on his behalf, and were only prevented
from doing so by the unexpected arrival of Leonidas; nor is it
unlikely that the Thessalians, now the chief guides of Xerxes,[162]
together with Alexander of Macedon, would try the same means of
frightening away the garrison of Thermopylæ, as had already been so
successful in causing the evacuation of Tempê. An interval of two or
three days might be well bestowed for the purpose of leaving to such
intrigues a fair chance of success: the fleet, meanwhile, would be
arrived at Aphetæ after the dangers of the storm: we may thus venture
to read the conduct of Xerxes in a manner somewhat less childish than
it is depicted by Herodotus.

[161] Diodor. xi, 4.

[162] Herodot. vii, 174; viii, 29-32.

The Medes, whom Xerxes first ordered to the attack, animated as well
by the recollection of their ancient Asiatic supremacy as by the
desire of avenging the defeat of Marathon,[163] manifested great
personal bravery. The position was one in which bows and arrows were
of little avail: a close combat hand to hand was indispensable,
and in this the Greeks had every advantage of organization as well
as armor. Short spears, light wicker shields, and tunics, in the
assailants, were an imperfect match for the long spears, heavy and
spreading shields, steady ranks,[164] and practised fighting of the
defenders. Yet the bravest men of the Persian army pressed on from
behind, and having nothing but numbers in their favor, maintained
long this unequal combat, with great slaughter to themselves and
little loss to the Greeks. Though constantly repulsed, the attack was
as constantly renewed, for two successive days: the Greek troops
were sufficiently numerous to relieve each other when fatigued, since
the space was so narrow that few could contend at once; and even
the Immortals, or ten thousand choice Persian guards, and the other
choice troops of the army, when sent to the attack on the second day,
were driven back with the same disgrace and the same slaughter as the
rest. Xerxes surveyed this humiliating repulse from a lofty throne
expressly provided for him: “thrice (says the historian, with Homeric
vivacity) did he spring from his throne, in agony for his army.”[165]

[163] Diodor. xi, 6.

[164] Herodot. vii, 211; ix, 62, 63; Diodor. xi, 7: compare
Æschyl. Pers. 244.

[165] Herodot. vii, 212. Ἐν ταύτῃσι τῇσι προσόδοισι τῆς μάχης
λέγεται βασιλέα, θηεύμενον, τρὶς ἀναδραμεῖν ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου,
δείσαντα περὶ τῇ στρατίῃ. See Homer, Iliad, xx, 62; Æschyl. Pers.
472.

At the end of two days’ fighting no impression had been made, the
pass appeared impracticable, and the defence not less triumphant
than courageous,—when a Malian, named Ephialtês, revealed to Xerxes
the existence of the unfrequented mountain-path. This at least was
the man singled out by the general voice of Greece as the betrayer
of the fatal secret: after the final repulse of the Persians, he
fled his country for a time, and a reward was proclaimed by the
Amphiktyonic assembly for his head; having returned to his country
too soon, he was slain by a private enemy, whom the Lacedæmonians
honored as a patriot.[166] There were, however, other Greeks who
were also affirmed to have earned the favor of Xerxes by the same
valuable information; and very probably there may have been more than
one informant,—indeed, the Thessalians, at that time his guides, can
hardly have been ignorant of it. So little had the path been thought
of, however, that no one in the Persian army knew it to be already
occupied by the Phocians. At nightfall, Hydarnês with a detachment of
Persians was detached along the gorge of the river Asôpus, ascended
the path of Anopæa, through the woody region between the mountains
occupied by the Œtæans and those possessed by the Trachinians, and
found himself at daybreak near the summit, within sight of the
Phocian guard of one thousand men. In the stillness of daybreak,
the noise of his army trampling through the wood[167] aroused
the defenders; but the surprise was mutual, and Hydarnês in alarm
asked his guide whether these men also were Lacedæmonians. Having
ascertained the negative, he began the attack, and overwhelmed the
Phocians with a shower of arrows, so as to force them to abandon the
path and seek their own safety on a higher point of the mountain.
Anxious only for their own safety, they became unmindful of the
inestimable opening which they were placed to guard. Had the full
numerical strength of the Greeks been at Thermopylæ, instead of
staying behind for the festivals, they might have planted such
a force on the mountain-path as would have rendered it not less
impregnable than the pass beneath.

[166] Herodot. vii, 213, 214; Diodor. xi, 8.

Ktesias states that it was two powerful men of Trachis, Kalliadês
and Timaphernês, who disclosed to Xerxes the mountain-path
(Persica, c. 24).

[167] Herodot. vii, 217, 218. ἠώς τε δὴ διέφαινε—ἦν μὲν δὴ
νηνεμίη, ψόφου δὲ γενομένου πολλοῦ, etc.

I cannot refrain from transcribing a remark of Colonel Leake:
“The _stillness of the dawn_, which saved the Phocians from being
surprised, is very characteristic of the climate of Greece in
the season when the occurrence took place, and like many other
trifling circumstances occurring in the history of the Persian
invasion, is an interesting proof of the accuracy and veracity of
the historian.” (Travels in Northern Greece, vol. ii, c. x, p.
55.)

Hydarnês, not troubling himself to pursue the Phocians, followed the
descending portion of the mountain-path, shorter than the ascending,
and arrived in the rear of Thermopylæ not long after midday.[168] But
before he had yet completed his descent, the fatal truth had already
been made known to Leonidas, that the enemy were closing in upon him
behind. Scouts on the hills, and deserters from the Persian camp,
especially a Kymæan[169] named Tyrastiadas, had both come in with
the news: and even if such informants had been wanting, the prophet
Megistias, descended from the legendary seer Melampus, read the
approach of death in the gloomy aspect of the morning sacrifices. It
was evident that Thermopylæ could be no longer defended; but there
was ample time for the defenders to retire, and the detachment of
Leonidas were divided in opinion on the subject. The greater number
of them were inclined to abandon a position now become untenable,
and to reserve themselves for future occasions on which they might
effectively contribute to repel the invader. Nor is it to be doubted
that such was the natural impulse, both of brave soldiers and of
prudent officers, under the circumstances. But to Leonidas the idea
of retreat was intolerable. His own personal honor, together with
that of his Spartan companions and of Sparta herself,[170] forbade
him to think of yielding to the enemy the pass which he had been
sent to defend. The laws of his country required him to conquer or
die in the post assigned to him, whatever might be the superiority
of number on the part of the enemy:[171] moreover, we are told that
the Delphian oracle had declared that either Sparta itself, or a king
of Sparta, must fall a victim to the Persian arms. Had he retired,
he could hardly have escaped that voice of reproach which, in Greece
especially, always burst upon the general who failed: while his
voluntary devotion and death would not only silence every whisper of
calumny, but exalt him to the pinnacle of glory both as a man and as
a king, and set an example of chivalrous patriotism at the moment
when the Greek world most needed the lesson.

[168] Herodot. vii, 216, 217.

[169] Diodor. xi, 9.

[170] Herodot. vii, 219. ἐνθαῦτα ἐβουλεύοντο οἱ Ἕλληνες, καί
σφεων ἐσχίζοντο αἱ γνῶμαι.

[171] Herodot. vii, 104.

The three hundred Spartans under Leonidas were found fully equal to
this act of generous and devoted self-sacrifice. Perhaps he would
have wished to inspire the same sentiment to the whole detachment:
but when he found them indisposed, he at once ordered them to retire,
thus avoiding all unseemly reluctance and dissension:[172] the same
order was also given to the prophet Megistias, who however refused to
obey it and stayed, though he sent away his only son.[173] None of
the contingents remained with Leonidas except the Thespian and the
Theban. The former, under their general Demophilus, volunteered to
share the fate of the Spartans, and displayed even more than Spartan
heroism, since they were not under that species of moral constraint
which arises from the necessity of acting up to a preëstablished
fame and superiority. But retreat with them presented no prospect
better than the mere preservation of life, either in slavery or in
exile and misery; since Thespiæ was in Bœotia, sure to be overrun by
the invaders;[174] while the Peloponnesian contingents had behind
them the isthmus of Corinth, which they doubtless hoped still to
be able to defend. With respect to the Theban contingent, we are
much perplexed; for Herodotus tells us that they were detained by
Leonidas against their will as hostages, that they took as little
part as possible in the subsequent battle, and surrendered themselves
prisoners to Xerxes as soon as they could. Diodorus says that the
Thespians alone remained with the Spartans; and Pausanias, though
he mentions the eighty Mykenæans as having stayed along with the
Thespians (which is probably incorrect), says nothing about the
Thebans.[175] All things considered, it seems probable that the
Thebans remained, but remained by their own offer,—being citizens of
the anti-Persian party, as Diodorus represents them to have been, or
perhaps because it may have been hardly less dangerous for them to
retire with the Peloponnesians, than to remain, suspected as they
were of _medism_: but when the moment of actual crisis arrived, their
courage not standing so firm as that of the Spartans and Thespians,
they endeavored to save their lives by taking credit for _medism_,
and pretending to have been forcibly detained by Leonidas.

[172] Herodot. vii, 220. Ταύτῃ καὶ μᾶλλον τῇ γνώμῃ πλεῖστός εἰμι,
Λεωνίδην, ἐπεί τε ἤσθετο τοὺς συμμάχους ἐόντας ἀπροθύμους, καὶ
οὐκ ἐθέλοντας συνδιακινδυνεύειν, κελεῦσαί σφεας ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι·
αὐτῷ δὲ ἀπιέναι οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν· μένοντι δὲ αὐτοῦ κλέος μέγα
ἐλείπετο, καὶ ἡ Σπάρτης εὐδαιμονίη οὐκ ἐξηλείφετο.

Compare a similar act of honorable self-devotion, under less
conspicuous circumstances, of the Lacedæmonian commander
Anaxibius, when surprised by the Athenians under Iphikratês in
the territory of Abydus (Xenophon. Hellenic. iv, 8, 38). He and
twelve Lacedæmonian harmosts, all refused to think of safety by
flight. He said to his men, when resistance was hopeless, Ἄνδρες,
ἐμοὶ μὲν καλὸν ἔνθαδε ἀποθανεῖν· ὑμεῖς δὲ, πρὶν συμμίξαι τοῖς
πολεμίοις, σπεύδετε εἰς τὴν σωτηρίαν.

[173] Herodot. vii, 221. According to Plutarch, there were also
two persons belonging to the Herakleid lineage, whom Leonidas
desired to place in safety, and for that reason gave them a
despatch to carry home. They indignantly refused, and stayed to
perish in the fight (Plutarch. Herodot. Malign. p. 866).

[174] The subsequent distress of the surviving Thespians is
painfully illustrated by the fact, that in the battle of Platæa
in the following year, they had no heavy armor (Herodot. ix, 30).
After the final repulse of Xerxes, they were forced to recruit
their city by the admission of new citizens (Herodot. viii, 75).

[175] Herodot. vii, 222. Θηβαῖοι μὲν ἀέκοντες ἔμενον, καὶ
οὐ βουλόμενοι, κατεῖχε γάρ σφεας Λεωνίδης, ἐν ὁμήρων λόγῳ
ποιεύμενος. How could these Thebans serve as hostages? Against
what evil were they intended to guard Leonidas, or what
advantages could they confer upon him? Unwilling comrades on
such an occasion would be noway desirable. Plutarch (De Herodot.
Malign. p. 865) severely criticizes this statement of Herodotus,
and on very plausible grounds: among the many unjust criticisms
in his treatise, this is one of the few exceptions.

Compare Diodorus, xi, 9; and Pausan. x, 20, 1.

Of course the Thebans, taking part as they afterwards did
heartily with Xerxes, would have an interest in representing
that their contingent had done as little as possible against
him, and may have circulated the story that Leonidas detained
them as hostages. The politics of Thebes _before_ the battle
of Thermopylæ were essentially double-faced and equivocal: not
daring to take any open part against the Greeks before the
arrival of Xerxes.

The eighty Mykenæans, like the other Peloponnesians, had the
isthmus of Corinth behind them as a post which presented good
chances of defence.

The devoted band thus left with Leonidas at Thermopylæ consisted
of the three hundred Spartans, with a certain number of Helots
attending them, together with seven hundred Thespians and apparently
four hundred Thebans. If there had been before any Lacedæmonians,
not Spartans, present, they must have retired with the other
Peloponnesians. By previous concert with the guide, Ephialtês,
Xerxes delayed his attack upon them until near noon, when the troops
under Hydarnês might soon be expected in the rear. On this last
day, however, Leonidas, knowing that all which remained was to sell
the lives of his detachment dearly, did not confine himself to the
defensive,[176] but advanced into the wider space outside of the
pass; becoming the aggressor and driving before him the foremost of
the Persian host, many of whom perished as well by the spears of the
Greeks as in the neighboring sea and morass, and even trodden down
by their own numbers. It required all the efforts of the Persian
officers, assisted by threats and the plentiful use of the whip, to
force their men on to the fight. The Greeks fought with reckless
bravery and desperation against this superior host, until at length
their spears were broken, and they had no weapon left except their
swords. It was at this juncture that Leonidas himself was slain, and
around his body the battle became fiercer than ever: the Persians
exhausted all their efforts to possess themselves of it, but were
repulsed by the Greeks four several times, with the loss of many of
their chiefs, especially two brothers of Xerxes. Fatigued, exhausted,
diminished in number, and deprived of their most effective weapons,
the little band of defenders retired, with the body of their chief,
into the narrow strait behind the cross wall, where they sat all
together on a hillock, exposed to the attack of the main Persian
army on one side, and of the detachment of Hydarnês, which had
now completed its march, on the other. They were thus surrounded,
overwhelmed with missiles, and slain to a man; not losing courage
even to the last, but defending themselves with their remaining
daggers, with their unarmed hands, and even with their mouths.[177]

[176] The story of Diodorus (xi, 10) that Leonidas made an
attack upon the Persian camp during the night, and very nearly
penetrated tn the regal tent, from which Xerxes was obliged to
flee, suddenly, in order to save his life, while the Greeks,
after having caused immense slaughter in the camp, were at
length overpowered and slain,—is irreconcilable with Herodotus
and decidedly to be rejected. Justin, however (ii, 11), and
Plutarch (De Herodot. Malign. p. 866), follow it. The rhetoric
of Diodorus is not calculated to strengthen the evidence in its
favor. Plutarch had written, or intended to write, a biography of
Leonidas (De Herodot. Mal. ibid.); but it is not preserved.

[177] Herodot. vii, 225.

Thus perished Leonidas with his heroic comrades,—three hundred
Spartans and seven hundred Thespians. Amidst such equal heroism,
it seemed difficult to single out any individual as distinguished:
nevertheless, Herodotus mentions the Spartans Diênekês, Alpheus, and
Maron,—and the Thespian Dithyrambus,—as standing preëminent. The
reply ascribed to the first became renowned.[178] “The Persian host
(he was informed) is so prodigious that their arrows conceal the
sun.” “So much the better (he answered), we shall then fight them
in the shade.” Herodotus had asked and learned the name of every
individual among this memorable three hundred, and even six hundred
years afterwards, Pausanias could still read the names engraved on
a column at Sparta.[179] One alone among them—Aristodêmus—returned
home, having taken no part in the combat. He, together with Eurytus,
another soldier, had been absent from the detachment on leave, and
both were lying at Alpêni, suffering from a severe complaint in the
eyes. Eurytus, apprized that the fatal hour of the detachment was
come, determined not to survive it, asked for his armor, and desired
his attendant Helot to lead him to his place in the ranks; where
he fell gallantly fighting, while the Helot departed and survived.
Aristodêmus did not imitate this devotion of his sick comrade:
overpowered with physical suffering, he was carried to Sparta—but he
returned only to scorn and infamy among his fellow-citizens.[180]
He was denounced as “the coward Aristodêmus;” no one would speak or
communicate with him, or even grant him a light for his fire.[181]
After a year of such bitter disgrace, he was at length enabled to
retrieve his honor at the battle of Platæa, where he was slain, after
surpassing all his comrades in heroic and even reckless valor.

[178] Herodot. vii, 226.

[179] Herodot. vii, 224. ἐπυθόμην δὲ καὶ ἁπάντων τῶν τριακοσίων.
Pausanias, iii, 14, 1. Annual festivals, with a panegyrical
oration and gymnastic matches, were still celebrated even in
his time in honor of Leonidas, jointly with Pausanias, whose
subsequent treason tarnished his laurels acquired at Platæa.
It is remarkable, and not altogether creditable to Spartan
sentiment, that the two kings should have been made partners in
the same public honors.

[180] Herod. vii, 229. Ἀριστόδημον—λειποψυχέοντα
λειφθῆναι—ἀλγήσαντα ἀπονοστῆσαι ἐς Σπάρτην. The commentators
are hard upon Aristodêmus when they translate these epithets,
“animo deficientem, timidum, pusillanimum,” considering that
ἐλειποψύχησε is predicated by Thucydides (iv, 12) even respecting
the gallant Brasidas. Herodotus scarcely intends to imply
anything like pusillanimity, but rather the effect of extreme
physical suffering. It seems, however, that there were different
stories about the cause which had kept Aristodêmus out of the
battle.

The story of another soldier, named Pantitês, who having been
sent on a message by Leonidas into Thessaly, did not return in
time for the battle, and was so disgraced when he went back to
Sparta that he hanged himself,—given by Herodotus as a report, is
very little entitled to credit. It is not likely that Leonidas
would send an envoy into Thessaly, then occupied by the Persians:
moreover, the disgrace of Aristodêmus is particularly explained
by Herodotus by the difference between his conduct and that of
his comrade Eurytus: whereas Pantitês stood alone.

[181] See the story of the single Athenian citizen, who returned
home alone, after all his comrades had perished in an unfortunate
expedition to the island of Ægina. The widows of the slain
warriors crowded round him, each asking him what had become of
her husband, and finally put him to death by pricking with their
bodkins (Herodot. v, 87).

In the terrible battle of St. Jacob on the Birs, near Basle
(August, 1444), where fifteen hundred Swiss crossed the river and
attacked forty thousand French and Germans under the Dauphin of
France, against strong remonstrances from their commanders,—all
of them were slain, after deeds of unrivalled valor and great
loss to the enemy, except sixteen men, who receded from their
countrymen in crossing the river, thinking the enterprise
desperate. These sixteen men, on their return, were treated
with intolerable scorn and hardly escaped execution (Vogelin,
Geschichte der Schweizer Eidgenossenschaft, vol. i, ch. 5, p.
393).

Amidst the last moments of this gallant band, we turn with repugnance
to the desertion and surrender of the Thebans. They are said to have
taken part in the final battle, though only to save appearances and
under the pressure of necessity: but when the Spartans and Thespians,
exhausted and disarmed, retreated to die upon the little hillock
within the pass, the Thebans then separated themselves, approached
the enemy with outstretched hands, and entreated quarter. They now
loudly proclaimed that they were friends and subjects of the Great
King, and had come to Thermopylæ against their own consent; all which
was confirmed by the Thessalians in the Persian army. Though some few
were slain before this proceeding was understood by the Persians,
the rest were admitted to quarter; not without the signal disgrace,
however, of being branded with the regal mark as untrustworthy
slaves,—an indignity to which their commander, Leontiadês was
compelled to submit along with the rest. Such is the narrative which
Herodotus recounts, without any expression of mistrust or even
of doubt: Plutarch emphatically contradicts it, and even cites a
Bœotian author,[182] who affirms that Anaxarchus, not Leontiadês, was
commander of the Thebans at Thermopylæ. Without calling in question
the equivocal conduct and surrender of this Theban detachment, we
may reasonably dismiss the story of this ignominious branding, as
an invention of that strong anti-Theban feeling which prevailed in
Greece after the repulse of Xerxes.

[182] Herodot. vii, 233; Plutarch, Herodot. Malign. p. 867. The
Bœotian history of Aristophanês, cited by the latter, professed
to be founded in part upon memorials arranged according to
the sequence of magistrates and generals—ἐκ τῶν κατὰ ἄρχοντας
ὑπομνημάτων ἱστόρησε.

The wrath of that monarch, as he went over the field after the
close of the action, vented itself upon the corpse of the gallant
Leonidas, whose head he directed to be cut off and fixed on a cross.
But it was not wrath alone which filled his mind: he was farther
impressed with involuntary admiration of the little detachment which
had here opposed to him a resistance so unexpected and so nearly
invincible,—he now learned to be anxious respecting the resistance
which remained behind. “Demaratus (said he to the exiled Spartan king
at his side), thou art a good man: all thy predictions have turned
out true: now tell me, how many Lacedæmonians are there remaining,
and are they all such warriors as these fallen men?” “O king (replied
Demaratus), the total of the Lacedæmonians and of their towns is
great; in Sparta alone, there are eight thousand adult warriors, all
equal to those who have here fought; and the other Lacedæmonians,
though inferior to them, are yet excellent soldiers.” “Tell me
(rejoined Xerxes), what will be the least difficult way of conquering
such men?” Upon which Demaratus advised him to send a division of
his fleet to occupy the island of Kythêra, and from thence to make
war on the southern coast of Laconia, which would distract the
attention of Sparta, and prevent her from coöperating in any combined
scheme of defence against his land-force. Unless this were done,
the entire force of Peloponnesus would be assembled to maintain
the narrow isthmus of Corinth, where the Persian king would have
far more terrible battles to fight than anything which he had yet
witnessed.[183]

[183] Herodot. vii, 235.

Happily for the safety of Greece, Achæmenes, the brother of Xerxes,
interposed to dissuade the monarch from this prudent plan of action;
not without aspersions on the temper and motives of Demaratus, who,
he affirmed, like other Greeks, hated all power, and envied all
good fortune, above his own. The fleet, added he, after the damage
sustained by the recent storm, would bear no farther diminution of
number: and it was essential to keep the entire Persian force, on
land as well as on sea, in one undivided and coöperating mass.[184]

[184] Herodot. vii, 236.

A few such remarks were sufficient to revive in the monarch his
habitual sentiment of confidence in overpowering number: yet while
rejecting the advice of Demaratus, he emphatically repelled the
imputations against the good faith and sincere attachment of that
exiled prince.[185]

[185] Herodot. vii, 237. “The citizen (Xerxes is made to observe)
does indeed naturally envy another citizen more fortunate than
himself, and if asked for counsel, will keep back what he has
best in his mind, unless he be a man of very rare virtue. But a
foreign friend usually sympathizes heartily with the good fortune
of another foreigner, and will give him the best advice in his
power whenever he is asked.”

Meanwhile the days of battle at Thermopylæ had been not less actively
employed by the fleets at Aphetæ and Artemisium. It has already been
mentioned that the Greek ships, having abandoned their station at
the latter place and retired to Chalkis, were induced to return, by
the news that the Persian fleet had been nearly ruined by the recent
storm,—and that, on returning to Artemisium, the Grecian commanders
felt renewed alarm on seeing the enemy’s fleet, in spite of the
damage just sustained, still mustering in overwhelming number at the
opposite station of Aphetæ. Such was the effect of this spectacle,
and the impression of their own inferiority, that they again resolved
to retire without fighting, leaving the strait open and undefended.
Great consternation was caused by the news of their determination
among the inhabitants of Eubœa, who entreated Eurybiadês to maintain
his position for a few days, until they could have time to remove
their families and their property. But even such postponement was
thought unsafe, and refused: and he was on the point of giving
orders for retreat, when the Eubœans sent their envoy, Pelagon,
to Themistoklês, with the offer of thirty talents, on condition
that the fleet should keep its station and hazard an engagement in
defence of the island. Themistoklês employed the money adroitly and
successfully, giving five talents to Eurybiadês, with large presents
besides to the other leading chiefs: the most unmanageable among them
was the Corinthian Adeimantus,—who at first threatened to depart with
his own squadron alone, if the remaining Greeks were mad enough to
remain. His alarm was silenced, if not tranquillized, by a present of
three talents.[186]

[186] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 7; Herodot. viii, 5, 6.

However Plutarch may be scandalized at such inglorious revelations
preserved to us by Herodotus respecting the underhand agencies of
this memorable struggle, there is no reason to call in question
the bribery here described. But Themistoklês doubtless was only
tempted to do, and enabled to do, by means of the Eubœan money,
that which he would have wished and had probably tried to accomplish
without the money,—to bring on a naval engagement at Artemisium.
It was absolutely essential to the maintenance of Thermopylæ, and
to the general plan of defence, that the Eubœan strait should be
defended against the Persian fleet, nor could the Greeks expect a
more favorable position to fight in. We may reasonably presume that
Themistoklês, distinguished not less by daring than by sagacity, and
the great originator of maritime energies in his country, concurred
unwillingly in the projected abandonment of Artemisium: but his high
mental capacity did not exclude that pecuniary corruption which
rendered the presents of the Eubœans both admissible and welcome,—yet
still more welcome to him perhaps, as they supplied means of bringing
over the other opposing chiefs and the Spartan admiral.[187] It
was finally determined, therefore, to remain, and if necessary, to
hazard an engagement in the Eubœan strait: but at any rate to procure
for the inhabitants of the island a short interval to remove their
families. Had these Eubœans heeded the oracles, says Herodotus,[188]
they would have packed up and removed long before: for a text of
Bakis gave them express warning: but, having neglected the sacred
writings as unworthy of credit, they were now severely punished for
such presumption.

[187] The expression of Herodotus is somewhat remarkable:
Οὗτοί τε δὴ πληγέντες δώροισι (Eurybiadês, Adeimantus, etc.),
ἀναπεπεισμένοι ἦσαν, καὶ τοῖσι Εὐβοέεσι ἐκεχάριστο· αὐτός τε ὁ
Θεμιστοκλέης ἐκέρδῃνε, ἐλάνθανε δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ ἔχων.

[188] Herodot. viii, 20. Οἱ γὰρ Εὐβοέες παραχρησάμενοι τὸν
Βάκιδος χρησμὸν ὡς οὐδὲν λέγοντα, οὔτε τι ἐξεκομίσαντο οὐδὲν,
οὔτε προεσάξαντο, ὡς παρεσομένου σφι πολέμου· περιπετέα δὲ
ἐποιήσαντο σφίσι αὐτοῖσι τὰ πρήγματα. Βάκιδι γὰρ ὧδε ἔχει περὶ
τούτων ὁ χρησμός·

Φράζεο, βαρβαρόφωνον ὅταν ζυγὸν εἰς ἅλα βάλλῃ
Βύβλινον, Εὐβοίης ἀπέχειν πολυμηκάδας αἶγας.

Τούτοισι δὲ οὐδὲν τοῖσι ἔπεσι χρησαμένοισι ἐν τοῖσι τότε παρεοῦσί
τε καὶ προσδοκίμοισι κακοῖσι, παρῆν σφι συμφορῇ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὰ
μέγιστα.

Among the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, on the other hand, the feeling
prevalent was one of sanguine hope and confidence in their superior
numbers, forming a strong contrast with the discouragement of the
Greeks at Artemisium. Had they attacked the latter immediately, when
both fleets first saw each other from their opposite stations, they
would have gained an easy victory, for the fleet would have fled,
as the admiral was on the point of ordering, even without an attack.
But this was not sufficient for the Persians, who wished to cut off
every ship among their enemies even from flight and escape.[189]
Accordingly, they detached two hundred ships to circumnavigate the
island of Eubœa, and to sail up the Eubœan strait from the south,
in the rear of the Greeks,—and postponing their own attack in front
until this squadron should be in position to intercept the retreating
Greeks. But though the manœuvre was concealed by sending the squadron
round outside of the island of Skiathos, it became known immediately
among the Greeks, through a deserter,—Skyllias of Skionê. This man,
the best swimmer and diver of his time, and now engaged like other
Thracian Greeks in the Persian service, passed over to Artemisium,
and communicated to the Greek commanders both the particulars of
the late destructive storm, and the despatch of the intercepting
squadron.[190]

[189] Herodot. viii, 6. καὶ ἔμελλον δῆθεν ἐκφεύξεσθαι (οἱ
Ἕλληνες)· ἔδει δὲ μηδὲ πυρφόρον, τῷ ἐκείνων (Περσῶν) λόγῳ,
περιγενέσθαι.

[190] Herodot. viii, 7, 8. Wonderful stories were recounted
respecting the prowess of Skyllias as a diver.

It appears that his communications, respecting the effects of the
storm and the condition of the Persian fleet, somewhat reassured the
Greeks, who resolved during the ensuing night to sail from their
station at Artemisium for the purpose of surprising the detached
squadron of two hundred ships, and who even became bold enough, under
the inspirations of Themistoklês, to go out and offer battle to
the main fleet near Aphetæ.[191] Wanting to acquire some practical
experience, which neither leaders nor soldiers as yet possessed,
of the manner in which Phœnicians and others in the Persian fleet
handled and manœuvred their ships, they waited till a late hour of
the afternoon, when little daylight remained.[192] Their boldness in
thus advancing out, with inferior numbers and even inferior ships,
astonished the Persian admirals, and distressed the Ionians and other
subject Greeks who were serving them as unwilling auxiliaries:
to both it seemed that the victory of the Persian fleet, which
was speedily brought forth to battle, and was numerous enough to
encompass the Greeks, would be certain as well as complete. The Greek
ships were at first marshalled in a circle, with the sterns in the
interior, and presenting their prows in front at all points of the
circumference;[193] in this position, compressed into a narrow space,
they seemed to be awaiting the attack of the enemy, who formed a
larger circle around them: but on a second signal given, their ships
assumed the aggressive, rowed out from the inner circle in direct
impact against the hostile ships around, and took or disabled no less
than thirty of them: in one of which Philaon, brother of Gorgus,
despot of Salamis in Cyprus, was made prisoner. Such unexpected
forwardness at first disconcerted the Persians, who however rallied
and inflicted considerable damage and loss on the Greeks: but the
near approach of night put an end to the combat, and each fleet
retired to its former station,—the Persians to Aphetæ, the Greeks to
Artemisium.[194]

[191] Diodorus, xi, 12.

[192] Herodot. viii, 9. δείλην ὀψίην γινομένην τῆς ἡμέρης
φυλάξαντες, αὐτοὶ ἐπανέπλωον ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους, ἀπόπειραν αὐτῶν
ποιήσασθαι βουλόμενοι τῆς τε μάχης καὶ τοῦ διεκπλόου.

[193] Compare the description in Thucyd. ii, 84, of the naval
battle between the Athenian fleet under Phormio and the
Lacedæmonian fleet, where the ships of the latter are marshalled
in this same array.

[194] Herodot. viii, 11. πολλὸν παρὰ δόξαν
ἀγωνισάμενοι—ἑτεραλκέως ἀγωνιζομένους, etc.

The result of this first day’s combat, though indecisive in itself,
surprised both parties and did much to exalt the confidence of the
Greeks. But the events of the ensuing night did yet more. Another
tremendous storm was sent by the gods to aid them. Though it was the
middle of summer,—a season when rain rarely falls in the climate of
Greece,—the most violent wind, rain, and thunder, prevailed during
the whole night, blowing right on shore against the Persians at
Aphetæ, and thus but little troublesome to the Greeks on the opposite
side of the strait. The seamen of the Persian fleet, scarcely
recovered from the former storm at Sêpias Aktê, were almost driven
to despair by this repetition of the same peril: the more so when
they found the prows of their ships surrounded, and the play of
their oars impeded, by the dead bodies and the spars from the recent
battle, which the current drove towards their shore. If this storm
was injurious to the main fleet at Aphetæ, it proved the entire ruin
of the squadron detached to circumnavigate Eubœa, who, overtaken
by it near the dangerous eastern coast of that island, called the
Hollows of Eubœa, were driven upon the rocks and wrecked. The news
of this second conspiracy of the elements, or intervention of the
gods, against the schemes of the invaders, was highly encouraging
to the Greeks; and the seasonable arrival of fifty-three fresh
Athenian ships, who reinforced them the next day, raised them to a
still higher pitch of confidence. In the afternoon of the same day,
they sailed out against the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, and attacked
and destroyed some Kilikian ships even at their moorings; the fleet
having been too much damaged by the storm of the preceding night to
come out and fight.[195]

[195] Herodot. viii, 12, 13, 14; Diodor. xi, 12.

But the Persian admirals were not of a temper to endure such
insults,—still less to let their master hear of them. About noon
on the ensuing day, they sailed with their entire fleet near to
the Greek station at Artemisium, and formed themselves into a half
moon; while the Greeks kept near to the shore, so that they could
not be surrounded, nor could the Persians bring their entire fleet
into action; the ships running foul of each other, and not finding
space to attack. The battle raged fiercely all day, and with great
loss and damage on both sides: the Egyptians bore off the palm of
valor among the Persians, the Athenians among the Greeks. Though
the positive loss sustained by the Persians was by far the greater,
and though the Greeks, being near their own shore, became masters
of the dead bodies as well as of the disabled ships and floating
fragments,—still, they were themselves hurt and crippled in greater
proportion with reference to their inferior total: and the Athenian
vessels especially, foremost in the preceding combat, found one half
of their number out of condition to renew it.[196] The Egyptians
alone had captured five Grecian ships with their entire crews.

[196] Herodot. viii, 17, 18.

Under these circumstances, the Greek leaders,—and Themistoklês, as
it seems, among them,—determined that they could no longer venture
to hold the position of Artemisium, but must withdraw the naval
force farther into Greece:[197] though this was in fact a surrender
of the pass of Thermopylæ, and though the removal which the Eubœans
were hastening was still unfinished. These unfortunate men were
forced to be satisfied with the promise of Themistoklês to give
them convoy for their boats and their persons; abandoning their
sheep and cattle for the consumption of the fleet, as better than
leaving them to become booty for the enemy. While the Greeks were
thus employed in organizing their retreat, they received news which
rendered retreat doubly necessary. The Athenian Abrônychus, stationed
with his ship near Thermopylæ, in order to keep up communication
between the army and fleet, brought the disastrous intelligence
that Xerxes was already master of the pass, and that the division
of Leonidas was either destroyed or in flight. Upon this the fleet
abandoned Artemisium forthwith, and sailed up the Eubœan strait; the
Corinthian ships in the van, the Athenians bringing up the rear.
Themistoklês, conducting the latter, stayed long enough at the
various watering-stations and landing-places to inscribe on some
neighboring stones invitations to the Ionian contingents serving
under Xerxes: whereby the latter were conjured not to serve against
their fathers, but to desert, if possible,—or at least, to fight as
little and as backwardly as they could. Themistoklês hoped by this
stratagem perhaps to detach some of the Ionians from the Persian
side, or, at any rate, to render them objects of mistrust, and thus
to diminish their efficiency.[198] With no longer delay than was
requisite for such inscriptions, he followed the remaining fleet,
which sailed round the coast of Attica, not stopping until it reached
the island of Salamis.

[197] Herodot. viii, 18. δρησμὸν δὴ ἐβούλευον ἔσω ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

[198] Herodot. viii, 19, 21, 22; Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 9.

The news of the retreat of the Greek fleet was speedily conveyed
by a citizen of Histiæa to the Persians at Aphetæ, who at first
disbelieved it, and detained the messenger until they had sent to
ascertain the fact. On the next day, their fleet passed across to
the north of Eubœa, and became master of Histiæa and the neighboring
territory: from whence many of them, by permission and even
invitation of Xerxes, crossed over to Thermopylæ to survey the
field of battle and the dead. Respecting the number of the dead,
Xerxes is asserted to have deliberately imposed upon the spectators:
he buried all his own dead, except one thousand, whose bodies were
left out,—while the total number of Greeks who had perished at
Thermopylæ, four thousand in number, were all left exposed, and
in one heap, so as to create an impression that their loss had
been much more severe than their own. Moreover, the bodies of the
slain Helots were included in the heap, all of them passing for
Spartans or Thespians in the estimation of the spectators. We are
not surprised to hear, however, that this trick, gross and public
as it must have been, really deceived very few.[199] According to
the statement of Herodotus, twenty thousand men were slain on the
side of the Persians,—no unreasonable estimate, if we consider that
they wore little defensive armor, and that they were three days
fighting. The number of Grecian dead bodies is stated by the same
historian as four thousand: if this be correct, it must include a
considerable proportion of Helots, since there were no hoplites
present on the last day except the three hundred Spartans, the seven
hundred Thespians, and the four hundred Thebans. Some hoplites were
of course slain in the first two days’ battles, though apparently
not many. The number who originally came to the defence of the pass
seems to have been about seven thousand:[200] but the epigram,
composed shortly afterwards, and inscribed on the spot by order of
the Amphiktyonic assembly, transmitted to posterity the formal boast
that four thousand warriors “from Peloponnesus had here fought with
three hundred myriads or three million of enemies.”[201] Respecting
this alleged Persian total, some remarks have already been made: the
statement of four thousand warriors from Peloponnesus, must indicate
all those who originally marched out of that peninsula under
Leonidas. Yet the Amphiktyonic assembly, when they furnished words
to record this memorable exploit, ought not to have immortalized the
Peloponnesians apart from their extra-Peloponnesian comrades, of
merit fully equal,—especially the Thespians, who exhibited the same
heroic self-devotion as Leonidas and his Spartans, without having
been prepared for it by the same elaborate and iron discipline.
While this inscription was intended as a general commemoration of
the exploit, there was another near it, alike simple and impressive,
destined for the Spartan dead separately: “Stranger, tell the
Lacedæmonians, that we lie here, in obedience to their orders.” On
the hillock within the pass, where this devoted band received their
death-wounds, a monument was erected, with a marble lion in honor
of Leonidas; decorated, apparently, with an epigram by the poet
Simonides. That distinguished genius composed at least one ode, of
which nothing but a splendid fragment now remains, to celebrate the
glories of Thermopylæ; besides several epigrams, one of which was
consecrated to the prophet Megistias, “who, though well aware of the
fate coming upon him, would not desert the Spartan chiefs.”

[199] Herodot. viii, 24, 25. οὐ μὴν οὐδ’ ἐλάνθανε τοὺς
διαβεβηκότας Ξέρξης ταῦτα πρήξας περὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς τοὺς ἑωϋτοῦ·
καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ γελοῖον ἦν, etc.

[200] About the numbers of the Greeks at Thermopylæ, compare
Herodot. vii, 202; Diodorus, xi, 4; Pausanias, x, 20, 1; and
Manso’s Sparta, vol. ii, p. 308; Beylage 24th.

Isokratês talks about one thousand Spartans, with a few allies,
Panegyric, Or. iv, p. 59. He mentions also only sixty Athenian
ships of war at Artemisium: in fact, his numerical statements
deserve little attention.

[201] Herodot. vii, 228.

CHAPTER XLI.

BATTLE OF SALAMIS. — RETREAT OF XERXES.

The sentiment, alike durable and unanimous, with which the Greeks
of after-times looked back on the battle of Thermopylæ, and which
they have communicated to all subsequent readers, was that of just
admiration for the courage and patriotism of Leonidas and his band.
But among the contemporary Greeks that sentiment, though doubtless
sincerely felt, was by no means predominant: it was overpowered
by the more pressing emotions of disappointment and terror. So
confident were the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the defensibility
of Thermopylæ and Artemisium, that when the news of the disaster
reached them, not a single soldier had yet been put in motion: the
season of the festival games had passed, but no active step had yet
been taken.[202] Meanwhile the invading force, army and fleet, was
in its progress towards Attica and Peloponnesus, without the least
preparations,—and, what was still worse, without any combined and
concerted plan,—for defending the heart of Greece. The loss sustained
by Xerxes at Thermopylæ, insignificant in proportion to his vast
total, was more than compensated by the fresh Grecian auxiliaries
which he now acquired. Not merely the Malians, Lokrians, and
Dorians, but also the great mass of the Bœotians, with their chief
town Thebes, all except Thespiæ and Platæa, now joined him.[203]
Demaratus, his Spartan companion, moved forward to Thebes to renew
an ancient tie of hospitality with the Theban oligarchical leader,
Attagînus, while small garrisons were sent by Alexander of Macedon
to most of the Bœotian towns,[204] as well to protect them from
plunder as to insure their fidelity. The Thespians, on the other
hand, abandoned their city, and fled into Peloponnesus; while
the Platæans, who had been serving aboard the Athenian ships at
Artemisium,[205] were disembarked at Chalkis as the fleet retreated,
for the purpose of marching by land to their city, and removing their
families. Nor was it only the land-force of Xerxes which had been
thus strengthened; his fleet also had received some accessions from
Karystus in Eubœa, and from several of the Cyclades,—so that the
losses sustained by the storm at Sêpias and the fights at Artemisium,
if not wholly made up, were at least in part repaired, while the
fleet remained still prodigiously superior in number to that of the
Greeks.[206]

[202] Herodot. viii, 40, 71, 73.

[203] Herodot. viii, 66. Diodorus calls the battle of Thermopylæ
a _Kadmeian victory_ for Xerxes,—which is true only in the
letter, but not in the spirit: he doubtless lost a greater number
of men in the pass than the Greeks, but the advantage which he
gained was prodigious (Diodor. xi, 12); and Diodorus himself sets
forth the terror of the Greeks after the event (xi, 13-15).

[204] Plutarch, De Herodot. Malignit. p. 864; Herodot. viii, 34.

[205] Herodot. viii, 44, 50.

[206] Herodot. viii, 66.

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, near fifty years after
these events, the Corinthian envoys reminded Sparta that she had
allowed Xerxes time to arrive from the extremity of the earth at the
threshold of Peloponnesus, before she took any adequate precautions
against him: a reproach true almost to the letter.[207] It was only
when roused and terrified by the news of the death of Leonidas,
that the Lacedæmonians and the other Peloponnesians began to put
forth their full strength. But it was then too late to perform the
promise made to Athens, of taking up a position in Bœotia so as to
protect Attica. To defend the isthmus of Corinth was all that they
now thought of, and seemingly all that was now open to them: thither
they rushed with all their available population under the conduct
of Kleombrotus, king of Sparta (brother of Leonidas), and began to
draw fortifications across it, as well as to break up the Skironian
road from Megara to Corinth, with every mark of anxious energy.
The Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, Eleians, Corinthians, Sikyonians,
Epidaurians, Phliasians, Trœzenians, and Hermionians, were all
present here in full numbers; many myriads of men (bodies of ten
thousand each) working and bringing materials night and day.[208] As
a defence to themselves against attack by land, this was an excellent
position: they considered it as their last chance,[209] abandoning
all hope of successful resistance at sea. But they forgot that a
fortified isthmus was no protection even to themselves against the
navy of Xerxes,[210] while it professedly threw out not only Attica,
but also Megara and Ægina. And thus rose a new peril to Greece from
the loss of Thermopylæ: no other position could be found which, like
that memorable strait, comprehended and protected at once all the
separate cities. The disunion thus produced brought them within a
hair’s breadth of ruin.

[207] Thucyd. i, 69. τόν τε γὰρ Μῆδον αὐτοὶ ἴσμεν ἀπὸ περάτων
γῆς πρότερον ἐπὶ Πελοπόννησον ἐλθόντα, πρὶν τὰ παρ’ ὑμῶν ἀξίως
προαπαντῆσαι.

[208] Herodot. viii, 71. συνδραμόντες ἐκ τῶν πολίων.

[209] Herodot. viii, 74.

[210] Herodot. vii, 139.

If the causes of alarm were great for the Peloponnesians, yet more
desperate did the position of the Athenians appear. Expecting,
according to agreement, to find a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia ready
to sustain Leonidas, or at any rate to coöperate in the defence
of Attica, they had taken no measures to remove their families or
property: but they saw with indignant disappointment as well as
dismay, on retreating from Artemisium, that the conqueror was in full
march from Thermopylæ, that the road to Attica was open to him, and
that the Peloponnesians were absorbed exclusively in the defence of
their own isthmus and their own separate existence.[211] The fleet
from Artemisium had been directed to muster at the harbor of Trœzen,
there to await such reinforcements as could be got together: but the
Athenians entreated Eurybiadês to halt at Salamis, so as to allow
them a short time for consultation in the critical state of their
affairs, and to aid them in the transport of their families. While
Eurybiadês was thus staying at Salamis, several new ships which had
reached Trœzen came over to join him; and in this way Salamis became
for a time the naval station of the Greeks, without any deliberate
intention beforehand.[212]

[211] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 9. ἅμα μὲν ὀργὴ τῆς προδοσίας
εἶχε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἅμα δὲ δυσθυμία καὶ κατήφεια μεμονωμένους.

Herodot. viii, 40. δοκέοντες γὰρ εὑρήσειν Πελοποννησίους πανδημεὶ
ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίῃ ὑποκατημένους τὸν βάρβαρον, τῶν μὲν εὗρον οὐδὲν
ἐὸν, οἱ δὲ ἐπυνθάνοντο τὸν Ἰσθμὸν αὐτοὺς τειχέοντας ἐς τὴν
Πελοπόννησον, περὶ πλείστου δὲ ποιουμένους περιεῖναι, καὶ ταύτην
ἔχοντας ἐν φυλακῇ, τὰ τε ἄλλα ἀπιέναι.

Thucyd. i, 74. ὅτε γοῦν ἦμεν (we Athenians) ἔτι σῶοι, οὐ
παρεγένεσθε (Spartans).

Both Lysias (Oratio Funebr. c. 8) and Isokratês take pride in
the fact that the Athenians, in spite of being thus betrayed,
never thought of making separate terms for themselves with
Xerxes (Panegyric, Or. iv. p. 60). But there is no reason to
believe that Xerxes would have granted them separate terms: his
particular vengeance was directed against them. Isokratês has
confounded in his mind the conduct of the Athenians when they
refused the offers of Mardonius in the year following the battle
of Salamis, with their conduct before the battle of Salamis
against Xerxes.

[212] Herodot. viii, 40-42.

Meanwhile Themistoklês and the Athenian seamen landed at Phalêrum,
and made their mournful entry into Athens. Gloomy as the prospect
appeared, there was little room for difference of opinion,[213] and
still less room for delay. The authorities and the public assembly at
once issued a proclamation, enjoining every Athenian to remove his
family out of the country in the best way he could. We may conceive
the state of tumult and terror which followed on this unexpected
proclamation, when we reflect that it had to be circulated and acted
upon throughout all Attica, from Sunium to Orôpus, within the narrow
space of less than six days; for no longer interval elapsed before
Xerxes actually arrived at Athens, where indeed he might have arrived
even sooner.[214] The whole Grecian fleet was doubtless employed in
carrying out the helpless exiles; mostly to Trœzen, where a kind
reception and generous support were provided for them (the Trœzenian
population being seemingly semi-Ionic, and having ancient relations
of religion as well as of traffic with Athens),—but in part also to
Ægina: there were, however, many who could not, or would not, go
father than Salamis. Themistoklês impressed upon the sufferers that
they were only obeying the oracle, which had directed them to abandon
the city and to take refuge behind the wooden walls; and either
his policy, or the mental depression of the time, gave circulation
to other stories, intimating that even the divine inmates of the
acropolis were for a while deserting it. In the ancient temple of
Athênê Polias on that rock, there dwelt, or was believed to dwell,
as guardian to the sanctuary and familiar attendant of the goddess,
a sacred serpent, for whose nourishment a honey-cake was placed once
in the month. The honey-cake had been hitherto regularly consumed;
but at this fatal moment the priestess announced that it remained
untouched: the sacred guardian had thus set the example of quitting
the acropolis, and it behooved the citizens to follow the example,
confiding in the goddess herself for future return and restitution.
The migration of so many ancient men, women, and children, was a
scene of tears and misery inferior only to that which would have
ensued on the actual capture of the city.[215] Some few individuals,
too poor to hope for maintenance, or too old to care for life,
elsewhere,—confiding, moreover, in their own interpretation[216] of
the wooden wall which the Pythian priestess had pronounced to be
inexpugnable,—shut themselves up in the acropolis along with the
administrators of the temple, obstructing the entrance or western
front with wooden doors and palisades.[217] When we read how great
were the sufferings of the population of Attica near half a century
afterwards, compressed for refuge within the spacious fortifications
of Athens at the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian war,[218] we
may form some faint idea of the incalculably greater misery which
overwhelmed an emigrant population, hurrying, they knew not whither,
to escape the long arm of Xerxes. Little chance did there seem that
they would ever revisit their homes except as his slaves.

[213] Plato, Legg. iii, p. 699.

[214] Herodot. viii, 66, 67. There was, therefore, but little
time for the breaking up and carrying away of furniture, alluded
to by Thucydides, i, 18—διανοηθέντες ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν καὶ
~ἀνασκευασάμενοι~, etc.

[215] Herodot. viii, 41; Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. x.

In the years 1821 and 1822, during the struggle which preceded
the liberation of Greece, the Athenians were forced to leave
their country and seek refuge in Salamis three several times.
These incidents are sketched in a manner alike interesting and
instructive by Dr. Waddington, in his Visit to Greece (London,
1825), Letters, vi, vii, x. He states, p. 92, “Three times
have the Athenians emigrated in a body, and sought refuge from
the sabre among the houseless rocks of Salamis. Upon these
occasions, I am assured, that many have dwelt in caverns, and
many in miserable huts, constructed on the mountain-side by their
own feeble hands. Many have perished too, from exposure to an
intemperate climate; many, from diseases contracted through the
loathsomeness of their habitations; many from hunger and misery.
On the retreat of the Turks, the survivors returned to their
country. But to what a country did they return? To a land of
desolation and famine; and in fact, on the first reoccupation of
Athens, after the departure of Omer Brioni, several persons are
known to have subsisted for some time on grass, till a supply of
corn reached the Piræus from Syra and Hydra.”

A century and a half ago, also in the war between the Turks and
Venetians, the population of Attica was forced to emigrate to
Salamis, Ægina, and Corinth. M. Buchon observes, “Les troupes
Albanaises, envoyées en 1688 par les Turcs (in the war against
the Venetians) se jetèrent sur l’Attique, mettant tout à feu
et à sang. En 1688, les chroniques d’Athènes racontent que ses
malheureux habitants furent obligés de se refugier à Salamine, à
Egine, et à Corinthe, et que ce ne fut qu’après trois ans qu’ils
purent rentrer en partie dans leur ville et dans leurs champs.
Beaucoup des villages de l’Attique sont encore habités par les
déscendans de ces derniers envahisseurs, et avant la dernière
révolution, on n’y parloit que la langue albanaise: mais leur
physionomie diffère autant que leur langue de la physionomie de
la race Grecque.” (Buchon, La Grèce Continentale et la Morée.
Paris, 1843, ch. ii, p. 82.)

[216] Pausanias seems to consider these poor men somewhat
presumptuous for pretending to understand the oracle better than
Themistoklês,—Ἀθηναίων τοὺς πλέον τι ἐς τὸν χρησμὸν ἢ Θεμιστοκλῆς
εἰδέναι νομίζοντας (i, 18, 2).

[217] Herodot. viii, 50.

[218] Thucyd. ii, 16, 17.

In the midst of circumstances thus calamitous and threatening,
neither the warriors nor the leaders of Athens lost their energy,—arm
as well as mind was strung to the loftiest pitch of human resolution.
Political dissensions were suspended: Themistoklês proposed to the
people a decree, and obtained their sanction, inviting home all who
were under sentence of temporary banishment: moreover, he not only
included but even specially designated among them his own great
opponent Aristeidês, now in the third year of ostracism. Xanthippus
the accuser, and Kimon the son, of Miltiadês, were partners in the
same emigration: the latter, enrolled by his scale of fortune among
the horsemen of the state, was seen with his companions cheerfully
marching through the Kerameikus to dedicate their bridles in the
acropolis, and to bring away in exchange some of the sacred arms
there suspended, thus setting an example of ready service on
shipboard, instead of on horseback.[219] It was absolutely essential
to obtain supplies of money, partly for the aid of the poorer exiles,
but still more for the equipment of the fleet; there were no funds in
the public treasury,—but the Senate of Areopagus, then composed in
large proportion of men from the wealthier classes, put forth all its
public authority as well as its private contributions and example to
others,[220] and thus succeeded in raising the sum of eight drachms
for every soldier serving.

[219] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 10, 11; and Kimon, c. 5.

[220] Whether this be the incident which Aristotle (Politic. v,
3, 5) had in his mind, we cannot determine.

This timely help was indeed partly obtained by the inexhaustible
resource of Themistoklês, who, in the hurry of embarkation, either
discovered or pretended that the Gorgon’s head from the statue of
Athênê was lost, and directing upon this ground every man’s baggage
to be searched, rendered any treasures, which private citizens might
be carrying out, available to the public service.[221] By the most
strenuous efforts, these few important days were made to suffice for
removing the whole population of Attica,—those of military competence
to the fleet at Salamis,—the rest to some place of refuge,—together
with as much property as the case admitted. So complete was the
desertion of the country, that the host of Xerxes, when it became
master, could not seize and carry off more than five hundred
prisoners.[222] Moreover, the fleet itself, which had been brought
home from Artemisium partially disabled, was quickly repaired,
so that, by the time the Persian fleet arrived, it was again in
something like fighting condition.

[221] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. x.

[222] Herodot. ix, 99.

The combined fleet which had now got together at Salamis consisted
of three hundred and sixty-six ships,—a force far greater than at
Artemisium. Of these, no less than two hundred were Athenian; twenty
among which, however, were lent to the Chalkidians, and manned by
them. Forty Corinthian ships, thirty Æginetan, twenty Megarian,
sixteen Lacedæmonian, fifteen Sikyonian, ten Epidaurian, seven
from Ambrakia, and as many from Eretria, five from Trœzen, three
from Hermionê, and the same number from Leukas; two from Keos, two
from Styra, and one from Kythnos; four from Naxos, despatched as a
contingent to the Persian fleet, but brought by the choice of their
captains and seamen to Salamis;—all these triremes, together with
a small squadron of the inferior vessels called pentekonters, made
up the total. From the great Grecian cities in Italy there appeared
only one trireme, a volunteer, equipped and commanded by an eminent
citizen named Phayllus, thrice victor at the Pythian games.[223] The
entire fleet was thus a trifle larger than the combined force, three
hundred and fifty-eight ships, collected by the Asiatic Greeks at
Ladê, fifteen years earlier, during the Ionic revolt. We may doubt,
however, whether this total, borrowed from Herodotus, be not larger
than that which actually fought a little afterwards at the battle
of Salamis, and which Æschylus gives decidedly as consisting of
three hundred sail, in addition to ten prime and chosen ships. That
great poet, himself one of the combatants, and speaking in a drama
represented only seven years after the battle, is better authority on
the point even than Herodotus.[224]

[223] Herodot. viii, 43-48.

[224] Æschylus, Persæ, 347; Herodot. viii, 48; vi, 9; Pausanias,
i, 14, 4. The total which Herodotus announces is three hundred
and seventy-eight; but the items which he gives amount, when
summed up, only to three hundred and sixty-six. There seems
no way of reconciling this discrepancy except by some violent
change, which we are not warranted in making.

Ktesias represents that the numbers of the Persian war-ships
at Salamis were above one thousand, those of the Greeks seven
hundred (Persica, c. 26).

The Athenian orator in Thucydides (i, 74) calls the total of the
Grecian fleet at Salamis “nearly four hundred ships, and the
Athenian contingent somewhat less than _two parts_ of this total
(ναῦς μέν γε ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν).”

The Scholiast, with Poppo and most of the commentators on
this passage, treat τῶν δύο μοιρῶν as meaning unquestionably
_two parts out of three_: and if this be the sense, I should
agree with Dr. Arnold in considering the assertion as a mere
exaggeration of the orator, not at all carrying the authority of
Thucydides himself. But I cannot think that we are here driven
to such a necessity; for the construction of Didot and Göller,
though Dr. Arnold pronounces it “a most undoubted error,” appears
to me perfectly admissible. They maintain that αἱ δύο μοιραὶ does
not of necessity mean two parts _out of three_: in Thucydid.
i, 10, we find καίτοι Πελοποννήσου τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοιρὰς
νέμονται, where the words mean _two parts out of five_. Now in
the passage before us, we have ναῦς μέν γε ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας
ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν: and Didot and Göller contend, that
in the word τετρακοσίας is implied a quaternary division of the
whole number,—_four hundreds_ or _hundredth parts_: so that the
whole meaning would be—“To the aggregate _four hundreds_ of ships
we contributed something less than _two_.” The word τετρακοσίας,
equivalent to τέσσαρας ἑκατοντάδας, naturally includes the
general idea of τέσσαρας μοιράς: and this would bring the passage
into exact analogy with the one cited above,—τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο
μοιράς. With every respect to the judgment of Dr. Arnold on an
author whom he had so long studied, I cannot enter into the
grounds on which he has pronounced this interpretation of Didot
and Göller to be “an undoubted error.” It has the advantage of
bringing the assertion of the orator in Thucydides into harmony
with Herodotus, who states the Athenians to have furnished one
hundred and eighty ships at Salamis.

Wherever such harmony can be secured by an admissible
construction of existing words, it is an unquestionable
advantage, and ought to count as a reason in the case, if there
be a doubt between two admissible constructions. But on the
other hand, I protest against altering numerical statements in
one author, simply in order to bring him into accordance with
another, and without some substantive ground in the text itself.
Thus, for example, in this very passage of Thucydides, Bloomfield
and Poppo propose to alter τετρακοσίας into τριακοσίας, in
order that Thucydides may be in harmony with Æschylus and other
authors, though not with Herodotus; while Didot and Göller would
alter τριακοσίων into τετρακοσίων in Demosthenes de Coronâ (c.
70), in order that Demosthenes may be in harmony with Thucydides.
Such emendations appear to me inadmissible in principle: we are
not to force different witnesses into harmony by retouching their
statements.

Hardly was the fleet mustered at Salamis, and the Athenian
population removed, when Xerxes and his host overran the deserted
country, his fleet occupying the roadstead of Phalêrum with the
coast adjoining. His land-force had been put in motion under the
guidance of the Thessalians, two or three days after the battle of
Thermopylæ, and he was assured by some Arcadians who came to seek
service, that the Peloponnesians were, even at that moment, occupied
with the celebration of the Olympic games. “What prize does the
victor receive?” he asked. Upon the reply made, that the prize was
a wreath of the wild olive, Tritantæchmês, son of the monarch’s
uncle Artabanus, is said to have burst forth, notwithstanding the
displeasure both of the monarch himself and of the bystanders:
“Heavens, Mardonius, what manner of men are these against whom thou
hast brought us to fight! men who contend not for money, but for
honor!”[225] Whether this be a remark really delivered, or a dramatic
illustration imagined by some contemporary of Herodotus, it is not
the less interesting as bringing to view a characteristic of Hellenic
life, which contrasts not merely with the manners of contemporary
Orientals, but even with those of the earlier Greeks themselves
during the Homeric times.

[225] Herodot. viii, 26. Παπαὶ, Μαρδόνιε, κοίους ἐπ’ ἄνδρας
ἤγαγες μαχησομένους ἡμέας, οἳ οὐ περὶ χρημάτων τὸν ἀγῶνα
ποιεῦνται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἀρετῆς.

Among all the various Greeks between Thermopylæ and the borders
of Attica, there were none except the Phocians disposed to refuse
submission: and they refused only because the paramount influence of
their bitter enemies the Thessalians made them despair of obtaining
favorable terms.[226] Nor would they even listen to a proposition of
the Thessalians, who, boasting that it was in their power to guide
as they pleased the terrors of the Persian host, offered to insure
lenient treatment to the territory of Phocis, provided a sum of fifty
talents were paid to them.[227] The proposition being indignantly
refused, they conducted Xerxes through the little territory of Doris,
which _medized_ and escaped plunder, into the upper valley of the
Kephisus, among the towns of the inflexible Phocians. All of them
were found deserted; the inhabitants having previously escaped either
to the wide-spreading summit of Parnassus, called Tithorea, or even
still farther, across that mountain into the territory of the Ozolian
Lokrians. Ten or a dozen small Phocian towns, the most considerable
of which were Elateia and Hyampolis, were sacked and destroyed by
the invaders, nor was the holy temple and oracle of Apollo at Abæ
better treated than the rest: all its treasures were pillaged, and
it was then burnt. From Panopeus Xerxes detached a body of men to
plunder Delphi, marching with his main army through Bœotia, in which
country he found all the towns submissive and willing, except Thespiæ
and Platæa: both were deserted by their citizens, and both were now
burnt. From hence he conducted his army into the abandoned territory
of Attica, reaching without resistance the foot of the acropolis at
Athens.[228]

[226] Herodot. viii, 30.

[227] Herodot. viii, 28, 29.

[228] Herodot. viii, 32-34.

Very different was the fate of that division which he had detached
from Panopeus against Delphi: Apollo defended his temple here
more vigorously than at Abæ. The cupidity of the Persian king was
stimulated by accounts of the boundless wealth accumulated at Delphi,
especially the profuse donations of Crœsus. The Delphians, in the
extreme of alarm, while they sought safety for themselves on the
heights of Parnassus, and for their families by transport across the
gulf into Achaia, consulted the oracle whether they should carry
away or bury the sacred treasures. Apollo directed them to leave the
treasures untouched, saying that he was competent himself to take
care of his own property. Sixty Delphians alone ventured to remain,
together with Akêratus, the religious superior: but evidences of
superhuman aid soon appeared to encourage them. The sacred arms
suspended in the interior cell, which no mortal hand was ever
permitted to touch, were seen lying before the door of the temple;
and when the Persians, marching along the road called Schistê, up
that rugged path under the steep cliffs of Parnassus which conducts
to Delphi, had reached the temple of Athênê Pronœa,—on a sudden,
dreadful thunder was heard,—two vast mountain crags detached
themselves and rushed down with deafening noise among them, crushing
many to death,—the war-shout was also heard from the interior of
the temple of Athênê. Seized with a panic terror, the invaders
turned round and fled; pursued not only by the Delphians, but also,
as they themselves affirmed, by two armed warriors of superhuman
stature and destructive arm. The triumphant Delphians confirmed this
report, adding that the two auxiliaries were the heroes Phylakus and
Autonoüs, whose sacred precincts were close adjoining: and Herodotus
himself when he visited Delphi, saw in the sacred ground of Athênê
the identical masses of rock which had overwhelmed the Persians.[229]
Thus did the god repel these invaders from his Delphian sanctuary
and treasures, which remained inviolate until one hundred and thirty
years afterwards, when they were rifled by the sacrilegious hands of
the Phocian Philomêlus. On this occasion, as will be seen presently,
the real protectors of the treasures were the conquerors at Salamis
and Platæa.

[229] Herodot. viii, 38, 39; Diodor. xi, 14; Pausan. x, 8, 4.

Compare the account given in Pausanias (x, 23) of the subsequent
repulse of Brennus and the Gauls from Delphi: in his account, the
repulse is not so exclusively the work of the gods as in that of
Herodotus: there is a larger force of human combatants in defence
of the temple, though greatly assisted by divine intervention:
there is also loss on both sides. A similar descent of crags from
the summit is mentioned.

See for the description of the road by which the Persians
marched, and the extreme term of their progress, Ulrichs, Reisen
und Forschungen in Griechenland, ch. iv, p. 46; ch. x, p. 146.

Many great blocks of stone and cliff are still to be seen near
the spot, which have rolled down from the top, and which remind
the traveller of these passages.

The attack here described to have been made by order of Xerxes
upon the Delphian temple, seems not easy to reconcile with
the words of Mardonius, Herodot. ix, 42: still less can it be
reconciled with the statement of Plutarch (Numa, c. 9), who says
that the Delphian temple was burnt by the Medes.

Four months had elapsed since the departure from Asia when Xerxes
reached Athens, the last term of his advance. He brought with him
the members of the Peisistratid family, who doubtless thought their
restoration already certain,—and a few Athenian exiles attached to
their interest. Though the country was altogether deserted, the
handful of men collected in the acropolis ventured to defy him: nor
could all the persuasions of the Peisistratids, eager to preserve
the holy place from pillage, induce them to surrender.[230] The
Athenian acropolis,—a craggy rock rising abruptly about one hundred
and fifty feet, with a flat summit of about one thousand feet
long from east to west, by five hundred feet broad from north to
south,—had no practicable access except on the western side:[231]
moreover, in all parts where there seemed any possibility of climbing
up, it was defended by the ancient fortification called the Pelasgic
wall. Obliged to take the place by force, the Persian army was posted
around the northern and western sides, and commenced their operations
from the eminence immediately adjoining on the northwest, called
Areopagus:[232] from whence they bombarded, if we may venture upon
the expression, with hot missiles, the woodwork before the gates;
that is, they poured upon it multitudes of arrows with burning tow
attached to them. The wooden palisades and boarding presently took
fire and were consumed: but when the Persians tried to mount to the
assault by the western road leading up to the gate, the undaunted
little garrison still kept them at bay, having provided vast stones,
which they rolled down upon them in the ascent. For a time the Great
King seemed likely to be driven to the slow process of blockade; but
at length some adventurous men among the besiegers tried to scale the
precipitous rock before them on its northern side, hard by the temple
or chapel of Aglaurus, which lay nearly in front of the Persian
position, but behind the gates and the western ascent. Here the rock
was naturally so inaccessible, that it was altogether unguarded,
and seemingly even unfortified:[233] moreover, the attention of the
little garrison was all concentrated on the host which fronted the
gates. Hence the separate escalading party was enabled to accomplish
their object unobserved, and to reach the summit in the rear of the
garrison; who, deprived of their last hope, either cast themselves
headlong from the walls, or fled for safety to the inner temple.
The successful escaladers opened the gates to the entire Persian
host, and the whole acropolis was presently in their hands. Its
defenders were slain, its temples pillaged, and all its dwellings and
buildings, sacred as well as profane, consigned to the flames.[234]
The citadel of Athens fell into the hands of Xerxes by a surprise,
very much the same as that which had placed Sardis in those of
Cyrus.[235]

[230] Herodot. viii, 52.

[231] Pausanias, i, 22, 4; Kruse, Hellas, vol. ii, ch. vi, p.
76. Ernst Curtius (Die Akropolis von Athens, p. 5, Berlin,
1844) says that the plateau of the acropolis is rather less
than four hundred feet higher than the town: Fiedler states it
to be one hundred and seventy-eight fathoms, or one thousand
and sixty-eight feet above the level of the sea. (Reise durch
das Königreich Griechenland, i, p. 2); he gives the length and
breadth of the plateau in the same figures as Kruse, whose
statement I have copied in the text. In Colonel Leake’s valuable
Topography of Athens, I do not find any distinct statement
about the height of the acropolis. We must understand Kruse’s
statement, if he and Curtius are both correct, to refer only to
the precipitous impracticable portion of the whole rock.

[232] Athenian legend represented the Amazons as having taken
post on the Areopagus, and fortified it as a means of attacking
the acropolis,—ἀντεπύργωσαν (Æschyl. Eumenid. 638).

[233] Herodot. viii, 52, 53. ... ἔμπροσθε ὦν πρὸ τῆς ἀκροπόλιος,
ὄπισθε δὲ τῶν πύλεων καὶ τῆς ἀνόδου, τῇ δὴ οὔτε τις ἐφύλασσε,
οὔτ’ ἂν ἤλπισε μή κοτέ τις κατὰ ταῦτα ἀναβαίη ἀνθρώπων, ταύτῃ
ἀνέβησάν τινες κατὰ τὸ ἱρὸν τῆς Κέκροπος θυγατρὸς Ἀγλαύρου,
καίτοιπερ ἀποκρήμνου ἐόντος τοῦ χώρου.

That the Aglaurion was on the north side of the acropolis,
appears clearly made out; see Leake, Topography of Athens, ch.
v, p. 261; Kruse, Hellas, vol. ii, ch. vi, p. 119; Forchhammer,
Topographie Athens, pp. 365, 366; in Kieler Philologischen
Studien, 1841. Siebelis (in the Plan of Athens prefixed to his
edition of Pausanias, and in his note on Pausanias, i, 18, 2)
places the Aglaurion erroneously on the eastern side of the
acropolis.

The expressions ἔμπροσθε πρὸ τῆς ἀκροπόλιος appear to refer to
the position of the Persian army, who would naturally occupy the
northern and western fronts of the acropolis: since they reached
Athens from the north,—and the western side furnished the only
regular access. The hill called Areopagus would thus be nearly
in the centre of their position. Forchhammer explains these
expressions unsatisfactorily.

[234] Herodot. viii, 52, 53.

[235] Herodot. i, 84.

Thus was divine prophecy fulfilled: Attica passed entirely into
the hands of the Persians, and the conflagration of Sardis was
retaliated upon the home and citadel of its captors, as it also was
upon their sacred temple of Eleusis. Xerxes immediately despatched
to Susa intelligence of the fact, which is said to have excited
unmeasured demonstrations of joy, confuting, seemingly, the gloomy
predictions of his uncle Artabanus.[236] On the next day but one,
the Athenian exiles in his suite received his orders, or perhaps
obtained his permission, to go and offer sacrifice amidst the ruins
of the acropolis, and atone, if possible, for the desecration of the
ground: they discovered that the sacred olive-tree near the chapel
of Erechtheus, the special gift of the goddess Athênê, though burnt
to the ground by the recent flames, had already thrown out a fresh
shoot of one cubit long,—at least the piety of restored Athens
afterwards believed this encouraging portent,[237] as well as that
which was said to have been seen by Dikæus, an Athenian companion of
the Peisistratids, in the Thriasian plain. It was now the day set
apart for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries; and though in
this sorrowful year there was no celebration, nor any Athenians in
the territory, Dikæus still fancied that he beheld the dust and heard
the loud multitudinous chant, which was wont to accompany in ordinary
times the processional march from Athens to Eleusis. He would even
have revealed the fact to Xerxes himself, had not Demaratus deterred
him from doing so: but he as well as Herodotus construed it as
an evidence that the goddesses themselves were passing over from
Eleusis to help the Athenians at Salamis. But whatever may have been
received in after times, on that day certainly no man could believe
in the speedy resurrection of conquered Athens as a free city:
not even if he had witnessed the portent of the burnt olive-tree
suddenly sprouting afresh with preternatural vigor. So hopeless did
the circumstances of the Athenians then appear, not less to their
confederates assembled at Salamis than to the victorious Persians.

[236] Herodot. v, 102; viii, 53-99; ix, 65. ἔδεε γὰρ κατὰ τὸ
θεοπρόπιον πᾶσαν τὴν Ἀττικὴν τὴν ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ γενέσθαι ὑπὸ
Πέρσῃσι.

[237] Herodot. viii, 55-65.

About the time of the capture of the acropolis, the Persian fleet
also arrived safely in the bay of Phalêrum, reinforced by ships from
Karystus as well as from various islands of the Cyclades, so that
Herodotus reckons it to have been as strong as before the terrible
storm at Sêpias Aktê,—an estimate certainly not admissible.[238]

[238] Herodot. viii, 66. Colonel Leake observes upon this
statement (Athens and the Demi of Attica, App. vol. ii, p.
250), “_About one thousand ships_ is the greatest accuracy we
can pretend to, in stating the strength of the Persian fleet at
Salamis: and from these are to be deducted, in estimating the
number of ships engaged in the battle, those which were sent to
occupy the Megaric strait of Salamis, two hundred in number.”

The estimate of Colonel Leake appears somewhat lower than the
probable reality. Nor do I believe the statement of Diodorus,
that ships were detached to occupy the Megaric strait: see a note
shortly following.

Soon after their arrival, Xerxes himself descended to the shore
to inspect the fleet, as well as to take counsel with the various
naval leaders about the expediency of attacking the hostile fleet,
now so near him in the narrow strait between Salamis and the coasts
of Attica. He invited them all to take their seats in an assembly,
wherein the king of Sidon occupied the first place and the king of
Tyre the second. The question was put to each of them separately
by Mardonius, and when we learn that all pronounced in favor of
immediate fighting, we may be satisfied that the decided opinion of
Xerxes himself must have been well known to them beforehand. One
exception alone was found to this unanimity,—Artemisia, queen of
Halikarnassus in Karia; into whose mouth Herodotus puts a speech of
some length, deprecating all idea of fighting in the narrow strait
of Salamis,—predicting that if the land-force were moved forward to
attack Peloponnesus, the Peloponnesians in the fleet at Salamis would
return for the protection of their own homes, and thus the fleet
would disperse, the rather as there was little or no food in the
island,—and intimating, besides, unmeasured contempt for the efficacy
of the Persian fleet and seamen as compared with the Greek, as well
as for the subject contingents of Xerxes generally. That queen
Artemisia gave this prudent counsel, there is no reason to question;
and the historian of Halikarnassus may have had means of hearing
the grounds on which her opinion rested: but I find a difficulty in
believing that she can have publicly delivered any such estimate of
the maritime subjects of Persia,—an estimate not merely insulting
to all who heard it, but at the time not just, though it had come
to be nearer the truth at the time when Herodotus wrote,[239] and
though Artemisia herself may have lived to entertain the conviction
afterwards. Whatever may have been her reasons, the historian tells
us that friends as well as rivals were astonished at her rashness in
dissuading the monarch from a naval battle, and expected that she
would be put to death. But Xerxes heard the advice with perfect good
temper, and even esteemed the Karian queen the more highly: though he
resolved that the opinion of the majority, or his own opinion, should
be acted upon: and orders were accordingly issued for attacking the
next day,[240] while the land-force should move forward towards
Peloponnesus.

[239] The picture drawn in the Cyropædia of Xenophon represents
the subjects of Persia as spiritless and untrained to war
(ἀνάλκιδες καὶ ἀσύντακτοι) and even designedly kept so, forming a
contrast to the native Persians (Xenophon, Cyropæd. viii, 1, 45).

[240] Herodot. viii, 68, 69, 70.

Whilst on the shore of Phalêrum, an omnipotent will compelled seeming
unanimity and precluded all real deliberation,—great, indeed, was
the contrast presented by the neighboring Greek armament at Salamis,
among the members of which unmeasured dissension had been reigning.
It has already been stated that the Greek fleet had originally got
together at that island, not with any view of making it a naval
station, but simply in order to cover and assist the emigration of
the Athenians. This object being accomplished, and Xerxes being
already in Attica, Eurybiadês convoked the chiefs to consider what
position was the fittest for a naval engagement. Most of them,
especially those from Peloponnesus, were averse to remaining at
Salamis, and proposed that the fleet should be transferred to the
isthmus of Corinth, where it would be in immediate communication with
the Peloponnesian land-force, so that in case of defeat at sea, the
ships would find protection on shore, and the men would join in the
land service,—while if worsted in a naval action near Salamis, they
would be inclosed in an island from whence there were no hopes of
escape.[241] In the midst of the debate, a messenger arrived with
news of the capture and conflagration of Athens and her acropolis by
the Persians: and such was the terror produced by this intelligence,
that some of the chiefs, without even awaiting the conclusion of the
debate and the final vote, quitted the council forthwith, and began
to hoist sail, or prepare their rowers, for departure. The majority
came to a vote for removing to the Isthmus, but as night was
approaching, actual removal was deferred until the next morning.[242]

[241] Herodot. viii, 70.

[242] Herodot. viii. 49, 50, 56.

Now was felt the want of a position like that of Thermopylæ, which
had served as a protection to all the Greeks at once, so as to check
the growth of separate fears and interests. We can hardly wonder
that the Peloponnesian chiefs,—the Corinthian in particular, who
furnished so large a naval contingent, and within whose territory
the land-battle at the Isthmus seemed about to take place,—should
manifest such an obstinate reluctance to fight at Salamis, and should
insist on removing to a position where, in case of naval defeat,
they could assist, and be assisted by, their own soldiers on land.
On the other hand, Salamis was not only the most favorable position,
in consequence of its narrow strait, for the inferior numbers of the
Greeks, but could not be abandoned without breaking up the unity
of the allied fleet; since Megara and Ægina would thus be left
uncovered, and the contingents of each would immediately retire for
the defence of their own homes,—while the Athenians also, a large
portion of whose expatriated families were in Salamis and Ægina,
would be in like manner distracted from combined maritime efforts at
the Isthmus. If transferred to the latter place, probably not even
the Peloponnesians themselves would have remained in one body; for
the squadrons of Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, etc., each fearing
that the Persian fleet might make a descent on one or other of these
separate ports, would go home to repel such a contingency, in spite
of the efforts of Eurybiadês to keep them together. Hence the order
for quitting Salamis and repairing to the Isthmus was nothing less
than a sentence of extinction for all combined maritime defence; and
it thus became doubly abhorrent to all those who, like the Athenians,
Æginetans, and Megarians, were also led by their own separate safety
to cling to the defence of Salamis. In spite of all such opposition,
however, and in spite of the protest of Themistoklês, the obstinate
determination of the Peloponnesian leaders carried the vote for
retreat, and each of them went to his ship to prepare for it on the
following morning.

When Themistoklês returned to his ship, with the gloom of this
melancholy resolution full upon his mind, and with the necessity of
providing for removal of the expatriated Athenian families in the
island as well as for that of the squadron,—he found an Athenian
friend named Mnêsiphilus, who asked him what the synod of chiefs
had determined. Concerning this Mnêsiphilus, who is mentioned
generally as a sagacious practical politician, we unfortunately
have no particulars: but it must have been no common man whom fame
selected, truly or falsely, as the inspiring genius of Themistoklês.
On learning what had been resolved, Mnêsiphilus burst out into
remonstrance on the utter ruin which its execution would entail:
there would presently be neither any united fleet to fight, nor any
aggregate cause and country to fight for.[243] He vehemently urged
Themistoklês again to open the question, and to press by every means
in his power for a recall of the vote for retreat, as well as for a
resolution to stay and fight at Salamis. Themistoklês had already in
vain tried to enforce the same view: but disheartened as he was by
ill-success, the remonstrances of a respected friend struck him so
forcibly as to induce him to renew his efforts. He went instantly to
the ship of Eurybiadês, asked permission to speak with him, and being
invited aboard, reopened with him alone the whole subject of the past
discussion, enforcing his own views as emphatically as he could. In
this private communication, all the arguments bearing upon the case
were more unsparingly laid open than it had been possible to do in
an assembly of the chiefs, who would have been insulted if openly
told that they were likely to desert the fleet when once removed
from Salamis. Speaking thus freely and confidentially, and speaking
to Eurybiadês alone, Themistoklês was enabled to bring him partially
round, and even prevailed upon him to convene a fresh synod. So soon
as this synod had assembled, even before Eurybiadês had explained the
object and formally opened the discussion, Themistoklês addressed
himself to each of the chief’s separately, pouring forth at large his
fears and anxiety as to the abandonment of Salamis: insomuch that the
Corinthian Adeimantus rebuked him by saying: “Themistoklês, those
who in the public festival-matches rise up before the proper signal,
are scourged.” “True, (rejoined the Athenian), but those who lag
behind the signal win no crowns.”[244]

[243] Herodot. viii, 57. Οὖτοι ἄρα ἤν ἀπαίρωσι τὰς νῆας ἀπὸ
Σαλαμῖνος, περὶ οὐδεμίης ἔτι πατρίδος ναυμαχήσεις· κατὰ γὰρ πόλις
ἕκαστοι τρέψονται, etc. Compare vii, 139, and Thucyd. i, 73.

[244] Herodot. viii, 58, 59. The account given by Herodotus, of
these memorable debates which preceded the battle of Salamis, is
in the main distinct, instructive, and consistent. It is more
probable than the narrative of Diodorus (xi, 15, 16), who states
that Themistoklês succeeded in fully convincing both Eurybiadês
and the Peloponnesian chiefs of the propriety of fighting at
Salamis, but that, in spite of all their efforts, the armament
would not obey them, and insisted on going to the Isthmus. And
it deserves our esteem still more, if we contrast it with the
loose and careless accounts of Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos.
Plutarch (Themist. c. 11) describes the scene as if Eurybiadês
was the person who desired to restrain the forwardness and
oratory of Themistoklês, and with that view, first made to
him the observation given in my text out of Herodotus, which
Themistoklês followed up by the same answer,—next, lifted up his
stick to strike Themistoklês, upon which the latter addressed to
him the well-known observation,—“Strike, but hear me,” (Πάταξον
μὲν, ἄκουσον δέ.) Larcher expresses his surprise that Herodotus
_should have suppressed_ so impressive an anecdote as this
latter: but we may see plainly from the tenor of his narrative
that he cannot have heard it. In the narrative of Herodotus,
Themistoklês gives no offence to _Eurybiadês_, nor is the latter
at all displeased with him: nay, Eurybiadês is even brought
over by the persuasion of Themistoklês, and disposed to fall in
with his views. The persons whom Herodotus represents as angry
with Themistoklês, are the Peloponnesian chiefs, especially
Adeimantus the Corinthian. They are angry too, let it be added,
not without plausible reason: a formal vote has just been taken
by the majority, after full discussion; and here is the chief
of the minority, who persuades Eurybiadês to reopen the whole
debate: not an unreasonable cause for displeasure. Moreover, it
is _Adeimantus_, not _Eurybiadês_, who addresses to Themistoklês
the remark, that “persons who rise before the proper signal are
scourged:” and he makes the remark because Themistoklês goes
on speaking to, and trying to persuade, the various chiefs,
_before_ the business of the assembly has been formally opened.
Themistoklês draws upon himself the censure by sinning against
the forms of business, and talking before the proper time. But
Plutarch puts the remark into the mouth of Eurybiadês, without
any previous circumstance to justify it, and without any fitness.
His narrative represents Eurybiadês as the person who was anxious
both to transfer the ships to the Isthmus, and to prevent
Themistoklês from offering any opposition to it: though such an
attempt to check argumentative opposition from the commander of
the Athenian squadron is noway credible.

Dr. Blomfield (ad Æschyl. Pers. 728) imagines that the story
about Eurybiadês threatening Themistoklês with his stick, grew
out of the story as related in Herodotus, though to Herodotus
himself it was unknown. I cannot think that this is correct,
since the story will not fit on to the narrative of that
historian: it does not consist with his conception of the
relations between Eurybiadês and Themistoklês.

Eurybiadês then explained to the synod that doubts had arisen in his
mind, and that he called them together to reconsider the previous
resolve: upon which Themistoklês began the debate, and vehemently
enforced the necessity of fighting in the narrow sea of Salamis and
not in the open waters at the Isthmus,—as well as of preserving
Megara and Ægina: contending that a naval victory at Salamis would
be not less effective for the defence of Peloponnesus than if it
took place at the Isthmus, whereas, if the fleet were withdrawn to
the latter point, they would only draw the Persians after them. Nor
did he omit to add, that the Athenians had a prophecy assuring to
them victory in this, their own island. But his speech made little
impression on the Peloponnesian chiefs, who were even exasperated
at being again summoned to reopen a debate already concluded,—and
concluded in a way which they deemed essential to their safety. In
the bosom of the Corinthian Adeimantus, especially, this feeling
of anger burst all bounds. He sharply denounced the presumption of
Themistoklês, and bade him be silent as a man who had now no free
Grecian city to represent,—Athens being in the power of the enemy:
nay, he went so far as to contend that Eurybiadês had no right to
count the vote of Themistoklês, until the latter could produce some
free city as accrediting him to the synod. Such an attack, alike
ungenerous and insane, upon the leader of more than half of the whole
fleet, demonstrates the ungovernable impatience of the Corinthians
to carry away the fleet to their Isthmus: it provoked a bitter
retort against them from Themistoklês, who reminded them that while
he had around him two hundred well-manned ships, he could procure
for himself anywhere both city and territory as good or better than
Corinth. But he now saw clearly that it was hopeless to think of
enforcing his policy by argument, and that nothing would succeed
except the direct language of intimidation. Turning to Eurybiadês,
and addressing him personally, he said: “If thou wilt stay here, and
fight bravely here, all will turn out well: but if thou wilt not
stay, thou wilt bring Hellas to ruin.[245] For with us, all our means
of war are contained in our ships. Be thou yet persuaded by me. If
not, we Athenians shall migrate with our families on board, just as
we are, to Siris in Italy, which is ours from of old, and which the
prophecies announce that we are one day to colonize. You chiefs then,
when bereft of allies like us, will hereafter recollect what I am now
saying.”

[245] Herodot. viii, 61, 62. Σὺ εἰ μενέεις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μένων ἔσεαι
ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀνατρέψεις τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

All the best commentators treat this as an elliptical
phrase,—some such words as σώσεις τὴν Ἑλλάδα or καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι,
being understood after ἀγαθός. I adopt their construction, not
without doubts whether it be the true one.

Eurybiadês had before been nearly convinced by the impressive
pleading of Themistoklês. But this last downright menace clenched
his determination, and probably struck dumb even the Corinthian and
Peloponnesian opponents: for it was but too plain, that without
the Athenians the fleet was powerless. He did not however put
the question again to vote, but took upon himself to rescind the
previous resolution and to issue orders for staying at Salamis to
fight. In this order all acquiesced, willing or unwilling;[246] the
succeeding dawn saw them preparing for fight instead of for retreat,
and invoking the protection and companionship of the Æakid heroes
of Salamis,—Telamon and Ajax: they even sent a trireme to Ægina to
implore Æakus himself and the remaining Æakids. It seems to have been
on this same day, also, that the resolution of fighting at Salamis
was taken by Xerxes, whose fleet was seen in motion, towards the
close of the day, preparing for attack the next morning.

[246] Herodot. viii, 64. Οὕτω μὲν οἱ περὶ Σαλαμῖνα, ἔπεσι
ἀκροβολισάμενοι, ἐπεί τε Εὐρυβιάδῃ ἔδοξε, αὐτοῦ παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς
ναυμαχήσοντες.

But the Peloponnesians, though not venturing to disobey the orders of
the Spartan admiral, still retained unabated their former fears and
reluctance, which began again after a short interval to prevail over
the formidable menace of Themistoklês, and were further strengthened
by the advices from the Isthmus. The messengers from that quarter
depicted the trepidation and affright of their absent brethren
while constructing their cross wall at that point, to resist the
impending land invasion. Why were _they_ not there also, to join
hands and to help in the defence,—even if worsted at sea,—at least
on land, instead of wasting their efforts in defence of Attica,
already in the hands of the enemy? Such were the complaints which
passed from man to man, with many a bitter exclamation against the
insanity of Eurybiadês: at length the common feeling broke out in
public and mutinous manifestation, and a fresh synod of the chiefs
was demanded and convoked.[247] Here the same angry debate, and the
same irreconcilable difference, was again renewed; the Peloponnesian
chiefs clamoring for immediate departure, while the Athenians,
Æginetans,[248] and Megarians, were equally urgent in favor of
staying to fight. It was evident to Themistoklês that the majority
of votes among the chiefs would be against him, in spite of the
orders of Eurybiadês; and the disastrous crisis, destined to deprive
Greece of all united maritime defence, appeared imminent,—when he
resorted to one last stratagem to meet the desperate emergency, by
rendering flight impossible. Contriving a pretext for stealing away
from the synod, he despatched a trusty messenger across the strait
with a secret communication to the Persian generals. Sikinnus his
slave,—seemingly an Asiatic Greek,[249] who understood Persian,
and had perhaps been sold during the late Ionic revolt, but whose
superior qualities are marked by the fact that he had the care and
teaching of the children of his master,—was instructed to acquaint
them privately, in the name of Themistoklês, who was represented as
wishing success at heart to the Persians, that the Greek fleet was
not only in the utmost alarm, meditating immediate flight, but that
the various portions of it were in such violent dissension, that
they were more likely to fight against each other than against any
common enemy. A splendid opportunity, it was added, was thus opened
to the Persians, if they chose to avail themselves of it without
delay, first, to inclose and prevent their flight, and then to attack
a disunited body, many of whom would, when the combat began, openly
espouse the Persian cause.[250]

[247] Herodot. viii, 74. ἕως μὲν δὴ αὐτῶν ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὶ παρίστατο,
θώυμα ποιεύμενοι τὴν Εὐρυβιάδεω ἀβουλίην· τέλος δὲ, ἐξεῤῥάγη ἐς
τὸ μέσον, σύλλογός τε δὴ ἐγίνετο, καὶ πολλὰ ἐλέγετο περὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν, etc. Compare Plutarch, Themist. c. 12.

[248] Lykurgus (cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. 185) numbers the
Æginetans among those who were anxious to escape from Salamis
during the night, and were only prevented from doing so by the
stratagem of Themistoklês. This is a great mistake, as indeed
these orators are perpetually misconceiving the facts of their
past history. The Æginetans had an interest not less strong than
the Athenians in keeping the fleet together and fighting at
Salamis.

[249] Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 12) calls Sikinnus a _Persian by
birth_, which cannot be true.

[250] Herodot. viii, 75.

Such was the important communication despatched by Themistoklês
across the narrow strait, only a quarter of a mile in breadth at the
narrowest part, which divides Salamis from the neighboring continent
on which the enemy were posted. It was delivered with so much
address as to produce the exact impression which he intended, and
the glorious success which followed caused it to pass for a splendid
stratagem: had defeat ensued, his name would have been covered with
infamy. What surprises us the most is, that after having reaped
signal honor from it in the eyes of the Greeks, as a stratagem,
he lived to take credit for it, during the exile of his latter
days,[251] as a capital service rendered to the Persian monarch:
nor is it improbable, when we reflect upon the desperate condition
of Grecian affairs at the moment, that such facility of double
interpretation was in part his inducement for sending the message.

[251] Thucydid. i, 137. It is curious to contrast this with
Æschylus, Persæ, 351, _seq._ See also Herodot. viii, 109, 110.

Isokratês might well remark about the ultimate rewards given by
the Persians to Themistoklês,—Θεμιστοκλέα δ’, ὃς ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος
αὐτοὺς κατεναυμάχησε, τῶν μεγίστων δωρέων ἠξίωσαν (Panegyric, Or.
iv, p. 74),—though that orator speaks as if he knew nothing about
the stratagem by which Themistoklês compelled the Greeks to fight
at Salamis against their will. See the same Oration, c. 27, p. 61.

It appears to have been delivered to Xerxes shortly after he had
issued his orders for fighting on the next morning: and he entered so
greedily into the scheme, as to direct his generals to close up the
strait of Salamis on both sides during the night,[252] to the north
as well as to the south of the town of Salamis, at the risk of their
heads if any opening were left for the Greeks to escape. The station
of the numerous Persian fleet was along the coast of Attica,—its
head-quarters were in the bay of Phalêrum, but doubtless parts of
it would occupy those three natural harbors, as yet unimproved by
art, which belonged to the deme of Peiræus,—and would perhaps extend
besides to other portions of the western coast southward of Phalêrum:
while the Greek fleet was in the harbor of the town called Salamis,
in the portion of the island facing mount Ægaleos, in Attica.
During the night,[253] a portion of the Persian fleet, sailing from
Peiræus northward along the western coast of Attica, closed round
to the north of the town and harbor of Salamis, so as to shut up
the northern issue from the strait on the side of Eleusis: while
another portion blocked up the other issue between Peiræus and the
southeastern corner of the island, landing a detachment of troops on
the desert island of Psyttaleia, near to that corner.[254] These
measures were all taken during the night, to prevent the anticipated
flight of the Greeks, and then to attack them in the narrow strait
close on their own harbor the next morning.

[252] Æschylus, Persæ, 370.

Herodotus does not mention this threat to the generals, nor does
he even notice the personal interference of Xerxes in any way,
so far as regards the night-movement of the Persian fleet. He
treats the communication of Sikinnus as having been made to the
Persian generals, and the night-movement as undertaken by them.
The statement of the contemporary poet seems the more probable of
the two: but he omits, as might be expected, all notice of the
perilous dissensions in the Greek camp.

[253] Diodorus (xi, 17) states that the Egyptian squadron in
the fleet of Xerxes was detached to block up the outlet between
Salamis and the Megarid; that is, to sail round the southwestern
corner of the island to the northwestern strait. Where the
northwestern corner of the island is separated by a narrow
strait from Megara, near the spot where the fort of Budorum was
afterwards situated, during the Peloponnesian war.

Herodotus mentions nothing of this movement, and his account
evidently implies that the Greek fleet was inclosed to the north
of the town of Salamis, the Persian right wing having got between
that town and Eleusis. The movement announced by Diodorus appears
to me unnecessary and improbable. If the Egyptian squadron had
been placed there, they would have been far indeed removed from
the scene of the action, but we may see that Herodotus believed
them to have taken actual part in the battle along with the rest
(viii, 100).

[254] Herodot. viii, 76. Τοῖσι δὲ ὡς πιστὰ ἐγίνετο τὰ ἀγγελθέντα,
τοῦτο μὲν, ἐς τὴν νησίδα τὴν Ψυττάλειαν, μεταξὺ Σαλαμῖνός τε
κειμένην καὶ τῆς ἠπείρου, πολλοὺς τῶν Περσέων ἀπεβίβασαν· τοῦτο
δὲ, ἐπειδὴ ἐγίνοντο μέσαι νύκτες, ἀνῆγον μὲν τὸ ἀπ’ ἑσπέρης κέρας
κυκλούμενοι πρὸς τὴν Σαλαμῖνα· ἀνῆγον δὲ οἱ ἀμφὶ τὴν Κέον τε καὶ
τὴν Κυνόσουραν τεταγμένοι, κατεῖχόν τε μέχρι Μουνυχίης πάντα τὸν
πορθμὸν τῇσι νηϋσί.

He had previously stated Phalêrum as the main station of the
Persian fleet; not necessarily meaning that the whole of it was
there. The passage which I have just transcribed intimated what
the Persians did to accomplish their purpose of surrounding
the Greeks in the harbor of Salamis and the first part of it,
wherein he speaks of the western (more properly northwestern)
wing, presents no extraordinary difficulty, though we do not
know how far the western wing extended before the movement was
commenced. Probably it extended to the harbor of Peiræus, and
began from thence its night-movement along the Attic coast to get
beyond the town of Salamis. But the second part of the passage
is not easy to comprehend, where he states that, “those who were
stationed about Keos and Kynosura also moved, and beset with
their ships the whole strait as far as Munychia.” What places
are Keos and Kynosura, and where were they situated? The only
known places of those names, are the island of Keos, not far
south of cape Sunium in Attica,—and the promontory Kynosura, on
the northeastern coast of Attica, immediately north of the bay
of Marathon. It seems hardly possible to suppose that Herodotus
meant this latter promontory, which would be too distant to
render the movement which he describes at all practicable: even
the island of Keos is somewhat open to the same objection, though
not in so great a degree, of being too distant. Hence Barthélemy,
Kruse, Bähr, and Dr. Thirlwall, apply the names Keos and Kynosura
to two promontories (the southernmost and the southeasternmost)
of the island of Salamis, and Kiepert has realized their idea in
his newly published maps. But in the first place, no authority
is produced for giving these names to two promontories in the
island, and the critics only do it because they say it is
necessary to secure a reasonable meaning to this passage of
Herodotus. In the next place, if we admit their supposition, we
must suppose that, _before this night-movement commenced_, the
Persian fleet was already stationed in part of _the island of
Salamis_: which appears to me highly improbable. Whatever station
that fleet occupied before the night-movement, we may be very
sure that it was not upon an island then possessed by the enemy:
it was somewhere on the coast of Attica: and the names Keos and
Kynosura must belong to some unknown points in _Attica_, not
in Salamis. I cannot therefore adopt the supposition of these
critics, though on the other hand Larcher is not satisfactory
in his attempt to remove the objections which apply to the
supposition of Keos and Kynosura as commonly understood. It is
difficult in this case to reconcile the statement of Herodotus
with geographical considerations, and I rather suspect that on
this occasion the historian has been himself misled by too great
a desire to find the oracle of Bakis truly fulfilled. It is from
Bakis that he copies the name Kynosura (viii, 77).

Meanwhile, that angry controversy among the Grecian chiefs, in the
midst of which Themistoklês had sent over his secret envoy, continued
without abatement and without decision. It was the interest of the
Athenian general to prolong the debate, and to prevent any concluding
vote until the effect of his stratagem should have rendered retreat
impossible: nor was prolongation difficult in a case so critical,
where the majority of chiefs was on one side and that of naval
force on the other,—especially as Eurybiadês himself was favorable
to the view of Themistoklês. Accordingly, the debate was still
unfinished at nightfall, and either continued all night, or was
adjourned to an hour before daybreak on the following morning, when
an incident, interesting as well as important, gave to it a new
turn. The ostracized Aristeidês arrived at Salamis from Ægina. Since
the revocation of his sentence, proposed by Themistoklês himself,
he had had no opportunity of revisiting Athens, and he now for the
first time rejoined his countrymen in their exile at Salamis; not
uninformed of the dissensions raging, and of the impatience of the
Peloponnesians to retire to the Isthmus. He was the first to bring
the news that such retirement had become impracticable from the
position of the Persian fleet, which his own vessel, in coming from
Ægina, had only eluded under favor of night. He caused Themistoklês
to be invited out from the assembled synod of chiefs, and after a
generous exordium, wherein he expressed his hope that their rivalry
would for the future be only a competition in doing good to their
common country, apprized him that the new movement of the Persians
excluded all hope of now reaching the Isthmus and rendered farther
debate useless. Themistoklês expressed his joy at the intelligence,
and communicated his own secret message whereby he had himself
brought the movement about, in order that the Peloponnesian chiefs
might be forced to fight at Salamis, even against their own consent.
He moreover desired Aristeidês to go himself into the synod, and
communicate the news: for if it came from the lips of Themistoklês,
the Peloponnesians would treat it as a fabrication. So obstinate
indeed was their incredulity, that they refused to accept it as truth
even on the assertion of Aristeidês: nor was it until the arrival of
a Tenian vessel, deserting from the Persian fleet, that they at last
brought themselves to credit the actual posture of affairs and the
entire impossibility of retreat. Once satisfied of this fact, they
prepared themselves at dawn for the impending battle.[255]

[255] Herodot. viii, 79, 80.

Herodotus states, doubtless correctly, that Aristeidês,
immediately after he had made the communication to the synod,
went away, not pretending to take part in the debate: Plutarch
represents him as present, and as taking part in it (Aristeidês,
c. 9). According to Plutarch, Themistoklês desires Aristeidês
to assist him in persuading Eurybiadês: according to Herodotus,
Eurybiadês was already persuaded: it was the Peloponnesian chiefs
who stood out.

The details of Herodotus will be found throughout both more
credible and more consistent than those of Plutarch and the later
writers.

Having caused his land-force to be drawn up along the shore opposite
to Salamis, Xerxes had erected for himself a lofty seat, or throne,
upon one of the projecting declivities of mount Ægaleos, near the
Herakleion and immediately overhanging the sea,[256]—from whence he
could plainly review all the phases of the combat and the conduct
of his subject troops. He was persuaded himself that they had not
done their best at Artemisium, in consequence of his absence, and
that his presence would inspire them with fresh valor: moreover, his
royal scribes stood ready by his side to take the names both of the
brave and of the backward combatants. On the right wing of his fleet,
which approached Salamis on the side of Eleusis, and was opposed to
the Athenians on the Grecian left,—were placed the Phenicians and
Egyptians; on his left wing the Ionians,[257]—approaching from the
side of Peiræus, and opposed to the Lacedæmonians, Æginetans, and
Megarians. The seamen of the Persian fleet, however, had been on
shipboard all night, in making that movement which had brought them
into their actual position: while the Greek seamen now began without
previous fatigue, fresh from the animated harangues of Themistoklês
and the other leaders: moreover, just as they were getting on board,
they were joined by the triremes which had been sent to Ægina to
bring to their aid Æakus, with the other Æakid heroes. Honored with
this precious heroic aid, which tended so much to raise the spirits
of the Greeks, the Æginetan trireme now arrived just in time to take
her post in the line, having eluded pursuit from the intervening
enemy.[258]

[256] Æschylus, Pers. 473; Herodot. viii, 90. The throne with
silver feet, upon which Xerxes had sat, was long preserved
in the acropolis of Athens,—having been left at his retreat.
Harpokration, Ἀργυρόπους δίφρος.

A writer, to whom Plutarch refers,—Akestodôrus,—affirmed that
the seat of Xerxes was erected, not under mount Ægaleos, but
much further to the northwest, on the borders of Attica and
the Megarid, under the mountains called Kerata (Plutarch,
Themistoklês, 13). If this writer was acquainted with the
topography of Attica, we must suppose him to have ascribed an
astonishingly long sight to Xerxes: but we may probably take the
assertion as a sample of that carelessness in geography which
marks so many ancient writers. Ktesias recognizes the Ἡρακλεῖον
(Persica, c. 26)

[257] Herodot. viii, 85; Diodor. xi, 16.

[258] Herodot. viii, 83; Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 13;
Aristeidês, c. 9; Pelopidas, c. 21). Plutarch tells a story
out of Phanias respecting an incident in the moment before
the action, which it is pleasing to find sufficient ground
for rejecting. Themistoklês, with the prophet Euphrantidês,
was offering sacrifice by the side of the admiral’s galley,
when three beautiful youths, nephews of Xerxes, were brought
in prisoners. As the fire was just then blazing brilliantly,
and sneezing was heard from the right, the prophet enjoined
Themistoklês to offer these three prisoners as a propitiatory
offering to Dionysus Omêstês: which the clamor of the bystanders
compelled him to do against his will. This is what Plutarch
states in his life of Themistoklês; in his life of Aristeidês, he
affirms that these youths were brought prisoners from Psyttaleia,
when Aristeidês attacked _it at the beginning of the action_.
Now Aristeidês did not attack Psyttaleia until the naval combat
was nearly over, so that no prisoners can have been brought from
thence at the commencement of the action: there could therefore
have been no Persian prisoners to sacrifice, and the story may be
dismissed as a fiction.

The Greeks rowed forward from the shore to attack with the usual
pæan, or war-shout, which was confidently returned by the Persians;
and the latter were the most forward of the two to begin the fight:
for the Greek seamen, on gradually nearing the enemy, became at first
disposed to hesitate,—and even backed water for a space, so that
some of them touched ground on their own shore: until the retrograde
movement was arrested by a supernatural feminine figure hovering
over them, who exclaimed with a voice that rang through the whole
fleet,—“Ye worthies, how much farther are ye going to back water?”
The very circulation of this fable attests the dubious courage of the
Greeks at the commencement of the battle.[259] The brave Athenian
captains Ameinias and Lykomêdês (the former, brother of the poet
Æschylus) were the first to obey either the feminine voice or the
inspirations of their own ardor: though according to the version
current at Ægina, it was the Æginetan ship, the carrier of the Æakid
heroes, which first set this honorable example.[260] The Naxian
Demokritus was celebrated by Simonides as the third ship in action.
Ameinias, darting forth from the line, charged with the beak of his
ship full against a Phenician, and the two became entangled so that
he could not again get clear: other ships came in aid on both sides,
and the action thus became general. Herodotus, with his usual candor,
tells us that he could procure few details about the action, except
as to what concerned Artemisia, the queen of his own city: so that we
know hardly anything beyond the general facts. But it appears that,
with the exception of the Ionic Greeks, many of whom—apparently a
greater number than Herodotus likes to acknowledge—were lukewarm, and
some even averse;[261] the subjects of Xerxes conducted themselves
generally with great bravery: Phenicians, Cyprians, Kilikians,
Egyptians, vied with the Persians and Medes serving as soldiers on
shipboard, in trying to satisfy the exigent monarch who sat on shore
watching their behavior. Their signal defeat was not owing to any
want of courage,—but, first, to the narrow space which rendered their
superior number a hindrance rather than a benefit: next, to their
want of orderly line and discipline as compared with the Greeks:
thirdly, to the fact that, when once fortune seemed to turn against
them, they had no fidelity or reciprocal attachment, and each ally
was willing to sacrifice or even to run down others, in order to
effect his own escape. Their numbers and absence of concert threw
them into confusion, and caused them to run foul of each other:
those in the front could not recede, nor could those in the rear
advance:[262] the oar-blades were broken by collision,—the steersmen
lost control of their ships, and could no longer adjust the ship’s
course so as to strike that direct blow with the beak which was
essential in ancient warfare. After some time of combat, the whole
Persian fleet was driven back and became thoroughly unmanageable, so
that the issue was no longer doubtful, and nothing remained except
the efforts of individual bravery to protract the struggle. While
the Athenian squadron on the left, which had the greatest resistance
to surmount, broke up and drove before them the Persian right, the
Æginetans on the right intercepted the flight of the fugitives to
Phalêrum:[263] Demokritus, the Naxian captain, was said to have
captured five ships of the Persians with his own single trireme. The
chief admiral, Ariabignês, brother of Xerxes, attacked at once by two
Athenian triremes, fell, gallantly trying to board one of them, and
the number of distinguished Persians and Medes who shared his fate
was great:[264] the more so, as few of them knew how to swim, while
among the Greek seamen who were cast into the sea, the greater number
were swimmers, and had the friendly shore of Salamis near at hand.
It appears that the Phenician seamen of the fleet threw the blame
of defeat upon the Ionic Greeks; and some of them, driven ashore
during the heat of the battle under the immediate throne of Xerxes,
excused themselves by denouncing the others as traitors. The heads
of the Ionic leaders might have been endangered if the monarch had
not seen with his own eyes an act of surprising gallantry by one of
their number. An Ionic trireme from Samothrace charged and disabled
an Attic trireme, but was herself almost immediately run down by
an Æginetan. The Samothracian crew, as their vessel lay disabled
on the water, made such excellent use of their missile weapons,
that they cleared the decks of the Æginetan, sprung on board, and
became masters of her. This exploit, passing under the eyes of
Xerxes himself, induced him to treat the Phenicians as dastardly
calumniators, and to direct their heads to be cut off: his wrath and
vexation, Herodotus tells us, were boundless, and he scarcely knew on
whom to vent it.[265]

[259] Herodot. viii, 84. φανεῖσαν δὲ διακελεύσασθαι, ὥστε καὶ
ἅπαν ἀκοῦσαι τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων στρατόπεδον, ὀνειδίσασαν πρότερον
τάδε· Ὦ δαιμόνιοι, μέχρι κόσου ἔτι πρύμναν ἀνακρούεσθε;

Æschylus (Pers. 396-415) describes finely the war-shout of the
Greeks and the response of the Persians: for very good reasons,
he does not notice the incipient backwardness of the Greeks,
which Herodotus brings before us.

The war-shout, here described by Æschylus, a warrior actually
engaged, shows us the difference between a naval combat of
that day and the improved tactics of the Athenians fifty years
afterwards, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Phormio
especially enjoins on his men the necessity of silence (Thucyd.
ii, 89).

[260] Simonides, Epigram 138, Bergk; Plutarch, De Herodot.
Malignitate, c. 36.

According to Plutarch (Themist. 12) and Diodorus (xi, 17), it was
the Persian admiral’s ship which was first charged and captured:
if the fact had been so, Æschylus would probably have specified
it.

[261] Herodot. viii, 85; Diodor. xi, 16. Æschylus, in the Persæ,
though he gives a long list of the names of those who fought
against Athens, does not make any allusion to the Ionic or to
any other Greeks as having formed part of the catalogue. See
Blomfield ad Æschyl. Pers. 42. Such silence easily admits of
explanation: yet it affords an additional reason for believing
that the persons so admitted did not fight very heartily.

[262] Herodot. viii, 86; Diodor. xi, 17. The testimony of the
former, both to the courage manifested by the Persian fleet, and
to their entire want of order and system, is decisive, as well as
to the effect of the personal overlooking of Xerxes.

[263] Simonides, Epigr. 138, Bergk.

[264] The many names of Persian chiefs whom Æschylus reports as
having been slain, are probably for the most part inventions
of his own, to please the ears of his audience. See Blomfield,
Præfat. ad Æschyl. Pers. p. xii.

[265] Herodot. viii, 90.

In this disastrous battle itself, as in the debate before the battle,
the conduct of Artemisia of Halikarnassus was such as to give him
full satisfaction. It appears that this queen maintained her full
part in the battle until the disorder had become irretrievable; she
then sought to escape, pursued by the Athenian trierarch, Ameinias,
but found her progress obstructed by the number of fugitive or
embarrassed comrades before her. In this dilemma, she preserved
herself from pursuit by attacking one of her own comrades; she
charged the trireme of the Karian prince, Damasithymus, of Kalyndus,
ran it down and sunk it, so that the prince with all his crew
perished. Had Ameinias been aware that the vessel which he was
following was that of Artemisia, nothing would have induced him to
relax in the pursuit,—for the Athenian captains were all indignant
at the idea of a female invader assailing their city;[266] but
knowing her ship only as one among the enemy, and seeing her thus
charge and destroy another enemy’s ship, he concluded her to be a
deserter, turned his pursuit elsewhere, and suffered her to escape.
At the same time, it so happened that the destruction of the ship of
Damasithymus happened under the eyes of Xerxes and of the persons
around him on shore, who recognized the ship of Artemisia, but
supposed the ship destroyed to be a Greek. Accordingly they remarked
to him, “Master, seest thou not how well Artemisia fights, and how
she has just sunk an enemy’s ship?” Assured that it was really her
deed, Xerxes is said to have replied, “My men have become women; my
women, men.” Thus was Artemisia not only preserved, but exalted to
a higher place in the esteem of Xerxes by the destruction of one of
his own ships,—among the crew of which not a man survived to tell the
true story.[267]

[266] Compare the indignant language of Demosthenês a century and
a quarter afterwards, respecting the second Artemisia, queen of
Karia, as the enemy of Athens,—ὑμεῖς δ’ ὄντες Ἀθηναῖοι βάρβαρον
ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ταῦτα γυναῖκα, φοβηθήσεσθε (Demosthenes, De
Rhodior. Libertat. c. x, p. 197).

[267] Herodot. viii, 87, 88, 93. The story given here by
Herodotus respecting the stratagem whereby Artemisia escaped,
seems sufficiently probable; and he may have heard it from
fellow-citizens of his own who were aboard her vessel. Though
Plutarch accuses him of extravagant disposition to compliment
this queen, it is evident that he does not himself like the
story, nor consider it to be a compliment; for he himself
insinuates a doubt: “I do not know whether she ran down the
Kalyndian ship intentionally, or came accidentally into collision
with it.” Since the shock was so destructive that the Kalyndian
ship was completely run down and sunk, so that every man of her
crew perished, we may be pretty sure that it was intentional; and
the historian merely suggests a possible hypothesis to palliate
an act of great treachery. Though the story of the sinking of the
Kalyndian ship has the air of truth, however, we cannot say the
same about the observation of Xerxes, and the notice which he is
reported to have taken of the act: all this reads like nothing
but romance.

We have to regret (as Plutarch observes, De Malign. Herodot. p.
873) that Herodotus tells us so much less about others than about
Artemisia; but he doubtless _heard_ more about her than about
the rest, and perhaps his own relatives may have been among her
contingent.

Of the total loss of either fleet, Herodotus gives us no estimate;
but Diodorus states the number of ships destroyed on the Grecian side
as forty, on the Persian side as two hundred; independent of those
which were made prisoners with all their crews. To the Persian loss
is to be added, the destruction of all those troops whom they had
landed before the battle in the island of Psyttaleia: as soon as the
Persian fleet was put to flight, Aristeidês carried over some Grecian
hoplites to that island, overpowered the enemy, and put them to death
to a man. This loss appears to have been much deplored, as they were
choice troops; in great proportion, the native Persian guards.[268]

[268] Herodot. viii, 95; Plutarch, Aristid. c. 9; Æschyl. Pers.
454-470; Diodor. xii, 19.

Great and capital as the victory was, there yet remained after it a
sufficient portion of the Persian fleet to maintain even maritime
war vigorously, not to mention the powerful land-force, as yet
unshaken. And the Greeks themselves, immediately after they had
collected in their island, as well as could be done, the fragments
of shipping and the dead bodies, made themselves ready for a second
engagement.[269] But they were relieved from this necessity by the
pusillanimity[270] of the invading monarch, in whom the defeat had
occasioned a sudden revulsion from contemptuous confidence, not only
to rage and disappointment, but to the extreme of alarm for his own
personal safety. He was possessed with a feeling of mingled wrath and
mistrust against his naval force, which consisted entirely of subject
nations,—Phenicians, Egyptians, Kilikians, Cyprians, Pamphylians,
Ionic Greeks, etc., with a few Persians and Medes serving on board,
in a capacity probably not well suited to them. None of these
subjects had any interest in the success of the invasion, or any
other motive for service except fear, while the sympathies of the
Ionic Greeks were even decidedly against it. Xerxes now came to
suspect the fidelity, or undervalue the courage, of all these naval
subjects;[271] he fancied that they could make no resistance to the
Greek fleet, and dreaded lest the latter should sail forthwith to the
Hellespont, so as to break down the bridge and intercept his personal
retreat; for, upon the maintenance of that bridge he conceived his
own safety to turn, not less than that of his father Darius, when
retreating from Scythia, upon the preservation of the bridge over the
Danube.[272] Against the Phenicians, from whom he had expected most,
his rage broke out in such fierce threats, that they stole away from
the fleet in the night, and departed homeward.[273] Such a capital
desertion made future naval struggle still more hopeless, and Xerxes,
though at first breathing revenge, and talking about a vast mole or
bridge to be thrown across the strait to Salamis, speedily ended by
giving orders to the whole fleet to leave Phalêrum in the night,—not
without disembarking, however, the best soldiers who served on
board.[274] They were to make straight for the Hellespont, and there
to guard the bridge against his arrival.[275]

[269] Herodot. viii, 96.

[270] The victories of the Greeks over the Persians were
materially aided by the personal timidity of Xerxes, and of
Darius Codomannus at Issus and Arbela (Arrian, ii, 11, 6; iii,
14, 3).

[271] See this feeling especially in the language of Mardonius
to Xerxes (Herodot. viii, 100), as well as in that put into the
mouth of Artemisia by the historian (viii, 68), which indicates
the general conception of the historian himself, derived from the
various information which reached him.

[272] Herodot. vii, 10.

[273] This important fact is not stated by Herodotus: but it is
distinctly given in Diodorus, xi, 19. It seems probable enough.

If the tragedy of Phrynichus, entitled _Phœnissæ_, had been
preserved, we should have known more about the position and
behavior of the Phenician contingent in this invasion. It was
represented at Athens only three years after the battle of
Salamis, in B. C. 477 or 476, with Themistoklês as choregus, four
years earlier than the Persæ of Æschylus, which was affirmed
by Glaukus to have been (παραπεποιῆσθαι) altered from it. The
Chorus in the Phœnissæ consisted of Phenician women, possibly the
widows of those Phenicians whom Xerxes had caused to be beheaded
after the battle (Herodot. viii, 90, as Dr. Blomfield supposes,
Præf. ad Æsch. Pers. p. ix), or only of Phenicians absent on the
expedition. The fragments remaining of this tragedy, which gained
the prize, are too scanty to sustain any conjectures as to its
scheme or details (see Welcker Griechische Tragœd. vol. i, p. 26;
and Droysen, Phrynichos, Æschylos, und die Trilogie, pp. 4-6).

[274] Herodot. ix, 32.

[275] Herodot. viii, 97-107. Such was the terror of these
retreating seamen, that they are said to have mistaken the
projecting cliffs of Cape Zôstêr (about half-way between Peiræus
and Sunium) for ships, and redoubled the haste of their flight
as if an enemy were after them,—a story which we can treat as
nothing better than silly exaggeration in the Athenian informants
of Herodotus.

Ktesias, Pers. c. xxvi; Strabo, ix, p. 395; the two latter
talk about the intention to carry a mole across from Attica to
Salamis, as if it had been conceived _before_ the battle.

This resolution was prompted by Mardonius, who saw the real terror
which beset his master, and read therein sufficient evidence of
danger to himself. When Xerxes despatched to Susa intelligence of
his disastrous overthrow, the feeling at home was not simply that of
violent grief for the calamity, and fear for the personal safety of
the monarch,—it was farther imbittered by anger against Mardonius,
as the instigator of this ruinous enterprise. That general knew full
well that there was no safety for him[276] in returning to Persia
with the shame of failure on his head: it was better for him to take
upon himself the chance of subduing Greece, which he had good hopes
of being yet able to do,—and to advise the return of Xerxes himself
to a safe and easy residence in Asia. Such counsel was eminently
palatable to the present alarm of the monarch, while it opened to
Mardonius himself a fresh chance not only of safety, but of increased
power and glory. Accordingly, he began to reassure his master, by
representing that the recent blow was after all not serious,—that
it had only fallen upon the inferior part of his force, and upon
worthless foreign slaves, like Phenicians, Egyptians, etc., while the
native Persian troops yet remained unconquered and unconquerable,
fully adequate to execute the monarch’s revenge upon Hellas;—that
Xerxes might now very well retire with the bulk of his army if he
were disposed, and that he, Mardonius, would pledge himself to
complete the conquest, at the head of three hundred thousand chosen
troops. This proposition afforded at the same time consolation
for the monarch’s wounded vanity, and safety for his person: his
confidential Persians, and Artemisia herself, on being consulted,
approved of the step. The latter had acquired his confidence by the
dissuasive advice which she had given before the recent deplorable
engagement, and she had every motive now to encourage a proposition
indicating solicitude for his person, as well as relieving herself
from the obligation of farther service. “If Mardonius desires to
remain (she remarked, contemptuously[277]), by all means let him
have the troops: should he succeed, thou wilt be the gainer: should
he even perish, the loss of some of thy slaves is trifling, so long
as thou remainest safe, and thy house in power. Thou hast already
accomplished the purpose of thy expedition, in burning Athens.”
Xerxes, while adopting this counsel, and directing the return of his
fleet, showed his satisfaction with the Halikarnassian queen, by
intrusting her with some of his children, directing her to transport
them to Ephesus.

[276] Compare Herodot. vii, 10.

[277] Herodot. viii, 101, 102.

The Greeks at Salamis learned with surprise and joy the departure
of the hostile fleet from the bay of Phalêrum, and immediately put
themselves in pursuit; following as far as the island of Andros
without success. Themistoklês and the Athenians are even said to
have been anxious to push on forthwith to the Hellespont, and there
break down the bridge of boats, in order to prevent the escape of
Xerxes,—had they not been restrained by the caution of Eurybiadês and
the Peloponnesians, who represented that it was dangerous to detain
the Persian monarch in the heart of Greece. Themistoklês readily
suffered himself to be persuaded, and contributed much to divert his
countrymen from the idea; while he at the same time sent the faithful
Sikinnus a second time to Xerxes, with the intimation that he,
Themistoklês, had restrained the impatience of the Greeks to proceed
without delay and burn the Hellespontine bridge,—and that he had
thus, from personal friendship to the monarch, secured for him a safe
retreat.[278] Though this is the story related by Herodotus, we can
hardly believe that, with the great Persian land-force in the heart
of Attica, there could have been any serious idea of so distant an
operation as that of attacking the bridge at the Hellespont. It seems
more probable that Themistoklês fabricated the intention, with a view
of frightening Xerxes away, as well as of establishing a personal
claim upon his gratitude in reserve for future contingences.

[278] Herodot. viii, 109, 110; Thucyd. i, 137. The words
ἢν ψευδῶς προσεποιήσατο may probably be understood in a
sense somewhat larger than that which they naturally bear
in Thucydidês. In point of fact, not only was it false that
Themistoklês was the person who dissuaded the Greeks from going
to the Hellespont, but it was also false that the Greeks had ever
any serious intention of going there. Compare Cornelius Nepos,
Themistokl. c. 5.

Such crafty manœuvres and long-sighted calculations of possibility,
seem extraordinary: but the facts are sufficiently attested,—since
Themistoklês lived to claim as well as to receive fulfilment of the
obligation thus conferred,—and though extraordinary, they will not
appear inexplicable, if we reflect, first, that the Persian game,
even now, after the defeat of Salamis, was not only not desperate,
but might perfectly well have succeeded, if it had been played
with reasonable prudence: next, that there existed in the mind of
this eminent man an almost unparalleled combination of splendid
patriotism, long-sighted cunning, and selfish rapacity. Themistoklês
knew better than any one else that the cause of Greece had appeared
utterly desperate, only a few hours before the late battle: moreover,
a clever man, tainted with such constant guilt, might naturally
calculate on being one day detected and punished, even if the Greeks
proved successful.

He now employed the fleet among the islands of the Cyclades, for the
purpose of levying fines upon them as a punishment for adherence to
the Persian. He first laid siege to Andros, telling the inhabitants
that he came to demand their money, bringing with him two great
gods,—Persuasion and Necessity. To which the Andrians replied, that
“Athens was a great city, and blest with excellent gods: but that
_they_ were miserably poor, and that there were two unkind gods who
always stayed with them and would never quit the island,—Poverty
and Helplessness.[279] In these gods the Andrians put their trust,
refusing to deliver the money required; for the power of Athens could
never overcome their inability.” While the fleet was engaged in
contending against the Andrians with their sad protecting deities,
Themistoklês sent round to various other cities, demanding from them
private sums of money on condition of securing them from attack.
From Karystus, Paros, and other places, he thus extorted bribes for
himself apart from the other generals,[280] but it appears that
Andros was found unproductive, and after no very long absence, the
fleet was brought back to Salamis.[281]

[279] Herodot. viii, 111. ἐπεὶ Ἀνδρίους γε εἶναι γεωπείνας ἐς τὰ
μέγιστα ἀνήκοντας, καὶ θεοὺς δύο ἀχρήστους οὐκ ἐκλείπειν σφέων
τὴν νῆσον, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ φιλοχωρέειν—Πενίην τε καὶ Ἀμηχανίην.

Compare Alkæus, Fragm. 90, ed. Bergk, and Herodot. vii, 172.

[280] Herodot. viii, 112; Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 21,—who
cites a few bitter lines from the contemporary poet Timokreon.

[281] Herodot. viii, 112-121.

The intimation sent by Themistoklês perhaps had the effect of
hastening the departure of Xerxes, who remained in Attica only a few
days after the battle of Salamis, and then withdrew his army through
Bœotia into Thessaly, where Mardonius made choice of the troops to
be retained for his future operations. He retained all the Persians,
Medes, Sakæ, Baktrians, and Indians, horse as well as foot, together
with select detachments of the remaining contingents: making in all,
according to Herodotus, three hundred thousand men. But as it was now
the beginning of September, and as sixty thousand out of his forces,
under Artabazus, were destined to escort Xerxes himself to the
Hellespont, Mardonius proposed to Winter in Thessaly, and to postpone
farther military operations until the ensuing spring.[282]

[282] Herodot. viii, 114-126.

Having left most of these troops under the orders of Mardonius in
Thessaly, Xerxes marched away with the rest to the Hellespont,
by the same road as he had taken in his advance a few months
before. Respecting his retreat, a plentiful stock of stories were
circulated,[283]—inconsistent with each other, fanciful and
even incredible: Grecian imagination, in the contemporary poet
Æschylus, as well as in the Latin moralizers Seneca or Juvenal,[284]
delighted in handling this invasion with the maximum of light and
shadow,—magnifying the destructive misery and humiliation of the
retreat so as to form an impressive contrast with the superhuman
pride of the advance, and illustrating the antithesis with unbounded
license of detail. The sufferings from want of provision were
doubtless severe, and are described as frightful and death-dealing:
the magazines stored up for the advancing march had been exhausted,
so that the retiring army were now forced to seize upon the corn of
the country through which they passed,—an insufficient maintenance,
eked out by leaves, grass, the bark of trees, and other wretched
substitutes for food. Plague and dysentery aggravated their misery,
and occasioned many to be left behind among the cities through
whose territory the retreat was carried; strict orders being left
by Xerxes that these cities should maintain and tend them. After
forty-five days’ march from Attica, he at length found himself at
the Hellespont, whither his fleet, retreating from Salamis, had
arrived long before him.[285] But the short-lived bridge had already
been knocked to pieces by a storm, so that the army was transported
on shipboard across to Asia, where it first obtained comfort and
abundance, and where the change from privation to excess engendered
new maladies. In the time of Herodotus, the citizens of Abdêra still
showed the gilt cimeter and tiara, which Xerxes had presented to them
when he halted there in his retreat, in token of hospitality and
satisfaction: and they even went the length of affirming that never,
since his departure from Attica, had he loosened his girdle until he
reached their city. So fertile was Grecian fancy in magnifying the
terror of the repulsed invader! who reëntered Sardis, with a broken
army and humbled spirit, only eight months after he had left it, as
the presumed conqueror of the western world.[286]

[283] The account given by Æschylus of this retiring march
appears to me exaggerated, and in several points incredible
(Persæ, 482-513). That they suffered greatly during the march
from want of provisions, is doubtless true, and that many of them
died of hunger. But we must consider in deduction: 1. That this
march took place in the months of October and November, therefore
not very long after the harvest. 2. That Mardonius maintained a
large army in Thessaly all the winter, and brought them out in
fighting condition in the spring. 3. That Artabazus also, with
another large division, was in military operation in Thrace all
the winter, after having escorted Xerxes into safety.

When we consider these facts, it will seem that the statements
of Æschylus, even as to the sufferings by famine, must be taken
with great allowance. But his statement about the passage of the
Strymon appears to me incredible, and I regret to find myself
on this point differing from Dr. Thirlwall, who considers it
an undoubted fact. (Hist. Greece, ch. xv, p. 351, 2d ed.) “The
river had been frozen in the night hard enough to bear those who
arrived first. But the ice suddenly gave way under the morning
sun, and numbers perished in the waters,”—so Dr. Thirlwall
states, after Æschylus,—adding, in a note, “It is a little
surprising that Herodotus, when he is describing the miseries
of the retreat, does not notice this disaster, which is so
prominent in the narrative of the Persian messenger in Æschylus.
There can, however, be no doubt as to the fact: and perhaps it
may furnish a useful warning, not to lay too much stress on the
silence of Herodotus, as a ground for rejecting even important
and interesting facts which are only mentioned by later writers,”
etc.

That a large river, such as the Strymon, near its mouth (180
yards broad, and in latitude about N. 40° 50′), at a period which
could not have been later than the beginning of November, should
have been frozen over in one night so hardly and firmly as to
admit of a portion of the army marching over it at daybreak,
before the sun became warm,—is a statement which surely requires
a more responsible witness than Æschylus to avouch it. In fact,
he himself describes it as a “frost out of season,” (χειμῶν’
ἄωρον,) brought about by a special interposition of the gods.
If he is to be believed, none of the fugitives were saved,
except such as were fortunate enough to cross the Strymon on
the ice during the interval between break of day and the sun’s
heat. One would imagine that there was a pursuing enemy on
their track, leaving them only a short time for escape: whereas
in fact, they had no enemy to contend with,—nothing but the
difficulty of finding subsistence. During the advancing march
of Xerxes, a bridge of boats had been thrown over the Strymon:
nor can any reason be given why that bridge should not still
have been subsisting: Artabazus must have recrossed it after he
had accompanied the monarch to the Hellespont. I will add, that
the town and fortress of Eion, which commanded the mouth of the
Strymon, remained as an important strong-hold of the Persians
some years after this event, and was only captured, after a
desperate resistance, by the Athenians and their confederates
under Kimon.

The Athenian auditors of the Persæ would not criticize nicely,
the historical credibility of that which Æschylus told them about
the sufferings of their retreating foe, nor his geographical
credibility when he placed Mount Pangæus on the hither side of
the Strymon, to persons marching out of Greece (Persæ, 494).
But I must confess that, to my mind, his whole narrative of the
retreat bears the stamp of the poet and the religious man, not
of the historical witness. And my confidence in Herodotus is
increased when I compare him on this matter with Æschylus,—as
well in what he says as in what he does not say.

[284] Juvenal, Satir. x, 178.

Ille tamen qualis rediit, Salamine relictâ,
In Caurum atque Eurum solitus sævire flagellis, etc.

[285] Herodot. viii, 130.

[286] See the account of the retreat of Xerxes, in Herodotus,
viii, 115-120, with many stories which he mentions only to
reject. The description given in the Persæ of Æschylus (v, 486,
515, 570) is conceived in the same spirit. The strain reaches its
loudest pitch in Justin (ii, 13), who tells us that Xerxes was
obliged to cross the strait in a fishing-boat. “Ipse cum paucis
Abydon contendit. Ubi cum solutum pontem hibernis tempestatibus
offendisset, piscatoriâ scaphâ trepidus trajecit. Erat res
spectaculo digna et, æstimatione sortis humanæ, rerum varietate
miranda—in exiguo latentem videre navigio, quem paulo ante vix
æquor omne capiebat: carentem etiam omni servorum ministerio,
cujus exercitus propter multitudinem terris graves erant.”

Meanwhile the Athenians and Peloponnesians, liberated from the
immediate presence of the enemy either on land or sea, and passing
from the extreme of terror to sudden ease and security, indulged in
the full delight and self-congratulation of unexpected victory. On
the day before the battle, Greece had seemed irretrievably lost: she
was now saved even against all reasonable hope, and the terrific
cloud impending over her was dispersed.[287] In the division of the
booty, the Æginetans were adjudged to have distinguished themselves
most in the action, and to be entitled to the choice lot; while
various tributes of gratitude were also set apart for the gods. Among
them were three Phenician triremes, which were offered in dedication
to Ajax at Salamis, to Athênê at Sunium, and to Poseidon at the
isthmus of Corinth; farther presents were sent to Apollo at Delphi,
who, on being asked whether he was satisfied, replied, that all had
done their duty to him except the Æginetans: from them he required
additional munificence on account of the prize awarded to them, and
they were constrained to dedicate in the temple four golden stars
upon a staff of brass, which Herodotus himself saw there. Next to the
Æginetans, the second place of honor was awarded to the Athenians;
the Æginetan Polykritus, and the Athenians Eumenês and Ameinias,
being ranked first among the individual combatants.[288] Respecting
the behavior of Adeimantus and the Corinthians in the battle, the
Athenians of the time of Herodotus drew the most unfavorable picture,
representing them to have fled at the commencement, and to have been
only brought back by the information that the Greeks were gaining
the victory. Considering the character of the debates which had
preceded, and the impatient eagerness manifested by the Corinthians
to fight at the Isthmus instead of at Salamis, some such backwardness
on their part, when forced into a battle at the latter place, would
not be in itself improbable: yet in this case it seems that not only
the Corinthians themselves, but also the general voice of Greece,
contradicted the Athenian story, and defended them as having behaved
with bravery and forwardness. We must recollect that, at the time
when Herodotus probably collected his information, a bitter feeling
of hatred prevailed between Athens and Corinth, and Aristeus, son of
Adeimantus, was among the most efficient enemies of the former.[289]

[287] Herodot. viii, 109. ἡμεῖς δὲ, εὕρημα γὰρ εὑρήκαμεν ἡμέας
αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, μὴ διώκωμεν ἄνδρας φεύγοντας.

[288] Herodot. viii, 93-122; Diodor. xi, 27.

[289] Herodot. viii, 94; Thucyd. i, 42, 103. τὸ σφοδρὸν μῖσος
from Corinth towards Athens. About Aristeus, Thucyd. ii, 67.

Plutarch (De Herodot. Malignit. p. 870) employs many angry words
in refuting this Athenian scandal, which the historian himself
does not uphold as truth. The story advanced by Dio Chrysostom
(Or. xxxvii, p. 456), that Herodotus asked for a reward from the
Corinthians, and on being refused, inserted this story into his
history for the purpose of being revenged upon them, deserves
no attention without some reasonable evidence: the statement of
Diyllus, that he received ten talents from the Athenians as a
reward for his history, would be much less improbable, so far
as the fact of pecuniary reward, apart from the magnitude of
the sum: but this also requires proof. Dio Chrysostom is not
satisfied with rejecting this tale of the Athenians, but goes the
length of affirming that the Corinthians carried off the palm
of bravery, and were the cause of the victory. The epigrams of
Simonides, which he cites, prove nothing of the kind (p. 459).
Marcellinus (Vit. Thucyd. p. xvi), insinuates a charge against
Herodotus, something like that of Plutarch and Dio.

Besides the first and second prizes of valor, the chiefs at the
Isthmus tried to adjudicate among themselves the first and second
prizes of skill and wisdom. Each of them deposited two names on the
altar of Poseidon: and when these votes came to be looked at, it was
found that each man had voted for himself as deserving the first
prize, but that Themistoklês had a large majority of votes for the
second.[290] The result of such voting allowed no man to claim the
first prize, nor could the chiefs give a second prize without it;
so that Themistoklês was disappointed of his reward, though exalted
so much the higher, perhaps, through that very disappointment, in
general renown. He went shortly afterwards to Sparta, where he
received from the Lacedæmonians honors such as were never paid,
before nor afterwards, to any foreigner. A crown of olive was indeed
given to Eurybiadês as the first prize, but a like crown was at
the same time conferred on Themistoklês as a special reward for
unparalleled sagacity; together with a chariot, the finest which the
city afforded. Moreover, on his departure, the three hundred select
youths called Hippeis, who formed the active guard and police of the
country, all accompanied him in a body as escort of honor to the
frontiers of Tegea.[291] Such demonstrations were so astonishing,
from the haughty and immovable Spartans, that they were ascribed
by some authors to their fear lest Themistoklês should be offended
by being deprived of the general prize,—and they are even said to
have excited the jealousy of the Athenians so much, that he was
displaced from his post of general and Xanthippus nominated.[292]
Neither of these last reports is likely to be true, nor is either of
them confirmed by Herodotus: the fact that Xanthippus became general
of the fleet during the ensuing year, is in the regular course of
Athenian change of officers, and implies no peculiar jealousy of
Themistoklês.

[290] Herodot. viii, 123. Plutarch (Themist. c. 17: compare De
Herodot. Malign. p. 871) states that _each individual_ chief gave
his second vote to Themistoklês. The more we test Herodotus by
comparison with others, the more we shall find him free from the
exaggerating spirit.

[291] Herodot. viii 124; Plutarch, Themist. c. 17.

[292] Diodor. xi, 27; compare Herodot. viii, 125, and Thucyd. i,
74.

CHAPTER XLII.

BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALE. — FINAL REPULSE OF THE PERSIANS.

Though the defeat at Salamis deprived the Persians of all hope from
farther maritime attack of Greece, they still anticipated success
by land from the ensuing campaign of Mardonius. Their fleet, after
having conveyed the monarch himself with his accompanying land-force
across the Hellespont, retired to winter at Kymê and Samos: in the
latter of which places large rewards were bestowed upon Theomêstor
and Phylakus, two Samian captains who had distinguished themselves
in the late engagement. Theomêstor was even nominated despot of
Samos under Persian protection.[293] Early in the spring they were
reassembled, to the number of four hundred sail, but without the
Phenicians, at the naval station of Samos, intending, however, only
to maintain a watchful guard over Ionia, and hardly supposing that
the Greek fleet would venture to attack them.[294]

[293] Herodot. viii, 85.

[294] Herodot. viii, 130; Diodor xi. 27.

For a long time, the conduct of that fleet was such as to justify
such a belief in its enemies. Assembled at Ægina in the spring, to
the number of one hundred and ten ships, under the Spartan king
Leotychidês, it advanced as far as Delos, but not farther eastward:
nor could all the persuasions of Chian and other Ionian envoys,
despatched both to the Spartan authorities and to the fleet, and
promising to revolt from Persia as soon as the Grecian fleet should
appear, prevail upon Leotychidês to hazard any aggressive enterprise.
Ionia and the western waters of the Ægean had now been for fifteen
years completely under the Persians, and so little visited by the
Greeks, that a voyage thither appeared, especially to the maritime
inexperience of a Spartan king, like going to the Pillars of
Hêraklês,[295]—not less venturesome than the same voyage appeared
fifty-two years afterwards to the Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas,
when he first hazarded his fleet amidst the preserved waters of the
Athenian empire.

[295] Herodot. viii, 131, 132: compare Thucyd. iii, 29-32.

Herodotus says, that the Chian envoys had great difficulty in
inducing Leotychidês to proceed even as far as Delos,—τὸ γὰρ
προσωτέρω πᾶν δεινὸν ἦν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι, οὔτε τῶν χώρων ἐοῦσι
ἐμπείροισι, στρατιῆς τε πάντα πλέα ἐδόκεε εἶναι· τὴν δὲ Σάμον
ἐπιστέατο δόξῃ καὶ Ἡρακλέας στήλας ἴσον ἀπέχειν.

This last expression of Herodotus has been erroneously
interpreted by some of the commentators, as if it were a measure
of the geographical ignorance, either of Herodotus himself, or
of those whom he is describing. In my judgment, no inferences
of this kind ought to be founded upon it: it marks fear of an
enemy’s country which they had not been accustomed to visit, and
where they could not calculate the risk beforehand,—rather than
any serious comparison between one distance and another. Speaking
of our forefathers, such of them as were little used to the sea,
we might say,—“A voyage to Bordeaux or Lisbon seemed to them as
distant as a voyage to the Indies,”—by which we should merely
affirm something as to their state of feeling, not as to their
geographical knowledge.

Meanwhile the hurried and disastrous retreat of Xerxes had produced
less disaffection among his subjects and allies than might have been
anticipated. Alexander, king of Macedon, the Thessalian Aleuadæ,[296]
and the Bœotian leaders, still remained in hearty coöperation with
Mardonius: nor were there any, except the Phocians, whose fidelity
to him appeared questionable, among all the Greeks northwest of
the boundaries of Attica and Megaris. It was only in the Chalkidic
peninsula, that any actual revolt occurred. Potidæa, situated on the
isthmus of Pallênê, together with the other towns in the long tongue
of Pallênê, declared themselves independent: and the neighboring town
of Olynthus, occupied by the semi-Grecian tribe of Bottiæans, was on
the point of following their example. The Persian general, Artabazus,
on his return from escorting Xerxes to the Hellespont, undertook the
reduction of these towns, and succeeded perfectly with Olynthus. He
took the town, slew all the inhabitants, and handed it over to a
fresh population, consisting of Chalkidic Greeks, under Kritobulus of
Torônê. It was in this manner that Olynthus, afterwards a city of so
much consequence and interest, first became Grecian and Chalkidic.
But Artabazus was not equally successful in the siege of Potidæa,
the defence of which was aided by citizens from the other towns in
Pallênê. A plot which he concerted with Timoxenus, commander of the
Skiônæan auxiliaries in the town, became accidentally disclosed: a
considerable body of his troops perished while attempting to pass at
low tide under the walls of the city, which were built across the
entire breadth of the narrow isthmus joining the Pallenæan peninsula
to the mainland: and after three months of blockade, he was forced to
renounce the enterprise, withdrawing his troops to rejoin Mardonius,
in Thessaly.[297]

[296] Herodot. ix, 1, 2, 67; viii, 136.

[297] Herodot. viii, 128, 129.

The latter, before he put himself in motion for the spring campaign,
thought it advisable to consult the Grecian oracles, especially
those within the limits of Bœotia and Phocis. He sent a Karian,
named Mys, familiar with the Greek as well as the Karian language,
to consult Trophônius at Lebadeia, Amphiaraus, and the Ismenian
Apollo at Thebes, Apollo at mount Ptôon near Akræphiæ, and Apollo
at the Phocian Abæ. This step was probably intended as a sort of
ostentatious respect towards the religious feelings of allies upon
whom he was now very much dependent: but neither the questions put,
nor the answers given, were made public: and the only remarkable
fact which Herodotus had heard was, that the priest of the Ptôian
Apollo delivered his answer in Karian, or at least in a language
intelligible to no person present except the Karian Mys himself.[298]
It appears, however, that at this period, when Mardonius was
seeking to strengthen himself by oracles, and laying his plans for
establishing a separate peace and alliance with Athens against the
Peloponnesians, some persons in his interest circulated predictions,
that the day was approaching when the Persians and the Athenians
jointly would expel the Dorians from Peloponnesus.[299] The way was
thus paved for him to send an envoy to Athens,—Alexander, king of
Macedon; who was instructed to make the most seductive offers, to
promise reparation of all the damage done in Attica, as well as the
active future friendship of the Great King, and to hold out to the
Athenians a large acquisition of new territory as the price of their
consent to form with him an equal and independent alliance.[300] The
Macedonian prince added warm expressions of his own interest in the
welfare of the Athenians, recommending them, as a sincere friend,
to embrace propositions so advantageous as well as so honorable:
especially as the Persian power must in the end prove too much for
them, and Attica lay exposed to Mardonius and his Grecian allies,
without being covered by any common defence as Peloponnesus was
protected by its isthmus.[301]

[298] Herodot. viii, 134, 135; Pausanias, ix, 24, 3.

[299] Herodot. viii. 141. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ... ἀναμνησθέντες τῶν
λογίων, ὥς σφεας χρεόν ἐστι ἅμα τοῖσι ἄλλοισι Δωριεῦσι ἐκπίπτειν
ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ὑπὸ Μήδων τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων, κάρτα τε ἔδεισαν μὴ
ὁμολογήσωσι τῷ Πέρσῃ Ἀθηναῖοι, etc.

Such oracles must have been generated by the hopes of the
_medizing_ party in Greece at this particular moment: there is
no other point of time to which they could be at all adapted,—no
other, in which expulsion of all the Dorians from Peloponnesus,
by united Persians and Athenians, could be even dreamed of.
The Lacedæmonians are indeed said here, “to call to mind the
prophecies,”—as if these latter were old, and not now produced
for the first time. But we must recollect that a fabricator of
prophecies, such as Onomakritus, would in all probability at
once circulate them as old; that is, as forming part of some old
collection like that of Bakis or Musæus. And Herodotus doubtless,
himself, believed them to be old, so that he would naturally give
credit to the Lacedæmonians for the same knowledge, and suppose
them to be alarmed by “calling these prophecies to mind.”

[300] Herodot. ix, 7.

[301] Herodot. viii, 142.

This offer, despatched in the spring, found the Athenians
reëstablished wholly or partially in their half-ruined city. A simple
tender of mercy and tolerable treatment, if despatched by Xerxes
from Thermopylæ the year before, might perhaps have been sufficient
to detach them from the cause of Hellas: and even at the present
moment, though the pressure of overwhelming terror had disappeared,
there were many inducements for them to accede to the proposition
of Mardonius. The alliance of Athens would insure to the Persian
general unquestionable predominance in Greece, and to Athens herself
protection from farther ravage as well as the advantage of playing
the winning game: while his force, his position, and his alliances,
even as they then stood, threatened a desolating and doubtful war,
of which Attica would bear the chief brunt. Moreover, the Athenians
were at this time suffering privations of the severest character;
for not only did their ruined houses and temples require to be
restored, but they had lost the harvest of the past summer, together
with the seed of the past autumn.[302] The prudential view of the
case being thus favorable to Mardonius rather than otherwise, and
especially strengthened by the distress which reigned at Athens, the
Lacedæmonians were so much afraid lest Alexander should carry his
point, that they sent envoys to dissuade the Athenians from listening
to him, as well as to tender succor during the existing poverty of
the city. After having heard both parties, the Athenians delivered
their reply in terms of solemn and dignified resolution, which their
descendants delighted in repeating. To Alexander they said: “Cast
not in our teeth that the power of the Persian is many times greater
than ours: we too know _that_, as well as thou: but we, nevertheless,
love freedom well enough to resist him in the best manner we can.
Attempt not the vain task of talking us over into alliance with him.
Tell Mardonius that as long as the sun shall continue in his present
path, we will never contract alliance with Xerxes: we will encounter
him in our own defence, putting our trust in the aid of those gods
and heroes to whom he has shown no reverence, and whose houses
and statues he has burned. Come thou not to us again with similar
propositions, nor persuade us, even in the spirit of good-will, into
unholy proceedings: thou art the guest and friend of Athens, and we
would not that thou shouldst suffer injury at our hands.”[303]

[302] Herodot. viii, 142. Πιεζευμένοισι μέντοι ὑμῖν συναχθόμεθα
(say the Spartan envoys to the Athenians), καὶ ὅτι καρπῶν
ἐστερήθητε διξῶν ἤδη, καὶ ὅτι οἰκοφθόρησθε χρόνον ἤδη πολλόν.
Seeing that this is spoken before the invasion of Mardonius,
the loss of _two crops_ must include the seed of the preceding
autumn; and the advice of Themistoklês to his countrymen,—καί τις
οἰκίην τε ἀναπλασάσθω, καὶ σπόρου ἀνακῶς ἐχέτω (viii, 109)—must
have been found impracticable in most cases to carry into effect.

[303] Lykurgus the Athenian orator, in alluding to this incident
a century and a half afterwards, represents the Athenians as
having been “on the point of stoning Alexander,”—μικροῦ δεῖν
κατέλευσαν (Lykurg. cont. Leokrat. c. 17. p. 186)—one among many
specimens of the careless manner in which these orators deal with
past history.

To the Spartans, the reply of the Athenians was of a similar decisive
tenor: protesting their unconquerable devotion to the common
cause and liberties of Hellas, and promising that no conceivable
temptations, either of money or territory, should induce them to
desert the ties of brotherhood, common language, and religion. So
long as a single Athenian survived, no alliance should ever be made
with Xerxes. They then thanked the Spartans for offering them aid
during the present privations: but while declining such offers, they
reminded them that Mardonius, when apprized that his propositions
were refused, would probably advance immediately, and they therefore
earnestly desired the presence of a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia to
assist in the defence of Attica.[304] The Spartan envoys, promising
fulfilment of this request,[305] and satisfied to have ascertained
the sentiments of Athens, departed.

[304] Herodot. viii, 143, 144; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 10.
According to Plutarch, it was Aristeidês who proposed and
prepared the reply to be delivered. But here as elsewhere, the
loose, exaggerating style of Plutarch contrasts unfavorably with
the simplicity and directness of Herodotus.

[305] Herodot. ix, 7. συνθέμενοι δὲ ἡμῖν τὸν Πέρσην ἀντιώσεσθαι
ἐς τὴν Βοιωτίην, etc.

Diodorus gives the account of this embassy to Athens
substantially in the same manner, coupling it however with some
erroneous motives (xi, 28).

Such unshaken fidelity on the part of the Athenians to the
general cause of Greece, in spite of present suffering, combined
with seductive offers for the future, was the just admiration of
their descendants, and the frequent theme of applause by their
orators.[306] But among the contemporary Greeks it was hailed only
as a relief from danger, and repaid by a selfish and ungenerous
neglect. The same feeling of indifference towards all Greeks outside
of their own Isthmus, which had so deeply endangered the march
of affairs before the battle of Salamis, now manifested itself a
second time among the Spartans and Peloponnesians. The wall across
the Isthmus, which they had been so busy in constructing, and on
which they had relied for protection against the land-force of
Xerxes, had been intermitted and left unfinished when he retired:
but it was resumed as soon as the forward march of Mardonius was
anticipated. It was, however, still unfinished at the time of the
embassy of the Macedonian prince to Athens, and this incomplete
condition of their special defence was one reason of their alarm
lest the Athenians should accept the terms proposed. That danger
being for the time averted, they redoubled their exertions at the
Isthmus, so that the wall was speedily brought into an adequate
state of defence, and the battlements along the summit were in
course of being constructed. Thus safe behind their own bulwark,
they thought nothing more of their promise to join the Athenians in
Bœotia, and to assist in defending Attica against Mardonius: indeed,
their king Kleombrotus, who commanded the force at the Isthmus,
was so terrified by an obscuration of the sun at the moment when
he was sacrificing to ascertain the inclinations of the gods in
reference to the coming war, that he even thought it necessary to
retreat with the main force to Sparta, where he soon after died.[307]
Besides these two reasons,—indifference and unfavorable omens,—which
restrained the Spartans from aiding Attica, there was also a third:
they were engaged in celebrating the festival of the Hyakinthia,
and it was their paramount object, says the historian,[308] to
fulfil “the exigences of the god.” As the Olympia and the Karneia
in the preceding year, so now did the Hyakinthia, prevail over the
necessities of defence, putting out of sight both the duties of
fidelity towards an exposed ally, and the bond of an express promise.

[306] Herodot. ix, 7. ἐπιστάμενοί τε ὅτι κερδαλεώτερόν ἐστι
ὁμολογέειν τῷ Πέρσῃ μᾶλλον ἢ πολεμέειν, etc.

The orators are not always satisfied with giving to Athens the
credit which she really deserved: they venture to represent the
Athenians as having refused these brilliant offers from Xerxes
on his first invasion, instead of from Mardonius in the ensuing
summer. Xerxes never made any offers to them. See Isokratês, Or.
iv, Panegyric, c. 27, p. 61.

[307] Herodot. ix, 10.

[308] Herodot. ix, 7. Οἱ γὰρ δὴ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὅρταζόν τε τοῦτον
τὸν χρόνον καί σφι ἦν Ὑακίνθια· περὶ πλείστου δ’ ἦγον τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ
πορσύνειν· ἅμα δὲ τὸ τεῖχός σφι τὸ ἐν τῷ Ἰσθμῷ ἐτείχεον, καὶ ἤδη
ἐπάλξεις ἐλάμβανε.

Nearly a century after this, we are told that it was always the
practice for the Amyklæan hoplites to go home for the celebration
of the Hyakinthia, on whatever expedition they might happen to be
employed (Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 5, 11).

Meanwhile, Mardonius, informed of the unfavorable reception which his
proposals had received at Athens, put his army in motion forthwith
from Thessaly, joined by all his Grecian auxiliaries, and by fresh
troops from Thrace and Macedonia. As he marched through Bœotia, the
Thebans, who heartily espoused his cause, endeavored to dissuade him
from farther military operations against the united force of his
enemies,—urging him to try the efficacy of bribes, presented to the
leading men in the different cities, for the purpose of disuniting
them. But Mardonius, eager to repossess himself of Attica, heeded
not their advice: about ten months after the retreat of Xerxes, he
entered the country without resistance, and again established the
Persian head-quarters in Athens, May or June, 479 B. C.[309]

[309] Diodor. xi, 28; Herodot. ix, 2, 3, 17. οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες
παρεῖχον στρατιὴν καὶ συνεσέβαλον ἐς Ἀθήνας ὅσοι περ ἐμήδιζον
Ἑλλήνων τῶν ταύτῃ οἰκημένων, etc.

Before he arrived, the Athenians had again removed to Salamis, under
feelings of bitter disappointment and indignation. They had in vain
awaited the fulfilment of the Spartan promise, that a Peloponnesian
army should join them in Bœotia for the defence of their frontier;
at length, being unable to make head against the enemy alone, they
found themselves compelled to transport their families across to
Salamis.[310] The migration was far less terrible than that of the
preceding summer, since Mardonius had no fleet to harass them; but it
was more gratuitous, and might have been obviated had the Spartans
executed their covenant, which would have brought about the battle of
Platæa two months earlier than it actually was fought.

[310] Herodot. ix, 4.

Mardonius, though master of Athens, was so anxious to conciliate
the Athenians, that he at first abstained from damaging either the
city or the country, and despatched a second envoy to Salamis to
repeat the offers made through Alexander of Macedon: he thought that
they might now be listened to, since he could offer the exemption
of Attica from ravage, as an additional temptation. Murychidês, a
Hellespontine Greek, was sent to renew these propositions to the
Athenian senate at Salamis; but he experienced a refusal not less
resolute than that of Alexander of Macedon when sent to Athens,
and all but unanimous. One unfortunate senator, Lykidas, made an
exception to this unanimity, and ventured to recommend acceptance
of the propositions of Murychidês. So furious was the wrath, or so
strong the suspicion of corruption, which his single-voiced negative
provoked, that senators and people both combined to stone him to
death: while the Athenian women in Salamis, hearing what had passed,
went of their own accord to the house of Lykidas, and stoned to death
his wife and children. In the desperate pitch of resolution to which
the Athenians were now wound up, an opponent passed for a traitor:
unanimity, even though extorted by terror, was essential to their
feelings.[311] Murychidês, though his propositions were refused, was
dismissed without injury.

[311] Herodot. ix, 5. I dare not reject this story about Lykidas
(see Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 30, p. 222), though other authors
recount the same incident as having happened to a person named
Kyrsilus, during the preceding year, when the Athenians quitted
Athens: see Demosthen. de Coronâ, p. 296, c. 59; and Cicero de
Officiis, iii, 11. That two such acts were perpetrated by the
Athenians, is noway probable: and if we are to choose between
the two, the story of Herodotus is far the more probable. In the
migration of the preceding year, we know that a certain number of
Athenians actually did stay behind in the acropolis, and Kyrsilus
might have been among them, if he had chosen. Moreover, Xerxes
held out no offers, and gave occasion to no deliberation; while
the offers of Mardonius might really appear to a well-minded
citizen deserving of attention.

Isokrates (Or. iv, Panegyric. p. 74, c. 42) states that the
Athenians condemned many persons to death for _medism_ (in
allusion doubtless to Themistoklês as one), but he adds,—“even
now they imprecate curses on any citizen who enters into amicable
negotiation with the Persians,”—ἐν δὲ τοῖς συλλόγοις ἔτι καὶ νῦν
ἀρὰς ποιοῦνται, εἴτις ἐπικηρυκεύεται Πέρσαις τῶν πολιτῶν. It
is difficult to believe that in his time any such imprecation
can have been included in the solemnities whereby the Athenian
meetings were opened.

While the Athenians thus gave renewed proofs of their steadfast
attachment to the cause of Hellas, they at the same time sent
envoys, conjointly with Megara and Platæa, to remonstrate with the
Spartans on their backwardness and breach of faith, and to invoke
them even thus late to come forth at once and meet Mardonius in
Attica: not omitting to intimate, that if they were thus deserted,
it would become imperatively necessary for them, against their
will, to make terms with the enemy. So careless, however, were the
Spartan ephors respecting Attica and the Megarid, that they postponed
giving an answer to these envoys for ten successive days, while in
the mean time they pressed with all their efforts the completion of
the isthmic fortifications. And after having thus amused the envoys
as long as they could, they would have dismissed them at last with
a negative answer,—such was their fear of adventuring beyond the
Isthmus,—had not a Tegean, named Chileos, whom they much esteemed,
and to whom they communicated the application, reminded them that
no fortifications at the Isthmus would suffice for the defence of
Peloponnesus, if the Athenians became allied with Mardonius, and thus
laid the peninsula open by sea. The strong opinion of this respected
Tegean, proved to the ephors that their selfish policy would not be
seconded by their chief Peloponnesian allies, and brought to their
attention, probably for the first time, that danger by sea might
again be renewed, though the Persian fleet had been beaten in the
preceding year, and was now at a distance from Greece. It changed
their resolution, not less completely than suddenly; and they
despatched forthwith in the night five thousand Spartan citizens
to the Isthmus,—each man with seven Helots attached to him. And
when the Athenian envoys, ignorant of this sudden change of policy,
came on the next day to give peremptory notice that Athens would no
longer endure such treacherous betrayal, but would forthwith take
measures for her own security and separate pacification,—the ephors
affirmed on their oath that the troops were already on their march,
and were probably by this time out of the Spartan territory.[312]
Considering that this step was an expiation, imperfect, tardy, and
reluctant, for foregoing desertion and breach of promise,—the ephors
may probably have thought that the mystery of the night-march, and
the sudden communication of it as an actual fact to the envoys,
in the way of reply, would impress more emphatically the minds of
the latter,—who returned with the welcome tidings to Salamis, and
prepared their countrymen for speedy action. Five thousand Spartan
citizens, each with seven light-armed Helots as attendants, were thus
on their march to the theatre of war. Throughout the whole course of
Grecian history, we never hear of any number of Spartan citizens at
all approaching to five thousand being put on foreign service at the
same time. But this was not all: five thousand Lacedæmonian Periœki,
each with one light-armed Helot to attend him, were also despatched
to the Isthmus, to take part in the same struggle. Such unparalleled
efforts afford sufficient measure of the alarm which, though late
yet real, now reigned at Sparta. Other Peloponnesian cities followed
the example, and a large army was now collected under the Spartan
Pausanias.

[312] Herodot. ix, 10, 11; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 10. Plutarch
had read a decree ascribed to Aristeidês, in which Kimon,
Xanthippus, and Myrônidês, were named envoys to Sparta. But it is
impossible that Xanthippus could have taken part in the embassy,
seeing that he was now in command of the fleet.

Probably the Helots must have followed: one hardly sees how
so great a number could have been all suddenly collected, and
marched off in one night, no preparations having been made
beforehand.

Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. ch. xvi, p. 366) suspects the
correctness of the narrative of Herodotus, on grounds which do
not appear to me convincing. It seems to me that, after all,
the literal narrative is more probable than anything which we
can substitute in its place. The Spartan foreign policy all
depended on the five ephors; there was no public discussion or
criticism. Now the conduct of these ephors is consistent and
intelligible,—though selfish, narrow-minded, and insensible to
any dangers except what are present and obvious. Nor can I think,
with Dr. Thirlwall, that the manner of communication ultimately
adopted is of the nature of a jest.

It appears that Mardonius was at this moment in secret correspondence
with the Argeians, who, though professing neutrality, are said to
have promised him that they would arrest the march of the Spartans
beyond their own borders.[313] We may reasonably doubt whether they
ever made such a promise: but at any rate, the suddenness of the
march as well as the greatness of the force prevented them from
fulfilling it; and they were forced to content themselves with
apprizing Mardonius instantly of the fact, through their swiftest
courier. It determined that general to evacuate Attica, and to carry
on the war in Bœotia,—a country in every way more favorable to him.
He had for some time refrained from committing devastations in or
round Athens, hoping that the Athenians might be induced to listen
to his propositions; but the last days of his stay were employed in
burning and destroying whatever had been spared by the host of Xerxes
during the preceding summer. After a fruitless attempt to surprise a
body of one thousand Lacedæmonians which had been detached for the
protection of Megara,[314] he withdrew all his army into Bœotia,
not taking either the straight road to Platæa through Eleutheræ,
or to Thebes through Phylê, both which roads were mountainous and
inconvenient for cavalry, but marching in the northeasterly direction
to Dekeleia, where he was met by some guides from the adjoining
regions near the river Asôpus, and conducted through the deme of
Sphendaleis to Tanagra. He thus found himself, by a route longer but
easier, in Bœotia, on the plain of the Asôpus: along which river
he next day marched westward to Skôlus, a town in the territory of
Thebes, seemingly near to that of Platæa.[315] He then took up a
position not far off, in the plain on the left bank of the Asôpus:
his left wing over against Erythræ, his centre over against Hysiæ,
and his right in the territory of Platæa: and he employed his army
in constructing forthwith a fortified camp[316] of ten furlongs
square, defended by wooden walls and towers, cut from trees in the
Theban territory.

[313] Herodot. ix, 12.

[314] There were stories current at Megara, even in the time of
Pausanias, respecting some of these Persians, who were said to
have been brought to destruction by the intervention of Artemis
(Pausan. i, 40, 2).

[315] Herodot. ix, 15. The situation of the Attic deme Sphendalê,
or Sphendaleis, seems not certainly known (Ross, Über die Demen
von Attika, p. 138); but Colonel Leake and Mr. Finlay think that
it stood “near Aio Merkurio, which now gives name to the pass
leading from Dekeleia through the ridges of Parnes into the
extremity of the Tanagrian plain, at a place called Malakasa.”
(Leake, Athens and the Demi of Attica, vol. ii, sect. iv, p. 123.)

Mr. Finlay (Oropus and the Diakria, p. 38) says that “Malakasa is
the only place on this road where a considerable body of cavalry
could conveniently halt.”

It appears that the Bœotians from the neighborhood of the
Asôpus were necessary as guides for this road. Perhaps even the
territory of Orôpus was at this time still a part of Bœotia: we
do not certainly know at what period it was first conquered by
the Athenians.

The combats between Athenians and Bœotians will be found to
take place most frequently in this southeastern region of
Bœotia,—Tanagra, Œnophyta, Delium, etc.

[316] Herodot. ix, 15.

Mardonius found himself thus with his numerous army, in a plain
favorable for cavalry; with a camp more or less defensible,—the
fortified city of Thebes[317] in his rear,—and a considerable stock
of provisions as well as a friendly region behind him from whence to
draw more. Few among his army, however, were either hearty in the
cause or confident of success:[318] even the native Persians had been
disheartened by the flight of the monarch the year before, and were
full of melancholy auguries. A splendid banquet to which the Theban
leader Attagînus invited Mardonius, along with fifty Persians and
fifty Theban or Bœotian guests, exhibited proofs of this depressed
feeling, which were afterwards recounted to Herodotus himself by
one of the guests present,—an Orchomenian citizen of note named
Thersander. The banquet being so arranged as that each couch was
occupied by one Persian and one Theban, this man was accosted by his
Persian neighbor in Greek, who inquired to what city he belonged,
and, upon learning that he was an Orchomenian,[319] continued thus:
“Since thou hast now partaken with me in the same table and cup,
I desire to leave with thee some memorial of my convictions: the
rather, in order that thou mayst be thyself forewarned so as to take
the best counsel for thine own safety. Seest thou these Persians here
feasting, and the army which we left yonder encamped near the river?
Yet a little while, and out of all these thou shalt behold but few
surviving.” Thersander listened to these words with astonishment,
spoken as they were with strong emotion and a flood of tears, and
replied: “Surely, thou art bound to reveal this to Mardonius, and to
his confidential advisers:” but the Persian rejoined: “My friend,
man cannot avert that which God hath decreed to come: no one will
believe the revelation, sure though it be. Many of us Persians know
this well, and are here serving only under the bond of necessity.
And truly this is the most hateful of all human sufferings,—to
be full of knowledge, and at the same time to have no power over
any result.”[320] “This (observes Herodotus) I heard myself from
the Orchomenian Thersander, who told me farther that he mentioned
the fact to several persons about him, even before the battle of
Platæa.” It is certainly one of the most curious revelations in the
whole history; not merely as it brings forward the historian in
his own personality, communicating with a personal friend of the
Theban leaders, and thus provided with good means of information as
to the general events of the campaign,—but also as it discloses to
us, on testimony not to be suspected, the real temper of the native
Persians, and even of the chief men among them. If so many of these
chiefs were not merely apathetic, but despondent, in the cause,
much more decided would be the same absence of will and hope in
their followers and the subject allies. To follow the monarch in his
overwhelming march of the preceding year, was gratifying in many ways
to the native Persians: but every man was sick of the enterprise as
now cut down under Mardonius: and Artabazus, the second in command,
was not merely slack but jealous of his superior.[321] Under such
circumstances we shall presently not be surprised to find the whole
army disappearing forthwith, the moment Mardonius is slain.

[317] The strong town of Thebes was of much service to him
(Thucyd. i, 90).

[318] Herodot. ix, 40, 45, 67; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 18.

[319] Herodot. ix, 16. Thersander, though an Orchomenian, passes
as a Theban—Πέρσην τε καὶ Θηβαῖον ἐν κλίνῃ ἑκάστῃ—a proof of the
intimate connection between Thebes and Orchomenus at this time,
which is farther illustrated by Pindar, Isthm. i, 51 (compare the
Scholia ad loc. and at the beginning of the Ode), respecting the
Theban family of Herodotus and Asôpodôrus. The ancient mythical
feud appears to have gone to sleep, but a deadly hatred will be
found to grow up in later times between these two towns.

[320] Herodot. ix, 16, 17. The last observation here quoted is
striking and emphatic—ἐχθίστη δὲ ὀδύνη ἐστὶ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι
αὕτη, πολλὰ φρονέοντα μηδενὸς κρατέειν. It will have to be
more carefully considered at a later period of this history,
when we come to touch upon the scientific life of the Greeks,
and upon the philosophy of happiness and duty as conceived by
Aristotle. If carried fully out, this position is the direct
negative of what Aristotle lays down in his Ethics, as to the
superior happiness of the βίος θεωρητικὸς, or life of scientific
observation and reflection.

[321] Herodot. ix, 66.

Among the Grecian allies of Mardonius, the Thebans and Bœotians were
active and zealous, most of the remainder lukewarm, and the Phocians
even of doubtful fidelity. Their contingent of one thousand hoplites,
under Harmokydês, had been tardy in joining him, having only come up
since he retired from Attica into Bœotia: and some of the Phocians
even remained behind in the neighborhood of Parnassus, prosecuting
manifest hostilities against the Persians. Aware of the feeling
among this contingent, which the Thessalians took care to place
before him in an unfavorable point of view, Mardonius determined to
impress upon them a lesson of intimidation. Causing them to form
in a separate body on the plain, he then brought up his numerous
cavalry all around them: while the phêmê, or sudden simultaneous
impression, ran through the Greek allies as well as the Phocians
themselves, that he was about to shoot them down.[322] The general
Harmokydês, directing his men to form a square and close their ranks,
addressed to them short exhortations to sell their lives dearly,
and to behave like brave Greeks against barbarian assassins,—when
the cavalry rode up, apparently to the charge, and advanced close
to the square, with uplifted javelins and arrows on the string,
some few of which were even actually discharged. The Phocians
maintained, as enjoined, steady ranks with a firm countenance, and
the cavalry wheeled about without any actual attack or damage. After
this mysterious demonstration, Mardonius condescended to compliment
the Phocians on their courage, and to assure them, by means of a
herald, that he had been greatly misinformed respecting them: he at
the same time exhorted them to be faithful and forward in service
for the future, and promised that all good behavior should be amply
recompensed. Herodotus seems uncertain,—difficult as the supposition
is to entertain,—whether Mardonius did not really intend at first
to massacre the Phocians in the field, and desisted from the
intention only on seeing how much blood it would cost to accomplish.
However this may be, the scene itself was a remarkable reality,
and presented one among many other proofs of the lukewarmness and
suspicious fidelity of the army.[323]

[322] Herodot. ix, 17. διεξῆλθε φήμη, ὡς κατακοντιεῖ σφέας.
Respecting φήμη, see a note a little farther on, at the battle of
Mykalê, in this same chapter.

Compare the case of the Delians at Adramyttium, surrounded
and slain with missiles by the Persian satrap, though not his
enemies—περιστήσας τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ κατηκόντισε (Thucyd. viii, 108).

[323] Οὐκ ἔχω δ’ ἀτρεκέως εἰπεῖν, οὔτε εἰ ἦλθον μὲν ἀπολέοντες
τοὺς Φωκέας, δεηθέντων τῶν Θεσσαλῶν, etc. (Herodot. ix, 18.)

This confession of uncertainty as to motives and plans,
distinguishing between them and the visible facts which he is
describing, is not without importance as strengthening our
confidence in the historian.

Conformably to the suggestion of the Thebans, the liberties of Greece
were now to be disputed in Bœotia: and not only had the position of
Mardonius already been taken, but his camp also fortified, before the
united Grecian army approached Kithæron in its forward march from the
Isthmus. After the full force of the Lacedæmonians had reached the
Isthmus, they had to await the arrival of their Peloponnesian and
other confederates. The hoplites who joined them were as follows:
from Tegea, fifteen hundred; from Corinth, five thousand,—besides a
small body of three hundred from the Corinthian colony of Potidæa;
from the Arcadian Orchomenus, six hundred; from Sikyon, three
thousand; from Epidaurus, eight hundred; from Trœzen, one thousand;
from Lepreon, two hundred; from Mykênæ and Tiryns, four hundred; from
Phlius, one thousand; from Hermionê, three hundred; from Eretria and
Styra, six hundred; from Chalkis, four hundred; from Ambrakia, five
hundred; from Leukas and Anaktorium, eight hundred; from Palê in
Kephallenia, two hundred; from Ægina, five hundred. On marching from
the Isthmus to Megara, they took up three thousand Megarian hoplites;
and as soon as they reached Eleusis in their forward progress,
the army was completed by the junction of eight thousand Athenian
hoplites, and six hundred Platæan, under Aristeidês, who passed over
from Salamis.[324] The total force of hoplites, or heavy-armed
troops, was thus thirty-eight thousand seven hundred men: there were
no cavalry, and but very few bowmen; but if we add those who are
called light-armed, or unarmed generally,—some perhaps with javelins
or swords, but none with any defensive armor,—the grand total was not
less than one hundred and ten thousand men. Of these light-armed, or
unarmed, there were, as computed by Herodotus; thirty-five thousand
in attendance on the five thousand Spartan citizens, and thirty-four
thousand five hundred in attendance on the other hoplites,—together
with eighteen hundred Thespians, who were properly hoplites, yet so
badly armed as not to be reckoned in the ranks.[325]

[324] Compare this list of Herodotus with the enumeration which
Pausanias read inscribed on the statue of Zeus, erected at
Olympia by the Greeks who took part in the battle of Platæa
(Pausan. v, 23, 1).

Pausanias found inscribed all the names here indicated by
Herodotus except the Palês of Kephallenia: and he found in
addition the Eleians Keans, Kythnians, Tenians, Naxians, and
Mêlians. The five last names are islanders in the Ægean:
their contingents sent to Platæa must, at all events, have
been very small, and it is surprising to hear that they sent
any,—especially when we recollect that there was a Greek fleet at
this moment on service, to which it would be natural that they
should join themselves in preference to land-service.

With respect to the name of the Eleians, the suspicion of
Bröndstedt is plausible, that Pausanias may have mistaken the
name of the Palês of Kephallenia for theirs, and may have fancied
that he read FΑΛΕΙΟΙ when it was really written ΠΑΛΕΙΣ, in an
inscription at that time about six hundred years old. The place
in the series wherein Pausanias places the name of the Eleians,
strengthens the suspicion. Unless it be admitted, we shall be
driven, as the most probable alternative, to suppose a fraud
committed by the vanity of the Eleians, which may easily have
led them to alter a name originally belonging to the Palês.
The reader will recollect that the Eleians were themselves the
superintendents and curators at Olympia.

Plutarch seems to have read the same inscription as Pausanias (De
Herodoti Malignit. p. 873).

[325] Herodot. ix, 19, 28, 29.

Such was the number of Greeks present or near at hand in the combat
against the Persians at Platæa, which took place some little time
afterwards: but it seems that the contingents were not at first
completely full, and that new additions[326] continued to arrive
until a few days before the battle, along with the convoys of cattle
and provisions which came for the subsistence of the army. Pausanias
marched first from the Isthmus to Eleusis, where he was joined by the
Athenians from Salamis: at Eleusis, as well as at the Isthmus, the
sacrifices were found encouraging, and the united army then advanced
across the ridge of Kithæron, so as to come within sight of the
Persians. When Pausanias saw them occupying the line of the Asôpus in
the plain beneath, he kept his own army on the mountain declivity
near Erythræ, without choosing to adventure himself in the level
ground. Mardonius, finding them not disposed to seek battle in the
plain, despatched his numerous and excellent cavalry under Masistius,
the most distinguished officer in his army, to attack them. For the
most part, the ground was so uneven as to check their approach,—but
the Megarian contingent, which happened to be more exposed than the
rest, were so hard pressed that they were forced to send to Pausanias
for aid. They appear to have had not only no cavalry, but no bowmen
or light-armed troops of any sort with missile weapons; while the
Persians, excellent archers and darters, using very large bows,
and trained in such accomplishments from their earliest childhood,
charged in successive squadrons and overwhelmed the Greeks with darts
and arrows,—not omitting contemptuous taunts on their cowardice for
keeping back from the plain.[327] So general was then the fear of
the Persian cavalry, that Pausanias could find none of the Greeks,
except the Athenians, willing to volunteer and go to the rescue of
the Megarians. A body of Athenians, however, especially three hundred
chosen troops under Olympiodorus, strengthened with some bowmen,
immediately marched to the spot and took up the combat with the
Persian cavalry. For some time the struggle was sharp and doubtful:
at length the general, Masistius,—a man renowned for bravery, lofty
in stature, clad in conspicuous armor, and mounted on a Nisæan horse
with golden trappings,—charging at the head of his troops, had
his horse struck by an arrow in the side. The animal immediately
reared and threw his master on the ground, close to the ranks of the
Athenians, who, rushing forward, seized the horse, and overpowered
Masistius before he could rise. So impenetrable were the defences of
his helmet and breastplate,[328] however, that they had considerable
difficulty in killing him, though he was in their power: at length
a spearman pierced him in the eye. The death of the general passed
unobserved by the Persian cavalry, but as soon as they missed him and
became aware of the loss, they charged furiously and in one mass to
recover the dead body. At first the Athenians, too few in number to
resist the onset, were compelled for a time to give way, abandoning
the body; but reinforcements presently arriving at their call, the
Persians were driven back with loss, and it finally remained in their
possession.[329]

[326] Herodot. ix, 28. οἱ ἐπιφοιτῶντές τε καὶ οἱ ἀρχὴν ἐλθόντες
Ἑλλήνων.

[327] About the missile weapons and skill of the Persians, see
Herodot. i, 136; Xenophon, Anabas. iii, 4, 17.

Cyrus the younger was eminent in the use both of the bow and the
javelin (Xenoph. Anab. i, 8, 26; i, 9, 5: compare Cyropæd. i, 2,
4).

[328] See Quintus Curtius, iii, 11, 15; and the note of Mützel.

[329] Herodot. ix, 21, 22, 23; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 14.

The death of Masistius, coupled with that final repulse of the
cavalry which left his body in possession of the Greeks, produced
a strong effect on both armies, encouraging the one as much as it
disheartened the other. Throughout the camp of Mardonius, the grief
was violent and unbounded, manifested by wailings so loud as to echo
over all Bœotia; while the hair of men, horses, and cattle, was
abundantly cut in token of mourning. The Greeks, on the other hand,
overjoyed at their success, placed the dead body in a cart, and
paraded it around the army: even the hoplites ran out of their ranks
to look at it; not only hailing it as a valuable trophy, but admiring
its stature and proportions.[330] And so much was their confidence
increased, that Pausanias now ventured to quit the protection of
the mountain-ground, inconvenient from its scanty supply of water,
and to take up his position in the plain beneath, interspersed only
with low hillocks. Marching from Erythræ in a westerly direction
along the declivities of Kithæron, and passing by Hysiæ, the Greeks
occupied a line of camp in the Platæan territory along the Asôpus and
on its right bank; with their right wing near to the fountain called
Gargaphia,[331] and their left wing near to the chapel, surrounded
by a shady grove, of the Platæan hero, Androkratês. In this position
they were marshalled according to nations, or separate fractions of
the Greek name,—the Lacedæmonians on the right wing, with the Tegeans
and Corinthians immediately joining them,—and the Athenians on the
left wing; a post which, as second in point of dignity, was at first
claimed by the Tegeans, chiefly on grounds of mythical exploits,
to the exclusion of the Athenians, but ultimately adjudged by the
Spartans, after hearing both sides, to Athens.[332] In the field,
even Lacedæmonians followed those democratical forms which pervaded
so generally Grecian military operations: in this case, it was not
the generals, but the Lacedæmonian troops in a body, who heard the
argument, and delivered the verdict by unanimous acclamation.

[330] Herodot. ix, 24, 25. οἰμωγῇ τε χρεώμενοι ἀπλέτῳ· ἅπασαν γὰρ
τὴν Βοιωτίην κατεῖχε ἠχώ, etc.

The exaggerated demonstrations of grief, ascribed to Xerxes and
Atossa. in the Persæ of Æschylus, have often been blamed by
critics: we may see from this passage how much they are in the
manners of Orientals of that day.

[331] Herodot. ix, 25-30; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 11. τὸ τοῦ
Ἀνδροκράτους ἡρῷον ἐγγὺς ἄλσει πυκνῶν καὶ συσκίων δένδρων
περιεχόμενον.

The expression of Herodotus respecting this position taken by
Pausanias, Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ταχθέντες ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀσωπῷ ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο,
as well as the words which follow in the next chapter (31)—Οἱ
βάρβαροι, πυθόμενοι εἶναι τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐν Πλαταιῇσι, παρῇσαν καὶ
αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀσωπὸν τὸν ταύτῃ ῥέοντα,—show plainly that the
Grecian troops were encamped along the Asôpus on the Platæan
side, while the Persians in their second position occupied the
ground on the opposite, or Theban side of the river. Whichever
army commenced the attack had to begin by passing the Asôpus (c.
36-59).

For the topography of this region, and of the positions occupied
by the two armies, compare Squire, in Walpole’s Turkey, p. 338;
Kruse, Hellas, vol. ii, ch. vi, p. 9, _seq._, and ch. viii, p.
592. _seq._: and the still more copious and accurate information
of Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, ch. xvi, vol. ii,
pp. 324-360. Both of them have given plans of the region; that
which I annex is borrowed from Kiepert’s maps. I cannot but think
that the fountain Gargaphia is not yet identified, and that both
Kruse and Leake place the Grecian position farther from the river
Asôpus than is consistent with the words of Herodotus; which
words seem to specify points near the two extremities, indicating
that the fountain of Gargaphia was near the river towards the
right of the Grecian position, and the chapel of Androkratês
also _near_ the river towards the left of that position, where
the Athenians were posted. Nor would such a site for a chapel of
Androkratês be inconsistent with Thucydides (iii, 24), who merely
mentions that chapel as being on the right hand of the first mile
of road from Platæa to Thebes.

Considering the length of time which has elapsed since the
battle, it would not be surprising if the spring of Gargaphia
were no longer recognizable. At any rate, neither the fountain
pointed out by Colonel Leake (p. 332) nor that of Vergutiani,
which had been supposed by Colonel Squire and Dr. Clarke, appear
to me suitable for Gargaphia.

The errors of that plan of the battle of Platæa which accompanies
the Voyage d’Anacharsis, are now well understood.

[332] Herodot. ix, 26-29. Judging from the battles of Corinth (B.
C. 396) and Mantineia (B. C. 418), the Tegeans seem afterwards to
have dropped this pretension to occupy the left wing, and to have
preferred the post in the line next to the Lacedæmonians (Xenoph.
Hellen. iv, 2, 19).

Mardonius, apprized of this change of position, marched his army also
a little farther to the westward, and posted himself opposite to the
Greeks, divided from them by the river Asôpus. At the suggestion of
the Thebans, he himself, with his Persians and Medes, the picked
men of his army, took post on the left wing, immediately opposite
to the Lacedæmonians on the Greek right, and even extending so far
as to cover the Tegean ranks on the left of the Lacedæmonians:
Baktrians, Indians, Sakæ, with other Asiatics and Egyptians, filled
the centre: and the Greeks and Macedonians in the service of Persia,
the right,—over against the hoplites of Athens. The numbers of these
last-mentioned Greeks Herodotus could not learn, though he estimates
them conjecturally at fifty thousand:[333] nor can we place any
confidence in the total of three hundred thousand, which he gives as
belonging to the other troops of Mardonius, though probably it cannot
have been much less.

[333] Herodot. ix, 31, 32.

In this position lay the two armies, separated only by a narrow space
including the river Asôpus, and each expecting a battle, whilst the
sacrifices on behalf of each were offered up. Pausanias, Mardonius,
and the Greeks in the Persian army, had each a separate prophet to
offer sacrifice, and to ascertain the dispositions of the gods; the
two first had men from the most distinguished prophetic breeds in
Elis,—the latter invited one from Leukas.[334] All received large
pay, and the prophet of Pausanias had indeed been honored with a
recompense above all pay,—the gift of full Spartan citizenship for
himself as well as for his brother. It happened that the prophets
on both sides delivered the same report of their respective
sacrifices,—favorable for resistance if attacked; unfavorable for
beginning the battle. At a moment when doubt and indecision was
the reigning feeling on both sides, this was the safest answer for
the prophet to give, and the most satisfactory for the soldiers
to hear. And though the answer from Delphi had been sufficiently
encouraging, and the kindness of the patron-heroes of Platæa[335]
had been solemnly invoked, yet Pausanias did not venture to cross the
Asôpus and begin the attack, in the face of a pronounced declaration
from his prophet. Nor did even Hegesistratus, the prophet employed
by Mardonius, choose on his side to urge an aggressive movement,
though he had a deadly personal hatred against the Lacedæmonians,
and would have been delighted to see them worsted. There arose
commencements of conspiracy, perhaps encouraged by promises or bribes
from the enemy, among the wealthier Athenian hoplites, to establish
an oligarchy at Athens under Persian supremacy, like that which now
existed at Thebes,—a conspiracy full of danger at such a moment,
though fortunately repressed[336] by Aristeidês, with a hand at
once gentle and decisive. More over, the annoyance inflicted by the
Persian cavalry, under the guidance of the Thebans, was incessant:
their constant assaults, and missile weapons from the other side
of the Asôpus, prevented the Greeks from using it for supplies of
water, so that the whole army was forced to water at the fountain
Gargaphia, at the extreme right of the position,[337] near the
Lacedæmonian hoplites. Moreover, the Theban leader, Timegenidas,
remarking the convoys which arrived over the passes of Kithæron, in
the rear of the Grecian camp, and the constant reinforcements of
hoplites which accompanied them, prevailed upon Mardonius to employ
his cavalry in cutting off such communication. The first movement
of this sort, undertaken by night against the pass called the Oak
Heads, was eminently successful: a train of five hundred beasts of
burden with supplies, was attacked descending into the plain with its
escort, all of whom were either slain or carried prisoners to the
Persian camp: nor was it safe for any farther convoys to approach the
Greeks.[338] Eight days had already been passed in inaction before
Timegenidas suggested, or Mardonius executed, this manœuvre, which
it is fortunate for the Greeks that he did not attempt earlier,
and which afforded clear proof how much might be hoped from an
efficient employment of his cavalry, without the ruinous risk of a
general action. Nevertheless, after waiting two days longer, his
impatience became uncontrollable, and he determined on a general
battle forthwith.[339] In vain did Artabazus endeavor to dissuade
him from the step,—taking the same view as the Thebans, that in a
pitched battle the united Grecian army was invincible, and that the
only successful policy was that of delay and corruption to disunite
them: he recommended standing on the defensive, by means of Thebes,
well fortified and amply provisioned,—which would allow time for
distributing effective bribes among the leading men throughout the
various Grecian cities. This suggestion, which Herodotus considers as
wise and likely to succeed, was repudiated by Mardonius as cowardly
and unworthy of the recognized superiority of the Persian arms.[340]

[334] Herodot. ix, 36, 38. μεμισθωμένος οὐκ ὀλίγου.

These prophets were men of great individual consequence, as may
be seen by the details which Herodotus gives respecting their
adventures: compare also the history of Euenius, ix, 93.

[335] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. xi; Thucyd. ii, 74.

[336] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 13.

[337] Herodot. ix, 40, 49, 50. τήν τε κρήνην τὴν Γαργαφίην, ἀπ’
ἧς ὑδρεύετο πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα τὸ Ἑλληνικόν—ἐρυκόμενοι δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ
Ἀσωποῦ, οὕτω δὴ ἐπὶ τὴν κρήνην ἐφοίτεον· ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ γάρ σφι
οὐκ ἐξῆν ὕδωρ φορέεσθαι, ὑπό τε τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τοξευμάτων.

Diodorus (xi, 30) affirms that the Greek position was so well
defended by the nature of the ground, and so difficult of
attack, that Mardonius was prevented from making use of his
superior numbers. It is evident from the account of Herodotus
that this is quite incorrect. The position seems to have had no
protection except what it derived from the river Asôpus, and the
Greeks were ultimately forced to abandon it by the incessant
attacks of the Persian cavalry. The whole account, at once
diffuse and uninstructive, given by Diodorus of this battle (xi,
30-36), forms a strong contrast with the clear, impressive, and
circumstantial narrative of Herodotus.

[338] Herodot. ix, 38, 39.

[339] Herodot. ix, 40, 41.

[340] Herodot. ix, 42.

But while he overruled, by virtue of superior authority, the
objections of all around him, Persian as well as Greek, he could not
but feel daunted by their reluctant obedience, which he suspected
might arise from their having heard oracles or prophecies of
unfavorable augury. He therefore summoned the chief officers, Greek
as well as Persian, and put the question to them, whether they knew
any prophecy announcing that the Persians were doomed to destruction
in Greece. All were silent: some did not know the prophecies, but
others, Herodotus intimates, knew them full well, though they did
not dare to speak. Receiving no answer, Mardonius said, “Since ye
either do not know or will not tell, I, who know well, will myself
speak out. There is an oracle to the effect, that Persian invaders
of Greece shall plunder the temple of Delphi, and shall afterwards
all be destroyed. Now we, being aware of this, shall neither
go against that temple, nor try to plunder it: on that ground,
therefore, we shall not be destroyed. Rejoice ye, therefore, ye who
are well-affected to the Persians,—we shall get the better of the
Greeks.” With that he gave orders to prepare everything for a general
attack and battle on the morrow.[341]

[341] Herodot. ix, 42.

It is not improbable that the Orchomenian Thersander was present
at this interview, and may have reported it to Herodotus. But the
reflection of the historian himself is not the least curious part
of the whole, as illustrating the manner in which these prophecies
sunk into men’s minds, and determined their judgments. Herodotus
knew, though he does not cite it, the particular prophecy to which
Mardonius made allusion; and he pronounces, in the most affirmative
tone,[342] that it had no reference to the Persians: it referred to
an ancient invasion of Greece by the Illyrians and the Encheleis.
But both Bakis, from whom he quotes four lines, and Musæus had
prophesied, in the plainest manner, the destruction of the Persian
army on the banks of the Thermôdon and Asôpus. And these are the
prophecies which we must suppose the officers convoked by Mardonius
to have known also, though they did not dare to speak out: it was the
fault of Mardonius himself that he did not take warning.

[342] Herodot. ix, 43. Τοῦτον δ’ ἔγωγε τὸν χρησμὸν τὸν Μαρδόνιος
εἶπε ἐς Πέρσας ἔχειν, ἐς Ἰλλυρίους τε καὶ τὸν Ἐγχελέων ~στρατὸν
οἶδα πεποιημένον~, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐς Πέρσας. Ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν Βάκιδι ἐς
ταύτην τὴν μάχην ἔστι πεποιημένα, etc.

The attack of a multitude like that of Mardonius was not likely under
any circumstances to be made so rapidly as to take the Greeks by
surprise: but the latter were forewarned of it by a secret visit from
Alexander, king of Macedon; who, riding up to the Athenian advanced
posts in the middle of the night, desired to speak with Aristeidês
and the other generals. Announcing to them alone his name, and
proclaiming his earnest sympathy for the Grecian cause, as well as
the hazard which he incurred by this nightly visit,—he apprized them
that Mardonius, though eager for a battle long ago, could not by
any effort obtain favorable sacrifices, but was, nevertheless, even
in spite of this obstacle, determined on an attack the next morning.
“Be ye prepared accordingly; and if ye succeed in this war (said he)
remember to liberate me also from the Persian yoke: I too am a Greek
by descent, and thus risk my head because I cannot endure to see
Greece enslaved.”[343]

[343] Herodot. ix, 44-45. The language about the sacrifices is
remarkable,—λέγω δὲ ὦν ὅτι Μαρδονίῳ τε καὶ τῇ στρατιῇ οὐ ~δύναται
τὰ σφάγια καταθύμια γενέσθαι~· πάλαι γὰρ ἂν ἐμάχεσθε, etc.

Mardonius had tried many unavailing efforts to procure better
sacrifices: it _could_ not be done.

The communication of this important message, made by Aristeidês to
Pausanias, elicited from him a proposal not a little surprising
as coming from a Spartan general. He requested the Athenians to
change places with the Lacedæmonians in the line. “We Lacedæmonians
(said he) now stand opposed to the Persians and Medes, against whom
we have never yet contended, while ye Athenians have fought and
conquered them at Marathon. March ye then over to the right wing and
take our places, while we will take yours in the left wing, against
the Bœotians and Thessalians, with whose arms and attack we are
familiar.” The Athenians readily acceded, and the reciprocal change
of order was accordingly directed: nor was it yet quite completed
when day broke, and the Theban allies of Mardonius immediately took
notice of what had been done. That general commanded a corresponding
change in his own line, so as to place the native Persians once more
over against the Lacedæmonians: upon which Pausanias, seeing that his
manœuvre had failed, led back his Lacedæmonians to the right wing,
while a second movement on the part of Mardonius replaced both armies
in the order originally observed.[344]

[344] Herodot. ix, 47; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 16. Here, as on
many other occasions, Plutarch rather spoils than assists the
narrative of Herodotus.

No incident similar to this will be found throughout the whole course
of Lacedæmonian history. To evade encountering the best troops
in the enemy’s line, and to depart for this purpose from their
privileged post on the right wing, was a step well calculated to
lower them in the eyes of Greece, and could hardly have failed to
produce that effect, if the intention had been realized: it is at
the same time the highest compliment to the formidable reputation
of the native Persian troops,—a reputation recognized by Herodotus,
and well sustained at least by their personal bravery.[345] Nor can
we wonder that this publicly manifested reluctance on the part of
the leading troops in the Grecian army contributed much to exalt
the rash confidence of Mardonius: a feeling which Herodotus, in
Homeric style,[346] casts into the speech of a Persian herald sent
to upbraid the Lacedæmonians, and challenge them to a “single combat
with champions of equal numbers, Lacedæmonians against Persians.”
This herald, whom no one heard or cared for, and who serves but as
a mouthpiece for bringing out the feelings belonging to the moment,
was followed by something very real and terrible,—a vigorous attack
on the Greek line by the Persian cavalry; whose rapid motions, and
showers of arrows and javelins, annoyed the Greeks on this day more
than ever. The latter, as has been before stated, had no cavalry
whatever; nor do their light troops, though sufficiently numerous,
appear to have rendered any service, with the exception of the
Athenian bowmen. How great was the advantage gained by the Persian
cavalry, is shown by the fact that they for a time drove away the
Lacedæmonians from the fountain of Gargaphia, so as to choke it up
and render it unfit for use. As the army had been prevented by the
cavalry from resorting to the river Asôpus, this fountain had been
of late the only watering-place: and without it the position which
they then occupied became untenable,—while their provisions also were
exhausted, inasmuch as the convoys, from fear of the Persian cavalry,
could not descend from Kithæron to join them.[347]

[345] Herodot. ix, 71.

[346] Compare the reproaches of Hektor to Diomêdês (Iliad, viii,
161).

[347] Herodot. ix, 49, 50. Pausanias mentions that the Platæans
restored the fountain of Gargaphia after the victory (τὸ ὕδωρ
ἀνεσώσαντο); but he hardly seems to speak as if he had himself
seen it (ix, 4, 2).

In this dilemma, Pausanias summoned the Grecian chiefs to his tent,
and after an anxious debate the resolution was taken, in case
Mardonius should not bring on a general action in the course of the
day, to change their position during the night, when there would be
no interruption from the cavalry; and to occupy the ground called the
island, distant about ten furlongs in a direction nearly west, and
seemingly north of the town of Platæa, which was itself about twenty
furlongs distant: this island, improperly so denominated, included
the ground comprised between two branches of the river Oeroê,[348]
both of which flow from Kithæron, and, after flowing for a certain
time in channels about three furlongs apart, form a junction and run
in a northwesterly direction towards one of the recesses of the gulf
of Corinth,—quite distinct from the Asôpus, which, though also rising
near at hand in the lowest declivities under Kithæron, takes an
easterly direction and discharges itself into the sea opposite Eubœa.
When in this so-called island, the army would be secure of water from
the stream in their rear; nor would they, as now, expose an extended
breadth of front to a numerous hostile cavalry separated from them
only by the Asôpus.[349] It was farther resolved, that so soon as the
army should once be in occupation of the island, half of the troops
should forthwith march onward to disengage the convoys blocked up on
Kithæron and conduct them to the camp. Such was the plan settled in
council among the different Grecian chiefs; the march to be commenced
at the beginning of the second night-watch, when the enemy’s cavalry
would have completely withdrawn.

[348] See a good description of the ground in Colonel Leake,
Travels in Northern Greece, ch. xvi, vol. ii, p. 358.

[349] Herodot. ix, 51. Ἐς τοῦτον δὴ τὸν χῶρον ἐβουλεύσαντο
μεταστῆναι, ἵνα καὶ ὕδατι ἔχωσι χρᾶσθαι ἀφθόνῳ, καὶ οἱ ἱππέες
σφέας μὴ σινοίατο, ὥσπερ κατ’ ἰθὺ ἐόντων.

The last words have reference to the position of the two hostile
armies, extended front to front along the course of the Asôpus.

In spite of what Mardonius is said to have determined, he passed
the whole day without any general attack: but his cavalry, probably
elated by the recent demonstration of the Lacedæmonians, were on that
day more daring and indefatigable than ever, and inflicted much loss
as well as severe suffering;[350] insomuch that the centre of the
Greek force (Corinthians, Megarians, etc., between the Lacedæmonians
and Tegeans on the right, and the Athenians on the left), when
the hour arrived for retiring to the island, commenced their march
indeed, but forgot or disregarded the preconcerted plan and the
orders of Pausanias, in their impatience to obtain a complete shelter
against the attacks of the cavalry. Instead of proceeding to the
island, they marched a distance of twenty furlongs directly to the
town of Platæa, and took up a position in front of the Heræum, or
temple of Hêrê, where they were protected partly by the buildings,
partly by the comparatively high ground on which the town with its
temple stood. Between the position which the Greeks were about to
leave and that which they had resolved to occupy (_i. e._ between the
course of the Asôpus and that of the Oeroê), there appear to have
been a range of low hills: the Lacedæmonians, starting from the right
wing, had to march directly over these hills, while the Athenians,
from the left, were to turn them and get into the plain on the other
side.[351] Pausanias, apprized that the divisions of the centre had
commenced their night-march, and concluding of course that they
would proceed to the island according to orders, allowed a certain
interval of time in order to prevent confusion, and then directed
that the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans should also begin their movement
towards that same position. But here he found himself embarrassed by
an unexpected obstacle. The movement was retrograde, receding from
the enemy, and not consistent with the military honor of a Spartan;
nevertheless, most of the taxiarchs, or leaders of companies, obeyed
without murmuring; but Amompharetus, lochage or captain of that band
which Herodotus calls the lochus of Pitana,[352] obstinately refused.
Not having been present at the meeting in which the resolution had
been taken, he now heard it for the first time with astonishment
and disdain, declaring “that he for one would never so far disgrace
Sparta as to run away from the foreigner.”[353] Pausanias, with the
second in command, Euryanax, exhausted every effort to overcome his
reluctance: but they could by no means induce him to retreat; nor
did they dare to move without him, leaving his entire lochus exposed
alone to the enemy.[354]

[350] Herodot. ix, 52. κείνην μὲν τὴν ἡμέρην πᾶσαν, προσκειμένης
τῆς ἵππου, εἶχον πόνον ἄτρυτον.

[351] Herodot. ix, 56. Παυσανίης—σημῄνας ἀπῆγε διὰ τῶν κολωνῶν
τοὺς λοιποὺς πάντας· εἵποντο δὲ καὶ Τεγεῆται. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ
ταχθέντες ἤϊσαν τὰ ἔμπαλιν ἢ Λακεδαιμόνιοι. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε
ὄχθων ἀντείχοντο καὶ τῆς ὑπωρείης τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ,
κάτω τραφθέντες ἐς τὸ πεδίον.

With which we must combine another passage, c. 59, intimating
that the track of the Athenians led them to turn and get behind
the hills, which prevented Mardonius from seeing them, though
they were marching along the plain: Μαρδόνιος—ἐπεῖχε ἐπὶ
Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Τεγεήτας μούνους· Ἀθηναίους γὰρ τραπομένους ἐς
τὸ πεδίον ὑπὸ τῶν ὄχθων οὐ κατεώρα.

[352] There is on this point a difference between Thucydides and
Herodotus: the former affirms that there never was any Spartan
lochus so called (Thucyd. i, 21).

We have no means of reconciling the difference, nor can we be
certain that Thucydides is right in his negative comprehending
all past time—ὃς οὐδ’ ἐγένετο πώποτε.

[353] Herodot. ix, 53, 54.

[354] Herodot. ix, 52, 53.

Amidst the darkness of night, and in this scene of indecision and
dispute, an Athenian messenger on horseback reached Pausanias,
instructed to ascertain what was passing, and to ask for the last
directions: for in spite of the resolution taken after formal debate,
the Athenian generals still mistrusted the Lacedæmonians, and doubted
whether, after all, they would act as they had promised: the movement
of the central division having become known to them, they sent at
the last moment before they commenced their own march, to assure
themselves that the Spartans were about to move also. A profound,
and even an exaggerated mistrust, but too well justified by the
previous behavior of the Spartans towards Athens, is visible in this
proceeding:[355] yet it proved fortunate in its results,—for if the
Athenians, satisfied with executing their part in the preconcerted
plan, had marched at once to the island, the Grecian army would
have been severed without the possibility of reuniting, and the
issue of the battle might have proved altogether different. The
Athenian herald found the Lacedæmonians still stationary in their
position, and the generals in hot dispute with Amompharetus; who
despised the threat of being left alone to make head against the
Persians, and when reminded that the resolution had been taken by
general vote of the officers, took up with both hands a vast rock,
fit for the hands of Ajax or Hektor, and cast it at the feet of
Pausanias, saying—“This is _my_ pebble, wherewith I give my vote
not to run away from the strangers.” Pausanias denounced him as a
madman,—desiring the herald to report the scene of embarrassment
which he had just come to witness, and to entreat the Athenian
generals not to commence their retreat until the Lacedæmonians should
also be in march. In the mean time the dispute continued, and was
even prolonged by the perverseness of Amompharetus until the morning
began to dawn; when Pausanias, afraid to remain longer, gave the
signal for retreat,—calculating that the refractory captain, when he
saw his lochus really left alone, would probably make up his mind to
follow. Having marched about ten furlongs, across the hilly ground
which divided him from the island, he commanded a halt,—either to
await Amompharetus, if he chose to follow, or to be near enough to
render aid and save him, if he were rash enough to stand his ground
single-handed. Happily the latter, seeing that his general had really
departed, overcame his scruples, and followed him; overtaking and
joining the main body in its first halt near the river Moloeis and
the temple of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr.[356] The Athenians, commencing
their movement at the same time with Pausanias, got round the hills
to the plain on the other side and proceeded on their march towards
the island.

[355] Herodot. ix, 54, Ἀθηναῖοι—εἶχον ἀτρέμας σφέας αὐτοὺς ἵνα
ἐτάχθησαν, ἐπιστάμενοι τὰ Λακεδαιμονίων φρονήματα, ὡς ἄλλα
φρονεόντων καὶ ἄλλα λεγόντων.

[356] Herodot. xi. 56, 57.

When the day broke, the Persian cavalry were astonished to find the
Grecian position deserted. They immediately set themselves to the
pursuit of the Spartans, whose march lay along the higher and more
conspicuous ground, and whose progress had moreover been retarded
by the long delay of Amompharetus: the Athenians on the contrary,
marching without halt and being already behind the hills, were not
open to view. To Mardonius, this retreat of his enemy inspired an
extravagant and contemptuous confidence, which he vented in full
measure to the Thessalian Aleuadæ: “These are your boasted Spartans,
who changed their place just now in the line, rather than fight the
Persians, and have here shown by a barefaced flight what they are
really worth!” With that, he immediately directed his whole army to
pursue and attack, with the utmost expedition. The Persians crossed
the Asôpus, and ran after the Greeks at their best speed, pell-mell,
without any thought of order or preparations for overcoming
resistance: the army already rang with shouts of victory, in full
confidence of swallowing up the fugitives as soon as they were
overtaken.

The Asiatic allies all followed the example of this disorderly rush
forward:[357] but the Thebans and the other Grecian allies on the
right wing of Mardonius, appear to have maintained somewhat better
order.

[357] Herodot. ix, 59. ἐδίωκον ὡς ποδῶν ἕκαστος εἶχον, οὔτε κόσμῳ
οὐδενὶ κοσμηθέντες, οὔτε τάξι. Καὶ οὗτοι μὲν βοῇ τε καὶ ὁμίλῳ
ἐπήϊσαν, ὡς ἀναρπασόμενοι τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

Herodotus dwells especially on the reckless and disorderly manner
in which the Persians advanced: Plutarch, on the contrary, says
of Mardonius,—ἔχων ~συντεταγμένην~ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπεφέρετο τοῖς
Λακεδαιμονίοις, etc. (Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 17.)

Plutarch also says that Pausanias ἦγε τὴν ἄλλην δύναμιν ~πρὸς τὰς
Πλαταιὰς~, etc., which is quite contrary to the real narrative
of Herodotus. Pausanias intended to march to the island, not to
Platæa: he did not reach either the one or the other.

Pausanias had not been able to retreat farther than the neighborhood
of the Demetrion, or temple of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr, where he had
halted to take up Amompharetus. Overtaken first by the Persian
horse, and next by Mardonius with the main body, he sent a horseman
forthwith to apprize the Athenians, and to entreat their aid. Nor
were the Athenians slack in complying with his request: but they
speedily found themselves engaged in conflict against the Theban
allies of the enemy, and therefore unable to reach him.[358]
Accordingly, the Lacedæmonians and Tegeates had to encounter the
Persians single-handed, without any assistance from the other Greeks.
The Persians, on arriving within bowshot of their enemies, planted
in the ground the spiked extremities of their gerrha, or long wicker
shields, forming a continuous breastwork, from behind which they
poured upon the Greeks a shower of arrows:[359] their bows were of
the largest size, and drawn with no less power than skill. In spite
of the wounds and distress thus inflicted, Pausanias persisted in
the indispensable duty of offering the battle sacrifice, and the
victims were for some time unfavorable, so that he did not venture
to give orders for advance and close combat. Many were here wounded
or slain in the ranks,[360] among them the brave Kallikratês, the
handsomest and strongest man in the army: until Pausanias, wearied
out with this compulsory and painful delay, at length raised his eyes
to the conspicuous Heræum of the Platæans, and invoked the merciful
intervention of Hêrê to remove that obstacle which confined him
to the spot. Hardly had he pronounced the words, when the victims
changed and became favorable:[361] but the Tegeans, while he was
yet praying, anticipated the effect and hastened forward against
the enemy, followed by the Lacedæmonians as soon as Pausanias
gave the word. The wicker breastwork before the Persians was soon
overthrown by the Grecian charge: nevertheless the Persians, though
thus deprived of their tutelary hedge, and having no defensive
armor, maintained the fight with individual courage, the more
remarkable because it was totally unassisted by discipline or trained
collective movement, against the drilled array, the regulated step,
the well-defended persons, and the long spears, of the Greeks.[362]
They threw themselves upon the Lacedæmonians, seizing hold of
their spears, and breaking them: many of them devoted themselves in
small parties of ten to force by their bodies a way into the lines,
and to get to individual close combat with the short spear and the
dagger.[363] Mardonius himself, conspicuous upon a white horse, was
among the foremost warriors, and the thousand select troops who
formed his body-guard distinguished themselves beyond all the rest.
At length he was slain by the hand of a distinguished Spartan named
Aeimnêstus; his thousand guards mostly perished around him, and the
courage of the remaining Persians, already worn out by the superior
troops against which they had been long contending, was at last
thoroughly broken by the death of their general. They turned their
backs and fled, not resting until they got into the wooden fortified
camp constructed by Mardonius behind the Asôpus. The Asiatic allies
also, as soon as they saw the Persians defeated, took to flight
without striking a blow.[364]

[358] Herodot. ix, 60, 61.

[359] About the Persian bow, see Xenoph. Anabas. iii, 4, 17.

[360] Herod. ix, 72.

[361] Herodot. ix, 62. Καὶ τοῖσι Λακεδαιμονίοισι ~αὐτίκα~ μετὰ
τὴν εὐχὴν τὴν Παυσανίεω ἐγίνετο θυομένοισι τὰ σφάγια χρηστά.
Plutarch exaggerates the long-suffering of Pausanias (Aristeid.
c. 17, ad finem).

The lofty and conspicuous site of the Heræon, visible to
Pausanias at the distance where he was, is plainly marked in
Herodotus (ix, 61).

For incidents illustrating the hardships which a Grecian army
endured from its reluctance to move without favorable sacrifices,
see Xenophon, Anabasis, vi, 4, 10-25; Hellenic. iii, 2, 17.

[362] Herodot. ix, 62, 63. His words about the courage of the
Persians are remarkable: λήματι μέν νυν καὶ ῥώμῃ οὐκ ἕσσονες
ἦσαν οἱ Πέρσαι· ἄνοπλοι δὲ ἐόντες, καὶ πρὸς, ἀνεπιστήμονες ἦσαν,
καὶ οὐκ ὁμοῖοι τοῖσι ἐναντίοισι σοφίην ... πλεῖστον γάρ σφεας
ἐδηλέετο ἡ ἐσθὴς ἐρῆμος ἐοῦσα ὅπλων· πρὸς γὰρ ὁπλίτας ἐόντες
γυμνῆτες ἀγῶνα ἐποιεῦντο. Compare the striking conversation
between Xerxes and Demaratus (Herodot. vii, 104).

The description given by Herodotus of the gallant rush made by
these badly-armed Persians, upon the presented line of spears in
the Lacedæmonian ranks, may be compared with Livy (xxxii, 17),
a description of the Romans attacking the Macedonian phalanx,
and with the battle of Sempach (June, 1386), in which fourteen
hundred half-armed Swiss overcame a large body of fully-armed
Austrians, with an impenetrable front of projecting spears; which
for some time they were unable to break in upon, until at length
one of their warriors, Arnold von Winkelried, grasped an armful
of spears, and precipitated himself upon them, making a way for
his countrymen over his dead body. See Vogelin, Geschichte der
Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, ch. vi, p. 240, or indeed
any history of Switzerland, for a description of this memorable
incident.

[363] For the arms of the Persians, see Herodot. vii, 61.

Herodotus states in another place that the Persian troops adopted
the Egyptian breastplates (θώρηκας): probably this may have been
after the battle of Platæa. Even at this battle, the Persian
leaders on horseback had strong defensive armor, as we may see by
the case of Masistius, above narrated: by the time of the battle
of Kunaxa, the habit had become more widely diffused (Xenoph.
Anabas. i, 8, 6; Brisson, De Regno Persarum, lib. iii, p. 361),
for the cavalry at least.

[364] Herodot. ix, 64, 65.

The Athenians on the left, meanwhile, had been engaged in a serious
conflict with the Bœotians; especially the Theban leaders with the
hoplites immediately around them, who fought with great bravery,
but were at length driven back, after the loss of three hundred of
their best troops. The Theban cavalry, however, still maintained a
good front, protecting the retreat of the infantry and checking the
Athenian pursuit, so that the fugitives were enabled to reach Thebes
in safety; a better refuge than the Persian fortified camp.[365]
With the exception of the Thebans and Bœotians, none of the other
_medizing_ Greeks rendered any real service: instead of sustaining
or reinforcing the Thebans, they never once advanced to the charge,
but merely followed in the first movement of flight. So that, in
point of fact, the only troops in this numerous Perso-Grecian army
who really fought, were the native Persians and Sakæ on the left, and
the Bœotians on the right: the former against the Lacedæmonians, the
latter against the Athenians.[366]

[365] Herodot. ix, 67, 68.

[366] Herodot. ix, 67, 68. Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων τῶν μετὰ βασιλέος
ἐθελοκακεόντων ... καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων ὁ πᾶς ὅμιλος οὔτε
διαμαχεσάμενος οὐδενὶ οὔτε τι ἀποδεξάμενος ἔφυγεν.

Nor did even all the native Persians take part in the combat. A
body of forty thousand men under Artabazus, of whom some must
doubtless have been native Persians, left the field without fighting
and without loss. That general, seemingly the ablest man in the
Persian army, had been from the first disgusted with the nomination
of Mardonius as commander-in-chief, and had farther incurred his
displeasure by deprecating any general action. Apprized that
Mardonius was hastening forward to attack the retreating Greeks, he
marshalled his division and led them out towards the scene of action,
though despairing of success, and perhaps not very anxious that his
own prophecies should be contradicted. And such had been the headlong
impetuosity of Mardonius in his first forward movement,—so complete
his confidence of overwhelming the Greeks when he discovered their
retreat,—that he took no pains to insure the concerted action of his
whole army: accordingly, before Artabazus arrived at the scene of
action, he saw the Persian troops, who had been engaged under the
commander-in-chief, already defeated and in flight. Without making
the least attempt either to save them or to retrieve the battle,
he immediately gave orders to his own division to retreat: not
repairing, however, either to the fortified camp, or to Thebes, but
abandoning at once the whole campaign, and taking the direct road
through Phocis to Thessaly, Macedonia, and the Hellespont.[367]

[367] Herodot. ix, 66.

As the native Persians, the Sakæ, and the Bœotians, were the only
real combatants on the one side, so also were the Lacedæmonians,
Tegeans, and Athenians, on the other. It has already been mentioned
that the central troops of the Grecian army, disobeying the general
order of march, had gone during the night to the town of Platæa
instead of to the island. They were thus completely severed from
Pausanias, and the first thing which they heard about the battle,
was, that the Lacedæmonians were gaining the victory. Elate with
this news, and anxious to come in for some share of the honor, they
rushed to the scene of action, without any heed of military order;
the Corinthians taking the direct track across the hills, while
the Megarians, Phliasians, and others, marched by the longer route
along the plain, so as to turn the hills and arrive at the Athenian
position. The Theban horse under Asôpodôrus, employed in checking
the pursuit of the victorious Athenian hoplites, seeing these fresh
troops coming up in thorough disorder, charged them vigorously, and
drove them back to take refuge in the high ground, with the loss
of six hundred men.[368] But this partial success had no effect in
mitigating the ruin of the general defeat.

[368] Herodot. ix, 69.

Following up their pursuit, the Lacedæmonians proceeded to attack
the wooden redoubt wherein the Persians had taken refuge. But though
they were here aided by all or most of the central Grecian divisions,
who had taken no part in the battle, they were yet so ignorant of
the mode of assailing walls, that they made no progress, and were
completely baffled, until the Athenians arrived to their assistance.
The redoubt was then stormed, not without a gallant and prolonged
resistance on the part of its defenders. The Tegeans, being the first
to penetrate into the interior, plundered the rich tent of Mardonius,
whose manger for his horses, made of brass, remained long afterwards
exhibited in their temple of Athênê Alea,—while his silver-footed
throne, and cimeter[369] were preserved in the acropolis of Athens,
along with the breastplate of Masistius. Once within the wall,
effective resistance ceased, and the Greeks slaughtered without mercy
as well as without limit; so that if we are to credit Herodotus,
there survived only three thousand men out of the three hundred
thousand which had composed the army of Mardonius,—save and except
the forty thousand men who accompanied Artabazus in his retreat.[370]
Respecting these numbers, the historian had probably little to give
except some vague reports, without any pretence of computation: about
the Grecian loss, his statement deserves more attention, when he
tells us that there perished ninety-one Spartans, sixteen Tegeans,
and fifty-two Athenians. Herein, however, is not included the loss of
the Megarians when attacked by the Theban cavalry, nor is the number
of slain Lacedæmonians, not Spartans, specified; while even the other
numbers actually stated are decidedly smaller than the probable
truth, considering the multitude of Persian arrows and the unshielded
right side of the Grecian hoplite. On the whole, the affirmation of
Plutarch, that not less than thirteen hundred and sixty Greeks were
slain in the action, appears probable: all doubtless hoplites,—for
little account was then made of the light-armed, nor indeed are we
told that they took any active part in the battle.[371] Whatever may
have been the numerical loss of the Persians, this defeat proved
the total ruin of their army: but we may fairly presume that many
were spared and sold into slavery,[372] while many of the fugitives
probably found means to join the retreating division of Artabazus.
That general made a rapid march across Thessaly and Macedonia,
keeping strict silence about the recent battle, and pretending to be
sent on a special enterprise by Mardonius, whom he reported to be
himself approaching. If Herodotus is correct (though it may well be
doubted whether the change of sentiment in Thessaly and the other
_medizing_ Grecian states was so rapid as he implies), Artabazus
succeeded in traversing these countries before the news of the battle
became generally known, and then retreated by the straightest and
shortest route through the interior of Thrace to Byzantium, from
whence he passed into Asia: the interior tribes, unconquered and
predatory, harassed his retreat considerably; but we shall find long
afterwards Persian garrisons in possession of many principal places
on the Thracian coast.[373] It will be seen that Artabazus afterwards
rose higher than ever in the estimation of Xerxes.

[369] Herodot. ix, 70; Demosthenês cont. Timokrat. p. 741, c. 33.
Pausanias (i, 27, 2) doubts whether this was really the cimeter
of Mardonius, contending that the Lacedæmonians would never have
permitted the Athenians to take it.

[370] Herodot. ix, 70: compare Æschyl. Pers. 805-824. He singles
out “the Dorian spear” as the great weapon of destruction to the
Persians at Platæa,—very justly. Dr. Blomfield is surprised at
this compliment; but it is to be recollected that all the earlier
part of the tragedy had been employed in setting forth the glory
of Athens at Salamis, and he might well afford to give the
Peloponnesians the credit which they derived at Platæa. Pindar
distributes the honor between Sparta and Athens in like manner
(Pyth. i, 76).

[371] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 19. Kleidemus, quoted by Plutarch,
stated that all the fifty-two Athenians who perished belonged
to the tribe Æantis, which distinguished itself in the Athenian
ranks. But it seems impossible to believe that no citizens
belonging to the other nine tribes were killed.

[372] Diodorus, indeed, states that Pausanias was so apprehensive
of the numbers of the Persians, that he forbade his soldiers to
give quarter or take any prisoners (xi, 32); but this is hardly
to be believed, in spite of his assertion. His statement that the
Greeks lost ten thousand men is still less admissible.

[373] Herodot. ix, 89. The allusions of Demosthenês to Perdikkas
king of Macedonia, who is said to have attacked the Persians
on their flight from Platæa, and to have rendered their ruin
complete, are too loose to deserve attention; more especially as
Perdikkas was _not then_ king of Macedonia (Demosthenês cont.
Aristokrat. pp. 687, c. 51; and περὶ Συντάξεως, p. 173, c. 9).

Ten days did the Greeks employ after their victory, first in
burying the slain, next in collecting and apportioning the booty.
The Lacedæmonians, the Athenians, the Tegeans, the Megarians, and
the Phliasians, each buried their dead apart, erecting a separate
tomb in commemoration: the Lacedæmonians, indeed, distributed their
dead into three fractions, in three several burial-places: one for
those champions who enjoyed individual renown at Sparta, and among
whom were included the most distinguished men slain in the recent
battle, such as Poseidonius, Amompharetus, the refractory captain,
Philokyon, and Kallikratês,—a second for the other Spartans and
Lacedæmonians,[374]—and a third for the Helots. Besides these
sepulchral monuments, erected in the neighborhood of Platæa by those
cities whose citizens had really fought and fallen, there were
several similar monuments to be seen in the days of Herodotus, raised
by other cities which falsely pretended to the same honor, with the
connivance and aid of the Platæans.[375] The body of Mardonius was
discovered among the slain, and treated with respect by Pausanias,
who is even said to have indignantly repudiated advice offered to
him by an Æginetan, that he should retaliate upon it the ignominious
treatment inflicted by Xerxes upon the dead Leonidas.[376] On the
morrow, the body was stolen away and buried; by whom, was never
certainly known, for there were many different pretenders who
obtained reward on this plea from Artyntês, the son of Mardonius: the
funereal monument was yet to be seen in the time of the traveller
Pausanias.[377]

[374] Herodot. ix, 84. Herodotus indeed assigns this second
burial-place only to the other _Spartans_, apart from the Select.
He takes no notice of the Lacedæmonians not Spartans, either in
the battle or in reference to burial, though he had informed us
that five thousand of them were included in the army. Some of
them must have been slain, and we may fairly presume that they
were buried along with the Spartan citizens generally. As to
the word ἱρέας, or εἴρενας, or ἱππέας (the two last being both
conjectural readings), it seems impossible to arrive at any
certainty: we do not know by what name these select warriors were
called.

[375] Herodot. ix, 85. Τῶν δ’ ἄλλων ὅσοι καὶ φαίνονται ἐν
Πλαταιῇσι ἐόντες τάφοι, τούτους δὲ, ~ὡς ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι~,
ἐπαισχυνομένους τῇ ἀπεστοῖ τῆς μάχης, ἑκάστους χώματα χῶσαι
κεινὰ, τῶν ἐπιγινομένων εἵνεκεν ἀνθρώπων· ἐπεὶ καὶ Αἰγινητέων
ἐστὶ αὐτόθι καλεόμενος τάφος, τὸν ἐγὼ ἀκούω καὶ δέκα ἔτεσι
ὕστερον μετὰ ταῦτα, δεηθέντων τῶν Αἰγινητέων, χῶσαι Κλεάδην τὸν
Αὐτοδίκου, ἄνδρα Πλαταιέα, πρόξεινον ἐόντα αὐτῶν.

This is a curious statement, derived by Herodotus doubtless from
personal inquiries made at Platæa.

[376] Herodot. ix, 78, 79. This suggestion, so abhorrent to
Grecian feeling, is put by the historian into the mouth of
the Æginetan Lampôn. In my preceding note, I have alluded to
another statement made by Herodotus, not very creditable to the
Æginetans: there is, moreover, a third (ix, 80), in which he
represents them as having cheated the Helots in their purchases
of the booty. We may presume him to have heard all these
anecdotes at Platæa: at the time when he probably visited that
place, not long before the Peloponnesian war, the inhabitants
were united in the most intimate manner with Athens, and
doubtless sympathized in the hatred of the Athenians against
Ægina. It does not from hence follow that the stories are all
untrue. I disbelieve, indeed, the advice said to have been given
by Lampôn to crucify the body of Mardonius,—which has more the
air of a poetical contrivance for bringing out an honorable
sentiment, than of a real incident. But there seems no reason to
doubt the truth of the other two stories. Herodotus does but too
rarely specify his informants: it is interesting to scent out the
track in which his inquiries have been prosecuted.

After the battle of Kunaxa, and the death of Cyrus the younger,
his dead body had the head and hands cut off, by order of
Artaxerxes, and nailed to a cross (Xenoph. Anab. i, 10, 1; iii,
1, 17).

[377] Herodot. ix, 84; Pausanias, ix, 2, 2.

The spoil was rich and multifarious,—gold and silver in Darics as
well as in implements and ornaments, carpets, splendid arms and
clothing, horses, camels, etc., even the magnificent tent of Xerxes,
left on his retreat with Mardonius, was included.[378] By order of
the general Pausanias, the Helots collected all the valuable articles
into one spot for division; not without stealing many of the golden
ornaments, which, in ignorance of the value, they were persuaded
by the Æginetans to sell as brass. After reserving a tithe for the
Delphian Apollo, together with ample offerings for the Olympic Zeus
and the Isthmian Poseidon, as well as for Pausanias as general,—the
remaining booty was distributed among the different contingents
of the army in proportion to their respective numbers.[379] The
concubines of the Persian chiefs were among the prizes distributed:
there were probably however among them many of Grecian birth,
restored to their families; and one especially, overtaken in her
chariot amidst the flying Persians, with rich jewels and a numerous
suite, threw herself at the feet of Pausanias himself, imploring his
protection. She proved to be the daughter of his personal friend
Hegetoridês, of Kos, carried off by the Persian Pharandatês; and he
had the satisfaction of restoring her to her father.[380] Large as
the booty collected was, there yet remained many valuable treasures
buried in the ground, which the Platæan inhabitants afterwards
discovered and appropriated.

[378] Herodot. ix, 80, 81: compare vii, 41-83.

[379] Diodorus (xi, 33) states this proportional distribution.
Herodotus only says—ἔλαβον ἕκαστοι τῶν ἄξιοι ἦσαν (ix, 81).

[380] Herodot. ix, 76, 80, 81, 82. The fate of these female
companions of the Persian grandees, on the taking of the camp by
an enemy, forms a melancholy picture here as well as at Issus,
and even at Kunaxa: see Diodor. xvii, 35; Quintus Curtius, iii,
xi, 21; Xenoph. Anab. i, 10, 2.

The real victors in the battle of Platæa were the Lacedæmonians,
Athenians, and Tegeans: the Corinthians and others, forming part of
the army opposed to Mardonius, did not reach the field until the
battle was ended, though they doubtless aided both in the assault of
the fortified camp and in the subsequent operations against Thebes,
and were universally recognized, in inscriptions and panegyrics,
among the champions who had contributed to the liberation of
Greece.[381] It was not till after the taking of the Persian camp
that the contingents of Elis and Mantineia, who may perhaps have been
among the convoys prevented by the Persian cavalry from descending
the passes of Kithæron, first reached the scene of action. Mortified
at having missed their share in the glorious exploit, the new-comers
were at first eager to set off in pursuit of Artabazus: but the
Lacedæmonian commander forbade them, and they returned home without
any other consolation than that of banishing their generals for not
having led them forth more promptly.[382]

[381] Plutarch animadverts severely (De Malign. Herodot. p. 873;
compare Plut. Aristeid. c. 19) upon Herodotus, because he states
that none of the Greeks had any share in the battle of Platæa
except the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians: the orator
Lysias repeats the same statement (Oratio Funebr. c. 9).

If this were the fact (Plutarch asks) how comes it that the
inscriptions and poems of the time recognize the exploit as
performed by the whole Grecian army, Corinthians and others
included? But these inscriptions do not really contradict what is
affirmed by Herodotus. The actual battle happened to be fought
only by a part of the collective Grecian army; but this happened
in a great measure by accident; the rest were little more than a
mile off, and until within a few hours had been occupying part of
the same continuous line of position; moreover, if the battle had
lasted a little longer, they would have come up in time to render
actual help. They would naturally be considered, therefore, as
entitled to partake in the glory of the entire result.

When however in after-times a stranger visited Platæa, and saw
Lacedæmonian, Tegean, and Athenian tombs, but no Corinthian nor
Æginetan, etc., he would naturally inquire how it happened that
none of these latter had fallen in the battle, and would then
be informed that they were not really present at it. Hence the
motive for these cities to erect empty sepulchral monuments on
the spot, as Herodotus informs us that they afterwards did or
caused to be done by individual Platæans.

[382] Herodot. ix, 77.

There yet remained the most efficient ally of Mardonius,—the city
of Thebes; which Pausanias summoned on the eleventh day after the
battle, requiring that the _medizing_ leaders should be delivered
up, especially Timêgenidas and Attagînus. On receiving a refusal, he
began to batter their walls, and to adopt the still more effective
measure of laying waste their territory,—giving notice that the work
of destruction would be continued until these chiefs were given up.
After twenty days of endurance, the latter at length proposed, if
it should prove that Pausanias peremptorily required their persons
and refused to accept a sum of money in commutation, to surrender
themselves voluntarily as the price of liberation for their country.
A negotiation was accordingly entered into with Pausanias, and the
persons demanded were surrendered to him, excepting Attagînus, who
found means to escape at the last moment. His sons, whom he left
behind, were delivered up as substitutes, but Pausanias refused to
touch them, with the just remark, which in those times was even
generous,[383] that they were nowise implicated in the _medism_
of their father. Timêgenidas and the remaining prisoners were
carried off to Corinth, and immediately put to death, without the
smallest discussion or form of trial: Pausanias was apprehensive
that if any delay or consultation were granted, their wealth and
that of their friends would effectually purchase voices for their
acquittal,—indeed, the prisoners themselves had been induced to give
themselves up partly in that expectation.[384] It is remarkable that
Pausanias himself, only a few years afterwards, when attainted of
treason, returned and surrendered himself at Sparta, under similar
hopes of being able to buy himself off by money.[385] In this hope,
indeed, he found himself deceived, as Timêgenidas had been deceived
before: but the fact is not the less to be noted, as indicating
the general impression that the leading men in a Grecian city were
usually open to bribes in judicial matters, and that individuals
superior to this temptation were rare exceptions. I shall have
occasion to dwell upon this recognized untrustworthiness of the
leading Greeks when I come to explain the extremely popular cast of
the Athenian judicature.

[383] See, a little above in this chapter, the treatment of the
wife and children of the Athenian senator Lykidas (Herodot. ix,
5). Compare also Herodot. iii, 116; ix, 120.

[384] Herodot. ix, 87, 88.

[385] Thucyd. i, 131. καὶ πιστεύων χρήμασι διαλύσειν τὴν
διαβολήν. Compare Thucyd. viii, 45, where he states that the
trierarchs and generals of the Lacedæmonian and allied fleet,
all except Hermokratês of Syracuse, received bribes from
Tissaphernes to betray the interests both of their seamen and of
their country: also c. 49 of the same book about the Lacedæmonian
general Astyochus. The bribes received by the Spartan kings
Leotychidês and Pleistoanax are recorded (Herodot. vi, 72;
Thucyd. ii, 21).

Whether there was any positive vote taken among the Greeks respecting
the prize of valor at the battle of Platæa, may well be doubted: and
the silence of Herodotus goes far to negative an important statement
of Plutarch, that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians were on the point
of coming to an open rupture, each thinking themselves entitled to
the prize,—that Aristeidês appeased the Athenians, and prevailed
upon them to submit to the general decision of the allies,—and that
Megarian and Corinthian leaders contrived to elude the dangerous
rock by bestowing the prize on the Platæans, to which proposition
both Aristeidês and Pausanias acceded.[386] But it seems that the
general opinion recognized the Lacedæmonians and Pausanias as bravest
among the brave, seeing that they had overcome the best troops of
the enemy and slain the general. In burying their dead warriors,
the Lacedæmonians singled out for peculiar distinction Philokyon,
Poseidonius, and Amompharetus the lochage, whose conduct in the
fight atoned for his disobedience to orders. There was one Spartan,
however, who had surpassed them all,—Aristodêmus, the single survivor
of the troop of Leonidas at Thermopylæ. Having ever since experienced
nothing but disgrace and insult from his fellow-citizens, this
unfortunate man had become reckless of life, and at Platæa he stepped
forth single-handed from his place in the ranks, performing deeds
of the most heroic valor, and determined to regain by his death the
esteem of his countrymen. But the Spartans refused to assign to him
the same funereal honors as were paid to the other distinguished
warriors, who had manifested exemplary forwardness and skill, yet
without any desperate rashness, and without any previous taint such
as to render life a burden to them. Subsequent valor might be held to
efface this taint, but could not suffice to exalt Aristodêmus to a
level with the most honored citizens.[387]

[386] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 20; De Herodot. Malign. p. 873.

[387] Herodot. iv, 71, 72.

But though we cannot believe the statement of Plutarch, that the
Platæans received by general vote the prize of valor, it is certain
that they were largely honored and recompensed, as the proprietors
of that ground on which the liberation of Greece had been achieved.
The market-place and centre of their town was selected as the scene
for the solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, offered up by Pausanias,
after the battle, to Zeus Eleutherius, in the name and presence of
all the assembled allies. The local gods and heroes of the Platæan
territory, who had been invoked in prayer before the battle, and who
had granted their soil as a propitious field for the Greek arms,
were made partakers of this ceremony, and witnesses as well as
guarantees of the engagements with which it was accompanied.[388]
The Platæans, now re-entering their city, which the Persian invasion
had compelled them to desert, were invested with the honorable duty
of celebrating the periodical sacrifice in commemoration of this
great victory, as well as of rendering care and religious service
at the tombs of the fallen warriors. As an aid to enable them to
discharge this obligation, which probably might have pressed hard
upon them at a time when their city was half-ruined and their fields
unsown, they received out of the prize-money the large allotment of
eighty talents, which was partly employed in building and adorning a
handsome temple of Athênê,—the symbol probably of renewed connection
with Athens. They undertook to render religious honors every year
to the tombs of the warriors, and to celebrate in every fifth year
the grand public solemnity of the Eleutheria with gymnastic matches
analogous to the other great festival games of Greece.[389] In
consideration of the discharge of these duties, together with the
sanctity of the ground, Pausanias, and the whole body of allies,
bound themselves by oath to guarantee the autonomy of Platæa, and
the inviolability of her territory. This was an emancipation of the
town from the bond of the Bœotian federation, and from the enforcing
supremacy of Thebes as its chief.

[388] Thucyd. ii, 71, 72. So the Roman emperor Vitellius, on
visiting the field of Bebriacum, where his troops had recently
been victorious, “instaurabat sacrum Diis loci.” (Tacitus,
Histor. ii, 70.)

[389] Thucyd. ii, 71; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 19-21; Strabo, ix,
p. 412; Pausanias, ix, 2, 4.

The Eleutheria were celebrated on the fourth of the Attic month
Boedromion, which was the day on which the battle itself was
fought; while the annual decoration of the tombs, and ceremonies
in honor of the deceased, took place on the sixteenth of the
Attic month Mæmaktêrion. K. F. Hermann (Gottesdienstliche
Alterthümer der Griechen, ch. 63, note 9) has treated these two
celebrations as if they were one.

But the engagement of the allies appears to have had other objects
also, larger than that of protecting Platæa, or establishing
commemorative ceremonies. The defensive league against the Persians
was again sworn to by all of them, and rendered permanent: an
aggregate force of ten thousand hoplites, one thousand cavalry,
and one hundred triremes, for the purpose of carrying on the war,
was agreed to and promised, the contingent of each ally being
specified: moreover, the town of Platæa was fixed on as the annual
place of meeting, where deputies from all of them were annually to
assemble.[390] This resolution is said to have been adopted on the
proposition of Aristeidês, whose motives it is not difficult to
trace. Though the Persian army had sustained a signal defeat, no
one knew how soon it might reassemble, or be reinforced; indeed,
even later, after the battle of Mykalê had become known, a fresh
invasion of the Persians was still regarded as not improbable,[391]
nor did any one then anticipate that extraordinary fortune and
activity whereby the Athenians afterwards organized an alliance such
as to throw Persia on the defensive. Moreover, the northern half of
Greece was still _medizing_, either in reality or in appearance,
and new efforts on the part of Xerxes might probably keep up his
ascendency in those parts. Now assuming the war to be renewed,
Aristeidês and the Athenians had the strongest interest in providing
a line of defence which should cover Attica as well as Peloponnesus,
and in preventing the Peloponnesians from confining themselves to
their isthmus, as they had done before. To take advantage for this
purpose of the new-born reverence and gratitude which now bound
the Lacedæmonians to Platæa, was an idea eminently suitable to the
moment, though the unforeseen subsequent start of Athens, combined
with other events, prevented both the extensive alliance and the
inviolability of Platæa, projected by Aristeidês, from taking
effect.[392]

[390] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 21.

[391] Thucyd. i, 90.

[392] It is to this general and solemn meeting, held at Platæa
after the victory, that we might probably refer another vow
noticed by the historians and orators of the subsequent century,
if that vow were not of suspicious authenticity. The Greeks,
while promising faithful attachment, and continued peaceful
dealing among themselves, and engaging at the same time to amerce
in a tithe of their property all who had _medized_,—are said to
have vowed that they would not repair or rebuild the temples
which the Persian invader had burnt; but would leave them in
their half-ruined condition as a monument of his sacrilege.
Some of the injured temples near Athens were seen in their
half-burnt state even by the traveller Pausanias (x, 35, 2),
in his time. Periklês, forty years after the battle, tried to
convoke a Pan-Hellenic assembly at Athens, for the purpose of
deliberating what should be done with these temples (Plutarch,
Periklês, c. 17). Yet Theopompus pronounced this alleged oath to
be a fabrication, though both the orator Lykurgus and Diodorus
profess to report it verbatim. We may safely assert that the
oath, _as they give it_, is not genuine; but perhaps the vow of
tithing those who had voluntarily joined Xerxes, which Herodotus
refers to an earlier period, when success was doubtful, may now
have been renewed in the moment of victory: see Diodor. ix,
29; Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 19, p. 193; Polybius, ix, 33;
Isokrates, Or. iv; Panegyr. c. 41, p. 74; Theopompus, Fragm. 167,
ed. Didot; Suidas, v. Δεκατεύειν, Cicero de Republicâ, iii, 9,
and the beginning of the chapter last but one preceding, of this
history.

On the same day that Pausanias and the Grecian land army conquered
at Platæa, the naval armament under Leotychidês and Xanthippus
was engaged in operations hardly less important, at Mykalê on the
Asiatic coast. The Grecian commanders of the fleet, which numbered
one hundred and ten triremes, having advanced as far as Delos, were
afraid to proceed farther eastward, or to undertake any offensive
operations against the Persians at Samos, for the rescue of
Ionia,—although Ionian envoys, especially from Chios and Samos, had
urgently solicited aid both at Sparta and at Delos. Three Samians,
one of them named Hegesistratus, came to assure Leotychidês, that
their countrymen were ready to revolt from the despot Theomêstor,
whom the Persians had installed there, so soon as the Greek fleet
should appear off the island. In spite of emphatic appeals to
the community of religion and race, Leotychidês was long deaf to
the entreaty; but his reluctance gradually gave way before the
persevering earnestness of the orator. While yet not thoroughly
determined, he happened to ask the Samian speaker what was his name.
To which the latter replied, “Hegesistratus, _i. e._ army-leader.” “I
accept Hegesistratus as an omen (replied Leotychidês, struck with
the significance of this name), pledge thou thy faith to accompany
us,—let thy companions prepare the Samians to receive us, and we will
go forthwith.” Engagements were at once exchanged, and while the
other two envoys were sent forward to prepare matters in the island,
Hegesistratus remained to conduct the fleet, which was farther
encouraged by favorable sacrifices, and by the assurances of the
prophet Dêiphonus, hired from the Corinthian colony of Apollonia.[393]

[393] Herodot. ix, 91, 92, 95; viii, 132, 133. The prophet of
Mardonius at Platæa bore the same name, and was probably the more
highly esteemed for it (Herodot. ix, 37).

Diodorus states the fleet as comprising two hundred and fifty
triremes (xi, 34).

The anecdotes respecting the Apolloniate Euenius, the father
of Deïphonus, will be found curious and interesting (Herodot.
ix, 98, 94). Euenius, as a recompense for having been unjustly
blinded by his countrymen, had received from the gods the grant
of prophecy transmissible to his descendants: a new prophetic
breed was thus created, alongside of the Iamids, Telliads,
Klytiads, etc.

When they reached the Heræum near Kalami in Samos,[394] and had
prepared themselves for a naval engagement, they discovered that
the enemy’s fleet had already been withdrawn from the island to
the neighboring continent. For the Persian commanders had been so
disheartened with the defeat of Salamis that they were not disposed
to fight again at sea: we do not know the numbers of their fleet,
but perhaps a considerable proportion of it may have consisted of
Ionic Greeks, whose fidelity was now very doubtful. Having abandoned
the idea of a sea-fight, they permitted their Phenician squadron to
depart, and sailed with their remaining fleet to the promontory of
Mykalê near Miletus.[395] Here they were under the protection of a
land-force of sixty thousand men, under the command of Tigranês,—the
main reliance of Xerxes for the defence of Ionia: the ships were
dragged ashore, and a rampart of stones and stakes was erected to
protect them, while the defending army lined the shore, and seemed
amply sufficient to repel attack from seaward.[396]

[394] Herodot. ix, 96. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένοντο τῆς Σαμίης πρὸς
Καλάμοισι, οἱ μὲν αὐτοῦ ὁρμισάμενοι ~κατὰ τὸ Ἡραῖον τὸ ταύτῃ~,
παρεσκευάζοντο ἐς ναυμαχίην.

It is by no means certain that the Heræum here indicated is the
celebrated temple which stood near the city of Samos (iii, 80):
the words of Herodotus rather seem to indicate that another
temple of Hêrê, in some other part of the island, is intended.

[395] Herodotus describes the Persian position by topographical
indications known to his readers, but not open to be determined
by us,—Gæson, Skolopœis, the chapel of Dêmêtêr, built by
Philistus, one of the primitive colonists of Miletus, etc. (ix,
96): from the language of Herodotus, we may suppose that Gæson
was the name of a town as well as of a river (Ephonas ap. Athenæ.
vi, p. 311).

The eastern promontory (cape Poseidion) of Samos was separated
only by seven stadia from Mykalê (Strabo, xiv, p. 637), near to
the place where Glaukê was situated (Thucyd. viii. 79),—modern
observers make the distance rather more than a mile (Poppo,
Prolegg. ad Thucyd. vol. ii, p. 465).

[396] Herodot. ix, 96, 97.

It was not long before the Greek fleet arrived. Disappointed of their
intention of fighting, by the flight of the enemy from Samos, they
had at first proposed either to return home, or to turn aside to the
Hellespont: but they were at last persuaded by the Ionian envoys
to pursue the enemy’s fleet and again offer battle at Mykalê. On
reaching that point, they discovered that the Persians had abandoned
the sea, intending to fight only on land. So much had the Greeks
now become emboldened, that they ventured to disembark and attack
the united land-force and sea-force before them: but since much of
their chance of success depended on the desertion of the Ionians, the
first proceeding of Leotychidês was, to copy the previous manœuvre of
Themistoklês, when retreating from Artemisium, at the watering-places
of Eubœa. Sailing along close to the coast, he addressed, through
a herald of loud voice, earnest appeals to the Ionians among the
enemy to revolt; calculating, even if they did not listen to him,
that he should at least render them mistrusted by the Persians. He
then disembarked his troops and marshalled them for the purpose of
attacking the Persian camp on land; while the Persian generals,
surprised by this daring manifestation, and suspecting, either from
his manœuvre or from previous evidences, that the Ionians were in
secret collusion with him, ordered the Samian contingent to be
disarmed, and the Milesians to retire to the rear of the army, for
the purpose of occupying the various mountain roads up to the summit
of Mykalê,—with which the latter were familiar as a part of their
own territory.[397]

[397] Herodot. ix, 98, 99, 104.

Serving as these Greeks in the fleet were, at a distance from their
own homes, and having left a powerful army of Persians and Greeks
under Mardonius in Bœotia, they were of course full of anxiety lest
his arms might prove victorious and extinguish the freedom of their
country. It was under these feelings of solicitude for their absent
brethren that they disembarked, and were made ready for attack by the
afternoon. But it was the afternoon of an ever-memorable day,—the
fourth of the month Boëdromion (about September) 479 B. C. By a
remarkable coincidence, the victory of Platæa in Bœotia had been
gained by Pausanias that very morning. At the moment when the Greeks
were advancing to the charge, a divine phêmê, or message, flew into
the camp,—whilst a herald’s staff was seen floated to the shore by
the western wave, the symbol of electric transmission across the
Ægean;—the revelation, sudden, simultaneous, irresistible, struck
at once upon the minds of all, as if the multitude had one common
soul and sense, acquainting them that on that very morning their
countrymen in Bœotia had gained a complete victory over Mardonius. At
once the previous anxiety was dissipated, and the whole army, full
of joy and confidence, charged with redoubled energy. Such is the
account given by Herodotus,[398] and doubtless universally accepted
in his time, when the combatants of Mykalê were alive to tell their
own story: he moreover mentions another of those coincidences which
the Greek mind always seized upon with so much avidity, there was a
chapel of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr close to the field of battle at Mykalê
as well as at Platæa. Diodorus and other later writers,[399] who
wrote when the impressions of the time had vanished, and when divine
interventions were less easily and literally admitted, treat the
whole proceeding as if it were a report designedly circulated by the
generals, for the purpose of encouraging their army.

[398] Herodot. ix, 100, 101. ἰοῦσι δέ σφι (Ἕλλησι) ~φήμη τε
ἐσέπτατο ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον πᾶν~, καὶ κηρυκήϊον ἐφάνη ἐπὶ τῆς
κυματωγῆς κείμενον. ~ἡ δὲ φήμη διῆλθέ σφι ὧδε~, ὡς οἱ Ἕλληνες
τὴν Μαρδονίου στρατιὴν νικῷεν ἐν Βοιωτίῃ μαχόμενοι. Δῆλα δὴ
πολλοῖσι τεκμηρίοισί ἐστι τὰ θεῖα τῶν πρηγμάτων· εἰ καὶ τότε
τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρης συμπιπτούσης τοῦ τε ἐν Πλαταιῇσι καὶ τοῦ ἐν
Μυκάλῃ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι τρώματος, φήμη τοῖσι Ἕλλησι τοῖσι ταύτῃ
ἐσαπίκετο, ὥστε θαρσῆσαί τε τὴν στρατιὴν πολλῷ μᾶλλον, καὶ
ἐθέλειν προθυμότερον κινδυνεύειν ... γεγονέναι δὲ νίκην τῶν μετὰ
Παυσανίεω Ἑλλήνων ~ὀρθῶς σφι ἡ φήμη συνέβαινε ἐλθοῦσα~· τὸ μὲν
γὰρ ἐν Πλαταιῇσι πρωῒ ἔτι τῆς ἡμέρης ἐγίνετο· τὸ δὲ ἐν Μυκάλῃ,
περὶ δείλην ... ἦν δὲ ἀῤῥωδίη σφι πρὶν τὴν φήμην ἐσαπικέσθαι,
οὔτι περὶ σφέων αὐτῶν οὕτω, ὡς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, μὴ περὶ Μαρδονίῳ
πταίσῃ ἡ Ἑλλάς, ὡς μέντοι ~ἡ κλῃδὼν αὕτη σφι ἐσέπτατο~, μᾶλλόν
τι καὶ ταχύτερον τὴν πρόσοδον ἐποιεῦντο: compare Plutarch, Paul.
Emilius, c. 24, 25, about the battle of Pydna. The φήμη which
circulated through the assembled army of Mardonius in Bœotia,
respecting his intention to kill the Phocians, turned out
incorrect (Herodot. ix, 17).

Two passages in Æschines (cont. Timarchum. c. 27, p. 57, and
De Fals. Legat. c. 45, p. 290) are peculiarly valuable as
illustrating the ancient idea of Φήμη,—a divine voice, or vocal
goddess, generally considered as informing a crowd of persons
at once, or moving them all by one and the same unanimous
feeling,—the Vox Dei passing into the Vox Populi. There was an
altar to Φήμη at Athens (Pausan. i, 17, 1); compare Hesiod. Opp.
Di. 761, and the Ὄσσα of Homer, which is essentially the same
idea as Φήμη: Iliad, ii, 93. μετὰ δέ σφισιν Ὄσσα δεδῄει Ὀτρύνουσ’
ἰέναι, Διὸς ἄγγελος; also Odyssey, i, 282—opposed to the idea of
a distinct human speaker or informant—ἤν τίς τοι εἴπῃσι βροτῶν,
ἢ Ὄσσαν ἀκούσῃς Ἐκ Διὸς, ἥτε μάλιστα φέρει κλέος ἀνθρώποισι;
and Odyss. xxiv, 412. Ὄσσα δ’ ἄρ’ ἄγγελος ὦκα κατὰ πτόλιν ᾤχετο
πάντη, Μνηστήρων στυγερὸν θάνατον καὶ κῆρ’ ἐνέπουσα. The word
κλῃδὼν is used in the same meaning by Sophokles, Philoktet. 255
(see Andokides de Mysteriis, c. 22, p. 64): and Herodotus in the
passage now before us considers the two as identical,—compare
also Herodot. v, 72: both words are used also to signify an
omen conveyed by some undesigned human word or speech, which in
that particular case is considered as determined by the special
intervention of the gods for the information of some person who
hears it: see Homer, Odyss. xx, 100: compare also Aristophan.
Aves, 719; Sophoklês, Œdip. Tyr. 43-472; Xenophon, Symposion, c.
14, s. 48.

The descriptions of _Fama_ by Virgil, Æneid, iv, 17 6, _seqq._,
and Ovid Metamorph. xii, 40, _seqq._, are more diffuse and
overcharged, departing from the simplicity of the Greek
conception.

We may notice, as partial illustrations of what is here intended,
those sudden, unaccountable impressions of panic terror which
occasionally ran through the ancient armies or assembled
multitudes, and which were supposed to be produced by Pan or by
Nymphs—indeed sudden, violent, and contagious impressions of
every kind, not merely of fear. Livy, x, 28. “Victorem equitatum
velut _lymphaticus_ pavor dissipat.” ix, 27. “Milites, incertum
ob quam causam, _lymphatis_ similes ad arma discurrunt,”—in
Greek, νυμφόληπτοι: compare Polyæn, iv. 3, 26, and an instructive
note of Mutzel, ad Quint. Curt. iv, 46, 1 (iv, 12, 14).

But I cannot better illustrate that idea, which the Greeks
invested with divinity under the name of Φήμη, than by
transcribing a striking passage from M. Michelet’s Histoire de la
Révolution Françoise. The illustration is the more instructive,
because the religious point of view, which in Herodotus is
predominant,—and which, to the believing mind, furnishes an
explanation preëminently satisfactory,—has passed away in the
historian of the nineteenth century, and gives place to a graphic
description of the real phenomenon, of high importance in human
affairs; the common susceptibilities, common inspiration and
common spontaneous impulse, of a multitude, effacing for the time
each man’s separate individuality.

M. Michelet is about to describe that ever-memorable event, the
capture of the Bastile, on the 14th of July, 1789 (ch. vii, vol.
i, p. 105).

“Versailles, avec un gouvernement organisé, un roi, des
ministres, un général, une armée, n’étoit qu’hésitation, doute,
incertitude, dans la plus complète anarchie morale.

“Paris, bouleversé, délaissé de toute autorité légale, dans un
désordre apparent, atteignit, le 14 Juillet, ce qui moralement
est l’ordre le plus profond, l’unanimité des esprits.

“Le 13 Juillet, Paris ne songeait qu’à se defendre. Le 14, il
attaqua.

“Le 13, au soir, il y avoit encore des doutes, il n’y en eut plus
le matin. Le soir étoit plein de troubles, de fureur désordonnée.
Le matin fut lumineux et d’une sérénité terrible.

“_Une idée se leva sur Paris avec le jour, et tous virent la même
lumière. Une lumière dans les esprits, et dans chaque cœur une
voix_: Va, et tu prendras la Bastille!

“Cela étoit impossible, insensé, étrange à dire;... Et tous le
crurent néanmoins. Et cela se fit.

“La Bastille, pour être une vieille forteresse, n’en étoit pas
moins imprenable, à moins d’y mettre plusieurs jours, et beaucoup
d’artillerie. Le peuple n’avoit en cette crise ni le temps ni les
moyens de faire un siége régulier. L’eût il fait, la Bastille
n’avoit pas à craindre, ayant assez de vivres pour attendre
un secours si proche, et d’immenses munitions de guerre. Ses
murs de dix pieds d’épaisseur au sommet des tours, de trente et
quarante à la base, pouvaient rire longtemps des boulets: et ses
batteries, à elle, dont le feu plongeoit sur Paris, auroient pu
en attendant démolir tout le Marais, tout le Faubourg St. Antoine.

“L’attaque de la Bastille ne fut un acte nullement raisonnable.
Ce fut un acte de foi.

“_Personne ne proposa. Mais tous crurent et tous agirent._ Le
long des rues, des quais, des ponts, des boulevards, la foule
criait à la foule—à la Bastille—à la Bastille. Et dans le tocsin
qui sonnoit, tous entendoient: à la Bastille.

“_Personne, je le répète, ne donna l’impulsion._ Les parleurs
du Palais Royal passèrent le temps à dresser une liste de
proscription, à juger à mort la Reine, la Polignac, Artois, le
prévôt Flesselles, d’autres encore. Les noms des vainqueurs de la
Bastille n’offrent pas un seul des faiseurs de motions. Le Palais
Royal ne fut pas le point de départ, et ce n’est pas non plus au
Palais Royal que les vainqueurs raménèrent les depouilles et les
prisonniers.

“Encore moins les électeurs qui siégeaient à l’Hotel de Ville
eurent ils l’idée de l’attaque. Loin de là, pour l’empêcher,
pour prévenir le carnage que la Bastille pouvoit faire si
aisément, ils allèrent jusqu’à promettre au gouverneur, que s’il
retirait ses canons, on ne l’attaqueroit pas. Les électeurs ne
trahissoient pas comme ils en furent accusés; mais ils n’avoient
pas la foi.

“Qui l’eut? Celui qui eut aussi le dévoument, la force, pour
accomplir sa foi. Qui? Le peuple, tout le monde.”

[399] Diodor. xi, 35; Polyæn. i, 33. Justin (ii, 14) is
astonished in relating “tantam famæ velocitatem.”

The Lacedæmonians on the right wing, and the portion of the army
near them, had a difficult path before them, over hilly ground and
ravine; while the Athenians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, and Trœzenians,
and the left half of the army, marching only along the beach, came
much sooner into conflict with the enemy. The Persians, as at Platæa,
employed their _gerrha_, or wicker bucklers, planted by spikes in
the ground, as a breastwork, from behind which they discharged
their arrows, and they made a strenuous resistance to prevent this
defence from being overthrown. Ultimately, the Greeks succeeded
in demolishing it, and in driving the enemy into the interior of
the fortification, where they in vain tried to maintain themselves
against the ardor of the pursuers, who forced their way into it
almost along with the defenders. Even when this last rampart was
carried, and when the Persian allies had fled, the native Persians
still continued to prolong the struggle with undiminished bravery.
Unpractised in line and drill, and acting only in small knots,[400]
with disadvantages of armor, such as had been felt severely at
Platæa, they still maintained an unequal conflict with the Greek
hoplites; nor was it until the Lacedæmonians with their half of the
army arrived to join in the attack, that the defence was abandoned
as hopeless. The revolt of the Ionians in the camp put the finishing
stroke to this ruinous defeat: first, the disarmed Samians; next,
other Ionians and Æolians; lastly, the Milesians who had been posted
to guard the passes in the rear, not only deserted, but took an
active part in the attack; and the Milesians especially, to whom the
Persians had trusted for guidance up to the summits of Mykalê, led
them by wrong roads, threw them into the hands of their pursuers, and
at last set upon them with their own hands. A large number of the
native Persians, together with both the generals of the land-force,
Tigranês and Mardontês, perished in this disastrous battle: the two
Persian admirals, Artayntês and Ithamithrês, escaped, but the army
was irretrievably dispersed, while all the ships which had been
dragged up on the shore fell into the hands of the assailants, and
were burned. But the victory of the Greeks was by no means bloodless:
among the left wing, upon which the brunt of the action had fallen,
a considerable number of men were slain, especially Sikyonians,
with their commander Perilaus.[401] The honors of the battle were
awarded, first to the Athenians, next to the Corinthians, Sikyonians,
and Trœzenians; the Lacedæmonians having done comparatively little.
Hermolykus the Athenian, a celebrated pankratiast, was the warrior
most distinguished for individual feats of arms.[402]

[400] Herodot. ix, 102, 103. Οὗτοι δὲ (Πέρσαι), κατ’ ὀλίγους
γινόμενοι, ἐμάχοντο τοῖσι αἰεὶ ἐς τὸ τεῖχος ἐσπίπτουσι Ἑλλήνων.

[401] Herodot. ix, 104, 105. Diodorus (xi, 36) seems to follow
different authorities from Herodotus: his statement varies in
many particulars, but is less probable.

Herodotus does not specify the loss on either side, nor Diodorus
that of the Greeks; but the latter says that forty thousand
Persians and allies were slain.

[402] Herodot. ix, 105.

The dispersed Persian army, so much of it at least as had at first
found protection on the heights of Mykalê, was withdrawn from the
coast forthwith to Sardis under the command of Artayntês, whom
Masistês, the brother of Xerxes, bitterly reproached on the score
of cowardice in the recent defeat: the general was at length so
maddened by a repetition of these insults, that he drew his cimeter
and would have slain Masistês, had he not been prevented by a Greek
of Halikarnassus named Xenagoras,[403] who was rewarded by Xerxes
with the government of Kilikia. Xerxes was still at Sardis, where he
had remained ever since his return, and where he conceived a passion
for the wife of his brother Masistês; the consequences of his passion
entailed upon that unfortunate woman sufferings too tragical to be
described, by the orders of his own queen, the jealous and savage
Amêstris.[404] But he had no fresh army ready to send down to the
coast, so that the Greek cities, even on the continent, were for the
time practically liberated from Persian supremacy, while the insular
Greeks were in a position of still greater safety.

[403] Herodot. ix, 107. I do not know whether we may suppose
Herodotus to have heard this from his fellow-citizen Xenagoras.

[404] Herodot. ix, 108-113. He gives the story at considerable
length: it illustrates forcibly and painfully the interior of the
Persian regal palace.

The commanders of the victorious Grecian fleet had full confidence
in their power of defending the islands, and willingly admitted the
Chians, Samians, Lesbians, and the other islanders hitherto subjects
of Persia, to the protection and reciprocal engagements of their
alliance. We may presume that the despots Stratis and Theomêstor were
expelled from Chios and Samos.[405] But the Peloponnesian commanders
hesitated in guaranteeing the same secure autonomy to the continental
cities, which could not be upheld against the great inland power
without efforts incessant as well as exhausting. Nevertheless, not
enduring to abandon these continental Ionians to the mercy of Xerxes,
they made the offer to transplant them into European Greece, and to
make room for them by expelling the _medizing_ Greeks from their
seaport towns. But this proposition was at once repudiated by the
Athenians, who would not permit that colonies originally planted
by themselves should be abandoned, thus impairing the metropolitan
dignity of Athens.[406] The Lacedæmonians readily acquiesced in this
objection, and were glad, in all probability, to find honorable
grounds for renouncing a scheme of wholesale dispossession eminently
difficult to execute,[407]—yet, at the same time, to be absolved
from onerous obligations towards the Ionians, and to throw upon
Athens either the burden of defending or the shame of abandoning
them. The first step was thus taken, which we shall quickly see
followed by others, for giving to Athens a separate ascendency and
separate duties in regard to the Asiatic Greeks, and for introducing
first, the confederacy of Delos,—next, Athenian maritime empire.

[405] Herodot. viii, 132.

[406] Herodot. ix, 106; Diodor. xi, 37. The latter represents the
Ionians and Æolians as having actually consented to remove into
European Greece, and indeed the Athenians themselves as having at
first consented to it, though the latter afterwards repented and
opposed the scheme.

[407] Such wholesale transportations of population from one
continent to another have always been more or less in the habits
of Oriental despots, the Persians in ancient times and the Turks
in more modern times: to a conjunction of free states, like the
Greeks, they must have been impracticable.

See Von Hammer, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, vol. i, book
vi, p. 251, for the forced migrations of people from Asia into
Europe, directed by the Turkish Sultan Bajazet (A. D. 1390-1400).

From the coast of Ionia the Greek fleet sailed northward to the
Hellespont, chiefly at the instance of the Athenians, and for the
purpose of breaking down the Xerxeian bridge; for so imperfect was
their information, that they believed this bridge to be still firm
and in passable condition in September, 479 B. C., though it had
been broken and useless at the time when Xerxes crossed the strait
in his retreat, ten months before, about November, 480 B. C.[408]
Having ascertained on their arrival at Abydos the destruction of the
bridge, Leotychidês and the Peloponnesians returned home forthwith;
but Xanthippus with the Athenian squadron resolved to remain and
expel the Persians from the Thracian Chersonese. This peninsula had
been in great part an Athenian possession, for the space of more than
forty years, from the first settlement of the elder Miltiadês[409]
down to the suppression of the Ionic revolt, although during part
of that time tributary to Persia: from the flight of the second
Miltiadês to the expulsion of Xerxes from Greece (493-480 B. C.), a
period during which the Persian monarch was irresistible and full
of hatred to Athens, no Athenian citizen would find it safe to live
there. But the Athenian squadron from Mykalê were now naturally
eager both to reëstablish the ascendency of Athens and to regain the
properties of Athenian citizens in the Chersonese,—probably many of
the leading men, especially Kimon, son of Miltiadês, had extensive
possessions there to recover, as Alkibiades had in after days, with
private forts of his own.[410] To this motive for attacking the
Chersonese may be added another,—the importance of its corn-produce
as well as of a clear passage through the Hellespont for the corn
ships out of the Propontis to Athens and Ægina.[411] Such were the
reasons which induced Xanthippus and the leading Athenians, even
without the coöperation of the Peloponnesians, to undertake the
siege of Sestus,—the strongest place in the peninsula, the key of
the strait, and the centre in which all the neighboring Persian
garrisons, from Kardia and elsewhere, had got together, under Œobazus
and Artayktês.[412]

[408] Herodot. viii, 115, 117; ix, 106, 114.

[409] See the preceding volume of this history, ch. xxx, p 119;
ch. xxxiv, p. 271; ch. xxxv, p. 307.

[410] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5. 17. τὰ ἑαυτοῦ τείχη.

[411] Herodot. vii, 147. Schol. ad Aristophan. Equites, 262.

In illustration of the value set by Athens upon the command of
the Hellespont, see Demosthenês, De Fals. Legat. c. 59.

[412] Herodot. ix, 114, 115. Σηστὸν—φρούριον καὶ φυλακὴν τοῦ
παντὸς Ἑλλησπόντου—Thucyd. viii, 62: compare Xenophon, Hellenic.
ii, 1, 25.

The Grecian inhabitants of the Chersonese readily joined the
Athenians in expelling the Persians, who, taken altogether by
surprise, had been constrained to throw themselves into Sestus,
without stores of provisions or means of making a long defence.
But of all the Chersonesites the most forward and exasperated were
the inhabitants of Elæus,—the southernmost town of the peninsula,
celebrated for its tomb, temple, and sacred grove of the hero
Protesilaus, who figured in the Trojan legend as the foremost warrior
in the host of Agamemnon to leap ashore, and as the first victim to
the spear of Hektor. The temple of Protesilaus, conspicuously placed
on the sea-shore,[413] was a scene of worship and pilgrimage not
merely for the inhabitants of Elæus, but also for the neighboring
Greeks generally, insomuch that it had been enriched with ample
votive offerings, and probable deposits for security,—money, gold
and silver saucers, brazen implements, robes, and various other
presents. The story ran, that when Xerxes was on his march across
the Hellespont into Greece, Artayktês, greedy of all this wealth,
and aware that the monarch would not knowingly permit the sanctuary
to be despoiled, preferred a wily request to him: “Master, here is
the house of a Greek, who, in invading thy territory, met his just
reward and perished: I pray thee give his house to me, in order
that people may learn for the future not to invade _thy_ land,”—the
whole soil of Asia being regarded by the Persian monarchs as their
rightful possession, and Protesilaus having been in this sense an
aggressor against them. Xerxes, interpreting the request literally,
and not troubling himself to ask who the invader was, consented:
upon which, Artayktês, while the army were engaged in their forward
march into Greece, stripped the sacred grove of Protesilaus,
carrying all the treasures to Sestus. Nor was he content without
still farther outraging Grecian sentiment: he turned cattle into the
grove, ploughed and sowed it, and was even said to have profaned the
sanctuary by visiting it with his concubines.[414] Such proceedings
were more than enough to raise the strongest antipathy against him
among the Chersonesite Greeks, who now crowded to reinforce the
Athenians and blocked him up in Sestus. After a certain length of
siege, the stock of provisions in the town failed, and famine began
to make itself felt among the garrison, which nevertheless still
held out, by painful shifts and endurance, until a late period in
the autumn, when the patience even of the Athenian besiegers was
well-nigh exhausted; nor was it without difficulty that the leaders
repressed the clamorous desire manifested in their own camp to return
to Athens.

[413] Thucyd. viii, 102.

[414] Herodot. ix, 116: compare i, 4. Ἀρταΰκτης, ἀνὴρ Πέρσης,
δεινὸς δὲ καὶ ἀτάσθαλος· ὃς καὶ βασιλέα ἐλαύνοντα ἐπ’ Ἀθήνας
ἐξηπάτησε, τὰ Πρωτεσίλεω τοῦ Ἰφίκλου χρήματα ἐξ Ἐλαιοῦντος
ὑφελόμενος. Compare Herodot. ii, 64.

Impatience having been appeased, and the seamen kept together, the
siege was pressed without relaxation, and presently the privations
of the garrison became intolerable; so that Artayktês and Œobazus
were at last reduced to the necessity of escaping by stealth, letting
themselves down with a few followers from the wall at a point where
it was imperfectly blockaded. Œobazus found his way into Thrace,
where, however, he was taken captive by the Absinthian natives and
offered up as a sacrifice to their god Pleistôrus: Artayktês fled
northward along the shores of the Hellespont, but was pursued by
the Greeks, and made prisoner near Ægos Potamos, after a strenuous
resistance. He was brought with his son in chains to Sestus, which
immediately after his departure had been cheerfully surrendered by
its inhabitants to the Athenians. It was in vain that he offered
a sum of one hundred talents as compensation to the treasury of
Protesilaus, and a farther sum of two hundred talents to the
Athenians as personal ransom for himself and his son. So deep was the
wrath inspired by his insults to the sacred ground, that both the
Athenian commander Xanthippus and the citizens of Elæus disdained
everything less than a severe and even cruel personal atonement for
the outraged Protesilaus. Artayktês, after having first seen his son
stoned to death before his eyes, was hung up to a lofty board fixed
for the purpose, and left to perish, on the spot where the Xerxeian
bridge had been fixed.[415] There is something in this proceeding
more Oriental than Grecian: it is not in the Grecian character to
aggravate death by artificial and lingering preliminaries.

[415] Herodot. ix, 118, 119, 120. Οἱ γὰρ Ἐλαιούσιοι τιμωρέοντες
τῷ Πρωτεσίλεῳ ἐδέοντό μιν καταχρησθῆναι καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ
ταύτῃ ὁ νόος ἔφερε.

After the capture of Sestus, the Athenian fleet returned home with
their plunder, towards the commencement of winter, not omitting
to carry with them the vast cables of the Xerxeian bridge, which
had been taken in the town, as a trophy to adorn the acropolis of
Athens.[416]

[416] Herodot. ix, 121. It must be either to the joint Grecian
armament of this year, or to that of the former year, that
Plutarch must intend his celebrated story respecting the
proposition of Themistoklês, condemned by Aristeidês, to apply
(Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 20; Aristeidês, c. 22). He tells us
that the Greek fleet was all assembled to pass the winter in the
Thessalian harbor of Pagasæ, when Themistoklês formed the project
of burning all the other Grecian ships except the Athenian,
in order that no city except Athens might have a naval force.
Themistoklês, he tells us, intimated to the people, that he had
a proposition, very advantageous to the state, to communicate;
but that it could not be publicly proclaimed and discussed: upon
which they desired him to mention it privately to Aristeidês.
Themistoklês did so: and Aristeidês told the people, that the
project was at once eminently advantageous and not less eminently
unjust. Upon which the people renounced it forthwith, without
asking what it was.

Considering the great celebrity which this story has obtained,
some allusion to it was necessary, though it has long ceased to
be received as matter of history. It is quite inconsistent with
the narrative of Herodotus, as well as with all the conditions
of the time: Pagasæ was _Thessalian_, and as such hostile to the
Greek fleet rather than otherwise: the fleet seems to have never
been there: moreover, we may add, that taking matters as they
then stood, when the fear from Persia was not at all terminated,
the Athenians would have lost more than they gained by burning
the ships of the other Greeks, so that Themistoklês was not very
likely to conceive the scheme, nor Aristeidês to describe it in
the language put into his mouth.

The story is probably the invention of some Greek of the Platonic
age, who wished to contrast justice with expediency, and
Aristeidês with Themistoklês,—as well as to bestow at the same
time panegyric upon Athens in the days of her glory.

CHAPTER XLIII.

EVENTS IN SICILY DOWN TO THE EXPULSION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY AND
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND.

I have already mentioned, in the third volume of this history, the
foundation of the Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily, together with
the general fact, that in the sixth century before the Christian era,
they were among the most powerful and flourishing cities that bore
the Hellenic name. Beyond this general fact, we obtain little insight
into their history.

Though Syracuse, after it fell into the hands of Gelo, about 485 B.
C., became the most powerful city in Sicily, yet in the preceding
century Gela and Agrigentum, on the south side of the island, had
been its superiors. The latter, within a few years of its foundation,
fell under the dominion of one of its own citizens, named Phalaris;
a despot energetic, warlike, and cruel. An exile from Astypalæa
near Rhodes, but a rich man, and an early settler at Agrigentum,
he contrived to make himself despot, seemingly, about the year 570
B. C. He had been named to one of the chief posts in the city, and
having undertaken at his own cost the erection of a temple to Zeus
Polieus in the acropolis (as the Athenian Alkmæônids rebuilt the
burnt temple of Delphi), he was allowed on this pretence to assemble
therein a considerable number of men; whom he armed, and availed
himself of the opportunity of a festival of Dêmêtêr to turn them
against the people. He is said to have made many conquests over
the petty Sikan communities in the neighborhood: but exaction and
cruelties towards his own subjects are noticed as his most prominent
characteristic, and his brazen bull passed into imperishable memory.
This piece of mechanism was hollow, and sufficiently capacious to
contain one or more victims inclosed within it, to perish in tortures
when the metal was heated: the cries of these suffering prisoners
passed for the roarings of the animal. The artist was named Perillus,
and is said to have been himself the first person burnt in it, by
order of the despot. In spite of the odium thus incurred, Phalaris
maintained himself as despot for sixteen years; at the end of which
period a general rising of the people, headed by a leading man named
Telemachus, terminated both his reign and his life.[417] Whether
Telemachus became despot or not, we have no information: sixty years
afterwards, we shall find his descendant Thêron established in that
position.

[417] Everything which has ever been said about Phalaris is
noticed and discussed in the learned and acute Dissertation
of Bentley on the Letters of Phalaris: compare also Seyffert,
Akragas und sein Gebiet, pp. 57-61, who, however, treats the
pretended Letters of Phalaris with mere consideration than the
readers of Dr. Bentley will generally be disposed to sanction.

The story of the brazen bull of Phalaris seems to rest on
sufficient evidence: it is expressly mentioned by Pindar, and the
bull itself, after having been carried away to Carthage when the
Carthaginians took Agrigentum, was restored to the Agrigentines
by Scipio when he took Carthage. See Aristot. Polit. v, 8, 4;
Pindar, Pyth. i, 185; Polyb. xii, 25; Diodor. xiii, 90; Cicero in
Verr. iv, 33.

It does not appear that Timæus really called in question the
historical reality of the bull of Phalaris, though he has been
erroneously supposed to have done so. Timæus affirmed that the
bull which was shown in his own time at Agrigentum was not the
identical machine: which was correct, for it must have been
_then_ at Carthage, from whence it was not restored to Agrigentum
until after 146 B. C. See a note of Boeckh on the Scholia ad
Pindar. Pyth. i, 185.

It was about the period of the death of Phalaris that the Syracusans
reconquered their revolted colony of Kamarina (in the southeast of
the island between Syracuse and Gela), expelled or dispossessed the
inhabitants, and resumed the territory.[418] With the exception of
this accidental circumstance, we are without information about the
Sicilian cities until a time rather before 500 B. C., just when the
war between Kroton and Sybaris had extinguished the power of the
latter, and when the despotism of the Peisistratids at Athens had
been exchanged for the democratical constitution of Kleisthenês.
The first forms of government among the Sicilian Greeks, as among
the cities of Greece Proper in the early historical age, appear to
have been all oligarchical: we do not know under what particular
modifications, but probably all more or less resembling that of
Syracuse, where the Gamori—or wealthy proprietors descended from
the original colonizing chiefs—possessing large landed properties
titled by a numerous Sikel serf population called Kyllyrii, formed
the qualified citizens, out of whom, as well as by whom, magistrates
and generals were chosen; while the Demos, or non-privileged
freemen, comprised the small proprietary cultivators who maintained
themselves, by manual labor and without slaves, from their own lands
or gardens, together with the artisans and tradesmen. In the course
of two or three generations, many individuals of the privileged
class would have fallen into poverty and would find themselves more
nearly on a par with the non-privileged; while such members of the
latter as might rise to opulence were not for that reason admitted
into the privileged body. Here were ample materials for discontent:
ambitious leaders, often themselves members of the privileged body,
put themselves at the head of the popular opposition, overthrew the
oligarchy, and made themselves despots; democracy being at that time
hardly known anywhere in Greece. The general fact of this change,
preceded by occasional violent dissensions among the privileged
class themselves,[419] is all that we are permitted to know, without
those modifying circumstances by which it must have been accompanied
in every separate city. Towards or near the year 500 B. C., we
find Anaxilaus despot at Rhegium, Skythês at Zanklê, Têrillus at
Himera, Peithagoras at Selinus, Kleander at Gela, and Panætius at
Leontini.[420] It was about the year 509 B. C. that the Spartan
prince Dorieus conducted a body of emigrants to the territories of
Eryx and Egesta, near the northwestern corner of the island, in hopes
of expelling the non-Hellenic inhabitants and founding a new Grecian
colony. But the Carthaginians, whose Sicilian possessions were
close adjoining, and who had already aided in driving Dorieus from
a previous establishment at Kinyps in Libya,—now lent such vigorous
assistance to the Egestæan inhabitants, that the Spartan prince,
after a short period of prosperity, was defeated and slain with most
of his companions: such of them as escaped, under the orders of
Euryleon, took possession of Minoa, which bore from henceforward the
name of Herakleia,[421]—a colony and dependency of the neighboring
town of Selinus, of which Peithagoras was then despot. Euryleon
joined the malcontents at Selinus, overthrew Peithagoras, and
established himself as despot, until, after a short possession of
power, he was slain in a popular mutiny.[422]

[418] Thucyd. vi, 5; Schol. ad Pindar. Olymp. v, 19; compare
Wesseling ad Diodor. xi, 76.

[419] At Gela, Herodot. vii, 153; at Syracuse, Aristot. Politic.
v, 3, 1.

[420] Aristot. Politic. v, 8, 4; v, 10, 4. Καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα
μεταβάλλει ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ὥσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ σχεδὸν αἱ πλεῖσται τῶν
ἀρχαίων· ἐν Λεοντίνοις εἰς τὴν Παναιτίου τυραννίδα, καὶ ἐν Γέλᾳ
εἰς τὴν Κλεάνδρου, καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς πόλεσιν ὡσαύτως.

[421] Diodorus ascribes the foundation of Herakleia to Dorieus;
this seems not consistent with the account of Herodotus, unless
we are to assume that the town of Herakleia which Dorieus founded
was destroyed by the Carthaginians, and that the name Herakleia
was afterwards given by Euryleon or his successors to that which
had before been called Minoa (Diodor. iv, 23).

A funereal monument in honor of Athenæus, one of the settlers
who perished with Dorieus, was seen by Pausanias at Sparta
(Pausanias, iii, 16, 4).

[422] Herodot. v, 43, 46.

We are here introduced to the first known instance of that series
of contests between the Phenicians and Greeks in Sicily, which,
like the struggles between the Saracens and the Normans in the
eleventh and twelfth centuries after the Christian era, were destined
to determine whether the island should be a part of Africa or a
part of Europe,—and which were only terminated, after the lapse
of three centuries, by the absorption of both into the vast bosom
of Rome. It seems that the Carthaginians and Egestæans not only
overwhelmed Dorieus, but also made some conquests of the neighboring
Grecian possessions, which were subsequently recovered by Gelo of
Syracuse.[423]

[423] Herodot. vii, 158. The extreme brevity of his allusion is
perplexing, as we have no collateral knowledge to illustrate it.

Not long after the death of Dorieus, Kleander, despot of Gela, began
to raise his city to ascendency over the other Sicilian Greeks, who
had hitherto been, if not all equal, at least all independent. His
powerful mercenary force, levied in part among the Sikel tribes,[424]
did not preserve him from the sword of a Geloan citizen named
Sabyllus, who slew him after a reign of seven years: but it enabled
his brother and successor Hippokratês to extend his dominion over
nearly half of the island. In that mercenary force two officers,
Gelo and Ænesidêmus (the latter a citizen of Agrigentum, of the
conspicuous family of the Emmenidæ, and descended from Telemachus,
the deposer of Phalaris), particularly distinguished themselves. Gelo
was descended from a native of Têlos near the Triopian cape, one
of the original settlers who accompanied the Rhodian Antiphêmus to
Sicily. His immediate ancestor, named Têlinês, had first raised the
family to distinction, by valuable aid to a defeated political party,
who had been worsted in a struggle, and forced to seek shelter in
the neighboring town of Maktorium. Têlinês was possessed of certain
peculiar sacred rites (or visible and portable holy symbols, with
a privileged knowledge of the ceremonial acts and formalities of
divine service under which they were to be shown) for propitiating
the subterranean goddesses, Dêmêtêr and Persephonê; “from whom he
obtained them, or how he got at them himself (says Herodotus) I
cannot say:” but such was the imposing effect of his presence and
manner of exhibiting them, that he ventured to march into Gela at the
head of the exiles from Maktorium, and was enabled to reinstate them
in power,—deterring the people from resistance in the same manner as
the Athenians had been overawed by the spectacle of Phyê-Athênê in
the chariot along with Peisistratus. The extraordinary boldness of
this proceeding excites the admiration of Herodotus, especially as
he had been informed that Têlinês was of an unwarlike temperament:
the restored exiles rewarded it by granting to him, and to his
descendants after him, the hereditary dignity of hierophants of the
two goddesses,[425]—a function certainly honorable, and probably
lucrative, connected with the administration of consecrated property
and with the enjoyment of a large portion of its fruits.

[424] Polyænus, v, 6.

[425] See about Têlinês and this hereditary priesthood, Herodot.
vii, 153. τούτους ὦν ὁ Τηλίνης κατήγαγε ἐς Γέλην, ἔχων οὐδεμίαν
ἀνδρῶν δύναμιν, ἀλλ’ ἱρὰ τούτων τῶν θεῶν· ὅθεν δὲ αὐτὰ ἔλαβε, ἢ
αὐτὸς ἐκτήσατο, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχω εἶπαι. τούτοισι δὲ ὦν πίσυνος ἐὼν,
κατήγαγε, ἐπ’ ᾧ τε οἱ ἀπόγονοι αὐτοῦ ἱροφάνται τῶν θεῶν ἔσονται:
compare a previous passage of this history, vol. i, chap. i, p.
26.

It appears from Pindar, that Hiero exercised this hereditary
priesthood (Olymp. vi, 160 (95), with the Scholia ad loc. and
Scholia ad Pindar. Pyth. ii, 27).

About the story of Phyê personifying Athênê at Athens, see above,
vol. iv of this history, chap. xxx, p. 105.

The ancient religious worship addressed itself more to the eye
than to the ear; the words spoken were of less importance than
the things exhibited, the persons performing, and the actions
done. The vague sense of the Greek and Latin neuter, ἱερὰ, or
_sacra_, includes the entire ceremony, and is difficult to
translate into a modern language: but the verbs connected with
it, ἔχειν, κεκτῆσθαι, κομίζειν, φαίνεν, ἱερὰ—ἱεροφάντης, etc.,
relate to exhibition and action. This was particularly the
case with the mysteries (or solemnities not thrown open to the
general public but accessible only to those who went through
certain preliminary forms, and under certain restrictions) in
honor of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, as well as of other deities in
different parts of Greece. The λεγόμενα, or things _said_ on
these occasions, were of less importance than the δρώμενα and
δεικνύμενα, or _matters shown and things done_ (see Pausanias,
ii, 37, 3). Herodotus says, about the lake of Sais in Egypt,
Ἐν δὲ τῇ λίμνῃ ταύτῃ ~τὰ δείκηλα~ τῶν παθέων αὐτοῦ (of Osiris)
νυκτὸς ποιεῦσι, τὰ καλέουσι μυστήρια Αἰγύπτιοι: he proceeds to
state that the Thesmophoria celebrated in honor of Dêmêtêr in
Greece were of the same nature, and gives his opinion that they
were imported into Greece from Egypt. Homer (Hymn. Cerer. 476):
compare Pausan. ii, 14, 2.

~Δεῖξεν~ Τριπτολέμῳ τε, Διόκλεΐ τε πληξίππῳ
~Δρησμοσύνην ἱερῶν~· καὶ ἐπέφραδεν ~ὄργια~ παισὶ
Πρεσβυτέρῃς Κελέοιο...
Ὄλβιος, ὃς ~τάδ’ ὄπωπεν~ ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων, etc.

Compare Euripid. Hippolyt. 25; Pindar, Fragm. xcvi; Sophocl.
Frag. lviii, ed. Brunck; Plutarch, De Profect. in Virtute, c.
10, p. 81: De Isid. et Osir. p. 353, c. 3. ὡς γὰρ οἱ τελούμενοι
κατ’ ἀρχὰς ἐν θορύβῳ καὶ βοῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὠθούμενοι συνίασι,
~δρωμένων~ δὲ καὶ ~δεικνυμένων τῶν ἱερῶν~, προσέχουσιν ἤδη
μετὰ φόβου καὶ σιωπῆς: and Isokratês, Panegyric. c. 6, about
Eleusis, τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ νῦν ~δείκνυμεν~ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτόν.
These mysteries consisted thus chiefly of exhibition and
action addressed to the eyes of the communicants, and Clemens
Alexandrinus calls them a mystic drama—Δηὼ καὶ Κόρη δρᾶμα
ἐγενέσθην μυστικὸν, καὶ τὴν πλάνην καὶ τὴν ἀρπαγὴν καὶ τὸ
πένθος ἡ Ἐλευσὶς δᾳδουχεῖ. The word ὄργια is originally nothing
more than a consecrated expression for ἔργα—ἱερὰ ἔργα (see
Pausanias, iv, 1, 4, 5), though it comes afterwards to designate
the whole ceremony, matters shown as well as matters done—τὰ
ὄργια κομίζων—ὀργίων παντοίων συνθέτης, etc.: compare Plutarch,
Alkibiad. 22-34.

The sacred objects exhibited formed an essential part of the
ceremony, together with the chest in which such of them as were
movable were brought out—τελετῆς ἐγκύμονα μυστίδα κίστην (Nonnus,
ix, 127). Æschines, in assisting the religious lustrations
performed by his mother, was bearer of the chest—κιστόφορος
καὶ λικνόφορος (Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 79, p. 313). Clemens
Alexandrius (Cohort. ad Gent. p. 14) describes the objects
which were contained in these mystic chests of the Eleusinian
mysteries,—cakes of particular shape, pomegranates, salt,
ferules, ivy, etc. The communicant was permitted, as a part of
the ceremony, to take these out of the chest and put them into a
basket, afterwards putting them back again: “Jejunavi et ebibi
cyceonem: ex cistâ sumpsi et in calathum misi: accepi rursus, in
cistulam transtuli,” (Arnobius ad Gent. v, 175, ed. Elmenherst,)
while the uninitiated were excluded from seeing it, and forbidden
from looking at it “even from the house-top.”

Τὸν κάλαθον κατιόντα χαμαὶ θασεῖσθε βέβαλοι
Μήδ’ ἀπὸ τῶ τέγεος.
(Kallimachus, Hymn. in Cererem, 4.)

Lobeck, in his learned and excellent treatise, Aglaophamus
(i, p. 51), says: “Sacrorum nomine tam Græci, quam Romani,
præcipuè signa et imagines Deorum, omnemque sacram supellectilem
dignari solent. Quæ res animum illuc potius inclinat, ut putem
Hierophantas ejusmodi ἱερὰ in conspectum hominum protulisse,
sive deorum simulacra, sive vasa sacra et instrumenta aliave
priscæ religionis monumenta; qualia in sacrario Eleusinio
asservata fuisse, etsi nullo testimonio affirmare possumus, tamen
probabilitatis speciem habet testimonio similem. Namque non solum
in templis ferè omnibus cimelia venerandæ antiquitatis condita
erant, sed in mysteriis ipsis talium rerum mentio occurrit, quas
initiati summâ cum veneratione aspicerent, non initiatis ne
aspicere quidem liceret.... Ex his testimoniis efficitur (p. 61)
sacra quæ Hierophanta ostendit, illa ipsa fuisse ἄγια φάσματα
sive simulacra Deorum, eorumque aspectum qui præbeant δεῖξαι τὰ
ἱερὰ vel παρέχειν vel φαίνειν dici, et ab hoc quasi primario
Hierophantæ actu tum Eleusiniorum sacerdotum principem nomen
accepisse, tum totum negotium esse nuncupatum.”

Compare also K. F. Hermann, Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der
Griechen, part ii, ch. ii, sect. 32.

A passage in Cicero de Haruspicum Responsis (c. 11), which is
transcribed almost entirely by Arnobius adv. Gentes, iv, p.
148, demonstrates the minute precision required at Rome in the
performance of the festival of the Megalesia: the smallest
omission or alteration was supposed to render the festival
unsatisfactory to the gods.

The memorable history of the Holy Tunic at Treves, in 1845, shows
what immense and wide-spread effect upon the human mind may be
produced, even in the nineteenth century, by ἱερὰ δεικνύμενα.

Gelo thus belonged to an ancient and distinguished hierophantic
family at Gela, being the eldest of four brothers, sons of
Deinomenes,—Gelo, Hiero, Polyzelus, and Thrasybulus: and he further
ennobled himself by such personal exploits in the army of the despot
Hippokratês as to be promoted to the supreme command of the cavalry.
It was greatly to his activity that the despot owed a succession of
victories and conquests, in which the Ionic or Chalkidic cities of
Kallipolis, Naxos, Leontini, and Zanklê, were successively reduced to
dependence.[426]

[426] Herodot. vii, 154.

The fate of Zanklê,—seemingly held by its despot Skythês, in a
state of dependent alliance under Hippokratês, and in standing feud
with Anaxilaus of Rhegium, on the opposite side of the strait of
Messina,—was remarkable. At the time when the Ionic revolt in Asia
was suppressed, and Milêtus reconquered by the Persians (B. C.
494-493), a natural sympathy was manifested by the Ionic Greeks in
Sicily towards the sufferers of the same race on the east of the
Ægean sea. Projects were devised for assisting the Asiatic refugees
to a new abode, and the Zanklæans especially, invited them to form a
new Pan-Ionic colony upon the territory of the Sikels, called Kalê
Aktê, on the north coast of Sicily,—a coast presenting fertile and
attractive situations, and along the whole line of which there was
only one Grecian colony,—Himera. This invitation was accepted by
the refugees from Samos and Milêtus, who accordingly put themselves
on shipboard for Zanklê; steering, as was usual, along the coast
of Akarnania to Korkyra, from thence across to Tarentum, and along
the Italian coast to the strait of Messina. It happened that when
they reached the town of Epizephyrian Lokri, Skythês, the despot of
Zanklê, was absent from his city, together with the larger portion
of his military force, on an expedition against the Sikels,—perhaps
undertaken to facilitate the contemplated colony at Kalê Aktê: and
his enemy the Rhegian Anaxilaus, taking advantage of this accident,
proposed to the refugees at Lokri that they should seize for
themselves, and retain, the unguarded city of Zanklê. They followed
his suggestion, and possessed themselves of the city, together with
the families and property of the absent Zanklæans; who speedily
returned to repair their loss, while their prince Skythês farther
invoked the powerful aid of his ally and superior, Hippokratês. The
latter, however, provoked at the loss of one of his dependent cities,
seized and imprisoned Skythês, whom he considered as the cause of
it,[427] at Inykus, in the interior of the island; but he found it at
the same time advantageous to accept a proposition made to him by the
Samians, captors of the city, and to betray the Zanklæans whom he had
come to aid. By a convention, ratified with an oath, it was agreed
that Hippokratês should receive for himself all the extra-mural, and
half the intra-mural, property and slaves belonging to Zanklæans,
leaving the other half to the Samians. Among the property without
the walls, not the least valuable part consisted in the persons of
those Zanklæans whom Hippokratês had come to assist, but whom he now
carried away as slaves: excepting, however, from this lot, three
hundred of the principal citizens, whom he delivered over to the
Samians to be slaughtered,—probably lest they might find friends to
procure their ransom, and afterwards disturb the Samian possession of
the town. Their lives were however spared by the Samians, though we
are not told what became of them. This transaction, alike perfidious
on the part of the Samians and of Hippokratês, secured to the former
a flourishing city, and to the latter an abundant booty. We are glad
to learn that the imprisoned Skythês found means to escape to Darius,
king of Persia, from whom he received a generous shelter,—imperfect
compensation for the iniquity of his fellow Greeks.[428] The
Samians, however, did not long retain possession of their conquest,
but were expelled by the very person who had instigated them to
seize it,—Anaxilaus, of Rhegium. He planted in it new inhabitants,
of Dorian and Messenian race, recolonizing it under the name of
Messênê,—a name which it ever afterwards bore;[429] and it appears to
have been governed either by himself or by his son Kleophron, until
his death about B. C. 476.

[427] Herodot. vi, 22, 23. Σκύθην μὲν τὸν μούναρχον τῶν
Ζαγκλαίων, ὡς ἀποβαλόντα τὴν πόλιν, ὁ Ἱπποκράτης πεδήσας, καὶ τὸν
ἀδελφεὸν αὐτοῦ Πυθογένεα, ἐς Ἴνυκον πόλιν ἀπέπεμψε.

The words ὡς ἀποβαλόντα seem to imply the relation preëxisting
between Hippokratês and Skythês, as superior and subject; and
punishment inflicted by the former upon the latter for having
lost an important post.

[428] Herodot. vi, 23, 24. Aristotle (Politic. v, 2, 11)
represents the Samians as having been first actually received
into Zanklê, and afterwards expelling the prior inhabitants: his
brief notice is not to be set against the perspicuous narrative
of Herodotus.

[429] Thucyd. vi, 4; Schol. ad Pindar. Pyth. ii, 84; Diodor. xi,
48.

Besides the conquests above mentioned, Hippokratês of Gela was on the
point of making the still more important acquisition of Syracuse, and
was only prevented from doing so, after defeating the Syracusans at
the river Helôrus, and capturing many prisoners, by the mediation of
the Corinthians and Korkyræans, who prevailed on him to be satisfied
with the cession of Kamarina and its territory as a ransom. Having
repeopled this territory, which became thus annexed to Gela, he was
prosecuting his conquests farther among the Sikels, when he died or
was killed at Hybla. His death caused a mutiny among the Geloans, who
refused to acknowledge his sons, and strove to regain their freedom;
but Gelo, the general of horse in the army, espousing the cause of
the sons with energy, put down by force the resistance of the people.
As soon as this was done, he threw off the mask, deposed the sons of
Hippokratês, and seized the sceptre himself.[430]

[430] Herodot. vii, 155; Thucyd. vi, 5. The ninth Nemean Ode of
Pindar (v, 40), addressed to Chromius the friend of Hiero of
Syracuse, commemorates, among other exploits, his conduct at the
battle of the Helôrus.

Thus master of Gela, and succeeding probably to the ascendency
enjoyed by his predecessor over the Ionic cities, Gelo became the
most powerful man in the island; but an incident which occurred a
few years afterwards (B. C. 485), while it aggrandized him still
farther, transferred the seat of his power from Gela to Syracuse.
The Syracusan Gamori, or oligarchical order of proprietary families,
probably humbled by their ruinous defeat at the Helôrus, were
dispossessed of the government by a combination between their
serf-cultivators, called the Kyllyrii, and the smaller freemen,
called the Demos; they were forced to retire to Kasmenæ, where
they invoked the aid of Gelo to restore them. That ambitious
prince undertook the task, and accomplished it with facility; for
the Syracusan people, probably unable to resist their political
opponents when backed by such powerful foreign aid, surrendered to
him without striking a blow.[431] But instead of restoring the place
to the previous oligarchy, Gelo appropriated it to himself, and
left Gela to be governed by his brother Hiero. He greatly enlarged
the city of Syracuse, and strengthened its fortifications: probably
it was he who first carried it beyond the islet of Ortygia, so
as to include a larger space of the adjacent mainland (or rather
island of Sicily) which bore the name of Achradina. To people this
enlarged space, he brought all the residents in Kamarina, which
town he dismantled,—and more than half of those in Gela; which was
thus reduced in importance, while Syracuse became the first city
in Sicily, and even received fresh addition of inhabitants from
the neighboring towns of Megara and Eubœa. Both these towns, like
Syracuse, were governed by oligarchies, with serf cultivators
dependent upon them, and a Dêmos, or body of smaller freemen,
excluded from the political franchise: both were involved in war with
Gelo, probably to resist his encroachments,—both were besieged and
taken. The oligarchy who ruled these cities, and who were the authors
as well as leaders of the year, anticipated nothing but ruin at the
hands of the conqueror; while the Demos, who had not been consulted
and had taken no part in the war (which we must presume to have been
carried on by the oligarchy and their serfs alone), felt assured
that no harm would be done to them. His behavior disappointed the
expectations of both. After transporting both of them to Syracuse,
he established the oligarchs in that town as citizens, and sold
the Demos as slaves, under covenant that they should be exported
from Sicily. “His conduct (says Herodotus[432]) was dictated by
the conviction, that a Demos was a most troublesome companion to
live with.” It appears that the state of society which he wished to
establish was that of Patricians and clients, without any Plebs;
something like that of Thessaly, where there was a proprietary
oligarchy living in the cities, with Penestæ, or dependent
cultivators, occupying and tilling the land on their account,—but
no small self-working proprietors or tradesmen in sufficient number
to form a recognized class. And since Gelo was removing the free
population from these conquered towns, and leaving in or around the
towns no one except the serf-cultivators, we may presume that the
oligarchical proprietors when removed might still continue, even as
residents at Syracuse, to receive the produce raised for them by
others: but the small self-working proprietors, if removed in like
manner, would be deprived of subsistence, because their land would
be too distant for personal tillage, and they had no serfs. While
therefore we fully believe, with Herodotus, that Gelo considered the
small free proprietors as “troublesome yoke-fellows,”—a sentiment
perfectly natural to a Grecian despot, unless where he found them
useful aids to his own ambition against a hostile oligarchy,—we must
add that they would become peculiarly troublesome in his scheme of
concentrating the free population of Syracuse, seeing that he would
have to give them land in the neighborhood or to provide in some
other way for their maintenance.

[431] Herodot. vii, 155. Ὁ γὰρ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Συρηκοσίων ἐπιόντι
Γέλωνι παραδιδοῖ τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἑωϋτόν.

Aristotle (Politic. v, 2, 6) alludes to the Syracusan democracy
prior to the despotism of Gelo as a case of democracy ruined by
its own lawlessness and disorder. But such can hardly have been
the fact, if the narrative of Herodotus is to be trusted. The
expulsion of the Gamori was not an act of lawless democracy,
but the rising of free subjects and slaves against a governing
oligarchy. After the Gamori were expelled, there was no time
for the democracy to constitute itself, or to show in what
degree it possessed capacity for government, since the narrative
of Herodotus indicates that the restoration by Gelo followed
closely upon the expulsion. And the superior force, which Gelo
brought to the aid of the expelled Gamori, is quite sufficient
to explain the submission of the Syracusan people, had they been
ever so well administered. Perhaps Aristotle may have had before
him reports different from those of Herodotus: unless, indeed,
we might venture to suspect that the name of _Gelo_ appears in
Aristotle by lapse of memory in place of that of _Dionysius_.
It is highly probable that the partial disorder into which the
Syracusan democracy had fallen immediately before the despotism
of Dionysius, was one of the main circumstances which enabled him
to acquire the supreme power; but a similar assertion can hardly
be made applicable to the early times preceding Gelo, in which,
indeed, democracy was only just beginning in Greece.

The confusion often made by hasty historians between the names
of Gelo and Dionysius, is severely commented on by Dionysius
of Halikarnassus (Antiq. Roman. vii, 1, p. 1314): the latter,
however, in his own statement respecting Gelo, is not altogether
free from error, since he describes Hippokratês as _brother_
of Gelo. We must accept the supposition of Larcher, that
Pausanias (vi, 9, 2), while professing to give the date of Gelo’s
occupation of _Syracuse_, has really given the date of Gelo’s
occupation of _Gela_ (see M. Fynes Clinton, Fast. Hellen. ad ann.
491 B. C.).

[432] Herodot. vii, 156. Μεγαρέας τε τοὺς ἐν Σικελίῃ, ὡς
πολιορκεόμενοι ἐς ὁμολογίην προσεχώρησαν, τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν παχέας,
ἀειραμένους τε πόλεμον αὐτῷ καὶ προσδοκέοντας ἀπολέεσθαι διὰ
τοῦτο, ἄγων ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας πολιήτας ἐποίησε· τὸν δὲ δῆμον
τῶν Μεγαρέων, οὐκ ἐόντα μεταίτιον τοῦ πολέμου τούτου, οὐδὲ
προσδεκόμενον κακὸν οὐδὲν πείσεσθαι, ἀγαγὼν καὶ τούτους ἐς τὰς
Συρακούσας, ἀπέδοτο ἐπ’ ἐξαγωγῇ ἐκ Σικελίης. Τὠυτὸ δὲ τούτου
καὶ Εὐβοέας τοὺς ἐν Σικελίῃ ἐποίησε διακρίνας. Ἐποίεε δὲ ταῦτα
τούτους ἀμφοτέρους, νομίσας δῆμον εἶναι συνοίκημα ἀχαριτώτατον.

So large an accession of size, walls, and population, rendered
Syracuse the first Greek city in Sicily. And the power of Gelo,
embracing as it did not merely Syracuse, but so considerable a
portion of the rest of the island, Greek as well as Sikel, was the
greatest Hellenic force then existing. It appears to have comprised
the Grecian cities on the east and southeast of the island from
the borders of Agrigentum to those of Zanklê or Messênê, together
with no small proportion of the Sikel tribes. Messênê was under the
rule of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, Agrigentum under that of Thêro son of
Ænesidêmus, Himera under that of Terillus; while Selinus, close on
the borders of Egesta and the Carthaginian possessions, had its own
government free or despotic, but appears to have been allied with or
dependent upon Carthage.[433] A dominion thus extensive doubtless
furnished ample tribute; besides which Gelo, having conquered and
dispossessed many landed proprietors and having recolonized Syracuse,
could easily provide both lands and citizenship to recompense
adherents. Hence, he was enabled to enlarge materially the military
force transmitted to him by Hippokratês, and to form a naval force
besides. Phormis[434] the Mænalian, who took service under him and
became citizen of Syracuse, with fortune enough to send donatives to
Olympia,—and Agêsias, the Iamid prophet from Stymphâlus,[435]—are
doubtless not the only examples of emigrants joining him from
Arcadia; for the Arcadian population were poor, brave, and ready for
mercenary soldiership; nor can we doubt that the service of a Greek
despot in Sicily must have been more attractive to them than that of
Xerxes.[436] Moreover, during the ten years between the battles of
Marathon and Salamis, when not only so large a portion of the Greek
cities had become subject to Persia, but the prospect of Persian
invasion hung like a cloud over Greece Proper, the increased feeling
of insecurity throughout the latter probably rendered emigration to
Sicily unusually inviting.

[433] Diodor. xi, 21.

[434] Pausan. v, 27, 1, 2. We find the elder Dionysius, about
a century afterwards, transferring the entire free population
of conquered towns (Kaulonia and Hipponium in Italy, etc.) to
Syracuse (Diodor. xiv, 106, 107).

[435] See the sixth Olympic Ode of Pindar, addressed to the
Syracusan Agêsias. The Scholiast on v. 5, of that ode,—who says
that not Agêsias himself, but some of his progenitors migrated
from Stymphâlus to Syracuse,—is contradicted not only by the
Scholiast on v. 167, where Agêsias is rightly termed both Ἀρκὰς
and Συρακόσιος; but also by the better evidence of Pindar’s own
expressions,—συνοικιστήρ τε τᾶν κλεινᾶν Συρακοσσᾶν,—οἴκοθεν
οἴκαδε, with reference to Stymphâlus and Syracuse,—δύ’ ἀγκύραι
(v, 6, 99, 101 = 166-174).

Ergotelês, an exile from Knôssus in Krete, must have migrated
somewhere about this time to Himera in Sicily. See the twelfth
Olympic Ode of Pindar.

[436] Herodot. viii, 26.

These circumstances in part explain the immense power and position
which Herodotus represents Gelo to have enjoyed, towards the
autumn of 481 B. C., when the Greeks from the isthmus of Corinth,
confederated to resist Xerxes, sent to solicit his aid. He was
then imperial leader of Sicily: he could offer to the Greek—so the
historian tells us—twenty thousand hoplites, two hundred triremes,
two thousand cavalry, two thousand archers, two thousand slingers,
two thousand light-armed horse, besides furnishing provisions for
the entire Grecian force as long as the war might last.[437] If this
numerical statement could be at all trusted, which I do not believe,
Herodotus would be much within the truth in saying, that there was no
other Hellenic power which would bear the least comparison with that
of Gelo:[438] and we may well assume such general superiority to
be substantially true, though the numbers above mentioned may be an
empty boast rather than a reality.

[437] Herodot. vii, 157. σὺ δὲ δυνάμιός τε ἥκεις μεγάλης, καὶ
μοῖρά τοι τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐκ ἐλαχίστη μέτα, ἄρχοντί γε Σικελίης: and
even still stronger, c. 163. ἐὼν Σικελίης τύραννος.

The word ἄρχων corresponds with ἀρχὴ, such as that of the
Athenians, and is less strong than τύραννος.

The numerical statement is contained in the speech composed by
Herodotus for Gelo (vii, 158).

[438] Herodot. vii, 145. τὰ δὲ Γέλωνος πρήγματα μεγάλα ἐλέγετο
εἶναι· οὐδαμῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τῶν οὐ πολλὸν μέζω.

Owing to the great power of Gelo, we now for the first time trace an
incipient tendency in Sicily to combined and central operations. It
appears that Gelo had formed the plan of uniting the Greek forces in
Sicily for the purpose of expelling the Carthaginians and Egestæans,
either wholly or partially, from their maritime possessions in the
western corner of the island, and of avenging the death of the
Spartan prince, Dorieus;—that he even attempted, though in vain, to
induce the Spartans and other central Greeks to coöperate in this
plan,—and that, upon their refusal, he had in part executed it with
the Sicilian forces alone.[439] We have nothing but a brief and
vague allusion to this exploit, wherein Gelo appears as the chief
and champion of Hellenic against barbaric interests in Sicily,—the
forerunner of Dionysius, Timoleon, and Agathoklês. But he had already
begun to conceive himself, and had already been recognized by others,
in this commanding position, when the envoys of Sparta, Athens,
Corinth, etc., reached him from the isthmus of Corinth, in 481 B.
C., to entreat his aid for the repulse of the vast host of invaders
about to cross the Hellespont. Gelo, after reminding them that they
had refused a similar application for aid from him, said that, far
from requiting them at the hour of need in the like ungenerous
spirit, he would bring to them an overwhelming reinforcement (the
numbers as given by Herodotus have been already stated), but upon one
condition only,—that he should be recognized as generalissimo of the
entire Grecian force against the Persians. His offer was repudiated,
with indignant scorn, by the Spartan envoy: and Gelo then so far
abated in his demand, as to be content with the command either of the
land-force or the naval force, whichever might be judged preferable.
But here the Athenian envoy interposed his protest: “We are sent here
(said he) to ask for an army, and not for a general; and thou givest
us the army, only in order to make thyself general. Know, that even
if the Spartans would allow thee to command at sea, _we_ would not.
The naval command is ours, if they decline it: we Athenians, the
oldest nation in Greece,—the only Greeks who have never migrated from
home,—whose leader before Troy stands proclaimed by Homer as the best
of all the Greeks for marshalling and keeping order in an army,—we,
who moreover furnish the largest naval contingent in the fleet,—_we_
will never submit to be commanded by a Syracusan.”

[439] Herodot. vii, 158. Gelo says to the envoys from
Peloponnesus:—Ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, λόγον ἔχοντες πλεονέκτην,
ἐτολμήσατε ἐμὲ σύμμαχον ἐπὶ τὸν βάρβαρον παρακαλέοντες
ἐλθεῖν. Αὐτοὶ δὲ, ἐμεῦ πρότερον δεηθέντος βαρβαρικοῦ στρατοῦ
συνεπάψασθαι, ὅτε μοι πρὸς Καρχηδονίους νεῖκος συνῆπτο,
ἐπισκήπτοντός τε τὸν Δωριέος τοῦ Ἀναξανδρίδεω πρὸς Ἐγεσταίων
φόνον ἐκπρήξασθαι, ὑποτείνοντός τε τὰ ἐμπόρια συνελευθεροῦν, ἀπ’
ὧν ὑμῖν μεγάλαι ὠφελίαι τε καὶ ἐπαυρέσιες γεγόνασι· οὔτε ἐμεῦ
εἵνεκα ἤλθετε βοηθήσοντες, οὔτε τὸν Δωριέος φόνον ἐκπρηξόμενοι·
τὸ δὲ κατ’ ὑμέας τάδε ἅπαντα ὑπὸ βαρβάροισι νέμεται. Ἀλλὰ εὖ γὰρ
ἡμῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄμεινον κατέστη· νῦν δὲ, ἐπειδὴ περιελήλυθε ὁ
πόλεμος καὶ ἀπῖκται ἐς ὑμέας, οὕτω δὴ Γέλωνος μνῆστις γέγονε.

It is much to be regretted that we have no farther information
respecting the events which these words glance at. They seem
to indicate that the Carthaginians and Egestæans had made
some encroachments, and threatened to make more: that Gelo
had repelled them by actual and successful war. I think it
strange, however, that he should be made to say: “_You_ (the
Peloponnesians) have derived great and signal advantages from
these seaports;”—the profit derived from the latter by _the
Peloponnesians_ can never have been so great as to be singled
out in this pointed manner. I should rather have expected, ἀπ’
ὧν ~ἡμῖν~ (and not ἀπ’ ὧν ~ὑμῖν~),—which must have been true in
point of fact, and will be found to read quite consistently with
the general purport of Gelo’s speech.

“Athenian stranger (replied Gelo), ye seem to be provided with
commanders, but ye are not likely to have soldiers to be commanded.
Ye may return as soon as you please, and tell the Greeks that their
year is deprived of its spring.”[440]

[440] Herodot. vii, 161, 162. Polybius (xii, 26) does not
seem to have read this embassy as related by Herodotus,—or
at least he must have preferred some other account of it;—he
gives a different account of the answer which they made
to Gelo: an answer (not insolent, but) business-like and
evasive,—πραγματικώτατον ἀπόκριμα, etc. See Timæus, Fragm. 87,
ed. Didot.

That envoys were sent from Peloponnesus to solicit assistance from
Gelo against Xerxes, and that they solicited in vain, is an incident
not to be disputed: but the reason assigned for refusal—conflicting
pretensions about the supreme command—may be suspected to have arisen
less from historical transmission, than from the conceptions of the
historian, or of his informants, respecting the relations between
the parties. In his time, Sparta, Athens, and Syracuse were the
three great imperial cities of Greece, and his Sicilian witnesses,
proud of the great past power of Gelo, might well ascribe to him
that competition for preëminence and command which Herodotus has
dramatized. The immense total of forces which Gelo is made to promise
becomes the more incredible, when we reflect that he had another and
a better reason for refusing aid altogether. He was attacked at home,
and was fully employed in defending himself.

The same spring which brought Xerxes across the Hellespont into
Greece, also witnessed a formidable Carthaginian invasion of Sicily.
Gelo had already been engaged in war against them, as has been above
stated, and had obtained successes, which they would naturally seek
the first opportunity of retrieving. The vast Persian invasion of
Greece, organized for three years before, and drawing contingents
not only from the whole eastern world, but especially from their
own metropolitan brethren at Tyre and Sidon, was well calculated to
encourage them: and there seems good reason for believing that the
simultaneous attack on the Greeks both in Peloponnesus and in Sicily,
was concerted between the Carthaginians and Xerxes,[441]—probably
by the Phenicians on behalf of Xerxes. Nevertheless, this alliance
does not exclude other concurrent circumstances in the interior of
the island, which supplied the Carthaginians both with invitation
and with help. Agrigentum, though not under the dominion of Gelo,
was ruled by his friend and relative Thêro: while Rhegium and
Messênê under the government of Anaxilaus, Himera under that of
his father-in-law Terillus, and Selinus, seem to have formed an
opposing minority among the Sicilian Greeks; at variance with Gelo
and Thêro, but in amity and correspondence with Carthage.[442] It
was seemingly about the year 481 B. C., that Thêro, perhaps invited
by an Himeræan party, expelled from Himera the despot Terillus, and
became possessed of the town. Terillus applied for aid to Carthage,
backed by his son-in-law Anaxilaus, who espoused the quarrel so
warmly, as even to tender his own children as hostages to Hamilkar
the Carthaginian suffes, or general, the personal friend or guest of
Terillus. The application was favorably entertained, and Hamilkar,
arriving at Panormus in the eventful year 480 B. C., with a fleet of
three thousand ships of war and a still larger number of storeships,
disembarked a land-force of three hundred thousand men: which would
even have been larger, had not the vessels carrying the cavalry and
the chariots happened to be dispersed by storms.[443] These numbers
we can only repeat as we find them, without trusting them any farther
than as proof that the armament was on the most extensive scale. But
the different nations of whom Herodotus reports the land-force to
have consisted are trustworthy and curious: it included Phenicians,
Libyans, Iberians, Ligyes, Helisyki, Sardinians, and Corsicans.[444]
This is the first example known to us of those numerous mercenary
armies, which it was the policy of Carthage to compose of nations
different in race and language,[445] in order to obviate conspiracy
or mutiny against the general. Having landed at Panormus, Hamilkar
marched to Himera, dragged his vessels on shore under the shelter
of a rampart, and then laid siege to the town: while the Himeræans,
reinforced by Thêro and the army of Agrigentum, determined on an
obstinate defence, and even bricked up the gates. Pressing messages
were despatched to solicit aid from Gelo, who collected his whole
force, said to have amounted to fifty thousand foot, and five
thousand horse, and marched to Himera. His arrival restored the
courage of the inhabitants, and after some partial fighting, which
turned out to the advantage of the Greeks, a general battle ensued.
It was obstinate and bloody, lasting from sunrise until late in the
afternoon; and its success was mainly determined by an intercepted
letter which fell into the hands of Gelo,—a communication from the
Selinuntines to Hamilkar, promising to send a body of horse to his
aid, and intimating the time at which they would arrive. A party
of Gelo’s horse, instructed to personate this reinforcement from
Selinus, were received into the camp of Hamilkar, where they spread
consternation and disorder, and are even said to have slain the
general and set fire to the ships: while the Greek army, brought to
action at this opportune moment, at length succeeded in triumphing
over both superior numbers and a determined resistance. If we are to
believe Diodorus, one hundred and fifty thousand men were slain on
the side of the Carthaginians; the rest fled partly to the Sikanian
mountains, where they became prisoners of the Agrigentines,—partly
to a hilly ground, where, from want of water, they were obliged
to surrender at discretion: twenty ships alone escaped with a few
fugitives, and these twenty were destroyed by a storm in the passage,
so that only one small boat arrived at Carthage with the disastrous
tidings.[446] Dismissing such unreasonable exaggerations, we can
only venture to assert that the battle was strenuously disputed, the
victory complete, and the slain as well as the prisoners numerous.
The body of Hamilkar was never discovered, in spite of careful
search ordered by Gelo: the Carthaginians affirmed, that as soon
as the defeat of his army became irreparable, he had cast himself
into the great sacrificial fire, wherein he had been offering entire
victims (the usual sacrifice consisting only of a small part of the
beast),[447] to propitiate the gods, and had there been consumed.
The Carthaginians erected funereal monuments to him, graced with
periodical sacrifices, both in Carthage and in their principal
colonies:[448] on the field of battle itself also, a monument
was raised to him by the Greeks. On that monument, seventy years
afterwards, his victorious grandson, fresh from the plunder of this
same city of Himera, offered the bloody sacrifice of three thousand
Grecian prisoners.[449]

[441] Ephorus, Fragment. 111, ed. Didot; Diodor. xi, 1, 20.
Mitford and Dahlmann (Forschungen, _Herodotus_, etc., sect. 35,
p. 186) call in question this alliance or understanding between
Xerxes and the Carthaginians; but on no sufficient grounds, in my
judgment.

[442] Herodot. vii, 165; Diodor. xi, 23: compare also xiii,
55, 59. In like manner Rhegium and Messênê formed the opposing
interest to Syracuse, under Dionysius the elder (Diodor. xiv, 44).

[443] Herodotus (vii, 165) and Diodorus (xi, 20) both give the
number of the land-force: the latter alone gives that of the
fleet.

[444] Herodot. vii, 165. The Ligyes came from the southern
junction of Italy and France; the gulfs of Lyons and Genoa. The
Helisyki cannot be satisfactorily verified: Niebuhr considers
them to have been the _Volsci_: an ingenious conjecture.

[445] Polyb. i, 67. His description of the mutiny of the
Carthaginian mercenaries, after the conclusion of the first Punic
war, is highly instructive.

[446] Diodor. xi, 21-24.

[447] Herodotus, vii, 167. σώματα ὅλα καταγίζων. This passage
of Herodotus receives illustration from the learned comment
of Mövers on the Phenician inscription recently discovered at
Marseilles. It was the usual custom of the Jews, and it had been
in old times the custom with the Phenicians (Porphyr. de Abstin.
iv, 15), to burn the victim entire: the Phenicians departed from
this practice, but the departure seems to have been considered as
not strictly correct, and in times of great misfortune or anxiety
the old habit was resumed (Mövers, Das Opferwesen der Karthager.
Breslau, 1847, pp. 71-118).

[448] Herodot. vii, 166, 167. Hamilkar was son of a Syracusan
mother: a curious proof of _connubium_ between Carthage and
Syracuse. At the moment when the elder Dionysius declared war
against Carthage, in 398 B. C., there were many Carthaginian
merchants dwelling both in Syracuse and in other Greco-Sicilian
cities, together with ships and other property. Dionysius
gave license to the Syracusans, at the first instant when he
had determined on declaring war, to plunder all this property
(Diodor. xiv, 46). This speedy multiplication of Carthaginians
with merchandise in the Grecian cities, so soon after a bloody
war had been concluded, is a strong proof of the spontaneous
tendencies of trade.

[449] Diodor. xiii, 62. According to Herodotus, the battle of
Himera took place on the same day as that of Salamis; according
to Diodorus, on the same day as that of Thermopylæ. If we are
forced to choose between the two witnesses, there can be no
hesitation in preferring the former: but it seems more probable
that neither is correct.

As far as we can judge from the brief allusions of Herodotus,
he must have conceived the battle of Himera in a manner totally
different from Diodorus. Under such circumstances, I cannot
venture to trust the details given by the latter.

We may presume that Anaxilaus with the forces of Rhegium shared in
the defeat of the foreign invader whom he had called in, and probably
other Greeks besides. All of them were now compelled to sue for
peace from Gelo, and to solicit the privilege of being enrolled as
his dependent allies, which was granted to them without any harder
imposition than the tribute probably involved in that relation.[450]
Even the Carthaginians themselves were so intimidated by the defeat,
that they sent envoys to ask for peace at Syracuse, which they are
said to have obtained mainly by the solicitation of Damaretê, wife
of Gelo, on condition of paying two thousand talents to defray the
costs of the war, and of erecting two temples in which the terms of
the treaty were to be permanently recorded.[451] If we could believe
the assertion of Theophrastus, Gelo exacted from the Carthaginians
a stipulation that they would for the future abstain from human
sacrifices in their religious worship:[452] but such an interference
with foreign religious rites would be unexampled in that age, and we
know, moreover, that the practice was not permanently discontinued
at Carthage.[453] Indeed, we may reasonably suspect that Diodorus,
copying from writers like Ephorus, and Timæus, long after the events,
has exaggerated considerably the defeat, the humiliation, and the
amercement, of the Carthaginians. For the words of the poet Pindar,
a very few years after the battle of Himera, represent a fresh
Carthaginian invasion as matter of present uneasiness and alarm:[454]
and the Carthaginian fleet is found engaged in aggressive warfare
on the coast of Italy, requiring to be coerced by the brother and
successor of Gelo.

[450] I presume this treatment of Anaxilaus by Gelo must be
alluded to in Diodorus, xi, 66: at least it is difficult to
understand what other “great benefit” Gelo had conferred on
Anaxilaus.

[451] Diodor. xi, 26.

[452] Schol. ad Pindar. Pyth. ii, 3; Plutarch, De Serâ Numinis
Vindictâ, p. 552, c. 6.

[453] Diodor. xx, 14.

[454] Pindar, Nem. ix, 67 (= 28 B.) with the Scholia.

The victory of Himera procured for the Sicilian cities immunity
from foreign war together with a rich plunder. Splendid offerings
of thanksgiving to the gods were dedicated in the temples of
Himera, Syracuse, and Delphi: and the epigram of Simonidês,[455]
composed for the tripod offered in the latter temple, described
Gelo with his three brothers Hiero, Polyzêlus, and Thrasybulus, as
the joint liberators of Greece from the Barbarian, along with the
victors of Salamis and Platæa. And the Sicilians alleged that he
was on the point of actually sending reinforcements to the Greeks
against Xerxes, in spite of the necessity of submitting to Spartan
command, when the intelligence of the defeat and retreat of that
prince reached him. But we find another statement decidedly more
probable,—that he sent a confidential envoy named Kadmus, to Delphi,
with orders to watch the turn of the Xerxeian invasion, and in case
it should prove successful (as he thought that it probably would
be) to tender presents and submission to the victorious invader
on behalf of Syracuse.[456] When we consider that until the very
morning of the battle of Salamis, the cause of Grecian independence
must have appeared to an impartial spectator almost desperate, we
cannot wonder that Gelo should take precautions for preventing the
onward progress of the Persians towards Sicily, which was already
sufficiently imperiled by its formidable enemies in Africa. The
defeat of the Persians at Salamis, and of the Carthaginians at
Himera, cleared away, suddenly and unexpectedly, the terrific cloud
from Greece as well as from Sicily, and left a sky comparatively
brilliant with prosperous hopes.

[455] Simonidês, Epigr. 141, ed. Bergk.

[456] Herodot. vii, 163-165: compare Diodor. xi, 26; Ephorus,
Fragm. 111, ed. Didot.

To the victorious army of Gelo, there was abundant plunder for
recompense as well as distribution: among the most valuable part
of the plunder were the numerous prisoners taken, who were divided
among the cities in proportion to the number of troops furnished
by each. Of course the largest shares must have fallen to Syracuse
and Agrigentum: while the number acquired by the latter was still
farther increased by the separate capture of those prisoners who
had dispersed throughout the mountains in and near the Agrigentine
territory. All the Sicilian cities allied with or dependent on Gelo,
but especially the two last mentioned, were thus put in possession
of a number of slaves as public property, who were kept in chains
to work,[457] and were either employed on public undertakings for
defence, ornament, and religious solemnity,—or let out to private
masters so as to afford a revenue to the state. So great was the
total of these public slaves at Agrigentum, that though many
were employed on state-works, which elevated the city to signal
grandeur during the flourishing period of seventy years which
intervened between the recent battle and its subsequent capture by
the Carthaginians,—there nevertheless remained great numbers to be
let out to private individuals, some of whom had no less than five
hundred slaves respectively in their employment.[458]

[457] Diodor. xi, 25. αἱ δὲ πόλεις εἰς πέδας κατέστησαν τοὺς
διαιρεθέντας αἰχμαλώτους, καὶ τὰ δημόσια τῶν ἔργων διὰ τούτων
ἐπεσκεύαζον.

For analogous instances of captives taken in war being employed
in public works by the captors, and laboring in chains, see the
cases of Tegea and Samos in Herodot. i, 66; iii, 39.

[458] Diodor. xi, 25. Respecting slaves belonging to the public,
and let out for hire to individual employers, compare the large
financial project conceived by Xenophon, De Vectigalibus, capp. 3
and 4.

The peace which now ensued left Gelo master of Syracuse and Gela,
with the Chalkidic Greek towns on the east of the island; while
Thêro governed in Agrigentum, and his son Thrasydæus in Himera. In
power as well as in reputation, Gelo was unquestionably the chief
person in the island; moreover, he was connected by marriage, and
lived on terms of uninterrupted friendship, with Thêro. His conduct
both at Syracuse and towards the cities dependent upon him, was
mild and conciliating. But his subsequent career was very short: he
died of a dropsical complaint, not much more than a year after the
battle of Himera, while the glories of that day were fresh in every
one’s recollection. As the Syracusan law rigorously interdicted
expensive funerals, Gelo had commanded that his own obsequies should
be conducted in strict conformity to the law: nevertheless, the zeal
of his successor as well as the attachment of the people disobeyed
these commands. The great mass of citizens followed his funeral
procession from the city to the estate of his wife, fifteen miles
distant: nine massive towers were erected to distinguish the spot;
and the solemnities of heroic worship were rendered to him. Nor
did the respectful recollections of the conqueror of Himera ever
afterwards die out among the Syracusan people, though his tomb was
defaced, first by the Carthaginians, and afterwards by the despot
Agathoklês.[459] And when we recollect the destructive effects caused
by the subsequent Carthaginian invasions, we shall be sensible how
great was the debt of gratitude owing to Gelo by his contemporaries.

[459] Diodor. xi, 38, 67; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 29; Aristotle,
Γελώων Πολιτεία; Fragm. p. 106, ed. Neumann.

It was not merely as conqueror of Himera, but as a sort of second
founder of Syracuse,[460] that Gelo was thus solemnly worshipped. The
size, the strength, and the population of the town were all greatly
increased under him. Besides the number of new inhabitants which he
brought from Gela, the Hyblæan Megara, and the Sicilian Eubœa, we
are informed that he also inscribed on the roll of citizens no less
than ten thousand mercenary soldiers. It will, moreover, appear that
these new-made citizens were in possession of the islet of Ortygia,
and the portion of the city closely bordering on it, which bore the
name of Achradina,[461]—the interior strongholds of Syracuse. It has
already been stated that Ortygia was the original settlement, and
that the city did not overstep the boundaries of the islet before
the enlargements of Gelo. We do not know by what arrangements Gelo
provided new lands for so large a number of newcomers; but when we
come to notice the antipathy with which these latter were regarded by
the remaining citizens, we shall be inclined to believe that the old
citizens had been dispossessed and degraded.

[460] Diodor. xi, 49.

[461] Diodor. xi, 72, 73.

Gelo left a son in tender years; but his power passed, by his own
direction, to two of his brothers, Polyzêlus and Hiero; the former
of whom married the widow of the deceased prince, and was named,
according to his testamentary directions, commander of the military
force,—while Hiero was intended to enjoy the government of the city.
Whatever may have been the wishes of Gelo, however, the real power
fell to Hiero,—a man of energy and determination, and munificent
as a patron of contemporary poets, Pindar, Simonidês, Bacchylidês,
Epicharmus, Æschylus, and others; but the victim of a painful
internal complaint, jealous in his temper, cruel and rapacious in
his government,[462] and noted as an organizer of that systematic
espionage which broke up all freedom of speech among his subjects.
Especially jealous of his brother Polyzêlus, who was very popular
in the city, he despatched him on a military expedition against the
Krotoniates, with a view of indirectly accomplishing his destruction:
but Polyzêlus, aware of the snare, fled to Agrigentum, and sought
protection from his brother-in-law, the despot Thêron; from whom
Hiero redemanded him, and, on receiving a refusal, prepared to
enforce the demand by arms. He had already advanced on his march as
far as the river Gela, but no actual battle appears to have taken
place: it is interesting to hear that Simonidês the poet, esteemed
and rewarded by both these princes, was the mediator of peace between
them.[463]

[462] Diodor. xi, 67; Aristotel. Politic. v, 9, 3. In spite of
the compliments directly paid by Pindar to Hiero (πραῢς ἀστοῖς,
οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς, ξείνοις δὲ θαυμαστὸς πατὴρ, Pyth. iii, 71
= 125), his indirect admonitions and hints sufficiently attest
the real character (see Dissen ad Pindar. Pyth. i, and ii, pp.
161-182).

[463] Diodor. xi, 48; Schol. Pindar, Olymp. ii, 29.

The temporary breach, and sudden reconciliation, between these two
powerful despots, proved the cause of sorrow and ruin at Himera. That
city, under the dominion of the Agrigentine Thêro, was administered
by his son Thrasydæus,—a youth whose oppressive conduct speedily
excited the strongest antipathy. The Himeræans, knowing that they had
little chance of redress from Thêro against his son, took advantage
of the quarrel between him and Hiero to make propositions to the
latter, and to entreat his aid for the expulsion of Thrasydæus,
tendering themselves as subjects of Syracuse. It appears that Kapys
and Hippokratês, cousins of Thêro, but at variance with him, and
also candidates for the protection of Hiero, were concerned in this
scheme for detaching Himera from the dominion of Thêro. But so soon
as peace had been concluded, Hiero betrayed to Thêro both the schemes
and the malcontents at Himera. We seem to make out that Kapys and
Hippokratês collected some forces to resist Thêro, but were defeated
by him at the river Himera:[464] his victory was followed by seizing
and putting to death a large number of Himeræan citizens. So great
was the number slain, coupled with the loss of others who fled for
fear of being slain, that the population of the city was sensibly
and inconveniently diminished. Thêro invited and enrolled a large
addition of new citizens, chiefly of Dorian blood.[465]

[464] Schol. ad Pindar. Olymp. ii, 173. For the few facts which
can be made out respecting the family and genealogy of Thêro, see
Göller, De Situ et Origine Syracusarum, ch. vii, pp. 19-22. The
Scholiasts of Pindar are occasionally useful in explaining his
brief historical allusions; but they seem to have had very few
trustworthy materials before them for so doing.

[465] Diodor. xi, 48, 49.

The power of Hiero, now reconciled both with Thêro and with his
brother Polyzêlus, is marked by several circumstances as noway
inferior to that of Gelo, and probably the greatest not merely
in Sicily, but throughout the Grecian world. The citizens of the
distant city of Cumæ, on the coast of Italy, harassed by Carthaginian
and Tyrrhenian fleets, entreated his aid, and received from him a
squadron which defeated and drove off their enemies:[466] he even
settled a Syracusan colony in the neighboring island of Pithekusa.
Anaxilaus, despot of Rhegium and Messênê, had attacked, and might
probably have overpowered, his neighbors, the Epizephyrian Lokrians;
but the menaces of Hiero, invoked by the Lokrians, and conveyed
by the envoy Chromius, compelled him to desist.[467] Those heroic
honors, which in Greece belonged to the œkist of a new city, were
yet wanting to him; and he procured them by the foundation of the
new city of Ætna,[468] on the site and in the place of Katana, the
inhabitants of which he expelled, as well as those of Naxos. While
these Naxians and Katanæans were directed to take up their abode
at Leontini along with the existing inhabitants, Hiero planted ten
thousand new inhabitants in his adopted city of Ætna: five thousand
from Syracuse and Gela,—with an equal number from Peloponnesus.
They served as an auxiliary force, ready to be called forth in the
event of discontents at Syracuse, as we shall see by the history of
his successor: he gave them not only the territory which had before
belonged to Katana, but also a large addition besides, chiefly at the
expense of the neighboring Sikel tribes. His son Deinomenês, and his
friend and confidant, Chromius, enrolled as an Ætnæan, became joint
administrators of the city: its religious and social customs were
assimilated to the Dorian model,[469] and Pindar dreams of future
relations between the despot and citizens of Ætna, analogous to those
between king and citizens at Sparta. Both Hiero and Chromius were
proclaimed as Ætnæans at the Pythian and Nemean games, when their
chariots gained victories; on which occasion the assembled crowd
heard for the first time of the new Hellenic city of Ætna. We see,
by the compliments of Pindar,[470] that Hiero was vain of his new
title as founder; but we must remark that it was procured, not, as in
most cases, by planting Greeks on a spot previously barbarous, but by
the dispossession and impoverishment of other Grecian citizens, who
seem to have given no ground of offence. Both in Gelo and Hiero we
see the first exhibition of that propensity to violent and wholesale
transplantation of inhabitants from one seat to another, which was
not uncommon among Assyrian and Persian despots, and which was
exhibited on a still larger scale by the successors of Alexander the
Great in their numerous new-built cities.

[466] The brazen helmet, discovered near the site of Olympia,
with the name of Hiero and the victory at Cumæ inscribed on it,
yet remains as an interesting relic to commemorate this event: it
was among the offerings presented by Hiero to the Olympic Zeus:
see Boechk, Corp. Inscriptt. Græc. No. 16, part i, p. 34.

[467] Diodor. xi, 51; Pindar, i, 74 (= 140); ii, 17 (= 35) with
the Scholia; Epicharmus, Fragment, p. 19, ed. Krusemann; Schol.
Pindar. Pyth. i, 98; Strabo, v, p. 247.

[468] Ἱέρων ~οἰκιστὴς ἀντὶ τυράννου βουλόμενος εἶναι~, Κατάνην
ἐξελὼν Αἴτνην μετωνόμασε τὴν πόλιν, ἑαυτὸν οἰκιστὴν προσαγορεύσας
(Schol. ad Pindar. Nem. i, 1).

Compare the subsequent case of the foundation of Thurii, among
the citizens of which violent disputes arose, in determining who
should be recognized as œkist of the place. On referring to the
oracle, Apollo directed them to commemorate _himself_ as œkist
(Diodor. xii, 35).

[469] Chromius ἐπίτροπος τῆς Αἴτνης (Schol. Pind. Nem. ix, 1).
About the Dorian institutions of Ætna, etc., Pindar, Pyth. i,
60-71.

Deinomenês survived his father, and commemorated the Olympic
victories of the latter by costly offerings at Olympia (Pausan.
vi, 12, 1).

[470] Pindar, Pyth. i, 60 (= 117); iii, 69 (= 121). Pindar.
ap. Strabo. vi, p. 269. Compare Nemea, ix, 1-30, addressed to
Chromius. Hiero is proclaimed in some odes as a Syracusan;
but Syracuse and the newly-founded Ætna are intimately joined
together: see Nemea, i, _init._

Anaxilaus of Rhegium died shortly after that message of Hiero which
had compelled him to spare the Lokrians; but such was the esteem
entertained for his memory, and so efficient the government of
Mikythus, a manumitted slave whom he constituted regent, that Rhegium
and Messênê were preserved for his children, yet minors.[471] But
a still more important change in Sicily was caused by the death
of the Agrigentine Thêro, which took place, seemingly, about 472
B. C. This prince, a partner with Gelo in the great victory over
the Carthaginians, left a reputation of good government as well
as ability among the Agrigentines, which we find perpetuated in
the laureate strains of Pindar,—and his memory doubtless became
still farther endeared from comparison with his son and successor.
Thrasydæus, now master both of Himera and Agrigentum, displayed on a
larger scale the same oppressive and sanguinary dispositions which
had before provoked rebellion at the former city. Feeling himself
detested by his subjects, he enlarged the military force which had
been left by his father, and engaged so many new mercenaries, that
he became master of a force of twenty thousand men, horse and foot.
And in his own territory, perhaps, he might long have trodden with
impunity in the footsteps of Phalaris, had he not imprudently
provoked his more powerful neighbor, Hiero. In an obstinate and
murderous battle between these two princes, two thousand men were
slain on the side of the Syracusans, and four thousand on that of
the Agrigentines: an immense slaughter, considering that it mostly
fell upon the Greeks in the two armies, and not upon the non-Hellenic
mercenaries.[472] But the defeat of Thrasydæus was so complete, that
he was compelled to flee not only from Agrigentum, but from Sicily:
he retired to Megara, in Greece Proper, where he was condemned to
death and perished.[473] The Agrigentines, thus happily released from
their oppressor, sued for and obtained peace from Hiero: they are
said to have established a democratical government, but we learn that
Hiero sent many citizens into banishment from Agrigentum and Himera,
as well as from Gela,[474] nor can we doubt that all the three
were numbered among his subject cities. The moment of freedom only
commenced for them when the Gelonian dynasty shared the fate of the
Theronian.

[471] Justin, iv, 2.

[472] So I conceive the words of Diodorus are to be
understood,—πλεῖστοι τῶν παραταξαμένων Ἑλλήνων πρὸς Ἕλληνας
ἔπεσον (Diodor. xi, 53).

[473] Diodor. xi, 53. ἐκεῖ θανάτου καταγνωσθεὶς ἐτελεύτησεν. This
is a remarkable specimen of the feeling in a foreign city towards
an oppressive τύραννος. The Megarians of Greece Proper were much
connected with Sicily, through the Hyblæan Megara, as well as
Selinus.

[474] Diodor. xi, 76. Οἱ κατὰ τὴν Ἱέρωνος δυναστείαν ἐκπεπτωκότες
ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων πόλεων—τούτων δ’ ἦσαν Γελῶοι καὶ Ἀκραγαντῖνοι καὶ
Ἱμεραῖοι.

The victory over Thrasydæus rendered Hiero more completely master
of Sicily than his brother Gelo had been before him. The last
act which we hear of him, is, his interference on behalf of his
brothers-in-law,[475] the sons of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, who were
now of age to govern. He encouraged them to prefer, and probably
showed himself ready to enforce, their claim against Mikythus, who
had administered Rhegium since the death of Anaxilaus, for the
property as well as the sceptre. Mikythus complied readily with the
demand, rendering an account so exact and faithful, that the sons
of Anaxilaus themselves entreated him to remain and govern,—or more
probably to lend his aid to their government. This request he was
wise enough to refuse: he removed his own property and retired to
Tegea in Arcadia. Hiero died shortly afterwards, of the complaint
under which he had so long suffered, after a reign of ten years.[476]

[475] Hiero had married the daughter of Anaxilaus, but he seems
also to have had two other wives,—the sister or cousin of Thêro,
and the daughter of a Syracusan named Nikoklês: this last was the
mother of his son Deinomenês (Schol. Pindar. Pyth. i, 112).

We read of Kleophron, son of Anaxilaus, governing Messênê during
his father’s lifetime: probably this young man must have died,
otherwise Mikythus would not have succeeded (Schol. Pindar. Pyth.
ii, 34).

[476] Diodor. xi, 66.

On the death of Hiero, the succession was disputed between his
brother Thrasybulus, and his nephew, the youthful son of Gelo, so
that the partisans of the family became thus divided. Thrasybulus,
surrounding his nephew with temptations to luxurious pleasure,
contrived to put him indirectly aside, and thus to seize the
government for himself.[477] This family division,—a curse often
resting upon the blood-relations of Grecian despots, and leading to
the greatest atrocities,[478]—coupled with the conduct of Thrasybulus
himself, caused the downfall of the mighty Gelonian dynasty. The bad
qualities of Hiero were now seen greatly exaggerated, but without his
energy, in Thrasybulus,—who put to death many citizens, and banished
still more, for the purpose of seizing their property, until at
length he provoked among the Syracusans intense and universal hatred,
shared even by many of the old Gelonian partisans. Though he tried
to strengthen himself by increasing his mercenary force, he could
not prevent a general revolt from breaking out among the Syracusan
population. By summoning those citizens whom Hiero had planted in
his new city of Ætna, as well as various troops from his dependent
allies, he found himself at the head of fifteen thousand men, and
master of the interior strongholds of the city,—the island of Ortygia
with Achradina, while the great body of the revolted Syracusans
were assembled in the outer city called Tychê. Though superior in
number, yet being no match in military efficiency for the forces of
Thrasybulus, they were obliged to invoke aid from the other cities in
Sicily, as well as from the Sikel tribes,—proclaiming the Gelonian
dynasty as the common enemy of freedom in the island, and holding out
universal independence as the reward of victory. It was fortunate
for them that there was no brother-despot, like the powerful Thêro,
to espouse the cause of Thrasybulus: Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus,
Himera, and even the Sikel tribes, all responded to the call with
alacrity, so that a large force, both military and naval, came to
reinforce the Syracusans: Thrasybulus was totally defeated, first
in a naval action, next on land, and obliged to shut himself up in
Ortygia and Achradina, where he soon found his situation hopeless.
He accordingly opened a negotiation with his opponents, which ended
in his abdication and retirement to Lokri, while the mercenary
troops whom he had brought together were also permitted to depart
unmolested.[479] The expelled Thrasybulus afterwards lived and died
as a private citizen at Lokri,—a very different fate from that which
had befallen Thrasydæus, son of Thêro at Megara, though both seem to
have given the same provocation.

[477] Aristotel. Politic. v, 8, 19. Diodorus does not mention the
son of Gelo.

Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellenici, App. chap. 10, p. 264,
_seq._) has discussed all the main points connected with
Syracusan and Sicilian chronology.

[478] Xenophon, Hiero, iii, 8. Εἰ τοίνυν ἐθέλεις κατανοεῖν,
εὑρήσεις μὲν τοὺς ἰδιώτας ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα φιλουμένους, τοὺς
δὲ τυράννους πολλοὺς μὲν παῖδας ἑαυτῶν ἀπεκτονηκότας, πολλοὺς δ’
ὑπὸ παίδων αὐτοὺς ἀπολωλότας, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀδελφοὺς ἐν τυραννίσιν
ἀλληλοφόνους γεγενημένους, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ γυναικῶν τῶν ἑαυτῶν
τυράννους διεφθαρμένους, καὶ ὑπὸ ἑταίρων γε τῶν μάλιστα δοκούντων
φίλων εἶναι: compare Isokratês, De Pace, Orat. viii, p. 182, §
138.

So also Tacitus (Hist. v, 9) respecting the native kings of
Judæa, after the expulsion of the Syrian dynasty: “Sibi ipsi
reges imposuere: qui, mobilitate vulgi expulsi, resumptâ per arma
dominatione, fugas civium, urbium eversiones,—_fratrum, conjugum,
parentum, neces,— aliaque solita regibus ausi_,” etc.

[479] Diodor. ix, 67, 68.

Thus fell the powerful Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse, after a
continuance of eighteen years.[480] Its fall was nothing less than
an extensive revolution throughout Sicily. Among the various cities
of the island there had grown up many petty despots, each with his
separate mercenary force; acting as the instruments, and relying on
the protection, of the great despot at Syracuse. All these were now
expelled, and governments more or less democratical were established
everywhere.[481] The sons of Anaxilaus maintained themselves a
little longer at Rhegium and Messênê, but the citizens of these two
towns at length followed the general example, compelled them to
retire,[482] and began their era of freedom.

[480] Aristotel. Politic. v, 8, 23.

[481] Diodor. xi, 68.

[482] Diodor. xi, 76.

But though the Sicilian despots had thus been expelled, the free
governments established in their place were exposed at first to
much difficulty and collision. It has been already mentioned that
Gelo, Hiero, Thêro, Thrasydæus, Thrasybulus, etc., had all condemned
many citizens to exile with confiscation of property; and had
planted on the soil new citizens and mercenaries in numbers no less
considerable. To what race these mercenaries belonged, we are not
told: it is probable that they were only in part Greeks. Such violent
mutations, both of persons and property, could not occur without
raising bitter conflicts, of interest as well as of feeling, between
the old, the new, and the dispossessed proprietors, as soon as the
iron hand of compression was removed. This source of angry dissension
was common to all the Sicilian cities, but in none did it flow more
profusely than in Syracuse. In that city, the new mercenaries last
introduced by Thrasybulus, had retired at the same time with him,
many of them to the Hieronian city of Ætna, from whence they had been
brought; but there yet remained the more numerous body introduced
principally by Gelo, partly also by Hiero,—the former alone had
enrolled ten thousand, of whom more than seven thousand yet remained.
What part these Gelonian citizens had taken in the late revolution,
we do not find distinctly stated: they seem not to have supported
Thrasybulus, as a body, and probably many of them took part against
him. After the revolution had been accomplished, a public assembly
of the Syracusans was convened, in which the first resolution
was, to provide for the religious commemoration of the event, by
erecting a colossal statue of Zeus Eleutherius, and by celebrating
an annual festival to be called the Eleutheria, with solemn matches
and sacrifices. They next proceeded to determine the political
constitution; and such was the predominant reaction, doubtless
aggravated by the returned exiles, of hatred and fear against the
expelled dynasty,—that the whole body of new citizens, who had
been domiciliated under Gelo and Hiero, were declared ineligible
to magistracy or honor. This harsh and sweeping disqualification,
falling at once upon a numerous minority, naturally provoked renewed
irritation and civil war. The Gelonian citizens, the most warlike
individuals in the state, and occupying, as favored partisans of
the previous dynasty, the inner and separately fortified sections
of Syracuse,[483]—Achradina and Ortygia,—placed themselves in open
revolt; while the general mass of citizens, masters of all the outer
sections of the city, were not strong enough to assail with success
this defensible position. They could only block it up, and intercept
its supplies, which the garrison within were forced to come out and
fight for. This disastrous internal war continued for some months,
with many partial conflicts both by land and sea: the general body
of citizens became accustomed to arms, while a chosen regiment of
six hundred trained volunteers acquired especial efficiency. Unable
to maintain themselves longer, the Gelonians were forced to hazard
a general battle, which, after an obstinate struggle, terminated
in their complete defeat. The chosen band of six hundred, who
had eminently contributed to this victory, received from their
fellow-citizens a crown of honor, and a reward of one mina per
head.[484]

[483] Diodor. xi, 73. τήν τε Ἀχραδινὴν καὶ τὴν Νῆσον· ἀμφοτέρων
τῶν τόπων τούτων ἐχόντων ἴδιον τεῖχος, καλῶς κατεσκευασμένον.

Diodorus goes on to say that the general mass of citizens τὸ
πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς τετραμμένον αὐτῆς ~ἐπετείχισαν~.,—if we could
venture to construe this last word rigidly, we might suppose that
the parts of the city, _exterior_ to Achradina and the island,
had before been unfortified.

Aristotle (Politic. v, 2, 11) mentions, as one of his
illustrations of the mischief of receiving new citizens, that
the Syracusans, after the Gelonian dynasty, admitted the foreign
mercenaries to citizenship, and from hence came to sedition and
armed conflict. But the incident cannot fairly be quoted in
illustration of that principle which he brings it to support. The
mercenaries, so long as the dynasty lasted, had been the first
citizens in the community: after its overthrow, they became the
inferior, and were rendered inadmissible to honors. It is hardly
matter of surprise that so great a change of position excited
them to rebel; but this is not a case properly adducible to prove
the difficulty of adjusting matters with new-coming citizens.

After the expulsion of Agathoklês from Syracuse, nearly two
centuries after these events, the same quarrel and sedition was
renewed, by the exclusion of his mercenaries from magistracy and
posts of honor (Diodor. xxi, Fragm. p. 282).

[484] Diodor. xi, 72, 73, 76.

The meagre annals, wherein these interesting events are indicated
rather than described, tell us scarcely anything of the political
arrangements which resulted from so important a victory. Probably
the Gelonians were expelled: but we may assume as certain, that
the separate fortifications of the island and Achradina were
abolished, and that from henceforward there was only one fortified
city, until the time of the despot Dionysius, more than fifty years
afterwards.[485]

[485] Diodorus, xiv, 7.

Meanwhile the rest of Sicily had experienced disorders analogous in
character to those of Syracuse. At Gela, at Agrigentum, at Himera,
the reaction against the Gelonian dynasty had brought back in
crowds the dispossessed exiles; who, claiming restitution of their
properties and influence, found their demands sustained by the
population generally. The Katanæans, whom Hiero had driven from their
own city to Leontini, in order that he might convert Katana into his
own settlement Ætna, assembled in arms and allied themselves with the
Sikel prince Duketius, to reconquer their former home and to restore
to the Sikels that which Hiero had taken from them for enlargement of
the Ætnæan territory. They were aided by the Syracusans, to whom the
neighborhood of these Hieronian partisans was dangerous: but they did
not accomplish their object until after a long contest and several
battles with the Ætnæans. A convention was at length concluded, by
which the latter evacuated Katana and were allowed to occupy the town
and territory,—seemingly Sikel,—of Ennesia, or Inessa, upon which
they bestowed the name of Ætna,[486] with monuments commemorating
Hiero as the founder,—while the tomb of the latter at Katana was
demolished by the restored inhabitants.

[486] Diodorus, xi, 76; Strabo, vi, 268. Compare, as an analogous
event, the destruction of the tomb of Agnon, the œkist of
Amphipolis, after the revolt of that city from Athens (Thucyd. v,
11).

These conflicts, disturbing the peace of all Sicily, came to be so
intolerable, that a general congress was held between the various
cities to adjust them. It was determined by joint resolution to
readmit the exiles and to extrude the Gelonian settlers everywhere:
but an establishment was provided for these latter in the territory
of Messênê. It appears that the exiles received back their property,
or at least an assignment of other lands in compensation for it.
The inhabitants of Gela were enabled to provide for their own
exiles by reëstablishing the city of Kamarina,[487] which had been
conquered from Syracuse by Hippokratês, despot of Gelo, but which
Gelo, on transferring his abode to Syracuse, had made a portion
of the Syracusan territory, conveying its inhabitants to the city
of Syracuse. The Syracusans now renounced the possession of it,—a
cession to be explained probably by the fact, that among the
new-comers transferred by Gelo to Syracuse, there were included not
only the previous Kamarinæans, but also many who had before been
citizens of Gela.[488] For these men, now obliged to quit Syracuse,
it would be convenient to provide an abode at Kamarina, as well as
for the other restored Geloan exiles; and we may farther presume that
this new city served as a receptacle for other homeless citizens
from all parts of the island. It was consecrated by the Geloans as
an independent city, with Dorian rights and customs: its lands were
distributed anew, and among its settlers were men rich enough to send
prize chariots to Peloponnesus, as well as to pay for odes of Pindar.
The Olympic victories of the Kamarinæan Psaumis secured for his new
city an Hellenic celebrity, at a moment when it hardly yet emerged
from the hardships of an initiatory settlement.[489]

[487] Diodor. xi, 76. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Καμαρίναν μὲν Γελῶοι
κατοικίσαντες ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατεκληρούχησαν.

See the note of Wesseling upon this passage. There can be little
doubt that in Thucydides (vi, 5) the correction of κατῳκίσθη ὑπὸ
Γελώων (in place of ὑπὸ Γέλωνος) is correct.

[488] Herodot. vii, 155.

[489] See the fourth and fifth Olympic odes of Pindar, referred
to Olympiad 82, or 452 B. C., about nine years after the Geloans
had reëstablished Kamarina. Τὰν νέοικον ἕδραν (Olymp. v, 9); ἀπ’
ἀμαχανíας ἄγων ἐς φάος τόνδε δᾶμον ἀστῶν (Olymp. v, 14).

Such was the great reactionary movement in Sicily against the
high-handed violences of the previous despots. We are only enabled to
follow it generally, but we see that all their transplantations and
expulsions of inhabitants were reversed, and all their arrangements
overthrown. In the correction of the past injustice, we cannot
doubt that new injustice was in many cases committed, nor are we
surprised to hear that at Syracuse many new enrolments of citizens
took place without any rightful claim,[490] probably accompanied by
grants of land. The reigning feeling at Syracuse would now be quite
opposite to that of the days of Gelo, when the Demos, or aggregate
of small self-working proprietors, was considered as “a troublesome
yoke-fellow,” fit only to be sold into slavery for exportation: it is
highly probable that the new table of citizens now prepared included
that class of men in larger number than ever, on principles analogous
to the liberal enrolments of Kleisthenês at Athens. In spite of all
the confusion, however, with which this period of popular government
opens, lasting for more than fifty years until the despotism of the
elder Dionysius, we shall find it far the best and most prosperous
portion of Sicilian history. We shall arrive at it in a subsequent
chapter.

[490] Diodor. xi. 86. πολλῶν εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε πεπολιτογραφημένων.

Respecting the Grecian cities along the coast of Italy, during the
period of the Gelonian dynasty, a few words will exhaust the whole
of our knowledge. Rhegium, with its despots Anaxilaus and Mikythus,
figures chiefly as a Sicilian city, and has been noticed as such in
the stream of Sicilian politics. But it is also involved in the only
event which has been preserved to us respecting this portion of the
history of the Italian Greeks. It was about the year B. C. 473, that
the Tarentines undertook an expedition against their non-Hellenic
neighbors the Iapygians, in hopes of conquering Hyria and the other
towns belonging to them. Mikythus, despot of Rhegium, against the
will of his citizens, despatched three thousand of them by constraint
as auxiliaries to the Tarentines. But the expedition proved signally
disastrous to both. The Iapygians, to the number of twenty thousand
men, encountered the united Grecian forces in the field, and
completely defeated them: the battle having taken place in a hostile
country, it seems that the larger portion, both of Rhegians and
Tarentines, perished, insomuch that Herodotus pronounces it to have
been the greatest Hellenic slaughter within his knowledge.[491] Of
the Tarentines slain, a great proportion were opulent and substantial
citizens, the loss of whom sensibly affected the city; strengthening
the Demos, and rendering the constitution more democratical. In what
particulars the change consisted we do not know: the expression of
Aristotle gives reason to suppose that even before this event the
constitution had been popular.[492]

[491] Herodot. vii, 170; Diodor. xi, 52. The latter asserts that
the Iapygian victors divided their forces, part of them pursuing
the Rhegian fugitives, the rest pursuing the Tarentines. Those
who followed the former were so rapid in their movements, that
they entered, he says, along with the fugitives into the town of
Rhegium, and even became masters of it.

To say nothing of the fact, that Rhegium continues afterwards, as
before, under the rule of Mikythus,—we may remark that Diodorus
must have formed to himself a strange idea of the geography of
southern Italy, to talk of pursuit and flight _from Iapygia to
Rhegium_.

[492] Aristotel. Polit. v, 2, 8. Aristotle has another passage
(vi, 3, 5) in which he comments on the government of Tarentum:
and O. Müller applies this second passage to illustrate the
particular constitutional changes which were made after the
Iapygian disaster. I think this juxtaposition of the two passages
unauthorized: there is nothing at all to connect them together.
See History of the Dorians, iii, 9, 14.

CHAPTER XLIV.

FROM THE BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALE DOWN TO THE DEATHS OF
THEMISTOKLES AND ARISTEIDES.

After having in the last chapter followed the repulse of the
Carthaginians by the Sicilian Greeks, we now return to the central
Greeks and the Persians,—a case in which the triumph was yet more
interesting to the cause of human improvement generally. The
disproportion between the immense host assembled by Xerxes, and the
little which he accomplished, naturally provokes both contempt for
Persian force and an admiration for the comparative handful of men
by whom they were so ignominiously beaten. Both these sentiments are
just, but both are often exaggerated beyond the point which attentive
contemplation of the facts will justify. The Persian mode of making
war (which we may liken to that of the modern Turks,[493] now that
the period of their energetic fanaticism has passed away) was in a
high degree disorderly and inefficient: the men indeed, individually
taken, especially the native Persians, were not deficient in the
qualities of soldiers, but their arms and their organization were
wretched,—and their leaders yet worse. On the other hand, the Greeks,
equal, if not superior, in individual bravery, were incomparably
superior in soldier-like order as well as in arms: but here too the
leadership was defective, and the disunion a constant source of
peril. Those who, like Plutarch (or rather the Pseudo-Plutarch) in
his treatise on the Malignity of Herodotus, insist on acknowledging
nothing but magnanimity and heroism in the proceedings of the Greeks
throughout these critical years, are forced to deal very harshly
with the inestimable witness on whom our knowledge of the facts
depends,—and who intimates plainly that, in spite of the devoted
courage displayed, not less by the vanquished at Thermopylæ than
by the victors at Salamis, Greece owed her salvation chiefly to
the imbecility, cowardice, and credulous rashness, of Xerxes.[494]
Had he indeed possessed either the personal energy of Cyrus or the
judgment of Artemisia, it may be doubted whether any excellence of
management, or any intimacy of union, could have preserved the Greeks
against so great a superiority of force; but it is certain that all
their courage as soldiers in line would have been unavailing for that
purpose, without a higher degree of generalship, and a more hearty
spirit of coöperation, than that which they actually manifested.

[493] Mr. Waddington’s Letters from Greece, describing the Greek
revolution of 1821, will convey a good idea of the stupidity of
Turkish warfare: compare also the second volume of the Memoirs of
Baron de Tott, part iii.

[494] Thucyd. i, 69. ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτὸν περὶ αὑτῷ
τὰ πλείω σφαλέντα, etc.: compare Thucyd. vi, 33.

One hundred and fifty years after this eventful period, we shall
see the tables turned, and the united forces of Greece under
Alexander of Macedon becoming invaders of Persia. We shall find
that in Persia no improvement has taken place during this long
interval,—that the scheme of defence under Darius Codomannus labors
under the same defects as that of attack under Xerxes,—that there
is the same blind and exclusive confidence in pitched battles with
superior numbers,[495]—that the advice of Mentor the Rhodian, and of
Charidemus, is despised like that of Demaratus and Artemisia,—that
Darius Codomannus, essentially of the same stamp as Xerxes, is
hurried into the battle of Issus by the same ruinous temerity as
that which threw away the Persian fleet at Salamis,—and that the
Persian native infantry (not the cavalry) even appear to have lost
that individual gallantry which they displayed so conspicuously at
Platæa. But on the Grecian side, the improvement in every way is
very great: the orderly courage of the soldier has been sustained
and even augmented, while the generalship and power of military
combination has reached a point unexampled in the previous history
of mankind. Military science may be esteemed a sort of creation
during this interval, and will be found to go through various stages:
Demosthenês and Brasidas, the Cyreian army and Xenophon, Agesilaus,
Iphikratês, Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon, Alexander:[496] for the
Macedonian princes are borrowers of Greek tactics, though extending
and applying them with a personal energy peculiar to themselves,
and with advantages of position such as no Athenian or Spartan ever
enjoyed. In this comparison between the invasion of Xerxes and that
of Alexander we contrast the progressive spirit of Greece, serving as
herald and stimulus to the like spirit in Europe, with the stationary
mind of Asia, occasionally roused by some splendid individual, but
never appropriating to itself new social ideas or powers, either for
war or for peace.

[495] Thucyd. i, 142. πλήθει τὴν ἀμαθίαν θρασύνοντες, etc.

[496] See a remarkable passage in the third Philippic of
Demosthenês, c. 10, p. 123.

It is out of the invasion of Xerxes that those new powers of
combination, political as well as military, which lighten up Grecian
history during the next two centuries, take their rise. They are
brought into agency through the altered position and character of
the Athenians—improvers, to a certain extent, of military operations
on land, but the great creators of marine tactics and manœuvring in
Greece,—and the earliest of all Greeks who showed themselves capable
of organizing and directing the joint action of numerous allies and
dependents,—thus uniting the two distinctive qualities of the Homeric
Agamemnon,[497]—ability in command, with vigor in execution.

[497]

Ἀμφότερον, βασιλεύς τ’ ἀγαθὸς, κρατερός τ’ αἰχμήτης.
Homer, Iliad, iii, 179.

In the general Hellenic confederacy, which had acted against Persia
under the presidency of Sparta, Athens could hardly be said to occupy
any ostensible rank above that of an ordinary member: the post of
second dignity in the line at Platæa had indeed been adjudged to
her, but only after a contending claim from Tegea. But without any
difference in ostensible rank, she was in the eye and feeling of
Greece no longer the same power as before. She had suffered more,
and at sea had certainly done more, than all the other allies put
together: even on land at Platæa, her hoplites had manifested a
combination of bravery, discipline, and efficiency against the
formidable Persian cavalry superior even to the Spartans: nor had
any Athenian officer committed so perilous an act of disobedience
as the Spartan Amompharetus. After the victory of Mykalê, when the
Peloponnesians all hastened home to enjoy their triumph, the Athenian
forces did not shrink from prolonged service for the important object
of clearing the Hellespont, thus standing forth as the willing and
forward champions of the Asiatic Greeks against Persia. Besides
these exploits of Athens collectively, the only two individuals
gifted with any talents for command, whom this momentous conquest had
thrown up, were both of them Athenians: first, Themistoklês; next,
Aristeidês. From the beginning to the end of the struggle, Athens
had displayed an unreserved Pan-Hellenic patriotism, which had been
most ungenerously requited by the Peloponnesians; who had kept within
their isthmian walls, and betrayed Attica twice to hostile ravage;
the first time, perhaps, unavoidably,—but the second time a culpable
neglect, in postponing their outward march against Mardonius. And the
Peloponnesians could not but feel, that while they had left Attica
unprotected, they owed their own salvation at Salamis altogether to
the dexterity of Themistoklês and the imposing Athenian naval force.

Considering that the Peloponnesians had sustained little or no
mischief by the invasion, while the Athenians had lost for the
time even their city and country, with a large proportion of their
movable property irrecoverably destroyed,—we might naturally expect
to find the former, if not lending their grateful and active aid
to repair the damage in Attica, at least cordially welcoming the
restoration of the ruined city by its former inhabitants. Instead
of this, we find the same selfishness again prevalent among them;
ill-will and mistrust for the future, aggravated by an admiration
which they could not help feeling, overlays all their gratitude and
sympathy. The Athenians, on returning from Salamis after the battle
of Platæa, found a desolate home to harbor them. Their country was
laid waste,—their city burnt or destroyed; so that there remained
but a few houses standing, wherein the Persian officers had taken
up their quarters,—and their fortifications for the most part razed
or overthrown. It was their first task to bring home their families
and effects from the temporary places of shelter at Trœzen, Ægina,
and Salamis. After providing what was indispensably necessary
for immediate wants, they began to rebuild their city and its
fortifications on a scale of enlarged size in every direction.[498]
But as soon as they were seen to be employed on this indispensable
work, without which neither political existence nor personal safety
was practicable, the allies took the alarm, preferred complaints
to Sparta, and urged her to arrest the work: in the front of these
complainants, probably, stood the Æginetans, as the old enemies of
Athens, and as having most to apprehend from her might at sea. The
Spartans, perfectly sympathizing with the jealousy and uneasiness
of their allies, were even disposed, from old association, to carry
their dislike of fortifications still farther, so that they would
have been pleased to see all the other Grecian cities systematically
defenceless like Sparta itself.[499] But while sending an embassy
to Athens, to offer a friendly remonstrance against the project of
re-fortifying the city, they could not openly and peremptorily forbid
the exercise of a right common to every autonomous community,—nor
did they even venture, at a moment when the events of the past
months were fresh in every one’s remembrance, to divulge their real
jealousies as to the future. They affected to offer prudential
reasons against the scheme, founded on the chance of a future
Persian invasion; in which case it would be a dangerous advantage
for the invader to find any fortified city outside of Peloponnesus
to further his operations, as Thebes had recently seconded
Mardonius. They proposed to the Athenians, therefore, not merely to
desist from their own fortifications, but also to assist them in
demolishing all fortifications of other cities beyond the limits of
Peloponnesus,—promising shelter within the isthmus, in case of need,
to all exposed parties.

[498] Thucyd. i. 89.

[499] Thucyd. i, 90. τὰ μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἥδιον ἂν ὁρῶντες μήτε
ἐκείνους μητ’ ἄλλον μηδένα τεῖχος ἔχοντα, τὸ δὲ πλέον, τῶν
ξυμμάχων ἐξοτρυνόντων καὶ φοβουμένων τοῦ τε ναυτικοῦ αὐτῶν τὸ
πλῆθος, ὃ πρὶν οὐχ ὑπῆρχε, καὶ τὴν ἐς τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον τόλμαν
γενομένην.

A statesman like Themistoklês was not likely to be imposed upon
by this diplomacy: but he saw that the Spartans had the power of
preventing the work if they chose, and that it could only be executed
by the help of successful deceit. By his advice, the Athenians
dismissed the Spartan envoys, saying that they would themselves
send to Sparta and explain their views. Accordingly, Themistoklês
himself was presently despatched thither, as one among three envoys
instructed to enter into explanations with the Spartan authorities;
but his two colleagues, Aristeidês and Abronichus, by previous
concert, were tardy in arriving,—and he remained inactive at Sparta,
making use of their absence as an excuse for not even demanding
an audience, but affecting surprise that their coming was so long
delayed. But while Aristeidês and Abronichus, the other two envoys,
were thus studiously kept back, the whole population of Athens
labored unremittingly at the walls. Men, women, and children, all
tasked their strength to the utmost during this precious interval:
neither private houses, nor sacred edifices, were spared to furnish
materials; and such was their ardor in the enterprise, that, before
the three envoys were united at Sparta, the wall had already
attained a height sufficient at least to attempt defence. Yet the
interval had been long enough to provoke suspicion, even in the
slow mind of the Spartans, while the more watchful Æginetans sent
them positive intelligence that the wall was rapidly advancing.
Themistoklês, on hearing this allegation, peremptorily denied the
truth of it; and the personal esteem entertained towards him was at
that time so great, that his assurance[500] obtained for some time
unqualified credit, until fresh messengers again raised suspicions
in the minds of the Spartans. In reply to these, Themistoklês urged
the ephors to send envoys of their own to Athens, and thus convince
themselves of the state of the facts. They unsuspectingly acted
upon his recommendation, while he at the same time transmitted a
private communication to Athens, desiring that the envoys might
not be suffered to depart until the safe return of himself and
his colleagues, which he feared might be denied them when his
trick came to be divulged. Aristeidês and Abronichus had now
arrived,—the wall was announced to be of a height at least above
contempt,—and Themistoklês at once threw off the mask: he avowed
the stratagem practised,—told the Spartans that Athens was already
fortified sufficiently to insure the safety and free will of its
inhabitants,—and warned them that the hour of constraint was now
past, the Athenians being in a condition to define and vindicate for
themselves their own rights and duties in reference to Sparta and the
allies. He reminded them that the Athenians had always been found
competent to judge for themselves, whether in joint consultation, or
in any separate affair, such as the momentous crisis of abandoning
their city and taking to their ships: they had now, in the exercise
of this self-judgment, resolved upon fortifying their city, as
a step indispensable to themselves and advantageous even to the
allies generally. Nor could there be any equal or fair interchange
of opinion unless all the allies had equal means of defence: either
all must be unfortified, or Athens must be fortified as well as the
rest.[501]

[500] Thucyd. i. 91, τῷ μὲν Θεμιστοκλεῖ ἐπείθοντο διὰ φιλίαν
αὐτοῦ.

[501] Thucyd. i. 91, Οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε εἶναι μὴ ἀπὸ ἀντιπάλου
παρασκευῆς ὁμοῖόν τι ἢ ἴσον ἐς τὸ κοινὸν βουλεύεσθαι. Ἢ πάντας
οὖν ἀτειχίστους ἔφη χρῆναι ξυμμαχεῖν ἢ καὶ τάδε νομίζειν ὀρθῶς
ἔχειν.

Mortified as the Spartans were by a revelation which showed that they
had been not only detected in a dishonest purpose, but completely
outwitted,—they were at the same time overawed by the decisive tone
of Themistoklês, whom they never afterwards forgave. To arrest
beforehand erection of the walls would have been practicable,
though not perhaps without difficulty; to deal by force with
the fact accomplished, was perilous in a high degree: moreover,
the inestimable services just rendered by Athens became again
predominant in their minds, so that sentiment and prudence for the
time coincided. They affected therefore to accept the communication
without manifesting any offence, nor had they indeed put forward any
pretence which required to be formally retracted. The envoys on both
sides returned home, and the Athenians completed their fortifications
without obstruction,[502]—yet not without murmurs on the part of the
allies, who bitterly reproached Sparta afterwards for having let slip
this golden opportunity of arresting the growth of the giant.[503]

[502] We are fortunate enough to possess this narrative,
respecting the rebuilding of the walls of Athens, as recounted by
Thucydidês. It is the first incident which he relates, in that
general sketch of events between the Persian and Peloponnesian
war, which precedes his professed history (i, 89-92). Diodorus
(xi, 39, 40), Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 19), and Cornelius Nepos
(Themist. c. 6, 7), seem all to have followed Thucydidês, though
Plutarch also notices a statement of Theopompus, to the effect
that Themistoklês accomplished his object by bribing the ephors.
This would not be improbable in itself,—nor is it inconsistent
with the narrative of Thucydidês; but the latter either had not
heard or did not believe it.

[503] Thucyd. i, 69. Καὶ τῶνδε ὑμεῖς αἴτιοι (says the Corinthian
envoy addressing the Lacedæmonians), τό τε πρῶτον ἐάσαντες αὐτοὺς
(the Athenians) τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ κρατῦναι, καὶ ὕστερον τὰ
μακρὰ στῆσαι τείχη, etc.

If the allies were apprehensive of Athens before, the mixture of
audacity, invention, and deceit, whereby she had just eluded the
hindrance opposed to her fortifications, was well calculated to
aggravate their uneasiness. On the other hand, to the Athenians,
the mere hint of intervention to debar them from that common right
of self-defence which was exercised by every autonomous city except
Sparta, must have appeared outrageous injustice,—aggravated by the
fact that it was brought upon them by their peculiar sufferings in
the common cause, and by the very allies who, without their devoted
forwardness, would now have been slaves of the Great King. And the
intention of the allies to obstruct the fortifications must have
been known to every soul in Athens, from the universal press of
hands required to hurry the work and escape interference; just as it
was proclaimed to after-generations by the shapeless fragments and
irregular structure of the wall, in which even sepulchral stones and
inscribed columns were seen imbedded.[504] Assuredly, the sentiment
connected with this work, performed as it was alike by rich and
poor, strong and weak,—men, women, and children,—must have been
intense as well as equalizing: all had endured the common miseries
of exile, all had contributed to the victory, all were now sharing
the same fatigue for the defence of their recovered city, in order to
counterwork the ungenerous hindrance of their Peloponnesian allies.
We must take notice of these stirring circumstances, peculiar to the
Athenians and acting upon a generation which had now been nursed in
democracy for a quarter of a century, and had achieved unaided the
victory of Marathon,—if we would understand that still stronger burst
of aggressive activity, persevering self-confidence, and aptitude as
well as thirst for command,—together with that still wider spread of
democratical organization,—which marks their character during the age
immediately following.

[504] Thucyd. i, 93. Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 7) exaggerates
this into a foolish conceit.

The plan of the new fortification was projected on a scale not
unworthy of the future grandeur of the city. Its circuit was sixty
stadia, or about seven miles, with the acropolis nearly in the
centre: but the circuit of the previous walls is unknown, so that we
are unable to measure the extent of that enlargement which Thucydidês
testifies to have been carried out on every side. It included within
the town the three hills of the Areopagus, the Pnyx, and the Museum;
while on the south of the town it was carried for a space even on
the southern bank of the Ilissus, thus also comprising the fountain
Kallirhoê.[505] In spite of the excessive hurry in which it was
raised, the structure was thoroughly solid and sufficient against
every external enemy: but there is reason to believe that its very
large inner area was never filled with buildings. Empty spaces, for
the temporary shelter of inhabitants driven in from the country with
their property, were eminently useful to a Grecian city-community;
to none more useful than to the Athenians, whose principal strength
lay in their fleet, and whose citizens habitually resided in large
proportion in their separate demes throughout Attica.

[505] For the dimensions and direction of the Themistoklean
walls of Athens, see especially the excellent Treatise of
Forchhammer—Topographie von Athen—published in the Kieler
Philologische Studien. Kiel, 1841.

The plan of Athens, prepared by Kiepert after his own researches
and published among his recent maps, adopts for the most part the
ideas of Forchhammer, as to the course of the walls.

The first indispensable step, in the renovation of Athens after her
temporary extinction, was now happily accomplished: the city was
made secure against external enemies. But Themistoklês, to whom the
Athenians owed the late successful stratagem, and whose influence
must have been much strengthened by its success, had conceived plans
of a wider and more ambitious range. He had been the original adviser
of the great maritime start taken by his countrymen, as well as of
the powerful naval force which they had created during the last few
years, and which had so recently proved their salvation. He saw in
that force both the only chance of salvation for the future, in
case the Persians should renew their attack by sea,—a contingency
at that time seemingly probable,—and boundless prospects of future
ascendency over the Grecian coasts and islands: it was the great
engine of defence, of offence, and of ambition. To continue this
movement required much less foresight and genius than to begin it,
and Themistoklês, the moment that the walls of the city had been
finished, brought back the attention of his countrymen to those
wooden walls which had served them as a refuge against the Persian
monarch. He prevailed upon them to provide harbor-room at once safe
and adequate, by the enlargement end fortification of the Peiræus.
This again was only the prosecution of an enterprise previously
begun: for he had already, while in office two or three years
before,[506] made his countrymen sensible that the open roadstead
of Phalêrum was thoroughly insecure, and had prevailed upon them
to improve and employ in part the more spacious harbors of Peiræus
and Munychia,—three natural basins, all capable of being closed and
defended. Something had then been done towards the enlargement of
this port, though it had probably been subsequently ruined by the
Persian invaders: but Themistoklês now resumed the scheme on a scale
far grander than he could then have ventured to propose,—a scale
which demonstrates the vast auguries present to his mind respecting
the destinies of Athens. Peiræus and Munychia, in his new plan,
constituted a fortified space as large as the enlarged Athens, and
with a wall far more elaborate and unassailable. The wall which
surrounded them, sixty stadia in circuit,[507] was intended by him to
be so stupendous, both in height and thickness, as to render assault
hopeless, and to enable the whole military population to act on
shipboard, leaving only old men and boys as a garrison.[508] We may
judge how vast his project was, when we learn that the wall, though
in practice always found sufficient, was only carried up to half
the height which he had contemplated.[509] In respect to thickness,
however, his ideas were exactly followed: two carts meeting one
another brought stones which were laid together right and left on
the outer side of each, and thus formed two primary parallel walls,
between which the interior space—of course, at least as broad as the
joint breadth of the two carts—was filled up, “not with rubble, in
the usual manner of the Greeks, but constructed, throughout the whole
thickness, of squared stones, cramped together with metal.”[510] The
result was a solid wall, probably not less than fourteen or fifteen
feet thick, since it was intended to carry so very unusual a height.
In the exhortations whereby he animated the people to this fatiguing
and costly work, he labored to impress upon them that Peiræus was
of more value to them than Athens itself, and that it afforded a
shelter into which, if their territory should be again overwhelmed
by a superior land-force, they might securely retire, with full
liberty of that maritime action in which they were a match for all
the world.[511] We may even suspect that if Themistoklês could have
followed his own feelings, he would have altered the site of the city
from Athens to Peiræus: the attachment of the people to their ancient
and holy rock doubtless prevented any such proposition. Nor did he at
that time, probably, contemplate the possibility of those long walls
which in a few years afterwards consolidated the two cities into one.

[506] Thucyd. i. 93. ἔπεισε δὲ καὶ τοῦ Πειραιέως τὰ λοιπὰ ὁ
Θεμιστοκλῆς οἰκοδομεῖν (ὑπῆρκτο δ’ αὐτοῦ πρότερον ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκείνου
ἀρχῆς, ἧς κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν Ἀθηναίοις ἦρξε).

Upon which words the Scholiast observes (Κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν)—κατά τινα
ἐνιαυτὸν ~ἡγεμὼν~ ἐγένετο· πρὸ δὲ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἦρξε Θεμιστοκλῆς
ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα.

It seems hardly possible, having no fuller evidence to proceed
upon, to determine to which of the preceding years Thucydidês
means to refer this ἀρχὴ of Themistoklês. Mr. Fynes Clinton,
after discussing the opinions of Dodwell and Corsini (see Fasti
Hellenici, ad ann. 481 B. C. and Preface, p. xv), inserts
Themistoklês as archon eponymus in 481 B. C., the year before
the invasion of Xerxes, and supposes the Peiræus to have been
commenced in that year. This is not in itself improbable: but
he cites the Scholiast as having asserted the same thing before
him (πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἦρξε Θεμιστοκλῆς ~ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα~), in which
I apprehend that he is not borne out by the analogy of the
language: ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα, in the accusative case, denotes only
the duration of the ἀρχὴ, not the position of the year (compare
Thucyd. iii, 68).

I do not feel certain that Thucydidês meant to designate
Themistoklês as having been archon eponymus, or as having been
one of the nine archons. He may have meant, “during the year when
Themistoklês was stratêgus (or general),” and the explanation of
the Scholiast, who employs the word ἡγεμὼν, rather implies that
he so understood it. The stratêgi were annual as well as the
archons. Now we know that Themistoklês was one of the generals in
480 B. C., and that he commanded in Thessaly, at Artemisium, and
at Salamis. The Peiræus may have been begun in the early part of
480 B. C., when Xerxes was already on his march, or at least at
Sardis.

[507] Thucyd. ii, 13.

[508] Thucyd. i, 93.

[509] Thucyd. i, 93. Τὸ δὲ ὕψος ἥμισυ μάλιστα ἐτελέσθη οὗ
διενοεῖτο· ἐβούλετο γὰρ τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ πάχει ἀφιστάναι τὰς
τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιβουλάς, ἀνθρώπων δὲ ἐνόμιζεν ὀλίγων καὶ τῶν
ἀχρειοτάτων ἀρκέσειν τὴν φυλακὴν, τοὺς δ’ ἄλλους ἐς τὰς ναῦς
ἐσβήσεσθαι.

[510] Thucyd. i, 93. The expressions are those of Colonel Leake,
derived from inspection of the scanty remnant of these famous
walls still to be seen—Topography of Athens, ch. ix, p. 411: see
edit. p. 293, Germ. transl. Compare Aristophan. Aves, 1127, about
the breadth of the wall of Nephelokokkygia.

[511] Thucyd. i, 93 (compare Cornel. Nepos, Themistok. c. 6) ταῖς
ναυσὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνθίστασθαι.

Forty-five years afterwards, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian
war, we shall hear from Periklês, who espoused and carried out the
large ideas of Themistoklês, this same language about the capacity
of Athens to sustain a great power exclusively or chiefly upon
maritime action. But the Athenian empire was then an established
reality, whereas in the time of Themistoklês it was yet a dream,
and his bold predictions, surpassed as they were by the future
reality, mark that extraordinary power of practical divination which
Thucydidês so emphatically extols in him. And it proves the exuberant
hope which had now passed into the temper of the Athenian people,
when we find them, on the faith of these predictions, undertaking
a new enterprise of so much toil and expense; and that too when
just returned from exile into a desolated country, at a moment of
private distress and public impoverishment. However, Peiræus served
other purposes besides its direct use as a dockyard for military
marine: its secure fortifications and the protection of the Athenian
navy, were well calculated to call back those metics, or resident
foreigners, who had been driven away by the invasion of Xerxes, and
who might feel themselves insecure in returning, unless some new and
conspicuous means of protection were exhibited. To invite them back,
and to attract new residents of a similar description, Themistoklês
proposed to exempt them from the metoikion, or non-freeman’s annual
tax:[512] but this exemption can only have lasted for a time, and the
great temptation for them to return must have consisted in the new
securities and facilities for trade, which Athens, with her fortified
ports and navy, now afforded. The presence of numerous metics was
profitable to the Athenians, both privately and publicly: much of
the trading, professional, and handicraft business was in their
hands: and the Athenian legislation, while it excluded them from the
political franchise, was in other respects equitable and protective
to them. In regard to trading pursuits, the metics had this advantage
over the citizens,—that they were less frequently carried away for
foreign military service. The great increase of their numbers, from
this period forward, while it tended materially to increase the
value of property all throughout Attica, but especially in Peiræus
and Athens, where they mostly resided, helps us to explain the
extraordinary prosperity, together with the excellent cultivation,
prevalent throughout the country before the Peloponnesian war.
The barley, vegetables, figs, and oil, produced in most parts of
the territory,—the charcoal prepared in the flourishing deme of
Acharnæ,[513]—and the fish obtained in abundance near the coast,—all
found opulent buyers and a constant demand from the augmenting town
population.

[512] Diodor. xi, 43.

[513] See the lively picture of the Acharnian demots in the
comedy of Aristophanês so entitled.

Respecting the advantages derived from the residence of metics
and from foreign visitors, compare the observations of Isokratês,
more than a century after this period, Orat. iv, De Pace, p. 163,
and Xenophon, De Vectigalibus, c. iv.

We are farther told that Themistoklês[514] prevailed on the Athenians
to build every year twenty new ships of the line,—so we may designate
the trireme. Whether this number was always strictly adhered to, it
is impossible to say: but to repair the ships, as well as to keep
up their numbers, was always regarded among the most indispensable
obligations of the executive government.

[514] Diodor. xi, 43.

It does not appear that the Spartans offered any opposition to the
fortification of the Peiræus, though it was an enterprise greater,
more novel, and more menacing, than that of Athens. But Diodorus
tells us, probably enough, that Themistoklês thought it necessary to
send an embassy to Sparta,[515] intimating that his scheme was to
provide a safe harbor for the collective navy of Greece, in the event
of future Persian attack.

[515] Diodor. xi, 41, 42, 43. I mean, that the fact of such an
embassy being sent to Sparta is probable enough,—separating that
fact from the preliminary discussions which Diodorus describes
as having preceded it in the assembly of Athens, and which seem
unmeaning as well as incredible. His story—that Themistoklês
told the assembly that he had a conceived scheme of great
moment to the state, but that it did not admit of being made
public beforehand, upon which the assembly named Aristeidês
and Xanthippus to hear it confidentially and judge of it—seems
to indicate that Diodorus had read the well-known tale of the
project of Themistoklês to burn the Grecian fleet in the harbor
of Pagasæ, and that he jumbled it in his memory with this other
project for enlarging and fortifying the Peiræus.

Works on so vast a scale must have taken a considerable time, and
absorbed much of the Athenian force; yet they did not prevent
Athens from lending active aid towards the expedition which, in
the year after the battle of Platæa (B. C. 478) set sail for Asia
under the Spartan Pausanias. Twenty ships from the various cities
of Peloponnesus[516] were under his command: the Athenians alone
furnished thirty, under the orders of Aristeidês and Kimon: other
triremes also came from the Ionian and insular allies. They first
sailed to Cyprus, in which island they liberated most of the Grecian
cities from the Persian government: next, they turned to the
Bosphorus of Thrace, and undertook the siege of Byzantium, which,
like Sestus in the Chersonese, was a post of great moment, as well
as of great strength,—occupied by a considerable Persian force,
with several leading Persians and even kinsmen of the monarch. The
place was captured,[517] seemingly after a prolonged siege: it might
probably hold out even longer than Sestus, as being taken less
unprepared. The line of communication between the Euxine sea and
Greece was thus cleared of obstruction.

[516] Thucyd. i, 94; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 23. Diodorus (xi,
44) says that the Peloponnesian ships were fifty in number: his
statement is not to be accepted, in opposition to Thucydidês.

[517] Thucyd. i, 94.

The capture of Byzantium proved the signal for a capital and
unexpected change in the relations of the various Grecian cities;
a change, of which the proximate cause lay in the misconduct of
Pausanias, but towards which other causes, deep-seated as well as
various, also tended. In recounting the history of Miltiades,[518]
I noticed the deplorable liability of the Grecian leading men to be
spoiled by success: this distemper worked with singular rapidity
on Pausanias. As conqueror of Platæa, he had acquired a renown
unparalleled in Grecian experience, together with a prodigious
share of the plunder: the concubines, horses,[519] camels, and
gold plate, which had thus passed into his possession, were well
calculated to make the sobriety and discipline of Spartan life
irksome, while his power also, though great on foreign command,
became subordinate to that of the ephors when he returned home. His
newly-acquired insolence was manifested immediately after the battle,
in the commemorative tripod dedicated by his order at Delphi, which
proclaimed himself by name and singly, as commander of the Greeks
and destroyer of the Persians: an unseemly boast, of which the
Lacedæmonians themselves were the first to mark their disapprobation,
by causing the inscription to be erased, and the names of the
cities who had taken part in the combat to be all enumerated on the
tripod.[520] Nevertheless, he was still sent on the command against
Cyprus and Byzantium, and it was on the capture of this latter place
that his ambition and discontent first ripened into distinct treason.
He entered into correspondence with Gongylus the Eretrian exile (now
a subject of Persia, and invested with the property and government
of a district in Mysia), to whom he intrusted his new acquisition
of Byzantium, and the care of the valuable prisoners taken in it.
These prisoners were presently suffered to escape, or rather sent
away underhand to Xerxes; together with a letter from the hand of
Pausanias himself, to the following effect: “Pausanias, the Spartan
commander, having taken these captives, sends them back, in his
anxiety to oblige thee. I am minded, if it so please thee, to marry
thy daughter, and to bring under thy dominion both Sparta and the
rest of Greece: with thy aid, I think myself competent to achieve
this. If my proposition be acceptable, send some confidential person
down to the seaboard, through whom we may hereafter correspond.”
Xerxes, highly pleased with the opening thus held out, immediately
sent down Artabazus (the same who had been second in command in
Bœotia) to supersede Megabatês in the satrapy of Daskylium; the new
satrap, furnished with a letter of reply bearing the regal seal, was
instructed to further actively the projects of Pausanias. The letter
was to this purport: “Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias. Thy name
stands forever recorded in my house as a well-doer, on account of
the men whom thou hast saved for me beyond sea at Byzantium: and thy
propositions now received are acceptable to me. Relax not either
night or day in accomplishing that which thou promisest, nor let
thyself be held back by cost, either gold or silver, or numbers of
men, if thou standest in need of them, but transact in confidence thy
business and mine jointly with Artabazus, the good man whom I have
now sent, in such manner as may be best for both of us.”[521]

[518] See the volume of this history immediately preceding, ch.
xxxvi, p. 372.

[519] Herodot. ix, 81.

[520] In the Athenian inscriptions on the votive offerings
dedicated after the capture of Eion, as well as after the great
victories near the river Eurymedon, the name of Kimon the
commander is not even mentioned (Plutarch, Kimon, c. 7; Diodor.
xi, 62).

A strong protest, apparently familiar to Grecian feeling, against
singling out the general particularly, to receive the honors of
victory, appears in Euripid. Andromach. 694: striking verses,
which are said to have been indignantly repeated by Kleitus,
during the intoxication of the banquet wherein he was slain by
Alexander (Quint. Curtius, viii, 4, 29 (viii, 4); Plutarch,
Alexand. c. 51).

[521] These letters are given by Thucydidês verbatim (i,
128, 129): he had seen them or obtained copies (ὡς ὕστερον
ἀνευρέθη)—they were, doubtless, communicated along with the
final revelations of the confidential Argilian slave. As they
are autographs, I have translated them literally, retaining that
abrupt transition from the third person to the first, which is
one of their peculiarities. Cornelius Nepos, who translates the
letter of Pausanias, has effaced this peculiarity, and carries
the third person from the beginning to the end (Cornel. Nep.
Pausan. c. 2).

Throughout the whole of this expedition, Pausanias had been insolent
and domineering, degrading the allies at quarters and watering-places
in the most offensive manner as compared with the Spartans, and
treating the whole armament in a manner which Greek warriors could
not tolerate, even in a Spartan Herakleid, and a victorious general.
But when he received the letter from Xerxes, and found himself in
immediate communication with Artabazus, as well as supplied with
funds for corruption,[522] his insane hopes knew no bounds, and he
already fancied himself son-in-law of the Great King, as well as
despot of Hellas. Fortunately for Greece, his treasonable plans
were not deliberately laid and veiled until ripe for execution, but
manifested with childish impatience. He clothed himself in Persian
attire—(a proceeding which the Macedonian army, a century and a half
afterwards, could not tolerate,[523] even in Alexander the Great)—he
traversed Thrace with a body of Median and Egyptian guards,—he copied
the Persian chiefs, both in the luxury of his table and in his
conduct towards the free women of Byzantium. Kleonikê, a Byzantine
maiden of conspicuous family, having been ravished from her parents
by his order, was brought to his chamber at night: he happened to be
asleep, and being suddenly awakened, knew not at first who was the
person approaching his bed, but seized his sword and slew her.[524]
Moreover, his haughty reserve, with uncontrolled bursts of wrath,
rendered him unapproachable; and the allies at length came to regard
him as a despot rather than a general. The news of such outrageous
behavior, and the manifest evidences of his alliance with the
Persians, were soon transmitted to the Spartans, who recalled him to
answer for his conduct, and seemingly the Spartan vessels along with
him.[525]

[522] Diodor. xi, 44.

[523] Arrian. Exp. Alex. iv, 7, 7; vii, 8, 4; Quint. Curt. vi, 6,
10 (vi, 21, 11).

[524] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 6; also Plutarch, De Ser. Numin. Vind.
c. 10, p. 555. Pausanias, iii, 17, 8. It is remarkable that the
latter heard the story of the death of Kleonikê from the lips of
a Byzantine citizen of his own day, and seems to think that it
had never found place in any written work.

[525] Thucyd. i, 95-131: compare Duris and Nymphis apud Athenæum,
xii, p. 535.

In spite of the flagrant conduct of Pausanias, the Lacedæmonians
acquitted him on the allegations of positive and individual wrong;
yet, mistrusting his conduct in reference to collusion with the
enemy, they sent out Dorkis to supersede him as commander. But a
revolution, of immense importance for Greece, had taken place in the
minds of the allies. The headship, or hegemony, was in the hands
of Athens, and Dorkis the Spartan found the allies not disposed to
recognize his authority.

Even before the battle of Salamis, the question had been raised,[526]
whether Athens was not entitled to the command at sea, in consequence
of the preponderance of her naval contingent. The repugnance of
the allies to any command except that of Sparta, either on land or
water, had induced the Athenians to waive their pretensions at that
critical moment. But the subsequent victories had materially exalted
the latter in the eyes of Greece: while the armament now serving,
differently composed from that which had fought at Salamis, contained
a large proportion of the newly-enfranchised Ionic Greeks, who not
only had no preference for Spartan command, but were attached to the
Athenians on every ground,—as well from kindred race, as from the
certainty that Athens with her superior fleet was the only protector
upon whom they could rely against the Persians. Moreover, it happened
that the Athenian generals on this expedition, Aristeidês and
Kimon, were personally just and conciliating, forming a striking
contrast with Pausanias. Hence the Ionic Greeks in the fleet, when
they found that the behavior of the latter was not only oppressive
towards themselves but also revolting to Grecian sentiment generally,
addressed themselves to the Athenian commanders for protection and
redress, on the plausible ground of kindred race;[527] entreating
to be allowed to serve under Athens as leader instead of Sparta.
Plutarch tells us that Aristeidês not only tried to remonstrate with
Pausanias, who repelled him with arrogance,—which is exceedingly
probable,—but that he also required, as a condition of his compliance
with the request of the Ionic allies, that they should personally
insult Pausanias, so as to make reconciliation impracticable:
upon which a Samian and a Chian captain deliberately attacked and
damaged the Spartan admiral-ship in the harbor of Byzantium.[528]
The historians from whom Plutarch copied this latter statement must
have presumed in the Athenians a disposition to provoke that quarrel
with Sparta which afterwards sprung up as it were spontaneously:
but the Athenians had no interest in doing so, nor can we credit
the story,—which is, moreover, unnoticed by Thucydidês. To give
the Spartans a just ground of indignation, would have been glaring
imprudence on the part of Aristeidês: but he had every motive to
entertain the request of the allies, and he began to take his
measures for acting as their protector and chief. And his proceedings
were much facilitated by the circumstance that the Spartan government
about this time recalled Pausanias to undergo an examination, in
consequence of the universal complaints against him which had reached
them. He seems to have left no Spartan authority behind him,—even the
small Spartan squadron accompanied him home: so that the Athenian
generals had the best opportunity for insuring to themselves and
exercising that command which the allies besought them to undertake.
So effectually did they improve the moment, that when Dorkis arrived
to replace Pausanias, they were already in full supremacy; while
Dorkis, having only a small force, and being in no condition to
employ constraint, found himself obliged to return home.[529]

[526] Herodot. viii, 2, 3. Compare the language of the Athenian
envoy, as it stands in Herodotus (vii, 155) addressed to Gelo.

[527] Thucyd. i, 95. ἠξίουν αὐτοὺς ἡγεμόνας σφῶν γενέσθαι κατὰ τὸ
ξυγγενὲς καὶ Παυσανίᾳ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἤν που βιάζηται.

[528] 2 Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 23.

[529] Thucyd. i, 95; Diodorus, xi, 44-47.

This incident, though not a declaration of war against Sparta, was
the first open renunciation of her authority as presiding state
among the Greeks; the first avowed manifestation of a competitor
for that dignity, with numerous and willing followers; the first
separation of Greece—considered in herself alone and apart from
foreign solicitations, such as the Persian invasion—into two distinct
organized camps, each with collective interests and projects of its
own. In spite of mortified pride, Sparta was constrained, and even
in some points of view not indisposed, to patient acquiescence: for
she had no means of forcing the dispositions of the Ionic allies,
while the war with Persia altogether,—having now become no longer
strictly defensive, and being withal maritime as well as distant from
her own territory,—had ceased to be in harmony with her home routine
and strict discipline. Her grave senators, especially an ancient
Herakleid named Hetœmaridas, reproved the impatience of the younger
citizens, and discountenanced the idea of permanent maritime command
as a dangerous innovation: they even treated it as an advantage,
that Athens should take the lead in carrying on the Persian war,
since it could not be altogether dropped; nor had the Athenians as
yet manifested any sentiments positively hostile, to excite their
alarm.[530] Nay, they actually took credit in the eyes of Athens,
about a century afterwards, for having themselves advised this
separation of command at sea from command on land.[531] Moreover, if
the war continued under Spartan guidance, there would be a continued
necessity for sending out their kings or chief men to command:
and the example of Pausanias showed them the depraving effect of
such military power, remote as well as unchecked. The example of
their king Leotychidês, too, near about this time, was a second
illustration of the same tendency. At the same time, apparently, that
Pausanias embarked for Asia to carry on the war against the Persians,
Leotychidês was sent with an army into Thessaly to put down the
Aleuadæ and those Thessalian parties who had sided with Xerxes and
Mardonius. Successful in this expedition, he suffered himself to be
bribed, and was even detected with a large sum of money actually on
his person: in consequence of which the Lacedæmonians condemned him
to banishment, and razed his house to the ground: he died afterwards
in exile at Tegea.[532] Two such instances were well calculated
to make the Lacedæmonians distrust the conduct of their Herakleid
leaders when on foreign service, and this feeling weighed much in
inducing them to abandon the Asiatic headship in favor of Athens. It
appears that their Peloponnesian allies retired from this contest at
the same time as they did, so that the prosecution of the war was
thus left to Athens as chief of the newly-emancipated Greeks.[533]

[530] Thucyd. i, 95. Following Thucydidês in his conception of
these events, I have embodied in the narrative as much as seems
consistent with it in Diodorus (xi, 50), who evidently did not
here copy Thucydidês, but probably had Ephorus for his guide.
The name of Hetœmaridas, as an influential Spartan statesman on
this occasion, is probable enough; but his alleged speech on the
mischiefs of maritime empire, which Diodorus seems to have had
before him, composed by Ephorus, would probably have represented
the views and feelings of the year 350 B. C., and not those of
476 B. C. The subject would have been treated in the same manner
as Isokratês, the master of Ephorus, treats it, in his Crat.
viii, De Pace, pp. 179, 180.

[531] Xenophon, Hellen. vi, 5, 34. It was at the moment
when the Spartans were soliciting Athenian aid, after their
defeat at Leuktra. ὑπομιμνήσκοντες μὲν, ὡς τὸν βάρβαρον κοινῇ
ἀπεμαχέσαντο—ἀναμιμνήσκοντες δὲ, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοί τε ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων
ᾑρέθησαν ἡγεμόνες τοῦ ναυτικοῦ, καὶ τῶν κοινῶν χρημάτων φύλακες,
τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ταῦτα συμβουλομένων· αὐτοί τε κατὰ γῆν
ὁμολογουμένως ὑφ’ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμόνες προκριθείησαν,
συμβουλομένων αὖ ταῦτα τῶν Ἀθηναίων.

[532] Herodot. vi, 72; Diodor. xi, 48; Pausanias, iii, 7, 8:
compare Plutarch, De Herodoti Malign. c. 21, p. 859.

Leotychidês died, according to Diodorus, in 476 B. C.: he had
commanded at Mykalê in 479 B. C. The expedition into Thessaly
must therefore have been in one of the two intermediate years,
if the chronology of Diodorus were, in this case, thoroughly
trustworthy. But Mr. Clinton (Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, ch. iii,
p. 210) has shown that Diodorus is contradicted by Plutarch,
about the date of the accession of Archidamus,—and by others,
about the date of the revolt at Sparta. Mr. Clinton places the
accession of Archidamus and the banishment of Leotychidês (of
course, therefore, the expedition into Thessaly) in 469 B. C. I
incline to believe that the expedition of Leotychidês against the
Thessalian Aleuadæ took place in the year or in the second year
following the battle of Platæa, because they had been the ardent
and hearty allies of Mardonius in Bœotia, and because the war
would seem not to have been completed without putting them down
and making the opposite party in Thessaly predominant.

Considering how imperfectly we know the Lacedæmonian chronology
of this date, it is very possible that some confusion may
have arisen in the case of Leotychidês, from the difference
between the date of his _banishment_ and that of his _death_.
King Pleistoanax afterwards, having been banished for the same
offence as that committed by Leotychidês, and having lived many
years in banishment, was afterwards restored: and the years
which he had passed in banishment were counted as a part of his
reign (Fast. Hellen. l. c. p. 211). The date of Archidamus may,
perhaps, have been reckoned in one account from the _banishment_
of Leotychidês,—in another, from his _death_; the rather, as
Archidamus must have been very young, since he reigned forty-two
years even after 469 B. C. And the date which Diodorus has given
as that of the death of Leotychidês, may really be only the date
of his banishment, in which he lived until 469 B. C.

[533] Thucyd. i, 18.

It was from these considerations that the Spartans were induced to
submit to that loss of command which the misconduct of Pausanias
had brought upon them. Their acquiescence facilitated the immense
change about to take place in Grecian politics. According to the
tendencies in progress prior to the Persian invasion, Sparta had
become gradually more and more the president of something like a
Pan-Hellenic union, comprising the greater part of the Grecian
states. Such at least was the point towards which things seemed to
be tending; and if many separate states stood aloof from this union,
none of them at least sought to form any counter-union, if we except
the obsolete and impotent pretensions of Argos. The preceding volumes
of this history have shown that Sparta had risen to such ascendency,
not from her superior competence in the management of collective
interests, nor even in the main from ambitious efforts on her own
part to acquire it,—but from the converging tendencies of Grecian
feeling, which required some such presiding state, and from the
commanding military power, rigid discipline, and ancient undisturbed
constitution, which attracted that feeling towards Sparta. The
necessities of common defence against Persia greatly strengthened
these tendencies, and the success of the defence, whereby so many
Greeks were emancipated who required protection against their
former master, seemed destined to have the like effect still more.
For an instant, after the battles of Platæa and Mykalê,—when the
town of Platæa was set apart as a consecrated neutral spot for an
armed confederacy against the Persian, with periodical solemnities
and meetings of deputies,—Sparta was exalted to be the chief of a
full Pan-Hellenic union, Athens being only one of the principal
members: and had Sparta been capable either of comprehensive policy,
of self-directed and persevering efforts, or of the requisite
flexibility of dealing, embracing distant Greeks as well as near,—her
position was now such, that her own ascendency, together with
undivided Pan-Hellenic union, might long have been maintained. But
she was lamentably deficient in all the requisite qualities, and the
larger the union became, the more her deficiency stood manifest.
On the other hand, Athens, now entering into rivalry as a sort of
leader of opposition, possessed all those qualities in a remarkable
degree, over and above that actual maritime force which was the want
of the day; so that the opening made by Spartan incompetence and
crime, so far as Pausanias was concerned, found her in every respect
prepared. But the sympathies of the Peloponnesians still clung to
Sparta, while those of the Ionian Greeks had turned to Athens: and
thus not only the short-lived symptoms of an established Pan-Hellenic
union, but even all tendencies towards it from this time disappear.
There now stands out a manifest schism, with two pronounced parties,
towards one of which nearly all the constituent atoms of the
Grecian world gravitate: the maritime states, newly enfranchised
from Persia, towards Athens,—the land-states, which had formed
most part of the confederate army at Platæa, towards Sparta.[534]
Along with this national schism and called into action by it,
appears the internal political schism in each separate city between
oligarchy and democracy. Of course, the germ of these parties had
already previously existed in the separate states, but the energetic
democracy of Athens, and the pronounced tendency of Sparta to rest
upon the native oligarchies in each separate city as her chief
support, now began to bestow, on the conflict of internal political
parties, an Hellenic importance, and an aggravated bitterness, which
had never before belonged to it.

[534] Thucyd. i, 18. Καὶ μεγάλου κινδύνου ἐπικρεμασθέντος οἵ
τε Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῶν ξυμπολεμησάντων Ἑλλήνων ἡγήσαντο δυνάμει
προὔχοντες, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, διανοηθέντες ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν καὶ
ἀνασκευασάμενοι, ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐμβάντες ναυτικοὶ ἐγένοντο. Κοινῇ
δὲ ἀπωσάμενοι τὸν βάρβαρον, ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ διεκρίθησαν πρός τε
Ἀθηναίους καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, οἵ τε ἀποστάντες βασιλέως Ἕλληνες
καὶ οἱ ξυμπολεμήσαντες. Δυνάμει γὰρ ταῦτα μέγιστα διεφάνη·
ἴσχυον γὰρ οἱ μὲν κατὰ γῆν, οἱ δὲ ναυσί. Καὶ ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον
συνέμεινεν ἡ ~ὁμαιχμία~, ἔπειτα δὲ διενεχθέντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι
καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπολέμησαν μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς ἀλλήλους·
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων εἴτινές που διασταῖεν, πρὸς τούτους ἤδη
ἐχώρουν. Ὥστε ~ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἐς τόνδε ἀεὶ τὸν πόλεμον~, etc.

This is a clear and concise statement of the great revolution
in Grecian affairs, comparing the period before and after
the Persian war. Thucydidês goes on to trace briefly the
consequences of this bisection of the Grecian world into two
great leagues,—the growing improvement in military skill, and
the increasing stretch of military effort on both sides from
the Persian invasion down to the Peloponnesian war;—he remarks
also, upon the difference between Sparta and Athens in their
way of dealing with their allies respectively. He then states
the striking fact, that the military force put forth separately
by Athens and her allies on the one side, and by Sparta and her
allies on the other, during the Peloponnesian war, were each of
them greater than the entire force which had been employed by
both together in the most powerful juncture of their confederacy
against the Persian invaders,—Καὶ ἐγένετο ~αὐτοῖς~ ἐς τόνδε τὸν
πόλεμον ~ἡ ἰδία παρασκευὴ~ μείζων ἢ ὡς τὰ κράτιστά ~ποτε μετὰ
ἀκραιφνοῦς τῆς ξυμμαχίας~ ἤνθησαν (i, 19).

I notice this last passage especially (construing it as
the Scholiast seems to do), not less because it conveys an
interesting comparison, than because it has been understood by
Dr. Arnold, Göller, and other commentators, in a sense which
seems to me erroneous. They interpret thus: αὐτοῖς to mean the
Athenians only, and not the Lacedæmonians,—ἡ ἰδία παρασκευὴ
to denote the forces equipped by Athens herself, apart from
her allies,—and ἀκραιφνοῦς ξυμμαχίας to refer “to the Athenian
alliance only, at a period a little before the conclusion of the
thirty years’ treaty, when the Athenians were masters not only
of the islands, and the Asiatic Greek colonies, but had also
united to their confederacy Bœotia and Achaia on the continent
of Greece itself.” (Dr. Arnold’s note.) Now so far, as the words
go, the meaning assigned by Dr. Arnold might be admissible; but
if we trace the thread of ideas in Thucydidês, we shall see
that the comparison, as these commentators conceive it, between
Athens alone and Athens aided by her allies—between the Athenian
empire as it stood during the Peloponnesian war, and the same
empire as it _had_ stood before the thirty years’ truce—is quite
foreign to his thoughts. Nor had Thucydidês said one word to
inform the reader, that the Athenian empire at the beginning
of the Peloponnesian war had diminished in magnitude, and thus
was no longer ἀκραιφνής: without which previous notification,
the comparison supposed by Dr. Arnold could not be clearly
understood. I conceive that there are two periods, and two sets
of circumstances, which, throughout all this passage, Thucydidês
means to contrast: first, confederate Greece at the time of the
Persian war; next, bisected Greece in a state of war, under the
double headship of Sparta and Athens. Αὐτοῖς refers as much to
Sparta as to Athens—ἀκραιφνοῦς τῆς ξυμμαχίας means what had been
before expressed by ὁμαιχμία—and ποτε set against τόνδε τὸν
πόλεμον, is equivalent to the expression which had before been
used—ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἐς τόνδε ἀεὶ τὸν πόλεμον.

The departure of the Spartan Dorkis left the Athenian generals at
liberty; and their situation imposed upon them the duty of organizing
the new confederacy which they had been chosen to conduct. The Ionic
allies were at this time not merely willing and unanimous, but acted
as the forward movers in the enterprise; for they stood in obvious
need of protection against the attacks of Persia, and had no farther
kindness to expect from Sparta or the Peloponnesians. But even had
they been less under the pressure of necessity, the conduct of
Athens, and of Aristeidês as the representative of Athens, might
have sufficed to bring them into harmonious coöperation. The new
leader was no less equitable towards the confederates than energetic
against the common enemy. The general conditions of the confederacy
were regulated in a common synod of the members, appointed to meet
periodically for deliberative purposes, in the temple of Apollo
and Artemis at Delos,—of old, the venerated spot for the religious
festivals of the Ionic cities, and at the same time a convenient
centre for the members. A definite obligation, either in equipped
ships of war or in money, was imposed upon every separate city; and
the Athenians, as leaders, determined in which form contribution
should be made by each: their assessment must of course have been
reviewed by the synod, nor had they at this time power to enforce any
regulation not approved by that body. It had been the good fortune of
Athens to profit by the genius of Themistoklês on two recent critical
occasions (the battle of Salamis and the rebuilding of her walls),
where sagacity, craft, and decision were required in extraordinary
measure, and where pecuniary probity was of less necessity: it was
no less her good fortune now,—in the delicate business of assessing
a new tax and determining how much each state should bear, without
precedents to guide them, when unimpeachable honesty in the assessor
was the first of all qualities,—_not_ to have Themistoklês; but
to employ in his stead the well-known, we might almost say the
ostentatious, probity of Aristeidês. This must be accounted good
fortune, since at the moment when Aristeidês was sent out, the
Athenians could not have anticipated that any such duty would devolve
upon him. His assessment not only found favor at the time of its
original proposition, when it must have been freely canvassed by the
assembled allies—but also maintained its place in general esteem, as
equitable and moderate, after the once responsible headship of Athens
had degenerated into an unpopular empire.[535]

[535] Thucyd. v, 18; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 24. Plutarch states
that the allies expressly asked the Athenians to send Aristeidês
for the purpose of assessing the tribute. This is not at all
probable: Aristeidês, as commander of the Athenian contingent
under Pausanias, was at Byzantium when the mutiny of the Ionians
against Pausanias occurred, and was the person to whom they
applied for protection. As such, he was the natural person to
undertake such duties as devolved upon Athens, without any
necessity of supposing that he was specially asked for to perform
it.

Plutarch farther states that a certain contribution had been
levied from the Greeks towards the war, even during the headship
of Sparta. This statement also is highly improbable. The headship
of Sparta covers only one single campaign, in which Pausanias
had the command: the Ionic Greeks sent their ships to the fleet,
which would be held sufficient, and there was no time for
measuring commutations into money.

Pausanias states, but I think quite erroneously, that the name
of Aristeidês was robbed of its due honor because he was the
first person who ἔταξε φοροὺς τοῖς Ἕλλησι (Pausan. viii, 52, 2).
Neither the assessment nor the name of Aristeidês was otherwise
than popular.

Aristotle employs the name of Aristeidês as a symbol of
unrivalled probity (Rhetoric. ii, 24, 2).

Respecting this first assessment, we scarcely know more than one
single fact,—the aggregate in money was four hundred and sixty
talents, equal to about one hundred and six thousand pounds sterling.
Of the items composing such aggregate,—of the individual cities which
paid it,—of the distribution of obligations to furnish ships and to
furnish money,—we are entirely ignorant: the little information which
we possess on these points relates to a period considerably later,
shortly before the Peloponnesian war, under the uncontrolled empire
then exercised by Athens. Thucydidês, in his brief sketch, makes
us clearly understand the difference between _presiding_ Athens,
with her autonomous and regularly assembled allies in 476 B. C.,
and _imperial_ Athens, with her subject allies in 432 B. C.; the
Greek word equivalent to _ally_ left either of these epithets to be
understood, by an ambiguity exceedingly convenient to the powerful
states,—and he indicates the general causes of the change: but he
gives us few particulars as to the modifying circumstances, and none
at all as to the first start. He tells us only that the Athenians
appointed a peculiar board of officers, called the Hellênotamiæ, to
receive and administer the common fund,—that Delos was constituted
the general treasury, where the money was to be kept,—and that the
payment thus levied was called the _phorus_;[536] a name which
appears then to have been first put into circulation, though
afterwards usual,—and to have conveyed at first no degrading import,
though it afterwards became so odious as to be exchanged for a more
innocent synonym.

[536] Thucyd. i, 95, 96.

Endeavoring as well as we can to conceive the Athenian alliance
in its infancy, we are first struck with the magnitude of the
total sum contributed; which will appear the more remarkable when
we reflect that many of the contributing cities furnished ships
besides. We may be certain that all which was done at first was
done by general consent, and by a freely determining majority: for
Athens, at the time when the Ionic allies besought her protection
against Spartan arrogance, could have had no power of constraining
unwilling parties, especially when the loss of supremacy, though
quietly borne, was yet fresh and rankling among the countrymen of
Pausanias. So large a total implies, from the very first, a great
number of contributing states, and we learn from hence to appreciate
the powerful, wide-spread, and voluntary movement which then brought
together the maritime and insular Greeks distributed throughout the
Ægean sea and the Hellespont. The Phenician fleet, and the Persian
land-force, might at any moment reappear, nor was there any hope of
resisting either except by confederacy: so that confederacy, under
such circumstances, became, with these exposed Greeks, not merely a
genuine feeling, but at that time the first of all their feelings.
It was their common fear, rather than Athenian ambition, which
gave birth to the alliance, and they were grateful to Athens for
organizing it. The public import of the name Hellênotamiæ, coined for
the occasion,—the selection of Delos as a centre, and the provision
for regular meetings of the members,—demonstrate the patriotic and
fraternal purpose which the league was destined to serve. In truth,
the protection of the Ægean sea against foreign maritime force and
lawless piracy, as well as that of the Hellespont and Bosphorus
against the transit of a Persian force, was a purpose essentially
public, for which all the parties interested were bound in equity to
provide by way of common contribution: any island or seaport which
might refrain from contributing, was a gainer at the cost of others:
and we cannot doubt that the general feeling of this common danger
as well as equitable obligation, at a moment when the fear of Persia
was yet serious, was the real cause which brought together so many
contributing members, and enabled the forward parties to shame into
concurrence such as were more backward. How the confederacy came to
be turned afterwards to the purposes of Athenian ambition, we shall
see at the proper time: but in its origin it was an equal alliance,
in so far as alliance between the strong and the weak can ever be
equal,—not an Athenian empire: nay, it was an alliance in which
every individual member was more exposed, more defenceless, and more
essentially benefited in the way of protection, than Athens. We have
here in truth one of the few moments in Grecian history wherein a
purpose at once common, equal, useful, and innocent, brought together
spontaneously many fragments of this disunited race, and overlaid for
a time that exclusive bent towards petty and isolated autonomy which
ultimately made slaves of them all. It was a proceeding equitable
and prudent, in principle as well as in detail; promising at the
time the most beneficent consequences,—not merely protection against
the Persians, but a standing police of the Ægean sea, regulated
by a common superintending authority. And if such promise was not
realized, we shall find that the inherent defects of the allies,
indisposing them to the hearty appreciation and steady performance of
their duties as equal confederates, are at least as much chargeable
with the failure as the ambition of Athens. We may add that, in
selecting Delos as a centre, the Ionic allies were conciliated by a
renovation of the solemnities which their fathers, in the days of
former freedom, had crowded to witness in that sacred island.

At the time when this alliance was formed, the Persians still held
not only the important posts of Eion on the Strymon and Doriskus in
Thrace, but also several other posts in that country,[537] which are
not specified to us. We may thus understand why the Greek cities
on and near the Chalkidic peninsula,—Argilus, Stageirus, Akanthus,
Skôlus, Olynthus, Spartôlus, etc.,—which we know to have joined under
the first assessment of Aristeidês, were not less anxious[538] to
seek protection in the bosom of the new confederacy, than the Dorian
islands of Rhodes and Kos, the Ionic islands of Samos and Chios,
the Æolic Lesbos and Tenedos, or continental towns such as Milêtus
and Byzantium: by all of whom adhesion to this alliance must have
been contemplated, in 477 or 476 B. C., as the sole condition of
emancipation from Persia. Nothing more was required, for the success
of a foreign enemy against Greece generally, than complete autonomy
of every Grecian city, small as well as great,—such as the Persian
monarch prescribed and tried to enforce ninety years afterwards,
through the Lacedæmonian Antalkidas, in the pacification which bears
the name of the latter: some sort of union, organized and obligatory
upon each city, was indispensable to the safety of all. Nor was it
by any means certain, at the time when the confederacy of Delos was
first formed, that, even with that aid, the Asiatic enemy would
be effectually kept out; especially as the Persians were strong,
not merely from their own force, but also from the aid of internal
parties in many of the Grecian states,—traitors within, as well as
exiles without.

[537] Herodot. vii, 106. ὕπαρχοι ἐν τῇ Θρηΐκῃ καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου
~πανταχῇ~. Οὗτοι ὦν ~πάντες~, οἵ τε ἐκ Θρηΐκης καὶ τοῦ
Ἑλλησπόντου, πλὴν τοῦ ἐν Δορίσκῳ, ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων ὕστερον ταύτης τῆς
στρατηλασίης ἐξῃρέθησαν, etc.

[538] Thucyd. v, 18. Τὰς δὲ πόλεις, φερούσας τὸν φόρον τὸν ἐπ’
Ἀριστείδου, αὐτονόμους εἶναι.... εἰσὶ δὲ, Ἄργιλος, Στάγειρος,
Ἄκανθος, Σκῶλος, Ὄλυνθος, Σπάρτωλος.

Among these, the first in rank as well as the most formidable, was
the Spartan Pausanias. Summoned home from Byzantium to Sparta, in
order that the loud complaints against him might be examined, he
had been acquitted[539] of the charges of wrong and oppression
against individuals; yet the presumptions of _medism_, or treacherous
correspondence with the Persians, appeared so strong that, though
not found guilty, he was still not reappointed to the command. Such
treatment seems to have only emboldened him in the prosecution
of his designs against Greece, and he came out with this view to
Byzantium in a trireme belonging to Hermionê, under pretence of
aiding as a volunteer without any formal authority in the war. He
there resumed his negotiations with Artabazus: his great station
and celebrity still gave him a strong hold on men’s opinions, and
he appears to have established a sort of mastery in Byzantium, from
whence the Athenians, already recognized heads of the confederacy,
were constrained to expel him by force:[540] and we may be very sure
that the terror excited by his presence as well as by his known
designs tended materially to accelerate the organization of the
confederacy under Athens. He then retired to Kolônæ in the Troad,
where he continued for some time in the farther prosecution of his
schemes, trying to form a Persian party, despatching emissaries to
distribute Persian gold among various cities of Greece, and probably
employing the name of Sparta to impede the formation of the new
confederacy:[541] until at length the Spartan authorities, apprized
of his proceedings, sent a herald out to him, with peremptory
orders that he should come home immediately along with the herald:
if he disobeyed, “the Spartans would declare war against him,” or
constitute him a public enemy.

[539] Cornelius Nepos states that he was fined (Pausanias, c.
2), which is neither noticed by Thucydidês, nor at all probable,
looking at the subsequent circumstances connected with him.

[540] Thucyd. i, 130, 131. Καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Βυζαντίου βίᾳ ὑπὸ τῶν
Ἀθηναίων ἐκπολιορκηθεὶς, etc.: these words seem to imply that he
had acquired a strong position in the town.

[541] It is to this time that I refer the mission of Arthmius
of Zeleia (an Asiatic town, between Mount Ida and the southern
coast of the Propontis) to gain over such Greeks as he could by
means of Persian gold. In the course of his visit to Greece,
Arthmius went to Athens: his purpose was discovered, and he
was compelled to flee: while the Athenians, at the instance of
Themistoklês, passed an indignant decree, declaring him and his
race enemies of Athens, and of all the allies of Athens,—and
proclaiming that whoever should slay him would be guiltless;
because he had brought in Persian gold to bribe the Greeks. This
decree was engraven on a brazen column, and placed on record in
the acropolis, where it stood near the great statue of Athênê
Promachos, even in the time of Demosthenês and his contemporary
orators. See Demosthen. Philippic. iii, c. 9, p. 122, and De
Fals. Legat. c. 76, p. 428; Æschin. cont. Ktesiphont. ad fin.
Harpokrat. v. Ἄτιμος—Deinarchus cont. Aristogeiton, sects. 25, 26.

Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 6, and Aristeidês, tom. ii, p. 218)
tells us that Themistoklês proposed this decree against Arthmius
and caused it to be passed. But Plutarch refers it to the time
when Xerxes was on the point of invading Greece. Now it appears
to me that the incident cannot well belong to that point of time.
Xerxes did not rely upon bribes, but upon other and different
means, for conquering Greece: besides, the very tenor of the
decree shows that it must have been passed after the formation
of the confederacy of Delos,—for it pronounces Arthmius to be
an enemy of Athens and of all the allies of Athens. To a native
of Zeleia it might be a serious penalty to be excluded and
proscribed from all the cities in alliance with Athens; many
of them being on the coast of Asia. I know no point of time to
which the mission of Arthmius can be so conveniently referred
as this,—when Pausanias and Artabazus were engaged in this very
part of Asia, in contriving plots to get up a party in Greece.
Pausanias was thus engaged for some years,—before the banishment
of Themistoklês.

As the execution of this threat would have frustrated all the
ulterior schemes of Pausanias, he thought it prudent to obey; the
rather, as he felt entire confidence of escaping all the charges
against him at Sparta by the employment of bribes,[542] the means
for which were abundantly furnished to him through Artabazus. He
accordingly returned along with the herald, and was, in the first
moments of indignation, imprisoned by order of the ephors; who, it
seems, were legally competent to imprison him, even had he been king
instead of regent. But he was soon let out, on his own requisition,
and under a private arrangement with friends and partisans, to take
his trial against all accusers.[543] Even to stand forth as accuser
against so powerful a man was a serious peril: to undertake the proof
of specific matter of treason against him was yet more serious: nor
does it appear that any Spartan ventured to do either. It was known
that nothing short of the most manifest and invincible proof would
be held to justify his condemnation, and amidst a long chain of acts
carrying conviction when taken in the aggregate, there was no single
treason sufficiently demonstrable for the purpose. Accordingly,
Pausanias remained not only at large but unaccused, still audaciously
persisting both in his intrigues at home and his correspondence
abroad with Artabazus. He ventured to assail the unshielded side of
Sparta by opening negotiations with the Helots, and instigating them
to revolt; promising them both liberation and admission to political
privilege;[544] with a view, first, to destroy the board of ephors,
and render himself despot in his own country,—next, to acquire
through Persian help the supremacy of Greece. Some of those Helots
to whom he addressed himself revealed the plot to the ephors, who,
nevertheless, in spite of such grave peril, did not choose to take
measures against Pausanias upon no better information,—so imposing
was still his name and position. But though some few Helots might
inform, probably many others both gladly heard the proposition and
faithfully kept the secret: we shall find, by what happened a few
years afterwards, that there were a large number of them who had
their spears in readiness for revolt. Suspected as Pausanias was, yet
by the fears of some and the connivance of others, he was allowed
to bring his plans to the very brink of consummation; and his last
letters to Artabazus,[545] intimating that he was ready for action,
and bespeaking immediate performance of the engagements concerted
between them, were actually in the hands of the messenger. Sparta
was saved from an outbreak of the most formidable kind, not by the
prudence of her authorities, but by a mere accident, or rather by the
fact that Pausanias was not only a traitor to his country, but also
base and cruel in his private relations.

[542] Thucyd. i, 131. Ὁ δὲ βουλόμενος ὡς ἥκιστα ὕποπτος εἶναι καὶ
πιστεύων χρήμασι διαλύσειν τὴν διαβολὴν, ἀνεχώρει τὸ δεύτερον ἐς
Σπάρτην.

[543] Thucyd. i, 131. Καὶ ἐς μὲν τὴν εἱρκτὴν ἐσπίπτει τὸ πρῶτον
ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφόρων· ἔπειτα διαπραξάμενος ὕστερον ἐξῆλθε, καὶ
καθίστησιν ἑαυτὸν ἐς κρίσιν τοῖς βουλομένοις περὶ αὐτῶν ἐλέγχειν.

The word διαπραξάμενος indicates, first, that Pausanias
himself originated the efforts to get free,—next, that he
came to an underhand arrangement: very probably by a bribe,
though the word does not necessarily imply it. The Scholiast
says so, distinctly,—χρήμασι καὶ λόγοις διαπραξάμενος
δηλόνοτι διακρουσάμενος τὴν κατηγορίαν. Dr. Arnold translates
διαπραξάμενος, “having settled the business.”

[544] Aristotel. Politic. iv, 13, 13; v, 1, 5; v, 6, 2; Herodot.
v, 32. Aristotle calls Pausanias _king_, though he was only
_regent_: the truth is, that he had all the power of a Spartan
king, and seemingly more, if we compare his treatment with that
of the Prokleid king Leotychidês.

[545] Thucyd. i, 132. ὁ μέλλων ~τὰς τελευταίας~ βασιλεῖ ἐπιστολὰς
πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον κομιεῖν, ἀνὴρ Ἀργίλιος, etc.

The messenger to whom these last letters were intrusted was a native
of Argilus in Thrace, a favorite and faithful slave of Pausanias;
once connected with him by that intimate relation which Grecian
manners tolerated, and admitted even to the full confidence of
his treasonable projects. It was by no means the intention of
this Argilian to betray his master; but, on receiving the letter
to carry, he recollected, with some uneasiness, that none of the
previous messengers had ever come back. Accordingly, he broke the
seal and read it, with the full view of carrying it forward to
its destination, if he found nothing inconsistent with his own
personal safety: he had farther taken the precaution to counterfeit
his master’s seal, so that he could easily reclose the letter.
On reading it, he found his suspicions confirmed by an express
injunction that the bearer was to be put to death,—a discovery which
left him no alternative except to deliver it to the ephors. But
those magistrates, who had before disbelieved the Helot informers,
still refused to believe even the confidential slave with his
master’s autograph and seal, and with the full account besides,
which doubtless he would communicate at the same time, of all that
had previously passed in the Persian correspondence, not omitting
copies of those letters between Pausanias and Xerxes, which I have
already cited from Thucydidês—for in no other way can they have
become public. Partly from the suspicion which, in antiquity, always
attached to the testimony of slaves, except when it was obtained
under the pretended guarantee of torture, partly from the peril of
dealing with so exalted a criminal,—the ephors would not be satisfied
with any evidence less than his own speech and their own ears. They
directed the Argilian slave to plant himself as a suppliant in the
sacred precinct of Poseidon, near Cape Tænarus, under the shelter of
a double tent, or hut, behind which two of them concealed themselves.
Apprized of this unexpected mark of alarm, Pausanias hastened to the
temple, and demanded the reason: upon which the slave disclosed his
knowledge of the contents of the letter, and complained bitterly
that, after long and faithful service,—with a secrecy never once
betrayed, throughout this dangerous correspondence,—he was at length
rewarded with nothing better than the same miserable fate which had
befallen the previous messengers. Pausanias, admitting all these
facts, tried to appease the slave’s disquietude, and gave him a
solemn assurance of safety if he would quit the sanctuary; urging him
at the same time to proceed on the journey forthwith, in order that
the schemes in progress might not be retarded.

All this passed within the hearing of the concealed ephors; who
at length thoroughly satisfied, determined to arrest Pausanias
immediately on his return to Sparta. They met him in the public
street, not far from the temple of Athênê Chalkiœkus (or of the
Brazen House); but as they came near, either their menacing looks, or
a significant nod from one of them, revealed to this guilty man their
purpose; and he fled for refuge to the temple, which was so near that
he reached it before they could overtake him. He planted himself
as a suppliant, far more hopeless than the Argilian slave whom he
had so recently talked over at Tænarus, in a narrow-roofed chamber
belonging to the sacred building; where the ephors, not warranted
in touching him, took off the roof, built up the doors, and kept
watch until he was on the point of death by starvation. According to
a current story,[546]—not recognized by Thucydidês, yet consistent
with Spartan manners,—his own mother was the person who placed the
first stone to build up the door, in deep abhorrence of his treason.
His last moments being carefully observed, he was brought away just
in time to expire without, and thus to avoid the desecration of the
temple. The first impulse of the ephors was to cast his body into the
ravine, or hollow, called the Kæadas, the usual place of punishment
for criminals: probably, his powerful friends averted this disgrace,
and he was buried not far off, until, some time afterwards, under the
mandate of the Delphian oracle, his body was exhumed and transported
to the exact spot where he had died. Nor was the oracle satisfied
even with this reinterment: pronouncing the whole proceeding to be a
profanation of the sanctity of Athênê, it enjoined that two bodies
should be presented to her as an atonement for the one carried away.
In the very early days of Greece,—or among the Carthaginians, even
at this period,—such an injunction would probably have produced the
slaughter of two human victims: on the present occasion, Athênê,
or Hikesius, the tutelary god of suppliants, was supposed to be
satisfied by two brazen statues; not, however, without some attempts
to make out that the expiation was inadequate.[547]

[546] Diodor. xi, 45; Cornel. Nepos, Pausan. c. 5; Polyæn. viii,
51.

[547] Thucyd. i, 133, 134: Pausanias, iii, 17, 9.

Thus perished a Greek who reached the pinnacle of renown simply
from the accidents of his lofty descent, and of his being general
at Platæa, where it does not appear that he displayed any superior
qualities. His treasonable projects implicated and brought to
disgrace a man far greater than himself, the Athenian Themistoklês.

The chronology of this important period is not so fully known as to
enable us to make out the full dates of particular events; but we
are obliged—in consequence of the subsequent events connected with
Themistoklês, whose flight to Persia is tolerably well marked as to
date—to admit an interval of about nine years between the retirement
of Pausanias from his command at Byzantium, and his death. To
suppose so long an interval engaged in treasonable correspondence,
is perplexing; and we can only explain it to ourselves very
imperfectly by considering that the Spartans were habitually slow
in their movements, and that the suspected regent may perhaps have
communicated with partisans, real or expected, in many parts of
Greece. Among those whom he sought to enlist as accomplices was
Themistoklês, still in great power,—though, as it would seem, in
declining power,—at Athens: and the charge of collusion with the
Persians connects itself with the previous movement of political
parties in that city.

The rivalry of Themistoklês and Aristeidês had been greatly
appeased by the invasion of Xerxes, which had imposed upon both the
peremptory necessity of coöperation against a common enemy. Nor was
it apparently resumed, during the times which immediately succeeded
the return of the Athenians to their country: at least we hear of
both in effective service, and in prominent posts. Themistoklês
stands forward as the contriver of the city walls and architect of
Peiræus: Aristeidês is commander of the fleet, and first organizer
of the confederacy of Delos. Moreover, we seem to detect a change
in the character of the latter: he had ceased to be the champion
of Athenian old-fashioned landed interest, against Themistoklês as
the originator of the maritime innovations. Those innovations had
now, since the battle of Salamis, become an established fact; a fact
of overwhelming influence on the destinies and character, public
as well as private, of the Athenians. During the exile at Salamis,
every man, rich or poor, landed proprietor or artisan, had been for
the time a seaman: and the anecdote of Kimon, who dedicated the
bridle of his horse in the acropolis, as a token that he was about
to pass from the cavalry to service on shipboard,[548] is a type
of that change of feeling which must have been impressed more or
less upon every rich man in Athens. From henceforward the fleet is
endeared to every man as the grand force, offensive and defensive,
of the state, in which character all the political leaders agree in
accepting it: we ought to add, at the same time, that this change
was attended with no detriment either to the land-force or to the
landed cultivation of Attica, both of which will be found to acquire
extraordinary development during the interval between the Persian
and Peloponnesian wars. Still, the triremes and the men who manned
them, taken collectively, were now the determining element in the
state: moreover, the men who manned them had just returned from
Salamis, fresh from a scene of trial and danger, and from a harvest
of victory, which had equalized for the moment all Athenians as
sufferers, as combatants, and as patriots. Such predominance of
the maritime impulse, having become pronounced immediately after
the return from Salamis, was farther greatly strengthened by the
construction and fortification of the Peiræus,—a new maritime Athens,
as large as the old inland city,—as well as by the unexpected
formation of the confederacy at Delos, with all its untried prospects
and stimulating duties.

[548] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 8.

The political change arising from hence in Athens was not less
important than the military. “The maritime multitude, authors of
the victory of Salamis,”[549] and instruments of the new vocation
of Athens as head of the Delian confederacy, appear now ascendant
in the political constitution also; not in any way as a separate or
privileged class, but as leavening the whole mass, strengthening
the democratical sentiment, and protesting against all recognized
political inequalities. In fact, during the struggle at Salamis,
the whole city of Athens had been nothing else than “a maritime
multitude,” among which the proprietors and chief men had been
confounded, until, by the efforts of all, the common country had been
reconquered: nor was it likely that this multitude, after a trying
period of forced equality, during which political privilege had been
effaced, would patiently acquiesce in the full restoration of such
privilege at home. We see by the active political sentiment of the
German people, after the great struggles of 1813 and 1814, how much
an energetic and successful military effort of the people at large,
blended with endurance of serious hardship, tends to stimulate the
sense of political dignity and the demand for developed citizenship:
and if this be the tendency even among a people habitually passive
on such subjects, much more was it to be expected in the Athenian
population, who had gone through a previous training of near thirty
years under the democracy of Kleisthenês. At the time when that
constitution was first established,[550] it was perhaps the most
democratical in Greece: it had worked extremely well and had diffused
among the people a sentiment favorable to equal citizenship and
unfriendly to avowed privilege: so that the impressions made by the
struggle at Salamis found the popular mind prepared to receive them.
Early after the return to Attica, the Kleisthenean constitution
was enlarged as respects eligibility to the magistracy. According
to that constitution, the fourth or last class on the Solonian
census, including the considerable majority of the freemen, were not
admissible to offices of state, though they possessed votes in common
with the rest: no person was eligible to be a magistrate unless
he belonged to one of the three higher classes. This restriction
was now annulled, and eligibility extended to all the citizens. We
may appreciate the strength of feeling with which such reform was
demanded, when we find that it was proposed by Aristeidês; a man the
reverse of what is called a demagogue, and a strenuous friend of
the Kleisthenean constitution. No political system would work after
the Persian war, which formally excluded “the maritime multitude”
from holding magistracy. I rather imagine, as has been stated in the
previous volume, that election of magistrates was still retained,
and not exchanged for drawing lots until a certain time, though
not a long time, afterwards. That which the public sentiment first
demanded was the recognition of the equal and open principle: after
a certain length of experience, it was found that poor men, though
legally qualified to be chosen, were in point of fact rarely chosen:
then came the lot, to give them an equal chance with the rich. The
principle of sortition, or choice by lot, was never applied, as I
have before remarked, to all offices at Athens,—never, for example,
to the stratêgi, or generals, whose functions were more grave and
responsible than those of any other person in the service of the
state, and who always continued to be elected by show of hands.

[549] Aristotel. Politic. v, 3, 5. Καὶ πάλιν ~ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος~,
γενόμενος αἴτιος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμῖνα νίκης, καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς
ἡγεμονίας καὶ διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν δύναμιν, τὴν δημοκατίαν
ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποίησεν.

Ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος (Thucyd. viii, 72 and _passim_).

[550] For the constitution of Kleisthenês, see vol. iv, of this
History, ch. xxxi, p. 142, _seqq._

In the new position into which Athens was now thrown, with so great
an extension of what may be termed her foreign relations, and with a
confederacy which imposed the necessity of distant military service,
the functions of the stratêgi naturally tended to become both more
absorbing and complicated; while the civil administration became more
troublesome, if not more difficult, from the enlargement of the city,
and the still greater enlargement of Peiræus,—leading to an increase
of town population, and especially to an increase of the metics, or
resident non-freemen. And it was probably about this period, during
the years immediately succeeding the battle of Salamis,—when the
force of old habit and tradition had been partially enfeebled by so
many stirring novelties,—that the archons were withdrawn altogether
from political and military duties, and confined to civil or judicial
administration. At the battle of Marathon, the polemarch is a
military commander, president of the ten stratêgi:[551] we know
him afterwards only as a civil magistrate, administering justice
to the metics, or non-freemen, while the stratêgi perform military
duties without him. I conceive that this alteration, indicating as it
does a change in the character of the archons generally, must have
taken place at the time which we have now reached,[552]—a time when
the Athenian establishments on all sides required a more elaborate
distribution of functionaries. The distribution of so many Athenian
boards of functionaries, part to do duty in the city, and part in the
Peiræus, cannot have commenced until after this period, when Peiræus
had been raised by Themistoklês to the dignity of town, fortress,
and state-harbor. Such boards were the astynomi and agoranomi, who
maintained the police of streets and markets,—the metronomi, who
watched over weights and measures,—the sitophylakes, who carried into
effect various state regulations respecting the custody and sale of
corn,—with various others who acted not less in Peiræus than in the
city.[553] We may presume that each of these boards was originally
created as the exigency appeared to call for it, at a period later
than that which we have now reached, most of these duties of detail
having been at first discharged by the archons, and afterwards, when
these latter became too full of occupation, confided to separate
administrators. The special and important change which characterized
the period immediately succeeding the battle of Salamis, was the more
accurate line drawn between the archons and the stratêgi; assigning
the foreign and military department entirely to the stratêgi, and
rendering the archons purely civil magistrates,—administrative as
well as judicial; while the first creation of the separate boards
above named was probably an ulterior enlargement, arising out of
increase of population, power, and trade, between the Persian and
Peloponnesian wars. It was by some such steps that the Athenian
administration gradually attained that complete development which it
exhibits in practice during the century from the Peloponnesian war
downward, to which nearly all our positive and direct information
relates.

[551] Herod. vi, 109.

[552] Aristotel. Πολιτειῶν Fragm. xlvii, ed. Neumann;
Harpokration, v. Πολέμαρχος; Pollux, viii, 91: compare Meier und
Schömann, Der Attische Prozess, ch. ii, p. 50, _seqq._

[553] See Aristotel. Πολιτειῶν Fragm. ii, v, xxiii, xxxviii, l,
ed. Neumann; Schömann, Antiqq. Jur. Publ. Græc. c. xli, xlii,
xliii.

With this expansion both of democratical feeling and of military
activity at Athens, Aristeidês appears to have sympathized; and
the popularity thus insured to him, probably heightened by some
regret for his previous ostracism, was calculated to acquire
permanence from his straightforward and incorruptible character,
now brought into strong relief from his function as assessor to
the new Delian confederacy. On the other hand, the ascendency of
Themistoklês, though so often exalted by his unrivalled political
genius and daring, as well as by the signal value of his public
recommendations, was as often overthrown by his duplicity of means
and unprincipled thirst for money. New political opponents sprung
up against him, men sympathizing with Aristeidês, and far more
violent in their antipathy than Aristeidês himself. Of these, the
chief were Kimon—son of Miltiades—and Alkmæon; moreover, it seems
that the Lacedæmonians, though full of esteem for Themistoklês
immediately after the battle of Salamis, had now become extremely
hostile to him,—a change which may be sufficiently explained from his
stratagem respecting the fortifications of Athens, and his subsequent
ambitious projects in reference to the Peiræus. The Lacedæmonian
influence, then not inconsiderable in Athens, was employed to second
the political combinations against him.[554] He is said to have
given offence by manifestations of personal vanity,—by continual
boasting of his great services to the state, and by the erection
of a private chapel, close to his own house, in honor of Artemis
Aristobulê, or Artemis of admirable counsel; just as Pausanias had
irritated the Lacedæmonians by inscribing his own single name on the
Delphian tripod, and as the friends of Aristeidês had displeased the
Athenians by endless encomiums upon his justice.[555] But the main
cause of his discredit was, the prostitution of his great influence
for arbitrary and corrupt purposes. In the unsettled condition of
so many different Grecian communities, recently emancipated from
Persia, when there was past misrule to avenge, wrong-doers to
be deposed and perhaps punished, exiles to be restored, and all
the disturbance and suspicions accompanying so great a change of
political condition as well as of foreign policy,—the influence of
the leading men at Athens must have been great in determining the
treatment of particular individuals. Themistoklês, placed at the head
of an Athenian squadron and sailing among the islands, partly for
the purposes of war against Persia, partly for organizing the new
confederacy,—is affirmed to have accepted bribes without scruple,
for executing sentences just and unjust,—restoring some citizens,
expelling others, and even putting some to death. We learn this
from a friend and guest of Themistoklês,—the poet Timokreon of
Ialysus in Rhodes, who had expected his own restoration from the
Athenian commander, but found that it was thwarted by a bribe of
three talents from his opponents; so that he was still kept in exile
on the charge of _medism_. The assertions of Timokreon, personally
incensed on this ground against Themistoklês, are doubtless to be
considered as passionate and exaggerated: nevertheless, they are a
valuable memorial of the feelings of the time, and are far too much
in harmony with the general character of this eminent man to allow
of our disbelieving them entirely. Timokreon is as emphatic in his
admiration of Aristeidês as in his censure of Themistoklês, whom he
denounces as “a lying and unjust traitor.”[556]

[554] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16; Scholion 2, ad Aristophan. Equit.
84.

[555] Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 22; Kimon, c. 5-8; Aristeidês,
c. 25); Diodorus, xi, 54.

[556] Plutarch, Themist. c. 21

Such conduct as that described by this new Archilochus, even making
every allowance for exaggeration, must have caused Themistoklês to
be both hated and feared among the insular allies, whose opinion was
now of considerable importance to the Athenians. A similar sentiment
grew up partially against him in Athens itself, and appears to have
been connected with suspicions of treasonable inclinations towards
the Persians. As the Persians could offer the highest bribes, a man
open to corruption might naturally be suspected of inclinations
towards their cause; and if Themistoklês had rendered preëminent
service against them, so also had Pausanias, whose conduct had
undergone so fatal a change for the worse. It was the treason of
Pausanias, suspected and believed against him by the Athenians even
when he was in command at Byzantium, though not proved against him
at Sparta until long afterwards,—which first seems to have raised
the presumption of _medism_ against Themistoklês also, when combined
with the corrupt proceedings which stained his public conduct: we
must recollect, also, that Themistoklês had given some color to
these presumptions, even by the stratagems in reference to Xerxes,
which wore a double-faced aspect, capable of being construed either
in a Persian or in a Grecian sense. The Lacedæmonians, hostile to
Themistoklês since the time when he had outwitted them respecting the
walls of Athens,—and fearing him also as a supposed accomplice of the
suspected Pausanias,—procured the charge of _medism_ to be preferred
against him at Athens; by secret instigations, and, as it is said, by
bribes, to his political opponents.[557] But no satisfactory proof
could be furnished of the accusation, which Themistoklês himself
strenuously denied, not without emphatic appeals to his illustrious
services. In spite of violent invectives against him from Alkmæon
and Kimon, tempered, indeed, by a generous moderation on the part
of Aristeidês,[558] his defence was successful. He carried the
people with him and was acquitted of the charge. Nor was he merely
acquitted, but, as might naturally be expected, a reaction took
place in his favor: his splendid qualities and exploits were brought
impressively before the public mind, and he seemed for the time to
acquire greater ascendency than ever.[559]

[557] This accusation of treason brought against Themistoklês
at Athens, _prior to his ostracism_, and at the instigation of
the Lacedæmonians,—is mentioned by Diodorus (xi, 54). Thucydidês
and Plutarch take notice only of the second accusation, _after_
his ostracism. But Diodorus has made his narrative confused,
by supposing the first accusation preferred at Athens to have
come after the full detection of Pausanias and exposure of his
correspondence; whereas these latter events, coming after the
first accusation, supplied new proofs before unknown, and thus
brought on the second, after Themistoklês had been ostracized.
But Diodorus has preserved to us the important notice of this
first accusation at Athens, followed by trial, acquittal, and
temporary glorification of Themistoklês,—and preceding his
ostracism.

The indictment stated by Plutarch to have been preferred against
Themistoklês by Leôbotas son of Alkmæon, at the instance of the
Spartans, probably relates to the first accusation at which
Themistoklês was acquitted. For when Themistoklês was arraigned
after the discovery of Pausanias, he did not choose to stay,
nor was there any actual trial: it is not, therefore, likely
that the name of the accuser would be preserved,—Ὁ δὲ γραψάμενος
αὐτὸν προδοσίας Λεωβώτης ἦν Ἀλκμαίωνος, ἅμα συνεπαιτιωμένων τῶν
Σπαρτιατῶν (Plutarch, Themist. c. 23).

Compare the second Scholion on Aristophan. Equit. 84, and
Aristeidês, Orat. xlvi, Ὑπὲρ τῶν Τεττάρων (vol. ii, p. 318, ed.
Dindorf, p. 243, Jebb).

[558] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 25.

[559] Diodor. xi, 54. ~τότε μὲν~ ἀπέφυγε τὴν τῆς προδοσίας
κρίσιν· διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον μετὰ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν μέγας ἦν παρὰ
τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις· ἠγάπων γὰρ αὐτὸν διαφερόντως οἱ πολῖται· ~μετὰ
δὲ ταῦτα~, οἱ μὲν, φοβηθέντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, οἱ δὲ,
φθονήσαντες τῇ δόξῃ, τῶν μὲν εὐεργεσιῶν ἐπελάθοντο, τὴν δὲ ἴσχυν
καὶ τὸ φρόνημα ταπεινοῦν ἔσπευδον.

Such a charge, and such a failure, must have exasperated to the
utmost the animosity between him and his chief opponents,—Aristeidês,
Kimon, Alkmæon, and others; nor can we wonder that they were anxious
to get rid of him by ostracism. In explaining this peculiar process,
I have already stated that it could never be raised against any one
individual separately and ostensibly,—and that it could never be
brought into operation at all, unless its necessity were made clear,
not merely to violent party men, but also to the assembled senate
and people, including, of course, a considerable proportion of the
more moderate citizens. We may well conceive that the conjuncture was
deemed by many dispassionate Athenians well suited for the tutelary
intervention of ostracism, the express benefit of which consisted
in its separating political opponents when the antipathy between
them threatened to push one or the other into extra-constitutional
proceedings,—especially when one of those parties was Themistoklês,
a man alike vast in his abilities and unscrupulous in his morality.
Probably also there were not a few who wished to revenge the
previous ostracism of Aristeidês: and lastly, the friends of
Themistoklês himself, elate with his acquittal and his seemingly
augmented popularity, might indulge hopes that the vote of ostracism
would turn out in his favor, and remove one or other of his chief
political opponents. From all these circumstances we learn without
astonishment, that a vote of ostracism was soon after resorted to. It
ended in the temporary banishment of Themistoklês.

He retired into exile, and was residing at Argos, whither he carried
a considerable property, yet occasionally visiting other parts
of Peloponnesus,[560]—when the exposure and death of Pausanias,
together with the discovery of his correspondence, took place
at Sparta. Among this correspondence were found proofs, which
Thucydidês seems to have considered as real and sufficient, of the
privity of Themistoklês. According to Ephorus and others, he is
admitted to have been solicited by Pausanias, and to have known his
plans,—but to have kept them secret while refusing to coöperate
in them,[561]—but probably after his exile he took a more decided
share in them than before; being well-placed for that purpose at
Argos, a city not only unfriendly to Sparta, but strongly believed
to have been in collusion with Xerxes at his invasion of Greece. On
this occasion the Lacedæmonians sent to Athens, publicly to prefer
a formal charge of treason against him, and to urge the necessity
of trying him as a Pan-Hellenic criminal before the synod of the
allies assembled at Sparta.[562] Whether this latter request would
have been granted, or whether Themistoklês would have been tried at
Athens, we cannot tell: for no sooner was he apprized that joint
envoys from Sparta and Athens had been despatched to arrest him, than
he fled forthwith from Argos to Korkyra. The inhabitants of that
island, though owing gratitude to him and favorably disposed, could
not venture to protect him against the two most powerful states in
Greece, but sent him to the neighboring continent. Here, however,
being still tracked and followed by the envoys, he was obliged to
seek protection from a man whom he had formerly thwarted in a demand
at Athens, and who had become his personal enemy,—Admêtus, king of
the Molossians. Fortunately for him, at the moment when he arrived,
Admêtus was not at home; and Themistoklês, becoming a suppliant to
his wife, conciliated her sympathy so entirely, that she placed
her child in his arms and planted him at the hearth in the full
solemnity of supplication to soften her husband. As soon as Admêtus
returned, Themistoklês revealed his name, his pursuers, and his
danger,—entreating protection as a helpless suppliant in the last
extremity. He appealed to the generosity of the Epirotic prince not
to take revenge on a man now defenceless, for offence given under
such very different circumstances; and for an offence too, after all,
not of capital moment, while the protection now entreated was to the
suppliant a matter of life or death. Admêtus raised him up from the
hearth with the child in his arms,—an evidence that he accepted the
appeal and engaged to protect him; refusing to give him up to the
envoys, and at last only sending him away on the expression of his
own wish to visit the king of Persia. Two Macedonian guides conducted
him across the mountains to Pydna, in the Thermaic gulf, where he
found a merchant-ship about to set sail for the coast of Asia Minor,
and took a passage on board; neither the master nor the crew knowing
his name. An untoward storm drove the vessel to the island of Naxos,
at that moment besieged by an Athenian armament: had he been forced
to land there, he would of course have been recognized and seized,
but his wonted subtlety did not desert him. Having communicated both
his name and the peril which awaited him, he conjured the master of
the ship to assist in saving him, and not to suffer any one of the
crew to land; menacing that if by any accident he were discovered, he
would bring the master to ruin along with himself, by representing
him as an accomplice induced by money to facilitate the escape of
Themistoklês: on the other hand, in case of safety, he promised a
large reward. Such promises and threats weighed with the master,
who controlled his crew, and forced them to beat about during a
day and a night off the coast, without seeking to land. After that
dangerous interval, the storm abated, and the ship reached Ephesus in
safety.[563]

[560] Thucyd. i, 137. ἦλθε γὰρ αὐτῷ ὕστερον ἔκ τε Ἀθηνῶν παρὰ τῶν
φίλων, καὶ ἐξ Ἄργους ἃ ~ὑπεξέκειτο~, etc.

I follow Mr. Fynes Clinton, in considering the year 471 B. C. to
be the date of the ostracism of Themistoklês. It may probably
be so, nor is there any evidence positively to contradict it:
but I think Mr. Clinton states it too confidently, as he admits
that Diodorus includes, in the chapters which he devotes to one
archon, events which must have happened in several different
years (see Fast. Hellen. B. C. 471).

After the expedition under the command of Pausanias in 478 B.
C., we have no one date at once certain and accurate, until
we come to the death of Xerxes, where Diodorus is confirmed
by the Canon of the Persian kings, B. C. 465. This last event
determines by close approximation and inference, the flight of
Themistoklês, the siege of Naxos, and the death of Pausanias: for
the other events of this period, we are reduced to a more vague
approximation, and can ascertain little beyond their order of
succession.

[561] Thucyd. i, 135; Ephorus ap. Plutarch. de Malign. Herodoti,
c. 5, p. 855; Diodor. xi, 54; Plutarch, Themist. c. 23.

[562] Diodor. xi, 55.

[563] Thucyd. i, 137. Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 8) for the
most part follows Thucydidês, and professes to do so; yet he
is not very accurate, especially about the relations between
Themistoklês and Admêtus. Diodorus (xi, 56) seems to follow
chiefly other guides: also to a great extent Plutarch (Themist.
c. 24-26). There were evidently different accounts of his voyage,
which represented him as reaching, not Ephesus, but the Æolic
Kymê. Diodorus does not notice his voyage by sea.

Thus did Themistoklês, after a series of perils, find himself safe
on the Persian side of the Ægean. At Athens, he was proclaimed
a traitor, and his property confiscated: nevertheless, as it
frequently happened in cases of confiscation, his friends secreted
a considerable sum, and sent it over to him in Asia, together with
the money which he had left at Argos; so that he was thus enabled
liberally to reward the ship-captain who had preserved him. With all
this deduction, the property which he possessed of a character not
susceptible of concealment, and which was therefore actually seized,
was found to amount to eighty talents, according to Theophrastus,—to
one hundred talents, according to Theopompus. In contrast with this
large sum, it is melancholy to learn that he had begun his political
career with a property not greater than three talents.[564] The
poverty of Aristeidês at the end of his life presents an impressive
contrast to the enrichment of his rival.

[564] Plutarch, Themist. c. 25; also Kritias ap. Ælian. V. H. x,
17: compare Herodot. viii, 12.

The escape of Themistoklês, and his adventures in Persia, appear
to have formed a favorite theme for the fancy and exaggeration of
authors a century afterwards: we have thus many anecdotes which
contradict either directly or by implication the simple narrative of
Thucydidês. Thus we are told that at the moment when he was running
away from the Greeks, the Persian king also had proclaimed a reward
of two hundred talents for his head, and that some Greeks on the
coast of Asia were watching to take him for this reward: that he was
forced to conceal himself strictly near the coast, until means were
found to send him up to Susa in a closed litter, under pretence that
it was a woman for the king’s harem: that Mandanê, sister of Xerxes,
insisted upon having him delivered up to her as an expiation for the
loss of her son at the battle of Salamis: that he learned Persian so
well, and discoursed in it so eloquently, as to procure for himself
an acquittal from the Persian judges, when put upon his trial through
the importunity of Mandanê: that the officers of the king’s household
at Susa, and the satraps in his way back, threatened him with still
farther perils: that he was admitted to see the king in person, after
having received a lecture from the chamberlain on the indispensable
duty of falling down before him to do homage, etc., with several
other uncertified details,[565] which make us value more highly the
narrative of Thucydidês. Indeed, Ephorus, Deinô, Kleitarchus, and
Herakleidês, from whom these anecdotes appear mostly to be derived,
even affirmed that Themistoklês had found Xerxes himself alive and
seen him: whereas, Thucydidês and Charon, the two contemporary
authors, for the former is _nearly_ contemporary, asserted that he
had found Xerxes recently dead, and his son Artaxerxes on the throne.

[565] Diodor. xi, 56; Plutarch, Themist. c. 24-30.

According to Thucydidês, the eminent exile does not seem to have
been exposed to the least danger in Persia. He presented himself as
a deserter from Greece, and was accepted as such: moreover,—what is
more strange, though it seems true,—he was received as an actual
benefactor of the Persian king, and a sufferer from the Greeks on
account of such dispositions,—in consequence of his communications
made to Xerxes respecting the intended retreat of the Greeks
from Salamis, and respecting the contemplated destruction of the
Hellespontine bridge. He was conducted by some Persians on the coast
up to Susa, where he addressed a letter to the king couched in the
following terms, such as probably no modern European king would
tolerate except from a Quaker: “I, Themistoklês, am come to thee,
having done to thy house more mischief than any other Greek, as
long as I was compelled in my own defence to resist the attack of
thy father,—but having also done him yet greater good, when I could
do so with safety to myself, and when his retreat was endangered.
Reward is yet owing to me for my past service: moreover, I am now
here, chased away by the Greeks, in consequence of my attachment to
thee,[566] but able still to serve thee with great effect. I wish to
wait a year, and then to come before thee in person to explain my
views.”

[566] “Proditionem _ultrò imputabant_ (says Tacitus, Hist. ii,
60, respecting Paullinus and Proculus, the generals of the army
of Otho, when they surrendered to Vitellius after the defeat at
Bebriacum), spatium longi ante prœlium itineris, fatigationem
Othonianorum, permixtum vehiculis agmen, ac _pleraque fortuita
fraudi suæ assignantes_.—Et Vitellius credidit de perfidiâ, et
fraudem absolvit.”

Whether the Persian interpreters, who read this letter to Artaxerxes
Longimanus, exactly rendered its brief and direct expression, we
cannot say. But it made a strong impression upon him, combined with
the previous reputation of the writer, and he willingly granted the
prayer for delay: though we shall not readily believe that he was
so transported as to show his joy by immediate sacrifice to the
gods, by an unusual measure of convivial indulgence, and by crying
out thrice in his sleep, “I have got Themistoklês the Athenian,”—as
some of Plutarch’s authors informed him.[567] In the course of
the year granted, Themistoklês had learned so much of the Persian
language and customs as to be able to communicate personally with
the king, and acquire his confidence: no Greek, says Thucydidês,
had ever before attained such a commanding influence and position
at the Persian court. His ingenuity was now displayed in laying out
schemes for the subjugation of Greece to Persia, which were eminently
captivating to the monarch, who rewarded him with a Persian wife
and large presents, sending him down to Magnesia, on the Mæander,
not far from the coast of Ionia. The revenues of the district round
that town, amounting to the large sum of fifty talents yearly, were
assigned to him for bread: those of the neighboring seaport of Myus,
for articles of condiment to his bread, which was always accounted
the main nourishment: those of Lampsakus on the Hellespont, for
wine.[568] Not knowing the amount of these two latter items, we
cannot determine how much revenue Themistoklês received altogether:
but there can be no doubt; judging from the revenues of Magnesia
alone, that he was a great pecuniary gainer by his change of country.
After having visited various parts of Asia,[569] he lived for a
certain time at Magnesia, in which place his family joined him from
Athens. How long his residence at Magnesia lasted we do not know,
but seemingly long enough to acquire local estimation and leave
mementos behind him. He at length died of sickness, when sixty-five
years old, without having taken any step towards the accomplishment
of those victorious campaigns which he had promised to Artaxerxes.
That sickness was the real cause of his death, we may believe on the
distinct statement of Thucydidês;[570] who at the same time notices
a rumor partially current in his own time, of poison voluntarily
taken, from painful consciousness on the part of Themistoklês himself
that the promises made could never be performed,—a farther proof of
the general tendency to surround the last years of this distinguished
man with impressive adventures, and to dignify his last moments with
a revived feeling, not unworthy of his earlier patriotism. The report
may possibly have been designedly circulated by his friends and
relatives, in order to conciliate some tenderness towards his memory
(his sons still continued citizens at Athens, and his daughters
were married there). These friends farther stated that they had
brought back his bones to Attica, at his own express command, and
buried them privately without the knowledge of the Athenians; no
condemned traitor being permitted to be buried in Attic soil. If,
however, we even suppose that this statement was true, no one could
point out with certainty the spot wherein such interment had taken
place: nor does it seem, when we mark the cautious expressions of
Thucydidês,[571] that he himself was satisfied of the fact: moreover,
we may affirm with confidence that the inhabitants of Magnesia, when
they showed the splendid sepulchral monument erected in honor of
Themistoklês in their own market-place, were persuaded that his bones
were really inclosed within it.

[567] Plutarch, Themist. c. 28.

[568] Thucyd. i, 138; Diodor. xi, 57. Besides the three
above-named places, Neanthês and Phanias described the grant as
being still fuller and more specific: they stated that Perkôtê
was granted to Themistoklês for bedding, and Palæskêpsis for
clothing (Plutarch, Themist. c. 29; Athenæus, i, p. 29).

This seems to have been a frequent form of grants from the
Persian and Egyptian kings, to their queens, relatives, or
friends,—a grant nominally to supply some particular want or
taste: see Dr. Arnold’s note on the passage of Thucydidês. I
doubt his statement, however, about the land-tax, or rent; I do
not think that it was a tenth or a fifth of the produce of the
soil in these districts which was granted to Themistoklês, but
the portion of regal revenue, or tribute, levied in them. The
Persian kings did not take the trouble to assess and collect the
tribute: they probably left that to the inhabitants themselves,
provided the sum total were duly paid.

[569] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 31. πλανώμενος περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν:
this statement seems probable enough, though Plutarch rejects it.

[570] Thucyd. i, 138. Νοσήσας δὲ τελευτᾷ τὸν βίον· λέγουσι δέ
τινες καὶ ἑκούσιον φαρμάκῳ ἀποθανεῖν αὐτὸν, ἀδύνατον νομίσαντα
εἶναι ἐπιτελέσαι βασιλεῖ ἃ ὑπέσχετο.

This current story, as old as Aristophanês (Equit. 83, compare
the Scholia), alleged that Themistoklês had poisoned himself by
drinking bull’s blood (see Diodor. xi, 58), who assigns to this
act of taking poison a still more sublime patriotic character
by making it part of a design on the part of Themistoklês to
restrain the Persian king from warring against Greece.

Plutarch (Themist. c. 31, and Kimon, c. 18) and Diodorus both
state, as an unquestionable fact, that Themistoklês died by
poisoning himself: omitting even to notice the statement of
Thucydidês, that he died of disease. Cornelius Nepos (Themist.
c. 10) follows Thucydidês. Cicero (Brutus, c. 11) refers the
story of the suicide by poison to Clitarchus and Stratoklês,
recognizing it as contrary to Thucydidês. He puts into the mouth
of his fellow dialogist, Atticus, a just rebuke of the facility
with which historical truth was sacrificed to rhetorical purpose.

[571] Thucyd. i, 138. τὰ δὲ ὀστᾶ ~φασὶ κομισθῆναι αὐτοῦ οἱ
προσήκοντες οἴκαδε κελεύσαντος ἐκείνου~, καὶ τεθῆναι κρύφα
Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ· οὐ γὰρ ἐξῆν θάπτειν, ὡς ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ
φεύγοντος.

Cornelius Nepos, who here copies Thucydidês, gives this statement
by mistake, as if Thucydidês had himself affirmed it: “Idem (sc.
Thucydidês) ossa ejus clam in Atticâ ab amicis sepulta, quoniam
legibus non concederetur, quod proditionis esset damnatus,
memoriæ prodidit.” This shows the haste or inaccuracy with which
these secondary authors so often cite: Thucydidês is certainly
not a witness _for_ the fact: if anything, he may be said to
count somewhat against it.

Plutarch (Themist. c. 32) shows that the burial-place of
Themistoklês, supposed to be in Attica, was yet never verified
before his time: the guides of Pausanias, however, in the
succeeding century, had become more confident (Pausanias, i, 1,
3).

Aristeidês died about three or four years after the ostracism of
Themistoklês;[572] but respecting the place and manner of his death,
there were several contradictions among the authors whom Plutarch
had before him. Some affirmed that he perished on foreign service in
the Euxine sea; others, that he died at home, amidst the universal
esteem and grief of his fellow-citizens. A third story, confined
to the single statement of Kraterus, and strenuously rejected by
Plutarch, represents Aristeidês as having been falsely accused before
the Athenian judicature and condemned to a fine of fifty minæ, on
the allegation of having taken bribes during the assessment of the
tribute upon the allies,—which fine he was unable to pay, and was
therefore obliged to retire to Ionia, where he died. Dismissing
this last story, we find nothing certain about his death except one
fact,—but that fact at the same time the most honorable of all,—that
he died very poor. It is even asserted that he did not leave enough
to pay funeral expenses,—that a sepulchre was provided for him at
Phalêrum at the public cost, besides a handsome donation to his son
Lysimachus, and a dowry to each of his two daughters. In the two or
three ensuing generations, however, his descendants still continued
poor, and even at that remote day, some of them received aid out
of the public purse, from the recollection of their incorruptible
ancestor. Near a century and a half afterwards, a poor man, named
Lysimachus, descendant of the just Aristeidês, was to be seen at
Athens, near the chapel of Iacchus, carrying a mysterious tablet, and
obtaining his scanty fee of two oboli for interpreting the dreams of
the passers by: Demetrius the Phalerean procured from the people, for
the mother and aunt of this poor man, a small daily allowance.[573]
On all these points the contrast is marked when we compare Aristeidês
with Themistoklês. The latter, having distinguished himself by
ostentatious cost at Olympia, and by a choregic victory at Athens,
with little scruple as to the means of acquisition,—ended his life
at Magnesia in dishonorable affluence, greater than ever, and left
an enriched posterity both at that place and at Athens. More than
five centuries afterwards, his descendant, the Athenian Themistoklês,
attended the lectures of the philosopher Ammonius at Athens, as the
comrade and friend of Plutarch himself.[574]

[572] Respecting the probity of Aristeidês, see an interesting
fragment of Eupolis, the comic writer (Δῆμοι, Fragm, iv, p. 457,
ed. Meineke).

[573] Plutarch, Arist. c. 26, 27; Cornelius Nepos. Arist. c. 3:
compare Aristophan. Vesp. 53.

[574] Plutarch, Themist. c. 5-32.

CHAPTER XLV.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENS AS HEAD. — FIRST
FORMATION AND RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

I have already recounted, in the preceding chapter, how the Asiatic
Greeks, breaking loose from the Spartan Pausanias, entreated
Athens to organize a new confederacy, and to act as presiding city
(Vorort),—and how this confederacy, framed not only for common
and pressing objects, but also on principles of equal rights and
constant control on the part of the members, attracted soon the
spontaneous adhesion of a large proportion of Greeks, insular or
maritime, near the Ægean sea. I also noticed this event as giving
commencement to a new era in Grecian politics. For whereas there had
been before a tendency, not very powerful, yet on the whole steady
and increasing, towards something like one Pan-Hellenic league under
Sparta as president,—from henceforward that tendency disappears and
a bifurcation begins: Athens and Sparta divide the Grecian world
between them, and bring a much larger number of its members into
coöperation, either with one or the other, than had ever been so
arranged before.

Thucydidês marks precisely, as far as general words can go, the
character of the new confederacy during the first years after its
commencement: but unhappily he gives us scarcely any particular
facts,—and in the absence of such controlling evidence, a habit
has grown up of describing loosely the entire period between 477
B. C., and 405 B. C. (the latter date is that of the battle of
Ægos Potamos), as constituting “the Athenian empire.” This word
denotes correctly enough the last part, perhaps the last forty
years, of the seventy-two years indicated; but it is misleading
when applied to the first part: nor, indeed, can any single word be
found which faithfully characterizes as well the one part as the
other. A great and serious change had taken place, and we disguise
the fact of that change, if we talk of the Athenian hegemony, or
headship, as a portion of the Athenian empire. Thucydidês carefully
distinguishes the two, speaking of the Spartans as having lost, and
of the Athenians as having acquired, not empire, but headship, or
hegemony.[575] The transition from the Athenian hegemony to the
Athenian empire was doubtless gradual, so that no one could determine
precisely where the former ends and the latter begins: but it had
been consummated before the thirty years’ truce, which was concluded
fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war,—and it was in fact
the substantial cause of that war. Empire then came to be held by
Athens,—partly as a fact established, resting on acquiescence rather
than attachment or consent on the minds of the subjects,—partly as a
corollary from necessity of union combined with her superior force:
while this latter point, superiority of force as a legitimate title,
stood more and more forward, both in the language of her speakers
and in the conceptions of her citizens. Nay, the Athenian orators
of the middle of the Peloponnesian war venture to affirm that their
empire had been of this same character ever since the repulse of the
Persians: an inaccuracy so manifest, that if we could suppose the
speech made by the Athenian Euphêmus at Kamarina in 415 B. C. to
have been heard by Themistoklês or Aristeidês fifty years before,
it would have been alike offensive to the prudence of the one and
to the justice of the other. The imperial state of Athens, that
which she held at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when her
allies, except Chios and Lesbos, were tributary subjects, and when
the Ægean sea was an Athenian lake,—was of course the period of
her greatest splendor and greatest action upon the Grecian world.
It was also the period most impressive to historians, orators, and
philosophers,—suggesting the idea of some one state exercising
dominion over the Ægean, as the natural condition of Greece, so
that if Athens lost such dominion, it would be transferred to
Sparta,—holding out the dispersed maritime Greeks as a tempting prize
for the aggressive schemes of some new conqueror,—and even bringing
up by association into men’s fancies the mythical Minos of Krete,
and others, as having been rulers of the Ægean in times anterior to
Athens.

[575] Thucyd. i, 94. ἐξεπολιόρκησαν (Βυζἁντιον) ἐν ~τῇδε τῇ
ἡγεμονίᾳ~, i.e. under the Spartan hegemony, before the Athenians
were invited to assume the hegemony: compare ἡγησάμενοι, i, 77,
and Herodot. viii, 2, 3. Next, we have (i, 95) φοιτῶντές τε (the
Ionians, etc.) πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἠξίουν αὐτοὺς ~ἡγεμόνας~ σφῶν
γενέσθαι κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές. Again, When the Spartans send out
Dorkis in place of Pausanias, the allies οὐκέτι ἐφίεσαν ~τὴν
ἡγεμονίαν~. Then, as to the ensuing proceedings of the Athenians
(i, 96)—παραλαβόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ~τὴν ἡγεμονίαν~ τούτῳ τῷ
τρόπῳ ἑκόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ τὸ Παυσανίου μῖσος, etc.: compare
i. 75,—ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων
~ἡγεμόνας~ καταστῆναι, and vi, 76.

Then the transition from the ἡγεμονία to the ἀρχή (i,
97)—ἡγούμενοι δὲ αὐτονόμων τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ ἀπὸ κοινῶν
ξυνόδων βουλευόντων, ~τόσαδε ἐπῆλθον~ πολέμῳ τε καὶ διαχειρίσει
πραγμάτων μεταξὺ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ.

Thucydidês then goes on to say, that he shall notice these
“many strides in advance” which Athens made, starting from her
original hegemony, so as to show in what manner the Athenian
empire, or ἀρχὴ, was originally formed,—ἅμα δὲ καὶ ~τῆς ἀρχῆς~
ἀπόδειξιν ἔχει τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἐν οἵῳ τρόπῳ ~κατέστη~. The
same transition from the ἡγεμονία to the ἀρχὴ is described in
the oration of the Athenian envoy at Sparta, shortly before the
Peloponnesian war (i, 75): but as it was rather the interest
of the Athenian orator to confound the difference between
ἡγεμονία and ἀρχὴ, so, after he has clearly stated what the
relation of Athens to her allies had been at first, and how it
afterwards became totally changed, Thucydidês makes him slur
over the distinction, and say,—οὕτως οὐδ’ ἡμεῖς θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν
πεποιήκαμεν ... ~εἰ ἀρχήν τε διδομένην ἐδεξάμεθα~ καὶ ταύτην μὴ
ἀνεῖμεν, etc.; and he then proceeds to defend the title of Athens
to command on the ground of superior force and worth: which last
plea is advanced a few years afterwards, still more nakedly and
offensively, by the Athenian speakers. Read also the language
of the Athenian Euphêmus at Kamarina (vi, 82), where a similar
confusion appears, as being suitable to the argument.

It is to be recollected that the word _hegemony_, or headship, is
extremely general, denoting any case of following a leader, and
of obedience, however temporary, qualified, or indeed little more
than honorary. Thus it is used by the Thebans to express their
relation towards the Bœotian confederated towns (ἡγεμονεύεσθαι
ὑφ’ ἡμῶν, Thuc. iii, 61, where Dr. Arnold draws attention to the
distinction between that verb and ἄρχειν, and holds language
respecting the Athenian ἀρχὴ, more precise than his language in
the note ad Thucyd. i, 94), and by the Corinthians to express
their claims as metropolis of Korkyra, which were really little
more than honorary,—ἐπὶ τῷ ~ἡγεμόνες~ τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα
θαυμάζεσθαι (Thucyd. i, 38): compare vii, 55. Indeed, it
sometimes means simply a guide (iii, 98; vii, 50).

But the words ἀρχὴ, ἄρχειν, ἄρχεσθαι, voc. pass., are much
less extensive in meaning, and imply both superior dignity and
coercive authority to a greater or less extent: compare Thucyd.
v, 69; ii, 8, etc. The πόλις ἀχὴν ἔχουσα is analogous to ἀνὴρ
τύραννος (vi, 85).

Herodotus is less careful in distinguishing the meanings of these
words than Thucydidês: see the discussion of the Lacedæmonian
and Athenian envoys with Gelo (vii. 155-162). But it is to be
observed that he makes Gelo ask for the ἡγεμονία and not for the
ἀρχὴ,—putting the claim in the least offensive form: compare also
the claim of the Argeians for ἡγεμονία (vii, 148).

Even those who lived under the full-grown Athenian empire had before
them no good accounts of the incidents between 479-450 B. C.; for
we may gather from the intimation of Thucydidês, as well as from
his barrenness of facts, that while there were chroniclers both for
the Persian invasion and for the times before, no one cared for the
times immediately succeeding.[576] Hence, the little light which has
fallen upon this blank has all been borrowed—if we except the careful
Thucydidês—from a subsequent age; and the Athenian hegemony has been
treated as a mere commencement of the Athenian empire: credit has
been given to Athens for a long-sighted ambition, aiming from the
Persian war downwards at results which perhaps Themistoklês[577] may
have partially divined, but which only time and successive accidents
opened even to distant view. But such systematic anticipation of
subsequent results is fatal to any correct understanding, either
of the real agents or of the real period; both of which are to be
explained from the circumstances preceding and actually present, with
some help, though cautious and sparing, from our acquaintance with
that which was then an unknown future. When Aristeidês and Kimon
dismissed the Lacedæmonian admiral Dorkis, and drove Pausanias away
from Byzantium on his second coming out, they had to deal with the
problem immediately before them; they had to complete the defeat of
the Persian power, still formidable,—and to create and organize a
confederacy as yet only inchoate. This was quite enough to occupy
their attention, without ascribing to them distant views of Athenian
maritime empire.

[576] Thucyd. i, 97. τοῖς πρὸ ἐμοῦ ἅπασιν ἐκλιπὲς ἦν τοῦτο τὸ
χωρίον, καὶ ἢ τὰ πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ξυνετίθεσαν ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ Μηδικά·
τούτων δὲ ὅσπερ ~καὶ ἥψατο~ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ξυγγραφῇ Ἑλλάνικος,
βραχέως τε καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ἐπεμνήσθη.

Hellanikus, therefore, had done no more than _touch_ upon the
events of this period: and he found so little good information
within his reach as to fall into chronological blunders.

[577] Thucyd. i, 93. τῆς γὰρ δὴ θαλάσσης πρῶτος ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν
ὡς ἀνθεκτέα ἐστὶ, καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς ξυγκατεσκεύαζεν.

Dr. Arnold says in his note, “εὐθὺς signifies probably
immediately after the retreat of the Persians.” I think it refers
to an earlier period,—that point of time when Themistoklês
first counselled the building of the fleet, or at least when
he counselled them to abandon their city and repose all their
hopes in their fleet. It is only by this supposition that we
get a reasonable meaning for the words ἐτόλμησε εἰπεῖν, “he
was the _first who dared to say_,”—which implies a counsel of
extraordinary boldness. “For he was the first who dared to advise
them to grasp at the sea, and from that moment forward he helped
to establish their empire.” The word ~ξυγκατεσκεύαζε~ seems to
denote a collateral consequence, not directly contemplated,
though perhaps divined, by Themistoklês.

In that brief sketch of incidents preceding the Peloponnesian
war, which Thucydidês introduces as “the throwing off of his
narrative,”[578] he neither gives, nor professes to give, a complete
enumeration of all which actually occurred. During the interval
between the first desertion of the Asiatic allies from Pausanias
to Athens, in 477 B. C.,—and the revolt of Naxos in 466 B. C.,—he
recites three incidents only: first, the siege and capture of Eion,
on the Strymon, with its Persian garrison,—next, the capture of
Skyros, and appropriation of the island to Athenian kleruchs, or
out-citizens,—thirdly, the war with Karystus in Eubœa, and reduction
of the place by capitulation. It has been too much the practice
to reason as if these three events were the full history of ten
or eleven years. Considering what Thucydidês states respecting
the darkness of this period, we might perhaps suspect that they
were all which he could learn about it on good authority: and they
are all, in truth, events having a near and special bearing on
the subsequent history of Athens herself,—for Eion was the first
stepping-stone to the important settlement of Amphipolis, and Skyros
in the time of Thucydidês was the property of outlying Athenian
citizens, or kleruchs. Still, we are left in almost entire ignorance
of the proceedings of Athens, as conducting the newly-established
confederate force: for it is certain that the first ten years of
the Athenian hegemony must have been years of most active warfare
against the Persians. One positive testimony to this effect has
been accidentally preserved to us by Herodotus, who mentions, that
“before the invasion of Xerxes, there were Persian commanders and
garrisons everywhere in Thrace and the Hellespont,[579] all of whom
were conquered by the Greeks after that invasion, with the single
exception of Maskamês, governor of Doriskus, who could never be
taken, though many different Grecian attempts were made upon the
fortress. Of those who were captured by the Greeks, not one made
any defence sufficient to attract the admiration of Xerxes, except
Bogês, governor of Eion.” Bogês, after bravely defending himself,
and refusing offers of capitulation, found his provisions exhausted,
and farther resistance impracticable. He then kindled a vast funeral
pile,—slew his wives, children, concubines, and family, and cast
them into it,—threw his precious effects over the wall into the
Strymon,—and lastly, precipitated himself into the flames.[580] His
brave despair was the theme of warm encomium among the Persians,
and his relatives in Persia were liberally rewarded by Xerxes. This
capture of Eion, effected by Kimon, has been mentioned, as already
stated, by Thucydidês; but Herodotus here gives us to understand
that it was only one of a string of enterprises, all unnoticed
by Thucydidês, against the Persians. Nay, it would seem from his
language, that Maskamês maintained himself in Doriskus during the
whole reign of Xerxes, and perhaps longer, repelling successive
Grecian assaults.

[578] Thucyd. i, 97 ἔγραψα δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ ~τὴν ἐκβολὴν τοῦ λόγου~
ἐποιησάμην διὰ τόδε, etc.

[579] Herodot. vii, 106, 107. Κατέστασαν γὰρ ἔτι πρότερον ταύτης
τῆς ἐλάσιος ὕπαρχοι ἐν τῇ Θρηΐκῃ καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου πανταχῇ.
Οὗτοι ὦν πάντες, οἵ τε ἐκ Θρηΐκης καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου, πλὴν
τοῦ ἐν Δορίσκῳ, ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων ὕστερον ταύτης τῆς στρατηλασίης
ἐξῃρέθησαν· τὸν δὲ ἐν Δορίσκῳ Μασκάμην οὐδαμοί κω ἐδυνάσθησαν
ἐξελεῖν, ~πολλῶν πειρησαμένων~.

The loose chronology of Plutarch is little to be trusted; but
he, too, acknowledges the continuance of Persian occupations in
Thrace, by aid of the natives, until a period later than the
battle of the Eurymedon (Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14).

It is a mistake to suppose, with Dr. Arnold, in his note on
Thucyd. viii, 62, “that Sestus was almost the last place held by
the Persians in Europe.”

Weissenborn (Hellen oder Beiträge zur genaueren Erforschung der
altgriechischen Geschichte, Jena, 1844, p. 144, note 31) has
taken notice of this important passage of Herodotus, as well as
of that in Plutarch; but he does not see how much it embarrasses
all attempts to frame a certain chronology for those two or three
events which Thucydidês gives us between 476-466 B. C.

[580] Kutzen (De Atheniensium Imperio Cimonis atque Periclis
tempore constituto. Grimæ, 1837. Commentatio, i, p. 8) has good
reason to call in question the stratagem ascribed to Kimon by
Pausanias (viii, 8, 2) for the capture of Eion.

The valuable indication here cited from Herodotus would be of itself
a sufficient proof that the first years of the Athenian hegemony were
full of busy and successful hostility against the Persians. And in
truth this is what we should expect: the battles of Salamis, Platæa,
and Mykalê, drove the Persians out of Greece, and overpowered their
main armaments, but did not remove them at once from all the various
posts which they occupied throughout the Ægean and Thrace. Without
doubt, the Athenians had to clear the coasts and the islands of a
great number of different Persian detachments: an operation never
short nor easy, with the then imperfect means of siege, as we may see
by the cases of Sestus and Eion; nor, indeed, always practicable,
as the case of Doriskus teaches us. The fear of these Persians, yet
remaining in the neighborhood,[581] and even the chance of a renewed
Persian invading armament, formed one pressing motive for Grecian
cities to join the new confederacy: while the expulsion of the enemy
added to it those places which he had occupied. It was by these
years of active operations at sea against the common enemy, that
the Athenians first established[582] that constant, systematic, and
laborious training, among their own ships’ crews, which transmitted
itself with continual improvements down to the Peloponnesian war: it
was by these, combined with the present fear, that they were enabled
to organize the largest and most efficient confederacy ever known
among Greeks,—to bring together deliberative deputies,—to plant their
own ascendency as enforcers of the collective resolutions,—and to
raise a prodigious tax from universal contribution. Lastly, it was
by these same operations, prosecuted so successfully as to remove
present alarm, that they at length fatigued the more lukewarm and
passive members of the confederacy, and created in them a wish either
to commute personal service for pecuniary contribution, or to escape
from the obligation of service in any way. The Athenian nautical
training would never have been acquired,—the confederacy would never
have become a working reality,—the fatigue and discontents among its
members would never have arisen,—unless there had been a real fear
of the Persians, and a pressing necessity for vigorous and organized
operations against them, during the ten years between 477 and 466 B.
C.

[581] To these “remaining operations against the Persians” the
Athenian envoy at Lacedæmon alludes, in his speech prior to
the Peloponnesian war—ὑμῶν μὲν (you Spartans) οὐκ ἐθελησάντων
παραμεῖναι ~πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου~, ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων
τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστῆναι, etc.
(Thucyd. i, 75:) and again, iii, 11. τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τῶν ἔργων.

Compare also Plato, Menexen. c. 11. αὐτὸς δὲ ἠγγέλλετο βασιλεὺς
διανοεῖσθαι ὡς ἐπιχειρήσων πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας, etc.

[582] The Athenian nautical training begins directly after
the repulse of the Persians. Τὸ δὲ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐπιστήμονας
γενέσθαι (says Periklês respecting the Peloponnesians, just at
the commencement of the Peloponnesian war) οὐ ῥᾳδίως αὐτοῖς
προσγενήσεται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑμεῖς, μελετῶντες αὐτὸ ~εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῶν
Μηδικῶν~, ἐξείργασθέ πω (Thucyd. i, 142).

As to the ten years from 477-466 B. C., there has been a tendency
almost unconscious to assume that the particular incidents mentioned
by Thucydidês about Eion, Skyros, Karystus, and Naxos, constitute
the sum total of events. To contradict this assumption, I have
suggested proof sufficient, though indirect, that they are only part
of the stock of a very busy period,—the remaining details of which,
indicated in outline by the large general language of Thucydidês, we
are condemned not to know. Nor are we admitted to be present at the
synod of Delos, which during all this time continued its periodical
meetings: though it would have been highly interesting to trace the
steps whereby an institution which at first promised to protect not
less the separate rights of the members than the security of the
whole, so lamentably failed in its object. We must recollect that
this confederacy, formed for objects common to all, limited to a
certain extent the autonomy of each member; both conferring definite
rights and imposing definite obligations. Solemnly sworn to by all,
and by Aristeidês on behalf of Athens, it was intended to bind the
members in perpetuity,—marked even in the form of the oath, which
was performed by casting heavy lumps of iron into the sea never
again to be seen.[583] As this confederacy was thus both perpetual
and peremptory, binding each member to the rest, and not allowing
either retirement or evasion, so it was essential that it should
be sustained by some determining authority and enforcing sanction.
The determining authority was provided by the synod at Delos: the
enforcing sanction was exercised by Athens as president. And there
is every reason to presume that Athens, for a long time, performed
this duty in a legitimate and honorable manner, acting in execution
of the resolves of the synod, or at least in full harmony with its
general purposes. She exacted from every member the regulated quota
of men or money, employing coercion against recusants, and visiting
neglect of military duty with penalties. In all these requirements
she only discharged her appropriate functions as chosen leader of the
confederacy, and there can be no reasonable doubt that the general
synod went cordially along with her[584] in strictness of dealing
towards those defaulters who obtained protection without bearing
their share of the burden.

[583] Plutarch. Aristeidês. c. 24.

[584] Such concurrence of the general synod is in fact implied
in the speech put by Thucydidês into the mouth of the Mitylenæan
envoys at Olympia, in the third year of the Peloponnesian war:
a speech pronounced by parties altogether hostile to Athens
(Thucyd. iii, 11)—ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μαρτυρίῳ ἐχρῶντο (the Athenians)
μὴ ἂν ~τούς γε ἰσοψήφους ἄκοντας~, εἰ μή τι ἠδίκουν οἷς ἐπῄεσαν,
~ξυστρατεύειν~.

But after a few years, several of the confederates becoming weary of
personal military service, prevailed upon the Athenians to provide
ships and men in their place, and imposed upon themselves in exchange
a money-payment of suitable amount. This commutation, at first
probably introduced to meet some special case of inconvenience, was
found so suitable to the taste of all parties that it gradually
spread through the larger portion of the confederacy. To unwarlike
allies, hating labor and privation, it was a welcome relief,—while
to the Athenians, full of ardor and patient of labor, as well as
discipline, for the aggrandizement of their country, it afforded
constant pay for a fleet more numerous than they could otherwise
have kept afloat. It is plain from the statement of Thucydidês
that this altered practice was introduced from the petition of
the confederates themselves, not from any pressure or stratagem,
on the part of Athens.[585] But though such was its real source,
it did not the less fatally degrade the allies in reference to
Athens, and extinguish the original feeling of equal rights and
partnership in the confederacy, with communion of danger as well as
of glory, which had once bound them together. The Athenians came to
consider themselves as military chiefs and soldiers, with a body of
tribute-paying subjects, whom they were entitled to hold in dominion,
and restrict, both as to foreign policy and internal government, to
such extent as they thought expedient,—but whom they were also bound
to protect against foreign enemies. The military force of these
subject-states was thus in a great degree transferred to Athens, by
their own act, just as that of so many of the native princes in India
has been made over to the English. But the military efficiency of the
confederacy against the Persians was much increased, in proportion
as the vigorous resolves of Athens[586] were less and less paralyzed
by the contentions and irregularity of a synod; so that the war
was prosecuted with greater success than ever, while those motives
of alarm, which had served as the first pressing stimulus to the
formation of the confederacy, became every year farther and farther
removed.

[585] Thucyd. i, 97-99. Αἰτίαι δὲ ἄλλαι ἦσαν τῶν ἀποστάσεων,
καὶ μέγισται, αἱ τῶν φόρων καὶ νεῶν ἐκδεῖαι καὶ λιποστράτιον,
εἴ τῳ ἐγένετο· οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκριβῶς ἔπρασσον, καὶ λυπηροὶ
ἦσαν, οὐκ εἰωθόσιν οὐδὲ βουλομένοις ταλαιπωρεῖν προσάγοντες
τὰς ἀνάγκας. Ἦσαν δέ πως καὶ ἄλλως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ὁμοίως
ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες, καὶ οὔτε ξυνεστράτευον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου, ῥᾴδιόν
τε προσάγεσθαι ἦν αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἀφισταμένους· ~ὧν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι
ἐγένοντο οἱ ξύμμαχοι~· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀπόκνησιν ταύτην τῶν
στρατειῶν, οἱ πλείους αὐτῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἀπ’ οἴκου ὦσι, χρήματα
~ἐτάξαντο~ ἀντὶ τῶν νεῶν τὸ ἱκνούμενον ἀνάλωμα φέρειν, καὶ τοῖς
μὲν Ἀθηναίοις ηὔξετο τὸ ναυτικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς δαπάνης ἣν ἐκεῖνοι
ξυμφέροιεν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ὅποτε ἀποσταῖεν, ἀπαράσκευοι καὶ ἄπειροι ἐς
τὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντο.

[586] See the contemptuous remarks of Periklês upon the debates
of the Lacedæmonian allies at Sparta (Thucyd. i, 141).

Under such circumstances several of the confederate states grew tired
even of paying their tribute,—and averse to continuance as members.
They made successive attempts to secede, but Athens, acting seemingly
in conjunction with the synod, repressed their attempts one after the
other,—conquering, fining, and disarming the revolters; which was the
more easily done, since in most cases their naval force had been
in great part handed over to her. As these events took place, not
all at once, but successively in different years,—the number of mere
tribute-paying allies as well as of subdued revolters continually
increasing,—so there was never any one moment of conspicuous change
in the character of the confederacy: the allies slid unconsciously
into subjects, while Athens, without any predetermined plan, passed
from a chief into a despot. By strictly enforcing the obligations of
the pact upon unwilling members, and by employing coercion against
revolters, she had become unpopular in the same proportion as she
acquired new power,—and that, too, without any guilt of her own.
In this position, even if she had been inclined to relax her hold
upon the tributary subjects, considerations of her own safety would
have deterred her from doing so; for there was reason to apprehend
that they might place their strength at the disposal of her enemies.
It is very certain that she never was so inclined; it would have
required a more self-denying public morality than has ever been
practised by any state, either ancient or modern, even to conceive
the idea of relinquishing voluntarily an immense ascendency as well
as a lucrative revenue: least of all was such an idea likely to be
conceived by Athenian citizens, whose ambition increased with their
power, and among whom the love of Athenian ascendency was both
passion and patriotism. But though the Athenians were both disposed
and qualified to push all the advantages offered, and even to look
out for new, we must not forget that the foundations of their empire
were laid in the most honorable causes: voluntary invitation, efforts
both unwearied and successful against a common enemy, unpopularity
incurred in discharge of an imperative duty, and inability to break
up the confederacy without endangering themselves as well as laying
open the Ægean sea to the Persians.[587]

[587] The speech of the Athenian envoy at Sparta, a little before
the Peloponnesian war, sets forth the growth of the Athenian
empire, in the main, with perfect justice (Thucyd. i, 75, 76).
He admits and even exaggerates its unpopularity, but shows that
such unpopularity was, to a great extent, and certainly as to its
first origin, unavoidable as well as undeserved. He of course, as
might be supposed, omits those other proceedings by which Athens
had herself aggravated it.

Καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν τήνδε (τὴν ἀρχὴν) ἐλάβομεν οὐ βιασάμενοι ... ἐξ
αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἔργου κατηναγκάσθημεν τὸ πρῶτον προαγαγεῖν αὐτὴν
ἐς τόδε, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ δέους, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τιμῆς, ὕστερον
καὶ ὠφελείας. Καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ἔτι ἐδόκει εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς
ἀπηχθημένους, καί τινων καὶ ἤδη ἀποστάντων κεχειρωμένων,
ὑμῶν τε ἡμῖν οὐκέτι ὁμοίως φίλων, ἀλλ’ ὑπόπτων καὶ διαφόρων
ὄντων, ἀνέντας κινδυνεύειν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν αἱ ἀποστάσεις πρὸς ὑμᾶς
ἐγίγνοντο· πᾶσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον τὰ ξυμφέροντα τῶν μεγίστων πέρι
κινδύνων εὖ τίθεσθαι.

The whole speech well merits attentive study: compare also
the speech of Periklês at Athens, in the second year of the
Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. ii, 63).

There were two other causes, besides that which has just been
adverted to, for the unpopularity of imperial Athens. First, the
existence of the confederacy, imposing permanent obligations, was
in conflict with the general instinct of the Greek mind, tending
towards separate political autonomy of each city, as well as with
the particular turn of the Ionic mind, incapable of that steady
personal effort which was requisite for maintaining the synod of
Delos, on its first large and equal basis. Next,—and this is the
great cause of all,—Athens, having defeated the Persians, and thrust
them to a distance, began to employ the force and the tribute of
her subject-allies in warfare against Greeks, wherein these allies
had nothing to gain from success,—everything to apprehend from
defeat,—and a banner to fight for, offensive to Hellenic sympathies.
On this head, the subject-allies had great reason to complain,
throughout the prolonged wars of Greek against Greek, for the purpose
of sustaining Athenian predominance: but on the point of practical
grievances or oppressions, they had little ground for discontent,
and little feeling of actual discontent, as I shall show more fully
hereafter. Among the general body of citizens in the subject-allied
cities, the feeling towards Athens was rather indifference than
hatred: the movement of revolt against her proceeded from small
parties of leading men, acting apart from the citizens, and generally
with collateral views of ambition for themselves: and the positive
hatred towards her was felt chiefly by those who were not her
subjects.

It is probable that the same indisposition to personal effort,
which prompted the confederates of Delos to tender money-payment as
a substitute for military service, also induced them to neglect
attendance at the synod. But we do not know the steps whereby this
assembly, at first an effective reality, gradually dwindled into
a mere form and vanished. Nothing, however, can more forcibly
illustrate the difference of character between the maritime allies of
Athens, and the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta, than the fact,—that
while the former shrank from personal service, and thought it an
advantage to tax themselves in place of it,—the latter were “ready
enough with their bodies,” but uncomplying and impracticable as
to contributions.[588] The contempt felt by these Dorian landsmen
for the military efficiency of the Ionians recurs frequently, and
appears even to have exceeded what the reality justified: but when
we turn to the conduct of the latter twenty years earlier, at
the battle of Ladê, in the very crisis of the Ionic revolt from
Persia,[589]—we detect the same want of energy, the same incapacity
of personal effort and labor, as that which broke up the confederacy
of Delos with all its beneficial promise. To appreciate fully
the indefatigable activity and daring, together with the patient
endurance of laborious maritime training, which characterized the
Athenians of that day,—we have only to contrast them with these
confederates, so remarkably destitute of both. Amidst such glaring
inequalities of merit, capacity, and power, to maintain a confederacy
of equal members was impossible: it was in the nature of things that
the confederacy should either break up, or be transmuted into an
Athenian empire.

[588] Thucyd. i, 141. σώμασι δὲ ἑτοιμότεροι οἱ αὐτουργοὶ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων ἢ χρήμασι πολεμεῖν, etc.

[589] See Herodot. vi, 12, and the preceding volume of this
history, chap. xxxv, vol. iv, p. 301.

It has already been mentioned that the first aggregate assessment of
tribute, proposed by Aristeidês, and adopted by the synod at Delos,
was four hundred and sixty talents in money. At that time many of
the confederates paid their quota, not in money but in ships; but
this practice gradually diminished, as the commutations above alluded
to, of money in place of ships, were multiplied, while the aggregate
tribute, of course, became larger. It was no more than six hundred
talents[590] at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, forty-six
years after the first formation of the confederacy; from whence we
may infer that it was never at all increased upon individual members
during the interval. For the difference between four hundred and
sixty talents and six hundred admits of being fully explained by
the numerous commutations of service for money, as well as by the
acquisitions of new members, which doubtless Athens had more or
less the opportunity of making. It is not to be imagined that the
confederacy had attained its maximum number, at the date of the first
assessment of tribute: there must have been various cities, like
Sinopê and Ægina, subsequently added.[591]

[590] Thucyd. ii, 13.

[591] Thucyd. i, 108; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 20.

Without some such preliminary statements as those just given,
respecting the new state of Greece between the Persian and
Peloponnesian wars, beginning with the Athenian hegemony, or
headship, and ending with the Athenian empire, the reader would
hardly understand the bearing of those particular events which
our authorities enable us to recount; events unhappily few in
number, though the period must have been full of action, and not
well authenticated as to dates. The first known enterprise of the
Athenians in their new capacity—whether the first absolutely or not,
we cannot determine—between 476 B. C. and 466 B. C., was the conquest
of the important post of Eion, on the Strymon, where the Persian
governor, Bogês, starved out after a desperate resistance, destroyed
himself rather than capitulate, together with his family and precious
effects, as has already been stated. The next events named are their
enterprises against the Dolopes and Pelasgi in the island of Skyros,
seemingly about 470 B. C., and the Dryopes in the town and district
of Karystus, in Eubœa. To the latter, who were of a different kindred
from the inhabitants of Chalkis and Eretria, and received no aid from
them, they granted a capitulation: the former were more rigorously
dealt with, and expelled from their island. Skyros was barren, and
had little to recommend it, except a good maritime position and
an excellent harbor; while its inhabitants, seemingly akin to the
Pelasgian residents in Lemnos, prior to the Athenian occupation of
that spot, were alike piratical and cruel. Some Thessalian traders,
recently plundered and imprisoned by them, had raised a complaint
against them before the Amphiktyonic synod, which condemned the
island to make restitution: the mass of the islanders threw the
burden upon those who had committed the crime; and these men, in
order to evade payment, invoked Kimon with the Athenian armament,—who
conquered the island, expelled the inhabitants, and peopled it with
Athenian settlers.

Such clearance was a beneficial act, suitable to the new character
of Athens as guardian of the Ægean sea against piracy: but it seems
also connected with Athenian plans. The island lay very convenient
for the communication with Lemnos, which the Athenians had doubtless
reoccupied after the expulsion of the Persians,[592] and became,
as well as Lemnos, a recognized adjunct, or outlying portion,
of Attica: moreover, there were old legends which connected the
Athenians with it, as the tomb of their hero Theseus, whose name,
as the mythical champion of democracy, was in peculiar favor at
the period immediately following the return from Salamis. It was
in the year 476 B. C., that the oracle had directed them to bring
home the bones of Theseus from Skyros, and to prepare for that
hero a splendid entombment and edifice in their new city: they had
tried to effect this, but the unsocial manners of the Dolopians had
prevented a search, and it was only after Kimon had taken the island
that he found, or pretended to find, the body. It was brought to
Athens in the year 469 B. C.,[593] and after being welcomed by the
people in solemn and joyous procession, as if the hero himself had
come back, was deposited in the interior of the city,—the monument
called the Theseium, with its sacred precinct being built on the
spot, and invested with the privilege of a sanctuary for men of poor
condition who might feel ground for dreading the oppressions of the
powerful, as well as for slaves in case of cruel usage.[594] Such
were the protective functions of the mythical hero of democracy,
whose installation is interesting as marking the growing intensity of
democratical feeling in Athens since the Persian war.

[592] Xenophon, Hellenic, v, 1, 31.

[593] Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellenic. ad ann. 476 B. C.)
places the conquest of Skyros by Kimon in the year 476 B. C.
He says, after citing a passage from Thucyd. i, 98, and from
Plutarch, Theseus, c. 36, as well as a proposed correction of
Bentley, which he justly rejects: “The island was actually
conquered in the year of the archon Phædon, B. C. 476. This
we know from Thucyd. i, 98, and Diodor. xi, 41-48, combined.
Plutarch named the archon Phædon, with reference to the
_conquest_ of the island: then, by a negligence not unusual with
him, connected the oracle with that fact, as a contemporary
transaction: although in truth the oracle was not procured till
six or seven years afterwards.”

Plutarch has many sins to answer for against chronological
exactness; but the charge here made against him is undeserved. He
states that the oracle was given in (476 B. C.) the year of the
archon Phædon; and that the body of Theseus was brought back to
Athens in (469 B. C.) the year of the archon Aphepsion. There is
nothing to contradict either statement; nor do the passages of
Thucydidês and Diodorus, which Mr. Clinton adduces, prove that
which he asserts. The two passages of Diodorus have, indeed, no
bearing upon the event: and in so far as Diodorus is in this
case an authority at all, he goes against Mr. Clinton, for he
states Skyros to have been conquered in 470 B. C. (Diodor. xi,
60). Thucydidês only tells us that the operations against Eion,
Skyros, and Karystus, took place in the order here indicated,
and at some periods between 476 and 466 B. C.; but he does not
enable us to determine positively the date of either. Upon
what authority Mr. Clinton states, that “the oracle was not
procured till six or seven years afterwards,” (_i. e._, after the
conquest,) I do not know: the account of Plutarch goes rather
to show that it was procured six or seven years _before_ the
conquest: and this may stand good until some better testimony
is produced to contradict it. As our information now stands, we
have no testimony as to the year of the conquest except that of
Diodorus, who assigns it to 470 B. C., but as he assigns both the
conquest of Eion and the expeditions of Kimon against Karia and
Pamphylia with the victories of the Eurymedon, all to the same
year, we cannot much trust his authority. Nevertheless, I incline
to believe him as to the date of the conquest of Skyros: because
it seems to me very probable that this conquest took place in
the year immediately before that in which the body of Theseus
was brought to Athens, which latter event may be referred with
great confidence to 469 B. C., in consequence of the interesting
anecdote related by Plutarch about the first prize gained by the
poet Sophoklês.

Mr. Clinton has given in his Appendix (Nos. vi-viii, pp. 248-253)
two Dissertations respecting the chronology of the period from
the Persian war down to the close of the Peloponnesian war. He
has rendered much service by correcting the mistake of Dodwell,
Wesseling, and Mitford (founded upon an inaccurate construction
of a passage in Isokratês) in supposing, after the Persian
invasion of Greece, a Spartan hegemony, lasting ten years,
prior to the commencement of the Athenian hegemony. He has
shown that the latter must be reckoned as commencing in 477, or
476 B. C., immediately after the mutiny of the allies against
Pausanias,—whose command, however, need not be peremptorily
restricted to one year, as Mr. Clinton (p. 252) and Dodwell
maintain: for the words of Thucydidês, ἐν τῇδε τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ, imply
nothing as to annual duration, and designate merely “the hegemony
which preceded that of Athens.”

But the refutation of this mistake does not enable us to
establish any good positive chronology for the period between
477 and 466 B. C. It will not do to construe Πρῶτον μὲν (Thuc.
i, 98) in reference to the Athenian conquest of Eion, as if it
must necessarily mean “_the year after_” 477 B. C. If we could
imagine that Thucydidês had told us all the military operations
between 477-466 B. C., we should be compelled to admit plenty of
that “interval of inaction” against which Mr. Clinton so strongly
protests (p. 252). Unhappily, Thucydidês has told us but a small
portion of the events which really happened.

Mr. Clinton compares the various periods of duration assigned
by ancient authors to that which is improperly called the
Athenian “empire,”—between 477-405 B. C. (pp. 248, 249.) I
confess that I rather agree with Dr. Gillies, who admits the
discrepancy between these authors broadly and undisguisedly,
than with Mr. Clinton, who seeks to bring them into comparative
agreement. His explanation is only successful in regard to one
of them,—Demosthenês; whose two statements (forty-five years
in one place and seventy-three years in another) are shown to
be consistent with each other as well as chronologically just.
But surely it is not reasonable to correct the text of the
orator Lykurgus from ἐννενήκοντα to ἑβδομήκοντα, and then to
say, that “Lykurgus may be added to the number of those who
describe the period as seventy years,” (p. 250.) Neither are
we to bring Andokidês into harmony with others, by supposing
that “his calculation ascends to the battle of Marathon, from
the date of which (B. C. 490) to the battle of Ægos Potami,
are just eighty-five years.” (Ibid.) Nor ought we to justify a
computation by Demosthenês, of sixty-five years, by saying, “that
it terminates at the Athenian defeat in Sicily,” (p. 249).

The truth is, that there is more or less chronological inaccuracy
in all these passages, except those of Demosthenês,—and
historical inaccuracy in _all_ of them, not even excepting those.
It is not true that the Athenians ἦρξαν τῆς θαλάσσης—ἦρξαν τῶν
Ἑλλήνων—προστάται ἦσαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων—for seventy-three years. The
historical language of Demosthenês, Plato, Lysias, Isokratês,
Andokidês, Lykurgus, requires to be carefully examined before we
rely upon it.

[594] Plutarch (Kimon, c. 8; Theseus, c. 36). ἐστὶ δὲ φύξιον
οἰκέταις καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ταπεινοτέροις καὶ δεδιόσι κρείττονας, ὡς
καὶ τοῦ Θησέως προστατικοῦ τινος καὶ βοηθητικοῦ γενομένου καὶ
προσδεχομένου φιλανθρώπως τὰς τῶν ταπεινοτέρων δεήσεις.

It was about two years or more after this incident, that the first
breach of union in the confederacy of Delos took place. The important
island of Naxos, the largest of the Cyclades,—an island which
thirty years before had boasted a large marine force and eight
thousand hoplites,—revolted; on what special ground we do not know:
but probably the greater islands fancied themselves better able to
dispense with the protection of the confederacy than the smaller,—at
the same time that they were more jealous of Athens. After a siege,
of unknown duration, by Athens and the confederate force, it was
forced to surrender, and reduced to the condition of a tributary
subject;[595] its armed ships being doubtless taken away, and its
fortifications razed: whether any fine or ulterior penalty was
levied, we have no information.

[595] Thucyd. i, 98. It has already been stated in the preceding
chapter, that Themistoklês, as a fugitive, passed close to Naxos
while it was under siege, and incurred great danger of being
taken.

We cannot doubt that the reduction of this powerful island, however
untoward in its effects upon the equal and self-maintaining character
of the confederacy, strengthened its military force by placing the
whole Naxian fleet with new pecuniary contributions in the hands
of the chief: nor is it surprising to hear that Athens sought
both to employ this new force, and to obliterate the late act of
severity, by increased exertions against the common enemy. Though
we know no particulars respecting operations against Persia, since
the attack on Eion, such operations must have been going on; but
the expedition under Kimon, undertaken not long after the Naxian
revolt, was attended with memorable results. That commander, having
under him two hundred triremes from Athens, and one hundred from
the various confederates, was despatched to attack the Persians on
the south-western and southern coast of Asia Minor. He attacked
and drove out several of their garrisons from various Grecian
settlements, both in Karia and Lykia: among others, the important
trading city of Phasêlis, though at first resisting, and even
standing a siege, was prevailed upon by the friendly suggestions of
the Chians in Kimon’s armament to pay a contribution of ten talents
and join in the expedition. From the length of time occupied in
these various undertakings, the Persian satraps had been enabled to
assemble a powerful force, both fleet and army, near the mouth of
the river Eurymedon, in Pamphylia, under the command of Tithraustês
and Pherendatês, both of the regal blood. The fleet, chiefly
Phenician, seems to have consisted of two hundred ships, but a
farther reinforcement of eighty Phenician ships was expected, and was
actually near at hand, and the commanders were unwilling to hazard
a battle before its arrival. Kimon, anxious for the same reason to
hasten on the combat, attacked them vigorously: partly from their
inferiority of numbers, partly from discouragement at the absence of
the reinforcement, they seem to have made no strenuous resistance.
They were put to flight and driven ashore; so speedily, and with so
little loss to the Greeks, that Kimon was enabled to disembark his
men forthwith, and attack the land-force which was drawn up on shore
to protect them. The battle on land was long and gallantly contested,
but Kimon at length gained a complete victory, dispersed the army
with the capture of many prisoners, and either took or destroyed the
entire fleet. As soon as his victory and his prisoners were secured,
he sailed to Cyprus for the purpose of intercepting the reinforcement
of eighty Phenician ships in their way, and was fortunate enough
to attack them while yet they were ignorant of the victories of
the Eurymedon. These ships too were all destroyed, though most of
the crews appear to have escaped ashore on the island. Two great
victories, one at sea and the other on land, gained on the same day
by the same armament, counted with reason among the most glorious of
all Grecian exploits, and were extolled as such in the inscription on
the commemorative offering to Apollo, set up out of the tithe of the
spoils.[596] The number of prisoners, as well as the booty taken by
the victors, was immense.

[596] For the battles of the Eurymedon, see Thucyd. i, 100;
Diodor. xi, 60-62; Plutarch, Kimon, 12, 13.

The accounts of the two latter appear chiefly borrowed from
Ephorus and Kallisthenês, authors of the following century; and
from Phanodemus, an author later still. I borrow sparingly from
them, and only so far as consists with the brief statement of
Thucydidês. The narrative of Diodorus is exceedingly confused,
indeed hardly intelligible.

Phanodemus stated the number of the Persian fleet at six hundred
ships; Ephorus, at three hundred and fifty. Diodorus, following
the latter, gives three hundred and forty. Plutarch mentions the
expected reinforcement of eighty Phenician ships; which appears
to me a very credible circumstance, explaining the easy nautical
victory of Kimon at the Eurymedon. From Thucydidês, we know that
the vanquished fleet at the Eurymedon consisted of no more than
two hundred ships; for so I venture to construe the words of
Thucydidês, in spite of the authority of Dr. Arnold,—Καὶ εἶλον
(Ἀθηναῖοι) τριήρεις Φοινίκων καὶ διέφθειραν τὰς πάσας ἐς (τὰς)
διακοσίας. Upon which Dr. Arnold observes: “Amounting in all to
two hundred: that is, that the whole number of ships taken or
destroyed was two hundred,—not that the whole fleet consisted
of no more.” Admitting the correctness of this construction
(which may be defended by viii, 21), we may remark that the
defeated Phenician fleet, according to the universal practice of
antiquity, ran ashore to seek protection from its accompanying
land-force. When, therefore, this land-force was itself defeated
and dispersed, the ships would all naturally fall into the
power of the victors; or if any escaped, it would be merely by
accident. Moreover, the smaller number is in this case more
likely to be the truth, as we must suppose an easy naval victory
in order to leave strength for a strenuous land-battle on the
same day.

It is remarkable that the inscription on the commemorative
offering only specifics “one hundred Phenician ships with their
crews” as having been captured (Diodor. xi, 62). The other
hundred ships were probably destroyed. Diodorus represents Kimon
as having captured three hundred and forty ships, though he
himself cites the inscription which mentions only one hundred.

A victory thus remarkable, which thrust back the Persians to the
region eastward of Phasêlis, doubtless fortified materially the
position of the Athenian confederacy against them; but it tended not
less to exalt the reputation of Athens, and even to popularize her
with the confederates generally, from the large amount of plunder
divisible among them. Probably this increased power and popularity
stood her in stead throughout her approaching contest with Thasos, at
the same time that it explains the increasing fear and dislike of the
Peloponnesians.

Thasos was a member of the confederacy of Delos; but her quarrel
with Athens seems to have arisen out of causes quite distinct from
confederate relations. It has been already stated that the Athenians
had within the last few years expelled the Persians from the
important post of Eion, on the Strymon, the most convenient post for
the neighboring region of Thrace, which was not less distinguished
for its fertility than for its mining wealth. In the occupation of
this post, the Athenians had had time to become acquainted with the
productive character of the adjoining region, chiefly occupied by the
Edonian Thracians; and it is extremely probable that many private
settlers arrived from Athens, with the view of procuring grants
or making their fortunes by partnership with powerful Thracians
in working the gold-mines round Mount Pangæus. In so doing, they
speedily found themselves in collision with the Greeks of the
opposite island of Mount Thasos, who possessed a considerable strip
of land, with various dependent towns on the continent of Thrace, and
derived a large revenue from the mines of Skaptê Hylê, as well as
from others in the neighborhood.[597] The condition of Thasos at this
time, about 465 B. C., indicates to us the progress which the Grecian
states in the Ægean had made since their liberation from Persia. It
had been deprived both of its fortifications and of its maritime
force, by order of Darius, about 491 B. C., and must have remained in
this condition until after the repulse of Xerxes; but we now find it
well-fortified and possessing a powerful maritime force.

[597] About Thasos, see Herodot. vi, 46-48; vii, 118. The
position of Ragusa in the Adriatic, in reference to the despots
of Servia and Bosnia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,
was very similar to that of Athens and Thasos in regard to the
Thracian princes of the interior. In Engel’s History of Ragusa
we find an account of the large gains made in that city by its
contracts to work the gold and silver mines belonging to these
princes (Engel, Geschichte des Freystaates Ragusa, sect. 36, p.
163. Wien, 1807).

In what precise manner the quarrel between the Thasians and the
Athenians of Eion manifested itself, respecting the trade and the
mines in Thrace, we are not informed; but it reached such a height
that the Athenians were induced to send a powerful armament against
the island, under the command of Kimon.[598] Having vanquished the
Thasian force at sea, they disembarked, gained various battles,
and blocked up the city by land as well as by sea. And at the same
time they undertook—what seems to have been part and parcel of the
same scheme—the establishment of a larger and more powerful colony
on Thracian ground not far from Eion. On the Strymon, about three
miles higher up than Eion, near the spot where the river narrows
itself again out of a broad expanse of the nature of a lake, was
situated the Edonian town or settlement called Ennea Hodoi, (Nine
Ways), a little above the bridge, which here served as an important
communication for all the people of the interior. Both Histiæus
and Aristagoras, the two Milesian despots, had been tempted by the
advantages of this place to commence a settlement there: both of
them had failed, and a third failure on a still grander scale was
now about to be added. The Athenians sent thither a large body of
colonists, ten thousand in number, partly from their own citizens,
partly collected from their allies: and the temptations of the site
probably rendered volunteers numerous. As far as Ennea Hodoi was
concerned, they were successful in conquering it and driving away the
Edonian possessors: but on trying to extend themselves farther to
the eastward, to a spot called Drabêskus, convenient for the mining
region, they encountered a more formidable resistance from a powerful
alliance of Thracian tribes, who had come to the aid of the Edonians
in decisive hostility to the new colony,—probably not without
instigation from the inhabitants of Thasos. All or most of the ten
thousand colonists were slain in this warfare, and the new colony
was for the time completely abandoned: we shall find it resumed
hereafter.[599]

[598] Thucyd. i, 100, 101; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14; Diodor xi, 70.

[599] Thucyd. i, 101. Philip of Macedon, in his dispute more than
a century after this period with the Athenians respecting the
possession of Amphipolis, pretended that his ancestor, Alexander,
had been the first to acquire possession of the spot after the
expulsion of the Persians from Thrace, (see Philippi Epistola
ap. Demosthen. p. 164, R.) If this pretence had been true, Ennea
Hodoi would have been in possession of the Macedonians at this
time, when the first Athenian attempt was made upon it: but
the statement of Thucydidês shows that it was then an Edonian
township.

Disappointed as the Athenians were in this enterprise, they did not
abandon the blockade of Thasos, which held out more than two years,
and only surrendered in the third year. Its fortifications were
razed; its ships of war, thirty-three in number, taken away:[600]
its possessions and mining establishments on the opposite continent
relinquished: moreover, an immediate contribution in money was
demanded from the inhabitants, over and above the annual payment
assessed upon them for the future. The subjugation of this powerful
island was another step in the growing dominion of Athens over her
confederates.

[600] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14. Galêpsus and Œsymê were among the
Thasian settlements on the mainland of Thrace (Thucyd. iv, 108).

The year before the Thasians surrendered, however, they had
taken a step which deserves particular notice, as indicating the
newly-gathering clouds in the Grecian political horizon. They had
made secret application to the Lacedæmonians for aid, entreating
them to draw off the attention of Athens by invading Attica; and
the Lacedæmonians, without the knowledge of Athens, having actually
engaged to comply with this request, were only prevented from
performing their promise by a grave and terrible misfortune at
home.[601] Though accidentally unperformed, however, this hostile
promise is a most significant event: it marks the growing fear
and hatred on the part of Sparta and the Peloponnesians towards
Athens, merely on general grounds of the magnitude of her power, and
without any special provocation. Nay, not only had Athens given no
provocation, but she was still actually included as a member of the
Lacedæmonian alliance, and we shall find her presently both appealed
to and acting as such. We shall hear so much of Athens, and that too
with truth, as pushing and aggressive,—and of Sparta as homekeeping
and defensive,—that the incident just mentioned becomes important
to remark. The first intent of unprovoked and even treacherous
hostility—the germ of the future Peloponnesian war—is conceived and
reduced to an engagement by Sparta.

[601] Thucyd. i, 101. οἱ δὲ ὑπέσχοντο μὲν κρύφα τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ
ἔμελλον, διεκωλύθησαν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ γενομένου σεισμοῦ.

We are told by Plutarch, that the Athenians, after the surrender of
Thasos and the liberation of the armament, had expected from Kimon
some farther conquests in Macedonia,—and even that he had actually
entered upon that project with such promise of success, that its
farther consummation was certain as well as easy. Having under
these circumstances relinquished it and returned to Athens, he was
accused by Periklês and others of having been bought off by bribes
from the Macedonian king Alexander; but was acquitted after a public
trial.[602]

[602] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14.

During the period which had elapsed between the first formation
of the confederacy of Delos and the capture of Thasos (about
thirteen or fourteen years, B. C. 477-463), the Athenians seem to
have been occupied almost entirely in their maritime operations,
chiefly against the Persians,—having been free from embarrassments
immediately around Attica. But this freedom was not destined to
last much longer; and during the ensuing ten years, their foreign
relations near home become both active and complicated; while their
strength expands so wonderfully, that they are found competent at
once to obligations on both sides of the Ægean sea, the distant as
well as the near.

Of the incidents which had taken place in Central Greece during the
twelve or fifteen years immediately succeeding the battle of Platæa,
we have scarcely any information. The feelings of the time, between
those Greeks who had supported and those who had resisted the Persian
invader, must have remained unfriendly even after the war was at
an end, and the mere occupation of the Persian numerous host must
have inflicted severe damage both upon Thessaly and Bœotia. At the
meeting of the Amphiktyonic synod which succeeded the expulsion of
the invaders, a reward was proclaimed for the life of the Melian
Ephialtês, who had betrayed to Xerxes the mountain-path over Œta,
and thus caused the ruin of Leonidas at Thermopylæ: moreover, if
we may trust Plutarch, it was even proposed by Lacedæmon that all
the _medizing_ Greeks should be expelled from the synod,[603]—a
proposition which the more long-sighted views of Themistoklês
successfully resisted. Even the stronger measure, of razing the
fortifications of all the extra-Peloponnesian cities, from fear
that they might be used to aid some future invasion, had suggested
itself to the Lacedæmonians,—as we see from their language on the
occasion of rebuilding the walls of Athens; and in regard to Bœotia,
it appears that the headship of Thebes as well as the coherence of
the federation was for the time almost suspended. The destroyed
towns of Platæa and Thespiæ were restored, and the latter in part
repeopled,[604] under Athenian influence; and the general sentiment
of Peloponnesus as well as of Athens would have sustained these towns
against Thebes, if the latter had tried at that time to enforce
her supremacy over them in the name of “ancient Bœotian right and
usage.”[605] The Theban government was then in discredit for its
previous _medism_,—even in the eyes of Thebans themselves;[606] while
the party opposed to Thebes in the other towns was so powerful, that
many of them would probably have been severed from the federation to
become allies of Athens like Platæa, if the interference of Lacedæmon
had not arrested such a tendency. The latter was in every other
part of Greece an enemy to organized aggregation of cities, either
equal or unequal, and was constantly bent on keeping the little
autonomous communities separate;[607] whence she sometimes became
by accident the protector of the weaker cities against compulsory
alliance imposed upon them by the stronger: the interest of her own
ascendency was in this respect analogous to that of the Persians when
they dictated the peace of Antalkidas,—of the Romans in administering
their extensive conquests,—and of the kings of medieval Europe in
breaking the authority of the barons over their vassals. But though
such was the policy of Sparta elsewhere, her fear of Athens, which
grew up during the ensuing twenty years, made her act differently in
regard to Bœotia: she had no other means of maintaining that country
as her own ally and as the enemy of Athens, except by organizing the
federation effectively, and strengthening the authority of Thebes.
It is to this revolution in Spartan politics that Thebes owed the
recovery of her ascendency,[608]—a revolution so conspicuously
marked, that the Spartans even aided in enlarging her circuit and
improving her fortifications: nor was it without difficulty that she
maintained this position, even when recovered, against the dangerous
neighborhood of Athens, a circumstance which made her not only a
vehement partisan of Sparta, but even more furiously anti-Athenian
than Sparta, down to the close of the Peloponnesian war.

[603] Plutarch, Themistokl. c. 20.

[604] See the case of Sikinnus, the person through whom
Themistoklês communicated with Xerxes before the battle of
Salamis, and for whom he afterwards procured admission among the
batch of newly-introduced citizens at Thespiæ (Herodot. viii. 75).

[605] Τὰ τῶν Βοιωτῶν πάτρια—τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια
(Thucyd. iii, 61-65).

[606] Thucyd. iii, 62.

[607] See, among many other evidences, the remarkable case of the
Olynthian confederacy (Xenophon, Hellen. v, 2, 16).

[608] Diodor. xi, 81; Justin, iii, 6.

The revolution, just noticed, in Spartan politics towards Bœotia, did
not manifest itself until about twenty years after the commencement
of the Athenian maritime confederacy. During the course of those
twenty years, we know that Sparta had had more than one battle to
sustain in Arcadia, against the towns and villages of that country,
in which she came forth victorious: but we have no particulars
respecting these incidents. We also know that a few years after the
Persian invasion, the inhabitants of Elis concentrated themselves
from many dispersed townships into the one main city of Elis:[609]
and it seems probable that Lepreum in Triphylia, and one or two of
the towns of Achaia, were either formed or enlarged by a similar
process near about the same time.[610] Such aggregation of towns
out of preëxisting separate villages was not conformable to the
views, nor favorable to the ascendency, of Lacedæmon: but there
can be little doubt that her foreign policy, after the Persian
invasion, was both embarrassed and discredited by the misconduct of
her two contemporary kings, Pausanias, who, though only regent, was
practically equivalent to a king, and Leotychidês,—not to mention
the rapid development of Athens and Peiræus. But in the year B. C.
464, the year preceding the surrender of Thasos to the Athenian
armament, a misfortune of yet more terrific moment befell Sparta.
A violent earthquake took place in the immediate neighborhood of
Sparta itself, destroying a large portion of the town, and a vast
number of lives, many of them Spartan citizens. It was the judgment
of the earth-shaking god Poseidon, according to the view of the
Lacedæmonians themselves, for a recent violation of his sanctuary
at Tænarus, from whence certain suppliant Helots had been dragged
away not long before for punishment,[611]—not improbably some of
those Helots whom Pausanias had instigated to revolt. The sentiment
of the Helots, at all times one of enmity towards their masters,
appears at this moment to have been unusually inflammable: so that an
earthquake at Sparta, especially an earthquake construed as divine
vengeance for Helot blood recently spilt, was sufficient to rouse
many of them at once into revolt, together with some even of the
Periœki. The insurgents took arms and marched directly upon Sparta,
which they were on the point of mastering during the first moments
of consternation, had not the bravery and presence of mind of the
young king Archidamus reanimated the surviving citizens and repelled
the attack. But though repelled, the insurgents were not subdued:
for some time they maintained the field against the Spartan force,
and sometimes with considerable advantage, since Aeimnêstus, the
warrior by whose hand Mardonius had fallen at Platæa, was defeated
and slain with three hundred followers in the plain of Stenyklêrus,
overpowered by superior numbers.[612] When at length defeated, they
occupied and fortified the memorable hill of Ithômê, the ancient
citadel of their Messenian forefathers. Here they made a long and
obstinate defence, supporting themselves doubtless by incursions
throughout Laconia: nor was defence difficult, seeing that the
Lacedæmonians were at that time confessedly incapable of assailing
even the most imperfect species of fortification. After the siege had
lasted some two or three years, without any prospect of success, the
Lacedæmonians, beginning to despair of their own sufficiency for the
undertaking, invoked the aid of their various allies, among whom we
find specified the Æginetans, the Athenians, and the Platæans.[613]
The Athenian troops are said to have consisted of four thousand men,
under the command of Kimon; Athens being still included in the list
of Lacedæmonian allies.

[609] Diodor. xi. 54; Strabo, viii, p. 337.

[610] Strabo, viii, pp. 337, 348, 356.

[611] Thucyd. i, 101-128; Diodor. xi, 62.

[612] Herodot. ix. 64.

[613] Thucyd. i, 102; iii, 54; iv, 57.

So imperfect were the means of attacking walls at that day, even
for the most intelligent Greeks, that this increased force made no
immediate impression on the fortified hill of Ithômê. And when the
Lacedæmonians saw that their Athenian allies were not more successful
than they had been themselves, they soon passed from surprise into
doubt, mistrust, and apprehension. The troops had given no ground
for such a feeling, and Kimon, their general, was notorious for his
attachment to Sparta; yet the Lacedæmonians could not help calling to
mind the ever-wakeful energy and ambition of these Ionic strangers,
whom they had introduced into the interior of Laconia, together
with their own promise—though doubtless a secret promise—to invade
Attica, not long before, for the benefit of the Thasians. They even
began to fear that the Athenians might turn against them, and listen
to solicitations for espousing the cause of the besieged. Under
the influence of such apprehensions, they dismissed the Athenian
contingent forthwith, on pretence of having no farther occasion for
them; while all the other allies were retained, and the siege or
blockade went on as before.[614]

[614] Thucyd. i, 102. τὴν μὲν ὑποψίαν οὐ δηλοῦντες, εἰπόντες δὲ
ὅτι οὐδὲν προσδέονται αὐτῶν ἔτι.

Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. ann. 464-461 B. C.), following
Plutarch, recognizes two Lacedæmonian requests to Athens, and
two Athenian expeditions to the aid of the Spartans, both under
Kimon; the first in 464 B. C., immediately on the happening of
the earthquake and consequent revolt,—the second in 461 B. C.,
after the war had lasted some time.

In my judgment, there is no ground for supposing more than
one application made to Athens, and one expedition. The
duplication has arisen from Plutarch, who has construed too much
as historical reality the comic exaggeration of Aristophanês
(Aristoph. Lysistrat. 1138; Plutarch, Kimon, 16). The heroine
of the latter, Lysistrata, wishing to make peace between the
Lacedæmonians and Athenians, and reminding each of the services
which they had received from the other, might permit herself
to say to the Lacedæmonians: “Your envoy, Perikleidas, came to
Athens, pale with terror, and put himself a suppliant at the
altar to entreat our help as a matter of life and death, while
Poseidon was still shaking the earth, and the Messenians were
pressing you hard: then Kimon with four thousand hoplites went
and achieved your complete salvation.” This is all very telling
and forcible, as a portion of the Aristophanic play, but there is
no historical truth in it except the fact of an application made
and an expedition sent in consequence.

We know that the earthquake took place at the time when the
siege of Thasos was yet going on, because it was the reason
which prevented the Lacedæmonians from aiding the besieged by an
invasion of Attica. But Kimon commanded at the siege of Thasos
(Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14); accordingly, he could not have gone as
commander to Laconia at the time when this first expedition is
alleged to have been undertaken.

Next, Thucydidês acknowledges only one expedition: nor, indeed,
does Diodorus (xi, 64), though this is of minor consequence.
Now mere silence on the part of Thucydidês, in reference to the
events of a period which he only professes to survey briefly,
is not always a very forcible negative argument. But in this
case, his account of the expedition of 461 B. C., with its very
important consequences, is such as to exclude the supposition
that _he knew_ of any prior expedition, two or three years
earlier. Had he known of any such, he could not have written
the account which now stands in his text. He dwells especially
on the prolongation of the war, and on the incapacity of the
Lacedæmonians for attacking walls, as the reasons why they
invoked the Athenians as well as their other allies: he implies
that their presence in Laconia was a new and threatening
incident: moreover, when he tells us how much the Athenians were
incensed by their abrupt and mistrustful dismissal, he could
not have omitted to notice, as an aggravation of this feeling,
that, only two or three years before, they had rescued Lacedæmon
from the brink of ruin. Let us add, that the supposition of
Sparta, the first military power in Greece, and distinguished
for her unintermitting discipline, being reduced all at once
to a condition of such utter helplessness as to owe her safety
to foreign intervention,—is highly improbable in itself:
inadmissible, except on very good evidence.

For the reasons here stated. I reject the first expedition into
Laconia mentioned in Plutarch.

This dismissal, ungracious in the extreme, and probably rendered
even more offensive by the habitual roughness of Spartan dealing,
excited the strongest exasperation both among the Athenian soldiers
and the Athenian people,—an exasperation heightened by circumstances
immediately preceding. For the resolution to send auxiliaries into
Laconia, when the Lacedæmonians first applied for them, had not been
taken without considerable debate at Athens: the party of Periklês
and Ephialtês, habitually in opposition to Kimon, and partisans of
the forward democratical movement, had strongly discountenanced
it, and conjured their countrymen not to assist in renovating and
strengthening their most formidable rival. Perhaps the previous
engagement of the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica on behalf of the
Thasians may have become known to them, though not so formally as to
exclude denial; and even supposing this engagement to have remained
unknown at that time to every one, there were not wanting other
grounds to render the policy of refusal plausible. But Kimon, with
an earnestness which even the philo-Laconian Kritias afterwards
characterized as a sacrifice of the grandeur of Athens to the
advantage of Lacedæmon,[615] employed all his credit and influence
in seconding the application. The maintenance of alliance with
Sparta on equal footing,—peace among the great powers of Greece,
and common war against Persia,—together with the prevention of all
farther democratical changes in Athens,—were the leading points
of his political creed. As yet, both his personal and political
ascendency was predominant over his opponents: as yet, there was
no manifest conflict, which had only just begun to show itself in
the case of Thasos, between the maritime power of Athens, and the
union of land-force under Sparta: and Kimon could still treat both
of these phenomena as coexisting necessities of Hellenic well-being.
Though no way distinguished as a speaker, he carried with him the
Athenian assembly by appealing to a large and generous patriotism,
which forbade them to permit the humiliation of Sparta. “Consent
not to see Hellas lamed of one leg, and Athens drawing without her
yoke-fellow;”[616] such was his language, as we learn from his friend
and companion, the Chian poet Ion: and in the lips of Kimon it proved
effective. It is a speech of almost melancholy interest, since ninety
years passed over before such an appeal was ever again addressed to
an Athenian assembly.[617] The despatch of the auxiliaries was thus
dictated by a generous sentiment, to the disregard of what might seem
political prudence: and we may imagine the violent reaction which
took place in Athenian feeling, when the Lacedæmonians repaid them
by singling out their troops from all the other allies as objects
of insulting suspicion,—we may imagine the triumph of Periklês
and Ephialtês, who had opposed the mission,—and the vast loss of
influence to Kimon, who had brought it about,—when Athens received
again into her public assemblies the hoplites sent back from Ithômê.

[615] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16.

[616] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16. Ὁ δ’ Ἴων ἀπομνημονεύει καὶ τὸν
λόγον, ᾧ μάλιστα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐκίνησε, παρακαλὼν μήτε τὴν
Ἑλλάδα χωλὴν, μήτε τὴν πόλιν ἑτερόζυγα, περιϊδεῖν γεγενημένην.

[617] See Xenophon, Hellenic. vi, 3,—about 372 B. C.—a little
before the battle of Leuktra.

Both in the internal constitution, indeed,—of which more
presently,—and in the external policy of Athens, the dismissal of
these soldiers was pregnant with results. The Athenians immediately
passed a formal resolution to renounce the alliance between
themselves and Lacedæmon against the Persians. They did more:
they looked out for land enemies of Lacedæmon, with whom to ally
themselves. Of these by far the first, both in Hellenic rank and
in real power, was Argos. That city, neutral during the Persian
invasion, had now recovered from the effects of the destructive
defeat suffered about thirty years before from the Spartan king
Kleomenês: the sons of the ancient citizens had grown to manhood, and
the temporary predominance of the Periœki, acquired in consequence
of the ruinous loss of citizens in that defeat, had been again put
down. In the neighborhood of Argos, and dependent upon it, were
situated Mykenæ, Tiryns, and Midea,—small in power and importance,
but rich in mythical renown. Disdaining the inglorious example of
Argos, at the period of danger, these towns had furnished contingents
both to Thermopylæ and Platæa, which their powerful neighbor had
been unable either to prevent at the time, or to avenge afterwards,
from fear of the intervention of Lacedæmon. But so soon as the
latter was seen to be endangered and occupied at home, with a
formidable Messenian revolt, the Argeians availed themselves of the
opportunity to attack not only Mykenæ and Tiryns, but also Orneæ,
Midea, and other semi-dependent towns around them. Several of these
were reduced; and the inhabitants robbed of their autonomy, were
incorporated with the domain of Argos: but the Mykenians, partly from
the superior gallantry of their resistance, partly from jealousy
of their mythical renown, were either sold as slaves or driven
into banishment.[618] Through these victories Argos was now more
powerful than ever, and the propositions of alliance made to her by
Athens, while strengthening both the two against Lacedæmon, opened
to her a new chance of recovering her lost headship in Peloponnesus.
The Thessalians became members of this new alliance, which was a
defensive alliance against Lacedæmon: and hopes were doubtless
entertained of drawing in some of the habitual allies of the latter.

[618] Diodor. xi, 65; Strabo, viii, p. 372; Pausan. ii, 16,
17, 25. Diodorus places this incident in 468 B. C.: but as it
undoubtedly comes after the earthquake at Sparta, we must suppose
it to have happened about 463 B. C. See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fasti
Hellenici, Appendix, 8.

The new character which Athens had thus assumed, as a competitor
for landed alliances, not less than for maritime ascendency,
came opportunely for the protection of the neighboring town of
Megara. It appears that Corinth, perhaps instigated, like Argos,
by the helplessness of the Lacedæmonians, had been making border
encroachments on the one side upon Kleônæ, on the other side upon
Megara:[619] on which ground the latter, probably despairing of
protection from Lacedæmon, renounced the Lacedæmonian connection,
and obtained permission to enrol herself as an ally of Athens.[620]
This was an acquisition of signal value to the Athenians, since it
both opened to them the whole range of territory across the outer
isthmus of Corinth to the interior of the Krissæan gulf, on which the
Megarian port of Pegæ was situated, and placed them in possession
of the passes of Mount Geraneia, so that they could arrest the
march of a Peloponnesian army over the isthmus, and protect Attica
from invasion. It was, moreover, of great importance in its effects
on Grecian politics: for it was counted as a wrong by Lacedæmon,
gave deadly offence to the Corinthians, and lighted up the flames
of war between them and Athens; their allies, the Epidaurians and
Æginetans, taking their part. Though Athens had not yet been guilty
of unjust encroachment against any Peloponnesian state, her ambition
and energy had inspired universal awe; while the maritime states in
the neighborhood, such as Corinth, Epidaurus, and Ægina, saw these
terror-striking qualities threatening them at their own doors,
through her alliance with Argos and Megara. Moreover, it is probable
that the ancient feud between the Athenians and Æginetans, though
dormant since a little before the Persian invasion, had never been
appeased or forgotten: so that the Æginetans, dwelling within sight
of Peiræus, were at once best able to appreciate, and most likely to
dread, the enormous maritime power now possessed by Athens. Periklês
was wont to call Ægina the eyesore of Peiræus:[621] but we may be
very sure that Peiræus, grown into a vast fortified port, within the
existing generation, was in a much stronger degree the eyesore of
Ægina.

[619] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 17.

[620] Thucyd. i. 103.

[621] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 8.

The Athenians were at this time actively engaged in prosecuting
the war against Persia, having a fleet of no less than two hundred
sail, equipped by or from the confederacy collectively, now serving
in Cyprus and on the Phenician coast. Moreover, the revolt of the
Egyptians under Inaros, about 460 B. C., opened to them new means
of action against the Great King; and their fleet, by invitation of
the revolters, sailed up the Nile to Memphis, where there seemed at
first a good prospect of throwing off the Persian dominion. Yet in
spite of so great an abstraction from their disposable force, their
military operations near home were conducted with unabated vigor:
and the inscription which remains,—a commemoration of their citizens
of the Erechtheid tribe, who were slain in one and the same year,
in Cyprus, Egypt, Phenicia, the Halieis, Ægina, and Megara,—brings
forcibly before us that energy which astonished and even alarmed
their contemporaries. Their first proceedings at Megara were of a
nature altogether novel, in the existing condition of Greece. It was
necessary for the Athenians to protect their new ally against the
superiority of Peloponnesian land-force, and to insure a constant
communication with it by sea; but the city, like most of the ancient
Hellenic towns, was situated on a hill at some distance from the sea,
separated from its port Nisæa by a space of nearly one mile. One of
the earliest proceedings of the Athenians was to build two lines
of wall, near and parallel to each other, connecting the city with
Nisæa, so that the two thus formed one continuous fortress, wherein
a standing Athenian garrison was maintained, with the constant means
of succor from Athens in case of need. These “long walls,” though
afterwards copied in other places, and on a larger scale, were at
that juncture an ingenious invention, for the purpose of extending
the maritime arm of Athens to an inland city.

The first operations of Corinth, however, were not directed against
Megara. The Athenians having undertaken a landing in the territory
of the Halieis, the population of the southern Argolic peninsula,
bordering on Trœzen and Hermionê, were defeated on land by the
Corinthian and Epidaurian forces: possibly it may have been in this
expedition that they acquired possession of Trœzen, which we find
afterwards in their dependence, without knowing when it became so.
But in a sea-fight which took place off the island of Kekryphaleia,
between Ægina and the Argolic peninsula, the Athenians gained the
victory. After this victory and defeat,—neither of them apparently
very decisive,—the Æginetans began to take a more energetic part in
the war, and brought out their full naval force, together with that
of their allies,—Corinthians, Epidaurians, and other Peloponnesians:
while Athens equipped a fleet of corresponding magnitude, summoning
her allies also; though we do not know the actual numbers on either
side. In the great naval battle which ensued off the island of Ægina,
the superiority of the new nautical tactics, acquired by twenty
years’ practice of the Athenians since the Persian war,—over the old
Hellenic ships and seamen, as shown in those states where, at the
time of the battle of Marathon, the maritime strength of Greece had
resided,—was demonstrated by a victory most complete and decisive.
The Peloponnesian and Dorian seamen had as yet had no experience
of the improved seacraft of Athens, and when we find how much they
were disconcerted with it, even twenty-eight years afterwards, at
the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we shall not wonder at its
destructive effect upon them in this early battle. The maritime power
of Ægina was irrecoverably ruined: the Athenians captured seventy
ships of war, landed a large force upon the island, and commenced the
siege of the city by land as well as by sea.[622]

[622] Thucyd. i, 105; Lysias, Orat. Funebr. c. 10. Diodor. xi. 78.

If the Lacedæmonians had not been occupied at home by the blockade
of Ithômê, they would have been probably induced to invade Attica as
a diversion to the Æginetans; especially as the Persian Megabazus
came to Sparta at this time on the part of Artaxerxes to prevail
upon them to do so, in order that the Athenians might be constrained
to retire from Egypt: this Persian brought with him a large sum of
money, but was nevertheless obliged to return without effecting his
mission.[623] The Corinthians and Epidaurians, however, while they
carried to Ægina a reinforcement of three hundred hoplites, did
their best to aid her farther by an attack upon Megara; which place,
it was supposed, the Athenians could not possibly relieve without
withdrawing their forces from Ægina, inasmuch as so many of their
men were at the same time serving in Egypt. But the Athenians showed
themselves equal to all these three exigencies at one and the same
time,—to the great disappointment of their enemies. Myrônidês marched
from Athens to Megara at the head of the citizens in the two extremes
of military age, old and young; these being the only troops at home.
He fought the Corinthians near the town, gaining a slight, but
debatable advantage, which he commemorated by a trophy, as soon as
the Corinthians had returned home. But the latter when they arrived
at home, were so much reproached by their own old citizens, for not
having vanquished the refuse of the Athenian military force,[624]
that they returned back at the end of twelve days and erected a
trophy on their side, laying claim to a victory in the past battle.
The Athenians, marching out of Megara, attacked them a second
time, and gained on this occasion a decisive victory. The defeated
Corinthians were still more unfortunate in their retreat; for a body
of them, missing their road, became entangled in a space of private
ground, inclosed on every side by a deep ditch, and having only one
narrow entrance. Myrônidês, detecting this fatal mistake, planted his
hoplites at the entrance to prevent their escape, and then surrounded
the enclosure with his light-armed troops, who, with their missile
weapons, slew all the Corinthian hoplites, without possibility either
of flight or resistance. The bulk of the Corinthian army effected
their retreat, but the destruction of this detachment was a sad blow
to the city.[625]

[623] Thucyd. i, 109.

[624] Lysias, Orat. Funebr. c. 10. ἐνίκων μαχόμενοι ἅπασαν τὴν
δύναμιν τὴν ἐκείνων τοῖς ἤδη ἀπειρηκόσι καὶ τοῖς οὔπω δυναμένοις,
etc.

The incident mentioned by Thucydidês about the Corinthians,
that the old men of their own city were so indignant against
them on their return, is highly characteristic of Grecian
manners,—κακιζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρεσβυτέρων, etc.

[625] Thucyd. i, 106. πάθος μέγα τοῦτο Κορινθίοις ἐγένετο.
Compare Diodor. xi, 78, 79,—whose chronology, however, is very
misleading.

Splendid as the success of the Athenians had been during this year,
both on land and at sea, it was easy for them to foresee that
the power of their enemies would presently be augmented by the
Lacedæmonians taking the field. Partly on this account,—partly also
from the more energetic phase of democracy, and the long-sighted
views of Periklês, which were now becoming ascendent in the city,—the
Athenians began the stupendous undertaking of connecting Athens
with the sea by means of long walls. The idea of this measure had
doubtless been first suggested by the recent erection of long walls,
though for so much smaller a distance, between Megara and Nisæa:
for without such an intermediate stepping-stone, the idea of a wall
forty stadia long (equal to four and a half miles) to join Athens
with Peiræus, and another wall of thirty-five stadia (equal to about
four miles) to join it with Phalêrum, would have appeared extravagant
even to the sanguine temper of Athenians,—as it certainly would
have seemed a few years earlier to Themistoklês himself. Coming as
an immediate sequel of great recent victories, and while Ægina,
the great Dorian naval power, was prostrate and under blockade, it
excited the utmost alarm among the Peloponnesians,—being regarded
as the second great stride,[626] at once conspicuous and of lasting
effect, in Athenian ambition, next to the fortification of Peiræus.
But besides this feeling in the bosom of enemies, the measure was
also interwoven with the formidable contention of political parties
then going on at Athens. Kimon had been recently ostracized; and the
democratical movement pressed by Periklês and Ephialtês—of which more
presently—was in its full tide of success, yet not without a violent
and unprincipled opposition on the part of those who supported the
existing constitution. Now, the long walls formed a part of the
foreign policy of Periklês, continuing on a gigantic scale the plans
of Themistoklês when he first schemed the Peiræus. They were framed
to render Athens capable of carrying on war against any superiority
of landed attack, and of bidding defiance to the united force of
Peloponnesus. But though thus calculated for contingencies which
a long-sighted man might see gathering in the distance, the new
walls were, almost on the same grounds, obnoxious to a considerable
number of Athenians: to the party recently headed by Kimon, who were
attached to the Lacedæmonian connection, and desired above all things
to maintain peace at home, reserving the energies of the state for
anti-Persian enterprise: to many landed proprietors in Attica, whom
they seemed to threaten with approaching invasion and destruction of
their territorial possessions: to the rich men and aristocrats of
Athens, averse to a still closer contact and amalgamation with the
maritime multitude in Peiræus: lastly, perhaps, to a certain vein of
old Attic feeling, which might look upon the junction of Athens with
the separate demes of Peiræus and Phalêrum as effacing the special
associations connected with the holy rock of Athênê. When, to all
these grounds of opposition, we add, the expense and trouble of the
undertaking itself, the interference with private property, the
peculiar violence of party which happened then to be raging, and the
absence of a large proportion of military citizens in Egypt,—we shall
hardly be surprised to find that the projected long walls brought
on a risk of the most serious character both for Athens and her
democracy. If any farther proof were wanting of the vast importance
of these long walls, in the eyes both of friends and of enemies, we
might find it in the fact, that their destruction was the prominent
mark of Athenian humiliation after the battle of Ægos Potamos, and
their restoration the immediate boon of Pharnabazus and Konon after
the victory of Knidus.

[626] Καὶ τῶνδε ὑμεῖς αἴτιοι, τό τε πρῶτον ἐάσαντες αὐτοὺς
τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ κρατῦναι, καὶ ὕστερον τὰ μακρὰ
στῆσαι τείχη,—is the language addressed by the Corinthians
to the Spartans, in reference to Athens, a little before the
Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i, 69).

Under the influence of the alarm now spread by the proceedings
of Athens, the Lacedæmonians were prevailed upon to undertake an
expedition out of Peloponnesus, although the Helots in Ithômê were
not yet reduced to surrender. Their force consisted of fifteen
hundred troops of their own, and ten thousand of their various
allies, under the regent Nikomêdês. The ostensible motive, or the
pretence, for this march, was the protection of the little territory
of Doris against the Phocians, who had recently invaded it and
taken one of its three towns. The mere approach of so large a force
immediately compelled the Phocians to relinquish their conquest,
but it was soon seen that this was only a small part of the objects
of Sparta, and that her main purposes, under instigation of the
Corinthians, were directed against the aggrandizement of Athens.
It could not escape the penetration of Corinth, that the Athenians
might presently either enlist or constrain the towns of Bœotia into
their alliance, as they had recently acquired Megara, in addition to
their previous ally, Platæa: for the Bœotian federation was at this
time much disorganized, and Thebes, its chief, had never recovered
her ascendency since the discredit of her support lent to the
Persian invasion. To strengthen Thebes, and to render her ascendency
effective over the Bœotian cities, was the best way of providing a
neighbor at once powerful and hostile to the Athenians, so as to
prevent their farther aggrandizement by land: it was the same policy
as Epaminondas pursued eighty years afterwards in organizing Arcadia
and Messênê against Sparta. Accordingly, the Peloponnesian force was
now employed partly in enlarging and strengthening the fortifications
of Thebes herself, partly in constraining the other Bœotian cities
into effective obedience to her supremacy: probably by placing
their governments in the hands of citizens of known oligarchical
politics,[627] and perhaps banishing suspected opponents. To this
scheme the Thebans lent themselves with earnestness; promising to
keep down for the future their border neighbors, so as to spare the
necessity of armies coming from Sparta.[628]

[627] Diodor. xii, 81; Justin, iii, 6. Τῆς μὲν τῶν Θηβαίων πόλεως
μείζονα τὸν περίβολον κατεσκεύασαν, τὰς δ’ ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ πόλεις
ἠνάγκασαν ὑποτάττεσθαι τοῖς Θηβαίοις.

[628] Diodor. l. c. It must probably be to the internal affairs
of Bœotia, somewhere about this time, full as they were of
internal dissension, that the dictum and simile of Periklês
alludes,—which Aristotle notices in his Rhetoric. iii, 4, 2.

But there was also a farther design, yet more important, in
contemplation by the Spartans and Corinthians. The oligarchical
opposition at Athens were so bitterly hostile to the Long Walls, to
Periklês, and to the democratical movement, that several of them
opened a secret negotiation with the Peloponnesian leaders, inviting
them into Attica, and entreating their aid in an internal rising
for the purpose not only of putting a stop to the Long Walls, but
also of subverting the democracy. And the Peloponnesian army, while
prosecuting its operations in Bœotia, waited in hopes of seeing the
Athenian malcontents in arms, encamping at Tanagra, on the very
borders of Attica, for the purpose of immediate coöperation with
them. The juncture was undoubtedly one of much hazard for Athens,
especially as the ostracized Kimon and his remaining friends in the
city were suspected of being implicated in the conspiracy. But the
Athenian leaders, aware of the Lacedæmonian operations in Bœotia,
knew also what was meant by the presence of the army on their
immediate borders, and took decisive measures to avert the danger.
Having obtained a reinforcement of one thousand Argeians and some
Thessalian horse, they marched out to Tanagra, with the full Athenian
force then at home; which must, of course, have consisted chiefly
of the old and the young, the same who had fought under Myrônidês
at Megara; for the blockade of Ægina was still going on. Nor was
it possible for the Lacedæmonian army to return into Peloponnesus
without fighting; for the Athenians, masters of the Megarid, were
in possession of the difficult highlands of Geraneia, the road of
march along the isthmus; while the Athenian fleet, by means of the
harbor of Pegæ, was prepared to intercept them, if they tried to come
by sea across the Krissæan gulf, by which way it would appear that
they had come out. Near Tanagra, a bloody battle took place between
the two armies, wherein the Lacedæmonians were victorious, chiefly
from the desertion of the Thessalian horse, who passed over to them
in the very heat of the engagement.[629] But though the advantage
was on their side, it was not sufficiently decisive to favor the
contemplated rising in Attica: nor did the Peloponnesians gain
anything by it, except an undisturbed retreat over the highlands of
Geraneia, after having partially ravaged the Megarid.

[629] Thucyd. i, 107.

Though the battle of Tanagra was a defeat, yet there were
circumstances connected with it which rendered its effects highly
beneficial to Athens. The ostracized Kimon presented himself on the
field as soon as the army had passed over the boundaries of Attica,
requesting to be allowed to occupy his station as an hoplite and to
fight in the ranks of his tribe,—the Œnêis. But such was the belief,
entertained by the members of the senate and by his political enemies
present, that he was an accomplice in the conspiracy known to be
on foot, that permission was refused and he was forced to retire.
In departing, he conjured his personal friends, Euthippus, of the
deme Anaphlystus, and others, to behave in such a manner as might
wipe away the stain resting upon his fidelity, and in part also upon
theirs. His friends retained his panoply, and assigned to it the
station in the ranks which he would himself have occupied: they then
entered the engagement with desperate resolution, and one hundred of
them fell side by side in their ranks. Periklês, on his part, who was
present among the hoplites of his own tribe, the Akamantis, aware of
this application and repulse of Kimon, thought it incumbent upon him
to display not merely his ordinary personal courage, but an unusual
recklessness of life and safety, though it happened that he escaped
unwounded. All these incidents brought about a generous sympathy and
spirit of compromise among the contending parties at Athens, while
the unshaken patriotism of Kimon and his friends discountenanced and
disarmed those conspirators who had entered into correspondence with
the enemy, at the same time that it roused a repentant admiration
towards the ostracized leader himself. Such was the happy working
of this new sentiment that a decree was shortly proposed and
carried,—proposed too, by Periklês himself,—to abridge the ten years
of Kimon’s ostracism, and permit his immediate return.[630] We may
recollect that, under circumstances partly analogous, Themistoklês
had himself proposed the restoration of his rival Aristeidês from
ostracism, a little before the battle of Salamis:[631] and in both
cases, the suspension of enmity between the two leaders was partly
the sign, partly also the auxiliary cause, of reconciliation and
renewed fraternity among the general body of citizens. It was a
moment analogous to that salutary impulse of compromise, and harmony
of parties, which followed the extinction of the oligarchy of Four
Hundred, forty-six years afterwards, and on which Thucydidês dwells
emphatically as the salvation of Athens in her distress,—a moment
rare in free communities generally, not less than among the jealous
competitors for political ascendency at Athens.[632]

[630] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14; Periklês, c. 10. Plutarch
represents the Athenians as having recalled Kimon from fear of
the Lacedæmonians who had just beaten them at Tanagra, and for
the purpose of procuring peace. He adds that Kimon obtained
peace for them forthwith. Both these assertions are incorrect.
The extraordinary successes in Bœotia, which followed so quickly
after the defeat at Tanagra, show that the Athenians were under
no impressions of fear at that juncture, and that the recall of
Kimon proceeded from quite different feelings. Moreover, the
peace with Sparta was not made till some years afterwards.

[631] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 10.

[632] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 17; Periklês, c. 10; Thucyd. viii, 97.
Plutarch observes, respecting this reconciliation of parties
after the battle of Tanagra, after having mentioned that Periklês
himself proposed the restoration of Kimon—

Οὕτω τότε πολιτικαὶ μὲν ἦσαν αἱ διαφοραὶ, μέτριοι δὲ οἱ θυμοὶ
καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐανάκλητοι σύμφερον, ἡ δὲ φιλοτιμία πάντων
ἐπικρατοῦσα τῶν παθῶν τοῖς τῆς πατρίδος ὑπεχώρει καίροις.

Which remarks are very analogous to those of Thucydidês, in
recounting the memorable proceedings of the year 411 B. C., after
the deposition of the oligarchy of Four Hundred (Thucyd. viii,
97).

Καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι
φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες· μετρία γὰρ ἥ τε ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ
τοὺς πολλοὺς ξύγκρασις ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐκ πονηρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων
γενομένων τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀνήνεγκε τὴν πόλιν. I may remark that
the explanatory note of Dr. Arnold on this passage is less
instructive than his notes usually are, and even involves, in
my judgment, an erroneous supposition as to the meaning. Dr.
Arnold says: “It appears that the constitution as now fixed, was
_at first_, in the opinion of Thucydidês, the best that Athens
had ever enjoyed within his memory; that is, the best since the
complete ascendancy of the democracy effected under Periklês.
But how long a period is meant to be included by the words τὸν
πρῶτον χρόνον, and when, and how, did the implied change take
place? Τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον can hardly apply to the whole remaining
term of the war, as if this improved constitution had been first
subverted by the triumph of the oligarchy under the Thirty, and
then superseded by the restoration of the old democracy after
their overthrow. Yet Xenophon mentions no intermediate change in
the government between the beginning of his history and the end
of the war,” etc.

Now I do not think that Dr. Arnold rightly interprets τὸν πρῶτον
χρόνον. The phrase appears to me equivalent to τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον
πρῶτον: the words τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον, apply the comparison
altogether to the period _preceding_ this event here described,
and not to the period _following_ it. “And it was _during this
period first_, in my time at least, that the Athenians most of
all behaved like good citizens: for the Many and the Few met
each other in a spirit of moderation, and this first brought up
the city from its deep existing distress.” No such comparison is
intended as Dr. Arnold supposes, between the first moments after
this juncture, and the subsequent changes: the comparison is
between the political temper of the Athenians at this juncture,
and their usual temper as far back as Thucydidês could recollect.

Next, the words εὖ πολιτεύσαντες are understood by Dr. Arnold
in a sense too special and limited,—as denoting merely the new
constitution, or positive organic enactments, which the Athenians
now introduced. But it appears to me that the words are of wider
import: meaning the general temper of political parties, both
reciprocally towards each other and towards the commonwealth:
their inclination to relinquish antipathies, to accommodate
points of difference, and to coöperate with each other heartily
against the enemy, suspending those ἰδίας φιλοτιμίας, ἰδίας
διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας (ii, 65) noticed as
having been so mischievous before. Of course, any constitutional
arrangements introduced at such a period would partake of
the moderate and harmonious spirit then prevalent, and would
therefore form a part of what is commended by Thucydidês: but
his commendation is not confined to them specially. Compare the
phrase ii, 38. ἐλευθέρως δὲ τά τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν,
etc.

So powerful was this burst of fresh patriotism and unanimity after
the battle of Tanagra, which produced the recall of Kimon, and
appears to have overlaid the preëxisting conspiracy, that the
Athenians were quickly in a condition to wipe off the stain of
their defeat. It was on the sixty-second day after the battle that
they undertook an aggressive march under Myrônidês into Bœotia: the
extreme precision of this date,—being the single case throughout
the summary of events between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars,
wherein Thucydidês is thus precise, marks how strong an impression
it made upon the memory of the Athenians. At the battle of Œnophyta,
engaged against the aggregate Theban and Bœotian forces,—or, if
Diodorus is to be trusted, in two battles, of which that of Œnophyta
was the last, Myrônidês was completely victorious. The Athenians
became masters of Thebes as well as of the remaining Bœotian towns;
reversing all the arrangements recently made by Sparta,— establishing
democratical governments,—and forcing the aristocratical leaders,
favorable to Theban ascendency and Lacedæmonian connection, to
become exiles. Nor was it only Bœotia which the Athenians thus
acquired: Phocis and Lokris were both successively added to the list
of their dependent allies,—the former being in the main friendly to
Athens and not disinclined to the change, while the latter were so
decidedly hostile that one hundred of their chiefs were detained
and sent to Athens as hostages. The Athenians thus extended their
influence,—maintained through internal party-management, backed by
the dread of interference from without in case of need,—from the
borders of the Corinthian territory, including both Megara and Pêgæ,
to the strait of Thermopylæ.[633]

[633] Thucyd. i, 108; Diodor. xi, 81, 82.

These important acquisitions were soon crowned by the completion of
the Long Walls and the conquest of Ægina. That island, doubtless
starved out by its protracted blockade, was forced to capitulate on
condition of destroying its fortifications, surrendering all its
ships of war, and submitting to annual tribute as a dependent ally
of Athens. The reduction of this once powerful maritime city, marked
Athens as mistress of the sea on the Peloponnesian coast not less
than on the Ægean. Her admiral Tolmidês displayed her strength by
sailing round Peloponnesus, and even by the insult of burning the
Lacedæmonian ports of Methônê and of Gythium. He took Chalkis, a
possession of the Corinthians, and Naupaktus belonging to the Ozolian
Lokrians, near the mouth of the Corinthian gulf,—disembarked troops
near Sikyon with some advantage in a battle against opponents from
that town,—and either gained or forced into the Athenian alliance not
only Zakynthus and Kephallênia, but also some of the towns of Achaia;
for we afterwards find these latter attached to Athens without
knowing when the connection began.[634]

[634] Thucyd. i, 108-115; Diodor. xi, 84.

During the ensuing year the Athenians renewed their attack upon
Sikyon, with a force of one thousand hoplites under Periklês
himself, sailing from the Megarian harbor of Pêgæ in the Krissæan
gulf. This eminent man, however, gained no greater advantage than
Tolmidês,—defeating the Sikyonian forces in the field and driving
them within their walls: he afterwards made an expedition into
Akarnania, taking the Achæan allies in addition to his own forces,
but miscarried in his attack on Œniadæ and accomplished nothing. Nor
were the Athenians more successful in a march undertaken this same
year against Thessaly, for the purpose of restoring Orestes, one of
the exiled princes or nobles of Pharsalus. Though they took with them
an imposing force, including their Bœotian and Phocian allies, the
powerful Thessalian cavalry forced them to keep in a compact body
and confined them to the ground actually occupied by their hoplites;
while all their attempts against the city failed, and their hopes of
internal rising were disappointed.[635]

[635] Thucyd. i, 111; Diodor. xi, 85.

Had the Athenians succeeded in Thessaly, they would have acquired
to their alliance nearly the whole of extra-Peloponnesian Greece:
but even without Thessaly their power was prodigious, and had now
attained a maximum height, from which it never varied except to
decline. As a counterbalancing loss against so many successes, we
have to reckon their ruinous defeat in Egypt, after a war of six
years against the Persians (B. C. 460-455). At first, they had
gained brilliant advantages, in conjunction with the insurgent
prince Inarôs; expelling the Persians from all Memphis except the
strongest part, called the White Fortress: and such was the alarm of
the Persian king, Artaxerxes, at the presence of the Athenians in
Egypt, that he sent Megabazus with a large sum of money to Sparta,
in order to induce the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica. This envoy,
however, failed, and an augmented Persian force being sent to Egypt
under Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus,[636] drove the Athenians and their
allies, after an obstinate struggle, out of Memphis into the island
of the Nile called Prosôpîtis. Here they were blocked up for eighteen
months, until at length Megabyzus turned the arm of the river,
laid the channel dry, and stormed the island by land. A very few
Athenians escaped by land to Kyrênê: the rest were either slain or
made captive, and Inarôs himself was crucified. And the calamity of
Athens was farther aggravated by the arrival of fifty fresh Athenian
ships, which, coming after the defeat, but without being aware of it,
sailed into the Mendesian branch of the Nile, and thus fell unawares
into the power of the Persians and Phenicians; very few either of the
ships or men escaping. The whole of Egypt became again subject to
the Persians, except Amyrtæus, who contrived, by retiring into the
inaccessible fens, still to maintain his independence. One of the
largest armaments ever sent forth by Athens and her confederacy was
thus utterly ruined.[637]

[636] Herodot. iii, 160.

[637] Thucyd. i, 104, 109, 110; Diodor. xi, 77; xii, 3. The story
of Diodorus, in the first of these two passages,—that most of
the Athenian forces were allowed to come back under a favorable
capitulation granted by the Persian generals,—is contradicted by
the total ruin which he himself states to have befallen them in
the latter passages, as well as by Thucydidês.

It was about the time of the destruction of the Athenian army in
Egypt, and of the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by Tolmidês, that
the internal war, carried on by the Lacedæmonians, against the Helots
or Messenians at Ithômê, ended. These besieged men, no longer able to
stand out against a protracted blockade, were forced to abandon this
last fortress of ancient Messenian independence, stipulating for a
safe retreat from Peloponnesus with their wives and families, with
the proviso, that if any one of them ever returned to Peloponnesus,
he should become the slave of the first person who seized him. They
were established by Tolmidês at Naupaktus, which had recently been
taken by the Athenians from the Ozolian Lokrians,[638]—where they
will be found rendering good service to Athens in the following wars.

[638] Thucyd. i, 103; Diodor. xi, 84.

After the victory of Tanagra, the Lacedæmonians made no farther
expeditions out of Peloponnesus for several succeeding years, not
even to prevent Bœotia and Phocis from being absorbed into the
Athenian alliance. The reason of this remissness lay, partly, in
their general character; partly, in the continuance of the siege
of Ithômê, which occupied them at home; but still more, perhaps,
in the fact that the Athenians, masters of the Megarid, were in
occupation of the road over the highlands of Geraneia, and could
therefore obstruct the march of any army out from Peloponnesus. Even
after the surrender of Ithômê, the Lacedæmonians remained inactive
for three years, after which time a formal truce was concluded with
Athens by the Peloponnesians generally, for five years longer.[639]
This truce was concluded in a great degree through the influence of
Kimon,[640] who was eager to resume effective operations against the
Persians; while it was not less suitable to the political interests
of Periklês that his most distinguished rival should be absent on
foreign service,[641] so as not to interfere with his influence at
home. Accordingly, Kimon equipped a fleet of two hundred triremes,
from Athens and her confederates, and set sail for Cyprus, from
whence he despatched sixty ships to Egypt, at the request of the
insurgent prince Amyrtæus, who was still maintaining himself against
the Persians amidst the fens,—while with the remaining armament he
laid siege to Kitium. In the prosecution of this siege, he died,
either of disease or of a wound. The armament, under his successor,
Anaxikrates, became so embarrassed for want of provisions that
they abandoned the undertaking altogether, and went to fight the
Phenician and Kilikian fleet near Salamis, in Cyprus. They were here
victorious, first on sea, and afterwards on land, though probably not
on the same day, as at the Eurymedon; after which they returned home,
followed by the sixty ships which had gone to Egypt for the purpose
of aiding Amyrtæus.[642]

[639] Thucyd. i, 112.

[640] Theopompus, Fragm. 92, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 18;
Diodor. xi, 86.

It is to be presumed that this is the peace which Æschines (De
Fals. Legat. c. 54, p. 300) and Andokides or the Pseudo-Andokides
(De Pace, c. 1), state to have been made by Miltiades, son of
Kimon, proxenus of the Lacedæmonians; assuming that Miltiades
son of Kimon is put by them, through lapse of memory, for Kimon
son of Miltiades. But the passages of these orators involve so
much both of historical and chronological inaccuracy, that it
is unsafe to cite them, and impossible to amend them except
by conjecture. Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellen. Appendix, 8,
p. 257) has pointed out some of these inaccuracies; and there
are others besides, not less grave, especially in the oration
ascribed to Andokides. It is remarkable that both of them seem to
recognize only _two_ long walls, the northern and the southern
wall; whereas, in the time of Thucydidês, there were _three_ long
walls: the two near and parallel, connecting Athens with Peiræus,
and a third connecting it with Phalêrum. This last was never
renewed, after all of them had been partially destroyed at the
disastrous close of the Peloponnesian war: and it appears to have
passed out of the recollection of Æschines, who speaks of the
two walls as they existed in his time. I concur with the various
critics who pronounce the oration ascribed to Andokides to be
spurious.

[641] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 10, and Reipublic. Gerend. Præcep.
p. 812.

An understanding to this effect between the two rivals is
so natural, that we need not resort to the supposition of a
secret agreement concluded between them through the mediation
of Elpinikê, sister of Kimon, which Plutarch had read in some
authors. The charms as well as the intrigues of Elpinikê appear
to have figured conspicuously in the memoirs of Athenian
biographers: they were employed by one party as a means of
calumniating Kimon, by the other for discrediting Periklês.

[642] Thucyd. i, 112; Diodorus, xii, 13. Diodorus mentions the
name of the general Anaxikrates. He affirms farther that Kimon
lived not only to take Kitium and Mallus, but also to gain these
two victories. But the authority of Thucydidês, superior on every
ground to Diodorus, is more particularly superior as to the death
of Kimon, with whom he was connected by relationship.

From this time forward no farther operations were undertaken by
Athens and her confederacy against the Persians. And it appears that
a convention was concluded between them, whereby the Great King
on his part promised two things: To leave free, undisturbed, and
untaxed, the Asiatic maritime Greeks, not sending troops within a
given distance of the coast: to refrain from sending any ships of
war either westward of Phasêlis (others place the boundary at the
Chelidonean islands, rather more to the westward) or within the
Kyanean rocks at the confluence of the Thracian Bosphorus with
the Euxine. On their side, the Athenians agreed to leave him in
undisturbed possession of Cyprus and Egypt. Kallias, an Athenian of
distinguished family, with some others of his countrymen, went up to
Susa to negotiate this convention: and certain envoys from Argos,
then in alliance with Athens, took the opportunity of going thither
at the same time, to renew the friendly understanding which their
city had established with Xerxes at the period of his invasion of
Greece.[643]

[643] Herodot. vii, 151; Diodor. xii, 3, 4. Demosthenês (De False
Legat. c. 77, p. 428, R: compare De Rhodior. Libert. c. 13, p.
199) speaks of this peace as τὴν ὑπὸ πάντων θρυλλουμένην εἰρήνεν.
Compare Lykurgus, cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. 187; Isokratês,
Panegyr. c. 33, 34, p. 244; Areopagitic. c. 37, pp. 150, 229;
Panathenaic, c. 20, p. 360.

The loose language of these orators makes it impossible to
determine what was the precise limit in respect of vicinity to
the coast. Isokratês is careless enough to talk of the river
Halys as the boundary; Demosthenês states it as “a day’s course
for a horse,”—which is probably larger than the truth.

The two boundaries marked by sea, on the other hand, are both
clear and natural, in reference to the Athenian empire,—the
Kyanean rocks at one end, Phasêlis, or the Chelidonian
islands—there is no material distance between these two
last-mentioned places—on the other.

Dahlmann, at the end of his Dissertation on the reality of
this Kimonian peace, collects the various passages of authors
wherein it is mentioned: among them are several out of the rhetor
Aristeidês (Forschungen pp. 140-148).

As is generally the case with treaties after hostility,—this
convention did little more than recognize the existing state of
things, without introducing any new advantage or disadvantage on
either side, or calling for any measures to be taken in consequence
of it. We may hence assign a reasonable ground for the silence
of Thucydidês, who does not even notice the convention as having
been made: we are to recollect always that in the interval between
the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, he does not profess to do
more than glance briefly at the main events. But the boastful and
inaccurate authors of the ensuing century, orators, rhetors, and
historians, indulged in so much exaggeration and untruth respecting
this convention, both as to date and as to details,—and extolled
as something so glorious the fact of having imposed such hard
conditions on the Great King,—that they have raised a suspicion
against themselves. Especially, they have occasioned critics to ask
the very natural question, how this splendid achievement of Athens
came to be left unnoticed by Thucydidês? Now the answer to such
question is, that the treaty itself was really of no great moment:
it is the state of facts and relations implied in the treaty, and
existing substantially before it was concluded, which constitutes
the real glory of Athens. But to the later writers, the treaty stood
forth as the legible evidence of facts which in their time were
passed and gone; while Thucydidês and his contemporaries, living in
the actual fulness of the Athenian empire, would certainly not appeal
to the treaty as an evidence, and might well pass it over, even as
an event, when studying to condense the narrative. Though Thucydidês
has not mentioned the treaty, he says nothing which disproves its
reality, and much which is in full harmony with it. For we may show,
even from him: 1. That all open and direct hostilities between
Athens and Persia ceased, after the last-mentioned victories of the
Athenians near Cyprus: that this island is renounced by Athens, not
being included by Thucydidês in his catalogue of Athenian allies
prior to the Peloponnesian war;[644] and that no farther aid is given
by Athens to the revolted Amyrtæus in Egypt. 2. That down to the
time when the Athenian power was prostrated by the ruinous failure
at Syracuse, no tribute was collected by the Persian satraps in Asia
Minor from the Greek cities on the coast, nor were Persian ships
of war allowed to appear in the waters of the Ægean,[645] nor was
the Persian king admitted to be sovereign of the country down to
the coast. Granting, therefore, that we were even bound, from the
silence of Thucydidês, to infer that no treaty was concluded, we
should still be obliged also to infer, from his positive averments,
that a state of historical fact, such as the treaty acknowledged and
prescribed, became actually realized. But when we reflect farther,
that Herodotus[646] certifies the visit of Kallias and other Athenian
envoys to the court of Susa, we can assign no other explanation of
such visit so probable as the reality of this treaty: certainly, no
envoys would have gone thither during a state of recognized war; and
though it may be advanced as possible that they may have gone with
the view to conclude a treaty, and yet not have succeeded,—this would
be straining the limits of possibility beyond what is reasonable.[647]

[644] Thucyd. ii, 14.

[645] Thucyd. viii, 5, 6, 56. As this is a point on which very
erroneous representations have been made by some learned critics,
especially by Dahlmann and Manso (see the treatises cited in the
subsequent note 647), I transcribe the passage of Thucydidês.
He is speaking of the winter of B. C. 412, immediately succeeding
the ruin of the Athenian army at Syracuse, and after redoubled
exertions had been making—even some months before that ruin
actually took place—to excite active hostile proceedings against
Athens from every quarter (Thucyd. vii, 25): it being seen that
there was a promising opportunity for striking a heavy blow
at the Athenian power. The satrap Tissaphernes encouraged the
Chians and Erythræans to revolt, sending an envoy along with
them to Sparta with persuasions and promises of aid,—ἐπήγετο
καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης τοὺς Πελοποννησίους καὶ ὑπισχνεῖτο τροφὴν
παρέξειν. Ὑπὸ βασιλέως γὰρ ~νεωστὶ ἐτύγχανε~ πεπραγμένος τοὺς
ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους, οὓς δι’ Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων
πόλεων οὐ δυνάμενος πράσσεσθαι ~ἐπωφείλησε~. Τούς τε οὖν φόρους
μᾶλλον ἐνόμιζε κομιεῖσθαι, κακώσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ἅμα
βασιλεῖ ξυμμάχους Λακεδαιμονίους ποιήσειν, etc. In the next
chapter, Thucydidês tells us that the satrap Pharnabazus wanted
to obtain Lacedæmonian aid in the same manner as Tissaphernes,
for _his_ satrapy also, in order that he might detach the Greek
cities from Athens, and be able to levy the tribute upon them.
Two Greeks go to Sparta, sent by Pharnabazus, ὅπως ναῦς κομίσειαν
ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον, καὶ αὐτὸς, εἰ δύναιτο ἅπερ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης
προὐθυμεῖτο, τάς τε ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῇ πόλεις Ἀθηναίων ἀποστήσειε
~διὰ τοὺς φόρους~, καὶ ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ βασιλεῖ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν τῶν
Λακεδαιμονίων ποιήσειε.

These passages, strange to say, are considered by Manso and
Dahlmann as showing that the Grecian cities on the Asiatic coast,
though subject to the Athenian empire, continued, nevertheless,
to pay their tribute regularly to Susa. To me, the passages
appear to disprove this very supposition: they show that it was
essential for the satrap to detach these cities from the Athenian
empire, as a means of procuring tribute from them to Persia:
that the Athenian empire, while it lasted, prevented him from
getting any tribute from the cities subject to it. Manso and
Dahlmann have overlooked the important meaning of the adverb
of time νεωστὶ—“lately.” By that word, Thucydidês expressly
intimates that the court of Susa _had only recently_ demanded
from Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, tribute from the maritime
Greeks within their satrapies: and he implies that _until
recently no such demand_ had been made upon them. The court of
Susa, apprized, doubtless, by Grecian exiles and agents, of the
embarrassments into which Athens had fallen, conceived this a
suitable moment for exacting tributes; to which, doubtless, it
always considered itself entitled, though the power of Athens
had compelled it to forego them. Accordingly, the demand was now
for the first time sent down to Tissaphernes, and he “_became
a debtor_ for them” to the court (ἐπωφείλησε), until he could
collect them: which he could not at first do, even then,
embarrassed as Athens was,—and which, _à fortiori_, he could not
have done before, when Athens was in full power.

We learn from these passages two valuable facts. 1. That the
maritime Asiatic cities belonging to the Athenian empire paid no
tribute to Susa, from the date of the full organization of the
Athenian confederacy down to a period after the Athenian defeat
in Sicily. 2. That, nevertheless, these cities always continued,
throughout this period, to stand rated in the Persian king’s
books each for its appropriate tribute,—the court of Susa waiting
for a convenient moment to occur, when it should be able to
enforce its demands, from misfortune accruing to Athens.

This state of relations, between the Asiatic Greeks and the
Persian court under the Athenian empire, authenticated by
Thucydidês, enables us to explain a passage of Herodotus, on
which also both Manso and Dahlmann have dwelt (p. 94) with rather
more apparent plausibility, as proving their view of the case.
Herodotus, after describing the rearrangement and remeasurement
of the territories of the Ionic cities by the satrap Artaphernes
(about 493 B. C., after the suppression of the Ionic revolt),
proceeds to state that he assessed the tribute of each with
reference to this new measurement, and that the assessment
remained unchanged until his own (Herodotus’s) time,—καὶ
τὰς χώρας σφέων μετρήσας κατὰ παρασάγγας ... φόρους ~ἔταξε~
ἑκάστοισι, οἳ κατὰ χώρην διατελέουσι ἔχοντες ἐκ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου
αἰεὶ ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ, ὡς ἐτάχθησαν ἐξ Ἀρταφέρνεος· ~ἐτάχθησαν~ δὲ
σχεδὸν κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τὰ καὶ πρότερον εἶχον (vi, 42). Now Dahlmann
and Manso contend that Herodotus here affirms the tribute
of the Ionic cities to Persia to have been continuously and
regularly paid, down to his own time. But in my judgment this is
a mistake: Herodotus speaks, not about the _payment_, but about
the _assessment_: and these were two very different things, as
Thucydidês clearly intimates in the passage which I have cited
above. The _assessment_ of all the Ionic cities in the Persian
king’s books remained unaltered all through the Athenian empire;
but the _payment_ was not enforced until immediately before 412
B. C., when the Athenians were supposed to be too weak to hinder
it. It is evident by the account of the general Persian revenues,
throughout all the satrapies, which we find in the third book
of Herodotus, that he had access to official accounts of the
Persian finances, or at least to Greek secretaries who knew those
accounts. He would be told, that these assessments remained
unchanged from the time of Artaphernes downward: whether they
were _realized_ or not was another question, which the “books”
would probably not answer, and which he might or might not know.

The passages above cited from Thucydidês appear to me to afford
positive proof that the Greek cities on the Asiatic _coast_—not
those in the interior, as we may see by the case of Magnesia
given to Themistoklês—paid no tribute to Persia during the
continuance of the Athenian empire. But if there were no such
positive proof, I should still maintain the same opinion. For
if these Greeks went on paying tribute, what is meant by the
phrases, of their having “_revolted_ from Persia,” of their
“having _been liberated_ from the king,” (οἱ ἀποστάντες βασιλέως
Ἕλληνες—οἱ ἀπὸ Ἰωνίας καὶ Ἑλλησπόντου ἤδη ἀφεστηκότες ἀπὸ
βασιλέως—ὅσοι ἀπὸ βασιλέως νεωστὶ ἠλευθέρωντο, Thucyd. i, 18, 89,
95)?

So much respecting the payment of tribute. As to the other
point,—that between 477 and 412 B. C., no Persian ships were
tolerated along the coast of Ionia, which coast, though
claimed by the Persian king, was not recognized by the Greeks
as belonging to him,—proof will be found in Thucyd. viii, 56:
compare Diodor. iv, 26.

[646] Herodot. vi, 151. Diodorus also states that this peace was
concluded by Kallias the Athenian (xii, 4).

[647] I conclude, on the whole, in favor of this treaty as an
historical fact,—though sensible that some of the arguments
urged against it are not without force. Mr. Mitford and Dr.
Thirlwall (ch. xvii, p. 474), as well as Manso and Dahlmann, not
to mention others, have impugned the reality of the treaty: and
the last-mentioned author, particularly, has examined the case at
length and set forth all the grounds of objection; urging, among
some which are really serious, others which appear to me weak and
untenable (Manso, Sparta, vol. iii, Beylage x, p. 471; Dahlmann,
Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte, vol. i, Ueber den
Kimonischen Frieden, pp. 1-148). Boëckh admits the treaty as an
historical fact.

If we deny altogether the historical reality of the treaty, we
must adopt some such hypothesis as that of Dahlmann (p. 40):
“The distinct mention and averment of such a peace as having
been formally concluded, appears to have first arisen among the
schools of the rhetors at Athens, shortly after the peace of
Antalkidas, and as an oratorical antithesis to oppose to that
peace.”

To which we must add the supposition, that some persons must have
taken the trouble to cause this fabricated peace to be engraved
on a pillar, and placed, either in the Metrôon or somewhere else
in Athens, among the records of Athenian glories. For that it was
so engraved on a column is certain (Theopompus ap. Harpokration.
Ἀττικοῖς γράμμασι). The suspicion started by Theopompus (and
founded on the fact that the peace was engraved, not in ancient
Attic, but in Ionic letters—the latter sort having been only
legalized in Athens after the archonship of Eukleides), that this
treaty was a subsequent invention and not an historical reality,
does not weigh with me very much. Assuming the peace to be real,
it would naturally be drawn up and engraved in the character
habitually used among the Ionic cities of Asia Minor, since they
were the parties most specially interested in it: or it might
even have been reëngraved, seeing that nearly a century must
have elapsed between the conclusion of the treaty and the time
when Theopompus saw the pillar. I confess that the hypothesis
of Dahlmann appears to me more improbable than the historical
reality of the treaty. I think it more likely that there _was_ a
treaty, and that the orators talked exaggerated and false matters
respecting it,—rather than that they fabricated the treaty from
the beginning with a deliberate purpose, and with the false name
of an envoy conjoined.

Dahlmann exposes justly and forcibly—an easy task, indeed—the
loose, inconsistent, and vainglorious statements of the orators
respecting this treaty. The chronological error by which it
was asserted to have been made shortly after the victories of
the Eurymedon—and was thus connected with the name of Kimon—is
one of the circumstances which have most tended to discredit
the attesting witnesses: but we must not forget that Ephorus
(assuming that Diodorus in this case copies Ephorus, which is
highly probable—xii, 3, 4) did not fall into this mistake,
but placed the treaty in its right chronological place, after
the Athenian expedition under Kimon against Cyprus and Egypt
in 450-449 B. C. Kimon died before the great results of this
expedition were consummated, as we know from Thucydidês: on this
point Diodorus speaks equivocally, but rather giving it to be
understood that Kimon lived to complete the whole, and then died
of sickness.

The absurd exaggeration of Isokratês, that the treaty bound the
Persian kings not to come westward of the river Halys, has also
been very properly censured. He makes this statement in two
different orations (Areopagatic. p. 150; Panathenaic. p. 462).

But though Dahlmann succeeds in discrediting the orators, he
tries in vain to show that the treaty is in itself improbable,
or inconsistent with any known historical facts. A large portion
of his dissertation is employed in this part of the case, and I
think quite unsuccessfully. The fact that the Persian satraps are
seen at various periods after the treaty lending aid—underhand,
yet without taking much pains to disguise it—to Athenian revolted
subjects, does not prove that no treaty had been concluded.
These satraps would, doubtless, be very glad to infringe the
treaty, whenever they thought they could do so with advantage:
if any misfortune had happened to Athens from the hands of the
Peloponnesians,—for example, if the Athenians had been unwise
enough to march their aggregate land-force out of the city to
repel the invading Peloponnesians from Attica, and had been
totally defeated,—the Persians would, doubtless, have tried to
regain Ionia forthwith. So the Lacedæmonians, at a time when
they were actually in alliance with Athens, listened to the
persuasions of the revolted Thasians, and promised secretly to
invade Attica, in order to aid their revolt (Thucyd. i, 103).
Because a treaty is very imperfectly observed,—or rather because
the parties, without coming to open war, avail themselves of
opportunities to evade it and encroach upon its prescriptions,—we
are not entitled to deny that it has ever been made (Dahlmann, p.
116).

It seems to me that the objections which have been taken by
Dahlmann and others against the historical reality of this
treaty, tell for the most part only against the exaggerated
importance assigned to it by subsequent orators.

We may therefore believe in the reality of this treaty between Athens
and Persia, improperly called the Kimonian treaty: improperly, since
not only was it concluded after the death of Kimon, but the Athenian
victories by which it was immediately brought on were gained after
his death. Nay, more,—the probability is, that if Kimon had lived, it
would not have been concluded at all; for his interest as well as his
glory led him to prosecute the war against Persia, since he was no
match for his rival Periklês, either as a statesman or as an orator,
and could only maintain his popularity by the same means whereby he
had earned it,—victories and plunder at the cost of the Persians.
His death insured more complete ascendency to Periklês, whose policy
and character were of a cast altogether opposite:[648] while even
Thucydidês, son of Melêsias, who succeeded Kimon, his relation, as
leader of the anti-Periklean party, was also a man of the senate and
public assembly rather than of campaigns and conquests. Averse to
distant enterprises and precarious acquisitions, Periklês was only
anxious to maintain unimpaired the Hellenic ascendency of Athens,
now at its very maximum: he was well aware that the undivided force
and vigilance of Athens would not be too much for this object,—nor
did they in fact prove sufficient, as we shall presently see. With
such dispositions he was naturally glad to conclude a peace, which
excluded the Persians from all the coasts of Asia Minor, westward of
the Chelidoneans, as well as from all the waters of the Ægean, under
the simple condition of renouncing on the part of Athens farther
aggressions against Cyprus, Phenicia, Kilikia, and Egypt. The Great
King on his side had had sufficient experience of Athenian energy
to fear the consequences of such aggressions, if prosecuted; nor
did he lose much by relinquishing formally a tribute which at the
time he could have little hope of realizing, and which of course he
intended to resume on the first favorable opportunity. Weighing all
these circumstances, we shall find that the peace, improperly called
Kimonian, results naturally from the position and feelings of the
contracting parties.

[648] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 21-28.

Athens was now at peace both abroad and at home, under the
administration of Periklês, with a great empire, a great fleet, and
a great accumulated treasure. The common fund collected from the
contributions of the confederates, and originally deposited at Delos,
had before this time been transferred to the acropolis at Athens. At
what precise time this transfer took place, we cannot state: nor are
we enabled to assign the successive stages whereby the confederacy,
chiefly with the freewill of its own members, became transformed
from a body of armed and active warriors under the guidance of
Athens, into disarmed and passive tribute-payers, defended by the
military force of Athens,—from allies free, meeting at Delos, and
self-determining, into subjects isolated, sending their annual
tribute, and awaiting Athenian orders. But it would appear that the
change had been made before this time: some of the more resolute of
the allies had tried to secede, but Athens had coerced them by force,
and reduced them to the condition of tribute-payers, without ships
or defence; and Chios, Lesbos, and Samos were now the only allies
free and armed on the original footing. Every successive change of an
armed ally into a tributary,—every subjugation of a seceder,—tended
of course to cut down the numbers, and enfeeble the authority, of the
Delian synod; and, what was still worse, it altered the reciprocal
relation and feelings both of Athens and her allies,—exalting the
former into something like a despot, and degrading the latter into
mere passive subjects.

Of course, the palpable manifestation of the change must have been
the transfer of the confederate fund from Delos to Athens. The only
circumstance which we know respecting this transfer is, that it was
proposed by the Samians,[649]—the second power in the confederacy,
inferior only to Athens, and least of all likely to favor any job or
sinister purpose of the Athenians. It is farther said that, when the
Samians proposed it, Aristeidês characterized it as a motion unjust,
but useful: we may well doubt, however, whether it was made during
his lifetime. When the synod at Delos ceased to be so fully attended
as to command respect,—when war was lighted up, not only with Persia,
but with Ægina and Peloponnesus,—the Samians might not unnaturally
feel that the large accumulated fund, with its constant annual
accessions, would be safer at Athens than at Delos, which latter
island would require a permanent garrison and squadron to insure it
against attack. But whatever may have been the grounds on which the
Samians proceeded, when we find them coming forward to propose the
transfer, we may reasonably infer that it was not displeasing, and
did not appear unjust, to the larger members of the confederacy,—and
that it was no high-handed and arbitrary exercise of power, as it is
often called, on the part of Athens.

[649] Plutarch, Aristeidês. c. 25.

After the conclusion of the war with Ægina, and the consequences
of the battle of Œnophyta, the position of Athens became altered
more and more. She acquired a large catalogue of new allies, partly
tributary, like Ægina,—partly in the same relation as Chios, Lesbos,
and Samos; that is, obliged only to a conformity of foreign policy
and to military service. In this last category were Megara, the
Bœotian cities, the Phocians, Lokrians, etc. All these, though
allies of Athens, were strangers to Delos and the confederacy
against Persia; and accordingly, that confederacy passed insensibly
into a matter of history, giving place to the new conception of
imperial Athens, with her extensive list of allies, partly free,
partly subject. Such transition, arising spontaneously out of the
character and circumstances of the confederates themselves, was thus
materially forwarded by the acquisitions of Athens extraneous to
the confederacy. She was now not merely the first maritime state of
Greece, but perhaps equal to Sparta even in land-power,—possessing
in her alliance Megara, Bœotia, Phocis, Lokris, together with Achæa
and Trœzen, in Peloponnesus. Large as this aggregate already was,
both at sea and on land, yet the magnitude of the annual tribute,
and still more the character of the Athenians themselves, superior
to all Greeks in that combination of energy and discipline which
is the grand cause of progress, threatened still farther increase.
Occupying the Megarian harbor of Pêgæ, the Athenians had full means
of naval action on both sides of the Corinthian isthmus: but, what
was of still greater importance to them, by their possession of
the Megarid, and of the highlands of Geraneia, they could restrain
any land-force from marching out of Peloponnesus, and were thus,
considering besides their mastery at sea, completely unassailable in
Attica. Ever since the repulse of Xerxes, Athens had been advancing
in an uninterrupted course of power and prosperity at home, as well
as of victory and ascendency abroad,—to which there was no exception,
except the ruinous enterprise in Egypt. Looking at the position of
Greece, therefore, about 448 B. C.,—after the conclusion of the
five years’ truce between the Peloponnesians and Athens, and of the
so-called Kimonian peace between Persia and Athens,—a discerning
Greek might well calculate upon farther aggrandizement of this
imperial state as the tendency of the age; and accustomed as every
Greek was to the conception of separate town-autonomy as essential to
a freeman and a citizen, such prospect could not but inspire terror
and aversion. The sympathy of the Peloponnesians for the islanders
and ultra-maritime states, who constituted the original confederacy
of Athens, was not considerable; but when the Dorian island of Ægina
was subjugated also, and passed into the condition of a defenceless
tributary, they felt the blow sorely on every ground. The ancient
celebrity and eminent service rendered at the battle of Salamis, of
this memorable island, had not been able to protect it; while those
great Æginetan families, whose victories at the sacred festival-games
Pindar celebrates in a large proportion of his odes, would spread
the language of complaint and indignation throughout their numerous
“guests” in every Hellenic city. Of course, the same anti-Athenian
feeling would pervade those Peloponnesian states who had been
engaged in actual hostility with Athens,—Corinth, Sikyon, Epidaurus,
etc., as well as Sparta, the once-recognized head of Hellas, but
now tacitly degraded from her preëminence, baffled in her projects
respecting Bœotia, and exposed to the burning of her port at Gythium,
without being able even to retaliate upon Attica. Putting all those
circumstances together, we may comprehend the powerful feeling of
dislike and apprehension now diffused so widely over Greece against
the upstart despot city; whose ascendency, newly acquired, maintained
by superior force, and not recognized as legitimate,—threatened,
nevertheless, still farther increase. Sixteen years hence, this same
sentiment will be found exploding into the Peloponnesian war; but
it became rooted in the Greek mind during the period which we have
now reached, when Athens was much more formidable than she had
come to be at the commencement of that war: nor shall we thoroughly
appreciate the ideas of that later period, unless we take them as
handed down from the earlier date of the five years’ truce, about
451-446 B. C.

Formidable as the Athenian empire both really was and appeared to
be, however, this wide-spread feeling of antipathy proved still
stronger, so that, instead of the threatened increase, the empire
underwent a most material diminution. This did not arise from the
attack of open enemies; for during the five years’ truce, Sparta
undertook only one movement, and that not against Attica: she sent
troops to Delphi, in an expedition dignified with the name of the
Sacred War,—expelled the Phocians, who had assumed to themselves the
management of the temple,—and restored it to the native Delphians.
To this the Athenians made no direct opposition: but as soon as the
Lacedæmonians were gone, they themselves marched thither and placed
the temple again in the hands of the Phocians, who were then their
allies.[650] The Delphians were members of the Phocian league, and
there was a dispute of old standing as to the administration of the
temple,—whether it belonged to them separately or to the Phocians
collectively. The favor of those who administered it counted as an
element of considerable moment in Grecian politics; the sympathies
of the leading Delphians led them to embrace the side of Sparta, but
the Athenians now hoped to counteract this tendency by means of their
preponderance in Phocis. We are not told that the Lacedæmonians took
any ulterior step in consequence of their views being frustrated by
Athens,—a significant evidence of the politics of that day.

[650] Thucyd. i, 112; compare Philochor. Fragm. 88, ed. Didot.

The blow which brought down the Athenian empire from this its
greatest exaltation, was struck by the subjects themselves. The
Athenian ascendency over Bœotia, Phocis, Lokris, and Eubœa, was
maintained, not by means of garrisons, but through domestic parties
favorable to Athens, and a suitable form of government; just in the
same way as Sparta maintained her influence over her Peloponnesian
allies.[651] After the victory of Œnophyta, the Athenians had broken
up the governments in the Bœotian cities established by Sparta
before the battle of Tanagra, and converted them into democracies
at Thebes and elsewhere. Many of the previous leading men had thus
been sent into exile: and as the same process had taken place in
Phocis and Lokris, there was at this time a considerable aggregate
body of exiles, Bœotian, Phocian, Lokrian, Eubœan, Æginetan, etc.,
all bitterly hostile to Athens, and ready to join in any attack upon
her power. We learn farther that the democracy,[652] established
at Thebes after the battle of Œnophyta, was ill-conducted and
disorderly: which circumstances laid open Bœotia still farther to
the schemes of assailants on the watch for every weak point. These
various exiles, all joining their forces and concerting measures with
their partisans in the interior, succeeded in mastering Orchomenus,
Chæroneia, and some other less important places in Bœotia. The
Athenian general, Tolmidês, marched to expel them, with one thousand
Athenian hoplites and an auxiliary body of allies. It appears that
this march was undertaken in haste and rashness: the hoplites of
Tolmidês, principally youthful volunteers, and belonging to the
best families of Athens, disdained the enemy too much to await
a larger and more commanding force: nor would the people listen
even to Periklês, when he admonished them that the march would be
full of hazard, and adjured them not to attempt it without greater
numbers as well as greater caution.[653] Fatally, indeed, were
his predictions justified. Though Tolmidês was successful in his
first enterprise,—the recapture of Chæroneia, wherein he placed a
garrison,—yet in his march, probably incautious and disorderly, when
departing from that place, he was surprised and attacked unawares,
near Korôneia, by the united body of exiles and their partisans. No
defeat in Grecian history was ever more complete or ruinous. Tolmidês
himself was slain, together with many of the Athenian hoplites,
while a large number of them were taken prisoners. In order to
recover these prisoners, who belonged to the best families in the
city, the Athenians submitted to a convention whereby they agreed
to evacuate Bœotia altogether: in all the cities of that country,
the exiles were restored, the democratical government overthrown,
and Bœotia was transformed from an ally of Athens into her bitter
enemy.[654] Long, indeed, did the fatal issue of this action dwell
in the memory of the Athenians,[655] and inspire them with an
apprehension of Bœotian superiority in heavy armor on land: but if
the hoplites under Tolmidês had been all slain on the field, their
death would probably have been avenged and Bœotia would not have been
lost,—whereas, in the case of living citizens, the Athenians deemed
no sacrifice too great to redeem them. We shall discover hereafter in
the Lacedæmonians a feeling very similar, respecting their brethren
captured at Sphakteria.

[651] Thucyd. i, 19. Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς ἔχοντες φόρου
τοὺς ξυμμάχους, κατ’ ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς μόνον ἐπιτηδείως
ὅπως πολιτεύσουσι θεραπεύοντες—the same also i, 76-144.

[652] Aristotel. Politic. v, 2, 6. Καὶ ἐν Θήβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν
Οἰνοφύτοις μάχην, κακῶς πολιτευομένων, ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη.

[653] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 18; also, his comparison between
Periklês and Fabius Maximus, c. 3.

Kleinias, father of the celebrated Alkibiadês, was slain in
this battle: he had served, thirty-three years before, at
the sea-fight of Artemisium: he cannot therefore be numbered
among the youthful warriors, though a person of the first rank
(Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 1).

[654] Thucyd. i, 113; Diodor. xii, 6. Platæa appears to have
been considered as quite dissevered from Bœotia: it remained in
connection with Athens as intimately as before.

[655] Xenophon, Memorabil. iii, 5, 4.

The calamitous consequences of this defeat came upon Athens in thick
and rapid succession. The united exiles, having carried their point
in Bœotia, proceeded to expel the philo-Athenian government both from
Phocis and Lokris, and to carry the flame of revolt into Eubœa. To
this important island Periklês himself proceeded forthwith, at the
head of a powerful force; but before he had time to complete the
reconquest, he was summoned home by news of a still more formidable
character. The Megarians had revolted from Athens: by a conspiracy
previously planned, a division of hoplites from Corinth, Sikyon,
and Epidaurus, was already admitted as garrison into their city:
the Athenian soldiers who kept watch over the Long Walls had been
overpowered and slain, except a few who escaped into the fortified
port of Nisæa. As if to make the Athenians at once sensible how
seriously this disaster affected them, by throwing open the road
over Geraneia,—Pleistoanax, king of Sparta, was announced as already
on his march for an invasion of Attica. He did, in truth, conduct an
army, of mixed Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesian allies, into Attica,
as far as the neighborhood of Eleusis and the Thriasian plain. He was
a very young man, so that a Spartan of mature years, Kleandridês,
had been attached to him by the ephors as adjutant and counsellor.
Periklês, it is said, persuaded both the one and the other, by means
of large bribes, to evacuate Attica without advancing to Athens. We
may well doubt whether they had force enough to adventure so far into
the interior, and we shall hereafter observe the great precautions
with which Archidamus thought it necessary to conduct his invasion,
during the first year of the Peloponnesian war, though at the head
of a more commanding force. Nevertheless, on their return, the
Lacedæmonians, believing that they might have achieved it, found both
of them guilty of corruption. Both were banished: Kleandridês never
came back, and Pleistoanax himself lived for a long time in sanctuary
near the temple of Athênê, at Tegea, until at length he procured his
restoration by tampering with the Pythian priestess, and by bringing
her bought admonitions to act upon the authorities at Sparta.[656]

[656] Thucyd. i, 114; v, 16, Plutarch, Periklês, c. 22.

So soon as the Lacedæmonians had retired from Attica, Periklês
returned with his forces to Eubœa, and reconquered the island
completely. With that caution which always distinguished him as a
military man, so opposite to the fatal rashness of Tolmidês, he took
with him an overwhelming force of fifty triremes and five thousand
hoplites. He admitted most of the Eubœan towns to surrender, altering
the government of Chalkis by the expulsion of the wealthy oligarchy
called the Hippobotæ; but the inhabitants of Histiæa, at the north
of the island, who had taken an Athenian merchantman and massacred
all the crew, were more severely dealt with,—the free population
being all or in great part expelled, and the land distributed among
Athenian kleruchs, or out-settled citizens.[657]

[657] Thucyd. i, 114; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 23; Diodor. xii, 7.

But the reconquest of Eubœa was far from restoring Athens to the
position which she had occupied before the fatal engagement of
Korôneia. Her land empire was irretrievably gone, together with
her recently acquired influence over the Delphian oracle; and
she reverted to her former condition of an exclusively maritime
potentate. For though she still continued to hold Nisæa and Pegæ,
yet her communication with the latter harbor was now out off by the
loss of Megara and its appertaining territory, so that she thus
lost her means of acting in the Corinthian gulf, and of protecting
as well as of constraining her allies in Achaia. Nor was the port
of Nisæa of much value to her, disconnected from the city to which
it belonged, except as a post for annoying that city. Moreover,
the precarious hold which she possessed over unwilling allies had
been demonstrated in a manner likely to encourage similar attempts
among her maritime subjects,—attempts which would now be seconded by
Peloponnesian armies invading Attica. The fear of such a combination
of embarrassments, and especially of an irresistible enemy carrying
ruin over the flourishing territory round Eleusis and Athens, was at
this moment predominant in the Athenian mind. We shall find Periklês,
at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, fourteen years afterwards,
exhausting all his persuasive force, and not succeeding without great
difficulty, in prevailing upon his countrymen to endure the hardship
of invasion,—even in defence of their maritime empire, and when
events had been gradually so ripening as to render the prospect of
war familiar, if not inevitable. But the late series of misfortunes
had burst upon them so rapidly and unexpectedly, as to discourage
even Athenian confidence, and to render the prospect of continued war
full of gloom and danger. The prudence of Periklês would doubtless
counsel the surrender of their remaining landed possessions or
alliances, which had now become unprofitable, in order to purchase
peace; but we may be sure that nothing short of extreme temporary
despondency could have induced the Athenian assembly to listen to
such advice, and to accept the inglorious peace which followed. A
truce for thirty years was concluded with Sparta and her allies, in
the beginning of 445 B. C., whereby Athens surrendered Nisæa, Pegæ,
Achaia, and Trœzen,—thus abandoning Peloponnesus altogether,[658]
and leaving the Megarians—with their full territory and their two
ports—to be included among the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta.

[658] Thucyd. i, 114, 115; ii, 21; Diodor. xii, 5. I do not at
all doubt that the word Achaia here used, means the country in
the north part of Peloponnesus, usually known by that name.
The suspicions of Göller and others, that it means, not this
territory, but some unknown town, appear to me quite unfounded.
Thucydidês had never noticed the exact time when the Athenians
acquired Achaia as a dependent ally, though he notices the
Achæans (i, 111) in that capacity. This is one argument, among
many, to show that we must be cautious in reasoning from the
silence of Thucydidês against the reality of an event,—in
reference to this period between the Persian and Peloponnesian
wars, where his whole summary is so brief.

In regard to the chronology of these events, Mr. Fynes Clinton
remarks: “The disasters in Bœotia produced the revolt of Eubœa
and Megara about eighteen months after, in Anthestêrion 445 B.
C.: and the Peloponnesian invasion of Attica, on the expiration
of the five years’ truce,” (ad ann. 447 B. C.)

Mr. Clinton seems to me to allow a longer interval than is
probable: I incline to think that the revolt of Eubœa and Megara
followed more closely upon the disasters in Bœotia, in spite of
the statement of archons given by Diodorus: οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον,
the expression of Thucydidês means probably no more than three
or four months; and the whole series of events were evidently
the product of one impulse. The truce having been concluded in
the beginning of 445 B. C., it seems reasonable to place the
revolt of Eubœa and Megara, as well as the invasion of Attica by
Pleistoanax, in 446 B. C.—and the disasters in Bœotia, either in
the beginning of 446 B. C., or the close of 447 B. C.

It is hardly safe to assume, moreover (as Mr. Clinton does, ad
ann. 450, as well as Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. xvii, p. 478),
that the five years’ truce must have been actually expired before
Pleistoanax and the Lacedæmonians invaded Attica: the thirty
years’ truce, afterwards concluded, did not run out its full time.

It was to the Megarians, especially, that the altered position of
Athens after this truce was owing: it was their secession from Attica
and junction with the Peloponnesians, which laid open Attica to
invasion. Hence, arose the deadly hatred on the part of the Athenians
towards Megara, manifested during the ensuing years,—a sentiment the
more natural, as Megara had spontaneously sought the alliance of
Athens a few years before as a protection against the Corinthians,
and had then afterwards, without any known ill-usage on the part of
Athens, broken off from the alliance and become her enemy, with the
fatal consequence of rendering her vulnerable on the land-side. Under
such circumstances we shall not be surprised to find the antipathy of
the Athenians against Megara strongly pronounced, insomuch that the
system of exclusion which they adopted against her was among the most
prominent causes of the Peloponnesian war.

Having traced what we may call the foreign relations of Athens down
to this thirty years’ truce, we must notice the important internal
and constitutional changes which she had experienced during the same
interval.

CHAPTER XLVI.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKLES.

The period which we have now passed over appears to have been that in
which the democratical cast of Athenian public life was first brought
into its fullest play and development, as to judicature, legislation,
and administration.

The great judicial change was made by the methodical distribution of
a large proportion of the citizens into distinct judicial divisions,
by the great extension of their direct agency in that department,
and by the assignment of a constant pay to every citizen so engaged.
It has been already mentioned that even under the democracy of
Kleisthenês, and until the time succeeding the battle of Platæa,
large powers still remained vested both in the individual archons and
in the senate of Areopagus: which latter was composed exclusively
of the past archons after their year of office, sitting in it for
life,—though the check exercised by the general body of citizens,
assembled for law-making in the ekklesia, and for judging in the
heliæa, was at the same time materially increased. We must farther
recollect, that the distinction between powers administrative and
judicial, so highly valued among the more elaborate governments
of modern Europe, since the political speculations of the last
century, was in the early history of Athens almost unknown. Like
the Roman kings,[659] and the Roman consuls before the appointment
of the prætor, the Athenian archons not only administered, but also
exercised jurisdiction, voluntary as well as contentious,—decided
disputes, inquired into crimes, and inflicted punishment. Of the
same mixed nature were the functions of the senate of Areopagus,
and even of the annual senate of Five Hundred, the creation of
Kleisthenês. The stratêgi, too, as well as the archons, had
doubtless the double competence—in reference to military, naval, and
foreign affairs—of issuing orders and of punishing by their own
authority, disobedient parties: the _imperium_ of the magistrates,
generally, enabled them to enforce their own mandates as well as
to decide in cases of doubt whether any private citizen had or had
not been guilty of infringement. Nor was there any appeal from
these magisterial judgments; though the magistrates were subject,
under the Kleisthenean constitution, to personal responsibility for
their general behavior, before the people judicially assembled,
at the expiration of their year of office,—and to the farther
animadversion of the ekklesia, or public deliberative assembly,
meeting periodically during the course of that year: in some of
which ekklesiæ, the question might formally be raised for deposing
any magistrate, even before his year was expired.[660] Still, in
spite of such partial checks, the accumulation, in the same hand,
of powers to administer, judge, punish, and decide civil disputes,
without any other canon than the few laws then existing, and without
any appeal,—must have been painfully felt, and must have often led
to corrupt, arbitrary, and oppressive dealing: and if this be true
of individual magistrates, exposed to annual accountability, it is
not likely to have been less true of the senate of Areopagus, which,
acting collectively, could hardly be rendered accountable, and in
which the members sat for life.[661]

[659] See K. F. Hermann, Griechische Staatsalterthümer, sects.
53-107, and his treatise De Jure et Auctoritate Magistratuum ap.
Athen. p. 53 (Heidelb. 1829); also Rein, Römisches Privatrecht,
pp. 26, 408, Leips. 1836. M. Laboulaye also insists particularly
upon the confusion of administrative and judiciary functions
among the Romans (Essai sur les Loix Criminelles des Romains,
pp. 23, 79, 107, etc.): and compare Mr. G. C. Lewis, Essay on
the Government of Dependencies, p. 42, with his citation from
Hugo, Geschichte des Römischen Rechts, p. 42. Mr. Lewis has given
just and valuable remarks upon the goodness of the received
classification of powers as a theory, and upon the extent to
which the separation of them either has been, or can be, carried
in practice: see also Note E, in the same work, p. 347.

The separation of administrative from judicial functions appears
unknown in early societies. M. Meyer observes, respecting
the judicial institutions of modern Europe: “Anciennement
les fonctions administratives et judiciaires n’étoient pas
distinctes. Du temps de la liberté des Germains et même long
temps après, les plaids de la nation ou ceux du comté rendoient
la justice et administroient les intérêts nationaux ou locaux
dans une seule et même assemblée: sous le régime féodal, le roi
ou l’empereur dans son conseil, sa cour, son parlement composé
des hauts barons ecclésiastiques et laïes, exerçait tous les
droits de souveraineté comme de justice: dans la commune, le
bailli, mayeur, ou autre fonctionnaire nommé par le prince,
administraient les intérêts communaux et jugeoient les bourgeois
de l’avis de la communauté entière, des corporations qui la
composoient, ou des autorités et conseils qui la réprésentoient:
on n’avoit pas encore soupçonné que le jugement d’une cause entre
particuliers pût être étranger à la cause commune.”—Meyer, Esprit
des Institutions Judiciaires, book v, chap. 11, vol. iii, p. 239;
also chap. 18, p. 383.

[660] A case of such deposition of an archon by vote of the
public assembly, even before the year of office was expired,
occurs in Demosthenês, cont. Theokrin. c. 7: another, the
deposition of a stratêgus, in Demosthen. cont. Timoth. c. 3.

[661] Æschinês (cont. Ktesiphont, c. 9, p. 373) speaks of the
senate of Areopagus as ὑπεύθυνος, and so it was doubtless
understood to be: but it is difficult to see how accountability
could be practically enforced against such a body. They could
only be responsible in this sense,—that, if any one of their
number could be proved to have received a bribe, he would
be individually punished. But in this sense the dikasteries
themselves would also be responsible: though it is always
affirmed of them that they were not responsible.

I have already mentioned that shortly after the return of the
expatriated Athenians from Salamis, Aristeidês had been impelled,
by the strong democratical sentiment which he found among his
countrymen, to propose the abolition of all pecuniary qualification
for magistracies, so as to render every citizen legally eligible.
This innovation, however, was chiefly valuable as a victory and
as an index of the predominant sentiment: notwithstanding the
enlarged promise of eligibility, little change probably took place
in the fact, and rich men were still most commonly chosen. Hence
the magistrates, possessing the large powers administrative and
judicial above described,—and still more the senate of Areopagus,
which sat for life,—still belonging almost entirely to the wealthier
class, remained animated more or less with the same oligarchical
interest and sympathies, which manifested themselves in the abuse
of authority. At the same time the democratical sentiment among
the mass of Athenians went on steadily increasing from the time
of Aristeidês to that of Periklês: Athens became more and more
maritime, the population of Peiræus augmented in number as well as in
importance, and the spirit even of the poorest citizen was stimulated
by that collective aggrandizement of his city to which he himself
individually contributed. Before twenty years had elapsed, reckoning
from the battle of Platæa, this new fervor of democratical sentiment
made itself felt in the political contests of Athens, and found able
champions in Periklês and Ephialtês, rivals of what may be called the
conservative party, headed by Kimon.

We have no positive information that it was Periklês who introduced
the lot, in place of election, for the choice of archons and various
other magistrates, but the change must have been introduced nearly
at this time, and with a view of equalizing the chances of office to
every candidate, poor as well as rich, who chose to give in his name,
and who fulfilled certain personal and family conditions ascertained
in the dokimasy, or preliminary examination. But it was certainly to
Periklês and Ephialtês that Athens owed the elaborate constitution
of her popular dikasteries, or jury courts regularly paid, which
exercised so important an influence upon the character of the
citizens. These two eminent men deprived both the magistrates and the
senate of Areopagus of all the judicial and penal competence which
they had hitherto possessed, save and except the power of imposing
a small fine. This judicial power, civil as well as criminal, was
transferred to numerous dikasts, or panels of jurors selected from
the citizens; six thousand of whom were annually drawn by lot and
sworn, and then distributed into ten panels of five hundred each,
the remainder forming a supplement in case of vacancies. The
magistrate, instead of deciding causes, or inflicting punishment by
his own authority, was now constrained to impanel a jury,—that is, to
submit each particular case, which might call for a penalty greater
than the small fine to which he was competent, to the judgment of
one or other among these numerous popular dikasteries. Which of
the ten he should take, was determined by lot, so that no one knew
beforehand what dikastery would try any particular cause: he himself
presided over it during the trial, and submitted to it the question
at issue, with the results of his own preliminary examination, in
addition to the speeches of accuser and accused, with the statements
of their witnesses. So also the civil judicature, which had before
been exercised in controversies between man and man by the archons,
was withdrawn from them and transferred to these dikasteries under
the presidence of an archon. It is to be remarked, that the system
of reference to arbitration for private causes[662] was extensively
applied at Athens: a certain number of public arbitrators were
annually appointed, to one of whom—or to some other citizen adopted
by mutual consent of the parties—all private disputes were submitted
in the first instance. If dissatisfied with the decision, either
party might afterwards carry the matter before the dikastery: but
it appears that in many cases the decision of the arbitrator was
acquiesced in without this ultimate resort.

[662] Respecting the procedure of arbitration at Athens,
and the public as well as private arbitrators, see the
instructive treatise of Hudtwalcker, Ueber die öffentlichen und
Privat-Schiedsrichter (Diaeteten) zu Athen: Jena, 1812.

Each arbitrator seems to have sat alone to inquire into and
decide disputes: he received a small fee of one drachma from
both parties: also an additional fee when application was made
for delay (p. 16). Parties might by mutual consent fix upon any
citizen to act as arbitrator: but there were a certain number of
public arbitrators, elected or drawn by lot from the citizens
every year: and a plaintiff might bring his cause before any
one of these. They were liable to be punished under εὔθυναι, at
the end of their year of office, if accused and convicted of
corruption or unfair dealing.

The number of these public diætetæ, or arbitrators, was unknown
when Hudtwalcker’s book was published. An inscription, since
discovered by Professor Ross, and published in his work, Über die
Demen von Attika, p. 22, records the names of all the diætetæ for
the year of the archon Antiklês, B. C. 325, with the name of the
tribe to which each belonged.

The total number is one hundred and four: the number in each
tribe is unequal; the largest number is in Kekropis, which
furnishes sixteen; the smallest in Pandionis, which sends only
three. They must have been either elected or drawn by lot from
the general body of citizens, without any reference to tribes.
The inscription records the names of the diætetæ for this year B.
C. 325, in consequence of their being crowned or receiving a vote
of thanks from the people. The fragment of a like inscription for
the year B. C. 337, also exists.

I do not here mean to affirm that there never was any trial by the
people before the time of Periklês and Ephialtês: I doubt not that,
before their time, the numerous judicial assembly called Heliæa,
pronounced upon charges against accountable magistrates as well as
upon various other accusations of public importance; and perhaps in
some cases, separate bodies of them may have been drawn by lot for
particular trials. But it is not the less true, that the systematic
distribution and constant employment of the numerous dikasts of
Athens cannot have begun before the age of these two statesmen,
since it was only then that the practice of paying them began: for
so large a sacrifice of time on the part of poor men, wherein M.
Boëckh states,[663] doubtless in very exaggerated language, that
“nearly one-third of the citizens sat as judges every day,” cannot be
conceived without an assured remuneration. From and after the time
of Periklês, these dikasteries were the exclusive assemblies for
trial of all causes, civil as well as criminal, with some special
exceptions, such as cases of homicide and a few others: but before
his time, the greater number of these causes had been adjudged
either by individual magistrates or by the senate of Areopagus. We
may therefore conceive how great and important was the revolution
wrought by that statesman, when he first organized these dikastic
assemblies into systematic action, and transferred to them nearly all
the judicial power which had before been exercised by magistrates and
senate. The position and influence of these latter became radically
altered: the most commanding functions of the archon were abrogated,
and he retained only the power of receiving complaints, inquiring
into them, exercising some small preliminary interference with the
parties for the furtherance of the cause or accusation, fixing the
day for trial, and presiding over the dikastic assembly, by whom
peremptory verdict was pronounced. His administrative functions
remained unaltered, but his powers, inquisitorial and determining, as
a judge, passed away.[664]

[663] Public Economy of the Athenians, book ii, chap. xiv, p.
227. Engl. transl.

M. Boëckh must mean that the whole six thousand, or nearly the
whole, were employed every day. It appears to me that this
supposition greatly overstates both the number of days and the
number of men actually employed. For the inference in the text,
however, a much smaller number is sufficient.

See the more accurate remark of Schömann, Antiquit. Juris Public.
Græcor., sect. lxxi, p. 310.

[664] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 9, 3. Καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ
πάγῳ βουλὴν Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς· τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια
μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς· καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἕκαστος
τῶν δημαγωγῶν προήγαγεν, αὔξων εἰς τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν. Φαίνεται
δ’ οὐ κατὰ τὴν Σόλωνος γενέσθαι τοῦτο προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
ἀπὸ συμπτώματος. Τῆς ναυαρχίας γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ὁ δῆμος
αἴτιος γενόμενος ἐφρονηματίσθη, καὶ δημαγωγοὺς ἔλαβε φαύλους,
ἀντιπολιτευομένων τῶν ἐπιεικῶν· ἐπεὶ Σόλων γ’ ἔοικε τὴν
ἀναγκαιοτάτην ἀποδιδόναι τῷ δήμῳ δύναμιν, τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρεῖσθαι
καὶ εὐθύνειν· μηδὲ γὰρ τούτου κύριος ὢν ὁ δῆμος δοῦλος ἂν εἴη καὶ
πολέμιος.

The words τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς,
are commonly translated, “Periklês first gave pay to the
dikasteries,” wherein it is assumed that these bodies had
before judged gratuitously. But it appears to me that the words
ought to be translated, “Periklês first constituted the paid
dikasteries:” that is, the dikasteries as well as the pay were of
his introduction.

It is evident from this whole passage that Aristotle did not
suppose the dikasteries, either gratuitous or paid, to have been
constituted by Solon, but to have been foreign to the purpose of
that lawgiver, and to have been novelties emanating from Periklês
and Ephialtês, at the same time that the judicial functions of
the senate of Areopagus were cut down.

In reference to the senate of Areopagus also, the changes introduced
were not less considerable. That senate, anterior to the democracy in
point of date, and standing alone in the enjoyment of a life-tenure,
appears to have exercised an undefined and extensive control which
long continuance had gradually consecrated. It was invested with
a kind of religious respect, and believed to possess mysterious
traditions emanating from a divine source:[665] especially, the
cognizance which it took of intentional homicide was a part of
old Attic religion not less than of judicature. Though put in the
background for a time, after the expulsion of the Peisistratids, it
had gradually recovered itself when recruited by the new archons
under the Kleisthenean constitution; and during the calamitous
sufferings of the Persian invasion, its forwardness and patriotism
had been so highly appreciated as to procure for it an increased
sphere of ascendency. Trials for homicide were only a small part of
its attributions: it exercised judicial competence in many other
cases besides, and what was of still greater moment, it maintained
a sort of censorial police over the lives and habits of the
citizens,—it professed to enforce a tutelary and paternal discipline,
beyond that which the strict letter of the law could mark out, over
the indolent, the prodigal, the undutiful, and the deserters from old
rite and custom. To crown all, the senate of Areopagus also exercised
a supervision over the public assembly, taking care that none of
the proceedings of those meetings should be such as to infringe
the established laws of the country. These were powers immense as
well as undefined, not derived from any formal grant of the people,
but having their source in immemorial antiquity, and sustained by
general awe and reverence: when we read the serious expressions of
this sentiment in the mouths of the later orators,—Demosthenês,
Æschinês, or Deinarchus,—we shall comprehend how strong it must have
been a century and a half before them, at the period of the Persian
invasion. Isokratês, in his Discourse usually called _Areopagiticus_,
written a century and a quarter after that invasion, draws a picture
of what the senate of Areopagus had been while its competence was yet
undiminished, and ascribes to it a power of interference little short
of paternal despotism, which he asserts to have been most salutary
and improving in its effect. That the picture of this rhetor is
inaccurate,—and to a great degree indeed ideal, insinuating his own
recommendations under the color of past realities,—is sufficiently
obvious: but it enables us to presume generally, the extensive
regulating power of the senate of Areopagus, in affairs both public
and private, at the time which we are now describing.

[665] Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. Or. i, p. 91. φυλάττει τὰς
ἀποῤῥήτους διαθήκας, ἐν αἷς τὰ τῆς πόλεως σωτήρια κεῖται, etc. So
also Æschinês calls this senate τὴν σκυθρωπὸν καὶ τῶν μεγίστων
κυρίαν βουλὴν (cont. Ktesiphont. c. 9, p. 373: compare also cont.
Timarchum, c. 16, p. 41; Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. c. 65, p.
641). Plutarch, Solon, c. 19. τὴν ἄνω βουλὴν ἐπίσκοπον πάντων καὶ
φύλακα τῶν νόμων, etc.

Ἐδίκαζον οὖν οἱ Ἀρεοπαγῖται περὶ πάντων σχεδὸν τῶν σφαλμάτων καὶ
παρανομιῶν, ὡς ἅπαντά φησιν Ἀνδροτίων ἐν πρώτῃ καὶ Φιλόχορος ἐν
δευτέρᾳ καὶ τρίτῃ τῶν Ἀτθίδων (Philochorus, Fr. 17-58, ed. Didot,
p. 19, ed. Siebelis).

See about the Areopagus, Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Att. sect. lxvi.;
K. F. Hermann, Griech. Staatsalterthümer, sect. 109.

Such powers were pretty sure to be abused, and when we learn that
the Spartan senate[666] was lamentably open to bribery, we can
hardly presume much better of the life-sitting elders at Athens.
But even if their powers had been guided by all that beneficence of
intention which Isokratês affirms, they were in their nature such as
could only be exercised over a passive and stationary people: and
the course of events at Athens, at that time peculiarly, presented
conditions altogether the reverse. During the pressure of the Persian
invasion, indeed, the senate of Areopagus had been armed with more
than ordinary authority, which it had employed so creditably as
to strengthen its influence, and tighten its supervision during
the period immediately following: but that same trial had also
called forth in the general body of the citizens a fresh burst of
democratical sentiment, and an augmented consciousness of force, both
individual and national. Here then were two forces, not only distinct
but opposite and conflicting, both put into increased action at the
same time.[667] Nor was this all: a novel cast was just then given to
Athenian life and public habits by many different circumstances,—the
enlargement of the city, the creation of the fortified port and
new town of Peiræus, the introduction of an increased nautical
population, the active duties of Athens as head of the Delian
confederacy, etc. All these circumstances tended to open new veins of
hope and feeling, and new lines of action, in the Athenians between
480-460 B. C., and by consequence to render the interference of the
senate of Areopagus, essentially old-fashioned and conservative as
it was, more and more difficult. But at the very time when prudence
would have counselled that it should have been relaxed or modified,
the senate appear to have rendered it stricter, or at least to
have tried to do so: which could not fail to raise against them a
considerable body of enemies. Not merely the democratical innovators,
but also the representatives of new interests generally at Athens,
became opposed to the senate as an organ of vexatious repression,
employed for oligarchical purposes.[668]

[666] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 18.

[667] Aristotle particularly indicates these two conflicting
tendencies in Athens, the one immediately following the other, in
a remarkable passage of his Politics (v, 3, 5).

Μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ εἰς δῆμον καὶ εἰς
πολιτείαν ἐκ τοῦ εὐδοκιμῆσαί τι ἢ αὐξηθῆναι ἢ ἀρχεῖον ἢ μόριον
τῆς πόλεως· οἷον, ἡ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴ εὐδοκιμήσασα ἐν τοῖς
Μηδικοῖς ἔδοξε ~συντονωτέραν~ ποιῆσαι τὴν πολιτείαν. Καὶ πάλιν
ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος γενόμενος αἴτιος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμῖνα νίκης καὶ
διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν δύναμιν, τὴν
~δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυροτέραν~ ἐποίησεν.

The word συντονωτέραν (“stricter, more rigid,”) stands opposed in
another passage to ἀνειμένας (iv, 3, 5).

[668] Plutarch. Reipub. Ger. Præcept. p. 805. Οὐκ ἀγνοῶ δὲ, ὅτι
βουλήν τινες ἐπαχθῆ καὶ ὀλιγαρχικὴν κολούσαντες, ὥσπερ Ἐφιάλτης
Ἀθήνῃσι καὶ Φορμίων παρ’ Ἠλείοις, δύναμιν ἅμα καὶ δόξαν ἔσχον.

About the oligarchical character of the Areopagites, see
Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. pp 46, 98.

From the character of the senate of Areopagus, and the ancient
reverence with which it was surrounded, it served naturally as a
centre of action to the oligarchical or conservative party,—that
party which desired to preserve the Kleisthenean constitution
unaltered, with undiminished authority, administrative as well as
judicial, both to individual magistrates and to the collective
Areopagus. Of this sentiment, at the time of which we are now
speaking, Kimon was the most conspicuous leader, and his brilliant
victories at the Eurymedon, as well as his exploits in other warlike
enterprises, doubtless strengthened very much his political influence
at home. The same party also probably included the large majority of
rich and old families at Athens; who, so long as the magistracies
were elected and not chosen by lot, usually got themselves chosen,
and had every interest in keeping the power of such offices as high
as they could. Moreover, the party was farther strengthened by
the pronounced support of Sparta, imparted chiefly through Kimon,
proxenus of Sparta at Athens. Of course, such aid could only have
been indirect, yet it appears to have been of no inconsiderable
moment,—for when we consider that Ægina had been in ancient feud
with Athens, and Corinth in a temper more hostile than friendly,
the good feeling of the Lacedæmonians might well appear to Athenian
citizens eminently desirable to preserve: and the philo-Laconian
character of the leading men at Athens contributed to disarm the
jealousy of Sparta during that critical period while the Athenian
maritime ascendency was in progress.[669]

[669] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16; Themistoklês, c. 20.

The political opposition between Periklês and Kimon was hereditary,
since Xanthippus, the father of the former, had been the accuser of
Miltiadês, the father of the latter. Both were of the first families
in the city, and this, combined with the military talents of Kimon,
and the great statesmanlike superiority of Periklês, placed both the
one and the other at the head of the two political parties which
divided Athens. Periklês must have begun his political career very
young, since he maintained a position first of great influence, and
afterwards of unparalleled moral and political ascendency, for the
long period of forty years, against distinguished rivals, bitter
assailants, and unscrupulous libellers (about 467-428 B. C.) His
public life began about the time when Themistoklês was ostracized,
and when Aristeidês was passing off the stage, and he soon displayed
a character which combined the pecuniary probity of the one with
the resource and large views of the other; superadding to both a
discretion and mastery of temper never disturbed,—an excellent
musical and lettered education received from Pythokleidês,—an
eloquence such as no one before had either heard or conceived,—and
the best philosophy which the age afforded. His military duties as
a youthful citizen were faithfully and strenuously performed, but
he was timid in his first political approaches to the people,—a
fact perfectly in unison with the caution of his temperament, but
which some of his biographers[670] explained by saying that he was
afraid of being ostracized, and that his countenance resembled
that of the despot Peisistratus. We may be pretty sure, however,
that this personal resemblance, like the wonderful dream ascribed
to his mother[671] when pregnant of him, was an after-thought of
enemies, when his ascendency was already established,—and that
young beginners were in little danger of ostracism. The complexion
of political parties in Athens had greatly changed since the days
of Themistoklês and Aristeidês; for the Kleisthenean constitution,
though enlarged by the latter after the return from Salamis to
the extent of making all citizens without exception eligible for
magistracy, had become unpopular with the poorer citizens, and to the
keener democratical feeling which now ran through Athens and Peiræus.

[670] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 4-7., _seq._

[671] Herodot. vi, 131.

It was to this democratical party,—the party of movement against
that of resistance, or of reformers against conservatives, if we
are to employ modern phraseology,—that Periklês devoted his great
rank, character, and abilities. From the low arts which it is common
to ascribe to one who espouses the political interests of the poor
against the rich, he was remarkably exempt: he was indefatigable
in his attention to public business, but he went little into
society, and disregarded almost to excess the airs of popularity:
his eloquence was irresistibly impressive, yet he was by no means
prodigal of it, taking care to reserve himself, like the Salaminian
trireme, for solemn occasions, and preferring for the most part
to employ the agency of friends and partisans:[672] moreover, he
imbibed from his friend and teacher Anaxagoras, a tinge of physical
philosophy, which greatly strengthened his mind,[673] and armed him
against many of the reigning superstitions,— but which at the same
time tended to rob him of the sympathy of the vulgar, rich as well
as poor. The arts of demagogy were in fact much more cultivated by
the oligarchical Kimon, whose open-hearted familiarity of manner was
extolled, by his personal friend the poet Ion, in contrast with the
reserved and stately demeanor of his rival Periklês. Kimon employed
the rich plunder, procured by his maritime expeditions, in public
decorations as well as in largesses to the poorer citizens,—throwing
open his fields and fruits to all the inhabitants of his deme, and
causing himself to be attended in public by well-dressed slaves,
directed to tender their warm tunics in exchange for the threadbare
garments of those who seemed in want; while the property of Periklês
was administered with a strict, though benevolent economy, by his
ancient steward Evangelus,—the produce of his lands being all
sold, and the consumption of his house supplied by purchase in the
market.[674] It was by such regularity that his perfect and manifest
independence of all pecuniary seduction was sustained. In taste, in
talent, and in character, Kimon was the very opposite of Perikles,—a
brave and efficient commander, a lavish distributor, a man of
convivial and amorous habits, but incapable of sustained attention
to business, untaught in music or letters, and endued with Laconian
aversion to rhetoric and philosophy; while the ascendency of Periklês
was founded on his admirable combination of civil qualities,—probity,
firmness, diligence, judgment, eloquence, and power of guiding
partisans. As a military commander, though noway deficient in
personal courage, he rarely courted distinction, and was principally
famous for his care of the lives of the citizens, discountenancing
all rash or distant enterprises: his private habits were sober and
recluse,—his chief conversation was with Anaxagoras, Protagoras,[675]
Zeno, the musician Damon, and other philosophers,—while the tenderest
domestic attachment bound him to the engaging and cultivated Aspasia.

[672] Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 812; Periklês, c. 5,
6, 7.

[673] Plato, Phædrus, c. 54, p. 270; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 8;
Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 46.

[674] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 9, 16; Kimon, c. 10; Reipubl.
Gerend. Præcept. p. 818.

[675] The personal intercourse between Periklês and Protagoras is
attested by the interesting fragment of the latter which we find
in Plutarch, Consolat. ad Apollonium, c. 33, p. 119.

Such were the two men who stood forward at this time as most
conspicuous in Athenian party-contest,—the expanding democracy
against the stationary democracy of the past generation, which now
passed by the name of oligarchy,—the ambitious and talkative energy
spread even among the poor population, which was now forming more
and more the characteristic of Athens, against the unlettered and
uninquiring valor of the conquerors of Marathon.[676] Ephialtês, son
of Sophônidês, was at this time the leading auxiliary, seemingly
indeed the equal of Periklês, and no way inferior to him in
personal probity, though he was a poor man:[677] as to aggressive
political warfare, he was even more active than Periklês, who
appears throughout his long public life to have manifested but
little bitterness against political enemies. Unfortunately, our
scanty knowledge of the history of Athens brings before us only some
general causes and a few marked facts: the details and the particular
persons concerned are not within our sight: yet the actual course of
political events depends everywhere mainly upon these details, as
well as upon the general causes. Before Ephialtês advanced his main
proposition for abridging the competence of the senate of Areopagus,
he appears to have been strenuous in repressing the practical
abuse of magisterial authority, by accusations brought against the
magistrates at the period of their regular accountability. After
repeated efforts to check the practical abuse of these magisterial
powers,[678] Ephialtês and Periklês were at last conducted to the
proposition of cutting them down permanently, and introducing an
altered system.

[676] Aristophan. Nubes, 972, 1000, _seq._ and Ranæ, 1071.

[677] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 10; Ælian, V. H. ii, 43; xi, 9.

[678] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 10: compare Valer. Maxim. iii, 8,
4. Ἐφιάλτην μὲν οὖν, φοβερὸν ὄντα τοῖς ὀλιγαρχικοῖς καὶ περὶ
τὰς εὐθύνας καὶ διώξεις τῶν τὸν δῆμον ἀδικούντων ἀπαραίτητον,
ἐπιβουλεύσαντες οἱ ἐχθροὶ δι’ Ἀριστοδίκου τοῦ Ταναγρικοῦ κρυφαίως
ἀνεῖλον, etc.

We are not surprised to find that such proceedings provoked extreme
bitterness of party-feeling, and it is probable that this temper may
have partly dictated the accusation preferred against Kimon, about
463 B. C., after the surrender of Thasos, for alleged reception
of bribes from the Macedonian prince Alexander,—an accusation of
which he was acquitted. At this time the oligarchical or Kimonian
party was decidedly the most powerful: and when the question was
proposed for sending troops to aid the Lacedæmonians in reducing
the revolted Helots on Ithômê, Kimon carried the people along with
him to comply, by an appeal to their generous feelings, in spite of
the strenuous opposition of Ephialtês.[679] But when Kimon and the
Athenian hoplites returned home, having been dismissed by Sparta
under circumstances of insulting suspicion, as has been mentioned in
the preceding chapter, the indignation of the citizens was extreme:
they renounced their alliance with Sparta, and entered into amity
with Argos. Of course the influence of Kimon, and the position of the
oligarchical party, was materially changed by this incident: and in
the existing bitterness of political parties, it is not surprising
that his opponents should take the opportunity for proposing, soon
afterwards, a vote of ostracism,[680]—a challenge, indeed, which
may, perhaps, have been accepted not unwillingly by Kimon and his
party, since they might still fancy themselves the strongest, and
suppose that the sentence of banishment would fall upon Ephialtês or
Periklês. However, the vote ended in the expulsion of Kimon, a sure
proof that his opponents were now in the ascendent. On this occasion,
as on the preceding, we see the ostracism invoked to meet a period of
intense political conflict, the violence of which it would at least
abate, by removing for the time one of the contending leaders.

[679] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16.

[680] Plutarch, Kimon, c. 17. Οἱ δὲ πρὸς ὀργὴν ἀπελθόντες ἤδη
τοῖς λακωνίζουσι φανερῶς ἐχαλέπαινον, καὶ τὸν Κίμωνα ~μικρᾶς
ἐπιλαβόμενοι προφάσεως~ ἐξωστράκισαν εἰς ἔτη δέκα.

I transcribe this passage as a specimen of the inaccurate manner
in which the ostracism is so often described. Plutarch says:
“The Athenians took advantage of a slight pretence to ostracize
Kimon:” but it was the peculiar characteristic of ostracism that
it had no _pretence_: it was a judgment passed without specific
or assigned cause.

It was now that Periklês and Ephialtês carried their important
scheme of judicial reform. The senate of Areopagus was deprived of
its discretionary censorial power, as well as of all its judicial
competence except that which related to homicide. The individual
magistrates, as well as the senate of Five Hundred, were also
stripped of their judicial attributes, except the power of imposing
a small fine,[681] which were transferred to the newly created
panels of salaried dikasts, lotted off in ten divisions from the
aggregate heliæa. Ephialtês[682] first brought down the laws of Solon
from the acropolis to the neighborhood of the marketplace, where
the dikasteries sat,—a visible proof that the judicature was now
popularized.

[681] Demosthen. cont. Euerg. et Mnesibul. c. 12.

[682] Harpokration—Ὁ κάτωθεν νόμος—Pollux, viii, 128.

In the representations of many authors, the full bearing of this
great constitutional change is very inadequately conceived. What we
are commonly told, is, that Periklês was the first to assign a salary
to these numerous dikasteries at Athens; he bribed the people with
the public money, says Plutarch, in order to make head against Kimon,
who bribed them out of his own private purse: as if the pay were
the main feature in the case, and as if all which Periklês did, was
to make himself popular by paying the dikasts for judicial service,
which they had before rendered gratuitously. The truth is, that this
numerous army of dikasts, distributed into ten regiments and summoned
to act systematically throughout the year, was now for the first time
organized: the commencement of their pay is also the commencement
of their regular judicial action. What Periklês really did, was
to sever for the first time from the administrative competence of
the magistrates that judicial authority which had originally gone
along with it. The great men who had been accustomed to hold these
offices were lowered both in influence and authority:[683] while
on the other hand a new life, habit, and sense of power, sprang
up among the poorer citizens. A plaintiff, having cause of civil
action, or an accuser, invoking punishment against citizens guilty
of injury either to himself or to the state, had still to address
himself to one or other of the archons, but it was only with a view
of ultimately arriving before the dikastery, by whom the cause was
to be tried. While the magistrates acting individually were thus
restricted to simple administration and preliminary police, they
experienced a still more serious loss of power in their capacity
of members of the Areopagus, after the year of archonship was
expired. Instead of their previous unmeasured range of supervision
and interference, they were now deprived of all judicial sanction,
beyond that small power of fining, which was still left both to
individual magistrates, and to the senate of Five Hundred. But the
cognizance of homicide was still expressly reserved to them,—for the
procedure, in this latter case, religious not less than judicial, was
so thoroughly consecrated by ancient feeling, that no reformer could
venture to disturb or remove it.[684] It was upon this same ground
probably that the stationary party defended _all_ the prerogatives
of the senate of Areopagus,—denouncing the curtailments proposed
by Ephialtês as impious and guilty innovations.[685] How extreme
their resentment became, when these reforms were carried, and how
fierce was the collision of political parties at this moment, we
may judge by the result. The enemies of Ephialtês caused him to be
privately assassinated, by the hand of a Bœotian of Tanagra, named
Aristodikus. Such a crime—rare in the political annals of Athens, for
we come to no known instance of it afterwards, until the oligarchy
of the Four Hundred, in 411 B. C.—marks at once the gravity of the
change now introduced, the fierceness of the opposition offered, and
the unscrupulous character of the conservative party: Kimon was in
exile, and had no share in the deed. Doubtless the assassination of
Ephialtês produced an effect unfavorable in every way to the party
who procured it: the popular party, in their resentment, must have
become still more attached to the judicial reforms just assured to
them, while the hands of Periklês, the superior leader, left behind
and now acting singly, must have been materially strengthened.

[683] Arist. Polit. iv, 5, 6. ἔτι δ’ οἱ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγκαλοῦντες
τὸν δῆμόν φασι δεῖν κρίνειν· ὁ δὲ ἀσμένως δέχεται τὴν πρόκλησιν·
ὥστε καταλύονται πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρχαί, etc.; compare vi, 1, 8.

The remark of Aristotle is not justly applicable to the change
effected by Periklês, which transferred the power taken from
the magistrates, not to the people but to certain specially
constituted, though numerous and popular dikasteries, sworn
to decide in conformity with known and written laws. Nor is
the separation of judicial competence from administrative, to
be characterized as “dissolving or extinguishing magisterial
authority.” On the contrary, it is conformable to the best modern
notions. Periklês cannot be censured for having effected this
separation, however persons may think that the judicature which
he constituted was objectionable.

Plato seems also to have conceived administrative power as
essentially accompanied by judicial (Legg. vi, p. 767)—πάντα
ἄρχοντα ἀναγκαῖον καὶ δικαστὴν εἶναι τίνων—an opinion, doubtless,
perfectly just, up to a certain narrow limit: the separation
between the two sorts of powers cannot be rendered _absolutely_
complete.

[684] Demosthen. cont. Neær. p. 1372; cont. Aristokrat. p. 642.

Meier (Attischer Prozess, p. 143) thinks that the senate of
Areopagus was also deprived of its cognizance of homicide as well
as of its other functions, and that this was only restored after
the expulsion of the Thirty. He supposes this to be proved by a
passage of Lysias which he produces (De Cæde Eratosthenis, pp.
31-33).

M. Boëckh and O. Müller adopt the same opinion as Meier, and
seemingly on the authority of the same passage, (see the
Dissertation of O. Müller on the Eumenides of Æschylus, p.
113, Eng. transl.) But in the first place, this opinion is
contradicted by an express statement in the anonymous biographer
of Thucydidês, who mentions the trial of Pyrilampês for murder
before the Areopagus; and contradicted also, seemingly, by
Xenophon (Memorab. iii, 5, 20); in the next place, the passage
of Lysias appears to me to bear a different meaning. He says:
ᾧ καὶ πάτριόν ἐστι καὶ ἐφ’ ὑμῶν ἀποδέδοται τοῦ φόνου τὰς δίκας
δικάζειν: now—even if we admit the conjectural reading ἐφ’ ὑμῶν
in place of ἐφ’ ὑμῖν to be correct—still, this restoration of
functions to the Areopagus, refers naturally to the restored
democracy after the violent interruption occasioned by the
oligarchy of Thirty. Considering how many persons the Thirty
caused to be violently put to death, and the complete subversion
of all the laws which they introduced, it seems impossible to
suppose that the Areopagus could have continued to hold its
sittings and try accusations for intentional homicide, under
their government. On the return of the democracy after the Thirty
were expelled, the functions of the senate of Areopagus would
return also.

If the supposition of the eminent authors mentioned above were
correct,—if it were true that the Areopagus was deprived not only
of its supervising function generally, but also of its cognizance
of homicide, during the fifty-five years which elapsed between
the motion of Ephialtês and the expulsion of the Thirty,—this
senate must have been without any functions at all during that
long interval; it must have been for all practical purposes
non-existent. But during so long a period of total suspension,
the citizens would have lost all their respect for it; it could
not have retained so much influence as we know that it actually
possessed immediately before the Thirty (Lysias c. Eratosth.
c. 11, p. 126); and it would hardly have been revived after
the expulsion of the Thirty. Whereas, by preserving during
that period its jurisdiction in cases of homicide, apart from
those more extended privileges which had formerly rendered it
obnoxious, the ancient traditional respect for it was kept alive,
and it was revived, after the fall of the Thirty, as a venerable
part of the old democracy; even apparently with some extension of
privileges.

The inferences which O. Müller wishes to draw, as to the facts
of these times, from the Eumenides of Æschylus, appear to me
ill-supported. In order to sustain his view, that, by virtue
of the proposition of Ephialtês “the Areopagus almost entirely
ceased to be a high court of judicature,” (sect. 36, p. 109,)
he is forced to alter the chronology of the events, and to
affirm that the motion of Ephialtês must have been carried
subsequently to the representation of the Eumenides, though
Diodorus mentions it in the year next but one before, and there
is nothing to contradict him. All that we can safely infer from
the very indistinct allusions in Æschylus, is, that he himself
was full of reverence for the Areopagus, and that the season
was one in which party bitterness ran so high as to render
something like civil war (ἐμφύλιον Ἅρη, v. 864) within the scope
of reasonable apprehension. Probably, he may have been averse to
the diminution of the privileges of the Areopagus by Ephialtês:
yet even thus much is not altogether certain, inasmuch as he
puts it forward prominently and specially as a tribunal for
homicide, exercising this jurisdiction by inherent prescription,
and confirmed in it by the Eumenides themselves. Now when we
consider that such jurisdiction was precisely the thing confirmed
and left by Ephialtês to the Areopagus, we might plausibly argue
that Æschylus, by enhancing the solemnity and predicting the
perpetuity of the remaining privilege, intended to conciliate
those who resented the recent innovations, and to soften the
hatred between the two opposing parties.

The opinion of Boëckh, O. Müller, and Meier, respecting the
withdrawal from the senate of Areopagus of the judgments on
homicide, by the proposition of Ephialtês, has been discussed,
and in my judgment refuted, by Forchhammer, in a valuable
Dissertation, De Areopago non privato per Ephialten Homicidii
Judiciis. Kiel, 1828.

[685] This is the language of those authors whom Diodorus copied
(Diodor. xi, 77)—~οὐ μὴν ἀθρόως γε διέφυγε τηλικούτοις ἀνομήμασιν
ἐπιβαλόμενος~ (Ephialtês), ἀλλὰ τῆς νυκτὸς ἀναιρεθεὶς, ἄδηλον
ἔσχε τὴν τοῦ βίου τελευτήν. Compare Pausanias, i, 29, 15.

Plutarch (Periklês, c. 10) cites Aristotle as having mentioned
the assassination of Ephialtês. Antipho, however, states that the
assassin was never formally known or convicted (De Cæde Hero. c.
68).

The enemies of Periklês circulated a report, mentioned by
Idomeneus, that it was he who had procured the assassination
of Ephialtês, from jealousy of the superiority of the latter
(Plutarch, Periklês, c. 10). We may infer from this report how
great the eminence of Ephialtês was.

It is from this point that the administration of that great man may
be said to date: he was now the leading adviser, we might almost
say prime minister, of the Athenian people. His first years were
marked by a series of brilliant successes, already mentioned, the
acquisition of Megara as an ally, and the victorious war against
Corinth and Ægina. But when he proposed the great and valuable
improvement of the Long Walls, thus making one city of Athens and
Peiræus, the same oligarchical party which had opposed his judicial
changes and assassinated Ephialtês again stood forward in vehement
resistance. Finding direct opposition unavailing, they did not
scruple to enter into treasonable correspondence with Sparta,
invoking the aid of a foreign force for the overthrow of the
democracy; so odious had it become in their eyes since the recent
innovations. How serious was the hazard incurred by Athens, near the
time of the battle of Tanagra, has been already recounted; together
with the rapid and unexpected reconciliation of parties after that
battle, principally owing to the generous patriotism of Kimon and his
immediate friends. He was restored from ostracism on this occasion,
before his full time had expired, and the rivalry between him and
Periklês henceforward becomes mitigated, or even converted into a
compromise,[686] whereby the internal affairs of the city were left
to the one, and the conduct of foreign expeditions to the other. The
successes of Athens during the ensuing ten years were more brilliant
than ever, and she attained the maximum of her power: which doubtless
had a material effect in imparting stability to the democracy, as
well as to the administration of Periklês, and enabled both the one
and the other to stand the shock of those great public reverses,
which deprived the Athenians of their dependent landed alliances,
during the interval between the defeat of Korôneia and the thirty
years’ truce.

[686] The intervention of Elpinikê, the sister of Kimon, in
bringing about this compromise between her brother and Periklês,
is probable enough (Plutarch, Periklês, c. 10, and Kimon, c.
14). Clever and engaging, she seems to have played an active
part in the political intrigues of the day: but we are not at
all called upon to credit the scandals insinuated by Eupolis and
Stesimbrotus.

Along with the important judicial revolution brought about by
Periklês, were introduced other changes belonging to the same scheme
and system.

Thus a general power of supervision, both over the magistrates and
over the public assembly, was vested in seven magistrates, now
named for the first time, called Nomophylakes, or Law-Guardians,
and doubtless changed every year. These nomophylakes sat alongside
of the proëdri, or presidents, both in the senate and in the public
assembly, and were charged with the duty of interposing whenever
any step was taken or any proposition made contrary to the existing
laws: they were also empowered to constrain the magistrates to act
according to law.[687] We do not know whether they possessed the
presidency of a dikastery,—that is, whether they could themselves
cause one of the panels of jurors to be summoned, and put an alleged
delinquent on his trial before it, under their presidency, or whether
they were restricted to entering a formal protest, laying the alleged
illegality before the public assembly. To appoint magistrates,
however, invested with this special trust of watching and informing,
was not an unimportant step; for it would probably enable Ephialtês
to satisfy many objectors who feared to abolish the superintending
power of the Areopagus without introducing any substitute. The
nomophylakes were honored with a distinguished place at the public
processions and festivals, and were even allowed, like the archons,
to enter the senate of Areopagus after their year of office had
expired: but they never acquired any considerable power, such as
that senate had itself exercised. Their interference must have been
greatly superseded by the introduction and increasing application of
the Graphê Paranomôn, presently to be explained; nor are they even
noticed in the description of that misguided assembly which condemned
the six generals after the battle of Arginusæ, by a gross violation
of legal form not less than of substantial justice.[688] After the
expulsion of the Thirty, the senate of Areopagus was again invested
with a supervision over magistrates, though without anything like its
ancient ascendency.

[687] We hear about these nomophylakes in a distinct statement
cited from Philochorus, by Photius, Lexic. p. 674, Porson.
Νομοφύλακες· ἕτεροί εἰσι τῶν θεσμοθετῶν, ὡς Φιλόχορος ἐν ζ’· οἱ
μὲν γὰρ ἄρχοντες ἀνέβαινον εἰς Ἄρειον πάγον ἐστεφανώμενοι, οἱ
δὲ νομοφύλακες χρύσια στρόφια ἄγοντες· καὶ ταῖς θεαῖς ἐνάντιον
ἀρχόντων ἐκαθέζοντο· καὶ τὴν πομπὴν ἔπεμπον τῇ Παλλάδι· τὰς δὲ
ἀρχὰς ἠνάγκαζον τοῖς νόμοις χρῆσθαι· καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ καὶ ἐν
τῇ βουλῇ μετὰ τῶν προέδρων ἐκάθηντο, κωλύοντες τὰ ἀσύμφορα τῇ
πόλει πράττειν· ἕπτα δὲ ἦσαν· καὶ κατέστησαν, ὡς Φιλόχορος, ὅτε
Ἐφιάλτης μόνῃ κατέλιπε τῇ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῇ τὰ ὑπὲρ τοῦ
σώματος.

Harpokration, Pollux, and Suidas, give substantially the same
account of these magistrates, though none except Photius mentions
the exact date of their appointment. There is no adequate ground
for the doubt which M. Boëckh expresses about the accuracy of
this statement: see Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Pub. Græc. sect. lxvi;
and Cicero, Legg. iii, 20.

[688] See Xenophon, Hellenic. i, 7; Andokidês de Mysteriis, p. 40.

Another important change which we may with probability refer to
Periklês, is the institution of the Nomothetæ. These men were, in
point of fact, dikasts, members of the six thousand citizens annually
sworn in that capacity. But they were not, like the dikasts for
trying causes, distributed into panels, or regiments, known by a
particular letter, and acting together throughout the entire year:
they were lotted off to sit together only on special occasion and
as the necessity arose. According to the reform now introduced,
the ekklesia, or public assembly, even with the sanction of the
senate of Five Hundred, became incompetent either to pass a new
law or to repeal a law already in existence; it could only enact a
_psephism_,—that is, properly speaking, a decree, applicable only
to a particular case; though the word was used at Athens in a very
large sense, sometimes comprehending decrees of general as well as
permanent application. In reference to laws, a peculiar judicial
procedure was established. The thesmothetæ were directed annually
to examine the existing laws, noting any contradictions or double
laws on the same matter; and in the first prytany (tenth part)
of the Attic year, on the eleventh day, an ekklesia was held, in
which the first business was to go through the laws _seriatim_, and
submit them for approval or rejection: first beginning with the
laws relating to the senate, next, those of more general import,
especially such as determined the functions and competence of the
magistrates. If any law was condemned by the vote of the public
assembly, or if any citizen had a new law to propose, the third
assembly of the prytany was employed, previous to any other business,
in the appointment of nomothetæ, and in the provision of means to pay
their salary. Previous notice was required to be given publicly by
every citizen who had new propositions of the sort to make, in order
that the time necessary for the sitting of the nomothetæ might be
measured according to the number of matters to be submitted to their
cognizance. Public advocates were farther named to undertake the
formal defence of all the laws attacked, and the citizen who proposed
to repeal them had to make out his case against this defence, to the
satisfaction of the assembled nomothetæ. These latter were taken
from the six thousand sworn dikasts, and were of different numbers
according to circumstances: sometimes we hear of them as five
hundred, sometimes as one thousand, and we may be certain that the
number was always considerable.

The effect of this institution was, to place the making or repealing
of laws under the same solemnities and guarantees as the trying of
causes or accusations in judicature. We must recollect that the
citizens who attended the ekklesia, or public assembly, were not
sworn like the dikasts; nor had they the same solemnity of procedure,
nor the same certainty of hearing both sides of the question set
forth, nor the same full preliminary notice. How much the oath sworn
was brought to act upon the minds of the dikasts, we may see by the
frequent appeals to it in the orators, who contrast them with the
unsworn public assembly.[689] And there can be no doubt that the
nomothetæ afforded much greater security than the public assembly,
for a proper decision. That security depended upon the same principle
as we see to pervade all the constitutional arrangements of Athens;
upon a fraction of the people casually taken, but sufficiently
numerous to have the same interest with the whole,—not permanent, but
delegated for the occasion,—assembled under a solemn sanction, and
furnished with a full exposition of both sides of the case. The power
of passing psephisms, or special decrees, still remained with the
public assembly, which was doubtless much more liable to be surprised
into hasty or inconsiderate decision than either the dikastery or the
nomothetæ,—in spite of the necessity of previous authority from the
senate of Five Hundred, before any proposition could be submitted to
it.

[689] Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 20, pp. 725, 726. Ἆρ’ οὖν τῷ
δοκεῖ συμφέρειν τῇ πόλει τοιοῦτος νόμος, ὃς δικαστηρίου γνώσεως
αὐτὸς κυριώτερος ἔσται, καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ὀμωμοκότων γνώσεις τοῖς
ἀνωμότοις προστάξει λύειν; Ἐνθυμεῖσθε, ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαστηρίου
καὶ τῆς καταγνώσεως οἷ διεπήδησεν (Timokratês) ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον,
ἐκκλέπτων τὸν ἠδικηκότα! Compare Demosthen. cont. Eubulid. c. 15.

See, about the nomothetæ, Schömann, De Comitiis, ch. vii, p.
248, _seqq._, and Platner, Prozess und Klagen bey den Attikern,
Abschn. ii, 3, 3, p. 33, _seqq._

Both of them maintain, in my opinion erroneously, that the
nomothetæ are an institution of Solon. Demosthenês, indeed,
ascribes it to Solon (Schömann, p. 268): but this counts, in my
view, for nothing, when I see that all the laws which he cites
for governing the proceedings of the nomothetæ, bear unequivocal
evidence of a time much later. Schömann admits this to a certain
extent, and in reference to the style of these laws,—“Illorum
quidem fragmentorum, quæ in Timokrateâ extant, _recentiorem
Solonis ætate formam atque orationem apertum est_.” But it is not
merely the style which proves them to be of post-Solonian date:
it is the mention of post-Solonian institutions, such as the ten
prytanies into which the year was divided, the ten statues of
the eponymi,—all derived from the creation of the ten tribes by
Kleisthenês. On the careless employment of the name of Solon by
the orators, whenever they desire to make a strong impression on
the dikasts, I have already remarked.

As an additional security both to the public assembly and the
nomothetæ against being entrapped into decisions contrary to existing
law, another remarkable provision has yet to be mentioned,—a
provision probably introduced by Periklês at the same time as the
formalities of law-making by means of specially delegated nomothetæ.
This was the Graphê Paranomôn,—indictment for informality or
illegality,—which might be brought on certain grounds against the
proposer of any law or any psephism, and rendered him liable to
punishment by the dikastery. He was required, in bringing forward his
new measure, to take care that it should not be in contradiction with
any preëxisting law,—or if there were any such contradiction, to give
formal notice of it, to propose the repeal of that which existed, and
to write up publicly beforehand what his proposition was,—in order
that there might never be two contradictory laws at the same time
in operation, nor any illegal decree passed either by the senate
or by the public assembly. If he neglected this precaution, he was
liable to prosecution under the graphê paranomôn, which any Athenian
citizen might bring against him before the dikastery, through the
intervention and under the presidency of the thesmothetæ.

Judging from the title of this indictment, it was originally confined
to the special ground of formal contradiction between the new and
the old. But it had a natural tendency to extend itself: the citizen
accusing would strengthen his case by showing that the measure which
he attacked contradicted not merely the letter, but the spirit and
purpose of existing laws,—and he would proceed from hence to denounce
it as generally mischievous and disgraceful to the state. In this
unmeasured latitude, we find the graphê paranomôn at the time of
Demosthenês: the mover of a new law or psephism, even after it had
been regularly discussed and passed, was liable to be indicted, and
had to defend himself not only against alleged informalities in
his procedure, but also against alleged mischiefs in the substance
of his measure. If found guilty by the dikastery, the punishment
inflicted upon him by them was not fixed, but variable according to
circumstances; for the indictment belonged to that class wherein,
after the verdict of guilty, first a given amount of punishment was
proposed by the accuser, next, another and lighter amount was named
by the accused party against himself,—the dikastery being bound to
make their option between one and the other, without admitting any
third modification,—so that it was the interest even of the accused
party to name against himself a measure of punishment sufficient to
satisfy the sentiment of the dikasts, in order that they might not
prefer the more severe proposition of the accuser. At the same time,
the accuser himself, as in other public indictments, was fined in the
sum of one thousand drachms, unless the verdict of guilty obtained
at least one-fifth of the suffrages of the dikastery. The personal
responsibility of the mover, however, continued only one year after
the introduction of his new law: if the accusation was brought at a
greater distance of time than one year, the accuser could invoke no
punishment against the mover, and the sentence of the dikasts neither
absolved nor condemned anything but the law. Their condemnation of
the law, with or without the author, amounted _ipso facto_ to a
repeal of it.

Such indictment against the author of a law or of a decree, might be
preferred either at some stage prior to its final enactment,—as after
its acceptance simply by the senate, if it was a decree, or after its
approval by the public assembly, and prior to its going before the
nomothetæ, if it was a law,—or after it had reached full completion
by the verdict of the nomothetæ. In the former case, the indictment
stayed its farther progress until sentence had been pronounced by the
dikasts.

This regulation is framed in a thoroughly conservative spirit, to
guard the existing laws against being wholly or partially nullified
by a new proposition. As, in the procedure of the nomothetæ, whenever
any proposition was made for distinctly repealing any existing law,
it was thought unsafe to intrust the defence of the law so assailed
to the chance of some orator gratuitously undertaking it, and paid
advocates were appointed for the purpose; so also, when any citizen
made a new positive proposition, sufficient security was not supposed
to be afforded by the chance of opponents rising up at the time;
and a farther guarantee was provided in the personal responsibility
of the mover. That the latter, before he proposed a new decree or a
new law, should take care that there was nothing in it inconsistent
with existing laws,—or, if there were, that he should first formally
bring forward a direct proposition for the repeal of such preëxistent
law,—was in no way unreasonable: it imposed upon him an obligation
such as he might perfectly well fulfil,—it served as a check upon
the use of that right, of free speech and initiative in the public
assembly, which belonged to every Athenian without exception,[690]
and which was cherished by the democracy as much as it was condemned
by oligarchical thinkers,—it was a security to the dikasts, who
were called upon to apply the law to particular cases, against the
perplexity of having conflicting laws quoted before them, and being
obliged in their verdict to set aside either one or the other. In
modern European governments, even the most free and constitutional,
laws have been both made and applied either by select persons or
select assemblies, under an organization so different as to put out
of sight the idea of personal responsibility on the proposer of
a new law. Moreover, even in such assemblies, private initiative
has either not existed at all, or has been of comparatively little
effect, in law-making; while in the application of laws when made,
there has always been a permanent judicial body exercising an
action of its own, more or less independent of the legislature, and
generally interpreting away the text of contradictory laws so as to
keep up a tolerably consistent course of forensic tradition. But
at Athens, the fact that the proposer of a new decree, or of a new
law, had induced the senate or the public assembly to pass it, was
by no means supposed to cancel his personal responsibility, if the
proposition was illegal: he had deceived the senate or the people, in
deliberately keeping back from them a fact which he knew, or at least
might and ought to have known.

[690] The privation of this right of public speech (παῤῥησία)
followed on the condemnation of any citizen to the punishment
called ἀτιμία, disfranchisement, entire or partial (Demosthen.
cont. Neær. p. 1352, c. 9; cont. Meidiam, p. 545, c. 27). Compare
for the oligarchical sentiment, Xenophon, Republ. Athen. i, 9.

But though a full justification may thus be urged on behalf of the
graphê paranomôn, as originally conceived and intended, it will
hardly apply to that indictment as applied afterwards in its plenary
and abusive latitude. Thus Æschinês indicts Ktesiphon under it for
having, under certain circumstances, proposed a crown to Demosthenês.
He begins by showing that the proposition was illegal,—for this
was the essential foundation of the indictment: he then goes on
farther to demonstrate, in a splendid harangue, that Demosthenês
was a vile man and a mischievous politician: accordingly, assuming
the argument to be just, Ktesiphon had deceived the people in an
aggravated way,—first, by proposing a reward under circumstances
contrary to law; next, by proposing it in favor of an unworthy man.
The first part of the argument only is of the essence of the graphê
paranomôn: the second part is in the nature of an abuse growing out
of it,—springing from that venom of personal and party enmity which
is inseparable, in a greater or less degree, from free political
action, and which manifested itself with virulence at Athens, though
within the limits of legality. That this indictment, as one of the
most direct vents for such enmity, was largely applied and abused
at Athens, is certain; but though it probably deterred unpractised
citizens from originating new propositions, it did not produce the
same effect upon those orators who made politics a regular business,
and who could therefore both calculate the temper of the people,
and reckon upon support from a certain knot of friends. Aristophon,
towards the close of his political life, made it a boast that he had
been thus indicted and acquitted seventy-five times. Probably, the
worst effect which it produced was that of encouraging the vein of
personality and bitterness which pervades so large a proportion of
Attic oratory, even in its most illustrious manifestations; turning
deliberative into judicial eloquence, and interweaving the discussion
of a law, or decree, along with a declamatory harangue against the
character of its mover. We may at the same time add that the graphê
paranomôn was often the most convenient way of getting a law or a
psephism repealed, so that it was used even when the annual period
had passed over, and when the mover was therefore out of danger,—the
indictment being then brought only against the law, or decree, as
in the case which forms the subject of the harangue of Demosthenês
against Leptinês. If the speaker of this harangue obtained a verdict,
he procured at once the repeal of the law, or decree, without
proposing any new provision in its place; which he would be required
to do,—if not peremptorily, at least by common usage,—if he had
carried the law for repeal before the nomothetæ.

The dikasteries provided under the system of Periklês varied
in number of members: we never hear of less than two hundred
members,—most generally of five hundred,—and sometimes also of
one thousand, fifteen hundred, two thousand members, on important
trials.[691] Each man received pay from the treasurers, called
Kolakretæ, after his day’s business was over, of three oboli, or half
a drachm: at least this was the amount paid during the early part
of the Peloponnesian war. M. Boëckh supposes that the original pay
proposed by Periklês was one obolus, afterwards tripled by Kleon; but
his opinion is open to much doubt. It was indispensable to propose
a measure of pay sufficient to induce citizens to come, and come
frequently, if not regularly: now one obolus seems to have proved
afterwards an inadequate temptation even to the ekklesiasts, or
citizens who attended the public assembly, who were less frequently
wanted, and must have had easier sittings, than the dikasts: much
less, therefore, would it be sufficient in the case of the latter.
I incline to the belief that the pay originally awarded was three
oboli:[692] the rather, as these new institutions seem to have
nearly coincided in point of time with the transportation of the
confederate treasure from Delos to Athens,—so that the exchequer
would then appear abundantly provided. As to the number of dikasts
actually present on each day of sitting, or the minimum number
requisite to form a sitting, we are very imperfectly informed. Though
each of the ten panels or divisions of dikasts included five hundred
individuals, seldom probably did all of them attend; but it also
seldom happened, probably, that all the ten divisions sat on the same
day: there was therefore an opportunity of making up deficiencies
in division Α, when its lot was called and when its dikasts did not
appear in sufficient numbers, from those who belonged to division Β
or Δ, besides the supplementary dikasts who were not comprised in any
of the ten divisions: though on all these points we cannot go beyond
conjecture. Certain it is, however, that the dikasteries were always
numerous, and that none of the dikasts could know in what causes they
would be employed, so that it was impossible to tamper with them
beforehand.[693]

[691] See Meier, Attisch. Prozess, p. 139. Andokidês mentions a
trial under the indictment of γραφὴ παρανόμων, brought by his
father Leogoras against a senator named Speusippus, wherein six
thousand dikasts sat,—that is, the entire body of heliasts.
However, the loose speech so habitual with Andokidês, renders
this statement very uncertain (Andokidês de Mysteriis, p. 3, §
29).

See Matthiæ, De Judiciis Atheniensium, in his Miscellanea
Philologica, vol. i, p. 252. Matthiæ questions the reading of
that passage in Demosthenês (cont. Meideam, p. 585), wherein two
hundred dikasts are spoken of as sitting in judgment: he thinks
it ought to be πεντακοσίους instead of διακοσίους,—but this
alteration would be rash.

[692] See on this question, Boëckh, Public Econ. of Athens, ch.
xv, p. 233; K. F. Hermann, Griech. Staatsalt. § 134.

The proof which M. Boëckh brings to show, first, that the
original pay was one obolus,—next, that Kleon was the first to
introduce the triobolus,—is in both cases very inconclusive.

Certain passages from the Scholiast, stating that the pay of
the dikasts fluctuated (οὐκ ἕστηκεν—ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἐδίδοτο) do
not so naturally indicate a rise from one obolus to three, as a
change backwards and forwards according to circumstances. Now
it seems that there were some occasions when the treasury was
so very poor that it was doubtful whether the dikasts could be
paid: see Lysias, cont. Epikrat. c. 1; cont. Nikomach. c. 22; and
Aristophan. Equit. 1370. The amount of pay may, therefore, have
been sometimes affected by this cause.

[693] There is a remarkable passage on this point in the treatise
of Xenophon, De Republic. Athen. iii, 6. He says:—

Φέρε δὴ, ἀλλὰ φησί τις χρῆναι δικάζειν μὲν, ἐλάττους δὲ δικάζειν.
Ἀνάγκῃ τοίνυν, ἐὰν μὲν πολλὰ (both Weiske and Schneider
substitute πολλὰ here in place of ὀλίγα, which latter makes
no sense) ποιῶνται δικαστήρια, ὀλίγοι ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἔσονται τῷ
δικαστηρίῳ· ὥστε καὶ διασκευάσασθαι ῥᾴδιον ἔσται πρὸς ὀλίγους
δικαστὰς, καὶ συνδεκάσαι (so Schneider and Matthiæ, in place of
συνδικάσαι) πολὺ ἧττον δικαίως δικάζειν.

That there was a good deal of bribery at Athens, where
individuals could be approached and dealt with, is very probable
(see Xenoph. de Repub. Ath. iii. 3): and we may well believe
that there were also particular occasions on which money was
given to the dikasts, some of whom were punished with death for
such corrupt receipt (Æschinês cont. Timarch. c. 17-22, pp.
12-15). But the passage above quoted from Xenophon, an unfriendly
witness, shows that the precautions taken to prevent corruption
of the dikasteries were well-devised and successful, though these
precautions might sometimes be eluded.

Such were the great constitutional innovations of Periklês and
Ephialtês,—changes full of practical results,—the transformation as
well as the complement of that democratical system which Kleisthenês
had begun, and to which the tide of Athenian feeling had been
gradually mounting up, during the preceding twenty years. The entire
force of these changes is generally not perceived, because the
popular dikasteries and the nomothetæ are so often represented as
institutions of Solon, and as merely supplied with pay by Periklês.
This erroneous supposition prevents all clear view of the growth of
the Athenian democracy, by throwing back its last elaborations to the
period of its early and imperfect start. To strip the magistrates
of all their judicial power, except that of imposing a small fine,
and the Areopagus of all its jurisdiction, except in cases of
homicide,—providing popular, numerous, and salaried dikasts to decide
all the judicial business at Athens, as well as to repeal and enact
laws; this was the consummation of the Athenian democracy: no serious
constitutional alteration—I except the temporary interruptions of the
Four Hundred and the Thirty—was afterwards made until the days of
Macedonian interference. As Periklês made it, so it remained in the
days of Demosthenês,—though with a sensible change in the character,
and abatement in the energies, of the people, rich as well as poor.

In appreciating the practical working of these numerous dikasteries
at Athens, in comparison with such justice as might have been
expected from individual magistrates, we have to consider, first,
that personal and pecuniary corruption seems to have been a common
vice among the leading men of Athens and Sparta, when acting
individually or in boards of a few members, and not uncommon even
with the kings of Sparta,—next, that in the Grecian cities generally,
as we know even from the oligarchical Xenophon (he particularly
excepts Sparta), the rich and great men were not only insubordinate
to the magistrates, but made a parade of showing that they cared
nothing about them.[694] We know, also, from the same unsuspected
source,[695] that while the poorer Athenian citizens who served
on ship board were distinguished for the strictest discipline, the
hoplites, or middling burghers, who formed the infantry, were less
obedient, and the rich citizens who served on horseback the most
disobedient of all. To make rich and powerful criminals effectively
amenable to justice, has indeed been found so difficult everywhere,
until a recent period of history, that we should be surprised if
it were otherwise in Greece. When we follow the reckless demeanor
of rich men like Kritias, Alkibiadês,[696] and Meidias, even under
the full grown democracy of Athens, we may be very sure that their
predecessors under the Kleisthenean constitution would have been
often too formidable to be punished or kept down by an individual
archon of ordinary firmness,[697] even assuming him to be upright
and wellintentioned. Now the dikasteries established by Periklês
were inaccessible both to corruption and intimidation: their number,
their secret suffrage, and the impossibility of knowing beforehand
what individuals would sit in any particular cause, prevented both
the one and the other. And besides that the magnitude of their
number, extravagant, according to our ideas of judicial business, was
essential to this tutelary effect,[698] it served farther to render
the trial solemn and the verdict imposing on the minds of parties and
spectators, as we may see by the fact that, in important causes, the
dikastery was doubled or tripled. Nor was it possible, by any other
means than numbers,[699] to give dignity to an assembly of citizens,
of whom many were poor, some old, and all were despised individually
by rich accused persons who were brought before them,—as Aristophanês
and Xenophon give us plainly to understand.[700] If we except the
strict and peculiar educational discipline of Sparta, these numerous
dikasteries afforded the only organ which Grecian politics could
devise, for getting redress against powerful criminals, public as
well as private, and for obtaining a sincere and uncorrupt verdict.

[694] Xenophon, De Republ. Laced. c. 8, 2. Τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ταῦτα,
ὅτι ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν οἱ δυνατώτεροι ~οὔτε βούλονται
δοκεῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς φοβεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ νομίζουσι τοῦτο ἀνελεύθερον
εἶναι~· ἐν δὲ τῇ Σπάρτῃ οἱ κράτιστοι καὶ ὑπέρχονται μάλιστα τὰς
ἀρχάς, etc.

Respecting the violent proceedings committed by powerful men at
Thebes, whereby it became almost impossible to procure justice
against them for fear of being put to death, see Dikæarchus, Vit.
Græc. Fragm. ed. Fabr. p. 143, and Polybius, xx, 4, 6; xxiii, 2.

[695] Xenophon, Memorab. iii, 5, 18. Μηδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης,
ὦ Περίκλεις, οὕτως ἥγου ἀνηκέστῳ πονηρίᾳ νοσεῖν Ἀθηναίους·
Οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ~ὡς εὔτακτοι μέν εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς ναυτικοῖς~, εὐτάκτως
δ’ ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι πείθονται τοῖς ἐπιστάταις, οὐδένων
δὲ καταδεέστερον ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς ὑπηρετοῦσι τοῖς διδασκάλοις;
Τοῦτο γάρ τοι, ἔφη, καὶ θαυμαστόν ἐστι· ~τὸ τοὺς μὲν τοιούτους
πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς ἐφεστῶσι, τοὺς δὲ ὁπλίτας, καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς, οἳ
δοκοῦσι καλοκαγαθίᾳ προκεκρίσθαι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀπειθεστάτους εἶναι
πάντων~.

[696] See Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 12-25; Thucyd. vi, 15, and the
speech which he gives as spoken by Alkibiadês in the assembly,
vi, 17; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 7-8-16, and the Oration of
Demosthenês against Meidias throughout: also Fragm. v. of the
Πέλαργοι of Aristophanês, Meineke, ii, p. 1128.

[697] Sir Thomas Smith, in his Treatise on the Commonwealth
of England, explains the Court of Star-chamber as originally
constituted in order “to deal with offenders too stout for the
ordinary course of justice.” The abundant compounds of the Greek
language furnish a single word exactly describing this same class
of offenders,—Ὑβριστόδικαι—the title of one of the lost comedies
of Eupolis: see Meineke, Historia Critica Comicorum Græcorum,
vol. i, p. 145.

Dean Tucker observes, in his Treatise on Civil Government:
“There was hardly a session of parliament, from the time of
Henry the Third to Henry the Eighth, but laws were enacted for
restraining the feuds, robberies, and oppressions of the barons
and their dependents on the one side,—and to moderate and check
the excesses and extortions of the royal purveyors on the other;
these being the two capital evils then felt. Respecting the
tyranny of the ancient baronage, even squires as well as others
were not ashamed to wear the liveries of their leaders, and to
glory in every badge of distinction, whereby they might be known
to be retained as the bullies of such or such great men, and
to engage in their quarrels, just or unjust, right or wrong.
The histories of those times, together with the statutes of the
realm, inform us that they associated (or, as they called it,
_confederated_ together) in great bodies, parading on horseback
in fairs and markets, and clad in armor, to the great terror
of peaceable subjects; nay, that they attended their lords to
parliament, equipped in the same military dress, and even dared
sometimes to present themselves before the judge of assize,
and to enter the courts of justice, in a hostile manner,—while
their principals sat with the judges on the bench, intimidating
the witnesses, and influencing the juries by looks, nods, signs
and signals.” (Treatise concerning Civil Government, p. 337, by
Josiah Tucker, D. D. London, 1781.)

The whole chapter (pp. 301-355) contains many statutes and much
other matter, illustrating the intimidation exercised by powerful
men in those days over the course of justice.

A passage among the Fragmenta of Sallust, gives a striking
picture of the conduct of powerful citizens under the Roman
Republic. (Fragm. lib. i, p. 158, ed. Delph.)

“At discordia, et avaritia, et ambitio, et cætera secundis
rebus oriri sueta mala, post Carthaginis excidium maximè aucta
sunt. Nam injuriæ validiorum, et ob eas discessio plebis à
Patribus, aliæque dissensiones domi fuere jam inde à principio:
neque amplius, quam regibus exactis, dum metus à Tarquinio et
bellum grave cum Etruriâ positum est, æquo et modesto jure
agitatum: dein, servili imperio patres plebem exercere: de vitâ
atque tergo, regio more consulere: agro pellere, et à cæteris
expertibus, soli in imperio agere. Quibus servitiis, et maximè
fœnoris onere, oppressa plebes, cum assiduis bellis tributum
simul et militiam toleraret, armata Montem Sacrum et Aventinum
insedit. Tumque tribunos plebis, et alia sibi jura paravit.
Discordiarum et certaminis utrimque finis fuit secundum bellum
Punicum.”

Compare the exposition of the condition of the cities throughout
Europe in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, in
Hüllmann’s Städte-Wesen des Mittelalters, especially vol. iii,
pp. 196-199, _seqq._

The memorable institution which spread through nearly all the
Italian cities during these centuries, of naming as podesta, or
supreme magistrate, a person not belonging to the city itself,
to hold office for a short time,—was the expedient which they
resorted to for escaping the extreme perversion of judicial and
administrative power, arising out of powerful family connections.
The restrictions which were thought necessary to guard against
either favor or antipathies on the part of the podesta, are
extremely singular. (Hüllmann, vol. iii, pp. 252-261, _seqq._)

“The proceedings of the patrician families in these cities
(observes Hüllmann) in respect to the debts which they owed, was
among the worst of the many oppressions to which the trading
classes were exposed at their hands, one of the greatest abuses
which they practised by means of their superior position. How
often did they even maltreat their creditors, who came to demand
merely what was due to them!” (Städte-Wesen, vol. ii, p. 229.)

Machiavel’s History of Florence illustrates, throughout, the
inveterate habit of the powerful families to set themselves above
the laws and judicial authority. Indeed, he seems to regard this
as an incorrigible chronic malady in society, necessitating
ever-recurring disputes between powerful men and the body of the
people. “The people (he says) desire to live according to the
laws; the great men desire to overrule the laws: it is therefore
impossible that the two should march in harmony.” “Volendo il
popolo vivere secondo le leggi, e i potenti comandare a quelle,
non è possibile che capino insieme.” (Machiavelli, Istorie
Fiorentine, liv. ii, p. 79, ad ann. 1282.)

The first book of the interesting tale, called the Promessi
Sposi, of Manzoni,—itself full of historical matter, and
since published with illustrative notes by the historian
Cantù,—exhibits a state of judicial administration, very similar
to that above described, in the Milanese, during the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries: demonstrated by repeated edicts, all
ineffectual, to bring powerful men under the real control of the
laws.

Because men of wealth and power, in the principal governments of
modern Europe, are now completely under the control of the laws,
the modern reader is apt to suppose that this is the natural
state of things. It is therefore not unimportant to produce some
references, which might be indefinitely multiplied, reminding
him of the very different phenomena which past history exhibits
almost everywhere.

[698] The number of Roman judices employed to try a criminal
cause under the _quæstiones perpetuæ_ in the last century and a
half of the Republic, seems to have varied between one hundred,
seventy-five, seventy, fifty-six, fifty-one, thirty-two, etc.
(Laboulaye, Essai sur les Loix Criminelles des Romains, p. 336,
Paris, 1845.)

In the time of Augustus, there was a total of four thousand
judices at Rome, distributed into four decuries (Pliny, H. N.
xxxiii, 1, 31).

The venality, as well as the party corruption of these Roman
judices, or jurors, taken from the senatorial and equestrian
orders, the two highest and richest orders in the state,—was
well-known and flagrant (Appian, Bell. Civ. i, 22, 35, 37;
Laboulaye, ibid. pp. 217-227; Walter, Geschichte des Römischen
Rechts, ch. xxviii, sect. 237, 238; Asconius in Ciceron. Verrin.
pp. 141-145, ed. Orell.; and Cicero himself, in the remarkable
letter to Atticus, Ep. ad Attic. i, 16).

[699] Numerous dikasteries taken by lot seem to have been
established in later times in Rhodes and other Grecian cities,
though Rhodes was not democratically constituted, and to have
worked satisfactorily. Sallust says (in his Oratio ii. ad Cæsarem
de Republicâ ordinandâ, p. 561, ed. Cort.): “Judices à paucis
probari regnum est; ex pecuniâ legi, inhonestum. Quare omnes
primæ classis judicare placet; sed numero plures quam judicant.
Neque Rhodios, neque alias civitates unquam suorum judiciorum
pœnituit; ubi promiscuè dives et pauper, ut cuique sors tulit, de
maximis rebus juxtà ac de minimis disceptat.”

The necessity of a numerous judicature, in a republic where
there is no standing army, or official force professionally
constituted, as the only means of enforcing public-minded justice
against powerful criminals, is insisted upon by Machiavel,
Discorsi sopra Tito Livio, lib. i, c. 7.

“Potrebbesi ancora allegare, a fortificazione della soprascritta
conclusione, l’accidente seguito pur in Firenze contra Piero
Soderini: il quale al tutto seguì per non essere in quella
republica alcuno modo di accuse contro alla ambizione dei potenti
cittadini: perchè lo accusare un potente a otto giudici in una
republica, non basta: bisogna che i giudici siano assai, perchè
pochi sempre fanno a modo de’ pochi,” etc.: compare the whole of
the same chapter.

[700] Aristophan. Vesp. 570; Xenophon, Rep. Ath. i, 18. We are
not to suppose that _all_ the dikasts who tried a cause were very
poor: Demosthenês would not talk to very poor men, as to “the
slave whom each of them might have left at home.” (Demosthenês
cont. Stephan. A. c. 26, p. 1127.)

It was criminal by law in the dikasts to receive bribes in the
exercise of their functions, as well as in every citizen to
give money to them (Demosth. cont. Steph. B. c. 13, p. 1137).
And it seems perfectly safe to affirm that in practice the
dikasts were never tampered with beforehand: had the fact been
otherwise, we must have seen copious allusions to it in the many
free-spoken pleadings which remain to us, just as there are in
the Roman orators: whereas, in point of fact, there are hardly
any such allusions. The word δεκάζων (in Isokratês de Pac. Or.
viii, p. 169, sect. 63) does not allude to obtaining by corrupt
means verdicts of dikasts in the dikastery, but to obtaining by
such means votes for offices in the public assembly, where the
election took place by show of hands. Isokratês says that this
was often done in his time, and so perhaps it may have been: but
in the case of the dikasteries, much better security was taken
against it.

The statement of Aristotle (from his Πολιτεῖαι, Fragm. xi, p.
69, ed. Neumann: compare Harpokration v. Δεκάζειν; Plutarch,
Coriolan. c. 14; and Pollux, viii, 121) intimates that Anytus was
the first person who taught the art τοῦ δεκάζειν τὰ δικαστήρια,
a short time before the battle of Ægos Potamos. But besides,
that the information on this point is to the last degree vague,
we may remark that between the defeat of the oligarchy of Four
Hundred and the battle of Ægos Potamos, the financial and
political condition of Athens was so exceedingly embarrassed,
that it may well be doubted whether she could maintain the paid
dikasteries on the ordinary footing. Both all the personal
service of the citizens, and all the public money, must have been
put in requisition at that time for defence against the enemy,
without leaving any surplus for other purposes: there was not
enough even to afford constant pay to the soldiers and sailors
(compare Thucyd. vi, 91; viii, 69, 71, 76, 86). If therefore, in
this time of distress, the dikasteries were rarely convoked, and
without any certainty of pay, a powerful accused person might
find it more easy to tamper with them beforehand, than it had
been before, or than it came to be afterwards, when the system
was regularly in operation. We can hardly reason with safety,
therefore, from the period shortly preceding the battle of Ægos
Potamos, either to that which preceded the Sicilian expedition,
or to that which followed the subversion of the Thirty.

Taking the general working of the dikasteries, we shall find that
they are nothing but jury-trial applied on a scale broad, systematic,
unaided, and uncontrolled, beyond all other historical experience,
and that they therefore exhibit in exaggerated proportions both the
excellences and the defects characteristic of the jury-system, as
compared with decision by trained and professional judges. All the
encomiums, which it is customary to pronounce upon jury-trial, will
be found predicable of the Athenian dikasteries in a still greater
degree: all the reproaches, which can be addressed on good ground
to the dikasteries, will apply to modern juries also, though in a
less degree. Nor is the parallel less just, though the dikasteries,
as the most democratical feature of democracy itself, have been
usually criticized with marked disfavor,—every censure, or sneer,
or joke against them, which can be found in ancient authors, comic
as well as serious, being accepted as true almost to the letter;
while juries are so popular an institution, that their merits have
been over-stated, in England at least, and their defects kept out
of sight. The theory of the Athenian dikastery, and the theory of
jury-trial, as it has prevailed in England since the revolution
of 1688, are one and the same: recourse to a certain number of
private citizens, taken by chance, or without possibility of knowing
beforehand who they will be, sworn to hear fairly and impartially
plaintiff and defendant, accuser and accused, and to find a true
verdict, according to their consciences, upon a distinct issue
before them. But in Athens this theory was worked out to its natural
consequences; while English practice, in this respect as in so many
others, is at variance with English theory: the jury, though an
ancient and a constant portion of the judicial system, has never been
more than a portion,—kept in subordination, trammels, and pupilage,
by a powerful crown, and by judges presiding over an artificial
system of law. In the English state trials, down to a period not
long before the revolution of 1688, any jurors who found a verdict
contrary to the dictation of the judge were liable to fine; and at an
earlier period, if a second jury on being summoned found an opposite
verdict, even to the terrible punishment of attaint.[701] And
though, for the last century and a half, the verdict of the jury has
been free as to matters of fact, new trials having taken the place
of the old attaint, yet the ascendency of the presiding judge over
their minds, and his influence over the procedure as the authority on
matters of law, has always been such as to overrule the natural play
of their feelings and judgment as men and citizens,[702] sometimes to
the detriment, much oftener to the benefit—always excepting political
trials—of substantial justice. But in Athens, the dikasts judged of
the law as well as of the fact: the laws were not numerous, and were
couched in few, for the most part familiar, words. To determine how
the facts stood, and whether, if the facts were undisputed, the law
invoked was properly applicable to them, were parts of the integral
question submitted to them, and comprehended in their verdict:
moreover, each dikastery construed the law for itself, without being
bound to follow the decisions of those which had preceded it, except
in so far as such analogy might really influence the convictions of
the members. They were free, self-judging persons, unassisted by the
schooling, but at the same time untrammelled by the awe-striking
ascendency, of a professional judge, obeying the spontaneous
inspirations of their own consciences, and recognizing no authority
except the laws of the city, with which they were familiar.

[701] Mr. Jardine, in his interesting and valuable publication,
Criminal Trials, vol. i, p. 115, after giving an account of the
trial of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton in 1553, for high treason,
and his acquittal, observes: “There is one circumstance in
this trial, which ought not to be passed over without an
observation. It appears that after the trial was over, the jury
were required to give recognizances to answer for their verdict,
and were afterwards imprisoned for nearly eight months, and
heavily fined, by a sentence of the Star-chamber. Such was the
security which the trial by jury afforded to the subject in
those times: and such were the perils to which juries were then
exposed, who ventured to act upon their conscientious opinions
in state prosecutions! But even these proceedings against the
jury, monstrous as they appear to our improved notions of the
administration of justice, must not be considered as a wanton
exercise of unlawful power on this particular occasion. The
fact is, that the judges of England had for centuries before
exercised a similar authority, though not without some murmuring
against it; and it was not until more than a century after it,
in the reign of Charles the Second, that a solemn decision was
pronounced against its legality.”

... “In the reign of James the First, it was held by the Lord
Chancellor Egerton, together with the two Chief Justices and
the Chief Baron, that when a party indicted is _found guilty on
the trial_, the jury shall not be questioned; but on the other
side, when a jury hath _acquitted_ a felon or a traitor against
manifest proof, they may be charged in the Star-chamber for their
partiality in finding a manifest offender not guilty. After the
abolition of the Star-chamber, there were several instances in
the reign of Charles the Second, in which it was resolved, that
both grand and petit juries might be fined for giving verdicts
against plain evidence and the directions of the court.” Compare
Mr. Amos’s Notes on Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliæ, c. 27.

[702] Respecting the French juries, M. Cottu (Réflexions sur la
Justice Criminale, p. 79) remarks:—

“Le désir ardent de bien faire dont les jurés sont généralement
animés, et la crainte de s’égarer, les jette dans une obéissance
passive à l’impulsion qui leur est donnée par le président de la
Cour d’Assise, et si ce magistrat sait s’emparer de leur estime,
alors leur confiance en lui ne connoit plus de bornes. Ils le
considèrent comme l’étoile qui doit les guider dans l’obscurité
qui les environne, et pleins d’un respect aveugle pour son
opinion, ils n’attendent que la manifestation qu’il leur en fait
pour la sanctionner par leur déclaration. Ainsi au lieu de deux
juges que l’accusé devoit avoir, il n’en a bien souvent qu’un
seul, qui est le président de la Cour d’Assise.”

Anselm Feuerbach (in the second part of his work, Ueber die
Oeffentlichkeit und Mündlichkeit der Gerechtigkeitspflege, which
contains his review of the French judicial system, Ueber die
Gerichtsverfassung Frankreichs, Abt. iii, H. v, p. 477) confirms
this statement from a large observation of the French courts of
justice.

The habit of the French juries, in so many doubtful cases, to
pronounce a verdict of guilty, by a majority of seven against
five, in which case the law threw the actual condemnation upon
the judges present in court, directing their votes to be counted
along with those of the jury, is a remarkable proof of this
aversion of the jury to the responsibility of decision; see
Feuerbach, ibid. p. 481, _seqq._ Compare also the treatise of
the same author, Betrachtungen über das Geschwornen Gericht. pp.
186-198.

Trial by jury, as practised in England since 1688, has been
politically most valuable, as a security against the encroachments
of an anti-popular executive: partly for this reason, partly for
others, not necessary to state here, it has had greater credit as
an instrument of judicature generally, and has been supposed to
produce much more of what is good in English administration of
justice, than really belongs to it. Amidst the unqualified encomiums
so frequently bestowed upon the honesty, the unprejudiced rectitude
of appreciation, the practical instinct for detecting falsehood
and resisting sophistry, in twelve citizens taken by hazard and
put into a jury-box,—comparatively little account is taken either
of the aids, or of the restrictions, or of the corrections in the
shape of new trials, under which they act, or of the artificial
forensic medium into which they are plunged for the time of their
service: so that the theory of the case presumes them to be more of
spontaneous agents, and more analogous to the Athenian dikasts than
the practice confirms. Accordingly, when we read these encomiums in
modern authors, we shall find that both the direct benefits ascribed
to jury-trial in insuring pure and even-handed justice, and still
more its indirect benefits in improving and educating the citizens
generally, might have been set forth yet more emphatically in a
laudatory harangue of Periklês about the Athenian dikasteries. If it
be true that an Englishman or an American counts more certainly on an
impartial and uncorrupt verdict from a jury of his country, than from
a permanent professional judge, much more would this be the feeling
of an ordinary Athenian, when he compared the dikasteries with the
archon. The juror hears and judges under full persuasion that he
himself, individually, stands in need of the same protection or
redress invoked by others: so also did the dikast. As to the effects
of jury-trial, in diffusing respect to the laws and constitution, in
giving to every citizen a personal interest in enforcing the former
and maintaining the latter, in imparting a sentiment of dignity to
small and poor men, through the discharge of a function exalted
as well as useful, in calling forth the patriotic sympathies, and
exercising the mental capacities of every individual; all these
effects were produced in a still higher degree by the dikasteries at
Athens; from their greater frequency, numbers, and spontaneity of
mental action, without any professional judge, upon whom they could
throw the responsibility of deciding for them.[703]

[703] I transcribe from an eminent lawyer of the United States,
Mr. Livingston, author of a Penal Code for the State of Louisiana
(Preface, pp. 12-16), an eloquent panegyric on trial by jury.
It contains little more than the topics commonly insisted on,
but it is expressed with peculiar warmth, and with the greater
fulness, inasmuch as the people of Louisiana, for whom the author
was writing, had no familiarity with the institution and its
working. The reader will observe that almost everything here said
in recommendation of the jury might have been urged by Periklês
with much truer and wider application, in enforcing his transfer
of judicial power from individual magistrates to the dikasteries.

“By our constitution (_i. e._ in Louisiana), the right of a trial
by jury is secured to the accused, but it is not exclusively
established. This, however, may be done by law, and there are
so many strong reasons in its favor, that it has been thought
proper to insert in the codes a precise declaration that, in all
criminal prosecutions, the trial by jury is a privilege which
cannot be renounced. Were it left entirely at the option of the
accused, a desire to propitiate the favor of the judge, ignorance
of his interest, or the confusion incident to his situation,
might induce him to waive the advantage of a trial by his
country, and thus by degrees accustom the people to a spectacle
which they ought never to behold,—a single man determining the
fact, applying the law, and disposing at his will of the life,
liberty, and reputation of a citizen.... Those who advocate
the present disposition of our law say,—admitting the trial by
jury to be an advantage, the law does enough when it gives the
accused the option to avail himself of its benefits; he is the
best judge whether it will be useful to him; and it would be
unjust to direct him in so important a choice. This argument is
specious, but not solid. There are reasons, and some have already
been stated, to show that this choice cannot be freely exercised.
There is, moreover, another interest besides that of the culprit
to be considered. If he be guilty, the state has an interest
in his conviction: and, whether guilty or innocent, it has a
higher interest,—that the fact should be fairly canvassed before
judges inaccessible to influence, and unbiased by any false views
of official duty. It has an interest in the character of its
administration of justice, and a paramount duty to perform in
rendering it free from suspicion. It is not true, therefore, to
say that the laws do enough when they give the choice between a
fair and impartial trial, and one that is liable to the greatest
objections. They must do more; they must restrict that choice, so
as not to suffer an ill-advised individual to degrade them into
instruments of ruin, though it should be voluntarily inflicted;
or of death, though that death should be suicide.

“Another advantage of rendering this mode of trial obligatory
is, that it diffuses the most valuable information among every
rank of citizens; it is a school, of which every jury that is
impanelled is a separate class, where the dictates of the laws,
and the consequences of disobedience to them, are practically
taught. The frequent exercise of these important functions,
moreover, gives a sense of dignity and self-respect, not only
becoming to the character of a free citizen, but which adds
to his private happiness. Neither party-spirit, nor intrigue,
nor power, can deprive him of this share in the administration
of justice, though they can humble the pride of every other
office and vacate every other place. Every time he is called
on to act in this capacity, he must feel _that though placed
in the humblest station, he is yet the guardian of the life,
the liberty, and the reputation of his fellow-citizens against
injustice and oppression; and that while his plain understanding
has been found the best refuge for innocence, his incorruptible
integrity is pronounced a sure pledge that guilt will not
escape_. A state whose _most obscure citizens_ are thus
individually elevated to perform these august functions; who
are alternately the defenders of the injured, the dread of the
guilty, the vigilant guardians of the constitution; without whose
consent no punishment can be inflicted, no disgrace incurred;
who can by their voice arrest the blow of oppression, and direct
the hand of justice where to strike,—such a state can never sink
into slavery, or easily submit to oppression. Corrupt rulers
may pervert the constitution: ambitious demagogues may violate
its precepts: foreign influence may control its operations; but
while the people enjoy the trial by jury, taken by lot from
among themselves, they cannot cease to be free. The information
it spreads, the sense of dignity and independence it inspires,
the courage it creates, will always give them an energy of
resistance that can grapple with encroachments, and a renovating
spirit that will make arbitrary power despair. The enemies of
freedom know this: they know how admirable a vehicle it is, to
convey the contagion of those liberal principles which attack
the vitals of their power, and they therefore guard against
its introduction with more care than they would take to avoid
pestilential disease. In countries where it already exists, they
insidiously endeavor to innovate, because they dare not openly
destroy: changes inconsistent with the spirit of the institution
are introduced, under the plausible pretext of improvement: _the
common class of citizens are too ill-informed to perform the
functions of jurors,—a selection is necessary_. This choice must
be confided to an agent of executive power, and must be made
among the most eminent for education, wealth, and respectability;
so that, after several successful operations of political
chemistry, a shining result may be obtained, freed, indeed,
from all republican dross, but without any of the intrinsic
value that is found in the rugged but inflexible integrity, and
incorruptible worth, of the original composition. Men impanelled
by this process, bear no resemblance but in name to _the sturdy,
honest, unlettered jurors who derive no dignity but from the
performance of their duties; and the momentary exercise of
whose functions gives no time for the work of corruption or the
influence of fear_. By innovations such as these the institution
is so changed as to leave nothing to attach the affections or
awaken the interest of the people, and it is neglected as an
useless, or abandoned as a mischievous, contrivance.”

Consistently with this earnest admiration of jury-trial, Mr.
Livingston, by the provisions of his code, limits very materially
the interference of the presiding judge, thus bringing back the
jurors more nearly to a similarity with the Athenian dikasts
(p. 85): “I restrict the charge of the judge to an opinion of
the law, and to the repetition of the evidence, _only when
required by any one of the jury_. The practice of repeating all
the testimony from notes, always (from the nature of things)
imperfectly, not seldom inaccurately, and sometimes carelessly
taken,—has a double disadvantage: it makes the jurors, who rely
more on the judge’s notes than on their own memory, inattentive
to the evidence: and it gives them an imperfect copy of that
which the nature of the trial by jury requires that they should
record in their own minds. Forced to rely upon themselves, the
necessity will quicken their attention, and it will be only
when they disagree in their recollection, that recourse will be
had to the notes of the judge.” Mr. Livingston goes on to add,
that the judges, from their old habits, acquired as practising
advocates, are scarcely ever neutral,—almost always take a side,
and generally against the prisoners on trial.

The same considerations as those which Mr. Livingston here sets
forth to demonstrate the value of jury-trial, are also insisted
upon by M. Charles Comte, in his translation of Sir Richard
Phillips’s Treatise on Juries, enlarged with many valuable
reflections on the different shape which the jury-system has
assumed in England and France. (Des Pouvoirs et des Obligations
des Jurys, traduit de l’Anglois, par Charles Comte, 2d ed. Paris,
1828, with preliminary Considérations sur le Pouvoir Judiciaire,
pp. 100, _seqq._)

The length of this note forbids my citing anything farther either
from the eulogistic observations of Sir Richard Phillips or from
those of M. Comte: but they would be found, like those of Mr.
Livingston, even more applicable to the dikasteries of Athens
than to the juries of England and America.

On the other hand, the imperfections inherent in jury-trial were
likewise disclosed in an exaggerated form under the Athenian
system. Both juror and dikast represent the average man of the
time and of the neighborhood, exempt, indeed, from pecuniary
corruption or personal fear, deciding according to what he thinks
justice, or to some genuine feeling of equity, mercy, religion, or
patriotism, which in reference to the case before him he thinks
as good as justice,—but not exempt from sympathies, antipathies,
and prejudices, all of which act the more powerfully because there
is often no consciousness of their presence, and because they
even appear essential to his idea of plain and straight-forward
good sense. According as a jury are composed of Catholics or
Protestants, Irishmen or Englishmen, tradesmen, farmers, or
inhabitants of a frontier on which smuggling prevails, there is
apt to prevail among them a corresponding bias: at the time of any
great national delusion, such as the Popish Plot,—or of any powerful
local excitement, such as that of the Church and King mobs, at
Birmingham, in 1791, against Dr. Priestley and the Dissenters,—juries
are found to perpetrate what a calmer age recognizes to have
been gross injustice. A jury who disapprove of the infliction of
capital punishment for a particular crime, will acquit prisoners
in spite of the clearest evidence of guilt. It is probable that a
delinquent, indicted for any state offence before the dikastery,
at Athens,—having only a private accuser to contend against, with
equal power of speaking in his own defence, of summoning witnesses,
and of procuring friends to speak for him,—would have better chance
of a fair trial than he would now have anywhere, except in England
and the United States of America; and better than he would have had
in England down to the seventeenth century.[704] Juries bring the
common feeling as well as the common reason of the public,—or often,
indeed, only the separate feeling of particular fractions of the
public,—to dictate the application of the law to particular cases:
they are a protection against anything worse,—especially against
such corruption and servility as are liable to taint permanent
official persons, but they cannot possibly reach anything better.
Now the dikast trial at Athens effected the same object, and had
in it only the same ingredients of error and misdecision, as the
English jury: but it had them in stronger dose,[705] without the
counteracting authority of a judge, and without the benefit of a
procedure such as has now been obtained in England. The feelings of
the dikasts counted for more, and their reason for less: not merely
because of their greater numbers, which naturally heightened the
pitch of feeling in each individual, but also because the addresses
of orators or parties formed the prominent part of the procedure,
and the depositions of witnesses only a very subordinate part;
the dikast,[706] therefore, heard little of the naked facts, the
appropriate subjects for his reason,—but he was abundantly supplied
with the plausible falsehoods, calumnies, irrelevant statements
and suggestions, etc., of the parties, and that too in a manner
skilfully adapted to his temper. To keep the facts of the case
before the jury, apart from the falsehood and coloring of parties,
is the most useful function of the modern judge, whose influence
is also considerable as a restraint upon the pleader. The helps to
the reason of the dikast were thus materially diminished, while the
action upon his feelings, of anger as well as of compassion, was
sharpened, as compared with the modern juror.[707] We see, in the
remaining productions of the Attic orators, how much there is of
plausible deception, departure from the true issue, and appeals to
sympathies, antipathies, and prejudices of every kind; addressed to
the dikasteries.[708] Of course, such artifices were resorted to by
opposite speakers in each particular trial, nor have we any means of
knowing to what extent they actually perverted the judgment of the
hearers.[709] Probably, the frequent habit of sitting in dikastery,
gave them a penetration in detecting sophistry not often possessed by
non-professional citizens: nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that,
in a considerable proportion of cases, success depended less upon the
intrinsic merits of a case, than upon apparent airs of innocence and
truth-telling, dexterity of statement, and good general character, in
the parties, their witnesses, and the friends who addressed the court
on their behalf. The accusatory speeches in Attic oratory, wherein
punishment is invoked upon an alleged delinquent, are expressed
with a bitterness which is now banished from English criminal
judicature, though it was common in the state trials of two centuries
ago. Against them may be set the impassioned and emphatic appeals
made by defendants and their friends to the commiseration of the
dikasts; appeals the more often successful, because they came last,
immediately before decision was pronounced. This is true of Rome as
well as of Athens.[710]

[704] Mr. Jardine (Criminal Trials, Introduct. p. 8) observes,
that the “proceedings against persons accused of state offences,
in the earlier periods of our history, do not deserve the name of
trials: they were a mere mockery of justice,” etc.

Respecting what English juries have been, it is curious to peruse
the following remarks of Mr. Daines Barrington, Observations on
the Statutes, p. 409. In remarking on a statute of Henry the
Seventh, A. D. 1494, he says:

“The twenty-first chapter recites: That perjury is much and
customarily used within the city of London, among such persons as
passen and been impannelled in issue, joined between party and
party.’

“This offence hath been before this statute complained of in
preambles to several laws, being always the perjury of a _juror_,
who finds a verdict contrary to his oath, and not that which we
hear too much of at present, in the witnesses produced at a trial.

“In the Dance of Death, written originally in French, by
Macharel, and translated by John Lydgate in this reign, with
some additions, to adapt it to English characters,—a juryman is
mentioned, who had often been bribed for giving a false verdict,
which shows the offence to have been very common. The sheriff,
who summoned the jury, was likewise greatly accessory to this
crime, by summoning those who were most partial and prejudiced.
Carew, in his account of Cornwall, informs us that it was a
common article in an attorney’s bill, to charge _pro amicitiâ
vicecomitis_.

“It is likewise remarkable, that partiality and perjury in jurors
of the city of London is more particularly complained of than
in other parts of England, by the preamble of this and other
statutes. Stow informs us that in 1468, many jurors of this city
were punished by having papers fixed on their heads, stating
their offence of having been tampered with by the parties to the
suit. He likewise complains that this crying offence continued in
the time of Queen Elizabeth, when he wrote his account of London:
and Fuller, in his English Worthies, mentions it as a proverbial
saying, that London juries hang half and save half. Grafton also,
in his Chronicle, informs us that the Chancellor of the diocese
of London was indicted for a murder, and that the bishop wrote a
letter to Cardinal Wolsey, in behalf of his officer, to stop the
prosecution, ‘because London juries were so prejudiced, that they
would find Abel guilty for the murder of Cain.’

“The punishment for a false verdict by the petty jury is by writ
of attaint: and the statute directs, that half of the grand-jury,
when the trial is _per medietatem linguæ_, shall be strangers,
not Londoners.

‘And there’s no London jury, but are led
In evidence as far by common fame,
As they are by present deposition.’
(Ben Jonson’s Magnetic Lady, Act. iii, Sc. 3.)

“It appears by 15 Henry the Sixth, c. 5,—which likewise recites
the great increase of perjury in jurors, and in the strongest
terms,—that in every attaint there were thirteen defendants:
the twelve jurors who gave the verdict, and the plaintiff or
defendant who had obtained it, who therefore was supposed to have
used corrupt means to procure it. For this reason, if the verdict
was given in favor of the crown, no attaint could be brought,
because the king could not be joined as a defendant with the jury
who were prosecuted.”

Compare also the same work, pp. 394-457, and Mr. Amos’s Notes on
Fortescue de Laudib. Leg. Angliæ, c. 27.

[705] In France, jury-trial was only introduced for the first
time by the Constituent Assembly in 1790, and then only for
criminal procedure: I transcribe the following remarks on
the working of it from the instructive article in Merlin’s
“Répertoire de Jurisprudence,” article _Juré_. Though written in
a spirit very favorable to the jury, it proclaims the reflections
of an observing lawyer on the temper and competence of the
jurymen whom he had seen in action, and on their disposition to
pronounce the verdict according to the _feeling_ which the case
before them inspired.

“Pourquoi faut il qu’une institution qui rassure les citoyens
contre l’endurcissement et la prévention si funeste à
l’innocence, que peut produire l’habitude de juger les crimes
... qu’une institution qui donne pour juges à un accusé, des
citoyens indépendans de toute espèce d’influence, ses pairs, ses
égaux ... pourquoi faut il que cette institution, dont les formes
sont simples, touchantes, patriarchales, dont la théorie flatte
et entraine l’esprit par une séduction irrésistible, ait été si
souvent méconnue, trompée par l’ignorance et la pusillanimité,
prostitutée peut-être par une vile et coupable corruption?

“Rendons pourtant justice aux erreurs, même à la prévarication,
des jurés: ils ont trop de fois acquitté les coupables, mais
il n’a pas encore été prouvé qu’ils eussent jamais fait couler
une goutte de sang innocent: et si l’on pouvoit supposer qu’ils
eussent vu quelquefois le crime là où il n’y en avoit qu’une
apparence trompeuse et fausse, ce ne seroit pas leur conscience
qu’il faudroit accuser: ce seroit la fatalité malheureuse des
circonstances qui auroient accompagné l’accusation, et qui auroit
trompé de même les juges les plus pénétrans et les plus exercés à
rechercher la vérité et à la démêler du mensonge.

“Mais les reproches qu’ont souvent mérités les jurés, c’est
d’avoir cédé à _une fausse commisération_, ou à l’intérêt
qu’étoient parvenus à leur inspirer les familles d’accusés qui
avaient un rang dans la société: c’est souvent d’être sortis
de leurs attributions, qui se bornent à apprécier les faits,
et les juger d’une manière différente de la loi. _J’ai vu cent
exemples de ces usurpations de pouvoir et de ce despotisme des
jurés._ Trop souvent ils out voulu voir une action innocente,
là où la loi avoit dit qu’il y avait un crime, et alors ils
n’ont pas craint de se jouer de la vérité pour tromper et éluder
la loi.” ... “Serat-il possible d’améliorer l’institution des
jurés, et d’en prévenir les écarts souvent trop scandaleux?
Gardons nous d’en douter. Que l’on commence par composer le
jury de propriétaires intéressés à punir le crime pour le
rendre plus rare: que surtout on en éloigne les artisans, les
petits cultivateurs, hommes chez qui sans doute la probité est
heureusement fort commune, mais dont l’esprit est peu exercé,
et qui, accoutumés aux déférences, aux égards, cèdent toujours
à l’opinion de ceux de leurs collègues dont le rang est plus
distingué: ou qui, familiarisés seulement avec les idées
relatives à leur profession, n’ont jamais eu, dans tout le reste,
que des idées d’emprunt ou d’inspiration. On sait qu’aujourdhui
ce sont ces hommes qui dans presque toute la France forment
toujours la majorité des jurés: mettez au milieu d’eux un homme
d’un état plus élevé, d’un esprit délié, d’une élocution facile,
il entrainera ses collègues, il décidera la délibération: et
si cet homme a le jugement faux ou le cœur corrompu, cette
délibération sera nécessairement mauvaise.

“Mais pourra-t-on parvenir à vaincre l’insouciance des
propriétaires riches et éclairés, à leur faire abandonner leurs
affaires, leurs familles, leurs habitudes, pour les entrainer
dans les villes, et leur y faire remplir des fonctions qui
tourmentent quelquefois la probité, et donnent des inquiétudes
d’autant plus vives que la conscience est plus délicate? Pourquoi
non? Pourquoi les mêmes classes de citoyens qui dans les huit
ou dix premiers mois de 1792, se portaient avec tant de zèle à
l’exercice de ces fonctions, les fuiroient elles aujourdhui?
surtout si, pour les y rappeler, la loi fait mouvoir les deux
grands ressorts qui sont dans sa main, si elle s’engage à
récompenser l’exactitude, et à punir la négligence?” (Merlin,
Répertoire de Jurisprudence, art. Jurés, p. 97.)

In these passages, it deserves notice, that what is particularly
remarked about juries, both English and French, is, their
reluctance to convict accused persons brought before them. Now
the character of the Athenian dikasts, as described by Mr.
Mitford and by many other authors, is the precise reverse of
this: an extreme severity and cruelty, and a disposition to
convict all accused persons brought before them, upon little or
no evidence,—especially rich accused persons. I venture to affirm
that, to ascribe to them such a temper generally, is not less
improbable in itself, than unsupported by any good evidence.
In the speeches remaining to us from defendants, we do indeed
find complaints made of the severity of the dikasteries: but in
those speeches which come from accusers, there are abundance of
complaints to the contrary,—of over-indulgence on the part of
the dikasteries, and consequent impunity of criminals. Nor does
Aristophanês,—by whom most modern authors are guided, even when
they do not quote him,—when fairly studied, bear out the temper
ascribed by Mr. Mitford to the dikasts; even if we admitted
Aristophanês to be a faithful and trustworthy witness, which no
man who knows his picture of Sokratês will be disposed to do.
Aristophanês takes hold of every quality which will raise a laugh
against the dikasts, and his portrait of them as wasps was well
calculated for this purpose,—to describe them as boiling over
with acrimony, irritation, impatience, to find some one whom
they could convict and punish. But even he, when he comes to
describe these dikasts in action, represents them as obeying the
appeals to their pity, as well as those to their anger,—as being
yielding and impressionable when their feelings are approached on
either side, and unable, when they hear the exculpatory appeal
of the accused, to maintain the anger which had been raised by
the speech of the accuser. (See Aristophan. Vesp. 574, 713, 727,
794.) Moreover, if from the Vespæ we turn to the Nubes, where
the poet attacks the sophists and not the dikasts, we are there
told that the sophists could arm any man with fallacies and
subterfuges which would enable him to procure acquittal from the
dikasts, whatever might be the crime committed.

I believe that this open-mindedness, and impressibility of
the feelings on all sides, by art, eloquence, prayers, tears,
invectives, etc., is the true character of the Athenian dikasts.
And I also believe that they were, as a general rule, more
open to commiseration than to any other feeling,—like what is
above said respecting the French jurymen: εὐκίνητος πρὸς ὀργὴν
(ὁ Ἀθηναίων δῆμος), εὐμετάθετος πρὸς ἔλεον,—this expression of
Plutarch about the Athenian demos is no less true about the
dikasts: compare also the description given by Pliny (H. N. xxxv,
10) of the memorable picture of the Athenian demos by the painter
Parrhasius.

[706] That the difference between the dikast and the juryman,
in this respect, is only one of degree, I need hardly remark.
M. Merlin observes, “Je ne pense pas, comme bien des gens, que
pour être propre aux fonctions de juré, il suffise d’avoir _une
intelligence ordinaire et de la probité_. Si l’accusé paroissoit
seul aux débats avec les témoins, il ne faudroit sans doute que
du bon sens pour reconnoitre la vérité dans des déclarations
faites avec simplicité et dégagées de tout raisonnement: mais il
y paroit assisté presque toujours d’un ou de plusieurs défenseurs
qui par des interpellations captieuses, embarrassent ou égarent
les témoins; et par une discussion subtile, souvent sophistique,
quelquefois éloquente, enveloppent la vérité des nuages, et
rendent l’évidence même problématique. Certes, il faut plus que
de bonnes intentions, il faut plus que du bon sens, pour ne pas
se laisser entrainer à ces fausses lueurs, pour se garantir des
écarts de la sensibilité, et pour se maintenir immuablement
dans la ligne du vrai, au milieu de ces impulsions données
en même temps à l’esprit et au cœur.” (Merlin, Répertoire de
Jurisprudence, art. Jurés, p. 98).

At Athens, there were no professional advocates: the accuser
and the accused—or the plaintiff and defendant, if the cause
was civil—each appeared in person with their witnesses, or
sometimes with depositions which the witnesses had sworn to
before the archon: each might come with a speech prepared by
Antipho (Thucyd. viii, 68) or some other rhetor: each might have
one or more ξυνηγόρους to speak on his behalf after himself,
but seemingly only out of the space of time allotted to him by
the clepsydra. In civil causes, the defendant must have been
perfectly acquainted with the plaintiff’s case, since, besides
the anakrisis, or preliminary examination before the archon, the
cause had been for the most part already before an arbitrator.
In a criminal case, the accused party had only the anakrisis to
guide him, as to the matter of which he was to be accused: but
it appears from the prepared speeches of accused parties which
we now possess, that this anakrisis must have been sufficiently
copious to give him a good idea of that which he had to rebut.
The accuser was condemned to a fine of one thousand drachms, if
he did not obtain on the verdict one-fifth of the votes of the
dikasts engaged.

Antipho not only composed speeches for pleaders before the
dikastery, but also gave them valuable advice generally as to the
manner of conducting their case, etc., though he did not himself
speak before the dikasts: so also Ktesiklês the λογόγραφος
(Demosthenês cont. Theokrin. c. 5) acted as general adviser, or
attorney.

[707] Aristotle, in the first and second chapters of his Treatise
de Rhetoricâ, complains that the teachers and writers on rhetoric
who preceded him, treated almost entirely of the different
means of working on the feelings of the dikasts, and of matters
“extraneous to the real question which the dikasts ought to try.”
(περὶ τῶν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τὰ πλεῖστα πραγματεύονται· διαβολὴ
γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργὴ, οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς
τὸν δικαστὴν, etc., i, 1, 1: compare, i, 2, 3, and iii, 1, 2.)

This is sufficient to show how prominent such appeals to the
feelings of the dikasts were, in actual fact and practice, even
if we did not know it from the perusal of the orations themselves.

Respecting the habit of accused persons to bring their wives and
children before the dikasts as suppliants for them, to obtain
mercy or acquittal, see Aristophan. Vesp. 567-976; Andokidês de
Mysteriis (ad finem), and Lysias, Orat. iv, de Vulnere (ad finem).

[708] To a person accustomed to the judicature of modern Europe,
conducted throughout all its stages by the instrumentality
of professional men,—judges, advocates, attorneys, etc.,—and
viewed by the general public as a matter in which no private
citizen either could act or ought to act for himself,—nothing
is more remarkable in reading the Attic judicial orations, to a
certain extent also the Roman, than the entire absence of this
professional feeling, and the exhibition of justice both invoked
and administered by private citizens exclusively. The nearest
analogy to this, which modern justice presents, is to be found in
the courts of Requests and other courts for trying causes limited
to small sums of property,—too small to be worth the notice of
judges and lawyers.

These courts, in spite of their direct and important bearing on
the welfare and security of the poorer classes, have received
little elucidation. The History of the Birmingham Court of
Requests, by Mr. William Hutton,—lately republished by Messrs.
Chambers,—forms an exception to this remark, and is full of
instruction in respect to the habits, the conduct, and the
sufferings of poor persons. It furnishes, besides, the closest
approach that I know to the feelings of Athenian dikasts and
pleaders, though of course with many important differences.
Mr. Hutton was for many years unremitting in his attendance
as a commissioner, and took warm interest in the honorable
working of the court. His remarks upon the position, the duties,
and the difficulties of the commissioners, illustrated by
numerous cases given in detail, are extremely interesting, and
represent thoughts which must have often suggested themselves to
intelligent dikasts at Athens.

“Law and equity (he says, p. 34) often vary. If the commissioners
cannot decide _against_ law, they can decide _without_ it. Their
oath binds them to proceed according to _good conscience_ (περὶ
ὁτοῦ οὔκ εἰσι νόμοι, γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ, was the oath of the
Athenian dikast). A man only needs information to be able to
decide.”

A few words from p. 36, about the sources of misjudgment.
“Misinformation is another source of evil: both parties equally
treat the commissioners with deceit. The only people who can
throw light upon the subject will not.

“It is difficult not to be won by the first speaker, if he
carries the air of mildness and is master of his tale; or not
to be biased in favor of infirmity or infancy. Those who cannot
assist themselves, we are much inclined to assist.

“Nothing dissolves like tears. Though they arise from weakness,
they are powerful advocates, which instantly disarm, particularly
those which the afflicted wish to hide. They come from the heart
and will reach it, if the judge has a heart to reach. Distress
and pity are inseparable.

“Perhaps there never was a judge, from seventeen to seventy,
who could look with indifference upon beauty in distress; if he
could, he was unfit to be a judge. He should be a stranger to
decision, who is a stranger to compassion. All these matters
influence the man, and warp his judgment.”

This is a description, given by a perfectly honest and
unprofessional judge, of his own feelings when on the bench.
It will be found illustrated by frequent passages in the Attic
pleaders, where they address themselves to the feelings here
described in the bosom of the dikasts.

[709] Demosthenês (cont. Phormio. p. 913, c. 2) emphatically
remarks, how much more cautious witnesses were of giving false
testimony before the numerous dikastery, than before the
arbitrator.

[710] Asconius gives an account of the begging off and
supplication to the judices at Rome, when sentence was about to
be pronounced upon Scaurus, whom Cicero defended (ad Ciceron.
Orat. pro Scauro, p. 28, ed. Orelli): “Laudaverunt Scaurum
consulares novem—Horum magna pars per tabellas laudaverunt, qui
aberant: inter quos Pompeius quoque. Unus prætereà adolescens
laudavit, frater ejus, Faustus Cornelius, Syllæ filius. Is in
laudatione multa humiliter et cum lacrimis locutus non minus
audientes permovit, quam Scaurus ipse permoverat. Ad genua
judicum, cum sententiæ ferrentur, bifariam se diviserunt qui pro
eo rogabant: ab uno latere Scaurus ipse et M. Glabrio, sororis
filius, et Paulus, et P. Lentulus, et L. Æmilius Buca, et C.
Memmius, supplicaverunt: ex alterâ parte Sylla Faustus, frater
Scauri, et T. Annius Milo, et T. Peducæus, et C. Cato, et M.
Octavius Lænas.”

Compare also Cicero, Brutus, c. 23, about the defence of Sergius
Galba; Quintilian, I. O. ii, 15.

As an organ for judicial purposes, the Athenian dikasteries were
thus a simple and plenary manifestation of jury-trial, with its
inherent excellences and defects both brought out in exaggerated
relief: they insured a decision at once uncorrupt, public-minded, and
imposing,—together with the best security which the case admitted
against illegal violences on the part of the rich and great.[711]
Their extreme publicity, as well as their simple and oral procedure,
divested of that verbal and ceremonial technicality which marked
the law of Rome, even at its outset, was no small benefit: and
as the verdicts of the dikasts, even when wrong, depended upon
causes of misjudgment common to them with the general body of the
citizens, so they never appeared to pronounce unjustly, nor lost
the confidence of their fellow-citizens generally. But whatever
may have been their defects as judicial instruments, as a stimulus
both to thought and speech, their efficacy was unparalleled, in
the circumstances of Athenian society. Doubtless, they would not
have produced the same effect if established at Thebes or Argos:
the susceptibilities of the Athenian mind, as well as the previous
practice and expansive tendencies of democratical citizenship, were
also essential conditions,—and that genuine taste of sitting in
judgment, and hearing both sides fairly, which, however Aristophanês
may caricature and deride it, was alike honorable and useful to
the people. The first establishment of the dikasteries is nearly
coincident with the great improvement of Attic tragedy in passing
from Æschylus to Sophoklês. The same development of the national
genius, now preparing splendid manifestations both in tragic and
comic poetry, was called with redoubled force into the path of
oratory, by the new judicial system. A certain power of speech
now became necessary, not merely for those who intended to take
a prominent part in politics, but also for private citizens to
vindicate their rights, or repel accusations in a court of justice.
It was an accomplishment of the greatest practical utility, even
apart from ambitious purposes; hardly less so than the use of arms or
the practice of the gymnasium. Accordingly, the teachers of grammar
and rhetoric, and the composers of written speeches to be delivered
by others, now began to multiply and to acquire an unprecedented
importance,—as well at Athens as under the contemporary democracy
of Syracuse,[712] in which, also, some form of popular judicature
was established. Style and speech began to be reduced to a system,
and so communicated: not always happily, for several of the early
rhetors[713] had adopted an artificial, ornate, and conceited manner,
from which Attic good taste afterwards liberated itself,—but the very
character of a teacher of rhetoric as an art,—a man giving precepts
and putting himself forward in show-lectures as a model for others,
is a feature first belonging to the Periklean age, and indicates
a new demand in the minds of the citizens. We begin to hear, in
the generation now growing up, of the rhetor and the sophist, as
persons of influence and celebrity. These two names denoted persons
of similar moral and intellectual endowments, or often indeed the
same person, considered in different points of view;[714] either
as professing to improve the moral character, or as communicating
power and facility of expression, or as suggesting premises for
persuasion, illustrations on the common-places of morals and
politics, argumentative abundance on matters of ordinary experience,
dialectical subtlety in confuting an opponent, etc.[715] Antipho
of the deme Rhamnus in Attica, Thrasymachus of Chalkêdon, Tisias of
Syracuse, Gorgias of Leontini, Protagoras of Abdêra, Prodikus of
Keôs, Theodôrus of Byzantium, Hippias of Elis, Zeno of Elea, were
among the first who distinguished themselves in these departments
of teaching. Antipho was the author of the earliest composed speech
really spoken in a dikastery, and preserved down to the later
critics.[716] These men were mostly not citizens of Athens, though
many of them belonged to towns comprehended in the Athenian empire,
at a time when important judicial causes belonging to these towns
were often carried up to be tried at Athens,—while all of them looked
to that city as a central point of action and distinction. The term
_sophist_, which Herodotus[717] applies with sincere respect to men
of distinguished wisdom, such as Solon, Anacharsis, Pythagoras,
etc., now came to be applied to these teachers of virtue, rhetoric,
conversation, and disputation; many of whom professed acquaintance
with the whole circle of human science, physical as well as moral
(then narrow enough), so far as was necessary to talk about any
portion of it plausibly and effectively, and to answer any question
which might be proposed to them. Though these men passed from one
Grecian town to another, partly in the capacity of envoys from their
fellow-citizens, partly as exhibiting their talents to numerous
hearers, with much renown and large gain,[718]—they appeared to have
been viewed with jealousy and dislike by a large portion of the
public:[719] for at a time when every citizen pleaded his own cause
before the dikastery, they imparted, to those who were rich enough
to purchase it, a peculiar skill in the common weapons, which made
them seem like fencing-masters, or professional swordsmen, amidst a
society of untrained duellists.[720] Moreover, Sokratês,—himself a
product of the same age, and a disputant on the same subjects,—and
bearing the same name of a _sophist_,[721] but despising political
and judicial practice, and looking to the production of intellectual
stimulus and moral impressions upon his hearers,—Sokratês carried on
throughout his life a constant polemical warfare against the sophists
and rhetors, in that negative vein in which he was unrivalled. And
as the works of these latter have not remained, it is chiefly from
the observations of their opponents that we know them; so that they
are in a situation such as that in which Sokratês himself would have
been, if we had been compelled to judge of him only from the Clouds
of Aristophanês, or from those unfavorable impressions respecting
his character, which we know, even from the Apologies of Plato and
Xenophon, to have been generally prevalent at Athens. This is not
the opportunity, however, for trying to distinguish the good from
the evil in the working of the sophists and rhetors: at present, it
is enough that they were the natural product of the age,—supplying
those wants, and answering to that stimulus, which arose partly
from the deliberations of the ekklesia, but still more from the
contentions before the dikastery,—in which latter a far greater
number of citizens took active part, with or without their own
consent. The public and frequent dikasteries constituted by Periklês,
opened to the Athenian mind precisely that career of improvement
which was best suited to its natural aptitude: they were essential
to the development of that demand out of which grew not only Grecian
oratory, but also, as secondary products, the speculative moral
and political philosophy, and the didactic analysis of rhetoric and
grammar, which long survived after Grecian creative genius had passed
away.[722] And it was one of the first measures of the oligarchy of
Thirty, to forbid, by an express law, any teaching of the art of
speaking. Aristophanês derides the Athenians for their love of talk
and controversy, as if it had enfeebled their military energy: but
in his time, most undoubtedly, that reproach was not true; nor did
it become true, even in part, until the crushing misfortunes which
marked the close of the Peloponnesian war. During the course of that
war, restless and energetic action was the characteristic of Athens,
even in a greater degree than oratory or political discussion, though
before the time of Demosthenês a material alteration had taken place.

[711] Plato, in his Treatise de Legibus (vi, p. 768) adopts all
the distinguishing principles of the Athenian dikasteries. He
particularly insists, that the citizen, who does not take his
share in the exercise of this function, conceives himself to have
no concern or interest in the commonwealth,—τὸ παράπαν τῆς πόλεως
οὐ μέτοχος εἶναι.

[712] Aristot. ap. Cicero. Brut. c. 12. “Itaque cum sublatis
in Siciliâ tyrannis res privatæ longo intervallo judiciis
repeterentur, tum primum quod esset acuta ea gens et
controversa naturâ, artem et præcepta Siculos Coracem et Tisiam
conscripsisse,” etc. Compare Diodor. xi, 87; Pausan. vi, 17, 8.

[713] Especially Gorgias: see Aristotel. Rhetor. iii, 1, 26;
Timæus, Fr.; Dionys. Halicarn. De Lysiâ Judicium, c. 3; also
Foss, Dissertatio de Gorgiâ Leontino, p. 20 (Halle, 1828); and
Westermann, Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland und Rom.,
sects. 30, 31.

[714] Plato (Gorgias, c. 20-75; Protagoras, c. 9). Lysias is
sometimes designated as a sophist (Demosthen. cont. Neær. c. 7,
p. 1351; Athenæ. xiii. p. 592). There is no sufficient reason for
supposing with Taylor (Vit. Lysiæ, p. 56, ed. Dobson) that there
were two persons named Lysias, and that the person here named is
a different man from the author of the speeches which remain to
us: see Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fast. H. p. 360. Appendix, c. 20.

[715] See the first book of Aristotle’s Rhetoric—alluded to in a
former note—for his remarks on the technical teachers of rhetoric
before his time. He remarks—and Plato remarked before him (i,
1 and 2)—that their teaching was for the most part thoroughly
narrow and practical, bearing exclusively on what was required
for the practice of the dikastery (περὶ τοῦ δικάζεσθαι πάντες
πειρῶνται τεχνολογεῖν): see also a remarkable passage in his
Treatise de Sophisticis Elenchis, c. 32, ad finem. And though he
himself lays down a far more profound and comprehensive theory of
rhetoric, and all matters appertaining to it,—in a treatise which
has rarely been surpassed in power of philosophical analysis,—yet
when he is recommending his speculations to notice, he appeals
to the great practical value of rhetorical teaching, as enabling
a man to “help himself,” and fight his own battles, in case of
need—Ἄτοπον εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχρὸν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ,
λόγῳ δὲ οὐκ αἰσχρόν (i, 1, 3: compare iii, 1, 2; Plato Gorgias,
c, 41-55; Protagoras, c. 9; Phædrus, c. 43-50; Euthydem. c. 1-31
and Xenophon, Memorab. iii, 12, 2, 3).

See also the character of Proxenus in the Anabasis of Xenophon,
ii, 6, 16; Plutarch, Vit. x, Orator. p. 307; Aristoph. Nubes,
1108; Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 48; Plato, Alkibiadês, i, c. 31,
p. 119; and a striking passage in Plutarch’s Life of Cato the
elder, c. 1.

[716] Plutarch, Vit. x, Orator. p. 832; Quintilian, iii, 1, 10.
Compare Van Spaan, or Ruhnken, Dissertatio de Antiphonte Oratore
Attico, pp. 8, 9, prefixed to Dobson’s edition of Antipho and
Andokidês. Antipho is said to have been the teacher of the
historian Thucydidês. The statement of Plutarch, that the father
of Antipho was also a sophist, can hardly be true.

[717] Herodot. i, 29; iv, 95.

[718] Plato (Hippias Major, c. 1, 2; Menon, p. 95; and Gorgias,
c. 1, with Stallbaum’s note); Diodor. xii, 53; Pausan. vi, 17, 8.

[719] Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 31. To teach or learn the art
of speech was the common reproach made by the vulgar against
philosophers and lettered men,—τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὑπὸ τῶν
πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον (Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 31). Compare Æschinês
cont. Timar. about Demosthenês, c. 25, 27, which illustrates the
curious fragment of Sophoklês, 865. Οἱ γὰρ ~γύνανδροι~ καὶ λέγειν
~ἠσκηκότες~.

[720] Such is probably the meaning of that remarkable passage
in which Thucydidês describes the Athenian rhetor, Antipho,
(viii, 68): Ἀντιφῶν, ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναίων ἀρετῇ τε οὐδενὸς ὕστερος, καὶ
κράτιστος ἐνθυμηθῆναι γενόμενος καὶ ἃ ἂν γνοίη εἰπεῖν· καὶ ἐς
μὲν δῆμον οὐ παριὼν οὐδ’ ἐς ἄλλον ἀγῶνα ἑκούσιος οὐδένα, ἀλλ’
~ὑπόπτως τῷ πλήθει διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος διακείμενος~, τοὺς μέντοι
ἀγωνιζομένους καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ, πλεῖστα εἷς ἀνὴρ,
ὅστις ξυμβουλεύσαιτό τι, δυνάμενος ὠφελεῖν. “Inde illa circa
occultandam eloquentiam simulatio,” observes Quintilian, Inst.
Or. iv, 1, 8.

Compare Plato (Protagoras, c. 8; Phædrus, c. 86), Isokratês
cont. Sophistas, Or. xiii, p. 295, where he complains of the
teachers,—οἵτινες ὑπέσχοντο, δικάζεσθαι διδάσκειν, ἐκλεξάμενοι τὸ
δυσχερέστατον τῶν ὀνομάτων, ὃ τῶν φθονούντων ἔργον εἴη λέγειν,
ἀλλ’ οὐ τῶν προεστώτων τῆς τοιαύτης παιδεύσεως, Demosthen. De
Fals. Legat, c. 70, 71, pp. 417-420; and Æschin. cont. Ktesiphon.
c. 9, p. 371,—κακοῦργον σοφιστὴν, οἰόμενον ῥήμασι τοὺς νόμους
ἀναιρήσειν.

[721] Æschinês cont. Timarch. c. 34, p. 74. Ὑμεῖς μὲν, ὦ
Ἀθηναῖοι, ~Σωκράτην μὲν τὸν σοφιστὴν~ ἀπεκτείνατε, ὅτι Κριτίαν
ἐφάνη πεπαιδευκὼς, ἕνα τῶν τριάκοντα τῶν τὸν δῆμον καταλυσάντων.

Among the sophists whom Isokratês severely criticizes, he
evidently seems to include Plato, as may be seen by the contrast
between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη, which he particularly notes, and
which is so conspicuously set forth in the Platonic writings
(Isokratês cont. Sophistas, Or. xiii, p. 293; also p. 295). We
know also that Lysias called both Plato and Æschinês the disciple
of Sokratês, by the name of _sophists_ (Aristeidês, Orat.
Platonic. xlvi, Ὑπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων, p. 407, vol. ii, ed. Dindorf).
Aristeidês remarks justly that the name sophist was a general
name, including all the philosophers, teachers, and lettered men.

The general name, _sophists_, in fact, included good, bad, and
indifferent; like “the philosophers, the political economists,
the metaphysicians,” etc. I shall take a future opportunity of
examining the indiscriminate censures against them as a class,
which most modern writers have copied implicitly from the
polemics of ancient times.

[722] Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 31. λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν.
Xenophon ascribes the passing of this law to a personal hatred
of Kritias against Sokratês, and connects it with an anecdote
exceedingly puerile, when considered as the alleged cause of that
hatred, as well as of the consequent law. But it is evident that
the law had a far deeper meaning, and was aimed directly at one
of the prominent democratical habits.

The establishment of these paid dikasteries at Athens was thus one
of the most important and prolific events in all Grecian history.
The pay helped to furnish a maintenance for old citizens, past the
age of military service. Elderly men were the best persons for such
a service, and were preferred for judicial purposes both at Sparta,
and, as it seems, in heroic Greece: nevertheless, we need not suppose
that _all_ the dikasts were either old or poor, though a considerable
proportion of them were so, and though Aristophanês selects these
qualities as among the most suitable subjects for his ridicule.
Periklês has been often censured for this institution, as if he
had been the first to insure pay to dikasts who before served for
nothing, and had thus introduced poor citizens into courts previously
composed of citizens above poverty. But, in the first place, this
supposition is not correct in point of fact, inasmuch as there were
no such constant dikasteries previously acting without pay; next, if
it had been true, the habitual exclusion of the poor citizens would
have nullified the popular working of these bodies, and would have
prevented them from answering any longer to the reigning sentiment
at Athens. Nor could it be deemed unreasonable to assign a regular
pay to those who thus rendered regular service: it was, indeed,
an essential item in the whole scheme[723] and purpose; so that
the suppression of the pay of itself seems to have suspended the
dikasteries, while the oligarchy of Four Hundred was established,—and
it can only be discussed in that light. As the fact stands, we may
suppose that the six thousand heliasts who filled the dikasteries
were composed of the middling and poorer citizens indiscriminately:
though there was nothing to exclude the richer, if they chose to
serve.

[723] Thucyd. viii, 67. Compare a curious passage, even in
reference to the time of Demosthenês, in the speech of that
orator contra Bœotum de Nomine, c. 5. καὶ εἰ μισθὸς ἐπορίσθη τοῖς
δικαστηρίοις, εἰσῆγον ἂν με δῆλον ὅτι, etc.

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