Submarine Warfare - Past, Present, and Future

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Title: Submarine Warfare - Past, Present, and Future
Author: Fyfe, Herbert C.
Language: English
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*** Start of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Submarine Warfare - Past, Present, and Future" ***

SUBMARINE WARFARE

PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

[Illustration:

“DAVID AND GOLIATH.”

_The Russian Battleship “Retvisan” (12,700 tons) and the U.S.
Submarine “Holland” (75 tons)._
]

SUBMARINE WARFARE
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

HERBERT C. FYFE

(_Sometime Librarian of the Royal Institution, London_)

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY ADMIRAL THE HON. SIR EDMUND ROBERT FREMANTLE,
G.C.B., C.M.G.; AND A CHAPTER ON “THE PROBABLE FUTURE OF SUBMARINE BOAT
CONSTRUCTION” BY SIR EDWARD J. REED, M.P. ✜ ✜ ✜ ✜ ✜

[Illustration]

WITH FIFTY ILLUSTRATIONS

LONDON
GRANT RICHARDS
48, LEICESTER SQUARE
1902

UNWIN BROTHERS, LIMITED, PRINTERS, WOKING AND LONDON.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

PREFACE

_There exists no popular work in the English language on submarine
warfare, and only one which deals exclusively with submarine boats. This
was written fifteen years ago by Lieutenant G. W. Hovgaard of the Danish
Navy. It is a little book of ninety-eight pages, and out of these forty
only are given to the “History and Development of Submarine Boats.” The
rest of the volume is taken up with a description of a vessel imagined
by the author but never constructed. Lieutenant Sleeman’s “Torpedoes and
Torpedo Warfare” takes no account of under-water craft, whilst
Lieutenant G. E. Armstrong, in his little book, “Torpedoes and
Torpedo-vessels” devotes only eighteen pages out of 306 to “Submarines
and Submersibles.”_

_Having always taken a keen interest in submarine boats, the writer some
two years ago commenced the compilation of the present work. His aim has
been to produce a book which should be essentially of a popular
character and should appeal to those who have neither the time nor the
inclination to pursue the subject very deeply. It necessarily contains a
certain amount of detailed description, but the aim has been to avoid
technicalities as far as possible. That the book may appeal to the
general public, and that it may also be found worthy of a place on the
shelves of the student of naval history and naval warfare is the
author’s wish, and he trusts that a volume will not be unacceptable that
traces the story of under-water warfare from the earliest times to the
present day, that endeavours to explain how a submarine boat is worked,
and that attempts to arrive at some conclusions respecting a mode of
fighting which may possibly figure largely in future battles on the
seas._

_Interest in the navy and in naval matters is fortunately greater than
it used to be, but there is still a vast amount of ignorance existing in
the minds of the public respecting our warships and our sailors. When an
explosion occurred recently on the Royal Sovereign a man in the street
remarked to his friend, “How lucky it didn’t happen when we went to
Margate on her last summer!” The navy is certainly not so much in the
public eye as is the army, still it should be the desire of every Briton
to know even a little about the service for which he pays so much. Many
people seem to imagine that torpedo-boats do their work below the waves,
and have but very hazy notions respecting the working of the torpedo or
the functions of the destroyer._

_It was recently remarked to the writer by one who has had a large
experience in catering for the mental needs of the British public that
we were not a mechanical nation, and that while Americans would
naturally be interested in such a subject as submarine warfare, Britons
would only display an apathetic attitude towards it. Perhaps the general
lack of interest in scientific matters is due to the fact that little
trouble is taken to place them before readers in an attractive form.
There is no doubt that the Germans, the French, and the Americans are
far more alive to the importance of science, and are far more ready to
discuss inventions, discoveries, and scientific topics than we are
ourselves._

_That his work will appeal to a very large class of readers the writer
has little hope. He trusts, however, that those who do read it will be
encouraged to pursue the subject a little more deeply, and that
inventive minds may be induced to apply their ingenuity to the designing
of weapons for under-water warfare._

_When we decided to add submarines to our navy, we had to adopt the
design of an American, Mr. Holland, because no other was then available.
Similarly the system of wireless telegraphy used on our men-of-war is
the invention of an Italian._

_“We have started,” says a well-known English professor, “all the
branches of engineering; we have invented nearly all the important
things, but the great development of these things has gone out of the
hands of the amateurs of our nation. It is because our statesmen are
Gallios who ‘care for none of these things,’ because they know nothing
of science.”_

_It was an Englishman who invented the Whitehead torpedo; it was in the
brain of an Englishman that the idea of the torpedo-boat destroyer was
evolved. Are there not those who will bring their inventive talent to
bear on the perfecting of the diving torpedo-boat and of the many
contrivances that are needed to make it an efficient weapon of offence
and defence?_

_It may be said that the encouragement given to the inventor by the
Admiralty is so scanty as to make him shy of offering them his ideas.
Let us hope, now that Lord Selborne and Mr. Arnold Forster are at the
Admiralty, that the bad old days when inventors were snubbed, and novel
ideas ridiculed, have gone never to return. The submersible craft of
to-day is no longer an ingenious toy; it is a practiced engine of
warfare of no mean value. But there is vast room for improvement in its
design. It must be endowed with more speed, its longitudinal stability
must be improved, and its appliances for under-water vision perfected.
Are there not Britons willing to devote their energies to the
realisation of the ideal submarine?_

_The author has derived his information from a great many sources, some
of which are mentioned in the brief Bibliography at the end of the
book._

_He desires to express his thanks to Messrs. Vickers Sons & Maxim, the
Holland Torpedo-boat Company, Mr. P. W. D’Alton, Lieutenant A. T.
Dawson, late R.N., Mr. Simon Lake and others, for information kindly
given him respecting various boats and for photographs. To Mr. Alan H.
Burgoyne his thanks are due for permission to use some of his original
sketches._

ROYAL SOCIETIES’ CLUB,
ST. JAMES STREET, S.W.

INTRODUCTION

ADMIRAL THE HON. SIR E. R. FREMANTLE, G.C.B, C.M.G.

(_Rear-Admiral of the United Kingdom._)

The natural attitude of the Naval mind towards submarines is the same
now as that expressed by Lord St. Vincent when Fulton invented the
notorious “catamaran” expedition.

Fulton had been trying some experiments before Pitt, who favoured the
project, to which Lord St. Vincent, then First Lord of the Admiralty,
was strongly opposed, and he bluntly stated that “Pitt was the greatest
fool that ever existed to encourage a mode of war which those who
commanded the seas did not want, and which, if successful, would deprive
them of it.”

It was, our Admiralty recently held, “the weapon of the weaker power,
and not our concern,” then we were to “watch and wait,” which sounded
plausible but was evidently dangerous, and as the success of the French
submarines became too evident we were forced to follow suit. As Lord
Selborne reminded us when speaking about the boilers, we have too often
ignored new inventions and resisted change till we were left well behind
in the race, as we were with ironclads, breech-loading guns, and other
improvements in naval warfare.

The fact is that every new invention has its infancy of weakness and
failure, its adolescence of partial adoption, and doubtful success, and
its manhood of completion and achievement. Unfortunately the natural
conservatism of a profession and perhaps of human nature is apt to
deride the early failures, and to prejudice the invention so as to delay
its adoption. Every inventor can tell stories of the obstruction he has
met with, and often of his ultimate triumph, like Mr. Whitworth and his
steam hammer pile-driving competition, when he succeeded in driving
piles with his steam hammer in as many minutes as it took hours under
the method previously adopted, much to the astonishment of the old
hands.

Certainly the submarine has had its period of failure and ridicule, for
the attempt to use submarines dates from very ancient days, as Mr.
Fyfe’s interesting historical _résumé_ shows, yet it is only now
arriving at the stage of development which forces us to reckon with it
as a serious factor in naval warfare.

We need not follow Mr. Fyfe in his early history of the submarine, but
leaving James I.’s somewhat apocryphal voyage under the waters of the
Thames, the inventions of Bushnell, Fulton, Warner, and others, we may
come to the Confederate diving boat during the war of secession. Here we
have a real diving boat which, though it drowned three crews, did
succeed in destroying the United States sloop _Housatonic_, one of the
blockading fleet off Charleston, though she was herself sunk in the
effort, drowning her fourth crew. It is interesting to compare this
submarine boat with one of our modern _Hollands_.

The following is the description given by Captain Maury, the well-known
hydrographer, then at the head of the Confederate torpedo bureau, of
this unfortunate craft, or _David_ as she was called. “It was built of
boiler iron, about 35 feet long, and was manned by a crew of nine men,
eight of whom worked the propeller by hand, the ninth steered the boat
and regulated her movements below the surface of the water. She could be
submerged at pleasure to any desired depth, or could be propelled on the
surface. In smooth, still water she could be exactly controlled, and her
speed was about 4 knots.”

It is further stated that she could remain submerged for half an hour
“without inconvenience to her crew,” and in action she was to drag a
torpedo under a ship’s bottom, which was intended to explode on
striking.

Now contrast this rude and dangerous craft with the “Holland” boats now
building for the British Government, and the advance which has been made
in the last forty years is evident.

I need not describe the _Holland_ here, but motive power, speed, radius
of action, and torpedo are all essentially different; but above all it
has been proved that a modern submersible boat like the French _Gustave
Zédé_, or _Narval_, or our _Holland_ can remain under water truly
“without inconvenience to her crew” for periods of nine or ten hours, so
that all the problems connected with submarine navigation may be said to
have been solved, except that of seeing under water, for when submerged
the submarine is in cimmerian darkness, and more helpless than an
ordinary vessel in the densest of fogs. Nor is it likely that invention
has said its last word in regard to the submarine now that it is
acknowledged to be a weapon of practical value.

On this point it is convenient to call to mind the remarkable
development of the Whitehead torpedo since it was first adopted in our
Navy rather more than thirty years ago. It happens that I have been able
to refer to an article on torpedoes which I wrote in _Fraser’s Magazine_
just thirty years ago, in which I described the Whitehead of that day as
having a speed of from 7 to 7½ knots, a range of 1,000 yards, and a
charge of 67 lbs. of gun-cotton. Now, the speed of our modern Whiteheads
is 30 knots, the range 2,000 yards, the charge 200 lbs. of gun-cotton,
and, thanks to the gyroscope, it can be discharged with extraordinary
accuracy.

Admitting, then, that the submarine is with us, and that it will remain,
let us see what is likely to be its function in war. The submarine
compares naturally with the torpedo destroyer or torpedo boat; like them
it will attack by stealth, and it has neither their speed nor radius of
action. But, whereas searchlights and quick-firing guns are effective
weapons against the latter, they are of little use against the
submarine, and as all these craft are to act by surprise, the advantage
is strongly in favour of the submarine, which can approach with little
danger of being discovered, with the cupola only showing, until close to
her enemy, thus rendering a close blockade by large vessels impossible.

I have said that is naturally the weapon of the weaker power, but that
it can be used and that it will be used by the stronger power acting on
the offensive I see no reason to doubt. It can certainly be employed
against ships at anchor unless they are suitably protected, and it can
probably render good service in removing obstructions and clearing
passages defended by torpedoes.

The question remains as to whether any antidote to the submarine is
likely to be effective. It is possible that one may be discovered, but
it is not easy to see in what direction we are to look for it, as the
submarine differs from other craft in the fact that the possession of
any number of similar vessels, by ourselves for instance, affords little
or no protection against a few well-handled _Gustave Zédé’s_ in the
hands of our enemies. At the same time they would be of little or no
value against torpedo boats or destroyers; and cruisers blockading,
moving about at a speed of 10 knots or more, at some distance from a
port known to harbour submarines, would have little to fear, as it could
only be by a lucky chance that a submarine could approach near enough to
them to have a fair shot. It is also worthy of remark that the
navigation and pilotage of a submarine, even with her cupola above
water, would be by no means easy in shallow water or thick weather, and
of the value of the periscope I cannot but feel somewhat sceptical. The
French are stated to have found that submarines can be easily discovered
from balloons; but this must naturally apply only to daylight and fine
weather, and their opportunity will naturally occur in thick weather or
at night.

I have offered these remarks to show that though I consider the
submarine to be an important weapon, it clearly has its limitations, and
I suspect that when we have them fairly under trial we shall find that
when these are fully appreciated and the position of the submarine in
naval warfare is duly assigned, much of the terror and mystery now
surrounding this novel weapon will be removed. Probably it will be found
to be a more dangerous and effective torpedo boat, and will supplant it
in great measure.

Mr. Fyfe has done good service in giving us this popular account of
submarines, which is a valuable addition to the scanty literature of the
subject in the English language.

THE PROBABLE FUTURE OF SUBMARINE BOAT CONSTRUCTION.

SIR EDWARD J. REED, K.C.B., F.R.S., M.P.

(_Chief Constructor of the Navy 1863–70._)

There is nothing in the nature of things that I know of to prevent
submarine warfare being carried on in the future to a very large extent.
This development will probably follow triple lines: (1) Vessels for the
defence of ports and harbours, with sufficient means of proceeding
outside to give the defence a certain limited power of attack in the
approaches; (2) Vessels primarily designed for attack, and therefore
capable of proceeding to sea for considerable distances; and (3) Smaller
vessels to be taken to sea in ships, as part of their equipment, and
capable of being lowered to take part in a battle, and raised again, and
re-stowed on board when no longer needed in action. All these types of
vessel will need to be endowed with the power of passing easily and
quickly from the floating to the submerged condition, and back again to
the surface when necessary; but the boats of the second class in the
foregoing category will doubtless be developed to an extent as yet
anticipated by very few of us, in respect alike of their ability to
proceed for great distances below water, and of their ability to steam
satisfactorily afloat when submergence is needless.

All who are acquainted with the structure of waves, so to speak, will be
aware that wave disturbance diminishes very rapidly as we go down below
the surface, and will consequently understand that when once we have
succeeded in giving submarines a great range of under-water travel, we
shall have endowed them with the capability of avoiding at pleasure in
bad weather the tempestuous surface of the sea, with all the drawbacks
to speed which stormy seas impose upon ships, and especially upon
comparatively small vessels. In order to bring about this advantage,
science has to effect, no doubt, immense improvements in the production
of storage of air, or of its equivalent; but there is great reason to
believe that the demand will bring the supply, as in so many other
matters. Nor must it be forgotten that this is a branch of science for
the development of which the ship proper, as we have hitherto known it,
has offered few, if any, inducements. I do not know how the sight of an
ordinary modern ship of war strikes the eyes of others, but for my part
I never look at one, with its vast and monstrous assemblage of gaping
mouths of funnels, pipes, and cowls, without thinking that our method of
supplying breathing gas to men below in a ship is at present of a very
elementary and unsatisfactory character. It is certainly the roughest
and readiest method that could well be adopted. Nor is it without a
sense of satisfaction that one knows that the submarine ship will at
least sweep away these ugly and towering excrescences, and force us to
resort much more than at present to the chemical and mechanical arts for
the ventilation of vessels.

The development of the sea-going submarine will bring with it,
doubtless, many improvements in the vessels which have been first
mentioned, viz., vessels for the defence of ports and their approaches.
It is not possible yet to say to what extent the “Holland” boats
building at Barrow will prove fairly satisfactory, although my
acquaintance with this class of vessel for several years past has given
me a favourable impression of it—favourable, that is, as furnishing many
elements of initial success. More than this could not be reasonably
expected; nor can we doubt that with the skill of both the Admiralty
designers and those of the great manufacturing establishment which has
produced the first few vessels concentrated upon this class of boat,
immense improvements may be confidently anticipated.

Of the third class of vessels before referred to the Goubet boat may be
regarded as a commencing type. The principle of this boat appears to be
that of carrying and launching torpedoes from external supports, the
size and buoyancy of the vessels being very small by comparison with
those of vessels which carry their torpedoes inside. M. Goubet appears
to go beyond this principle, and to have other ideas, which are
mentioned in the text of this work. Suffice it here to say that the idea
of relieving the submarine boat from the necessity of carrying its
torpedoes with it, goes a long way towards furthering the use of
submarine torpedo craft carried on the decks, or at the davits of
battleships and cruisers.

If one may contrast for a moment the present attempts at aerial
navigation with the concurrent attempts at submarine navigation, one
quickly sees how terribly the æronaut is handicapped as compared with
the under-water sailor. The advantage of the dense medium which the sea
offers to the submarine navigator is precisely the same as it has
offered from the beginning of time to the surface navigator, and nothing
new is needed to sustain the submarine ship, whereas the unhappy man who
seeks to navigate the air has to obtain from a medium of extraordinary
levity the support necessary for keeping him aloft. The difference
between the specific gravity of air (of which ships are full) and of
water is so great by comparison between the specific gravity of any gas
available for filling aerial-ships and that of air, that the problem of
the submarinist is easy indeed compared with the other. But it is in the
face of this initial and enormous difficulty that the æronauts of to-day
have apparently persuaded themselves that they can successfully float
their balloon-ship in mid-air, and propel it not only against the rapid
tides of the air in which it floats, but also drive it at a good
additional speed. When men are to be found capable of committing their
fortunes, and even their lives, to navigation of this kind, it is not
surprising to find that the far easier problem of navigating the seas
beneath the surface has won the attention and the effort of enterprising
men. They certainly have chosen, if the humbler, also the more practical
and promising field of operation. I doubt not that they have likewise
chosen the more fruitful field.

It is worthy of remark that it is once again in connection with the arts
of war that a great extension of human progress has been commenced. But
for the temptation of gaining equality with, and even mastery over, our
possible foes, the art of submarine navigation would certainly not have
been attracting the attention of some of our best and most scientific
men, who are once again eagerly developing—

“Those dire implements
Which sombre science with unpitying pains,
That love of neither man nor God restrains,
To warring foes presents.”

One can only be thankful that the world is so constituted and so ruled,
that out of seeming evil often comes great good to men.

I have not been asked to say anything of the book with which these lines
are associated. I may nevertheless remark that I have had an opportunity
of hastily looking through the author’s proofsheets, and have formed the
opinion that it is a most timely and highly instructive work, and one
which gives to the non-technical world an extremely good review of all
that has been done in the way of submarine war vessels, while the
technical man into whose hands it may come will be compelled, by its
great interest and by its clever record of facts, to read every page of
it.

CONTENTS

PART I.

PAGE
CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY 1

CHAPTER II.

THE PLACE OF THE SUBMARINE IN WARFARE 6

CHAPTER III.

THE MORALITY OF SUBMARINE WARFARE 27

CHAPTER IV.

THE MECHANISM OF THE SUBMARINE AND SUBMARINES OF THE FUTURE 64

CHAPTER V.

THE ROMANCE OF UNDER-WATER WARFARE 102

CHAPTER VI.

THE MORAL INFLUENCE OF UNDER-WATER WARFARE 111

CHAPTER VII.

THE SUBMARINE IN ACTION 120

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ANTIDOTE TO SUBMARINES 136

PART II.

CHAPTER IX.

THE EARLY HISTORY OF SUBMARINE WARFARE 149

CHAPTER X.

EARLY EFFORTS IN SUBMARINE NAVIGATION 157

CHAPTER XI.

DAVID BUSHNELL 179

CHAPTER XII.

FULTON’S SUBMARINE BOATS 190

CHAPTER XIII.

UNDER-WATER CRAFT IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 201

CHAPTER XIV.

THE WHITEHEAD TORPEDO 214

CHAPTER XV.

THE NORDENFELT SUBMARINES 233

PART III.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX I. THE BRITISH SUBMARINES 249

APPENDIX II. THE AMERICAN SUBMARINES 261

APPENDIX III. THE FRENCH SUBMARINES 273

APPENDIX IV. SUBMARINES OLD AND NEW 311

APPENDIX V. THE LAKE SUBMARINES 319

A SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SUBMARINE WARFARE 331

ILLUSTRATIONS

PAGE
“DAVID AND GOLIATH” _Frontispiece_

MODEL OF FIRST BRITISH SUBMARINE _Title-page_

THE FIRST BRITISH SUBMARINE 7

“SHARK” ON THE STOCKS 11

LAUNCH OF THE “SHARK” 17

THE “FULTON” 23

EMERGING TO TAKE BEARINGS 47

BENEATH THE WAVES 53

INTERIOR OF FIRST BRITISH SUBMARINES 65

SUBMARINE OF A. CONSTANTIN 70

“GOUBET II.” 71

M. GOUBET GOING UNDER WATER 72

PROFESSOR TUCK’S SUBMARINE 75

INSIDE THE “GOUBET” 86

GASOLINE ENGINES OF FIRST BRITISH SUBMARINES 87

ARMAMENT AND PERISCOPE OF THE “GOUBET” 91

THE “GOUBET” OUT OF WATER 110

INTERIOR OF A BRITISH SUBMARINE 111

THE SUBMARINE IN ACTION 123

EXIT SUBMARINE (AN ORIGINAL SKETCH BY A. H. BURGOYNE) 143

THE EARLIEST PICTURE OF A SUBMARINE 159

M. BAUER’S “DIABLE MARIN” 167

M. APOSTOLOFF’S PROPOSED SUBMARINE (BY A. H. BURGOYNE) 173

THE “INTELLIGENT WHALE” 175

THE “AQUAPEDE” 179

BUSHNELL’S SUBMARINE 183

BUSHNELL’S SUBMARINE 188

THE “NAUTILUS” 193

THE “DAVID” 207

THE SINKING OF THE “HOUSATONIC” 210

THE “SPUTYEN DUYVIL” 213

INTERIOR OF THE WHITEHEAD TORPEDO 221

THE FIRING OF A TORPEDO 227

A BRITISH DESTROYER 232

“NORDENFELT II.” RUNNING AWASH 237

“NORDENFELT II.” AT CONSTANTINOPLE 242

MR. HOLLAND’S EARLIEST SUBMARINE 262

BOW VIEW OF THE “HOLLAND” 265

STERN VIEW OF THE “HOLLAND” 271

“GYMNOTE” 285

“GUSTAVE ZÉDÉ” 289

“NARVAL” 303

“NARVAL” ON SURFACE 305

“NARVAL” AWASH 307

“PERAL” 315

“ARGONAUT” IN DRY DOCK 321

“ARGONAUT” AWASH 325

“ARGONAUT” ON THE SEA BOTTOM 329

PART I

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY

“The submarine craft is a miracle of ingenuity though Nelson and his
hearts of oak, fighting only on deck, in God’s free air, and with
‘the meteor flag of England’ fluttering overhead, would have loathed
and scorned her burglarious, area-sneak dodges down below.”

In modern under-water warfare two weapons are employed, the Mine and the
Torpedo. Both are explosive devices, but whilst mines are stationary,
torpedoes are endowed with the power of locomotion in some form or
another.

The modern submarine boat is in reality a diving torpedo-boat and like
all other torpedo craft of the present day its function is to discharge
automobile torpedoes.

The submarine boat is sometimes said to be the child of the
torpedo-boat. As a matter of fact the earliest known torpedo vessel was
designed to do its work _under_ water.

In 1776 an attack was made on the English frigate H.M.S. _Eagle_, and in
1777 on the English man-of-war H.M.S. _Cerberus_ by a submarine vessel
invented by David Bushnell and provided with “torpedoes.” Although no
injury was inflicted on these ships, three of the crew of a prize
schooner astern of the _Cerberus_, in hauling one of Bushnell’s drifting
torpedoes on board, were killed by its explosion.

A few years afterwards Robert Fulton occupied himself with torpedoes,
and like Bushnell he came to the conclusion that a submarine boat was
the best suited for the discharge of his weapons. In time of peace
Fulton showed that his torpedoes could sink ships, but in actual warfare
he failed to accomplish the destruction of any craft. For a while
torpedo warfare received but scant attention, but on the outbreak of the
American Civil War the mine and the torpedo “leapt at one bound from the
condition of theory and experiment to become accepted once for all as
practical and valuable factors for offence and defence.”

At this period also it is to be noted that the torpedoists considered
the under-water vessel the most favourable method of utilising the
spar-torpedo, the weapon of the day. Both Federals and Confederates paid
much attention to submarine navigation, and success attended the efforts
of the latter, for on February 17, 1864, the Federal frigate
_Housatonic_ was sunk off Charleston by a submarine boat manned by the
Confederates and armed with a spar-torpedo. This is the sole occasion on
which an under-water vessel has ever succeeded in sinking a hostile
craft in actual warfare, and even then it was being navigated in the
awash condition, and not completely submerged.

The introduction of the automobile or fish torpedo led to the building
of above-water torpedo vessels by all the great Powers. The idea of
discharging this weapon from a submarine boat occupied the attention of
numerous inventors, amongst others of Mr. Nordenfelt, of machine-gun
fame.

Greece and Turkey both bought Nordenfelt submarine boats, but although
they achieved a certain amount of success and were certainly the best
specimens of under-water fighting vessels extant, they failed to receive
wider recognition owing to their serious disadvantages.

The possibility of utilising the electric accumulator revived the hopes
of the advocates of submarine navigation, and towards the end of the
eighties, France added the first under-water torpedo-boat to her navy:
since then her interest in the subject has never abated, and although it
would be unfair to attribute to all French naval men and officials the
ideas as to the superiority of the torpedo vessel to the ironclad put
forward by a certain class of writers, it cannot be denied that the
question of under-water warfare has attracted more attention in France
than in any other country. A few years after the launch of the first
French submarine, the _Gymnote_, the U.S. Government purchased the
_Holland_, and in the same year ordered six more _Hollands_ of an
improved type.

When Greece and Turkey purchased Nordenfelt boats there were not wanting
those who declared that Great Britain should also add under-water
vessels to her navy. The official view was however hostile to such
craft. In the early part of 1900, Viscount Goschen said that while close
attention had been given by the Admiralty to the subject of submarine
boats, they considered that even if the practical difficulties attending
their use could be overcome, they would seem to be weapons for “maritime
Powers on the defensive.” It seemed to him that the reply to this weapon
must be looked for in other ways than in building submarine boats
ourselves, for it was clear that one submarine boat could not fight
another. It would seem from this that the Admiralty had no very high
opinion of the submarine as an offensive weapon. However this may be, an
order was placed in the autumn of 1900 with Messrs. Vickers Sons and
Maxim for five of the newest “Holland” boats, they being the agents in
Europe for the Holland Torpedo-boat Company of New York, and this being
the only type available. Not till the statement of the First Lord was
published on March 1, 1901, was the fact of the ordering of these boats
made public; the secret had indeed been well kept.

He would be a bold man who would prophesy how the question of submarine
navigation will stand fifty years hence. Some declare that the
under-water vessel will go the way of the dynamite gun, the circular
battleship, the aerial torpedo and other inventions; others affirm that
the warfare of the future will take place neither on land nor on the
seas, but in the air and beneath the waves. We shall see what we shall
see. At present we would prefer to go no further than the cautious
statement of the First Lord. “What the future value of these boats may
be in naval warfare can only be a matter of conjecture. The experiments
with these boats will assist the Admiralty in assessing their true
value. The question of their employment must be studied, and all
developments in their mechanism carefully watched by this country.”

CHAPTER II
THE PLACE OF THE SUBMARINE IN WARFARE

“Drake would have understood Trafalgar. Neither Drake nor Nelson
could understand a modern naval action.”

“Competent authorities hold that the submersible torpedo-boat is the
vessel of the future rather than either the existing type, or the
‘Destroyer’” (EXCUBITOR in the _Fortnightly Review_ for August,
1901).

“It is not only the unstable opinions of experts, liable to sudden
change, which makes the forecast of future naval war difficult; it
is that the progress of invention may be, for all we know,
undermining the whole position by disturbing the balance which
creates existing warship design” (the late Vice-Admiral P. H.
COLOMB).

“Conservatism has thus far delayed the adoption of a most valuable
offensive and defensive weapon, not because success was ever proved
to be unattainable, but because some vessels built by inexperienced
inventors happened to be failures” (Mr. J. P. HOLLAND).

“In the dawn of the twentieth century there has entered into the
history of the world’s navies a class of vessel which is probably
destined to revolutionise, eventually, the whole system of maritime
construction. The problem of submarine navigation, in a limited
sense at least, has been solved” (Lieutenant G. E. ARMSTRONG).

“Most torpedo destruction has been done with a bag of explosive tied
to the end of a pole, and the submarine boat will permit you to get
closer to the enemy with a bigger bag of explosive and with less
damage to the pole. You have all the advantages of attack with
almost absolute safety to the torpedo-boat itself.”

[Illustration:

THE FIRST SUBMARINE TO FLY THE WHITE ENSIGN.

(_By permission of the Admiralty and Messrs. Vickers, Sons, and
Maxim._)
]

At the present time opinion is divided as to the part that the submarine
boat is likely to play in the naval warfare of the future. Those who
have expressed themselves on the subject may be roughly divided into
three classes.

1. Those who have little or no faith in submarines.

2. Those who believe that submarines will revolutionise warfare, ocean
locomotion, marine industries, &c., and that an epoch may come in which
merchantmen will alone sail the ocean and all the warships will be
submarines or submersibles.

3. Those who recognise that the submarine boat of to-day is a great
improvement on the boats of twenty years ago; who believe that although
at present it suffers from grave defects, its development will continue,
and who are of opinion that it will find useful spheres of action in
time of war.

Much of the adverse criticism which the “submarine boat” has had to
encounter has been due to the popular belief that this type of craft was
intended to do its work _below_ the surface of the water. As it is
impossible at present to see beneath the waves, many critics have
declared the submarine to be a perfectly useless fighting vessel. It
cannot be too often asserted, for the sake of overcoming prejudice, that
the proper place of the submarine is _at the surface_, and that she only
goes below for short intervals. This is now universally recognised by
constructors of such craft, which it might be more correct to term
“submersibles” or “diving torpedo-boats.” So far back as 1886 Mr.
Nordenfelt remarked, “It is impossible to think of a submarine boat that
actually manœuvres and does its work under water. I gave that up from
the very commencement.”

By the term “submarine” we mean to imply a vessel capable of manœuvring
on the surface like an ordinary torpedo boat, of running awash with her
conning tower alone above water to enable her to be steered, and of
totally immersing herself for short periods either to escape detection,
avoid the fire of the enemy, or fire torpedoes.

The history of the submarine bears a curious resemblance to that of the
torpedo and the torpedo vessel in many particulars. All three have been
declared to be the weapons of the weaker power and of no possible value
to a nation which must maintain the command of the seas. The first
Whitehead torpedoes were certainly slow and erratic; now they are
capable of running within a few inches of the required depth at a speed
of over 37 miles an hour for a range up to 2,000 yards, and hitting the
point aimed at with almost the same precision as a gun.

In spite of the sneers of fossilised officials, Great Britain adopted
the torpedo-boat, and in the process of time evolved the destroyer, an
offensive weapon of no mean value, and a type of craft which some have
declared to be the fighting vessel of the future. She will soon be in
the possession of nine under-water vessels, and it may be that the
submarines of twenty years hence will bear the same resemblance to those
of to-day, as the _Albatross_ does to the _Lightning_ of 1877.

The very first submarine to figure in actual warfare was the boat
invented by David Bushnell. His attempt to blow up the British frigate
_Eagle_ failed, mainly owing to the incapacity of the operator, Sergeant
Ezra Lee. Fulton, although he blew up several old hulks in time of
peace, was afforded no opportunity of testing the capabilities of his
vessel in actual warfare.

[Illustration:

U.S. SUBMARINE “SHARK” ON THE STOCKS.
]

During the American Civil War there occurred the famous incident of the
destruction of the _Housatonic_ by the Confederate diving torpedo-boat
_David_—the only occasion on which a submarine boat has succeeded in
inflicting injury on a hostile vessel in a naval action. Though many
lives were lost in the _David_, this would not have occurred had the
most ordinary precautions been taken.

On February 5, 1886, Mr. Nordenfelt read a paper before the Royal United
Service Institution on his Submarine Boats; in the discussion that
followed many eminent naval authorities took part, and the following are
extracts taken from their speeches on this occasion:—

“My opinion is that all torpedo-boats should be submarine boats”
(Admiral ARTHUR).

“With the cupola above water the submarine boat would prove a very
formidable means of attack” (Admiral Sir ASTLEY COOPER KEY).

“Mr. Nordenfelt has done much towards solving a problem which is
likely to be of great importance in future naval operations”
(Vice-Admiral H.R.H. DUKE OF EDINBURGH).

“I think Mr. Nordenfelt is to be congratulated on having made an
enormous step forward, and one which I am sure has a great future
before it” (Admiral SELWYN).

“If you want to economically defend a port it is better to have a
boat that does not show at all. The moral effect of this boat would
be enormous, and I am perfectly certain that foreign war vessels
would not lay off a port to intercept outward- and homeward-bound
vessels if they knew that there was a submarine vessel inside that
could come out without being seen” (Major-General HARDINGE STEWART).

“As far as practicability for warfare is concerned this submarine
boat (the Nordenfelt) is pretty well accepted by the profession....
Therefore as a craft not altogether wholly submerged, but just a
boat awash for coast defence, and also for the attack of ships at
sea, and especially in heavy weather, when the fast torpedo boats
cannot act, I believe the vessel will be found of great practical
and reliable service” (Major-General Sir ANDREW CLARKE).

The Nordenfelt boats, as will be seen in Chapter XV, failed to come up
to the high expectations that had been formed of them, and the British
Admiralty considered themselves relieved from the necessity of taking up
the subject of submarine navigation.

In 1888 France added the first submarine (the _Gymnote_) to her navy,
and proceeded to lay down a certain number of under-water craft yearly.
In 1900 the United States Government bought the _Holland_, and in many
quarters the opinion was held that the Admiralty should carefully
investigate the whole question of submarine warfare.

The official mind thought otherwise, and expressed itself thus: “We know
all about submarines: they are the weapons of the weaker power; they are
very poor fighting machines, and can be of no possible use to the
Mistress of the Seas. We are very grateful to the Governments of France
and the United States for expending so much money in experimenting with
these craft, and in allowing us to buy experience for nothing; if ever
they produce a vessel which we consider satisfactory we shall begin to
build, but not till then.” The official mind was inclined to apply to
submarine warfare, the words used by Earl St. Vincent in reference to
Fulton’s torpedo warfare—“A mode of war which we who command the seas do
not want, and which, if successful, would deprive us of it.”

This council of sitting still and watching others experiment did not
commend itself to many thinking people who saw that the French and the
Americans were every year improving their vessels and converting them
little by little from expensive toys into fighting machines with which
we should have to reckon sooner or later. Even the _Engineer_, never
enthusiastic about submarine boats, went so far as to remark that “the
day for pooh-poohing them is past.”

The anti-submarine party replied that the French and Americans were
suffering from hallucinations; that the submarine boat was of no value
except for purposes of defence, as its range of action was very limited.
The advent of the _Holland_ and the _Narval_, each capable of making
long journeys, proved the fallacy of this view.

Shifting their ground they said that the submarine would be of no use as
a weapon of offence, because it was blind; that it would never be able
to fire a torpedo at a moving vessel whilst itself in motion; that its
speed was so small that big ships could always avoid it; that it would
be unable to remain under water for long, as the effect of “potted air”
on the crew would be disastrous; and that its lack of longitudinal
stability was a fatal drawback to its employment in action.

The behaviour of the _Gustave Zédé_, the _Narval_, and the _Holland_ in
manœuvres, during the course of which they have all fired fish torpedoes
whilst moving, which have hit targets, again showed that such arguments
could not hold water.

Now whilst it is one thing to say that the submarine boat is a useless
weapon to-day, it is quite another to prophecy that it will never be of
any value to a navy whose ships are intended to act on the offensive.

The introduction of gunpowder; of steam; of the screw-propeller; of
iron-built ships; of high-pressure engines; of rifled ordnance; of
explosive shells; of armour plating; of twin-screws; of breech-loading
guns; of steel-built ships; of the locomotive torpedo; of electricity on
shipboard; of quick-firing and machine guns; of collapsible boats; of
wireless telegraphy; of turbine vessels; of devices for coaling ships at
sea; of magazine-rifles, &c., &c., have been successively ridiculed by
those responsible for the condition of the British Navy.

Officialism is, and always has been, a foe to inventive progress, and
the official mind still seems incapable of realising that invention is a
plant of slow growth; that improvements or innovations when first mooted
do not necessarily represent their final form, and that all the great
advances and revolutions in the past in the world of science, invention,
and discovery have sprung from small beginnings which have grown
gradually and slowly until they forced upon themselves the recognition
that was their due.

Faraday, when asked by “practical people” the use of any of his
experimental researches, would reply, “What is the use of a baby?” An
invention resembles a baby, in that it needs to be carefully watched,
tended, and cared for in its initial stages if ever it is to be of any
value in the world.

We all remember the gentleman who said that he would eat the first
steamboat that crossed the Atlantic; the Quarterly Reviewer who wrote
with reference to the proposal to build a line to Woolwich that “he
should as soon expect the people of Woolwich to suffer themselves to be
fired off by one of Congreve’s _ricochet_ rockets as trust themselves to
the mercy of a high-pressure steam engine travelling at the awful speed
of eighteen to twenty miles an hour”; and the wiseacres who pooh-poohed
the electric telegraph and telephone, the electric light, the electric
car, the pneumatic-tyred bicycle, and many other inventions which have
come into general use.

Granting, as we do, that the submarine is at present in a very
inefficient stage of its existence, the necessity for experiment in view
of the march of science during the past century is obvious. What should
we say of a professor who pleaded that his experiments were a waste of
time and money, as he could arrive at his end quite as well by simply
reading what other professors in foreign countries were doing?

One cannot too often insist on the fact that it is only by actual
experiment that useful facts are arrived at, and that in the
investigation of new devices more can, as a rule, be learnt from an
experiment carefully arranged and personally carried out than from the
reading of voluminous reports of the work of others.

[Illustration:

LAUNCH OF U.S. SUBMARINE “SHARK.”
]

Rear-Admiral C. C. P. FitzGerald, in an article in the _Empire Review_
for February, 1901, on “Our Naval Strength,” referring to submarines
said:—“It seems a little risky to hold our hand altogether. We are said
to be ‘watching,’ and no doubt it will be very convenient if we can
allow others to spend their time and money on experiments and then just
cut in at the right moment when the submarine boat has established
itself as a practicable engine of warfare and build as many as we want
with the unrivalled resources which we are so fond of talking about. But
it should be remembered that secrets are better kept abroad than they
are in England and that a new mechanical industry always takes some time
to develop and to train the special workmen essential to its
prosecution.”

Mr. Arnold Forster has himself said that an ounce of practice is worth a
ton of theory, and it would be well if all officials thought as he does.
There is far too little experimental work and practical trial of novel
ideas both in the Army and the Navy. If we were never going to use our
soldiers or our ships in actual warfare it would be both economical and
prudent to wait until other nations had perfected inventions before
adopting them ourselves. In this case we should never make any progress
at all, for the reason that no improvement is final, and that the fleet
of to-day is a totally different thing from the fleet of fifty years
ago.

_Si vis pacem para bellum._ The essence of maritime war is, it has been
well said, its suddenness, and a day gained in striking the first blow
may make the difference between the fall of an empire and the
annihilation of the enemy. To wait to consider to what use we can put
submarine vessels and to postpone the question of discovering the most
effective method of destroying the boats of the enemy until war breaks
out is a suicidal policy, which, however, seemed for many years to
appeal to a “Government of Amateurs.”

Had there been more experimental work before the outbreak of the Boer
War our army would have probably finished its task sooner and with less
loss of life. Questions such as the employment of heavy field ordnance,
of telescopic sights, of shields for guns and rifles, of motors, of
electricity, &c., will have to be considered when the war is over, but
they should have received attention before hostilities commenced. If
every nation would agree to maintain the _status quo_ and to make no
effort to keep its navy and its army abreast of the advances of modern
scientific progress and invention, then the policy of our Admiralty and
War Office would be excellently suited to our needs. As it is, however,
Germany, France, the United States, Russia, and Japan are much more
ready to improve their services than is Great Britain, whose officials,
for the sake of peace and quiet, snub the inventor and smother their
consciences by repeating that all is well in our army and navy. Only
when great pressure is brought to bear on them will they stir
themselves. Admiral Sir E. Fremantle recently suggested that there ought
to be a committee on inventions always sitting, and Mr. Laird Clowes has
appealed for readier official interest in certain recent inventions.

The experiments with the British submarines must be carefully watched in
order that we may arrive at a well-reasoned opinion concerning their
future. It may be that it will be decided that for our purposes a means
of destroying the submarines of the enemy will be of more value than the
boats themselves. On the other hand, the conclusion may be reached that
for certain purposes this type of craft will be a useful adjunct to our
fleet. Whatever the decision may be it is quite certain that the
submarine boat will continue to receive improvements at the hands of
inventors, and that as practical applications have been found for the
Röntgen Rays and wireless telegraphy, so uses will be found for the
submarine of the future which may be as great an improvement on the
submarine of to-day as the _Deutschland_ is over the _Savannah_, the
first steam-packet that ever crossed the Atlantic.

Those who discuss submarine navigation as if it were quite a new
development are apt to forget that the earliest use of the torpedo was
in an under-water vessel. Bushnell and Fulton, no less than the
Confederates of a later day, saw that their best chance of success lay
in attacking by stealth, and though the modern Whitehead is a very
different weapon to the cases of explosive used by Bushnell and Fulton,
or the spar-torpedo employed by the Confederates in their _Davids_,
there are still the same advantages to be gained by a submarine attack.

Whilst the torpedoists of the extreme school claim that torpedo vessels
can attack with a very good chance of success in daylight, the more
general opinion is that they will he utilised chiefly under cover of
darkness, and that the destroyer and the smaller torpedo-boat would
stand no chance in broad daylight against the tremendous artillery fire
to which they would be subjected by the battleships singled out for
attack. Even at night, however, the flare from her funnels might betray
the destroyer.

A writer in the _United Service Gazette_ a few years ago remarked that
the development of quick-firing guns brought about by the increase in
the offensive and defensive power of swift torpedo-boats threatened ere
long to completely abolish the use of surface torpedo-boats in marine
warfare unless the latter could be rendered proof against those terribly
destructive weapons, the new rapid-firing guns of large calibre. To
secure this invulnerability by the aid of armour would destroy the speed
and hardiness of the torpedo-boats, and it had long been the opinion
amongst naval officers, more especially on the Continent and in America,
that if the torpedo is to be used for successful attack it would have to
be discharged from a vessel which was rendered invulnerable by being
totally submerged—that is to say, from a submarine torpedo-boat.

The submarine boat of the future will be a diving torpedo-boat capable
of manœuvring (1) on the surface, (2) awash with conning tower only
above the water, and (3) beneath the waves.

It will have two methods of propulsion, one for the surface, one for
beneath the water, and its mode of operation will be to steam on the
surface until it is within sighting range; to then take in enough water
ballast to bring it to the “awash” condition, thus greatly reducing the
chances of being hit; and, having approached within a certain distance
of the enemy, to sink entirely beneath the waves, rising once probably
for a second to take final bearings before firing its torpedo.

The nine vessels ordered for our navy are really diving torpedo-boats
and are not intended for use under water except for very short intervals
of time. The submarine of to-day bears a close resemblance to the
torpedo-boat in the early stages of its development and appears to be of
more value to a country that is desirous of defending its coasts than to
one which must maintain the command of the seas.

There are signs, however, that in the process of its evolution the
submarine will go through many of the same stages as did the torpedo
vessel, and will develop into an offensive weapon which England will be
unable any longer to despise.

That a _Holland_, a _Narval_, or a _Gustave Zédé_ is as formidable an
adversary as an _Albatross_ or an _Express_ few would claim, but the
last word has not yet been said on submarine navigation, and the future
may be expected to bring about many changes.

For purposes of coast defence the submarine may be said to have fairly
established its value. The knowledge that such craft were “in being”
would have a deterrent influence upon an admiral attacking a fort or
contemplating a blockade, and in all probability the days of close
blockade are over.

As a weapon of offence the utility of the submarine boat is not so
clearly established. It is true that some of the French boats have
operated at a considerable distance from their base, but its speed, its
seaworthiness, and range of action must be improved before the submarine
can be regarded as a useful adjunct to a fleet acting on the offensive.
The radius of action at the surface of the newest _Hollands_ is only 400
knots at 8 knots per hour, and submerged the speed is 7 knots for a four
hours’ run.

[Illustration:

THE “FULTON” RUNNING ON THE SURFACE.
]

Still even now there are uses to which a submarine boat might be put,
such, for instance, as the attack of ships shut up in a blockaded
harbour, or of vessels in port; the destruction of a mine field so that
ships may enter in safety; the cutting and repairing of cables; the
forcing an entrance through a boom, &c.

The late Captain Cairnes, in his book “The Coming Waterloo,” enunciated
the theory that even if the British fleet destroyed the French fleet it
would still be necessary for us to land an army on French soil in order
to bring hostilities to a conclusion. In that case submarine boats would
probably be employed, for some of the purposes above enumerated.

It has been suggested that small diving torpedo-boats might be carried
on battleships, and it is said that the United States have been
experimenting with vessels of this kind. The difficulties of hoisting
such vessels in and out of a big ship are, however, considerable, and
few naval officers favour this idea. Perhaps a special “submarine depot
ship” somewhat similar to the _Vulcan_ might be useful for conveying
submarines to foreign waters.

In the opinion of many naval experts most of the naval actions of the
future will be virtually decided quite outside the reach of any torpedo
yet designed, and at ranges almost beyond the ken of unaided human
vision, owing to the fact that with the breech-loading gun of to-day
accurate practice can be made at very long range. The battle of Manila
was fought and decided at a distance varying from 5,600 to 2,000 yards,
and the battle of Santiago from 5,000 to 1,600. A naval battle of the
future, according to a distinguished German admiral, if both adversaries
are determined and energetic, will resemble a conflict between two
stags, which in a moment of fury rush upon one another, entangling their
antlers, and, in the end of ends, destroying one another. Or if the
enemies are less determined, a naval battle will resemble a contest of
athletes, the combatants moving backwards and forwards in serpentine
lines; both will keep up fire from a great distance until neither has
enough ammunition left to strike a decisive blow.

In the opinion of the late M. Jean de Bloch the warfare of the future
will resemble the latter picture, but it will be remembered that this
writer in his book, “Is War now Impossible?” laid it down that the
bayonet would never be used, as troops would be unable to cross the
terrible bullet-swept zone and thus come into personal contact with the
enemy. The Boer War has proved on the contrary that the bayonet is still
a valuable weapon, and that the bravery of the soldier, combined with
artillery fire, will enable him to use it with good effect in spite of
the modern rifle.

What the bayonet is in military, that the submarine is in naval warfare.
The increasing range of rifle and cannon enable both combatants, if well
entrenched, to blaze away at one another and do very little damage, and
the necessity therefore arises, if a definite conclusion is to be
reached, for some sharp and sudden blow to be delivered at close
quarters that shall cause the enemy to evacuate his position and beat a
hasty retreat. A bayonet charge is a desperate affair no doubt, but
owing to the modern art of entrenchment, recourse must be had to it if
the enemy is to be shifted.

In much the same way a submarine attack will be ordered when firing at
long ranges has had no effect. There will be great risks, but the
chances of a successful attack will be sufficient to warrant its being
tried.

In conclusion the following extract from a recent article in the
_Engineer_—a journal which has always regarded the submarine with
suspicion—may be quoted: “We must not shut our eyes to the fact that the
semi-submarine boat may be a very dangerous foe. Years have passed since
we pointed this out. It seems to be admitted that a fast torpedo-boat
can get within say a mile of an enemy without certainty of destruction.
Indeed, up to that she is fairly safe. If now, that point reached, she
descends say five feet below the surface, leaving a conning tower just
level with the water, she can be steered, and the chances that she will
be sunk by her enemies are very small. The five feet of water above her
would deflect all projectiles from machine guns. She would have to get
very close up to be hit hard even by heavier metal, and the little
conning tower at the water level would be a very difficult matter to
strike. A fast vessel operating thus _a fleur d’eau_ would be no
despicable enemy. And it is in this direction we think that submarine
attacks will be developed with the best chance of success.”

CHAPTER III
THE MORALITY OF SUBMARINE WARFARE

“War’s a brain-spattering, wind-pipe slitting art. It is not to be
‘humanised,’ but only abolished one fine day when nations have cut
their wisdom teeth.”

“Inter arma silent leges.”

“All’s fair in love and war.”

“The sea fights of the future, with improved ships, guns, and
range-finders, may be fought at ranges almost beyond the ken of
unaided human vision. It is to be hoped that before that time
arrives the progress of civilisation, intellect, and humanity will
have consigned all weapons of war to the museum of the antiquary,
and that other methods than war may have been discovered for
preserving the peace and virility of men and nations.”

In the early years of the nineteenth century the writer of an article in
the _Naval Chronicle_, devoted to a consideration of Fulton’s schemes,
stigmatised his torpedoes and submarine boats as “revolting to every
noble principle,” their projector as a “crafty murderous ruffian,” and
his patrons as “openly stooping from their lofty stations to superintend
the construction of such detestable machines, that promised destruction
to maritime establishments.” He went on to protest against the policy of
encouraging inventions that tended to innovate on the triumphant system
of naval warfare in which England excelled, and he concluded thus:

“Guy Fawkes is got afloat, battles in future may be fought under water;
our invincible ships of the line may give place to horrible and unknown
structures, our projects to catamarans, our pilots to divers, our hardy,
dauntless tars to _submarine assassins_; coffers, rockets, catamarans,
infernals, water-worms, and fire-devils! How honourable! how fascinating
is such an enumeration! How glorious, how fortunate for Britain are
discoveries like these! How worthy of being adopted by a people made
wanton by naval victories, by a nation whose empire are the seas!”

It is quite evident that even in this “so-called Twentieth Century”
there exist many Britons who in their heart of heart agree with this
writer, and who cherish the idea, though they may not openly express it,
that there is something mean and underhanded, something dishonourable
and “un-English” in all methods of under-water warfare. The Englishman
prides himself on being a lover of fair play, and so long as the odds
are more or less equal, he is ready to enjoy any contest or sport. The
average Englishman is neither a hot-headed Jingoist, nor a
peace-at-any-price humanitarian; he regards wars as unfortunate
necessities of modern civilisation, and he likes to see them waged
fairly and squarely, each side observing the rules of the game. As
regards warfare on land, it must be confessed that he has had to correct
some of his ideas since the Boer war. He would have preferred the enemy
to come out into the open and fight like men. Instead of this, they took
every precaution to avoid being seen, and our army found that it had to
face an invisible foe. From the Boers we have learnt the lesson of the
value of cover and entrenchments, and now officers and men, however much
they may dislike it, are forced to seek and utilise cover whenever
possible, making it their aim to hit their opponents and to avoid being
hit themselves.

“Let us admit it fairly as a business people should,
We have had no end of a lesson, it will do us no end of good.”

In naval warfare we have had no opportunity of learning our lesson in
the light of actual experience, for we have had no big battle on the
seas since Trafalgar, and our naval supremacy has not been seriously
threatened since 1805; it is thus possible for men to hold different
opinions as to the value of submarine fighting, and we consequently find
that there are numerous people who, whilst they would not go so far as
to declare mines, torpedoes, and submarine boats unlawful, yet consider
them as methods better fitted to the requirements of other nations than
to those of the Mistress of the Seas.

Modern submarine warfare was introduced by two Americans, David Bushnell
and Robert Fulton, and forced itself into prominence during the American
War of Independence. The spar-torpedo originated in America; the
Whitehead torpedo was first adopted by the Austrian Government, and
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, France, and Austria all began to build torpedo
boats before Great Britain condescended to add them to her Navy.

As to submarine vessels Greece and Turkey purchased Nordenfelt boats in
1887. France built her first boat in 1888, and the United States
purchased her first submarine, the _Holland_, in 1900. Great Britain,
then, has followed instead of leading other nations in the matter of
mines, torpedoes, and submarine boats, and has only been induced to
adopt such methods of warfare because other nations forced her to do so.

Before the advent of the torpedo boat, Great Britain was secure in her
position of Mistress of the Seas, so long as she possessed more
line-of-battle ships than any other nation. The arrival of the
torpedo-boat, the destroyer, and the submarine, all armed with the
Whitehead torpedo, has given weaker nations the chance of attacking our
ironclads with new weapons, and there are even those who affirm that the
battleship is doomed, and must give way to a different type of craft.

The whole trend of modern invention has been to the advantage of weaker
nations. Earl St. Vincent described under-water methods as “a mode of
war which they, who commanded the seas, did not want, and which, if
successful, would deprive them of it.” It is quite true that Great
Britain would sooner trust to her guns and her line-of-battle ships than
to her torpedoes and torpedo craft in actions on the high seas, but
owing to other nations—admittedly weaker—having adopted the torpedo, she
has no choice but to adopt it also in order to maintain her naval
supremacy. So long as she provides herself not only with methods of
submarine attack, but also with means of warding off the under-water
attacks of the enemy, other nations are not likely to wrest the command
of the seas from her.

It is idle to lament the advancement of Science. Man is an inventive
animal, and is ever trying to inaugurate new devices and improve on old
ones. For hundreds of years the sailing ship held the field, and guns
and cannon underwent but little change. During the “Wonderful Century,”
however, changes began in earnest. The wooden sailing ship disappeared,
and the steam-driven ironclad took its place, whilst rifled ordnance,
high explosive shells, and powerful propellants were introduced.

The fish torpedo made its appearance, and the swift torpedo vessel
followed in its wake, and we are now threatened with submarine boats,
turbine-driven men-of-war, and aerial machines for the launching of
aerial torpedoes both on armies and on fleets.

What the future has in store none can foresee, and until the next great
naval battle between first-class Powers comes to pass the value of
modern engines of warfare will remain doubtful. All that is certain at
present is that Great Britain cannot afford to dispense with mines,
torpedoes, and submarine boats.

We may seem to have wandered a long way from the “morality of submarine
warfare,” but our purpose has been to show that when certain people
argue—as they do seriously in this year of grace—that torpedo warfare
should be declared contrary to the laws and customs of war, they are, to
a certain extent, influenced by the fact that the torpedo is a weapon
which Great Britain could very well do without, provided it was tabooed
by other nations.

No one, not even a member of the Peace Society, would urge the
suppression of the Lee-Enfield, or the quick-firer, because Great
Britain relies on these for the maintenance of her place in the front
rank of the nations of the world, and the argument as to the
“illegitimacy” of the torpedo depends largely on the fact that other
nations gain and Great Britain loses by its adoption.

There have been persons who have argued in favour of giving no quarter
to crews of torpedo boats and submarines that might fall into our hands,
and have suggested that we could explain such action to the other
Powers, to whose advantage it is to use such weapons, by saying that
though we had been driven to employ such methods, we were forced to
treat the practice with severity. Such a course of action would cut both
ways, and we suspect our own torpedoists would be very much averse to
it.

Strange engines of warfare and new modes of fighting are received by the
bulk of a nation, whose instincts are conservative and whose minds are
incapable of imagining a state of things other than that which prevails
at the moment, in much the same way as are new inventions. They are
first of all scouted as impossible; then, if possible, of no utility;
and finally, when they have been universally adopted, they are declared
to be no novelties at all. Just as many old ladies have been heard to
declare that they will never travel by the Two-penny Tube, so nations
have been known to disclaim all intention of using particular weapons.
Yet after a time we find the old ladies in the Tube and the nations
employing the weapons. Familiarity breeds contempt.

The earliest man—_Homo sapiens_—fought with his fists, his legs, and his
teeth. Gradually he made for himself weapons, deriving his first
instruction in their manufacture by observing the ways in which the
animal creation fought one another. His earliest weapons were made of
wood, bone, and stone, and in due course there was evolved the spear,
the waddy, the boomerang, the hatchet, the tomahawk, the bow and arrow,
the pike, the lance, the axe, the sword, and other implements.

It is exceedingly probable that the adoption of a new engine of warfare
by a tribe would be condemned by another tribe—to whom it had not
occurred to use it—as illegitimate, but it is equally probable that
while sturdily protesting against the use of one weapon the tribe would
be slily endeavouring to procure one more deadly still.

The first great revolution in the art of war was the introduction of
gunpowder, both as a propelling agent and also as a charge for shells
and bombs. Although the explosive nature of saltpetre when mixed with
carbon and charcoal was doubtless known to the Chinese some centuries
before the Christian era, our first knowledge of the use of gunpowder as
a military agent dates from the seventh century, when it was used by the
Byzantine emperors under the name of “Greek fire” in the defence of
Constantinople against the Saracens.

“Greek fire,” the invention of which is commonly attributed to
Callinichus in 668 A.D., consisted probably of pounded resin or bitumen,
sulphur, naphtha, and nitre. There were three ways of employing it: it
was poured out burning from ladles on besiegers, it was projected out of
tubes to a distance, and it was shot from _balistæ_ burning on tow, tied
to arrows. Its effect was probably rather moral than material.

Geoffrey de Vinesauf, in an account of a naval battle in the time of
Richard I., writes thus of Greek fire: “The fire, with a deadly stench
and livid flames, consumes flint and iron; and unquenchable by water,
can only be extinguished by sand or vinegar. What more direful than a
naval conflict! What more fatal, when so various a fate envolves the
combatants, for they are either burnt and writhe in the flames,
shipwrecked and swallowed up by the waves, or wounded and perish by
arms.”

Despite the lamentations of the humanitarians of the time, Greek fire
and serpents (missiles resembling rockets charged with and impelled by
the slow explosion of a certain mixture) continued to be used in the
navy until the reign of Richard III.

Another favourite method of early naval warfare was the “fire-ship.”
Falkiner, an old writer, tells us that fire-ships were used by the
Rhodians in 190 B.C. They were certainly used by the Greeks; they were
employed by ourselves against the Armada, and they first appeared in our
Navy List in the year 1675; they were used in the Dutch and French wars
at the close of that century, but probably fell into disuse in the
eighteenth. It is quite clear that with the French, as well as with
ourselves, the crews of fire-ships did not expect quarter. Admiral
Gambier deprecated fire-ships as being a “horrible and anti-Christian
mode of warfare,” while Lord Cochrane said that if any attempts were
made upon the British squadron by fire-ships they would be “boarded by
the numerous row-boats on guard, the crews murdered, and the fire-ships
turned in a harmless direction.”

Lord Dunsany appeared to think that this apparently cruel rule of no
quarter to the crews of fire-ships worked well for humanity in practice,
and he seemed to be in favour of its being extended to the crews of
torpedo-boats and submarines. His Lordship pointed out, in a lecture at
the Royal United Service Institution, that the crews of fire-ships would
not stick to their ships to the moment of explosion, but had after
firing the fuse to make their escape in boats, which boats, as they
passed through the enemy’s lines, would naturally become targets, and if
meanwhile some ship clasped in the deadly embrace of the fire-ship had
exploded, it was all the more likely that the fugitives would be the
objects of unsparing vengeance.

“Probably then the vague but fatal epithet ‘un-English’ came to attach
to men who used a deadly weapon, but withdrew themselves (sometimes too
quickly) from the fray. I cannot produce evidence of the facts, but I
believe that officers serving in fire-ships did not stand high with
their brother officers. It is some confirmation of this creed that we do
not find the Boscawens, Rodneys, Howes, Jervises, Nelsons serving in
fire-ships.”

The first use of gunpowder as a propelling agent was in Spain in the
twelfth century, at which period both the Moors and the Christians used
artillery. It was first employed in warfare in England in 1327 by Edward
III. in his war against the Scotch, the cannon from which the shot was
fired being termed “Crakys of war.”

There is abundant evidence that the use of artillery in battle was at
first thought to be improper. When cannon was employed at Chiaggia in
the fourteenth century all Italy made complaint against this manifest
contravention of fair warfare; the ruling classes, seeing their armour,
lances, and knightly prowess rendered useless, vigorously opposed the
newly-invented arms, declaring that they were calculated to extinguish
personal bravery. Perhaps this sentiment may have had some weight with
our navy, for it was not until towards the close of the sixteenth
century that artillery finally assumed the position of the dominant arm
in the service and that musketry fire altogether displaced the arrow and
the bolt.

Shells appear to have been first used by the Sultan of Gujarat in 1480,
and they were in general use about the middle of the seventeenth
century.

There is no doubt whatever that shells and bombs were considered highly
immoral by the side which did _not_ employ them. To those accustomed
only to fire solid shot there must have been something very terrifying
in the hurling of shells fitted with explosives which when they burst
slew those round about and set fire to dwellings and ships.

When the _Bomb Ketch_, a ship firing bombs and shells, was introduced
into our navy in the seventeenth century, the French were particularly
angered by the “inhumanity” of the English in firing “inflammable fire
balls and shells.” Again in the eighteenth century we find the Marechal
de Conflans issuing an order against the use of hollow shot or
incendiary shell because they “were not generally used by polite
nations, and the French ought to fight according to the laws of honour.”

At the battle of the Nile in 1798 the French flagship _L’Orient_ took
fire and blew up, and when the French sailors reproached the English for
using incendiary missiles the latter repudiated the charge, and
mentioned that they had found such unlawful weapons in one of the prizes
they had taken; thus the hollowness of the French regard for humane
warfare was neatly demonstrated.

Whilst Great Britain did not scruple to fire lyddite shells at the
Boers, their wives, and their children at Paardeberg, she prided herself
on her abstention from the use of explosive or expanding bullets, and
much abuse was heaped on the Boers for their employment of such. It may,
however, be doubted whether a bullet which kills you right off at once,
or at any rate which disables you permanently for a long time, is not
preferable to one which is of so mild a nature that you can be shot over
and over again, alternating your appearances on the battlefield with
visits to the hospital.

A lecture on “Explosive Bullets and their Application to Military
Purposes” was delivered before the Royal United Service Institution in
1868 by Major G. V. Fosbery, the first officer to use these projectiles
in the field, systematically and to any large extent, against some of
the mountain tribes of the North-West frontier of India. The lecturer
tells us that the natives considered them unfair on two grounds—firstly,
because they exploded in an objectionable way; secondly, because there
was nothing they could collect of them afterwards, as in the case of
ordinary bullets. But more civilised people complained of the use of
“rifle shell” on the ground of their Satanic nature, and to these Major
Fosbery replies as follows:

“The arguments which condemn a warlike instrument simply on the grounds
of its destructiveness to life, provided that it neither adds keen agony
to wounds nor new terrors to death itself, are, if logically pursued,
simply retrogressive, and even if not recommending by implication a
return to the bow and arrow, at all events point to the old times of
protracted wars and deaths from fatigue and disease far exceeding in
number those caused by the weapons of an enemy. We can therefore afford
to set these on one side, or rather we are bound to neglect them
altogether and seriously consider any invention which under the
conditions above laid down promises us a more certainly destructive fire
than that attainable _cæteris paribus_ by the arms at present included
in our war material.”

In spite of opinions such as these the humanitarians have won the day,
and explosive bullets are now tabooed by Great Britain. The great Duke
of Wellington used to say that he should not like to see the bullet
reduced in size, because it broke the bone, and the object of war was
either to kill your man or else put him in hospital and keep him there.
With the Mauser and the Lee-Enfield neither of these results is
attained.

The prototypes of the modern submarine torpedo, although they were
employed on the surface of the water and not below, were the “machine,”
the “infernal,” the “catamaran,” the “powder-vessel,” &c.

“Machines” may be best described as fire-ships specially arranged so as
to explode very destructively when alongside one of the enemy’s vessels.
They are first found in the British Navy in the seventeenth century, but
were soon discontinued, not we are afraid on humanitarian grounds, but
because Bushnell and Fulton pointed the way to the more convenient
explosive device known as the “torpedo.”

In the year 1650 Prince Rupert made an attempt to blow up the English
Vice-admiral in the _Leopard_ by a species of “infernal.” He sent a
couple of negroes and one of his seamen in Portuguese dress alongside
the _Leopard_ in a shore boat. They carried with them what purported to
be a barrel of oil, but the barrel really held an infernal machine to be
fired by a pistol attachment, the trigger of which could be pulled by a
string passing through the bung. The story goes that one of the crew of
the boat, finding the lower deck ports closed, “uttered an exclamation”
in English. This betrayed them, but Blake refused to take vengeance on
them, though the trick was one he would himself have scorned to play on
his adversary.

During the war between Great Britain and the United States in 1812
H.M.S. _Ramilies_ of seventy-four tons, was so unfortunate as to be the
object of attack both by a diving vessel carrying torpedoes and by a
powder-ship. The _Ramilies_ was lying off New London at anchor and
maintaining the blockade. As she was known to be short of provisions the
Americans fitted out a schooner and filled the hold with powder,
covering it over in the hatchways with barrels of flour. By means of an
ingenious piece of clockwork attached to a gunlock and a train leading
to the powder its explosion was ensured at the intended time. The
_Ramilies_ suspecting nothing, but thanking Heaven for the gift,
captured the vessel and the crew escaped to land. By some extraordinary
chance (or was it destiny?) the schooner was ordered to anchor near
another prize some distance from the _Ramilies_, so that when the
clockwork reached the fatal hour, 2.30, the charge exploded and blew up,
not the _Ramilies_ with her captain, Sir Thomas Hardy, and crew of six
hundred men, but only the prize crew who were in the schooner.

The naval historian James could not trust himself to comment upon “this
most atrocious proceeding,” whilst a naval officer wrote: “A quantity of
arsenic in the flour would have been so perfectly compatible with the
rest of the contrivance that we wonder it was not resorted to. Should
actions like this receive the sanction of Governments, the science of
war and the laws of nations will degenerate into the barbarity of the
Algerians, and pillage will take the place of kindness and humanity to
our enemies.”

During the American Civil War a species of weapon known as a “coal
torpedo” was employed. This consisted of a hollow lump of iron, fitted
with a charge of dynamite. It was rubbed over with coal tar and dust,
and exactly resembled a large lump of coal. Lord Dunsany thought that
this certainly seemed to be on the verge of lawful, if not beyond it.

At the close of the eighteenth century David Bushnell inaugurated the
era of submarine warfare by devising cases fitted with explosives,
arranged to go off at a set time by clockwork. To enable these cases to
be affixed to the sides of vessels, Bushnell invented the first boat
capable of diving beneath the waves of which we have any definite
details. His attempts to blow up the _Eagle_ in 1776 by a case fastened
on her bottom, and the _Cerberus_ in 1777 by means of a towing torpedo,
failed, owing more to the lack of skill on the part of the operator,
Sergt. Ezra Lee, than to any defect in the apparatus employed. Nor was
Bushnell successful in his effort to destroy vessels in the Delaware by
the aid of a number of kegs filled with powder and set adrift.

The introduction of gunpowder, of Greek fire, of fire-ships, of
artillery, of shells, of bombs, of machines, of infernals, of
catamarans, of powder vessels having, as has been shown, been at one
time or another denounced as immoral by certain “humanitarians,” it was
but natural that a secret contrivance for bringing about a terrific
explosion _beneath_ an unsuspecting ship’s crew should have been
believed to be an invention of the Evil One, and history affords proof
that the novel modes of fighting introduced by Bushnell and Fulton were
regarded with great disfavour by naval men, who considered the
innovators as men “who would discredit the glorious traditions of our
navy, and substitute a set of catamarans for the noble frigates that had
carried our flag to victory and were the pride of the nation”; by
humanitarians, who regarded the torpedoes as a “dishonest and cowardly
system of warfare”; and by the public generally, who denounced the
nations who attempted to compass the destruction of British ships of the
line by dastardly tricks which England would never stoop to employ.

In a work written by James Kelly, and published in 1818, the author
comments with great severity on “some infamous and insidious attempts to
destroy British men-of-war upon the coasts of America by torpedoes and
other explosive machinery.” This refers to the attacks on H.M.S.
_Ramilies_ by one of Fulton’s boats, attacks which failed, but which
caused Sir Thomas Hardy to notify the American Government that he had
ordered on board from fifty to one hundred American prisoners of war,
“who, in the event of the effort to destroy the ship by torpedoes or
other infernal inventions being successful, would share the fate of
himself and his crew.” So frightened were the relations and friends of
prisoners of war by these threats that public meetings were held, and
petitions were presented to the American executive against the further
employment of torpedoes in the ordinary course of warfare.

Those who endeavoured to perfect a system of submarine mining for the
defence of harbours and coasts were abused in the same way that Bushnell
and Fulton had been. Samuel Colt, the inventor of the pistol which bore
his name, and one of the first to experiment with mines fired from shore
by means of an electric current, was roundly denounced by John Quincy
Adams, who dubbed him “that Guy Fawkes afloat.”

At the time of the Crimean War the popular term “infernal machine” was
applied to the submarine mines laid down by the Russians to defend the
approaches to Cronstadt. In the seventies Lieut.-Col. Martin endeavoured
to establish, on the grounds of humanity, an international anti-torpedo
association, while even to-day there are people found to protest against
the employment of certain forms of torpedoes, as witness the following
letter recently published in the _Engineer_. The author, Mr. Reginald
Bolton, declared that while no one could object to the defensive lay
torpedo or the spar torpedo, the same could not be said of the
“Whitehead,” “Brennan,” or “Edison.”

“Surely,” he urges, “our forefathers’ code of morality in warfare
should not be in advance of our own. All civilised nations have
debarred the brutal explosive bullet, and why not the equally mean
submarine torpedo? If such a remedy as Commodore Hardy’s were to be
applied by any nation, could its opponent complain, and is there
anything in the practice of morality to prevent, say, a thousand
prisoners’ lives being presented as a bar to the use of an implement
which was acknowledged to be a disgrace to its employers not less
than eighty years ago?”

The methods of warfare which have most aroused the ire of humanitarians
and “blatant platform orators, with their vulgar party cries of eternal
peace,” are those which depend for their success on secrecy or deceit.
Powder vessels, coal torpedoes, _et hoc genus omne_, are condemned
because they pretend to be what in reality they are not, and torpedoes
and submarine boats because they advance in secrecy without giving the
enemy any chance of firing at them or of protecting themselves against
their insidious attacks beneath the water-line.

The arguments of the humanitarians, who are doubtless well meaning
enough, are inconsistent, because, while they raise no protest against
certain modes of conducting war, they unreservedly condemn other
methods—mainly, it must be observed, because of their novelty. Such a
class of person resembles the Quaker who found himself on a vessel
engaged in a conflict with another vessel. He resolutely refused to
assist in fighting the guns, but at last, when the enemy attempted to
board, he collared the leader and pitched him into the sea, saying as he
did so, “Friend, thou hast no business here.”

Major Fosbery, in a lecture on explosive bullets, asked whether any of
the deaths due to fighting were, strictly speaking, humane, and if they
were not, what was this humanity of which so much was made? “Have we not
heard that in the dark ages humanity beat out men’s brains with a mace,
whilst cruelty used the lance, the sword, and the arrow, and that
bishops of the period rode into action with the mace so as to kill
without shedding blood? A very nice distinction indeed, as you will
admit. In later times, were not Congreve and Shrapnel denounced as
monsters for the initiation of inventions in whose perfection we rejoice
to-day?”

Inconsistency indeed is the particular failing of Peace propagandists.
They not only condemn the use of certain weapons while raising no
protest against others equally as destructive of life, but they also
pretend to be horrified at deeds committed by the enemy which they
themselves would not scruple to do should opportunity offer.
Particularly is this the case in savage warfare. Captain Herbert has
mentioned a striking instance during the Zulu War. One day the boys were
calling in the streets, “Shocking _murder_ of a whole British regiment”
(it was at Isandlewana), and a few weeks afterwards the same boys were
shouting, “Great _slaughter_ of the Zulus.” This is akin to the practice
of those orators who refer to the “expansion” of England, but to the
“encroachment” of Russia.

As to the “inhumanity” of the submarine vessel, Mr. Nordenfelt, it may
be noted, would not admit that there was anything especially cruel or
horrible in the idea of a diving torpedo boat. War altogether was cruel
and horrible, and caused an enormous amount of pain and suffering, but
any invention which tended to shorten a war or to protect common or
private property during war would really diminish this suffering on the
whole. Humanitarians had urged that there was something especially cruel
in the secrecy of the submarine boat, but the whole tendency of war had,
he pointed out, moved in this direction ever since the days of old, when
Hector and Achilles advanced in front of their respective followers and
spent half an hour in abusing their adversary’s parents and ancestors
before they commenced to fight.

[Illustration:

EMERGING TO TAKE BEARINGS.
]

The whole object of modern warfare is to keep the enemy ignorant of your
whereabouts and your actions, and to mislead him whenever possible, and
for this reason smokeless powder, torpedoes, disappearing guns, &c.,
have come into use, false attacks are considered admissible, and every
advantage is taken of cover and entrenchments. The only “cover” possible
in naval warfare is beneath the waves, and it is difficult to see any
greater inhumanity in submarine than in military mining, which certainly
dates from very early times. If it is lawful to sap and mine before a
fortified town, and to blow up an army as it marches unsuspectingly over
“mined” ground, it is surely permissible to send ships sky-high by mines
and to sink them by torpedoes.

Mr. A. F. Yarrow has remarked that it seemed strange that an
artilleryman behind ten or twenty feet of earthwork, hurling explosive
shells at an almost unseen foe, should be held as fighting fairly, while
in the case of the torpedoist, who has the pluck to accompany his
missile to within a short distance of his enemy, it should be considered
an unfair mode of attack.

Yet so it is, and we find in a recent number of the _Engineer_[1] that
submarine warfare is placed on a par with guerilla warfare and
train-wrecking. “The torpedoing of a single German ironclad by a
submarine would almost certainly be followed by a refusal to recognise
submarines as belligerents.”

Footnote 1:

_Engineer_, October 1, 1901.

The question of the laws and usages of civilised warfare has been the
subject of many books and articles, and conferences have been called to
endeavour to arrive at some understanding on the subject. An
International Conference on the “Usages of War,” held at Brussels in
1874 at the instance of Alexander II., considered among other things,
“the means of injuring an enemy,” and suggested the prohibition of the
use of poison and poisoned weapons, murder by treachery, and murder of a
disarmed enemy, projectiles causing unnecessary suffering, and
prohibited by the declaration of St. Petersburg in 1818; “_ruses de
guerre_” were, however, declared permissible.

In connection with the Boer War it is interesting to note that
differences arose at this Conference between the representatives of the
large States possessing great standing armies, and of the minor States
with small armies. The former thought that war should be the business of
professional trained soldiers, that they, and as a rule they alone,
should fight, that war should follow a regular course, and that the
worthlessness, from a military point of view, of the sporadic efforts of
partisan warfare should be recognised, and that when a battle was won
and the seat of Government was in the possession of an invader the
inhabitants should respect the conquerors as the _de facto_ and _de
jure_ Government. If they interrupted communications and cut off
isolated bodies of troops they were to be dealt with not as honourable
combatants, but as assassins and marauders.

The “Geneva Convention” met at Geneva on August 8, 1864, and on the 22nd
of the same month an International Code was adopted by all civilised
powers, except the United States. The code mainly concerned itself with
the succour of the wounded in time of war, and certain cruel methods of
warfare, such as the use of explosive bullets, were condemned, Great
Britain agreeing not to use such weapons in war against civilised
nations.

The Peace Conference at the Hague was opened on May 18, 1899. Of the
eight proposals submitted for discussion, the second was the prohibition
of the use of new arms and explosives, the third the restriction of the
use of existing explosives and the prohibition of projectiles and
explosives from balloons, and the fourth the prohibition of submarine
torpedo boats, and the agreement not to construct boats with rams in the
future.

The final act embodying the results of the Conference contained three
declarations. 1. Prohibition of the throwing of projectiles and
explosives from balloons or any other analogous means. This prohibition
to be in force for five years. 2. Prohibition of projectiles intended
solely to diffuse asphyxiating or deleterious gases. 3. Prohibition of
the use of bullets which expand easily in the human body.

It may be noted that Great Britain did not bind herself to accept any of
these three declarations.

“The laws of war,” wrote Montague Bernard, “are nothing at all but the
usages according to which warfare by land and sea is carried on, and the
collection of the whole body of usages represents what we call the laws
of war.... The student of history is apt to be a little puzzled by
frequent reference to ‘_laws_’ with which he is tacitly assumed to be
familiar. What are these laws? Where are they written? What authority do
they command? They are a body of _usages_, for the most part
conditional, which have arisen principally from motives of convenience
and the extension of commerce.”

It is of course recognised that the only force which supports
international law is the appeal to the conscience of the nation, for
there is no international tribunal to punish countries for deeds
committed in time of war. While it is unlikely that the rough game of
war ever will be played (it certainly never has been in the past) in
exact conformity with the rules of the jurists, there are certain
methods of waging war which England would not employ, and certain acts
which she would not commit in the event of hostilities breaking out
between herself and a civilised country.

She would not use explosive bullets. She would not fire on undefended
towns, and would endeavour to avoid the destruction of non-combatants
and their property. She would not poison wells, she would not endeavour
to accomplish the assassination of a commander-in-chief, she would not
abuse a flag of truce, she would not murder prisoners who behaved
themselves, and put to death those who surrendered.

On the other hand, she would consider herself at perfect liberty to
employ submarine boats, torpedoes, and mines, both military and naval;
to discharge shells filled with high explosives, whether lyddite,
melinite, or other substance, from aerial machines; to intercept the
enemy’s messages and to mislead him by sending false ones; to commence
hostilities without issuing a declaration of war;[2] to fire on, and if
necessary sink, the merchant ships of the enemy; to starve a garrisoned
town; to erect wire entanglements and similar obstructions; to offer
wrecking lights as navigation lights; and to employ any “stratagem” or
“_ruse de guerre_” which might serve some useful end. With regard to
stratagems, it appears to be quite proper to disguise ships and men, and
to use false signals, false colours, and neutral flags, though a British
naval officer would probably not fire into his enemy before hauling down
his neutral or false colours.

Footnote 2:

The Romans considered that no war could be just unless it was preceded
by a formal declaration.

Vice-Admiral Rodney M. Lloyd pointed out in a recent letter to the
_Times_ that while in naval warfare all stratagems were admitted,
expected, and provided against, in military operations, on the contrary,
some acts of a similar kind appeared to be objected to. The Boers, for
instance, frequently disguised themselves in British khaki uniforms, and
endeavoured to delude sentries and guards.

Some writers refer to this as “the abuse of the khaki uniform” and “the
treacherous use of the khaki uniform,” but if such things are permitted
in naval operations it is difficult to see why they should be considered
immoral if practised on land.

_Apropos_ it may be mentioned that during some Russian naval manœuvres
the admiral’s ship was destroyed by the following trick. A party of
volunteers from other squadrons came alongside the cruiser _Africa_, the
flagship, in a Finnish coasting smack, and one of the volunteers,
dressed as a peasant, came on board with a telegram. Whilst the
attention of the _Africa’s_ crew was diverted the other volunteers
fastened a small buoy with the inscription, “Frigate _Prince Pojarsky_,”
under the stern of the flagship.

[Illustration:

BENEATH THE WAVES.
]

Of course there is a very thin line which separates what is considered
fair and what is considered unfair warfare among civilised communities.
Lord Dunsany said that he was not perfectly sure that there could not be
something said in favour of poisoning wells. “We have heard something
about poisoning the air. The French some time ago had what they called
_bullets asphyxiants_. These would have utterly poisoned a whole ship’s
crew. If these missiles may be used, then it comes to this: that it is
lawful to poison the air, but not lawful to poison the water.”

Lyddite shells seem rather to resemble these _bullets asphyxiants_, for
their stench is reported to be terribly stupefying to those in the
immediate neighbourhood when they burst. But whereas explosive shells
fired from guns are considered “legitimate,” shells fired from rifles
are regarded as “illegitimate.”

Respecting the question of poisoning wells, Colonel Lonsdale Hale has
remarked that so long as this was done openly, and the fact notified in
some way to those who would use them, there seemed to be nothing more to
be said against this forbidden practice than against the permitted
practice of depriving the enemy of good water supply by filling in wells
and by cutting off the good water, as the Germans did at Metz and Paris,
and reducing their enemy’s water supply to the sewage-receiving Moselle
and Seine. If it was permissible to starve one’s enemy by denying him
solid food, it seemed to him equally permissible to starve him by
denying him liquid food.

Wolff and Bynkerhoeck, two of the originators of international law,
thought the use of poison in warfare perfectly legitimate. Vattel
considered the practice interdicted by the law of nature which did not
allow of the multiplying the evils of war beyond all bounds. To get the
better of the enemy he must be struck, and if once disabled, what
necessity, he asked, was there that he should eventually die of wounds.

Opinion also differs as to the morality of attacking undefended towns
and injuring the property of non-combatants during a war.

The late Admiral Aube, when he was head of the French Admiralty, said
the proper way of bringing this country to order was to burn Brighton
and Scarborough and a few other places; and Admiral Sir J. C. Dalrymple
Hay, Bart., has remarked that he could not say he thought that he was
wrong. According to the latter, the object of each side is to do the
greatest possible destruction to the enemy, and also to make him cave
in; the whole of the country is engaged in war, they pay taxes for the
war, they encourage their soldiers and sailors to fight courageously,
they suffer for the war in various ways and they urge it on; and they
must expect to suffer accordingly.

Humanitarians affirm that in actual war soldiers and sailors of the
Dalrymple Hay school would be too human to act up to their expressed
opinions; the probability is that England would only resort to such
measures if the enemy were determined to employ them. Vice-Admiral
Bourgois, in his book “Les Torpilleurs,” made a strong protest against
the doctrines of those who advocated the bombardment of undefended towns
and the sinking without warning of defenceless merchant ships. He urged
that the nationality of the vessel should first be verified, and then
provision made for the crew and passengers.

Apart from the “Hague enthusiasts” who are for prohibiting the
employment of high explosives, aerial torpedoes, and submarine torpedo
boats, there is another class of humanitarians who urge the adoption of
all new and deadly engines of warfare, apparently with the idea that if
war is made sufficiently terrible no nation would dare fight another.
“The more terrible the anticipation of naval war,” says a writer, “as
fashion and science continue the contest, the less likely will be its
realisation.”

The late M. Bloch, as we know, considered war to be tactically,
strategically, economically, and morally impossible, but as he assured
us also in his book, “Is War Impossible?” that bayonets were quite out
of date, one may be forgiven for not paying much heed to his
lucubrations.

Admiral Porter, of the U.S. Navy, considered that if war was made so
dangerous that every combatant would to a certainty be killed, then
there would be an end of the business and the Peace Society could put up
their shutters.

The newspapers, especially the halfpenny ones, are constantly informing
us of the discovery of new engines of warfare of terrible potency. Mr.
Tesla is going to wipe out the British Fleet by simply touching a button
on his waistcoat or elsewhere. Mr. Hudson Maxim has devised a method of
throwing aerial torpedoes carrying each of them one ton of high
explosive which is so efficacious that one cruiser lying just out of
range of our guns would destroy all our battleships with the greatest
ease. Dr. Barton is building an airship which will throw explosives on
the enemy below, who will be powerless to retaliate, and so on.

The wars of the future, so the halfpenny journalists inform us, will be
either waged under the seas or above the clouds, and we seem to be
approaching the time imagined by Lord Tennyson, whose swain (in
“Locksley Hall”)—

“Heard the heavens filled with shouting, and there rain’d a ghastly dew
From the nations’ airy navies grappling in the central blue.”

If wars ever die out, it will certainly _not_ be owing to the
destructive capabilities of the weapons employed. In the eyes of old
Geoffrey de Vinesauf the naval conflicts of his time were as terrible as
he could well imagine them to be, but a hundred years hence a Conference
will doubtless be held at Tokyo to consider what restrictions should be
placed on the use of submarine boats and aerial machines in time of war.

Those who are in favour of utilising the latest resources of science for
the purpose of warfare are in reality more humane in the truest sense of
the word than those who seek to limit nations in their choice of
weapons. Vice-Admiral Sir John Fisher, who was one of those chosen to
represent Great Britain at the Hague Conference, expressed himself
strongly on the cruelty of making war on “humane” or moderate
principles, and it is an undoubted fact that in spite of the deadly
nature of modern arms, wars, on land at least, are not so destructive of
life nor do they cause so much misery and suffering as they did
formerly.

We can speak with more certainty with regard to warfare on land than we
can to warfare on sea, but though the next great naval fight between two
nations will certainly entail terrible suffering on the combatants
(especially on those whose stations are below), it may be said that on
the whole they will neither cause such wholesale misery nor be so
protracted as the naval battles of old.

“Every war,” said Captain Herbert in a recent lecture at the Royal
United Service Institution on “The Ethics of Warfare,” “marks a step. In
1885 the Servians, when they invaded Bulgaria, paid conscientiously in
good coin for every fowl or pig seized in farmhouses, for every glass of
brandy drunk in village inns; and when the tables were turned, and the
Bulgarians invaded Servia, the Bulgarian soldiers and the Servian
traders fraternised most cordially in the alehouses of Pirot. To come to
the latest European war—that between Turkey and Greece in 1897—we have
the testimony of the war correspondents that the behaviour of the
Ottoman soldiery was quite exemplary. If things continue in this wise we
shall perchance hear in the next century of every rifle discharge being
preceded by a conciliatory caution and every bursted shell being
followed by a humble apology.”

Dr. J. Macdonell, in a recent lecture, has touched on this subject. “It
must be owned,” he says, “that the progress in mitigating the evils of
war have been immense—that acts of useless violence which were once
habitual are now exceptional, and are punished or condemned by military
opinion. Ask those who say, ‘Things are much as they were: the grim
realities of war no better than before,’ to note the matter-of-fact way
Comines de Hoissard relates cruelties as the necessary accompaniments of
warfare; then compare with such passages some of the many handbooks
published by European Governments for the use of their troops. It has
been truly said that the difference between the methods of the Thirty
Years’ War and of the War of the Spanish Succession is the difference
between darkness and twilight; the difference between warfare as
understood by Tilly and Pappenheim and that described in modern official
Manuals is the difference between light and darkness. Everywhere is
recognised that only effective injuries are justifiable. The modern
soldier strikes hard, he doesn’t mutilate or destroy for the love of
destruction.”

The Rev. Edmund Warre has drawn a vivid picture of the wretched plight
of the slaves labouring at the oars, who suffered intense discomfort and
were in continual danger.

“In a hot climate, with but very little ventilation, it must have been
exceedingly trying to take part in a laborious mechanical toil with
perhaps some hundred or two of human beings stark naked and packed so
closely that there was not room, as Cicero says, for even _one_ man
more. The heat, the smells, the toil must have been terrible to any one
undergoing it against his will—so terrible as to suggest that even death
itself were better than such drudgery. A dull dead feeling of despair
must have crept over man and crew in such a case, and though the lash
might keep them going under ordinary circumstances, such spirits could
not be relied upon in times of emergency, Besides the question of
discomfort, the actual danger was very great. The crews were liable at
any moment to be drowned or burnt, or, in the case of defeat, butchered
by the victors—perhaps, as at Sybota, deliberately in cold blood.
Conceive the moment of conflict and its horrors, when the sharp-pointed
beak came crashing through the timbers, smashing them right and left
along with the helpless mass of human beings, while the water followed
swift upon the blow, perhaps just giving time to the Thranites (the
rowers on the topmost of the three benches in the Trireme, who had the
most work and the longest oars) to swarm up upon the deck, while the
helpless Thalamites (the rowers on the lowest bench) were drowned at
once.”

Science, although she is continually placing man in possession of
weapons more terrible and more destructive than those of the previous
generation, really acts for the good of humanity at large, who owe a
debt of gratitude to the mechanical geniuses who have evolved modes of
warfare which enable war to be waged with as little unpleasantness as
possible to the peaceful populations that have no concern with it.

In one respect at least modern warfare is certainly more humane than
that of olden times, and this is in the treatment of the wounded and the
captured. In ancient warfare the fate of the captive was death or
slavery, and in early battles no quarter was given, except to personages
of great distinction, and the object of both sides was to slay as many
of their opponents as possible, and as surrender only made the prisoner
the perquisite of his captor, the fighting was both bloody and fierce.
Even as late as 1780 a prisoner was still viewed as the property of the
victor, and there was a regular scale or tariff of payments.

One instance culled from an account of a battle between Christians and
Turks, written by Geoffrey de Vinesauf, must suffice.

“Drawing the hostile galley with them to the shore the victors exposed
it to be destroyed by our people of both sexes who met it on land. Then
our women seized and dragged the Turks by the hair, beheading them and
treating them with every indignity and savagely stabbing them, and the
weaker their hands so much the more protracted were the pains of death
to the vanquished, for they cut off their heads not with swords but with
knives.”

Dr. Macdonell has pointed out that the only notable survival of
barbarism in respect to captives was the rule—abrogated apparently in
some countries but retained by us for reasons never satisfactorily
explained—that the crews of pirate vessels captured at sea were treated
as prisoners of war.

In the next great fight on the seas, if a submarine boat should be hit
by the quick-firing guns of a battleship she is endeavouring to destroy,
her crew, provided they are not sunk like rats in a trap, will be picked
up by the ironclad’s boats and kept as prisoners of war till hostilities
are at an end.

We are reminded of some lines in Mr. Kipling’s poem, “Kitchener’s
School”—

“They terribly carpet the earth with dead, and before their cannon cool
They walk unarmed by twos and threes and call the living to school.”

Those who argue in favour of the suppression of under-water warfare have
pointed out that whereas the battleship can save the crew of the torpedo
vessel, the latter owing to her small size can only steam away, sending
the big ship to the bottom, and leave the unfortunate crew to drown or
save themselves as best they can, which, with shell and shot flying
about, would not be easy. A way out of the difficulty has not been found
yet.

What then is the conclusion of the whole matter? It is this. Since the
object of war is peace, make war as deadly as possible; since your goal
is complete conquest, use all efforts to get it over as quickly as
possible. We cannot do better than quote the following remarks made by a
speaker during the discussion on Lord Dunsany’s lecture, above referred
to.

“In conclusion I would say, save us from the cruel mercies of the weak.
War—that splendid mistress for whose favours we have all longed since we
reached man’s estate—must be given her full attributes and painted in
her most deadly colours in order that the misery, which undoubtedly she
brings to the majority of the population, may extend over as short a
period as possible. Let us make her as deadly as we can, in the name of
humanity and of every good feeling.”

CHAPTER IV
THE MECHANISM OF THE SUBMARINE, AND SUBMARINES OF THE FUTURE

Mr. H. G. Wells, in his “Anticipations,” confesses that his imagination,
in spite even of spurring, refuses to see any sort of submarine doing
anything but suffocate its crew and founder at sea. “It must involve
physical inconvenience of the most demoralising sort simply to be in one
for any length of time.... You may of course throw out a torpedo or so
with as much chance of hitting vitally as you would have if you were
blindfolded, turned round three times and told to fire revolver-shots at
a charging elephant.... Given a derelict ironclad on a still night
within sight of land, a carefully handled submarine might succeed in
groping its way to it and destroying it; but then it would be much
better to attack such a vessel and capture it boldly with a few
desperate men on a tug. At the utmost, the submarine will be used in
narrow waters, in rivers, or to fluster or destroy ships in harbour, or
with poor-spirited crews—that is to say, it will simply be an added
power in the hands of the nation that is predominant at sea. And even
then, it can be merely destructive, while a sane and high-spirited
fighter will always be dissatisfied if, with an undisputable superiority
of force, he fails to take.”

[Illustration:

INTERIOR OF THE FIRST BRITISH SUBMARINES (NOS. I.–V.).
]

We are afraid that Mr. Wells has not taken the trouble to keep himself
in touch with the latest developments of submarine navigation. As we
write, news comes from America of a party who spent fifteen hours under
water in the _Fulton_ without suffering any inconvenience. This does not
look much like the “suffocation” Mr. Wells anticipates. As to
torpedo-firing, French and American boats whilst under way have made
excellent practice, both at stationary and at moving targets; while in
making the assertion that the submarine will be used in narrow waters,
in rivers or in harbours, it is evident that Mr. Wells is unaware of the
lengthy voyages made by some of the newest boats.

The _David_ represented the best type of under-water vessel in the
sixties; that she is infinitely inferior to the newest _Holland_ type or
some of the French vessels of to-day goes without saying, and it will
not be surprising if the submarine of thirty years hence bears the same
resemblance to the _Holland_, as the _Holland_ does to the _David_.

The ideal submarine boat has a speed as great as that of the fastest
torpedo-boat, a very wide radius of action, excellent sea-keeping
powers, unlimited quantities of air for power and for respiration by the
crew; a means of directing its course by vision upon a moving object
whilst itself remaining invisible beneath the surface, and is very
habitable and comfortable for long periods of time.

The submarine of to-day lacks most of these attributes. It has a slow
rate of speed, whether on the surface or submerged, a narrow radius of
action, poor sea-keeping powers, a strictly limited quantity of
compressed air, and is absolutely blind when beneath the waves. Thus it
differs greatly from the ideal boat as sketched above, but its gradual
improvement may be safely predicted.

We propose in this chapter to describe, in simple language, the working
of a vessel intended for under-water navigation, and to consider what
improvements are likely to take place.

Every submarine boat worked by a crew must of necessity be capable of
floating on the surface of the water. This is a self-evident
proposition, for the crew must have means of ingress and egress, and the
only practical way of entering and leaving the boat is by an opening in
the hull when she is on the surface.

We have no doubt that the files of the Patent Office would show that
many inventors had designed boats which would sink to a certain depth
directly they were placed in the water. While in such a system no time
is lost in submersion, there would undeniably be difficulties in the way
of coming to the surface, &c.

The first problem, then, which confronts the designer of a submarine
boat is to find the most suitable method of sinking it to the depth at
which it is intended to navigate.

The most fundamental law of hydrostatics, which applies to all floating
bodies, and is equally true of wholly submerged vessels floating at any
depth, as of ships of ordinary form, floating on the surface, having
only a portion of their volume immersed, is that a ship floating freely
and at rest in still water must displace a volume of water having a
weight equal to her own weight.

The “displacement” of a vessel is defined as the weight of water
displaced, which is equal to the weight of the vessel and that of her
lading. A ship floating on the surface “displaces” a certain weight of
water; in order to force her beneath the surface two methods are open.

In the first place, her weight is increased by the introduction of water
ballast; thus her “displacement” is altered and she sinks until her
weight is again equal to the volume of water displaced.

In the second, the weight of the boat remains constant, but the
displacement is altered by the drawing in of “cylinders” or “drums;”
thus she sinks until her displacement again equals her weight.

The first inventor to employ the latter method was André Constantin, who
built a vessel during the siege of Paris, which was furnished with
pistons working in two cylinders; on these being drawn in from the
interior the boat sank to the required depth. The actual trials were,
however, not satisfactory. The _Nautilus_, of Messrs. Campbell & Ash,
which underwent some trials in Tilbury Docks in 1888, depended also on
the pulling in of cylinders (ten were employed, five on each side of the
vessel), for her submersion; the results were equally discouraging, and
some eminent men nearly lost their lives owing to the erratic behaviour
of this craft.

[Illustration:

THE SUBMARINE OF ANDRÉ CONSTANTIN.

(1874.)
]

No serious ship-constructor would nowadays think of adopting this method
of submersion, and we may therefore pass on to consider those which are
brought to the submerged condition by the admission of water into
special reservoirs or tanks.

Submarine boats so far as their immersion is concerned may be divided
into two classes.

1. Those which when submerged possess no floatability.

2. Those which in the same condition possess a small reserve buoyancy or
floatability.

Modern submarines almost without exception belong to the second
division, as this class has been found to possess great advantages over
the first.

1. SUBMARINES WITH NO FLOATABILITY WHEN SUBMERGED.

[Illustration:

“GOUBET II.”
]

Boats belonging to this division possess when submerged a total weight
equal to the weight of water displaced. During immersion it has been
found necessary to make the weight of the vessel and its contents
slightly exceed the weight of water displaced by the total volume of the
vessel; this excess of weight causes a downward motion which rapidly
accelerates unless checked, and care must be taken to regulate, either
automatically or otherwise, the depth, lest the vessel sink to a depth
where the pressure is greater than she can withstand.

[Illustration:

M. GOUBET ABOUT TO GO UNDER WATER IN HIS BOAT.
]

Although M. Goubet is a believer in the “no-floatability” idea, it has,
for some time past, been regarded with disfavour. Theoretically it is
possible to navigate a submarine whose total weight equals the weight of
water displaced so that she keeps at a given level without rising or
sinking, but the system will not work satisfactorily when put to severe
and prolonged tests. It is found to be impossible to obtain perfect
equality between the two weights: submarine currents, variations of
atmospheric pressure and temperature, and movements inside the boat all
tending to disturb its equilibrium.

2. SUBMARINES POSSESSING FLOATABILITY WHEN SUBMERGED.

Mr. Nordenfelt realised the superiority of submarines possessing a
reserve buoyancy when submerged over those which possessed no buoyancy
and all the most important of latter-day submarines fall under this
division.

It is quite obvious that should any accident happen, such as the entry
of water, the failure of the machinery, the asphyxiation of the crew
(rendering the detaching of a false keel impossible), &c., the submarine
with a reserve buoyancy would at once rise to the surface, while the
boat with no floatability would remain where it was and then gradually
commence to sink, owing to the fact that it is almost impossible to
prevent the water from finding its way, little by little, into the boat.

Submarines which possess floatability when submerged have a weight which
is less than their displacement and some mechanical action must be
resorted to to force them below the surface. The first operation
consists in introducing a certain amount of water into the tanks so that
the boat is brought to the “awash” condition, with the greater part of
the hull below water and only the conning tower, &c., appearing above
the waves. The complete submersion of the vessel may be attained in two
ways: either screws on vertical shafts are employed to “screw” the
vessel below the surface, whether at rest or whilst moving; or
horizontal rudders, or planes, are used to steer the boat below the
surface; this latter method is only applicable to moving vessels.[3]

Footnote 3:

A system of moving weights was employed by Drzewiecki and other
inventors.

IMMERSION BY SCREWS MOUNTED ON A VERTICAL SHAFT.

Just as a ship is driven backwards and forwards in the horizontal plane
by means of a screw or screws mounted on a horizontal shaft, so it is
possible to drive a ship up and down the vertical plane by means of one
or more screws immersed in the water and mounted on a vertical shaft;
the boat is by this method literally “screwed down” into the liquid.

The principle of the vertical screw was adopted by Bushnell who, in the
description of his submarine vessel, writes: “At the top there was
likewise an oar for ascending and descending or continuing at any
particular depth.... When the skilful operator had obtained an
equilibrium (by means of the forcing pumps) he could row upwards and
downwards or continue at any particular depth with an oar placed near
the top of the vessel, formed upon the principle of the screw, the axis
of the oar entering the vessel. By turning the oar one way he raised the
vessel, by turning it in the other he depressed it.”

[Illustration:

PROFESSOR TUCK’S SUBMARINE.

(1884.)
]

M. Gaget remarks that “it is very strange that Bushnell should have
discovered and concealed with so much care the instrument of propulsion
which Sauvage studied and introduced fifty years later.” The fact is, of
course, that the principle of the screw-propeller was known in the
seventeenth century and that in May, 1785, Joseph Bramah patented a
screw-propeller, identical in general arrangement with those in use
to-day. The first practical use of the screw was made by John Stevens,
who in 1804 launched a steamboat eighteen feet long by fourteen feet
beam with a direct acting high-pressure engine having a tubular
boiler—and driving a screw with four blades. Although the principle of
the screw for ship propulsion was thus recognised at this early period
it was not till the thirties (of the nineteenth century) that the
screw-propeller succeeded in attracting the attention of the engineering
world.

Professor Tuck in his boat (1884) placed the propeller directly beneath
the centre of the hull, so that it should submerge on an even keel.

Mr. Nordenfelt used vertical screws, which at first he fitted in side
sponsons, but afterwards in the fore and aft line, and considered it
absolutely essential that a diving boat should be kept horizontal when
being submerged, as any inclination downwards with the impetus of a
heavy boat would, he considered, almost to a certainty carry the boat
below its safe depth, before it could be effectually counteracted by
shifting weights. Such a theory was soon shown to be founded on a
misapprehension.

Some inventors (Waddington, Baker, &c.) have used four screws operating
in pits equidistant from the centre of the boat, two on the upper part
and two on the under part, but all such methods have been discarded in
the newest designs.

IMMERSION BY HORIZONTAL RUDDERS.

The ordinary vertical rudder steers the ship either to port or starboard
in the horizontal plane, and the horizontal rudder can be used similarly
to control its position in the vertical plane.

This method of steering a boat beneath the surface by the inclination of
horizontal rudders is, of course, only applicable when the boat is
moving.

The position that the horizontal rudder or rudders should occupy is a
question about which much has been written, and opinion appears to be
still divided on the subject. Some hold that they should be placed at
the stern, others that they should be placed on either side of the
vessel, and these latter again differ as to whether they should be
forward, amidship, or aft. In spite of all the arguments in favour of
placing the rudders forward, Captain Hovgaard considers that this
disposition can hardly be recommended except in very long boats where it
may prove a necessity. The _Gustave Zédé_ has six diving rudders, two
forward, two in the centre, and two aft; whilst in the _Narval_ class
there are four rudders, two forward and two aft; the _Holland_
submarines have aft rudders only.

_Control in the Vertical Plane._

That beautiful machine, the Whitehead torpedo, is maintained at a set
depth below the surface by means of a pendulum and a hydrostatic valve
which regulate the horizontal rudders, and also in its true course by
the gyroscope. In the case of the submarine it is necessary that it
should not pass a certain limit when on its downward course, and that it
keep so far as is possible the same level throughout its run under
water.

The control of the submarine in the vertical plane may be accomplished
by the manipulation of the rudders, either automatically, by means of
some such arrangement as the hydrostatic valve or pendulum, or by hand,
and she can be kept on an even keel and prevented from rising to the
surface or sinking to the bottom, when running beneath the waves, by the
pumping of water from a reservoir situated aft to one situated forward,
or vice versâ, by the admission of water into trimming tanks, by
shifting weights, &c. These operations can be carried out either
automatically or by hand-operated mechanism.

It will be readily understood that while it is a comparatively simple
matter to force a vessel beneath the surface to a depth previously
determined, it is not so easy to ensure its keeping at this depth during
the whole time it is submerged and maintaining throughout the run a
perfectly even keel.

One of the greatest difficulties the inventor of submarine boats has to
overcome is their lack of longitudinal stability. Submerged vessels are
of two classes, those which are equal in weight to the water they
displace, and those which are lighter. Both classes are subject to
various disturbances which tend to upset their longitudinal stability
and send them up to the surface and down towards the bottom. In Chapter
XV. mention is made of the difficulties experienced by those who had to
navigate the Nordenfelt.

The principal causes of disturbance have been summed up by Captain
Hovgaard in a paper entitled, “The Motion of Submarine Boats in the
Vertical Plane,” read before the Institution of Naval Architects at the
Annual Meeting in 1901.

1. Faulty use of horizontal rudder. 2. Admission of water through
leakages. 3. Expulsion of foul air and products of combustion. 3a.
Firing of torpedoes and projectiles. 4. Movements of crew. 5. Existence
of free surfaces of liquid. 6. Movements of loose weights, such as fuel.
7. Variations of buoyancy caused by varying density of sea water. 8.
Grounding and collision. 9. Variations in speed.

Some of the most important of these disturbances may be briefly
discussed.

1. Most modern submarines are provided with more than one pair of
horizontal rudders, but if all the rudders should refuse to act and the
boat is running down an inclined plane, the only thing to be done is to
pump the water out of the tanks and thus bring the boat to the surface.

2. By the careful construction of the hull, and by strict control of all
sea-valves, the admission of water may be prevented. If the boat is
stove in and water enters in any quantity, she will inevitably sink. As
an escape some inventors have provided their submarines with detachable
boats.

3. Usually the length of the run under water will not be so great that
the foul air will need to be got rid of. If necessary it can be expelled
by drawing on the store of compressed air, and as the substances
withdrawn will always be small, no change in longitudinal balance need
be feared if precautions are taken. As all modern submarines are driven
by electricity beneath the surface, the expulsion of products of
combustion need not be considered.

3a. In the earliest submarine boats the torpedoes consisted of charges
of explosive in cases, which were attached to the outside of the vessel
to be attacked, or were towed against her sides.

Those who had little faith in the future of under-water warfare declared
that a torpedo could never be fired from a tube in a submerged vessel
without disastrous effects. The Nordenfelt boats were certainly not
successful in discharging torpedoes, for as a general rule they as
nearly as possible stood up vertically on their tails and proceeded to
plunge to the bottom stern first on these occasions.

However, since then, submarines have fired torpedoes quite
satisfactorily under water.

The expulsion of a torpedo from a vessel totally submerged in the water,
whether equal to or less than the weight to the water displaced,
naturally reduces her weight and tends to send her up towards the
surface. This tendency can best be counteracted by the admission of a
certain quantity of water ballast into the boat.

The method now usually followed is to allow the surrounding water to
enter the tube immediately after the launch of the torpedo, and as the
weight of the volume of water admitted will be about equal to that of
the missile ejected, the longitudinal stability of the submarine should
not be disturbed. When the second torpedo comes to be placed in the
tube, the volume of water already in it must of necessity be ejected,
and a compensating reservoir may be used to receive it. As each torpedo
is fired a certain amount of water, corresponding to the weight of the
projectile, must be allowed to enter the compensating reservoir. This
may be done automatically.

The _Engineer_ in a leader on January 18, 1901, said: “The discharge of
a bow torpedo (by a submarine) would be instantly followed by the rise
of the bow; relieved of the weight the boat would tend to stand on end.
If going ahead at the time she would immediately come to the surface to
be destroyed. If going astern she would plunge downwards and the
consequences might be equally serious.... Torpedoes must be fired when
the submarine is at rest.”

In spite of this dogma submarines have fired torpedoes whilst in motion
with success, and in modern submarines ample provision is made for the
loss of weight occasioned by the discharge of the torpedo.

4. Reference has been made to the fact that when the Nordenfelt boat was
moving along on an even keel, and a greaser walked forward a couple of
feet in his engine room, her head would go down a little, the water
would surge forward in the tanks, and she would plunge to the bottom,
unless checked in time. It has been said that one man going forward in a
submarine boat would cause her to dive to a depth of thirty-six feet in
one minute. The movements of the crew may be compensated for by
automatic arrangements, but the ideal method would be one in which every
one remained immovable at his post during the submerged run.

_Steering Below Water._

Quite early in the history of submarine navigation it was found that the
compass was not so reliable when the boat was navigating under water as
it was when she was on the surface. This is not to be wondered at, for
the compass of a submarine is placed in the interior of a tightly-closed
metallic shell and in close proximity to an electro-motor and powerful
currents capable of influencing it considerably, if not of rendering it
altogether useless.

The principal causes of the unreliability of the compass on a submerged
boat are:—

1. The currents normally produced by the electric motor.

2. The abnormal currents flowing in certain unknown parts of the hull
owing to lack of proper insulation.

3. The permanent or transitory magnetisation of the hull if made of a
magnetic metal.

The best position for the compass on a submarine has been a much debated
point, but it is now generally agreed to be in the centre of the hull.
The conning tower of the first British submarine was made of steel, but
it was afterwards replaced by one of brass.

M. M. Gaget in his book[4] states that so entirely untrustworthy and
impracticable has steering by compass in French submarines been found,
that the gyroscope has been requisitioned. He inclines to the belief
that this instrument is the best indicator of route that has yet been
devised, yet he points out the want of some reliable method by which the
distance made by a submerged boat could be gauged with accuracy.

Footnote 4:

“La Navigation Sous-Marin.”

MOTIVE POWER.

The question of the best method of propulsion for submarine boats must
be considered under two heads, namely, propulsion on the surface and
below the water.

It will be quite evident that the conditions under which a motor in a
submarine works differ according as the boat is running above or beneath
the surface; and we arrive at the conclusion that if the same motor is
to serve for both conditions special arrangements will have to be made
to permit it to work under abnormal conditions. Should this be found
impracticable a new method of propulsion will have to be found for
under-water travelling.

Every heat engine consumes both air and fuel (whether coal, oil, gas,
&c.), and the process of absorption of the fuel is accompanied by the
giving out of a certain weight of the substance in the form of gas.
Whilst the boat is proceeding beneath the water its weight is
continually being modified, and it is practically impossible to
compensate for this change by the addition of water to the reservoirs.
Besides this difficulty the combustion of the fuel not only absorbs a
large quantity of the air which is so precious a quantity in a submerged
vessel, but also sets free deleterious gases which naturally have
prejudicial effects on the health of the crew. It may therefore be
asserted that a submarine can only be propelled under water by means of
a motor capable of working without combustion or loss of weight. It
remains therefore to discover the most suitable method fulfilling these
conditions.

1. _By Mechanical Means such as Clockwork, Springs, &c._—The Howell
torpedo is driven by means of a heavy flywheel in the interior which is
spun up to 10,000 revolutions a minute before discharging by means of
special machinery. While all these methods are practicable they must be
put aside as unsuitable owing to the slowness of the speed which a boat
thus propelled can attain.

2. _Compressed Air._—In order that a submarine may be driven at a high
rate of speed for a considerable distance, such a large store of
compressed air would have to be carried if this method were adopted,
that little space would be left in the vessel for any other purposes. In
addition to this such a store of compressed air would be a source of
danger.

3. _Manual Power._—The earliest submarines were of course driven by hand
power, but no one nowadays would think of adopting this method.

4. _Steam from Heated Water._—Mr. Nordenfelt propelled his boats beneath
the surface by means of the steam given off by the heated water in the
cisterns, and this was found sufficient for a distance run of 14 knots.
He disliked accumulators, and this is not to be wondered at, for in his
time they were very far from perfect; were he designing a submarine
to-day, however, it is probable that he would choose electricity for
sub-surface working.

5. _Chemical Engines._—Dr. Payerne, d’Allest, and others, by means of a
_chaudière pyrotechnique_, burnt, in hermetically closed furnaces,
combustibles containing in themselves the oxygen necessary for their
combustion, and got rid of the products of combustion by ingenious
devices.

6. _Electricity._—All modern submarines rely on an electric motor for
under-water propulsion, the current being derived from accumulators. The
ideal primary battery and the ideal accumulator are still to seek, but
the latter improves yearly, and there is little doubt that some few
years hence the current available will enable the submarine to make long
voyages under water with greatly increased speed. It is said that the
_Holland_ has on no fewer than four occasions burned up the armature of
her motor, and some device seems to be wanted to keep the armature cool.

7. _Carbonic Acid._—Many attempts have been made to construct an engine
which can be worked by liquid carbonic acid, but the general result, as
some one has said, has hitherto been that the inventors have been more
or less broken up in body and mind.

8. _Liquid Air_ has been suggested as a propelling agent for submarines,
but up till now it has not been applied for such a purpose. A motor-car
propelled by liquid atmospheric air was shown at the Agricultural Hall
in April last, and some energetic Americans are endeavouring to “boom”
this elusive substance in this country. More sober investigators have,
however, little faith in an immediate commercial future for liquid air.

[Illustration:

INSIDE THE “GOUBET.”
]

PROPULSION OF THE SURFACE.

While the “Holland” boats for the British and United States navies are
driven on the surface by a gasoline engine, this type of motor has not
yet been used on the French boats, a steam engine fed with liquid fuel
being employed in the _Narval_ and vessels of this class, while in the
_Gustave Zédé_, _Morse_, &c., electricity is the sole motive power both
above and below the waves. _Le Yacht_ states that France has always
avoided the use of gasoline owing to the danger which arises from its
presence on board submarine craft.

[Illustration:

THE GASOLINE ENGINES OF THE FIRST BRITISH SUBMARINES.
]

(_a_) _The Steam Engine._—In the Nordenfelt boat steam was raised, when
running on the surface, by the burning of coal, but of late the advances
that have been made by the employment of liquid fuel have led to the
employment of this combustible for submarine boat propulsion in
preference to coal.

The great drawback at present to the use of the steam engine is the
length of time necessary for the unshipping of the chimney, the cooling
of the engines, &c.

(_b_) _The Oil Engine._—At the present time there is no oil motor in
existence of sufficient power to give even moderate speed to a large
boat, but the ingenuity of the engineer will probably overcome this
drawback.

Those who make the dogmatic assertion that the submarine boat cannot be
very fast because she cannot be endowed with much power, remind one of
the wiseacres who were so convinced that steamboats would never replace
sailing-vessels, nor steam locomotives the horse-drawn coach.

“The power required to impel a vessel through the water is augmented by
her submergence. If 5,000 1–h.p. are required to drive a displacement of
120 tons at 28 knots, then rather more power will be required to drive
120 tons wholly submerged at the same speed.”

This statement appeared in the _Engineer_ in the early part of 1901, but
it appears that an exactly opposite opinion is held by many eminent
authorities. For instance, at the discussion which followed the reading
of Mr. Nordenfelt’s paper on Submarine Boats at the Royal United Service
Institution in 1886, Mr. Anderson, C.E., stated that it was well known
through the late Mr. Froude’s investigation that a fish-shaped vessel
under water was in much more favourable circumstances for obtaining high
speed than any vessel on the surface of the water, because it had been
established theoretically that a vessel of easy lines completely
submarine met with no resistance at all except the skin friction of the
water, no resistance, that was to say, such as that which arose from the
bow wave.

Mr. Anderson went on to say that he believed that if Mr. Nordenfelt
would apply a little more ingenuity and perseverance to the perfecting
of his boat, the result would be the attainment of a very high speed
under water, and consequently a most formidable vessel. Mr. Nordenfelt
himself said that it was absolutely proved that the speed below for a
given consumption of fuel for a given boat must be greater than the
speed above, and Mr. J. J. Thornycroft recently explained to an
interviewer that the resistance is less for a completely submerged body
than one travelling on the surface, because no waves are created. “The
water that is displaced in front,” he said, “simply closes in behind and
helps to push the body forward. A boat moving on the surface throws out
waves in front and on either side, and that means an absolute loss of
energy. You will find that for this reason a ‘Whitehead’ torpedo travels
faster under the water than on the surface.”[5]

Footnote 5:

_Daily Graphic_, November 10, 1900.

ARMAMENT.

The armament of the boats designed by Bushnell and Fulton was a case of
explosive; the armament of the _David_ that sank the _Housatonic_ was a
spar-torpedo, but the armament of all modern submarines is the
automobile fish torpedo. Mr. Holland in his earlier designs provided his
boats with guns, but submarine cannon firing heavy shells have since
been discarded.

In the new British submarines one torpedo expulsion tube is fitted at
the extreme forward end of the vessel, opening outward 2 feet below the
light water-line. Five Whitehead torpedoes, each 11 feet 8 inches long,
are carried.

SAFETY AND HABITABILITY.

It may safely be said that no difficulty will be found in getting
sailors to form the crew of a submarine boat in time of war. Great
Britain, the United States, France, and other great naval Powers have
only to call, and hundreds of brave fellows will volunteer, however
great the odds against which they may have to fight. This being the
case, our naval constructors must see to it that every precaution is
taken to make the boats as safe and as habitable as possible.

The accidents to which a submarine is subject are many. The most serious
is passing the safe limit of depth. If she descends beneath this limit
the pressure will increase; her hull will be battered in; she will
diminish in volume; her downward course will be rapidly accentuated, and
there must inevitably follow the crushing in of the boat and the death
of the crew.

[Illustration:

THE ARMAMENT AND THE PERISCOPE OF THE “GOUBET.”
]

For every boat there is a limiting depth, beyond which she must not go.
While it is quite possible to construct a boat strong enough to resist
the pressure at depths of 50 fathoms and over, it will not be necessary
to go deeper than 5 to 6 fathoms, or enough to clear the keel of a big
ship. Still it will be well to give the boat a hull capable of resisting
pressures greater than those she will normally encounter. By means of a
hydrostatic valve or some similar arrangement, the submarine may be kept
from diving to too great depths.

It is said that the “Goubet” boats can withstand the pressure at a depth
of about 5,000 feet, or very nearly a mile beneath the surface; the
“Holland” boats can navigate with safety at 150 feet, a depth quite
sufficient for all practical purposes.

The French submersible _Silure_ was recently sunk to a depth of 134½
feet, and it was found that the hull was compressed to the extent of
1–25th of an inch. No inconvenience was felt by the crew greater than
that experienced at a depth of 20 feet.

Submarines possessing floatability have the power of rising to the
surface should any accident happen to the motive power, steering gear,
machinery, &c., and automatic arrangements are provided for working the
horizontal rudders in order to keep the boat on an even keel. Some
accident might, however, cause the boat to begin to sink, and the
advisability of the submarine carrying a false bottom or detachable keel
has been pointed out, as this could be dropped in an emergency, causing
the vessel to rise at once to the surface.

The vessel _Le Plongeur_ carried a detachable boat, and Captain Hovgaard
in his design also supplied such a boat. It was made to stand the same
pressure as the submarine itself, and rested on a saddle-shaped packing,
against which it was tightly pressed down by means of a number of clips.
Inside the packing was a circular door in the boat and a corresponding
and smaller one in the ship arranged in such a way that it was possible
to get up into the boat, close the lower lid in the ship, and then the
lid in the boat. This done, all the handles of the clips were turned and
the water would probably enter the space inside the packing, and if not
it might be made to do so through a small pipe leading from the outside
to the space, and provided with a stopcock. The boat would now have a
certain buoyancy, but would hang on in two main clips, placed one at
each end of the detachable boat on mechanical connection with each other
so that they could only be let go both at the same time, thereby
preventing jamming. When these clips were opened the boat would ascend
to the surface; communication with the vessel, if somebody should be
left behind, might be kept up by telephonic connection.

M. Goubet, M. Drzewiecki, and other inventors provided their vessels
with means for being propelled by the crew, working either oars or
pedals, in the event of the machinery failing to act.

Respiration, or breathing, is a part of the life of all organisms,
whether animal or vegetable. Air is taken into the lungs; the oxygen is
absorbed, while the carbonic acid is given back again to the atmosphere.
The respiration of human beings or animals in closed chambers to which
the air is denied access is not possible beyond a certain period. The
oxygen is sooner or later, according to the size of the chamber, used
up, and the air becomes so vitiated with the carbonic acid expelled by
the lungs that the vital functions of the body are arrested.

Many of the earlier submarine boats carried no reserve of air, as the
time that they were intended to remain under water was not long.

Reference is made in old writings to the “chymicall liquor” supposed to
have been used by Cornelius Drebbel to restore the purity of the air in
his under-water vessel, but what its composition was we shall never
know.

The air required for respiration in a submarine vessel may be supplied
in two ways.

1. By some chemical method which purifies and regenerates the vitiated
air.

2. By compressed air or oxygen carried in special reservoirs.

3. By pipes leading down from the surface to the submerged vessel
through which fresh air is drawn and the foul air expelled.

4. By the return of the boat to the surface and the taking in of a fresh
supply of air.

Such substances as caustic soda, lime, bromide of magnesium, &c., are
capable of absorbing carbonic acid, and have been used, but modern
submarine vessels rely on compressed-air compartments. M. Calmette, in
his account of his voyage under water in the _Morse_, says that thanks
to the labours of a commission formed by M. de Lanessan the difficulty
of respiration has been satisfactorily overcome, with the result that
the crew can remain for sixteen hours under water without the slightest
strain. This may refer to the discovery by M. Georges Jaubert of a
chemical substance of comparatively light weight which in one single
operation can not only completely remove from vitiated air the carbonic
acid, water vapour, and other non-respirable products, but can also
automatically restore to it in exchange the exact mathematical quantity
of oxygen which it lacks. In other words the substance when placed in
contact with air vitiated by respiration can completely regenerate it
and restore to it its original qualities. This wonderful substance, the
composition of which has not yet been made public, has been the subject
of some communications by Dr. Laborde to the Paris Academy of Sciences.
In these it is mentioned that experiments were being made under the
auspices of the Minister of Marine, and that these had proved that with
3 to 4 kilos of this new product it was possible for a man to live for
twenty-four hours in an hermetically closed chamber.

VISION WHEN SUBMERGED.

When completely submerged the submarine boat is practically blind, and
it is impossible to steer it by direct vision through the water. However
slow its course the steersman would be unable to stop it before an
obstacle which rose suddenly into the restricted circle of his aquatic
vision, and he is therefore obliged to steer his course by means of
bearings taken before descending.

At one time inventors believed that some light would come down through
the water to help the steersman, but it is now acknowledged that once
below the surface the boat is in impenetrable darkness. Some have
proposed the use of a powerful electric projector which would emit a
beam of light sufficient to light up a path 50 to 60 metres long in
front of the submarine.

Unfortunately such an arrangement is not possible in practice. In the
first place, such a projector would be of great size and weight and
would require a considerable amount of current, but even if it were
installed on a submarine it would be of no use to those on board for the
reason that they would be placed immediately behind it and would be able
to distinguish nothing owing to the great glare. The projector’s light
would also be likely to betray the position of the submarine owing to
the rays finding their way to the surface.

A submarine boat when navigating as an ordinary torpedo-boat on the
surface or in the “awash” condition can be steered from a cupola or
conning tower fitted with windows, which is affixed to the top of the
hull, and which remains above the water when the hull is below.

It was asserted that such a cupola would not only be of no use beneath
the waves, but would also be a disturbing element in the equilibrium of
the boat, reducing its speed. For this reason the _Gymnote_ and the
_Gustave Zédé_ were provided with telescopic domes capable of being
pushed up or down at will. The arrangement was very complicated, and did
not give good results, so it was abandoned, and all modern submarines
carry a fixed dome on their deck platform.

When the submarine is submerged to a depth not greater than 10 to 12
feet such aids to vision as the optical tube and the periscope may be
employed, but when the depth exceeds this limit the helmsman must rely
on his compass, coming from time to time to the surface to verify, and,
if necessary, rectify his route.

The periscope (from the Greek περι, around, and σκοπειν, look) is
applied to an instrument by which objects in a horizontal view may be
seen through a vertical tube. It may be said to consist of a vertical
tube with a lenticular total-reflection prism at the top by which
horizontal rays are projected downward through the tube and brought to a
focus, after which they are received by a lens, the principal focus of
which coincides with that point. The vertical cylindrical beam thus
formed is converted into a horizontal one again by a mirror inclined at
45° from the vertical axis of the tube, and is thus conveyed to an
eyepiece through which, by turning the tube on its vertical axis with
its attached prism, a view of all the supernatant objects around the
vessel may be obtained. A screen or diaphragm operated by a tangent
screw is used to cut off the view of the vertical plane in which the sun
is. When used on a submarine boat the top of the periscope floats on the
surface.

The optical tube with which the _Gustave Zédé_ was at first provided
before she carried a periscope consisted of a lens and a prism on the
top of a tube, and the image of the surface was thrown on to a surface
of paper. By the aid of the picture on the sheet of white paper the
steersman could, under certain circumstances, tell approximately where
he was going.

A writer in a recent number of the _Debats_ has something to say about
vision below water.

“We certainly possess these vessels capable of navigating under
water, which is no small advantage, but in order that they may be
able to fight under these conditions and become really effective
fighting machines the question of vision will have to be perfectly
solved. The _Moniteur de la Marine_ affirms that the periscope, the
apparatus intended to secure this power of vision, perfectly fulfils
its object. It gives, six metres under water, a good enough view of
what is going on upon the surface to enable a boat to steer towards
the enemy’s vessel without the necessity of rising to the surface to
make observations which quick-firing guns would render dangerous. No
less an assertion than this is necessary to shake certain doubts on
this point which will be shared by all who have been in a position
to observe the troubles caused to the vision by the water and vapour
on ground glasses. Only those who have used this instrument have the
right to say with Polycente, ‘Je vois, je sais, je crois, je suis
illuminé.’

“We who have not seen cannot go so far as this. It is also necessary
that the images given by the periscope should be susceptible of
rapid measurement, sufficiently accurate for the officer in command
to be able to know if he is near enough for his torpedo to prove
effective.

“In a word, the _Sous-Marin_ and the _Submersible_ are at present
marvels of applied mechanics. They will be fighting machines only
when the problems of vision and accurate measurement of distances
are fully solved. If this result is reached we shall not long be
kept in the dark, for with modern parliamentary methods all over the
world we shall witness the simultaneous appearance in all naval
budgets of demands for considerable sums in order to construct these
vessels.”

A device for submarine vision, termed the cleptoscope, and invented by
Messrs. Russo and Laurenti, is reported to be used on the Italian
submarine _Delfino_. In its original form the instrument, according to
the _Lega Navale_, gave an exact view in a closed chamber of all that
was to be seen round about a submarine to any one applying his eye to a
small eyepiece. In its later form it gives the same image much enlarged,
and visible to both eyes at once at some distance from the chamber.

As an illustration of the disadvantages arising from the fact that the
submarine is blind, the following story may be told, the accuracy of
which cannot however be vouched for.

An Italian submarine went out on one occasion for practice. All at once
the crew found that they could neither go ahead nor astern, nor could
they rise to the surface. They pumped out the spare water that was
provided to give additional buoyancy, but with no effect. The heavy lead
keel provided for an emergency was at last detached; still the boat
refused to rise, and the crew gave themselves up for lost.

The Port-guardship was riding in the anchorage, and fortunately her
captain heard a scraping and knocking which could not be accounted for
at the bottom of his ship. It occurred to him at last to signal to the
station on shore asking if the submarine boat was out for practice, and
on being told it was, he shifted his anchorage, whereupon the submarine
boat came to the surface with a rush like a cork, and the crew were
rescued in a very exhausted condition.

The optical instrument used on the new British submarines is termed the
“Hyphydroscope,” and is the invention of Sir Howard Grubb, F.R.S.

CHAPTER V
THE ROMANCE OF UNDER-WATER WARFARE

“The Torpedo has brought into the Navy a fresh zest, a new romance,
and possibilities more daring than were ever existent before its
adoption.”

“ . . . . . . . .
For this cause I will make of your warfare a terrible thing,
A thing impossible, vain;
For a man shall set his hand to a handle and wither
Invisible armies and fleets,
And a lonely man with a breath shall exterminate armies,
With a whisper annihilate fleets;
And the captain shall sit in his chamber and level a city,
That far-off capital city.
Then the Tzar that dreameth in snow and broodeth in winter,
That foilèd dreamer in frost,
And the Teuton Emperor then, and the Gaul and the Briton
Shall cease from impossible war,
Discarding their glittering legions, armadas of iron
As children toys that are old.
As a man hath been brought, I will bring into judgment a nation;
Nor shall numbers be pleaded for sin.
And that people to whom I gave in commission the ocean,
To use my waters for fight,
Let them look to the inward things, to the searching of spirit,
And cease from boasting and noise.
Then nation shall cleave unto nation, and Babel shall fall:
They shall speak in a common tongue
And the soul of the Gaul shall leap to the soul of the Briton
Through all disguises and shows;
And soul shall speak unto soul—I weary of tongues,
I weary of babble and strife.
Lo! I am the bonder and knitter together of spirits,
I dispense with nations and shores.”

STEPHEN PHILLIPS.

“A blending of the heroic, the marvellous, the mysterious, and the
imaginative in actions, manners, ideas, language or literature; tendency
of mind to dwell upon or give expression to the heroic, the marvellous,
the mysterious or the imaginative.”

Such is one of the definitions given in the “Century Dictionary” for the
word “romance,” and as in the following pages there will be much of “the
heroic, the marvellous and the mysterious,” there is every justification
for using the term in connection with under-water warfare.

Some months since the writer was standing on the pier at Kyle of Loch
Alsh, a tiny village in South-west Rosshire, waiting for the boat going
south to Oban.

The sky was leaden, and ever and again a squall swept over from Skye and
blotted out the landscape for a time. Presently a little shiver of
excitement ran through the group of tourists, fisher folk, and idlers
gathered at the pier head. All eyes were directed up Loch Alsh, and for
a few minutes it was difficult to discover what it was that was
attracting so much attention.

Gradually there came into sight the first of a little flotilla of
torpedo boats, making their way, in single column, line ahead, to the
open sea. Each was painted black from bow to stern, each bore a number
in place of a name, and each crept along like a snake, surprised at
finding itself observed, and anxious to escape from the haunts of men.
One by one they passed by, gathering speed as they went, and in a little
while the last had disappeared into the mist and the rain and nothing
remained to show that they had passed save a few white patches of foam
scattered over the sullen waters.

What were the thoughts uppermost in the minds of those who watched these
tiny engines of destruction? Were they not of the next occasion on which
Great Britain shall require her navy to assume the offensive and “to
take arms” against the foe that dares to threaten her proud supremacy?

Were they not of the fate of the crews of these vessels in the next
great battle on the seas, and of the part they will be destined to play
when the “Real Thing” comes?

The torpedo boats and the destroyers of His Majesty’s Navy are manned by
brave and fearless officers and men, who take a keen interest in their
work and who mean to show of what their ships are capable if ever they
get the chance, while the torpedo lieutenant on a battleship, in spite
of the good-humoured sneers of his brother in arms, the gunnery
lieutenant, is not a whit less determined to inflict some injury with
the weapon which is his especial care. The commander of a destroyer when
he lies down at night in his “duffle suit” and endeavours to take his
well-earned repose dreams of a naval action in which he plays a
prominent part. It is a night attack, and the destroyers have orders to
seek the enemy and torpedo him. As silently, and withal as speedily as
possible, the mosquito fleet starts on its deadly mission. The pace is
tremendous and our commander, his nerves braced, his heart beating, and
his mouth set, peers forth from the conning tower into the darkness. His
funnels are flaming slightly but he dare not slacken speed, and all he
can do is to pray Heaven that they do not betray him. Suddenly the
foremost ship begins to signal. The quarry is discovered! Onward rush
the destroyers, and out to meet them come the destroyers of the enemy.
The twelve-pounders and the six-pounders are brought into play, and the
fight between the opposing forces waxes fierce. So far our commander and
his craft have escaped injury and the boat tears along, dodging its foes
like a three-quarter in Rugby football. He has set his heart on
torpedoing a mighty ironclad steaming ahead with her consorts at some
sixteen knots speed, and he means to get past the hostile destroyers or
die in the attempt. Shells are bursting all around and his armoured
conning tower has been hit, but so far luck has favoured him. Will the
gods be kind and allow him to accomplish his desire? He is now within
torpedo range, and the moment has arrived for the firing of the first
torpedo. Out of its tube rushes the Whitehead, plunges beneath the waves
and is seen no more. A few anxious seconds and then the commander knows
that it has missed its prey. Another must be fired, but the ironclad is
unpleasantly near, and her quick-firing guns are already discharging on
him a heavy and continuous fire.

The second torpedo is fired, and the destroyer waits not another second
but makes away at topmost speed. But “her mission is through.” The sound
of a mighty explosion is heard and the commander knows that he has
accounted for one of the battleships of the enemy.

The lieutenant of to-day thanks his stars for the opportunities that the
torpedo has afforded him of assuming the command of a torpedo-boat or a
destroyer at an early age, or of acting as torpedo lieutenant on a big
ship. There is no fear of his rusting or of his finding his life
uneventful while such posts as these are open to him, and there is also
the chance of his acquiring great fame when the day of battle comes.

“... They are young,” says Mr. Rudyard Kipling, “on the destroyers,—the
chattering black decks are no place for the middle aged—they have
learned how to handle 200 feet of shod death that cover a mile in two
minutes, turn in their own length, and leap to racing speed almost
before a man knows he has signalled the engine room. In these craft they
risk the extreme perils of the sea and make experiments of a kind that
would not read well in print. It would take much to astonish them when,
at the completion of their command, they are shifted say to a racing
cruiser. They have been within spitting distance of collision and
bumping distance of the bottom; they have tested their craft in
long-drawn channel jobs, not grudgingly or of necessity because they
could not find harbour, but because they ‘wanted to know, don’t you
know,’ and in the embroilment have been very literally thrown together
with their men. This makes for hardiness, coolness of head, and, above
all, resource.”

There is yet another dream that is dreamed by the younger of our young
naval lieutenants, and this relates to an engagement in which the diving
torpedo-boat plays a part.

Great Britain is at war with a rival Power; hostilities have barely
commenced, and one of the enemy’s swiftest cruisers has been sent to
gather information as to the probable movements of the British squadron.
Her captain is noted for his daring and resource, and he has succeeded
in obtaining news of a valuable character respecting the condition of
our ships and their immediate destination. Accompanied by two
first-class torpedo-boats, he has come, has seen, and is now making off
to join his fleet and to relate his news to the Admiral. It is of the
utmost importance that his message should not be delivered; the British
fleet is not quite ready to strike, and it does not wish the enemy to
know this. Onward steams the cruiser, the fastest vessel of her class in
the world. It is broad daylight, and she can be seen by our own cruisers
who, unhappily, are half a knot slower than she is. British destroyers
have attempted to torpedo her as she steams quickly by, but her
quick-firing guns and her attendant torpedo craft have so far foiled
their purpose and the daylight is against them.

There is only one chance—the submarine flotilla.

It is lying off a port which the cruiser must soon pass on her way down
channel, and a wireless message which the cruiser is powerless to
intercept has been sent to the commander of the “mother ship,” a torpedo
gunboat, to send out his tiny fleet and endeavour to torpedo the
cruiser. The “catcher” has no chance herself against the enemy’s swift
torpedo-boats, so she keeps in the background ready to render assistance
to her “ducklings” should they happen to require it.

The cruiser and her attendants is sighted, and the order to dive is at
once given. In a few moments there is nothing to be seen of the five
boats, and the look-out on the cruiser is in blissful ignorance of his
hidden foes. Suddenly Submarine No. 1 comes to the surface to take
bearings. She is observed by the look-out, the quick-firers are
immediately trained on her, and the torpedo-boats, with booms slung out,
rush to the attack. But she has disappeared before they can reach her,
and no one has any idea which direction she has taken. The excitement is
intense. The hearts of the cruiser’s captain and crew beat fast, and
eager eyes scan the face of the waters for any sign of the submarines,
but there is nothing to be seen. All at once a lieutenant on the cruiser
gazing down into the water shouts to his captain. He has seen a
submarine missile, but it is too late! The torpedo strikes, an explosion
ensues, and the cruiser’s fate is sealed. Her satellites dart hither and
thither like policemen in chase of a burglar, but their prey has eluded
them and is now making off to fort. The commander of the submarine
flotilla has done his work well. After coming momentarily to the surface
he dived below and by wireless telegraphy communicated to the other
vessels the position of the cruiser, her speed and her direction:
calculations were made, and at a given signal all five discharged their
torpedoes. Four missed, but one was more fortunate and was enough to
encompass the destruction of the enemy. After the explosion the
commander threw his tiny periscope on the surface and as a glance
assured him that the cruiser would float no more, he made off with his
boats to the shelter of port.

The two destroyers did not escape; hunting for the submarines they
forgot to consider the possibility of an attack on themselves, and it
was only when they saw four British destroyers at no great distance that
they sought refuge in flight. But they had delayed too long. The four
point sevens had something to say to them, their own three-pounders were
quickly silenced, and they were soon drifting about channel, hopeless
wrecks.

[Illustration:

THE “GOUBET” OUT OF WATER.
]

[Illustration:

INTERIOR OF A BRITISH SUBMARINE.
]

CHAPTER VI
THE MORAL INFLUENCE OF UNDER-WATER WARFARE

“I think that the enthusiasm with which in some countries, the
studies and the building of submarine boats have been accompanied is
in great part due to the feeling implanted in human nature, by which
danger appears the greater in proportion as it is more mysteriously
and insidiously able to threaten the existence of its adversaries”
(Rear-Admiral BETTOLO, in “All the World’s Fighting Ships,” 1901).

It was once said that the principal value of all methods of submarine
warfare was analogous to that of the notice board which tells the
would-be burglar to “Beware of the dog.”

In the face of a warning such as this the burglar is forced to take a
rapid survey of the situation. In the first place, he cannot tell
whether there really is any dog on the premises at all, and secondly he
has no means of discovering whether the animal, if there be one, is old,
blind, or decrepit and thus worthy of being disregarded. Which is his
best plan? to take his chance and trust to luck or leave the place
severely alone and look out for some other establishment where no such
notice meets his eye?

Some burglars might take one course and some another, according to their
individual temperament, but at any rate the warning serves this purpose,
that it causes the would-be house-breaker to pause before he commits his
crime, even if it does not act as a complete deterrent.

What the notice board is to the burglar, the mine, the torpedo, or the
submarine boat is to the naval officer, and in laying his plans he must
take into consideration the possibility of being blown up by one or
other of these methods of under-water attack. “The King’s Navee” has no
lack of brave men ready to risk their lives at a moment’s notice, and a
British officer if told to accomplish any task would as soon think of
replying that there were mines, torpedo-boats, and submarines in the
path of his advance as he would of going into action in a frock coat and
a silk hat.

He will undertake his task cheerfully and instantly, and he knows he can
rely on the support of his crew, but at the same time it is impossible
both for captain and crew to disregard absolutely the unseen dangers
that may lie in their way.

Though this will not prevent a British warship from going wherever it is
bid, yet the knowledge that they may at any moment be sent to the bottom
by the explosion of a submarine mine or by the blow of a Whitehead
torpedo, must of necessity make them nervous and will very likely have a
bad influence on their powers of shooting straight. “The presence of
mines,” says a naval writer, “has a moral effect upon crews which does
not altogether improve their shooting.”

So great has been the recent improvement in the _matériel_ of
under-water warfare that we have no chance of gauging accurately its
potential effect from a moral point of view. The mines, torpedoes, and
submarines hitherto employed in naval engagements are excessively crude
when compared with their modern equivalents, and the countries which
have used them have not been those most skilled in the practice of such
weapons. There is, however, sufficient evidence both from naval wars and
also from mimic battles to show that the mine, the torpedo and the
submarine will exercise a considerable moral influence when the next
great fight on the seas takes place.

There have been those who have declared that those who handle such
weapons will be far more subject to moral and indeed physical effect
than those against whom they are directed, and though this may be true
of certain navies it is certainly not true of the British.

It would be possible to quote many instances, both of cases in which
submarine defences have prevented the carrying out of certain operations
and also of other cases where they have been disregarded. Just as there
have been audacious burglaries in spite of “Beware of the dog” notices,
so there have been daring attacks in spite of known submarine defences.
There is always in warfare the possibility that the mine may fail to act
at the critical moment, that the torpedo may not succeed in firing its
mark and that the submarine boat may miss its prey.

The first occasion on which the moral influence of modern under-water
methods of warfare made itself felt was during the American Civil War.

The story of Admiral Farragut’s entrance into Mobile Bay, on August 5,
1864, is a well-known instance of a commander advancing in spite of
known dangers beneath the waves. It has been admirably told in the life
of the Admiral by Captain A. T. Mahan. The channel was known to be sown
with mines and one of his ships, the _Tecumseh_, had been sent to the
bottom already by one of these unseen weapons. The Admiral reasoned
thus: “The chances are that I shall lose some of my vessels by torpedoes
or the guns of the enemy, but with some of my fleet afloat I shall
eventually be successful. I cannot lose all. I will attack regardless of
consequences and never turn back.” As the _Hartford_ passed the
_Brooklyn_ a warning cry came from the latter that there were torpedoes
ahead.

“Damn the torpedoes!” shouted the Admiral in the exaltation of his high
purpose. “Four bells! Captain Drayton, go ahead. Jouett, full speed!”
The _Hartford_ and her consort crossed the line about 500 yards from
Mobile Point, well to the westward of the buoy and of the spot where the
_Tecumseh_ had gone down. As they passed between the buoys the cases of
the torpedoes were heard by many on board knocking against the copper of
the bottom, and many of the primers snapped audibly, but no torpedo
exploded.

The _Hartford_ went safely through, the gates of Mobile Bay were forced,
and as Farragut’s flag cleared the obstructions his last and hardest
battle was virtually won.

Mines had been plentifully sown by the Confederates, and across the deep
water 180 had been placed in a double line. The most effective were
those made of lager beer kegs coated with pitch and fitted with a number
of sensitive primers; the others had tin or iron covers, but they
corroded in the water and quickly became harmless. In addition, there
were three electro-contact mines which were to be exploded from Fort
Morgan. Had the mines been in an efficient state Admiral Farragut and
his fleet would assuredly have gone to the bottom. He took the risk—and
won.

Turning now to the other side of the picture it will be found that
hidden enemies are always the most dreaded, and that the history of
naval operations affords many examples of their moral influence
hindering the carrying out of certain operations.

In the actions off Charleston, in the American Civil War, the mines and
obstructions so influenced Admiral Dupont that he was content to
maintain the blockade instead of risking his ships against them.

One of the clearest cases of the moral influence of submarine mines
occurred during the Franco-Prussian War, when the French fleet were
prevented from entering Prussian harbours simply through fear of
submarine dangers. The naval campaign of 1870 consisted solely of the
watching by a strong French squadron of North German ships which had
taken refuge behind a reputed impassable barrier of subaqueous defences.

“The power of the French steamships,” writes Admiral Cyprian Bridge, “to
stand in within practicable range of their heavy guns, and do enormous
mischief to the rising naval establishment of the Bund as it then was,
was completely set at nought by the subaqueous defensive system which
the weaker force had devised to redress the inequality between it and
its rival. We shall do well to mark the results; the stronger navy did
and could do practically nothing; the smaller one preserved itself from
injuries, and at the close of the war still existed intact, as a nucleus
for that splendid force, which is now (October, 1878) third amongst the
navies of the world.”

During the Franco-German war the French fleet was kept off a fort by a
harbour protected by dummy mines. The story goes, that when the mines
arrived, the burgomaster was afraid to charge them, and laid them out
empty. At the completion of the war, when the dummies were taken up, the
burgomaster was congratulated by several consuls on the masterly way in
which he had performed his perilous task, no loss of life having been
caused.

There are so many instances of mines failing to explode or if exploding,
doing no damage, that naval officers may well declare that the submarine
mine is nothing but a “military bugbear.” In 1863, during the American
Civil War, the _New Ironsides_ halted off Fort Sumner, and just over a
submarine mine containing 2,000 lbs. of powder, which failed to explode
when fired from the battery, as one of the wires had been accidentally
severed by a waggon passing over it.

Instances of the moral influences of the torpedo are afforded by the two
most recent naval wars, the Chino-Japanese and the Spanish-American, and
by the manœuvres of the fleets of Great Britain, France, Germany, and
Russia.

Although the Chinese officers were quite unable to use the torpedo with
any effect, and evidently regarded the weapon as of more potential
danger to themselves than to the enemy, the Japanese commanders on more
than one occasion decided against certain movements, owing to a fear of
the Chinese torpedo flotilla.

During the Spanish-American war, the Americans suffered severely from
“torpedoites,” and were continually fancying they saw Spanish
torpedo-boats, and firing on them, when in reality there were none
present.

As an American officer remarked, “whatever the actual shortcomings of a
torpedo-boat flotilla, it must always act at least as an admirable
anti-soporific.” As to the Spaniards they appeared to dread the mines
they had themselves laid more than did the Americans.

One of the most amusing cases of the moral influences of torpedo warfare
was related by Vice-Admiral Sir Nowell Salmon at the Royal United
Service Institution in 1892.

Sir Nowell was discussing the question of the value of the electric
searchlight on battleships in warding off torpedo attack. He was
inclined to think that he would rather not have it at all, for on any
occasion that he had seen, whether it had been at a fixed station on
shore or whether it had been a fixed station on board, making a
quadrangle within which ships might lie, the torpedo station had always
been the point of attack, and had always suffered. In one case in which
he put a squadron inside four ships to make a path of light round them,
the ships showing the light were of course at once the point of attack,
and were all attacked and sunk; one commander indeed said that he was
sunk no less than seven times.

“I can remember a little incident in which I took part. It shows how
very curiously the electric light may act in some cases. The squadron
inside the rectangle of light was in total darkness, and my boat in
which I was inspecting the preparations happened to get within the beam
of one of the ships showing the light. Just as this happened, I saw a
boat inshore of me. I thought she was one of the attacking boats
steaming up inshore. Of course I set to work to cut her off, as I was
commanding the defending squadron. I steamed as hard as ever I could. I
got my muskets ready and so on. Still she went past me, going inshore as
I thought, and it was not until I recognised my own shadow shaking its
fist at the engineer for not clapping on more steam, that I found I was
chasing the shadow of my own boat thrown on the cliff. In a very few
seconds I should have been hard and fast ashore.”

“The real strength of the destroyer,” wrote a special correspondent with
the British fleet during the 1901 manœuvres, “consists not so much in
what she can do against large ships, certainly not in what she ever has
done so far, but in the fear entertained by her adversaries of the harm
she is held to be capable of doing. Her menace is tremendous, and really
paralysing to some minds.” This probably applies quite as much to
submarines as to destroyers.

CHAPTER VII
THE SUBMARINE IN ACTION

Once, and only once, has a submarine boat succeeded in inflicting any
damage on an enemy in actual warfare. This was during the American Civil
War when one of the Confederate _Davids_ succeeded in blowing up the
Federal frigate _Housatonic_, and in annihilating itself at the same
time.

Before this event under-water vessels had attempted to destroy hostile
craft, but with no success.

In 1776 Bushnell’s diving torpedo-boat made an attack on the English
frigate _Eagle_, and in 1777 on the English man-of-war _Cerberus_ and
other vessels. Although it failed to inflict any injury on a single
vessel, three of the crew of a prize schooner astern of the _Cerberus_,
hauling one of Bushnell’s drifting torpedoes on board, were killed by
the explosion.

In 1801 Fulton attempted to destroy one of the English Channel Fleet off
Boulogne by means of his drifting torpedoes, but owing to the ship
altering her position at the moment of setting the torpedo adrift, the
attack failed. In 1804–5, Fulton, who had now joined the British forces,
attacked some of the French ships, but the torpedoes exploded
harmlessly. From the death of Fulton to the commencement of the American
Civil War, numerous inventive minds built or projected submarine craft
of all shapes and sizes, but none of these ever participated in an
actual engagement.

The exploits of the diving torpedo-boats known by the generic name of
_David_, during the contest between the Federals and the Confederates,
have been fully described in Chapter XII., and there is therefore no
need to dwell further on this period in the history of under-water
warfare. Since then no submarine boat has ever been taken into battle,
although during the Spanish-American war Spain might have used the
_Peral_, and the United States the _Holland_. In mimic warfare
submarines have played their part, and although no very definite
conclusions respecting their possible value in time of war can be drawn
from their performances in peace manœuvres, still it may not be
unprofitable briefly to note the various occasions on which some of the
new submarine torpedo-boats have been used.

The first of these occasions was in September, 1900, during the
manœuvres of the U.S. North Atlantic Squadron off Newport, Rhode Island,
when the _Holland_ made an attack upon the fleet by herself, without
convoy, at a distance of seven miles out from the mouth of the harbour,
and, with her own crew alone in her, torpedoed the flagship of the
squadron, the _Kearsarge_, commanded by Capt. Wm. M. Folger. Lieut.
Caldwell, who commanded the _Holland_ on this occasion, wrote regarding
the incident:—

“The _Holland_ was not seen by any vessel of the blockading fleet or
torpedo-boat, although she was within torpedo range of three of the
former and several of the latter. I consider the attack was a success
because the _Holland_ could in all probability have torpedoed three
blockading vessels without being discovered.”

It must be added that Admiral O’Neil, who has but a poor opinion of the
value of submarines in war, has written as follows: “.... On September
25, 1900, during some manœuvres of the North Atlantic Fleet off Newport,
Rhode Island, the _Holland_, on a very fine evening and under
exceptionally favourable circumstances, steamed seven miles as a surface
boat only outside Newport harbour, and like the torpedo-boat _Porter_,
claims to have put the battleship _Kearsarge_ out of action, which was
not allowed by the umpire, as it was decided that the _Kearsarge_ had
already been put out of action by the torpedo-boat _Dahlgren_.”

Since this exploit of the _Holland_, no American submarine has taken
part in manœuvres with the fleet.

FRENCH SUBMARINES.

From 1898 onwards French under-water vessels have often engaged in mimic
warfare, and many of the French papers have published glowing accounts
of their wonderful performances, but one has to accept such statements
with caution. In the following story of their doings care has been taken
so far as possible to represent what really took place.

[Illustration:

THE SUBMARINE IN ACTION.
]

The torpedoing of the _Magenta_ in December, 1898, by the _Gustave Zédé_
is a famous chapter in the history of French submarines, and one of
which all Frenchmen are naturally proud.

M. Lockroy in his book “La Défense Navale” has recorded the incident.

The manœuvre commenced at 3.17 in the afternoon, and the torpedo was
fired at 3.28. The _Gustave Zédé_ plunged at 3.20 for the first time;
she emerged five times, and the longest appearance was 1 min. 30 secs.,
the shortest 30 secs.

The three cruisers, _Magenta_, _Neptune_, and _Marceau_, knew the exact
moment when the attack would take place, and also the exact position of
the _Gustave Zédé_, yet though they trained their quick-firing guns upon
the submarine, the judges decided that she would not have been hit.

M. Lockroy says that if the boat had carried her optical arrangements
she would not have needed to come to the surface.

“The eyes of all on board were fixed on the sea; officers and men
stood watching the crest of the waves, and every minute there were
exclamations, or some one fancied he had seen the submarine. We
imagined we saw it everywhere, and it was nowhere.

“In point of fact it was proceeding quietly and invisibly towards
its mark.

“Suddenly a precise and exact observation was made. The cupola of
the _Gustave Zédé_ had just appeared 400 yards away, still abreast
of us, notwithstanding the distance which we had covered.

“Immediately orders were issued. The guns were brought to bear upon
her, and the quick-firers depressed in her direction. The submarine
was no longer there. She was hidden from our fire and from our view.
A minute elapsed. Though orders were given to the engineers to put
on steam, and the _Magenta_ had gone some considerable distance in
the sixty seconds, the Admiral and I, leaning over the railing of
the bridge, saw approaching us with lightning speed an elongated
body shining like gold.

“It was the torpedo of the _Gustave Zédé_! It struck the ship about
four yards below the water-line, and was smashed on the iron armour,
but if it had been charged the _Magenta_ would have been sunk.”

The _Majenta_ was twice successfully torpedoed, once while at anchor and
once whilst steaming at ten knots, and the _Gustave Zédé_ showed that it
was quite possible for a submarine to discharge torpedoes below the
water without having its equilibrium disturbed.

To accomplish the second of these feats the vessel came five times to
the surface to take bearings, but on no occasion was her conning tower
in view for more than 1½ minutes. The last time just before discharging
her torpedo the conning tower was only seen for 30 seconds. The torpedo
struck the battleship on the port side just forward of the bow barbette.

After her trial the submarine proceeded unaided from Toulon to
Marseilles, a distance of 41 miles in a rough sea at 6 knots, thus
showing her sea-going qualities.

When Englishmen took up their morning papers on July 5, 1901, there met
the gaze such headings as “Submarine’s great feat;” “How the _Gustave
Zédé_ torpedoed a big battleship;” “New Naval Warfare;” “French Navy the
most powerful in the world.”

The Paris correspondent of the _Daily Express_ sent the following
telegram to his journal:—

“The feat performed in Ajaccio Harbour by the submarine _Gustave
Zédé_ in hitting the great battleship _Jauréguiberry_ with a dummy
torpedo without her approach being even suspected, has produced a
deep impression in naval circles. That the act was a brilliant piece
of seamanship and gunnery tactics now admits of no question, though
full details are not yet forthcoming. The facts, according to the
concurring testimony of the Paris journals, are shortly these: The
Mediterranean division of Admiral Gervais’ great fleet, which is
under Admiral de Maigret, and has its headquarters at Algiers, had
put into Ajaccio to provision, and yesterday morning steamed from
the harbour in three lines, the torpedo-boat flotilla leading, then
the cruisers, and the two battleships _Charles Martel_ and the
_Jauréguiberry_ in rear. All the other ships had got well under way,
and the _Jauréguiberry_ had just moved from her moorings, when she
was struck by a dummy torpedo by an invisible enemy. Instantly the
quick-firing machine guns were set to sweep the sea, and signals
sent the torpedo flotilla scouring in all directions to search for
the mysterious foe. The chase being quite fruitless, the division
finally steamed away, and then, the coast being clear, there popped
up to the surface, like a dark spectre from the nether world, the
submarine _Gustave Zédé_. Vice-Admiral Menard, who commands the
Northern Squadron, with headquarters at Toulon, hearing that his
adversary was provisioning at Ajaccio, had despatched the submarine
from Toulon on Tuesday night on the mission which was to put the
efficacy of submarines in practical warfare to a supreme test. The
sequel shows that she had accomplished her voyage, taken her
observations, gone under water, and after allowing the whole
division to pass, had struck with unerring aim, and with complete
success, at the most formidable vessel in it. This perfect mastery
of the position shown by the submarine constitutes the most striking
part of the achievement, which can only be minimised by assuming on
the part of the Mediterranean squadron a degree of carelessness
difficult to understand, considering that the order had been given
to act in all things as in real war. After every deduction has been
made, however, there is no disputing the fact that the submarine has
proved its tremendous possibilities in warfare. In consequence of
this success of the _Gustave Zédé_ the French are suffering from a
bad attack of naval fever. Some would call it ‘tête montée.’ ‘Where
is Britain’s naval supremacy now?’ is a question which was often
asked to-day. ‘C’est magnifique!’ say the papers, describing
France’s submarine fleet. ‘By reason of her submarine division the
navy of France is the most dread and powerful in the world.’”

The enthusiasm of the French was somewhat lessened by the subsequent
accounts of the exploits of the submarine. It appeared that it was the
battleship _Charles Martel_ which received the _Gustave Zédé’s_ torpedo,
and that the latter, after her feat, crossed the bows of the
_Jauréguiberry_ so closely that the last named had to turn in her whole
length to avoid colliding with the submarine, which in war would have
been destroyed. It was also stated that the success of the _Gustave
Zédé_ was considerably minimised by the fact that Ajaccio was an
“inviolate” port and that the enemy had no necessity to keep a sharp
look-out when they knew themselves to be in absolute security, that the
_Gustave Zédé_ belonged to the same side as her “victim,” and that the
manœuvres did not commence officially until Wednesday night, whereas the
incident in question took place on Wednesday morning.

Certain cynical folk declared that the whole business was a
stage-managed affair designed to gratify the popular affection the
French had for the submarine, and to justify the naval department which
had exploited the engine of war. The majority of the French papers,
however, made the most of the _Gustave Zédé’s_ “splendid
accomplishment,” and seemed to imagine that the British Admiralty were
terror-stricken at the notion of what French submarines would be able to
accomplish in war.

The _Patrie_ published an interview a correspondent had at Toulon with
Lieutenant Jobart, who was in command of the _Gustave Zédé_. The officer
stated that the enemy were perfectly well aware of the departure of the
_Gustave Zédé_ from Toulon in tow of the tug _Utile_. As Ajaccio was
neared, Lieutenant Jobart dismissed the _Utile_, and lay on the surface
of the ocean waiting for the appearance of the enemy. He soon saw two
cruisers leave their anchorage, and he sank his vessel until they had
passed out of sight. On coming again to the surface, he saw that the
battleships were still at anchor, so he crept nearer, only sinking when
he saw the big vessels moving, and after he had taken his bearings for
an attack on the _Charles Martel_, and when the battleship passed over
the _Gustave Zédé_, the torpedo was fired which struck the vessel, and
thus warned the Fleet that a submarine was in the harbour. The
lieutenant asserts that none of the look-out men on the warship observed
him, but when the torpedo had been fired he rose to the surface,
whereupon two shots were fired from the Fleet, and he sank at once,
remaining below the surface until the last vessel of the Fleet was out
of the harbour, and the submarine was beyond range. The _Journal_ stated
that Admiral Gervais had indirectly warned the squadron of the
participation of the _Gustave Zédé_ by recommending it to act as if
threatened by an attack of submarines.

The Paris correspondent of the _Times_ wrote as follows:—

“What will be the result of these exercises it is impossible at
present to foresee, but meanwhile an event of singular, and one
might even add, of grave suggestiveness has occurred—of a character,
indeed, which may render these manœuvres historic. I refer to an
exploit of the _Gustave Zédé_, which suddenly turned up in the port
of Ajaccio, unheralded but safe and sound, and so completely in
fighting trim, in spite of the long voyage from Toulon, that she
dared even to torpedo the battleship _Jauréguiberry_ as the latter
was leaving her moorings. The unexpected arrival of the submarine
created consternation. She had passed nearly the whole day at sea
out of sight of land. She left Toulon in company with a tug, and may
for a time have utilised the assistance thus furnished in order to
economise her store of electricity. But she arrived, at all events,
quite alone at Ajaccio with enough electricity at her disposal to
torpedo one of the enemy’s vessels, escaped from the torpedo-boats
which she surprised in her daring exploit, and again disappearing
below the surface, returned without being detected to port. She
entered the bay of Ajaccio completely submerged, sighted by none of
the signal-stations, and was thus able to traverse the entire line
of war vessels in the bay. This feat is regarded as conclusive as to
the practical utility of the French submarine. It sets one
speculating on the revolution which the invention of these submarine
craft may, after all, make in naval warfare, in spite of incredulous
over-Channel critics.”

The _Temps_ somewhat detracts from the glory of the performance by
pointing out that the _Gustave Zédé_ was towed most of the way from
Toulon, but added that there could be no two opinions as to the value of
the subsequent success. The fleet had no suspicion of what had happened
until the _Jauréguiberry_ was struck by the torpedo. Even then it was a
mystery, as the destroyers dashed hither and thither, seeking in vain
for the hidden foe. When they had returned, baffled and perplexed, the
submarine rose to the surface and steamed slowly alongside the great
battleship, whose crew lined the sides and cheered with wild enthusiasm
at the brilliant achievement which had vindicated the glory of the
unconquerable submarine.

With regard to the tug which accompanied the _Gustave Zédé_, it was
stated that she was sent with the submarine as an additional precaution,
in order that she might be assured of help in case of accident, but the
_Gustave Zédé_ could have reached Ajaccio by her own motor-power. She
accomplished the voyage, moreover, in a sea with waves nine to twelve
feet high, but notwithstanding the rough passage, her rolling was
comparatively slight.

Those who had been most insistent in arguing the value of submarine
warships declared that the torpedoing of the _Charles Martel_ proved
that instead of simply serving to defend the coast, a submarine could
put to sea and assail the coasts of an enemy.

After her “brilliant exploit” the _Gustave Zédé_ left Ajaccio at 6
o’clock one evening, and arrived at Toulon at 11 o’clock the following
morning, her speed averaging 8 knots.

A _Petit Journal_ correspondent at Marseilles said:—

“I mentioned this morning that the _Gustave Zédé_ had arrived at 11
o’clock in the old port while still under warfare. I should like to
call attention to the feat accomplished by this little boat. The
_Gustave Zédé_ had not been perceived by any of the coast signal
stations, although the sea was calm, and the pilot steamer the
_Sentinelle_ went out to meet the tug _Utile_ without suspecting
that the submarine was immersed near at hand, navigating under
water. Its presence was shown above water only by the tiny tricolour
flag, the size of a sheet of paper, just above the surface. The
_Gustave Zédé_ entered the port and was moored at the quay among the
other vessels without its presence being detected, save by reason of
the little flag. This shows what service this submarine can render
in time of war, and how natural and patriotic is the interest taken
in it.”

On July 27, 1901, during a sham fight at Toulon, the _Gustave Zédé_ was
reported to have approached the _Bouvet_, on which were MM.
Waldeck-Rousseau and De Lanessan, unseen, and to have fired a torpedo at
the battleship whilst the Ministers and the Admiral were peacefully
eating their dinners.

Commenting on this “feat,” a correspondent of the _Matin_ said:—

“About 5 o’clock in the evening the fleet arrived at the entrance to
the Salins d’Hyères. The _Gustave Zédé_, which was lying under the
shelter of one of the islands which close the Roads, at once got
under way, and from the bridge of the _Bouvet_, M. Waldeck-Rousseau
could see it plunge, and then make its way beneath the surface
straight for the _Bouvet_, without deviating once.

“When about three hundred yards off, the _Gustave Zédé_ launched a
torpedo, which came towards the flagship in an absolutely straight
line, showing that its course had been as admirably directed as it
had been aimed. The _Bouvet_ was struck on the starboard beam, three
yards below the water-line. All those who were on the bridge saw the
torpedo strike the hull, and they even heard the sound caused by the
shock, and felt the slight trepidation usual in such cases, for it
needs very little to cause vibration on board ships constructed
entirely of steel.

“What is curious is that the torpedo, probably on account of its
velocity, immediately after striking the _Bouvet_, glanced forward
and was lost to sight. Thrown out of order by the sudden shock, it
must have sunk to the bottom, for it has never been found.”

M. Waldeck-Rousseau subsequently went on board the _Gustave Zédé_, and
after spending three-quarters of an hour on her he went away “in an
enthusiastic frame of mind.”

M. Camille Pelletan, reporter of the Budget of the Ministry of Marine,
said:—

“That a submarine should plunge beneath the surface of the water,
and that it should then be able to discharge a torpedo, does not
prove very much. There is no vessel of this description, however
indifferent it may be, which does not accomplish as much. The whole
question is to know its navigable sea-going and manœuvring
qualities. If the _Gustave Zédé_, therefore, in or near a harbour,
torpedoed an ironclad, that, I repeat, proves nothing. The
unfortunate thing is that it does not appear to have accomplished
even that on the occasion referred to, for all efforts to find the
torpedo have failed, and it is thus permissible to suppose that it
missed its mark. I do not think that M. Waldeck-Rousseau could have
seen the submarine effect its submersion and make for the _Bouvet_.
The foremost quality of a submarine—its special guarantee of
security—is that of being invisible. The _Gustave Zédé_ will
speedily have to be laid up if she betrays her presence so clumsily,
but I have not much difficulty in reassuring myself. At the most,
the _Gustave Zédé_ could only have been seen when, instead of the
vessel being nine feet below the surface, her optic tube, and
probably even her cupola, were emerging above the water, an
operation which is necessary for the discharge of the torpedo in the
desired direction.”

In July, 1901, the _Morse_ made an attempt to torpedo the coast-defence
ship _Jocyte_. According to one report the _Morse_ was ordered to sail
from Cherbourg to Havre, and go for the gunboat _Coeyte_, which would be
found moored in the Roads. Reaching Havre at night-time, the _Morse_,
while still an hour’s run out, plunged, and continuing her voyage at
eight knots an hour, approached the _Coeyte_ unperceived, and launched
three torpedoes against, her with success. The _Morse_ then came to the
surface, and was recognised by Admiral Fournier, who was on board the
_Coeyte_. A feature of this particular experiment was the long
preliminary voyage made by the submarine. Reuter, however, sent the
following message relating to the same experiment: “The attempt made by
the submarine _Morse_ last night to torpedo the coast-defence ship
_Jocyte_ (_sic_) did not succeed, owing to the state of the sea, but the
manœuvre gave certain results as showing the ability of the submarine to
approach without detection. The swell prevented any torpedo from being
fired.” A Dalziel message is still more emphatic as to the failure. It
states that the gunboat knew long enough ahead of the approach of the
submarine to repel the attack. No torpedo could be discharged because of
the swell.

In December, 1901, the _Narval_ and _Morse_ defended Cherbourg from an
attack by the coast-defence ships _Bouvines_ and _Valmy_, and torpedoed
these vessels, those on board not being aware of the presence of the
submarines until they rose to the surface.

During some manœuvres at Cherbourg in January, 1902, the two guardships
_Bouvines_ and _Tréhouart_, and the torpedo-boat destroyer _Cassini_
were attacked by the five submarines, _Morse_, _Narval_, _Triton_,
_Espadon_ and _Français_.

The _Bouvines_ was hit at 100 yards by a torpedo fired from the _Morse_,
which steered by periscope without showing above the surface; the
_Tréhouart_ was attacked by the _Triton_ and the _Espadon_; the former
came to the surface as a fishing boat got in her way, and she was put
out of action; the latter fired a torpedo, which hit the _Tréhouart_.
The _Cassini_ evaded the _Morse_, but passed within range of the
_Français_, and was torpedoed by her.

Thus of the five submarines one was put out of action, whilst all three
warships were destroyed.

In March, 1902, combined manœuvres of the coast-defence ships _Valmy_
and _Jemmapes_, and the submarines _Algerien_ and _Français_, took
place; the _Algerien_ was able unperceived to torpedo the _Valmy_, while
the _Français_ succeeded in directing a torpedo at the _Jemmapes_. In
May, 1902, the _Gustave Zédé_ in an experimental attack on the
battleship _Jauréguiberry_ off Hyères grounded, but was subsequently
refloated.

CHAPTER VIII
THE ANTIDOTE TO SUBMARINES

Mr. John P. Holland, in an article which he contributed to the _North
American Review_ for December, 1900, wrote as follows:—

“When the first submarine torpedo-boat goes into action she will
bring us face to face with the most puzzling problem ever met in
warfare. She will present the unique spectacle, when used in attack,
of a weapon against which there is no defence. You can pit sword
against sword, rifle against rifle, cannon against cannon, ironclad
against ironclad; you can send torpedo-boat destroyers against
torpedo-boats, and destroyers against destroyers, but you can send
nothing against the submarine boat, not even itself. You cannot
fight submarines with submarines. The fanciful descriptions of the
submarine battle of the future have one fatal defect. You cannot see
under water. Hence you cannot fight under water. Hence you cannot
defend yourself against an attack under water except by running
away. If you cannot run away you are doomed. Wharves, shipping at
anchor, the buildings in seaport towns, cannot run away, therefore
the sending of a submarine against them means their inevitable
destruction. No; as nearly as the human mind can discern now, the
submarine is indeed a ‘sea-devil’ against which no means that we
possess at present can prevail. It is no use for the defence to
mine, for the submarine would countermine, and torpedo nets would be
of no use, for it would blow a hole through them, and any attempt to
discover the position of the boat when below the surface is about as
promising a pursuit as dredging with a butterfly-net for a
half-dollar that had been thrown into New York Bay.”

In the present state of the science of submarine warfare it is certainly
impossible to fight submarines with submarines, and it is recognised
that the best chance of destroying an under-water vessel is when it
comes to the surface to take a momentary glance at the position of its
victim before launching its torpedo.

When a means of distinguishing objects beneath the waves has been
evolved then it will be time enough to discuss the possibility of
constructing a submarine boat destroyer which shall itself go beneath
the surface and seek out the submarine to deal it its deathblow.

Every advance in military and naval science that tends to strengthen the
attack has been met by some invention or device calculated to enable the
defence to withstand it.

In the early days men went into battle wearing heavy armour, but
nowadays, although bullet-proof cuirasses and bullet-proof shields have
been suggested, the foot soldier carries no protection on his person,
but relies instead upon entrenchments and fortifications.

It may be remembered that when the hostilities in South Africa
commenced, certain experts declared that the new lyddite shells would
annihilate the Boers in a very short space of time. The capabilities of
the enemy for defending himself had been underestimated by these
gentlemen, and the terrible slaughter which was predicted at Paardeberg
did not occur owing to the wonderful entrenchments beneath which the
Boers and their families sheltered.

Any system of entrenchment is of course impossible upon the high seas,
and therefore men-of-war have to carry armour plate to protect their
sides from the effects of shell and shot.

But no sooner had metallic armour been applied to the sides of war
vessels than the manufacturers set to work to increase the size and
destructive capacity of the shot, and for years past a duel has been in
progress between the projectile and the plate; each improvement in the
one has led to an improvement in the other, and all the resources of
science have been requisitioned to render the projectile more deadly and
the plate more impervious to its attack and lighter than before.

The advent of the torpedo as an effective weapon of attack brought about
the “torpedo-boat,” which was met first by the “torpedo-catcher,” and
then by the “torpedo-boat destroyer;” while as protection against the
torpedo itself, nets and crinolines have been devised for the purpose of
foiling the objects of the attack. A net-cutter on the bows of the
torpedo has, however, made its appearance, and it is now considered
unlikely that nets will be of much protection to a ship, even when
stationary.

“The practice of “Submarine Mining” has led to “Counter-mining,” and the
adoption of the searchlight on shipboard has caused the invention of a
device whereby the rays of light are reflected away from the attacking
vessel, thus enabling it to advance unobserved.”

The destructive effects of explosive shells have been met by the
shipbuilders by the subdivision of the air space of a warship into
watertight compartments, and the desire of the enemy’s gunners to
inflict injury upon the boilers, the engines, or the propellers, has led
numerous inventors to devise a type of warlike craft that shall be
almost entirely destitute of armour, but constructed on such a
principle-both as to hull and machinery—that she can be raked fore and
aft and shot through in all directions without becoming either
water-logged or deprived of her motive power.[6]

Footnote 6:

See “Twentieth Century Inventions,” by G. Sutherland, 1901.

So far as we are aware the only nation that has seriously taken up the
question of an antidote to submarines is Great Britain. At present the
submarine boat, owing to its slow speed and narrow radius of action, is
more suited for defence than attack, though as it is year by year
improving it may soon become a valuable attacking weapon. France has
preferred to build torpedo-boats and Great Britain destroyers, and on
January 15, 1901, France had 235 torpedo-boats and 9 destroyers, and
Great Britain had 95 torpedo-boats and 89 destroyers, and in the same
way while France is rapidly constructing a flotilla of submarines, Great
Britain, although building a few submarines, is also devoting attention
to the best method of meeting under-water attack.

The means of attack against submarines at present are:—

1. By quick-firing guns.

2. By firing shells full of high explosive, which bursting in the water
near the boat, will beat it in.

3. By firing explosives at the end of a spar.

When running awash, the submarine presents a very small target; the hull
is 3 to 5 feet below the surface, which would deflect all projectiles
from machine guns, and the armoured conning tower, which is alone
visible, would be a difficult object to hit.

After running awash for some distance the submarine will submerge
herself, but in spite of periscope and optical tube she will most
probably have to come to the surface once or twice to take a short sharp
look round before firing her torpedo. This is the moment when the attack
must be made upon the diving vessel, and the idea is to destroy her
either by firing a shell from a gun, or an outrigger torpedo from a
swiftly moving vessel. In so much as it is difficult to make a shell
burst with certainty at the right instant, the second method is the one
that seems most to commend itself to the authorities.

The Lords of the Admiralty in the course of their visit to Portsmouth in
June, 1901, witnessed the working of a method of destroying submarines
that had been devised by the _Vernon’s_ staff. The trials took place at
a considerable distance from shore, and were confidential, and therefore
no official account of what took place has appeared. Still from various
sources it is possible to piece together a “story,” the moral of which
(according to some writers) seems to be that a satisfactory method of
destroying the enemy’s submarine boats has been found, and that
henceforth the British fleet has nothing to fear from the attacks of
these “marine devils.”

In the present state of the science, they say, a submarine attacking a
ship is bound to come to the surface to take bearings or else to betray
her presence by optic tube or periscope. With the new invention that has
been evolved on the _Vernon_, the sighting of a submarine entails her
almost certain destruction. Sighting is said to be now practically
certain, though it is not to the public benefit that the means which
will be employed should be stated, as the principle has other and varied
uses.

The experiments were made with H.M. torpedo-boat destroyer _Starfish_.
On the starboard side certain plates had been strengthened, and above
there was a crutch upon which worked a spar or outrigger torpedo. A
spar-torpedo is really a movable observation mine. In the present
instance it consisted of a stout pole some 42 feet in length, at the end
of which was an explosive charge of 32 lbs. of wet gun-cotton,
explodable by an electric current by the crew in the boat. Normally this
boom stows inboard and forward, but on going into action it is slung out
well forward and immersed in the water in the proper moment. This
immersion carries the boom end downward and aft, and it is exploded
directly the submarine is past. The idea is that the speed of the
destroyer will carry her past the centre of the explosion before the
full effects reach her. Her strengthened plates add to her safety, and
it is thought that in any case destroyers are too light and “cork-light”
to be seriously affected. As for the submarine below the waves, the men
of the _Vernon_ make out a pitiable case for her. She will experience
the full force of the terrific concussion. Within from 50 feet to 100
feet or more of the centre of explosion, according to the charge
employed, the sides of the submarine _should_ be compressed sufficiently
to cause fatal leaks, while even at a greater distance stability
_should_ be destroyed.

At the Portsmouth experiment the “dummy” submarine consisted of a barrel
sunk some 10 feet below the surface of the water to represent a
submerged boat. This was attacked and destroyed by the torpedo-boat
destroyer _Starfish_ in the following way. When within striking distance
of the barrel, the boom was dropped and the gun-cotton exploded by
electrical contact. The officers who carried out the experiment are
reported to have said that any submarine within an area of 60 feet of
the outrigger boom when the explosion occurred must infallibly have been
annihilated by the bursting of the charge, and that if a submarine came
up to within a 1,000 yards of a boom-fitted destroyer, it would
certainly be done for.

[Illustration:

EXIT SUBMARINE.
]

It was stated that the single experiment carried out at Portsmouth was
not enough to indicate exactly the best position for the boom, and the
first boats to be fitted will probably vary somewhat between having it
in the quarter or right aft. The additional weight of the boom is
slight; in the case of the _Starfish_, the destroyer experimentally
fitted, the weight had been more than compensated for by fitting her
with aluminium, instead of the usual torpedo tubes.

To say that if a submarine rises anywhere near a destroyer armed with a
spar, her destruction is absolutely certain, is, we think, going too
far. To blow up a stationary barrel is not a very difficult task, but it
must not be forgotten that if the destroyer sights the submarine, the
submarine will also sight the destroyer and will endeavour to launch a
torpedo at the destroyer before the latter can explode its weapon.
Besides this the submarine having sighted the destroyer can dive and
make off in a direction which the latter cannot foretell, and there
would seem to be a good chance of her escaping.

Submarines will probably act in conjunction with torpedo-boats and
destroyers, and the object of these vessels will be to ward off the
attacks of hostile torpedo-boats and destroyers.

It has been said that in action the moral effect of the submarine would
probably outweigh its practical effect, and it is now urged that the
moral influence of this new antidote to submarines will be very great.

“The risks of ordinary submarine work,” says a writer, are not so great
as many people imagine; and they can in a great measure be overcome by
practice. But the deadly spar will quite alter this. The men in the
submarine cannot acquire familiarity with this in peace; not till war
will it operate. Then, whenever they are rising, they will know that a
destroyer _may_ be within reach, and that, if so, absolute annihilation
is _certain_, and annihilation in a particularly horrible form.

“Excitement may sustain them; they may figure it out that their chances
of life and death are on a par with those of the soldier in a frontal
attack, but it is at least doubtful. It is difficult to make the
analogy; and, moreover, there is the chill of the water to consider.
Nerves and courage both suffer from cold, and the interior of a
submarine has always the chill of a tomb. Inside it men sit, and may not
move without endangering the craft’s stability. It will need a high
courage thus to sit absolutely without means of knowing whether a
painful annihilation is coming in a few minutes; it will certainly
render it difficult to take careful observations—and careful
observations are a vital necessity. And the Frenchman, of all races of
men, seems least fitted to be calm under such circumstances. It must
further be remembered that if a destroyer is within a thousand yards she
will be easily able to steam up and destroy the boat, for a thousand
yards a minute is now destroyer speed. The boat, on the other hand,
cannot, save under favourable circumstances, see a distance of a
thousand yards, certainly not in a hasty rise and plunge again. She
might just distinguish a big ship, but that is about all. On the verge
of a frightful death it will take a very cool man even to see that.”[7]

Footnote 7:

“Our preparations for attacking submarines with spar torpedoes fitted
to torpedo-boats or destroyers are exciting the ridicule of those
foreign nations which from experience know what submarines are like.
We claim that our specially rigged spar-torpedo can reach a submarine
at a depth of 10 feet below the surface, but why a submarine should
run at 10 instead of 30 or 40 feet does not appear. The truth seems to
be that if the submarine can be reached at all by the spar-torpedo she
could, at least in the vast majority of cases, be reached much more
expeditiously and certainly by means of the gun” (W. LAIRD CLOWES, at
Institution of Naval Architects, 1902).

The French appear to have considered the possibility of some “antidote,”
for the submersible _Narval_ has a double hull, and in the space between
the two, sea water is allowed to circulate freely. Whether this device
will enable the boat to resist the force of an explosion is a question
which can only be satisfactorily decided in actual warfare. Meanwhile
the bomb-proof hull will certainly receive attention.

So far the periscope and the optical tube have not done away with the
necessity for the submarine to come to the surface to correct her course
and take her bearings, but there are those who claim that even if the
necessity were removed, the whereabouts of the submarine would be
revealed by tell-tale foam and bubbles.

Many inventors have lately been devoting their attention to the steering
of torpedoes without the need of connecting wires, and some consider
that wireless torpedoes would be an efficient antidote to submarine
boats. That such weapons can be produced there is little doubt, but that
they will be sufficient to drive submarines from the seas, appears
extremely doubtful—at any rate just at present.

The possibility of a battleship or a cruiser being able to inform
herself of the advance of a submarine vessel must be considered. Water
is an excellent conductor of sound, and a microphone or some similar
apparatus could be arranged to give notice of the approach of an
invisible ship, even when it was some way away. The ironclad could then
surround herself with her torpedo nets, or steam away leaving the
submarine powerless to overtake her.

The French are very naturally watching with intense interest the
attitude of the British navy towards submarine boats, and the
experiments that have lately been carried out by the officers of H. M.
S. _Vernon_ with a view to discovering the most effective method of
destroying under-water craft, have been carefully followed by our
neighbours over the channel.

According to a recent article in _Le Yacht_ we are endeavouring to get
submarines prohibited as unfair weapons, but being doubtful of such a
“happy result,” have devised a torpedo that is fired the instant one is
sighted. We have also perfected a “Röntgen ray device” whereby the
British sailor will be enabled to scan the ocean depths and sight the
submarine even if it lurk at a depth of 20 feet below the surface. _Le
Yacht_, however, thinks this device would cut both ways, and would
enable the submarine to find its prey without coming to the surface at
all. No official information regarding the Röntgen ray device has up
till now been vouchsafed, and it may after all exist nowhere else than
in the heated imagination of French writers who hate perfidious Albion
more than ever since she has considered the question of accomplishing
the destruction of France’s submarine flotilla.

M. Lockroy, in a recent article in the _Matin_, suggested that it would
only be possible to fight against submarines when the steering of
balloons had been discovered, the black form of the vessel being very
easily distinguished in the water from a certain height.

PART II

CHAPTER IX
THE EARLY HISTORY OF SUBMARINE WARFARE

Although no mention of a submarine vessel having been actually
constructed can be found earlier than the seventeenth century, and
although the torpedo and the mine were not invented till still later,
the art of submarine warfare and subaqueous exploration dates back to a
very much earlier period.

The earliest form of under-water attack was carried out by divers long
before explosive compounds were invented, and the old writers have
strange stories to tell of fierce fights beneath the waves.

“The first divers learned their art,” says John Beckmann, in his
“History of Inventions and Discoveries,” “by early and adventurous
experience, in trying to continue under water as long as possible
without breathing, and indeed it must be allowed that some of them
carried it to very great perfection. This art, however, excites little
surprise, for, like running, throwing, and other bodily dexterities, it
requires only practice; but it is certain that those nations called by
us uncultivated and savage excel in it the Europeans who through
refinement and luxury have become more delicate and less fit for such
laborious exercises.”

In early times divers were employed for peaceful as well as for hostile
purposes. They were kept in ships to assist in raising anchors and to
recover goods thrown overboard in times of danger, and by the laws of
the Rhodians they were allowed a share of the wreck, proportional to the
depth at which they had gone in search of it. “The pearls of the Greek
and Roman ladies,” writes Beckmann, “were fished up by divers at the
great hazard of their lives, and by the like means are procured at
present those which are purchased as ornaments by our fair.”

In the operations of war divers were used for many purposes. Beckmann
tells us that when Alexander was besieging Tyre, divers swam off from
the city under water to a great distance and with long hooks tore to
pieces the mole with which the besiegers were endeavouring to block up
the harbour.

We learn from Herodotus (viii. 8) that when the fleet of Xerxes was
advancing to the invasion of Greece, “there was in the force one
Skyllias, a Skionaian, the best diver of his time, who in the shipwreck
off Pilîon had saved many things for the Persians and had also obtained
many things himself.” This diver deserted to the Greeks and gave them
the benefit of his skill as well as of recent intelligence concerning
their enemy. He was the means of destroying a number of the Persian
ships by a curious kind of submarine attack. Accompanied by his daughter
Kyane, whom he had instructed in his art, he dived during a storm and
“cast off” the cables from the anchors which held the vessels, the
result being that they were driven on shore and wrecked.

Thucydides (iv. 26) gives an instance of a case of divers being employed
as subaqueous auxiliaries during the siege of Syracuse.

“The besieged had driven piles into the water before their old docks,
that their vessels might be in safety behind them and the Athenians be
unable to stand in amongst them and do any damage to the shipping.” The
latter endeavoured to remove this species of nautical entrenchment, and
for this purpose they constructed a raft on which were turrets and
parapets to cover the men who embarked on it. It was towed up to a line
of piles and used as a kind of covering battery for the crews of boats
who removed the piles which had been “sawed off close to the bottom by
divers.” A serious obstruction was offered by some piles driven in till
their heads were below the surface of the water in the hope that the
besieging ships might run upon it. But the divers, by persevering
efforts, succeeded in sawing them through, thus enabling the besiegers
to remove them.

The Chronicles of the early Middle Ages supply instances of the
employment of divers in naval warfare. The Baltic, we read, was so
infested with pirates that a Swedish force was sent against them. The
Swedish admiral, observing that the pirate vessels lay at anchor in a
certain bay, sent in at night men from his own fleet to dive beneath
them and make holes in their bottoms. The following day he engaged them.
In the action the leaks made by the subaqueous assailants during the
night proved so serious that the piratical crews had to turn their
attention chiefly to stopping them and to baling out their vessels. The
number available to fight their enemy was in consequence so reduced that
the Swedes gained a complete victory and the power of the pirates was
annihilated.

Again at the siege of Malta by the Turks in the sixteenth century some
furious under-water fighting occurred. The Maltese were excellent divers
and the Knights took advantage of their skill to assist in the erection
of a barricade across the mouth of one of the creeks which indent the
shores of the Grand Harbour. This obstruction the Turkish besiegers
endeavoured to remove, and accordingly they made upon it a series of
determined attacks. The divers left their work to drive them off and a
terrible and weird struggle ensued, frequently below the surface of the
water, which finally ended in the repulse of the infidel assailants.

One must accept _cum grano salis_ the stories told by writers regarding
the time that divers were able to continue under water. Beckmann said
that the divers of Astrakhan employed in the fishery there could remain
for seven minutes under water. The divers in Holland seem to have been
very expert, for an observer, during the time they were under water, was
obliged to breathe at least ten times. “Those who collect pearl-shells
in the East Indies can remain under water a quarter of an hour, though
some are of opinion that it is possible to continue longer; and Mersenne
mentions a diver, named John Barrinus, who could dive under water for
six hours.” Beckmann evidently found it a little difficult to swallow
this, so he adds, “How far this may be true I shall leave others to
judge.”

An account of a Sicilian diver, Nicolo Pesce, given by Kircher, is yet
more marvellous than any of those just cited. So great was his skill
that he carried letters for the king from Sicily to Calabria. The story
goes that the king offered him a gold cup if he would explore the
terrible Gulf of Charybdis. He remained for three-quarters of an hour
amidst the foaming abyss and on his return described all the horrors of
the place to the astonished monarch, who requested him to dive once more
to further examine the gulf. For some time he hesitated, but upon the
promise of a still larger cup and a purse of gold he was tempted to
plunge again, with the melancholy result that he never came to the
surface again.

A history of the art and practice of diving, although it would present
many points of interest, is foreign to our subject, and attention must
be confined to the question of submarine warfare.

Some writers on this subject, whilst making such statements as “The
confinement of gunpowder in watertight cases and its submarine explosion
for the destruction of floating and other bodies is almost as old as
villainous saltpetre itself,” or “The ancients understood the
manufacture of subaqueous explosives or at least combustibles,” do not
trouble to give any particular instances. A French writer is reported to
have collected accounts of the use of such devices against ships below
the water-line, but a diligent search has failed to reveal the name of
the author.

“The fact that some under-water explosive compound,” said Admiral
Cyprian Bridge, in an article he contributed to _Fraser’s Magazine_ many
years ago, “had been known in ancient times was not lost sight of in the
stirring intellectual revolution of the Renaissance, which, amongst
other legacies, bequeathed to mankind the outlines of the modern art of
war. It is not surprising, therefore, that we should meet with the use
of such an agent in the wars of the sixteenth century. The most
celebrated instance of its employment was by the Italian Giannibelli
(_sic_) at Antioch during the siege of the city by the Prince of Parma.”

Perhaps the Admiral is referring to what Lieutenant Sleeman says is the
earliest record of the employment of a torpedo (_i.e._, a case of
explosion possessing the power of aggression). In 1585 an Italian
engineer named Zambelli invented a floating mine and succeeded in
destroying a bridge built over the Scheldt by the Prince of Parma.
Zambelli’s mine consisted of a flat boat filled with gunpowder arranged
in it so as to secure the maximum effectiveness, and provided with a
long sulphur metal rope and clockwork for its ignition.

A few years before this feat (in 1578) an Englishman, by name William
Bourne, published a book entitled, “Inventions or Devices.” He suggested
in his seventeenth article, “How for to sink a ship that hath laid you
aboard without shooting of ordnance.” William Bourne is in some books
said to have actually invented a plunging apparatus for use in warfare,
but no circumstantial account of such a vessel is extant.

The Marquis of Worcester, in his “Century of Inventions” (1663),
describes in section 9 “An engine, portable in one’s pocket, which may
be carried and fastened on the inside of the greatest ship, _Tanquam
aliud agens_, and at any appointed minute, though a week after, either
by day or night it shall irrecoverably sink that ship.” The smallness of
the engine suggests some explosive missile connected with clockwork as
the only means to insure its being compact and operating on a precise
day at a stated point of time. Section 10 is as follows: “A way from a
mile off to dive and fasten a like engine to any ship so as it may
punctually work the same effect either for time or execution.”

In 1596 John Napier of Merchiston wrote a statement of four “Secret
Inventions,” concluding with the remark—“These inventions, besides
devices of _sailing under the water_ with divers other devices and
stratagems for burning of the enemies, by the grace of God, and work of
expert craftsmen, I hope to perform.”

Pepys in his “Diary,” under date March 14, 1662, says: “This afternoon
came the German Doctor Knuffler to discourse with us about his engine to
blow up ships. We doubted not the matter of fact it being tried in
Cromwell’s time, but the safety of carrying them in ships, but he do
tell us that when he comes to tell the King his secret, for none but the
Kings successively and their heirs must know it, it will appear to be of
no danger at all.”

The foregoing extracts show that the possibility of a practical method
of submarine attack was beginning to take shape in the minds of
philosophers and inventive geniuses. “Fire and Powder Ships,”
“Machines,” “Internals,” “Catamarans,” and similar devices for
accomplishing the destruction of an enemy were known at this time, and
it is not strange that the idea of making the explosion take place
_beneath_ the water should have suggested itself.

CHAPTER X
EARLY EFFORTS IN SUBMARINE NAVIGATION

Who invented the first boat which was capable of being propelled beneath
the water? Opinions differ as to the correct answer to this question.
David Bushnell’s boat (_circa_ 1773) is the first of which we have any
definite record, but William Bourne (1580), Magnus Pegelius (1605), and
Cornelius Van Drebbel (1620) have all been credited with having
constructed under-water vessels. In the previous chapter it has been
shown that the earliest form of submarine attack was carried out by
divers. The prototype of the submarine boat was undoubtedly the diving
bell, the history of which contrivance, although presenting many points
of interest, it will be impossible to relate here.

According to some writers to William Bourne, the English mathematician,
belongs the credit (in 1580), of operating the first submarine boat as
such, in contradistinction to a diving-bell, but there is nothing to
show that Bourne did more than discuss the question, as did also Magnus
Pegelius, although the latter is reported to have built a small
submarine vessel in the year 1605.

[Sidenote: Drebbel’s Reputed Submarine.]

The Dictionary of National Biography credits Cornelius Drebbel, who was
born in 1572, in the town of Alkmaar, in Holland, and who died in London
in 1634, with the invention of a submarine boat “which was navigable
without the use of artificial light, from Westminster to Greenwich.” We
have spent some time in endeavouring to verify this assertion, but the
references to the boat are vague and unsatisfactory. However, as Drebbel
is by some accounted the “Father of Submarine Navigation,” it seems
scarcely fitting to dismiss him without further thought.

In that curious old volume entitled “New Experiments Physico-mechanical
touching the Spring of the Air and its Effects,” by the “Honourable
Robert Boyle, Esq.,” mention is made of Drebbel’s boat, and it may be
interesting to transcribe the passage. It occurs, on p. 188 of the
second edition, published at Oxford in 1662.

[Illustration:

THE EARLIEST KNOWN PICTURE OF AN UNDER-WATER VESSEL.
]

“But yet on occasion of this opinion of Paracelsus, perhaps it will
not be impertinent if before I proceed, I acquaint your lordship
with a Conceit of that deservedly Famous Mechanician and Chymist,
_Cornelius Drebell_, who among other strange things that he
performed, is affirmed (by more than a few credible Persons) to have
contrived for the late learned King _James_, a vessel to go under
Water; of which tryal was made in the _Thames_ with admirable
success, the vessel carrying twelve Rowers besides Passengers; one
of which is yet alive, and related to an excellent Mathematician
that informed me of it. Now that for which I mention this story is,
That having had the curiosity and opportunity to make particular
Enquiries among the Relations of _Drebell_, and especially of an
ingenious Physitian that marryed his daughter, concerning the
grounds upon which he conceived it feasible to make men unaccustomed
to continue so long under Water without suffocation, or (as the
lately mention’d Person that went in the Vessel affirms) without
inconvenience, I was answered that _Drebell_ conceived, that ’tis
not the whole body of the air but a certain Quintessence (as
Chymists speake) or spirituous part of it that makes it fit for
respiration, which being spent the remaining grosser body, or
carcase (if I may so call it) of the Air, is unable to cherish the
vital flame residing in the heart: so that (for ought I could
gather) besides the Mechanicall contrivance of his vessel he had a
Chymicall liquor, which he accounted the chief secret of his
Submarine Navigation. For when from time to time he perceived that
the finer and purer part of the Air was consumed or over-clogged by
the respiration, and steams of those that went in his ship, he
would, by unstopping a vessel full of the liquor speedily restore to
the troubled air such a proportion of vital parts as would make it
again for a good while fit for Respiration. Whether by dissipating
or precipitating the grosser exhalations, or by some other
intelligible way, I must not now stay to examine, contenting myself
to add, that having had the opportunity to do some service to those
of his Relations, that were most intimate with him, and having made
it my business to learn what the strange liquor might be, they
constantly affirmed that _Drebell_ would never disclose the Liquor
unto any, nor so much as tell the matter whereof he made it, to
above one Person, who himself assured me what it was.”

It is much to be wished that fuller accounts were extant respecting
Drebbel’s boat, and the methods he employed to enable his passengers to
breathe under water. W. B. Rye in one of the notes to his work “England
as seen by Foreigners” (1865, p. 232), gives a carefully compiled
account of Drebbel’s inventions and quotes from a Dutch Chronicle of
Alkmaar, by C. van der Wonde (1645), a passage relating to his submarine
boat.

“He built a ship in which one could row and navigate under water
from Westminster to Greenwich, the distance of two Dutch miles; even
five or six miles, or as far as one pleased. In this boat a person
could see under the surface of the water and without candle-light,
as much as he needed to read in the Bible or any other book. Not
long ago this remarkable ship was yet to be seen lying in the Thames
or London river.”

As to what Drebbel’s “Chymicall Liquor” really was there is no chance of
discovering. Professor W. P. Bradley has pointed out that the name
“Quintessence of Air” is very suggestive of oxygen. The life-giving
component of air (not discovered until a century and a half after
Drebbel’s time) is volumetrically the “quintessence,” the fifth part of
air. “Is it possible,” he asks, “that Drebbel had discovered some liquid
which easily disengaged the then unknown oxygen gas and thus was able to
restore to vitiated air that principle of which respiration deprives it?
Undoubtedly not. It is much more likely that he possessed a solution
capable of absorbing the carbonic acid gas which is produced by
respiration, and that the name given it was entirely fanciful and
without special significance. But even if Drebbel’s claim was a piece of
pure quackery with no substantial basis at all, it is nevertheless not
without interest, for it shows, as we might have anticipated, that the
problem of ventilation, one of the most important with which the
inventors of submarines have to deal, was at least appreciated by
Drebbel the pioneer.”

A writer of the period, one Harsdoffer, tells how Drebbel was led to the
construction of his boat:—

“One day when walking along the banks of the Thames Drebbel noticed
some sailors dragging behind their barques baskets full of fish; he
saw that the barques were weighed down in the water, but that they
rose a little when the baskets allowed the ropes which held them to
slacken a little. The idea occurred to him that a ship could be held
under the water by a somewhat similar method and could be propelled
by oars and poles. Some time afterwards he constructed two little
boats of this nature, but of different sizes, which were tightly
closed with thick skin, and King James himself journeyed in one of
them on the Thames. There were on this occasion twelve rowers
besides the passengers, and the vessel during several hours was kept
at a depth of twelve to fifteen feet below the surface.” This royal
excursion under water terminated, we read, “fort hereusement.”

The Abbé de Hautefeuille, in a brochure which appeared in 1680 entitled
“Manière de respirer sous l’Eau,” writes thus:—

“Drebbel’s secret was probably the machine which I had imagined
consisting of a bellows with two valves and two tubes resting on the
surface of the water, the one bringing down air and the other
sending it back. By speaking of a volatile essence which restored
the nitrous parts consumed by respiration Drebbel evidently wished
to disguise his invention and prevent others from finding out its
real nature.”

Ben Jonson, in his comedy, “The Staple of News,” first acted by His
Majesty’s servants in 1625, has a hit at certain inventions of the time,
and amongst these is the boat of Master Drebbel. Thomas, Act III., Scene
I., says:—

“They write here one Cornelius’ son
Hath made the Hollanders an invisible eel
To swim the tavel at Dunkirk and sink all
The shipping there.

_Pennyboy, junior._ But how is’t done?

_Grabal._ I’ll shew you, sir,
It is an automa, runs under water
With a snug nose, and has a nimble tail
Made like an auger with which tail she wriggles
Betwixt the costs of a ship and sinks it straight.

_P., jun._ Whence have you this news?

_Fitton._ From a right hand I assure you.
The eel-boats here, that lie before Queen-hythe
Came out of Holland.

_P., jun._ A most brave device
To murder their flat bottoms.”

That Ben Jonson should class the submarine boat of Drebbel with such a
proposal as that of bringing an army over seas in corkshoes—

“All his horse
Are shod with cork, all fourscore pieces of ordnance
Mounted upon cork carriages, with bladders
Instead of wheels, to run the passage over
At a spring tide.”

and with the discovery of perpetual motion—

“By an ale-wife in St. Katherine’s
At the sign of the Dancing Bear,”

gives one an idea of how the world in general viewed Drebbel’s
invention, and yet the inventor found favour in the eyes of James I.,
who bestowed money upon him, gave him a lodging in Eltham Palace, took a
great interest in his experiments, and when his life was in danger at
Prague, owing to a revolution, succeeded in obtaining his release by
personal intercession.

In return for his Majesty’s favour Cornelius invented an “ingenious
machine” for producing perpetual motion, which became one of the
wonderful sights of the day. According to a description in the
_Biographie Universelle_ it consisted of a globe of glass in which by
means of the four elements Drebbel imitated perpetual motion. In the
space of twenty-four hours one could behold the course of the sun, the
planets, and the stars. By means of this marvellous globe he showed “the
cause of cold, of the ebb and flow of the sea, of storms, of thunder, of
rain, of the wind, _enfin tout le mecanisme de la nature_.”

In the diary of Lewis Frederick, Prince of Wurtemberg, under date
Tuesday, May 1, 1610, occurs the passage, “His Excellency went to Elham
Park to see the perpetual motion; the inventor’s name was Cornelius
Trebel, a native of Alkmaar, a very fair and handsome man, and of very
gentle manners, altogether different from such-like characters; we also
saw there Virginals, which played of themselves.”

Undoubtedly Drebbel was ahead of his time, but one cannot credit him
with all the wonders he is reported to have achieved. Some of his
biographers state that he invented a telescope, a microscope, and a
thermometer; an incubator for hatching fowls; an instrument for showing
pictures of portraits of people not present at the time, and a method of
producing at will the most extreme cold. Drebbel was evidently highly
thought of at the Courts of James I., Rudolph II., and Ferdinand II.,
but this was perhaps due more to his being “a very fair and handsome man
of very gentle manners,” than to his scientific attainments.

One of his biographers refers to him thus: “Cornelius van Drebbel, ein
Charlatan,” and others have dubbed him alchemist, empiric, magician, and
professor of the Black Art.

Mr. Rye’s estimate is perhaps the truer:—

“But however extravagant and improbable some of the following
descriptions may appear, yet, allowing as we ought to do for the
crude state of physical science and the credulity of the times in
which he lived, as well as the then prevailing tendency to clothe
scientific investigation and experiment with an air of mystery,
Cornelius Drebbel is entitled, we think, to hold a respectable
position among the ingenious inventors and mechanicians of the early
part of the seventeenth century.”

[Sidenote: Bishop Wilkins on Submarine Navigation.]

Drebbel’s boat attracted the attention of the Right Reverend John
Wilkins, whose mathematical and philosophical works were published in
London in the year 1708.

John Wilkins was a remarkable man, considerably in advance of his day in
scientific speculation. As few people nowadays read his books a brief
extract from his “Mathematical Magick: or the Wonders that may be
perform’d by Mechanical Geometry” may be read with interest and
amusement.

The book is divided into two parts, the first entitled “Archimedes, or
Mechanical Powers,” the second, “Doedalus, or Mechanical Motions.”

Chapter V. of Part 2 deals with “the possibility of framing an Ark for
Submarine Navigation: the Difficulties and Consequences of such a
Contrivance.”

“It will not be altogether impertinent,” says the author, “with the
Discourse of these gradient _Automata_ to mention what Mersennus
doth so pleasantly and largely descant upon concerning the making of
a ship wherein men may safely swim under the water. That such a
Contrivance is feasible, and may be effected, is beyond all
question, because it hath been already experimented here in
_England_ by _Cornelius Dreble_; but how to improve it unto Publick
Use and Advantage, so as to be serviceable for remote Voyages, the
carrying of any considerable Number of Men, with Provisions and
Commodities, would be of such excellent Use, as may deserve some
further enquiry.”

The difficulties are divided into three heads:—

1. “The letting-out or receiving in anything as there shall be
occasion without the admission of Water. If it hath not such a
convenience these kind of Voyages must needs be very dangerous and
uncomfortable both by Reason of many noisome and offensive Things
which should be thrust out, and many other needful Things which
should be received in. Now herein will consist the Difficulty, for
to contrive the opening of the Vessel so that anything may be put in
or out, and yet the Water not rush into it with much Violence as it
doth usually in the leak of a Ship.”

The learned Doctor’s remedy is as follows: “Let there,” he says, “be
certain leather bags made of several bignesses, long and open at
both ends, and answerable to these let there be divers windows made
in open places in the frame of the ship round the sides, to which
one end of these bags might be fixed, the other end coming within
the ship. The bag being thus fastened and tied close about towards
the window, then any thing that is to be sent out might be safely
put into that end within the ship: this being again close shut, and
the other end loosened, the thing may be safely sent out without the
admission of any water.”

In taking anything in, it was to be first received into that part of
the bag towards the window, which being close tied down at the other
end may then be safely opened.

[Illustration:

A CONCERT IN A SUBMARINE.

The _Diable Marin_ of W. Bauer.

(1855.)
]

“It is easy to conceive, how by such means as these a Person may be
sent out or received in, as there shall be occasion; how the water
which will perhaps by Degrees leak into several parts may be emptied
out again, with divers other like advantages. Tho’ if there should
be a leak at the bottom of the vessel, yet very little Water would
get in, because the Air would get out.”

The fate of the unhappy Person thrust out of the Vessel by means of
the leather bags is too dreadful to contemplate, and the sailors
called upon to man a modern war submarine may congratulate
themselves that this convenient contrivance imagined by the
ingenious prelate has not come into use. As to the taking in of
things into the boat one does not quite gather how they would get
into the bag, or how the bag would be first untied and then tied
again by those inside the vessel.

The second difficulty in such an Ark is “the Motion or fixing of it
according to occasion: the directing of it to several places as the
Voyage shall be designed, without which it would be very useless, if
it were to remain only in one Place, and were to remove only
blindfold, without any certain Direction: And the Contrivance of
this may seem very difficult because these submarine Navigators will
want the usual advantages of Wind and Tide for Motion, and the sight
of the Heavens for direction.”

The progressive motion of the boat would be effected by the help of
several oars made to contract and dilate like the fins of a fish,
the holes through which they pass into the ship being tied about
with the afore-mentioned Leather Bags.

“It will not be convenient, perhaps, that the motion in these
Voyages should be very swift because of those Observations and
Discoveries to be made at the Bottom of the Sea, which in a little
space may abundantly recompense the slowness of the Progress.”

Dr. Wilkins had grasped the fact that if the Ark were so ballasted
as to be equal weight with the like magnitude of Water, it would
then be easily movable in any Part of it.

As for the ascent and descent of the craft this was to be
accomplished by “some great Weight at the Bottom of the Ship (being
Part of its Ballast), which by some Cord within may be loosened from
it. If this Weight is let loose so will the Ship ascend from it (if
need be) to the very Surface of the Water; and again as it is pulled
close to the Ship, so will it descend.”

The idea of taking in Water-ballast for sinking the Ark does not
seem to have occurred to the Author.

For directing the course of the Vessel the Mariner’s Needle would be
employed, but the patent difficulty of all is this, “How the Air may
be supplied for Respiration, How constant Fires may be kept in for
light and the Dressing of Food, how those Vicissitudes of
Rarefaction and Condensation may be maintained.”

While our author will not go so far as to say that a man may by
custom, “which in other things doth produce such strange incredible
effects,” be enabled to live in the open Water as do the fishes, yet
he thinks that long use and custom may strengthen men against many
such inconveniences of this kind which to inexperienced persons may
prove very hazardous: thus it will not perhaps be so necessary to
have the air for breathing so “pure and desecated” as is required
for others.

The difficulty of respiration under water may be met in several
ways. “The submarine ark should be of such a large capacity that as
the air is corrupted in one part so it may be purified and renewed
in the other: if the mere refrigeration of the air would fit it for
breathing, this might be somewhat helped with bellows, which would
cool it by motion: it is not altogether improbable,” says the
doctor, “that the lamps and fires in the middle of it like the
reflected beams in the first region rarefy the air and the
circumambient coldness towards the sides of the vessel like the
second region, cooling and condensing of it would work such a
Vicissitude and change of air as might fit it for all its proper
uses.”

Finally, if none of these conjectures will help, the author mentions
that there is in France one Barrières, a diver, who hath found out
the art whereby a man might easily continue under water for six
hours together, “whereas Ten Cubical Feet of Air will not serve
another Diver to breathe in for Half an Hour, he by the help of a
Cavity not above one or two Foot at most will have Breath enough for
six hours and a Lanthorne scarce above the usual size to keep a
candle burning as long as a Man please. Which (if it be true and
were commonly known) might be sufficient help against the greatest
difficulty.”

Dr. Wilkins makes no mention of the “Chymicall Liquor” which Drebbel
is reported to have discovered for the purifying of the air inside
the boat when under water, and it is probable that he attached
little value to the accounts of this remarkable substance.

Having so far dealt with the difficulties of submarine navigation
and their remedies, the author proceeds to discuss the many
advantages and conveniences of such a contrivance.

_First of all_, says he—“’Tis private; a Man may thus go to any
Coast of the World invisibly without being discovered or prevented
in his journey.”

Certainly this would be a convenience to the criminal fleeing from
justice, to a deposed ruler wishing to escape from his conquerors,
and to others desirous of effacing themselves for a time.

_Secondly_—“’Tis safe from the Uncertainty of Tides and the Violence
of Tempests, which do never move the Sea above Five or Six paces
deep, from Pirates and Robbers which do so infest other Voyages.
From Ice and great Frosts, which do so much endanger the Passages
towards the Poles.” Could Bishop Wilkins but have perused Mr. John
Holland’s article in the _North American Review_ for December, 1900,
in which proposals for a submarine passenger service across the
Channel are put forward, he would have been gratified to find the
inventor of a practical under-water vessel of the same opinion as
himself regarding the “advantages and conveniences” of travelling
beneath rather than on the waves.

M. Goubet also has imagined a submarine cross-Channel service.

_Thirdly_—“It may be of very great advantage against a Navy of
Enemies, who by this means may be undermined in the Water and blown
up.”

Sixty-seven years after these words were written David Bushnell
launched his submarine boat, which carried a torpedo charged with
130 lbs. of gunpowder to be affixed to the side of the vessel to be
blown up. In 1864 the _David_, owned by the Confederates, blew up
the _Housatonic_, and though this is the only occasion on which a
submarine has done any damage to the foe in an actual real
encounter, it is more than likely that in the next great naval war
under-water vessels may “be of very great advantage against a Navy
of Enemies.”

_Fourthly_—“It may be of special use for the Relief of any Place
that is besieged by Water to convey unto them Invisible Supplies;
and so likewise for the Surprizal of any Place that is accessible by
Water.”

_Fifthly_—“It may be of unspeakable Benefit for Submarine
Experiments and Discoveries, as—The several Proportions of Swiftness
betwixt the ascent of a Bladder, Cork, or any other light Substance,
in comparison to the descent of Stones or Lead. The deep Caverns and
Subterranean Passages where the Sea Water in the course of its
circulation, doth vest itself into other Places and the like. The
Nature and Kinds of Fishes, the several Arts of Catching them, by
alluring them with Lights, by placing divers nets about the sides of
this Vessel, shooting the greater sort of them with Guns, which
might be put out of the ship by the help of such Bags as were
mentioned before, with divers the like Artifices and Treacheries,
which may be more successfully practised by such who live so
familiarly together. These fish may serve not only for food but for
Fewel likewise, in respect of that oil which may be extracted from
them; the Way of Dressing Meat by Lamps being in many Respects the
most convenient for such a Voyage. The many fresh springs that may
probably be met with at the Bottom of the Sea, will serve for the
Supply of Drink and other Occasions.”

Dr. Wilkins is, however, convinced that, above all, his Ark will be
most valuable in the discovery of submarine treasures, “not only in
regard of what hath been drowned by Wrecks, but the several precious
Things that grow there; as Pearl, Coral Mines; with innumerable
other Things of great Value which may be much more easily found out
and fetch’d up by the help of this than by any of the usual ways of
the Urinators.” For the better fulfilment of this purpose, the
author suggests that there should be some lesser cabins tied about
the Great Ark at various distances, where several persons as Scouts
might be lodged for the taking of observations according as the
Admiral should direct them. Dr. Wilkins’ prediction has been
realised, and in Mr. Simon Lake’s _Argonaut_ there exists a machine
which is bound to play an important part in “the discovery of
Submarine Treasure.”

In the penultimate paragraph of the chapter on the Submarine Ark Dr.
Wilkins waxes enthusiastic over the immense possibilities latent in
such a contrivance. “All kinds of Arts and Manufactures may be
exercised in this Vessel. The Observations made by it might be
written and (if need be) Printed here likewise. Several Colonies may
there inhabit, having their Children born, and bred up, without the
knowledge of land, who could not chuse but be amazed with Strange
Conceits upon the Discovery of this Upper World.”

In conclusion the author writes:—

“I am not able to judge what other Advantages there may be
suggested, or whether Experiment would fully answer these Notional
Conjectures. But, however, because the Invention did unto me seem
ingenious and new, being not impertinent to the present Enquiry
therefore I thought it might be worth the mentioning.”

[Sidenote: Mersenne.]

“Mersennus,” to whom the learned Bishop refers, was a monk of the order
of the “Minims,” who lived from 1588–1648, and was the chief friend and
literary agent of Des Cartes. He gave in his writings some attention to
submarine navigation. He proposed that the shell of a boat which he
projected, but never built, should be of copper or some other metal, and
that in shape it should resemble a fish, and in order to avoid its
turning round both ends should be pointed.

In time of war the boat would destroy the keels of the enemy’s ships. At
the port-holes were placed big cannon. An arrangement of packing with a
plug valve prevented the introduction of water. At the moment of firing
the guns were brought close to the openings and the plug-valve was
raised; after the shot had been discharged the plug fell automatically
back to its place. In order to replenish the air pneumatic machines and
ventilators would be used; for steering, the compass would act as well
beneath the waves as on the surface; for lighting, phosphorescent bodies
would be used. The boat was to have wheels and was to be moved by means
of oars. Mersenne was the first to affirm that even the most violent
tempests could not be a source of danger to the submarine vessel as the
disturbance was felt but a little distance below the surface.

[Illustration:

RACING THE “CAMPANIA.”

Apostoloff’s Proposed Submarine.
]

Another monk of the same order, Father Fournier, about the year 1640
gave to the world his ideas on the problem of navigating beneath the
water.

In the year 1653 a Frenchman, whose name we have been unable to
discover, is said to have built and operated a submarine boat at
Rotterdam. It was 72 feet long, 12 feet high, and 8 feet broad. It was
traversed down its entire length by a system of very solid girders whose
extremities projecting beneath the bottom were covered with iron.
Ordinarily the boat was not meant to be submerged lower than the “awash”
condition, but the part above the water was made to slope with the idea
of turning aside the projectiles aimed at it. In the centre of the boat
was a kind of paddle wheel, but the inventor was careful to keep many
details secret regarding its propulsion and its method of attack. For
some little time he showed his invention for a small pecuniary
remuneration, but it failed to attract the notice of those in authority.

In the _Annual Register_ of the year, 1774, at page 245, there appears
an authentic account of a late unfortunate transaction with respect to a
diving machine at Plymouth. This relates to the death of a Mr. Day who
lost his life in a boat of his own construction in Plymouth Sound.

[Sidenote: Day.]

It appears that Mr. Day, “the sole projector of the scheme, and as
matters have turned out, the unhappy sacrifice to his own
ingenuity,” planned a method of sinking a vessel under water with a
man in it, who should live there for a certain time, and then by his
own means only bring himself up to the surface. He tried his project
in the Broads near Yarmouth, fitting a Norfolk market-boat for his
purpose, and succeeded in sinking himself thirty feet under water,
where he continued during the space of twenty-four hours. Elated
with this success, he then wanted to avail himself of his invention.
He conversed with his friends, perfectly convinced that he had
brought his undertaking to a certainty; but how to reap the
advantage of it was the difficulty that remained.

[Illustration:

THE “INTELLIGENT WHALE” OF HALSTEAD.

(1892.)
]

That this vessel might serve some useful purpose, whether peaceful
or warlike, does not seem to have occurred to Mr. Day, who was
content seemingly to construct a diving boat capable of sinking and
rising again to the surface, without furnishing it with any method
of propulsion. A friend of the inventor suggested that if he
acquainted the sporting gentlemen with the discovery and the
certainty of the performance considerable “betts” would take place
as soon as the project should be mentioned in Company. Struck by
this happy idea, Mr. Day looked into the “Sporting Kalendar” and
finding therein the name of Blake decided that it was to this
gentleman that he ought to address himself. Accordingly, in
November, 1773, Mr. Blake received the following letter:—

“SIR,—I have found out an affair by which many thousands may be won.
It is of a paradoxical nature, but can be performed with ease;
therefore, sir, if you chuse to be informed of it, and give me £100
for every £1,000 you shall win by it, I will very readily wait upon
you, and inform you of it. I am, myself, but a poor mechanic and not
able to make anything of it without your assistance.

“Yours, &c.,
“J. DAY.”

Mr. Blake naturally had no conception of Mr. Day’s design, nor was he
sure that the letter was serious. He wrote, however, to the inventor,
and appointed an interview, when the latter announced his project. He
declared “that he could sink a ship one hundred yards deep in the sea
with himself in it, and remain therein for the space of twenty-four
hours, without communication with anything above; and at the expiration
of the time rise up again in the vessel.”

Mr. Blake was not a little staggered at this dare-devil proposal, but
agreed to advance money for the construction of a model. This having
proved satisfactory Mr. Blake advanced a further sum for the building of
a practicable vessel. This, it would appear, had a false bottom,
“standing on feet like a butcher’s block, which contained the ballast;
and by the person in the vessel unscrewing some pins, he was to rise to
the surface leaving the false bottom behind.”

The boat was at length built and in the presence of Mr. Blake a trial
descent was made. The day fixed for the test which was to decide the bet
arrived, but Mr. Blake reduced the depth of water from one hundred yards
to one hundred feet, and the time from twenty-four to twelve hours.

“The vessel was towed to the place agreed upon; Mr. Day provided himself
with whatever he thought necessary, went into the vessel, let the water
into her, and with great composure retired to the room constructed for
him and shut up the valve. The ship went gradually down to twenty-two
fathom water at 2 o’clock on Tuesday, June 28 (1774), in the afternoon,
being to return at 2 o’clock the next morning. He had three buoys as
messengers which he could send to the surface at option to announce his
situation below; but none appearing Mr. Blake, who was near at hand in a
barge, began to entertain some suspicions. He kept a strict look-out,
and at the time appointed, neither the buoys nor the vessel coming up,
he applied to the _Orpheus_ frigate, which lay just off the barge, for
assistance. The captain with the most ready benevolence supplied them
with everything in his power to seek for the ship. Mr. Blake in this
alarming situation was not content with the help of the _Orpheus_ only;
he made immediate application to Lord Sandwich (who happened to be at
Plymouth) for further relief. His Lordship with great humanity ordered a
number of hands from the dock-yard, who went with the utmost alacrity
and tried every effort to regain the ship, but unhappily without
effect.”

According to Admiral Hichborn (U.S.N.) J. Day has the unique distinction
of being the only known victim of the dangers of submarine navigation.
This distinction, says the Admiral, depends upon the supposition that
reports of submarine accidents were much more reliable two hundred and
forty years ago than they have been for the last forty years, during
which period there have been _authentic_ newspaper reports of the loss
of eighty-two lives in attempting submarine navigation in the United
States. “Fifty of these lives were not lost at all, and the other
thirty-two, though lost in a boat designed to operate as a submarine,
were all lost when, and apparently because, she was not so operating.”
This refers to the _David_, which in the American Civil War destroyed
four crews of eight men each.

Mr. Charles Babbage in his article on the Diving Bell in the
“Encyclopædia Metropolitana,” describes Day’s under-water boat. He
writes:—

“Having purchased a sloop of 50 tons it was prepared by building an
air-tight chamber in the middle 12 feet long, 9 feet broad, and 8 feet
deep, and capable of containing 75 hogsheads of air. Considerable pains
were taken to make this as strong and as secure as possible. In the
middle of the top of this chamber was a square hole, a scuttle just
sufficiently large to admit a man; it was bevelled outwards, in order
that the valve which was to close the chamber might be driven in more
tightly. Screws were applied to this valve, in order to screw it home,
and it, as well as the scuttle, was lined with flannel. On the decks of
the vessel three buoys of different colours, white, red and black, were
fixed by plugs in such a manner that they were to be disengaged by
driving another plug from the inside of the chamber. These were designed
as signals to indicate the state of health of the adventurer during his
stay under water. The white was to denote his being very well, the red
indifferent, and the black his being very ill. The ballast of 20 tons,
by which the vessel was to be sunk and by disengaging of which it was to
be raised again, was fixed to four iron rods passing through tubes into
the chamber. The vessel was ballasted internally with 10 tons, which
with the twenty suspended from her would, it was imagined, cause her to
sink when full of water. Thus perished a man whose intrepidity resulted
from his ignorance of the dangers he encountered, and who fell a victim
to his obstinate confidence in the success of a plan concerning which
his knowledge was totally insufficient to enable him to judge. The depth
of water in which the vessel sank was 22 fathoms; the pressure of more
than four atmospheres thus produced, in all probability crushed in the
sides of the chamber soon after it reached the bottom.”

[Illustration:

ALVARY TEMPLO “AQUAPEDE.” (1826.)
]

CHAPTER XI
DAVID BUSHNELL

The originator of the modern method of submarine warfare was David
Bushnell, a native of Saybrook (now Westbrook) in the State of Maine,
U.S.A., who in the latter part of the eighteenth century conceived the
idea of destroying the British ships of war which were employed upon the
coasts of North America by exploding gunpowder, contained in a magazine,
beneath their bottoms. In order the better to fix the charge to the
ships, Bushnell built in 1775 the first practical submarine boat, and
the first of which any detailed account is extant.

In a letter written in October, 1789, to Thomas Jefferson, the Minister
Plenipotentiary of the United States at Paris, David Bushnell gives a
very interesting description of his vessel and its achievements. This
deserves to be printed here in full in view of the many quite remarkable
devices (considering the period) which the inventor originated.

The external shape of the submarine vessel bore some resemblance to
two upper tortoise shells of equal size, joined together, the place
of entrance into the vessel being represented by the opening made by
the swell of the shells at the head of the animal. The inside was
capable of containing the operator and air sufficient to support him
thirty minutes without receiving fresh air. At the bottom, opposite
to the entrance, was fixed a quantity of lead for ballast. At one
edge, which was directly before the operator, who sat upright, was
an oar for rowing forward or backward. At the other edge was a
rudder for steering. An aperture at the bottom, with its valve, was
designed to admit water for the purpose of defending, and two brass
forcing pumps served to eject the water within when necessary for
ascending. At the top there was likewise an oar for ascending or
descending, or continuing at any particular depth. A water-gauge or
barometer determined the depth of descent, a compass directed the
course, and a ventilator within supplied the vessel with fresh air
when on the surface.

The entrance into the vessel was elliptical, and so small as barely
to admit a person. This entrance was surrounded with a broad
elliptical iron band, the lower edge of which was let into the wood,
of which the body of the vessel was made, in such a manner as to
give its utmost support to the body of the vessel against the
pressure of the water. Above the upper edge of this iron band there
was a brass crown or cover, resembling a hat with its crown and
brim, which shut watertight upon the iron band; the crown was hung
to the iron band with hinges so as to turn over sidewise when
opened. To make it perfectly secure when shut it might be screwed
down upon the band by the operator or by a person without.

There were in the brass crown three round doors, one directly in
front and one on each side, large enough to put the hand through.
When open they admitted fresh air. Their shutters were ground
perfectly tight into their places with emery, hung with hinges, and
secured in their places when shut. There were likewise several small
glass windows in the crown for looking through, and for admitting
light in the day-time, with covers to secure them. There were two
air-pipes in the crown. A ventilator within drew fresh air through
one of the air-pipes and discharged it into the lower part of the
vessel; the fresh air introduced by the ventilator expelled the
impure light air through the other air-pipe. Both air-pipes were so
constructed that they shut themselves whenever the water rose near
their tops, so that no water could enter through them, and opened
themselves immediately after they rose above the water.

The vessel was chiefly ballasted with lead fixed to its bottom; when
this was not sufficient a quantity was placed within, more or less
according to the weight of the operator; its ballast made it so
stiff that there was no danger of over-setting. The vessel, with all
its appendages and the operator, was of sufficient weight to settle
it very low in the water. About 200 lbs. of lead at the bottom for
ballast could be let down 40 or 50 feet below the vessel; this
enabled the operator to rise instantly to the surface of the water
in case of accident.

When the operator would descend he placed his foot upon the top of a
brass valve, depressing it, by which he opened a large aperture in
the bottom of the vessel, through which the water entered at his
pleasure; when he had admitted a sufficient quantity he descended
very gradually; if he admitted too much he ejected as much as was
necessary to obtain an equilibrium by the two brass forcing pumps
which were placed at each hand. Whenever the vessel leaked or he
would ascend to the surface he also made use of these forcing pumps.
When the skilful operator had obtained an equilibrium he could row
upward or downward, or continue at any particular depth, with an oar
placed near the top of the vessel, formed upon the principle of the
screw, the axis of the oar entering the vessel; by turning the oar
one way he raised the vessel, by turning it the other way he
depressed it.

A glass tube 18 inches long and 1 inch in diameter, standing
upright, its upper end closed, and its lower end, which was open,
screwed into a brass pipe, through which the external water had a
passage into the glass tube, served as a water-gauge or barometer.
There was a piece of cork with phosphorus on it put into the
water-gauge. When the vessel descended the water rose into the
water-gauge, condensing the air within, and bearing the cork with
its phosphorus on its surface. By the light of the phosphorus the
ascent of the water in the gauge was rendered visible, and the depth
of the vessel under water ascertained by a graduated line.

An oar, formed upon the principle of the screw, was fixed in the
forepart of the vessel; its axis entered the vessel, and being
turned one way, rowed the vessel forward, but being turned the other
way rowed it backward; it was made to be turned by the hand or foot.

A rudder, hung to the hinder part of the vessel, commanded it with
the greatest ease. The rudder was made very elastic, and might be
used for rowing forward. Its tiller was within the vessel, at the
operator’s right hand, fixed at a right angle on an iron rod which
passed through the side of the vessel; the rod had a crank on its
outside end which commanded the rudder by means of a rod extending
from the end of the crank to a kind of tiller fixed upon the left
hand of the rudder. Raising and depressing the first-mentioned
tiller turned the rudder as the same required. A compass marked with
phosphorus directed the course, both above and under the water, and
a line and lead founded the depth when necessary.

The internal shape of the vessel, in every possible section of it,
verged towards an ellipsis, as near as the design would allow, but
every horizontal section, although elliptical, yet as near to a
circle as could be admitted. The body of the vessel was made
exceedingly strong, and to strengthen it as much as possible a firm
piece of wood was framed, parallel to the conjugate diameter, to
prevent the sides from yielding to the great pressure of the
incumbent water in a deep immersion. This piece of wood was also a
seat for the operator.

Every opening was well secured. The pumps had two sets of valves.
The aperture at the bottom for admitting water was covered with a
plate perforated full of holes to receive the water and prevent
anything from choking the passage or stopping the valve from
shutting. The brass valve might likewise be forced into its place
with a screw if necessary. The air-pipes had a kind of hollow sphere
fixed round the top of each to secure the air-pipe valves from
injury; these hollow spheres were perforated full of holes for the
passage of the air through the pipes. Within the air-pipes were
shutters to secure them should any accident happen to the pipes or
the valves on their tops.

[Illustration:

BUSHNELL’S SUBMARINE
]

Wherever the external apparatus passed through the body of the
vessel the joints were round and formed by brass pipes, which were
driven into the wood of the vessel, the holes through the pipes were
very exactly made, and the iron rods which passed through them were
turned in a lathe to fit them; the joints were also kept full of oil
to prevent rust and leaking. Particular attention was given to bring
every part necessary for performing the operations, both within and
without the vessel, before the operator, and as conveniently as
could be devised, so that everything might be found in the dark
except the water-gauge and the compass, which were visible by the
light of the phosphorus, and nothing required the operator to turn
to the right hand or to the left to perform anything necessary.

_Description of a Magazine and its Appendages designed to be conveyed
by the Submarine Vessel to the bottom of a Ship._

In the forepart of the brim of the crown of the submarine vessel was
a socket, and an iron tube passing through the socket; the tube
stood upright, and could slide up and down in the socket 6 inches.
At the top of the tube was a wood screw (A), fixed by means of a
rod, which passed through the tube, and screwed the wood screw fast
upon the top of the tube; by pushing the wood screw up against the
bottom of the ship and turning it at the same time it would enter
the planks; driving would also answer the same purpose. When the
wood screw was firmly fixed it could be cast off by unscrewing the
rod, which fastened it upon the top of the tube.

Behind the submarine vessel was a place above the rudder for
carrying a large powder magazine. This was made of two pieces of oak
timber, large enough when hollowed out to contain 150 lbs. of
powder, with the apparatus used in firing it, and was secured in its
place by a screw turned by the operator. A strong piece of rope
extended from the magazine to the wood screw (A) above mentioned,
and was fastened to both. When the wood screw was fixed, and to be
cast off from its tube, the magazine was to be cast off likewise by
unscrewing it, leaving it hanging to the wood screw; it was lighter
than the water, that it might rise up against the object to which
the wood screw and itself were fastened.

Within the magazine was an apparatus constructed to run any proposed
length of time under twelve hours; when it had run out its time it
unpinioned a strong lock resembling a gunlock, which gave fire to
the powder. This apparatus was so pinioned that it could not
possibly move till, by casting off the magazine from the vessel, it
was set in motion.

The skilful operator could swim so low on the surface of the water
as to approach very near a ship in the night without fear of being
discovered, and might, if he chose, approach the stem or stern above
water with very little danger. He could sink very quickly, keep at
any depth he pleased, and row a great distance in any direction he
desired without coming to the surface, and when he rose to the
surface he could soon obtain a fresh supply of air. If necessary he
might descend again and pursue his course.

_Experiments made to prove the nature and use of a Submarine Vessel._

The first experiment I made was with about two ounces of gunpowder,
which I exploded 4 feet under water, to prove to some of the first
personages in Connecticut that powder would take fire under water.

The second experiment was made with 2 lbs. of powder enclosed in a
wooden bottle and fixed under a hogshead, with a 2–inch oak plank
between the hogshead and the powder. The hogshead was loaded with
stones as deep as it could swim; a wooden pipe descending through
the lower head of the hogshead and through the plank into the powder
contained in the bottle, was primed with powder. A match put to the
priming exploded the powder, which produced a very great effect,
rending the plank into pieces, demolishing the hogshead, and casting
the stones and the ruins of the hogshead, with a body of water, many
feet into the air, to the astonishment of the spectators. This
experiment was likewise made for the satisfaction of the gentlemen
above mentioned.

I afterwards made many experiments of a similar nature, some of them
with large quantities of powder; they produced very violent
explosions, much more than sufficient for any purpose I had in view.

In the first essays with the submarine vessel I took care to prove
its strength to sustain the great pressure of the incumbent water
when sunk deep before I trusted any person to descend much below the
surface, and I never suffered any person to go under water without
having a strong piece of rigging made fast to it, until I found him
well acquainted with the operations necessary for his safety. After
that I made him descend and continue at particular depths, without
rising or sinking, row by the compass, approach a vessel, go under
her, and fix the wood screw mentioned in No. 2, and marked A, into
her bottom, &c., until I thought him sufficiently expert to put my
design into execution.

I found, agreeably to my expectations, that it required many trials
to make a person of common ingenuity a skilful operator. The first I
employed was very ingenious, and made himself master of the
business, but was taken sick in the campaign of 1776 at New York
before he had an opportunity to make use of his skill, and never
recovered his health sufficiently afterwards.

After various attempts to find an operator to my wish, I sent one
who appeared more expert than the rest from New York to a 50–gun
ship lying not far from Governor’s Island. He went under the ship
and attempted to fix the wooden screw into her bottom, but struck,
as he supposes, a bar of iron which passes from the rudder hinge,
and is spiked under the ship’s quarter. Had he moved a few inches,
which he might have done without rowing, I have no doubt but he
would have found wood where he might have fixed the screw, or if the
ship were sheathed with copper he might easily have pierced it; but
not being well skilled in the management of the vessel, in
attempting to move to another place he lost the ship. After seeking
her in vain for some time, he rowed some distance and rose to the
surface of the water, but found daylight had advanced so far that he
durst not renew the attempt. He says that he could easily have
fastened the magazine under the stem of the ship above water, as he
rowed up to the stern and touched it before he descended. Had he
fastened it there the explosion of 150 lbs. of powder (the quantity
contained in the magazine) must have been fatal to the ship. In his
return from the ship to New York he passed near Governor’s Island,
and thought he was discovered by the enemy on the island. Being in
haste to avoid the danger he feared, he cast off the magazine, as he
imagined it retarded him in the swell, which was very considerable.
After the magazine had been cast off one hour, the time the internal
apparatus was set to run, it blew up with great violence.

Afterwards there were two attempts made in Hudson’s River, above the
city, but they effected nothing. One of them was by the
afore-mentioned person. In going towards the ship he lost sight of
her, and went a great distance beyond her. When he at length found
her the tide ran so strong that, as he descended under water for the
ship’s bottom, it swept him away. Soon after this the enemy went up
the river and pursued the boat which had the submarine vessel on
board, and sunk it with their shot. Though I afterwards recovered
the vessel, I found it impossible at that time to prosecute the
design any farther. I had been in a bad state of health from the
beginning of my undertaking, and was now very unwell; the situation
of public affairs was such that I despaired of obtaining the public
attention and the assistance necessary. I was unable to support
myself and the persons I must have employed had I proceeded.
Besides, I found it absolutely necessary that the operators should
acquire more skill in the management of the vessel before I could
expect success, which would have taken up some time, and made no
small additional expense. I therefore gave over the pursuit for that
time, and waited for a more favourable opportunity, which never
arrived.

In the year 1777 I made an attempt from a whale-boat against the
_Cerberus_ frigate, then lying at anchor between Connecticut River
and New London, by drawing a machine against her side by means of a
line. The machine was loaded with powder, to be exploded by a
gunlock, which was to be unpinioned by an apparatus to be turned by
being brought alongside of the frigate. This machine fell in with a
schooner at anchor astern of the frigate, and concealed from my
sight. By some means or other it was fired, and demolished the
schooner and three men, and blew the only one left alive overboard,
who was taken up very much hurt.

After this I fixed several kegs under water, charged with powder, to
explode upon touching anything as they floated along with the tide.
I set them afloat in the Delaware, above the English shipping at
Philadelphia, in December, 1777. I was unacquainted with the river,
and obliged to depend upon a gentleman very imperfectly acquainted
with that part of it, as I afterwards found. We went as near the
shipping as we durst venture; I believe the darkness of the night
greatly deceived him, as it did me. We set them adrift to fall with
the ebb upon the shipping. Had we been within sixty rods I believe
they must have fallen in with them immediately, as I designed; but,
as I afterwards found, they were set adrift much too far distant,
and did not arrive until, after being detained some time by frost,
they advanced in the day-time in a dispersed situation, and under
great disadvantages. One of them blew up a boat with several persons
in it who imprudently handled it too freely, and thus gave the
British that alarm which brought on the battle of the kegs.

[Illustration:

BUSHNELL’S SUBMARINE.

A A. Oars. B. Rudder. C. Seat. D. Immersion tank. E. Pipe. F.
Conning tower. G. Safety weight. H. Torpedo.
]

The above vessel, magazine, &c., were projected in the year 1771,
but not completed until the year 1775.

The above account appears in the fourth volume of the Transactions of
the American Philosophical Society, and also in the fourth volume of
Nicholson’s Journal of Natural Philosophy (1801).

Disappointed in the failure of his submarine boat to accomplish the
things of which he felt sure it was capable, Bushnell went to France,
and finally settled in Georgia, where he lived under the pseudonym of
Dr. Bush until the year 1826, when he died at the ripe age of ninety.

General Washington, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson dated September 26,
1775, described Bushnell as “a man of great mechanical powers, fertile
in inventions, and master of execution.” With regard to the submarine
vessel he says, “I thought, and still think, that it was an effort of
genius, but that too many things were necessary to be combined to expect
much from the issue against an enemy who are always upon guard.”

Bushnell was undoubtedly the first inventor who combined in his design
submarine navigation and torpedo warfare, and his invention, crude
though it was, was the embryo of the modern diving torpedo-boat. The
principles on which it was built may be traced in almost all the later
submarine craft, and the improvements that have taken place have been
mostly due to the general progress of engineering; the “oar placed near
the top of the vessel” may be compared with Mr. Nordenfelt’s vertical
screws.

CHAPTER XII
FULTON’S SUBMARINE BOATS

“What will become of navies, and where will sailors be found to man
ships of war, when it is a physical certainty that they may at any
moment be blown into the air by means of diving-boats, against which
no human foresight can guard them?”—M. ST. AUBIN (in 1802).

Robert Fulton was born in 1765 in Little Britain, Pennsylvania, and died
at New York on February 24, 1815. In the year 1796 Fulton went to Paris,
residing at the house of Joel Barlow, then resident minister for the
United States, for seven years. While in Paris two projects occupied a
large portion of his time. The first was a carcass, or box, filled with
combustibles which was to be propelled under water and made to explode
beneath the bottom of a vessel.

The second was a submarine boat. In 1797 Fulton submitted his vessel to
the approval of the Government of the Directory, promising to furnish
them with an agent by which they could dispose of their enemies,
particularly British, in all parts of the world. A Commission appointed
to examine his ideas reported favourably on them, but the Minister of
the Marine would have nothing to do with them. Fulton then made a model
of his submarine, which met with the approval of another Commission, but
again the Minister of Marine was obdurate. Fulton now tried the Dutch
Government, but they did not look with any favour on the new methods of
under-water warfare.

Three years later (in 1800), Fulton approached Napoleon, who appeared to
think well of his schemes, for he appointed La Place, Mouge, and Volney
to examine them, and also gave him 10,000 francs to carry out
experiments.

In May, 1801, Fulton built his first submarine boat, the _Nautilus_. She
made her first trial on the Seine opposite the Invalides. Fulton and one
sailor formed the crew and with nothing but a candle to light the
interior, they remained submerged twenty minutes. On coming to the
surface they found that the current had carried them some considerable
distance down the river, so again sinking beneath the surface Fulton
steered his vessel to the point of departure. On July 3, 1801, Fulton
embarked with three companions on board his “plunging boat” in the
harbour of Brest; the four men descended in the _Nautilus_ a depth of 23
feet, which seemed to be the greatest depth the boat would stand. They
remained below in total darkness for one hour. At subsequent descents
Fulton tried to employ candles, but found they destroyed the vitality of
the air. Bulls-eyes were then inserted in the top of the boat, and these
alleviated, to a certain extent, the prevailing gloom.

Once Fulton with three persons is said to have stayed for six hours at a
depth of 5 feet by the aid of a copper globe of 1 cubic foot capacity
“containing 200 atmospheres”; on another occasion he sailed out of the
harbour, then quite suddenly lowered his mast, and disappeared from
view, showing how quickly he could submerge his craft.

The _Nautilus_ was a cigar-shaped boat about 7 feet in diameter. The
hull was of copper, but supported by iron ribs. It had one mast, a
mainsail, and a jib, which moved her at the rate of two miles an hour on
the surface, and were stowed in two minutes when preparing to dive.
Under the water the vessel was moved by the exertions of two men, the
“propelling engine” consisting of a wheel rotated by a hand-winch, at
the rate of 2½ miles an hour. A third man steered from a small conning
tower while Fulton governed the position of the boat by regulating the
machine which kept her balanced and determined her depth below the
surface. She was 21 feet 4 inches long, and was furnished with a keel
under the whole length of the hull.

Having proved that man could exist for some time beneath the surface in
a vessel and could steer it, Fulton made experiments with a torpedo or
case of explosive. On the first occasion he blew a small ship to
fragments with 20 lbs. of powder.

As he had shown his ability to blow up old hulks in French waters,
Fulton proposed to build a large submarine vessel, but failed to attain
official support, partly because those in authority considered that
submarine explosions were not legal warfare. One of these writes that
“this type of warfare carries with it the objection that those who
undertake it and those against whom it is made, will all be lost. This
cannot be called a gallant death.”

[Illustration:

THE “NAUTILUS” OF ROBERT FULTON.
]

Fulton asked a reward for each vessel he destroyed, the re-imbursement
of the price of his ship (40,000 francs), and lastly a patent giving
himself and his crew the quality of belligerents, so that if they were
captured they would not be hanged as pirates.

That submarine warfare was considered by some “immoral” at the time is
evident from the statement of Admiral Pleville le Pelle, the Minister of
Marine. “It seems impossible to serve a Commission for belligerency to
men who employ such a method of destroying the fleet of the enemy.”

As Fulton was equally unsuccessful in his effort to interest Napoleon in
steam navigation, the disappointed inventor crossed the Channel in order
to discover whether the English would show themselves any readier to
grasp new ideas, and would prove capable of foreseeing the possibilities
of his inventions.

It was in May, 1804, that Fulton came to England, and from some accounts
it would appear that the English Government, alarmed at Fulton’s plans,
invited him, at the suggestion of Earl Stanhope, to lay his ideas before
them. The inventor explained to the naval authorities that his system
rendered above-water fleets unnecessary, but they did not at all relish
the idea of fighting beneath the waves.

Mr. Pitt, however, then Prime Minister, was very much taken with the
American and his torpedoes, and appointed a Commission to watch certain
experiments. The Commission consisted of Mr. Pitt, Lords Mulgrave,
Melville, and Castlereagh, Sir Joseph Banks, Mr. Cavendish, Admiral Sir
Howe Popham (the only naval man in the Commission), Major Congreve, and
Sir John Rennie.

Although Mr. Pitt and some few others were disposed to look with favour
on Fulton’s devices, the Commission as a whole were of the same opinion
as Admiral Earl St. Vincent, who remarked that it was foolish for Pitt
to encourage “that gimcrack, for so he was laying the foundation for
doing away with the Navy, on which depended the strength and prestige of
Great Britain.”

Thus Fulton’s plans were declared to be unpracticable by the Commission.
Mr. Pitt still refused to relinquish his faith in Fulton, and on October
15, 1805, he caused an experiment to be made on an old Danish brig which
was blown to pieces by 170 lbs. of powder. Even this wonderful result
failed to appeal to those in authority, for while they recognised that
torpedoes and submarine boats might prove useful to weaker nations, and
might be used with effect by them, they declared that such weapons of
warfare could have no place in the naval equipment of the Mistress of
the Seas. It is said that Fulton was offered a large sum of money to
suppress his inventions, but this is doubtful. Full details of Fulton’s
boat and various confidential reports are said to be amongst the secret
papers of the Record Office.

In the year 1806 Fulton returned to New York and made overtures to the
United States Government. Receiving some encouragement he succeeded,
after many unsuccessful efforts, in blowing up a vessel which had been
prepared for the purpose. Admiral Porter in 1878 wrote, “A Midshipman
nowadays at our Torpedo School at Newport, would consider himself
disgraced if he failed to destroy a ship of the line in ten minutes with
less explosive powder, especially if the ship lay at anchor and gave him
every opportunity to operate upon her.” The admiral seems to forget that
Fulton was a pioneer, and laboured under every possible disadvantage in
prosecuting his work.

In 1810 Congress appropriated 5,000 dollars to assist Fulton in
developing his ideas. After many trials, most of which were failures,
the United States brig _Argus_ was prepared for Fulton’s final
experiment. By order of Commodore Rodgers, the vessel had been so
protected with spars and netting reaching to the bottom as to be
practically unassailable, and the attempt to blow her up by a submarine
torpedo was unsuccessful, as Fulton himself acknowledged, though he
could not refrain from adding that “a system then in its infancy, which
compelled a hostile vessel to guard herself by such extraordinary means,
could not fail of becoming a most important mode of warfare.”

Could Fulton have foreseen the manner in which his crude devices were to
develop into the Whitehead torpedo and submarine boat of to-day, he
would have had something to cheer him in his hours of depression.

After the failure of the _Argus_ experiment, Fulton devoted his
attention to steam navigation, and was more successful in this line than
in his efforts to introduce torpedo warfare, though he considered the
latter a matter of greater moment than the former.

In a letter to Joel Barlow, dated New York, August 22, 1807, Fulton
says, after describing his celebrated steam voyage up the Hudson:—

“However, I will not admit that it (steam navigation) is half so
important as the torpedo system of defence or attack, for out of this
will grow the liberty of the seas—an object of infinite importance to
the welfare of America and every civilised country. But thousands of
witnesses have now seen the steamboat in rapid movement and they
believe; but they have not seen a ship of war destroyed by a torpedo,
and they do not believe. We cannot expect people in general to have
knowledge of physics or power to reason from cause to effect, but in
case we have war and the enemy’s ships come into our waters, if the
Government will give me reasonable means of action, I will soon convince
the world that we have surer and cheaper modes of defence than they are
aware of.”

Referring to the failure of Fulton to induce the various Powers to adopt
his submarine boat and torpedo, Admiral Porter said (in 1878) that naval
men seventy years ago, whether in this country or abroad, saw no
prospect in the success of Fulton’s scheme but the destruction of the
service which was then their pride and glory, and it was hardly to be
wondered at that all plans to destroy ships by other means than the
legitimate eighteen-pounder were looked upon with disfavour. So the
torpedo slept, but in time it reappeared invested with such deadly
attributes that no nation could afford to disregard its claims as the
most destructive implement of naval warfare yet devised. During the
“Second War of Independence” (1812–1814) some unsuccessful attacks were
made by a diving vessel on British men-of-war, and this is generally
understood to be one of Fulton’s vessels.

The following extract is from a work published by James Kelly in 1818.

“About this time—that is the summer of 1813—some infamous and
insidious attempts were publicly encouraged for the destruction of
the British men-of-war upon the coasts of America by torpedoes and
other explosive machinery, as will appear from the following extract
from the American newspapers.

“‘A gentleman at Norwich, U.S., has invented a diving boat, which by
means of paddles he can propel under water at the rate of three
miles an hour, and ascend and descend at pleasure. He has been three
times under the bottom of the _Ramilies_ off New London. In the
first attempt, after remaining under some time, he came to the top
of the water like the porpoise for air, and as luck would have it,
came up but a few feet from the stern of the _Ramilies_.

“‘He was observed by a sentinel on deck who sang out “Boat ahoy!”
immediately on hearing which, the boat descended without making a
reply. Seeing this an alarm gun was fired on board the ship and all
hands called to quarter, the cable cut and the ship got under weigh
with all possible despatch, expecting to be blown up by a torpedo.

“‘In the third attempt he came up directly under the _Ramilies_, and
fastened himself and his boat to her keel, where he remained half an
hour and succeeded in perforating a hole through her upper, but
while engaged in screwing a torpedo to her bottom the screw broke
and defeated his object for that time. So great is the alarm and
fear on board the _Ramilies_ of some such stratagem being played
upon them, that Commodore Hardy has withdrawn his force from before
New London and keeps his ship under weigh all the time instead of
lying at anchor as formerly.’”

This “dishonourable attempt,” evidently made under the sanction of the
American executive, induced Sir Thomas Hardy to address letters to the
public authorities of New London, and to the Government of the States of
Connecticut on the subject. In these Sir Thomas Hardy states that “he is
fully apprised of the efforts to destroy the _Ramilies_, and that he
shall do all in his power to defeat them, but he thinks it right to
notify publicly that since the attempt he had ordered on board from
fifty to a hundred American prisoners of war, who in the event of the
efforts to destroy the ship by torpedoes or other infernal inventions
being successful, would share the fate of himself and his crew. That in
future whenever a vessel was taken, the crew would be kept on board
until it has ascertained that no snare was laid for the destruction of
British seamen, and that the regulations would be observed when a vessel
was boarded and abandoned by her crew.”

Sir Thomas adds that his example would be followed by all the commanders
of his squadron.

These representations had some effect on the American public, for on the
contents of the letter being known a public meeting was held, and as
many of the citizens had relations and friends prisoners of war on board
the British squadron, it was determined to present a remonstrance to the
American executive against the further employment of torpedoes in the
ordinary course of warfare.

Admiral Porter says that these submarine attacks were mostly
unauthorised by the U.S. Government, and disapproved by the navy, “who
preferred the more chivalric method of sinking vessels with eighteen and
twenty-four pounders, or mowing down their crews with grape and
canister.”

It is almost certain that the submarine craft that attacked H.M.S.
_Ramilies_ as she lay off New London was one of Fulton’s boats.

In the year 1814 Fulton constructed the _Mute_, a huge submarine capable
of holding a hundred men, and deriving its name from the silent engine
that propelled it. The _Mute_ was 80 feet 6 inches long, 21 feet wide,
and 11 feet deep. It was armoured on the top with iron sheets, beneath
which was a wood lining almost a foot in thickness. Before the trials
could be completed Fulton died, and thus the story of this ardent
inventor’s notions concerning submarine warfare comes to a close.

In 1810 Fulton published at New York a book, “Torpedo War and Submarine
Explosions,” in which he gives an account of the various devices he had
contrived for blowing up ships, piers, &c., and of the actual
experiments he had made. He seems to have elaborated his submarine boat
after his torpedo had been invented, and his idea was that an
under-water vessel would be useful in discharging torpedoes. His method
of attack was to float the torpedo down to the object to be attacked,
and to guide and even explode them by means of lines. He seemed not to
have thought of the use of the spar torpedo as we know it to-day.

CHAPTER XIII
SUBMARINES DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

From the death of Robert Fulton down to the commencement of the American
Civil War no very startling developments in under-water warfare are to
be chronicled. During the Schleswig-Holstein War of 1848–50 the modern
subaqueous explosive mine first came into use in actual warfare, and
mines were also employed during the Crimean War; in 1859 by the
Austrians at the time of the threatened attack on Venice by the French,
and by the Chinese in 1857–58 to defend the streams in the neighbourhood
of Canton.

The mine and the torpedo both played their part in the American Civil
War, and since then both these weapons have been adopted as valuable
factors of offence and defence by all the great Powers. When the
Southern Confederacy seceded from the United States in 1861, one of the
first steps of its naval department was to form a torpedo section to
protect approaches to places liable to attack by the Northern fleet. It
was during the war that the idea was applied of taking the mine to the
hostile ship by means of a boat, for the mine, besides being immovable,
was liable to be picked up or cut adrift by the enemy. A charge of
powder was placed at the end of a long pole carried in the bows of the
boat; when darkness came on the boat crept up to the enemy, the pole and
charge were run under water until in contact with the hull of the enemy,
and the explosive was then ignited by means of electricity. Thus came
into being the “spar” or “outrigger” torpedo, a weapon which still finds
a place in the armament of the British fleet. The Confederates affixed
the spar torpedo to at least one ironclad ship and many small steam
vessels, and much damage was inflicted on the enemy by its employment.

It must be remembered that automobile or fish torpedoes had not been
invented at this time, and that the only under-water weapons used on
both sides were fixed mines and spar torpedoes.

It was in order to use the spar torpedo to the greatest advantage that
the diving torpedo-boat was employed, and in this chapter we shall have
to deal with a very famous incident in the history of submarine
navigation, namely, the sinking of the Federal frigate _Housatonic_ by a
submarine boat manned by the Confederates and armed with a spar torpedo.

Early in the war the Federal or Northern Government entered into
negotiations with a Frenchman, whose name we have been unable to
discover, to build and operate a submarine boat against the Confederate
or Southern vessels. In particular the North desired to blow up the
Confederate _Merrimac_ in Norfolk Harbour. It has been stated that
$10,000 were to be paid for the boat when finished, and $5,000 for each
successful attack with her. The boat was apparently constructed at the
Navy Yard at Washington, and paid for by the Federals, but before they
could learn the art of navigating the vessel the Frenchman, taking his
gains with him, left the country. Whether the boat would have proved of
much value is to be doubted, and the probability is that the inventor
would have been as unsuccessful as were the Federals in working the
craft.

Admiral Hichborn terms it “an absurd arrangement of duckfoot hand-worked
paddles in an age when the screw-propeller was in common use.”

It was 35 feet long and 6 feet in diameter, and was built up of
steel plates. Immersion was obtained by the admission of water, and
the mode of propulsion on the surface or below the water was by
eight pairs of oars or paddles which opened and shut like the leaves
of a book, and were worked by sixteen men placed half on the port
and half on the starboard. The maximum speed was 2½ knots on the
surface. Fresh air was produced by two machines—one consisted of a
bellows passing air over a chamber of lime, the other produced
oxygen. The armament was a spar torpedo. According to one account it
was towed round by a steamboat to Port Royal and foundered in a
storm of wind off Cape Hatteras.

Early in 1863 the Confederates cut down a gunboat at Charleston and
converted it into a half-submerged torpedo-boat. It does not appear to
have done any mischief, but Mr. H. W. Wilson, in his “Ironclads in
Action,” says that it may have been the vessel which on the night of
April 19, 1864, approached the _Wabash_. The Northern vessel was at
anchor when something was seen near her in the water and challenged. She
slipped her cable and went ahead, opening a heavy fire upon the strange
craft, after which it disappeared, whether as the result of a shot or
not is uncertain.

On the night of October 5, 1863, an attack was made upon the United
States’ ironclad, _New Ironsides_, of 3,486 old American tons, carrying
twenty guns, at anchor in the midst of the blockading squadron off
Charleston, by a submarine vessel owned by the Confederates. This boat
was built by Theodore Stoney at Charleston, and was called the _David_,
a name given by the Southerns to some subsequent under-water craft in
memory of the fight between the lad David and the giant Goliath.

This first _David_ was 54 feet long and at her widest depth 6 feet in
diameter. She was cigar-shaped, and was propelled by a screw driven by
steam power. When in action she lay almost flush with the water, her
funnel and steering chamber alone projecting above the surface. (Another
report says that she was so far submerged that only about 10 feet in
length of the hull was visible 2 feet above the water.) Her armament
consisted of a single spar torpedo with a 60 lb. charge of gunpowder,
which was folded alongside when not in use, and only run out on an iron
bar to a distance of 10 feet for the actual attack, ignition being
effected by an acid fuse rendered active by a collision nearly end on.
Her maximum speed was 7 knots an hour.

“With a crew of volunteers Lieut. Glassell took her out, and, a
little after nine in the evening, the _Ironsides_ watch saw her
approaching. She looked to them like a plank, since all that could
be seen was the coaming of her hatchway. Several officers were on
deck, and the _David_ was at once hailed. Her only answer was a
volley of musketry which mortally wounded one Federal officer. An
instant later the ironclad received a violent blow from the
explosion of a torpedo containing 60 lbs. of powder, which threw up
a column of water, shook the ship severely and broke one man’s leg
on board her. After the smoke and spray had cleared away the
_Ironsides_ was found to be uninjured and the boat had disappeared.
Her crew jumped overboard at the moment of firing the torpedo, and
Glassell, as he swam about, hailed a Northern coal schooner, on
board which he was taken, whilst a second man escaped to the
_Ironsides_. The engineer of the _David_, however, after the
explosion swam back to the boat, to which he found the pilot
clinging for dear life, as he was unable to swim. Helping him on
board he discovered that the _David_ could yet float, though the
explosion had put out the fires, and together the two took her back
to Charleston.”

In a paper on “Offensive Torpedo Warfare,” read before the Royal United
Service Institution in 1871, Commander W. Dawson, R.N., writes of the
attack as follows:—

“Observe the elements of failure. A charge destructive enough if
exploded in actual contact, but innocuous to a strongly built ship
by the accidental interposition of seven or eight feet of water, yet
held near enough to the operating vessel to place her in immediate
danger, either from the direct action of the explosion upon her thin
sides, or from her being swamped by the falling columns of water,
self-acting fuses, so arranged as to necessitate the most exposed
direction of attack, viz., the enemy’s broadside; an acid
composition sluggish enough in its action to allow time for the boat
to rebound after collision, the few feet required to render the
explosion harmless, and last, not least, a commander and crew, who,
having never fired their weapon before, were in greater terror of
their own torpedo than the enemy would have been. Can we wonder that
the conductor of this enterprise jumped overboard before the
explosion, that his little vessel had her fires extinguished and was
nearly swamped, and that the _New Ironsides_, though severely
injured, was not compelled to return into port? The crew, deserted
by their commander, relighted the fires, and brought the boat safely
into harbour.”

The first attempts of the Confederates with their submarine boat having
proved a failure, the Federal officers on the outside blockade grew
somewhat careless, and the final result of the Confederates’ efforts was
that one of the fine new vessels of the Federal fleet, the _Housatonic_,
1,264 tons, and carrying 13 guns, was destroyed in Charleston harbour on
the night of February 17, 1864.

The _David_ that accomplished this feat, unique in the annals of
submarine warfare, had been built at Mobile by Messrs. McClintock and
Howgate, and brought overland to Charleston. She had lateral fins by
which she could be raised and submerged, and ballast tanks to lighten
her and enable her to rise to the surface, though these, we read,
uniformly refused to act. She carried no reserve of air, and hence she
well deserved the name “peripatetic coffin.” She was about 60 feet long,
and elliptical in transverse section. Her crew consisted of nine men,
eight of whom propelled the vessel by operating cranks on the screw
shaft, while the ninth acted as pilot.

[Illustration:

THE “DAVID” THAT SANK THE “HOUSATONIC.”
]

It was originally designed to make the attack by passing under the keel
of a ship towing a contact torpedo, having a small reserve buoyancy.
Under favourable conditions the torpedo would be drawn under water when
the vessel descended, strike the bottom of the ship, and explode on
contact.

During her first cruise under the orders of Lieut. Payne (or Paine?) an
enemy’s vessel passed close to her without noticing her; the swill
raised by her paddles sunk the _David_, and Payne alone of all the crew
saved himself. When the boat was recovered from the bottom, Lieut. Payne
persuaded eight sailors to embark with him; a squall of wind caused the
boat to fill with water, Lieut. Payne and two bluejackets alone escaping
by leaping out of her as she went down. No sooner was the boat recovered
from the bottom than her gallant commander offered to try again. A new
crew volunteered, and all went well for a time. But one night, off Fort
Sumter, she capsized, and only four (of whom Lieut. Payne was one)
escaped.

A third time she was raised, and the next essay was made in the Cooper
River, under the lead of Mr. Aunley, one of the men who had constructed
the boat. Alas! She sank for the fourth time, having caught her nose in
the bottom, and all hands were drowned. Once more she was recovered only
to foul the cable of a schooner at anchor in the harbour, and to sink
for a fifth time.

Up to this time five crews of eight each had volunteered for service in
the ill-starred _David_, and of these forty men, no less than
thirty-five had perished. The brave Southern sailors, instead of
fighting shy of the submarine, were as ready as ever to face death
again. The _David_ was recovered, and Lieut. Dixon, with Captain
Carlson, both officers in the Confederate army, volunteered with five
others to take her out against the Northern fleet. The Federal corvette
_Housatonic_ lay outside the bar in Charleston harbour, and it was on
this vessel that on the evening of February 17, 1864, the attack was
made, an attack which is thus vividly described by Admiral David Porter,
U.S. Navy, in his book, “The Naval History of the Civil War”:—

“At about 8.45 p.m. the officer of the deck on board the unfortunate
vessel discovered something about 100 yards away, moving along the
water. It came directly towards the ship, and within two minutes of
the time it was first sighted was alongside. The cable was slipped,
the engines backed, and all hands called to quarters. But it was too
late—the torpedo struck the _Housatonic_ just forward of the
mainmast, on the starboard side, in a line with the magazine. The
man who steered her knew where the vulnerable spots of the steamer
were, and he did his work well. When the explosion took place the
ship trembled all over as if by the shock of an earthquake, and
seemed to be lifted out of the water, and then sunk stern foremost,
heeling to port as she went down. Her captain, Pickering, was
stunned and somewhat bruised by the concussion, and the order of the
day was ‘_Sauve qui peut_.’ A boat was despatched to the
_Canandaigua_, not far off, and that vessel at once responded to the
request for help, and succeeded in rescuing the greater part of the
crew. Strange to say, the _David_ was not seen after the explosion,
and was supposed to have slipped away in the confusion; but when the
_Housatonic_ was inspected by divers, the torpedo boat was found
sticking in the hole she had made, and all her crew were dead in
her. It was a reckless adventure these men had engaged in, and one
in which they could scarcely have hoped to succeed. They had tried
it once before inside the harbour, and some of the crew had been
blown overboard. How could they hope to succeed on the outside,
where the sea might be rough, when the speed of the _David_ was not
over five knots, and when they might be driven out to sea! Reckless
as it might be, it was the most sublime patriotism, and showed the
length to which men could be urged on behalf of a cause for which
they were willing to give up their lives and all they held most
dear.”

It was by deeds such as these that North and South are to-day united, as
they never were before.

When Lieutenant Hobson, during the Spanish-American war, offered to sink
the _Merrimac_ at the entrance of Santiago harbour, half the American
sailors were wild to join in the hazardous task, and if volunteers for
submarines had been requested it is certain that men would have come
forward in 1898 as they did so nobly in 1864.

[Illustration:

THE SINKING OF THE “HOUSATONIC.”
]

The _David_, that finally succeeded in sinking the _Housatonic_, proved
so costly an experiment in human lives, because she was not worked as a
submarine, but as a low freeboard surface torpedo boat, a purpose for
which she was never designed, and for which, as we have seen, she proved
dangerous and inefficient. As some one has observed, she was intended
for submerging at pleasure—her own pleasure, however, not that of her
crew. During the attack on the _Housatonic_, on February 17th, the
vessel did not run under water. The crew submerged it to the hatch
coaming and left the cover open against the protest of Mr. Howgate, who
despatched it on its mission. The attack was made by a spar torpedo, and
the wave thrown up by its explosion, when it struck the _Housatonic_,
entered the open hatchway and swamped the vessel. Most accounts of the
feat of the _David_ state that _all_ the crew were drowned. From the
following extract it would seem that the gallant captain survived the
attack.

“I remember on one occasion during the war,” wrote Hobart Pacha in
an article, “The Torpedo Scare,” appearing in _Blackwood’s Magazine_
for June, 1885, “when I was at Charleston, meeting in a coffee-room
at that place a young naval officer (a Southerner) with whom I got
into conversation. He told me that that night he was going to sink a
Northern man-of-war which was blockading the port, and invited me to
see him off. I accompanied him down to his cigar-boat, as he called
it, and found that she was a vessel about forty feet long, shaped
like a cigar, on the bow of which was placed a torpedo. On his
stepping on board with his crew of four men, his boat was immersed
till nothing but a small piece of funnel was visible. He moved off
into the darkness at no great speed—say at about five miles an hour.
The next evening, on visiting the coffee-house, I found my friend
sitting quietly smoking his pipe. He told me that he had succeeded
in making a hole in the frigate which he had attacked, which vessel
could, in fact, be seen lying in shallow water, some seven miles
off, careened over to repair damages. But he said that, on the
concussion made by firing the torpedo, the water had rushed in
through the hatches of his boat, and she had sunk to the bottom. All
his men were drowned. He said he didn’t know how he escaped himself,
but he fancied that he came up through the hatches, as he found
himself floating about, and swam on shore. This affair was
officially reported by the American blockading squadron,
corroborating the fact of the injury done to the frigate, and
stating that the torpedo-boat was got up, with four dead bodies in
her hold. Here is one system which might be utilised in naval
warfare if perfected, and I am given to understand that a submarine
torpedo-boat is already invented by Mr. Nordenfelt.”

After the sinking of the _Housatonic_ the Federals again turned their
attention to submarine warfare, and in October, 1864, some trials were
made on the Hudson with a boat named the _Stromboli_, constructed at
Fairhaven from the designs of an engineer, one Wood. It was not,
properly speaking, either a submarine or a diving boat, but by letting
in a certain quantity of water into the reservoirs it could be brought
flush with the surface, leaving only the conning tower, the chimney and
the ventilator above the waves. A steam engine propelled the _Stromboli_
at a speed of ten miles an hour, while a spar torpedo formed the
armament. On the 16th of November, 1864, the _Stromboli_ was under the
command of John Lay, and was ordered to proceed to Hampton Roads to
attack the Confederate cruisers. It appears to have arrived on the 6th
of December, but its subsequent doings are not to be discovered.

Another semi-submarine which figured in the American Civil War was the
_Sputyen Duyvil_, built by Messrs. Mallory & Co., from the plans of
Messrs. William Wood and John Lay. She was made of wood, and her
dimensions were, length 74 feet, beam 20 feet, draught 7½ feet. On going
into action she could be immersed to a depth of 9 feet in order to put
her armoured side below water, she was to fight with her deck, which was
placed with 3–in. armour, flush with the water. Amidships, and standing
about 3 feet above the deck, was a pilot house from which the boat could
be steered. The _Sputyen Duyvil_ was attached to James River’s squadron
during the year 1865, but there is no evidence that she was ever brought
into use; her torpedoes were fired on contact, and were worked through a
hollow iron boom projecting from the bow, and having inside it a rod to
which the torpedo was to be attached.

[Illustration:

THE “SPUTYEN DUYVIL.”
]

CHAPTER XIV
THE WHITEHEAD TORPEDO—“THE MOST WONDERFUL MACHINE IN THE WORLD”

“When you have been shown lovingly over a torpedo by an artificer
skilled in the working of its tricky bowels, torpedoes have a
meaning and a reality for you to the end of your days.”—RUDYARD
KIPLING.

“The next great naval war will bestow upon the torpedo and its users
a halo of romance which will eclipse entirely that surrounding the
gun and the ram.”

“The arts of shipbuilders and steel-workers stand for nothing when a
Whitehead torpedo succeeds in striking a ship’s bottom and tears and
rends it with the explosion of 200 lbs. of gun-cotton. In the hands
of ignorant or careless people the Whitehead is nearly as dangerous
to its friends as to its foes, but in the hands of skilful and
resolute men it is the most terrible engine of warfare which the
world has ever seen.”—Lieut. G. E. ARMSTRONG, in _Torpedoes and
Torpedo Vessels_.

“The spar-torpedo is the dagger which a determined man plunges into
the body of an enemy who does not protect himself with a coat of
mail; the Whitehead torpedo is the bullet which, easy to discharge
from afar, kills the enemy in its path.”—Lieut. C. ARNAULT.

Although twenty-five Federal vessels are known to have been sunk and
destroyed, and nine others more or less injured by various kinds of
torpedoes during the great war of secession, the many objections to the
employment of the spar-torpedo were only too evident. The necessarily
close proximity of the craft attacking and the ship attacked, resulted
in some cases in the destruction of the former as well as the latter,
and inventive minds therefore set to work to devise a submarine weapon
which could be discharged at the enemy from a distance. The result was
the automobile fish torpedo, an instrument of warfare which is to be
found in every navy, and the sole armament of the modern submarine boat.

In a history of under-water warfare, a description of the Whitehead
torpedo, which is in reality a crewless submarine boat, must find a
place, but a word may be said beforehand respecting the difference
between the “Mine” and the “Torpedo.”

The mine is a stationary charge of explosive contained in a case moored
beneath the surface of the water. The torpedo is a case of explosive,
which by some means or other is provided with the power of aggression,
either on or below the surface. The mine awaits the enemy, in fine,
whilst the torpedo goes to seek him. Into the details of Submarine
Mining it is not proposed to enter here.

Torpedoes are divided into two classes—(1) Uncontrollable. (2)
Controllable. Class I. comprises Projectile, Rocket, Drifting, and
Automobile torpedoes; the last named are now practically the only kind
of uncontrollable torpedo employed. In nearly all navies the “Whitehead”
is the type adopted; the German uses the “Schwartzkopff,” which differs
only from the former in that it is made of phosphor-bronze instead of
steel. Controllable torpedoes comprise Spar, Towing, Dirigible,
Locomotive and Automobile. Great Britain has adopted the Brennan
locomotive torpedo for coast defence only, and she still retains the
spar-torpedo, although it is doubtful if it would ever be used in a
naval engagement.

[Sidenote: The Whitehead Torpedo.]

Somewhere about the year 1860 an officer of the Austrian Marine
Artillery devised plans for the construction of a surface screw boat or
fire-ship, to be propelled either by a steam or hot-air engine, or by
clockwork, to be steered from the shore by means of long tiller ropes,
and to carry in its fore part a large charge of gun-cotton, the
explosion of which was effected by means of a pistol in communication
with a movable blade at the bow, and with one vertical and two
horizontal spars, so that if any of these arrangements came into contact
with the object aimed at the pistol was fired and the charge
exploded.[8] On the death of this officer, which took place before he
had time to put his ideas into practice, the pen drawings came into the
possession of Captain Lupuis, an officer of the Austrian navy. During
the sixties Captain Lupuis carried out a series of experiments with a
view of discovering a means of propelling a floating torpedo along the
surface of the water and directing it by means of ropes and guiding
lines. The forward end of the torpedo was to be charged with explosive,
and on coming in contact with a vessel it would be exploded by the
automatic firing of a pistol. The motive power was to be either steam or
clockwork. The Austrian Government, before whom he laid his plans, told
him that they could not consider them until he discovered some reliable
form of motor and a better method of steering. In the year 1864 Captain
Lupuis sought the advice and assistance of a Mr. Whitehead, at the time
manager to an engine manufacturing company at Fiume, and the result was
that the latter invented the famous locomotive torpedo that bears his
name.

Footnote 8:

A picture of this—the original idea for a locomotive torpedo—appears
in the twenty-ninth volume of the Journal of the Royal United Service
Institution.

The first Whitehead fish torpedo was produced in 1866, but it was a very
much less terrible engine of destruction than it is to-day. It was built
of steel, was 14 inches in diameter, 16 inches at the fins, and weighed
300 lbs. Its explosive charge was 18 lbs. of dynamite. The motive power
was compressed air charged to a pressure of about 700 lbs. to the square
inch, and the air chamber was made of ordinary boiler plates. The speed
was only six knots for a short distance. Mr. Whitehead’s design was a
great improvement on Captain Lupuis’s. It ran beneath the waves, it was
independent of outside aid when once started, and its motive power was
superior both to steam and clockwork. Still it was by no means a
perfectly reliable weapon, and its great fault was that it failed to
keep a uniform depth in the water.

By 1868 Mr. Whitehead had invented the “Balance” Chamber, which has
since proved a very effective means of controlling the depth of the
torpedo. In 1868 a committee of Austrian naval officers experimented
with two Whiteheads whose dimensions were as follows:—

Small. Large.
ft. in. ft. in.
Length 11 7 14 1
Maximum diameter 0 14 0 16

lbs. lbs.
Weight 346 650
Charge (gun-cotton) 40 60

The trials were carried out at Fiume; the Austrian gunboat _Genese_ was
handed over to Mr. Whitehead to fit with a bow ejecting tube, and the
target consisted of the yacht _Fantasie_. The result was the adoption of
the Whitehead by the Austrian Government in 1868.

Although the Austrian Government purchased the secret of the Whitehead
torpedo, they were unable to secure the exclusive right of manufacture.
On the invitation of the English Admiralty, Mr. Whitehead came to
England in 1870, bringing with him two torpedoes and a submerged tube.

The first two English torpedoes were of two sizes and of the following
dimensions:—

Length. Max. diam. Charge.
ft. in. in.
No. 1. Large size 14 0 16 67 lbs. gun-cotton.
No. 2. Small size 13 10½ 14 18 lbs. dynamite.

The trials were carried out on board the _Oberon_, an old paddle-wheel
sloop. Over 100 runs were made and the average speed obtained was 8·5
knots for a distance of 200 yards, and 7·5 knots for 600 yards. The
balance chamber proved capable of keeping the torpedo at the required
depth, although at times it behaved in an erratic fashion. After the
trials, the committee of investigation reported that in their opinion
“any maritime nation failing to provide itself with submarine locomotive
torpedoes, would be neglecting a great source of power both for offence
and defence.” Acting on this verdict the English Government, in April,
1871, purchased the secret and right of manufacture of the Whitehead
torpedo for £15,000.

Naturally certain conservative officers, incapable of recognising the
possibility of improvement in the weapons of naval warfare, sneered at
the torpedo, but their scorn had little effect, and in a short time all
the great navies of the world had adopted the Whitehead or some similar
form of fish torpedo. One instance will be sufficient to show that naval
men failed in many cases to realise the potential value of this
instrument of destruction.

Commander W. Dawson, R.N., in a paper read before the Royal United
Service Institution, commenting on the drawbacks of the Whitehead,
remarked that he did not attach much value to self-contained powers of
locomotion in submarine projectiles, and said that he believed that
progress must be looked for in modification of the outrigger and the
towing torpedoes which were free from complicated mechanism, simple in
their application, and above all safe to the operators and to friendly
vessels.

In 1876 Mr. Whitehead produced an improved torpedo. It had a diameter of
only 14 inches, a speed of 18 knots for a distance of 600 yards, and a
charge of 26 lbs. of gun-cotton. It was fitted for the first time with
the “servo-motor,” which, as Lieutenant Armstrong remarks, makes the
steering almost as perfect as if a mannikin helmsman were steering the
torpedo from the inside. In 1884 it was still further improved. The
speed was raised to 24 knots and the explosive charge was increased. In
1889 the speed was again raised to 29 knots for 1,000 yards, and the
charge was 200 lbs. of gun-cotton.

The Whitehead torpedoes carried in His Majesty’s ships to-day are of two
dimensions:—

Diameter. Speed. Range. Charge.
in. kts. yds.
A 18 32 600 200 lbs. gun-cotton
B 14 30 600 80 lbs. gun-cotton

Several different patterns of Whitehead torpedoes are turned out at the
various factories, but they all resemble each other in their main
characteristics.

[Illustration:

MARK IX., R.G.F., FOURTEEN INCH WHITEHEAD TORPEDO.
]

The “baby,” as the seaman calls it, is a cigar-shaped object made of
steel or of phosphor-bronze. It is divided into compartments, and in the
foremost of these is placed in war time the explosive charge. At the
head is the end of a pointed rod penetrating the explosive, and when the
torpedo comes into contact with a solid object, the point of the rod is
driven in against a detonator which explodes the charge and tears a hole
in the ship’s bottom. Abaft the explosive chamber comes the air chamber;
herein is stored the compressed air which acts as the motive power of
the torpedo. Behind this is the balance chamber, where all the automatic
steering apparatus is fixed. Abaft this are the engines; these are
worked by the compressed air from the air chamber and revolve a shaft,
on to the end of which are two screw-propellers working in opposite
directions. Furthest aft of all is another hollow air compartment termed
the buoyancy chamber. There are four rudders, two horizontal for
steering from right to left, and two vertical for maintaining the proper
depth.

One might be forgiven for thinking that the narrower the fore part of
the torpedo the faster would be its speed; a study of fishes shows,
however, that this is not Nature’s principle, and the Whitehead is
therefore thicker at the fore than at the tail; technically, it has “a
full entrance with a very fine run.” The Whitehead is divided into eight
sections, containing:—

1. The firing arrangement.

2. The explosive chamber.

3. The air chamber.

4. The “balance” chamber.

5. The engine chamber.

6. The buoyancy chamber.

7. The bevel wheel chamber.

8. The horizontal and vertical rudders and propellers.

1 AND 2. THE FIRING ARRANGEMENT AND EXPLOSIVE CHAMBER.

At the head of the _Whitehead_ is the end of a pointed steel rod
which penetrates the chamber containing the explosive. When the
torpedo’s nose comes into contact with a ship’s side, or in fact any
rigid object, the point of this rod is driven in against a detonator
cap inserted in the centre of the charge: the immediate result is an
explosion sufficient to tear a large hole in the ship’s hull. The
detonator is fulminate of mercury, which, when ignited by a sudden
blow, expands to about 2,500 times its own size. The sudden
expansion gives such a severe blow to the gun-cotton around it that
it at once explodes. Special precautions have to be taken to prevent
the torpedo from damaging the ship from which it is fired: it might
happen through carelessness that a lieutenant would fire one with
the port closed, and so three checks are provided. The rod is so
arranged that it cannot go back until a small “collar” with
propeller fans on it has revolved off. When the torpedo enters the
water the fans begin to turn, and when it has run some 30 yards the
collar is worked off. Even then the charge will not explode unless
the blow to the rod is severe enough to shear off a little copper
pin standing in the way. Lastly there is a third precaution in the
shape of a safety pin which holds the collar fixed until it is
withdrawn at the last moment as the torpedo is launched into the
tube.

It happened in the Russo-Turkish war that a Russian lieutenant in
command of a torpedo-boat forgot to haul out the “safety pin” and
the consequence was that though the torpedo reached the target it
failed to explode. From what has been said it will be understood
that torpedo warfare is not quite so simple as it looks. In time of
peace the torpedo is not fitted with its war head, and so for daily
purposes a steel dummy head is used, while there is an arrangement
that causes it to rise to the surface on completion of their run. To
facilitate its recovery, a “Holme’s light” is carried on to the
head. This consists of an arrow-headed tin canister pierced with
tubes and full of phosphide of calcium, which on contact with the
water gives out both a strong light and a strong smell.

3. THE AIR CHAMBER.

This contains the motive power of the torpedo and it comes just
behind the explosive chamber. The air is compressed into the
compartment by means of air-compressing pumps fitted on board ship,
and the latest types are tested to a pressure of 1,700 lbs. to the
square inch.

4. THE BALANCE CHAMBER.

Next the air chamber comes the balance, or secret chamber, although
the secret is now universally known. Here is contained the mechanism
for automatically transmitting to the horizontal rudders the
movements necessary for keeping the torpedo at a uniform and
pre-arranged depth below the surface during its run. It consists of
a hydrostatic valve and a pendulum whose combined movements are
transmitted to an air cylinder called a “servo-motor,” placed in the
engine room. The hydrostatic valve is kept in its place by a spring
that is forced in by the pressure of the water when the torpedo goes
below a certain depth to which the valve has previously been
adjusted. If the pressure be less than that of the set depth the
opposite action takes place. This valve is connected with the
servo-motor, which in its turn acts on the horizontal rudders. The
pendulum consists of a heavy iron weight curved to correspond with
the circular section of the torpedo and suspended by the pivoted
steel rods or arms. It swings in a fore and aft direction and is
connected by rods to the rudder for a certain distance after the
discharge of the torpedo. A controlling gear is provided which keeps
the rudders fixed. It will thus be seen that by the combined actions
of the hydrostatic valve and the pendulum the Whitehead, after
leaving the tube, is brought to the proper depth very rapidly and is
held at this depth throughout her run. Both these devices are
necessary, as the torpedo has a great tendency to run down an
inclined plane at great speed, and this requires to be checked. In
addition the balance chamber contains various valves (the stop
valve, the charging valve, the starting valve, the delay action
valve and the reducing valve) through which the air passes on its
way to the engines from the air chamber.

5. THE ENGINE ROOM.

Inside the engine room are the propelling engines and the
servo-motor. The engines are of the single-acting three-cylinder
Brotherhood type. The compressed air, after leaving the air
reservoir, passes through the main pipe to the pressure-reducing
valve. In the latest pattern 18 inch Whitehead the indicated horse
power is 56. The torpedo is started by means of a trigger which
projects a little beyond the casing of the torpedo, and which
automatically opens the starting valve when the torpedo is fired,
the trigger just before leaving the tube is caught by a catch in the
tube which draws it back when the catch releases itself.

THE SERVO-MOTOR.

This ingenious apparatus was called into existence owing to the fact
that the mechanism of the balance chamber was unable, through its
feeble power, to work the horizontal rudders of the faster
Whiteheads direct. The servo-motor is, then, the air engine from
which is derived the power to move the diving rudders. It is only
about 4 inches long, but so great is its power that with only
half-an-ounce pressure on the slide valve the piston is capable of
lifting 180 lbs. It consists of a cylinder, a piston, and a
cylindrical slide valve. Its balance mechanism acts on the slide
valve of the servo-motor, and this acts on the piston, and the
motion of the piston is transmitted to the diving rudders by means
of a rod and a system of levers.

6. THE BUOYANCY CHAMBER.

Abaft the engine room is the buoyancy chamber which gives the
necessary buoyancy to the torpedo: to guard against the collapse of
the chamber flat steel rings are fitted into it for support. In the
“Tail,” the rearmost compartments of the torpedo, are carried the
bevel wheel mechanism, the vertical and horizontal rudders and the
propellers, and the counter mechanism for adjusting the length of
run.

THE GYROSCOPE.

From the foregoing description of the many devices employed to enable
the Whitehead to accomplish the tasks for which it is intended, it might
be thought that everything that science could imagine has been done to
ensure its efficiency. There still, however, remained one great drawback
to the efficiency of the torpedo, and this was its deflection from right
to left, which was often so serious as to prevent it from striking the
object at which it was aimed. The hydrostatic valve and the pendulum
were sufficient to keep the torpedo at the required depth without
diverging from her true vertical course, but it was apt to swerve from
its course in a right or left direction either by reason of the blow it
received on striking the water, by dents on its shell, by air leakage,
or other causes. An error of only one degree in its course means a
lateral error of nearly 50 feet at 800 yards, and it was in order to
prevent the deflection of the Whitehead out of the line of fire that the
principle of the gyroscope has been applied to the torpedo. In addition
to her pair of ordinary vertical rudders, which may be set to any angle
up to 20 degrees by means of a clamping screw, the torpedo carries a
pair of movable vertical rudders placed in recesses in the vertical fins
and controlled by the gyroscope through a servo-motor. The ordinary
vertical rudders are usually discarded if the latter are carried.

[Illustration:

_Photos by_] [_West & Co._

THE FIRING OF A WHITEHEAD TORPEDO.
]

In a manifesto issued in July, 1901, the Navy League declared that owing
to the lack of prevision no adequate provision for gyroscopes and other
“essentials of efficient fighting” had been made. Soon afterwards, in
the House of Commons, Mr. Arnold Forster, referring to the condition of
the navy, remarked that the gyroscope was an exceedingly complicated and
beautiful appliance, which from its nature and mechanism you could not
get by sending round the corner. Its manufacture, he said, was a long
process, involving considerable skilled labour, but still it had been
carried out with unremitting zeal, and a great many vessels were
supplied with them, He assured the House that there had been no
relaxation in the effort to provide all torpedoes with this necessary
and desirable accomplishment.

The working of the gyroscope as applied to the Whitehead torpedo may now
be described. In the centre of the lower part of the buoyancy chamber is
placed a small heavy-rimmed flywheel or gyroscope about 1¾ lbs. in
weight, carefully suspended on gymbals (like a ship’s compass) in a
vertical position and transverse to the axis of the torpedo. The
apparatus is “set” by winding up a strong spring, and the action of
firing the torpedo from the tube releases the spring and causes the
gyroscope to spin round at a rate of about 2,200 revolutions a minute.
The use of the gyroscope is based on the fact that if a wheel be set
spinning on its axis with any considerable velocity, it will always tend
to revolve in the same place to which it is set spinning. The gyroscope
works a servo-motor, which in its turn works a pair of movable vertical
rudders, and the slightest deviation from the direction in which the
torpedo was originally fired causes the gyroscope to move the rudders
and bring back the torpedo to its pre-determined course. Thanks to the
hydrostatic valve, the pendulum, and the gyroscope, the Whitehead
torpedo is almost certain to hit the object at which it is aimed. In
peace manœuvres the Whitehead has often been run absolutely dead
straight, with no divergence either up or down, or from right to left,
to a distance of 2,000 yards. In 1890 the range of the Whitehead (Mark X
R.L.) was officially placed at 800 yards, so the value of the gyroscope
is quite evident.

Torpedoes are fired in four ways—

1. By submerged tubes.

2. By above-water tubes.

3. By revolving tubes.

4. By boat’s “dropping gear.”

The torpedo is blown out of the tube either by compressed air suddenly
injected into the rear end, or by an impulse charge of a few ounces of
powder, usually cordite. The air pressure varies from 300 to 600 lbs. to
the square inch, and the powder charge from 4 oz. to 6½ oz. Submerged
tubes are of course tubes below the water-line, and all the most recent
ships are fitted with these, as their advantages over above-water tubes
are universally recognised. After the Chino-Japanese war all
governments, when demanding designs for new warships, made it almost a
_sine qua non_ that the torpedoes should be discharged from below water.
In firing torpedoes from above-water tubes the torpedo is liable to be
hit by the enemy, and it is generally considered that if the tube be hit
by even a small projectile it must inevitably explode; the submerged
tube affords protection both to the men and the weapon, while the
torpedo is less deflected on entering the water. The weight of the
submerged tube is some 7 tons, 2 tons more than an above-water one. In
order to avoid any possibility of the Whitehead inflicting injury on the
vessel firing it, and in order that it may be as little deflected as
possible, a guiding bar is run out of the tube by means of pneumatic
power when the torpedo has been placed in it. The guiding bar holds and
guides the torpedo until quite clear of the ship, when by means of a
secret apparatus it releases the torpedo at the end simultaneously;
without this arrangement the torpedo would be enormously deflected
towards the stern directly it began to leave the tube, and would
probably strike the ship from which it had just been fired.

Revolving tubes are carried either singly or in pairs on board
torpedo-boats and destroyers, and the torpedoes are fired from them by
powder impulse only. “Dropping gear” is only used on second-class
torpedo boats and picket boats. It consists of a pair of clip tongs
suspended from pivoted davits; the tongs being opened, the torpedo falls
into the water, the engines are set in motion, and it speeds off to do
its deadly work. The torpedoes for the English Admiralty are made at the
Royal Gun Factory, by Messrs. Greenwood and Batley, of Leeds, and by Mr.
Whitehead’s factory at Portland.

Mr. Whitehead has another factory at Fiume, whence he supplies almost
all the Great Powers with his torpedoes. In time of war the torpedo
would be discharged by an officer in the conning tower; by the aid of a
torpedo directory he would make the necessary adjustments and would fire
the torpedo down below by pressing his hand on an electric key, thus
completing a circuit connected with the firing apparatus in the tube.

[Illustration:

A BRITISH DESTROYER.
]

CHAPTER XV
THE NORDENFELT SUBMARINES

About the year 1878 a gentleman in holy orders, Mr. Garrett by name,
designed a submarine boat, which was built by Messrs. Cochrane, of
Liverpool. It was 45 feet long, of the shape of two cones, with a
central cylindrical portion. This vessel, to which the name of
_Resurgam_ was given, was tried in the Birkenhead Float in 1879. It
descended by means of pistons which varied the displacement of the boat
by being drawn in and pushed out, as well as by central rudders which
steered it up and down. Compressed-air tanks were provided, and
chemicals were stored to purify the air after use.

Soon after a larger boat was constructed in which steam replaced manual
labour as the motive power; when about to sink the chimney was removed
and an air-tight stopper fitted on the opening to the up-take; the
furnace mouths were similarly closed by doors, like those of a gas
retort, and the boat sank. Power was supplied on Lamm’s system by the
hot water in the boiler. After a number of experiments she was finally
lost off the Welsh coast.

The attention of Mr. Thorsten Nordenfelt (the inventor of the gun which
bears his name) was directed to Mr. Garrett’s design, and the result was
that he decided to build a submarine vessel himself. He acknowledged
that the negative experience gained during the trials of the Garrett
boat had been of advantage to him in avoiding the faults which made that
boat unsuccessful.

[Sidenote: Nordenfelt I.]

Mr. Nordenfelt’s first submarine boat was built at Stockholm, and was
tried in the Sound of Landskrova, in Sweden, in September, 1885, in the
presence of delegates from most of the leading Governments.

Its dimensions and details were as follows: Length 64 feet, beam 9
feet (over sponsons 12 feet), draught 11 feet, displacement 60 tons;
speed on measured mile 9 knots; distance travelled without
re-coaling 150 miles; depth to which safe descent was possible,
about 50 feet. Engines, surface condensing compound type, with two
cylinders and cranks at 90°; at pressure of 100 lbs. to square inch,
indicating 100 horse-power. Boiler of ordinary marine return tube
type, having one furnace, and about 200 square feet of heating
surface; two hot-water cisterns, rhomboidal in body with spherical
ends. The boilers and cisterns contained about eight tons of water.
Both boilers and cisterns were made for a working pressure of 150
lbs. to square inch. One fish torpedo, 14 feet long, was carried
outside on the bow and discharged mechanically. The sinking
apparatus consisted of two vertical propellers driven by a 6–h.p.
double-cylinder engine, and placed in sponsons on each side of the
boat. The revolution of these caused the boat to descend
horizontally when its buoyancy had been sufficiently diminished.
There was one cold-water tank in the centre of boat, holding about
four tons of water, for regulating buoyancy. This tank was used as
coal bunker when doing long surface runs. In the stern was a
four-bladed propeller 5 feet in diameter, and the rudder for port
and starboard steering was placed aft of this propeller.

In the bow on either side were balanced rudders on one and the same
axle, always maintained in the horizontal position. The crew
consisted of three men, and when the boat was closed up there was
sufficient air to supply three men for six hours without causing
discomfort, and this was not supplemented by any storage of
compressed air or restorative chemicals. The depth below the surface
at which the boat travelled could be varied in two ways; either by
varying the speed of the vertical propellers, or by reducing the
speed of the engines driving them by an automatic valve controlling
the steam supply. On the surface the boat was driven by working the
boiler in the usual manner, and the temperature of the water in the
cisterns was kept up to a degree corresponding to a steam pressure
of 150 lbs. When it was desired to descend, the ashpit and fire door
were closed, as also the funnel inside the boat, and the vertical
propellers were started. For sub-surface travelling there was
available, as propelling power, the steam given off by the heated
water (about eight tons), and this was found sufficient for a
distance of 14 knots; on one occasion, when the boat was opened up,
there was still over 20 lbs. pressure in the boiler.

[Sidenote: Nordenfelt II.]

Mr. Nordenfelt recognised that for the defence of open coasts and for
operations where it might be necessary to keep the sea for days together
without being able to seek the shelter of inlets or the mouths of
rivers, other and larger proportions than those of his first 64
foot-boat would be desirable.

He accordingly constructed a boat on such larger lines, the details of
which are as follows:—

Length 100 feet, beam 12 feet, displacement 160 tons, speed on
measured mile 12 knots, distance travelled without re-coaling 900
miles, depth to which descent could safely be made, about 50 feet.
Engines, surface condensing compound type, with two cylinders, and
cranks at 90°, and at a pressure of 100 lbs. of steam indicating 250
h.p. Boiler, of the ordinary marine return tube type, having two
furnaces; about 750 square feet of heating surface. Hot-water
cistern, rhomboidal in body with spherical ends. Both boiler and
cistern made for a working pressure of 150 lbs. per square inch.
Armament, two fish torpedoes, 14 feet long, carried outside on the
bow and discharged mechanically. Two Nordenfelt quick-firing machine
guns consisting of 1–inch calibre. Sinking apparatus, two _vertical_
propellers, driven by two engines, each indicating 6 h.p.; these
propellers were placed in the fore and aft line. This was an
improvement on the earlier boat whose screws were fitted in side
sponsons. The mere arrest of these propellers sufficed to bring the
boat to the surface, as it had a reserve buoyancy. Bow fins, whose
action was both automatic and controllable, maintained the boat in
the horizontal position. The main propeller was placed abaft the
rudder. Two main cold-water cisterns placed at each end, and
containing 15 tons of water each, also one in centre of boat for
regulating buoyancy containing 7 tons; coal bunkers on the side of
boiler; 8 tons of coal carried at the side of hot-water cistern and
in middle of boat. Crew, three men in a watch: two watches carried.
With coal in the bunkers only, this boat could keep the sea for five
days or more. No attempt was made to purify the air when submerged.
When descending, the boat was perfectly horizontal, and was
invariably kept so when moving under water by means of the bow
rudders operated by a plumb weight.

[Illustration:

“NORDENFELT II.” RUNNING AWASH.
]

Nordenfelt II. had two distinct conditions of existence as a torpedo
craft—that of a surface boat and a submarine one. The sinking operations
were as follows: the furnaces were hermetically closed, upon which
combustion was soon brought to an end. The piece of funnel connecting
the boiler with the outward portion was then removed and the doors
placed in position. Whilst these changes were being effected, water was
allowed to run into the ballast tanks to reduce the buoyancy to its
proper limit, and this arrived at, nothing remained but to close up the
conning tower and to set in motion the vertically acting screws to place
the boat quite out of sight.

In a paper which he read before the Royal United Service Institution, on
February 5, 1886, Major-General Sir Andrew Clarke in the chair, Mr.
Nordenfelt after mentioning previous under-water vessels, gave his views
as to the reason of their failure.

First of all he said they were always built too small and too weak.
The longest was 45 feet, and their small dimensions and weak plates
made them useless in bad weather and dangerous for submersion; the
small air space available forced the crew to use chemical means to
obtain pure air. Secondly, they were never made for firing a fish
torpedo; consequently they had to endeavour to fix a mine to the
bottom of a vessel, a feat which Mr. Nordenfelt considered
impracticable, owing to the risk of contact with the vessel, which,
especially if it were pitching or moving, might easily destroy the
boat. Thirdly, in all the early boats, the mines were charged with
only black powder, the effect of which was less destructive than
that of the gun-cotton or dynamite in the fish torpedoes. The effect
of the explosion, again, against a wooden ship, was nothing like as
serious as against the thin bottom plates of an ironclad. Fourthly,
all the boats hitherto in use were propelled by hand power; this
gave too much hard work to the crew, who could not take the boat any
distance on the surface previous to the actual attack, and made it
quite impossible for it to face any rough weather. In the Nordenfelt
boat the use of steam diminished the number of men, and they had so
little to do when below the surface that the temperature, lower than
in modern stokeholes, was no detriment. Fifthly, all previous boats
had most unreliable means of descending and ascending. The descent
by steering downwards in the American boats of the Civil War period
was quite as dangerous as the attempts before and after that time to
lower and raise the boats and to keep them steady at any desired
depth, by means of increasing and decreasing the weight of the boats
by more or less water-ballast or by altering their displacement.

None of these boats used the principle which Mr. Nordenfelt applied to
pull his boat down by mechanical means, while relying upon its always
retained buoyancy for rising; so that if the mechanical apparatus failed
the boat rose at once to the surface. Again, they did not have the
tendency to steadiness given by the two forces of constant pulling down
by the vertical screws, acting all the time, whether still or moving,
against the pulling upwards caused by the buoyancy.

Mr. Nordenfelt considered it most dangerous to rely upon a detachable
weight in case of emergency, as the apparatus for detaching it would be
always liable to fail. He confessed that he could not imagine how the
longitudinal instability of a submerged boat could possibly have been
satisfactorily controlled by any of the means applied to the previous
boats. Even Goubet’s system of moving water or weights fore and aft
inside the boat must act more slowly and cause more diving and
oscillation than his rudders which always remained in the horizontal,
and thus controlled the slightest tendency of the boat to get out of the
longitudinally horizontal position. He considered it absolutely
essential to keep the boat horizontal when moving, as he believed that
any inclination downwards with the impetus of a heavy boat would almost
to a certainty carry the boat below its safe depth before it could be
effectually counteracted by shifting weights.

The reason which led Mr. Nordenfelt to construct his submarine boats was
the almost insuperable difficulty in carrying the Whitehead and
Schwarzkopf fish torpedoes with any degree of certainty up to the short
distance at which they could be considered infallibly effective. It
seemed to him that a much greater chance would be given for carrying the
torpedoes within striking distance, if, instead of trying to rush the
distance by many boats, all the time exposed to the destructive fire
from machine guns, he could carry the torpedo secretly up to this
distance without the probability of being seen at all, and without any
probability of being struck by the enemy’s shot even if seen.

The tactics to be adopted by his submarines in action were thus laid
down by Mr. Nordenfelt. Out of sight of the enemy the vessel ran on the
surface with its cupola and about three feet of its turtle back out of
water, but by forced draught, blowing out its smoke under the surface.
When she arrived within such distance of the enemy that she might be
discovered, she descended into the water so far that the cupola alone
appeared above the waves, this was done by taking in water into the
cold-water tanks sufficient to reduce the floatability to what the
horizontal screws were capable of overpowering. The “reduced
floatability” was never done away with, but the descent from the “awash”
position was effected by starting the vertical screws, thus overcoming
mechanically the buoyancy of the boat, which was pulled down to a less
or greater depth depending upon the speed given to the screws.

The three main points in Mr. Nordenfelt’s system on which he laid
special stress were these:

1. That by using water as the means of storing up energy he was in
possession of a reservoir which could never get out of order, and which
could be replaced at any hour in any part of the world, and without any
extraneous assistance from shore or other ships. The reason of all
others which at once decided him to adopt the hot-water system was the
enormous factor of safety obtained by his being able to blow out, by
steam pressure without the use of machinery, large weights of water
which would lighten the boat and counteract any leak likely to occur.
Mr. Nordenfelt had little faith in electricity as a motive power, which
is not surprising considering the accumulators then in use.

2. The submerging the boat by mechanical means: Mr. Nordenfelt was
convinced that previous attempts had proved unsuccessful, mainly because
either they depended upon varying the displacement of the boat by taking
in water to submerge her and to regulate the depth at which they desired
to operate, or they descended by steering downwards. His objection to
the first-named method of descending, by taking in water and thus
increasing the specific gravity of the boat, was that practically there
was no difference in the specific gravity of water on the surface or at
50 feet depth; thus when the boat had lost its buoyancy at the surface
it had also no buoyancy at any given depth, and the risk was thus very
great of suddenly descending beyond a safe depth.

3. The horizontal position Mr. Nordenfelt found to be a _sine qua non_
for a submarine boat.

When Mr. Nordenfelt built his boats electric accumulators were very much
inferior to those of to-day; no designer of an under-water vessel would
think nowadays of using the steam given off by heated water for
under-water propulsion. As to his theory that a submarine boat must
always descend on an even keel, this has since proved to be entirely
erroneous; the modern diving torpedo boat goes down at an angle and is
brought to the horizontal position at the required depth either
automatically or by hand-worked mechanism.

[Illustration:

“NORDENFELT II.” AT CONSTANTINOPLE.
]

During her trials _Nordenfelt I._ hardly did herself justice, but
nevertheless in the beginning of 1886, she was bought by the Greek
Government, and in April, 1886, trials took place in the Bay of Salamis,
when Mr. Nordenfelt’s agent carried out the various conditions imposed.

Shortly after the first boat had been bought by Greece, Turkey ordered
two submarine boats (_Nordenfelt II._ and _III._) from the inventor.
Both boats were sent to Turkey in sections, but only one was assembled
and tested. In 1887 it underwent trials at Constantinople, which were
witnessed by the Sultan himself, who expressed himself highly satisfied
with the performance of the boat.

[Sidenote: Nordenfelt IV.]

Mr. Nordenfelt’s fourth vessel was built by the Barrow Ship Building
Company, the machinery being supplied by Messrs. Plenty & Sons, Newbury.

The principal dimensions were: Length, 125 feet; diameter, 12 feet;
displacement fully immersed, 245 tons; in light surface condition,
160 tons. The engines turning the main propeller were especially
designed for using steam at varying pressures, and indicated 1,000
h.p. when working with steam at a pressure of 150 lbs. At that power
her estimated speed was 15 knots. Submerged, her speed was 5 knots.
Fourteen auxiliary engines were carried for driving air circulating
and feed pumps for steering and sinking. In the middle was the
entrance to the stokehole through a scuttle 4 feet in diameter. Fore
and aft of this scuttle were two funnels, and about 30 feet from the
stem and stern of the boat were the conning towers, 2 feet high and
of the same diameter. They were of 1–inch steel and were considered
perfectly impervious to any shot which in warfare would ever be
directed against them. In the forward tower were placed at the hands
of a commander means of controlling every motion of the vessel. The
boat was divided into five compartments: (1) The torpedo chamber
containing two tubes; (2) Quarters for four officers; (3) The boiler
room; (4) The engine room; (5) The men’s quarters, cooking galley,
stoves, &c. The crew consisted of nine men all told; 35 tons of cold
water were carried in the tanks; and 27 tons of hot water in the
boilers. These latter were expected to store sufficient heat for a
run of 20 knots under water. The coal bunkers held stores of coal
which, at a speed of 8–9 knots, could drive the boat a distance of
1,000 miles. Should it be necessary to transport her to a greater
distance, her water tanks could be filled with coal, enabling her to
steam 2,500 miles. Two vertical propellers, one forward and one aft,
kept the vessel submerged and overcame the retained force of
buoyancy (500 lbs.). The boat was lighted by candles; without any
special provision of air it contained enough for a crew of nine men
for about six hours.

_Nordenfelt IV._ made her passage from Barrow-in-Furness to Southampton
through some heavy seas, and during the voyage she was tested by her
commander in every wind and every condition of wave and sea, and she
proved that she was capable of being manœuvred in any weather, however
bad.

On the 26th of May, 1887, she underwent her first examination before a
body of critics, composed for the most part of skilled, experienced
scientific officers of both branches of the Service. She was first run
with nothing above water save the two conning towers and a few inches of
her back, at the rate of about six miles an hour. The time occupied by
the trial in the awash condition was 1½ hours, and at the end of the
time a sufficiency of steam was stored up in the boilers to drive her a
distance of about 24 miles. On the pumps being put in motion, some 20
tons of water were pumped out in eight minutes. The funnels were then
fixed, the fires relighted, and the _Nordenfelt_ was soon making 15
knots on the surface.

On December 19, 1887, a semi-official trial of the _Nordenfelt_ took
place, when she manœuvred successfully both on the surface and
submerged, but no attempt was made to fire the torpedoes.

“The neutral tint she was painted,” wrote the special correspondent of
the _Engineer_, “rendered her almost invisible at the distance of even a
few hundred yards, while as a target she presented nothing to attack
save the two conning towers and a few inches of her turtle back, and as
these were of great strength and rendered still more invulnerable by
their shape, it is all but certain that no gun carried on any other
torpedo boat would ever do her the slightest injury, while she at the
same time possesses the enormous advantage of being able to attack
without smoke, or fire, or noise. Indeed, given these advantages of a
minimum of target and a total absence of noise and smoke, we fail to see
what more could be desired in any vessel of war.”

In a leading article in the issue of December 23, 1887, the _Engineer_
said: “We may—we hope we shall—have quite a little fleet of
_Nordenfelts_ when Christmas comes round again. When once Columbus had
shown the way to America, the water was freely traversed.”

The correspondent of the _Army and Navy Gazette_ said that the
_Nordenfelt_ had a great and assured future before it, that with a gun
or two on her turtle back, and working as an above-water torpedo boat,
she certainly possessed many advantages over the ordinary first-class
torpedo boat, and that her powers of submersing should make her the more
valuable craft, the cost being the same. “It is not likely or advisable
that a number of such boats should be at once built, but the country
which can give £100,000 for a Brennan torpedo would do well to further,
in every possible manner, trials and experiments with a boat so simple,
yet possessing such possibilities in the future.”

It will be very naturally wondered why, in spite of these favourable
opinions, the _Nordenfelt_ was so soon forgotten. The answer may be
found in some recent issues of the _Engineer_. This journal published,
during the years 1886–1888, all the information that was suffered to
leak out concerning the experiments with the Nordenfelt boats. In 1901,
by the courtesy of Mr. P. W. D’Alton (now Chief Engineer to the Central
London Railway), who was associated with Mr. Garrett and Mr. Nordenfelt,
it was enabled to state much more than had hitherto been made public.

Taking first the Turkish boat, it was easily proved that as a boat
working near the surface, but not wholly submerged, she was fast,
manageable, and a very dangerous foe because of the difficulty of
finding her, and the very small mark which she offered.

As a submarine boat, she was entirely a failure.

“She had the fault of all submarine boats, viz., a total lack of
longitudinal stability. All submarines are practically devoid of
weight when under water. The _Nordenfelt_, for example, weighed by a
couple of hundredweights less than nothing when submerged, and had
to be kept down by screw-propellers provided for the purpose. The
Turkish boat was submerged by admitting water to tanks aided by
horizontal propellers, and raised by blowing the ballast out again
and reversing the propellers. Nothing could be imagined more
unstable than this Turkish boat. The moment she left the horizontal
position the water in her boiler and the tanks surged forward and
backwards and increased the angle of inclination. She was
perpetually working up and down like a scale beam, and no human
vigilance could keep her on an even keel for half a minute at a
time. Once, and we believe only once, she fired a torpedo with the
result that she as nearly as possible stood up vertically on her
tail and proceeded to plunge to the bottom stern first. On another
occasion all hands were nearly lost. Mr. Garrett was in the little
conning tower. The boat was being slowly submerged—an operation of
the utmost delicacy—before a committee of Ottoman officers, when a
boat came alongside without warning. Her wash sent a considerable
quantity of water down the conning tower, the lid of which was not
closed, and the submarine boat instantly began to sink like a stone.
Fortunately Mr. Garrett got the lid closed just in time, and Mr.
Lawrie, the engineer, without waiting for orders, blew some water
ballast out. It was an exceedingly narrow escape. In spite of these
difficulties, the Ottoman officers were so impressed that the
Turkish Government bought the boat. It goes without saying that it
was only with the greatest difficulty the price was extracted from
the Sultan’s treasury. But no use whatever has been made of her, and
she lies rotting away in Constantinople, unless, indeed, she has
found her way piecemeal to the marine-store dealers. A paramount
difficulty in the way of utilising her was that no engineers could
be got to serve in her. If men were appointed they promptly
deserted. Indeed, it may be taken as certain that not one man in
five hundred is fit to take charge of any submarine boat.”

The _Engineer_ is not less severe on _Nordenfelt IV._

“To all intents and purposes the _Nordenfelt_ was a total failure as
a submarine boat. She began badly. As soon as she was launched from
the stocks at Barrow it was seen that a mistake had been made in
calculating weight, as she was down by the stern, drawing 9 feet aft
and about 4 feet 6 inches forward. This would have been partially
rectified by her torpedoes, but she never had one on board. Extra
ballast had to be put in forward, and it was always held, rightly or
wrongly, that this made it all the more difficult to keep her on an
even keel, when submerged. The extra weight carried militated
greatly against her speed as a surface boat. Another mistake was
that the water ballast tanks were too large, or perhaps it would be
more correct to say that they were not sufficiently subdivided. When
she was in just the proper condition to be manœuvred by her
horizontal propellers the ballast tanks were only about
three-quarters full, and the water being left free surges backwards
and forwards in them. It must not be forgotten, however, that ample
tank capacity was necessary because the quantity of ballast needed,
depended on the number of tons of coal and stores on board.
Subdivision would, however, have prevented the surging of the
ballast water. If, for example, the boat was moving forward or on an
even keel at, say, two knots, if a greaser walked forward a couple
of feet in his engine room her head would go down a little. Then the
water surged forward in the tanks, and she would proceed to plunge,
unless checked, and in shallow water would touch the bottom, as she
did on the Mother Bank in the Solent, or if in deep water she would
run down until the pressure of water collapsed her hull. No one who
has not been down in a submarine can realise their extraordinary
crankness. The _Nordenfelt_ was always rising or falling, and
required the greatest care in handling.”

PART III

APPENDIX I
BRITISH SUBMARINES

“The tendency of the Admiralty is to follow and not to lead other
great nations. I hope that one of these days we shall not follow
just a little too late.”—W. E. ARNOLD FORSTER.

Probably the first occasion of recent years that mention was made of
submarine boats in Parliament was subsequent to the trial of the
_Nautilus_, a diving boat invented by Messrs. Campbell and Ash, during a
trial of which several exalted personages nearly lost their lives. Lord
George Hamilton described the incident to the House of Commons, and
created some amusement by his relation, and there is no reason to
believe that the submarine was looked upon by members other than as an
erratic toy to whose mercy no wise man would entrust his person.

Mr. Nordenfelt built several submarine boats, one of which was bought by
the Turkish and another by the Greek Government, but though in several
quarters the advisability of the Admiralty purchasing one or more
Nordenfelt boats was suggested, nothing came of it.

Mr. Edmund Robertson, K.C., dealing in the _Nineteenth Century_, of May,
1900, with the question of submarine boats remarked that five or six
years ago he knew the opinion of the technical advisers of the
Admiralty, and that they did not see their way to recommend the
Admiralty or the Government to make any provision for submarine vessels
of war.

Since that time, however, very few weeks passed but some writer took up
the cudgels on behalf of the submarine and urged the Admiralty to
consider the advisability of constructing boats.

The keen interest taken in France in under-water warfare was reflected
to a certain extent in this country, and on the 9th of February, 1899,
Mr. Charles McLaren addressed a question to the First Lord of the
Admiralty in which he referred to the “extraordinary value” assigned by
the French minister to the new vessels, and asked “whether the British
Admiralty attached any importance to these experiments, or had any
intention of adding any such vessels to the British Navy?” Viscount
Goschen’s answer was: “It would be inexpedient at this stage for me to
express the opinion of the Admiralty as to the reported performances of
the new submarine boats. With reference to any action which the Board of
Admiralty may take, I am not at present prepared to make any statement.”

The position of the Admiralty in the early part of 1900 may be
ascertained from an answer given by Viscount Goschen to a question put
by Captain Norton on the 6th of April. “Close attention has been given
by the Admiralty to the subject of submarine boats. The submarine boat,
even if the practical difficulties attending its use can be overcome,
would seem so far as the immediate future is concerned to be eventually
a weapon for maritime Powers on the defensive, and it is natural that
those nations which anticipate holding that position should endeavour to
develop it. The question of the best way of meeting its attack is
receiving much consideration, and it is in this direction that practical
suggestions should be valuable. It seems certain that the reply to this
weapon must be looked for in other directions than in building submarine
boats ourselves, for it is clear that one submarine boat cannot fight
another.” In the debate on the Ship-building vote the First Lord made a
further statement. “The importance of submarine boats had been pointed
out, and it had been said that it was their duty to make experiments.
The nations which were likely to have the greatest use for these boats
might gain from their experiment more than others. He did not propose to
make publicly any declaration as to these boats. Of course he did not
wish to encourage or discourage other nations, but he must ask the
Committee to excuse him going into the question.”

In the same debate Mr. Arnold Forster, who a few months later was
appointed Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, made
some remarks on this “somewhat cryptic utterance,” as Mr. Robertson
called it. “If in the matter of submarine boats the First Lord of the
Admiralty had said that in the opinion of the engineering advisers of
the Admiralty to design and work a submarine boat, was so remote of
accomplishment that there was no reasonable probability of being able to
work it, he would have been slow to contradict him; but that was not the
line taken by him. The First Lord said that the Admiralty had not
designed a submarine boat, and did not propose to design one, because
such a boat would be the weapon of an inferior power. But if it could be
produced as a working article, the Power which possessed such an article
would no longer be an inferior but a superior Power. We, above all
nations, were exposed to the attacks of this engine. He submitted that
it was not a satisfactory thing to stand by and allow others to carry
out this problem without making some attempt to solve it for ourselves.
He admitted the tendency of the Admiralty to follow and not to lead
other great nations. He hoped that one of these days we should not
follow just a little too late. If we had been compelled to learn our
lesson with regard to ironclads, breechloaders, and armoured cruisers in
the face of an active enemy we should have experienced the same lessons
which the Austrian army underwent in 1866 when they were compelled to
learn the merits of the breechloader by studying it on the field of
battle. There was room for improvement in the attitude we had taken up
in regard to submarine navigation.”

During the short session of December, 1900, after the General Election,
the Admiralty was again questioned, and the reply was that the
“attention of the Admiralty had been called to the additional provision
for submarine boats in the French naval programme, and a statement will
be made when the estimates are laid before the House.” Between this date
and the introduction of the Navy Estimates endless rumours regarding the
position the Admiralty would take as to the submarine boat question
found their way into the daily press. While, on the one hand, it was
“confidently asserted” that, the Government were making secret trials
with all kinds of wonderful craft, on the other hand it was stated “on
the highest authority” that the Lords of the Admiralty had no intention
of altering their minds as to the advisability of taking any action
whatever in the matter.

The statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty explanatory of the Navy
Estimates for 1901–2, published on the 1st of March, 1901, contained the
following item:—

“Five submarine vessels of the type invented by Mr. Holland have been
ordered, the first of which should be delivered next autumn. What the
future value of these boats may be in naval warfare can only be a matter
of conjecture. The experiments with these boats will assist the
Admiralty in assessing their true value. The question of their
employment must be studied, and all developments in their mechanism
carefully watched by this country.”

In the discussion on the Navy (Supplementary) Estimates on March 4,
1901, Mr. Flynn asked whether the policy of the Admiralty in
constructing battleships “as to the strength of which they knew
nothing,” when other nations were turning their attention to submarine
vessels, was quite wise. This same notion as to the advisability of
going in for small submarines instead of big battleships is to be found
in a speech by Mr. O’Shee on March 23rd, who said that if these boats
were able to do half what was claimed for them, then the present
gigantic expenditure for naval construction was entirely uncalled for. A
submarine boat could be built for £25,000, and manned by ten men, and if
it were true they were able to combat the big ships which the Government
were building, those ships would be absolutely useless except for
carrying the submarine boats to places where they were to work. If
submarines were all that was claimed for them it would render
unnecessary the £9,000,000 which was then being expended on new
battleships.

Mr. Arnold Forster in the House on March 18, 1901, said:—

“I will not say much about submarine vessels, but I will say that I am
glad that the Admiralty, under the advice of Lord Goschen, took the view
that it was wise not to be found unprepared in regard to this matter. We
have a great amount of information about these boats, but we do not
attach an exaggerated value to it. But we believe that an ounce of
practice is worth a ton of theory, and that when we get officers and men
to see these boats, they will learn more from them than from many
reports which come from foreign countries. One thing stands between the
submarine boat and efficiency, and that is the motor by which it is
propelled. But there is no disguising the fact that if you can add speed
to the other qualities of the submarine boat, it might in certain
circumstances become a very formidable vessel. We are comforted by the
judgment of the United States and Germany, which is hostile to these
inventions, which I confess I desire shall never prosper.—(Commander
Young, M.P., said that if the Admiralty built any submarine boats, all
he would ask would be that he might not be ordered to serve on one.)—But
we cannot regard our position as the same as that of other nations. The
United States to-morrow, if a perfect submarine were invented, would not
only have more secure protection for their harbours. In Germany the
harbours are no doubt carefully protected now. But we live in the narrow
waters of the Channel, and our problem is not precisely that of any
other nation, and I am glad that Lord Goschen did give this instruction
to the Board which has now borne fruit in the determination to put this
experiment into execution, and we shall see the result of it during the
next financial year.”

Mr. Edmund Robertson, K.C., in the debate on the Navy Estimates on March
21, 1901, remarked that as the building of the submarine boats was only
a matter of experiment, he thought it might have been introduced upon a
somewhat smaller scale. If its value was purely conjectural, he should
have said that one boat would have been enough to experiment with. Two
should have been quite enough, but we generally did things on a large
scale, and after having refused to say one word for many years about
submarine boats, we now found the Admiralty launching out into quite a
little fleet of them. “What,” asked Mr. Robertson, “had become of the
control of the House of Commons? What had become of that control when
the Admiralty of the day, having refused to tell them their policy, come
forward shortly afterwards and say they will build five of these boats?”
He could not help protesting against this, for a new departure of this
nature ought not to have been made except with the sanction of the
House, and at the very least it ought not to have been done without
being divulged to the House.

It may be noted that Mr. Arnold Forster, speaking in the House of
Commons in January, 1902, explained that when the decision to construct
submarine boats was arrived at, only one type was available for
purchase, that the right to build boats of this type was in the hands of
one firm, and that it was therefore necessary to entrust the work to
that firm.

_The first British Submarines._—The first five British submarines are
almost identically the same as the six Holland boats ordered by the U.S.
Congress on June 7, 1900.

They are cigar-shaped vessels 63 feet 4 inches long; beam, 11 feet 9
inches; and displacement submerged, 120 tons. The plating and frames are
of steel and of sufficient size and thickness to withstand the pressure
of depths not exceeding 100 feet. The bulkheads are located to provide
safety in event of collision, and to stiffen the hull as a whole; decks
are provided throughout the whole length of the interior of the vessel,
combined with beams and floors to carry the weight of machinery; the
tanks are of steel, and they are braced, stiffened, rivetted, and
caulked absolutely tight, and man-holes are located to allow access to
the interior of all tanks.

When the vessel is in light condition for surface running, an
above-water deck, 31 feet long, is available, and there are means of
stowing anchor and lines and of affording mooring facilities to the
vessel. Rudders of steel plates are provided, and they are supported by
skegs at the stern of the vessel. The conning tower is of armoured
steel; its outside diameter is 32 inches, and its minimum thickness 4
inches; it is provided with ports for observation by the steersman. In
the construction of the vessel care has been taken that all portions of
the exterior of the hull shall be free from projections of a kind that
might be entangled by ropes or other obstacles when submerged, and the
lines of the vessels have been designed so that there shall be a minimum
of resistance when it is running at the surface.

_Propulsion._—On the surface the vessel is propelled by a 160 h.p.,
single screw, four-cylinder, Otto gasoline engine, capable of giving a
speed of 8 knots, while when submerged it is driven through the water by
a 70 h.p. electric waterproof motor giving a speed of 7 knots. The
radius of action at the surface is about 400 knots, while the storage
batteries have sufficient capacity for a speed of 7 knots on a four
hours’ submerged run. Gearing is provided for the charging of the
batteries by using the motor as a dynamo, and running it from the
gasoline engine when at the surface, and from connecting the propeller
either to the engine or the motor; these operations are effected through
clutches. Switchboards and switches are provided for the safe and
efficient distribution of the electric current throughout the vessel.
The lighting system consists of portable incandescent electric lamps,
together with several ports and openings in the hull to admit the
outside light. The hull is circular, in cross sections, and is divided
by the watertight bulkheads into three separate compartments. There is
also a thorough subdivision of the bottom and every precaution is taken
to localise any injury to the hull which might threaten the buoyancy.

In the forward compartment is one torpedo expulsion tube, located at the
extreme forward end of the vessel, opening outward two feet below the
light water-line. The tube is placed with its muzzle in the nose of the
craft and its axis inclined somewhat to the longitudinal axis of the
vessel. The muzzle of the tube is closed by a watertight door, and this
can be lifted from within for the discharge of the five Whitehead
torpedoes, each 11 feet 8 inches long, which are carried in the
interior. One torpedo is placed in the tube, and the other four are
placed side by side above the storage batteries. When the first torpedo
is fired a sufficient amount of water to compensate for the loss of
weight is automatically and almost instantaneously admitted into the
tube, causing only a slight change of time for a few seconds. Such
compensation is necessary, as the submarine boat is lighter than the
amount of water it displaces and any alteration in its weight tends to
send it up to the surface or down towards the bottom. When the second
torpedo is placed in the tube the water is run into a special torpedo
compensating tank; of these tanks there are four, and they are filled as
each torpedo is fired. When the last torpedo has been ejected the
expulsion tube is filled with water and is kept thus until the end of
the run.

Besides the torpedo tube there is in the forward compartment a series of
air flasks, a gasoline tank of 850 gallons capacity, and a trimming
tank.

The central compartment contains in its double bottom the main ballast
tanks and a circular compensating tank placed between the two sets of
batteries. Above the double bottom and below the axis of the vessel are
located the storage batteries, and above these are carried the four
torpedoes, which are 45 centimetres in diameter and 11 feet 8 inches in
length. In the same compartment are a series of air flasks in which air
at 2,000 lbs. to the square inch pressure is stored for the purpose of
keeping pure the living spaces of the crew.[9]

Footnote 9:

Also for firing the torpedoes and for blowing the water out of the
ballast tanks when it is desired to navigate as a surface boat.

In the rear compartment is the four-cylinder gasoline engine, which is
rated at from 160 to 190 actual horse-power, and at from 320 to 390
revolutions per minute. Its net weight is 1,300 lbs., its length over
all is 9 feet 7 inches, and its total height above the crank-shaft
centre is 5 feet 6 inches. In these engines, which gave satisfaction in
the first Holland boat, the distribution of the cranks and the timing of
the valves and igniters are so arranged that the operations in the
four-cylinders alternate, so that while one is at the expansion stroke
the other three are at the suction, compression, and exhaust strokes
respectively. By this arrangement the engine is perfectly balanced and
vibration is reduced to a minimum.

_Submersion._—The first operation to be performed when it is desired to
submerge the vessel is the admission of water into her ballast tanks.
When these are full she runs “awash” with her conning tower alone above
the waves.

In order to completely submerge the boat she is steered below the
surface by means of her pair of horizontal rudders at the stern. When at
the required depth (normally from 20 to 30 feet) she is brought up on an
even keel by the inclination of the horizontal rudders, which may be
controlled automatically (by some such arrangement as is found in the
Whitehead torpedo) or by hand. All modern submarine craft go under at an
angle, and are steered below the waves by rudders: the principle of
submersion on an even keel by down-haul propellers, advocated by Mr.
Nordenfelt, has been abandoned by all latter-day designers, as has also
the submersion of the drawing in of cylinders adopted in the
Campbell-Ash boat.

When running submerged the submarine is lighter than her displacement,
and is only kept under by her horizontal rudders, which, of course, only
act when she is moving.

The great drawback to all under-water craft has been their lack of
longitudinal stability, for they have a tendency to rise or sink at the
slightest provocation. In our account of the Nordenfelt boats this
disagreeable quality is illustrated. In order to keep the vessel at a
regular depth recourse must be had to the horizontal rudders and to the
two trimming tanks and the one circular compensating tank carried.

In a general way it will probably be found possible to keep the boat on
an even keel by means of her rudders, but if she shows any decided
tendency either to dive to the bottom or to rise to the surface or to
heel over to one side water may be admitted into the above-mentioned
tanks, and the admission may be effected either automatically or by
hand. A hydrostatic valve will prevent the vessel passing the safe limit
of depth.

_Air Supply and Ventilation._—Compressed air is stored aboard the vessel
with means of allowing a supply of air into the interior of the vessel.
Ventilators are provided for the circulation of outside air throughout
the vessel; the gasoline vapours from the engines and all noxious gases
are carefully excluded by suitable devices, while safety valves are
provided to prevent the pressure to the vessel from exceeding that of
the atmosphere.

_Pumps and Pumping._—All tanks and compartments are connected with the
pumps, the valves are located to allow of quick manipulation, and pumps
with independent means of operation are furnished in duplicate. The
tanks can also be emptied by flowing out.

_Navigating Apparatus._—In communication with the interior of the vessel
there are bells and speaking tubes, while there are provided gauges,
indices, and clinometers for indicating pressure, depth, positions,
quantities, and weights.

Two compasses are carried, each compensated and adjusted. It is said
that the first of the British submarines exhibited certain defects in
its compasses, which it was thought were due to the steel conning tower.
This was replaced by a brass construction, and on being tested the
compasses acted more satisfactorily. After a few trials a new
steering-wheel was fixed in the boat close to the conning tower, which
could be worked from above and below alike.

The first British submarine was launched on November 2, 1901, at Barrow
without any ceremony, although representatives of the Admiralty were
present. The trials were placed under the direction of Captain R. H. S.
Bacon, D.S.O.

Before launching “No. 1” was by means of a floating dock placed on the
gridiron. A crew of six men were put on board, and she was then
hermetically sealed for three hours, air being supplied by compressed
air cylinders. The trial was quite successful, and the men suffered no
inconvenience. On her first “sea trial” “No. 1” started from the
floating dock and proceeded along the Devonshire and Buccleuch docks and
back to her moorings. On subsequent trials she attained a surface speed
of 10 knots.

The first submersion trials of “No. 1” were carried out on February 5,
1902. She went under water with some officers of the _Hazard_ t.g.b.,
the mother ship to the submarines (Captain R. H. S. Bacon, D.S.O.) on
board, and most satisfactory results were obtained. Her appliances for
the purification of the air were used to maintain atmospheric conditions
without any need of her cylinders of compressed air being requisitioned.
The first deep sea trials of “No. 1” took place at the beginning of
April last in the Irish Sea. The submerging was accomplished in less
than six seconds. From the “awash” conditions she suddenly disappeared
and then came again into sight some yards’ distant with great rapidity
and ease, and the diving was continued at intervals for several hours at
a time without any perceptible hitch.[10]

Footnote 10:

Mr. Arnold Foster, in the House of Commons on May 29, 1902, said that
the submarines had been a pronounced success, performing all that
could be expected from them in the way of evolution and manœuvring.

Submarine “No. 2” was launched on February 21, 1902. Certain alterations
were made in her construction, rendered advisable by defects which had
been discovered during the testing of “No. 1.” “No. 3” took the water on
May 9th, and “No. 4” on May 23 last.

During April last No. 42 t.b. was commissioned at Portsmouth as tender
to the _Hazard_ t.g.b., and was sent to Barrow for a series of
experiments with the submarines.

The Navy Estimates for 1902–1903 provided for four further submarines,
which Mr. Arnold Forster said would be an improvement on those already
constructed at Barrow. The Admiralty, he added, proposed to continue the
process of adding submarines to our fleet. Details of the new boats are
not obtainable.

APPENDIX II
THE AMERICAN SUBMARINES

“The Submarine Boat is a small ship on the model of the Whitehead,
subject to none of its limitations, improving on all its special
qualities, excepting speed, for which it substitutes incomparably
greater endurance. It is not, like other small vessels, compelled to
select for its antagonist a vessel of about its own or inferior
power; the larger and more powerful its mark the better its
opportunity.”—Mr. J. P. HOLLAND.

“In my judgment, as a constructor of these boats (the new Hollands
for the United States Government), and from my long experience in
designing and constructing war vessels for the Government, and as
the constructor of the original _Holland_, I have no doubt whatever
of the endurance, habitability, durability, and reliability of these
boats.

* * * * *

“No type of boat in the navy has received such crucial tests as the
_Holland_. The submarine boat to-day is further advanced in its
development than any type of naval vessels that I am aware of. I
desire to say that in my opinion the _Holland_, without any
improvements, is to-day the greatest vessel for harbour and coast
defence ever known.”—Mr. LEWIS NIXON, builder of the _Holland_.

When the British Admiralty decided to experiment with submarine boats,
the type chosen was that invented by Mr. John P. Holland. It is
therefore fitting that some account should be given of the various
stages through which the Holland boat has gone in the course of its
evolution.

Although Mr. John P. Holland, of Paterson, New Jersey, U.S.A., made a
number of experiments in the sixties, his first real submarine boat was
not built until 1875.

_Holland No. 1_ may be described as an under-water canoe, for there was
only room for one occupant, who propelled the vessel along by means of
pedal-acting mechanism, a small screw being fitted at the stern.

The dimensions were:—

Length 16 feet
Beam 20 inches
Depth 2 feet

[Illustration:

MR. HOLLAND’S EARLIEST SUBMARINE.

(1875.)
]

It was divided into three parts; the two end ones were used as air
reservoirs and submersion tanks, and that in the centre contained the
operator, whose head was encased in a diver’s helmet. The vessel was
driven by a small propeller projecting from the stern joist, and beneath
this was the rudder.

_Holland No. 2_ was constructed in 1877 at the Albany City Iron Works of
New York.

Its dimensions were:—

Length 10 feet
Beam 3·5 feet
Depth 3 feet

It had a double shell, and in the space between water ballast could be
admitted for submersion. The motor was a petroleum engine of 4 h.p.,
working a screw at the stern. Two rudders, one vertical, the other
horizontal, were carried, and experiments showed that the latter acted
better when placed at the stern than when on the side. After a series of
trials on the Passaic River, Mr. Holland removed the machinery and sank
his boat under Falls Bridge at Patterson, where it probably remains at
this day.

_Holland No. 3_ was commenced in 1879 in the yards of the Delamater Iron
Company of New York City, and finished in 1881.

Its dimensions were:—

Length 31 feet
Beam 6 feet
Depth 6 feet
Displacement 19 tons

It was propelled by a 15 h.p. petroleum engine of the Brayton type; as
armament a submarine cannon, 11 feet long and 9 inches in diameter, was
carried, and the projectile was expelled by means of a charge of
compressed air. “She was the first submarine since Bushnell’s time,”
writes Admiral Hichborn, “employing water ballast and always retaining
buoyancy, in which provision was made to ensure a fixed centre of
gravity and a fixed absolute weight. Moreover, she was the first buoyant
submarine to be steered down and up inclines in the vertical plane by
horizontal rudder action, as she was pushed forward by her motor,
instead of being pushed up and down by vertically acting mechanism. Her
petroleum engine, provided for motive power and for charging her
compressed air flasks, was inefficient, and the boat therefore failed as
a practical craft; but in her were demonstrated all the chief principles
of successful brain-directed submarine navigation. After the completion
of the boat, Holland led the world far and away in the solution of
submarine problems, and for a couple of years demonstrated that he could
perfectly control his craft in the vertical plane. Eventually, through
financial complications, she was taken to New Haven, where she now is.”
In 1896 her air-compressor was removed to work a forge, and she is now
nothing but an empty hull.

_Holland No. 4_ was constructed in the yard of Gammon and Cooper, of
Jersey City. It was simply meant as a model, being only 16 ft. 4 in.
long, 28 in. in diameter, and displacing a ton. The motor was an
explosive engine, which was to serve for propulsion above and below the
surface. The life of this model was unfortunately short, for on one
occasion she was submerged with her cupola open, with the result that
the water entered and she sank.

_Holland No. 5_, commonly known under the name of the “Zalinsky Boat,”
owing to its dynamite guns, was built at Fort Lafayette.

It was—

30 feet long,
7 feet beam,
7 feet in diameter,

and was armed with two Zalinsky pneumatic dynamite guns. Owing to an
error in construction, she was shipwrecked on the rocks, but was
afterwards rescued and used for some experiments in the docks.

_Holland No. 6_ never got further than the design stage; it was not a
true submarine, not being capable of total submergence.

_Holland No. 7_ was known as the _Plunger_.

[Illustration:

BOW VIEW OF THE “HOLLAND.”
]

Whilst Mr. Whitney was Secretary of the Navy he was anxious to provide
some kind of protection against gun-fire for torpedo-boats, and under
suggestion he invited proposals for submarine boats. A great many
designs were sent in, and two propositions to build were made by the
famous Cramp firm, the designs being those of Holland and Nordenfelt. It
will not be necessary to enter into any detailed comparison between the
two types. Suffice it to say that while Mr. Nordenfelt screwed his boat
down by using vertical screws, and held the opinion that the keel of a
submarine must always be kept parallel to the surface of the water, Mr.
Holland steered his boat down and up an incline by the action of
horizontal rudders placed in the stern. The Holland design was accepted,
because “it embodied the ideas of a fixed centre of gravity, of an exact
compensation for expended weights, of a low longitudinal metacentric
height, and of quick diving and rising by the effort of the propeller
pushing the vessel against the resistance of her midship section only
down and up inclines, the angles of which were to be determined by
horizontal rudder action.” Difficulties in regard to guarantees of
performance prevented the closing of a contract that year—1888—and the
next year, after all preliminaries were arranged, a change in
administration caused the matter to be put aside. After the lapse of
some years interest in submarine boats was again aroused, and on March
3rd, 1893, Congress authorised the building of a single experimental
vessel, and after a third competition of designs and other delays a
contract for a Holland boat was signed two years later with the Holland
Torpedo-boat Company (formed in 1895). The new vessel was to be called
the _Plunger_. The long delay was owing, Mr. Holland has said, to the
opposition of a few officers of Conservative spirit, who preferred to
see the value of submarine boats fully established by their employment
in other navies, and their place in schemes of attack and defence
properly located before they could recommend their adoption in their own
navy.

The dimensions of the _Plunger_ are as follows:—

Length 85 feet
Beam 11½ feet
Diameter 11½ feet
Displacement 140 tons on the surface
Displacement 165 tons submerged
Guaranteed speed 15 knots on the surface for two hours
Guaranteed speed 14 knots submerged to one foot with the conning
tower above water
I.H.P. (surface) 1,625
I.H.P. (submerged) 200
Motor Steam engine on surface, fed with liquid fuel
Electric motor, completely submerged, giving speed
of 8 knots for six hours

Although the _Plunger_ was actually launched on the 7th of August, 1897,
she was never completed, although for three years various alterations
were carried out. The steam engines were removed and were replaced by
oil motors, but by the time these modifications had been effected the
Holland Torpedo-boat Company came to the conclusion that the _Plunger_,
when completed according to the terms of the contract, would be so
inferior to the more modern _Hollands_ that they offered to refund the
Government all it had paid them upon the _Plunger_, and all expenses
connected with the contract, provided the Navy Department would enter
into a contract for a new _Holland_. The proposition was accepted, and
the money, some $94,000 odd, was accordingly refunded. A short time ago
it was announced that the _Plunger_ was being broken up.

_Holland No. 8_ resembled very much the later types, but as she was not
entirely satisfactory, _Holland No. 9_ was built. This latter vessel is
generally referred to as the _Holland_. She was the prototype of the
British submarines, and her performances have excited a vast deal of
interest all over the civilised world.

The dimensions of the _Holland_, which was constructed at Elizabeth
Port, New Jersey, by Mr. Lewis Nixon, at the expense of the Holland
Company, and whilst the alterations to the _Plunger_ were still in
progress, are as follows:—

Length 53 ft. 10 ins.
Diameter 10 ft. 3 ins.
Height (bottom to superstructure deck) 10 ft. 7 ins.
Displacement 75 tons
Water ballast 10 tons
Reserve buoyancy 250 lbs.

On the surface the motor is a gasoline engine of the Otto type of 50
h.p., giving a speed of about 7 knots an hour, and under water an
electric motor, capable of giving 50 h.p. for 6 hours or 150 h.p. for 2
hours, is used. The battery of accumulators consists of 66 cells, giving
350 amperes for 4 hours, and allowing a speed of 8 knots an hour. The
radius of action on the surface is 1,500 miles at 7 knots without a
renewal of gasoline, and it can go 50 knots under water without coming
to the surface. In order to dive water ballast is admitted until the
boat is flush with the water, and it is then steered down an incline by
her two horizontal rudders at the stern, carried in addition to the
ordinary vertical rudder. It has a reserve buoyancy which tends to bring
it to the surface in case of accident. It can dive to a depth of 28 feet
in 8 seconds. The armament was intended originally to consist of three
tubes—two at the bows and one at the stern; two were to throw aerial
torpedoes and shells, while the third was to discharge Whitehead
torpedoes. The submarine gun aft, which was worked by pneumatic power,
and was capable of throwing 80 lbs. of dynamite a distance of about half
a mile, was, however, abandoned. The aerial gun at the bows is 11·25 ft.
long and 8 in. in diameter, and each of the projectiles weighs 222 lbs.,
and carries 100 lbs. of gun-cotton. This gun can shoot these projectiles
a distance of one mile. The torpedo tube is 18 in., and three torpedoes
are carried; they have a running capacity of more than half a mile at a
speed of 30 knots. On the top of the boat a flat superstructure is built
to afford a walking platform, and underneath this are spaces for exhaust
pipes, and for the external outfit of the boat, such as ropes and a
small anchor. From the centre of the boat a turret extends upward
through the superstructure about 18 inches. It is about 2 feet in
diameter, and is the only means of entrance to the boat; it is also the
place from which the boat is operated.

As Mr. Holland had been experimenting with submarine craft for 25 years,
and as he now considered that he had secured a practical result, and
that his newest boat would do all that he claimed, he requested the
United States Admiralty to make a series of exhaustive trials with the
_Holland_. These trials accordingly took place, and having been found to
be satisfactory, the _Holland_ was purchased by the U.S. Government on
April 11, 1900. The price paid was $150,000, and the Company stated that
the vessel had cost them, exclusive of any office expenses, or salaries
of officers, $236,615,427. The _Holland_ was formally placed in
commission under the command of Lieut. Harry H. Caldwell, U.S.N., on
October 13, 1900, but the boat had been under the charge of this officer
since June 25, 1900.

An Act making appropriations for the Naval Service for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1901, which was approved on June 7, 1900, contained the
following item:—

“The Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorised and directed to contract
for five submarine torpedo boats of the _Holland_ type, of the most
improved design, at a price not to exceed one hundred and seventy
thousand dollars each: _Provided_, That such boats shall be similar in
dimensions to the proposed new _Holland_, plans and specifications of
which were submitted to the Navy Department by the Holland Torpedo-boat
Company, November twenty-third, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine. The
said new contract and the submarine torpedo-boats covered by the same
are to be in accordance with the stipulations of the contract of
purchase made April eleventh, nineteen hundred, by and between the
Holland Torpedo-boat Company, represented by the secretary of the said
company, the party of the first part, and the United States, represented
by the Secretary of the Navy, the party of the second part. Towards the
completion of the equipment, outfit of the new vessels heretofore
authorised 400,000 dollars.”

A contract for the construction of _six_ (not five) submarine
torpedo-boats, Nos. 3–8, was finally concluded on the 25th of August,
1900, between the Holland Torpedo-boat Company and the Secretary of the
United States Navy.

Their names are as follows:—

1. _Adder._

2. _Moccassin._

3. _Porpoise._

4. _Shark._

These four were to be constructed in the yards of Lewis Nixon, at
Elizabethport, New Jersey.

5. _Grampus._

6. _Pike._

These were to be built at the Union Iron Works, San Francisco.

As the specification for these six boats resembles in almost every
particular that for the five British submarines of the _Holland_ type,
details need not be given here.

The contract price of the hull and machinery of each boat was $34,000.

The first of the six submarine boats ordered from the Holland Company by
the United States Government, to be launched was the _Adder_, the
launching ceremony being performed by Mrs. E. B. Frost, wife of the
Secretary of the Holland Company.

The _Porpoise_, _Moccassin_, and _Shark_ were all launched in 1901; at
the time of writing the _Grampus_ and the _Pike_ were still on the
stocks.[11]

Footnote 11:

The Naval Committee of the United States Senate in June, 1902, amended
the Appropriation Bill, and provided for the purchase of five further
submarines of the latest _Holland_ type, and for investigation into
other types.

[Sidenote: The “Fulton.”]

The _Fulton_ is an exact duplicate of the six boats the Holland
Torpedo-boat Company have built for the United States. She has been
built at the expense of the company with the object of experimenting, to
see if it is possible to get smaller engines with less weight and
greater power.

Mr. Holland said that he could not build his boats any longer and could
not get any more speed, simply for the reason that he could not get
engines with enough power. It was his intention to subject every part of
the equipment and motive power of the _Fulton_ to thorough test, and to
incorporate the experience thus gained in the six Government boats.

The _Fulton_ was launched on June 2, 1901, from the yards of Lewis
Nixon.

In the autumn of last year the vessel, with seven officers and men on
board, remained for fifteen hours at the bottom of Peconie Bay, whilst a
bad storm was raging above, without having the air in the interior
renewed. The turret-hatch was closed at seven o’clock on November 23rd,
and at the expiration of fifteen hours it had not been found necessary
to draw off any of the compressed air contained in the four flasks taken
down with the boat. The atmosphere was said to be as pure as in the
cabin of an ordinary yacht. A glass of water filled to the brim stood on
the cabin table during all the time of submersion, and not a drop was
spilled in spite of the gale blowing above water. The new submarines of
the _Fulton_ type carry 59 cubic feet of air compressed by a pressure of
2,000 pounds to the square inch. With the supply to fall back on,
Captain Cable said that six men could probably live in the _Fulton_ for
something like eight months. It was, according to him, more a matter of
food than air.

[Illustration:

STERN VIEW OF THE “HOLLAND.”
]

In December, 1901, the _Fulton_ gave an exhibition for the benefit of
the Norwegian naval officers who were deputed to inquire into the
capabilities of the Holland boats. Whilst travelling under water it
discharged dummy torpedoes at targets with perfect accuracy, and dived
repeatedly once in three seconds, or quickly enough to dodge a shell
aimed at it. Commander Geelmuyden, who was aboard, said that when he
inspected the _Holland_ it was quite incapable of the _Fulton’s_
performances. There is indeed little doubt that the newest _Holland_
boats represent all that is newest and best in submarine boat
construction.

She does not, however, appear to be perfect in every particular. On
Monday, April 28, 1902, the _Fulton_ left New York for Washington,
convoyed by the steamer _Norfolk_. Her course was to have been to
Hampton Roads, up Chesapeake Bay and the Potomac River to the Federal
capital, where she was expected to arrive on the Saturday following her
departure. She had on board, besides stored electricity for her
submarine trials, 750 gallons of gasoline for surface propulsion. She
put in at Delaware Breakwater on Monday morning, and shortly afterwards
an explosion occurred. Lieutenant Oscar Kohen, of the Austrian Navy, who
was on board at the time, was severely bruised, while a lieutenant of
the American Navy and several others were injured. The boat itself was
not seriously damaged. It transpired that the accident was due to a
slight explosion of hydrogen gas caused by the spilling of the acid from
the batteries. It was stated that during the trial the engine ran twenty
hours in a very heavy sea without stopping, and the speed of the boat
averaged 8–7⁄10 knots, and behaved extremely well.

The Holland Torpedo-boat Company intended, so it is stated, to build a
couple of boats to go to the lakes and to be carried on battleships. Mr.
Lewis Nixon, the builder of the _Holland_, said recently that Congress
should provide one submarine boat at least for every battleship and
cruiser small enough to be swung by a derrick, and lowered into the
water before going into action. He remarked that it was perfectly
feasible to design a successful submarine boat for such service. Admiral
Dewey had said that big vessels could be fitted to carry diving
torpedo-boats, and that special transport steamers would be the best for
this purpose.

APPENDIX III
FRANCE AND HER SUBMARINES

“By reason of her submarine division the navy of France is the most
dread and the most powerful in the world” (A French journalist,
after the torpedoing of the battleship _Charles Martel_ by the
_Gustave Zédé_ in Ajaccio Harbour in July, 1901).

“Jamais nous n’aurions trop de sous-marins.”—(M. V. GUILLOUSE in _Le
Yacht_).

Had it not been for the keen and abiding interest displayed by Admiral
Aube in the question of under-water warfare, it is extremely unlikely
that the French Navy would be in possession of its present fleet of
submarines.

It was in 1886 that Admiral Aube, being then Minister of Marine,
requested designs for submarine boats. In most quarters his ideas were
received with ridicule, and the experts of the day did not hesitate to
declare that such vessels would never become warships, that at best they
would serve only as diving bells, and that submarine navigation was a
subject more fitted for romancers like Jules Verne than for serious
marine architects.

The Admiral held his own, however, and contrary to the advice of the
Director of Material, ordered from M. Goubet on the 12th of September,
1886, a small boat, and in the same year, in face of the protests of all
his colleagues, he signed an order directing the Société des Forges et
Chantiers de la Méditerranée to build a larger vessel from the plans of
M. Gustave Zédé.

M. A. Saissy, a French journalist who has warmly advocated the
constructing of submarines by France, has written a preface to Messrs.
Forest and Noalhat’s treatise, “Les bateaux sous-marins” (1900), in
which he pays a tribute to the endeavours of the late Admiral to provide
his country with a submarine fleet. “Had we but followed his ideas,” he
writes, “had we but carried out his plans, not only would the defence of
our coasts and of our colonies be assured against attack, but France
would be at this hour the greatest naval power in the world.”

Admiral Aube argued that in the naval war of the future France would
most certainly act on the defensive, and that it was therefore the
business of the nation to prepare, to organise, and to bring to the
highest state of efficiency its weapons of defence. He blamed the
Admiralty for spending the millions which had been voted for the navy in
the creation of “mastodons” which “had neither speed, nor teeth to
bite.”

M. Saissy says that the Admiral’s plans were put on one side and that
his warnings appealed to deaf ears, but the time came when they were
brought to light again.

“On the morrow of Fashoda, after the insolent behaviour of the English,
the Minister of Marine saw his duty plain before him, and set to work
with zeal. M. Lockroy was surrounded by officers to whom the programme
of Admiral Aube was not a chimera. The study of submarine navigation was
actively pushed forward, and if M. Lockroy had remained at the Ministry
we should have at this moment an important number of these weapons of
naval warfare, so precious and so indispensable; but he was superseded
and, according to custom, his successor began to undo the good work of
his predecessor, so that we find ourselves to-day in a most difficult
situation. Our habit is always to act as if we had plenty of time before
us, and the enormous budget of the Navy and its supplementary estimates
will, unless we are on our guard, be wasted in a useless expenditure.

* * * * *

“If war had broken out last year, all our maritime ports and our
arsenals would have been bombarded and burned, before our squadrons
could have attempted to defend them.

“Is the situation better now than it was then? Have the means of defence
been strengthened as they should be?

“The Ministry of Marine is aware of the gravity of the situation. Our
legislators cannot be ignorant of the facts, and yet nothing is done.
Our only hope is in the individual initiative of those honest men of
science who give some thought to what the morrow may bring forth.”

M. Fleury Ravarin in a report written in November, 1900, supporting the
Ministerial programme for the building of large battleships, remarked:—

“If we are now asked what a fighting navy should really be we must say
that it should be capable of fighting upon the high seas with the navies
of rival nations, and that it is the business of the technical boards of
the Navy to indicate the nature and composition of the fleet required
for the purpose. It is for the Parliament to decide if we shall be
content with a modest defensive navy which would be unable, we cannot
repeat too often, to do more than delay defeat in case of war, or
whether on the other hand France is resolved to enforce her position as
a great Power and to make the heavy but remunerative sacrifices
necessary to give weight to her voice in the councils of Europe, thus
attracting to herself commerce and riches, and spreading throughout the
world her influence and her traditional ideal of justice and
generosity.”

Recent French naval activity in ship construction, deepening the
anchorages in home waters and protecting them against torpedo attacks,
organising torpedo stations, enlarging dry docks, creating vast depôts
of coal, war stores, &c., facilitating the rapid coaling of vessels,
providing bases of operation in different parts of the world, &c., is
avowedly aimed at Great Britain, and the idea that was uppermost in the
minds of those who counselled these preparations was that France should
be able, when a favourable moment arose, to strike a swift and sudden
blow at British supremacy.

Writers in France openly acknowledge that all French manœuvres embrace
the idea that the “enemy” is Great Britain, and the manœuvres of 1901
took the form of an attempt to prevent a junction of the British Channel
and Mediterranean squadrons.

Baron de Coubertin has lately warned England in the plainest and most
emphatic way that France will support Russia in any war with England,
and it is now well known that Russia was prepared to support France in
the Fashoda crisis.

Opinion in France is divided on the question of the shipbuilding
programme; whilst, on the one hand, there are those who regard the
construction of large battleships and cruisers as absolutely necessary,
on the other hand, there are others who look upon this type of warship
as inferior to the smaller class of fighting ship.

Just now the former party is in the ascendant. M. de Lanessan has
contrasted the short range of the torpedo with the long range of the
gun, and has deduced from the conditions the necessity for two classes
of vessels (_a_) torpedo craft, and (_b_) battleships and armoured
cruisers. He has explained that in order that the gun should be given
its full value it is essential that the platform should be stable and
that a vessel of considerable dimensions was thus called for. It was
impossible upon such a platform to place many powerful guns, but a
necessary consequence was that these should be protected, and hence came
the need of heavy armouring. In short, the two qualities of offence and
defence were indissoluble, but they were not the only qualities called
for; speed and range in action were also necessary, and these again led
inevitably to the heavy battleship.

M. Fleury-Ravarin, commenting on the fact that many advocates of the
_guerre de course_ had asked if there did not exist a more economical
means of making war than that which consisted in opposing to certain
ships others of a like character, told the French Parliament that it
(the _guerre de course_) had never brought an enemy to submission, and
that in the existing conditions of naval warfare it was very costly,
whilst speed, its essential element, was of all elements at sea the most
elusive. Moreover, the organisation of the _guerre de course_ required
many naval bases so that not only was it more costly in the beginning,
but it demanded greater charges for maintenance. For these reasons this
system of warfare could not be raised to a method; it must remain an
accessory.

There can be no doubt that the popularity of the submarine craft with
ministers, writers, journalists, and populace is due very largely to the
idea that these vessels will in warfare prove capable of meeting and
defeating the battleships and cruisers which Great Britain will send
against France when the “Real Thing” arrives.

A writer who adopts the _nom de plume_ of “_Armour_” points out the
probable course of action in a naval war between France and Great
Britain. British squadrons would be deprived of value by giving them no
object to attack and preventing the possibility of establishing an
effective blockade. The French ships would be withdrawn to the forts,
which would be strongly fortified so as to secure them against attack.
The close watching of a port would be too dangerous to be undertaken,
and at night the squadrons would be obliged to withdraw to great
distances in order to escape the menaces of the submersible boats: and
at the same time the ingress and egress of cruisers—the only large
vessels that would put to sea—would be easy.

In theory the British fleet should be equal in strength to the combined
fleets of any two Powers, and although there are times when our strength
is below the requisite, this ideal standard should be ever before those
responsible for the condition of the navy. In the opinion of a certain
class of Frenchmen the submarine will at a comparatively small expense,
and in a very short space of time, satisfactorily neutralise all that
England can do.

They hold that the use of the torpedo greatly strengthens an inferior
but enterprising enemy, and that the tendency of torpedo warfare is to
reduce the maritime forces of states differing considerably in power to
the level of equals.

The opinions of a few of the most ardent believers in submarines among
Frenchmen may be given here.

A French naval writer commenting on the sums expended by the French
Government on the construction of submarines writes—

“The cruiser which can guard itself from the ordinary torpedo-boat will
be without defence against the invisible enemy slowly creeping up to it
to discharge its torpedo. It will be no longer possible for it to enter
narrow waters and to approach the enemy’s coast. Its only safety will be
in flight, and it will become a relic of the past. The naval battles of
the future will take place not on the surface but in the depths of the
ocean.”

M. Lockroy, in 1899, speaking in explanation of the French navy
estimates, said that whilst formerly France had but one naval rival, she
now had four, and the Triple Alliance could muster but sixty-seven
battleships, while England had ninety-four, and France sixty. Could
France ensure superiority over her rivals? Yes; submarine navigation
ensured her a considerable advantage. The achievements of the _Zédé_
might lead to a revolution in naval equipment and warfare. Meanwhile
France had a terrible weapon—just what she wanted. “Everything,” said
Vice-Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, “which threatens _les colosses_ and
tends to emancipate _les moucherons_ should be warmly welcomed by the
French Navy, for by such means we can double in a few years our forces
and our power.” One might be forgiven for supposing that all French
writers were on the side of the smaller fighting vessel. There are,
however, quite as many who are opposed to this policy and who believe
that France would be better with more battleships and cruisers and less
torpedo craft, but they do not state their views in the emphatic and
picturesque language of the other party, and as a consequence their
influence is less felt. In 1888 Admiral Bourgois in his book on
Torpedoes emphatically stated that the torpedo and the torpedo-boat
could not take the place of the ironclad.

Says another writer: “Qu’on se rappelle les mitrailleuses de 1871. Nous
souhaitons sincerement que le sous-marin après avoir inspiré la meme
confiance exagerée ne cause pas les mêmes déceptions que les
mitrailleuses de 1870!”

Again the same writer reminds his countrymen that a naval battle cannot
be compared to a manœuvre when everything is arranged beforehand. The
submarine cannot venture to sea in foul weather without exposing itself
to dire accidents, but will the enemy wait until the sea is calm before
commencing battle? What would happen if he chose the moment to attack
when a troubled sea forces the submarine to remain in port and no other
defence can be utilised?

The submarine, he says, is still in the rudimentary condition, and the
problem of submarine navigation has not yet been solved.

“Other navies possess submarines and have made experiments, and we
cannot be certain that we are ahead of them, although we make the most
fuss.

“A means of defence from the attack of submarines, if ever they become
really dangerous weapons, will assuredly be found, and the country which
is so imprudent as to rely chiefly on such vessels will be quickly
disarmed by a stronger foe.

“To sum up, submarine navigation, like aerial navigation, is as yet only
in the experimental stage—let us follow its progress carefully and
encourage experiments; but to make a radical transformation in our navy
on the strength of certain manœuvres would be an act of imprudence both
perilous and criminal.”

The attitude of the saner class of Frenchmen may be gathered from the
following extract from a speech delivered in the Senate on the 4th of
December, 1900.

“At the present time we are certainly all of us believers in the
submarines; I am as keen a believer as you, but it must be recognised
that it is still the vessel of the future rather than of to-day.

“The day may come when it will cause all the cruisers to disappear, but
to-day the submarine is a weapon about whose efficiency one cannot be
very certain, or at least whose use in warfare is limited to special
circumstances. For the present, then, we needs must accept the proposals
of the Admiralty and wait to substitute these new engines of warfare for
our present bigger vessels until the future has given to submarines the
power and the value which some already claim for them.”

“It has been the crowning misfortune of France,” said Sir G. Clarke,
“that every fresh invention has resulted to the advantage of the
principal naval Power, from whom it has ever been her ambition to wrest
the command of the sea. A closer study of the problem of the submarine
boat will probably reveal the fact that the boat will be of little use
against moving targets, but, having been convoyed to its destination,
may be of service against fixed targets. The Power able to blockade its
enemy can so convoy the submarine boat without risk, and then it can be
sent on its adventurous enterprise in the crowded harbours of the
enemy.”

It will be only an instance of the irony of fate if submarines come to
be employed by Great Britain against France in the next great war, but
the French writers who declare that England reaps where France has sown
must remember that no nation can hope in these days to possess the
monopoly of any one particular weapon of warfare.

“We have seriously believed,” says a writer in the _Journal de la
Marine_, “that in all the great modifications that have been brought
about in the construction of submarines is the result of the important
changes which the last fifty years of the century have produced in the
art of naval warfare. All these changes have been sought out,
experimented upon, studied, and finally realised by France, who has also
been the first to apply them. These results have established in a
brilliant and incontestable manner the skill of our engineers; but our
rivals have not only appropriated the results of our labours, but they
have not been slow to place themselves on equal terms with us, and
finally to excel us in the application of these discoveries.... We have
been only the humble artisans working for them to establish their
superiority.”

All this, it is added, is due to the industrial supremacy of England.
France built a commerce-destroyer, _D’Entrecasteaux_, of 8,000 tons, and
with a speed of 19 knots. She was to prey on English ships of commerce
like a second _Alabama_. And Great Britain replied to the threat by
building the _Powerful_ and the _Terrible_, each of 14,000 tons and 22
knots, and the efforts of France were thus brought to naught, and the
_Journal_ wearily complains that, “It is easy for England to place three
armed cruisers for service where we can only place one.”

In the question of submarines Great Britain has pursued the same
perfidious conduct. Very quietly the British sat still until France had
done all the preliminary work of experiment and trial, and now, after
something of the nature of a real engine for naval war has been produced
by their engineers, Britain quietly steps in and begins at the point
France had reached.

“The English Government have not chosen to contribute by their own
researches and work to upset a state of things to which the supremacy of
the British Navy is due; the appearance of a boat which will plunge
under the water and act on the offensive within a considerable radius of
action has enlarged the question. At present all they wish is the
protection of coasts and harbours.”

But it was the intention of France to place herself in a position of
offence towards England.

“In the near future the types _Narval_ and _Holland_, being invisible
enemies, would be in a position to operate against the English coasts
and carry destruction into the midst of the naval forces which protect
them. They would be able to seek and hunt out these same forces even in
the harbours and roads where they are lying at anchor.”

But the ability of England to reply with some other equally good engine
and protect herself as she has always done oppresses the writer’s mind.

“On the other hand, if England with any chance of success is able to
oppose with the torpedo destroyer or some other force of an equalising
nature, she will render all this impossible to the submarine. There will
be some other means of defence against these redoubtable engines, though
the solution does not appear to be near. England will find her best
means of protection to attack the coasts of the enemy.... Anyway, she
has five submarines on the stocks, and it is believed that these will be
followed shortly by others.... The English have kept it a great secret.
They have allowed a time of serious observation and attention to pass
not with indifference before entering on the path opened by other
nations.”

The writer takes consolation from the reflection that, although when
England does begin it is easy for her to put three armed cruisers where
France can only put one, yet the start in submarines which France has
will revolutionise the conditions of naval war, and, he hopes, is such
that she need not fear what England can do for a long time to come.
“Doubtless,” he says, “more than a year will pass before the _Holland_
or vessels of that class, however perfect they may be, can really be
placed on service.” Then follows an enumeration of France’s fleet of
submarines:—

“We possess already four submarines in service actually employed on the
same work as torpedo boats—the _Gymnote_, the _Gustave Zédé_, the
_Morse_, and the _Narval_. The _Française_ and the _Korrigan_ will
follow the _Gnome_ and the _Lutin_ at Rochefort. At Cherbourg four are
now on the stocks—the _Silure_, _Triton_, _Sirène_, and _Escapadon_.
During this year twenty-three more will be placed on the stocks, which
will make altogether thirty-seven submarines.”

These will make a most formidable fleet, sporting like porpoises round
the English warships in the Channel and along her shores, and holding
them at the mercy of France. “The fact that England should launch into
their construction shows that they are more menacing to her than to us,”
adds the writer complacently. But France is not to sit down quietly:—

“But since we have made a very real advance in that which concerns the
submarine, let us work without ceasing to preserve this superiority. Our
engineers, who have succeeded so brilliantly, will be able to work for
themselves new improvements while profiting by the experience already
acquired.”

__PART I.__
FRENCH SUBMARINES PROPER, _i.e._ THOSE DEPENDENT ENTIRELY ON ELECTRICITY
FOR MOTIVE POWER.

_Gymnote._

The first submarine built for the French navy was the _Gymnote_. The
original plans of this vessel were worked out by the celebrated
engineer, Dupuy de Lôme, but unfortunately he never lived to execute his
project, for he died just when he had finished the details.

Some years later M. Gustave Zédé, a Marine Engineer, revived the ideas
of his friend, and after making some modifications in Dupuy de Lôme’s
original design, he brought it before Admiral Aube, the Minister of
Marine, who accepted it at once, and signed a contract for its
construction by the Société des Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée.
M. Zédé was one of the directors of this society, and thus he was able
to superintend the work, which was carried out under the direction of M.
Romazzotti, then first-class Assistant Engineer of Marine.

The _Gymnote_ is built of steel in the shape of a cigar. It is 59 feet
long, 5·9 feet beam, and 6 feet in diameter, just deep enough to allow a
man to stand upright in the interior; its displacement is 30 tons, a
total weight a little less than the weight of the water displaced by the
boat when completely immersed, and its speed about 6 knots; leaden
plates placed on each side of the boat in two hollows regulate its
draught of water. The top of the vessel affords a narrow platform, and
on this are a manhole and a little cupola, with windows.

The motive power was originally an electro-motor of 55 h.p., driven from
564 accumulators. It was designed by Captain Krebs and built in the
workshops of the Société des Forges et Chantiers at Havre.

It was of extraordinary lightness, weighing only 4,410 lbs., and drove
the screw at the rate of 2,000 revolutions a minute, giving a speed of 6
knots an hour, its radius of action at this speed being 35 knots;
reduced to 4 knots its radius of action was 100 miles.

This motor was afterwards replaced by a much simpler machine.

Immersion is obtained by the introduction of water into three
reservoirs, placed one forward, one aft, and one centre.

The water is expelled either by means of compressed air or by a rotary
Behrens pump worked by an electro-motor.

Two horizontal rudders steer the boat in the vertical plane and an
ordinary rudder steers it on the horizontal. Originally one horizontal
rudder only was carried at the stern, but this did not answer well and
was given up.

The behaviour in the sea of the boat when subjected to the influence of
this rudder was somewhat unsatisfactory. For rather prolonged “dives,”
such as would be necessary, for example, in forcing a blockade, the
instability of the boat became very great, and the man at the helm was
unduly fatigued without succeeding in retaining the mastery of his
craft. On account of this instability no greater speed in submersions
than 6 knots was attained. For this speed the inclination of the axis of
the boat was from three to five degrees forward. The difference in the
draught of water between the bow and the stern was 0·88 metre (about 34
inches) for an inclination of 3 degrees; for 5 degrees it reached 1·50
metres (nearly 5 feet).

[Illustration:

_Photo by_] [_M. Bar_

THE “GYMNOTE.”
]

Another system of “dip” rudder, proposed in 1891, executed in 1893, and
tested towards the end of 1894, consists in the employment of two
horizontal floatboards, placed on each side of the boat at the height of
the midship frame. Their use, combined with that of the stern rudder,
has given better results. The boat is inclined less for the “dive,” dips
more regularly, and lurches or “yaws” less.

When navigating on the surface or when her hull is immersed to the
water-line the _Gymnote_ carries a cupola, or movable shell with
sidelights.

This apparatus is composed essentially of a metal shell provided with
sidelights all round its circumference. A cylinder of strong tarred
canvas fixed on steel springs, which ensure rigidity, bind the shell
itself to the upper part of the hull. Horizontal folds in front permit
this canvas to double up regularly upon itself after the style of a
Venetian lantern, and in such a way that when the doubling up is
complete the height of the shell (or “casque”) comes exactly on a level
with the upper platform of the boat. During navigation at the surface or
on the water-line the whole structure can be raised or lowered by means
of a vertical screw moved by a horizontal hand-wheel of which the
movable nut constitutes the lower part of a vertical frame formed of
metallic uprights, which go to rejoin the hull. When the system is at
the end of an upward course the canvas is completely stretched and the
observatory is at its maximum height; when, on the contrary, it is at
the end of a downward run, the canvas is completely contracted and the
“kiosk” has externally disappeared.

Such a system (as a French writer has pointed out) is very faulty and
dangerous, as may be easily conceived. In the first place, considering
the feeble resistance which a canvas can oppose even when mounted on
steel springs, it was indispensable to protect it against the pressure
of the water during the “dive.” This was believed to have been
accomplished by providing the shell with an indiarubber crown, forming a
sort of beak, which, when the system was completely folded up and
closed, came to rest on another washer of indiarubber placed at the
bottom of a groove, where it formed a watertight joint. This would have
been very good if there had been certitude that the beak or cap fixed on
the shell rested exactly at the bottom of the groove. To make sure of
that there had been arranged a small opening, which ought to give water
when the closure was not sufficient, but this only gave an almost
illusory means of control, the opening being found almost always
obstructed by some detritus, _débris_ of sea-wrack, and other foreign
bodies encountered by the vessel. It will be seen what permanent danger
was created by this apparatus—danger which on two occasions just missed
causing the loss of the craft, an unlooked-for chance alone preventing
it from foundering.

It would further be easy to show that in spite of its danger the movable
shell, with canvas folded in accordion pleats, was almost unusable—that
it could not serve when there was a slight sea on; that it caused, even
during progress on the water-line, infiltrations capable of sinking the
boat; and finally that, even in a calm sea and under the best
conditions, the length of the manœuvre of raising and lowering made the
operations of the “dive” slow and wanting in precision—operations which
demand so much rapidity and delicacy, and to which alone it is allowable
to sacrifice something on a submarine boat. This movable shell was 0·35
metre (about 13½ to 14 inches) in diameter; it was abandoned after all
the Commandants had successively condemned it, and to-day it is never
used.

For use below the surface the _Gymnote_ carries an optical tube with two
inclined mirrors and a periscope, but these have so far given but poor
results.

The _Gymnote_ was first tried on September 24, 1888, in Toulon harbour.
The French Press was enthusiastic about the qualities of the new boat.
According to _Le Temps_ she was a complete success: “She steers like a
fish both as regards direction and depth; she masters the desired depth
with ease and exactness; at full power she attains to anticipated speed
of from nine to ten knots; the lighting is excellent, there is no
difficulty about heating. It was a strange sight to see the vessel
skimming along the top of the water, suddenly give a downward plunge
with its snout and disappear with a shark-like wriggle of its stern,
only to come up again at a distance out and in an unlooked-for
direction. A few small matters connected with the accumulators have to
be seen to; but they will not take a month.”

At the trials which took place before the Maritime Prefect of Toulon in
1888, the _Gymnote_ behaved very well, as far as speed and stability
were concerned, but it was found difficult to keep her at a constant
level when submerged.

The _Gymnote_ was commanded by several officers, and for some time
served as a training school for officers and men in the management of
the new type of craft, and many suggestions and improvements were
suggested by them, and in some cases carried out. She is now used as an
instructional boat.

At first the vessel carried no armament, but afterwards two torpedo
tubes were fitted.

_Gustave Zédé._

The _Gymnote_ being intended merely as an unarmed, experimental craft,
the next step was to construct a larger vessel carrying a submerged
torpedo tube.

M. Barbey, the Minister of Marine, took the initiative in this project
and M. Romazzotti, Naval Constructor, was ordered to draw up the plans
for the boat and to place it on the stocks in the yard of Mourillon.

The construction of the boat (which was to be named the _Sirène_) was
decided upon in 1890.

During the building M. Zédé, the inventor of the _Gymnote_, died, and
the Minister of Marine conceived the happy idea of paying a last tribute
of respect to the famous engineer by giving the name of _Gustave Zédé_
to the first armed submarine of the French fleet.

The _Gustave Zédé_ was launched at Toulon on June 1, 1893; she is 159
feet in length, beam 12 feet 4 inches, and has a total displacement of
266 tons. Her shell is of “Roma” bronze, a non-magnetic metal, and one
that cannot be attacked by sea water.

[Illustration:

_Photo by_] [_M. Bar_

THE “GUSTAVE ZÉDÉ.”
]

The motive power, of 720 h.p. is furnished by two independent
electro-motors of 360 h.p. each of the Thury type, constructed by M.
Sautter-Harlé and fed by accumulators of the Laurent-Cély type. The
screw revolves at the rate of 250 revolutions a minute.

In order to endow the boat with a wide radius of action a battery was
provided composed of 720 cells, each containing 29 plates and having an
output of 400 amperes and a capacity of 1,800 amperes an hour. The
_Gustave Zédé_ had scarcely been placed in the water before the motive
power gave out owing to the short-circuiting of most of the cells.

To remedy this, two plates were removed from each cell in order that
each plate might be wrapped in a “chemise en toile d’amiante.” The
result was no better for the covers, and the ebonite joints burst into
flames and the boat was in danger of being consumed by fire. It was then
decided to reduce it to 360 cells; this gave a speed of eight knots,
though originally it was hoped that sixteen would be obtained.

The successive crews of the _Gustave Zédé_ have suffered much from the
poisonous fumes of the accumulators, and during the earlier trials all
the men on board were ill.

In the bows is a torpedo tube and an arrangement is used whereby the
water that enters the tube after the discharge of the torpedo is forced
out by compressed air. Three 17½ Whitehead torpedoes are carried. In
spite of the fact that a horizontal rudder placed at the stern had not
proved serviceable on the _Gymnote_, such a rudder was fitted in the
_Gustave Zédé_. With this rudder she usually plunged at an angle of
about 5°, but on several occasions she behaved in a very erratic
fashion, seesawing up and down, and once when the Committee and Experts
were on board, she proved so capricious, going down at an angle of
30°–35°, often throwing the poor gentlemen on to the floor, that it was
decided to fix a system of six rudders, three on each side.

Four water tanks are carried, one at each end and two in the middle, and
the water is expelled by four Thirion pumps worked by a little
electro-motor; these pumps also furnish the air necessary for the crew
and for the discharge of the torpedoes.

For steering on the surface there was placed on the _Gustave Zédé_ at
first a movable shell with folded canvas similar to that of the
_Gymnote_. It was found even more dangerous there than on the smaller
boat; it was, therefore, taken away and replaced by a fixed kiosk,
immovably attached to the hull, and of a shape tapering away fore and
aft. The _Gustave Zédé_ possesses, for under-water vision, an optical
tube and a periscope.

The crew consists of an officer and eight men.

The first journey of any length undertaken by the _Gustave Zédé_ was
from Salins d’Hyères to Toulon. The sea was choppy, and a fresh breeze
was blowing, and yet no mishap of any kind occurred. She navigated for
the greater distance at the surface, with her cupola above the water,
but when the water became too rough she plunged under the waves,
occasionally emerging to take bearings. The distance between Toulon and
Salins is short, and so the next journey was from Toulon to Marseilles,
a distance of forty-one miles, and this the _Gustave Zédé_ covered also
in a rough sea without accident of any kind at the rate of six knots.
Although accompanied by a tug, the _Utile_, it had no occasion for its
services. She navigated on the surface all the way, but by reason of the
swell everything was hermetically closed, and for more than seven hours
the crew were kept in conditions exactly the same as if the vessel had
been really under water.

On reaching Marseilles the accumulators had sufficient power left to
perform the return journey.

The trials of the _Gustave Zédé_ resulted in stimulating the interest of
the French in submarine warfare. Writers vied with one another in
extolling the qualities of under-water craft and the popular imagination
saw already the powerful fleets of Great Britain and Germany destroyed
by the attacks of the French submarine flotilla.

“Jamais nous n’aurions trop de sous-marins,” wrote M. V. Guilloux in _Le
Yacht_. “The twelve years of consecutive efforts and studies continued
in order to obtain a solution of the question of submarine navigation
have at length been crowned with success,” said a writer in the
_Moniteur de la Flotte_.

Lieutenant Maurice Loir writing in the _Moniteur_ of a later date
remarked that Frenchmen went too fast in proclaiming that these isolated
trials sounded the knell of the battleships.

He nevertheless believed the submarine boat to be a real element in
naval war because the very fear of its invisible attack would keep at a
distance adversaries who might have an object in approaching the coasts.

So great was the interest taken in France in submarine boats that the
_Matin_ opened a “Patriotic Subscription Fund” in 1898, to raise money
for building submarine boats of the _Gustave Zédé_ type. The journal
itself headed the list with a subscription of 5,000 francs. In a long
article the _Matin_ dwelt on the utility of these engines of warfare,
and asked the French public to furnish the funds necessary for the
construction of at least one more _Gustave Zédé_. It urged the
Government to build a fleet of these boats as an effectual protection
for the French ports and the harbours of the French Colonies, against
the most powerful navies of the world.

The result of the opening of the fund was that two submarines were
presented to the nation—the _Français_ and the _Algerien_—and the sum of
300,000 francs, mostly in small sums, was contributed by the French
nation for these vessels.

The history of the _Gustave Zédé_ shows how much in earnest the French
were in the matter of submarines. When it was first launched it was a
distinct failure in almost every respect, and it was only after some
years during which many alterations and improvements were carried out,
that she became a serviceable craft. At first nothing would induce the
_Gustave Zédé_ to quit the surface, and when at last she did plunge she
did it so effectually that she went down to the bottom in 10 fathoms of
water at an angle of 30°. The Committee of Engineers were on board at
the time, and it speaks well for their patriotism that they did not as a
result of their unpleasant experiences condemn the _Gustave Zédé_, and
advise the Government to spend no more money over these monsters of the
deep.

_Morse._

Before the _Gustave Zédé_ was completed M. Romazzotti prepared designs
for a smaller submarine, which should be intermediary between the
_Gymnote_, displacing 30 tons, and the _Gustave Zédé_ of 266 tons.

This vessel, the _Morse_, is 118 feet long, 9 feet beam, 8 feet 3 inches
diameter, is made of “Roma” bronze, and displaces 146 tons. Amidships is
a circular conning tower rising about 18 in. from the top of the boat.

The sole motive power, as in the _Gustave Zédé_ and the _Gymnote_, is
electricity. The motor is of the Thury type, and develops 350 h.p.,
rotating the screw at 250 revolutions a minute. The current is derived
from a battery of accumulators by the Société anonyme pour le Travail
Electrique des Métaux. It is claimed that a means of recharging the
batteries while at sea has been discovered; it is described as being a
“combination of motors,” doubtless an intentionally vague description of
a method which seems to be like an attempt to solve the impossible
problem of creating energy.

The _Morse_ is submerged and steered in the same way as the _Gustave
Zédé_ in her most improved form. Water is admitted into three separate
compartments until a certain amount of buoyancy has been overcome, and
the boat is then steered below the surface by her horizontal rudders. A
false keel of lead can be detached if necessary from the inside.

The armament consists of a bow torpedo tube and two special carriers on
the side, each holding one torpedo. Her crew consists of a commander and
8 men, and her range of action is 150 miles.

Although the _Morse_ was taken in hand many years previously she was not
launched until the 5th of July, 1899. One of the reasons for this delay
was the question whether an oil engine should be fitted in the vessel
for surface navigation. She has cost in all 648,000 francs.

The _Morse_ is steered on the surface and awash from the conning tower,
and underneath by means of a periscope that rises above the surface and
allows (theoretically) of her seeing everything at a depth of 20 feet.
In fine weather the periscope reflects everything within its field of
vision, and can be turned round so as to cover the whole horizon.

The French naval authorities believe that they have in the _Morse_ a
vessel which fulfils all the conditions of coast defence torpedo-boats,
with the further advantage of invisibility, which makes it a specially
dangerous weapon of attack upon hostile vessels in day-time.

Early in January, 1901, the French Minister of War visited Cherbourg and
went for a trip in the _Morse_.

Although a considerable sea was running outside the harbour the
submarine rolled very slightly. The operation of submerging took but two
minutes. During the voyage four torpedoes were fired, and each was said
to run straight and true.

“The feeling experienced,” says a writer in the _Temps_, “at the moment
the vessel is making her descent is most peculiar; it is one of
expectancy, but nothing happens, one is astonished at the quiet, the
absolute calm, there is no movement, not even a tremble, the waves wash
overhead without causing the least vibration, the motor works silently,
and the vessel glides through the water without causing any bow wave or
leaving any track. Above, the voice of the captain is heard, who,
standing by the periscope, gives his orders for so many degrees of helm
and so many revolutions of the engine. The little vessel is now almost
in equilibrium, and would sink deeper or rise to the surface were it not
for the ‘ailettes’ on each side which serve to prevent this. Before an
instrument which indicates the depth stands a petty officer with his eye
fixed and his attention concentrated on the pointer, and by turning a
wheel he causes the ‘ailettes’ to act so as to maintain the vessel at
the required depth. Should she for any reason continue to descend or
refuse to ascend, a pig of lead ballast can be detached which would
cause her immediately to rise to the surface, but after this the
buoyancy would be so much increased that she could no longer be
submerged even with all her ballast tanks full. Orders had been given to
remain a quarter of an hour under water, and at the expiration of the
time pumps are set in motion and the water is forced out of the ballast
tanks (situated forward, aft, and amidships) and the _Morse_ commences
to rise, the conning tower and the small platform emerge, and the
man-holes are opened. No commotion takes place at the entering of the
external air and no inconvenience has been felt by those on board during
the dive, the act of breathing being as free and regular as in the open
air.

“Trials to ascertain the habitability of the _Morse_ had already been
made, and she has remained for eight hours under water, the crew
experiencing no difficulty in breathing and no buzzing sensation in the
ears, no excitation or inconvenience of any sort, and it was considered
they could have remained double the time if necessary, the chemical
analysis of the air showing also that it would have been possible to
considerably prolong the trial if required.”

M. Calmette, of the _Figaro_, who accompanied General André on the trial
trip of the _Morse_, sent to his journal a long account of his
experiences during the two hours which the trial lasted. He said the
defect of the _Morse_ lay in the fact that the motive power was supplied
by electric accumulators, the premature exhaustion of which might
deprive the vessel of all means of action. A combination had, however,
been effected, which enabled accumulators to be recharged on the spot.
This system would be utilised on the submarines _Français_ and
_Algerien_. As was already known, the commander directed the navigation
of the vessel by means of a periscope, the extremity of which, resting
on the surface, gave him—no matter at what depth—an absolutely faithful
and distinct image of all that was taking place on the surface. The
immersion was effected easily and without shock, in exactly seventy
seconds. Breathing in a submarine was as easy as in an ordinary room.
The vessel could remain in the water for sixteen hours without
inconvenience to the occupants, and could rise to the surface very
rapidly. The correspondent went on to say that after the trial the
_Morse_, in conjunction with the _Narval_, went through a series of
manœuvres lasting eight hours. The _Morse_ discharged a torpedo with
remarkable precision by a process which was a profound secret.

M. Calmette’s account furnishes interesting reading. He says:—

“General André, Dr. Vincent, a naval doctor, and I enter the submarine
boat _Morse_ through the narrow opening in the upper surface of the
boat. Our excursion is to begin immediately; in two hours we are to come
to the surface of the water again three miles to the north to rejoin the
_Narval_. Turning to the crew, every man of which is at his post, the
commandant gives his orders, dwelling with emphasis on each word. A
sailor repeats his orders one by one, and all is silent. The _Morse_ had
already started on its mysterious voyage, but is skimming along the
surface until outside the port in order to avoid the numerous craft in
the Arsenal. To say that at this moment, which I had so keenly
anticipated, I did not have the tremor which comes from contact with the
unknown would be beside the truth. On the other hand, calm and
imperturbable, but keenly curious as to this novel form of navigation,
General André had already taken his place near the commandant on a
folding seat. There are no chairs in this long tube in which we are
imprisoned. Everything is arranged for the crew alone, with an eye to
serious action. Moreover, the Minister of War is too tall to stand
upright beneath the iron ceiling, and in any case it would be impossible
to walk about.

“The only free space is a narrow passage, 60 centimetres broad, less
than two metres high, and 30 metres long, divided into three equal
sections. In the first, in the forefront of the tube, repose the
torpedoes, with the machine for launching them, which at a distance of
from 500 to 600 metres are bound to sink, with the present secret
processes, the largest of ironclads. In the second section are the
electric accumulators which give the light and power. In the third, near
the screw, is the electric motor which transforms into movement the
current of the accumulators. Under all this, beneath the floor, from end
to end, are immense water ballasts, which can be emptied or filled in a
few seconds by electric machines, in order to carry the vessel up or
down. Finally, in the centre of the tube, dominating these three
sections, which the electric light inundates, and which no partition
divides, the navigating lieutenant stands on the look-out giving his
orders.

“There is but one thing which could destroy in a second all the sources
of authority, initiative, and responsibility in this officer. That is
the failure of the accumulators. Were the electricity to fail everything
would come to a stop. Darkness would overtake the boat and imprison it
for ever in the water. To avoid any such disaster there have been
arranged, it is true, outside the tube and low down a series of lead
blades which can be removed from within to lighten the vessel. But
admitting that the plunger would return to the surface, the boat would
float hither and thither, and at all events lose all its properties as a
submarine vessel. To avoid any such disaster a combination of motors has
been in course of construction for some months, so that the accumulators
may be loaded afresh on the spot, in case of their being used up. I
betray no secret in stating that this new scheme is already completed,
and the next submarine vessels, the _Français_, the _Algerien_, and the
_Matin_, will be fitted with the result.

“The _Morse_, after skimming along the surface of the water until
outside the port, is now about to sink. The commandant’s place is no
longer in the helmet or kiosque whence he can direct the route along the
surface of the sea. His place is henceforth in the very centre of the
tube, in the midst of all sorts of electric manipulators, his eyes
continually fixed on a mysterious optical apparatus, the periscope. The
other extremity of this instrument floats on the surface of the water,
and whatever the depth of the plunge it gives him a perfectly faithful
and clear representation, as in a camera, of everything occurring on the
water.

“The most interesting moment of all now comes. I hasten to the little
opening to get the impression of total immersion. The lieutenant by the
marine chart verifies the depths. The casks of water are filled and our
supply of air is thereby renewed from their stores of surplus air. In
our tiny observatory, where General André stations himself above me, a
most unexpected spectacle presents itself as the boat is immersed.

“The plunge is so gentle that in the perfect silence of the waters one
does not perceive the process of descent, and there is only an
instrument capable of indicating, by a needle, the depth to which the
_Morse_ is penetrating. The vessel is advancing while at the same time
it descends, but there is no sensation of either advance or roll. As to
respiration, it is as perfect as in any room. M. de Lanessan, who since
entering office has ordered eight more submarine vessels, has concerned
himself with the question as a medical man also, and, thanks to the
labours of a commission formed by him, the difficulties of respiration
are entirely solved. The crew can remain under water sixteen hours
without the slightest strain. Our excursion on this occasion lasted
scarcely two hours. Towards noon, by means of the mysterious periscope,
which, always invisible, floats on the surface and brings to the vessel
below a reflection of all that passes up above, the captain shows us the
_Narval_, which has just emerged with its two flags near the old battery
Impregnable. From the depths in which we are sailing we watch its
slightest manœuvres, until the admiral’s flag, waving on the top of a
fort, reminds us that it is time to return.”

_Français and Algerien._

Two sister vessels, submarines proper, the _Français_ and the
_Algerien_, designed by M. Romazzotti, were laid down at Cherbourg in
1900. They were built with the proceeds of a subscription opened by the
_Matin_ at the time of the Fashoda dispute. They are almost identical
with the _Morse_, though in some respects they are improvements on their
prototype. They are built of steel, and the sole motive power is
electricity. The cost of each is £32,972. The _Français_ was launched on
January 29, 1901, and the _Algerien_ on February 15, 1901.

_Farfadet Class._

The _Farfadet_ class, designed by M. Maugas, consists of four submarines
all laid down simultaneously at Cherbourg on September 27, 1899, viz.,
_Farfadet_, _Gnome_, _Korrigan_, and _Lutin_.

In size they are between the _Gustave Zédé_ and the _Morse_, the
measurements being—length 135 feet 8 inches, beam and also draught 9½
feet, displacement 185 tons. Each has a single screw, and the sole
motive power is electricity, supplied by accumulators. On the surface
the speed is 12·25, and submerged 9 knots. The complement is a
lieutenant and eight men. The hull is of steel and not of Roma metal,
like the _Gustave Zédé_ and the _Morse_. The armament consists of four
torpedoes carried on the exterior of the vessel.

The cost of each of the _Farfadet_ class is about £32,000. The
_Farfadet_ was launched on May 17, 1901, and the _Korrigan_ on February
2, 1902.

_The Perle Class._

The Budget of 1901 made provision for 23 submarines, 20 of the
“defensive,” 3 of the “offensive” class.

The names of the 20 defensive boats are: (1) _Perle_; (2) _Bonite_; (3)
_Esturgeon_; (4) _Thon_; (5) _Souffleur_; (6) _Anguille_; (7) _Alose_;
(8) _Dorade_; (9) _Truite_; (10) _Grondin_; (11) _Naiäde_; (12)
_Protée_; (13) _Lynx_; (14) _Ludion_; (15) _Loutre_; (16) _Castor_; (17)
_Phoque_; (18) _Otarie_; (19) _Méduse_; (20) _Oursin_.

All these twenty boats (which were laid down in 1901) will be
constructed of steel, will have a displacement of 68 tons, a length of
77 feet, a beam of 7½ feet, and draught 8 feet.

The sole motive power will be electricity supplied by accumulators, and
the motor will actuate a single screw.

The maximum speed will be 8 knots, and their crew will consist of an
officer and four men. The price of each is £14,616, which is less than
any previous submarine boat.

Of these twenty vessels five are building at Cherbourg, six at
Rochefort, and the rest at Toulon. They are to unite all the best points
of the existing vessels, and are intended primarily for harbour and
coast defence.

_PART II._
FRENCH “SUBMERSIBLES,” _i.e._, THOSE FITTED WITH TWO SOURCES OF MOTIVE
POWER, ONE FOR SURFACE, AND ONE FOR SUB-SURFACE PROPULSION.

_The Narval Class._

In February, 1896, M. Lockroy, Minister of Marine, acting in conjunction
with M. Bertin, Director of Material, invited designs for a submarine
torpedo-boat from Frenchmen and foreigners. The commission appointed to
examine the various projects decided in favour of the one sent in by M.
Laubeuf. This decision was approved by the Minister, who ordered the
construction of the vessel to be taken in hand, and awarded a gold medal
to its inventor.

The _Narval_ was commenced at Cherbourg in 1897, and launched on October
26, 1899, but it was not until certain modifications had been made that
it was considered to be (in 1900) in a satisfactory condition to run her
trials.

While the _Gymnote_, the _Gustave Zédé_, and the _Morse_ rely solely on
electricity for their motive power, the _Narval_ can navigate in three
different ways.

1. As an ordinary torpedo-boat, with water, ballast tanks empty.

2. Awash, with the dome and chimney alone above the waves, carrying a
certain amount of ballast.

3. Entirely submerged with tanks full of water.

Some French writers have divided under-water craft into three classes.
The first is the “Submersible”: this type is represented by the _Mute of
Fulton_, the _Stromboli_, the _Spuyten Duyvil_, the _Porter_, &c. Such
boats are never completely submerged, but only take in sufficient
ballast to keep their decks flush with the water.

The second is the “Sous-Marin”: this type, represented by the _Gymnote_,
_Gustave Zédé_, and _Morse_, has no sphere of action except as a totally
submerged craft.

The third is the “Sous-Marin autonome à grand rayon d’action,” and is
represented by the _Narval_ type of vessel. They can be used both as
ordinary torpedo-boats or submarines. We have in our classifications
adopted the terms “submarine” and “submersible.”

In designing the _Narval_ M. Laubeuf aimed at producing a disappearing
vessel, which should correspond with the sea-going torpedo-boat in the
same way as the _Morse_ is partly designed to replace the torpedo-boat
for coast defence.

The _Narval_ possesses various radii of action.

1. On the surface and propelled by its steam engine—
252 miles at a speed of 12 knots for 21 hours
624 miles at a speed of 8 knots for 78 hours

2. Submerged and propelled by electricity—
25 miles at a speed of 8 knots
72 miles at a speed of 5 knots

The hull of the _Narval_ is peculiar, being double. The interior hull is
of thick steel sheets: it has a circular section, and ends in a point at
its two extremities. The outer hull which envelopes it is of thin
sheets; its form is that of the _Gustave Zédé_. The external hull is
pierced with holes above and below, and at the two ends, and the sea
water circulates freely between the two hulls, which allows the ship to
receive a hail of small projectiles without suffering from them, the
rents in its outer hull making no change in its situation.

The boat is brought to the awash condition by taking in water ballast
and is steered below the surface by four horizontal float-board rudders,
arranged systematically on each side of the ship, two towards the bows
and two towards the stern. These “dip-rudders” are manipulated by means
of a hand-wheel placed at the centre of the ship.

The _Narval_ is not cylindrical in shape like the _Morse_, and her upper
works are flat and form a deck.

The principal dimensions of the _Narval_ are as follows:—

Length 111 ft. 6 in.
Extreme beam 12 ft. 4 in.
Displacement { 106 tons when light.
{ 200 tons completely submerged.

The motive power on the surface is supplied by a triple-expansion steam
engine of 250 horse-power constructed by Messrs. Brule and Co. It has a
water-tube boiler of the Seigle type having five injectors for stoking
with heavy petroleum.

In the original project the boat was to have been propelled on the
surface by steam machinery of 300 i.h.p., the stoking being with
compressed coal, but it was afterwards decided to supply liquid fuel.

Submerged the motive power is an electro-motor, the current being
supplied by 158 accumulators of the Fulmen type, which can be recharged
by the motor, worked as a dynamo by the petroleum motor.

Before going below the chimney is to be unshipped and all the openings
are hermetically closed. Sufficient time is allowed for the motor to
cool and for the air to be cleared of the hot gases. The steam engine
has to be replaced by the electric motor and water ballast has to be
pumped in.

At first these operations took at least a quarter of an hour, but the
newer vessels of the _Narval_ class are said to be able to disappear
beneath the waves in some five moments only.

[Illustration:

_Photo by_] [_M. Bar_

THE “NARVAL.”
]

The armament consists of four 17½ inch Whitehead torpedoes, and there
are two Drzewiecki torpedo tubes on each side and towards the upper part
of the boat, which launch the torpedoes in the direction of the beam.

“As long ago as 1893,” says a French writer, “Mr. Drzewiecki invented a
method of firing a torpedo which is quite different from the torpedo
tubes commonly used, and which is, therefore, peculiarly suited for
submarine vessels. By it the torpedo could be fired at any angle from 30
to 120 degrees from the bow, and experiments with it were carried out in
1894 at Cherbourg. The system may be briefly explained as follows: At
the side of the boat a horizontal spar is placed, which works on a hinge
at an angle to the bow. The torpedo is fastened to this spar by two
pairs of clamps, and when not in use lies along the side of the boat in
a recess cut in the side. A swing-out rod, fastened at one end to the
spar and at the other to the boat, enables the desired angle for firing
to be obtained. A lever worked from inside the vessel pushes the spar
and the torpedo away from the side of the boat, and the pressure of the
water stiffens the swing-out rod, and by so doing frees the torpedo from
the clamps, and opens the air lever which sets the torpedo in motion. It
is, therefore, necessary that the vessel should be under way when the
torpedo is fired.

“The principle of the invention is very simple, and at the same time
very ingenious; and the experiments which were made at Cherbourg proved
that torpedoes could be fired by this system with perfect precision.
Since 1894 Mr. Drzewiecki has made alterations in his invention. For
example, he has done away with the spar and the clamps, and by so doing
has greatly lightened his apparatus. The tail of the torpedo is now
seized by two claws, which grip it firmly and hold it in position. The
contrivance is placed on the deck of the submarine boat, which is not
submerged except on going into action. The torpedo rests on cushions
fixed to the deck, with its axis parallel to that of the boat, but as
soon as it is moved by a lever to the position for firing, the water
pressing against it frees the torpedo by opening the air valve. The only
inconvenience of the system is that it is not easy to fire at the exact
angle required, but it has the great advantage of doing away with all
the machinery of valves and safety appliances which are necessary when
submerged tubes are employed. Further experiments will doubtless make
the system still more efficacious.”

Commenting on the _Narval_ class a writer in the _Temps_ said:—

“Their range of action will be large, they will be self-controlling, and
they will realise Admiral Aube’s theory of the empire of the sea,
invisibility, divisibility and number. The estimate for each is 600,000
francs, which is not one-fortieth of the cost of a battleship. Are not
the Mediterranean experiments calculated to lead to changes in our naval
construction, and would not the present situation justify the devotion
of all the efforts of the dockyards to submarine torpedo-boats without
stopping the programme now in progress?”

[Illustration:

THE “NARVAL” AS A SURFACE TORPEDO-BOAT.
]

On the 6th of January, 1901, M. de Lanessan, Minister of Marine, and
General André, Minister of War, visited Cherbourg to witness comparative
trials between the two submarine vessels, _Morse_ and _Narval_, with a
view to determining the relative merits of the two systems for guidance
in the construction of the new under-water vessels provided in the
programme for 1901.

Before embarking the Minister inspected the crews, who wear ordinary
uniform with the addition of a red cap ribbon bearing the words
“_Sous-Marins_.”

M. Calmette, who was allowed to accompany the Minister during the trial,
wrote:—

“The submerging of the _Narval_ is a rather delicate operation: the
motive power has to be changed, the funnel, &c., have to be drawn in,
sufficient time must be allowed for the unused steam to cool down, and a
much greater quantity of water than in the case of the _Morse_ has to be
introduced into the ballast tank to overcome her buoyancy. Great
progress has been made in these respects since her first trial, and the
operation of submerging has been much accelerated, but it still takes
considerably longer than in the case of the _Morse_. On the present
occasion submergence was effected in a quarter of an hour, and when
submerged the only thing visible above the water is the periscope.”

In May, 1901, the _Narval_ made a voyage from Cherbourg to St. Malo.

The _Figaro_ declared that the trip was completely successful. “The
Minister of Marine had ordered a cruise of forty consecutive hours. The
_Narval_ left Cherbourg at 1 o’clock in the afternoon of May 23rd, in a
very heavy sea, caused by strong north-easterly gale. She returned to
St. Malo on the Saturday at 5 o’clock in the morning. That was the sole
departure from her programme. The _Narval_ had been navigated for 40
hours without stopping, covering 260 miles at an average speed of 6½
knots in a very rough sea. During the trip the _Narval_ remained below
the surface for several hours at a time, and twice recharged her
accumulators. On Sunday she left St. Malo, without taking in fresh
provisions, and made Cherbourg. On her arrival there she made excellent
practice with her four torpedoes. It was proved that the torpedo
mechanism, regulated five days previously, had not been in the least put
out of order by the trial. During the return voyage to Cherbourg the
_Narval_ had an accident to her pump, and was towed for three hours by
the t.b. _Zouave_. The damage was repaired, and the submarine returned
with her own motive power. It has to be pointed out, however, that the
crew suffered greatly from discomfort. When fresh trials are conducted
everything will be done to remedy the defects which have been reported.”
The _Figaro_, in conclusion, protested against the decision of the
Ministry of Marine to build henceforth vessels of 68 tons burden and
with a radius of action of 100 miles only, pointing out that such boats
can only be used for defensive purposes, whereas if the tonnage were
increased the radius of action and the accommodation would also be
increased, and the submarine could be employed offensively. On the other
hand, the _Petit Parisien_ said that the results of the recent trial of
the _Narval_ for 48 hours were not satisfactory. “The navigation of the
vessel on the surface was defective and difficult, and she sustained an
accident, in consequence of which she had to be towed back to port. The
crew were suffering from exhaustion and nausea, the cause of which it is
impossible to explain.”

[Illustration:

THE “NARVAL” IN THE “AWASH” CONDITION.
]

The _Narval_ in June, 1901, made the experiment of remaining for twelve
hours under water.

The Ministry of Marine were represented by Naval Surgeon Gibrat, who
wrote a full and detailed report on the condition of the crew after
their twelve hours’ submersion.

From notices published in the French papers it would appear that “the
trial succeeded without incident,” but the impression seems to be
general that the crew were in a more or less exhausted condition after
their prolonged sojourn beneath the waves, which after all is not to be
wondered at.

It appears that after six hours under water the inhaling of artificial
air became difficult; the long exclusion of natural atmosphere caused a
painful irritation of the nerve centres which even the coolest of the
officers could not resist, and anæmia set in accompanied by cerebral
compression and sick headache. Trouble was also caused by the working of
the accumulators, which liberated among the crew salts of lead and
sulphur, causing digestive and intestinal complaints. Dr. Gibrat is
reported to have expressed to them that, in the present condition of
knowledge, 12 hours is the outside limit of efficient work on a
submarine under water.

The _Narval_ class, besides the eponymous vessel, comprises four other
submersibles—the _Sirène_ (launched May 4, 1901), the _Triton_ (launched
July 13, 1901), the _Espadon_ (launched August 31, 1901), and the
_Silure_ (launched October 29, 1901). These four resemble the _Narval_
in most particulars, though in some respects they are improvements on
their prototype.

The outer hull of each is made of steel, but the inner hull is made of
nickel steel. The choice of the metal is a matter of importance, for the
difficulty is to build a hull which possesses sufficient strength to
resist the pressure of the water, and yet at the same time is not too
expensive. Between the two hulls in the interior of the vessel are seven
compartments for water ballast. There are also four water tanks, which
are used to regulate the trim of the vessel by introducing water at the
last moment.

The inconvenient points of the _Sirène_ and her sister vessels are the
same as those of the _Narval_. A few minutes are sufficient to fill the
water-ballast compartments, but, according to a recent article in _La
Patrie_, it takes a good half-hour to empty them in order to rise to the
surface. The operation is begun with compressed air, and continued with
a pump worked by electricity. For steaming on the surface of the sea the
_Sirène_ uses a triple-expansion engine and a Normand boiler heated by
petroleum. For submarine navigation she uses two dynamos connected with
the main shaft. These dynamos recharge the accumulators, which are on
the Laurent Cely system, in less than 7 hours. The vessel can steam on
the surface 21 hours at 12 knots with the petroleum engine, and 625
miles at 8 knots. Under water, making use of the accumulators, she can
do 25 miles at 8 knots, or 70 miles at 5 knots. Her armament consists of
four torpedoes 17¾ inches in diameter, which are fired by the Drzewiecki
system. As the torpedoes are placed on the deck, the vessel must be
under the water in order that they may be fired. The crew consists of
twelve men, including the lieutenant commander and his sub-lieutenant.

The _Sirène_ recently underwent a 24 hours’ trial at Cherbourg. Twenty
hours were devoted to evolutions on the surface, and the remaining four
hours spent under water.

The _Sirène_ afterwards carried out successful experiments in
discharging torpedoes. “The _Sirène_,” said the _Petit Journal_, “is at
present the most perfect of the submarines. She possesses rapidity of
submersion (the time being five minutes), perfect stability and
habitability, wide radius of action, and a powerful armament. In a word,
she is the true type of an independent submarine capable of acting on
the offensive.”

The _Triton_ made a trial trip at Cherbourg in October, 1901. Though the
sea was rough, she totally submerged herself in 6½ minutes, and remained
under water for an hour and a half.

The _Espadon_ made her trial plunge on October 18, 1901. She took 8
minutes to sink to a depth of 26 feet, and she remained submerged for 2½
hours.

The cost of the _Sirène_ was £32,000, of the _Triton_ £21,700.

THE NEW SUBMARINES.

Of the three “offensive” boats provided for in the Budget of 1901 the
first, Q 35, is to be built at Cherbourg, after the plans of M.
Romazzotti, the builder of the _Gustave Zédé_ and the _Morse_. Her cost
is estimated at 19,592 francs.

The second, Q 36, is to be built at Rochefort to the designs of M.
Maugas, the designer of the _Farfadet_ class, and her cost will be
31,973 francs.

The third, Q 37, will be built at Toulon, after the designs of M.
Bertin, Director of the Technical Section of Naval Construction, her
cost being put down as 36,970 francs.

Up to the time of writing the Department of Construction has refused to
divulge the characteristics of these three boats, and has confined
itself to mentioning their cost and the name of the designers.

It has been stated in some of the French service journals that Q 37 will
be driven on the surface by an alcohol motor, and submerged by
compressed air in place of accumulators.

No submarine boats are to be laid down in France in 1902.

In 1903, 13 will be laid down, and by the close of the year 37 are
expected to be in commission. By the year 1906 France should be in
possession of a submarine flotilla numbering 68 vessels.

Q 38–42 and Q 61–68 are to be built at Toulon, Q 43–50 at Rochefort, and
Q 51–60 at Cherbourg.

Of these 31 boats it has been stated that 8 will be submersibles with a
double motive power, _i.e._, a vapour or gas engine and electric
accumulators. They are to have a radius of action a little more extended
than that of the submarine proper, and will plunge more rapidly than the
_Narval_ and _Sirène_, which have to fill the ballast tanks between the
hulls.

APPENDIX IV
SUBMARINES OLD AND NEW

To give some description, even of the briefest nature, of every
submarine boat that has ever been constructed would necessitate a volume
three or four times the size of the present work. There are, however, a
few vessels that demand some notice here.

[Sidenote: Payerne.]

The first inventor to propose a mode of propulsion other than by
hand-operated mechanism, was Dr. Payerne, who in the fifties proposed a
boat which was propelled by a screw driven by a steam engine, furnished
with two boilers, an ordinary boiler-furnished steam for surface
navigation; whilst the other, which he termed a “chaudière
pyrotechnique,” for use beneath the waves, was so arranged as to burn in
hermetically closed furnaces a combustible containing in itself the
oxygen necessary for its combustion. The products of combustion escaped
by raising a plug so devised as to prevent water entering the fire-box.
The combustibles to which Dr. Payerne gave preference were:—

Coke 165
Nitrate of Soda 835

Coke 145
Nitrate of Potash 855

The boat was known by the name of _L’Hydrostat_; but, as its inventors
were not able to work out their ideas satisfactorily, it was turned into
an ordinary diving-bell, and used for submarine excavations at Cherbourg
and at Brest.

[Sidenote: Riou.]

In 1861 Olivier Riou built two models, one driven by steam (generated by
the heat of ether in combustion), and the other by electricity derived
from batteries. This is the first occasion that we find electricity
requisitioned for the propulsion of an under-water vessel.

[Sidenote: Alstitt.]

The submarine of Mr. Alstitt, constructed in 1863 at Mobile, in the
U.S.A., possesses a great interest in that it was the first to be fitted
with two modes of propulsion; the one for navigation on the surface, the
other beneath.

[Sidenote: Bourgois and Brun.]

The _Plongeur_, invented by Captain Bourgois and M. Brun, and built at
Rochefort in 1863, was the most ambitious attempt that had up till then
been made to solve the problem of submarine navigation. It was driven by
an 80 h.p. compressed-air engine, and underwent numerous trials; these
did not satisfy the officials, and it was eventually converted into a
water tank. The armament of the _Plongeur_ was a spar-torpedo.

[Sidenote: Lacomme.]

In 1869 Dr. J. A. Lacomme submitted to Napoleon III. a project for a
submarine railway across the Channel. Rails were to be laid on the floor
of the ocean, and in the event of an accident the submarine car, by
reason of its reserve of floatability, could detach itself from the
track and rise to the surface. M. Goubet has since proposed a similar
“submarine ferry.”

[Sidenote: Halstead.]

The _Intelligent Whale_ was built at Newark in 1872 from the designs of
Mr. Halstead. Its novel features were two doors in the bottom through
which divers could leave the boat when submerged. On one occasion the
boat went down in 16 feet of water and General Sweeney, clad in a
diver’s suit, passed out through the bottom manhole, placed a torpedo
under a scow anchored there for the purpose, and after entering the boat
and moving away to a safe distance, exploded the torpedo by a lanyard
and friction primer, and blew the scow to pieces.

[Sidenote: Constantin.]

During the siege of Paris, André Constantin, a lieutenant in the French
navy, built a vessel which was submerged on an entirely novel principle.
Instead of admitting water to sink his boat he immersed it by the
drawing in of pistons working in cylinders.

[Sidenote: Drzewiecki.]

The Russian inventor, Drzewiecki, built a vessel at Odessa in 1877,
which had two methods of submersion. Whilst in motion a system of
sliding weights inclined the boat either upwards or downwards. To regain
the horizontal position the weights were brought to the centre. When at
rest submersion was obtained by the introduction of water into a central
reservoir.

[Sidenote: Campbell and Ash.]

The _Nautilus_ of these inventors was submerged on the same principle as
the boat of André Constantin, viz., by the drawing in of cylinders. The
submersion was effected by means of four-cylinders on each side of the
vessel, which were drawn in flush and pushed out beyond the side, thus
altering the displacement. The _Nautilus_ underwent some trials in
Tilbury Docks in 1888, and the following account is from the pen of Mr.
Bennett Burleigh: “A few years ago a gentleman invited a number of
officials and specialists down to one of the London docks to see a new
submarine boat, which, like so many gone before, was to achieve marvels.
There were naval men and military men, and journalists there by the
score. Among others were the present chief-instructor of the navy, Sir
W. H. White, and Lord Charles Beresford. The writer was on board, but
felt a strong natural disinclination to go below or permit any of his
friends to adventure. It possibly was an excess of natural timidity.
That craft was warranted ‘extra special safe.’ She had water tanks, a
false keel that could be slipped off, and cylinders or drums which,
pushed out or drawn in from her sides, added or took away from her
displacement and buoyancy. Charming in theory, but hydrostatics present
strange problems, so note the result. The boat, with Sir W. H. White on
board, having made all tight, let water into her tanks, and sank into
the profound oleaginous mud of the dock. She remained invisible beneath
for a protracted period, greater, in truth, than those upon the dock
knew was safe, for she had no air or oxygen storage. We could do nothing
but wait and look at our watches. Finally, to everybody’s intense
relief, she reappeared. It happened that the boat stuck in the mud, and
neither sending out the drums nor unloading the tanks made her rise. Sir
William White suggested, when the light was turning blue, as were some
faces, moving the crew to the higher end of the craft. It had the
desired effect, the boat was lifted from the grip of the mud. Once on
top, the engineer undid the manhole and shouted with elation to his
friends ashore that they were going down again. Several of the visitors
had had more than enough, and the gentleman was pulled down by the legs
to make way for those who wished to escape upon deck and reach _terra
firma_. That ‘famous’ submarine craft also followed the course of its
predecessors, and shortly after passed into the limbo of forgotten
failures.”

It appears that the cylinders declined to out-thrust because the power
for working them, though amply sufficient for working in water, was not
great enough to drive them into mud, and the inventors had not taken
into consideration the adhesiveness of mud.

[Sidenote: Waddington.]

Mr. J. H. Waddington claimed that his vessel the _Porpoise_ (1886) was
the first practical submarine to be propelled by electricity. The
electric motor was worked by 45 accumulators of 660 ampere-hours
capacity; the maximum current taken by the motor was 66 amperes, the
e.m.f. being 90 volts, giving an electrical h.p. of 7·96. The speed was
to be 8 miles an hour.

[Illustration:

THE “PERAL”: SPAIN’S ONLY SUBMARINE.
]

[Sidenote: The Peral.]

This vessel was named after its designer Don Isaac Peral, a Spanish
lieutenant, on whom, in reward for his labours, the Spanish Government
conferred titles of nobility and an indemnity of 500,000 francs. It was
constructed at the Arsenal of Caraca, and launched on October 23, 1887.
It measured 72 feet from stem to stern, and was 9 feet in beam. The
motive power was furnished by two electric motors of 30 h.p. each
driving two screws; 600 accumulators supplied the power for all
purposes. During its trials in 1889 the _Peral_ was ordered to proceed
to sea to blow up an old hull placed at a distance of some two or three
miles from shore in Cadiz Bay, running a long distance under water in
search of the supposed ironclad. The boat was subsequently reported to
have successfully accomplished this feat, and, as a consequence, the
Spanish Government would, it was said, order several vessels of this
type for the defence of the coasts of the Peninsula. A public
subscription was started in Spain. For a time great enthusiasm
prevailed, but as Spain made no use of the _Peral_ during the
Spanish-American War it may be presumed that the interest in under-water
vessels soon died out. On the 28th of June, 1890, a night attack was
made by the _Peral_ against the cruiser _Colon_. The latter, in spite of
its powerful electrical projectors, failed to pick out the submarine,
which advanced within 10 metres of the cruiser to discharge its torpedo.
During the year 1898 several accounts appeared in the papers relating to
a wonderful submarine which the Spanish Government was said to have
purchased. It consisted of a large steel sphere, so solidly constructed
that it could resist the pressure of the water no matter at how great a
depth. Its exterior diameter was 9 feet 9 inches, and the shell measured
4 inches in thickness. It weighed 10 tons, and contained sufficient air
for a crew of three for 48 hours. Electric accumulators drove it at a
speed of 4 to 5 knots. It was suggested that the submarine might be
connected by an electric cable with a battleship and a cruiser, thus
enabling them to steer a safe course through a channel laid with mines.

A “cutter” was fixed in the bows to destroy submarine cables of all
kinds.

[Sidenote: Goubet.]

M. Goubet has built several submarine boats. _Goubet I._ was built at
Paris in 1888, and like all the vessels designed by this inventor, its
weight when submerged equals the weight of the water it displaces. To
prevent it diving to the bottom or rising to the surface, water is
automatically pumped from the forward to the after tank, or _vice
versâ_. The sole motive power of all the Goubet boats is electricity.
_Goubet I._ was only 16 feet long and displaced one ton. The crew
consisted of two men, who sat back to back on a case containing all the
machinery and the air reservoirs. The armament was a torpedo carried on
the outside of the hull and released from the interior. By its reserve
of buoyancy it rose until it caught on to the enemy’s bottom by spikes;
it was then exploded electrically.

_Goubet II._ was 26 feet long, but its speed was only some 5½ knots. In
February, 1901, she underwent some trials in France. According to the
_Echo de Paris_ the results were very poor. Her extreme radius was 25
miles, her greatest speed less than 4 knots, and she never succeeded in
launching a torpedo. In some books of reference it is stated that 300
Goubet boats were ordered by the Russian Government in 1881, and that 50
had been delivered by 1883, but it is very doubtful if Russia has a
single Goubet boat at the present day capable of being used in the event
of war. Brazil is also said to be a possessor of some boats designed by
M. Goubet, who a few weeks ago was reported to have sold his patents to
a British company.

[Sidenote: Italy.]

The Italian navy is credited with possessing at least two submarines,
the _Audace_ and the _Delfino_. The latter cost £12,000, and is
cigar-shaped and of steel. Its length is about 78 feet, and its diameter
9 feet. When wholly immersed its displacement is about 107 tons. The
motive power is an electric battery of 300 accumulators. It is propelled
by a screw, while above are two smaller screws by which the vessel is
immersed or raised. Its armament consists of two torpedo tubes in the
bow. The provision of air is sufficient for a crew of 12 men for a
period of seven to eight hours.[12]

Footnote 12:

In June, 1902, the sum of 800,000 lire was sanctioned for the
construction of a new Italian submarine.

[Sidenote: Russia.]

It has often been stated that the Russian Government some years since
ordered 300 Goubet submarines, the hulls to be built in Russia, and the
engines and mechanism to come from France. Whether any of these are
to-day possessed by Russia is very doubtful.

Last year the construction of a submarine boat, designed by Lieutenant
Kolbassieff and Naval Engineer Konteinikoff, was begun at Cronstadt. She
is cigar-shaped with a piece cut-away along the upper part. On the sides
forward there are blades which are used in sinking or raising the boat.

Six more submarines are said to be building at Cronstadt. Most of the
reports of these are mythical, more especially that which credits one of
these, “a vessel which combines in itself the properties of a submarine
and an ordinary warship,” with a speed of “60 knots on the surface and
30 knots submerged.”

[Sidenote: Brazil.]

Señor Mello Marques, formerly of the Brazilian navy, has invented a new
type of submarine boat, which was tried last year as a model in a tank
in the presence of the President of the Republic, the Minister of
Marine, and others. The propelling power appears to be electricity
solely. It is stated that the Government has decided to have a larger
boat built for the final trials.

[Sidenote: Germany.]

Experiments have been carried out during the past few years with
submarines in Germany, but few details are obtainable. A boat designed
by an ex-lieutenant of the German navy was built to the order of the
Cyclops Company, Messrs. Schwartzkopff and Messrs. Howaldt, in the yards
of the last-named firm. It has been stated that this boat has made 16·5
knots on the surface and 9·5 beneath.

[Sidenote: Norway.]

As some Norwegian naval officers were present at the trials of the
_Fulton_ last autumn, it is thought possible that Norway will shortly
acquire one or more of the _Holland_ type. Admiral Borreseu is reported
to have asked for £35,000 for this purpose.

[Sidenote: Sweden.]

Mr. Euroth, a Swedish engineer, has offered a submarine to the Swedish
Government. Its dimensions are—length, 82 feet; beam, 13 feet; diameter,
11½ feet; displacement (light), 142 tons; (submerged) 146 tons; engines
100 h.p., supplied by two boilers heated by oil; speed 12 knots surface
and 6 submerged. The boilers do no function when the boat is submerged,
the engines being then partly driven by the steam already generated, and
partly by compressed air stored fore and aft.

[Sidenote: Portugal.]

In October last trials were made with a model of a new submarine
invented by Lieutenant Foutes, who designed the _Plongeur_, built in
Portugal, and tried in 1892.

APPENDIX V
THE “LAKE” SUBMARINES

The Right Rev. John Wilkins, from whose book “Mathematical Magick” some
extracts have been given, was far-seeing enough to predict that a
submarine vessel would prove of great value in the discovery of
submarine treasures, “not only,” as he expressed it, “in regard of what
hath been drowned by wreck, but the several precious things that grow
there, as pearl, coral, mines, with innumerable other things of great
value, which may be much more easily found out and fetched up by the
help of this, than by any other usual way of the Urinators.” Could
newspapers and magazines but find their way to the shades, Dr. Wilkins
would be enchanted to find that his dream has been realised, and that a
vessel has actually been constructed for the purpose of harvesting some
of the treasures of the deep.

The _Argonaut_, designed by Mr. Simon Lake, of Baltimore, is a vessel
which rolls along the floor of the ocean as a carriage rolls along the
highway. In this it differs from any other under-water craft either
projected or constructed, for all previous inventors have attempted to
navigate their boats between the surface and the bottom. In the
invention of this type of submarine boat Mr. Lake elaborated an idea
which the United States Patent Office described to be absolutely
original, and the _Argonaut_ has undoubtedly done things that no other
vessel has before accomplished.

Mr. Lake built his first experimental submarine boat, the _Argonaut
Junior_, in 1894. After several successful descents she was abandoned,
and now lies at Atlantic Highlands, half buried in the sand. Her
dimensions were: length, 14 feet, beam 4½ feet, depth 5 feet. _Argonaut
No. 2_ was a much bigger boat, and proved that Mr. Lake’s theories were
substantially correct. She is 36 feet long. Her diameter amidships is 9
feet; her displacement when entirely submerged is about 59 tons; her
draught when at the surface is 10 feet, and when submerged 15 feet. She
is built of steel plates ⅜ inch in thickness, and double-riveted over
strong steel frames. She is provided with a 30 h.p. “White and
Middleton” gasoline engine, which propels her both on the surface and
while submerged, and runs all the auxiliary machinery. She has two
Mannesmann steel reservoirs for the storage of compressed air, which
have been tested to a pressure of 4,000 lbs. per square inch. She is
provided with air compressors, water-ballast pumps, and hoisting
machinery for raising or lowering her two down-haul weights. She is
lighted by incandescent electric lamps throughout, and carries a 4,000
candle-power searchlight in her bows, all run by a dynamo. Machinery for
driving her side driving-wheels and various gauges for determining
depth, rate of speed and air pressure, are also provided, together with
a complete outfit for divers, who are equipped with telephones and
electric lamps.

The following account of his boat was written by Mr. Simon Lake himself,
and we have his permission to reprint it here:—

[Illustration:

THE “ARGONAUT” IN DRY DOCK.
]

The hull of the vessel is mounted on three wheels. Of these E is the
rudder, for surface steering, and is also the guiding wheel when the
vessel is running on the sea bottom; and C is one of the supporting and
driving wheels, of which there are two, one on each side. BB are two
anchor weights, each weighing 1,000 pounds, attached to cables, and
capable of being hauled up or lowered by a drum and mechanism within the
boat: 0000 are water-ballast compartments contained within the boat; H
is the diver’s compartment, situated forward, with an exit door opening
outward in the bottom; while G is an airlock. When it is desired to
submerge the vessel, the anchor weights BB are first lowered to the
bottom; water is then allowed to enter the water-ballast compartments
until her buoyancy is less than the weight of the two anchors, say 1,500
lbs.; the cables connecting with the weights are then wound in, and the
vessel is thus hauled to the bottom, until she comes to rest on her
three wheels. The weights are then hauled into their pockets in the
keel, and it is evident that she is resting on the wheels with a weight
equal to the difference between her buoyancy with the weights at the
bottom, and the weights in their pockets, or 500 lbs. Now this weight
may be increased or diminished as we please, either by admitting more
water into the ballast tanks or by pumping some out. Thus it will be
seen that we have perfect control of the vessel in submerging her, as we
may haul her down as fast or as slow as we please, and by having her
rest in the bottom with sufficient weight to prevent the currents from
moving her out of the course, we may start up our propeller or
driving-wheels and drive her at will over the bottom, the same as a
tricycle is propelled on the surface of the earth in the upper air. In
muddy bottoms, we rest with a weight not much over 100 lbs.; while on
hard bottoms, or where there are strong currents, we sometimes rest on
the wheels with a weight of from 1,000 to 1,500 lbs. Thus the effect of
currents and wave motion, and the maintenance of trim and equilibrium
are not factors in the successful navigation of the vessel; in fact,
navigation becomes surer on the surface, as one is travelling in a
medium which does not constantly change like the surface water from the
effects of winds, waves, and currents. When the divers desire to leave
the vessel they go into the diver’s compartment, located in the forward
portion of the ship, and close the door communicating with the living
quarters. This door closes on rubber packing, and is air-tight. Air is
then admitted into the compartment from compressed-air reservoirs, until
the pressure of air equals that of the surrounding water. The bottom
door may then be opened, and no water will come into the boat, as the
pressure of air contained within the compartment offers an invisible
barrier to its entrance, and the divers may pass in and out as
frequently as they please. The _Argonaut_ is fitted with a White and
Middleton gasoline engine of 30 h.p., which operates the screws the
driving wheels, the dynamo, the air compressors, anchor hoists, and
derrick-operating machinery. She is provided with two Mannesmann steel
tubes, in which sufficient air may be stored, with what is contained in
the boat, to last the crew for twenty-four hours without obtaining a
fresh supply from the surface. In the _Argonaut_, however, and probably
in all such craft used for commercial pursuits, as a usual thing, there
will be a connection with the surface, through which a constant supply
of air may be drawn, either by the masts, as shown in the views, one of
which supplies air to the interior of the vessel, the other being
utilised as an exhaust from the engine, or through suction hose
extending to a buoy on the surface. While the engine is running there is
about fifty cubic feet of air flowing into the boat per minute; and when
the engine is closed down there may be a flow of air maintained by an
auxiliary blower, so that it is possible to remain below for days, or
even weeks, at a time.

The course is directed by an ordinary compass when on the bottom, and it
is found that the needle responds as quickly and is as accurate as when
on the surface. Notwithstanding the fact that the _Argonaut_ is quite a
small vessel, a crew of five men have lived aboard her during an
experimental cruise extending over two months, during which she
travelled over 1,000 miles under her own power, partly on the surface
and partly on the bottom. The trip was made to demonstrate the
practicability of vessels of her type travelling on various kinds of
bottoms; also to demonstrate her seaworthiness and capabilities in
searching the bottom, in working on sunken wrecks, finding and taking up
submerged cables, &c.

We have been in some pretty rough weather, and found that she was
perfectly seaworthy. Of course, being so small and of such weight, the
seas at times would wash clear over her decks. This, however, caused no
inconvenience to those below, as her stability was such that she would
roll or pitch very little, even though the seas were breaking over her
in great volume. We have been cruising on the bottom in rivers, in
Chesapeake Bay and beneath the Broad Atlantic. In the rivers we
invariably found a muddy bed; in the bay we found bottoms of various
kinds, in some places so soft that our divers would sink up to their
knees, while in other places the ground would be hard, and at one place
we ran across a bottom which was composed of a loose gravel, resembling
shelled corn. Out in the ocean, however, was found the ideal submarine
course, consisting of a fine gray sand, almost as hard as a macadamised
road, and very level and uniform.

During this trip we investigated several sunken wrecks, of which there
are a great many in Chesapeake Bay and on the coast adjacent thereto.
The vessels we boarded were coal-laden craft, and of themselves not of
much value; but the coal would pay handsomely for its recovery, which
could be readily accomplished with the proper equipment. We found one
old wreck, said to have gone down some forty years ago near the mouth of
the Patuxent River. There was nothing in sight except a few timbers and
deck beams, and these were nearly consumed by the teredo—a boring worm
which completely honeycombs any timber it may attack. We pulled up some
of the planks of this vessel, which had a numerous growth of oysters,
mussels, and several kinds of submarine vegetation clinging to them. The
portion of the timbers not eaten by the teredo was found to be almost as
hard as iron, and thoroughly impregnated with the dark-blue mud in which
the hull lies buried. After the timbers were hauled to the surface, in
sawing them in two, we noticed a very strong odour of yellow pine, and
so learned that they must be of that wood, though they were as black as
ebony. Toad-fish had evidently found this old wreck a congenial
habitation, and when the diver’s hand comes in contact with the slimy
back of one of these horrible-looking, strong-jawed, big-mouthed fish,
he pulls it back pretty quickly. The piece we pulled up had within it
three of these fish, which had taken up their abode in portions of the
timber that had been eaten away, and one was a prisoner in a recess
which, evidently, he had entered when small, and had grown too large to
get out. In a wreck near Cape Henry, fish were very numerous,
principally bass and croakers, though two or three small sharks were
seen in the vicinity.

It might prove interesting to copy one day’s experiences from our
log-book. This day we submerged for the purpose of discovering how much
weight was necessary to prevent the current from moving the _Argonaut_
in a strong tideway (Hampton Roads), and also to discover if there was
any difference in starting our machinery again under water after it had
been shut down for several hours. I copy verbatim from the log-book
under date of July 28, 1898:—

[Illustration:

THE “ARGONAUT” AWASH.
]

“We spent some hours with Hampton Roads as headquarters, and made
several descents in the waters adjacent thereto; we were desirous of
making a search for the cables which connected with the mines guarding
the entrance to the harbour, but could not obtain permission from the
authorities, who were afraid we might accidentally sever them, which
would, of course, make their entire system of defence useless. It was,
therefore, necessary for us, in order to demonstrate the practicability
of vessels of this type for this purpose, to lay a cable ourselves,
which we did, across the channel leading into the Patuxent River. We
then submerged, and taking our bearings by the compass, ran over the
bottom, with the door in our diving compartment open, until we came
across the cable, which we hauled up into the compartment with a hook
only about 4½ feet long, and we could not avoid the impression that it
would be a very easy thing to destroy the efficiency of the present mine
system. And how many lives might have been saved, and millions of
dollars besides, had our navy been provided with a craft of this type to
lead the way into Santiago, Havana, or San Juan, off which ports
squadrons were compelled to lie for weeks and months owing to fear of
the mines.”

I have frequently been asked my sensations on going beneath the
water—whether I had any fear of not being able to come up again, and
whether it did not require a lot of courage. I usually reply that I have
always been too busy and interested for fears or sensations, and that it
does not require any courage on my part, as I am so thoroughly satisfied
of the correctness of the principles upon which the _Argonaut_ is
constructed and the strength of the structure as to have no doubts or
fears of any kind; but I do think it requires courage on the part of
those who do not understand all the principles involved, and who simply
trust their lives in my hands. Quite a number of people have made
descents in the vessel, but in only one or two instances have I seen
them show any signs of fear.

In one instance, during our trials in the Patapsco, several gentlemen
were very importunate in requesting the privilege of making a descent
the next time we were to submerge. They were accordingly notified when
the boat was to go down. At the appointed time, however, some of them
did not appear, and of those who did not one at the last would venture.
I have no doubt had we made the descent at the time they made the
request all would have gone, but thinking about it for a couple of days
made them change their minds.

On another trip we had a college professor on board who could not
understand exactly how our men could get out of the boat. I told him to
come into the diver’s compartment and I would explain it to him.
Accordingly he reluctantly, as I thought, entered the compartment, which
in the _Argonaut_ is a little room only four feet long and a little
wider. After closing the door I noticed that the colour was leaving his
face and a few beads of perspiration were standing out upon his
forehead, and had he been any one else than a professor or, possibly, a
newspaper man, I would not have gone any further with the experiment.
The door, however, was closed and securely fastened. I then opened the
valve a full turn, and the air began to rush in with a great noise. He
grabbed hold of one of the frames and glanced with longing eyes at the
door we had just entered. I then turned off the air and said, “By the
way, Professor, are you troubled with heart disease?” He said, placing
his hand over his heart, “Why, yes, my heart is a little affected.”
Remarking, “Oh, well, this little depth will not hurt you,” I turned on
the air again after saying to him, “If you feel any pain in your ears
swallow as if you were drinking water.” He immediately commenced
swallowing, and during that half-minute or so we were getting the
pressure on I believe he swallowed enough to have drunk a bucketful of
water. After getting the desired pressure I stooped down and commenced
to unscrew the bolts, holding the door which leads out into the water.
Our professor said, “What are you doing now?” I answered, “I am going to
open this door so that you can see the bottom.” Throwing out his hands
he said, “No, no. Don’t do that. I would not put you to that trouble for
the world.” However, about that time the door dropped down, and as he
saw the water did not come in the colour returned to his face, and he
exclaimed, “Well, if I had not seen it I would never have believed it!”

Mr. Lake declares that as a submarine torpedo-boat his vessel will be
practically invincible. She could, he claims, approach a stationary
enemy on the bottom and rise up under the water and secure a time-fuse
torpedo to her bottom, and she could be fitted with tubes to fire
automobile torpedoes. She could also find cables to repair or cut them,
and could be used for countermining purposes. The _Argonaut_ is,
however, intended not so much for warfare as for recovering treasures
from the deep, and for the coral, sponge, pearl, and similar industries.
It has been calculated that of the cargoes, treasures and vessels lost
in the merchant service the aggregate amounts to over one hundred
millions of dollars per year, and the loss has, of course, been going on
for many years.

“There is every reason to believe,” says a writer, “that the sea is even
richer than the earth, owing to the millions of shipwrecks which have
swallowed up so many a royal fortune; the wealth lying at the bottom of
the ocean transcends the fabulous riches of the Klondyke.”

The recovery of sunken treasure has always exercised a great fascination
over certain minds, and much money has been spent in devising means
whereby it might be brought again to the surface. Hitherto the results
have not been such as might have been desired, but the _Argonaut_ seems
to promise success in the future.

Mr. Lake believes that the majority of the great losses on the ocean
occur in waters in which it will be practical to operate with submarine
boats of the _Argonaut_ type. The bottom around the coast lines of the
United States is principally composed of a hard white or grey sand and
is very uniform. The depth increases from the shore at the average rate
of about 6 feet per mile, and the bottom forms “an ideal roadway.” The
_Argonaut_ can descend to 100 feet below the surface. Needless to say,
there are ocean depths where the pressure would be so great that man
could never live, but Mr. Lake appears to think that exploring the ocean
bed, within certain limits, will become in the near future almost as
common as travelling on the surface.

Mr. Lake’s third under-water vessel, _Argonaut No. 3_, is built of
steel, is 66 feet long and 10 feet wide, and displaces 100 tons; the
motive power is gasoline, and the air chambers contain 13,000 cubic feet
of air. She has four large wheels for running on the bottom and also
twin screws for the surface.

[Illustration:

THE “ARGONAUT” ON THE SEA BOTTOM.
]

The following is taken from a New York paper, and relates to an
entertainment given on _Argonaut No. 3_:—

“Captain Lake, the inventor of the submarine boat _Argonaut_,
participated yesterday with thirteen other guests in one of the most
novel summer entertainments ever devised by the brain of man.

“The party embarked at Bridgeport on Long Island Sound in the boat,
which was then submerged, and travelled along the bottom of the sea for
several miles. While running at a depth of 35 feet a dinner prepared and
cooked on board was served.

“After dinner Captain Lake had the door of the diving compartment
opened, and two divers went out and exhibited the patent diving suits.
Captain Lake then gave an exhibition of his suction pump, which is
designed to raise sunken wreckage. The _Argonaut_ stopped near a sunken
coal schooner, and by means of the pump four tons of coal were sent up
through the water to a coal barge above. The coal was transferred at the
rate of a ton a minute.

“A crew of five men navigated the _Argonaut_ under the inventor’s
direction. Slight headaches were experienced by some of the guests,
otherwise no inconvenience was suffered from the submarine voyage.”

A SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SUBMARINE WARFARE

_France._

“La Navigation Sous-Marine,” by G. L. Pesce. Paris, 1897.

“Les Bateaux Sous-Marins,” 2 vols., by F. Forest and H. Noalhat.
Paris, 1900.

“La Navigation Sous-Marine,” by M. Gaget. Paris, 1901.

“La Navigation Sous-Marine à travers les Siècles,” by M. Delpeuel.
Paris, 1902.

“Les Torpilleurs autonomes et l’avenir de la Marine,” by G. Charmes.
Paris, 1885.

“Les Torpilleurs, la Guerre Navale et la Defense des côtes,” by
Vice-Admiral Bourgois. Paris, 1888.

_Belgium._

“La Guerre Sous-Marine,” by L. G. Daudenart. Brussels, 1872.

“Les Mines Sous-Marines dans la defense des Rades,” by C. Huët.
Brussels, 1875.

_Germany._

“Die Unterseische Schiffahrt,” by L. Hauff. Munich, 1859.

“Geschichte der Sieminen und Torpedoes,” by F. von Ehrenkrook. Berlin,
1878.

“Die Fisch Torpedoes,” by F. von Ehrenkrook. Berlin, 1878.

_Great Britain._

“Submarine Boats,” by G. W. Hovgaard. London (Spon), 1887.

“Submarine Mines and Torpedoes as applied to Harbour Defence,” by
Major J. T. Bucknill. London, 1889.

“Notes on Submarine Mines, commonly called Torpedoes,” by Capt. H.
Steward, R.E. London, 1886.

“Torpedoes and Torpedo Warfare,” by Lt. C. W. Sleeman (2nd ed., 1889).
Simpkin, London.

“Torpedoes and Torpedo Vessels,” by Lt. G. E. Armstrong. London, 2nd
ed., 1901.

“Submarine Navigation,” a Scientific Quarterly, by Alan H. Burgoyne,
1901.

_United States._

“Torpedo War and Submarine Explosions,” by R. Fulton. New York, 1810.

“Submarine Warfare,” by J. S. Barnes. New York, 1869.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES

1. P. 1, added “PART I”.
2. P. 71, changed “advantages over the second” to “advantages over the
first”.
3. P. 179, changed “built in 1795” to “built in 1775”.
4. P. 189, changed “General Washington, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson
dated September 26, 1875” to “General Washington, in a letter to
Thomas Jefferson dated September 26, 1775”.
5. P. 190, changed “In 1787 Fulton” to “In 1797 Fulton”.
6. P. 315, changed “On the 28th of June, 1870” to “On the 28th of June,
1890”.
7. Silently corrected typographical errors and variations in spelling.
8. Archaic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings retained as printed.
9. Footnotes were re-indexed using numbers.
10. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.

*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Submarine Warfare - Past, Present, and Future" ***

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