Title: Financial Crime and Corruption
Author: Vaknin, Samuel
Language: English
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Financial Crime and
Corruption


2nd EDITION

Sam Vaknin, Ph.D.

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Lidija Rangelovska

A Narcissus Publications Imprint, Skopje 2007

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Created by: LIDIJA RANGELOVSKA
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C O N T E N T S


     I. Slush Funds
     II. Corruption and Transparency
     III. Money Laundering in a Changed World
     IV. Hawala, the Bank that Never Was
     V. Straf - Corruption in Central and Eastern Europe
     VI. The Kleptocracies of the East
     VII. Russia's Missing Billions
     VIII. The Enrons of the East
     IX. The Typology of Financial Scandals
     X. The Shadowy World of International Finance
     XI. Maritime Piracy
     XII. Legalizing Crime
     XIII. Begging Your Trust in Africa
     XIV. Organ Trafficking in east Europe
     XV. Arms Sales to Rogue States
     XVI. The Industrious Spies
     XVII. Russia's Idled Spies
     XVIII. The Business of Torture
     XIX. The Criminality of Transition
     XX. The Economics of Conspiracy Theories
     XXI. The Demise of the Work Ethic
     XXII. The Morality of Child Labor
     XXIII. The Myth of the Earnings Yield
     XXIV. The Future of the SEC
     XXV. Trading from a Suitcase - Shuttle Trade
     XXVI. The Blessings of the Black Economy
     XXVII. Public Procurement and Very Private Benefits
     XXVIII. Crisis of the Bookkeepers
     XXIX. Competition Laws
     XXX. The Benefits of Oligopolies
     XXXI. Anarchy as an Organizing Principle
     XXXII. Narcissism in the Boardroom
     XXXIII. The Revolt of the Poor and Intellectual Property Rights
     XXXIV. The Kidnapping of Content
     XXXV. The Economics of Spam
     XXXVI. The Content Downloader's Profile
     XXXVII. The Fabric of Economic Trust
     XXXVIII. The Distributive Justice of the Market
     XXXIX. The Agent-Principal Conundrum
     XL. The Green-eyed Capitalist
     XLI. Notes on the Economics of Game Theory
     XLII. Market Impeders and Market Inefficiencies
     XLIII. The Pettifogger Procurators
     XLIV. Microsoft's Third Front
     XLV. NGOs - The Self-appointed Altruists
     XLVI. Who is Guarding the Guards
     XLVII. The Honorary Academic
     XLVIII. Rasputin in Transition
     XLIX. The Eureka Connection
     L. The Treasure Trove of Kosovo
     LI. Milosevic's Treasure Island
     LII. Macedonia's Augean Stables
     LIII. The Macedonian Lottery
     LIV. Crime Fighting Computer Systems and Databases
     LV. The Author



I. Slush Funds

According to David McClintick ("Swordfish: A True
Story of Ambition, Savagery, and Betrayal"), in the late
1980's, the FBI and DEA set up dummy corporations to
deal in drugs. They funneled into these corporate fronts
money from drug-related asset seizures.

The idea was to infiltrate global crime networks but a lot
of the money in "Operation Swordfish" may have ended
up in the wrong pockets. Government agents and sheriffs
got mysteriously and filthily rich and the whole sorry
affair was wound down. The GAO reported more than
$3.6 billion missing. This bit of history gave rise to at
least one blockbuster with Oscar-winner Halle Berry.

Alas, slush funds are much less glamorous in reality. They
usually involve grubby politicians, pawky bankers, and
philistine businessmen - rather than glamorous hackers
and James Bondean secret agents.

The Kazakh prime minister, Imanghaliy
Tasmaghambetov, freely admitted on April 4, 2002 to his
country's rubber-stamp parliament the existence of a $1
billion slush fund. The money was apparently skimmed
off the proceeds of the opaque sale of the Tengiz oilfield.

Remitting it to Kazakhstan - he expostulated with a poker
face - would have fostered inflation. So, the country's
president, Nazarbaev, kept the funds abroad "for use in
the event of either an economic crisis or a threat to
Kazakhstan's security".

The money was used to pay off pension arrears in 1997
and to offset the pernicious effects of the 1998
devaluation of the Russian ruble. What was left was duly
transferred to the $1.5 billion National Fund, the PM
insisted. Alas, the original money in the Fund came
entirely from another sale of oil assets to Chevron, thus
casting in doubt the official version.

The National Fund was, indeed, augmented by a transfer
or two from the slush fund - but at least one of these
transfers occurred only 11 days after the damning
revelations. Moreover, despite incontrovertible evidence
to the contrary, the unfazed premier denied that his
president possesses multi-million dollar bank accounts
abroad.

He later rescinded this last bit of disinformation. The
president, he said, has no bank accounts abroad but will
promptly return all the money in these non-existent
accounts to Kazakhstan. These vehemently denied
accounts, he speculated, were set up by the president's
adversaries "for the purpose of compromising his name".

On April 15, 2002 even the docile opposition had enough
of this fuzzy logic. They established a People Oil's Fund
to monitor, henceforth, the regime's financial shenanigans.

By their calculations less than 7 percent of the income
from the sale of hydrocarbon fuels (c. $4-5 billion
annually) make it to the national budget.

Slush funds infect every corner of the globe, not only the
more obscure and venal ones. Every secret service - from
the Mossad to the CIA - operates outside the stated state
budget. Slush funds are used to launder money, shower
cronies with patronage, and bribe decision makers. In
some countries, setting them up is a criminal offense, as
per the 1990 Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure,
and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime. Other
jurisdictions are more forgiving.

The Catholic Bishops Conference of Papua New Guinea
and the Solomon Islands issued a press release November
2001 in which it welcomed the government's plans to
abolish slush funds. They described the poisonous effect
of this practice:
"With a few notable exceptions, the practice of directing
funds through politicians to district projects has been
disastrous. It has created an atmosphere in which
corruption is thought to have flourished. It has reduced
the responsibility of public servants, without reducing
their numbers or costs. It has been used to confuse
people into believing public funds are the 'property' of
individual members rather than the property of the
people, honestly and fairly administered by the servants
of the people.

The concept of 'slush-funds' has resulted in well-
documented inefficiencies and failures. There were even
accusations made that funds were withheld from certain
members as a way of forcing them into submission. It
seems that the era of the 'slush funds' has been a
shameful period."

But even is the most orderly and lawful administration,
funds are liable to be mislaid. "The Economist" reported
recently about a $10 billion class-action suit filed by
native-Americans against the US government. The funds,
supposed to be managed in trust since 1880 on behalf of
half a million beneficiaries, were "either lost or stolen"
according to officials.

Rob Gordon, the Director of the National Wilderness
Institute accused "The US Interior Department (of)
looting the special funds that were established to pay for
wildlife conservation and squandering the money instead
on questionable administrative expenses, slush funds and
employee moving expenses".

Charles Griffin, the Deputy Director of the Heritage
Foundation's Government Integrity Project, charges:
"The federal budget provides numerous slush funds that
can be used to subsidize the lobbying and political
activities of special-interest groups".

On his list of "Top Ten Federal Programs That Actively
Subsidize Politics and Lobbying" are: AmeriCorps, Senior
Community Service Employment Program, Legal
Services Corporation, Title X Family Planning, National
Endowment for the Humanities, Market Promotion
Program, Senior Environmental Employment Program,
Superfund Worker Training, HHS Discretionary Aging
Projects, Telecomm. & Info. Infrastructure Assistance.

These federal funds alone total $1.8 billion.
"Next" and "China Times" - later joined by "The
Washington Post" - accused the former Taiwanese
president, Lee Teng-hui, of forming a $100 million
overseas slush fund intended to finance the gathering of
information, influence-peddling, and propaganda
operations. Taiwan footed the bills trips by Congressional
aides and funded academic research and think tank
conferences.

High ranking Japanese officials, among others, may have
received payments through this stealthy venue. Lee is
alleged to have drawn $100,000 from the secret account in
February 1999. The money was used to pay for the studies
of a former Japanese Vice-Defense Minister Masahiro
Akiyama's at Harvard.

Ryutaro Hashimoto, the former Japanese prime minister,
was implicated as a beneficiary of the fund. So were the
prestigious lobbying firm, Cassidy and Associates and
assorted assistant secretaries in the Bush administration.

Carl Ford, Jr., currently assistant secretary of state for
intelligence and research, worked for Cassidy during the
relevant period and often visited Taiwan. James Kelly,
assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs enjoyed the Taiwanese largesse as well. Both are
in charge of crafting America's policy on Taiwan.

John Bolton, erstwhile undersecretary of state for arms
control and international security, admitted, during his
confirmation hearings, to having received $30,000 to
cover the costs of writing 3 research papers.

The Taiwanese government has yet to deny the news
stories.

A Japanese foreign ministry official used slush fund
money to finance the extra-marital activities of himself
and many of his colleagues - often in posh hotel suites.

But this was no exception. According to Asahi Shimbun,
more than half of the 60 divisions of the ministry
maintained similar funds. The police and the ministry are
investigating. One arrest has been made. The ministry's
accounting division has discovered these corrupt practices
twenty years before but kept mum.

Even low-level prefectural bureaucrats and teachers in
Japan build up slush funds by faking business trips or
padding invoices and receipts. Japanese citizens' groups
conservatively estimated that $20 million in travel and
entertainment expenses in the prefectures in 1994 were
faked, a practice known as "kara shutcho" (i.e., empty
business trip).

Officials of the Hokkaido Board of Education admitted to
the existence of a 100 million yen secret fund. In a
resulting probe, 200 out of 286 schools were found to
maintain their own slush funds. Some of the money was
used to support friendly politicians.

But slush funds are not a sovereign prerogative.

Multinationals, banks, corporation, religious
organizations, political parties, and even NGO's salt away
some of their revenues and profits in undisclosed
accounts, usually in off-shore havens.

Secret election campaign slush funds are a fixture in
American politics. A 5-year old bill requires disclosure of
donors to such funds but the House is busy loosening its
provisions. "The Economist" listed in 2002 the tsunami of
scandals that engulfs Germany, both its major political
parties, many of the Lander and numerous highly placed
and mid-level bureaucrats. Secret, mainly party, funds
seem to be involved in the majority of these lurid affairs.

Italian firms made donations to political parties through
slush funds, though corporate donations - providing they
are transparent - are perfectly legal in Italy. Both the right
and, to a lesser extent, the left in France are said to have
managed enormous political slush funds.

President Chirac is accused of having abused for his
personal pleasure, one such municipal fund in Paris, when
he was its mayor. But the funds were mostly used to
provide party activists with mock jobs. Corporations paid
kickbacks to obtain public works or local building
permits. Ostensibly, they were paying for sham
"consultancy services".

The epidemic hasn't skipped even staid Ottawa. Its Chief
Electoral Officer told Sun Media in September 2001 that
he is "concerned" about millions stashed away by Liberal
candidates. Sundry ministers who coveted the prime
minister's job, have raised funds covertly and probably
illegally.

On April 11, 2002 UPI reported that Spain's second-
largest bank, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA),
held nearly $200 million hidden in secret offshore
accounts, "which were allegedly used to manipulate
politicians, pay off the 'revolutionary tax' to ETA - the
Basque terrorist organization - and open the door for
business deals, according to news reports".

The money may have gone to luminaries such as
Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, Peru's Alberto Fujomori and
Vladimiro Montesinos. The bank's board members
received fat, tax-free, "pensions" from the illegal accounts
opened in 1987 - a total of more than $20 million.

Latin American drug money launderers - from Puerto
Rico to Colombia - may have worked through these funds
and the bank's clandestine entities in the Cayman Islands
and Jersey. The current Spanish Secretary of State for the
Treasury has been the bank's tax advisor between 1992-7.

The "Financial Times" reported in June 2000 that, in
anticipation of new international measures to curb
corruption, "leading European arms manufacturers"
resorted to the creation of off-shore slush funds. The
money is intended to bribe foreign officials to win tenders
and contracts.

Kim Woo-chung, Daewoo's former chairman, is at the
center of a massive scandal involving dozens of his
company's executive, some of whom ended up in prison.

He stands accused of diverting a whopping $20 billion to
an overseas slush fund.

A mind boggling $10 billion were alleged to have been
used to bribe Korean government officials and politicians.

But his conduct and even the scale of the fraud he
perpetrated may have been typical to Korea's post-war
incestuous relationship between politics and business.

In his paper "The Role of Slush Funds in the Preparation
of Corruption Mechanisms", reprinted by Transparency
International, Gherardo Colombo defines corporate slush
funds thus:
"Slush funds are obtained from a joint stock company's
finances, carefully managed so that the amounts
involved do not appear on the balance sheet. They do not
necessarily have to consist of money, but can also take
the form of stocks and shares or other economically
valuable goods (works of art, jewels, yachts, etc.) It is
enough that they can be used without any particular
difficulty or that they can be transferred to a third party.

If a fund is in the form of money, it is not even necessary
to refer to it outside the company accounts, since it can
appear in them in disguised form (the 'accruals and
deferrals' heads are often resorted to for the purpose of
hiding slush money). In light of this, it is not always
correct to regard it as a reserve fund that is not
accounted for in the books. Deception, trickery or
forgery of various kinds are often resorted to for the
purpose of setting up a slush fund".

He mentions padded invoices, sham contracts, fictitious
loans, interest accruing on holding accounts, back to back
transactions with related entities (Enron) - all used to
funnel money to the slush funds. Such funds are often set
up to cover for illicit and illegal self-enrichment,
embezzlement, or tax evasion.

Less known is the role of these furtive vehicles in
financing unfair competitive practices, such as dumping.

Clients, suppliers, and partners receive hidden rebates and
subsidies that much increase the - unreported - real cost of
production.

BBVA's payments to ETA may have been a typical
payment of protection fees. Both terrorists and organized
crime put slush funds to bad use. They get paid from such
funds - and maintain their own. Ransom payments to
kidnappers often flow through these channels.

But slush funds are overwhelmingly used to bribe corrupt
politicians. The fight against corruption has been titled
against the recipients of illicit corporate largesse. But to
succeed, well-meaning international bodies, such as the
OECD's FATF, must attack with equal zeal those who
bribe. Every corrupt transaction is between a venal
politician and an avaricious businessman. Pursuing the
one while ignoring the other is self-defeating.

Note - The Psychology of Corruption
Most politicians bend the laws of the land and steal
money or solicit bribes because they need the funds to
support networks of patronage. Others do it in order to
reward their nearest and dearest or to maintain a lavish
lifestyle when their political lives are over.

But these mundane reasons fail to explain why some
officeholders go on a rampage and binge on endless
quantities of lucre. All rationales crumble in the face of a
Mobutu Sese Seko or a Saddam Hussein or a Ferdinand
Marcos who absconded with billions of US dollars from
the coffers of Zaire, Iraq, and the Philippines,
respectively.

These inconceivable dollops of hard cash and valuables
often remain stashed and untouched, moldering in bank
accounts and safes in Western banks. They serve no
purpose, either political or economic. But they do fulfill a
psychological need. These hoards are not the
megalomaniacal equivalents of savings accounts. Rather
they are of the nature of compulsive collections.

Erstwhile president of Sierra Leone, Momoh, amassed
hundreds of video players and other consumer goods in
vast rooms in his mansion. As electricity supply was
intermittent at best, his was a curious choice. He used to
sit among these relics of his cupidity, fondling and
counting them insatiably.

While Momoh relished things with shiny buttons, people
like Sese Seko, Hussein, and Marcos drooled over money.

The ever-heightening mountains of greenbacks in their
vaults soothed them, filled them with confidence,
regulated their sense of self-worth, and served as a love
substitute. The balances in their bulging bank accounts
were of no practical import or intent. They merely catered
to their psychopathology.

These politicos were not only crooks but also
kleptomaniacs. They could no more stop thieving than
Hitler could stop murdering. Venality was an integral part
of their psychological makeup.

Kleptomania is about acting out. It is a compensatory act.

Politics is a drab, uninspiring, unintelligent, and, often
humiliating business. It is also risky and rather arbitrary. It
involves enormous stress and unceasing conflict.

Politicians with mental health disorders (for instance,
narcissists or psychopaths) react by decompensation. They
rob the state and coerce businessmen to grease their palms
because it makes them feel better, it helps them to repress
their mounting fears and frustrations, and to restore their
psychodynamic equilibrium. These politicians and
bureaucrats "let off steam" by looting.

Kleptomaniacs fail to resist or control the impulse to steal,
even if they have no use for the booty. According to the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV-TR (2000), the bible
of psychiatry, kleptomaniacs feel "pleasure, gratification,
or relief when committing the theft." The good book
proceeds to say that " ... (T)he individual may hoard the
stolen objects ...".

As most kleptomaniac politicians are also psychopaths,
they rarely feel remorse or fear the consequences of their
misdeeds. But this only makes them more culpable and
dangerous.



II. Corruption and Transparency

I. The Facts
Just days before a much-awaited donor conference, the
influential International Crisis Group (ICG) recommended
to place all funds pledged to Macedonia under the
oversight of a "corruption advisor" appointed by the
European Commission. The donors ignored this and other
recommendations. To appease the critics, the affable
Attorney General of Macedonia charged a former Minister
of Defense with abuse of duty for allegedly having
channeled millions of DM to his relatives during the
recent civil war. Macedonia has belatedly passed an anti-
money laundering law recently - but failed, yet again, to
adopt strict anti-corruption legislation.

In Albania, the Chairman of the Albanian Socialist Party,
Fatos Nano, was accused by Albanian media of
laundering $1 billion through the Albanian government.

Pavel Borodin, the former chief of Kremlin Property,
decided not appeal his money laundering conviction in a
Swiss court. The Slovak daily "Sme" described in
scathing detail the newly acquired wealth and lavish
lifestyles of formerly impoverished HZDS politicians.

Some of them now reside in refurbished castles. Others
have swimming pools replete with wine bars.

Pavlo Lazarenko, a former Ukrainian prime minister, is
detained in San Francisco on money laundering charges.

His defense team accuses the US authorities of "selective
prosecution".

They are quoted by Radio Free Europe as saying:
"The impetus for this prosecution comes from allegations
made by the Kuchma regime, which itself is corrupt and
dedicated to using undemocratic and repressive methods
to stifle political opposition ... (other Ukrainian officials)
including Kuchma himself and his closest associates, have
committed conduct similar to that with which Lazarenko
is charged but have not been prosecuted by the U.S.
government".

The UNDP estimated, in 1997, that, even in rich,
industrialized, countries, 15% of all firms had to pay
bribes. The figure rises to 40% in Asia and 60% in Russia.

Corruption is rife and all pervasive, though many
allegations are nothing but political mud-slinging.

Luckily, in countries like Macedonia, it is confined to its
rapacious elites: its politicians, managers, university
professors, medical doctors, judges, journalists, and top
bureaucrats. The police and customs are hopelessly
compromised. Yet, one rarely comes across graft and
venality in daily life. There are no false detentions (as in
Russia), spurious traffic tickets (as in Latin America), or
widespread stealthy payments for public goods and
services (as in Africa).

It is widely accepted that corruption retards growth by
deterring foreign investment and encouraging brain drain.

It leads to the misallocation of economic resources and
distorts competition. It depletes the affected country's
endowments - both natural and acquired. It demolishes the
tenuous trust between citizen and state. It casts civil and
government institutions in doubt, tarnishes the entire
political class, and, thus, endangers the democratic system
and the rule of law, property rights included.

This is why both governments and business show a
growing commitment to tackling it. According to
Transparency International's "Global Corruption Report
2001", corruption has been successfully contained in
private banking and the diamond trade, for instance.

Hence also the involvement of the World Bank and the
IMF in fighting corruption. Both institutions are
increasingly concerned with poverty reduction through
economic growth and development. The World Bank
estimates that corruption reduces the growth rate of an
affected country by 0.5 to 1 percent annually. Graft
amounts to an increase in the marginal tax rate and has
pernicious effects on inward investment as well.

The World Bank has appointed last year a Director of
Institutional Integrity - a new department that combines
the Anti-Corruption and Fraud Investigations Unit and the
Office of Business Ethics and Integrity. The Bank helps
countries to fight corruption by providing them with
technical assistance, educational programs, and lending.

Anti-corruption projects are an integral part of every
Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). The Bank also
supports international efforts to reduce corruption by
sponsoring conferences and the exchange of information.

It collaborates closely with Transparency International,
for instance.

At the request of member-governments (such as Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Romania) it has prepared detailed
country corruption surveys covering both the public and
the private sectors. Together with the EBRD, it publishes
a corruption survey of 3000 firms in 22 transition
countries (BEEPS - Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey). It has even set up a multilingual
hotline for whistleblowers.

The IMF made corruption an integral part of its country
evaluation process. It suspended arrangements with
endemically corrupt recipients of IMF financing. Since
1997, it has introduced policies regarding misreporting,
abuse of IMF funds, monitoring the use of debt relief for
poverty reduction, data dissemination, legal and judicial
reform, fiscal and monetary transparency, and even
internal governance (e.g., financial disclosure by staff
members).

Yet, no one seems to agree on a universal definition of
corruption. What amounts to venality in one culture
(Sweden) is considered no more than hospitality, or an
expression of gratitude, in another (France, or Italy).

Corruption is discussed freely and forgivingly in one
place - but concealed shamefully in another. Corruption,
like other crimes, is probably seriously under-reported and
under-penalized.

Moreover, bribing officials is often the unstated policy of
multinationals, foreign investors, and expatriates. Many of
them believe that it is inevitable if one is to expedite
matters or secure a beneficial outcome. Rich world
governments turn a blind eye, even where laws against
such practices are extant and strict.

In his address to the Inter-American Development Bank
on March 14, President Bush promised to "reward nations
that root out corruption" within the framework of the
Millennium Challenge Account initiative. The USA has
pioneered global anti-corruption campaigns and is a
signatory to the 1996 IAS Inter-American Convention
against Corruption, the Council of Europe's Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption, and the OECD's 1997 anti-
bribery convention. The USA has had a comprehensive
"Foreign Corrupt Practices Act" since 1977.

The Act applies to all American firms, to all firms -
including foreign ones - traded in an American stock
exchange, and to bribery on American territory by foreign
and American firms alike. It outlaws the payment of
bribes to foreign officials, political parties, party officials,
and political candidates in foreign countries. A similar law
has now been adopted by Britain.

Yet, "The Economist" reports that the American SEC has
brought only three cases against listed companies until
1997. The US Department of Justice brought another 30
cases. Britain has persecuted successfully only one of its
officials for overseas bribery since 1889. In the
Netherlands bribery is tax deductible. Transparency
International now publishes a name and shame Bribery
Payers Index to complement its 91-country strong
Corruption Perceptions Index.

Many rich world corporations and wealthy individuals
make use of off-shore havens or "special purpose entities"
to launder money, make illicit payments, avoid or evade
taxes, and conceal assets or liabilities. According to Swiss
authorities, more than $40 billion are held by Russians in
its banking system alone. The figure may be 5 to 10 times
higher in the tax havens of the United Kingdom.

In a survey it conducted last month of 82 companies in
which it invests, "Friends, Ivory, and Sime" found that
only a quarter had clear anti-corruption management and
accountability systems in place.

Tellingly only 35 countries signed the 1997 OECD
"Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions" -
including four non-OECD members: Chile, Argentina,
Bulgaria, and Brazil. The convention has been in force
since February 1999 and is only one of many OECD anti-
corruption drives, among which are SIGMA (Support for
Improvement in Governance and Management in Central
and Eastern European countries), ACN (Anti-Corruption
Network for Transition Economies in Europe), and FATF
(the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering).

Moreover, The moral authority of those who preach
against corruption in poor countries - the officials of the
IMF, the World Bank, the EU, the OECD - is strained by
their ostentatious lifestyle, conspicuous consumption, and
"pragmatic" morality.

II. What to Do? What is Being Done?
Two years ago, I proposed a taxonomy of corruption,
venality, and graft. I suggested this cumulative definition:
a. The withholding of a service, information, or
goods that, by law, and by right, should have been
provided or divulged.
b. The provision of a service, information, or goods
that, by law, and by right, should not have been
provided or divulged.
c. That the withholding or the provision of said
service, information, or goods are in the power of
the withholder or the provider to withhold or to
provide AND That the withholding or the
provision of said service, information, or goods
constitute an integral and substantial part of the
authority or the function of the withholder or the
provider.
d. That the service, information, or goods that are
provided or divulged are provided or divulged
against a benefit or the promise of a benefit from
the recipient and as a result of the receipt of this
specific benefit or the promise to receive such
benefit.
e. That the service, information, or goods that are
withheld are withheld because no benefit was
provided or promised by the recipient.

There is also what the World Bank calls "State Capture"
defined thus:
"The actions of individuals, groups, or firms, both in the
public and private sectors, to influence the formation of
laws, regulations, decrees, and other government policies
to their own advantage as a result of the illicit and non-
transparent provision of private benefits to public
officials".

We can classify corrupt and venal behaviors according to
their outcomes:
a. Income Supplement - Corrupt actions whose sole
outcome is the supplementing of the income of the
provider without affecting the "real world" in any
manner.
b. Acceleration or Facilitation Fees - Corrupt
practices whose sole outcome is to accelerate or
facilitate decision making, the provision of goods
and services or the divulging of information.
c. Decision Altering (State Capture) Fees - Bribes
and promises of bribes which alter decisions or
affect them, or which affect the formation of
policies, laws, regulations, or decrees beneficial to
the bribing entity or person.
d. Information Altering Fees - Backhanders and
bribes that subvert the flow of true and complete
information within a society or an economic unit
(for instance, by selling professional diplomas,
certificates, or permits).
e. Reallocation Fees - Benefits paid (mainly to
politicians and political decision makers) in order
to affect the allocation of economic resources and
material wealth or the rights thereto. Concessions,
licenses, permits, assets privatized, tenders
awarded are all subject to reallocation fees.

To eradicate corruption, one must tackle both giver and
taker.

History shows that all effective programs shared these
common elements:
a. The persecution of corrupt, high-profile, public
figures, multinationals, and institutions (domestic
and foreign). This demonstrates that no one is
above the law and that crime does not pay.
b. The conditioning of international aid, credits, and
investments on a monitored reduction in
corruption levels. The structural roots of
corruption should be tackled rather than merely its
symptoms.
c. The institution of incentives to avoid corruption,
such as a higher pay, the fostering of civic pride,
"good behavior" bonuses, alternative income and
pension plans, and so on.
d. In many new countries (in Asia, Africa, and
Eastern Europe) the very concepts of "private"
versus "public" property are fuzzy and
impermissible behaviors are not clearly
demarcated. Massive investments in education of
the public and of state officials are required.
e. Liberalization and deregulation of the economy.

Abolition of red tape, licensing, protectionism,
capital controls, monopolies, discretionary, non-
public, procurement. Greater access to information
and a public debate intended to foster a
"stakeholder society".
f. Strengthening of institutions: the police, the
customs, the courts, the government, its agencies,
the tax authorities - under time limited foreign
management and supervision.

Awareness to corruption and graft is growing - though it
mostly results in lip service. The Global Coalition for
Africa adopted anti-corruption guidelines in 1999. The
otherwise opaque Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) forum is now championing transparency and
good governance. The UN is promoting its pet convention
against corruption.

The G-8 asked its Lyon Group of senior experts on
transnational crime to recommend ways to fight
corruption related to large money flows and money
laundering. The USA and the Netherlands hosted global
forums on corruption - as will South Korea next year. The
OSCE is rumored to respond with its own initiative, in
collaboration with the US Congressional Helsinki
Commission.

The south-eastern Europe Stability Pact sports its own
Stability Pact Anti-corruption Initiative (SPAI). It held its
first conference in September 2001 in Croatia. More than
1200 delegates participated in the 10th International Anti-
Corruption Conference in Prague last year. The
conference was attended by the Czech prime minister, the
Mexican president, and the head of the Interpol.

The most potent remedy against corruption is sunshine -
free, accessible, and available information disseminated
and probed by an active opposition, uncompromised
press, and assertive civic organizations and NGO's. In the
absence of these, the fight against official avarice and
criminality is doomed to failure. With them, it stands a
chance.

Corruption can never be entirely eliminated - but it can be
restrained and its effects confined. The cooperation of
good people with trustworthy institutions is indispensable.

Corruption can be defeated only from the inside, though
with plenty of outside help. It is a process of self-
redemption and self-transformation. It is the real
transition.

III. Asset Confiscation and Asset Forfeiture
The abuse of asset confiscation and forfeiture statutes by
governments, law enforcement agencies, and political
appointees and cronies throughout the world is well-
documented. In many developing countries and countries
in transition, assets confiscated from real and alleged
criminals and tax evaders are sold in fake auctions to
party hacks, cronies, police officers, tax inspectors, and
relatives of prominent politicians at bargain basement
prices.

That the assets of suspects in grave crimes and corruption
should be frozen or "disrupted" until they are convicted or
exonerated by the courts - having exhausted their appeals
- is understandable and in accordance with the Vienna
Convention. But there is no justification for the seizure
and sale of property otherwise.

In Switzerland, financial institutions are obliged to
automatically freeze suspect transactions for a period of
five days, subject to the review of an investigative judge.

In France, the Financial Intelligence Unit can freeze funds
involved in a reported suspicious transaction by
administrative fiat. In both jurisdictions, the fast track
freezing of assets has proven to be a more than adequate
measure to cope with organized crime and venality.

The presumption of innocence must fully apply and due
process upheld to prevent self-enrichment and corrupt
dealings with confiscated property, including the unethical
and unseemly use of the proceeds from the sale of
forfeited assets to close gaping holes in strained state and
municipal budgets.

In the United States, according to The Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (HR 1658), the assets of
suspects under investigation and of criminals convicted of
a variety of more than 400 minor and major offenses
(from soliciting a prostitute to gambling and from
narcotics charges to corruption and tax evasion) are often
confiscated and forfeited ("in personam, or value-based
confiscation").

Technically and theoretically, assets can be impounded or
forfeited and disposed of even in hitherto minor Federal
civil offenses (mistakes in fulfilling Medicare or tax
return forms)
The UK's Assets Recovery Agency (ARA) that is in
charge of enforcing the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, had
this chilling statement to make on May 24, 2007:
"We are pursuing the assets of those involved in a wide
range of crime including drug dealing, people
trafficking, fraud, extortion, smuggling, control of
prostitution, counterfeiting, benefit fraud, tax evasion
and environmental crimes such as illegal dumping of
waste and illegal fishing." (!)
Drug dealing and illegal fishing in the same sentence.

The British firm Bentley-Jennison, who provide Forensic
Accounting Services, add:
"In some cases the defendants will even have their assets
seized at the start of an investigation, before any charges
have been considered. In many cases the authorities will
assume that all of the assets held by the defendant are
illegally obtained as he has a "criminal lifestyle". It is
then down to the defendant to prove otherwise. If the
defendant is judged to have a criminal lifestyle then it
will be assumed that physical assets, such as properties
and motor vehicles, have been acquired through the use
of criminal funds and it will be necessary to present
evidence to contradict this.

The defendant's bank accounts will also be scanned for
evidence of spending and any expenditure on
unidentified assets (and in some cases identified assets)
is also likely to be included as alleged criminal benefit.

This often leads to the inclusion of sums from legitimate
sources and double counting both of which need to be
eliminated".

Under the influence of the post-September 11 United
States and the FATF (Financial Action Task Force on
Money Laundering), Canada, Australia, the United
Kingdom, Greece, South Korea, and Russia have similar
asset recovery and money laundering laws in place.

International treaties (for instance, the 1959 European
Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters, the 1990 Convention of the Council of Europe on
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the
Proceeds from Crime (ETS 141), and The U.N.

Convention against Corruption 2003- UNCAC) and
European Union Directives (e.g., 2001/97/EC) allow the
seizure and confiscation of the assets and "unexplained
wealth" of criminals and suspects globally, even if their
alleged or proven crime does not constitute an offense
where they own property or have bank accounts.

This abrogation of the principle of dual criminality
sometimes leads to serious violations of human and civil
rights. Hitler could have used it to ask the United
Kingdom's Assets Recovery Agency (ARA) to confiscate
the property of refugee Jews who committed "crimes" by
infringing on the infamous Nuremberg race laws.

Only offshore tax havens, such as Andorra, Antigua,
Aruba, the British Virgin Islands, Guernsey, Monaco, the
Netherlands Antilles, Samoa, St. Vincent, the US Virgin
Islands, and Vanuatu still resist the pressure to join in the
efforts to trace and seize suspects' assets and bank
accounts in the absence of a conviction or even charges.

Even worse, unlike in other criminal proceedings, the
burden of proof is on the defendant who has to
demonstrate that the source of the funds used to purchase
the confiscated or forfeited assets is legal. When the
defendant fails to furnish such evidence conclusively and
convincingly, or if he has left the United States or had
died, the assets are sold at an auction and the proceeds
usually revert to various law enforcement agencies, to the
government's budget, or to good social causes and
programs. This is the case in many countries, including
United Kingdom, United States, Germany, France, Hong
Kong, Italy, Denmark, Belgium, Austria, Greece, Ireland,
New Zealand, Singapore and Switzerland.

According to a brief written by Jack Smith, Mark Pieth,
and Guillermo Jorge at the Basel Institute on Governance,
International Centre for Asset Recovery:
"Article 54(1)(c) of the UNCAC recommends that states
parties establish non-criminal systems of confiscation,
which have several advantages for recovery actions: the
standard of evidence is lower ("preponderance of the
evidence" rather than "beyond a reasonable doubt");
they are not subject to some of the more restrictive
traditional safeguards of international cooperation such
as the offense for which the defendant is accused has to
be a crime in the receiving state (dual criminality); and
it opens more formal avenues for negotiation and
settlements. This is already the practice in some
jurisdictions such as the US, Ireland, the UK, Italy,
Colombia, Slovenia, and South Africa, as well as some
Australian and Canadian States".

In most countries, including the United Kingdom, the
United States, Austria, Germany, Indonesia, Macedonia,
and Ireland, assets can be impounded, confiscated, frozen,
forfeited, and even sold prior to and without any criminal
conviction.

In Australia, Austria, Ireland, Hong-Kong, New Zealand,
Singapore, United Kingdom, South Africa, United States
and the Netherlands alleged and suspected criminals, their
family members, friends, employees, and partners can be
stripped of their assets even for crimes they have
committed in other countries and even if they have merely
made use of revenues obtained from illicit activities (this
is called "in rem, or property-based confiscation"). This
often gives rise to cases of double jeopardy.

Typically, the defendant is notified of the impending
forfeiture or confiscation of his or her assets and has
recourse to a hearing within the relevant law enforcement
agency and also to the courts. If he or she can prove
"substantial harm" to life and business, the property may
be released to be used, though ownership is rarely
restored.

When the process of asset confiscation or asset forfeiture
is initiated, banking secrecy is automatically lifted and the
government indemnifies the banks for any damage they
may suffer for disclosing confidential information about
their clients' accounts.

In many countries from South Korea to Greece, lawyer-
client privilege is largely waived. The same requirements
of monitoring of clients' activities and reporting to the
authorities apply to credit and financial institutions,
venture capital firms, tax advisers, accountants, and
notaries.

Elsewhere, there are some other worrying developments:
In Bulgaria, the assets of tax evaders have recently begun
to be confiscated and turned over to the National Revenue
Agency and the State Receivables Collection Agency.

Property is confiscated even when the tax assessment is
disputed in the courts. The Agency cannot, however,
confiscate single-dwelling houses, bank accounts up to
250 leva of one member of the family, salary or pension
up to 250 leva a month, social care, and alimony, support
money or allowances.

Venezuela has recently reformed its Organic Tax Code to
allow for:
" (P)re-judgment enforcement measures (to) include
closure of premises for up to ten days and confiscation
of merchandise. These measures will be applied in
addition to the attachment or sequestration of personal
property and the prohibition against alienation or
encumbrance of realty. During closure of premises, the
employer must continue to pay workers, thereby
avoiding an appeal for constitutional protection".

Finally, in many states in the United States, "community
responsibility" statutes require of owners of legal
businesses to "abate crime" by openly fighting it
themselves. If they fail to tackle the criminals in their
neighborhood, the police can seize and sell their property,
including their apartments and cars. The proceeds from
such sales accrue to the local municipality.

In New-York City, the police confiscated a restaurant
because one of its regular patrons was an alleged drug
dealer. In Alabama, police seized the home of a senior
citizen because her yard was used, without her consent,
for drug dealing. In Maryland, the police confiscated a
family's home and converted it into a retreat for its
officers, having mailed one of the occupants a package of
marijuana.



III.Money Laundering in A Changed World


If you shop with a major bank, chances are that all the
transactions in your account are scrutinized by AML (Anti
Money Laundering) software. Billions of dollars are being
invested in these applications. They are supposed to track
suspicious transfers, deposits, and withdrawals based on
overall  statistical patterns. Bank directors, exposed, under
the Patriot Act, to personal liability for money laundering
in their establishments, swear by it as a legal shield and
the holy grail of the on-going war against financial crime
and the finances of terrorism.

Quoted in Wired.com, Neil Katkov of Celent
Communications, pegs future investments in compliance-
related activities and products by American banks alone at
close to $15 billion in the next 3 years (2005-2008). The
United State's Treasury Department's Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (finCEN) received c. 15 million
reports in each of the years 2003 and 2004.

But this is a drop in the seething ocean of illicit financial
transactions, sometimes egged on and abetted even by the
very Western governments ostensibly dead set against
them.

Israel has always turned a blind eye to the origin of funds
deposited by Jews from South Africa to Russia. In Britain
it is perfectly legal to hide the true ownership of a
company. Underpaid Asian bank clerks on immigrant
work permits in the Gulf states rarely require identity
documents from the mysterious and well-connected
owners of multi-million dollar deposits.

Hawaladars continue plying their paperless and trust-
based trade - the transfer of billions of US dollars around
the world. American and Swiss banks collaborate with
dubious correspondent banks in off shore centres.

Multinationals shift money through tax free territories in
what is euphemistically known as "tax planning". Internet
gambling outfits and casinos serve as fronts for narco-
dollars. British Bureaux de Change launder up to 2.6
billion British pounds annually.

The 500 Euro note makes it much easier to smuggle cash
out of Europe. A French parliamentary committee accused
the City of London of being a money laundering haven in
a 400 page report. Intelligence services cover the tracks of
covert operations by opening accounts in obscure tax
havens, from Cyprus to Nauru. Money laundering, its
venues and techniques, are an integral part of the
economic fabric of the world. Business as usual?
Not really. In retrospect, as far as money laundering goes,
September 11 may be perceived as a watershed as
important as the precipitous collapse of communism in
1989. Both events have forever altered the patterns of the
global flows of illicit capital.

What is Money Laundering?
Strictly speaking, money laundering is the age-old process
of disguising the illegal origin and criminal nature of
funds (obtained in sanctions-busting arms sales,
smuggling, trafficking in humans, organized crime, drug
trafficking, prostitution rings, embezzlement, insider
trading, bribery, and computer fraud) by moving them
untraceably and investing them in legitimate businesses,
securities, or bank deposits. But this narrow definition
masks the fact that the bulk of money laundered is the
result of tax evasion, tax avoidance, and outright tax
fraud, such as the "VAT carousel scheme" in the EU
(moving goods among businesses in various jurisdictions
to capitalize on differences in VAT rates). Tax-related
laundering nets between 10-20 billion US dollars annually
from France and Russia alone. The confluence of criminal
and tax averse funds in money laundering networks serves
to obscure the sources of both.

The Scale of the Problem
According to a 1996 IMF estimate, money laundered
annually amounts to 2-5% of world GDP (between 800
billion and 2 trillion US dollars in today's terms). The
lower figure is considerably larger than an average
European economy, such as Spain's.

The System
It is important to realize that money laundering takes
place within the banking system. Big amounts of cash are
spread among numerous accounts (sometimes in free
economic zones, financial off shore centers, and tax
havens), converted to bearer financial instruments (money
orders, bonds), or placed with trusts and charities. The
money is then transferred to other locations, sometimes as
bogus payments for "goods and services" against fake or
inflated invoices issued by holding companies owned by
lawyers or accountants on behalf of unnamed
beneficiaries. The transferred funds are re-assembled in
their destination and often "shipped" back to the point of
origin under a new identity. The laundered funds are then
invested in the legitimate economy. It is a simple
procedure - yet an effective one. It results in either no
paper trail - or too much of it. The accounts are invariably
liquidated and all traces erased.

Why is It a Problem?
Criminal and tax evading funds are idle and non-
productive. Their injection, however surreptitiously, into
the economy transforms them into a productive (and
cheap) source of capital. Why is this negative?
Because it corrupts government officials, banks and their
officers, contaminates legal sectors of the economy,
crowds out legitimate and foreign capital, makes money
supply unpredictable and uncontrollable, and increases
cross-border capital movements, thereby enhancing the
volatility of exchange rates.

A multilateral, co-ordinated, effort (exchange of
information, uniform laws, extra-territorial legal powers)
is required to counter the international dimensions of
money laundering. Many countries opt in because money
laundering has also become a domestic political and
economic concern. The United Nations, the Bank for
International Settlements, the OECD's FATF (Financial
Action Task Force), the EU, the Council of Europe, the
Organisation of American States, all published anti-
money laundering standards. Regional groupings were
formed (or are being established) in the Caribbean, Asia,
Europe, southern Africa, western Africa, and Latin
America.

Money Laundering in the Wake of the September 11
Attacks
Regulation
The least important trend is the tightening of financial
regulations and the establishment or enhancement of
compulsory (as opposed to industry or voluntary)
regulatory and enforcement agencies.

New legislation in the US which amounts to extending the
powers of the CIA domestically and of the DOJ extra-
territorially, was rather xenophobically described by a
DOJ official, Michael Chertoff, as intended to "make sure
the American banking system does not become a haven
for foreign corrupt leaders or other kinds of foreign
organized criminals".

Privacy and bank secrecy laws have been watered down.

Collaboration with off shore "shell" banks has been
banned. Business with clients of correspondent banks was
curtailed. Banks were effectively transformed into law
enforcement agencies, responsible to verify both the
identities of their (foreign) clients and the source and
origin of their funds. Cash transactions were partly
criminalized. And the securities and currency trading
industry, insurance companies, and money transfer
services are subjected to growing scrutiny as a conduit for
"dirty cash".

Still, such legislation is highly ineffective. The American
Bankers' Association puts the cost of compliance with the
laxer anti-money-laundering laws in force in 1998 at 10
billion US dollars - or more than 10 million US dollars per
obtained conviction. Even when the system does work,
critical alerts drown in the torrent of reports mandated by
the regulations. One bank actually reported a suspicious
transaction in the account of one of the September 11
hijackers - only to be ignored.

The Treasury Department established Operation Green
Quest, an investigative team charged with monitoring
charities, NGO's, credit card fraud, cash smuggling,
counterfeiting, and the Hawala networks. This is not
without precedent. Previous teams tackled drug money,
the biggest money laundering venue ever, BCCI (Bank of
Credit and Commerce International), and ... Al Capone.

The more veteran, New-York based, El-Dorado anti
money laundering Task Force (established in 1992) will
lend a hand and share information.

More than 150 countries promised to co-operate with the
US in its fight against the financing of terrorism - 81 of
which (including the Bahamas, Argentina, Kuwait,
Indonesia, Pakistan, Switzerland, and the EU) actually
froze assets of suspicious individuals, suspected charities,
and dubious firms, or passed new anti money laundering
laws and stricter regulations (the Philippines, the UK,
Germany).

A EU directive now forces lawyers to disclose
incriminating information about their clients' money
laundering activities. Pakistan initiated a "loyalty
scheme", awarding expatriates who prefer official bank
channels to the much maligned (but cheaper and more
efficient) Hawala, with extra baggage allowance and
special treatment in airports.

The magnitude of this international collaboration is
unprecedented. But this burst of solidarity may yet fade.

China, for instance, refuses to chime in. As a result, the
statement issued by APEC in November 2001 on
measures to stem the finances of terrorism was lukewarm
at best. And, protestations of close collaboration to the
contrary, Saudi Arabia has done nothing to combat money
laundering "Islamic charities" (of which it is proud) on its
territory.

Still, a universal code is emerging, based on the work of
the OECD's FATF (Financial Action Task Force) since
1989 (its famous "40 recommendations") and on the
relevant UN conventions. All countries are expected by
the West, on pain of possible sanctions, to adopt a
uniform legal platform (including reporting on suspicious
transactions and freezing assets) and to apply it to all
types of financial intermediaries, not only to banks. This
is likely to result in...

The Decline of off Shore Financial Centres and Tax
Havens
By far the most important outcome of this new-fangled
juridical homogeneity is the acceleration of the decline of
off shore financial and banking centres and tax havens.

The distinction between off-shore and on-shore will
vanish. Of the FATF's "name and shame" blacklist of 19
"black holes" (poorly regulated territories, including
Israel, Indonesia, and Russia) - 11 have substantially
revamped their banking laws and financial regulators.

Coupled with the tightening of US, UK, and EU laws and
the wider interpretation of money laundering to include
political corruption, bribery, and embezzlement - this
would make life a lot more difficult for venal politicians
and major tax evaders. The likes of Sani Abacha (late
President of Nigeria), Ferdinand Marcos (late President of
the Philippines), Vladimiro Montesinos (former, now
standing trial, chief of the intelligence services of Peru),
or Raul Salinas (the brother of Mexico's President) -
would have found it impossible to loot their countries to
the same disgraceful extent in today's financial
environment. And Osama bin Laden would not have been
able to wire funds to US accounts from the Sudanese Al
Shamal Bank, the "correspondent" of 33 American banks.

Quo Vadis, Money Laundering?
Crime is resilient and fast adapting to new realities.

Organized crime is in the process of establishing an
alternative banking system, only tangentially connected to
the West's, in the fringes, and by proxy. This is done by
purchasing defunct banks or banking licences in territories
with lax regulation, cash economies, corrupt politicians,
no tax collection, but reasonable infrastructure.

The countries of Eastern Europe - Yugoslavia
(Montenegro and Serbia), Macedonia, Ukraine, Moldova,
Belarus, Albania, to mention a few - are natural targets. In
some cases, organized crime is so all-pervasive and local
politicians so corrupt that the distinction between criminal
and politician is spurious.

Gradually, money laundering rings move their operations
to these new, accommodating territories. The laundered
funds are used to purchase assets in intentionally botched
privatizations, real estate, existing businesses, and to
finance trading operations. The wasteland that is Eastern
Europe craves private capital and no questions are asked
by investor and recipient alike.

The next frontier is cyberspace. Internet banking, Internet
gambling, day trading, foreign exchange cyber
transactions, e-cash, e-commerce, fictitious invoicing of
the launderer's genuine credit cards - hold the promise of
the future. Impossible to track and monitor, ex-territorial,
totally digital, amenable to identity theft and fake
identities - this is the ideal vehicle for money launderers.

This nascent platform is way too small to accommodate
the enormous amounts of cash laundered daily - but in ten
years time, it may. The problem is likely to be
exacerbated by the introduction of smart cards, electronic
purses, and payment-enabled mobile phones.

In its "Report on Money Laundering Typologies"
(February 2001) the FATF was able to document concrete
and suspected abuses of online banking, Internet casinos,
and web-based financial services. It is difficult to identify
a customer and to get to know it in cyberspace, was the
alarming conclusion. It is equally complicated to establish
jurisdiction.

Many capable professionals - stockbrokers, lawyers,
accountants, traders, insurance brokers, real estate agents,
sellers of high value items such as gold, diamonds, and art
- are employed or co-opted by money laundering
operations. Money launderers are likely to make increased
use of global, around the clock, trading in foreign
currencies and derivatives. These provide instantaneous
transfer of funds and no audit trail.

The underlying securities involved are susceptible to
market manipulation and fraud. Complex insurance
policies (with the "wrong" beneficiaries), and the
securitization of receivables, leasing contracts, mortgages,
and low grade bonds are already used in money
laundering schemes. In general, money laundering goes
well with risk arbitraging financial instruments.

Trust-based, globe-spanning, money transfer systems
based on authentication codes and generations of
commercial relationships cemented in honour and blood -
are another wave of the future. The Hawala and Chinese
networks in Asia, the Black Market Peso Exchange
(BMPE) in Latin America, other evolving courier systems
in Eastern Europe (mainly in Russia, Ukraine, and
Albania) and in Western Europe (mainly in France and
Spain).

In conjunction with encrypted e-mail and web
anonymizers, these networks are virtually impenetrable.

As emigration increases, diasporas established, and
transport and telecommunications become ubiquitous,
"ethnic banking" along the tradition of the Lombards and
the Jews in medieval Europe may become the the
preferred venue of money laundering. September 11 may
have retarded world civilization in more than one way.



IV. Hawala, or The Bank that Never Was


I. OVERVIEW
In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the
USA, attention was drawn to the age-old, secretive, and
globe-spanning banking system developed in Asia and
known as "Hawala" (to change, in Arabic). It is based on a
short term, discountable, negotiable, promissory note (or
bill of exchange) called "Hundi". While not limited to
Moslems, it has come to be identified with "Islamic
Banking".

Islamic Law (Sharia'a) regulates commerce and finance in
the Fiqh Al Mua'malat, (transactions amongst people).

Modern Islamic banks are overseen by the Shari'a
Supervisory Board of Islamic Banks and Institutions
("The Shari'a Committee").

The Shi'a "Islamic Laws according to the Fatawa of
Ayatullah al Uzama Syed Ali al-Husaini Seestani" has this
to say about Hawala banking:
"2298. If a debtor directs his creditor to collect his debt
from the third person, and the creditor accepts the
arrangement, the third person will, on completion of all
the conditions to be explained later, become the debtor.

Thereafter, the creditor cannot demand his debt from the
first debtor".

The prophet Muhammad (a cross border trader of goods
and commodities by profession) encouraged the free
movement of goods and the development of markets.

Numerous Moslem scholars railed against hoarding and
harmful speculation (market cornering and manipulation
known as "Gharar"). Moslems were the first to use
promissory notes and assignment, or transfer of debts via
bills of exchange ("Hawala"). Among modern banking
instruments, only floating and, therefore, uncertain,
interest payments ("Riba" and "Jahala"), futures contracts,
and forfeiting are frowned upon. But agile Moslem traders
easily and often circumvent these religious restrictions by
creating "synthetic Murabaha (contracts)" identical to
Western forward and futures contracts. Actually, the only
allowed transfer or trading of debts (as distinct from the
underlying commodities or goods) is under the Hawala.
"Hawala" consists of transferring money (usually across
borders and in order to avoid taxes or the need to bribe
officials) without physical or electronic transfer of funds.

Money changers ("Hawaladar") receive cash in one
country, no questions asked. Correspondent hawaladars in
another country dispense an identical amount (minus
minimal fees and commissions) to a recipient or, less
often, to a bank account. E-mail, or letter ("Hundi")
carrying couriers are used to convey the necessary
information (the amount of money, the date it has to be
paid on) between Hawaladars. The sender provides the
recipient with code words (or numbers, for instance the
serial numbers of currency notes), a digital encrypted
message, or agreed signals (like handshakes), to be used
to retrieve the money. Big Hawaladars use a chain of
middlemen in cities around the globe.

But most Hawaladars are small businesses. Their Hawala
activity is a sideline or moonlighting operation. "Chits"
(verbal agreements) substitute for certain written records.

In bigger operations there are human "memorizers" who
serve as arbiters in case of dispute. The Hawala system
requires unbounded trust. Hawaladars are often members
of the same family, village, clan, or ethnic group. It is a
system older than the West. The ancient Chinese had their
own "Hawala" - "fei qian" (or "flying money"). Arab
traders used it to avoid being robbed on the Silk Road.

Cheating is punished by effective ex-communication and
"loss of honour" - the equivalent of an economic death
sentence. Physical violence is rarer but not unheard of.

Violence sometimes also erupts between money recipients
and robbers who are after the huge quantities of physical
cash sloshing about the system. But these, too, are rare
events, as rare as bank robberies. One result of this
effective social regulation is that commodity traders in
Asia shift hundreds of millions of US dollars per trade
based solely on trust and the verbal commitment of their
counterparts.

Hawala arrangements are used to avoid customs duties,
consumption taxes, and other trade-related levies.

Suppliers provide importers with lower prices on their
invoices, and get paid the difference via Hawala.

Legitimate transactions and tax evasion constitute the bulk
of Hawala operations. Modern Hawala networks emerged
in the 1960's and 1970's to circumvent official bans on
gold imports in Southeast Asia and to facilitate the
transfer of hard earned wages of expatriates to their
families ("home remittances") and   their conversion at
rates more favourable (often double) than the
government's. Hawala provides a cheap (it costs c. 1% of
the amount transferred), efficient, and frictionless
alternative to morbid and corrupt domestic financial
institutions. It is Western Union without the hi-tech gear
and the exorbitant transfer fees.

Unfortunately, these networks have been hijacked and
compromised by drug traffickers (mainly in Afganistan
and Pakistan), corrupt officials, secret services, money
launderers, organized crime, and terrorists. Pakistani
Hawala networks alone move up to 5 billion US dollars
annually according to estimates by Pakistan's Minister of
Finance, Shaukut Aziz. In 1999, Institutional Investor
Magazine identified 1100 money brokers in Pakistan and
transactions that ran as high as 10 million US dollars
apiece. As opposed to stereotypes, most Hawala networks
are not controlled by Arabs, but by Indian and Pakistani
expatriates and immigrants in the Gulf. The Hawala
network in India has been brutally and ruthlessly
demolished by Indira Ghandi (during the emergency
regime imposed in 1975), but Indian nationals still play a
big part in international Hawala networks. Similar
networks in Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Bangladesh
have also been eradicated.

The OECD's Financial Action Task Force (FATF) says
that:
"Hawala remains a significant method for large
numbers of businesses of all sizes and individuals to
repatriate funds and purchase gold.... It is favoured
because it usually costs less than moving funds through
the banking system, it operates 24 hours per day and
every day of the year, it is virtually completely reliable,
and there is minimal paperwork required."
(Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD), "Report on Money Laundering
Typologies 1999-2000," Financial Action Task Force,
FATF-XI, February 3, 2000, at
http://www.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/TY2000_en.pdf )
Hawala networks closely feed into Islamic banks
throughout the world and to commodity trading in South
Asia. There are more than 200 Islamic banks in the USA
alone and many thousands in Europe, North and South
Africa, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states (especially in the free
zone of Dubai and in Bahrain), Pakistan, Malaysia,
Indonesia, and other South East Asian countries. By the
end of 1998, the overt (read: tip of the iceberg) liabilities
of these financial institutions amounted to 148 billion US
dollars. They dabbled in equipment leasing, real estate
leasing and development, corporate equity, and
trade/structured trade and commodities financing (usually
in consortia called "Mudaraba").

While previously confined to the Arab peninsula and to
south and east Asia, this mode of traditional banking
became truly international in the 1970's, following the
unprecedented flow of wealth to many Moslem nations
due to the oil shocks and the emergence of the Asian
tigers. Islamic banks joined forces with corporations,
multinationals, and banks in the West to finance oil
exploration and drilling, mining, and agribusiness. Many
leading law firms in the West (such as Norton Rose,
Freshfields, Clyde and Co. and Clifford Chance) have
"Islamic Finance" teams which are familiar with Islam-
compatible commercial contracts.

II. HAWALA AND TERRORISM
Recent anti-terrorist legislation in the US and the UK
allows government agencies to regularly supervise and
inspect businesses that are suspected of being a front for
the ''Hawala'' banking system, makes it a crime to
smuggle more than $10,000 in cash across USA borders,
and empowers the Treasury secretary (and its Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network - FinCEN) to tighten
record-keeping and reporting rules for banks and financial
institutions based in the USA. A new inter-agency Foreign
Terrorist Asset Tracking Center (FTAT) was set up. A
1993 moribund proposed law requiring US-based
Halawadar to register and to report suspicious transactions
may be revived. These relatively radical measures reflect
the belief that the al-Qaida network of Osama bin Laden
uses the Hawala system to raise and move funds across
national borders. A Hawaladar in Pakistan (Dihab Shill)
was identified as the financier in the attacks on the
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.

But the USA is not the only country to face terrorism
financed by Hawala networks.

In mid-2001, the Delhi police, the Indian government's
Enforcement Directorate (ED), and the Military
Intelligence (MI) arrested six Jammu Kashmir Islamic
Front (JKIF) terrorists. The arrests led to the exposure of
an enormous web of Hawala institutions in Delhi, aided
and abetted, some say, by the ISI (Inter Services
Intelligence, Pakistan's security services). The Hawala
network was used to funnel money to terrorist groups in
the disputed Kashmir Valley.

Luckily, the common perception that Hawala financing is
paperless is wrong. The transfer of information regarding
the funds often leaves digital (though heavily encrypted)
trails. Couriers and "contract memorizers", gold dealers,
commodity merchants, transporters, and moneylenders
can be apprehended and interrogated. Written, physical,
letters are still the favourite mode of communication
among small and medium Hawaladars, who also
invariably resort to extremely detailed single entry
bookkeeping.  And the sudden appearance and
disappearance of funds in bank accounts still have to be
explained. Moreover, the sheer scale of the amounts
involved entails the collaboration of off shore banks and
more established financial institutions in the West. Such
flows of funds affect the local money markets in Asia and
are instantaneously reflected in interest rates charged to
frequent borrowers, such as wholesalers. Spending and
consumption patterns change discernibly after such
influxes. Most of the money ends up in prime world banks
behind flimsy business facades. Hackers in Germany
claimed (without providing proof) to have infiltrated
Hawala-related bank accounts.

The problem is that banks and financial institutions - and
not only in dodgy offshore havens ("black holes" in the
lingo) - clam up and refuse to divulge information about
their clients. Banking is largely a matter of fragile trust
between bank and customer and tight secrecy. Bankers are
reluctant to undermine either. Banks use mainframe
computers which can rarely be hacked through cyberspace
and can be compromised only physically in close co-
operation with insiders. The shadier the bank - the more
formidable its digital defenses. The use of numbered
accounts (outlawed in Austria, for instance, only recently)
and pseudonyms (still possible in Lichtenstein)
complicates matters. Bin Laden's accounts are unlikely to
bear his name. He has collaborators.

Hawala networks are often used to launder money, or to
evade taxes. Even when employed for legitimate
purposes, to diversify the risk involved in the transfer of
large sums, Hawaladars apply techniques borrowed from
money laundering. Deposits are fragmented and wired to
hundreds of banks the world over ("starburst").

Sometimes, the money ends up in the account of origin
("boomerang").

Hence the focus on payment clearing and settlement
systems. Most countries have only one such system, the
repository of  data regarding all banking (and most non-
banking) transactions in the country. Yet, even this is a
partial solution. Most national systems maintain records
for 6-12 months, private settlement and clearing systems
for even less.

Yet, the crux of the problem is not the Hawala or the
Hawaladars. The corrupt and inept governments of Asia
are to blame for not regulating their banking systems, for
over-regulating everything else, for not fostering
competition, for throwing public money at bad debts and
at worse borrowers, for over-taxing, for robbing people of
their life savings through capital controls, for tearing at
the delicate fabric of trust between customer and bank
(Pakistan, for instance, froze all foreign exchange
accounts two years ago). Perhaps if Asia had reasonably
expedient, reasonably priced, reasonably regulated, user-
friendly banks - Osama bin Laden would have found it
impossible to finance his mischief so invisibly.



V. Straf - Corruption in Central and Eastern Europe


The three policemen barked "straf", "straf" in unison. It
was a Russianized version of the German word for "fine"
and a euphemism for bribe. I and my fianće were
stranded in an empty ally at the heart of Moscow,
physically encircled by these young bullies, an ominous
propinquity. They held my passport ransom and began to
drag me to a police station nearby. We paid.

To do the fashionable thing and to hold the moral high
ground is rare. Yet, denouncing corruption and fighting it
satisfies both conditions. Such hectoring is usually the
preserve of well-heeled bureaucrats, driving utility
vehicles and banging away at wireless laptops. The
General Manager of the IMF makes 400,000 US dollars a
year, tax-free, and perks. This is the equivalent of 2,300
(!) monthly salaries of a civil servant in Macedonia - or
7,000 monthly salaries of a teacher or a doctor in
Yugoslavia, Moldova, Belarus, or Albania. He flies only
first class and each one of his air tickets is worth the bi-
annual income of a Macedonian factory worker. His
shareholders - among them poor and developing countries
- are forced to cough up these exorbitant fees and to
finance the luxurious lifestyle of the likes of Kohler and
Wolfensohn. And then they are made to listen to the IMF
lecture them on belt tightening and how uncompetitive
their economies are due to their expensive labour force.

To me, such a double standard is the epitome of
corruption. Organizations such as the IMF and World
Bank will never be possessed of a shred of moral
authority in these parts of the world unless and until they
forgo their conspicuous consumption.

Yet, corruption is not a monolithic practice. Nor are its
outcomes universally deplorable or damaging. One would
do best to adopt a utilitarian and discerning approach to it.

The advent of moral relativism has taught us that "right"
and "wrong" are flexible, context dependent and culture-
sensitive yardsticks.

What amounts to venality in one culture (Slovenia) is
considered no more than gregariousness or hospitality in
another (Macedonia).

Moreover, corruption is often "imported" by
multinationals, foreign investors, and expats. It is
introduced by them to all levels of governments, often in
order to expedite matters or secure a beneficial outcome.

To eradicate corruption, one must tackle both giver and
taker.

Thus, we are better off asking "cui bono" than "is it the
right thing to do". Phenomenologically, "corruption" is a
common - and misleading - label for a group of
behaviours. One of the following criteria must apply:
(a) The withholding of a service, information, or goods
that, by law, and by right, should have been provided or
divulged.

To have a phone installed in Russia one must openly bribe
the installer (according to a rather rigid tariff). In many of
the former republics of Yugoslavia, it is impossible to
obtain statistics or other data (the salaries of senior public
officeholders, for instance) without resorting to kickbacks.
(b) The provision of a service, information, or goods that,
by law, and by right, should not have been provided or
divulged.

Tenders in the Czech Republic are often won through
bribery. The botched privatizations all over the former
Eastern Bloc constitute a massive transfer of wealth to
select members of a nomenklatura. Licences and
concessions are often granted in Bulgaria and the rest of
the Balkan as means of securing political allegiance or
paying off old political "debts".
(c) That the withholding or the provision of said service,
information, or goods are in the power of the withholder
or the provider to withhold or to provide AND That the
withholding or the provision of said service, information,
or goods constitute an integral and substantial part of the
authority or the function of the withholder or the provider.

The post-communist countries in transition are a
dichotomous lot. On the one hand, they are intensely and
stiflingly bureaucratic. On the other hand, none of the
institutions functions properly or lawfully. While these
countries are LEGALISTIC - they are never LAWFUL.

This fuzziness allows officials in all ranks to usurp
authority, to trade favours, to forge illegal consensus and
to dodge criticism and accountability. There is a direct
line between lack of transparency and venality. Eran
Fraenkel of Search for Common Ground in Macedonia
has coined the phrase "ambient corruption" to capture this
complex of features.
(d) That the service, information, or goods that are
provided or divulged are provided or divulged against a
benefit or the promise of a benefit from the recipient and
as a result of the receipt of this specific benefit or the
promise to receive such benefit.

It is wrong to assume that corruption is necessarily, or
even mostly, monetary or pecuniary. Corruption is built
on mutual expectations. The reasonable expectation of a
future benefit is, in itself, a benefit. Access, influence
peddling, property rights, exclusivity, licences, permits, a
job, a recommendation - all constitute benefits.
(e) That the service, information, or goods that are
withheld are withheld because no benefit was provided or
promised by the recipient.

Even then, in CEE, we can distinguish between a few
types of corrupt and venal behaviours in accordance with
their OUTCOMES (utilities):
(1) Income Supplement
Corrupt actions whose sole outcome is the supplementing
of the income of the provider without affecting the "real
world" in any manner.

Though the perception of corruption itself is a negative
outcome - it is so only when corruption does not
constitute an acceptable and normative part of the playing
field. When corruption becomes institutionalised - it also
becomes predictable and is easily and seamlessly
incorporated into decision making processes of all
economic players and moral agents. They develop "by-
passes" and "techniques" which allow them to restore an
efficient market equilibrium. In a way, all-pervasive
corruption is transparent and, thus, a form of taxation.

This is the most common form of corruption exercised by
low and mid-ranking civil servants, party hacks and
municipal politicians throughout the CEE.

More than avarice, the motivating force here is sheer
survival. The acts of corruption are repetitive, structured
and in strict accordance with an un-written tariff and code
of conduct.
(2) Acceleration Fees
Corrupt practices whose sole outcome is to
ACCELERATE decision making, the provision of goods
and services or the divulging of information. None of the
outcomes or the utility functions are altered. Only the
speed of the economic dynamics is altered. This kind of
corruption is actually economically BENEFICIAL. It is a
limited transfer of wealth (or tax) which increases
efficiency. This is not to say that bureaucracies and venal
officialdoms, over-regulation and intrusive political
involvement in the workings of the marketplace are good
(efficient) things. They are not. But if the choice is
between a slow, obstructive and passive-aggressive civil
service and a more forthcoming and accommodating one
(the result of bribery) - the latter is preferable.

Acceleration fees are collected mostly by mid-ranking
bureaucrats and middle rung decision makers in both the
political echelons and the civil service.
(3) Decision Altering Fees
This is where the line is crossed from the point of view of
aggregate utility. When bribes and promises of bribes
actually alter outcomes in the real world - a less than
optimal allocation of resources and distribution of means
of production is obtained. The result is a fall in the general
level of production. The many is hurt by the few. The
economy is skewed and economic outcomes are distorted.

This kind of corruption should be uprooted on utilitarian
grounds as well as on moral ones.
(4) Subversive Outcomes
Some corrupt collusions lead to the subversion of the flow
of information within a society or an economic unit.

Wrong information often leads to disastrous outcomes.

Consider a medical doctor or an civil engineer who bribed
their way into obtaining a professional diploma.

Human lives are at stake. The wrong information, in this
case is the professional validity of the diplomas granted
and the scholarship (knowledge) that such certificates
stand for. But the outcomes are lost lives. This kind of
corruption, of course, is by far the most damaging.

Unfortunately, it is widespread in CEE. It is proof of the
collapse of the social treaty, of social solidarity and of the
fraying of the social fabric.

No Western country accepts CEE diplomas without
further accreditation, studies and examinations. Many
"medical doctors" and "engineers" who emigrated to
Israel from Russia and the former republics of the USSR -
were suspiciously deficient professionally. Israel was
forced to re-educate them prior to granting them a licence
to practice locally.
(5) Reallocation Fees
Benefits paid (mainly to politicians and political decision
makers) in order to affect the allocation of economic
resources and material wealth or the rights thereto.

Concessions, licences, permits, assets privatised, tenders
awarded are all subject to reallocation fees. Here the
damage is materially enormous (and visible) but, because
it is widespread, it is "diluted" in individual terms. Still, it
is often irreversible (like when a sold asset is purposefully
under-valued) and pernicious. a factory sold to avaricious
and criminally minded managers is likely to collapse and
leave its workers unemployed.

Corruption pervades daily life even in the prim and often
hectoring countries of the West. It is a win-win game (as
far as Game Theory goes) - hence its attraction. We are all
corrupt to varying degrees. But it is wrong and wasteful -
really, counterproductive - to fight corruption in CEE in a
wide front and indiscriminately.  It is the kind of
corruption whose evil outcomes outweigh its benefits that
should be fought. This fine (and blurred) distinction is too
often lost on decision makers and law enforcement
agencies in both East and West.

ERADICATING CORRUPTION
An effective program to eradicate corruption must include
the following elements:
1. Egregiously corrupt, high-profile, public figures,
multinationals, and institutions (domestic and
foreign) must be singled out for harsh (legal)
treatment and thus demonstrate that no one is
above the law and that crime does not pay.
2. All international aid, credits, and investments must
be conditioned upon a clear, performance-based,
plan to reduce corruption levels and intensity.

Such a plan should be monitored and revised as
needed. Corruption retards development and
produces instability by undermining the
credentials of democracy, state institutions, and
the political class. Reduced corruption is,
therefore, a major target of economic and
institutional developmental.
3. Corruption cannot be reduced only by punitive
measures. A system of incentives to avoid
corruption must be established. Such incentives
should include a higher pay, the fostering of civic
pride, educational campaigns, "good behaviour"
bonuses, alternative income and pension plans,
and so on.
4. Opportunities to be corrupt should be minimized
by liberalizing and deregulating the economy. Red
tape should be minimized, licensing abolished,
international trade freed, capital controls
eliminated, competition introduced, monopolies
broken, transparent public tendering be made
mandatory, freedom of information enshrined, the
media should be directly supported by the
international community, and so on. Deregulation
should be a developmental target integral to every
program of international aid, investment, or credit
provision.
5. Corruption is a symptom of systemic institutional
failure. Corruption guarantees efficiency and
favourable outcomes. The strengthening of
institutions is of critical importance. The police,
the customs, the courts, the government, its
agencies, the tax authorities, the state owned
media - all must be subjected to a massive
overhaul. Such a process may require foreign
management and supervision for a limited period
of time. It most probably would entail the
replacement of most of the current - irredeemably
corrupt - personnel. It would need to be open to
public scrutiny.
6. Corruption is a symptom of an all-pervasive sense
of helplessness. The citizen (or investor, or firm)
feels dwarfed by the overwhelming and capricious
powers of the state. It is through corruption and
venality that the balance is restored. To minimize
this imbalance, potential participants in corrupt
dealings must be made to feel that they are real
and effective stakeholders in their societies. A
process of public debate coupled with
transparency and the establishment of just
distributive mechanisms will go a long way
towards rendering corruption obsolete.



VI. The Kleptocracies of the East


The process of transition from communism to capitalism
was largely hijacked either by outright criminals in
budding outfits of organized crime - or by pernicious and
all-pervasive kleptocracies: politicians and political
parties bent on looting the state and suppressing the
opposition, sometimes fatally.

In the past 16 years, industrial production in the
economies in transition tumbled in real terms by more
than 60 percent. The monthly salary in the poorer bits
equals the daily wage of a skilled German industrial
worker, or one seventh the European Union's average.

Gross domestic product per capita is less than one third
the EU's. Infrastructure, internal and export markets, state
institutions - all crumbled with dizzying speed.

In some countries - not the least Russia - privatization
amounted to a mass transfer of assets to cronies and
insiders, often well-connected members of the communist
nomenclature: managers, members of the security services
and other penumbral figures. Laws were passed and
institutions tweaked to reflect the special interests of these
groupings.
"Classical" forms of crime flourished throughout the
benighted region. Prostitution, gambling, drugs,
smuggling, kidnapping, organ trafficking and other
varieties of delinquency yielded to their perpetrators
billions of dollars annually. In the impoverished
economies of the east, these fantastic revenues - laundered
through off shore accounts - were leveraged by criminals
to garner political favors, to buy into legitimate businesses
and to infiltrate civil society.

None of this is new to Western publics. Rogues and
"robber barons" have always doubled as entrepreneurs.

The oil, gaming and railways industries in America, for
instance, owe their existence to dubious personas and
questionable practices. Well into the 17th century, the
British sovereign maintained a monopoly on chartering
businesses and awarded the coveted licenses to loyal
servants and obsequious sycophants.

Still, the ubiquity of crime in east Europe and its reach are
unprecedented in European annals. In the void-like
interregnum between centrally planned and free market
economies only criminals, politicians, managers, and
employees of the security services were positioned to
benefit from the upheaval.

At the outset of transition, the underworld constituted an
embryonic private sector, replete with international
networks of contacts, cross-border experience, capital
agglomeration and wealth formation, sources of venture
(risk) capital, an entrepreneurial spirit, and a diversified
portfolio of investments and revenue generating assets.

Criminals were used to private sector practices: price
signals, competition, joint venturing, and third party
dispute settlement.

Crime - alone among all economic activities in communist
societies - obeyed the laws of the free market. Criminals
had to be entrepreneurial and profitable to survive. Their
instincts sharpened by - often lethal - competition, they
were never corrupted by central planning.

Deprived of access to state largesse, criminals invested
their own capital in efficiently-run small to medium size
enterprises. Attuned to the needs and wishes of their
customers, criminals engaged in primitive forms of
market research, through neighborhood and grassroots
"pollsters" and "activists". They responded with agility
and in real time to changes in the patterns of supply and
demand by altering their product mix and their pricing.

They have always been pioneers of bleeding-edge
technologies.

Criminals are effective organizers and managers. They
excel at enforcing workplace discipline with irresistible
incentives and irreversible disincentives, at setting targets
and at networking. The superior felonious echelons are
upwardly mobile and have a clear career path. Every
management fad - from territorially exclusive franchises
to  "stock" options - has been invented by criminals long
before they triumphed in the boardroom.

In east Europe, criminals on all levels, from the organized
to the petty, often substituted for the dysfunctional, or
ideologically hidebound organs of the state. Consider the
dispensation of justice. The criminal code of conduct and
court system replaced the compromised and lethargic
official judiciary. Debt collectors and enforcers stood in
for venal and incompetent police forces.

Crime is a growth industry and sustains hordes of
professionals: accountants and lawyers, forgers and cross
border guides, weapons experts and bankers, mechanics
and hit-men. Expertise, know-how and acumen, amassed
over centuries of practice, are taught in the criminal
universities known as penitentiaries: roads less traveled,
countries more lenient, passports to be bought, sold, or
forged, how-to manuals, goods and services on offer and
demand.

Profit margins in crime are outlandish and lead to feverish
wealth accumulation. The banking system is used both to
stash the proceeds and to launder them. Tax havens, off
shore financial institutions and money couriers - all form
part of a global web. Thus cleansed and rendered
untraceable, the money is invested in legitimate activities.

In some countries - especially on the drug path, or on the
trail of white slavery - crime is a major engine of
economic growth.

As opposed to the visible sectors of the east's demonetized
economies, criminal enterprises never run out of liquidity
and thus are always keen to invest. Moreover, crime is
international and cosmopolitan. It is accustomed to
sophisticated export-import transactions.

Many criminals - as opposed to the vast majority of their
countrymen - are polyglottal, well-traveled, aware of
world prices, the international financial system and
demand and supply in various markets. They are
experienced negotiators. In short: criminals are well-
heeled international businessmen, well-connected both
abroad and with the various indigenous elites.

The Wild East in Europe is often compared to the Wild
West in America a century or so ago. The Russian
oligarchs, goes the soothing analogy, are local versions of
Morgan, Rockefeller, Pullman and Vanderbilt. But this
affinity is spurious. the United States always had a civic
culture with civic values and an aspiration to, ultimately,
create a harmonious and benevolent civic society.

Criminality was regarded as a shameful stepping stone on
the way to an orderly community of learned, civilized,
law-abiding citizens.

This cannot be said about Russia, for instance. The
criminal there is, if anything, admired and emulated. Even
the language of legal business in countries in transition is
suffused with underworld parlance. There is no - and
never was - a civic tradition in the countries of eastern
Europe, a Bill of Rights, a veritable Constitution, a
modicum of self rule, a true abolition of classes and
nomenclatures. These territories are accustomed to being
governed by paranoiac and murderous tyrants akin to the
current crop of delinquents. That some criminals are
members of the new political, financial and industrial
elites (and vice versa) - tends to support this long-rooted
association.

In all the countries of the region, politicians and managers
abuse the state and its simulacrum institutions in close
symbiosis with felons. Patronage and sinecures extend to
collaborating lawbreakers. Veritable villains gain access
to state owned assets and resources in a cycle of money
laundering.  Law enforcement agencies and the courts are
"encouraged" to turn a blind eye, or even to help criminals
eliminate internal and external competition in their turf.

Criminals, in return, serve as the "long and anonymous
arm" of politicians, obtaining for them illicit goods, or
providing "black" services. Corruption often flows
through criminal channels or via the mediation and
conduit of delinquents. Within the shared sphere of the
informal economy, assets are shifted among these
economic players. Both players oppose attempts at reform
and transparency and encourage - even engender -
nationalism and racism, paranoias and grievances to
recruit foot soldiers.

Fortunately, there is the irrepressible urge to become
legitimate. Politicians, who grope for a new ideological
cover for their opportunism, partner with legitimacy-
seeking, established crime lords. Both groups benefit from
a swelling economic pie. They fight against other, less
successful, criminals, who wish to persist in their old
ways and, thus, hamper economic growth. The battle is
never won but at least it succeeds to firmly drive crime
where it belongs: underground.



VII. FIMACO - Russia's Missing Billions


Russia's Audit Chamber - with the help of the Swiss
authorities and their host of dedicated investigators - may
be about to solve a long standing mystery. An
announcement by the Prosecutor's General Office is said
to be imminent. The highest echelons of the Yeltsin
entourage - perhaps even Yeltsin himself - may be
implicated - or exonerated. A Russian team has been
spending the better part of the last two months poring over
documents and interviewing witnesses in Switzerland,
France, Italy, and other European countries.

About $4.8 billion of IMF funds are alleged to have gone
amiss during the implosion of the Russian financial
markets in August 1998. They were supposed to prop up
the banking system (especially SBS-Agro) and the ailing
and sharply devalued ruble. Instead, they ended up in the
bank accounts of obscure corporations - and, then,
incredibly, vanished into thin air.

The person in charge of the funds in 1998 was none other
than Mikhail Kasyanov, Russia's current Prime Minister -
at the time, Deputy Minister of Finance for External Debt.

His signature on all foreign exchange transactions - even
those handled by the central bank - was mandatory. In
July 2000, he was flatly accused by the Italian daily, La
Reppublica, of authorizing the diversion of the disputed
funds.

Following public charges made by US Treasury Secretary
Robert Rubin as early as March 1999, both Russian and
American media delved deeply over the years into the
affair. Communist Duma Deputy Viktor Ilyukhin jumped
on the bandwagon citing an obscure "trustworthy foreign
source" to substantiate his indictment of Kremlin cronies
and oligarchs contained in an open letter to the Prosecutor
General, Yuri Skuratov.

The money trail from the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York to Swiss and German subsidiaries of the Russian
central Bank was comprehensively reconstructed. Still,
the former Chairman of the central bank, Sergei Dubinin,
called Ilyukhin's allegations and the ensuing Swiss
investigations - "a black PR campaign ... a lie".

Others pointed to an outlandish coincidence: the ruble
collapsed twice in Russia's post-Communist annals. Once,
in 1994, when Dubinin was Minister of Finance and was
forced to resign. The second time was in 1998, when
Dubinin was governor of the central bank and was, again,
ousted.

Dubinin himself seems to be unable to make up his mind.

In one interview he says that IMF funds were used to prop
up the ruble - in others, that they went into "the national
pot" (i.e., the Ministry of Finance, to cover a budgetary
shortfall).

The Chairman of the Federation Council at the time,
Yegor Stroev, appointed an investigative committee in
1999. Its report remains classified but Stroev confirmed
that IMF funds were embezzled in the wake of the 1998
forced devaluation of the ruble.

This conclusion was weakly disowned by Eleonora
Mitrofanova, an auditor within the Duma's Audit
Chamber who said that they discovered nothing "strictly
illegal" - though, incongruously, she accused the central
bank of suppressing the Chamber's damning report. The
Chairman of the Chamber of Accounts, Khachim
Karmokov, quoted by PwC, said that "the audits
performed by the Chamber revealed no serious procedural
breaches in the bank's performance".

But Nikolai Gonchar, a Duma Deputy and member of its
Budget Committee, came close to branding both as liars
when he said that he read a copy of the Audit Chamber
report and that it found that central bank funds were
siphoned off to commercial accounts in foreign banks.

The Moscow Times cited a second Audit Chamber report
which revealed that the central bank was simultaneously
selling dollars for rubles and extending ruble loans to a
few well-connected commercial banks, thus subsidizing
their dollar purchases. The central bank went as far as
printing rubles to fuel this lucrative arbitrage. The dollars
came from IMF disbursements.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, based on its own
sources and an article in the Russian weekly "Novaya
Gazeta", claims that half the money was almost instantly
diverted to shell companies in Sydney and London. The
other half was mostly transferred to the Bank of New
York and to Credit Suisse.

Why were additional IMF funds transferred to a chaotic
Russia, despite warnings by many and a testimony by a
Russian official that previous tranches were squandered?
Moreover, why was the money sent to the Central Bank,
then embroiled in a growing scandal over the
manipulation of treasury bills, known as GKO's and other
debt instruments, the OFZ's - and not to the Ministry of
Finance, the beneficiary of all prior transfers? The central
bank did act as MinFin's agent - but circumstances were
unusual, to say the least.

There isn't enough to connect the IMF funds with the
money laundering affair that engulfed the Bank of New
York a year later to the day, in August 1999 - though
several of the personalities straddled the divide between
the bank and its clients. Swiss efforts to establish a firm
linkage failed as did their attempt to implicate several
banks in the Italian canton of Ticino. The Swiss - in
collaboration with half a dozen national investigation
bureaus, including the FBI - were more successful in Italy
proper, where they were able to apprehend a few dozen
suspects in an elaborate undercover operation.

FIMACO's name emerged rather early in the swirl of
rumors and denials. At the IMF's behest,
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) was commissioned by
Russia's central bank to investigate the relationship
between the Russian central bank and its Channel Islands
offshoot, Financial Management Company Limited,
immediately when the accusations surfaced.

Skuratov unearthed $50 billion in transfers of the nation's
hard currency reserves from the central bank to FIMACO,
which was majority-owned by Eurobank, the central
bank's Paris-based daughter company. According to PwC,
Eurobank was 23 percent owned by "Russian companies
and private individuals".

Dubinin and his successor, Gerashchenko, admit that
FIMACO was used to conceal Russia's assets from its
unrelenting creditors, notably the Geneva-based Mr.

Nessim Gaon, whose companies sued Russia for $600
million. Gaon succeeded to freeze Russian accounts in
Switzerland and Luxemburg in 1993. PwC alerted the
IMF to this pernicious practice, but to no avail.

Moreover, FIMACO paid exorbitant management fees to
self-liquidating entities, used funds to fuel the speculative
GKO market, disbursed non-reported profits from its
activities, through "trust companies", to Russian subjects,
such as schools, hospitals, and charities - and, in general,
transformed itself into a mammoth slush fund and source
of patronage. Russia admitted to lying to the IMF in 1996.

It misstated its reserves by $1 billion.

Some of the money probably financed the fantastic
salaries of Dubinin and his senior functionaries. He earned
$240,000 in 1997 - when the average annual salary in
Russia was less than $2000 and when Alan Greenspan,
Chairman of the Federal Reserve of the USA, earned
barely half as much.

Former Minister of Finance, Boris Fedorov, asked the
governor of the central bank and the prime minister in
1993 to disclose how were the country's foreign exchange
reserves being invested. He was told to mind his own
business. To Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty he said, six
years later, that various central bank schemes were set up
to "allow friends to earn handsome profits ... They
allowed friends to make profits because when companies
are created without any risk, and billions of dollars are
transferred, somebody takes a (quite big) commission ... a
minimum of tens of millions of dollars. The question is:
Who received these commissions? Was this money
repatriated to the country in the form of dividends?"
Dubinin's vehement denials of FIMACO's involvement in
the GKO market are disingenuous. Close to half of all
foreign investment in the money-spinning market for
Russian domestic bonds were placed through FIMACO's
nominal parent company, Eurobank and, possibly, through
its subsidiary, co-owned with FIMACO, Eurofinance
Bank.

Nor is Dubinin more credible when he denies that profits
and commissions were accrued in FIMACO and then
drained off. FIMACO's investment management
agreement with Eurobank, signed in 1993, entitled it to
0.06 percent of the managed funds per quarter.

Even accepting the central banker's ludicrous insistence
that the balance never exceeded $1.4 billion - FIMACO
would have earned $3.5 million per annum from
management fees alone - investment profits and brokerage
fees notwithstanding. Even Eurobank's president at the
time, Andrei Movchan, conceded that FIMACO earned
$1.7 million in management fees.

The IMF insisted that the PwC reports exonerated all the
participants. It is, therefore, surprising and alarming to
find that the online copies of these documents, previously
made available on the IMF's Web site, were "Removed
September 30, 1999 at the request of
PricewaterhouseCoopers".

The cover of the main report carried a disclaimer that it
was based on procedures dictated by the central bank and
"...consequently, we (PwC) make no representation
regarding the sufficiency of the procedures described
below ... The report is based solely on financial and other
information provided by, and discussions with, the
persons set out in the report. The accuracy and
completeness of the information on which the report is
based is the sole responsibility of those persons. ...

PricewaterhouseCoopers have not carried out any
verification work which may be construed to represent
audit procedures ... We have not been provided access to
Ost West Handelsbank (the recipient of a large part of the
$4.8 IMF tranche)".

The scandal may have hastened the untimely departure of
the IMF's Managing Director at the time, Michel
Camdessus, though this was never officially
acknowledged. The US Congress was reluctant to
augment the Fund's resources in view of its controversial
handling of the Asian and Russian crises and contagion.

This reluctance persisted well into the new millennium. A
congressional delegation, headed by James Leach (R,
Iowa), Chairman of the Banking and Financial Services
Committee, visited Russia in April 2000, accompanied by
the FBI, to investigate the persistent contentions about the
misappropriation of IMF funds.

Camdessus himself went out of his way to defend his
record and reacted in an unprecedented manner to the
allegations. In a letter to Le Mond, dated August 18, 1999
- and still posted on the IMF's Web site, three years later -
he wrote, inadvertently admitting to serious
mismanagement:
"I wish to express my indignation at the false statements,
allegations, and insinuations contained in the articles and
editorial commentary appearing in Le Monde on August
6, 8, and 9 on the content of the PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PWC) audit report relating to the operations of the
Central Bank of Russia and its subsidiary, FIMACO.

Your readers will be shocked to learn that the report in
question, requested and made public at the initiative of the
IMF ... (concludes that) no misuse of funds has been
proven, and the report does not criticize the IMF's
behavior ... I would also point out that your representation
of the IMF's knowledge and actions is misleading. We did
know that part of the reserves of the Central Bank of
Russia was held in foreign subsidiaries, which is not an
illegal practice; however, we did not learn of FIMACO's
activities until this year--because the audit reports for
1993 and 1994 were not provided to us by the Central
Bank of Russia.

The IMF, when apprised of the possible range of
FIMACO activities, informed the Russian authorities that
it would not resume lending to Russia until a report on
these activities was available for review by the IMF and
corrective actions had been agreed as needed ... I would
add that what the IMF objected to in FIMACO's
operations extends well beyond the misrepresentation of
Russia's international reserves in mid-1996 and includes
several other instances where transactions through it had
resulted in a misleading representation of the reserves and
of monetary and exchange policies. These include loans to
Russian commercial banks and investments in the GKO
market".

No one accepted - or accepts - the IMF's convoluted post-
facto "clarifications" at face value. Nor was Dubinin's
tortured sophistry - IMF funds cease to be IMF funds
when they are transferred from the Ministry of Finance to
the central bank - countenanced.

Even the compromised office of the Russian Prosecutor-
General urged Russian officials, as late as July 2000, to
re-open the investigation regarding the diversion of the
funds. The IMF dismissed this sudden burst of rectitude as
the rehashing of old stories. But Western officials -
interviews by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty - begged
to differ.

Yuri Skuratov, the former Prosecutor-General, ousted for
undue diligence, wrote in a book he published two years
ago, that only c. $500 million of the $4.8 were ever used
to stabilize the ruble. Even George Bush Jr., when still a
presidential candidate accused Russia's former Prime
Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin of complicity in
embezzling IMF funds. Chernomyrdin threatened to sue.

The rot may run even deeper. The Geneva daily "Le
Temps", which has been following the affair relentlessly,
accused, two years ago, Roman Abramovich, a Yeltsin-
era oligarch and a member of the board of directors of
Sibneft, of colluding with Runicom, Sibneft's trading arm,
to misappropriate IMF funds. Swiss prosecutors raided
Runicom's offices just one day after Russian Tax Police
raided Sibneft's Moscow headquarters.

Absconding with IMF funds seemed to have been a
pattern of behavior during Yeltsin's venal regime. The
columnist Bradley Cook recounts how Aldrich Ames, the
mole within the CIA, "was told by his Russian control
officer during their last meeting, in November 1993, that
the $130,000 in fresh $100 bills that he was being bribed
with had come directly from IMF loans." Venyamin
Sokolov, who headed the Audit Chamber prior to Sergei
Stepashin, informed the US Senate of $2 billion that
evaporated from the coffers of the central bank in 1995.

Even the IMF reluctantly admits:
"Capital transferred abroad from Russia may represent
such legal activities as exports, or illegal sources. But it is
impossible to determine whether specific capital flows
from Russia-legal or illegal-come from a particular
inflow, such as IMF loans or export earnings. To put the
scale of IMF lending to Russia into perspective, Russia's
exports of goods and services averaged about $80 billion a
year in recent years, which is over 25 times the average
annual disbursement from the IMF since 1992".

DISCLAIMER
Sam Vaknin served in various senior capacities in Mr.

Gaon's firms and advises governments in their
negotiations with the IMF.



VIII. The Enrons of the East


Hermitage Capital Management, an international
investment firm owned by HSBC London, is suing PwC
(PricewaterhouseCoopers), the biggest among the big four
accounting firms (Andersen, the fifth, is being
cannibalized by its competitors).

Hermitage also demands to have PwC's license suspended
in Russia. All this fuss over allegedly shoddy audits of
Gazprom, the Russian energy behemoth with over $20
billion in annual sales and the world's largest reserves of
natural gas. Hermitage runs a $600 million Russia fund
which is invested in the shares of the allegedly misaudited
giant.

The accusations are serious. According to infuriated
Hermitage, PwC falsified and distorted the 2000-1 audits
by misrepresenting the sale of Gazprom's subsidiary,
Purgaz, to Itera, a conveniently obscure entity. Other loss
spinning transactions were also creatively tackled.

Stoitransgaz - partly owned by former Gazprom managers
and their relatives - landed more than $1 billion in
lucrative Gazprom contracts.

These shenanigans resulted in billions of dollars of losses
and a depressed share price. AFP quotes William
Browder, Hermitage's disgruntled CEO, as saying: "This
is Russia's Enron". PwC threatened to counter-sue
Hermitage over its "completely unfounded" allegations.

But Browder's charges are supported by Boris Fyodorov,
a former Russian minister of finance and a current
Gazprom independent director. Fyodorov manages his
own investment boutique, United Financial Group.

Browder is a former Solomon Brothers investment
banker. Other investment banks and brokerage firms -
foreign and Russian - are supportive of his allegations.

They won't and can't be fobbed.

Fyodorov speculates that PwC turned a blind eye to many
of Gazprom's shadier deals in order to keep the account.

Gazprom shareholders will decide in June whether to
retain it as an auditor or not. Browder is initiating a class
action lawsuit in New York of Gazprom ADR holders
against PwC.

Even Russia's president concurs. A year ago, he muttered
ominously about "enormous amounts of misspent money
(in Gazprom)". He replaced Rem Vyakhirev, the oligarch
that ran Gazprom, with his own protégé. Russia owns 38
percent of the company.

Gazprom is just the latest in an inordinately long stream
of companies with dubious methods. Avto VAZ bled itself
white - under PwC's nose - shipping cars to dealers,
without guarantees or advance payments. The penumbral
dealers then vanished without a trace. Avto VAZ wrote
off more than $1 billion in "uncollected bills" by late
1995. PwC did make a mild comment in the 1997 audit.

But the first real warning appeared only three years later
in the audit for the year 2000.

Andrei Sharonov, deputy minister in the federal Ministry
of Economics said, in an interview he granted "Business
Week" last February: "Auditors have been working on
behalf of management rather than shareholders." In a
series of outlandish ads, published in Russian business
dailies in late February, senior partners in the PwC
Moscow office made this incredible statement: "(Audit)
does not represent a review of each transaction, or a
qualitative assessment of a company's performance".

The New York Times quotes a former employee of
Ernst&Young in Moscow as saying: "A big client is god.

You do what they want and tell you to do. You can play
straight-laced and try to be upright and protect your
reputation with minor clients, but you can't do it with the
big guys. If you lose that account, no matter how justified
you are, that's the end of a career".

PwC should know. When it mentioned suspicious heavily
discounted sales of oil to Rosneft in a 1998 audit report,
its client, Purneftegaz, replaced it with Arthur Andersen.

The dubious deals dutifully vanished from the audit
reports, though they continue apace. Andersen claims
such transactions do not require disclosure under Russian
law.

How times change! Throughout the 1990's, Russia and its
nascent private sector were subjected to self-righteous
harangues from visiting Big Five accountants. The
hectoring targeted the lack of good governance among
Russia's corporations and public administration alike.

Hordes of pampered speakers and consultants espoused
transparent accounting, minority shareholders' rights,
management accessibility and accountability and other
noble goals.

That was before Enron. The tables have turned. The Big
Five - from disintegrating Andersen to KPMG - are being
chastised and fined for negligent practices, flagrant
conflicts of interests, misrepresentation, questionable
ethics and worse. Their worldwide clout, moral authority,
and professional standing have been considerably dented.

America's GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting
Practices) - once considered the undisputable benchmark
of rectitude and disclosure - are now thought in need of
urgent revision. The American issuer of accounting
standards - FASB (Financial Accounting Standards
Board) - is widely perceived to be an incestuous
arrangement between the clubby members of a rapacious
and unscrupulous profession. Many American scholars
even suggest to adopt the hitherto much-derided
alternative - the International Accounting Standards (IAS)
recently implemented through much of central and eastern
Europe.

Russia's Federal Commission for the Securities Market
(FCSM) convened a conclave of Western and domestic
auditing firms. The theme was how to spot and neutralize
bad auditors. With barely concealed and gleeful
schadenfreude, the Russians said that the Enron scandal
undermined their confidence in Western accountants and
the GAAP.

The Institute of Corporate Law and Corporate Governance
(ICLG), having studied the statements of a few major
Russian firms, concluded that there are indications of
financial problems, "not mentioned by (mostly Western)
auditors". They may have a point. Most of the banks that
collapsed ignominiously in 1998 received glowing audits
signed by Western auditors, often one of the Big Five.

The Russian Investor Protection Association (IPA) and
Institute of Professional Auditors (IPAR) embarked on a
survey of Russian investors, enterprises, auditors, and
state officials - and what they think about the quality of
the audit services they are getting.

Many Russian managers - as avaricious and venal as ever
- now can justify hiring malleable and puny local auditors
instead of big international or domestic ones.

Surgutneftegaz - with $2 billion net profit last year and
on-going dispute with its shareholders about dividends -
wants to sack "Rosexperitza", a respectable Russian
accountancy, and hire "Aval", a little known accounting
outfit. Aval does not even make it to the list of 200 largest
accounting firms in Russia, according to Renaissance
Capital, an investment bank.

Other Russian managers are genuinely alarmed by the
vertiginous decline in the reputation of the global
accounting firms and by the inherent conflict of interest
between consulting and audit jobs performed by the same
entity. Sviazinvest, a holding and telecom company, hired
Accenture on top of - some say instead of - Andersen
Consulting.

A decade of achievements in fostering transparency,
better corporate governance, and more realistic accounting
in central and eastern Europe - may well evaporate in the
wake of Enron and other scandals. The forces of reaction
and corruption in these nether lands - greedy managers,
venal bureaucrats, and anti-reformists - all seized the
opportunity to reverse what was hitherto considered an
irreversible trend towards Western standards. This, in
turn, is likely to deter investors and retard the progress
towards a more efficient market economy.

The Big Six accounting firms were among the first to
establish a presence in Russia. Together with major league
consultancies, such as Baker-McKinsey, they coached
Russian entrepreneurs and managers in the ways of the
West. They introduced investors to Russia when it was
still considered a frontier land. They promoted Russian
enterprises abroad and nursed the first, precarious, joint
ventures between paranoid Russians and disdainful
Westerners.

Companies like Ernst&Young are at the forefront of the
fight to include independent directors in the boards of
Russian firms, invariably stuffed with relatives and
cronies. Together with IPA, Ernst&Young recently
established the National Association of Independent
Directors (NAID). It is intended to "assist Russian
companies to increase their efficiency through
introduction of best independent directors' practices".

But even these - often missionary - pioneers were blinded
by the spoils of a "free for all", "winner takes all", and
"might is right" environment. They geared the accounts of
their clients - by minimizing their profits - towards tax
avoidance and the abolition of dividends. Quoting
unnamed former employees of the audit firms, "The New
York Times" described how "... the auditors often chose
to play by Russian rules, and in doing so sacrificed the
transparency that investors were counting on them to
ensure".



IX. The Typology of Financial Scandals


I. Overview
The recent implosion of the global equity markets - from
Hong Kong to New York - engendered yet another round
of the semipternal debate: should central banks
contemplate abrupt adjustments in the prices of assets -
such as stocks or real estate - as they do changes in the
consumer price indices? Are asset bubbles indeed
inflationary and their bursting deflationary?
Central bankers counter that it is hard to tell a bubble until
it bursts and that market intervention bring about that
which it is intended to prevent. There is insufficient
historical data, they reprimand errant scholars who insist
otherwise. This is disingenuous. Ponzi and pyramid
schemes have been a fixture of Western civilization at
least since the middle Renaissance.

Assets tend to accumulate in "asset stocks". Residences
built in the 19th century still serve their purpose today.

The quantity of new assets created at any given period is,
inevitably, negligible compared to the stock of the same
class of assets accumulated over decades and, sometimes,
centuries. This is why the prices of assets are not anchored
- they are only loosely connected to their production costs
or even to their replacement value.

Asset bubbles are not the exclusive domain of stock
exchanges and shares. "Real" assets include land and the
property built on it, machinery, and other tangibles.
"Financial" assets include anything that stores value and
can serve as means of exchange - from cash to securities.

Even tulip bulbs will do.

In 1634, in what later came to be known as "tulipmania",
tulip bulbs were traded in a special marketplace in
Amsterdam, the scene of a rabid speculative frenzy. Some
rare black tulip bulbs changed hands for the price of a big
mansion house. For four feverish years it seemed like the
craze would last forever. But the bubble burst in 1637. In
a matter of a few days, the price of tulip bulbs was slashed
by 96%!
Uniquely, tulipmania was not an organized scam with an
identifiable group of movers and shakers, which
controlled and directed it. Nor has anyone made explicit
promises to investors regarding guaranteed future profits.

The hysteria was evenly distributed and fed on itself.

Subsequent investment fiddles were different, though.

Modern dodges entangle a large number of victims. Their
size and all-pervasiveness sometimes threaten the national
economy and the very fabric of society and incur grave
political and social costs.

There are two types of bubbles.

Asset bubbles of the first type are run or fanned by
financial intermediaries such as banks or brokerage
houses. They consist of "pumping" the price of an asset or
an asset class.

The assets concerned can be shares, currencies, other
securities and financial instruments - or even savings
accounts. To promise unearthly yields on one's savings is
to artificially inflate the "price", or the "value" of one's
savings account.

More than one fifth of the population of 1983 Israel were
involved in a banking scandal of Albanian proportions. It
was a classic pyramid scheme. All the banks, bar one,
promised to gullible investors ever increasing returns on
the banks' own publicly-traded shares.

These explicit and incredible promises were included in
prospectuses of the banks' public offerings and won the
implicit acquiescence and collaboration of successive
Israeli governments. The banks used deposits, their
capital, retained earnings and funds illegally borrowed
through shady offshore subsidiaries to try to keep their
impossible and unhealthy promises. Everyone knew what
was going on and everyone was involved. It lasted 7
years. The prices of some shares increased by 1-2 percent
daily.

On October 6, 1983, the entire banking sector of Israel
crumbled. Faced with ominously mounting civil unrest,
the government was forced to compensate shareholders. It
offered them an elaborate share buyback plan over 9
years. The cost of this plan was pegged at  $6 billion -
almost 15 percent of Israel's annual GDP. The indirect
damage remains unknown.

Avaricious and susceptible investors are lured into
investment swindles by the promise of impossibly high
profits or interest payments.

The organizers use the money entrusted to them by new
investors to pay off the old ones and thus establish a
credible reputation. Charles Ponzi perpetrated many such
schemes in 1919-1925 in Boston and later the Florida real
estate market in the USA. Hence a "Ponzi scheme".

In Macedonia, a savings bank named TAT collapsed in
1997, erasing the economy of an entire major city, Bitola.

After much wrangling and recriminations - many
politicians seem to have benefited from the scam - the
government, faced with elections in September, has
recently decided, in defiance of IMF diktats, to offer
meager compensation to the afflicted savers. TAT was
only one of a few similar cases. Similar scandals took
place in Russia and Bulgaria in the 1990's .

One third of the impoverished population of Albania was
cast into destitution by the collapse of a series of nation-
wide leveraged investment plans in 1997. Inept political
and financial crisis management led Albania to the verge
of disintegration and a civil war. Rioters invaded police
stations and army barracks and expropriated hundreds of
thousands of weapons.

Islam forbids its adherents to charge interest on money
lent - as does Judaism. To circumvent this onerous decree,
entrepreneurs and religious figures in Egypt and in
Pakistan established "Islamic banks". These institutions
pay no interest on deposits, nor do they demand interest
from borrowers.  Instead, depositors are made partners in
the banks' - largely fictitious - profits. Clients are charged
for - no less fictitious - losses. A few Islamic banks were
in the habit of offering vertiginously high "profits". They
went the way of other, less pious, pyramid schemes.

They melted down and dragged economies and political
establishments with them.

By definition, pyramid schemes are doomed to failure.

The number of new "investors" - and the new money they
make available to the pyramid's organizers - is limited.

When the funds run out and the old investors can no
longer be paid, panic ensues. In a classic "run on the
bank", everyone attempts to draw his money
simultaneously. Even healthy banks - a distant relative of
pyramid schemes - cannot cope with such stampedes.

Some of the money is invested long-term, or lent. Few
financial institutions keep more than 10 percent of their
deposits in liquid on-call reserves.

Studies repeatedly demonstrated that investors in pyramid
schemes realize their dubious nature and stand forewarned
by the collapse of other contemporaneous scams. But they
are swayed by recurrent promises that they could draw
their money at will ("liquidity") and, in the meantime,
receive alluring returns on it ("capital gains", "interest
payments", "profits").

People know that they are likelier to lose all or part of
their money as time passes. But they convince themselves
that they can outwit the organizers of the pyramid, that
their withdrawals of profits or interest payments prior to
the inevitable collapse will more than amply compensate
them for the loss of their money. Many believe that they
will succeed to accurately time the extraction of their
original investment based on - mostly useless and
superstitious - "warning signs".


While the speculative rash lasts, a host of pundits,
analysts, and scholars aim to justify it. The "new
economy" is exempt from "old rules and archaic modes of
thinking". Productivity has surged and established a
steeper, but sustainable, trend line. Information
technology is as revolutionary as electricity. No, more
than electricity. Stock valuations are reasonable. The Dow
is on its way to 33,000. People want to believe these
"objective, disinterested analyses" from "experts".

Investments by households are only one of the engines of
this first kind of asset bubbles. A lot of the money that
pours into pyramid schemes and stock exchange booms is
laundered, the fruits of illicit pursuits. The laundering of
tax-evaded money or the proceeds of criminal activities,
mainly drugs, is effected through regular banking
channels. The money changes ownership a few times to
obscure its trail and the identities of the true owners.

Many offshore banks manage shady investment ploys.

They maintain two sets of books. The "public" or
"cooked" set is made available to the authorities - the tax
administration, bank supervision, deposit insurance, law
enforcement agencies, and securities and exchange
commission. The true record is kept in the second,
inaccessible, set of files.

This second set of accounts reflects reality: who deposited
how much, when and subject to which conditions - and
who borrowed what, when and subject to what terms.

These arrangements are so stealthy and convoluted that
sometimes even the shareholders of the bank lose track of
its activities and misapprehend its real situation.

Unscrupulous management and staff sometimes take
advantage of the situation. Embezzlement, abuse of
authority, mysterious trades, misuse of funds are more
widespread than acknowledged.

The thunderous disintegration of the Bank for Credit and
Commerce International (BCCI) in London in 1991
revealed that, for the better part of a decade, the
executives and employees of this penumbral institution
were busy stealing and misappropriating $10 billion. The
Bank of England's supervision department failed to spot
the rot on time. Depositors were - partially - compensated
by the main shareholder of the bank, an Arab sheikh. The
story repeated itself with Nick Leeson and his
unauthorized disastrous trades which brought down the
venerable and veteran Barings Bank in 1995.

The combination of black money, shoddy financial
controls, shady bank accounts and shredded documents
renders a true account of the cash flows and damages in
such cases all but impossible. There is no telling what
were the contributions of drug barons, American off-shore
corporations, or European and Japanese tax-evaders -
channeled precisely through such institutions - to the
stratospheric rise in Wall-Street in the last few years.

But there is another - potentially the most pernicious -
type of asset bubble. When financial institutions lend to
the unworthy but the politically well-connected, to
cronies, and family members of influential politicians -
they often end up fostering a bubble. South Korean
chaebols, Japanese keiretsu, as well as American
conglomerates frequently used these cheap funds to prop
up their stock or to invest in real estate, driving prices up
in both markets artificially.

Moreover, despite decades of bitter experiences - from
Mexico in 1982 to Asia in 1997 and Russia in 1998 -
financial institutions still bow to fads and fashions. They
act herd-like in conformity with "lending trends". They
shift assets to garner the highest yields in the shortest
possible period of time. In this respect, they are not very
different from investors in pyramid investment schemes.

II. Case Study - The Savings and Loans Associations
Bailout
Also published by United Press International (UPI)
Asset bubbles - in the stock exchange, in the real estate or
the commodity markets - invariably burst and often lead
to banking crises. One such calamity struck the USA in
1986-1989. It is instructive to study the decisive reaction
of the administration and Congress alike. They tackled
both the ensuing liquidity crunch and the structural flaws
exposed by the crisis with tenacity and skill. Compare this
to the lackluster and hesitant tentativeness of the current
lot. True, the crisis - the result of a speculative bubble -
concerned the banking and real estate markets rather than
the capital markets. But the similarities are there.

The savings and loans association, or the thrift, was a
strange banking hybrid, very much akin to the building
society in Britain. It was allowed to take in deposits but
was really merely a mortgage bank. The Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980 forced S&L's to achieve interest parity with
commercial banks, thus eliminating the interest ceiling on
deposits which they enjoyed hitherto.

But it still allowed them only very limited entry into
commercial and consumer lending and trust services.

Thus, these institutions were heavily exposed to the
vicissitudes of the residential real estate markets in their
respective regions. Every normal cyclical slump in
property values or regional economic shock - e.g., a
plunge in commodity prices - affected them
disproportionately.

Interest rate volatility created a mismatch between the
assets of these associations and their liabilities. The
negative spread between their cost of funds and the yield
of their assets - eroded their operating margins. The 1982
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act encouraged
thrifts to convert from mutual - i.e., depositor-owned -
associations to stock companies, allowing them to tap the
capital markets in order to enhance their faltering net
worth.

But this was too little and too late. The S&L's were
rendered unable to further support the price of real estate
by rolling over old credits, refinancing residential equity,
and underwriting development projects. Endemic
corruption and mismanagement exacerbated the ruin. The
bubble burst.

Hundreds of thousands of depositors scrambled to
withdraw their funds and hundreds of savings and loans
association (out of a total of more than 3,000) became
insolvent instantly, unable to pay their depositors. They
were besieged by angry - at times, violent - clients who
lost their life savings.


The illiquidity spread like fire. As institutions closed their
gates, one by one, they left in their wake major financial
upheavals, wrecked businesses and homeowners, and
devastated communities. At one point, the contagion
threatened the stability of the entire banking system.

The Federal Savings and Loans Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC) - which insured the deposits in the savings and
loans associations - was no longer able to meet the claims
and, effectively, went bankrupt. Though the obligations of
the FSLIC were never guaranteed by the Treasury, it was
widely perceived to be an arm of the federal government.

The public was shocked. The crisis acquired a political
dimension.

A hasty $300 billion bailout package was arranged to
inject liquidity into the shriveling system through a
special agency, the FHFB. The supervision of the banks
was subtracted from the Federal Reserve. The role of the
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was
greatly expanded.

Prior to 1989, savings and loans were insured by the now-
defunct FSLIC. The FDIC insured only banks. Congress
had to eliminate FSLIC and place the insurance of thrifts
under FDIC. The FDIC kept the Bank Insurance Fund
(BIF) separate from the Savings Associations Insurance
Fund (SAIF), to confine the ripple effect of the meltdown.

The FDIC is designed to be independent. Its money comes
from premiums and earnings of the two insurance funds,
not from Congressional appropriations. Its board of
directors has full authority to run the agency.

The board obeys the law, not political masters. The FDIC
has a preemptive role. It regulates banks and savings and
loans with the aim of avoiding insurance claims by
depositors.

When an institution becomes unsound, the FDIC can
either shore it up with loans or take it over. If it does the
latter, it can run it and then sell it as a going concern, or
close it, pay off the depositors and try to collect the loans.

At times, the FDIC ends up owning collateral and trying
to sell it.

Another outcome of the scandal was the Resolution Trust
Corporation (RTC). Many savings and loans were treated
as "special risk" and placed under the jurisdiction of the
RTC until August 1992. The RTC operated and sold these
institutions - or paid off the depositors and closed them. A
new government corporation (Resolution Fund
Corporation, RefCorp) issued federally guaranteed bailout
bonds whose proceeds were used to finance the RTC until
1996.

The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) was also
established in 1989 to replace the dismantled Federal
Home Loan Board (FHLB) in supervising savings and
loans. OTS is a unit within the Treasury Department, but
law and custom make it practically an independent
agency.


The Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB) regulates the
savings establishments for liquidity. It provides lines of
credit from twelve regional Federal Home Loan Banks
(FHLB). Those banks and the thrifts make up the Federal
Home Loan Bank System (FHLBS). FHFB gets its funds
from the System and is independent of supervision by the
executive branch.

Thus a clear, streamlined, and powerful regulatory
mechanism was put in place. Banks and savings and loans
abused the confusing overlaps in authority and regulation
among numerous government agencies. Not one regulator
possessed a full and truthful picture. Following the
reforms, it all became clearer: insurance was the FDIC's
job, the OTS provided supervision, and liquidity was
monitored and imparted by the FHLB.

Healthy thrifts were coaxed and cajoled to purchase less
sturdy ones. This weakened their balance sheets
considerably and the government reneged on its promises
to allow them to amortize the goodwill element of the
purchase over 40 years. Still, there were 2,898 thrifts in
1989. Six years later, their number shrank to 1,612 and it
stands now at less than 1,000. The consolidated
institutions are bigger, stronger, and better capitalized.

Later on, Congress demanded that thrifts obtain a bank
charter by 1998. This was not too onerous for most of
them. At the height of the crisis the ratio of their
combined equity to their combined assets was less than
1%. But in 1994 it reached almost 10% and remained
there ever since.

This remarkable turnaround was the result of serendipity
as much as careful planning. Interest rate spreads became
highly positive. In a classic arbitrage, savings and loans
paid low interest on deposits and invested the money in
high yielding government and corporate bonds. The
prolonged equity bull market allowed thrifts to float new
stock at exorbitant prices.

As the juridical relics of the Great Depression - chiefly
amongst them, the Glass-Steagall Act - were repealed,
banks were liberated to enter new markets, offer new
financial instruments, and spread throughout the USA.

Product and geographical diversification led to enhanced
financial health.

But the very fact that S&L's were poised to exploit these
opportunities is a tribute to politicians and regulators alike
- though except for setting the general tone of urgency and
resolution, the relative absence of political intervention in
the handling of the crisis is notable. It was managed by
the autonomous, able, utterly professional, largely a-
political Federal Reserve. The political class provided the
professionals with the tools they needed to do the job.

This mode of collaboration may well be the most
important lesson of this crisis.

III. Case Study - Wall Street, October 1929
Also published by United Press International (UPI)
Claud Cockburn, writing for the "Times of London" from
New-York, described the irrational exuberance that
gripped the nation just prior to the Great Depression.

As Europe wallowed in post-war malaise, America
seemed to have discovered a new economy, the secret of
uninterrupted growth and prosperity, the fount of
transforming technology:
"The atmosphere of the great boom was savagely exciting,
but there were times when a person with my European
background felt alarmingly lonely. He would have liked to
believe, as these people believed, in the eternal upswing
of the big bull market or else to meet just one person with
whom he might discuss some general doubts without
being regarded as an imbecile or a person of deliberately
evil intent-some kind of anarchist, perhaps".

The greatest analysts with the most impeccable credentials
and track records failed to predict the forthcoming crash
and the unprecedented economic depression that followed
it. Irving Fisher, a preeminent economist, who, according
to his biographer-son, Irving Norton Fisher, lost the
equivalent of $140 million in today's money in the crash,
made a series of soothing predictions. On October 22 he
uttered these avuncular statements: "Quotations have not
caught up with real values as yet ... (There is) no cause for
a slump ... The market has not been inflated but merely
readjusted..".

Even as the market convulsed on Black Thursday,
October 24, 1929 and on Black Tuesday, October 29 - the
New York Times wrote: "Rally at close cheers brokers,
bankers optimistic".


In an editorial on October 26, it blasted rabid speculators
and compliant analysts: ``We shall hear considerably less
in the future of those newly invented conceptions of
finance which revised the principles of political economy
with a view solely to fitting the stock market's vagaries.''
But it ended thus: "(The Federal Reserve has) insured the
soundness of the business situation when the speculative
markets went on the rocks.''
Compare this to Alan Greenspan Congressional testimony
this summer: "While bubbles that burst are scarcely
benign, the consequences need not be catastrophic for the
economy ... (The Depression was brought on by) ensuing
failures of policy".

Investors, their equity leveraged with bank and broker
loans, crowded into stocks of exciting "new technologies",
such as the radio and mass electrification. The bull market
- especially in issues of public utilities - was fueled by
"mergers, new groupings, combinations and good
earnings" and by corporate purchasing for "employee
stock funds".

Cautionary voices - such as Paul Warburg, the influential
banker, Roger Babson, the "Prophet of Loss" and
Alexander Noyes, the eternal Cassandra from the New
York Times - were derided. The number of brokerage
accounts doubled between March 1927 and March 1929.

When the market corrected by 8 percent between March
18-27 - following a Fed induced credit crunch and a series
of mysterious closed-door sessions of the Fed's board -
bankers rushed in. The New York Times reported:
``Responsible bankers agree that stocks should now be
supported, having reached a level that makes them
attractive.'' By August, the market was up 35 percent on
its March lows. But it reached a peak on September 3 and
it was downhill since then.

On October 19, five days before "Black Thursday",
Business Week published this sanguine prognosis:
"Now, of course, the crucial weaknesses of such periods --
price inflation, heavy inventories, over-extension of
commercial credit -- are totally absent. The security
market seems to be suffering only an attack of stock
indigestion... There is additional reassurance in the fact
that, should business show any further signs of fatigue, the
banking system is in a good position now to administer
any needed credit tonic from its excellent Reserve
supply".

The crash unfolded gradually. Black Thursday actually
ended with an inspiring rally. Friday and Saturday  -
trading ceased only on Sundays - witnessed an upswing
followed by mild profit taking. The market dropped 12.8
percent on Monday, with Winston Churchill watching
from the visitors' gallery - incurring a loss of $10-14
billion.

The Wall Street Journal warned naive investors:
"Many are looking for technical corrective reactions from
time to time, but do not expect these to disturb the upward
trend for any prolonged period."


The market plummeted another 11.7 percent the next day
- though trading ended with an impressive rally from the
lows. October 31 was a good day with a "vigorous,
buoyant rally from bell to bell". Even Rockefeller joined
the myriad buyers. Shares soared. It seemed that the worst
was over.

The New York Times was optimistic:
"It is thought that stocks will become stabilized at their
actual worth levels, some higher and some lower than the
present ones, and that the selling prices will be guided in
the immediate future by the worth of each particular
security, based on its dividend record, earnings ability and
prospects. Little is heard in Wall Street these days about
'putting stocks up.'"
But it was not long before irate customers began blaming
their stupendous losses on advice they received from their
brokers. Alec Wilder, a songwriter in New York in 1929,
interviewed by Stud Terkel in "Hard Times" four decades
later, described this typical exchange with his money
manager:
"I knew something was terribly wrong because I heard
bellboys, everybody, talking about the stock market.

About six weeks before the Wall Street Crash, I persuaded
my mother in Rochester to let me talk to our family
adviser. I wanted to sell stock which had been left me by
my father. He got very sentimental: 'Oh your father
wouldn't have liked you to do that.' He was so persuasive,
I said O.K. I could have sold it for $160,000. Four years
later, I sold it for $4,000".

Exhausted and numb from days of hectic trading and back
office operations, the brokerage houses pressured the
stock exchange to declare a two day trading holiday.

Exchanges around North America followed suit.

At first, the Fed refused to reduce the discount rate.
"(There) was no change in financial conditions which the
board thought called for its action." - though it did inject
liquidity into the money market by purchasing
government bonds. Then, it partially succumbed and
reduced the New York discount rate, which, curiously,
was 1 percent above the other Fed districts - by 1 percent.

This was too little and too late. The market never
recovered after November 1. Despite further reductions in
the discount rate to 4 percent, it shed a whopping 89
percent in nominal terms when it hit bottom three years
later.

Everyone was duped. The rich were impoverished
overnight. Small time margin traders - the forerunners of
today's day traders - lost their shirts and much else
besides. The New York Times:
"Yesterday's market crash was one which largely affected
rich men, institutions, investment trusts and others who
participate in the market on a broad and intelligent scale.

It was not the margin traders who were caught in the rush
to sell, but the rich men of the country who are able to
swing blocks of 5,000, 10,000, up to 100,000 shares of
high-priced stocks. They went overboard with no more
consideration than the little trader who was swept out on
the first day of the market's upheaval, whose prices, even
at their lowest of last Thursday, now look high by
comparison ...

To most of those who have been in the market it is all the
more awe-inspiring because their financial history is
limited to bull markets".

Overseas - mainly European - selling was an important
factor. Some conspiracy theorists, such as Webster
Tarpley in his "British Financial Warfare", supported by
contemporary reporting by the likes of "The Economist",
went as far as writing:
"When this Wall Street Bubble had reached gargantuan
proportions in the autumn of 1929, (Lord) Montagu
Norman (governor of the Bank of England 1920-1944)
sharply (upped) the British bank rate, repatriating British
hot money, and pulling the rug out from under the Wall
Street speculators, thus deliberately and consciously
imploding the US markets. This caused a violent
depression in the United States and some other countries,
with the collapse of financial markets and the contraction
of production and employment. In 1929, Norman
engineered a collapse by puncturing the bubble".

The crash was, in large part, a reaction to a sharp reversal,
starting in 1928, of the reflationary, "cheap money",
policies of the Fed intended, as Adolph Miller of the Fed's
Board of Governors told a Senate committee, "to bring
down money rates, the call rate among them, because of
the international importance the call rate had come to
acquire. The purpose was to start an outflow of gold - to
reverse the previous inflow of gold into this country (back
to Britain)." But the Fed had already lost control of the
speculative rush.


The crash of 1929 was not without its Enrons and
World.com's. Clarence Hatry and his associates admitted
to forging the accounts of their investment group to show
a fake net worth of $24 million British pounds - rather
than the true picture of 19 billion in liabilities. This led to
forced liquidation of Wall Street positions by harried
British financiers.

The collapse of Middle West Utilities, run by the energy
tycoon, Samuel Insull, exposed a web of offshore holding
companies whose only purpose was to hide losses and
disguise leverage. The former president of NYSE, Richard
Whitney was arrested for larceny.

Analysts and commentators thought of the stock exchange
as decoupled from the real economy. Only one tenth of
the population was invested - compared to 40 percent
today. "The World" wrote, with more than a bit of
Schadenfreude: "The country has not suffered a
catastrophe ... The American people ... has been gambling
largely with the surplus of its astonishing prosperity."
"The Daily News" concurred: "The sagging of the stocks
has not destroyed a single factory, wiped out a single farm
or city lot or real estate development, decreased the
productive powers of a single workman or machine in the
United States." In Louisville, the "Herald Post"
commented sagely: "While Wall Street was getting rid of
its weak holder to their own most drastic punishment,
grain was stronger. That will go to the credit side of the
national prosperity and help replace that buying power
which some fear has been gravely impaired".

During the Coolidge presidency, according to the
Encyclopedia Britannica, "stock dividends rose by 108
percent, corporate profits by 76 percent, and wages by 33
percent. In 1929, 4,455,100 passenger cars were sold by
American factories, one for every 27 members of the
population, a record that was not broken until 1950.

Productivity was the key to America's economic growth.

Because of improvements in technology, overall labour
costs declined by nearly 10 percent, even though the
wages of individual workers rose".

Jude Waninski adds in his tome "The Way the World
Works" that "between 1921 and 1929, GNP grew to
$103.1 billion from $69.6 billion. And because prices
were falling, real output increased even faster." Tax rates
were sharply reduced.

John Kenneth Galbraith noted these data in his seminal
"The Great Crash":
"Between 1925 and 1929, the number of manufacturing
establishments increased from 183,900 to 206,700; the
value of their output rose from $60.8 billions to $68
billions. The Federal Reserve index of industrial
production which had averaged only 67 in 1921 ... had
risen to 110 by July 1928, and it reached 126 in June 1929
... (but the American people) were also displaying an
inordinate desire to get rich quickly with a minimum of
physical effort".

Personal borrowing for consumption peaked in 1928 -
though the administration, unlike today, maintained twin
fiscal and current account surpluses and the USA was a
large net creditor.

Charles Kettering, head of the research division of
General Motors described consumeritis thus, just days
before the crash: "The key to economic prosperity is the
organized creation of dissatisfaction".

Inequality skyrocketed. While output per man-hour shot
up by 32 percent between 1923 and 1929, wages crept up
only 8 percent. In 1929, the top 0.1 percent of the
population earned as much as the bottom 42 percent.

Business-friendly administrations reduced by 70 percent
the exorbitant taxes paid by those with an income of more
than $1 million. But in the summer of 1929, businesses
reported sharp increases in inventories. It was the
beginning of the end.

Were stocks overvalued prior to the crash? Did all stocks
collapse indiscriminately? Not so. Even at the height of
the panic, investors remained conscious of real values. On
November 3, 1929 the shares of American Can, General
Electric, Westinghouse and Anaconda Copper were still
substantially higher than on March 3, 1928.

John Campbell and Robert Shiller, author of "Irrational
Exuberance", calculated, in a joint paper titled "Valuation
Ratios and the Lon-Run Market Outlook: An Update"
posted on Yale University' s Web Site, that share prices
divided by a moving average of 10 years worth of
earnings reached 28 just prior to the crash. Contrast this
with 45 on March 2000.

In an NBER working paper published December 2001 and
tellingly titled "The Stock Market Crash of 1929 - Irving
Fisher was Right", Ellen McGrattan and Edward Prescott
boldly claim:

"We find that the stock market in 1929 did not crash
because the market was overvalued. In fact, the evidence
strongly suggests that stocks were undervalued, even at
their 1929 peak".

According to their detailed paper, stocks were trading at
19 times after-tax corporate earning at the peak in 1929, a
fraction of today's valuations even after the recent
correction. A March 1999 "Economic Letter" published
by the Federal Reserve Bank of San-Francisco
wholeheartedly concurs. It notes that at the peak, prices
stood at 30.5 times the dividend yield, only slightly above
the long term average.

Contrast this with an article published in June 1990 issue
of the "Journal of Economic History" by Robert Barsky
and Bradford De Long and titled "Bull and Bear Markets
in the Twentieth Century":
"Major bull and bear markets were driven by shifts in
assessments of fundamentals: investors had little
knowledge of crucial factors, in particular the long run
dividend growth rate, and their changing expectations of
average dividend growth plausibly lie behind the major
swings of this century".

Jude Waninski attributes the crash to the disintegration of
the pro-free-trade coalition in the Senate which later led to
the notorious Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. He traces
all the important moves in the market between March
1929 and June 1930 to the intricate protectionist danse
macabre in Congress.

This argument may never be decided. Is a similar crash on
the cards? This cannot be ruled out.

The 1990's resembled the 1920's in more than one way.

Are we ready for a recurrence of 1929? About as we were
prepared in 1928. Human nature - the prime mover behind
market meltdowns - seemed not to have changed that
much in these intervening seven decades.

Will a stock market crash, should it happen, be followed
by another "Great Depression"? It depends which kind of
crash. The short term puncturing of a temporary bubble -
e.g., in 1962 and 1987 - is usually divorced from other
economic fundamentals. But a major correction to a
lasting bull market invariably leads to recession or worse.

As the economist Hernan Cortes Douglas reminds us in
"The Collapse of Wall Street and the Lessons of History"
published by the Friedberg Mercantile Group, this was the
sequence in London in 1720 (the infamous "South Sea
Bubble"), and in the USA in 1835-40 and 1929-32.

IV. Britain's Real Estate
The five ghastly "Jack the Ripper" murders took place in
an area less than a quarter square mile in size. Houses in
this haunting and decrepit no man's land straddling the
City and metropolitan London could be had for 25-50,000
British pounds as late as a decade ago. How things
change!
The general buoyancy in real estate prices in the capital
coupled with the adjacent Spitalfields urban renewal
project have lifted prices. A house not 50 yards from the
scene of the Ripper's last - and most ghoulish - slaying
now sells for over 1 million pounds. In central London,
one bedroom apartments retail for an outlandish half a
million.

According to research published in September 2002 by
Halifax, the UK's largest mortgage lender, the number of
1 million pound homes sold has doubled in 1999-2002 to
2600. By 2002, it has increased elevenfold since 1995.

According to The Economist's house price index, prices
rose by a further 15.6% in 2003, 10.2% in 2004 and a
whopping 147% in total since 1997. In Greater London,
one in every 90 homes fetches even a higher price. The
average UK house now costs 100,000 pounds. In the
USA, the ratios of house prices to rents and to median
income are at historic highs.

One is reminded of the Japanese boast, at the height of
their realty bubble, that the grounds of the royal palace in
Tokyo are worth more than the entire real estate of
Manhattan. Is Britain headed the same way?
A house - much like a Big Mac - is a basket of raw
materials, goods, and services. But, unlike the Big Mac -
and the purchasing power index it spawned - houses are
also investment vehicles and stores of value. They yield
often tax exempt capital gains, rental income, or benefits
from occupying them (rent payments saved). Real estate is
used to hedge against inflation, save for old age, and
speculate. Prices of residential and commercial property
reflect scarcity, investment fads, and changing moods.

Homeowners in both the UK and the USA - spurred on by
aggressive marketing and the lowest interest rates in 30
years - have been refinancing old, more expensive,
mortgages and heavily borrowing against their "equity" -
i.e., against the meteoric rise in the market prices of their
abodes.

According to the Milken Institute in Los Angeles, asset
bubbles tend to both enhance and cannibalize each other.

Profits from surging tradable securities are used to buy
property and drive up its values. Borrowing against
residential equity fuels overvaluations in fervid stock
exchanges. When one bubble bursts - the other initially
benefits from an influx of funds withdrawn in panic from
the shriveling alternative.

Quantitatively, a considerably larger share of the nation's
wealth is tied in real estate than in the capital markets.

Yet, the infamous wealth effect - an alleged fluctuation in
the will to consume as a result of changing fortunes in the
stock exchange - is equally inconspicuous in the realty
markets. It seems that consumption is correlated with
lifelong projected earnings rather than with the state of
one's savings and investments.

This is not the only counter-intuitive finding. Asset
inflation - no matter how vertiginous - rarely spills into
consumer prices. The recent bubbles in Japan and the
USA, for instance, coincided with a protracted period of
disinflation. The bursting of bubbles does have a
deflationary effect, though.

In a late 2002 survey of global house price movements,
"The Economist" concluded that real estate inflation is a
global phenomenon. Though Britain far outpaces the
United States and Italy (65% rise since 1997), it falls
behind Ireland (179%) and South Africa (195%). It is in
league with Australia (with 113%) and Spain (132%).

The paper notes wryly:
"Just as with equities in the late 1990s, property bulls
are now coming up with bogus arguments for why
rampant house-price inflation is sure to continue.

Demographic change ... Physical restrictions and tough
planning laws ... Similar arguments were heard in
Japan in the late 1980s and Germany in the early 1990s
- and yet in recent years house prices in these two
countries have been falling. British house prices also
tumbled in the late 1980s".

They are bound to do so again. In the long run, the rise in
house prices cannot exceed the increase in disposable
income. The effects of the bursting of a property bubble
are invariably more pernicious and prolonged than the
outcomes of a bear market in stocks. Real estate is much
more leveraged. Debt levels can well exceed home equity
("negative equity") in a downturn. Nowadays, loans are
not eroded by high inflation. Adjustable rate mortgages -
one third of the annual total in the USA - will make sure
that the burden of real indebtedness mushrooms as interest
rates rise.

The Economist (April 2005):
"An IMF study on asset bubbles estimates that 40% of
housing booms are followed by housing busts, which last
for an average of four years and see an average decline
of roughly 30% in home values. But given how many
homebuyers in booming markets seem to be basing their
purchasing decisions on expectations of outsized
returns-a recent survey of buyers in Los Angeles
indicated that they expected their homes to increase in
value by a whopping 22% a year over the next decade-
nasty downturns in at least some markets seem likely".

With both the equity and realty markets in gloom, people
revert to cash and bonds and save more - leading to
deflation or recession or both. Japan is a prime example of
such a shift of investment preferences. When prices
collapse sufficiently to become attractive, investors pile
back into both the capital and real estate markets. This
cycle is as old and as inevitable as human greed and fear.



X. The Shadowy World of International Finance


Strange, penumbral, characters roam the boardrooms of
banks in the countries in transition. Some of them pop
apparently from nowhere, others are very well connected
and equipped with the most excellent introductions. They
all peddle financial transactions which are too good to be
true and often are. In the unctuously perfumed propinquity
of their Mercedesed, Rolex waving entourage - the
polydipsic natives dissolve in their irresistible charm and
the temptations of the cash: mountainous returns on
capital, effulgent profits, no collaterals, track record, or
business plan required. Total security is cloyingly assured.

These Fausts roughly belong to four tribes:
The Shoppers
These are the shabby operators of the marginal shadows
of the world of finance. They broker financial deals with
meretricious sweat only to be rewarded their meagre,
humiliated fees. Most of their deals do not materialize.

The principle is very simple:
They approach a bank, a financial institution, or a
borrower and say: "We are connected to banks or
financial institutions in the West. We can bring you
money in the form of credits. But to do that - you must
first express interest in getting this money. You must
furnish us with a bank guarantee / promissory note / letter
of intent that indicates that you desire the credit and that
you are willing to provide a liquid financial instrument to
back it up.". Having obtained such instruments, the
shoppers begin to "shop around". They approach banks
and financial institutions (usually, in the West). This time,
they reverse their text: "We have an excellent client, a
good borrower. Are you willing to lend to it?" An
informal process of tendering ensues. Sometimes it ends
in a transaction and the shopper collects a small
commission (between one quarter of a percentage point
and two percentage points - depending on the amount).

Mostly it doesn't -and the Flying Dutchman resumes his
wanderings looking for more venal gulosity and less legal
probity.

The Con-Men
These are crooks who set up elaborate schemes ("sting
operations") to extract money from unsuspecting people
and financial institutions. They establish "front" or
"phantom" firms and offices throughout the world. They
tempt the gullible by offering them enormous, immediate,
tax-free, effort-free, profits. They let the victims profit in
the first round or two of the scam. Then, they sting: the
victims invest money and it evaporates together with the
dishonest operators. The "offices" are deserted, the fake
identities, the forged bank references, the falsified
guarantees are all exposed (often with the help of an
inside informant).

Probably the most famous and enduring scam is the
"Nigerian-type Connection". Letters - allegedly composed
by very influential and highly placed officials - are sent
out to unsuspecting businessmen. The latter are asked to
make their bank accounts available to the former, who
profess to need the third party bank accounts through
which to funnel the sweet fruits of corruption. The
account owners are promised huge financial rewards if
they collaborate and if they bear some minor-by-
comparison upfront costs. The con-men pocket these
"expenses" and vanish. Sometimes, they even empty the
accounts of their entire balance as they evaporate.

The Launderers
A lot of cash goes undeclared to tax authorities in
countries in transition. The informal economy (the
daughter of both criminal and legitimate parents)
comprises between 15% (Slovenia) and 50% (Russia,
Macedonia) of the official one. Some say these figures are
a deliberate and ferocious understatement. These are mind
boggling amounts, which circulate between financial
centres and off shore havens in the world: Cyprus, the
Cayman Islands, Liechtenstein (Vaduz), Panama and
dozens of aspiring laundrettes.

The money thus smuggled is kept in low-yielding cash
deposits. To escape the cruel fate of inflationary
corrosion, it has to be reinvested. It is stealthily re-
introduced to the very economy that it so sought to evade,
in the form of investment capital or other financial assets
(loans and credits). Its anxious owners are preoccupied
with legitimising their stillborn cash through the conduit
of tax-fearing enterprises, or with lending it to same. The
emphasis is on the word: "legitimate". The money surges
in through mysterious and anonymous foreign
corporations, via off-shore banking centres, even through
respectable financial institutions (the Bank of New York
we mentioned?). It is easy to recognize a laundering
operation. Its hallmark is a pronounced lack of selectivity.

The money is invested in anything and everything, as long
as it appears legitimate. Diversification is not sought by
these nouveau tycoons and they have no core investment
strategy. They spread their illicit funds among dozens of
disparate economic activities and show not the slightest
interest in the putative yields on their investments, the
maturity of their assets, the quality of their newly acquired
businesses, their history, or real value. Never the
sedulous, they pay exorbitantly for all manner of
prestidigital endeavours. The future prospects and other
normal investment criteria are beyond them. All they are
after is a mirage of lapidarity.

The Investors
This is the most intriguing group. Normative, law abiding,
businessmen, who stumbled across methods to secure
excessive yields on their capital and are looking to borrow
their way into increasing it. By cleverly participating in
bond tenders, by devising ingenious option strategies, or
by arbitraging - yields of up to 300% can be collected in
the immature markets of transition without the normally
associated risks. This sub-species can be found mainly in
Russia and in the Balkans.

Its members often buy sovereign bonds and notes at
discounts of up to 80% of their face value. Russian
obligations could be had for less in August 1998 and
Macedonian ones during the Kosovo crisis. In cahoots
with the issuing country's central bank, they then convert
the obligations to local currency at par (for 100% of their
face value). The difference makes, needless to add, for an
immediate and hefty profit, yet it is in (often worthless
and vicissitudinal) local currency. The latter is then
hurriedly disposed of (at a discount) and sold to
multinationals with operations in the country of issue,
which are in need of local tender. This fast becomes an
almost addictive avocation.

Intoxicated by this pecuniary nectar, the fortunate, those
privy to the secret, try to raise more capital by hunting for
financial instruments they can convert to cash in Western
banks. A bank guarantee, a promissory note, a confirmed
letter of credit, a note or a bond guaranteed by the Central
Bank - all will do as deposited collateral against which a
credit line is established and cash is drawn. The cash is
then invested in a new cycle of inebriation to yield
fantastic profits.

It is easy to identify these "investors". They eagerly seek
financial instruments from almost any local bank, no
matter how suspect. They offer to pay for these coveted
documents (bank guarantees, bankers' acceptances, letters
of credit) either in cash or by lending to the bank's clients
and this within a month or more from the date of their
issuance. They agree to "cancel" the locally issued
financial instruments by offering a "counter-financial-
instrument" (safe keeping receipt, contra-guarantee,
counter promissory note, etc.). This "counter-instrument"
is issued by the very Prime World or European Bank in
which the locally issued financial instruments are
deposited as collateral.

The Investors invariably confidently claim that the
financial instrument issued by the local bank will never be
presented or used (which is true) and that this is a risk free
transaction (which is not entirely so). If they are forced to
lend to the bank's clients, they often ignore the quality of
the credit takers, the yields, the maturities and other
considerations which normally tend to interest lenders
very much.

Whether a financial instrument cancelled by another is
still valid, presentable and should be honoured by its
issuer is still debated. In some cases it is clearly so. If
something goes horribly (and rarely, admittedly) wrong
with these transactions - the local bank stands to suffer,
too.

It all boils down to a terrible hunger, the kind of thirst that
can be quelled only by the denominated liquidity of lucre.

In the post nuclear landscape of this part of the world, a
fantasy is shared by both predators and prey. Circling
each other in marble temples, they switch their roles in
dizzying progression. Tycoons and politicians,
industrialists and bureaucrats all vie for the attention of
Mammon. The shifting coalitions of well groomed man in
back stabbed suits, an hallucinatory carousel of avarice
and guile. But every circus folds and every Luna park is
destined to shut down. The dying music, the frozen
accounts of the deceived, the bankrupt banks, the Jurassic
Park of skeletal industrial beasts - a muted testimony to a
wild age of mutual assured destruction and self deceit.

The future of Eastern and South Europe. The present of
Russia, Albania and Yugoslavia.



XI. Treasure Island Revisited On Maritime Piracy


The rumors concerning the demise of maritime piracy
back in the 19th century were a tad premature. The
scourge has so resurged that the International Maritime
Board (IMB), founded by the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) in 1981, is forced to broadcast daily
piracy reports to all shipping companies by satellite from
its Kuala Lumpur Piracy Reporting Center, established in
1992 and partly funded by maritime insurers. The reports
carry this alarming disclaimer:
"For statistical purposes, the IMB defines piracy and
armed robbery as: An act of boarding or attempting to
board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or
any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability
to use force in the furtherance of that act. This definition
thus covers actual or attempted attacks whether the ship is
berthed, at anchor or at sea. Petty thefts are excluded,
unless the thieves are armed".

The 1994 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea defines piracy as "any illegal acts of violence or
detention, or any act of depredation, committed by
individuals (borne aboard a pirate vessel) for private ends
against a private ship or aircraft (the victim vessel)".

When no "pirate vessel" is involved - for instance, when
criminals embark on a ship and capture it - the legal term
is hijacking.

On July 8, 2002 seven pirates, armed with long knives
attacked an officer of a cargo ship berthed in Chittagong
port in Bangladesh, snatched his gold chain and watch and
dislocated his arm. This was the third such attack since the
ship dropped anchor in this minacious port.

Three days earlier, in Indonesia, similarly-armed pirates
escaped with the crew's valuables, having tied the hands
of the duty officer. Pirates in small boats stole anodes
from the stern of a bulk carrier in Bangladesh. Others, in
Indonesia, absconded with a life raft.

The pirates of Guyana are either unlucky or untrained.

They were consistently scared off by flares hurled at them
and alarms set by vigilant hands on deck. A Colombian
band, riding a high speed boat, attempted to board a
container ship. Warring parties in Somalia hijacked yet
another ship in June 2002.

A particularly egregious case - and signs of growing
sophistication and coordinated action - is described in the
July 1-8, 2002 report of the IMB:
"Six armed pirates boarded a chemical tanker from a
small boat and stole ship's stores. Another group of pirates
broke in to engine room and stole spare parts. Thefts took
place in spite of the ship engaging three shore security
watchmen." Piracy incidents have been reported in India,
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, the Red Sea,
the Gulf of Aden, Nigeria, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela.

According to the ICC Year 2001 Piracy Report, more than
330 attacks on seafaring vessels were reported in 2001 -
down by a quarter compared to 2000 but 10 percent
higher than 1999 and four times the 1991 figure. Piracy
rose 40 percent between 1998 and 1999 alone.

Sixteen ships - double the number in 2000 - were captured
and taken over in 2001. Eighty seven attacks were
reported during the first quarter of 2002 - up from 68 in
the corresponding period the year before. Seven of these
were hijackings - compared to only 1 in the first quarter of
2001. Nine of every 10 hijacked ships are ultimately
recovered, often with the help of the IMB.

Many masters and shipowners do not report piracy for
fear of delays due to protracted investigations, increased
insurance premiums, bad publicity, and stifling red tape.

The number of unreported attacks in 1999 was estimated
by the World Maritime Piracy Report to be 130.

According to "The Economist", the IMO believes that half
of all incidents remain untold. Still, increased patrols and
international collaboration among law enforcement
agencies dented the clear upward trend in maritime crime
- even in the piracy capital, Indonesia.

The number of incidents in the pirate-infested Malacca
Straits dropped from 75 in 2000 to 17 in 2001 - though the
number of crew "kidnap and ransom" operations,
especially in Aceh, has increased. Owners usually pay the
"reasonable" amounts demanded - c. $100,000 per ship.

Contrary to folklore, most ships are attacked while at
anchor.

Twenty one people, including passengers, were killed in
2001 - and 210 taken hostage. Assaults involving guns
were up 50 percent to 73 - those involving mere knives
down by a quarter to 105. Piracy seems to ebb and flow
with the business cycles of the host economies. The Asian
crisis, triggered by the freefall of the Thai baht in 1997-8,
gave a boost to East Asian maritime robbers. So did the
debt crises of Latin America a decade earlier. Drug
transporters - armed with light aircraft and high speed
motorboats - sometimes double as pirates during the dry
season of crop growth.

Pirates endanger ship and crew. But they often cause
collateral damage as well. Pirates have been known to
dump noxious cargo into the sea, or tie up the crew and let
an oil tanker steam ahead, its navigational aides smashed,
or tamper with substances dangerous to themselves and to
others, or cast crew and passengers adrift in tiny rafts with
little food and water.

Many shipowners resorted to installing on-board satellite
tracking systems, such as Shiploc, and aircraft-like "black
boxes". A bulletproof life vest, replete with an integral
jagged edged knife, was on display in the millennium
exhibition at the Millennium Dome two years ago. The
International Maritime Organization (IMO) is considering
to compel shipowners to tag their vessels with visibly
embossed numbers in compliance with the Safety of Life
at Sea Convention.

The IMB also advises shipping companies to closely
examine the papers of crew and masters, thousands of
whom carry forged documents. In  54 maritime
administrations surveyed in 2001 by the Seafarers'
International Research Centre, Cardiff University in
Wales, more than 12,000 cases of forged certificates of
competency were unearthed.

Many issuing authorities are either careless or venal or
both. The IMB accused the Coast Guard Office of Puerto
Rico for issuing 500 such "suspicious" certificates. The
Chinese customs and navy - especially along the southern
coast - have often been decried for working hand in glove
with pirates.

False documents are an integral - and crucial - part of
maritime piracy. The IMB says:
"Many of the phantom ships that set off to sea with a
cargo and then disappear are sailed by crewmen with false
passports and competency certificates. They usually
escape detection by the port authorities. In a recent case of
a vessel located and arrested in South-East Asia further to
IMB investigations, it has emerged that all the senior
officers had false passports. The ship's registry documents
were also false".

As documents go electronic and integrated in proprietary
or common cargo tracking systems, such forgery will
wane. Bolero - an international digital bill of lading ledger
- is backed by the European Union, banks, shipping and
insurance companies. The IMO is a proponent of a
technology to apply encrypted "digital signatures" to
electronic bills of lading. Still, the industry is highly
fragmented and many ships and ports don't even possess
rudimentary information technology. The protection
afforded by the likes of Bolero is at least five years away.

Pirates sometimes work hand in hand with conspiring
crew members (or, less often, stowaways). In many
countries - in East Asia, Latin America, and Africa -
Coast Guard operatives, corrupt drug agents, and other
law enforcement officials, moonlight as pirates. Renegade
members of British trained Indonesian anti-piracy squads
are still roaming the Malacca Straits.

Pirates also enjoy the support of an insidious and vast
network of suborned judges and bureaucrats. Local
villagers along the coasts of Indonesia and Malaysia - and
Africa - welcome pirate business and provide the
perpetrators with food and shelter.

Moreover, large tankers, container ships, and cargo
vessels are largely computerized and their crew members
few. The value of an average vessel's freight has increased
dramatically with improvements in container and oil
storage technologies. "Flag of convenience" registration
has assumed monstrous proportions, allowing ship owners
and managers to conceal their identity effectively. Belize,
Honduras, and Panama are the most notorious, no
questions asked, havens.

Piracy has matured into a branch of organized crime.

Hijacking requires money, equipment, weapons, planning,
experience and contacts with corrupt officials. The loot
per vessel ranges from $8 million to $200 million.

Pottengal Mukundan, Director of ICC's Commercial
Crime Services states in an IMB press release:
"(Piracy) typically involves a mother ship from which to
launch the attacks, a supply of automatic weapons, false
identity papers for the crew and vessel, fake cargo
documents, and a broker network to sell the stolen goods
illegally. Individual pirates don't have these resources.

Hijackings are the work of organized crime rings".

The IMB describes the aftermath of a typical hijacking:
"The Global Mars has probably been given a new name
and repainted. Armed with false registration papers and
bills of lading, the pirates - or more likely the mafia
bosses pulling the strings - will then try to dispose of their
booty. The vessel has probably put in to a port where the
false identity of vessel and cargo may escape detection.

Even when identified, the gangs have been known to bribe
local officials to allow them to sell the cargo and leave the
port".

Such a ship is often "recycled" a few times. It earns its
operators an average of $40-50 million per "cycle",
according to "The Economist". The pirates contract with
sellers or shipping agents to load it with a legitimate
consignment of goods or commodities. The sellers and
agents are unaware of the true identity of the ship, or of its
unsavory "owners/managers".

The pirates invariably produce an authentic vessel
registration certificate that they acquired from crooked
officials - and provide the sellers or agents with a bill of
lading. The payload is then sold to networks of traders in
stolen merchandise or to gullible buyers in a different port
of destination - and the ship is ready for yet another
round.

In January 2002, the Indonesian Navy has permanently
stationed six battleships in the Malacca Straits, three of
them off the coast of the secessionist region of Aceh. A
further 20-30 ships and 10 aircraft conduct daily patrols of
the treacherous traffic lane. Some 200-600 ships cross the
Straits daily. A mere 50 ships or so are boarded and
searched every month.

The Greek government has gunboats patrolling the 2
miles wide Corfu Channel, where yachts frequently fall
prey to Albanian pirates. Brazil has imposed an unpopular
anti-piracy inspection fee on berthing vessels and used the
proceeds to finance a SWAT team to protect ships and
their crews while in port. Both India and Thailand have
similar units.

International cooperation is also on the rise. About one
third of the world's shipping traffic goes through the
South China Sea. A conference convened by Japan in
March 2000 - Japanese vessels have become favored
targets of piracy in the last few years - pushed for the
ratification of the International Maritime Organisation's
(IMO) 1988 Rome Convention on the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
by Asian and ASEAN countries.

The Convention makes piracy an extraterritorial crime
and, thus, removes the thorny issue of jurisdiction in cases
of piracy carried in another country's territorial waters or
out on the high seas. The Comite Maritime International -
the umbrella organization of national maritime law
associations - promulgated a model anti-piracy law last
year.

Though it rejected Japan's offer for collaboration, in a
sharp reversal of its previous policy, China started
handing down death sentences against murderous pirates.

The 13 marauders who seized the Cheung Son and
massacred its 23 Chinese sailors were executed five years
ago in the southern city of Shanwei. Another 25 people
received long prison sentences. The - declared - booty
amounted to a mere $300,000.

India and Iran - two emerging "pirates safe harbor"
destinations - have also tightened up sentencing and port
inspections. In the Alondra Rainbow hijacking, the Indian
Navy captured the Indonesian culprits in a cinematic
chase off Goa. They were later sentenced severely under
both the Indian Penal Code and international law. Even
the junta in Myanmar has taken tentative steps against
compatriots with piratical predilections.

Law enforcement does not tolerate a vacuum. "The
Economist" reports about two private military companies
- Marine Risk Management and Satellite Protection
Services (SPS) - which deploy airborne mercenaries to
deal with piracy. SPS has even suggested to station 2500
former Dutch marines in Subic Bay in the Philippines -
for a mere $2500 per day per combatant.

Shipowners are desperate. Quoted by "The Economist",
they "suggest that the region's governments negotiate the
right for navies to chase pirates across national
boundaries: the so-called 'right of hot pursuit'. So far, only
Singapore and Indonesia have negotiated limited rights.

Some suggest that the American navy should be invited
into territorial waters to combat piracy, a 'live' exercise it
might relish. At the very least, countries such as Indonesia
should advertise which bits of their territorial waters at
any time are patrolled and safe from pirates. No countries
currently do this".



XII.  Legalizing Crime


Also Read:
Narcissists, Ethnic or Religious Affiliation, and Terrorists


"Those who have the command of the arms in a country
are masters of the state, and have it in their power to
make what revolutions they please. [Thus,] there is no
end to observations on the difference between the
measures likely to be pursued by a minister backed by a
standing army, and those of a court awed by the fear of
an armed people".

Aristotle (384-322 BC), Greek philosopher
"Murder being the very foundation of our social
institutions, it is consequently the most imperious
necessity of civilised life. If there were no murder,
government of any sort would be inconceivable. For the
admirable fact is that crime in general, and murder in
particular, not simply excuses it but represents its only
reason to exist ... Otherwise we would live in complete
anarchy, something we find unimaginable ..".

Octave Mirbeau (1848-1917), The Torture Garden
The state has a monopoly on behaviour usually deemed
criminal. It murders, kidnaps, and locks up people.

Sovereignty has come to be identified with the unbridled -
and exclusive - exercise of violence. The emergence of
modern international law has narrowed the field of
permissible conduct. A sovereign can no longer commit
genocide or ethnic cleansing with impunity, for instance.

Many acts - such as the waging of aggressive war, the
mistreatment of minorities, the suppression of the freedom
of association - hitherto sovereign privilege, have
thankfully been criminalized. Many politicians, hitherto
immune to international prosecution, are no longer so.

Consider Yugoslavia's Milosevic and Chile's Pinochet.

But, the irony is that a similar trend of criminalization -
within national legal systems - allows governments to
oppress their citizenry to an extent previously unknown.

Hitherto civil torts, permissible acts, and common
behaviour patterns are routinely criminalized by
legislators and regulators. Precious few are
decriminalized.

Consider, for instance, the criminalization in the
Economic Espionage Act (1996) of the misappropriation
of trade secrets and the criminalization of the violation of
copyrights in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(2000) - both in the USA. These used to be civil torts.

They still are in many countries. Drug use, common
behaviour in England only 50 years ago - is now criminal.

The list goes on.

Criminal laws pertaining to property have malignantly
proliferated and pervaded every economic and private
interaction. The result is a bewildering multitude of laws,
regulations statutes, and acts.

The average Babylonian could have memorizes and
assimilated the Hammurabic code 37 centuries ago - it
was short, simple, and intuitively just.

English criminal law - partly applicable in many of its
former colonies, such as India, Pakistan, Canada, and
Australia - is a mishmash of overlapping and
contradictory statutes - some of these hundreds of years
old - and court decisions, collectively known as "case
law".

Despite the publishing of a Model Penal Code in 1962 by
the American Law Institute, the criminal provisions of
various states within the USA often conflict. The typical
American can't hope to get acquainted with even a
negligible fraction of his country's fiendishly complex and
hopelessly brobdignagian criminal code. Such inevitable
ignorance breeds criminal behaviour - sometimes
inadvertently - and transforms many upright citizens into
delinquents.

In the land of the free - the USA - close to 2 million adults
are behind bars and another 4.5 million are on probation,
most of them on drug charges. The costs of
criminalization - both financial and social - are mind
boggling. According to "The Economist", America's
prison system cost it $54 billion a year - disregarding the
price tag of law enforcement, the judiciary, lost product,
and rehabilitation.

What constitutes a crime? A clear and consistent
definition has yet to transpire.

There are five types of criminal behaviour: crimes against
oneself, or "victimless crimes" (such as suicide, abortion,
and the consumption of drugs), crimes against others
(such as murder or mugging), crimes among consenting
adults (such as incest, and in certain countries,
homosexuality and euthanasia), crimes against collectives
(such as treason, genocide, or ethnic cleansing), and
crimes against the international community and world
order (such as executing prisoners of war). The last two
categories often overlap.

The Encyclopaedia Britannica provides this definition of a
crime: "The intentional commission of an act usually
deemed socially harmful or dangerous and specifically
defined, prohibited, and punishable under the criminal
law."

But who decides what is socially harmful? What about
acts committed unintentionally (known as "strict liability
offences" in the parlance)? How can we establish
intention - "mens rea", or the "guilty mind" - beyond a
reasonable doubt?
A much tighter definition would be: "The commission of
an act punishable under the criminal law." A crime is
what the law - state law, kinship law, religious law, or any
other widely accepted law - says is a crime. Legal systems
and texts often conflict.

Murderous blood feuds are legitimate according to the
15th century "Qanoon", still applicable in large parts of
Albania. Killing one's infant daughters and old relatives is
socially condoned - though illegal - in India, China,
Alaska, and parts of Africa. Genocide may have been
legally sanctioned in Germany and Rwanda - but is
strictly forbidden under international law.

Laws being the outcomes of compromises and power
plays, there is only a tenuous connection between justice
and morality. Some "crimes" are categorical imperatives.

Helping the Jews in Nazi Germany was a criminal act -
yet a highly moral one.

The ethical nature of some crimes depends on
circumstances, timing, and cultural context. Murder is a
vile deed - but  assassinating Saddam Hussein may be
morally commendable. Killing an embryo is a crime in
some countries - but not so killing a fetus. A "status
offence" is not a criminal act if committed by an adult.

Mutilating the body of a live baby is heinous - but this is
the essence of Jewish circumcision. In some societies,
criminal guilt is collective. All Americans are held
blameworthy by the Arab street for the choices and
actions of their leaders. All Jews are accomplices in the
"crimes" of the "Zionists".

In all societies, crime is a growth industry. Millions of
professionals - judges, police officers, criminologists,
psychologists, journalists, publishers, prosecutors,
lawyers, social workers, probation officers, wardens,
sociologists, non-governmental-organizations, weapons
manufacturers, laboratory technicians, graphologists, and
private detectives - derive their livelihood, parasitically,
from crime. They often perpetuate models of punishment
and retribution that lead to recidivism rather than to to the
reintegration of criminals in society and their
rehabilitation.

Organized in vocal interest groups and lobbies, they harp
on the insecurities and phobias of the alienated urbanites.

They consume ever growing budgets and rejoice with
every new behaviour criminalized by exasperated
lawmakers. In the majority of countries, the justice system
is a dismal failure and law enforcement agencies are part
of the problem, not its solution.

The sad truth is that many types of crime are considered
by people to be normative and common behaviours and,
thus, go unreported. Victim surveys and self-report studies
conducted by criminologists reveal that most crimes go
unreported. The protracted fad of criminalization has
rendered criminal many perfectly acceptable and recurring
behaviours and acts. Homosexuality, abortion, gambling,
prostitution, pornography, and suicide have all been
criminal offences at one time or another.

But the quintessential example of over-criminalization is
drug abuse.

There is scant medical evidence that soft drugs such as
cannabis or MDMA ("Ecstasy") - and even cocaine - have
an irreversible effect on brain chemistry or functioning.

Last month an almighty row erupted in Britain when Jon
Cole, an addiction researcher at Liverpool University,
claimed, to quote "The Economist" quoting the
"Psychologist", that:
"Experimental evidence suggesting a link between
Ecstasy use and problems such as nerve damage and brain
impairment  is flawed ... using this ill-substantiated cause-
and-effect to tell the 'chemical generation' that they are
brain damaged when they are not creates public health
problems of its own".

Moreover, it is commonly accepted that alcohol abuse and
nicotine abuse can be at least as harmful as the abuse of
marijuana, for instance. Yet, though somewhat curbed,
alcohol consumption and cigarette smoking are legal. In
contrast, users of cocaine - only a century ago
recommended by doctors as tranquilizer - face life in jail
in many countries, death in others. Almost everywhere pot
smokers are confronted with prison terms.

The "war on drugs" - one of the most expensive and
protracted in history - has failed abysmally. Drugs are
more abundant and cheaper than ever. The social costs
have been staggering: the emergence of violent crime
where none existed before, the destabilization of drug-
producing countries, the collusion of drug traffickers with
terrorists, and the death of millions - law enforcement
agents, criminals, and users.

Few doubt that legalizing most drugs would have a
beneficial effect. Crime empires would crumble
overnight, users would be assured of the quality of the
products they consume, and the addicted few would not
be incarcerated or stigmatized - but rather treated and
rehabilitated.

That soft, largely harmless, drugs continue to be illicit is
the outcome of compounded political and economic
pressures by lobby and interest groups of manufacturers
of legal drugs, law enforcement agencies, the judicial
system, and the aforementioned long list of those who
benefit from the status quo.

Only a popular movement can lead to the
decriminalization of the more innocuous drugs. But such a
crusade should be part of a larger campaign to reverse the
overall tide of criminalization. Many "crimes" should
revert to their erstwhile status as civil torts. Others should
be wiped off the statute books altogether. Hundreds of
thousands should be pardoned and allowed to reintegrate
in society, unencumbered by a past of transgressions
against an inane and inflationary penal code.

This, admittedly, will reduce the leverage the state has
today against its citizens and its ability to intrude on their
lives, preferences, privacy, and leisure. Bureaucrats and
politicians may find this abhorrent. Freedom loving
people should rejoice.

APPENDIX - Should Drugs be Legalized?
The decriminalization of drugs is a tangled issue
involving many separate moral/ethical and practical
strands which can, probably, be summarized thus:

(a) Whose body is it anyway? Where do I start and the
government begins? What gives the state the right to
intervene in decisions pertaining only to my self and
contravene them?

PRACTICAL:

The government exercises similar "rights" in other cases
(abortion, military conscription, sex)

(b) Is the government the optimal moral agent, the best or
the right arbiter, as far as drug abuse is concerned?

PRACTICAL:

For instance, governments collaborate with the illicit drug
trade when it fits their realpolitik purposes.

(c) Is substance abuse a personal or a social choice? Can
one limit the implications, repercussions and outcomes of
one's choices in general and of the choice to abuse drugs,
in particular? If the drug abuser in effect makes decisions
for others, too - does it justify the intervention of the
state? Is the state the agent of society, is it the only agent
of society and is it the right agent of society in the case of
drug abuse?

(d) What is the difference (in rigorous philosophical
principle) between legal and illegal substances? Is it
something in the nature of the substances? In the usage
and what follows? In the structure of society? Is it a moral
fashion?

PRACTICAL:

Does scientific research support or refute common myths
and ethos regarding drugs and their abuse?

Is scientific research influenced by the current anti-drugs
crusade and hype? Are certain facts suppressed and
certain subjects left unexplored?

(e) Should drugs be decriminalized for certain purposes
(e.g., marijuana and glaucoma)? If so, where should the
line be drawn and by whom?

PRACTICAL:

Recreational drugs sometimes alleviate depression.

Should this use be permitted?



XIII. Begging Your Trust in Africa


The syntax is tortured, the grammar mutilated, but the
message - sent by snail mail, telex, fax, or e-mail - is
coherent: an African bigwig or his heirs wish to transfer
funds amassed in years of graft and venality to a safe bank
account in the West. They seek the recipient's permission
to make use of his or her inconspicuous services for a
percentage of the loot - usually many millions of dollars.

A fee is required to expedite the proceedings, or to pay
taxes, or to bribe officials - they plausibly explain. A
recent (2005) variant involves payment with expertly
forged postal money orders for goods exported to a transit
address.

It is a scam two decades old - and it still works. In
September 2002, a bookkeeper for a Berkley, Michigan
law firm embezzled $2.1 million and wired it to various
bank accounts in South Africa and Taiwan. Other victims
were kidnapped for ransom as they traveled abroad to
collect their "share". Some never made it back. Every
year, there are 5 such murders as well as 8-10 snatchings
of American citizens alone. The usual ransom demanded
is half a million to a million dollars.

The scam is so widespread that the Nigerians saw fit to
explicitly ban it in article 419 of their penal code. The
Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo castigated the
fraudsters for inflicting "incalculable damage to Nigerian
businesses" and for "placing the entire country under
suspicion".
"Wired" quotes statistics presented at the International
Conference on Advance Fee (419) Frauds in New York on
Sept. 17, 2002:
"Roughly 1 percent of the millions of people who receive
419 e-mails and faxes are successfully scammed. Annual
losses to the scam in the United States total more than
$100 million, and law enforcement officials believe
global losses may total over $1.5 billion".

According to the "IFCC 2001 Internet Fraud Report",
published by the FBI and the National White Collar Crime
Center, Nigerian letter fraud cases amount to 15.5 percent
of all grievances. The Internet Fraud Complaint Center
refers such rip-offs to the US Secret Service. While the
median loss in all manner of Internet fraud was $435 - in
the Nigerian scam it was a staggering $5575. But only one
in ten successful crimes is reported, says the FBI's report.

The IFCC provides this advisory to potential targets:
? Be skeptical of individuals representing
themselves as Nigerian or other foreign
government officials asking for your help in
placing large sums of money in overseas bank
accounts.
? Do not believe the promise of large sums of
money for your cooperation.
? Do not give out any personal information
regarding your savings, checking, credit, or other
financial accounts.
? If you are solicited, do not respond and quickly
notify the appropriate authorities.

The "419 Coalition" is more succinct and a lot more
pessimistic:
1. "NEVER pay anything up front for ANY reason.
2. NEVER extend credit for ANY reason.
3. NEVER do ANYTHING until their check clears.
4. NEVER expect ANY help from the Nigerian
Government.
5. NEVER rely on YOUR Government to bail you
out".

The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs published a brochure titled
"Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud". It describes the history of
this particular type of  swindle:
"AFF criminals include university-educated
professionals who are the best in the world for
nonviolent spectacular crimes. AFF letters first surfaced
in the mid-1980s around the time of the collapse of
world oil prices, which is Nigeria's main foreign
exchange earner. Some Nigerians turned to crime in
order to survive. Fraudulent schemes such as AFF
succeeded in Nigeria, because Nigerian criminals took
advantage of the fact that Nigerians speak English, the
international language of business, and the country's
vast oil wealth and natural gas reserves - ranked 13th in
the world - offer lucrative business opportunities that
attract many foreign companies and individuals".

According to London's Metropolitan Police Company
Fraud Department, potential targets in the UK and the
USA alone receive c. 1500 solicitations a week. The US
Secret Service Financial Crime Division takes in 100 calls
a day from Americans approach by the con-men. It now
acknowledges that "Nigerian organized crime rings
running fraud schemes through the mail and phone lines
are now so large, they represent a serious financial threat
to the country".

Sometimes even the stamps affixed to such letters are
forged. Nigerian postal workers are known to be in
cahoots with the fraudsters. Names and addresses are
obtained from "trade journals, business directories,
magazine and newspaper advertisements, chambers of
commerce, and the Internet".

Victims are either too intimidated to complain or else
reluctant to admit their collusion in money laundering and
fraud. Others try in vain to recoup their losses by
ploughing more money into the scheme.

Contrary to popular image, the scammers are often violent
and involved in other criminal pursuits, such as drug
trafficking, According to Nigeria's Drug Law
Enforcement Agency. The blight has spread to other
countries. Letters from Sierra Leone, Ghana, Congo,
Liberia, Togo, Ivory Coast, Benin, Burkina Faso, South
Africa, Taiwan, or even Canada, the United Kingdom,
Oman, and Vietnam are not uncommon.

The dodges fall into a few categories.

Over-invoiced contract scams involve the ostensible
transfer of amounts obtained through inflated invoices to
the bank account of an unrelated foreign firm. Contract
fraud or "trade default" is simply a bogus order
accompanied by a fraudulent bank draft (or fake postal or
other money order) for the products of an export company
accompanied by demand for "samples" and various
transaction "fees and charges".

Some of the rackets are plain outlandish. In the "wash-
wash" confidence trick people have been known to pay up
to $200,000 for a special solution to remove stains from
millions in defaced dollar notes. Others "bought" heavily
"discounted" crude oil stored in "secret" locations - or real
estate in rezoned locales. "Clearing houses" or "venture
capital organizations" claiming to act on behalf of the
Central Bank of Nigeria launder the proceeds of the
scams.

In another twist, charities, academic institutions, nonprofit
organizations, and religious groups are asked to pay the
inheritances tax on a "donation". Some "dignitaries" and
their relatives may seek to flee the country and ask the
victims to advance the bribe money in return for a
generous cut of the wealth they have stashed abroad.
"Bankers" may find inactive accounts with millions of
dollars - often in lottery winnings - waiting to be
transferred to a safe off-shore haven. Bogus jobs with
inflated wages are another ostensible way to defraud state-
owned companies - as is the sale of the target's used
vehicle to them for an extravagant price. There seems to
be no end to criminal ingenuity.

Lately, the correspondence purports to be coming from -
often white - disinterested professional third parties.

Accountants, lawyers, directors, trustees, security
personnel, or bankers pretend to be acting as fiduciaries
for the real dignitary in need of help. Less gullible victims
are subjected to plain old extortion with verbal
intimidation and stalking.

The more heightened public awareness grows with over-
exposure and the tighter the net of international
cooperation against the scam, the wilder the stories it
spawns. Letters have surfaced recently signed by dying
refugees, tsunami victims, survivors of the September 11
attacks, and serendipitous US commandos on mission in
Afghanistan.

Governments throughout the world have geared up to
protect their businessmen. The US Department of
Commerce, for instance, publishes the "World Traders
data Report", compiled by US embassy in Nigeria. It
"provides the following types of information: types of
organizations, year established, principal owners, size,
product line, and financial and trade references".

Unilateral US activity, inefficacious collaboration with the
Nigerian government some of whose officials are rumored
to be in on the deals, multilateral efforts in the framework
of the OECD and the Interpol, education and information
campaigns - nothing seems to be working.

The treatment of 419 fraudsters in Nigeria is so lenient
that, according to the "Nigeria Tribune", the United States
threatened the country with sanctions if it does not
considerably improve its record on financial crime by
November 2002. Both the US Treasury's Financial Crime
Enforcement Network (FINCEN) and the OECD's
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) had characterized
the country as "one of the worst perpetrators of financial
crimes in the world". The Nigerian central bank promises
to get to grips with this debilitating problem.

Nigerian themselves - though often victims of the scams -
take the phenomenon in stride. The Nigerian "Daily
Champion", proffered this insightful apologia on behalf of
the ruthless and merciless 419 gangs. It is worth quoting
at length:
"To eradicate the 419 scourge, leaders at all levels
should work assiduously to create employment
opportunities and people perception of the leaders as
role models. The country's very high unemployment
figure has made nonsense of the so-called democracy
dividends. Great majority of Nigerian youthful school
leaver's including University graduates, are without
visible means of livelihood... The fact remains that most
of these teeming youths cannot just watch our so-called
leaders siphon their God-given wealthy. So, they resorted
to alternative fraudulent means of livelihood called 419,
at least to be seen as have arrived... Some of these 419ers
are in the National Assembly and the State Houses of
Assembly while some surround the President and
governors across the country".

Some swindlers seek to glorify their criminal activities
with a political and historical context. The Web site of the
"419 Coalition" contains letters casting the scam as a form
of forced reparation for slavery, akin to the compensation
paid by Germany to survivors of the holocaust. The
confidence tricksters boast of defrauding the "white
civilization" and unmasking the falsity of its claims for
superiority. But a few delusional individuals aside, this is
nothing but a smokescreen.

Greed outweighs fear and avarice enmeshes people in
clearly criminal enterprises. The "victims" of advance fee
scams are rarely incognizant of their alleged role. They
knowingly and intentionally collude with self-professed
criminals to fleece governments and institutions. This is
one of the rare crimes where prey and perpetrator may
well deserve each other.



XIV. Organ Trafficking in Eastern Europe


A kidney fetches $2700 in Turkey. According to the
October 2002 issue of the Journal of the American
Medical Association, this is a high price. An Indian or
Iraqi kidney enriches its former owner by a mere $1000.

Wealthy clients later pay for the rare organ up to
$150,000.

CBS News aired, five years ago, a documentary, filmed
by Antenna 3 of Spain, in which undercover reporters in
Mexico were asked, by a priest acting as a middleman for
a doctor, to pay close to 1 million dollars for a single
kidney. An auction of a human kidney on eBay in
February 2000 drew a bid of $100,000 before the
company put a stop to it. Another auction in September
1999 drew $5.7 million - though, probably, merely as a
prank.

Organ harvesting operations flourish in Turkey, in central
Europe, mainly in the Czech Republic, and in the
Caucasus, mainly in Georgia. They operate on Turkish,
Moldovan, Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Romanian,
Bosnian, Kosovar, Macedonian, Albanian and assorted
east European donors.

They remove kidneys, lungs, pieces of liver, even corneas,
bones, tendons, heart valves, skin and other sellable
human bits. The organs are kept in cold storage and air
lifted to illegal distribution centers in the United States,
Germany, Scandinavia, the United Kingdom, Israel, South
Africa, and other rich, industrialized locales. It gives
"brain drain" a new, spine chilling, meaning.

Organ trafficking has become an international trade. It
involves Indian, Thai, Philippine, Brazilian, Turkish and
Israeli doctors who scour the Balkan and other destitute
regions for tissues. The Washington Post reported, in
November 2002, that in a single village in Moldova, 14
out of 40 men were reduced by penury to selling body
parts.

Four years ago, Moldova cut off the thriving baby
adoption trade due to an - an unfounded - fear the toddlers
were being dissected for spare organs. According to the
Israeli daily, Ha'aretz, the Romanians are investigating
similar allegations in Israel and have withheld permission
to adopt Romanian babies from dozens of eager and out of
pocket couples. American authorities are scrutinizing a
two year old Moldovan harvesting operation based in the
United States.

Organ theft and trading in Ukraine is a smooth operation.

According to news agencies, in August 2002, three
Ukrainian doctors were charged in Lvov with trafficking
in the organs of victims of road accidents. The doctors
used helicopters to ferry kidneys and livers to colluding
hospitals. They charged up to $19,000 per organ.

The West Australian daily surveyed in January 2002 the
thriving organs business in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sellers
are offering their wares openly, through newspaper ads.

Prices reach up to $68,000. Compared to an average
monthly wage of less than $200, this is an unimaginable
fortune.

National health insurance schemes turn a blind eye.

Israel's participates in the costs of purchasing organs
abroad, though only subject to rigorous vetting of the
sources of the donation. Still, a May 2001 article in a the
New York Times Magazine, quotes "the coordinator of
kidney transplantation at Hadassah University Hospital in
Jerusalem (as saying that) 60 of the 244 patients currently
receiving post-transplant care purchased their new kidney
from a stranger - just short of 25 percent of the patients at
one of Israel's largest medical centers participating in the
organ business".

Many Israelis - attempting to avoid scrutiny - travel to
east Europe, accompanied by Israeli doctors, to perform
the transplantation surgery. These junkets are
euphemistically known as "transplant tourism". Clinics
have sprouted all over the benighted region. Israeli
doctors have recently visited impoverished Macedonia,
Bulgaria, Kosovo and Yugoslavia to discuss with local
businessmen and doctors the setting up of kidney
transplant clinics.

Such open involvement in what can be charitably
described as a latter day slave trade gives rise to a new
wave of thinly disguised anti-Semitism. The Ukrainian
Echo, quoting the Ukrinform news agency, reported, on
January 7, 2002, that, implausibly, a Ukrainian guest
worker died in Tel-Aviv in mysterious circumstances and
his heart was removed. The Interpol, according to the
paper, is investigating this lurid affair.

According to scholars, reports of organ thefts and related
abductions, mainly of children, have been rife in Poland
and Russia at least since 1991. The buyers are supposed to
be rich Arabs.

Nancy Scheper-Hughes, an anthropologist at the
University of California at Berkeley and co-founder of
Organs Watch, a research and documentation center, is
also a member and co-author of the Bellagio Task Force
Report on Transplantation, Bodily Integrity and the
International Traffic in Organs. In a report presented in
June 2001 to the House Subcommittee on International
Operations and Human Rights, she substantiated at least
the nationality of the alleged buyers, though not the urban
legends regarding organ theft:

"In the Middle East residents of the Gulf States (Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, and Oman) have for many years traveled to
India, the Philippines, and to Eastern Europe to purchase
kidneys made scarce locally due to local fundamentalist
Islamic teachings that allow organ transplantation (to save
a life), but prohibit organ harvesting from brain-dead
bodies.

Meanwhile, hundreds of kidney patients from Israel,
which has its own well -developed, but under-used
transplantation centers (due to ultra-orthodox Jewish
reservations about brain death) travel in 'transplant tourist'
junkets to Turkey, Moldova, Romania where desperate
kidney sellers can be found, and to Russia where an
excess of lucrative cadaveric organs are produced due to
lax standards for designating brain death, and to South
Africa where the amenities in transplantation clinics in
private hospitals can resemble four star hotels.

We found in many countries - from Brazil and Argentina
to India, Russia, Romania, Turkey to South Africa and
parts of the United States - a kind of 'apartheid medicine'
that divides the world into two distinctly different
populations of 'organs supplies' and 'organs receivers'."

Russia, together with Estonia, China and Iraq, is, indeed, a
major harvesting and trading centre. International news
agencies described, five years ago, how a grandmother in
Ryazan tried to sell her grandchild to a mediator. The boy
was to be smuggled to the West and there dismembered
for his organs. The uncle, who assisted in the matter, was
supposed to collect $70,000 - a fortune in Russian terms.

When confronted by the European Union on this issue,
Russia responded that it lacks the resources required to
monitor organ donations. The Italian magazine, Happy
Web, reports that organ trading has taken to the Internet.

A simple query on the Google search engine yields
thousands of Web sites purporting to sell various body
parts - mostly kidneys - for up to $125,000. The sellers are
Russian, Moldovan, Ukrainian and Romanian.

Scheper-Hughes, an avid opponent of legalizing any form
of trade in organs, says that "in general, the movement
and flow of living donor organs - mostly kidneys - is from
South to North, from poor to rich, from black and brown
to white, and from female to male bodies".

Yet, in the summer of 2002, bowing to reality, the
American Medical Association commissioned a study to
examine the effects of paying for cadaveric organs would
have on the current shortage. The 1984 National Organ
Transplant Act that forbids such payments is also under
attack. Bills to amend it were submitted recently by
several Congressmen. These are steps in the right
direction.

Organ trafficking is the outcome of the international ban
on organ sales and live donor organs. But wherever there
is demand there is a market. Excruciating poverty of
potential donors, lengthening patient waiting lists and the
better quality of organs harvested from live people make
organ sales an irresistible proposition. The medical
professions and authorities everywhere would do better to
legalize and regulate the trade rather than transform it into
a form of organized crime. The denizens of Moldova
would surely appreciate it.



XV. Selling Arms to Rogue States

Also Read
Russian Roulette - The Security Apparatus


In a desperate bid to fend off sanctions, the Bosnian
government banned yesterday all trade in arms and
munitions. A local, Serb-owned company was
documented by the State Department selling spare parts
and maintenance for military aircraft to Iraq via Yugoslav
shell companies.

Heads rolled. In the Republika Srpska, the Serb
component of the ramshackle Bosnian state, both the
Defense Minister Slobodan Bilic and army Chief of Staff
Novica Simic resigned. Another casualty was the general
director of the Orao Aircraft Institute of Bijeljina - Milan
Prica. On the Yugoslav side, Jugoimport chief Gen Jovan
Cekovic and federal Deputy Defense Minister Ivan Djokic
stood down.

Bosnia's is only the latest in a series of embarrassing
disclosures in practically every country of the former
eastern bloc, including all the EU accession candidates.

With the crumbling of the Warsaw pact and the
economies of the region, millions of former military and
secret service operators resorted to peddling weapons and
martial expertise to rogue states, terrorist outfits, and
organized crime. The confluence - and, lately,
convergence - of these interests is threatening Europe's
very stability.

Last week, the Polish "Rzeczpospolita" accused the
Military Information services (WSI) of illicit arms sales
between 1992-6 through both private and state-run
entities. The weapons were plundered from the Polish
army and sold at half price to Croatia and Somalia, both
under UN arms embargo.

Deals were struck with the emerging international
operations of the Russian mafia. Terrorist middlemen and
Latvian state officials were involved. Breaching Poland's
democratic veneer, the Polish Ministry of Defense
threatened to sue the paper for disclosing state secrets.

Police in Lodz is still investigating the alarming
disappearance of 4 Arrow anti-aircraft missiles from a
train transporting arms from a factory to the port of
Gdansk, to be exported. The private security escort claim
innocence.

The Czech Military Intelligence Services (VZS) have long
been embroiled in serial scandals. The Czech defense
attaché to India, Miroslav Kvasnak, was recently fired for
disobeying explicit orders from the minister of defense.

According to Jane's, Kvasnak headed URNA - the elite
anti-terrorist unit of the Czech National Police. He was
sacked in 1995 for selling Semtex, the notorious Czech
plastic explosive, as well as weapons and munitions to
organized crime gangs.

In late August, the Czechs arrested arms traffickers,
members of an international ring, for selling Russian
weapons - including, incredibly, tanks, fighter planes,
naval vessels, long range rockets, and missile platforms -
to Iraq. The operation has lasted 3 years and was
conducted from Prague.

According to the "Wall Street Journal", the Czech
intelligence services halted the sale of $300 million worth
of the Tamara radar systems to Iraq in 1997. Czech firms,
such as Agroplast, a leading waste processing company,
have often been openly accused of weapons smuggling.
"The Guardian" tracked in February a delivery of missiles
and guidance systems from the Czech Republic through
Syria to Iraq.

German go-betweens operate in the Baltic countries. In
May a sale of more than two pounds of the radioactive
element cesium-137 was thwarted in Vilnius, the capital
of Lithuania. The substance was sold to terrorist groups
bent on producing a "dirty bomb", believe US officials
quoted by "The Guardian". The Director of the CIA, John
Deutsch, testified in Congress in 1996 about previous
cases in Lithuania involving two tons of radioactive
wolfram and 220 pounds of uranium-238.

Still, the epicenters of the illicit trade in weapons are in
the Balkan, in Russia, and in the republics of the former
Soviet Union. Here, domestic firms intermesh with
Western intermediaries, criminals, terrorists, and state
officials to engender a pernicious, ubiquitous and
malignant web of smuggling and corruption.

According to the Center for Public Integrity and the
Western media, over the last decade, renegade Russian
army officers have sold weapons to every criminal and
terrorist organization in the world - from the IRA to al-
Qaida and to every failed state, from Liberia to Libya.

They are protected by well-connected, bribe-paying, arms
dealers and high-level functionaries in every branch of
government. They launder the proceeds through Russian
oil multinationals, Cypriot, Balkan, and Lebanese banks,
and Asian, Swiss, Austrian, and British trading
conglomerates - all obscurely owned and managed.

The most serious breach of the united international front
against Iraq may be the sale of the $100 million anti-
stealth Ukrainian Kolchuga radar to the pariah state two
years ago. Taped evidence suggests that president Leonid
Kuchma himself instructed the General Director of the
Ukrainian arms sales company, UkrSpetzExport, Valery
Malev to conclude the deal. Malev died in a mysterious
car accident on March 6, three days after his taped
conversation with Kuchma surfaced.

The Ukrainians insist that they were preempted by
Russian dealers who sold a similar radar system to Iraq -
but this is highly unlikely as the Russian system was still
in development at the time. the American and British are
currently conducting a high-profile investigation in Kyiv.

In Russia, illegal arms are traded mainly by the Western
Group of Forces in cahoots with private companies, both
domestic and foreign. The Air Defense Army specializes
in selling light arms. The army is the main source of
weapons - plastic explosives, grenade launchers,
munitions - of both Chechen rebels and Chechen
criminals. Contrary to received opinion, volunteer-
soldiers, not conscripts, control the arms trade. The state
itself is involved in arms proliferation. Sales to China and
Iran were long classified. From June, all sales of materiel
enjoy "state secret" status.

There is little the US can do. The Bush administration has
imposed in May sanctions on Armenian and Moldovan
companies, among others, for aiding and abetting Iran's
efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Armenian
president, Robert Kocharian, indignantly denied
knowledge of such transactions and vowed to get to the
bottom of the American allegations.

The Foreign Policy Research Institute, quoted by Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, described a "Department of
Energy (DOE) initiative, underway since 1993, to
improve 'material protection, control and accountability' at
former Soviet nuclear enterprises. The program enjoys
substantial bipartisan support in the United States and is
considered the first line of defense
against unwanted proliferation episodes."


"As of February 2000, more than 8 years after the collapse
of the USSR, new security systems had been installed at
113 buildings, most of them in Russia; however, these
sites contained only 7 percent of the estimated 650 tons of
weapons-usable material considered at risk for theft or
diversion. DOE plans call for safeguarding 60 percent of
the material by 2006 and the rest in 10 to 15 years or
longer".

Russian traders learned to circumvent official channels
and work through Belarus. Major General Stsyapan
Sukharenka, the first deputy chief of the Belarusian KGB,
denied, in March, any criminal arms trading in his
country. This vehement protest is gainsaid by the
preponderance of Belarusian arms traders replete with
fake end-user certificates in Croatia during the Yugoslav
wars of secession (1992-5).

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Steven Pifer said that
UN inspectors unearthed Belarusian artillery in Iraq in
1996. Iraqis are also being trained in Belarus to operate
various advanced weapons systems. The secret services
and armies of Ukraine, Russia, and even Romania use
Belarus to mask the true origin of weapons sold in
contravention of UN sanctions.

Western arms manufacturers lobby their governments to
enhance their sales. Legitimate Russian and Ukrainian
sales are often thwarted by Western political arm-twisting.

When Macedonia, in the throes of a civil war it was about
to lose, purchased helicopter gunships from Ukraine, the
American Embassy leaned on the government to annul the
contracts and threatened to withhold aid and credits if it
does not succumb.

The duopoly, enjoyed by the USA and Russia, forces
competitors to go underground and to seek rogue or
felonious customers. Yugoslav scientists, employed by
Jugoimport and other firms run by former army officers,
are developing cruise missiles for Iraq, alleges the
American administration. The accusation, though, is
dubious as Iraq has no access to satellites to guide such
missiles.

Another Yugoslav firm, Brunner, constructed a Libyan
rocket propellant manufacturing facility. In an interview
to the "Washington Post", Yugoslavia's president Vojislav
Kostunica brushed off the American complaints about, as
he put it disdainfully, "overhauling older-generation
aircraft engines".

Such exploits are not unique to Yugoslavia or Bosnia. The
Croat security services are notorious for their collusion in
drug and arms trafficking, mainly via Hungary.

Macedonian construction companies collaborate with
manufacturers of heavy machinery and purveyors of
missile technology in an effort to recoup hundreds of
millions of dollars in Iraqi debts. Albanian crime gangs
collude with weapon smugglers based in Montenegro and
Kosovo. The Balkan - from Greece to Hungary - is
teeming with these penumbral figures.

Arms smuggling is a by-product of criminalized societies,
destitution, and dysfunctional institutions. The prolonged
period of failed transition in countries such as Yugoslavia,
Macedonia, Bosnia, Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine has
entrenched organized crime. It now permeates every
legitimate economic sphere and every organ of the state.

Whether this situation is reversible is the subject of heated
debate. But it is the West which pays the price in
increased crime rates and, probably in Iraq, in added
fatalities once it launches war against that murderous
regime.



XVI.   The Industrious Spies

By: Dr. Sam Vaknin
Also published by United Press International (UPI)


The Web site of GURPS (Generic Universal Role Playing
System) lists 18 "state of the art equipments (sic) used for
advanced spying". These include binoculars to read lips,
voice activated bugs, electronic imaging devices,
computer taps, electromagnetic induction detectors,
acoustic stethoscopes, fiber optic scopes, detectors of
acoustic emissions (e.g., of printers), laser mikes that can
decipher and amplify voice-activated vibrations of
windows, and other James Bond gear.

Such contraptions are an integral part of industrial
espionage. The American Society for Industrial Security
(ASIC) estimated a few years ago that the damage caused
by economic or commercial espionage to American
industry between 1993-5 alone was c. $63 billion.

The average net loss per incident reported was $19 million
in high technology, $29 million in services, and $36
million in manufacturing. ASIC than upped its estimate to
$300 billion in 1997 alone - compared to $100 billion
assessed by the 1995 report of the White House Office of
Science and Technology.

This figures are mere extrapolations based on anecdotal
tales of failed espionage. Many incidents go unreported.

In his address to the 1998 World Economic Forum, Frank
Ciluffo, Deputy Director of the CSIS Global Organized
Crime Project, made clear why:
"The perpetrators keep quiet for obvious reasons. The
victims do so out of fear. It may jeopardize shareholder
and consumer confidence. Employees may lose their jobs.

It may invite copycats by inadvertently revealing
vulnerabilities. And competitors may take advantage of
the negative publicity. In fact, they keep quiet for all the
same reasons corporations do not report computer
intrusions".

Interactive Television Technologies complained - in a
press release dated August 16, 1996 - that someone broke
into its Amherst, NY, offices and stole "three computers
containing the plans, schematics, diagrams and
specifications for the BUTLER, plus a number of
computer disks with access codes." BUTLER is a
proprietary technology which helps connect television to
computer networks, such as the Internet. It took four years
to develop.

In a single case, described in the Jan/Feb 1996 issue of
"Foreign Affairs", Ronald Hoffman, a software scientist,
sold secret applications developed for the Strategic
Defense Initiative to Japanese corporations, such as
Nissan Motor Company, Mitsubishi Electric, Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries, and Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy
Industries. He was caught in 1992, having received
$750,000 from his "clients", who used the software in
their civilian aerospace projects.

Canal Plus Technologies, a subsidiary of French media
giant Vivendi, filed a lawsuit last March against NDS, a
division of News Corp. Canal accused NDS of hacking
into its pay TV smart cards and distributing the cracked
codes freely on a piracy Web site. It sued NDS for $1.1
billion in lost revenues. This provided a rare glimpse into
information age, hacker-based, corporate espionage
tactics.

Executives of publicly traded design software developer
Avant! went to jail for purchasing batches of computer
code from former employees of Cadence in 1997.

Reuters Analytics, an American subsidiary of Reuters
Holdings, was accused in 1998 of theft of proprietary
information from Bloomberg by stealing source codes
from its computers.

In December 2001, Say Lye Ow, a Malaysian subject and
a former employee of Intel, was sentenced to 24 months in
prison for illicitly copying computer files containing
advanced designs of Intel's Merced (Itanium)
microprocessor. It was the crowning achievement of a
collaboration between the FBI's High-Tech squad and the
US Attorney's Office CHIP - Computer Hacking and
Intellectual Property - unit.

U.S. Attorney David W. Shapiro said: "People and
companies who steal intellectual property are thieves just
as bank robbers are thieves. In this case, the Itanium
microprocessor is an extremely valuable product that took
Intel and HP years to develop. These cases should send
the message throughout Silicon Valley and the Northern
District that the U.S. Attorney's Office takes seriously the
theft of intellectual property and will prosecute these
cases to the full extent of the law".

Yet, such cases are vastly more common than publicly
acknowledged.
"People have struck up online friendships with employers
and then lured them into conspiracy to commit espionage.

People have put bounties on laptops of executives. People
have disguised themselves as janitors to gain physical
access," Richard Power, editorial director of the Computer
Security Institute told MSNBC.

Marshall Phelps, IBM Vice President for Commercial and
Industry Relations admitted to the Senate Judiciary
Committee as early as April 1992:
"Among the most blatant actions are outright theft of
corporate proprietary assets. Such theft has occurred from
many quarters: competitors, governments seeking to
bolster national industrial champions, even employees.

Unfortunately, IBM has been the victim of such acts".

Raytheon, a once thriving defense contractor, released
"SilentRunner", a $25,000-65,000 software package
designed to counter the "insider threat". Its brochure,
quoted by "Wired", says:
"We know that 84 percent of your network threats can be
expected to come from inside your organization.... This
least intrusive of all detection systems will guard the
integrity of your network against abuses from
unauthorized employees, former employees, hackers or
terrorists and competitors".

This reminds many of the FBI's Carnivore massive
network sniffer software. It also revives the old dilemma
between privacy and security. An Omni Consulting
survey of 3200 companies worldwide pegged damage
caused by insecure networks at $12 billion.

There is no end to the twists and turns of espionage cases
and to the creativity shown by the perpetrators.

On June 2001 an indictment was handed down against
Nicholas Daddona. He stands accused of a unique
variation on the old theme of industrial espionage: he was
employed by two firms - transferring trade secrets from
one (Fabricated Metal Products) to the other (Eyelet).

Jungsheng Wang was indicted last year for copying the
architecture of the Sequoia ultrasound machine developed
by Acuson Corporation. He sold it to Bell Imaging, a
Californian company which, together with a Chinese firm,
owns a mainland China corporation, also charged in the
case. The web of collaboration between foreign - or
foreign born - scientists with access to trade and
technology secrets, domestic corporations and foreign
firms, often a cover for government interests - is clearly
exposed here.

Kenneth Cullen and Bruce Zak were indicted on April
2001 for trying to purchase a printed or text version of the
source code of a computer application for the processing
of health care benefit claim forms developed by ZirMed.

The legal status of printed source code is unclear. It is
undoubtedly intellectual property - but of which kind? Is it
software or printed matter?
Peter Morch, a senior R&D team leader for CISCO was
accused on March 2001 for simply burning onto compact
discs all the intellectual property he could lay his hands on
with the intent of using it in his new workplace, Calix
Networks, a competitor of CISCO.

Perhaps the most bizarre case involves Fausto Estrada. He
was employed by a catering company that served the
private lunches to Mastercard's board of directors. He
offered to sell Visa proprietary information that he
claimed to have stolen from Mastercard. In a letter signed
"Cagliostro", Fausto demanded $1 million. He was caught
red-handed in an FBI sting operation on February 2001.

Multinationals are rarely persecuted even when known to
have colluded with offenders. Steven Louis Davis pleaded
guilty on January 1998 to stealing trade secrets and
designs from Gillette and selling them to its competitors,
such as Bic Corporation, American Safety Razor, and
Warner Lambert. Yet, it seems that only he paid the price
for his misdeeds - 27 months in prison. Bic claims to have
immediately informed Gillette of the theft and to have
collaborated with Gillette's Legal Department and the
FBI.

Nor are industrial espionage or the theft of intellectual
property limited to industry. Mayra Justine Trujillo-Cohen
was sentenced on October 1998 to 48 months in prison for
stealing proprietary software from Deloitte-Touche, where
she worked as a consultant, and passing it for its own.

Caroll Lee Campbell, the circulation manager of Gwinette
Daily Post (GDP), offered to sell proprietary business and
financial information of his employer to lawyers
representing a rival paper locked in bitter dispute with
GDP.

Nor does industrial espionage necessarily involve
clandestine, cloak and dagger, operations. The Internet
and information technology are playing an increasing role.

In a bizarre case, Caryn Camp developed in 1999 an
Internet-relationship with a self-proclaimed entrepreneur,
Stephen Martin. She stole he employer's trade secrets for
Martin in the hope of attaining a senior position in
Martin's outfit - or, at least, of being richly rewarded.

Camp was exposed when she mis-addressed an e-mail
expressing her fears - to a co-worker.

Steven Hallstead and Brian Pringle simply advertised their
wares - designs of five advanced Intel chips - on the Web.

They were, of course, caught and sentenced to more than
5 years in prison. David Kern copied the contents of a
laptop inadvertently left behind by a serviceman of a
competing firm. Kern trapped himself. He was forced to
plead the Fifth Amendment during his deposition in a civil
lawsuit he filed against his former employer. This, of
course, provoked the curiosity of the FBI.

Stolen trade secrets can spell the difference between
extinction and profitability. Jack Shearer admitted to
building an $8 million business on trade secrets pilfered
from Caterpillar and Solar Turbines.

United States Attorney Paul E. Coggins stated: "This is
the first EEA case in which the defendants pled guilty to
taking trade secret information and actually converting the
stolen information into manufactured products that were
placed in the stream of commerce. The sentences handed
down today (June 15, 2000) are among the longest
sentences ever imposed in an Economic Espionage case".

Economic intelligence gathering - usually based on open
sources - is both legitimate and indispensable. Even
reverse engineering - disassembling a competitor's
products to learn its secrets - is a grey legal area. Spying is
different. It involves the purchase or theft of proprietary
information illicitly. It is mostly committed by firms. But
governments also share with domestic corporations and
multinationals the fruits of their intelligence networks.

Former - and current - intelligence operators (i.e., spooks),
political and military information brokers, and assorted
shady intermediaries - all switched from dwindling Cold
War business to the lucrative market of "competitive
intelligence".

US News and World Report described on May 6, 1996,
how a certain Mr. Kota - an alleged purveyor of secret
military technology to the KGB in the 1980's - conspired
with a scientist, a decade later, to smuggle
biotechnologically modified hamster ovaries to India.

This transition fosters international tensions even among
allies. "Countries don't have friends - they have interests!"
- screamed a DOE poster in the mid-nineties. France has
vigorously protested US spying on French economic and
technological developments - until it was revealed to be
doing the same. French relentless and unscrupulous
pursuit of purloined intellectual property in the USA is
described in Peter Schweizer's "Friendly Spies: How
America's Allies Are Using Economic Espionage to Steal
Our Secrets."
"Le Mond" reported back in 1996 about intensified
American efforts to purchase from French bureaucrats and
legislators information regarding France's WTO,
telecommunications, and audio-visual policies. Several
CIA operators were expelled.

Similarly, according to Robert Dreyfuss in the January
1995 issue of "Mother Jones", Non Official Cover (NOC)
CIA operators - usually posing as businessmen - are
stationed in Japan. These agents conduct economic and
technological espionage throughout Asia, including in
South Korea and China.

Even the New York Times chimed in, accusing American
intelligence agents of assisting US trade negotiators by
eavesdropping on Japanese officials during the car
imports row in 1995. And President Clinton admitted
openly that intelligence gathered by the CIA regarding the
illegal practices of French competitors allowed American
aerospace firms to win multi-billion dollar contracts in
Brazil and Saudi Arabia.

The respected German weekly, Der Spiegel, castigated the
USA, in 1990, for arm-twisting the Indonesian
government into splitting a $200 million satellite contract
between the Japanese NEC and US manufacturers. The
American, alleged the magazines, intercepted messages
pertaining to the deal, using the infrastructure of the
National Security Agency (NSA). Brian Gladwell, a
former NATO computer expert, calls it "state-sponsored
information piracy".

Robert Dreyfuss, writing in "Mother Jones", accused the
CIA of actively gathering industrial intelligence (i.e.,
stealing trade secrets) and passing them on to America's
Big Three carmakers. He quoted Clinton administration
officials as saying: "(the CIA) is a good source of
information about the current state of technology in a
foreign country ... We've always managed to get
intelligence to the business community. There is contact
between business people and the intelligence community,
and information flows both ways, informally".

A February 1995 National Security Strategy statement
cited by MSNBC declared:
"Collection and analysis can help level the economic
playing field by identifying threats to U.S. companies
from foreign intelligence services and unfair trading
practices".

The Commerce Department's Advocacy Center solicits
commercial information thus:
"Contracts pursued by foreign firms that receive
assistance from their home governments to pressure a
customer into a buying decision; unfair treatment by
government decision-makers, preventing you from a
chance to compete; tenders tied up in bureaucratic red
tape, resulting in lost opportunities and unfair advantage
to a competitor. If these or any similar export issues are
affecting your company, it's time to call the Advocacy
Center".

And then, of course, there is Echelon.

Exposed two years ago by the European Parliament in
great fanfare, this telecommunications interception
network, run by the US, UK, New Zealand, Australia, and
Canada has become the focus of bitter mutual
recriminations and far flung conspiracy theories.

These have abated following the brutal terrorist attacks of
September 11 when the need for Echelon-like system with
even laxer legal control was made abundantly clear.

France, Russia, and 28 other nations operate indigenous
mini-Echelons, their hypocritical protestations to the
contrary notwithstanding.

But, with well over $600 billion a year invested in easily
pilfered R&D, the US is by far the prime target and main
victim of such activities rather than their chief perpetrator.

The harsh - and much industry lobbied - "Economic
Espionage (and Protection of Proprietary Economic
Information) Act of 1996" defines the criminal offender
thus:
"Whoever, intending or knowing that the offense will
benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality,
or foreign agent, knowingly" and "whoever, with intent to
convert a trade secret, that is related to or included in a
product that is produced for or placed in interstate or
foreign commerce, to the economic benefit of anyone
other than the owner thereof, and intending or knowing
that the offense will , injure any owner of that trade
secret":
"(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes,
carries away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or
deception obtains a trade secret (2) without authorization
copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs,
downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies,
replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails,
communicates, or conveys a trade secret (3) receives,
buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to
have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted
without authorization (4) attempts to commit any offense
described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3); or (5)
conspires with one or more other persons to commit any
offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (4),
and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the
object of conspiracy".

Other countries either have similar statutes (e.g., France) -
or are considering to introduce them. Taiwan's National
Security Council has been debating a local version of an
economic espionage law lat month. There have been
dozens of prosecutions under the law hitherto. Companies
- such as "Four Pillars" which stole trade secrets from
Avery Dennison - paid fines of millions of US dollars.

Employees - such as PPG's Patrick Worthing - and their
accomplices were jailed.

Foreign citizens - like the Taiwanese Kai-Lo Hsu and
Prof. Charles Ho from National Chiao Tung university -
were detained. Mark Halligan of Welsh and Katz in
Chicago lists on his Web site more than 30 important
economic espionage cases tried under the law by July last
year.

The Economic Espionage law authorizes the FBI to act
against foreign intelligence gathering agencies toiling on
US soil with the aim of garnering proprietary economic
information. During the Congressional hearings that
preceded the law, the FBI estimated that no less that 23
governments, including the Israeli, French, Japanese,
German, British, Swiss, Swedish, and Russian, were busy
doing exactly that. Louis Freeh, the former director of the
FBI, put it succinctly: "Economic Espionage is the
greatest threat to our national security since the Cold
War".

The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs runs a program
which commutes military service to work at high tech US
firms. Program-enrolled French computer engineers were
arrested attempting to steal proprietary source codes from
their American employers.

In an interview he granted to the German ZDF Television
quoted by "Daily Yomiuri" and Netsafe, the former
Director of the French foreign counterintelligence service,
the DGSE, freely confessed:
"....All secret services of the big democracies undertake
economic espionage ... Their role is to peer into hidden
corners and in that context business plays an important
part ... In France the state is not just responsible for the
laws, it is also an entrepreneur. There are state-owned and
semi-public companies. And that is why it is correct that
for decades the French state regulated the market with its
right hand in some ways and used its intelligence service
with its left hand to furnish its commercial companies ... It
is among the tasks of the secret services to shed light on
and analyze the white, grey and black aspects of the
granting of such major contracts, particularly in far-off
countries".

The FBI investigated 400 economic espionage cases in
1995 - and 800 in 1996. It interfaces with American
corporations and obtains investigative leads from them
through its 26 years old Development of Espionage,
Counterintelligence, and Counter terrorism Awareness
(DECA) Program renamed ANSIR (Awareness of
National Security Issues and Response). Every local FBI
office has a White Collar Crime squad in charge of
thwarting industrial espionage. The State Department runs
a similar outfit called the Overseas Security Advisory
Council (OSAC).

These are massive operations. In 1993-4 alone, the FBI
briefed well over a quarter of a million corporate officers
in more than 20,000 firms. By 1995, OSAC collaborated
on overseas security problems with over 1400 private
enterprises. "Country Councils", comprised of embassy
official and private American business, operate in dozens
of foreign cities. They facilitate the exchange of timely
"unclassified" and threat-related security information.

More than 1600 US companies and organization are
currently permanently affiliated wit OSAC. Its Advisory
Council is made up of twenty-one private sector and four
public sector member organizations that, according to
OSAC, "represent specific industries or agencies that
operate abroad. Private sector members serve for two to
three years. More than fifty U.S. companies and
organizations have already served on the Council.

Member organizations designate representatives to work
on the Council.

These representatives provide the direction and guidance
to develop programs that most benefit the U.S. private
sector overseas. Representatives meet quarterly and staff
committees tasked with specific projects. Current
committees include Transnational Crime, Country
Council Support, Protection of Information and
Technology, and Security Awareness and Education".

But the FBI is only one of many agencies that deal with
the problem in the USA. The President's Annual Report to
Congress on "Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial
Espionage" dated July 1995, describes the multiple
competitive intelligence (CI) roles of the Customs
Service, the Department of Defense, the Department of
Energy, and the CIA.

The federal government alerts its contractors to CI threats
and subjects them to "awareness programs" under the
DOD's Defense Information Counter Espionage (DICE)
program. The Defense Investigative Service (DIS)
maintains a host of useful databases such as the Foreign
Ownership, Control, or Influence (FOCI) register. It is
active otherwise as well, conducting personal security
interviews by industrial security representatives and
keeping tabs on the foreign contacts of security cleared
facilities. And the list goes on.

According to the aforementioned report to Congress:
"The industries that have been the targets in most cases of
economic espionage and other collection activities include
biotechnology; aerospace; telecommunications, including
the technology to build the 'information superhighway';
computer software/ hardware; advanced transportation
and engine technology; advanced materials and coatings,
including 'stealth' technologies; energy research; defense
and armaments technology; manufacturing processes; and
semiconductors. Proprietary business information-that is,
bid, contract, customer, and strategy in these sectors is
aggressively targeted. Foreign collectors have also shown
great interest in government and corporate financial and
trade data".

The collection methods range from the traditional - agent
recruitment and break ins - to the technologically
fantastic. Mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, research
and development partnerships, licensing and franchise
agreements, friendship societies, international exchange
programs, import-export companies - often cover up for
old fashioned reconnaissance. Foreign governments
disseminate disinformation to scare off competitors - or
lure then into well-set traps.

Foreign students, foreign employees, foreign tourist
guides, tourists, immigrants, translators, affable
employees of NGO's, eager consultants, lobbyists, spin
doctors, and mock journalists are all part of national
concerted efforts to prevail in the global commercial
jungle. Recruitment of traitors and patriots is at its peak in
international trade fairs, air shows, sabbaticals, scientific
congresses, and conferences.

On May 2001, Takashi Okamoto and Hiroaki Serizwa
were indicted of stealing DNA and cell line reagents from
Lerner Research Institute and the Cleveland Clinic
Foundation. This was done on behalf of the Institute of
Physical and Chemical Research (RIKEN) in Japan - an
outfit 94 funded by the Japanese government. The
indictment called RIKEN "an instrumentality of the
government of Japan".

The Chinese Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
was involved on May 2001 in an egregious case of theft of
intellectual property. Two development scientists of
Chinese origin transferred the PathStar Access Server
technology to a Chinese corporation owned by the
ministry. The joint venture it formed with the
thieves promptly came out with its own product probably
based on the stolen secrets.

The following ad appeared in the Asian Wall Street
Journal in 1991 - followed by a contact phone number in
western Europe:
"Do you have advanced/privileged information of any
type of project/contract that is going to be carried out in
your country? We hold commission/agency agreements
with many large European companies and could introduce
them to your project/contract. Any commission received
would be shared with yourselves".

Ben Venzke, publisher of Intelligence Watch Report,
describes how Mitsubishi filed c. 1500 FOIA (Freedom of
Information Act) requests in 1987 alone, in an effort to
enter the space industry. The US Patent office is another
great source of freely available proprietary information.

Industrial espionage is not new. In his book, "War by
Other Means: Economic Espionage in America", The
Wall Street Journal's John Fialka, vividly describes how
Frances Cabot Lowell absconded from Britain with the
plans for the cutting edge Cartwright loom in 1813.

Still, the phenomenon has lately become more egregious
and more controversial. As Cold War structures - from
NATO to the KGB and the CIA - seek to redefine
themselves and to assume new roles and new functions,
economic espionage offers a tempting solution.

Moreover, decades of increasing state involvement in
modern economies have blurred the traditional
demarcation between the private and the public sectors.

Many firms are either state-owned (in Europe) or state-
financed (in Asia) or sustained by state largesse and
patronage (the USA). Many businessmen double as
politicians and numerous politicians serve on corporate
boards.

Eisenhower's "military-industrial complex" though not as
sinister as once imagined is, all the same, a reality. The
deployment of state intelligence assets and resources to
help the private sector gain a competitive edge is merely
its manifestation.

As foreign corporate ownership becomes widespread, as
multinationals expand, as nation-states dissolve into
regions and coalesce into supranational states - the classic,
exclusionary, and dichotomous view of the world ("we"
versus "they") will fade. But the notion of "proprietary
information" is here to stay. And theft will never cease as
long as there is profit to be had.



XVII.  Russia's Idled Spies

Also Read"
The Industrious Spies
Russian Roulette - The Security Apparatus


On November 11, 2002, Sweden expelled two Russian
diplomats for spying on radar and missile guidance
technologies for the JAS 39 British-Swedish Gripen
fighter jet developed by Telefon AB LM Ericsson, the
telecommunications multinational. The Russians
threatened to reciprocate. Five current and former
employees of the corporate giant are being investigated.

Ironically, the first foreign buyer of the aircraft may well
be Poland, a former Soviet satellite state and a current
European Union candidate.

Sweden arrested in February 2001 a worker of the Swiss-
Swedish engineering group, ABB, on suspicion of spying
for Russia. The man was released after two days for lack
of evidence and reinstated. But the weighty Swedish
daily, Dagens Nyheter, speculated that the recent Russian
indiscretion was in deliberate retaliation for Swedish
espionage in Russia. Sweden is rumored to have been in
the market for Russian air radar designs and the JAS radar
system is said by some observers to uncannily resemble
its eastern counterparts.

The same day, a Russian military intelligence (GRU)
colonel, Aleksander Sipachev, was sentenced in Moscow
to eight years in prison and stripped of his rank.

According to Russian news agencies, he was convicted of
attempting to sell secret documents to the CIA. Russian
secret service personnel, idled by the withering of Russia's
global presence, resort to private business or are re-
deployed by the state to spy on industrial and economic
secrets in order to aid budding Russian multinationals.

According to the FBI and the National White-collar Crime
Center, Russian former secret agents have teamed with
computer hackers to break into corporate networks to steal
vital information about product development and
marketing strategies. Microsoft has admitted to such a
compromising intrusion.

In a December 1999 interview to Segodnya, a Russia
paper, Eyer Winkler, a former high-ranking staffer with
the National Security Agency (NSA) confirmed that
"corruption in the Russian Government, the Foreign
Intelligence Service, and the Main Intelligence
Department allows Russian organized criminal groups to
use these departments in their own interests. Criminals
receive the major part of information collected by the
Russian special services by means of breaking into
American computer networks".

When the KGB was dismantled and replaced by a host of
new acronyms, Russian industrial espionage was still in
diapers. as a result, it is a bureaucratic no-man's land
roamed by agents of the GRU, the Foreign Intelligence
Service (SVR), and smaller outfits, such as the Federal
Agency on Government Communications and Information
(FAPSI).

According to Stratfor, the strategic forecasting
consultancy, "the SVR and GRU both handle manned
intelligence on U.S. territory, with the Russian Federal
Security Service (FSB) doing counterintelligence in
America. Also, both the SVR and GRU have internal
counterintelligence units created for finding foreign
intelligence moles." This, to some extent, is the division
of labor in Europe as well.

Germany's Federal Prosecutor has consistently warned
against $5 billion worth of secrets pilfered annually from
German industrial firms by foreign intelligence services,
especially from east Europe and Russia. The
Counterintelligence News and Developments newsletter
pegs the damage at $13 billion in 1996 alone:
"Modus operandi included placing agents in
international organizations, setting up joint-ventures
with German companies, and setting up bogus
companies. The (Federal Prosecutor's) report also
warned business leaders to be particularly wary of
former diplomats or people who used to work for foreign
secret services because they often had the language
skills and knowledge of Germany that made them
excellent agents".

Russian spy rings now operate from Canada to Japan.

Many of the spies have been dormant for decades and
recalled to service following the implosion of the USSR.

According to Asian media, Russians have become
increasingly active in the Far East, mainly in Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan, and mainland China.

Russia is worried about losing its edge in avionics,
electronics, information technology and some emerging
defense industries such as laser shields, positronics,
unmanned vehicles, wearable computing, and real time
triple C (communication, command and control)
computerized battlefield management. The main targets
are, surprisingly, Israel and France. According to media
reports, the substantive clients of Russia's defense
industry - such as India - insist on hollowing out Russian
craft and installing Israeli and west European systems
instead.

Russia's paranoid state of mind extends to its interior.

Uralinformbureau reported earlier in 2002 that the Yamal-
Nenets autonomous okrug (district) restricted access to
foreigners citing concerns about industrial espionage and
potential sabotage of oil and gas companies. The Kremlin
maintains an ever-expanding list of regions and territories
with limited - or outright - forbidden - access to
foreigners.

The FSB, the KGB's main successor, is busy arresting
spies all over the vast country. To select a random events
of the dozens reported every year - and many are not - the
Russian daily Kommersant recounted in February 2002
how when the Trunov works at the Novolipetsk
metallurgical combine concluded an agreement with a
Chinese company to supply it with slabs, its chief
negotiator was nabbed as a spy working for "circles in
China". His crime? He was in possession of certain
documents which contained "intellectual property" of the
crumbling and antiquated mill pertaining to a slab quality
enhancement process.

Foreigners are also being arrested, though rarely. An
American businessman, Edmund Pope, was detained in
April 2000 for attempting to purchase the blueprints of an
advanced torpedo from a Russian scientist. There have
been a few other isolated apprehensions, mainly for
"proper", military, espionage. But Russians bear the brunt
of the campaign against foreign economic intelligence
gathering.

Strana.ru reported in December 2001 that, speaking on the
occasion of Security Services Day, Putin - himself a KGB
alumnus - warned veterans that the most crucial task
facing the services today is "protecting the country's
economy against industrial espionage".

This is nothing new. According to History of Espionage
Web site, long before they established diplomatic
relations with the USA in 1933, the Soviets had Amtorg
Trading Company. Ostensibly its purpose was to
encourage joint ventures between Russian and American
firms. Really it was a hub of industrial undercover
activities. Dozens of Soviet intelligence officers
supervised, at its peak during the Depression, 800
American communists. The Soviet Union's European
operations in Berlin (Handelsvertretung) and in London
(Arcos, Ltd.) were even more successful.



XVIII. The Business of Torture

Also Read
The Argument for Torture


On January 16, 2003, the European Court of Human
Rights agreed - more than two years after the applications
have been filed - to hear six cases filed by Chechens
against Russia. The claimants accuse the Russian military
of torture and indiscriminate killings. The Court has ruled
in the past against the Russian Federation and awarded
assorted plaintiffs thousands of euros per case in
compensation.

As awareness of human rights increased, as their
definition expanded and as new, often authoritarian
polities, resorted to torture and repression - human rights
advocates and non-governmental organizations
proliferated. It has become a business in its own right:
lawyers, consultants, psychologists, therapists, law
enforcement agencies, scholars and pundits tirelessly
peddle books, seminars, conferences, therapy sessions for
victims, court appearances and other services.

Human rights activists target mainly countries and
multinationals.

In June 2001, the International Labor Rights Fund filed a
lawsuit on behalf of 11 villagers against the American oil
behemoth, ExxonMobile, for "abetting" abuses in Aceh,
Indonesia. They alleged that the company provided the
army with equipment for digging mass graves and helped
in the construction of interrogation and torture centers.

In November 2002, the law firm of Cohen, Milstein,
Hausfeld & Toll joined other American and South African
law firms in filing a complaint that "seeks to hold
businesses responsible for aiding and abetting the
apartheid regime in South Africa ... forced labor,
genocide, extrajudicial killing, torture, sexual assault, and
unlawful detention".

Among the accused: "IBM and ICL which provided the
computers that enabled South Africa to ... control the
black South African population. Car manufacturers
provided the armored vehicles that were used to patrol the
townships. Arms manufacturers violated the embargoes
on sales to South Africa, as did the oil companies. The
banks provided the funding that enabled South Africa to
expand its police and security apparatus".

Charges were leveled against Unocal in Myanmar and
dozens of other multinationals. In September 2002, Berger
& Montague filed a class action complaint against Royal
Dutch Petroleum and Shell Transport. The oil giants are
charged with "purchasing ammunition and using ...
helicopters and boats and providing logistical support for
'Operation Restore Order in Ogoniland'" which was
designed, according to the law firm, to "terrorize the
civilian population into ending peaceful protests against
Shell's environmentally unsound oil exploration and
extraction activities".

The defendants in all these court cases strongly deny any
wrongdoing.

But this is merely one facet of the torture business.

Torture implements are produced - mostly in the West -
and sold openly, frequently to nasty regimes in developing
countries and even through the Internet. Hi-tech devices
abound: sophisticated electroconvulsive stun guns, painful
restraints, truth serums, chemicals such as pepper gas.

Export licensing is universally minimal and non-intrusive
and completely ignores the technical specifications of the
goods (for instance, whether they could be lethal, or
merely inflict pain).

Amnesty International and the UK-based Omega
Foundation, found more than 150 manufacturers of stun
guns in the USA alone. They face tough competition from
Germany (30 companies), Taiwan (19), France (14),
South Korea (13), China (12), South Africa (nine), Israel
(eight), Mexico (six), Poland (four), Russia (four), Brazil
(three), Spain (three) and the Czech Republic (two).

Many torture implements pass through "off-shore" supply
networks in Austria, Canada, Indonesia, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Albania, Russia, Israel, the
Philippines, Romania and Turkey. This helps European
Union based companies circumvent legal bans at home.

The US government has traditionally turned a blind eye to
the international trading of such gadgets.

American high-voltage electro-shock stun shields turned
up in Turkey, stun guns in Indonesia, and electro-shock
batons and shields, and dart-firing taser guns in torture-
prone Saudi Arabia. American firms are the dominant
manufacturers of stun belts. Explains Dennis Kaufman,
President of Stun Tech Inc, a US manufacturer of this
innovation: ''Electricity speaks every language known to
man. No translation necessary. Everybody is afraid of
electricity, and rightfully so.'' (Quoted by Amnesty
International).

The Omega Foundation and Amnesty claim that 49 US
companies are also major suppliers of mechanical
restraints, including leg-irons and thumbcuffs. But they
are not alone. Other suppliers are found in Germany (8),
France (5), China (3), Taiwan (3), South Africa (2), Spain
(2), the UK (2) and South Korea (1).

Not surprisingly, the Commerce Department doesn't keep
tab on this category of exports.

Nor is the money sloshing around negligible. Records
kept under the export control commodity number A985
show that Saudi Arabia alone spent in the United States
more than $1 million a year between 1997-2000 merely
on stun guns. Venezuela's bill for shock batons and such
reached $3.7 million in the same period. Other clients
included Hong Kong, Taiwan, Mexico and - surprisingly -
Bulgaria. Egypt's notoriously brutal services - already
well-equipped - spent a mere $40,000.

The United States is not the only culprit. The European
Commission, according to an Amnesty International
report titled "Stopping the Torture Trade" and published
in 2001:
"Gave a quality award to a Taiwanese electro-shock
baton, but when challenged could not cite evidence as to
independent safety tests for such a baton or whether
member states of the European Union (EU) had been
consulted. Most EU states have banned the use of such
weapons at home, but French and German companies are
still allowed to supply them to other countries".

Torture expertise is widely proffered by former soldiers,
agents of the security services made redundant, retired
policemen and even rogue medical doctors. China, Israel,
South Africa, France, Russia, the United kingdom and the
United States are founts of such useful knowledge and its
propagators.

How rooted torture is was revealed in September 1996
when the US Department of Defense admitted that
''intelligence training manuals'' were used in the Federally
sponsored School of the Americas - one of 150 such
facilities - between 1982 and 1991.The manuals, written
in Spanish and used to train thousands of Latin American
security agents, "advocated execution, torture, beatings
and blackmail", says Amnesty International.

Where there is demand there is supply. Rather than ignore
the discomfiting subject, governments would do well to
legalize and supervise it. Alan Dershowitz, a prominent
American criminal defense attorney, proposed, in an op-
ed article in the Los Angeles Times, published November
8, 2001, to legalize torture in extreme cases and to have
judges issue "torture warrants". This may be a radical
departure from the human rights tradition of the civilized
world. But dispensing export carefully reviewed licenses
for dual-use implements is a different matter altogether -
and long overdue.



XIX.  The Criminality of Transition

Lecture given at the Netherlands Economic
Institute (NEI) on 18/4/2001


Human vice is the most certain thing after death and taxes,
to paraphrase Benjamin Franklin. The only variety of
economic activity, which will surely survive even a
nuclear holocaust, is bound to be crime. Prostitution,
gambling, drugs and, in general, expressly illegal
activities generate c. 400 billion USD annually to their
perpetrators, thus making crime the third biggest industry
on Earth (after the medical and pharmaceutical
industries).

Many of the so called Economies in Transition and of
HPICs (Highly Indebted Poor Countries) do resemble
post-nuclear-holocaust ashes. GDPs in most of these
economies either tumbled nominally or in real terms by
more than 60% in the space of less than a decade. The
average monthly salary is the equivalent of the average
daily salary of the German industrial worker. The GDP
per capita - with very few notable exceptions - is around
20% of the EU's average and the average wages are 14%
the EU's average (2000). These are the telltale overt signs
of a comprehensive collapse of the infrastructure and of
the export and internal markets. Mountains of internal
debt, sky high interest rates, cronyism, other forms of
corruption, environmental, urban and rural dilapidation -
characterize these economies.

Into this vacuum - the interregnum between centrally
planned and free market economies - crept crime. In most
of these countries criminals run at least half the economy,
are part of the governing elites (influencing them behind
the scenes through money contributions, outright bribes,
or blackmail) and - through the mechanism of money
laundering - infiltrate slowly the legitimate economy.

What gives crime the edge, the competitive advantage
versus the older, ostensibly more well established elites?
The free market does. When communism collapsed, only
criminals, politicians, managers, and employees of the
security services were positioned to benefit from the
upheaval. Criminals, for instance, are much better
equipped to deal with the onslaught of this new
conceptual beast, the mechanism of the market, than most
other economic players in these tattered economies are.

Criminals, by the very nature of their vocation, were
always private entrepreneurs. They were never state
owned or subjected to any kind of central planning. Thus,
they became the only group in society that was not
corrupted by these un-natural inventions. They invested
their own capital in small to medium size enterprises and
ran them later as any American manager would have
done. To a large extent the criminals, single handedly,
created a private sector in these derelict economies.

Having established a private sector business, devoid of
any involvement of the state, the criminal-entrepreneurs
proceeded to study the market. Through primitive forms
of market research (neighbourhood activists) they were
able to identify the needs of their prospective customers,
to monitor them in real time and to respond with agility to
changes in the patterns of supply and demand. Criminals
are market-animals and they are geared to respond to its
gyrations and vicissitudes. Though they were not likely to
engage in conventional marketing and advertising, they
always stayed attuned to the market's vibrations and
signals. They changed their product mix and their pricing
to fit fluctuations in demand and supply.

Criminals have proven to be good organizers and
managers. They have very effective ways of enforcing
discipline in the workplace, of setting revenue targets, of
maintaining a flexible hierarchy combined with rigid
obeisance - with very high upward mobility and a clear
career path. A complex system of incentives and
disincentives drives the workforce to dedication and
industriousness. The criminal rings are well run
conglomerates and the more classic industries would have
done well to study their modes of organization and
management. Everything - from sales through territorially
exclusive licences (franchises) to effective "stock" options
- has been invented in the international crime
organizations long before it acquired the respectability of
the corporate boardroom.

The criminal world has replicated those parts of the state
which were rendered ineffective by unrealistic ideology or
by pure corruption. The court system makes a fine
example. The criminals instituted their own code of
justice ("law") and their own court system. A unique -
and often irreversible - enforcement arm sees to it that
respect towards these indispensable institutions is
maintained. Effective - often interactive - legislation, an
efficient court system, backed by ominous and ruthless
agents of enforcement - ensure the friction-free
functioning of the giant wheels of crime. Crime has
replicated numerous other state institutions. Small wonder
that when the state disintegrated - crime was able to
replace it with little difficulty. The same pattern is
discernible in certain parts of the world where terrorist
organizations duplicate the state and overtake it, in time.

Schools, clinics, legal assistance, family support, taxation,
the court system, transportation and telecommunication
services, banking and industry - all have a criminal
doppelganger.

To summarize:
At the outset of transition, the underworld constituted an
embryonic private sector, replete with international
networks of contacts, cross-border experience, capital
agglomeration and wealth formation, sources of venture
(risk) capital, an entrepreneurial spirit, and a diversified
portfolio of investments, revenue generating assets, and
sources of wealth. Criminals were used to private sector
practices: price signals, competition, joint venturing, and
third party dispute settlement.

To secure this remarkable achievement - the underworld
had to procure and then maintain - infrastructure and
technologies. Indeed, criminals are great at innovating and
even more formidable at making use of cutting edge
technologies. There is not a single technological advance,
invention or discovery that criminals were not the first to
utilize or the first to contemplate and to grasp its full
potential. There are enormous industries of services
rendered to the criminal in his pursuits. Accountants and
lawyers, forgers and cross border guides, weapons experts
and bankers, mechanics and hit-men - all stand at the
disposal of the average criminal. The choice is great and
prices are always negotiable. These auxiliary
professionals are no different to their legitimate
counterparts, despite the difference in subject matter. A
body of expertise, know-how and acumen has
accumulated over centuries of crime and is handed down
the generations in the criminal universities known as jail-
houses and penitentiaries. Roads less travelled, countries
more lenient, passports to be bought, sold, or forged, how
to manuals, classified ads, goods and services on offer and
demand - all feature in this mass media cum educational
(mostly verbal) bulletins. This is the real infrastructure of
crime. As with more mundane occupations, human capital
is what counts.

Criminal activities are hugely profitable (though wealth
accumulation and capital distribution are grossly non-
egalitarian). Money is stashed away in banking havens
and in more regular banks and financial institutions all
over the globe. Electronic Document Interchange and
electronic commerce transformed what used to be an
inconveniently slow and painfully transparent process -
into a speed-of-light here-I-am, here-I-am-gone type of
operation. Money is easily movable and virtually
untraceable. Special experts take care of that: tax havens,
off shore banks, money transactions couriers with the
right education and a free spirit. This money, in due time
and having cooled off - is reinvested in legitimate
activities. Crime is a major engine of economic growth in
some countries (where drugs are grown or traded, or in
countries such as Italy, in Russia and elsewhere in CEE).

In many a place, criminals are the only ones who have any
liquidity at all. The other, more visible, sectors of the
economy are wallowing in the financial drought of a
demonetized economy. People and governments tend to
lose both their scruples and their sense of fine distinctions
under these unhappy circumstances. They welcome any
kind of money to ensure their very survival. This is where
crime comes in. In Central and Eastern Europe the process
was code-named: "privatization".

Moreover, most of the poor economies are also closed
economies. They are the economies of nations
xenophobic, closed to the outside world, with currency
regulations, limitations on foreign ownership, constrained
(instead of free) trade. The vast majority of the populace
of these economic wretches has never been further than
the neighbouring city - let alone outside the borders of
their countries. Freedom of movement is still restricted.

The only ones to have travelled freely - mostly without
the required travel documents - were the criminals. Crime
is international. It involves massive, intricate and
sophisticated operations of export and import, knowledge
of languages, extensive and frequent trips, an intimate
acquaintance with world prices, the international financial
system, demand and supply in various markets, frequent
business negotiations with foreigners and so on. This list
would fit any modern businessman as well. Criminals are
international businessmen. Their connections abroad
coupled with their connections with the various elites
inside their country and coupled with their financial
prowess - made them the first and only true businessmen
of the economies in transition. There simply was no one
else qualified to fulfil this role - and the criminals stepped
in willingly.

They planned and timed their moves as they always do:
with shrewdness, an uncanny knowledge of human
psychology and relentless cruelty. There was no one to
oppose them - and so they won the day. It will take one or
more generations to get rid of them and to replace them by
a more civilized breed of entrepreneurs. But it will not
happen overnight.

In the 19th century, the then expanding USA went through
the same process. Robber barons seized economic
opportunities in the Wild East and in the Wild West and
really everywhere else. Morgan, Rockefeller, Pullman,
Vanderbilt - the most ennobled families of latter day
America originated with these rascals. But there is one
important difference between the USA at that time and
Central and Eastern Europe today. A civic culture with
civic values and an aspiration to, ultimately, create a civic
society permeated the popular as well as the high-brow
culture of America. Criminality was regarded as a
shameful stepping stone on the way to an orderly society
of learned, civilized, law-abiding citizens. This cannot be
said about Russia, for instance. The criminal there is, if
anything, admired and emulated. The language of
business in countries in transition is suffused with the
criminal parlance of violence. The next generation is
encouraged to behave similarly because no clear (not to
mention well embedded) alternative is propounded. There
is no - and never was - a civic tradition in these countries,
a Bill of Rights, a veritable Constitution, a modicum of
self rule, a true abolition of classes and nomenclatures.

The future is grim because the past was grim. Used to
being governed by capricious, paranoiac, criminal tyrants
- these nations know no better. The current criminal class
seems to them to be a natural continuation and extension
of generations-long trends. That some criminals are
members of the new political, financial and industrial
elites (and vice versa) - surprises them not.

In most countries in transition, the elites (the political-
managerial complex) make use of the state and its
simulacrum institutions in close symbiosis with the
criminal underworld. The state is often an oppressive
mechanism deployed in order to control the populace and
manipulate it. Politicians allocate assets, resources, rights,
and licences to themselves, and to their families and
cronies. Patronage extends to collaborating criminals.

Additionally, the sovereign state is regarded as a means to
extract foreign aid and credits from donors, multilaterals,
and NGOs.

The criminal underworld exploits the politicians.

Politicians give criminals access to state owned assets and
resources. These are an integral part of the money
laundering cycle. "Dirty" money is legitimized through
the purchase of businesses and real estate from the state.

Politicians induce state institutions to turn a blind eye to
the criminal activities of their collaborators and ensure
lenient law enforcement. They also help criminals
eliminate internal and external competition in their
territories.

In return, criminals serve as the "long and anonymous
arm" of politicians. They obtain illicit goods for them and
provide them with illegal services. Corruption often flows
through criminal channels or via the mediation and
conduit of delinquents. Within the shared sphere of the
informal economy, assets are often shifted among these
economic players. Both have an interest to maintain a
certain lack of transparency, a bureaucracy (=dependence
on state institutions and state employees) and NAIRU
(Non Abating Internal Recruitment Unemployment).

Nationalism and racism, the fostering of paranoia and
grievances are excellent tactics of mobilization of foot
soldiers. And the needs to dispense with a continuous
stream of patronage and provide venues for the
legitimization of illegally earned funds delay essential
reforms and the disposal of state assets.

This urge to become legitimate - largely the result of
social pressure - leads to a deterministic, four stroke cycle
of co-habitation between politicians and criminals. In the
first phase, politicians grope for a new ideological cover
for their opportunism. This is followed by a growing
partnership between the elites and the crime world. A
divergence then occurs. Politicians team up with
legitimacy-seeking, established crime lords. Both groups
benefit from a larger economic pie. They fight against
other, less successful, criminals, who wish to persist in
their old ways. This is low intensity warfare and it
inevitably ends in the triumph of the former over the
latter.



XX. The Economics of Conspiracy Theories


Barry Chamish is convinced that Shimon Peres, Israel's
wily old statesman, ordered the assassination of Yitzhak
Rabin, back in 1995, in collaboration with the French. He
points to apparent tampering with evidence. The blood-
stained song sheet in Mr. Rabin's pocket lost its bullet
hole between the night of the murder and the present.

The murderer, Yigal Amir, should have been immediately
recognized by Rabin's bodyguards. He has publicly
attacked his query before. Israel's fierce and fearsome
internal security service, the Shabak, had moles and
agents provocateurs among the plotters. Chamish
published a book about the affair. He travels and lectures
widely, presumably for a fee.

Chamish's paranoia-larded prose is not unique. The
transcripts of Senator Joseph McCarthy's inquisitions are
no less outlandish. But it was the murder of John F.

Kennedy, America's youthful president, that ushered in a
golden age of conspiracy theories.

The distrust of appearances and official versions was
further enhanced by the Watergate scandal in 1973-4.

Conspiracies and urban legends offer meaning and
purposefulness in a capricious, kaleidoscopic,
maddeningly ambiguous, and cruel world. They empower
their otherwise helpless and terrified believers.

New Order one world government, Zionist and Jewish
cabals, Catholic, black, yellow, or red subversion, the
machinations attributed to the freemasons and the
illuminati - all flourished yet again from the 1970's
onwards. Paranoid speculations reached frenzied nadirs
following the deaths of celebrities, such as "Princess Di".

Books like "The Da Vinci Code" (which deals with an
improbable Catholic conspiracy to erase from history the
true facts about the fate of Jesus) sell millions of copies
worldwide.

Tony Blair, Britain's ever righteous prime minister
denounced the "Diana Death Industry". He was referring
to the tomes and films which exploited the wild rumors
surrounding the fatal car crash in Paris in 1997. The
Princess, her boyfriend Dodi al-Fayed, heir to a fortune,
as well as their allegedly inebriated driver were killed in
the accident.

Among the exploiters were "The Times" of London which
promptly published a serialized book by Time magazine
reports. Britain's TV networks, led by Live TV,
capitalized on comments made by al-Fayed's father to the
"Mirror" alleging foul play.

But there is more to conspiracy theories than mass
psychology. It is also big business. Voluntary associations
such as the Ku Klux Klan and the John Birch Society are
past their heyday. But they still gross many millions of
dollars a year.

The monthly "Fortean Times" is the leading brand in
"strange phenomena and experiences, curiosities,
prodigies and portents". It is widely available on both
sides of the Atlantic. In its 29 years of existence it has
covered the bizarre, the macabre, and the ominous with
panache and open-mindedness.

It is named after Charles Fort who compiled unexplained
mysteries from the scientific literature of his age (he died
in 1932). He published four bestsellers in his lifetime and
lived to see "Fortean societies" established in many
countries.

A 12 months subscription to "Fortean Times" costs c. $45.

With a circulation of  60,000, the magazine was able to
spin off "Fortean Television" - a TV show on Britain's
Channel Four. Its reputation was further enhanced when it
was credited with inspiring the TV hit series X-Files and
The Sixth Sense.
"Lobster Magazine" - a bi-annual publication - is more
modest at $15 a year. It is far more "academic" looking
and it sells CD ROM compilations of its articles at
between $80 (for individuals) and $160 (for institutions
and organizations) a piece. It also makes back copies of its
issues available.

Its editor, Robin Ramsay, said in a lecture delivered to the
"Unconvention 96", organized by the "Fortean Times":
"Conspiracy theories certainly are sexy at the moment ...

I've been contacted by five or six TV companies in the
past six months - two last week - all interested in making
programmes about conspiracy theories. I even got a call
from the Big Breakfast Show, from a researcher who had
no idea who I was, asking me if I'd like to appear on it ...

These days we've got conspiracy theories everywhere; and
about almost everything".

But these two publications are the tip of a gigantic and
ever-growing iceberg. "Fortean Times" reviews, month in
and month out, books, PC games, movies, and software
concerned with its subject matter. There is an average of 8
items per issue with a median price of $20 per item.

There are more than 186,600 Web sites dedicated to
conspiracy theories in Google's database of 3 billion
pages. The "conspiracy theories" category in the Open
Directory Project, a Web directory edited by volunteers,
contains hundreds of entries.

There are 1077 titles about conspiracies listed in Amazon
and another 12078 in its individually-operated ZShops. A
new (1996) edition of the century-old anti-Semitic
propaganda pamphlet faked by the Czarist secret service,
"Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion", is available
through Amazon. Its sales rank is a respectable 64,000 -
out of more than 2 million titles stocked by the online
bookseller.

In a disclaimer, Amazon states:
"The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion is classified
under "controversial knowledge" in our store, along with
books about UFOs, demonic possession, and all manner
of conspiracy theories".

Yet, cinema and TV did more to propagate modern
nightmares than all the books combined. The Internet is
starting to have a similar impact compounded by its
networking capabilities and by its environment of
simulated reality - "cyberspace". In his tome, "Enemies
Within: The Culture of Conspiracy in Modern America",
Robert Alan Goldberg comes close to regarding the
paranoid mode of thinking as a manifestation of
mainstream American culture.

According to the Internet Movie Database, the first 50 all
time hits include at least one "straight" conspiracy theory
movie (in the 13th place) - "Men in Black" with $587
million in box office receipts. JFK (in the 193rd place)
grossed another $205 million. At least ten other films
among the first 50 revolve around a conspiracy theory
disguised as science fiction or fantasy. "The Matrix" - in
the 28th place - took in $456 million. "The Fugitive"
closes the list with $357 million. This is not counting
"serial" movies such as James Bond, the reification of
paranoia shaken and stirred.

X-files is to television what "Men in Black" is to cinema.

According to "Advertising Age", at its peak, in 1998, a 30
seconds spot on the show cost $330,000 and each chapter
raked in $5 million in ad revenues. Ad prices declined to
$225,000 per spot two years later, according to CMR
Business to Business.

Still, in its January 1998 issue, "Fortune" claimed that "X-
Files" (by then a five year old phenomenon) garnered Fox
TV well over half a billion dollars in revenues. This was
before the eponymous feature film was released. Even at
the end of 2000, the show was regularly being watched by
12.4 million households - compared to 22.7 million
viewers in 1998. But X-files was only the latest, and the
most successful, of a line of similar TV shows, notably
"The Prisoner" in the 1960's.

It is impossible to tell how many people feed off the
paranoid frenzy of the lunatic fringe. I found more than
3000 lecturers on these subjects listed by the Google
search engine alone. Even assuming a conservative
schedule of one lecture a month with a modest fee of $250
per appearance - we are talking about an industry of c.
$10 million.

Collective paranoia has been boosted by the Internet.

Consider the computer game "Majestic" by Electronic
Arts. It is an interactive and immersive game, suffused
with the penumbral  and the surreal. It is a Web
reincarnation of the borderlands and the twilight zone -
centered around a nefarious and lethal government
conspiracy. It invades the players' reality - the game
leaves them mysterious messages and "tips" by phone,
fax, instant messaging, and e-mail. A typical round lasts 6
months and costs $10 a month.

Neil Young, the game's 31-years old, British-born,
producer told Salon.com recently:
"... The concept of blurring the lines between fact and
fiction, specifically around conspiracies. I found myself
on a Web site for the conspiracy theory radio show by Art
Bell ... the Internet is such a fabulous medium to blur
those lines between fact and fiction and conspiracy,
because you begin to make connections between things.

It's a natural human reaction - we connect these dots
around our fears. Especially on the Internet, which is so
conspiracy-friendly. That was what was so interesting
about the game; you couldn't tell whether the sites you
were visiting were Majestic-created or normal Web
sites..".

Majestic creates almost 30 primary Web sites per episode.

It has dozens of "bio" sites and hundreds of Web sites
created by fans and linked to the main conspiracy threads.

The imaginary gaming firm at the core of its plots,
"Amin-X", has often been confused with the real thing. It
even won the E3 Critics Award for best original product...

Conspiracy theories have pervaded every facet of our
modern life. A.H. Barbee describes in "Making Money
the Telefunding Way" (published on the Web site of the
Institute for First Amendment Studies) how conspiracy
theorists make use of non-profit "para-churches".

They deploy television, radio, and direct mail to raise
billions of dollars from their followers through
"telefunding". Under section 170 of the IRS code, they are
tax-exempt and not obliged even to report their income.

The Federal Trade commission estimates that 10% of the
$143 billion donated to charity each year may be solicited
fraudulently.

Lawyers represent victims of the Gulf Syndrome for hefty
sums. Agencies in the USA debug bodies - they "remove"
brain  "implants" clandestinely placed by the CIA during
the Cold War. They charge thousands of dollars a pop.

Cranks and whackos - many of them religious
fundamentalists - use inexpensive desktop publishing
technology to issue scaremongering newsletters
(remember Mel Gibson in the movie "Conspiracy
Theory"?).

Tabloids and talk shows - the only source of information
for nine tenths of the American population - propagate
these "news". Museums - the UFO museum in New
Mexico or the Kennedy Assassination museum in Dallas,
for instance - immortalize them. Memorabilia are sold
through auction sites and auction houses for thousands of
dollars an item.

Numerous products were adversely affected by
conspiratorial smear campaigns. In his book "How the
Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where it Comes From",
Daniel Pipes describes how the sales of Tropical Fantasy
plummeted by 70% following widely circulated rumors
about the sterilizing substances it allegedly contained -
put there by the KKK. Other brands suffered a similar
fate: Kool and Uptown cigarettes, Troop Sport clothing,
Church's Fried Chicken, and Snapple soft drinks.

It all looks like one giant conspiracy to me. Now, here's
one theory worth pondering...



XXI. The Demise of the Work Ethic


     "When work is a pleasure, life is a joy!
     When work is a duty, life is slavery".

Maxim Gorky (1868-1936), Russian novelist, author,
and playright


Airplanes, missiles, and space shuttles crash due to lack of
maintenance, absent-mindedness, and pure ignorance.

Software support personnel, aided and abetted by
Customer Relationship Management application suites,
are curt (when reachable) and unhelpful. Despite
expensive, state of the art supply chain management
systems, retailers, suppliers, and manufacturers habitually
run out of stocks of finished and semi-finished products
and raw materials. People from all walks of life and at all
levels of the corporate ladder skirt their responsibilities
and neglect their duties.

Whatever happened to the work ethic? Where is the pride
in the immaculate quality of one's labor and produce?
Both dead in the water. A series of earth-shattering social,
economic, and technological trends converged to render
their jobs loathsome to many - a tedious nuisance best
avoided.
1. Job security is a thing of the past. Itinerancy in various
McJobs reduces the incentive to invest time, effort, and
resources into a position that may not be yours next week.

Brutal layoffs and downsizing traumatized the workforce
and produced in the typical workplace a culture of
obsequiousness, blind obeisance, the suppression of
independent thought and speech, and avoidance of
initiative and innovation. Many offices and shop floors
now resemble prisons.
2. Outsourcing and offshoring of back office (and, more
recently, customer relations and research and
development) functions sharply and adversely effected the
quality of services from helpdesks to airline ticketing and
from insurance claims processing to remote maintenance.

Cultural mismatches between the (typically Western)
client base and the offshore service department (usually in
a developing country where labor is cheap and plenty)
only exacerbated the breakdown of trust between
customer and provider or supplier.
3. The populace in developed countries are addicted to
leisure time. Most people regard their jobs as a necessary
evil, best avoided whenever possible. Hence phenomena
like the permanent temp - employees who prefer a
succession of temporary assignments to holding a proper
job. The media and the arts contribute to this perception of
work as a drag - or a potentially dangerous addiction
(when they portray raging and abusive workaholics).
4. The other side of this dismal coin is workaholism - the
addiction to work. Far from valuing it, these addicts resent
their dependence. The job performance of the typical
workaholic leaves a lot to be desired. Workaholics are
fatigued, suffer from ancillary addictions, and short
attention spans. They frequently abuse substances, are
narcissistic and destructively competitive (being driven,
they are incapable of team work).
5. The depersonalization of manufacturing - the
intermediated divorce between the artisan/worker and his
client - contributed a lot to the indifference and alienation
of the common industrial worker, the veritable
"anonymous cog in the machine".

Not only was the link between worker and product broken
- but the bond between artisan and client was severed as
well. Few employees know their customers or patrons first
hand. It is hard to empathize with and care about a
statistic, a buyer whom you have never met and never
likely to encounter. It is easy in such circumstances to feel
immune to the consequences of one's negligence and
apathy at work. It is impossible to be proud of what you
do and to be committed to your work - if you never set
eyes on either the final product or the customer! Charlie
Chaplin's masterpiece, "Modern Times" captured this
estrangement brilliantly.
6. Many former employees of mega-corporations abandon
the rat race and establish their own businesses - small and
home enterprises. Undercapitalized, understaffed, and
outperformed by the competition, these fledging and
amateurish outfits usually spew out shoddy products and
lamentable services - only to expire within the first year of
business.
7. Despite decades of advanced notice, globalization
caught most firms the world over by utter surprise. Ill-
prepared and fearful of the onslaught of foreign
competition, companies big and small grapple with
logistical nightmares, supply chain calamities, culture
shocks and conflicts, and rapacious competitors. Mere
survival (and opportunistic managerial plunder) replaced
client satisfaction as the prime value.
8. The decline of the professional guilds on the one hand
and the trade unions on the other hand greatly reduced
worker self-discipline, pride, and peer-regulated quality
control. Quality is monitored by third parties or
compromised by being subjected to Procrustean financial
constraints and concerns.

The investigation of malpractice and its punishment are
now at the hand of vast and ill-informed bureaucracies,
either corporate or governmental. Once malpractice is
exposed and admitted to, the availability of malpractice
insurance renders most sanctions unnecessary or toothless.

Corporations prefer to bury mishaps and malfeasance
rather than cope with and rectify them.
9. The quality of one's work, and of services and products
one consumed, used to be guaranteed. One's personal
idiosyncrasies, eccentricities, and problems were left at
home. Work was sacred and one's sense of self-worth
depended on the satisfaction of one's clients. You simply
didn't let your personal life affect the standards of your
output.

This strict and useful separation vanished with the rise of
the malignant-narcissistic variant of individualism. It led
to the emergence of idiosyncratic and fragmented
standards of quality. No one knows what to expect, when,
and from whom. Transacting business has become a form
of psychological warfare. The customer has to rely on the
goodwill of suppliers, manufacturers, and service
providers - and often finds himself at their whim and
mercy. "The client is always right" has gone the way of
the dodo. "It's my (the supplier's or provider's) way or the
highway" rules supreme.

This uncertainty is further exacerbated by the pandemic
eruption of mental health disorders - 15% of the
population are severely pathologized according to the
latest studies. Antisocial behaviors - from outright crime
to pernicious passive-aggressive sabotage - once rare in
the workplace, are now abundant.

The ethos of teamwork, tempered collectivism, and
collaboration for the greater good is now derided or
decried. Conflict on all levels has replaced negotiated
compromise and has become the prevailing narrative.

Litigiousness, vigilante justice, use of force, and "getting
away with it" are now extolled. Yet, conflicts lead to the
misallocation of economic resources. They are non-
productive and not conducive to sustaining good relations
between producer or provider and consumer.
10. Moral relativism is the mirror image of rampant
individualism. Social cohesion and discipline diminished,
ideologies and religions crumbled, and anomic states
substituted for societal order. The implicit contracts
between manufacturer or service provider and customer
and between employee and employer were shredded and
replaced with ad-hoc negotiated operational checklists.

Social decoherence is further enhanced by the
anonymization and depersonalization of the modern chain
of production (see point 5 above).

Nowadays, people facilely and callously abrogate their
responsibilities towards their families, communities, and
nations. The mushrooming rate of divorce, the decline in
personal thrift, the skyrocketing number of personal
bankruptcies, and the ubiquity of venality and corruption
both corporate and political are examples of such
dissipation. No one seems to care about anything. Why
should the client or employer expect a different treatment?
11. The disintegration of the educational systems of the
West made it difficult for employers to find qualified and
motivated personnel. Courtesy, competence, ambition,
personal responsibility, the ability to see the bigger picture
(synoptic view), interpersonal aptitude, analytic and
synthetic skills, not to mention numeracy, literacy, access
to technology, and the sense of belonging which they
foster - are all products of proper schooling.
12. Irrational beliefs, pseudo-sciences, and the occult
rushed in to profitably fill the vacuum left by the
crumbling education systems. These wasteful
preoccupations encourage in their followers an
overpowering sense of fatalistic determinism and hinder
their ability to exercise judgment and initiative. The
discourse of commerce and finance relies on unmitigated
rationality and is, in essence, contractual. Irrationality is
detrimental to the successful and happy exchange of
goods and services.



XXII. The Morality of Child Labor


From the comfort of their plush offices and five to six
figure salaries, self-appointed NGO's often denounce
child labor as their employees rush from one five star
hotel to another, $3000 subnotebooks and PDA's in hand.

The hairsplitting distinction made by the ILO between
"child work" and "child labor" conveniently targets
impoverished countries while letting its budget
contributors - the developed ones - off-the-hook.

Reports regarding child labor surface periodically.

Children crawling in mines, faces ashen, body deformed.

The agile fingers of famished infants weaving soccer balls
for their more privileged counterparts in the USA. Tiny
figures huddled in sweatshops, toiling in unspeakable
conditions. It is all heart-rending and it gave rise to a
veritable not-so-cottage industry of activists,
commentators, legal eagles, scholars, and
opportunistically sympathetic politicians.

Ask the denizens of Thailand, sub-Saharan Africa, Brazil,
or Morocco and they will tell you how they regard this
altruistic hyperactivity - with suspicion and resentment.

Underneath the compelling arguments lurks an agenda of
trade protectionism, they wholeheartedly believe.

Stringent - and expensive - labor and environmental
provisions in international treaties may well be a ploy to
fend off imports based on cheap labor and the competition
they wreak on well-ensconced domestic industries and
their political stooges.

This is especially galling since the sanctimonious West
has amassed its wealth on the broken backs of slaves and
kids. The 1900 census in the USA found that 18 percent
of all children - almost two million in all - were gainfully
employed. The Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional laws
banning child labor as late as 1916. This decision was
overturned only in 1941.

The GAO published a report last week in which it
criticized the Labor Department for paying insufficient
attention to working conditions in manufacturing and
mining in the USA, where many children are still
employed. The Bureau of Labor Statistics pegs the
number of working children between the ages of 15-17 in
the USA at 3.7 million. One in 16 of these worked in
factories and construction. More than 600 teens died of
work-related accidents in the last ten years.

Child labor - let alone child prostitution, child soldiers,
and child slavery - are phenomena best avoided. But they
cannot and should not be tackled in isolation. Nor should
underage labor be subjected to blanket castigation.

Working in the gold mines or fisheries of the Philippines
is hardly comparable to waiting on tables in a Nigerian or,
for that matter, American restaurant.

There are gradations and hues of child labor. That
children should not be exposed to hazardous conditions,
long working hours, used as means of payment, physically
punished, or serve as sex slaves is commonly agreed. That
they should not help their parents plant and harvest may
be more debatable.

As Miriam Wasserman observes in "Eliminating Child
Labor", published in the Federal Bank of Boston's
"Regional Review", second quarter of 2000, it depends on
"family income, education policy, production
technologies, and cultural norms." About a quarter of
children under-14 throughout the world are regular
workers. This statistic masks vast disparities between
regions like Africa (42 percent) and Latin America (17
percent).

In many impoverished locales, child labor is all that
stands between the family unit and all-pervasive, life
threatening, destitution. Child labor declines markedly as
income per capita grows. To deprive these bread-earners
of the opportunity to lift themselves and their families
incrementally above malnutrition, disease, and famine - is
an apex of immoral hypocrisy.

Quoted by "The Economist", a representative of the much
decried Ecuador Banana Growers Association and
Ecuador's Labor Minister, summed up the dilemma
neatly: "Just because they are under age doesn't mean we
should reject them, they have a right to survive. You can't
just say they can't work, you have to provide alternatives".

Regrettably, the debate is so laden with emotions and self-
serving arguments that the facts are often overlooked.

The outcry against soccer balls stitched by children in
Pakistan led to the relocation of workshops ran by Nike
and Reebok. Thousands lost their jobs, including
countless women and 7000 of their progeny. The average
family income - anyhow meager - fell by 20 percent.

Economists Drusilla Brown, Alan Deardorif, and Robert
Stern observe wryly:
"While Baden Sports can quite credibly claim that their
soccer balls are not sewn by children, the relocation of
their production facility undoubtedly did nothing for their
former child workers and their families".

Such examples abound. Manufacturers - fearing legal
reprisals and "reputation risks" (naming-and-shaming by
overzealous NGO's) - engage in preemptive sacking.

German garment workshops fired 50,000 children in
Bangladesh in 1993 in anticipation of the American
never-legislated Child Labor Deterrence Act.

Quoted by Wasserstein, former Secretary of Labor, Robert
Reich, notes:
"Stopping child labor without doing anything else could
leave children worse off. If they are working out of
necessity, as most are, stopping them could force them
into prostitution or other employment with greater
personal dangers. The most important thing is that they be
in school and receive the education to help them leave
poverty".

Contrary to hype, three quarters of all children work in
agriculture and with their families. Less than 1 percent
work in mining and another 2 percent in construction.

Most of the rest work in retail outlets and services,
including "personal services" - a euphemism for
prostitution. UNICEF and the ILO are in the throes of
establishing school networks for child laborers and
providing their parents with alternative employment.

But this is a drop in the sea of neglect. Poor countries
rarely proffer education on a regular basis to more than
two thirds of their eligible school-age children. This is
especially true in rural areas where child labor is a
widespread blight. Education - especially for women - is
considered an unaffordable luxury by many hard-pressed
parents. In many cultures, work is still considered to be
indispensable in shaping the child's morality and strength
of character and in teaching him or her a trade.
"The Economist" elaborates:
"In Africa children are generally treated as mini-adults;
from an early age every child will have tasks to perform in
the home, such as sweeping or fetching water. It is also
common to see children working in shops or on the
streets. Poor families will often send a child to a richer
relation as a housemaid or houseboy, in the hope that he
will get an education".

A solution recently gaining steam is to provide families in
poor countries with access to loans secured by the future
earnings of their educated offspring. The idea - first
proposed by Jean-Marie Baland of the University of
Namur and James A. Robinson of the University of
California at Berkeley - has now permeated the
mainstream.

Even the World Bank has contributed a few studies,
notably, in June, "Child Labor: The Role of Income
Variability and Access to Credit Across Countries"
authored by Rajeev Dehejia of the NBER and Roberta
Gatti of the Bank's Development Research Group.

Abusive child labor is abhorrent and should be banned
and eradicated. All other forms should be phased out
gradually. Developing countries already produce millions
of unemployable graduates a year - 100,000 in Morocco
alone. Unemployment is rife and reaches, in certain
countries - such as Macedonia - more than one third of the
workforce. Children at work may be harshly treated by
their supervisors but at least they are kept off the far more
menacing streets. Some kids even end up with a skill and
are rendered employable.



XXIII. The Myth of the Earnings Yield


In American novels, well into the 1950's, one finds
protagonists using the future stream of dividends
emanating from their share holdings to send their kids to
college or as collateral.  Yet, dividends seemed to have
gone the way of the Hula-Hoop. Few companies distribute
erratic and ever-declining dividends. The vast majority
don't bother. The unfavorable tax treatment of distributed
profits may have been the cause.

The dwindling of dividends has implications which are
nothing short of revolutionary. Most of the financial
theories we use to determine the value of shares were
developed in the 1950's and 1960's, when dividends were
in vogue.  They invariably relied on a few implicit and
explicit assumptions:
1. That the fair "value" of a share is closely
correlated to its market price;
2. That price movements are mostly random, though
somehow related to the aforementioned "value" of
the share. In other words, the price of a security is
supposed to converge with its fair "value" in the
long term;
3. That the fair value responds to new information
about the firm and reflects it  - though how
efficiently is debatable. The strong efficiency
market hypothesis assumes that new information is
fully incorporated in prices instantaneously.

But how is the fair value to be determined?
A discount rate is applied to the stream of all future
income from the share - i.e., its dividends. What should
this rate be is sometimes hotly disputed - but usually it is
the coupon of "riskless" securities, such as treasury bonds.

But since few companies distribute dividends -
theoreticians and analysts are increasingly forced to deal
with "expected" dividends rather than "paid out" or actual
ones.

The best proxy for expected dividends is net earnings. The
higher the earnings - the likelier and the higher the
dividends. Thus, in a subtle cognitive dissonance, retained
earnings - often plundered by rapacious managers - came
to be regarded as some kind of deferred dividends.

The rationale is that retained earnings, once re-invested,
generate additional earnings. Such a virtuous cycle
increases the likelihood and size of future dividends. Even
undistributed earnings, goes the refrain, provide a rate of
return, or a yield - known as the earnings yield. The
original meaning of the word "yield" - income realized by
an investor - was undermined by this Newspeak.

Why was this oxymoron - the "earnings yield" -
perpetuated?
According to all current theories of finance, in the absence
of dividends - shares are worthless. The value of an
investor's holdings is determined by the income he stands
to receive from them. No income - no value. Of course, an
investor can always sell his holdings to other investors
and realize capital gains (or losses). But capital gains -
though also driven by earnings hype - do not feature in
financial models of stock valuation.

Faced with a dearth of dividends, market participants -
and especially Wall Street firms - could obviously not live
with the ensuing zero valuation of securities. They
resorted to substituting future dividends - the outcome of
capital accumulation and re-investment - for present ones.

The myth was born.

Thus, financial market theories starkly contrast with
market realities.

No one buys shares because he expects to collect an
uninterrupted and equiponderant stream of future income
in the form of dividends. Even the most gullible novice
knows that dividends are a mere apologue, a relic of the
past. So why do investors buy shares? Because they hope
to sell them to other investors later at a higher price.

While past investors looked to dividends to realize income
from their shareholdings - present investors are more into
capital gains. The market price of a share reflects its
discounted expected capital gains, the discount rate being
its volatility. It has little to do with its discounted future
stream of dividends, as current financial theories teach us.

But, if so, why the volatility in share prices, i.e., why are
share prices distributed? Surely, since, in liquid markets,
there are always buyers - the price should stabilize around
an equilibrium point.

It would seem that share prices incorporate expectations
regarding the availability of willing and able buyers, i.e.,
of investors with sufficient liquidity. Such expectations
are influenced by the price level - it is more difficult to
find buyers at higher prices - by the general market
sentiment, and by externalities and new information,
including new information about earnings.

The capital gain anticipated by a rational investor takes
into consideration both the expected discounted earnings
of the firm and market volatility - the latter being a
measure of the expected distribution of willing and able
buyers at any given price. Still, if earnings are retained
and not transmitted to the investor as dividends - why
should they affect the price of the share, i.e., why should
they alter the capital gain?
Earnings serve merely as a yardstick, a calibrator, a
benchmark figure. Capital gains are, by definition, an
increase in the market price of a security. Such an increase
is more often than not correlated with the future stream of
income to the firm - though not necessarily to the
shareholder. Correlation does not always imply causation.

Stronger earnings may not be the cause of the increase in
the share price and the resulting capital gain. But
whatever the relationship, there is no doubt that earnings
are a good proxy to capital gains.

Hence investors' obsession with earnings figures. Higher
earnings rarely translate into higher dividends. But
earnings - if not fiddled - are an excellent predictor of the
future value of the firm and, thus, of expected capital
gains. Higher earnings and a higher market valuation of
the firm make investors more willing to purchase the
stock at a higher price - i.e., to pay a premium which
translates into capital gains.

The fundamental determinant of future income from share
holding was replaced by the expected value of share-
ownership. It is a shift from an efficient market - where all
new information is instantaneously available to all rational
investors and is immediately incorporated in the price of
the share - to an inefficient market where the most critical
information is elusive: how many investors are willing
and able to buy the share at a given price at a given
moment.

A market driven by streams of income from holding
securities is "open". It reacts efficiently to new
information. But it is also "closed" because it is a zero
sum game. One investor's gain is another's loss. The
distribution of gains and losses in the long term is pretty
even, i.e., random. The price level revolves around an
anchor, supposedly the fair value.

A market driven by expected capital gains is also "open"
in a way because, much like less reputable pyramid
schemes, it depends on new capital and new investors. As
long as new money keeps pouring in, capital gains
expectations are maintained - though not necessarily
realized.

But the amount of new money is finite and, in this sense,
this kind of market is essentially a "closed" one. When
sources of funding are exhausted, the bubble bursts and
prices decline precipitously. This is commonly described
as an "asset bubble".

This is why current investment portfolio models (like
CAPM) are unlikely to work. Both shares and markets
move in tandem (contagion) because they are exclusively
swayed by the availability of future buyers at given prices.

This renders diversification inefficacious. As long as
considerations of "expected liquidity" do not constitute an
explicit part of income-based models, the market will
render them increasingly irrelevant.



XXIV. The Future of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)

Interview with Gary Goodenow


In June 2005, William H. Donaldson was forced to resign
as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).  The reason? As the New York Times put it:
"criticism that his enforcement was too heavy-handed".

President Bush chose California Rep. Christopher Cox, a
Republican, to replace him.

Gary Langan Goodenow is an attorney licensed to
practice in the State of Florida and the District of
Columbia. The Webmaster of
www.RealityAtTheSEC.com, he worked at the Miami
office of the SEC for about six years, in the Division of
Enforcement.

His experience is varied. As a staff attorney, he
investigated and prosecuted cases enforcing the federal
securities laws. As a branch chief, he supervised the work
of several staff attorneys. As a Senior Trial Counsel, he
was responsible for litigating about thirty enforcement
cases at any one time in federal court. As Senior Counsel,
he made the final recommendations on which cases the
office would investigate and prosecute, or decline.

He describes an experience he had after he left the SEC.
"I represented an Internet financial writer with a Web
site that touted stocks, Mr. Ted Melcher of SGA Whisper
Stocks.  The SEC sued Ted because as he was singing
the praises of certain stocks in his articles, he was selling
them into a rising market. He got his shares from the
issuers in exchange for doing the promotional
touting. Unfortunately for him, the SEC and the
Department of Justice made an example of his case, and
he went to jail".

Q. The SEC is often accused of lax and intermittent
enforcement of the law.  Is the problem with the
enforcement division - or with the law? Can you describe
a typical SEC investigation from start to finish?
A. The problem lies with both.

At the SEC, the best argument in support of a proposed
course of action is "that's what we did last time". That will
inevitably please the staff attorney's superiors.

SEC rules and regulations remind me of an old farmhouse
that has been altered and adapted, sometimes for
convenience, other times for necessity. But it has never
been just plain pulled down and rebuilt despite incredible
changes around it. To the uninitiated, the house is
rambling with hidden passages, dark corners, low ceilings,
folklore and horror stories, and accumulations of tons of
antique rubbish that sometimes no one - not even some
SEC Commissioners - can wade through.

Wandering from room to room in this farmhouse are the
SEC staff.  Regretfully, I found that many are ignorant or
indifferent to their mission, or scornful of investors'
plight, too addicted to their petty specializations in their
detailed job descriptions, and way too prone to follow
only the well-trodden path.

They are stunned by the rapidity, multiplicity, immensity
and intelligence behind the scams. Their tools of research,
investigation and prosecution are confusingly changed
periodically when Congress passes some new "reform"
legislation, or a new Chairman or new Enforcement
Director issues some memo edict on a "new approach".

Staff attorneys typically bring investors only bad news
and are numbed by the latters' emotional reactions, in a
kind of "shell shock". The SEC lost one quarter of its staff
in the last two years. The turnover of its 1200 attorneys, at
14%, is nearly double the government's average.

One SEC official was quoted as saying "We are losing our
future - the people who would have had the experience to
move into the senior ranks". Those that stay behind and
rise in the ranks are often the least inspired. At the SEC
enforcement division, one is often confronted with the
"evil of banality".

The SEC is empowered by the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to seek
injunctive relief where it appears that a person is engaged
or about to engage in violations of the federal securities
laws. This is a civil remedy, not a criminal law
sanction. Under well-settled case law, the purpose of
injunctive relief is deterrence, rather than punishment, of
those who commit violations. Investors do not know that,
and are uniformly shocked when told.

The "likelihood requirement" means that, once the
Commission demonstrates a violation, for injunctive relief
it needs only show that there is some reasonable
likelihood of future violations. "Positive proof' of
likelihood, as one court demanded, is hard to provide. At
the other extreme, I had one former Commissioner tell me
that, as he understood the law, if the person is alive and
breathing, the Commission enforcement staff can show
likelihood of future violations.

The broad powers of the federal courts are used in
actions brought by the Commission to prevent securities
violators from enjoying the fruits of their misconduct. But
because this is a civil and not a criminal remedy, the SEC
has a unique rule where defendants can consent to an
injunction without "admitting or denying the allegations
of the complaint". This leads to what are called "waivers",
and I submit that "waivers" are the fundamental flaw in
U.S. securities laws enforcement.

In a nutshell, here is the problem. A "fraudster"
commits a fraud. The Commission sues for an injunction.

The fraudster consents to the injunction as per above. The
Court then orders the fraudster to "disgorge" his "ill gotten
gains" from the scam, usually within 30 days and with
interest.

In most cases, the fraudster doesn't pay it all and the
Commission moves to hold him in civil contempt for
disobeying the Court's order. The fraudster claims to the
Court that it is impossible for him to comply because the
money is gone and  he is "without the financial means to
pay". The Commission then issues a "waiver" and that's
the way many cases end. Thus both sides can put the case
behind them. The fraudster agrees to the re-opening of the
case if he turns out to have lied.

This procedure is problematic. The Commission
typically alleges that these fraudsters have lied through
their teeth in securities sales - but is forced to accept their
word in an affidavit swearing that they have no money to
pay the disgorgement. So the waivers are based on an
assumption of credibility that has no basis in experience
and possibly none in fact.

Moreover, the Division of Enforcement has no
mechanism in place to check if the fraudster has, indeed,
lied. After the waiver, the files of the case get stored. The
case is closed. I don't know if there's even a central place
where the records of waivers are kept.

In the six years I was at the Commission, I never heard
of a case involving a breach of waiver affidavit. I doubt if
one has ever been brought by the Commission -
anywhere. UPI ought to do a Freedom Of Information Act
Request on that.

Something similar happens with the Commission's
much vaunted ability to levy civil penalties. The statute
requires that a court trial be held to determine the
egregiousness of the fraud. Based on its findings, the court
can levy the fines. But, according to some earlier non-
SEC case law, a fraudster can ask for a jury trial regarding
the amount of the civil penalties because he or she lack
the means to pay them. U.S. district courts being as busy
as they are, there's no way the court is going to hold a jury
trial.

Instead, the fraudster consents to a court order "noting
the appropriateness of civil penalties for the case, but
declining to set them based on a demonstrated inability to
pay". Again, if the fraudster lied, the Commission can ask
the Court to revisit the issue.

Q. Internet fraud, corporate malfeasance, derivatives, off-
shore special purpose entities, multi-level marketing,
scams, money laundering - is the SEC up to it? Isn't its
staff overwhelmed and under-qualified?
A. The staff is overwhelmed.  The longest serving are
often the least qualified because the talented usually leave.

We've already got the criminal statutes on the books for
criminal prosecution of securities fraud at the federal
level. Congress should pass a law deputizing staff
attorneys of the Commission Division of Enforcement,
with at least one-year experience and high performance
ratings, as Special Assistant United States Attorneys for
the prosecution of securities fraud.  In other words, make
them part of the Department of Justice to make criminal,
not just civil cases, against the fraudsters.

The US Department of Justice does not have the person
power to pursue enough criminal securities cases in the
Internet Age. Commission attorneys have the expertise,
but not the legal right, to bring criminal prosecution. The
afore-described waiver system only makes the fraudsters
more confident that the potential gain from fraud
outweighs the risk.

I'd keep the civil remedies. In an ongoing fraud, with no
time to make out a criminal case, the Commission staff
can seek a Temporary Restraining Order and an asset
freeze. This more closely resembles the original intent of
Congress in the 1930s. But after the dust settles, the
investing public deserves to demand criminal
accountability for the fraud, not just waivers.

Q. Is the SEC - or at least its current head - in hock to
special interests, e.g., the accounting industry?
A. "In hock to special interests" is too explicit a statement
about US practice. It makes a good slogan for a Marxist
law school professor, but reality is far subtler.

By unwritten bipartisan agreement, the Chairman of the
SEC is always a political figure. Two of the five SEC
Commissioners are always Democrats, two Republicans,
and the Chairman belongs to the political party of the
President. I am curious to see if this same agreement will
apply to the boards established under the Sarbannes-Oxley
Act.

Thus, both parties typically choose a candidate for
Chairman of impeccable partisan credentials and
consistent adherence to the "party line". The less
connected, the less partisan, and academicians serve as
Commissioners, not Chairmen.

The Chairman's tenure normally overlaps with a specific
President's term in office, even when, as with President
Bush the elder following President Reagan, the same party
remains in power. SEC jobs lend themselves to lucrative
post-Commission employment. This explains the dearth of
"loyal opposition". Alumni pride themselves on their
connections following their departure.

The Chairman is no more and no less "in hock" than any
leading member of a US political party. Still, I faulted
Chairman Pitt, and became the first former member of
SEC management to call for his resignation, in an Op/Ed
item in the Miami Herald. In my view, he was
impermissibly indulgent of his former law clients at the
expense of SEC enforcement.

Q. What more could stock exchanges do to help the SEC?
A. At the risk of being flippant, enforce their own
rules. The major enforcement action against the
NASDAQ brokers a few years ago, for instance, was
toothless. Presently, Merrill Lynch is being scrutinized by
the State of New York, but there is not a word from the
NYSE.

Q. Do you regard the recent changes to the law -
especially the Sarbanes-Oxley Act - as toothless or an
important enhancement to the arsenal of law enforcement
agencies? Do you think that the SEC should have any
input in professional self-regulating and regulatory bodies,
such as the recently established accountants board?
A. It remains to be seen. The Act establishes a Public
Accounting Oversight Board ("the Board"). It reflects one
major aspect of SEC enforcement practice: unlike in many
countries, the SEC does not recognize an
accountant/client privilege, though it does recognize an
attorney/client privilege.

Regrettably, in my experience, attorneys organize at least
as much securities fraud as accountants. Yet in the US,
one would never see an "attorneys oversight board". For
one thing, Congress has more attorneys than accountants.

Section 3 of the Act, titled "Commission Rules and
Enforcement", treats a violation of the Rules of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board as a
violation of the '34 Act, giving rise to the same
penalties. It is unclear if this means waiver after waiver,
as in present SEC enforcement. Even if it does, the Rules
may still be more effective because US state regulators
can forfeit an accountant's license based on a waived
injunction.

The Act's provision, in Section 101, for the membership
of said Board has yet to be fleshed out. Appointed to five-
year   terms, two of the members must be - or have been -
certified public accountants, and the remaining three must
not be and cannot have been CPAs. Lawyers are the
likeliest to be appointed to these other seats. The
Chairmanship may be held by one of the CPA members,
provided that he or she has not been engaged as a
practicing CPA for five years, meaning, ab initio, that he
or she will be behind the practice curb at a time when
change is rapid.

No Board member may, during their service on the Board,
"share in any of the profits of, or receive payments from, a
public accounting firm," other than "fixed continuing
payments," such as retirement payments. This mirrors
SEC practice with the securities industry, but does little to
tackle "the revolving door".

The Board members are appointed by the SEC, "after
consultation with" the Federal Reserve Board Chairman
and the Treasury Secretary. Given the term lengths, it is
safe to predict that every new presidential administration
will bring with it a new Board.

The major powers granted to the Board will effectively
change the accounting profession in the USA, at least with
regards to public companies, from a self-regulatory body
licensed by the states, into a national regulator.

Under Act Section 103, the Board shall: (1) register public
accounting firms; (2) establish "auditing, quality control,
ethics, independence, and other standards relating to the
preparation of audit reports for issuers;" (3) inspect
accounting firms; and (4) investigate and discipline firms
to enforce compliance with the Act, the Rules,
professional standards and the federal securities
laws. This is a sea change in the US.

As to professional standards, the Board must "cooperate
on an on-going basis" with certain accountants advisory
groups. Yet, US federal government Boards do not "co-
operate" - they dictate. The Board can "to the extent that it
determines appropriate" adopt proposals by such groups.

More importantly, it has authority to reject any standards
proffered by said groups. This will then be reviewed by
the SEC, because the Board must report on its standards to
the Commission every year. The SEC may - by rule -
require the Board to cover additional ground. The Board,
and the SEC through the Board, now run the US
accounting profession.

The Board is also augments the US effort to establish
hegemony over the global practice of accounting. Act
Section 106, Foreign Public Accounting Firms, subjects
foreigners who audit U.S. companies - including foreign
firms that perform audit work that is used by the primary
auditor on a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company - to
registration with the Board.

I am amazed that the EU was silent on this inroad to their
sovereignty. This may prove more problematic in US
operations in China. I do not think the US can force its
accounting standards on China without negatively
affecting our trade there.

Under Act Section 108, the SEC now decides what are
"generally" accepted accounting principles. Registered
public accounting firms are barred from providing certain
non-audit services to an issuer they audit. Thus, the split,
first proposed by the head of Arthur Anderson in 1974, is
now the law.

Act Section 203, Audit Partner Rotation, is a gift to the
accounting profession. The lead audit or coordinating
partner and the reviewing partner must rotate every 5
years. That means that by law, the work will be spread
around. Note that the law says "partner", not
"partnership". Thus, we are likely to continue to see
institutional clients serviced by "juntas" at accounting
firms, not by individuals. This will likely end forever the
days when a single person controlled major amounts of
business at an accounting firm. US law firms would never
countenance such a change, as the competition for major
clients is intense.

Act Section 209, Consideration by Appropriate State
Regulatory Authorities, "throws a bone" to the states. It
requires state regulators to make an independent
determination whether Board standards apply to small and
mid-size non-registered accounting firms. No one can
seriously doubt the outcome of these determinations.  But
we now pretend that we still have real state regulation of
the accounting profession, just as we pretend that we have
state regulation of the securities markets through "blue
sky laws". The reality is that the states will be confined
hence to the initial admission of persons to the accounting
profession. Like the "blue sky laws", it will be a revenue
source, but the states will be completely junior to the
Board and the SEC.

Act Section 302, Corporate Responsibility For Financial
Reports, mandates that the CEO and CFO of each issuer
shall certify the "appropriateness of the financial
statements and disclosures contained in the periodic
report, and that those financial statements and disclosures
fairly present, in all material respects, the operations and
financial condition of the issuer". This may prove
problematic with global companies. We have already seen
resistance by Daimler-Benz of Germany.

Act Section 305: Officer And Director Bars And
Penalties; Equitable Relief, will be used by the SEC to
counterattack arguments arising out of the Central Bank
case. As I maintained in the American Journal of Trial
Advocacy, the real significance of the Supreme Court
decision in Central Bank was that the remedial sanctions
of the federal securities laws should be narrowly
construed.

Well, now the SEC has a Congressional mandate. Federal
courts are authorized to "grant any equitable relief that
may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of
investors". That is an incredibly broad delegation of
rights, and is an end run around Central Bank.  I was
surprised that this received no publicity.

Lastly, Act Section 402, Prohibition on Personal Loans
to Executives, shows how low this generation of US
leadership has sunk. President Bush has signed a law that
makes illegal the type of loans from which he and his
extended family have previously benefited.

Tacitly, the Act admits that some practices of Enron were
not illegal inter se. Act Section 401, Study and Report on
Special Purpose Entities, provides that the SEC should
study off-balance sheet disclosures to determine their
extent and whether they are reported in a sufficiently
transparent fashion. The answer will almost certainly be
no, and the Board will change GAAP accordingly.

Q. Does the SEC collaborate with other financial
regulators and law enforcement agencies internationally?
Does it share information with other US law enforcement
agencies? Is there interagency rivalry and does it hamper
investigations? Can you give us an example?
A. The SEC and other regulators - as well as two House
subcommittees - have only very recently begun
considering information sharing between financial
regulators.

This comes too late for the victims of Martin Frankel,
who, having been barred for life from the securities
industry by the SEC and NASD in 1992, simply moved
over to the insurance industry to perpetrate a scam where
investors have lost an estimated $200 million dollars.

Had the state insurance regulators known this person's
background, he would have been unable to set up multiple
insurance companies. Failure to share information is a
genuine problem, but "turf" considerations generally
trump any joint efforts.



XXV. Trading from a Suitcase. The Case of Shuttle Trade


They all sport the same shabby clothes, haggard looks,
and bulging suitcases bound with frayed ropes. These are
the shuttle traders. You can find them in Mongolia and
Russia, China and Ukraine, Bulgaria and Kosovo, the
West Bank and Turkey. They cross the border as
"tourists", sometimes as often as 10 times a year, and
come back with as much merchandise as they can carry in
their enormous luggage. Some of them resort to freight
forwarding their "personal belongings".

They distort trade figures, smuggle goods across ill-
guarded borders, ignore international treaties and
conventions and, in short, revive moribund economies.

They are the life-blood and the only manifestation of true
entrepreneurship in swathes of economic wastelands.

They meet demands for consumer goods unmet by
domestic manufacturers or by officially-sanctioned
importers.

In recognition of their vital role, the worried Kyrgyz
government held a round table discussion last summer
about the precarious state of Kyrgyzstan's shuttle trade.

Many former Soviet republics have tightened up their
border controls. In May last year, Russian officials seized
half a million dollars worth of shuttle goods belonging to
1500 traders. When two million dollars worth of goods
were confiscated in a similar incident in fall 2001, eight
Kyrgyz traders committed suicide.

The number of Kyrgyz shuttle traders dropped in 2002 to
300,000 (from 500,000 in 1996). The majority of those
who remain are insolvent. Many of them emigrated to
other countries. The shuttle traders asked the government
to legalize and regulate their vanishing trade and thus to
save them from avaricious and minacious customs
officials.

Even prim international financial institutions recognize
the survival-value of shuttle trade to the economies of
developing and transition countries. It employs millions,
boosts investments in transport and infrastructure, and
encourages grassroots capitalism. The IMF - in the 11th
meeting of its Committee on Balance of Payments
Statistics in 1998 - officially recognized shuttle trade as a
business activity to be recorded under "goods".

But there is a seedier and seamier side to shuttle trade
where it interfaces with organized crime and official
corruption. Shuttle trade also constitutes unfair
competition to legitimate, tax and customs duties paying
enterprises - the manufacturers of textiles, shoes,
cigarettes, alcoholic drinks, and food products. Shuttled
goods are not subject to health and safety inspections, or
quality control.

According to the March 27th 2002 issue of East West
Institute's "Russian Regional Report", the value of
Chinese goods shuttled into the borderlands of the
Russian Far East is a whopping $50 million a month.

China benefits from the serendipitous proceeds of these
informal exports - but is unhappy at the lost tax revenues.

EWI claims that Russian banks in the region (such as
DalOVK, Primsotsbank, and Regiobank) are already
offering money transfer services to China. DalOVK alone
transfers $1 million a month - a fortune in local terms. But
even these figures may be a serious under-estimate. The
trade between Khabarovsk Territory in Russia and
Heilongjiang Province in China - most of it in shuttle
form - was $1.5 billion in 2001. The bulk of it was one
way, from China to Russia.

Shuttle trade is even more prominent between Iraq and
Turkey. The Anatolia News Agency expected it to
increase to $2 billion in 2002. By comparison, the official
exports of Turkey to Iraq amount to $800 million. The
then prime minister Bulent Ecevit himself stated to the
Ankara Anatolia news agency: "We have provided
necessary support to increase shuttle trade".

"The Economist" reports about the flourishing "petty
trade" between China and Vietnam. Western and
counterfeit goods are smuggled to bazaars in Vietnam,
owned and operated by Chinese nationals. The border
between these two erstwhile enemies opened in 1990.

This led to the rise of criminal networks which involve
border guards and policemen.

Another hot spot is the Balkan. In a report dated July
2001, the Balkan Information Exchange describes the
"Tulip Market" in Istanbul. Vendors are fluent in Russian,
Bulgarian and Romanian and most of the clients are East
European. They buy wholesale and use special vans and
buses to transport the goods - mainly textiles -
northwards, frequently to destinations in the Balkan. This
kind of trade is estimated to be worth $8 billion a year -
more than one quarter of Turkey's official exports.

Bulgarian customs officials, border patrols, and policemen
form part of these efficient rings - as do their Macedonian
and, to a lesser extent, Greek counterparts. The Sofia-
based Center for the Study of Democracy thinks that a
third of the Bulgarian workforce (i.e., c. 1 million people)
may be involved. Many of the traders maintain mom-and-
pop establishments or stalls in public bazaars, where
members of their family sell the goods.

Some of the merchandise ends up in Serbia, which was
subjected to UN sanctions until lately. Fuel smuggling on
bikes and other forms of sanctions busting have largely
ended but they have been replaced by cigarettes, alcohol,
firearms, stolen cars, and mobile phones.

The Serbian authorities often round up and deport
Bulgarian shuttle traders, provoking furious resentment in
Bulgaria. Headlines like "(Serbian) Policemen take away
our countrymen's money" and "Serbs searching
(Bulgarian) women's genitals for money" are pretty
common. The Bulgarians are embittered. They used to
smuggle medicines and fuel into embargoed Serbia - only
to be abused by Serb officials now, that the embargo has
been lifted.

East European buyers used to reach as far as India where
they shopped wholesale in winter. Russians used to buy
readymade clothes, leather goods, and cheap jewelry in
New Delhi and elsewhere and sell the goods in the
numerous flea markets back home.

To finance their purchases, they used to sell in India
Russian cosmetics and consumer goods such as watches,
cameras, or hair dryers. But the 1998 financial crisis and
sub-standard wares offered by unscrupulous Indian traders
put a stop to this particular venue.

Governments are trying to stem the shuttle trade. The
Russian news agency, ITAR-TASS, reports that Sergei
Stepashin, the dynamic chairman of the Russian Audit
Chamber (and a former short-lived prime minister of
Russia) is bent on tightening the cooperation between
member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

The audit agencies of China, Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan will exchange
information and strive to control the thriving shuttle trade
across their porous borders. China and Russia are poised
to sign a bilateral accord regarding these issues in
October.

The WPS Monitoring Agency reported last November that
the Economic Development and Trade Ministry of Russia
intends to treat cargos of more than 50 kilos as a
consignment of commercial goods, subject to import
tariffs (on top of the current tax of 30 percent).

The Ministry claimed that shuttle trade accounts for up to
90 percent of all imported goods "in certain spheres" (e.g.,
furs). As late as 1994, Russians were allowed to import up
to $5000 of duty-free goods in their accompanied baggage
- a relic of communist days when only the privileged few
were allowed to travel.

Up to 2 million Russian citizens may be engaged in
shuttle trade and the value of "gray" goods may be as high
as $10 billion annually. Goods from Turkey alone
amounted in 2002 to $1.5-2 billion, according to then
vice-premier Viktor Khristenko, but shuttle traders also
operate in the United Arab Emirates, Syria, Israel,
Pakistan, India, China, Poland, Hungary, and Italy.

A set of figures published for the first quarter of 2001
shows that shuttle trade amounted to $2.6 billion, or 8
percent of Russia's total foreign trade. Shuttle traded
goods made up 1.5 percent of exports - but a full quarter
of imports.

But the shuttle trade's coup de grace may well be EU
enlargement. Already a new "iron curtain", comprised of
visas and regulations, is rising between EU candidates and
other East European and Balkan countries.

Consider the EU's eastern boundary. More than a million
people cross the busy Ukrainian-Polish border every
month. Enhanced regulation on the Polish side and new,
IMF-inspired, tax laws on the Ukrainian side - led to a
massive increase in corruption and smuggling. Truck
owners now bribe customs officials to the tune of $300
per vehicle, according to a January 2001 report by CEPS.

The results are grave. Following the introduction of these
new measures, cross border traffic fell by 50 percent and
unemployment in the Polish border zones jumped by 40
percent in 2002 alone. It has since doubled. The IMF and
the EU are much decried by the Polish minority now
trapped in Western Ukraine.

The situation is likely to be further exacerbated with the
introduction of a reciprocal visa regime between the two
countries. Shuttle trade may be decimated by the resulting
bureaucratic bottlenecks.

Still, it may no longer be needed now that Poland acceded
to the EU. Shuttle trade thrives on poverty. It arbitrates
between inefficient markets. It satisfies unrequited
demand for goods. The single market ought to rid Europe
of all these distortions - and, thus, most probably of this
makeshift though resilient solution, the shuttle trader.



XXVI. The Blessings of the Black Economy


Some call it the "unofficial" or "informal" economy,
others call it the "grey economy" but the old name fits it
best: the "black economy". In the USA "black" means
"profitable, healthy" and this is what the black economy
is. Macedonia should count its blessings for having had a
black economy so strong and thriving to see it through the
transition. If Macedonia had to rely only on its official
economy it would have gone bankrupt long ago.

The black economy is made up of two constituent
activities:
1. Legal activities that are not reported to the tax
authorities and the income from which goes
untaxed and unreported. For instance: it is not
illegal to clean someone's house, to feed people or
to drive them. It is, however, illegal to hide the
income generated by these activities and not to pay
tax on it. In most countries of the world, this is a
criminal offence, punishable by years in prison.
2. Illegal activities which, needless to say, are also
not reported to the state (and, therefore, not taxed).

These two types of activities together are thought to
comprise between 15% (USA, Germany) to 60% (Russia)
of the economic activity (as measured by the GDP),
depending on the country. It would probably be an
underestimate to say that 40% of the GDP in Macedonia
is "black". This equals 1.2 billion USD per annum. The
money generated by these activities is largely held in
foreign exchange outside the banking system or smuggled
abroad (even through the local banking system).

Experience in other countries shows that circa 15% of the
money "floats" in the recipient country and is used to
finance consumption. This should translate to 1 billion
free floating dollars in the hands of the 2 million citizens
of Macedonia. Billions are transferred to the outside world
(mostly to finance additional transactions, some of it to be
saved in foreign banks away from the long hand of the
state). A trickle of money comes back and is "laundered"
through the opening of small legal businesses.

These are excellent news for Macedonia. It means that
when the macro-economic, geopolitical and (especially)
the micro-economic climates will change - billions of
USD will flow back to Macedonia. People will bring their
money back to open businesses, to support family
members and just to consume it. It all depends on the
mood and on the atmosphere and on how much these
people feel that they can rely on the political stability and
rational management. Such enormous flows of capital
happened before: in Argentina after the Generals and their
corrupt regime were ousted by civilians, in Israel when
the peace process started and in Mexico following the
signature of NAFTA, to mention but three cases. These
reserves can be lured back and transform the economy.

But the black economy has many more important
functions.

The black economy is a cash economy. It is liquid and
fast. It increases the velocity of money. It injects much
needed foreign exchange to the economy and
inadvertently increases the effective money supply and the
resulting money aggregates. In this sense, it defies the
dictates of "we know better" institutions such as the IMF.

It fosters economic activity and employs people. It
encourages labour mobility and international trade. Black
economy, in short, is very positive. With the exception of
illegal activities, it does everything that the official
economy does - and, usually, more efficiently.

So, what is morally wrong with the black economy? The
answer, in brief: it is exploitative. Other parts of the
economy, which are not hidden (though would have liked
to be), are penalized for their visibility. They pay taxes.

Workers in a factory owned by the state or in the
government service cannot avoid paying taxes. The
money that the state collects from them is invested, for
instance, in infrastructure (roads, phones, electricity) or
used to pay for public services (education, defence,
policing). The operators of the black economy enjoy these
services without paying for them, without bearing the
costs and worse: while others bear the costs. These
encourages them, in theory to use these resources less
efficiently.

And all this might be true in a highly efficient, almost
ideal market economy. The emphasis is on the word
"market". Unfortunately, we all live in societies which are
regulated by bureaucracies which are controlled (in
theory, rarely in practice) by politicians. These elites have
a tendency to misuse and to abuse resources and to
allocate them in an inefficient manner. Even economic
theory admits that any dollar left in the hands of the
private sector is much more efficiently used than the same
dollar in the hands of the most honest and well meaning
and well planning civil servant. Governments all over the
world distort economic decisions and misallocate scarce
economic resources.

Thus, if the goals are to encourage employment and
economic growth - the black economy should be
welcomed. This is precisely what it does and, by
definition, it does so more efficiently than the
government. The less tax dollars a government has - the
less damage it does. This is an opinion shares by most
economists in the world today. Lower tax rates are an
admission of this fact and a legalization of parts of the
black economy.

The black economy is especially important in times of
economic hardships. Countries in transition are a private
case of emerging economies which are a private case of
developing countries which used to be called (in less
politically correct times) "Third World Countries". They
suffer from all manner of acute economic illnesses. They
lost their export markets, they are technologically
backward, their unemployment skyrockets, their plant and
machinery are dilapidated, their infrastructure decrepit
and dysfunctional, they are lethally illiquid, they become
immoral societies (obligations not honoured, crime
flourishes), their trade deficits and budget deficits balloon
and they are conditioned to be dependent on handouts and
dictates from various international financial institutions
and donor countries.

Read this list again: isn't the black economy a perfect
solution until the dust settles?
It enhances exports (and competitiveness through
imports), it encourages technology transfers, it employs
people, it invests in legitimate businesses (or is practised
by them), it adds to the wealth of the nation (black
marketeers are big spenders, good consumers and build
real estate), it injects liquidity to an otherwise dehydrated
market. Mercifully, the black economy is out of the reach
of zealous missionaries such as the IMF. It goes its own
way, unnoticed, unreported, unbeknownst, untamed. It
doesn't pay attention to money supply targets (it is much
bigger than the official money supply figure), or to
macroeconomic stability goals. It plods on: doing business
and helping the country to survive the double scourges of
transition and Western piousness and patronizing. As long
as it is there, Macedonia has a real safety net. The
government is advised to turn a blind eye to it for it is a
blessing in disguise.

There is one sure medicine: eliminate the population and
both unemployment and inflation will be eliminated.

Without the black economy, the population of Macedonia
would not have survived. This lesson must be
remembered as the government prepares to crack down on
the only sector of the economy which is still alive and
kicking.

Operational Recommendations
The implementation of these recommendations and
reforms should be obliged to be GRADUAL. The
informal economy is an important pressure valve for the
release of social pressures, it ameliorates the social costs
inherent to the period of transition and it constitutes an
important part of the private sector.

As we said in the body of our report, these are the reasons
for the existence of an informal economy and they should
be obliged to all be tackled:
? High taxation level (in Macedonia, high payroll
taxes);
? Onerous labour market regulations;
? Red tape and bureaucracy (which often leads to
corruption);
? Complexity and unpredictability of the tax system.

Reporting Requirements and Transparency
? All banks should be obliged to report foreign
exchange transactions of more than 10,000 DM
(whether in one transaction or cumulatively by the
same legal entity). The daily report should be
submitted to the Central Bank. In extreme cases,
the transactions should be investigated.
? All the ZPP account numbers of all the firms in
Macedonia should be publicly available through
the Internet and in printed form.
? Firms should be obliged by law to make a list of
all their bank accounts available to the ZPP, to the
courts and to plaintiffs in lawsuits.
? All citizens should be obliged to file annual,
personal tax returns (universal tax returns, like in
the USA). This way, discrepancies between
personal tax returns and other information can lead
to investigations and discoveries of tax evasion
and criminal activities.
? All citizens should be obliged to file bi-annual
declarations of personal wealth and assets
(including real estate, vehicles, movables,
inventory of business owned or controlled by the
individual, financial assets, income from all
sources, shares in companies, etc.).
? All retail outlets and places of business should be
required to install - over a period of 3 years - cash
registers with "fiscal brains". These are cash
registers with an embedded chip. The chips are
built to save a trail (detailed list) of all the
transactions in the place of business. Tax
inspectors can pick the chip at random, download
its contents to the tax computers and use it to issue
tax assessments. The information thus gathered
can also be crossed with and compared to
information from other sources (see: "Databases
and Information Gathering"). This can be done
only after the full implementation of the
recommendations in the section titled "Databases
and Information Gathering". I do not regard it as
an effective measure. While it increases business
costs - it is not likely to prevent cash or otherwise
unreported transactions.
? All taxis should be equipped with taximeters,
which include a printer. This should be a licencing
condition.
? Industrial norms (for instance, the amount of sugar
needed to manufacture a weight unit of chocolate,
or juice) should be revamped. Norms should NOT
be determined according to statements provided by
the factory - but by a panel of experts. Each norm
should be signed by three people, of which at least
one is an expert engineer or another expert in the
relevant field. Thought should be dedicated to the
possibility of employing independent laboratories
to determine norms and supervise them.
? Payments in wholesale markets should be done
through a ZPP counter or branch in the wholesale
market itself. Release of the goods and exiting the
physical location of the wholesale market should
be allowed only against presentation of a ZPP
payment slip.

Reduction of Cash Transactions
? Cash transactions are the lifeblood of the informal
economy. Their reduction and minimization is
absolutely essential in the effort to contain it. One
way of doing it is by issuing ZPP payment (debit)
cards to businesses, firm and professionals. Use of
the payment cards should be mandatory in certain
business-to-business transactions.
? All exchange offices should be obliged to issue
receipt for every cash transaction above 100 DM
and to report to the Central Bank all transactions
above 1000 DM. Suspicious transactions (for
instance, transactions which exceed the financial
wherewithal of the client involved) should be duly
investigated.
? The government can reduce payroll taxes if the
salary is not paid in cash (for instance, by a
transfer to the bank account of the employee). The
difference between payroll taxes collected on cash
salaries and lower payroll taxes collected on
noncash salaries - should be recovered by
imposing a levy on all cash withdrawals from
banks. The banks can withhold the tax and transfer
it to the state monthly.
? Currently, checks issued to account-holders by
banks are virtually guaranteed by the issuing
banks. This transforms checks into a kind of cash
and checks are used as cash in the economy. To
prevent this situation, it is recommended that all
checks will be payable to the beneficiary only. The
account-holder will be obliged to furnish the bank
with a monthly list of checks he or she issued and
their details (to whom, date, etc.). Checks should
be valid for 5 working days only.
? An obligation can be imposed to oblige businesses
to effect payments only through their accounts
(from account to account) or using their debit
cards. Cash withdrawals should be subject to a
withholding tax deducted by the bank. The same
withholding tax should be applied to credits given
against cash balances or to savings houses
(stedilnicas). Alternatively, stedilnicas should also
be obliged to deduct, collect and transfer the cash
withdrawal withholding tax.
? In the extreme and if all other measures fail after a
reasonable period of time, all foreign trade related
payments should be conducted through the Central
Bank. But this is really a highly irregular,
emergency measure, which I do not recommend at
this stage.
? The interest paid on cash balances and savings
accounts in the banks should be increased (starting
with bank reserves and deposits in the central
bank).
? The issuance of checkbook should be made easy
and convenient. Every branch should issue
checkbooks. All the banks and the post office
should respect and accept each other's checks.
? A Real Time Gross Settlement System should be
established to minimize float and facilitate
interbank transfers.

Government Tenders
? Firms competing for government tenders should
be obliged to acquire a certificate from the tax
authorities that they owe no back-taxes.

Otherwise, they should be barred from bidding in
government tenders and RFPs (Requests for
Proposals).

Databases and Information Gathering
? Estimating the informal economy should be a
priority objective of the Bureau of Statistics,
which should devote considerable resources to this
effort. In doing so, the Bureau of Statistics should
coordinate closely with a wide variety of relevant
ministries and committees that oversee various
sectors of the economy.
? All registrars should be computerized: land, real
estate, motor vehicles, share ownership,
companies registration, tax filings, import and
export related documentation (customs), VAT,
permits and licences, records of flights abroad,
ownership of mobile phones and so on. The tax
authorities and the Public Revenue Office (PRO)
should have unrestricted access to ALL the
registers of all the registrars. Thus, they should be
able to find tax evasion easily (ask for sources of
wealth- how did you build this house and buy a
new car if you are earning 500 DM monthly
according to your tax return?).
? The PRO should have complete access to the
computers of the ZPP and to all its computerized
and non-computerized records.
? The computer system should constantly compare
VAT records and records and statements related to
other taxes in order to find discrepancies between
them.
? Gradually, submissions of financial statements, tax
returns and wealth declarations should be
computerized and done even on a monthly basis
(for instance, VAT statements).
? A system of informants and informant rewards
should be established, including anonymous phone
calls. Up to 10% of the intake or seizure value
related to the information provided by the
informant should go to the informant.

Law Enforcement
? Tax inspectors and customs officials should
receive police powers and much higher salaries
(including a percentage of tax revenues). The
salaries of all tax inspectors - regardless of their
original place of employment - should be
equalized (of course, taking into consideration
tenure, education, rank, etc.).
? Judges should be trained and educated in matters
pertaining to the informal economy. Special courts
for taxes, for instance, are a good idea (see
recommendation below). Judges have to be trained
in tax laws and the state tax authorities should
provide BINDING opinions to entrepreneurs,
businessmen and investors regarding the tax
implications of their decisions and actions.
? It is recommended to assign tax inspectors to the
public prosecutors' office to work as teams on
complex or big cases.
? To establish an independent Financial and Tax
Police with representatives from all relevant
ministries but under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the PRO. The remit of this Police should include
all matters financial (including foreign exchange
transactions, property and real estate transactions,
payroll issues, etc.).
? Hiring and firing procedures in all the branches of
the tax administration should be simplified. The
number of administrative posts should be reduced
and the number of tax inspectors and field agents
increased.
? Tax arrears and especially the interest accruing
thereof should be the first priority of the ZPP,
before all other payments.
? All manufacturers and sellers of food products
(including soft drinks, sweetmeats and candy,
meat products, snacks) should purchase a licence
from the state and be subjected to periodic and
rigorous inspections.
? All contracts between firms should be registered in
the courts and stamped to become valid. Contracts
thus evidenced should be accompanied by the
registration documents (registrar extract) of the
contracting parties. Many "firms" doing business
in Macedonia are not even legally registered.

Reforms and Amnesty
? A special inter-ministerial committee with
MINISTER-MEMBERS and headed by the PM
should be established. Its roles: to reduce
bureaucracy, to suggest appropriate new
legislation and to investigate corruption.
? Bureaucracy should be pared down drastically.

The more permits, licences, tolls, fees and
documents needed - the more corruption. Less
power to state officials means less corruption. The
One Stop Shop concept should be implemented
everywhere.
? A general amnesty should be declared. Citizens
declaring their illegal wealth should be pardoned
BY LAW and either not taxed or taxed at a low
rate once and forever on the hitherto undeclared
wealth.

The Tax Code
? To impose a VAT system. VAT is one the best
instruments against the informal economy because
it tracks the production process throughout a chain
of value added suppliers and manufacturers.
? The Tax code needs to be simplified. Emphasis
should be placed on VAT, consumption taxes,
customs and excise taxes, fees and duties. To
restore progressivity, the government should
directly compensate the poor for the excess
relative burden.
? After revising the tax code in a major way, the
government should declare a moratorium on any
further changes for at least four years.
? The self-employed and people whose main
employment is directorship in companies should
be given the choice between paying a fixed % of
the market value of their assets (including
financial assets) or income tax.
? All property rental contracts should be registered
with the courts. Lack of registration in the courts
and payment of a stamp tax should render the
contract invalid. The courts should be allowed to
evidence and stamp a contract only after it carries
the stamp of the Public Revenue Office (PRO).

The PRO should register the contract and issue an
immediate tax assessment. Contracts, which are
for less than 75% of the market prices, should be
subject to tax assessment at market prices. Market
prices should be determined as the moving average
of the last 100 rental contracts from the same
region registered by the PRO.
? Filing of tax returns - including for the self-
employed - should be only with the PRO and not
with any other body (such as the ZPP).

Legal Issues
? The burden of proof in tax court cases should shift
from the tax authorities to the person or firm
assessed.
? Special tax courts should be established within the
existing courts. They should be staffed by
specifically trained judges. Their decisions should
be appealed to the Supreme Court. They should
render their decisions within 180 days. All other
juridical and appeal instances should be cancelled
- except for an appeal instance within the PRO.

Thus, the process of tax collection should be
greatly simplified. A tax assessment should be
issued by the tax authorities, appealed internally
(within the PRO), taken to a tax court session (by a
plaintiff) and, finally, appealed to the Supreme
Court (in very rare cases).
? The law should allow for greater fines, prison
terms and for the speedier and longer closure of
delinquent businesses.
? Seizure and sale procedures should be specified in
all the tax laws and not merely by way of
reference to the Income Tax Law. Enforcement
provisions should be incorporated in all the tax
laws.
? To amend the Law on Tax Administration, the
Law on Personal Income Tax and the Law on
Profits Tax as per the recommendations of the IRS
experts (1997-9).

Customs and Duties
? Ideally, the customs service should be put under
foreign contract managers. If this is politically too
sensitive, the customs personnel should be entitled
to receive a percentage of customs and duties
revenues, on a departmental incentive basis. In any
case, the customs should be subjected to outside
inspection by expert inspectors who should be
rewarded with a percentage of the corruption and
lost revenues that they expose.
? In the case of imports or payments abroad,
invoices, which include a price of more than 5%
above the list price of a product, should be rejected
and assessment for the purposes of paying customs
duties and other taxes should be issued at the list
price.
? In the case of exports or payments from abroad,
invoices which include a discount of more than
25% on the list price of a product should be
rejected and assessment for the purposes of paying
customs duties and other taxes should be issued at
the list price.
? The numbers of tax inspectors should be
substantially increased and their pay considerably
enhanced. A departmental incentive system should
be instituted involving a percentage of the intake
(monetary fines levied, goods confiscated, etc.).
? The computerized database system (see
"Databases and Information Gathering") should be
used to compare imports of raw materials for the
purposes of re-export and actual exports (using
invoices and customs declarations). Where there
are disparities and discrepancies, severe and
immediate penal actions should be taken. Anti-
dumping levies and measures, fines and criminal
charges should be adopted against exporters
colluding with importers in hiding imported goods
or reducing their value.
? Often final products are imported and declared to
the customs as raw materials (to minimize customs
duties paid). Later these raw materials are either
sold outright in the domestic or international
markets or bartered for finished products (for
example: paints and lacquers against furniture or
sugar against chocolate). This should be a major
focus of the fight against the informal economy. I
follow with an analysis of two products, which are
often abused in this manner.
? I study two examples (white sugar and cooking
oil) though virtually all raw materials and foods
are subject to the aforementioned abuse.
? White Sugar is often imported as brown sugar.

One way to prevent this is to place sugar on the list
of LB (import licence required) list, to limit the
effective period of each licence issued, to connect
each transaction of imported brown sugar to a
transaction of export, to apply the world price of
sugar to customs duties, to demand payment of
customs duties in the first customs terminal, to
demand a forwarder's as well as an importer's
guarantee and to require a certificate of origin. The
same goes for Cooking Oil (which - when it is
imported packaged - is often declared as some
other goods).
? All payments to the customs should be made only
through the ZPP. Customs and tax inspectors
should inspect these receipts periodically.
? All goods should be kept in the customs terminal
until full payment of the customs duties, as
evidenced by a ZPP receipt, is effected.

Public Campaign
? The government should embark on a massive
Public Relations and Information campaign. The
citizens should be made to understand what is a
budget, how the taxes are collected, how they are
used. They should begin to view tax evaders as
criminals. "He who does not pay his taxes - is
stealing from you and from your children", "Why
should YOU pay for HIM?" "If we all did not pay
taxes- there would be no roads, bridges, schools,
or hospitals" (using video to show disappearing
roads, bridges, suffering patients and students
without classes), "Our country is a partnership -
and the tax-evader is stealing from the till (kasa)"
and so on.

*  The phrase "Gray Economy" should be replaced
by the more accurate phrases "Black Economy" or
"Criminal Economy".



XXVII. Public Procurement and Very Private Benefits


In every national budget, there is a part called "Public
Procurement". This is the portion of the budget allocated
to purchasing services and goods for the various
ministries, authorities and other arms of the executive
branch. It was the famous management consultant,
Parkinson, who once wrote that government officials are
likely to approve a multi-billion dollar nuclear power
plant much more speedily that they are likely to authorize
a hundred dollar expenditure on a bicycle parking device.

This is because everyone came across 100 dollar
situations in real life - but precious few had the fortune to
expend with billions of USD.

This, precisely, is the problem with public procurement:
people are too acquainted with the purchased items. They
tend to confuse their daily, household-type, decisions with
the processes and considerations which should permeate
governmental decision making. They label perfectly
legitimate decisions as "corrupt" - and totally corrupt
procedures as "legal" or merely "legitimate", because this
is what was decreed by the statal mechanisms, or because
"this is the law".

Procurement is divided to defence and non-defence
spending. In both these categories - but, especially in the
former - there are grave, well founded, concerns that
things might not be all what they seem to be.

Government - from India's to Sweden's to Belgium's - fell
because of procurement scandals which involved bribes
paid by manufacturers or service providers either to
individual in the service of the state or to political parties.

Other, lesser cases, litter the press daily. In the last few
years only, the burgeoning defence sector in Israel saw
two such big scandals: the developer of Israel's missiles
was involved in one (and currently is serving a jail
sentence) and Israel's military attache to Washington was
implicated - though, never convicted - in yet another.

But the picture is not that grim. Most governments in the
West succeeded in reigning in and fully controlling this
particular budget item. In the USA, this part of the budget
remained constant in the last 35(!) years at 20% of the
GDP.

There are many problems with public procurement. It is
an obscure area of state activity, agreed upon in
"customized" tenders and in dark rooms through a series
of undisclosed agreements. At least, this is the public
image of these expenditures.

The truth is completely different.

True, some ministers use public money to build their
private "empires". It could be a private business empire,
catering to the financial future of the minister, his cronies
and his relatives. These two plagues - cronyism and
nepotism - haunt public procurement. The spectre of
government official using public money to benefit their
political allies or their family members - haunts public
imagination and provokes public indignation.

Then, there are problems of plain corruption: bribes or
commissions paid to decision makers in return for
winning tenders or awarding of economic benefits
financed by the public money. Again, sometimes these
moneys end in secret bank accounts in Switzerland or in
Luxembourg. At other times, they finance political
activities of political parties. This was rampantly abundant
in Italy and has its place in France. The USA, which was
considered to be immune from such behaviours - has
proven to be less so, lately, with the Bill Clinton alleged
election financing transgressions.

But, these, with all due respect to "clean hands"
operations and principles, are not the main problems of
public procurement.

The first order problem is the allocation of scarce
resources. In other words, prioritizing. The needs are
enormous and ever growing. The US government
purchases hundreds of thousands of separate items from
outside suppliers. Just the list of these goods - not to
mention their technical specifications and the
documentation which accompanies the transactions -
occupies tens of thick volumes. Supercomputers are used
to manage all these - and, even so, it is getting way out of
hand. How to allocate ever scarcer resources amongst
these items is a daunting - close to impossible - task. It
also, of course, has a political dimension. A procurement
decision reflects a political preference and priority. But
the decision itself is not always motivated by rational - let
alone noble - arguments. More often, it is the by product
and end result of lobbying, political hand bending and
extortionist muscle. This raises a lot of hackles among
those who feel that were kept out of the pork barrel. They
feel underprivileged and discriminated against. They fight
back and the whole system finds itself in a quagmire, a
nightmare of conflicting interests. Last year, the whole
budget in the USA was stuck - not approved by Congress
- because of these reactions and counter-reactions.

The second problem is the supervision, auditing and
control of actual spending. This has two dimensions:
1. How to make sure that the expenditures match and
do not exceed the budgetary items. In some
countries, this is a mere ritual formality and
government departments are positively expected to
overstep their procurement budgets. In others, this
constitutes a criminal offence.
2. How to prevent the criminally corrupt activities
that we have described above - or even the non
criminal incompetent acts which government
officials are prone to do.

The most widespread method is the public, competitive,
tender for the purchases of goods and services.

But, this is not as simple as it sounds.

Some countries publish international tenders, striving to
secure the best quality in the cheapest price - no matter
what is its geographical or political source. Other
countries are much more protectionist (notably: Japan and
France) and they publish only domestic tenders, in most
cases. A domestic tender is open only to domestic bidders.

Yet other countries limit participation in the tenders on
various backgrounds:
the size of the competing company, its track record, its
ownership structure, its human rights or environmental
record and so on. Some countries publish the minutes of
the tender committee (which has to explain WHY it
selected this or that supplier). Others keep it a closely
guarded secret ("to protect commercial interests and
secrets").

But all countries state in advance that they have no
obligation to accept any kind of offer - even if it is the
cheapest. This is a needed provision: the cheapest is not
necessarily the best. The cheapest offer could be coming
from a very unreliable supplier with a bad past
performance or a criminal record or from a supplier who
offers goods of shoddy quality.

The tendering policies of most of the countries in the
world also incorporates a second principle: that of
"minimum size". The cost of running a tender is
prohibitive in the cases of purchases in small amounts.

Even if there is corruption in such purchases it is bound to
cause less damage to the public purse than the costs of the
tender which is supposed to prevent it!
So, in most countries, small purchases can be authorized
by government officials - larger amounts go through a
tedious, multi-phase tendering process. Public competitive
bidding is not corruption-proof: many times officials and
bidders collude and conspire to award the contract against
bribes and other, noncash, benefits. But we still know of
no better way to minimize the effects of human greed.

Procurement policies, procedures and tenders are
supervised by state auditing authorities. The most famous
is, probably, the General Accounting Office, known by its
acronym: the GAO.

It is an unrelenting, very thorough and dangerous
watchdog of the administration. It is considered to be
highly effective in reducing procurement - related
irregularities and crimes. Another such institutions the
Israeli State Reviser. What is common to both these
organs of the state is that they have very broad authority.

They possess (by law) judicial and criminal prosecution
powers and they exercise it without any hesitation. They
have the legal obligation to review the operations and
financial transactions of all the other organs of the
executive branch. Their teams select, each year, the
organs to be reviewed and audited. They collect all
pertinent documents and correspondence. They cross the
information that they receive from elsewhere. They ask
very embarrassing questions and they do it under the
threat of perjury prosecutions. They summon witnesses
and they publish damning reports which, in many cases,
lead to criminal prosecutions.

Another form of review of public procurement is through
powers granted to the legislative arm of the state
(Congress, Parliament, Bundestag, or Knesset). In almost
every country in the world, the elected body has its own
procurement oversight committee. It supervises the
expenditures of the executive branch and makes sure that
they conform to the budget. The difference between such
supervisory, parliamentary, bodies and their executive
branch counterparts - is that they feel free to criticize
public procurement not only in the context of its
adherence to budget constraints or its cleanliness - but
also in a political context. In other words, these
committees do not limit themselves to asking HOW - but
also engage in asking WHY. Why this specific expense in
this given time and location - and not that expense,
somewhere else or some other time. These elected bodies
feel at liberty - and often do - intervene in the very
decision making process and in the order of priorities.

They have the propensity to alter both quite often.

The most famous such committee is, arguably, the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). It is famous because
it is non-partisan and technocratic in nature. It is really
made of experts which staff its offices.

Its apparent - and real - neutrality makes its judgements
and recommendations a commandment not to be avoided
and, almost universally, to be obeyed. The CBO operates
for and on behalf of the American Congress and is, really,
the research arm of that venerable parliament. Parallelly,
the executive part of the American system - the
Administration - has its own guard against waste and
worse: the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

Both bodies produce learned, thickset, analyses, reports,
criticism, opinions and recommendations. Despite quite a
prodigious annual output of verbiage - they are so highly
regarded, that virtually anything that they say (or write) is
minutely analysed and implemented to the last letter with
an air of awe.

Only a few other parliaments have committees that carry
such weight. The Israeli Knesset have the extremely
powerful Finance Committee which is in charge of all
matters financial, from appropriations to procurement.

Another parliament renowned for its tight scrutiny is the
French Parliament - though it retains very few real
powers.

But not all countries chose the option of legislative
supervision. Some of them relegated parts or all of these
functions to the executive arm.

In Japan, the Ministry of Finance still scrutinizes (and has
to authorize) the smallest expense, using an army of
clerks. These clerks became so powerful that they have
the theoretical potential to secure and extort benefits
stemming from the very position that they hold. Many of
them suspiciously join companies and organizations
which they supervised or to which they awarded contracts
- immediately after they leave their previous, government,
positions. The Ministry of Finance is subject to a major
reform in the reform-bent government of Prime Minister
Hashimoto. The Japanese establishment finally realized
that too much supervision, control, auditing and
prosecution powers might be a Pyrrhic victory: it might
encourage corruption - rather than discourage it.

Britain opted to keep the discretion to use public funds
and the clout that comes with it in the hands of the
political level. This is a lot like the relationship between
the butter and the cat left to guard it. Still, this
idiosyncratic British arrangement works surprisingly well.

All public procurement and expenditure items are
approved by the EDX Committee of the British Cabinet
(=inner, influential, circle of government) which is headed
by the Ministry of Finance. Even this did not prove
enough to restrain the appetites of Ministers, especially as
quid pro quo deals quickly developed. So, now the word
is that the new Labour Prime Minister will chair it-
enabling him to exert his personal authority on matters of
public money.

Britain, under the previous, Tory, government also
pioneered an interesting and controversial incentive
system for its public servants as top government officials
are euphemistically called there. They receive, added to
their salaries, a portion of the savings that they effect in
their departmental budgets. This means that they get a
small fraction of the end of the fiscal year difference
between their budget allowances and what they actually
spent. This is very useful in certain segments of
government activity - but could prove very problematic in
others. Imagine health officials saving on medicines, or
others saving on road maintenance or educational
consumables. This, naturally, will not do.

Needless to say that no country officially approves of the
payment of bribes or commission to officials in charge of
public spending, however remote the connection is
between the payment and the actions.

Yet, law aside many countries accept the intertwining of
elites - business and political - as a fact of life, albeit a sad
one. Many judicial systems in the world even make a
difference between a payment which is not connected to
an identifiable or discernible benefit and those that are.

The latter - and only the latter - are labelled "bribery".

Where there is money - there is wrongdoing. Humans are
humans - and sometimes not even that.

But these unfortunate derivatives of social activity can be
minimized by the adoption of clear procurement policies,
transparent and public decision making processes and the
right mix of supervision, auditing and prosecution. Even
then the result is bound to be dubious, at best.



XXVIII.  Crisis of the Bookkeepers

The Future of the Accounting Profession
Interview with David Jones


On May 31, 2005, the US Supreme Court overturned the
conviction of accounting firm Arthur Anderson on
charges related to its handling of the books of the now
defunct energy concern, Enron. It was only the latest
scene in a drama which unfolded at the height of the wave
of corporate malfeasance in the USA.

David C. Jones is a part-time research fellow at the Center
for Urban Development Studies of the Graduate School of
Design, Harvard University. He has been associated with
the University since 1987 when he retired from the World
Bank, where he served as financial adviser for water
supply and urban development.

He had joined the World Bank, as a senior financial
analyst, in 1970, after working as a technical assistance
advisor for the British Government in East Africa. He
began his career in British local government. He is a
Chartered Public Finance Accountant and a Chartered
Certified Accountant (UK). He is the author of
"Municipal Accounting for Developing Countries"
originally published by the World Bank and the Chartered
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (UK) in
1982.

Q: Accounting scandals seem to form the core of
corporate malfeasance in the USA. Is there something
wrong with the GAAP - or with American accountants?
A: Accounting is based on some fundamental principles.

As I say at the beginning of my textbook, the accountant
"records and interprets variations in financial position ...
during any period of time, at the end of which he can
balance net results (of past operations) against net
resources (available for future operations)".

Accountancy includes the designing of financial records,
the recording of financial information based on actual
financial transactions (i.e., bookkeeping), the production
of financial statements from the recorded information,
giving advice on financial matters, and interpreting and
using financial data to assist in making the best
management decisions.

Simple as these principles may sound, they are, in
practice, rather complicated to implement, to interpret and
to practice. About 80% of the transactions require only
about 20% of the effort because they are straightforward
and obvious to a book-keeper, once the rules are learned.

But - and it is a big but - the other 20% or so of
transactions require 80% of the intellectual effort. These
transactions are most likely to have major impacts on the
profit and loss account and the balance sheet.

My colleagues and I, all qualified accountants, have
heated discussion over something as simple as the
definition of a debit or a credit. Debits can be records of
either expenses or assets. The former counts against
income in the statement of profit and loss. The latter is
treated as a continuing resource in a balance sheet. It is
sometimes gradually allocated (expensed) against income
in subsequent years, sometimes not.

A fundamental problem with the financial reporting of
WorldCom, for example, was that huge quantities of
expenses were misallocated in the accounts as assets.

Thus, by reducing expenditures, profit appeared to be
increased. The effect of this on stock values and, thereby,
on executive rewards are secondary and tertiary outcomes
not caused directly by the accountancy.

Another example concerns interest on loans that may have
been raised to finance capital investment, while a large
asset is under construction, often for several years.

Some argue that the interest should be accounted for as
part of the capital cost until the asset is operational. Others
claim that because the interest is an expense, it should be
charged against that year's profits. Yet, the current year's
income includes none of the income generated by the new
asset, so profit is under-stated. And what if a hydro-
electric power station starts to operate three of its ten
turbines while still under construction? How does one
allocate what costs, as expenses or assets, in such cases?
Interestingly, the Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) require that "interest during
construction" be capitalized, that is included in the cost of
the asset. The International Accounting Standards (IAS)
prefer expensing but allow capitalization. From an
economic viewpoint, both are wrong - or only partially
right!
The accountancy profession should get together to
establish common practices for comparing companies,
limiting the scope for judgment. Accountants used to
make the rules in the USA and elsewhere until the
business community demanded input from other
professionals, to provide a more "balanced" view.

This led to the establishment of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB), with non-accountants as
members. The GAAP has been tempered by political and
business lobbying. Moreover, accounting rules for
taxation purposes and applied to companies quoted on
stock exchanges are not always consistent with the
GAAP.

Accountants who do not follow the rules are disciplined.

American accountants are among the best educated and
best-trained in the world. Those who wish to be
recognized as auditors of significant enterprises must be
CPAs. Thus, they must have obtained at least a finance-
related bachelor's degree and then have passed a five-part
examination that is commonly set, nation-wide, by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA). To practice publicly, they must be licensed by
the state in which they live or practice. To remain a CPA,
each must abide by the standards of conduct and ethics of
the AICPA, including a requirement for continuing
professional education.

Most other countries have comparable rules. Probably the
closest comparisons to the USA are found in the UK and
its former colonies.

Q: Can you briefly compare the advantages and
disadvantages of the GAAP and the IAS?
A: It is asserted that the GAAP tend to be "rule-based"
and the IAS are "principle-based." GAAP, because they
are founded on the business environment of the USA are
closely aligned to its laws and regulations. The IAS seek
to prescribe how credible accounting practices can operate
within a country's existing legal structure and prevailing
business practices.

Alas, sometimes the IAS and the GAAP are in
disagreement. The two rule-making bodies - FASB and
IASB - are trying to cooperate to eliminate such
differences.

The Inter-American Development Bank, having reviewed
the situation in Latin America, concluded that most of the
countries in that region - as well as Canada and the EU
aspirants - are IAS-orientated. Still, the USA is by far the
largest economy in the world, with significant political
influence. It also has the world's most important financial
markets.

Q: Can accounting cope with derivatives, off-shore
entities, stock options - or is there a problem in the very
effort to capture dynamics and uncertainties in terms of a
static, numerical representation?
A: Most, if not all, of these matters can be handled by
proper application of accounting principles and practices.

Much has been made of expensing employee stock
options, for instance. But an FASB proposal in the early
nineties was watered down at the insistence of US
company lobbyists and legislators.

How to value stock options and when to recognize them is
not clear. A paper on the topic identified sixteen different
valuation parameters. But accountants are accustomed to
dealing with such practical matters.

Q: Can you describe the state of the art (i.e., recent
trends) of municipal finance in the USA, Europe, Latin
America (mainly Argentina and Brazil), and in emerging
economies (e.g., central and eastern Europe)?
A: There are no standard practices for governmental
accounting - whether national, federal, state, or local. The
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) urged
accountants to follow various practices. It subsequently
settled mainly on accrual accounting standards.

Some countries - the UK, for local government, New
Zealand for both central and local government - use full
accrual at current value, which is beyond many private
sector practices. This is being reviewed in the UK. The
central government there is introducing "resource-based"
accounting, approximating full accrual at current value.

The US Governmental Accounting Standards Board has
recently recommended that US local governments
produce dual financial reports, combining "commercially-
based" practices with those emanating from the truly
unique US "fund accounting" system.

In my book I recognized that fixed assets are being funded
less and less entirely by debt, private sector accounting
practices increasingly intrude into the public sector, and
costs of services must be much more carefully assessed.

Q: Are we likely to witness municipal Enrons and
World.com's?
A: We already have! Remember the financial downfall
and restructuring of New York City in the seventies.

Other state and local governments have had serious
defaults in USA and elsewhere. Shortcomings of their
accounting, politicians choosing to ignore predictive
budgeting, borrowing used to cover operating
expenditures - similar to WorldCom. In the case of the
New York City debacle, operating expenditures were
treated as capital expenditures to balance the operating
budget.

More recently, I testified to the US Congress about
Washington DC, where the City Council ran up a huge
accumulated operating deficit, of c. $700 million. It then
sought Congressional approval to cover this deficit by
borrowing.

Even more recently, the State of Virginia decided to
abolish the property tax on domestic vehicles. This left a
huge gap in the following year's current budget. The
governor proposed to use a deceptive accounting device
and to set up a separate - and, thus not subject to a
referendum - "revenue" bond-issuing entity (shades of
Enron's "Special Purpose Entities"). The bonds were then
to be serviced by expected annual receipts from the
negotiated tobacco settlement, at that time not even
finalized. This crazy and illegal plan was abandoned.

The fact that both accounting and financial reporting for
local governments are very often in slightly modified
cash-based formats adds to the confusion. But these
formats could be built on. Indeed, in the very tight
budgetary situations facing virtually every local
government, it is essential that cash management on a day-
to-day basis be given high priority.

Still, the system can be misleading. It produces extremely
scant information on costs - the use of resources - compared
with expenditures (i.e., cash-flows). More seriously, cash
accounting allows indiscriminate allocation of funds
between capital and recurrent purposes, thus permitting no
useful assessment of annual or other periodic financial
performance.

A cash-based system cannot engender a credible balance
sheet. It produces meaningless and incoherent information
on assets and liabilities and the ownership, or trusteeship, of
separate (or separable) funds. It is not a sound system of
budgetary control. When year-end unpaid invoices are held
over, it creates a false impression of operating within
approved budgetary limits. Thus, local government units
can run serious budgetary deficits that are hidden from
public view merely by not paying their bills on time and
in full! A cash accounting system will not reveal this.

Still, moving to an accrual system should be done slowly
and cautiously. Private sector experience, in former Soviet
countries, of changing to accrual accounting was
administratively traumatic. Their public sector systems
may not easily survive any major tinkering, let alone an -
eventually inevitable - full overhaul. Skills, tools, and
access to proper professional knowledge are required
before this is attempted.

Q: Can you compare municipal and corporate accounting
and financing practices as far as governance and control
are concerned?
A: In corporate accounting practice, the notional owners
and managers are the shareholders. In practice, through
the use of proxies and other devices, the real control is
normally in the hands of a board of directors. Actual day
to day control reverts to the company chairmen, president,
chief executive or chief operating officer. The chief
financial officer is often - though not necessarily - an
accountant and he or she oversees qualified accountants.

The company's accountants must produce the annual and
other financial statements. It is not the responsibility of
the auditors whose obligation is to report to the
shareholders on the credibility and legality of the financial
statements. The shareholders may appoint an audit
committee to review the audit reports on their behalf. The
audit is carried out by Certified Public Accountants with
recognized accounting credentials. Both the qualified
accountants in the audit firm and those in the corporation
are subject to professional discipline of their accounting
institutions and of the law.

In local government accounting practice, the public
trustees and managers are normally a locally elected
council. Often, the detailed control over financial
management is in the hands of a finance committee or
finance commission, usually comprised only of elected
members.

Traditionally, only the elected council may take major
financial decisions, such as approving a budget, levying
taxes and borrowing. Actual day to day control of a local
government may be by an executive mayor, or by an
elected or appointed chief executive. There normally is a
chief financial officer, often - though not necessarily - an
accountant in charge of other qualified accountants.

It is the responsibility of the accountants of the local
government to produce the annual and other financial
statements. It is not the responsibility of the auditors
whose obligation is to report to the local elected council
on the credibility and legality of the financial statements.

The council may appoint an audit committee to review the
audit reports on their behalf, or they may ask the finance
committee to do this.

However, it is quite common, in many countries, for local
government financial statements to be audited by properly
authorized public officials. Auditors should be qualified,
independent, experienced, and competent. Audits should
be regular and comprehensive. It is unclear whether or not
public official auditors always fulfill these conditions.

In the United Kingdom, for example, there is a Local
Government Audit Commission which employs qualified
accountants either on its own staff or from hired
accountancy firms. Thus, it clearly follows high standards.

Q: How did the worldwide trend of devolution affect
municipal finance?
A: Outside of the former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, municipal finance was not significantly affected
by devolution, though there has been a tendency for
decentralization. Central governments hold the purse-
strings and almost all local governments operate under
legislation engendered by the national, or - in federal
systems - state, governments. Local governments rarely
have separate constitutional authority, although there are
varying degrees of local autonomy.

In the former Soviet Empire, changes of systems and of
attitudes were much more dramatic. Local government
units, unlike under the former Soviet system, are not
branches of the general government. They are separate
corporate bodies, or legal persons. But in Russia, and in
other former socialist countries, they have often been
granted "de jure" (legal) independence but not full "de
facto" (practical) autonomy.

There seems to be an unwillingness to accept that the two
systems are intended to operate quite differently. What is
good for a central government is not necessarily equally
good for a local government unit. For example, the main
purpose of local government is to provide public services,
with only enough authority to perform them effectively. It
is almost always the responsibility of a central or state
government to enact and enforce the criminal and civil
law. Local by-laws or ordinances are usually concerned
only with minor matters and are subject to an enabling
legislation. Moreover, they may prove to be "ultra vires"
(beyond their powers) and, therefore, unconstitutional, or
at least unenforceable.

It may be appropriate, under certain circumstances, for a
central government to run budgetary deficits, whether
caused by current or capital transactions. In local
government units, there is almost always a necessity to
distinguish between such transactions. Moreover, in most
countries, local government units are required by law to
have balanced budgets, without resort to borrowing to
cover current deficits.

A corporate body (legal person), whether a private or a
public sector entity, has a separate legal identity from the
central government and from the members, shareholders, or
electorate who own and manage it. It has its own corporate
name. Typically, its formal decisions are by resolution of its
managing body (board or council). Written documents are
authenticated by its common seal. It may contract, sue and
be sued in its own name. Indeed, unless specifically
prevented by law, it may even sue the central government!
It may also have legal relationships with its own individual
members or with its staff. It is often said to have perpetual
succession, meaning that it lives on, even though the
individual members may die, resign or otherwise cease their
membership.

While a corporation owes its existence to legislation, a
local government unit is established, typically, under
something like a "Local Government Organic Law".

Corporate status differs fundamentally from that of (say)
government departments in a system of de-concentration.

Permanent closure or abolition of a municipal council, or
indeed any change in its powers and duties, would almost
always require formal legal action, typically national
parliamentary legislation.

A local government unit makes its own policy decisions,
some of which, especially the financial ones, often require
approval by a central government authority. Still, the central
government rarely runs, or manages, a local government
unit on a daily basis. The relationship is at arms length and
not hands on. A local government unit usually is
empowered to own land and real estate. Sometimes, public
assets - such as with roads or drainage systems - are deemed
to be "vested in" the local authority because they cannot be
owned in the same way as buildings are.

Q: Local authorities issue bonds, partake in joint ventures,
lend to SME's - in short, encroach on turf previously
exclusively occupied by banks, the capital markets, and
business. Is this a good or a bad thing?
A: Local governments are established to provide services
and perform activities required or allowed by law!
Normally, they won't seek or be permitted to engage in
commercial activities, best left to the private sector.

However, there have always been natural monopolies
(such as water supply), coping with negative economic
externalities (such as sewerage and solid waste
management), the provision of whole or partial public
goods (such as street lighting, or roads) and merit goods
(such as education, health, and welfare), and services that
the community, for economic or social reasons, seeks to
subsidize (such as urban transport). Left to the private
marketplace, these services would be absent, or under-
supplied, or over-charged for.

Such services are wholly or partially financed by local
taxation, either imposed by local governments, or by
central (or state) taxation, through a grant or revenue-
sharing system. What has changed in recent years is that
local governments have been encouraged and empowered
to outsource these services to the private sector, or to
"public-private" partnerships.

Charges for services, and revenues from taxation cover
current operating expenditures with a small operating
surplus used to partly fund capital expenditure or to
service long, or medium term debt, such as bond issues
secured against future revenues. Commercial banks,
because of their tendency to lend only for relatively short
periods of time, usually have a relatively minor role in
such funding, except perhaps as fiscal agents or bond
issue managers.

Other funding is obtained via direct - and dependence-
forming - capital grants from the central or state
government. Alternatively, the central government can
establish a quasi-autonomous local government loans
authority, which it may wholly or partially fund. The
authority may also seek to raise additional funds from
commercial sources and make loans on reasonable terms
to the local governments.

Third, the central government may lend directly to local
governments, or guarantee their borrowing. Finally, local
governments are left to their own devices to raise loans as
and when they can, on whatever terms are available. This
usually leaves them in a precarious position, because the
market for this kind of long and medium term credit is
thin and costly.

Commercial banks make short term loans to local
governments to cover temporary shortages of working
capital. If not properly controlled, such short-term loans
are rolled over and accumulate unsustainably. That is
what happed in New York City, in the seventies.

Q: In the age of the Internet and the car, isn't the added
layer of municipal bureaucracy superfluous or even
counterproductive? Can't the center - at least in smallish
countries - administer things at least as well?
A: I am quite sure that they can. There are many glaring
examples of mismatches of sizes, shapes and
responsibilities of local government units. For example,
New York, Moscow and Bombay are each single local
government units. Yet, they each have much bigger
populations than many countries, such as New Zealand,
the republics of former Yugoslavia, and the Baltic states.

On the other hand, the Greater Washington Metropolitan
Area comprises a federal district, four counties and
several small cities. The local government systems are
under the jurisdictions of two states and the federal
government. Each of the two states has a completely
different traditions and systems of local governance,
emanating from pre-independence times. Accordingly, the
local government systems north and east of the Potomac
River (which flows through the Washington area) are
substantially different from those to the south and west.

Finally, the Boston area, a cradle of U.S. democracy, is
governed by a conglomerate of over 40 local government
jurisdictions. Even its most famous college, Harvard, is in
Cambridge and not in Boston itself. Many of the
jurisdictions are so small (Boston is not very big by U.S.
standards) that common services are run by agencies of
the State of Massachusetts.

The problem of centralizing financial records would,
indeed, be relatively simple to solve. If credit card
companies can maintain linkages world-wide, there is no
practical reason why local government accounts for (say)
a city in Macedonia could not be kept in China. The issue
here is quite different. It revolves around democracy,
tradition, living in community, service delivery at a local
level, civil society, and the common wealth. It really has
very little to do with accountancy, which is just one tool
of management, albeit an important one.



XXIX. Competition Laws


A. THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMPETITION
The aims of competition (anti-trust) laws are to ensure
that consumers pay the lowest possible price (=the most
efficient price) coupled with the highest quality of the
goods and services which they consume. This, according
to current economic theories, can be achieved only
through effective competition. Competition not only
reduces particular prices of specific goods and services - it
also tends to have a deflationary effect by reducing the
general price level. It pits consumers against producers,
producers against other producers (in the battle to win the
heart of consumers) and even consumers against
consumers (for example in the healthcare sector in the
USA). This everlasting conflict does the miracle of
increasing quality with lower prices. Think about the vast
improvement on both scores in electrical appliances. The
VCR and PC of yesteryear cost thrice as much and
provided one third the functions at one tenth the speed.

Competition has innumerable advantages:
a. It encourages manufacturers and service providers
to be more efficient, to better respond to the needs of their
customers, to innovate, to initiate, to venture. In
professional words: it optimizes the allocation of
resources at the firm level and, as a result, throughout the
national economy.

More simply: producers do not waste resources (capital),
consumers and businesses pay less for the same goods and
services and, as a result, consumption grows to the benefit
of all involved.
b. The other beneficial effect seems, at first sight, to
be an adverse one: competition weeds out the
failures, the incompetents, the inefficient, the fat
and slow to respond. Competitors pressure one
another to be more efficient, leaner and meaner.

This is the very essence of capitalism. It is wrong
to say that only the consumer benefits. If a firm
improves itself, re-engineers its production
processes, introduces new management
techniques, modernizes - in order to fight the
competition, it stands to reason that it will reap the
rewards. Competition benefits the economy, as a
whole, the consumers and other producers by a
process of natural economic selection where only
the fittest survive. Those who are not fit to survive
die out and cease to waste the rare resources of
humanity.

Thus, paradoxically, the poorer the country, the less
resources it has - the more it is in need of competition.

Only competition can secure the proper and most efficient
use of its scarce resources, a maximization of its output
and the maximal welfare of its citizens (consumers).

Moreover, we tend to forget that the biggest consumers
are businesses (firms). If the local phone company is
inefficient (because no one competes with it, being a
monopoly) - firms will suffer the most: higher charges,
bad connections, lost time, effort, money and business. If
the banks are dysfunctional (because there is no foreign
competition), they will not properly service their clients
and firms will collapse because of lack of liquidity. It is
the business sector in poor countries which should head
the crusade to open the country to competition.

Unfortunately, the first discernible results of the
introduction of free marketry are unemployment and
business closures. People and firms lack the vision, the
knowledge and the wherewithal needed to support
competition. They fiercely oppose it and governments
throughout the world bow to protectionist measures. To
no avail. Closing a country to competition will only
exacerbate the very conditions which necessitate its
opening up. At the end of such a wrong path awaits
economic disaster and the forced entry of competitors. A
country which closes itself to the world - will be forced to
sell itself cheaply as its economy will become more and
more inefficient, less and less competitive.

The Competition Laws aim to establish fairness of
commercial conduct among entrepreneurs and competitors
which are the sources of said competition and innovation.

Experience - later buttressed by research - helped to
establish the following four principles:
1. There should be no barriers to the entry of new
market players (barring criminal and moral
barriers to certain types of activities and to certain
goods and services offered).
2. A larger scale of operation does introduce
economies of scale (and thus lowers prices).

This, however, is not infinitely true. There is a
Minimum Efficient Scale - MES - beyond which
prices will begin to rise due to monopolization of
the markets. This MES was empirically fixed at
10% of the market in any one good or service. In
other words: companies should be encouraged to
capture up to 10% of their market (=to lower
prices) and discouraged to cross this barrier, lest
prices tend to rise again.
3. Efficient competition does not exist when a market
is controlled by less than 10 firms with big size
differences. An oligopoly should be declared
whenever 4 firms control more than 40% of the
market and the biggest of them controls more than
12% of it.
4. A competitive price will be comprised of a
minimal cost plus an equilibrium profit which does
not encourage either an exit of firms (because it is
too low), nor their entry (because it is too high).

Left to their own devices, firms tend to liquidate
competitors (predation), buy them out or collude with
them to raise prices. The 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act in
the USA forbade the latter (section 1) and prohibited
monopolization or dumping as a method to eliminate
competitors. Later acts (Clayton, 1914 and the Federal
Trade Commission Act of the same year) added forbidden
activities: tying arrangements, boycotts, territorial
divisions, non-competitive mergers, price discrimination,
exclusive dealing, unfair acts, practices and methods.

Both consumers and producers who felt offended were
given access to the Justice Department and to the FTC or
the right to sue in a federal court and be eligible to receive
treble damages.

It is only fair to mention the "intellectual competition",
which opposes the above premises. Many important
economists thought (and still do) that competition laws
represent an unwarranted and harmful intervention of the
State in the markets. Some believed that the State should
own important industries (J.K. Galbraith), others - that
industries should be encouraged to grow because only size
guarantees survival, lower prices and innovation (Ellis
Hawley). Yet others supported the cause of laissez faire
(Marc Eisner).

These three antithetical approaches are, by no means,
new. One led to socialism and communism, the other to
corporatism and monopolies and the third to jungle-
ization of the market (what the Europeans derisively call:
the Anglo-Saxon model).

B. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
Why does the State involve itself in the machinations of
the free market? Because often markets fail or are unable
or unwilling to provide goods, services, or competition.

The purpose of competition laws is to secure a
competitive marketplace and thus protect the consumer
from unfair, anti-competitive practices. The latter tend to
increase prices and reduce the availability and quality of
goods and services offered to the consumer.

Such state intervention is usually done by establishing a
governmental Authority with full powers to regulate the
markets and ensure their fairness and accessibility to new
entrants. Lately, international collaboration between such
authorities yielded a measure of harmonization and
coordinated action (especially in cases of trusts which are
the results of mergers and acquisitions).

Yet, competition law embodies an inherent conflict: while
protecting local consumers from monopolies, cartels and
oligopolies - it ignores the very same practices when
directed at foreign consumers. Cartels related to the
country's foreign trade are allowed even under
GATT/WTO rules (in cases of dumping or excessive
export subsidies). Put simply: governments regard acts
which are criminal as legal if they are directed at foreign
consumers or are part of the process of foreign trade.

A country such as Macedonia - poor and in need of
establishing its export sector - should include in its
competition law at least two protective measures against
these discriminatory practices:
1. Blocking Statutes - which prohibit its legal entities
from collaborating with legal procedures in other
countries to the extent that this collaboration
adversely affects the local export industry.
2. Clawback Provisions - which will enable the local
courts to order the refund of any penalty payment
decreed or imposed by a foreign court on a local
legal entity and which exceeds actual damage
inflicted by unfair trade practices of said local
legal entity. US courts, for instance, are allowed to
impose treble damages on infringing foreign
entities. The clawback provisions are used to battle
this judicial aggression.

Competition policy is the antithesis of industrial policy.

The former wishes to ensure the conditions and the rules
of the game - the latter to recruit the players, train them
and win the game. The origin of the former is in the 19th
century USA and from there it spread to (really was
imposed on) Germany and Japan, the defeated countries in
the 2nd World War. The European Community (EC)
incorporated a competition policy in articles 85 and 86 of
the Rome Convention and in Regulation 17 of the Council
of Ministers, 1962.

Still, the two most important economic blocks of our time
have different goals in mind when implementing
competition policies. The USA is more interested in
economic (and econometric) results while the EU
emphasizes social, regional development and political
consequences. The EU also protects the rights of small
businesses more vigorously and, to some extent, sacrifices
intellectual property rights on the altar of fairness and the
free movement of goods and services.

Put differently: the USA protects the producers and the
EU shields the consumer. The USA is interested in the
maximization of output at whatever social cost - the EU is
interested in the creation of a just society, a liveable
community, even if the economic results will be less than
optimal.

There is little doubt that Macedonia should follow the EU
example. Geographically, it is a part of Europe and, one
day, will be integrated in the EU. It is socially sensitive,
export oriented, its economy is negligible and its
consumers are poor, it is besieged by monopolies and
oligopolies.

In my view, its competition laws should already
incorporate the important elements of the EU
(Community) legislation and even explicitly state so in the
preamble to the law. Other, mightier, countries have done
so. Italy, for instance, modelled its Law number 287 dated
10/10/90 "Competition and Fair Trading Act" after the EC
legislation. The law explicitly says so.

The first serious attempt at international harmonization of
national antitrust laws was the Havana Charter of 1947. It
called for the creation of an umbrella operating
organization (the International Trade Organization or
"ITO") and incorporated an extensive body of universal
antitrust rules in nine of its articles. Members were
required to "prevent business practices affecting
international trade which restrained competition, limited
access to markets, or fostered monopolistic control
whenever such practices had harmful effects on the
expansion of production or trade". the latter included:
a. Fixing prices, terms, or conditions to be observed
in dealing with others in the purchase, sale, or lease of any
product;
b. Excluding enterprises from, or allocating or
dividing, any territorial market or field of business
activity, or allocating customers, or fixing sales
quotas or purchase quotas;
c. Discriminating against particular enterprises;
d. Limiting production or fixing production quotas;
e. Preventing by agreement the development or
application of technology or invention, whether
patented or non-patented; and
f. Extending the use of rights under intellectual
property protections to matters which, according to
a member's laws and regulations, are not within
the scope of such grants, or to products or
conditions of production, use, or sale which are
not likewise the subject of such grants.

GATT 1947 was a mere bridging agreement but the
Havana Charter languished and died due to the objections
of a protectionist US Senate.

There are no antitrust/competition rules either in GATT
1947 or in GATT/WTO 1994, but their provisions on
antidumping and countervailing duty actions and
government subsidies constitute some elements of a more
general antitrust/competition law.

GATT, though, has an International Antitrust Code
Writing Group which produced a "Draft International
Antitrust Code" (10/7/93). It is reprinted in II, 64
Antitrust & Trade Regulation Reporter (BNA), Special
Supplement at S-3 (19/8/93).

Four principles guided the (mostly German) authors:
1. National laws should be applied to solve
international competition problems;
2. Parties, regardless of origin, should be treated as
locals;
3. A minimum standard for national antitrust rules
should be set (stricter measures would be
welcome); and
4. The establishment of an international authority to
settle disputes between parties over antitrust
issues.

The 29 (well-off) members of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) formed
rules governing the harmonization and coordination of
international antitrust/competition regulation among its
member nations ("The Revised Recommendation of the
OECD Council Concerning Cooperation between Member
Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting
International Trade," OECD Doc. No. C(86)44 (Final)
(June 5, 1986), also in 25 International Legal Materials
1629 (1986). A revised version was reissued. According
to it, " .Enterprises should refrain from abuses of a
dominant market position; permit purchasers, distributors,
and suppliers to freely conduct their businesses; refrain
from cartels or restrictive agreements; and consult and
cooperate with competent authorities of interested
countries".

An agency in one of the member countries tackling an
antitrust case, usually notifies another member country
whenever an antitrust enforcement action may affect
important interests of that country or its nationals (see:
OECD Recommendations on Predatory Pricing, 1989).

The United States has bilateral antitrust agreements with
Australia, Canada, and Germany, which was followed by
a bilateral agreement with the EU in 1991. These provide
for coordinated antitrust investigations and prosecutions.

The United States thus reduced the legal and political
obstacles which faced its extraterritorial prosecutions and
enforcement. The agreements require one party to notify
the other of imminent antitrust actions, to share relevant
information, and to consult on potential policy changes.

The EU-U.S. Agreement contains a "comity" principle
under which each side promises to take into consideration
the other's interests when considering antitrust
prosecutions. A similar principle is at the basis of Chapter
15 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) - cooperation on antitrust matters.

The United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business
Practices adopted a code of conduct in 1979/1980 that was
later integrated as a U.N. General Assembly Resolution
[U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/10 (1980)]: "The Set of
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules".

According to its provisions, "independent enterprises
should refrain from certain practices when they would
limit access to markets or otherwise unduly restrain
competition".

The following business practices are prohibited:
1. Agreements to fix prices (including export and
import prices);
2. Collusive tendering;
3. Market or customer allocation (division)
arrangements;
4. Allocation of sales or production by quota;
5. Collective action to enforce arrangements, e.g., by
concerted refusals to deal;
6. Concerted refusal to sell to potential importers;
and
7. Collective denial of access to an arrangement, or
association, where such access is crucial to
competition and such denial might hamper it. In
addition, businesses are forbidden to engage in the
abuse of a dominant position in the market by
limiting access to it or by otherwise restraining
competition by:
a. Predatory behaviour towards
competitors;
b. Discriminatory pricing or terms or
conditions in the supply or purchase
of goods or services;
c. Mergers, takeovers, joint ventures,
or other acquisitions of control;
d. Fixing prices for exported goods or
resold imported goods;
e. Import restrictions on legitimately-
marked trademarked goods;
f. Unjustifiably - whether partially or
completely - refusing to deal on an
enterprise's customary commercial
terms, making the supply of goods
or services dependent on
restrictions on the distribution or
manufacturer of other goods,
imposing restrictions on the resale
or exportation of the same or other
goods, and purchase "tie-ins".

C. ANTI - COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES
Any Competition Law in Macedonia should, in my view,
excplicitly include strict prohibitions of the following
practices (further details can be found in Porter's book -
"Competitive Strategy").

These practices characterize the Macedonian market.

They influence the Macedonian economy by discouraging
foreign investors, encouraging inefficiencies and
mismanagement, sustaining artificially high prices,
misallocating very scarce resources, increasing
unemployment, fostering corrupt and criminal practices
and, in general, preventing the growth that Macedonia
could have attained.

Strategies for Monopolization
Exclude competitors from distribution channels. - This is
common practice in many countries. Open threats are
made by the manufacturers of popular products: "If you
distribute my competitor's products - you cannot distribute
mine. So, choose." Naturally, retail outlets, dealers and
distributors will always prefer the popular product to the
new. This practice not only blocks competition - but also
innovation, trade and choice or variety.

Buy up competitors and potential competitors. - There is
nothing wrong with that. Under certain circumstances, this
is even desirable. Think about the Banking System: it is
always better to have fewer banks with bigger capital than
many small banks with capital inadequacy (remember the
TAT affair). So, consolidation is sometimes welcome,
especially where scale represents viability and a higher
degree of consumer protection. The line is thin and is
composed of both quantitative and qualitative criteria.

One way to measure the desirability of such mergers and
acquisitions (M&A) is the level of market concentration
following the M&A. Is a new monopoly created? Will the
new entity be able to set prices unperturbed? stamp out its
other competitors? If so, it is not desirable and should be
prevented.

Every merger in the USA must be approved by the
antitrust authorities. When multinationals merge, they
must get the approval of all the competition authorities in
all the territories in which they operate. The purchase of
"Intuit" by "Microsoft" was prevented by the antitrust
department (the "Trust-busters"). A host of airlines was
conducting a drawn out battle with competition authorities
in the EU, UK and the USA lately.

Use predatory [below-cost] pricing (also known as
dumping) to eliminate competitors. - This tactic is mostly
used by manufacturers in developing or emerging
economies and in Japan. It consists of "pricing the
competition out of the markets". The predator sells his
products at a price which is lower even than the costs of
production. The result is that he swamps the market,
driving out all other competitors. Once he is left alone - he
raises his prices back to normal and, often, above normal.

The dumper loses money in the dumping operation and
compensates for these losses by charging inflated prices
after having the competition eliminated.

Raise scale-economy barriers. - Take unfair advantage of
size and the resulting scale economies to force conditions
upon the competition or upon the distribution channels. In
many countries Big Industry lobbies for a legislation
which will fit its purposes and exclude its (smaller)
competitors.

Increase "market power (share) and hence profit
potential".

Study the industry's "potential" structure and ways it
can be made less competitive. - Even thinking about sin
or planning it should be prohibited. Many industries have
"think tanks" and experts whose sole function is to show
the firm the way to minimize competition and to increase
its market shares. Admittedly, the line is very thin: when
does a Marketing Plan become criminal?
Arrange for a "rise in entry barriers to block later
entrants" and "inflict losses on the entrant". - This
could be done by imposing bureaucratic obstacles (of
licencing, permits and taxation), scale hindrances (no
possibility to distribute small quantities), "old boy
networks" which share political clout and research and
development, using intellectual property right to block
new entrants and other methods too numerous to recount.

An effective law should block any action which prevents
new entry to a market.

Buy up firms in other industries "as a base from which
to change industry structures" there. - This is a way of
securing exclusive sources of supply of raw materials,
services and complementing products. If a company owns
its suppliers and they are single or almost single sources
of supply - in effect it has monopolized the market. If a
software company owns another software company with a
product which can be incorporated in its own products -
and the two have substantial market shares in their
markets - then their dominant positions will reinforce each
other's.
"Find ways to encourage particular competitors out of
the industry". - If you can't intimidate your competitors
you might wish to "make them an offer that they cannot
refuse". One way is to buy them, to bribe the key
personnel, to offer tempting opportunities in other
markets, to swap markets (I will give you my market
share in a market which I do not really care about and you
will give me your market share in a market in which we
are competitors). Other ways are to give the competitors
assets, distribution channels and so on providing that they
collude in a cartel.
"Send signals to encourage competition to exit" the
industry. - Such signals could be threats, promises, policy
measures, attacks on the integrity and quality of the
competitor, announcement that the company has set a
certain market share as its goal (and will, therefore, not
tolerate anyone trying to prevent it from attaining this
market share) and any action which directly or indirectly
intimidates or convinces competitors to leave the industry.

Such an action need not be positive - it can be negative,
need not be done by the company - can be done by its
political proxies, need not be planned - could be
accidental. The results are what matters.

Macedonia's Competition Law should outlaw the
following, as well:
'Intimidate' Competitors
Raise "mobility" barriers to keep competitors in the
least-profitable segments of the industry. - This is a tactic
which preserves the appearance of competition while
subverting it. Certain segments, usually less profitable or
too small to be of interest, or with dim growth prospects,
or which are likely to be opened to fierce domestic and
foreign competition are left to the competition. The more
lucrative parts of the markets are zealously guarded by the
company. Through legislation, policy measures,
withholding of technology and know-how - the firm
prevents its competitors from crossing the river into its
protected turf.

Let little firms "develop" an industry and then come in
and take it over. - This is precisely what Netscape is
saying that Microsoft is doing to it. Netscape developed
the now lucrative Browser Application market. Microsoft
was wrong in discarding the Internet as a fad. When it was
found to be wrong - Microsoft reversed its position and
came up with its own (then, technologically inferior)
browser (the Internet Explorer). It offered it free (sound
suspiciously like dumping) to buyers of its operating
system, "Windows". Inevitably it captured more than 30%
of the market, crowding out Netscape. It is the view of the
antitrust authorities in the USA that Microsoft utilized its
dominant position in one market (that of the Operating
Systems) to annihilate a competitor in another (that of the
browsers).

Engage in "promotional warfare" by "attacking shares
of others". - This is when the gist of a marketing,
lobbying, or advertising campaign is to capture the market
share of the competition. Direct attack is then made on the
competition just in order to abolish it. To sell more in
order to maximize profits, is allowed and meritorious - to
sell more in order to eliminate the competition is wrong
and should be disallowed.

Use price retaliation to "discipline" competitors. -
Through dumping or even unreasonable and excessive
discounting. This could be achieved not only through the
price itself. An exceedingly long credit term offered to a
distributor or to a buyer is a way of reducing the price.

The same applies to sales, promotions, vouchers, gifts.

They are all ways to reduce the effective price. The
customer calculates the money value of these benefits and
deducts them from the price.

Establish a "pattern" of severe retaliation against
challengers to "communicate commitment" to resist
efforts to win market share. - Again, this retaliation can
take a myriad of forms: malicious advertising, a media
campaign, adverse legislation, blocking distribution
channels, staging a hostile bid in the stock exchange just
in order to disrupt the proper and orderly management of
the competitor. Anything which derails the competitor
whenever he makes a headway, gains a larger market
share, launches a new product - can be construed as a
"pattern of retaliation".

Maintain excess capacity to be used for "fighting"
purposes to discipline ambitious rivals. - Such excess
capacity could belong to the offending firm or - through
cartel or other arrangements - to a group of offending
firms.

Publicize one's "commitment to resist entry" into the
market.

Publicize the fact that one has a "monitoring system" to
detect any aggressive acts of competitors.

Announce in advance "market share targets" to
intimidate competitors into yielding their market share.

Proliferate Brand Names
Contract with customers to "meet or match all price cuts
(offered by the competition)" thus denying rivals any
hope of growth through price competition.

Secure a big enough market share to "corner" the
"learning curve," thus denying rivals an opportunity to
become efficient. - Efficiency is gained by an increase in
market share. Such an increase leads to new demands
imposed by the market, to modernization, innovation, the
introduction of new management techniques (example:
Just In Time inventory management), joint ventures,
training of personnel, technology transfers, development
of proprietary intellectual property and so on. Deprived of
a growing market share - the competitor will not feel
pressurized to learn and to better itself. In due time, it will
dwindle and die.

Acquire a wall of "defensive" patents to deny
competitors access to the latest technology.
"Harvest" market position in a no-growth industry by
raising prices, lowering quality, and stopping all
investment and advertising in it.

Create or encourage capital scarcity. - By colluding with
sources of financing (e.g., regional, national, or
investment banks), by absorbing any capital offered by the
State, by the capital markets, through the banks, by
spreading malicious news which serve to lower the credit-
worthiness of the competition, by legislating special tax
and financing loopholes and so on.

Introduce high advertising-intensity. - This is very
difficult to measure. There could be no objective criteria
which will not go against the grain of the fundamental
right to freedom of expression. However, truth in
advertising should be strictly imposed. Practices such as
dragging a competitor through the mud or derogatorily
referring to its products or services in advertising
campaigns should be banned and the ban should be
enforced.

Proliferate "brand names" to make it too expensive for
small firms to grow. - By creating and maintaining a host
of absolutely unnecessary brandnames, the competition's
brandnames are crowded out. Again, this cannot be
legislated against. A firm has the right to create and
maintain as many brandnames as it wishes. The market
will exact a price and thus punish such a company
because, ultimately, its own brandname will suffer from
the proliferation.

Get a "corner" (control, manipulate and regulate) on
raw materials, government licenses, contracts, subsidies,
and patents (and, of course, prevent the competition
from having access to them).

Build up "political capital" with government bodies;
overseas, get "protection" from "the host government".
'Vertical' Barriers
Practice a "preemptive strategy" by capturing all
capacity expansion in the industry (simply buying it,
leasing it or taking over the companies that own or
develop it).

This serves to "deny competitors enough residual
demand". Residual demand, as we previously explained,
causes firms to be efficient. Once efficient, they develop
enough power to "credibly retaliate" and thereby "enforce
an orderly expansion process" to prevent overcapacity
Create "switching" costs. - Through legislation,
bureaucracy, control of the media, cornering advertising
space in the media, controlling infrastructure, owning
intellectual property, owning, controlling or intimidating
distribution channels and suppliers and so on.

Impose vertical "price squeezes". - By owning,
controlling, colluding with, or intimidating suppliers and
distributors, marketing channels and wholesale and retail
outlets into not collaborating with the competition.

Practice vertical integration (buying suppliers and
distribution and marketing channels).

This has the following effects:
The firm gains a "tap (access) into technology" and
marketing information in an adjacent industry. It defends
itself against a supplier's too-high or even realistic prices.

It defends itself against foreclosure, bankruptcy and
restructuring or reorganization. Owning suppliers means
that the supplies do not cease even when payment is not
affected, for instance.

It "protects proprietary information from suppliers" -
otherwise the firm might have to give outsiders access to
its technology, processes, formulas and other intellectual
property.

It raises entry and mobility barriers against competitors.

This is why the State should legislate and act against any
purchase, or other types of control of suppliers and
marketing channels which service competitors and thus
enhance competition.

It serves to "prove that a threat of full integration is
credible" and thus intimidate competitors.

Finally, it gets "detailed cost information" in an adjacent
industry (but doesn't integrate it into a "highly competitive
industry").
"Capture distribution outlets" by vertical integration to
"increase barriers".
'Consolidate' the Industry
Send "signals" to threaten, bluff, preempt, or collude
with competitors.

Use a "fighting brand" (a low-price brand used only for
price-cutting).

Use "cross parry" (retaliate in another part of a
competitor's market).

Harass competitors with antitrust suits and other
litigious techniques.

Use "brute force" ("massed resources" applied "with
finesse") to attack competitors
or use "focal points" of pressure to collude with
competitors on price.
"Load up customers" at cut-rate prices to "deny new
entrants a base" and force them to "withdraw" from
market.

Practice "buyer selection," focusing on those that are
the most "vulnerable" (easiest to overcharge) and
discriminating against and for certain types of
consumers.
"Consolidate" the industry so as to "overcome industry
fragmentation".

This arguments is highly successful with US federal
courts in the last decade. There is an intuitive feeling that
few is better and that a consolidated industry is bound to
be more efficient, better able to compete and to survive
and, ultimately, better positioned to lower prices, to
conduct costly research and development and to increase
quality. In the words of Porter: "(The) pay-off to
consolidating a fragmented industry can be high because...
small and weak competitors offer little threat of
retaliation".

Time one's own capacity additions; never sell old
capacity "to anyone who will use it in the same
industry" and buy out "and retire competitors'
capacity".

A Note on the Spiteful Application of Competition Laws
In many developing countries and countries in transition
from Communism to capitalism, competition laws are
used to reward cronies or to damage opponents. The
discriminatory and partial application of such laws and
regulations sustains networks of patronage and cements
political-economic alliances.

This abuse of the rule of Law and the regulatory regime is
further compounded by the seething pathological envy
that is typical of erstwhile egalitarian societies now
exposed to growing income inequalities. The mob,
business rivals, political parties, and the populace at large
leverage competition laws to tear down businesses and
humiliate entrepreneurs whose success grates on their
nerves and provokes their unbridled jealousy.



XXX.  The Benefits of Oligopolies


The Wall Street Journal has recently published an elegiac
list:
"Twenty years ago, cable television was dominated by a
patchwork of thousands of tiny, family-operated
companies. Today, a pending deal would leave three
companies in control of nearly two-thirds of the market.

In 1990, three big publishers of college textbooks
accounted for 35% of industry sales. Today they have
62% ... Five titans dominate the (defense) industry, and
one of them, Northrop Grumman ... made a surprise
(successful) $5.9 billion bid for (another) TRW ... In
1996, when Congress deregulated telecommunications,
there were eight Baby Bells. Today there are four, and
dozens of small rivals are dead. In 1999, more than 10
significant firms offered help-wanted Web sites. Today,
three firms dominate".

Mergers, business failures, deregulation, globalization,
technology, dwindling and more cautious venture capital,
avaricious managers and investors out to increase share
prices through a spree of often ill-thought acquisitions -
all lead inexorably to the congealing of industries into a
few suppliers. Such market formations are known as
oligopolies. Oligopolies encourage customers to
collaborate in oligopsonies and these, in turn, foster
further consolidation among suppliers, service providers,
and manufacturers.

Market purists consider oligopolies - not to mention
cartels - to be as villainous as monopolies. Oligopolies,
they intone, restrict competition unfairly, retard
innovation, charge rent and price their products higher
than they could have in a perfect competition free market
with multiple participants. Worse still, oligopolies are
going global.

But how does one determine market concentration to start
with?
The Herfindahl-Hirschmann index squares the market
shares of firms in the industry and adds up the total. But
the number of firms in a market does not necessarily
impart how low - or high - are barriers to entry. These are
determined by the structure of the market, legal and
bureaucratic hurdles, the existence, or lack thereof of
functioning institutions, and by the possibility to turn an
excess profit.

The index suffers from other shortcomings. Often the
market is difficult to define. Mergers do not always drive
prices higher. University of Chicago economists studying
Industrial Organization - the branch of economics that
deals with competition - have long advocated a shift of
emphasis from market share to - usually temporary -
market power. Influential antitrust thinkers, such as
Robert Bork, recommended to revise the law to focus
solely on consumer welfare.

These - and other insights - were incorporated in a theory
of market contestability. Contrary to classical economic
thinking, monopolies and oligopolies rarely raise prices
for fear of attracting new competitors, went the new
school. This is especially true in a "contestable" market -
where entry is easy and cheap.

An Oligopolistic firm also fears the price-cutting reaction
of its rivals if it reduces prices, goes the Hall, Hitch, and
Sweezy theory of the Kinked Demand Curve. If it were to
raise prices, its rivals may not follow suit, thus
undermining its market share. Stackleberg's amendments
to Cournot's Competition model, on the other hand,
demonstrate the advantages to a price setter of being a
first mover.

In "Economic assessment of oligopolies under the
Community Merger Control Regulation, in European
Competition law Review (Vol 4, Issue 3), Juan Briones
Alonso writes:
"At first sight, it seems that ... oligopolists will sooner or
later find a way of avoiding competition among
themselves, since they are aware that their overall profits
are maximized with this strategy. However, the question
is much more complex. First of all, collusion without
explicit agreements is not easy to achieve. Each supplier
might have different views on the level of prices which
the demand would sustain, or might have different price
preferences according to its cost conditions and market
share. A company might think it has certain advantages
which its competitors do not have, and would perhaps
perceive a conflict between maximising its own profits
and maximizing industry profits.

Moreover, if collusive strategies are implemented, and
oligopolists manage to raise prices significantly above
their competitive level, each oligopolist will be confronted
with a conflict between sticking to the tacitly agreed
behaviour and increasing its individual profits by
'cheating' on its competitors. Therefore, the question of
mutual monitoring and control is a key issue in collusive
oligopolies".

Monopolies and oligopolies, went the contestability
theory, also refrain from restricting output, lest their
market share be snatched by new entrants. In other words,
even monopolists behave as though their market was fully
competitive, their production and pricing decisions and
actions constrained by the "ghosts" of potential and
threatening newcomers.

In a CRIEFF Discussion Paper titled "From Walrasian
Oligopolies to Natural Monopoly - An Evolutionary
Model of Market Structure", the authors argue that:
"Under decreasing returns and some fixed cost, the market
grows to 'full capacity' at Walrasian equilibrium
(oligopolies); on the other hand, if returns are increasing,
the unique long run outcome involves a profit-maximising
monopolist".

While intellectually tempting, contestability theory has
little to do with the rough and tumble world of business.

Contestable markets simply do not exist. Entering a
market is never cheap, nor easy. Huge sunk costs are
required to counter the network effects of more veteran
products as well as the competitors' brand recognition and
ability and inclination to collude to set prices.

Victory is not guaranteed, losses loom constantly,
investors are forever edgy, customers are fickle, bankers
itchy, capital markets gloomy, suppliers beholden to the
competition. Barriers to entry are almost always
formidable and often insurmountable.

In the real world, tacit and implicit understandings
regarding prices and competitive behavior prevail among
competitors within oligopolies. Establishing a reputation
for collusive predatory pricing deters potential entrants.

And a dominant position in one market can be leveraged
into another, connected or derivative, market.

But not everyone agrees. Ellis Hawley believed that
industries should be encouraged to grow because only size
guarantees survival, lower prices, and innovation. Louis
Galambos, a business historian at Johns Hopkins
University, published a 1994 paper titled "The Triumph of
Oligopoly". In it, he strove to explain why firms and
managers - and even consumers - prefer oligopolies to
both monopolies and completely free markets with
numerous entrants.

Oligopolies, as opposed to monopolies, attract less
attention from trustbusters. Quoted in the Wall Street
Journal on March 8, 1999, Galambos wrote:
"Oligopolistic competition proved to be beneficial ...
because it prevented ossification, ensuring that
managements would keep their organizations innovative
and efficient over the long run".

In his recently published tome "The Free-Market
Innovation Machine - Analysing the Growth Miracle of
Capitalism", William Baumol of Princeton University,
concurs. He daringly argues that productive innovation is
at its most prolific and qualitative in oligopolistic markets.

Because firms in an oligopoly characteristically charge
above-equilibrium (i.e., high) prices - the only way to
compete is through product differentiation. This is
achieved by constant innovation - and by incessant
advertising.

Baumol maintains that oligopolies are the real engines of
growth and higher living standards and urges antitrust
authorities to leave them be. Lower regulatory costs,
economies of scale and of scope, excess profits due to the
ability to set prices in a less competitive market - allow
firms in an oligopoly to invest heavily in  research and
development. A new drug costs c. $800 million to develop
and get approved, according to Joseph DiMasi of Tufts
University's Center for the Study of Drug Development,
quoted in The wall Street Journal.

In a paper titled "If Cartels Were Legal, Would Firms Fix
Prices", implausibly published by the Antitrust Division
of the US Department of Justice in 1997, Andrew Dick
demonstrated, counterintuitively, that cartels are more
likely to form in industries and sectors with many
producers. The more concentrated the industry - i.e., the
more oligopolistic it is - the less likely were cartels to
emerge.

Cartels are conceived in order to cut members' costs of
sales. Small firms are motivated to pool their purchasing
and thus secure discounts. Dick draws attention to a
paradox: mergers provoke the competitors of the merging
firms to complain. Why do they act this way?
Mergers and acquisitions enhance market concentration.

According to conventional wisdom, the more concentrated
the industry, the higher the prices every producer or
supplier can charge. Why would anyone complain about
being able to raise prices in a post-merger market?
Apparently, conventional wisdom is wrong. Market
concentration leads to price wars, to the great benefit of
the consumer. This is why firms find the mergers and
acquisitions of their competitors worrisome. America's
soft drink market is ruled by two firms - Pepsi and Coca-
Cola. Yet, it has been the scene of ferocious price
competition for decades.
"The Economist", in its review of the paper, summed it up
neatly:
"The story of America's export cartels suggests that when
firms decide to co-operate, rather than compete, they do
not always have price increases in mind. Sometimes, they
get together simply in order to cut costs, which can be of
benefit to consumers".

The very atom of antitrust thinking - the firm - has
changed in the last two decades. No longer hierarchical
and rigid, business resembles self-assembling, nimble, ad-
hoc networks of entrepreneurship superimposed on ever-
shifting product groups and profit and loss centers.

Competition used to be extraneous to the firm - now it is
commonly an internal affair among autonomous units
within a loose overall structure. This is how Jack
"neutron" Welsh deliberately structured General Electric.

AOL-Time Warner hosts many competing units, yet no
one ever instructs them either to curb this internecine
competition, to stop cannibalizing each other, or to start
collaborating synergistically. The few mammoth agencies
that rule the world of advertising now host a clutch of
creative boutiques comfortably ensconced behind Chinese
walls. Such outfits often manage the accounts of
competitors under the same corporate umbrella.

Most firms act as intermediaries. They consume inputs,
process them, and sell them as inputs to other firms. Thus,
many firms are concomitantly consumers, producers, and
suppliers. In a paper published last year and titled
"Productive Differentiation in Successive Vertical
Oligopolies", that authors studied:
"An oligopoly model with two brands. Each downstream
firm chooses one brand to sell on a final market. The
upstream firms specialize in the production of one input
specifically designed for the production of one brand, but
they also produce he input for the other brand at an extra
cost. (They concluded that) when more downstream
brands choose one brand, more upstream firms will
specialize in the input specific to that brand, and vice
versa. Hence, multiple equilibria are possible and the
softening effect of brand differentiation on competition
might not be strong enough to induce maximal
differentiation" (and, thus, minimal competition).

Both scholars and laymen often mix their terms.

Competition does not necessarily translate either to
variety or to lower prices. Many consumers are turned off
by too much choice. Lower prices sometimes deter
competition and new entrants. A multiplicity of vendors,
retail outlets, producers, or suppliers does not always
foster competition. And many products have umpteen
substitutes. Consider films - cable TV, satellite, the
Internet, cinemas, video rental shops, all offer the same
service: visual content delivery.

And then there is the issue of technological standards. It is
incalculably easier to adopt a single worldwide or
industry-wide standard in an oligopolistic environment.

Standards are known to decrease prices by cutting down
R&D expenditures and systematizing components.

Or, take innovation. It is used not only to differentiate
one's products from the competitors' - but to introduce
new generations and classes of products. Only firms with
a dominant market share have both the incentive and the
wherewithal to invest in R&D and in subsequent branding
and marketing.

But oligopolies in deregulated markets have sometimes
substituted price fixing, extended intellectual property
rights, and competitive restraint for market regulation.

Still, Schumpeter believed in the faculty of  "disruptive
technologies" and "destructive creation" to check the
power of oligopolies to set extortionate prices, lower
customer care standards, or inhibit competition.

Linux threatens Windows. Opera nibbles at Microsoft's
Internet Explorer. Amazon drubbed traditional
booksellers. eBay thrashes Amazon. Bell was forced by
Covad Communications to implement its own technology,
the DSL broadband phone line.

Barring criminal behavior, there is little that oligopolies
can do to defend themselves against these forces. They
can acquire innovative firms, intellectual property, and
talent. They can form strategic partnerships. But the
supply of innovators and new technologies is infinite - and
the resources of oligopolies, however mighty, are finite.

The market is stronger than any of its participants,
regardless of the hubris of some, or the paranoia of others.



XXXI. Anarchy as an Organizing Principle


The recent spate of accounting fraud scandals signals the
end of an era. Disillusionment and disenchantment with
American capitalism may yet lead to a tectonic
ideological shift from laissez faire and self regulation to
state intervention and regulation. This would be the
reversal of a trend dating back to Thatcher in Britain and
Reagan in the USA. It would also cast some fundamental -
and way more ancient - tenets of free-marketry in grave
doubt.

Markets are perceived as self-organizing, self-assembling,
exchanges of information, goods, and services. Adam
Smith's "invisible hand" is the sum of all the mechanisms
whose interaction gives rise to the optimal allocation of
economic resources. The market's great advantages over
central planning are precisely its randomness and its lack
of self-awareness.

Market participants go about their egoistic business,
trying to maximize their utility, oblivious of the interests
and action of all, bar those they interact with directly.

Somehow, out of the chaos and clamor, a structure
emerges of order and efficiency unmatched. Man is
incapable of intentionally producing better outcomes.

Thus, any intervention and interference are deemed to be
detrimental to the proper functioning of the economy.

It is a minor step from this idealized worldview back to
the Physiocrats, who preceded Adam Smith, and who
propounded the doctrine of "laissez faire, laissez passer" -
the hands-off battle cry. Theirs was a natural religion. The
market, as an agglomeration of individuals, they
thundered, was surely entitled to enjoy the rights and
freedoms accorded to each and every person. John Stuart
Mill weighed against the state's involvement in the
economy in his influential and exquisitely-timed
"Principles of Political Economy", published in 1848.

Undaunted by mounting evidence of market failures - for
instance to provide affordable and plentiful public goods -
this flawed theory returned with a vengeance in the last
two decades of the past century. Privatization,
deregulation, and self-regulation became faddish
buzzwords and part of a global consensus propagated by
both commercial banks and multilateral lenders.

As applied to the professions - to accountants, stock
brokers, lawyers, bankers, insurers, and so on - self-
regulation was premised on the belief in long-term self-
preservation. Rational economic players and moral agents
are supposed to maximize their utility in the long-run by
observing the rules and regulations of a level playing
field.

This noble propensity seemed, alas, to have been
tampered by avarice and narcissism and by the immature
inability to postpone gratification. Self-regulation failed
so spectacularly to conquer human nature that its demise
gave rise to the most intrusive statal stratagems ever
devised. In both the UK and the USA, the government is
much more heavily and pervasively involved in the
minutia of accountancy, stock dealing, and banking than it
was only two years ago.

But the ethos and myth of "order out of chaos" - with its
proponents in the exact sciences as well - ran deeper than
that. The very culture of commerce was thoroughly
permeated and transformed. It is not surprising that the
Internet - a chaotic network with an anarchic modus
operandi - flourished at these times.

The dotcom revolution was less about technology than
about new ways of doing business - mixing umpteen
irreconcilable ingredients, stirring well, and hoping for the
best. No one, for instance, offered a linear revenue model
of how to translate "eyeballs" - i.e., the number of visitors
to a Web site - to money ("monetizing"). It was
dogmatically held to be true that, miraculously, traffic - a
chaotic phenomenon - will translate to profit - hitherto the
outcome of painstaking labour.

Privatization itself was such a leap of faith. State owned
assets - including utilities and suppliers of public goods
such as health and education - were transferred wholesale
to the hands of profit maximizers. The implicit belief was
that the price mechanism will provide the missing
planning and regulation. In other words, higher prices
were supposed to guarantee an uninterrupted service.

Predictably, failure ensued - from electricity utilities in
California to railway operators in Britain.

The simultaneous crumbling of these urban legends - the
liberating power of the Net, the self-regulating markets,
the unbridled merits of privatization - inevitably gave rise
to a backlash.

The state has acquired monstrous proportions in the
decades since the Second world War. It is about to grow
further and to digest the few sectors hitherto left
untouched. To say the least, these are not good news. But
we libertarians - proponents of both individual freedom
and individual responsibility - have brought it on
ourselves by thwarting the work of that invisible regulator
- the market.



XXXII. Narcissism in the Boardroom


The perpetrators of the recent spate of financial frauds in
the USA acted with callous disregard for both their
employees and shareholders - not to mention other
stakeholders. Psychologists have often remote-diagnosed
them as "malignant, pathological narcissists".

Narcissists are driven by the need to uphold and maintain
a false self - a concocted, grandiose, and demanding
psychological construct typical of the narcissistic
personality disorder. The false self is projected to the
world in order to garner "narcissistic supply" - adulation,
admiration, or even notoriety and infamy. Any kind of
attention is usually deemed by narcissists to be preferable
to obscurity.

The false self is suffused with fantasies of perfection,
grandeur, brilliance, infallibility, immunity, significance,
omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience. To be a
narcissist is to be convinced of a great, inevitable personal
destiny. The narcissist is preoccupied with ideal love, the
construction of brilliant, revolutionary scientific theories,
the composition or authoring or painting of the greatest
work of art, the founding of a new school of thought, the
attainment of fabulous wealth, the reshaping of a nation or
a conglomerate, and so on. The narcissist never sets
realistic goals to himself. He is forever preoccupied with
fantasies of uniqueness, record breaking, or breathtaking
achievements. His verbosity reflects this propensity.

Reality is, naturally, quite different and this gives rise to a
"grandiosity gap". The demands of the false self are never
satisfied by the narcissist's accomplishments, standing,
wealth, clout, sexual prowess, or knowledge. The
narcissist's grandiosity and sense of entitlement are
equally incommensurate with his achievements.

To bridge the grandiosity gap, the malignant
(pathological) narcissist resorts to shortcuts. These very
often lead to fraud.

The narcissist cares only about appearances. What matters
to him are the facade of wealth and its attendant social
status and narcissistic supply. Witness the travestied
extravagance of Tyco's Denis Kozlowski. Media attention
only exacerbates the narcissist's addiction and makes it
incumbent on him to go to ever-wilder extremes to secure
uninterrupted supply from this source.

The narcissist lacks empathy - the ability to put himself in
other people's shoes. He does not recognize boundaries -
personal, corporate, or legal. Everything and everyone are
to him mere instruments, extensions, objects
unconditionally and uncomplainingly available in his
pursuit of narcissistic gratification.

This makes the narcissist perniciously exploitative. He
uses, abuses, devalues, and discards even his nearest and
dearest in the most chilling manner. The narcissist is
utility- driven, obsessed with his overwhelming need to
reduce his anxiety and regulate his labile sense of self-
worth by securing a constant supply of his drug -
attention. American executives acted without
compunction when they raided their employees' pension
funds - as did Robert Maxwell a generation earlier in
Britain.

The narcissist is convinced of his superiority - cerebral or
physical. To his mind, he is a Gulliver hamstrung by a
horde of narrow-minded and envious Lilliputians. The
dotcom "new economy" was infested with "visionaries"
with a contemptuous attitude towards the mundane:
profits, business cycles, conservative economists, doubtful
journalists, and cautious analysts.

Yet, deep inside, the narcissist is painfully aware of his
addiction to others - their attention, admiration, applause,
and affirmation. He despises himself for being thus
dependent. He hates people the same way a drug addict
hates his pusher. He wishes to "put them in their place",
humiliate them, demonstrate to them how inadequate and
imperfect they are in comparison to his regal self and how
little he craves or needs them.

The narcissist regards himself as one would an expensive
present, a gift to his company, to his family, to his
neighbours, to his colleagues, to his country. This firm
conviction of his inflated importance makes him feel
entitled to special treatment, special favors, special
outcomes, concessions, subservience, immediate
gratification, obsequiousness, and lenience. It also makes
him feel immune to mortal laws and somehow divinely
protected and insulated from the inevitable consequences
of his deeds and misdeeds.

The self-destructive narcissist plays the role of the "bad
guy" (or "bad girl"). But even this is within the traditional
social roles cartoonishly exaggerated by the narcissist to
attract attention. Men are likely to emphasise intellect,
power, aggression, money, or social status. Narcissistic
women are likely to emphasise body, looks, charm,
sexuality, feminine "traits", homemaking, children and
childrearing.

Punishing the wayward narcissist is a veritable catch-22.

A jail term is useless as a deterrent if it only serves to
focus attention on the narcissist. Being infamous is second
best to being famous - and far preferable to being ignored.

The only way to effectively punish a narcissist is to
withhold narcissistic supply from him and thus to prevent
him from becoming a notorious celebrity.

Given a sufficient amount of media exposure, book
contracts, talk shows, lectures, and public attention - the
narcissist may even consider the whole grisly affair to be
emotionally rewarding. To the narcissist, freedom, wealth,
social status, family, vocation - are all means to an end.

And the end is attention. If he can secure attention by
being the big bad wolf - the narcissist unhesitatingly
transforms himself into one. Lord Archer, for instance,
seems to be positively basking in the media circus
provoked by his prison diaries.

The narcissist does not victimise, plunder, terrorise and
abuse others in a cold, calculating manner. He does so
offhandedly, as a manifestation of his genuine character.

To be truly "guilty" one needs to intend, to deliberate, to
contemplate one's choices and then to choose one's acts.

The narcissist does none of these.

Thus, punishment breeds in him surprise, hurt and
seething anger. The narcissist is stunned by society's
insistence that he should be held accountable for his deeds
and penalized accordingly. He feels wronged, baffled,
injured, the victim of bias, discrimination and injustice.

He rebels and rages.

Depending upon the pervasiveness of his magical
thinking, the narcissist may feel besieged by
overwhelming powers, forces cosmic and intrinsically
ominous. He may develop compulsive rites to fend off
this "bad", unwarranted, persecutory influences.

The narcissist, very much the infantile outcome of stunted
personal development, engages in magical thinking. He
feels omnipotent, that there is nothing he couldn't do or
achieve if only he sets his mind to it. He feels omniscient -
he rarely admits to ignorance and regards his intuitions
and intellect as founts of objective data.

Thus, narcissists are haughtily convinced that
introspection is a more important and more efficient (not
to mention easier to accomplish) method of obtaining
knowledge than the systematic study of outside sources of
information in accordance with strict and tedious
curricula. Narcissists are "inspired" and they despise
hamstrung technocrats.

To some extent, they feel omnipresent because they are
either famous or about to become famous or because their
product is selling or is being manufactured globally.

Deeply immersed in their delusions of grandeur, they
firmly believe that their acts have - or will have - a great
influence not only on their firm, but on their country, or
even on Mankind. Having mastered the manipulation of
their human environment - they are convinced that they
will always "get away with it". They develop hubris and a
false sense of immunity.

Narcissistic immunity is the (erroneous) feeling,
harboured by the narcissist, that he is impervious to the
consequences of his actions, that he will never be effected
by the results of his own decisions, opinions, beliefs,
deeds and misdeeds, acts, inaction, or membership of
certain groups, that he is above reproach and punishment,
that, magically, he is protected and will miraculously be
saved at the last moment. Hence the audacity, simplicity,
and transparency of some of the fraud and corporate
looting in the 1990's. Narcissists rarely bother to cover
their traces, so great is their disdain and conviction that
they are above mortal laws and wherewithal.

What are the sources of this unrealistic appraisal of
situations and events?
The false self is a childish response to abuse and trauma.

Abuse is not limited to sexual molestation or beatings.

Smothering, doting, pampering, over-indulgence, treating
the child as an extension of the parent, not respecting the
child's boundaries, and burdening the child with excessive
expectations are also forms of abuse.

The child reacts by constructing false self that is
possessed of everything it needs in order to prevail:
unlimited and instantaneously available Harry Potter-like
powers and wisdom. The false self, this Superman, is
indifferent to abuse and punishment. This way, the child's
true self is shielded from the toddler's harsh reality.

This artificial, maladaptive separation between a
vulnerable (but not punishable) true self and a punishable
(but invulnerable) false self is an effective mechanism. It
isolates the child from the unjust, capricious, emotionally
dangerous world that he occupies. But, at the same time, it
fosters in him a false sense of "nothing can happen to me,
because I am not here, I am not available to be punished,
hence I am immune to punishment".

The comfort of false immunity is also yielded by the
narcissist's sense of entitlement. In his grandiose
delusions, the narcissist is sui generis, a gift to humanity,
a precious, fragile, object. Moreover, the narcissist is
convinced both that this uniqueness is immediately
discernible - and that it gives him special rights. The
narcissist feels that he is protected by some cosmological
law pertaining to "endangered species".

He is convinced that his future contribution to others - his
firm, his country, humanity - should and does exempt him
from the mundane: daily chores, boring jobs, recurrent
tasks, personal exertion, orderly investment of resources
and efforts, laws and regulations, social conventions, and
so on.

The narcissist is entitled to a "special treatment": high
living standards, constant and immediate catering to his
needs, the eradication of any friction with the humdrum
and the routine, an all-engulfing absolution of his sins,
fast track privileges (to higher education, or in his
encounters with bureaucracies, for instance). Punishment,
trusts the narcissist, is for ordinary people, where no great
loss to humanity is involved.

Narcissists are possessed of inordinate abilities to charm,
to convince, to seduce, and to persuade. Many of them are
gifted orators and intellectually endowed. Many of them
work in in politics, the media, fashion, show business, the
arts, medicine, or business, and serve as religious leaders.

By virtue of their standing in the community, their
charisma, or their ability to find the willing scapegoats,
they do get exempted many times. Having recurrently
"got away with it" - they develop a theory of personal
immunity, founded upon some kind of societal and even
cosmic "order" in which certain people are above
punishment.

But there is a fourth, simpler, explanation. The narcissist
lacks self-awareness. Divorced from his true self, unable
to empathise (to understand what it is like to be someone
else), unwilling to constrain his actions to cater to the
feelings and needs of others - the narcissist is in a constant
dreamlike state.

To the narcissist, his life is unreal, like watching an
autonomously unfolding movie. The narcissist is a mere
spectator, mildly interested, greatly entertained at times.

He does not "own" his actions. He, therefore, cannot
understand why he should be punished and when he is, he
feels grossly wronged.

So convinced is the narcissist that he is destined to great
things - that he refuses to accept setbacks, failures and
punishments. He regards them as temporary, as the
outcomes of someone else's errors, as part of the future
mythology of his rise to power/brilliance/wealth/ideal
love, etc. Being punished is a diversion of his precious
energy and resources from the all-important task of
fulfilling his mission in life.

The narcissist is pathologically envious of people and
believes that they are equally envious of him. He is
paranoid, on guard, ready to fend off an imminent attack.

A punishment to the narcissist is a major surprise and a
nuisance but it also validates his suspicion that he is being
persecuted. It proves to him that strong forces are arrayed
against him.

He tells himself that people, envious of his achievements
and humiliated by them, are out to get him. He constitutes
a threat to the accepted order. When required to pay for
his misdeeds, the narcissist is always disdainful and bitter
and feels misunderstood by his inferiors.

Cooked books, corporate fraud, bending the (GAAP or
other) rules, sweeping problems under the carpet, over-
promising, making grandiose claims (the "vision thing") -
are hallmarks of a narcissist in action. When social cues
and norms encourage such behaviour rather than inhibit it
- in other words, when such behaviour elicits abundant
narcissistic supply - the pattern is reinforced and become
entrenched and rigid. Even when circumstances change,
the narcissist finds it difficult to adapt, shed his routines,
and replace them with new ones. He is trapped in his past
success. He becomes a swindler.

But pathological narcissism is not an isolated
phenomenon. It is embedded in our contemporary culture.

The West's is a narcissistic civilization. It upholds
narcissistic values and penalizes alternative value-
systems. From an early age, children are taught to avoid
self-criticism, to deceive themselves regarding their
capacities and attainments, to feel entitled, and to exploit
others.

As Lilian Katz observed in her important paper,
"Distinctions between Self-Esteem and Narcissism:
Implications for Practice", published by the Educational
Resources Information Center, the line between enhancing
self-esteem and fostering narcissism is often blurred by
educators and parents.

Both Christopher Lasch in "The Culture of Narcissism"
and Theodore Millon in his books about personality
disorders, singled out American society as narcissistic.

Litigiousness may be the flip side of an inane sense of
entitlement. Consumerism is built on this common and
communal lie of "I can do anything I want and possess
everything I desire if I only apply myself to it" and on the
pathological envy it fosters.

Not surprisingly, narcissistic disorders are more common
among men than among women. This may be because
narcissism conforms to masculine social mores and to the
prevailing ethos of capitalism. Ambition, achievements,
hierarchy, ruthlessness, drive - are both social values and
narcissistic male traits. Social thinkers like the
aforementioned Lasch speculated that modern American
culture - a self-centred one - increases the rate of
incidence of the narcissistic personality disorder.

Otto Kernberg, a notable scholar of personality disorders,
confirmed Lasch's intuition: "Society can make serious
psychological abnormalities, which already exist in some
percentage of the population, seem to be at least
superficially appropriate".

In their book "Personality Disorders in Modern Life",
Theodore Millon and Roger Davis state, as a matter of
fact, that pathological narcissism was once the preserve of
"the royal and the wealthy" and that it "seems to have
gained prominence only in the late twentieth century".

Narcissism, according to them, may be associated with
"higher levels of Maslow's hierarchy of needs ...

Individuals in less advantaged nations .. are too busy
trying (to survive) ... to be arrogant and grandiose".

They - like Lasch before them - attribute pathological
narcissism to "a society that stresses individualism and
self-gratification at the expense of community, namely the
United States." They assert that the disorder is more
prevalent among certain professions with "star power" or
respect. "In an individualistic culture, the narcissist is
'God's gift to the world'. In a collectivist society, the
narcissist is 'God's gift to the collective".

Millon quotes Warren and Caponi's "The Role of Culture
in the Development of Narcissistic Personality Disorders
in America, Japan and Denmark":
"Individualistic narcissistic structures of self-regard (in
individualistic societies) ... are rather self-contained and
independent ... (In collectivist cultures) narcissistic
configurations of the we-self ... denote self-esteem
derived from strong identification with the reputation and
honor of the family, groups, and others in hierarchical
relationships".

Still, there are malignant narcissists among subsistence
farmers in Africa, nomads in the Sinai desert, day laborers
in east Europe, and intellectuals and socialites in
Manhattan. Malignant narcissism is all-pervasive and
independent of culture and society. It is true, though, that
the way pathological narcissism manifests and is
experienced is dependent on the particulars of societies
and cultures.

In some cultures, it is encouraged, in others suppressed. In
some societies it is channeled against minorities - in
others it is tainted with paranoia. In collectivist societies,
it may be projected onto the collective, in individualistic
societies, it is an individual's trait.

Yet, can families, organizations, ethnic groups, churches,
and even whole nations be safely described as
"narcissistic" or "pathologically self-absorbed"? Can we
talk about a "corporate culture of narcissism"?
Human collectives - states, firms, households, institutions,
political parties, cliques, bands - acquire a life and a
character all their own. The longer the association or
affiliation of the members, the more cohesive and
conformist the inner dynamics of the group, the more
persecutory or numerous its enemies, competitors, or
adversaries, the more intensive the physical and emotional
experiences of the individuals it is comprised of, the
stronger the bonds of locale, language, and history - the
more rigorous might an assertion of a common pathology
be.

Such an all-pervasive and extensive pathology manifests
itself in the behavior of each and every member. It is a
defining - though often implicit or underlying - mental
structure. It has explanatory and predictive powers. It is
recurrent and invariable - a pattern of conduct melding
distorted cognition and stunted emotions. And it is often
vehemently denied.



XXXIII. The Revolt of the Poor

The Demise of Intellectual Property?


In 1997, I published a book of short stories in Israel. The
publishing house belongs to Israel's leading (and
exceedingly wealthy) newspaper. I signed a contract
which stated that I am entitled to receive 8% of the
income from the sales of the book after commissions
payable to distributors, shops, etc. A few months later
(1997), I won the coveted Prize of the Ministry of
Education (for short prose). The prize money (a few
thousand DMs) was snatched by the publishing house on
the legal grounds that all the money generated by the book
belongs to them because they own the copyright.

In the mythology generated by capitalism to pacify the
masses, the myth of intellectual property stands out. It
goes like this: if the rights to intellectual property were
not defined and enforced, commercial entrepreneurs
would not have taken on the risks associated with
publishing books, recording records, and preparing
multimedia products. As a result, creative people will
have suffered because they will have found no way to
make their works accessible to the public. Ultimately, it is
the public which pays the price of piracy, goes the refrain.

But this is factually untrue. In the USA there is a very
limited group of authors who actually live by their pen.

Only select musicians eke out a living from their noisy
vocation (most of them rock stars who own their labels -
George Michael had to fight Sony to do just that) and very
few actors come close to deriving subsistence level
income from their profession. All these can no longer be
thought of as mostly creative people. Forced to defend
their intellectual property rights and the interests of Big
Money, Madonna, Michael Jackson, Schwarzenegger and
Grisham are businessmen at least as much as they are
artists.

Economically and rationally, we should expect that the
costlier a work of art is to produce and the narrower its
market - the more emphasized its intellectual property
rights.

Consider a publishing house.

A book which costs 50,000 DM to produce with a
potential audience of 1000 purchasers (certain academic
texts are like this) - would have to be priced at a a
minimum of 100 DM to recoup only the direct costs. If
illegally copied (thereby shrinking the potential market as
some people will prefer to buy the cheaper illegal copies)
- its price would have to go up prohibitively to recoup
costs, thus driving out potential buyers. The story is
different if a book costs 10,000 DM to produce and is
priced at 20 DM a copy with a potential readership of
1,000,000 readers. Piracy (illegal copying) should in this
case be more readily tolerated as a marginal phenomenon.

This is the theory. But the facts are tellingly different. The
less the cost of production (brought down by digital
technologies) - the fiercer the battle against piracy. The
bigger the market - the more pressure is applied to clamp
down on samizdat entrepreneurs.

Governments, from China to Macedonia, are introducing
intellectual property laws (under pressure from rich world
countries) and enforcing them belatedly. But where one
factory is closed on shore (as has been the case in
mainland China) - two sprout off shore (as is the case in
Hong Kong and in Bulgaria).

But this defies logic: the market today is global, the costs
of production are lower (with the exception of the music
and film industries), the marketing channels more
numerous (half of the income of movie studios emanates
from video cassette sales), the speedy recouping of the
investment virtually guaranteed. Moreover, piracy thrives
in very poor markets in which the population would
anyhow not have paid the legal price. The illegal product
is inferior to the legal copy (it comes with no literature,
warranties or support). So why should the big
manufacturers, publishing houses, record companies,
software companies and fashion houses worry?
The answer lurks in history. Intellectual property is a
relatively new notion. In the near past, no one considered
knowledge or the fruits of creativity (art, design) as
"patentable", or as someone's "property". The artist was
but a mere channel through which divine grace flowed.

Texts, discoveries, inventions, works of art and music,
designs - all belonged to the community and could be
replicated freely. True, the chosen ones, the conduits,
were honoured but were rarely financially rewarded. They
were commissioned to produce their works of art and
were salaried, in most cases. Only with the advent of the
Industrial Revolution were the embryonic precursors of
intellectual property introduced but they were still limited
to industrial designs and processes, mainly as embedded
in machinery. The patent was born. The more massive the
market, the more sophisticated the sales and marketing
techniques, the bigger the financial stakes - the larger
loomed the issue of intellectual property. It spread from
machinery to designs, processes, books, newspapers, any
printed matter, works of art and music, films (which, at
their beginning were not considered art), software,
software embedded in hardware, processes, business
methods, and even unto genetic material.

Intellectual property rights - despite their noble title - are
less about the intellect and more about property. This is
Big Money: the markets in intellectual property outweigh
the total industrial production in the world. The aim is to
secure a monopoly on a specific work. This is an
especially grave matter in academic publishing where
small- circulation magazines do not allow their content to
be quoted or published even for non-commercial
purposes. The monopolists of knowledge and intellectual
products cannot allow competition anywhere in the world
- because theirs is a world market. A pirate in Skopje is in
direct competition with Bill Gates. When he sells a pirated
Microsoft product - he is depriving Microsoft not only of
its income, but of a client (=future income), of its
monopolistic status (cheap copies can be smuggled into
other markets), and of its competition-deterring image (a
major monopoly preserving asset). This is a threat which
Microsoft cannot tolerate. Hence its efforts to eradicate
piracy - successful in China and an utter failure in legally-
relaxed Russia.

But what Microsoft fails to understand is that the problem
lies with its pricing policy - not with the pirates. When
faced with a global marketplace, a company can adopt one
of two policies: either to adjust the price of its products to
a world average of purchasing power - or to use
discretionary differential pricing (as pharmaceutical
companies were forced to do in Brazil and South Africa).

A Macedonian with an average monthly income of 160
USD clearly cannot afford to buy the Encyclopaedia
Encarta Deluxe. In America, 50 USD is the income
generated in 4 hours of an average job. In Macedonian
terms, therefore, the Encarta is 20 times more expensive.

Either the price should be lowered in the Macedonian
market - or an average world price should be fixed which
will reflect an average global purchasing power.

Something must be done about it not only from the
economic point of view. Intellectual products are very
price sensitive and highly elastic. Lower prices will be
more than compensated for by a much higher sales
volume. There is no other way to explain the pirate
industries: evidently, at the right price a lot of people are
willing to buy these products. High prices are an implicit
trade-off favouring small, elite, select, rich world
clientele. This raises a moral issue: are the children of
Macedonia less worthy of education and access to the
latest in human knowledge and creation?
Two developments threaten the future of intellectual
property rights. One is the Internet. Academics, fed up
with the monopolistic practices of professional
publications - already publish on the web in big numbers.

I published a few book on the Internet and they can be
freely downloaded by anyone who has a computer or a
modem. The full text of electronic magazines, trade
journals, billboards, professional publications, and
thousands of books is available online. Hackers even
made sites available from which it is possible to download
whole software and multimedia products. It is very easy
and cheap to publish on the Internet, the barriers to entry
are virtually nil. Web pages are hosted free of charge, and
authoring and publishing software tools are incorporated
in most word processors and browser applications. As the
Internet acquires more impressive sound and video
capabilities it will proceed to threaten the monopoly of the
record companies, the movie studios and so on.

The second development is also technological. The oft-
vindicated Moore's law predicts the doubling of computer
memory capacity every 18 months. But memory is only
one aspect of computing power. Another is the rapid
simultaneous advance on all technological fronts.

Miniaturization and concurrent empowerment by software
tools have made it possible for individuals to emulate
much larger scale organizations successfully. A single
person, sitting at home with 5000 USD worth of
equipment can fully compete with the best products of the
best printing houses anywhere. CD-ROMs can be written
on, stamped and copied in house. A complete music
studio with the latest in digital technology has been
condensed to the dimensions of a single chip. This will
lead to personal publishing, personal music recording, and
the to the digitization of plastic art. But this is only one
side of the story.

The relative advantage of the intellectual property
corporation does not consist exclusively in its
technological prowess. Rather it lies in its vast pool of
capital, its marketing clout, market positioning, sales
organization, and distribution network.

Nowadays, anyone can print a visually impressive book,
using the above-mentioned cheap equipment. But in an
age of information glut, it is the marketing, the media
campaign, the distribution, and the sales that determine
the economic outcome.

This advantage, however, is also being eroded.

First, there is a psychological shift, a reaction to the
commercialization of intellect and spirit. Creative people
are repelled by what they regard as an oligarchic
establishment of institutionalized, lowest common
denominator art and they are fighting back.

Secondly, the Internet is a huge (200 million people), truly
cosmopolitan market, with its own marketing channels
freely available to all. Even by default, with a minimum
investment, the likelihood of being seen by surprisingly
large numbers of consumers is high.

I published one book the traditional way - and another on
the Internet. In 50 months, I have received 6500 written
responses regarding my electronic book. Well over
500,000 people read it (my Link Exchange meter
registered c. 2,000,000 impressions since November
1998). It is a textbook (in psychopathology) - and 500,000
readers is a lot for this kind of publication. I am so
satisfied that I am not sure that I will ever consider a
traditional publisher again. Indeed, my last book was
published in the very same way.

The demise of intellectual property has lately become
abundantly clear. The old intellectual property industries
are fighting tooth and nail to preserve their monopolies
(patents, trademarks, copyright) and their cost advantages
in manufacturing and marketing.

But they are faced with three inexorable processes which
are likely to render their efforts vain:
The Newspaper Packaging
Print newspapers offer package deals of cheap content
subsidized by advertising. In other words, the advertisers
pay for content formation and generation and the reader
has no choice but be exposed to commercial messages as
he or she studies the content.

This model - adopted earlier by radio and television -
rules the internet now and will rule the wireless internet in
the future. Content will be made available free of all
pecuniary charges. The consumer will pay by providing
his personal data (demographic data, consumption
patterns and preferences and so on) and by being exposed
to advertising. Subscription based models are bound to
fail.

Thus, content creators will benefit only by sharing in the
advertising cake. They will find it increasingly difficult to
implement the old models of royalties paid for access or
of ownership of intellectual property.

Disintermediation
A lot of ink has been spilt regarding this important trend.

The removal of layers of brokering and intermediation -
mainly on the manufacturing and marketing levels - is a
historic development (though the continuation of a long
term trend).

Consider music for instance. Streaming audio on the
internet or downloadable MP3 files will render the CD
obsolete. The internet also provides a venue for the
marketing of niche products and reduces the barriers to
entry previously imposed by the need to engage in costly
marketing ("branding") campaigns and manufacturing
activities.

This trend is also likely to restore the balance between
artist and the commercial exploiters of his product. The
very definition of "artist" will expand to include all
creative people. One will seek to distinguish oneself, to
"brand" oneself and to auction off one's services, ideas,
products, designs, experience, etc. This is a return to pre-
industrial times when artisans ruled the economic scene.

Work stability will vanish and work mobility will increase
in a landscape of shifting allegiances, head hunting,
remote collaboration and similar labour market trends.

Market Fragmentation
In a fragmented market with a myriad of mutually
exclusive market niches, consumer preferences and
marketing and sales channels - economies of scale in
manufacturing and distribution are meaningless.

Narrowcasting replaces broadcasting, mass customization
replaces mass production, a network of shifting
affiliations replaces the rigid owned-branch system. The
decentralized, intrapreneurship-based corporation is a late
response to these trends. The mega-corporation of the
future is more likely to act as a collective of start-ups than
as a homogeneous, uniform (and, to conspiracy theorists,
sinister) juggernaut it once was.



XXXIV. The Kidnapping of Content

http://www.plagiarism.org and http://www.Turnitin.com


Latin kidnapped the word "plagion" from ancient Greek
and it ended up in English as "plagiarism". It literally
means "to kidnap" - most commonly, to misappropriate
content and wrongly attribute it to oneself. It is a close kin
of piracy. But while the software or content pirate does
not bother to hide or alter the identity of the content's
creator or the software's author - the plagiarist does.

Plagiarism is, therefore, more pernicious than piracy.

Enter Turnit.com. An off-shoot of  www.iparadigms.com,
it was established by a group of concerned (and
commercially minded) scientists from UC Berkeley.

Whereas digital rights and asset management systems are
geared to prevent piracy - plagiarism.org and its
commercial arm, Turnit.com, are the cyber equivalent of a
law enforcement agency, acting after the fact to discover
the culprits and uncover their misdeeds. This, they claim,
is a first stage on the way to a plagiarism-free Internet-
based academic community of both teachers and students,
in which the educational potential of the Internet can be
fully realized.

The problem is especially severe in academia. Various
surveys have discovered that a staggering 80%(!) of US
students cheat and that at least 30% plagiarize written
material. The Internet only exacerbated this problem.

More than 200 cheat-sites have sprung up, with thousands
of papers available on-line and tens of thousands of
satisfied plagiarists the world over. Some of these hubs -
like cheater.com, cheatweb or cheathouse.com - make no
bones about their offerings. Many of them are located
outside the USA (in Germany, or Asia) and at least one
offers papers in a few languages, Hebrew included.

The problem, though, is not limited to the ivory towers. E-
zines plagiarize. The print media plagiarize. Individual
journalists plagiarize, many with abandon. Even
advertising agencies and financial institutions plagiarize.

The amount of material out there is so overwhelming that
the plagiarist develops a (fairly justified) sense of
immunity. The temptation is irresistible, the rewards big
and the pressures of modern life great.

Some of the plagiarists are straightforward copiers. Others
substitute words, add sentences, or combine two or more
sources. This raises the question: "when should content be
considered original and when - plagiarized?". Should the
test for plagiarism be more stringent than the one applied
by the Copyright Office? And what rights are implicitly
granted by the material's genuine authors or publishers
once they place the content on the Internet? Is the Web a
public domain and, if yes, to what extent? These questions
are not easily answered. Consider reports generated by
users from a database. Are these reports copyrighted - and
if so, by whom - by the database compiler or by the user
who defined the parameters, without which the reports in
question would have never been generated? What about
"fair use" of text and works of art? In the USA, the
backlash against digital content piracy and plagiarism has
reached preposterous legal, litigious and technological
nadirs.

Plagiarism.org has developed a statistics-based
technology (the "Document Source Analysis") which
creates a "digital fingerprint" of every document in its
database. Web crawlers are then unleashed to scour the
Internet and find documents with the same fingerprint and
a colour-coded report is generated. An instructor, teacher,
or professor can then use the report to prove plagiarism
and cheating.

Piracy is often considered to be a form of viral marketing
(even by software developers and publishers). The
author's, publisher's, or software house's data are
preserved intact in the cracked copy. Pirated copies of e-
books often contribute to increased sales of the print
versions. Crippled versions of software or pirated copies
of software without its manuals, updates and support -
often lead to the purchase of a licence. Not so with
plagiarism. The identities of the author, editor, publisher
and illustrator are deleted and replaced by the details of
the plagiarist. And while piracy is discussed freely and
fought vigorously - the discussion of plagiarism is still
taboo and actively suppressed by image-conscious and
endowment-weary academic institutions and media. It is
an uphill struggle but plagiarism.org has taken the first
resolute step.



XXXV. The Economics of Spam


Tennessee resident K. C. "Khan" Smith owes the internet
service provider EarthLink $24 million. According to the
CNN, in August 2001 he was slapped with a lawsuit
accusing him of violating federal and state Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statutes, the
federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, the
federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
and numerous other state laws. On July 19, 2002 - having
failed to appear in court - the judge ruled against him. Mr.

Smith is a spammer.

Brightmail, a vendor of e-mail filters and anti-spam
applications warned that close to 5 million spam "attacks"
or "bursts" occurred in June 2002 and that spam has
mushroomed 450 percent since June 2001. This pace
continued unabated well into the beginning of 2004 when
the introduction of spam filters began to take effect. PC
World concurs.

Between one half and three quarters of all e-mail
messages are spam or UCE (Unsolicited Commercial
Email) - unsolicited and intrusive commercial ads, mostly
concerned with sex, scams, get rich quick schemes,
financial services and products, and health articles of
dubious provenance. The messages are sent from spoofed
or fake e-mail addresses. Some spammers hack into
unsecured servers - mainly in China and Korea - to relay
their missives anonymously.

Starting in 2003, malicious hackers began using spam to
install malware - such as viruses, adware, spyware, and
Trojans - on the unprotected personal computers of less
savvy users. They thus transform these computers into
"zombies", organize them into spam-spewing "bots"
(networks), and sell access to them to criminals on
penumbral boards and forums all over the Net.

Spam is an industry. Mass e-mailers maintain lists of e-
mail addresses, often "harvested" by spamware bots -
specialized computer applications - from Web sites. These
lists are rented out or sold to marketers who use bulk mail
services. They come cheap - c. $100 for 10 million
addresses. Bulk mailers provide servers and bandwidth,
charging c. $300 per million messages sent.

As spam recipients become more inured, ISPs less
tolerant, and both more litigious - spammers multiply their
efforts in order to maintain the same response rate. Spam
works. It is not universally unwanted - which makes it
tricky to outlaw. It elicits between 0.1 and 1 percent in
positive follow ups, depending on the message. Many
messages now include HTML, JavaScript, and ActiveX
coding and thus resemble (or actually contain) viruses and
Trojans.

Jupiter Media Matrix predicted in 2001 that the number of
spam messages annually received by a typical Internet
user will double to 1400 and spending on legitimate e-
mail marketing will reach $9.4 billion by 2006 - compared
to $1 billion in 2001. Forrester Research pegs the number
at $4.8 billion in 2003.

More than 2.3-5 billion spam messages are sent daily.
eMarketer puts the figures a lot lower at 76 billion
messages in 2002. By 2006, daily spam output will soar to
c. 15 billion missives, says Radicati Group. Jupiter
projects a more modest 268 billion annual messages this
year (2005). An average communication costs the
spammer 0.00032 cents.

PC World quotes the European Union as pegging the
bandwidth costs of spam worldwide in 2002 at $8-10
billion annually. Other damages include server crashes,
time spent purging unwanted messages, lower
productivity, aggravation, and increased cost of Internet
access.

Inevitably, the spam industry gave rise to an anti-spam
industry. According to a Radicati Group report titled
"Anti-virus, anti-spam, and content filtering market trends
2002-2006", anti-spam revenues were projected to exceed
$88 million in 2002 - and more than double by 2006. List
blockers, report and complaint generators, advocacy
groups, registers of known spammers, and spam filters all
proliferate. The Wall Street Journal reported in its June
25, 2002 issue about a resurgence of anti-spam startups
financed by eager venture capital.

ISPs are bent on preventing abuse - reported by victims -
by expunging the accounts of spammers. But the latter
simply switch ISPs or sign on with free services like
Hotmail and Yahoo! Barriers to entry are getting lower by
the day as the costs of hardware, software, and
communications plummet.

The use of e-mail and broadband connections by the
general population is spreading. Hundreds of thousands of
technologically-savvy operators have joined the market in
the last five years, as the dotcom bubble burst. Still, Steve
Linford of the UK-based Spamhaus.org insists that most
spam emanates from c. 80 large operators.

Now, according to Jupiter Media, ISPs and portals are
poised to begin to charge advertisers in a tier-based
system, replete with premium services. Writing back in
1998, Bill Gates described a solution also espoused by
Esther Dyson, chair of the Electronic Frontier Foundation:
"As I first described in my book 'The Road Ahead' in
1995, I expect that eventually you'll be paid to read
unsolicited e-mail. You'll tell your e-mail program to
discard all unsolicited messages that don't offer an
amount of money that you'll choose. If you open a paid
message and discover it's from a long-lost friend or
somebody else who has a legitimate reason to contact
you, you'll be able to cancel the payment. Otherwise,
you'll be paid for your time".

Subscribers may not be appreciative of the joint ventures
between gatekeepers and inbox clutterers. Moreover,
dominant ISPs, such as AT&T and PSINet have
recurrently been accused of knowingly collaborating with
spammers. ISPs rely on the data traffic that spam
generates for their revenues in an ever-harsher business
environment.

The Financial Times and others described how WorldCom
refuses to ban the sale of spamware over its network,
claiming that it does not regulate content. When "pink"
(the color of canned spam) contracts came to light, the
implicated ISPs blame the whole affair on rogue
employees.

PC World begs to differ:
"Ronnie Scelson, a self-described spammer who signed
such a contract with PSInet, (says) that backbone
providers are more than happy to do business with bulk
e-mailers. 'I've signed up with the biggest 50 carriers
two or three times', says Scelson ... The Louisiana-based
spammer claims to send 84 million commercial e-mail
messages a day over his three 45-megabit-per-second
DS3 circuits. 'If you were getting $40,000 a month for
each circuit', Scelson asks, 'would you want to shut me
down?'"
The line between permission-based or "opt-in" e-mail
marketing and spam is getting thinner by the day. Some
list resellers guarantee the consensual nature of their
wares. According to the Direct Marketing Association's
guidelines, quoted by PC World, not responding to an
unsolicited e-mail amounts to "opting-in" - a marketing
strategy known as "opting out". Most experts, though,
strongly urge spam victims not to respond to spammers,
lest their e-mail address is confirmed.

But spam is crossing technological boundaries. Japan has
just legislated against wireless SMS spam targeted at
hapless mobile phone users. Many states in the USA as
well as the European parliament have followed suit. Ideas
regarding a "do not spam" list akin to the "do not call" list
in telemarketing have been floated. Mobile phone users
will place their phone numbers on the list to avoid
receiving UCE (spam). Email subscribers enjoy the
benefits of a similar list under the CAN-Spam Act of
2003.

Expensive and slow connections make mobile phone
spam and spim (instant messaging spam) particularly
resented. Still, according to Britain's Mobile Channel, a
mobile advertising company quoted by "The Economist",
SMS advertising - a novelty - attracts a 10-20 percent
response rate - compared to direct mail's 1-3 percent.

Net identification systems - like Microsoft's Passport and
the one proposed by Liberty Alliance - will make it even
easier for marketers to target prospects.

The reaction to spam can be described only as mass
hysteria. Reporting someone as a spammer - even when
he is not - has become a favorite pastime of vengeful, self-
appointed, vigilante "cyber-cops". Perfectly legitimate,
opt-in, email marketing businesses and discussion forums
often find themselves in one or more black lists - their
reputation and business ruined.

In January 2002, CMGI-owned Yesmail was awarded a
temporary restraining order against MAPS - Mail Abuse
Prevention System - forbidding it to place the reputable e-
mail marketer on its Real-time Blackhole list. The case
was settled out of court.

Harris Interactive, a large online opinion polling
company, sued not only MAPS, but ISPs who blocked its
email messages when it found itself included in MAPS'
Blackhole. Their CEO accused one of their competitors
for the allegations that led to Harris' inclusion in the list.

Coupled with other pernicious phenomena - such as
viruses, Trojans, and spyware - the very foundation of the
Internet as a fun, relatively safe, mode of communication
and data acquisition is at stake.

Spammers, it emerges, have their own organizations.

NOIC - the National Organization of Internet Commerce
threatened to post to its Web site the e-mail addresses of
millions of AOL members. AOL has aggressive anti-
spamming policies. "AOL is blocking bulk email because
it wants the advertising revenues for itself (by selling pop-
up ads)" the president of NOIC, Damien Melle,
complained to CNET.

Spam is a classic "free rider" problem. For any given
individual, the cost of blocking a spammer far outweighs
the benefits. It is cheaper and easier to hit the "delete"
key. Individuals, therefore, prefer to let others do the job
and enjoy the outcome - the public good of a spam-free
Internet. They cannot be left out of the benefits of such an
aftermath - public goods are, by definition, "non-
excludable". Nor is a public good diminished by a
growing number of "non-rival" users.

Such a situation resembles a market failure and requires
government intervention through legislation and
enforcement. The FTC - the US Federal Trade
Commission - has taken legal action against more than
100 spammers for promoting scams and fraudulent goods
and services.
"Project Mailbox" is an anti-spam collaboration between
American law enforcement agencies and the private
sector. Non government organizations have entered the
fray, as have lobbying groups, such as CAUCE - the
Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial E-mail.

But, a few recent anti-spam and anti-spyware Acts
notwithstanding, Congress is curiously reluctant to enact
stringent laws against spam. Reasons cited are free
speech, limits on state powers to regulate commerce,
avoiding unfair restrictions on trade, and the interests of
small business. The courts equivocate as well. In some
cases - e.g., Missouri vs. American Blast Fax - US courts
found "that the provision prohibiting the sending of
unsolicited advertisements is unconstitutional".

According to Spamlaws.com,  the 107th Congress, for
instance, discussed these laws but never enacted them:
Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of 2001
(H.R. 95), Wireless Telephone Spam Protection Act (H.R.
113), Anti-Spamming Act of 2001 (H.R. 718), Anti-
Spamming Act of 2001 (H.R. 1017), Who Is E-Mailing
Our Kids Act (H.R. 1846), Protect Children From E-Mail
Smut Act of 2001 (H.R.  2472), Netizens Protection Act
of 2001 (H.R. 3146), "CAN SPAM" Act of 2001 (S. 630).

Anti-spam laws fared no better in the 106th Congress.

Some of the states have picked up the slack. Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin.

The situation is no better across the pond. The European
parliament decided in 2001 to allow each member country
to enact its own spam laws, thus avoiding a continent-
wide directive and directly confronting the
communications ministers of the union. Paradoxically, it
also decided, in March 2002, to restrict SMS spam.

Confusion clearly reigns. Finally, in May 2002, it adopted
strong anti-spam provisions as part of a Directive on Data
Protection.

Responding to this unfavorable legal environment, spam
is relocating to developing countries, such as Malaysia,
Nepal, and Nigeria. In a May 2005 report, the OECD
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development) warned that these countries lack the
technical know-how and financial resources (let alone the
will) to combat spam. Their users, anyhow deprived of
bandwidth, endure, as a result, a less reliable service and
an intermittent access to the Internet;
"Spam is a much more serious issue in developing
countries...as it is a heavy drain on resources that are
scarcer and costlier in developing countries than
elsewhere" - writes the report's author, Suresh
Ramasubramanian, an OECD advisor and postmaster for
Outblaze.com.

ISPs, spam monitoring services, and governments in the
rich industrialized world react by placing entire countries
- such as Macedonia and Costa Rica - on black lists and,
thus denying access to their users en bloc.

International collaboration against the looming destruction
of the Internet by crime organizations is budding. The
FTC had just announced that it will work with its
counterparts abroad to cut zombie computers off the
network. A welcome step - but about three years late.

Spammers the world over are still six steps ahead and are
having the upper hand.

The Content Downloader's Profile
Interview granted to Tim Emmerling, a student at Eastern
Illinois University.

Q. What do you know about people illegally
downloading files over the internet?
A. I know what everyone knows from being exposed to
the news media and to lawsuits filed by publishers: the
phenomenon is widespread and most of the millions of
exchanged files are music tracks and films (though book
rip-offs are not unknown as well).

Q. Why do you think people are taking part in these
electronic transactions? Does the cost of purchasing the
media come into play?
A. It's a complex canvass of motivations, I guess. Many
media products (especially in developing and poor
countries) are overpriced in terms of the local purchasing
power. Illegally downloading them is often an act of
protest or defiance against what disgruntled consumers
perceive as excessive profiteering. It may also be the only
realistic way to gain ownership of coveted content.

The fact that everything - from text to images - is digital
makes replication facile and enticing. Illegal downloading
also probably confers an aura of daring and mystique on
the "pirates" involved (whose life may otherwise be a lot
drearier and mundane).

Additionally, these products resemble public goods in that
they are nonrivalrous (the cost of extending the service or
providing the good to another person is (close to) zero)
and largely nonexcludable.

Most products are rivalrous (scarce) - zero sum games.

Having been consumed, they are gone and are not
available to others. Public goods, in contrast, are
accessible to growing numbers of people without any
additional marginal cost. This wide dispersion of benefits
renders them unsuitable for private entrepreneurship. It is
impossible to recapture the full returns they engender. As
Samuelson observed, they are extreme forms of positive
externalities (spillover effects).

Moreover, it is impossible to exclude anyone from
enjoying the benefits of a public good, or from defraying
its costs (positive and negative externalities). Neither can
anyone willingly exclude himself from their remit.

Needless to emphasize that media products are not public
goods at all! They only superficially resemble public
goods. Still, the fact that many books, music, and some
films are, indeed, in the public domain further exacerbates
the consumer's confusion. "Why can I (legally) download
certain books and music tracks free of charge - but not
others?" - wonders the baffled surfer, who is rarely versed
in the intricacies of copyright laws.

Q. Do you think this leads to a feeling of disrespect
toward the various pieces of media by the person that
steals it so frequently? (If I download music all the time,
will I lose interest in it?)

A. I am not sure that the word "respect" is relevant here.

People don't respect or disrespect music - they enjoy it,
like it, or dislike it. But frequent illegal downloading of
media products is, probably, the outcome of disrespect
towards content intermediaries such as publishers,
producers, and retail outlets. I don't know for sure because
there is no research to guide us in this matter, but I would
imagine that these people (wrongly) perceive content
intermediaries as parasitic and avaricious.

Q. Downloading is still a widespread act today. The
threats of lawsuits and legal action against downloaders
hasn't stopped the problem. What, in your opinion,
needs to be done to stop this behavior?

A. Law enforcement activities and lawsuits are already
having an effect. But you cannot prosecute thousands of
people on a regular basis without suffering a
commensurate drop in popularity and a tarnished image.

People do not perceive these acts as self-defense but as
David vs. Goliath bullying. Sooner or later, the efficacy of
such measures is bound to decline.

Media companies would do better to adopt new
technologies rather than fight them. They must come forth
with new business models and new venues of
dissemination of content. They have to show more
generosity in the management of digital rights. They have
to adopt differential pricing of their products across the
board, to reflect disparities in earnings and purchasing
power in the global marketplace. They have to transform
themselves rather than try to coerce the world into their
antiquated and Procrustean ways of doing things.

Q. Psychologically speaking, is there a certain kind of
person who is more likely to take part in this behavior?
Do you feel that this is a generational issue?

A. I cannot but speculate. There is a dearth of data at this
early stage. I would imagine that illegal downloaders are
hoarders. They are into owning things rather than into
using or consuming them. They are into building libraries
and collections. They are young and intelligent, but not
affluent. They are irreverent, rebellious, and non-
conformist. They may be loners who network socially
only online. Some of them love culture and its artifacts
but they need not be particularly computer-savvy.



XXXVII. The Fabric of Economic Trust


Economics acquired its dismal reputation by pretending to
be an exact science rather than a branch of mass
psychology. In truth it is a narrative struggling to describe
the aggregate behavior of humans. It seeks to cloak its
uncertainties and shifting fashions with mathematical
formulae and elaborate econometric computerized
models.

So much is certain, though - that people operate within
markets, free or regulated, patchy or organized. They
attach numerical (and emotional) values to their inputs
(work, capital) and to their possessions (assets, natural
endowments). They communicate these values to each
other by sending out signals known as prices.

Yet, this entire edifice - the market and its price
mechanism - critically depends on trust. If people do not
trust each other, or the economic "envelope" within which
they interact - economic activity gradually grinds to a halt.

There is a strong correlation between the general level of
trust and the extent and intensity of economic activity.

Francis Fukuyama, the political scientist, distinguishes
between high-trust and prosperous societies and low-trust
and, therefore, impoverished collectives. Trust underlies
economic success, he argued in a 1995 tome.

Trust is not a monolithic quantity. There are a few
categories of economic trust. Some forms of trust are akin
to a public good and are closely related to governmental
action or inaction, the reputation of the state and its
institutions, and its pronounced agenda. Other types of
trust are the outcomes of kinship, ethnic origin, personal
standing and goodwill, corporate brands and other data
generated by individuals, households, and firms.

I. Trust in the playing field
To transact, people have to maintain faith in a relevant
economic horizon and in the immutability of the
economic playing field or "envelope". Put less obscurely,
a few hidden assumptions underlie the continued
economic activity of market players.

They assume, for instance, that the market will continue to
exist for the foreseeable future in its current form. That it
will remain inert - unhindered by externalities like
government intervention, geopolitical upheavals, crises,
abrupt changes in accounting policies and tax laws,
hyperinflation, institutional and structural reform and
other market-deflecting events and processes.

They further assume that their price signals will not be
distorted or thwarted on a consistent basis thus skewing
the efficient and rational allocation of risks and rewards.

Insider trading, stock manipulation, monopolies, hoarding
- all tend to consistently but unpredictably distort price
signals and, thus, deter market participation.

Market players take for granted the existence and
continuous operation of institutions - financial
intermediaries, law enforcement agencies, courts. It is
important to note that market players prefer continuity and
certainty to evolution, however gradual and ultimately
beneficial. A venal bureaucrat is a known quantity and
can be tackled effectively. A period of transition to good
and equitable governance can be more stifling than any
level of corruption and malfeasance. This is why
economic activity drops sharply whenever institutions are
reformed.

II. Trust in other players
Market players assume that other players are (generally)
rational, that they have intentions, that they intend to
maximize their benefits and that they are likely to act on
their intentions in a legal (or rule-based), rational manner.

III. Trust in market liquidity
Market players assume that other players possess or have
access to the liquid means they need in order to act on
their intentions and obligations. They know, from
personal experience, that idle capital tends to dwindle and
that the only way to, perhaps, maintain or increase it is to
transact with others, directly or through intermediaries,
such as banks.

IV. Trust in others' knowledge and ability
Market players assume that other players possess or have
access to the intellectual property, technology, and
knowledge they need in order to realize their intentions
and obligations. This implicitly presupposes that all other
market players are physically, mentally, legally and
financially able and willing to act their parts as stipulated,
for instance, in contracts they sign.

The emotional dimensions of contracting are often
neglected in economics. Players assume that their
counterparts maintain a realistic and stable sense of self-
worth based on intimate knowledge of their own strengths
and weaknesses. Market participants are presumed to
harbor realistic expectations, commensurate with their
skills and accomplishments. Allowance is made for
exaggeration, disinformation, even outright deception -
but these are supposed to be marginal phenomena.

When trust breaks down - often the result of an external or
internal systemic shock - people react expectedly. The
number of voluntary interactions and transactions
decreases sharply. With a collapsed investment horizon,
individuals and firms become corrupt in an effort to
shortcut their way into economic benefits, not knowing
how long will the system survive. Criminal activity
increases.

People compensate with fantasies and grandiose delusions
for their growing sense of uncertainty, helplessness, and
fears.  This is a self-reinforcing mechanism, a vicious
cycle which results in under-confidence and a fluctuating
self esteem. They develop psychological defence
mechanisms.

Cognitive dissonance ("I really choose to be poor rather
than heartless"), pathological envy (seeks to deprive
others and thus gain emotional reward), rigidity ("I am
like that, my family or ethnic group has been like that for
generations, there is nothing I can do"), passive-
aggressive behavior (obstructing the work flow,
absenteeism, stealing from the employer, adhering strictly
to arcane regulations) - are all reactions to a breakdown in
one or more of the four aforementioned types of trust.

Furthermore, people in a trust crisis are unable to
postpone gratification. They often become frustrated,
aggressive, and deceitful if denied. They resort to reckless
behavior and stopgap economic activities.

In economic environments with compromised and
impaired trust, loyalty decreases and mobility increases.

People switch jobs, renege on obligations, fail to repay
debts, relocate often. Concepts like exclusivity, the
sanctity of contracts, workplace loyalty, or a career path -
all get eroded. As a result, little is invested in the future, in
the acquisition of skills, in long term savings. Short-
termism and bottom line mentality rule.

The outcomes of a crisis of trust are, usually, catastrophic:
Economic activity is much reduced, human capital is
corroded and wasted, brain drain increases, illegal and
extra-legal activities rise, society is polarized between
haves and haves-not, interethnic and inter-racial tensions
increase. To rebuild trust in such circumstances is a
daunting task. The loss of trust is contagious and, finally,
it infects every institution and profession in the land. It is
the stuff revolutions are made of.



XXXVIII. The Distributive Justice of the Market


The public outcry against executive pay and compensation
followed disclosures of insider trading, double dealing,
and outright fraud. But even honest and productive
entrepreneurs often earn more money in one year than
Albert Einstein did in his entire life. This strikes many -
especially academics - as unfair. Surely Einstein's
contributions to human knowledge and welfare far exceed
anything ever accomplished by sundry businessmen?
Fortunately, this discrepancy is cause for constructive
jealousy, emulation, and imitation. It can, however, lead
to an orgy of destructive and self-ruinous envy.

Such envy is reinforced by declining social mobility in the
United States. Recent (2006-7) studies by the OECD
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development) clearly demonstrate that the American
Dream is a myth. In an editorial dated July 13, 2007, the
New-York Times described the rapidly deteriorating
situation thus:
"... (M)obility between generations - people doing
better or worse than their parents - is weaker in
America than in Denmark, Austria, Norway, Finland,
Canada, Sweden, Germany, Spain and France. In
America, there is more than a 40 percent chance that if
a father is in the bottom fifth of the earnings'
distribution, his son will end up there, too. In Denmark,
the equivalent odds are under 25 percent, and they are
less than 30 percent in Britain.

America's sluggish mobility is ultimately unsurprising.

Wealthy parents not only pass on that wealth in
inheritances, they can pay for better education, nutrition
and health care for their children. The poor cannot
afford this investment in their children's development -
and the government doesn't provide nearly enough help.

In a speech earlier this year, the Federal Reserve
chairman, Ben Bernanke, argued that while the
inequality of rewards fuels the economy by making
people exert themselves, opportunity should be "as
widely distributed and as equal as possible." The
problem is that the have-nots don't have many
opportunities either".

Still, entrepreneurs recombine natural and human
resources in novel ways. They do so to respond to
forecasts of future needs, or to observations of failures
and shortcomings of current products or services.

Entrepreneurs are professional - though usually intuitive -
futurologists. This is a valuable service and it is financed
by systematic risk takers, such as venture capitalists.

Surely they all deserve compensation for their efforts and
the hazards they assume?
Exclusive ownership is the most ancient type of such
remuneration. First movers, entrepreneurs, risk takers,
owners of the wealth they generated, exploiters of
resources - are allowed to exclude others from owning or
exploiting the same things. Mineral concessions, patents,
copyright, trademarks - are all forms of monopoly
ownership. What moral right to exclude others is gained
from being the first?
Nozick advanced Locke's Proviso. An exclusive
ownership of property is just only if "enough and as good
is left in common for others". If it does not worsen other
people's lot, exclusivity is morally permissible. It can be
argued, though, that all modes of exclusive ownership
aggravate other people's situation. As far as everyone, bar
the entrepreneur, are concerned, exclusivity also prevents
a more advantageous distribution of income and wealth.

Exclusive ownership reflects real-life irreversibility. A
first mover has the advantage of excess information and of
irreversibly invested work, time, and effort. Economic
enterprise is subject to information asymmetry: we know
nothing about the future and everything about the past.

This asymmetry is known as "investment risk". Society
compensates the entrepreneur with one type of asymmetry
- exclusive ownership - for assuming another, the
investment risk.

One way of looking at it is that all others are worse off by
the amount of profits and rents accruing to owner-
entrepreneurs. Profits and rents reflect an intrinsic
inefficiency. Another is to recall that ownership is the
result of adding value to the world. It is only reasonable to
expect it to yield to the entrepreneur at least this value
added now and in the future.

In a "Theory of Justice" (published 1971, p. 302), John
Rawls described an ideal society thus:
"(1) Each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible
with a similar system of liberty for all. (2) Social and
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged,
consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached
to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity".

It all harks back to scarcity of resources - land, money,
raw materials, manpower, creative brains. Those who can
afford to do so, hoard resources to offset anxiety
regarding future uncertainty. Others wallow in paucity.

The distribution of means is thus skewed. "Distributive
justice" deals with the just allocation of scarce resources.

Yet, even the basic terminology is somewhat fuzzy. What
constitutes a resource? what is meant by allocation? Who
should allocate resources - Adam Smith's "invisible
hand", the government, the consumer, or business? Should
it reflect differences in power, in intelligence, in
knowledge, or in heredity? Should resource allocation be
subject to a principle of entitlement? Is it reasonable to
demand that it be just - or merely efficient? Are justice
and efficiency antonyms?
Justice is concerned with equal access to opportunities.

Equal access does not guarantee equal outcomes,
invariably determined by idiosyncrasies and differences
between people. Access leveraged by the application of
natural or acquired capacities - translates into accrued
wealth. Disparities in these capacities lead to
discrepancies in accrued wealth.

The doctrine of equal access is founded on the
equivalence of Men. That all men are created equal and
deserve the same respect and, therefore, equal treatment is
not self evident. European aristocracy well into this
century would have probably found this notion abhorrent.

Jose Ortega Y Gasset, writing in the 1930's, preached that
access to educational and economic opportunities should
be premised on one's lineage, up bringing, wealth, and
social responsibilities.

A succession of societies and cultures discriminated
against the ignorant, criminals, atheists, females,
homosexuals, members of ethnic, religious, or racial
groups, the old, the immigrant, and the poor. Communism
- ostensibly a strict egalitarian idea - foundered because it
failed to reconcile strict equality with economic and
psychological realities within an impatient timetable.

Philosophers tried to specify a "bundle" or "package" of
goods, services, and intangibles (like information, or
skills, or knowledge). Justice - though not necessarily
happiness - is when everyone possesses an identical
bundle. Happiness - though not necessarily justice - is
when each one of us possesses a "bundle" which reflects
his or her preferences, priorities, and predilections. None
of us will be too happy with a standardized bundle,
selected by a committee of philosophers - or bureaucrats,
as was the case under communism.

The market allows for the exchange of goods and services
between holders of identical bundles. If I seek books, but
detest oranges - I can swap them with someone in return
for his books. That way both of us are rendered better off
than under the strict egalitarian version.

Still, there is no guarantee that I will find my exact match
- a person who is interested in swapping his books for my
oranges. Illiquid, small, or imperfect markets thus inhibit
the scope of these exchanges. Additionally, exchange
participants have to agree on an index: how many books
for how many oranges? This is the price of oranges in
terms of books.

Money - the obvious "index" - does not solve this
problem, merely simplifies it and facilitates exchanges. It
does not eliminate the necessity to negotiate an "exchange
rate". It does not prevent market failures. In other words:
money is not an index. It is merely a medium of exchange
and a store of value. The index - as expressed in terms of
money - is the underlying agreement regarding the values
of resources in terms of other resources (i.e., their relative
values).

The market - and the price mechanism - increase
happiness and welfare by allowing people to alter the
composition of their bundles. The invisible hand is just
and benevolent. But money is imperfect. The
aforementioned Rawles demonstrated (1971), that we
need to combine money with other measures in order to
place a value on intangibles.

The prevailing market theories postulate that everyone has
the same resources at some initial point (the "starting
gate"). It is up to them to deploy these endowments and,
thus, to ravage or increase their wealth. While the initial
distribution is equal - the end distribution depends on how
wisely - or imprudently - the initial distribution was used.

Egalitarian thinkers proposed to equate everyone's income
in each time frame (e.g., annually). But identical incomes
do not automatically yield the same accrued wealth. The
latter depends on how the income is used - saved,
invested, or squandered. Relative disparities of wealth are
bound to emerge, regardless of the nature of income
distribution.

Some say that excess wealth should be confiscated and
redistributed. Progressive taxation and the welfare state
aim to secure this outcome. Redistributive mechanisms
reset the "wealth clock" periodically (at the end of every
month, or fiscal year). In many countries, the law dictates
which portion of one's income must be saved and, by
implication, how much can be consumed. This conflicts
with basic rights like the freedom to make economic
choices.

The legalized expropriation of income (i.e., taxes) is
morally dubious. Anti-tax movements have sprung all
over the world and their philosophy permeates the
ideology of political parties in many countries, not least
the USA. Taxes are punitive: they penalize enterprise,
success, entrepreneurship, foresight, and risk assumption.

Welfare, on the other hand, rewards dependence and
parasitism.

According to Rawles' Difference Principle, all tenets of
justice are either redistributive or retributive. This ignores
non-economic activities and human inherent variance.

Moreover, conflict and inequality are the engines of
growth and innovation - which mostly benefit the least
advantaged in the long run. Experience shows that
unmitigated equality results in atrophy, corruption and
stagnation. Thermodynamics teaches us that life and
motion are engendered by an irregular distribution of
energy. Entropy - an even distribution of energy - equals
death and stasis.

What about the disadvantaged and challenged - the
mentally retarded, the mentally insane, the paralyzed, the
chronically ill? For that matter, what about the less
talented, less skilled, less daring? Dworkin (1981)
proposed a compensation scheme. He suggested a model
of fair distribution in which every person is given the
same purchasing power and uses it to bid, in a fair
auction, for resources that best fit that person's life plan,
goals and preferences.

Having thus acquired these resources, we are then
permitted to use them as we see fit. Obviously, we end up
with disparate economic results. But we cannot complain -
we were given the same purchasing power and the
freedom to bid for a bundle of our choice.

Dworkin assumes that prior to the hypothetical auction,
people are unaware of their own natural endowments but
are willing and able to insure against being naturally
disadvantaged. Their payments create an insurance pool to
compensate the less fortunate for their misfortune.

This, of course, is highly unrealistic. We are usually very
much aware of natural endowments and liabilities - both
ours and others'. Therefore, the demand for such insurance
is not universal, nor uniform. Some of us badly need and
want it - others not at all. It is morally acceptable to let
willing buyers and sellers to trade in such coverage (e.g.,
by offering charity or alms) - but may be immoral to make
it compulsory.

Most of the modern welfare programs are involuntary
Dworkin schemes. Worse yet, they often measure
differences in natural endowments arbitrarily, compensate
for lack of acquired skills, and discriminate between types
of endowments in accordance with cultural biases and
fads.

Libertarians limit themselves to ensuring a level playing
field of just exchanges, where just actions always result in
just outcomes. Justice is not dependent on a particular
distribution pattern, whether as a starting point, or as an
outcome. Robert Nozick "Entitlement Theory" proposed
in 1974 is based on this approach.

That the market is wiser than any of its participants is a
pillar of the philosophy of capitalism. In its pure form, the
theory claims that markets yield patterns of merited
distribution - i.e., reward and punish justly. Capitalism
generate just deserts. Market failures - for instance, in the
provision of public goods - should be tackled by
governments. But a just distribution of income and wealth
does not constitute a market failure and, therefore, should
not be tampered with.



XXXIX.  The Agent-Principal Conundrum

In the catechism of capitalism, shares represent the part-
ownership of an economic enterprise, usually a firm. The
value of shares is determined by the replacement value of
the assets of the firm, including intangibles such as
goodwill. The price of the share is determined by
transactions among arm's length buyers and sellers in an
efficient and liquid market. The price reflects expectations
regarding the future value of the firm and the stock's
future stream of income - i.e., dividends.

Alas, none of these oft-recited dogmas bears any
resemblance to reality. Shares rarely represent ownership.

The float - the number of shares available to the public - is
frequently marginal. Shareholders meet once a year to
vent and disperse. Boards of directors are appointed by
management - as are auditors. Shareholders are not
represented in any decision making process - small or big.

The dismal truth is that shares reify the expectation to find
future buyers at a higher price and thus incur capital gains.

In the Ponzi scheme known as the stock exchange, this
expectation is proportional to liquidity - new suckers - and
volatility. Thus, the price of any given stock reflects
merely the consensus as to how easy it would be to
offload one's holdings and at what price.

Another myth has to do with the role of managers. They
are supposed to generate higher returns to shareholders by
increasing the value of the firm's assets and, therefore, of
the firm. If they fail to do so, goes the moral tale, they are
booted out mercilessly. This is one manifestation of the
"Principal-Agent Problem". It is defined thus by the
Oxford Dictionary of Economics:
"The problem of how a person A can motivate person B to
act for A's benefit rather than following (his) self-
interest".

The obvious answer is that A can never motivate B not to
follow B's self-interest - never mind what the incentives
are. That economists pretend otherwise - in "optimal
contracting theory" - just serves to demonstrate how
divorced economics is from human psychology and, thus,
from reality.

Managers will always rob blind the companies they run.

They will always manipulate boards to collude in their
shenanigans. They will always bribe auditors to bend the
rules. In other words, they will always act in their self-
interest. In their defense, they can say that the damage
from such actions to each shareholder is minuscule while
the benefits to the manager are enormous. In other words,
this is the rational, self-interested, thing to do.

But why do shareholders cooperate with such corporate
brigandage? In an important Chicago Law Review article
whose preprint was posted to the Web a few weeks ago -
titled "Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the
Design of Executive Compensation" - the authors
demonstrate how the typical stock option granted to
managers as part of their remuneration rewards mediocrity
rather than encourages excellence.

But everything falls into place if we realize that
shareholders and managers are allied against the firm - not
pitted against each other. The paramount interest of both
shareholders and managers is to increase the value of the
stock - regardless of the true value of the firm. Both are
concerned with the performance of the share - rather than
the performance of the firm. Both are preoccupied with
boosting the share's price - rather than the company's
business.

Hence the inflationary executive pay packets.

Shareholders hire stock manipulators - euphemistically
known as "managers" - to generate expectations regarding
the future prices of their shares. These snake oil salesmen
and snake charmers - the corporate executives - are
allowed by shareholders to loot the company providing
they generate consistent capital gains to their masters by
provoking persistent interest and excitement around the
business. Shareholders, in other words, do not behave as
owners of the firm - they behave as free-riders.

The Principal-Agent Problem arises in other social
interactions and is equally misunderstood there. Consider
taxpayers and their government. Contrary to conservative
lore, the former want the government to tax them
providing they share in the spoils. They tolerate
corruption in high places, cronyism, nepotism, inaptitude
and worse - on condition that the government and the
legislature redistribute the wealth they confiscate. Such
redistribution often comes in the form of pork barrel
projects and benefits to the middle-class.

This is why the tax burden and the government's share of
GDP have been soaring inexorably with the consent of the
citizenry. People adore government spending precisely
because it is inefficient and distorts the proper allocation
of economic resources. The vast majority of people are
rent-seekers. Witness the mass demonstrations that erupt
whenever governments try to slash expenditures,
privatize, and eliminate their gaping deficits. This is one
reason the IMF with its austerity measures is universally
unpopular.

Employers and employees, producers and consumers -
these are all instances of the Principal-Agent Problem.

Economists would do well to discard their models and go
back to basics. They could start by asking:
Why do shareholders acquiesce with executive
malfeasance as long as share prices are rising?
Why do citizens protest against a smaller government -
even though it means lower taxes?
Could it mean that the interests of shareholders and
managers are identical? Does it imply that people prefer
tax-and-spend governments and pork barrel politics to the
Thatcherite alternative?
Nothing happens by accident or by coercion. Shareholders
aided and abetted the current crop of corporate executives
enthusiastically. They knew well what was happening.

They may not have been aware of the exact nature and
extent of the rot - but they witnessed approvingly the
public relations antics, insider trading, stock option
resetting , unwinding, and unloading, share price
manipulation, opaque transactions, and outlandish pay
packages. Investors remained mum throughout the
corruption of corporate America. It is time for the
hangover.



XL.  The Green-Eyed Capitalist

Conservative sociologists self-servingly marvel at the
peaceful proximity of abject poverty and ostentatious
affluence in American - or, for that matter, Western -
cities. Devastating riots do erupt, but these are reactions
either to perceived social injustice (Los Angeles 1965) or
to political oppression (Paris 1968). The French
Revolution may have been the last time the urban sans-
culotte raised a fuss against the economically
enfranchised.

This pacific co-existence conceals a maelstrom of envy.

Behold the rampant Schadenfreude which accompanied
the antitrust case against the predatory but loaded
Microsoft. Observe the glee which engulfed many
destitute countries in the wake of the September 11
atrocities against America, the epitome of triumphant
prosperity. Witness the post-World.com orgiastic
castigation of avaricious CEO's.

Envy - a pathological manifestation of destructive
aggressiveness - is distinct from jealousy.

The New Oxford Dictionary of English defines envy as:
"A feeling of discontented or resentful longing aroused by
someone else's possessions, qualities, or luck ...

Mortification and ill-will occasioned by the contemplation
of another's superior advantages".

Pathological envy - the fourth deadly sin - is engendered
by the realization of some lack, deficiency, or inadequacy
in oneself. The envious begrudge others their success,
brilliance, happiness, beauty, good fortune, or wealth.

Envy provokes misery, humiliation, and impotent rage.

The envious copes with his pernicious emotions in five
ways:
1. They attack the perceived source of frustration in
an attempt to destroy it, or "reduce it" to their
"size". Such destructive impulses often assume the
disguise of championing social causes, fighting
injustice, touting reform, or promoting an
ideology.
2. They seek to subsume the object of envy by
imitating it. In extreme cases, they strive to get
rich quick through criminal scams, or corruption.

They endeavor to out-smart the system and
shortcut their way to fortune and celebrity.
3. They resort to self-deprecation. They idealize the
successful, the rich, the mighty, and the lucky and
attribute to them super-human, almost divine,
qualities. At the same time, they humble
themselves. Indeed, most of this strain of the
envious end up disenchanted and bitter, driving the
objects of their own erstwhile devotion and
adulation to destruction and decrepitude.
4. They experience cognitive dissonance. These
people devalue the source of their frustration and
envy by finding faults in everything they most
desire and in everyone they envy.
5. They avoid the envied person and thus the
agonizing pangs of envy.

Envy is not a new phenomenon. Belisarius, the general
who conquered the world for Emperor Justinian, was
blinded and stripped of his assets by his envious peers. I -
and many others - have written extensively about envy in
command economies. Nor is envy likely to diminish.

In his book, "Facial Justice", Hartley describes a post-
apocalyptic dystopia, New State, in which envy is
forbidden and equality extolled and everything enviable is
obliterated. Women are modified to look like men and
given identical "beta faces". Tall buildings are razed.

Joseph Schumpeter, the prophetic Austrian-American
economist, believed that socialism will disinherit
capitalism. In "Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy" he
foresaw a conflict between a class of refined but dirt-poor
intellectuals and the vulgar but filthy rich businessmen
and managers they virulently envy and resent. Samuel
Johnson wrote: "He was dull in a new way, and that made
many people think him great." The literati seek to tear
down the market economy which they feel has so
disenfranchised and undervalued them.

Hitler, who fancied himself an artist, labeled the British a
"nation of shopkeepers" in one of his bouts of raging
envy. Ralph Reiland, the Kenneth Simon professor of free
enterprise at Robert Morris University, quotes David
Brooks of the "weekly Standard", who christened this
phenomenon "bourgeoisophobia":
"The hatred of the bourgeoisie is the beginning of all
virtue' - wrote Gustav Flaubert. He signed his letters
'Bourgeoisophobus' to show how much he despised 'stupid
grocers and their ilk ... Through some screw-up in the
great scheme of the universe, their narrow-minded greed
had brought them vast wealth, unstoppable power and
growing social prestige".

Reiland also quotes from Ludwig van Mises's "The Anti-
Capitalist Mentality":
"Many people, and especially intellectuals, passionately
loathe capitalism. In a society based on caste and status,
the individual can ascribe adverse fate to conditions
beyond his control. In ... capitalism ... everybody's station
in life depends on his doing ... (what makes a man rich is)
not the evaluation of his contribution from any 'absolute'
principle of justice but the evaluation on the part of his
fellow men who exclusively apply the yardstick of their
personal wants, desires and ends ... Everybody knows
very well that there are people like himself who succeeded
where he himself failed. Everybody knows that many of
those he envies are self-made men who started from the
same point from which he himself started. Everybody is
aware of his own defeat. In order to console himself and
to restore his self- assertion, such a man is in search of a
scapegoat. He tries to persuade himself that he failed
through no fault of his own. He was too decent to resort to
the base tricks to which his successful rivals owe their
ascendancy. The nefarious social order does not accord
the prizes to the most meritorious men; it crowns the
dishonest, unscrupulous scoundrel, the swindler, the
exploiter, the 'rugged individualist'".

In "The Virtue of Prosperity", Dinesh D'Souza accuses
prosperity and capitalism of inspiring vice and temptation.

Inevitably, it provokes envy in the poor and depravity in
the rich.

With only a modicum of overstatement, capitalism can be
depicted as the sublimation of jealousy. As opposed to
destructive envy - jealousy induces emulation. Consumers
- responsible for two thirds of America's GDP - ape role
models and vie with neighbors, colleagues, and family
members for possessions and the social status they endow.

Productive and constructive competition - among
scientists, innovators, managers, actors, lawyers,
politicians, and the members of just about every other
profession - is driven by jealousy.

The eminent Nobel prize winning British economist and
philosopher of Austrian descent, Friedrich Hayek,
suggested in "The Constitution of Liberty" that innovation
and progress in living standards are the outcomes of class
envy. The wealthy are early adopters of expensive and
unproven technologies. The rich finance with their
conspicuous consumption the research and development
phase of new products. The poor, driven by jealousy,
imitate them and thus create a mass market which allows
manufacturers to lower prices.

But jealousy is premised on the twin beliefs of equality
and a level playing field. "I am as good, as skilled, and as
talented as the object of my jealousy." - goes the subtext -
"Given equal opportunities, equitable treatment, and a bit
of luck, I can accomplish the same or more".

Jealousy is easily transformed to outrage when its
presumptions - equality, honesty, and fairness - prove
wrong. In a paper recently published by Harvard
University's John M. Olin Center for Law and titled
"Executive Compensation in America: Optimal
Contracting or Extraction of Rents?", the authors argue
that executive malfeasance is most effectively regulated
by this "outrage constraint":
"Directors (and non-executive directors) would be
reluctant to approve, and executives would be hesitant to
seek, compensation arrangements that might be viewed by
observers as outrageous".



Notes on the Economics of
Game Theory

Consider this:
Could Western management techniques be successfully
implemented in the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE)? Granted, they have to be adapted,
modified and cannot be imported in their entirety. But
their crux, their inalienable nucleus - can this be
transported and transplanted in CEE? Theory provides us
with a positive answer. Human agents are the same
everywhere and are mostly rational. Practice begs to
differ. Basic concepts such as the money value of time or
the moral and legal meaning of property are non existent.

The legal, political and economic environments are all
unpredictable. As a result, economic players will prefer to
maximize their utility immediately (steal from the
workplace, for instance) - than to wait for longer term
(potentially, larger) benefits. Warrants (stock options)
convertible to the company's shares constitute a strong
workplace incentive in the West (because there is an
horizon and they increase the employee's welfare in the
long term). Where the future is speculation - speculation
withers. Stock options or a small stake in his firm, will
only encourage the employee to blackmail the other
shareholders by paralysing the firm, to abuse his new
position and will be interpreted as immunity, conferred
from above, from the consequences of illegal activities.

The very allocation of options or shares will be interpreted
as a sign of weakness, dependence and need, to be
exploited. Hierarchy is equated with slavery and
employees will rather harm their long term interests than
follow instructions or be subjected to criticism - never
mind how constructive. The employees in CEE regard the
corporate environment as a conflict zone, a zero sum
game (in which the gains by some equal the losses to
others). In the West, the employees participate in the
increase in the firm's value. The difference between these
attitudes is irreconcilable.

Now, let us consider this:
An entrepreneur is a person who is gifted at identifying
the unsatisfied needs of a market, at mobilizing and
organizing the resources required to satisfy those needs
and at defining a long-term strategy of development and
marketing. As the enterprise grows, two processes
combine to denude the entrepreneur of some of his initial
functions. The firm has ever growing needs for capital:
financial, human, assets and so on. Additionally, the
company begins (or should begin) to interface and interact
with older, better established firms. Thus, the company is
forced to create its first management team: a general
manager with the right doses of respectability,
connections and skills, a chief financial officer, a host of
consultants and so on. In theory - if all our properly
motivated financially - all these players (entrepreneurs
and managers) will seek to maximize the value of the
firm. What happens, in reality, is that both work to
minimize it, each for its own reasons. The managers seek
to maximize their short-term utility by securing enormous
pay packages and other forms of company-dilapidating
compensation. The entrepreneurs feel that they are
"strangled", "shackled", "held back" by bureaucracy and
they "rebel". They oust the management, or undermine it,
turning it into an ineffective representative relic. They
assume real, though informal, control of the firm. They do
so by defining a new set of strategic goals for the firm,
which call for the institution of an entrepreneurial rather
than a bureaucratic type of management. These cycles of
initiative-consolidation-new initiative-revolution-
consolidation are the dynamos of company growth.

Growth leads to maximization of value. However, the
players don't know or do not fully believe that they are in
the process of maximizing the company's worth. On the
contrary, consciously, the managers say: "Let's maximize
the benefits that we derive from this company, as long as
we are still here." The entrepreneurs-owners say: "We
cannot tolerate this stifling bureaucracy any longer. We
prefer to have a smaller company - but all ours." The
growth cycles forces the entrepreneurs to dilute their
holdings (in order to raise the capital necessary to finance
their initiatives). This dilution (the fracturing of the
ownership structure) is what brings the last cycle to its
end. The holdings of the entrepreneurs are too small to
materialize a coup against the management. The
management then prevails and the entrepreneurs are
neutralized and move on to establish another start-up. The
only thing that they leave behind them is their names and
their heirs.

We can use Game Theory methods to analyse both these
situations. Wherever we have economic players
bargaining for the allocation of scarce resources in order
to attain their utility functions, to secure the outcomes and
consequences (the value, the preference, that the player
attaches to his outcomes) which are right for them - we
can use Game Theory (GT).

A short recap of the basic tenets of the theory might be in
order.

GT deals with interactions between agents, whether
conscious and intelligent - or Dennettic. A Dennettic
Agent (DA) is an agent that acts so as to influence the
future allocation of resources, but does not need to be
either conscious or deliberative to do so. A Game is the
set of acts committed by 1 to n rational DA and one a-
rational (not irrational but devoid of rationality) DA
(nature, a random mechanism). At least 1 DA in a Game
must control the result of the set of acts and the DAs must
be (at least potentially) at conflict, whole or partial. This
is not to say that all the DAs aspire to the same things.

They have different priorities and preferences. They rank
the likely outcomes of their acts differently. They engage
Strategies to obtain their highest ranked outcome. A
Strategy is a vector, which details the acts, with which the
DA will react in response to all the (possible) acts by the
other DAs. An agent is said to be rational if his Strategy
does guarantee the attainment of his most preferred goal.

Nature is involved by assigning probabilities to the
outcomes. An outcome, therefore, is an allocation of
resources resulting from the acts of the agents. An agent is
said to control the situation if its acts matter to others to
the extent that at least one of them is forced to alter at
least one vector (Strategy). The Consequence to the agent
is the value of a function that assigns real numbers to each
of the outcomes. The consequence represents a list of
outcomes, prioritized, ranked. It is also known as an
ordinal utility function. If the function includes relative
numerical importance measures (not only real numbers) -
we call it a Cardinal Utility Function.

Games, naturally, can consist of one player, two players
and more than two players (n-players). They can be zero
(or fixed) - sum (the sum of benefits is fixed and whatever
gains made by one of the players are lost by the others).

They can be nonzero-sum (the amount of benefits to all
players can increase or decrease). Games can be
cooperative (where some of the players or all of them
form coalitions) - or non-cooperative (competitive). For
some of the games, the solutions are called Nash
equilibria. They are sets of strategies constructed so that
an agent which adopts them (and, as a result, secures a
certain outcome) will have no incentive to switch over to
other strategies (given the strategies of all other players).

Nash equilibria (solutions) are the most stable (it is where
the system "settles down", to borrow from Chaos Theory)
- but they are not guaranteed to be the most desirable.

Consider the famous "Prisoners' Dilemma" in which both
players play rationally and reach the Nash equilibrium
only to discover that they could have done much better by
collaborating (that is, by playing irrationally). Instead,
they adopt the "Paretto-dominated", or the "Paretto-
optimal", sub-optimal solution. Any outside interference
with the game (for instance, legislation) will be construed
as creating a NEW game, not as pushing the players to
adopt a "Paretto-superior" solution.

The behaviour of the players reveals to us their order of
preferences. This is called "Preference Ordering" or
"Revealed Preference Theory". Agents are faced with sets
of possible states of the world (=allocations of resources,
to be more economically inclined). These are called
"Bundles". In certain cases they can trade their bundles,
swap them with others. The evidence of these swaps will
inevitably reveal to us the order of priorities of the agent.

All the bundles that enjoy the same ranking by a given
agent - are this agent's "Indifference Sets". The
construction of an Ordinal Utility Function is, thus, made
simple. The indifference sets are numbered from 1 to n.

These ordinals do not reveal the INTENSITY or the
RELATIVE INTENSITY of a preference - merely its
location in a list. However, techniques are available to
transform the ordinal utility function - into a cardinal one.

A Stable Strategy is similar to a Nash solution - though
not identical mathematically. There is currently no
comprehensive theory of Information Dynamics. Game
Theory is limited to the aspects of competition and
exchange of information (cooperation). Strategies that
lead to better results (independently of other agents) are
dominant and where all the agents have dominant
strategies - a solution is established. Thus, the Nash
equilibrium is applicable to games that are repeated and
wherein each agent reacts to the acts of other agents. The
agent is influenced by others - but does not influence
them (he is negligible). The agent continues to adapt in
this way - until no longer able to improve his position.

The Nash solution is less available in cases of cooperation
and is not unique as a solution. In most cases, the players
will adopt a minimax strategy (in zero-sum games) or
maximin strategies (in nonzero-sum games). These
strategies guarantee that the loser will not lose more than
the value of the game and that the winner will gain at least
this value. The solution is the "Saddle Point".

The distinction between zero-sum games (ZSG) and
nonzero-sum games (NZSG) is not trivial. A player
playing a ZSG cannot gain if prohibited to use certain
strategies. This is not the case in NZSGs. In ZSG, the
player does not benefit from exposing his strategy to his
rival and is never harmed by having foreknowledge of his
rival's strategy. Not so in NZSGs: at times, a player stands
to gain by revealing his plans to the "enemy". A player
can actually be harmed by NOT declaring his strategy or
by gaining acquaintance with the enemy's stratagems. The
very ability to communicate, the level of communication
and the order of communication - are important in
cooperative cases. A Nash solution:
1. Is not dependent upon any utility function;
2. It is impossible for two players to improve the
Nash solution (=their position) simultaneously
(=the Paretto optimality);
3. Is not influenced by the introduction of irrelevant
(not very gainful) alternatives; and
4. Is symmetric (reversing the roles of the players
does not affect the solution).

The limitations of this approach are immediately evident.

It is definitely not geared to cope well with more complex,
multi-player, semi-cooperative (semi-competitive),
imperfect information situations.

Von Neumann proved that there is a solution for every
ZSG with 2 players, though it might require the
implementation of mixed strategies (strategies with
probabilities attached to every move and outcome).

Together with the economist Morgenstern, he developed
an approach to coalitions (cooperative efforts of one or
more players - a coalition of one player is possible).

Every coalition has a value - a minimal amount that the
coalition can secure using solely its own efforts and
resources. The function describing this value is super-
additive (the value of a coalition which is comprised of
two sub-coalitions equals, at least, the sum of the values
of the two sub-coalitions). Coalitions can be
epiphenomenal: their value can be higher than the
combined values of their constituents. The amounts paid
to the players equal the value of the coalition and each
player stands to get an amount no smaller than any
amount that he would have made on his own. A set of
payments to the players, describing the division of the
coalition's value amongst them, is the "imputation", a
single outcome of a strategy. A strategy is, therefore,
dominant, if: (1) each player is getting more under the
strategy than under any other strategy and (2) the players
in the coalition receive a total payment that does not
exceed the value of the coalition. Rational players are
likely to prefer the dominant strategy and to enforce it.

Thus, the solution to an n-players game is a set of
imputations. No single imputation in the solution must be
dominant (=better). They should all lead to equally
desirable results. On the other hand, all the imputations
outside the solution should be dominated. Some games are
without solution (Lucas, 1967).

Auman and Maschler tried to establish what is the right
payoff to the members of a coalition. They went about it
by enlarging upon the concept of bargaining (threats,
bluffs, offers and counter-offers). Every imputation was
examined, separately, whether it belongs in the solution
(=yields the highest ranked outcome) or not, regardless of
the other imputations in the solution. But in their theory,
every member had the right to "object" to the inclusion of
other members in the coalition by suggesting a different,
exclusionary, coalition in which the members stand to
gain a larger payoff. The player about to be excluded can
"counter-argue" by demonstrating the existence of yet
another coalition in which the members will get at least as
much as in the first coalition and in the coalition proposed
by his adversary, the "objector". Each coalition has, at
least, one solution.

The Game in GT is an idealized concept. Some of the
assumptions can - and should be argued against. The
number of agents in any game is assumed to be finite and
a finite number of steps is mostly incorporated into the
assumptions. Omissions are not treated as acts (though
negative ones). All agents are negligible in their
relationship to others (have no discernible influence on
them) - yet are influenced by them (their strategies are not
- but the specific moves that they select - are). The
comparison of utilities is not the result of any ranking -
because no universal ranking is possible. Actually, no
ranking common to two or n players is possible (rankings
are bound to differ among players). Many of the problems
are linked to the variant of rationality used in GT. It is
comprised of a clarity of preferences on behalf of the
rational agent and relies on the people's tendency to
converge and cluster around the right answer / move.

This, however, is only a tendency. Some of the time,
players select the wrong moves. It would have been much
wiser to assume that there are no pure strategies, that all
of them are mixed. Game Theory would have done well to
borrow mathematical techniques from quantum
mechanics. For instance: strategies could have been
described as wave functions with probability distributions.

The same treatment could be accorded to the cardinal
utility function. Obviously, the highest ranking (smallest
ordinal) preference should have had the biggest
probability attached to it - or could be treated as the
collapse event. But these are more or less known, even
trivial, objections. Some of them cannot be overcome. We
must idealize the world in order to be able to relate to it
scientifically at all. The idealization process entails the
incorporation of gross inaccuracies into the model and the
ignorance of other elements. The surprise is that the
approximation yields results, which tally closely with
reality - in view of its mutilation, affected by the model.

There are more serious problems, philosophical in nature.

It is generally agreed that "changing" the game can - and
very often does - move the players from a non-
cooperative mode (leading to Paretto-dominated results,
which are never desirable) - to a cooperative one. A
government can force its citizens to cooperate and to obey
the law. It can enforce this cooperation. This is often
called a Hobbesian dilemma. It arises even in a population
made up entirely of altruists. Different utility functions
and the process of bargaining are likely to drive these
good souls to threaten to become egoists unless other
altruists adopt their utility function (their preferences,
their bundles). Nash proved that there is an allocation of
possible utility functions to these agents so that the
equilibrium strategy for each one of them will be this kind
of threat. This is a clear social Hobbesian dilemma: the
equilibrium is absolute egoism despite the fact that all the
players are altruists. This implies that we can learn very
little about the outcomes of competitive situations from
acquainting ourselves with the psychological facts
pertaining to the players. The agents, in this example, are
not selfish or irrational - and, still, they deteriorate in their
behaviour, to utter egotism. A complete set of utility
functions - including details regarding how much they
know about one another's utility functions - defines the
available equilibrium strategies. The altruists in our
example are prisoners of the logic of the game. Only an
"outside" power can release them from their predicament
and permit them to materialize their true nature. Gauthier
said that morally-constrained agents are more likely to
evade Paretto-dominated outcomes in competitive games
- than agents who are constrained only rationally. But this
is unconvincing without the existence of an Hobesian
enforcement mechanism (a state is the most common
one). Players would do better to avoid Paretto dominated
outcomes by imposing the constraints of such a
mechanism upon their available strategies. Paretto
optimality is defined as efficiency, when there is no state
of things (a different distribution of resources) in which at
least one player is better off - with all the other no worse
off. "Better off" read: "with his preference satisfied". This
definitely could lead to cooperation (to avoid a bad
outcome) - but it cannot be shown to lead to the formation
of morality, however basic. Criminals can achieve their
goals in splendid cooperation and be content, but that does
not make it more moral. Game theory is agent neutral, it is
utilitarianism at its apex. It does not prescribe to the agent
what is "good" - only what is "right". It is the ultimate
proof that effort at reconciling utilitarianism with more
deontological, agent relative, approaches are dubious, in
the best of cases. Teleology, in other words, in no
guarantee of morality.

Acts are either means to an end or ends in themselves.

This is no infinite regression. There is bound to be an holy
grail (happiness?) in the role of the ultimate end. A more
commonsense view would be to regard acts as means and
states of affairs as ends. This, in turn, leads to a
teleological outlook: acts are right or wrong in accordance
with their effectiveness at securing the achievement of the
right goals. Deontology (and its stronger version,
absolutism) constrain the means. It states that there is a
permitted subset of means, all the other being immoral
and, in effect, forbidden. Game Theory is out to shatter
both the notion of a finite chain of means and ends
culminating in an ultimate end - and of the deontological
view. It is consequentialist but devoid of any value
judgement.

Game Theory pretends that human actions are breakable
into much smaller "molecules" called games. Human acts
within these games are means to achieving ends but the
ends are improbable in their finality. The means are
segments of "strategies": prescient and omniscient
renditions of the possible moves of all the players. Aside
from the fact that it involves mnemic causation (direct and
deterministic influence by past events) and a similar
influence by the utility function (which really pertains to
the future) - it is highly implausible. Additionally, Game
Theory is mired in an internal contradiction: on the one
hand it solemnly teaches us that the psychology of the
players is absolutely of no consequence. On the other, it
hastens to explicitly and axiomatically postulate their
rationality and implicitly (and no less axiomatically) their
benefit-seeking behaviour (though this aspect is much
more muted). This leads to absolutely outlandish results:
irrational behaviour leads to total cooperation, bounded
rationality leads to more realistic patterns of cooperation
and competition (coopetition) and an unmitigated rational
behaviour leads to disaster (also known as Paretto
dominated outcomes).

Moreover, Game Theory refuses to acknowledge that real
games are dynamic, not static. The very concepts of
strategy, utility function and extensive (tree like)
representation are static. The dynamic is retrospective, not
prospective. To be dynamic, the game must include all the
information about all the actors, all their strategies, all
their utility functions. Each game is a subset of a higher
level game, a private case of an implicit game which is
constantly played in the background, so to say. This is a
hyper-game of which all games are but derivatives. It
incorporates all the physically possible moves of all the
players. An outside agency with enforcement powers (the
state, the police, the courts, the law) are introduced by the
players. In this sense, they are not really an outside event
which has the effect of altering the game fundamentally.

They are part and parcel of the strategies available to the
players and cannot be arbitrarily ruled out. On the
contrary, their introduction as part of a dominant strategy
will simplify Game theory and make it much more
applicable. In other words: players can choose to compete,
to cooperate and to cooperate in the formation of an
outside agency. There is no logical or mathematical
reason to exclude the latter possibility. The ability to thus
influence the game is a legitimate part of any real life
strategy. Game Theory assumes that the game is a given -
and the players have to optimize their results within it. It
should open itself to the inclusion of game altering or
redefining moves by the players as an integral part of their
strategies. After all, games entail the existence of some
agreement to play and this means that the players accept
some rules (this is the role of the prosecutor in the
Prisoners' Dilemma). If some outside rules (of the game)
are permissible - why not allow the "risk" that all the
players will agree to form an outside, lawfully binding,
arbitration and enforcement agency - as part of the game?
Such an agency will be nothing if not the embodiment, the
materialization of one of the rules, a move in the players'
strategies, leading them to more optimal or superior
outcomes as far as their utility functions are concerned.

Bargaining inevitably leads to an agreement regarding a
decision making procedure. An outside agency, which
enforces cooperation and some moral code, is such a
decision making procedure. It is not an "outside" agency
in the true, physical, sense. It does not "alter" the game
(not to mention its rules). It IS the game, it is a procedure,
a way to resolve conflicts, an integral part of any solution
and imputation, the herald of cooperation, a representative
of some of the will of all the players and, therefore, a part
both of their utility functions and of their strategies to
obtain their preferred outcomes. Really, these outside
agencies ARE the desired outcomes. Once Game Theory
digests this observation, it could tackle reality rather than
its own idealized contraptions.



XLII.  Market Impeders and Market Inefficiencies

Even the most devout proponents of free marketry and
hidden hand theories acknowledge the existence of market
failures, market imperfections and inefficiencies in the
allocation of economic resources. Some of these are the
results of structural problems, others of an accumulation
of historical liabilities. But, strikingly, some of the
inefficiencies are the direct outcomes of the activities of
"non bona fide" market participants. These "players"
(individuals, corporations, even larger economic bodies,
such as states) act either irrationally or egotistically (too
rationally).

What characterizes all those "market impeders" is that
they are value subtractors rather than value adders. Their
activities generate a reduction, rather than an increase, in
the total benefits (utilities) of all the other market players
(themselves included). Some of them do it because they
are after a self interest which is not economic (or, more
strictly, financial). They sacrifice some economic benefits
in order to satisfy that self interest (or, else, they could
never have attained these benefits, in the first place).

Others refuse to accept the self interest of other players as
their limit. They try to maximize their benefits at any cost,
as long as it is a cost to others. Some do so legally and
some adopt shadier varieties of behaviour. And there is a
group of parasites - participants in the market who feed
off its very inefficiencies and imperfections and, by their
very actions, enhance them. A vicious cycle ensues: the
body economic gives rise to parasitic agents who thrive on
its imperfections and lead to the amplification of the very
impurities that they prosper on.

We can distinguish six classes of market impeders:
1. Crooks and other illegal operators. These take
advantage of ignorance, superstition, greed, avarice,
emotional states of mind of their victims - to strike. They
re-allocate resources from (potentially or actually)
productive agents to themselves. Because they reduce the
level of trust in the marketplace - they create negative
added value. (See: "The Shadowy World of International
Finance" and "The Fabric of Economic Trust")
2. Illegitimate operators include those treading the
thin line between legally permissible and ethically
inadmissible. They engage in petty cheating
through misrepresentations, half-truths, semi-
rumours and the like. They are full of pretensions
to the point of becoming impostors. They are
wheeler-dealers, sharp-cookies, Daymon Ranyon
characters, lurking in the shadows cast by the sun
of the market. Their impact is to slow down the
economic process through disinformation and the
resulting misallocation of resources. They are the
sand in the wheels of the economic machine.
3. The "not serious" operators. These are people too
hesitant, or phobic to commit themselves to the
assumption of any kind of risk. Risk is the coal in
the various locomotives of the economy, whether
local, national, or global. Risk is being assumed,
traded, diversified out of, avoided, insured against.

It gives rise to visions and hopes and it is the most
efficient "economic natural selection" mechanism.

To be a market participant one must assume risk, it
in an inseparable part of economic activity.

Without it the wheels of commerce and finance,
investments and technological innovation will
immediately grind to a halt. But many operators
are so risk averse that, in effect, they increase the
inefficiency of the market in order to avoid it.

They act as though they are resolute, risk assuming
operators. They make all the right moves, utter all
the right sentences and emit the perfect noises. But
when push comes to shove - they recoil, retreat,
defeated before staging a fight. Thus, they waste
the collective resources of all that the operators
that they get involved with. They are known to
endlessly review projects, often change their
minds, act in fits and starts, have the wrong
priorities (for an efficient economic functioning,
that is), behave in a self defeating manner, be
horrified by any hint of risk, saddled and
surrounded by every conceivable consultant,
glutted by information. They are the stick in the
spinning wheel of the modern marketplace.
4. The former kind of operators obviously has a
character problem. Yet, there is a more
problematic species: those suffering from serious
psychological problems, personality disorders,
clinical phobias, psychoneuroses and the like. This
human aspect of the economic realm has, to the
best of my knowledge, been neglected before.

Enormous amounts of time, efforts, money and
energy are expended by the more "normal" -
because of the "less normal" and the "eccentric".

These operators are likely to regard the
maintaining of their internal emotional balance as
paramount, far over-riding economic
considerations. They will sacrifice economic
advantages and benefits and adversely affect their
utility outcome in the name of principles, to quell
psychological tensions and pressures, as part of
obsessive-compulsive rituals, to maintain a false
grandiose image, to go on living in a land of
fantasy, to resolve a psychodynamic conflict and,
generally, to cope with personal problems which
have nothing to do with the idealized rational
economic player of the theories. If quantified, the
amounts of resources wasted in these coping
manoeuvres is, probably, mind numbing. Many
deals clinched are revoked, many businesses
started end, many detrimental policy decisions
adopted and many potentially beneficial situations
avoided because of these personal upheavals.
5. Speculators and middlemen are yet another
species of parasites. In a theoretically totally
efficient marketplace - there would have been no
niche for them. They both thrive on information
failures. The first kind engages in arbitrage
(differences in pricing in two markets of an
identical good - the result of inefficient
dissemination of information) and in gambling.

These are important and blessed functions in an
imperfect world because they make it more
perfect. The speculative activity equates prices
and, therefore, sends the right signals to market
operators as to how and where to most efficiently
allocate their resources. But this is the passive
speculator. The "active" speculator is really a
market rigger. He corners the market by the
dubious virtue of his reputation and size. He
influences the market (even creates it) rather than
merely exploit its imperfections. Soros and Buffet
have such an influence though their effect is likely
to be considered beneficial by unbiased observers.

Middlemen are a different story because most of
them belong to the active subcategory. This means
that they, on purpose, generate market
inconsistencies, inefficiencies and problems - only
to solve them later at a cost extracted and paid to
them, the perpetrators of the problem. Leaving
ethical questions aside, this is a highly wasteful
process. Middlemen use privileged information
and access - whereas speculators use information
of a more public nature. Speculators normally
work within closely monitored, full disclosure,
transparent markets. Middlemen thrive of
disinformation, misinformation and lack of
information. Middlemen monopolize their
information - speculators share it, willingly or not.

The more information becomes available to more
users - the greater the deterioration in the
resources consumed by brokers of information.

The same process will likely apply to middlemen
of goods and services. We are likely to witness the
death of the car dealer, the classical retail outlet,
the music records shop. For that matter, inventions
like the internet is likely to short-circuit the whole
distribution process in a matter of a few years.
6. The last type of market impeders is well known
and is the only one to have been tackled - with
varying degrees of success by governments and by
legislators worldwide. These are the trade
restricting arrangements: monopolies, cartels,
trusts and other illegal organizations. Rivers of
inks were spilled over forests of paper to explain
the pernicious effects of these anti-competitive
practices (see: "Competition Laws"). The short
and the long of it is that competition enhances and
increases efficiency and that, therefore, anything
that restricts competition, weakens and lessens
efficiency.

What could anyone do about these inefficiencies? The
world goes in circles of increasing and decreasing free
marketry. The globe was a more open, competitive and, in
certain respects, efficient place at the beginning of the 20th
century than it is now. Capital flowed more freely and so
did labour. Foreign Direct Investment was bigger. The
more efficient, "friction free" the dissemination of
information (the ultimate resource) - the less waste and
the smaller the lebensraum for parasites. The more
adherence to market, price driven, open auction based,
meritocratic mechanisms - the less middlemen,
speculators, bribers, monopolies, cartels and trusts. The
less political involvement in the workings of the market
and, in general, in what consenting adults conspire to do
that is not harmful to others - the more efficient and
flowing the economic ambience is likely to become.

This picture of "laissez faire, laissez aller" should be
complimented by even stricter legislation coupled with
effective and draconian law enforcement agents and
measures. The illegal and the illegitimate should be
stamped out, cruelly. Freedom to all - is also freedom
from being conned or hassled. Only when the righteous
freely prosper and the less righteous excessively suffer -
only then will we have entered the efficient kingdom of
the free market.

This still does not deal with the "not serious" and the
"personality disordered". What about the inefficient havoc
that they wreak? This, after all, is part of what is known,
in legal parlance as: "force majeure".

Note
There is a raging debate between the "rational
expectations" theory and the "prospect theory". The
former - the cornerstone of rational economics - assumes
that economic (human) players are rational and out to
maximize their utility (see: "The Happiness of Others",
"The Egotistic Friend" and "The Distributive Justice of
the Market"). Even ignoring the fuzzy logic behind the ill-
defined philosophical term "utility" - rational economics
has very little to do with real human being and a lot to do
with sterile (though mildly useful) abstractions. Prospect
theory builds on behavioural research in modern
psychology which demonstrates that people are more loss
averse than gain seekers (utility maximizers). Other
economists have succeeded to demonstrate irrational
behaviours of economic actors (heuristics, dissonances,
biases, magical thinking and so on).

The apparent chasm between the rational theories
(efficient markets, hidden hands and so on) and
behavioural economics is the result of two philosophical
fallacies which, in turn, are based on the misapplication
and misinterpretation of philosophical terms.

The first fallacy is to assume that all forms of utility are
reducible to one another or to money terms. Thus, the
values attached to all utilities are expressed in monetary
terms. This is wrong. Some people prefer leisure, or
freedom, or predictability to expected money. This is the
very essence of risk aversion: a trade off between the
utility of predictability (absence or minimization of risk)
and the expected utility of money. In other words, people
have many utility functions running simultaneously - or,
at best, one utility function with many variables and
coefficients. This is why taxi drivers in New York cease
working in a busy day, having reached a pre-determined
income target: the utility function of their money equals
the utility function of their leisure.

How can these coefficients (and the values of these
variables) be determined? Only by engaging in extensive
empirical research. There is no way for any theory or
"explanation" to predict these values. We have yet to
reach the stage of being able to quantify, measure and
numerically predict human behaviour and personality
(=the set of adaptive traits and their interactions with
changing circumstances). That economics is a branch of
psychology is becoming more evident by the day. It
would do well to lose its mathematical pretensions and
adopt the statistical methods of its humbler relative.

The second fallacy is the assumption underlying both
rational and behavioural economics that human nature is
an "object" to be analysed and "studied", that it is static
and unchanged. But, of course, humans change
inexorably. This is the only fixed feature of being human:
change. Some changes are unpredictable, even in
deterministic principle. Other changes are well
documented. An example of the latter class of changes in
the learning curve. Humans learn and the more they learn
the more they alter their behaviour. So, to obtain any
meaningful data, one has to observe behaviour in time, to
obtain a sequence of reactions and actions. To isolate,
observe and manipulate environmental variables and
study human interactions. No snapshot can approximate a
video sequence where humans are concerned.



XLIII. The Pettifogger Procurators

Diplomats in Post-Communist Countries

In 2001, the most unusual event has gone unnoticed in the
international press. A former minister of finance has
accused the more prominent members of the diplomatic
corps in his country of corruption. He insisted that these
paragons of indignant righteousness and hectoring
morality have tried to blackmail him into paying them
hefty commissions from money allotted to exigent
humanitarian aid. This was immediately and from afar -
and, therefore, without proper investigation - denied by
their superiors in no uncertain terms.

The facts are these: most (though by no means all)
Western diplomats in the nightmarish wasteland that is
East Europe and the Balkan, the unctuously fulsome and
the frowzily wizened alike, are ageing and sybaritic basket
cases. They have often failed miserably in their bootless
previous posts - or have insufficiently submerged in the
Byzantine culture of their employers. Thus emotionally
injured and cast into the frigorific outer darkness of a
ravaged continent, they adopt the imperial patina of
Roman procurators in narcissistic compensation. Their
long suffering wives - bored to distraction in the
impassibly catatonic societies of post communism -
impose upon a reluctant and flummoxed population the
nescient folderol of their distaff voluntary urges or
exiguous artistic talents. Ever more crapulous, they
aestivate and hibernate, the queens of tatty courts and
shabby courtiers.

The cold war having ebbed, these emissaries of
questionable provenance engage in the promotion of the
narrow interests of specific industries or companies. They
lobby the local administration, deploying bare threats and
obloquies where veiled charm fails. They exert subtle or
brutal pressure through the press. They co-opt name-
dropping bureaucrats and bribe pivotal politicians. They
get fired those who won't collaborate or threaten to expose
their less defensible misdeeds. They are glorified delivery
boys, carrying apocryphal messages to and fro. They are
bloviating PR campaigners, seeking to aggrandize their
meagre role and, incidentally, that of their country. They
wine and dine and banter endlessly with the provincial
somnolent variety of public figures, members of the venal
and pinchbeck elites that now rule these tortured
territories. In short - forced to deal with the bedizened
miscreants that pass for businessmen and politicians in
this nether world - they are transformed, assuming in the
process the identity of their obdurately corrupted hosts.

Thus, they help to sway elections and hasten to endorse
their results, however disputed and patently fraudulent.

They intimidate the opposition, negotiate with
businessmen, prod favoured politicians, spread roorbacks
and perambulate their fiefdom to gather intelligence.

More often than not, they cross the limpid lines between
promotion and extortion, lagniappe and pelf, friendship
and collusion, diplomacy and protectorate, the kosher and
the criminal.

They are the target and the address of a legion of
pressures and demands. Their government may ask them
to help depose one coalition and help install another.

Their secret services - disguised as intrusive NGOs or
workers at the embassy - often get them involved in shady
acts and unscrupulous practices. Real NGOs ask for their
assiduous assistance and protection. Their hosts - and
centuries old protocol - expect them to surreptitiously
provide support while openly refrain from intervening,
maintaining equipoise. Other countries protest, compete,
or leak damaging reports to an often hostile media. The
torpid common folk resent them for their colonial ways
and hypocritical demarches. Lacking compunction, they
are nobody's favourites and everybody's scapegoats at one
time or another.

And they are ill-equipped to deal with these subtleties.

Not of intelligence, they end where they now are and wish
they weren't. Ignorant of business and entrepreneurship,
they occupy the dead end, otiose and pension-orientated
jobs they do. Devoid of the charm, negotiating skills and
human relations required by the intricacies of their
profession - they are relegated to the Augean outskirts of
civilization. Dishonest and mountebank, they persist in
their mortifying positions, inured to the conniving they
require.

This blatantly discernible ineptitude provokes the
"natives" into a wholesale rejection of the West, its values
and its culture. The envoys are perceived as the cormorant
reification of their remote controllers. Their voluptuary
decadence is a distant echo of the West's decay, their
nonage greed - a shadow of its avarice, their effrontery
and hidebound peremptory nature - its mien. They are in
no position to preach or teach.

The diplomats of the West are not evil. Some of them
mean well. To the best of their oft limited abilities, they
cadge and beg and press and convince their governments
to show goodwill and to contribute to their hosts. But soon
their mettle is desiccated by the vexatious realities of their
new habitation. Reduced to susurrus cynicism and
sardonic contempt, they perfunctorily perform their
functions, a distant look in their now empty eyes. They
have been assimilated, rendered useless to their
dispatchers and to their hosts alike.



XLIV. Microsoft's Third Front

The Intellectual Property Wars


Elated investors greeted chairman Bill Gates and chief
executive officer Steve Ballmer for Microsoft's victory in
the titanic antitrust lawsuit brought against it by the
Department of Justice and assorted state attorneys general.

They also demanded that Microsoft distribute its pile of
cash - $40 billion in monopoly profits - as dividends.

But Microsoft may need that hoard. The battle is far from
over. The European Commission, though much weakened
by recent European Court of First Instance rulings against
its competition commissioner, Mario Monti, can fine the
company up to one tenth its worldwide turnover if it finds
against it. Microsoft is being investigated by the European
watchdog for anti-competitive practices now threatening
to spread into the high-end server software and digital
media markets.

But the software colossus faces an even more daunting
third front in central and eastern Europe and Asia. It is the
war against piracy. Both its operating system, Windows,
and its office productivity suite, Office, are widely
cracked and replicated throughout these regions.

Three years ago, Microsoft negotiated a $3 million
settlement with the government of Macedonia, one of the
single largest abusers of intellectual property rights in this
tiny country. More than 1 percent of Macedonia's GDP is
said by various observers to be derived from software and
digital content piracy.

According to Yugoslavia's news agency, Tanjug, The
governments of Serbia and Yugoslavia purchased, last
month, 30,000 software licenses from the Redmond giant.

Another 10-15,000 are in the pipeline. Aleksandar
Bojovic, public relations manager of Microsoft's
representative office in Belgrade was ebullient:
"Before the signing of an agreement on a strategic
partnership with authorities of Yugoslavia and Serbia, the
percentage of legal software used by the citizens and
industry of Serbia and Montenegro was only a few
percents. Presently it is about 20 percents. Microsoft is
more than surprised at the interest for legalization that
exists in Yugoslavia".

According to the Yugoslav newspaper Danas, Microsoft
Yugoslavia has developed versions of Windows and
Office in Serbian, replete with a spell-checker. There are
c. 1 million computers in Yugoslavia. The company
undertook, last year, to revamp the Yugoslav labyrinthine
health, education, customs and tax systems. It also sent
representatives to a delegation of businessmen that visited
Bosnia-Herzegovina in February.

Microsoft obstinately refused to price its products
differentially - to charge less in poorer markets. The
Office suite costs the equivalent of 6 weeks of the average
wage in Macedonia and a whopping 3 months' wages in
Serbia. This extortionate pricing gave rise to resentment
and thriving markets in pilfered Microsoft applications.

Pirated software costs between $1.5 per compact disk in
Macedonia and $3 in Moscow's immense open-air
Gorbushka market.

According to the Russia-based Compulog Computer
Consultants, quoted by USA Today, most communist
states maintained large-scale hacking operations involving
not only the security services, but also the computers and
electrical engineering departments of universities and
prestigious research institutes. American bans on the sale
of certain software applications - such as computer-aided
design and encryption - fostered the emergence of an
officially-sanctioned subculture of crackers and pirates.

In the last few years, Russian organized crime has evolved
to incorporate computer fraud, identity theft, piracy of
software and digital media and other related offenses. The
Russian mafia employs programmers and graduates of
computer sciences. The British Daily Express reported in
September that - probably Russian - hackers broke into
Microsoft's computer network and absconded with
invaluable source codes. These are believed to be now
also in the possession of the FSB, the chief successor to
Russia's notorious KGB.

The Business Software Alliance, a United States based
trade group, claims that 87-92 percent of all business
computer programs used in Russia are bootlegged - a
piracy rate second only to China's. Microsoft sells c. $80-
100 million a year in the Russian Federation and the CIS.

Had it not been for piracy, its revenues could have
climbed well above the $1 billion mark.

According to Moscow Times and RosBalt, Microsoft's
sales in Russia almost doubled in the last 12 months and it
has decided to expand into the regions outlying Moscow
and into Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Yet, the company's
attempts to stamp out illicit copying in the last years of
Russian president Boris Yeltsin's regime - including a
much publicized visit by Bill Gates and a series of
televised raids on disk stamping factories - floundered and
yielded a wave of xenophobic indignation.

Still, central and eastern Europe is a natural growth
market for the likes of Microsoft. The region is awash
with highly qualified, talented, and - by Western measure
- sinfully cheap experts. Purchasing power has increased
precipitously in countries like the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, parts of Russia, and Croatia.

Both governments and businesses are at the initial stages
of investing in information technology infrastructure.

Technological leapfrogging rendered certain countries
here more advanced than the West in terms of broadband
and wireless networks.



XLV. NGOs - The Self-Appointed Altruists


Their arrival portends rising local prices and a culture
shock. Many of them live in plush apartments, or five star
hotels, drive SUV's, sport $3000 laptops and PDA's. They
earn a two figure multiple of the local average wage. They
are busybodies, preachers, critics, do-gooders, and
professional altruists.

Always self-appointed, they answer to no constituency.

Though unelected and ignorant of local realities, they
confront the democratically chosen and those who voted
them into office. A few of them are enmeshed in crime
and corruption. They are the non-governmental
organizations, or NGO's.

Some NGO's - like Oxfam, Human Rights Watch,
Medecins Sans Frontieres, or Amnesty - genuinely
contribute to enhancing welfare, to the mitigation of
hunger, the furtherance of human and civil rights, or the
curbing of disease. Others - usually in the guise of think
tanks and lobby groups - are sometimes ideologically
biased, or religiously-committed and, often, at the service
of special interests.

NGO's - such as the International Crisis Group - have
openly interfered on behalf of the opposition in the last
parliamentary elections in Macedonia. Other NGO's have
done so in Belarus and Ukraine, Zimbabwe and Israel,
Nigeria and Thailand, Slovakia and Hungary - and even in
Western, rich, countries including the USA, Canada,
Germany, and Belgium.

The encroachment on state sovereignty of international
law - enshrined in numerous treaties and conventions -
allows NGO's to get involved in hitherto strictly domestic
affairs like corruption, civil rights, the composition of the
media, the penal and civil codes, environmental policies,
or the allocation of economic resources and of natural
endowments, such as land and water. No field of
government activity is now exempt from the glare of
NGO's. They serve as self-appointed witnesses, judges,
jury and executioner rolled into one.

Regardless of their persuasion or modus operandi, all
NGO's are top heavy with entrenched, well-remunerated,
extravagantly-perked bureaucracies. Opacity is typical of
NGO's. Amnesty's rules prevent its officials from publicly
discussing the inner workings of the organization -
proposals, debates, opinions - until they have become
officially voted into its Mandate. Thus, dissenting views
rarely get an open hearing.

Contrary to their teachings, the financing of NGO's is
invariably obscure and their sponsors unknown. The bulk
of the income of most non-governmental organizations,
even the largest ones, comes from - usually foreign -
powers. Many NGO's serve as official contractors for
governments.

NGO's serve as long arms of their sponsoring states -
gathering intelligence, burnishing their image, and
promoting their interests. There is a revolving door
between the staff of NGO's and government bureaucracies
the world over. The British Foreign Office finances a host
of NGO's - including the fiercely "independent" Global
Witness - in troubled spots, such as Angola. Many host
governments accuse NGO's of - unwittingly or knowingly
- serving as hotbeds of espionage.

Very few NGO's derive some of their income from public
contributions and donations. The more substantial NGO's
spend one tenth of their budget on PR and solicitation of
charity. In a desperate bid to attract international attention,
so many of them lied about their projects in the Rwanda
crisis in 1994, recounts "The Economist", that the Red
Cross felt compelled to draw up a ten point mandatory
NGO code of ethics. A code of conduct was adopted in
1995. But the phenomenon recurred in Kosovo.

All NGO's claim to be not for profit - yet, many of them
possess sizable equity portfolios and abuse their position
to increase the market share of firms they own. Conflicts
of interest and unethical behavior abound.

Cafedirect is a British firm committed to "fair trade"
coffee. Oxfam, an NGO, embarked, three years ago, on a
campaign targeted at Cafedirect's competitors, accusing
them of exploiting growers by paying them a tiny fraction
of the retail price of the coffee they sell. Yet, Oxfam owns
25% of Cafedirect.

Large NGO's resemble multinational corporations in
structure and operation. They are hierarchical, maintain
large media, government lobbying, and PR departments,
head-hunt, invest proceeds in professionally-managed
portfolios, compete in government tenders, and own a
variety of unrelated businesses. The Aga Khan Fund for
Economic Development owns the license for second
mobile phone operator in Afghanistan - among other
businesses. In this respect, NGO's are more like cults than
like civic organizations.

Many NGO's promote economic causes - anti-
globalization, the banning of child labor, the relaxing of
intellectual property rights, or fair payment for
agricultural products. Many of these causes are both
worthy and sound. Alas, most NGO's lack economic
expertise and inflict damage on the alleged recipients of
their beneficence. NGO's are at times manipulated by - or
collude with - industrial groups and political parties.

It is telling that the denizens of many developing countries
suspect the West and its NGO's of promoting an agenda of
trade protectionism. Stringent - and expensive - labor and
environmental provisions in international treaties may
well be a ploy to fend off imports based on cheap labor
and the competition they wreak on well-ensconced
domestic industries and their political stooges.

Take child labor - as distinct from the universally
condemnable phenomena of child prostitution, child
soldiering, or child slavery.

Child labor, in many destitute locales, is all that separates
the family from all-pervasive, life threatening, poverty. As
national income grows, child labor declines. Following
the outcry provoked, in 1995, by NGO's against soccer
balls stitched by children in Pakistan, both Nike and
Reebok relocated their workshops and sacked countless
women and 7000 children. The average family income -
anyhow meager - fell by 20 percent.

This affair elicited the following wry commentary from
economists Drusilla Brown, Alan Deardorif, and Robert
Stern:
"While Baden Sports can quite credibly claim that their
soccer balls are not sewn by children, the relocation of
their production facility undoubtedly did nothing for their
former child workers and their families".

This is far from being a unique case. Threatened with
legal reprisals and "reputation risks" (being named-and-
shamed by overzealous NGO's) - multinationals engage in
preemptive sacking. More than 50,000 children in
Bangladesh were let go in 1993 by German garment
factories in anticipation of the American never-legislated
Child Labor Deterrence Act.

Former Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich, observed:
"Stopping child labor without doing anything else could
leave children worse off. If they are working out of
necessity, as most are, stopping them could force them
into prostitution or other employment with greater
personal dangers. The most important thing is that they be
in school and receive the education to help them leave
poverty".

NGO-fostered hype notwithstanding, 70% of all children
work within their family unit, in agriculture. Less than 1
percent are employed in mining and another 2 percent in
construction. Again contrary to NGO-proffered panaceas,
education is not a solution. Millions graduate every year
in developing countries - 100,000 in Morocco alone. But
unemployment reaches more than one third of the
workforce in places such as Macedonia.

Children at work may be harshly treated by their
supervisors but at least they are kept off the far more
menacing streets. Some kids even end up with a skill and
are rendered employable.
"The Economist" sums up the shortsightedness,
inaptitude, ignorance, and self-centeredness of NGO's
neatly:
"Suppose that in the remorseless search for profit,
multinationals pay sweatshop wages to their workers in
developing countries. Regulation forcing them to pay
higher wages is demanded... The NGOs, the reformed
multinationals and enlightened rich-country governments
propose tough rules on third-world factory wages, backed
up by trade barriers to keep out imports from countries
that do not comply. Shoppers in the West pay more - but
willingly, because they know it is in a good cause. The
NGOs declare another victory. The companies, having
shafted their third-world competition and protected their
domestic markets, count their bigger profits (higher wage
costs notwithstanding). And the third-world workers
displaced from locally owned factories explain to their
children why the West's new deal for the victims of
capitalism requires them to starve".

NGO's in places like Sudan, Somalia, Myanmar,
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Albania, and Zimbabwe have
become the preferred venue for Western aid - both
humanitarian and financial - development financing, and
emergency relief. According to the Red Cross, more
money goes through NGO's than through the World Bank.

Their iron grip on food, medicine, and funds rendered
them an alternative government - sometimes as venal and
graft-stricken as the one they replace.

Local businessmen, politicians, academics, and even
journalists form NGO's to plug into the avalanche of
Western largesse. In the process, they award themselves
and their relatives with salaries, perks, and preferred
access to Western goods and credits. NGO's have evolved
into vast networks of patronage in Africa, Latin America,
and Asia.

NGO's chase disasters with a relish. More than 200 of
them opened shop in the aftermath of the Kosovo refugee
crisis in 1999-2000. Another 50 supplanted them during
the civil unrest in Macedonia a year later. Floods,
elections, earthquakes, wars - constitute the cornucopia
that feed the NGO's.

NGO's are proponents of Western values - women's lib,
human rights, civil rights, the protection of minorities,
freedom, equality. Not everyone finds this liberal menu
palatable. The arrival of NGO's often provokes social
polarization and cultural clashes. Traditionalists in
Bangladesh, nationalists in Macedonia, religious zealots
in Israel, security forces everywhere, and almost all
politicians find NGO's irritating and bothersome.

The British government ploughs well over $30 million a
year into "Proshika", a Bangladeshi NGO. It started as a
women's education outfit and ended up as a restive and
aggressive women empowerment political lobby group
with budgets to rival many ministries in this
impoverished, Moslem and patriarchal country.

Other NGO's - fuelled by $300 million of annual foreign
infusion - evolved from humble origins to become mighty
coalitions of full-time activists. NGO's like the
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and
the Association for Social Advancement mushroomed
even as their agendas have been fully implemented and
their goals exceeded. It now owns and operates 30,000
schools.

This mission creep is not unique to developing countries.

As Parkinson discerned, organizations tend to self-
perpetuate regardless of their proclaimed charter.

Remember NATO? Human rights organizations, like
Amnesty, are now attempting to incorporate in their ever-
expanding remit "economic and social rights" - such as
the rights to food, housing, fair wages, potable water,
sanitation, and health provision. How insolvent countries
are supposed to provide such munificence is conveniently
overlooked.
"The Economist" reviewed a few of the more egregious
cases of NGO imperialism.

Human Rights Watch lately offered this tortured argument
in favor of expanding the role of human rights NGO's:
"The best way to prevent famine today is to secure the
right to free expression - so that misguided government
policies can be brought to public attention and corrected
before food shortages become acute." It blatantly ignored
the fact that respect for human and political rights does
not fend off natural disasters and disease. The two
countries with the highest incidence of AIDS are Africa's
only two true democracies - Botswana and South Africa.

The Centre for Economic and Social Rights, an American
outfit, "challenges economic injustice as a violation of
international human rights law". Oxfam pledges to
support the "rights to a sustainable livelihood, and the
rights and capacities to participate in societies and make
positive changes to people's lives". In a poor attempt at
emulation, the WHO published an inanely titled document
- "A Human Rights Approach to Tuberculosis".

NGO's are becoming not only all-pervasive but more
aggressive. In their capacity as "shareholder activists",
they disrupt shareholders meetings and act to actively
tarnish corporate and individual reputations. Friends of
the Earth worked hard four years ago to instigate a
consumer boycott against Exxon Mobil - for not investing
in renewable energy resources and for ignoring global
warming. No one - including other shareholders -
understood their demands. But it went down well with the
media, with a few celebrities, and with contributors.

As "think tanks", NGO's issue partisan and biased reports.

The International Crisis Group published a rabid attack on
the then incumbent government of Macedonia, days
before an election, relegating the rampant corruption of its
predecessors - whom it seemed to be tacitly supporting -
to a few footnotes. On at least two occasions - in its
reports regarding Bosnia and Zimbabwe - ICG has
recommended confrontation, the imposition of sanctions,
and, if all else fails, the use of force. Though the most
vocal and visible, it is far from being the only NGO that
advocates "just" wars.

The ICG is a repository of former heads of state and has-
been politicians and is renowned (and notorious) for its
prescriptive - some say meddlesome - philosophy and
tactics. "The Economist" remarked sardonically: "To say
(that ICG) is 'solving world crises' is to risk
underestimating its ambitions, if overestimating its
achievements".

NGO's have orchestrated the violent showdown during the
trade talks in Seattle in 1999 and its repeat performances
throughout the world. The World Bank was so intimidated
by the riotous invasion of its premises in the NGO-
choreographed "Fifty Years is Enough" campaign of
1994, that it now employs dozens of NGO activists and let
NGO's determine many of its policies.

NGO activists have joined the armed - though mostly
peaceful - rebels of the Chiapas region in Mexico.

Norwegian NGO's sent members to forcibly board
whaling ships. In the USA, anti-abortion activists have
murdered doctors. In Britain, animal rights zealots have
both assassinated experimental scientists and wrecked
property.

Birth control NGO's carry out mass sterilizations in poor
countries, financed by rich country governments in a bid
to stem immigration. NGO's buy slaves in Sudan thus
encouraging the practice of slave hunting throughout sub-
Saharan Africa. Other NGO's actively collaborate with
"rebel" armies - a euphemism for terrorists.

NGO's lack a synoptic view and their work often
undermines efforts by international organizations such as
the UNHCR and by governments. Poorly-paid local
officials have to contend with crumbling budgets as the
funds are diverted to rich expatriates doing the same job
for a multiple of the cost and with inexhaustible hubris.

This is not conducive to happy co-existence between
foreign do-gooders and indigenous governments.

Sometimes NGO's seem to be an ingenious ploy to solve
Western unemployment at the expense of down-trodden
natives. This is a misperception driven by envy and
avarice.

But it is still powerful enough to foster resentment and
worse. NGO's are on the verge of provoking a ruinous
backlash against them in their countries of destination.

That would be a pity. Some of them are doing
indispensable work. If only they were a wee more
sensitive and somewhat less ostentatious. But then they
wouldn't be NGO's, would they?

Interview granted to Revista Terra, Brazil, September
2005
Q. NGOs are growing quickly in Brazil due to the
discredit politicians and governmental institutions face
after decades of corruption, elitism etc. The young
people feel they can do something concrete working as
activists in a NGOs. Isn't that a good thing? What kind
of dangers someone should be aware before enlisting
himself as a supporter of a NGO?
A. One must clearly distinguish between NGOs in the
sated, wealthy, industrialized West - and (the far more
numerous) NGOs in the developing and less developed
countries.

Western NGOs are the heirs to the Victorian tradition of
"White Man's Burden". They are missionary and charity-
orientated. They are designed to spread both aid (food,
medicines, contraceptives, etc.) and Western values. They
closely collaborate with Western governments and
institutions against local governments and institutions.

They are powerful, rich, and care less about the welfare of
the indigenous population than about "universal"
principles of ethical conduct.

Their counterparts in less developed and in developing
countries serve as substitutes to failed or dysfunctional
state institutions and services. They are rarely concerned
with the furthering of any agenda and more preoccupied
with the well-being of their constituents, the people.

Q. Why do you think many NGO activists are narcissists
and not altruists? What are the symptoms you identify
on them?
A. In both types of organizations - Western NGOs and
NGOs elsewhere - there is a lot of waste and corruption,
double-dealing, self-interested promotion, and, sometimes
inevitably, collusion with unsavory elements of society.

Both organizations attract narcissistic opportunists who
regards NGOs as venues of upward social mobility and
self-enrichment. Many NGOs serve as sinecures,
"manpower sinks", or "employment agencies" - they
provide work to people who, otherwise, are
unemployable. Some NGOs are involved in political
networks of patronage, nepotism, and cronyism.

Narcissists are attracted to money, power, and glamour.

NGOs provide all three. The officers of many NGOs draw
exorbitant salaries (compared to the average salary where
the NGO operates) and enjoy a panoply of work-related
perks. Some NGOs exert a lot of political influence and
hold power over the lives of millions of aid recipients.

NGOs and their workers are, therefore, often in the
limelight and many NGO activists have become minor
celebrities and frequent guests in talk shows and such.

Even critics of NGOs are often interviewed by the media
(laughing).

Finally, a slim minority of NGO officers and workers are
simply corrupt. They collude with venal officials to enrich
themselves. For instance: during the Kosovo crisis in
1999, NGO employees sold in the open market food,
blankets, and medical supplies intended for the refugees.

Q. How can one choose between good and bad NGOs?
A. There are a few simple tests:
1. What part of the NGO's budget is spent on salaries and
perks for the NGO's officers and employees? The less the
better.
2. Which part of the budget is spent on furthering the aims
of the NGO and on implementing its promulgated
programs? The more the better.
3. What portion of the NGOs resources is allocated to
public relations and advertising? The less the better.
4. What part of the budget is contributed by governments,
directly or indirectly? The less the better.
5. What do the alleged beneficiaries of the NGO's
activities think of the NGO? If the NGO is feared,
resented, and hated by the local denizens, then something
is wrong!
6. How many of the NGO's operatives are in the field,
catering to the needs of the NGO's ostensible
constituents? The more the better.
7. Does the NGO own or run commercial enterprises? If it
does, it is a corrupt and compromised NGO involved in
conflicts of interest.

Q. The way you describe, many NGO are already more
powerful and politically influential than many
governments. What kind of dangers this elicits? Do you
think they are a pest that need control? What kind of
control would that be?
A. The voluntary sector is now a cancerous phenomenon.

NGOs interfere in domestic politics and take sides in
election campaigns. They disrupt local economies to the
detriment of the impoverished populace. They impose
alien religious or Western values. They justify military
interventions. They maintain commercial interests which
compete with indigenous manufacturers. They provoke
unrest in many a place. And this is a partial list.

The trouble is that, as opposed to most governments in the
world, NGOs are authoritarian. They are not elected
institutions. They cannot be voted down. The people have
no power over them. Most NGOs are ominously and
tellingly secretive about their activities and finances.

Light disinfects. The solution is to force NGOs to become
both democratic and accountable. All countries and
multinational organizations (such as the UN) should pass
laws and sign international conventions to regulate the
formation and operation of NGOs.

NGOs should be forced to democratize. Elections should
be introduced on every level. All NGOs should hold
"annual stakeholder meetings" and include in these
gatherings representatives of the target populations of the
NGOs. NGO finances should be made completely
transparent and publicly accessible. New accounting
standards should be developed and introduced to cope
with the current pecuniary opacity and operational double-
speak of NGOs.

Q. It seems that many values carried by NGO are
typically modern and Western. What kind of problems
this creates in more traditional and culturally different
countries?
A. Big problems. The assumption that the West has the
monopoly on ethical values is undisguised cultural
chauvinism. This arrogance is the 21st century equivalent
of the colonialism and racism of the 19th and 20th
century. Local populations throughout the world resent
this haughty presumption and imposition bitterly.

As you said, NGOs are proponents of modern Western
values - democracy, women's lib, human rights, civil
rights, the protection of minorities, freedom, equality. Not
everyone finds this liberal menu palatable. The arrival of
NGOs often provokes social polarization and cultural
clashes.



XLVII.   Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?

Who is Guarding the Guards in Countries in Transition from Communism?


Written: August 23, 1999

Izetbegovic, the nominal president of the nominal Bosnian
state, the darling of the gullible western media, denies that
he and his cronies and his cronies' cronies stole 40% of all
civilian aid targeted at Bosnia - a minor matter of 1 billion
US dollars and change, in less than 4 years. The tribes of
the Balkans stop bleeding each other to death only when
they gang up to bleed another. In this, there are no races
and no traces - everyone is equal under the sign of the
dollar. Serbs, Bosnians and Croats divided the loot with
the loftiest of egalitarian instincts. Honour among thieves
transformed into honour among victims and their
murderers. Mammon is the only real authority in this god
forsaken, writhing rump of a country.

And not only there.

In Russia, billions (3 to 5) were transferred to secret off
shore bank accounts to be "portfolio managed" by
mysterious fly-by-night entities. Many paid with their jobs
when the trail led to the incestuous Yeltsin clan and their
byzantine court.

Convoys snake across the mountainous Kosovo, bringing
smuggled goods at exorbitant prices to the inhabitants of
this parched territory - all under the avuncular gaze of
multinational peacekeepers.

In Romania, Hungary and Greece, UN forces have been
known to take bribes to allow goods into besieged Serbia.

Oil, weapons and strategic materials, all slid across this
greasy channel of the international brotherhood of cash.

A lot of the aid, ostensibly intended to ameliorate the state
of refugedom imposed upon the unsuspecting, harried
population of Kosovo - resurfaced in markets, white and
black, across the region. Food, blankets, tents, electrical
equipment, even toys - were on offer in bazaars from
Skopje to Podgorica and from Sofia to Thessaloniki,
replete with the stamps of the unwitting donors. Aid
workers scurried back and forth in expensive utility
vehicles, buzzing mobile phones in hand and latest model,
officially purchased, infrared laptops humming in the air
conditioned coolness of their five star hotel rooms (or
fancy apartments). In their back pockets they safeguarded
their first class tickets (the food is better and the
stewardesses ...). The scavengers of every carnage, they
descended upon this tortured land in redundant hordes,
feeding off the misery, the autoimmune deficiency of the
syndrome of humanism.

Ask yourselves: how could one of every 3 dollars - 50%
of GNP - be stolen in a country the size of a tiny
American state - without the knowledge and collaboration
of the international organizations which ostensibly
manage this bedlam? Why did the IMF renew the credit
lines to a Russia which cheated bold-facely regarding its
foreign exchange reserves? How was Serbia awash and
flush with oil and other goods prohibited under the terms
of the never-ending series of embargoes imposed upon it?
The answer is that potent cocktail of fear and graft. First
came fear - that Russia will collapse, that the Balkans will
spill over, that Bosnia will disintegrate. Nuclear
nightmares intermingled with Armenian and Jewish
flashbacks of genocide. The west shut its eyes tight and
threw money at the bad spirits of irredentism and re-
emergent communism. The long arm of the USA, the
"international" financial institutions, collaborated in
constructing the habit forming dole house that Eastern and
Southern Europe has become. This conflict-reticence,
these approach-avoidance cycles led to an inevitable
collusion between the ruling mob families that pass for
regimes in these parts of the planet - and the unilateral
institutions that pass for multilateral ones in the rest of it.

An elaborate system of winks and nods, the sign language
of institutional rot and decaying governance, took over.

Greasy palms clapped one another with the eerie silence
of conspiracy. The world looked away as both -
international financial institutions and corrupt regimes -
robbed their constituencies blind. This was perceived to
be the inevitable moral cost of stability. Survival of the
majority entailed the filthy enrichment of the minority.

And the west acquiesced.

But this grand design backfired. Like insidious bacteria,
corruption breeds violence and hops from host to host. It
does not discriminate, this plague of black conscience,
between east and west. As it infected the indigenous, it
also effected their guardians. They were all engulfed by
raging greed, by a degradation of the inhibitions and by
the intoxicating promiscuity of lawlessness. Inebriated by
their newly found powers, little ceasars - natives and
financial colonialists - claimed their little plots of crime
and avarice, a not so secret order of disintegration of the
social fabric. A ghoulish landscape, shrouded in the
opaque mist of the nomenclature, the camaraderie of the
omnipotent.

And corruption bred violence. The Chicago model
imported lock, stock and the barrel of the gun. Former
cronies disappeared mysteriously, bloated corpses in stale
hotel rooms - being the only "contracts" honoured.

Territories were carved up in constant, unrelenting
warfare. One billion dollars are worth a lot of blood and it
was spilled with glee, with the enthusiasm of the
inevitable, with the elation of gambling all on a single
spin of the Russian roulette.

It is this very violence that the west tried to drown with its
credits. But unbeknownst to it, this very violence thrived
on these pecuniary fertilizers. A plant of horrors, it
devoured its soil and its cultivators alike. And 120,000
people paid with their lives for this wrong gamble.

Counting its losses, the west is poised to spin the wheel
again. More money is amassed, the dies are cast and more
people cast to die.



XLVII.  The Honorary Academic Higher Education for Sale

In Countries in Transition from Communism

Mira Markovic is an "Honorary Academic" of the Russian
Academy of Science. It cost a lot of money to obtain this
title and the Serb multi-billionnaire Karic was only too
glad to cough it up. Whatever else you say about Balkan
cronies, they rarely bite the hand that feeds them (unless
and until it is expedient to do so). And whatever else you
say about Russia, it adapted remarkably to capitalism.

Everything has a price and a market. Israel had to learn
this fact the hard way when Russian practical-nurse-level
medical doctors and construction-worker-level civil
engineers flooded its shores. Everything is for sale in this
region of opportunities, instant education inclusive.

It seems that academe suffered the most during the
numerous shock therapies and transition periods showered
upon the impoverished inhabitants of Eastern and Central
Europe. The resident of decrepit communist-era buildings,
it had to cope with a flood of eager students and a deluge
of anachronistic "scholars". But in Russia, the CIS and the
Balkans the scenery is nothing short of Dantesque.

Unschooled in any major European language, lazily
content with their tenured positions, stagnant and formal -
the academics and academicians of the Balkans are both
failures and a resounding indictment of the rigor mortis
that was socialism. Economics textbooks stop short of
mentioning Friedman or Phelps. History textbooks should
better be relegated to the science fiction shelves. A brave
facade of self sufficiency covers up a vast hinterland of
inferiority complex fully supported by real inferiority. In
antiquated libraries, shattered labs, crooked buildings and
inadequate facilities, student pursue redundant careers
with the wrong teachers.

Corruption seethes under this repellent surface. Teachers
sell exams, take bribes, trade incestuous sex with their
students. They refuse to contribute to their communities.

In all my years in the Balkans, I have yet to come across a
voluntary act - a single voluntary act - by an academic.

And I have come across numerous refusals to help and to
contribute. Materialism incarnate.

This sorry state of affairs has a twofold outcome. On the
one hand, herds of victims of rigidly dictated lectures and
the suppression of free thought. These academic products
suffer from the twin afflictions of irrelevance of skills and
the inability to acquire relevant ones, the latter being the
result of decades of brainwashing and industrial
educational methods. Unable to match their anyhow
outdated knowledge with anything a modern marketplace
can offer - they default on to menial jobs, rebel or pull
levers to advance in life. Which leads us to the death of
meritocracy and why this region's future is behind it.

In the wake of the downfall of all the major ideologies of
the 20th century - Fascism, Communism, etc. the New
Order, heralded by President Bush, emerged as a battle of
Open Club versus Closed Club societies, at least from the
economic point of view.

All modern states and societies must choose whether to be
governed by merit (meritocracy) or by the privileged few
(oligarchy). It is inevitable that the social and economic
structures be controlled by elites. It is a complex world
and only a few can master the knowledge it takes to
govern effectively. What sets meritocracy apart is not the
number of members of its ruling (or leading) class,
usually no larger than an oligarchy. No, it is distinguished
by its membership criteria and by the mode of their
application.

The meritocratic elite is an open club because it satisfies
three conditions:
1. The process and rules of joining up (i.e., the
criteria) are transparent and widely known.
2. The application and membership procedures are
uniform, equal to all and open to continuous public
scrutiny and criticism.
3. The system alters its membership requirements in
direct response to public feedback and to the
changing social and economic environment.

To belong to a meritocracy one needs to satisfy a series of
demands, whose attainment is entirely up to he individual.

And that is all that one needs to do. The rules of joining
and of membership are cast in iron. The wishes and
opinions of those who happen to comprise the club at any
given moment are of no importance and of no
consequence. Meritocracy is a "fair play" by rules of equal
chance to derive benefits. Put differently, is the rule of
law.

To join a meritocratic club, one needs to demonstrate that
one is in possession of, or has access to, "inherent"
parameters, such as intelligence, a certain level of
education, a potential to contribute to society. An inherent
parameter must correspond to a criterion and the latter
must be applied independent of the views and
predilections of those who sometimes are forced to apply
it. The members of a committee or a board can disdain an
applicant, or they might wish not to approve a candidate.

Or they may prefer someone else for the job because they
owe her something, or because they play golf with him.

Yet, they are permitted to consider only the applicant's or
the candidate's "inherent" parameters: does he have the
necessary tenure, qualifications, education, experience?
Does he contribute to his workplace, community, society
at large? In other words: is he "worthy" or "deserving"?
Not WHO he is - but WHAT he is.

Granted, these processes of selection, admission,
incorporation and assimilation are administered by mere
humans and are, therefore, subject to human failings. Can
qualifications be always judged "objectively,
unambiguously and unequivocally"? Can "the right
personality traits" or "the ability to engage in teamwork"
be evaluated "objectively"? These are vague and
ambiguous enough to accommodate bias and bad will.

Still, at least appearances are kept in most cases - and
decisions can be challenged in courts.

What characterizes oligarchy is the extensive, relentless
and ruthless use of "transcendent" (in lieu of "inherent")
parameters to decide who will belong where, who will get
which job and, ultimately, who will enjoy which benefits.

The trouble with transcendent parameters is that there is
nothing much an applicant or a candidate can do about
them. Usually, they are accidents, occurrences absolutely
beyond the reach or control of those most affected by
them. Race is such a transcendent parameter and so are
gender, familial affiliation or contacts and influence.

In many corners of the globe, to join a closed, oligarchic
club, to get the right job, to enjoy excessive benefits - one
must be white (racism), male (sexual discrimination), born
to the right family (nepotism), or to have the right political
(or other) contacts (cronyism). And often, belonging to
one such club is the prerequisite for joining another.

In France, for instance, the whole country is politically
and economically run by graduates of the Ecole Normale
d'Administration (ENA). They are known as the
ENArques (=the royal dynasty of ENA graduates).

The privatization of state enterprises in most East and
Central European countries provided a glaring example of
oligarchic machinations. In most of these countries (the
Czech Republic, Macedonia, Serbia and Russia are
notorious examples) - state companies, the nation's only
assets, were "sold" to political cronies, creating in the
process a pernicious amalgam of capitalism and oligarchy,
known as "crony capitalism" or privateering. The national
wealth was passed on to the hands of relatively few, well
connected, individuals, at a ridiculously low price. The
nations involved were robbed, their riches either
squandered or smuggled abroad.

In the affairs of humans, not everything falls neatly into
place. Take money, for instance. Is it an inherent
parameter or an expressly transcendent one? Making
money indicates the existence of some merit, some
inherent advantageous traits of the money-making
individual. To make money consistently, a person needs
to be diligent, resilient, hard working, to prevail and
overcome hardships, to be far sighted and to possess a
host of other - universally acclaimed - traits. On the other
hand, is it fair when someone who made his fortune
through corruption, inheritance, or luck - be preferred to a
poor genius?
That is a contentious issue. In the USA money talks.

Being possessed of money means being virtuous and
meritorious. To preserve a fortune inherited is as difficult
a task as to make it in the first place, the thinking goes.

Thus, the source of the money is secondary.

An oligarchy tends to have long term devastating
economic effects.

The reason is that the best and the brightest - when shut
out by the members of the ruling elites - emigrate. In a
country where one's job is determined by his family
connections or by influence peddling - those best fit to do
the job are likely to be disappointed, then disgusted and
then to leave the place altogether.

This is the phenomenon known as "Brain Drain". It is one
of the biggest migratory tidal waves in human history.

Capable, well-trained, educated, young people leave their
oligarchic, arbitrary, influence peddling societies and
migrate to less arbitrary meritocracies (mostly to be found
in what is collectively known as "The West").

This is colonialism of the worst kind. The mercantilist
definition of a colony is a territory which exports raw
materials only to re-import them in the form of finished
products. The Brain drain is exactly that: the poorer
countries are exporting raw brains and buying back the
finished products masterminded, invented and
manufactured by theses brains.

Yet, while in classical colonialism, the colony at least
received some recompense for its goods - here the poor
country is actually the poorer for its exports. The bright
young people who depart (most of them never to return)
carry with them an investment of the scarce resources of
their homeland - and award it to their new, much richer,
host countries. This is an absurd situation, a subsidy
granted reluctantly by the poor to the rich. This is also one
of the largest capital transfers (really capital flight) in
history.

Some poor countries understood these basic, unpleasant,
facts of life. They extracted an "education fee" from those
emigrating. This fee was supposed to, at least partially,
recapture the costs of educating and training the
immigrants. Romania and the USSR imposed such levies
on Jews emigrating to Israel in the 1970s. Others
despairingly regard the brain drain as a natural
catastrophe. Very few countries are trying to tackle the
fundamental, structural and philosophical flaws of the
system, the roots of the disenchantment of those who
leave.

The Brain Drain is so serious that some countries lost up
to a third of their total young and educated population to it
(Macedonia in South-eastern Europe, some less developed
countries in South East Asia and in Africa). Others were
drained of almost one half of the growth in their educated
workforce (for instance, Israel during the 1980s).

Brains are an ideal natural resource: they can be
cultivated, directed, controlled, manipulated, regulated.

They are renewable and replicable. Brains tend to grow
exponentially through interaction and they have an
unparalleled economic value added. The profit margin in
knowledge and information related industries far exceeds
anything common to more traditional, second wave,
industries (not to mention first wave agriculture and
agribusiness).

What is even more important:
Poor countries are uniquely positioned to take advantage
of this third revolution. With cheap, educated workforce -
they can monopolize basic data processing and
telecommunications functions worldwide. True, this calls
for massive initial investments in physical infrastructure.

But the important input is the wetware, the brains. To
constrain them, to disappoint them, to make them run
away, to more merit-orientated places - is to sentence
oneself to a permanent disadvantage and deprivation.

This is what the countries in the Balkans are doing.

Driving away the best part of their population by
encouraging the worst part. Abandoning their future by
dwelling on their past. Caught in a fatal spider web of
family connections and political cronyism of their own
design. Their factories and universities and offices and
government filled to the brim with third rate relatives of
third rate professors and bureaucrats. Turning themselves
into third rate countries in a self perpetuating, self feeding
process of decline. And all the while eyeing the new and
the foreign with the paranoia that is the result of true guilt.



XLVIII.  Rasputin in Transition

Frauds and Con-men in Countries in Transition from Communism


The mad glint in his eyes is likely to be nothing more
ominous than maladjusted contact lenses. If not clean
shaven, he is likely to sport nothing wilder than a goatee.

More likely an atheist than a priest, this mutation of the
ageless confidence artist is nonetheless the direct spiritual
descendent of Rasputin, the raving maniac who governed
Russia until his own execution by Russian noblemen and
patriots.

They are to be found in all countries in transition. Wild
and insidious weeds, the outcome of wayward pollination
by mutated capitalism. They prey on their victims, at first
acquiring their confidence and love, then penetrating their
political, social and financial structures almost as a virus
would: stealthily and treacherously. By the time their
quarry wakes up to its infection and subjugation - it is
already too late. By then, the invader will have become
part of the invaded or its master, either through blackmail
or via tempting subornation.

This region of the CEE and the Balkans provides for
fertile grounds. It is a Petrie dish upon which cultures of
corruption and scandalous conduct are fermented. The
typical exploiter of these vulnerabilities is a foreigner.

Things foreign are held in awe and adulation by a
populace so down trodden and made to feel inferior in
every way, not least by foreign tutors and advisors. The
craving to be loved, this gnawing urge to be accepted, to
be a member of the club, to be distinguished from one's
former neighbours - are irresistible. The modern Rasputin
doles out this unconditional acceptance, this all
encompassing affinity, the echoes of avuncularity. In
doing so, he evokes in the recipients such warmth, such
relief, such fervour and reciprocity - that he becomes an
idol, a symbol of a paradise long lost, a golden braid.

Having thus completed the first phase of his meticulous
attack - he moves on to the second chapter in this book of
body snatching.

Armed with his new-fangled popularity, the crook moves
on and leverages it to the hilt. He does so by feigning
charity, by faking interest, by false "constructive
criticism". To his slow forming army, he recruits the
media, the flower children, the bleeding hearts, reformers,
dissidents and the occasional freak. By holding old
authority in disdain, by declaring his contempt for the
methods of the "tried and true", by appearing to make war
upon all rot and immorality - this creature of expediency
emerges as a folk hero. It is the more cynical and world
weary and "sophisticated" members of society that lead
the way, succumbing to his ardour and conviction, to his
child-like innocence, to his unwavering agenda. He
cleverly thrusts at them the double edge of their own
disillusionment and disappointment. Thus mirrored, they
are transformed and converted into his camp of renewal
and clean promises by this epiphany. They hand him the
keys to every medium, the very codes and secrets that
make him so powerful. They pledge their alliance and
allegiance and render to him the access they possess to the
nerve centres of society. The castle gates thus opened
from inside, his victory assured, the rogue moves on to
consummate this unholy marriage between himself and
the deceived.

Always in fear of light, he surreptitiously and cunningly
begins to interact with the foci of power and money in the
land. However loathsome he is to them, however
repulsive the experience, however undesirable the effects
of their surrender - they are made to recognize him as
their equal. With the might of the media and a large part
of the people behind him, he can no longer be ignored.

Their conspiracy-prone mind, awash with superstitions
and its attaching phobias, tries to comprehend his
meteoric rise, the forcefulness with which he treads, his
unmitigated, inane, self confidence. Is he a spy? A
member of a secret order? The latent agent of a
hyperpower? The heart of a world conspiracy? Has he no
fear of retribution and no remorse? Before this great
unknown, they kneel and yield, an atavistic reaction to
atavistic fears. Now all doors are thrown open, all deals
are made available, all secrets are revealed. The more he
learns, the mightier he becomes - the more his might, the
more he learns. To him, a virtuous cycle, to his hosts - a
vicious one.

In all this tumult, he does not lose sight of his original
goals - power, money, fame, all three. It is a relentless
pursuit, an obsessive hunt, a ruthless and unscrupulous
chase. In his war, no prisoners are taken, no price too
dear, no human in his orbit left untouched. He will
manipulate and threat and beg and promise and plead and
blackmail and extort to accomplish that which he set out
to achieve: decision making powers, wealth, clout,
exposure and resultant fame. It is at this stage that the
latter day Rasputin emerges from the shadows and joins
officialdom or concludes lucrative transactions based on
favourably deflated prices and insider dealing. By now,
his shady past is no longer a hindrance. His prowess far
exceeds his invidious biography. Well installed, he
ignores both media and the people. He brushes aside
contemptuously all criticism and enquiry. His true,
narcissistic, face is exposed and it is hideous to behold.

But there is nothing to be done and all resistance is futile.

The con-man now is in a haste to maximize his hard
earned profits and exit the scene, on his way to another
realm of guile and naivet.



XLVIX. The Eureka Connection

How East and Central Europeans Defraud the Gullible West


A common, guttural cry of "Eureka" echoed as the
peoples of East Europe and the Balkan emerged from the
Communist steam bath. It was at once an expression of
joy and disbelief. That the West should be willing to
bankroll the unravelling of a failed social experiment,
freely entered into, exceeded the wildest imaginings. That
it would do so indefinitely and with no strings attached
was a downright outlandish fortuity.

Transition in the post communist countries was coupled
with a hubristic and haughty conviction in the
transforming powers of the Western values, Western
technology, and Western economics. The natives - awe
struck and grateful - were supposed to assimilate these
endowments and thus become honorary Westerners
("white men"). Where osmosis and immitation failed -
bayonets and bombs were called upon. These were later
replaced by soft credits and economic micromanagement
by a host of multilateral institutions.

Accustomed to Pavolvian interactions, adept at
manipulating "the system", experts in all manner of make
belief - the shrewd denizens of the East exercised the
reflexive levers of the Great Democracies. They adopted
stratagems whose sole purpose was to extract additional
aid, to foster a dependency of giving, to emotionally
extort. In one sentence: they learned how to corrupt the
donors.

The most obvious subterfuge involved the mindless
repetition of imported mantras. Possessed of the same
glazed eyes and furled lips, the loyal members of a
perfidious nomenklatura uttered with the same seemingly
perfervid conviction the catechism of a new religion.

Yesterday communism - today capitalism, unblushingly,
unhesitatingly, cynically. Yesterday, a recondite
dictatorship of the proletariat or, more often, a personality
cult - today "democracy". Yesterday - brotherhood and
unity, today - genocidal "self determination". Yesterday -
genocidal inclinations, today - a "growth and stability
pact". If required to bark in the nude in order to secure the
flow of unsupervised funding (mainly to their pockets),
these besuited "gentlemen" would have done so with self-
sacrificial ardour, no doubt.

When it dawned upon them that the West is willing to pay
for every phase of self-betterment, for every stage of self-
improvement, for every functioning institution and law
passed - this venal class (the soi-disant "elite" in
government, in industry and academe) embarked on a
gargantuan blackmail plot. The inventors of the most
contorted and impervious bureaucracies ever, have
recreated them. They have transformed the simplest tasks
of reform into tortuous, hellish processes, mired in a
miasma of numerous committees and deluged by cavils,
captious "working" papers and memoranda of stupefying
trumpery. They have stalled and retraced, reversed and
regressed, opined and debated, refused and accepted
grudgingly. The very processes of transformation and
transition - a simulacrum to begin with - acquired an  aura
of somnolent lassitude and the nightmarish quality of
ensnarement. And they made the West bribe them into
yielding that which was ostensibly in their very own
interest. Every act of legislation was preceded and
followed by dollops of foreign cash. Every ministry
abolished was conditioned upon more aid. Every court
established, every bloodletting firm privatized, every bank
sold, every system made more efficient, every procedure
simplified, every tender concluded and every foreign
investor spared - had a tariff. "Pay or else ..." was the
overt message - and the West preferred to pay and to
appease, as it has always done.

The money lavished on these "new democracies" was
routed rather conspicuously into the private bank accounts
of the thin layer of vituperable "leaders", "academics" and
"businessmen" (often the same people). One third
cigarette smugglers, one third uncommon criminals and
one third cynical con-artists, these people looted the
coffers of their states. The IMF - this sanctuary of fourth
rate economists from third world countries, as I am never
wont of mentioning - collaborated with the US
government, the European Union and the World Bank in
covering up this stark reality. They turned a common
blind eye to the diversion of billions in aid and credits to
mysterious bank accounts in dubious tax havens. They
ignored fake trading deals, itinerant investment houses,
shady investors and shoddy accounting. They expressed
merely polite concern over blatant cronyism and rampant
nepotism. They kept pouring money into the rapidly
growing black hole that Eastern Europe and the Balkan
have become. They pretended not to know and feigned
surprise when confronted with the facts. In their
complicity, they have encouraged the emergence of a
criminal class of unprecedented proportions, hold and
penetration in many of the countries within their remit.

To qualify to participate in this grand larceny, one needed
only to have a "sovereign" "state". Sovereign states are
entitled to hold shares in multilateral financial institutions
and to receive international aid and credits. In other
words: sovereignty is the key to instant riches. The
unregenerate skulks that pass for political parties in many
countries in East Europe and the Balkan (though not in all
of them - there are exceptions), carved up the territory.

This led to a suspicious proliferation of "republics", each
with its own access to international funds. It also led to
"wars" among these emergent entities.

Recent revelations regarding the close and cordial co-
operation between Croatia's late president, Franjo
Tudjman and Yugoslavia's current strongman, Slobodan
Milosevic - ostensibly, bitter enemies - expose the role
that warfare and instability played in increasing the flow
of aid (both civil and military) to belligerent countries.

The more unstable the region, the more ominous its
rhetoric, the more fractured its geopolitics - the more
money flowed in. It was the right kind of money:
multilateral - not multinational, public - not private,
deliberately ignorant - not judiciously cognizant. It was
the "quantum fund" - capable of "tunnelling" (as the
Czechs called it) - vanishing in one place (the public
purse) and appearing in another (the private wallet)
simultaneously. Even the exception - the never-enforced
sanctions against Yugoslavia - served to enrich its
cankerous ruling class by way of smuggling and
monopolies.

And why did the West collaborate in this charade? Why
did it compromise its goodwill, its carefully crafted
institutions, its principles and ethos? The short and the
long of it is: to get rid of a nuisance at a minimal cost. It is
much cheaper to grease the palms of a deciding few - than
to embark on the winding path of true and painful growth.

It is more convenient to co-opt a political leader than to
confront an angry mob. It is by far easier to throw money
at a problem than to solve it.

It was not a sinister conspiracy of the Great Powers as
many would have it. Nor was it the result of foresight,
insight, perspicacity, or planning. It was a typical
improvident European default, adopted by a succession of
lacklustre and lame American administrations. It enriched
the few and impoverished the many. It fostered anti-
Western sentiments. It provoked skirmishes that provoked
wars that led to massacres. To reverse it would require
more resources than should have been committed in the
first place. These are not forthcoming. The West is again
misleading and deceiving and collaborating to defraud the
peoples of these unfortunate netherlands. It again
promises prosperity it cannot deliver, growth it will not
guarantee and stability it cannot ensure. This
prestidigitation is bound to lead to ever larger bills and to
the attrition of good will of both donor and recipient.

Never before was such a unique historical opportunity so
thoroughly missed. The consequences may well be as
unprecedented.



L.  The Treasure Trove of Kosovo

Nothing like a juicy, photogenic human catastrophe to
enrich corrupt politicians and bottom-line-orientated,
stock-option-motivated corporate executives. The Balkan
is teeming with both these sad days.

Even as the war was raging, shortages of food and other
supplies led to the dispensation of political favours (in the
form of import licences, for instance) to the chosen few.

Bulgarian, Greek and Albanian firms, owned by ruthless
criminals and criminals-turned-politicians benefited
mightily. Millions were made and shared as artificially
high prices were maintained by various means while
cronies and crime controlled firms shared the spoils. This
orgiastic intercourse between the corrupt and the criminal
was not confined to one country. The whole region
partook in robbing the most impoverished populations in
Europe by "legal" means.

Their more refined and perfumed Western brethren were
never far behind in taking advantage of American largesse
on the one hand and re-emerging alarmist tendencies, on
the other. Thus, American, German, Greek, French and
Italian firms enjoyed funds allocated to international
humanitarian aid by the likes of the US government, the
United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF and other long
arms of the American octopus. Defence contractors and
the dubious characters known as weapons intermediaries
stoked the atavistic fires of war in securing defence
contracts. And aid workers resided in six star hotels,
driving the latest sports utility vehicles and brandishing
futuristic laptop computers as they went about the
business of dispensing aid. In the meantime, at least one
half of all aid money was pilfered - not to use a harsher
term. Aid rations were freely available in Macedonian,
Albanian, Greek and Bulgarian markets - offered at a
discount by aid workers who stole them from their
supposed recipients. The refugees were never given
mattresses, were short of blankets, water, showers and
toilets (I visited the camps - this is an eyewitness
account). Only bread was abundant.

Now that the war is over, some people are counting their
dead - while others are counting their blessings. But this
has all been a prelude. It is the next wave of aid which is
the main course in this bacchanalia. Outlandishly feverish
numbers are tossed around. Kosovo's immediate
reconstruction (housing and infrastructure) will require
well over 2 billion US dollars in the next 2 years. Of this,
1.5 billion dollars has already been raised. A further 2
billion USD is slated as direct aid to the shattered
economies of Macedonia and Albania. But the real booty
lies in Serbia. A minimum of 10-13 billion dollars will be
required simply to restore Serbia's infrastructure to its
former, inglorious self. To resuscitate the whole
languishing area, a staggering 30 billion dollars is touted
as the minimal bill.

Rest assured that at least one third of this generous
cornucopia will end up lining the pockets of the rich and
mighty. At least 1 billion dollars will end up festering in
Swiss, Cypriot, South African and Israeli bank accounts.

The politicians know it, the "grupirovki" (business cartels
controlled by mafia-style organizations) know it, Western
governments know it. This is the REAL stability pact.

Financially inebriated politicians are better motivated to
maintain peace and stability, or so the thinking goes.

The history of the Balkans will play a major role in
determining the topography and geography of this flood
of cronyism, nepotism, criminality and vice. The Balkan
is composed of states run by crime organizations and
crime organizations run by states. Old alliances last long
(as opposed to the Middle East where alliances, dune-like,
shift with the winds). Bulgaria and Macedonia, for
instance. Serbia and Greece. Albania and Kosovo. And
now Albania and Macedonia. Meetings of regional
"leaders" in the Balkans were always reminiscent of
scenes from "The Godfather". The dons, uncomfortably
clad in expensive business suits and wearing golden rings,
deciding life and death and a jovial yet vaguely menacing
atmosphere. Only the leaders of the New Balkans are
much younger, less experienced, more prone to
superstition, extremism and moodiness. The old tension
are bound to re-emerge, this time in the employ of
business interests. Expect a flare up of animosity between
Greece and Macedonia. Despite its Bulgarophile regime,
expect uneasy moments between Bulgaria and Macedonia.

And expect an unholy alliance of business interests
between Mr. Thaci and his sprawling business empire and
the governments of Albania and Macedonia. If not
assassinated before, Thaci is definitely the Man to watch.

Young, well educated, ruthless, involved in business
(read: corrupt to the core) - an aptly dangerous man in
dangerous times.

The problem is that everyone hold high expectations. This
is a poor recipe for an amicable carving of the cake of
international funding. Macedonia expects to lead the
reconstruction effort of Kosovo. It was offended greatly
by the decision to base the Kosovo reconstruction agency
in Pristina. Greek and Italian firms expect to snatch profits
out of the jaws of their near treacherous behaviour during
the war. Turkish firms except to be rewarded for the
loyalty of Turkey during the same. American and German
firms expect to exclude all else in gaining access to
American and German (=EU) funds (as they have done in
Bosnia). These all are mutually incompatible expectations
and they will lead to mutually exclusive behaviour.

Expect some very ugly scenes, including spilt doses of
this cheap, red liquid, blood.

Albania, already governed by the ungovernable crime
gangs it spawned in the last few years, has formed an
alliance with the KLA, never a moral standard-bearer.

This expanded amusement park of drug trafficking,
prostitution, weapons smuggling, contraband and much
worse is now threatening to take over its more virtuous
(though by no means virginal) neighbour, Macedonia. A
flare up of hitherto unimaginable brotherly love has
indicated this sacrilegious rapprochement. The
Macedonian Prime Minister - encumbered by a
demanding Albanian coalition partner - has met Thaci and
the encounter had all the trappings of a state visit. Soon
after senior albanian politicians started talking about a
Macedonian recognition of an independent state of
Kosovo and an Albanian language university (the reason
for student riots just two years before).

To a large extent, the Kosovo war was a gang warfare.

The Serb criminal organization known as Yugoslavia
against the Albanian gang known as the KLA. It was a
war over turf and lucrative businesses. In what used to be
the Third World and moreso in the post-communist
countries in transition, criminal activities often
accompany "wars of liberation". In Congo, in Sierra
Leone, in Chechnyia, in Kashmir - wars are as much
about diamonds, oil and opium poppies as about national
aspirations. Kosovo is no exception but it was here that
the West was duped into intervention. NATO was called
upon to arbiter between two crime gangs. There is no end
to the mischievous irony of history.

Perhaps the following incidents are more telling than any
learned analysis:
In late April, the Albanian telecom switched off the
roaming facility of cell phones in Albania. Foreigners -
including aid workers - had to pay the company 1000
dollars for a special roaming-enabled chip.

Rumour has it that the post of the Chief of Police in the
Tirana Airport was "sold" at the beginning of April for an
undisclosed amount (presumably 250,000 US dollars).

The reasons: all shippers (including NATO and aid
organizations) have to pay enormous kickbacks to airport
and customs officials to release their goods.

Most Albanian families charged refugee families an
average of 500 DM a month for their accommodation in
subhuman conditions. Refugees who could not pay (or
who had no relatives in Germany and Switzerland to pay
for them) were evicted, often cruelly.

As Serbs were murdering their supposed brothers in
Kosovo, Albanian crime gangs laid an oil pipeline
(through Lake Shkoder) to Serbia and supplied the Serb
army with the oil it was deprived of by NATO.

Welcome to the Balkans.



LI.  Milosevic's Treasure Island


Milosevic and his cronies stand accused of plundering
Serbia's wealth - both pecuniary and natural. Yet, the
media tends to confuse three modes of action with two
diametrically opposed goals. There was state sanctioned
capital flight. Gold and foreign exchange were smuggled
out of Yugoslavia and deposited in other countries. This
was meant to provide a cushion against embargo and
sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia by the West.

The scale of these operations has been wildly over-
estimated at 4 billion US dollars. A figure half as big is
more reasonable. Most of the money was used
legitimately, to finance the purchase of food, medicines,
and energy products. Yugoslavia would have frozen to
death had its leaders not have the foresight to act as they
did.

This had nothing to do with party officials, cronies, and
their family members enriching themselves by "diverting"
export proceeds and commodities into private accounts in
foreign lands. The culprits often disguised these acts of
plunder as sanctions-busting operations. Hence the
confusion.

Thirdly, members of the establishment and their relatives
were allowed to run lucrative smuggling and black market
operations fuelled by cheap credits coerced out of the
dilapidated and politicised "banking" system.

As early as 1987, a network of off-shore bank accounts
and holding companies was established by Serbia's
Communist party and, later, by Yugoslavia. This frantic
groping for alternatives reached a peak during 1989 and
1991 and after 1992 when accounts were opened in
Cyprus, Israel, Greece, and Switzerland and virtually all
major Yugoslav firms opened Cypriot subsidiaries or
holding structures. Starting in 1991, the Central Bank's
gold (and a small part of the foreign exchange reserves)
were deposited in Switzerland (mainly in Zurich). A
company by the name of "Metalurski Kombinat
Smederevo - MKS" (renamed "Sartid" after its bogus
privatisation) was instrumental in this through its MKS
Zurich subsidiary. MKS was a giant complex of metal
processing factories, headed by a former Minister of
Industry and a Milosevic loyalist, Dusko Matkovic. The
latter also served as deputy chairman of Milosevic's party.

The lines between party, state and personal fortunes
blurred fast. Small banking institutions were established
everywhere, even in London (the AY Bank) and
conducted operations throughout the world. They were
owned by bogus shareholders, out of the reach of the
international sanctions regime.

When UN sanctions were imposed in stages (1992-5), the
state made sure its export proceeds were out of harm's
way and never in sanctions-bound UK and USA banks.

The main financial agent was "Beogradska Banka" and its
branch in Novi Sad. In a series of complex transactions
involving foreign exchange trades, smuggled privatisation
proceeds, and inflated import invoices, it was able to stash
away hundreds of millions of dollars. This money was
used to finance imports and defray the exorbitant
commissions, fees, and costs charged by numerous
intermediaries. Yugoslavia (and the regime) had no choice
- it was either that or starvation, freezing and explosive
social discontent.

Concurrently, a massive and deeply criminalized web of
smuggling, illegal (customs-exempt) imports, bribe and
corruption has stifled all legal manufacturing and
commerce activities. Cigarettes through Montenegro,
alcohol and oil through Romania, petrol, other goods
(finished and semi-finished) and raw materials from
Greece through the Vardar river (Macedonia), absolutely
everything through Croatia, drugs from Turkey (and
Afghanistan). UN personnel happily colluded and
collaborated - for a fee, of course. The export of
commodities - such as grain or precious metals (gold,
even Uranium) - was granted in monopoly to Milosevic
stalwarts. These were vast fiefdoms controlled by a few
prominent "families" and Milosevic favourites. It was also
immensely lucrative. Even minor figures were able to
deposit millions of US dollars in their Russian, Cypriot,
Lebanese, Greek, Austrian, Swiss, and South African
accounts. The regime leaned heavily on Yugoslav banks
to finance these new rich with cheap, soft, and often non-
returnable, credits. These were often used to speculate in
the frenetic informal foreign exchange markets for
immediate windfalls.

The new Yugoslav authorities are likely to be deeply
frustrated and disappointed. Most of the money was
expended on essentials for the population. The personal
fortunes made are tiny by comparison and well-shielded
in off-shore banking havens. Milosevic himself has almost
nothing to his name. His son and daughter may constitute
richer pickings but not by much. The hunt for the
Milosevic treasure is bound to be an expensive, futile
undertaking.



LII.  Macedonia's Augean Stables,

or: Don't Hurry to Invest in Macedonia


In the near past, Macedonia seemed to have been bent on
breaking its own record of surrealism. While politicians in
other countries in transition from communism and
socialism strive to be noticed for not stealing, their
Macedonian counterparts, without a single exception, aim
to steal without being noticed.

The previous VMRO-DPMNE government (1999-2002),
in which Nikola Gruevski, the current Prime Minister,
served as Minister of Finance, plundered the country
shamelessly. The local papers accused then outgoing
prime minister, Ljubco Georgievski - a virtual pauper
when he attained power - of owning land and a residential
building in the capital's most expensive neighborhood.

The erstwhile Minister of Defense, Ljuben Paunovski,
was recently sentenced to 42 months in prison for his
pecuniary shenanigans during his tenure. Another leading
figure, the former Minister of interior, Ljube Boskovski, is
in the dock in the Hague on war crime charges.

Inevitably, VMRO-DPMNE lost power to the SDSM in
the heated elections of 2002 and then fractured as its new
leader, Gruevski, purged the old guard and installed his
own cohorts everywhere.

Then prime minister designate, Branko Crvnkovski (the
country's current President whose legitimacy is contested
by the Gruevski government), vowed to learn from his
party's (SDSM) past mistakes when they venally ruled the
land until 1998. In a sudden and politically-motivated
resurrection, the high court began scrutinizing the "Okta"
deal: the opaque sale of the country's loss-making refinery
to the Greeks in 1999. Heads will roll, promised both the
election victors (the SDSM) and their Western sponsors.

Nothing happened.

The country's current Governor of the Central bank and
then minister of finance, Petar Goshev, a former socialist
high-level functionary known for his integrity, announced
that his top priority would be to eradicate corruption by
instituting structural and legal reforms. His newfound
socialist partners - he headed a center-right outfit - found
this bizarre ardor unpalatable and promptly kicked him
out of office.

Four years later, with Georgievski relegated to the
political wasteland, Crvnkovski ensconced in the
presidential suite, and his successor, Buckovski a
resounding failure, Gruevski's ascent in 2006 was all but
secure. It was the SDSM's turn to crumble acrimoniously
amid a virulent contest for its leadership. It has never
recovered and Macedonia has had no viable opposition
ever since.

Macedonia's post-electoral euphoria faded, in July 2006,
into arduous coalition-building negotiations replete with
arm-twisting by the worried representatives of the
"international community".

The country's new VMRO-DPMNE Prime Minister,
Nikola Gruevski (36), excluded from his government the
party that won the majority of Albanian votes because of
its roots in the much-hated Albanian NLA, National
Liberation Army, the instigator of the 2001 near-civil-war.

Albanian factions clashed in a chilling reminder of the
country's inter-ethnic fragility.

To add to Macedonia's precarious standing, its greenhorn
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antonio Milososki, engaged
in intermittent - and utterly avoidable - spats with its
neighbor and biggest foreign investor, Greece, virtually
guarantee delayed accession to both NATO and the
European Union, the much ballyhooed strategic goals of
the current administration. Milososki adopted a similarly
belligerent and ill-informed stance against Bulgaria,
another flanking polity and the newest member of the
coveted European club.

Where the government claims great strides is in its
uncompromising stance against all forms of malfeasance
and delinquency in both the public and the private sectors.

From the army to various municipalities, scandals erupt
daily in an atmosphere often bordering on a frenzied,
media saturated, witch-hunt.

Gruevski is alleged to have rejected a bribe of 3 million
euros (c. 4 million USD) offered to him by a Serb firm.

His government embarked on highly publicized
campaigns against illegal construction (the "urban mafia")
and other festering nests of corruption.

Alas, Gruevski himself appointed members of his family
and innumerable political hacks to senior government
positions in a series of blatant acts of nepotism and
cronyism decried by the European Union and other
watchdogs. Consequently, with one exception (Zoran
Stavreski, the talented vice-premier), the government in
all echelons is largely made up of utterly inexperienced
operators. Plus ca change.

Politics, venality, and terrorism are the sole venues of
social mobility in this tiny, landlocked, country of 2
million impoverished people. Immediately following their
insurgency, the former terrorists of the Albanian National
Liberation - courtesy of Western pressure and the
Albanian voters - occupied crucial ministries with
lucrative opportunities of patronage of which they are
rumored to have availed themselves abundantly.

Comic relief is often provided by bumbling NGOs, such
as the International Crisis Group. In 2001, its
representative in Macedonia, Edward Joseph, went to
Prilep to conduct an impromptu investigation of the
thriving cigarette smuggling trade. Posing to the cameras
he declared that only the local leaf-rolling plant was not
involved in this pernicious line of work.

Macedonia is a hub of expats and consultants in the
Balkans. Ante Markovic, an Austria-based former
Yugoslav prime minister, who served as an oft-criticized
economic advisor to the government until he was dumped,
sued Macedonia for $1 million. In 2001-3, the youthful
former minister of finance, Nikola Gruevski, was asked
by USAID, on behalf of the Serbian-Montenegrin
government, to serve as its consultant on matters of
reform of the financial system. The author of this article
acted as Economic Advisor to Georgievski's government
and, later, to Gruevski himself.

But to no avail. The country is a shambles. In the wake of
a civil war, the official unemployment rate is 31-35
percent. Close to 70,000 people work in the bloated
central and local administrations. The trade deficit is an
unparalleled 17 percent of GDP. In 2001, the budget
deficit climbed to 5 percent, though it was since halved.
"The Heritage Foundation" has consistently ranked
Macedonia 95-97 out of 155 countries in terms of
economic freedom. The country is "mostly unfree" it
correctly concludes in its reports, though it cites
sometimes erroneous data. A moderate level of trade
protectionism, low tax rates, moderate inflation, a
moderate burden of the government, moderate barriers to
capital flows and foreign investment, and moderate
interference in the economy are offset by a dysfunctional
banking system, intervention in wages and prices, low
level of protection of property, a high level of regulation,
and a very high level of activity of the black market.

Owing to the IMF's misguided emphasis on exchange rate
stability, the currency is inanely overvalued. The
manufacturing sector has all but evaporated. Industrial
production declined by a vertiginous 20 percent in August
2002 compared to the average the year before - or by 11
percent year on year. The trend has not been reversed
since.

Macedonian steel is exempt from the latest bout of
American protectionism, but not so its textile industry.

Europe is fending off the country's agricultural products.

People make their meager and desultory living catering to
the needs of an ever-expanding international presence or
dabbling in illicit activities. Piracy of intellectual property,
for instance, is thought to yield c. 1 percent of GDP.

Close to half the population is under the poverty line. The
number of welfare cases increased by 70 percent between
1994 and 2002. Generous and incessant multilateral and
bilateral credits sustain the faltering economy (and line
politicians' ever-deepening pockets). The country is
alternately buffeted by floods and droughts. There has
been only one day of rain in all of January 2007.

In a much-touted donor conference after the 2001
skirmishes, the pledges amounted to a whopping 15
percent of GDP. Then governor of the central bank, Ljube
Trpski (currently detained for his role in a murky affair
involving the country's foreign exchange reserves),
cheerfully predicted that these handouts will cover the
gaping hole in the balance of payments.

Macedonia also received 7.5 percent of the gold reserves
of the former federated Yugoslavia of which it was a
component. At between $700 million and one billion USD
net, foreign exchange reserves are at an all-time high.

Macedonia has recently decided to prepay its $104 million
debt to the Paris Club creditors.

Both the IMF and the World Bank, who did their best to
obstruct the previous VMRO-DPMNE government in its
last few months in power, promised a speedy return to
business as usual. An hitherto elusive standby
arrangement is likely to be concluded by the end of the
year. World Bank funds, frozen in material breach of its
written contracts with the state, will flow again. The EU
promised development funds if the new government acts
in a "European spirit" - i.e., obeys the diktats of Brussels.

The incoming administration is likely to enjoy a period of
grace with both the trade unions and international
creditors. Strikes and demonstrations by dispossessed
miners and underpaid railways workers have waned. But
Macedonia joined the WTO in 2002 and will thus be
forced to open even more to devastating competition.

Labor unrest is likely to re-erupt soon.

Foreign investment in the country mysteriously wanes and
waxes - some of it laundered money reinvested in
legitimate businesses. The government is doing a great job
of building up the image of Macedonia as an FDI (Foreign
Direct Investment) destination. But public relations and
perceptions management must be followed by palpable
actions and the new government is woefully short on
concrete steps. It talks the talk but hitherto does not walk
the walk.

The government's attempts to attract foreign investors by
introducing lower taxes may backfire: studies clearly
evince that multinationals worry less about taxation and
more about functioning institutions, a commodity that
Macedonia is irreparably short of. Moreover, vanishingly
lower taxes signal desperation and Macedonia indeed
sounds more desperate than confident. No one wants to
buy the country's leading bank, long on offer. Only one
contender (Mobilkom Austria) entered a bid for
Macedonia's third operator cellular network licence.

On a few occasions, domestic firms, using international
fronts, have bid for local factories, such as the textile plant
"Astibo". The national payment card project has been
guzzled by two banks incestuously close to the outgoing
ruling party, VMRO-DPMNE.

But there are real investments, too. The capital's central
heating utility was purchased by a unidentified French
energy outfit, announced the general manager. The
utility's shares were listed in the Athens stock exchange.

The Macedonian construction firm "Granit" will build a
$59 million highway in Ukraine, with which Macedonia
enjoyed an unusually cordial relationship, to American
chagrin. Johnson Controls and others are eying a string of
free trade zones and infrastructure projects (dams, roads,
railways, oil pipeline). A much hyped Vardar Silicone
Valley is in the works.

The contentious census in the first two weeks of
November 2002, a part of the "Ohrid Framework
Agreement" which ended the internecine fighting the year
before, was conducted fairly. The count showed that
Albanians make c. one quarter of the population rather
than one third, as most Albanians spuriously insisted.

But, with Kosovo's independence looming across the
border, the restive Albanians are likely to coerce the
enfeebled Macedonia into translating this numerical
reality into political and economic clout. The
Macedonians are likely to resist. The West will intervene.

Macedonia is facing a hot spring and a sizzling summer.



LIII. The Macedonian Lottery


Every conflict has its economic moments and dimensions.

The current conflict in Macedonia perhaps even more so.

The USA and its Western allies regard Macedonia as a
bridge between Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Albania.

Hence the EU's plans for the revival of transport corridors
8 and 10 connecting these countries. If all goes well (and
nothing has hitherto), railways will connect Bulgaria to
Macedonia and river traffic will flow to Serbia from its
southern neighbours. All this is envisioned in the Stability
Pact. There are talks of an oil pipeline across Macedonia's
territory. A pacified Macedonia is fairly crucial to Serbia's
recovery and to the prospects of the whole region to
attract FDI.

NATO is afraid of Turkish-Greek clashes in the aftermath
of Kosovo and Macedonia. Turkey has increasingly cast
itself in its ancient role of "protector of the Balkan
Muslims". Greece is the only Orthodox-Christian member
of the EU and an old foe of the erstwhile Sick Man of
Europe from which it won bloody independence at the
beginning of the 19th century. Such clashes are likely to
destabilize the southern flank of NATO and block the
West's access to Iraq, the Middle East, oil-rich Central
Asia, and northern China. This will seriously dent the new
"Pacific and Middle East Orientations" of the Bush
Administration.

And what about the actual combatants?
Albanians and Macedonian crime gangs (in cahoots with
kleptocratic and venal local politicians) regard Macedonia
as a vital route for drugs, stolen cars, smuggled cigarettes
and soft drinks, illegal immigrants, white slavery, and
weapons dealing. These criminal activities far outweigh
the GDP of all the adversary states combined. This
conflict is about controlling territory and the economic
benefits attendant to such control.

Crime and war provide employment, status, regular
income, perks, and livelihood to many denizens of
Macedonia, Albania, and Bulgaria. They constitute an
outlet for entrepreneurship, however perverted. Fighting
for the cause and smuggling often means travel abroad
(for instance, on fund raising missions), five star
accommodation, and a lavish lifestyle. It also translates
into powers of patronage and excesses of self-enrichment.

Moreover, in ossified, socially stratified, ethnically
polarized, and economically impoverished societies, war
and crime engender social mobility. The likes of Hashim
Thaci, Ramush Harajdini, and Ali Ahmeti often start as
rebels and end as part of the cosseted establishment. Many
a criminal dabble in politics and business.

Hence the tenacity of both phenomena. Hence the bleak
and pessimistic outlook for this region. The "formal"
economies simply cannot compete. Jobs are not created,
the educated are often bitterly idle, salaries are minuscule
if paid at all, the future is past. Crime and politics (one
and the same in the Balkan) are alluring alternatives.

Moreover, the NLA and its political successor DUI is not
a monolithic entity. It is more like an umbrella
organization with serious and fracturing differences of
opinion regarding the ultimate goals of the insurrection
four years ago (2001) and the means to obtain these goals.

Roughly, NLA was made up of one third veteran Kosovo
fighters, some of them professional soldiers, who also
fought in Croatia, or in the Foreign Legion. These people
are bitter and disgruntled by what they see as the betrayal
of the West in refusing to guarantee an independent
Kosovo and the failure of the current Kosovar leadership
to integrate them economically into the emerging polity
there. Their motives for joining the fighting in Macedonia
were part emotional and part pecuniary.

Another third was made of unemployed, young Albanians,
mainly from Macedonia itself. Their fighting is self-
interested. They get a monthly salary and perks and,
lacking education and skills, they don't have much of a
choice outside the killing fields.

The rest are diehard, hardcore, idealists who either
fervently espouse a Great Albania, or would like to take
over Western Macedonian in a "constitutional coup"
which will grant them their own police force,
municipalities, institutions, universities, budgets, and
semi-political structures.

The NLA itself was not directly involved in criminal
activities, though a few of its members are. But the money
that financed it (from the Czech Republic, Switzerland,
Germany, and the USA) is tainted by drug dealing, white
slavery, illegal immigration, and the smuggling of
everything illicit, from cigarettes to stolen cars, to
weapons. In this they collaborate with politicians and
criminals in Macedonia - both Albanian and Macedonian.

Being a politician in the Balkan is an extremely lucrative
proposition. Both Albanian and Macedonian politicians
will abandon the peace process if they believe it leads to
electoral ruin. Given the current atmosphere, it pays to be
a pacifist. Virulent nationalism is a guaranteed vote
loser. But every re-election ticket still requires a modicum
of xenophobia, ethnic exclusivity, and radicalism. Here
lies the future.



LIV.  Crime Fighting Computer Systems and Databases

As crime globalizes, so does crime fighting. Mobsters,
serial killers, and terrorists cross state lines and borders
effortlessly, making use of the latest advances in mass
media, public transportation, telecommunications, and
computer networks. The police - there are 16,000 law
enforcement agencies in the Unites States alone - is never
very far behind.

Quotes from the official Web pages of some of these
databases:
National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime
(NCAVC)
Its mission is to combine investigative and operational
support functions, research, and training in order to
provide assistance, without charge, to federal, state, local,
and foreign law enforcement agencies investigating
unusual or repetitive violent crimes. The NCAVC also
provides support through expertise and consultation in
non-violent matters such as national security, corruption,
and white-collar crime investigations.

It comprises the Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU), Child
Abduction and Serial Murder Investigative Resources
Center (CASMIRC), and Violent Criminal
Apprehension Program (VICAP).

VICAP is a nationwide data information center designed
to collect, collate, and analyze crimes of violence -
specifically murder. It collates and analyzes the
significant characteristics of all murders, and other violent
offenses.

Homicide Investigation Tracking System (HITS)
A program within the Washington state's Attorney
General's Office that tracks and investigates homicides
and rapes.

Violent Crime Linkage System (ViCLAS)
Canada-wide computer system that assists specially
trained investigators to identify serial crimes and
criminals by focusing on the linkages that exist among
crimes by the same offender. This system was developed
by the RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police) in the
early 1990s.

UTAP, stands for The Utah Criminal Tracking and
Analysis Project
Gathers experts from forensic science, crime scene
analysis, psychiatry and other fields to screen unsolved
cases for local law enforcement agencies.

International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO) -
Interpol's DNA Gateway
Provides for the transfer of profile data between two or
more countries and for the comparison of profiles that
conform to Interpol standards in a centralized database.

Investigators can access the database via their Interpol
National Central Bureau (NCB) using Interpol's secure
global police communications system, I-24/7.

Interpol's I-24/7
Global communication system to connect its member
countries and provide them with user-friendly access to
police information. Using this system, Interpol National
Central Bureaus (NCBs) can search and cross-check data
in a matter of seconds, with direct and immediate access
to databases containing critical information (ASF
Nominal database of international criminals, electronic
notices, stolen motor vehicles, stolen/lost/counterfeit
travel and ID documents, stolen works of art, payment
cards, fingerprints and photographs, a terrorism watch list,
a DNA database, disaster victim identification,
international weapons tracking and trafficking in human
beings-related information, etc).

Interpol Fingerprints
Provides information on the development and
implementation of fingerprinting systems for the general
public and international law enforcement entities.

Europol (European Union's criminal intelligence
agency) Computer System (TECS)
Member States can directly input data into the information
system in compliance with their national procedures, and
Europol can directly input data supplied by non EU
Member States and third bodies. Also provides analyses
and indexing services.
http://www.atg.wa.gov/hits/index.shtml
http://www.mass.gov/msp/unitpage/vicap.htm
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/isd/cirg/ncavc.htm
http://www.rcmp.ca/techops/viclas_e.htm
http://www.justicejunction.com/innocence_lost_ian_wing
_utap.htm
http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/FactSheets/fsADN20
0501.asp
http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/FactSheets/i247.asp
http://www.europol.eu.int/index.asp?page=facts

T H E   A U T H O R


SHMUEL (SAM) VAKNIN

Curriculum Vitae
Click on blue text to access relevant web sites - thank
you.

Born in 1961 in Qiryat-Yam, Israel.

Served in the Israeli Defence Force (1979-1982) in
training and education units.

Education
Completed a few semesters in the Technion - Israel
Institute of Technology, Haifa.

Ph.D. in Philosophy (major: Philosophy of Physics) -
Pacific Western University, California, USA.

Graduate of numerous courses in Finance Theory and
International Trading.

Certified E-Commerce Concepts Analyst by Brainbench.

Certified in Psychological Counselling Techniques by
Brainbench.

Certified Financial Analyst by Brainbench.

Full proficiency in Hebrew and in English.

Business Experience
1980 to 1983
Founder and co-owner of a chain of computerised
information kiosks in Tel-Aviv, Israel.
1982 to 1985
Senior positions with the Nessim D. Gaon Group of
Companies in Geneva, Paris and New-York (NOGA and
APROFIM SA):
- Chief Analyst of Edible Commodities in the Group's
Headquarters in Switzerland
- Manager of the Research and Analysis Division
- Manager of the Data Processing Division
- Project Manager of the Nigerian Computerised Census
- Vice President in charge of RND and Advanced
Technologies
- Vice President in charge of Sovereign Debt Financing
1985 to 1986
Represented Canadian Venture Capital Funds in Israel.
1986 to 1987
General Manager of IPE Ltd. in London. The firm
financed international multi-lateral countertrade and
leasing transactions.
1988 to 1990
Co-founder and Director of "Mikbats-Tesuah", a portfolio
management firm based in Tel-Aviv.

Activities included large-scale portfolio management,
underwriting, forex trading and general financial advisory
services.
1990 to Present
Freelance consultant to many of Israel's Blue-Chip firms,
mainly on issues related to the capital markets in Israel,
Canada, the UK and the USA.

Consultant to foreign RND ventures and to Governments
on macro-economic matters.

Freelance journalist in various media in the United States.
1990 to 1995
President of the Israel chapter of the Professors World
Peace Academy (PWPA) and (briefly) Israel
representative of the "Washington Times".
1993 to 1994
Co-owner and Director of many business enterprises:
- The Omega and Energy Air-Conditioning Concern
- AVP Financial Consultants
- Handiman Legal Services
  Total annual turnover of the group: 10 million USD.

Co-owner, Director and Finance Manager of COSTI Ltd.
- Israel's largest computerised information vendor and
developer. Raised funds through a series of private
placements locally in the USA, Canada and London.
1993 to 1996
Publisher and Editor of a Capital Markets Newsletter
distributed by subscription only to dozens of subscribers
countrywide.

In a legal precedent in 1995 - studied in business schools
and law faculties across Israel - was tried for his role in
an attempted takeover of Israel's Agriculture Bank.

Was interned in the State School of Prison Wardens.

Managed the Central School Library, wrote, published
and lectured on various occasions.

Managed the Internet and International News Department
of an Israeli mass media group, "Ha-Tikshoret and
Namer".

Assistant in the Law Faculty in Tel-Aviv University (to
Prof. S.G. Shoham).
1996 to 1999
Financial consultant to leading businesses in Macedonia,
Russia and the Czech Republic.

Economic commentator in "Nova Makedonija",
"Dnevnik", "Makedonija Denes", "Izvestia", "Argumenti i
Fakti", "The Middle East Times", "The New Presence",
"Central Europe Review", and other periodicals, and in
the economic programs on various channels of
Macedonian Television.

Chief Lecturer in courses in Macedonia organised by the
Agency of Privatization, by the Stock Exchange, and by
the Ministry of Trade.
1999 to 2002
Economic Advisor to the Government of the Republic of
Macedonia and to the Ministry of Finance.
2001 to 2003
Senior Business Correspondent for United Press
International (UPI).
2007
Associate Editor, Global Politician
Founding Analyst, The Analyst Network
Contributing Writer, The American Chronicle Media
Group
Web and Journalistic Activities
Author of extensive Web sites in:
- Psychology ("Malignant Self Love") - An Open
Directory Cool Site,
- Philosophy ("Philosophical Musings"),
- Economics and Geopolitics ("World in Conflict and
Transition").

Owner of the Narcissistic Abuse Study List and the
Abusive Relationships Newsletter (more than 6000
members).

Owner of the Economies in Conflict and Transition Study
List , the Toxic Relationships Study List, and the Link and
Factoid Study List.

Editor of mental health disorders and Central and Eastern
Europe categories in various Web directories (Open
Directory, Search Europe, Mentalhelp.net).

Editor of the Personality Disorders, Narcissistic
Personality Disorder, the Verbal and Emotional Abuse,
and the Spousal (Domestic) Abuse and Violence topics on
Suite 101 and Bellaonline.

Columnist and commentator in "The New Presence",
United Press International (UPI), InternetContent,
eBookWeb, PopMatters, Global Politician, eBookNet.org,
and "Central Europe Review".

Publications and Awards
"Managing Investment Portfolios in States of
Uncertainty", Limon Publishers, Tel-Aviv, 1988
"The Gambling Industry", Limon Publishers, Tel-Aviv,
1990
"Requesting My Loved One - Short Stories", Yedioth
Aharonot, Tel-Aviv, 1997
"The Suffering of Being Kafka" (electronic book of
Hebrew and English Short Fiction), Prague and Skopje,
1998-2004
"The Macedonian Economy at a Crossroads - On the Way
to a Healthier Economy" (dialogues with Nikola
Gruevski), Skopje, 1998
"The Exporters' Pocketbook", Ministry of Trade, Republic
of Macedonia, Skopje, 1999
"Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited", Narcissus
Publications, Prague and Skopje, 1999-2007  (Read
excerpts - click here)
The Narcissism Series (e-books regarding relationships
with abusive narcissists), Skopje, 1999-2007
"After the Rain - How the West Lost the East", Narcissus
Publications in association with Central Europe
Review/CEENMI, Prague and Skopje, 2000
Winner of numerous awards, among them Israel's Council
of Culture and Art Prize for Maiden Prose (1997), The
Rotary Club Award for Social Studies (1976), and the
Bilateral Relations Studies Award of the American
Embassy in Israel (1978).

Hundreds of professional articles in all fields of finances
and the economy, and numerous articles dealing with
geopolitical and political economic issues published in
both print and Web periodicals in many countries.

Many appearances in the electronic media on subjects in
philosophy and the sciences, and concerning economic
matters.

Contact Details:
palma@unet.com.mk
My Web Sites:
Economy / Politics:
http://ceeandbalkan.tripod.com/
Psychology:
http://samvak.tripod.com/index.html
Philosophy:
http://philosophos.tripod.com/
Poetry:
http://samvak.tripod.com/contents.html



After the Rain
How the West
Lost the East


The Book
This is a series of articles written and published in 1996-2000 in Macedonia, in Russia,
in Egypt and in the Czech Republic.

How the West lost the East. The economics, the politics, the geopolitics, the
conspiracies, the corruption, the old and the new, the plough and the internet - it is all
here, in colourful and provocative prose.

From "The Mind of Darkness":
"'The Balkans' - I say - 'is the unconscious of the world'. People stop to digest this
metaphor and then they nod enthusiastically. It is here that the repressed memories of
history, its traumas and fears and images reside. It is here that the psychodynamics of
humanity - the tectonic clash between Rome and Byzantium, West and East, Judeo-
Christianity and Islam - is still easily discernible. We are seated at a New Year's dining
table, loaded with a roasted pig and exotic salads. I, the Jew, only half foreign to this
cradle of Slavonics. Four Serbs, five Macedonians. It is in the Balkans that all ethnic
distinctions fail and it is here that they prevail anachronistically and atavistically.

Contradiction and change the only two fixtures of this tormented region. The women of
the Balkan - buried under provocative mask-like make up, retro hairstyles and too
narrow dresses. The men, clad in sepia colours, old fashioned suits and turn of the
century moustaches. In the background there is the crying game that is Balkanian
music: liturgy and folk and elegy combined. The smells are heavy with muskular
perfumes. It is like time travel. It is like revisiting one's childhood."



LV.  The Author


Sam Vaknin is the author of Malignant Self Love -
Narcissism Revisited and After the Rain - How the West
Lost the East. He is a columnist for Central Europe
Review, PopMatters, and eBookWeb , a United Press
International (UPI) Senior Business Correspondent, and
the editor of mental health and Central East Europe
categories in The Open Directory and Suite101 .

Until recently, he served as the Economic Advisor to the
Government of Macedonia.

Visit Sam's Web site at http://samvak.tripod.com





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